meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Nashim/Ketubot/English/Daf Shevui.txt"}
text: Ketubot
  כתובות
  Daf Shevui
  
  
  Ketubot
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court.
  GEMARA. R. Joseph said: Rav Judah said [that] Shmuel said:  Why did they [the rabbis] say: A virgin is married on the fourth day? Because we have learned: If the time [determined for the marriage] arrived and they were not married, they eat of his [food] and they eat of terumah.”
  You might have thought that if the time arrived on the first day of the week he would have to supply her with food, therefore have we learned,  “A virgin is married on the fourth day.”
  R. Joseph said: Master of Abraham! He [Shmuel] attaches a Mishnah which was taught, to a Mishnah which was not taught! Which was taught and which was not taught? This was taught and this was taught! Rather  he attaches a Mishnah, the reason of which was explained, to a Mishnah, the reason of which was not explained.
  Rather if it was said, this is what was said: Rav Judah said [that] Shmuel said: Why did they say, “A virgin is married on the fourth day of the week”? Because if he had a virginity claim he could go early the [next morning] to the court.  Let her be married on the first day of the week, and if he has a virginity claim he could go early [on the morning of the second day of the week] to the court! The Sages watched over the interests of the daughters of Israel so that [the bridegroom] should prepare for the feast three days,  on the first day in the week, the second day in the week, and the third day in the week, and on the fourth day he marries her.
  And now that we have learned that the sages “watched over the interests” that which we have learned: If the time arrived and they were not married, they eat of his [food] and they eat of terumah, if the time arrived on the first day of the week, since he cannot marry her, he does not give her food.
  Therefore, if he became ill or she became ill, or she began to menstruate, he does not give her food.
  There are those who put this as a question: If he became ill, what is [the law]?  There the reason [he need not support her,] is because he is forced, and here too, he is also forced? Or perhaps there he was forced by an enactment which the Rabbis enacted, but here, he is not? 
  And if you say:  If he became ill he provides her with food, [then the question would still be] if she became ill, what is [the law]?  Can he say to her, I am here? Or, perhaps, she can say to him, “His field has been flooded”?
  And if you will say [that] she can say to him, “His field has been flooded” [then the question is,] if she began to menstruate, what is the law? 
  During her regular time there is no question that she cannot say to him, 
  
  Daf 2b
  
  During her regular time there is no question that she cannot say to him, “His field has been flooded.  When is the question asked? Not during her regular time, what is [the law]? Since it is not during her regular time, she can say to him, “His field has been flooded”? Or, perhaps, since there are women who change their periods, it is as if it was her regular time?
  R. Ahai answered: [The mishnah states]:  “When the time came and they were not married, they eat of his food and they eat of terumah.” It does not state: They [the men] did not marry them [the women], rather [it says] “They [the women] were not married.” What is the case? If they delayed [the marriage] why should they eat of his food and eat of the terumah? 
  Therefore, you must say that they were forced as in this case, and it states “they eat of his food and they eat of terumah”?
  R. Ashi said: Indeed I can say [that]  in the case of any forced [delay] she does not eat [of his]. And [the mishnah refers to a case where] they [the men] delayed. And it should have stated, “They [the men] did not marry [the women].” But since the first clause refers to them [the women], the latter clause also speaks of them [the women].
  Rava said:  And with regard to divorce it is not so.  thus Rava holds [that]  “force” is not a claim in regard to divorce.
  From where does Rava get this [rule]?  If we say, from what we have learned:  “Behold this is your get if I do not come back from now until twelve months,” and he died within twelve months, there is no divorce.  [And we would conclude from this that only if] he died there is no divorce, but if he became ill there is a divorce. 
  But perhaps I could say to you [that]  if he became ill there would also be no divorce. And it teaches us that  there is no divorce after death.
  [That] there is no divorce after death, it taught us earlier:  “Behold, this is your get if I die,” [or] “Behold, this is your get [if I die] from this illness,” [or] “Behold, this is your get after [my] death,” he has not said anything.
  [But] perhaps [that mishnah] excludes from the opinion of our rabbis,  for it has been taught: Our rabbis allowed her to marry again. And we said: Who are ‘our rabbis?  Rav Judah said [that] Shmuel said: The court that allowed the oil [of gentiles].  They hold like R. Yose who said, “The date of the document attests to [when it is effective].
  Rather [he derives it from the] later clause:  This is your get]  from now if I do not come [back] from now [and] until twelve months,” and he died within the twelve months, it is a divorce. [And we may deduce] “if he died,” and the same rule applies if he became ill. 
  [But] perhaps [the divorce is effective] only when he died, because he did not want her to be liable to [marry] the levir (yavam).
  But [rather deduce] from here:  here was a certain [man] who said to them:  “If I do not come [back] from now until thirty days it shall be a divorce.” He came [back] at the end of thirty days but the ferry prevented him [from crossing]. He said to them, “Look, I have come [back]; look, I have come [back]!”   Shmuel said: This is not regarded as having come back.
  But perhaps a case of “force” which is frequent  is different, for since he ought to have stipulated it and he did not stipulate it, he caused himself a loss.
  Rather [we must say] Rava stated his own opinion: On account of modest women and on account of loose women.   On account of modest women, because if you will say that it should not be a divorce.  
  
  Daf 3a
  
  sometimes [it may happen] that he was not held back by an accident, and she would think that he was held back by an accident  and she would be an agunah, and sit waitng for him. And on account of loose women, because if you will say [that] it should not be a divorce, sometimes [it may happen] that he was held back by force and she would say that he was not held back by force and she would go and get married, and the result would be [that] the divorce was invalid and her children [from the second marriage] would be mamzerim.
  But is there anything that according to the law of the Torah it would not be a divorce   and on account of “chaste women” and on account of “loose women” we allow a married woman to the world?
  Yes, everyone who betroths, does in accordance with the laws of the rabbis, and the rabbis have annulled his betrothal.
  Ravina to R. Ashi: This makes sense [if] he betrothed her with money, [but if] he betrothed [her] by act of marriage, what can one say [then]? The rabbis have made his act of marriage [an act of] fornication.
  There are those who say: Rava said:  And so [also] with regard to divorce. Therefore Rava holds [that the plea of] force does apply to divorce.  They objected:
  “Behold this is your get if I do not come [back] from now [and] until twelve months,” and he died within twelve months, there is no divorce. If he dies there is no divorce, but if he became ill there would be a divorce
  [That] there is no divorce after death a previous Mishnah teaches.
  Indeed I might say that if he became sick there would be no divorce either, and [the Mishnah] teaches us this that there is no divorce after death. Perhaps [that is] to exclude from that of our teachers.
  Come and hear:  “[This is your get] if from now if I have not come [back] from now [and] until twelve months,” and he died within the twelve months it is a divorce. Would not the same rule apply if he became ill? No, only if he died, because he did not want his wife to become subject to levirate marriage.
  Come and hear: A certain [man] said to them: “If I do not come [back] from now [and] until thirty days it shall be a divorce.” He came [back] at the end of thirty days but the ferry prevented him [from crossing]. And he said to them, “Look, I have come [back]; look, I have come [back]!” And Shmuel said: This is not regarded as having come back.
  An accident which is frequent is different, for since he should have stipulated it and he did not stipulate it, he caused himself the loss.
  Shmuel b. Yitzchak said: They only taught this from the enactment of Ezra and after, [according to which] the courts sit only on the second day and on the fifth day [of the week]. But before the enactment of Ezra, when the courts sat every day, a woman could be married on any day.
  Before the enactment of Ezra, what there was there was! This is what  he means:  If there are courts that sit now as before the enactment of Ezra, a woman may be married on any day.
  But what about the issue of “they watched diligently over…”? This is in a case where he already prepared [for the feast].
  
  Daf 3b
  
  What does it mean “they watched diligently over”? As it has been taught: Why did they say that a virgin is married on the fourth day? So that if he has a virginity claim he could go early the [next morning] to the court. But let her be married on the first day of the week and if he has a virginity claim he could go early [on the morning of the second day of the week] to the court? The Sages watched diligently over the interests of the daughters of Israel so that [the man] should prepare for the feast three days, the first day of the week, and the second day of the week, and the third day of the week, and on the fourth day he marries her.
  And from [the time of] danger the people had a custom to marry on the third day and the sages did not stop them. And on the second day [of the week] he shall not marry; and if on account of duress it is allowed. And they separate the bridegroom from the bride on the nights of Shabbat at the beginning [of their marriage], because he makes a wound.
  What [was the] danger? If I say that they said,  then why does it just say that “they made it a custom”?  Let them abolish it entirely!
  Rabbah said: [That] they said: A virgin that gets married on the fourth day [of the week] shall first have sexual intercourse with the governor. Is this danger? This is duress! Because there are chaste women who would rather surrender themselves to death and [thus] come to danger.
  But teach them that [in a case of] duress [it] is allowed? There are loose women and there are also priestesses.
  But [then] let them abolish it? A decree is likely to be annulled, and [therefore] we do not abolish an enactment of the rabbis on account of a decree. If so, on the third day he [the governor] would also come and have intercourse [with the bride]? Out of doubt he does not move himself.
  “And on the second day [of the week] he should not marry; but if on account of duress it is permitted.” What is “duress”? If you say [that it is] that which we have said, there it is called “danger” and here it is called “duress”? And further, there [it states], “they made a custom” but here, “it is allowed”!
  Rava said: They say: “A general has come to town.”  What is the case? If he comes and passes by, let it be delayed. It is not necessary [to state this but] that he came and stayed. Let him, [then], marry on the third day [of the week]! His vanguard arrived on the third day.
  And if you want I can say: What is [the meaning of] “on account of the duress”?  If his bread was baked and his meat slaughtered and his wine mixed and the father of the bridegroom or the mother of the bride died, they bring the dead [person] into a room and the bridegroom and the bride into the huppah
  
  Daf 4a
  
   and he has the mandated act of intercourse and then separates from her. And [then] he observes the seven days of the [wedding] feast and after that he keeps the seven days of mourning.  And [during] all these days he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women.  And they do not withhold jewellery from the bride all the thirty days. 
  [But this is] only [if] the father of the bridegroom or the mother of the bride [died], because there is [then] no one who should prepare for them [for the wedding], but not [in case of] the reverse.
  Rafram b. Papa said [that] R. Hisda said:  They taught [this] only when water had [already] been put on the meat,  but if water had not [yet] been put on the meat, it is to be sold.
  Rava said: And in a city, although water had been put on the meat, it is sold. Papa said: And in a village, although water had not been put on the meat, it is not sold. But where [then] will you find [the rule] of R. Hisda? Ashi said: For instance, [in] Mata Mehasia, which is neither a city nor a village.
  It has been taught according to R. Hisda:  If his bread was baked and his meat prepared and his wine mixed and water had been put on the meat and the father of the bridegroom or the mother of the bride died, they bring the dead [person] into a room and the bridegroom and the bride into the bridal chamber, and he has the mandated act of intercourse and [then] separates [himself from her]. And [then] he keeps the seven days of the [wedding-] feast and after that he keeps the seven days of mourning. And all these days he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women.
  And so [also] if his wife became a menstruant he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women. And they do not withhold jewelry from the bride all the thirty days. In any case he should not have relations with her on Friday night or Saturday night.
  The master said [above]: He sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women. This supports R. Yohanan, for R. Yohanan said: Although they said [that] there is no mourning on a festival, he keeps [mourning] in private.
  Joseph the son of Rava expounded in the name of Rava:  They taught this only if he had not yet had intercourse with her but if he had [already] intercourse, his wife may sleep with him.
  But here we are dealing with a case where he had intercourse, and it still it teaches [that]  he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women? When did he say [this]? With regard to his wife becoming a menstruant.
  But it teaches: And so [also if his wife became a menstruant].
  
  Daf 4b
  
  This is what he means to say: And so [also], if his wife became a menstruant and he had not yet had intercourse [with her] he sleeps among the men and she sleeps among the women.
  Is this [then] to say mourning is lighter in his eyes than menstruation? 
  Did not R. Yitzchak the son of Hanina say that R. Huna said:  All kinds of work which a wife performs for her husband, a menstruant may perform for her husband, except mixing the cup, making the bed and washing his face, his hands and his feet; But with regard to mourning it has been taught:  Although they said:  A man may not force his wife to paint [her eyes] or rouge [her face], in truth they said:  She may mix him a cup and make his bed and wash his face, his hands and his feet?
  [This is] not difficult: Here [it speaks] of his mourning, there   [it speaks] of her mourning.  
  But it says: “The father of the bridegroom or the mother of the bride [died]”?  This refers to the rest.
  But is there a difference between his mourning and her mourning? Has it not been taught: If a man’s father-in-law or mother-in-law died, he cannot force his wife to paint [her eyes] and to rouge [her face]. Rather he turns over his bed and keeps mourning with her. And so [also] if a woman’s father-in-law or mother-in-law died she is not allowed to paint [her eyes] and to rouge [her face], but she turns over her bed and keeps mourning with him!
  Teach with reference to his mourning: He sleeps among the men and his wife sleeps among the women. But it says: And so too?   This refers to paint and rouge. But it says with him! Does this not mean with him in one bed? No, [it means] with him in one house,  and as Rav said to his son Hiyya: In her presence keep mourning, in her absence do not keep mourning. 
  Ashi said: Can you really compare this mourning with ordinary mourning? Ordinary mourning is strict and he would not deal lightly with it. [But] this mourning, since the rabbis were lenient [about it], he might come to deal lightly with it.
  What is the leniency?   Shall I say because it teaches that he has the mandated act of sex and then separates [from her]?  That is because he has not yet become obligated in mourning, if according to R. Eliezer, [the mourning does not begin] until the body has been taken out of the house, and if according to R. Joshua, [the mourning does not begin] until the rolling stone has been closed!
  Rather [the leniency is this,] because it teaches:  He keeps [first] the seven days of the [wedding] feast and after that he keeps the seven days of mourning.
  The master said:   In any case he many not have first intercourse on the eve of Shabbat or in the night following Shabbat.  It makes on the eve of Shabbat, because of a wound. But in the night following the Shabbat, why not?
  Zera:
  
  Daf 5a
  
  
  
  Daf 5b
  
  he should plug his finger into his ears And this is the same thing that R. Elazar said: Why do the fingers of man resemble pegs? What is the reason?  Shall I say because they are divided? [Surely] each one has been made for its own purpose! For the Master said:  This one is zeret, this one is kemitzah, this one is amah, this one is etzba and this one is gudal.
  Rather, [the question is] why [are the fingers] curved like pegs?  That if one hears an unworthy thing he shall plug his fingers into his ears. A tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: Why is the whole ear hard and the ear-lap soft [So] that if a person hears an unworthy thing he shall bend the ear-lap into it.  Our Rabbis taught: A man shall not let his ears hear idle things, because they are burned first of [all] the organs. 
  The question was asked:  Is it allowed to have sex for the first time on Shabbat? Is the blood [in the womb] stored up, or is it the result of a wound?
  And if you will say [that] the blood is stored up [in the womb, then the question is:] does he need the blood, and it is allowed: or does he need the opening, and it is forbidden?
  And if you will say [that] he needs the blood and the opening comes of itself, [then the question is:] Does the halakhah follow R. Shimon who says: A thing which is not intended is allowed; or does the halakhah follow R. Judah who says:  A thing which is not intended is forbidden?
  And if you will say [that] the halakhah is according to R. Judah [then the question is], do damage in regard to the opening, or does he improve in regard to the opening? 
  There are those who state the question this way: And if you will say that the blood is the result of a wound [then the question is], does he need the blood and it is forbidden, or is he concerned with his own pleasure, and it is allowed?
  And if you will say [that] he is concerned with his own pleasure and the blood comes out of itself, [then the question is] does the halakhah follow R. Judah or does the halakhah follow R. Shimon?
  And if you will say [that] the halakhah follows R. Judah, [then the question is,] does he do damage by [making] the wound, or does he improve by [making] the wound?
  And if you will say [that] he does damage by [making] the wound, [then the question is,] with regard to one who does damage, does the halakhah follow R. Judah? 
  
  Daf 6a
  
  Or does the halakhah follow R. Shimon?
  It was stated: in the school of Rav they said: Rav permitted and Shmuel forbade.  In Nehardea they said: Rav forbade and Shmuel permitted. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: And your sign is: These are lenient on themselves, and these are lenient on themselves.
  But does Rav permit it? Did not R. Shimi b. Hezekiah say in the name of Rav:  [As regards] that stopper of the brewing vat, it is forbidden to squeeze it in on a festival day!
  In that [case]  even R. Shimon admits [that it is forbidden],  for Abaye and Rava, both of them say: R. Shimon admits [that it is forbidden] in [a case of] “If he cuts off its head, will it not die.”
  [But] R. Hiyya the son of Ashi said [that] Rav said: The halakhah is according to R. Judah,   and R. Hanan the son of Ammi said that Shmuel said: The halakhah is according to R. Shimon. And R. Hiyya the son of Avin taught it without [naming the] men:  Rav said the halakhah is according to R. Judah and Shmuel said the halakhah is according to R. Shimon?
  In any case Rav holds like R. Judah, according to the version that says,  “the blood is stored up [in the womb],” he does damage to the opening, [and] according to the version that says, “the blood is the result of a wound,” he does damage in [making] the wound.
  Hisda objected: If a young girl, whose age of menstruation has not arrived, married: Bet Shammai says: she is allowed four nights; And Bet Hillel says:  until the wound is healed.
  If the age of her menstruation has arrived and she married: Bet Shammai says:  she is allowed the first night; And Bet Hillel says:  four nights, until after Shabbat.
  
  Daf 6b
  
  [Now] does it not  mean that if he had not yet had intercourse [with his wife] he may have intercourse [with her] even on Shabbat? Rava said: No, except for Shabbat. Abaye said to him: But it says: “until the night following Shabbat, four nights!” Rather Rava said: Rather Rava said:
   If already had intercourse, what does it teach us? It teaches us that it is permitted to have intercourse on Shabbat, as with the [statement] of Shmuel, for Shmuel said: One may enter into a narrow opening on Shabbat, although  he causes pebbles to break loose.
  Joseph objected:  A bridegroom is exempt from the reading the Shema in the first night until after Shabbat, if he has not performed the act. Is it not because he is anxious to have intercourse? Abaye said to him: No; he is anxious because he has not had intercourse.
  Rava said to him: And on account of anxiety [only] he is exempt [from the Shema]? If this were so, then if his ship sank in the sea, he would also be exempt! And should you say that this is so, did not R. Abba b. Zabda say [that] Rav said:  A mourner is obligated to observe all the mitzvot stated in the Torah except tefillin because it is said with regard to them an “ornament” (Ezekiel 24:17).
  Rather Rava said:  This is a dispute of tannaim, for one teaches: If he did not do the act on the first night, he is exempt [from the Shema] also in the second night;  in the second night, he is exempt [from the Shema] also in the third night.
  And another teaches: In the first and second night he is exempt, but in the third night he is obligated to read Shema.
  And Abaye?  He could hold that there they also differ with regard to anxiety.
  And these tannaim [are] like those tannaim, as it has been taught: He who marries a virgin should not have first intercourse on Shabbat, but the Sages allow [it].
  He who marries a virgin should not have first intercourse on Shabbat, but the Sages allow [it]. Rabbah said: It is R. Shimon, who says: A thing which is not intended is allowed.
  Abaye to him: But R. Shimon agrees [that it is forbidden] in a case of “If its head was cut off will it not die”! He said to him: Not like those Babylonians who are not skilled in moving to the side, rather there are some who are skilled in moving to the side.
  If so, why would he be anxious? This refers to one who is not skilled. [Then] let them say: One who is skilled is allowed, one who is not skilled is forbidden? Most [people] are skilled.
  Rava the son of R. Hanan said to Abaye: If this were so, then why have groomsmen, why have a sheet? He [Abaye] said to him There perhaps he will see and destroy [the tokens of her virginity].
  Ammi objected:  He who pierces an abscess on Shabbat, if in order to make an opening for it, he is liable, but if [in order] to cause pus to come out of 
  
  Daf 7a
  
  There it is stored up and ready to be released, here it is stored up but not ready to be released. There it is stored up and ready to be released, here it is stored up but not ready to be released.
  Ammi permitted first intercourse on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to him: But her kethubah is not written yet! He said to them: Let her seize movable goods.
  Zevid permitted to have first intercourse on Shabbat.  Others say: R. Zevid himself had first intercourse on Shabbat.
  Rav Judah permitted first intercourse on a festival. Papi said in the name of Rava: Do not say that on a festival it is allowed, but on Shabbat it is forbidden, for it is also allowed on Shabbat, and the event that happened, happened in that way.
  Papa said in the name of Rava: On a festival it is allowed, on Shabbat it is forbidden. Papi said to R. Papa:  What is your opinion? Since a wound has been permitted for a necessity it should also be permitted when there is no necessity? If that were so, it should be permitted to put incense on coals on a festival, for since the kindling of fire has been allowed on a festival for a necessity, it should be allowed also when there is no necessity!
  He said to him:  Concerning this the verse said, “Except for that which is eaten by every person,” something that is equally used by every person.
  Aha, the son of Rava, said to R. Ashi: If this were so, then if a deer happened to come to a person on a festival, since it is not of equal usefulness for every person, it would be forbidden to kill it?   He said to him: I say: a thing that is needed every person, [and] a deer is needed every person.
  Jacob bar Idi said: R. Yohanan instructed in Sidon: It is forbidden to have first intercourse on Shabbat. And is there instruction for a prohibition?
  Yes as we have learned in a Mishnah: Bet Hillel instructed her that she should be a Nazirite for another seven years.
  Alternatively like that which has been taught:  If the cord of the spinal column is severed in its larger portion [the animal is trefa], the words of Rabbi. R. Jacob says: Even if it is only perforated [the animal is trefa]. Rabbi instructed according to R. Jacob. Huna said: The halakhah is not according to R. Jacob.
  Nahman b. Isaac taught it thus: R. Abahu said:  R. Ishmael b. Jacob from Tyre asked R. Yohanan in Sidon, and I heard:  Is it allowed to have first intercourse on Shabbat? And he said to him: It is forbidden. And the law is: It is allowed to have first intercourse on Shabbat.
  Helbo said in the name of R. Huna in the name of R. Abba bar Zavda, in the name of Rav:  Both a virgin and a widow requires a blessing. But did R. Huna say this?  Did not R. Huna say: A widow does not require a blessing? It is not difficult: Here it refers to a young man who marries a widow, there to a widower who marries a widow.
  And when a widower marries a widow a blessing is not required? Did not R. Nahman say: Huna b. Natan said to me: A tanna taught:  From where do we know that the blessing of the bridegrooms requires the presence of ten?  Because it is said, “And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said: ‘Sit down.’ And they sat down” (Ruth 4:2). And Boaz was a widower who married a widow! 
  What is it that R. Huna meant, “she does not require a blessing”? She does not require a blessing during all the seven days but on one day she requires a blessing.
  But that which has been taught: The Sages were concerned for the welfare of the daughters of Israel that he may rejoice with her for three days: when does this occur?   If [it speaks] of a young man, did you not say seven days;  If of a widower, did you not say one day?
  If you want, you may say that   it refers to a widower: One day is for the blessing and three days are for rejoicing. And if you wish,  you may say that it refers to a young man: Seven days are for the blessing and three days for rejoicing.
  
  
  Daf 7b
  
  They objected: They bless over a virgin for seven days and over a widow one day. Is this not even [in the case of] a widow who marries a young man? No [only when the widow marries] a widower. But [if a widow is married to] a young man, what is the rule? Seven days? If that is so, let it be taught: They say the blessing for a virgin for seven days, and for a widow who marries a young man seven [days], and for a widow [who marries a widower] one day?
  It taught a decided thing: That there is no virgin who has less than seven days and there is no widow who has less than one day.
  The above text says: R. Nahman say: Huna b. Natan said to me: A tanna taught: From where do we know that the blessing of the bridegrooms requires the presence of ten? Because it is said, “And he took ten men of the elders of the city, and said: ‘Sit down.’ And they sat down” (Ruth 4:2). But R. Abahu said from here: “In assemblies you shall bless God, the Lord, from the fountain of Israel” (Psalms 68:27). And R. Nahman, what does he expound with verse used by R. Abahu?
  He requires it for the following teaching: R. Meir used to say: From where do we know that even fetuses in the wombs of their mothers sang a song by the sea? Because it is said, “In assemblies you shall bless God, the Lord, from the fountain of Israel” (Psalms 68:27).” And the other one? If [that were] so, let the verse say, “From the womb.” Why “from the fountain”? Concerning the matters of the fountain.
  And R. Abbahu how does he expound that verse of R. Nahman? He requires it for expounding: An Ammonite, and not an Ammonitess, a Moabite, and not a Moabitess.  For if you would think that he needed ten to recite the blessing, would it not have been sufficient for them not to be elders?
  And the other one? If you would think [that the verse was to be used] for that midrash, would it not have been sufficient if there had not been ten [persons]? Yes, to publicize the matter, and as Shmuel said to R. Hanna of Baghdad: Go out and bring me ten and I will say to you in their presence; If one assigns [property] to an embryo, it acquires it. But the law is: If one assigns [property] to an embryo, it does not acquire it.      
  Our rabbis taught:  The bridegrooms’ blessing is recited in the house of the bridegroom.   Judah says: Also in the house of the betrothal they bless it.
  Abaye said: And in Judah they taught [R. Judah’s opinion] because [in Judah] he is secluded with her.
  Another [baraita] teaches: The bridegrooms’ blessing is said in the house of the bridegrooms and the blessing over betrothal in the house of betrothal. [As to] the blessing over betrothal, what does one bless? Rabin b. R. Adda and Rabbah son of R. Adda both said in the name of Rav Judah:  Blessed are You, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who has sanctified us by His commandments and has commanded us concerning the forbidden relations and has forbidden to us the betrothed   and has allowed to us the married through huppah and kiddushin. Aha the son of Rava, concludes it in the name of Rav Judah:  Blessed are You, O Lord, who sanctifies Israel through huppah and kiddushin.
  He who does not conclude [holds that] it is like the blessing over deriving benefit and the blessing [said on performing] mitzvot. And he who concludes [holds that] it is like kiddush.
  Our Rabbis taught: They bless the bridegrooms’ blessing in the presence of ten persons all the seven days. Rav Judah said: And that is only if new guests come.
  What does he bless? Rav Yehudah said: Blessed are You, LORD, our God, sovereign of the universe,
  
  Daf 8a
  
  who created everything for His Glory. 
  [Blessed are You, LORD, our God, sovereign of the universe,] who creates man.
  [Blessed are You, LORD, our God, sovereign of the universe,] who creates man in your image, fashioning perpetuated life. Blessed are You, LORD, creator of man.
  May the barren one exult and be glad as her children are joyfully gathered to her (in haste). Blessed are You, LORD, who gladden Zion with her Children.
  Grant perfect joy to these loving companions, as you did your creations in the Garden of Eden. Blessed are You, LORD, who grants the joy of groom and bride.
  Blessed are You, LORD, our God, sovereign of the universe, who created joy and gladness, groom and bride, mirth, song, delight and rejoicing, love and harmony and peace and companionship. Soon, LORD our God, may there ever be heard in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem voices of joy and gladness, voices of groom and bride, the jubilant voices of those joined in marriage under the bridal canopy, the voices of young people feasting and singing. Blessed are You, LORD, who causes the groom to rejoice with his bride. 
  Levi came to the house of Rabbi at the wedding-feast of R. Shimon his son [and] said five blessings.   Assi came to the house of R. Ashi at the wedding-feast of Mar his son [and] said six blessings.
  Shall we say that they argue about this: One holds that there was one formation, and the other holds that  there were two formations?
  No. All agree that there was only one formation, [but they disagree over this:]  One holds that we go according to the intention, and the other holds [that]  we go according to the act, as in the statement of Rav Judah who contrasted the following verses: It is written, “And God created man in His own image,” (Genesis 1:27) and it is written, “Male and female He created He them” (Genesis 5:2). How is this [to be understood]? In the beginning it was God’s intention to create two human beings, and in the end only one was created. 
  Rav Ashi came to the house of Rav Kahana. The first day he said all the blessings. From then and on; if there were new guests he said all the blessings, but if not it is just a continuation of the same joy he blesses, “In whose dwelling there is joy” and “Who has formed.”
  From the seventh day to the thirtieth day whether he said to them “Because of the wedding”   or whether he did not say to them “Because of the wedding,” one says the blessing “In whose dwelling there is joy.” From then and on: If he said to them “Because of the wedding” he says the blessing “In whose dwelling there is joy,” but otherwise not.
  And if he says to them “Because of the wedding,” until when [do they say the blessing]?  Rav Papi in the name of Rava:  Twelve months, a year. And at the outset from when [do they recite the special blessing]?  Rav Papa said: From the time that they put barley into the mortar. But is this so?  Did not Rav Papa busy himself for his son Abba Mar and say the blessing from the time of the betrothal? It was different [in the case of] Rav Papa, for all the preparations were made for him.
  Ravina busied himself [preparing for the wedding] for his son in the house of Rav Habiba and said the blessing from the time of the betrothal.  He said:  I am sure with regard to them that they will not retract [the betrothal]. The matter was not successful and they did retract. Rav Tahlifa of the West, came to Babylon [and] said six long blessings.   But the law is not according to him.
  Rav Habiba came into the house of a circumcision [and] said the blessing “In whose dwelling there is joy.” But the law does not follow him, since they are distressed because the child has pain.
  Rav Nahman said in the name of Rav:  Bridegrooms count in the minyan, and mourners do not count in the minyan.   They objected: Bridegrooms and mourners count in the minyan! You cast a baraita against Rav? Rav is a Tanna and disagrees. It was stated: R. Yitzhak said that R. Yohanan said: Bridegrooms count in the minyan, but mourners to do not count in the minyan. They objected: Bridegrooms and mourners count in the minyan!
  
  Daf 8b
  
  That was taught with regard to birkat hamazon and R. Yohanan referred to the line [in which mourners are comforted].
  But what about the statement of R. Yitzhak in the name of R. Yohanan:  They say the blessing of the bridegrooms in the presence of ten and the bridegrooms count in the minyan, and they say the blessing of the mourners in the presence of ten and the mourners do not count in the minyan. Is there a blessing said in the line of comforters?  Rather, R. Yohanan made that statement with regard to the [blessing recited in the] plaza.
  But what about the statement of R. Yitzhak in the name of R. Yohanan: They say the blessing of the bridegrooms in the presence of ten all the seven [days] and the bridegrooms count in the minyan and they say the blessing of the mourners in the presence of ten all seven and the mourners do not count in the minyan. Is the blessing [recited in] the plaza?  It is possible in the presence of new guests.
  As in the case of R. Hiyya bar Abba, [who was] the teacher of written Torah to the son of Resh Lakish, or, as some say, the teacher of oral Torah to the son of Resh Lakish.   A child of his died. The first day [of mourning] he [Resh Lakish] did not go to him. The next day he [Resh Lakish] took with him Judah the son of Nahmani, his meturgaman. He said to him: Rise, say something about the child. He began to speak: “And the Lord saw and spurned, because of the provoking of His sons and His daughters” (Deuteronomy 32:19). A generation in which the fathers spurn the Holy One, blessed be He, He becomes angry with their sons and their daughters and they die when they are young.
  And some say  he was a young man and that this is what he said to him: “Therefore the Lord shall have no joy in their young men, neither shall He have compassion on their fatherless and widows; for everyone is profane and an evil doer, and every mouth speaks folly. For all this His anger is not turned away, but His hand is stretched out still” (Isaiah 9:16). What is the meaning of “but His hand is stretched out still”? Rav Hanan bar Rav said: All know why a bride goes into the bridal chamber, but whoever disgraces his mouth and lets a disgraceful word out of his mouth even if a decree of seventy years of happiness were sealed for him it is turned for him into evil.
  He came to comfort, he caused him pain? This is what he said to him: You are important enough to be punished for the sins of the generation.
  He said to him: Rise, say something with regard to the praise of the Holy One, blessed be He. He spoke and said: The God, who is great in the abundance of His greatness, mighty and strong in an abundance of awesome deeds, who revives the dead with His word, who does great things that are beyond knowing and wondrous works without number. Blessed are you, O Lord, who revives the dead.
  He said to him: Rise, say something with regard to the mourners. He spoke and said:  Our brethren, who are worn out, who are crushed by this bereavement, set your heart to consider this: This is what stands forever, it is a path from the six days of creation. Many have drunk, many will drink, as the drinking of the first ones, so will be that of the last ones.  Our brethren, may the Lord of consolation comfort you. Blessed be He who comforts the mourners.
  Abaye said: Let him say, “Many have drunk” but “many will drink”  he should not say; Let him say, “the drinking of the first ones,” but “the drinking of the last ones” he should not say,  for R Shimon, the son of Lakish said, and so it was taught in the name of R. Yose:  A person should never open his mouth to Satan. Rav Joseph said: What is the verse, “We would have been like Sodom, we would have been like Gomorrah” (Isaiah 1:9)? What did He reply unto him? “Hear the word of the Lord, you rulers of Sodom” (Isaiah 1:10).
  He said to him: Rise, say something with regard to the comforters of the mourners. He spoke and said: Our brethren, performers of acts of loving kindness, children of performers of acts of loving kindness, who hold fast to the covenant of Abraham our father [as it is said, “For I have known him, to the end that he may command his children…” (Genesis 18:19)], our brethren, may the Lord of reward pay you your reward.  Blessed are you who pays a reward.
  He said to him: Rise, say something with regard to the whole of Israel.  He spoke and said: Master of the world, redeem and save, deliver and help Your people Israel from pestilence,   and from the sword, and from plundering, and from the blast, and from the mildew, and from all kinds of calamities that come into the world.  Before we call, You answer. Blessed are you who stops the plague.
  Ulla said, and some say it was taught in a baraita: The sages established ten cups of wine for the house of the mourner:  Three before the meal in order to open up the stomach, three during the meal in order to soak the food in the stomach, and four after the meal: one corresponding to “who sustains,” one corresponding to the blessing over the land, one corresponding to “who rebuilds Jerusalem,” and one corresponding to “who is good and does good.”
  They added to them four more cups: ne in honor of the officers of the town, and one in honor of the leaders of the town, and one in honor of the Temple, and one in honor of Rabban Gamaliel. They began to drink and to become intoxicated, they restored the matter to its original state. 
  What does it mean “Rabban Gamaliel?” As it has been taught: At first the carrying out of the dead was harder for his relatives than his death, so much so that they would leave him and run away, until Rabban Gamaliel came and treated himself lightly, and they carried him out in garments of linen, and then all the people followed his example and carried out the dead in garments of linen. Rav Papa said:  And now the common practice to carry out the dead even in rough cloth worth only a zuz.
  Rabbi Elazar said:
  
  Daf 9a
  
  He who says: I have found an “open opening” is trusted to make her forbidden for him. Why?
   It is a double doubt: It is a doubt [whether she had the intercourse with the other man while] married to him, or before married to him. And if you say that [she had that intercourse] while married to him, there is still a doubt [whether she had intercourse] by violence or according to her own free will!
  It was necessary [to state this rule] in the case of the wife of a priest.  And if you want, you may say [that it speaks of] the wife of an Israelite, and for instance when her father received the betrothal for her when she was less than three years and one day old. 
  What does teach us? We have already learned: One who says to a woman, "I have betrothed you [to myself]” and she says, "You did not betroth me," she is permitted to his relatives, but he is forbidden to her relatives.
  What you might have said?  There he is certain, but here he is not certain. Therefore he teaches us [this rule].
  But did R. Elazar really say this?  Did not R. Elazar say: A woman does not become forbidden to her husband except with warning and seclusion, as we find in the occurrence that happened?
  But is this reasonable?  Was the occurrence that happened accompanied by warning and seclusion? And furthermore, did they prohibit her to him?
  This is not a difficulty, for thus he means to say: A wife does not become forbidden to her husband except in the case of warning and seclusion, [and this we learn] from the occurrence that happened, where there was no warning and seclusion and therefore she was not prohibited. But in any case, there is still a difficulty.  Where there was warning and seclusion [she is prohibited to him] but if [he said, “I found] an open opening” she is not prohibited! 
  But according to your argument you could deduce:  [In the case of] warning and seclusion, yes, [and in the case of] witnesses, no!
  Rather this is what he means: The wife does not become forbidden for her husband through one witness but through two witnesses; but in the case of warning and seclusion, even through one witness, and “an open opening” is like two witnesses.
  And if you will say:  [In the case of] the occurrence that happened why did they not declare her forbidden? There it was rape. And if you wish you can say like that of R. Shmuel the son of Nahmani said in the name of R. Yonatan: 
  
  Daf 9b
  
  Everyone who goes out into the battle of the House of David writes for his wife a bill of divorce, for it is written, “And to your brethren bring greetings, and take their pledge” (I Samuel 17:18).  What does it mean “and take their pledge”? Rav Joseph taught: Things which are mixed between him and her.
  Abaye said:  We have also taught this: A virgin is married on the fourth day of the week. On the fourth day, but not the fifth day. What is the reason? On account of the cooling of his temper.
  With regard to what [do we care if he cools off]? If with regard to giving her the ketubah, let him give it to her. Rather it is with regard to making her forbidden to him.
  And when he claims a claim is it not that he claims the claim of “an open opening”? No, [it is a case where] he claims the claim of blood.
  Rav Judah said [that] Shmuel said: If any one says: “I have found an open opening,” he is believed to cause her to lose her ketubah. Rav Joseph:  What does he teach us? We have already learned this: He who eats at his father-in-law’s [between the time of betrothal and the time of marriage] in Judaea, without witnesses, cannot [after the marriage] make a virginity, because he was secluded with her.   In Judaea he cannot make a claim, but in Galilee he can make it.
  Now in which respect?  If to make her forbidden for him, why should he not be able to make this claim in Judaea?  Rather it is to cause her to lose her ketubah. And when he claims a claim, is it not that he claims the claim of “an open opening”? No, when he claims the claim of blood.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  It was stated: Rav Nahman said in the name of Shmuel who said in the name of R. Shimon ben Elazar: The rabbis enacted for the daughters of Israel, for a virgin two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh [one hundred zuz].  And they believed him, so that if he said, “I have found an open opening,” he is believed. If so, what have the Sages accomplished with their enactment?
  Rava said: The presumption is [that] no one will take the trouble of preparing a wedding feast and will then spoil it.
  It was taught: Since it is a fine instituted by the sages she collects only from the worst land  [of the husband’s estate]. A fine! Why is it a fine?  Rather say: Since it is an enactment of the sages, she collects only from the worst land [of the husband’s estate]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: A woman’s ketubah is from the Torah.
  But did Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel really say this? But it has been taught: [It is written in the Torah] “He shall pay money according to the bride-price of virgins” (Exodus 22:16); that this is as much as the dowry of the virgins and the dowry of the virgins is as much as this.  From here the Sages found a support for [the rule that] a woman’s ketubah is from the Torah.  Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says: A woman’s ketubah is not from the words of the Torah, but from the words of the scribes.
  Reverse it. And what did you see to reverse the latter?  Reverse the former!
  We have heard that R. Shimon ben Gamaliel said that the ketubah is from the Torah, for we learned:  Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says:  He gives her [the ketubah] in Cappadocian coins.
  And if you wish, you may say: The whole of it follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel and it is defective and it teaches thus: From here the sages found a support from the Torah for a woman’s ketubah. The ketubah of a widow is not from the Torah but from the words of the scribes, for Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says: The ketubah of a widow is not from the words of the Torah but from the words of the scribes.
  A certain man came before R. Nahman and said to him: I have found an open opening.   Nahman answered: Lash him with palm branches; prostitutes were available to him.
  But it is R. Nahman who said that he [the husband] is believed! He is believed, but they also lash him with palm-branches. Ahai answered: Here [it refers] to a young man, there [it refers] to one was married before.
  A certain came before Rabban Gamaliel [and] said to him, I have found an “open opening”. He [Rabban Gamaliel] answered him: Perhaps you moved aside. I will give you a parable: To what is this like? To a man who was walking in the deep darkness of the night [and came to his house and found the door locked]. If he moves aside [the bolt of the door] he finds it open, if he does not move aside [the bolt of the door] he finds it locked.
  There are those who say [that] he [R. Gamaliel] answered him thus: Perhaps you moved aside intentionally and you tore away the door and the bar.  I will give you a parable: To what is this like? To a man who was walking in the deep darkness of the night [and came to his house and found the door locked]; if he moves aside [the bolt of the door] intentionally he finds it open, if he does not move aside [the bolt of the door] intentionally he finds it locked.
  A certain man came before Rabban Gamaliel the son of Rabbi [and] said to him: My master, I have had intercourse and I have not found any blood. She said to him:  My master, I was a virgin. He said to them: Bring me that cloth.  They brought him the cloth, and he soaked it in water and he washed it and he found on it a some drops of blood.  He [Rabban Gamaliel] said to him [the husband]: Go, be happy with your acquisition.
  Huna Mar the son of Rava of Parazikia said to R. Ashi: We should also do this?   He answered him: 
  
  Daf 10b
  
  Our  laundry work is like their  washing. And if you will say let us do laundry work, [my answer is] the smoothing stone will remove it. 
  A certain man came before Rabban Gamaliel the son of Rabbi [and] said to him: My master, l have had intercourse and I have not found any blood. She [the wife] said to him: My master, I am still a virgin. He said to them: Bring me two handmaids, one who is a virgin and one who was not a virgin. They brought them to him, and he placed them upon a cask of wine. The one who was not a virgin, the smell wafted through; the virgin, the smell did not waft through. He [then] placed this one [the wife] also [on a cask of wine] and the smell did not waft through. He said to him: Go, be happy with your acquisition.
  But he should have examined her from the very beginning! He had heard a tradition, but he had not seen it done in practice. And he thought, lest the matter might not be certain and it would not be proper to deal lightly with daughters of Israel.
  A certain man came before Rabban Gamaliel the elder [and] said to him: My master, I have had intercourse and I have not found any blood. She [the wife] said to him: My master, I am of the family of Dorkati, [the women of] which have neither blood of menstruation nor blood of virginity. Rabban Gamaliel investigated among her women relatives and he found in accordance with her words. He [then] said to him:  Go, be happy with your acquisition. Happy are you that you merited a woman of the family of Dorkati.
  What is [the meaning of] Dorkati? A cut-off generation.  Hanina said: Empty consolation Rabban Gamaliel offered that man, for R. Hiyya taught: As the leaven is good for the dough, so is blood good for a woman. And one has [also] taught in the name of R. Meir:  Every woman who has abundant blood has many children.
  It was said: R. Jeremiah b. Abba said: He [Rabban Gamaliel] said to him [the husband]: Be happy with your acquisition. But R. Jose b. Avin said: He said to him: You have been made liable with your acquisition.  It is understandable for the one who says, You have been made liable with your acquisition,  this follows the view of R. Hanina. But according to the one who says, “Be happy”, what is the merit [of such a marriage]? He [the husband] does not come to any doubt regarding menstruation.
  Someone came to Rabbi [and] said: My master, I have had intercourse and I have not found any blood. She said: My master, I was [and am] still a virgin, and it was during years of famine.  Rabbi saw that their faces were black, [and] he gave some orders concerning them, and they brought them to a bath and gave them to eat and to drink and brought them to the bridal chamber, and he (the husband) had intercourse with her and found blood. He  said to him: Go, be happy with your acquisition. Rabbi applied to them the verse: “Their skin is shriveled upon their bodies, it is withered, it is become like a stick” (Lamentations 4:8).
  1) A virgin — her kethubah is two hundred [zuz], and a widow — a maneh (100 zuz). 2) A virgin, who is a widow, [or] divorced, or a halutzah from betrothal — her kethubah  is two hundred [zuz], and there is upon her a claim of non-virginity.
  GEMARA. Why [is a widow called] “almanah”?  R. Hana of Baghdad said: Because of the maneh (al shum maneh). But what can be said with regard to a widow from the betrothal? Because that one is called “almanah” this one is also called “almanah.” 
  What can be said with regard to [the word] “almanah,” that is written in the Bible?  That the Rabbis will in future enact for her a maneh. But does the Bible speak of a thing which will be in the future? Yes, for it is written:  “And the name of the third river is Hiddekel, that is it which goes towards the east of Ashur” (Genesis 2:14), and R. Joseph taught: Ashur, that is Seleucia. But was [Seleucia] already then in existence? But because it will exist in the future. Here too because it will exist in the future. 
  And R. Hana of Baghdad also said: “Rain” (matar)—waters, saturates and enriches [the earth] and refreshes and enlarges [the fruits]. Rava the son of R. Ishmael, and some say R. Yemar the son of Shelemyah, said:  What is the verse?   “Saturating its furrows, leveling its ridges. You soften it with showers, You bless its growth” (Psalms 65:11). 
  Elazar said: The altar removes and feeds, makes beloved, atones. “Atones” is the same as “removes” the same meaning?   It removes [evil decrees] and atones for sins.
  Hana of Baghdad also said: Dates warm, satisfy, act as a laxative, satisfy and do not make [one] delicate. Rav said: If one has eaten dates, he should not give a legal decision. They objected: Dates in the morning and evening are wholesome, in the afternoon they are bad, at noon there is nothing like them and they remove three things: evil thought, gastrointestinal disorders, and bowel disorders!
  Did we say that they are no good?  They are indeed good, only for the moment [they cause] unsteadiness. Just like wine, for the Master said: He who has drunk one-fourth [of a log] of wine shall not give a legal decision.  And if you wish you may say: There is no difficulty:  This is before a meal and that is after a meal, for Abaye said: Mother told me: Dates before a meal are as an axe to the palmtree, after a meal as a bar to the door.
  Dasha [door]: Rava explained: Derekh sham  [that is the way].   Darga [stairs, ladder]: Raba explained: Derekh gag [by way of the roof].   Puria [bed]: R. Papa explained: Sheparin verabin aleha [because one is fruitful and multiplies on it]. Nahman b. Isaac said: 
  
  
  Daf 11a
  
  We also teach “aylonit”—a “duchranit” for she cannot give birth.
  A female proselyte, a woman captive, and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] less than three years and one day old — their kethubah is two hundred [zuz] there is upon them a claim of non-virginity.
  GEMARA. R. Huna said: A minor convert is immersed on the consent of the court.
  What you might have said? That it is an advantage to him and one may act for a person in his absence to his advantage? We have learned this already:  One may act for a person in his absence to his advantage, but one may not act for a person in his absence to his disadvantage!
  What you might have said? A non-Jew prefers a life without restraint because it is established for us that a slave certainly prefers a life without restraint, therefore, he teaches us
  that this is said only in the case of an adult who has already tasted sin, but [in the case of] a minor, it is an advantage to him.
  Should we say that [this Mishnah] supports him:  A female proselyte, a woman captive, and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] less than three years and one day old? Is it not that they immersed them on the consent of the court?
  No. What are we dealing with here? A proselyte whose sons and daughters were converted with him, that it is comfortable for them to do what their father does.
  Joseph said:  When they become of age they can protest [against their conversion]. Abaye raised a difficulty:   A female proselyte, a woman captive, and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] less than three years and one day old — their kethubah is two hundred [zuz] there is upon them a claim of non-virginity. Now if you indeed think that when they have become of age they can protest [against their conversion], would we give her the ketubah that she may go and consume [it] in her Gentile state?
  When she has become of age.   When she has become of age, she can protest and go out [of her marriage]!  As soon as she was of age one hour and did not protest she cannot protest any more.
  Rava objected:  These young girls receive the fine: If a man has intercourse with mamzeret, a netinah, a Samaritan, a convert, a captive or a slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] less than three years and one day old–they have to be paid the fine.  Now if you say [that] when they have become of age they can protest, would we give her the fine that she may go and consume it in her Gentile state?
  When she has become of age. When she has become of age she can protest and go out! As soon as she was of age one hour and did not protest she cannot protest any more.
  Abaye did not say as Rava [said] because there, with regard to the fine, the reason might be that the sinner should not have any benefit.  
  Rava did not say as Abaye said because in the case of the ketubah the reason might be that it   should not easy for him to send her away.
  When an adult has had sexual intercourse with a young girl, or when a small boy has had intercourse with an adult woman, or a girl who was injured by a piece of wood   — [in all these cases] their kethubah is two hundred [zuz], the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: a girl who was injured by a piece of wood — her kethubah is a maneh.
  1. A virgin, who was a widow, a divorcee, or a halutzah from marriage— her kethubah is a maneh,
  
  Daf 11b
  
  and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her.
  A female proselyte, a woman captive and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] more than three years and one day old — their kethubah is a maneh, and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her.
  GEMARA. Rav Judah said that Rav said:  A young boy who has intercourse with an adult woman makes her [as though she were] injured by a piece of wood.  When I said this before Shmuel he said:  There is no such thing as “injured by a piece of wood” when done by flesh.
  Some teach this teaching on its own: [As to] a young boy who has intercourse with an adult woman: Rav said: He makes her [as though she were] injured by a piece of wood; whereas Shmuel said:  There is no such thing as “injured by a piece of wood” when done by flesh.
  Oshaia objected:  When an adult has had sexual intercourse with a young girl, or when a small boy has had intercourse with an adult woman, or a girl who was injured by a piece of wood — [in all these cases] their kethubah is two hundred [zuz], the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say:  a girl who was injured by a piece of wood — her kethubah is a maneh
  Rava said. It means this: When adult man has intercourse with a young girl it is nothing, for when the girl is less than this, it is like putting a finger into the eye. But when a young boy has intercourse with an adult woman he makes her as “a girl who is injured by a piece of wood.” And “a girl injured by a piece of wood” is a dispute between R. Meir and the Sages.
  Rami b. Hama said: The dispute is only when he knew that she was [a mukat etz], for R. Meir compares her to a mature girl, and the Sages compare her to a woman who had intercourse with a man.   But if he did not know that she was a [mukat etz] , all agree that she receives nothing.
  And why does R. Meir compare her to a mature girl?  Let him compare her to a woman who had intercourse with a man! [In the case of] a woman who had intercourse with a man, something had been done to her by a man; but in the case of a mukat etz, nothing had been done to her by a man. And why do the Rabbis compare her to a woman who had intercourse with a man? Let them compare her to a mature girl! [In the case of] a mature girl nothing whatsoever has been done to her, but in the case of a mukat etz something has been done to her. “But if he did not recognize that she was a mukat etz, all agree that she receives nothing.”
  Nahman objected:  If she says: “I was injured by a piece of wood,” and he says. ‘No, you had intercourse with a man,” Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say [that] she is believed.
  Rather Rava said:  Whether he knew that she was a mukat etz or did not know according to R. Meir [her ketubah is] two hundred [zuz].  According to the Rabbis, if he knew that she was a mukat etz, [her ketubah is] a maneh, [if] he did not know, she gets nothing. 
  Rava changed his opinion, for it has been taught:  How does the bringing out of an evil name take place?   He comes to court and says, “I, So-and-so, have not found your daughter to be a virgin.” If there are witnesses that she fornicated while betrothed to him, she gets a ketubah of a maneh.  If there are witnesses that she fornicated while betrothed to him, she is to be stoned!  It means this:   If there are witnesses that she fornicated while betrothed to him, she is to be stoned; if she fornicated before the betrothal, she gets a ketubah of a maneh.
  And R. Hiyya b. Abin said that R. Sheshet said:  This means: If he married her in the presumption that she is a virgin and she was found to have had intercourse with a man, she gets a ketubah of a maneh. And R. Nahman objected: One who marries a woman and does not find her to be a virgin, and she says, “After you betrothed me I was raped and your field has been flooded,” and he says, “No, before I betrothed you, you had intercourse with a man and my acquisition was a mistake”–and she gets nothing!
  And R. Hiyya b. Abin said to them:  Is it possible! R. Amram and all the great ones of the generation sat when R. Shesheth said that teaching and they found it difficult and he   answered:  What does it mean that it is a mistaken acquisition? In respect of two hundred [zuz], but she does receive a maneh.  And you say that she receives nothing!
  And Rava said: He who asked [this question] has asked well, for a “mistaken acquisition” means entirely. But [then] that [other teaching] presents a difficulty.   Resolve it and say it this: If there are witnesses that she fornicated while betrothed to him she is to be stoned, if she fornicated before [the betrothal], she gets nothing. If she was found to be injured by a piece of wood, she has a ketubah of a maneh.
  But it was Rava who said [above that], according to the Rabbis, if he did not know that she was a mukat etz, she gets nothing! Rather you must conclude from this that Rava retracted that opinion.
  Our Rabbis taught:  If the first husband brought her [the bride] into his home for the sake of marriage and she has witnesses that she was not secluded with him, or even if she was secluded with him, she did not stay with him as much time as is needed for intercourse, the second husband cannot make a virginity claim for the first [husband] had taken her into his home for the purpose of marriage. 
  
  Daf 12a
  
  Rabbah said: This means that if he married her in the presumption that she was a virgin and she was found to have had intercourse she gets a ketubah of a maneh.  Ashi said: In general I could say to you that she receives nothing; but it is different here, because the first one had married her.
  But let us be concerned that she fornicated while betrothed to him! Sheravia said: For instance he betrothed her and immediately had intercourse with her.
  There are those who teach this in reference to our Mishnah:  A virgin, who was a widow, a divorcee, or a halutzah from marriage— her kethubah is a maneh, and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her. A virgin from marriage- how is it possible? When she was brought into the bridal chamber and no intercourse took place.
  Rabbah said: This means that if he married her in the presumption that she was a virgin and she was found to have had intercourse she gets a ketubah of a maneh. Ashi said: In general I could say to you that she receives nothing; but it is different here, because the first one had married her.
  But let us be concerned that she fornicated while betrothed to him! Sheravia said: For instance he betrothed her and immediately had intercourse with her.
  He who teachs this in reference to the baraita, how much more [could he teach it in reference] to our Mishnah.  But he who teaches this in reference to our Mishnah might not teach it in reference to the baraita, because he could say to her, “I have relied on the witnesses.”
  He who eats with his father-in-law in Judea without the presence of witnesses cannot raise a virginity claim against his wife because he has been alone with her.
  GEMARA. Since it says in the Mishnah “one who eats”, it follows that there are places also in Judea where one does not eat.   Abaye said: Conclude from this that in Judea, too, there are different places [with different customs]. As it was taught: R. Judah said: In earlier times in Judea they used to leave the bridegroom and the bride alone one hour before their entry into the bridal chamber, so that he may become intimate with her, but in Galilee they did not do so.
  In earlier times in Judea they used to set up two groomsmen, one for him and one for her, in order to examine the bridegroom and the bride when they enter the bridal chamber, and in Galilee they did not do so.
  In earlier times in Judea the groomsmen used to sleep in the house in which the bridegroom and the bride slept, and in Galilee they did not do so.
  And anyone who did not act according to this custom could not make a virginity claim. To which [does this refer]? If I say [that it refers] to the first clause?  [If so,] It should have read, “He who acted [according to this custom]!”
  And [if you will say that it refers] to the last clause, it should have read, “He who was not examined.”
  Abaye said: Indeed [it refers] to the first clause, and recite it [thus]: “He who acted [according to this custom]. Rava said to him: But it reads, “He who did not act [in this way]!” Rather Rava said this is what it says:  He who did not act according to the custom of Galilee in Galilee but [acted] according to the custom of Judea in Galilee cannot make a virginity claim. R. Ashi said: Indeed [it refers] to the last clause, and read it this way, “He who was not examined.”
  It is the same whether [the woman is] an Israelite widow or a priestly widow  — her kethubah is a maneh. The court of the priests collected for a virgin four hundred zuz, and the sages did not protest.
  GEMARA. A Tanna taught: And the widow of a priest -her ketubah is two hundred. But we have taught in our Mishnah:  It is the same whether [the woman is] an Israelite widow or a priestly widow  — her kethubah is a maneh.
  Ashi said:  There were two enactments.  At first they enacted for a virgin four hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  When they saw that the treated them  lightly, they enacted for them two hundred zuz. When they saw again that they stayed away from them, saying, “Instead of marrying a priestly widow, we will rather marry the virgin Israelite,” they restored their [former] enactment.
  The court of the priests, etc.: Judah said that Shmuel said:  They did not say this only regarding the court of the priests, but even families of good lineage in Israel, if they want to do as the priests do, they may do so.
  They objected: If one wants to do as the priests do, for instance [if] the daughter of an Israelite [gets] married to a priest or the daughter of a priest [gets married] to an Israelite, one may do [so]. A daughter of an Israelite to a priest or a daughter of a priest to an Israelite [can do this] because one side belongs to the priesthood, but if the daughter of an Israelite [gets married] to an Israelite, it is not allowed!
  It is a case of “not only”; not only [is it allowed in the case of] the daughter of an Israelite [getting married] to an Israelite, who cannot say to her, “I am raising you up [to a higher social status”]; but [in the case of] the daughter of an Israelite [getting married] to a priest who can say to her, “I am raising you up [to a higher social status]” I might say that it is not allowed, therefore he teaches us that it is permitted.
  If a man marries a woman and does not find her to be a virgin: She says,  “After you betrothed me I was raped, and so your field has been washed away” And he says, “No, rather [it occurred] before I betrothed you and my acquisition was a mistaken acquisition” — Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed. Rabbi Joshua says: We do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had intercourse before she was betrothed and having deceived him, until she brings proof for her statement.
  GEMARA. It was stated: [One who says to another], “I have a maneh in your hand,” and the latter responds, “I do not know”: Rav Judah and Rav Huna say:  He is liable [to pay]. And R. Nahman and R. Yohanan say:  He is exempt [from paying].   Huna and R. Judah say: He is liable [to pay]–in the case of “certain” and “perhaps” “certain is preferable. Nahman and R. Yohanan say: He is exempt [from paying]–leave the money in the possession of its present owner.
  Abaye said to R. Joseph: The opinion of R. Huna and Rav Judah corresponds with that of Shmuel, for we have learned: She was pregnant and they said to her, “What is the nature of this fetus?’ [And she answered, “It is] from so-and-so and he is a priest.” Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed.  And R. Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel.
  And R. Shmuel b. Judah said to Rav Judah: Toothy one! You said to us in the name of Shmuel [that] the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel even in the first Mishnah. [Now what does it mean]: “Even in the first [Mishnah]”?  Even though one could say, “Leave the money in the possession of its [present] owner” [still] Rabban Gamaliel would say: “certain” is preferable.
  Shall we then say that R. Judah and R. Huna follow the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel, and R. Nahman and R. Yohanan follow the opinion of R. Joshua?
  Nahman could say to you: I follow even the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel;  only Rabban Gamaliel says it there because there is “migo”. But what “migo” is there here?
  Alternatively: Rabban Gamaliel says it only there, because we say: “Leave her in her presumptive state,” but here what presumptive state has he got?
  It is also reasonable, as we have answered, that R. Nahman follows the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel,
  
  Daf 13a
  
   for if it were [not] so, there would be a difficulty between one halakhah and another halakhah, for we hold [that] in civil matters the halakhah follows R. Nahman, whereas in this [case] R. Judah [said] in the name of Shmuel [that] the halakhah follows Rabban Gamaliel. Rather, it is as we resolved, conclude [so] from this.
  She says, “I was struck by a piece of wood”,  And he says, “No, you, rather you have been trampled by a man:” Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed, And Rabbi Joshua says: We do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having been trampled by a man, until she brings proof for her statement.
  GEMARA. What are their claims? Yohanan says: Two hundred zuz and a maneh. Elazar says: A maneh and nothing.
  Yohanan says: Two hundred zuz and a maneh, he holds like R. Meir who says  that whether he knew or did not know [she was a mukat etz] she gets as her kethubah two hundred zuz. And R. Elazar says: A maneh or nothing, because he holds like the Rabbis who say that whether he knew of her or did not [she was a mukat etz], she gets a maneh.
  It is understandable why R. Elazar does not say as R. Yohanan says because he interprets it  according to the Rabbis.But why does R. Yohanan not say as R. Elazar?
  He holds that if he married her in the presumption of her being a virgin and she is found to have had intercourse, she has a ketubah of a maneh. If so, here he would say “a maneh,” and she would say “a maneh,” and what difference would there be between his claim and her claim?
  It is understandable, why, according to R. Elazar we have taught two cases [in the Mishnah] one to exclude the opinion of Rami b. Hama, and one to exclude the opinion of R. Hiyya b. Abin in the name of R. Sheshet.
  But according to R. Yohanan why are two cases necessary?
  One to show you the strength of Rabban Gamaliel, and one to show you the strength of R. Joshua. The first case to show you the strength of R. Joshua, that, although one could say there migo, she is not believed. The second case to show you the strength of Rabban Gamaliel, that, although one cannot say there migo, she is believed.
  They saw her talking with someone in the marketplace, and they said to her, “What sort of a man is he?” And she answered, “He is so-and-so and he is a priest” — Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed,  And Rabbi Joshua says: we do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had relations with a natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof for her statement.
  She was pregnant and they said to her, “What is the nature of this fetus?’   And she answered, “It is from so-and-so and he is a priest.” — Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: she is believed, And Rabbi Joshua says: we do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had relations with a natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof for her statement.
  GEMARA. What is the meaning of “talking”? Ze’iri said: She was secluded. R. Assi said: She had intercourse. It is understandable according to Ze’iri, for that is why it says, “talking.” But according to R.Assi why does it say “talking”? It is a euphemism, as it is written: “She eats, and wipes her mouth, and says, ‘I have done no wickedness’” (Proverbs 30:20).
  It is understandable according to Ze’iri that it teaches in the Mishnah two cases: “talking” and “pregnant,” but according to R. Assi, why does the Mishnah teach two cases?
  One case to declare her fit and one case to declare her daughter fit.
  This goes well according to him who says that he who declares her fit declares also her daughter fit. But according to him who says that he who declares her fit declares her daughter unfit, what is there to say? Assi holds like the one who says that he who declares her fit declares also her daughter fit.
  1. Papa said to Abaye:  According to Ze’iri who said: What is “talking”? She was secluded, and R. Joshua said that she is not believed, did not Rav say:  We punish with lashes for seclusion but we do not prohibit on account of seclusion? Should we say that this does not follow R. Joshua?
  You may even say that it follows R. Joshua, for they set a higher standard in matters of priestly lineage.
  They objected: If they saw her go in with someone into a hidden place
  
  Daf 13b
  
  or into a ruin, and they said to her, “What sort of a man is he?” and she answered, “He is a priest and he is the son of the brother of my father”: Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed. R. Joshua says: We do not live by her mouth, rather she is in the presumption of having had intercourse with a natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof for her words.
  It goes well according to Ze’iri, that it teaches two cases: into a hidden place or into a ruin. But according to R. Assi who said: “she had intercourse,” why does it teach two cases? It teaches only one case: Into the hidden place of a ruin.
  But it teaches: Into a hidden place or into a ruin!  Rather say one refers to the ruin of a town and one refers to the ruin of a field. And they are both necessary. For if it had taught us only concerning a ruin of a town, I might have said that in this case Rabban Gamaliel declares her fit because most of the men of the town are fit with regard to her, but in the case of  a ruin of a field, where most of the men are unfit with regard to her, I might say that he agrees with R. Joshua.
  And if it  had told us only this case, I might have said that only in this case did R. Joshua say that she is not believed, but in that case I might say that he agrees with Rabban Gamaliel; therefore it was necessary to state both cases.
  They objected: This is testimony which a woman is fit to give. But R. Joshua says:  She is not believed. Joshua said to them: Do you not agree that in the case of a woman who was captured, and there are witnesses that she was captured, and she says, “I am pure,” that she is not believed?
  They said to him: Yes, but what a difference there is between this case and that case.  In that case there are witnesses, and in this case there are no witnesses.
  He said to them: In this case too there are witnesses, for her stomach reaches up to her teeth. They said to him: Most non-Jews are unrestrained in sexual matters. He said to them: There is no guardian in sexual matters.
  This applies only in the case of the testimony of the woman with regard to herself but in the case of the testimony of the woman with regard to her daughter all agree that the child is a shetuki.
  What did he say to them and what did they answer him? This they said to him: You have answered us with regard to the pregnant woman, what will you answer us with regard to the woman whom they saw talking to a man?  He said to them: The woman whom they saw talking to a man is the same as the captive woman. They said to him: The captive woman is different, for most of the idolators are unrestrained in sexual matters. He said to them:  Here also, since she hid herself, there is no guardian in sexual matters.
  Now in any case it teaches two cases: he woman whom they saw talking to a man and the pregnant woman! This is a refutation of R. Assi,  this is indeed a refutation.
  But let him note this difference–there most of the men are unfit with regard to her, but here most of the men are fit with regard to her! This supports R. Joshua b. Levi, for R. Joshua b. Levi said: He who declares her fit declares her fit even when most of the men are unfit, and he who declares her unfit declares her unfit even when most of the men are fit.
  Yohanan says: He who declares her fit declares also her daughter fit, and he who declares her unfit declares also her daughter unfit. And R. Elazar says: He who declares her fit declares her daughter unfit.
  Rabbah said: What is the reason of R. Elazar? It is understandable with regard to her, she has the presumption of fitness, but her daughter has no presumption of fitness.
  Elazar raised an objection to R. Yohanan: This only applies to the testimony of the woman with regard to herself, but in the case of the testimony of the woman with regard to her daughter, all agree that the child is a shetuki. Does this not mean a shetuki and unfit? No, a shethuki and fit.
  But is there such a thing as a shetuki who is fit? Yes, according to Shmuel, for Shmuel said If ten priests are standing together and one of them goes away and has intercourse with a woman, the child is a shetuki.
  Now what does shetuki mean here? Is it to say that he is “silenced” from the property of his father? This is obvious! Do we even know who his father is? Rather it means that he is silenced from the rights of being a priest, for it is written: “And it shall be for him and for his seed after him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood” (Numbers 2513): ne whose seed legitimately descends from him, excluding this one, whose seed does not descend from him.
  A betrothed couple once came before R. Joseph. She said,  “It is from him.”  And he said: 
  
  
  Daf 14a
  
  “Yes. It is from me.” Joseph said: What should we be concerned about? First, he admits, and moreover, Rav Judah said that Shmuel said: The halakhah is according to Rabban Gamaliel.
  Abaye said to him: And in this case, if he did not admit [that it was his], would Rabban Gamaliel declare fit? Did not Shmuel say to Rav Judah: Toothy one! The halakhah is according to Rabban Gamaliel, but you should not act on it, unless most men are fit for her, whereas here most men are unfit for her!
  And according to your reasoning is not this statement in itself difficult? First he says  ‘The halackah is…” and then “do not act on it”! Hence you must say: The one ruling applies ab initio, the other ex post facto, and in this case it is ex post facto.
  Abaye asked Rava: Did R. Joshua say: She is not believed? But this contradicts the following: R. Joshua and R. Judah b. Batera testified concerning the widow [of one who was] of a mixed family that she is fit to marry a priest.
  He said to him: Now is this so? There the woman marries, and she examines [his lineage] and [then] marries; but here the woman who is licentious; does she first examine and then act licentiously?
  Rava said: One statement of R. Joshua and the other statement of R. Joshua contradict each other, but one statement of Rabban Gamaliel does not contradict the other statement?  But does not the concluding clause teach: Rabban Gamaliel said to them:  We accept your testimony, but what can we do, since Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai decreed that no court be set up for this purpose because the priests will obey you to distance but not to bring near?
  Rather Rava said: There is no contradiction between the statement of Rabban Gamaliel and the other statement of Rabban Gamaliel, because there it is “certain” and here it is “perhaps.”
  Neither is there a contradiction between the one statement of R. Joshua and the other statement of R. Joshua, because in that case there is one doubt and here there is a double doubt.
  Therefore, according to Rabban Gamaliel the “certain” is so strong that even where there is only one doubt he declares her fit, and the “perhaps” is so weak that even where there is a double doubt he declares her unfit. And according to R. Joshua one doubt is so strong that even in the case where she stakes a “certain” claim he declares her unfit, and a double doubt is so light that even in the case where she stakes a “perhaps” claim he declares her fit.
  Our Rabbis taught: Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? Anyone about whom there is no doubt on account of mamzerut, natinut or on account of slaves of the kings. Meir said:
  
  Daf 14b
  
  I have heard that when there is none of these defects in the family, they may marry her into the priesthood.
  Shimon b. Elazar said in the name of R. Meir and R. Shimon the son of Menasia also said it:  Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? When a doubtful halal was mixed up in it,
  for the Israelites know the mamzerim who are among them, but they do not know the halalim who are among them.
  The Master said:  Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? Anyone about whom there is no doubt on account of mamzerut, natinut or on account of slaves of the kings. [By implication] if there is a doubt on account of a halal in the family she is fit. 
  Why should these be different? Because these are Biblical? A halal is also Biblical. And further: R. Meir said:  I have heard that when there is none of these defects in the family they may marry her into the priesthood. This is the same as that which the first Tanna taught!
  And further: R. Shimon b. Elazar said in the name of R. Meir and R. Shimon b. Menasia also said like him:  Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? When a halal was mixed up in [his lineage], for the Israelites know the mamzerim who are among them, but they do not know the halalim who are among them. But it says in the first clause [that if there is a doubt regarding] a halal [in the family], she is fit to marry into the priesthood!
  Yohanan said:  There is a difference between them concerning a person who when he is called a mamzer protests and when he is called a halal is silent. The first Tanna holds that every person who when called “unfit” is silent is considered unfit, and thus the first Tanna said: Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? When with regard to her there is no one who is silent if he is called mamzer or natin, or slave of the king, or halal. Our Rabbis taught:  Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? Anyone about whom there is no doubt on account of mamzerut, natinut or on account of slaves of the kings.  
  Meir said: I have heard that when there is none of these defects in the family, they may marry her into the priesthood.
  Shimon b. Elazar said in the name of R. Meir and R. Shimon the son of Menasia also said it: Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? When a doubtful halal was mixed up in it, for the Israelites know the mamzerim who are among them, but they do not know the halalim who are among them. The Master said: Which is the widow of one of a mixed family? Anyone about whom there is no doubt on account of mamzerut, natinut or on account of slaves of the kings. And R. Shimon b. Elazar said to the first Tanna of R. Meir:  If you have heard that R. Meir declares the person fit in the case of silence, this is not when he is called halal and is silent, but when he is called mamzer and is silent. And why is he silent? Because he says to himself. a mamzer is well-known.  
  But if he is called mamzer and he protests or he is called halal and is silent he is unfit, for the reason he is silent is because he thinks, it is enough if he is not excluded from the congregation. One baraita taught:  R. Yose says:If he is called mamzer and is silent, he is fit, and if he is called halal and is silent, he is unfit.
  And another baraita taught:  If he is called halal and is silent he is fit, but if he is called mamzer and is silent, he is unfit.
  Rabbi Yose said: it happened that a young girl went down to draw water from a spring and she was raped. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said: if most of the inhabitants of the town marry [their daughters] into the priesthood, this [girl] may [also] marry into the priesthood.
  GEMARA. Rava said to R. Nahman: According to whom did R. Yohanan b. Nuri say [his statement in the Mishnah]? If according to Rabban Gamaliel, he declares her fit even when there is a majority of unfit!  And if it is according to R. Joshua, he declares her unfit even when there is a majority of fit!  He said to him: Rav Judah said that Rav said:
  
  Daf 15a
  
  The incident happened in the marketplaces of Tzippori, and this follows R. Ammi,  for R. Ammi said: And that is when a company of fit men passed by there, and it also follows R. Yannai for R. Yannai said: If she had intercourse in the marketplaces she is fit for the priesthood.
  In the marketplaces, does that make sense? Rather say: If she had intercourse at the time of [the wagons arriving at] the marketplaces she is fit for the priesthood. But if someone went out from Tzippori and had intercourse with her, the offspring is a shetuki.
  Like the following: When R. Dimi came he said in the name of Ze’iri who said in the name of R. Hanina, and some say: Ze’iri said in the name of R. Hanina: We go after the majority of the town and we do not go after the majority of the passing company.
  Just the reverse! These move about and these are stationary!
  Rather we go after the majority of the inhabitants of the town, but only when there is also the majority of the passing company with it, but only when there is also the majority of the passing company with it, of the town alone, nor after the majority of the passing company alone. What is the reason? It is a decree not to go after the majority of the passing company in order to prevent going after the majority of the inhabitants of the town.
  But even in the case of the majority of the inhabitants of the town, if he, went to her, he who separates himself separates himself from the majority?   It is only necessary when she went to him so that he was stationary, and R. Zera said: All that is stationary is considered as half to half. 
  But do we require two majorities? Has it not been taught: Nine [butcher] shops, all of them  sell ritually slaughtered meat and one sells meat not ritually slaughtered and he bought from one of them and he does not know from which one he bought it is prohibited because of the doubt. But if [meat] was found, follow the majority?
  And if you will say that this refers to a case when the gates of the city are not closed, so that a majority came also from outside, did not R. Zera say: Even when the gates of the city are closed? They added an extra degree of stringency in matters of lineage.
  The text says: R. Zera said: All that is stationary is considered as half to half. Whether this results in a leniency or in a stringency.
  From where does R. Zera derive this? If I say from [the following baraita]: nine butcher shops, all of them sell ritually slaughtered meat and one sells meat not ritually slaughtered and he bought in one of them and he does not know in which of them he bought, it is prohibited because of the doubt; But if [meat] was found, one goes after the majority? There it leads to a stringency!
  Rather [he derives it] from [the following]: If there were nine frogs and one sheretz and he touches one of them and he does not know which of them he touched he is unclean because of the doubt? There it also leads to a stringency.
  But [rather] from [the following]: If there were nine sheratzim and one frog and he touches one of them and he does not know which of them he touched: In the private domain he is unclean because of the doubt; in a public domain, he is clean because of the doubt.
  And how do we know this from the Torah? The verse says: “And if he lie in wait for him and rise up against him.” [He is not guilty of murder] until he intended [to kill] him.  And the Rabbis? they said in the school of R. Yannai: This excludes one who throws a stone into [a group of people].
  What was the exact case? What was the exact case? If you say there were nine non-Jews and one Israelite? Let it be sufficient for him that the majority are non-Jews. Alternatively, if it was half and half, [the rule is that] when there is a doubt in capital cases one takes a lenient view!
  Rather it is necessary when there were nine Israelites and one non-Jew, so that the non-Jew is stationary, and whatever is stationary is considered as half and half.
  It was stated: R. Hiyya b. Ashi said in the name of Rav: The halakhah follows R. Yose. And R. Hanan b. Rava said in the name of Rav: It was a temporary decision.
  Yirmiyah raised an objection:   And for matters of lineage we do not require two majorities? Have we not learned: 
  
  Daf 15b
  
  If one found in it an abandoned child — if the majority were non-Jews [the child is] a non-Jew, if the majority are Jews [the child is] a Jew, half and half, [the child is] a Jew. 
  And Rav said: They have taught this only with regard to sustaining it, but not with regard to lineage. And Shmuel said: [They have taught this only] with regard to removing stones from on top of it.
  That which R. Judah said in the name of Rav,  that the incident happened at the springs of Tzippori, escaped his attention.
  But according to R. Hanan b. Rava who said [that]  it was a temporary decision, it is difficult!    He who taught this did not teach that.
  The above text said: If one found in it an abandoned child — if the majority were non-Jews [the child is] a non-Jew, if the majority are Jews [the child is] a Jew, half and half, [the child is] a Jew. And Rav said:  They have taught this only with regard to sustaining it, but not with regard to lineage. And Shmuel said:  [They have taught this only] with regard to removing stones from on top of it.
  But did Shmuel really say this? Did not R. Joseph say that R. Judah said in the name of Shmuel: We do not follow the majority when it comes to saving a life? Rather when Shmuel said it, it referred to the first clause: If the majority [of the inhabitants of the town are] non-Jews [the child is] a non-Jew. [On this] Shmuel said: And with regard to removing stones from on top of it.
  If the majority [of the inhabitants of the town consist of] non-Jews [the child is] a non-Jew: For what practical purpose [was this taught]? Papa said: To feed him meat not ritually slaughtered.
  If the majority [of the inhabitants of the town are] Jews [the child is] a Jew: For what practical purpose [is this taught]? Papa said: That one returns to him a lost object.
  If [the inhabitants of the town are] half and half [the child is] Jewish: For what practical purpose [is this taught]? Resh Lakish said: With regard to damages.   What is the exact case? If it was an ox of ours that gored an ox of his?   [In this case] let him say to him: “Bring evidence that you are an Israelite — and take!”
  Rather it is necessary when an ox of his gored an ox of ours: One half he pays, and with regard to the other half he says to them: “Bring evidence that I am not an Israelite and I will pay you.”
  May we return to you “A virgin is wedded.”
  A woman became a widow or was divorced. She says,  “I was a virgin when you married me” and he says,  “Not so, rather you were a widow when I married you”, — If there are witnesses that she went out with a hinuma, and with her head uncovered, her ketubah is two hundred [zuz.]   Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: the distribution of roasted ears of corn is also evidence.
  And Rabbi Joshua admits that, if one says to his fellow, “This field belonged to your father and I bought it from him”, he is believed,
  
  Daf 16a
  
  for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that it belonged to his father and he says, “I bought it from him”, he is not believed.
  GEMARA. The reason is that there are witnesses, but if there are no witnesses the husband is believed. Shall we say that it is taught anonymously not according to Rabban Gamaliel? For if it were according to Rabban Gamaliel, did not he say that she is believed?
  You may even say [that it accords with] Rabban Gamaliel: for Rabban Gamaliel says [it]  only there in a case of “certain” and “perhaps.” But here where they are both “certain” he did not say it.
  But now that you have said that, why did you say that? Clearly this is a case where they are both “certain”!  Since most women get married as virgins [you might say that] it is like “certain and perhaps.”
  This is also reasonable from that which it teaches “and Rabbi Joshua agrees.”     If you say that it refers to Rabban Gamaliel with whom he agrees, then it is understandable. But if you say it does not refer to Rabban Gamaliel with whom he agrees, then with whom does R. Joshua agree?
  Do you think [that] R. Joshua refers to this chapter? He refers to a “miggo” in the first chapter.
  To which [does he refer]? If you [that he refers] to this: If she was pregnant, and they said to her: What is the nature of this fetus? [And she answered: It is] from So-and-so and he is a priest.  Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed, [and] R. Joshua says: We do not live from her mouth! What miggo is there in that case?  Behold, her stomach reaches up to her teeth!  
  Rather, it [might] refer to this: They saw her talking with someone  and they said to her: “What is the nature of this man?” [And she answered, “He is] So-and-so and he is a priest.” Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed. And R. Joshua says: We do not live from her mouth.  What miggo is there in that case? This works for Ze’iri, who says [that] “she was talking” means “she was secluded [with a man].” [In which case she has] a miggo, for if she wished she could say, “I did not have intercourse” and [still] she said, “I had intercourse,” [therefore] she is believed. But according to R. Assi, who says that “she was talking” means “she had intercourse,” what miggo is there?
  Rather, he might refer to this: She says, “I was injured by [a piece of] wood,” and he says.  “Not so, rather you were trampled [i.e. had sex] with a man.”  Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed, and R. Joshua says: We do not live from her mouth.   What miggo is there?
  This works according to R. Eliezer, who says that [the dispute between the husband and the wife is] with regard to a maneh and nothing. She has] a miggo, for if she wished she could have said, “I was injured by a piece of wood under you [after betrothal],”  and she would get two hundred [zuz], and [still] she said [that she was injured] earlier, [therefore] she is believed. But according to R. Yohanan who says that [the dispute between the husband and the wife is] with regard to two hundred and a maneh, what miggo is there? 
  Rather he refers to this: If one has married a woman and has not found her to be a virgin [and] she says,  “After you betrothed me I was raped and your field was flooded,” and he says, ‘Not so, but rather it happened before I betrothed you.”
  Rabban Gamaliel and R. Eliezer say: She is believed, and R. Joshua says:  We do not live from her mouth. For [here there is] a miggo, because if she wished she could say, “I was injured by a piece of wood after betrothal,” and [by saying this] she would not make herself unfit for the priesthood and [still] she said, “I have been raped,” and she makes herself unfit for the priesthood; therefore Rabban Gamaliel said that she is believed. And R. Joshua said to Rabban Gamaliel:  With regard to this miggo here, I agree with you, but with regard to that miggo there, I disagree with you.
  Now, this is a miggo and that is a miggo, what difference is there between this miggo and that miggo? Here there is no slaughtered ox before you, there, there is a slaughtered ox before you.
  But since most women get married as virgins, [even] if no witnesses came, why is that important? Ravina said: Because one could say, most women are married as virgins and a minority as widows. And whenever a virgin gets married, it has a voice, 
  
  Daf 16b
  
  and since this one does not have a voice, [the presumption that she belonged to] the majority has been undermined.
  But if [you maintain that] whenever a virgin gets married she has a voice, [then even] when witnesses come, what of it? They are false witnesses! Rather Ravina said: Most marriages of virgins have a voice, and [in the case of] this one, since there is no voice, [the presumption that she belonged to] the majority has been undermined.
  If there are witnesses that she went out with a veil (himuna), etc. But let us be concerned that she might produce witnesses before this court and collect her ketubah and then later produce the ketubah before another court and collect [a second time] by that [document]! Abbahu said: That is to say they write a receipt. Rav Papa said: We are dealing with a place where they do not write a ketubah.
  Some teach this with regard to the following baraita: If she lost her ketubah document, or she hid it, or it was burned: If they danced before her, played before her, passed before her the cup of [glad] tidings, or the cloth of virginity, if she has witnesses with regard to one of these, her ketubah is two hundred [zuz].
  But let us be concerned that perhaps she might produce witnesses before this court and collect her ketubah and then later produce the ketubah before another court and collect [a second time] by that [document]! Abbahu said: That is to say they write a receipt. Rav Papa said: We are dealing with a place where they do not write a ketubah.
  But does it not say “If she lost her ketubah document”? He wrote her [one]. But in the end, she will still produce it and collect [her kethubah a second time] with it! What does it mean “she lost [it]”? [It means:] “she lost [it] in fire.”  
  If so, it is the same as “it was burned!” Furthermore, what can you say with regard to “she hid [it]?”   And furthermore, why [mention] “she lost [it]”? Rather [this is what the baraita means]: If she lost it, it is as if she had hidden it before us, and we do not give her [the ketubah money] until witnesses say [that] her ketubah document has been burned.
  He who teaches this in reference to the baraita, all the more [does he refer it] to the Mishnah. But he who teaches this in reference to our Mishnah [does] not [teach it] in reference to the baraita, because of the difficulty.
  If there are witnesses, etc. But let us be concerned that perhaps she might produce witnesses of the veil before this court and collect [her ketubah] and [later] she might produce [other] witnesses of the veil before another court and collect [her ketubah a second time]! In a case where it is not possible otherwise, we certainly write a receipt.
  “[If] they passed before her the cup of glad tidings.” What is the cup of [glad] tidings? Rav Adda the son of Ahava said: They pass before her a cup of wine of terumah, as if to say, “This one is worthy of eating terumah.” Rav Papa raised an objection: Does not a widow eat terumah?   Rather Rav Papa said [as if to say]: This one is “first” just as terumah is “first”. 
  It has been taught: R. Judah says: They pass before her a cask of wine. Rav Adda the son of Ahava said: [If she was] a virgin they pass before her a closed one, [and if] she had had intercourse with a man they pass before her an open one. Why? Let us pass [a cask of wine] before a virgin and let us not pass [a cask of wine] at all before one who had intercourse? [It could happen] some times that she would seize two hundred [zuz] and [then] say, “I was a virgin and they did not pass [a cask of wine] before me because they were prevented by an accident.”
  Our rabbis taught: How does one dance before the bride? Bet Shammai say:
  
  Daf 17a
  
  The bride as she is. And Bet Hillel say: “A beautiful and graceful bride”! Bet Shammai said to Bet Hillel: If she was lame or blind, does one say of her, “Beautiful and graceful bride”? Whereas the Torah said, “Keep away from a lie” (Exodus 23:7). Bet Hillel said to Bet Shammai: According to your words, if one has made a bad purchase in the market, should one praise it in front of him or denigrate it? Surely, one should praise it in front of him. Therefore, the sages said: One should always have a pleasing disposition in front of other people.
  When Rav Dimi came, he said: Thus they sing before the bride in the West: No blue makeup and no rouge and no braiding [of the hair], and still a graceful gazelle. When the Rabbis ordained R. Zera they sang before him: No blue makeup and no rouge and no braiding [of the hair], and still a graceful gazelle.
  When the Rabbis ordained R. Ammi and R. Assi they sang before them thus: All such as this, and all such as this ordain for us, but do not ordain for us of those who garble or babble, and some say: of the one-fifth scholars or one-third-scholars. 
  When R. Abbahu came from the Yeshiva to the court of the Emperor, handmaids from the Emperor’s house went out towards him and sang before him thus: “Prince of his people, leader of his nation, shining light, blessed be your coming in peace!”
  They tell of R. Judah b. Ilai that he used to take a myrtle twig and dance before the bride and say: “Beautiful and graceful bride.” Rav Shmuel the son of Rav Yitzchak danced with three [twigs].   Zera said: The old man is putting us to shame. When he died, a pillar of fire came between him and the rest of the world. And we have a tradition that a pillar of fire has made such a separation only either for one in a generation or for two in a generation only. 
  Zera said: His twig (shotiteh) [benefited] the old man, and some say: His craziness (shtuteh) [benefited] the old man, and some say: his method (shitateh) [benefited] the old man
  Rav Aha took her on his shoulder and danced [with her]. The Rabbis said to him: Can we also do this? He said to them: If they are like a beam to you, [then it is] permitted and if not, [you may] not.
  Shmuel b. Nahmani said [that] R. Yonatan said: It is permitted to look at the face of the bride all the seven days in order to make her beloved to her husband. But the halakhah is not according to him.
  Our Rabbis taught: They move aside a funeral procession to make way for a bridal procession, and both of them for the King of Israel.  They said of King Agrippa that he made way for a bride, and the sages praised him.
  They praised him, from this we can conclude that what he did was appropriate. But did not R. Ashi say: Even according to he who says [that] if a prince forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, if a king forgoes his honor, his honor is not forgone for a Master said: You shall set over yourself a king” (Deuteronomy 17:15) [this means] that his awe shall be over your?  It was [at] a crossroads.
  Our Rabbis taught: One interrupts the study of the Torah for the sake of a funeral procession and bringing the bride [into the huppah]. They said about R. Judah b. Ila’i that he would interrupt the study of Torah for the sake of a funeral procession and bringing the bride [into the huppah]. When is this so? When there are not sufficient people at the funeral procession,   but if there are sufficient people one does not interrupt [the study of the Torah].
  And how many are sufficient? R. Shmuel the son of Ini said in the name of Rav: Twelve thousand men and six thousand trumpets. And some say: Thirteen thousand men and among them six thousand trumpets. Ulla said: For instance when people form a line from the city-gate to the burial place. Sheshet, and some say R. Yohanan said:  Its taking away is like its giving. Just as its giving was in [the presence of] sixty myriads of people, so its taking away should be in [the presence of] sixty myriads of people. And this is the case only with regard to one who read [the Bible] and recited [the oral Torah.]  
  
  Daf 17b
  
  But there is no measure for one who teaches [the oral Torah].
  And if there are witnesses that she went out with a hinuma etc. What is hinuma? Surhab b. Papa said in the name of Ze’iri: A myrtle-canopy. Yohanan said:  A veil under which the bride naps.
  Yohanan ben Beroka says, etc. It was taught: This was [regarded as] a proof in Judaea. What is the proof in Babylonia? Rav said: The dripping of oil on the heads of the scholars.  Papa said to Abaye: Did the master refer to oil [used] for cleaning [the head]? He said to him: You orphan, did your mother not do the dripping of the oil on the heads of the scholars at the time of the event? As that [case when] one of the scholars was occupied with the wedding of his son in the house of Rabbah b. Ulla, and some say, Rabbah b. Ulla was occupied with the wedding of his son in the house of one of the scholars, and he dripped oil on the heads of the scholars at the time of the event.
  What [sign is there at the wedding of] a widow? Joseph taught:  A widow has no roasted ears of grain [distributed at her wedding].
  And R. Joshua agrees that if one says to his fellow etc. But let him teach: R. Joshua agrees that if one says to his fellow, “This field belonged to you and I have bought it from you” [he is believed]?
  Because he would have to teach [in] the last clause: If there are witnesses that it was his and he says, “I have bought it from you” he is not believed. [And] what was this case?
  If he ate [the produce of] it [during the] years of hazakah why should he not be believed? And if he did not eat [the produce of] it [during the] years of hazakah it is obvious that he is not believed!
  If so, with regard to his father also [one could argue]: If he ate [the produce of] it [during the] years of hazakah why should he not be believed?   And if he did not eat [the produce of] it [during the] years of hazakah, it is obvious that he is not believed!
  It works with regard to [the field belonging to] his father, [because] it could happens for instance, when he ate [the produce of] it two [years] during the life of the father and one [year] during the life of his son. And [this would be] according to R. Huna,  for R. Huna said: One does not acquire the ownership of the property of a minor through hazakah even if [he continued in the possession after] the minor had become of age.
  But does R. Huna comes to teach [what is already taught In] our Mishnah! If you wish you may say, R. Huna says what is to be derived from our Mishnah by implication. And if you wish, you may say,  “He teaches us, even if he had become of age.”
  But let him teach with regard to himself and stand the case where he ate [the fruits of] it two [years] in his presence and one [year] in his absence, and, for instance, when he fled?
  Because of what did he flee?  If he fled because of [danger to his] life, it is obvious that he is not believed. since he cannot protest! And if he fled because of money [matters] he ought to have protested because we hold [that] a protest in his absence is a [valid] protest!  For we have learned: 
  There are three regions with regard to hazakah: Judea, Trans-Jordan and Galilee.  [If] he was in Judea and someone took possession [of his land] in Galilee, [or he was] in Galilee and someone took possession [of his land] in Judea, it is not a hazakah until he is with him in the [same] province. And we asked concerning this, 
  what does he hold? If he holds that a protest in his absence is a [valid] protest, this should apply also to Judaea and Galilee.   And if he holds [that] a protest in his absence is not a [valid] protest, it should not he [a valid protest] even if they are both in Judaea?
  Abba bar Mamel says:  He always holds that a protest in his absence is a valid protest, but our Mishnah refers to a time of emergency.
  And why are Judea and the Galilee different such that he mentions them?
  
  Daf 18a
  
  For in general Judea and the Galilee are like a time of emergency.
  But let it teach: R. Joshua admits that when one says to his fellow, “I borrowed from you a maneh and paid it back to you” he is believed! Because he would have to teach in the last clause: “If there are witnesses that he borrowed from him [a maneh] and he says ‘I have paid it back,’ he is not believed.” But we hold the principle that if one lends money to his fellow in front of witnesses, he need not pay it back to him before witnesses.
  But let him teach: R. Joshua admits that if one says to his fellow, “I owed to your father a maneh and I returned to him half,” he is believed! 
  According to whose opinion?  If according to the opinion of the Rabbis. surely they say [that he is regarded as] one who returns a lost thing, [and] if according to R. Eliezer b. Yaakov.  Surely he says that he must take an oath! 
  For it has been taught: R. Eliezer b. Yaakov says: Sometimes a person has to take an oath because of his own statement. How so?  [If one says to his fellow], ‘I owed your father a maneh and I returned to him half,” he must take an oath. And this is [a case] where one takes an oath because of his own statement.  But the Sages say:  He is only as one who returns a lost thing and he is exempt.
  And does R. Eliezer b. Jacob not hold [that] one who returns a lost thing is exempt [from an oath]?  Rav said:  [It speaks here of a case] when a minor claimed from him. But did not a Master say: One does not take an oath because of a claim by a deaf-mute, a person lacking sound senses, or a minor? 
  What is [meant by] “minor”? An adult, and why does he call him a “minor”? Because with regard to the affairs of his father he is [regarded as] a minor. If so, [it is not] “his own statement?”  It is a claim made by others! It is a claim [made] by others and [also] his own admission.
  But all claims are really a claim made by others and one’s own admission!
  They differ here with regard to [an opinion of] Rabbah,  for Rabbah said:  Why did the Torah say that he who admits a part of the claim must take an oath? [Because] it is assumed that no man is brazen in the face of his creditor.  He would indeed like to deny the whole debt. But he does not deny the whole debt because no one is so brazen.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  He would like to admit that he owes the whole debt, and the reason he does not admit, is that he would like to elude him [for the time being]. And he thinks, “as soon as I will have money I will pay it,” and [therefore] the Torah said:  Impose an oath on him, so that he should admit the whole of it.
  Eliezer b. Jacob holds [that] he is not brazen against him nor against his son, and therefore he is not like one who returns a lost thing. And the Rabbis hold [that]  against him he is not brazen, but against his son he might be brazen, and since he is not brazen, he is like one who returns a lost thing.
   If witnesses said, “This is our handwriting, but we were forced, [or] we were minors, [or] we were disqualified witnesses” they are believed.   But if there are witnesses that it is their handwriting, or their handwriting comes out from another place, they are not believed. 
  GEMARA. Rami b. Hama said: They taught this only when they said: We were forced by threats with regard to money. But if they said we were forced [by threats] to our life, they are believed.
  Rava said to him:  Does he really have this power? Once he has once testified he cannot again testify! And if you will say [that] this applies only to oral testimony but not to testimony in a document, did not Resh Lakish say: If witnesses are signed on a document it is as if their testimony had been examined in court?
  Rather, if it has been said, it has been said with regard to the first clause: they are believed. Rami b. Hama said:  They taught this only when they said, “We were forced [by threats] to [our] life.” But if they said, We were forced [by threats] with regard to money” they are not believed because no one makes himself out to be wicked. Our rabbis taught:
  They are not believed to disqualify it, the words of R. Meir. But the Sages say [that] they are believed. This goes well according to the rabbis, who follow their reasoning, “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits,” but what is the reason of R. Meir? It works [with regard to] those disqualified from testifying [because] the creditor himself checks beforehand and [then] he signs. With regard to] “minors” also [it can be explained] according to R. Shimon ben Lakish. for Resh Lakish said:
  
  Daf 19a
  
  It is a presumption that the witnesses do not sign a document unless [everything] was done by adults. But when it comes to “we were under duress” what is his reasoning?
  Hisda said: R. Meir holds that if one said to witnesses, “sign a falsehood and you will not be killed,” they should rather be killed and not sign a falsehood.
  Rava said to him: Now. if they would come to us to ask advice, we would say to them: Go [and] sign and do not be killed, for a Master said: “There is nothing that comes before the saving of life except idolatry, fornication and murder.”  Now that they have signed, can we say to them: why have you signed? 
  Rather the reason of R. Meir is in accordance with what R. Huna that Rav said: for R. Huna said that Rav said: If he  admits that he has written the document, there is no need  to confirm it.
  [To revert to] the main text: R. Huna said that Rav said: If he admits that he has written the document, there is no need to confirm it. Nahman said to him:  Why do you say this in a sneaky way?  If you hold with R. Meir, say: the halakhah is according to R. Meir.
  He said to him: And how does the Master [you], hold?  He said to him: When they come before us in court, we say to them: go [and] confirm your documents and [then] come to court.
  Rav Judah said that Rav said: If one said: This is a loan document of trust he is not believed.
  Who said it? If the debtor said it, it is obvious; why should he be believed? If the creditor said it, may a blessing come upon him! Rather, the witnesses said it. If their handwriting comes out from another place, it is obvious that they are not believed, and if their handwriting does not come out from another place, why should they not be believed?
  Mnemonic: BASH)  Rava said:  Indeed, the debtor said [it], and [it is] follows R. Huna, for R. Huna said that Rav said: If he admits that he has written the document, there is no need to confirm it.
  Abaye said: Indeed, the creditor said it, and it is a case where he would cause a debt to others.
  And it follows R. Natan, for it has been taught: R. Nathan says: From where [do we learn that], if one has a claim of a maneh against his fellow and that fellow against another fellow, we take from this one and give it to that one? Scripture says, “And he shall give to whom he owes” (Numbers 5:7).
  Ashi said: Indeed, the witnesses said it, and [it is in a case] where their handwriting does not come out from another place; and when you asked why should they not be believed, it is as stated by R. Kahana, for R. Kahana said: It is forbidden for a man to keep a loan deed of trust in his house, because it is said: “Let not unrighteousness dwell in your tents” (Job 11:14).
  
  Daf 19b
  
  And R. Sheshet the son of R. Idi said: From [the words of] R. Kahana we can learn [the following]: Witnesses who said, “Our words were [regarding a matter of] trust,” they are not believed, or this reason: Since it is “unrighteousness,” [we say that] on unrighteousness they would not have signed.
  Joshua b. Levi. said: It is forbidden for a man to keep a paid bill of debt in his house, because it is said: “Let not unrighteousness dwell in your tents.” In the West they said in the name of Rav: [It is said]: “If iniquity be in your hand, put it far away” (Job 11:14) this refers to a loan deed of trust and a deed of sale for accommodation; [and it is said]: “And let not unrighteousness dwell in your tents” (ibid). This is a paid bill of debt.
  He who says [that it applies to] a paid bill of debt, how much more [does it apply to] a loan deed of trust. But he, who says [that it applies to] a loan deed of trust, [would hold that it does not apply to] a paid bill of debt, because sometimes they keep it on account of the scribe’s fees.
  It was stated: A scroll that has not been corrected: Ami said: For thirty days one is allowed to hold on to it, from that point and onward, it is forbidden to hold on to it, because it is said: “Let not unrighteousness dwell in your tents.”
  Nahman said: Witnesses who said, “Our words were [regarding a matter of] trust” are not believed. [If they said], “Our words were [accompanied by a] declaration,” they are [also] not believed. Mar the son of R. Ashi said: [If witnesses said] “Our words were [regarding a matter of] trust,” they are not believed; [But if they said], “Our words were [accompanied by] a declaration,” they are believed. What is the reason?  This one was allowed to be written and that one was not allowed to be written.
  Rava asked of R. Nahman: [If witnesses say], “Our words were [accompanied by] a condition,” what is the law?  “A declaration” and “trust” are not believed because they overturn [the validity] of the document, and this overturns [the validity] of the document? Or perhaps “condition” is a different situation? He said to him: When they come before us in court, we say to them: go fulfill your conditions and then come to court.
  If one witness says [that there was] a condition, and one witness says [that there was] no condition: R. Papa said: They both testify to a valid document and only one says [that there was] a condition, and the words of one [witness] have no value where there are two witnesses.
  Huna the son of R. Joshua objected: If so, even if they both say [that there was a condition] [their words should] also [have no value]! Rather we say [that] they have come to uproot their testimony, and this one also comes to uproot his testimony. And the law is according to R. Huna the son of R. Joshua.
  Our rabbis taught: If two [witnesses] were signed on a document and died, and two [other witnesses] came from the street and said, “We know that it is their handwriting, but they were forced, they were minors, or they were disqualified witnesses,” they are believed. But if there are other witnesses that this is their handwriting or their handwriting comes out from another place, from a document which was challenged and then confirmed in a court of law, they are not believed.
  And we collect with it as with a valid document?  Why? They are two and two!
  Sheshet: This teaches [that] contradiction is the beginning of rebuttal, 
  
  Daf 20a
  
  and just as witnesses can be rebutted only in their presence, so too they can be contradicted only in their presence.
  Nahman said to him: If they had been before us and [the other two witnesses] had contradicted them, it  would have been a contradiction,  and we would not have paid any attention to them, because it  is a contradicted testimony. Now that they are not here, and perhaps if they had been before us, they might [even] have admitted to them, why should they be believed?
  Rather R. Nahman said; set the two [witnesses] against the two [witnesses] and leave the property in the possession of its master. This is like the case of the property of a certain lunatic. A certain lunatic sold property. Two came and said that he sold [the property] when he was insane, and two came and said that he sold [the property] when he was sane.
  R. Ashi said: Set the two [witnesses] against the two [witnesses] and leave the property in the possession of the lunatic. And we say this only when he has the presumption of ownership from his ancestors, but if he does not have the presumption of ownership of his ancestors, we say that he bought [the property] when he was insane and that he sold [it] when he was insane. 
  Abbahu said: They rebut witnesses only in their presence, but they contradict them also in not in their presence. And a rebuttal in their absence — granted that it does not count as rebuttal, but it does count as contradiction.
  The Master said [above]: If there are witnesses that this is their handwriting, or their handwriting came out from another place, [namely] from a document which was contested and was confirmed in court, they are not believed.” If it was contested, but not if it was not contested.  This is a support for R. Assi, for R. Assi said:  They uphold a document only from a document which was contested and was confirmed in court.
  The Nehardeans say: A document is confirmed only from two ketubot or from two fields, and [only] when their owners used them for three years, and in comfort.
  Shimi b. Ashi said: And only when it is produced by another person, but not [if it is produced] by himself. What is the difference if he himself produces it? Because he may have forged [the signatures of the witnesses]. [If so] even when produced by another person also, perhaps he went and saw [the signatures] and forged [them]? All of this, it is too difficult to direct [his handwriting].
  Our Rabbis taught: A person may write [down] his testimony in a document and may through it give evidence even after some years. Huna said: Only when he remembers it by himself.Only when he remembers it by himself. Yohanan said:  Even if he does not remember it by himself. Rabbah said: Learn from [the words of] R. Yohanan [the following]: These two people who know evidence and one of them has forgotten it, the other one may remind him of it.
  They asked: In the case of the litigant himself what is the law?  Haviva said: Even he himself may do so. Mar b. R. Ashi said:  He himself may not. And the law is: He himself may not.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  But if he is a scholar even he himself may remind the witness.  As that case of R. Ashi who knew evidence for R. Kahana, and he (R. Kahana) said to him (R. Ashi): Does the master remember that evidence?  And he said to him: No.  But was it not so and so? He replied: I do not know. In the end, R. Ashi remember, and he testified for him.  He saw that R. Kahana was surprised, so he said to him: Do you think that I relied upon you? I took it on myself and I remembered it.
  We taught elsewhere: Those mounds which are near, whether to a town or a road, both new and old, are unclean. Those which are distant: If they are new, they are clean,  and if they are old, they are unclean.   What is near? Fifty cubits. And what is old? Sixty years, the words of R. Meir. Judah says: “Near”—when there is none nearer; “old,” when no one remembers it.
  What is a town and what is a road? If I say: A town actually means a town, and a road is actually a road, do we presume uncleanness out of doubt? Did not Resh Lakish say: They found some pretext and purified the land of Israel? Zera: A town—this is a town which is near a burial place,  and a road—this is a road [leading] to a burial place.
  This makes sense [in the case of] a road [leading] to a burial place, because sometimes it might happen [that a funeral took place] at twilight, and that they buried it in the mound. But [in the case of] a town which is near a burial place, all go to the burial place!   
  Hanina said: Because women bring there their abortions and lepers their arms. [And it is assumed that] to a distance of fifty cubits she goes alone, but for a longer distance she takes a man with her and [then] she goes to the burial place. Therefore, we do not presume uncleanness in Eretz Israel.
  Hisda said: Learn from [the words of] R. Meir: This testimony, for sixty years one will remember it, for longer one does not remember. But this is not so: There [he does not remember the evidence after sixty years] because it is not his concern, but here, since it has been given to him [as a responsibility], even for a longer [period he] also [remembers the evidence].
  1) [If] one witness says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, and the other [witness] says, “This is my handwriting and that is the handwriting of my fellow”, they are believed. 2) [If] one says, “This is my handwriting” and the other says, “This is my handwriting” they must join to themselves another [person], the words of Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]. But the Sages say: They need not join to themselves another [person], rather a person is believed to say, “this is my handwriting.
  When you think about it, according to Rabbi [Judah Hanasi]  
  
  Daf 21a
  
  they give evidence with regard to their handwriting, according to the Sages they give evidence with regard to the maneh in the deed.
  This is obvious! You might have said  that Rebbe was in doubt whether they testified to their signature or to the maneh in the deed.
  And the ramification would be when one of them died. [Here] we would need two witnesses from the street to testify regarding it,
  because otherwise the [whole of the money] less a quarter would go out by the mouth of one witness,
  and both here and there the stricter rule would prevail.
  Therefore, he teaches that it is clear to Rebbe, whether the result is lenient or strict. For Rav Judah said that Rav said: If two [witnesses] are signed on a document and one of them died, two from the street must give evidence with regard to him. In this case Rebbe would be lenient and the Rabbis would be strict.
  And if there are not two, but there is only one, what [then]? Abaye said: He [the second witness] writes his signature on a piece of clay and places it before the court, and the court confirms it, and he need not testify to his own signature, and he goes with that one and they testify to [the signature of] the other [witness].
  And specifically only on a piece of clay but not a scroll, lest a person of bad character find it and write on it whatever he likes, and we have learned:  If one person produces the handwriting   of another person that he owes him [money], he collects [the debt] from unencumbered property.
  Rav Judah said [that] Shmuel said. The halakhah is according to the sages   This is obvious! A singular sage and the many–the halakhah follows the many. What might you have thought: Since the halakhah follows Rebbe as against one of his fellow-scholars, it is also against many of his fellow-scholars, that is why he teaches us.
  (Mnemonic: Nah, Nad, Had) R. Hinena b. Hiyya said to R. Judah, and some say R. Huna b. Judah said to Rav Judah, and some say R. Hiyya b. Judah said to Rav Judah: Did Shmuel really say this?
  Surely there once was a document that came out of the court of Mar Shmuel and there was written in it:  When R. Anan b. Hiyya came and testified to his own signature and to that of his fellow-witness, namely, R. Hanan b. Rabbah, and when R. Hanan b. Rabbah came and testified to his own signature and to that of his fellow-witness, namely R. Anan b. Hiyya, we verified it, and we have confirmed it, as it is proper!
  He said to him: That deed belonged to orphans, and Shmuel was concerned of an errant court, and Shmuel thought: Lest there be someone who held that the halakhah is [generally] according to Rebbe against one fellow-scholar, and not against many of his fellow-scholars but [that] in this [the halakhah is according to Rebbe] even against many of his fellow-scholars, I will leave some room, so that the orphans should not suffer any loss.
  Rav Judah said that Shmuel said: A witness and judge can be joined together [to create one set of witnesses].
  Rami b. Hama said:  How excellent is this tradition! Rava said: What is the excellence? What the witness testifies to the judge does not testify to, and what the judge testifies to the witness does not testify to?.
  Rather, when Rami b. Ezekiel came he said: Do not listen to those rules which my brother Judah laid down in the name of Shmuel.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  Rabbanai, the brother of R. Hiyya b. Abba, came to buy sesame and he said: Thus Shmuel said: Witness and judge are joined together. Amemar said: How excellent is this tradition! Ashi said to Amemar:  Because the father of your mother praised it, you also praise it! Rava has already refuted it.
  Safra said that R. Abba said that R. Isaac b. Shmuel b. Martha said that R. Huna said, and some say that R. Huna said that Rav said:  Three that sat together to uphold a document, and two of them know the signatures of the witnesses and one does not know, before they sign, they may testify before him, and he  then signs  with them; after they have signed, they may not testify before him and he may not sign.  
  But do we write the attestation [to such a document]?  Did not R. Papi say in the name of Rava: The judge’s attestation which is written before the witnesses give evidence as to their signatures is invalid, because it looks like a lie?  And here also it looks like a lie!
  Rather say: Before they have written the attestation they may testify before him and he then signs with them; after they have written the attestation, they may not testify before him and he may not sign.
  Learn from this three things: Learn from this that a witness may be  a judge; Learn from this that if the judges know the signatures of the witnesses, here is no need to testify before them; and learn from this that  if the judges do not know the signatures of the witnesses, it is necessary to testify before every one
  Ashi raised a difficulty on this: It makes sense that we learn from this that a witness may be a judge,  but [how can we learn that] if the judges know the signatures of the witnesses, there is no need to testify before them? Perhaps I could say to you that this is [generally] necessary, but it is different here, because the telling has been fulfilled before one.
  And [how can we learn that] if the judges do not know the signatures of the witnesses, it is necessary to give evidence before every one?  Perhaps I could say to you that this is not necessary, but it is different here, because the telling would not have been fulfilled at all.
  Abba sat and said this tradition, that a witness may be a judge. Safra objected to R. Abba: If three saw it and they are the court, two shall stand up and seat two of their colleagues beside the one, and they shall testify before them, and [then] they say: Sanctified is the new moon, sanctified; for one person is not believed by himself. Now, if you should think that a witness may be a judge, why go through all this? Let them sit in their places and sanctify [the new moon]!
  He said to him: That was also difficult to me, and I asked R. Yitzchak b. Shmuel b. Martha. and R. Yitzchak [asked] R. Huna, and R. Huna [asked] Hiyya b. Rav, and Hiyya b. Rav [asked] Rav, and he said to them: Leave alone the testimony as to the new moon, [for it is] biblical, and the upholding of documents is rabbinic.
  Abba said [that] R. Huna said [that] Rav said: If three sit to uphold a document and an objection was raised against one of them: If before they have signed [the attestation], they may give evidence regarding him, and he may [then] sign; after they have signed, they may not give evidence regarding him and he may not sign.
  What was the nature of the protest? If the protest was on the grounds of robbery, 
  
  Daf 22a
  
  they are two and two. [And] if it is a protest regarding family blemish, then it just a matter of revealing the truth. In any case, I can tell you, it is a protest regarding robbery, and these say: We know of him that he has repented.
  Zera said: This matter I have heard from R. Abba, and if not for R. Abba of Acco, I would have forgotten it: If three sit to confirm a document and one of them dies, they must write, “We were in a session of three, and one is no more.”
  Nahman b. Yitzchak said: And if it is written in it: This document has been produced before us [as] a court of law, they need not do anymore But perhaps it was an arrogant court, and it follows Shmuel, for Shmuel said: If two have judged, their judgment is a judgment, only they are called an arrogant court?
  When it is written in it, “The court of our Master Ashi.”   But perhaps the scholars of the school of R. Ashi hold like Shmuel? When it is written in it, “And our Master Ashi told us.”
  If a woman says, “I was married and I am divorced”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was married, and she says, “I am divorced”, she is not believed. If she says, “I was taken captive but I have remained clean”, she is believed, for the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. But if there are witnesses that she was taken captive and she says, “I have remained clean” she is not believed. But if the witnesses came after she had married, she shall not go out.
  Assi said: From where in the Torah is [the principle of] “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits”? Because it is said: “My daughter I gave to this man as a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:16): “To a man” he made her forbidden, “This,” he made her permitted.
  Why do I need a verse? It is logic— he made her forbidden, and he made her permitted! Rather, the verse is required according to what R. Huna said in the name of Rav, or R. Huna said in the name of Rav:  From where do we know from the Bible that the father is believed to make his daughter forbidden? Because it is said: “My daughter I gave to [this] man as his wife.” Why do I need the word “this”? It is required for what R. Jonah taught, for R. Jonah taught:
  “My daughter I gave to this man”: “To this”, and not to the brother-in-law.
  Our Rabbis taught: If a woman says, “I am married,”and then she says, “I am unmarried,” she is believed. But she made herself forbidden! Rava the son of R. Huna said: When she has given a plausible reason for her words. It was also taught in a baraita: If she says, I am married’, and then she says, ‘I am unmarried’, she is not believed, but if she gives a plausible reason for her words, she is believed. And so it once happened with a great woman, who was great in beauty, and men were eager   to betroth her, and she said to them,
  “I am betrothed.” After some time she betrothed herself.  The Sages said to her: Why did you do this? She answered them, “At first, when unworthy men came to me, I said, “I am betrothed”; now that worthy men come to me, I betrothed myself.” And this law R. Aha, the officer of the castle, brought before the Sages in Usha, and they said: If she gives a plausible reason for her words she is believed.
  Shmuel asked Rav:  If [a woman] says, “I am unclean,”and then she says, “I am clean,” what is [the law]?   He answered him:  Also in this case if she gives a plausible reason for her words she is believed.
  
  Daf 22b
  
  Also in this case if she gives a plausible reason for her words she is believed. He learned it from him forty times, and still Shmuel did not act accordingly with regard to himself.
  Our Rabbis taught: Two [witnesses] say [that the husband of the woman] has died, and two [witnesses] say [that] he has not died, or two [witnesses] say [that] she has been divorced, and two [witnesses] say [that] she has not been divorced, she shall not marry [again],ut if she has married [again], she need not go out. R. Menahem b. Yose says: She must go out. Menahem b. Yose said: When do I say [that] she must go out [of the second marriage]? — When witnesses came and then she married, but if she married and then witnesses came, she need not go out.
  Now, they are two and two, [and] he who has intercourse with her should be liable to bring a doubtful guilt-offering!  Sheshet said: For instance, when she was married to one of her witnesses. She herself should bring a doubtful guilt offering! When she says, “I am sure.”
  Yohanan said: Two [witnesses] say [that the husband] has died, and two [witnesses] say  he has not died, she shall not remarry, but if she has remarried, she need not go out [of the second marriage]. two [witnesses] say [that]  she has been divorced, and two [witnesses] say [that]  she has not been divorced, she shall not remarry and if she has married, she must go out.
  What is the difference between the first case and the second case? Abaye said Interpret it [that it speaks] of one witness. One witness says [that] he has died, the rabbis believe him as two [witnesses], and [this is] according to Ulla, for Ulla said: Wherever the Torah believes one witness, [it is as if] there are two,  whereas he who said that he has not died is one, and the words of one have no strength against the [words of] two.
  If so, [she should be allowed to marry again] ab initio! Because of R. Assi, for R. Assi said “Turn away from yourself a twisted mouth, and keep away from perverse lips” (Proverbs 4:24).
  In the second case [however] one witness says [that] she has been divorced, and one witness says [that] she has not been divorced, they [therefore] both testify that she was a married woman, and he who says [that] she has been divorced is one, and the words of one have no validity against two.
  Rava said: Indeed, they are two and two, and R. Yohanan agreed with the words of R. Menahem b. Yose in [the case of] divorce, but not in [the case of] death. Why? In the case of death, she cannot contradict him, [but] in the case of divorce, she can contradict him.
  But would she really have so much chutzpah?   Did not R. Hamnuna say:  f a woman says to her husband, “You have divorced me,” she is believed, for it is a presumption [that] a woman would not be so bold before her husband? This is the case only when there are no witnesses who support her; but when there are witnesses who support her, she is indeed bold.
  Assi says: This is a case where the witnesses say, He has died now,” [or] “He has divorced her now.” Death one cannot prove, divorce one can prove,  for we say to her, If it is so, show us your get.”
  Our rabbis taught:  Two [witnesses] say that he has been betrothed, and two [witnesses] say [that]  she has not been betrothed, she may not marry, and if she has married, she need not go out. Two [witnesses] say [that]  she has been divorced, and two [witnesses] say [that]  she has not been divorced, she may not marry, and if she has married, she must go out.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  What is the difference between the first case and the second case?
  Abaye said:  Interpret it [as referring] to one witness.  One witness says [that] she has been betrothed and one witness says [that] she has not been betrothed, they both testify to an unmarried woman, and he who says [that] she has been betrothed is one, and the words of one have no validity against two.
  In the second case, one witness says [that] she has been divorced and one witness says [that] she has not been divorced, they both testify to a married woman, and he who says that she has been divorced is one, and the words of one have no validity against two.
  Ashi said: Indeed, they are two and two, and reverse it. Two say, “We have seen that she has been betrothed,” and two say, “We have not seen that she has been betrothed,” she shall not marry [another man], and if she has married she must go out.
  [But] this is obvious! “We have not seen” is no evidence! It is necessary for the case when they dwelt in one courtyard; one might say, “If she had been betrothed it would have been known,” therefore it teaches us there are people who get betrothed in private.
  In the second case, when two say, “We have seen that she has been divorced,” and two say, “We have not seen that she has been divorced,” she shall not marry again, and if she has married she need not go out.” What does it teach us?  Although they live in the same courtyard! [But then] this teaches the same thing as the first case!
  What might you have said? That with regard to betrothal it happens that people get betrothed quietly, but with regard to divorce, if she had been divorced, it would have been known, so it teaches us that there are people who get betrothed and get divorced in private.
  And if witnesses come after she got married she need not go out [of the marriage]. Oshaia teaches it in reference to the first clause. Rabbah b. Avin teaches it in reference to the second clause.
  He who teaches it in reference to the first clause, how much more [does he refer it] to the second clause, for in the case of a captive woman they ruled leniently.   But he who teaches it in reference to the second clause does not refer it to the first clause.
  Shall we say that they disagree concerning the view of R. Hamnuna: that he who teaches it in reference to the first clause holds the view of R. Hamnuna, and he who teaches it in reference [only] to the second clause does not hold the View of R. Hamnuna?
  No, they all hold the view of R. Hamnuna and here they differ in this. One reasons: when R. Hamnuna’s statement was made, it referred to a case [where she said so] in his presence, but in his absence she is bold [enough to lie], and one reasons [that] even in his absence she is not bold.
  And if witnesses came after she got married etc. Avuha DeShmuel said: “She got married,” does not mean she actually got married. Rather as soon as they allowed her to get married even if she did not get married yet. But it says: “She shall not go out”!  [This means] she shall not go out from her first permission.
  Our rabbis taught:  If she says, “I was taken captive and I am pure, and I have witnesses that I am pure” they do not say “Let’s wait until the witnesses come,” Rather they allow her at once [to marry]. If they allowed her to marry and then the witnesses came and said, “We do not know,” then she need not go out [of the marriage]. But if witnesses of defilement came, even if she has many children she must go out.
  Certain women captives once came to Nehardea. Avuha DeShmuel placed watchmen over them.  Shmuel said to him: And who watched them till now?  He said back to him: If they had been you daughters would you have treated them so cheaply?
  It was, “As an error which proceeds from before the ruler” (Ecclesiastes 10:5) and the daughters of Mar Samuel were taken captive. And they were brought to the Land of Israel. They had their captors stand outside and they went in into the school of R. Hanina. This one said, “I was taken captive and I am pure,” and that one said. “I was taken captive and I am pure,”  and they allowed them [to marry a priest].
  In the end the captors entered. R. Hanina said: They are the children of a teacher [of Torah]. It [then] became known that they were the daughters of Mar Shmuel.
  R. Hanina said to R. Shaman b. Abba:  Go and take care of your relatives. He said to R. Hanina: But there are witnesses in the country beyond the sea! Now, however they are not before us. Witnesses are in the north, and [therefore] she shall be forbidden [to marry]? [Now] the reason is because no witnesses came, but if witnesses came she is forbidden!
  But did not Avuha DeShmuel say:  As soon as they allowed her to get married, even if she did not get married?   Ashi said:  Witnesses of defilement were referred to here.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  Two women were taken captive: one says,  “I was taken captive and I am pure”, and the other one says,  “I was taken captive and I am pure”– they are not believed. But when they testify regarding one another, they are believed. 
  GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: [If she says], “I am impure and my friend is pure,” she is believed; “I am pure and my friend is impure,” she is not believed; “I and my friend are impure,” she is believed as to herself and she is not believed as to her friend;  “I and my friend are pure,” she is believed as to her friend and she is not believed as to herself.
  The Master said: “[If she says] “I am pure and my friend is impure” she is not believed. What was the actual case? If there are no witnesses, why is she not believed as to herself? She says, “I was taken captive and I am pure!” Hence it is obvious that there are witnesses. 
  [Now] say the middle clause: “I and my friend are impure”; she is believed as to herself and she is not believed as to her friend.” But if there are witnesses, why is she not believed?  Hence it is obvious that there are no witnesses.
  [Now] read the last clause: I and my friend are pure,” she is believed as to her friend and she is not believed as to herself.” But if there are no witnesses, why is she not believed as to herself? Rather it is obvious that there are witnesses.
  The first clause and the last clause refer to a case when there are witnesses, [and] the middle clause when there are no witnesses? Abaye said:  Yes, the first clause and the last clause refer to a case when there are witnesses, [and] the middle clause when there are no witnesses?
  Papa said: All of it refers to where there are witnesses, but there is one witness who states the opposite. [If] she says, “I am impure and my friend is pure,” and the one witness says to her, “You are pure and your friend is impure,” she has declared herself forbidden, [and] her friend becomes permitted through her testimony.
  If [she says], “I am pure and my friend is impure,” and the one witness says to her,  “You are impure and your friend is pure’, since there are witnesses, she is not believed [as to herself], [and] her friend becomes permitted through the testimony of the [one] witness.
  [If she says], “I and my friend are impure” and the one witness says to her, “You and your friend are pure,” she has declared herself forbidden, [and] her friend becomes permitted through the testimony of the [one] witness. Why do I need this again?  It is the same 
  as the first clause! You might have said [that] they are both pure and the reason she says so is “Let me die with the Philistines,” so he teaches us [that this is not s
  [If she says] “I and my friend are pure,” and the one witness says to her, “You and your friend are impure,” since there are witnesses, she is not believed, [and] her friend becomes permitted through her testimony.   What need is there again for this?  It is the same as in the very first clause! 
  What might you have said? She is believed only when she declares herself unfit, but when she declares herself fit I might say that she is not believed, so he teaches us [that this is not so].
  And likewise two men, [if] one says, “I am a priest”, and the other says, “I am a priest”, they are not believed. But when they testify about one another, they are believed. Rabbi Judah says:  one does not raise [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Elazar says: When is this true? When there are people who object; but when there are no people who object, one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the assistant chief of priests: one raises [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.
  GEMARA. Why do I need all of these [cases]? They are needed. For if he had stated [only the case of] “R. Joshua admits”: [I might have said that only in that case is that principle invoked] because there is a possible loss of money but [in the case of] witnesses where there is no possible loss of money, I would not say so.
  And if he had stated [the case of] witnesses, for [their statement concerns] other people but where it concerns himself I would not say so.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  I would not say so.
  And if he would let us hear these two [cases I might have said] because [both cases deal with] money matters but [in the case of] “a married woman” which is a matter of [sexual] prohibition I would say no.
  Why do I need [the case of] “I was taken captive and I am pure”?   Because he wants to teach, “But if witnesses came after she got married, she shall not go out.”
  This goes well according to him who teaches this in reference to the second clause, but according to him who teaches it in reference to the first clause, what is there to say? Because he wants to teach [the case of], “If two women were taken captive.”
  And why do I need [the case of] “If two women were taken captive”? What might you have said? Let us be concerned lest they collude, therefore he teaches us [that we are not concerned].
  And also why do I need the case of “and also two men”?  Because he wants to teach the dispute between R. Judah and the rabbis.
  Our rabbis taught: [One who says:] I am a priest and my friend is a priest, he is believed in order that others may allow him to eat terumah, but he is not believed that he would be allowed to marry a woman until there are three, [and] two testify to one and two testify to the other. R. Judah says: He is not believed even with regard to allowing him to eat terumah until there are three, [and] two testify to one and two testify to the other.
  That is to say that R. Judah is concerned about collusion,  and the rabbis are not concerned about collusion? But we have heard the opposite, as it is taught:  Donkey-drivers who come to a town and one of them says, “Mine is new and my friend’s is old” [or] “Mine has not had tithes removed and my friends has tithes removed”; he is not believed. R. Judah says: He is believed! Ada b. Ahava, in the name of Rav: 
  The statement must be reversed. Abaye said:  Indeed, do not reverse it;  they were lenient with regard to demai, for most ammei haaretz separate tithes. Rava said: 
  Is the question [only] of R. Judah against R. Judah? Are the rabbis against the rabbis not a difficulty?  Rather, R. Judah against R. Judah is not a difficulty  as we have [just] explained, [and] the rabbis against the rabbis is not a difficulty for it is as R. Hama b. Ukba said that [it speaks of] when he has his trade-tools in his hand;  
  
  Daf 24b
  
  so too here it refers to a case when he  has his trade-tools in his hand
  And in what context was that of R. Hama. b. Ukba said?  On this which we have learned: If a potter left his pots  and went down to drink [water from the river,]  the inner ones are pure and the outer ones are impure. 
  But it has been taught that these and those are impure? Hama b. Ukba said: [It refers to a case] when he had his trade-tools in his hand, so that everyone’s hand touches them.
  But [then] the case that we have learned, “The inner ones are pure and the outer ones are impure,” where would it be found?  These and those are pure? Hama b. Ukba said:  When his trade-tools are not in his hand.
  But [then] the case that we have learned,  “The inner ones are pure and the outer ones are impure,”   where would it be found?
  When they are near the public road and [they are impure] because of border stones of the public road.
  When they are near the public road and [they are impure] because of border stones of the public road. R. Judah and the rabbis differ as to whether one raises [a person] from terumah to the status of a kohen.
  It was asked of them: Does one raise [a person] from documents to [the full status of a priest] with regard to lineage?  What is this case? If we say that it is written in it: “I, So-and-so, a priest have signed as witness,” who has testified about him?
  Rather, it is necessary when it is written in it: “I, So-and-so, a priest, have borrowed a maneh from so-and-so,” and witnesses have signed [the document]. What [then] is [the law]?  Do they testify [only] to the maneh [mentioned] in the document, or do they testify to the whole matter?  Huna and R. Hisda One says: They raise [him] and one says: They do not raise [him].
  It was asked of them:  Do they raise [a person] from the lifting up of the hands to the status of a priest with regard to lineage? Ask this according to him who says [that] they raise [a person] from terumah to the status of a priest and ask it according to him who says [that] they do not raise [a person from terumah to the status of a priest].  
  Ask it according to him who says [that] they raise:  This is said in the case of terumah, which [if eaten by one who is not a kohen] is punishable with death;  but [in the case of] “lifting up the hands,” which is only the prohibition of a positive commandment, [I would say] no.  Or perhaps there is no difference.
  And ask it according to him who says [that] they do not raise [from eating terumah to being a priest]: This is in the case of terumah, which is eaten in privacy; but “lifting up the hands,” which [is done] in public [I might say that] if he were not a priest he would not have the chutzpah [to do so]. Or perhaps there is no difference?
  Hisda and Rabbi Avina:  One says they raise, and one says they do not raise. Nahman b. Yitzhak said to Rava: Do they raise [a person] from “lifting up the hands” to the full status of a priest for matters of lineage? He said to him: This is a dispute between R. Hisda and R. Avina.
  What is the halakhah? He said to him: I know a baraita:  For it has been taught:R. Yose said: Great is presumption, for it is said: “And of the children of the priests: the children of Havayah, the children of Hakkoz, the children of Barzillai, who took a wife of the daughters of Barzillai the Gileadite, and was called after their name.  These sought their register of those that were reckoned by genealogy, and they were not found, therefore were they deemed polluted and sent away from the priesthood. And the Tirshatha said to them, that they should not eat of the most holy things, till there stood up a priest with Urim and Tummim” (Ezra 2:61-63).  
  He said to them: You remain in your presumptive state; what have you eaten in exile? The holy things eaten outside of Jerusalem. So too here also [you may eat] the holy things eaten outside of Jerusalem. Now if we were to assume [that] one raises [a person] from “lifting up the hands” to the state of full priesthood, since these spread out their hands, they might come to raise them?
  It is different here, for their presumption has been damaged.  For if you do not say so [then] according to him who says [that] they raise [a person] from terumah to being a priest, since they eat terumah they might come raise them! Rather it is because their presumption has been damaged.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  If so, what is so great about presumption? Until now they ate [only] rabbinical terumah [and] now they ate toraitic terumah.
  And if you wish you may say: Now also they ate [only] rabbinic terumah [and] did not eat toraitic terumah, and when they raise [a person] from terumah to the status of a priest, it is only in the case of toraitic terumah, but in the case of rabbinic terumah they do not raise. If so, what [is the meaning of the words] “Great is presumption?” Although one might have forbidden them [from eating rabbinic terumah] because of toraitic terumah, they did not forbid them.
  But did they not eat toraitic terumah? Surely it is written: “That they should not eat of the most holy things” (Ezra 2:63) of “the most holy things” they did not eat, but toraitic terumah they did eat!
  Rather this is what he says: They did not [eat] anything that is called a “holy thing” as it is written: “And no stranger shall eat of the holy thing” (Leviticus 22:10), nor anything which is called “holy thing” for it is written: “And if a priest’s daughter be married to a stranger she shall not eat of that which is separated from the holy things” (Leviticus 22:12) and  a Master said: That which has been set aside from the holy things she shall not eat.
  Come and hear: A presumption for the priesthood: The “lifting up of the hands” in Babylonia, and the eating of the hallah in Syria, and taking a share in [the priestly] gifts in large cities. In any case he teaches the “lifting up of the hands,” is it not with regard to the full status of the priest?  No, with regard to terumah.
  But he teaches it as similar to the eating of hallah, just as the eating of hallah [is sufficient to prove that he has] the full status of a priest, so does the lifting up of the hands [prove that he has] the full status of a priest? No the eating of the hallah itself merely [serves as evidence] regarding terumah, [for] he holds that hallah in our days is of rabbinical status and terumah is Biblical and one raises [a person] from rabbinic hallah to Biblical terumah and [it is] as R. Huna the son of R. Joshua reversed [the words of] the rabbis.
  Come and hear: [The following constitutes a] presumption for the priesthood: the lifting up of the hands and [taking a share] at the distribution at the threshing floors in the Land of Israel;  in Syria and in all places to which the messengers of the New Moon come the lifting up of the hands is evidence, but not [taking a share] at the distribution at the threshing floors.
  Babylonia is like Syria. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says:  Also Alexandria in Egypt in earlier times because there was there a permanent court of law. 
  In any case he teaches the lifting up of the hands. Is this not with regard to the full status of the priest? No, with regard to hallah.  But he teaches [the rule regarding the lifting up of the hands] as similar to taking a share at the threshing floors: just as taking a share at the threshing floors [serves as evidence] in respect of the full status of a priest, so does the lifting up of the hands [serve as evidence] in respect of the full status of a priest! No, taking a share at the threshing floor itself [serves as evidence only as] to hallah,  for he holds that  terumah in our days is rabbinical and hallah is biblical and one raises [a person] from rabbinical terumah to biblical hallah.
  As the rabbis found by R. Huna the son of R. Joshua.  For R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said:  I found the rabbis in the Bet Rav sitting and saying:  Even according to him who says that terumah in these days is rabbinical, hallah is biblical, for during the seven [years] that they conquered [the Land] and during the seven [years] that they distributed [it] they were obligated in hallah and not obligated in terumah.
  Even according to him who says that terumah in these days is rabbinical, hallah is biblical, for during the seven [years] that they conquered [the Land] and during the seven [years] that they distributed [it] they were obligated in hallah and not obligated in terumah. On the contrary, even according to him who says [that] terumah in these days is biblical, hallah is rabbinical, for it has been taught: [It is written:] “In your coming into the land:” If “in your coming” you might think as soon as two or three spies had entered it? [Therefore] it is said “in your coming” (Numbers 15:18). I have spoken of the coming of all of you and not of the coming of a portion of you. Now when Ezra brought them up
  
  Daf 25b
  
  not all of them went up.
  Come and hear: A presumption for the priesthood [is constituted by] the “lifting up of the hands” and taking a share at the threshing floors and testimony.  Now is testimony a presumption?  Rather this is what he means:  The “lifting up of the hands is like a testimony:” Just as testimony [raises one] to the status of a priest, so too the “lifting up of the hands’ [raises one] to the status of a priest! No. Testimony that comes on the strength of a presumption is like a presumption.
  Like that man who came before R. Ammi [and] said to him:  I am convinced that he is a priest.  He said to him:  What have you seen?  And he answered him:  He read first in the synagogue.  [He responded] As a priest or as a great man? After him a Levite read. And R. Ammi raised him to the priesthood on the strength of his testimony.
  Someone came before R. Joshua b. Levi, [and] said to him: I am convinced that he is a Levite. He said to him:  What have you seen? He answered him: He read second in the Synagogue.  As a Levite or as a prominent man? A priest read before him.  And R. Joshua b. Levi raised him to the status of Levite on the strength of his testimony.
  Someone once came before Resh Lakish [and] said to him:  I am convinced that he is a priest.  He said to him: What have you seen?  [He answered him:]  He asked him: He read first in the Synagogue.  Have you seen him take a share at the threshing floors?  R. Elazar said to him:  And if there is no threshing floor, is the priesthood annulled?
  Once they were sitting before R. Yohanan [and] there came such a case before them. Resh Lakish asked him: Have you seen him take a share at the threshing floor?  R. Yohanan said to him:  And if there is no threshing floor, is the priesthood annulled? He turned round and looked at R. Elazar with displeasure. He said: You have heard something from the smith’s son and you did not say it to us in his name.
  Rabbi and R. Hiyya: one raised a son to the priesthood on the testimony of his father, and one raised a brother to the state of Levite on the testimony of his brother.
  Conclude that it was Rabbi who raised the son to the priesthood on the testimony of his father, for it has been taught: If one comes and says: “This is my son and he is a priest,” he is believed with regard to allowing him to eat terumah, but he is not believed with regard to allowing him to marry a woman, the words of Rabbi. R. Hiyya said to him: If you believe him to allow him to eat terumah, believe him to allow him to marry a woman, and if you do not believe him so as to allow him to marry a woman, do not believe him also as to allow him to eat terumah. 
  He answered him: I believed him to allow him to eat terumah because it is in his hands to let him eat terumah, but I do not believe him so as to allow him to marry a woman because it is not in his hands to let him marry a woman.   Conclude [that this opinion belongs to Rabbi]. And since it was Rabbi who raised the son to the priesthood on the testimony of his father, [it must have been] R. Hiyya who raised the brother to the status of Levite on the testimony of his brother.
  But [according to] R. Hiyya, why is the son different that [he is] not [raised]? Because he is related to his father. A brother too is related to his brother! 
  
  Daf 26a
  
  When he was innocently talking.  As that which Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel:  It happened that a man was talking innocently and said:  “I remember when I was a child and riding on my father’s shoulder, they took me out from school and stripped me of my shirt and immersed me  so that I could eat terumah in the evening.”
  And R. Hiyya added:  And my friends kept away from me  and called me ‘Yohanan the hallot-eater.” And Rabbi raised him to the priesthood on his testimony.
  It was taught R. Shimon b. Elazar says: Just as terumah is a presumption for the priesthood, so is the first tithe a presumption for the priesthood, but he who takes a share through the court, [this] is not a presumption.
  The first tithe belongs to the Levite?! [This] follows R. Elazar ben Azariah, for it has been taught: Terumah belongs to the priest, the first tithe to the Levite, the words of R. Akiva. Elazar ben Azariah says:  The first tithe belongs also to the priest. Say that R. Elazar ben Azariah says: “Also to the priest” does he say: to the priest and not to the Levite?
  Yes. after Ezra had punished them. But perhaps it happened that they gave it to him? Hisda said:  What are we dealing with here? A case where we know that his father was a priest and a rumor came out concerning him that he was the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah and [yet] they gave him tithe at the threshing floor.
  [He could not be regarded as] a Levite, because he was not a Levite. What then could you say? That he was the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah? Even so there is no question, for according to the one who says [that] the first tithe is forbidden to strangers they would not have given [it] to him. And even according to the one who says that the first tithe is permitted to strangers, this refers only to give to them but as part of the distribution, they would not give it to him.
  But he who takes a share through the court, [this] is not a presumption. If through the court it is not a presumption, what is presumption? Sheshet said: This is what he means:  One who shares with his brother’s at the court terumah that was part of his father’s property, it is not a presumption.
  This is obvious! What might you have said? Since these [get their share of terumah] in order to eat it, so too this one also [gets his share of terumah] in order to eat it. So he teaches us [that] those [get the terumah] for eating and this one for selling. 
  Judah says:  One does not raise [a person] to the priesthood on the testimony of one witness, etc… [ Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon the son of the assistant chief of priests: [a person] to the priesthood through the testimony of one witness.] Shimon b. Gamaliel is the same as R. Eliezer?  And if you will say [that] they differ with regard to an objection raised by one person [in] that R. Eliezer holds that an objection [can be accepted from] one [person] and R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that  an objection [must come from at least] two [people],  did not R. Yohanan say: All agree that an objection [must come from] at least two persons?
  Rather here we are dealing with a case where we have a presumption that the father of this [person] is a priest and a rumor came out concerning him that he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah and they demoted him from the priesthood, and one witness came and said, “I know that he is a priest” and they raised him [again]
  
  Daf 26b
  
  and they raised him [again] and [then] came two [other witnesses] and said [that] he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah and they demoted him [again] and [then] one witness came and said, “I know that he is a priest. All agree that the [two witnesses] are joined into one testimony, but they differ as to whether we are afraid of disgracing the court.
  The first Tanna holds:  Since we demoted him we do not raise him, [again] because we are afraid of disgracing the court.  And R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds:  We have demoted him and we can raise him and we are not concerned of bringing disgrace on the court.
  Ashi asked against this:  If so, even [when there are] two and two also?
  Rather R. Ashi said  they differ as to whether they are joined into one testimony. And they are arguing about the same issue as the following tannaim,  for it has been taught: Their testimonies are not joined together unless they have both seen [the event] at the same time. Joshua b. Korha says:  Even when [they have seen] one after another. And their testimonies cannot be upheld in court until they both testify at the same time Natan says: 
   We hear the evidence of one today and when the other one comes tomorrow we hear his evidence.
  A woman was imprisoned by non-Jews: If for the sake of money, she is permitted to her husband, And if in order to take her life, she is forbidden to her husband..
  GEMARA. R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak said in the name of Rav:  They have taught [this] only when the hand of Israel is strong over the non-Jews but when the hand of the non-Jews is strong over themselves, even if for the sake of money, she is forbidden to her husband.
  Rava objected: R. Yose the priest and R. Zechariah b. HaKatzav testified regarding an Israelite woman, who had been taken as collateral in Ashkelon and her family distanced her and her witnesses testified that she had not been secluded [with a man] and that she was not defiled [by a man]. And the Sages said to them: If you believe [the witnesses] that she had been taken as collateral, believe [them also] that she was not secluded and that she was not defiled, and if you do not believe [them] that she was not secluded and that she was not defiled, do not believe [them] that she was pledged.
  Now Ashkelon [was a town in which] the hand of the non-Jews was strong over themselves
  
  Daf 27a
  
  and he teaches when she was taken as collateral” but not “when she was imprisoned”? [No] the same applies also to [the case if] she had been imprisoned, and the case just happened this way.
  There are those who say: Rav said: We have also learned this [in a Mishnah]: R. Yose the priest and R. Zechariah b. HaKatzav testified regarding an Israelite woman, who had been taken as collateral in Ashkelon and her family distanced her and her witnesses testified that she had not been secluded [with a man] and that she was not defiled [by a man]. And the Sages said to them: If you believe [the witnesses] that she had been taken as collateral, believe [them also] that she was not secluded and that she was not defiled, and if you do not believe [them] that she was not secluded and that she was not defiled, do not believe [them] that she was pledged.
  Now Ashkelon where [it happened] for the sake of money, and [yet] the reason [why she was permitted her to her husband was] because witnesses testified concerning her, but if witnesses did not testify concerning her [she would] not [have been permitted]; and is it not [also to be supposed] that there is no difference whether she was pledged or imprisoned? No, when she was pledged it is different.
  Some put in the form of a contradiction. We have learned: if for the sake of money she is permitted to her husband. But they raise a contradiction:  R. Yose testified etc. [Now] in Ashkelon [it happened] for the sake of money and [yet] the reason [why she is permitted to her husband] is because witnesses testify concerning her, but if no witnesses testify concerning her, [she would] not [have been permitted].
  And they resolve: R. Shmuel b. Yitzhak said: It is no contradiction; here  [it speaks] when the hand of Israel is strong over the non-Jews, [and] there when the hand of the non-Jews is strong over themselves.
  If for the purpose of [taking her] life she is forbidden [to her husband]. Rav said: As for instance the wives of thieves. Levi said: As for instance, the wife of Ben Dunai. Hezekiah said:  This is only when they have [already] been sentenced to death. Yohanan says: Even if they have not yet been sentenced to death.
  A town that has been conquered by a besieging troop: all the priests’ wives who are in it are prohibited [from their husbands].   If they have witnesses, even a slave, even a female slave, they are believed. A person is not believe about themselves. 
  GEMARA. They raised a contradiction against this:  If a reconnoitring troop comes to a town  in time of peace the open casks [of wine] are forbidden and the closed ones are permitted.   In times of war both are permitted, because they have no time to offer libations.
  Mari answered:  To have intercourse they have time, to offer libations they have no time. Yitzchak b. Elazar said in the name of Hezekiah: Here [it speaks] of a besieging troop of the same kingdom here [it speaks] of a besieging troop of another kingdom. [Even in the case of a besieging troop] of the same kingdom, it is not possible that at least one of them did not run away [from the rest of the troop]!
  Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: When they guard one another.   [But still] it is not possible that one does not sleep a little!  Levi answered: When they placed round the town, chains, wooden sticks and geese.
  Abba b. Zavda said:  With regard to this R. Judah Nesiah and the rabbis argued about this: One said:  there [it speaks] of a besieging troop of the same kingdom and here of a besieging troop of another kingdom, and he found no difficulties, Whereas one raised all those difficulties and he resolved [them by saying]  when they placed round the town chains, dogs, sticks, and geese.
  Idi b. Abin said in the name of R. Yitzchak b. Ashian:  If there is there one hiding place, it protects all of the priestly women.
  Yirmiyah asked:  What is [the law] if [the hiding place] holds only one?  Do we say  of each one was the one [who hid there] or do we not say this?
  But why is this different from the case of two paths, one clean and one unclean, and someone walked in one of them and [then] prepared clean things and another person came and walked in the second path and [then] prepared clean things. Judah says:
  If each one comes to ask separately, they are [declared] clean; [but] if they both come together, they are [declared] unclean. Yose says:  In both cases they are [declared] unclean.
  And Rava said, and some say R. Yohanan: [If they come to ask] at the same time, all agree that they are [declared] unclean, if they come one after another, all agree that they are [declared] clean; they differ only when one comes to ask for himself and for the other one; one treats this as [if it were] at the same time, and the other regards this as [if it were] one after another. Now here also, since all [ the women] were permitted, it is like [the case where they came] at the same time? 
  How now!  In that case, there is certainly an impurity, [but] here who says that any one has been defiled?
  Ashi asked: If she said, “I have not hidden myself and I have not been defiled,” what is [the law]?  Do we say
  
  Daf 27b
  
  why would she lie” or do we not say it?
  But why should this be different from the following case of someone who hired out a donkey to a person, and he said to him, “Do not go the way of Nehar Pekod. where there is water, go the way of Naresh, where there is no water.” But he went the way of Nehar Pekod and the donkey died.
  He [then] came before Rava and said to him: ‘Indeed, I went the way of Nehar Pekod, but there was no water. Rava: “Why should he lie? If he wished he could have said, “I went the way of Naresh.” And Abaye said to him:  We do not say “Why should he lie?’ where there are witnesses.
  Now is this so? There there were witnesses that there certainly was water on the way of Nehar Pekod, but here has she certainly been defiled?  It is [only] a concern, and in the case of a mere concern we do say [“why should he lie?”].
  If there are witnesses, even a slave, even a handmaid, they are believed. And even her own handmaid is believed. But we raise a contradiction against this:  She should not be secluded with him unless there are witnesses, even a slave,
  even a handmaid except her own handmaid, because she is familiar with her own handmaid! Papi said: In [the case of] a female captive they were lenient.
  Papa said:  In the one case [it speaks of] her handmaid, in the other case [it speaks of] his handmaid.
  But is her handmaid really not believed?  Does it not teach  “No one may testify as to himself?” [Implying] her handmaid is believed!   Her handmaid is like herself.
  Ashi said:  In both cases [it speaks of] her handmaid. A handmaid sees and is silent.  There, where her silence makes her permitted, she is not believed, but here, where her silence makes her forbidden she is believed.
  Now also, she may come and lie?   Two [things] she would not do.
  As in the case of Mari b. Isak [or as some say of Hana b. Isak], a brother came to him from Be-Hozae  and said to him:  Give me a share in the property of our father.  He answered him:  I do not know you. He [then] came to R. Hisda, and he said to him:  He answered you well, for it is written: “And Joseph knew his brothers, but they did not know him” (Genesis 22:8) This teaches that he went away before he had grown a beard and he came back after growing a beard.
  [Then] he said to him:  I Go and bring witnesses that you are his brother.  He answered him:  I have witnesses, but they are afraid of him, because he is a powerful man.  He [then] said to the other man:  Go you and bring witnesses that he is not your brother.  He answered him:  Is this the law?  [Surely] he who wishes to extract money from his fellow, must provide the evidence.  He said to him:  This is how I rule for you and all who are powerful like you! But they might still come and lie?  Two things they will not do.
  Shall we say that this difference is like that between [these] tannaim? [For it was taught]: This testimony: a man and a woman, a boy and a girl, her father and her mother, her brother and her sister [may testify], but not her son and her daughter, nor her slave and her handmaid. And in another [baraita] it was taught: All are believed to testify [for her] except herself and her husband.
  Now the views of R. Papi and R. Ashi are [certainly] according to the difference of the Tannaim.  But is the view of R. Papa according to the Tannaim?
  Papa could answer you:  When that baraita was taught, it referred to a woman who talked in her simplicity.
  Like that which R. Dimi said when he came: R. Hanan of Carthage told a story:  A case came before R. Joshua b. Levi (or as some say R. Joshua b. Levi told a story:  A case came before Rabbi): Someone was talking in his simplicity and said:  I and my mother were taken captives among the non-Jews. When I went out to draw my water, my mind was on my mother.   [When I was out] to gather wood, my mind was on my mother.  And Rabbi allowed her to marry a priest by [the words of] his mouth. 
  Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-katzav said:  “By this temple!  Her hand did not move out of my hand from the time that the non-Jews entered Jerusalem until they departed.” They said to him:  “No one may testify concerning himself.”
  GEMARA. It has been taught:  And nevertheless, he set aside a house for her in his courtyard, and when she would go out, she went out at the head of her children, and when she would come in, she came in at the head of her children.
  Abaye asked:  May one do so with regard to one’s divorcee?   [Do I say:] There it was allowed because in [the case of] a captive woman they were lenient, but not here. Or is there no difference?
  Come and hear:  It has been taught: If someone has divorced his wife, she may not get married [and live] in his neighborhood. 
  
  Daf 28a
  
  And if he was a priest she must not live with him in the [same] alley.  If it was a small village, such a case happened, and they said: A small village is considered a neighborhood.
  Who must give way before whom? Come and hear: It has been taught:  She must give way before him, but he does not give way before her,  but if the courtyard belonged to her, he must give way before her.
  The question was asked:  If the courtyard belonged to both, what is [the law]?  Come and hear:  “She must give way before him.”  What are we dealing with here?   If the courtyard belongs to him it is obvious;  and if the courtyard belongs to her, has it not been taught: “If the courtyard belongs to her, he gives way before her”?  Thus is it not in such a case!  [No.] Perhaps [it deals with a case] when they rented [the courtyard].
  What then do we know about this?  Come and hear:  [It is written:] “The Lord will hurl you away violently as a man” (Isaiah 22:17) and Rav said:  Moving about is harder for a man than for a woman.
  Our Rabbis taught: If he borrowed from the property of her father, she collects the payment only through another person.   Shesheth said: And if they [both] come before us to court, we do not deal with them. Papa said: We excommunicate them. Huna, the son of R. Joshua said:  We even order them to be lashed. Nahman said:  It is taught in [Tractate] Evel Rabbati :  To what does this refer? To a case when she was divorced after marriage, but if she was divorced after betrothal, she may collect the payments herself, because he is not [so] familiar with her.
  Once a betrothed and his [former] fiancee came before Rava, and R. Adda b. Matanah, sat before him. Rava placed a messenger between them.  R. Adda b. Matanah said to him:  Did not R. Nahman say: “It is taught in Evel Rabbathi etc.”?  He answered him:  We see that they are familiar with one another.
  There are those who say:  Rava did not place a messenger between them.  R. Adda b. Matanah said to him:  Let the Master place a messenger between them.  He answered him:  Did not R. Nahman say:  “It is taught in Evel Rabbati, etc.”? He said to him: This refers to a case where they are not familiar with one another, but [as to] these, I see that they are familiar with one another.
  The following are believed to testifying when they are grown-up about what they saw when they were minors: A person is believed to say “This is the handwriting of my father”, “This is the handwriting of my teacher”, “This is the handwriting of my brother”;
  “I remember that that woman went out with a hinuma and an uncovered head”; “That that man used to go out from school to immerse in order to eat terumah”; “That he used to take a share with us at the threshing floor”; “That this place was a bet ha-peras”; “That up to here we used to go on Shabbat”;
  But a man is not believed when he says: “So-and-so had a path in this place”; “That man had a place of standing up and eulogy in this place”.
  R. Huna b. Joshua said: [This is] only when a grown up person is with him.  
  And it is necessary [to teach all three cases]: For if he had taught us [with regard to] his father, [I might say] that is because he was always with him, but [with regard to] his teacher [he would] not [be believed]. And if he had taught us [with regard to] his teacher, [I might say] that is because he had reverence for his teacher, but not his father.
  And if he had taught us these two [cases], [I might say with regard to] his father, that is because he was always with him, and [with regard to] his teacher, because he had reverence for him, but [with regard to] his brother, in regard to whom there is neither this nor that ground, I might say [that he is] not [believed]; so he teaches us [that] since the confirmation of documents is [only] an enactment of the rabbis, so the rabbis believed him regarding what the rabbis enacted.
  “I remember that that woman went out with a hinuma and an uncovered head”;  What is the reason [he is believed]?   Because most women get married as virgins, so this is only a revelation that we already know.
  That that man used to go out from school to immerse in order to eat terumah. But perhaps he was the slave of a priest?  This supports R. Joshua b. Levi;  for R. Joshua b. Levi said:  A man is forbidden to teach his slave the Torah.
  But is it indeed not [permitted]?  Has it not been taught:  If his master has borrowed from him or his master made him 
  
  Daf 28b
  
  a guardian or he put on Tefillin in the presence of his master or he read three verses in the Synagogue, he does not become free! There it happened that he read on his own, when we say [that he should not teach his slave Torah] it referred to treating him like a son. To immerse in order to eat terumah: [Only] with regard to rabbinical terumah.
  That he was taking a share with us at the threshing floor.  But perhaps he was the slave of a priest?  This was taught according to the one who says:  One does not distribute terumah to a slave unless his master is with him,  for it has been taught:  One does not distribute terumah to a slave unless his master is with him, the words of R. Judah.  R. Yose says:  He can say:  “If I am a priest, give me for my sake, and if I am the slave of a priest, give me for the sake of my master.” 
  In the place of R. Judah they used to raise from terumah to the status of a priest;  in the place of R. Yose t hey would not raise from terumah to the status of a priest. It was taught: R. Elazar, the son of R. Yose said: Throughout my whole life I never gave testimony. Once I gave testimony and they raised a slave to the priesthood through my testimony. 
  Do you really think they raised [a slave to the priesthood through his testimony]!  Now if the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring a stumbling through the animals of the pious how much less through the pious men themselves? 
  Rather they wanted to raise a slave to the priesthood through my testimony.  He saw it in the place of R. Yose and he went and testified in the place of R. Judah.
  That this place was a bet haperas.  Why [is he believed]?   Because [the law of] bet haperas is of rabbinical origin, for R. Judah said in the name of Rav:  One blows away [the dust from] a bet haperas and goes [there]. Rav Judah b. Ammi said in the name of Rav Judah:  A bet haperas which has been trodden upon clean.  What is the reason? It is impossible that a bone [of the size] of a barleycorn was not trodden down by the foot. 
  Up to here we used to go on Shabbat. He holds that  the [Shabbat] limits are rabbinical.
  But a man is not believed when he says: “So-and-so had a path in this place”; “That man had a place of standing up and eulogy in this place”. What is the reason? We do not extract money.
  Our Rabbis taught:  A boy is believed when he says, “Thus my father told me:  this family is pure. This family is unclean.”  Do you really mean to say “clean and unclean”!  Rather, “This family is fit and this family is unfit.” 
  “That we have eaten at the ketzatzah of the daughter of So-and-so to So-and-so,” “ That we used to bring hallah and [priestly] gifts to the priest So-and-so.” But only through himself, and not through someone else. In all these cases, if he was a non-Jew and he converted, a slave and he was set free, he is not believed. [But] he is not believed when he says “that man had a path in this place, that man had a place of standing up and eulogy in this place.”  R. Yohanan b. Beroka said.  He is believed.
  To which [clause] does R. Yohanan b. Beroka refer?  If I say to the last clause, This is extracting money?  Rather [it refers] to the earlier clause.  In all these cases, if he was a non-Jew and he converted, a slave and he was set free, he is not believed. R. Yohanan b. Beroka says:  He is believed.
  What are they arguing about?  The first Tanna holds:  Since he was a non-Jew he would not pay special attention to it, and R. Yohanan b. Beroka holds:  Since he had it in his mind to become a convert he would pay special attention to it.
  What is ketzatzah? —  The rabbis taught:  How does a ketzatzah take place?  If one of the brothers has married a woman who is unworthy of him, the members of the family come together, bring a cask full of fruit, break it in the middle of the open place and say,  “Brethren of the house of Israel, hear.  Our brother So-and-so has married a woman who is not worthy of him, and we are afraid lest his descendants will mix with our descendants. Come and take for yourselves a sign for future generations, that his descendants shall not mix with our descendants.”  This is the ketzatzah with regard to which a child is believed when he testifies.
  May we return to you, the chapter “the woman who was widowed.”
  
  Daf 29a
  
  These are girls to whom the fine is due: If one had intercourse with a mamzeret, a netinah, a Samaritan; Or with a convert, a captive, or a slave-woman, who was redeemed, converted, or freed [when she was] under the age of three years and one day.  
  If one had intercourse with his sister, with the sister of his father, with the sister of his mother, with the sister of his wife, with the wife of his brother, with the wife of the brother of his father, or with a woman during menstruation, he has to pay the fine, [for] although these are punishable through karet, there is not, with regard to them, a death [penalty inflicted] by the court.
  These prohibited maidens get the fine, [but] fit ones [do] not? This is what it mean:  These are prohibited maidens who get the fine. If anyone had intercourse with a mamzeret, a netinah, a Samaritan, etc.
  A young girl [receives a fine], [but not] a minor.  
  Who is the Tanna [who taught this]? Rav Judah said in the name of Rav:  It is R. Meir,  for it has been taught:  A small girl from the age of one day until [the time that] she grows two pubic hairs, [the laws of] sale apply to her, but not the [laws of] fine;  from [the time that] she grows two pubic hairs until she becomes mature, the [laws of the] fine apply to her, but not [the laws of the] sale, the words of R. Meir;  for R. Meir said:  Wherever sale applies, the fine does not apply, and wherever the fine applies, sale does not apply.
  But the Sages say:  A small girl from the age of three years and one day until [the time that] she becomes mature — the fine applies to her. The fine yes but not the sale!  Say:
  
  Daf 29b
  
  also the fine [applies] when the sale [applies].
  But are these entitled to the fine!    Why? It reads here: “And she shall be his wife” (Deuteronomy 22:29), [that means] one who is fit to be his wife?  Resh Lakish:  [It is written:] “na’arah,” “na’arah”, “ha-na’arah”  once is necessary for itself, once to include those prohibited by negative commandment and once to include those punishable with karet.
  Papa said:  [It is written:] “virgin,” “virgin,” “the virgins,” (Exodus 22:15-16)  once is necessary for itself, once to include those prohibited by negative commandment and once to include those punishable with karet.
  Why does R. Papa not agree with Resh Lakish? That [verse] he requires for [the same teaching] as that of Abaye, for Abaye said:  If he had relations with her and she died, he is exempt, for it is said: “And he shall give to the father of the young girl” [this means]: To the father of the young girl, but not to the father of a dead [person].
  And why did not Resh Lakish say the same as R. Papa?  That [verse] he requires for an analogy (gezerah shavah)  for it is taught:  [It is written:] “He shall pay money according to the bride-price (mohar) of virgins,” (Exodus 22:16)  [this means that] this shall be like the mohar of virgins, and the mohar of virgins shall be like this.  But Resh Lakish also requires it for [the same teaching] as that of Abaye, and R. Papa also requires it for the gezerah shavah (the analogy)?
  Rather, six words are written: “maiden”, “maiden”, “the maiden”, “virgin”, “virgins”, “the virgins”: Two [are necessary] for themselves, one for the teaching of Abaye, and one for the gezerah shave, [and] two remain over: once to include those prohibited by negative commandment and once to include those punishable with karet.
  This [mishnah] excludes [the view of] the following tanna: For it has been taught: “And she shall be his wife” (Deuteronomy 22:29). Shimon the Yemenite says: A woman who can become his wife;  R. Shimon b. Menasya says:  A woman who can remain his wife.
  What difference is there between them?  Zera said: The difference between them is with regard to a mamzeret and a netinah. According to him who says that she can become his wife, here also there is the possibility of her becoming his wife. And according to him who says that there must be the possibility of her remaining his wife, here there is not the possibility of her remaining his wife.
   But according to R. Akiva, who says:  There can be no betrothal when [the woman] is prohibited by a negative commandment, what is the difference between them? There is a difference between them in the case of a widow who marries a high priest, and this according to R. Simai,  for it is taught: R. Simai says: Of all R. Akiba makes mamzerim, except [the offspring of] a widow and a high priest, for the Torah says: “He shall not take” and “he shall not profane,” (Leviticus 21:14-15) [this teaches that] he makes [his offspring] profane, but not mamzerim.
  And according to R. Yeshebav, who says:  Come and let us cry out against Akiba b. Joseph, who says: Whenever the marriage is forbidden in Israel the child [of such marriage] is a mamzer,  what is the difference between them? The difference between them 
  
  Daf 30a
  
  is with regard to the marriage between an Egyptian or an Edomite [woman], in which case there is a transgression [merely] of a positive law.
  That is all right if R. Yeshebav [by his statement] only came to exclude the view of R. Simai.   But if his statement was his own, whenever the marriage is forbidden in Israel, the child [of such a marriage] is a mamzer even in the case of a positive commandment. What is [then] the difference between them?
  The difference between them is with regard to a non-virgin married to a high priest. And why is this different? It is a law which does not apply to all.
  Hisda said:  All agree that he who has intercourse with a woman during menstruation has to pay the fine, for according to him who holds that there must be the possibility of her becoming his wife, she can become his wife, and according to him who holds that there must be the possibility of her remaining his wife, she can remain his wife.
  But [our mishnah] excludes the view of R. Nehunia b. HaKaneh, f or it is taught: R. Nehunia b. HaKaneh, made Yom Kippur equal to Shabbat with regard to payment;  just as [he who desecrates] Shabbat forfeits his life and is free from payment, so too [he who desecrates] Yom Kippur forfeits his life and is free from payment.
  What is the reason of R. Nehunia b. Hakaneh? Abaye said:  It is said “harm” (Exodus 21:22) [in the case of death] by the hand of man, and it is said “harm” (Genesis 42:38) [in the case of death] by the hand of heaven. Just as in the case of the “harm” done by the hand of man one is free from payment, so too in the case of “harm” done by the hand of heaven, one is free from payment.
  Ada b. Ahava raised a difficulty:  How [do you know] that Jacob warned his sons against cold and heat, which are by the hand of heaven? Perhaps [he warned them] against lions and thieves, which are “by the hand of man?”  Did Jacob warn them against this and not against that?   Jacob warned then against every kind of harm.
  [But] are cold and heat by the hand of heaven?  Is it not taught:  Everything is “by the hand of heaven” except cold and heat, for it is said: “Cold and heat are in the path of the crooked; he that values his life will keep far from them” (Proverbs 22:5)? Further,  are lions and thieves “by the hand of man”?  Did not R. Joseph say and R. Hiyya teach:  Since the day of the destruction of the Temple, although the Sanhedrin ceased, the four forms of capital punishment have not ceased? “They have not ceased”!!?  Surely they have ceased!  Rather 
  
  Daf 30b
  
  the judgment of the four forms of capital punishment has not ceased.   He who would have been sentenced to stoning, either falls down from the roof or a wild beast runs him down.   He who would have been sentenced to burning, either falls into a fire or a serpent bites him.  He who would have been sentenced to decapitation is either delivered to the government or robbers come upon him.  He who would have been sentenced to strangulation, is either drowned in the river or dies from suffocation. Rather reverse it:  Lions and thieves are “by the hands of heaven” and cold and heat are by the hands of man.
  Rava said:  The reason [for the view] of R. Nehunia b. Hakaneh, is from here:  “And if the people of the land should shut their eyes from that man, when he gives of his offspring to Molech, [and not put him to death]; then I will set my face against that man, and against his family, and will cut him off” (Leviticus 20:5). The Torah says:  My karet is like your death penalty; just as [in the case of] your death penalty one is free from payment, so in the case of my karet one is free from payment.
  What is the difference between Rava and Abaye? The difference is [with regard to] a non-priest who ate terumah.  According to Abaye he is free [from payment], and according to Rava he is obligated [to pay].
  But according to Abaye is he exempt?  Did not R. Hisda say: R. Nehunia  ben Hakaneh admits that he who stole [forbidden] fat belonging to his neighbor and ate it, is liable [to pay],   because he was guilty of stealing before he came to [the transgression of] the prohibition with regard to [forbidden] fat?   Hence as soon as he lifted it up he acquired it, but he did not become liable for death until he ate it.  Here also, when he lifted it up he acquired it, but he did not become liable for death until he had eaten it!  Here we refer to a case where his friend stuck it into his mouth.
  [But] even then, as soon as he chewed it, he acquired it, but he is not liable for death until he has swallowed it!   When [his friend] stuck it into his esophagus. What is this case?  If he can give it back, let him give it back. And if he cannot give it back, why is he guilty?   It is only necessary when he can give it back only with an effort.
  Papa said:  When his friend put liquids of terumah into his mouth. Ashi said:  When a non-priest ate his own terumah 
  
  Daf 31a
  
  and [at the same time] tore the silk garments of his neighbor. 
  The [above] text [stated]: R. Hisda said:  R. Nehunia b. Hakaneh agrees that, if someone stole [forbidden] fat belonging to his neighbor and ate it, he is liable [to pay], because he was guilty of stealing before he came to the prohibition with of [forbidden] fat. Shall we say he disagrees with R. Abin? For R. Abin said:  If someone threw an arrow [on Shabbat] from the beginning of four [cubits] to the end of four [cubits] and it tore silk garments in its passage he is exempt [from payment], for the uprooting was necessary for the putting down.  Here too the lifting up was necessary for the eating.
  Now is this so?  There the “putting down” is impossible without the “uprooting”; but here the eating is possible without the “lifting up,” for if he wants, he could bend down and eat. Alternatively,  there if he wants to take it back, he cannot take it back; but here, he can put it back.
  What is the [practical] difference between the one answer and the other answer? The difference between them is [in the following case]: One who carries a knife in the public domain and it tore silk garments in its passage:  According to the answer that the “putting down” is impossible without the “uprooting”  here also the “putting down” is impossible without the “uprooting.”  And according to the answer that he cannot take it back, here he can take it back.
  The text [stated above]: R. Abin said:  If someone threw [on Sabbath] an arrow from the beginning of four [cubits] to the end of four [cubits] and it tore silk garments in its passage he is exempt [from payment], for the “uprooting” was necessary for the “putting down.” Bibi b. Abaye raised an objection:  If someone stole a purse on Shabbat he is obligated [to pay], because he was guilty of stealing before he came to the [transgression of] the prohibition punishable with stoning,  but if he dragged it along he is exempt [from payment], because the desecration of Shabbat and the stealing come at the same time.
  And why?  Here also we should say: The lifting up is necessary for the carrying out! Here also we should say: The lifting up is necessary for the carrying out!
  [But] is he, in such a case guilty [of trangressing Shabbat]?  Did not R. Simon say [that] R. Ammi said in the name of R. Yohanan:  If someone was removing objects from one corner to another corner and changed his mind and carried them out he is exempt because the taking up was not from the outset for that [purpose]?
  Do not say [he picked it up] in order to hide it, rather say [he picked it up] in order to carry it out. Here we are dealing with a case where he [paused and] remained standing [for a while].
  For what purpose did he stand? If to adjust [the weight], this is the usual way. Rather where he stood still in order to rest. But if he stood in order to adjust the weight what is the rule? 
  
  Daf 31b
  
   He would be exempt. [If so] instead of teaching “but if he dragged it along he is exempt [from payment],” let it teach the distinction in the same case:  “When was this said?  If he stood still to rest; but if [he stood still] to adjust the weight, he is exempt [from payment]”? 
  Rather, whose opinion is this? It is Ben Azzai who said that  one who walks is like one who stands.  [But] what would be the rule if he threw [the purse]?  He would be exempt [from payment]. Let him then make the distinction in the same case:  When was this said? When he walked, but when he threw it, he is exempt.
  The case of dragging it along need [to be stated]. Lest you would have said that  this is not the way of carrying out, so he teaches us [that it is a way of carrying out].
  What [kind of purse was it]?  If large, this is the ordinary way [of carrying it out], and if small, this is not the ordinary way?  Rather it was medium sized. But where did he carry it to?
  If he carried it into the public domain, there is a transgression of Shabbat but no stealing, and if he carried it into the private domain, there is stealing but no transgression of Shabbat!   No, it is necessary [to state it] when he carried it out to the sides of the public road.
  According to whose view?  If according to R. Eliezer, who says:  The sides of the public road are like the public road, there is a transgression of Shabbat but no stealing and  if it is according to the rabbis, who say: The sides of the public road are not like the public road, there is stealing but no transgression of Shabbat?
  Indeed, it is according to R. Eliezer, and when R. Eliezer says: The sides of the public road are like the public road, these words refer only to the obligation for transgressing Shabbat, because sometimes people push and go there, but with regard to acquiring, one does acquire there. Why [not]? Because the public is not often there.
  Ashi said:  It refers to a case where he lowered his hand to less than three [handbreadths] and received it. [And this is] according to Rava, for Rava said:  The hand of a person is regarded as [a place of] four by four [handbreadths]. Aha taught so.
  Ravina [however] taught:  Indeed, when he carried it out into the public road, for he acquires also in the public ground. [And] they differ with regard to a deduction from this Mishnah, for we have learned:  If he was pulling it out and it died in the domain of the owner, he is exempt. But if he lifted it up or brought it out from the domain of the owner and it died, he is obligated [to pay]. 
  Ravina makes a deduction from the first clause, and R. Aha makes a deduction from the second clause.  Ravina makes a deduction from the first clause:  “If he was pulling it out and it died in the domain of the owner, he is exempt.”  The reason [he is exempt] is because it died in the domain of the owner, but if he had brought it out from the domain of the owner and it died, he would have been obligated [to pay].  Aha makes a deduction from the second clause: “But if he lifted it up or brought it out [etc.]” Bringing out is like lifting up; just as lifting up is [an act through which the object] comes into his possession, so too bringing out [must he an act through which the object] comes into his possession.
  According to R. Aha the first clause is difficult and according to Rabina the second clause is difficult? The first clause is not difficult to R. Aha, for as long as it has not come into his possession it is called “in the domain of the owner.”   The second clause is not difficult to Ravina,  for we do not say [that] bringing out is like lifting up.
  One who has sex with his sister, or with the sister of his father, etc. They raised a contradiction against this:  The following persons receive [the punishment of] lashes: He who has intercourse with his sister, with the sister of his father, with the sister of his mother, with the sister of his wife, with the sister of his brother, with the wife of the brother of his father, or with a woman during menstruation,
  
  Daf 32a
  
  and we hold that one does not receive lashes and pay! Ulla said:  There is no difficulty.  Here [it speaks] of his sister [who is] a young girl, and there [it speaks] of his sister [who is] a mature girl.
  [But in the case of] his sister [who is] a mature girl, too, [there are damages to be paid for the] shame and damage? It refers to one not of sound senses. But [there are still damages to be paid for] the pain?  [It speaks of] a girl who was seduced.
  Now that you have come to this, you can even say [that it speaks of] his sister [who was] a young girl [and namely when she was] an orphan and [she was] seduced.
  Therefore Ulla holds:  Wherever there is a monetary payment and the punishment of lashes, he pays the money and does not receive the lashes.  From where does Ulla derive this? He derives it from [the law with regard to] one person who injures another person. Just as when one person injures another person, where there is a monetary payment and the punishment of lashes, he pays the money and does not receive the lashes, so too whenever there is a payment of money and a punishment of lashes, he pays the money and does not receive the lashes.
  But it is different with [the case of] one who injures another because he is liable for five things?And [if you will say] that [the payment of] money is still lighter, [one can say against this] that [here it has been excepted] from its rule [and] permitted to the court!  
  Rather he derives it from the case of plotting witnesses.  Just as in the case of plotting witnesses, whose transgression involves the payment of money and the punishment with lashes, they pay the money but do not receive the lashes, so too whenever there is payment of money and the punishment of lashes, he pays the money and does not receive the lashes.
  [But it may be argued] it is different with the case of plotting witnesses, because they do not require a warning? [And if you will say] that [the payment of] money is lighter, [one can say against this,] that they have not done any deed!
  Rather he derives it from both (plotting witnesses and personal injury).  The point common to both is that there is the payment of money and the punishment of lashes, and in either case he pays the money and does not receive the lashes. So whenever there is payment of money and the punishment of lashes, he pays the money and does not receive the lashes. But [it may be argued] the point common to both is [also] that they both have a strict side? And if [you will say that the payment of] money is lighter, [one can say against this] that they have both a lighter side?
  
  Daf 32b
  
  Rather, Ulla derives it from the two words “tahat:”  It is written here “Since (tahat) he has laid with her” (Deuteronomy 22:29) and it is written there: “Eye for (tahat) eye.” Just as there he pays money and does not receive lashes, so wherever there is the payment of money and the punishment of lashes, he pays money and does not receive the lashes.
  Yohanan said: You can even say that it speaks of his sister who was a young girl [and you can resolve the contradiction in the following way]: Here it speaks of a case where they warned him, and here it speaks of a case where they did not warn him.
  Therefore, R. Yohanan holds that wherever there is the payment of money and the punishment of lashes and they warned him, he receives the lashes and does not pay the money.  From where does R. Yohanan derive this? The verse says: “According to his guilt” (Deuteronomy 25:2); you punish him because of one guilt but not because of two guilts, and immediately following [it says]: “He shall strike him with forty lashes.”
  But behold when one person injures another person, in which case there is the payment of money and the punishment of lashes, he pays money and does not receive the lashes? And if you will say that  this is only when they did not warn him, but when they warned him, he receives the lashes and does not pay — did not R. Ammi say in the name of R. Yohanan that,  if one person struck another person a blow, for which no perutah can be claimed as damages, he receives the lashes?  What was this case?  If they did not warn him, why would he receive the lashes?  Rather it is clear that  they warned him, and the reason [why he receives the lashes and does not pay] is because the damages do not amount to a perutah, but if they amount to a perutah he pays the money but does not receive the lashes! 
  [It is] as R. Ila said:  The Torah has expressly stated that plotting witnesses have to pay money; so [here] also the Torah has expressly stated that the person who injures another person has to pay money. Where was the teaching of R. Ila said? On the following:  “We testify that So-and-so owes his fellow two hundred zuz” and they were found to be plotting witnesses, they receive the lashes and pay, for the verse that imposes upon them the lashes does not impose upon them the payment, the words of R. Meir; and the Sages say:  All who pay do not receive lashes.
  [And] let us say: He who receives lashes does not pay?  R. Ila said:  The Torah has expressly stated that plotting witnesses have to pay money.  Where has the Torah stated this?  Since; it is written: “Then you shall do to him as he had thought to do to his fellow”  (Deuteronomy 19:19); why [is it written further,] “hand for hand” (19:21)? Something that is given from hand to hand. And what is this? Money.
   [And] the same applies to the case of one who injures another. Since it is written: “As he has done, so shall it be done to him” (Leviticus 24:19); Why [is it also stated] “So shall it be given to him” (Leviticus 24:20)?  A thing that can be given from hand to hand, and that is money.
  Why does R. Yohanan not say as Ulla?  If so you would abolish [the lashes accorded to one who transgresses]: “The nakedness of your sister you shall not uncover” (Leviticus 18:9).
  
  Daf 33a
  
  [The same could be said] about one who injures another: If so you would abolish [the lashes accorded to one who transgresses], “He shall not exceed, lest, if he should exceed” (Deuteronomy 25:3).  [And the same could be said of] plotting witnesses: If so you would abolish [the lashes accorded to one who transgresses]: “Then it shall be, if the guilty man deserve to be beaten” (Deuteronomy 25:2).   Rather [lashing for] plotting witnesses could be fulfilled when [the witnesses testified falsely about someone that he was] the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah.  [Similarly in the case of] one who injured another, it could be fulfilled when he struck him a blow for which no perutah can be claimed as damages. 
  [But you could] also say [with regard to] his sister— it could be fulfilled in the case of his sister who was a mature girl! Yohanan could answer you: [The verse] “Since (tahat) he had relations with her” is required for the teaching of Abaye, for Abaye said: The verse says, “Since he had relations with her.” This [he shall pay] for he has had relations with her, [from which we infer] by implication, that there is also payment for shame and damages.
  And Ulla? He derives it from a teaching of Rava, for Rava said: The verse says: “Then the man that lay with her must give to the father of the girl fifty shekel of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29); for the enjoyment of lying [with her he pays] fifty [shekel of silver], [and from here we infer], by implication, that there is also payment for shame and damages.
  Elazar says: Plotting witnesses pay money and do not receive lashes, because they cannot be warned. Rav said: Know it [from the following logic]: When could we warn them? Could we warn them at first? They will say: We have forgotten. Could we warn them during the deed? They would [then] leave and not testify.   Could we warn them at the end? What has been has been.  
  Abaye raised a difficulty on this: Let us warn them immediately after they have given their evidence?   Aha the son of R. Ika raised a difficulty: Let us warn them at first and hint to them [afterwards].
   Abaye changed his mind and said: What I said was nothing. For if you thought that plotting witnesses require a warning, if we have not warned them, we would not kill them. [But then] is it possible that who they wished to kill without a warning, that they should require a warning? Surely, we need to fulfill “then you shall do to him as he has plotted to do to his brother,” and this could not be fulfilled.
  Samma the son of R. Jeremiah raised a difficulty: But now [according to your logic], [if the witnesses testified falsely about someone that he was] the son of a divorced woman or the son of a halutzah since this case is not included in “as he had thought etc.” he should require a warning should be required! The verse says: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22) [this means] a law that is equal for all of you.
  Shisha, the son of R. Idi, said: That a person who injures another person pays money and does not receive the lashes is derived from the following: [It is written:] “And if men fight and harm a woman with child, so that she miscarries,” (Exodus 21:22): [Upon this] R. Elazar said: The verse speaks of fighting with intent to kill, for it is written, “But if any harm follow, then you shall take a life for a life.”
  How did this occur? If they did not warn him, why should he be killed? Hence it is obvious that he was warned, [and it is held], when one is warned regarding a severe matter one also is warned for a light matter, and [yet] the Torah says: “And if no harm follow, he shall be surely fined.” 
  Ashi raised a difficulty:  From where [do we know] that when one is warned regarding a severe matter one also stands warned for a light matter? Perhaps it is not so!  And even if we say that it is so, how [do we know] that death is more severe?
  
  Daf 33b
  
  Perhaps lashes are more severe, for Rav said: If they had lashed Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah, they would have worshipped the [golden] image? Samma the son of R. Assi said to R. Ashi; and some say [that] R. Samma the son of R. Ashi [said] to R. Ashi: Do you not make a distinction between a beating that has a limit and a beating that has no limit!
   Jacob from Nehar Pekod raised a difficulty: hat works for the Rabbis who hold that life actually means [life]. But according to Rabbi, who holds that it means money, what is there to say?
  Rather R. Jacob from Nehar Pekod said in the name of Rava: [It is to derived] from the following verse: [It is written,] “Should he get up and walk about on his staff then he that smote him shall be cleansed” (Exodus 21:19). Would you think that this one walks about in the market and that one should be killed? Rather it teaches that they imprison him; if he dies, they kill him; and if he does not die, “he shall pay for the loss of his time, and heal him.”  
  Now what is this case? If they did not warn him, why should he be killed? Rather it is clear that they warned him, and [it is held], one who was warned for a severe matter stands warned for the lighter matter and the Torah says [that if he does not die] “he shall pay for the loss of his time, and heal him.” 
  Ashi raised a difficulty:  From where [do we know] that when one is warned regarding a severe matter one also stands warned for a light matter?  Perhaps it is not so! And even if we say that it is so, how [do we know] that death is more severe?  Perhaps lashes are more severe, for Rav said: ? If they had lashed Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah, they would have worshipped the [golden] image?
  Samma the son of R. Assi said to R. Ashi; and some say [that] R. Samma the son of R. Ashi [said] to R. Ashi:  Do you not make a distinction between a beating that has a limit and a beating that has no limit!
  Mari raised a difficulty:  From where [do you know] that he struck him intentionally, and he is cleansed from execution. Perhaps he struck him unintentionally, and he is cleansed from exile.  The difficulty remains.
  Resh Lakish said:  Whose opinion is this? R. Meir, who says: . He receives the lashes and pays [the money] If it is according to R. Meir, [then one who violated] his daughter should also [pay the fine]?  
  And if you will say that R. Meir holds [that] one may receive the lashes and pay [the money], but he does not hold [that] one may receive the death penalty and pay [the money], is this so?  Has it not been taught: If he has stolen and slaughtered [an animal] on Shabbat, or has stolen and slaughtered [an animal] for idolatry, or has stolen an ox that is to be stoned and slaughtered it, he shall pay fourfold or fivefold, the words of R. Meir, but the sages exempt him [from payment].
  Has it not been stated regarding this: R. Jacob said in the name of R. Yohanan, and some say [that] R. Jeremiah said in the name of R. Shimon b. Lakish:  R. Abin and R. Elai and the whole company [of scholars] said in the name of R. Yohanan: It refers to a case where he [who stole the animal] let it be slaughtered by another person.
  But is it possible that one sins and another one is punished?  Rava said: The Torah says: “And he slaughters it or sells it” (Exodus 21:37); just as the sale is performed by another person, so too the slaughter is performed by another person.
  The School of R. Ishmael taught:  [The word] “or” comes to include the agent. The School of Hezekiah taught:  [The word] “instead” comes to include the agent
  Mar Zutra raises a difficulty on this:  Is it anywhere to be found that if he does [the deed] himself he is not liable and if an agent does it he is liable? He himself [does not pay], not because he is not liable, but because he receives the more severe penalty
  But if it had been slaughtered by another person, what is the reason of the rabbis who declare him free [from paying]? Who are the Sages?
  
  Daf 34a
  
  Who are the Sages? R. Shimon, who says: An unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering. This is correct with regard to [slaughtering for] idolatry and [slaughtering of] the ox that is to be stoned, but slaughtering on Shabbat is a valid slaughtering, for we have learned:  One who slaughters [an animal] on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable for the death penalty his slaughtering is valid?
  He holds the opinion of R. Yohanan the Sandler, for it has been taught:  One who cooks on Shabbat, [if] by mistake, he may eat it; if intentionally he may not eat it, the words of R. Meir.  R. Judah says:  [If] by mistake, he may eat it Shabbat is over; if intentionally, he may never eat it.  R. Johanan the Sandler says: [If] by mistake, others may eat it after Shabbat but he may not;  if intentionally neither he nor others may eat it.
  What is R. Yohanan the Sandler’s reasoning?  As R. Hiyya expounded at the entrance of the house of the Patriarch:   “You shall keep the Shabbat for it is holy to you” (Exodus 31:14).   Just as what is holy is forbidden to be eaten, so too what has been prepared on Shabbat is forbidden to be eaten. If [so, you might say that] just as what is holy is forbidden to be enjoyed, so too what has been prepared on Shabbat should be forbidden to be enjoyed? It says, “to you,” from this we learn: It shall belong to you.
  You might think [that it is forbidden to eat] even [what has been prepared on Shabbat] by mistake, [therefore] it is said: “Those who desecrate it shall surely die” (Exodus 31:14).  I have told you this only when it was done intentionally, not when it was done by mistake.
  Aha and Rabina argue about this.   One says: What has been prepared on Shabbat [is forbidden] by the Torah, and one says: by the rabbis. by the rabbis. The one who says: By the Torah, as we have said [above].  [And] the one who says: By the rabbis — the verse says: .  “It is holy,” “it” is holy, but what has been prepared on it is not holy
  According to the one who says [that the prohibition is only] by the rabbis, what is the reason of the rabbis who declare him exempt?  The rabbis declare him exempt only with regard to other cases.
  But [with regard to] one who slaughtered for idolatry [one can ask:] as soon as he has cut a little it has become forbidden, so when he continues the slaughtering he is not slaughtering what belongs to the owner?  Rava said: [It refers to a case] when he says [that] he worships it with the completion of the slaughtering.
  [But with regard to] the ox that is to he stoned, it is not his that he is slaughtering?   Rabbah said:  What are we dealing with here? When he handed it to a guardian and it caused the damage in the house of the guardian and it was sentenced in the house of the guardian and a thief stole it from the house of the guardian.
  And R. Meir holds like R. Yaakov and holds like R. Shimon.  He holds like R. Yaakov who says:  If the guardian returned it even after the sentence had been completed, it is regarded as returned.  And he holds like R. Shimon who says:  that which causes [the gain or loss of] money is regarded as money.
  Rabbah said:  Indeed [it speaks of a case] when he slaughtered it himself an
  
  Daf 34b
  
  and R. Meir holds the view that [though generally] one may receive the lashes and pay, one cannot receive the death penalty and pay but these [cases]  are different, because the Torah has enacted something novel with regard to a fine, and [therefore]  he has to pay, although he has to suffer the death penalty. And Rabbah follows his own principle, for Rabbah said: If he had a kid which he had stolen and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is obligated, for he was already guilty of stealing before he came to the prohibition of Shabbat;  [but] if he stole and slaughtered it on Sabbath he is free, for if there is no stealing there is no slaughtering and no selling.
  Rabbah also said: If he had a kid which he had stolen and had slaughtered it at the place he broke into, he is liable, for he was already guilty of stealing before he came to the transgression of breaking in; [But] if he stole and slaughtered it in the place he broke into, he is exempt, for if there is no stealing, there is no slaughtering and no selling.
  And it was necessary [to state both cases]. For if he had let us hear [the case of] Shabbat [I would have said that he is free from payment] because its prohibition is forever, but [in the case of] breaking in, which is only a prohibition for the moment, I might say, [that it is] not [so]. And if he had let us hear [the case of] breaking in [I would say that he is exempt from payment] because his breaking in is his warning, but [with regard to] Shabbat, [in] which [case] a warning is required, I might say that [it is] not [so] Therefore] it is necessary [to state both cases].
  Papa said: If one had a cow that he had stolen and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is liable for he was already guilty of stealing before he came to the prohibition of Shabbat; If he had a cow that he borrowed and he slaughtered it on Shabbat, he is exempt. Aha the son of Raba said to R. Ashi:  Does R. Papa come just to teach us the rule about the cow?
  He said to him:  R. Papa comes to teach us the rule of a borrowed [cow]. Lest you think [that] because R. Papa said  that he becomes responsible for its food from the time of possession by “drawing it [to him],” here also he becomes responsible for any unpreventable accident from the time of borrowing, so he lets us hear [that it is not so].
  Rava said: If their father left them a borrowed cow, they may use it during the whole period for which he borrowed it; if it died, they are not responsible.  If they thought that it belonged to their father and they slaughtered it and ate it, they pay the value of the meat at the lowest price. If their father left them an obligation of property, they are liable to pay.
  Some teach it in reference to the first case and some teach it in reference to the second case.   He who teaches it in reference to the first case, so much the more [does he teach it in reference] to the second case, and he disagrees with R. Papa.  
  And he who teaches it in reference to the second case does not teach it in reference to the first case, and he agrees with R. Papa. It is alright [that] R. Yohanan does not say like Resh Lakish, because he wants to explain it   according to the rabbis. But why does not Resh Lakish say like R. Yohanan?  He could answer you: since he is exempt if they warned him, he is also free [even] if they did not warn him.
  And they follow their own reasoning, for when R. Dimi came [from Eretz Yisrael] he said:  He who has committed inadvertently an act which, if he had committed it intentionally, would have been punishable with death or with lashes, and [which is also punishable] with something else, R. Yohanan says  he is liable, and Resh Lakish says  he is exempt.  Yohanan says he is liable, for they did not warn him. Resh Lakish says [that] he is exempt, for since he is exempt if they warned him, so he is exempt also when they did not warn him.
  Resh Lakish raised an objection against R. Yohanan:  [It is written]: “If no harm comes, he shall be surely fined” (Exodus 21:22). 
  
  Daf 35a
  
  Does this not refer to the law concerning “harm”?  No, it refers to real “harm.” Some say: R. Yohanan raised an objection against Resh Lakish:  [It is written] “And if no harm follows, he shall be surely fined.” Does this not refer to the law concerning “harm”?  No, it refers to real “harm.”
  Rava said: Is there anyone who holds that he who committed unintentionally an act which, if he had committed it intentionally would have been punishable with death [and which is also punishable with the payment of money] is obligated [to pay money]? Has not the house of Hezekiah taught: [It is written] “He that kills a man . . . he that kills a beast:”
  Just as in [the case of] the killing of a beast you have made no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to free exempt him [from the payment], but [to in any case] make him liable to pay, so also in [the case of] the killing of a person you shall make no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to make him liable to pay money, but to free him from paying money?
  Rather when Ravin came [from Eretz Yisrael], he said:  Those who committed inadvertently an act which, if committed willfully, would have been punishable with death [and which is also punishable with the payment of money] — all agree that he is free [from the payment of money], they only disagree when the act committed inadvertently would, if committed willfully, have been punishable with lashes and something else. Yohanan says [that]  he is liable [to pay, because] only with regard to those who commit an act punishable with death, those punishable by death have all been compared together, but those liable for lashes have not been compared together. [But] Resh Lakish says [that]  he is free [from making the money payment, because] the Torah has expressly included those who commit an act punishable with lashes to be as those who commit an act punishable with death.
  Where has the Torah included [them]?  Abaye said: ” It comes from “that wicked man” (Numbers 35:31) and “that wicked man” (Deuteronomy 25:2),  Rava said: It comes from “one who strikes” and “one who strikes. Papa said to Rava:  Which “striking” [do you refer to]?  If we say, “And he that strikes a beast shall pay for it, and he that strikes a man shall be put to death,” (Leviticus 24:21) this is written about death. Rather it this “striking”;  “He that strikes a beast shall pay for it: life for life” and adjacent to it [comes the following verse] “And if a man wounds his neighbor, as he has done so shall it be done to him?” (Leviticus 24:18-19). 
  But here “striking” is not mentioned!  We mean the effect of “striking.” But this verse refers to one who injures his fellow, and one who injures his fellow has to pay damages?  If it does not refer to a “striking” in which there is the value of a perutah, teach it in reference to a “striking” in which there is not the value of a perutah. 
  
  Daf 35b
  
  Anyhow, he is not liable to pay damages?  It necessarily [speaks of a case] where, while he struck him, he tore his silk garment.
  Hiyya said to Rava:  And according to the Tanna of the House of Hezekiah, who says:  [It is written] “He that kills a man . . . He that kills a beast” [etc.,] how does he know that it refers to a week-day and there is no distinction to be made? Perhaps it refers to Shabbat, [in which case] there is a distinction to be made with regard to the beast itself?
  This cannot be, for it is written: “And he that kills a beast shall pay for it, and he that kills a man shall be put to death.”  What is this case?  If they did not warn him, why should one who killed a man be put to death?  Rather it is clear that they warned him, and if [it happened] on Shabbat would he, if he killed a beast, pay for it?   Therefore it can only refer to a week-day. 
  Papa said to Abaye: According to Rabbah, who says [that] the Torah has innovated and innovation in the matter of fines and [therefore] he pays although he is killed, according to whom does he place our Mishnah?  If according to R. Meir, [the law regarding] his daughter is difficult, if according to R. Nehuniah ben Hakaneh, [the law regarding] his sister is difficult; [and] if according to R. Isaac [the law regarding] a mamzeret is difficult?
  It would be alright if he would hold like R. Yohanan, [for] he could [then] resolve it like R. Yohanan.   But if he holds like Resh Lakish how can he resolve it? Therefore you must say that he holds like R. Johanan. 
  Matanah said to Abaye:  According to Resh Lakish who says [that]  he is free [from paying the fine, because] the Torah has expressly included those who commit an act punishable by lashes to be as those who commit an act punishable by death, who is the Tanna who differs from R. Nehuniah b. Hakaneh? It is either R. Meir or R. Isaac.
  Our rabbis taught:  Forbidden relations and relations forbidden in the second degree, they have no claim to fine [for rape] or for seduction [payment].  A woman who refuses [her husband] has no claim to fine [for rape] or for seduction [payment]. An aylonit has no claim to fine [for rape] or for seduction [payment]. And a woman who has gone out on account of an evil name, has no claim to fine [for rape] or for seduction [payment].
  What are “forbidden relations” and what are “relations forbidden in the second degree”? If we say [that] “forbidden relations” 
  
  Daf 36a
  
  are really forbidden relations and prohibitions of the second degree [are those relations which were forbidden] by the rabbis, since she is permitted to him by the Torah, why should she not receive the fine? Rather, forbidden relations are those with regard to those punishable by death, prohibitions of the second degree are those punishable by karet. But in the case of prohibitions which are simply the transgression of a negative commandment, they do receive the fine. And whose opinion is it? [It is that of] Shimon the Yemenite.
  There are those who say:  “Forbidden relations” are those punishable by death at the hand of the Court or karet, “prohibitions of the second degree” are prohibitions which are simply the transgression of a negative commandment. Whose opinion is this? That of R. Shimon b. Menassia.
  A woman who refuses her husband, has no claim to fine [for rape] or payment for seduction. But an ordinary minor has a claim [to the fine]. Whose opinion is this? It is the rabbis, who say: A minor receives the fine. Say now the other clause:  “An aylonit has no claim to fine [for rape] or payment for seduction,” this accords with R. Meir, who says:  The minor does not receive the fine; and this one went straight from her state as minor into adulthood.  The first clause would then be according to the rabbis and the last clause according to R. Meir?
  And if you would say that  all of it accords with R. Meir, but in the case of the woman who refuses her husband he holds like R. Judah.  But does he indeed hold the like [R. Judah]?  Has it not been taught:  Until when can the daughter exercise the right of refusal? Until she grows two hairs, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah says:  Until the black is more than the white.
  Rather it is according to R. Judah, and with regard to a minor he holds like R. Meir. But does he hold this view?  Did not Rav Judah say in the name of Rav:  “These are the words of R. Meir”? Now if it had been so, he ought to have said: “These are the words of R. Meir and R. Judah”? This tanna holds according to R. Meir in one thing and differs from him in one thing.
  Rafram says:  What is a “woman who has refused marriage?” One who is able to refuse marriage. But then let it teach “a minor.” This is a difficulty.
  [It was said above:] “An aylonit has no claim to a fine [for rape] or [payment] for seduction. They raised a contradiction:  A woman who is a deaf-mute, or lacking sound senses, or an aylonit, has a claim to a fine [for rape], and a suit can be brought [by her husband] against her concerning her virginity. What contradiction is there?  The one is according to R. Meir and the other is according to the Rabbis! But why did he even raise this as a difficulty?  
  He wanted to raise another contradiction:  A woman who is a deaf-mute, or lacking sound senses, or has reached maturity, or lost her virginity through an accident, her husband cannot bring a virginity claim against her; A woman who is blind or an aylonit, her husband cannot bring a virginity claim against her.  Summachus says in the name of R. Meir:  A blind woman, her husband cannot bring a virginity claim against her.
  Sheshet said:  This is not difficult:  the one is according to R. Gamaliel and the other is according to R. Joshua. Say that R. Gamaliel holds this view when she makes this claim, but does he hold this view when she does not make a claim. Yes, since R. Gamaliel holds that she is believed, [we apply], in a case like this, [the verse], “Open thy mouth for the mute” )Proverbs 21:8).
  A woman who has reached the age of maturity, one cannot bring against her a virginity claim. But did not Rav say:  They give a woman who has reached the age of maturity the whole first night?
  
  Daf 36b
  
  If he claims with regard to the bleeding, it is really so [that he can make a virginity claim]. So what are we dealing with here? Where he claims that he found her to be an open opening.
  Summachus says in the name of R. Meir: A blind woman can have no virginity claim against her. What is the reason of Summachus? R. Zera said: For she may have struck against the ground.  All others may also have struck against the ground? All others see it and show it to their mothers, this one does not see it and does not show it to her mother.
  A woman who goes out because of an evil name receives no fine [for rape] and or seduction payment. A woman who goes out because of an evil name is liable to be stoned?  Sheshet said: This is what he means: If an evil name has gone out concerning her in her childhood receives no fine [for rape] and or seduction payment. 
  Papa said:  Infer from this [that] one does not collect [a debt] with an unsound document.  What is this case? If we say that a rumor has gone out that the document is forged, and similarly here a rumor has gone out that she has fornicated? Did not Rava say [that] if a rumor has gone out in the town [that] she fornicated one does not pay any attention to it?
  Rather two came and said [that] she asked them to commit with her a transgression and similarly here [that] two came and said [that] he said to them: Forge me [the document]. It is all right there, since there are many licentious men. But here if he has been assumed [to have been a forger], have [therefore] all Israelites been established?  Here also, since he was going round searching for a forgery, I can say [that] he [himself] has forged it and written it.
  And in the following cases there is no fine: If a man had intercourse with a female convert, a female captive or a slave-woman, who was redeemed, converted or freed after the age of three years and a day. Rabbi Judah says: a female captive who was redeemed is considered to be in her state of holiness (a virgin) even if she is of majority age.
  A man who had intercourse with his daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter, her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter does not pay the fine, because he forfeits his life, for his death is in the hands of the court, and he who forfeits his life pays no monetary fine for it is said, “And yet no other damage ensues he shall be fined” (Exodus 21:22).
  GEMARA. R. Yohanan said:  Both R. Judah and R. Dosa taught the same thing.  As to R. Judah [we have the ruling] just mentioned. As to R. Dosa? It was taught:  A female captive may eat terumah, the words of R. Dosa.  R. Dosa:  After all, what has that trader done to her?  Just because he squeezed her between the breasts, has a he rendered her unfit to her priestly husband?
  Rava said: Perhaps that is not so,  for R. Judah may have said his rule here only in order that the sinner may gain no advantage, but there he may hold the same opinion as the rabbis; Alternatively,  R. Dosa may have said his rule only there  [where it concerns] terumah which is only a rabbinical enactment, but in the case of a fine which is a toraitic law he may have held the same view as the Rabbis? 
  Abaye answered him: Is R. Judah’s reason here “that the sinner should gain no advantage”?  has it not been taught: R. Judah says,  “If a female captive was ransomed she remains in her state of holiness, and even if she is ten years old her kethubah is two hundred zuz.” Now how [could the reason] “that the sinner should gain no advantage” apply there? There also [a good reason exists for R. Judah’s ruling, since otherwise men] would refrain from marrying her.      
  Does R. Judah really hold [that a female captive] remains in her state of holiness.  Has it not been taught:  A man who ransoms a female captive may marry her, but he who testifies on her behalf may not marry her, and R. Judah ruled: In either case he may not marry her. The baraita itself is difficult? You said, “A man who ransoms a female captive may marry her,” and then it teaches, “But he who testifies on her behalf may not marry her.” Just because he testifies on her behalf, he cannot marry her?
  This is no difficulty: This is what it means to say: A man who ransoms a female captive and gives evidence on her behalf may marry her,” but he who merely gives evidence on her behalf may not marry her.
  In any case there is a contradiction against R. Judah?  Papa said:  Say [the following]: R. Judah says: In either case he may marry her. Huna the son of R. Joshua says:  It can still be maintained as was originally taught: R. Judah was speaking to the rabbis in accordance with their own ruling.  According to my view [he argued] the man may marry her in either case; but according to your view, in either case he may not marry her.
  And the rabbis?  “A man who ransoms a captive and testifies on her behalf may marry her” because no one would throw money away for nothing; “He who [merely] testifies on her behalf may not marry her” lest he set his eyes on her.
  Rav Papa b. Shmuel raised a contradiction  in front of R. Joseph:
  
  Daf 37a
  
  Does R. Judah really hold that [a female captive] remains in her state of holiness.  Has it not been taught: A woman convert who saw [menstrual] blood on [the day of] her conversion: R. Judah says: [It is sufficient to reckon her impurity from] the time she [discovered it]. R. Yose says: She is subject to the same laws as all other women and, therefore, causes impurity [retroactively] for the past period of twenty-four hours, or [for the period] between [her last ] examination and [her previous] examination. And she must also wait three months [before marrying], the words of R. Judah.
  But R. Yose permits her to be betrothed and married at once. The other replied: You are pointing out a contradiction between a convert  and a captive? A convert does not protect herself, but a captive does protect herself.
  But raise a contradiction between two rulings concerning a captive. For it was taught: Converts, captives or slaves who were ransomed, or converted or were manumitted, must wait three months if they were older than three years and one day; the words of R. Judah. R. Yose permits immediate betrothal and marriage. [The other] remained silent.
  He said to him: Have you heard anything on the subject? He said to him: This is what R. Sheshet said: This is a case where people saw that she had intercourse.  If so, what could be R. Yose’s reason? Rabbah said: R. Yose holds that a woman who fornicates makes use of a contraceptive sponge in order to prevent conception.
  This makes sense in the case of a convert, since her intention is to convert, she guards herself. It also makes sense in the case of a captive [who is also careful] since she does not know where they will take her It also makes sense in the case of a slave woman [who might also be careful] when she hears from her master. What, however, can be said in the case of one who is freed on account of the loss of a tooth or an eye?
  And were you to suggest that R. Yose did not refer to the case of unexpected occurrence, there is the case of a woman who was raped or seduced which may happen unexpectedly and yet it was taught: A woman who has been raped or seduced must wait three months, the words of R. Judah, but R. Yose permits immediate betrothal and marriage!
  Rather Rabbah said: R. Yose holds tha  a woman who fornicates turns over in order to prevent conception. And the other? We must be concerned that she might not have turned over properly.
  For it says, “And if no harm follows he shall be surely fined” (Exodus 21:22). Is the deduction made from this text? Is it not in fact made from the following text: “According to the wickedness of his crime,” (Deuteronomy 25:2) [which implies] you make him liable for one wickedness but you do not make him liable for two wickednesses”?
  One with [the penalties of] death and money and the other with [the penalties of] lashing and money. And [both were] needed. For if we had been told only death and money it might have been assumed [that the restriction applied only to the death penalty] because it involves loss of life, but not to lashing and money where no loss of life is involved.
  And if we had been told only of lashing and money [it might have been assumed that he is only lashed] because the transgression for which lashing is inflicted is not very grave, but not [to the penalties of] death and money where the transgression for which the death penalty is imposed is very grave. Hence both were necessary.
  According to R. Meir, however, who ruled: “One may be lashed and also pay the penalty.” What need was there for the two texts?  One refers to the penalties of death and money 
  
  
  Daf 37b
  
  and one refers to the penalties of death and lashes. And [both texts were] needed.  For if we had been told only that one cannot be executed and pay a fine, this would be because we don’t punish a person with his body and with his money, but when it comes to death and lashes, both of which are with his body, I might have said that this is one long death, and we should perform it.
  And if it had taught us only that he cannot be executed and receive lashes, it would be because we do not do two things against his body, but execution and a fine, where one is against his body and one against his property, I might have said we could do this, therefore both are necessary.
  “And you shall take no ransom for one who has killed” (Numbers 35:31)?  The Torah has stated, “Do not take money and exempt him from death.” “And do not take a ransom to flee to the city of refuge” (Numbers 35:32). This means do not take money from him and exempt him from exile.  
  But why two texts?   One deals with unwitting [killing], and the other with intentional [murder]. And [both texts] were required.  For if we had been told of intentional murder only it might have been assumed [that the restriction applied to this case only], because the transgression for which death is inflicted is grave, but not to the one of unintentional killing where the transgression is not so grave. And if we had been told of unintentional killing only it might have been assumed [that the restriction applied to this case only] because no loss of life is involved, but not to intentional murder where a loss of life is involved. Therefore, both were required.
  “And no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed on it, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numbers 35:33)—Why do I need this verse?
  It was required for the following: From where do we know that if the heifer’s neck was broken and then the murderer was found, how do we know that we do not let him go? As it is said, “And no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it.” “So you shall expunge the clean blood in your midst” (Deuteronomy 21:9)
  —Why do I need this verse? It is required for that which is taught:  From where do we know that execution by the sword must be at the neck? Scripture says, “So you shall expunge the clean blood in your midst”– all who shed blood are compared to the heifer with the broken neck: Just as its head is cut at the neck so is those who shed blood [cut] at the neck.
  If so, just as there [its head is cut] with an axe and at the back of the neck so here too? Nahman answered in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha:  Scripture says, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18)—choose for him a good death.
  “None proscribed, that may be proscribed of men, shall be ransomed” (Leviticus 27:29)? —Why do I need this verse?  It is required for that which is taught:  From where do we know that if a person was being led to his execution, and someone said, “I vow to give his value [to the Temple]” he has said nothing? As it is said, “None proscribed, that may be proscribed of man, shall be ransomed.” 
  It might have been true even before his sentence had been completed? Scripture says, “Of men” and not every man.
  According to R. Hanania b. Akabia who ruled that  the value of such a person may be vowed because its price is fixed, what deduction does he make from the text of “None proscribed”?
  He requires it for that which was taught: R. Ishmael the son of R. Yohanan b. Beroka said:  Since we find that those who incur the penalty of death at the hand of heaven may pay a monetary fine and thereby obtain atonement, as it is said, “If a ransom be placed on him” (Exodus 21:3) it might [have been assumed that] the same law applied also [to those who are sentenced to death] at the hands of men. Therefore, Scripture says. “None proscribed of men can be ransomed.” 
  I know this only concerning severe death penalties since [they are imposed for offences] which cannot be atoned for if committed unwittingly; how do I know the same is true for lighter death penalties seeing that [they are for offences] that may be atoned for if committed unwittingly? Scripture says, “None proscribed.
  But is this not derived directly from “You shall take no ransom” which implies:  You shall take no money from him to exempt him [from death]? Why do I need the verse, “None devoted”? —  Rami b. Hama said:  It was required.  Lest I thought that
  
  
  Daf 38a
  
  this applied only where murder had been committed in the course of an upward movement, because no atonement is allowed when such an act was committed unwittingly but that where murder was committed in the course of a downward movement, which [is an offence that] may be atoned for if committed unwittingly, a monetary fine may be received from him and thereby he may be exempted [from the death penalty]. Hence we were taught [that in no circumstances may he pay a ransom to avoid a death penalty]. 
  Rava said to him,   Does not this  follow from what a Tanna of the House of Hezekiah [taught]! For a tanna of the house of Hezekiah taught: It is written] “He that kills a man . . . he that kills a beast:”
  Just as in [the case of] the killing of a beast you have made no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to free exempt him [from the payment], but [to in any case] make him liable to pay, so also in [the case of] the killing of a person you shall make no distinction between [it being done] inadvertently and willfully, intentionally and unintentionally, by way of going down or by way of going up, so as to make him liable to pay money, but to free him from paying money?
  Rather Rami b. Hama said:  [The verse is] required  lest I would say that  this is so only where a man blinded another man’s eye and thereby killed him, but that where he blinded his eye and killed him by another act a monetary fine must be exacted from him. Rava said to him:  This is also deduced from another statement of the Tanna of the House of Hezekiah;  for a Tanna of the House of Hezekiah [taught:]  “Eye for eye” but not an eye and a life for an eye?  
  Rather R. Ashi:  It was necessary,  lest I thought that  since the law of a monetary fine is an innovation innovated by the Torah, one must pay the fine even though he is also executed. Therefore it teaches us [that he is only executed]. But according to Rabbah, who said that  the innovation that the Torah innovated with regard to a fine is that even though he is executed he still pays a fine, how does he use the verse, “None proscribed…” He holds like the first Tanna who argued R. Hanania b. Akavia.
  A girl who was betrothed and then divorced—Rabbi Yose the Galilean says:  she does not receive a fine. Rabbi Akiva says:  she receives the fine and the fine belongs to her.
   GEMARA. What is the reason of R. Yose the Galilean?   The verse said, “Who has not been betrothed”—if she has been betrothed she does not receive the fine. And R. Akiva?   “Who has not been betrothed”—[in such a case the fine goes] to her father. If she has been betrothed, it goes to her.
  If so, then “A na’arah” but not a girl who reached majority age, here too the fine should go to her. [Likewise the expression] “Virgin” but not one who is no longer a virgin, here too the fine should go to her! Rather the exclusion is complete, and here too it should be complete!
  Akiva could answer you:  The verse “not betrothed” is required for that which is taught:  “Who has not been betrothed”—this excludes a girl that was betrothed and then divorced who has no claim to a fine, the word of R. Yose the Galilean. Akiva said:  She receives the fine and her fine [is given] to her father.  Logic would dictate that since her father is entitled to have the money of her betrothal and he is also entitled to have the money of her fine, just as the money of her betrothal belongs to her father even after she had been betrothed and divorced, so also the money of her fine should belong to her father even after she had been betrothed and divorced.
  If so what does Scripture mean when it says “Who has not been betrothed”? It is free for the purpose of a comparison with it and an inference from it by means of a gezerah shavah. Here it is said, “Who has not been betrothed” and elsewhere it is said, “Who has not been betrothed” (Exodus 22:15). Just as here [the fine is that of] fifty [silver coins] so is it fifty [silver coins] there also;  and as there [the coins must be] shekels so here also they must be shekels.
  And R. Akiva—what did you see [to use] “Who has not been betrothed” for a gezerah shavah and “virgin” to exclude one who was no longer a virgin?
  
  Daf 38b
  
  Why not say  that “virgin” should be used for the gezerah shavah and “who was not betrothed” [should be used to] exclude a girl that was betrothed and divorced?
   stands to reason that “who has not been betrothed” should be used for the gezerah shavah,  since such a girl is still a na’arah that is a virgin. On the contrary; “virgin” should be used for the gezerah shavah, for she is still called “one who has not been betrothed.” It is reasonable, for the body of the one had undergone a change while that of the other had not.
  As to R. Yose the Galilean, where does he derive the reasoning [that the payment for rape is the same as that for seduction]?  He derives it from the following where it was taught:  “He shall pay money according to the bride-price of virgins” (Exodus 22:16)— that this [payment] shall be the same sum as the bride-price of the virgins and the bride-price of virgins shall be the same as this.
  One statement of R. Akiva contradicts the other statement of R. Akiva?  There were two tannaim, both reciting the statements of R. Akiva.
  It goes well for R. Akiva in our Mishnah since the gezerah shavah does not altogether remove the verse from its simple meaning. But according to R. Akiva in the baraita, the gezerah shavah removes the verse completely from its simple meaning!
  Nahman b. Yitzchak said. Read the text [as if it says]: “Who is not betrothed”. But a betrothed girl is obligated for the death penalty! I might have said that  since it is an innovation that the Torah innovated by establishing a fine, even though he is executed, he must still pay.
  But according to Rabbah, who said that the innovation that the Torah innovated with regard to a fine is that even though he is executed he still pays a fine, what can he say? He holds like R. Akiva in our Mishnah.
  Our Rabbis taught: To whom is the fine given? To her father. Others say: To herself. But why “to herself”?   Hisda said: We are dealing here with the case of a virgin who was once betrothed and is now divorced, and they differ in the same dispute as R. Akiva of the Mishnah and R. Akiva of the baraita.
  Abaye said:  If he had intercourse with her and she died, he is exempt [from the fine], as it says, “Then he shall give to the girl’s father” (Deuteronomy 22:29) but not to the father of a deceased girl. The ruling which was so obvious to Abaye was part of a question asked by Rava.
  For Raba asked: Is the age of maturity legally attainable in the grave or not? Is the age of maturity attainable in the grave and [the fine, therefore,] belongs to her son, or is perhaps the age of maturity not attainable in the grave and [the fine, therefore,] belongs to her father?
  
  Daf 39a
  
  But can she become pregnant? Did not R. Bibi say in front of R. Nahman: Three [categories of] women may use a contraceptive sponge: A minor, a pregnant woman and nursing mother. The minor, lest she become pregnant and die. A pregnant woman, lest the intercourse cause her fetus to become a sandal. A nursing mother, lest she have to wean her child [prematurely] and this would result in his death.
  And what is [the age of such] a minor? From the age of eleven years and one day to the age of twelve years and one day. One who is under, or over this age should have relations in the normal manner, the words of R. Meir. But the Sages say: All of them should have relations in the normal manner, and God will have mercy on them from Heaven, as it says, “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6).
  And should you say that this is a case where she conceived when she was a na’arah and gave birth to a child when she was still a na’arah, can she give birth to a child within six months [after conception]? Did not Shmuel say: The period between the age of na’aruth and that of bagrut (maturity) is only six months?  And should you suggest [that he meant to say] that there were no less but more [than six months] didn’t he say “only”!
  Rather this is what he asked: Is the state of maturity attainable in the grave and her father consequently forfeits [his right], or is perhaps the state of maturity not attainable in the grave and the father, therefore, does not forfeit [his right]? Mar son of R. Ashi raised the question in the following manner:  Does death effect maturity or not? The question stands undecided.
  Rava asked Abaye:   What if he had intercourse and then she became betrothed?  The other replied:  Is it written, “Then he shall give to the father of the girl who was not a betrothed woman”? But according to your line of reasoning, that which is taught, “If he had relations with her and then she was married, she keeps the fine”, is it written “Then he shall give to the father of the girl who was not a married woman”?
  Is that so!  In that case, since the state of maturity removes a daughter from her father’s authority and marriage also removes a daughter from her father’s authority [the two may be compared to one another]: Just as [in the case of] maturity, if she attains maturity after he had intercourse with her, [the fine] belongs to the girl herself, so too [in the case of] marriage, if she married after he had intercourse with her, [the fine] belongs to the girl herself. But as to betrothal, does it completely remove a daughter from her father’s authority?  Surely we learned:  [In the case of] a betrothed girl her father and her husband jointly may invalidate her vows. 
  Mishnah: 1. The seducer pays three forms [of compensation] and the rapist four. The seducer pays compensation for embarrassment and blemish and the fine; The rapist pays an additional [form of compensation] in that he pays for the pain. 2 What [is the difference] between [the penalties of] a seducer and those of a rapist?  The rapist pays compensation for the pain but the seducer does not pay compensation for the pain. The rapist pays immediately but the seducer [pays only] if he dismisses her. The rapist must “drink out of his pot” but the seducer may dismiss [the girl] if he wishes.
  3 What is meant by “he must drink out of his pot”? Even if she is lame, even if she is blind and even if she is afflicted with boils [he may not dismiss her]. 4 If she was found to have committed a licentious act or was unfit to marry an Israelite he may not continue to live with her, for it is said, “And she shall be for him a wife”(Deut. 22:29)—a wife that is fit for him.
  Gemara. The pain for what?  The father of Shmuel replied:  For the pain [he has inflicted] when he thrust her upon the ground.  Zera raised a difficult: Now then, if he had thrown her upon silk he would be exempt? And should you say that the law is so indeed, has it not been taught: R. Shimon b. Judah stated in the name of R. Shimon: A rapist does not pay compensation for the pain [he has inflicted] because
  
  Daf 39b
  
  the woman would ultimately have suffered the same pain from her husband. But they said to him: One who is forced to have intercourse cannot be compared to one who acts  willingly? Rather R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha: The pain of spreading the legs, for so it is says, “And you have spread your legs to everyone that passed by” (Ezekiel 16:25).
  But if so, the same applies to one who has been seduced?  Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha: The case of one who has been seduced may be compared to that of a person who said to his friend, “Tear up my silk garments and you will be free from liability.” “My”? They are her father’s! Rather R. Nahman in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha: The smart women among them declare that one who is seduced experiences no pain.
  But do we not see that one does experience pain? Abaye replied: My nurse told me: Like hot water on a bald head.   Rava said: R. Hisda’s daughter told me, like the prick of the blood-letting lancet.   Papa said: The daughter of Abba of Sura told me, like hard crust in the jaws.
  The rapist pays the fine immediately, the seducer when he divorces her etc. When he divorces her? Is she his wife? Abaye said: Read, “If he does not marry her.” It was also taught thus:  Even though they said that the seducer pays only if he does not marry her, he must pay compensation for shame and blemish immediately. And [in the case of] the rapist and the seducer, she herself or her father may oppose [the marriage].
  This goes well with regard to one who has been seduced–it is written, “If her father will refuse” (Exodus 22:16). I know this only about her father, from where do I know that she herself may refuse? Scripture says, “will refuse,” in any case. 
  But as regards a rapist, though it makes sense that she [may refuse him since] it is written. “And she will be to him,” (Deuteronomy 2:29) with her consent,  but how do I know her father [may also object to the marriage]?
  Abaye said: In order that the sinner might not gain an advantage.   Rava said: It is deduced from an a fortiori (kal vehomer): If a seducer who has acted against the wish of her father alone may be rejected either by her or by her father how much more so the rapist who has acted both against the wish of her father and against the wish of her.
  Rava did not give the same reply as Abaye, because, having paid the fine, this is not a case of a sinner gaining an advantage. Abaye does not give the same reply as Rava: [In the case of] a seducer, since he himself may object [to the marriage], her father also may object to it; [but in the case of] a rapist, since he himself may not object [to the marriage] her father also may have no right to object to it.
  Another baraita taught: Although they said that the rapist pays immediately, she has no claim upon him when he divorces her.   “When he divorces her”! Can he divorce her?  Read: When she demands a divorce she has no claim upon him. If he died, the fine is regarded as her ketubah.   Yose the son of R. Judah ruled:  She is entitled to a ketubah of one maneh.
  What are they arguing about? The rabbis hold that the rabbis instituted a ketubah in order that it should not be easy for him to divorce her, but [the rapist,] cannot divorce her [therefore she does not receive a ketubah, even if he dies].   Yose the son of R. Judah holds that  this man too might torment her until she says to him, “I do not want you.”
  The rapist must drink out of his pot. Rava of Prazkiya said to R. Ashi: Since the laws of the rapist and seducer are learned from one another, 
  
  Daf 40a
  
  why isn’t this also learned? The verse says: “He shall surely pay a dowry for her to be his wife” (Exodus 22:15). “To be his”—this implies only if he agrees.
  What is meant “he drinks out of his pot”? Kahana said: I stated the following argument before R. Zevid of Nehardea:  Why should not the positive commandment supersede the negative one?
  He said to me:  When do we say that a positive commandment supersedes a negative one? In a case like circumcision on a place of scale disease since otherwise it would be impossible to fulfill the positive commandment,  but here, if she should say that she did not want to marry him, would [the question of the performance of] the positive commandment ever arise?
  An orphan who was betrothed and then divorced—Rabbi Elazar says  that one who seduces her is exempt but one who rapes her is liable [to pay the fine].
  GEMARA. Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Yohanan: R. Elazar said his statement  in accordance with the method of R. Akiva who ruled:  She is entitled to the fine, and the fine belongs to her. How do I know this? As it was taught, An orphan..Rabbi Elazar says that one who seduces her is exempt but one who rapes her is liable [to pay the fine].
  An orphan! This is obvious!  Rather it teaches:  A girl who was betrothed and then divorced has the same status as an orphan. Just as [the fine of] an orphan belongs to the orphan herself so does that of a girl who was betrothed and then divorced belong to the girl herself.
  Zera said in the name of Rabbah b. Shila who said in the name of R. Hamnuna the Elder who said in the name of R. Ada b. Ahavah who said in the name of Rav:  The halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar.  Rav called R. Elazar  the best of the sages.
  Mishnah: How is [the compensation that is paid for] embarrassment [reckoned]? It all depends on the status of the offender and the offended. How is [the compensation that is paid for] blemish [reckoned]? She is regarded as if she were a slave to be sold in the market place [and it is estimated] how much she was worth then and how much she is worth now. The fine is the same for all.
  And any sum that is fixed in the Torah remains the same for all. GEMARA, Why not say that the Torah stated 50 selas to cover all payments? Zera said: People would say, “Should one who had intercourse with a princess pay fifty and one who had intercourse with the daughter of a commoner also pay only fifty? Abaye said to him: If so, the same might be argued with regard to a slave: “Should [compensation for] a slave who puts holes in pearls be thirty ” [and that for] one who does 
  
  Daf 40b
  
  needlework also be thirty?
  Rather R. Zera said: If two men had intercourse with her, one in a natural manner, and the other in an unnatural manner, it would be argued,  “Should one who had intercourse with a undamaged woman pay fifty and one who had intercourse with a damaged woman also pay fifty? Abaye said to him:  If so, they might say the same about the slave: “Should [compensation for] a healthy slave be thirty [and that for] one afflicted with boils also be thirty?”
  Rather Abaye said: [This is the explanation]: The verse said, “Because he laid with her”: These [must be paid] “because he laid with her,” (Deuteronomy 22:29) but it may be inferred that [compensation for] shame and blemish must also be paid.     Rava said: The verse said, “Then the man that lay with her shall give the girl’s father fifty [shekels of] silver” for the benefit of lying [with her] [he gives] fifty. Thus it may be inferred that [compensation for] shame and blemish must also be paid.  
  But say [perhaps] that [compensation for shame and blemish should be paid] to her?   The verse said,  “Being in her youth in her father’s house” (Numbers 30:17)—all benefits accruing to her in her youth go to her father.
  But what about that which R. Huna said in the name of Rav:  From where do I know that a daughter’s handiwork belongs to her father?  As it is said, “And if a man sell his daughter to be a slave”, just as the handiwork of a slave belongs to her master so does the handiwork of a daughter belong to her father.” Why do I need this?  Let him derive it from “Being in her youth in her father’s house”?  Rather that text was written in connection only with the annulment of vows?
  And should you say that  we might derive [the laws regarding shame and blemish payments] from it, monetary matters cannot be inferred from ritual matters.   And should you say that we might infer it from the laws of fines, monetary payments cannot be inferred from fines? Rather, [in the end] it is logical that [it should] belong to her father; for if he wished he could have handed her over to a scoundrel or to one afflicted with boils. 
  As to blemish, she is regarded as if she were a slave-woman to be sold. How do they assess her? The father of Shmuel said: They estimate how much more a man would pay for a virgin slave than for a non-virgin slave to serve him.
  A non-virgin slave to serve him! What difference does this make to him? Rather [how much more a man would pay for] a virgin slave than for a non-virgin slave for the purpose of marrying her to his slave. “To his slave”! What difference does this make to him? [We are dealing here] with a slave who gives his master satisfaction. 
  Wherever there is the right of sale there is a fine and wherever there is a fine there is no right of sale. In the case of a minor there is the right of sale and there is no fine; In the case of a young woman there is a fine but no right of sale. In the case of a girl who has reached majority age there is no right of sale and there is no fine.
  GEMARA. Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: This is the words of R. Meir, but the Sages rule: She receives a fine even where the right of sale applies. or it was taught: A minor from the age of one day until the time when she grows two hairs, she can be sold but no fine is incurred through her. From the time she grows two hairs until she comes of age a fine is incurred through her but no right of sales applies; the words of R. Meir, because R. Meir has said: Wherever the right of sale applies no fine is incurred, and wherever a fine is incurred no right of sale applies. The Sages say: A minor from the age of three years and one day until the time she becomes adolescent a fine is incurred. 
  Only a fine but not the right of sale?  Read: A fine also where the right of sale applies. Hisda said: What is R. Meir’s reasoning? The verse said, “And she shall be for him a wife”–the text speaks of a girl who may herself contract a marriage. And the rabbis? Resh Lakish said: The verse said, “Na’arah” which implies even a minor.
  Papa the son of R. Hanan of Be Kelohit heard this. He went and said it before R. Shimi b. Ashi.  [The latter] said to him:  You teach it in reference to that, we teach it in reference to this:  Resh Lakish said; One who has brought an evil name upon a minor is exempt, as it is said, “And he shall give them to the father of the young girl” the verse referred to a full “na’arah.”
  Adda b. Ahavah raised a difficulty: The reason is that the Torah wrote “na’arah,” but if not for this I would have thought that even a minor [was included], but has it not been written, “But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity are not found in the young girl, then they shall bring out the young girl to the door of her father’s house, and [the men of her city] shall stone her” but a minor is not subject to punishment? Rather,  here it refers to na’arah, but wherever it says “na’arah” even a minor is included.
  
  
  Daf 41a
  
  He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine. He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double, fourfold  or fivefold. [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence. This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.
  GEMARA. Let it [also teach] “I have raped”!  He said that this was not even necessary: It was unnecessary [to state that if a man declared,] “I have raped” in which case he does not blemish her character, that he must pay compensation for indignity and blemish on his own evidence, but [if he declared] “I have seduced,” where he does blemish her character, it might have been assumed that he does not pay [compensation] on his own evidence, hence he informs us [that he does].
  Our mishnah does not agree with the following tanna, as it was taught: R. Shimon ben Judah said in the name of R. Shimon:  So too with regard to [payment] for embarrassment and blemish, he does not pay on his own testimony because he does not have the power to defame so-and-so’s daughter.
  Papa said to Abaye: What if she is okay [with his testimony]? Perhaps it is not okay with her father. [What if it is also] okay with her father? Perhaps it is not okay with her family members. [What if it is also] okay with her family members?  It is not possible that there is not one [family member] abroad with whom it is not okay.
  He who says, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal etc. It was stated: R. Papa said: Half damages are compensation, but R. Huna the son of R. Joshua said: Half damages are a penalty.  
  Papa said: Half damages are compensation for he holds that  as a rule cattle are not safe. By law the owner should have made full restitution, but the Torah had mercy towards him because his cattle have not yet become an attested danger. Huna the son of R. Joshua said:  Half damages are a penalty,  for he holds that  cattle are safe. By law, the owner should make no restitution at all, but the Torah imposed a fine on him in order that he should guard his cattle.
  (Mnemonic: He damaged what, and killed a general rule.) We have taught:  The plaintiff and the defendant are involved in the payment.  This goes well for the one who holds that liability for half damages is compensation, that is why the plaintiff is involved in the payment, but according to the one who holds that liability for half damages is a penalty: If he receives that which really should not be his, how can he be involved in the payment? 
  It is only necessary in reference to decrease in the value of the carcass. [But have we not] already taught elsewhere?  “Damage payments:” This teaches that the owner must dispose of the carcass.  
  One [of the statements deals] refers to an unattested danger (tam) and the other to an attested danger (mu’ad).   And [both statements are] required: For if it had taught us about a tam, that may have been because the animal has not yet become mu’ad but not to a mu’ad since his owner has been warned. And if it had taught us only about a mu’ad, it might have been assumed that it is because the owner pays full compensation but it would not refer to a tam. Therefore, [both rulings were] necessary.
  Come and hear: What is the difference [in the case of compensation for damages] between a tam and a mu’ad?   The tam pays half damages out of the value of its own body, while the mu’ad pays full damages out of the best of the [defendant’s] estate.   But it does not teach that in the case of a tam no compensation is paid based on one’s own admission whereas in the case of a mu’ad he does pay based on his own admission?
  He taught [some distinctions] and omitted others.  What [else] did he omit [that should justify the assumption] that he omitted this distinction also. He omitted [also the payment of] half ransom. If [the only difference not mentioned] is that of half ransom it is not an omission,
  
  Daf 41b
  
  since that [mishnah] may be the view of  R. Yose the Galilean who ruled that  [in the case of] a tam half ransom is paid.
  Come and hear:  [One who said:] “My ox killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must pay compensation based on his own testimony.  Does this not refer to a tam?  No to a mu’ad.
  What [would be the law] in the case of a tam? He would not pay based on his own testimony? Then instead of stating in the final clause, “The slave of so-and-so” he does not pay based on his own evidence,” let it draw a distinction in the same case: “When does this apply? To a mu’ad but in respect of a tam he does not pay based on his own testimony? The entire [mishnah] deals with a mu’ad.
  Come and hear: This is the general rule: Whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done does not pay on his own evidence. [We can deduce that if the payment is] less than the cost of the damage, he must pay based on his own testimony?   Do not say:  “[If payment is] less than the cost of the damage [he pays based on his own testimony],” rather say:  “[If payment] corresponds to the actual amount of the damage he pays compensation based on his own testimony.
  But what [would be the law if payment were] less than the amount of the damage?  He would not pay based on his own testimony? Then let it teach, “This is the general rule: Whoever does not pay an amount corresponding to the actual cost of the damage he has done does not pay based on his own testimony” which implies both more or less?  This is indeed a refutation.
  The law [is that the liability for]  half damages is a penalty. “A refutation” [of a ruling] and [yet it is] the law? Yes. Why was the statement refuted? For [the mishnah] does not teach “corresponding to the actual cost of the damage he has done.” [But such a principle] was not absolute [and therefore could not be taught in the mishnah], since there is the liability for half damages [in the case of the damage done by] pebbles. Concerning which there is a halakhic tradition that the liability is compensation. For this reason, it was not taught.
  Now that you have said that liability for half damage is a fine, the case of a dog that ate lambs or that of a cat that ate big hens is unusual, and payment in such a case is not collected in Babylon.  If, however, they were small, it is usual and they are collected.
  If the plaintiff seizes [the property of the defendant] it is not to be taken away from him.   And if he says,  “Set me a date [by which the defendant must come with me] to the land of Israel,” we set him a date, and if [the defendant] does not go with him he must be placed under the ban.
  In any case, however, [the defendant] is to be placed under the ban; for he is told, Go remove the damaging [animals] you own, in accordance with R. Natan. As it was taught, R. Natan said: How do I know that one may not raise a bad dog in his house or place a shaky ladder in his house? As it is said, “Do not bring blood into your house” (Deuteronomy 22:8).
  May we return to you chapter “These are the young girls.”
  If a young girl was seduced [the compensation for] her embarrassment and blemish and the fine belong to her father; [and the compensation for] pain in the case of one who was raped. If the girl’s case was tried before her father died [all the forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’.
  If her father died before her case was tried they are hers. If her case was tried before she became of majority age [all forms of compensation] are her father’s. If her father [subsequently] died they are her brothers’. If she became of majority age before her case was tried they are hers. Rabbi Shimon says  if her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. 
  
  Daf 42a
  
  Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she had not collected [the proceeds] belong to her brothers if her father died. 
  GEMARA. What does he teach us? Have we not [already] learned: The seducer pays three forms [of compensation] and the rapist four. The seducer pays compensation for embarrassment and blemish as well as the fine, and the violator pays an additional [form of compensation] in that he pays for the pain?  It was necessary [to teach us  that the compensation is due] to her father. [But] that [the compensation is due] to her father is also obvious, since a seducer has to pay for it?  For if [it were to be given] to her, why should the seducer pay her? He acted with her consent?
  It was necessary [to tell us of the case where] she went to trial [to teach us the] dispute between R. Shimon and the rabbis.
   “You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,”  — “I adjure you,” — and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable.
  Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission.   They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.  
  Abaye asked Rabbah: One who says to another,  You raped or seduced my daughter, and I have brought you to court and you were ordered to pay me money” and the other replied, I have neither raped nor seduced her, nor have you brought me to law nor have I been ordered to pay you any money,” and after he had taken an oath he admitted his guilt? What is the law according to R. Shimon? 
  Since he stood trial his obligation is considered payment and he is obligated to bring a sacrifice for a false oath  or even though he stood trial, it is still a fine. He said to him:  It is a monetary obligation and he is liable to bring a sacrifice for a false oath.
  He raised the following objection:  R. Shimon says: It might have been presumed that if one said to his fellow, “You have raped or seduced my daughter” and the other replied ‘I have neither raped nor seduced her”,  [or if the first said] “Your ox has killed my slave” and the other replied, He did not kill him,”  or if a slave said to his master,  “You have knocked out my tooth” or “You have blinded my eye” and he replied “I have not knocked it out” or “I have not blinded it”and [the defendant] swore but afterwards admitted his liability it might have been presumed that he is liable, Scripture says, “And he denies [owing] his fellow a deposit or a pledge or something robbed or he defrauds his fellow, or he finds a lost object and denies it and he falsely swears” (Leviticus 5:21), just as these are distinguished that they are compensatory, so too [one is liable for falsely swearing over all debts that are] compensatory. 
  This excludes anything that is a fine.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  Does this not refer to one who had already been tried? No, it refers to one who had not yet been tried. 
  But since the first clause deals with the case of one who had been tried, should not the second clause also deal with such a case? For in the first clause it was stated:  I only knew [that liability is incurred in] cases where compensation is paid for the actual value only, how do I know that the same is true with regard to the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold and [in those of] the rapist, the seducer and the one who brings out a bad name?   Scripture says, “And commit a trespass,” this includes such cases.
  How is this statement to be understood?  If [it refers to] a man whose had not yet been tried [the objection could be raised:] Is double compensation payable in such circumstances?  Rather it is obvious that [it refers to one] who had already been tried. And since the first clause deals with one who had been tried, the final clause also must deal with one who had already been tried?
  He said to him: I could have solved this for you. that the first clause deals with one who had already been tried, and the final clause with one who had not yet been tried and that the entire baraita represents the view of R. Shimon, But I would not give you forced interpretations, for, were I to do so, you might say: Then either the first clause should begin with “R. Shimon said” or the final clause should conclude with “these are the words of R. Shimon.”
  Rather the entire [baraita] refers to one who had already been tried, the first clause being the view of the rabbis and the final clause that of R. Shimon,
  and I agree with you in regard to the sacrifice for [taking a false] oath, that the Torah has exempted him from [the word] “And he denied.”  When I said, that it is compensation,
  I meant that he transmits it as an inheritance to his sons.
  He raised an objection against him: R. Shimon says:  If her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her.  Now if you say [that this] is compensation in respect that it is bequeathed as an inheritance to one’s sons, why should the compensation belong to her?  Should it not, in fact, belong to the brothers?
  Rava said This matter was difficult for Rabbah and R. Joseph for twenty-two years and they could not solve it until R. Joseph sat at the head [of the academy] and solved it:  There it is different [from other fines] because Scripture said, “Then the man that lay with her shall give to the young girl’s father fifty [shekels of] silver” [which implies that] the Torah has not given the father the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him. 
  And when Rabbah said, “It is compensation in respect that it is transmitted as an inheritance to his sons” he was referring to other fines.
  But then, in the case of a slave where it is written, “He shall give (יתן) to his master thirty shekels of silver,” so too here the Torah has not given the master the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him? [The word] yiten and [the word] venatan are different.
  If so, [instead of deducing the exemption from sacrifice] from, “And he denied”  it should have been deduced from “And he shall give.”
  Rava said:  The words “And he denied” were required in a case, for instance, where the girl’s case had been brought to court and then she became adolescent and then died,  in which case when the father receives [the fine] he inherits [it] from her.
  If so, how could it have been said “These are excluded [from liability] since they are fines”... when they are in fact compensation? Nahman b. Yitzchak said These are excluded since they are basically fines.
  He raised another objection: R. Shimon exempts him for one does not pay a fine based on one’s own admission.  The reason is because he has not been convicted but if he had been convicted,  since he does pay even on his own admission, he would be liable to bring a sacrifice for a false oath.
  Shimon was responding to the words of the other rabbis: According to my own view [he argued] even though he has been tried he is exempt [from bringing the sacrifice as may be deduced] from the text “And deal falsely.”  But according to your view, however, you must at least admit that [the man is exempt] if he has not yet been tried, since the claim against him is a fine
  
  Daf 43a
  
  and one who makes a voluntary admission in a penal case is exempt. But the rabbis hold that he is claiming payment for shame and blemish.
  What are they arguing about? Papa said: R. Shimon holds that a man would not leave that which is fixed to claim that which is not fixed, while the Rabbis hold that no man would leave a claim  from which [the defendant] could not be exempt even if he made a voluntary admission  and advance a claim   from which he would be exempt if he made a voluntary admission.
  Avina asked of R. Sheshet:  A daughter who is maintained by her brothers, to whom does her handiwork belong?
  Are they in place of her father and as in that case her handiwork belongs to her father so here also it belongs to her brothers;  or are they not similar to the father,  for in that case she is maintained out of his own estate but here she is not maintained out of their estate?
  He replied:  We have taught this:  A widow is to be maintained out of the estate of [her deceased husband’s] orphans, and her handiwork belongs to them.
  [But] are they the same?  A man may not want his wife to be sustained expansively, but he would want his daughter sustained expansively.
  That is to say that a man’s daughter is preferable to him than his widow?  But did not R. Abba said in the name of R. Yose:  They made a widow and her daughter like a daughter and her brothers in the case of a small estate: just as in the case of the relationship between a daughter and her brothers, the daughter is maintained while the brothers can go begging at [people’s] doors, so also in the case of the relationship between a widow and her daughter, the widow is maintained and the daughter can go begging at [people’s] doors.
  With regard to degradation a man gives preference to his widow; with regards to expansive maintenance he gives preference to his daughter.
  Joseph objected:  Her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she has not collected [the proceeds], if her father dies, belong to her brothers.  The reason then is that [they originated during] the lifetime of their father, but [if they originated] after his death [they would belong] to her.  Does not [this refer to a daughter] who is maintained? No; [this refers to a case] where she is not being maintained.  
  If she is not being maintained, why does this even need to be stated? Even according to the who ruled that  a master can say to his slave, “Work with me and I will not maintain you” the ruling applies only to a Canaanite slave concerning whom “With you” was not written,
  but not to a Hebrew slave concerning whom “With you” was written in Scripture. All the more [would such a ruling apply] to one’s daughter?
  Rabbah b. Ulla replied:  It was only required in the case of a surplus. Rava said: Did not such a great man as R. Joseph know that [sometimes there may] be a surplus and he still raised an objection?
  Rather Rava said: To R. Joseph the mishnah itself was difficult.  For it was stated, “her handiwork and anything she finds, even if she has not collected [the proceeds]”; but from whom [it may be asked] is she to collect anything she finds?
  Rather this is what it means:  Her handiwork is like anything she finds; just as anything she finds while her father is alive it belongs to her father and after his death it belongs to her, so too her handiwork—while her father is alive it belongs to her father, after his death it belongs to her . Thus it may be concluded [that R. Sheshet is refuted].
  It was also stated: Rav Judah said in the name of Rav:  A daughter who is maintained by her brothers, her handiwork belongs to herself. Kahana said:  What is the reason? Because it is written, “And you shall give them as an inheritance to your sons after you,” (Leviticus 25:46) “them as an inheritance to your sons,” but not your daughters to your sons. This teaches that a man does not bequeath as an inheritance the rights he receives from his daughter to his son.
  Rabbah raised an objection: Say that it refers to [payments in connection with] the seduction of one’s daughter, fines and personal injury! And so did R. Hanina teach: The verse speaks of [payments in connection with] the seduction of one’s daughter, fines and personal injury!
  Is not personal injury bodily pain?  Yose b. Hanina said: 
  
  Daf 43b
  
  This refers to a case where the wound was on her face. Rav Zera said in the name of R. Matan who said in the name of Rav: (others says [that it was] Rabbi  Zera who stated in the name of R. Matana who said in the name of Rav):  The handiwork of a daughter who is maintained by her brothers belongs to herself, for it is written, “And you shall give them as an inheritance to your sons after you,” “them as an inheritance to your sons,” but not your daughters to your sons. This teaches us that a man does not bequeath as an inheritance the rights he receives from his daughter to his son.
  Avimi b. Papi to him:  Shakud made this statement.  Who is Shakud? Shmuel. But was it not Rav who made this statement?   Read: Shakud also made this statement. Mar the son of Amemar said to R. Ashi,  Thus the Nehardeans say: The law is in agreement with the ruling of R. Sheshet.  Ashi [however] said:  The law is in agreement with Rav. And the law is in agreement with Rav.
  If a man gave his daughter in betrothal and she was divorced, [and then] he gave her [again] in betrothal and she was widowed, her ketubah belongs to him. If he gave her in marriage and she was divorced [and then] he gave her [again] in marriage and she was left a widow, her ketubah belongs to her. Rabbi Judah said: the first belongs to her father. They said to him: as soon as he gives her in marriage, her father loses all control over her.
  GEMARA. The reason is that when he married her off and was divorced, [and then] married her off and she was widowed, but if she had been widowed twice she would not have been fit to marry again. And the tanna indirectly taught us like Rabbi, who said that  if [a thing has happened] twice presumption is established.
  Judah said: The first belongs to her father.  What is R. Judah’s reason?  Both Rabbah and R. Joseph said:  Since her father has acquired the right to it from the time of the betrothal.
  Rava objected:  R. Judah ruled that  the first belonged to her father; But R. Judah admits that if a father gave his daughter in betrothal while she was still a minor and she married after she became a mature girl he has no authority over her.  But why?  Let him say,  “Since her father has acquired the right to it at the time of the betrothal”?
  Rather if it was said, this is what was meant:  Both Rabbah and R. Joseph explained:  Because it was written while she was still under his authority.
  From when does he collect? 
  Huna replied: The hundred or the two hundred from the date of the betrothal and the additional amount from the date of the marriage. Assi said: Both from from the date of the marriage.
  But did R. Huna really say this? Has it not been stated: If a wife produced against her husband two ketubot, one for two hundred, and one for three hundred zuz, R. Huna said, if she wants to collect the two hundred zuz she can collect from the earlier date, [but if she wants to collect the] three hundred zuz ketubah, she collects from the later date only.
  Now [if R. Huna had said this] she should be entitled, to collect two hundred zuz from the earlier date and one hundred from the later date?
  But [even] according to your reasoning, let her collect the whole five hundred zuz, two hundred from the earlier date and three hundred from the later date?
  Rather  what is the reason she does not collect all five hundred? Since he did not write to her, “I willingly added to you three hundred zuz to the two hundred” he must have meant to imply:  “If you want to collect from the earlier date you would recover [no more than] two hundred, but if you want to collect from the later date you would receive three hundred.”
  
  Daf 44a
  
  Here also [it may similarly be said:] This is the reason why she cannot collect [for the additional amount from the earlier date]: Since he did not write to her, “I have added a hundred zuz to the two hundred,” she has forgiven her former lien. 
  It was said above: If she wishes she may collect with this ketubah and if she wishes she may collect with that ketubah  Shall we say [that this ruling] differs from that of R. Nahman who laid down that if two deeds  were issued one after the other the latter cancels the former? 
  Has it not been said in connection with this statement: R. Papa said: R. Nahman admits that if the man has added one palm, he wrote it for the addition? And here also, [the husband] has added something. 
  [To turn to] the original text: R. Nahman said: Two deeds were issued one after the other the latter cancels the former. Papa said:  R. Nahman admits that if he added one palm the insertion, he wrote it for the addition. It is obvious [that both deeds are valid where] the first [was a deed] of sale and the second [a deed] of gift  [because the owner] intended to improve the other’s rights, as a safeguard against the law of pre-emption;  
  And all the more [is this obvious where] the first was for a gift and the second was a sale, for it may then be presumed  that the latter was written in that manner in order to safeguard the other against a creditor’s rights.
  But if both are sales or both are gifts—the second cancels out the first. What is the reason? Rafram said: We can say that [the holder of the deeds] has admitted to the other [the invalidity of the first deed].   Aha said: We can say that [the holder of the deeds] has surrendered his security on the first deed.
  What is the practical difference between them?   The disqualification of the witnesses
   payment of compensation for usufruct and land tax.  
  What is [the decision] about the ketubah? Come and hear what Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel in the name of R. Elazar the son of R. Shimon: The [basic amount of a] maneh or two hundred zuz [are collected from] from [the date of] the betrothal but the additional amount only from the date of the marriage.
  The Sages say: Both this and that [may be collected only] from the date of the marriage. The law is: Both this and that [may be collected only] from the date of the marriage.
  The daughter of a convert who converted together with her mother and then committed an act of fornication is subject to the penalty of strangulation. She is not [stoned] at the door of her father’s house nor [does her husband pay the] hundred sela’.  
  If she was conceived in unholiness but her birth was in holiness she is subject to the penalty of stoning. She is not [stoned] at the door of her father’s house nor [does her husband pay the] hundred sela’.   If she was both conceived and born in holiness she is regarded as a daughter of Israel in all respects.
  A girl who has a father but no door of her father’s house; or a door of her father’s house but no father, is subject to the penalty of stoning—[the verse did not state] “the opening of her father’s house” (Deut. 22:21) except as a precept. 
  
  Daf 44b
  
  GEMARA. From where do we know this? Resh Lakish said: Since the verse says, “That she die” (Deuteronomy 22:23)—this comes to include one whose conception was not in holiness but whose birth was in holiness.
  If so, [should not her wrongful accuser] also be flogged and [condemned] to pay the hundred sela’? The verse says, “That she die” [implying that she] was included in respect of death but not in respect of the fine. Why not say that it comes include one who was both conceived and born in holiness? Such a person is a proper Israelite woman.
  But why not say [Scripture intended] to include one conceived and born in unholiness? If so what is the purpose of the word “in Israel” (Deuteronomy 22:21)?
  Yose b. Hanina said: A man who brought an evil name upon an orphan girl is exempt, as it is said, “And he shall give them to the father of the girl,” (Deuteronomy 22:19) to exclude this girl who has no father.
  Yose b. Avin, or if you want, R. Yose b. Zevida, raised an objection: “If her father utterly refuses” (Exodus 22:16) this comes to include an orphan girl in respect of the fine, the words of R. Yose the Galilean.
  He raised the objection and he himself supplied the answer:  [This refers to a case] where he had intercourse with her and then she became an orphan.
  Rava said: He is liable.  From where [did he infer this]? From that which Ammi taught:  A virgin of Israel, but not a convert virgin.
  Now if you assume that in a similar such a case for an Israelite girl he is liable, it is understandable, and that is why it needed to exclude converts, but if you said in a similar such case for an Israelite he is exempt, if he is exempt for an Israelite, why would it need to speak about a convert.
  Resh Lakish said: A man who has brought an evil name on a minor is exempt, as it is said, “And he shall give them to the father of the young girl,” the verse referred to a full young girl.
  Aha b. Abba raised a difficulty:  The reason is because the Torah uses the word “na’arah,” otherwise it would have been said that even a minor [was included]. But has it not been written, “And if the matter turns out to be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found in the young girl, then they shall bring out the young girl to the door of her father’s house and [the men of the city] shall stone her” and a minor is not liable for punishment?
  Rather, here it refers only to a “na’arah” but any place where “na’ar” is written, it refers even to a minor.
  Shila taught: There are three modes [of execution] in the case of a [betrothed] young girl [who committed adultery]: If witnesses appeared against her in the house of her father-in-law [testifying] that she fornicated in her father’s house 
  
  Daf 45a
  
  she is stoned at the door of her father’s house, as if to say, “See what you have raised.” If witnesses came [to testify] against her in her father’s house that she played the harlot in her father’s house she is stoned at the entrance of the gate of the city. If she committed adultery and then became of majority age, she is condemned to strangulation.
  This implies that wherever there occurred a change in one’s body, the mode of execution is also changed. But they raise the following against this:  If a betrothed young girl fornicated and after she reached majority age, her husband brought out a bad name against her, he is not flogged nor does he pay the hundred sela, but she and the witnesses who testified falsely against her are hurried to the place of stoning’?  
  She and the witnesses who testified falsely against her! Rather she or her witnesses are hurried to the place of stoning.
  Rava said: You referred to [the law about a husband] who brought out an evil name; the law of one who brings out an evil name is different,because it is an anomaly. For, in general, if a girl entered the bridal chamber and did not have intercourse, and then committed adultery, she is condemned to strangulation, but [a woman upon whom a husband] brought an evil name is condemned to stoning.
  Huna the son of R. Joshua said to Rava:  Perhaps when the Torah created the anomaly it was only where her body had not changed, but where her body did change, the Torah did not make an anomaly.
  Rather R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: The question of whether a change in body effects a change in punishment is [a point of dispute between] Tannaim. For we have learned: If they transgressed before they were appointed, and afterwards they were appointed, they are regarded as regular people. 
  Rabbi Shimon said:  if their sin came to their knowledge before they were appointed they are liable, but if after they were appointed they are exempt.
  
  Daf 45b
  
  Say that we have heard that R. Shimon follows [the time of] the awareness also, but did you hear him say that he follows the time of realization and not the time of the sin? For were that so, should they not have brought an offering in accordance with their present status, the High Priest a bull, and the chief a he-goat?
  Surely R. Yohanan said to the Tanna:  Teach, She is to be condemned to stoning.  But why? Did not the Torah speak of a betrothed young girl and this one is of majority age? R. Ila replied: The verse said, “The young girl” [implying] her who was a young girl before.
  Hanania to R. Ila: If so, should not [the husband] also be flogged and pay the hundred sela? He said back to him: May the All-Merciful one save us from such an opinion.  “On the contrary, may the All-Merciful save us from such an opinion as yours.
  What is the reason?  Yitzchak b. Avin, or, as some say, R. Yitzchak b. Abba, replied: In her case it was her behavior that brought about her [punishment] but in his case it was is the perversion of his lips that brought about his [penalties]. In her case it was her behavior that brought about her [punishment]’ and when she fornicated she was still a na’arah.   But in his case it was the perversion of his lips that brought about his [penalty]’; and when did he incur his guilt? At that time, and at that time she was already adolescent. 
  Our rabbis taught:  A betrothed young girl who fornicated is stoned at the door of her father’s house. If she had no door of her father’s house she is stoned at the door of the gate of that city. But in a town which is mostly inhabited by non-Jews she is stoned at the door of the court. Similarly you may say: A man who worships idols is to be stoned at the gate [of the city] where he worshipped, and in a city the majority of whose inhabitants are idolaters he is stoned at the door of the court. 
  From where are these rules [derived]? From that which our Rabbis have taught:  “Your gates”  this refers to the gate [of the city] where the man has worshipped.  You say, “The gate [of the city] where the man has worshipped” or might it not mean the gate where he was tried?
   It says “your gates” below and it says “your gate” above, just as “your gates” referred to above refers to the gates where he worshipped, so too “your gates” referred to below refers to the gates where he worshipped.
  Another interpretation:  “Your gates” but not the gates of non-Jews.   But this phrase “Your gates” have you not already deduced something from it?    If so, the verse should have said “gate”; why “Your gates”?  You can learn from it two things.
  Thus we have derived this rule with regard to idolatry, from where do we [derive the law in respect of] a betrothed girl?  
  Abbahu replied:  We learn “door” from “door” and “door” from “gate”  and “gate” from “your gates.”
  Our rabbis taught: [A husband] who brings up an evil name [upon his wife] is flogged and he must also pay a hundred sela’. R. Judah said:  As to flogging, [the husband is] flogged in all circumstances; as to the hundred sela’, where he had intercourse with her he pays but if he did not have intercourse with her he does not pay.
  They differ on the same principles as those on which R. Eliezer b. Jacob and the Rabbis differed,  and this is what they meant: [A husband] who brought an evil name [upon his wife] is flogged and he must also pay a hundred sela’, whether he had intercourse, or did not have intercourse with her, [this being] in agreement with the Rabbis.   Judah ruled:  As to flogging [the husband is] flogged in all circumstances; as to the hundred sela’, where he had intercourse with her he pays but if he did not have intercourse with her he does not pay; this is in agreement with R. Eliezer b. Jacob.
  Other say:  Everyone is in agreement with R. Eliezer b. Jacob   and this is what they mean:  [A husband] who brought an evil name [upon his wife] is flogged and he must also pay the hundred sela’, but only where he had intercourse with her.   Judah ruled:  As to flogging, [the husband is] flogged in all circumstances.
  But does R. Judah, hold that “as to flogging, [the husband] is flogged in all circumstance.”  But has it not been taught: R. Judah says:  If he had intercourse he is flogged but if he did not have intercourse he is not flogged? Nahman b. Yitzchak said: He is flogged with lashes for rebelling against the rabbis.
  
  Daf 46a
  
  Papa said:  What does it mean “if he had intercourse he is flogged” which was used there. A monetary fine. But could one describe a monetary fine as “flogging”? Yes, and so indeed we have learned: If a man said, “I vow to pay half of my valuation” he most pay half of his valuation. R. Yose the son of R. Judah ruled: He is flogged and must pay his full valuation. Why should he be flogged? R. Papa explained: He is “flogged” by [having to pay his] full valuation.
  What is the reason? It is a preventive measure against the possibility [of a vow for] the value of half of one’s body, and the value of a half is like an organ that life depends on.
  Our rabbis taught: “And they shall punish him” (Deuteronomy 22:19) this refers to a monetary fine; “And chastise him” (v. 18) this refers to flogging.
  It is easy to understand why “And they shall punish him” refers to a monetary payment since it is written, “And they shall punish him a hundred shekels of silver and he shall give them to the father of the young girl” (v. 19). But how do I know that “And chastise him” refers to flogging?
  Abbahu said:  We learn “shall chastise” from “shall chastise,” and “shall chastise” from “son” and “son” from “son”– “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be flogged” (Deuteronomy 25:2).
  From where is the warning against bringing up an evil name [upon one’s wife] deduced? Elazar said: From, “Do not go around as a talebearer” (Leviticus 19:16). Nathan said: From “You shall guard yourself from every evil thing” (Deuteronomy 23:10).
  What is the reason that R. Elazar does not say [that the warning comes] from this text? That text he requires for [the same deduction] as [that made by] R. Pinchas b. Yair: “And you shall keep yourself from every evil thing”; From here R. Pinchas b. Yair  said that a person should not have [impure] thoughts in his heart, and thus bring himself to have impurity at night.
  What then is the reason why R. Nathan does not make his deduction from this text?    That text is a warning to the court that it must not be lenient with one [of the litigants] and harsh to the other.
  If [a husband] did not tell the witnesses, “Come and testify for me” and they testify on their own, he is not to be lashed nor is he to pay the hundred sela.  
  She, however, and the witnesses who testified falsely against her are hurried to the place of stoning. “She and the false witnesses who testified against her”!  Rather,
  “She or her false witnesses are hurried to the place of stoning.” The reason is because he did not tell them [to testify]. Had he told them [he would have been subject to the penalties] even though he did not hire them.  This comes to exclude the view of R. Judah, as it was taught: R. Judah ruled:
   [A husband] incurs no penalties unless he has hired the witnesses. What is R. Judah’s reason?  R. Abbahu said:   It is drawn from the two appearance of the root “to place” (שימה). 
  Here it is written, “And he places false charges against her,” (Deuteronomy 22:14) and elsewhere it is written, “Neither shall you place interest on him” (Exodus 22:24) just as there refers to money so too here it refers to money. Nahman b. Yitzchak said,and so did R. Joseph the of Sidon teach at the school of R. Shimon b. Yohai:  It is drawn from the two appearance of the root “to place” (שימה).
  Yirmiyah asked: What is the ruling where [the husband] hired them with a piece of land? What [if he hired them] for a sum less than a perutah? What [if both witnesses were hired] for one perutah?
  Ashi asked: What [is the ruling where a husband] brought an evil name [on his wife] in respect of their first marriage? What [if a levir brought up an evil name] in respect of his brother’s marriage?
  Solve, in any case, one [of these questions]. For R. Jonah taught:  “I gave my daughter to this man” but not to the levir.
  What [is the ruling of] the rabbis and what [is that of] R. Eliezer b. Jacob? As it was taught: What is the bringing up of an evil name [against one’s wife]? If [a husband] came to the court and said,  “I, So-and-so, did not find signs of virginity for your daughter.”  If there are witnesses that she committed adultery after being betrothed to him, he is entitled to a ketubah of a maneh.
  If there are witnesses that she committed adultery after being betrothed to him, she is entitled to a ketubah of a maneh!  She is liable for stoning?  This is what was meant: If there are witnesses that she fornicated while she was betrothed, she is to be stoned; if she fornicated before [her marriage] she is entitled to a ketubah of a maneh. 
   If it turns out that the evil name was not an evil name, the husband is flogged and he must also pay a hundred sela, whether he had intercourse [with her] or whether he did not have intercourse [with her]. R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said: These things were said only where he had intercourse [with her]. According to R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov one can well understand why Scripture used the expressions, “And he came upon her” and “And I drew near to her”,
  but according to the Rabbis, what does it mean “And he came upon her” and “And I drew near to her”?   “And he came upon her” with accusations and “And I drew near to her”, with words.
  According to R. Eliezer b. Jacob one can understand why Scripture used the expression, “I did not find in your daughter the signs of virginity,  but according to the Rabbis what does it mean, “I did not find in your daughter the signs of virginity.” I did not find for your daughter witnesses to establish her claim to virginity.
  According to R. Eliezer b. Jacob one can understand why Scripture used the expression, “And these are the tokens of my daughter’s virginity”;  but according to the Rabbis what could be the sense of [the expression,] “And these are the tokens of my daughter’s virginity”? And these are the witnesses who testify to my daughter’s virginity.
  According to R. Eliezer b. Jacob one can understand why Scripture used the expression, “And they shall spread the garment,”  but according to the Rabbis what does “And they shall spread the garment” mean? 
  Abbahu said: They explain [the charge] which he submitted against her;  as it was taught: “And they shall spread the garment” teaches that the witnesses of the one party and those of the other party come, and the matter is made as clear as a new garment. Eliezer b. Jacob said: The words are to be taken in their literal sense: An actual garment.
  Yitzchak son of R. Ya’akov b. Giyori sent this message in the name of R. Yohanan:  : Although we do not find anywhere in the Torah that Scripture draws a distinction between natural and unnatural intercourse in respect of lashes or other punishments, such a distinction was made in the case of a man who brought an evil name [upon his wife];  for he is not liable unless he has intercourse with her, [even] in an unnatural manner, he brought up an evil name upon her in respect of a natural intercourse.
  In accordance with whose view? If in accordance with the view of the Rabbis [the husband should have been held guilty] even if he did not have intercourse with her. If in accordance with the view of R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, 
  
  Daf 46b
  
  both cases are in a natural manner? Rather, R. Kahana sent in the name of R. Yohanan: He is not guilty unless he had intercourse in a natural manner and he brought up an evil name upon her in respect of a natural intercourse.
  A father has authority over his daughter in her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, document or intercourse. He is entitled to anything she finds, to her handiwork and to annul her vows. He receives her get but he has no usufruct [from her property] during her lifetime.
  When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct during her lifetime. And he is obligated to feed her, to pay a ransom for her and to provide for her burial.  Rabbi Judah says:  even the poorest man in Israel must provide no less than two flutes and one lamenting woman.
  GEMARA. “By money.” From where is this deduced? Rav Judah replied: Scripture said, “Then she shall go out for nothing, without money” (Exodus 21:11), [which implies that] this master receives no money but that another master does receive money; And who is he? Her father.
  But might it not be suggested that it belongs to her? Now that her father who contracts her betrothal, as it is written in Scripture, “I gave my daughter to this man,” (Deuteronomy 22:16) would she take the money!
  But might it not be suggested that this applies only to a minor who has no legal right [to betroth herself], but a na’arah who has such rights may herself contract her betrothal, and she herself receives the money? Scripture stated, “Being in her youth in her father’s house” (Numbers 30:17), [implying that] all the advantages of her youth belong to her father.
  But what about that which R. Huna said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that a daughter’s handiwork belongs to her father? As it is said, “And if a man sells his daughter to be a maidservant” (Exodus 21:7): just as the handiwork of a maidservant belongs to her master so does the handiwork of a daughter belong to her father. Now why do I need this verse, deduce it from “Being in her youth in her father’s house”?
  Rather, that verse was written in connection only with the annulment of vows?   And should you suggest that we might infer this from it, monetary matters cannot be inferred from ritual matters.
  And should you suggest that  it might be inferred from [the laws of compensation for] shame and blemish, shame and blemish are different, since the father is also involved in it?
  Rather, it is logical that when the Torah excluded [one “going out”] it excluded a “going out” that was similar.
  But this “going out,” is not like that of the other: For in the case of the master [the maidservant] goes entirely out of his control while in the “going out” from the control of her father she still needs to be brought into the huppah?
  In respect of the annulment of vows, at any rate, she goes out of his control; for we have learned: In the case of a betrothed na’arah, the father and her husband jointly annul her vows.
  Document or intercourse: From where do we know this?   Scripture said,  “And becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2) all of the ways in which a woman becomes a wife are compared one to the other.
  He receives the lost objects she finds:
  
  
  Daf 47a
  
  Because of enmity.
   To her handiwork. From where do we know this? R. Huna said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that a daughter’s handiwork belongs to her father? As it is said, “And if a man sells his daughter to be a maidservant” (Exodus 21:7): just as the handiwork of a maidservant belongs to her master so does the handiwork of a daughter belong to her father. But say that this [applies only to] a minor whom he may sell, but the handiwork of a na’arah  whom he cannot sell belongs to herself?
  It is but logical that it should belong to her father, for should you think that her handiwork does not belong to her father, how could the Torah confer upon the father the right to send his daughter to the huppah: How could he send her?  This would prevent her from doing her work?
  Ahai raised an objection: Say that he pays her compensation [for the time] she is taken away [from her work]? Alternatively, he could send her at night? Alternatively, he could send her on a Sabbath or festival?
  Rather, a minor does not need a verse. Now that he may sell her was it at all necessary [to state that her handiwork belongs to him]? Rather, the verse is needed in reference to a na’arah.
  To annul her vows.  From where do we know this?  As it is written, “Being in her youth in her father’s house.”
  And he receives her bill of divorce. From where do we know this? — As it is written, “And she goes out and becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2), her going out is compared to her becoming.
  But he has no usufruct during her lifetime. Our Rabbis taught: A father has no rights to usufruct during the lifetime of his daughter. R. Yose the son of R. Judah ruled: A father does have rights to usufruct in the lifetime of his daughter. On what principle do they differ? The first tanna holds that  the rabbis were well justified in allowing enacting that the usufruct belongs to a husband, since otherwise he might refrain from ransoming [his wife].  But with regard to the father, what is there to say? That he would refrain from ransoming her?
  [It is certain that] he would ransom her in any case. Yose the son of R. Judah holds that  a father also might refrain from ransoming [his daughter],  for he might think: She is carrying a purse on her, let her go and ransom herself.
  When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct etc. Our Rabbis taught: If [a father] promised his daughter in writing fruit, clothes or other movable objects that she would take with her from her father’s house to that of her husband,  and she died, her husband does not acquire these objects. In the name of R. Natan it was stated:  The husband does acquire them.
  Shall we say that they differ on the same principles as those on which R. Elazar b. Azariah and the Rabbis differed? For we learned: If she was widowed or divorced, either after betrothal or after marriage, she is entitled to collect the entire amount.  Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says: [a woman widowed or divorced] after marriage receives the entire amount; After betrothal [but before marriage], a virgin collects two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh,
  
  Daf 47b
  
  for the man wrote her [the additional amount] in order to marry her. The one who says that he does not acquire [that which her father wrote] is like R. Elazar b. Azaryah, and the one who says that he has acquired, is like the rabbis.
  No; all hold like R. Elazar b. Azaryah.  He who said that he does not acquire [is obviously] in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azaryah.  And he who said that he does acquire, it might be said that R. Elazar b. Azaryah was referring only to commitments from him to her, for the man wrote her [the additional amount] in order to marry her.
  But with regard to that which goes from her to him, even R. Elazar b. Azaryah may admit [that betrothal has the same force as marriage] since [these were promised] due to [a desire for] matrimonial association, and such association, surely, had taken place. 
  He provides for his wife’s maintenance: Our Rabbis taught: They established that he provides maintenance in return for receiving her handiwork, and he is responsible for her burial in return for receiving her ketubah [dowry], and therefore the husband receives the usufruct.
  Usufruct! Who mentioned it? A clause is missing, and this is how it should read: They established that he provides maintenance in return for receiving her handiwork, and he is responsible for redeeming her in return for receiving the usufruct, and for burying her in return for her ketubah [dowry], and therefore the husband receives the usufruct.
  What does “therefore” mean?
  What might you have said? [That a husband] must not consume the usufruct but should rather leave it, since otherwise, he might refrain from ransoming her, thus it teaches us that that  was preferable, for sometimes [the proceeds of the usufruct] might not suffice and he would have to ransom her at his own expense.
  But why should I not reverse the correlation?
  Abaye aid: They established the common for the common and the uncommon for the uncommon.
  Rava said: The following Tanna holds that maintenance is obligatory on the husband from the Torah. For it was taught: “She’erah” refers to maintenance, for so it is said in Scripture, “Who also eat the she’er (flesh) of my people” Micah 3:3; “Kesutah” [is to be understood] according to its ordinary meaning [as clothing]; “Onatah” refers to the time for conjugal duty prescribed in the Torah, for so it is said in Scripture, “If you withhold conjugal duty (te’aneh) from my daughters” (Genesis 31:50).
  Elazar said: “She’arah refers to the prescribed time for conjugal duty, for so it is said, “None of you shall approach to anyone that is near of kin (she’er) to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6); “Kesutah” [is to be understood] according to its ordinary meaning [as clothing]; “Onatah” refers to maintenance, for so it is said, “And he afflicted you, and caused you to be ravenous” (Deuteronomy 8:3).
  
  Daf 48a
  
  Eliezer b. Ya’akov says: “She’erah kesutah:” Provide her with clothing according to her age, that he should not provide his old wife [with the clothing] of a young one nor his young wife with that of an old one. “Kesutah Ve-Onatah:” Provide her with clothing according to the season of the year, that he should not give her new clothing in the summer nor worn out clothing in the winter.
  Joseph taught: “Her flesh” implies close bodily contact, that he should not treat her in the manner of the Persians who have sexual relations with their clothes on. This provides support for [a ruling of] R. Huna who said that a husband who says, “I will not [have sex with my wife] unless she wears her clothes and I mine,” he must divorce her and also her kethubah.
  Judah ruled: even the poorest man in Israel etc. This then implies that the first Tanna is of the opinion that these are not [necessary]. But how is one to imagine [the case]? If it was her customs, why would the first opinion say he is not liable? And if it is not her custom, then what is R. Judah’s reasoning?
   [The ruling was] necessary only [in a case], for instance, where this was her custom but not his. The first Tanna is of the opinion that  the principle that she rises with him but does not go down with him is applied only during her lifetime but not after her death,
  while R. Judah maintains [that the principle applies] even after her death. Hisda said in the name of Mar Ukba: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Judah.
  Hisda further stated in the name of Mar Ukba: If a man became insane the court takes possession of his estate and provides food and clothing for his wife, sons and daughters, and something else. Ravina said to R. Ashi: Why should this be different from that concerning which it was taught: If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife demanded maintenance, the court takes possession of his estate and provides food and clothing for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters or for something else?
  The other replied: Do you not draw a distinction between one who departs intentionally and one who departs unintentionally?
  What [is meant by] “something else”? Hisda said: This refers to cosmetics. Joseph said:  Charity. The one who said, “cosmetics,” all the more so charity. But the one who said, “charity” would say that he does give her cosmetics, for he would not want her to be disgraced.
  Hiyya b. Avin said in the name of R. Huna:  If a man went to a country beyond the sea, and his wife died, the court takes possession of his estate and buries her in a manner befitting his status. “In a manner befitting his status,” but not her status!  
  Say: Even in a manner befitting his status;  and it is this that he teaches us: She goes up with him [to  his status] but does not go down with him [to a lower status] even after her death.
  Matana said: A man who said that when [his wife] died she shall not be buried at the expense of his estate must be obeyed. Why should it be different if he has left instructions? Obviously because the estate falls to the orphans; but the estate falls to the orphans even if he left no instructions?
  Rather [it should read]: One who said that when he dies he should not be buried at the expense of his estate is not to be obeyed, for it is not within his power to enrich his sons and throw himself upon the public.
  She remains in the domain of her father until she enters
  
  Daf 48b
  
  the domain of her husband [by going into the bridal chamber] at marriage. If her father delivered her to the agents of the husband she passes into the domain of her husband. If her father went with the husband’s agents or if the father’s agents went with the husband’s agents she remains in the domain of her father. If her father’s agents delivered her to the husband’s agents she passes into the domain of her husband.
  GEMARA. What [is the purport of] “she remains”? To exclude [the ruling] of an earlier mishnah where we taught: If the time [for marriage] came and they were not married they are maintained out of the husband’s estate and [if he is a priest] they may eat terumah.   Therefore it teaches us “she remains.”
  If her father delivered her to the agents of the husband behold she is under the authority of her husband etc. Rav said: Her transfer [is effective] in all respects except for terumah;   But R. Asi said: Even in respect of terumah.
  Huna (or as some say, Hiyya b. Rav) raised an objection against R. Asi:  She remains under the authority of her father until she enters the huppah. Rav to them: Did I not say to you,  do not go after an ambiguous statement?  He could respond to you that “her transfer” is her entry into the huppah.
  Shmuel:  In respect of her inheritance.  
  Resh Lakish said: In respect of her ketubah.   What is meant by “her ketubah”? [If it means] that should [the woman] die he inherits [the dowry], then this is the same as Shmuel?   Ravina said: The meaning is that her [statutory] ketubah from a second husband is only a maneh.
  Both R. Yohanan and R. Hanina said:    Her transfer [is regarded as marriage] in all respects even that of terumah.
  They objected: If the father went with the agents of the husband, or if the agents of the father went with the agents of the husband, or if she had a courtyard on the way, and she entered it with him to rest there for the night, her father inherits from her if she died, even though her ketubah is already in the house of her husband.
  If, however, her father transferred her to her husband’s agents, or if her father’s agents transferred her to her husband’s agents, or he had a courtyard on the way, and she entered it with him with the intention of being married, her husband inherits her if she died, even though her ketubah was still in her father’s house.  
  With what regard was this stated? With regard to inheritance,  but in respect of terumah [the law is that] a woman is not allowed to eat terumah until she enters the huppah.   [Does not this represent] a refutation of all?   This is indeed a refutation.
  But the baraita itself is self-contradictory!  You said, “She entered it with him to rest for the night” the reason [why such an act is not regarded as marriage is] because [she entered for the purpose of] resting for the night. But if she had entered with no specified intention [it would be deemed to have been made] with an intention to be married. But then say the final clause: “She entered it with him with the intention of being married,” if she entered with no specified intention [it would be deemed to have been] in order to rest there for the night?
  Ashi replied: Both entrances were made with no specified intention:  Any unspecified [entrance into] a courtyard of hers [is presumed to have been made] in order to rest there for the night while any unspecified [entrance into] a courtyard of his [is presumed to have been made] with the intention of being married. 
  It was taught: f a father transferred [his daughter] to the agents of her husband and she committed adultery her penalty is strangulation. From where is this derived? Ammi b. Hama replied: The verse said: “To fornicate in her father’s house” (Deuteronomy 22:21 this excludes one whom the father had transferred to the agents of the husband.
  Why not say that this excludes one who entered the huppah but did not have sex?
  Rava said: Ammi told me [that a woman who entered her]  huppah was explicitly mentioned in Scripture: “If a young girl that is a virgin betrothed to a man” (Deuteronomy 22:23) “a young girl” but not a woman who is of majority age, “a virgin” but not a woman who had sex, “betrothed” but not one married. 
  Now what [is meant by] “married”? If I say one actually married, this is the same as “‘a virgin’ but not a woman who had sex.” . Rather it must refer to a woman who entered into the huppah but did not have sex.
  
  Daf 49a
  
  But say that  if she returned to her father’s home she resumes her former status?  Rava said: A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael has already settled this. 
  For a Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: “But the vow of a widow, or of a divorcee, anything that she has bound upon herself, shall stand against her?” (Numbers 30:10). What is Scripture saying?  Has she not been removed from the authority of her father and also from that of her husband? 
  Rather, where her father had transferred her to the agents of her husband, or where the agents of her father had transferred her to the agents of her husband and, on the way, she became a widow or was divorced what do I say about her?  Is she of the house of her father or of the house of her husband?  Hence the text tells you that  as soon as she has left her father’s authority, even if only for a short while, he may no longer annul her vows.
  Papa said:  We also learned [a similar ruling]: A man who has intercourse with a betrothed girl is not liable unless she is a na’arah, a virgin, betrothed, and in her father’s house. It is understandable that “na’arah” excludes one who is of majority age, “virgin” excludes   one with whom a man has had intercourse, and “betrothed” excludes one who married [by entry into the bridal chamber]. But what does “in her father’s house” exclude? Obviously this:   [The case where] her father delivered her to the agents of the husband.
  Nahman b. Isaac said: We also learned [a similar ruling]: One who has intercourse with a married woman, one she entered the domain of her husband for the sake of marriage even though no intercourse had taken place, he is punished by strangulation. “She entered the domain of her husband” in any form whatever. Learn from this.
  A father is not obligated to maintain his daughter. This exposition was made by Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah in front of the sages in the vineyard of Yavneh:  “The sons shall inherit [their mother’s kethubah] and the daughters shall be maintained [out of their father’s estate” —just as the sons do not inherit except after the death of their father, so the daughters are not maintained except after the death of their father.
  GEMARA. It is his daughter that he is not obligated to sustain, but it follows that he is obligated to sustain his son, [and in the case of] his daughter also, it is not an obligation but it is a moral duty. Who then is the author of our Mishnah?  [Is it] neither R. Meir nor R. Judah nor R. Yohanan b. Beroka?
  For it was taught: It is a moral duty to feed one’s daughters, and all the more so one’s sons, since the latter are engaged in the study of the Torah, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah ruled: It is a moral duty to feed one’s sons, and all the more so one’s daughters, in order (to prevent their) degradation. R. Yohanan b. Beroka ruled: It is a legal obligation to feed one’s daughters after their father’s death; but during the lifetime of their father neither sons nor daughters need be fed.
  Now who [is the author of] our Mishnah? If R. Meir, he said that it is only a moral duty [to feed sons]. If R. Judah also said that it is only a moral duty [to feed sons]. And if R. Yohanan b. Beroka, there is not even a moral duty [to feed sons].
  If you wish I might say [that the author is] R. Meir; If you wish I might say that it is R. Judah; and if you wish I might say that it is R. Yohanan b. Beroka.
  If you wish I might say [that the author is] R. Meir, and this is what he means: A father is not obligated to sustain his daughter, and the same law applies to his son. But there is a moral duty in the case of his daughter and all the more so in the case of his sons; and the reason why his daughter was mentioned was to teach us this: 
  
  Daf 49b
  
  That even in the case of his daughter there is no legal obligation but there is a moral duty. 
  If you wish I might say that the mishnah accords with R. Judah and this is what he meant: A father is not obligated to sustain his daughter, and all the more so his son. But there is a moral duty [to sustain] one’s son and all the more so his daughters; and the only reason why it mentions his daughter was to teach us this: That even [the sustenance of] his daughter is not a legal obligation.
  And if you wish I might say that the mishnah accords with R. Yohanan b. Beroka, and this is what he meant: the father is not obligated to sustain his daughter, and the same law applies to his son; and there is not even a moral duty and since it teaches [in a later clause] that it is an obligation to sustain them after his death, it also taught here that he is not obligated.  
  Elai said in the name of Resh Lakish in the name R. Judah b. Hanina: At Usha it was enacted that a man must sustain his sons and daughters while they are young. The question was raised: Does the halakhah follow this statement or not? Come and hear: When people came before Rav Judah, he used to say to them,  “A yarod bears children and throws them upon [the mercy of] the townspeople.”  
  When people came before R. Hisda, he used to tell them:  “Turn over a mortar for him in public and let one stand [on it] and say: The raven cares for its young but that man does not care for his children.” But does a raven care for its young? Is it not written in Scripture, “To the young ravens which cry?” (Psalms 147:9). This is no difficulty: The one applies to white ravens and the one to black ones.
  When a man came before Rava he used to tell him,  “Does it please you that your children should be sustained from the charity funds?”
  This ruling was said only for one who is not a wealthy man, but if the man is wealthy he may be compelled even against his will; as was the case with Rava who forced R. Nathan b. Ammi and extracted from him four hundred zuz for charity.
  Elai stated in the name of Resh Lakish:  It was enacted at Usha that  if a man assigned all his estate to his sons in writing, he and his wife may nevertheless be maintained out of it.
  Zera, or as some say, R. Shmuel b. Nahmani, raised a difficulty:  They even said something greater that [in the case that follows]...  a widow is maintained out of her husband’s estate, was there any necessity [to state that such maintenance is given to] the man himself and his wife?
  For Rabin had sent in his letter:  If a man died and left a widow and a daughter, his widow is to receive her maintenance from his estate. If the daughter married, his widow is still to receive her maintenance from his estate. If the daughter died? Rav Judah the son of the sister of R. Yose b. Hanina said:
   I had such a case, and they said that his widow was to receive her maintenance from his estate. [In view of this] did we even need to say he and his wife [are maintained from his estate]?
  What might you have said? In that case, there is no one else to provide for her, but here [it might be argued:] Let him provide for himself and for her; therefore it teaches us [that the father and his wife are sustained from the estate].
  The question was raised: Is the law in agreement with his view or not? Come and hear: R. Hanina and R. Yonatan were once standing together when a man approached them and bent down kissed R. Yonatan upon his foot. R. Hanina said to him:  What is this?  He said to him: This man assigned his estate to his sons in writing 
  
  Daf 50a
  
  and I forced them to maintain him. Now if you say that this was not [in accordance with the strict] law one can well understand why he had to force them, but if you say this is the law, why did he have to force them?
  R. Elai stated: It was enacted at Usha that  if a man wishes to spend liberally he should not spend more than a fifth. It was also taught: If a man desires to spend liberally he should not spend more than a fifth, lest he come to need the help of people.  And it once happened that a man wished to spend more than a fifth but his friend did not allow him.  Who was it?  R. Yeshevav. Others say [that the man who wished to spend was] R. Yeshevav, but his friend did not allow him. And who was it? R. Akiva.
  R. Nahman, or as some say, R. Aha b. Ya’akov said: What [is the proof from] Scripture? “And of all that you give me I will surely give you a tenth” (Genesis 28:22). 
  But the second tenth is not the same as the first one? R. Ashi replied:  I will give a second tenth that is the same as the first. 
  R. Shimi b. Ashi said: [The number of those who report] these traditions steadily diminishes. And your mnemonic is,  “The young assigned in writing and spent liberally.”
  Yitzchak said:  It was ordained at Usha that a man must put up with his son until [he is] twelve years [of age]. From that point onwards he may threaten his life. But is this so? Did not Rav say to R. Shmuel b. Shilat:   Under the age of six do not accept him [as a student]; At the age of six accept him and stuff him like an ox?
  Yes, stuff him like an ox, . but do not threaten his life until after [he has reached the age of] twelve years. And if you want I may say: There is no difficulty, one referred to Scripture and the other to Mishnah;
  for Abaye stated: Mother (or nurse) told me  that a child of six [is ready] for Scripture; one of ten, for Mishnah; one of thirteen, for a full twenty-four hours’ fast, and, in the case of a girl, [one who is of] the age of twelve.
  Abaye said:  Mother (nurse) told me:  A child of the age of six whom a scorpion has bitten on the day on which he has completed his sixth year does not survive [as a rule].   What is his remedy? The gall of a white stork in beer. This should be rubbed into the wound [he should] be made to drink it. A child of the age of one year whom a bee has stung on the day he has completed his first year does not survive [as a rule].   What is his remedy? The creepers of a palm-tree in water. This should be rubbed in and [the patient] be made to drink it.
  Katina said: Whoever brings his son [to school] under the age of six will run after him but never overtake him. Others say: His fellows will run after him but will never overtake him.   Both statements are correct: He is feeble but learned. If you want I might say: One applies to one who is weak; the latter, to one who is in good health.
  Yose b. Hanina stated: At Usha it was enacted that  if a woman had sold property for which he has usufruct rights during the lifetime of her husband and then died, the husband may seize it from the buyers. Yitzchak b. Yosef found R. Abahu standing among a crowd of people in Usha.  He said to him:  Who is the author of the traditions of Usha?  He responded:  R. Yose b. Hanina.  He learned this from him forty times and then it appeared to him as if he had it safely in his bag.
  “Happy are they that keep justice, that do righteousness at all times” (Psalms 106:3):  Is it possible to do righteousness at all times? Our Rabbis in Yavneh expounded on this (and others say R. Eliezer): This refers to a man who sustains his sons and daughters while they are young. Shmuel b. Nahmani said:  This refers to a man who brings up an orphan boy or orphan girl in his house and marries them off.
  “Wealth and riches are in his house; and his righteousness endures forever” (Psalms 112:3). R. Huna and R. Hisda [expounded the text in different ways].  One said:  It applies to a man who studies the Torah and teaches it to others; and the other said: .It applies to a man who writes a Torah, Prophets and Writings and lends them to others
  “And see you children’s children, peace be upon Israel” (Psalms 128:6).  R. Joshua b. Levi said:  As soon as your children have children there will be peace upon Israel; for they will not be subject to halitzah or levirate marriage.   Shmuel b. Nahmani said:   As soon as your children have children there will be peace for the judges of Israel, for [doubtful claimants] will not come to quarrels.
  This midrash was expounded by R. Elazar before the sages etc.
  
  Daf 50b
  
  Joseph sat before R. Hamnuna while R. Hamnuna was sitting and saying:  Just as sons receive their inheritance only from landed property, so one’s daughters are sustained only from landed property.  Everyone shouted at him:  Is it only from a man who leaves land that sons inherit while from him who leaves no land his sons do not inherit? 
  R. Joseph said to him: Maybe the master was referring to the ketubah [inherited by] male children? The other replied: The Master who is a great man understood precisely what I meant.
  Hiyya b. Yosef stated: Rav provided sustenance [to daughters] from wheat taken from the “aliyah.” They asked: Was [Rav’s provision made for] a dowry, and what is “aliyah?” From the best that the father would have given, and this would be like Shmuel, for Shmuel said  that in respect of dowry the assessment is determined by [the disposition of] the father.
  Or was it rather for actual sustenance, and by “aliyah” he meant “in accordance with the good enactments made in an upper chamber,” for R. Yitzchak b. Yosef stated: In an upper chamber it was enacted that daughters should be maintained even out of movable property? 
  Come and hear. R. Banai the brother of R. Hiyya b. Abba had in his possession orphans’ movable property, and when they came before Shmuel, he said to him, “Go and sustain them.”
  Does this not refer to sustenance, and he holds like R. Yitzchak b. Yosef? No; that case was in connection with dowry, and Shmuel [acted] in accordance with his own view, for Shmuel said that  in respect of dowry the assessment is determined by [the disposition of] the father.
  [Such] a case occurred at Nehardea and the Nehardean judges judged [in favor of the daughters]. At Pumbedita also R. Hana b. Bizna collected [sustenance for daughters from movable property]. R. Nahman said to them: Go and return that property [to the heirs] otherwise I will order the seizure of your mansions. 
  Ammi and R. Assi intended to sustain daughters out of movable property. Ya’akov b. Idi said to them:  Something which R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish did not do, and you wish to do it.
  Elazar intended to sustain daughters out of movable property. R. Shimon b. Elyakim said to him:  Master, I know that you are not acting on the line of justice but on the line of mercy, but [you should be concerned that] the students might observe this ruling and fix it as a halakhah for future generations.
  A similar case once came in front of R. Joseph. He said to them: Give her of the dates that [are spread] on the reed-mat. Abaye said to him: Even if she were a creditor would the Master have given this to her?
  He said back:  I meant to say [dates] that are suitable for [spreading on] the reed-mat. 
  
  Daf 51a
  
  But in the end, anything that is about to be cut off the tree is like something still on the tree. [He said back]: I meant to say date that still need to be on the tree.
  A boy orphan and girl orphan once came before Rava. Rava said to them: Give a bigger [maintenance allowance] to the boy for the sake of the girl. The rabbis said to Rava: Did not the Master himself say: From landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of [a daughter’s] maintenance, [a wife’s] ketubah or [a daughter’s] dowry? 
  He answered them: Had he desired to have a handmaiden to attend on him would we not have given him one?  How much more here where it serves two purposes.
  Our rabbis taught: Both landed property and movable property may be seized for the sustenance of a wife or daughters, the words of Rabbi. Shimon b. Elazar says: Landed property: They may take it for daughters from sons, for daughters from daughters, and for sons from sons 
  and for sons from daughters where the estate is large but not for sons from daughters where it is small.
  Movable property: They may be seized for sons from sons, for daughters from daughters and for sons from daughters, but not for daughters from sons.
  Although we hold that the halakhah is in agreement with Rabbi [where he differs] from his colleague, the halakhah here is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Elazar; for Rava stated: From landed property but not from movable property whether in respect of [a daughter’s] maintenance, [a wife’s] ketubah or [a daughter’s] dowry? 
  If he did not write a ketubah for her, a virgin still collects two hundred zuz and a widow one mane, because it is a condition laid down by court. If he assigned to her in writing a field that was worth one mane instead of the two hundred zuz and did not write for her, “All property that I possess is a lien for your ketubah,” he is liable [for the full amount] because  it is a condition laid down by the court.
   If he did not write for her, “if you are taken captive I will ransom you and take you again as my wife”, or in the case of a priest’s wife, “I will restore you to your people,” he is liable [to carry out these obligations], because it is a condition laid down by court.
  If she was taken captive he is obligated to ransom her; And if he said, “Here is her get and her ketubah, let her ransom herself”, he is not allowed [to act accordingly]. If she was injured it is his duty to provide for her medical treatment; And if he said, “Here is her get and her ketubah, let her heal herself”, he is allowed [to act accordingly].
  GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in our Mishnah]?... It is R. Meir who said that any man who gives a virgin a ketubah of less than two hundred zuz  or a widow less than a maneh, his intercourse is fornication,
  for if [the mishnah was the view of] R. Judah, did he not say,... [that if a husband] wishes he may write out for a virgin a document for two hundred zuz and she writes [a receipt] “I have received from you a maneh,” and for a widow [he may write out a document for] a maneh and she writes [a receipt], “I received from you fifty zuz.” 
  Read, however, the final clause: If he assigned to her in writing a field that was worth one maneh instead of the two hundred zuz and did not write for her, “All property that I possess is a lien for your ketubah,” he is liable [for the full amount] because it is a condition laid down by the court. Does not this represent the view of R. Judah who said that [the omission from a document of the clause] pledging property [is regarded as] a scribe’s error?
  For if it was the view of R. Meir, does he not hold that [the omission from a document of the clause] pledging property is not [regarded as] a scribe’s error. For we have learned: If a man found debt documents he should not return them [to the creditor] 
  
  Daf 51b
  
  he should not return them [to the creditor] if they recorded a lien on the [debtor’s] property, since the court would exact repayment from the property. But if they did not record a lien on the [debtor’s] property he may return them, since the court would not exact payment from the property, according to Rabbi Meir.
  But the Sages say:  In either case he should not return them, since [in either case] the court would exact payment from the property.
  Would then the first clause [represent the view of] R. Meir and the final clause that of R. Judah? And should you suggest that both clauses [represent the view of] R. Meir and that he draws a distinction between a ketubah and debt documents, does he really draw such a distinction?
  Has it not been taught: Five may collect only from free assets: They are as follows. [A claim for] produce, for having improved property, one who accepts upon himself to sustain his wife’s son or daughter, a debt document that has no pledge of property, and a woman’s ketubah from that has no pledge of property. From whom did you hear that [the omission from a deed of] a pledge on property is no regarded as the scribe’s error?  It is R. Meir, and yet he taught
  “a woman’s ketubah.”
  If you wish, I can say that our mishnah accords with R. Meir and if you wish I can say it accords with R. Judah. If you wish I can say it accords with R. Judah for there she specifically wrote to the husband “I received” but here she did not write “I received.”
   If you wish I can say that it is R. Meir.  What does it mean “he is obligated?” From free assets.
  If he did not write for her… etc. Shmuel’s father said: The wife of an Israelite who has been raped is forbidden to her husband, since we must be concerned that the beginning was under compulsion, but the end was willing.
  Rav raised an objection against Shmuel’s father: if you are taken captive I will ransom you and take you again as my wife?  The other remained silent.
  Rav thereupon applied to Shmuel’s father the verse,  “The princes refrained talking and laid their hand on their mouth” (Job 29:9).   What could he have said [in response]? They were lenient in the case of a captive.
  According to Shmuel’s father how is it possible to conceive a case of rape in which the Torah permitted her to return to her husband?   Where, for instance, witnesses testified that she screamed out from the beginning to the end.
  And he disagrees with Rava, for Rava said: Any case where the beginning was rape and the end was with her consent, and even if she said, “Leave him alone.” and that if he had not made the attack upon her she would have hired him to do it, she is permitted [to her husband]. What is the reason? She was overcome by her urges.
  A baraita was taught in agreement with Rava: “And she was not seized” (Numbers 5:13), therefore she is forbidden, but if she was seized she is permitted.   And there is another class of woman who is permitted even if she was not seized. And who is that? Any woman who began under compulsion and ended with her consent.
  Another baraita taught:  “And she was not seized” [then] is she forbidden. But if she was seized she is permitted.  But there is another class of woman who is forbidden even though she was seized. And who is that? The wife of a priest.
  Rav Judah stated in the name of Shmuel in the name of R. Ishmael: “And she was not seized,” if she was seized, she is forbidden, but if she was seized she is permitted. There is, however, another class of woman who is permitted even if she was not seized. And who is that? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one, that even if her son sits riding on her shoulder, she may refuse her husband and go away.
  Rav Judah said:  Women who were kidnapped by kidnappers are permitted to their husbands. The rabbis said to Rav Judah:  But they are bringing them their bread? [They do this] out of fear. But they are handing them their arrows? [They do this also] out of fear. It is certain, that if the captors let them go and they come back of their own free will, they are prohibited.
  Our rabbis taught: Royal captives have the status of ordinary captives but those that are kidnapped by highwaymen are not regarded as ordinary captives. But have we not taught the reverse!?
  There is no contradiction between the rulings concerning royal captives since  the former refers to the kingdom of Ahashverosh while the latter refers to the kingdom of  Ben Netzer.
  There is also no contradiction between the two rulings concerning captives of highwaymen since  the former refers to Ben Netzer while the latter refers to an ordinary highwayman. As to Ben Nezer, there they call him a king and here they call him a highwayman? Yes; in comparison with Ahashverosh he was a highwayman but in comparison with an ordinary robber he was a king.
  Or, in the case of a priest’s wife, “I will restore you to your people” etc. Abaye said:  If a widow was married to a High Priest he must redeem her, since one may apply to her: “Or, in the case of a priest’s wife, ‘I will restore you to your people’” etc.
  
  Daf 52a
  
  But if a mamzeret or a netinah was married to an Israelite he is not obligated to redeem her, since one cannot apply to her: “And take you again as my wife.” Rava said: Wherever the captivity causes the woman to be forbidden [to her husband] he must redeem her but where some other circumstance causes her to be forbidden to him he is not obligated to redeem her.
  Shall we say [that they differ on the same principles] as the following tannaim?  [It was taught:] If a man forbade his wife by a vow [from deriving any benefit from him] and she was taken captive: R. Eliezer said  he must redeem her and give her her ketubah. R. Joshua said:  He must give her her ketubah but he need not redeem her.
  Natan: I asked Symachus:  When R. Joshua said, “He must give her her kethubah but he need not redeem her” [did he refer to a case] where her husband first made his vow against her and then she was taken captive or even to a case where she was first taken captive and then he made his vow against her?
  And he told me: I did not hear [what he said] but it seems [that he referred to] a case where [the husband] made the vow against her first and the woman was taken captive afterwards; for, should you say [that the ruling applied also to a woman who] was taken captive first and then the man made his vow against her afterwards, he might come to act deceitfully.
  Do they not disagree in [the case of one] who made a vow against the wife of a priest, Abaye says like R. Eliezer while Rava says like R. Joshua? 
  No; what are we dealing with here? A case where she made the vow herself and her husband confirmed it: R. Eliezer holds that it was he who put his finger between her teeth while R. Joshua holds that  it was she herself who put her finger between her teeth.
  [But] if she herself put her finger between her teeth why does she receive her ketubah?
  And, furthermore, [it was stated]:  I asked Symachus: When R. Joshua said, “He must give her her ketubah but he need not redeem her” [did he refer to a case] where her husband first made his vow against her and then she was then taken captive or even to a case where she was first taken captive and then he made his vow against her? And he told me: I did not hear [what he said].
  Now if [this is a case] where she herself had made the vow, what difference is there whether he made the vow first against her and then she was taken captive or whether she was first taken captive and he then made the vow? 
  Rather [here it is indeed a case where] the husband made the vow against her,  and Abaye explains [the tannaitic dispute] on the lines of his view while Rava explains it on the lines of his view. Abaye explains the dispute in line with his view: If a widow [was married] to a High Priest no one disputes that the husband must redeem her; If a mamzeret or a netinah [was married] to an Israelite no one disputes that he does not have to redeem her, Also one who made a vow against the wife of a priest no one disputes that he must redeem her, since [the principle in this case] is identical with that of a widow [who was married] to a High Priest.  
  They differ only in [respect of a husband who] made a vow against the wife of an Israelite, R. Eliezer says we follow the original status while R. Joshua says we follow her subsequent status.
  Rava explains it in line with his view:  If a widow [was married] to a High Priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite no one disputes that he need not redeem her. They differ only in [the case where one] made a vow against either the wife of a priest or the wife of an Israelite, 
  R. Eliezer says we follow the original status while R. Joshua says we follow her subsequent status.
  If she is taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her etc. Our rabbis taught: If she was taken captive during the lifetime of her husband, and he died afterwards, and her husband was aware of her [captivity], his heirs are obligated to redeem her, but if her husband was not aware of her captivity his heirs are not obligated to redeem her.
  Levi thought to act in accordance with this baraita.  Rav said to him, Thus said Havivi [my uncle]:  The law is not in accordance with that baraita but with the following teaching:  [If a woman] was taken captive after the death of her husband the orphans are not obligated to redeem her, and, furthermore, even if she was taken captive during the lifetime of her husband, and then he died, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her, since one cannot apply to her [the clause in her kehubah:] “And I will restore you as my wife.”
  Our rabbis taught:  [If a woman] was taken captive and they demanded that her husband pay ten times her value, he must redeem her the first time. Subsequently, if he wants he may redeem her, but if he does not want, he need not redeem her. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says:.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  Captives must not be redeemed for more than their value, because of the public good. [This then implies] that they must be redeemed for their actual value even though the cost of the ransom exceeds the amount of her ketubah.
  Against this they brought the following: [If a woman] was taken captive, and they demanded of her husband ten times the amount of her ketubah he must redeem her the first time. Subsequently, if he wants to he may redeem her, but if he does not want, he need not redeem her. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says: If the price of her ransom corresponded to the amount of her ketubah, he must ransom her; if not, he need not ransom her.
  Shimon b. Gamaliel has two lenient rules.
  If she was injured he must provide for her medical treatment. Our Rabbis taught: A widow is to be maintained from [her husband’s] orphans’ estate; and if she requires medical treatment, it is regarded as maintenance. Shimon b. Gamaliel ruled: For medical treatment that has a limit, her medical costs are deducted from her ketubah. But medical cost that has no limit is regarded as maintenance.
  Yohanan said: Bloodletting in the land of Israel is regarded as medical treatment that has no limit. Yohanan’s relatives had a wife of their father who required daily medical treatment. When they came to R. Yohanan he said to them: Set aside a fee for the doctor.
  Yohanan then said: We have made ourselves like legal advisers.  What did he think at first and what did he think at the end? At first he thought, “ And do not hide from your own flesh,” and at the end he realized. that an important person is different.
  If he did not write for her, “The male children that will be born from our marriage shall inherit the money of your ketubah over and above their shares with their brothers”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court. If he did not write for her, “the female children that I will have from you will dwell in my house and be maintained out of my estate until they are taken in marriage”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court.
  If he did not write for her, “You shall live in my house and be maintained from my estate throughout the duration of your widowhood”, he is nevertheless liable, because [this clause] is a condition laid down by the court Thus did the men of Jerusalem write. The men of Galilee wrote as did the men of Jerusalem. The men of Judea used to write: “Until the heirs wish to pay you your ketubah”. Therefore if the heirs wish to, they may pay her her ketubah and dismiss her.
  GEMARA. R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: Why did they institute the ketubah for male children? In order that any man might be encouraged to give to his daughter as much as to his son.
  But does this happen, that the Torah says that the son inherits and the daughter does not inherit, and the rabbis come and establish that the daughter should inherit.
  This too is from the Torah, as it is written, “Take wives, and have sons and daughters, and take wives far your sons, and give your daughters to husbands” (Jeremiah 29:6). Now this makes sense with regard to the sons,  [since such marriages are] within a father’s power but with regard to his daughters does he have such power? 
  Thus it teaches us that  a father must provide for his daughter clothing and covering and must also give her a dowry so that men would be enthusiastic her and marry her. And up to how much? Both Abaye and Raba said:  Up to a tenth of his wealth.
  But why not say [that the sons] should inherit [what their mother received] from her father but not [that what she received] from her husband? If that were so, a father also not assign for her [a large dowry].
  But why not say that where her father had assigned her a dowry her husband must also write this clause, but where her father did not assign any dowry her husband does not need to write this clause? The rabbis drew no distinction.
  But should not then a daughter among sons also inherit? The rabbis have treated [the ketubah] like an inheritance.  
  But should not then a daughter among the other daughters inherit? The rabbis made no distinction. So let him recover also from movable property? The rabbis treated it like the ketubah.  
  So let him recover from encumbered property? The mishnah taught “inherit. Say that they receive their ketubah even if there is no extra dinar! In a case where this would uproot biblical inheritance, the rabbis did not make an enactment.
  Papa was making arrangements for his son to be married into the house of Abba of Sura. He went there to write the ketubah for the bride.  When Judah b. Meremar heard [of his arrival] he went out to welcome him. ” When they reached the door [of the bride’s father’s house] he wanted to leave but  [R. Papa] said to him,  “Will the Master come in with me?
  
  Daf 53a
  
  He [R. Papa] saw that [Judah b. Meremar] did not want [to enter]. He said to him: What is it that you think? [Are you reluctant to enter] because Shmuel said to Rav Judah, “Toothy one, stay away from  transfers of inheritance  even if they are from a bad son to a good son, because one never knows what will come out of him, and all the more so [when the transfer is] from a son to a daughter,”  
  this too is an enactment of the Rabbis; as R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai.” He [Judah b. Meremar] said to him: This applies only [to one who acts] willingly; does it also imply that one should be compelled so to act?’ He [Judah b. Meremar] said to him:  This applies only [to one who acts] willingly;  does it also imply that one should be compelled so to act?’ He replied:  My very entrance is like compulsion.
  Papa forced him to enter. He was silent and sat down. [Abba] thought that he was angry with him and consequently assigned [to his daughter as dowry] all that he possessed.  At the end, he said to him: “Will not the Master speak even now? By the life of the Master, I have left nothing for myself!”
  He [Judah b. Meremar] said to him: If you asked me, even that which you assigned to her was too much. He [Abba] said: Now, let me change my mind. He said: You made a promise, I did not say you could change your mind.
  Yemar the Elder asked of R. Nahman: ? Does a woman who sells her ketubah to her husband retain the right to the ketubah for her male children or not. Rava said to him:  Why do you not ask the same question in the case of a woman who forgave her claim [to her ketubah]?
  He said to him: Now I am enquiring concerning the case of a woman who forgave her ketubah—even though [in that case] it might be assumed [that her need for] money compelled her [to the sale; and, furthermore,] it might be said [that she is] like a person who was struck a hundred blows with a hammer, do I need to ask the question about one who surrendered her claim to her ketubah?
  Rava said: It is obvious to me that a woman who sells her ketubah to strangers retains the right to the male children’s ketubah. What is the reason? [It is her need for] money that has compelled her [to sell].   A woman who forgives her claim [to her ketubah] to her husband does not retain the right to the male children’s ketubah. What is the reason? She forgave it.
  Rava asked: A woman who sells her ketubah to her husband, is she like one who sells it to strangers, or as one who forgives it in favor of her husband?   After he raised the question he himself solved it: A woman who sells her ketubah to her husband is like one who sells it to strangers.
  Idi b. Abin raised an objection: [We learned]: If she died, neither the heirs of the one husband nor the heirs of the other are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And we raised the difficulty, Why is the ketubah mentioned at all? 
  And R. Papa replied, This refers to the ketubah of the male children. But why?  Could not one say here too:  Her desire overpowered her?
  There [the loss of her ketubah] is a penalty that the rabbis have imposed upon her.
  Rabin b. Hanina was sitting before R. Hisda and he was sitting and he said in the name of R. Elazar: A woman who forgives her ketubah to her husband is not entitled to maintenance.  He said to him:  Had you not said this in the name of a great man I would have told you: “Whoever rewards evil for good, evil shall not depart from his house” (Proverbs 17:13).
  Nahman, Ulla and Abimi son of R. Papi were sitting, and R. Hiyya b. Ammi was sitting with them.  A certain man came before them whose betrothed wife had died. They said to him:  Go and bury her or pay her the ketubah. Hiyya said to them, We have taught: In the case of a betrothed wife [the husband] is not subject to the laws of onan, nor may he defile himself for her; and she likewise is not subject to the laws of onan, nor may she defile herself for him. If she dies, he does not inherit from her. If he dies, she collects her ketubah.
  The reason [she collects her ketubah] is that he died, but if she dies, she does not receive her ketubah. What is the reason? R. Hoshaia said:  Because I cannot apply to her: “When you marry another man, you will take what I assigned to you.”
  When Rabin came he stated in the name of Resh Lakish:  If a betrothed woman died, she does not receive her kethubah. Abaye said to them:  Go and tell him:
  
  Daf 53b
  
  Take your benefit and throw it on the thorns, for R. Hoshaia has already interpreted this teaching in Babylonia.
  The female children that you will have from me etc. Rav taught:  Until they are taken in marriage; But Levi taught:  Until they shall reach maturity. To Rav even though they reached maturity, and to Levi even though they married?
  Rather, whether she reaches maturity and is not married or whether she is married but did not reach maturity, they all agree [that the father is not obligated to sustain her]. They differ only on the question of a [daughter who was] betrothed before she reaches maturity.   So too did Levi teach in his baraita: Until they reach maturity and the time for their marriages arrives. Both? Rather, what this means is: Either they reach maturity or the time for their marriage arrives.
  [They differ on the same principles] as the following tannaim: How long is a daughter to be maintained? Until she is betrothed. In the name of R. Elaazar it was stated:  Until she reaches maturity. Joseph taught: [Daughters must be maintained] until they become [wives]. They asked: Does this mean becoming [wives] at marriage or becoming [wives] at betrothal? The question must stand unanswered.
  Hisda said to R. Joseph: Did you ever hear from Rav Judah whether a betrothed girl is entitled to maintenance or not? The other replied: I have not actually heard it, but it may logically be concluded that she is not entitled,   because [her future husband], having betrothed her, would not allow her to be degraded.
  He said back: If you have not actually heard this it may logically be concluded that she is entitled, since her future husband is not sure [he will end up marrying her] he would not throw away money for nothing.
  Others say: He said: I have not actually heard it, but it may logically be concluded that she is entitled [to maintenance]; since her future husband is not sure [he will end up marrying her] he would not throw away money for nothing. The other replied: If you have not actually heard this it may logically be concluded that she is not entitled to maintenance, because [her future husband], having betrothed her, would not allow her to be degraded. 
  (Mnemonic of the men: Shak Zarap. [Subjects:] She refused and a sister-in-law of the second degree is betrothed and he raped her.)
  Shesheth was asked: Is a minor who exercised her right of refusal entitled to maintenance or not?
  Sheshet said to them: You have learned this:  A widow in her father’s house, a divorced woman in her father’s house or a woman who was awaiting the decision of the yavam in her father’s house are all entitled to maintenance. R. Judah said: Only a woman who is still in her father’s house is entitled to maintenance but a woman who is no longer in her father’s house is not entitled to maintenance.
  Judah’s ruling is the same as that of the first Tanna? Rather it may be concluded that the difference between them is the case of a minor who had exercised her right of refusal: the first Tanna holds that  she is entitled [to maintenance]  while R. Judah holds that she is not.
  Resh Lakish asked: Is the daughter of a yavamah entitled to maintenance or not?
  Since the Master said: Her ketubah is a charge on the estate of her first husband, she does not have such rights, or is it possible that since the rabbis have enacted that whenever she is unable to collect her ketubah from [the estate of] her first [husband], she may recover it from that of the second, she does have [rights to maintenance]?  The question remains unanswered.
  Elazar asked:  Is the daughter of a forbidden relative of the second degree of incest entitled to maintenance or not?
  
  Daf 54a
  
  Since [her mother] is not entitled to a ketubah, she is not sustained, or since  her mother transgressed the rabbis penalized her, but she [the daughter], who did not transgress, the rabbis did not penalize her. This remains unanswered.
  Rava asked: Is the daughter of a betrothed wife entitled to maintenance or not? Is she entitled to maintenance since [her mother] is entitled to a ketubah or is it possible that she is not entitled [to maintenance], since the Rabbis have not established [the writing of] the ketubah until the time of the marriage? The question must stand unanswered.
  Papa asked:  Is the daughter of a raped woman entitled to maintenance or not?  According to the ruling of R. Yose the son of R. Judah, who said that [her mother] is entitled to a ketubah of one maneh,
  the question is not asked. It is asked according to the ruling of the rabbis who said that  the money for the fine is regarded as her ketubah. 
  Since her mother has no ketubah, she receives no maintenance, or might it possibly [be argued thus:]  What is the reason why a ketubah [has been instituted for a wife]? In order that the man might not find it easy to divorce her and this man cannot divorce her? The question remains unanswered.
  You shall dwell in my house etc. R. Joseph taught: In my house, but not in my hovel.  But she is entitled to maintenance.   Mar son of R. Ashi ruled: She is not entitled even to maintenance.   The law, however, is not in agreement with Mar son of R. Ashi.
  Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: If marriage was proposed to her and she accepted, she is no longer entitled to maintenance. [This is to imply that] if she did not accept, she would not be entitled to maintenance! Anan said: This was explained to me by Mar Shmuel: If she said, “I cannot accept the proposal] out of respect for the memory of So-and-so, my husband,” she is entitled to maintenance; [but if she said], “Because the men are not suitable for me,” she is not entitled to maintenance.
  Hisda said:  If she fornicated she is not entitled to maintenance. Joseph said:  If she painted her eyes or dyed her hair she is not entitled to maintenance. 
  The one who said: If she fornicated would even more so [deny her maintenance] if she paints her eyes or dyes her hair. But the one who said: If she painted her eyes or dyed her hair [would allow her maintenance] if she fornicated. What is the reason? Her inclination overcame her.
  The law, however, is not in agreement with any of these reported rulings but with that which Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: She who claims her ketubah at court is not entitled to maintenance.
  But is she not entitled?  Surely it was taught: If she sold her ketubah, pledged it, or mortgaged her ketubah to another, she is not entitled to maintenance.  [Does this not imply] that only such [acts deprive a widow of her maintenance] but not [the act of] claiming [her ketubah at court]?
  These [acts deprive her of her maintenance] whether she appeared at court or not,  but the act of claiming [her ketubah deprives her of maintenance] only if she appeared  in court but not if she did not appear at court.
  So did the men of Jerusalem etc. It was stated: Rav said: The halakhah is in agreement with [the practice of] the men of Judea. And Shmuel said: The halakhah agrees with [the practice of] the men of Galilee.
  Babylon and all its neighboring towns followed Rav; Nehardea and all its neighboring towns followed Shmuel. A woman of Mehoza was once married to [a man of] Nehardea. When they came to R. Nahman, and he heard from her voice that she was a native of Mehoza,
  he said to them: Babylon and all its neighboring towns followed Rav. They said to him: But she married a man from Nehardea. He said to them: If that is the case, Nehardea and all its neighboring towns followed Shmuel. How far does [the custom of] Nehardea extend? As far afield as the Nehardean kav is in use.
  It was stated: [When a ketubah is being paid to] a widow: Rav said: They assess what she wears, and Shmuel says they do not asses what she wears. Hiyya b. Avin said: [Their opinions are] reversed in the case of a hired worker.
  Kahana taught: And so [are their opinions] in the case of a hired worker; and he made this mnemonic:  A widow and an orphan—strip them and go out.
  Nahman said: Although we have learned in a Mishnah in agreement with Shmuel, the law is in agreement with Rav. For we learned: Whether a man has consecrated his estate, or whether he has consecrated the valuation of himself, [the Temple treasurer] has no claim on the clothes of his wife, or on the clothes of his children, or on the colored articles that were dyed for them, or any new sandals that he bought for them.
  Rava said to R. Nahman: Since, however, we have learned in a Mishnah in agreement with Shmuel, why does the halakhah agree with Rav? He said back: At first sight it seems to follow Shmuel, but if you examine it carefully [you will find that] the halakhah is in fact in agreement with Rav.
  What is the reason? When he bought [the clothes] for her [he did so] on the assumption that she would live with him. He did not buy them for her on the assumption that she should take them and depart.  
  A daughter-in-law of the house of Bar Eliashiv was claiming her ketubah from orphans. When she summoned them to court they said: It is degrading for us that you should come with us in such [clothes]. She went home and dressed and wrapped herself in all her clothing. When they came before Ravina he told them: The law is in agreement with Rav who said [that when a ketubah is being paid to] a widow, they assess what she wears.
  A man once said: Let this be for a dowry for my daughter, and the price of the object [he designates] went down.  R. Idi b. Avin said:  The benefit goes to the orphans.
  A man once said:
  
  Daf 54b
  
  Four hundred zuz [of the value of this] wine shall be given to my daughter,  and the price of wine rose. R. Joseph said: The profit belongs to the orphans.
  Relatives of R. Yohanan had [the responsibility of maintaining their] father’s wife who was causing them the loss of a great amount of food. They came to R. Yohanan.  He told them: Go and tell your father that he should assign a plot of land for her maintenance.
  They then came before Resh Lakish. He said to them: He has all the more so increased her maintenance. They said back to him: But this is not what R. Yohanan said! He responded to them: Go and give her [proper maintenance], otherwise I shall pull R. Yohanan out of your ears. They then came [back to] R. Yohanan. He said to them:  What can I do  when one of equal standing differs from me?
  Abbahu stated: This was explained to me by R. Yohanan: [If the husband] said: “Towards maintenance,” he has thereby increased [the allowance for] her maintenance; But if he said, “for maintenance” he has thereby limited the allowance for her maintenance.
  May we return to you chapter four of Ketubot.
  Although [the Sages] have said: A virgin collects two hundred and a widow one maneh, if he wishes to add, even a hundred maneh, he may do so.  If she was widowed or divorced, either after betrothal or after marriage, she is entitled to collect the entire amount.  Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says: [a woman widowed or divorced] after marriage receives the entire amount;  After betrothal [but before marriage], a virgin collects two hundred zuz and a widow only one maneh, for the man wrote her [the additional amount] in order to marry her.
  Rabbi Judah says:   if he wishes he may write for a virgin a document for two hundred zuz and she writes “I have received from you a maneh”, or for a widow [he may write a document for] a maneh and she writes, “I have received from you fifty zuz”. Rabbi Meir says:  Any man who gives a virgin less than two hundred zuz or a widow less than a maneh is engaging in licentious sex.
  Gemara. Is this not obvious? What might you have thought? That the Rabbis set a limit in order not to embarrass someone who does not have funds [to pay for a larger ketubah]. 
  Thus it teaches us that this is not so. If he wishes to add etc. It was not stated, “If he wishes to write,” but rather “if he wishes to add.” This supports [a ruling which] R. Aibu stated in the name of R. Yannai. For R. Aibu stated in the name of R. Yannai: The ketubah conditions are subject to the same regulations as the ketubah. For R. Aibu stated in the name of R. Yannai:  The ketubah conditions are subject to the same regulations as the ketubah.
  What does this effect? A woman who sells or forgives [her ketubah], Or one who rebels,
  One who damages [her ketubah], Or claims [her ketubah], Or one who transgresses the law;
  
  Daf 55a
  
  In respect of improvement, Or an oath, Or the Sabbatical year,
  One who assigned all his property to his sons, Or to collect payment out of real estate and from the worst part of it, Also in respect of [the law of a widow] while in her father’s house, And of the ketubah for male children.
  It was stated: The ketubah for the male children, [the scholars of] Pumbedita ruled:  They do not collect from sold or mortgaged property, for we have learned, “They inherit [their mother’s ketubah]”  And the scholars of Mata Mehasya ruled:
   They do collect from sold or mortgaged property, for we have learned, “They collect [their mother’s ketubah]”   And the law is that  it that they do not collect from sold or mortgaged property, since we have learned, “They inherit.”
  Movables which are available [may be collected] without an oath.
  But if they are not available, [the scholars of] Pumbedita ruled: [She collects] without an oath. And [the scholars of] Mata Mehasya ruled:  Only with an oath. The law is: without an oath.
  If [her husband] has set aside for her a plot of land [defining it] by its four boundaries [she may collect from it] without an oath;   But if [he only defined it] by one boundary, [the scholars of] Pumbedita say: She collects without an oath. The [scholars] of Mata Mehasya say: With an oath.   And the law is that  she may collect without an oath.
  If a man said to witnesses, “Write out [a deed], sign it and give it to a certain person,” if they take from him symbolic possession (kinyan) there is no need to consult him.   If they did not take symbolic possession, [the scholars of] Pumbedita say: They do not need to consult him. But the scholars of Mata Mehasya say: It is necessary to consult him. The law is that  it is necessary to consult him.
  Elazar b. Azariah etc. It was stated: Rav and R. Natan [differed]. One said that the halakhah was in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah and the other said that  the halakhah was not in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah.
  You may conclude that  it was R. Natan who said that the halakhah was in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah since R. Natan was heard [elsewhere] to follow [the rule of] assumption, for R. Natan said that the halakhah was in agreement with R. Shimon Shezuri in the case of a man dangerously ill
  
  Daf 55b
  
  and in that of terumah  of the tithe of demai produce. 
  But Rav does not follow [the rule of] assumption? Surely it was stated: As to the gift of a dying man [in the deed of] which was recorded a [symbolic] acquisition: The school of Rav in the name of Rav said: Ride him on two harnessed horses; But Shmuel said: I do not know how to decide on the matter.
  ‘The school of Rav in the name of Rav said: Ride him on two harnessed horses” for it is like the gift of a man in good health, and it is also like the gift of a dying man. 
  It is like the gift of a man in good health in that, if he recovered, he cannot retract, and it is like the gift of a dying man in that, if he said that his loan [shall be given] to X, his loan [is to be given] to X.  
  But Shmuel said: I do not know how to decide on the matter, since it is possible that he decided not to transfer possession to him except through the deed, and there can be no deed after death.
  
  Daf 56a
  
  Rather both follow [the rule of] assumption;
  and he who stated that the halakhah [was in accordance with R. Elazar b. Azaryah]—this goes well, but he who stated that the halakhah was not [in accordance with R. Elazar b. Azaryah],  this is also based on an assumption, that the man’s intention [it is assumed] was to draw her [and her family] near. And she was indeed drawn near.
  Hanina sat in the presence of R. Yannai and he stated: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azaryah. R. Yannai] said to him, “Go out and read your verses outside;  the halakhah is not in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah.”
  Isaac b. Avdimi stated in the name of our teacher:  The halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah. R. Nahman stated in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah.
  R. Nahman in his own name stated that  the halakhah is not in agreement with R. Eeazar b. Azariah,  and the Nehardeans stated in the name of R. Nahman that the halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah. And even though R. Nahman uttered a curse, and said, Any judge who judges in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah, such and such a thing should happen to him, the halakhah is nevertheless in agreement with R. Elazar b.Azariah. And the practical halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar b. Azariah.
  Rabin asked: What is the law where the bride only entered the huppah but there was no intercourse? Does the desire of being in the huppah acquire her as a wife, or does only the desire of intercourse acquire her?
  Come and hear what R. Joseph taught: “Because he wrote it to her only on account of the desire of the first night.”  Now, if you say that it is the desire of the huppah that effects the acquisition it was correct for him to state “the first night.” If, however, you say that it is the desire of intercourse that effects the acquisition, does intercourse take place on the first night only and not subsequently?
  What then [do you say]? The huppah [acquires her]? Is the huppah only at night and not during the day? But according to your argument does intercourse take place at night and not in the day time? Surely Rav stated: If one was in a dark room [intercourse] is permitted! This is no difficulty. He may have taught us that it is proper conduct that intercourse should be at night.
  But if it is huppah [that acquires] this is difficult. [The assumption that acquisition is effected in the] huppah also presents no difficulty. Since, usually, the huppah is a prelude to intercourse he taught us that it was proper that [it should be entered] at night.
  Ashi asked: What is the law where [a bride] entered the huppah and then became menstruous? If you should say that the desire for huppah effects acquisition, [the question still remains whether this applies only to] a huppah that is fit for intercourse but not to a huppah that is not fit for intercourse. Or perhaps it does not matter. This question is left unresolved.
  R. Judah said:  if [a husband] wishes he may write out for a virgin etc. Does R. Judah hold that a receipt is written? For have we not learned: If a person repaid part of his debt, R. Judah said, he must exchange [the document for another].  R. Yose said:  He can write a receipt for him.
  Yirmiyah said:  [Here it is a case] where the receipt is [written] within.
  Abaye says: You may even say [that here it is a case] where the receipt is not written within. There he certainly repaid the debt [therefore a receipt must be written] lest he lose the receipt, and the [creditor] take out the document and collect with it again. Here, did he really repay her? She was just saying words to him. If he preserves it [the receipt] then he preserved it, if he does not preserve it, he causes his own loss.
  One can well understand why Abaye did not say like R. Yirmiyah, since it does not teach the receipt was written within, but why did R. Yirmiyah not say like Abaye? The receipt here is forbidden as a preventive measure lest they permit a receipt elsewhere.
  The reason [that this is allowed] is because she wrote him [a receipt]. If, however, [she forgave a portion of her ketubah] by word of mouth [he would] not [have been exempt]. But why? This is a monetary matter, and we have heard R. Judah say that in a monetary matter one’s stipulation is valid.
  As it was taught: If a man said to a woman, “Behold you are betrothed to me on condition that you will have no [claim] on me [for] food, clothing or conjugal rights,” she is betrothed and the stipulation is invalid, the words of R. Meir.  R. Judah said: In respect of monetary matters his stipulation is valid.
  Judah is of the opinion that the kethubah is a rabbinical enactment, and the sages bolstered their words more than they did for the Torah.
  But what of the case of usufruct which is of rabbinic origin and the rabbis nevertheless did not strengthen it, for we learned: R. Judah said, He may always consume the produce of the produce unless he wrote out for her, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and its produce and the produce of its produce forever,”
  
  Daf 56b
  
  and we hold  that “writing” means “saying.”
  Abaye replied: All [married women] have a ketubah; not all, however, have produce.  The rabbis strengthened matters that were common, but matters that were not common they did not strengthen.
  But what of the case of donkey-drivers which is a common occurrence and the rabbis did not strengthen their words;
  for we learned: Donkey-drivers that entered a town and one of them declared,  “My [produce] is new and that of my fellow is old” or “Mine has not had tithes removed but that of my fellow has had tithes removed,” they are not believed. But R. Judah said:  They are believed.
  Abaye said:  Any rabbinical enactment that is of a certain nature, the rabbis strengthened their words, but any rabbinical enactment of uncertain nature  the rabbis did not strengthen their words. Rava said: They were lenient in respect of demai.
  Meir says: Anyone who gives less:  One who gives less, even through a stipulation.  Thus he holds that the man’s stipulation is null and that the woman receives [her full ketubah].  Yet since he said to her, “You have only a maneh,” her mind is not at ease and his intercourse is regarded as an act of fornication.
  But have we not heard R. Meir say: Anyone who makes a stipulation against that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void. [This implies] that if it is against a law of the rabbis it is valid.  R. Meir holds that the kethubah is of biblical origin.
  It was taught: R. Meir ruled: Anyone who gives a virgin less than two hundred zuz or a widow less than a maneh, behold this is fornication. R. Yose says: He is permitted. R. Judah ruled: If he wants he may write out for a virgin a document for two hundred zuz while she writes for him, “I have received from you a maneh”; or for a widow for a maneh while she writes for him, “I have received from you fifty zuz.”
  Does R. Yose really hold that “he is permitted [to give his wife a lower ketubah]”? They contrasted this with the following:  A woman’s ketubah may not be made [a charge on] movable property because of the repairing of the world (tikkun olam).  R. Yose: What tikkun olam is this? After all, their price is not set and it deteriorates. 
  Now, did not the first Tanna also say that [a ketubah] may not be made [a charge on movable property]? Rather this is what it means to say:  This applies only where he accepted no responsibility;  but where he accepted responsibility [the ketubah] may be made [a charge on movable property].  R. Yose then comes and says:  Even If he did accept responsibility how [could the ketubah be] made [a charge on them]  when their price is not fixed and they deteriorate in value.
  Now, if there, R. Yose is concerned lest they deteriorate in value, here where there is certainly a deterioration, should he not [all the more so be concerned]. How now!  There she did not know [such that she could] forego her rights; but here she was well aware [of the fact] and has forgone her rights.
  Rami bar Hama’s sister was married to Rav Avya.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  Her ketubah was lost. They came in front of R. Joseph. He said to them:  Thus said Rav Judah in the name of Shmuel:  This is the opinion of R. Meir, but the sages say that 
  a man may live with his wife without a ketubah for two or three years. Abaye said to him: But did not R. Nahman say in the name of Shmuel that the halakhah is in agreement with R. Meir in his preventive measures?   [He replied]: If so, [the other replied] go and write one for her.
  When R. Dimi came he stated in the name of R. Shimon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara:  The dispute refers to the beginning, but at the end, all hold that she may not forgive her ketubah. R. Yohanan stated that there is a dispute in both cases. Abahu said: [The following] was explained to me by R. Yohanan: I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one another.
  The “beginning” of which R. Joshua b. Levi spoke means the beginning of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and the “end” means the termination of the intercourse.  And when I stated that the dispute remains in both cases [I meant] the beginning [of the meeting in] the bridal chamber and the end of that meeting which is the beginning of intercourse.”
  When Rabin came he stated in the name of R. Shimon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara: The dispute refers only to the end, but at the beginning everyone holds she may forgive her ketubah. R. Yohanan stated that there is a dispute in both cases. Abahu said: This was explained to me by R. Yohanan:  “I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one another. The ‘end’ of which R. Joshua b. Levi spoke meant the end of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and by the ‘beginning was meant the beginning of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber; and when I stated that there was a dispute in both cases [I meant] the beginning, and the end of the intercourse.”
  Papa said: Had not R. Abbahu stated,  “This was explained to me by R. Yohanan: ‘I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one another’” I would have said that R. Yohanan and R. Joshua b. Levi were in dispute while R. Dimi and Rabin were not in dispute.
  The “end” of which Rabin spoke means the end of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and the ‘beginning’ of which R. Dimi spoke means the beginning of the intercourse.
  What does he teach us thereby?
  He teaches us: [It is preferable to assume] that two amoraim differ in their own opinions  rather than that two amoraim should differ as to what was the view of another amora.
  A virgin is given twelve months from the [time her intended] husband claimed her, [in which] to prepare herself for marriage. Just as [such a period] is given to the woman, so is it given to the man to prepare himself.   A widow is given thirty days. If the time has come and they were not married they are entitled to receive maintenance from the man’s estate and [if he is a priest] they may eat terumah.
  Rabbi Tarfon says: They give her [all of her food] in terumah.   Rabbi Akiva says:  One half unconsecrated food and one half terumah.
  A yavam [who is a priest] does not allow [his sister-in-law] to eat terumah.   If she had spent six months waiting for her husband and six months waiting for the yavam, or even [if she spent] all of them waiting for her husband less one day waiting for the yavam, or all of them waiting for the yavam less one day waiting for her husband, she may not eat terumah.  
  This [was the ruling according to] the first mishnah.   The court that followed afterwards ruled
  
  Daf 57b
  
  a woman may not eat terumah until she has entered the bridal chamber.
  GEMARA. From where is this derived?  R. Hisda said:  As Scripture said, “And her brother and her mother said: ‘Let the girl stay with us for days (yamim), or for ten’” (Genesis 24:25).  
  Now, what could be meant by days? If it be suggested “two days” do people talk that way? [If when] they said to him two days he said  no, would they then say ten days? Rather, “days” must mean  a year, for it is written, “For days (yamim) he shall have the right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:29).
  But might it not be said [that “days” means] a month, for it is written, “For a month of days” (Numbers 11:20)?   Say: We compare an unspecified number of days with another mention of an unspecified number of days, but we do not compare an unspecified number of days with days about which it is said “a month.”
  Zera said: It was taught:  In the case of a minor, either she herself or her father may postpone [her marriage]. One can well understand why she can postpone [the marriage], but [why also her] father? If she is satisfied, why should her father care? He might reason: Now she does not understand but tomorrow she will rebel [against her husband], leave him and come back to, and fall [as a burden] on me.
  Abba b. Levi stated: hey may not make arrangement for marrying a minor while she is still a minor. But they may make arrangements for marrying a minor when she becomes an adolescent. Is not this obvious? What might you have said? We should be concerned lest she begin to feel anxiety at now and so become ill. Hence he taught us [that they may make arrangements for a minor to marry when she becomes an adolescent].
  Huna stated: If she became adolescent for one day and then she was betrothed, she is allowed thirty days like a widow. An objection was raised: One who has become of majority age is like one who has been claimed [by her intended husband in marriage]. Is this not like a virgin who was claimed? No, like a widow who was claimed.
  Come and hear:  If a woman who is adolescent had waited for twelve months: R. Eliezer says: Since her husband is liable for her maintenance, he may also annul [her vows]!   Read: A woman who is adolescent or one who waited twelve months. R. Eliezer says: Since her husband is liable for her maintenance, he may also annul [her vows].
  Come and hear: If a man betrothed a virgin, whether he claimed her and she delayed or whether she claimed him and he delayed, she is given twelve months from the time of the claim but not from the time of the betrothal. And one who becomes an adolescent is like one who has been claimed. How so? If she was betrothed on the day she became adolescent, she is given twelve months; while one betrothed [is allowed] thirty days.   Is not this a refutation against R. Huna!  It is a refutation.
  What [was meant by] “while one betrothed [is allowed] thirty days”? Papa said: This is what was meant: If an adolescent woman was betrothed after twelve months of her adolescence have elapsed, she is allowed thirty days like a widow.
  If the time had come and they were not married: Ulla stated: The daughter of an Israelite who is betrothed [to a priest] is, according to toraitic law, permitted to eat terumah, for it said, “But if a priest buy any person, the purchase of his money” and that [woman] also is the purchase of his money. What then is the reason why [the rabbis] ruled that she is not permitted to eat [terumah]? Lest they mix her a cup [of terumah] in her father’s home and she gives it her brother or sister to drink.
  If so, [the same should apply] if the time had come and they were not married? In that case he designates for her a special place.
  If so, a kohen harvest worker [working] for an Israelite should not be allowed to eat terumah, since it is possible that [members of household of the Israelite] would come to eat with him! How so! Now that they are feeding him from their own [food], would they really eat of his?
  Shmuel b. R. Yehudah said:  because of simpon.
  If so, [the same should be true] if she entered the huppah but had not yet had relations. In that case he arranges for her to be first examined and only then takes her in.
  If so, the slave of a priest, bought from an Israelite, should not be allowed to eat terumah on account of a simpon. There is no simpon for slaves, for if it is external, he would have seen it [and bought the slave anyways] and if it is internal, he wants the slave for the purpose of work, and if it is hidden, he does not care. If it turns out that the slave is a thief or
  
  Daf 58a
  
  a gambler, the acquisition is still valid.  An armed robber or assigned to death by the government—these are well-known.
  Whether according to the [explanation of the one] Master or according to that of the other Master she is not permitted to eat [terumah], what then is the practical difference between them? The difference between them [is the case where her intended husband] accepted [her defects, or where her father] delivered [her to the intended husband’s agents] or went [with them]. 
  Tarfon said: All [the sustenance] for such a woman may be given in terumah etc. Abaye stated: The dispute applies only to the daughter of a priest who was betrothed to a priest but with respect to the daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest all agree [that he gives her] one half unconsecrated food and one half terumah.
  Abaye further stated: Their dispute relates to one who was only betrothed, but in respect of a married woman all agree [that she is supplied with] one half unconsecrated food and one half terumah.
  So it was also taught: R. Tarfon said, All [the sustenance] for such a woman is given of terumah. R. Akiva said, One half consecrated food and one half terumah. To what does this apply? Only to the daughter of a priest who was betrothed to a priest, but with respect to the daughter of an Israelite who was betrothed to a priest all agree [that she is supplied with] one half unconsecrated food and one half terumah. To what does this apply? To one who was only betrothed but in respect of a married woman all agree [that she is supplied with] one half unconsecrated food and one half of terumah.
  Judah b. Batera said: She is supplied with two thirds of terumah and one third of unconsecrated food. Judah said: All [her sustenance] is given to her in terumah and she sells it and purchases unconsecrated food out of the proceeds. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: Wherever terumah was mentioned [the woman] is to be given double the amount in unconsecrated food.
  What is the practical difference between them? The difference between them is who must bother [to sell the terumah].
  A yavam [who is a priest] does not confer [upon his sister-in-law] the right of eating terumah. What is the reason? The Torah says, “The purchase of his money,” (Leviticus 22:11) and this one is the purchase of his brother.
  If she had spent six months with her husband. Now that you stated [that even if she spent the full twelve months less one day] with the husband [she is] not [permitted to eat terumah] is there any need [to mention] before the yavam? It was taught as a “this, and there is not even any need to say this.”
  This [was the ruling according to] an earlier mishnah etc. What is the reason?  Ulla, or some say R. Shmuel b. Judah said: Because of simpon.
  This works well according to Ulla–the former prohibition was lest they pour for her a cup [of terumah] in the house of her father, and the latter because of [the possibility of] a bodily defect. 
  
  
  Daf 58b
  
  But according to R. Shmuel b. Judah the earlier [ruling of the] Mishnah is due to a bodily defect and the latter is also due to a bodily defect! What then is [the reason for] the difference?
  The difference is the [efficacy of an] examination by outsiders. One Master  is of the opinion that an examination by others is regarded as effective, while the other Master holds the opinion that an examination by others is not regarded as effective.
  If a man consecrated his wife’s handiwork, she continues to work and to consume [that which she makes].  [Concerning the] surplus: Rabbi Meir says:  it is consecrated. Rabbi Yohanan Hasandlar says: it is unconsecrated.
   GEMARA. R. Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman may say to her husband, “I do not wish either to be maintained by you or to work for you.” He holds the opinion that when the rabbis enacted [the relations of husband and wife] her maintenance was fundamental while [he receives] her handiwork in order [to prevent] enmity.  Therefore, if she said, “I do not wish either to be maintained by you or to work for you,” she is entitled to do so. 
  An objection was raised:  They enacted that she receives maintenance in return for her handiwork.  Read: They enacted that he receives her handiwork in return for sustaining her.
  Shall we say that [our Mishnah] provides support for his view? One who consecrated his wife’s handiwork she may nevertheless continue to work and to consume [the proceeds herself].  Does not [this refer to a wife who can be maintained by her husband? No; [it is a case where the husband is unable to] provide her maintenance.
  If this is a case where [her husband is unable to] provide her maintenance, what does this teach us? Even according to the one who holds that a master has the right to say to his slave, “Work for me but I will not maintain you,” such a rule applies only to a Canaanite slave concerning whom Scripture has not written “with you,” but not to a Hebrew slave concerning whom it is written in Scripture, “With you,” all the more so he could not say so to his wife.
  It  was necessary [as an introduction to] the final clause:  [Concerning the] surplus: Rabbi Meir says: it is consecrated.  Rabbi Yohanan Hasandlar says: it is unconsecrated.
  This [R. Huna’s ruling] disagrees with that of Resh Lakish. For Resh Lakish stated: You should not say that R. Meir’s reason is because he is of the opinion that a man may consecrate that which has not yet come into existence. Rather, this is R. Meir’s reason: Since [a husband] has the right to compel her to work, it is as if he said to her “May your hands be consecrated to He who created them.”
  But, surely, he did not say this! Since we heard R. Meir say: a man does not utter his words to no purpose, it is as if he had actually said to her, “May your hands be consecrated to He who created them.”
  But does R. Meir hold that a man cannot consecrate anything that is not yet in existence? Surely it was taught: If a man said to a woman, “Behold you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “After you convert,” or “After I have been set free,” or “After you have been set free,” or “After your husband dies,” “After your sister died,” or “After your brother-in-law performs halitzah for you:” R. Meir says: She is betrothed!  
  From that you can learn [that R. Meir holds that one can consecrate something not yet in existence] but from this [mishnah] you cannot learn.
  The surplus: R. Meir ruled: it is consecrated. When does it become consecrated? Both Rav and Shmuel stated: The surplus becomes consecrated only after [the wife’s] death.   Adda b. Ahavah stated: The surplus is consecrated while she is still alive.
  Papa thought about this: What is the case? If we say: Where [the husband] provides her maintenance and also provides her a silver ma’ah for her other needs, what is the reason of the one who stated that it “becomes consecrated only after death”?
  But if it is a case where [the husband] does not provide her maintenance and does not provide her a silver ma’ah for her other needs, what is the reason of the one who stated that “it becomes consecrated while she is still alive?”
  This is a case indeed where he does provide her maintenance; but does not provide her a silver ma’ah for her other needs. Rav and Shmuel hold that [the rabbis] have established maintenance [for a wife]
  
  Daf 59a
  
  in return for her handiwork, and a silver ma’ah in return for the surplus;  and since the husband does not give her the silver ma’ah, the surplus remains hers.  Adda b. Ahavah holds that the rabbis  enacted maintenance in return for the surplus, and the silver ma’ah in return for her handiwork; and since [the husband] supplies her maintenance, the surplus is his.
  On what principle do they differ? One master holds that the usual is for the usual, and the other Master holds that the fixed [sum] is for the fixed [quantity].
  An objection was raised: Maintenance [for a wife] was provided in return for her handiwork!  Say: In return for the surplus of her handiwork.
  Come and hear:  If he does not give her a silver ma’ah for her other requirements, her handiwork belongs to her! Read: The surplus of her handiwork belongs to her. But was it not taught with regard to this statement: What [is the quantity of work that] she must do for him? The weight of five selas of warp in Judea!  
  This is what was meant: What is the quantity of work [that she must do] in order that we might determine how much is her surplus? The weight of five selas of warp in Judea which is ten selas in Galilee.
  Shmuel said: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Yohanan Hasandlar.  
  But did Shmuel really say this? Have we not taught: [If a woman said to her husband]. “Konam anything I do for your mouth” he need not annul her vow.  Akiva said: He must annul it, since she might do more work than is due to him. Yohanan b. Nuri said: He must annul her vow lest he divorce her and she would be forbidden to return to him.
  And Shmuel stated:  The halakhah is in agreement with R. Yohanan b. Nuri?   When Shmuel stated: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Yohanan b. Nuri [he referred only] to the surplus.  
  Then let him specifically state: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Yohanan b. Nuri in respect of the surplus” or else  “The halakhah is not in agreement with the first Tanna”   or else,  “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Akiva.”
  Rather R. Joseph said:  Your were speaking of konamot?  Konamot are different. For just as a man may forbid to himself the fruit of his fellow so may he also consecrate that which is not yet in existence.  
  Abaye said to him:  It makes sense that a man can forbid the use of the fruit of his fellow to himself, since he may also forbid his own fruit to his fellow. But does he have the right to forbid something that is not yet in existence, seeing that a man cannot forbid the fruit of his fellow to his fellow?
  Rather R. Huna son of R. Joshua said that this is a case where the woman said, “My hands shall be consecrated to He who created them” [such consecration is valid] since her hands are in existence.  
  But even if she had said so, could she consecrate them? Are they not obligated to him?   [This is a case] where she said, “When I shall have been divorced.” But is there anything that one cannot consecrate now but does become consecrated later?
  Ilai said: Why not?  Were one to say to his friend, “This field that I am selling you shall be consecrated as soon as I repurchase it from you,” would it not become consecrated?
  Yirmiyah raised a difficulty: Is that similar?  There [the seller] has the right to consecrate [his field]; here [the woman] has no power to divorce herself! Rather this is similar to the case of a man who said to another, “This field which I have sold to you shall become consecrated after I repurchase it from you,” where it does not become consecrated.
  Papa raised a difficulty: Are the two cases similar? There both the field itself and its produce are in the possession of the buyer, but here the wife’s person is in her own possession.  This is rather similar to the case of a man who said to another, 
  
  Daf 59b
  
  “This field which I have mortgaged to you shall be consecrated after I have redeemed it,” where it is consecrated.
  Shisha son of R. Idi raised a difficulty:  Are these cases similar? There it is in his power to redeem it; but here she has no power to divorce herself.  This is rather similar to the case of a man who said to his fellow, “This field which I have mortgaged to you for ten years shall be consecrated when I shall have redeemed it,” where it becomes consecrated.
  Ashi raised a difficulty: Are these cases similar? There he has the power to redeem it after ten years, but here she has never the power to divorce herself!
  Rather R. Ashi said: You were speaking of konamot! Konamot are different [from ordinary vows] since they effect the consecration of the body itself. And [the reason here is the same] as that of Rava,  for Rava stated: Consecration, chametz cancel a mortgage.
  But then let her [handiwork] be consecrated immediately. The rabbis strengthened a husband’s rights [to his wife’s handiwork] so that they shall not become consecrated immediately.
  The following are the kinds of work which a woman must perform for her husband: Grinding, Baking, Washing, Cooking, Nursing her child, Preparing his bed, And working in wool. If she brought one slave-woman into the marriage she need not grind or bake or wash. [If she brought] two slave-women, she need not cook or nurse her child. If three, she need not prepare his bed or work in wool. If four, she may lounge in an easy chair.
  Rabbi Eliezer says:   even if she brought him a hundred slave-women he may compel her to work in wool; for idleness leads to unchastity. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if a man forbade his wife under a vow to do any work he must divorce her and give her kethubah to her for idleness leads to insanity. 
  GEMARA. Grinding grain! Do you really think [she is obligated to do] this?  Rather say: Attending to the grinding.   And if you prefer I might say: With a hand mill.
  Our Mishnah does not agree with R. Hiyya. For R. Hiyya taught: A wife is only for the sake of beauty; a wife is only for the sake of children. And R. Hiyya further taught: A wife is only for the wearing of a woman’s finery. And R. Hiyya taught: He who wishes his wife to look graceful should clothe her in linen garments. He who wishes his daughter to have a light complexion, let him, on the approach of her maturity, feed her with young fowls and give her milk to drink.
  Nursing her child. Shall we assume that our mishnah does not agree with Bet Shammai? For it was taught: If a woman vowed not to nurse her child: Bet Shammai: she must pull the breast out of his mouth. Bet Hillel says: [Her husband] may force her to nurse him.   If she was divorced he cannot force her; but if [the child] knows her [her husband] pays her wages may force her to nurse him due to the danger?
  You can say that it even agrees with Bet Shammai. What are we dealing with here?  For instance, where the woman made a vow and her husband confirmed it;  Bet Shammai holds that  he put his finger between her teeth, and Bet Hillel holds that she put her finger between her teeth.
  Then let them dispute with regard to the ketubah in general.   Furthermore, it was taught: Beth Shammai said: She is not obligated to nurse her child. Rather, clearly our mishnah is not in agreement with Bet Shammai.
  If he knew her?
  
  Daf 60a
  
  At what age? Rava said in the name of R. Jeremiah b. Abba who said in the name of Rav: Three months. Shmuel said: Thirty days. And R. Yitzchak said in the name of R. Yohanan: Fifty days. Shimi b. Abaye stated: The halakhah is in agreement with the statement of R. Isaac who said it in the name of R. Yohanan. Rav and R. Yohanan make sense—every child according to his own keenness.  But according to Shmuel is such [precocity] possible?
  When Rami b. Yehezkel came he said, “Pay no attention to those rules which my brother Judah said in the name of Shmuel; for thus said Shmuel: As soon as [the child] knows her.
  A [divorced woman] once came to Shmuel [declaring her refusal to nurse her son]. He said to R. Dimi b. Joseph, “Go and check.” He went and placed her among a row of women. He took the child, and passed him in front of them. When he came to her [the child] looked up at her face, but she turned her eye away from him. He said to her: “Lift up your eyes, come, take your son.” How does a blind child know [its mother]?  R. Ashi said:  By the smell and the taste.
  Our rabbis taught: A child may nurse for twenty-four months. From that age onwards it is as if he nurses from a sheketz, the words of R. Eliezer. Joshua said: [He may nurse] even for four or five years. If he stopped after twenty-four months and started again it is as if he nurses from a sheketz.
  The Master said: From that age onwards it is as if he nurses from a sheketz. They raised a contradiction: It might have been that human milk is forbidden. And this is logical: When it comes to a beast, the law is lenient with regard to contact and yet the law is strict with regard to its milk, thus when it comes to a human where the law is strict with regard to contact, it is logical that the law should be strict with regard to his milk.
  Thus Scripture says, “The camel because it chews the cud…it is unclean to you”—“it” is unclean; but human milk is not unclean but clean. I might have excluded only [human] milk because [the use of milk] is not equally [forbidden] in all cases but I would not exclude [human] blood since [the prohibition of eating blood] is equally applicable in all cases. Hence Scripture says, “It,” only “it” is forbidden; human blood, however, is not forbidden but permitted.  
  And R. Sheshet said: There is not even a mitzvah to separate from it.
  This is no difficulty. The latter [refers to milk] that has left [the breast] whereas the former [refers to milk] which has not left [the breast].
  [This law] is reversed in the case of blood, as it was taught: [Human] blood which [is found] upon a loaf of bread, he scrapes it off and then he eats it; but that which is between the teeth he may suck with no concern.
  The Master stated: “R. Joshua said: [He may be breast fed] even for four or five years.” But was it not taught that R. Joshua said: Even when [he carries] his bundle on his shoulders? Both are the same age.   Joseph stated: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Joshua.
  It was taught: R. Marinus said: A man groaning may suck milk [from a beast] on Shabbat. What is the reason? Sucking is an unusual way of unloading [milk from an animal] and in a case of suffering, the rabbis did not decree against it.   Joseph stated:  The halachah is in agreement with R. Marinus.
  It was taught: Nahum the Galatian stated:  A gutter that became full of debris, it is permissible to crush it with one’s foot surreptitiously on Shabbat, and one need have no scruples about the matter. What is the reason? This is repairing in an unusual manner and when loss is involved, the rabbis did not decree. Joseph said: The halachah is in agreement with Nahum the Galatian.
  If he stopped [nursing] after the twenty-four months and started again he is to be regarded as one who sucks an abominable thing. And for how long?  Judah b. Haviva said in the name of Shmuel:  For three days. Others say: R. Judah b. Haviva recited before Shmuel:  For three days.
  Our Rabbis taught: A nursing mother whose husband died within twenty-four months [of the birth of their child] may not betrothed
  
  Daf 60b
  
  nor married again for twenty-four months, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah permits [remarriage] after eighteen months.  Natan b. Joseph said: These are the very words of Bet Shammai and these are the very words of Bet Hillel; for Bet Shammai said: Twenty four months, while Bet Hillel said: Eighteen months.
  Shimon b. Gamaliel said: I will decide: According to the one who said twenty-four months she is permitted to marry again after twenty-one months, and according to the one who said eighteen months she may marry again after fifteen months; because a [nursing mother’s] milk goes bad only three months after [her conception].
  Ulla stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. And Mar Ukba stated: R. Hanina permitted me to marry [a nursing woman] fifteen months after [the birth of her child]. Abaye’s field worker once came to Abaye and asked him: Is it permissible to betroth [a nursing woman] fifteen months after [her child’s birth]? He said to him: First, [whenever there is disagreement] between R. Meir and R. Judah the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah; and, furthermore, [in a dispute between] Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel the halachah is in agreement with Bet Hillel; And Ulla said, “The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah,” and Mar Ukba said, “ R. Hanina permitted me to marry [a nursing woman] fifteen months after [the birth of her child].” How much more then [is there no need for you to wait the longer period] since you only intend to betroth.
  When he came to R. Joseph the latter told him: Both Rav and Shmuel ruled that [a nursing woman] must wait twenty-four months exclusive of the day on which her child was born and exclusive of the day on which she is betrothed.  Thereupon he ran three parasangs after him, (some say, one parasang in sand), but failed to overtake him.
  Abaye said: That which the rabbis said: Even [a question about the permissibility of eating] an egg with kutah a person should not permit [in an area under the rule] of his Master was not due [because this might] appear as an act of irreverence but rather it is because he would have no help in answering correctly. For I have in fact learned the tradition of Rav and Shmuel and yet I did not get the opportunity of applying it. 
  Our Rabbis taught: [If a nursing mother] gave her child to a wet nurse or weaned him, or if he died, she is permitted to marry again immediately.   Papa and R. Huna son of R. Joshua intended to give a practical decision in accordance with this baraita.  An old woman said to them: I have been in such a position and R. Nahman forbade me [to marry again].
  But is this so? For has not R. Nahman in fact permitted [such remarriage] to the Exilarch’s family?  The family of the Exilarch was different [from ordinary people] because no nurse would break her agreement with them.    
  Papi said to them: Could you not have inferred it from the following? It has been taught: [A married woman] who was always anxious to go to her father’s home, or who has some quarrel at her husband’s home, or whose husband was in prison, or had gone to a country beyond the sea, or whose husband was old or infirm, or if she herself was barren, old, incapable of procreation or a minor, or if she miscarried after the death of her husband, or was in any other way unable to bear children, must wait three months, the words of R. Meir.
  R. Yose permits betrothal or marriage immediately. And [in connection with this] R. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Meir in his restrictive decrees!
  They said to him: We did not know about this. The law is [that if the child] died, she may remarry immediately, but if she has weaned him, it is forbidden. Mar bar R. Ashi ruled: Even if the child died, she may not remarry, lest she killed him so as to remarry. It once actually happened that a mother strangled her child. But this is not proof.  That woman was crazy, for it is not likely that [sane] women would strangle their children.
  Our Rabbis taught: If a woman was given a child to nurse she must not nurse together with it either her own child or the child of her friend.  If she agreed to a small allowance for food she must nevertheless eat much. . While nursing the child she must not eat things which are bad for the milk
  Now that you said [that she must] not [nurse] “her own child” was there any need [to state] “nor the child of her friend”? What might you have thought? Her own child she cares about, and she would give him more, but when it comes to her friend’s child, if she did not have extra [milk] she would not give him more. Thus it teaches us [that she may not nurse the child of her friend].
  “If she agreed to a small allowance for food she must nevertheless eat much.” From whose funds? Sheshet replied:  From her own.
  ‘While in charge of the child she must not eat things which are injurious.” What are these?  R. Kahana said: For instance, cuscuta, lichen, small fishes and earth.   Abaye said: Even pumpkins and quinces. Papa said: Even a palm’s heart and unripe dates Ashi said: Even kamak and fish-hash. Some of these cause the flow of the milk to stop while others cause the milk to become turbid.
  A woman who couples in a mill will have epileptic children. One who couples on the ground will have children with long necks. [A woman] who treads on the blood of a donkey will have scabby (or bald) children. One who eats mustard will have gluttonous children. One who eats cress will have weepy-eyed children. One who eats fish brine will have children with wandering eyes. One who eats clay will have ugly children. One who drinks intoxicating liquor will have ungainly children.
  
  Daf 61a
  
  One who eats meat and drinks wine will have healthy children. One who eats eggs will have children with big eyes. One who eats fish will have graceful children. One who eats parsley will have beautiful children. One who eats coriander will have stout children. One who eats etrog will have fragrant children The daughter of King Shapur, her mother had at etrog [while she was pregnant] with her, and she used to be presented before her father as his principal perfume.
  Huna said:  R. Huna b. Hinena tested us [with the following question:] If she says that she wants to nurse her child and he says that she may not nurse, we listen to her, for it is her suffering.  If he says that she shall nurse the child and she says that she will not nurse, what is the law? Whenever this is not the practice in her family, we listen to her. But what if it is her practice but not his? Do we follow the practice of his family or that of hers?
  And we solved his problem from this: She rises with him but does not go down with him.    Huna said:  What is the Scriptural proof? “For she is a man’s wife” (Genesis 20:3) [she is to participate] in the rise of her husband but not in his descent. Elazar said: [The proof is] from here: “Because she was the mother of all living” (Genesis 3:20) she was given for life but for suffering.
  If she brought him one slave woman etc.  But her other duties she must still perform. Let her say to him, “I brought you a woman in my place!” Because he might say back to her, “That slave woman works for me and for herself, who will work for you!”
  [If she brought] two slave women, she need not even cook or suckle etc. But her other duties she must perform.  Let her say to him, “I brought you another wife who will work for me and for her, while the first one [will work] for you and for herself!” Because he might reply, “Who will do the work for our guests and occasional visitors!”
  If three, she need neither make ready his bed. But her other duties she must perform.  Let her say to him, “I brought you a third one to attend for our guests and occasional visitors!”  Because he might reply, “The more the number of the household the more the number of guests and occasional visitors.”
  If so, the same would be true if she brings four slaves. [In the case of] four slaves, since their number is considerable they assist one another.
  Hana, or some say R. Shmuel b. Nahmani, stated: [She brought] does not mean that she had actually brought. Rather, even if she is in a position to bring, even though she has not brought any. A Tanna taught: [A wife is entitled to the same privileges] whether she brought [a slave] to him or whether she saved up for one out of her income.
  If four, she may lounge in an easy chair. Yitzchak b. Hanania stated in the name of R. Huna: Although it has been said, she may lounge in an easy chair she must nevertheless fill for him his cup, make his bed and wash his face, hands and feet.
  Yitzchak b. Hanania further stated in the name of R. Huna:  All of the labors which a wife performs for her husband a menstruant also may perform for her husband, with the exception of filling his cup, making his bed and washing his face, hands and feet.
  “Making his bed:” Rava said:  This refers only to doing so in his presence. But not in his presence, there is no prohibition.   “Filling his cup:” Shmuel–his wife passed it to him with her left hand. Abaye—[His wife] placed it on the edge of the wine cask Rava– [His wife placed it] at the head of the couch. Papa—[His wife put it] on his foot-stool.
  Yitzchak b. Hanania further stated: All [foodstuffs] may be held back from the waiter except meat and wine. Hisda said: [This applies only to] fat meat and old wine. Rava said: Fat meat throughout the year but old wine only in the Tammuz season.
  Anan b. Tahlifa related:  I was once standing in the presence of Shmuel when they brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had he not given me [some of it], I would have been in danger.  R. Ashi related:  I was once standing before R. Kahana when they brought him slices of turnips in vinegar, and had he not given me some, I would have been in danger. Papa said:  Even a fragrant date [if not tasted may put one in danger This is the rule: Any food that has a strong smell or sharp taste [will expose one to danger if he is not allowed to taste of it].
  Avuha b. Ihi and Minyamin b. Ihi: One gave [the waiter] from of every kind of dish while the other gave him from one kind only.  With the former Elijah conversed, with the latter he did not.
  These two pious men, and others say R. Mari and R. Pinchas the sons of R. Hisda: One of them gave [a share to his waiter] first while the other gave him last. With the one who gave [the waiter] first, Elijah conversed; with the one who gave [his waiter] last, Elijah did not converse.
  Amemar, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi were once sitting at the gate of King Izgur when the king’s steward passed them by. Ashi, saw that Mar Zutra’s 
  
  Daf 61b
  
  so he took [some food] with his finger and put it in his [Mar Zutra’s] mouth.  The steward said to him: “You have ruined the King’s meal!” They said to him: “Why did you do such a thing?”  He said to them: “The man who prepared that dish has rendered the King’s food objectionable.” . They said to him, “Why?” He replied, “I noticed a piece of leprous swine flesh in it.” They examined [the dish] but did not find [such a thing]. Thereupon he took hold of his finger and put it on it saying,. “Did you examine this part?” They examined it and found it [to be as R. Ashi had said]. The rabbis asked him:  “Why did you rely upon a miracle?”  He said to them:  “I saw the spirit of leprosy floating over it.”
  A Roman once said to a woman, “Will you marry me?” She said to him, “No.” He went and brought some pomegranates, split them open and ate them in front of her. She kept on swallowing all the saliva that irritated her, but he did not give her [any of the fruit] until [her body] became swollen.   Ultimately he said to her, “If I cure you, will you marry me?”  she replied, “Yes.” He went and brought some pomegranates, split them and ate them in her presence.  He said to her: “All the saliva that irritates you, spit it out, spit it out.”  [She did so] until [the matter] came forth in her like a green palm-branch; and she recovered.
  And she works in wool:  “In wool” but not in flax. Whose [view is represented in] our Mishnah? It is that of R. Judah. For it was taught: [Her husband] may not compel her to tend to his father or to his son, or to put straw before his beast. But he may compel her to put straw before his cattle.   Judah said: He may not compel her to work in flax because flax causes one’s mouth to be sore and makes one’s lips stiff. This refers only to Roman flax.
  Eliezer said: even if she brought him a hundred bondwomen. Malkio said in the name of R. Adda b. Ahavah: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Eliezer.
  Hanina the son of R. Ika said: [The rulings concerning] a spit, bondwomen and follicles [were stated by] R. Malkio;
  [but those concerning] a forelock, wood-ash and cheese [were stated by] R. Malkia.
  Papa, however, said: [If the statement is made on] a mishnah or a baraita [the author is] R. Malkia [but if on] an amoraic statement [the author is] R. Malkio. And your mnemonic is, “mishnah is queen” (matnita malketa).   What is the practical difference between them? Bondwomen.
  Shimon b. Gamaliel said etc. Is not this the same view as that of the first Tanna? The practical difference between them [is the case of a woman] who plays with puppies or checkers.
  A man who forbade himself by vow from having intercourse with his wife:   Beth Shammai says: two weeks; Beth Hillel says: one week.one week.
  Students may go away to study Torah, without the permission [of their wives for a period of] thirty days; workers for one week. The times for conjugal duty prescribed in the torah are: For independent men, every day; For workers, twice a week; For donkey-drivers, once a week; For camel-drivers, once in thirty days; For sailors, once in six months. These are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.
  GEMARA. What is the reason of Bet Shammai? They derive their ruling from [the law relating to] a woman who bears a female child.  And Bet Hillel? They derive their ruling from [the law relating to] one who bears a male child.
  Why doesn’t Bet Hillel also derive their ruling from [the law relating to] a woman who bears a female child? If they had derived their ruling from [the law relating to] a woman who bears a child they should indeed have ruled thus. Rather, Bet Hillel derive their ruling from [the law of] the menstruant.  
  On what principle do they differ? One is of the opinion that the usual [is to be inferred] from the usual, and the other is of the opinion  that what a husband has caused should be derived from that which he has caused.
  Rav said: They differ only in the case of one who specified [the period of abstention] but where he did not specify the period it is the opinion of both that he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketubah. Shmuel said: Even where the period had not been specified the husband may delay [his divorce], since it might be possible for him to discover some reason to be released from the vow.
  But surely, they disputed this question in a different context, for have we not learned: If a man forbade his wife by vow from having any benefit from him he may, for thirty days, appoint an agent [to provide for her], but if for a longer period he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. And [in connection with this] Rav stated: This ruling applies only where he specified [the period] but where he did not specify it he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketubah. And Shmuel stated: Even when he did not specify a period the husband may also delay [his divorce], since it is possible that he will find a way of being released from his vow.
  [Both disputes are] required. For if [their views] had been stated in the former, it might have been assumed that only in that case did Rav say his view, since [the appointment] of an agent is not possible  but that in the second case where [the appointment] of a agent is possible he agrees with Shmuel. And if they had only been stated in the second case, it might have been assumed that only in that case did Shmuel maintain his view but that in the former case he agrees with Rav. [Hence both statements were] necessary.
  Students may go away to study etc. For how long [may they go away] with the permission [of their wives]? For as long as they want.
  
  Daf 62a
  
  What is the normal period? Rav said: One month here [at the Bet Midrash] and one month at home; as it is said, “In any matter of the courses which came in and went out month by month throughout all the months of the year” (I Chronicles 27:1).  Yohanan said: One month here and two months at home; for it is said, “A month they were in Lebanon and two months at home” (I Kings 5:28).
  Why did Rav not derive his opinion from this text?   The building of the Temple is different [from the study of the Torah] since it could be carried on by others.  And why did R. Yohanan not derive his opinion from that text?  There [the conditions were] different because there was support [from David’s table]. 
  Rav said: A sigh breaks down half of the human body, for it is said in Scripture, “And you, O mortal, sigh; with the breaking of your loins and bitter grief, sigh before their eyes” (Ezekiel 21:11). Yohanan said: His entire body, for it is said in Scripture, “And it shall be when they say to you: Why are you sighing? You shall say: Because of the tidings, for it comes; and every heart shall melt, and all hands shall be slack, and every spirit shall faint, and all knees shall drip with water” (Ezekiel 21:12)
  As to R. Yohanan, is it not also written, “With the breaking of your loins”? [The meaning of] this is that when [the breaking] begins it does so from the loins. And as to Rav, is it not also written, “And every heart shall melt, and all hands shall be slack, and every spirit shall be faint”? The report of the holy Temple is different since [the calamity] was very severe.
  An Israelite and an idolater were once walking together on the same road and the idolater could not keep pace with the Israelite. He [the idolater] reminded him of the destruction of the holy Temple, he [the Israelite] grew faint and sighed; but still the idolater was unable to keep pace with him. He [the idolater] said to him: “Did you not say that a sigh breaks half of the human body”? He [the Israelite] replied:  “This applies only to a fresh calamity but not one with which we are familiar. As people say: ‘A woman who is accustomed to bereavements is not alarmed [when another occurs].’”
  Men of leisure, every day.  What is meant by tayyalin?   Rava said: Students of the pirka. Abaye said to him: About whom is it written, “In vain do you rise early and stay up late, you who toil for the bread you eat; He provides sleep for his loved ones” (Psalms 127:2): R. Yitzchak explained: These are the wives of the scholars,   who chase the sleep from their eyes   in this world and achieve thereby the life of the world to come, and yet you say “students of the pirka.”
  Rather Abaye said: This is in agreement [with a statement] of Rav who said [a man of leisure is one]  like R. Shmuel b. Shilat who eats of his own, drinks of his own and sleeps in the shadow of his mansion and a king’s officer never passes his door. When Rabin came he stated:  [A man of leisure is one] like the pampered men of the West.
  Abbahu was once standing in a bath house, two slaves supporting him,  when [the floor of] the bath house collapsed under him. By chance he was near a column. He climbed taking up the slaves with him. Yohanan was once ascending a staircase, R. Ammi and R. Assi supporting him,  when the staircase collapsed under him. He climbed up and brought them up with him.  The Rabbis said to him,  “Since [your strength is] such, why do you require support?” He replied to them: “If I did otherwise, what [strength] would I leave for my old age?”
  For laborers twice a week. But was it not taught: Laborers, once a week? Yose the son of R. Hanina replied: This is no difficulty; the former [refers to laborers] who do their work in their own town while the latter [refers to laborers] who do their work in another town. It was also taught in a baraita: Laborers [are obligated to have sex with their wives] twice a week. To what does this refer? [To those] who do their work in their own town, but for those who do their work in another town [the time is only] once a week.
  For donkey-drivers once a week. Rabbah son of R. Hanan said to Abaye:  Did the Tanna go to all this trouble to teach us [just the law relating to] the man of leisure and the laborer?  The other replied: No,
  
  Daf 62b
  
  it refers to all of them. But was it not stated once in six months?  One who has bread in his basket is not like one who has no bread in his basket. 
  Rabbah son of R. Hanan said to Abaye: What [is the law where] a donkey driver becomes a camel-driver? He replied:  A woman prefers one kav with frivolity to ten kav with abstinence.
  For sailors, once in six months, the words of R. Eliezer. Beruna stated in the name of Rav The halakhah follows R. Eliezer. Adda b. Ahavah said in the name of Rav:  This is the view of R. Eliezer, but the sages say: Students may go away to study Torah without the permission [of their wives even for] two or three years. Rava stated: The rabbis relied on R. Adda b. Ahabah and act accordingly at the risk of [losing] their lives.
  Thus R. Rehumi was found frequently in the presence of Rava at Mahuza. He used to regularly return home on the Eve of every Yom Kippur. On one occasion his learning attracted him [and he did not return home].  His wife was expecting [him every moment, saying,] “He is coming soon, he is coming soon.” But he did not come.  She became so depressed that tears began to flow from her eyes.  He was [at that moment] sitting on a roof. The roof collapsed under him and he was killed.
  How often are scholars to perform their marital duties? Rav Judah in the name of Shmuel replied: Every Friday night. “Which brings forth fruit in its season” (Psalms 1:3): Rav Judah, and some say R. Huna, and some say, R. Nahman, stated:  This [refers to one] who performs his marital duty every Friday night.
  Judah the son of R. Hiyya and son-in-law of R. Yannai went to learn at the Bet Rav (the study hall) but every Shabbat eve he came home.  When he would arrive the people saw a pillar of light going before him. One day his learning attracted him [and he forgot to return home]. When he did not see the sign, R. Yannai said to those [around him], “Overturn his bed, for had Judah been alive he would not have neglected the performance of his marital duties.” This [remark] was like an error that proceeds from the ruler, and he [Judah] died.
  Rabbi was busy arranging the marriage of his son into the family of R. Hiyya, but when the ketubah was about to be written the bride passed away. Rabbi said: “Is there, God forbid any familial blemish?” They enquired into [the genealogy of the two] families [and it was discovered that] Rabbi descended from Shephatiah the son of Avital while R. Hiyya descended from Shimi a brother of David. 
  Later he was preparing for the marriage of his son into the family of R. Yose b. Zimra. It was agreed that he should spend twelve years at the academy. When the girl was led before him he said to them  “Let it be six years.” When they made her pass before him [a second time] he said, “I would rather marry [her first] and then go [to the academy].”  He felt embarrassed  before his father, but the latter said to him, “My son, you have the mind of your creator. 
  For it was first written, ‘You bring them and you plant them’ (Exodus 15:17) and later it is written, “And let them make Me a sanctuary. that I may dwell among them” (Exodus 25:8).
  [After the marriage] he departed and spent twelve years at the academy. By the time he returned his wife had become barren. Rabbi said, “What can we do? If we order him to divorce her, it would be said: This poor soul waited in vain! Were he to marry another woman, it would be said: The one is his wife and the other his mistress. He prayed for mercy for her, and she recovered.
  Hanania b. Hakinai was about to go away to the academy at the end of R. Shimon b. Yohai’s wedding. He [R. Shimon b. Yohai] said to him, “Wait for me until I am able to join you.” He did not wait for him but went away and spent twelve years at the academy. but went away and spent twelve years at the academy. By the time he returned the streets of the town had changed and he was unable to find the way to his home.
  He went and sat down on the river bank. He heard a girl that they called: “Daughter of Hakinai, O, daughter of Hakinai, fill up your pitcher and let us go!” He said to himself: “Learn from this, that girl is ours,” and he followed her. [When they reached the house] his wife was sitting and sifting flour. She lifted up her eyes, saw him, was joyous and then her spirit departed her. He said in front of Him, “Master of the World, this poor soul; is this her reward?” He prayed for mercy for her and she he brought her back to life.
  Hama b. Bisa went away [from home and] spent twelve years at the house of study. When he returned he said, “I will not do as Hakhinai did.” He therefore entered the [local] house of study and sent word to his house. Meanwhile his son, R. Oshaia entered, sat down before him and addressed to him a question on his studies. [R. Hama]. Seeing how well versed he was in his studies, became depressed. He said,  “Had I been here, I also could have had such a child.”
  He entered his house. Then his son entered,  whereupon [the father] rose before him, believing that he wished to ask him some [further] legal questions.  His wife said to him: “Does it happen that a father stands up before a son!”  Rami b. Hama applied to him [the following Scriptural text:] “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecclesiastes 4:12)—this refers to R. Oshaia, son of R. Hama son of Bisa.
  R. Akiba was a shepherd of Ben Kalba Sabua. His daughter saw how modest and noble [the shepherd] was She said to him,  “Were I to be betrothed to you would you go away to [study at] an academy?” he replied, “Yes”.   She was then secretly betrothed to him and sent him away.  Her father heard [what she had done]. He sent her from his house and forbade her by a vow to have any benefit from his estate.  [R. Akiva] departed and spent twelve years at the academy. When he returned home he brought with him twelve thousand disciples. He heard an old man saying to her, “How long
  
  Daf 63a
  
  will you suffer being a widow [while your husband is still alive?” She replied, “If he would listen to me he would spend another twelve years in study.” [R. Akiva] said: “I must have done this with her consent.”  He departed again and spent another twelve years at the academy. When he finally returned he brought with him twenty-four thousand disciples.  His wife heard [of his arrival] and went out to meet him. Her neighbors said to her, “Borrow some fine clothes and put them on.”  But she replied: “A righteous man regards the life of his beast” (Proverbs 12:10). When he reached her, she fell upon her face and kissed his feet. His attendants were about to push her aside,  when [R. Akiva] cried to them, “Leave her alone, mine and yours are hers.”
  Her father heard that a great man had come to the town. He said,  “I shall go to him; perchance he will invalidate my vow.”  When he came to him  [R. Akiva] asked, “Would you have made your vow if you had known that he was a great man?” He replied, “[Had he known even one chapter or even one single halakhah [I would not have made the vow].” He then said to him, “I am that man.” He then fell upon his face and kissed his feet and also gave him half of his wealth. The daughter of R. Akiva acted in a similar way towards Ben Azzai,  and this is what people say, “A ewe follows ewe; a daughter’s acts are like those of her mother.”
  Joseph the son of Rava [was] sent [by] his father to the academy under R. Joseph. They arranged for him [to stay there for] six years. After three years the day of Yom Kippur approached.  He said, “I would go and see my family.” When his father heard [of his premature arrival] he took up a weapon and went out to meet him. He said to him,  “You have remembered your whore.” There are those who say:  He said to him, “You have remembered your dove!”   They quarreled and neither the one nor the other ate of the last meal before the fast.
  If a wife rebels against her husband her ketubah is reduced by seven denarii a week.  Rabbi Judah says:  seven tropaics How long does he continue to reduce? Until the amount of her ketubah.   Rabbi Yose says: he may continue to reduce, and if she receives an inheritance he may collect from it. Similarly, if a husband rebels against his wife, an addition of three denarii a week is made to her ketubah. Rabbi Judah said:  three tropaics.
  GEMARA. What is she rebelling from? Huna replied: From having sex. Yose the son of R. Hanina replied: From work. We learned: Similarly, if a husband rebels against his wife. Now according to him who said, “From sex” [this ruling] is logical; but according to him who said, “From work” is he obligated to work for her. Yes, when he declares  “I will neither sustain nor support [my wife].”
  But did not Rav state: If a man says “I will neither sustain nor support [my wife]” he must divorce her and give her the ketubah?  Is it not necessary to consult him [before ordering him to divorce her]?  
  An objection was raised: The same [law is applicable to a woman] betrothed or married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick woman and even to one who was awaiting the decision of the levir.
  (This makes sense according to the one who says [she rebels] from work, but for the one who says [she rebels] from sex, can one have sex with a menstruant? He could say to you: One who has bread in his basket differs from one who does not.)
  Others say) This makes sense according to the one who said, “[She rebels] from sex” this is why it teaches “one who is sick,”
  
  Daf 63b
  
  but according to the one who said, “[She rebels] from work,” is a sick woman fit to do work? Rather all agree that [a wife who refuses] to have sex is regarded as a rebellious wife.  They differ only in respect of work. One Master holds that  [for refusing to] do work she is not a rebellious wife and the other  Master holds that [for refusing to do] work she is not a rebellious wife.
  [To return to] the main text: A wife who rebels against her husband, they reduce her ketubah by seven denarii a week. R. Judah said: Seven tropaics. Our rabbis took a second vote [and decreed] that an announcement regarding her should be made on four consecutive Sabbaths and that the court shall send to her [the following]: “Know that even if your ketubah is a hundred maneh you have forfeited it.” The same [law is applicable to a woman] betrothed or married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick woman, and even to one who was awaiting the decision of the levir.
  Hiyya b. Joseph said to Shmuel: Is a menstruant capable of sex? He replied:  One who has bread in his basket is not like one who has no bread in his basket.
  Rami b. Hama stated: They make their announcement only in synagogues and the houses of study.  Rava said:  This may be proved by a precise reading of the baraita, for it taught, “Four consecutive Sabbaths.” Learn from this. Rami b. Hama stated:  They send to her from the court twice,  once before the announcement and once after the announcement.
  Nahman b. R. Hisda expounded:  The halakhah is in agreement with our rabbis. Rava remarked: This is unfair.   Nahman b. Isaac to him:  What is unfair about it? I, in fact, told it to him, and it was in the name of a great man that I told it to him. And who is it? R. Yose the son of R. Hanina!
  And who does he follow? Like the following that was stated: Rava said in the name of R. Sheshet: The halakhah is that she is to be consulted. R. Huna b. Judah stated in the name of R. Sheshet: The halakhah is that she is not to be consulted.
  What is the case of “the rebellious woman”?  Amemar said: [One] who says, “I want him but wish to torment him.” But if she said, “He is repulsive to me,” they do not force her to remain with him.   Mar Zutra ruled: They do force her.
  Such a case once occurred, and Mar Zutra forced the woman [to remain with her husband] and [as a result] R. Hanina of Sura was born from the reunion. But this is not [the right thing to do]. That case was due to the help of heaven.
  Zevid’s daughter-in-law rebelled [against her husband] and took possession of her silk [cloak]. Amemar, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi were sitting together and R. Gamda sat with them. While sitting, they said: [If a wife] rebels she forfeits the worn-out clothing that may still be in existence. R. Gamda said to them, “Is it because R. Zebid is a great man that you would flatter him? Surely R. Kahana stated that Rava had only raised this question but had not solved it.” Another version: While sitting they said: [If a wife] rebels she does not forfeit her worn-out clothing that may still be in existence. Gamda said to them,
  
  Daf 64a
  
  “Is it because R. Zevid is a great man hat you turn the law against him?  Surely R. Kahana stated  that Rava had only raised the question but had not solved it.” Now that it has not been stated what the law is, [such clothing] is not to be taken away from her if she has already seized it, but if she has not yet seized it, it is not to be given to her. 
  And we make her wait twelve months, a [full] year for her divorce, and during these twelve months she receives no maintenance from her husband.
  Tobi b. Kisna stated in the name of Shmuel: A certificate of rebellion may be written against a betrothed woman but a certificate of rebellion may be written against one who is awaiting the decision of the levir. An objection was raised:  The same [law is applicable to a woman] betrothed or married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick woman and even to one who was awaiting the decision of the levir!
  This is no contradiction: The one refers to the case where the man claimed her; the other to a case where she claimed him. For R. Tahlifa b. Avimi stated in the name of Shmuel: If he claimed her he is attended to; if she claimed him she is not attended to. 
  To what case did you explain the statement of Shmuel as referring? To one where she claimed him?   [But if so] instead of saying, “A certificate of rebellion may be written against a betrothed woman” it should have said,  “On behalf of a betrothed woman”!    This is no difficulty. Read, “On behalf of a betrothed woman.”
  Why is a woman awaiting the decision of the levir different that no [certificate of rebellion should be issued on her behalf]? Obviously because we tell her, “Go, you are not commanded.” A betrothed woman they should also say to her, “Go, you are not commanded.” Rather [it is a case] where she comes with the plea, saying, “I wish to have a staff in my hand and a spade for my burial,”
  [this then should] also apply to a woman awaiting the decision of the levir if she comes with such a plea! Rather, both statements [refer to the case] where the man claimed [and the woman refused], and yet there is no difficulty.  Since one refers to the performance of halitzah and the other to that of the levirate marriage. For R. Pedat stated in the name of R. Yohanan: [If the levir] claimed her for the performance of halitzah his request is to be attended to, but if he claimed her for the levirate marriage his request is not attended to.
  Why [is he] not [attended to when he claims her] for levirate marriage? Because we say to him, “Go and marry another woman.” [But then even when he claims her] for the performance of halitzah could we not also say to him, “Go and marry another woman”?
  Rather, it is because he could say, “Since she is bound to me no other wife will be given me.”
  Here also [could he not say], “Since she is bound to me no other wife will be given to me”?   Rather, both statements [deal with one] who claimed her for levirate marriage, but there is no difficulty, one follows the earlier Mishnah while the other follows the latter Mishnah. For we have learned.
  The commandment of levirate marriage takes precedence over that of halitzah, in earlier days when [levirs] had the intention of observing the commandment. Now, when their intention is not the fulfilment of the commandment, they said that  the commandment of halitzah takes precedence over that of the levirate marriage.
  How long does he reduce [her ketubah]? etc. What [is meant by] tropaics?  R. Sheshet said:  An istira. And how much is an istira? Half a zuz.   It was also taught in a baraita: R. Judah said: Three tropaics which [amount to] nine ma’ah [the reduction being at the rate of] one ma’ah and a half per day.
  Hiyya b. Joseph asked Shmuel: Why is he different [from his wife] that he is allowed [a reduction] for the Shabbat, and how is she different [from him] that she is not allowed [an addition] for the Sabbath? In her case, since it is a reduction, it does not look like wages on Shabbat. In his case, however, since it is addition, 
  
  Daf 64b
  
  it looks like Shabbat wages.
  Hiyya b. Joseph [further] asked of Shmuel: What [is the reason for the distinction] between a man who rebels [against his wife] and a woman who rebels [against her husband]? He replied: Go and learn it from the prostitute market; who hires whom?  Another explanation: [The manifestation of] his passions is external; hers is internal.
  If a man provides for his wife through an agent, he must give her [every week] not less than two kavs of wheat or four kavs of barley. Rabbi Yose said: only Rabbi Ishmael, who lived near Edom, granted her a supply of barley.  He must also give her half a kav of pulse and half a log of oil; and a kav of dried figs or a maneh of pressed figs, and if he has no [such fruit] he must supply her with a corresponding quantity of other fruit.
  He must also provide her with a bed, a mattress and a mat. He must also give her a hat for her head and a girdle for her loins; shoes, from festival to festival; and clothing worth fifty zuz every year. She is not to be given new [clothes] in the summer or worn-out clothes in the winter, but must be given clothes worth fifty zuz during the winter, and she wears them when they are worn-out during the summer; and the worn-out clothes remain her property.
  He must also give her [every week] a silver ma’ah for her [other] needs and she is to eat with him every Friday eve. If he does not give her a silver ma’ah for her other needs, her handiwork belongs to her.
  And what [is the quantity of work that] she must do for him? The weight of five sela’s of warp in Judea, which amounts to ten sela’s in Galilee, or the weight of ten sela’s of woof in Judea, which amounts to twenty sela’s in Galilee. If she was nursing, her handiwork is reduced and her maintenance is increased. All this applies to a poor person in Israel, but in the case of a more respectable [husband] all is fixed according to his dignity. 
  GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in] our Mishnah? [It is] neither that of R. Yohanan b. Beroka nor that of R. Shimon. For we learned: And what must be its size? Food for two meals for each, [the quantity being] the food one eats on weekdays and not Shabbat, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah said: The food for Shabbat not for weekdays. And both intended to give the lenient ruling.
  R. Yohanan b. Beroka said: A loaf that is purchased for a pondion [when the cost of wheat is at the rate of] four seah for a sela. R. Shimon said: Two thirds of a loaf, three of which are made from a kav.
  Half of this [loaf is the size prescribed] for a leprous house, and half of its half  renders one’s body unfit; and half of the half of its half is susceptible to food impurity.
  Now, whose [view is that expressed in our Mishnah]? If it is that of R. Yohanan b. Beroka [the two kavs would] be [sufficient for] only eight [meals] and if it is R. Shimon [the two kavs would] be [sufficient even for] eighteen [meals]. 
  Actually, it accords with R. Yohanan b. Beroka but, as R. Hisda said,  “Deduct a third of them for the [profit of the] shopkeeper,” so too here take a third and add to them. But [do not the meals] still amount only to twelve? She eats with him on Friday nights.
  This works for the one who said that [eating] means actual eating. But to the one who said eating means intercourse, what can be said?  Furthermore, this is still only thirteen. Rather, this is as R. Hisda said elsewhere: Deduct a half for the [profit of the] shopkeeper, so here also take a half and add to them.
  But one statement of R. Hisda contradicts the other? There is no contradiction. One statement refers to a place where [the sellers] supply also wood while the other refers to a place where they do not supply the wood.
  If so   [the number of meals] is sixteen. With whose [view then would our Mishnah agree]? With R. Hidka who ruled: A man must eat on the Sabbath four meals.
  It may be said to represent even the view of the rabbis, for one meal is to be reserved for guests and occasional visitor.
  Now that you have arrived at this position [our Mishnah] may be said to represent even the view of R. Shimon: according to the Rabbis, reduce three meals for guests and occasional visitors and according to R. Hidka reduce two for guests and occasional visitors.
  Yose: He granted a supply of barley etc  Do they eat barley at Edom only and throughout the rest of the world they do not eat? This is what he meant: Only R. Ishmael who lived near Edom granted a supply of barley equal to twice the quantity of wheat, because the Edomite barley was of an inferior quality.
  The man must also give her half a kav of pulse.  Wine, however, is not mentioned. This supports R. Elazar, for R. Elazar stated: 
  
  Daf 65a
  
  They do not provide wine for a woman. And should you say, “I will go after my lovers, that give me my bread and my water, my wool and my flax, my oil and my drink (shikuyay)” (Hosea 2:7),  [it may be replied that that this refers to] things which a woman desires (mishtokeket). And what is that? Jewelry.
  Judah of Kefar Nabirya (others say: of Kefar Napor Hayil) made the following exposition:  From where is it derived that they do not allot wine to a woman? As it is said, “So Hannah rose up after she had eaten in Shiloh, and after drinking” (I Samuel 1:9).  Only “he drank” but she did not drink.
  If so, “She had eaten” but he did not eat?   What we say is [that the deduction may be made] because the text has deliberately been changed. Since it was dealing with her, why did it change [the form]?   Deduce from this  that he drank and that she did not drink.
  They objected: If [a woman] is accustomed [to drink] she is given [an allowance of drink]! Where she is accustomed to drink the case is different, for R. Hinena b. Kahana stated in the name of Shmuel, If she was accustomed [to drink] she is given an allowance of one cup; if she was not accustomed [to drink] she is given an allowance of two cups.” 
  What can this mean? Abaye replied: This is what it means: If she was in the custom [of drinking] two cups in the presence of her husband she is given one cup in his absence; if she is accustomed [to drinking] in the presence of her husband only one cup, she is given none at all in his absence.
  And if you prefer I might say: If she is accustomed [to drink] she is allowed some wine for her cooked dishes. For R. Abahu stated in the name of R. Yohanan: It happened that when the sages granted the daughter in-law of Nakdimon b. Gurion a weekly allowance of two se’ahs of wine for her cooked dishes she said to them, “May you grant such an allowance to your daughters.”  A Tanna taught: She was a woman awaiting the decision of the levir. Hence they did not reply Amen after her. 
  A Tanna taught: One cup is becoming to a woman; two are degrading [and if she has] three she will demand [sex] publicly, [and if she has] four even if a donkey wants to have sex with her in the marketplace, she will not care. Rava said: This was taught only [in respect of a woman] whose husband is not with her; but if her husband is with her, we are not concerned.
  But there is the case of Hannah whose husband was with her!   With a guest it is different, for R. Huna stated, ...From where do we know that a guest is forbidden to have sex? [From Scripture in] which it is said, “And they rose up in the morning early and worshipped before the Lord, and returned, and came to their house to Ramah; and Elkanah knew Hannah his wife; and the Lord remembered her” (I Samuel 1:19), only then but not before.
  Homa, Abaye’s wife, came in Rava. She said to him, “Grant me an allowance of board,” and he granted it to her. She said: “Grant me an allowance of wine.” He said to her, “I know that Nahmani did not drink wine She replied, “By the life of the Master, he gave me to drink from drinking horns like this.” As she was showing it to him her arm was uncovered and a light shone upon the court. 
  Rava rose, went home and requested to have sex with R. Hisda’s daughter, [his wife]. The daughter of R. Hisda said to him: “Who has been at court today?” He replied,  “Homa the wife of Abaye.” Thereupon she followed her, striking her with the straps of a chest until she chased her out of all Mehoza. She said to her, “You have already killed three [husbands] and now you come to kill another [man]!”
  The wife of R. Joseph the son of Rava cam  and said to him, “Grant me an allowance of board,” and he granted her.  “Grant me also an allowance of wine,” and he granted her.  He said to her, “I know that the people of Mehoza drink wine.”
  The wife of R. Joseph the son of R. Menashya of Devil came before R. Joseph and said to him, “Grant me an allowance of board,” and he granted her. “Grant me an allowance of wine,” and he granted her. “Grant me an allowance of silks.” He asked, “Why silks?” She replied, “For your sake, and for the sake of your friend  and for the sake of your associates.”  
  He must also provide her with a bed, a mattress etc. ... Why should he give her a mattress and a mat?   Papa replied: [This is done only] in a place where it is the practice to fill the bed with ropes which would hurt her.
  Our Rabbis taught: She is not given a cushion and a bolster.  In the name of R. Natan it was stated: She is given a cushion and a bolster. What is the case? If it is a case where it was her custom, what is the reason of the first tanna? And if it is a case where it is not her custom, what is the reason of R. Natan?
  The statement was necessary only in the case where it was his custom but not her custom. The first Tanna is of the opinion that [her husband]  may say to her,  “When I go away I take them and when I return I bring them back with me,”  while R. Natan holds the opinion that she can tell him, “It might sometimes happen [that you will return] at twilight when you will be unable to bring them and so you will take mine and make me sleep on the ground.”
  He must also give her [once a year] a hat. Papa said to Abaye:
  
  Daf 65b
  
  This tanna [expects a person to be] “stripped naked and to wear shoes”! He replied: “The Tanna was referring to a mountainous region where one cannot manage with less than three pairs of shoes [a year]  and indirectly he informed us that these should be given to her on the occasion of a festival so that she might derive joy from them.”
  And clothing [of the value] of fifty zuz. Abaye said: Fifty ordinary zuz. From where is this deduced? From the statement: All this applies to the poorest in israel, but in the case of a member of the better classes all is fixed according to the dignity of his position. Now if you would think it refers to fifty real zuz, where would a poor man obtain fifty zuz?  Consequently it must be concluded [that the meaning is] fifty ordinary zuz.
  He does not give her new etc. Our Rabbis taught: Any surplus of food belongs to the husband. Any surplus of worn out clothes belongs to the woman. “Any surplus of worn out clothes belongs to the woman.” Of what use are they to her? Rehava replied: For putting on during the days of her menstruation so that she may not [by the constant wearing of the same clothes] become repulsive to her husband.
  Abaye stated: We have a tradition that the surplus of the worn out clothes of a widow belongs to her husband’s heirs.  For the reason in the former case is that she shall not become repulsive to her husband but in this case let her be ever so repulsive.
  He must also give her [every week] a silver ma’ah etc. What [is meant by] she eats [with him every Friday night]? Nahman replied:  Actual eating. Ashi replied: Intercourse.
  We have learned: She is to eat with him erev Shabbat [Friday night]. This works according to the one who said that she eats, that is why it says “she eats.” However, to the one who said, “intercourse,” why does it say she eats?  It is a euphemism, as it is written “She eats, and wipes her mouth, and says: ‘I have done no wickedness’” (Proverbs 30:20).
  An objection was raised: R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said, “She is to eat with him on the night of the Shabbat and on the Shabbat [day].” This works according to he who said, “[Actual] eating,” that is why it states, “And on the Shabbat [day].”   But according to the one who said, “intercourse,” can one have intercourse on the Shabbat day?  Did not R. Huna state, Israelites are holy and do not have intercourse in the daytime? But, surely, Rava stated:  It is permitted in a dark room.
  If she was nursing [her child]. Ulla the Great expounded at the door of the Patriarch’s home: Although it was said: “A man is not obligated to maintain his sons and daughters when they are young,” he must maintain them while they are very young.
  For how long? Until the age of six; in accordance [with the view of] R. Assi, for R. Assi stated: A child of the age of six is exempt by the eruv of his mother.
  From where did he derive this? From the statement: If she was nursing [her child] her handiwork is reduced and her maintenance is increased. What is the reason? Surely because he must eat together with her. But is it not possible [that the reason is] because she is sick?
  If that were the case it should have been stated, “If she was sick,” why then [was it stated], “If she was nursing.” But is it not possible that it was this that we were taught: Nursing mothers are considered sick. It was stated: R. Joshua b. Levi said:  She is given an additional allowance of wine, because wine is good for milk.
  May we return to you chapter “Even though.”
  A wife’s finds and her handiwork belong to her husband. And [concerning] her inheritance:  He has the usufruct during her lifetime.   [Any compensation for] an embarrassment or blemish [that may have been inflicted upon] her belongs to her.
  Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: [if the embarrassment or blemish was inflicted upon her] on a hidden place [on her body] she receives two-thirds while he receives one-third; if on an open place [on her body]  he receives two-thirds and she receives one-third. His share is to be given to him immediately, but with hers land is to be bought and he enjoys the usufruct.
  GEMARA. What does he teach us? This surely was already learnt: A father has authority over his daughter in her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, document or intercourse. He is entitled to anything she finds, to her handiwork and to annul her vows.  He receives her get but he has no usufruct [from her property] during her lifetime. When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct during her lifetime.
  It was necessary to teach this so that it could teach about her embarrassment or blemish, so it could teach the dispute between the R. Judah ben Batera and the rabbis.
  A tanna recited in the presence of Rava: A wife’s finds belong to herself. R. Akiva said:  [They belong] to her husband. The other said to him: Now that [in respect of the] surplus it belonged,
  
  Daf 66a
  
   which is her handiwork, R. Akiva ruled [that it belongs] to herself, how much more so with regard to her finds? 
  For we learned: [If a woman said to her husband,] “Konam, that which I do for your mouth”, he need not annul her vow, R. Akiva said: He must annul it, since she might do more work than is due to him! Rather, reverse the baraita: A wife’s finds belong to her husband. R. Akiva says  to herself.
  But when Rabin came he said in the name of R. Yohanan: In respect of a surplus obtained without exertion all agree that [it belongs to the] husband, and they only differ in respect of a surplus obtained through exertion; the first Tanna holds [that even this belongs]... to her husband while R. Akiva holds [that it belongs] to herself! Papa said: A find is like a surplus gained through exertion, [concerning which there is] a difference of opinion between R. Akiva and the rabbis.
  Papa raised the question: What is the law where she performed for him two [kinds of work] simultaneously? Rabina raised the question: What is the ruling where she did three or four [kinds of work] simultaneously? These remain undecided. 
  [Compensation for] embarrassment or blemish. Rava son of R. Hanan raised a difficulty [on R. Judah ben Batera’s opinion in the mishnah]:... Now then, if a man embarrassed his fellow’s horse would he also have to pay him [compensation for the] embarrassment? But is a horse susceptible to embarrassment? Rather, this [is the objection:] If a man spat on his fellow’s garment would he also have to pay him [compensation for this] indignity?
  And should you say that [the ruling] is really so, we have learned: If a man spat so that the spit fell on another person, or uncovered the head of a woman, or removed a cloak from a person he must pay four hundred zuz; and R. Papa explained: This has been taught [to apply] only [where it touched] him but if it touched his garment only [the offender] is exempt! When it comes to his garment, he is not shamed, but when it comes to his wife, he is shamed.
  Rabina said to R. Ashi:... If so, then if a man embarrassed a poor man of a good family where all the members of the family are involved in the embarrassment, must he also pay [compensation for] embarrassment to all the members of the family? The other replied: There it is not their own person [that are insulted]. Here, however, one’s wife is [like] one’s own body. 
  If a man agreed to give a fixed sum of money to his son-in-law and his son-in-law died:   the Sages say that he may say “I was willing to give to your brother but I am unwilling to give to you.”
  If a woman agreed to bring her husband one thousand denarii he must agree to give her a corresponding sum of fifteen maneh.  As a corresponding sum for appraised goods, he agrees to give one-fifth less.
  [If a husband is requested to enter in his wife’s ketubah] “goods assessed at one maneh”, and these are in fact worth a maneh, he only [must agree to] a maneh. [Otherwise, if he is requested to enter in the ketubah:] “goods assessed at a maneh”, his wife must give him thirty-one sela and a denar, and if “at four hundred”, she must give [him goods valued at] five hundred.   Whatever 
  
  Daf 66b
  
  a bridegroom agrees to give [his wife in her ketubah] he writes one fifth less [than the appraised value].
  GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: There was no need to state that where the first was a scholar and the second an am ha’aretz [the father-in-law] can say, but even where the first was an am ha’aretz and the second a scholar he may also say so.   “I was willing to give to your brother but I am unwilling to give to you.”
  If a woman undertook to bring to her husband one thousand denarii etc. Are not these  the same as the case in the first clause? He taught [first concerning a] large assessment  and then he taught also about a smaller assessment; he taught about his assessment  and he also taught about her assessment. 
  If a woman agreed to bring him cash, every sela’ counts as six denarii.   The bridegroom must accept upon himself [to give his wife] ten denarii for her [perfume] basket for call maneh [which she brings as dowry].   Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel said: in all matters the local usage shall be followed.
  GEMARA. This, surely, is exactly [the same ruling as] “He must assign to her a corresponding sum of fifteen maneh.” 
  He taught first about a major transaction and then taught about a minor transaction. And [both rulings were] necessary. For had he taught only about a major transaction, it might have been assumed [that it applied to this only] because the profit [it brings in] is large but not to a minor transaction the profit from which is small; [hence it was] necessary [to state the latter].  And had we been informed of that of the minor transaction only it might have been said [to apply to this only] because the expenses are small but not to a large transaction where the expenses are great; [hence it was] necessary [to state the former].
  The bridegroom must undertake [to give his wife] ten denarii for her basket. What is meant by basket?     Ashi says: The perfume basket. Ashi further stated: This ruling applies to Jerusalem only.
  Ashi asked: [Is the prescribed perfume allowance made] in respect of each maneh valued or each maneh for which [obligation has been] accepted?
  And if you could reason to say: [“In respect of each] maneh for which [obligation has been] accepted” [the question arises: Is the allowance to be made only on] the first day or every day? Should you find reason to say: Every day, [the question still remains whether this applies only to the] first week or to every week. Should you find some reason to say: Every week, [it may be asked whether this applies only to the] first month or to every month. And should you find some reason to say: Every month, [it may be asked whether this is applicable only to the] first year or to every year. All this remains undecided.
  Rav Judah said in the name of Rav:... It once happened that the daughter of Nakdimon b. Gorion  was granted by the sages an allowance of four hundred gold coins for her perfume basket for that particular day, and she said to them, “May you grant such allowances for your own daughters!” and they answered after her: Amen.
  Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that R. Yohanan b. Zakkai left Jerusalem riding a donkey, while his disciples followed him, and he saw a girl picking barley grains in the dung of Arab cattle. As soon as she saw him, she wrapped herself with her hair and stood before him.
  She said to him,  “Master, provide for me.”  “My daughter,”  he asked her, “who are you?”  “I am,”  she replied, “the daughter of Nakdimon b. Gorion”.  “My daughter,”  he said to her, “what has become  of the wealth of your father’s house?”  “Master,”  she answered him, “are they not making a proverb in Jerusalem:  ‘The salt that preserves money [should] reduce it [by giving to charity]?”  (Others read: Lovingkindess [preserves money]). “And where is the wealth of your father-in-law’s house?”  “The one,” she replied,  “came and destroyed the other.” “Do you remember, Master,” she said to him, “when you signed my ketubah?” 
  “I remember,” he said to his disciples, “that when I signed the ketubah of this [unfortunate woman], I read ‘A million gold denarii from her father’s house’ besides [the amount] from her father-in-law’s house.” Thereupon R. Johanan b. Zakkai wept and said:  “Happy are you Israel; when they do the will of God no nation or language has any power over them; but when they do not do the will of God, He delivers them into the hands of a low people, and not only in the hands of a low people but into the power of the beasts of a low people.”
  Did Nakdimon b. Gorion not practice charity? Surely it was taught: It was said of Nakdimon b. Gorion that, when he walked from his house to the house of study, flax garments were 
  
  Daf 67a
  
  spread beneath his feet and the poor followed behind him and rolled them up! If you wish I might sat:  He did it for his own glorification. And if you wish I might say:  He did not act as he should have done, as people say,  “In accordance with the camel is the burden.”
   It was taught: R. Elazar the son of R. Zadok said,  “May I [not] behold the consolation [of Zion] if I have not seen her picking barley grains among the horses” hoofs at Acco. I applied to her this Scriptural text: “If you do not know, O thou fairest among women, go forth by the footsteps of the flock and feed your kids” (Songs of Songs 1:8);  read not your kids but your “bodies.”
  Shemen b. Abba stated in the name of R. Yohanan:  If a wife brought to her husband gold, it is to be assessed and [entered in her ketubah] according to its actual value. They objected: “[Pieces] of gold are like vessels.”  Does this not mean, “like silver vessels” which diminish in value No, “like gold vessels” which do not diminish. If so, [the expression] should have been “like vessels [made] from it”!
  And, furthermore, it was taught: [Pieces of] gold are like vessels; gold denarii are like money. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: In a place where they do not exchange them, they are evaluated and are [entered in the ketubah] at the rate of their actual value.   To what is R. Shimon b. Gamaliel referring? If you say [that he refers] to the final clause, the inference [would be] that the first Tanna holds that even when they do not exchange them, but, surely, they cannot be used as currency!   
  Rather, he must refer to the first clause and this is what he meant: [Pieces of] gold are like vessels; and what [is meant by] vessels? Silver vessels. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: They are like gold denarii where the usage is not to change them.
  No; he may still refer to the final clause but [it is a case where] with difficulty they can be used as currency and this is what they disagree about: One Master holds that since they can be used as currency we increase [the value in the ketubah] and the other Master holds that since they can be used as currency only with difficulty, we do not increase the value.
  If you want I can say: The whole statement is that of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, but a clause is missing, and the proper reading is as follows: [Pieces of] gold are like vessels. Gold denarii are like cash. When is this so? Where it is customary to exchange them, but where it is not customary to exchange them, they are to be valued and entered in the ketubah at the rate of their actual value, the words of Rabban Shimon be Gamaliel for R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds the view that  where it is not the custom to exchange them they are to be valued and [entered in the ketubah] at the rate of their actual value.
  But [the difficulty] nevertheless [remains that the expression] should have been, “like vessels [made] from it”! This is indeed a difficulty. If you want I might say: We are here dealing with a case of broken pieces of gold.   Ashi said: [We deal here with] gold powder.
  Yannai stated: The spices of Antioch are like cash. Samuel b. Nahmani stated in the name of R. Yohanan: A woman is entitled to seize Arabian camels for her ketubah.
  Papi stated: A woman may seize garments made at Be Mikse for her kethubah. Papi further stated: A woman may seize sacks made at Rodya and the ropes of Kamhunya for her ketubah. Rava stated: At first I said: A woman is entitled to seize purses from Mehoza for her ketubah. What was [my] reason? Because [women] relied upon them. When I observed that they took them and went out with them and as soon as they found land they purchased it with this money I said  that they rely only upon land.
  If a man gives his daughter in marriage without specifying any conditions, he must give her not less than fifty zuz. If [the father] cut a deal [with the husband] that he would take her naked [i.e. without a dowry], the husband may not say “When I have taken her into my house I shall clothe her with clothes of my own,” rather he must provide her with clothing while she is still in her father’s house. Similarly if an orphan is given in marriage she must be given not less than fifty zuz. If funds are available she is to be provided in accordance with the dignity of her position.
  GEMARA. Abaye stated: Fifty simple zuz. How do we know this?  From the statement in the final clause: If funds are available she is to be provided in accordance with the dignity of her position, and we said,  What was meant by “funds?” Rehava explained: Charity funds. Now if you would think that this is fifty actual zuz, if funds are available how much more could we possibly give her? Rather learn from this that it refers to fifty simple zuz.
  Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan boy and an orphan girl come to be sustained [from charity], the girl orphan is to be sustained first and the boy orphan afterwards, because it is normal for a man to go begging but it is unusual for a woman to do so.   If an orphan boy and an orphan girl
  
  Daf 67b
  
  come to receive help in getting married, the girl orphan is to be enabled to marry first and the boy orphan is married afterwards, because the shame of a woman is greater than that of a man. 
  Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan came for assistance in marriage, they must rent a house for him, prepare a bed for him and [buy him] all his [household] objects, and then marry him off, for it is said in Scriptures, “Sufficient for his need in that which is lacking for him” (Deuteronomy 15:8): “sufficient for his need,” refers to the house; “in that which wants,” refers to a bed and a table;  “He” refers to a wife, for so it is said in Scripture, “I will make a partner for him” (Genesis 2:18).
  Our Rabbis taught: “Sufficient for his need” [implies] you are commanded to sustain him, but you are not commanded to make him rich. “In that which he lacks” [includes] even a horse to ride on and a slave to run before him. It was said about Hillel the Elder that he bought for a certain poor man who was of a good family a horse to ride on and a slave to run before him. On one occasion he could not find a slave to run before him, so he himself ran before him for three miles.
  Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that the people of Upper Galilee bought for a poor member of a good family of Tzippori a pound of meat every day. “A pound of meat”! What is so great about this? Huna replied: [It was] a pound of fowl’s meat. And if you want I might say: [They purchased] ordinary meat for a pound [of money].   Ashi replied: The place was a small village and everyday a beast had to be lost for his sake.
   A certain man once came in front of R. Nehemiah [to ask for maintenance]. He said to him, “What do you dine on?” He replied, “Fat meat and old wine.” “Will you consent to live with me on lentils?” He lived with him on lentils and died. [R. Nehemiah] said, “Oy, for this man whom Nehemiah has killed.” On the contrary, he should [have said], “Oy for Nehemiah who killed this man”! Rather, he should not have spoiled himself to such an extent.  
  A man came in front of Rava [for provisions]. How said to him: “On what do dine?”  He replied, In fat chicken and old wine.” He said back, “Don’t you take into consideration the burden of the community?” The other replied,  “Am I eating of theirs?  I am eating from God’s food; for we learned:  “The eyes of all wait for you, and You give them their food in his due season,” (Psalms 145:15) this, since it is not said, “in their season” but “in his season,” teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, provides for every individual his food in the proper time.
  Meanwhile Rava’s sister arrived, who had not seen him for thirteen years, and brought him a fat chicken and old wine. He said, “What’s this!” He said to him, “I have been answered for you. Come and eat.”
  Our Rabbis taught: If a man does not have the means [to provide for himself] and does not wish to be maintained [from charity] they give him the money as a loan and then they go back and give it to him as a gift, the words of R. Meir. The Sages said: They give it to him as a gift and then they go back and give it to him as a loan. They give it to him as a gift? But he won’t take it. Rava explained: They begin by offering it as a gift.
  If he has the means but does not want to sustain himself, [at his own expense], he is given [what he needs] as a gift, and then he is made to repay it. “He is made to repay it” he would, surely, not take again! Papa replied: After his death. Shimon said: If he has the means and does not want to provide for himself [at his own expense], we do not deal with him. If he does not have the means and does not wish to be provided for [out of the poor funds] he is told, “Bring a pledge and you will receive [a loan]” in order to raise his spirit.
  Our Rabbis taught: “Lend” (Deuteronomy 15:8) refers to one who does not have the means and is does not want to be provided for [from the poor funds] to whom they give as a loan and then give it to him as a gift. “You shall lend to him:” refers to one who has the means and does not wish to provide for himself [at his own expense] to whom they give as a gift and then reclaim from him after his death, the words of R. Judah.
  The Sages, however, said: If he has the means and does not wish to provide for himself [at his own expense] we are not concerned with him. So how then do I understand “You shall lend to him”? The Torah speaks as an ordinary person.
  Mar Ukba had a poor man in his neighborhood into whose door-socket he used to throw four zuz every day. Once [the poor man] thought: “I will go and see who does me this kindness.” On that day [it happened] that Mar Ukba was late at the house of study and his wife was coming home with him.
   As soon as [the poor man] saw them moving the door he went out after them, but they fled from him and ran into a furnace from which the fire had just been swept. Mar Ukba’s feet were burning. and his wife said to him: Raise your feet and put them on mine. He became distressed. She said to him, “I am usually at home and therefore I give benefit to the poor quicker.”
  And what [was the reason for] all that? Because Mar Zutra b. Toviah said in the name of Rav (others state: R. Huna b. Bizna said in the name of R. Shimon Hasida; and others again say: R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai):  A man should throw himself into a fiery furnace rather than publicly shame his neighbor. From where do we know this? From Tamar; as it is written, “When she was brought forth” (Genesis 38:25).
  Mar Ukba had a poor man in his neighborhood to whom he regularly sent four hundred zuz on the eve of every Yom Kippur. On one occasion he sent them through his son who came back and said to him, “He does not need [your help]. He said back, “What did you see?” “I saw that they were sprinkling old wine [on the floor].” “Is he so delicate?” [the father] said. He doubled the amount and sent it to him.
  When he was about to die he said, “Bring me my charity accounts.” He found written there seven thousand of Sinaki [gold] denarii. He said, “The provisions are scanty and the road is long,” and he then distributed half of his wealth. But how could he do such a thing? Has not R. Ilai stated: It was ordained at Usha that if a man wishes to disperse his money, he should not disperse more than a fifth?  This applies only during one’s lifetime, so that he not become impoverished. But after his death, there is no such prohibition.
  Abba would roll up four zuz in a kerchief and cast it behind him and make it available to poor people.
  Hanina had a poor person in his neighborhood to whom he would regularly send four zuz every Shabbat eve. One day he sent the money through his wife.  She came back and told him, “He doesn’t need it.” “What did you see?” [She replied:]. “I heard that he was asked, ‘On what will you dine;
  
  Daf 68a
  
  ‘On what will you dine; on the silver [colored] cloths or on the gold [colored] ones?” He said, “This is what R. Elazar said: Come let us be grateful to the deceivers for were it not for them, we would be sinning every day, for it is said in Scripture, “And he cry unto the Lord against you, and you will be sinful” (Deuteronomy 15:9).
  Furthermore, R. Hiyya b. Rav of Difti taught: R. Joshua b. Korha said: Anyone who hides his eye from tzedakah is like one who worships idols, for here it is written, “Beware that there be not a base thought in your heart” (Deuteronomy 15:9) etc. and there it is written, “Certain base fellows have gone out” (Deuteronomy 13:14)–just as there [the crime is that of] idolatry, so here it is idolatry.
  Our Rabbis taught: One who pretends to have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a shrunken leg will not pass from this world before actually coming into such a condition.  One who accepts charity and is not in need of it will not pass from this world before actually coming to [need charity].
  We learned elsewhere: We do not force him to sell his house or his household goods.   We do not? But was it not taught: If he used gold vessels, he should now use copper ones!
  Zevid said: This is no difficulty. The one refers to the bed and table: the other to cups and dishes. But why are cups and dishes different that they need not be sold? Because he can say, “[The inferior quality] is repulsive to me,” so too with regard to a bed and table he might say, “I cannot accept them.” Rava the son of Rabbah replied: This refers] to a silver [toy] plow.  
  Papa replied: There is no difficulty: one [refers to a man] before he came under the obligation of repayment, and the other refers to a man after he had come under the obligation of repayment. 
  If an orphan was given in marriage by her mother or her brothers with her consent and they gave her a dowry of a hundred, or fifty zuz, she may, when she reaches majority age, legally claim from them the amount that was due to her.  
  Rabbi Judah says: if the father had given his first daughter in marriage, the second must receive as much as the first. The Sages say: sometimes a man is poor and becomes rich or rich and becomes poor. Rather the estate should evaluated and [the appropriate amount] given to her.
   GEMARA. Shmuel said: In respect of the dowry the assessment is based on a [determination of] the father’s [will]. They objected: “The daughters are to be maintained and provided for out of the estate of their father.” How so? They should not say, “Had her father been alive he would have given her such and such a sum” rather the estate is evaluated and she is given [her due share].” Does this not refer to the dowry? Nahman b. Yitzchak replied: No; [it refers to] her own maintenance.
  But, surely, it was stated: “Are to be maintained and provided for,” does not one [of the expressions] refer to the dowry and the other to her own maintenance?  No; both refer to her own maintenance, and yet there is no difficulty, for one of the expressions refers to food and drink and the other to clothing and bedding.
  We learned: The Sages say: sometimes a man is poor and becomes rich or rich and becomes poor. Rather the estate should evaluated and [the appropriate amount] given to her. Now what is meant by “poor” and “rich”? If we say that “poor” means poor in assets, and “rich” means rich in assets, the inference [would be] that the first tanna holds the opinion that even when a man was rich and became poor she is given as much as before; but he has none [to give]! 
  Rather, “poor” means poor in mind and “rich” means rich in mind, and yet it was stated, “rather the estate should evaluated and [the appropriate amount] given to her.” Therefore, we do not estimate, and this is a rejection of Shmuel. He holds the view of R. Judah. For we learned, Rabbi Judah says: if the father had given his first daughter in marriage, the second must receive as much as the first.
  Let him then say, “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Judah”? If he had said,  “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Judah,” it might have been assumed [to apply] only [where her father had actually] given her in marriage, since [in that case] he has revealed the amount he wishes to give, but not [to a case where] he had not given her in marriage, hence he taught us that R. Judah’s reason is that estimate [how much the father would have given], there is difference whether he had already given her in marriage or whether he had not given her in marriage;
  the reason the mishnah mentioned [the case where a father] gave her in marriage was to let you know the extent of the ruling of the sages [who hold] that although he had already given her in marriage and had thereby revealed the amount he wished to give, we do not follow such estimates.
  Rava said to R. Hisda: We expound in your name, “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Judah.” The other replied: May it be God’s will that you may report in your discourses all such beautiful sayings in my name.
  But could Rava have said this? Surely it was taught: Rabbi said: A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father’s] estate; and Rava said  that the law is in agreement with Rabbi!   This is no difficulty. The former [is a case] where we estimated how much he could give, and the latter is a case where we did not estimate how much he could give.
  This explanation is also reasonable for R. Adda b. Ahava said: It once happened that Rabbi gave her a twelfth of [her father’s] estate. Are these two statements contradictory?  Rather it must be inferred that one is a case where we estimated how much he could give, and the other is a case where we did not estimate how much he could give.
  [To return to] the main text: Rabbi said: A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father’s] estate. They said to Rabbi: According to your words, if a man had ten daughters and one son the sons should receive no share at all on account of the daughters?
  He replied: What I mean is this: The first [daughter] receives a tenth of the estate, the second [receives a tenth] of what [the first] had left, and the third [gets a tenth] of what [the second] had left, and then they divide again [all that they had received] into equal shares.
  
  Daf 68b
  
  But did not each one receive what was hers? This is what was meant:  If all of them wish to marry at the same time they are to receive equal shares.
  This supports [the opinion] of R. Matana; for R. Matana has said: If all of them wish to marry at the same time they are to receive one tenth. “One tenth”! Do you really think this? Rather, they receive their tenths at the same time.
  Our Rabbis taught: The daughters, whether they reached majority age before they married or whether they married before they reached majority age, lose their right to maintenance but not their rights to a dowry, the words of Rabbi. R. Shimon b. Elazar says: They have also lost their right to a dowry. What should they do? They hire for themselves husbands who extract their dowries.
  Nahman stated: Huna told me, “The law is in agreement with Rabbi.” Rava raised an objection against R. Nahman: If an orphan was given in marriage by her mother or her brothers with her consent and they gave her a dowry of a hundred, or fifty zuz, she may, when she reaches majority age, legally claim from them the amount that was due to her.   The reason then is because she was a minor; had she been of majority age, she would have forgone her right.
  This is no difficulty; the one is a case where she protested; the other where she did not protest. This explanation is also reasonable for otherwise there would arise a contradiction between two statements of Rabbi.
  For it was taught, Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father’s] estate,” [which implies] only when she is maintained but not when she is not maintained.
  Rather, one [statement deals with one] who protested and the other [with one] who did not protest. Learn from this.
  Ravina said to Rava: R. Adda b. Ahaba told us in your name, If she became an adult she need not lodge a protest; if she married she need not lodge a protest; but if she became an adult and was also married it is necessary for her to protest.
  But did Rava really say this? Surely, Rava raised an objection against R. Nahman [from the mishnah of] an orphan, and the other replied that. “the one is a case where she protested, the other where she did not protest”!   This is no difficulty. One is a case where she is maintained by them; the other, where she is not maintained by them.  
  Huna said in the name of Rabbi: [The right to] a dowry is not the same as the conditions in a ketubah. What is meant by “is not the same as the conditions in a ketubah”? If we say that whereas for the dowry she may seize encumbered property, whereas for conditions in the ketubah she may not seize encumbered property, what would this teach us? Surely it is a daily occurrence [that pledged property] is seized for dowry but not for maintenance!
  Rather if we say that a dowry can be collected from movable objects, whereas ketubah conditions can be collected only from real estate but not from movable objects, [it may be objected that,] according to Rabbi, both may be collected [for maintenance]. For it was taught:
  Both real estate and movable property may be seized for the maintenance of a wife or daughters, the words of Rabbi!
  What then is meant by “[The right to] a dowry is not the same as the conditions in a ketubah”? As it was taught:  If a man said that his daughters must not be maintained out of his estate he is not to be obeyed. [If, however, he said, that] his daughters shall not receive their dowry out of his estate he is obeyed,  because [the right to] a dowry is not the same as the conditions in a ketubah.
  
  Daf 69a
  
  Rab inserted [the following question] between the lines [of a communication he sent] to Rabbi:  What [is the law] where the brothers have encumbered [the estate they inherited from their father]? [When the enquiry reached him] R. Hiyya [who] was sitting before him  asked, “[Does he mean:] They sold it or pledged it? He said back: “What difference does it make? Whether they sold it [or pledged it, [the estate] may be seized to pay for the dowry but may not be seized to pay for maintenance.
  As to Rav if he was asking about a case where they sold [the estate], he should have written to him, “sold” and if he was asking about a case where they pledged it, he should have written to him, “pledged”!
  Rav wanted to ask about both cases and he thought: If I write to him “sold,” I will be satisfied if he were to send [in reply] that “they may seize [the estate],” since the same ruling would apply with even greater force to the case where they pledged [the estate]. If, however, he were to send me in reply that “they may not seize” I would still need to ask about a case where they pledged it.
  If I were to write to him, “pledged” then if he sent in reply that “they may not seize the estate” this ruling would apply with even greater force [to the case where] they sold it. Should he, however, send a reply that “they may seize it,” I would still need to ask about a case where they sold it. I will, therefore, write to him, “encumbered” which might mean the one as well as the other.
  Yohanan said:  They do not seize [from encumbered property], neither for this, nor for that. The question was raised: Did R. Yohanan not hear the ruling of Rabbi, but if he had heard it he would have accepted it? Or is it possible that he heard it and did not accept it?
  Come and hear what has been stated: If a man died and left two daughters and one son, and the first preempted [the others] and took a tenth of the estate while the other did not manage to collect [her share] before the son died, R. 
  Yohanan ruled:  The second has surrendered her right. Hanina said: They said something even greater— “they may seize encumbered property for the dowry and not for maintenance” and you nevertheless state, “The second has surrendered her right”?
  Now, if that were the case, he should have asked him “who said it?” But perhaps he in fact did not hear it [at first] and had he heard it he would have accepted it, but there [the circumstances are] different, since the house [of the second daughter] has now ample provisions?
  Yemar said to R. Ashi: If this is so, then if she found anything at all, so that her house is amply provided for, would we in such a case also not give her a tenth of the estate? He said back: I said, A house amply provided for from the same estate.
  Amemar ruled: A daughter has [the legal status of] an inheritor. Ashi to Amemar: Should they wish to settle her claim by means of a money payment, they could not settle her claim. The other replied, “Correct.” “Should they desired to settle her claim by [giving her] one plot of land, they could not settle her claim.”   The other replied,  “Correct."
  Ashi ruled: A daughter has [the legal status of] a creditor. And Amemar changed his opinion. For R. Minyomi son of R. Nihumi stated: I was once standing before Amemar and a woman who claimed a tenth of [her deceased father’s] estate appeared before him,  and I saw [that it was his] opinion that if [her brothers] desired to settle with her by means of a money payment he would have agreed to the settlement. For he heard the brothers say to her, “If we had the money we would settle with you by a cash payment,” and he remained silent and didn’t say anything to them.
  Now that it has been said this, is she a creditor of the father or of the brothers?  What does this matter? In respect [of allowing her] to collect [her tenth] either from their medium land and without an oath, or of their worst land with an oath. 
  Now what [is the law]? Come and hear [of the decision] of Ravina: He allowed the daughter of R. Ashi to collect [her tenth] from Mar the son of R. Ashi out of his medium land, without an oath, but from the son of R. Sama the son of R. Ashi out of his worst land with an oath.
  Nehemiah the son of R. Joseph sent the following message to Rabbah the son of R. Huna Zuta of Nehardea: When this woman comes in front of you, collect for her a tenth part of [her deceased father’s] estate even from the placing of handmills. Ashi stated: When we were at the house of R. Kahana we collected [a daughter’s tenth] from the rent of houses also.
  Anan sent to R. Huna, “[To] our colleague Huna, Shalom. When this woman comes before you, authorize her to collect a tenth part of [her father’s] estate.” [When the communication arrived,] R. Sheshet was sitting before him. [R. Huna] said to him, “Go and say to him, and he who does not deliver the message to him shall fall under the ban, ‘Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made] from real estate or from movable property? And who presides at the meal in a house of mourning (marziha)?’”
  Sheshet went to R. Anan and said to him: The Master is a teacher, and R. Huna is a teacher of the teacher, and he pronounced the ban against anyone who would not state [his message] to you, and had he not pronounced the ban I would not have said, ‘Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made] from real estate or from movable property? And who presides at the meal in a house of mourning?’”
  Anan went to Mar Ukba and said to him: “See, Master, how R. Huna addressed me as ‘Anan, Anan.’ Moreover, the [question about] the marziha that he sent me, I do not know what he’s talking about.” He said back to him: Tell me now how
  
  Daf 69b
  
  the incident actually occurred. He said back, “It happened in such and such a way.” He replied,  “A man who does not know the meaning of marziha should [scarcely] presume to address R. Huna as, ‘our colleague Huna.’” What [is the meaning of] marziha? Mourning; for it is written in Scripture, “Thus says the Lord: Enter not into the house of mourning” (Jeremiah 16:5)
  Abbahu stated: From where do we know that a mourner sits at the head [of the table]? [From Scripture] as it is said, “I chose out their way, and sat at the head and dwelt as a king in the army, as one that comforts the mourners” (Job 29:25). But does not yenahem  mean [one who comforts] others?  Nahman b. Isaac replied: It is written “ynhm.”
  Mar Zutra said: From here: “Ve-sar marze’ah seruhim, he who is in bitterness and distracted  becomes the head of the great ones.
  Rava said: The law [is that she collects] from landed property, but not from movable property, whether in respect of maintenance, ketubah or dowry.
  If a man deposited a sum of money with an agent for his daugher, and [after she was betrothed] she says, “I trust my husband”, the trustee must act in accordance with the condition of his trust, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: were [the trust] a field and she wished to sell it, it would be as if it was sold immediately! To whom does this apply?  To [a daughter] who has reached majority age, but in the case of a minor, there is no validity at all to the act of a minor.
  GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: If a man deposited for his son-in-law with a trustee a sum of money with which to buy a field for his daughter, and she says,  “Let it be given to my husband,” if after marriage, she has a right to do as she wishes. But if only after her betrothal the trustee must act according to the conditions of his trust, the words of R. Meir. Yose says: A woman of majority age—whether after marriage or after betrothal, she has a right do as she wishes, but [in the case of] a minor, whether after marriage or after betrothal, the trustee must act according to the conditions of his trust.
  What is the practical difference between them? If it be suggested that the practical difference between them is the case of a minor after her marriage, R. Meir holds that she may do as she wishes and R. Yose comes to state that even after marriage [only] a woman who is of age may do as she wishes but not a minor.
  But then what of the final clause, in the case of a minor, there is no validity at all in the act of a minor. Who could have taught this? If it be suggested [that the author was] R. Yose, [it could be objected:] You could have learned this from the first clause; for, since R. Yose said, were [the trust] a field and she wished to sell it, it would be as if it was sold immediately, [it follows that only] one that is of age, who is eligible to effect a sale, was meant, but not a minor who is ineligible to effect a sale.
  Rather, [the last clause] must be R. Meir and it is actually defective, and this is what it is meant to teach: the trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust. When is this said? After betrothal, but if after her marriage she may do as she wishes.  And when was this said? When she is of majority age. But if she is a minor, there is no validity to the act of a minor. Rather, the practical difference between them is the case of one who is of majority age [whose wish was expressed] after her betrothal. 
  It was stated: R. Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah follows R. Yose. Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: The halakhah follows R. Meir.
  Ilfa hung himself up on a sail mast and said: If anyone can come and tell me any statement made by R. Hiyya or R. Oshaia which I cannot make clear to him [with the aid] of our Mishnah I will fall from the mast and drown myself.”
  An old man came and recited to him [the following baraita:] If a man said, “Give my children a shekel a week,” and they require a sela,  he should give them a sela. But if he said, “Give them no more than a shekel,” he may give them only a shekel. If he said if these die others should inherit in their place, whether he said “give them” or “don’t give them anything more than” he only gives them a shekel.
  [Ilfa] said to him:. Whose ruling this is? 
  
  Daf 70a
  
  It is that of R. Meir who said that it is a mitzvah to carry out the instructions of a dying man.
  Hisda said in the name of Mar Ukba: The law is that whether [the dying man] said, “Give” or “give no more,” they give them all that they require. But do we not hold that the halakhah is in agreement with R. Meir who said that it is a mitzvah to carry out the instructions of a dying man? This applies to other matters, but in this case [the father] would be satisfied [that his children should be provided with all they need]; and the reason he said this was to encourage them.
  We learned elsewhere: With regard to little children, their purchase is a valid purchase and their sale is a valid sale in the case of movable objects.
  Rafram explained: This has been taught in the case only where no guardian had been appointed, but where a guardian had been appointed neither their purchase nor their sale has any legal validity.
  From where do we know this?... From that which is taught, “There is no validity to the act of a minor.” But might not the case where a trustee had been appointed be different? If so, it should have been stated, “But in the case of a minor, a trustee must act in accordance with the conditions of his trust” what does it mean, there is no validity at all in the act of a minor? Learn from this [that the same law is applicable] in all cases.
  May we return to you chapter “the findings of a woman.”
  If a man forbade his wife by vow to have any benefit from him, for thirty days, he may appoint a provider, but if for a longer period he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.
  Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one month, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two months. If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two months, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow from tasting any kind of produce he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. Rabbi Judah ruled: if he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for one day, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] two days. If he was a priest he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was] for two days, but must divorce her and give her the ketubah [if it was for] three.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow that she should not adorn herself with any type of adornment he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. Rabbi Yose says: [this refers] to poor women if no time limit is given, and to rich women [if the time limit is] thirty days.
  GEMARA. Since he is under an obligation to [maintain] her how can he forbid her by a vow [from deriving any benefit from him]? Does he have the power to cancel his obligation?
  For surely we have learned: [If a woman said to her husband] “Konam, that which I produce for your mouth” he need not annul her vow. Therefore, since she is obligated to him, she does not have the power to cancel her obligation, so too here since he is obligated to her, he does not have the power to cancel his obligation.
  Rather, since he can say to her, “Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance”
  
  Daf 70b
  
  it is as if [in making his vow] he has said to her, “Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance.” However, if we hold like R. Huna in the name of Rav, for R. Huna stated in the name of Rav: A wife may say to her husband , “I will not be maintained nor will I do any work for you,” why should there be no need to annul [her vow] when she said “Konam that which I produce for your mouth”? Let it rather be said that since she may say, “I will not be maintained nor will I do any work for you,” it is as if she said “I will not be maintained nor will I do any work for you.”
  Rather do not say that “he is regarded” but rather  that he actually said to her, “Deduct your handiwork for your maintenance.”
  If so, what need has she of a steward? [She needs one] where [the proceeds of her handiwork] do not suffice. If, [however, her handiwork] does not suffice, our original difficulty arises again! Ashi replied: [This is a case] where [her handiwork] suffices for major needs but does not suffice for minor needs.
  What is the case of these “minor requirements”? If the woman is in the habit of having them, they are, surely, a part of her regular requirements, and if she is not used to them  what need has she for a steward? It was only necessary to teach this in a case where she was used [to them] in her father’s house but consented to put up without them when with her husband. For she can say to him, ‘Up until now, before you took a vow [to prohibit me from having any benefit from you], I was willing to put up with this, but now that you took a vow [to prohibit me from having any benefit from you] I am not able to put up [any longer] with it.
  And why for thirty days? For up to thirty days people would not become aware of it, and it will not be degrading for her;  but after a longer period people would hear of it, and the matter would be degrading to her.
  If you prefer I might say: He vowed while she was merely betrothed to him. But does a betrothed woman receive maintenance?  [Yes], if the time [for marriage] arrived and she was not married.  For we have learned: If the respective periods expired and they were not married, they eat from his food and [if he is a priest] they may eat terumah. 
  Why is [allow for] not more than thirty days? For up to thirty days an agent will perform his mission; for a longer period he will not perform his mission.
  And if you prefer I might say:  [The husband's vow is valid] when he made it while she was betrothed to him and she was [afterwards] married. But if she was married [afterwards] she saw her situation and accepted it. Where she said, “I thought I could bear it but now I cannot bear it.”
  But say such a plea is acceptable in respect of bodily defects; is it admissible, however, in respect of maintenance?  Rather it is clear that we can only explain as we explained at first.
  For up until thirty days, he must appoint a steward. But does the steward not just perform his agency?  R. Huna said: [Our Mishnah refers] to one who declared, “Whoever will maintain [my wife] will not lose out.”
  But even if be spoke in such a manner, is the steward not performing his agency? Have we not learned: If a man who was thrown into a pit cried “Whoever should hear his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife,” [the hearers] may write, and deliver [it to his wife]?
  How now!  There the man said, “should write” but did the man here say, “should maintain”? All he said was, “whoever will maintain.”
  But surely R. Ammi said: In [the case of] a fire [breaking] out on Shabbat] they allowed one to say “Whoever puts out the fire will not suffer a loss.” Now what does [the expression] “In a fire” exclude? Does it not exclude a case of this kind?v No; [it was meant] to exclude other acts that are forbidden on Shabbat. 
  Rabbah raised an objection: One who is forbidden by a vow from deriving any benefit from another one, and he has nothing to eat, [the other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him, “So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to derive any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him.” [The shopkeeper] may then give to the one and recover the cost from the other. Only this is permitted but not “whoever will provide for [this one] will not suffer any loss”? It wasn’t even necessary to state this.
  There is no question [that one may say] “whoever will provide [for so-and-so] will not suffer any loss,” since he is speaking to no one in particular; but even in this case where, since he is familiar with him and goes and speaks to him directly, [it might have been thought that this] is the same as if he had expressly told him, “Go and give him,” therefore it taught us [that this also is permitted]. 
  [To revert to] the main text. If a man is forbidden by a vow to derive any benefit from another man, and he has nothing to eat, [the other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he is familiar and say to him,  “So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to derive any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him.” [The shopkeeper] may then give to the one and recover the cost from the other. If his house is to be built, or his wall to be put up or his field to be harvested [the other] may go to laborers with whom he is familiar and say to them, “So and-so is forbidden by a vow to derive any benefit from me, and I do not know what to do for him.” They may then work for him and recover their wages from the other.
  If they were traveling together on the road and the one had with him nothing to eat, [the other] may give [some food] to a third person as a gift and the first may take it [from that person] and eat it.  If no third person is available, he may put the food on a rock or a wall, and say, “Behold this is free for any who wishes [to take it],” and the other may take it and eat it. R. Yose forbids this.  Rava said: What is R. Yose's reason? [It is forbidden as] a preventive measure because 
  
  Daf 71a
  
  of the case of Bet Horon.
  R. Judah said: If he was an Israelite he may keep her for one month etc. Is this not the same ruling as that of the first Tanna?  Abaye said: He came to teach us [the law concerning] a priest's wife. Rava said: The difference between them is a full month and a defective month.
  Rav said: This was taught only in the case of a man who specified [the period of the prohibition], but where he did not specify, he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketubah. Shmuel said: Even when he did not specify the period, [the husband] need not divorce her, since it is possible that he might discover some way to be released from the vow. 
  But have they not disagreed about this before. As it is taught, A man who forbade himself by vow from having intercourse with his wife:  Beth Shammai says: two weeks; Beth Hillel says: one week. And Rav said:  They differ only in the case of one who specified [the period of abstention] but where he did not specify the period it is the opinion of both that he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketubah.  Shmuel said: Even where the period had not been specified the husband may delay [his divorce], since it might be possible for him to discover some reason to be released from the vow.
  [Both disputes are] required  For if [their views] had been stated in the former, it might have been assumed that only in that case did Rav say his view, since [the appointment] of an agent is not possible  but that in the second case where [the appointment] of a agent is possible he agrees with Shmuel.  And if they had only been stated in the second case, that only in that case did Shmuel  maintain his view but that in the former case he agrees with Rav. [Hence both statements were] necessary.
  We learned: If a man forbade his wife by vow that she should not taste a certain type of produce, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah. Now this works according to Rav, for this mishnah refers to a husband who did not specify [the period of the prohibition] and the other to a husband who did specify [the period]. According to Shmuel, however, there is a contradiction.
  Here we are dealing with a case, for instance, where the woman made the vow and he confirmed it; R. Meir holds that [the husband] had himself put his finger between her teeth.
  But does R. Meir hold “He himself put his finger between her teeth”? Was it not download If a woman made a nazirite vow and her husband heard of it and did not annul it: R. Meir and R. Judah said: She has put her own finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said, “I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing,” she may be divorced without [receiving] her ketubah. 
  R. Yose and R. Elazar said: He has put his finger between her teeth. Therefore,  the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said, “I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing,” he may divorce her but must give her the ketubah!  Reverse [the views]:  R. Meir and R. Judah said: “He has put” and R. Yose and R. Elazar said: “She has put.”
  But does R. Yose hold that she has put? Have we not learned: R. Yose says: [this applies] to poor women if no time limit is given.
  Read: R. Meir and R. Yose said,  “He has put;” R. Judah and R. Elazar said, “She has put.” But does R. Judah hold the principle of “She put”?  Have we not learned: R. Judah ruled: If he was an Israelite he may keep her [as his wife, if the vow was
  for] one day? Read: R. Meir and R. Judah and R. Yose said, “He put” and R. Elazar said,   “She put.” And should you wish to say that the names must appear in pairs, then read:  R. Meir and R. Elazar said, “She put,” and R. Judah and R. Yose said, “He put’; and this anonymous Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Meir. 
  Does R. Yose really hold [this applies] to poor women if no time limit is given; from which it is evident that a husband has the right to annul [such vows]?  But they contrasted this [with the following]:  And these are the vows which he can annul:  vows of self-denial. [For instance:] “If I bathe” or “If I do not bathe;” “If I adorn myself,” or, “If I do not adorn myself.” Rabbi Yose says: These are not vows of self-denial. And the following are vows of self-denial: “[I swear] that I shall not eat meat” or “that I shall not drink wine” or “that I shall not adorn myself with 
  
  Daf 71b
  
  colored garments.” Here we are dealing with matters that are between him and her. 
  This explanation works according to the one who holds that a husband may annul [vows on] matters that are between him and her. But what can be said according to the one who holds that a husband may not annul [such vows]? For it was stated:  [As to vows on] matters affecting matters between him and her: R. Huna says: A husband may annul them; R. Adda b. Ahavah said:   A husband may not annul them, for we do not find that a fox should die of the dust of his den! 
  Rather what are we dealing with her. For instance, where she made her marital intercourse dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying. “The enjoyment intercourse dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying. “The enjoyment adornment.” Which is like R. Kahana, for R. Kahana said,
  [If a woman said to her husband], “The enjoyment of my intercourse [shall be forbidden] to you,” he may compel her to have intercourse. [If, however, she vowed,] “The enjoyment of your intercourse [shall be forbidden] to me” he must annul [her vow] because for one does not feed a person with something forbidden to him.
  But let her not adorn herself and consequently not be forbidden to him!  If so, she would be called, “The ugly woman.”
  But then let her adorn herself and be forbidden [intercourse] either for two weeks, according to Bet Shammai or for one week according to Bet Hillel! These apply only to a case where he [the husband] has forbidden her by a vow [to have intercourse with him], because [in such circumstances] she thinks  “He may have been angry with me and will later calm down.” But here, since she has made the vow and he remained silent, she will think: “Since he remained silent he must hate me.”
  R. Yose says: [This applies] to poor women if no time limit is given. What is the time limit. Rav Judah citing Shmuel replied: Twelve months. Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Yohanan:  Ten years. R. Hisda said in the name of Abimi: Until the next festival, for the daughters of Israel adorn themselves on a festival. 
  And to rich women [if the time limit is] thirty days. Why just thirty days? Abaye replied: Because a prominent woman enjoys the scent of her fragrances for thirty days. 
  If a man forbade his wife by vow that she may not go to her father’s house: When the father lives with her in the same town, the husband may retain [her as his wife, if the prohibition was for] one month; but if for two months he must  her and give her the ketubah. When the father lives in another town, the husband may retain [her as his wife, if the prohibition was for] one festival, but if for three festivals, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.
  If a man forbade his wife by vow from visiting a house of mourning or a house of feasting, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, because he has closed [peoples doors] against her.  If he claims [that his vow] was due to some other cause he is permitted [to forbid her].
  If he said to her: “[There shall be no prohibition] provided you tell so-and-so what you have told me” or “what I have told you” or “that you will fill and pour out in the garbage”, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah.
  GEMARA. This source is self-contradictory:  You said “he may keep [her as his wife if the prohibition was for] one festival,” which implies that if it was for two festivals he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. But read the concluding clause, “[if for] three festivals he must divorce her and give her her ketubah, which implies that if it was for two only he may keep [her as his wife]?
  Abaye said: The concluding clause refers to a priest's wife, and it represents the view of R. Judah. Rabbah b. Ulla said:  There is no contradiction, for one refers to a woman who was anxious [to visit her parents’ home] and the other applies to one who was not anxious.
  “Then I was in his eyes as one that found peace” (Song of Songs 8:10): R. Yohanan interpreted: like a bride who was found faultless in the house of her father-in-lawand she is anxious to go and tell of her success at her father’s home. 
  “And it shall be at that day, says the Lord, that you shall call me Ishi, and you shall not call me Ba'ali” (Hosea 2:18): R. Yohanan interpreted: Like a bride in the house of her father-in-law and not like a bride in her paternal home. 
  One who takes a vow etc.  his makes sense in reference to the house of feasting. 
  
  Daf 72a
  
  for he has closed [people's doors] against her;  but what when it comes to the house of mourning, what “he has closed people’s doors against there” is there? It was taught: omorrow she might die and no creature would mourn for her. Others say: No one would bury her. 
  It was taught: R. Meir used to say: What is meant by that which is written, “It is better to go to the house of mourning than to go to the house of feasting, for that is the end of all men, and the living will place it upon his heart” (Ecclesiastes 7:2): What does it mean “And the living will place it upon his heart”?  This refers to matters relating to death. [Let him realize] that if a person mourns for other people others will also mourn for him; if he buries other people others will also bury him; if he lifts up [his voice to lament] for others, others will [lift up their voices to lament] for him; if he escorts others [to the grave] others will  also escort him; if he carries others [to their last resting place] others will also carry him. 
  If he claims [that his vow] was due to some other cause he is permitted.  What is meant by some other cause?   Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: On account of the disreputable men who are found there. R. Ashi said: This was said only where [the place] has gained such a reputation; where, however, it has not gained such reputation it is not within the power of the husband [to vow that she may not go there]. 
  If he said to her: “[There shall be no prohibition] provided you tell so-and-so what you have told me” [or “what I have told you”]:  But let her say it? Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: [This refers to] disgraceful language.
  Or “that you shall fill and pour out on the rubbish heap.” But let her do this? Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: [Because the meaning of his request is] that she shall allow herself to be filled and then scatter it. In a baraita it was taught: That she shall fill ten jars of water and empty them on to the rubbish heap.
  According to Shmuel it is understandable why he must divorce her and also give her her ketubah; but according to the baraita, let her do it? Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Yohanan: Because she would look crazy.
  R. Kahana stated: If a man placed his wife under a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, he must divorce her and  also give her her ketubah, because he would give her a bad name among her neighbors.
  It was also taught in a baraita: If a man placed his wife under a vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, he must divorce her and give her her ketubah, because he would give her a bad name among her neighbors Similarly if she vowed that she shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, or that she shall not weave beautiful garments for his children, she may be divorced without a ketubah, because she gives him a bad name among his neighbors.
  These leave [their marriage] without their ketubah: A wife who transgresses the law of Moses or Jewish law.  And what is the law of Moses? Feeding her husband with untithed food, having intercourse with him while in the period of her menstruation, not separating dough offering, or making vows and not fulfilling them. 
  And what is Jewish practice? Going out with her head uncovered, spinning wool in the marketplace or conversing with every man.  Abba Shaul says: also one who curses her husband’s parents in his presence.  Rabbi Tarfon says: also one who has a loud voice. And who is regarded as one who has a loud voice? A woman whose voice can be heard by her neighbors when she speaks inside her house. Rabbi Tarfon 
  GEMARA. Feeding her husband with untithed food. What is the actual case? If the husband knows [the fact], let him abstain; if he does not know [it], how did he discover it?  [This ruling was] required only in the case where she told him, “So-and-so the priest has prepared for me the pile of grain,” and he went and asked him and her statement was found to be untrue. 
  Having intercourse with him during the period of her menstruation. What is the case?  If he knew he could have abstained, if he did not know he should rely upon her,  for R. Hinena b. Kahana stated in the name of Shmuel: From where do we know that a menstruant counts her own days of menstruation? As it is said, “Then she shall count for herself seven days” (Leviticus 15:28), “Lah” means for herself. 
  It was necessary only in the case where she said to her husband, “So-and-so the sage told me that the blood was clean,” and when her husband went and asked him it was found that her statement was untrue.  If you prefer I might say in accordance with the ruling of Rav Judah, for  R. Judah said: If a woman was known among her neighbors to be a menstruant her husband is flogged on her account for [having intercourse with] a menstruant.
  Not setting apart the dough offering. How is this to be understood? If the husband was aware [of the fact] he should have abstained [from the food]; if he was not aware [of it at the time] how does he know it now? The ruling is necessary only in the case only where she said to him,  “So-and-so the baker has prepared the dough for me” and when the husband went and asked him her statement was found to be untrue. 
  Or making vows and not fulfilling them for them, for the master said:  For the sin of vows one’s children die, as it is said in Scripture, “Do not allow your mouth to cause your flesh to sin… [why should God be angry at your voice, and destroy the work of your hands]” (Ecclesiastes 5:5). And what is the work of a man's hands? Say: His sons and his daughters. R. Nahman said, [It may be derived] from the following: “In vain have I smitten your children” (Jeremiah 2:30)... “In vain”--on account of vain oaths. 
  It was taught: R. Meir said: Any man who knows that his wife takes vows and does not fulfill them should impose vows upon her again. “Should impose vows upon her [again]”? How would this fix the matter? Rather he should provoke her again in order that she should make her vow in his presence and he would [thus be able to] annul it. They said to him:  No one can live with a serpent in the same basket. 
  It was taught: R. Judah said. Any husband who knows that his wife does not [properly] set apart for him the dough offering should set it apart again after her. They said to him: No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.
  He who taught it in connection with this case [would apply it] with even greater force to the other case; But he who taught it in connection with the other case [applies it to that case only] but [not to this one, because] it might sometimes happen that he would eat. 
  And what is Jewish practice? Going out with uncovered head.  Going out with an uncovered head is a biblical transgression! As it is written, “And he shall uncover the woman's head” (Numbers 5:18) and it was taught in he school of R. Ishmael: This [verse] is a warning to the daughters of Israel that they should not go out with uncovered head. From the Bible
  
  Daf 72b
  
  it is quite sufficient [if her head is covered by] her work-basket; according to Jewish practice, she is forbidden [to go out uncovered] even with her basket [on her head]. 
  R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: With a basket [on her head a woman] is not guilty of [going about with] an uncovered head. R. Zera was puzzled by this statement: Where [is this woman assumed to be]? If she is in the marketplace, [this is forbidden by] Jewish practice. But [if she is] in a courtyard then such a law would not leave our father Abraham a [single] daughter who could remain with her husband!  Abaye, or it might be said, R. Kahana, replied: [The statement refers to one who walks] from one courtyard into another by way of an alley.
  Spinning in the street. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: [The prohibition applies only] where she exposed her arms to the public. R. Hisda said in the name of Abimi: [This applies only] where she spins rose [colored materials, and holds them up] to her face.  Conversing with every man. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: [This refers to one] who plays with young men.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hana related: I was once walking behind R. Ukba when I saw an Arab woman who was sitting, casting her spindle and spinning a rose [colored material which she held up] to her face. When she saw us she detached the spindle [from the thread], threw it down and said to me, “Young man, hand me my spindle.” R. Ukba made a statement about her. What was that statement? Rabina said: He called her “a woman spinning in the marketplace.” The rabbis said: He called her “one conversing with every man.”
  Abba Shaul said: So too a wife who curses her husband's parents in his presence. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: [This includes also] one who curses his parents in the presence of his offspring;  and your mnemonic sign is, “Ephraim and Manasseh will be to be me like Shimon and Reuven” (Genesis 48:5). Rabbah explained: That she said in the presence of her husband's son, “May a lion devour your grandfather.”
  R. Tarfon said: also one who has a loud voice. What is meant by one with a loud voice? Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel:. One who lets her voice be sounded on marital matters. In a baraita it was taught: One has intercourse in one courtyard and her voice is heard in another courtyard. But should not this, then, have been taught in the
  Mishnah among defects?  Clearly we must revert to the original explanation. 
  If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah.
  [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.
  GEMARA. We have [in fact] learned [the same mishnah] also in [Tractate] Kiddushin.  It needed to be taught here with regard to ketubot, and therefore it also taught the laws concerning betrothal; there it needed to be taught with regard to betrothal and therefore it also taught it with respect to ketubot.
  R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yehozadak: They spoke only of the following vows: That she would not eat meat, that she would not drink wine or that she would not adorn herself with colored garments. It was also taught in a baraita: They spoke only of the following vows, matters that involve an affliction of the soul, [namely,] that she would not eat meat, that she would not drink wine or that she would not adorn herself with colored garments. 
  R. Papa pondered the following difficulty:  What does it refer to? If we say [that it refers] to the first clause [it might be retorted that] since the husband objects [to vows] all vows should be included! Rather it refers only to the final clause. 
  R. Ashi said: It may in fact refer to the first clause, but in respect of the vows to which people usually take exception his objection is valid. In respect of vows to which people do not as a rule take exception his objection has no validity. 
  It was stated: If a man betrothed a woman on condition [that she was under no vow] and married her without any condition: Rav said: She requires a get; and Shmuel said: She does not require a get.  Abaye said:
  
  Daf 73a
  
  Do not say that Rav's reason is that because the man has married her without attaching any conditions, he has forgone those conditions.  Rather, Rav's reason  is that no man treats his intercourse as a mere act of fornication.
  Surely they already disputed such a principle. For it was stated: [An orphan] minor who did not exercise her right of refusal and who, when she came of age, left [her husband] and married [another man]: Rav said: She does not need a get from her second husband, and Shmuel said:
  She does need a get from her second husband!
  [Both disputes were] necessary. For if it had only had been stated with regard to the latter, it might have been assumed that Rav stated his opinion in that case only because there was a condition, but that in the former case, where there was a condition, he would agree with Shmuel.
  And if it had been stated in the former case, it might have been assumed that Shmuel stated his opinion in that case only but that in the latter he agrees with Rav. [Hence both were] required.
  We have learned: If he married her without making any condition and she was found to be under a vow, she may be divorced without receiving her ketubah [which implies that] it is only her ketubah that she does not receive but she does require a get. Now does not this refer to one who betrothed a woman on condition [that she was under no vow] and married her without making any condition and it is a refutation of Shmuel.
  
  Daf 73b
  
  No; [this refers to one who] betrothed her without any condition and also married her without a condition. 
  If, however, one betrothed a woman with a condition and subsequently married her without a condition she would not require a divorce.  [If so, then, instead of stating, if a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not subject to any vows and she was found to be under a vow, her betrothal is invalid, it should rather have stated: If a man married a woman without attaching a condition and she was found to be under a vow, her betrothal is invalid, and all the more so to this case?
  This is what was really meant: If a man betrothed a woman on the condition that she was not subject to any vows, and then he married her without making a condition, and she was found to be under a vow, her betrothal is invalid; if, however, he betrothed her without making any conditions and also married her without making any conditions, she may be divorced without receiving her ketubah;
  it is only her ketubah that she cannot claim but it is necessary for her to receive a get. But what is different about the ketubah that she does not receive it? Because, he could say, “I do not want a wife that is in the habit of making vows.” But if that is the case there should be no need for her to receive a get either!
  Rabbah said: She requires a divorce from rabbinic law.  So also said R. Hisda: She requires a divorce from rabbinic law. Rava replied: The tanna was in doubt.  [Hence he adopted] the lenient view in monetary matters and the stricter one in the case of prohibitions.  
  Rabbah said: They differ only in the case of an error [affecting] two women, but where an error [affects] one woman all agree that she does not require a get.
  Abaye said: But our Mishnah refers to an error [involving] one woman but we used it as a difficulty.
  Rather, if it was said, this is what was said: Rabbah stated: They differ only in the case of an error [involving] a woman [who is in a position] similar [to that of one of] two women, but in the case of an error [involving] merely one woman all agree that she requires no divorce from him.
  Abaye raised an objection against him: If a man betrothed a woman in error or [with something worth] less than a perutah, and, similarly, if a minor betrothed a woman, even if any [of them] has subsequently sent presents [to the woman], her betrothal is invalid, because he has sent these gifts on account of the original betrothal. If, however, they had intercourse they have thereby effected legal acquisition. Shimon b. Judah in the name of R. Ishmael said: Even if they had intercourse they have not effected legal acquisition.
  Now here it is an error [involving] only one woman and they nevertheless disagree. Is this not a case where the “error” was due to vows.
  No; [what was meant is] an error in respect of that which was worth less than a perutah.   But was not “less than than a perutah” explicitly mentioned:  “If a man betrothed a woman in error or [with something worth] less than a perutah”?   [The latter part is] really an explanation [of the former:] What is meant by “If a man betrothed a woman in error”? If, for instance, he betrothed her with “something worth less than ‘a perutah.”
  On what principle do they differ One Master holds that a person knows that with less than the value of a perutah betrothal is not effective, and consequently he would know that his intercourse was for the sake of kiddushin.  The other Master holds that  not everyone knows that with less than the value of a perutah no betrothal can be effected, and when a man has intercourse [after], he does so with the original act of betrothal in mind.
  He raised [another] objection against him: [If a man said to a woman,] “I am having intercourse with you on the condition that my father will consent,” she is betrothed to him even if his father did not consent. R. Shimon b. Judah stated in the name of R. Shimon: If his father consented she is betrothed but if his father did not consent she is not betrothed. Now here it is a case similar to that of an error involving one woman and they nevertheless disagree!
  In that case, they differ over the following: One Master holds that [the expression], “On the condition that my father consents” means, ‘On condition that my father will remain silent,” and [the betrothal is valid] because, surely, his father remained silent. And the other Master holds the opinion [that the meaning of the expression is] that his father will say, “Yes,” and [the betrothal is invalid] because his father in fact did not say, “Yes.”
  He raised [another] objection against him. The Sages agree with R. Eliezer with regard to a minor who was married off by her father and who was then divorced, [in consequence of which] she is regarded as an “orphan” in her father’s lifetime, and who was then remarried, that she must perform halitzah but may not contract levirate marriage
  because her divorce was a perfectly legal divorce, but her remarriage was not a perfectly legal remarriage.
  When does this apply? When he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her while she was still a minor; but if he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her when she was already of age, or remarried her while she was still a minor and she became of age while she was still with him, and then he died, she may either perform halitzah or contract levirate marriage.
  
  Daf 74a
  
  In the name of R. Eliezer it was stated: She must perform halitzah and may not contract levirate marriage.  Now, here it is a case similar to that of an error involving one woman and they nevertheless differ!
  In that case also they differ on the following principles. One Master holds  everyone knows that there is no validity in the betrothal of a minor and, consequently he has intercourse for the purpose of betrothal. The other Master, however, holds that not everyone is aware that there is no validity in the betrothal of a minor, and when a man has intercourse [after such an act he does so] relying on his original betrothal.
  It was also stated: R. Aha b. Jacob stated in the name of R. Yohanan: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, all hold that she does not require a get. Aha the son of R. Ika, his sister’s son raised an objection against him:  Halitzah [performed] under a false pretext is valid. And what is “halitzah performed under a false pretext”? Resh Lakish explained: Where a levir is told, “Perform halitzah and you will thereby wed her.”
  Yohanan said to him: I teach [in a baraita] “Whether he had the intention [of performing the commandment of halitzah] and she had no such intention, or whether she had such intention and he had not, her halitzah is invalid, it being necessary that both shall [at the same time] have such intention,” and you say that her halitzah is valid? Rather R. Yohanan said [this is the meaning:] When a levir is told, “Perform halitzah on the condition that she gives you two hundred zuz.”
  Thus it clearly follows that as soon as a man has performed an act he has thereby dispensed with his condition, here also as soon as the man has intercourse he has thereby dispensed with his condition?
  The other replied: You young student, did you speak well? Consider:  From where do we derive [the law of the validity of] any condition? From the  condition in respect of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven.
  A condition that may be carried out through an agent, as was the case there, is regarded as a valid condition; but one which cannot be carried out through an agent, as was the case there, is not regarded as a valid condition. 
  But is not intercourse an act which cannot be performed through an agent as was the case there and yet a condition in connection with it is valid? 
  The reason there is because the various forms of betrothal were compared to one another. 
  R. Ulla b. Abba said in the name of Ulla in the name of R. Elazar: If a man betrothed a woman by a loan and then had intercourse with her, or on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, or with less than the value of a perutah and then had intercourse with her all hold that she requires a get.
  R. Joseph b. Abba said in the name of R. Menahem in the name of R. Ammi:  If a man betrothed a woman with something worth less than a perutah and then had intercourse with her, she requires a get from him. It is only in this case that one would not make a mistake, in other cases he would make a mistake.
  R. Kahana said in the name of Ulla: If a man betrothed a woman on a certain condition and then had intercourse with her, she needs a get from him. Such a case once occurred and the sages could not find the power to release the woman without a get.
  [This is meant] to exclude [the ruling] of the following Tanna. For Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel in the name of R. Ishmael: “And she was not seized” (Numbers 5:13) [only then is she] forbidden. If, however, she was seized she is permitted. There is, however, another [kind of woman] who is permitted even though she was not seized. And who is she? A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken one, even if her son sits riding on her shoulder,
  
  Daf 74b
  
  she may make a declaration of refusal [against her husband] and go away. 
  Our rabbis taught: If she went to a sage [after her betrothal] and he released her vow, her betrothal is valid. [If she went] to a physician who cured her, her betrothal is invalid. What is the difference between a sage and a physician? A sage uproots the vow from its roots, but a physician heals only from now and onward.
  But was it not taught, [that if she went] to a sage and he released her vow or to a physician and he cured her, her betrothal is invalid? Rava said: There is no contradiction. The former represents the view of R. Meir; the latter represents that of R. Elazar. The former represents the view of R. Meir, who holds that a man does not mind his wife being disgraced in a court of law. The latter represents that of R. Elazar who holds that a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in a court of law.
  What is the source [of these statements]?  [The following] as we learned: If a man divorced his wife on account of a vow [she had made], he may not remarry her. On account of a bad name, he may not remarry her
  R. Judah says: In the case of a vow that was made in the presence of many people he may not remarry her, but if it was not made in the presence of many people he may remarry her.  R. Meir says: In the case of a vow which requires the investigation of a sage [for it to be released] he may not remarry her, but if it does not require the investigation of a sage he may remarry her
    R. Elazar said: They only prohibited [remarriage after a vow which] requires [the investigation of a sage] on account [of a vow] which does not require [investigation].  (What is R. Judah's reason?  Because it is written,
  
  Daf 75a
  
  “And the children of Israel did not strike them down, because the princes of the congregation had sworn unto them” (Joshua 9:18). And what is considered “many”? R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: Three; [for the words] “days” implies two [days] and “many” three. R. Yitzchak said: Ten; [for the term] congregation was applied to them.)
  R. Meir says: In the case of a vow which requires the investigation of a sage [for it to be released] he may not remarry her.  R. Elazar said: They only prohibited [remarriage after a vow which] requires [the investigation of a sage] on account [of a vow] which does not require [investigation].  What are they disagreeing about? R. Meir holds that  “a man does not mind his wife's being disgraced by having to go in front of a court of law” and R. Elazar holds that a man would not want his wife to go in front of a court of law.
  Rava said: Here we are dealing with a woman from an important family in which case the man could say, “I do not wish to be prohibited from marrying her relatives.”
  If so, the final clause where it is stated, “But if he went to a sage who released his vow or to a physician who cured him, his betrothal of the woman is valid,” let it instead say, “the betrothal is invalid” and explain, “Here we are dealing with the case of a man from a noted family concerning whom the  woman might say, “I do not wish to be forbidden to marry his relatives”?
  A woman is satisfied with any sort [of husband] as Resh Lakish said. For Resh Lakish stated: “It is preferable to live in grief than to dwell in widowhood.” Abaye said: With a husband [of the size of an] ant her seat is placed among the great.
  R. Papa said: Even if her husband is a wool comber she can still call him to the threshold and sit down [at his side]. R. Ashi said: Even if her husband is only a cabbage-head she requires no lentils for her pot. A Tanna taught: But all such women fornicate and attribute the consequences to their husbands.
  All defects which disqualify etc. A Tanna taught: To these they added [excessive] perspiration, a mole and offensive breath. Do these not disqualify priests? Surely we have learned, “The old, the sick and the polluted” and we have also learned, “These defects whether permanent or impermanent, disqualify a person [from serving in the Temple]!” 
  R. Yose b. Hanina replied: This is no contradiction, the former refers to passing perspiration; the latter to perspiration that is constant
  R. Ashi said: You are pointing out a contradiction between “perspiration” and “one who is polluted.”  There, in the case of priests, it is possible to remove it by the sharpness of wine, and it is also possible [to remove] bad breath by holding pepper in one's mouth and thus performing the Temple service, but in the case of a wife this is not possible.
  What kind of a mole is here meant? If it has hair, it would disqualify in both cases; if one with no hair, [then, again], if it is a large one, it disqualifies in both cases and if it is a small one it does not disqualify in either; for it was taught: A mole which is has hair is regarded as a bodily defect; if it does not have hair, if it is large it regarded as a bodily defect, if it is small it is not a bodily defect; and what is meant by large? R. Shimon b. Gamaliel explained: The size of an Italian issar.
  R. Yose the son of R. Hanina said: One which is found on her forehead. [If it was on] her forehead he must have seen it and accepted it! R. Papa said: It is one that was found under her head covering and is sometimes exposed and sometimes not. 
  R. Hisda said: I heard the following statement from a great man (And who is he? R. Shila). If a dog bit her and the spot of the bite turned into a scar, it is considered a bodily defect. R. Hisda further stated: A thick (or low) voice in a woman is a bodily defect, as it is said, “For your voice is sweet and your appearance beautiful” (Song of Songs 2:14). R. Natan of Bira taught: [The space] of one handbreadth between a woman's breasts.  R. Aha the son of Raba intended to explain in the presence of R. Ashi [that this statement meant that “the space of] a handbreadth” is a good quality, but  R. Ashi said to him: This was taught in connection with bodily defects. And what is such a space? Abaye replied: [A space of] three fingers.
  It was taught: R. Natan said: Any woman, one of whose breasts are bigger than the others—behold this a physical defect. By how much? R. Maysha the grandson of R. Joshua b. Levi replied in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: By one handbreadth. Is such a thing possible? Yes; for Rabbah b. Bar Hana said: I saw an Arab woman who flung her breasts over her back and nursed her child. 
  “But of Zion it shall be said: ‘This man and that was born there; and the Most High Himself will preserve it” (Psalms 87:5).  R. Maysha, grandson of R. Joshua b. Levi, explained: Both he who was born there and he who looks forward to seeing it.  Abaye said: And one of them is better than two of us.  Rava said: When one of us, however, goes up there he is as good as two of them.  For when R. Yirmiyah was here, did not understand what the Rabbis were saying, but when he went up there he was able to refer to us as “the stupid Babylonians.”
  If she had bodily defects while she was still in her father’s house, her father must produce proof that these defects arose after she had been betrothed and that [consequently] it was the husband’s field that was flooded. a) If she was brought into her husband’s domain, [and the defects were discovered there] the husband must produce proof that these defects existed before she had been betrothed and [that consequently] his bargain was made in error—the words of Rabbi Meir.  The Sages say:  To what does this apply? Only to concealed defects;
  
  Daf 75b
  
  but with regard to defects that are exposed he cannot make any claim. b) And if there was a bath-house in the town he cannot make any claim even about concealed defects, because he [is assumed to have had her] examined by his female relatives.
  GEMARA. The reason then is because the father brought proof, but if he did not bring proof, the husband is believed. Whose [view is this]?  It is that of R. Joshua who stated, “We do not live by her words.” 
  Now read the final clause: If she came into her husband’s domain, the husband must bring proof.  The reason then is because the husband brought proof, but if he did not bring proof, the father is believed. [This is the view of] R. Gamaliel who stated that  the woman is believed! R. Elazar replied: The mishnah is broken--he who taught the one did not teach the other.
  Rava said: Do not say that R. Joshua never follows the principle of the presumption about the body. Rather R. Joshua does not follow the principle of the presumption of the body only where it is opposed by the principle of possession.
  When the principle of possession is not applicable R. Joshua does follow the presumption of the body; For it was taught: If the bright spot preceded the white hair, he is impure; if the white hair preceded the bright spot, he is pure. [If the order is in] doubt, he is unclean; but R. Joshua said: It darkened.   What is meant by “it darkened”? Rabbah said: [It is as though the spot] darkened [and, therefore,] he is clean.
  Rava explained: The first clause [is a case of] “Here they were found and here they must have happened” and the final clause is also a case of, “Here they were found and here they must have happened.”
  Abaye raised an objection against him:   If she entered her husband’s, the husband must prove that she had these defects before she had been betrothed and [that, consequently,] his acquisition was made in error. He must prove that they were there before betrothal, but it would not be sufficient if he proved they were there after betrothal! But why not? Let him say, “here they were found, and here they happened.”
  He said back: [The principle cannot be applied if the defects were discovered] after she had been betrothed because we can  assume that no man drinks out of a cup unless he has first examined it;  and this man must consequently have seen [the defects] and acquiesced. 
  If so, [the same principle should apply] also to one [who had defects] prior to her betrothal. Rather, we must say that there is a presumption a man would not be reconciled to bodily defects.  But then here too a man would not be reconciled to bodily defects?
  Rather, [this is the explanation]: After she had been betrothed there are two [principles]: The presumption that one can place the body in its previous presumed status and the presumption that no man drinks out of a cup without first examining it,  and he saw her and was reconciled. What can you say? That there is a presumption that a man would not be reconciled to defects,
  
  Daf 76a
  
  this is one principle against two principles, and we do not invoke one principle against two. [But where the defects were discovered] before betrothal, the presumption that one can place of the body in its previous presumed status cannot be applied, and all that remains he has first examined it and that this man must consequently have seen [the defects] and reconciled himself to them, [but to this it can be retorted:] On the contrary, the presumption is that no man is reconciled to bodily defects, and consequently the money is to remain in the possession of its holder.
  R. Ashi explained: The first clause is a case of, “You owe my father a maneh,” but the second clause is a case of “you owe me a maneh.”
  R. Aha the son of R. Avya raised an objection against R. Ashi: R. Meir admits that in respect of bodily defects likely to have come with her from her father's house it is the father who must produce the proof. But why? Is this not a case of, “You owe me a maneh”?
  What are we dealing with here? With the case of a woman who had a superfluous limb. [But if] she had a superfluous limb what proof could be brought? Proof that the man has seen it and was reconciled to it.
  Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: If a man exchanged a cow for [another man's] doney, and the owner of the donkey drew the cow towards him but the owner of the cow did not manage to pull the donkey before the donkey died, it is for the owner of the donkey to prove that his donkey was alive at the time the cow was pulled.
  And the Tanna [of our Mishnah who taught about]  a bride supports this ruling. Which [ruling concerning the] bride? If you say,
  
  Daf 76b
  
  the one concerning a bride in her father's house, are the two cases similar? There it is the father who produces the proof and receives [the ketubah from the husband] while here it is the owner of the donkey who produces the proof and keeps [the cow].
  R. Abba said: [The ruling concerning a] bride in her father-in-law's house. But [the two cases] are still not similar, for there it is the husband who produces the proof and thereby impairs the presumption of the father, while here it is the owner of the donkey who produces the proof and thereby confirms his presumption!
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: It is similar to the case of the bride in her father's house in respect of her token of betrothal.
  And, do not say [that this applies only] in accordance with him who holds [that a token of]  betrothal is not unreturnable but [it holds good] even according to him who maintains [that a token of] betrothal is unreturnable, since his ruling relates only to certain betrothal, but [not] to doubtful betrothal, where if he brings proof, he may keep the betrothal, if not, not.
  An objection was raised: If a needle was found in the thick walls of the second stomach [of a beast that had been properly slaughtered and it protrudes only] from one of its sides, the beast is kosher; [but if it protruded] from both sides, the beast is terefah. If a drop of blood was found on [the needle] it is certain that [the wound was inflicted] before the ritual killing;  if no drop of blood was found on it, it is certain that [the wound was made] after the killing.
  If the top of the wound was covered with a crust, it is certain that [the wounding occurred] three days prior to the killing; if the top of the wound was not covered with a crust, the burden of the proof is on the claimant. Now if the butcher had already paid the price he would have to produce the required proof and so retrieve his money? Let
  the owner of the beast rather produce the proof and retain [the purchase money]! 
  [This is a case] where the butcher has not yet paid the price. How can you be so sure?
  Rather, when Rami b. Yehezkel came he said, “Pay no regard to those rules which my brother Judah laid down in the name of Shmuel; for thus said Shmuel:  He in whose domain the doubt first arose must produce the proof; and the Tanna [of our Mishnah who taught about] the bride provides support for this ruling.
  An objection was raised: If a needle was found in the thick walls of the second stomach etc. Now, if the butcher has not yet paid the purchase price it would be the owner of the beast who would have to produce the proof and so extract [its price] from [the butcher]; But why? [Has not] the doubt arisen [when the beast was already] in the possession of the butcher? 
  [This is a case] where the butcher has already paid the price.  But how can you be so sure?  It is the usual practice that so long as one man does not pay the price the other does not give his beast.
  The sages say: this applies only to concealed bodily defects. R. Nahman stated:
  
  Daf 77a
  
   Epilepsy is regarded as a concealed bodily defects This, however, applies only to attacks which occur at regular periods, but if they are irregular [epilepsy is regarded] as [one of the] exposed bodily defects.
  A man in whom defects have arisen [after marriage] cannot be forced to divorce [his wife]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: To what does this apply: to minor defects, but with regard to major defects he can be forced to divorce her.
  GEMARA. Rav Judah recited: [The mishnah reads] “have arisen”; Hiyya b. Rav said: [It reads] “were.”  He who taught “have risen” [holds that the ruling applies] all the more so [where the defects] “were” for she was aware of them and accepted them. But the one who taught “were’ [holds that the ruling does] not [apply where the defects] “have arisen.”
  We learned: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: To what does this apply: to minor defects, but with regard to major defects he can be forced to divorce her. Now, according to him who reads, “have arisen” it makes sense to distinguish between major defects and minor defects. But according to he who reads, “were,” what [it may be asked] is the difference between major defects and minor ones? She accepted them in any case!?
  She may have thought that she would be able to accept them but now she finds that she is unable to accept them. What are major defects? R. Shimon b. Gamaliel explained: If, for instance, his eye was blinded, his hand was cut off or his leg was broken. 
  It was stated: R. Abba b. Jacob said in the name of R. Yohanan: The halakhah is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel. Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: The halakhah is in agreement with the sages.
  But could R. Yohanan have made such a statement?  Hurely Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Yohanan:  Wherever R. Shimon b. Gamaliel taught in our Mishnah, the halakhah is in agreement with his ruling except [in the cases of] “guarantor” “Zidon” and the “last proof”! There is an amoraic dispute as to what R. Yohanan said.
  These are the ones who are forced to divorce [their wives]:  one who is afflicted with boils, one who has a polypus, a gatherer [of dog feces for the treatment of hides], a coppersmith or a tanner —whether they were [in such a condition] before they married or whether they arose after they had married.  And concerning all these Rabbi Meir said: although the man made a condition with her [that she accept him despite these defects] she may nevertheless say, “I thought I could accept him, but now I cannot accept him.” 
  The Sages say: she must accept [such a person] against her will, the only exception being a man afflicted with boils, because she [by her intercourse] will enervate him. It once happened at Sidon that a tanner died, and he had a brother who was also a tanner.  The Sages said: she may say, “I was able to accept your brother but I cannot accept you.”
  GEMARA. What [is meant by one] What is “one who has a polypus?” Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: [One who suffers from an offensive] nasal smell. In a baraita it was taught: [One suffering from] offensive breath. R. Assi taught these in the reverse order and supplied the mnemonic,  “Shmuel did not stop his mouth from reciting all of the chapter.”
  “Who gathers”. What does “who gathers” mean? Rav Judah said: One who gathers dogs’ excrement.  They objected: “One who gathers” this refers to a tanner. But even according to your view, would not the Mishnah be a difficulty,  “One who gathers, or is a coppersmith or a tanner.”
  One may well explain why our Mishnah is not a difficulty because the latter refers to a great tanner while the former refers to a small tanner;  but according to Rav Judah there remains a difficulty? This is a dispute among Tannaim. For it was taught: “One who gathers” this is a “tanner;” and others say: It refers to “one who gathers dogs’ excrement.”
  Or is a coppersmith or a tanner. What is meant by a coppersmith? R. Ashi said: A kettle-smith. Rabbah b. Bar Hana explained: One who digs copper from a mine. It was taught in agreement with Rabbah b. Bar Hana: What is meant by a coppersmith? One who digs copper from a mine. 
  Rav stated: If a husband says, “I will neither maintain nor support [my wife],” he must divorce her and give her her ketubah. R. Elazar went and recited this statement in front of Shmuel [who]  exclaimed, “Make Elazar eat barley; rather than force him to divorce her they should force him to maintain her.”
  And Rav? One should not be forced to live with a serpent in the same basket.  When R. Zera went up he found R. Benjamin b. Yafet sitting and reporting this statement in the name of R. Yohanan. He said to him, “For this statement they fed Elazar barley in Babylonia.”
  Rav Judah said in the name of R. Assi:  We do not force divorce except [in the case of] those who are disqualified from marriage.  When I said this in the presence of Shmuel he said, “As, for instance, a widow [who was married] to a High Priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah to a common priest, a mamzer or a netinah to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite to a natin or a mamzer; But if a man married a woman and lived with her ten years and she bore no child they do not force him to divorce her.
  R. Tahlifa b. Abimi stated in the name of Shmuel: Even if married a woman and lived with her ten years and she bore no child they force him to divorce her We learned: The following are compelled to divorce [their wives]: a man who is afflicted with boils or has a polypus This can make sense to R. Assi [for he could say] they taught cases where rabbinic law [compels divorce] but not those forbidden according to the Torah However, to R. Tahlifa b. Abimi the Mishnah should have also taught: If a man married a woman and lived with her for ten years and she bore no child he may be compelled [to divorce her]. 
  R. Nahman replied: This is no difficulty.  In one case they force him with whips, and in the other they force him with words. R. Abba objected: “A servant will not be corrected by words” (Proverbs 29:19) Rather R. Abba said:  In both cases they force him with whips
  
  Daf 77b
  
  but in the former,  if she said, “I wish to be with him,” she is allowed [to live with him] while in the latter, even if she said, “I wish to be with him,” she is not allowed [to continue to live with him]. But behold [the case of the man who was] afflicted with boils with whom the woman is not allowed to live even if she said, “I wish to be with him’, for we learned:  except for a man afflicted with boils because she [by her intercourse] will enervate him,” and this case was nevertheless taught!
  There, if she were to say, “I will live with him under [the supervision of] witnesses,” she would be allowed [to remain with him] but here, even if she were to say, “I will live with him under [the supervision of] witnesses,” she would not be allowed to do so. 
  It was taught: R. Yose said: An old man of the inhabitants of Jerusalem told me, “There are twenty-four [kinds of] skin disease, and the rabbis said about all of them, “Intercourse is dangerous to them,” but those afflicted with ra’atan have it worst of all.  What is the cause of it? As it was taught: If a man had his blood let and then had intercourse, he will have feeble children; if both had their blood let and then had intercourse they will have children afflicted with ra'athan. R. Papa stated: This has been said only in the case where nothing was eaten [after the bleeding] but if something was eaten there is no danger.
  What are the symptoms?  His eyes tear, his nostrils run, spit flows from his mouth and flies swarm about him. What is the cure? Abaye said:  Pila, ladanum, the rind of a nut tree, the shavings of a dressed hide, melilot and the calyx of a red date-tree. These must be boiled together and carried into a house of marble,  and if no marble house is available they may be carried into a house [the walls of which are of the thickness] of seven bricks and a half. 
  Three hundred cups [of the mixture] must then be poured upon his head until his cranium is softened, and then his brain is cut open.  Four leaves of myrtle must be brought and each foot [in turn] lifted up and one [leaf] placed [beneath it]. It is then grasped with a pair of tweezers and burned; for otherwise it would return to him.
  R. Yohanan announced:  Beware of the flies of those afflicted with ra’atan. R. Zera never sat down wind from such a sufferer. R. Elazar never entered his tent. R. Ammi and R. Assi never ate any of the eggs coming from the alley in which he lived.  R. Joshua b. Levi attached himself to these [sufferers] and studied the Torah; for he said,  “A lovely hind and a graceful doe” (Proverbs 5:19): If [the Torah] bestows grace upon those who study it, would it not also protect them?
  When he was about to die they said to the Angel of Death: Go and carry out his wish. He came and appeared to him: He said: “Show me my place [in Eden].” He replied: “Very well.” He said: “Give me your knife, lest you may frighten me on the way.” He gave it to him. When he arrived there he lifted him up and showed him [his place]. The latter jumped and dropped on the other side [of the wall]. 
  He seized him by the corner of his cloak; but the other exclaimed, “I swear that I will not go back.”  The Holy One, blessed be He, said, “If he ever had an oath of his annulled he must return; but if not, he need not return.” He said to him; “Give me back my knife.” But the other would not return it to him. A bat kol (heavenly voice) went forth and said to him, “Give it back to him, for it is required for the mortals.” Elijah heralded him proclaiming:  “Make room for the son of Levi, make room for the son of Levi.”
  He went and found R. Shimon b. Yohai sitting on thirteen stools of gold.  He said to him:  “Are you the son of Levi?” He said: “Yes.” “Has a rainbow ever appeared to you in your lifetime?”  He replied.  “Yes.” “If that is so [the other said] you are not the son of Levi.”  But this is not so. Rather, he thought to himself, “I must take no credit for myself.”
  R. Hanina b. Papa was his friend, and when he was about to die the Angel of Death was commanded,  “Go and carry out any wish of his.” He went to him and revealed himself to him. The latter said to him, “Leave me for thirty days so I can go over my learning,” for it was said, “Happy is he who comes here in full possession of his Talmud.”  He left him,  and after thirty days he appeared to him again.  The latter said to him, “Show me my place [in Eden].”   He said:  “Give me your knife, lest you may frighten me on the way.” He said back, “Do you wish to treat me as your friend has done?”
  He said, “Bring a Sefer Torah and see if there is anything written in that I have not observed.”  He said to him, “Have you attached yourself to the sufferers of ra'atan and engaged in the study of the Torah?” Nevertheless when he died, a pillar of fire formed a partition between him and the world; and we have it as a tradition that such a partition by a pillar of fire is made only for one person in a generation or for two in a generation.
  R. Alexandri approached him and said, “Do it for the honor of the Sages,” but he disregarded him “Do it for the honor of your father's house,” but he again disregarded him “Do it for your own honor's” [and the pillar of fire] departed.  Abaye remarked: [The purpose of the pillar of fire was] to keep away anyone who had failed to observe even a single letter [of the Torah].  R. Ada b. Matana to him: [This then would also] exclude the Master, since he has no parapet to his roof But this is not so, he did indeed have one, but the wind had thrown it down at that moment.
  R. Hanina said: Why are there no sufferers from ra’atan in Babylon? Because they eat beets and drink beer containing hizme. R. Yohanan stated: Why are there no lepers in Babylon? Because they eat beets, drink beer, and bathe in the waters of the Euphrates
  May we return to you [chapter] “One who vows that his wife.”
  
  Daf 78a
  
  If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid.  If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. 
  Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” 1) He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”
  If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” 2) He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and do you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”
  Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one kind of property and another:  Property that is known to the husband [the wife] may not sell, and if she has sold it or given it away her act is void;  [Property] which is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she has sold it or given it away her act is legally valid.
  GEMARA. What is the difference between the first clause in which they do not disagree and the succeeding clause in which they do disagree?
  They said in the school of R. Yannai: In the first clause the property came into her possession; in the succeeding clause the property came into his possession.
  If the property “came into his possession” when she sold it or gave it way, why is the [sale or gift] valid? Rather, this [is the explanation:] In the first clause the property has certainly come into her possession. In the succeeding clause, we might say it came into her possession, or we might say it has come into his possession. Therefore, ab initio, she should not sell [the property] but if she did sell it, her sale is valid.
  Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, The question was raised: Does R. Judah refer to [the position that holds that she may sell] ab initio or to the [position that holds that the sale is valid] ex post facto?
  
  Daf 78b
  
  Come and hear what was taught in the following. R. Judah stated: They argued before R. Gamaliel, “Since this one is his wife and the other is his wife, just as a sale by the former is invalid so also should a sale by the latter be invalid.”  He replied, “We are in an embarrassed condition with regard to [the problem of] her new possessions and you wish to involve us [in the problem of] her old ones also?” Thus it may be inferred  that he referred to a case of ex post facto also. Learn from this. It was taught: R. Hanina b. Akavia said: 
  This is not how R. Gamaliel responded to the sages, rather this is how he responded: “[There is] no [comparison]; if you say [the ruling] applies to a married woman whose husband is entitled to her finds, to her handiwork and to the annulment of her vows, will you say it also applies to a betrothed woman whose husband is not entitled either to her finds or to her handiwork or to the annulment of her vows?”
  They said to him: “Rabbi, [this makes sense] if she sold the property before she was married; but what if she was married and then sold the property?”  He said to them:  “Even this one may sell or give away, and her act is valid.” They argued, “Since he gained possession of the woman should he not also gain possession of her property?” He said to them, “We are quite embarrassed about [the problem of] her new possessionsand you wish to involve us [in the problem of] her old ones also!”
  But, surely, we learned, [If she came into possession] before she was married, and subsequently was married, Rabban Gamaliel said: If she had sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid!
  R. Zevid said: Read: She may sell or give away and her act is valid. R. Papa said: There is no difficulty, for one is the view of R. Judah on R. Gamaliel's opinion while the other is the view of R. Hanina b. Akavia on R. Gamaliel's opinion. Is R. Hanina b. Akavia then in agreement with Beth Shammai? It is this that he meant: Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel do not disagree on this.
  Both Rav and Shmuel stated: Whether a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed or whether she came into possession after she was betrothed her husband may, [if she sold it] after she married, take it away from the buyers.
  Who does this agree with? It is not like R. Judah nor is it like R. Hanina b. Akavia? They rule like our rabbis;  for it was taught: Our rabbis took a recount [of votes, and decided that] whether a woman came into the possession [of property] before she was betrothed or whether she came into its possession after she was betrothed, her husband may, [if she sold it] take it away from the buyers.
  After she was married, both agree [that if she sold the property, the sale is not valid]. Did they teach the enactment of Usha, for R. Yose the son of R. Hanina stated: It was enacted at Usha that if a woman sold pluckable property during the lifetime of her husband and she died, the husband may seize it from the buyers!
  Our Mishnah refers to during the woman's lifetime for the purposes of usufruct [only]; the enactment of Usha [refers to the seizure] of the land itself after her death. 
  Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one kind of property and another etc. Which kind is regarded as know, and which as unknown? R. Yose the son of R. Hanina replied: “Known” refers to land; “Unknown” refers to movable property. But R. Yohanan said: Both are regarded as “known.” So what is “unknown”? Whenever a woman lives in a certain place and she comes into the possession of property in a country beyond the sea. 
  So it was also taught in a baraita: The following is considered “unknown. Wherever a woman lives in a certain place and comes into the possession of property in a country beyond the sea.
  A certain woman who wanted to deprive her [intended] husband of her estate assigned it in writing to her daughter. After she married and was divorced
  
  Daf 79a
  
  she came before R. Nahman [to claim the return of her estate] and R. Nahman tore up the deed. Anan went to Mar Ukba and said to him, “See, Master, how Nahman the farmer tears up people’s deeds.” He said back to him, “Tell me how exactly the incident occurred.
  He replied, “It happened in such and such a way.” He responded, “Do you refer to the deed of a woman intended as a means of evasion? Thus said R. Hanilai b. Idi in the name of Shmuel: I am an officially recognized judge, and should a deed which a woman intended as a means of evasion come into my hand I would tear it up. 
  Rava said to R. Nahman: What is the reason? Because a person would not neglect himself and give his property away to others. But this would apply to strangers only, but to a daughter one would give [away property]! Even in the case of a daughter a woman prefers to [keep her property] for herself.
  An objection was raised: If a woman desires to keep her property from her husband, what is she to do? She writes out a deed of trust to a stranger, the words of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel.
  But the sages says: If he wishes he may laugh at her unless she wrote out for him: “[You shall acquire possession] from this day as long as I consent.”  
  The reason then is because she wrote out for him in the manner prescribed; but had she not done so, the buyer would have acquired it? 
  Zera said: There is no difficulty. One ruling refers to [a woman who has assigned to the stranger] all her property; the other to [a woman who assigned to a stranger] a part of her property.
  But if the buyer does not acquire her property the husband should acquire it!  Abaye replied: It was treated as property unknown to the husband and in accordance with the view of R. Shimon.
  [If a married woman] came into the possession of money, land should be bought with the money and the husband is entitled to the usufruct. [If she came into the possession of] produce that was detached from the ground, land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.
  [If it was] produce attached to the ground—Rabbi Meir says, the land is to be valued as to how much it is worth with the produce and how much without the produce, and with the difference land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct. The Sages say: produce attached to the ground belongs to the husband and produced detached from it belongs to the wife; [with the proceeds from the latter] land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.
  Rabbi Shimon says: In respect to that in which the husband is at an advantage when he marries his wife he is at a disadvantage when he divorces her and in respect to that in which he is at a disadvantage when he marries her he is at an advantage when he divorces her. How? Produce which is attached to the ground is the husband’s when he marries his wife and hers when he divorces her, Produce that is detached from the ground is hers when she marries but the husband’s when she is divorced.
  GEMARA. It is obvious [that if husband and wife differ on the choice of purchase between] land and houses, land [is bought]. [If they differ on the choice between] houses and date-trees, houses [are bought]. [If they insist respectively on] date-trees and other fruit trees, date-trees [are bought]. [If their dispute is on] fruit trees and vines, fruit trees [are bought].
  [What, however, is the ruling if the husband desires to purchase] a thicket of sorb or a fish pond? Some maintain  that it is regarded as produce; and others maintain that it is regarded as capital. This is the general rule: If the stump grows new shoots it is regarded as (capital) produce, but if the stump grows no new shoots it is regarded as (produce) capital.
  Zera stated in the name of R. Oshaia in the name of R. Yannai (others say, R. Abba stated in the name of R. Oshaia in the name of R. Yannai): One who steals
  
  Daf 79b
  
  the offspring of a melog animal he must pay double its value to the woman.
  In accordance with whom? It does not accord with the Rabbis nor with Hananiah? For it was taught: The young of a melog beast belongs to the husband; the child of a melog slave woman belongs to the wife; but Hananiah the son of Yoshayah’s brother ruled, The child of a melog slave woman has been given the same legal status as the young of a melog beast!
  It may be said to agree even with everyone’s opinions, for it is the produce alone that the rabbis assigned to the husband but not the produce that accrues from this produce.
  [The view] of Hananiah makes on the assumption that we are not concerned about death,
  but [what principle is followed by] the Rabbis? If they do take into consideration the possibility of death, even the offspring of a melog beast also should not [belong to the husband], and if they do not take the possibility of death into consideration, then even the offspring of a slave woman also [should belong to the husband]!
  They do in fact take the possibility of death into consideration, but the case of the beast is different [from that of a slave] since its skin remains. 
  Huna b. Hiyya stated in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah is in agreement with Hananiah. Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: Although Shmuel said, “The halakhah is in agreement with Hananiah,” Hananiah agrees that if the woman is divorced she may pay the price [of the slave woman’s children] and take them because [they constitute] the pride of her paternal house [which she is entitled to retain].
  Rava stated in the name of R. Nahman: If a woman brought to her husband a goat for milking, a ewe for shearing, a hen for laying eggs, or a date-tree for producing fruit, he may go on eating [the yield of any of these] until the capital is consumed. Nahman stated: If a woman brought to her husband a cloak [its use] is [to be regarded as] produce and he may continue to use it as a covering until it is worn out.
  In accordance with whom? In accordance with the following tanna, for it has been taught: Salt or sand is regarded as produce; a sulfur quarry or an aluminum mine: R. Meir says: It is regarded as capital, but the sages say:  As produce.
  Shimon said: In a case where the husband is at an advantage. R. Shimon’s view is identical [with that of] the first tanna? Rava said: The difference between them is [the case of produce that was] attached at the time of the divorce. 
  If she inherited old slaves or female slaves, they are to be sold, and land purchased with the proceeds, and the husband can enjoy the usufruct. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: she need not sell them, because they are the glory of her father’s house. If she inherited old olive-trees or vines they must be sold, and land purchased with the proceeds, and the husband can enjoy the usufruct. Rabbi Judah says: she need not sell them, because they are the glory of her paternal house. 
  GEMARA. R. Kahana said in the name of Rav: There is a dispute only where [the olive-trees or vines] fell [to the woman] in her own field, but [if they were] in a field that did not belong to her all agree that she must sell them; because [otherwise] the capital would be finished up.
  Joseph raised a difficulty: Are not slaves or female slaves the same as [trees in] a field that does not belong to her and there is nevertheless a dispute? Rather if it was said, it was said in the following way: R. Kahana said in the name of Rav, They differ only where [the olive-trees and vines] fell [to the woman] in a field that did not belong to her but [if they were] in her own field all agree that she need not sell them because they are the glory of her paternal house.
  He who spent money in connection with his wife’s property, whether he spent much and consumed little, [or spent] little and consumed much, what he has spent he has spent, and what he has consumed he has consumed.   If he spent but did not consume he may take an oath as to how much he has spent and receive compensation.
  GEMARA. How much is considered “little”? Assi said: Even one dried fig; but this applies only where he ate it in a dignified manner.  Abba said:
  
  Daf 80a
  
   At the school of Rav it was stated, Even the refuse of dates. Bibi asked: What [is the ruling in respect of] a mash of pressed dates? Let this question stand.
  What [is the ruling if] he did not eat it in a dignified manner?  Ulla said: Two Amoraim in the west disagreed about this: One says: The value of an issar; and the other says, The value of a dinar.
  The judges of Pumbedita say: Rav Judah issued a practical decision in [a case where the husband used up some] bundles of vine-shoots. Rav Judah follows his own principle; for Rav Judah ruled: If he ate [during one of the three years] only orlah, [the produce of] the Sabbatical year, or kilayim   this counts [towards the three years of] hazakah.
  Ya’akov said in the name of R. Hisda: A man who has incurred expenses on the property of his minor wife is like who incurred expenses on the property of another. What is the reason?  The rabbis made an enactment in order that he should not allow her property to deteriorate.
  A woman once came into the possession of four hundred zuz at Bet Hoze. Her husband went and spent six hundred [on his journey] and brought with him the four hundred. While he was on his way back he required one zuz and took it out from them. When he came before R. Ammi the latter ruled: What he has spent he has spent and what he used he has used.
  The rabbis said to R. Ammi: This applies only where he consumes the produce, but here he used up the capital which [constituted a part of] the expenditure? If so, he replied, he is one who spent but did not consume, then he may take an oath as to how much he has spent and receive his compensation.
  He may take an oath as to how much he has spent and receive compensation. Assi said: This applies only where the appreciation corresponds to the expenditure. What is the practical result of this law?  Abaye said: That if the appreciation exceeded the expenditure he receives the sum of his outlay without an oath.
  Rava said to him: If so, he might come to act deceptively! Rather Rava said [that the implication of the law is] that if the expenditures exceeded the appreciation he is only entitled to receive that amount of his expenditure which corresponds to the appreciations and [even this can be obtained only] by an oath.
  The question was raised: A husband who send sharecroppers in his place—what is the rule?  Does [the sharecropper] go down [into the fields] relying on the husband, [and, consequently,] when the husband forfeits his claim they also lose theirs, or does a sharecropper possibly go down [into the fields] relying on the [yield of] the land, and land, surely is usually entrusted to sharecroppers?    
  Rava son of R. Hanan raised an objection: How does this differ from one who went down into a neighbor’s field and planted it without the owner’s authority where an assessment is made and he is at a disadvantage?
  In that case there was no other person to take the trouble; but here there is the husband who should have taken the trouble.
  What then is the decision on the matter? Huna the son of R. Joshua said: We examine [the conditions of each case]: If the husband is a sharecropper, when the husband loses his claim, the sharecroppers lose their claim; if the husband is not a sharecropper, the land is entrusted to the sharecroppers.
  The question was raised: A husband sold [his wife’s] land for usufruct Do we say that whatever he possesses he may transfer to others, or is it possible that the rabbis granted the usufruct to the husband only 
  
  Daf 80b
  
  in order to provide for the comfort of his home but not so that he should sell it? Judah Mar b. Meremar said in the name of Rava: Whatever he has done is done. Papa said in the name of Rava: His act has no validity.
  Papa said: The statement of Judah Mar b. Meremar was not explicitly stated but was arrived at by inference. For a woman once brought to her husband two slave women, and then the man went and married another wife and assigned to her one of them.
  [When the first wife] came before Rava and cried, he paid no attention to her. One who observed [the incident] thought [that Rava’s inaction] was due to his view that whatever the husband did is valid; but in fact, it is not so. [Usufruct granted to a husband] in order to provide for the comfort of his house and here, comfort was provided.
  And the law is that if a husband sold [his wife’s] field for its usufruct his act has no legal validity. What is the reason? Abaye said: Lest the land deteriorate.   Raba said: In order [to safeguard] the comfort of his house.
  What is the practical difference between them? The practical difference between them is the case of land that was adjoining a town; or else where the husband [himself] was [acting as] a sharecropper,  or else where [the husband] receives money and uses it for trade.
  If a woman awaiting yibbum came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid.
  If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her?   Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father;   Beth Hillel says: he property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father.  
  If his brother left money, land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct. [If his brother left] produce that was detached from the ground, land shall be bought [out of the proceeds] and he enjoys the usufruct.
  [If it was] produce attached to the ground: Rabbi Meir says, the land is to be valued as to how much it is worth with the produce and how much without the produce, and with the difference land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct.
  The Sages say: produce attached to the ground belongs to the husband but that which is detached from the ground belongs to the first person who takes it: If he [seized it] first he acquires ownership; and if she [seized it] first land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct.
  If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate.
  He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah. So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah.
  If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.
  GEMARA. The question was raised: If a woman awaiting the decision of a levir died, who is responsible for burying her? Do her husband’s heirs bury her because they inherit her ketubah   or do the heirs of her father bury her because they inherit the property that comes in and goes out with her? Amram said: Come and hear what was taught: If a woman awaiting the decision of a levir died,
  
  Daf 81a
  
  it is the duty of her heirs, those who inherit her ketubah, to bury her. Abaye said: We also have learned this in a mishnah: A widow is to be maintained out of the estate of [her deceased husband’s] orphans, and her handiwork belongs to them. They are not obligated to bury her; it is the duty of her heirs, those who inherit her ketubah, to bury her. Now, what widow is it that has two kinds of heirs? I would say she who is awaiting the decision of a levir.
  Rava said: But let him say, “I am inheriting my brother; I am not burying his wife!”  Abaye replied: Because they come at him from two sides:   If he is heir to his brother he should bury his wife; if he does not bury his wife he should return her ketubah.
  Rava responded: This is what I am saying: [The brother could say], “I am inheriting my brother; I am not burying his wife; and if [I am expected to bury her] because of the ketubah, a ketubah is not payable during [the husband’s] lifetime”?
  From whom did we learn that a midrash may be made on the ketubah? Bet Shammai. But we have also heard Bet Shammai say that  a document which is due for payment is regarded as repaid.
  For we have learned: If their husbands died before they drank, Bet Shammai says that  they take their ketubah and that they do not drink, and Bet Hillel say that they either drink or they do not receive their ketubah.
  [How can they say,] “They either drink,” it says in the Torah, “Then the man shall bring his wife to the priest” (Numbers 5:15) and he is not there? Rather,  since they cannot drink they do not receive their ketubah.
  Bet Shammai says that they receive their ketubah and that they need not drink. But why [should they receive their ketubah]? This is a claim of a doubtful nature, it being uncertain whether she had committed adultery or not; then how could an uncertainty override a certainty?  
  Bet Shammai holds that “a document that is due for payment is regarded as repaid.”
  But do we not require, “When you will be married to another man you will receive what is written for you” and this has not happened?
  Ashi said: A levir is also regarded as “another man.”
  Rava sent [the following message] to Abaye through R. Shemaya b. Zera: Is the ketubah indeed payable during [the levir’s] lifetime?
  Has it not in fact, been taught: R. Abba stated, “I asked Symmachus: ‘One who wants to sell his brother’s property, how is he to proceed’  [and he replied,] ‘If he is a priest, he should prepare a banquet and use persuasive means.’ If he is an Israelite he may divorce her and then marry her again.’”
  
  Daf 81b
  
  Now if it could be assumed that a ketubah is payable during the lifetime [of the levir] why should he not set aside some property equal in value to the amount of the ketubah, and then sell the rest?  But according to your argument  [it might be asked] why should not the same objection be raised from our Mishnah [where it was stated,] He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah is lying on the table.” Rather all his property is pledged for her ketubah?
  There it was only teaching us good advice, for if you did not say this, [how would you] read the final clause where it is stated: So, too, a husband must not say to his wife, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table,” rather all his property is pledged for her ketubah, would he here also [it may be asked] not be able to sell if he wished to do so? Rather, there it was just teaching us good advice; and similarly here it is also teaching us good advice.
  But R. Abba’s statement is now difficult! Abba’s statement is also not difficult: He may not sell her property because of enmity.
  There once was a man in Pumbedita whose sister-in-law became liable for levirate marriage with him. His [younger] brother wanted to cause her to be forbidden to marry him by giving her a get. He [the eldest brother] said to him,
  “What is it that you have in your mind? [Are you troubled] because of the property [that I all, to inherit]?   I will share the property with you.”
  Joseph said: Since the Rabbis have said that he may not sell, his sale is invalid even if he had already sold it. For it was taught: If a man died and left a widow who was awaiting the decision of a levir and also left property of the value of a hundred maneh, [the levir] must not sell the property although the widow’s ketubah amounts only to one maneh, because all his property is pledged to her ketubah.
  Abaye said to him: And anywhere the rabbis ruled that one must not sell, even if he sold it, the sale is invalid? But did we not teach: Beth Shammai said: She may sell it, and Beth Hillel said, She may not sell it; but both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid? The case was sent to R. Hanina b. Papi who sent [the same reply] as that of R. Joseph.
  On this Abaye remarked: Has R. Hanina b. Papi hung jewels upon it? They then sent it to R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihume.  He sent [the same reply] as Abaye [and added:] “Should R. Joseph give a new reason report it to me.”
  Joseph went out, investigated, and discovered that it was taught:  If a man who had a monetary claim against his brother died, and left a widow who had to await the decision of a levir,  he may not say, “Since I am the heir I have acquired [the amount of the debt].” Rather it must be taken from the levir and spent on the purchase of land and he is only entitled to its usufruct.
  Abaye said to him, “Perhaps they just did that because it is in his own interests?” He [R. Joseph] said: The tanna taught “it must be taken,” and you say “they just did that because it is in his own interests.”
  The case was again sent to R. Minyomi the son of R. Nihumai. He said to them: “Thus said R. Joseph b. Minyomi in the name of R. Nahman, ‘This is not a teaching.’”
  What is the reason? If you say, “Because is is a movable thing and movable things are not pledged to a ketubah,” perhaps it reflects the opinion of R. Meir who holds that movable things are pledged to a ketubah?
  Rather, because he could say to her: You are not the party I have to deal with.
  
  Daf 82a
  
  Perhaps it accords with the view of R. Nathan, since it was taught: R. Nathan stated, “From where do we known that if a man claims a maneh from another, and this one [claims a similar sum] from a third, the sum is to be collected from the last and handed over to the first? Scripture says, “And he shall give it to the one to whom he is guilty” (Numbers 5:7).
  We find nowhere one who holds by both stringencies in the matter of the ketubah; rather one holds either like R. Meir or like R. Natan.
  Rava remarked: If so, I can understand what Abaye meant when I heard him say, “This is not an authentic mishnah” and [at the time] I did not understand what [his reason] was.
  There was a man in Mata Mehasia whose sister became liable for yibbum with him.  His brother wanted to cause her to be forbidden to marry him by giving her a get. He said to him: What do you have in mind? If it is on account of the property, I will share the estate with you. The other replied, “I am afraid that you will treat me like that Pumbedian cheater [treated his brother].” He said to him, “If you want, take half now.
  Mar bar R. Ashi said: Even though when R. Dimi came he stated in the name of R. Yohanan, If a man said to another, “Go and draw  this cow, but it will not be acquired by you for thirty days,” he legally acquires it after thirty days, even if it stands at the time in the meadow.
  In that case, he would have been able [to give him the cow now] but in this case he could not give him [half of the inheritance now].
  But, surely, when Rabin came be stated in the name of R. Yohanan:  “He does not acquire possession”! This is no difficulty: One refers to a case where the seller said, “Acquire possession from now,” the other, where he did not say, “Acquire from now.”
  They asked Ulla: What is the ruling where levirate marriage was consummated first and then he divided the property?   [He replied]: He has done nothing. What if he divided the property and then performed levirate marriage? He has done nothing.
  Sheshet raised a difficulty: Now [when] he performed levirate marriage and then divided the property, the division is null and void, was it at all necessary [to ask the question where] the division took place first and the levirate marriage afterwards? These were two independent incidents.
  When Rabin came he stated in the name of Resh Lakish: Whether he first performed levirate marriage and then divided the property or divided the property and then performed levirate marriage, the act is null and void. And the law is that the act is null and void.
  The sages say: what is still attached to the ground belongs to him.  But why? Is not all his of his property a pledge and a guarantee for her ketubah? Resh Lakish said: Read,  “Belongs to her.”
  If he married her she is regarded as his wife. What is the practical ramification of this? Yose the son of R. Hanina said: By this is meant that he must divorce her with a get and he may remarry her. “He divorces her with a get”; This is obvious?
  What might you have thought?  Since the Torah says, “And has levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:2) she is still subject to the original levirate obligations and a get is not sufficient for her, and she also requires halitzah. Therefore it teaches us.
  “He may marry her again.” This is obvious!
  
  Daf 82b
  
  What might you have thought? Since he has already performed the commandment that God imposed on him she shall again become prohibited to him by being his brother’s wife,  hence it teaches us [that he may remarry her].
  But might it not be suggested that the law is so indeed? The verse stated, “And take her to him to wife,” (Deuteronomy 25:5)  once he has taken her she becomes his wife [in all respects]. 
  Except that her ketubah remains a charge on her first husband’s estate. What is the reason? A wife was given to him from heaven. 
  If she cannot receive her ketubah from her first husband she receives one from the second in order that it may not be easy for him to divorce her.
  He cannot say to her, “behold your ketubah” [etc.]. What [need was there for stating] “so too”?
  What might you have said? [That the restriction mentioned applies only] in the former case because the levir does not write [in the ketubah] “That which I acquired and that which I will acquire,” but here, where he does write, ‘That which I acquired and that which I will acquire,” she relies upon this guarantee, hence it needed to teach us this in both cases.
  If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he divorced her [may he sell the property], but if he did not divorce her he may not. This teaches us like R. Abba.
  If he remarried her she is the same as all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her! What does this teach us?  Have we not learned: If a man divorced his wife and then remarried her, his second marriage is contracted on the terms of her first ketubah?
  What might you have thought? [This is true of] his wife, since it was he himself who wrote the ketubah; but the case of his yevamah, since it was not he who wrote the ketubah for her, when he divorced her and remarried her the ketubah should come from him, therefore it taught [that in this case also she is entitled only to the first ketubah].
  Rav Judah said: At first they used to write for a virgin’s ketubah two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently they grew old and could not take any wives, until Shimon b. Shetah came and ordained that all the property of a husband is pledged for the ketubah of his wife.  
  It was also taught thus: At first they used to write for a virgin’s ketubah two hundred zuz and for a widow a maneh, and consequently they grew old and could not take any wives.  So they established that he should deposit the money in her father’s house. Still whenever he would get angry with her he used to tell her, “Go to your ketubah.” They ordained that the amount of the ketubah was to be deposited in the house of her father-in-law.   
  Wealthy women make it into silver, or gold baskets, while poor women would make it into tubs.
  Still, whenever the husband would get angry with his wife he would say to her,   “Take your kethubah and go.” Until Shimon b. Shetah came and ordained that all the property of a husband is pledged for the ketubah of his wife.
  May we return to you, chapter “Ha’Ishah”
  
  Daf 83a
  
  If a husband writes to his wife, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”, he may enjoy its usufruct during her lifetime and, when she dies, he is her heir. If so, why might he have written to her, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”? That if she sold it or gave it away her act is valid. 
  If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon their produce”, he may not enjoy their usufruct during her lifetime but, when she dies, he inherits her.  Rabbi Judah says: he may in all cases enjoy the usufruct from the usufruct unless he wrote to her: “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon its produce and the produce of its produce and so on without end.”
  If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property, its produce and the produce of its produce during your lifetime and after your death”, he may neither enjoy it produce dies. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: when she dies he inherits her because [by his declaration] he is making a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah and whenever a man makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void.
  GEMARA. R. Hiyya taught:  If a husband said to his wife. 
  And if he wrote this what does it matter? Was it not taught: One who says to another, “I have no claim whatsoever on this field, I have no concern in it and I entirely dissociate myself from it,” his statement is of no effect?
  The school of R. Yannai said: It refers to of a man who wrote this to her while she was still only betrothed to him. This is in accordance with the statement of R. Kahana: R. Kahana said: An inheritance that is coming to a person from another source, a person can make a stipulation that he will not inherit it. And this is also in accordance with a statement by Rava,  Rava said: that if anyone says, “I do not desire [to avail myself] of such an ordinance of the rabbis, he is listened to. 
  What [is meant by the expression] “such as this”? As [that referred to in the statement made by] R. Huna in the name of Rav, for R. Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman may say to her husband, “I do not wish either to be maintained by you or to work for you.”
  If so, should not [the same ruling apply to] a married woman also? 
  Abaye replied: In the case of a married woman the husband's rights have the same force as the wife's Rava said: His rights are superior to hers. What is the practical difference between their opinions? A woman who was awaiting the decision of the levir. 
  They asked:. What is the ruling if symbolic kinyan was executed [at the time of the renunciation]?  R. Joseph said: [The kinyan is invalid since] it was related only to words.  R. Nahman said: [The kinyan is valid because] it related to land itself.  Abaye said: R. Joseph's statement makes sense 
  
  Daf 83b
  
  where [the partner] protested immediately, but if he delayed, the kinyan must be regarded as relating to the land itself
  Amemar said: The law is that the kinyan is taken to refer to the land itself.  R. Ashi said to Amemar: [Do you speak] of one who protested immediately or of one who delayed it?  For what purpose does this matter? In respect of [determining whether the law is] in agreement with the view of R. Joseph.  He [Amemar] said to him: “I did not hear this” meaning to say, “I do not accept it.
  If so, why did he write to her etc. But let her say to him, “You have renounced all your claims”? Abaye said: The holder of a deed is always at a disadvantage. 
  But say [that he renounced his rights to] the usufruct?  Abaye said: A young pumpkin [in hand] is better than a full-grown one [in the field]. 
  So say he renounced his rights to inheritance. Abaye said: Death is common, sale is not common, and when a person renounces his rights, he does so from something that is not common. But from something that is common, he does not renounce his rights. R. Ashi replied: [The husband's renunciation was] “on your property” but not their usufruct; “on your property” but not after your death.
  R. Judah says: In all cases she may benefit from the usufruct of the usufruct [etc.]. Our Rabbis taught: The following are regarded as usufruct and the following as the usufruct of the usufruct. If a woman brought to her husband a plot of land and it yielded produce, this is usufruct. If he sold the produce and purchased land with the proceeds and that land yielded produce, this is regarded as the usufruct of the usufruct.
  The question was raised:  According to R. Judah, [is the expression] “the usufruct of the usufruct” the essential phrasing, or is “without end” essential, or perhaps both are essential?
  If you say [that the expression] “the usufruct of the usufruct” is essential,  what need was there to say “without end”? It teaches us: Since he wrote, “the usufruct of the usufruct” it is as if he wrote “without end.” But if you say that “without end” is the essential phrase, why did it need to mention “the usufruct of the usufruct”? 
  It teaches us that although he wrote “usufruct of the usufruct,” if he also wrote “without end” the renouncement works, if he did not, it does not work. 
  But if you should say that both expressions are essential why do we need both? Both are necessary. For if he only wrote “usufruct of the usufruct” and did not write “without end,” I would have said that he does not eat “usufruct of the usufruct” but “usufruct of the usufruct of the usufruct” he can eat, therefore he needs to write “without end.” And if he only wrote “without end” and did not write “usufruct of the usufruct” I would have said that he is only referring to “usufruct,” therefore it needed to write “usufruct of the usufruct.”
  They asked: If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and the usufruct of the usufruct” can he eat the produce itself? Has he renounced the usufruct of the usufruct but not the usufruct itself or perhaps he renounced his claim over everything?
  It is quite obvious that he has renounced his claims over everything for if you said that he renounced his claim only on the usufruct of the usufruct but not the usufruct itself, once he eats the produce, where would he get the usufruct of the usufruct?
  But even according to your reasoning, that which we taught in the Mishnah, R. Judah says: he may in all cases enjoy the usufruct of the usufruct etc., since he ate the usufruct, how could there be usufruct of usufruct. Rather it must be where there was some left over, so too here there was some left over.
  Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel ruled etc. Rav said:  The halakhah is in agreement with the ruling of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel but not because of the reason he gave.
  What is meant by “the halakhah is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel but not because of the reason he gave” If it be suggested: “The halakhah is in agreement with the ruling of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel” who said, “when she dies, he inherits her”  “but not because of the reason he gave” for whereas R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that  if one makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void, whereas Rav holds that such a condition is valid  but he holds that a husband’s right of inheritance is of rabbinic origin and the sages strengthened their enactments to be greater than those in the Torah.
  
  Daf 84a
  
  But does Rav hold that one’s condition [though contrary to what is written in the Torah] is valid? Has it not in fact been stated: If a man says to another, “[I will sell you this object] on condition that you have no claim for overcharging against me:” Rav said: He has the right to make a claim for overcharging; Shmuel says: He does not have a right to claim overcharging.
  Rather, “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel” who said that “one who makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void,” “but not because of the reason he gave,” for whereas R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that when she dies he inherits her, whereas Rav holds that when she dies he does not inherit her.
  But is not this in agreement with his reason and not with his ruling?
  Rather this is what was meant, “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel” who said that “when she dies he inherits her,” but not “because of the reason he gave” for, whereas R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that a condition that is contrary to a biblical law is null but one that is contrary only to a rabbinic law is valid, whereas Rav holds that even a condition contrary to a rabbinic law is also null.
  But this would be in agreement with both his reason and his ruling, and Rav would be adding to it.
  Rather, “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel” who said “when she dies, he inherits her,” but not “because of the reason he gave,” for whereas R. Shimon b. Gamaliel holds that a husband’s right to inherit is from the Torah and that [it is invalid because] wherever one makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void, whereas Rav holds that  a husband’s right of inheritance is only a rabbinic enactment and [that the condition is nevertheless null because] the sages strengthened their enactments to be like those from the Torah
  But does Rav hold that a husband’s right to inherit is of rabbinic origin. Have we not learned: R. Yohanan b. Beroka ruled, A husband who inherits his wife he must [when the Jubilee year arrives] return [the inheritance] to the members of her family and allow them a reduction of price;
  And we asked about this: What does he hold? If he holds that the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah, why should he give the property back? And if it is from the rabbis, why should he get any money [for returning it]?
  And Rav explained: He holds that a husband’s right of inheritance is from the Torah but [here it refers to a case of a man], for instance, whose wife bequeathed to him a [family] graveyard, [and it is] in order [to avoid] a family slight that the rabbis ruled,  Let him take the price and return it;
  and what does it mean “allow them a reduction in price,” the cost of his wife’s grave; as it was taught: If a person has sold his [family] grave, the path to this grave, his halting place or his place of mourning, the members of his family may come and bury him against the buyer’s will, in order [to avert] a slight upon the family!
  Rav spoke here in accordance with R. Yohanan b. Beroka’s point of view but he himself does not hold this way.
  A man died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs and he also had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others: Rabbi Tarfon says: It shall be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says:  We do not show mercy in a matter of law.  Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.  
  If he left produce that was detached from the ground, whoever seizes it first acquires possession. If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt, the balance: Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law.  Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
  Gem: Why did it need to teach a loan and why did it need to teach a deposit? It was necessary, for if it had taught only about a loan, in that case R. Tarfon would say [it should be given to the weakest] for a loan is meant to be used,  but when it comes to a deposit which should remain in his possession, I would say he agrees with R. Akiva;
  And if it had taught about this [a deposit, I might have thought] that R. Akiva said it only about this, but about a [loan] I would have said he agrees with R. Tarfon. Therefore both were necessary.
  What is meant by “to the weakest of them”? Yose the son of R. Hanina said: To the one who has the most disadvantageous evidence. Yohanan said: [The reference is] to the wife’s ketubah of the wife, due to favor.
  [This dispute is the same] as that between the following tannaim: R. Benjamin said, To the one who has the most disadvantageous evidence.   Elazar said: [The reference is] to the wife’s ketubah of the wife, due to favor.
  If he left produce that was detached. As to R. Akiva, what was the point in discussing the “balance” when the entire estate belongs to the heirs? This is indeed true, but since R. Tarfon spoke of the balance, he also mentioned the balance.
  
  Daf 84b
  
  And to R. Akiva, is seizure [of property] never effective ?  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: Seizure is effective if it took place during the lifetime [of the deceased].
  Now according to R. Tarfon, where [must the produce] be kept?  Both Rav and Shmuel said: [Seizure if effective] only when it is heaped up and lying in the public domain, but [if it was kept] in an alley the [seizure is not valid]. Both R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish, however, said: Even [if the produce lay] in an alley [seizure is valid].
  Certain judges once judged in agreement with R. Tarfon, and Resh Lakish reversed their verdict. R. Yohanan said to him, “You have acted as [if R. Akiva’s ruling were a law] of the Torah!”
  Shall we say that they differ on this principle; One Master holds that  if the judge erred in a decision because he overlooked a mishnah, the decision must be reversed and the other Master holds that  if the judge erred in a decision because he overlooked a mishnah, the decision need not be reversed?
  No; all agree that if the judge erred in a decision because he overlooked a mishnah, the decision must be reversed,  but they disagree about the follow:  One Master holds that  the halakhah is in agreement with R. Akiva [only when he disagrees] with a colleague of his but not with his master,  while the other Master holds that  the halakhah [is in agreement with him] even [if he disagrees] with his master.
  If you prefer I might say: All agree that the halakhah agrees with R. Akiva [only when he disagrees] with a colleague of his but when he disagrees with his master. But they dispute this:  One Master holds R. Tarfon was his master and the other Master holds  that he was his colleague.
  If you prefer I might say: All agree that he was his colleague; but they disagree over this: One Master holds the statement was that, “The halakhah [agrees with R. Akiva]” and the other Master holds that the statement was that “one should be inclined [to rule like R. Akiva].”
  Yohanan’s relatives seized in an alleyway a cow that belonged to orphans. When they appeared before R. Yohanan, he said to them, “Your seizure is lawful.” They came in front of R. Shimon b. Lakish. He said to them, “Go and return it.” They came back in front of R. Yohanan and he said to them, “What can I do, when my colleague disagrees with me.”
  There was a herdsman [watching The creditor said, “I seized it during the lifetime [of the debtor]” and the herdsman said, “He seized it after the debtor’s death.”   They appeared before R. Nahman. He asked the herdsman, “Have you witnesses that [the creditor] has seized it?” He replied, “No.” He said back to him: “Since he could have said, ‘I bought it’ he is also entitled to say I seized it during the lifetime [of the debtor].’”
  But did not Resh Lakish state; There is no law of presumptive possession for living creatures? The case of an ox is different, for it was turned over to a herdsman.
  The people of the patriarch’s household once seized in an alley a slave woman belonging to orphans R. Abbahu, R. Hanina b. Papi and R. Isaac Nappaha were sitting, and R. Abba was sitting in their presence. They said to them, “Your seizure is effective.” Abba said to them,  “Just because these people are of the patriarch’s household you are favoring them? Surely, when those judges once gave a decision in agreement with R. Tarfon, Resh Lakish reversed their decision.”
  Yemar b. Hashu had a money claim against a certain person who died and left a boat. He said to his agent, “Go and seize it.” [The latter] went and seized it. R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Joshua met him and told him,  “You are seizing [the ship] on behalf of a creditor and thereby you are causing loss to others, and R. Yohanan said: He who seizes [a debtor’s property] on behalf of a creditor and thereby causes loss to others
  
  Daf 85a
  
  does not legally acquire it.” Thereupon they seized it themselves. R. Papa rowed boat while R. Huna the son of R. Joshua pulled it by the rope. One Master then declared, “I have acquired all the ship” and the other similarly declared,  “I have acquired all of it.”
  They were met by R. Pinchas b. Ammi who said to them: Both Rav and Shumel ruled that “[Seizure is valid] only if [the produce] was piled up and lay in a public domain.”  They replied to them, “We have seized it at the main current of the river.”
  They came in front of Rava he said to them, “[You are] quacking geese that strip the people of their cloaks; thus ruled R. Nahman: ‘[The seizure is valid] only if it took place during the lifetime [of the original owner].’”
  Abimi the son of R. Abbahu owed money to the men of Be Hoze. He sent it to them with Hama the son of Rabbah b. Abbahu. He went there and paid them. He said to them, “Give me back the debt bond.” They said to him, “This payment was made in settlement of some other claim
  He came in front R. Abbahu [to complain]. He asked him, “Have you witnesses that you have paid them?” He said,  “No.” He said back to him, “Since they could say  that the payment was never made, they are also entitled to plead that the payment was made in settlement of some other claims.”
  With regard to repaying [the sender] is the agent obligated to repay him? Ashi said: We have to see: If he said to him,
  But this is not so, rather he must refund it in either case, because the other may say, “I sent you to help me but not to make things worse for me.”
  There was a certain woman with whom a bundle of bonds was once deposited. The heirs [of the depositor] came to claim it from her. She said to them, “I seized them during [the depositor’s] lifetime.”   She came in front of R. Nahman. He said to her, “Do you have witnesses that it was claimed from you during [the depositor’s] lifetime and that you refused to return it?” She replied,  “No.” He said to her, “If so your seizure is one that took place after [the owner’s] death, and such a seizure is invalid.”
  A woman was once obligated to take an oath at the court of Rava. R. Hisda’s daughter said to him, “I know that she is suspected of [taking false] oaths,” Rava transferred the oath to her opponent.
  On another occasion R. Papa and R. Adda b. Matana sat in front of him when a bond was brought to him. R. Papa said to him, “I know that this bond has been paid.” He [Rava] said, “Is there anyone else with the Master [to confirm the statement]?”  He said “No.” He replied, “Even though there is the Master, there is no validity [in the testimony of] one witness.”
  Adda b. Matana to him, “Should not R. Papa be [deemed as reliable] as the daughter of R. Hisda?” “As to the daughter of R. Hisda [he replied] I am certain of her; I am not sure, however, about the Master.”
  Papa said: Now that the Master has stated, “I am certain of a person” is a valid assertion, I would tear up a bond on the evidence of my son Abba Mar of whose reliability I am certain. “I would tear up”!
  Do you really think [he would do this]? Rather, “I would impair a bond on his evidence.”
  There was a woman who was obligated to take an oath at the court of R. Bibi b. Abaye. Her opponent said to them, “Let her come and take the oath in the town, where she might feel ashamed [of her action] and confess.” She said to them, “Write out the verdict in my favor so that after I shall have taken the oath it may be given to me.” Bibi b. Abaye said to them, “Write it out for her.”
  Papi said, “Because you are descendants of short-lived people you speak weak words?
  For surely Rava has said, ‘A judges’ confirmation written before the witnesses have identified their signatures is invalid,” for it looks like a lie. So too here, the verdict looks like a lie.
  This conclusion is wrong [as we may learn] from a statement of R. Nahman, who said; R. Meir says that even if [a husband] found it [the get] on a rubbish heap, and then signed and gave it to her, it is valid; And even the rabbis disagree with R. Meir only in respect of letters of divorce where it is necessary that the writing shall be done specifically in her name, but in respect of other legal documents they agree with him,
  for R. Assi stated in the name of R. Yohanan, “A bond that was used to secure a loan and then repaid, he may not borrow again on its basis because the lien the first loan created was forgiven;” the reason is because “the lien the first loan created was forgiven,” but we are not concerned that it looks
  
  Daf 85b
  
  like a lie.
  A certain man once deposited seven pearls, wrapped in a sheet, with R. Miasha the son of the son of R. Joshua h. Levi. R. Miasha died without providing any instructions.  They came in front of R. Ammi. He said to them, “First of all, I know that R. Miasha the son of the son of R. Joshua b. Levi was not a wealthy man, and secondly did he not provide the signs?”
  This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the guardian’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there it might well be assumed that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.
  A certain man once deposited a silver cup at the house of Hasa; and Hasa died without giving instructions. They came in front of R. Nahman. He said to them, “I know that Hasa was not a wealthy man and, furthermore, did he not provide the signs?” This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the guardian’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there it might well be assumed that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.
  A certain man once deposited a silk cloth with R. Dimi the brother of R. Safra, and R. Dimi died without giving instructions.  They came in front of R. Abba. He said to them, “First of all, I know that R. Dimi was not a wealthy man and, furthermore, did he not provide the signs?” This ruling, however, applies only to a man who was not a frequent visitor at the guardian’s house, but if he was a frequent visitor there it might well be assumed that another person has made the deposit and he happened to see it.
   A man once said to those around him, “Let my estate be given to Tobiah,” and then he died. [A man named] Tobiah came [to claim the estate]. R. Yohanan said, “Behold, Tobiah has come.”
  Now if he said, “Tobiah” and “R. Tobiah” came, [he may not claim the estate, since] he said “To Tobiah” but not “To R. Tobiah.” If, however, he was on familiar terms with him [he may claim the estate, because he might have omitted the term because] he was on familiar terms with him. If two Tobiahs appeared, one of whom was a neighbor and the other a scholar, the scholar is to be given precedence. If one [of the Tobiahs] is a relative and the other a scholar, the scholar is given precedence.
  The question was asked: What if one is a neighbor and the other a relative? Come and hear; “Better is a neighbor that is near than a brother that is far off” (Proverbs 27:10). If both are relatives, or both are neighbors or both are scholars the decision is left to the discretion of the judges.
  Rava said to the son of R. Hiyya b. Abin: Come and I will tell you a fine saying of your father’s: Although Shmuel said, “If a man sold a debt document to another person and then he released the debtor, the latter is legally released; and, moreover, even [a creditor’s] heir may release [the debtor].” Shmuel, nevertheless, admits that, where a wife brought in to her husband  a debt document and then released it, the debt is not to be considered released, because her husband’s rights are equal to hers.
  A relative of R. Nahman once sold her ketubah for its benefit. She was divorced and then died. Thereupon [the buyers] came to claim [the amount of the ketubah] from her daughter. Nahman said to those around him, “Is there no one here who can give her advice?
  
  Daf 86a
  
  She should go and remit her mother’s kethubah in favor of her father,and then she may inherit it frons him.” When she heard this she went and remitted it [in her father’s favor]. 
  Nahman said: “We have made ourselves like of legal advisers.” What did he think at first and what did he think at the end? At first he thought, “And you should not ignore your own flesh” (Isaiah 58:7), but in the end he realized that [the position of] an important person is different.
  [Reverting to] the main text; Shmuel said, “If a man sold a debt document to another person, and then he released the debtor, the latter is released; and even [a creditor’s] heir may release [the debtor].” Huna the son of R. Joshua said: But if he is clever he rattles some coins in his face and [the latter] writes the bond in his name.
  Amemar said; He who adjudicates [liability] in a case of indirect damages would force him to pay the value of the full document but he who does not adjudicate indirect damages would here force him to pay the value of the mere scrap of paper.
  This case happened and Rafram forced R. Ashi and ordered the collection [of damages] in the manner of a beam that is fit for idols.
  Amemar said in the name of R. Hama: If a man has against him the claim of his wife’s ketubah and that of a creditor, and he owns a plot of land and he has also cash, he may settle with the creditor with the cash and settle with the woman by land. This one receives his proper due and this one her proper due.  
  If he owns only one plot of land and it is enough for only one of them, it is to be given to the creditor; it is not to be given to the wife. What is the reason? More than the man desires to marry the woman desires to be married.
  Papa said to R. Hama: Did you really say in the name of Rava; If a man, against whom there was a monetary claim owned a plot of land, and who, when his creditor approached him with the claim for repayment, replied, “Collect your loan from the land,” they say to him, “You must yourself go and sell it and bring the proceeds and give it to him?”
  He said to him, “No.” He then said back, “Tell me what happened?” He replied, “The [debtor] alleged that his money belonged to a non-Jew; and since he acted in an improper manner he was similarly treated in an improper manner.”
  Kahana said to R. Papa; According to you who said that the repayment of [a debt to] a creditor is a religious act, what is the ruling where [a debtor] said, “I do not want to perform this religious act”? He said back, “We have learned: This applies only to negative commandments, but in the case of positive commandments, as for instance, when a man is told, ‘Make a sukkah’ and he does not make it [or, ‘perform the commandment of the] lulav’ and he does not perform it, 
  
  Daf 86b
  
  he is flogged  until he dies.
  Rami b. Hama asked of R. Hisda: What is the ruling where [a husband said to his wife,] “Here is your get but you shall be divorced by it only after thirty days.” And she went and put it at the sides of a public domain?
  He said back, “She is not divorced, because of the ruling of Rav and Shmuel, both of whom have stated, ‘It must be heaped up and lie in a public domain’ and the sides of a public domain are regarded as the public domain itself.”
  On the contrary! She should be divorced because of a ruling of R. Nahman, who stated in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha, “If a man said to another, ‘Pull this cow, but you shall acquire it only after thirty days,’ he legally acquires it even if it stands at the time in the meadow.” And does a meadow not the same status as the sides of a public domain? No; a meadow has a status of its own and the sides of a public domain have a status of their own. 
  There are those who say: He said to him, “She is divorced because of the ruling of R. Nahman, and the sides of a public domain have the same status as a meadow.”On the contrary! She is not divorced because of the ruling of Rav and Samuel. For is it not so that the sides of a public domain have the same status as a public domain? No; a public domain has a status of its own and the sides of a public domain have a status of their own.
  If a husband set up his wife as a shopkeeper or appointed her guardian he may impose upon her an oath whenever he wants. Rabbi Eliezer said:  even in respect of her spindle and her dough. 
  GEMARA. The question was asked; Does R. Eliezer mean [that the oath can be imposed] by rolling it in [to the other oath] or does he mean that it may be imposed directly?
  Come and hear: They said to R. Eliezer, “No one can live with a serpent in the same basket.” Now if you will say that R. Eliezer meant the imposition of a direct oath this is understandable; but if you say [that he meant the oath to be imposed] by rolling it in only, why would this matter to her?
  She could say to him, “Since you are so particular with me I cannot live with you.”
  Come and hear: If a man did not exempt his wife from a vow and from an oath and set her up as his shopkeeper or appointed her as the guardian of his property, he may impose upon her an oath whenever he desires to do so. If he did not set her up as his shopkeeper and did not appoint her as the guardian of his property, he may not impose any oath upon her.
  Eliezer said: Even though he did not set her up as his shopkeeper and did not appoint her as his guardian, he may nevertheless impose upon her an oath wherever he desires to do so, because there is no woman who was not a guarding for a short time, at least, during the lifetime of her husband, in respect of her spindle and her dough. Learn from this that he allows him to impose an oath on her at any time.
  If he (the husband) wrote to her (his wife), “I have no claim upon you for either a vow or an oath”, he cannot make her swear an oath. However, he may make her heirs and upon those who have done business with her swear an oath.
  [If he wrote,] “I have no claim upon you for either a vow or an oath nor upon your heirs nor upon those who have done business with you”, he may not impose an oath either upon her or upon her heirs or upon those who have done business with you. However his heirs may impose an oath upon her or upon her heirs or upon those who have done business with her.
  [If he wrote] “Neither I nor my heirs nor those who have done business with me shall have any claim upon you or upon your heirs or upon those who have done business with you for either a vow or an oath”, neither he nor his heirs nor those who have done business with him may impose an oath either upon her or upon her heirs or upon those who have done business with her.
  If she went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house but was not made a guardian, the heirs may not make her swear an oath. But if she was made a guardian the heirs may make her swear an oath in respect of [her administration] during the subsequent period but not in respect of the past.
  GEMARA. What is the nature of this oath? Rav Judah replied in the name of Rab:
  
  Daf 87a
  
  It is for a woman who during the lifetime of her husband was made guardian [of his affairs]. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha: It is for a woman who impairs her kethubah.
  Mordecai went to R. Ashi and said the following argument in front of him: It makes sense for the one who holds [that the oath] was on a woman who impairs her ketubah for it might occur to the woman that she will sometime be in need of money and would draw it from her ketubah and she would therefore tell her husband, “Write for me that you will not impose an oath upon me.” But according to the one who holds [that the oath] was on a woman who during the lifetime of her husband was made guardian [of his affairs],  how could she know that he would set her up as guardian that she should say to him, “Write for me that you will not impose an oath upon me.” 
  The other replied: You taught this statement in connection with that clause; we teach it in connection with this:  If she went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house but was not made a guardian, the heirs may not make her swear an oath. But if she was made a guardian the heirs may make her swear an oath in respect of [her administration] during the subsequent period but not in respect of the past.
  But how can it be about the past? Rav Judah stated in the name of Rav: For the period during the lifetime of her husband for which she was made guardian [of his affairs],
  but in respect of [the period] between death and burial an oath may be imposed upon her. Matana said: Even in respect of [the period between] death and burial they may not impose an oath on her for the Nehardeans say: For poll-tax, maintenance and funeral expenses an estate is sold without public announcement.
  Rabbah said in the name of R. Hiyya: [If the husband wrote,] “Neither vow nor oath” he cannot impose an oath on her, but his heirs may impose an oath upon her. [If he wrote,] “Free from vow, free from oath,” neither he nor his heirs may exact an impose an oath on her, [since by this expression] he meant to say to her: “Be free from the obligation of an oath.”
  But R. Joseph stated in the name of R. Hiyya: [If he said,] “Neither vow nor oath” he who cannot impose an oath on her but his heirs may; [But if he wrote,] “Free from vow, free from oath,” both he and his heirs may impose an oath on her [since by such an expression] he thus meant to say to her, “Clear yourself by means of an oath.”
  Zakkai sent to Mar Ukba: Whether [the husband wrote,] “Neither oath” or “Free from oath,” or whether [he wrote,] “Neither vow,” or “Free from vow,” [and he used the expression] “In respect of my property,” he cannot impose an oath upon her, but his heirs may. [If he wrote, however,] “In respect of this property,” neither he nor his heirs may impose an oath on her.
  Nahman said in the name of Shmuel in the name of Abba Shaul the son of Imma Miriam: Whether [the husband wrote,] “Neither oath” or “Free from oath,” whether [he wrote,] “Neither vow” or “Free from vow,” or whether [he wrote,] “In respect of my property” or “In respect of this property,” neither he nor his heirs may impose an oath on her. But what can I do in view of a ruling of the Sages that anyone who comes to exact payment from the property of orphans is not to be paid unless he first takes an oath.
  Others read this as a baraita: Abba Shaul son of Imma Miriam said: Whether [the husband wrote,] “Neither oath” or “Free from oath’’ whether [he wrote,] “Neither vow” or “Free from vow,” or whether [he wrote,] “In respect of my property” or “In respect of this property,: neither he nor his heirs may impose an oath on her; but what can I do in view of a ruling of the Sages that anyone who comes to exact payment out of the property of orphans is not to be paid unless he first takes an oath. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah is in agreement with the son of Imma Miriam.
  A woman who impairs her kethubah is not paid except by an oath. If one witness testifies against her that [her kethubah] has been paid, she is not be paid except by an oath. From the property of orphans, from property with a lien on it and [from the property of] an husband who is not present she is not paid except by an oath.
  “A woman who impairs her ketubah”: How is this so? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and [her husband] said to her, “You have already received your ketubah”, and she says, “I received only a maneh,” she is not paid [the balance] except by an oath.
  “If one witness testifies against her that [her ketubah] has been paid”:  How is this so? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and [her husband] said to her, “You have already received your ketubah,” and she says, “I have not received it” and one witness testifies against her that [the ketubah] has been paid, she is not paid except by an oath.
  “From property with a lien on it”:  How is this so? He had sold his property to others and she seeks to recover payment from the buyers, she is not paid except by an oath.
  “From the property of orphans”:  How is this so? He died and left his estate to his orphans and she seeks to recover payment from the orphans, she is not paid except by an oath.
  “A husband who is not present” How is this so? If her husband went to a country beyond the sea and she seeks to recover payment in his absence, she is not paid except by an oath.
  
  Daf 87b
  
  Rabbi Shimon says: whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may impose an oath upon her but whenever she does not claim her ketubah the heirs cannot impose an oath upon her.
  GEMARA. Rami b. Hama wished to assume that this oath was biblical, since [it is a case where] one one person claims two hundred [zuz] and the other admits one hundred, which is a case of an admission to a part of the claim, and whoever admits to a part of a claim must  take an oath. 
  Rava said: There are two objections to this matter: In the first place, all who take an oath in accordance with biblical law take the oath and do not pay, while she takes the oath and receives payment. And, secondly, no oath may be imposed in respect of the denial of [a claim that is] secured on landed property.
  Rather Rava said, [that the oath is only] of rabbinic status. For the one who pays is careful to remember the details while the one who receives payment is not, the Rabbis have imposed an oath upon her so that she would be careful to remember the details.
  The question was raised; What if a woman impaired her ketubah by [receiving part of it in front of] witnesses? If it is true that [her husband] had paid her [the balance] he would have done so in front of witnesses, or [is it rather assumed that] it was a mere coincidence [that witnesses were present when the first payment was made]?  
  Come and hear: All who take an oath in accordance with biblical law, take the oath and do not pay, but the following take an oath and receive payment; A hired worker, a man who was robbed or wounded, [any claimant] whose opponent is suspected of [taking a false] oath   and a shopkeeper with his [accounts] book, and also [a creditor] who impaired his document in the absence of witnesses. Thus only [where he paid the first installment] “in the absence of witnesses” but not where he paid it in the presence of witnesses!
  This is a case of “it did not even need to say.” It did not need to say that [when he paid the first installment] in the presence of witnesses she must take an oath; when, however, [he paid it] in the absence of witnesses, it might be assumed that she is like one who returns a lost object [to its owner] and should receive payment without taking an oath. It was, therefore, taught [that the oath is nevertheless not to be dispensed with].
  The question was asked: What if a woman impaired her ketubah [by admitting to receiving] sums [each of which] were less than the value of a perutah? Do we say that since she is so careful in her statements she must be speaking the truth or is it possible that she is merely acting cunningly? This remains unsolved.  
  The question was raised: What if a woman declares her [original] ketubah to have been less [than the amount recorded in the document]? Do we say that such a woman is in the same position as the woman who impaired [her ketubah] or is it possible that the woman who impairs [her ketubah] admits a part [of the full sum] while this one does not admit a part [of the full sum]? 
  Come and hear: A woman who declares that her [original] ketubah was less [than the amount recorded in the document] receives payment without an oath. How [is this so]? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and when her husband said to her, “You have already received your ketubah,” she replies. “I have not received it, but [the original ketubah] was only for one maneh,” she receives payment without an oath.
  But how does she collect [the amount she claims]? With this document? But this document is just a potsherd! Rava the son of Rabbah replied: [This is a case] where she states, “There was an arrangement of mutual trust between me and him.”
  If one witness testifies against her that [her ketubah] has been paid [etc.]. Rami b. Hama thought that the oath was of biblical authority, as it is written, “One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or for any sin” (Deuteronomy 19:15); for any iniquity or for any sin he may not rise up, but he may rise up [to impose] an oath. And, furthermore, a Master stated: In all cases where two witnesses obligate a person to pay money, one witness obligates a person take an oath. 
  Rava said: There are two objections to this matter: In the first place, all who take an oath in accordance with biblical law take the oath and do not pay, while she takes the oath and receives payment. And, secondly, no oath may be imposed in respect of the denial of [a claim that is] secured on landed property.
  Rather, Rava said [that the oath is only] rabbinical, [having been enacted] to appease the husband.
  Papa said:
  
  Daf 88a
  
  If he is clever he may bring her under the obligation of a biblical oath: He pays her the amount of her ketubah in the presence of one witness, associates the first witness with the second and then treats his first payment as a loan.
  Shisha son of R. Idi raised a difficulty: How can he associate the first witness with the second one? Rather R. Shisha the son of R. Idi: He gives her the amount of her ketubah in the presence of the first witness and a second one, and then treats his first payments as a loan.
  Ashi raised a difficulty: Might she not still assert that there were two ketubahs? Rather R. Ashi said: He should inform them [of the facts].
  From property with a lien on it. We have learned elsewhere: And so also orphans cannot exact payment unless they first take an oath.  
  From whom? If we say from a borrower [it may be objected;] Since their father would have received payment without an oath should they require an oath? Rather this is what was meant: And so also orphans cannot exact payment from orphans unless they first take an oath.
    Zerika stated in the name of Rav Judah: This has been taught only [in the case] where the orphans stated, “Father told us, I have borrowed and paid up.” If, however, they said, “Father told us, I have never borrowed” [the others] cannot exact payment even if they take an oath.
  Rava said: On the contrary, wherever a man says, “I have not borrowed,” it is as if he had said, “I have not paid”!
  Rather, if it was stated, this is what was stated: R. Zerika stated in the name of Rav Judah. This has been taught only [in a case] where the orphans stated, “Father told us, l have borrowed and paid up.” If, however, they said, “Father told us, I have never borrowed,” [the orphans of the creditor] may exact payment from them without an oath, because one who says, “I have not borrowed” is like one who says, “I have not paid.”
  And if she collects not in his presence, she is not repaid without taking an oath. Aha, the governor of the castle, said: A case was once brought before R. Isaac at Antioch and he made this statement, “This was taught only in respect of the ketubah of a woman in order to maintain favor [between her and her husband] but not [in respect of] a creditor.”
  But Rava stated in the name of R. Nahman: Even a creditor [must take an oath when collecting in the debtor’s absence] in order that every person should not take his friend’s money and abscond and settle in a country beyond the sea and thus [cause the creditor’s] door to be shut in the face of borrowers.
  Shimon says: whenever she claims her ketubah etc. What is R. Shimon referring to? — R. Jeremiah said. To this; And a woman who is claiming her ketubah in her husband’s absence may not be repaid without an oath; there is no difference between [a claim] for maintenance and one for a ketubah, and R. Shimon comes to say whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may impose an oath on her but where she does not claim her ketubah the heirs cannot impose an oath upon her.
  
  Daf 88b
  
  And they participate in the same dispute as that in which Hanan and the sons of the High Priests disputed; as we learned: If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: Hanan says: she must take an oath at the end but not at the beginning. 
  The sons of the high priests differed from him and ruled that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end. Shimon holds like Hanan; the rabbis [hold the same view] as the sons of the High Priests.
  Sheshet raised a difficulty; Then [instead of saying,] “the heirs may impose an oath upon her,” It should have said, “The court may impose an oath upon her.”
  Rather R. Sheshet said [that R. Shimon referred] to this:  If she went from her husband’s grave to her father’s house, or returned to her father-in-law’s house but was not made a guardian, the heirs may not make her swear an oath. But if she was made a guardian the heirs may make her swear an oath in respect of [her administration] during the subsequent period but not in respect of the past. And [ about this] R. Shimon came to say that whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may impose an oath on her but where she does not claim her ketubah the heirs cannot impose an oath on her.
  And they differ on the same principles as those on which Abba Shaul and the rabbis differed; for we have learned: A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath.  [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse.
  Shimon [holds like] Abba Shaul and the Rabbis [in our mishnah hold the same view] as the Rabbis.
  Abaye raised a difficulty: Then   [rather than say,] “whenever she claims her ketubah” it should have said, “If she claims.”
  Rather Abaye said: [that R. Shimon referred] to this: [If a husband] wrote to his wife, “I will not impose an oath or a vow on you” he cannot impose an oath upon her etc. [If he wrote] “Neither I nor my heirs nor my lawful successors will not impose on you or on your heirs or your lawful successors a vow or oath,” neither he nor his heirs nor his lawful successors may impose an oath either upon her or upon her heirs or upon her lawful successors; And [in reference to this ruling] R. Shimon came to say that whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may enact an oath from her. 
  And they differ on the same principles as those on which Abba Shaul the son of Imma Miriam, and the Rabbis differed. R. Shimon holds like Abba Shaul and the rabbis [in our mishnah] hold like the rabbis.
  Papa raised a difficulty: This would satisfactorily explain [the expression] whenever she claims her ketubah. What could be said about “but where she does not claim her ketubah”?
  Rather R. Papa said [R. Shimon’s ruling was intended] to oppose the views of both R. Eliezer and those who differed from him.
  If she produced a get without a ketubah,
  
  Daf 89a
  
   she collects her kethubah.
  [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul.
  GEMARA. This implies that a receipt should be written; for if a receipt is not written we should be concerned lest she produce her ketubah [after her husband’s death] and collect with it [a second time]?
  Rav said: We are dealing with a place where they do not write a ketubah. And Shmuel said: [Our Mishnah refers] even to a place where they do write a ketubah.    
  And according to Shmuel do they write a receipt? Anan replied: This was explained to me by Mar Shmuel; Where it is the custom not to write [a ketubah] and [the husband] said, “I have written one” it is he who must produce the proof. Where it is the custom to write, and she says, “He did not write one for me” she must produce the proof.
  Rav also retracted [his previously expressed opinion]. For Rav said: Both in a place where they write [a ketubah] and in one where they do not write a ketubah, with a get she collects her base amount, [while with a] ketubah [she] collects the additional amount; and whosoever wishes to raise any objection may come and do so. 
  We have learned: [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost,” and he says, “My receipt was lost,” and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back.
  This makes sense according to Shmuel, for he could interpret it as applying to a place where it is not the practice to write [a ketubah] and the husband said “I did write one.” For we would say to him, “Bring proof” and if he does not bring proof, we would say to him, “Go and pay it.”
  But according to Rav, while she would not be able to collect the base payment, she could collect the extra.
  Joseph answered: Here we are dealing with a case where there were no witnesses to the divorce. Since [the husband] could have said, “I have not divorced her,”
  
  
  Daf 89b
  
  he also can say, “I have divorced her but I have already paid her the ketubah.”
  But since it was stated in the final clause, Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah without a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul. [It follows that] we are dealing with a case where there are witnesses to the divorce, for if there were no such witnesses, how could she collect anything?
  Rather the entire mishnah represents the view of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, but some clauses are missing, the correct reading being the following: “Behold these are not paid. This applies only where there are no witnesses to the divorce, but where there are witnesses to the divorce she may collect the additional amount. As to the base ketubah, if she produces her get she may collect it, but if she does not produce her get she may not collect it.
  And from the time of danger, however, a woman may collect her ketubah even if she does not produce her get, for Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul.
  Kahana and R. Assi said to Rav: According to your ruling, that with a get she can collect her base ketubah payment, how does a woman who was widowed after her marriage collect her ketubah? Through the witnesses [who testify to the] death [of her husband]. Should we not be concerned that her husband might have divorced her and that she might subsequently produce the get  and collect  with it also? [A widow may collect her ketubah only] if she lived with her husband.
  But perhaps he might have divorced her near the time of his death? [In such a case] it is he who has brought the loss upon himself.
  How does a woman who was widowed after her betrothal collect her ketubah? By the witnesses [who testify to his] death. Should we not be concerned lest he divorced her and she takes out a get and collects [again]?
  Rather, where no other solution exists, a receipt may be written. For if we did not say this, even with witnesses to testify to his death, we should be concerned lest she bring these witnesses at this court and collect her ketubah, and then bring them out at another court and collect. Rather, clearly where there is no other solution, they write a receipt.
  Mar Kashisha the son of R. Hisda said to R. Ashi: From where do we know that a woman who was widowed after her betrothal receives a ketubah? If you say [that it may be derived] from following: “If she was widowed or divorced, whether after betrothal or after marriage, she receives the entire ketubah,” perhaps this is only in a case where he wrote her [a ketubah].
  And were you to say, “If he has written one for her,” what does this teach us? It could be that it rejects the view of R. Elazar b. Azariah who said that “he wrote the [additional amount] only in order to marry her.”
  This conclusion can also be read from the mishnah, as it teaches, “[She] collects the entire amount.” If you agree that [this is a case where] the husband had written [a ketubah] for her, one can well understand why she “collects the entire amount.” But if you say that he did not write for her, what can it mean that she “collects the entire amount”? She only receives the 200 or 100.
  Rather, [maybe it could be derived] from that which R. Hiyya b. Abin taught: “In the case of a betrothed wife, [a husband] is neither [subject to the laws of] onen nor may he defile himself for her, and she too is not subject to the laws of onen nor does she defile herself for him. If she died he does not inherit from her. If he dies, she collects her ketubah.” 
  But again, this might refer only to a case where he wrote for her. And were you to say, “If he has written one for her,” what does this teach us? It might be replied that] it needed to teach that if she dies he does not inherit her.
  Nahman said to R. Huna: According to Rav who said that a get [enables a woman to] collect her base kethubah, let us be concerned that she would take the get out at one court of law and collect her ketubah and then again produce it at another court of law and collect it [a second time]? And should you reply that it might be torn up, she could say that she needs it in order to marry again?
  [What we do is,] we tear it and write on the back of it: “This letter of divorce has been torn by us, not because it is an invalid document but in order to prevent the woman from collecting with it a second time.”
  [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketubot collects two ketubot.
  Two ketubot and one get or one ketubah and two gittin, or a ketubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one ketubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first ketubah.
  GEMARA. If she wants she can collect with this one or with the other one.  
  Shall we say that this ruling is a rejection of R. Nahman who said in the name of Shmuel? For R. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: Two documents, one issued one after the other, the second annuls the first!
  Was it not stated about this that R. Papa said: R. Nahman agrees that if he added in the [second] document one palm-tree [it is assumed that] he has written it for the sake of that addition, so also here [it is a case] where the husband has added something for her [in the second ketubah].  
  Our Rabbis taught: If [a woman] produced a get, a ketubah and [evidence of her husband’s] death:
  
  Daf 90a
  
  if the get has a date earlier than the ketubah, she may collect two ketubot, but if the ketubah is earlier than the get she may collect payment of one ketubah only, for any man who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.
  A minor whose father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife. A convert who converted with his wife, the ketubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.
  GEMARA. R. Huna stated: This was taught only in respect of the maneh or the two hundred zuz; but she does not receive the additional amount. Rav Judah said: She does receive the additional amount.
  An objection was raised: If he added an obligation, she collects the additional amount. That which he added [she receives] but not that which he did not add.
  Say: “Also that which had been added.” But surely it was not taught so: “If he added additional money, she collects that which was added. But if he does not add additional money, a virgin receives 200 and a widow 100.” This is a refutation of Rav Judah.
  Rav Judah was misled by the Mishnah. He thought that “the kethubah of his wife remains valid,” applied to the full amount; but in fact it is not so. It applies only to the base ketubah.
  May we return to you chapter “One who writes to his wife.”
  If a man was married to two wives and died, the first wife takes precedence over the second, and the heirs of the first wife take precedence over the heirs of the second.
  If he married a first wife and she died and then he married a second wife and he died, the second wife and her heirs take precedence over the heirs of the first wife.
  GEMARA. Since it was stated “the first [wife] takes precedence over the second” and not “The first wife receives payment and the second does not,” it may be deduced that if the second wife went forth and seized [the payment for her ketubah] we do not take it away from her.  
  Learn from here that if a creditor of a later date goes forth and collects his debt, that which he collected has been [validly] collected?
  I could say to you that his collection is not valid, what does it mean by “takes precedence,” it means means completely, as we have learned: A son takes precedence over a daughter.
  There are those who say: Since it was not taught, “If the second wife went forth [before the first] and seized [her ketubah] they do not take it away from her,” it could be deduced that if she goes forth and seizes payment it may be taken away from her.
  Learn from here that if a creditor of a later date goes forth [before of an earlier date] and collects [the property of a debtor] his collection is not valid?
  I could say to you that his collection is valid, but that since it taught the second and her inheritors take precedence over the first,
  
  Daf 90b
  
  it also taught that the first takes precedence over the second.
  If a man married a first wife. Learn from this three rulings. Learn from this that if one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death, [the sons of the former] are entitled to the ketubah of “benin dikhrin” and we are not concerned with quarreling. 
  From where do we derive this? From that which is taught, “the second wife and her heirs take precedence over the heirs of the first wife;” they take precedence, but if there is enough then [the first sons] take it.
  And also learn that the ketubah [of the second wife] may be regarded as the surplus over the other.
  From where do we derive this? Since it was not taught [that the first sons collect only] if a surplus of a denar remained there.
  And learn that a benin dikhrin ketubah is not collected from mortgaged property; for if you should think that it is collected from mortgaged property, the sons of the first wife should [be able to] come and take [the property] of the sons of the second.
  Rav Ashi raised a difficulty: How do we know this? I could say that if one [wife died] while her husband was alive, and the other after his death, [the sons of the former] are not entitled to the benin dikhrin ketubah. And what does “take precedence” mean?  It was taught in reference to  inheritance?
  And should you say: Why mention “the inheritors of the first wife”?   [I might reply that] since the tanna taught, “the second wife and her inheritors” he also taught of “the inheritors of the first wife.”
  And that which you said that “the ketubah [of the second wife] may be regarded as a surplus over the other,” I might say to you that the ketubah is not considered a surplus over the other, but here it is simply a case where there was a surplus of a denar!
  The case where one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death, is [a matter in dispute between] tannaim. For it was taught: [If a man’s wives] died, one during his lifetime and the other after his death: Ben Nannas says: The sons of the first can say to the sons of the second, “You are the sons of a creditor, take your mother’s ketubah and go.”
  R. Akiva says: The inheritance has already been transferred from the sons of the first and landed on the sons of the second.
  Do they not differ on the following principle: One Master holds that where one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to their benin dikhrin ketubah, and the other Master holds that where one [wife died] during a husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are not entitled to the benin dikhrin ketubah?  
  Rabbah said: I found the rabbis of the academy while they were sitting and arguing: All [hold that where] one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to [their mother’s] “benin dikhrin” ketubah, but here they differ [over whether the second wife’s] ketubah may be regarded as a surplus over the other; and the same dispute applies to [the debt] of a creditor.
  One Master holds that the [second wife’s] ketubah is regarded as a surplus over the other, and the same law applies to [the debt] of a creditor, and the other Master holds that a ketubah may not be regarded as a surplus over the other, and the same law applies to [the debt] of a creditor.
  And I said to them: In respect of [a claim of] a creditor no one disputes that [the debt] is regarded as a surplus; they only differ in respect of a ketubah.
  Joseph raised a difficulty: If so [instead of saying,] “R. Akiva said: The inheritance has already been transferred” it should [have said] “If there is a surplus of a dinar [the sons of the first wife receive their mother’s ketubah].”
  Rather R. Joseph said that they differ [over whether the sons of the first wife receive their mother’s benin dikhrin ketubah when] one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death.
  And these tannaim [differ on the same principle] as the following tannaim, as it was taught: If a man married his first wife and she died and then he married his second wife and he died, the sons of this wife may come after [her] death and exact their mother’s ketubah. Shimon ruled: If there is a surplus of one dinar these take their mother’s ketubah, and these take their mother’s ketubah. But if no [such surplus remains] they divide [the remainder] equally.
  Do they not differ on the following principle: One Master holds that where one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to their benin dikhrin ketubah, and the other Master holds that where one [wife died] during a husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are not entitled to the benin dikhrin ketubah.
  No; all may agree that where one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are to receive the “benin dikhrin” ketubah,
  
  Daf 91a
  
  but they differ [over whether it is necessary for the surplus] dinar to consist of real estate. One Master holds that only real estate is regarded as a surplus but not movables and the other Master holds that even movables [are regarded as surplus].
  But can you really say this?  Have we not learned, R. Shimon says: Even if there was movable property it matters not unless there was real estate [the value of] one dinar more than [the total amount of] the two ketubot?
  Rather, they differ [over whether] a dinar of mortgaged property [is regarded as surplus]. One Master holds that only free property constitutes a surplus but not mortgaged property, and the other Master holds that mortgaged property also [constitutes a surplus].
  If so, [instead of stating,] “R. Shimon ruled: If there is a surplus of one denar” it should have said, “Since there is a surplus of one dinar”?
  Rather, they differ [over whether a sum] less than a dinar [constitutes a surplus].
  But did not R. Shimon say “a dinar”? And were you to reply, “Reverse [their views]” does not the first Tanna of the Mishnah also speak of a dinar?
  Rather [we must follow] one of two explanations above and reverse [the views].  
  Mar Zutra said in the name of R. Papa: The law [is that where] one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to the “benin dikhrin” ketubah, and that one ketubah is regarded as the surplus over the other.
  If he had taught us that [where] one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to the “benin dikhrin” ketubah, but had not taught us that one ketubah is regarded as the surplus over the other, I might have said that if there is a surplus of a dinar, they do receive [the ketubah] and if not, they do not.
  But he could have taught us that one ketubah is regarded as the surplus over the other, and I would have known that this is because where one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death [the sons of the former] are entitled to the “benin dikhrin” ketubah?
  If he taught us only this, I might have said that it [applies to a case,] where a man had married three wives two of whom died during his lifetime and one after his death, and the one who died after his death had given birth to a daughter who is not entitled to inheritance, 
  but [it does not apply to a case where] one [wife died] during her husband’s lifetime and the other after his death and the latter had given birth to a son, [since in this case] we would have to be concerned about quarreling. Therefore, he teaches us [that even if one dies during her husband’s lifetime and one after his death, the sons of the first receive their ketubah].
  If a man was married to two wives and they died, and subsequently he died, and the orphans [of one of the wives] claim their mother’s ketubah and there is only enough for the two ketubot,[all the orphans] they divide it equally.
  If there was a surplus of [at least] one dinar, these take their mother’s ketubah and these take their mothers ketubah.
  If the orphans [of one of the wives] says, “We are raising the estate of our father by a denar [more than the total amount of the kethuboth]”, in order that they can take their mother’s ketubah, they are not listened to, rather the estate is evaluated by the court.
  If there was property that would soon belong to the estate, it is not [regarded] as [property held] in possession.
  Rabbi Shimon says: even if there was movable property it is not regarded unless there was real estate worth one denar more than [the total amount of] the two kethubot.
  GEMARA. Our rabbis taught: If one wife had [a ketubah for] a thousand [zuz] and the other for five hundred: if there is a surplus of a denar, these receive the ketubah of their mother and these receive the ketubah of their mother; if there is not [a surplus], they divide the estate in equal proportions.
  It is obvious [that if the estate was] large and it depreciated, the heirs have already acquired ownership of it.What, [however, is the ruling where the estate was] small and it appreciated?
    Come and hear: The estate of the house of Bar Zarzur was small and then appreciated, and when [the heirs] came before R. Amram he said to them, “It is your duty to appease them.”  They paid no attention to him. 
  He said to them, “If you will not appease them I will chastise you with a thorn that causes no blood to flow.” He sent them to R. Nahman, who said to them “Just as [in the case where an estate was] large and it depreciated
  
  Daf 91b
  
  the heirs have already acquired ownership, so [also where the estate was] small and it appreciated the heirs have already acquired ownership.”
   (Mnemonic: A thousand and a hundred a mitzvah in a ketubah, Jacob put up his fields by words [of] claimants.)
  There was a man against whom there was a claim of a thousand zuz. He had two mansions, and he sold one for five hundred zuz and the other for five hundred zuz. The creditor came and distrained one of them and then he wanted to distrain the other.
  [The purchaser] took one thousand zuz, and went to [the creditor] and said to him, “If [the one mansion] is worth to you one thousand zuz, well and good; but if not, take your thousand zuz and go.”
  Rami b. Hama wanted to say that this case was analogous to that in our Mishnah: If the orphans [of one of the wives] said, “we are raising the amonut our father’s estate by the amount of one denar.”
  Rava said to him, “Are the two cases similar? There the orphans would be suffering a loss, but here does the creditor suffer any loss? He gave a thousand and he gets a thousand.”
  And for what amount is the tirfa written out?  
  Ravina said: For a thousand zuz. R. Avira said: For five hundred. And the law is [that the tirfa is written out] for five hundred. 
  There was a man against whom there was a claim for a hundred zuz. He had two small plots. He sold one for fifty zuz and the other for fifty zuz. His creditor came and distrained one of them and then he came again to distrain the other.
  [The purchaser] took a hundred zuz and went to him and said, “If [one of the plots] is worth a hundred zuz to you well and good; but if not, take the one hundred zuz and go.”  
  Joseph thought that this was like the case in our Mishnah: if the orphans [of one of the wives] said etc. Abaye said to him, “Are the two cases alike? There the orphans would have suffered a loss, but here, what loss would [the creditor] have? He gave a hundred and receives a hundred.”
  For what amount is the tirfa written out? Ravina said: For a hundred. R. Avira said: For fifty. And the law is [that it is written out] for fifty.
  There was certain man against whom there was a claim for a hundred zuz, He died and left a small plot of land that was worth fifty zuz. The creditor came and distrained it. The orphans went to him and gave him fifty zuz. He then distrained on it again.
  They came before Abaye. He said to them, “It is a mitzvah for orphans to pay the debt of their father. With the first payment they performed the mitzvah. And now that he has seized [the land again] his action is a valid seizure.”
  This ruling applies only in the case where [the orphans] did not tell him, “These fifty zuz are for the price of the small plot of land,” but if they did tell him, “these fifty zuz are for the price of the small plot of land,” they have removed his right to the land.
  A certain man once sold the ketubah of his mother for its benefit and said to [the buyer], “If mother comes and objects I will not pay you any compensation.”  
  His mother then died having raised no objections but he came and objected. Rami b. Hama thought to say that he stands in the place of his mother. Rava said to him: Let it be that he did not accept responsibility for her actions, but did he not accept responsibility for his own actions?
  Rami b. Hama said: If Reuven sold a field to Shimon without a guarantee and Shimon then re-sold it to Reuven with a guarantee
  
  Daf 92a
  
  and Reuven’s creditor came and seized it from him, the law is that Shimon must compensate Reuven.
  Rava said to him: Granted that [Shimon] had accepted responsibility for general claims, did he also accept responsibility for [claims against Reuven] himself?
  But Rava agrees that where Reuven inherited a field from Jacob and sold it to Shimon without a guarantee and Shimon then sold it to Reuven with a guarantee, and then Jacob's creditor came and seized it from him, the law is that Shimon must compensate Reuven.
  What is the reason? Jacob's creditor is regarded as any other creditor.
  Rami b. Hama stated: If Reuven sold a field to Shimon with a guarantee and turned [the price of the field] into a loan, and then Reuven died, and his creditor came to seize it from Shimon, [and Shimon] appeased the creditor by [paying him the] amount in coins
  the law is that Reuven’s children can say to him, “[As far as] we [are concerned,] our father has left movables with you and the movables of orphans are not pledged to a creditor.”
  Rava said: If the other one is clever he gives them a plot of land in settlement of the debt and then he collects it from them, in accordance [with a ruling of] R. Nahman who stated in the name of Rabbah b. Abbahu: If orphans collected a plot of land for their father’s debt, a creditor may in turn collect it from them.
  Rabbah said: If Reuven sold all his fields to Shimon and Shimon in turn sold one field [of these] to Levi, and then Reuven’s creditor appeared, if he wants he may collect from this one, and if he wants he may collect from this one.
  This was stated only where [Levi] had bought [land of] medium quality, but if he bought either the best or the worst he may tell him, “It is for this reason that I have taken the trouble to buy land which is not available for you.”
  And even [when he bought] medium quality the law is applicable only where [Levi] did not leave medium quality land like it 
  
  Daf 92b
  
  but if he did leave medium quality land like it he may say to him, “I have left for you land  from which to collect [your debt].”
  Abaye said: If Reuven sold a field to Shimon with a guarantee and a creditor of Reuven’s came to seize it, the laws is that Reuven may proceed to compensate the creditor and [the latter] cannot say to him, “You are no party to me” for [the other can] say to him, “For whatever you will take away from him he will turn to me [to claim compensation].”
  There are those who say: [This is so] even where no guarantee was given, since [Reuven] may say to him [to the creditor], “I do not want Shimon to have any grievance against me.”
  Abaye said: If Reuven sold a field to Shimon with a guarantee and a creditor of Reuven’s came to seize it,
  
  Daf 93a
  
  the laws is that Reuven may proceed to compensate the creditor and [the latter] cannot say to him, “You are no party to me” for [the other can] say to him, “For whatever you will take away from him he will turn to me [to claim compensation].”
  There are those who say: [This is so] even where no guarantee was given, since [Reuven] may say to him [to the creditor], “I do not want Shimon to have any grievance against me.”
  If a man who was married to three wives died, and the kethubah of one was a maneh, and of the other two hundred zuz, and of the third three hundred zuz and the estate [was worth] only one maneh they divide it equally.
  If the estate [was worth] two hundred zuz [the woman whose ketubah] is a maneh receives fifty zuz [and the woman whose ketubah] was two hundred and [the woman whose ketubah] was three hundred [receive each] three gold denarii (=seventy-five zuz). If the estate [was worth] three hundred zuz, [the woman whose ketubah] was a maneh receives fifty zuz  and [the woman whose ketubah] was two hundred [receives] a maneh  and [the woman whose ketubah] was worth three hundred [receives] six gold denarii (=one hundred and fifty zuz).
  Similarly, if three persons contributed to a joint fund and the fund lost or gained they share in the same manner.
  GEMARA. [The claimant] of the maneh receives fifty zuz. Should she not be entitled to only thirty-three and a third zuz?   
  Shmuel said: [Here it is a case] where the one who is entitled to the two hundred zuz wrote to the woman who was entitled to one maneh, “I have no claim whatsoever upon the maneh.”
  But if so, say the next clause: [the claimants respectively] of the two hundred, and the three hundred zuz [receive each] three gold dinars, she should say to her, “You have already removed your claim to it”?
  Because she can reply, “I have only renounced my claim.”
  If the estate [was worth] three hundred etc. 
  The claimant of 200 receives a maneh. But why? She should be entitled to seventy-five zuz only? 
  Shmuel said: [Our Mishnah refers to a case] where the woman who was entitled to the three hundred zuz wrote to the one entitled to the two hundred zuz and the one entitled to a maneh, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you in respect of one maneh.”
  Jacob of Nehar Pekod said in the name of Ravina: The first clause deals with two acts of seizure and the final clause deals with two acts of seizure.
  “The first clause deals with two acts of seizure:” That seventy-five zuz came into their hands the first time and one hundred and twenty-five the second time.
  “The final clause deals with two acts of seizure,” in that seventy-five came into their hands   the first time and two hundred and twenty-five the second time.
  It was taught: This is the teaching of R. Natan. Rabbi said, “I do not agree with R. Natan’s views in these [cases], rather they each take equal shares.”
  Similarly if three people contributed. Shmuel said: If two people contributed to a joint fund, one of them a maneh, and the other two hundred zuz, 
  
  Daf 93b
  
  the profit is equally divided.
  Rabbah said: It stands to reason that Shmuel’s statement applies where an ox [was purchased] for ploughing and was used for ploughing.  But where an ox [was purchased] for ploughing and was used for slaughter each of the partners receives a share in proportion to his capital. Hamnuna said: Even if the ox [was bought] for ploughing, and was used for slaughter the profit must be equally divided.
  They objected: If two people contributed to a joint fund, one of them a maneh, and the other, two hundred zuz, the profit is to be equally divided. Does not this refer to an ox [bought] for ploughing and used for slaughter, and is a rejection of Rabbah? No, it refers to an ox that was bought for ploughing and was used for ploughing.
  But what is the law if the ox was bought for ploughing and used for slaughtering? Each partner receives his share in proportion to his capital? Then instead of stating in the final clause, “If one man had bought [oxen] out of his own money and the other [had bought] oxen out of his own money and the animals were mixed up, each partner receives a share in proportion to his capital,”
  let it draw a distinction in the very same case, “When was this stated? Only when an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for ploughing, but when an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for slaughter each partner receives a share in proportion to his capital”?  
  This is indeed what was said: “When was this stated? When an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for ploughing but when an ox was bought for ploughing and was used for slaughter the law is the same as if he had bought [some oxen] out of his own money and the other [had bought some] out of his own money, and the animals were mixed up [in which case] each party receives a share in proportion to his capital.”
  We learned: Similarly if three people contributed to a joint fund and they made a loss or a profit they share in the same manner.
  Does not “they made a loss” mean that they made an actual loss, and “a profit” that they made an actual profit?  
  Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuhah: No; they made “a profit” [by receiving] new coins and “they made a loss” [by the deterioration of a coin into] an istira that was only suitable for covering a wound.
  If a man who was married to four wives died, his first wife takes precedence over the second, the second over the third and the third over the fourth. The first must take an oath to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth recovers payment without an oath.  Ben Nannus says:  Should she be rewarded because she is the last? She too may not exact payment except by an oath.
  If all were issued on the same day then the woman [whose kethubah] preceded that of the other, even if only by one hour, gets [her ketubah first]. And so it was the custom in Jerusalem to write the hours. If all kethuboth were issued at the same hour and the estate is worth no more than a maneh, they divide it equally.
  GEMARA. On what principle do they differ? Shmuel said: 
  
  Daf 94a
  
  For instance, where it was found that one of the fields did not belong to him, and with regard to a creditor of a later date who preceded [one of an earlier date] and collected [the debtor’s property]. 
  The first tanna holds that that which he collected was not legally collected,
  whereas Ben Nanas holds that which he collected was legally collected.
  Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: Both agree that that which he collected was not legally collected, but here they differ over whether we are concerned lest the fourth woman let [the ground] deteriorate.
  One Master holds that we must be concerned lest she let the ground deteriorate, whereas the other master is not concerned lest she let the ground deteriorate.
  Abaye said: The difference between them is the ruling of Abaye the Elder who said: The “orphans” of which they spoke are adults and there is no need to even say that minors [are included].
  The first tanna does not hold the view of Abaye the Elder and Ben Nanas holds the view of Abaye the Elder.
  Huna stated: If two brothers or two partners had a lawsuit against a third party and one of them went with that person to the court, the other cannot say to him, “You are not my party” for he has acted as his agent.
  Nahman once visited Sura and they asked him what the law was in such a case.
  He said to them: This is like a mishnah: the first must take an oath to the second, the second to the third and the third to the fourth, but it was not stated, “the first to the third.” What is the reason?  Is it not because [the second] has acted as her agent.
  But are [the two cases] alike? In that case, an oath for one person is the same as an oath for a hundred, but in this case he might well say, “Had l been present I would have made more convincing arguments.”
  This applies only when he was not in town, but if he was in town he should have come to the court.
  It was stated: Two deeds bearing the same date: Rav said: They should be divided [between the two claimants], and Shmuel said: [The case is to be decided at] the discretion of the judges. 
  Shall we say that Rav follows the view of R. Meir who holds that the signatures of the witnesses make [a get] effective,
  
  
  Daf 94b
  
  and that Shmuel follows the view of R. Elazar who holds that the witnesses to the delivery [of a Get] make it effective?
  No, all follow the view of R. Elazar, but here they disagree about the following. Rav holds that a division [between the claimants] is preferable and Shmuel holds that the discretion of the judges is preferable.
  But can you really say that Rav follows the view of R. Elazar? But did not R. Judah say in the name of Rav, “The halakhah is in agreement with R. Elazar in matters of divorce.” And when I said this in front of Shmuel he said: “Also in the case of other deeds.” This implies that Rav holds that [the halakhah does not follow R. Elazar] in case of other deeds. Rather it seems clear that Rav holds like R. Meir and Shmuel holds like R. Elazar.
  They raised an objection: “If two deeds bearing the same date [are produced in court, the property] is to be divided.” This is a rejection of Shmuel? Shmuel could say to you: Whose view is this? R. Meir but I follow the view of R. Elazar.
  But if this represents the view of R. Meir, what about the final clause: “If he wrote [a deed] for one man [and then he wrote a deed for] and delivered it to another man, the one to whom he delivered it has acquired it?” Now if [this accords with] R. Meir why does he acquire possession? Did he not say that witnesses to the signature cause the document to be effective?
  This is a tannaitic dispute: For it was taught: And the Sages say [that the money] must be divided, while here they said that the trustee should do what he sees fit.
  The mother of Rami b. Hama gave her property in writing to Rami b. Hama in the morning, but in the evening she gave it in writing to Mar Ukba b. Hama.  
  Rami b. Hama came before R. Sheshet who confirmed him in the possession of the property. Mar Ukba then appeared before R. Nahman who similarly confirmed him in the possession of the property. Sheshet came to R. Nahman and said to him, “What is the reason that the Master has acted in this way?” He said back, “And what is the reason that the Master has acted in that way?” He said: Because his deed came first.
  He replied, “Are we living in Jerusalem where they write hours [in deeds]?” “Then why did the Master act in this way.” He said: “I acted at the discretion of the judges.”
  He said back: “I too acted at the discretion of the judges.” He (R. Nahman) said back: “In the first place I am a judge and the Master is not a judge, and furthermore, at first you did not come with this argument.”
  Two deeds were once presented before R. Joseph. On one was written, “On the fifth of Nisan,” and on the other was, “In Nisan.” R. Joseph confirmed the property as belonging to the [person whose deed had written in it] “the fifth of Nisan.”
  The other one said to him, “And must I lose?”
  He said back to him, “Are you at a disadvantage, I could say to you that it was written on the twenty-ninth of Nisan.”
  He asked, “Will the master then write for me 
  
  Daf 95a
  
  a tirpa [authorizing distraint on property sold] after the first of Iyar?” He replied, “They might tell you: You [are holding a deed] that was written on the first of Nisan.”
  How can they fix this situation? They can write out authorizations to one another.
  If a man who was married to two wives sold his field, and the first wife wrote to the buyer, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you,” the second wife may take [the field] away from the buyer, and the first wife from the second, and the buyer from the first wife; and so they go on in turn until they arrange a compromise between them. The same law applies also to a creditor and to a woman creditor.
  GEMARA. And even if she wrote this for him, what does it matter? Has it not been taught, If a man says to another, “I have no claim whatsoever on this field,” “I have no interest in it” or “I am entirely withdrawn from it,” he has said nothing? What are we dealing with here? Where they made a kinyan.  
  But even if they made kinyan, what does it matter? Could she not say, “I merely wished to please my husband”? Have we not taught: If a man bought [a married woman’s property] from her husband and then bought it also from the wife, his purchase is legally invalid. Therefore, she can say, “I merely wished to please my husband.”
  Zera said in the name of R. Hisda: This is no difficulty, this one is R. Meir and the other is R. Judah.
  For it was taught: [If a husband] wrote a deed for the first buyer, and she did not sign on it, [and then he wrote a deed] for a second buyer and she did sign on it, she has thereby lost [her claim to] her kethubah, the words of R. Meir.
  R. Judah says: She may say, “I merely wished to please my husband, so what [claim] can you have against me?”
  As to Rabbi, would he teach the anonymous mishnah in accordance with R. Meir and the anonymous mishnah there in accordance with R. Judah?  
  Papa replied: [Our Mishnah deals] with the case of a divorced woman, and it represents the opinion of both [tannaim].
  Ashi replied: Both Mishnahs represent the views of R. Meir, for R. Meir says his view only there where there are two buyers, since in each case they can say to her, “If you wished to please your husband, you should have done so in the case of the first buyer.” But where there is only one buyer R. Meir admits [that the sale is invalid]. And our Mishnah [refers to a case] where [the husband had first] written out a deed for another buyer.
  We have taught elsewhere: They do not collect payment from mortgaged property where free assets are available, even if they are only of the poorest quality. They asked: If the free assets were ruined can one collect mortgaged property?
  Come and hear: [If a husband] wrote a deed for the first buyer, and she did not sign on it, [and then he wrote a deed] for a second buyer and she did sign on it, she has thereby lost [her claim to] her kethubah, the words of R. Meir.
  Now, if you thought that where the free assets were ruined she may recover from mortgaged property, granted that she lost [her right to recover] her ketubah from the second buyer, why should she not be entitled to recover it from the first buyer? 
  Nahman b. Yitzchak said: The meaning of “she loses” is that she loses [her right to recover] from the second buyer.
  Rava said: There are two objections [against this explanation]: First, “she loses” implies total loss. And, furthermore, it was taught: If a man borrowed from one person and sold his property to two others, and the creditor gave a written declaration to the second buyer, “I have no claim whatever upon you,” [this creditor] has no claim whatever upon the first buyer, since the latter can tell him, “I have left you a source from which to recover your debt”!
  There, it was he who had deliberately caused the loss to himself.      
  Yemar said to R. Ashi:
  
  Daf 95b
  
  But this happens every day [that a court takes mortgaged property when free assets were destroyed], For a man who pledged a vineyard to his friend for ten years but it aged after five years, and [when the creditor] came to the rabbis  they wrote out a tirpa for him?
  There also it was they caused the loss to themselves. Since they knew that a vineyard could age, they should not have bought [any of the debtor’s pledged land].
  The law is that where free assets have been ruined, he may collect from mortgaged property.
  Abaye ruled: [If a man said to a woman], “My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so,” and then the woman married, her husband has the status of a purchaser and her successor has no legal claim in place of her husband.
  With whom does this agree? With the following Tanna, as it has been taught: [If one man said to another,] “My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so” and the first recipient went down [into the estate] and sold it, the second may claim the estate   from those who bought it, the worlds of Rabbi. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says: The second may receive only that which the first has left. 
  But did Abaye really say such a thing? Did Abaye not say, “Who is a cunning wicked person? He who advises [his friend] to sell an estate in accordance with the ruling of R. Shimon b. Gamaliel?”
  Did he say, “She should marry”?  He said, “She was married.”
  Abaye further stated: [If a man said to a woman.]   “My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so,” and the woman sold [the estate] and died, her husband  may seize it from the buyer, the woman’s successor [may seize it] from the husband, and the buyer from the successor, and the estate is then placed in the hands of the buyer.
  But why should this case be different from the following where we learned: And so they go on in turn until they arrange some compromise between them? There they are all suffering some loss but here it is only the buyer who suffers the loss.
   Rafram went and recited this teaching in front of R. Ashi: Could Abaye have said such a ruling? Did he not say: [If a man said to a woman], “My estate shall be yours and after you [it shall be given] to So-and-so,” and then the woman married, her husband has the status of a vendee, and her successor has no legal claim in place of her husband?  
  He replied: There he spoke while she was unmarried, but here he spoke to her when she was married.  What did he mean to say to her? “Your successor shall acquire possession; your husband shall not.”
  The same law applies also to a creditor. A Tanna taught: ...
  The same law applies to a creditor and two buyers and also to a woman, who was a creditor, and two buyers.  
  May we return to you, chapter “One who was married.”
  A widow is to be maintained out of the estate of [her husband’s] orphans [and], her handiwork belongs to them but it is not their obligation to bury her. Her heirs, who inherit her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.
  GEMARA. The question was asked: Was it taught, “Is to be maintained,” or was “One who is maintained” taught? “Is to be maintained,” was taught in agreement with the men of Galilee, for it is not possible that they do not maintain her;
  or have we rather learned “one who is maintained,” is taught   in agreement with the men of Judea, so that if they do not want, they do not have to maintain her?
  
  Daf 96a
  
  Shmuel says that a widow can keep what she finds. This makes sense only if the orphans are not maintaining her, implying that they are not obligated to maintain her. For if they are maintaining her, then just as a wife’s findings go to her husband, since he is maintaining her, so too a widow’s findings should go to the heirs who are maintaining her.
  I could still tell you that what we teach “is to be maintained.” Why then did the Rabbis say that the find of a wife belonged to her husband. So that he would not have enmity against her, but as regards these let them bear the grudge. 
  Yose b. Hanina said: All of the labors which a wife must perform for her husband a widow must perform for the orphans, with the exception of pouring drinks, making ready the bed and washing the face, hands or feet.
  Joshua b. Levi said: All manner of service that a slave must perform for his master a student must perform for his teacher, except that of taking off his shoe.
  Rava said: This ruling applies only to a place where he is not known, but where he is known there can be no objection.
  Hiyya b. Abba said in the name of R. Yohanan: Anyone who deprives his student of [the privilege of] serving him acts, it is as if he has deprived him of [an act of] kindness, as it is said, “To him that deprives his friend of kindness” (Job 6:14). Nahman b. Yitzchak said: He also deprives him of the fear of heaven, for it is said “And he causes him to forsake the fear of the Almighty.”
  Rabbi Elazar said: If a widow seized movable property [to provide] for her maintenance, what she has seized was seized.  
  So it was also taught: If a widow seized movable property [to provide] for her maintenance, what she has seized was seized. And so when R. Dimi came he said: It once happened that the daughter-in-law of R. Shabtai seized a bag full of money, and the Sages did not have the power to take it out of her possession.  
  Ravina said: This applies only to maintenance but [if she seizes movable property] in payment of her ketubah they take it away from her.
  Mar bar R. Ashi raised a difficulty: How is it different if she seizes for her ketubah? Is it because [ketubot payments may be collected] from real estate and not from movable property, maintenance also, [is collected from] real estate and not movable property? Rather, if she seizes [movable property] for maintenance, what she has seized is hers, and so too for her ketubah.
  Yitzchak b. Naphtali said to Ravina: Thus they say in the name of Rav in accordance with your opinion.
  Yohanan said in the name of R. Yose b. Zimra: A widow who waited two or three years without claiming maintenance has lost her rights to maintenance.
  Now [that it has been said that] she loses [maintenance after] two years, was it necessary [to mention also] three? This is no difficulty—one [two] refers to a poor woman while the other [three years] refers to a rich woman; or else:.
  one [two] refers to a bold woman and the other [three] to a modest woman
  Rava said: This applies only to a retrospective claim, but in respect of the future she is entitled [to maintenance].
  Yohanan asked: If the orphans say, “We have already paid [for her maintenance],” and she says, “I did not receive it,” who must produce the proof?
  
  
  Daf 96b
  
  Is the estate [of the deceased man] in the presumptive possession of the orphans and consequently it is the widow who must produce the proof, or is the estate rather in the presumptive possession of the widow and the proof must be produced by the orphans? 
  Come and hear what Levi taught: A widow—as long as she has not remarried, the orphans must produce the proof that they have not paid her maintenance, but if she was married she must produce the proof.
  Shimi b. Ashi said: [This is a matter in dispute between] the following tannaim: She may sell [portions of her deceased husband’s estate] but she must write, “These I have sold for maintenance,” and “These I have sold for the ketubah,” the words of R. Judah. Yose says: She may sell [this property] and write without specifying, and thus she gains an advantage. 
  Do they not differ on the following point: R. Judah, who says that she must specify the purpose, holds that the [deceased man’s] estate is in the presumptive possession of the orphans and that it is the widow who must produce the proof, while R. Yose, who said that it was not necessary to specify the purpose, holds that the estate is in the presumptive possession of the widow and that it is the orphans who must produce the proof. 
  How do you know this? Perhaps all agree that the [deceased man’s] estate is in the presumptive possession of his widow and that the orphans must produce the proof, but R. Judah is merely giving her good advice, so that they should not call her a glutton.
  For were you not to say this, the question raised by R. Yohanan could have been answered from the Mishnah: She may sell [her deceased husband’s estate] for her maintenance out of court but she should write, “I have sold these for maintenance”?   Rather, we cannot learn anything from the Mishnah, for it was only giving her advice, so too here he was only giving her advice.
  Alternatively, all agree that the estate [of the deceased] is in the presumptive possession of the orphans, but R. Yose’s reason is like that given by Abaye the Elder, for Abaye the Elder stated: To what may the ruling of R. Yose be compared? To [the instructions of] a dying man who said, “Give two hundred zuz  to So-and-so, my creditor.” If he wants, he may take them in payment of his debt, if he wants, he may take then, as a gift.
  
  Daf 97a
  
  If he takes them as a gift, he has not gained an advantage.
  How does [a widow] sell [her deceased husband’s property] for her maintenance? Daniel son of R. Katina said in the name of R. Huna: She sells [portions of it] once every twelve months and the buyer supplies her maintenance once every thirty days. Rav Judah stated: She sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance once every thirty days.
  It was taught in agreement with R. Huna: [A widow] sells once in twelve months and the buyer supplies her maintenance once every thirty days. It was also taught in agreement with Rav Judah: [A widow] sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance once every thirty days.
  Amemar said: The law is that [a widow] sells once in six months and the buyer provides her maintenance once every thirty days. Ashi said to Amemar: What [about the ruling] of R. Huna? He replied, “I have not heard of it,” by which he meant, “I do not hold by it.”
  R. Sheshet was asked: May [a widow] who sold [land] for her maintenance subsequently seize it for her ketubah?
  This question was raised on [the basis of a ruling of] R. Joseph, for R. Joseph stated: If a widow has sold [any of her deceased husband's estate] the  responsibility falls upon the orphans, and if the court sold [any such property] the responsibility falls upon the orphans.
  What [then is the ruling if she herself sold the property]? Since the responsibility falls on the orphans, may she seize the land, or may [the buyers] say to her, “Granted that you have not accepted general responsibility, did you not accept responsibility against yourself either?
  He replied, “You have learned this: “[A widow] may continue to sell until [the estate of] the value of her ketubah [remains], and this is a support to her since she might thus collect her ketubah from the remainder.” Learn from this that only if she left [estate corresponding to the value of her ketubah] may [she collect her ketubah] but if she did not leave [enough estate to cover her ketubah] she may not.
  But perhaps this is only good advice, in order that people might not call her “one who goes back and collects twice”? If so, he should have stated, “She collects her ketubah from the remainder.” Why [then did it teach] “This is a support to her”? Thus learn from this that if she left property [for her ketubah] she may collect, if she did not leave, she may not.
  The question was raised: If a man sold [a plot of land] but then it turned out that he no longer needed money, may his sale be withdrawn or not? 
  Come and hear: There was a certain man who sold a plot of land to R. Papa because he was in need of money to buy some oxen. In the end, he did not need it and R. Papa returned the land to him! [This is no proof since] R. Papa may have acted beyond the strict requirements of the law. 
   Come and hear: There was once a famine in Nehardea and all the people sold their mansions. When wheat eventually arrived R. Nahman told them: The law is that the mansions must be returned to their original owners! 
  There also the sales were made in error since it eventually became known that the ship was waiting in the bays. 
  If that is so, this [explains] what Rami b. Shmuel said to R. Nahman, “If [you rule] this way you will cause them trouble in the future,” [whereupon] he replied, “Does famine happen every day” and to which the former responded, “Yes, famine in Nehardea is indeed a common occurrence.”
  And the law is that if one sold [a plot of land] but did not end up needing the money, the sale may be withdrawn.
  A widow, whether [her husband died] after betrothal or after marriage may sell [her husband's estate] without [permission from] a court.
  Rabbi Shimon says: [If her husband died] after marriage she may sell without [permission from] a court, but if after betrothal, she may not sell except with [permission from] a court, since she is not entitled to maintenance, and anyone who is not entitled to maintenance may not sell except with [permission from] a court.
  GEMARA. It makes sense  [that she can sell without going to the court if she is widowed] after marriage,
  
  Daf 97b
  
  for she needs maintenance [immediately]; But what is the reason she may do so [if widowed] after betrothal? Ulla said: In order to make marriage more attractive. R. Yohanan said: Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court.
  What is the practical difference between them? The practical difference between them is the case of a divorced woman. For according to the one who said, “In order to make marriage more attractive,” a divorced woman would also want marriage to be more attractive; but according to the one who said, “Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court,” he does not care if his wife suffers this indignity.
  We learned: And a divorced woman may not sell [her former husband's estate] except with the sanction of the court. This makes sense to the one who said, “Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court”—he does not care about his divorced wife; but according the one who said, “In order to make marriage more attractive,” a divorced woman would also want marriage to be attractive.
  This represents the view of R. Shimon.
  If [this represents the view of] R. Shimon, it already taught in the first clause, “from betrothal she may not sell [without permission of the court]!”
  What might you have thought? [That his ruling applied] only to a woman widowed after [her] betrothal, since in her case there was not much affection, but that a divorced woman, in whose case there was much affection, may demand [the privilege of making marriage more] attractive.
  But have we not learned this also: “Anyone who is not entitled to maintenance” does this not come to include a divorced woman?
  No, [it comes to include a woman who] was divorced and not divorced, in accordance with R. Zera, for R. Zera stated: Wherever they said a woman is both divorced and not divorced her husband is responsible for her maintenance. 
  Come and hear: Just as she may sell [her deceased husband's estate] without [the sanction of] the court, so may her heirs, those who inherit her ketubah. This makes sense for the one who says, “Because no man wants his wife to suffer the indignity [of appearing] in court” just as he does not want her to suffer indignity, he also does not want her inheritors to suffer indignity. But to the one who said, “In order to make marriage more attractive” what [consideration for] attractiveness is there for her heirs? Ulla interpreted this [to be a case where] for instance, her daughter or sister inherited her.
  [A widow who] sold her ketubah or part of it; or pledged her ketubah or part of it; or gave it away to someone else or part of it, may not sell [her husband’s property] in order to receive the remainder of her ketubah except with [the permission of] a court. four or five installments. And [meanwhile] she may sell [her husband’s estate to provide] for her maintenance without [the permission of] the court, and she writes, “I sold [the land to provide] for my maintenance.” A divorced woman must not sell [her husband’s property] except with [the permission of] the court.
  GEMARA. Who [is the author of the first ruling in] our Mishnah? It is R. Shimon. For it was taught: If a woman sold [all] her ketubah or pledged it, or mortgaged [the land that was pledged for] her ketubah to a stranger, she is not entitled to maintenance. R. Shimon ruled: Even if she did not sell or pledge [all] her ketubah, but half of it only, she loses her maintenance. 
  This implies that Rabbi Shimon holds that we do not regard part of the amount as being legally equal to the full amount, while the rabbis says that part of the amount is legally regarded as the full amount?
  But have we not in fact heard the opposite? For was it not taught: “And he shall take a wife in her virginity” this excludes one who is adolescent [some of whose] virginity is ended; the words of R. Meir. R. Elazar and R. Shimon permit [the marriage] of one who is adolescent?
  There they differ [on the interpretation] of Scripture, R. Meir holds that “virgin”  even [one who retains] some of her virginity; “her virginity” implies only one who retains all her virginity; “in her virginity” implies only [when previous intercourse with her took place] in a natural manner, but not when in an unnatural manner. 
  R. Elazar and R. Shimon hold that “virgin” implies a full virgin; “her virginity” implies even [one who retains] only part of her virginity;
  
  Daf 98a
  
  “in her virginity” implies only one whose entire virginity is intact, irrespective of whether [previous intercourse with her was] of a natural or unnatural character.
  A certain woman once seized a silver cup for her ketubah and then claimed her maintenance. She appeared before Rava. He said to the orphans, “Go give her maintenance; no one has regard for the ruling of R. Shimon who said that we do not regard part of the amount as legally equal to the full amount.”
  Rabbah the son of Rava sent to R. Joseph [the following enquiry:] Is a woman who sells [her deceased husband’s estate] without [the authorization] of the court required to take an oath or is she not required to take an oath? Why don’t you ask whether a public announcement [is required]?
  He replied: I do not need to ask about a public announcement because R. Zera has stated in the name of R. Nahman, “If a widow assessed [her husband’s estate] on her own behalf her act is invalid?” Now how did this case happen?
  If a public announcement had been made, why should her act be invalid? Rather there was no public announcement, and if she made [the assessment] on her own behalf, she has done nothing. But if she made it on behalf of another, her act is valid.
  No, I can still say to you public announcement may in fact have been made but [her act is nevertheless invalid] because they can say to her, “Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?”
  As was the case with a certain man with whom corals belonging to orphans had been deposited. He went and assessed them on his own behalf for four hundred zuz, and when later its price rose to six hundred zuz,
  he appeared before R. Ammi, who said to him, “Who [authorized] you to make the assessment?”
  And the law is that she is required to take an oath, but there is no need to make a public announcement. 
  If a widow whose ketubah was two hundred zuz sold [land] worth a maneh for two hundred zuz or [land] worth two hundred zuz for one maneh, she has received her ketubah.
  If her kethubah was one maneh, and she sold [land] worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, her sale is void. Even if she says, “I will return the denar to the heirs”, her sale is void.  
  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: her sale is always valid unless there was so much land there as to allow her to leave a field of nine kav, and from a garden, an area of half a kav, or, according to Rabbi Akiba, a quarter of a kav.
  If her ketubah was four hundred zuz and she sold [land] to [three] persons, to each for one maneh, and to a fourth [she sold] what was worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, [the sale] to the last person is void but [the sale] to all the others are valid.
  GEMARA. Why is the case of “a piece of land worth two hundred for one hundred” differ [in that she has received her ketubah?] Because they may say to her, “You yourself have caused the loss”? [But, so too] when she sold a piece of land worth one hundred for two hundred, she too could say, “It is I who have made the profit”? 
  R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha:
  
  Daf 98b
  
  Rabbi has taught here that all [profits belong] to the owner of the money: As it was taught, “If they added one extra to [the purchases made by an agent] all [the profit belongs] to the agent,” the words of R. Judah,
  but R. Yose says, “They divide the profit.” But, surely, it was taught that R. Yose says, “All [profit belongs] to the owner of the money!” Rami b. Hama replied: This is no difficulty: the former refers to an object that has a fixed value while the latter refers to one that has no fixed value.
  R. Papa stated: The law is: if it is an object that had a fixed value, they divide the value, but if the object has no fixed value, all [profit belongs] to the owner of the money. What does he teach us? That the reply that was given is the proper one.
  They asked: If he said, “Sell me a letekh” and the latter went and sold him a kor, what is the ruling? [Is the agent deemed to be merely] adding to the owner's instructions and [the buyer, therefore,] acquires possession of a letekh, or perhaps he is transgressing his instructions and [the buyer, therefore,] acquires no possession of a letek either?
  R. Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod said in the name of Ravina: Come and hear: If a householder said to his agent, “Serve a piece [of meat] to the guests,” and the latter said to them, “Take two,” and they took three, all of them are guilty of trespass. 
  Now this makes sense if you say [that the agent] was merely adding to the host's instructions, this is why the householder is guilty of trespass. But if you say, [that the agent] was transgressing his instruction: Why should the householder be guilty of trespass? Have we not in fact learned: If an agent performed his mission the householder is guilty of trespass but if he did not perform his mission the agent is guilty of trespass? 
  What are we dealing with here? When the agent said to the guests, “Take one at the request of the householder and one at my own request” and they took three.
  Come and hear: If her ketubah was one maneh, and she sold [land] worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, her sale is void.
  Does not [this mean] that she sold [land that was] worth a maneh and a denar for a maneh, and what does it mean “for a maneh” the maneh that was due to her, and by even, it means even though she said, I will return the denar to the heirs [by repurchasing for them] land of the value of a denar’? And was it not nevertheless stated, her sale is void?
  R. Huna the son of R. Natan said: No, [this is a case] where [she sold] at the lower price. 
  
  Daf 99a
  
  But since the final clause [deals with a case] where [she sold] at a lower price, [would not] the earlier clause [refer to one] where [she did] not [sell] at a lower price, for has [it not] been stated in the final clause, If her ketubah was four hundred zuz and she sold [land] to [three] persons, to each for one maneh, and to a fourth [she sold] what was worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, [the sale] to the last person is void but [the sale] to all the others are valid?
  No, both the earlier and the final clause [refer to a sale] at a lower price, and the final clause teaches us the following: The reason [why her sale is void is] because [she sold] at a lower price [property] that belonged to the orphans, but [if she had sold] her own property, her sale is valid.
  But is not this already inferred from the first clause: If a widow whose ketubah was two hundred zuz sold [land] worth a maneh for two hundred zuz or [land] worth two hundred zuz for one maneh, she has received her ketubah?
  What might I have said? There because [by her one act] she completely severed her connection with that house, but here [the sale for] the first maneh should be disqualified because the sale of the last maneh is invalid, therefore it teaches us that it is not. 
  There are those who say: This, you did not need to ask [for a ruling], where [he said to his agent,] “Go and sell for me a letekh” and [the latter] sold for him a kor, since [in this case the agent] was undoubtedly adding to his instructions.
  If you have a question, it is where he said to the agent, “Go and sell for me a kor” and he sold for him only one letekh. Do we [in such a case] say that [the agent] might tell the man, “I have done what is good for you, for [had I sold the full kor, and] you were no longer in need of money you could not have retracted,”
  or perhaps [the owner] could say to him, “I do not want so many documents held against me.”
  R. Hanina of Sura said: Come and hear: If one gave to another a gold denar and told him, “Bring me a shirt,” and the other brought him a shirt for three sela's and a cloak for three sela's, both are guilty of trespass. 
  Now if you say that an agent in similar circumstances has performed his mission and was only adding to his instructions, one can well see why the owner is guilty of trespass. But if you say that [the agent in such circumstances] was transgressing his instructions, why should [the owner] be guilty of trespass? 
  Here we are dealing with a case where [the agent] brought him [a shirt that was] worth six sela's for three
  If so why should the agent be guilty of trespass? On account of the cloak. 
  But if that were so, read the final clause: R. Judah says, Even in this case the owner is not guilty of trespass because he might say [to the agent,] “I wanted a big shirt and you brought me one that is small and bad.”
  What does “bad” mean? “Bad in respect of the price,” for [the owner can] tell him, “Had you brought me one for six sela's [my gain would have been] even greater since it would have been worth twelve sela's.”
  R. Judah admits [that if the transaction was] This may also be proved by a precise reading, for it taught:
  
  Daf 99b
  
  because [the quantity of] pulse for a sela” [is in exactly the same proportion as] that for one perutah. This is conclusive.
  How is this to be understood? If it be suggested [that it refers] to a place where [pulse] is sold by estimate, when he pays a sela he gets it at a much cheaper rate?
  R. Papa replied: [It refers] to a place where each kanna is sold for one perutah.
  Come and hear: If her ketubah was for four hundred zuz and she sold to this onea  maneh and to this one a maneh, and to a fourth [she sold] what was worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, [the sale] to the last person is void but [the sales] of all the others are valid!
  [This is no proof, for] as R. Shisha the son of R. Idi said [the final clause of our Mishnah deals] with small plots of land, so too hear, it deals with small plots of land.
  It is obvious [that if a person] instructed [his agent to “sell a plot of land] to one person but not to two” [and he sold it to two the sale is invalid for] he told him, “To one person but not to two.” But what if he said, “To one?”
  R. Huna ruled: “To one” implies “but not to two.” R. Hisda and Rabbah son of R. Huna both said: “To one” and even to two; “to one,” and even to a hundred.
  R. Nahman once happened to be at Sura when R. Hisda and Rabbah b. R. Huna came to visit him. They said to him: “What [is the ruling] in such a case? He replied, “To one” and even to two; “to one,” and even to a hundred.
  They said to him, “Even where the agent made an error?” He replied, “I was not speaking of a case where the agent made an error.” They said back to him, “But did the master not say [that the law of] over/undercharging does not apply to landed property”?
  This applies only where the owner made the error; but where the agent has made the error [the owner] might tell him, “I sent you to improve my position but not to impair it.”
  From where can you infer that there is a difference [in this matter] between the agent and the owner?
  [From] what we have taught, One who says to his agent: “Go and give terumah [for me],” he should give terumah in accordance with the mind of the owner. If he does not know the mind of the owner, he should according to the average amount— one fiftieth. If he gave ten parts less or more, the terumah is terumah.
  While in respect of an owner it was taught: If, when setting apart terumah, there came up in his hand even so much as one twentieth his terumah is valid.
  Come and hear: If her ketubah was for four hundred zuz and she sold this one for a maneh, and to this one for a maneh, and to a fourth [she sold] what was worth a maneh and a denar for one maneh, [the sale] to the last person is void but [the sales] of all others are valid. 
  R. Shisha the son of R. Idi replied: [This clause deals] with small plots of land. 
  If an assessment of the judges was one sixth less, or one sixth more [than the actual value of the property] their sale is void.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: their sale is valid for, otherwise, of what advantage is the power of a court? But if they made a bill for inspection, their sale is valid even if they sold for two hundred zuz what was worth one maneh or for one maneh what was worth two hundred zuz.
  GEMARA. The question was asked: What is the legal status of an agent? 
  
  Daf 100a
  
  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: An agent [has the same status] as judges; R. Shmuel b. Bisna said in the name of R. Nahman: As a widow. 
  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: An agent [has the same status] as judges--just as judges are not [selling] property for themselves, so too an agent is not selling property for himself, thus excluding a widow who is selling for herself.
  R. Shmuel b. Bisna said in the name of R. Nahman: As a widow, just as the widow is a single individual so too an agent a single individual; thus excluding a court, who are many. And the law is that an agent [has the same legal status] as a widow.
  But how is this different from that which we taught, “Go and give terumah [for me],” he should give terumah in accordance with the mind of the owner. If he does not know the mind of the owner, he should according to the average amount— one fiftieth. If he gave ten parts less or more, the terumah is terumah.
  There [the circumstances are different], for, since someone might give his terumah in a stingy manner while others might give it generously, [the agent] might tell the owner, “I thought of you to be of such [a disposition],” but here, since it was an error, [the owner] might say, “You should not have made an error.”
  R. Huna b. Hanina said in the name of R. Nahman: The halakhah follows the rulings of the sages. But R. Nahman does not hold that [their sale is valid for, otherwise,] of what advantage is the power of a court? But did not R. Nahman say in name of Shmuel: If orphans came to take their shares in their father's estate, the court must appoint for [each of] them a guardian and [these guardians] choose for [each of] them a proper share, and when [the orphans] grow up they may protest [against the settlement]; but R. Nahman himself said: When they grow up they may not protest since, otherwise, of what advantage would the power of a court be?
  This is no difficulty, the former [refers to a case] where they made a mistake while the latter [refers to a case] where they did not make a mistake. 
  If they did not make a mistake, what could they protest? [They could protest] the direction in which their field lays.
  When R. Dimi came he said: It once happened that Rabbi acted in agreement with the ruling of the sages. Perata, the son of R. Elazar b. Perata, grandson of R. Perata the Great, said in front of him, “If so, of what advantage would the power of a court be?” And [as a result] Rabbi reversed his decision.
  This is how it was taught by R. Dimi. R. Safra, however, taught as follows: It once happened that Rabbi wanted to act in agreement with the ruling of the sages, when Perata, the son of R. Elazar b. Perata, grandson of R. Perata the Great, said to him, “If so, of what advantage is the power of a court?” And [as a result] Rabbi did not act as he intended.
  Shall we say that they differ on this principle: One master holds the view that if one errs in a decision based on a mishnah, the ruling is reversed?
  And one master holds it is not reversed. No; all agree that if one errs in a decision based on a mishnah, the ruling is reversed, but one Master holds that the incident occurred in one way while the other holds that it occurred in the other way. 
  R. Joseph stated: If a widow sold [any of her deceased husband's estate] the responsibility for the indemnity falls upon the orphans, and if the court sold [any such property] the responsibility for the indemnity again falls upon the orphans.
  But this is obvious?
  It was not necessary to state this in respect of the widow, but it is necessary in respect of the court. What might you have said?
  
  Daf 100b
  
  That whoever buys from the court does so in order that he may have the benefit of a public announcement, hence it taught [that the responsibility for the indemnity still remains upon the orphans].
  R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says etc. What is the limit [of error]? R. Huna b. Judah said in the name of R. Sheshet: Up to a half
  It was also taught in a baraita: R. Shimon b. Gamaliel says: If the court sold for one maneh what was worth two hundred zuz, or for two hundred zuz what was worth one maneh, their sale is valid.
  Amemar said in the name of R. Joseph: A court that sold [an estate] without a [previous] public announcement are deemed as though they erred with regard to a law cited in a Mishnah and [their decision] must be reversed.
  “Are deemed”? They certainly have erred, for we learned: The assessment [of the property] of the orphans [must be publicly announced for] thirty days, and the assessment of consecrated land for sixty days; and they announce in the morning and in the evening?
  If [the ruling were to be derived] from that [Mishnah alone] I might have thought that it applied only to an agent but not to a court; thus he teaches us [that the same law applies to the court].
  R. Ashi raised an objection against Amemar: An assessment of judges which was less by one sixth, or more by one sixth [than the actual value of the property], their sale is void. No; [it refers to] where an announcement was made.
  But since the final clause [refers to a case] where an announcement was made[must not] the first clause [refer to one] where an announcement was not made; for in the final clause it was taught: But if they made a bill for inspection, their sale is valid even if they sold for two hundred zuz what was worth one maneh or for one maneh what was worth two hundred zuz? 
  Indeed [the first clause does refer to a case] where no announcement was made, and [yet there is] no difficulty, for one ruling refers to objects concerning which public announcements must be made,
  while the other refers to objects concerning which no public announcements are made, such as slaves, movables and deeds. What is the reason (why no announcement is made in the case of) slaves? Lest they hear it and escape. Movables and deeds? Lest they are stolen.
  If you wish I might say: One ruling refers to a time when they do make announcements while the others refers to a time when they do not,
  for the Nehardeans say that for poll-tax, for provisions or for funeral expenses, they sell without a public announcement.
  And if you want I might say: One ruling applies to a place where announcements are made while the other applies to a place where announcements are not made, for R. Nahman said: They never made a bill for inspection at Nehardea. 
  They thought that [the reason was] because they were experts in assessments. [But] R. Joseph b. Minyomi said to them: It was explained to me by R. Nahman [that the reason is] because they were nicknamed “consumers of publicly auctioned estates.”
  Rav Judah says in the name of Shmuel: Movables belonging to orphans are assessed and sold immediately. R. Hisda said in the name of Avimi: They are to be sold in the markets. 
  There is, however, no disagreement between them. One refers to place close to a market, while the other refers to a place far from the market.
  R. Kahana had in his possession some beer that belonged to the orphan R. Mesharsheya b. Hilkai. He kept it until the festival, saying, even though it might deteriorate, it will bring a quick sale.”
  Ravina had in his possession some wine belonging to the orphan Little Ravina, his sister's son, and he had also some wine of his own which he was about to take up to Sikara. 
  He came to R. Ashi and asked him, “May I carry (the orphan's wine) with my own?” He said to him, “Go, it is not preferable to yours.”
  [A minor] who refused her husband, a secondary incest prohibition, or an aylonit is not entitled to a ketubah or to the usufruct [of her dowry] or to maintenance, or to the wornout articles [of her dowry].
  If from the outset he had married on the understanding that she is an aylonit she is entitled to a ketubah. 
  A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah who was married to a regular priest, a mamzereth or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a Natin or a mamzer is entitled to a ketubah. 
  GEMARA. Rav taught: A minor who is released by means of a get is not entitled to a ketubah and all the more so [a minor] who exercises the right of refusal.  
  Shmuel taught: [A minor] who exercises the right of refusal is not entitled to a ketubah, but a minor who is released by a get is entitled to her ketubah.
  Shmuel follows his own reasoning; for Shmuel said: [A minor] who exercises the right of refusal is not entitled to a ketubah but a minor who is released by a get is entitled to her ketubah.
  [A minor] who exercises the right of refusal is not disqualified from marrying the brothers [of her husband], nor is she thereby disqualified from marrying a priest, but [a minor who] is released by a get is disqualified from marrying the brothers [of her husband] and also from marrying a priest;  
  [A minor] who exercises the right of refusal need not wait three months 
  
  Daf 101a
  
  but [a minor who] was released by a get must wait three months
  What does he teach us? We have already taught all of these rules:  If [a minor] has exercised the right of refusal against her husband he is permitted to marry her relatives and she is permitted to marry his relatives, and he does not disqualify her from marrying a priest; but if he gave her a get he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives and he also disqualifies her from marrying a priest?  
  “She must wait three months” was necessary for him [to teach] for we did not teach this.
  Shall we assume [that they differ on the same principles] as the following tannaim: R. Eliezer stated, There is no validity whatsoever to the act of a minor girl, and her husband is not entitled to anything she finds, nor to the work of her hands, nor may he invalidate her vows; he does not inherit from her and he may not defile himself for her. The general rule is: She is not his wife in any way, except that she must make a declaration of refusal.
  Joshua says: The act of a minor is valid, and her husband has the right to anything she finds and to the work of her hands, and to invalidate her vows. He inherits from her, and to defile himself for her. The general rule is that she is regarded as his wife in every respect, except that she may leave him by making a declaration of refusal?
  Shall we then assume that Rav holds like R. Eliezer, and Shmuel holds like R. Joshua?
  No one disagrees with regard to R. Eliezer.
  They differ only with regard to R. Joshua. Shmuel holds like R. Joshua; but Rav? He could argue that R. Joshua stated his view only there [where the benefits are] from her to him but [where the benefits are] from him to her, he did not say.
  Or to her worn out articles. Huna b. Hiyya said to R. Kahana: You said to us in the name of Shmuel that this was taught only in respect of pluckable property, but she is entitled to her iron sheep property.
  Papa wondered: To which [category of woman did Shmuel refer]? If you say: to a minor who made a declaration of refusal, [the difficulty would arise:] If [the articles] are still in existence she receives them in either case, and if they were no longer in existence she would not receive them in any case.
  If her refers to an aylonit, again, if [the articles] were still in existence she would receive them in either case, and if they no longer exist [the ruling] should be reversed: Pluckable property, since it is in her possession, she receives, but iron sheep property, since it is not in her possession, she does not receive.
  Rather, he refers to a forbidden relative of the second degree: the Rabbis penalized the woman in respect of [what is due to her] from him, and penalized the man in respect of [what is due to him] from the woman.
  Shimi b. Ashi said: From R. Kahana’s statement one can learn [that if a lawful wife] brought to her husband a cloak, the article is [to be treated as] capital and the man may not continue to wear it until it is worn out.
  But did not R. Nahman say that [a cloak must be treated as] produce? He differs from R. Nahman.
  They do not receive a ketubah. Shmuel said: This was taught only in respect of the maneh and the two hundred zuz, but she does receive the additional amount.
  It was also taught in a baraita: The women concerning whom the Sages have ruled, they do not receive a ketubah, for instance, a minor who exercised her right of refusal and the others listed in the same context, are not entitled to the maneh or to the two hundred zuz, but they are entitled to the additional amount;
  Women about whom the Sages ruled, “They may be divorced without [receiving their] ketubah” for instance, [a wife who] transgresses the [Mosaic] law, and others listed in the same context, are not entitled to the additional amounts and all the more so to the 100 or 200 zuz; A woman who is divorced on the grounds of an evil rumor takes only what is in front of her and departs. 
  This provides support for R. Huna, for R. Huna said: If she fornicates, she does not lose the worn out articles
  
  Daf 101b
  
  still in existence.
  A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: [A wife who] who fornicated loses her right to her worn out articles [though they are still] in existence. He said to him, “If she fornicated, did her possessions fornicate? Teach rather: She does not lose her worn out articles [that are still] in existence.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Yohanan: Thi is the view of the unnamed R. Menahem, but the Sages ruled: [A wife who] fornicated does not lose her worn out articles that are still in existence. 
  If he married her etc. R. Huna said: An aylonit [sometimes has the status of] a wife and [sometimes] does not have the status of wife; a widow [married to a high priest always has the status of] a proper wife.
  “An aylonit [sometimes has the status of] a wife and [sometimes] does not have the status of wife”; if the husband knew [beforehand] she is entitled to a ketubah and if he did not know, she is not entitled to a ketubah. “A widow [married to a high priest always has the status of] a proper wife” for whether her husband was aware of her [widowhood] or not, she is always entitled to a ketubah.
  Rav Judah said: Both this one and that one [sometimes have the status of] a wife and [sometimes] does not: If her husband knew of her [condition or status] she is entitled to a ketubah and if he was not aware of it she is not entitled to a ketubah.
  They objected: If [a High Priest] married on the presumption that [the woman] was a widow and it turns out that she is, she is entitled to her ketubah. This implies that if there was no presumption she is not entitled to a kethubah?
  Do not say “that if there was not a presumption she does not receive a ketubah” rather say that if he married her on the presumption that she was not a widow and it was found that she was a widow, she is not entitled to a ketubah.
  What then is the ruling when he married her with no presumption? She is entitled [to a ketubah]? Then instead of stating, “On the presumption that [the woman] was a widow and it turns out that she is, she is entitled to her ketubah,” it should have taught us, “With no presumption [she is entitled to her ketubah]” and all the more so in the former?
  Furthermore, it was explicitly taught: If he married her believing [that she was a widow] and it was found that his belief was justified, she is entitled to a ketubah, but if he married her with no presumption she is not entitled to a ketubah. This indeed is a refutation of R. Huna.
  It was our Mishnah that caused R. Huna to err. He thought that, since a distinction was drawn in the case of an aylonit and no distinction was drawn in the case of a widow, it can be inferred that a widow is entitled [to a ketubah even if she was married] with no presumption of her status. But this is not so, for when it taught the case of a widow the author intended to apply to it the distinction drawn in the case of the aylonit.
  May we return to you chapter, “A widow is provided for.”
  If a man married a woman and she cut a deal with him that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years.
  If she was [subsequently] married to another man and cut a deal with him [as well] that he should maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. The first husband may not plead, “If she will come to me I will maintain her”, rather he must send her maintenance to her at the place where her mother [lives].  
  Similarly, the two husbands cannot plead, “We will maintain her jointly”, but one must maintain her and the other give her the cost of her maintenance.
  If she married her husband must supply her with maintenance and they give her the cost of her maintenance. If they die, their daughters are maintained out of their free assets only but she must be maintained even out of assigned property, because she is like a creditor.
  Clever men used to write, “On condition that I shall maintain your daughter for five years while you are with me”.
  GEMARA. It was stated: One who says to his fellow, “I owe you a maneh:” R. Yohanan says: He is liable; but Resh Lakish says: He is exempt.
  What is the case? If [it refers to a case] where the man said to them, “You are my witnesses,” what is the reason of Resh Lakish who holds him to be exempt? If [it is a case] where he did not say to them, “You are my witnesses,” what is the reason of R. Yohanan who holds him liable?
  The fact is that [the dispute relates to a case] where he did not say, “You are my witnesses,” but here we are dealing [with the case of a person] who said to another, “I owe you a maneh” in a document R. Yohanan says: He is liable, because the contents of a document have the same strength as if he said, “You are my witnesses,” but Resh Lakish says: He is exempt, because the contents of a document do not have legal force.
  We learned: If a man married a woman and she made an agreement with him that he will maintain her daughter for five years, he must maintain her for five years. Does this not refer to a case like this? 
  
  Daf 102a
  
  No, [our Mishnah is dealing] with documents on verbal agreements, and this is in accordance with R. Gidel,
   since R. Gidel has said in the name of Rav: [If one man said to another], “How much are you giving to your son?” [and the other replies] “Such and such a sum,” and [the other said,] “How much are you giving to your daughter?” [and the other replies], “Such and such a sum,” if they betroth, they have performed kinyan (acquisition), and these are the things which are acquired by verbal agreement. 
  Come and hear: If a man writes to a priest that “I owe you five selas” he must pay him the five selas and his son is not redeemed.
  There [the law] is different because he is under biblical obligation [to give them] to him. If that be so, why did he write? In order to choose for himself a priest.
  If that is the case why is not his son redeemed? This accords with Ulla; For Ulla said: According to the Torah, [the son] is redeemed as soon as [the father] gives the money. And why then did they say that he was not redeemed? It is a decree lest they say that redemption can be done with documents.
  Rava said: This is like the dispute of Tannaim: [If the guarantee] of a guarantor appears below the signing of the document, [the creditor] may recover his debt from unencumbered property.
  Such a case once came before R. Ishmael and he said that [the debt] may be recovered from unencumbered property. Ben Nannas said to him: He may not collect either from unencumbered property or from property with a lien on it. 
  He said to him: Why? He said back: Behold if one was choking another in the street, and his friend found him and said to him, “Leave him alone and I will pay you,” [where he is undoubtedly] exempt from liability, since the loan was not made through trust in him.” 
  Shall we say that R. Yohanan holds like R. Ishmael while Resh Lakish holds like Ben Nannas? 
  They did not disagree about the view of Ben Nannas, rather they disagree
  
  Daf 102b
  
  with regard to the view of R. Ishmael. R. Yohanan holds like R. Ishmael, while Resh Lakish [might argue:] R. Ishmael states his view there only because there is a biblical responsibility but here no biblical responsibility is involved. 
  The [above] text [stated]: R. Gidel said in the name of Rav: [If one man said to another], “How much are you giving to your son?” [and the other replies] “Such and such a sum,” and [the other said,] “How much are you giving to your daughter?” [and the other replies], “Such and such a sum,” if they betroth, they have performed kinyan (acquisition), and these are the things which are acquired by verbal agreement.
  Rava said: It stands to reason that Rav’s ruling should apply [only] to the case of a man whose daughter was a na'arah, for he receives benefit, but not to that of a bogert, for he does not receive benefit.
  But by God! Rav meant [his ruling to include] even one who is a bogeret. For should you not say this, what benefit does the son’s father derive? Rather by the benefit of joining the other family, they decisively transfer the money.
  Ravina said to R. Ashi: Can these matters be written down or may they not be written down? He said to him: They may not be written down.
  He raised an objection against him: Clever men used to write, “On condition that I shall maintain your daughter for five years as long as you live with me?” What does “write” mean? Saying.
  And is “saying” called “writing”? Yes, for so we learned: If a husband writes to his wife, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property” and R. Hiyya taught: If a husband said to his wife.
  Come and hear: Documents of betrothal and marriage may not be written except with the consent of both parties. Behold with the consent of both parties they may be written. Does this not refer to deeds based on verbal agreements?
  No; it refers to actual betrothal documents, in accord with R. papa and R. Sheravya; for it was stated: If a man wrote it for her sake but without her consent Rabbah and Ravina said: She is betrothed, but R. Papa and R. Sheravaya said: he is not betrothed.
  Come and hear: If they die, their daughters are maintained out of their free assets only but she must be maintained even out of assigned property, because she is like a creditor.
  Here we are dealing with a case where the man performed a formal act of acquisition (kinyan). 
  If so, his own daughters should also have that right? [This is a case] they made an act of kinyan for some but not for others.
  How do we know this? Since she was in existence at the time of the kinyan, the kinyan is effective for her; the other daughters who were not in existence at the time of kinyan, the kinyan does not work for them.
  But do we not also deal with the case where they were in existence at the time of kinyan, and how is this possible? When he divorced his wife and then remarried her?
  Rather [this is the explanation:] Since she is not covered by the court stipulation, kinyan is effective; the other daughters who are protected by court stipulation, kinyan is not effective.
  Are they, on that account, worse off? Rather, this is the reason: In the case of his own daughters, since they are protected by the court stipulation, it might be assumed that he entrusted them with some bundles [of money].
  The first husband may not plead [etc.] R. Hisda stated: This implies that [the place of] a daughter must be with her mother.
  How do we know we are dealing here with one who is of age; perhaps we are dealing only with a minor [whose custody must be entrusted to her mother] on account of what had once happened?
  For it was taught: If a man died and left a young son with his mother, [and] the father’s heirs demand, “Let him be brought up with us” and his mother claims, “My son should be brought up by me,” [the son] must be left with his mother, but may not be left with anyone who is entitled to be his heir. This once occurred and [the heirs] killed him on the eve of Pesach!
  If that were so it should have been stated, “To wherever she is,” why then was it stated, “at the place where her mother was”?
  
  Daf 103a
  
  Learn from that that a daughter stays with her mother, it does not matter whether she is of majority age or a minor.
  The two husbands cannot plead etc.
  A certain man once leased his mill to another in return for his grinding his grain.  Eventually he grew wealthy and bought another mill and a donkey. 
  He said to the other, “Until now I have had my grinding done at your place but now pay me rent.” He said back to him, “I will only grind for you.”
  Ravina thought that it was the same principle that was in our Mishnah: the two husbands cannot plead, “We will maintain her jointly,” but one must maintain her and the other give her the cost of her maintenance. 
  Avira said to him: Are [the two cases] alike? There [the woman] has only one stomach, she does not have two stomachs; but here he might say to him, “Grind [in your own mill] and sell; grind [in mine] and keep.”
  This however was said only in a case where had no [other orders for] grinding at his mill, but if he has [sufficient orders for] grinding at his mill, in such a case we do enforce [against behaving] in the manner of Sodom.
  A widow who says, “I do not want to move from my husband’s house”, the heirs cannot tell her, “Go to your father’s house and we will maintain you,” rather they must maintain her in her husband’s house and they give her a residence according to her honor.
  If she said, “I have no desire to move from my father’s house,” the heirs can say to her, “If you stay with us you will have your maintenance, but if you do not stay with us you will receive no maintenance.”
  If she claimed [that she didn’t want to live there] because she is young and they are young, they must maintain her while she lives in the house of her father.
  Our Rabbis taught:  [A widow] may use [her deceased husband’s] dwelling as she used it during his lifetime. [She may also use] his slaves and handmaidens, as she used them while he was alive, the cushions and the bolsters, as he used them while he was alive, and the silver and gold utensils as she used them while he was alive, for thus he wrote to her in the ketubah: “And you shall dwell in my house and be maintained from of my estate for the duration of your widowhood.” 
  Joseph taught: “In my house” but not in my hovel.
  Nahman said: If orphans sold a widow’s dwelling their act is legally invalid.
  But why [should this case be] different from that of which R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan, who said: If the orphans got ahead of themselves and sold some property of a small estate their sale is valid?  
  There [the property] was not pledged to her during [her father’s] lifetime, but here [the dwelling] was pledged to the widow during [her husband’s] lifetime. 
  Abaye said: We have a tradition that if a widow’s dwelling collapsed, it is not the duty of the heirs to rebuild it.
  It was also taught: If a widow’s dwelling collapsed it is not the duty of the heirs to rebuild it. Furthermore, even if she says, “Allow me and I will rebuild it at my own expense,” she is not heeded.      
  Abaye asked: What if she repaired it? This is undecided.
  If she said, “I do not want” etc. But let them give her while she is there?  
  This supports [a statement] of R. Huna, for R. Huna said, “The blessing of a house [is proportionate] to its size.”
  Why then should they not give her according to the blessing of the house?  They indeed must.  
  Huna said: The sayings of the sages [are a source of] blessing, wealth and healing. [As to] “blessing,” this is what we just said.
  “Wealth”? As we have learned: If one sold produce to another [and the buyer] drew them toward him, though they have not yet been measured, he has acquired. If he measured them, but did not draw them toward him, he has not acquired. But if [the buyer] is prudent he rents the place where they are kept.
  “Healing”? For we have learned: A man should not chew wheat and put it on his wound during Pesah because it ferments. 
  Our rabbis taught: When Rabbi was about to die he said, “I require [the presence] of my sons.” His sons came before him. He instructed them: “Take care that you show proper respect to your mother. The light shall continue to burn in its usual place, the table shall be laid in its usual place [and my] bed shall be spread in its usual place. Joseph of Haifa and Shimon of Efrat, they who attended to me in my lifetime shall attend on me when I am dead.”
  “Take care that you show proper respect to your mother.” Is this not from the Torah, since it is written, “Honor your father and your mother?”  She was their stepmother.  
  [The commandment to honor] a stepmother is also from the Torah, for it was taught: “Honor your father and your mother,” “your father” includes your stepmother, “and your mother” includes your stepfather. And the superfluous vav includes your older brother?
  This refers to honoring them during their lifetime. But it does not include after death.
  “The light shall continue to burn in its usual place, the table shall be laid in its usual place [and my] bed shall be spread in its usual place.”  What is the reason [for all these instructions]?
  He used to come home at twilight every Shabbat eve [even after his death]. On a certain Shabbat eve a neighbor came calling at his door. His handmaiden said, “Be quiet for Rabbi is sitting there.” As soon as he heard this he did not come anymore, in order not to cast aspersion on earlier righteous ones.
  “Joseph of Haifa and Shimon of Efrat who attended to me in my lifetime shall attend to me when I am dead.” They thought he meant [that they would attend to him] in this world.  When they saw that their biers preceded his they said, “Learn from this that he was referring to the world to come.” And why did he mention it? 
  So that people should not say that they were guilty of some offence and until now Rabbi’s merit was protecting them.
  He said to them, “I require [the presence] of the Sages of Israel.” The Sages of Israel entered into his presence. He said to them, “Do not eulogize me in the smaller towns.
  
  Daf 103b
  
  Reassemble the yeshiva after thirty days. My son Shimon is wise, my son Gamaliel the Nasi, and Hanina b. Hama shall preside at the head.”
  “Do not eulogize me in the smaller towns.” They thought he was saying this in order [to cause less] trouble.  When they saw that they were eulogizing him in the large towns and everyone was gathering, they said, “Learn from this that he said this because of honor.”
  “Reassemble the yeshiva after thirty days.” For I am no greater than our teacher Moses concerning whom it is written, “And the children of Israel wept for Moses in the plains of Moab thirty days.” For thirty days they mourned both day and night. Subsequently they mourned during the day and studied at night or mourned at night and studied during the day, until a period of twelve months of mourning [had passed].
  On the day that Rabbi died a heavenly voice went forth and announced: Whoever was present at the death of Rabbi is destined to enjoy the life of the world to come. A certain launderer, who used to come to him every day, failed to come on that day; and, as soon as he heard this, he went up on the roof, and fell down to the ground and died. A heavenly voice went forth and announced: That launderer also is destined to enjoy the life of the world to come.
  “My son Shimon is wise.” What did he mean?  This is what he meant: Although my son Shimon is wise, my son Gamaliel shall be the Nasi.  
  Levi said, “Was it even necessary to state this?”  Shimon b. Rabbi said, “It was necessary for you and your lameness.” What was his difficulty?  Does not Scripture state, “But the kingdom he gave to Yehoram, because he was the firstborn?” 
  He filled the place of his ancestors but R. Gamaliel did not fill the place of his ancestors.
  Then why did Rabbi act in the manner he did?  Granted that he did not fill the place of his ancestors in wisdom but he did fill their place in his fear of sin.
  Hanina b. Hama shall sit at the head [of the academy]. R. Hanina did not accept [the office] because R. Afes was older than him by two and a half years. R. Afas sat at the head of the academy. R. Hanina sat outside and Levi came and joined him.
  When R. Afes died and R. Hanina sat at the head, Levi had no one to join him and came in consequence to Babylonia. That is why they said to Rav: A great man came to Nehardea, and he was one who limps, and he expounded that it is permitted to wear a wreath in public on Shabbat. He said, “Learn from this that R. Afes has died, and R. Hanina sits at the head of the academy; and that Levi had no one to sit with him, and therefore has come [down here].”
  But maybe R. Hanina died, and R. Afes continued to sit at the head and that Levi had no one to sit with him, and therefore came [down here]? If you want I can say: Levi would have submitted to the authority of R. Afes.
   And if you prefer I might reply: Since [Rabbi] said, “Hanina b. Hama shall sit at the head of the academy,” there could be no possibility of his not becoming head; for about the righteous it is written “You shall decree and it shall be done.”
  But was there not R. Hiyya? He had already died. But did not R. Hiyya say, “I saw Rabbi’s grave and shed tears on it”? Reverse [the names].
  But was it not taught, “On the day on which Rabbi died holiness ceased”? Reverse [the names].
  But has it not been taught: When Rabbi fell ill, R. Hiyya entered into his presence and found him weeping. He said to him, “My master, why are you weeping? Was it not taught: “[If a man] dies laughing is a good omen for him, if weeping it is a bad omen for him; his face upwards it is a good omen, his face downwards it is a bad omen; his face towards the public it is a good omen, towards the wall it is a bad omen; if his face is greenish it is a bad omen, if bright and ruddy it is a good omen. If he dies on erev Shabbat it is a good omen, at the end of Shabbat it is a bad omen; if he dies on erev Yom Kippur it is a bad omen, at the end of Yom Kippur, it is a good omen; if he dies of dysentery it is a good omen because most righteous men die of dysentery?”
  And the other replied, “I am crying over the Torah and commandments [that I will no longer be able to study or observe.]
  If you want I might say: Reverse [the names]; But if you prefer I might say: In fact there is no need to reverse. R. Hiyya was engaged in the performance of mitzvot, and Rabbi thought “I will not disturb him.”  
  This is similar to the following: When R. Hanina and R. Hiyya were engaged in a dispute, R. Hanina said to R. Hiyya, “Are you disputing with me? Were the Torah, God forbid, forgotten in Israel, I would restore it by means of my dialectical arguments.”
  Hiyya said, “I am the one who makes sure that the Torah should not be forgotten in Israel. For I bring flax seed, sow it, and weave nets [from the plants]. [With these] I hunt deer with whose flesh I feed orphans and from whose skins I prepare scrolls, and then I got up to a town where there are no teachers of young children, and write out the five Books of the Torah for five children and teach another six children the six orders of the Mishnah, and then tell each one: Teach your section to your colleagues.”
  This is like what Rabbi said, “How great are the deeds of Hiyya?” R. Shimon b. Rabbi to him: “[Greater] even than yours?” “Yes,” he replied. R. Ishmael the son of R. Yose asked, “Even greater than my father’s?” He replied, “God forbid. Let no such thing be [mentioned] in Israel!”     
  He said to them, “I want my youngest son. R. Shimon entered into his presence and he entrusted him with the orders of wisdom.
  He said, “I want my oldest son.” R. Gamaliel entered into his presence and he entrusted him with the traditions and regulations of the Patriarchate. He said to him, “Conduct your Patriarchate with high standing, and cast bile among the students.”
  Is this so? But is it not written, “And honor those who fear the Lord,” and the Master said that this refers to Yeshoshapat, King of Judah. who, on seeing a scholar, used to rise from his throne, embrace him and kiss him, and call him, “My master, my master; my teacher, my teacher”?
  This is no difficulty: This was in private and this was in public.
  It was taught: Rabbi was lying [on his sickbed] at Tzippori but a [burial] place was reserved for him at Beth She’arim.  
  But have we not taught: “Justice, justice shalt you pursue”–follow Rabbi to Beth She’arim? Rabbi was [indeed] living at Beth She’arim but when he fell ill he was brought to Tzippori
  
  
  Daf 104a
  
  for it was on higher ground and its air was good.
  On the day when Rabbi died the sages decreed a public fast and offered prayers for heavenly mercy. They announced that whoever said that Rabbi was dead would be stabbed with a sword. 
  Rabbi’s handmaiden went up to the roof and prayed: “Those above [in the heavens] want Rabbi [to join them] and those below want Rabbi [to remain with them]; may it be the will [of God] that those below overpower those above.” When she saw how often he had to go to the toilet, and he would have to remove his tefillin and put them back on again and this caused him distress she prayed: “May it be the will [of God] that those above should overcome those below.”
  But the sages did not stop asking for mercy for him. She picked up a jar and threw it down from the roof to the ground. [For a moment] they stopped praying for him and Rabbi died.
  The sages said to Bar Kappara, “Go investigate.” He went and found that [Rabbi] had died. He tore his cloak and turned the tear backwards. [On returning to the Rabbis] he began: “The angels and the mortals have taken hold of the holy ark. The angels overpowered the mortals and the holy ark has been captured.” They said to him, “He died.” He replied, “You said it, not me.”
  When he was about to die, Rabbi raised his ten fingers towards heaven and said: “Master of the Universe, it is revealed and known to you that I have labored in the study of the Torah with my ten fingers and that I did not enjoy [any worldly] benefits even with my little finger. May it be Your will that there be peace in my resting place.” A heavenly voice went out, and said, “He shall enter into peace; they shall rest on their beds.
  Shouldn’t it say “on your bed”?  This supports R. Hiyya b. Gamda, for R. Hiyya b. Gamda said in the name of R. Yose b. Saul: When a righteous man departs from this world the ministering angels say to the Holy One, blessed be He, “Master of the Universe, the righteous man So-and-so is coming,” and he answers them, “Let the righteous men come [from their resting places], go forth to meet him.” And they say to him, “Enter in peace [and then] they   shall rest on their beds.”
  Elazar stated: When a righteous man departs from the world three companies of ministering angels greet him. One exclaims, “Come in peace”; the other exclaims, “He who walks in his uprightness,” and the third exclaims, “He shall enter into peace; they shall rest on their beds.” When a wicked man perishes from the world three groups of angels of destruction greet him. One exclaims, “There is no peace, say the Lord, for the wicked”; the other tells him, “He   shall lie down in sorrow,” while the third   tells him, “Go down and be laid down with the uncircumcised.”
  As long as she lives in her father’s house she may collect her ketubah at any time. As long as she lives in her husband’s house she may recover her ketubah, only within twenty-five years, because in the course of twenty-five years she has sufficient opportunities to give favors equal [in value to the amount of] her ketubah, the words of Rabbi Meir who spoke in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel.
  The Sages say: As long as she lives in her husband’s house she may collect her ketubah at any time. As long as she lives in her father’s house she may collect her ketubah only within twenty-five years.
  If [the widow] died, her heirs must mention her ketubah within twenty-five years.
  GEMARA. Abaye said to R. Joseph: The poorest woman in Israel is given 25 years and Martha the daughter of Boethus is also given 25 years?
  He replied: In accordance with the camel is the burden. 
  The question was raised: According to R. Meir, does she lose her ketubah in proportion? This stands undecided.
  The sages said: As long. Abaye said to R. Joseph: If she comes before sunset she may collect her ketubah and [if she came] after sunset she does collect it? In that short time she has forgiven her ketubah?
  He replied, “Yes. All of the measures of the Sages are such. In [a bath of] forty se’ah one may immerse; In [a bath of] forty se’ah minus one kortov one may not immerse.
  Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: R. Ishmael son of R. Yose testified in the presence of Rabbi to a statement he made in the name of his father: It was taught only [in respect of a woman] who does not produce her ketubah document but if she produces her ketubah document, she may recover [the amount of] her ketubah at any time. Elazar said: Even if she produces her ketubah document she may recover for only 25 years.
  Sheshet raised an objection: A creditor may recover his debt [at any time] even if there was no mention of it. What is the precise case? If he does not have a document, how can he collect? Rather [it must refer to one] who does hold a document, [from which it follows that] only a creditor does not forgive his debt, but a widow does forgive the debt? 
  He raised the objection and he also solved it: This may, in fact, refer to one who does not have a document but here we are dealing with a case where the debtor admits [his liability].
  But has R. Elai not stated: We teach, “A divorced woman is like a creditor.” What is the case? If she does not have her ketubah document, then with what does she collect the debt? Rather, [it must refer to one] who does hold her ketubah, [from which it follows that] only a divorcee [may recover her ketubah] because she is not likely to have surrendered it, but that a widow [is deemed to have] surrendered? 
  Here also [it refers to case] where the defendant admits [the claim].   
  Nahman b. Yitzchak stated: R. Judah b. Kaza taught in a baraita from the school of Bar Kaza: If she claimed her ketubah
  
  Daf 104b
  
  she is again entitled to the original period. And if she produced ketubah document she may recover [the amount of] her ketubah at any time.
  Nahman b. R. Hisda sent [the following message] to R. Nahman b. Ya’akov: Let our Master teach us: Is there a dispute when she produces the ketubah document or when she does not produce the ketubah document and with whom does the halakhah agree?
  He sent to him: The dispute refers to one who did not produce the ketubah document, but if she produced the ketubah document, she may recover her ketubah at any time; and the halakhah is in agreement with the Sages.
  When R. Dimi came he reported that R. Shimon b. Pazzi said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi in the name of Bar Kappara: This was taught only in respect of the maneh and the two hundred zuz, but she always receives the extra amount. 
  But R. Abahu said in the name of R. Yohanan said: She loses even the extra amount; for R. Aibu said in the name of R. Yannai: The ketubah conditions are subject to the same rules as the ketubah itself.
  It was also stated: R. Abba said in the name of R. Huna who said it in the name of Rav: This was taught only in respect of the maneh and the two hundred zuz but she always receives the extra amount.
  Abba said to R. Huna: Did Rav really say this? He replied, “Do you want to silence me or give me a drink?” He replied, “I wish to silence you!”
  The mother-in-law of R. Hiyya Arika was the wife of his brother and [she became] a widow who lived in her father’s house and [R. Hiyya] maintained her for twenty-five years at her paternal home.
  At the end [of the period] she said to him, “Give me my maintenance.” He said to her, “You no longer receive maintenance.” “Then give me my ketubah.” He said to her, “You have no rights to maintenance or to your ketubah.”
  She summoned him to law before Rabbah b. Shila. The judge said to him, “Tell me what exactly were the circumstances.” He said, “I maintained her for twenty-five years at her paternal home and, by the life of the Master, I carried [the provisions] to her on my shoulder.”
  He said to him, “What is the reason that the sages ruled, that ‘as long as she lives in her husband’s house [a widow] may recover her ketubah at any time’? Because we assume that she did not claim the ketubah in order [to save herself from] shame. Similarly here too she did not [previously] submit her claim in order [to save herself from] shame. Go and give her the ketubah.”
  [R. Hiyya] disregarded [the ruling. The judge] wrote out for her a writ of seizure on his property. He came in front of Rava and said to him, “See, Master, how he judged me.” He replied, “He judged you well.”
  She said to him, “If that is so, let him proceed to refund me the produce [he has consumed] since that day to today.” He said to her, “Show me the writ of seizure.” He saw that it did not contain the clause, “And we have ascertained that this estate belonged to the deceased.” He said to her, “The writ of seizure was not properly drawn up.”
  She said to him, “Forget the writ. Let me take [the refund for the produce] from the day on which the period of the public announcement terminated to date.” He said to her, “This applies only to a case where no error has was written into the writ of seizure, but where an error was written in the writ, it possesses no validity.”
  But she said to him, “Did not the Master himself say [that the omission of the] lien clause is to be regarded as a scribal error?”  
  Rava said to her, “In this case, [the omission] cannot be said to be a scribal error, for even Rabbah b. Shila originally made a mistake. He thought: Since both belonged to him what matters it [whether the widow distrains] on the one or the other. But this is not correct.
  For sometimes [the widow] might go and improve those [lands] while those belonging to her husband would be allowed to deteriorate and [the heir might eventually] tell her, ‘Take yours   and return to me mine,’ and a bad name would come on the court.”
  May we return to you chapter “Hanose.”
  There were two judges of fines in Jerusalem, Admon and Hanan ben Avishalom. Hanan stated two rulings and Admon stated seven. If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: Hanan says: 
  
  Daf 105a
  
  she must take an oath at the end but not at the beginning. The sons of the high priests differed from him and ruled that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well; she need take an oath only at the end. 
  GEMARA. They raised an inconsistency: “There were three judges of robberies in Jerusalem: Admon b. Gadai,  Hanan the Egyptian and Hanan b. Abishalom.” There is a difficulty between “three and “two,” and a difficulty between “fines (gezerot)”  and robbery (gezelot)?  
  There is no problem between “three” and two” since he lists [only those] whom he considers important and those not important, he does not list. But there still is a difficulty between “fines” and “robbery”?
  Nahman b. Yitzchak said: That they would decree fines for acts of robbery; as it was taught: If [a beast] bit off a plant: R. Yose says: Those who decreed fines in Jerusalem ruled that if the plant was in its first year [the owner of the beast pays as compensation] two silver pieces. If it was in its second year [he pays as compensation] four silver pieces.
  They raised another contradiction: There were three judges of fines in Jerusalem: Admon, and Hanan and Nahum?  R. Papa said: Who taught Nahum [as part of the list]? R. Nathan;  or it was taught: R. Nathan stated: Nahum the Mede also was one of those who decreed fines in Jerusaelm, but the Sages did not agree with him.
  But were there no more? [Did not] R. Pinchas say in the name of R. Oshaia that there were three hundred and ninety four courts of law in Jerusalem, and an equal number of synagogues. of houses of study and of schools? There were indeed many judges, and when we said that, we meant only those who decreed fines.
  Rav Judah said in the name of R. Assi: The judges of fines in Jerusalem received their salaries out of the Temple funds [at the rate of] ninety-nine maneh [per year]. If they were not satisfied, they would give them more. “They were not satisfied”?  Are we dealing with wicked men? Rather, [if the amount was] not sufficient, they would give them more even if they did not want it.
  Karna used to take one istira from the innocent party and one istira from the guilty party and then informed them of his decision. But how could he do this? Is it not written, “And a bribe you shall not take”? 
  And should you say that this applies only where he does not take from both [litigants] since he might [in consequence] tilt the judgment in favor of one, but Karna, since he took [the same amount] from both parties, would not come to tilt the judgment. But is it really permitted even where one would not come to tilt judgment?
  Was it not in fact taught: Why does Scripture say, “And you shall not take a bribe”?  If this teaches that one must not acquit the guilty or that one must not condemn the innocent, it was already stated, “Do not pervert judgment.”  Consequently, even if he acquits the innocent and condemns the guilty, the Torah says, “Do not take a bribe”?  
  This applies only where [the judge] takes [the gift] as a bribe, but Karna took [the two istira] as a fee. But is it permissible [for a judge to take money] as a fee. Have we not in fact learned: One who takes wages for adjudicating, his judgments are void? This applies only to a fee for pronouncing judgment; Karna took compensation for loss of other work. 
  But [is a judge] permitted to take compensation for loss of work? Was it not in fact taught: Contemptible is the judge who takes a fee for pronouncing judgment; but his decision is valid?  What is the precise situation? If he took a fee for acting as judge how could his decision be valid, have we not taught: One who takes wages for adjudicating, his judgments are void? Consequently it must mean a fee for loss of work, and yet it was stated, was it not, “Contemptible is the judge etc.”?
  This applies only to a loss of work that cannot be proved, but Karna received [compensation for] loss of work that could be proved.  For he was [regularly occupied in] smelling tests at a winery, and for this he was paid a fee.
  This is similar to the case of R. Huna. When a lawsuit was brought to him, he used to say to the [litigants], “Provide me with a man who will draw the water in my place and I will pronounce judgment for you.”
  Abahu said: Come and see how blind are the eyes of those who take a bribe. If a man has pain in his eyes he pays money to a doctor and he may be cured or he may not be cured, yet these take what is worth one perutah and blind their eyes, as it is said in Scripture, “For a bribe blinds those that have sight.”
  Our Rabbis taught: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise” and all the more so those of the foolish; “And perverts the words of the righteous,” and all the more so those of the wicked. Are fools and wicked men capable of acting as judges? Rather, this is what it meant: “For a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise,” even a great sage who takes bribes will not depart from the world without [the affliction of] a dullness of the mind. “And pervert the words of the righteous,” 
  
  Daf 105b
  
  even one who is righteous in every respect but takes a bribe will not depart from this world without [the affliction of] confusion of mind.
  When R. Dimi came he said: R. Nahman b. Kohen made the following exposition: What is it that is written, “The king by justice establishes the land, but he that takes gifts will overthrow it” (Proverbs 29:4)? If the judge is like a king who is not in need of anything, he will establish the land, but if he is like a priest who moves chases after threshing floors, he will overthrow it.
  Rabbah b. R. Shila stated: Any judge who borrows things is unfit to pronounce judgment. But this applies only where he possesses nothing to lend to others, but where he possesses things to lend, there is no problem.
  Is this true? But did not Rava borrow things from the household of Bar Merion, although they did not borrow anything from him? There he desired to give them better standing.
  Rava stated: What is the reason for [the prohibition against taking] a gift?  Because as soon as a man receives a gift from another he becomes so well disposed towards him that he becomes like his own person, and no man sees himself in the wrong. What [is the meaning of] shohad? She-hu had.
  Abaye said: This scholar who is loved by the townspeople, it is not because he is great, rather it is because he does not rebuke them with matters of heaven.
  Rava said: At first I thought that all the people of Mehoza loved me. When I was appointed judge I thought that some would hate me and others would love me. When I saw that the man who loses today wins tomorrow I said that if I am loved they all love me and if I am hated they all hate me.
  Our Rabbis taught: “And you shall not take a bribe”; there was no need to speak of [the prohibition of taking] a bribe of money, but rather even a bribe of actions is also forbidden, for Scripture does not write, “And you shall not take a gain.” What is the case of “a bribe of words’?
  Like the case of Shmuel who was once crossing [a river] on a bridge. A man came up and offered him his hand.  [Shmuel] asked him, “What is your business here?” He said to him, “I have a court case.” [Shmuel] replied, “I am disqualified from acting as your judge.”
  Amemar was once sitting and adjudicating when a bird flew down upon his head. A man came and removed it. ‘What is your business here?’ [Amemar] asked him, “What is your business here?” He said to him, “I have a court case.” [Amemar] replied, “I am disqualified from acting as your judge.” Mar Ukba once spit and a man came and covered it. ‘[Mar Ukba] asked him, “What is your business here?” He said to him, “I have a court case.” [Mar Ukba] replied, “I am disqualified from acting as your judge.”
  Yishmael son of R. Yose, had a sharecropper who was would regularly bring him a basket full of fruit every Friday. One day he brought it to him on a Thursday. He said to him, “Why is now different?” He replied, “I have a lawsuit and I said to myself that at the same time I might bring [the fruit] to the Master.” He did not accept it from him [and] said, “I am disqualified to act as your judge.”
  He thereupon appointed a couple of rabbis to try the case for him. As he was arranging the matter he said, “If he wants he can make this claim and if he wants he can make that claim.” He then said, “Blast those take bribes! If I, who have not taken [the fruit at all], and even if I had taken I would only have taken what is my own am thinking in this way, all the mores so would be those who actually take bribes.”
  A man once brought to R. Yishmael b. Elisha [a gift of] the first fleece. He said to him, “Where are you from?” He replied, “From such and such a place.” [R. Ishmael] asked, “But from here to there there was there no other priest to whom to give it?”  He responded,  “I have a lawsuit and I thought that at the same time I would bring [the gift] to the Master.”
  He thereupon appointed a couple of rabbis to try the case for him. As he was arranging the matter he said, “If he wants he can make this claim and if he wants he can make that claim. He then said, “Blast those take bribes! If I, who have not taken [the fruit at all], and even if I had taken I would only have taken what is my own am thinking in this way, all the mores so would be those who actually take bribes.”
  A man once brought to R. Anan a bale of small fish. He said to him, “What is your business here?” He responded, “I have a lawsuit.” [R. Anan] did not accept it from him, and told him, “I am disqualified from trying your case.”...
  He responded, “I was not asking the Master’s decision [in my lawsuit]; will the Master, however, at least accept [the present] so that I may not be prevented from offering my first-fruits?” For it was taught: “And there came a man from Baal-Shalishah, and brought the man of God bread of the first-fruits, twenty loaves of barley, and fresh ears of grain in his sack” (II Kings 4:42); but was Elisha entitled to eat first-fruits?  
  This, however, was intended to tell you that one who brings a gift to a scholar [is doing as good a deed] as if he had offered first-fruits. [R. Anan] said to him, “I did not want to accept your gift, but now that you have given me a reason I will accept it.” Thereupon he sent him in front of R. Nahman. He also sent to him, “Will the Master try [the action of] this man, for I, Anan, am disqualified from acting as judge for him.”  He said, “Since he has sent me such a message, he must be his relative.” There was a case involving orphans in front of him and he said:
  
  Daf 106a
  
  “This one is a positive commandment and this one is a positive commandment but the positive commandment of showing respect for the Torah must take precedence. He, therefore, postponed the orphans’ case and brought up that man’s suit. When the other party noticed the honor he was showing him he remained speechless. 
  Elijah was a frequent visitor of R. Anan and he was teaching him Seder Eliyahu.  But as soon as he acted in this way [Elijah] left. He fasted, and asked for mercy, [until Elijah] came to him again. When he appeared he greatly frightened him. 
  Thereupon he made a box [for himself] and he sat in front of it, until he concluded his Order with him. And this is [the reason] why people speak of the Seder Eliyahu Rabbah and the Seder Eliyahu Zuta.  
  In the days of R. Joseph there was a famine. The rabbis said to R. Joseph, “Will the master offer up prayers for mercy”? He replied, “Now, if Elisha, with whom, when the [main body of] rabbis had departed, there still remained two thousand and two hundred rabbis, did not offer up any prayers for mercy in a time of famine, should I [at such a time venture to] offer prayers for mercy?”
  And how do we know that this many remained? As it is written, “And his servant said: How should I place this before 100 men?” (II Kings 4:43). What does it mean “before 100 men?” If we say that all of it was placed before 100 men, in years of drought this is a lot of food! Rather, each and every one was placed before 100 men.
  When the rabbis would depart from the school of Rav there remained behind one thousand and two hundred rabbis. [When they departed] from the school of R. Huna there remained behind eight hundred rabbis. Huna when delivering his discourses [was assisted] by thirteen voice amplifiers. When the rabbis stood up after R. Huna’s discourses and shook out their garments the dust rose [so high] that it obscured the [light of] day, and people in Palestine said, “They have risen after the discourses of R. Huna the Babylonian.”
  When the rabbis departed from the schools of Rabbah and R. Joseph there remained four hundred rabbis and they described themselves as orphans. When the rabbis departed from the school of Abaye (others say, From the school of R. Papa, while still others say, From the school of R. Ashi) there remained two hundred rabbis, and these described themselves as orphans of the orphans.
  Yitzchak b. Radifa said in the name of R. Ammi: The inspectors of [animal] blemishes in Jerusalem received their wages from the Temple funds. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The scholars who taught the priests the laws of ritual slaughter received their fees from the Temple funds.
  Giddal said in the name of Rav: The scholars who taught the priests the rules of kemitzah received their fees from the Temple funds. Rabbah b. Bar Hana said in the name of R. Yohanan: Book editors in Jerusalem received their fees from the Temple funds.  
  Nahman said: Rav said that the women who wove the [Temple] curtains received their wages from the Temple funds but I say [that they received them] from the funds consecrated for Temple repairs, since the curtains were part of the builder’s work.
  They raised an objection: The women who wove the [Temple] curtains, and the house of Garmo ]who were in charge] of the preparation of the show bread, and the house of Avtinas  [who were in charge] of the preparation of the incense, received their wages from the Temple funds.
  There it refers [to the curtains] of the gates; for R. Zera said in the name of Rav: There were thirteen curtains in the second Temple, seven corresponding to the seven gates, one for the entrance to the Sanctuary (Hekhal), one for the entrance to the Hall (Ulam), two for the Holy of Holies (Devir) and two [above them and] corresponding to them in the upper story.
  Our rabbis taught: The women who raised their children for the [services of the red] heifer, received their wages from the Temple funds. Abba Shaul said: The rich women of Jerusalem fed them and maintained them. 
  Huna asked of Rav: 
  
  Daf 106b
  
  Are these requirement for the altar and therefore may be financed with Temple repair funds, or are these requirements of the sacrifices and therefore should be financed with Temple funds? He said to him, “They may be financed with the Temple funds only.”
  He raised an objection against him, “And when they had finished, they brought the rest of the money before the king and Yehoyada, and from this they made vessels for the house of the Lord, ministering vessels” (II Chronicles 24:14).
  He said back to him: He that taught you verses from the Writings did not teach you the Prophets: “However, there were not made for the house of the Lord [silver bowls, snuffers, basins or trumpets—no vessels of gold or silver—from the money brought into the House of the Lord,] this was given only to overseers of the work” (II Kings 12:14-15).
  But if so, the verses contradict each other? There is no contradiction. The former is a case they collected [for Temple repair] there remained a balance, while the latter is a case where they collected and nothing remained.
  But even if they collected and funds remained, what of it? Abahu said: In their minds, the court makes stipulates about these funds, that if they are needed [for Temple repair], then they are needed. But if they are not needed, they should go for the ministering vessels. 
  A Tanna of the school of R. Ishmael taught: Ministering vessels come from the Temple funds, as it says, “And the rest of the money” (II Chronicles 24:14). What money has a remainder? I must say, the Temple funds.
  But say that only the balance itself [could be used to pay for the ministering vessels]? As Rava said, “The burnt-offering” implies the first burnt-offering, so too “the money,” the first money.
  They raised an objection: The incense and all congregational sacrifices come from the Temple funds. The golden altar, the frankincense and the ministering vessels come from the remainders of libations;
  the altar for the burnt-offerings, the chambers and the courts come from the funds that were dedicated for Temple repair, [and whatever was situated] outside the court walls comes out of the surplus of the Temple funds; and this is what we learned: The city wall and its towers and all other requirements of the city come from the surplus of the Temple funds?
  This is a tannaitic dispute: What was done with the surplus of the appropriation?  1)      [They would buy] plates of gold for covering the interior of the Holy of Holies. 2)      Rabbi Ishmael says: the surplus [from the sale] of the produce was used for the altar’s “dessert,” and the surplus of the appropriation was used for the ministering vessels.
  3)      Rabbi Akiba says: the surplus of the appropriation was used for the altar’s “dessert,” and the surplus of the libations was used for the ministering vessels. 4)      Rabbi Hananiah the chief of the priests says: the surplus of the libations was used for the altar’s “dessert” and the surplus of the appropriation was used for the ministering vessels. 5)      Neither of these [two sages] allowed [a profit from the sale of] the produce.
   What is [meant by] “produce”?  As it was taught: What did they do with the surplus of the offering [to the Temple funds]?  They bought produce at a low price and sold it at a higher price, and with the profits sacrifices were purchased for the “dessert” of the altar; and this is what we learned: The surplus of the produce was spent on sacrifices for the “dessert” of the altar.
  What does it mean “neither of these [two sages] allowed [a profit from the sale of] the produce?” As we have taught, What did they do with the surplus of the remainder in the chamber? They would buy with it wines, oils and fine flours, and the profit belonged to the Temple, the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: one may not make a profit with the property of the Temple, nor with the property of the poor.
  Why is it prohibited to make a profit with sacred funds? There must be no poverty where there is wealth. Why is it prohibited to make a profit with property of the poor? — Because a poor man might come unexpectedly and there would be nothing to give him.
  A husband who has gone abroad: It was stated: Rav said:
  
  Daf 107a
  
  They make an allowance of maintenance for a married woman. But Shmuel said: They do not make an allowance of maintenance for a married woman. Shmuel said: Abba agrees with me [that no allowance is to be granted] during the first three months, because no man leaves his house empty.
  In a case where they heard that he died they do not argue. They only differ when they did not hear that he had died. Rav said: They make an allowance for he is obligated to maintain her. Shmuel said: They do not make an allowance.
  What is Shmuel’s reasoning? Rav Zevid said: Because I might say that he gave over to her some bundles. Papa said: We must be concerned that he told her, “Deduct [the proceeds of] your handiwork for your maintenance.”
  What is the practical difference between them?
  The practical difference between them is the case of a woman who is of age but [the proceeds of whose handiwork] did not suffice [for her maintenance], or a minor  [the proceeds of whose handiwork] is sufficient [for her maintenance]. 
  We learned: If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: Hanan says: she must take an oath at the end but not at the beginning.  The sons of the high priests differed from him and ruled that she must take an oath both at the beginning and at the end. They thus differ only in respect of the oath but they do not disagree that maintenance must be given to her? Shmuel explained [this to refer to a case] where they heard that he was dead.
  Come and hear: If [a husband] went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance: The sons of the High Priests say she must take an oath, Hanan said: She need not take an oath. If [the husband] came and declared, “I have provided for her maintenance,” he is believed.
  Here also [it may be replied] is a case where a report was received that he was dead. But did it not say, “If [the husband] came and declared…”?  If he came after the report had been received. 
  Come and hear: If [a husband] went to a country beyond the sea, and his wife claimed maintenance, and he returned and said [to her], “Deduct your handiwork for your maintenance,” he is permitted to say this. If the court granted the allowance before [he returned] their decision is valid. Here also it is a case where a report that he had died was received.
  Come and hear: If [a husband] went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance, the court sells some of his estate and provides food and clothing for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters or for anything else! 
  Sheshet said; [Here it is a case] where a husband maintained his wife at the hands of an agent. If so, they should also provide for his sons and daughters? [It is a case] where [a husband] made provision for the maintenance for her but not for them. How can we be so certain?  
  Rather R. Papa said, [The case] is where she heard from one witness that [her husband] had died. To her, since she could marry on the evidence of one witness, they also grant her maintenance;
  to his sons and daughters, since even if they wanted to take possession of his estate on the evidence of one witness they cannot, we also do not provide for them maintenance.
  What [is meant by] “something else”? Hisda said: This refers to cosmetics. Joseph said: Charity. The one who said, “cosmetics,” all the more so charity. 
  
  Daf 107b
  
  But the one who said, “charity” would say that he does give her cosmetics, for he would not want her to be disgraced.
  Come and hear: A yevamah during the first three months is maintained out of the estate of her ‎husband; henceforth, she is not to be maintained either out of the estate of her husband or out of ‎that of the levir.‎
  If [the levir] appeared in court and then fled she is maintained out of the estate of the levir!‎
  Shmuel could respond to you: What could we be concerned about here?  If that he gave her bundles, he is not yet close to her; and if we are concerned about her handiwork, she is not obligated to him.
  Come and hear: A woman who went with her husband to a country beyond the sea and then came back and stated, “My husband is dead:” If she wants she may be maintained and, if she wants she may claim her ketubah. [If she stated], “My husband has divorced me,” she may be maintained to the extent of her ketubah!
  Here too it is a case where they heard that he died. Then why [is she maintained] only to the extent of her kethubah? Because she herself has brought the loss upon herself.
  Come and hear: In what circumstances did they say that [a minor girl who] exercised her right of refusal is not entitled to maintenance? It cannot be said, in the case of one who lives with her husband, for her husband is obligated to maintain her, rather for instance, in a case where her husband went to a country beyond the sea, and she borrowed money and spent it and then exercised her right of refusal. Now, the reason [why she is not entitled to maintenance is] because she exercised her right of refusal; had she, however, not exercised her right of refusal, they would have given her maintenance?  
  Shmuel could respond to you: What could we be concerned about here?  If that he gave her bundles, no one entrusts a minor with bundles; and if we are concerned about her handiwork, she is not obligated to him, the handiwork of a minor does not suffice [for her maintenance].
  What did they decide about this?  When R. Dimi came he said: Such a case came in front of Rabbi at Beth She’arim and he made an allowance for her maintenance, and in front of R. Yishmael at Tzippori and he did not make an allowance for her maintenance. Yohanan was astonished at this decision: What did R. Yishmael see that caused him to not give her maintenance? Behold the sons of the High Priests and Hanan disputed only on the question of the oath, but [they all agree that] they give her maintenance?
  Shemen b. Abba answered him: Our Master, Shmuel, in Babylon has already solved: [She receives maintenance only] when they have heard that he died. He responded, “With this, you have solved everything?”
  When Rabin came he related: Such a case came in front of Rabbi at Beth She’arim and he did not grant the woman maintenance, and in front of R. Yishmael at Tzipori and he made an allowance for her maintenance. R. Yohanan said: What reason could Rabbi see for not granting her an allowance! Behold Hanan and the sons of the High Priests disagreed only about the oath  but [they agreed that] they give her maintenance? R. Shemen b. Abba answered him: Our Master, Shmuel, in Babylon has already solved: [She receives maintenance only] when they have heard that he died. He responded, “With this, you have solved everything?”
  The law is in agreement with Rav, and they grant an allowance to a married woman. The law is also in agreement with R. Huna who said in the name of Rav, for R. Huna said in the name of Rav: A wife may say to her husband, “I do not want to be maintained by you, and I refuse to do [any work for you].”
  The law also agrees with R. Zevid with regard to glazed vessels, for R. Zevid said: Glazed vessels: if they are white or black they are permitted, 
  but if green they are forbidden. This, however, applies only to those that have no cracks but if they have cracks they are forbidden. 
  If a man went to a country beyond the sea and someone came forward and financially supported his wife, Hanan says: he lost his money.
  The sons of the high priests differed from him and said: let him take an oath as to how much he spent and recover it. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well [the man] put his money on the horn of a deer.
  GEMARA. We have taught elsewhere:  If one is under a vow not to benefit from his neighbor,
  
  Daf 108a
  
  [his neighbor] may pay his shekel, pay off his debts, and return a lost article to him. Where payment is taken for this, the benefit should become sacred property.
  It makes sense that he may “pay for him his shekel” [because by this payment] he merely performs a mitzvah, for it was taught:  One may withdraw [from the funds of the Temple treasury] on the account of that which was lost, collected  or about to be collected;
  And one who returns to him a lost object is also performing a mitzvah. But “repay his debt”—is this not providing him with a direct benefit?
  Oshaya replied: Who is this [that rules thus?] It is Hanan, who said, “he has lost his money.”
  Rava said: You can say that the ruling agrees even with the rabbis. What are we dealing with here? With one who borrowed money on the condition that he does not repay it [except when he wants to].
  It makes sense that Rava does not say as did R. Oshaia, since [he wishes] the ruling to agree even with the opinion of the rabbis. But why does R. Oshaia not resolve the problem like Rava? R. Oshaia could answer you: Granted that he does not have actual benefit, 
  
  
  Daf 108b
  
  but he would be embarrassed [not to pay back the debt?] There also he has benefit, the benefit that he [need not] feel embarrassed.
  Admon said seven [rulings]: If a man dies and leaves sons and daughters, if the estate is large, the sons inherit it and the daughters are maintained [from it]. And if the estate is small, the daughters are maintained from it, and the sons can go begging. Admon said, “Just because I’m a male I lose out!” Rabban Gamaliel said; I agree with the words of Admon.
  GEMARA. What did he mean? Abaye said: This is what he means, Just because I’m a male capable of engaging in the study of the Torah I lose out?
  Rava said to him: One who is engaged in the study of the Torah inherits, while he who is not engaged in the study of the Torah does not inherit? Rather Rava said, This is what he mean: “Just because I am a male,” and entitled to inherit in the case of a large estate, I lose [my rights] in the case of a small estate?
  If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the claim, he must swear. But the Sages say: the admission is not of the same kind as the claim.   Rabban Gamaliel said:  I agree with the words of Admon.
  GEMARA. Learn from this that according to the Rabbis, [a man from] whom one claimed wheat and barley and he admitted the claim to the barley is exempt [from taking an oath].
  Shall we then say that this is a refutation of R. Nahman in the name of Shmuel? For R. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: [A man from] whom one claimed wheat and barley and he admitted one of them is liable [to an oath]?    
  Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: [The mishnah refers to a case] where he claimed from him a measure [of oil].
  If so, what could Admon’s reason be? Rather Rava said: Both [agree] that where [the claimant] said to the other, “I have the contents of ten jars of oil in your vat,” he is claiming from him the oil but not the jars. [And if he said], “You have ten jars full of oil of mine,” he is claiming from him both the oil and the jars.
  They differ where [the claimant] said to him, “You owe me ten jars of oil.” Admon says that this expression includes a claim for the jars, and the Rabbis hold that in this expression does not include a claim for the jars.
  The reason then is because “this expression includes a claim for the jars” but if the expression included jars, he would have been obligated. Shall we say that this is a refutation of R. Hiyya b. Abba? For R. Hiyya b. Abbah said: [A man from] whom one claimed wheat and barley, and he admitted one of them, is exempt [from an oath]?
  Shimi b. Ashi said: It is like a case where one claimed from another a pomegranate with its peel. Ravina raised a difficulty: A pomegranate without its peel cannot be preserved, but oil can well be preserved without jars! 
  Rather, what are we dealing with here? [With the case of one] who said to another, “You owe me ten jars of oil,” and the other replied, “The [claim for the] oil is completely false, [and as to] the jars, too, I owe you five and the other five I do not owe you. 
  Admon says that this expression includes the jars also and, since [the defendant] must take an oath in respect of the jars, he must also take an oath in respect of the oil, while the Rabbis hold that such an expression does not include the jars [so that] what the one claims the other did not admit, and what the latter admitted the former did not claim.
  If a man promised money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, 
  
  
  Daf 109a
  
  [his daughter] shall sit until her hair turns white. Admon says:  She may say, “Had I myself promised the sum I would sit until my hair turns white, but now that my father has promised it, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free.” Rabban Gamaliel said:  I agree with the words of Admon.
  GEMARA. Our Mishnah does not accord with the following Tanna. For it was taught: R. Yose son of R. Judah stated, Admon and the sages did not disagree about a man who promised a sum of money to his [prospective] son-in-law and then defaulted, that his daughter may say “My father has promised on my behalf, what can I do?”
  They only disagree where she herself promised a sum of money on her own behalf, in which case the Sages ruled: Let her remain [single] until her hair grows grey, while Admon says that she could say, “I thought that my father would pay for me [the promised amount], but now that my father does not pay for me, what can I do? Either marry me or set me free.” R. Gamaliel said: I see Admon’s words.
  A Tanna taught: This applies only to a woman who is of majority age but in the case of a minor, they may use force. Whom do they force? If we say the father, it should have said the opposite?  Rather Rava said: They force the husband to give a get.
  Yitzchak b. Elazar said in the name of Hezekiah: Wherever R. Gamaliel stated, “I see Admon’s words,” the halakhah agrees with him. Rava said to R. Nahman: Even in a baraita?  He said back: Did we say ‘In the Mishnah?” We said, “Wherever R. Gamaliel stated.”
  Zera said in the name of Rabbah b. Yirmiyah: As to the two rulings which Hanan has said, the halakhah is in agreement with he who followed his view. The seven rulings that Admon said, the halakhah is not in agreement with him who followed his view. What does he mean?
  If we say that this is what he means: The two rulings which Hanan said, the halakhah is in agreement with him and he who followed his view. And the seven rulings that that Admon said, the halakhah does not agree with him or with he who followed his view. But did not R. Yitzchak b. Elazar say in the name of Hezekiah, “wherever R. Gamaliel stated, ‘I see Admon’s words’ the halakhah agrees with him?”
  Rather this is what he meant: The two rulings which Hanan has said, the halakhah is in agreement with him and with he who followed his view. The seven rulings that Admon said, the halakhah does not agree with he who followed his view but agrees with him in all his rulings.
  But surely R. Yitzchak b. Elazar said in the name of Hezekiah “wherever R. Gamaliel stated, ‘I see Admon’s words’ the halakhah agrees with him?”  [Does this not imply:] Only where he stated; but not where he did not state?
  Rather, this is what he meant: The two rulings which Hanan has said, the halakhah is in agreement with him and with he who followed his view. The seven rulings that Admon said, there are some concerning which the halakhah is in agreement with him and with he who followed his view while there are others concerning which the halakhah does not agree with him but with him who followed his view. 
  Wherever R. Gamaliel said, “I see Admon’s words” the halakhah is in agreement with him, but not in the other cases.
  If a man contests [the ownership of] a field and he has signed as a witness on [its deed of sale], Admon says:  He can say, “[Litigation with] the second is easier for me, since the first is a more difficult person than he”.
  But the Sages say:  He lost his right. If [the protester] made it a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest].
  GEMARA. Abaye said: This was taught only [in respect of] a witness, but a judge does not lose his right; for R. Hiyya taught witnesses may not sign a deed unless they have read it 
  
  Daf 109b
  
  but judges may sign even though they have not read it.   
  If [the protester] made [a piece of land] a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person. Abaye said: This was taught only [where it was] for another person, but [if he made it a boundary mark] for himself he does not lose his right;
  for he can say, “Had I not done that for him he would not have sold the field to me.” What [possible objection can] you have?  That he should have made a declaration [to that effect]? Your friend [it can be retorted] has a friend, and the friend of your friend has a friend.
  A certain man once made a field a [boundary] mark for another person. He then contested [its ownership,] died, and a guardian was appointed [over his estate]. The guardian came to Abaye. He said to him: “If [the protester] made [a piece of land] a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest].”
  He said, “If the father of the orphans had been alive, he would have claimed, ‘I have conceded to him only one furrow?’” He said: You spoke well for R. Yohanan stated: “If he claimed, ‘I have conceded to you only one furrow, he is believed.” So go and give him at least one furrow.
  On that [furrow, there was a row of palm trees, and [the guardian] said to him, “Had the father of the orphans been alive, he would have claimed, ‘I went back and purchased it from him.”   [Abaye] said to him: You have spoken well, for R. Yohanan said, “If he claimed, ‘I have re-purchased it from him’ he is believed.”  Abaye said: Anyone who appoints a guardian should appoint one like this man who understands how to turn [the scales] in favor of orphans.
  If a man went to a country beyond the sea and [in his absence] the path to his field was lost, Admon ruled: let him walk [to his field] by the shortest way.  But the Sages say: let him purchase a path for himself even if it costs him a hundred maneh or let him fly through the air.
  GEMARA. What is the sages’ reason? Admon spoke well!  Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: For instance, when [the fields of] four persons surrounded on its four sides. If that be so, what is Admon’s reasoning?
  Rava said: Where four persons come [to the adjacent fields] by virtue of the rights of four [persons] or where four persons come [to them]  by virtue of one, all agree that they may turn him away. In what case do they differ? When one person came [to all the surrounding fields] by virtue of four persons.
  Admon holds that [the claimant can say to that person,] “In any case, my path is in your territory”; and the sages hold, “If you will keep quiet, you will keep quiet, but if not l will return the deeds to their respective original owners whom you will have no chance of holding court.”
  A [dying man] once said that a palm tree should be given to his daughters but the orphans proceeded to divide the estate and did not give her a palm tree. R. Joseph thought that this was like the same principle as that of our Mishnah.
  Abaye said to him: Are the two the same? There, each one can send [the claimant] away; but here, the palm tree is in their common possession. How can they fix the situation? They must give her a palm tree and divide [the estate] all over again.    
  A [dying man] once said that a palm tree should be given to his daughter. When he died he left  two halves of a palm tree....
  R. Ashi sat [discussing the case] and grappled with this difficulty; Do people call two halves of palms trees a palm tree or not? Mordecai said to R. Ashi, Thus said Avimi of Hagronia in the name of Rav: People do call two halves of palm trees “a palm tree.”
  
  Daf 110a
  
  If a man produced a debt document against another, and the latter produced [a deed of sale showing] that the former had sold him a field, Admon ruled: [The other] can say, “Had I owed you [anything] you should have been paid pack when you sold me the field.” But the Sages say: This [seller] was clever, since he may have sold him the land in order to be able to take it from him as a pledge.
  GEMARA. What is the reason of the sages? Admon spoke well? In a place where they first pay and then write the deed, no one disputes that the [defendant] may well say [to the claimant], “You should have recovered your debt when you sold me the field.”
  They only differ where they first write the deed and then pay the money. Admon reasons that [the claimant] should have made a declaration [of his motive],  while the rabbis hold [that the claimant can retort,] “Your friend has a friend, and the friend of your friend has a friend.”
  If two men produced debt documents against one another, Admon says; [the holder of the later document can say to the other,] “Had I owed you [any money] how is it that you borrowed from me?” But the Sages say: This one collects his debt and this one collects his debt.
  GEMARA. It was stated: If two men produced debt documents against one another, R. Nahman ruled: The one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt. Sheshet said: What is the point in exchanging bags? Rather, this one retains his and this one retains his.
  All agree that if both [litigants possess] best quality, or medium or worst quality this is undoubtedly a case of changing bags.
  They differ only where one [of the litigants] has land of medium quality and the other of the worst quality. R. Nahman holds that “the one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt” because he holds that they assess based on the debtor’s possessions, 
  [so that] the owner of the land of the worst quality comes and collects the medium quality [of the other] which then becomes with him the best; and the other can then proceed to take from him the worst only.
  Sheshet said, “What is the point in exchanging bags?” He holds that they assess based on a general basis, [so that] eventually when the original owner of the medium land comes, he will just take back his own land.
  But according to R. Nahman, why would the owner of the worst quality of land collect first? Let the owner of the medium quality come first and collect the worst [of the other] and then let him reclaim it.
  [His statement] is only necessary where the [holder of the worst land] submitted his claim first. But in the end, when they come to collect, do they not come simultaneously?
  Rather, the ruling is necessary only where one [of the litigants] has best and medium land, and the other has only of the worst. One Master is of the opinion that an assessment is made on the basis of the debtor’s possessions, while the other Master is of the opinion that an assessment is made on a general basis.
  We have learned: The sages say: The one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt. Nahman explained this according to R. Sheshet, [as referring to a case,] for instance, where one borrowed for a period of ten years, and the other for one of five years.
  What is the exact case? If we say that the first [document] was for ten years and the second for five, would Admon have ruled [that the second can say to the first:] “Had I owed you [any money] how is it that you borrowed from me?” The time for payment had not yet arrived. Rather, the first was for five years and the second for ten.
  What was the exact case? If the time for payment had arrived, what [it may be asked] could be the reason of the sages? And if the time for payment had not yet arrived, payment was not yet due and what is Admon’s reason?  
   [This ruling was] was necessary only where [the holder of the earlier document] came [to borrow] on the day on which the five years was over. One master holds a person will borrow money for one day and one master holds that a person will not borrow money for a day.
  Rami b. Hama said: We are dealing here with a case of orphans who collect debts but from whom debts are not collected. But did it not teach, the one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt?  [The meaning is:] The one recovers his debt, and the other is entitled to recover it but gets nothing.
  Rava said: There are two objections to this explanation. Firstly, it was stated, “the one recovers his debt and the other recovers his debt”; and, secondly, could not [the other party] give the orphans a plot of land [of his] and then recover it from them, in accordance with [a ruling of] R. Nahman, for R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: If orphans collected a plot of land for their father’s debt the creditor may recollect it from them?  This is a difficulty. 
  But let it be explained [that this is a case] where the orphans owned land of the worst quality and the other owned best and medium quality, so that the orphans come and collect his medium land and let him collect their worst land? For, even though an assessment is made on a general basis, is not payment from orphans’ property recovered from their worst land only?
  This applies only where [the creditor] has not yet seized [their property] but where he had seized it, it is seized.
  [The following regions are regarded as] three regions in respect of marriage: Judaea, Transjordan and Galilee. [A husband] may not take out [his wife with him] from one town to another or from one city to another. But within the same region he may take her out with him from one town into another town or from one city into another city, but not from a town to a city nor from a city to a town.
  
  Daf 110b
  
  But within the same region he may take her out with him from one town into another town or from one city into another city, but not from a town to a city nor from a city to a town.
  [A man] may take out [his wife with him] from an inferior to a superior dwelling, but not from a superior to an inferior dwelling. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: not even from an inferior dwelling to a superior dwelling, because the [change to a] superior dwelling tests.
  GEMARA. It makes sense [that a wife may not be compelled to move] from a city to a town, for in a city everything is available while in a town not everything is available. But why not from a town to a city? 
  [This ruling] supports R. Yose b. Hanina who said: From where do I know that city living is difficulty?  As it is said, “And the people blessed all men that willingly offered themselves to dwell in Jerusalem” (Nehemiah 11:2).
  Rabban Shimon b. Gamaliel says etc. What [is meant by] “tests”?  It is in accordance with Shmuel, for Shmuel said: A change of diet is the beginning of gastrointestinal sickness. It is written in the Book of Ben Sira: “All the days of the poor are evil” (Proverbs 15:15) but are there not the Sabbaths and festivals?   It is in accordance with Shmuel, for Shmuel said: A change of diet is the beginning of gastrointestinal sickness.  
  Ben Sira said: The nights also. Lower than [all] roofs is his roof, and on the height of mountains is his vineyard. The rain of [other] roofs [pours down] on his roof and the earth of his vineyard [is washed down] into the vineyards [of others].
  Everyone may compel [their spouse] to go up to the land of Israel, but none may compel [their spouse] to leave. Everyone may compel [their spouse] to go up to Jerusalem, but none may compel [their spouse]  to leave. The same is true for both men and women and [slaves].
  If a man married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in the land of Israel and divorced her in Cappadocia he must pay her [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel. If he married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in the land of Israel, he must a gain pay [her ketubah] in the currency of the land of Israel.  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says that he must pay her [her ketubah] in the Cappadocian currency.
  GEMARA. “All may force” what does this come to include?  To include slaves.
  And for the one who taught slaves explicitly in the mishnah, what does this include? It include from a superior dwelling to a bad one.
  To include a slave who fled from outside the Land [of Israel] into the Land, for they say to his master, “Sell him here, and go,” in order to [encourage] settlement of the Land of Israel.  
  “All may be compelled to go up to Jerusalem” what does this include?  To include [removal] from a superior dwelling to a bad one.
  “But none may be compelled to leave it:” what does this come to include?  To include even from an bad dwelling to a superior one. And since it was stated in the earlier clause, “None may be compelled to leave it” it was also stated in the latter clause, “None may be compelled to leave it.”
  Our Rabbis taught: If [the husband] desires to go up and his wife refuses, they force her to go up; and if [she does] not, she may be divorced without a ketubah. If she desires to go up and be refuses, they force him to go up; and if [he does] not, he must divorce her and pay her ketubah. If she says she wants to leave and he refuses to leave, they force her not to leave, and if [she does not consent], she may be divorced without a ketubah. If he says he wants to to leave and she refuses, they force him not to leave, and if he does not consent, he must divorce her and pay her ketubah.
  If he married a woman…. The mishnah itself is self-contradictory. It teaches, “If he married a woman in Israel and divorced her in Cappadocia, he must pay her with Israeli coins.” Therefore we follow the place in which the debt was incurred. But at the end [of the mishnah] it says, “If he married her in Cappadocia and divorced her in Israel, he must pay her with Israeli coins.” Therefore we follow the place in which collection takes place.
  If he married a woman…. The mishnah itself is self-contradictory.
  It teaches, “If he married a woman in Israel and divorced her in Cappadocia, he must pay her with Israeli coins.” Therefore we follow the place in which the debt was incurred. But at the end [of the mishnah] it says, “If he married her in Cappadocia and divorced her in Israel, he must pay her with Israeli coins.” Therefore we follow the place in which collection takes place.
  Rabbah said: This is one of the leniencies of the ketubah which they taught. He reasons that the ketubah is of rabbinic origin.
  Shimon b. Gamaliel say: He pays her with Cappadocian currency. He holds that the kethubah is from the Torah.
  Our Rabbis taught: One who produces a debt document against his fellow, and in it is written Babylonian, he collects in Babylonian currency. If in it is written, the Land of Israel he collects with coins from the Land of Israel. If nothing is written in it, then if it was presented in Babylonia, he pays him in Babylonian currency; and, if it was presented in the Land of Israel, he pays him in the currency of the Land of Israel. If in it is written “silver” with no explanation, he collects only whatever the borrower wishes. [This is a ruling] does not apply to a ketubah.
  To what does this refer? Mesharsheya says: To the first clause, to express disagreement with R. Shimon b. Gamaliel who ruled that the ketubah is from the Torah. 
  “If in it is written “silver” with no explanation, he collects only whatever the borrower wishes. But say that [“silver” means] a piece [of silver]? Elazar said: Where it says “coin.” But say that it refers to a small coin? Papa said: Small coins are not made of silver.
  Our Rabbis taught: One should always live in the Land of Israel, even in a town most of whose inhabitants are idolaters, but one should never live outside the Land, even in a town most of whose inhabitants are Israelites; for whoever lives in the Land of Israel may be considered to have a God, but whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who has no God. For it is said in Scripture, “To give you the Land of Canaan, to be your God” (Leviticus 25:38).  
  One who does not live in the Land, has no God? Rather [this is what the text intended] to teach you, that whoever lives outside the Land, it is as if he worships idols. Similarly about David it says, “For they have driven me out this day that I should not cleave to the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve other gods” (I Samuel 26:19). Now who told David, “Serve other gods”? Rather [the text intended] to teach you that whoever lives outside the Land may be regarded as one who worships idols. 
  Zera was evading R. Judah because he wanted to go up to the Land of Israel for R. Judah said: Anyone goes up from Babylonia to the Land of Israel transgresses a positive commandment, for it is said in Scripture, 
  
  
  Daf 111a
  
  “They shall be carried to Babylon, and there shall they be, until the day that I remember them, says the Lord” (Jeremiah 27:22).
  And R. Zera? That text refers to the vessels of ministry. And R. Judah? There is another verse:  “I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the deer of the field, [that you awaken not, nor stir up love, until it please]” (Song of Songs 2:7). 
  And R. Zera? That implies that Israel shall not go up like a wall. 
  And R. Judah? Another “I adjure you” is written. And R. Zera?  That text is required for R. Yose son of R. Hanina who said: These three adjurations, what are they?  One, that Israel shall not go up like a wall; another, that the Holy Blessed One adjured Israel that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the other that the Holy Blessed One, adjured the nations that they shall not oppress Israel too much.
  And R. Judah? It is written, “That you awaken not, nor stir up” (Song of Songs 2:7).  And R. Zera?
  That text is required for R. Levi who stated: ‘What was the purpose of those six oaths?  Three are those that we just mentioned and the others, that they should not reveal the end, that they shall not delay the end, and that they shall not reveal the secret to the non-Jews.
  “By the gazelles, and by the deer of the field” (Song of Songs 2:7): R. Elazar explained: The Holy Blessed One said to Israel, ‘If you will keep the adjuration, well and good; but if not, I will permit your flesh [to be for food] like [that of] the gazelles and the deer of the field.”
  Elazar said: Whoever lives in the Land of Israel lives without sin, as it is said, “And the inhabitant will not say, ‘I am sick,’ for the people that dwell there shall be forgiven their sins” (Isaiah 33:24). Rava said to R. Ashi; We apply this [text] to those who suffer from disease.
  Anan said: Whoever is buried in the Land of Israel is deemed to be buried under the altar; it says here, “An altar of earth you shall make for me” (Exodus 20:24), and there it says, “And his earth cleanses him.”
  Ulla would frequently go up to the land of Israel. He died outside the Land. People came and reported this to R. Elazar. He exclaimed, “You Ulla, “should you die in an unclean land!” (Amos 7:17). They said to him, “His coffin has arrived.” He said to them, “His absorption [in the land] when dead is not the same as his absorption when alive.”
  A certain man at Be Hoza’a sister become liable for levirate marriage with him. He came in front of R. Hanina. He asked him: Can I go down there to contract with her levirate marriage?
  [R. Hanina] replied: His brother married a Cuthean and died, blessed be God who killed him, and this one would follow him!
  Rav Judah stated in the name of Shmuel: Just as it is forbidden to leave the Land of Israel for Babylon so it is forbidden to leave Babylon for other countries. Rabbah and R. Joseph both said: Even from Pumbeditha to Be Kubi. A man once moved from Pumbedita to Be Kubi and R. Joseph placed him under the ban. A man once moved from Pumbedita to Astunia and he died. Abaye said: “If this young scholar wanted, he would still be alive.”     
  Rabbah and R. Joseph both stated: The fit persons of Babylonia are received by the Land of Israel, and the fit of other countries are received by Babylonia. In what respect?   If it be suggested: In respect of genealogy, but did not the Master say, “All countries are [like] dough vis a vis the Land of Israel, and the Land of Israel is [like] dough vis a vis Babylon”? Rather in respect of burial.
  Rav Judah said: Whoever lives in Babylonia it is as if he lived in the Land of Israel; for it is said, “Ho, Zion, escape, you who dwell with the daughter of Babylon” (Zechariah 2:11). Abaye stated: We have a tradition that Babylonia will not witness the birth pangs of the Messiah.   He [also] explained it to refer to Huzal in Benjamin and they called it the Horn of Salvation.
  Elazar stated: The dead outside the Land will not be resurrected; as it is said, “And I will set My glory (tzvi) in the land of the living,” (Ezekiel 26:20) in a land in which I have my desire (tzvi) the dead will be resurrected, but in [a land] in which I have no desire, the dead will not be resurrected.
  Abba b. Memel objected: “Your dead shall live, my dead bodies shall arise” (Isaiah 26:19); Does not “Your dead shall live” refer to the dead of the Land of Israel, and “My dead bodies shall arise” to the dead outside the Land. What then does it mean “And I will set My glory in the land of the living?” This was written about Nebuchadnezzar concerning whom God said, “I will bring against them a king who is as swift as a deer.”
  He said back: Master, I am making an ex position of another verse: “He that gives breath to the people upon it, and spirit to those that walk therein” (Isaiah 42:5). But is it not written, “My dead bodies shall arise”?   That was written in reference to miscarriages.
  Now as to R. Abba b. Memel, the verse, “He that gives breath to the people on it,” what does he do with it? He requires it for a statement like that of R. Abahu, for R. Abahu stated: “Even a Canaanite slave woman who [lives] in the Land of Israel is assured of a place in the world to come,” for here it is written, “To the people on it,” and elsewhere (Genesis 22:5) it is written, “Stay here with the donkey,” a people that are like a donkey.
   “And spirit to them that walk there:” R. Yirmiyah b. Abba said in the name of R. Yohanan: Anyone walks four cubits in the Land of Israel is assured of a place in the world to come.
  Now according to R. Elazar, the righteous outside the Land are not resurrected? Ilai replied: [They will be revived] by rolling [to the Land of Israel]. Abba Sala the Great raised an objection: Will not the rolling be painful to the righteous? Abaye said: Tunnels will be made for them underground.
  Lest we are concerned that the righteous outside of the land of Israel will not be resurrected, R. Ilai assures us that their bodies will roll to Israel where they will be resurrected. The tunnels will go underground to spare them any pain. “You shall carry me out of Egypt and bury me in their burying-place” (Genesis 47:30): Karna said: There is some inner meaning here. Our father Jacob well knew that he was a righteous man in every way, and, since the dead outside the Land will also be resurrected, why did he trouble his sons? Lest he not merit rolling underground.      
  Similarly you say, “And Joseph took an oath of the children of Israel, etc.” (Genesis 50:25), and R. Hanina remarked: There is some inner meaning here. Joseph well knew that he was a righteous man in every way, and, since the dead outside the Land will also be resurrected, why did he trouble his sons to carry him four hundred parsangs? Lest he not merit rolling underground. 
  His brothers sent [the following message] to Rabbah:  Jacob knew that he was a righteous man in every way etc. Ilfa added to this the following incident. It happened that a man was once troubled on account of [his inability to marry] a certain woman and desired to go down [to her country]; but as soon as he heard this he suffered until the day of his death.
  Although you are a great scholar, a man who studies on his own is not the same as one who learns from his master. And if you say that you have no master [good enough for you here] you have one, and he is   R. Yohanan.
  If you are not coming up, be careful of three things. Do not sit for too long, for sitting aggravates one’s abdominal troubles; do not stand for too long, because standing is damaging to the heart; and do not walk too much, because walking is harmful to the eyes. Rather [spend] one third [of your time] sitting, one third standing and one third walking.
  Sitting when one has nothing to lean against, standing is more comfortable. “Standing”! How can you think this! Did you not say that “standing is damaging to the heart”? Rather: Sitting
  
  Daf 111b
  
  when one has nothing to lean against, standing with something to lean against is more comfortable.   
  And they also said, “Yitzchak, Shimon and Oshaya all said that the halakhah is in agreement with R. Judah with regard to mules. For it was taught: R. Yehudah says: If a mule demanded [sex] it must not be mated with a horse or a donkey but [only with one of] its own species.     
  Nahman b. Yitzchak stated; “Yitzchak” refers to R. Yitzchak Nafha. “Shimon” to R. Shimon b. Pazzi — others say: Resh Lakish;  and “Oshaya,” to R. Oshaya  Berabbi.
  Elazar said; Amei Ha’aretz will not be resurrected, as it is said, “The dead will not live” etc (Isaiah 26:14). It was also taught: “The dead will not live” this might have been read as applying to all, Scripture says, “The shades (refaim) will not rise,” the verse refers to one who loosens (merapeh) himself from the words of Torah.
  Yohanan said to him: It is not pleasing to their Master that you should speak to them in this manner. That text was written of a man who was lax as to worshiping idols. He replied: I was expounding on another text. For it is written, “For your dew is as the dew of light, and you make the land of the shades come to life” (Isaiah 26:19).  He who makes use of the ‘light’ of the Torah, the light of the Torah will resurrect him, but he who does not make use of the light of the Torah, the light of the Torah will not resurrect him.
  When he saw that he was distressed, he said to him: Master, I have found for them a remedy in the Torah: “But you that cling to the Lord your God are alive every one of you this day” (Deuteronomy 4:4); now is it possible to cling to the divine presence? Is it not written, “For the Lord your God is a consuming fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24)?
  Rather, anyone who marries his daughter to a Torah scholar, or carries on a trade on behalf of Torah scholars, or benefits Torah scholars from his estate is regarded by Scripture as if he had clung to the divine presence. 
  Similarly you say, “To love the Lord your God, and to cling unto Him” (Deuteronomy 30:20).   Is it possible for a human being to cling to the divine presence? Rather, anyone who marries his daughter to a Torah scholar, or carries on a trade on behalf of Torah scholars, or benefits Torah scholars from his estate is regarded by Scripture as if he had cleaved to the divine presence. 
  Hiyya b. Joseph said: In the future the righteous will burst forth through [the soil] and rise up in Jerusalem, as it is said, “And they will blossom out of the city like grass of the earth” (Psalms 72:16) and “city” means Jerusalem, as it is said, “For I will defend this city” (II Kings 19:34).
  Hiyya b. Joseph further stated: In the future the righteous will rise in their own clothes. [This is deduced] from a kal vehomer from a grain of wheat. If a grain of wheat that is buried naked sprouts up with many coverings how much more so the righteous who are buried in their clothes.
  Hiyya b. Joseph further stated: In the future the Land of Israel will produce loaves of bread and clothes of pure silk, as it is said, “Let abundant grain be in the land” (Psalms 72:16).
  Our Rabbis taught: “Let abundant grain be in the land, upon the top of the mountains.” They said: In the future wheat will rise as high as a palm-tree and will grow on the top of the mountains. But lest you should think that there will be trouble in harvesting it, Scripture says, “Its fruit shall rustle like Lebanon” (Psalms 72:16); the Holy Blessed One will bring a wind from his treasure houses which He will cause to blow upon it. This will loosen its fine flour and a person will walk out into the field and take a handful out of it and from it will be his sustenance and sustenance for his entire house.
  “With the kidney-fat of wheat” (Deuteronomy 32:14). They said: In the future, a grain of wheat will be as large as the two kidneys of a big bull. And do not be surprised at this, for a fox once made his nest in a turnip and they weighed it and it was found [to be] sixty liters in the liter measures of Tzippori.      
  It was taught: R. Joseph said: It once happened to someone at Shihin to whom his father had left three twigs of mustard. And one of these split and in it was found nine kav of mustard, and its wood sufficed to cover a potter’s hut. Shimon b. Tahlifa said. Our father left us a cabbage stalk and we ascended and descended it by means of a ladder.
  “And of the blood of the grape you shall drink wine” (Deuteronomy 32:14).  They said: The world to come is not like this world. In this world there is the trouble of harvesting and treading [of the grapes], but in the world to come a man will bring one grape on a wagon or a ship, put it in a corner of his house and supply himself from it as if it was a large wine cask, and its will be used to make fires for cooking. There will be no grape that will not contain thirty jugs of wine, for it is said is Scripture, “And of the blood of the grape you shall drink wine,” read not “hamer” but homer (thirty jugs).
  When R. Dimi came he said: What is it that is written, “Binding his foal to the vine” (Genesis 49:11)?  There is not a vine in the Land of Israel that does not require an entire city to harvest it.
  “And his donkey’s colt to the choice vine,” there is not a barren tree in the Land of Israel that does not produce a load of [produce for] two she-donkeys.  Lest you say that it contains no wine, Scripture says, “He washes his garments in wine.” And lest you say that it is not red, Scripture says, “And of the blood of the grape you drank wine.” And lest you say that it does not cause intoxication Scripture says, “His garment.” And lest you say that it is tasteless it says, “His eyes shall be red with wine,” any palate that will taste it says, “Mine, mine.” And lest you say that it is suitable for young people but unsuitable for old, Scripture says “And his teeth white with milk,” read not, “teeth white” but “to he who has many years.”
  What is the simple meaning of the verse? When R. Dimi came he said: The congregation of Israel said to the Holy Blessed One, “Master of the Universe, hint to me with your eyes, which are sweeter than wine, and show me your teeth which will be sweeter than milk.”
  This provides support for R. Yohanan who said; One who shows the whiteness of his teeth to his friend is better than one who gives him milk to drink, as it is said, “And his teeth are white with milk,” do not read “teeth white” but the “whitening of teeth.”
  Hiyya b. Adda was a teacher of Scripture for the children of Resh Lakish. [On one occasion] he was delayed for three days and he did not come [to teach the children].
  When he came back, he said to him, “Why were you delayed for three days?” He replied, “My father left me one branch [of a vine] and on the first day I cut from it three hundred clusters [of grapes], each cluster yielding one jug. On the second day I cut three hundred clusters, two of which yielded one jug. On the third day I cut three hundred clusters, three of which yielded one jug, and I made more than half of it ownerless [so the poor could take it].” He said back, “If you had not delayed [from teaching Torah] it would have yielded much more.”
  Rami b. Ezekiel once visited Benei Berak. He saw goats grazing under fig trees while honey was flowing from the figs, and milk ran from them, and these mingled with each other. He said, “This is [what it means] flowing with milk and honey.”
  Jacob b. Dostai said: From Lod to Ono is three miles. Once I rose up early in the morning and walked there up to my ankles in the honey of the figs. Resh Lakish said: I myself saw the flow of the milk and honey of Tzippori and it extended [over an area of] sixteen by sixteen miles. Rabbah b. Bar Hana said: I saw the flow of the milk and honey in all the Land of Israel
  
  Daf 112a
  
  l and [the total area] was equal [to distance] from Be Mikhse to the Fort of Tulbanke, twenty-two parasangs in length and six parasangs in breadth.
  Helbo, R. Avira and R. Yose b. Hanina once visited a certain place. They brought in front of them a peach that was [as large] as a pot from Kefar Hino. (And how big is a pot from Kefar Hino? Five se’ah.) One third [of the fruit] they ate, one third they declared ownerless, and one third they put in front of their animals.
  A year later R. Elazar came there on a visit and they brought [a peach] before him. He took it in one hand and said, “A fruitful land into a salt waste, because the wickedness of those that dwell there.” (Psalms 107:34).
  Joshua b. Levi once visited Gabla. He saw vines laden with clusters of ripe grapes standing up like calves. He said, “Calves among the vines!” They said to him, “These are clusters of ripe grapes.” He said, “Land, O land, take back your fruit! For whom are you taking out your fruit? For those non-Jews who rose up against us on account of our sins?”
  A year later R. Hiyya happened to be there and saw them standing up like goats. He said, “Goats among the vines.” They said to him, “Go away, do not you treat us as your friend did.”
  Our rabbis taught: When the land of Israel is blessed a bet se’ah yields fifty thousand kor. When Tzoan was settled, a bet se’ah yielded [no more than] seventy kor.  For it was taught: R. Meir said, I saw in the valley of Bet Shean that a bet se’ah yielded seventy kor.
  There is no greater (more fertile) country than the land of Egypt, as it is said, “Like the garden of the Lord, like the land of Egypt” (Genesis 13:10); and there is no more fertile spot in all the land of Egypt than Tzoan where many kings were made, as it is written, “For his princes are at Tzoan” (Isaiah 30:4). And in all the Land of Israel there is no ground rockier than at Hebron where they would bury the dead.
  Hebron was nevertheless seven times as built as Zoan, as it is written, “And Hebron was built seven years before Tzoan in Egypt” (Genesis 13:22).  What [is the meaning of] built? If you say that it was actually built, is it possible that a man would build a house for his younger son before he built one for his elder son, as it is said, “And the sons of Ham, Cush and Mitzrayim, and Put and Canaan” (Genesis 10:6)?   Rather that it was seven times as fertile as Tzoan.  
  This refers to stony ground, but [in ground] where there are no stones [a bet se’ah would yield] five hundred [kor].
  This too refers to periods when the land was not blessed, but when it was blessed it is written, “And Isaac sowed in that land, [and found in the same year a hundredfold]” (Genesis 26:12).
  It was taught: R. Yose stated, One se’ah in Judea yielded five se’ah: One se’ah of flour, one se’ah of fine flour, one se’ah of bran, one se’ah of coarse bran and one se’ah of kiburya. A certain Sadducee once said to R. Hanina: They praise you correctly in your country. My father left me one bet se’ah and from it [I obtain] oil, wine, grain and pulse, and my cattle also feed on it.
  An Amorite once said to a resident of Israel, “That date tree that stands on the bank of the Jordan, how much do you harvest from it?” He replied, “Sixty kor.”  He said back, “You have not improved it but rather ruined it; we used to gather from it one hundred and twenty kor.” He said back, “I was speaking of one side only.”
  Hisda stated: What is the meaning of that which is written, “I give you a pleasant land, the heritage of the deer” (Jeremiah 3:19)? Why was the land of Israel compared to a deer? To tell you that just as the skin of a deer cannot contain its flesh, so too the land of Israel cannot contain its produce. Another explanation: Just as the deer is the swiftest of the animals so is the land of Israel the swiftest of all lands in the ripening of its fruit.
  Lest you think that just as the deer is swift but his flesh is not fat so is the land of Israel swift to ripen but its fruits are not fat, Scripture says, “Flowing with milk and honey” fatter than milk and sweeter than honey.
  When R. Elazar went up to the Land of Israel he said, “I have escaped from one.” When they ordained him he said, “I have escaped from two.” When they placed him on the council for intercalation he exclaimed, “I have escaped from three,”
  as it is said, “And My hand shall be against the prophets that see vanity…They shall not be in the council of My people.” This refers to the council for intercalation, “neither shall they be written in the register of the house of Israel,” this refers to ordination; “neither shall they enter into the land of Israel,” in accordance with its plain meaning.
  When R. Zera went up to the land of Israel. He could not find a ferry to cross the river with. He grasped a rope bridge and crossed. A certain Sadducee said to him: ‘Hasty people, that put your mouths before your ears, you are still clinging to your hastiness.” He said back, “The place which Moses and Aaron did not merit [entering] who could assure me that I would merit [entering]?”
  R. Abba used to kiss the cliffs of Akko. R. Hanina used to repair its stumbling blocks. R. Ammi and R. Assi
  
  
  Daf 112b
  
  would move from a sunny spot to a shady one or from a shady one to a sunny one.  R. Hiyya b. Gamda would roll in the dust, as it says, “For your servants desire her stones, and love her dust” (Psalms 102:15).
  R. Zera said: R. Jeremiah b. Abba said: In the generation in which the son of David will come there will be prosecution against Torah scholars. When I repeated this statement in front of Shmuel, he said, “[There will be] refinement after refinement,” as it is said, “And if there be yet a tenth in it, it shall again be consumed” (Isaiah 6:13). R. Joseph taught: [There will be] plunderers and plunderers of the plunderers.
  R. Hiyya b. Ashi said in the name of Rav: In the time to come all the barren trees of the Land of Israel will bear fruit; as it is said, “For the tree bears its fruit, the fig-tree and the vine will yield their strength” (Joel 2:22).
  May we return to you, chapter “the judges of decrees” and this is the completion
  