meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Commentary/Tosafot/Seder Nashim/Tosafot on Kiddushin/English/merged.txt"}
text: Tosafot on Kiddushin
  תוספות על קידושין
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  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -Sefaria Community Translation
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  Tosafot on Kiddushin
  
  
  
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  "The woman (האשה) is acquired": here [the Mishnah] teaches with a ה, and so too in many places regarding איש or אשה it teaches with ה, such as: "The woman that went", "The woman whose husband went", "The woman that was widowed", "The man betroths". Problem: we also teach regarding this "A virgin married"—why did [the Mishnah] not teach "The virgin married"? Solution: Here, it relies on Scripture, i.e. that it is "The woman" selected in the verse, for we find "A woman" selected in Scripture regarding marriage, as it is written, "When a man acquires a woman". But "A virgin" does not rely on Scripture, for we don't find any place where "A virgin" is specified in Scripture regarding marriage. However, problem: Later we teach [in the Mishnah] "A Hebrew slave", "A Canaanite slave", "A Hebrew slave girl"—why does it not teach them with ה, for they are selected by the verse! Perhaps with these, slave and slave girl, the use of ה is not suitable for them, for they are not so selected, since it is required to explain which of them one is, whether Hebrew man, Canaanite man, Hebrew woman, or Canaanite woman, as as opposed to regarding the Yevamah where it teaches "The Yevamah". But one shouldn't care too much, for in every place the Tanna teaches the language that flows from his mouth. For thus we find that, in some places it teaches the law before the list—like here [because it begins with "The woman is acquired in 3 ways..." and only then lists the 3 ways]. This is also the case for "A virgin is married on Wednesday", "An etrog is equal to a tree in 3 ways", "The Torah is acquired in 48 ways"—and in other places it teaches the list first—such as "With 10 statements", They check light for 14", "7 days before Yom Kippur", "In seven ways they check the zav", "In 3 ways are women's gittin equal to slaves' emancipation agreements".
  "Beit Shammai say: With a dinar". In Eduyot 4:7, it teaches this [debate] among the [Mishnah's list of the] leniencies of Beit Shammai [that they aren't married if he gave her less than a Dinar] and the stringencies of Beit Hillel [that if he gave her a Pruta they'd be married and he'd have to divorce her]. Problem: If she received kiddushin [money] from another man, then Beit Shammai would be stringent [since, if it were less than a dinar, she would still be betrothed to the first man]! Solution: It was not brought up for this case [but for the more general case when Beit Shammai is lenient], just like we say in Yoma, "When it was brought up was for the subject of Og King of Bashan".
  "With a perutah or worth a perutah". Problem: [The Mishnah] only needed to teach "worth a perutah", as we teach in Ha-Zahav "There are 5 perutot: loans with something worth a perutah, and the woman is betrothed with something worth a perutah"! Solution: Because it teaches here "with money", it explains with which kind of money—dinar for Beit Shammai and perutah for Beit Hillel, and in order that we shouldn't err to say [it requires] specifically money (i.e. coins) and not something worth money, as we derive "Acquire" "Acquire" from the field of Efron, where it is written money, it explains: "worth money" [and not specifically coins]. [Problem:] But if you say: How do we know that something "worth money" can be equivalent to "money"? since later, [the Talmud] needs a verse regarding the Hebrew slave: "'He will return'—to include something worth money as money"! [Solution:] Well, it says later that "Rav Kahana took a turban for redeeming a firstborn son"—how do we know that something worth money can be equivalent to money [for redemption, since there is no proof offered, it is just assumed by Rav Kahana]?! Problem: In the first chapter of Shevuot, [the Talmud] derives this with כלל ופרט וכלל! Solution: Regarding arakhin it is written "money", and for hekdesh also, as we teach regarding one who makes a field hekdesh that "the hekdesh can be redeemed with money or something worth money"—how do we know that that something worth money can be equivalent to money [since there is no derivation here, for arakhin and hekdesh, either]?! Problem: For hedkesh, it is also possible that we explain through כלל ופרט וכלל, for hekdesh can't be redeemed with land, as we say in Ha-Zahav: "For they say hekdesh cannot be made unsanctified through land, for God says 'He will give the money and it will stand for him'", and later we also say that hekdesh and second tithe can't be redeemed with contracts (the only way you would come to these conclusions was if you were following כלל ופרט וכלל)! Problem: So how do we know that something worth money can be equivalent for kiddushin and arakhin [since all other categories here have specific ways in which this is derived]?! Solution: We derive it from the Hebrew slave. Problem: If you say: But regarding damages Scripture also wrote "He will return money to its master", and we explain this in the first chapter of Bava Kama, "'He will return'—to include something worth money as equivalent to money", and then, if so, Hebrew slave and damages would be 2 verses that teach the same thing and we do not learn from this [since the assumption is that the Torah would not repeat itself, so if it looks like 2 verses are teaching exactly the same thing, you must be wrong]! Solution: They are both needed. For, if it wrote [the verse about the Hebrew] slave only, I would not have been able to derive [that שווה כסף = כסף regarding] damages from it, for we find that the Torah cares about this topic [damages] more, and I might have thought that [it requires] specifically money and not something worth that much—thus, "He will return money" is needed for damages; and regarding the Hebrew slave the verse is also needed, for I would not have been able to derive it from damages, for I would have thought that a slave is similar to damages and if he could be purchased with land, so much the better [which we know he can't]—thus both are needed. Alternative solution: If it wrote about the slave. I would have thought it the law would be lenient on him such that he would be able to redeem himself even with something worth money, in order that he should not be mixed up among the Gentiles [since he is or could be sold to them], but regarding damages, for which it is not possible to say this, I would not have said this [and required literal coins]; and if it wrote about damages alone, I would not have been able to derive the slave from it, and I would have thought that something worth money is not equivalent to money for a slave, for he also in some way caused himself to be sold, because of his conducting business with Shemittah produce [which is forbidden to do] and according to R. Yose bR. Hanina later, and so I would have thought that we are stringent upon him to say: specifically money, and not something worth that much. Solution [going back to redeeming firstborns and hekdesh]: A verse is needed for redeeming firstborns and hekdesh that something worth money can be equivalent to money, and we can't derive it from the Hebrew slave, because [the midrash and the כלל ופרט וכלל] comes to exclude land and contracts, for one can't redeem sons or hekdesh with those [but you can use those to buy out your slavery, thus if we had learnt directly from Eved Ivri we would have come to an incorrect conclusion about hekdesh and pidyon ha-ben].
  "How much is a perutah?" The reason that [the Mishnah] doesn't explain how much a dinar is is because the dinar was known how much it was, for it was 1/24th of a golden dinar, as we say in the beginning of Ha-Zahav. But for a perutah, there is a disagreement later—sometimes it is worth less, sometimes more. Additionally: Since our halakhah is established according to Beit Hillel, it wanted to explain [their position] more.
  "1/8th of an issar". This is when the issars are normal, but when the issars are worth less, it is 1/6th, as we say in the Gemara (later).
  "Italian (איטלקי)". Rabbenu Tam explained: This is the name Italy (of Greece), and one shouldn't be surprised about the ק just as we find "Shushan" spelled as שושנכיא (in Ezra 4:9).
  
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  "The Yevamah is acquired..." Problem: [The Mishnah] did not teach this in the same form as the list above—let it teach "She is acquired in 1 way and acquires herself in 2 ways"! And let it be like the earlier list [which comes] to exclude as we say in the Gemara: let this list also come to exclude; the beginning is to exclude money and contract, as [the Talmud] explains later, "Sex completes [the acquisition], but money and contract do not complete", and the list at the end to exclude also that we can't derive through ק״ו from the woman, as we say in the Gemara that we explain: "His shoe—yes; anything else—no"! Solution: For one item, one does not repeat the list form. [Problem:] But even though regarding etrog we teach "It is equal to a tree in 3 ways and to a vegetable in 1 way", [solution:] there it comes to explain the things in which it differs [as opposed to here, which are just independent lists]. [Solution on a new topic:] Since [the Mishnah] did not teach the list form for the yevamah, it was not worried to repeat the list form for Hebrew or Canaanite slave. Alternatively: because it is not needed to teach about them in list form to exclude anything [since there is nothing to exclude].
  
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  "What's different here that we teach 'The woman is acquired'". [Problem:] [The Talmud] should have answered this [objection about why the Mishnah is in passive and not active form] because [the Mishnah] needed to teach at the end "And she acquires herself" [in the active voice], for there it is not fitting for the language of kiddushin but in a case like this it is taught nearby! [In other words, the Mishnah might have used "is acquired" above because it needed to say "acquires" later]. Solution: Rabbenu Manoah says that it could have taught "And she is released in 2 ways", for regarding kiddushin, the language of "release" is fitting. [This is why the Gemara did not use this as an answer to this objection].
  "Because it needed to teach 'money'". And here it is not fitting to object "But he taught two as one!" as [the Talmud] objects later [regarding sex], for the terminology of "acquisition" is fitting also for contract and sex. And one should not be surprised about the terminology of "acquisition", rather because later it taught with the terminology of kiddushin and here it taught with the terminology of acquisition. Alternatively: With a contract we also find the terminology of acquisition, as it is written, "I took the book of acquisition" (Jeremiah 32:11).
  
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  "And where does [the use of] money [in betrothal] come from? We learn 'take' 'take' (קיחה) from the field of Efron." [Problem:] But if you say: What do I need all this for!? [the Talmud] only needed to say "Money is called acquisition (קניין), as it is written, 'I gave money of the field, take from me' and it is written 'The field that Avraham acquired'; or: 'Fields are acquired with money'"! Solution: It is because this wouldn't have been enough for, even granted that money for a field is called acquisition, money of a wife is not called acquisition. Therefore it needed to bring evidence of that money, for we learn from it that [money for] a wife is called acquisition.
  "It's written there 'I gave money of the field, take from me'". [The Talmud] is only concerned about finding the terminology of "take" (קיחה), since it is not similar because the "take" here is about the money of a field, while "take" for a wife is not about money but rather about the wife herself. [Problem:] But if you say: Let it teach "The wife is purchased (נקחת)", for this is more the terminology of Scripture as it is written "When he purchases", and we teach also in Eruvin "Anything can be purchased with tithe money", and it is also fitting to use the terminology of קיחה for sex, as it is written "A man that purchases his sister" (Vayikra 20:17)!? Solution: It would not have been fitting to teach at the end "and she purchases/takes herself in 2 ways".
  
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  "Alternatively: 'Fields with money are acquired'". And the reason that [the Talmud] did not bring "acquisition" that is written in the Torah from "from money of his acquisition" (Leviticus 25:51) is because it needed to bring acquisition of a field. Problem: If so, it should have brought "The field that Avraham acquired"! Solution: From that [second text] it would not be possible to be precise, for it would be possible to say "The field that Avraham purchased" by presumption or contract, for it didn't write "The field that Avraham acquired with money".
  
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  "The it forbids her to everyone like hekdesh". And [the pronouncement] "Behold you are betrothed (מקודשת) to me means "That you should be to me sanctified forever for me", like (Nedarim 48a) "Behold these are sanctified for heaven", that they should be heaven's. And the literal meaning of the word is "You are sanctified to me" = "Special to me", "Designated for me." But if he said "This cloak is sanctified to me" it doesn't appear that this is effective, since regarding a wife that is special to be his she is forbidden to everyone else, but with a loaf of bread or a cloak it is not fitting to say this.
  
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  "If [the Mishnah] taught 'he acquires' I would have thought it meant against her will". And even though it teaches "The man betroths", which implies against her will, this is because we already learnt here that it can't be against her will. Problem: it teaches "The yevamah is acquired" and it doesn't teach "the yevamah acquires" which would imply against her will! [Solution:] Since it needed to teach "The wife is acquired" it taught also at the end "The yevamah is acquired", since "is acquired" could imply either with her consent or against her will.
  
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  "It should teach 'three' (masc.)". Explanation: Because the whole Torah uses masculine numbers.
  
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  "Verses would contradict each other!" [Problem:] Even though we find many items that are in grammatical male and female, as it is written "Hand sent (fem.) to me and there was in it (masc.) a scroll" (Ezekiel 2:9), "The sun sets (fem.)" (Genesis 15:17) "The sun rises (masc.)" (Genesis 19:23), "The one (fem.) camp and he struck it (masc.) (Genesis 32:8); and so too in the language of Hazal we find, "A lamp that goes out (fem.) is not required for it" (Shabbat 21a) "Lamp that goes out (masc.)" (Shabbat 44a), "Your donkey left (fem.) Tarfon" (Sanhedrin 33a) "One who rents a donkey and she breaks off and goes to the mountain" (Baba Metzia 78a) "but before the owner of the cow could pull the donkey, the donkey died (masc.)", and so in many places. Solution: Whenever it is possible to teach [something interesting from the use of grammatical gender], we teach, and also with verses if there is a derashah. Alternatively: Because the mishnayot that teach their terminology after the biblical period, [Hazal] wanted to give them reason and specificity [to the biblical use of grammatical gender].
  
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  "Here it is about the Torah and the Torah is grammatically female". [Problem:] But if you say: "War" is also grammatically female, as it is written "The war was heavy (fem.) for Shaul" (1 Shmuel 1:33), "And the way continued (fem.)" (1 Shmuel 19:8). Additional problem: When it said that it is the way of a man to make war, and not of a woman, it is also the way of a man to learn Torah and not of a woman! Solution: These are not similar, because here it is about the Torah itself since Scripture is called "way", and not about those who learn it, while "They went out to you" (Devarim 28:7) is about the warriors, and they are men whose way is to make war.
  
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  ["Why does the Torah say 'When he purchases'..."? Explanation: This implies against her will since it didn't write "When she is purchased" which would imply with her consent. (Tosafot Yeshanim)]
  
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  "An etrog is equal to a tree in 3 ways". Rashi's explanation: For orlah, 4th year and 7th year; for regarding 7th year, their fruit are considered to be complete from their fruiting like a tree, and not from their gathering like a vegetable. [Problem:] But if you say: But this implies that 4th year is practised etrog—if so this here is difficult for the one who says that [the Mishnah] teaches "4th year vineyard" at the beginning of Ketzad Mevarkhin (Berakhot 35a) "that this implies 4th year is not practised with other trees"! Solution: This is what he meant to say: [the Mishnah says] "4th year vineyard" anywhere where it is possible to teach this, but if it is not possible to teach this they don't disagree about it. For they do not disagree there to say that there isn't any Tanna that thinks "4th year planting" except for perhaps this, for regarding etrog there is an explicit Tannaitic disagreement, they do not disagree except to contradict the mishnayot at the end of Maaser Sheni. But in all other places it doesn't matter if it is according to the one who thinks "4th year vineyard" or "4th year planting" except to know whom the halakhah follows. Solution: Even according to the one who teaches "4th year vineyard" would agree with regard to other trees that [one has to] practise [4th year produce laws] rabbinically, and here the Talmud meant it rabbinically. [New topic:] And there is a practical halakhic difference for us in this matter, for if they disagree [about the status of 4th year non-vine trees], the one who says "4th year vineyard" specifically but for planting there is no 4th year at all even rabbinically, and they say (Shabbat 139a): Anything that is lenient in the Land [of Israel], the halakhah is like it outside the Land—if so, today, outside the Land, there is no law of 4th year practised with trees! But if, rabbinically everyone agrees that it is practised with other trees, this would also be true outside the Land that 4th year is practised outside the Land. [New topic:] As for what Rashi explained "We go after the fruiting like a tree and not the collecting like vegetables"—this implies that, embedded in his commentary is that vegetables go after the collection regarding 7th year, but this is not precise for in Shevi'it we teach "All aftergrowths are permitted except for cabbage aftergrowths". Rabbenu Nissim raised a problem: In the chapter Makom She-Nehegu (Pesahim 51b) it teaches the opposite! [R"N's solution:] This in Shevi'it that teaches "All aftergrowths are permitted except for cabbage aftergrowths" is dealing with aftergrowths of the 6th year that entered the 7th, for, since most of them grew in the 6th year, they are as if they are of the 6th year [i.e. as if they grew totally in the 6th year] and are permitted even for business, except for cabbage aftergrowths which are forbidden for business like the law for 7th year [produce]. Or: After the end time of eating [produce in the 7th year], as we explain in the Yerushalmi, that "every vegetable you are able to rely on its leaves whether new or old, but for cabbage aftergrowths whose way it is to grow in layers, and some of the leaves grew in the 7th year and perhaps he buys one of the leaves that are forbidden and he will say, 'From the inner layers I bought it'". And that in Makom She-Nehegu that teaches "All aftergrowths are forbidden" is dealing with aftergrowths that grew in the 7th year and it is according to Rabbi Akiva's opinion who explains: "Since they were not planted, from where did they gather!? Rather to teach about aftergrowths that are forbidden even for eating", all the more so for business, and he thinks that aftergrowths are forbidden from the Torah, even before the end time of eating, and when they go into the 8th year they are forbidden rabbinically since what they make is like them. And he thinks that all other aftergrowths are forbidden in the 8th year, but cabbage aftergrowths that are not like field vegetables, we do not decree about them because [we're worried about people confusing this permission with the prohibition on] other aftergrowths, for they [cabbages] are recognisable: anything that grew in the inner layers will be of the 7th year and be forbidden, but anything that hasn't arrived yet will be of the 8th and be permitted, and one that saw a person eating cabbage aftergrowths in the 8th year will not come to eat other aftergrowths since they are different from the other aftergrowths, and we do not decree on a permission because of a prohibition. [Problem:] Nevertheless, learn from the fact that 6th year aftergrowths that enter the 7th year are permitted. that we do not go at all regarding vegetables after their collection but rather after [in which year] most of their growth [took place]! Solution: Granted that we do not go after collection, but regardless we also do not go after fruiting, but rather if it grew in a forbidden time it is forbidden; in a permitted time, it is permitted—which is not true regarding etrog and other trees where we go completely after fruiting, that if it fruited in a forbidden time, even that which grew in a permitted time after that is forbidden, and thus with regard to Shevi'it [the etrog] is equal to the tree, for if it were equal to a vegetable we would go after most of its growth.
  
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  "Just as a vegetable, its way is to grow on all water". The reason of the vegetable is explained in the first chapter of Rosh Hashanah (Rosh Hashanah 14a), that it is written "granary and winepress" about tithes: "'Like grain from the granary...' The granary and the winepress are unique because they grow on most water and are tithed according to the previous year, this excludes vegetables which grow on all water [and therefore are not tithed according to the previous year]". Even though tithing vegetables is rabbinic, and how can one make a midrashic category based on a thing that is rabbinic [and not directly from the Torah], the rabbis hooked it on verses, as Rashi explained. But Rabbenu Yitzhak explained: If is not taught about tithe, it is taught about 7th year that is practised for vegetables from the Torah, for the core of the derashah is derived for 7th year for vegetables, that [7th year] is from the Torah whether vegetable or tree, as we say in Rosh Hashanah (Rosh Hashanah 15b): "I say to you tithe of carobs is rabbinic and you say to me 7th year?!", for bushes are from the Torah, and this is true for vegetables also for everything that is unspecified and falls into the category of "He eats and guards" is from the Torah, as we teach in Shevi'it (Mishnah Shevi'it 7:1): "They said a general rule regarding 7th year...". And this is what it [the principle about the difference between vegetables and trees] means [according to R"I]: Just as granary and winepress grow on most water and we go after the previous year with regard to 7th year, so too... Problem [on R"I]: For behold etrog grows on all water as is true in our sugya, and even so we say that it is equal to a tree regarding 7th year that it goes after fruiting! Tentative solution: [What it means] that we go with it after fruiting for 7th year is specifically to make it more stringent, just as if it fruits in the 7th year but was collected in the 8th [but we would never permit the produce based on this]. Alternative solution: Even though etrog grows on all water, we do not separate it from the law of other trees regarding 7th year, for in the cases of orlah and 4th year the Torah does not separate it from other trees. And the derashah of granary and winepress comes for vegetables, not etrog. But regardless, for tithe which is rabbinic, the sages decreed "After its gathering is its tithing" since it grows on all water like a vegetable. [New problem:] But if you say: Why is the etrog not considered to be  equal to a tree for kilayim for there is no kilayim in a vineyard, so let [the Mishnah] consider that the etrog is like a tree in 4 ways!? Solution: It only taught that it was equal to a tree with respect to going after fruiting and to a vegetable with respect to going after collecting. [New problem:] If you say: Why did the Mishnah not consider that it is similar to a vegetable in 2 ways, such as with regard to peah, for etrog is not obligated in peah since it is not all gathered at once, and with regard to peah we need all the gathering at once and it is for this reason that we exclude date palms in the chapter Klal Gadol (Shabbat 68a) and in chapter Makom She-Nehegu (Pesahim 56b), and with vegetables also peah is not practised since it is not in the category of "continuing" that is required [for peah] there. Solution: Because there are many trees that are not obligated in peah, such as carobs, taught in Peah (Mishnah Peah 1:5), it was not fitting to teach that it was equal to vegetables [in this, since it is also the same as many trees]. And also for this reason it did not say that it is equal to a vegetable regarding first fruits, since first fruits is only for the 7 species as it says in the Sifrei, and if so [the etrog] would also be similar to other trees.
  
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  "[The koy is] neither [similar] to a wild animal nor to a domesticated animal". Explanation: Regarding interbreeding because it is doubtful to us if it is a type of wild or domesticated animal. Rabbenu Eliezer raised a problem: According to the one who says the koy is its own type of animal, what could "It is doubtful to us..." be talking about? Even if we knew that it was a wild animal, we would not interbreed with it because we don't interbreed a ram with a deer! Solution: This could be according to the one who thinks this koy had sex with a sheep or a doe and it is doubtful for us whether we are concerned about the seed of the father or not, for if we say we are not concerned, then we could interbreed it with a deer.
  
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  "And a wife with less than something worth a perutah would not let herself be acquired". Rashi's explanation: Because it would be shameful to her, therefore the laws of exchange is not applicable to her in kiddushin, even with an item that is worth a perutah if he gave it to her under the laws of exchange. This was a problem for Rabbenu Tam: For if so, should she spread out her hand and receive it, let her be betrothed with something worth less than a perutah! Another problem: Since the reason depends on "Because it would be shameful to her", if so why doesn't it object in the Gemara regarding "the daughters of Rabbi Yannai that were particular about themselves and would not be betrothed for less than 3 kavs of golden dinars", just as they object later (Kiddushin 11a) on the words of Beit Shammai! Another problem: Since you might think now to learn acquisition of a wife from acquisition of a field, if so a wife could also be acquired through presumption like a field! Another problem: Later (Kiddushin 5a) it asks in the Gemara "How do we know [a wife can be acquired] with a contract?", and what did it ask—it should learn it from the field!? Rabbenu Tam's solution: Our text should read "With something worth less than a perutah she is not acquired", and should not read "let herself (נפשה)", for the matter does not depend on how particular she is, rather this is the reason: Because of the גזירה שוה of "purchase" "purchase" from the field of Efron, for it is written "money", and something worse less than perutah isn't called "money". And that problem which you raised earlier [in the sugya]: "I could say: this too!" it couldn't raise the issue regarding contract or presumption, for it is obvious that we can't learn from [the] "purchase" [ג״ש] to make a wife['s law the same] as all the topics of [purchasing] a field, and this is why later we ask "How do we know with a contract?", for we can only learn from the field for money specifically it is written "purchase". And it only objects from [the laws of] exchange because exchange is similar to biblical "money" when [the item of exchange] is worth a perutah. And this is his explanation [of the flow of the Gemara]: "I could say: this too!" that a wife can be acquired with exchange when the exchange is worth at least a perutah, for this is more similar to biblical "money" than a contract that is worth a perutah, for one does not need to make the contract [i.e. the paper] worth a perutah as we say in Gittin (Gittin 20a) "If he wrote it on something which is forbidden to derive benefit from—[the get is] kosher", but exchange that is worth a perutah is similar to money. And [the Gemara] responds: Exchange can be worth less than a perutah, and if so it would not be really money but rather some other acquisition. [A new problem:] And if you say: How would I think that a woman can be acquired through exchange from the field of Efron, for the field itself was not purchased with exchange since we do not find [that] exchange [is effective] for Gentiles, as we say in Bekhorot (Bekhorot 13a): "Since a Jew has one way of purchasing it [in this case: drawing (משיכה)], so too does a Gentile have one way [money]"! Solution: This [in Bekhorot] wasn't discussing exchange when it said the Gentile has 1 way, and this is what it meant: A Jew has one way of acquiring, except for exchange which is the same for both of them [the Jew and Gentile]. And this is also implied later (Kiddushin 8a) regarding being sold to a Gentile from "'The money of his acquisition (כסף מקנתו)'—with money he can be acquired, but cannot be acquired under the law of grain or items, and what are these? exchange"—we learn from this that other things [i.e. non-slaves] can be acquired through exchange by Gentiles. And so too was Rabbenu Tam accustomed to sending power of attorney documents through Gentiles and they would acquire it through exchange. But regarding this [practice] one needs to be careful that one shouldn't write "And I acquired from him", for there is no power of emissary (שליחות) or ability to benefit (זכיה) for Gentiles, as we say in the [5th] chapter of Bava Metzia (Bava Metzia 71b), but we write "And the Gentile acquired". [New problem:] And if you say: If so, since it is obvious to us that a wife can't be purchased with exchange, why do we need a verse!? (Kiddushin 8a) Say it from "Money of his acquisition", that he can't be acquired under the law of grain or items, which is excluding exchange, for we make a הקיש between Hebrew slave and Hebrew slave girl, for from her we learn later (Kiddushin 14b) that the Hebrew slave can be acquired with money, and the Hebrew slave girl is in a הקיש with the wife, as it is written, "'If he takes another'—Scripture makes a הקיש between her [a slave girl] and another [a wife]" when we derive that both can use a contract to be acquired!? Solution: Inclusions for acquisitions carry through a הקיש [we can learn an inclusion from one category to another, e.g. that the wife can be acquired with a contract], but not exclusions for acquisitions [e.g. that the wife can't be acquired through exchange], for in a similar manner we say in the chapter Kol Ha-Basar (Hullin 117b) "Three verses are written about blood—one to exclude it from notar (leftovers of sacrifices), one to exclude it from me'ilah (misuse of Temple property), one to exclude it from impurity", and in the chapter Beit Shammai (Zevahim 45a) it derives notar [using a הקיש of] "profanation" "profanation" from impurity, and if so why does it need 2 verses, one for notar and one for impurity!? Rather no, it is because the ג״ש of "profanation" is not to be lenient but to be stringent [just like how we can learn that contract is included for a wife but not that exchange is excluded].
  
  Daf 3b
  
  
  
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  "But nothing else divorces her". [Problem:] If you say: Let the Hebrew slave girl leave [her master] with halitzah from the ק״ו of yevamah, from this exact ק״ו; and don't say that a wife breaks the ק״ו for she cannot leave [her husband] with money, which you can say for the אמה. Solution: I would have thought that a Canaanite slave girl would break the ק״ו since she can leave with money and can't leave with halitzah. [Problem:] But if you say: This is exactly what is brought in this ק״ו that excludes halitzah! Solution: It would be possibly to object: The yevamah that leaves [her levirate bond] with the death of the levir, and thus can leave with halitah, you would say that for Canaanite slave girl, who can't leave with the death of [her] master, would leave with halitzah!? [Problem:] But if you say: If so, let us also say a Canaanite slave girl breaks the ק״ו—it would be possible to object: The Canaanite slave girl that can't leave with the death of [her] master, could you then [make a connection to] the Hebrew slave girl [who does leave with the death of her master]? Solution: We could make the break of the ק״ו from [the combination of both] the wife and the Canaanite slave girl, for if you objected: The Canaanite slave girl who doesn't leave with the death of her master, a wife would break the ק״ו since she leaves with the death of her husband but doesn't leave with halitzah; the wife who can't leave [her husband] with money, the Canaanite slave girl would break the ק״ו.
  
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  "The father profits from his daughter..." It is explained in the Yerushalmi: He has the profit of sex because they give him money to betroth her with sex.
  
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  "Or I could say: it should be hers!" [Problem:] But if you say: Didn't we until now need a verse only in order to say that [the kiddushin money] is the father's, since the fact that he can betroth her with money is learnt from קיחה קיחה (the ג״ש connecting the two instances of "take/purchase") in the field of Efron! [And note we already have the verse that proves this: "'There is no money' for this master, but there is money for another master"]. Solution: Nevertheless, it can't be said that [the kiddushin money] belongs to the father based [only] on an extraneous word (in this case: אין כסף) if that is not the meaning of the verse [so we also need the other verse, "My daughter I gave to this man"], just like we say later in the conclusion that both of these verses are required [to teach that the kiddushin money belongs to the father].
  
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  "Or I could say: These words [apply] to a minor (קטנה)". [Problem:] Even though the verse is dealing with a na'arah! Another problem: It is written, "And they will stone her" (Devarim 22:16), but one who spreads evil rumours about a minor is exempt! [Therefore it can't be that these verses are about a minor]. Solution: Nevertheless, this is what it meant: "My daughter I gave to this man" when she was a minor, and now she is an adult [i.e. the case is when she was a na'arah, even though the father is talking about when his daughter was a minor]. [New problem:] But if you say: For a minor I didn't need a verse, for "now he can sell her, it is necessary [to find a verse for] kiddushin money!?" (Ketubot 47a) in a case just like this that we say regarding her handiwork in the chapter Na'arah She-Nitpat'tah (Ketubot 47a)! Solution: [These situations] are not similar, for regarding her handiwork it makes sense—when he sold her, he sold her handiwork, since behold she was sold for her work—but kiddushin is not connected to sale (even though he can designate her [and sell her as the wife of a freeman], this is with the money with which she is sold, but the kiddushin itself we find no [automatic] right for the father). [New problem:] But don't we say in the chapter Na'arah that "the daughter's handiwork belongs to the father *because* God gives him the right to hand her over in marriage even if it [results in] ceasing her work!? And Rashi explains there: "God gives him the right because of what is written 'My daughter I gave to [this] man'—this means all 'givings', including handing her over to marriage. But what evidence is that [i.e. how can Rashi use the verse in that way]!? I could say: These words [apply to] a minor but not a na'arah, just as we say here! [Rashi interprets the verse differently in Ketubot than here—there he assumes it applies to a na'arah, here the sugya claims that maybe it does not]. Solution: This verse "My daughter I gave" must be dealing with a na'arah as I explained. And, though for the matter of kiddushin we are able to explain [it as] "My daughter I gave" when she was a minor, for the matter of marriage it is impossible to explain it except about a na'arah. For if [she were married] while she was a minor, then she would have been married when she whorred and her punishment would be strangling rather than stoning, for she is not held responsible for the whorring while she was a minor [so she would be punished for adultery instead].
  
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  "But if you say: Let us derive it from shame and injury/blemish (פגם)". It is surprising: How could [the Talmud] want to say "Let us derive [that] kiddushin [money belongs to the father] from shame and injury", for we only know that shame and injury themselves belong to the father from kiddushin, as [the Talmud] says at the end of Elu Na'arot (Ketubot 40b): "For if he wants, he can hand her over [by betrothing her] to an ugly man or one afflicted with boils" [and this would cause her shame and injury]!? [Additional problem:] And this might lead you to say that there is a practical legal outcome from this [derivation of kiddushin from shame and injury], for if he wanted he could have handed her over when she was a minor and this shame would last even until she was a na'arah, and if so, even when she is a bogeret her shame and injury would belong to the father from this reasoning [which we know not to be the case, it belongs to her from when she is a bogeret]! Possible solution: Being a bogeret is not similar to being a na'arah because, granted that we don't derive everything [regarding the father's rights] from [the father's right to] the release of [her daughter's] vows, this we do in fact derive: that the power of the father only lasts into her being a na'arah, just as later: "Signs of puberty that don't take her out of the authority of her father but do take her out of the authority of her master, being a bogeret [does take her out of the authority of her father]"—and how would we know that being a bogeret takes her out of the authority of her father regarding kiddushin and everything else if not for [the law regarding] release of vows? [Tentative rejection:] But it is not clear because, since it depends on this reasoning that "If he wants he can hand her over" while she is a minor, this matter [the continuing shame] would be relevant while she is a bogeret just as while she is a na'arah [so it is not obvious there is any distinction as argued previously based on release of vows]. Therefore it seems to me [that we should explain the sugya] above [as so]: "I could say: These words [apply to a] minor", i.e. a minor is relevant for the ק״ו; "for now her father receives her kiddushin, she could take the money!?"—since she has no ability [as a minor] to betroth herself; "But a na'arah, who has the ability, let her betroth herself and take the money!"—since she has the ability to betroth herself, let the kiddushin be hers. But the truth is that also when she is a na'arah her father is able to betroth her, and when her father betroths her, then her kiddushin belongs to him. And now the problem above is resolved since the verse ("My daughter I gave") is dealing with when her father betrothed her, and there [in Ketubot] we derive shame and injury from kiddushin done by her father that these belong to the father; and here, this is what it meant: "But if you say: Let us derive it from shame and injury"—kiddushin done by her should [still] belong to the father because of shame and injury [which would belong to him (when she is not an adult)]. For it is certain that for her father's betrothal it would not be possible to object from a case where she did it herself totally. So initially [the Talmud] had to derive shame and injury that she did not cause from her father's betrothal, and after that it was possible to derive what she did herself from what was not caused by what her father did.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  
  
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  "A similar going out it comes to exclude". Rabbenu Hananel explained: "The going out of a Hebrew slave girl from her master that is at the time of being a na'arah, so too here [she is] a na'arah." [In other words: the similarity is the timing.] Problem: The sugya does not mean at all that it needs to learn that it is dealing with the day she is a na'arah but rather about the question "From where do we know that the money belongs to the father?"! Solution: "A similar going out"—i.e. under the authority of her master, if there was money there, then he could have given it to the master in order that she go out from him; so too here where there is money in her going out of the authority of the father, since it is her father, and this is also the meaning of the question. [In other words: the similarity is the existence of money.]
  
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  "From where do we know [that the verse includes] an unfit seed (i.e. child)?" Rabbenu Yitzhak said: [The midrash] was talking about an unfit grandchild (lit. seed of a seed), for since she had sex to make her unfit, she was made unfit [to marry a man] from the priesthood and she can no longer eat terumah. Therefore it is not possible to explain literally "an unfit child" but "an unfit grandchild".
  
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  "'She goes out free'—these are the days of being a bogeret; 'There is no money'—these are the days of being a na'arah". [Problem:] But if you say: If should have mentioned "these are the days of being a na'arah" first and afterwards "days of being a bogeret", solution: it is because "There is no money" is required to be assigned to the days of being a na'arah as we say earlier, "But there is money for a different master", this applies while she is a na'arah since the father has no rights to her bogeret daughter's kiddushin.
  
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  "This comes and teaches about that". Explanation: If only one of them were written, they would have assigned it to whatever seemed better, which would have been bogrut. [Problem:] But if you say: Why would I need "She goes out free" to teach on "There is no money"—I would have been forced not to assign "There is no money" to be about bogrut but rather na'arut, for it is from this that we explain above "But there is money for another master, and who is it? the father"; if so, this verse must be about na'arut, for if it were about bogrut, the father has no rights to her kiddushin, since when she is a bogeret her father has no authority over her!? [Solution:] Says Rabbenu Moshe: If there was no verse "She will go out free", we would have assigned [the 2 extraneous features of the verse] (i) "There is no money" and (ii) the extra י that Ravina talked about, one of them to na'arut, the other to bogrut, but the derashah of "There is no money for this master" we never would have come up with—this is why "She will go out free" is necessary.
  
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  "Being a bogeret that takes her out of the authority of the father..." [Problem:] But if you say: The death of the father breaks the ק״ו since it takes her out of the authority of her father but does not take her out of the authority of her master, solution: It would be possible to object: The death of the father that has involves no bodily change, you would say the same about bogrut that involves bodily change!?
  
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  "If the signs of na'arut have not arrived, then the sale would be invalid". [Problem:] But if you say: While she is a minor, how would we know that she would not produce the signs of na'arut since the signs of being an aylonit are if she is 20 years old and hasn't produced 2 hairs, as is in chapter Ha-Arel (Yevamot 80b)!? [Additional layer to the problem:] And even though there are signs of being an aylonit that are possible to recognise while she is a minor, such as a thick voice and her lower abdomen is not like those of women, we say regarding a eunuch: "Until he should have all of [the signs he is not considered a eunuch", and we would assume that this is the case also for an aylonit! Solution: This is what it meant to say: "The sale is invalid" and the master needs to return her handiwork and the father should return the money [so you can wait until all the signs of an aylonit are there and then retroactively undo the sale]. This all would be the case also if she were designated [and sold as a wife to a freeman, and not just sold for her handiwork, the sale would be disqualified].
  
  Daf 4b
  
  
  
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  "There is an objection from the same area of law, that she can go out with money". This is also the case if it wanted to mention "That she can go out after 6 years or in the Jubilee or with signs of puberty" but it was better for it to object with an objection that was also relevant for a Canaanite slavegirl, since he would have been able to make a ק״ו from a Canaanite slavegirl for whom signs of puberty, six years, and the jubilee are not relevant. But Rabbenu Ya'akov from Orleans raised a problem: Still, why do I need "When he purchases"? Granted that it was not able to derive it from a ק״ו, nevertheless let us derive it from the הקיש that it makes to the Hebrew slavegirl from "'And if he purchases another'—Scripture makes a הקיש to another", as is seen later (Kiddushin 16a), and the Hebrew slavegirl is derived for us later (Kiddushin 14b) that she is acquired with money from "'And redeem'—just as a slavegirl is acquired with money, so too a wife is acquired with money", and it is not possible to respond to a הקיש [so it would have saved us the challenges on the ק״ו]! Solution: If it were all learnt just from the הקיש, I would have thought that 1 perutah wouldn't have been enough until there were 2 perutot, just like we require for a Hebrew slavegirl which is proved later. [Alternative solution:] Rabbenu Netanel resolved: Since we do not know that a Hebrew slavegirl can be acquired with money except from "And redeem" and since she who goes out with money can be acquired with money, we would not have derived from it acquisition of a wife because she can't go out with money like a Hebrew slavegirl.
  
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  "Just as the Hebrew slave girl who leaves with money..." [Problem:] But if you say: Let us derive money from sex: just as sex doesn't acquire a Hebrew slave girl but does acquire a wife, money which can acquire a Hebrew slave, isn't it logical that it should be able to acquire a wife!? Solution: All the more so it would be possible to object: The yevamah breaks the ק״ו for she is acquired with sex but not acquired with money.
  
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  "A case where she gave to him and betrothed him". Rashi's explanation is that she says "Behold you are betrothed (מקודש) to me". Problem: The terminology of betrothal doesn't apply to a man since he is not made forbidden through this to other women. Solution: She says "Behold I am betrothed (מקודשת) to you". And one needs to say about [the line] "She gives to him" that this is not specifically [in a case where] the father receives the kiddushin [money], but only if she wants to say it and she says it [i.e. there would be no monetary transfer in this hypothetical situation when a woman can betroth herself to a man].
  "God wrote 'When he purchases', and not 'When a woman purchases a man'". Problem: Since the essence of the verse "When he purchases" comes to say that she can't betroth him, why do we need the גזירה שוה "purchase" "purchase" from the field of Efron!? Without this [ג״ש], we would have learnt from what is written "When he purchases", and not "When a woman purchases a man" [in other words: we would know that the man purchases her with money]! Solution: If it weren't for this ג״ש, I would have assigned the verse of "When he purchases" to be about kiddushin of sex, but about kiddushin of money we would not require "he gives and he says" [i.e. that the man has to do everything]—this is why we need the ג״ש to each that "When he purchases" is about money, and even here [with money] we require "he gives and he says].
  
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  "'And he has sex with her'—this teaches that she can be acquired with sex." [Problem:] But if you say: Let [the Talmud] derive it from what is written, "When he takes", which implies also the terminology of sex, just all all of the [instances of] "take" in [the passage of the] Arayot (Leviticus 20): "A man who took his sister", "A wife and his sister you should not take", "A man that takes the wife of his brother"! Solution: It is different in a case where it is not possible to interpret [the word "take"] about a different topic, as we say in the chapter Nos'in al Ha-Anusah (Yevamot 97a) "[The instances of] 'take' written in the Torah without specification: those appropriate [to be understood in the context of forbidden] sex [should be understood in the context of forbidden] sex; those appropriate [to be understood in the context of] taking [through marriage should be understood in the context of] taking [through marriage]." [Problem:] But if you say: Let us derive it from the גזירה שוה that she can be purchased with sex (ביאה), as we say at the beginning of Ha-Ba al Yevamto (Yevamot 55b), "How do we know that a wife can be acquired to her husband through sex (העראה)? The ג״ש of 'take' (כי יקח איש אשה) 'take' (איש אשר יקח את אחותו)"!? Solution: If it didn't write "And he has sex with her" (ובעלה), we would not have learnt the core power of ביאה [that one can be purchased with it] from the"taking" of the Arayot since that is not talking about acquisition at all [since you can't marry someone forbidden to you]. However, to consider העראה as the conclusion of ביאה we can learn well [from the ג״ש from the Arayot—we can learn about the parameters of ביאה but not about its power].
  
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  "A Hebrew slave girl can break the ק״ו since she can be acquired through money but can't be acquired through sex". Problem: If the word "And he has sex with her (ובעלה)" were not there, I would have thought that the Hebrew slave girl could also be acquired through sex from a ק״ו, for later (Kiddushin 9b) we exclude from "ובעלה" the Hebrew slave girl, but here [in the flow of the baraita, the Talmud is] questioning the necessity of the word ובעלה [and therefore we would have no way to know that the Hebrew slave girl can't be acquired through sex, and it couldn't break the ק״ו]! Solution: This is what the objection "But isn't it a ק״ו?" meant: The word ובעלה is not required, for it [that a wife can be acquired through sex] comes through a ק״ו, and if [the word came] to exclude the Hebrew slave girl, the verse should have written "And he has sex (ובעל)" since this word itself is not needed [because the כי יקח already tells you it's about sex]. So why do I need the extra ה? The baraita responds [with the line אמה העבריה תוכיח]: If it were only written ובעל, then this itself [the law of a wife being acquired with sex] I could not have derived from a ק״ו since I would have thought that the Hebrew slave girl breaks the ק״ו.
  
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  "The yevamah that is caught in a bond [with her levir]". [Problem:] But if you say: Isn't her bond not relevant to the matter of [her being acquired by] money [since it can only be broken by halitzah or sex]!? in which case, if this is true, then I could include it all in the ק״ו and say thus: "A yevamah, who, even though she is caught in a bond, can't be acquired with money but can be acquired with sex, a wife who, even though she is not bound, can be acquired money, surely can be acquired with sex!?" and the fact that [the wife] is not bound will not harm her [law, i.e. it does not affect the fact that she can be acquired with money]! [Another place when Tosafot makes this kind of move in order to support their combination of factors into the ק״ו here:] In a similar vein, one needs to say [this kind of ק״ו in] chapter Keitzad Ha-Regel (Baba Kamma 24b-25a) where [R. Tarfon in the Mishnah] wants to prove that for keren in the damaged party's courtyard one should pay full damages (as opposed to half damages) from a ק״ו [summarised:] Since shen and regel are exempt [from any payment] in the public space but are obligated in full payment in the damaged party's courtyard, keren, which is obligated in half damages in the public space, isn't it logical that it should be obligated in full damages in the damaged party's courtyard?! And Rabbenu Yitzhak questioned there [that leads to this solution of כל זה אכניס בק״ו] that it is possible to break [the ק״ו]: Shen and regel—their damages are common, so you would say [to make their laws relevant to] keren whose damage is not common!?  [I.e. the ק״ו is not a good one since shen-regel and keren are of such different frequency]. Rabbenu Yitzhak explained there: About the obligation of full payment in the damaged party's space [for shen and regel] it is not a stringency that one can object about since it would have no effect at all on shen and regel [in the damaged's courtyard] if [shen and regel] were obligated for half payments in the public space like keren [these two halves of the law are independent, what happens for shen and regel in רשות הרבים vs. the courtyard are independent of each other and also independent of what happens for keren]. And [therefore] all of this I can place in the ק״ו: "Shen and regel which, even though their damages are common, are exempt [from any payment] in the public space but are obligated in full damages in the damaged party's space, keren, which, even though its damages are not common, is obligated in half damages in the public space, isn't it logical that it should be obligated in full damages in the damaged party's courtyard!?" [The main point for this Tosafot: This is another example of כל זה אכניס בק״ו, Rabbenu Yitzhak's objection to R. Tarfon's ק״ו can be incorporated into his very same ק״ו; so too here, the question is that it seems Rav Ashi's objection to the baraita's ק״ו can be incorporated into that very same ק״ו! So what was Rav Ashi's objection?] [Solution:] It seemed to Rabbenu Yitzhak that this [Rav Ashi's] objection of "For she is caught in a bond" [is specifically] for sex; i.e. the core of her mitzvah is to uphold the [dead] brother's name [by marrying his living brother], therefore we are lenient on her more than for the wife that she can be acquired through sex [in other words: it is more intuitive that the yevamah can be acquired through sex than the wife since the whole point of the levirate bond is to create offspring, and this is how Rav Ashi understood the force of the potential objection (מעיקרא דדינא פירכא) to the baraita's ק״ו]. [Another solution:] Rabbenu Elazar from Shazna (Rabbenu Eliezer from Sens?) explained "For she is caught in a bond" [means] that this sex only achieves the completion of the original kiddushin [with the dead brother], and because we find that this sex is for [the] completion [of this bond that was created when she was engaged to the dead brother], we do not say that it can acquire to begin with.
  
  Daf 5a
  
  
  
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  "How do we know [a wife can be acquired] with a contract?" And it is not possible to say this from the ק״ו of Hebrew slavegirl who isn't acquired with sex but is acquired with a contract. Firstly because we derive the slavegirl herself from the hekesh to "another" (=a wife) later (Kiddushin 16a where we derive that a Hebrew slavegirl can be acquired with a contract from the wife). And even according to Rav Hisda who derives it (on Kiddushin 16a) from "'She shall not go out like slaves go out' (Shemot 21:7), but she can be acquired with the acquisition of slaves" [i.e. with a contract and therefore he does not derive this law for the slavegirl from the law of the wife], it is [still] possible to object [to the ק״ו] as above [on 4b where they pointed out] "that she [the Hebrew slavegirl] can go out with money [unlike the wife]"! Secondly, since according to Rav Hisda the father writes [the contract for the Hebrew slavegirl], it is not possible to learn [from this] about a wife who is not acquired in this way since the husband writes [the contract].
  
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  "For [with money] they can redeem hekdesh and tithe". [Problem:] But if you say: All of this I can put into the ק״ו—Just as money, even though with it they can redeem hekdesh and tithe but can't go out [of the marriage with it] and even so can enter [the marriage with it], a contract, which even though they can't redeem with it hekdesh, she can go out, isn't it logical that she should be able to enter?! Solution: A stringency written in the verse it is not possible to combine it into the ק״ו [and the Torah excludes non-money means of redemption], because only a logical stringency is able to be put into the ק״ו, one that is written we have to say that [the Torah] causes it to be effective [it doesn't interact with other logical bases we might use for a ק״ו]. [Problem:] But if you say: Let us say a ק״ו from land [with which] they can't go out and even so can enter!—i.e. a person is allowed to betroth a wife with land but can't divorce her with land—and there it wouldn't be possible to object "For [with money] they can redeem hekdesh" [so instead of comparing contract to money which is broken by the baraita with the fact that money is stronger (can redeem), why don't we compare contract to land which is not stronger in this way (can't redeem)]! Solution: It is possible to object [to this]: Land can be acquired with moveable objects, can you say the same with a contract [so land is stronger in a different way and this would break this tentative ק״ו]!? [Problem:] But if you say: Moveable objects will break [this breakage of the ק״ו] since they cannot be acquired with [other] moveable objects, they can't leave, but they can enter, so I should be able to include contract! Solution: With moveable objects they redeem hekdesh [so we would be back to the exact same problem we had with money].
  
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  "Just as 'being' is with money so too 'her leaving' is with money!?" [The question is: We suggested to apply this hekesh for contract to money, why didn't we try to apply this hekesh to sex as well?] On the topic of sex it would be impossible to say "Just as 'being' is with sex so too 'her leaving' is with sex" since he has to distance himself from her to divorce her, and further because a common [reason for divorce is] he found in her ervat davar (e.g. adultery) in which case he would have to separate.
  
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  "A defence attorney becomes a prosecuting attorney" [when money is the same thing that gets you in and out of the marriage]. Problem: If this is true, how could [the Talmud] say above: "A Hebrew slavegirl that goes out with money, isn't it logical that she should be acquired with money"? On the contrary, it is a disadvantage since we don't want a prosecuting attorney to become a defence attorney! Solution: For a Hebrew slavegirl it is not possible to say this since, originally, when her father sold her into slavery he received the money from the master, and if so when [the father] wants to redeem her, it is logical that the master should receive the money [it's a transaction, it doesn't make it look like she goes out and comes in with the exact same thing]. But a man that betroths a wife, everything comes through him, whether betrothal or divorce, so there it is relevant to object "They will say 'Money causes [her] to enter...' etc." [The money regarding a wife's entering or leaving never changes hands, it is the husband's throughout].
  
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  "[The verse] is about divorce [so comes to] exclude something else about divorce" [supporting Rava]. But it would not be logical to say [that the verse] is about writing [so comes to] exclude something else about writing [which would be against Rava], since the plain sense of the verse implies that it comes to say [he can divorce her] only with writing, for it says "If she didn't find favour in his eyes, and he wrote for her", this implies that it is specifically about this topic. [In other words: the verse is indeed primarily about divorce but it just tells you that methods not involving writing are wrong.]
  
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  "'With the understanding that you will not go to your father's house ever'—this is not a get". Rashi's explanation: "All her days she is bound to uphold this condition on his account". Problem: Why shouldn't it be a get since, if her father dies, then she is able to enter the house and she is no longer bound to him, since after the death of her father it is not considered "her father's house", as we say in Nedarim 46a: "[Someone says to their fellow:] 'Konam is your house that I will not enter it'—if he [the house owner] dies or sells it, he is permitted [to enter it]" [which should be the case for the condition that the husband made the wife swear about her father's house]! Solution: It is called her father's house by all of her father's offspring even though he died, as it is written about Tamar, "Return as a widow to your father's house" (Bereishit 38:11), even though her father died as the verses prove.
  
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  "But Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili derives [the permanent conditions that interfere with the efficacy of a get in the baraita] from [the fact that the verse could have said sefer] karet [but instead said sefer] keritut". Problem: In chapter Ha-Megaresh (Gittin 83b) it said about the Rabbanan of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah [i.e. the majority opinion he disputed] that they do not make a derash with karet-keritut, and Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili is included in the Rabbanan [since he is not Riva, he must be among the majority opinion against him]. But here it said that Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili made a derash with karet-keritut! Solution: It didn't say "They don't learn it" but rather "They don't make a derash", i.e. [they don't derash] this derashah there [to learn דבר הכורת בינו לבינה] for they need it for the derashah here [to learn אין דבר אחר כורתה].
  
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  "[If it weren't written about money, I would think] that [money too] is [effective] without her agreement [like sex and contract]". Rashi's explanation: Sex with a yevamah [is effective without her agreement], contract with divorce, and money with the Hebrew slavegirl. But this was a problem for Rabbenu Tam: If this is considered to be "without her agreement", that the father can sell his daughter without her agreement, if so, what does Rav Huna [mean when he, on Kiddushin 5b] says later that "Money regarding marriage nonetheless we do not find [it to be effective] without her agreement"—can't the father betroth his minor daughter with money without her agreement!? [Solution:] Rabbenu Tam said: Since the father stands in place of his daughter, this is not considered "without her agreement" since it is with the consent of the father. Problem: But if you say: If so, how can [the Talmud] say that money also is [effective] with a Hebrew slavegirl without her agreement—for the father sold her with his consent! Solution: This is what [the Talmud meant by its] object[ion with וכ״ת]: Money is [effective] with a slavegirl without her agreement in the case when the master designates [as a wife for his son] the Hebrew [slavegirl] with money from her acquisition with the agreement of neither the father nor the daughter. [Problem:] For it says later (Kiddushin 19a), "'That he did not designate her'—that he needs to designate her", [Solution: This] doesn't [mean] that he needs to do it with her consent but that he needs to inform her that she is designated for the sake of betrothal. [Problem:] And even though [the Talmud] said below "With marriage nonetheless we do not find [that money is effective without her agreement]", [Solution:] nevertheless, in a case like this where she is designated to be married, originally the money wasn't for marriage [it was for acquisition of a slavegirl]. There are those who return to Rashi's explanation that certainly the sale of a Hebrew slavegirl is called "without her agreement" for it is a debt for her since, if she were capable of decision-making [i.e. not a minor] she would not have agreed to [being sold]. But minor betrothal is not a debt to her like sale and in the end she will remain married, so if she were capable of decision-making she would have agreed [the assumption is that women would prefer to married than unmarried for financial and social security]—thus it is not really "without her agreement".
  
  Daf 5b
  
  
  
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  "Huppah that completes [the marriage], is it not logical that it should acquire?!" Problem: Let us say a "dayo" on the end of the ק״ו, for from where do we derive that huppah acquires? because it completes, [therefore we should say the dayo:] the target of a ק״ו can't be more stringent than the starting place—just as there [huppah acquires] after money, so too here [money should acquire] after money! Solution: [The sugya] follows Rabbi Tarfon who says (Baba Kama 25a) that "Anywhere a ק״ו would be broken, we do not say a dayo", for here, if we said a dayo, the ק״ו would be broken since we don't need [money] after money. New problem: According to us who say that huppah does not acquire, let us say that money completes after money [i.e. that betrothal money followed by more money would equal full marriage] from the ק״ו of huppah: just as huppah, which doesn't acquire, completes, money, that does acquire, isn't it logical that it should complete?! Solution: We are only able to prove [through this] that [money] completes after money like for huppah, but why should this money be stronger than that money!?
  
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  "I could include huppah which purchases elsewhere and purchases here. But couldn't the common denominator [of contract, sex, money] be that it's against her will [which would exclude huppah, which must be with her consent]!?" Even though he hands over his minor daughter to the huppah without her consent, since he stands in place of his daughter, it is not considered to be without her consent [his consent stands in place of her consent]. Problem: But will can still find a huppah which is against her will! Designation [of a Hebrew slavegirl to marry the master or his son] is separate from marriage, so it will turn out that after designation the master enters her to the huppah without the father's consent! Solution: Even though the designation can be done without the father's consent, the huppah needs to be done with his consent.
  
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  "But Rav Huna [thinks that] with marriage nevertheless we don't find [that she can be acquired] against her will." Even though the the father can betroth his minor daughter against her will, nonetheless, since it is with the father's consent, it is not called "against her will", as I explained. Furthermore, with huppah we also find that the ruling is like this (in Ketubot 47a) for the father can hand over his minor daughter [against her will] to the huppah [but we don't call this "against her will"].
  
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  "Therefore, if he gave and she said..." The reason [the Talmud] never mentioned at all [the case] "If she gave and he said" is because it is not so clear-cut, for sometimes she can be betrothed [in this manner] with an important man, as we say later (Kiddushin 7a).
  
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  "So if this isn't true, then [he is] not [a nazir]! Therefore, [Shmuel] thinks that yadayim (shorthands) that are not clear are not effective!" Problem: Why didn't [the Talmud] resolve [this by saying] that certainly he thinks that [these unclear shorthands] are effective, but there [in Nazir, the guy] said "I will be" isn't even effective as an unclear shorthand, since perhaps he meant "I will be in a fast"!? Solution: The language of "I will be" is more fitting for nezirut than it is for a fast, for "I will be" implies immediately, and sometimes he [already] ate [that day] and won't be able to be fasting until tomorrow, but regarding nezirut he can immediately begin being a nazir whenever he wants.
  
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  "This is what we're dealing with: 'When he said "to me"'". This implies that the Shmuel's conclusion here is that unclear yadayim (shorthands) are not effective. Problem: In the beginning of Nedarim (Nedarim 2b), [the Mishnah] said: "One who says to his fellow: I am vowed from you, I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I won't eat of yours, that I won't taste of yours—is forbidden [i.e. the vow works]". And we say in the Gemara on this (Nedarim 4b): "Shmuel said: About all of these [first statements in the Mishnah (I am vowed from you etc.), none of them work] until he says: That I won't eat of yours, [or] that I won't taste of yours'". And it concludes: "What's the reason [for Shmuel to require more explication for the vows to be effective]? Perhaps 'I am vowed from you' means 'I won't speak with you','I am separated from you' means 'I won't do business with you', 'I am distanced from you' means 'I won't stand within your 4 amot'". And [the Talmud] objects (Nedarim 5b): "Let's say that Shmuel thinks unclear shorthands are not effective!" And it resolves: "Shmuel assigns our mishnah according to R. Yehudah who says 'Unclear shorthands are not effective'". And since Shmuel assigns it to R. Yehudah, it implies that he doesn't agree with him but rather thinks that they are effective! And it is not possible to explain that Shmuel assigns our mishnah to R. Yehudah and agrees with him based on what is said later: "And what forces him to assign our mishnah to R. Yehudah!?", and what's the problem!? Why would he be forced to assign our mishnah to R. Yehudah if he he also agreed with him!? Therefore, he assigns it to R. Yehudah but certainly thinks that [these unclear shorthands] are effective. Another place where this contradiction comes up: [The Talmud] said in Gittin 85a: "The core of the get is [in Hebrew] 'Behold you are permitted to any man' (an unclear shorthand, since it doesn't have any form of relation to the declarer), R. Yehudah says [in Aramaic]: 'This one should go from me' is the core of the get" (he makes the shorthand less unclear because he doesn't think unclear shorthands work), and the majority disagrees with him (R. Yehudah), and Shmuel agrees with the majority! [So again Shmuel thinks that unclear shorthands are effective.] Solution: This "Behold you are betrothed" without "to me" doesn't imply at all that "You are betrothed to me" since it is common for a man to betroth a wife for his fellow and these are shorthands which are totally unclear, which for these Shmuel certainly thinks that they are not effective shorthands, but in this case in Nedarim, [these shorthands] are more clear, and this is also the case for divorce since a man doesn't divorce his fellow's wife. But there are other versions of the beginning of Nazir 2b. Version 2: "'I will be'—this is a nazir. Shmuel said: And there was a nazir passing by him"; and [the Talmud] said "Let us say that Shmuel thinks that unclear shorthands are not effective!? Yes! Because of this, when a nazir passes before him they are clear shorthands and are effective, but if there is no nazir passing before him they are unclear shorthands and are not effective" [in other words, it is not possible here to read Shmuel as ever thinking that unclear shorthands are effective, version 2 here specifies explicitly that he thinks they are not]. Version 3: "Let us say that Shmuel thinks unclear shorthands are not effective!?", and [the Talmud answers:] "If he passes before him, this is minimally unclear shorthand, but if he is not passing before him then it is not even unclear shorthand" [so Shmuel certainly would think according to version 3 that unclear shorthands are effective and only quibbles on things that are so unclear as to not be shorthands at all, like Tosafot argued for our Gemara in Kiddushin].
  
  Daf 6a
  
  
  
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  "My 'atzurah'—what is the law?" Rashi's explanation: "The terminology of 'atzeret' is that 'You should be gathered with me in the house.' But my teachers explained it according to 'For we are atzurah from a woman' (1 Shmuel 21:6), but this is not clear. For he meant 'Separate from us' when he said that, for Ahimelekh said to David: Have the young men been guarding themselves from a woman? And David answered him: A woman is atzurah from us, and behold we are pure." [In other words: Rashi's problem is that "atzurah" in his teacher's verse means "separate" and therefore can't be used for a kiddushin formula, which is about bringing a woman closer to a man.] But Rabbenu Yitzhak responds to the biblical language according to [Rashi's teachers] and this is its explanation: There was a woman that was with us recently, but now we are pure. [In other words, the term atzurah, while it means "separate", implies that they previously were with a woman (also the verse says "recently" = מתמול שלשם), so it can be used for kiddushin.] And now it is fine because all the terms [in the sugya] are biblical language.
  
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  "Because it is said, 'For she is a female slave neherefet to a man'". [The Talmud here, in this first rereading of the baraita, must] think that the verse is dealing with [a female slave that is] half slave and half free who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave, and it is according to the one who says in [the chapter] Ha-Sholeiah (Gitin 43a) that kiddushin works for her. [In other words, the verse needs to be talking about a case where kiddushin is possible in order for it to be the source of a valid kiddushin formula.]
  "For in Yehudah they call a betrothed woman 'harufah'". And [in this second reinterpretation of the baraita] it applies only in Yehudah but not in other places, for the [Talmud must think here] that the verse is speaking about a Canaanite slavegirl [and not one that is half free] for whom kiddushin does not work [because, if the verse was about actual kiddushin, then there is no reason it wouldn't apply everywhere since biblical language is not dialect-dependent].
  
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  "He should not have dealings with them." Rashi's explanation: He shouldn't be a judge in this matter, lest he permit a forbidden sexual sin, and this is a bent thing that cannot be repaired (see Kohelet 1:15)." But Rabbenu Azriel's explanation: That he [the prospective husband] shouldn't talk with women about subjects of kiddushin to betroth them, for sometimes she will be betrothed through their speech or their giving and will not understand. Problem [on Rabbenu Azriel]: This is fine for kiddushin, but for divorce [which the Talmud also included in this], why do we care if she thinks that she isn't divorced!? [Her consent is not required for divorce, only for betrothal!]. Solution: There is a problem [if she wants to get married] to a kohen [who can't marry a divorcée]. New problem: The language of "with them (pl.)" doesn't worth for this, for a man can only give a get to his wife [so it should be singular]! Another problem: It says later in our chapter (Kiddushin 13a) that the concern [of having people who don't pay attention to this Rav Yehudah-Shmuel traditional] is [having sex with] a married woman [and not a kohen marrying a divorcée] when it says "[Those people] are worse for the world than the generation of the Flood [and see the prooftext there that mentions adultery specifically]"! Solution: It is possible that we are concerned if she stretched out her hand and received a betrothal from another [and this could lead to adultery and the multiple men she is betrothed to could account for the plural language].
  "Even if he did not learn it." Explanation [of Rav Yemar's question]: A man that is appointed over gittin and kiddushin, do we need to inform him of this Rav Yehudah-Shmuel tradition (sic!, the Talmud says Rav Huna-Shmuel) such that he shouldn't fail in this common matter, or perhaps we are not worried about this since it is not so common? This is implied in Rashi's explanation.
  
  Daf 6b
  
  
  
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  "A wife, whose body is not acquired [by her husband], all the more so!?" Even though regarding "Behold, you are a free woman" this ק״ו is not effective (although "Behold, you are for yourself" is for a wife, and both are for a slave) because "freedom" is not relevant to a wife and we don't do a ק״ו except from language that is relevant for both cases.
  
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  "When you flee from him"—i.e. from the Gentile. But, he doesn't want to say "When you free from *me*, from now I have no business with you", for if so, immediately he would be free and obligated in the mitvot but he would not be able to observe them in the Gentile's house, so it turns out that the "Ono" is worse for him.
  
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  "When he extended for her the time [for repaying the debt]." Rashi's explanation: "She was obligated to him [in a debt] and he gave her time and said to her: 'Be betrothed to me with this benefit, that you could have given a perutah to a man to appease me about this [to extend the loan, and now I will extend it and you don't have to do anything about it]'—and if he explained this to her, she is betrothed, but it is scheming to do usury; but it is not full usury because he didn't fix [the monetary value] and he didn't take anything from her. All the more so if he forgave her all the loan and said to her: 'Be betrothed to me with the benefit of this forgiveness', she is betrothed [and it is not even scheming to do usury]. However, if he betrothed her with the actual money [of the loan], he didn't give her anything [at the time of kiddushin] since it was already hers and in her domain." Problem: As for what he explained, that this situation is not one of usury of a [real] fixed amount since the woman didn't give the man anything, this is not clear. Since he would [normally] give her this perutah for kiddushin but [in this case] didn't give her anything, it's as if SHE gave HIM a real perutah—thus it is full usury! Support: For it is (in Baba Metzia 62b) that "I don't have a maneh, but I have wheat for a maneh" would be appropriately called "scheming to do usury" since he schemed that he wouldn't have to pay to increase the deadline. Therefore Rabbenun Tam explained that we are dealing with a case where she was indebted to another guy, the time to collect arrived, and this [prospective husband] came and gave the creditor a perutah to give her more time and betrothed her with that benefit. Problem: But if you say: Why would it be forbidden to do this because of scheming to do usury? Doesn't it say in the chapter Eizehu Neshekh (Baba Metzia 69b): "It is permitted for a man to say to his fellow: Take 4 zuzim and loan them to Ploni", for the Torah forbade only usury that came from debtor to creditor!? Solution: This is true if the debtor doesn't give anything to the third party, but if he were to give [something to him] he would seem to be his agent and be forbidden [i.e. the prospective husband is the prospective wife's agent because the result of this relationship is betrothal, and that's why it's forbidden]. And this is also what we say there in Eizehu Neshekh, "A man is permitted to say to his fellow: Take 4 zuzim and say to Ploni that he should loan zuzim—this is when the receiver doesn't give anything to the creditor, but if he did then he appears as his agent." New problem: Why does [the Talmud] assign this [tradition of Abaye] to one of extending her deadline? At the beginning of the loan he could have established that with the benefit of the loan she would be betrothed, such as the betrother gives to the creditor a perutah to loan money to her, and with that perutah she would be betrothed to him! Answer: "The benefit of the loan"—this implies a loan that was already in existence.
  
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  "If he did not return [the etrog], he did not fulfil [his obligation]." Problem: Why [did Rava have to say that] he did not fulfil his obligation—[the guy] didn't make a double stipulation (tnai kaful, of the form "If you do Z, then X; but if you don't do Z, then Y", which is required for a valid stipulation)! Solution: There are stipulations that don't need doubling, such as here, since his intention was for his fellow to bless on his etrog. Even more so, they say (Kiddushin 49b) "about this man that sold his property with the intention of making aliyah but didn't say anything explicitly about this, and in the end he didn't go up and wants to renege on the deal, and Rav Huna: These are words in the heart which are not effective;" and if so, it seems that this [Rav Huna] is specifically because he didn't specify, so if he did specify [and said "I'm selling you this land with the understanding that I'm going to make aliyah"] then it is a[n effective] stipulation even if he didn't double it [even according to Rav Huna]. This is also in Mi She-Met (Baba Batra 147a) regarding "the guy on his deathbed who said, 'I thought that my wife is pregnant, but now that she is not pregnant, my property goes to Ploni', but in the end it is revealed that she was pregnant", and it says there that it isn't an effective gift because from the outset he didn't intend to give it to that Ploni if his wife were pregnant—here too we don't need a double stipulation, since his intention was for this. New problem: If he didn't return [the etrog], why [does it say] he didn't fulfil his obligation—for it is a case where the stipulation and deed are the same thing (in this case: the etrog), and the stipulation should be void! Just as we say there (Gittin 75a): "All [rules of] stipulations, from where do we derive [them]? From the stipulations of Gadites and Reuvenites, and there the stipulation was one thing (to fight with the other Israelites) and the deed was something else (to receive the land of Gilead)!" Solution: This is not the conclusion [of the sugya] there, since there are other solutions. Alternative solution: This situation, when the stipulation and deed are about the same thing, is not effective [only] when [the stipulation and deed] contradict each other, like the case of chapter Mi She-Ahazo (in Gittin 75a): [One who gives a get saying] "with the understanding that you return to me the paper", for there [the Talmud] thinks that anyone who says "with the understanding of" is not like one who says "from now" (i.e. retroactively effective after the return, see 75b), so it turns out that she isn't divorced until she returns the paper but then it isn't hers [and she needs to own the document in order for it to be a valid get]; but here it thinks that anyone who says "with the understanding of" is like someone who says "from now" [and therefore the deed and stipulation do not contradict each other, since, once the fellow returns the etrog, he would have retroactively owned it and fulfilled his obligation]. 
  "But if he didn't, he did not fulfil his obligation." [Implied problem:] As for what it said in Sukkah 41b: "Rabban Gamliel had an etrog, Rabbi Yehoshua took it and he fulfilled his obligation with it, and he gave it to Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Akiva fulfilled his obligation with it, and returned it to Rabban Gamliel", and we infer from this that a gift with the understanding of returning it is an effective gift, even though Rabbi Yehoshua didn't return it to Rabban Gamliel [though it seems that our sugya implies he would have had to in order for it to be a valid gift], [solution:] Rabban Gamliel intended this, that he wasn't concerned about it being returned to him until after everyone had fulfilled their obligation.
  
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  "[A gift with the understanding of returning it works for all of the items in the list] except for a wife since a wife is not acquired with exchange." Problem: In what way is [a gift with the understanding of returning it] similar to exchange [which is an underlying assumption of Rav Ashi's point]? If it is because in an exchange he returns [the symbolic exchange item, normally a cloth (sudra), which means in both cases there is a thing that is returned], even for actual exchange it says in Nedarim 48b, chapter Ha-Shutafin, "that if he seized it, he seized it" [and keep it, it became his in the transfer of ownership]! [Solution:] It seemed to Rabbenu Yitzhak that [a gift with the understanding of returning it] is not exchange, but de-rabbanan it is not [valid] kiddushin because it is the way of the world to return the [symbolic] exchange [item], and so it is similar to a kind of exchange, and people will come to say that a wife can be acquired with exchange [which is false]; therefore, the rabbis cancelled [this form of] kiddushin from her [a wife]. Know [this also from this proof]: That if it were similar to exchange, with sales how could one acquire with this maneh—coins can't be exchanged! And also with redemption of the firstborn, how could his son be redeemed with exchange—isn't it written 5 shekels, i.e. not exchange?!
  
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  "If so, then it would be property that has capacity for mortgage [i.e. the wife, that is bought along with property that doesn't, i.e. the maneh, which doesn't work]!" Rashi's explanation: "Because humans are compared to land, as it is written, 'You will inherit them [Canaanite slaves] as an inheritance holding [a phrase normally applied to land]'. Problem: This verse is written about a slave, but a freeman is not compared [to land] except only in [the case of one who vowed to bring to the Temple by saying] "My own value is upon me", since [that person] is evaluated like a slave as we see in the first chapter of Sanhedrin (15b), and a slave [being similar to land] is anyway subject to a dispute in the first chapter of Baba Kama (12a) whether they are similar to land or moveable property! Solution: [Rav Ashi's objection] is not specifically [based on the fact that people] have capacity for mortgage, but even if they don't have capacity for mortgage, there is no case where moveables can be acquired "on the back of" moveables [unlike land, for which you can acquire all the moveables "on its back"], since [the idea of] "on its back" is not relevant for property that doesn't have capacity for mortgage. Alternative solution: This is what he meant to say: You're forced to say, if a wife is acquired "on the back of" moveables, a field could also be acquired "on the back of" moveables, for we derive the acquisition of money for a wife from the field [of Efron] from [the ג״ש of] "purchase" "purchase", and if a field can't be acquired [in this way], from where would you derive it for a wife!?
  
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  "Let the kiddushin spread through all of her! Is it not taught etc." Problem: Terumah 11b derives [the law in the case of] "This [animal's] leg is an olah" and "with regard to a vital organ" from a verse, as it is written, "Anything that he gives from it to God", but regarding a wife there are no verses written [to derive this information]. If this is so, how [can Mar Zutra] challenge "Aren't they not similar!?" Solution: It is because of this that Rashi was particular and explained that this "mekudeshet" that [the man] said to [his prospective wife] is the terminology of "sanctified property (hekdesh)" [and did not mean "betrothed"], and this is like at the beginning of this chapter [of Kiddushin] that [kiddushin is like hekdesh through analogy] "he forbade her to everyone else like hekdesh", that a man can make her like hekdesh. Therefore, it is possible that the ruling of this case could be like hekdesh [since this is what the man in the case actually said]. However, if he had said "engaged" or any of the other earlier formulae [for betrothing a woman, see Kiddushin 6a], then it would not have been possible [for Mar Zutra] to raise the challenge "Let the kiddushin spread through all of her".
  
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  "Even according to the one who said it is not all an olah". There in Temurah 11b it is explained that according to the one who said it is not all olah, what does he do with it? And it says that he sells it except for the value of the leg that was sanctified [and gives the money to the Temple] for the needs of [buying] olot. And it challenges: How can he be exempt from his olah [that he promised to bring by doing this]—this is a lacking olah [since the leg is excluded]! And it responds: This is like one who said "Behold this will be upon me as an olah however I find it" [i.e. including if it were missing a leg].
  
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  "He came back and bought [the other half]". The reason [R. Yohanan's case] is specifically "He came back and bought it" and isn't "A cow owned by 2 partners, each of which made their half hekdesh", is because that, for that case, the line [later in R. Yohanan] "if he made an exchange then its exchange is the same" would not be relevant since partners can't make exchanges, as is said in Temurah 13a and in the first chapter of Zevahim 6a.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  
  
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  "Learn from this: animals [have dihui, become permanently unfit due to temporary circumstances while they're still alive]." Rashi's explanations: "If they are made dihui, they are dihui forever. For there is an opinion that dihui only applies to slaughtered animals, but living animals that are made dihui can return and be fit again, and he could have brought this cow when he came back and bought the other half." "Learn from this: Dihui at the beginning is dihui"—explanation: "Such as this case, for when he made it hekdesh it was not fit to be brought as a sacrifice [since it was only half hekdesh], and there is a dissenting opinion that dihui only applies with something that was [originally] fit and became dihui [later]." "Learn from this: There is dihui in value"—explanation: "The law of dihui applies in a matter that is only hekdesh in its value [and not the actual object], such as this case that was originally only hekdesh in its value since he would have to sell the cow and make hekdesh half its value, for it is not fit to bring halves of animals to the Tample, but even so dihui took effect to make it unfit for the altar forver, and we don't say that dihui only applies to a thing that was made hekdesh and itself could be brought to the Temple". Problem: Why did it need to say these two "learn from this"s—"There is dihui in value" and "Original dihui"—isn't it impossible to have original dihui that isn't about its value?! [Like in our case: the thing that makes the half hekdesh cow dihui is that you can't sacrifice half a cow so it can only be about its money]. Solution (part 1): One can find original dihui even where it itself is hekdesh [and not just its value], as Rabbi Yohanan said in Nigmar Ha-Din (Sanhedrin 47a): "Such as one who eats forbidden fat and designates a sacrifice, but then worships idols, and reneges on it—since it becomes dihui when he worships idols because of 'Sacrifice of wicked ones is an abomination', it is dihui"—and the law there is not dependent on him designating the sacrifice at the beginning, it would actually also be the case if he worshipped idols and afterwards designates a sacrifice, which would be original dihui, since it is Rabbi Yohanan who thinks that original dihui is dihui. But because of the other statement of Rabbi Yohanan that is brought there, "He ate forbidden fat, designated a sacrifice and became insane, but returned and became sane", it is not possible to say that he became insane at the beginning, because an insane person is not capable of designation—this is why he mentioned also [the case of] "He designated the sacrifice and worships idols" [in order that the two cases in Sanhedrin teach different things, for only one of them teaches that original dihui is real dihui]. Solution (part 2): We also find hekdesh for its value which is not original dihui, such as one who designates a female sheep for his pesah offering and it gives birth to a male—this is hekdesh of money because one can't bring a female pesah, but it is not original dihui for its offspring was fit to be brought as a sacrifice [so he designated a male as well, just not realising it, and he can use that male as his pesah]. [New section:] But there is an alternate version of the text: "Learn from this: hekdesh of value causes dihui". This is explained to mean that it makes its exchange also dihui to bring as a sacrifice, based on what [Rabbi Yohanan] taught "And its exchange is like it". But [this explanation] is not correct, for in Keritot 28a regarding "A rich man who defiled the Sanctuary and designated the nest [of 2 birds, a poor man's sacrifice] in place of his sheep [the proper rich man's sacrifice] and then became poor—since it was dihui [when he designated it], it remains dihui [even though he is now poor]", we recite also "Learn from this three things" just like in our sugya, but there it is impossible to explain that the hekdesh of value makes the exchange dihui because there is no exchange for birds [which is the topic there], rather you are forced to interpret it as it is hekdesh but can't be brought as a sacrifice [just as for Rabbi Yohanan here]. New problem: Why did we need Rabbi Yohanan teach us these 3 things—we already learnt them in Mi She-Hayah Tamei (Pesahim 98a). Solution: Because it is a disagreement in the last chapter of Keritot, where Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai and Rabbanan disagree, so [the Gemara here] brings the words of the Amoraim [like Rabbi Yohanan to weigh in on this disagreement]. New problem: Why didn't [the Talmud] object on this Rabbi Yohanan like it objected on that Rabbi Oshaya at the end of Keritot, who said "A rich man who defiled the Sanctuary and designated a nest for his sheep, then became poor—since it was [once] dihui it remains dihui", for it objects from this Rabbi Shimon there who says "One who designates a female sheep for his pesah before Pesah, it should be left to pasture until it gets a blemish, then sold and he should buy with its value a pesah; if it gave birth to a male, it should be left to pasture until it gets a blemish, then sold and he should buy with its value a pesah. But Rabbi Shimon says: He himself is brought as a pesah"!? Another problem: It objected to him from Rabbi Shimon, but let it support him the Rabbanan who say in the beginning [of the baraita] that the lamb should be left to pasture until it becomes blemished!? Another problem: Since it objected from a minority opinion when it objected from Rabbi Shimon of the baraita, let it object from Rabbi Eliezer of our mishnah in Temurah, that teaches in Elu Kodashim (Temurah 18b) regarding "One who designates a female for an olah and it gives birth to a male, Rabbi Eliezer says: It itself can be brought as an olah"!? Solution: The reason that it objected from Rabbi Shimon is because with that case, even the Rabbanan would agree, for, until now, the Rabbanan disagreed with him regarding something where hekdesh of its value is relevant, for they think that, since hekdesh of value is relevant, of course hekdesh of the item itself is relevant, and there is no hekdesh of itself here because there can't be a female pesah. But regarding the nest [of birds], even the Rabbanan would agree that hekdesh of value does not take effect with birds. [Solution for sugya here:] And with regard to the statement Rabbi Yohanan here, it is not possible to object [in this way] because it is like one who designated a female for his pesah, and if it would have objected from Rabbi Shimon then I would have thought "Let it bring support from the Rabbanan!". And the statement of Rabbi Eliezer is also not able to be use as an objection because it is a minority opinion.
  
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  "Half of you with a perutah, half of you with a perutah". Problem: Why is this not effective? Didn't it see earlier (on 7a) that the kiddushin only doesn't spread throughout all of her because she is an independent will and only wants what she hears. But if we know that she wants [to be betrothed] throughout all of her, then the kiddushin spreads throughout all of her, and here her will is revealed that she wants [to be betrothed] throughout all of her [since she agreed to both halves, as opposed to above where she only agreed to 1 half]! Answer: There the case is one where he used the language of kiddushin, then it certainly would have been effective and the kiddushin would have spread throughout all of her. But here the case is one where he said to her "Behold you are engaged to me" or any of the other languages above (Kiddushin 6).
  
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  "Half of you with a perutah today, and half of you with a perutah tomorrow". He said both of these to her at the same time.
  
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  "Your two daughters for my two sons [with 1 perutah]". Says Rabbenu Yitzhak: [Interpretative point 1:] It is dealing with minor daughters, i.e. the kiddushin belongs to the father. For if it were majority daughters and the father receives the kiddushin under the law of agency (shelihut), it would be obvious that he needs a perutah for each one, for an agent has no more power than the one who sent him [so can't take away the half perutah that is owed to each of his majority daughters]. [Point 2: When the Talmud] said "After the giver [the father of the sons]", it is not specific[ally about the giver], for the giver certainly comes under the law of agency for his sons, and if we go after the giver, then he would need 2 perutot as if the sons themselves were betrothing. So the question is really about the receiver [the father of the daughters], for perhaps we are only concerned that the receiver receives something worth a perutah. [Point 3:] It must be that he specifies which of them [are married to which], e.g. Rahel to Reuven and Leah to Shimon, for if not, it would be a case of kiddushin that will not lead to [permitted] sex (see Kiddushin 51a).
  
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  "Your daughter and your cow with a perutah". Since the cow can't be acquired with money [since you need to do meshikhah, some symbolic acquisition], we throw it in with his daughter [in the same transaction]. And afterwards, [the Talmud] asks: "Your daughter and your land", for land can be acquired with money.
  
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  "Rav Yosef said: The [silks] need evaluation". [The Talmud] means [it needs to be evaluated] before kiddushin, just as Rashi explained. Problem: Later on at Kiddushin 48a, there is a baraita about "Be betrothed to me with this contract... and Hakhaimim say: Evaluate the paper; if it is worth a perutah then she is betrothed [and if not, she is not]". This implies that they evaluate the paper after kiddushin, even though originally the evaluated worth of the paper was unknown! Solution: [According to] the version [of the mahloket Rabbah-Rav Yosef here] that says that they both agree on "a small amount (kol de-hu)", [the case in Kiddushin 48a with the contract] is dealing with when he said to her, "[The contract] is [worth] a small amount". But [according to] the version [of the mahloket] where they also disagree on "a small amount", this is what it means: If he wants to betroth her with a contract, they should evaluate the contract beforehand—"if it is worth a perutah, she is betrothed" i.e. if they evaluated it beforehand—to exclude the one who says she is betrothed because it's a contract, even if it is not worth a perutah.
  
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  "So too something worth money needs to have a fixed, known value". As for what we say later in Kiddushin 12a: "A man betrothed [a wife] with bundles of tow cotton. Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said and examined it—if it was worth a perutah, yes [the betrothal was effective]; if it was not, no". It seems like [Rav Shimi bar Hiyya] does not agree with Rav Yosef [since he allows the evaluation after the fact, while Rav Yosef requires the evaluation beforehand].
  
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  "What is it? Symbolic exchange (halifin)." A Hebrew slave can't be acquired through halifin and can't acquire himself through halifin, since the reason he can acquire with money is derived from this verse of "kesef miknato" later (on Kiddushin 14b). But a Canaanite slave can be acquired with halifin, as it teaches in the chapter Ha-Sholeah (Gittin 39b) regarding [the slaveowner] who took his hat and threw it at her and said to her: "Acquire this and acquire yourself", and it is implied there that his act did nothing because it was an item [the hat] belonging to the one who acquired [the slaveowner]. However, if it were an item of the acquirer [the slave], then she would have acquired [herself] through the laws of halifin, not the laws of money. This is also how Rabbenu Hananel explains it there.
  
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  "From where do I know this? As it is taught in a baraita: This calf..." He is bringing evidence according to the first version [of the sugya, where Rav Yosef agrees that one does not need an evaluation if he said "It is worth the minimum amount", which there is a perutah but here is 5 selaim. We know that he doesn't need an evaluation because, according to this baraita, all he has to do is to announce that the calf is worth 5 selaim and that is enough, because, like the silk which is obviously worth a perutah, the calf is clearly worth more than 5 selaim. The previous "From where do I know this?" of Rav Yosef at the top of the daf was within the world of "They also disagree if he said it was worth the minimum amount", so Tosafot is clarifying for us that we have returned to the earlier version of the mahloket].(See the Meharsha for his comments on the difficulty of this Tosafot and to resolve it in another way).
  
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  "Rav Kahana took a turban [as payment] for redemption of a firstborn son". This implies that Rav Kahana was a kohen. Problem: At the end of Elu Ovrin (Pesahim 49a) it imples that he was not a kohen, since he said, "If I hadn't married a kohenet, I would have not been exiled"! Solution: There were 2 Rav Kahanas. Alternative solution: It was because of his wife that he could purchase [i.e. redeem the firstborn son], as we find in chapter Ha-Zaro'a (Hullin 132a) "Rav Kahana eats [terumah] because of his wife".
  
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  "But for general people—no". Problem: Why doesn't this work!? Is it worse than a gift with the understanding that you need to return it, that we say earlier (in Kiddushin 6b) that it is an effective gift!? Solution: Yes indeed it is worse, for there (in 6b) it was a significant thing that was the gift [a maneh], even though it was given with the understanding that it should be returned. But here, regarding redemption, the turban wasn't worth 5 selaim and so when he gave it to him he did not fulfil his obligation of giving [whereas had he given him a maneh, 25 selaim, then he would have fulfilled the technical giving requirement even though he had to return it afterwards].
  
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  "Since it wouldn't be kiddushin with a nonspecific maneh, we need [to learn the case with] a specific maneh!?" Problem: Perhaps this is what it is teaching us: A specific maneh, even though she didn't change her mind [like in the reisha], it wouldn't be kiddushin because it turned out to be lacking [less than the promised maneh, and therefore the seifa is in fact necessary because otherwise we wouldn't know about the case where she didn't change her mind]! Solution: You can learn this from the reisha since, [there,] with a nonspecific maneh, she is able to change her mind and we don't say that he should complete [the maneh]—therefore, the kiddushin does not take effect at all until he completes [the maneh, in other words the main point of the reisha is that he hasn't paid yet, not that she is able to change her mind]. So too if he said to her "With this specific maneh" and it turned out to be lacking, the kiddushin did not take effect and even the completion was not effective, for she was not expecting him to pay her anything other than the maneh that he showed to her and it was lacking. [Therefore we can derive the law of the seifa on a specific maneh from the law of the reisha on a nonspecific maneh and the seifa is indeed unnecessary, the Gemara's resolution up to here works (though will be subsequently rejected).]
  
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  Him and not her- If you will say why do we need the passuk? For time bound mitzvoth we know women are exempt. From the eighth day on its a mitzvah until you do it. Since its a mitzvah can we do it during the day or at night? From the eighth day on if you haven't done it yet you can do it at night
  
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  "He received support for the matter" - While he was bent over him, he understood and expounded "A song for Asaf; God, the gentiles have entered Your inheritance." For he could not understand it before this and expound it. And some explain that just this verse itself [and not the chapter] did he expound, "It should not be 'Song' for Asaf, rather 'Lamentation' for Asaf! And he expounded that Asaf sang for the fact that God spent His anger on sticks and stones of His house, and thus allowed Israel to survive. For if not for that, he would not have allowed even one Israelite (lit. the enemies of Israel) to survive. And so, the verse states [in Lamentation] "God spent His anger and a fire went out in Zion." So explains Rashi. But there is a Midrash that Asaf said song because the gates sank into the ground. It is compared to a maidservant who went to draw water from the well and whose pitcher fell into the well. She became distraught and began to cry - until the king’s maidservant came to draw water carrying a golden pitcher, and it too, fell into the well. At which point the first maidservant began to sing. ‘Till now’, she exclaimed, I didn’t think that anybody would retrieve my cheap earthenware pitcher from the well. But now, whoever retrieves the golden pitcher, will retrieve mine as well!’ In the same way, when the sons of Korach, who were swallowed up inside the earth, saw how the gates of the Temple sunk into the ground, proclaimed ‘Whoever rescues the gates will also rescue us!’ That explains why Asaf, who was from the family of Korach, said ‘Mizmor.’