meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Moed/Sukkah/English/William Davidson Edition - English.txt"}
text: Sukkah
  סוכה
  William Davidson Edition - English
  
  
  Sukkah
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNA: A <i>sukka</i>, i.e., its roofing, which is the main and most crucial element of the mitzva, that is more than twenty cubits high is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit.
  Similarly, a <i>sukka</i> that is not even ten handbreadths high, and one that does not have three walls, and one whose sunlight that passes through its roofing is greater than its shade are unfit.
  GEMARA: We learned a similar <i>halakha</i> in a mishna there, in tractate <i>Eiruvin</i> (2a): In the case of an alleyway that is higher than twenty cubits, i.e., the beam that was placed across the end of an alleyway that opens into a public domain in order to permit carrying within the alleyway on Shabbat is higher than twenty cubits, one must diminish the height of the beam in order to permit carrying within the alleyway. Rabbi Yehuda says he need not do so, and although the beam lies higher than twenty cubits, the alleyway is qualified to permit carrying within.
  Given the seeming similarity between the two cases, that of the <i>sukka</i> and that of the alleyway, the Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a <i>sukka</i> where the mishna teaches that it is unfit, and what is different with regard to an alleyway where the mishna teaches the method of rectification, that one must diminish the height of the cross beam? Why was a solution not suggested in the case of a <i>sukka</i>?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to <i>sukka</i>, since it is a mitzva by Torah law, the mishna teaches that it is unfit, as, if it is not constructed in the proper manner, no mitzva is fulfilled. However, with regard to an alleyway, where the entire prohibition of carrying is only by rabbinic law, the mishna teaches the method of rectification, as the cross beam comes only to rectify a rabbinic prohibition but does not involve a mitzva by Torah law.
  The Gemara suggests an alternative explanation: And if you wish, say instead that even with regard to matters prohibited by Torah law, it would have been appropriate for the mishna to teach a method of rectification. However, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, whose matters are numerous, it categorically teaches that it is unfit. Merely diminishing the height of a <i>sukka</i> is insufficient to render it fit; the <i>sukka</i> must also satisfy requirements governing its size, its walls, and its roofing. Teaching the remedy for each disqualification would have required lengthy elaboration. With regard to an alleyway, however, whose matters are not numerous, the mishna teaches the method of rectification. Once the height is diminished, it is permitted to carry in the alleyway.
  § After clarifying its formulation, the Gemara addresses the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna and asks: From where are these matters, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> that a <i>sukka</i> may not exceed a height of twenty cubits, derived?
  Rabba said that it is derived as the verse states: “So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in <i>sukkot</i> when I took them out of the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 23:43). In a <i>sukka</i> up to twenty cubits high, even without a concerted effort, a person is aware that he is residing in a <i>sukka</i>. His eye catches sight of the roofing, evoking the <i>sukka</i> and its associated mitzvot. However, in a <i>sukka</i> that is more than twenty cubits high, a person is not aware that he is residing in a <i>sukka</i> because his eye does not involuntarily catch sight of the roof, as at that height, without a concerted effort one would not notice the roofing.
  Rabbi Zeira said that it is derived from here: The verse states: “And there shall be a <i>sukka</i> for shade in the daytime from the heat, and for refuge and cover from storm and from rain” (Isaiah 4:6). In a <i>sukka</i> up to twenty cubits high, a person is sitting in the shade of the <i>sukka</i>, i.e., the shade of the roofing; in a <i>sukka</i> that is more than twenty cubits high, a person is not sitting in the shade of the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> but rather in the shade of the walls of the <i>sukka</i>, as their considerable height provides constant shade, rendering the shade of the roofing irrelevant.
  Abaye said to him: But if it is so that one is required to sit in the shade of the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>, then in the case of one who makes his <i>sukka</i> in Ashterot Karnayim, which is located between two mountains that prevent sunlight from reaching there, so too, it is not a fit <i>sukka</i>, since he is not sitting in the shade of the roofing.
  Rabbi Zeira said to him: The two cases are not comparable; there, if one theoretically removes the Ashterot Karnayim mountains that obstruct the sunlight, there is still the shade of the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>. In that case, the <i>sukka</i> is properly constructed and there are only external factors that affect the sunlight. However, here, in the case of a <i>sukka</i> that is more than twenty cubits high, if one theoretically removes the walls of the <i>sukka</i>, there is no shade provided by the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>, since throughout the day sunlight will enter the <i>sukka</i> beneath the roofing from where the walls used to be.
  Rava said that the <i>halakha</i> is derived from here: “In <i>sukkot</i> shall you reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42). The Torah said: For the entire seven days, emerge from the permanent residence in which you reside year round and reside in a temporary residence, the <i>sukka</i>. In constructing a <i>sukka</i> up to twenty cubits high, a person can render his residence a temporary residence, as up to that height one can construct a structure that is not sturdy; however, in constructing a <i>sukka</i> above twenty cubits high, one cannot render his residence a temporary residence; rather, he must construct a sturdy permanent residence, which is unfit for use as a <i>sukka</i>.
  Abaye said to him: But if that is so, then if he constructed a <i>sukka</i> with steel partitions and placed roofing over them, so too, there, say that it would not be a fit <i>sukka</i>, as any <i>sukka</i> constructed as a permanent residence would be unfit. However, there is no opinion that deems a <i>sukka</i> of that sort unfit.
  Rava said to him in response that this is what I am saying to you: In a case where one constructs a <i>sukka</i> up to twenty cubits high, a height that a person typically constructs a temporary residence, when he constructs a structure of that height that is sturdy like a permanent residence, he also fulfills his obligation. However, in a case where one constructs a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high, a height that a person typically constructs a permanent residence, even when he constructs it in a less sturdy fashion like a temporary residence, he does not fulfill his obligation.
  
  Daf 2b
  
  The Gemara explains why each of the Sages cited his own source and did not accept the sources cited by the others. All of them, Rabbi Zeira and Rava, did not say that the fact that a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is unfit is derived from the verse: “So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in <i>sukkot</i> when I took them out of the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 23:43), as did Rabba, because in their opinion that verse does not mandate one to be aware that he is sitting in a <i>sukka</i>; rather, it mandates knowledge for future generations of the exodus from Egypt.
  Similarly, they, Rabba and Rava, also did not say that it is derived from the verse: “And there shall be a <i>sukka</i> for shade in the daytime from the heat” (Isaiah 4:6), as did Rabbi Zeira, because in their opinion it is with regard to the messianic era that this verse is written. It means that God will be a shield and a shelter for the Jewish people; it is not referring to the structure of a <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Zeira, how would he respond to this objection? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Zeira could say: If it is so that the verse is merely a metaphor, let the verse say: And there shall be a canopy for shade in the daytime from the heat, which is the term used in the previous verse. And what is the meaning of: “And there shall be a <i>sukka</i> for shade in the daytime from the heat”? Learn from it two matters: One is the plain meaning of the verse, that God will be a canopy of glory for the Jewish people, and the second is that the essence of a <i>sukka</i> is to have the roofing provide shade.
  They, Rabba and Rabbi Zeira, also did not say that it is derived from the verse: “In <i>sukkot</i> shall you reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), as did Rava, due to the difficulty raised by Abaye with regard to a <i>sukka</i> with steel partitions. Since there is a weakness in each of the sources, it is understandable why the other Sages did not accept it.
  § The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Yoshiya said that Rav said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the fitness of a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is specifically in a case where the walls of the <i>sukka</i> do not reach up to the roofing; however, in a case where the walls of the <i>sukka</i> reach up to the roofing, the Rabbis concede that even if the roofing is more than twenty cubits high, it is fit. In accordance with whose opinion is it?
  It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, who says that the reason that a <i>sukka</i> that high is unfit is because the eye does not automatically catch sight of the roofing. And since the walls of the <i>sukka</i> reach the roofing, the eye catches sight of the roofing, as the person will follow the walls all the way up to the roofing despite their considerable height. However, if the roofing is not contiguous with the top of the walls, a person does not notice it without a concerted effort.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Huna said that Rav said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the fitness of a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is specifically in a case where there is not an area of four cubits by four cubits in the <i>sukka</i>; however, in a case where there is an area of more than four cubits by four cubits in the <i>sukka</i>, the Rabbis concede that even if the roofing is more than twenty cubits high, it is fit. In accordance with whose opinion is it?
  It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, who says that a <i>sukka</i> that high is unfit due to the shade that is provided by the walls and not by the roofing; and since the <i>sukka</i> in this case is spacious and has a large area, there is shade from the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> and not only from the walls.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Ḥanan bar Rabba said that Rav said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to the fitness of a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is specifically in a case where the <i>sukka</i> is only large enough to hold one’s head, most of his body, and his table, as, if the <i>sukka</i> were smaller, it would not qualify as a <i>sukka</i>; however, in a case where it is sufficiently large to hold more than one’s head, most of his body, and his table, even if it is more than twenty cubits high, it is fit. In accordance with whose opinion is it? It is not in accordance with the opinion of any one of them. This statement cannot be explained according to any of the rationales for the fact that a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is unfit.
  With regard to the three aforementioned <i>halakhot</i>, the Gemara notes: Granted, the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya differs from the statements of Rav Huna and Rav Ḥanan bar Rabba, as they are providing the measure of the extent of the <i>sukka</i> while he is not providing a measure. In Rabbi Yoshiya’s opinion, the <i>halakha</i> is based on whether the top of the walls reach the roofing, which indicates a fundamentally different understanding of the issue of a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high.
  However, in terms of Rav Huna and Rav Ḥanan bar Rabba, let us say that it is with regard to the minimum size required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i> that they disagree; as one Sage, Rav Huna, holds: The minimum size required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i> is four by four cubits, and the other Sage, Rav Ḥanan bar Rabba, holds: The minimum size required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i> is one that holds one’s head, and most of his body, and his table.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, there is no need to explain their dispute that way, as it could be explained that everyone, i.e., Rav Huna and Rav Ḥanan bar Rabba, agrees that the minimum size required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i> is one that holds one’s head, and most of his body, and his table. And here, it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage, Rav Ḥanan bar Rabba, holds that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high in a case where it holds the person’s head, and most of his body, and his table. However, in a case where it is larger than one that holds one’s head, and most of his body, and his table, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is fit regardless of its height.
  And one Sage, Rav Huna, holds that it is with regard to a <i>sukka</i> that ranges in size from one that holds one’s head, and most of his body, and his table up to one that is four by four cubits that they disagree; however, if the <i>sukka</i> is more than four by four cubits, everyone agrees that it is fit.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: A <i>sukka</i> that is more than twenty cubits high is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems a <i>sukka</i> fit even if it is up to forty or fifty cubits high.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Queen Helene in Lod where her <i>sukka</i> was more than twenty cubits high, and the Elders were entering and exiting the <i>sukka</i> and did not say anything to her about the <i>sukka</i> not being fit. The Rabbis said to him: Is there proof from there? She was, after all, a woman and therefore exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. Consequently, the fact that her <i>sukka</i> was not fit did not warrant a comment from the Elders. Rabbi Yehuda said to them in response: Didn’t she have seven sons and therefore require a fit <i>sukka</i>? And furthermore, she performed all of her actions only in accordance with the directives of the Sages.
  Before analyzing the objection being raised from the <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara seeks to understand its content. Why do I need Rabbi Yehuda to teach: And furthermore, she performed all of her actions only in accordance with the directives of the Sages? His first contention was sufficient.
  The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Yehuda is saying to them: If you say that Helene’s sons were minor sons and minors are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, and that is why the Elders said nothing; since they were seven sons, then it is not possible that there was not at least one among them who no longer needed his mother to look after him. The <i>halakha</i> is that a minor who no longer needs his mother has reached the age of training and is required to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> by rabbinic law. Even if she gave birth to them in consecutive years, the oldest would be seven years old, and at that age a child does not need his mother to constantly look after him.
  And if you say that a child who no longer needs his mother is obligated in the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> only by rabbinic law, and Queen Helene did not observe rabbinic law, come and hear that which Rabbi Yehuda said: And furthermore, she performed all of her actions only in accordance with the directives of the Sages.
  The Gemara explores the statements of the <i>amora’im</i> who quoted Rav in light of this <i>baraita</i>. Granted, according to the one, Rabbi Yoshiya, who said that it is specifically in a case where the walls of the <i>sukka</i> do not reach up to the roofing that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, the <i>baraita</i> can be explained as dealing with a <i>sukka</i> of that type, as it is customary for a queen to reside in a <i>sukka</i> in which the walls do not reach up to the roofing,
  
  Daf 3a
  
  due to the fresh air that circulates through the openings in the wall. However, according to the one who said that it is specifically in the case of a small <i>sukka</i> that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, in which case the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where Queen Helene resided in a small <i>sukka</i>, is it customary for a queen to reside in a small <i>sukka</i> whose area is less than four cubits squared? Rabba bar Rav Adda said: This ruling is necessary only in the case of a <i>sukka</i> that is constructed with several small rooms [<i>kitoniyyot</i>]. The <i>sukka</i> was large, but it was subdivided into many small rooms, each of which was smaller than four square cubits.
  Again, the Gemara asks: Is it then customary for a queen to reside in a <i>sukka</i> constructed with several small rooms without leaving a large room in which she could assemble her family and servants? Rav Ashi said: This ruling is necessary only with regard to the compartments in the <i>sukka</i>. It was indeed a large <i>sukka</i> with a large central room; however, there were many small rooms adjacent to the main room. It is with regard to this type of <i>sukka</i> that there is a tannaitic dispute.
  The Rabbis hold: Her sons were residing in a full-fledged <i>sukka</i> with a large central room, which everyone agrees was fit. However, she often resided in the small rooms due to modesty, to avoid being in the public eye. And for that reason the Elders did not say anything to her, as even if the small rooms were too small relative to the height of the <i>sukka</i>, there was no problem since her sons did not sit in them. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: Her sons would occasionally reside with her in the small room, and even so, the Elders did not say anything to her, indicating that a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is fit even in a small <i>sukka</i>. Now that the <i>Tosefta</i> can be explained according to all the statements cited by the <i>amora’im</i> in the name of Rav, no proof can be cited with regard to the essence of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis with regard to a small <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high.
  § Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: The <i>halakha</i> is that one’s <i>sukka</i> must be large enough to hold his head, and most of his body, and his table. Rabbi Abba said to him, astonished: In accordance with whose opinion did you rule? Was it in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? This is the subject of a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and according to Beit Hillel it is sufficient for the <i>sukka</i> to be large enough to hold one’s head and most of his body; it need not be large enough to hold his table as well. The halakhic ruling that you issued is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, despite the fact that in disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said to him: Rather, in accordance with whose opinion should I rule? Yes, my ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai because in this case that is the <i>halakha</i>.
  Some say that the exchange between the <i>amora’im</i> was slightly different. Rabbi Abba said: Who stated that opinion to you? Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said to him: It was Beit Shammai, and nevertheless do not budge from it, as that is the established <i>halakha</i>. Based on either version of the exchange, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the minimum measure of a small <i>sukka</i>.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak strongly objects to this assumption: From where do you conclude that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to the minimum measure of a small <i>sukka</i>? Perhaps it is with regard to a large <i>sukka</i> that they disagree, and in a case where one is sitting at the entrance of the <i>sukka</i> and his table is inside the house. As Beit Shammai hold that we issue a decree to prohibit one from sitting that way lest he be drawn after his table while eating, to the extent that his head and most of his body will be inside the house and not inside the <i>sukka</i>. And Beit Hillel hold that we do not issue that decree.
  And the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the <i>sukka</i> and his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem it unfit and Beit Hillel deem it fit. And if it is so that the dispute is with regard to the minimum measure of the <i>sukka</i>, the formulation of the mishna is missing the essential point. The distinction between a <i>sukka</i> that holds and a <i>sukka</i> that does not hold his head and most of his body is what the mishna needed to say. Since the mishna does not make that distinction, apparently the dispute is not with regard to the minimum measure of a <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara questions this conclusion: And in the case of a small <i>sukka</i> do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel not disagree? But isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i>: A <i>sukka</i> that holds his head, and most of his body, and his table is fit. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is unfit until it measures at least four cubits by four cubits.
  And it is taught in yet another <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Any <i>sukka</i> that does not have an area of at least four cubits by four cubits is unfit. And the Rabbis say: Even if it holds only his head and most of his body, it is fit. However, the term: His table, is not taught in this <i>baraita</i>. If so, these two tannaitic sources contradict each other, as each attributes a different opinion to the Rabbis. Rather, must one not conclude from it that this <i>baraita</i>, in which: His table, is taught, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, while that <i>baraita</i>, in which: His table, is not taught, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel? Apparently, they do dispute the minimum measure of a small <i>sukka</i>.
  Mar Zutra said: And the language of the mishna is also precise, and it indicates that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel indeed dispute the minimum measure of a small <i>sukka</i> from the fact that it teaches: Beit Shammai deem it unfit and Beit Hillel deem it fit. And if it is so that the dispute is with regard to the conduct of one sitting at the entrance of a large <i>sukka</i>, then Beit Shammai say: He did not fulfill his obligation, and Beit Hillel say: He fulfilled his obligation, is what the mishna needed to say. However, the terms fit and unfit indicate that the dispute is with regard to the halakhic status of the <i>sukka</i> itself, not the individual’s behavior.
  The Gemara asks: But if that is so, the formulation of the mishna: One whose head and most of his body were in the <i>sukka</i>, is difficult, as it indicates that the dispute is with regard to where in the <i>sukka</i> he was sitting. The mishna does not say: A <i>sukka</i> that holds his head and most of his body, which would indicate that the dispute is with regard to the minimum measure of the <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, they disagree with regard to two issues; they disagree with regard to the minimum measure of a small <i>sukka</i>, and they disagree with regard to where one may sit in a large <i>sukka</i>. And the mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: One whose head and most of his body were in the <i>sukka</i> and his table was in the house, Beit Shammai say that he did not fulfill his obligation and Beit Hillel say that he fulfilled his obligation. And with regard to a <i>sukka</i> that holds only his head and most of his body, Beit Shammai deem it unfit and Beit Hillel deem it fit. In this way, the dispute in the mishna is understood as relating to the measure of a small <i>sukka</i> and the manner in which one fulfills his obligation in a large <i>sukka</i>.
  § Apropos the above discussion, the Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that which the Sages taught: The halakhic status of a house in which there is not an area of four cubits by four cubits is not that of a house? Therefore, <i>halakhot</i> in the Torah or the mishna that are relevant to a house do not apply to a house that size. Consequently, it is exempt from the mitzva of placing a <i>mezuza</i> on its doorpost; and it is exempt from the obligation of establishing a parapet around its roof; and it does not become ritually impure with leprosy of the house. And its sale is not rendered final in the same manner as the sale of houses within walled cities. The owner of a house in a walled city who sells his house has the option to buy it back from the purchaser within one year of the sale. If he fails to do so, the sale is rendered final and the house does not return to the original owner during the Jubilee Year (see Leviticus 25:29–31).
  And one does not return from the ranks of soldiers waging war for a house that size, as would one who built a house with an area greater than four by four cubits (see Deuteronomy 20:5). And one need not join the houses in the courtyards for a house with that area. If there is more than one house in a courtyard, it is prohibited by rabbinic law to carry in that courtyard unless the residents of each of the houses contribute food that is placed in one of the houses, thereby rendering them joint-owners of the courtyard. The resident of a house with an area of less than four by four cubits need not participate in this joining of courtyards. And one need not merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway for a courtyard in which the area of its only house is less than four by four cubits. In this case, too, the resident of that courtyard need not participate in the merging of alleyways. And one does not place the food collected for the aforementioned joining [<i>eiruv</i>] of courtyards in this house but rather in a house with an area of at least four by four cubits.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  And one does not render it an extension of the city limits when it is located between two cities. Two cities between which there is a distance of more than 141⅓ cubits cannot be joined and considered as a single city for the purpose of measuring the Shabbat limit for one city from the edge of the second city. However if there is a house equidistant between the two cities, i.e., a bit more than seventy cubits from each town, the house joins the two cities together for the purpose of measuring the Shabbat limit. A house in which there is an area of less than four by four cubits cannot serve this function; and brothers and partners do not divide it, as it is too small to be divided.
  In answer to the question with regard to the identity of the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara says: Let us say that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and not the Rabbis, as it is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who holds that a <i>sukka</i> with an area of less than four by four cubits is unfit. The Gemara rejects this contention: Even if you say that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is the Rabbis, the Rabbis say that a structure with an area smaller than four by four cubits is fit only there, with regard to a <i>sukka</i>, which is a temporary residence, because in a temporary residence one is willing to confine himself to a small area. However, with regard to <i>halakhot</i> relating to a house, which is a permanent residence, even the Rabbis concede that if it has an area of four cubits by four cubits, people reside in it, as it is a functional house, and if not, people do not reside in it, and its legal status is not that of a house at all.
  § The Gemara briefly discusses the <i>halakhot</i> listed in the <i>baraita</i>: The Master said that a house in which there is an area of less than four by four cubits it is exempt from the mitzva of placing a <i>mezuza</i> on its doorpost, and it is exempt from the obligation of establishing a parapet around its roof, and it does not become ritually impure with leprosy of the house. And its sale is not rendered final in the same manner as the sale of houses within walled cities, and one does not return from the ranks of soldiers waging war for a house that size. What is the reason for these <i>halakhot</i>? It is due to the fact that “house” is written in the Torah with regard to all these <i>halakhot</i>. The legal status of a structure with an area of less than four by four cubits is not that of a house.
  And by rabbinic law, one need not join the houses in the courtyards for a house with that area, and one need not merge the courtyards that open into an alleyway for a courtyard in which the area of its only house is less than four by four cubits. And one does not place the food collected for the joining of courtyards in this house. What is the reason for these <i>halakhot</i>? It is due to the fact that it is not fit for residence. The point of the joining of courtyards is to transform the courtyard into a residence shared by the residents of all its member households, and this can be accomplished only by placing the joint food in a place whose legal status is that of a house. The Gemara infers this from the fact that it is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And one does not place the food of the joining of courtyards in this house, but the food of the merging of alleyways, one places in it.
  What is the reason for this distinction? It is due to the fact that it is no less a residence than a courtyard in the alleyway. An unroofed courtyard is not fit for residence, and nevertheless the food for the merging of alleyways may be placed there, as we learned in a <i>baraita</i> in tractate <i>Eiruvin</i> (85b): The joining of courtyards may be placed in the courtyard and the merging of alleyways may be placed in the alleyway.
  And we discussed this <i>halakha</i>: How can the joining of courtyards be placed in the courtyard? Didn’t we learn in the mishna: With regard to one who placed his joining of courtyards in a gatehouse or in a portico [<i>akhsadra</i>], a roofed structure without walls or with incomplete walls, or on a balcony, it is not a fit <i>eiruv</i>. And one who resides there, in any of these structures, does not render it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry, even if he did not contribute to the <i>eiruv</i>, as the legal status of these places is not that of a house.
  Rather, emend the mishna and say: The joining of courtyards is placed in one of the full-fledged houses that is in the courtyard, and the merging of alleyways is placed even in one of the courtyards that opens into the alleyway. And this house whose area is less than four by four cubits is no less a residence than one of the courtyards that open into the alleyway.
  It is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And one does not render it an extension of the city limits when it is located between two cities. The Gemara explains: This means that we do not even render its halakhic status like that of huts [<i>burganin</i>] used by grain watchmen in the fields, which join the two cities between which they are located for the purpose of measuring the Shabbat limit. What is the reason that it is considered less a residence than a watchman’s hut? The Gemara answers: Watchmen’s huts, even though they are not sturdy, are suited for their matters, while this house with an area less than four by four cubits is not suited for its matter, as it is not fit for residence.
  It is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And brothers and partners do not divide a house that does not measure at least four by four cubits, as it is too small to be divided. The Gemara infers: The reason that a house that size is not divided is due to the fact that there is not an area of four by four cubits in it; however, if there is an area of four by four cubits in it, they divide it.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna: One divides the courtyard at the request of one of the heirs or partners only if its area is sufficient so that there will be in it four by four cubits for this partner or heir and four by four cubits for that partner or heir? Apparently, in order to divide a courtyard it must be at least four by eight cubits.
  Rather, emend the <i>baraita</i> and say that the <i>halakha</i> of division like that of a courtyard does not apply to it. As Rav Huna said: A courtyard is divided according to the number of its entrances. When the residents of the houses in a courtyard divide the courtyard between them, the division is not based on the number of houses in the courtyard, nor is it based on the size of the houses. Instead, it is divided based on the number of entrances that open into the courtyard. Rav Ḥisda said: One gives the homeowner for each and every entrance four cubits, and the rest of the courtyard is divided equally among the residents of the courtyard.
  The principle that entrances are factored into the division of a courtyard applies only with regard to a house that stands to endure, as the owner needs use of the yard to ease access to his house, so we provide him with four cubits according to Rav Ḥisda, or part of the courtyard according to Rav Huna. However, in the case of this small house, which stands to be leveled, its owner has no need for the adjacent courtyard, so we do not provide him with any part of the courtyard, as if it were not even there.
  § With regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high is unfit, the Gemara states: If the <i>sukka</i> was more than twenty cubits high and one comes to diminish its height by placing cushions and blankets on the floor, it is not a decrease of halakhic significance. It does not render the <i>sukka</i> fit, because in that case one is concerned that the bedding will be ruined and therefore does not intend to leave it there very long.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  And even though he nullified them all, intending that for the duration of the Festival the halakhic status of these cushions and blankets is nothing more than that of dirt, it is not deemed a fit nullification because his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. People do not typically do so, so the action of one who does so is discounted.
  If one placed straw on the floor of his <i>sukka</i> in order to diminish its height, and verbally nullified it by saying that he will not use it for another purpose, it is a decrease of halakhic significance, as the halakhic status of adding straw is like that of adding dirt to the <i>sukka</i> floor and diminishing its height. The same is true, all the more so, if he placed dirt on the <i>sukka</i> floor and nullified it.
  A case where one placed straw on the <i>sukka</i> floor and he does not intend to evacuate it from there, although he did not nullify it, and a case where one placed undesignated dirt that was not nullified, are the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis with regard to whether the actions alone are effective as nullification. As we learned in a mishna: In a house in which there is a corpse or an olive-bulk of a corpse, the <i>halakha</i> is that if there is a handbreadth of space between the corpse and the roof, the roof serves as a barrier that prevents the ritual impurity from spreading beyond the roof. However, if there is less than a handbreadth of space between the corpse and the roof, the roof does not serve as a barrier, and the ritual impurity spreads upward. In a house of that sort where one filled the space between the corpse and the roof with straw or pebbles mixed with clods of dirt, and then nullified the straw or dirt, it is effectively nullified, and the ritual impurity spreads upward.
  By inference, if he explicitly nullified it, yes, it is nullified; if he did not nullify it, no, it is not nullified. And it is taught concerning this mishna in the <i>Tosefta</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: If one placed straw on the <i>sukka</i> floor and he does not intend to evacuate it, its halakhic status is like that of undesignated dirt and it is nullified. If he placed dirt on the <i>sukka</i> floor and he does intend to evacuate it, its halakhic status is like that of undesignated straw, and it is not nullified. Apparently, the <i>tanna’im</i> already discussed this matter.
  If a <i>sukka</i> was more than twenty cubits high, but the ends of the palm leaves [<i>hutzin</i>] fall within twenty cubits, then the following distinction applies: If the shade provided solely by the leaves within twenty cubits of the ground is greater than the sunlight in the <i>sukka</i>, it is fit. If not, it is unfit.
  The Gemara applies the same principle to the opposite case. In a case where the <i>sukka</i> was only ten handbreadths high, the minimum height for a fit <i>sukka</i>, but the ends of the palm leaves fall within ten handbreadths, Abaye thought to say that the same calculation applies here: If the sunlight in the <i>sukka</i> is greater than the shade provided by the leaves within ten handbreadths of the ground, meaning that those leaves do not constitute a fit <i>sukka</i> on their own, the <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  Rava said to him: That calculation does not apply in this particular case, as, if the branches fall within ten handbreadths of the ground, that is considered a sagging [<i>seruḥa</i>] residence, and a person does not reside in a sagging residence. Therefore, it cannot even be considered a temporary residence.
  If a <i>sukka</i> was more than twenty cubits high and one built a raised platform in it opposite the entire middle wall, as typically a <i>sukka</i> has three walls and the fourth side is open as an entrance, and the platform has an area of at least a bit more than seven by seven handbreadths, the minimum area required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i>, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Since the seven-by-seven-handbreadth section from the platform to the roof has three walls and it is less than twenty cubits high, that section is a fit <i>sukka</i> in and of itself, and the rest of the <i>sukka</i> beyond the platform is fit as far as the roofing continues.
  And if one built the platform along the side wall of the <i>sukka</i>, then the following distinction applies: If there are four or more cubits from the edge of the platform to the opposite wall, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, as the area of the platform has only two walls. However, if the distance to the opposite wall is less than four cubits, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, as the halakhic status of the roofing that covers the distance to the wall is that of a curved extension of the opposite wall.
  The Gemara asks: What is this <i>halakha</i> teaching us? Is it that we say that the <i>halakha</i> of a curved wall applies to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>? We already learned this <i>halakha</i> in a mishna (17a): In the case of a house that was breached by a hole in the middle of the roof, and one roofed over the breach, if from the wall to the roofing there are four or more cubits of the remaining original roof it is an unfit <i>sukka</i>. By inference, if the distance is less than that, it is a fit <i>sukka</i>. That is due to the <i>halakha</i> of a curved wall. The intact portion of the roof is considered an extension of the wall. As this <i>halakha</i> was already taught with regard to <i>sukka</i>, what is novel in the <i>halakha</i> of the platform?
  The Gemara explains that there is indeed a novel element to the <i>halakha</i> of the platform. Lest you say that that one applies the <i>halakha</i> of a curved wall specifically there, in the case of a house that was breached, as the wall of the house is suited to be the wall of a <i>sukka</i> since it is less than twenty cubits high; however, here, in the case of the platform, where the opposite wall is not suited to be the wall of a <i>sukka</i> due to its excessive height, say no, the <i>halakha</i> of a curved wall does not apply. Therefore, it teaches us that in the case of the platform too, the roof is considered an extension of the wall.
  If the <i>sukka</i> was more than twenty cubits high and one built a platform in the center of the <i>sukka</i> if there is from the edge of the platform to the wall in each and every direction a distance of four cubits, it is unfit, as the platform has no walls. If the distance is less than four cubits, then it is fit.
  The Gemara asks: What is this <i>halakha</i> teaching us? Is it that we say that the <i>halakha</i> of curved wall applies to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>? Then this <i>halakha</i> is identical to that <i>halakha</i>, as we already learned that the <i>halakha</i> of a curved wall applies.
  The Gemara explains that there is indeed a novel element to the <i>halakha</i>. Lest you say that we say that the <i>halakha</i> of a curved wall applies only in one direction, with regard to one wall of the <i>sukka</i>; but in each and every direction with regard to all the walls of the <i>sukka</i>, no, the <i>halakha</i> does not apply; therefore, it teaches us that this <i>halakha</i> may be applied to consider the roof as an extension of all four walls.
  If the <i>sukka</i> was less than ten handbreadths high and he dug out an area inside the <i>sukka</i> in order to complete the requisite height of the <i>sukka</i> to ten handbreadths, if from the edge of the dug-out area to the wall there is a distance of three handbreadths, it is unfit, as in that case the edge of the dug-out area is not joined to the wall of the <i>sukka</i>. Therefore, even though the interior space is ten handbreadths high, its walls are not the requisite height to be considered a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  
  Daf 4b
  
  If the distance from the edge of the dug-out area to the wall was less than three handbreadths then it is fit, as the edge of the dug-out area is joined to the wall of the <i>sukka</i> based on the principle of <i>lavud</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is different there, in the case of a <i>sukka</i> with a platform in its center, that you said that it is a fit <i>sukka</i> if the wall is at a distance of less than four cubits from the edge of the platform, and what is different here that you said the wall must be at a distance of less than three handbreadths for the <i>sukka</i> to be fit?
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high, where there already is a wall, but it is removed from the platform, as long as the wall is at a distance of less than four cubits, it is sufficient to render the <i>sukka</i> fit. Here, where the <i>sukka</i> is less than ten handbreadths high, its wall is not a fit wall. In order to render it a wall by adding the height of the dug-out area, if the distance between them is less than three handbreadths, yes, the dug-out area is considered joined to the wall, as based on the principle of <i>lavud</i> two objects are considered joined if the gap between them is less than three handbreadths; and if not, no, they are not considered joined.
  If a <i>sukka</i> was more than twenty cubits high, and one built a pillar in the <i>sukka</i>, far from the walls, that is ten handbreadths high, and the distance from the top of the column to the roofing was less than twenty cubits, and on the horizontal surface of the column there is a bit more than seven by seven handbreadths, the minimum area required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i>, Abaye thought to say that this is a fit <i>sukka</i> because of the principle: Extend and raise the partitions of this pillar. Given that the column is at least ten handbreadths high, its four sides are therefore considered partitions, and the <i>halakha</i> is that the legal status of a partition is as if it extends and continues upwards indefinitely. Based on that perspective, the surface of the column is supported by four partitions at least ten handbreadths high that extend upward indefinitely, and from the top of the pillar to the roof is less than twenty cubits; therefore, this squared column forms a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  Rava said to Abaye: That is not so, since in order to have a fit <i>sukka</i> we require conspicuous partitions, and there are none, as the sides of the column do not actually project above the surface.
  § The Sages taught: If one inserted four posts [<i>kundeisin</i>] into the floor and placed roofing over them but no walls, Rabbi Ya’akov deems it a fit <i>sukka</i> and the Rabbis deem it unfit.
  Rav Huna said: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Ya’akov is in a case where the four posts are aligned on the edge of the roof, directly above the exterior walls of a house, as Rabbi Ya’akov holds that we say the principle: Extend and raise the partitions. Since the exterior walls of the house are full-fledged partitions, they are considered as extending upward indefinitely, constituting the walls of the <i>sukka</i>. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say the principle: Extend and raise the partitions. However, if the posts are placed in the center of the roof, then the walls of the house are irrelevant and everyone agrees that it is an unfit <i>sukka</i>. And Rav Naḥman said: The dispute is in the case of a <i>sukka</i> in the center of the roof, as according to Rabbi Ya’akov, if the posts themselves are one handbreadth wide, they serve as the partitions, while the Rabbis hold that it is not a fit <i>sukka</i> until it has two complete walls and a partial third wall.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rav Naḥman saying that only if the <i>sukka</i> is in the center of the roof there is a dispute between Rabbi Ya’akov and the Rabbis, but if it is at the edge of the roof everyone agrees that it is fit? Or perhaps he is saying that there is a dispute both in this case and in that case? No resolution was found, so the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  The Gemara raises an objection from another <i>baraita</i>: If one drove four posts into the ground and placed roofing over them, Rabbi Ya’akov deems it fit and the Rabbis deem it unfit.
  But isn’t the legal status of the ground like that of the center of the roof, as it is not surrounded by partitions that extend upward, and nevertheless Rabbi Ya’akov deems it fit? This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who said that everyone agrees that a <i>sukka</i> in the center of the roof is unfit. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation of Rav Huna’s opinion.
  And furthermore, there is an additional refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna. It is apparent from this <i>baraita</i> that they disagree with regard to the case of posts inserted in the center of the roof; however, in the case of the posts inserted on the edge of the roof everyone agrees that it is fit. Let us say, then, that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna on two counts. First, with regard to his statement that everyone agrees in the case of a <i>sukka</i> in the center of the roof that it is unfit, while the <i>baraita</i> cites a dispute on the matter; second, with regard to his statement that there is a dispute in the case of a <i>sukka</i> on the edge of the roof, while the <i>baraita</i> indicates that everyone agrees that it is fit.
  The Gemara rejects this: Rav Huna could have said to you that there is no proof from the <i>baraita</i> with regard to the second matter, as it is possible that they disagree in the case of a <i>sukka</i> in the center of the roof and that the same is true in the case of a <i>sukka</i> on the edge of the roof. And the fact that they specifically dispute the case of a <i>sukka</i> in the center of the roof is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who deems the <i>sukka</i> fit even in the center of the roof.
  The Sages taught: If one inserted four posts into the ground and placed a roof over them, Rabbi Ya’akov says: One considers whether the posts are wide enough that if they were grooved and split, forming a piece of wood with two segments at a right angle, and they have a handbreadth to here, in this direction, and a handbreadth to there, in that direction, then they are considered a double post [<i>deyumad</i>]. With regard to certain <i>halakhot</i>, the status of a double post positioned at a corner is that of two full-fledged partitions. And if not, if after splitting them they are narrower than that, they are not considered a double post, as Rabbi Ya’akov would say: The minimum measure of double posts of a <i>sukka</i> to be considered full-fledged partitions is one handbreadth. And the Rabbis say: The <i>sukka</i> is fit only if it has two full-fledged partitions in the standard sense, completely closing each of those two sides, and a third wall, which, based on a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, measures even a handbreadth.
  § The mishna continues: A <i>sukka</i> that is not even ten handbreadths high is unfit. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>?
  It was stated that Rav, and Rabbi Ḥanina, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Ḥaviva taught the matter below.
  As an aside, the Gemara notes: Throughout the entire order of <i>Mo</i>’<i>ed</i>, wherever this second pair of Sages is mentioned, there are some <i>amora’im</i> who replace Rabbi Yoḥanan and do so by inserting Rabbi Yonatan in his place.
  And this is what they taught: The Ark of the Covenant was itself nine handbreadths high, as it is stated explicitly in the Torah that it was one and a half cubits high and the cubit used to measure Temple vessels consisted of six handbreadths. And the Ark cover was one handbreadth thick. There is a total height of ten handbreadths here. And it is written: “I will meet with you there and I will speak with you from above the Ark cover” (Exodus 25:22),
  
  Daf 5a
  
  and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: The Divine Presence never actually descended below, and Moses and Elijah never actually ascended to heaven on high, as it is stated: “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, and the earth He gave to the children of man” (Psalms 115:16), indicating that these are two distinct domains. Apparently, from ten handbreadths upward is considered a separate domain. Consequently, any <i>sukka</i> that is not at least ten handbreadths high is not considered an independent domain and is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: And did the Divine Presence never descend below ten handbreadths? But isn’t it written: “And God descended onto Mount Sinai” (Exodus 19:20)? The Gemara answers: Although God descended below, He always remained ten handbreadths above the ground. Since from ten handbreadths and above it is a separate domain, in fact, the Divine Presence never descended to the domain of this world. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And on that day His feet will stand on the Mount of Olives” (Zechariah 14:4)? The Gemara answers: Here, too, He will remain ten handbreadths above the ground.
  The Gemara asks: And did Moses and Elijah never ascend to the heavens on high? But isn’t it written: “And Moses went up to God” (Exodus 19:3)? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, he remained below ten handbreadths adjacent to the ground. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And Elijah went up by a whirlwind heavenward” (II Kings 2:11)? The Gemara answers: Here, too, it was below ten handbreadths. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “He grasps the face of the throne, and spreads His cloud upon him” (Job 26:9)? And Rabbi Tanḥum said: This teaches that the Almighty spread of the radiance of His Divine Presence and of His cloud upon him. Apparently, Moses was in the cloud with God. The Gemara answers: Here, too, it was below ten handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: In any case: “He grasps the face of the throne,” is written, indicating that Moses took hold of the Throne of Glory. The Gemara rejects this: The throne was extended for him down to ten handbreadths and Moses grasped it; however, he remained below ten handbreadths. And since the Divine Presence speaks to Moses from above the Ark cover ten handbreadths above the ground, clearly a height of ten handbreadths is a distinct domain.
  The Gemara wonders about the proof offered: Granted, the height of the Ark was nine handbreadths, as it is written: “And they shall make an Ark of acacia wood; two cubits and a half shall be its length, and a cubit and a half its breadth, and a cubit and a half its height” (Exodus 25:10), and one and a half cubits equal nine handbreadths. However, from where do we derive the fact that the thickness of the Ark cover was one handbreadth? The Torah never states its dimensions explicitly, as Rabbi Ḥanina taught: For all the vessels that Moses crafted for the Tabernacle, the Torah provided in their regard the dimension of their length, the dimension of their width, and the dimension of their height. However, for the Ark cover, the Torah provided the dimension of its length and the dimension of its width; but the Torah did not provide the dimension of its height.
  The Gemara answers: Go out and learn from the smallest dimension mentioned in connection with any of the Tabernacle vessels, as it is stated with regard to the shewbread table: “And you shall make unto it a border of a handbreadth around” (Exodus 25:25). Just as there, the frame measures one handbreadth, so too, here, the thickness of the Ark cover measures a single handbreadth. The Gemara asks: And let us derive the thickness of the Ark cover from the vessels themselves, the smallest of which measures a cubit. The Gemara answers: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something. If there are two possible sources from which to derive the dimension of the Ark cover, then without conclusive proof one may not presume that the Torah intended to teach the larger dimension. Rather, the presumption is that the Torah is teaching the smaller dimension, which is included in the larger measure.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let us derive the thickness of the Ark cover from the frontplate, which is even smaller than a handbreadth, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The frontplate is a type of plate made of gold that is two fingerbreadths wide and stretches from ear to ear. And written upon it are two lines: The letters <i>yod</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>heh</i>, the name of God, above; and the word <i>kodesh</i>, spelled <i>kuf</i>, <i>dalet</i>, <i>shin</i>, followed by the letter <i>lamed</i>, below. Together it spelled <i>kodesh laHashem</i>, meaning: Sacred to the Lord, with <i>yod</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>heh</i> written on the upper line in deference to the name of God. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw the frontplate in the emperor’s treasury in Rome, where it was taken together with the other Temple vessels when the Temple was destroyed, and upon it was written: Sacred to the Lord, on one line. Why not derive the thickness of the Ark cover from the frontplate and say that it was only two fingerbreadths?
  The Gemara answers: One derives the dimension of a vessel from the dimension of a vessel, and one does not derive the dimension of a vessel from the dimension of an ornament. The frontplate is not one of the Tabernacle vessels but one of the ornaments of the High Priest.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us derive the thickness of the Ark cover from the crown featured atop several of the Tabernacle vessels, as the Master said: This crown, with regard to which the Torah did not specify its dimensions, could be any size. The Gemara answers: One derives the dimension of a vessel from the dimension of a vessel, and one does not derive the dimension of a vessel from the dimension of the finish of a vessel that serves decorative purposes. The Gemara asks: If it is so that one does not derive the dimensions of a vessel from the dimensions of the finish of a vessel, then how can dimensions be derived from the border of the table, which is also the finish of a vessel and not an integral part of the table? The Gemara answers: The border of the table was below, between the legs of the table, and the tabletop rested upon it. As it supports the table, it is an integral part of the table and not merely decoration.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that its border was below the tabletop; however, according to the one who said that its border was above the tabletop, what can be said? According to that opinion, this border is indeed the finish of a vessel.
  Rather, the thickness of the Ark cover must be derived from a different source. One derives the missing dimensions of an object for which the Torah provided part of its dimension, e.g., the Ark cover, for which the Torah provided the dimensions of length and width, from an object for which the Torah provided its dimension, e.g., the border of the table. And the frontplate and the crown, for which the Torah did not provide any dimension at all, and their dimensions were determined by the Sages, will not prove anything. It is certainly appropriate to derive the dimension of the thickness of the Ark cover from that which was stated clearly in the Torah.
  Rav Huna said that the thickness of the Ark cover is derived from here: “Upon the face of [<i>penei</i>] the Ark cover on the east” (Leviticus 16:14), and there is no face [<i>panim</i>] of a person that measures less than one handbreadth.
  The Gemara asks: And why say that the face in the verse is specifically the face of a person? Say that the Ark cover is like the face
  
  Daf 5b
  
  of a bird called <i>bar Yokhani</i>, whose face is significantly larger than a handbreadth? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something. The Gemara asks: If so, say that it is like the face of a bird, which is extremely small? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Rav Huna derives that the thickness of the Ark cover was one handbreadth not through an actual comparison to the real faces of different creatures but rather by means of a verbal analogy between the terms <i>penei</i> and <i>penei</i> written in different places in the Torah. It is written here: “Before [<i>penei</i>] the Ark cover” (Leviticus 16:2), and it is written there: “From the presence of [<i>penei</i>] Isaac his father” (Genesis 27:30). The dimension of the Ark cover is like that of the face of a person, a handbreadth.
  The Gemara suggests: And let us derive a verbal analogy from the face of God, as it is written: “For I have seen your face as one sees the face of [<i>penei</i>] God, and you were pleased with me” (Genesis 33:10). The term <i>penei</i> is used with regard to the face of God as well. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something.
  The Gemara suggests: And let us derive a verbal analogy from the face of the cherub in the Tabernacle and the Temple, as it is written: “Toward the Ark cover shall be the faces of [<i>penei</i>] the cherubs” (Exodus 25:20), and their faces were presumably smaller than one handbreadth.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: We have learned through tradition that the faces of the cherubs were not smaller than a handbreadth, and indeed Rav Huna derived the thickness of the Ark cover from here as well, i.e., from the verbal analogy between the instances of the word <i>penei</i> in the verses: “Upon the face of [<i>penei</i>] the Ark cover on the east” and: “The faces [<i>penei</i>] of the cherubs,” indicating that both are the same size.
  Apropos the cherubs, the Gemara asks: And what is the form of the face of a cherub [<i>keruv</i>]? Rabbi Abbahu said: Like that of a child [<i>keravya</i>], as in Babylonia one calls a child <i>ravya</i>.
  Abaye said to him: But if what you say is so, what is the meaning of that which is written about the faces of the celestial beasts drawing the celestial chariot: “The face of the first was the face of the cherub, and the face of the second was the face of a man” (Ezekiel 10:14)? According to your explanation, this face of the cherub is the same as that face of a man. The Gemara answers: Although two of the celestial beasts drawing that chariot had the face of a man, the difference between them is that one was a large face and one was a small face. In other words, the face described as the face of a man was the face of an adult, and the face described as the face of a cherub was that of a child. This is the source that the Ark and the Ark cover were ten handbreadths high.
  However, with regard to the application of this measure to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>, the Gemara asks: And from where is it derived that the interior space of the <i>sukka</i> must be ten handbreadths high without the thickness of the roofing? Say that the ten handbreadths of the <i>sukka</i> are with the thickness of the roofing. Just as the ten handbreadths of the Ark are measured from the bottom of the Ark to the top of the Ark cover, let the <i>sukka</i> be measured to the top of the roofing.
  Rather, the dimension of the <i>sukka</i> is not derived from the Ark; one instead derived it from the dimensions of the eternal Temple, as it is written: “And the house which King Solomon built for the Lord, its length was sixty cubits, and its breadth twenty cubits, and its height thirty cubits” (I Kings 6:2). And it is written: “The height of the first cherub was ten cubits, and likewise was the second cherub” (I Kings 6:26). And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Just as we find in the eternal Temple that the cherubs stand reaching one-third the height of the Temple, as each cherub was ten cubits high and the Temple was thirty cubits high, in the Tabernacle as well, the cherubs stand reaching one-third the height of the Tabernacle.
  And to calculate: How many cubits high was the Tabernacle? It was ten cubits, as it is written: “Ten cubits shall be the length of a beam” (Exodus 26:16). How many handbreadths do these ten cubits contain? They contain sixty handbreadths. And one third of that total is how many? It is twenty handbreadths. Subtract from this figure ten handbreadths of the Ark and the Ark cover upon which the cherubs stood, and ten handbreadths remain, which was the height of each individual cherub. And it is written: “And the cherubs shall spread out their wings upward, screening [<i>sokhekhim</i>] the Ark cover with their wings” (Exodus 25:20). Here the Merciful One is referring to the wings using the terminology of roofing [<i>sekhakha</i>] specifically when they are ten handbreadths above the Ark cover. This is a source that the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> is placed at least ten handbreadths high.
  The Gemara asks: And from where is it known that their wings were spread above their heads, from which it is derived that roofing is ten handbreadths high? Perhaps they were spread level with their heads. In that case, the ten handbreadths derived would include the roofing, leaving the interior space of the <i>sukka</i> less than ten handbreadths high. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said that it is written: “Spread out their wings upward,” indicating that the wings were above their heads. The Gemara asks: If so, say that the wings were extremely high to an unspecified height. The Gemara answers: Does the verse say: Upward, upward? It says upward only once, meaning slightly over their heads. There is proof from the verses that the roofing was at least ten handbreadths off the ground.
  The Gemara asks: This calculation works out well according to Rabbi Meir, who said that all the cubits in the Tabernacle and the Temple were intermediate cubits, consisting of six handbreadths; however, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that the cubit used in the dimensions of a building in the Temple was a cubit consisting of six handbreadths, but the cubit used in the dimensions of vessels was a cubit consisting of only five handbreadths, what is there to say?
  Based on that calculation, how many handbreadths was the height of the Ark and the Ark cover? They totaled eight and a half handbreadths. The height of the Ark was one and a half cubits, which, based on a five-handbreadth cubit, equals seven and a half handbreadths. Including the additional handbreadth of the Ark cover, the total height is eight and a half handbreadths. If the cherubs were one third of the height of the Tabernacle, which is twenty handbreadths, eleven and a half handbreadths remain for the height of the cherubs, over which their wings were spread. Therefore, say that for a <i>sukka</i> to be fit for use its interior space must be eleven and a half handbreadths high. However, there is no recorded opinion that requires a <i>sukka</i> with that dimension.
  Rather, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the Sages learned the minimum height of a <i>sukka</i> as a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: The measures in various areas of <i>halakha</i>, e.g., olive-bulk, dried fig-bulk, egg-bulk, and the various <i>halakhot</i> of interpositions that serve as a barrier between one’s body and the water in a ritual bath and invalidate immersions, and the dimensions and nature of halakhic partitions are all <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. They were not written in the Torah; rather, they were received in the framework of the Oral Law.
  The Gemara questions this assertion: Are measures a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? They are written in the Torah, as it is written: “A land of wheat, and barley, and vines, and figs, and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey” (Deuteronomy 8:8), and Rav Ḥanin said: This entire verse is stated for the purpose of teaching measures with regard to different <i>halakhot</i> in the Torah.
  Wheat was mentioned as the basis for calculating the time required for one to become ritually impure when entering a house afflicted with leprosy, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who enters a house afflicted with leprosy of the house (see Leviticus, chapter 14), and his clothes are draped over his shoulders, and his sandals and his rings are in his hands, both he and they, the clothes, sandals, and rings, immediately become ritually impure.
  
  Daf 6a
  
  However, if he was dressed in his clothes, and his sandals were on his feet, and his rings were on his fingers, he immediately becomes ritually impure, but they, the clothes, sandals, and rings, remain pure until he stays in the house long enough to eat half a loaf of bread. This calculation is based on wheat bread, which takes less time to eat, and not on barley bread, and it relates to one who is reclining and eating it together with relish or a condiment, which hastens the eating. This is a Torah measurement connected specifically to wheat.
  Barley is also used as a basis for measurements, as we learned in a mishna: A bone from a corpse the size of a grain of barley imparts ritual impurity through contact and by being carried, but it does not impart impurity by means of a tent, i.e., if the bone was inside a house, it does not render all the articles in the house ritually impure.
  The halakhic measure determined by a vine is the quantity of a quarter-<i>log</i> of wine for a nazirite. A nazirite, for whom it is prohibited to drink wine, is liable to be flogged if he drinks that measure.
  Fig alludes to the measure of a dried fig-bulk with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of carrying out on Shabbat. One is liable for carrying food fit for human consumption on Shabbat, provided that he carries a dried fig-bulk of that food.
  Pomegranate teaches the following measure, as we learned in a mishna: All ritually impure wooden vessels belonging to ordinary homeowners become pure through being broken, as broken vessels cannot contract or maintain ritual impurity. They are considered broken if they have holes the size of pomegranates.
  The Sages interpreted: “A land of olive oil and honey,” as: A land, all of whose measures are olive-bulks. The Gemara poses a question: Does it enter your mind that it is a land all of whose measures are olive-bulks? But aren’t there those measures that we just mentioned above, which are not olive-bulks? Rather, say: A land, most of whose measures are olive-bulks, as most measures relating to forbidden foods, e.g., fats, blood, <i>piggul</i>, leftover sacrificial flesh, ritually impure food, and the sciatic nerve, are olive-bulks, as are the measures for a corpse to transmit impurity in a tent and for an animal carcass to transmit impurity through contact.
  Honey, i.e., dates from which date honey is extracted, also determines a measure, as with regard to eating on Yom Kippur, one is liable only if he eats a large date-bulk of food.
  Apparently, all these halakhic measurements are derived from this verse in the Torah and are not <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara refutes this argument: And how can you understand it in that manner that all these measures are explicitly written in the Torah with regard to each of the <i>halakhot</i> mentioned above? Rather, they are <i>halakhot</i> that were transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the verse cited is mere support for these <i>halakhot</i>, not a source.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said earlier that Rav said that the <i>halakhot</i> governing interpositions that invalidate ritual immersion are <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara challenges this assertion: These, too, are written in the Torah, as it is written: “And he shall bathe his flesh in the water” (Leviticus 14:9), and the Sages derived that nothing should interpose between his flesh and the water. Apparently, the <i>halakhot</i> of interposition are derived from a verse in the Torah and not through oral tradition.
  The Gemara answers: When the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses comes to teach, it is not with regard to an interposition on one’s skin, which is indeed derived from verses in the Torah. Rather, it comes to teach that an interposition in one’s hair invalidates the immersion, in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: A single hair [<i>nima</i>] tied in a knot interposes and invalidates the immersion. Three hairs tied together in a knot do not interpose, because three hairs cannot be tied so tightly that water cannot penetrate them. With regard to two hairs tied together in a knot, I do not know the <i>halakha</i>. This <i>halakha</i> with regard to hair is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to one’s hair is also written in the Torah, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to that which is written: “And he shall bathe [<i>et besaro</i>] his flesh in the water.” The superfluous word <i>et</i> comes to include that which is subordinate to his flesh, and what is that? That is his hair. The fact that, like the body, there can be no interposition between one’s hair and the water is also derived from a verse.
  The Gemara answers: When the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai comes to teach, it is not with regard to an interposition in one’s hair, which is indeed derived from a verse in the Torah. Rather, it comes to teach in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said:
  
  Daf 6b
  
  By Torah law, if there is an interposition between a person and the water, and it covers the majority of his body, and he is particular about it and wants the interposing substance removed, only then is it considered an interposition that invalidates immersion in a ritual bath. However, if he is not particular about that substance, it is not considered an interposition. The Sages, however, issued a decree that it is prohibited to immerse with a substance covering the majority of one’s body with regard to which he is not particular, due to substances covering the majority of one’s body with regard to which he is particular. And, they issued a decree that it is prohibited to immerse with a substance covering the minority of his body with regard to which one is particular, due to substances covering the majority of his body with regard to which one is particular.
  The Gemara raises a question: Then let us also issue a decree deeming substances covering the minority of one’s body with regard to which he is not particular an interposition, due to substances covering the minority of his body with regard to which he is particular, or alternatively, due to substances covering the majority of his body with regard to which he is not particular.
  The Gemara answers: We do not issue that decree because the <i>halakha</i> that deems both an interposition covering the minority of his body about which one is particular and an interposition covering the majority of his body about which one is not particular an interposition is itself a decree. Shall we then arise and issue one decree to prevent violation of another decree? In any case, these details with regard to interpositions are neither written nor alluded to in the Torah; rather, they are <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  The <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the minimum height for partitions is ten handbreadths is as we stated earlier. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is no verse in the Torah from which this <i>halakha</i> can be derived, as he therefore concludes that it is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. However, according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that all of the cubits in the Temple consist of six handbreadths and therefore the measure of ten handbreadths can be derived from verses in the Torah, what is there to say? What is the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to partitions?
  When the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses comes to teach, it is with regard to other <i>halakhot</i> concerning partitions, e.g., the <i>halakhot</i> of extending [<i>gode</i>], according to which an existing partition is extended upward or downward to complete the requisite measure; and the <i>halakhot</i> of joining [<i>lavud</i>], according to which two solid surfaces are joined if they are separated by a gap of less than three handbreadths; and the <i>halakhot</i> of a curved wall of a <i>sukka</i>. A <i>sukka</i> is fit even if there are up to four cubits of unfit roofing, provided that this roofing is adjacent to one of the walls of the <i>sukka</i>. In that case, the unfit roofing is considered a bent extension of the wall. These concepts are certainly not written in the Torah.
  § Among the factors listed in the mishna that render a <i>sukka</i> unfit is: And one that does not have three walls.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: In order to construct a fit <i>sukka</i>, two of the walls must be walls in the standard sense, sealing the entire length and height of the <i>sukka</i>, and the third wall may be even one handbreadth long. Rabbi Shimon says: Three of the walls must be walls in the standard sense, and the fourth wall may be even one handbreadth long.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Rabbis hold: The tradition of the manner in which the verses in the Torah are written is authoritative, and one derives <i>halakhot</i> based on the spelling of the words. And Rabbi Shimon holds: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, meaning that one derives <i>halakhot</i> based on the pronunciation of the words, although it diverges from the spelling.
  With regard to <i>sukka</i>, the Rabbis hold: The tradition of the verses is authoritative, as the word <i>basukkot</i> is written three times in the context of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. It is written twice in the verse: “In <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>] shall you reside seven days; all that are home-born in Israel shall reside in <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>]” (Leviticus 23:42). In both of these instances, the word in Hebrew is spelled without a <i>vav</i>, as are Hebrew words in the singular. And one time it is written with a <i>vav</i>, as are Hebrew words in the plural: “So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>]” (Leviticus 23:43). There is mention here of <i>sukka</i> four times, two singular plus one plural hinted at here in these verses.
  Subtract one to teach the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> itself, and three remain. These three remaining <i>sukkot</i> teach that the <i>sukka</i> requires three walls; two of the three are walls in the standard sense, and the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai comes and reduces the dimension of the third and establishes it as one handbreadth. That tradition teaches that one wall need not be any longer than one handbreadth.
  On the other hand, Rabbi Shimon holds: The vocalization of the Torah is authoritative. Therefore, although two of the instances are written without a <i>vav</i>, since they are all vocalized in the plural, <i>basukkot</i>, <i>basukkot</i>, <i>basukkot</i>, there is mention here of <i>sukka</i> six times in these two verses. Subtract one verse to teach the mitzva of the <i>sukka</i> itself, and two mentions of <i>basukkot</i>, which equal four <i>sukkot</i>, remain and teach that the <i>sukka</i> requires four walls. Three of the walls are walls in the standard sense, and the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai comes and reduces the dimension of the fourth and establishes it as one handbreadth.
  And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the vocalization of the Torah is authoritative, and here, it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds that to derive its roofing requires a verse; therefore, only three of the original six <i>sukkot</i> remain from which walls can be derived. The <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai reduces the dimension of one of the three walls to one handbreadth. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that to derive its roofing does not require a verse, as the essence of <i>sukka</i> is its roofing. No additional source beyond the verse from which the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is derived is required for the roofing. Therefore, walls are derived from four of the six <i>sukkot</i> Three full-fledged walls and a fourth measuring one handbreadth.
  And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the tradition of the verses is authoritative, and here, it is with regard to this that they disagree: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds: When the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses comes to teach, it is to reduce to one handbreadth the dimension of one of the three walls derived from the verses. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds: When the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses comes to teach, it is to add another wall to the three walls derived from the verses; however, the dimension of that fourth wall may be one handbreadth.
  And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that when the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses comes to teach, it is to reduce the dimension of one of the three walls. And everyone agrees that the tradition of the verses is authoritative, and there are four mentions of <i>sukka</i> in the verse. And here it is with regard to whether one derives numbers for halakhic matters from the first mention of a term in the Torah that they disagree. When that total is derived from the number of instances a certain word appears in the Torah, there is a dispute whether the first instance is included in the tally, or whether the first instance is necessary to teach the mitzva itself and the number may be counted only from subsequent mentions. One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one derives numbers from the first mention and therefore four walls derived from the verses. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that one does not derive numbers from the first mention, and therefore only three walls are derived from the verses.
  Rav Mattana said that the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is derived from here: “And there shall be a <i>sukka</i> for shade in the daytime from the heat, and for refuge and cover from storm and from rain” (Isaiah 4:6). A <i>sukka</i> without three full-fledged walls does not provide shelter nor serve as refuge.
  § The Gemara asks: According to the opinion that a <i>sukka</i> can be built with two full-fledged walls and a third that is one handbreadth, where does one position that third wall that measures one handbreadth? Rav said: He positions it at the end of one of the standing walls opposite the wall that emerges from the other end of that wall.
  Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav:
  
  Daf 7a
  
  And let him position the wall measuring one handbreadth opposite the wall that emerges like the diagonal line formed by the end of the furrows as the field gradually narrows. This third partition would represent the third side of a triangle and would make the <i>sukka</i> appear more like a full-fledged structure, as the diagonal would represent closure of both unwalled directions. Rav was silent and did not respond.
  It was also stated that Shmuel said in the name of Levi: He positions it at the end of one of the standing walls opposite the wall that emerges from the other end of that wall. And similarly, they rule in the study hall: He positions it at the end of one of the standing walls opposite the wall that emerges from the other end of that wall.
  Rabbi Simon said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said, that the third wall is positioned differently. He establishes for the third side a wall that measures an expansive handbreadth, measured with the fingers spread apart, which is slightly larger than a standard handbreadth. And he then positions it less than three handbreadths from and adjacent to the wall opposite the second wall. And the legal status of any item positioned less than three handbreadths from and adjacent to the wall is like an item joined to that wall. In this way, the handbreadth-wide wall is joined to the adjacent wall, and it is as if it is a wall of four handbreadths, which is the majority of the minimum measure of the wall of a full-fledged <i>sukka</i>, seven handbreadths.
  Rav Yehuda said: A <i>sukka</i> constructed like an alleyway, with two parallel full-fledged walls, is fit, and with regard to that third wall that measures one handbreadth, he positions it adjacent to one of the walls in any direction that he chooses, as it is merely a conspicuous marker.
  Rabbi Simon said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said: In the case of a <i>sukka</i> built like an alleyway open on two ends, a third wall measuring a single handbreadth is insufficient. Rather, one establishes for the third side a board with a width of four handbreadths and a bit and positions it less than three handbreadths from and adjacent to either wall, as a wall on either of the open ends. And the legal status of any item positioned less than three handbreadths from and adjacent to the wall is like an item joined to that wall. The result is a full-fledged seven-handbreadth <i>sukka</i> wall.
  The Gemara asks: What is different there, in the case of two attached walls, where you say that a wall with the dimension of an expansive handbreadth suffices to complete the third wall, and what is different here where you say that it requires a board that measures four handbreadths and a bit? The Gemara answers: There, where there are two walls in the standard sense, as they are attached forming a type of structure, it is sufficient to have the third wall measure an expansive handbreadth in order to render the <i>sukka</i> fit; however, here, where there are not two walls in the standard sense, as they are not attached, if there is a board that measures four handbreadths as the third wall, yes, it is fit, and if not, no, it is unfit.
  Rava said: And the <i>sukka</i> consisting of two adjacent walls with a third wall measuring one handbreadth is permitted and fit only if the third wall is in the form of a doorway. One can render the sukka fit only by splitting the one-handbreadth wall and attaching one half to the standing wall and one half across from the other wall that emerges from the standing wall, and then placing a pole across the two halves. By creating the form of a doorway, that third wall becomes like an open gate, which is considered a halakhic partition.
  Some say that Rava said: And a <i>sukka</i> consisting of two adjacent walls is also permitted and fit if the third wall is in the form of a doorway. In other words, Rava does not reject the remedy of the expansive-handbreadth wall suggested by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi; rather, he suggests an alternative.
  Some say a third version of that which Rava said: And a <i>sukka</i> consisting of two adjacent walls, even with a third that is an expansive handbreadth wide as suggested by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, also requires the form of a doorway to be fit. In other words, in addition to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s remedy, one must also create the form of a doorway to render the <i>sukka</i> fit.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Ashi found Rav Kahana establishing his <i>sukka</i>, which had two adjacent walls, and establishing a third wall that was an expansive handbreadth wide and establishing the form of a doorway as well. Rav Ashi said to him: And does the Master not hold in accordance with that opinion of Rava, as Rava said: And the <i>sukka</i> is also permitted and fit if the third wall is in the form of a doorway? Why are you establishing a wall that is an expansive handbreadth wide as well? Rav Kahana said to him: I hold in accordance with the other version of the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: And the <i>sukka</i> also requires the form of a doorway, in addition to the expansive handbreadth, to be fit.
  § It is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that if the <i>sukka</i> has two walls in the standard sense and a third wall that measures one handbreadth, it is fit. Rava said: And likewise with regard to Shabbat that occurs during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, since it is considered a wall with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> it is considered a partition with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. Were one to construct a <i>sukka</i> in that manner in a public domain adjacent to the entrance to his house, its legal status would be that of a private domain and one would be permitted to move objects from it to his house and vice versa on Shabbat that occurs during the Festival. However, that structure is not considered a private domain on any other Shabbat.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>: And do we say that this principle: Since it is considered, etc., applies in this area of <i>halakha</i>? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The specifications of the wall of a <i>sukka</i> are like those of a partition with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. Just as with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, one forms a partition by establishing adjacent reeds, so too, one forms the wall of a <i>sukka</i> in the same manner, provided that the gap from one reed to another will not be as much as three handbreadths. If the gap is three handbreadths or greater, the legal status of the reeds is that they are not considered joined.
  But the stringency of the <i>halakha</i> with regard to Shabbat goes beyond the stringency of the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>sukka</i>, in terms of the criteria for effective partitions, as with regard to Shabbat, carrying is permitted only in a case where the total of the standing segments of the partition, the actual wall, is greater than the total of the breached segments of the partition, the gaps that are less than three handbreadths. That is not so with regard to the <i>sukka</i>, where, even if the breached segments total more than the standing segments, e.g., a <i>sukka</i> consisting of two walls in which there are gaps and a third wall measuring only a single handbreadth, it is still fit.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. What, isn’t the <i>baraita</i> teaching that the stringency with regard to Shabbat that occurs during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> goes beyond the stringency with regard to the rest of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? And apparently, we do not say the principle: Since it is considered a fit partition for <i>sukka</i> let it also be considered a fit partition for Shabbat. This is difficult according to Rava, in whose opinion that principle is applied in this case.
  Rava rejects that interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>. No, the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that the stringency with regard to Shabbat in general goes beyond the stringency with regard to Shabbat that occurs during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. On Shabbat during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, a partition where the total of the breached segments of the partition is greater than the total of the standing segments is effective, as, since it is effective as a wall in a <i>sukka</i>, it is effective as a partition for Shabbat as well. That is not the case on Shabbat during the rest of the year, when a partition of that sort is ineffective on Shabbat.
  Abaye asked: If it is so that the distinction in the <i>baraita</i> is not a fundamental distinction between the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> and the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, but is instead a distinction between the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat in general and the specific case of Shabbat during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, then let the <i>baraita</i> also teach a novel distinction involving Shabbat that occurs during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. The stringency with regard to <i>sukka</i> in general during the rest of <i>Sukkot</i> goes beyond the stringency with regard to <i>sukka</i> on Shabbat that occurs during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, as a <i>sukka</i> in general consisting of two parallel walls, like an alleyway, requires that its third wall measure an expansive handbreadth, while a <i>sukka</i> on Shabbat does not require an expansive handbreadth for this purpose, and it is sufficient for the third wall to be established with a side post ten handbreadths high and any width.
  Since the side post is effective as a partition with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, it should also be effective as a wall with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> although it is less than one handbreadth wide, as you are the one who said: If one placed roofing over an alleyway which has a side post on one of the open ends to permit carrying in that alleyway on Shabbat, it is fit as a <i>sukka</i> for that same Shabbat, although it would not be fit during the rest of the week of the Festival.
  Rava replied to him: That is indeed my statement; however, the fact is that the <i>baraita</i> does not cite that distinction, because it is not necessary to state that there are circumstances in which the general <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> are stricter than its <i>halakhot</i> on Shabbat, as there is no novelty in the concept that the <i>halakhot</i> of partitions on Shabbat should apply to a <i>sukka</i>. Now that we say that <i>halakhot</i> may be derived from a leniency to a stringency, as a <i>halakha</i> that applies to <i>sukka</i>, which is a positive mitzva, is applied to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, which is a stringent prohibition punishable by <i>karet</i>; then from a stringency, the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, to a leniency, all the more so may <i>halakhot</i> be derived. Therefore, there is no reason for the <i>baraita</i> to mention that distinction explicitly.
  § Apropos roofing over an alleyway, the Gemara elaborates about the matter itself. Rava said:
  
  Daf 7b
  
  If one placed roofing over an alleyway that has a side post, it is fit for use as a <i>sukka</i>.
  And similarly, Rava said: If one placed roofing over upright boards surrounding wells, it is fit for use as a <i>sukka</i>. A well is usually at least four handbreadths wide and ten handbreadths deep. Therefore, it is considered a private domain, and it is prohibited to draw water from it on Shabbat, as that would constitute a violation of the prohibition to carry from a private domain into a public one. In order to permit drawing water from the well, the surrounding area must be partitioned off and rendered a private domain. For the benefit of Festival pilgrims, the Sages instituted a special leniency that full-fledged partitions need not be constructed around the well for this purpose. Rather, it is sufficient if there are four double posts at the four corners of the area surrounding the well. Since these symbolic barriers are considered partitions for the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, they are considered partitions for the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> on Shabbat as well.
  The Gemara notes: And it is necessary for Rava to state the <i>halakha</i> in each of the two similar cases, as if he had taught us only that the <i>sukka</i> is fit in the case of the alleyway, one could say that it is due to the fact that there are two full-fledged walls; however, in the case of upright boards surrounding wells, where there are not two full-fledged walls and most of the area is breached, say no, it is not considered a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  And if he had taught us only the case of upright boards surrounding wells, one could say that it is due to the fact that in that case it is in the category of a <i>sukka</i> with four, albeit virtual, walls; however, in the case where one placed roofing over an alleyway, where it is not in the category of a <i>sukka</i> with four walls, say no, it is not considered a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  And if he had taught us only these two cases, to teach that a partition with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat is a partition with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>, one could say that it is due to the fact that one can derive a <i>halakha</i> from a stringency, the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, to a leniency, the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>; however, to derive a <i>halakha</i> from a leniency to a stringency, say no. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the third <i>halakha</i> with regard to a <i>sukka</i> consisting of two walls in the standard sense and a third wall measuring a handbreadth: Since the third wall is considered a wall with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>, a leniency, it is considered a wall with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, a stringency.
  § The mishna continues: And a <i>sukka</i> whose sunlight, i.e., the sunlight that passes through the roofing, is greater than its shade, is unfit.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that in the statement: Whose sunlight is greater than its shade,the reference is to sunlight that passes through due to sparse roofing, and not to the sunlight entering due to gaps in the walls. It is possible for a <i>sukka</i> to have more sunlight than shade due to sunlight passing through the sides and not the roofing, in which case the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Rabbi Yoshiya says: If the sunlight exceeds the shade the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, even if the sunlight is due to gaps in the walls.
  Rav Yeimar bar Shelemya said in the name of Abaye: What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya? It is as it is written: “And you shall screen [<i>vesakkota</i>] the Ark with the curtain” (Exodus 40:3). The curtain is a partition and not a covering over the Ark, and nevertheless, the Merciful One calls it roofing [<i>sekhakha</i>]. Apparently, we require the purpose of a partition to be similar to the purpose of roofing; just as the roofing must be mostly impermeable by sunlight, so must the partition.
  And how do the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yoshiya, interpret the term: And you shall screen [<i>vesakkota</i>]? That term teaches that we should bend the top of the curtain a bit so that it appears as roofing over the Ark.
  Abaye said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yoshiya, and Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon, and Rabban Gamliel, and Beit Shammai, and Rabbi Eliezer, and <i>Aḥerim</i> all hold that we require the <i>sukka</i> to be sturdy and fit for dwelling like a permanent residence.
  Abaye cites the relevant statements of the <i>tanna’im</i> listed above. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states this opinion, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Any <i>sukka</i> that does not have an area of four cubits by four cubits is unfit. These are the dimensions of a permanent residence.
  The fact that Rabbi Yoshiya holds that a <i>sukka</i> must be a permanent residence can be seen from that which we stated, that the walls must also be impermeable by sunlight like the walls of a permanent residence.
  Rabbi Yehuda also holds that a <i>sukka</i> must be a permanent residence, as we learned in the mishna: A <i>sukka</i> that is more than twenty cubits high is unfit; Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. As explained above, in constructing a <i>sukka</i> more than twenty cubits high, one cannot render his residence a temporary residence; rather, he must construct a sturdy permanent residence.
  Rabbi Shimon agrees, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The dimensions of a <i>sukka</i> are two walls in the standard sense, and a third wall that measures even a handbreadth; Rabbi Shimon says: Three of the walls must be walls in the standard sense, and a fourth wall is required that measures even a handbreadth. Apparently, a <i>sukka</i> must be surrounded on four sides like a permanent residence.
  Rabban Gamliel holds that a <i>sukka</i> must be a permanent residence, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> atop a wagon or atop a boat, Rabban Gamliel deems it unfit; a mobile structure is not a permanent residence. Rabbi Akiva deems it fit. Apparently, Rabban Gamliel requires that a <i>sukka</i> be a permanent residence.
  Beit Shammai agree, as we learned in a mishna: In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the <i>sukka</i> and his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem the <i>sukka</i> unfit, since a small <i>sukka</i> is unfit for use and one cannot fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> with it. And Beit Hillel deem it fit. Apparently, Beit Shammai require that the <i>sukka</i> be similar to a permanent structure.
  Rabbi Eliezer holds that a <i>sukka</i> must be a permanent residence, as we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> like a type of circular hut whose walls slope down from the center and has no roof, or one who rested the <i>sukka</i> against the wall, taking long branches and placing one end on the ground and leaning the other end against the wall, establishing a structure with no roof, Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit because it does not have a roof, and the Rabbis deem it fit. A permanent residence has a roof.
  <i>Aḥerim</i> agree, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that <i>Aḥerim</i> say: A <i>sukka</i> built in a circular shape like a dovecote is unfit, because it does not have corners, and a permanent residence is one with corners.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a <i>sukka</i> that is shaped like a furnace and is completely round, if its circumference has sufficient space for twenty-four people to sit in it, it is fit, and if not, it is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Yoḥanan rule that the <i>sukka</i> must be so expansive? The Gemara answers: It is undoubtedly in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Any <i>sukka</i> that does not have an area of four cubits by four cubits is unfit. Since he requires the <i>sukka</i> with the largest minimum dimensions, Rabbi Yoḥanan must hold in accordance with his opinion.
  However, even if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the question arises: Now, since when a person sits, he occupies one cubit of space, the circumference required by Rabbi Yoḥanan for the <i>sukka</i> is twenty-four cubits. However, mathematically, for every three handbreadths circumference in a circle, there is a diameter of approximately one handbreadth. Consequently, rather than requiring a <i>sukka</i> that holds twenty-four people, a <i>sukka</i> that holds merely twelve people should suffice, since a <i>sukka</i> with a circumference of twelve cubits has a diameter of approximately four. In that case, why does Rabbi Yoḥanan require the <i>sukka</i> to have double the necessary circumference?
  
  Daf 8a
  
  The Gemara answers: This applies only in the middle of the circle that has a circumference of twelve cubits, as the diameter of the circle is four cubits; but in order for a square inscribed within a circle to have a perimeter of sixteen cubits, the circle requires a circumference that is more than twelve cubits.
  The Gemara asks further: Now, by how much is the perimeter of a square inscribing a circle greater than the circumference of that circle? It is greater by one quarter of the perimeter of the square. If that is the case, a circle with a circumference of sixteen cubits is sufficient. Why, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan require a circumference of twenty-four cubits?
  The Gemara answers: This statement with regard to the ratio of the perimeter of a square to the circumference of a circle applies to a circle inscribed in a square, but in the case of a square circumscribed by a circle, the circle requires a greater circumference due to the projection of the corners of the square. In order to ensure that a square whose sides are four cubits each fits neatly into a circle, the circumference of the circle must be greater than sixteen cubits.
  The Gemara calculates precisely how much greater the circumference must be in order to circumscribe the four-by-four-cubit square. Now, in every square whose sides each measure one cubit its diagonal measures one and two-fifths cubits, and in a circle that circumscribes a square, the diagonal of the square is the diameter of the circle. In this case, the circumscribed square measures four by four cubits; therefore, the diagonal of the square, which is the diameter of the circle, measures five and three-fifths cubits. Since the Gemara calculates the circumference of the circle as three times its diameter, a circular <i>sukka</i> with a circumference of seventeen cubits minus one-fifth of a cubit should be sufficient. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan was not precise and rounded the dimensions of the circular <i>sukka</i> to a number higher than the absolute minimum.
  The Gemara wonders: Say that we say that the Sage was not precise when the difference between the number cited and the precise number is slight; however, when the difference is great, do we say the Sage was not precise? After all, Rabbi Yoḥanan stated that the minimum measure is twenty-four cubits, a difference of more than seven cubits.
  Mar Keshisha, i.e., the elder, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Do you hold that when a man sits, he sits and occupies one cubit, and consequently a <i>sukka</i> that seats twenty-four people must have a circumference of twenty-four cubits? In fact, three people sit and occupy two cubits. The Gemara asks: How many cubits are there in the <i>sukka</i> required by Rabbi Yoḥanan? There are sixteen cubits. But we require a <i>sukka</i> with a circumference of seventeen cubits minus one-fifth, as calculated above. The Gemara answers: He was not precise and rounded the figure down to the lower whole number; actually, the required circumference is four-fifths of a cubit larger.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: Say that we say that the Sage was not precise when the result is a stringency, e.g., he required a <i>sukka</i> whose dimensions are greater than the minimum required dimensions; however, when the result is a leniency, do we say the Sage was not precise? In that case, the lack of precision will lead to establishing a <i>sukka</i> whose dimensions are smaller than the minimum requirement.
  Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: Actually, a man sits and occupies one cubit, and Rabbi Yoḥanan is not factoring the space that the men occupy in his calculation. In other words, to this point, the assumption has been that Rabbi Yoḥanan calculated the circumference of the <i>sukka</i> required to seat twenty-four people. Actually, he merely calculated the circumference of the inner circle formed by the twenty-four people seated.
  The Gemara asks: How many cubits are there in the circumference of the inner circle formed by a circle of twenty-four people? There are eighteen cubits. Based on the principle that for every three cubits of circumference there is one cubit of diameter, the diameter of a circle whose outer circumference surrounds twenty-four people is eight cubits. To calculate the circumference of the inner circle, subtract from the diameter the space occupied by two people, each sitting at one end of the diameter. The result is a diameter of six cubits. Based on the above principle, a circle with a diameter of six cubits will have a circumference of eighteen cubits. However, a circumference of seventeen cubits minus one-fifth of a cubit should be sufficient. The Gemara answers: This is the case where he was not precise, and in this case he is not precise when the result is a stringency, as instead of sixteen and four-fifths, Rabbi Yoḥanan required eighteen cubits.
  The Sages of Caesarea, and some say that it was the judges of Caesarea, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement could be explained using a different calculation: The circumference of a circle inscribed in a square is one-quarter less than the perimeter of the square,
  
  Daf 8b
  
  while the perimeter of a square circumscribed by a circle is smaller than the circumference of that circle by half, i.e., if one adds half the perimeter of the square to the perimeter of the square, that is equal to the circumference of its circumscribing circle. Therefore, a circle with a circumference of twenty-four cubits would circumscribe a square with a perimeter of sixteen cubits, as prescribed by Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara notes: And that is not the case, as we see that the circumference of the circumscribing circle is not that much. The actual circumference is closer to seventeen cubits.
  § Rabbi Levi said in the name of Rabbi Meir: With regard to two craftsmen’s booths, one within the other, as potters would build two booths, an inner one used as living quarters and an outer one for plying their craft and selling their wares, the inner one is not fit for fulfillment of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, since the potter resides there year-round and it is not evident during the Festival that he is residing there for the sake of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. And since it a permanent residence, it is also obligated in the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>. And the outer booth is fit for fulfillment of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, since he does not reside there year-round, and when he resides there during the Festival it is evident that he is doing so for the sake of the mitzva. Since it is not designated as a year-round residence, but rather serves as an entrance to his residence and a passage for merchants and merchandise, it is not considered a residence and is not obligated in the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Why is the outer booth exempt from the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>? Let the outer booth be considered like a gatehouse of the inner booth and therefore be obligated in the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara answers: It is exempt because even the inner booth is not a permanent residence. It requires a <i>mezuza</i> because the potter resides there year-round; however, that alone does not render it a full-fledged residence that would obligate one to affix a <i>mezuza</i> to the outer booth as its gatehouse.
  The Sages taught: The booths represented by the mnemonic: <i>Gimmel</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>kaf</i>, which stands for a booth of gentiles [<i>goyim</i>], a booth of women [<i>nashim</i>], a booth of domesticated animals [<i>behema</i>], a booth of Samaritans [<i>Kutim</i>], a booth of any sort, each is fit for use as a <i>sukka</i>, provided it is roofed in the standard sense. None of them is disqualified due to the one who constructed it or the purpose for which it was constructed.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term: In the standard sense? Rav Ḥisda said that it means: And provided that one established the booth to provide shade of a <i>sukka</i> from its roofing, it may be used to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What does the phrase: A booth of any sort, come to include? What other booths are included in this generalization? The Gemara answers: It comes to include the booths listed in another <i>baraita</i> with the mnemonic: <i>Reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, as the Sages taught: The booth known by the mnemonic <i>reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, which stands for the booth of shepherds [<i>ro’im</i>], the booth of fig driers [<i>kayyatzim</i>], the booth of guards of fields [<i>burganin</i>], the booth of the guards of produce [<i>shomerei peirot</i>], a booth of any sort, each is fit, provided it is roofed in the standard sense.
  The Gemara asks again: What is the meaning of the term: In the standard sense? Rav Ḥisda said that it means: And provided that one established the booth to provide shade of a <i>sukka</i>, it may be used to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What does the phrase: A booth of any sort, come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include the booths listed in the first <i>baraita</i> cited above with the mnemonic <i>gimmel</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>kaf</i>.
  The Gemara explains: This <i>tanna</i> who taught and detailed the <i>halakhot</i> of booths of <i>gimmel</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>kaf</i> did so because the fitness of the booths of <i>gimmel</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>kaf</i> for use in fulfilling the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is powerful and more obvious to him because they are permanent structures, even though their builders are not obligated in the mitzva. And he taught: Booths of any sort, to include the booths of <i>reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, which, although they are seasonal and not permanent structures, may still be used to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  And that other <i>tanna</i> who taught and detailed the <i>halakhot</i> of booths of <i>reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i> did so because the fitness of the booths of <i>reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i> for use in fulfilling the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is powerful and more obvious to him because those who constructed the booths are obligated in the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. And he taught: Booths of any sort, to include the booths of <i>gimmel</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>kaf</i>, which, although those who constructed them are not obligated in the mitzva, may still be used to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  
  Daf 9a
  
  MISHNA: With regard to an old <i>sukka</i>, Beit Shammai deem it unfit for the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> and Beit Hillel deem it fit. And which is considered an old <i>sukka</i>? It is any booth that one established thirty days or more prior to the Festival without expressly designating that it was for the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. In that case, the assumption is that he constructed it for some other purpose. However, if he established it expressly for the sake of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, even if he constructed it at the beginning of the previous year, it is fit for use in the fulfillment of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, even according to Beit Shammai.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Beit Shammai? The Gemara explains that it is as the verse states: “The festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is seven days unto the Lord” (Leviticus 23:34), indicating that we require a <i>sukka</i> established for the sake of the Festival. A <i>sukka</i> not constructed expressly for the Festival is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: And how do Beit Hillel interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In Beit Hillel’s opinion, that verse is necessary to teach in accordance with the statement of Rav Sheshet, as Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: From where is it derived that use of the wood of the <i>sukka</i> is prohibited for any purpose other than for the <i>sukka</i> all seven days of the Festival, and it is designated exclusively for the mitzva? It is derived as the verse states: “The festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is seven days unto the Lord.”
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in explanation that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Just as the name of Heaven takes effect upon the Festival peace-offering, so too, the name of Heaven takes effect upon the <i>sukka</i>, as it is stated: “The festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is seven days unto the Lord”; just as the Festival offering is consecrated to the Lord, so too, the <i>sukka</i> is consecrated to the Lord.
  The Gemara asks: But don’t Beit Shammai require the verse to derive this <i>halakha</i> as well? The Gemara answers: Yes, indeed it is so that Beit Shammai derives the sanctity of the wood of the <i>sukka</i> from this verse. Therefore, the rationale for their opinion with regard to an old <i>sukka</i> must be based on a different verse.
  Rather, what is the rationale for the opinion of Beit Shammai with regard to an old <i>sukka</i>? Another verse is written: “You shall prepare for you the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for seven days” (Deuteronomy 16:13), from which it is derived that we require a <i>sukka</i> established for the sake of the Festival.
  The Gemara asks: And how do Beit Hillel interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary to teach that one may establish a <i>sukka</i> even during the intermediate days of the Festival. If one failed to construct a <i>sukka</i> prior to the onset of the Festival, or if it collapsed during the Festival, he may establish it during the intermediate days, as the mitzva to establish a <i>sukka</i> is in effect for all seven days of the Festival.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do Beit Shammai derive this <i>halakha</i>? They hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: One may not establish a <i>sukka</i> during the intermediate days of the Festival. Therefore, the requirement to build the <i>sukka</i> for the sake of the mitzva may be derived from this verse.
  The Gemara proceeds to clarify Beit Hillel’s opinion: And do Beit Hillel not agree with the statement that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said? As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: If one fashioned ritual fringes from hanging threads that remain protruding from the fabric like thorns after most of the superfluous threads were torn, and tied them into ritual fringes; or if he tied the fringes from threads that hang down after sewing; or if he tied them from the fringes [<i>geradin</i>] that hang from the bottom of a garment, the ritual fringes are unfit for fulfilling the mitzva. However, if the ritual fringes were tied from balls of thread that were not spun for the sake of the mitzva, they are fit.
  And Rav Yehuda related: When I stated this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav before Shmuel, he said to me: Even ritual fringes tied from balls of thread are unfit, as we require the spinning of the thread to be for the sake of the mitzva. Just as the threads for the ritual fringes must be spun for the sake of the mitzva, here too, let us require a <i>sukka</i> established for the sake of the mitzva.
  The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse states: “You shall prepare for you fringes” (Deuteronomy 22:12), from which it is derived: “For you,” for the sake of your obligation. The fringes, from the beginning of their production, must be produced for the sake of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: Here, too, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, the verse says: “You shall prepare for you the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:13). Shouldn’t it be derived: “For you,” for the sake of your obligation?
  The Gemara answers that this term “for you” is required to exclude use of a stolen <i>sukka</i>; establish the <i>sukka</i> for you, and do not use a <i>sukka</i> belonging to another. The Gemara asks: There, too, with regard to ritual fringes, isn’t the term “for you” required to exclude use of stolen ritual fringes?
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to ritual fringes, another verse is written: “And they shall make for them ritual fringes” (Numbers 15:38), from which it is derived: “For them,” of their own, to exclude the use of stolen ritual fringes. Therefore from the term “for you,” it may be derived that ritual fringes must be produced for the sake of the mitzva.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  MISHNA: With regard to one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> beneath a tree, it is as though he established it inside the house and it is unfit. If one established a <i>sukka</i> atop another <i>sukka</i>, the upper <i>sukka</i> is fit and the lower <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If there are no residents in the upper <i>sukka</i>, the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  GEMARA: Rava said: They taught this <i>halakha</i> that a <i>sukka</i> beneath a tree is unfit only with regard to a tree whose shade is greater than its sunlight, as the source of the shade in the <i>sukka</i> is the tree and not the roofing. However, if its sunlight is greater than its shade, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, as in that case the roofing provides the shade.
  The Gemara asks: From where does Rava reach this conclusion? The Gemara answers: He learns this from the fact that the mishna teaches: It is as though he established it inside the house. Why do I need the mishna to teach: It is as though he established it inside the house? Let the mishna teach simply: It is unfit. Rather, this is teaching us that in the context of this <i>halakha</i>, a tree is similar to a house; just as with regard to a house, its shade is greater than its sunlight, so too, with regard to a tree, it invalidates the <i>sukka</i> only if its shade is greater than its sunlight.
  The Gemara asks: And even if the sunlight is greater than the shade of the tree, what of it? Why does Rava deem the <i>sukka</i> beneath the tree fit in that case? Isn’t there unfit roofing, the uncut branches of the tree, joining together with the fit roofing on the <i>sukka</i>, rendering even the fit roofing on the <i>sukka</i> unfit? Rav Pappa said: This is referring to a case where one lowered the uncut branches and combined them with the fit roofing so that the branches still attached to the tree are inconspicuous. Given that the majority of the roofing is fit, the roofing in its entirety is fit.
  The Gemara asks: If it is a case where he lowered them, what is the purpose of stating this <i>halakha</i>? Isn’t it self-evident? The Gemara answers that it is necessary lest you say: Let us issue a decree and deem the roofing unfit in a case where one lowered them due to a case where one did not lower them. Therefore, it teaches us that we do not issue such a decree.
  The Gemara asks: That <i>halakha</i>, too, we already learned in a mishna: If one trellised the grapevine, the gourd, or the ivy, climbing plants, over a <i>sukka</i> while they are still attached to the ground, and he then added roofing atop them, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, as roofing attached to the ground is unfit. If the amount of fit roofing was greater than the plants attached to the ground, or if he cut the climbing plants so that they were no longer attached to the ground, it is fit.
  The Gemara clarifies the details of the mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that it is referring to a case where he did not lower the climbing plants and combine them with the fit roofing, doesn’t the unfit roofing join together with the fit roofing on the <i>sukka</i>, rendering even the fit roofing on the <i>sukka</i> unfit? Rather, isn’t the mishna referring to a case where he lowered them, and conclude from this mishna that we do not issue a decree in a case where he lowered the branches due to a case where he did not lower the branches. Rava’s statement is therefore unnecessary. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this applies only after the fact, i.e., that if one already lowered the uncut branches or plants it is not unfit, but one may not do so <i>ab initio</i>; therefore, Rava teaches us that one may place roofing in this manner even <i>ab initio</i>.
  § The mishna continues: If one established a <i>sukka</i> atop another <i>sukka</i>, the upper <i>sukka</i> is fit and the lower <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse states: “In <i>sukkot</i> shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42), and not in a <i>sukka</i> that is beneath another <i>sukka</i>, and not in <i>sukka</i> that is beneath a tree, and not in a <i>sukka</i> that is inside a house.
  The Gemara questions that derivation. On the contrary, the term “in <i>sukkot</i>,” which is written in the plural, indicates two. The conclusion should be that one sitting inside a <i>sukka</i> beneath a <i>sukka</i> fulfills the mitzva. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Although the term is vocalized in the plural, <i>basukkot</i> is written without the <i>vav</i>, indicating a single <i>sukka</i>.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: There are times when both of the <i>sukkot</i> one atop the other are fit; there are times when both of the <i>sukkot</i> are unfit; there are times when the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit and the upper <i>sukka</i> is unfit; and there are times when the lower <i>sukka</i> is unfit and the upper <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  The Gemara elaborates: There are times when both of the <i>sukkot</i> one atop the other are fit. What are the circumstances? It is in a case where in the lower <i>sukka</i> its sunlight is greater than its shade, rendering the <i>sukka</i> unfit, and in the upper <i>sukka</i> its shade is greater than its sunlight, rendering the <i>sukka</i> fit. And the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> is within twenty cubits of the ground. In that case, the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> is effective for both the upper <i>sukka</i> and the lower one.
  There are times when both of the <i>sukkot</i> are unfit. What are the circumstances? It is in a case where in both <i>sukkot</i>, their shade is greater than their sunlight, but the upper one is more than twenty cubits above the roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i>, rendering it unfit. Since the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> is unfit, and it casts shade over the lower <i>sukka</i>, the lower <i>sukka</i> is also unfit.
  There are times when the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit and the upper <i>sukka</i> is unfit.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  What are the circumstances? It is in a case where in the lower <i>sukka</i>, its shade is greater than its sunlight, rendering the <i>sukka</i> fit, and in the upper <i>sukka</i>, its sunlight is greater than its shade and it is therefore insignificant, and the roofing of both is within twenty cubits of the ground.
  And there are times when the upper <i>sukka</i> is fit and the lower <i>sukka</i> is unfit. What are the circumstances? It is in a case where in both <i>sukkot</i> their shade is greater than their sunlight, and the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> is within twenty cubits of the roofing of the lower one. In this case the upper <i>sukka</i> is fit, while the lower <i>sukka</i> is a <i>sukka</i> beneath a <i>sukka</i> and is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: This is obvious. There is nothing novel in any of these scenarios. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to mention the case where the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit and the upper <i>sukka</i> is unfit, as it contains a novel element. Lest you say: Let us issue a decree and deem the lower <i>sukka</i> unfit, as perhaps the unfit roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> joins together with the fit roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i> and renders it unfit as well; therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that the two roofings do not join together and the upper roofing does not render the lower <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  The Gemara elucidates this <i>halakha</i>. How much space shall there be between the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> and the roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i> for the lower <i>sukka</i> to be considered a discrete entity and therefore disqualified as a <i>sukka</i> beneath a <i>sukka</i>?
  Rav Huna said: There must be a handbreadth of space, as we likewise find in tents of ritual impurity the measure of a handbreadth. With regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, the legal status of the space of one handbreadth beneath a roof is that of a tent, as we learned in a mishna: A space measuring one handbreadth by one handbreadth with a height of one handbreadth transmits ritual impurity. If a source of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse is in that space, the impurity is transmitted to all people, vessels, and food in that space. And a space that size serves as a barrier before the spread of ritual impurity beyond that space. However, if the space measures less than the height of one handbreadth, it does not transmit impurity to the objects in that space, and it does not serve as a barrier before the spread of ritual impurity. The impurity breaches the confining walls and rises upward as if there were no covering over it.
  Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna say: For this to be considered a <i>sukka</i> beneath a <i>sukka</i>, the space between the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> and that of the lower one must measure at least four handbreadths, as we do not find a significant area that measures less than four handbreadths, e.g., with regard to the domains of Shabbat.
  And Shmuel said: The space between the roofing of the upper <i>sukka</i> and that of the lower one must measure at least ten handbreadths. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Shmuel? The Gemara explains: As the criterion for its fitness, so too is the criterion for its unfitness; just as its fitness is only in a <i>sukka</i> ten handbreadths high, so too, its unfitness as a <i>sukka</i> is engendered only by a <i>sukka</i> ten handbreadths high.
  The Gemara questions Shmuel’s statement: We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: If there are no residents in the upper <i>sukka</i>, the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of: There are no residents? If we say that it means that there are no actual residents, the question arises: Is that to say that residents cause it to be unfit? If the upper <i>sukka</i> is a fit <i>sukka</i>, is there any difference whether or not people reside there? Rather, what is the meaning of: There are no residents? Is it not referring to any <i>sukka</i> that is not suitable to serve as a residence? And what are the circumstances of that case? It is a case where the <i>sukka</i> is not ten handbreadths high, as anything less than ten handbreadths high is not considered a residence. From the fact that it is Rabbi Yehuda who distinguishes between whether or not the upper <i>sukka</i> is at least ten handbreadths high, conclude by inference that the first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds that the lower <i>sukka</i> is unfit even if the upper <i>sukka</i> is less than ten handbreadths high and therefore not suitable to serve as a residence. This is contrary to the opinion of Shmuel.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that the Sages say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in explanation of the mishna: If the roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i> is not sufficiently sturdy to be able to support the cushions and blankets of the upper <i>sukka</i>, then the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit, as the upper <i>sukka</i> is not suitable to serve as an independent residence. According to this explanation, the mishna does not discuss the height of the upper <i>sukka</i>; it discusses the quality of the roofing.
  The Gemara notes: Is that to say by inference that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that even though the roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i> is not sufficiently sturdy to be able to support the cushions and blankets of the upper <i>sukka</i>, the lower <i>sukka</i> is unfit? In that case, the upper <i>sukka</i> is not a suitable residence. Why should the lower <i>sukka</i> be unfit?
  The Gemara answers: The first <i>tanna</i> agrees that if the roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i> is unable to support the cushions and the blankets at all, the upper <i>sukka</i> is not considered a <i>sukka</i> and the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit. However, there is a practical difference between the opinions of the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Yehuda in a case where the roofing of the lower <i>sukka</i> is able to support the cushions and the blankets of the upper <i>sukka</i> with difficulty and there is a concern that the roofing might collapse. In that case, the first <i>tanna</i> holds that since the roofing is capable of supporting the cushions and blankets, the upper <i>sukka</i> is considered a separate <i>sukka</i> and renders the lower <i>sukka</i> unfit. According to Rabbi Yehuda, since the roofing is able to support the weight of the cushions and blankets only with difficulty, the upper <i>sukka</i> is not fit. Therefore, the lower <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  MISHNA: If one spread a sheet over the roofing as protection for those sitting in the <i>sukka</i> due to the sun, or if one spread a sheet beneath the roofing as protection due to the falling leaves, or if one spread a sheet as a canopy over the frame of a four-post [<i>kinof</i>] bed, the area in the <i>sukka</i> beneath the sheets is unfit. In the first two cases, because the sheet is susceptible to ritual impurity, it renders the otherwise fit roofing unfit. In the case of the canopy, one is not sitting under the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>; rather, he is sitting inside a tent. However, one may spread the sheet over the frame of a two-post [<i>naklitei</i>] bed, which has one post in the middle of each end of the bed. When spreading the sheet over the posts it forms an inclined rather than a flat roof, and a tent with an inclined roof is not considered a significant structure.
  GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda said: The Sages taught the ruling that the sheet renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit only when it is placed underneath the roofing due to the falling leaves; however, if his intent was to spread the sheet for decorative purposes to beautify the <i>sukka</i>, it is not in the category of roofing and the <i>sukka</i> is fit. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as: Due to the falling leaves, is what we learned in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the same is true, i.e., the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, even when the sheet was spread to beautify the <i>sukka</i>, and the reason that the mishna teaches specifically the case where one spread the sheet due to the falling leaves is that the mishna teaches the matter, spreading a sheet in the <i>sukka</i>, in the manner in which it typically occurs. Rav Ḥisda teaches us that the formulation of the mishna is precise and the <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to the case cited. If one spread the sheet for decorative purposes, it does not render the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following <i>Tosefta</i> supports the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. If one roofed the <i>sukka</i> in accordance with its halakhic requirements, and decorated it with colorful curtains and sheets, and hung in it ornamental nuts, peaches, almonds, and pomegranates, grape branches [<i>parkilei</i>], and wreaths of stalks of grain, wines, oils, and vessels full of flour, it is prohibited to derive benefit and use them
  
  Daf 10b
  
  until the conclusion of the last day of the Festival. And if before he hung the decorations he stipulated with regard to them that he will be permitted to use them even during the Festival, everything is according to his stipulation, and he is permitted to use them. Apparently, sheets may indeed be spread in the <i>sukka</i> for decorative purposes. The Gemara rejects this: There is no proof from the <i>Tosefta</i>, as perhaps the reference is to sheets spread on the side of the <i>sukka</i>. However, if they are spread beneath the roofing, it renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  § Apropos decorations, it was stated: <i>Sukka</i> decorations do not diminish the height of the <i>sukka</i>. Decorations hanging from the roofing are not considered part of the structure and therefore do not diminish the height of the <i>sukka</i>. If the roofing is more than twenty cubits above the ground, the decorations hanging within twenty cubits of the ground do not render the <i>sukka</i> fit. Rav Ashi said: However, if the decorations are spread on the side of the roof, they are considered part of the structure and diminish the area. If the decorations render the interior of the <i>sukka</i> less than seven by seven handbreadths, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit.
  The Gemara relates with regard to Minyamin, the servant of Rav Ashi, that his shirt became wet [<i>itamisha</i>], and he spread it over the <i>sukka</i> to dry it. Rav Ashi said to him: Take it down so that people will not say that they are roofing the <i>sukka</i> with an item susceptible to ritual impurity. The servant said to him: But don’t they see that it is wet and understand that I placed it there to dry? Rav Ashi replied: Take it down once it is dry is what I am saying to you, as then people are apt to think that it is part of the roofing.
  It was stated with regard to <i>sukka</i> decorations, e.g., sheets spread beneath the roofing to decorate the <i>sukka</i>, that are removed from the roofing four handbreadths, the <i>amora’im</i> disagreed whether they interpose between the roofing and the <i>sukka</i>. Rav Naḥman said: The <i>sukka</i> remains fit. Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna said: It is unfit.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna happened to come to the house of the Exilarch. Rav Naḥman, who was the official in charge of the Exilarch’s household, lodged them in a <i>sukka</i> whose decorations were removed from the roofing four handbreadths. They were silent and did not say anything to him, even though in their opinion the <i>sukka</i> was unfit. Rav Naḥman said to them: Did the Sages retract their halakhic ruling? Does your silence indicate that you concede to my ruling? They said to him: We are on the path to perform a mitzva and, therefore, we are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. Therefore, it is permitted for us to sleep in this <i>sukka</i>. In terms of the <i>halakha</i>, our ruling is unchanged.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted to sleep in a bed with netting inside the <i>sukka</i>, even though the bed has a roof, provided that the netting is not more than ten handbreadths higher than the bed. In that case, the netting is not considered a tent in and of itself.
  Come and hear: One who sleeps in a bed with netting inside the <i>sukka</i> did not fulfill his obligation, contrary to the statement that Rav Yehuda cited in the name of Shmuel. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the netting is more than ten handbreadths higher than the bed and is considered a tent in and of itself.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna: One who sleeps beneath the bed in the <i>sukka</i> did not fulfill his obligation. As the height of a typical bed is less than ten handbreadths, apparently, even if the covering beneath which one is sleeping in less than ten handbreadths high, it is a tent in and of itself and he does not fulfill his obligation. The Gemara answers: Didn’t Shmuel interpret the mishna as referring to the case of a bed ten handbreadths high? Therefore, one who sleeps beneath the bed did not fulfill his obligation.
  Come and hear that which is taught in the mishna: Or if one spread a sheet as a canopy over the frame of a four-post bed, the area in the <i>sukka</i> beneath the sheet is unfit. Apparently, a bed with certain types of netting is unfit. The Gemara answers: There, too, it is a case where the posts are ten handbreadths high.
  The Gemara asks: But that is not the way it is taught, as it is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: <i>Naklitin</i> are two posts and <i>kinofot</i> are four posts. If one spread a sheet over four posts, the area in the <i>sukka</i> beneath the sheet is unfit; if one did so over two posts the entire <i>sukka</i> is fit, provided the two posts are not ten handbreadths higher than the bed. This proves by inference that a sheet spread over four posts renders the area in the <i>sukka</i> beneath the sheet unfit even if it is not ten handbreadths high.
  The Gemara answers: Four posts are different because they are fixed in the bed and constitute a significant space even without the requisite height. The Gemara asks: But a <i>sukka</i> atop another <i>sukka</i> is fixed, and yet Shmuel said: As the criterion for its fitness, so too is the criterion for its unfitness. The upper <i>sukka</i> renders the lower <i>sukka</i> unfit only if it is ten handbreadths high. The Sages say in distinguishing between the cases: There, in the case of a <i>sukka</i> atop another <i>sukka</i>, where the measurement is in order to disqualify the lower <i>sukka</i>, ten handbreadths are required to render the upper <i>sukka</i> a separate entity. However, here, in the case of the four-post bed, in order to consider the covering a tent, less than ten handbreadths is also considered to be a tent, as it is fixed.
  § Rav Taḥalifa bar Avimi said that Shmuel said: One who sleeps naked in a bed with netting and is required to recite <i>Shema</i> moves his head out from beneath the netting and recites <i>Shema</i>. Although he is naked, the netting is considered like a garment; therefore, it is permitted to recite <i>Shema</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One who sleeps naked in a bed with netting may not move his head out from beneath the netting and recite <i>Shema</i>. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where the netting is ten handbreadths high. In that case, it is considered a tent and not a garment.
  The Gemara notes: So too, it is reasonable to understand the <i>baraita</i> in that manner from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of that <i>baraita</i>: To what is this comparable? It is comparable to one standing naked in his house, that he may not move his head out the window and recite <i>Shema</i>. That is certainly ineffective. The fact that the <i>baraita</i> likens the bed with netting to a house indicates that it is netting at least ten handbreadths high. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the correct understanding.
  
  Daf 11a
  
  And this <i>halakha</i> that it is not sufficient to place his head out the window applies also to a house even if it is not ten handbreadths high. Since it is a fixed structure it is considered a tent in and of itself, as it is no less permanent than a bed with four posts, which is considered a tent even though the netting is less than ten handbreadths higher than the bed.
  Some say another version of the previous discussion: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted to sleep inside a netted bridal canopy in the <i>sukka</i> since it is inclined and does not have a roof, even though it is ten handbreadths high.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One who sleeps in a bed with netting inside the <i>sukka</i> did not fulfill his obligation. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here in the <i>baraita</i>? It is with a bed with netting in a case where, unlike a bridal canopy, it has a roof.
  Come and hear another question from what we learned: <i>Naklitin</i> are two posts and <i>kinofot</i> are four posts. If one spread a sheet over four posts, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit; if he spread a sheet over two posts the <i>sukka</i> is fit, provided the two posts are not ten handbreadths higher than the bed. It can be inferred from here: But if they are higher than ten handbreadths the <i>sukka</i> is unfit even though it has no roof, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel.
  The Gemara answers: Two posts are different from the bridal canopy because they are fixed in the bed, and therefore the sheet over them is considered a tent even with an inclined roof. The Gemara asks: If they are fixed then let them be considered like four posts and let them render the <i>sukka</i> unfit even when they are less than ten handbreadths high. The Gemara answers: Vis-à-vis four posts, two posts are not considered fixed and therefore, they render the <i>sukka</i> unfit only when they are ten handbreadths higher than the bed. However, vis-à-vis a bed with netting, two posts are considered fixed and consequently, they render the <i>sukka</i> unfit even though they lack a roof.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna taught: It is permitted to sleep in a bed with netting even though it has a roof and even though it is higher than ten handbreadths. In accordance with whose opinion did Rabba bar Rav Huna teach this <i>halakha</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda who said that in principle, a temporary tent does not come and negate a permanent tent, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: We were accustomed to sleep beneath the bed before the Elders. Since a bed is a temporary tent relative to the more permanent <i>sukka</i>, even one sleeping beneath a bed is considered to be sleeping in the <i>sukka</i> and he fulfills his obligation in that manner.
  The Gemara asks: And if the statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, let him say simply that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara answers: If he said the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would have said that this applies only to a bed, which is made for use atop it and not beneath it. Perhaps the reason a bed is not considered a tent in and of itself is that its primary purpose is to lie on top of it, not in the space beneath it. However, with regard to a bed with netting, which is made for use of the space within it, say that no, it is indeed considered a tent in and of itself and one who sleeps in it does not fulfill his obligation. Therefore, Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches us that the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is that a temporary tent does not come and negate a permanent tent, and there is no difference whether the temporary tent is a bed or whether it is the netting over a bed.
  MISHNA: If one trellised climbing plants such as a grapevine, or gourd plant, or ivy [<i>kissos</i>], over a <i>sukka</i> while they were still attached to the ground, and then added roofing atop them, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. If the amount of fit roofing was greater than the plants attached to the ground, or if he cut the climbing plants so that they were no longer attached to the ground, it is fit.
  This is the principle with regard to the roofing of a <i>sukka</i>: Anything that is susceptible to ritual impurity, e.g., vessels, or its growth is not from the ground, e.g., animal hides, one may not roof his <i>sukka</i> with it. And anything that is not susceptible to ritual impurity and its growth is from the ground, one may roof his <i>sukka</i> with it.
  GEMARA: Rav Yosef sat before Rav Huna, and he sat and said, citing the mishna: Or if he cut them, it is fit. He added: And Rav said that it is not enough merely to cut the climbing plants; one is obligated to move the branches, thereby performing an action with the branches in order to render the roofing fit. When he placed the climbing plants atop the <i>sukka</i>, they were attached and therefore unfit roofing. When he ultimately cut them, it was as if the <i>sukka</i> were roofed by itself. In that case, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, derived from the verse: “You shall prepare for you the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:13).
  Rav Huna said to Rav Yosef: Shmuel stated this <i>halakha</i>. Rav Yosef turned his face away in anger and said to him: Did I say to you that Shmuel did not say it? Rav said it, and Shmuel said it as well. What is your point? Rav Huna said to him: This is what I am saying to you, that Shmuel said it and not Rav, as Rav deems the roofing fit merely by cutting them, without moving them, as in that incident where Rav Amram the Pious cast the sky-blue dye, i.e., ritual fringes, upon the garment [<i>pirzuma</i>] of the people of his household. However, he attached them, but did not cut the ends of their strands prior to tying them, i.e., he took a single string, folded it a number of times, and inserted it into the hole in the garment. Since the fringes were uncut when he tied them, he was uncertain whether they were fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva, due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared.
  Rav Amram came before Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi and asked him about the halakhic status of the ritual fringes. He said to him that this is what Rav said: One cuts them into separate strands and they are fit. There is no need to remove them, cut them, and reattach them to the garment as separate strands. Apparently, according to Rav, their cutting is their preparation. Cutting them qualifies as active preparation of the fringes. Here too, in the case of the roofing of a <i>sukka</i>, Rav holds: Their cutting is their preparation, and no further action is required.
  The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel hold that we do not say: Their cutting is their preparation? But didn’t Shmuel teach in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: If one cast fringes upon two corners of a garment simultaneously by repeatedly inserting one strand into holes in both corners and afterward cut the ends of their strands resulting in two full-fledged fringes, the fringes are fit. What, is it not referring to a case where one ties the fringes as required and afterward cuts them? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to a case where he cuts the strands and afterward ties them.
  The Gemara asks: If the reference is to a case where he cuts the strands and afterward ties them, what need was there to state that the ritual fringes are fit? That is the prescribed manner of preparing ritual fringes. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that in addition to tying the fringes separately
  
  Daf 11b
  
  we require that it must be a single corner at the time of threading the strand through the hole. And there is not a single corner in this case, as although he ties the fringes separately, he threads the two corners simultaneously. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that with regard to threading it is not a concern.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If one attached the ritual fringes and did not first cut the ends of their strands, they are unfit. What, is it not saying that the ritual fringes are unfit forever with no way to remedy the situation, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav? The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you: What is the meaning of unfit? It means they are unfit until they will be cut; not that they are unfit forever. And Shmuel said that it means they are unfit forever. And Levi also said: They are unfit forever. And likewise, Rav Mattana said that Shmuel said: They are unfit forever.
  Some say that Rav Mattana said: There was an incident that happened to me involving this uncertainty with regard to ritual fringes, and I came before Master Shmuel and he said to me: They are unfit forever.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s opinion from a different <i>baraita</i>: If one attached the ritual fringes and only afterward cut the ends of their strands, they are unfit. And furthermore, it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> with regard to a <i>sukka</i>: The verse states: “Prepare for you the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:13), and from the language of this verse the Sages derived the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared. From here the Sages said: If one trellised a grapevine, a gourd plant, or ivy over a <i>sukka</i> while still attached to the ground, and then he added roofing atop the vines, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit.
  What are the circumstances? If we say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he did not subsequently cut the vines, why does the <i>tanna</i> particularly teach that it is unfit due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared? Let him derive that the climbing plants are unfit for roofing due to the fact that they are attached to the ground, unrelated to the manner in which they were placed. Rather, it must be referring to a case where he cut them and nevertheless, the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that the vines are unfit, and learn from it that we do not say: Their cutting is their preparation; and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav.
  Rav could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where he pulled the branches until they broke off the tree. Since, in that case, their active preparation is not conspicuous, it does not render the climbing plants fit roofing. The Gemara asks: In any case, does that which was taught with regard to ritual fringes: If one attached the ritual fringes and only afterward cut their strands, etc., pose a difficulty to the opinion of Rav? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it remains difficult according to Rav.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. If black berries grew on a myrtle branch, one of the four species taken on <i>Sukkot</i>, and its berries were more numerous than its leaves, the myrtle branch is unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva of taking the four species on <i>Sukkot</i>. However, if one picked enough berries so that the leaves were more numerous, it is fit, although one may not pick the berries on the Festival itself. If he transgressed and picked them on the Festival, it is unfit; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak. And the Rabbis deem it fit in that case.
  The Gemara proceeds to explain the basis for the comparison between the dispute with regard to the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> and the dispute with regard to the myrtle branch. The Sages initially thought that everyone, Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak and the Rabbis, agrees that in fulfilling the mitzva of the four species, the three species, i.e., the <i>lulav</i>, the myrtle branch, and the willow branch, require a binding by Torah law. Therefore, it is relevant to discuss preparation with regard to this binding. And the Sages also initially thought that everyone agrees that we derive the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>, as it is written with regard to <i>sukka</i>: Prepare, from which is derived the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, and the same applies to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> as well.
  What, is it not that the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to the following? That the one who deems the myrtle branch whose berries were picked on the Festival fit, holds that with regard to the branches on a <i>sukka</i> we say: Their cutting is their preparation, and therefore, with regard to berries on the myrtle branch as one of the species bound with the <i>lulav</i> as well, we say: Their picking is their preparation, and no further action is required. And the one who deems it unfit holds that with regard to the branches on a <i>sukka</i> we do not say: Their cutting is their preparation, and therefore, with regard to <i>lulav</i> as well, we do not say: Their picking is their preparation. Therefore, since the myrtle branch was not prepared for use prior to the Festival, and it was bound together with the other species, it is considered already prepared and picking the fruit off the branch is not active preparation sufficient to render it fit.
  The Gemara rejects that explanation of the dispute. No, the fact is that everyone agrees that we do not say with regard to <i>sukka</i>: Their cutting is their preparation, and here in the case of the myrtle branch, it is with regard to deriving the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> that they disagree. The one who deems the myrtle branch fit holds that we do not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>, and therefore the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, does not apply to <i>lulav</i>. And the one who deems the myrtle branch unfit holds that we derive the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>.
  And if you wish, say instead: If we hold that <i>lulav</i> requires a binding, everyone agrees that we derive the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> and the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, applies to the <i>halakhot</i> of the four species as well. And here it is with regard to the following that they disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak, holds that the <i>lulav</i> requires a binding, and therefore the myrtle branch is unfit; and the other Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that the <i>lulav</i> does not require a binding, and therefore, preparation is not relevant with regard to <i>lulav</i> and it makes no difference whether the berries were picked before or after the myrtle branch was bound together with the <i>lulav</i> and the willow branch. And they disagree with regard to the same topic as in the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A <i>lulav</i>, whether it is bound with the myrtle and willow and whether it is not bound, is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it is bound it is fit; if it is not bound it is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? From where does he derive this requirement by Torah law? The Gemara answers: By means of a verbal analogy, he derives the term taking, written with regard to the four species, from the term taking written with regard to the bundle of hyssop. It is written there, in the context of the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb in Egypt: “Take a bundle of hyssop” (Exodus 12:22), and it is written here, in the context of the four species: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days” (Leviticus 23:40). Just as there, with regard to the Paschal lamb, the mitzva to take the hyssop is specifically in a bundle, so too here, the mitzva to take the four species is specifically in a bundle. And the Rabbis hold: We do not derive the term taking from the term taking by means of the verbal analogy.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in this <i>baraita</i>: There is a mitzva to bind the myrtle and the willow with the <i>lulav</i>. And if he did not bind it, it is fit. If the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, when one did not bind it, why is it fit? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, why is there a mitzva to bind it at all? The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And the reason that there is a mitzva to bind it is due to the fact that it is stated: “This is my God and I will glorify Him [<i>ve’anvehu</i>]” (Exodus 15:2), which they interpreted to mean: Beautify yourself [<i>hitna’e</i>] before Him in the performance of the mitzvot. The Rabbis agree that although failure to bind the three species does not render them unfit for the mitzva, the performance of the mitzva is more beautiful when the <i>lulav</i> is bound.
  § We learned in the mishna: This is the principle with regard to the roofing of a <i>sukka</i>: One may not roof the <i>sukka</i> with anything that is susceptible to ritual impurity or whose growth is not from the ground. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters with regard to the roofing of a <i>sukka</i> derived? Reish Lakish said that the verse states: “And there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the entire face of the ground” (Genesis 2:6); just as mist, i.e., a cloud, is a substance not capable of contracting ritual impurity, and its growth is from the ground, i.e., arises from the ground, so too, the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> must consist of a substance that is not susceptible to ritual impurity and its growth is from the ground. Since the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> evokes the clouds of glory with which God enveloped the Israelites in the desert, the legal status of roofing should be like that of a cloud.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that the <i>sukkot</i> mentioned in the verse: “I made the children of Israel to reside in <i>sukkot</i>” (Leviticus 23:43), were clouds of glory, as it is reasonable that the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> is modeled after clouds. However, according to the one who said that the children of Israel established for themselves actual <i>sukkot</i> in the desert, and the <i>sukkot</i> of today commemorate those, what can be said? According to that opinion, there is no connection between a <i>sukka</i> and a cloud. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse states: “I made the children of Israel to reside in <i>sukkot</i>”; these booths were clouds of glory, this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says: They established for themselves actual <i>sukkot</i>. This works out well according to Rabbi Eliezer; however, according to Rabbi Akiva what can be said?
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the verse states: “You shall prepare for you the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:13). The expression “festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” likens <i>sukka</i> to the Festival peace-offering [<i>ḥagiga</i>]. Just as the Festival peace-offering is an item not susceptible to ritual impurity, and its growth is from the ground, as animals draw nourishment from vegetation, so too, the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> must be a substance that is not susceptible to ritual impurity and its growth is from the ground.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  The Gemara asks: If that juxtaposition is the source of the <i>halakha</i>, say: Just as the Festival peace-offering is brought from animals, so too the <i>sukka</i> roofing should consist of animals. As that is clearly not the case, that verse cannot be the source for the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara cites a different source: When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the verse states: “You shall prepare for you the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for seven days as you gather from your threshing floor and from your winepress” (Deuteronomy 16:13), and the Sages interpreted that it is with regard to the waste of the threshing floor and of the winepress that the verse is speaking. One uses grain stalks and vines for roofing the <i>sukka</i>, materials that are not susceptible to ritual impurity and grow from the ground.
  The Gemara asks: And say that the verse teaches that one uses the items placed on the threshing floor itself, i.e., stalks with the grain still attached to them, and the items placed in the winepress itself, i.e., vines with the grapes still attached, as roofing. Grain and grapes, like all foods, are susceptible to ritual impurity. If the verse is interpreted in this manner, the mishna’s criteria for roofing fit for a <i>sukka</i> could not be derived from it. Rabbi Zeira said: “Winepress” is written in the verse here, referring to the wine, and it is impossible to roof with wine. Apparently, the verse is referring to stalks and sheaves but not to produce.
  Rabbi Yirmeya strongly objects to this: Why can’t a <i>sukka</i> be roofed with wine? Say that it is referring to congealed wine that comes from Senir, from Mount Hermon, which is similar to a cake of figs. Since it is possible to interpret the verse as referring to the use of food for roofing, the mishna’s criteria for roofing fit for a <i>sukka</i> could not be derived from it. Rabbi Zeira said: This matter was in our hands, as we assumed that we found the source in the Torah for the materials fit for roofing, and Rabbi Yirmeya came and took an axe to it. He destroyed the proof by raising the matter of congealed wine.
  Rav Ashi said: One may nevertheless derive the ruling of the mishna from this verse: “From your threshing floor,” indicating an item that comes from the threshing floor, but not the items placed on the threshing floor, i.e., grain, itself; “from your winepress,” but not the items placed in the winepress, i.e., grapes, itself. The verse is referring the waste products of the produce placed on threshing floor and in the winepress.
  Rav Ḥisda said that proof can be cited from here: “Go forth to the mount and fetch olive branches, and branches of wild olive, and myrtle branches, and palm branches, and the boughs of a dense-leaved tree in order to make <i>sukkot</i> as written” (Nehemiah 8:15). From this verse, the materials for <i>sukka</i> roofing can be derived.
  Apropos this verse, the Gemara asks: These myrtle branches are the same as those boughs of a dense-leaved tree; why does the verse mention both? Rav Ḥisda said that this is how it is to be understood. The term “myrtle branches” is referring to a wild myrtle, unfit for use as one of the four species, to be used for the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>. And the term “boughs of a dense-leaved tree” is referring to the myrtle, whose leaves overlie each other, to be used for the <i>lulav</i>, the mitzva of the four species.
  MISHNA: One may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with bundles of straw tied with rope, or bundles of wood, or bundles of twigs. And with regard to all of the bundles, if one untied them, they are fit for use in roofing the <i>sukka</i>, as their lack of fitness is due to the fact that the bundles are tied. And even when tied, all of the bundles are fit for use in constructing the walls of the <i>sukka</i>.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Ya’akov said: I heard explanations from Rabbi Yoḥanan for two similar <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>: One with regard to the <i>halakha</i> in this mishna that bundles may not be used in roofing the <i>sukka</i>, and the other with regard to the mishna below, pertaining to one who hollows out space in a stack of grain by removing sheaves from the bottom of the stack to establish a <i>sukka</i> for him. In that case, the space is surrounded by grain on the sides and above, and therefore it is not a <i>sukka</i>.
  The rationale for one of the <i>halakhot</i> is due to the decree of the storehouse. Although, fundamentally, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting its use, lest one come to use his storehouse as a <i>sukka</i> and fail to establish it properly. And the rationale for one of the <i>halakhot</i> is due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, as no active preparation was performed. And I do not know at present which of the <i>halakhot</i> is due to the decree of the storehouse and which of them is due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: Let us see and determine which rationale Rabbi Yoḥanan applied to each <i>halakha</i>; as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For what reason did they say that one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with bundles of straw, and bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs? It is because sometimes a person comes from the field in the evening, and he has his bundle of wood or straw on his shoulder, and he lifts it and places it atop his storage shed to dry it. And, when the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> arrives, he reconsiders and decides to use the shed as a <i>sukka</i> and the bundle on top of it for roofing. And in that case the roofing would be unfit, as the Torah said: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared. From Rabbi Yoḥanan’s formulation, apparently it is unfit due to the decree lest one come to use his storehouse as a <i>sukka</i> and fail to establish it properly, not due to some fundamental prohibition. From the fact that this case of the bundles is prohibited due to the decree of the storehouse, that case of the stack of grain must be prohibited due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared.
  The Gemara asks: And why was Rabbi Ya’akov unable to arrive at Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion based on the <i>halakha</i> cited in his name? The Gemara explains: It is because he did not hear this statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and there was no other proof.
  Rav Ashi said: The distinction of Rabbi Yoḥanan between these two cases is difficult. Is that to say that bundles of straw and bundles of wood are unfit roofing due to the decree of the storehouse and not due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared? Is that ultimately the principle underlying the decree of the storehouse? And on the other hand, in the case of one who hollows a stack of grain, is the <i>sukka</i> unfit due only to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, but not due to the decree of the storehouse? Rather, there is no distinction between the <i>halakhot</i> and both reasons apply to both.
  The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you, in response to Rav Ashi, that it is not so because the <i>halakhot</i> are formulated differently in the respective <i>mishnayot</i>. Here, in the mishna pertaining to bundles, where it teaches: One may not roof with them, it is <i>ab initio</i>
  
  Daf 12b
  
  that one may not roof, due to the decree of the storehouse issued by the Sages; but by Torah law, it seems well to do so. There, in the mishna pertaining to the stack of grain, where it teaches: It is not a <i>sukka</i>, it means that not only by rabbinic decree, but even after the fact, by Torah law as well, it is not a <i>sukka</i>.
  § Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: If one roofed a <i>sukka</i> with convex arrow shafts, which are made of wood with a protrusion on the end that is fitted into the socket of the metal arrowhead, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. These shafts are flat wooden utensils, which are not susceptible to ritual impurity. Therefore, they are fit roofing for a <i>sukka</i>. If, however, one roofed his <i>sukka</i> with concave arrow shafts, which have a socket into which a protrusion from the metal arrowhead is inserted, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Since these shafts are wooden utensils with a receptacle, they are susceptible to ritual impurity. Therefore, they are unfit roofing for a <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara asks: The fact that if one roofed a <i>sukka</i> with convex arrow shafts, the <i>sukka</i> is fit is obvious. It is no different from roofing with straight, smooth reeds. The Gemara answers: Stating this <i>halakha</i> is necessary. Lest you say: Let us issue a decree and prohibit roofing with convex shafts due to the prohibition against roofing with concave shafts, therefore Rav teaches us that no decree is issued, and convex shafts are fit roofing.
  The Master said: If one roofed a <i>sukka</i> with concave arrows, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. All wooden receptacles are susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: Stating this <i>halakha</i> is necessary. Lest you say: A receptacle that is designated to be permanently filled, its status is not that of a receptacle, as a receptacle is typically filled and emptied; in this case, once the arrowhead fills the receptacle, it remains there, therefore Rav teaches us that it is deemed a receptacle and is not fit roofing.
  § Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one roofed a <i>sukka</i> with bundles of combed flax, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, as flax at that stage of processing is the raw material from which threads are spun, and it is susceptible to ritual impurity. If one roofed a <i>sukka</i> with stalks of flax, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Since they remain in their natural state and have not been processed in any way, their legal status is that of any tree, and they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. And if one roofed with the <i>hoshen</i> of flax, stalks at an intermediate stage of processing, I do not know what their status is, i.e., whether or not they are fit for roofing.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana added: And when Rabbi Yoḥanan used the term <i>hoshen</i> of flax itself, I do not know to what stage of processing the flax he was referring. Which way do you look at it? Is it that if one crushed the flax and did not comb it, Rabbi Yoḥanan calls it <i>hoshen</i>, but if he soaked it and did not crush it, Rabbi Yoḥanan calls it <i>hotzen</i>, because he has not actually begun processing the flax itself? Or, perhaps if he soaked it and did not crush it, Rabbi Yoḥanan calls it <i>hoshen</i>, while <i>hotzen</i> is reserved for flax that was not processed at all.
  § Rav Yehuda said: With regard to these wide licorice and wormwood leaves, one may roof his <i>sukka</i> with them, since these are not consumed by people. Their legal status is that of any other plant; they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. Abaye said: With licorice leaves, one may roof his <i>sukka</i>; with wormwood leaves, one may not roof his <i>sukka</i>. What is the reason for this distinction? Since
  
  Daf 13a
  
  their odor grows offensive over time, one abandons the <i>sukka</i> and exits. It is inappropriate to establish a <i>sukka</i> in which it is impossible to remain.
  Similarly, Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said: With regard to these thorns and shrubs, one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with them. Abaye said: With thorns, one may roof his <i>sukka</i>; with shrubs, one may not roof his <i>sukka</i>. What is the reason for this distinction? Since their leaves fall over time and they are apt to fall into the food and disturb those in the <i>sukka</i>, one abandons the <i>sukka</i> and exits.
  Rav Giddel said that Rav said: With regard to this offshoot of the trunk of the palm tree, from which several branches emerge; one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with it. Although the branches are naturally bound, a binding at the hand of Heaven is not considered a binding. Furthermore, although one then binds the branches together at the end removed from the trunk, where they grow apart into separate branches, and roofs with them, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, since if one binds a bundle that is already bound into one unit it is not considered a binding.
  Likewise, Rav Ḥisda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: With regard to these offshoots of reeds, one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with them. Although the branches are naturally bound, a binding at the hand of Heaven is not considered a binding. Furthermore, although one then binds the reeds together at the other end, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, since if one binds a bundle that is already bound into one unit it is not considered a binding.
  The Gemara notes that this opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to reeds and spades, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with them. The Gemara asks: The fact that one may roof his <i>sukka</i> with reeds is obvious. After all, they meet all the criteria of fit roofing. Rather, say: With regard to these offshoots of reeds, one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with them.
  § Apropos the above <i>halakha</i>, the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Ḥisda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: With these bitter herbs of a marsh, a person fulfills his obligation on Passover.
  The Gemara raises an objection to his opinion. With regard to every mitzva that requires use of hyssop, one takes standard hyssop and neither a hyssop that grows in Greece, nor stibium hyssop, nor desert hyssop, nor Roman hyssop, nor any other kind of hyssop whose name is accompanied by a modifier. The same should hold true for the mitzva of bitter herbs; bitter herbs of the marsh, whose name is accompanied by a modifier, are not the bitter herbs mentioned in the Torah.
  Abaye said in response: There is a distinction between the cases. Every species whose name was differentiated prior to the giving of the Torah, i.e., the distinction between its different subspecies predated the Revelation at Sinai, and the Torah then came and was particular about one specific subspecies, it is known that the species has other subspecies identified with a modifier that are unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. And these bitter herbs, their names were not differentiated prior to the giving of the Torah at all; all the subspecies were known simply as bitter herbs. Therefore, when the Torah requires bitter herbs, one may fulfill the mitzva with all subspecies of bitter herbs.
  Rava said a different explanation. Actually, the name of this plant is merely bitter herbs without a modifier. And the fact that one calls them bitter herbs of the marsh is because they are typically found in the marsh. Therefore, there is no reason that they may not be used to fulfill the mitzva on Passover.
  § Rav Ḥisda said: If one bound one item, even if he did so with a knot, it is not considered a binding. If one bound three items together, everyone agrees that it is considered a binding. If one bound two items, it is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to all matters that involve the mitzva of hyssop, the requirement is to have three stalks with their roots, and on them three stems, one on each stalk. Rabbi Yosei says: The mitzva of hyssop fundamentally requires three stems. If the bundle of hyssop was rendered incomplete, its remnants are fit for use with two stems. If all the stems broke, the hyssop is fit for use, as long as the stumps of its central stem remain any size.
  It enters our minds to say: From the fact that Rabbi Yosei said that for the bundle of hyssop to be fit for the mitzva after the fact its remnants are two, apparently its origins were also two stalks. And the fact that the mishna teaches that the binding includes three plants, that is the requirement for the mitzva to be performed <i>ab initio</i>. And from the fact that Rabbi Yosei requires three plants only for the mitzva to be performed <i>ab initio</i>, conclude that the Rabbis, who disagree with him, hold that failure to include three stalks in the bundle renders it unfit for the mitzva. Apparently, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei dispute whether it is two or three items that are necessary to be considered a binding.
  The Gemara questions that understanding of the dispute. But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei said: With regard to the hyssop bundle, if its origins were two stalks and its remnants are one, it is unfit. And it is fit only when its origins were three and its remnants are two. Rather, reverse the opinions in the mishna: According to Rabbi Yosei, failure to include three stalks in the bundle renders it unfit for the mitzva; according to the Rabbis, three is the requirement for the mitzva to be performed <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> supporting this understanding. And this was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the hyssop bundle, if its origins were two stalks and its remnants are one, it is fit. And it is unfit only when its origins and its remnants are one. Clearly, this is the opinion of the Rabbis.
  The Gemara questions the end of the <i>baraita</i>: If its remnants are one, it is unfit? Didn’t you say in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> that if its remnants are one it is fit?
  
  Daf 13b
  
  Rather, emend the <i>baraita</i> and say: It is unfit only when its origins, like its remnants, are one.
  Mareimar taught: With regard to these bundles of reeds from Sura that are bound for sale, one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with them. Although the seller bound them, he bound them merely to ascertain the number more readily, and they will not remain bound.
  Rabbi Abba said: With regard to these huts made of willow branches, once their upper ties holding them together are undone, they are fit roofing. The Gemara asks: But aren’t they still tied from below? Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Abba is referring to a case where he unties them from below as well.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Even if you say that Rabbi Abba is referring to a case where one does not untie them from below, they are fit for <i>sukka</i> roofing, as any binding that is not destined to be moved is not considered a binding. Since these huts are untied from above, were one to attempt to move them, they would fall apart.
  § Rabbi Abba said that Shmuel said: With regard to vegetables about which the Sages said: One fulfills his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover, if they are spread over a source of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, they transmit ritual impurity, and the impurity spreads to objects beneath them. And, nevertheless, the Sages decreed that they do not serve as a barrier before the spread of ritual impurity. The impurity breaches roofing made of these vegetables and rises upward, as if there were no covering over it. If one roofs a <i>sukka</i> with these vegetables, it is as if they were not there at all, and they render a <i>sukka</i> unfit due to the unfitness of airspace. Just as three handbreadths of airspace in the roofing renders a <i>sukka</i> unfit, so too, three handbreadths of these vegetables in the roofing renders a <i>sukka</i> unfit. What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? Since when they dry they crumble and fall, even while fresh, they are as one that is not there.
  Apropos the statements of Rabbi Abba, the Gemara cites another. Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who harvests bunches of grapes for the winepress, these bunches do not have handles. The stems, which connect the grapes to the clusters, are not required for the production of wine. Therefore, their legal status is not that of a handle in terms of ritual impurity; they are merely waste. Consequently, if these stems come into contact with a source of ritual impurity, they do not become impure and they do not transmit impurity to the attached grapes.
  And Rav Menashya bar Gadda said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who harvests grain for roofing a <i>sukka</i>, the grain has no handles. The legal status of the straw is not that of a handle for the grain. Since his interest is roofing his <i>sukka</i>, he wants only the straw, which is fit roofing, and not the grain, which is unfit. Therefore, in this context, the straw does not facilitate moving the grain.
  The Gemara notes: The one who said that in the case of one who harvests grain, the straw is not a handle, all the more so would he say so in the case of one who harvests grapes, since the stems are not suitable for his needs. Stems are not wanted in the winepress, so that they will not absorb wine. By contrast, the one who said in the case of one who harvests grapes that it has no handles, he said so only in that case; however, in the case of one who harvests grain, he would say that it has handles, since the grain attached to the straw is suitable for his needs. He can roof the <i>sukka</i> with them and weigh down the straw, so that it does not scatter in the wind.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the statement of Rav Menashya bar Gadda is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Fig branches, and there are figs on them; vines, and there are grapes on them; straw, and there are stalks of grain on them; palm branches, and there are dates on them, with regard to them all, if the amount of waste is greater than the amount of the food, a <i>sukka</i> roofed with them is fit. And if not, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. <i>Aḥerim</i> say: The <i>sukka</i> is unfit until the amount of straw is greater than the combined amount of the handbreadth of the handles attached to the food that is susceptible to ritual impurity and the food.
  The Gemara continues: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, <i>Aḥerim</i>, who said that the straw must be greater than the handles as well, holds that the produce designated for roofing have handles; and one Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, who disagrees, holds that they do not have handles?
  The Gemara notes: According to the opinion of Rabbi Abba, who says that grape clusters harvested for the winepress do not have handles, but grain harvested for roofing does, it is certainly a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. Clearly, he holds in accordance with the opinion of <i>Aḥerim</i>, who hold that grain harvested for roofing has handles. However, according to the opinion of Rav Menashya bar Gadda, who says that grain harvested for roofing does not have handles, shall we say that it is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, and that he holds in accordance with the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>? Rav Menashya could have said to you that everyone agrees: With regard to one who harvests grain for roofing, the grain does not have handles. And here in the <i>baraita</i>, with what are we dealing? It is a case where one initially cut the stalks for food, and reconsidered his plan for them, and decided to use them for roofing. Since initially, as food, the grain had handles, its status does not change despite his change of intent.
  The Gemara asks: If he cut them for food, what is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis that the grain has no handles? As a rule, grain has handles. And if you say that the Rabbis hold that once he reconsidered his plan for them and decided to use them for roofing, his initial intent was negated and their legal status is like any other inedible roofing, and they consequently have no handles, the Gemara asks: And was his initial intent negated in that manner? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: All vessels
  
  Daf 14a
  
  descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought? Although an unfinished vessel ordinarily cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided to leave it in its unfinished state, it immediately assumes the legal status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. However, they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. Merely deciding to complete the unfinished vessel does not alter its status. It loses its status as a vessel only when he takes action to complete it. Action negates status created by action and status created by thought; however, thought negates neither status created by action nor status created by thought. Therefore, once the straw of the grain harvested for food is considered a handle and is susceptible to ritual impurity, its status cannot be negated by thought alone.
  And if you say: There is a distinction between the cases, as this principle applies only to vessels, which are significant, but with regard to handles that are not independently significant but are merely for the purpose of handling food, perhaps by means of thought they become handles and by means of thought they emerge from that status; but didn’t we learn in the mishna to the contrary? All handles of food that one <i>besasan</i> on the threshing floor are ritually pure, as through one’s actions he indicated that has no use for them and does not consider them significant. And Rabbi Yosei deems them capable of becoming ritually impure.
  The Gemara elaborates: Granted, according to the one who said that <i>besasan</i> means that one untied their binding, it works out well. Although no action was performed on the sheaves, nevertheless, since their only purpose is to facilitate binding the sheaves, he indicated by unbinding them that the handles no longer suit his needs. However, according to the one who said: What is the meaning of <i>besasan</i>? It means he actually trampled them, what can be said? According to that opinion, only an action can negate the status of the handles. What, then, is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that thought alone can negate their status?
  The Gemara answers: Here too, the dispute between the Rabbis and <i>Aḥerim</i> with regard to using grain for roofing the <i>sukka</i> is in a case where one actually trampled them, and that is the reason that they are no longer susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara asks: If so, and a change was made to the grain itself, what is the rationale for the opinion of <i>Aḥerim</i>, who nevertheless prohibit their use as roofing? The Gemara answers: It is because <i>Aḥerim</i> state their opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as we learned in the previously cited mishna: Rabbi Yosei deems them capable of becoming ritually impure even after trampling.
  The Gemara asks: What is the basis of this comparison between the cases? Granted, there, in the dispute concerning the ritual impurity of the grain on the threshing floor, the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, i.e., that the handles remain susceptible to ritual impurity, is that they are suitable for use. This is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Even after the grain is trampled the straw suits his needs, since the straw is suited to facilitate turning over the grain with a pitchfork, as the straw prevents the grain from falling between the prongs of the pitchfork.
  However, here, where one needs the straw only for roofing the <i>sukka</i>, for what are the handles suited after they have been trampled? They serve no purpose in terms of handling the grain. The Gemara answers: They are suited when one dismantles the roofing, in order to hold the grain by the straw, so that it will scatter. Therefore, <i>Aḥerim</i> hold that the straw remains capable of contracting ritual impurity.
  Apropos the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: All handles of food that one <i>besasan</i> on the threshing floor are ritually pure, and Rabbi Yosei deems them capable of becoming ritually impure. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>besasan</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It means that one actually trampled them under foot. Rabbi Elazar says: It means he untied their binding.
  The Gemara notes: Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar, who said that <i>besasan</i> means that he untied their binding, this is the reason that Rabbi Yosei deems the handles capable of contracting ritual impurity. However, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that <i>besasan</i> means that one actually trampled them, why does Rabbi Yosei deem the handles capable of contracting ritual impurity? Didn’t one thereby render them insignificant? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Even after the grain is trampled, the straw suits his needs, since the straw is suited to facilitate turning over the grain with a pitchfork.
  Apropos a pitchfork, the Gemara cites a related aggadic teaching: Rabbi Elazar said: Why are the prayers of the righteous likened to a pitchfork [<i>eter</i>]? It is written: “And Isaac entreated [<i>vayetar</i>] the Lord for his wife, because she was barren” (Genesis 25:21), to say to you: Just as this pitchfork overturns the grain on the threshing floor from place to place, so too, the prayers of the righteous overturn the mind of the Holy One, Blessed be He, from the attribute of cruelty to the attribute of mercy, and He accepts their prayers.
  MISHNA: One may roof the <i>sukka</i> with boards like those used in the ceiling of a house; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir prohibits their use. If one placed a board that is four handbreadths wide atop the <i>sukka</i>, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. He fulfills his obligation, provided he does not sleep beneath the board.
  GEMARA: Rav said: The dispute is with regard to boards that have four handbreadths in their width, the standard size for boards used in house ceilings, as Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the Sages issued the decree of the roof. In that case, the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> with boards that wide could be confused with a ceiling. If it were permitted to roof the <i>sukka</i> with a board that size, one might come to sleep beneath the ceiling of his own home during the Festival. And Rabbi Yehuda is not of the opinion that the Sages issued the decree of the roof. However, with regard to boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is fit. And Shmuel said: The dispute is with regard to boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width; however, if they have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that it is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: According to Shmuel, the dispute is with regard to boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width, and apparently the same would hold true even if their width were less than three handbreadths. In that case, aren’t they merely reeds; why would Rabbi Meir prohibit their use?
  Rav Pappa said that this is what Shmuel is saying: If they have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. If their width is less than three handbreadths, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is fit. What is the reason? It is because they are merely reeds. When they disagree in the mishna, their disagreement pertains to a case where the boards are from three to four handbreadths wide. In that case, one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that since they are not the measure of a significant place, we do not issue a decree prohibiting their use. And one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that since they have departed from the halakhic status of being joined [<i>lavud</i>], which applies only to gaps of less than three handbreadths, we issue a decree prohibiting their use as roofing.
  The Gemara cites proof with regard to the dispute between Rav and Shmuel. We learned in the mishna: If one placed a board that is four handbreadths wide atop the <i>sukka</i>, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. He fulfills his obligation, provided he does not sleep beneath the board. Granted, according to Shmuel, who said that the dispute is with regard to boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width, however, if they have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that it is unfit roofing, it is due to that reason that one should not sleep beneath the board. However, according to Rav, who said that the dispute is with regard to boards that have four handbreadths in their width, however, if they do not have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that it is fit, according to Rabbi Yehuda, why may one not sleep beneath it?
  The Gemara answers: Do you hold that this last <i>halakha</i> in the mishna, about not sleeping beneath the board, is a ruling with which everyone, including Rabbi Yehuda agrees? Rather, in the latter clause of the mishna we have come to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. He alone, not Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one may not sleep beneath the board. Therefore, no proof can be cited from the mishna.
  The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear: Two sheets placed over the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> join together to constitute four handbreadths, the measure of unfit roofing that renders a <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  
  Daf 14b
  
  However, two boards placed on the <i>sukka</i> do not combine. Rabbi Meir says: Even boards are like sheets, in that they join together to constitute the measure of unfitness.
  The Gemara elaborates: Granted, according to Shmuel, who said that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir is with regard to boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width, but if they have four handbreadths in their width everyone agrees that it is unfit; what is the meaning of that which Rabbi Meir said: Boards join together? It means that boards less than four handbreadths wide combine to measure four handbreadths, which renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  However, according to Rav, who said that the dispute is with regard to boards that have four handbreadths in their width, but if they do not have four handbreadths in their width everyone agrees that it is fit, what are the circumstances? If each of the boards has four handbreadths in its width, why must they join together to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit? If each board is four handbreadths wide, each is capable of rendering the <i>sukka</i> unfit on its own. And if each of the boards does not have four handbreadths in its width, why would Rabbi Meir prohibit their use? But aren’t they merely reeds according to Rav? Just as one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with reeds, one should be permitted to roof the <i>sukka</i> with these narrow boards.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, explain that there are four handbreadths in the width of each board and each renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit on its own. However, what is the meaning of: Boards join together? It is with regard to a completely different matter. They join together to constitute four cubits from the side. If one placed these unfit boards adjacent to one of the walls of the <i>sukka</i>, they do not render the <i>sukka</i> unfit, due to the halakhic principle of curved wall, which views that roofing as an extension of that wall. However, that principle applies only up to four cubits of unfit roofing. If these boards join together to measure four cubits, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit according to Rabbi Meir. According to this explanation, the mishna can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav as well.
  There is another version of the above exchange. Granted, according to Shmuel, who said that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir is with regard to boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width, but if they have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that it is unfit, what is the meaning of that which Rabbi Meir said: Boards join together? It means that they join together to constitute four cubits from the side, which renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  However, according to Rav, granted, according to Rabbi Meir, what is the meaning of: Boards join together? It means that they join together to constitute four cubits from the side. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that even if they have four handbreadths in their width, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, what is the meaning of: Boards do not join together? They are merely reeds, which is fit roofing and fit roofing that joins together remains fit roofing. The Gemara answers: Since Rabbi Meir used the phrase: Join together, Rabbi Yehuda, although it is irrelevant according to his opinion, also said: Do not join together.
  The Gemara notes: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one roofed the <i>sukka</i> with cedar boards that do not have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that it is fit. If there are four handbreadths in their width, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident during a time of danger, when the gentiles decreed that it is prohibited for Jews to construct a <i>sukka</i>, at which point we brought boards that had four handbreadths in their width, and we roofed the porch with them so that it would not appear to be a <i>sukka</i>, and we sat beneath them. Evidently, boards four handbreadths wide are fit roofing for a <i>sukka</i>. They said to him: Is there proof be cited from there? There is no proof from actions performed during a time of danger. It is possible that the <i>sukka</i> that they built on the porch was unfit, and they built it merely to commemorate the mitzva that they were unable to fulfill. From this <i>baraita</i>, it is apparent that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is in a case of boards that are four handbreadths wide, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: If one roofed the <i>sukka</i> with cedar boards that have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. If there are not four handbreadths in their width, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. And Rabbi Meir concedes that, if there is between one board and another board a gap the complete width of a board, then one places fit roofing from the waste of the threshing floor and the winepress, and the <i>sukka</i> is fit. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that if one roofed the <i>sukka</i> with a board that is four handbreadths wide adjacent to one of the walls, the <i>sukka</i> is fit based on the principle of curved wall; and, nevertheless, one may not sleep beneath that board, and one who sleeps beneath it does not fulfill his obligation. In any event, there are two <i>baraitot</i>, each in accordance with one of the two views presented.
  § It is stated that there is an amoraic dispute: If one turned the unfit boards on their sides, and the width of the side is less than the measure that renders them unfit, do the boards remain unfit, or are they fit because in their current placement their width is narrower? Rav Huna said: The <i>sukka</i> is unfit, and Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna said: It is fit.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Naḥman happened to come to Sura. Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna entered before him. They said to him: If one turned these boards on their sides and roofed the <i>sukka</i>, what is the <i>halakha</i>? They sought to ascertain whether his ruling is in accordance with their opinion or in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna. He said to them: The <i>sukka</i> is unfit; since the boards are unfit roofing when placed flat, their legal status became like that of skewers [<i>shapudin</i>] of metal, which are unfit under all circumstances.
  When they related this encounter to Rav Huna, Rav Huna said to them: Didn’t I tell you that you should say the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with my opinion? Even Rav Naḥman agrees with me. They said to him: And did the Master actually say a reason for this ruling to us, and we did not accept it from him? Rav Naḥman not only issued a ruling, he also explained his ruling to us. He said to them: And did you ask me for the reason and I did not say it to you?
  The Gemara notes: Let us say that this <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rav Huna: With regard to a <i>sukka</i> that does not hold one’s head, most of his body, and his table; a <i>sukka</i> whose wall was breached with a breach large enough for a goat to jump through headlong, i.e., three handbreadths; a <i>sukka</i> that one placed atop it a board that is four handbreadths wide, even if he only introduced three handbreadths of the board into the <i>sukka</i>, in all these cases, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit.
  What are the circumstances of the case where one introduces only three handbreadths of a board that is four handbreadths wide? What, is it not that he turned the board on its side, thereby diminishing its width from four to three handbreadths, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna? The Gemara rejects this: No, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where one placed the board over the entrance of the <i>sukka</i>, where there is no wall. He introduced three handbreadths into the <i>sukka</i> and took one handbreadth out of the <i>sukka</i>, so that the legal status of that part of the board would be like that of roofing that protrudes from the <i>sukka</i>, and the <i>halakha</i> is that the legal status of any roofing that protrudes from the <i>sukka</i> is considered like that of the <i>sukka</i>. However, since this board is not adjacent to the wall of a <i>sukka</i>, the principle of curved wall does not apply. Therefore, it is four handbreadths of unfit roofing; it is prohibited to sleep beneath that board, and the entire <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit. Consequently, there is no support for or against the opinion of Rav Huna from this <i>baraita</i>.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a roof made of boards that are four handbreadths wide upon which there is no coat of plaster, Rabbi Yehuda says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to the manner in which to render it fit. Beit Shammai say: One moves each board, and then it is considered as though he placed the board there for the sake of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, and one then removes one board from among the boards and replaces it with fit roofing. Beit Hillel say: One need not perform both actions; rather, one must either move the boards or remove one from among them. Rabbi Meir says: One only removes one from among them and does not move the others.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Beit Hillel, their reason for initially prohibiting this roof is due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared. If one moves the boards, he performs an action. Likewise, if he removes one of the boards from among them, he also performs an action. Therefore, in both cases, he prepared the roofing and the <i>sukka</i> is fit. However, with regard to the opinion of Beit Shammai, what is the rationale for their prohibition against using the original ceiling for a <i>sukka</i>? If the rationale is also due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared, one action should suffice. Or if the rationale is due to the decree of the roof, lest one come to reside beneath a regular plastered ceiling inside a house, removing one board from among them should suffice.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, the rationale is due to the decree of the roof, and this is what they are saying: Although one moves the boards, if he removes one board from among them, yes, it is fit; if not, no, it is unfit. Moving the boards is inconsequential. Removing one board from among them is all that is necessary.
  The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Meir says: One removes one from among them but does not move the others. This indicates that the opinion of Rabbi Meir is identical to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as according to the above explanation, Beit Shammai also hold that removing one of the boards and replacing it with fit roofing can render the <i>sukka</i> fit. It is unreasonable to say that Rabbi Meir would hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, which is rejected.
  The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Meir is saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree on this matter. They agree that the boards are prohibited due to the decree of the roof and that only by removing one of the boards is the <i>sukka</i> rendered fit. Rabbi Meir disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaching us? Is it that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the Sages issued the decree of the roof and Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that the Sages did not issue the decree of the roof? But didn’t they disagree about this once, as we learned in the mishna above: One may roof the <i>sukka</i> with boards; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir prohibits their use. The Gemara explained that the dispute is whether or not the Sages issued the decree of the roof.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is not the dispute, as in the first clause, i.e., in the earlier mishna, we are dealing with the case of planed boards. The rationale for their disagreement is not due to the decree of the roof; but it is due to the decree of the vessels that they touched upon it. The dispute is whether or not the Sages issued a decree prohibiting the use of planed beams in roofing the <i>sukka</i>, although as flat wooden vessels they are not susceptible to ritual impurity, lest one come to roof the <i>sukka</i> with vessels that are susceptible to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Yehuda, who said that Rav said: If one roofed a <i>sukka</i> with convex arrow shafts, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, but if he roofed his <i>sukka</i> with concave arrow shafts, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit; and he did not issue a decree and prohibit roofing with convex shafts due to the prohibition against roofing with concave shafts, here too, let us not issue a decree and prohibit roofing with planed boards, due to the prohibition against roofing with actual vessels.
  Rather, according to Rav, perforce you must say that in the first clause of the mishna they disagree with regard to the decree of the roof, and in the latter clause, i.e., this mishna as well, they disagree with regard to the decree of the roof. Once again, the question arises: Why do I need them to disagree about the same issue twice?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who is saying to Rabbi Meir: Why do you prohibit roofing with boards? Is it due to the decree of the roof? That is the reason according to Beit Shammai, who are of the opinion that the Sages issued the decree. But, contrary to your opinion, Beit Hillel do not issue the decree. And Rabbi Meir said to Rabbi Yehuda: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to this matter at all. These are not two separate disputes; rather, it is one extended dispute.
  The Gemara continues to ask: This works out well according to Rav, who said that the dispute is specifically in a case where the boards have four handbreadths in their width. He says that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the Sages issued the decree of the roof, and Rabbi Yehuda is not of the opinion that the Sages issued the decree of the roof. However, according to Shmuel, who said that the dispute is specifically in a case where the boards do not have four handbreadths in their width, but where they have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, and both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda agree that the Sages issued the decree of the roof; if so, in the latter clause of the mishna, with regard to what matter do they disagree?
  The Gemara answers: One may not use boards of this sort for roofing his <i>sukka</i>. Even according to Rabbi Yehuda, a <i>sukka</i> roofed in that manner is unfit, due to the decree of the roof. However, here, in the latter clause, it is with regard to negating an existing roof that consists of boards of this sort, in order to render the <i>sukka</i> fit that they disagree. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: The ceiling is thereby negated, by moving the boards, and one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that the ceiling is not thereby negated unless he also removes one beam from among them.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who roofs his <i>sukka</i> with metal skewers or with the long boards of the bed, which compose its frame, if there is space between each one of them equal to the width of the skewers or the boards, and if he places fit roofing in those spaces, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. In the case of one who hollows out and creates a space inside a stack of grain to establish a sukka for him, it is not a <i>sukka</i>.
  GEMARA: Let us say, based on the mishna, that this will be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, as it is stated that the <i>amora’im</i> disagreed concerning the following matter: With regard to the domains of Shabbat, if the breached segment is equal to the standing segment, is it deemed a partition or not? Rav Pappa said: It is permitted to carry within the partition; as long as the breached segment is not greater, it is considered a solid partition. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It is prohibited to carry within the partition, unless the standing portion is greater. Apparently, from the mishna, even if the fit roofing is equal to the unfit skewers and boards, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, contrary to the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.
  The Gemara answers that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, could have said to you: What is the meaning of: Like the skewers and the boards? It does not mean that the space between the skewers and boards equals the width of the skewers and boards themselves. It is referring to a case where the space is large enough so that the fit roofing can enter and emerge easily, i.e., it is wider than the unfit roofing. According to this interpretation, the mishna can be explained according to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, as well. The mishna agrees that even if the standing and breached areas are equal, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit.
  
  Daf 15b
  
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it possible to be precise? The mishna need not be understood in that manner, since it is possible to calibrate the width of the spaces to equal the width of the unfit roofing, as the mishna required no more than that. Rabbi Ami said: The mishna is referring to a case where one extends the width of the spaces beyond the width of the unfit roofing. The mishna deems the <i>sukka</i> fit only if the width of the spaces is greater than the width of the unfit roofing.
  Rava said: Even if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where one does not extend the width of the spaces, and nevertheless, the fit roofing is greater than the unfit roofing, if the skewers were placed lengthwise across the <i>sukka</i>, one places the fit roofing widthwise, and if the skewers were placed widthwise, one places the fit roofing lengthwise. By doing so, the fit roofing overlaps the skewers at least somewhat; otherwise it would fall between the unfit roofing. Consequently, even if the space equals the unfit roofing, the fit roofing is greater than the unfit roofing.
  § The mishna continues: Or with the long boards of the bed, which compose its frame, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna supports the opinion of Rabbi Ami bar Tavyomei, as Rabbi Ami bar Tavyomei said: If one roofed the <i>sukka</i> with worn, incomplete, vessels, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Although these incomplete vessels are no longer susceptible to ritual impurity, they remain unfit because they were initially unfit for roofing. Proof can be adduced from the mishna: The long boards of the bed are no longer vessels but rather pieces from broken vessels; still, they may not be used for roofing the <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this: The mishna is referring to a case similar to that which Rabbi Ḥanan said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said in another context: It is not referring to the long boards alone. Rather, it is referring to a case with the long board of the bed and two of the legs attached to it or to a case with the short board of the bed with two legs attached to it. In this case, the structure could be propped up against a wall and used as a bed. Here too, the mishna is referring to roofing with the long board and two legs or with the short board and two legs, which are still considered complete vessels.
  The Gemara asks: Where is it stated that which Rabbi Ḥanan said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a mishna:
  
  Daf 16a
  
  A bed becomes ritually impure as a complete entity if it comes into contact with a source of impurity. And it becomes ritually pure as a single entity through immersion, and in the case of impurity imparted by a corpse, through sprinkling and immersion. However, it may be neither impurified nor purified when dismantled. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Rabbis say: It becomes ritually impure even when it is dismantled into its component parts, and, so too, it becomes ritually pure even when it is dismantled into its component parts. The Gemara asks: If the bed breaks into parts that serve no purpose, it is pure; what are these component parts mentioned by the Rabbis? Rabbi Ḥanan said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The component parts are a long board and two legs attached to it and a short board and two legs attached to it.
  The Gemara asks: And for what purpose are these parts suited; what function qualifies their status as vessels? The Gemara answers: It is possible for one to lean them against the wall and to sit on them, after placing boards across the top and placing ropes across their length and width. The boards of the bed can thereby be used for the purpose of sitting or lying upon them; consequently, they are considered vessels.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself cited above. Rabbi Ami bar Tavyomei said: If one roofed the <i>sukka</i> with worn, incomplete, vessels, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Gemara asks: What are these worn vessels? Abaye said: They are small cloths that do not have an area of three by three fingerbreadths, which, due to their size, are not suited for use either by the poor or by the wealthy.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami bar Tavyomei: In the case of a mat made of different types of vegetation, e.g., papyrus and reed grass, even though its remnants were reduced from the requisite measure for contracting ritual impurity, one may not roof the <i>sukka</i> with them. This precisely corresponds to the opinion of Rabbi Ami.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If a mat of reeds is large and not designated for sleeping, but is suited only for roofing, one may roof the <i>sukka</i> with it. However, the status of a small mat, which can be utilized for sleeping, is that of a vessel, and one may not roof the <i>sukka</i> with it. Rabbi Eliezer says: The status of even a large mat is that of a vessel. It is capable of contracting ritual impurity, and therefore one may not roof his <i>sukka</i> with it.
  The mishna states: In the case of one who hollows out and creates a space inside a stack of grain, it is not a <i>sukka</i>. Rav Huna said: The Sages taught that it is not a <i>sukka</i> only in a case where there is not a space one handbreadth high along seven handbreadths upon which the grain was piled. However, if there is a space measuring one handbreadth high along seven handbreadths upon which the grain was piled, and now, by hollowing out the stack, one is raising the existing walls and not forming a new space, it is a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  That is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who hollows out a stack of grain to make himself a <i>sukka</i>, it is a <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara wonders: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that it is not a <i>sukka</i>? Rather, is it not correct to conclude from it, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, that in certain circumstances it is possible to hollow out a stack of grain and establish a fit <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the case.
  Some raised this matter as a contradiction between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i>. We learned in the mishna: One who hollows out a stack of grain in order to make himself a <i>sukka</i>, it is not a <i>sukka</i>. But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that this is a <i>sukka</i>? Rav Huna said: This is not difficult. Here, where it is a <i>sukka</i>, it is a case where there is a space measuring one handbreadth high along seven handbreadths, while there, where it is not a <i>sukka</i>, it is a case where there is not a space one handbreadth high along seven handbreadths.
  MISHNA: One who lowers the walls of the <i>sukka</i> from up downward, if the lower edge of the wall is three handbreadths above the ground, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Since animals can enter through that space, it is not the wall of a fit <i>sukka</i>. However, if one constructs the wall from down upward, if the wall is ten handbreadths high, even if it does not reach the roofing, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Rabbi Yosei says: Just as a wall built from down upward must be ten handbreadths, so too, in a case where one lowers the wall from up downward, it must be ten handbreadths in length. Regardless of its height off the ground, it is the wall of a fit <i>sukka</i>, as the legal status of a ten-handbreadth partition is that of a full-fledged partition in all areas of <i>halakha</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that a suspended partition, even if it does not reach all the way down, renders it permitted to carry on Shabbat, like a full-fledged partition. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that a suspended partition does not render it permitted to carry on Shabbat.
  We learned in a mishna there, in tractate <i>Eiruvin</i>: In the case of a cistern that is located between two courtyards, situated partly in each courtyard, one may draw water from it on Shabbat only if a partition ten handbreadths high was erected specifically for the cistern to separate the water between the domains, lest the residents of one courtyard draw water from the domain of the other courtyard. This partition is effective whether it is above, and lowered toward the water; whether it is below, in the water; or whether it is within the airspace of the cistern below the rim, above the surface of the water. A partition situated in any of these places forms a boundary between the two courtyards, permitting one to draw water from the cistern. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that this is the subject of an early dispute of <i>tanna’im</i>.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  Beit Shammai say: The partition that permits drawing water may be placed below; and Beit Hillel said it must be placed above. Rabbi Yehuda said: A partition for the cistern should be no more stringent than the wall serving as a partition between the two courtyards. Once there is a wall between courtyards, there is no need to erect an additional partition specifically for the cistern.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that a suspended partition permits one to carry, and therefore the wall between the courtyards suffices to divide the cistern as well.
  The Gemara rejects this equation. And that is not so, as neither does Rabbi Yehuda hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, nor does Rabbi Yosei hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara elaborates: Neither does Rabbi Yehuda hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as Rabbi Yehuda states his opinion that a suspended partition suffices only there, with regard to the joining of the courtyards, which is an obligation by rabbinic law. However, here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, which is by Torah law, a suspended partition does not suffice.
  Nor does Rabbi Yosei hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as Rabbi Yosei states his opinion that a suspended partition suffices only here, with regard to a <i>sukka</i>, which is a positive mitzva. However, in the case of carrying between courtyards on Shabbat, which is a prohibition that is punishable by stoning, no, a suspended partition does not suffice.
  The Gemara asks: And if you say: Since Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the laws of Shabbat, according to whose opinion was the action that was taken in Tzippori performed, where they relied on suspended partitions even on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: It was not performed according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei but rather on the authority of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei.
  And what was that incident? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: One time they forgot and did not bring a Torah scroll to the synagogue on Shabbat eve prior to the onset of Shabbat. The next day, on Shabbat, to avoid violating the prohibition against carrying, they spread and suspended sheets on posts that were fixed along the path from the house in which the Torah scroll was stored to the synagogue, establishing partitions. And they brought a Torah scroll along that path and read from it.
  The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that they spread the sheets on Shabbat? Carrying before the partitions were established was prohibited. From where did they bring these sheets on Shabbat? Rather, they found sheets already spread on the posts, and they brought a Torah scroll and read from it. They relied on a suspended partition even in this matter related to Torah law. They relied neither on the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor on the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; rather, they relied on the authority of a third <i>tanna</i>.
  § Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said: A mat that is four handbreadths and a bit wide can permit the use of a <i>sukka</i> as a wall. The Gemara explains: How does one accomplish this? He suspends it in the middle of a space ten handbreadths high, with less than three handbreadths below it and less than three handbreadths above it. And the principle states: The legal status of any objects that have a gap of less than three handbreadths between them is as if they were joined [<i>lavud</i>]. Therefore, a mat four handbreadths and a bit wide can constitute a fit partition of ten handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: This is obvious. The principle of joining with regard to a gap of less than three handbreadths is well known. There is no need to teach this <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that we state the principle of <i>lavud</i> once with regard to a particular surface but we do not state the principle of <i>lavud</i> twice to consider it joined in different directions, Avimi teaches us that one may implement the principle twice.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Avimi from a <i>baraita</i>: A mat that is seven handbreadths and a bit wide can permit use of a <i>sukka</i> as a wall. Apparently, a mat can serve as the wall of a <i>sukka</i> only when the principle of joined objects is implemented once. The Gemara answers: When that <i>baraita</i> was taught, it was with regard to a large <i>sukka</i>, one considerably higher than ten handbreadths. One suspends the mat from a bit less than three handbreadths from the roofing, and it is considered a fit <i>sukka</i> wall although it is a significant distance off the ground. And what does it teach us? It teaches that one may lower walls from up downward, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  Apropos forming a <i>sukka</i> wall based on the principle of <i>lavud</i>, the Gemara cites that Rabbi Ami said: A board that measures four handbreadths and a bit can permit the use of a <i>sukka</i>, serving as a wall, and it is effective if one establishes it less than three handbreadths from the adjacent wall. And the principle states: The legal status of any objects with a gap of less than three handbreadths between them is as if they were joined.
  The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us? The principle of <i>lavud</i> is well known. The Gemara answers: He comes to teach us that the minimum measure of the horizontal extension of the wall of a small <i>sukka</i> is seven handbreadths. Therefore, it is possible to establish a wall for the <i>sukka</i> using a board that measures four handbreadths and a bit.
  
  Daf 17a
  
  MISHNA: If one distanced the roofing from the walls of the <i>sukka</i> at a distance of three handbreadths the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, because three handbreadths of open space, even adjacent to the walls, render the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  In the case of a house that was breached, creating a hole in the middle of the roof, and one roofed over the breach, if from the wall to the roofing there are four or more cubits of the remaining original roof, it is an unfit <i>sukka</i>. If the roofing is less than four cubits from the wall, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, based on the principle of curved wall; the remaining intact ceiling is considered an extension of the vertical wall.
  And likewise, in the case of a courtyard that is surrounded on three sides by a portico, which has a roof but no walls, if one placed roofing over the courtyard between the different sides of the portico and the roof of the portico is four cubits wide, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Similarly, a large <i>sukka</i> that was surrounded at the edge of its roofing with material with which one may not roof a <i>sukka</i>, e.g., vessels susceptible to ritual impurity, if there are four cubits beneath the unfit roofing, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The principle of curved wall does not apply to unfit roofing that measures four cubits or more.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these cases based on the identical principle of curved wall? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to cite all the cases, as, if the mishna had taught us only the case of the house that was breached, I would have said that the principle of curved wall applies there because those walls were established for the house. Therefore, when the house is transformed into a <i>sukka</i>, the walls continue to serve their original function as walls of the <i>sukka</i>. However, with regard to a courtyard surrounded on each of the three sides by a portico, where its walls were established not for the portico but for the house that opens into the portico, and they happen to serve as the interior walls of the portico, I could say no, they are not considered as connected to the roofing at all. Consequently, it is necessary for the mishna to cite that case as well.
  And if the mishna taught us only these two cases, one would have said that the principle of curved wall can apply because all of their roofing is fit roofing, and the preexisting roof of the house and the portico is unfit only due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from that which has already been prepared. However, here, in the case of a large <i>sukka</i> that was surrounded at the edge of its roofing with material with which one may not roof a <i>sukka</i>, where some its roofing is unfit and the fit roofing does not actually reach the wall, one could say no, the roofing is unfit. Therefore, it is necessary to state that case as well.
  § Rabba said: I found the Sages of the school of Rav, who were sitting and saying in the name of Rav: Space without roofing renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with a measure of three handbreadths of space. However, unfit roofing renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with a measure of four handbreadths.
  And I said to them: From where do you derive that space renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit when it amount to three handbreadths? It is as we learned in the mishna: If one distanced the roofing from the walls of the <i>sukka</i> at a distance of three handbreadths, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. If, indeed, this mishna is the source of the <i>halakha</i>, also in the case of unfit roofing, let it render the <i>sukka</i> unfit only if the roofing measures four cubits, as we learned in the same mishna: With regard to a house that was breached and one roofed over the breach, if from the wall to the roofing there is four or more cubits of the remaining original roof, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit.
  And they said to me: Cite proof from the mishna, apart from this case, as both Rav and Shmuel said that in this case, the Sages in the mishna touched upon the principle of curved wall. In other words, the fact that this house is a fit <i>sukka</i> is unrelated to the minimum measure of unfit roofing. It is fit due to the principle of curved wall.
  And I said to them: What if there is a <i>sukka</i> with less than four handbreadths of unfit roofing and an adjacent space of less than three handbreadths; what would be the status of the <i>sukka</i>? The <i>sukka</i> would be fit, since it lacks the minimum measure of both space and unfit roofing that renders a <i>sukka</i> unfit. If one then filled the space with skewers, what would be the status of the <i>sukka</i>? It would be unfit, as there would be more than four handbreadths of unfit roofing. But shouldn’t space, which is more stringent, as it renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with only three handbreadths, be as stringent as unfit roofing, which renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit only with four handbreadths of unfit roofing?
  And they said to me: If so, according to you, who said that unfit roofing renders a <i>sukka</i> unfit only with four cubits of unfit roofing, the same question arises. Just as, if there were a <i>sukka</i> with less than four cubits of unfit roofing and an adjacent space measuring less than three handbreadths, what would be its status? It would be fit. If one then filled the space with skewers, what would be its status? It would be unfit. Here too, the question arises: Shouldn’t space, which is more stringent, as it renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with only three handbreadths of space, be as stringent as unfit roofing, which renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with only four cubits of unfit roofing?
  And I said to them: What is this comparison? Granted, according to my opinion, that I say that the measure of unfit roofing that renders a <i>sukka</i> unfit is four cubits,
  
  Daf 17b
  
  the status of the <i>sukka</i> is determined on the basis of whether it is the requisite measure or it is not the requisite measure. In other words, the difference between unfit roofing that is four cubits and unfit roofing that is less is a unique <i>halakha</i>, completely unrelated to the principle of curved wall. Similarly, it is a unique <i>halakha</i> that three handbreadths of space in a roof render a <i>sukka</i> unfit. In this case, there is not the requisite measure according to either <i>halakha</i>; and since their measures are not equal to each other, they do not combine to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit. The <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit only when the measure of unfit roofing reaches four cubits.
  However, according to you, who say that the measure of four handbreadths for unfit roofing is due to the distance between the wall and the fit roofing, which renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit, what is the difference to me if it was distanced due to unfit roofing, and what is the difference to me if it was distanced due to a combination of unfit roofing and space? In either case, the distance between the roofing and the wall should prevent connecting the roofing to the wall. This concludes Rabba’s account of his exchange with the Sages of the school of Rav.
  Abaye said to Rabba: And according to the Master, too, although their measures are not equal in a large <i>sukka</i>, which is larger than four cubits, in a small <i>sukka</i> aren’t their measures equal? In a minimally sized <i>sukka</i>, seven by seven handbreadths, three handbreadths of unfit roofing must render the <i>sukka</i> unfit. If the measure of fitness were to remain up to four handbreadths, that would mean that a <i>sukka</i> with a majority of unfit roofing is fit, which is unreasonable. Therefore, Rabba’s contention that the measures of unfit roofing and space are totally different is not precise.
  Rabba said to him: There, in the case of the minimally-sized <i>sukka</i>, the fact that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit is not due to the fact that their measures are equal. Rather, it is due to the fact that in a case where the unfit roofing is three handbreadths, the <i>sukka</i> lacks the minimum required measure of fit roofing. In other words, it is not the amount of unfit roofing that creates the problem; rather, it is that the fit area of the <i>sukka</i> is too small.
  Rabba maintains that since the two requisite measures of unfitness are not equal, they do not join together. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that their measures are not equal, do they not combine to constitute the requisite measure? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: The garment must be at least three by three handbreadths in order to become a primary source of ritual impurity by means of ritual impurity imparted by treading of a <i>zav</i>; and the sackcloth made from goats’ hair must be at least four by four handbreadths; and the animal hide must be five by five; and a mat must be six by six?
  And a <i>baraita</i> is taught concerning the mishna: The garment and the sackcloth, the sackcloth and the hide, and the hide and the mat join together with one another. If one attaches a piece of material that has a smaller, more stringent measure for ritual impurity to a piece of material that has a larger, more lenient measure, the combined cloth is susceptible to contract ritual impurity if together they compose the larger measure. Apparently, two items whose measures are not equal combine to compose the more lenient measure.
  The Gemara rejects this. There, it is as the reason is taught that Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason that these different fabrics combine? They combine since all the component materials are fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat upon which a <i>zav</i> sits, as they can each be used to patch a saddle or saddlecloth. Since they are all suitable for the same use, they join together with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity.As we learned in a mishna: In the case of one who trims and processes a piece of any of the above-mentioned materials measuring one handbreadth by one handbreadth, that piece is capable of becoming ritually impure. There is a certain <i>halakha</i> for which each of the different materials has the same measure; they therefore join together in other areas as well.
  The Gemara asks: For what use is a cloth that is one handbreadth by one handbreadth fit? After all, a rag that has no use does not contract ritual impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: Since it is suitable for use as a patch on a donkey’s saddlecloth, it is capable of contracting ritual impurity. This ends the discussion of the exchange between Rabba and the Sages of the school of Rav.
  The Gemara notes: In Sura, they stated this <i>halakha</i> in that language cited above. In Neharde’a, however, they taught it as follows: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Unfit roofing in the center of the <i>sukka</i> renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with a measure of four handbreadths of unfit roofing. Along the side of the <i>sukka</i>, it renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with a measure of four cubits of unfit roofing. And Rav said: Both along the side and in the center, it renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with a measure of four cubits of unfit roofing.
  We learned in a mishna: If one placed a board that is four handbreadths wide atop the <i>sukka</i>, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. And the Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rav, who said that both along the side and in the center, a <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit with a measure of four cubits of unfit roofing, it is due to that reason that the <i>sukka</i> is fit. However, according to Shmuel, who said that in the center of the <i>sukka</i>, the <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit with a measure of four handbreadths of unfit roofing, why is the <i>sukka</i> fit? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where he placed the beam along the side; but had he placed it in the center, then according to Shmuel the <i>sukka</i> would indeed be unfit.
  The Gemara cites a proof with regard to Rav’s opinion. Come and hear: Two sheets placed over the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> join together to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit. However, two boards placed on the <i>sukka</i> do not combine to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit. Rabbi Meir says: Even boards have the same legal status as sheets, and they combine to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to that version from Neharde’a that Rav said: Both along the side and in the center, a <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit with a measure of four cubits of unfit roofing, what is the meaning of join together? It means that the two unfit objects join together to comprise four cubits. However, according to this version from Sura, in which Rav said: A <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit with a measure of four handbreadths of unfit roofing in the center, what are the circumstances? If each of the boards has four handbreadths in its width, why must they join together to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit? If each board is four handbreadths wide, each is capable of rendering the <i>sukka</i> unfit on its own, and if each of the boards does not have four handbreadths in its width, why would Rabbi Meir prohibit their use; they are merely reeds?
  The Gemara answers: Actually, it is a case where each of the boards has four handbreadths in its width, and what is the meaning of join together? It means they join together to constitute four cubits along the side. This understanding fits both versions of Rav’s opinion.
  Come and hear proof from another <i>baraita</i>: If one roofed the entire <i>sukka</i> with cedar beams that have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. If they do not have four handbreadths in their width, Rabbi Meir deems the <i>sukka</i> unfit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit.
  
  Daf 18a
  
  And Rabbi Meir concedes that if there is between one board and another board a gap the complete width of a board, then one places fit roofing from the waste of the threshing floor and the winepress, and the <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to the one who said: Both along the side and in the center a <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit with a measure of four cubits of unfit roofing, it is due to that reason that the <i>sukka</i> under discussion is fit, as none of the boards is four cubits wide. However, according to the one who said that a <i>sukka</i> is rendered unfit with a measure of four handbreadths of unfit roofing in the center, why is the <i>sukka</i> fit? Each board is capable on its own of rendering the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here, we are dealing with a <i>sukka</i> that is exactly eight cubits, i.e., forty-eight handbreadths, wide, and one began placing the roofing from the side. And he places a four-handbreadth board and then four handbreadths of waste, and another board and waste, and a board and waste, from this side, so that the total measure of roofing from that side is twenty-four handbreadths. And then a beam and waste, a beam and waste, and a beam and waste, from that side, so that the total measure of roofing from that side is twenty-four handbreadths.
  The result is that the <i>sukka</i> has two four-handbreadth stretches of waste in the middle of the <i>sukka</i>, totaling eight handbreadths. In that case, there is the minimum measure of fit roofing required for fitness of a <i>sukka</i> in the middle, and everyone agrees that the unfit roofing in the rest of the <i>sukka</i> cannot render it unfit. Since the unfit roofing measures less than four cubits on either side, the <i>sukka</i> is fit both according to the principle of curved wall and according to the opinion that unfit roofing renders the <i>sukka</i> unfit with four cubits.
  § Abaye said: If there is space measuring three handbreadths in a large <i>sukka</i>, which is defined as one larger than seven by seven handbreadths, and one diminished the space, whether he did so with branches, fit for roofing, or whether he did so with metal skewers, unfit roofing, it is an effective diminution, as there is neither sufficient space nor sufficient unfit roofing to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit. However, in a small <i>sukka</i>, if one diminished the space with branches it is an effective diminution; if he diminished the space with skewers, it is not an effective diminution and the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The three handbreadths of skewers, while insufficient to render the <i>sukka</i> unfit, diminish the fit area of the <i>sukka</i> to the point that the measure that remains does not constitute a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara notes: And this applies only if the space is along the side of the <i>sukka</i>, in which case the principle of <i>lavud</i> applies. However, if the space is in the center of the <i>sukka</i>, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to the ruling. One said: The principle of <i>lavud</i> is applied even in the center of the <i>sukka</i>. And one said: The principle of <i>lavud</i> is not applied in the center of the <i>sukka</i>. Even if one diminished the space, the two sides of the roofing are not considered joined.
  The Gemara explains: What is the rationale for the opinion of the one who said: The principle of <i>lavud</i> is applied even in the center of the <i>sukka</i>? It is as it is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to a cross beam of the merging of alleyways that projects from this wall of an alleyway but does not touch the other opposite wall, and similarly, with regard to two cross beams, one projecting from this wall and one projecting from the other opposite wall and they do not touch each other, if there is a gap of less than three handbreadths between the beam and the wall or between the two beams respectively, one need not bring another cross beam to render the alleyway fit for one to carry within it, as they are considered joined based on the principle of <i>lavud</i>. However, if there is a gap of three handbreadths, one must bring another cross beam. Apparently, the principle of <i>lavud</i> is applied even in the center.
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who holds that <i>lavud</i> does not apply in the center, how would he explain the <i>Tosefta</i>? The Gemara clarifies that he would say that beams are different because the prohibition against carrying in an alleyway is a decree by rabbinic law, and it is a rabbinic ordinance that beams may be placed at the entrance to the alleyway to permit carrying therein, the Sages were lenient. Therefore, proof cannot be cited from the case of the beams with regard to other situations.
  What is the reason for the opinion of the one who said: The principle of <i>lavud</i> does not apply in the center? It is as we learned in a mishna: In the case of a skylight in the roof of a house whose opening is one square handbreadth, if there is a source of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse inside the house, all the objects in the entire house become ritually impure, as the legal status of the roof is that of a tent over a corpse. However, the objects that are directly opposite the skylight are ritually pure, as the roof does not cover that part of the house. If the source of ritual impurity is itself situated aligned with the skylight, all the objects in the entire house are ritually pure, as there is no roof over the source of impurity.
  If the skylight does not have an opening of a square handbreadth and there is ritual impurity in the house, the objects opposite the skylight remain ritually pure. If the source of ritual impurity is aligned with the skylight, the objects in the entire house are ritually pure. Apparently, the principle of <i>lavud</i> is not applied in the center; if it were, all the objects in the house would become ritually impure regardless of the location of the source of impurity. The opening of the skylight should be considered closed, as the distance between the two sides of its opening is less than three handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who holds that <i>lavud</i> applies in the center, how would he explain the mishna? The Gemara answers: The <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity are different, as that is the way they learned them through tradition. The <i>halakhot</i> of tents and ritual impurity are <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Therefore, their details are unique, and other areas of <i>halakha</i> cannot be derived from them.
  § Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai taught: A house that was breached and one roofed over it is a fit <i>sukka</i>. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: My teacher, explain your opinion. Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai said that this is how my father explained it: If the ceiling between the wall and the breach is four cubits long, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. If it is less than four cubits, the <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai taught: With regard to the abramis [<i>avroma</i>], it is permitted to eat it, despite the fact that it is a very small fish that is typically caught in a net with many similar, non-kosher, fish, and it is difficult to distinguish between them. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: My teacher, explain your opinion. Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai said that this is how my father explained it: The abramis found in the rivers of place so-and-so, where there are also non-kosher fish, is prohibited; however, the abramis of a different place so-and-so, where there are no non-kosher fish, is permitted.
  The Gemara notes that this is similar to that which Abaye said: These small fish [<i>tzaḥanta</i>] of the Bav River are permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Abaye unequivocally permitted eating these fish and was not concerned about the potential presence of non-kosher fish among them? If we say that it is due to the fact that the water flows rapidly, and these non-kosher fish, since they do not have a spinal cord, are not able to exist in that water, as the current carries the non-kosher fish out of the Bav River, and consequently all the remaining fish are kosher, that is not the case. Don’t we see that non-kosher fish exist in rivers with strong currents?
  Rather, perhaps Abaye permitted it because the water is salty, and these non-kosher fish are not able to exist in that water because they do not have scales. This, too, is not the case, as don’t we see that non-kosher fish exist in salty water? Rather, Abaye permitted the small fish in the Bav River because the mud in that river is not suited for non-kosher fish to reproduce. The conditions in the river render it an unproductive habitat for non-kosher fish. Ravina said: And today, since the government built canals between the rivers, and the Eitan River and the Gamda River spill into the Bav, it is prohibited to eat the small fish without thorough inspection.
  § It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> disagree: If one roofed a portico that has posts on its open side, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. If one roofed a portico that does not have posts on its open side, Abaye said: The <i>sukka</i> is fit, and Rava said: The <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Gemara elaborates: Abaye said: The <i>sukka</i> is fit,
  
  Daf 18b
  
  as we say that the edge of the roof descends and seals the opening. The edge of the roof itself is considered as though it were a small partition that extends downward and forms a wall. Rava said: This <i>sukka</i> is unfit, as we do not say that the edge of the roof descends and seals.
  Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who said: The edge of the roof descends and seals the opening like a wall, then in a case where the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> consists of straight beams, even if one removed the middle wall, leaving the <i>sukka</i> with only two parallel walls, the <i>sukka</i> would nevertheless be fit. Since the edge of the roof descends and seals, the legal status of that <i>sukka</i> is the same as one that has walls on all sides. Abaye said to him: I concede to you that in that particular case the principle: The edge of the roof descends and seals, does not apply, as it is considered like an open alleyway, through which the multitudes pass on two opposite sides. In other cases, the principle applies.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Abaye and Rava disagree with regard to the same issue that was the subject in the dispute of Rav and Shmuel; they are merely elaborating on a fundamental dispute between other <i>amora’im</i>. As it was stated: <i>Amora’im</i> disagree with regard to a portico, which has a roof and no walls or incomplete walls, located in a field, which is a <i>karmelit</i>. Rav said: It is permitted to move an object throughout the entire portico, as we say that the edge of the roof descends and seals the opening, rendering the portico a private domain, as it is effectively surrounded by partitions. And Shmuel said: One may move an object in the portico only within four cubits, as we do not say that the edge of the roof descends and seals the opening. Therefore, the portico’s legal status is that of the surrounding field. Ostensibly, the basis of the dispute between Abaye and Rava is identical to the basis of the dispute between Rav and Shmuel.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison and says: According to the opinion of Shmuel, everyone, even Abaye, agrees that one does not apply the principle: The edge of the roof descends and seals, to the case of a <i>sukka</i>.
  
  Daf 19a
  
  When they disagree is according to the opinion of Rav. Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav: The edge of the roof descends and seals both in the portico in the field and in the portico that one roofed as a <i>sukka</i>. And Rava could have said to you: Rav stated his opinion only there, with regard to a portico in the field, because the partitions formed by the descent of the edge of the roof are partitions established for the portico. However, here, in the case of a <i>sukka</i>, where the partitions formed by the descent of the edge of the roof are not partitions established for the portico, no, Rav would not say that the edge of the roof descends and seals.
  The Gemara cites another proof. We learned in the mishna: With regard to a courtyard that is surrounded on three sides by a portico, if there are four cubits beneath the unfit roofing, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Gemara asks: And why is the <i>sukka</i> unfit? Let us say that the edge of the roof descends and seals, forming a fit partition at the point where the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> begins?
  Rava interpreted the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: It is a case where one equalized the level of its roofing, i.e., the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> with the level of the roof of the portico. Since the edge of the roof of the portico is not visible inside the <i>sukka</i>, the principle: The edge of the roof descends and seals, does not apply.
  In Sura, they would teach this <i>halakha</i> in that language cited above. In Pumbedita they would teach it differently: If one roofed a portico that does not have posts on its open side, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. In the case of a portico that has posts less than three handbreadths apart on its open side, Abaye said: The <i>sukka</i> is fit, and Rava said: The <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Abaye said: The <i>sukka</i> is fit, as we say that the principle of <i>lavud</i> applies here; the posts are joined and form a partition for both the portico and the <i>sukka</i> in the courtyard outside the portico. Rava said: The <i>sukka</i> is unfit, as we do not say that the principle of <i>lavud</i> forms a partition for the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is ruled in accordance with the first version.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Ashi found Rav Kahana, who was placing roofing for a <i>sukka</i> atop a portico that did not have posts. He said to him: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with that which Rava said: If it has posts, the <i>sukka</i> is fit; if it does not have posts it is unfit? How can you use this as a <i>sukka</i>? Rav Kahana showed him that in this <i>sukka</i> the disparity between the <i>sukka</i> and the portico was visible from the inside and even from the outside. From outside, the portico and the <i>sukka</i> appeared to be one continuous structure. However, from inside, one of the walls of the portico was visibly thicker than the wall of the <i>sukka</i>, and that one handbreadth thickness serves as the third wall of the <i>sukka</i>.
  Alternatively, in this case that disparity was visible from the outside and even from the inside. The exterior walls of the portico and of the <i>sukka</i> were not even. From the outside, it was plainly discernible that they were two separate structures. However, from the inside the <i>sukka</i> appeared to be a direct extension of the portico with no post protruding. In both cases, the protruding segment serves as the third wall of the <i>sukka</i>, which measures one handbreadth, and the <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  This distinction is as it was stated in the context of merging courtyards that open into an alleyway that is open on one side to allow carrying there on Shabbat, one must establish a side post on one side of its opening: Any object that protrudes and is visible from outside the alleyway but is even with the wall on the inside of the alleyway has legal status of a side post, since it can be discerned from the outside. And the provisions that apply to a side post in the case of merging of alleyways are the same as those that apply to posts in the case of <i>sukka</i>. Rav Kahana’s <i>sukka</i> was essentially a portico with a post, and was fit for use as a <i>sukka</i>.
  § It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Fit roofing that consists of different kinds of agricultural waste products that extend from the<i>sukka</i> has the legal status like that of the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Waste products that extend from the <i>sukka</i>? Ulla said: Branches that extend behind the <i>sukka</i> and are not limited to the area within the <i>sukka</i> walls.
  The Gemara asks: But don’t we require three walls to render an area covered with roofing a fit <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where there are three walls. The two side walls of the <i>sukka</i> do not end at the middle wall between them; rather, they too extend behind the <i>sukka</i>, forming a second <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: But don’t we require seven by seven handbreadths as the minimum area for fitness of a <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where there is the requisite minimum area. The Gemara asks: But don’t we require that its shade exceeds its sunlight? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where there is more shade than sunlight.
  After noting that the <i>sukka</i> has three walls, the requisite area, and sufficient shade, the Gemara asks: If so, what purpose is there to state this <i>halakha</i>? The fact that this <i>sukka</i> extends from another is not relevant. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a novel element in this <i>halakha</i>. Lest you say that since, as evidenced by the placement of the connecting middle wall, these walls were initially established for inside the original <i>sukka</i> but not for outside the original <i>sukka</i>; and therefore you say no, the middle wall cannot be considered a wall for the additional <i>sukka</i>, Ulla teaches us that the initial intention is not relevant.
  Rabba and Rav Yosef both say with regard to the case in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Here, it is referring to a case with branches that extend before the front entrance of the <i>sukka</i>, and one of the side walls extends together with the roofing. Lest you say that this extension does not have the minimum requisite size for the fitness of a <i>sukka</i>, in terms of its area and number of walls, therefore, Ulla teaches us that it is fit because it is considered an extension of the <i>sukka</i>.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>Tosefta</i> was needed only to teach the case of a <i>sukka</i> where in its majority its shade exceeds its sunlight, and in its minority its sunlight exceeds its shade. Lest you say that since the extension lacks this basic requirement of a <i>sukka</i>, it is treated as if it were not there at all, and consequently the entire <i>sukka</i> should be rendered unfit due to that little area, therefore, Ulla teaches us that the entire area is one fit <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: According to that understanding of the <i>Tosefta</i>, what is the meaning of: Waste that extends from the <i>sukka</i>? It means that the roofing extends beyond the halakhic parameters for fitness of a <i>sukka</i>. It does not refer to a physical extension of the <i>sukka</i>.
  Rabbi Oshaya said: This <i>Tosefta</i> was needed only to teach the case of unfit roofing that measures less than three handbreadths in a small <i>sukka</i>. And what is the meaning of: Waste that extends from the <i>sukka</i>? It means that the roofing extends beyond the halakhic status of a fit <i>sukka</i>; it is not referring to a physical extension of the <i>sukka</i>. Nevertheless, it does not render the entire <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  Rav Hoshaya strongly objects to this: What is the novel element in this <i>Tosefta</i>? Let the status of unfit roofing be only as strict as the status of empty space. And does space measuring less than three handbreadths in a small <i>sukka</i> render the entire <i>sukka</i> unfit? If less than three handbreadths of space, which has a stringent measure for rendering the <i>sukka</i> unfit, does not render the <i>sukka</i> unfit, clearly the same measure of unfit roofing does not render the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  Rabbi Abba said to him: There is a distinction between unfit roofing and empty space. This unfit roofing combines with the fit roofing to compose the requisite measure. And one may even sleep beneath it, since the unfit roofing is nullified by the majority of fit roofing and completely incorporated into it. However, that space, although it too combines with the fit roofing to comprise the requisite measure of the <i>sukka</i>, one may not sleep beneath it, as it is not transformed into fit roofing. Therefore, there is a novel element in the explanation of Rabbi Hoshaya as well.
  The Gemara questions this contention. Is there any item that combines with other items to engender fitness, but the item itself is not fit? Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elyashiv said: Yes, that model exists in other areas of <i>halakha</i> as well.
  
  Daf 19b
  
  The case of mortar that is liquid and can be poured proves that there are situations where items that themselves are unfit render other items fit, as, on the one hand, it combines with water to complete the requisite measure of forty <i>se’a</i> to render a ritual bath fit to purify. But, on the other hand, one who immerses in a bath filled only with mortar, the immersion does not fulfill his obligation.
  MISHNA: One who establishes his <i>sukka</i> like a type of circular hut, with no roof whose walls slope down from the center or who rested the <i>sukka</i> against the wall, by taking long branches and placing one end on the ground and leaning the other end against the wall to establish a structure with no roof, Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit because it does not have a roof, and the Rabbis deem it fit; as, in their opinion, the roof and the walls may be a single entity, indistinguishable from each other.
  GEMARA: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one lifted one of these types of <i>sukkot</i> off the ground at least one handbreadth, thereby creating a vertical wall, or if one distanced the <i>sukka</i> resting against the wall one handbreadth from the wall, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. In these cases, the difference between the wall and the roof is conspicuous.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem a <i>sukka</i> fit even where it is an inclined roof rather than a flat one? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the legal status of the incline of a tent is like that of a tent. As long as it provides shelter, there is no need for a distinct, conspicuous roof for it to be a fit <i>sukka</i>.
  It is related: Abaye found Rav Yosef, his teacher, who was sleeping inside a netted bridal canopy, whose netting inclines down, inside a <i>sukka</i>. Ostensibly, Rav Yosef did not fulfill his obligation, as he slept in the tent formed by the canopy and not directly in the <i>sukka</i>. Abaye said to him: In accordance with whose opinion do you hold, that you do not consider this netting a tent? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that a structure without a distinct roof does not have the legal status of a tent, and therefore the netting does not constitute a barrier between the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> and the person sleeping below? Did you abandon the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the netting constitutes a barrier because the legal status of a structure without a distinct roof is that of a tent, and act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? In disputes between an individual Sage and multiple Sages, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the multiple Sages, i.e., the Rabbis.
  Rav Yosef said to him: In the <i>baraita</i>, the opposite is taught. Rabbi Eliezer deems it fit and the Rabbis deem it unfit. Abaye asked him: Did you abandon the mishna, whose formulation is authoritative, and act in accordance with a <i>baraita</i>, which may not be accurate?
  Rav Yosef said to him: I have proof that the formulation of this particular <i>baraita</i> is precise, as the formulation of the mishna is an individual version of the dispute, and most of the Sages adopt the version of the <i>baraita</i>, as it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One who establishes his <i>sukka</i> like a type of circular hut or rests the <i>sukka</i> against the wall, Rabbi Natan says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the structure unfit because it does not have a roof, and the Rabbis deem it fit. Apparently, the mishna reflects only Rabbi Natan’s version of the argument. According to most of the Sages, the correct formulation of the dispute is that of the <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer deems it fit and the Rabbis deem it unfit. The <i>halakha</i> in in accordance with the latter version of the dispute, and therefore it is permitted to sleep inside a bridal canopy in a <i>sukka</i>.
  MISHNA: In the case of a large mat of reeds, if one initially produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity like any other vessel, and therefore one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. If one initially produced it for roofing, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity, as its legal status is not that of a vessel. Rabbi Eliezer says that the distinction between mats is based on use, not size. Therefore, with regard to both a small mat and a large mat, if one produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. If one produced it for roofing, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.
  GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the formulation of the mishna and raises a difficulty. This mishna itself is difficult, as it contains an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, you said: If one produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. The reason it is unfit for roofing is due to the fact that one produced it specifically for the purpose of lying upon it. Presumably, a mat produced without designation is for roofing, and therefore one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it.
  And then it is taught in the mishna: If one produced it for roofing, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it, and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. The reason it is fit roofing is due to the fact that one produced it specifically for roofing. This implies that a mat that one produced without designation is presumably for the purpose of lying upon it, and therefore one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. The inferences drawn from these two clauses in the mishna about a mat produced without designation contradict each other.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the first clause of the mishna, it is referring to a large mat, which is typically not produced for the purpose of lying upon it. Therefore, it is unfit for roofing only if it is produced specifically for the purpose of lying upon it. If it is produced without designation, it is presumably for roofing, and one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. There, in the second clause of the mishna, it is referring to a small mat, which is typically not produced for roofing. Therefore, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it only if it is produced specifically for roofing. If it is produced without designation, it is presumably for the purpose of lying upon it, and one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it.
  The Gemara notes: Granted, according to the Rabbis this is not difficult; as the above distinction resolves the apparent contradiction in the mishna. However, according to Rabbi Eliezer, the contradiction remains difficult, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to both a small mat and a large mat, if one produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. The reason it is unfit for roofing is due to the fact that one produced it specifically for the purpose of lying upon it. This implies that a mat that one produced without designation is presumably for roofing, and therefore one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it.
  And say that in the latter clause of the mishna, where Rabbi Eliezer continues: If one produced it for roofing, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it and it is not susceptible to ritual impurity, the reason it is fit roofing is due to the fact that one produced it specifically for roofing. However, by inference, a mat that one produced without designation is presumably for the purpose of lying upon it, and therefore one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. The inferences drawn from these two clauses in the mishna contradict each other. The resolution cited above cannot resolve the contradiction according to Rabbi Eliezer, as he does not distinguish between a large mat and a small mat.
  Rather, Rava said: The above resolution is rejected. With regard to a large mat, everyone agrees that if it was produced without designation, presumably it is for roofing. Where they disagree, is with regard to a small mat: The first <i>tanna</i> holds that a small mat produced without designation is presumably for the purpose of lying upon it, and Rabbi Eliezer holds that a small mat produced without designation is also presumably for roofing.
  
  Daf 20a
  
  And this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to a large mat of reeds, if one produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, it is susceptible to ritual impurity, and one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. The reason is that one produced it specifically for the purpose of lying upon it; however, by inference, a mat that one produced without designation becomes as a mat produced for roofing, and one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. With regard to a small mat of reeds, if one produced it for roofing, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. The reason is that one produced it specifically for roofing; however, by inference, a mat that one produced without designation becomes as a mat produced for the purpose of lying upon it, and one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that both a small mat and a large one produced without designation are fit for roofing.
  Abaye said to him: If so, if their dispute is only with regard to a small mat, then instead of saying: Rabbi Eliezer says: Both a small mat and a large mat, the mishna needed to say: Both a large mat and a small mat. In a phrase with the format: Both this and that, one typically mentions the more obvious item first. Why then, does Rabbi Eliezer mention the small mat first, if it is with regard to the small mat that they disagree?
  And furthermore, there is proof that when they disagree, it is with regard to a large mat, and Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is a stringency and not a leniency, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a reed mat, with a large mat one may roof a <i>sukka</i>. Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is not susceptible to ritual impurity, one may roof his <i>sukka</i> with it. Apparently, Rabbi Eliezer holds that without designation, one may not roof his <i>sukka</i> with a large mat.
  Rather, Rav Pappa said: Rava’s proposed resolution is rejected. Rather, with regard to a small mat, everyone agrees that if it was produced without designation, presumably it is for the purpose of lying upon it. When they disagree, is with regard to a large mat: The first <i>tanna</i> holds that a large mat produced without designation is presumably for roofing, and Rabbi Eliezer holds that a large mat produced without designation is also presumably for the purpose of lying upon it.
  What, then, is the meaning of: If one produced it for the purpose of lying upon it, that Rabbi Eliezer states? This is what he is saying: Making mats without designation is also for the purpose of lying upon it, until one makes it specifically for roofing.
  § The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: In the case of a mat [<i>maḥatzelet</i>] woven of papyrus or bulrushes, if it is a large mat, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it, as it is not typically produced for the purpose of lying upon it. If it is a small mat, one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with it, as it is typically produced for the purpose of lying upon it. However, with regard to a mat produced of ordinary reeds or reeds specifically used for plaiting, if the mat is plaited with a large, coarse weave, one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with it, as it was certainly not produced for the purpose of lying upon it. If it is woven with a small, fine weave, one may not roof the <i>sukka</i> with it, as typically mats of this sort are woven only for the purpose of lying upon them.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said in the name of his father: Both with this plaited mat and with that woven mat, one may roof a <i>sukka</i>, as without specific designation otherwise they are not produced for the purpose of lying upon them, and therefore they are ritually pure. And likewise, Rabbi Dosa would say in accordance with his statement.
  We learned in a mishna there: All types of <i>ḥotzalot</i> can become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. Since their legal status is that of a vessel, they become a primary source of ritual impurity. This is the statement of Rabbi Dosa. And the Rabbis say: They become impure with the impurity imparted by treading. If a <i>zav</i> lies or sits on one of the <i>ḥotzalot</i>, they become a primary source of ritual impurity, like a chair or bed of a <i>zav</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Impurity imparted by treading, yes; impurity imparted by a corpse, no? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: Any item that becomes ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading also becomes ritually impure with other types of impurity, including impurity imparted by a corpse, although the reverse is not necessarily so. The opinion of the Rabbis is difficult. The Gemara explains: Emend the mishna and say: They become ritually impure even with the impurity imparted by treading. These mats are not merely nondescript vessels, which become primary sources of ritual impurity through exposure to a corpse, they are vessels designated for sitting and lying upon them, and therefore they also become primary sources of ritual impurity if a <i>zav</i> sits or lies upon them.
  The Gemara asks about the term used in the mishna: What is the meaning of <i>ḥotzalot</i>? Rav Avdimi bar Hamduri said: They are <i>marzovelei</i>. The Gemara is unfamiliar with the term and asks: What is the meaning of <i>marzovelei</i>? Rabbi Abba said: They are called <i>mezablei</i> in Babylonia. They are leather sacks used by shepherds to feed their animals. Shepherds place them under their heads when lying down. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: <i>Ḥotzalot</i> are a different term for actual mats.
  The Gemara notes: And Reish Lakish follows his line of reasoning stated elsewhere, as Reish Lakish said: I am the atonement for Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons, as initially, when some of the Torah laws were forgotten from the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, Ezra ascended from Babylonia and reestablished the forgotten laws. Parts of the Torah were again forgotten in Eretz Yisrael, and Hillel the Babylonian ascended and reestablished the forgotten sections. When parts of the Torah were again forgotten in Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons ascended and reestablished the forgotten sections. This expression of deference toward Rabbi Ḥiyya introduces the <i>halakha</i> that Reish Lakish is citing in his name. And so said Rabbi Ḥiyya and his sons: Rabbi Dosa and the Rabbis did not disagree concerning the soft mats of Usha,
  
  Daf 20b
  
  that they can become ritually impure, even with impurity imparted by treading, as those mats are produced for the purpose of lying upon them. And they also agreed concerning the coarse mats of Tiberias, that they are ritually pure, as these are produced exclusively for use in partitions and for roofing. Concerning what mats do they disagree? It is concerning the mats produced in the rest of the places. One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: Since there is no one who sits on these mats regularly, they are comparable to the mats of Tiberias and are pure. And one Sage, Rabbi Ḥiyya, holds that since it happens and one sits on them on occasion, they are comparable to the mats of Usha and are impure.
  The Gemara analyzes the mishna cited above. The Master said: All types of <i>ḥotzalot</i> can become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse; this is the statement of Rabbi Dosa. Apparently, they are all considered vessels, which is why they are susceptible to ritual impurity and one may not roof the <i>sukka</i> with them. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And likewise, Rabbi Dosa would say in accordance with his statement, i.e., in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, in the name of his father, that all types of mats are ritually pure, and one may roof a <i>sukka</i> with them? Don’t these two sources contradict each other?
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This mishna is referring to a mat that has an upturned edge, which renders the mat a vessel susceptible to ritual impurity. That <i>baraita</i> is referring to a mat that does not have an upturned edge [<i>gedanpa</i>]; therefore, it is not a vessel and is not susceptible to impurity.
  The Gemara raises an objection: <i>Ḥotzalot</i> made of papyrus, or of bulrushes, or of sackcloth produced out of goat hair, or of horsehair, all of which are woven and comfortable, can become ritually impure with the impurity imparted by a corpse but not with the impurity imparted by treading, because while they are considered vessels, they are not designated for sitting; this is the statement of Rabbi Dosa. And the Rabbis say: They do become ritually impure, even with the impurity imparted by treading.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that <i>ḥotzalot</i> are sacks called <i>marzovelei</i>, there is no problem. The reasoning of the one who holds that they do not become impure with impurity imparted by treading is that they are not designated for sitting. However, since they are vessels, they become impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. And for what are these vessels used? The vessels made of papyrus and of bulrushes are fit to be used as a fruit basket, and the ones made of sackcloth and of horsehair are fit to be used as small sacks [<i>gulkei</i>] and baskets for legumes and small fruits, because their weave is finer. However, according to the one who said that <i>ḥotzalot</i> are actual mats without upturned edges, what is the basis for the dispute? These mats are fit only for the purpose of lying upon them. Granted, the mats made of sackcloth, of goat hair, or of horsehair are fit for use as screens and flour sifters. However, the mats of papyrus and of bulrushes, for what use are they fit? The Gemara answers: They are fit for use as covers for vats of ale.
  Some say a different version of this exchange: Granted, according to the one who said that <i>ḥotzalot</i> are actual mats, then the mats of papyrus and of bulrushes are fit to be used as covers for vats of ale, while those of sackcloth, i.e., goat hair, and of horsehair may be used as screens or sifters. However, according to the one who said that the <i>ḥotzalot</i> are sacks called <i>marzovelei</i>, what is the basis of their dispute? Granted, sacks made of sackcloth and of horsehair are fit to be used as small baskets and sacks; but for what are mats of papyrus or of bulrushes fit; why are they susceptible to ritual impurity? The Gemara answers: They are fit to be used as a fruit basket.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥananya said: When I descended to the exile of Babylonia, I found one Elder, who said to me: One may roof the <i>sukka</i> with a mat. When I returned to Eretz Yisrael and came to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, the brother of my father, and related to him what the Elder said, he agreed with his statement. Rav Ḥisda said: That applies only to a mat that does not have an upturned edge and is not fit for any use other than for roofing.
  Ulla said: These mats of the residents of Meḥoza, if not for their wall, i.e., upturned edge, one would be permitted to roof a <i>sukka</i> with them. That opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may roof the <i>sukka</i> with a mat; and if they have a wall, one may not roof a <i>sukka</i> with them because the upturned edge renders it a receptacle susceptible to ritual impurity.
  
  MISHNA: One who sleeps beneath the bed in the <i>sukka</i> did not fulfill his obligation, because the bed constitutes a tent that serves as a barrier between him and the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>. Rabbi Yehuda said: It was our custom that we would sleep beneath the bed before the Elders and they did not say anything to us to the effect that we are not fulfilling our obligation. Apparently, the halakhic status of the bed is not like that of a tent and it does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva.
  § Rabbi Shimon said, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: There was an incident involving Tavi, the Canaanite slave of Rabban Gamliel, who was sleeping beneath the bed, and Rabbi Gamliel lightheartedly said to the Elders: Did you see my slave Tavi, who is a Torah scholar and knows that slaves are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? Since it is a positive, time-bound mitzva, Canaanite slaves, whose status with regard to this halakhic category is like that of women, are exempt from the obligation to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. Therefore, he sleeps under the bed. Rabbi Shimon continued: And by the way, as Rabban Gamliel was not issuing a halakhic ruling, we learned that one who sleeps beneath the bed did not fulfill his obligation.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that one who is sleeping beneath a bed did not fulfill his obligation because a bed, like a tent, acts as a barrier between the person and the roofing. The Gemara asks: But isn’t the height of the space beneath the bed lacking ten handbreadths, and a space less than ten handbreadths high does not constitute a tent? Shmuel interpreted the mishna: It is referring to the case of a bed ten handbreadths high.
  The Gemara comments: We learned in a mishna there with regard to the impurity of a tent: Both a hole that was perforated in a rock by water or by creeping animals, or a hole in a rock that was perforated because it was eaten away by salt, and likewise a space in a course of stones, and likewise a space in a pile of beams all have the legal status of a tent over impurity. A source of impurity imparted by a corpse transmits impurity to other objects in those spaces, as they constitute a tent over a corpse.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: The legal status of any tent that is not established by a person is not that of a tent and does not transmit impurity. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? From where did he derive that <i>halakha</i>?
  
  Daf 21a
  
  He derives by means of a verbal analogy that only a man-made tent transmits impurity, deriving the tent written with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse from the tent written with regard to the Tabernacle. It is written here with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse: “This is the teaching when a man dies in a tent” (Numbers 19:14). And it is written there with regard to the Tabernacle: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle” (Exodus 40:19). Just as there, with regard to the Tabernacle, the tent was established by a person, so too here, with regard to impurity of a corpse, it is a tent established by a person. And according to the Rabbis, because the passage dealing with impurity imparted by a corpse, i.e., tent tent, is repeated several times, this amplifies and includes any structure that provides shelter, even if it is not a standard tent.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that the legal status of any tent that is not established by a person is not that of a tent? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:2): Courtyards were built in Jerusalem atop the rock, and beneath these courtyards there was a space of at least a handbreadth due to the concern lest there is a grave in the depths. In that case, the space served as a barrier preventing the impurity from reaching the courtyards above. And they would bring pregnant women, and they would give birth there in those courtyards. And they would raise their children there and would not leave there with the children until they grew. All this was done so that the children would be untainted by any impurity and would be able to assist in the ritual of the red heifer, whose ashes are used to purify those impure with impurity imparted by a corpse.
  And once they reached age seven or eight and were capable of assisting in the performance of this ritual, the priests would bring oxen there. And they would place doors on the backs of these oxen, and the children would sit upon the doors and they would hold cups of stone, which are not susceptible to ritual impurity, in their hands. When they reached the Siloam pool, they descended into the water and filled the cups with water, and ascended and sat themselves on the doors. The water in the cups was mixed with the ashes of the heifer and used for sprinkling on the impure person or vessels. Rabbi Yosei says: The children did not descend from their oxen; rather, each child from his place on the door would lower the cup with a rope and fill it with water due to the concern lest there is a grave in the depths beneath the path leading from the oxen to the pool.
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: They would not bring doors; rather they would bring only oxen. The size of the spinal column and the body of the animal was sufficient to constitute a tent and therefore served as a barrier before the impurity imparted by a grave in the depths. And this is difficult, as aren’t oxen a tent that is not established by a person; and it is taught that Rabbi Yehuda says: They did not bring doors; rather they brought only oxen. Apparently, the legal status of a tent that is not man-made is that of a tent.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the legal status of a tent that is not man-made is that of a tent when the tent is a fistbreadth, which is more than a handbreadth in terms of length, width, and height. It is only when the tent is less than the size of a fist that Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is not a tent. That opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of caves and deep cavities in the rocks that their status is that of a tent even though they are not man-made.
  The Gemara asks: But a door on the back of an ox is an object that measures several fistbreadths, and it is taught that Rabbi Yehuda says: They did not bring doors but only oxen. Apparently, a door does not constitute a tent, since that is not the manner in which a tent is typically established. Abaye said in response that Rabbi Yehuda did not say that the legal status of the door is not that of a tent; rather, he said: They did not need to bring doors because the oxen themselves were sufficiently broad.
  Rava said Rabbi Yehuda’s statement should be explained differently. They would not bring doors at all. Because a child has an exaggerated sense of self-confidence due to the width of the door, he might allow himself to move from side to side and as a result, perhaps he will extend his head or one of his limbs beyond the edge of the door and will become impure
  
  Daf 21b
  
  with impurity imparted by a grave in the depths.
  The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rava, as Rabbi Yehuda says: They would not bring doors at all, because a child has an exaggerated sense of self-confidence and perhaps he will extend his head or one of his limbs beyond the edge of the door and will become impure with impurity imparted by a grave in the depths. Rather, they would bring Egyptian oxen whose bellies are broad, and the children would sit upon them and they would hold cups of stone in their hands. When they reached the Siloam pool they descended and filled them, and ascended and sat themselves on the backs of the oxen.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to a bed, which measures several fistbreadths, didn’t we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: It was our custom that we would sleep beneath the bed before the Elders? Apparently, despite the fact that a bed measures several handbreadths, its legal status is not that of a tent. The Gemara answers: A bed is different, since it is designed specifically for use upon it; therefore, the status of the space beneath it is not that of a tent. The Gemara asks: Aren’t oxen like those used to transport the children to bring water for the red heifer also designated specifically for use upon them and nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda deems their spinal column and bellies a tent.
  When Ravin came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Elazar said: Oxen are different since they protect the shepherds in the sun from the sun, and in the rain from the rain. Shepherds would lie beneath the bellies of the oxen as protection from the elements. The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if an ox is rendered a tent because it provides protection, even if its primary designation is for use upon it, then the status of a bed too should be that of a tent, since it protects shoes and sandals that are placed beneath it.
  Rather, Rava rejected that explanation and said: Oxen are different and their status is that of a tent since their bellies and backs are made to protect their innards, as it is stated: “With skin and flesh You have clothed me, and with bones and sinews You have knitted me together” (Job 10:11). Since flesh and skin are mentioned in the verse as providing shelter, the status of the oxen is that of a tent.
  And if you wish, say instead: In this case Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his reasoning, as he stated elsewhere: We require a <i>sukka</i> that is a permanent residence. The bed in a <i>sukka</i> is a temporary residence, and the <i>sukka</i> is a permanent tent; and a temporary tent does not come and negate a permanent tent. The permanent <i>sukka</i> is significant and that significance supersedes any temporary structure within it. Therefore, in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, the status of the bed is not that of a tent.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who also stated that we require a <i>sukka</i> that is a permanent residence, nevertheless, a temporary tent comes and negates a permanent tent. The Gemara answers: Yes, and that is the point over which they disagree. One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds: A temporary tent comes and negates a permanent tent, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds: A temporary tent does not come and negate a permanent tent.
  The mishna relates that Rabbi Shimon said, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: There was an incident involving Tavi, the Canaanite slave of Rabban Gamliel who was sleeping beneath the bed, and Rabban Gamliel claimed that Tavi did so because he was a Torah scholar and knew that slaves are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon said: From the conversation of Rabban Gamliel we learned two matters. We learned that Canaanite slaves are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, and we learned that one who sleeps beneath the bed did not fulfill his obligation.
  The Gemara questions the formulation of the <i>baraita</i>. And let Rabbi Shimon say: From the statement of Rabban Gamliel. Why did he use the atypical expression: From the conversation of Rabban Gamliel? The Gemara answers: Through this expression he teaches us another matter in passing, like that which Rabbi Aḥa bar Adda said, and some say that Rabbi Aḥa bar Adda said that Rabbi Hamnuna said that Rav said: From where is it derived that even the conversation of Torah scholars require analysis, even when the intention of the speaker was apparently not to issue a halakhic ruling? It is as it is stated with regard to the righteous: “Which brings forth its fruit in its season and whose leaf does not wither” (Psalms 1:3). This teaches that with regard to a Torah scholar, not only is his primary product, his fruit, significant but even ancillary matters that stem from his conversation, his leaves, are significant.
  MISHNA: One who supports his <i>sukka</i> on the legs of the bed, i.e., he leans the <i>sukka</i> roofing on a bed, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the <i>sukka</i> cannot stand in and of itself without support of the bed, it is unfit.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Yehuda deeming this <i>sukka</i> unfit? Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Abba bar Memel disagree with regard to the rationale. One said: It is unfit because it lacks permanence. The <i>sukka</i> is not stable enough, as if the bed is moved the <i>sukka</i> will collapse. And one said: It is unfit because he is supporting the roofing with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity, as the bedframe is a vessel. Not only the roofing, but that which supports the roofing as well may not be susceptible to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara explains: The difference is in a case where one wedged iron skewers into the ground and roofed the <i>sukka</i> upon them. According to the one who said that the reason the <i>sukka</i> is unfit is because it lacks permanence, this <i>sukka</i> has permanence, and it is fit. However, the one who said the reason the <i>sukka</i> is unfit is because he is supporting the roofing with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity, he is supporting it with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity, so it is unfit.
  Abaye said: The Sages taught this dispute only in a case where one leaned the roofing on the bed. However, if one placed the roofing atop the bed, i.e., he affixed poles to the bed and the roofing is supported by those poles, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is fit. What is the reason that it is fit? According to the one who said that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit because it lacks permanence, this <i>sukka</i> has permanence as even if the bed is moved, the roofing will move with it and will not collapse. And according to the one who said the <i>sukka</i> is unfit because he supports it with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity, in this case he is not supporting it with an object that is susceptible to ritual impurity, as the roofing is not supported by the bed.
  
  Daf 22a
  
  MISHNA: A <i>sukka</i> that is <i>meduvlelet</i> and whose shade exceeds its sunlight is fit. A <i>sukka</i> whose roofing is thick like a house of sorts, even though it is so thick that the stars cannot be seen from within it, is fit.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>meduvlelet</i>? Rav said: It means an impoverished <i>sukka</i>, i.e., a <i>sukka</i> whose roofing is sparse, although at no point in the roofing is there a gap of three handbreadths. And Shmuel said: It means that the roofing is aligned with one reed ascending and one reed descending. There are two layers of roofing, with each reed on the upper layer situated directly above the space between each reed on the lower level.
  The Gemara explains: Rav taught the first clause in the mishna as one <i>halakha</i>, and Shmuel taught that clause as two <i>halakhot</i>. Rav taught one <i>halakha</i>: The <i>halakha</i> of a <i>sukka meduvlelet</i>. And what is a <i>sukka meduvlelet</i>? It is a sparse <i>sukka</i>. Nevertheless, as long as the shade exceeds the sunlight the <i>sukka</i> is fit. And Shmuel taught two <i>halakhot</i>. What is a <i>sukka meduvlelet</i>? It is a disordered <i>sukka</i>. And he teaches two <i>halakhot</i>: A disordered <i>sukka</i> is fit, and one whose shade exceeds its sunlight is fit.
  Abaye said: They taught that a <i>sukka</i> with two layers of roofing is fit only in a case where there is not a gap of at least three handbreadths between the top and bottom layers. However, if there is a gap of three handbreadths between them it is unfit. Rava said: Even if there is a gap of three handbreadths between them, we say that the two layers of roofing are not considered joined only in a case where there is not the width of a handbreadth in its upper roof. However, if there is the width of a handbreadth in its upper roof, even if the gap between them is three handbreadths, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, because we say that the principle: Lower and cast down the upper level of the <i>sukka</i> roofing down to the level of the lower <i>sukka</i> roofing, applies here.
  Rava said: From where do I learn to say that when there is a handbreadth of width in its roof, we say that the principle lower and cast applies, and when there is not a handbreadth in its roof, we do not say that the principle lower and cast applies? Rava learns this from the <i>halakha</i> of impurity imparted by a corpse, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to the boards of the ceiling of the first floor of the house and of the second story that do not have plaster on them, so that each of the boards is considered a separate entity, and the boards of each are aligned so that the boards of the ceiling of the second story are directly above the boards of the house: If there is a source of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse beneath one of the lower boards, any object that is directly beneath that board is rendered impure by means of a tent over a corpse. However, any object that is above the board or off to the side remains pure.
  If the source of impurity is in the airspace of the second story between the lower and upper boards, any object between the two boards is impure; however, any object beneath the lower board or above the upper board or off to the side remains pure. If the source of impurity is atop the upper board, any object aligned with the source of impurity even up to the heavens is impure. However, if the upper boards are spaced between the lower boards, if the source of impurity is beneath any of the boards within the house, any object that is beneath any of the boards is impure, as the legal status of the roof is as though the upper boards were lowered to the level of the lower boards, and the result is one continuous ceiling. If the source of impurity is above them, i.e., above the top boards, any object aligned with the source of impurity even up to the heavens is impure.
  And it is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> elaborating on this mishna: In what case is this statement said? It is only when these boards have the width of a handbreadth, and between them is the space of a handbreadth. However, if the boards are close together and there isn’t even the space of a handbreadth between them, then if the source of impurity is directly beneath one of the boards, only objects in the space beneath it is impure, while an object between the two layers of boards and atop them remains pure. Apparently, when there is a handbreadth in the upper layer, we say lower and cast the upper <i>sukka</i> roofing down to the level of the lower <i>sukka</i> roofing. And when there is not even a handbreadth in the upper layer, we do not say lower and cast the upper <i>sukka</i> roofing down. Indeed, conclude from here that this is the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Kahana sat in the study hall and stated this <i>halakha</i> of Rava, that in a case where the upper <i>sukka</i> roofing is a handbreadth wide, even if the gap between the two layers of roofing is greater than three handbreadths, they are considered attached. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Is it so that wherever there is not the width of a handbreadth, we do not say lower and cast?
  Isn’t it taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the merging of alleyways that one of the means of rendering carrying in a closed alleyway permitted on Shabbat is by placing a beam one handbreadth wide over the entrance of the alleyway within twenty cubits but no less than ten handbreadths off the ground? With regard to a cross beam that projects from this wall of an alleyway but does not touch the other opposite wall, and similarly, with regard to two cross beams, one projecting from this wall and one projecting from the other opposite wall, and they do not touch each other, if there is a gap of less than three handbreadths between the beam and the wall, or between the two beams respectively, one need not bring another cross beam to render the alleyway fit for a person to carry within it. This is because they are considered joined based on the principle of <i>lavud</i>. However, if there is a gap of three handbreadths, one must bring another cross beam.
  However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that the principle of <i>lavud</i> applies to a gap of up to four handbreadths wide, says:
  
  Daf 22b
  
  If there is a gap of less than four handbreadths, one need not bring another cross beam. However, if there is a gap of four handbreadths, one must bring another cross beam.
  And similarly, if two parallel, extremely narrow cross beams are placed alongside each other, even though there is not sufficient width in this beam in order to receive and support a small brick, and there is not sufficient width in that beam in order to receive and support a small brick, if the two beams together can receive a small brick along its handbreadth width, one need not bring another cross beam to render the alleyway fit for one to carry within it. But if not, one is required to bring another cross beam.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the two cross beams can receive a small brick along its length, which is three handbreadths, one need not bring another cross beam, but if not, one must bring another cross beam.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: If these two narrow cross beams are placed at different heights, one above and one below, one considers the upper one as though it were below, and the lower one as though it were above, i.e., close together. If the two together are capable of supporting a small brick, they render the alleyway fit for one to carry within it, although they are not actually close to each other, provided that the upper cross beam is not above twenty cubits off the ground and the lower one is not below ten handbreadths off the ground, between which a cross beam renders an alleyway fit for one to carry within it. By inference, if both this beam and that beam are within twenty cubits, we say that the principle: Lower and cast the upper beam down even though there is not the width of a handbreadth in the upper beam. This is difficult according to Rava’s opinion, as he holds that the principle: Lower and cast, does not apply when the width of the upper crossbeam is less than a handbreadth.
  Rav Kahana said to him: Interpret the <i>baraita</i> and say as follows: Provided that the upper beam is not above twenty cubits but rather within twenty cubits and the lower one is adjacent to it, less than three handbreadths from it, as in that case they are joined due to the principle of <i>lavud</i> and not the principle of lower and cast. Alternatively, interpret the <i>baraita</i> as follows: Provided that the lower beam is not below ten handbreadths but rather above ten handbreadths and the upper beam is adjacent to it, less than three handbreadths from it. However, if the distance between the beams is three handbreadths, since there is not the width of one handbreadth in the beam, we do not say: Lower and cast the upper beam, and each beam is considered on its own.
  § The mishna continues: A <i>sukka</i> whose shade exceeds its sunlight is fit. From the formulation of the mishna, it can be inferred that if its shade and sunlight are equal, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna in another chapter in this tractate: A <i>sukka</i> whose sunlight exceeds its shade is unfit. From the formulation of that mishna it can be inferred that if its sunlight and shade are equal, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. The inferences of the two <i>mishnayot</i> are contradictory.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where the inference was that when the sunlight and shade are equal the <i>sukka</i> is unfit, it is referring to the ratio of shade to sunlight from above, in the <i>sukka</i> roofing itself; and there, where the inference was that when the sunlight and shade are equal the <i>sukka</i> is fit, it is referring to the ratio of shade to sunlight from below, on the <i>sukka</i> floor. The two inferences are not contradictory, as the lower in the <i>sukka</i> one observes the light, the more diffused it is. Therefore, if the shade and the sunlight are equal on the floor of the <i>sukka</i>, clearly, the roofing is sufficiently dense and exceeds the gaps. Rav Pappa said: That is the meaning of the folk saying with regard to light: Like a <i>zuz</i> coin above, like an <i>istera</i> coin below.
  The mishna continues: A <i>sukka</i> whose roofing is thick like a type of house is fit. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a <i>sukka</i> whose roofing is thick like a type of house, although it is so dense that the stars are not visible from within it, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. However, if it is so thick that the rays of the sun are also not visible from within it, Beit Shammai deem the <i>sukka</i> unfit and Beit Hillel deem it fit.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> at the top of the wagon or at the top of the ship, although it is portable it is fit, as it is sufficient for a <i>sukka</i> to be a temporary residence. And one may ascend and enter it even on the first Festival day. In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> at the top of a tree or atop a camel, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, but one may not ascend and enter it on the first Festival day because the Sages prohibit climbing or using trees or animals on the Festival.
  If two of the walls of the <i>sukka</i> are in the tree and one is established on the ground by a person, or if two are established on the ground by a person and one is in the tree, the <i>sukka</i> is fit, but one may not ascend and enter it on the first Festival day because it is prohibited to use the tree. However, if three of the walls are established on the ground by a person and one is in the tree, then since it contains the minimum number of walls required, it is fit, and one may enter it on the first Festival day.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  The mishna summarizes that this is the principle: Any case where, were the tree removed, the <i>sukka</i> would be able to remain standing in and of itself, it is fit, and one may ascend and enter it on the Festival, since the tree is not its primary support.
  GEMARA: The Gemara comments: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> at the top of the ship, Rabban Gamliel deems it unfit and Rabbi Akiva deems it fit.
  There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva, who were coming on a ship. Rabbi Akiva arose and established a <i>sukka</i> at the top of the ship. The next day the wind blew and uprooted it. Rabban Gamliel said to him: Akiva, where is your <i>sukka</i>? It was unfit from the start.
  Abaye said: Everyone agrees that in a case where the <i>sukka</i> is unable to withstand a typical land wind, the <i>sukka</i> is of no consequence and it is not even a temporary residence. If it is able to withstand even an atypical land wind, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Where they disagree is in a case where the <i>sukka</i> is able to withstand a typical land wind but is unable to withstand an atypical land wind, which is the equivalent of a typical sea wind. Rabban Gamliel holds: In order to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, we require a permanent residence, and since it is not able to withstand an atypical land wind, which is like a typical sea wind, it is of no consequence and is not a <i>sukka</i> at all. Rabbi Akiva holds: In order to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, we require a temporary residence, and since it is able to withstand a typical land wind, it is fit, although it is unable to withstand a typical sea wind.
  § The mishna continues: Or if one establishes his <i>sukka</i> atop a camel, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> atop an animal, Rabbi Meir deems it fit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers that it is as the verse states: “You shall prepare for yourself the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for seven days” (Deuteronomy 16:13), from which Rabbi Yehuda derives: A <i>sukka</i> that is suitable for seven days is called a <i>sukka</i>, while a <i>sukka</i> that is not suitable for seven days is not called a <i>sukka</i>. It is prohibited to climb upon an animal on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, and therefore a <i>sukka</i> atop an animal is unfit, as it cannot be used all seven days.
  And Rabbi Meir, who holds that the <i>sukka</i> is fit, would say: By Torah law, this <i>sukka</i> is also suitable for use on a Festival and on Shabbat, as there is no Torah prohibition against using an animal on those days, and it is the Sages who issued a decree prohibiting it. The fact that it is prohibited by rabbinic decree does not render the <i>sukka</i> unfit.
  However, if one utilized his animal as a wall for a <i>sukka</i> and did not establish the entire <i>sukka</i> atop the animal, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit, as Rabbi Meir would say: With regard to any animate object, one may neither establish it as a wall for the <i>sukka</i>, nor as a side post placed at the entrance to an alleyway to render it permitted to carry in the alleyway on Shabbat, nor as one of the upright boards placed around wells to render the area a private domain and permit one to draw water from the well on Shabbat, nor as the covering for a grave. In the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili the Sages said: Nor may one write bills of divorce on it.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who rules that an animal is unfit for use as a partition in areas of <i>halakha</i> where a partition is required? Abaye said: It is due to the concern lest the animal die, leaving the <i>sukka</i> without a wall. Rabbi Zeira said: It is due to the concern lest it flee. The Gemara explains the practical halakhic differences between the two opinions. In the case where one established a wall with a tied elephant, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is fit, as even if it dies and falls, its carcass still has a height of ten handbreadths and is fit for the wall of a <i>sukka</i>. Where they disagree is in the case of an elephant that is not tied. According to the one who said: It is due to the concern lest the animal die, we are not concerned in this case, as the carcass would remain a fit wall. According to the one who said: It is due to a decree lest it flee, we remain concerned.
  The Gemara asks: According to the one who said: It is due to a decree lest it die, let us also be concerned lest it flee, as that too is a reasonable concern. Rather, this is the explanation: In the case where one established a wall with an elephant that is not tied, everyone agrees that the <i>sukka</i> is unfit lest it flee. Where they disagree is in the case of a tied animal. According to the one who said: It is due to a decree lest the animal die, we are concerned, as although it cannot flee, it might die, and the carcass of a typical animal is not ten handbreadths high. And according to the one who said: It is due to a decree lest it flee, we are not concerned.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said: It is due to a decree lest it flee, let us also be concerned lest it die. The Gemara answers: That is not a concern because death is not common. The Sages do not issue decrees with regard to uncommon circumstances. The Gemara asks: But according to all opinions, isn’t there the space between its legs, which is like a breach in a wall? How can one establish a partition whose breached segment exceeds its standing segment? The Gemara answers: He establishes a partition for it by filling the gaps with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves, sealing the breach.
  The Gemara asks further: And even though there is no concern lest the animal die, perhaps it will crouch, leaving a wall that is less than ten handbreadths? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where the animal is tied with ropes from above so that it cannot crouch. Based on that explanation, the Gemara asks: And according to the one who said: It is due to a decree lest it die, there is also no concern since it is tied with ropes from above. Even if the animal died, it would remain in place as a fit partition. The Gemara answers: Sometimes the ten-handbreadth wall consists of the animal that is a bit higher than seven handbreadths established adjacent to the roofing, less than three handbreadths away.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  And once it dies, it contracts to be more than three handbreadths from the roofing, and it does not enter his mind to fix it because it is not noticeable. In that case, the principle of <i>lavud</i> would not apply, and the result would be a wall that is less than the minimum requisite height.
  The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say that Rabbi Meir is concerned about potential death with regard to the <i>sukka</i> walls and that Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to the daughter of an Israelite who married a priest and her husband went to a country overseas, she may continue to partake of <i>teruma</i> as the wife of a priest, as the presumptive status of her husband is that he is alive? Apparently, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that one who is alive remains alive.
  And we raised a contradiction from a different mishna: If one is leaving his place of residence, and in order to preclude a situation where his wife would have the status of a deserted wife he gives her a conditional bill of divorce and stipulates: This is your bill of divorce that will take effect one hour prior to my death, it is prohibited for her to partake of <i>teruma</i> immediately due to the concern lest he die in the next hour. Apparently, there is concern lest one die at any point.
  And Abaye said in resolving the contradiction: This is not difficult. This mishna, where the presumption is that one who is alive remains alive, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is not concerned about potential death. That mishna, where there is concern lest one die at any point, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who is concerned about potential death.
  The Gemara cites proof that these are the opinions of those <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans and there is reason to suspect that <i>teruma</i> and tithes were not taken, and he is not in a position to separate <i>teruma</i>, he acts as follows. If there are one hundred <i>log</i> of wine in the barrels, he says: Two <i>log</i> that I will separate in the future are <i>teruma</i>, as the mandated average measure of <i>teruma</i> is one-fiftieth; ten <i>log</i> are first tithe; and a tenth of the remainder, which is nine <i>log</i>, are second tithe. And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit one from doing so due to the concern lest the wineskin burst and the contents spill before he has an opportunity to actually separate the <i>teruma</i> and tithes. In that case, when he drank the wine, retroactively, he is found to have drunk untithed produce. Rabbi Meir is not concerned about potential change in the status quo, and Rabbi Yehuda, who is concerned lest the wineskin burst, would all the more so be concerned about potential death.
  The Gemara suggests: Reverse the attribution of the statements according to Abaye. Rabbi Meir is concerned about potential death, and Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about potential death, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one utilized his animal as a wall for the <i>sukka</i>, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit.
  The Gemara asks: This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Meir with regard to <i>sukka</i>, where he is concerned about potential death, and the other statement of Rabbi Meir with regard to separation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes, where he is not concerned lest the wineskin burst. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir could have said to you: Death is common, as every living being will eventually die; however, the bursting of the wineskin is not common because it is possible that he gave the wineskin to a guard for protection so that it does not burst until he has the opportunity to separate the required <i>teruma</i> and tithes.
  The Gemara asks: This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to <i>sukka</i>, where he is not concerned about potential death, and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to separation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes, where he is concerned lest the wineskin burst.
  The Gemara answers: The rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to tithes is not due to the fact that he is concerned about the potential bursting of the wineskin; rather, he rules that one may not drink the wine because he is not of the opinion that there is a principle of retroactive clarification. The procedure prescribed by Rabbi Meir is based on a fundamental assumption that when the separation is actually performed, the produce that he separates for <i>teruma</i> and tithes at that point is determined retroactively to have been <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the outset. Rabbi Yehuda does not accept this principle. Therefore, one’s subsequent actions do not retroactively determine the original status of the produce.
  The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yehuda not concerned about the potential bursting of the wineskin? But isn’t there proof from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> that the Sages said to Rabbi Meir with regard to tithes: Do you not concede that perhaps the wineskin will burst, and it will be determined retroactively that he is drinking untithed produce? And Rabbi Meir said to the Sages: That possibility is not a concern. When it actually bursts, I will be concerned. This indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with Rabbi Meir, is concerned about the potential bursting of the wineskin.
  The Gemara answers that there, it is Rabbi Yehuda who is saying to Rabbi Meir: For me, I am not of the opinion that there is a principle of retroactive clarification, and therefore one cannot separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes after drinking the wine. However, according to your opinion that there is a principle of retroactive clarification, do you not concede that one may not drink wine before separating <i>teruma</i> and tithes due to the concern lest the wineskin burst? Rabbi Meir said to him: When it actually bursts, I will be concerned.
  The Gemara asks further: And is Rabbi Yehuda not concerned about potential death? Didn’t we learn in a mishna in tractate <i>Yoma</i> (2a) that the Sages said with regard to the High Priest prior to Yom Kippur: And they would designate another priest in his stead, and since the High Priest performing the Yom Kippur service must be married, Rabbi Yehuda says: They would even designate another wife for him lest his wife die. Apparently, he is concerned about potential death. The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that this designation is unique to Yom Kippur, as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: They established a higher standard with regard to atonement? Therefore, matters that are not a source of concern in other areas of <i>halakha</i> are significant with regard to Yom Kippur.
  § The Gemara asks: Both according to the one who said that an animal is an unfit partition due to the concern lest it die, and according to the one who said that it is due to the concern lest it flee, apparently it is a full-fledged partition by Torah law, and it is the Sages who issued a decree prohibiting its use lest a problem arise. However, if that is so, according to Rabbi Meir an animal used as a covering for a grave should be impure due to the impurity of the covering of a grave. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (<i>Eiruvin</i> 15a–b) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even a living creature imparts ritual impurity due to the impurity of the covering of a grave, but Rabbi Meir deems it pure? If according to Rabbi Meir an animal is unfit for use as a partition only due to the concern lest it die or flee, but essentially it is a fit partition, why does it not become impure when used as a covering of a grave?
  Rather, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said, contrary to that which was stated above: Rabbi Meir holds that any partition that stands by means of air, i.e., by intangible means, like an animate being, which stands due to its life force, is not a partition. Some say a different version of that which Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Rabbi Meir holds that any partition that is not established by a person is not a partition.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two versions of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s statement? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in the case where one establishes a partition with an inflated wineskin. According to the one who said that a partition that stands by means of air is not a partition, this partition also stands by means of air and is therefore unfit. According to the one who said that if it is not established by a person it is not a partition,
  
  Daf 24b
  
  this partition was established by a person and is therefore fit.
  § The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> that in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they said: Nor may one write bills of divorce on it. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly thing in her; that he write her a scroll [<i>sefer</i>] of severance and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1); from the word scroll, I have derived only that a scroll is fit. From where do I derive to include all objects as fit materials upon which a bill of divorce may be written? The verse states: “That he write her,” in any case, i.e., any surface upon which the formula can be written.
  If so, what is the meaning of that which the verse states: Scroll? It is to tell you that a bill of divorce must be written on a surface like a scroll: Just as a scroll is neither alive nor is it food, so too, a bill of divorce may be written on any object that is neither alive nor food. That is why Rabbi Yosei HaGelili invalidates a bill of divorce written on a living being.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who disagree and say that a bill of divorce may be written even on a living creature or on food, interpret the verse? They contend: If the verse had written: That he write for her in the scroll [<i>basefer</i>], it would be as you said, that the bill of divorce may be written only on a scroll. Now that it is written simply: That he write her a <i>sefer</i>, it comes to teach that a mere account of the matters [<i>sefirat devarim</i>] is required. There are no restrictions with regard to the surface on which that account may be written.
  The Gemara continues: And what do the Rabbis derive from the phrase: “That he write her”? The Gemara answers: That phrase is required to teach the principle that a woman is divorced only by means of writing, i.e., a bill of divorce, and she is not divorced by means of money. It might have entered your mind to say: Since in the verse, leaving marriage, i.e., divorce, is juxtaposed to becoming married, i.e., betrothal, then just as becoming married is effected with money, so too, leaving marriage may be effected with money. Therefore, the Torah teaches us: “That he write her,” indicating that divorce can be effected only with a written bill of divorce.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, from where does he derive this reasoning that a woman cannot be divorced with money? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase: “A scroll of severance,” which teaches that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband, and nothing else severs her from him.
  The Gemara continues: And the other <i>tanna</i>, i.e., the Rabbis, requires that verse to teach that a bill of divorce must be a matter that severs all connection between him and her. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a man says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will never drink wine, or on the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not severance; the divorce is not valid. If a bill of divorce imposes a condition upon the woman that permanently binds her to her husband, her relationship with her husband has not been completely severed, which is a prerequisite for divorce. If, however, he imposes a condition for the duration of thirty days, or any other limited period of time, that is severance, and the divorce is valid, as the relationship will be completely terminated at the end of the thirty-day period.
  The Gemara continues: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, derives that a condition without a termination point invalidates the divorce from the fact that instead of using the term <i>karet</i>, the verse uses the more expanded term <i>keritut</i>. Inasmuch as both terms denote severance, using the longer term teaches two things: Divorce can be effected only by means of writing and not through money, and divorce requires total severance. And the other <i>tanna</i>, the Rabbis, does not derive anything from the expansion of <i>karet</i> to <i>keritut</i>, because the Rabbis do not see this as a significant deviation from the standard language of the verse.
  mishna In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> between the trees, and the trees serve as walls for it, the <i>sukka</i> is fit.
  gemara Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Any partition that is not able to stand in a typical wind, but rather is blown to and fro, is not a partition.
  The Gemara asks the following question based on that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of one who establishes his <i>sukka</i> between the trees, and the trees serve as walls for it, the <i>sukka</i> is fit. The Gemara asks: But don’t the trees sway back and forth in the wind? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? The mishna is referring to older trees that are thick and hard and do not sway in the wind.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the issue of its foliage, which certainly sways in the wind? If it constitutes part of the wall of the <i>sukka</i>, the <i>sukka</i> should be unfit. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where it is a fit wall due to the fact that he established the wall by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves to tighten it to prevent it from swaying in the wind. And the Gemara says: If it is so that the tree is tied and cannot sway, what purpose is there to state this <i>halakha</i>? It is obvious that it is a fit wall. The Gemara answers: It is lest you say: Let us issue a decree prohibiting its use lest one come to use the tree on Shabbat. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not a concern.
  Come and hear a different proof that a partition that is blown to and fro in the wind is a fit partition. The <i>halakha</i> is that double boards positioned in the four corners of an area surrounding a well render the area a private domain in which it is permitted to draw water from the well on Shabbat. If there was a tree there, one cubit thick on each side of one of the corners, or a square stone fence that measures one square cubit, or a partition of reeds, its legal status is assessed like that of a double board positioned at the corners of the area surrounding a well, and serve as a partition for two of the sides. Apparently, a partition that moves in the wind, like the partition of reeds, is considered a full-fledged partition. The Gemara refutes this proof: There, too, it is only considered a full-fledged partition due to the fact that he established the partition by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves.
  The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a tree whose foliage is broad and its branches reach down and cover the ground, if its foliage is not three handbreadths high off the ground it creates a space similar to a round room; therefore, one may carry beneath it, as it is a full-fledged private domain. Why is the foliage of the tree a fit partition? Doesn’t it sway back and forth in the wind? The Gemara answers: There, too, it is due to the fact that he established the partition by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves.
  The Gemara asks: If so that it is a case where one established the foliage as a complete partition, let him move objects in the entire area beneath the tree, since it is a private domain. Why, then, did Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, say: One may carry beneath this tree
  
  Daf 25a
  
  only within an area of two <i>beit se’a</i>, the area necessary to grow two <i>se’a</i> of produce? Two <i>beit se’a</i> was the area of the Tabernacle courtyard; it is also the area within which the Sages permitted one to carry on Shabbat in a case where there are partitions but the area was not originally enclosed for the purpose of residence. If one tied the foliage to prevent its swaying in the wind, he clearly established the partition for residence, and there should be no limits on the area in which he may carry.
  The Gemara answers: The reason that it is permitted to carry only if the enclosed area is less than this size is because it is a residence whose uses are for the open air beyond it, i.e., it is used by guards who are watching the fields beyond it rather than as an independent residence. And the <i>halakha</i> with regard to any residence whose uses are for the open air beyond it is that one may carry in it only if its area is no larger than two <i>beit se’a</i>.
  Come and hear proof from another source: With regard to one who established his Shabbat residence on a mound that is ten handbreadths high and its area is anywhere from four cubits to two <i>beit se’a</i>; and similarly, with regard to one who established his Shabbat residence in a natural cavity of a rock that is ten handbreadths deep and its area is anywhere from four cubits to two <i>beit se’a</i>; and similarly, with regard to one who established his Shabbat residence in a field of reaped grain, and rows of stalks ten handbreadths high that have not been reaped surround it, serving as a partition enclosing the reaped area, he may walk in the entire enclosed area and outside it an additional two thousand cubits. Apparently, the stalks are a fit partition although they sway back and forth in the wind. The Gemara refutes this proof: There, too, it is a fit partition due to the fact that he established the partition by tying it with hard palm leaves and laurel leaves.
  MISHNA: Those on the path to perform a mitzva are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. The ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. One may eat and drink in the framework of a casual meal outside the <i>sukka</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived that one who is performing a mitzva is exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written in the Torah that one recites <i>Shema</i> at the following times: “When you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way, and when you lie down, and when you rise up” (Deuteronomy 6:7). The Sages interpret: “When you sit in your house,” to the exclusion of one who is engaged in the performance of a mitzva, who is not sitting at home; “and when you walk by the way,” to the exclusion of a groom, who is preoccupied with his mitzva of consummating the marriage and is not walking along the way. The <i>baraita</i> adds that from here the Sages stated: One who marries a virgin is exempt from reciting <i>Shema</i> on his wedding night, and one who marries a widow is obligated.
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred in this verse that a groom is exempt from the mitzva of <i>Shema</i>? Rav Huna said: The circumstances when one is obligated to recite <i>Shema</i> are like the circumstances when one walks along the way: Just as the walking by the way described in the verse is voluntary and involves no mitzva, so too, all those obligated to recite <i>Shema</i> are similarly engaged in voluntary activities, to the exclusion of this groom, who is engaged in the performance of a mitzva.
  The Gemara asks: The verse does not specify the way along which one is walking. Are we not dealing with one who is walking along the way for a matter of a mitzva, and nevertheless, the Merciful One says to recite <i>Shema</i>? Apparently, one is obligated to do so even if he set out to perform a mitzva. The Gemara answers: If it is so that the intention was to obligate even those who are engaged in performance of a mitzva, let the verse state: When sitting and when walking. What is the meaning of: “When you sit…and when you walk”? It comes to underscore: It is in your walking, undertaken for personal reasons and of one’s own volition, that you are obligated to recite <i>Shema</i>; in walking with the objective of performing a mitzva, you are exempt from reciting <i>Shema</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, even one who marries a widow should also be exempt, as he too is engaged in the performance of a mitzva. That, however, contradicts the <i>baraita</i>. The Gemara responds that there is a distinction between one marrying a virgin and one marrying a widow. One who marries a virgin is preoccupied by his concern lest he discover that his bride is not a virgin, while one who marries a widow is not preoccupied.
  The Gemara asks: And wherever one is preoccupied is he indeed exempt? But if that is so, then one whose ship sank at sea, who is preoccupied, should also be exempt. The Gemara reinforces its question: And if you say that indeed, that is so, didn’t Rabbi Abba bar Zavda say that Rav said: A mourner is obligated in all the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah, including reciting <i>Shema</i>, except for the mitzva to don phylacteries, from which he is exempt, as the term splendor is stated with regard to phylacteries? If a mourner, who is clearly pained and preoccupied, is obligated to recite <i>Shema</i>, then certainly all others who are preoccupied, even one whose ship sank at sea, whose loss was merely monetary (<i>Birkat Hashem</i>), should be obligated. Why, then, is a groom exempted due to his preoccupation and one who lost his property is not?
  The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the cases. Here, in the case of a groom, he is preoccupied with the preoccupation of a mitzva that he must perform; there, in the case of a ship lost at sea, he is preoccupied with the preoccupation of a voluntary act that he chooses to perform.
  § The Gemara asks: And is the halakhic principle that one who is engaged in a mitzva is exempt from performing another mitzva derived from here? It is derived from there, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “There were certain men who were impure by the corpse of a person and they could not observe the <i>Pesaḥ</i> on that day” (Numbers 9:6). Before proceeding with the discussion, the <i>baraita</i> seeks to clarify with regard to those men who became impure: Who were they? The <i>baraita</i> answers: They were the bearers of Joseph’s coffin, which the Jewish people brought with them in the desert. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  Rabbi Akiva says: They were Mishael and Elzaphan, who were engaged in carrying the bodies of Nadav and Avihu after they were burned in the Holy of Holies (see Leviticus 10:4). Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These identifications are inaccurate, because if they were the bearers of Joseph’s coffin, they could have already been purified. They were camped at Sinai sufficient time to become purified in time to sacrifice the Paschal lamb. And if they were Mishael and Elzaphan they could have already been purified, as the Tabernacle was erected on the first of Nisan, which was the eighth day of the inauguration, when the sons of Aaron were burned. More than seven days remained until the eve of Passover on the fourteenth of Nisan.
  Rather, they were unnamed people who were engaged in tending to a corpse whose burial is a mitzva, i.e., which has no one else available to bury it, and their seventh day of impurity occurred precisely on the eve of Passover, as it is stated: “And they could not observe the <i>Pesaḥ</i> on that day” (Numbers 9:6). The Gemara infers: On that day they could not observe it; on the next day they could observe it. Although they would be purified at nightfall and would then be eligible to partake of the Paschal lamb, at the time of the slaughter and the sprinkling of the blood they were not yet pure. They asked whether the Paschal lamb could be slaughtered on their behalf. Apparently, they were obligated to perform the mitzva of burial of the corpse although it prevented them from fulfilling the mitzva of sacrificing the Paschal lamb, which is a stringent mitzva. This is the source for the principle that one engaged in the performance of a mitzva is exempt from performing another mitzva.
  The Gemara answers: Both sources are necessary. As, if it had taught us there, in the case of impurity imparted by a corpse, the conclusion would have been that the exemption from sacrificing the Paschal lamb is due to the fact that the time of the obligation of the <i>Pesaḥ</i> had not yet arrived when they were obligated to bury the corpse, and therefore they proceeded to fulfill the mitzva that they encountered first. However, here, where the time to recite <i>Shema</i> had already arrived during the wedding, say no, that the groom is not exempt; therefore, it is necessary to teach that the groom is exempt. And if it had taught us here, with regard to <i>Shema</i>, the conclusion would have been that the exemption from <i>Shema</i> is due to the fact that it is not a stringent mitzva, as there is no <i>karet</i> administered to one who fails to fulfill it. However, there, with regard to the Paschal lamb, where there is <i>karet</i> administered to one who fails to observe the <i>Pesaḥ</i>, say that one is not exempt from performing it. Therefore, it is necessary to teach both cases.
  § With regard to the matter itself, Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: A mourner is obligated in all the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah except for the mitzva to don phylacteries, from which a mourner is exempt, as the term splendor is stated with regard to phylacteries, and it is not proper for a mourner to adorn himself in this manner. This is derived from the fact that the Merciful One said to Ezekiel: “Sigh in silence; make no mourning for the dead, bind your splendor upon you, and put your shoes upon your feet” (Ezekiel 24:17). Ezekiel was commanded to refrain from mourning for his wife in the manner that others do. God said to Ezekiel: You are obligated to don phylacteries even while mourning; however, everyone else is exempt.
  The Gemara comments: This exemption applies only on the first day of mourning, as it is written: “And I will make it as the mourning for an only son, and the end thereof as a bitter day” (Amos 8:10). From this verse it is derived that the primary bitterness of a mourner lasts only one day.
  On a similar note, Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: A mourner is obligated in the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: That is obvious; why would he be exempt? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said that one who is suffering due to his presence in the <i>sukka</i> is exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, one could have said that this mourner too is one who is suffering and should be exempt as well. Therefore, he teaches us that the mourner is obligated in the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. These cases are not similar, since this exemption from <i>sukka</i> applies only with regard to suffering that is caused by the <i>sukka</i> itself, e.g., when one is cold or hot or when the roofing has a foul odor. However, here, in the case of a mourner, where he is causing himself to suffer unrelated to his presence in the <i>sukka</i>, he is required to settle himself and fulfill the mitzva.
  § And Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: The groom and the groomsmen and all members of the wedding party who participate in the wedding celebration are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> for all seven days of the wedding celebration. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they are exempt? It is because they wish to rejoice. The Gemara asks: And let them eat in the <i>sukka</i> and rejoice in the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara answers: The celebration of a wedding is only in the wedding home where the newlyweds reside after the marriage ceremony. The Gemara asks: So let them eat in the <i>sukka</i> like everyone else and rejoice in the wedding home. The Gemara answers: There is joy only in the place where there is a meal. Therefore, since the celebration must be in the home of the newlyweds, the meal must also be there.
  The Gemara asks: And let them establish the wedding home in the <i>sukka</i>. Abaye said: This may not be done due to the prohibition against seclusion of the bride with a man other than her husband. As the <i>sukka</i> was often established on a rooftop, if the groom went downstairs at any point, the bride could find herself alone in the <i>sukka</i> with a man. And Rava said: The reason is due to the suffering of the groom. Since the <i>sukka</i> is not enclosed on all sides, he will be unable to enjoy privacy with his bride. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where people regularly enter and leave the <i>sukka</i>. According to the one who said that the reason is due to the prohibition against being alone together, there is no room for concern in that case. However, according to the one who said that the reason is due to the suffering of the groom, there is room for concern in that case as well.
  Rabbi Zeira said: I married on the eve of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> and I ate in the <i>sukka</i> and rejoiced in the wedding home, and all the more so my heart rejoiced as I fulfilled two mitzvot: The mitzva of marriage and the accompanying celebration, and the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. Nevertheless, he did not require others to do the same.
  The Sages taught: The groom and the groomsmen and all the members of the wedding party are exempt from the mitzva of prayer and from the mitzva of phylacteries because they are unable to muster the requisite intent due to the excess of joy and levity; but they are obligated in the mitzva of reciting <i>Shema</i>.
  
  Daf 26a
  
  In the name of Rabbi Sheila they said: A groom is exempt from the mitzva of <i>Shema</i>, but the groomsmen and all the members of the wedding party are obligated.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya said: With regard to scribes of Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and <i>mezuzot</i>, they themselves, and the merchants who sell them, and the merchants who purchase them from the first merchants and sell them to others, and all who are engaged in the labor of Heaven, which comes to include the sellers of the sky-blue dye for ritual fringes, are all exempt from the mitzva of reciting <i>Shema</i> and from prayer and from donning phylacteries and from all mitzvot that are mentioned in the Torah while they are engaged in that labor. This statement comes to fulfill the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili would say: One who is engaged in a mitzva is exempt from another mitzva.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Travelers who travel during the day are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> during the day and are obligated at night. Travelers by night are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> at night and obligated during the day. Travelers both during the day and at night are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> both during the day and at night. Those who travel for a matter of mitzva are exempt both during the day and at night, because they are preoccupied with the mitzva, even if they are not traveling at night, as in this recurring incident involving Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna. The Gemara relates: When they would enter the house of the Exilarch on the Shabbat of the Festival to hear his Festival homily, they would sleep on the bank of the Sura River and not in a <i>sukka</i>. They said in explanation: We are ones on the path to perform a mitzva and are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Guardians of the city who guard during the day are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> during the day and are obligated at night. Guardians of the city at night are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> at night and are obligated during the day. Those who guard the city both during the day and at night are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> both during the day and at night.
  Guardians of gardens and orchards are exempt from <i>sukka</i> both during the day and at night. The Gemara asks: And let them establish a <i>sukka</i> there in the garden and reside there. Why are they exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? Abaye said: The reason for the exemption is the verse: “In <i>sukkot</i> shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42), which the Sages interpreted to mean: Reside as you dwell in your permanent home. Since preparing a <i>sukka</i> that is a fully equipped dwelling in the orchard far from his house would involve considerable exertion, the mitzva does not apply to him.
  Rava said: A breach summons the thief. If the guardian builds a <i>sukka</i>, thieves will know where the guardian is located in the field and they will enter the field elsewhere. The exemption of the watchman from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> prevents that situation. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons given? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where he is guarding a pile of fruit, which can be guarded from inside the <i>sukka</i>; therefore, according to Rava, in that case the guard would be obligated in the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. However, since the <i>sukka</i> in the orchard is not like a fully equipped home, in Abaye’s opinion he would still be exempt in that case.
  § It is stated in the mishna: The ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The ill person that they said is exempt from <i>sukka</i> is not only an ill person whose condition is critical, but even an ill person whose condition is not critical, and even one who feels pain in his eyes, and even one who feels pain in his head. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: One time I felt pain in my eyes in Caesarea, and the esteemed Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta permitted me and my attendant to sleep outside the <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara relates a similar tale: Rav permitted Rav Aḥa Bardela to sleep beneath a canopy in the <i>sukka</i> due to the biting flies [<i>baki</i>]. He permitted this although the canopy was more than ten handbreadths high and in sleeping beneath it he did not fulfill his obligation. Rava permitted Rabbi Aḥa bar Adda to sleep outside the <i>sukka</i> due to the foul odor of the earth [<i>gargishta</i>] floor of the <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara comments: Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava said: One who suffers in the <i>sukka</i> is exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? By inference, with regard to an ill person, yes, he is exempt; with regard to one who suffers, no, he is not exempt. The Sages say: With regard to an ill person, he and his caretakers are exempt; however, with regard to one who merely suffers in the <i>sukka</i>, he is exempt but his caretakers are not.
  § The mishna continues: One may eat and drink in the framework of a casual meal outside the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: And how much food is considered a casual meal? Rav Yosef said: It is two or three egg-bulks of bread. Abaye said to him: But often, doesn’t a person suffice with that measure of food, and then its legal status is that of a formal meal? Rather, Abaye said: A casual meal is like the measure that a student of the academy of Rav tastes and then enters the study hall to hear the lecture.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may eat a casual meal outside the <i>sukka</i>, but one may not take even a brief nap outside the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this distinction? After all, sleeping in the <i>sukka</i> is an obligation just as eating in the <i>sukka</i> is an obligation. Rav Ashi said: It is prohibited to nap outside the <i>sukka</i> due to a decree lest he fall into a deep sleep.
  Abaye said to him: But with regard to that <i>halakha</i> which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may take a brief nap while donning phylacteries but substantial sleep is not permitted. Let us be concerned in that case as well lest he fall into a deep sleep. Rav Yosef, son of Rav Illai, said: There is no concern with regard to phylacteries, as it is a case where one assigns responsibility for ensuring that his sleep will not be prolonged to others.
  Rav Mesharshiyya strongly objects to Abaye’s statement: Your guarantor, who ensures that you do not sleep too long, requires a guarantor to ensure that he does not do the same. Rather, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We are dealing with a case where he places his head between his knees, a position that does not lend itself to deep sleep. Rava said: Neither with regard to <i>sukka</i> nor with regard to phylacteries is there concern lest he fall into a deep sleep. Taking a brief nap outside the <i>sukka</i> is prohibited because there is no concept of substantial duration with regard to sleep, i.e., there is no halakhic difference between a brief nap and a longer-lasting sleep. Depending on circumstances, sleep of any duration can be considered substantial and is therefore prohibited outside a <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara comments that it is taught in one <i>baraita</i>: A person may take a brief nap with phylacteries, but substantial sleep is not permitted. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Both substantial sleep and a brief nap are permitted. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Neither substantial sleep nor a brief nap is permitted. The Gemara explains that this is not difficult: This <i>baraita</i>, where it is taught that even a brief nap is prohibited, is in a case where one holds the phylacteries in his hands. It is prohibited to sleep at all lest he drop them. That <i>baraita</i>, where it was taught that a brief nap is permitted, is in a case where the phylacteries are placed on his head. There is no concern during a brief nap lest he break wind or experience a seminal emission. During deep sleep, that is a concern. That third <i>baraita</i>, where it was taught that even substantial sleep is permitted with phylacteries, is in a case where he removes the phylacteries and spreads a cloth over them and sleeps alongside them.
  The Gemara asks: And how much is the duration of a brief nap? Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: It is equivalent to the time required for walking one hundred cubits. The Gemara comments: That is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who sleeps with phylacteries and experiences a seminal emission grips the strap of the phylacteries to remove them
  
  Daf 26b
  
  and does not grip the box of the phylacteries, which he may not touch while impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov. And the Rabbis say: A person may take a brief nap with his phylacteries, but substantial sleep is not permitted, and he will thereby avoid a seminal emission while donning phylacteries. And how long is the duration of a brief nap? It is equivalent to the time required for walking one hundred cubits.
  Apropos the duration of a brief nap, the Gemara cites that Rav said: It is prohibited for a person to sleep during the day longer than the duration of the sleep of a horse. One who sleeps for longer is derelict in the study of Torah. And how long is the duration of the sleep of a horse? It is sixty breaths long.
  Abaye said: The sleep of the Master, Rabba, is like that of Rav, and that of Rav is like the sleep of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And that of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is like that of King David, and that of King David is like that of a horse. And that of a horse is sixty breaths.
  The Gemara relates: Abaye would sleep during the day for a period equivalent to the time it takes to enter from Pumbedita to Bei Kuvei. Rav Yosef read the following verse as pertaining to Abaye: “How long will you sleep, sluggard? When will you arise from your sleep?” (Proverbs 6:9). Rav Yosef considered this dereliction in the study of Torah.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who enters his bed to sleep during the day, if he wishes, he may remove his phylacteries, and if he wishes, he may leave them in place. One who enters to sleep at night removes his phylacteries and may not leave them in place. This is the statement of Rabbi Natan. Rabbi Yosei says: The young men must always remove them and not leave them in place while sleeping because they are accustomed to impurity, as they are more likely to experience a seminal emission.
  The Gemara asks: Let us say that Rabbi Yosei holds that it is prohibited for one who experienced a seminal emission to don phylacteries. Abaye said: This is not so; rather, we are dealing with young men whose wives are with them, and the concern is lest they overlook the fact that they are donning phylacteries and inadvertently come to engage in matters to which they are accustomed, i.e., relations with their wives, which is certainly demeaning to the phylacteries.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one forgot that he was donning phylacteries and engaged in relations with his phylacteries in place, he may grip neither the strap nor the box until he washes his hands, and only then may he remove the phylacteries. This is because the hands are active and tend to inadvertently touch parts of the body that are unclean.
  MISHNA: Apropos eating in the <i>sukka</i>, which is discussed in the previous mishna, this mishna relates: An incident occurred where they brought a cooked dish to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai for him to taste, and to Rabban Gamliel they brought two dates and a bucket of water. And they each said: Take them up to the <i>sukka</i> and we will eat them there.
  In contrast, the mishna relates: And when they gave Rabbi Tzadok less than an egg-bulk of food, he took the food in a cloth for cleanliness; he did not wash his hands because in his opinion, one is not required to wash his hands before eating less than an egg-bulk. And he ate it outside the <i>sukka</i> and did not recite a blessing after eating it. He holds that one is not required to recite a blessing after eating less than an egg-bulk, as it is not satisfying, and it is written: “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8:10). The Gemara will explain the halakhic rationale for each of these actions described.
  GEMARA: The Gemara wonders: Is the mishna citing an incident to contradict the <i>halakha</i> cited in the previous mishna that one may eat or drink in the context of a casual meal outside the <i>sukka</i>? The incident involving Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai and Rabban Gamliel indicates that one may eat nothing outside the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete, as it is lacking a significant element, and it teaches the following: If one seeks to impose a stringency upon himself and eat nothing outside the <i>sukka</i>, he may be stringent, and there is no element of presumptuousness in adopting that stringency. And there was also an incident supporting that ruling: They brought a cooked dish to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai for him to taste, and to Rabban Gamliel they brought two dates and a bucket of water,
  
  Daf 27a
  
  and they each said: Take them up to the <i>sukka</i>.
  And when they gave Rabbi Tzadok less than an egg-bulk of food, he took the food in a cloth and he ate it outside the <i>sukka</i> and did not recite a blessing after eating it. The Gemara infers: Had they given him an egg-bulk of food, he would have been required to eat it in a <i>sukka</i>. Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yosef and Abaye, who said that one is permitted to eat that measure in the context of a casual meal outside the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara answers: No proof can be cited from here, because perhaps the reason the mishna emphasizes that Rabbi Tzadok ate less than an egg-bulk of food is that eating less than an egg-bulk does not require washing hands and reciting a blessing after eating it; however, eating an egg-bulk requires washing and reciting a blessing.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the <i>sukka</i> over the course of the seven days of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, one during the day each day and one at night each night. And the Rabbis say: There is no quota for the number of meals, and one may choose whether or not to eat any of the meals except for the meal on the evening of the first Festival day of <i>Sukkot</i>, which one is required to eat in the <i>sukka</i>.
  And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said: One who did not eat a meal on the evening of the first day of the Festival should compensate with a meal on the evening of the last day of the Festival, on the Eighth Day of Assembly, despite the fact that he will not eat it in the <i>sukka</i>. And the Rabbis say: There is no compensation for this matter, and with regard to similar cases where it is impossible to rectify failure to fulfill a positive mitzva, it is stated: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” (Ecclesiastes 1:15).
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who mandates eating fourteen meals in the <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers that he derives his opinion from the verse: “In <i>sukkot</i> shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42), which the Sages interpreted to mean: Reside as you dwell in your permanent home. Therefore, just as in one’s dwelling one typically eats one meal during the day and one meal at night, so too, in a <i>sukka</i> one eats one meal during the day and one meal at night.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis interpret that verse? The Gemara answers: They explain that a <i>sukka</i> is like a permanent dwelling. Just as in one’s dwelling, if one desires to eat, he eats, and if one does not desire to do so, he does not eat, so too, in the <i>sukka</i>, if one desires to eat, he eats, and if one does not desire to do so, he does not eat.
  The Gemara asks: If so, then according to the Rabbis, even on the first Festival evening as well one should not be required to eat in the <i>sukka</i>.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: There is a verbal analogy between the festivals of Passover and <i>Sukkot</i>. It is stated here, with regard to <i>Sukkot</i>: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for seven days unto the Lord” (Leviticus 23:34). And it is stated: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of <i>matzot</i> unto the Lord” (Leviticus 23:6) with regard to the festival of Passover. Just as there, with regard to Passover, on the first night there is an obligation to eat <i>matza</i> and from that point onward it is optional, as from that point onward the only obligation is to refrain from eating leaven, so too here, with regard to <i>Sukkot</i>, on the first night there is an obligation to eat in the <i>sukka</i> and from that point onward it is optional.
  The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to Passover, from where do we derive that there is an obligation to eat <i>matza</i> on the first night? The Gemara answers that the verse says: “In the evening you shall eat <i>matzot</i>” (Exodus 12:18). The verse established it as an obligation.
  § The mishna continues: And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said that one who did not eat a meal on the evening of the first day of the Festival should compensate with a meal on the evening of the last day of the Festival. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Eliezer say that a person is obligated to eat fourteen meals in the <i>sukka</i>, one during the day and one at night? However, the compensatory meal on the evening of the Eighth Day of Assembly is not eaten in the <i>sukka</i>. Beira said that Rabbi Ami said: Rabbi Eliezer retracted his previous statement and agrees with the Rabbis that there is no quota for the meals that one must eat in the <i>sukka</i>, and it is only the meal on the first evening of the Festival that one must eat in the <i>sukka</i>. Their dispute is with regard to compensation if one failed to eat the meal on the first evening.
  The Gemara asks: With what will he compensate for his failure to eat the Festival meal? If we say that he compensates with bread, he is thereby eating the festive meal of that Eighth Day of Assembly; how is it obvious that it is compensation for a different meal? Rather, what is the meaning of: He should compensate? It means that he should compensate by adding types of delicacies [<i>targima</i>]. That is taught in a <i>baraita</i> as well: If he compensated by adding types of delicacies, he fulfilled his obligation.
  The steward [<i>apotropos</i>] of King Agrippas asked Rabbi Eliezer: For someone like me, who is accustomed to eat only one meal a day, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it sufficient that I eat one meal and exempt myself from the obligation to eat any more that day? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Each day you continue eating and taste various kinds of appetizers in deference to your own desires, and now you do not continue eating even one appetizer in deference to your Maker?
  And the steward further asked Rabbi Eliezer: For someone like me, who has two wives, one in Tiberias and one in Tzippori, and has two <i>sukkot</i>, one in Tiberias and one in Tzippori, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Can I depart from one <i>sukka</i> to another <i>sukka</i> and exempt myself from the obligation? In other words, is it permitted to fulfill the mitzva in one <i>sukka</i> for part of <i>Sukkot</i> and in another for the rest of the Festival? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No, as I say that anyone who departs from one <i>sukka</i> to another <i>sukka</i> has negated the mitzva of the first. The obligation is to reside in the same <i>sukka</i> for all seven days.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says:
  
  Daf 27b
  
  One may not depart from one <i>sukka</i> to another <i>sukka</i>; he must reside in the same <i>sukka</i> for the entire Festival. And one may not establish a <i>sukka</i> during the intermediate days of the Festival if he failed to do so before the Festival. And the Rabbis say: One may depart from one <i>sukka</i> to another <i>sukka</i>, and one may establish a <i>sukka</i> on the intermediate days of the Festival. And they all, even Rabbi Eliezer, agree that if a <i>sukka</i> that one constructed before the Festival collapsed, he may rebuild it during the intermediate days of the Festival.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that it is prohibited to move from one <i>sukka</i> to another during the Festival? The Gemara explains it is as the verse says: “You shall prepare for yourself the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for seven days” (Deuteronomy 16:13); this is interpreted to mean: Establish a <i>sukka</i> that is suitable for seven days. It is considered a <i>sukka</i> suitable for the mitzva only if it is established for seven days. The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, this is what the Merciful One is saying: If one did not establish a <i>sukka</i> on the eve of the Festival, he should establish a <i>sukka</i> during the Festival. The obligation to establish a <i>sukka</i> is in effect all seven days of the Festival.
  It is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And they agree that if a <i>sukka</i> that one constructed before the Festival collapsed, he may rebuild it during the intermediate days of the Festival. The Gemara asks: That is obvious; why would it be prohibited? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that according to Rabbi Eliezer this rebuilt <i>sukka</i> is considered a different one and is not a <i>sukka</i> established for seven days, therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it is considered to be the same <i>sukka</i>.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: Just as a person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the Festival with the <i>lulav</i> of another, as it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm” (Leviticus 23:40), and the Sages derive from the phrase: Shall take for yourselves, that it must be taken from your own and not from that of someone else, so too, a person does not fulfill his obligation with the <i>sukka</i> of another, as it is written: “You shall prepare for yourself the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for seven days” (Deuteronomy 16:13), and the Sages derive from the term “for yourself” that it must be taken from your own.
  And the Rabbis say: Although they said that a person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the Festival with the <i>lulav</i> of another, he fulfills his obligation with the <i>sukka</i> of another, as it is written: “All the homeborn in Israel shall reside in <i>sukkot</i>” (Leviticus 23:42). This teaches that all of the Jewish people are fit to reside in one <i>sukka</i>. If the value of one <i>sukka</i> were divided among all the Jewish people, no individual would have a <i>peruta</i> stake in it; therefore, no individual could be considered even a part-owner of the <i>sukka</i>. The only way the entire Jewish people could fulfill the mitzva in one <i>sukka</i> is by residing in a communal <i>sukka</i> that does not belong to any of them. Apparently, there is no obligation to reside specifically in one’s own <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who do not derive that one is obligated to reside in his own <i>sukka</i>, what do they derive from this term “for yourself”? The Gemara answers: They require that term to exclude a stolen <i>sukka</i>. One does not fulfill his obligation with a stolen <i>sukka</i>. However, with regard to a borrowed <i>sukka</i>, it is written: “All the homeborn,” to teach that every Jew can fulfill the mitzva in a <i>sukka</i> borrowed from the community.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, what does he do with this term: “All the homeborn”? The Gemara answers: He requires that term to derive that a convert who converted in the interim, during <i>Sukkot</i>, and a minor who reached majority in the interim, whose obligation began during the Festival, are obligated to fulfill the mitzva of residing in a <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, from where are these <i>halakhot</i> derived? The Gemara answers: Once the Sages said that one may establish a <i>sukka</i> during the intermediate days of the Festival, an additional verse is not necessary to derive the obligation of the convert and the minor who reached majority.
  § The Sages taught: There was an incident involving Rabbi Elai, who went on <i>Sukkot</i> eve to greet his teacher Rabbi Eliezer in Lod on the first day of the Festival. He said to him: Elai, you are not among those who stay home on the Festival and therefore you have not fulfilled the mitzva of the Festival, as Rabbi Eliezer would say: I praise the lazy, who, although they act no differently than they do the entire year, are praiseworthy because they do not leave their houses on the Festival, as it is written: “You shall rejoice, you and your household” (Deuteronomy 14:26). The term “your household” is interpreted as referring to one’s wife. One who is not home cannot rejoice with his wife.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say: From where is it derived that one is obligated to greet his teacher on the Festival? It is as it is stated that the husband of the Shunamite woman asked his wife: “Why are you going to him today? It is neither the New Moon nor Shabbat” (II Kings 4:23). This proves by inference that on the New Moon and Shabbat a person is obligated to greet his teacher. The Gemara answers that this is not difficult: This statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak that one is obligated to go and greet his teacher is referring to a case where he goes and returns on the same day and can rejoice with his wife at night; and this statement of Rabbi Eliezer that one should stay home is referring to a case where he goes and does not return on the same day and cannot rejoice with his wife at night.
  § The Sages taught: There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer, who stayed in the Upper Galilee in the <i>sukka</i> of Yoḥanan, son of Rabbi Elai, in Caesarea; and some say that it did not occur in Caesarea but in Caesarion. And the sun reached a point over the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>, rendering it uncomfortable to remain in the <i>sukka</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: What is the <i>halakha</i>; may I spread a sheet over the roofing? Is it permitted, since it is only adding to a temporary tent or is it prohibited? Rabbi Eliezer evaded the question and said to him: There is no tribe of Israel from which a judge did not emerge.
  In the meantime, the sun reached directly over the midpoint of the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>. Once again, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: What is the <i>halakha</i>; may I spread a sheet over it? Rabbi Eliezer again evaded the question and said to him: There is no tribe of Israel from which prophets did not emerge. And the tribes of Judah and Benjamin were unique because they established kings according to prophets, as Saul and David were anointed by the prophet Samuel. At that point, the light of the sun reached the feet of Rabbi Eliezer. Yoḥanan took a sheet and spread it over the <i>sukka</i>. Rabbi Eliezer slung his cloak over his shoulder behind him and emerged from the <i>sukka</i> because he did not want to permit doing so. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Eliezer conducted himself in that manner not because he was seeking to avoid answering by diverting his attention with his words, but because Rabbi Eliezer never said a matter that he did not hear from his teacher.
  The Gemara asks: How did Rabbi Eliezer do so? How did he stay in a <i>sukka</i> in the Upper Galilee on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? Didn’t Rabbi Eliezer himself say: One may not depart from one <i>sukka</i> to another <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers: The incident was on a different Festival and not the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, and they were in the <i>sukka</i> merely for the fresh air.
  The Gemara asks from a different perspective: But didn’t Rabbi Eliezer say: I praise the lazy, who do not leave their houses on the Festival? That apparently applies to all Festivals. The Gemara answers: The incident did not take place on a Festival at all. It was on Shabbat, and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question was with regard to the prohibited labor of building on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: If so, resolve the matter and conclude that it is not permitted from his own opinion, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a window shutter on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer says: When it is tied to and hanging from the window, i.e., it is not touching the ground, one may shutter the window with it, because that is not considered building; and if not, i.e., if it is touching the ground, one may not shutter the window with it. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case one may shutter with it. From the fact that if it is not hanging from the window, Rabbi Eliezer prohibits shuttering the window, he also prohibits adding to a temporary tent.
  
  Daf 28a
  
  The Gemara answers: There is a difference between the case of the shutter and the case of the sheet. There, in the case of the shutter, where he negates it by shuttering the window, it is considered part of the building and it is therefore prohibited. However, here, in the case of the sheet, where he does not negate it, as he plans on removing it, no, it is not necessarily prohibited.
  The Gemara relates a similar incident. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer, who stayed in the Upper Galilee, and the people there asked him thirty <i>halakhot</i> in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>. In response to twelve, he said to them: I heard an answer from my teachers, and he related what he heard. In response to the other eighteen, he said to them: I did not hear an answer. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It was the reverse of these matters. In response to eighteen he said to them: I heard an answer; in response to the other twelve he said to them: I did not hear an answer.
  They said to him: Are all the matters that you know only from what you heard? Don’t you say any matters on your own? He said to them: Now you forced me to say a matter that I did not hear from my teachers, as I must describe my character traits and the manner in which I conduct myself. In all my days, no person ever preceded me into the study hall, as I am always first to arrive; and I never slept in the study hall, neither substantial sleep nor a brief nap; and I never left anyone in the study hall and exited, as I was always last to leave; and I never engaged in idle conversation; rather, I discussed only necessary matters or matters of Torah; and I never said anything that I did not hear from my teacher. That is why he did not answer those questions that his teacher did not address.
  Apropos the character traits of Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara cites character traits of his teacher. The Sages said about Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, the teacher of Rabbi Eliezer: In all his days he never engaged in idle conversation; and he never walked four cubits without engaging in Torah study and without donning phylacteries; and no person ever preceded him into the study hall; and he never slept in the study hall, neither substantial sleep nor a brief nap; and he never contemplated matters of Torah in alleyways filthy with human excrement, as doing so is a display of contempt for the Torah; and he never left anyone in the study hall and exited; and no person ever found him sitting and silent, i.e., inactive; rather, he was always sitting and studying; and only he opened the door for his students, disregarding his own eminent standing; and he never said anything that he did not hear from his teacher; and he never said to his students that the time has arrived to arise and leave the study hall except on Passover eves, when they were obligated to sacrifice the Paschal lamb, and Yom Kippur eves, when there is a mitzva to eat and drink abundantly. And Rabbi Eliezer, his student, accustomed himself to model his conduct after his example.
  The Gemara continues to praise the Sages. The Sages taught: Hillel the Elder had eighty students. Thirty of them were sufficiently worthy that the Divine Presence should rest upon them as it did upon Moses our teacher, and thirty of them were sufficiently worthy that the sun should stand still for them as it did for Joshua bin Nun, and twenty were on an intermediate level between the other two. The greatest of all the students was Yonatan ben Uzziel, and the youngest of them was Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.
  The Gemara relates: The Sages said about Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai that he did not neglect Bible; Mishna; Gemara; <i>halakhot</i> and <i>aggadot</i>; minutiae of the Torah and minutiae of the scribes; the hermeneutical principles of the Torah with regard to <i>a fortiori</i> inferences and verbal analogies; the calculation of the calendrical seasons; and numerology [<i>gimmatreyaot</i>]. In addition, he did not neglect esoteric matters, including the conversation of ministering angels; the conversation of demons, and the conversation of palm trees; parables of launderers, which are folk tales that can be used to explain the Torah; parables of foxes; and more generally, a great matter and a small matter.
  The Gemara elaborates: A great matter is referring to the secrets of the Design of the Divine Chariot, the conduct of the transcendent universe. A small matter is, for example, <i>halakhot</i> that were ultimately formulated in the framework of the disputes of Abaye and Rava. He did not neglect any of these disciplines so as to fulfill that which is stated: “That I may cause those that love me to inherit substance and that I may fill their treasuries” (Proverbs 8:21), as Rabban Yoḥanan was filled with the disciplines of Torah and wisdom. And if the youngest of them was so prolific, the greatest of them was all the more so prolific. The Gemara relates that the Sages said of Yonatan ben Uzziel, the greatest of Hillel’s students, that when he sat and was engaged in Torah study, the sanctity that he generated was so intense that any bird that flew over him was immediately incinerated.
  MISHNA: In the case of one whose head and most of his body were in the <i>sukka</i> and his table was in the house, Beit Shammai deem it unfit, and Beit Hillel deem it fit. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: And wasn’t there an incident where the Elders of Beit Shammai and the Elders of Beit Hillel went to visit Rabbi Yoḥanan ben HaḤoranit and they found him such that he was sitting with his head and most of his body in the <i>sukka</i> and his table in the house, and they said nothing to him? Even Beit Shammai did not object. Beit Shammai said to them: Is there proof from there? That is not what happened; rather, they said to him: If you were accustomed to act in this manner, you have never fulfilled the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> in your life.
  The mishna continues: Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. A minor who does not need his mother any longer is obligated in the mitzva. There was an incident where the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth just before <i>Sukkot</i>, and Shammai removed the coat of plaster from the roof, leaving the beams, and roofed with the beams over the bed for the newborn minor.
  GEMARA: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers that it is as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is stated: “All the homeborn in Israel shall reside in <i>sukkot</i>” (Leviticus 23:42). Had the verse stated only: Homeborn, it would have been derived that any homeborn member of the Jewish people is obligated to observe this mitzva. However, the term with the addition of the definite article: “The homeborn,” indicates that only certain homeborn members are obligated, i.e., men, to the exclusion of the women. The word “all” in the phrase: “All the homeborn,” comes to include the minors capable of performing this mitzva.
  § The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: “The homeborn” is to the exclusion of women. Is that to say that the term homeborn without the definite article indicates both men and women? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to Yom Kippur that it is stated: “And it shall be a statute forever unto you: In the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month, you shall afflict your souls and shall do no manner of work, the homeborn, or the stranger that sojourns among you” (Leviticus 16:29). And the term “the homeborn” in that verse comes to include homeborn women, who are obligated in the mitzva of affliction on Yom Kippur. In that case, the definite article comes to include women. Therefore, apparently, the term homeborn, without the definite article, indicates only men. Rabba said: They are each a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the Sages merely supported them with verses as a mnemonic device. Therefore, it is not surprising that the derivations are contradictory.
  The Gemara asks: Which of them is derived from the verse and which is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai and merely supported by a verse? And furthermore, why do I need the verse and why do I need the <i>halakha</i>? Isn’t <i>sukka</i> a positive, time-bound mitzva, and the principle is that women are exempt from all positive, time-bound mitzvot? There is no need for a special derivation to exempt women from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  And there is no need for a derivation with regard to their obligation to fast on Yom Kippur, as that can be derived from that which Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said, as Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said, and it was likewise taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: The verse says: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that a person commits, to commit a trespass against the Lord, and that soul be guilty” (Numbers 5:6).
  
  Daf 28b
  
  The verse equated a woman to a man with regard to all punishments and prohibitions in the Torah. The mitzvot of Yom Kippur include prohibitions, as well as the punishment of <i>karet</i>. Why, then, was this additional derivation necessary? Abaye said: Actually, <i>sukka</i> is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Nevertheless, it was necessary to teach that a woman is exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, as it might enter your mind to say: “Shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42) indicates that you reside in the <i>sukka</i> as you dwell; just as dwelling is typically performed by a man and his wife, so too, the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is performed by both a man and his wife. Therefore, it teaches us that women are exempt.
  Rava said a different reason: A <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai was necessary to teach that a woman is exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to <i>Sukkot</i>, about which it is written: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Leviticus 23:34), from Passover, about which it is written: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of <i>matzot</i>” (Leviticus 23:6). Just as there, women are obligated to eat <i>matza</i> on Passover even though it is a time-bound mitzva, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, women are obligated. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai teaches us that they are exempt.
  The Gemara asks: And now that you said that women’s exemption from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, why do I need the definite article stated in the verse in the term “the homeborn”? The Gemara answers: This verse comes to include converts, as it might enter your mind to say that the Merciful One says: “The homeborn in Israel,” indicating that only homeborn Jews are included and not the converts. Therefore, the verse teaches us that converts are also obligated.
  The Gemara asks: The obligation of women to fast on Yom Kippur is derived from the statement that Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said. In that case, why do I need the definite article in the term: The homeborn? The Gemara answers: That phrase was needed only to include women in the extension of the period of affliction on Yom Kippur eve, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the Merciful One excludes one who violates the obligation to afflict himself during the extension of the period of affliction from the punishment of <i>karet</i> and from the Torah prohibition, women should not be obligated to observe that period at all. Their obligation to observe Yom Kippur is based on the principle: The verse equated a woman to a man with regard to all punishments and prohibitions in the Torah. Since there is neither punishment nor Torah prohibition during that period, women should be exempt. Therefore, the verse teaches us that since they are obligated to observe Yom Kippur, they are obligated to observe the extension of Yom Kippur as well.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: “All the homeborn” comes to include the minors capable of performing this mitzva. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Women and slaves and minors are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the <i>baraita</i> where it is taught that minors are included, it is referring to a minor who reached the age of training, whose parents are commanded to train him in the performance of mitzvot and to accustom him to fulfill them. Here, in the mishna where it stated that the minor is exempt, it is referring to a minor who did not yet reach the age of training. The Gemara asks: The obligation of a minor who reached the age of training to perform mitzvot is by rabbinic law, and therefore it is not derived from a verse. The Gemara answers: Indeed, the obligation of the minor is by rabbinic law as part of his training, and the verse is a mere support alluding to that obligation.
  The mishna continues: A minor who does not need his mother any longer is obligated in the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a minor who does not need his mother? In the school of Rabbi Yannai they said: This is referring to any child who defecates and his mother does not need to wipe him. Rabbi Shimon says: It is any child who awakens from his sleep and does not call: Mother, mother. The Gemara asks: Older children also call for their mother when they arise; what, then, is the criterion? The Gemara answers: Rather, say that any child who awakens and does not call: Mother, mother, repeatedly until his mother comes is characterized as one who does not need his mother. An older child will cry once. However, if his mother does not come, he will tend to himself.
  The mishna relates: There was an incident where the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth and he removed part of the roof so the baby would be in a <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: Does the mishna cite an incident to contradict the preceding <i>halakha</i> that minors that are not independent are exempt from the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete, and it teaches the following: And Shammai is stringent even with very small children; and there was also an incident and the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth and Shammai removed the coat of plaster from the roof and left the beams and roofed with the beams over the bed for the newborn minor.
  MISHNA: All seven days of <i>Sukkot</i>, a person renders his <i>sukka</i> his permanent residence and his house his temporary residence. If rain fell, from when is it permitted to vacate the <i>sukka</i>? It is permitted from the point that it is raining so hard that the congealed dish will spoil. The Sages told a parable: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a servant who comes to pour wine for his master, and he pours a jug [<i>kiton</i>] of water in his face to show him that his presence is not desired. So too, in the <i>sukka</i>, rain is an indication that the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not want the person to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: All seven days of <i>Sukkot</i>, a person renders his <i>sukka</i> his permanent residence and his house his temporary residence. How so? If he has beautiful vessels, he takes them up to the <i>sukka</i>, which was typically built on the roof. If he has beautiful bedding, he takes it up to the <i>sukka</i>. He eats and drinks and relaxes in the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara explains that it is as the Sages taught: “In <i>sukkot</i> shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42), and they interpreted: Reside as you dwell in your permanent home. From here they said: All seven days, a person renders his <i>sukka</i> his permanent residence and his house his temporary residence. How so? If he has beautiful vessels, he takes them up to the <i>sukka</i>; if he has beautiful bedding, he takes it up to the <i>sukka</i>; he eats and drinks and relaxes in the <i>sukka</i> and studies Torah in the <i>sukka</i>.
  With regard to studying Torah in the <i>sukka</i>, the Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rava say: Studying Bible and studying Mishna are undertaken in the <i>sukka</i>; however, analyzing the Mishna must be undertaken outside the <i>sukka</i>. This indicates that one should not analyze Torah in the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, where it was taught that one studies in the <i>sukka</i>, is with regard to extensive study, i.e., broad study and memorization. That statement of Rava that one should study outside the <i>sukka</i> is with regard to intensive study; such study requires an environment where one can concentrate properly in order to engage in analysis of the Mishna.
  
  Daf 29a
  
  As in that situation involving Rava and Rami bar Ḥama, when they would stand before Rav Ḥisda, after he taught them a <i>halakha</i> they would quickly review the tradition that they heard from him together and only then analyze the rationale of the tradition that they had received. Apparently, in the study of Mishna and the amoraic commentary on the Mishna there is a distinction between extensive and intensive study.
  With regard to residence in the <i>sukka</i>, Rava said: Drinking vessels such as cups, which are usually clean, remain in the <i>sukka</i>. Eating vessels are taken out of the <i>sukka</i> after use. An earthenware jug and a wicker basket [<i>shaḥil</i> ] that are used for drawing water are taken outside the <i>sukka</i>. And a lamp remains inside the <i>sukka</i>, and some say it is taken outside the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree. Rather, this opinion, that a lamp remains inside the <i>sukka</i>, is referring to a large <i>sukka</i>, where the lamp and its odor do not disturb those residing in the <i>sukka</i>. And that opinion, that the lamp is taken outside the <i>sukka</i>, is referring to a small <i>sukka</i>, where the lamp’s odor is offensive.
  § The mishna stated: If rain fell, it is permitted to leave the <i>sukka</i> from the point that it is raining so hard that the congealed dish will spoil. It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: The measure is from when a congealed dish of pounded grain, a dish ruined by even slight rainfall, will spoil.
  Abaye was sitting before Rav Yosef in the <i>sukka</i>. The wind blew and brought with it splinters from the roofing, and they fell onto the food. Rav Yosef said to him: Vacate my vessels from here, and I will eat in the house. Abaye said to him: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that one remains in the <i>sukka</i> until the congealed dish will spoil? That is not yet the case. He said to him: For me, since I am delicate, this situation is as if the congealed dish will spoil.
  The Sages taught: If one was eating in the <i>sukka</i>, and rain fell, and he descended from the <i>sukka</i> on the roof to eat in his house, one does not burden him to ascend back to the <i>sukka</i> once the rain ceases until after he finishes his meal. Similarly, if one was sleeping under the roofing of the <i>sukka</i>, and rain fell, and he descended to sleep in the house, one does not burden him to ascend back to the <i>sukka</i> once the rain ceases; rather, he may sleep in the house until it becomes light.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the correct reading of the <i>baraita</i>: Until one awakens [<i>sheyeor</i>], spelled with an <i>ayin</i>, and once he awakens he returns to the <i>sukka</i> even in the middle of the night? Or is the correct reading: Until it becomes light [<i>sheyeor</i>], spelled with an <i>alef</i>, and he need not return to the <i>sukka</i> until morning? Come and hear a proof that will resolve the matter from a related <i>baraita</i>: One need not return to the <i>sukka</i> until it becomes light [<i>sheyeor</i>], spelled with an <i>alef</i>, and dawn arrives. The Gemara asks: Why did the <i>baraita</i> repeat the arrival of light two times (Ritva)? Rather, say instead: Until he awakens [<i>sheyeor</i>], spelled with an <i>ayin</i>, and the dawn arrives. Both of the readings are accurate, as until one awakens and it becomes light he may remain in the house.
  § The mishna continues: The Sages told a parable: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a servant who comes to pour wine for his master, and he pours a jug of water in his face. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Who poured the water in whose face? Come and hear a proof, as it is taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: His master poured a jug of water on his face and said to him: I do not want your service.
  Apropos the fact that rain on <i>Sukkot</i> is an indication of divine rebuke, the Gemara cites several related topics. The Sages taught: When the sun is eclipsed it is a bad omen for the entire world. The Gemara tells a parable. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a king of flesh and blood who prepared a feast for his servants and placed a lantern [<i>panas</i>] before them to illuminate the hall. He became angry at them and said to his servant: Take the lantern from before them and seat them in darkness.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir says: When the heavenly lights, i.e., the sun and the moon, are eclipsed, it is a bad omen for the enemies of the Jewish people, which is a euphemism for the Jewish people, because they are experienced in their beatings. Based on past experience, they assume that any calamity that afflicts the world is directed at them. The Gemara suggests a parable: This is similar to a teacher who comes to the school with a strap in his hand. Who worries? The child who is accustomed to be beaten each and every day is the one who worries.
  The Sages taught in another <i>baraita</i>: When the sun is eclipsed, it is a bad omen for the other nations. When the moon is eclipsed, it is a bad omen for the enemies of the Jewish people. This is due to the fact that the Jewish people calculate their calendar primarily based on the moon, and the other nations calculate based on the sun. When the sun is eclipsed in the east, it is a bad omen for the residents of the lands of the east. When it is eclipsed in the west, it is a bad omen for the residents of the lands of the west. When it is eclipsed in the middle of the sky, it is a bad omen for the entire world.
  If, during an eclipse, the visage of the sun is red like blood, it is an omen that sword, i.e., war, is coming to the world. If the sun is black like sackcloth made of dark goat hair, it is an omen that arrows of hunger are coming to the world, because hunger darkens people’s faces. When it is similar both to this, to blood, and to that, to sackcloth, it is a sign that both sword and arrows of hunger are coming to the world. If it was eclipsed upon its entry, soon after rising, it is an omen that calamity is tarrying to come. If the sun is eclipsed upon its departure at the end of the day, it is an omen that calamity is hastening to come. And some say the matters are reversed: An eclipse in the early morning is an omen that calamity is hastening, while an eclipse in the late afternoon is an omen that calamity is tarrying.
  The Sages said: There is no nation that is afflicted whose god is not afflicted with it, as it is stated: “And against all the gods of Egypt I will mete out judgment; I am God” (Exodus 12:12). The Gemara adds: When the Jewish people perform God’s will, they need not fear any of these omens, as it is stated: “Thus says the Lord: Learn not the way of the nations, and be not dismayed at the signs of Heaven; for the nations are dismayed at them” (Jeremiah 10:2). The nations will be dismayed, but the Jewish people will not be dismayed, provided they do not follow the ways of the nations.
  The Sages taught that on account of four matters the sun is eclipsed: On account of a president of the court who dies and is not eulogized appropriately, and the eclipse is a type of eulogy by Heaven; on account of a betrothed young woman who screamed in the city that she was being raped and there was no one to rescue her; on account of homosexuality; and on account of two brothers whose blood was spilled as one.
  And on account of four matters the heavenly lights are eclipsed: On account of forgers of a fraudulent document [<i>pelaster</i>] that is intended to discredit others; on account of testifiers of false testimony; on account of raisers of small domesticated animals in Eretz Yisrael in a settled area; and on account of choppers of good, fruit-producing trees.
  And on account of four matters the property of homeowners is delivered to the monarchy as punishment: On account of those keepers of paid promissory notes, who keep these documents instead of tearing them or returning them to the borrowers, as that would allow the lender to collect money with the note a second time; and on account of lenders with interest;
  
  Daf 29b
  
  and on account of those who had the ability to reprimand sinners and did not reprimand them; and on account of those who issued a commitment to give charity in public and ultimately do not give the charity to which they committed.
  Rav said: On account of four matters the property of homeowners is confiscated by the state treasury [<i>timyon</i>]: On account of those who delay payment of the salary of hired laborers (see Leviticus 19:13; Deuteronomy 24:15); on account of those who withhold the salary of hired laborers and do not pay at all; and on account of those who throw off the yoke of communal responsibility from their own necks and place that yoke on the necks of their friends; and on account of the arrogance of those who, due to their wealth, exercise power over the community. And the punishment for arrogance is equal to them all. However, with regard to the humble it is written: “The humble will inherit the land and delight themselves in the abundance of peace” (Psalms 37:11).
  
  MISHNA: A <i>lulav</i> that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva of the four species. The <i>lulav</i> of a tree worshipped as idolatry [<i>asheira</i>] and a <i>lulav</i> from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, which must be burned along with all the city’s property, are unfit. If the top of the <i>lulav</i> was severed or if the palm leaves were severed from the spine of the <i>lulav</i>, it is unfit. If its leaves, although still attached, were spread and are no longer completely joined to the spine, it is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: In that case, one should bind the <i>lulav</i> from the top, to join the leaves that spread to the spine. A <i>lulav</i> from the palms of the Iron Mountain are fit for use, although it differs from one taken from a standard palm tree, in that its leaves are shorter and do not cover the entire spine. A <i>lulav</i> that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva.
  GEMARA: The ruling in the mishna is that a stolen <i>lulav</i> is unfit. The Gemara posits: The mishna teaches this <i>halakha</i> unequivocally, indicating that there is no difference whether the stolen <i>lulav</i> is used on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, when taking the four species is a mitzva by Torah law, and there is no difference whether the stolen <i>lulav</i> is used beginning on the second day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, when it is a mitzva by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, a dry <i>lulav</i> is unfit both on the first day and subsequently. It is unfit for use because the term <i>hadar</i> is used with regard to the four species, from which it is derived that we require beauty. And since in a dry <i>lulav</i> there is not beauty, it is unfit. However, with regard to a stolen <i>lulav</i>, granted, on the first day of the Festival it is unfit, as it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day” (Leviticus 23:40), indicating that the four species must be taken from your own property. However, beginning on the second day of the Festival, why does one not fulfill his obligation with a stolen <i>lulav</i>?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai:
  
  Daf 30a
  
  It is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes to be fulfilled by means of a transgression, which renders the mitzva unfulfilled, as it is stated: “And you have brought that which was stolen and the lame, and the sick; that is how you bring the offering; should I accept this of your hand? says the Lord” (Malachi 1:13). Based on the juxtaposition in the verse, it is derived that the legal status of a stolen animal is equivalent to that of a lame animal. Just as a lame animal, because it is blemished, has no remedy and is unfit for use, so too, a stolen animal has no remedy. There is no difference before the owners reach a state of despair of recovering the stolen animal, and there is no difference after despair. In both cases there is no remedy.
  The Gemara elaborates: Granted, before the despair of the owner, the robber may not sacrifice the animal because the animal does not belong to him. The Merciful One says: “When a person sacrifices from yours an offering” (Leviticus 1:2). The term “from yours” indicates that the animal must belong to the one sacrificing it, and this stolen animal is not his. However, after the despair of the owner, didn’t the robber acquire the animal with the despair? Once the owner despairs, the animal belongs to the robber, despite the fact that he incurs a debt that he must repay the owner. Since the animal is legally his, why is it prohibited for the robber to sacrifice it as an offering? Rather, is it not because the offering is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression? Since the animal came into his possession by means of a transgression, it is unfit for use in fulfilling a mitzva.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For I the Lord love justice, I hate robbery in a burnt-offering” (Isaiah 61:8)? The Gemara cites a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who was passing by a customs house. He said to his servants: Pay the levy to the taxmen. They said to him: Doesn’t all the tax in its entirety belong to you? If the taxes will ultimately reach the royal treasury, what is the point of paying the levy? He said to them: From my conduct, all travelers will learn and will not evade payment of the tax. So too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “I the Lord... hate robbery in a burnt-offering.” Although the whole world is His and the acquisitions of man have no impact upon Him, God says: From My conduct, My children will learn and distance themselves from robbery, even from robbery unrelated to the needs of offerings.
  It was also stated: Rabbi Ami said: A dry <i>lulav</i> is unfit because it does not meet the criterion of beauty, and a stolen <i>lulav</i> is unfit because it is a mitzva that comes by means of a transgression.
  The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Ami disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzhak bar Naḥmani said that Shmuel said: The Sages taught that the <i>halakha</i> that a stolen <i>lulav</i> is unfit applies only with regard to the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. However, beginning on the second day of the Festival, there is no longer a Torah requirement to use a <i>lulav</i> from one’s own property. Since one fulfills his obligation with a borrowed <i>lulav</i>, one fulfills his obligation with a stolen one as well.
  Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raises an objection from the mishna: A <i>lulav</i> that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit. By inference, one concludes that a borrowed <i>lulav</i> is fit for use. The Gemara asks: When does this <i>halakha</i> apply? If you say that it applies only on the first day of the Festival, isn’t it written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day,” indicating that the four species must be taken from your own property, and this borrowed <i>lulav</i> is not his? Clearly, the mishna is not referring to the first day. Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to the second day of the Festival, and the mishna teaches that a stolen <i>lulav</i> is unfit on this day too, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion?
  Rava said: Actually, the mishna can be explained as referring to the first day of the Festival, and the <i>tanna</i> is stating the <i>halakha</i> employing the didactic style: It was not necessary. It was not necessary to state that one does not fulfill his obligation with a borrowed <i>lulav</i>, as it is not his. However, with regard to a stolen <i>lulav</i>, say: Barring extraordinary circumstances, standard robbery is a case that leads to despair of the owners, and despite the fact that a stolen <i>lulav</i> was acquired by means of a transgression, its legal status is like the robber’s own property. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not so. One does not fulfill his obligation with a stolen <i>lulav</i>. The mishna is not a refutation of Shmuel’s opinion.
  § Apropos the unfitness of four species acquired through robbery, the Gemara relates: Rav Huna said to the merchants [<i>avankarei</i>] selling the four species: When you purchase myrtle branches from gentiles, don’t you cut them off the tree? Rather, let the gentiles cut them and give them to you. What is the reason for this advice? It is because typical gentiles are land robbers,
  
  Daf 30b
  
  and land is not stolen. When one seizes land, the land remains the property of its original owner, even if that owner has despaired. In this case, there is concern that these myrtle branches were stolen from Jews. Therefore, let the gentiles cut the myrtle branches, so that the despair of the owners will be when the myrtle branches are still in the hands of the gentiles and the change of possession will be accomplished through their purchase and transfer into your hands. The combination of owner’s despair and change of possession will render the myrtle branches the property of the merchants, and it will not be a mitzva fulfilled by means of a transgression.
  The Gemara asks: Ultimately, even when the merchants cut the myrtle branches, let it be a case of despair in their hands, and the change of possession is accomplished through the purchase and transfer of the myrtle branches into the hands of the buyers. Why did Rav Huna advise them to have the gentiles cut the myrtle branches? The same result is achieved through their sale. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rav Huna to advise the merchants to allow the gentiles to cut the myrtle branches only with regard to the myrtle branches of the merchants themselves, which will not undergo another change of possession. The only way to ensure that the merchants are fulfilling the mitzva with myrtle branches that belong to them is to have the gentiles cut them and have the change of possession accomplished through the purchase from the gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: And let them acquire the myrtle branches with a physical change accomplished by the action of binding them with the <i>lulav</i> and the willow branch. Just as despair followed by a change in possession effects acquisition, despair followed by a physical change effects acquisition for the one who implements that change. In that case, too, the myrtle branches no longer belong to the original owner. The Gemara answers that Rav Huna holds: A <i>lulav</i> does not require binding. There is no mitzva to bind the four species together. One need only hold them unbound in his hand; therefore, the myrtle branches undergo no action that effects physical change.
  And even if you want to say that a <i>lulav</i> requires binding, and therefore the myrtle branches undergo a physical change, it is a change after which the object reverts to its original state. Binding the species effects no change in the myrtle branches themselves. Once the binding is removed, the myrtle branches are restored to their original state. And the principle is: A change after which the object reverts to its original state is not considered a change. It is of no significance with regard to effecting acquisition.
  The Gemara asks: And let the merchants acquire a myrtle branch with a change of name that it underwent, as initially it was called a myrtle branch, and now that it is designated for use in fulfilling the mitzva,
  
  Daf 31a
  
  it is called <i>hoshana</i>, which is a term used to describe the four species. The Gemara answers: This is not a full-fledged change of name, as occasionally it also happens that they initially refer to a myrtle branch as a <i>hoshana</i> while it is attached to the tree.
  § The Sages taught: With regard to a stolen <i>sukka</i> and with regard to one who roofs a <i>sukka</i> in the public domain, which is tantamount to robbing land from the public, Rabbi Eliezer deems these <i>sukkot</i> unfit for use in fulfillment of the mitzva, and the Rabbis deem them fit.
  Rav Naḥman said: This dispute is limited to a case where one assaults another and forcibly evicts him from his <i>sukka</i>, and takes his place in the <i>sukka</i>. In that case, Rabbi Eliezer deems the <i>sukka</i> unfit. And Rabbi Eliezer conforms to his own reasoning, as he said: A person does not fulfill his obligation with the <i>sukka</i> of another. Therefore, in any event, he does not fulfill his obligation with it. If land can be stolen and acquired by the robber, the <i>sukka</i> from which he evicted the owner is a stolen <i>sukka</i>. And if indeed land cannot be stolen, nevertheless, the robber does not fulfill his obligation according to Rabbi Eliezer, as it is a borrowed <i>sukka</i>.
  And the Rabbis conform to their reasoning, as they said: A person fulfills his obligation with the <i>sukka</i> of another. And since land cannot be stolen and the <i>sukka</i> is merely a borrowed <i>sukka</i> and not a stolen one, the robber fulfills his obligation, despite the fact that he committed a reprehensible act.
  However, if one stole wood and roofed a <i>sukka</i> with it, everyone agrees, as Rabbi Eliezer concedes, that the original owner of the wood has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. The wood itself belongs to the robber, so it is not a stolen <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Naḥman draw the conclusion that the dispute is with regard to a stolen <i>sukka</i> and not with regard to a <i>sukka</i> established with stolen building materials?
  The Gemara answers: From the fact that the <i>halakha</i> of a stolen <i>sukka</i> is juxtaposed in the <i>baraita</i> to the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>sukka</i> established in the public domain, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that the legal status of the stolen <i>sukka</i> is similar to the legal status of a <i>sukka</i> established in the public domain. Just as one does not fulfill his obligation with a <i>sukka</i> in the public domain because the land is not his, with regard to the stolen <i>sukka</i> too, one does not fulfill his obligation because the land is not his, not because the building materials were stolen.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain old woman who came before Rav Naḥman. She said to him: The Exilarch and all the Sages in his house have been sitting in a stolen <i>sukka</i>. She claimed that the Exilarch’s servants stole her wood and used it to build the <i>sukka</i>. She screamed, but Rav Naḥman did not pay attention to her. She said to him: A woman whose father, Abraham, our forefather, had three hundred and eighteen slaves screams before you, and you do not pay attention to her? She claimed that she should be treated with deference due to her lineage as a Jew. Rav Naḥman said to the Sages: This woman is a screamer, and she has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. However, the <i>sukka</i> itself was already acquired by the Exilarch.
  Ravina said: With regard to the stolen large beam of a <i>sukka</i>, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the robber need not return it intact, due to the general ordinance of a beam. By the letter of the law, one who stole a beam and incorporated it in the construction of a new house is required to dismantle the house and return the beam. The Sages instituted an ordinance requiring the robber to repay the monetary value of the beam instead. They instituted this ordinance to facilitate the repentance of the robber, who would be less likely to repent if doing so entailed destruction of the house.
  The Gemara asks: This is obvious. In what way is the beam different from other wood used in establishing the <i>sukka</i>? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Wood is common, and therefore the owners are more likely to despair of recovering the wood and will suffice with receiving monetary restitution and replacing the wood, but, with regard to this large beam, which is not common, say that there is no despair, and the robber is required to return the actual beam, therefore, Ravina teaches us that the ordinance applies even to this beam, and the robber is required to return only its monetary value.
  The Gemara notes: This <i>halakha</i> that the robber need not dismantle the <i>sukka</i> and return the beam applies only within the seven days of the Festival. However, after the seven days, the beam returns to the owner intact. And if the robber attached it with mortar and it is affixed permanently to the <i>sukka</i>, then even after the seven days of the Festival, the ordinance remains in effect, and the robber gives the original owner the monetary value of the beam.
  § It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: A dry <i>lulav</i> is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. Rava said: The dispute is specifically with regard to a <i>lulav</i>, as the Rabbis hold: We liken the <i>lulav</i> to the <i>etrog</i>, based on their juxtaposition in the verse. Just as the <i>etrog</i> requires beauty, so too, the <i>lulav</i> requires beauty. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: We do not liken the <i>lulav</i> to the <i>etrog</i>. However, with regard to an <i>etrog</i>, everyone agrees that we require beauty [<i>hadar</i>] as the verse states: “Fruit of a beautiful tree” (Leviticus 23:40) and a dry <i>etrog</i> does not meet that criterion.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to a <i>lulav</i>, does Rabbi Yehuda really not require beauty? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to a <i>lulav</i> whose leaves have spread out, one should bind the <i>lulav</i> from the top. What is the reason to do so? Is it not because he requires beauty in the case of <i>lulav</i>?
  The Gemara rejects this: No, as the reason is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon that the same verse states: “Branches [<i>kappot</i>] of a date palm.” The Sages interpret the term to mean bound [<i>kafut</i>], indicating that if the leaves of the <i>lulav</i> were spread, one should bind it.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda not require beauty with regard to the <i>lulav</i>? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: One binds the <i>lulav</i> only with its own species, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda? What is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda requires the binding to be from its own species? Is it not due to the fact that he requires beauty with regard to the <i>lulav</i>?
  The Gemara answers: No, that is not the reason, as Rava said: According to Rabbi Yehuda, one may bind the <i>lulav</i> even with fiber that grows around the trunk of the date palm and even with the root of the date palm, even though these do not meet the criterion of beauty. The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda there, that a <i>lulav</i> must be bound with its own species? The Gemara answers: It is because he holds that a <i>lulav</i> requires binding, and if one brought another species to bind it, they are five species instead of four, violating the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot of the Torah.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to an <i>etrog</i>, does Rabbi Yehuda require beauty? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the four species of the <i>lulav</i>, just as one may not diminish from their number, so too, one may not add to their number. If one did not find an <i>etrog</i>, he should not bring a quince, a pomegranate, or any other item instead. If the species are slightly dried, they are fit. If they are completely dry, they are unfit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even dry <i>etrogim</i> are fit.
  And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident
  
  Daf 31b
  
  involving city dwellers who lived in an area distant from the region where the four species grow, who would bequeath their <i>lulavim</i> to their grandchildren, even though they were completely dry. The Sages said to him: Is there proof from there that species that are dry remain fit for use? Actions taken in exigent circumstances are not proof. In typical circumstances, it would be prohibited to use those species.
  In any event, the <i>Tosefta</i> teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even dry species are fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. What, is it not referring to an <i>etrog</i> as well, indicating that in his opinion an <i>etrog</i> does not require beauty? No, he was stating only that a dry <i>lulav</i> is fit for use.
  The Master stated in the <i>baraita</i> cited above: Just as one may not diminish from their number, so too, one may not add to their number. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. Why would it be permitted to add an additional species? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Since Rabbi Yehuda said that a <i>lulav</i> requires a binding, and that requirement is a fundamental component of the mitzva, and if you bring another additional species, this species stands alone and that species stands alone, i.e., because the additional species is not bound with the others, its presence is insignificant, and causes no problem, therefore, Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that this is not the case. In fact, one may not bring an additional species.
  The Master stated in the <i>baraita</i> cited above: If one cannot find an <i>etrog</i>, he may not bring a pomegranate, a quince, or anything else instead. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say: He should bring these fruits so that the halakhic category of the <i>etrog</i> will not be forgotten, therefore, Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that it is in fact prohibited because on occasion, damage will result from this practice. Some may come to be drawn to this practice and use these species even when <i>etrogim</i> are available.
  The Gemara proposes: Come and hear another proof that, with regard to an <i>etrog</i>, Rabbi Yehuda does not require beauty: An old <i>etrog</i> is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava, who holds that everyone agrees that an <i>etrog</i> requires beauty. The Gemara concludes: It is, indeed, a conclusive refutation of Rava’s opinion.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda not require beauty in an <i>etrog</i>? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to an <i>etrog</i> that is leek green, Rabbi Meir deems it fit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit? The Gemara asks: Is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda requires beauty in an <i>etrog</i>? The Gemara answers: No, it is due to the fact that in the case of a green <i>etrog</i> the fruit did not ripen, and it is inappropriate to fulfill the mitzva with an unripe fruit.
  The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear: What is the minimum measure of a small <i>etrog</i>? Rabbi Meir says: It may be no smaller than a walnut-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be no smaller than an egg-bulk. The Gemara asks: Is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda requires beauty in an <i>etrog</i>? The Gemara answers: No, it is due to the fact that in that case of an <i>etrog</i> smaller than an egg-bulk, the fruit did not ripen.
  Come and hear an additional proof: And in a large <i>etrog</i>, the maximum measure is so that one could hold two in his one hand; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is fit even if it is so large that he can hold only one in his two hands. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda requires beauty in an <i>etrog</i>? The Gemara answers: No, the rationale is as Rabba said: One holds the <i>lulav</i> in the right hand and the <i>etrog</i> in the left. Sometimes, when one is handed the four species, they will exchange them for him, placing the three species in his left hand and the <i>etrog</i> in his right, and then he will come to switch them and place each in the appropriate hand. However, if the <i>etrog</i> is too large, he will be unable to hold the <i>etrog</i> and the <i>lulav</i> together, and he will come to render the <i>etrog</i> unfit, as it is apt to fall.
  The Gemara asks: However, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, isn’t it written: The fruit of a beautiful [<i>hadar</i>] tree? How, then, can he rule that an <i>etrog</i> does not require beauty?
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda holds: That verse means that one should take a fruit that dwells [<i>hadar</i>] in its tree from year to year. It remains on the tree and does not wither and fall at the end of the season as do most fruits. That is characteristic of the <i>etrog</i>.
  § The mishna continues: The <i>lulav</i> of a tree worshipped as idolatry [<i>asheira</i>] and a <i>lulav</i> from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, which must be burned along with all the city’s property, are unfit. And is a <i>lulav</i> of an <i>asheira</i> unfit? But didn’t Rava say with regard to a <i>lulav</i> of idolatry: One should not take it to fulfill the mitzva <i>ab initio</i>; however, if he took it, it is fit and he fulfills his obligation after the fact? Apparently, a <i>lulav</i> from an <i>asheira</i> is fit.
  The Gemara explains: Here, in the mishna, we are dealing with the <i>asheira</i> of Moses, depicted in the Torah. The mishna is not referring to a tree planted in deference to idolatry, but rather to a tree that was itself worshipped as an idol. There is an obligation to burn idolatry and destroy it. Therefore, legally, the latter tree is considered as if it were already burned. The requisite measure of the <i>lulav</i> was crushed, and it is therefore unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. Rava’s ruling does not apply to an <i>asheira</i> of that kind.
  The Gemara notes: The formulation of the mishna is also precise and indicates that the reference is to an <i>asheira</i> of Moses, as the juxtaposition of the <i>halakha</i> of an <i>asheira</i> to the <i>halakha</i> of a city whose residents were incited to idolatry teaches that the legal status of the <i>asheira</i> is similar to that of a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, in which all the property must be burned. In both cases, the <i>lulav</i> is considered already burned and lacking the requisite measure. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is the reason that the <i>lulav</i> is unfit.
  The mishna continues: If the top of the <i>lulav</i> was severed it is unfit. Rav Huna said: They taught that it is unfit only when it was completely severed; however, if the top merely split, the <i>lulav</i> is fit.
  The Gemara asks: And is a split <i>lulav</i> fit? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A <i>lulav</i> that is bent at the top,
  
  Daf 32a
  
  that is thorny, split, or curved to the extent that it is shaped like a sickle is unfit. If it became hard as wood it is unfit. If it merely appears like hard wood but is not yet completely hardened, it is fit. Apparently, a split <i>lulav</i> is unfit. Rav Pappa said: The split <i>lulav</i> in the <i>baraita</i> is so split that it is shaped like a fork [<i>heimanak</i>], with the two sides of the split completely separated, and it appears that the <i>lulav</i> has two spines.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If it is curved to the extent that it is shaped like a sickle, it is unfit. Rava said: We said that it is unfit only when it is curved forward away from the spine; however, if it is curved backward, toward the spine, it is fit for use because that is its nature, and that is the way a <i>lulav</i> typically grows.
  Rav Naḥman said: The legal status of a <i>lulav</i> that is curved to either of the sides is like that of a <i>lulav</i> curved forward, and it is unfit. And some say: Its legal status is like that of a <i>lulav</i> curved backward, and it is fit.
  And Rava said: This <i>lulav</i> that grew with one leaf, i.e., leaves on only one side of the spine, is blemished and unfit.
  § The mishna continues: If the palm leaves were severed from the spine of the <i>lulav</i>, it is unfit; if its leaves were spread, it is fit. Rav Pappa said: Severed means that the leaves are completely detached from the spine, and one ties them to the <i>lulav</i>, so that the <i>lulav</i> is made like a broom. Spread means that the leaves remain attached but are merely separated from the spine in that they jut outward.
  Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> if the central twin-leaf split? The Gemara cites proof to resolve the dilemma. Come and hear that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: If the central twin-leaf was removed, the <i>lulav</i> is unfit. What, is it not that the same is true if the twin-leaf split? The Gemara answers: No, the case where it was removed is different, because the result is that it is lacking, and an incomplete <i>lulav</i> is certainly unfit. However, if the leaf remains in place, even though it is split, it does not necessarily render the <i>lulav</i> unfit.
  Some say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: If the central twin-leaf split, it becomes as a <i>lulav</i> whose central twin-leaf was removed, and it is unfit. According to this version of the statement, the dilemma is resolved.
  § The mishna continues. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the leaves were spread, one should bind the <i>lulav</i> from the top. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon that the verse states: “Branches [<i>kappot</i>] of a date palm.” The Sages interpret the term to mean bound [<i>kafut</i>], indicating that if the leaves of the <i>lulav</i> were spread, one should bind it.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where is it ascertained that this term, “branches of a date palm,” is referring to the branches of the <i>lulav</i>? Say it is referring to the hardened branch of the date palm. Rav Ashi answered: That cannot be, as we require the <i>lulav</i> to be bound, and there is no binding, since at that stage the hardened leaves point outward, and binding them is impossible.
  The Gemara asks: If the fundamental requirement of the mitzva is a <i>lulav</i> that appears as one unit, say that one takes the trunk of the date palm. The Gemara answers: The term bound, from which it is derived that the branch should appear as one unit, indicates that there is the possibility that it could be spread. However, this trunk is perpetually bound, as it can never become separated.
  The Gemara asks: And say the verse is referring to the branch of the date palm [<i>kufra</i>] that has not yet hardened completely and could still be bound, albeit with difficulty. Abaye said that it is written in praise of the Torah: “Its way are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace” (Proverbs 3:17). At that stage of development, some of the leaves are thorns that potentially wound. The Torah would not command to use that type of branch in fulfilling the mitzva.
  Rava, the expert in <i>Tosefta</i>, said to Ravina: Since the verse states “branches of a date palm” in the plural, say that one is obligated to take two palm branches in fulfilling the mitzva of the four species. Ravina answered: Although the word is vocalized in the plural, based on tradition <i>kappot</i> is written without the letter <i>vav</i>, indicating that only one is required. The Gemara suggests: And say that one is required to take only one leaf? The Gemara answers: If that were the intention of the Torah, it would not have written <i>kappot</i> without a <i>vav</i>. That single leaf is called <i>kaf</i>. <i>Kappot</i> without the <i>vav</i> indicates both plural, i.e., multiple leaves, and singular, i.e., one branch.
  § The mishna continues: A <i>lulav</i> from the palms of the Iron Mountain is fit. It has few leaves on its spine, and those leaves are not crowded together like the leaves on a standard <i>lulav</i>. Abaye said: The Sages taught that this type of <i>lulav</i> is fit only in a case in which the top of this leaf reaches the base of that leaf above it on the spine. However, if there are so few leaves that the top of this leaf does not reach the base of that leaf, it is unfit.
  That was taught in a <i>baraita</i> as well: A <i>lulav</i> from the palms of the Iron Mountain are unfit. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that it is fit? Rather, learn from it in accordance with the statement of Abaye, that there is a distinction based on the configuration of the leaves on the <i>lulav</i>. Indeed, learn from it.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  And others raise it as a contradiction. We learned in the mishna: A <i>lulav</i> from the palms of the Iron Mountain is fit. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is unfit? Abaye said: This is not difficult: Here, in the mishna, where the <i>lulav</i> is fit, it is referring to a case where the top of this leaf reaches the base of that next leaf, whereas, there, in the <i>baraita</i>, where the <i>lulav</i> is unfit, it is referring to a case where the top of this leaf does not reach the base of that next leaf.
  The Gemara describes the location of these <i>lulavim</i>. Rabbi Maryon said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, and some say that Rabba bar Mari taught this <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai: There are two date palms in the valley of ben Hinnom, and smoke arises from between them. And this is the place about which we learned in the mishna: A <i>lulav</i> from the palms of the Iron Mountain is fit. And that site is the entrance of Gehenna.
  The mishna continues: A <i>lulav</i> that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The minimum measure of a myrtle branch and a willow branch is three handbreadths. And the minimum measure of a <i>lulav</i> is four handbreadths. The difference between the measures is so that the <i>lulav</i> will extend at least one handbreadth from the myrtle branch.
  And Rabbi Parnakh said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The spine of the <i>lulav</i>, and not merely its leaves, must be at least four handbreadths long, so that it will extend from the myrtle branch at least one handbreadth.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: A <i>lulav</i> that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva? That indicates that a <i>lulav</i> three handbreadths long is fit. The Gemara answers: Emend the language of the mishna and say: A <i>lulav</i> that has three handbreadths and an additional handbreadth that is sufficient to enable one to wave with it is fit. This emendation is understood by each <i>amora</i> according to his opinion. It is understood by this Sage, Shmuel, as per his opinion that only one additional handbreadth is required including the leaves; and it is understood by this Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, as per his opinion that the additional handbreadth must be in the length of the spine of the <i>lulav</i>, and the leaves are not taken into consideration.
  The Gemara cites proof from a <i>baraita</i>. Come and hear: The minimum measure of a myrtle branch and of a willow branch is three handbreadths, and that of a <i>lulav</i> is four handbreadths. What, is it not that this measure is calculated with the leaves, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel? The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it can be understood that the measure is calculated without the leaves.
  Apropos the <i>baraita</i> cited above, the Gemara discusses the matter itself. The minimum measure of a myrtle branch and of a willow branch is three handbreadths, and that of a <i>lulav</i> is four handbreadths. Rabbi Tarfon says: With a cubit of five handbreadths. The preliminary understanding of Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion is that the minimum measure of a myrtle branch is five handbreadths, not three.
  Rava said: May his Master, the Holy One, Blessed be He, forgive Rabbi Tarfon for this extreme stringency. Now, we do not find even a dense-leaved myrtle branch three handbreadths long; is it necessary to say that finding one five handbreadths long is nearly impossible?
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that this is the correct understanding of the statement of Rabbi Tarfon: Take a cubit of six handbreadths, and render it a cubit of five handbreadths. Rabbi Tarfon is saying that for the purpose of measuring the myrtle branch, willow branch, and <i>lulav</i>, the standard six-handbreadth cubit is divided into five handbreadths, each slightly larger than the standard handbreadth. Take three of these large handbreadths for the myrtle branch, and three of these handbreadths plus the extra handbreadth for the <i>lulav</i>. The Gemara calculates: How many standard handbreadths are there in the minimum measure of a myrtle branch or willow branch? There are three and three-fifths standard handbreadths.
  However, on that basis, there is a difficulty, as one statement ofShmuel contradicts another statement of Shmuel. Here, RabbiYehuda said that Shmuel said: The minimum measure of the myrtle branch and of the willow branch is three handbreadths, and there, Rav Huna said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who requires a larger handbreadth. There is a discrepancy of three-fifths of a handbreadth between the measures. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the measure is three handbreadths, he was not precise and merely approximated the measure. The Gemara asks: Say that we say: He was not precise when the approximation leads to stringency, but when it leads to leniency, do we say: He was not precise? That would result in using an unfit myrtle branch in performing a mitzva.
  When Rabin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that this is the correct understanding of the statement of Rabbi Tarfon: Take a cubit of five handbreadths, and render it a cubit of six handbreadths. Rabbi Tarfon said that for the purpose of measuring the myrtle branch, willow branch, and <i>lulav</i>, a five-handbreadth cubit is divided into six handbreadths, each slightly smaller than the standard handbreadth. Take three of these smaller handbreadths for the myrtle branch, and three of these handbreadths plus the extra handbreadth for the <i>lulav</i>. The Gemara calculates: How many standard handbreadths are there in the minimum measure of a myrtle branch or willow branch? There are two and a half standard handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: Ultimately, there remains a difficulty, as one statement of Shmuel contradicts another statement of Shmuel. In one statement he said the minimum measure of a myrtle branch is two and a half handbreadths, and in another he said that the measure is three handbreadths. The Gemara answers: When Shmuel said that the measure is three handbreadths, he was not precise and merely approximated the measure. And this is a case of: He was not precise, where the approximation leads to a stringency, as Rav Huna said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. Shmuel holds that the actual measure required is two and a half handbreadths, and he rounded it off to three, which is a more stringent measure.
  MISHNA: A myrtle branch that was stolen or that is completely dry is unfit. A myrtle branch of a tree worshipped as idolatry [<i>asheira</i>] or a myrtle branch from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. If the top of the myrtle branch was severed, if the leaves were severed completely, or if its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is unfit. If one diminished their number by plucking berries so that they no longer outnumbered the leaves, the myrtle branch is fit. But one may not diminish the number on the Festival itself.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: It is written: “Boughs of a dense-leaved tree” (Leviticus 23:40); this is referring to a tree whose leaves obscure its tree. And which tree is that? You must say it is the myrtle tree. The Gemara suggests: And say it is the olive tree, whose leaves obscure the tree. The Gemara answers: We require a “dense-leaved” tree, whose leaves are in a chain-like configuration, and that is not the case with an olive tree.
  The Gemara suggests: And say it is the Oriental plane tree, whose leaves are in a braid-like configuration. The Gemara answers: We require a tree whose leaves obscure its tree, and that is not the case with an Oriental plane tree. 
  The Gemara suggests: And say the verse is referring to oleander, which has both characteristics. Abaye said: It is written with regard to the Torah: “Its ways are ways of pleasantness” (Proverbs 3:17), and that is not the case with the oleander tree, because it is a poisonous plant and its sharp, thorn-like leaves pierce the hand of one holding it. Rava said: The unfitness of the oleander is derived from here: “Love truth and peace” (Zechariah 8:19), and poisonous plants that pierce are antithetical to peace.
  The Sages taught: Plaited like a braid and chain-like; that is characteristic of the myrtle branch used in the fulfillment of the mitzva. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says another characteristic. It is written: “Boughs of a dense-leaved tree,” indicating a tree that the taste of its branches and the taste of its fruit are alike. You must say this is the myrtle branch.
  A Sage taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: A dense-leaved branch is fit, and one that is not dense-leaved is unfit, even though it is a myrtle branch.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of “dense-leaved tree”? Rav Yehuda said: And it is a configuration where three leaves emerge from each base. Rav Kahana said: Even two leaves emerging from one base and one leaf that covers the other two emerging from a lower base is called thick. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, would purposely seek a myrtle branch configured with two leaves emerging from one base and one emerging from a lower base, since this statement emerged from the mouth of Rav Kahana. Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: My father called a myrtle branch with that configuration a wild myrtle branch.
  The Sages taught: If most of its leaves fell and only a minority of the leaves remained, the myrtle branch is fit, provided that its dense-leaved nature remains intact.
  The Gemara wonders: This matter itself is difficult, as there is an internal contradiction in this <i>baraita</i>. On the one hand, you said: If most of its leaves fell it is fit, and then the <i>baraita</i> taught: Provided that its dense-leaved nature remains intact. Once two of every three leaves fell, how can you find a branch whose dense-leaved nature is intact?
  Abaye said: You can find it
  
  Daf 33a
  
  in an Egyptian myrtle branch, which has seven leaves emerging from each and every base, as even when four leaves, the majority, fall, three remain, and its dense-leaved nature remains intact. Abaye said: Learn from it that the Sages hold that this Egyptian myrtle branch is fit for use as a <i>hoshana</i> in the mitzva of the four species.
  The Gemara asks: This is obvious. It is a myrtle branch. Why would it be unfit? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since its name is accompanied by a modifier, i.e., it is not called simply a myrtle branch but an Egyptian myrtle branch, it is unfit. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that it is fit for use. The Gemara asks: And say it is indeed so, that since its name is accompanied by a modifier it is unfit. The Gemara answers: It is fit, as “dense-leaved tree” is stated by the Merciful One. As the Torah did not mandate the use of a specific species but rather listed an identifying characteristic, a tree with that characteristic is fit in any case, and the modifier is irrelevant.
  The Sages taught: If most of its leaves dried and three branches of moist leaves remained on it, it is fit. Rav Ḥisda said: And that is the ruling only if the moist leaves are at the top of each and every one of the branches. However, if the moist leaves are elsewhere on the branch, it is unfit.
  § The mishna continues: If the top of the myrtle branch was severed, it is unfit. Ulla bar Ḥinnana taught: If the top of the myrtle branch was severed, but a gallnut-like berry grew in that place, it is fit, as the berry fills the void and the top of the branch no longer appears severed.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: If the top was severed on the Festival eve, and the berry grew in that place on the Festival, what is the <i>halakha</i>? This dilemma is tied to a more fundamental, wide-ranging dilemma: Is there disqualification with regard to mitzvot or not? Because this myrtle branch was unfit when the Festival began, is the <i>halakha</i> that it is permanently disqualified and cannot be rendered fit? Or perhaps the <i>halakha</i> is that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Once the growth of the berry neutralizes the cause for the disqualification, the myrtle branch is again fit for use.
  The Gemara asks: And resolve this dilemma from that which we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who slaughtered a non-domesticated animal or a bird and is obligated to cover the blood, if he covered the blood and it was then uncovered, he is exempt from the obligation to cover it a second time. However, if the wind blew dust and covered the blood and no person was involved, he is obligated to cover it. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught that he is obligated to cover the blood after the wind covered it only if the blood was then exposed. However, if it was not then exposed, he is exempt from the obligation to cover it.
  And we discussed this issue and asked: When it was then exposed, why is he obligated to cover it a second time? Since it was disqualified, it should remain disqualified. When the wind covered the blood, he was exempt from covering the blood. If so, even if the blood is subsequently uncovered, he should remain exempt. Why then, is he obligated to cover the blood in that case?
  And Rav Pappa said: That is to say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Once the cause of the exemption from the obligation is neutralized, one is once again obligated to fulfill the mitzva. Although there is disqualification with regard to offerings, that is not the case with regard to mitzvot. If so, Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma is resolved.
  The Gemara answers: It is with regard to Rav Pappa’s resolution itself that Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma. Is it obvious to Rav Pappa, based on the discussion with regard to the blood, that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot; and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to leniency, as in the case of a myrtle branch whose top was severed and a berry grew in its place, rendering it fit, and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to stringency, as in the case of the blood, where one is obligated to cover it anew? Or, perhaps the <i>tanna</i> was uncertain, and therefore, when that ruling leads to stringency, we say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and one must perform the mitzva. However, when that ruling leads to leniency, we do not say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma stands unresolved.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this matter of disqualification with regard to mitzvot is dependent upon a dispute of <i>tanna’im</i>, as a similar topic was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one transgressed and picked the berries that render the myrtle branch unfit on the Festival, it remains unfit; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok. The Sages deem it fit. The Gemara explains: Everyone, both <i>tanna’im</i>, agree that a <i>lulav</i> does not require binding. And even if you say that a <i>lulav</i> requires binding, nevertheless, we do not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>. With regard to <i>sukka</i> it is written: Prepare it, from which it is derived, and not from that which is already prepared. The <i>sukka</i> must be established by means of an action, not one that was established by itself.
  What, is it not that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, and the Rabbis are disagreeing about the following? The one who deems the myrtle branch unfit, Rabbi Elazar, holds: We say there is disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Since this myrtle branch was unfit when the Festival began because the berries outnumbered the leaves, reducing the number of berries will not render it fit. And the one who deems the myrtle branch fit, the Rabbis, holds: We do not say there is disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Even though this myrtle branch was unfit when the Festival began, once the cause of the disqualification is neutralized, the myrtle branch is rendered fit for use in the performance of the mitzva.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion. No, one could say that everyone agrees that we do not say there is disqualification with regard to mitzvot. And here, it is with regard to deriving <i>lulav</i> from <i>sukka</i> that they disagree. One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, holds: We derive <i>lulav</i> from <i>sukka</i>. Just as a <i>sukka</i> must be rendered fit through building and not by means of an action taken after it was built, so too, a <i>lulav</i> must be rendered fit through binding and not by an action taken after it was bound. Since this myrtle branch was not rendered fit through binding but rather through the removal of the berries after it was bound, it is unfit. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not derive <i>lulav</i> from <i>sukka</i>. Therefore, even if the <i>lulav</i> was rendered fit from that which is already prepared, it is fit.
  And if you wish, say instead: If we hold that <i>lulav</i> requires binding, everyone agrees that we derive the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>lulav</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>. And here, it is with regard to whether or not a <i>lulav</i> requires binding that they disagree, and they disagree in the dispute of these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A <i>lulav</i>, whether it is bound with the myrtle and willow and whether it is not bound, is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it is bound it is fit; if it is not bound it is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? From where does he derive this requirement by Torah law? The Gemara answers: He derives the term taking written with regard to the four species from the term taking written with regard to the bundle of hyssop by means of a verbal analogy. It is written there, in the context of the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb in Egypt: “Take a bundle of hyssop” (Exodus 12:22), and it is written here, in the context of the four species: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40). Just as there, with regard to the Paschal lamb, the mitzva to take the hyssop is specifically in a bundle, so too here, the mitzva to take the four species is specifically in a bundle. And the Rabbis hold: We do not derive the term taking from the term taking by means of the verbal analogy.
  On a related note, the Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught in the <i>baraita</i>: There is a mitzva to bind the myrtle and the willow with the <i>lulav</i>, and if he did not bind it, it is fit? Whose opinion is it? If the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, when he did not bind it, why is it fit? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, what mitzva did he perform? The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And the reason that there is a mitzva to bind them is due to the fact that it is stated: “This is my God and I will glorify Him [<i>ve’anvehu</i>]” (Exodus 15:2), which they interpreted to mean: Beautify yourself [<i>hitna’e</i>] before Him in the performance of the mitzvot. The Rabbis agree that although failure to bind the three species does not render the <i>lulav</i> unfit for the mitzva, the performance of the mitzva is more beautiful when the <i>lulav</i> is bound.
  § The mishna continues: Or if its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is unfit. Rav Ḥisda said: This statement was stated by our great rabbi, Rav, and may the Omnipresent come to his assistance. The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only if the berries were concentrated in one place. However, if they were distributed in two or three places throughout the branch, it is fit.
  Rava said to Rav Ḥisda:
  
  Daf 33b
  
  If the berries are distributed in two or three places, the myrtle branch is speckled with different colors in different places. It lacks beauty and is certainly unfit.
  Rather, emend the text: If this statement was stated, it was stated as follows: Or, if its berries were more numerous than its leaves, it is unfit. Rav Ḥisda said: This statement was stated by our great rabbi, Rav, and may the Omnipresent come to his assistance: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to ripe, black berries, since they stand in stark contrast to the green leaves of the branch, which then appears speckled. However, if its berries are green, they are considered of the same type as the myrtle branch, as they are the same color. Consequently, the branch does not appear speckled, and therefore it is fit.
  Rav Pappa said: The legal status of red berries is like that of black ones, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: In the case of menstrual blood, this black blood is actually red blood, except that it deteriorated. Red and black are considered two shades of the same color.
  § The mishna continues: If he diminished their number, it is fit. The Gemara asks: This is a case where he diminished their number when? If you say that he did so before he bound the <i>lulav</i>, it is obvious that it is fit. When he performs the mitzva with it, the leaves outnumber the berries. Rather, it must be that he diminished their number after he bound the <i>lulav</i> with the other species. If so, it is a case of disqualification from the outset, as it was unfit at the time that it was bound. Resolve from here the dilemma that was raised and conclude that disqualification from the outset is not permanent disqualification.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Actually, it is a case where he diminished the number of berries after he bound it. And that Sage holds that binding does not render the three bound species a <i>lulav</i> used for a mitzva. Rather, it is mere designation of the species for the mitzva, and mere designation is not anything of significance. The fact that the berries outnumbered the leaves at the time that it was bound is not disqualification from the outset, as binding is a stage prior to the outset.
  § The mishna continues: But one may not diminish the number on the Festival itself. The Gemara asks: But if one violated the prohibition and picked them, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The myrtle branch is fit, as the mishna prohibited doing so <i>ab initio</i> but did not deem it unfit. The Gemara clarifies: This is a case that the berries turned black when? If you say that they were black from yesterday, the Festival eve, the myrtle is disqualified from the outset, as it is unfit at the start of the Festival. If so, resolve from here that disqualification from the outset is not permanent disqualification, as the mishna says that if one picked the berries, the myrtle branch is fit.
  Rather, is it not that they turned black on the Festival itself and he picked them that day. That then is a case where the myrtle branch was fit and then disqualified, as at the start of the Festival the berries were green and only later turned black, rendering the myrtle branch unfit. Conclude from it that an item that was fit and then disqualified can then be rendered fit again, thereby resolving an unresolved dilemma.
  The Gemara rejects that conclusion. No, actually, it is a case where the berries turned black from the outset, prior to the Festival. Resolve from it that an item disqualified from the outset is not permanently disqualified. However, do not resolve the dilemma concerning whether an item that was fit and then disqualified can then be rendered fit, as no clear proof can be adduced from here.
  The Sages taught: One may not diminish the number of berries on the Festival to render the myrtle branch fit. In the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, they said: One may diminish their number. The Gemara asks: But isn’t he preparing a vessel on a Festival, as he renders an unfit myrtle branch fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva?
  Rav Ashi said: It is a case where he picked them for the purpose of eating them, as it is permitted to pick berries from a branch unattached to the ground, and preparing the myrtle branch for use is permitted because he did not intend to do so. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, who said: An unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited labor inadvertently ensues, is permitted on Shabbat or on a Festival. Here too, one’s intention is to eat the berries. Although the myrtle branch is prepared for use in the process, picking the berries is permitted because that was not his intention.
  The Gemara challenges: But didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon concedes in the case of: Cut off its head and will it not die? Even Rabbi Shimon, who says that an unintentional act is permitted, said so only in cases where the prohibited result is possible but not guaranteed. However, when a prohibited result is inevitable, just as death inevitably ensues from decapitation, the act is prohibited. In the case of picking berries off of a myrtle branch for food, one cannot claim that he did not intend for the prohibited result of preparing the myrtle branch for use to ensue. In this case, the myrtle branch will inevitably be rendered fit; how is this permitted?
  The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where he has another fit myrtle branch. Therefore, one is not considered to be preparing a vessel. Since the ultimate objective is to render the <i>lulav</i> and the accompanying species, which constitute the vessel in question, fit, and those species are already fit, picking the berries from the myrtle branch is not inevitable preparation of a vessel. Therefore, if one ate the berries, and the myrtle branch is thereby rendered fit, it is fit for use in the mitzva.
  § The Sages taught: If the binding of the <i>lulav</i> was untied on the Festival, one may bind it again. One may not bind it with a sophisticated knot as before, but with a knot like the one used in a binding of vegetables, by merely winding the string around the species. The Gemara asks: But why merely wind it? Let him tie a bow, which is permitted on Shabbat or a Festival, as he is not tying an actual knot. The Gemara answers: Whose opinion is it in this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a bow is a full-fledged knot, and therefore it is prohibited to tie one on the Festival.
  The Gemara answers: If the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, since he holds that a <i>lulav</i> requires binding, as he derived from the Paschal lamb, he requires the binding to be a full-fledged binding. How, then, can winding the string like the binding of vegetables suffice in fulfillment of the mitzva? The Gemara answers: This <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds in accordance with his opinion in one matter, i.e., that a bow is a full-fledged knot, and disagrees with him in one matter, as the <i>tanna</i> holds that binding the species is merely to enhance the beauty of the mitzva, but it is not a Torah requirement.
  MISHNA: A willow branch that was stolen or is completely dry is unfit. One from a tree worshipped as idolatry [<i>asheira</i>] or from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. If the top was severed, or its leaves were severed, or if it is the <i>tzaftzafa</i>, a species similar to, but not actually a willow, it is unfit. However, a willow branch that is slightly dried, and one that a minority of its leaves fell, and a branch from a willow that does not grow by the river, but instead is from a non-irrigated field, is fit.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: “Willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40) means willows that grow by the brook. Alternatively, “willows of the brook” is an allusion to the tree in question. It is a tree whose leaf is elongated like a brook.
  It was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: From “willows of the brook,” I have derived only actual willows of the brook that grow on the banks of the brook. With regard to willows of the non-irrigated field and willows of the mountains, from where do I derive that they are fit as well? The verse states: “Willows of the brook,” in the plural, teaching that the branches of willows are fit in any case.
  
  Daf 34a
  
  Abba Shaul says: “Willows” in the plural teaches that there are two mitzvot that involve use of the willow branch. One is the willow branch for the <i>lulav</i>, and one is the willow branch taken for the Temple, with which the people would circle the altar on <i>Sukkot</i>.
  And the Rabbis, who do not interpret the verse that way, from where do they derive the mitzva of the willow branch for the Temple? It is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that they learned through tradition and not from a verse, as Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There are three <i>halakhot</i> for which the Sages unsuccessfully sought a Torah source. The first is the <i>halakha of</i> ten saplings. There is a mitzva by Torah law to extend the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year and to begin refraining from plowing thirty days before the Sabbatical Year begins. However, one may plow around individual saplings to sustain them. In a field that is one <i>beit se’a</i>, fifty by fifty cubits, in which there are ten evenly spaced saplings, it is permitted to plow the entire field until the onset of the Sabbatical Year to sustain the saplings. The second <i>halakha</i> is the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple. And the third <i>halakha</i> is the mitzva of the water libation on the altar, which accompanies the daily offerings each day of <i>Sukkot</i>, together with the daily wine libation. No Torah source was found for these <i>halakhot</i>, as each is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  The Sages taught an additional <i>baraita</i>: “Willows of the brook” is referring to those that grow by the river, which comes to exclude a <i>tzaftzafa</i>, which grows among the mountains and not near a brook. Rabbi Zeira said: What is the verse from which the fact that the <i>tzaftzafa</i> is unfit is derived? It is derived from the reprimand that is written: “He placed it by great waters, and set it as a <i>tzaftzafa</i>” (Ezekiel 17:5). The Jewish people were planted like a willow on great waters, but ultimately became like a <i>tzaftzafa</i>. Apparently, a <i>tzaftzafa</i> does not grow on great waters.
  Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: And perhaps the second part of the verse is merely explaining the first part, and it means: He placed it by great waters, and what is it that He placed there? It is a <i>tzaftzafa</i>. Rabbi Zeira answered: If so, and that is the meaning of the verse, what is the meaning of the term “set it”? Rather, the verse means that the willow branch was transformed into a <i>tzaftzafa</i>. That is how Rabbi Abbahu explained the verse, as Rabbi Abbahu said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I said that the Jewish people should be before Me as a plant placed by great waters, and what is that plant? It is a willow. And they set themselves as a <i>tzaftzafa</i> of the mountains.
  Some taught this verse as the conclusion of the <i>baraita</i> and Rabbi Zeira raised the objection, and the response to his objection is unattributed: He placed it by great waters, and set it as a <i>tzaftzafa</i>. Rabbi Zeira strongly objects: And perhaps the second part of the verse is merely explaining the first part, and it means: He placed it by great waters, and what is it that He placed there? It is a <i>tzaftzafa</i>. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If so, and that is the meaning of the verse, what is the meaning of the term “set it”? Rabbi Abbahu said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I said that the Jewish people should be before Me as a plant placed by great waters, and what is that plant? It is a willow. And they set themselves as a <i>tzaftzafa</i> of the mountains.
  Apropos the defining characteristics of the willow branch, in contrast to similar species that are unfit, the Sages taught: What is a willow and what is a <i>tzaftzafa</i>? With regard to a willow branch, its stem is red, and its leaf is elongated, and the edge of its leaf is smooth. With regard to a <i>tzaftzafa</i>, its stem is white, its leaf is round, and the edge of its leaf is serrated like a sickle. The Gemara objects: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the edge of its leaf is serrated like a sickle it is fit, but if it is serrated like a saw, whose teeth are uneven in both size and sequence, it is unfit? Abaye said: When that <i>baraita</i> was taught, it was referring to a particular type of willow called <i>ḥilfa gila</i>, whose leaves are serrated. However, all other types of willow branches have leaves with a smooth edge.
  Abaye said: Conclude from it that this <i>ḥilfa gila</i> is fit for use in the <i>hoshana</i> of the four species. The Gemara wonders: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since its name is accompanied by a modifier, as it is called <i>ḥilfa gila</i>, it should not be unfit. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that it is fit.
  The Gemara asks: And say it is indeed so, that since its name is accompanied by a modifier it is unfit. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One states: “Willows of the brook,” in the plural, teaching that the branches of willows are fit in any case.
  Apropos the branches of the willow and the <i>tzaftzafa</i>, the Gemara cites what Rav Ḥisda said: These three objects’ names changed since the Temple was destroyed. That which was called willow was called in later generations <i>ḥalfata</i>, which is another name for <i>tzaftzafa</i>, and that which was called <i>ḥalfata</i> was called willow. The Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from the name change? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to the mitzva of taking the <i>lulav</i>, as one of the species bound with the <i>lulav</i> is a willow branch, which is now called <i>tzaftzafa</i>.
  In addition, that which was called trumpet was called <i>shofar</i> in later generations, and that which was called <i>shofar</i> was called trumpet in later generations. The Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference whether a <i>shofar</i> is called <i>shofar</i> or trumpet? The Gemara answers: It is significant with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana. On Rosh HaShana, one fulfills his obligation only by sounding a <i>shofar</i>. If one comes today and asks what instrument he should use to sound the requisite blasts, he should be told to use a trumpet.
  Also, that which was originally called <i>petora</i> was called in later generations by the name previously used for a small table, <i>petorata</i>, and a <i>petorata</i> was called <i>petora</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from the change of name? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of buying and selling. One who orders a <i>petora</i> should know that he ordered a small table and not a large one.
  Abaye said: I too shall speak of changes in the meaning of terms in this generation. That which was called <i>huvlila</i>, the first compartment of the stomach of animals that chew their cud, is, in recent generations, called <i>bei kasei</i>, the name of the second compartment of the animal’s stomach. Similarly, that which was once called <i>bei kasei</i> is called <i>huvlila</i> in recent generations.
  What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from this change of names? It is with regard to a needle that is found in the thick wall of the second compartment of the stomach. In the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>tereifot</i>, it is prohibited to eat animals with a life expectancy of less than a year. It was established that if a needle punctures the wall of the second compartment of the stomach from only one side, the animal is kosher. If the needle penetrates the wall in a manner visible from both sides, the animal assumes the halakhic status of a <i>tereifa</i>. In the first stomach, even if the needle penetrated only one side of the wall, the animal assumes the halakhic status of a <i>tereifa</i>. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the first and the second compartments of the stomach.
  Rava bar Yosef said: I too shall speak of changes in the meaning of terms in this generation. The city that in biblical times was called Babylon was called Bursif in later generations, and Bursif was called Babylon in later generations. The Gemara asks: What is
  
  Daf 34b
  
  the practical halakhic difference that emerges from this change of names? It is in the area of women’s bills of divorce. With regard to bills of divorce, special care is devoted to ensuring that the name of the place where the bill is written is not altered. Therefore, it is important to be aware that Babylon underwent a name change in later generations.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yishmael says: The mitzva of the four species is to take three myrtle branches, and two willow branches, one <i>lulav</i>, and one <i>etrog</i>. With regard to the myrtle branches, even if the tops of two are severed and the top of one is not severed, it is fit. Rabbi Tarfon says: Even if the tops of all three are severed, it is fit. Rabbi Akiva says with regard to the number of each of the species: Just as there is one <i>lulav</i> and one <i>etrog</i>, so too there is one myrtle branch and one willow branch.
  GEMARA: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael says: “The fruit of a beautiful tree” (Leviticus 23:40); that is one <i>etrog</i>. “Branches of a date palm”; that is one <i>lulav</i>. Based on tradition, <i>kappot</i> is written without the letter <i>vav</i>. Although the word is vocalized in the plural, the lack of the <i>vav</i> indicates that only one is required. “Boughs of a dense-leaved tree”; these are three, as the verse is referring to a branch with several stems. “Willows of the brook”; these are two, as it is plural. Even if the tops of two are severed and the top of one is not severed, it is fit. Rabbi Tarfon says: Even if the tops of all three are severed, it is fit. Rabbi Akiva says: Just as there is one <i>lulav</i> and one <i>etrog</i>, so too, there is one myrtle branch and one willow branch.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him that the species cannot be equated. I might have thought that the <i>etrog</i> should be bound with the other species in one bundle. However, you could say in response: Does it say: The fruit of a beautiful tree and branches of a date palm, with the conjunction joining them? Doesn’t it say only “branches of a date palm,” without a conjunction? That indicates that the <i>etrog</i> is taken separately from the other three species, which are joined in the verse by conjunctions: Branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook, are taken together. And from where is it derived that failure to take each of the species prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The verse states: “And you shall take [<i>ulkaḥtem</i>],” from which it is derived based on the etymological similarity that it shall be a complete taking [<i>lekiḥa tamma</i>] consisting of all the species.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, who deems the <i>lulav</i> fit even if the tops of two of the myrtle branches were severed, whichever way you look at it, his statement is problematic. If he requires whole myrtle branches, and those whose tops are severed do not fill the criterion of beauty, let him require all of them to be whole. And if he does not require whole myrtle branches, even one branch should not be required to be whole either, as Rabbi Tarfon said. The Sage Bira’a said that Rabbi Ami said: Rabbi Yishmael retracted his statement. He concedes that, fundamentally, only one myrtle branch is required, and that branch must be whole.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. And Shmuel conforms to his line of reasoning, as Shmuel said to those who were selling myrtle branches: Equate the price that you demand for myrtle branches to their value and sell your myrtle branches. And if you do not do so and overcharge, I will teach the <i>halakha</i> in public for you in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who allows the use of myrtle branches whose tops are severed.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Shmuel said that to them? If you say it is because Rabbi Tarfon is lenient in his ruling, let him say to them that he will teach the <i>halakha</i> in public for them in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who is even more lenient in his ruling, as he requires only one myrtle branch. The Gemara answers: That is not the case, as three myrtle branches whose tops are severed are common, but one complete myrtle branch whose top is not severed is not common. In practical terms, Rabbi Tarfon’s ruling is the more lenient.
  MISHNA: An <i>etrog</i> that was stolen or is completely dry is unfit. One from a tree worshipped as idolatry [<i>asheira</i>] or from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. An <i>etrog</i> that is fruit that grew on a tree during the three years after it was planted [<i>orla</i>] is unfit, because it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from it. An <i>etrog</i> of impure <i>teruma</i> is unfit. With regard to an <i>etrog</i> of pure <i>teruma</i>, one may not take it <i>ab initio</i>, and if one took it, it is fit, and he fulfilled his obligation after the fact. With regard to an <i>etrog</i> of <i>demai</i>, which is produce acquired from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, who does not reliably tithe his produce, Beit Shammai deem it unfit, and Beit Hillel deem it fit. With regard to an <i>etrog</i> of second tithe in Jerusalem, one may not take it <i>ab initio</i>; and if he took it, it is fit.
  If boil-like blemishes arose on the majority of the <i>etrog</i>; if its pestle-like protuberance on the upper, blossom end was removed; if the <i>etrog</i> was peeled, split, or pierced and is missing any amount, it is unfit. However, if boil-like blemishes arose only on its minority; if its stem, which connects it to the tree, was removed; or it was pierced but is not missing any amount, it is fit. A Cushite <i>etrog</i>, which is black like a Cushite, is unfit. And with regard to an <i>etrog</i> that is leek green, Rabbi Meir deems it fit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit. What is the minimum measure of a small <i>etrog</i>? Rabbi Meir says: It may be no smaller than a walnut-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be no smaller than an egg-bulk. And in a large <i>etrog</i>, the maximum measure is so that one could hold two in his one hand; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is fit even if it is so large that he can hold only one in his two hands.
  
  Daf 35a
  
  GEMARA: The Sages taught that the verse states: “Fruit of a beautiful tree,” meaning, a tree that the taste of its tree trunk and the taste of its fruit are alike. What tree is that? You must say it is the <i>etrog</i> tree.
  The Gemara asks: And say that it is referring to the pepper tree, since the taste of its trunk and the taste of its fruit are alike, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “When you enter the land and plant any tree for food you shall regard its fruit as <i>orla</i>” (Leviticus 19:23). Rabbi Meir would say that by inference from that which is stated “and plant any tree,” don’t I know that it is referring to a tree that produces food? Rather, for what purpose does the verse state: “Any tree for food”? It is to include a tree that the taste of its tree trunk and the taste of its fruit are alike. And which tree is this? You must say this is the pepper tree. This comes to teach you that the peppers, and even its trunk, are edible, and therefore the tree is obligated in the prohibition of <i>orla</i>. And Eretz Yisrael lacks nothing, as it is stated: “A land where you shall eat bread without scarceness, you shall lack nothing” (Deuteronomy 8:9). From where, then, is it derived that the Torah commands the taking of an <i>etrog</i> as one of the four species? Perhaps the verse is referring to peppers.
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the four species, it is clear that the Torah is not referring to peppers, due to the fact that it is not possible to utilize peppers for this purpose. How shall we proceed? If we take one pepper, its taking is not noticeable due to its small size. If we take two or three peppers, the Torah said one fruit and not two or three fruits. Therefore, it is impossible. The verse “the fruit of a beautiful tree” cannot be referring to peppers.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Do not read the verse as it is written, <i>hadar</i>, meaning beautiful, but rather read it <i>hadir</i>, meaning the sheep pen. And it means, just as in this pen there are large and small sheep, unblemished and blemished sheep, so too, this tree has large and small fruits, flawless and blemished fruits. The Gemara wonders: Is that to say that among other fruits there are not large and small fruits, flawless and blemished fruits? How does this description identify the <i>etrog</i> specifically? Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: Just as in a pen, there are both large and small sheep together, so too, on an <i>etrog</i> tree, when the small ones come into being, the large ones still exist on the tree, which is not the case with other fruit trees.
  Rabbi Abbahu said: Do not read it <i>hadar</i>, but rather read it <i>haddar</i>, meaning one that dwells, referring to an item that dwells on its tree from year to year. Ben Azzai says: Do not read it <i>hadar</i>, but rather read it <i>idur</i>, as in the Greek language one calls water <i>idur</i>. And which is the fruit that grows on the basis of all water sources, and not exclusively through irrigation or rainwater? You must say it is an <i>etrog</i>.
  The mishna continues: An <i>etrog</i> from a tree worshipped as idolatry or from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is unfit. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara answers: Since the <i>etrog</i> is fated for burning, its requisite measure was crushed. Although it has not yet been burned, its legal status is that of ashes.
  The mishna continues: An <i>etrog</i> of <i>orla</i> is unfit. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin and Rabbi Asi disagree about this matter. One said: It is unfit because there is no permission to eat <i>orla</i>. Anything that may not be eaten is not one’s property, and it is therefore unfit for use in this mitzva. And one said: It is unfit because it has no monetary value. Since it is prohibited to benefit from <i>orla</i>, it has no value, and one cannot own an item that has no value. Therefore, it does not fulfill the requirement of taking an <i>etrog</i> from one’s own property.
  The Gemara asserts that it may enter one’s mind to say: The one who requires permission to eat the <i>etrog</i> to render it fit does not require that it have monetary value, and the one who requires that it have monetary value does not require permission to eat it. On that basis, the Gemara raises a difficulty from what we learned in the mishna: An <i>etrog</i> of impure <i>teruma</i> is unfit. Granted, according to the one who says that an <i>etrog</i> of <i>orla</i> is unfit because there is no permission to eat it, it works out well that an <i>etrog</i> of impure <i>teruma</i> is unfit, as it too may not be eaten. However, according to the one who says that it is unfit because it has no monetary value, why is the <i>etrog</i> of impure <i>teruma</i> unfit? Although eating it is prohibited, a priest burns it as fuel under his cooked food. Since one may benefit from it, impure <i>teruma</i> has monetary value.
  Rather, contrary to the previous assumption, with regard to permission to eat it, everyone agrees that we require that it be permitted to eat the <i>etrog</i>. When they disagree is with regard to monetary value. One Sage holds: We require permission to eat it, but we do not require that it have monetary value. And one Sage holds: We also require that it have monetary value. The Gemara asks: If so, according to this understanding, what is the practical halakhic difference between them?
  There is a practical difference between them with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of an <i>etrog</i> of second tithe in Jerusalem, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the legal status of second-tithe produce in Jerusalem is that of consecrated property. Although its owner has the right to eat it, just as he may eat from offerings that he sacrifices, it is the property of God, and he has no monetary rights to the produce. According to the one who said: An <i>etrog</i> of <i>orla</i> is unfit because there is no permission to eat it, there is permission to eat second tithe; therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, a second-tithe <i>etrog</i> in Jerusalem is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. And according to the one who said: An <i>etrog</i> of <i>orla</i> is unfit because it has no monetary value, second tithe in Jerusalem is consecrated property of God and has no monetary value to its owner. Therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, it is not fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva.
  In an attempt to attribute the opinions to the <i>amora’im</i>, the Gemara suggests: Conclude that Rabbi Asi is the one who said that the reason is because there is no monetary value, as Rabbi Asi said: With an <i>etrog</i> of second tithe, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person does not fulfill his obligation with it on the Festival. According to the Rabbis, a person fulfills his obligation with it on the Festival. That is precisely the manner in which the dispute with regard to the need for the <i>etrog</i> to have monetary value is presented above. The Gemara determines: Indeed, conclude that Rabbi Asi is the one who holds that the <i>etrog</i> must have monetary value as well.
  § With regard to the matter itself, Rabbi Asi said: With an <i>etrog</i> of second tithe, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person does not fulfill his obligation with it on the Festival. According to the Rabbis, a person fulfills his obligation with it on the Festival. With <i>matza</i> of second tithe, according to Rabbi Meir, a person does not fulfill his obligation with it on Passover because it is not his. According to the Rabbis, a person fulfills his obligation with it on Passover. Similarly, according to Rabbi Meir, dough of second tithe is exempt from the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i>. According to the Rabbis, it is subject to the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i>. In all of these cases, the dispute is whether second tithe is the property of the owner or the property of God.
  Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: Granted, with regard to dough, it is written: “The first of your dough, <i>ḥalla</i> you shall offer as a gift” (Numbers 15:20). “Your dough” indicates that one is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i> only from dough that belongs to him and not consecrated dough. With regard to the <i>etrog</i> too it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves,” indicating that it must be from your own property. However, with regard to <i>matza</i>, why does he not fulfill his obligation with second tithe? Is it written: Your <i>matza</i>? Rabba bar Shmuel said, and some say it was Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya who said: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between bread written with regard to <i>matza</i> and bread written with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>. It is written here, with regard to <i>matza</i>: “Bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3), and it is written there, with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>:
  
  Daf 35b
  
  “And it shall be when you eat of the bread of the land you shall offer up a gift unto the Lord” (Numbers 15:19). Just as there, with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>, one is obligated only if the dough is from yours and not from second tithe, here too, with regard to <i>matza</i>, one fulfills his obligation only if it is from yours and not from second tithe.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this <i>baraita</i> supports the statement of Rabbi Asi: Dough of the second tithe is exempt from <i>ḥalla</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It is subject to the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i>. The Gemara wonders about the tentative nature of the Gemara’s suggestion. Let us say it supports his opinion. The <i>baraita</i> is not similar to the statement of Rav Asi; it is precisely the statement itself.
  Rather, this is what the Gemara is suggesting: Do we say that from the fact that they disagree with regard to this case of <i>ḥalla</i>, they disagree with regard to that case of <i>matza</i> as well? Or perhaps, dough is different because the verse states: “Your dough…your dough” (Numbers 15:20–21) twice. Perhaps this duplication indicates that ownership is required in order for dough to be obligated in the mitzva of <i>ḥalla</i>; however, with regard to <i>matza</i>, where there is no such duplication, perhaps one would be obligated, even in the case of second tithe in Jerusalem, according to Rabbi Meir. Therefore, no proof can be cited from here in support of Rav Asi’s statement.
  § The mishna continues: An <i>etrog</i> of impure <i>teruma</i> is unfit. The reason is, as explained above, that there is no permission to eat it.
  The mishna stated: And with regard to an <i>etrog</i> of pure <i>teruma</i>, one should not take it <i>ab initio</i>. However, if he did, it is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagreed about this. Why may one not take it <i>ab initio</i>? One of them said: It is because one renders it susceptible to impurity. All vegetation cannot become ritually impure, even if it came into contact with a source of impurity, unless it was moistened by one of seven liquids (see Leviticus 11:37–38). However, once one touches the <i>etrog</i> with wet hands, which are wet because he removed the other three species from the water in which they were kept to preserve their freshness, he renders the <i>etrog</i> susceptible to impurity. The Sages prohibited taking an <i>etrog</i> of <i>teruma</i>, lest it become impure, as it is prohibited to impurify <i>teruma</i>. And one said: It is because he damages it. By handling the <i>etrog</i>, the peel is rendered disgusting, and it is prohibited to damage <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The difference would be in a case where one accorded the entire <i>etrog</i> the status of <i>teruma</i>, to the exclusion of the peel, whose status remains non-sacred. According to the one who said: Because one renders it susceptible to impurity, there is a prohibition, as failure to sanctify the peel as <i>teruma</i> does not prevent the fruit from becoming susceptible to impurity. However, according to the one who said: Because he damages the <i>teruma</i>, there is no prohibition, as the peel that might be damaged was never <i>teruma</i>.
  The mishna continues: And if he took an <i>etrog</i> of <i>teruma</i>, it is fit, and he fulfilled his obligation after the fact. The Gemara explains: According to the one who said that one does not fulfill his obligation because there is no permission to eat the <i>etrog</i>, there is permission to eat it. According to the one who said that one does not fulfill his obligation because it has no monetary value, it has monetary value.
  § The mishna cites a dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai with regard to an <i>etrog</i> of <i>demai</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Beit Hillel, who deem it fit? It is prohibited to eat <i>demai</i>, due to the concern that it is actually untithed produce. The Gemara answers: Because, if one wants, he could declare all of his property ownerless, and he would be a pauper, in which case the <i>demai</i> would be fit for his consumption. Now too, even though he did not declare it ownerless, it is considered to meet the criterion of “and you shall take for yourselves.” As we learned in a mishna: One may feed the impoverished <i>demai</i>, and one may feed soldiers [<i>akhsanya</i>] whose support is imposed upon the residents of the city, <i>demai</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And why, then, do Beit Shammai deem it unfit? The Gemara answers: A pauper may not eat <i>demai</i>, as we learned in a mishna: One may not feed the impoverished <i>demai</i> and one may not feed soldiers <i>demai</i>. And Rav Huna said: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Beit Shammai say: One may not feed the impoverished <i>demai</i> and one may not feed soldiers whose support is imposed upon the residents of the city, <i>demai</i>. And Beit Hillel say: One may feed the impoverished <i>demai</i> and one may feed soldiers whose support is imposed upon the residents of the city, <i>demai</i>. On that basis, the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to an <i>etrog</i> of <i>demai</i> is clear.
  § The mishna continues: With regard to an <i>etrog</i> of second tithe in Jerusalem, one may not take it, <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara explains: According to the one who says that an <i>etrog</i> of pure <i>teruma</i> is unfit because one renders it susceptible to ritual impurity, here too, he renders it susceptible. According to the one who says it is unfit because one damages the peel, here too, he damages the peel.
  The mishna continues: And if one took an <i>etrog</i> of second tithe in Jerusalem, it is fit. The Gemara explains: According to the one who said that one does not fulfill his obligation with an <i>etrog</i> of <i>orla</i> because there is no permission to eat the <i>etrog</i>, everyone, i.e., Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, agrees that one fulfills his obligation, because in Jerusalem one may eat second tithe. However, according to the one who said that one does not fulfill his obligation with an <i>etrog</i> of <i>orla</i> because it has no monetary value, in accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not consider second tithe the property of God; it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  § The mishna continues: If boil-like blemishes arose on the majority of the <i>etrog</i>, it is unfit. Rav Ḥisda said: This statement was stated by our great rabbi, Rav, and may the Omnipresent come to his assistance. The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where the blemishes are concentrated in one place; however, if they are distributed in two or three places throughout the <i>etrog</i>, it is fit. Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: If the blemishes are distributed in two or three places, it is as if the <i>etrog</i> were speckled with different colors in different places; it lacks beauty and is certainly unfit.
  Rather, emend the text: If this statement was stated, it was stated concerning the latter clause of the mishna: If boil-like blemishes arose only on its minority, it is fit. Rav Ḥisda said: This statement was stated by our great rabbi, Rav, and may the Omnipresent come to his assistance. The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only if the blemishes are concentrated in one place. However, if they are distributed in two or three places throughout the <i>etrog</i>, even if their total remains a minority, it is as if the <i>etrog</i> were speckled, and it is unfit. Rava said: If there is a blemish on its upper, blossom end, which is clearly visible and comprises the essence of the beauty of the <i>etrog</i>, even if the blemish is of any size, the <i>etrog</i> is unfit.
  § The mishna continues: If its <i>pitam</i> was removed, it is unfit. Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar taught a <i>baraita</i>: This means if its pestle-like protuberance at its upper end was removed.
  The mishna continues: An <i>etrog</i> that was peeled is unfit. Rava said: This <i>etrog</i> that was peeled like a red date so that only its thin, outer peel is removed but the rest remains intact, is fit. The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn explicitly in the mishna: If the <i>etrog</i> was peeled it is unfit? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult;
  
  Daf 36a
  
  this mishna, where it states that if the <i>etrog</i> was peeled it is unfit, is in a case where all of it was peeled. That statement of Rava that if it was peeled it is fit is in a case where only part of it was peeled.
  The mishna continues discussing the <i>halakha</i> of an <i>etrog</i> that was split or pierced. Ulla bar Ḥanina taught: An <i>etrog</i> that was pierced with a hole that completely goes through its body is unfit with any size hole. If the hole does not completely go through the <i>etrog</i>, it is unfit only with a hole the size of an <i>issar</i> coin.
  Rava raised a dilemma: If signs of a <i>tereifa</i> developed in the <i>etrog</i>, what is its halakhic status? The Gemara clarifies: What is the dilemma that he is raising? There are similarities between the <i>halakhot</i> of the <i>etrog</i> in the mishna and some of the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>tereifa</i>, a bird or animal with a condition that will lead to its death within a year. If it is the case where the <i>etrog</i> was peeled, we already learned that case. If it is the case where the <i>etrog</i> was split, we learned that case as well. And if it is the case where the <i>etrog</i> was pierced, we learned that too. After ruling out those defects, the question remains: With regard to what is Rava’s dilemma?
  The Gemara answers: When he raises the dilemma, it is with regard to a case like that which Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A lung whose contents can be poured like a pitcher, i.e., whose tissue dissolved to the point of liquefaction, is not a sign of <i>tereifa</i>, and the animal is kosher. And Rava said: And that is the <i>halakha</i> only where the bronchia are intact. However, if the bronchia are not intact, it is a sign of <i>tereifa</i>. The dilemma here is with regard to a comparable situation in an <i>etrog</i>, i.e., an <i>etrog</i> that liquefied from within: What is its halakhic status? Perhaps it is there, in the case of the lung, where the air does not affect it since it is completely enclosed in the body, that the lungs can recover, and that is why it is not a <i>tereifa</i>. However, here, in the case of the <i>etrog</i>, where the air affects it, it inevitably decays and spoils and therefore it is a <i>tereifa</i>. Or, perhaps the case of the <i>etrog</i> is no different.
  The Gemara answers: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma based on that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>. An <i>etrog</i> that is <i>tafuaḥ</i>, <i>saruaḥ</i>, pickled, boiled, a black Cushite <i>etrog</i>, a white <i>etrog</i>, or a speckled <i>etrog</i> is unfit. An <i>etrog</i> shaped like a ball is unfit, and some say even a twin, conjoined, <i>etrog</i> is unfit. With regard to an <i>etrog</i> that is unripe, Rabbi Akiva deems it unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If he grew the <i>etrog</i> in a mold and shaped it to appear like a different entity, and it is no longer shaped like an <i>etrog</i>, it is unfit.
  In any event, it teaches that an <i>etrog</i> that is <i>tafuaḥ</i> or <i>saruaḥ</i> is unfit. What, is it not that <i>tafuaḥ</i> means that it decayed on the outside and <i>saruaḥ</i> means that it decayed on the inside? The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, both this and that are referring to decay on the outside. And this apparent redundancy is not difficult, as this case, <i>tafuaḥ</i>, is where it swelled even though it did not decay, and that case, <i>saruaḥ</i>, is where it decayed even though it did not swell.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> cited above: A Cushite <i>etrog</i> is unfit. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: A Cushite <i>etrog</i> is fit, but an <i>etrog</i> that is similar to a Cushite <i>etrog</i> is unfit. Abaye said: When we learned this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that it is unfit, too, we learned it not in reference to an actual Cushite <i>etrog</i>, but rather in reference to one that is similar to a Cushite <i>etrog</i>. Rava said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a Cushite <i>etrog</i>, and nevertheless, it is not difficult; this, the <i>halakha</i> that it is unfit, is for us in Babylonia because our <i>etrogim</i> are typically light, and the dark Cushite <i>etrogim</i> are conspicuously different. And that, the <i>halakha</i> that it is fit, is for them in Eretz Yisrael, whose <i>etrogim</i> are typically dark. In Eretz Yisrael the dark Cushite <i>etrog</i> is not conspicuously different, and it is therefore fit.
  It was also taught in the <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an unripe <i>etrog</i>, Rabbi Akiva deems it unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. Rabba said: Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Shimon said one and the same statement. The Gemara elaborates: The statement of Rabbi Akiva is that which we said; an unripe <i>etrog</i> is unfit. Rabbi Shimon, what is his statement? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon exempts <i>etrogim</i> from the requirement to be tithed while in their small state. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon, too, holds that an unripe <i>etrog</i> is not a fruit.
  Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps that is not the case and they do not share the same opinion. Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only here, with regard to an unripe <i>etrog</i>, as we require beauty [<i>hadar</i>] in an <i>etrog</i> and there is none in the case of an unripe <i>etrog</i> due to its color or small size; however, there, with regard to tithes, perhaps he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is obligated to tithe even a half-ripe <i>etrog</i>.
  Alternatively, Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only there with regard to the exemption of an unripe <i>etrog</i> from tithes, as it is written: “You shall surely tithe all the produce of your planting, which is brought forth in the field year by year” (Deuteronomy 14:22). From that verse it is derived that the obligation to tithe applies only to produce that has developed to the point where it is typical for people to take it out to the field for sowing; one is not obligated to tithe unripe fruit that is not suitable for planting. However, perhaps here he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva and would deem an unripe <i>etrog</i> fit.
  
  Daf 36b
  
  The Gemara notes: And there is nothing more to discuss here. Clearly, the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Shimon do not necessarily coincide.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If he grew the <i>etrog</i> in a mold and shaped it to appear like a different species, it is unfit. Rava said: The Sages taught that it is unfit only if he shaped it to appear like a different species; however, if he shaped the <i>etrog</i> so it still appears like its own species, it is fit. The Gemara asks: That is obvious; the phrase: Like a different species, is explicitly taught in the <i>baraita</i>. If it shaped like its own species, it is fit. The Gemara answers: No, Rava’s statement is necessary to deem fit an <i>etrog</i> that is shaped into the shape of many planks, i.e., pieces of wood attached to each other. Although its shape is not precisely that of a regular <i>etrog</i>, it sufficiently resembles a regular <i>etrog</i> and is fit.
  § It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to an <i>etrog</i> that mice pierced. Rav said: That is not beautiful. Is that so? But wouldn’t Rabbi Ḥanina dip his <i>etrog</i>, eat part of it, and fulfill his obligation with what remained of it? The Gemara asks: And for Rabbi Ḥanina, the mishna is difficult, as it states that an incomplete <i>etrog</i> is unfit.
  The Gemara explains: Granted, for Rabbi Ḥanina, the mishna is not difficult, as it can be explained that here, when the mishna prohibits one from using an incomplete <i>etrog</i>, it is referring to performing the mitzva on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, when a complete taking of the species is required; and there, when Rabbi Ḥanina’s conduct leads to the conclusion that an incomplete <i>etrog</i> is fit, it is referring to performing the mitzva on the second day of the Festival or thereafter. However, according to Rav, who said an <i>etrog</i> that was pierced by mice is unfit, Rabbi Ḥanina’s conduct is difficult, as the requirement of beauty applies on all seven days. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as Rav could have said to you: Mice are different, as they are repulsive. When mice pierce an <i>etrog</i>, what remains is antithetical to beauty. When a person bites an <i>etrog</i>, what remains can still be considered beautiful.
  § Some say this exchange differently. Rav said with regard to an <i>etrog</i> that mice pierced: That is beautiful, as Rabbi Ḥanina would dip his <i>etrog</i>, eat part of it, and fulfill his obligation with what remained of it, indicating that an incomplete <i>etrog</i> is fit. The Gemara asks: And for Rabbi Ḥanina, the mishna is difficult, as it states that an incomplete <i>etrog</i> is unfit. The Gemara answers: The mishna is not difficult; here, it is referring to performing the mitzva on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>; there, it is referring to performing the mitzva on the second day of the Festival or thereafter.
  A dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is cited in a mishna with regard to the minimum measure of a small <i>etrog</i>. Rafram bar Pappa said: Like the dispute here, so is the dispute with regard to the matter of rounded stones, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On Shabbat three rounded stones may be taken into the bathroom in order to clean oneself with them. Although generally one may not move stones on Shabbat because they are set aside from use, the Sages permitted doing so in the interest of human dignity. However, they disagreed, with regard to the size of these stones. And what is their measure? Rabbi Meir says: A walnut-bulk; Rabbi Yehuda says: An egg-bulk. Clearly the rationales for these disputes are different; however, since the respective measures are identical, the analogy can serve as a mnemonic.
  The mishna continues: And in a large <i>etrog</i>, the maximum measure is so that one could hold two in his one hand; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is fit even if it is so large that he can hold only one in his two hands. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who came to the synagogue, and his <i>etrog</i> was so large that he carried it on his shoulder. Apparently, one can fulfill his obligation with a large <i>etrog</i>. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Is there proof from there? In that case, too, the Sages said to him: That is not beauty.
  MISHNA: One may bind the <i>lulav</i> only with its own species; i.e., one of the four species taken with the <i>lulav</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may do so even with a string or with a cord. Rabbi Meir said: There was an incident involving the men of Jerusalem who would bind their <i>lulavim</i> with gold rings. The Sages said to him: They would bind it with its own species beneath the rings, which serve a merely decorative purpose and not a halakhic one.
  GEMARA: Rava said: One may bind the <i>lulav</i> even with fibers that grow around the trunk of the date palm, and even with a piece of the trunk of the date palm. And Rava said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? He holds that a <i>lulav</i> requires binding, and if one brings another species to bind the <i>lulav</i>, there will be five species and he will violate the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot.
  And Rava further said: From where do I say this <i>halakha</i> that fibers and the trunk of the date palm are the species of the <i>lulav</i>? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “You shall reside in <i>sukkot</i> for seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), which means a <i>sukka</i> of any material, as the Torah was not particular about the material to be used for the roofing; any species may be used as long as it grew from the ground and it is not susceptible to impurity. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is practiced only with the four species of the <i>lulav</i> as roofing. And, he claims, logic dictates that it is so, as it is derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, which is not practiced at night as it is during the day, is practiced only with the four species, with regard to the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, which is practiced at night as it is during the day, is it not right that its roofing should be only from the four species?
  The Rabbis said to him: That is not an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as any <i>a fortiori</i> inference that you infer initially to be stringent, but ultimately it is to be lenient, is not a legitimate <i>a fortiori</i> inference. If ultimately the stringency leads to a leniency, the entire basis of the inference is undermined.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  According to your reasoning, if one did not find any of the four species to roof his <i>sukka</i>, he will sit idly and fail to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>; and the Torah states: “You shall reside in <i>sukkot</i> for seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), meaning a <i>sukka</i> of any material. Likewise, in the book of Ezra, which can refer also to the book of Nehemiah, it says: “Go forth unto the mount, and fetch olive branches, and pine branches, and myrtle branches, and palm branches, and branches of a dense-leaved tree, to make <i>sukkot</i>, as it is written” (Nehemiah 8:15). Apparently, a <i>sukka</i> may be constructed even with materials other than the four species.
  And Rabbi Yehuda holds: These olive branches and pine branches mentioned in the verse were for the walls of the <i>sukka</i>, which need not be built from the four species. Myrtle branches, palm branches, and branches of a dense-leaved tree, i.e., again myrtle, all of which are among the four species, were for the roofing. Rabbi Yehuda holds that one may roof the <i>sukka</i> only with the four species. And we learned in a mishna: One may roof the <i>sukka</i> with boards; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. As boards can be produced from one of the four species only if the trunk of the date palm is considered a <i>lulav</i>, apparently, fibers and the trunk of the date palm are the species of the <i>lulav</i>. The Gemara determines: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
  The Gemara wonders: And did Rabbi Yehuda say with regard to the materials fit for roofing a <i>sukka</i> that the four species, yes, they are fit, but other materials, no, they are not fit? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one roofed the <i>sukka</i> with cedar [<i>erez</i>] boards that have four handbreadths in their width, everyone agrees that it is unfit. If they do not have four handbreadths in their width, Rabbi Meir deems it unfit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. And Rabbi Meir concedes that if there is between one board and another board a gap the complete width of a board, then one places fit roofing from the waste of the threshing floor and the winepress between the boards and the <i>sukka</i> is fit. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda permits one to roof the <i>sukka</i> with cedar wood, which is not one of the four species.
  The Gemara responds: What is the <i>erez</i> to which the mishna refers? It is in fact a myrtle tree, in accordance with that which Rabba bar Rav Huna said, as Rabba bar Rav Huna said that they say in the school of Rav: There are ten types of <i>erez</i>, as it is stated: “I will place in the wilderness the cedar [<i>erez</i>], the acacia-tree, the myrtle, and pine tree; I will set in the plain the juniper, the box-tree, and the cypress all together” (Isaiah 41:19). All the trees listed in this verse are types of cedar, and the myrtle is one of them.
  § The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir says: One may tie the <i>lulav</i> even with a cord. It is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that Rabbi Meir said: There was an incident involving the prominent residents of Jerusalem who would bind their <i>lulavim</i> with gold rings. The Sages said to him: Is there proof from there? They would bind it with its own species beneath the rings, which serve a merely decorative purpose and not a halakhic one.
  Rabba said to those who would bind the four species [<i>hoshana</i>] of the house of the Exilarch: When you bind the four species of the house of the Exilarch, leave room for a handgrip on it where there is neither binding nor decoration so that there will not be an interposition between the <i>lulav</i> and the hand of the person taking it.
  Rava said: That is unnecessary, as any addition whose purpose is to beautify does not interpose. And Rabba said: Let a person not take the four species with a cloth [<i>sudara</i>] around his hand, since I require a complete taking, and there is none in this case due to the interposition between his hand and the <i>lulav</i>. And Rava said: That is not a problem, as taking by means of another object is considered taking.
  Rava said: From where do I say that taking by means of another object is considered taking? It is as we learned in a mishna: One undergoing purification from impurity imparted by a corpse must be sprinkled with purification water with the ashes of the red heifer. If the hyssop used to sprinkle the water was short and did not reach the water in the receptacle, one renders it sufficiently long by attaching a string or a spindle, and then he dips the hyssop into the water, removes it, grasps the hyssop, and sprinkles the water on the one undergoing purification. And why may he do so? Doesn’t the Merciful One say in the Torah: “And a ritually pure person shall take hyssop, and dip it in the water, and sprinkle it” (Numbers 19:18), indicating that one must take the hyssop while dipping it? Rather, may one not conclude from this that taking by means of another object is considered taking?
  This proof is rejected: From where can that be proven? Perhaps it is different there; since he attached the string to the hyssop, its legal status is like that of the hyssop itself. However, the legal status of the cloth is not like that of the <i>lulav</i>, since it is not attached to the <i>lulav</i>. Rather, the fact that taking by means of another object is considered taking can be learned from here: If the ashes of the red heifer fell from the tube in which they were held into the trough in which the spring water was located, the water is unfit, since taking the ashes and placing them in the water must be performed intentionally.
  
  Daf 37b
  
  By inference, if he spilled the ashes intentionally from the tube into the water, it is fit. Why? Doesn’t the Merciful One say in the Torah: “And for the impure they shall take of the ashes of the burning of the purification from sin, and he places running water upon them in a vessel” (Numbers 19:17). Apparently, one must mix the water and the ashes intentionally. Rather, may one not conclude from it that taking by means of another object is considered taking?
  And Rabba said with regard to the <i>lulav</i>: After binding the myrtle branches and willow branches, let a person not insert the <i>lulav</i> into the binding of the four species, as perhaps as a result the leaves will fall from the branches and the leaves will constitute an interposition between the various species. And Rava said: An object of one species does not interpose before an object of the same species.
  And Rabba said: Let a person not cut the <i>lulav</i> in order to shorten it while it is in the binding of the four species, as perhaps as a result leaves will become detached and will constitute an interposition between the various species. And Rava said: An object of one species does not interpose before an object of the same species.
  § And Rabba said: It is prohibited to smell the myrtle branch used in fulfillment of the mitzva. However, it is permitted to smell the <i>etrog</i> used in fulfillment of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the distinction between them? The Gemara answers: With regard to a myrtle branch, which exists primarily for its fragrance, when he sets it aside exclusively for the mitzva, he sets it aside from enjoying its fragrance. With regard to an <i>etrog</i>, on the other hand, which exists primarily for eating, when he sets it aside exclusively for the mitzva, he sets it aside from eating. However, he never intended to prohibit this ancillary pleasure.
  And Rabba said: With regard to a myrtle branch, while it is attached to the tree, it is permitted to smell it on Shabbat. With regard to an <i>etrog</i>, while it is attached to the tree, it is prohibited to smell it. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between them? With regard to a myrtle branch, which exists primarily to smell it, if you permit him to smell it, he will not come to cut it. Once he has smelled it, he has no further use for it. With regard to an <i>etrog</i>, which exists primarily for eating, one may not smell it because if you permit him to do so, the concern is that he will come to cut it from the tree to eat it.
  § And Rabba said: One takes the <i>lulav</i> bound with the other two species in the right hand and the <i>etrog</i> in the left. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for that arrangement? These species constitute three mitzvot, and this <i>etrog</i> is only one mitzva. One accords deference to the greater number of mitzvot by taking the three species in the right hand. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zerika: What is the reason that we recite the blessing only with the formula: About taking the <i>lulav</i>, with no mention of the other species? Rabbi Zerika said to him: Since it is highest of them all and the most conspicuous, the other species are subsumed under it. Rabbi Yirmeya asks: And if that is the only reason, let him lift the <i>etrog</i> higher than the <i>lulav</i> and recite the blessing mentioning it. Rabbi Zerika said to him that he meant: Since the tree of its species is the tallest of them all, it is the most prominent, and therefore it is appropriate for the formula of the blessing to emphasize the <i>lulav</i>.
  MISHNA: And where in the recitation of <i>hallel</i> would they wave the <i>lulav</i>? They would do so at the verse: “Thank the Lord, for He is good” (Psalms 118:1, 29) that appears at both the beginning and the end of the psalm, and at the verse: “Lord, please save us” (Psalms 118:25); this is the statement of Beit Hillel. And Beit Shammai say: They would wave the <i>lulav</i> even at the verse: “Lord, please grant us success” (Psalms 118:25). Rabbi Akiva said: I was observing Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua and saw that all the people were waving their <i>lulavim</i>, and the two of them waved their <i>lulav</i> only at: “Lord, please save us,” indicating that this is the <i>halakha</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the premise of the mishna. With regard to waving, who mentioned it? As no previous mention was made of waving the <i>lulav</i>, it is a non sequitur when the <i>tanna</i> begins discussion of the details of the custom. The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> is basing himself on the mishna there (29b), which states: Any <i>lulav</i> that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. As the custom of waving the <i>lulav</i> was already established there, here the <i>tanna</i> is saying: Where would they wave the <i>lulav</i>?
  We learned in a mishna there (<i>Menaḥot</i> 61a): With regard to the two loaves and the two lambs offered on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, how does he perform their waving before the altar? He places the two loaves atop the two lambs, and places his hand beneath them, and waves to and fro to each side, and he raises and lowers them, as it is stated: “Which is waved and which is lifted” (Exodus 29:27), indicating that there is waving to the sides as well as raising and lowering.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He moves them to and fro to dedicate them to He Whom the four directions are His. He raises and lowers them to He Whom the heavens and earth are His. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught it as follows. Rabbi Ḥama bar Ukva said that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: He moves them to and fro in order to request a halt to harmful winds, storms and tempests that come from all directions; he raises and lowers them in order to halt harmful dews and rains that come from above. Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yosei bar Zevila who said: That is to say,
  
  Daf 38a
  
  non-essential aspects of a mitzva avert calamity, as waving is a non-essential aspect of the mitzva, since even if one failed to wave the loaves he fulfilled his obligation, and nevertheless it halts harmful winds and dews. And Rava said: And likewise one should conduct himself the same way with a <i>lulav</i>, i.e., one should wave it to and fro and raise and lower it for the same reasons. When Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov would move the <i>lulav</i> to and fro, he would say: This is an arrow in the eye of Satan, as despite his best efforts, the Jewish people continue to joyously fulfill mitzvot. The Gemara notes: That is not a proper manner of conduct, as it will induce Satan to come to incite him to sin. Gloating due to his victory over the evil inclination will lead Satan to redouble his efforts to corrupt him.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who was coming along the way and did not have a <i>lulav</i> in his hand to take and fulfill the mitzva while traveling, when he enters his house to eat,he should take the <i>lulav</i> at his table. He interrupts his meal to fulfill the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>. If he did not take the <i>lulav</i> in the morning, he should take it in the afternoon, as the entire day is suited for fulfilling the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the mishna. On one hand, you said that if he did not take the <i>lulav</i> before the meal then he takes it at his table. That is to say that if remembers that he did not yet take the <i>lulav</i>, he interrupts his meal, takes the <i>lulav</i>, and then continues his meal. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (<i>Shabbat</i> 9b): One may not begin to eat before he recites the afternoon prayer; however, if they started a meal, they need not interrupt the meal in order to pray. Rav Safra said: This is not difficult, as that mishna, where one need not interrupt his meal, is referring to a case where there is opportunity to pray later in the day; this mishna, where one must interrupt his meal, is referring to a case where there is no opportunity to take the <i>lulav</i> later in the day. In that case, one must fulfill the mitzva immediately.
  Rava said: What is the difficulty? The two cases are different, and there is no contradiction at all. Perhaps this mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is a mitzva by Torah law, and therefore one must interrupt his meal to take the <i>lulav</i>, while that mitzva to recite the afternoon prayer is a mitzva by rabbinic law, and therefore one need not interrupt his meal to pray. Rather, Rava said: If there is a difficulty, i.e., a contradiction, this is the difficulty: In the first clause in the mishna it says that when he enters his house to eat, he should take the <i>lulav</i> at his table. Apparently, one must interrupt his meal. And then in the latter clause of the mishna it is taught: If he did not take the <i>lulav</i> in the morning, he should take it in the afternoon. Apparently, he need not interrupt his meal.
  Resolving the contradiction, Rav Safra said: This is not difficult. This clause, where one need not interrupt his meal, is referring to a case where there is opportunity to take the <i>lulav</i> later in the day; that clause, where one must interrupt his meal, is referring to a case where there is no opportunity to take the <i>lulav</i> later in the day.
  Rabbi Zeira said: What is the difficulty? There is no contradiction, as perhaps the mishna is teaching that there is a mitzva to interrupt one’s meal and take the <i>lulav</i>; but if he did not interrupt his meal he should take it in the afternoon, as the entire day is suited for fulfilling the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>. Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: Actually, the contradiction is as we said initially, between the ruling with regard to <i>lulav</i> and the ruling with regard to the afternoon prayer. And as to that which you found difficult, i.e., there is no contradiction at all, as this mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is a mitzva by Torah law and that mitzva to recite the afternoon prayer is a mitzva by rabbinic law, that is not difficult; as here, in the case of <i>lulav</i>, we are dealing with the second day of the Festival and beyond, during the intermediate days, when the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is by rabbinic law. The contradiction is therefore between the rulings pertaining to two mitzvot by rabbinic law.
  The language of the mishna is also precise and indicates that it is dealing with the intermediate days of the Festival from the fact that it teaches: One who was coming along the way and does not have a <i>lulav</i> in his hand. As, if it enters your mind to say that the mishna is referring to the first day of the Festival, is it permitted to travel a long distance on that day? Rather, it is referring to the intermediate days.
  MISHNA: With regard to one for whom a Canaanite slave, a woman, or a minor was reciting <i>hallel</i>, he repeats after them what they are saying word for word. The mishna notes: And may a curse come to him for being so ignorant that he needs them to recite it for him. If an adult male was reciting <i>hallel</i> on his behalf, he need not repeat each word, as the adult male can fulfill the obligation to recite <i>hallel</i> on his behalf. Rather, he simply answers: <i>Halleluya</i>, to each phrase that is recited. In a place where they were accustomed to repeat certain verses, he, too, should repeat them. If the custom is to recite them plainly, without repetition, he should recite them plainly. In a place where the custom is to recite a blessing when reciting <i>hallel</i>, he should recite a blessing. Everything is in accordance with the local custom in these matters.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: Actually, they said that a son may recite a blessing on behalf of his father, and a slave may recite a blessing on behalf of his master, and a woman may recite a blessing on behalf of her husband, but the Sages said: May a curse come to a man who, due to his ignorance, requires his wife and children to recite a blessing on his behalf.
  Rava said:
  
  Daf 38b
  
  Many significant <i>halakhot</i> can be learned from the custom of <i>hallel</i> based on the manner in which it was recited. In reciting <i>hallel</i> there are allusions to several halakhic matters and customs that the Sages instituted due to circumstances extant at the time. Although due to increased literacy and familiarity with the <i>hallel</i> liturgy the reasons no longer apply, these customs remain in practice. The prayer leader recites: “<i>Halleluya</i>” (Psalms 113:1), and the congregation recites: <i>Halleluya</i>, in response. From here is the source that there is a mitzva to respond: <i>Halleluya</i>.
  Likewise, the prayer leader recites: “Give praise, servants of the Lord” (Psalms 113:1), and the congregation recites: <i>Halleluya</i>, in response. From here is the source of the <i>halakha</i> cited in the mishna that if an adult male was reciting <i>hallel</i> on his behalf, he answers: <i>Halleluya</i>. He recites: “Thank the Lord, for He is good” (Psalms 118:1), and they respond: “Thank the Lord, for He is good.” From here is the source that there is a mitzva to respond by reciting the beginnings of chapters. It was also stated that Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said: There is a mitzva to respond by reciting the beginnings of chapters.
  Rava continued to cite the significant <i>halakhot</i> learned from <i>hallel</i>. The prayer leader recites: “Lord, please save us” (Psalms 118:25), and the congregation recites: “Lord, please save us,” in response. From here is the source of the <i>halakha</i> cited in the mishna that if a minor was reciting a portion that is not from the beginning of a chapter on one’s behalf, he recites after him precisely what he says.
  The prayer leader recites: “Lord, please grant us success,” and the congregation recites in response: “Lord, please grant us success” (Psalms 118:25). From here is the source of the <i>halakha</i> that if one comes to repeat a particular verse in <i>hallel</i> twice, he may repeat it. The prayer leader recites: “Blessed is one who comes” (Psalms 118:26), and the congregation recites the rest of the verse: “In the name of the Lord” (Psalms 118:26), in response. From here is the source of the <i>halakha</i> that the halakhic status of one who hears a passage recited is equivalent to that of one who recites it, as the congregation fulfills its obligation even though it does not repeat the entire verse.
  Apropos this <i>halakha</i>, the Gemara relates that the Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: If one heard a passage recited and did not recite it himself, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Did he fulfill his obligation or not? He said to them that the Sages, and the schoolteachers, and the heads of the nation, and the homiletic interpreters said: One who heard a passage recited and did not recite it himself fulfilled his obligation.
  It was also stated that Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: From where is it derived that the halakhic status of one who hears a passage recited is equivalent to that of one who recites it? It is as it is written: “All the words of the book which the king of Judea has read” (II Kings 22:16). And did King Josiah read them? Didn’t Shaphan read them, as it is written: “And Shaphan read it before the king” (II Kings 22:10)? Rather, from here it is derived that the halakhic status of one who hears a passage recited is equivalent to that of one who recites it, and it is as though Josiah read the words himself.
  The Gemara asks: And perhaps after Shaphan read them Josiah read them again? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: It should not enter your mind to say so, as it is written: “Because your heart was tender and you humbled yourself before the Lord when you heard what I spoke in this place” (II Kings 22:19). The Gemara infers: “When you heard” is written in the verse, and not: When you read. In other words, immediately upon hearing Shaphan read the text, King Josiah sent for Huldah the prophetess, which shows that he humbled his heart. Clearly, the halakhic status of one who hears a passage recited is equivalent to that of one who recites it.
  Apropos <i>hallel</i>, the Gemara cites additional <i>halakhot</i>. Rava said: Let a person not recite: “Blessed is one who comes,” and then, after pausing, recite: “In the name of the Lord.” Rather, let him recite without pause: “Blessed is one who comes in the name of the Lord.” Rav Safra said to Rava:
  
  Daf 39a
  
  You, who are as great in this generation as Moses, did you speak well? It is not so; rather, both there and here, whether he recites it with or without pause, the latter part of the verse is the conclusion of the matter, and we have no problem with it, as it is clear that his intention is to recite the entire verse: “Blessed is one who comes in the name of the Lord.” Rava said: Let a person not recite in the <i>kaddish</i> prayer: May His great name, and then, after pausing, recite: Be blessed. Rather, let him recite without pause: May His great name be blessed. Rav Safra said to Rava: You, who are as great in this generation as Moses, did you speak well? It is not so, rather, both there and here, whether he recites it with or without pause, the latter part of the verse is the conclusion of the matter, and we have no problem with it.
  § The mishna continues: In a place where they were accustomed to repeat certain verses he too should repeat them. It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi repeats certain matters in <i>hallel</i>. Rabbi Elazar ben Perata adds certain matters in <i>hallel</i>. The Gemara asks: What does he add? Abaye said: He continues repeating additional verses in <i>hallel</i>, those from: I will thank You, and onward until the end of the psalm, as is the custom even today.
  § The mishna continues: In a place where the custom is to recite a blessing when reciting hallel, he should recite a blessing. Abaye said: The Sages taught that the obligation to recite a blessing is dependent on custom only with regard to the blessing recited after <i>hallel</i>. However, before <i>hallel</i>, there is a mitzva to recite a blessing, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to all the mitzvot, one recites a blessing over them prior to [<i>over</i>] their performance. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the word <i>over</i> is the language of priority? It is as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that it is written: “And Ahimaaz ran by the way of the plain and overtook [<i>vaya’avor</i>] the Cushite” (II Samuel 18:23). Abaye said: It is derived from here: “And he passed [<i>avar</i>] before them” (Genesis 33:3). And if you wish, say instead that the proof is from here: “And their king passed [<i>vaya’avor</i>] before them and the Lord at their head” (Micah 2:13).
  MISHNA: In the case of one who purchases a <i>lulav</i> from another who is an <i>am ha’aretz</i> during the Sabbatical Year, the seller gives him an <i>etrog</i> along with it as a gift, as he is not permitted to purchase the <i>etrog</i> during the Sabbatical Year because it is prohibited to engage in commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: If, the seller did not want to give him the <i>etrog</i> as a gift, what is the <i>halakha</i>? How should the buyer purchase the <i>etrog</i>? Rav Huna said: He incorporates the cost of the <i>etrog</i> into the price of the <i>lulav</i>. He should purchase the <i>lulav</i> at an inflated price to cover the cost of the <i>etrog</i> as well. The Gemara asks: And let the buyer give the seller the money for the <i>etrog</i> directly; why employ artifice in the transaction?
  The Gemara answers: That is necessary because one may not transfer money used to purchase Sabbatical-Year produce to an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, lest he make improper use of money that has sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not transfer to an <i>am ha’aretz</i> money used to purchase Sabbatical-Year produce that is worth more than the value of food sufficient for three meals. One may use money that has sanctity of the Sabbatical Year to purchase food for his personal use. If the money is sufficient for three meals, presumably the seller will use it in a permitted manner. And if the buyer transferred more money than that, he should say: This money is deconsecrated by my redeeming it in exchange for non-Sabbatical-Year produce that I have in my house.
  
  Daf 39b
  
  And then he comes home and eats the produce in the appropriate manner and at the appropriate time, due to the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: In what case is this statement said that it is permitted to transfer money used to purchase Sabbatical-Year produce to an <i>am ha’aretz</i> as long as it does not exceed the value of three meals? It is specifically in a case where one purchases produce that came from a field that was declared ownerless as required during the Sabbatical Year. In that case, the <i>am ha’aretz</i> who gathered the produce is paid only for the act of harvesting and not for the produce. However, if he buys produce that came from a field that was safeguarded for its owner in the manner that it is during the other years of the Sabbatical-Year cycle and was not declared ownerless, then even if one purchased produce worth half an <i>issar</i>, it is prohibited to transfer the money to him, as it is prohibited to utilize fruits that were safeguarded during the Sabbatical Year.
  Rav Sheshet raised an objection: And is it permitted to purchase produce from an ownerless field worth only the value of three meals and no more? He raised a contradiction from a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 9:1): Rue and sorrel, two types of herbs, and vegetables such as asparagus, purslane, coriander that is found in the mountains, water parsley of the rivers, and garden-eruca are all exempt from the requirement of tithes in all years, and they may be purchased from any person during the Sabbatical Year because there is no plant of their species that is safeguarded. These plants are not cultivated but grow wild, rendering them ownerless. Apparently, these plants that grow wild may be purchased in any quantity, even from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, with no three-meal limit.
  The Gemara continues. Rav Sheshet raised the objection, and he also resolved it: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna with regard to food in the amount sufficient for his sustenance [<i>man</i>]. These plants that the mishna excludes from the prohibition against purchase from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> are still subject to the three-meal limit. And likewise, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> in the amount sufficient for his sustenance [<i>man</i>]. From where may it be inferred that <i>man</i> is a term meaning sustenance? It is as it is written: “And the king appointed [<i>vayman</i>] for them a daily portion of the king’s food” (Daniel 1:5).
  § The Gemara asks: If so, if one may not purchase produce from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> lest he misuse the money, it should also be prohibited to give him money and purchase a <i>lulav</i> from him during the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara answers: The mishna is dealing with a case where the <i>lulav</i> is of the sixth year that is entering the seventh year. As it grew during the sixth year, it is permitted, even though it was removed from the tree during the seventh year. The fact that it remained on the tree between Rosh HaShana and <i>Sukkot</i> does not render it Sabbatical-Year produce. The Gemara objects: If so, the <i>etrog</i>, too, is an object of the sixth year that is entering the seventh year and should have the same status. The Gemara answers: With regard to an <i>etrog</i>, as opposed to a <i>lulav</i>, in determining its status we go according to its picking and not when it grew. Therefore, in that case, the <i>etrog</i> is considered to be Sabbatical-Year produce.
  The Gemara objects: But both Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer, who disagree about the status of an <i>etrog</i> that grew in one year and was picked in the following year in terms of determining its year for the <i>halakhot</i> of tithing, agree with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year that with regard to an <i>etrog</i> we go according to its ripening, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Bikkurim</i> 2:6): The halakhic status of the fruit of an <i>etrog</i> tree is like that of a typical fruit tree in three manners and like that of a vegetable in one manner.
  The mishna elaborates: Its halakhic status is like that of a tree in three manners: With regard to <i>orla</i>, i.e., it is prohibited to eat of its fruit during the first three years after its planting; with regard to fourth-year produce, i.e., fruits that grow during the fourth year after the tree’s planting, which may not be used outside of Jerusalem unless they are deconsecrated by means of redemption; and with regard to the Sabbatical Year. With regard to all those <i>halakhot</i>, the year to which the fruit is ascribed is determined by when it ripens. And its halakhic status is like that of a vegetable in one manner:
  
  Daf 40a
  
  It is like a vegetable in that at the time of its picking it is tithed; this is the statement of Rabban Gamliel. If it was picked in the third year of the Sabbatical cycle, poor man’s tithe is separated although it ripened in the second year, when the obligation is to separate second tithe and not poor man’s tithe. Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhic status of the fruit of an <i>etrog</i> tree is like that of a typical fruit tree in every matter. In any case, with regard to ascribing the status of Sabbatical-Year produce to the fruits, it is apparent from the mishna that the status of an <i>etrog</i> of the sixth year that was picked in the seventh year is that of sixth-year produce.
  The Gemara answers: It was the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna that distinguishes between the <i>lulav</i> and the <i>etrog</i> who stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of that <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei said that Avtolemos, one of the Sages, testified in the name of five Elders: The status of an <i>etrog</i> is determined by the time of its picking with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes. And our Sages were counted in Usha, reached a decision, and said: The status of an <i>etrog</i> is determined by the time of its picking both with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes and with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara questions the formulation of the <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the Sabbatical Year, who mentioned it? As no previous mention was made of the Sabbatical Year, the discussion of the status of an <i>etrog</i> during the Sabbatical Year is a non sequitur. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: The status of an <i>etrog</i> is determined by the time of its picking with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes and determined by the time of its ripening with regard to the Sabbatical Year. And our Sages were counted in Usha and said: The status of an <i>etrog</i> is determined by the time of its picking both with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes and with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year.
  § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the mishna: The reason that a <i>lulav</i> may be purchased from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> during the Sabbatical Year is specifically that it is a <i>lulav</i> of the sixth year that is entering the seventh. This indicates by inference that a <i>lulav</i> of the seventh year is sacred with the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara asks: Why is it sacred? It is merely wood, and wood is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to reed leaves and vine leaves that one piled for storage upon the field, if he gathered them for eating, they are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year; if he gathered them for use as wood, e.g., for kindling, they are not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Apparently, wood or any other non-food product is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of the reed and vine leaves, as the verse states: “And the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for you for food” (Leviticus 25:6). From the juxtaposition of the term: For you, and the term: For food, it is derived: For you is similar to for food; the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect on those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide. Wood is excluded, as its benefit is subsequent to its consumption. The primary purpose of kindling wood is not accomplished with the burning of the wood; rather, it is with the charcoal that heats the oven. Therefore, it is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara objects: But isn’t there wood used to provide heat (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), whose benefit coincides with its consumption? Rava said: Undesignated wood exists for fuel, i.e., charcoal, so its benefit is subsequent to its consumption.
  § The Gemara notes: The matter of whether kindling wood, whose benefit is subsequent to its consumption, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may neither transfer Sabbatical-Year produce, e.g., wine, for soaking flax to prepare it for spinning, as the benefit derived from the flax is subsequent to its soaking, when the soaked and spun thread is woven into a garment; nor for laundering with it, as the benefit derived is subsequent to the laundering when one wears the clean clothes. Soaking the flax or laundering the garment in wine is consumption of the wine, as it is no longer potable. Rabbi Yosei says: One may transfer Sabbatical-Year produce for those purposes.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>? It is as the verse states with regard to Sabbatical-Year produce: “For food,” from which it is inferred: And not for soaking and not for laundering. What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Yosei permitting one to do so? It is as the verse states: “For you,” from which it is inferred: For you, for all your needs, and even for soaking and for laundering. The Gemara asks: But according to the first <i>tanna</i>, isn’t it written: “For you”? How does he explain that term? The Gemara answers: From that term “for you” it is derived: For you, similar to for food; the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect on those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, which excludes soaking and laundering, where the items’ benefit is subsequent to their consumption.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yosei, isn’t it written: “For food,” indicating that it may not be used for any other purpose? The Gemara answers: He needs that phrase to teach: For food, and not for a remedy [<i>melugma</i>], as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For food and not for a remedy. The <i>baraita</i> continues: Do you say: For food and not for a remedy, or perhaps it is only: For food and not for laundering? When the verse says: “For you,” for laundering is already stated as permitted since it includes all one’s bodily needs. How, then, do I uphold that which the verse states: “For food”? It is: For food, and not for a remedy. And should one ask: What did you see that led you to include the use of Sabbatical-Year produce for laundering and to exclude the use of Sabbatical-Year produce as a remedy?
  
  Daf 40b
  
  Rabbi Yosei could respond: I include laundering, which applies equally to every person, as everyone needs clean clothes, and I exclude a remedy, which does not apply equally to every person; it is only for the ill.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to Sabbatical-Year produce: For food, and not for a remedy; for food, and not for sprinkling wine in one’s house to provide a pleasant fragrance; for food, and not to make it an emetic [<i>apiktoizin</i>] to induce vomiting? In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, isn’t there also soaking and laundering that should have been excluded in the <i>baraita</i>, as in their opinion, use of Sabbatical-Year produce for those purposes is prohibited?
  § Rabbi Elazar said: Sabbatical-Year produce is deconsecrated only by means of purchase; however, it cannot be deconsecrated through redemption. Merely declaring that the sanctity of that produce is transferred to money or other produce is ineffective. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is deconsecrated both by means of purchase and by means of redemption.
  What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar? It is as it is written: “In this year of Jubilee you shall return every man unto his possession” (Leviticus 25:13), and juxtaposed to it it is written: “And if you sell an item to your neighbor” (Leviticus 25:14); this indicates that in the Jubilee Year, during which the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year are in effect, one deconsecrates the produce by means of purchase and not by means of redemption. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the rationale for his opinion? It is as it is written: “For it is a Jubilee; it shall be consecrated unto you” (Leviticus 25:12); this indicates that just as one redeems consecrated items both by means of purchase and by means of redemption, so too, Sabbatical-Year produce can be redeemed both by means of purchase and by means of redemption.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this juxtaposition of the Jubilee Year to the verse: “If you sell an item”? The Gemara answers: He needs it to derive a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with that statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: Come and see how severe even the hint of violation of the prohibition of the Sabbatical Year is; as the prohibition against commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce is not one of the primary prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year, and its punishment is harsh. A person who engages in commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce is ultimately punished with the loss of his wealth to the point that he is forced to sell his movable property and his vessels, as it is stated: “In this year of Jubilee you shall return every man unto his possession” (Leviticus 25:13), and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “And if you sell an item to your neighbor” (Leviticus 25:14).
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Elazar, what does he do with this verse from which Rabbi Yoḥanan derived his opinion? The Gemara answers: He needs it to derive in accordance with that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “For it is a Jubilee; it shall be consecrated unto you” (Leviticus 25:12); just as the sanctity of consecrated items takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which they are redeemed, so too, the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which it is redeemed.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara elaborates that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar: Sabbatical-Year sanctity takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which the produce is redeemed, as it is stated: “For it is a Jubilee; it shall be consecrated unto you”; just as the sanctity of consecrated items takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which they are redeemed and it is prohibited to use the money for non-sacred purposes, so too, the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which it is redeemed, and it is prohibited to use this money for purposes for which Sabbatical-Year produce may not be used.
  Or perhaps extend the analogy and derive that just as the sanctity of consecrated items takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which they are redeemed, and the consecrated item assumes non-sacred status, so too, the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect on money or objects in exchange for which it is redeemed, and the Sabbatical-Year produce assumes non-sacred status. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be consecrated unto you,” meaning: It shall be as it is. Although the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect on the money, the produce remains consecrated as well.
  The Gemara explains: How so? If one purchased meat with Sabbatical-Year produce, both this, the produce, and that, the meat, must be removed during the Sabbatical Year. The meat may be eaten only as long as the produce in exchange for which it was purchased may be eaten, i.e., as long as produce of that kind remains in the field. However, if he purchased fish in exchange for the meat, the meat emerges from its consecrated status, and the fish assumes consecrated status. If he then purchased wine in exchange for the fish, the fish emerges from its consecrated status, and the wine assumes consecrated status. If he purchased oil in exchange for the wine, the wine emerges from its consecrated status, and the oil assumes consecrated status.
  How so? The last item purchased assumes the consecrated status of produce of the Sabbatical Year, and the produce itself remains consecrated and forbidden and never loses its consecrated status. The Gemara notes: From the fact that the <i>baraita</i> teaches each case using the term: Purchased, purchased, apparently it means that by means of transaction, yes, the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect; however, by means of redemption, no, the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year does not take effect.
  The Gemara continues: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Both Sabbatical-Year produce and second-tithe produce are deconsecrated upon domesticated animals, undomesticated animals,and fowl, whether they are alive or whether they are slaughtered; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Upon slaughtered animals, they are deconsecrated; upon animals that are alive, they are not deconsecrated. The reason is that a rabbinic decree was issued lest one raise flocks from them. If one breeds a herd from that consecrated animal, the entire herd would be sacred and the potential for misuse of second-tithe property would be great.
  Rava said: This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis
  
  Daf 41a
  
  is specifically with regard to male animals, which do not bear offspring. However, with regard to female animals, everyone agrees that upon slaughtered animals, produce is deconsecrated, but upon animals that are alive, produce is not deconsecrated. The reason is that a decree was issued lest one raise flocks from the females, as typically they bear offspring. The Sages extended the decree to include males as well. From the fact that the <i>baraita</i> uses the term deconsecrated, and not the term purchased, apparently the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect by means of redemption as well.
  Rav Ashi said: This dispute whether the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect by means of redemption or only by means of purchase is with regard to the original Sabbatical-Year produce itself. However, with regard to secondary produce purchased in exchange for Sabbatical-Year produce, everyone agrees that its sanctity takes effect both by means of purchase and by means of redemption. And the fact that the <i>baraita</i> cited in support of the opinion of Rabbi Elazar teaches: Purchased, purchased, employing that term even with regard to secondary produce, and not the terms deconsecrated or redeemed, does not prove that sanctity takes effect only by means of purchase. Rather, since the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> taught the first clause of the <i>halakha</i> employing the term purchased, he taught the latter clause employing the term purchased, even though sanctity takes effect even by means of redemption.
  Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi: With regard to one who has a <i>sela</i> coin that has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year and seeks to purchase a garment with it, how should he do so? He should go to the storekeeper whose store he typically patronizes and say to him: Give me fruits in exchange for this <i>sela</i>, and the storekeeper gives him fruits. And then he says to the storekeeper: These fruits that you sold me and that assumed the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year are given to you as a gift. The storekeeper may then eat them as one eats Sabbatical-Year produce. And the storekeeper says to him: Here is a <i>sela</i> for you as a gift, and that person purchases with it whatever he wants, as the <i>sela</i> was deconsecrated. Ravina asks: But here, isn’t it secondary produce, as the <i>sela</i> had previously been exchanged for the original Sabbatical-Year produce, and nevertheless the <i>baraita</i> teaches: By means of purchase, yes, it is effective; by means of redemption, no, it is not?
  Rather, Rav Ashi said, contrary to the suggestion above, that the dispute is specifically with regard to secondary produce; however, with regard to original produce, everyone agrees: By means of purchase, yes, it is deconsecrated; by means of redemption, no, it is not deconsecrated. And with regard to that which is taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited in support of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Both Sabbatical-Year produce and second-tithe produce are deconsecrated upon cattle, undomesticated animals, and fowl, indicating that the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce takes effect through both purchase and redemption. What is the meaning of Sabbatical-Year produce? It is referring to money exchanged for Sabbatical-Year produce but not to the produce itself.
  And the same must be said with regard to the second tithe mentioned in this <i>baraita</i>, as, if you do not say so but say instead that the second tithe referred to in the <i>baraita</i> is actual second-tithe produce, isn’t it written with regard to the second tithe: “Then shall you turn it into money and bind up the money in your hand…and you shall bestow the money for whatsoever your soul desires” (Deuteronomy 14:25–26), indicating that second-tithe produce can be redeemed only with money, with which other food items may be purchased? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> must be referring to money exchanged for second-tithe produce and not to the produce itself. Here, too, with regard to the Sabbatical Year, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to money exchanged for Sabbatical-Year produce and not to the produce itself.
  MISHNA: Originally, during the Temple era, the <i>lulav</i> was taken in the Temple for seven days, and in the rest of the country outside the Temple it was taken for one day. Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted an ordinance that the <i>lulav</i> should be taken even in the rest of the country for seven days, in commemoration of the Temple.
  And for similar reasons, he instituted an ordinance that for the entire day of waving the <i>omer</i> offering, it should be prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. It is prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop until the <i>omer</i> offering is brought and waved in the Temple on the sixteenth of Nisan. The offering was sacrificed in the morning; however, after taking potential delays into consideration, the new crop remained prohibited until it was clear that the offering had been sacrificed. Practically speaking, it was prohibited to eat the new grain until the sixteenth of Nisan was over; it was permitted only on the seventeenth. Once the Temple was destroyed and there was no longer an <i>omer</i> offering sacrificed, it was permitted to eat the new crop on the sixteenth. However, Rabban Yoḥanan instituted an ordinance that eating the new grain would remain prohibited until the seventeenth to commemorate the Temple.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that we institute ordinances in commemoration of the Temple? Rabbi Yoḥanan said that it is as the verse states: “For I will restore health unto you and I will heal you of your wounds, says the Lord; because they have called you an outcast, she is Zion, there is none that seeks her” (Jeremiah 30:17). From the fact that the verse states: “There is none that seeks her,” it can be learned by inference that it requires seeking, i.e., people should think of and remember the Temple. That is the reason for Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance.
  § The mishna continues: Rabban Yoḥanan instituted that for the entire day of waving the <i>Omer</i> offering, it is prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ordinance? It is that soon the Temple will be rebuilt, and people will say: Last year, when the Temple was in ruins, didn’t we eat of the new crop as soon as the eastern horizon was illuminated, as the new crop was permitted immediately with the advent of the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan? Now, too, let us eat the new grain at that time. And they do not know that although last year, when there was no Temple, the illuminating of the eastern sky permitted one to eat the new grain immediately, now that there is a Temple, the <i>omer</i> offering permits one to eat the new grain. Until the <i>omer</i> offering is sacrificed, the new grain is not permitted.
  The Gemara asks: When is it that the Temple will be rebuilt in this scenario? If we say that it will be rebuilt on the sixteenth of Nisan, since in the morning the Temple was not yet built, the illuminating of the eastern sky permitted one to eat the new grain, as the <i>omer</i> offering could not yet be brought. Rather, say that it will be rebuilt on the fifteenth of Nisan or on some earlier date, in which case the new grain would not become permitted by the illuminating of the eastern sky. In that case, from midday and onward let it be permitted to eat the new grain, as we learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i>: The people distant from Jerusalem, who are unaware of the precise time when the <i>omer</i> was brought, are permitted to eat the new grain from midday and onward because the members of the court are not indolent with regard to the <i>omer</i> and would not postpone bringing the offering after midday.
  The Gemara says: No, it is necessary to institute the ordinance only in the case where the Temple will be rebuilt at night, on the evening of the sixteenth, and there was no opportunity to cut the <i>omer</i> that night. Alternatively, it was necessary to institute the ordinance in the case where the Temple was built adjacent to sunset on the fifteenth because there would not be sufficient time to complete all the preparations and sacrifice the offering by noon the next day. Therefore, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the new grain is prohibited for the entire day of the sixteenth. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: That is not the reason; rather, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai stated his ordinance in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: It is prohibited by Torah law to eat the new grain until the seventeenth of Nisan, as it is written:
  
  Daf 41b
  
  “And you shall eat neither bread, nor roasted grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame [<i>etzem</i>] day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14), indicating until the essence [<i>itzumo</i>] of the day, and not the night before. And he holds that when the verse states: “Until,” the word until is inclusive, meaning that the grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But doesn’t he disagree with him, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Once the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that for the entire day of waving the <i>omer</i> offering, it should be prohibited to eat the grain of the new crop. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Isn’t it prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “Until this selfsame day,” which means: Until the essence of the day? Apparently, they have two divergentopinions.
  The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Yehuda who is mistaken. He thought that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying it is prohibited by rabbinic law. And that is not so; he is saying it is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara asks: But didn’t the mishna say: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, indicating that it is a rabbinic ordinance? The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of instituted? It means that he interpreted the verses in the Torah and instituted public notice for the multitudes to conduct themselves accordingly.
  MISHNA: If the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> occurs on Shabbat, all of the people bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the synagogue on Shabbat eve, as it is prohibited to carry in a public domain on Shabbat. The next day, on Shabbat, everyone rises early and comes to the synagogue. Each and every one recognizes his <i>lulav</i> and takes it. This emphasis that each and every one recognizes his own <i>lulav</i> and takes it is because the Sages said: A person does not fulfill his obligation to take the <i>lulav</i> on the first day of the Festival with the <i>lulav</i> of another, and on the rest of the days of the Festival a person fulfills his obligation even with the <i>lulav</i> of another. Rabbi Yosei says: If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and he forgot and carried the <i>lulav</i> out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering for this unwitting transgression because he carried it out with permission, i.e., he was preoccupied with the performance of the mitzva and carried it out.
  GEMARA: From where are these matters derived, that one does not fulfill his obligation with the <i>lulav</i> of another on the first day of the Festival? It is as the Sages taught that it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40). The use of second person plural in the phrase: “And you shall take,” indicates that there should be taking in the hand of each and every person. The word yourselves in the phrase “take for yourselves” means: From your own, to exclude a borrowed or stolen <i>lulav</i>. From here the Sages stated: A person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day of the Festival with the <i>lulav</i> of another unless the other gave it to him as a full-fledged gift, as in that case it belongs to him.
  There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva, who were all traveling on a ship during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> and only Rabban Gamliel had a <i>lulav</i>, which he had bought for one thousand <i>zuz</i>. Rabban Gamliel took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and then gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua as a gift. Rabbi Yehoshua took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya as a gift. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and gave it to Rabbi Akiva as a gift. Rabbi Akiva took it and fulfilled his obligation with it and returned it to Rabban Gamliel.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabbi Akiva returned the <i>lulav</i> to Rabban Gamliel? The crux of the story is that each of the Sages fulfilled his obligation with the same <i>lulav</i> after receiving it as a gift. The Gemara answers: By including that detail, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us another matter in passing, namely that a gift given on the condition that it be returned is considered a full-fledged gift. Even if the owner stipulates from the outset that the gift would be returned, since he gives it as a gift in the interim, its halakhic status is that of a full-fledged gift.
  This is like that which Rava said, that in the case of one who says to another: Here is an <i>etrog</i> for you on condition that you return it to me, and the recipient took it and fulfilled his obligation with it, if he returned the <i>etrog</i>, he fulfilled his obligation of taking the <i>etrog</i>. However, if he did not return the <i>etrog</i>, he did not fulfill his obligation. Since he did not fulfill the condition, retroactively he never acquired the gift at all.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say that Rabban Gamliel bought this <i>lulav</i> for one thousand <i>zuz</i>? The Gemara answers: It is to inform you how beloved mitzvot were to them to the extent that he was willing to pay an exorbitant sum to purchase a <i>lulav</i>.
  § Mar bar Ameimar said to Rav Ashi: My father would pray with the four species in his hand in an expression of his love for the mitzva. The Gemara raises an objection: A person should not hold phylacteries in his hand or a Torah scroll in his lap and pray while doing so; neither should he urinate with them in his hand; nor should he sleep with them in his hand, neither a deep sleep nor a brief nap.
  And Shmuel said: With regard to a knife, a bowl full of food, a loaf of bread, or money, these items are similar to those mentioned above; since he is concerned lest these items fall from his hand, he is distracted and he unable to concentrate on his prayers. Why, then, is that not the case with regard to <i>lulav</i>? It should be prohibited to hold the <i>lulav</i> during prayer for the same reason. The Gemara answers: There, in the cases listed above, they are not related to performance of a mitzva, and he is preoccupied with them. Therefore, that preoccupation distracts his focus from his prayers. Here, in the case of the four species, they are related to performance of a mitzva, so he is not preoccupied with them in a manner that will distract him from his prayers.
  The Gemara cites support for the custom mentioned above, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok says: This was the custom of the people of Jerusalem during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. A person leaves his house, and his <i>lulav</i> is in his hand; he goes to the synagogue, and his <i>lulav</i> is in his hand; he recites <i>Shema</i> and prays, and his <i>lulav</i> is in his hand; he reads the Torah and a priest lifts his hands to recite the priestly benediction, and he places it on the ground because he cannot perform those tasks while holding the <i>lulav</i>. He goes to visit the ill or to console mourners, and his <i>lulav</i> is in his hand; he enters the study hall to study Torah, and he sends his <i>lulav</i> home in the hands of his son, in the hands of his slave, or in the hands of his agent.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>baraita</i> teaching us by relating all these details that appear to establish the same practice? The Gemara explains: It is to inform you how vigilant they were in the performance of mitzvot and how much they cherished them.
  § The mishna continues: Rabbi Yosei says that if the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, and one forgot and carried the <i>lulav</i> out into the public domain, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering. Abaye said:
  
  Daf 42a
  
  The Sages taught that he is exempt only in a case where he did not yet fulfill his obligation. However, if he already fulfilled his obligation and he carries the <i>lulav</i> out, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: Is it possible to carry the <i>lulav</i> without fulfilling one’s obligation? Didn’t he, from the moment that he lifted it, fulfill his obligation with it? Abaye said: It is referring to a case where he overturned it and lifted it. One fulfills his obligation only when lifting it in the manner in which it grows.
  Rava said: Even if you say that it is referring to a case where he did not invert it, with what are we dealing here? It is with a case where he took the <i>lulav</i> out in a vessel and did not fulfill his obligation. The Gemara asks: But isn’t Rava the one who said that taking by means of another object is considered taking? The Gemara answers: This applies only when the addition is in a deferential manner, for wrapping or ornamentation. But if the addition is in a degrading manner, as in this case, where one places the <i>lulav</i> into a vessel and carries it that way, no, it is not considered taking.
  Rav Huna said that Rabbi Yosei would say: In the case of a bird sacrificed as a burnt-offering that is found among other birds in one of the corners of the altar, and the priest thought that it was a bird sacrificed as a sin-offering and he ate it, as sin-offerings are eaten by priests, he is exempt from liability to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated items. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Huna teaching us? Is it that if one erred in the matter of a mitzva, he is exempt? This is identical to that statement of Rabbi Yosei; what novel element is introduced by Rav Huna?
  The Gemara answers: It is lest you say that it is only there, in the case of carrying the <i>lulav</i>, that one who erred in a matter of a mitzva is exempt and that is because he performed a mitzva; however, here, with regard to mistakenly identifying the bird-offerings, where he erred in the matter of a mitzva but did not perform a mitzva at all, say no, in that case he would not be exempt from liability to bring a guilt-offering. Therefore, Rav Huna teaches us that he is in fact exempt.
  The Gemara raises an objection. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to one who slaughters the daily offering on Shabbat that is not properly inspected, and a blemish is discovered that disqualifies the sacrifice, he unwittingly performed the prohibited labor of slaughtering on Shabbat. He is liable to bring a sin-offering, and he needs to bring a different daily offering. Even though he erred in a matter of a mitzva, he is liable.
  Rav Huna said in response to the objection: Proof may be cited, except not from that <i>baraita</i>, as it was stated concerning that <i>baraita</i> that Rav Shmuel bar Ḥatai said that Rav Hamnuna Sava said that Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashian said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: It is referring to a case where they brought the sheep for the daily offering from a chamber in which there were sheep that are not inspected. Since under no circumstances should one take a sheep for the daily offering from uninspected sheep, his error cannot be attributed to preoccupation with the mitzva. Therefore, although he was engaged in performance of a mitzva, he is not exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering.
  MISHNA: A woman may receive a <i>lulav</i> from her son or from her husband and return it on Shabbat to the water in which it had been placed. Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat one may return the <i>lulav</i> to the water; and on the Festival one may even add fresh water to the vessel so the <i>lulav</i> will not wilt; and during the intermediate days of the Festival, one may even change the water.
  A minor who knows how to wave the <i>lulav</i> is obligated in the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> due to the requirement to train him in the performance of mitzvot.
  GEMARA: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that a woman may receive the <i>lulav</i>, the Gemara asks: That is obvious. Why would it be prohibited? The Gemara answers that it is necessary to state this lest you say: Since a woman is not subject to the obligation of the four species, as it is a time-bound, positive mitzva, say that she should not receive the <i>lulav</i>, as for her, moving the <i>lulav</i> is tantamount to moving set-aside objects and would therefore be prohibited. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that it is permitted.
  § It is taught in the mishna: A minor who knows how to wave the <i>lulav</i> is obligated in the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>. The Sages taught: A minor who knows how to wave the <i>lulav</i> is obligated in the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>; one who knows how to wrap himself in a garment, is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes; if he knows to preserve the sanctity of phylacteries in a state of cleanliness, his father buys him phylacteries; if he knows how to speak, his father immediately teaches him Torah and <i>Shema</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And in this context, what is the Torah taught to a child who has just learned to speak? Rav Hamnuna said: It is referring to the verse: “Moses commanded us Torah, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33:4), underscoring the relationship between the Jewish people and the Torah. The Gemara asks further: And what is <i>Shema</i> taught to a child who has just learned to speak? The Gemara answers: It is referring to the first verse of <i>Shema</i>.
  The Sages continued: If the minor is one who knows to protect his body from ritual impurity, it is permitted to eat ritually pure food that came into contact with his body. If he is one who knows to protect his hands from ritual impurity, it is permitted to eat ritually pure food that came into contact with his hands. If he is one who knows to be asked and accurately clarify which objects he touched, his status is like that of an adult based on the following distinction: If the question was with regard to ritual impurity in the private domain and it is a case of uncertainty, the item in question is deemed impure. However, if the question was with regard to ritual impurity in the public domain and it is a case of uncertainty, the item in question is deemed pure. If the minor is a priest who knows how to spread his hands and recite the priestly benediction, one distributes <i>teruma</i> to him in the granary as one would to any other priest.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  If he is one who knows how to slaughter an animal, one may eat from animals that he slaughtered. Rav Huna said: That is the <i>halakha</i> provided that an adult is standing over him overseeing the slaughter.
  If he is one who is able to eat an olive-bulk of grain, one distances himself four cubits from his feces and from his urine before praying or reciting <i>Shema</i>, as the feces and urine of a child at that stage of development produce offensive odors like those of an adult. Rav Ḥisda said: That is the <i>halakha</i> provided that the minor can eat the olive-bulk of grain in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. However, if it takes him longer, one need not distance himself before praying. Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Yeiva, said: And with regard to an adult, even if he is unable to eat an olive-bulk of grain in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, one must distance himself from his feces before praying, as it is written: “And he that increases knowledge, increases sorrow” (Ecclesiastes 1:18), meaning that as one grows older he becomes more flawed.
  If he is one who is able to eat an olive-bulk of roasted meat, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on his behalf, and he is included in the group assembled to eat the Paschal lamb, as it is stated: “According to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). Rabbi Yehuda says: Ability to consume an olive-bulk is insufficient to include him in the group; rather, he is not included until he is able to discern what he is eating. How is that determined? If one gives him a pebble and he throws it away, and if one gives him a nut and he takes it, he may be included in the group for eating the Paschal lamb.
  
  MISHNA: The <i>lulav</i> is taken and the altar is encircled together with the willow branch either six or seven days, depending on which day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat. The obligation to recite the full <i>hallel</i> and the mitzva of rejoicing, i.e., eating the meat of the peace-offering, is in effect for eight days, seven days of <i>Sukkot</i> and the Eighth Day of Assembly. The mitzva of <i>sukka</i> and the ritual of the water libation on the altar are in effect for seven days. The flute is played in the Temple for five or six days, depending on which day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, to enhance the rejoicing on the Festival.
  The mishna elaborates: The <i>lulav</i> is taken for seven days. How so? If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, since the mitzva to take the <i>lulav</i> on the first day is a mitzva by Torah law, it overrides Shabbat and one takes the <i>lulav</i> that day. As a result, the <i>lulav</i> is then taken for seven days. And if the first day occurs on one of the rest of the days of the week and one of the other days of the Festival coincides with Shabbat, the <i>lulav</i> is taken only six days. Since the mitzva to take the <i>lulav</i> is a mitzva by rabbinic law throughout the rest of <i>Sukkot</i>, it does not override Shabbat.
  The altar is encircled with the willow branch for seven days. How so? If the seventh day of the mitzva of the willow branch occurs on Shabbat, since on that day it is a mitzva by Torah law, it overrides Shabbat and the mitzva of the willow branch is then performed for seven days. And if the seventh day occurs on one of the rest of the days of the week, and one of the other days of the Festival coincides with Shabbat, since the mitzva of the willow branch is then by rabbinic law and consequently does not override Shabbat, it is performed for only six days.
  How is the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> fulfilled in the Temple when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat? If the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, all the people bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the Temple Mount on Friday. The attendants receive the <i>lulavim</i> from them and arrange them on a bench [<i>itztaba</i>], while the Elders place their <i>lulavim</i> in the chamber. They were given permission to do so due to the concern that they would be injured the following morning in the rush of people in search of their <i>lulavim</i>. And the court teaches the people to say: With regard to anyone whom my <i>lulav</i> reaches his possession, it is his as a gift. They did so to avoid the likely situation where people would inadvertently take <i>lulavim</i> that did not belong to them, as on the first day of the Festival one does not fulfill his obligation with a <i>lulav</i> that does not belong to him.
  The next day everyone rises early and comes to the Temple, and the attendants throw the <i>lulavim</i> before them. And in the confusion, the people snatch the <i>lulavim</i> and in the process strike one another. And when the court saw that they came to potential danger, they instituted that each and every person will take his <i>lulav</i> in his house and fulfill the mitzva there.
  GEMARA: Apropos the prohibition against taking a <i>lulav</i> on Shabbat, the Gemara asks: Why is this prohibited? After all, taking the <i>lulav</i> is merely moving the object and is prohibited due to the rabbinic prohibition of set-aside. Since the mitzva to take the <i>lulav</i> is a mitzva by Torah law, let it override this relatively minor Shabbat prohibition. Rabba said: This prohibition is a decree lest one take the <i>lulav</i> in his hand and go to an expert to learn how to wave the <i>lulav</i> or how to recite its blessing,
  
  Daf 43a
  
  and in doing so carry it four cubits in the public domain, thereby violating a severe Torah prohibition. And that is the reason for the prohibition against sounding the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat, and that is the reason for the prohibition against reading the Scroll of Esther when Purim coincides with Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: If so, on the first day of <i>Sukkot</i> that coincides with Shabbat too one should not take the <i>lulav</i> due to this concern. The Gemara answers: With regard to the first day, the Sages instituted that one should take the four species in his house. Since the Sages already prohibited one from taking the <i>lulav</i> out of the house, he will remember that it is prohibited and will not come to take it elsewhere to learn to wave it or to recite the blessing. The Gemara asks: This works out well after the ordinance that one takes the <i>lulav</i> in his house was instituted. However, prior to introducing the ordinance, what is there to say in explaining why it is permitted to take the <i>lulav</i> on the first day?
  Rather, the Gemara rejects the previous explanation and explains the distinction differently. On the first day, when the mitzva of taking the <i>lulav</i> even in the outlying areas and not just in the Temple is in effect by Torah law, the Sages did not issue a decree to prohibit taking the <i>lulav</i> on the first day and permitted the mitzva to be performed even in the outlying areas. However, with regard to these other days of <i>Sukkot</i>, when the mitzva of taking the <i>lulav</i> is not in effect by Torah law in the outlying areas and the <i>lulav</i> is taken there only to commemorate the practice in the Temple, the Sages issued a decree to prohibit taking the <i>lulav</i> on the other days.
  The Gemara asks: If it is so that the mitzva on the first day is a mitzva by Torah law even in the outlying areas, today too one should take the <i>lulav</i> on the first day of <i>Sukkot</i> that coincides with Shabbat. The Gemara answers: We do not know when precisely the establishment of the month was determined by the court. Therefore, it is possible that the day observed as the first day of <i>Sukkot</i> is not <i>Sukkot</i> at all. Certainly, one does not violate the rabbinic decree to fulfill a mitzva that is not definitely a mitzva by Torah law. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the people of Eretz Yisrael, who sanctify the month based on eyewitness testimony and who know when precisely the establishment of the month was determined by the court, let them override Shabbat for the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> on the first day of <i>Sukkot</i> even today.
  The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, and that is their practice, as it was taught in one mishna: On the first day of the Festival that occurs on Shabbat, all the people bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the Temple Mount on Friday. And we learned in another mishna: They bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the synagogue. Learn from the change in formulation that here, where the mishna says that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the Temple Mount, it is referring to when the Temple is in existence, and there, where the mishna says that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the synagogue, it is referring to when the Temple is not in existence. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is so.
  § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that by Torah law the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> on the first day is in effect even in the outlying areas? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days” (Leviticus 23:40). The Sages parse the phrases and terms in the verse. In the phrase “And you shall take,” the plural form of you is used, indicating that there should be taking in the hand of each and every one, and no one can fulfill the obligation on another’s behalf.
  They continue to expound the verse. Yourselves indicates from your own, to exclude a borrowed or stolen <i>lulav</i>. On the day comes to emphasize that there is a mitzva by Torah law to take the <i>lulav</i> on each day of the Festival, even on Shabbat. The word first, used with no qualification as to where the <i>lulav</i> is to be taken, indicates that this obligation is in effect everywhere on the first day, even in the outlying areas. The first, with the definite article for emphasis, is restrictive and teaches that the mitzva of taking the <i>lulav</i> overrides Shabbat only on the first day of the Festival.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: On the day, indicates even on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Now, since taking the four species entails merely moving the object and is prohibited due to the rabbinic prohibition of set-aside, is a verse needed to permit moving the <i>lulav</i>? Obviously, the Torah does not address prohibitions that are not by Torah law. Rava said: Indeed, the verse is necessary only for actions that are facilitators of the performance of the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, i.e., to permit actions necessary to prepare a <i>lulav</i> for the mitzva, such as severing it from the tree, which may be performed on Shabbat. And that is in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i> who permits doing so on Shabbat, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Lulav</i> and all the actions that are its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara explains: What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Eliezer? It is as the verse states: On the day, indicating that the obligation exists every day of the Festival, and even on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what do they do with the verse: On the day? The Gemara answers: They require it to teach that the mitzva of taking the <i>lulav</i> is specifically during the day and not at night. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive that the <i>lulav</i> is taken during the day and not at night? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the end of the verse: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days” (Leviticus 23:40), indicating that the obligation to take the <i>lulav</i> is during the days and not during the nights. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why don’t they derive it from that verse? The Gemara answers: If it was derived from there, I would have said: Derive days written with regard to <i>lulav</i> from days written with regard to <i>sukka</i> by means of a verbal analogy; just as there, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, it means days and even nights, here too, with regard to <i>lulav</i>, it means days and even nights.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to <i>sukka</i> itself, from where do we derive that the mitzva is observed at night as well? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “You shall reside in <i>sukkot</i> for seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), from which they derived: Days and even nights. The <i>tanna</i> continues the discussion: Do you say days and even nights; or perhaps the meaning is only days and not nights? And it may be inferred logically that the latter is correct. It is stated here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>: “Days.” And it is stated with regard to <i>lulav</i>: “Days.” Just as there, with regard to <i>lulav</i>, the meaning is days and not nights, so too here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, the meaning is days and not nights. That is one possibility.
  Or, perhaps, go this way and say the opposite. It is stated here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>: Days, and it is stated with regard to the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “And at the door of the Tent of Meeting you shall reside day and night seven days” (Leviticus 8:35). Just as there, with regard to the inauguration of the Tabernacle, the meaning is days and even nights, so too here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, the meaning is days and even nights. A source exists for either possibility.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Let us see to which of the paradigms the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is comparable. Perhaps one derives a matter whose mitzva is in effect the entire day, <i>sukka</i>, from another matter whose mitzva is in effect the entire day, the inauguration of the Tabernacle, and do not let a matter whose mitzva is in effect for a brief moment, <i>lulav</i>, prove otherwise. Or perhaps go this way and say the opposite: One derives a matter whose mitzva is in effect throughout the generations, <i>sukka</i>, from another matter whose mitzva is in effect throughout the generations, <i>lulav</i>, and do not let the inauguration that is not in practice throughout the generations, as it was in effect only at the establishment of the Tabernacle, prove otherwise.
  Since it is impossible to determine the more appropriate source based on logical inference, derive the matter as the verse states:
  
  Daf 43b
  
  “You shall reside,” “you shall reside,” by means of a verbal analogy. It is stated here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>: “You shall reside in <i>sukkot</i> seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), and it is stated with regard to the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “And at the door of the Tent of Meeting you shall reside day and night seven days” (Leviticus 8:35). Just as there, with regard to the inauguration, the meaning is days and even nights, so too here, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, the meaning is days and even nights.
  § The mishna continues: The altar is encircled with the willow branch for seven days. How so? If the seventh day of performing the mitzva of the willow branch occurs on Shabbat, since on that day the mitzva of the willow branch is a mitzva by Torah law, it overrides Shabbat and the mitzva of the willow branch is then performed seven days. The Gemara asks: With regard to the mitzva of the willow branch on the seventh day, what is the reason that it overrides Shabbat? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is in order to publicize that it is a mitzva that applies by Torah law, since it is not written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara raises an objection: If so, <i>lulav</i> too should override Shabbat in the Temple on the other days of <i>Sukkot</i> as well and not only on the first day in order to publicize that it is a mitzva by Torah law all seven days, since that too is not written explicitly in the Torah.
  The Gemara answers: One is prohibited from taking the <i>lulav</i> on Shabbat by rabbinic decree due to the concern expressed by Rabba (42b) lest he take the <i>lulav</i> in his hand and go to an expert to learn how to wave the <i>lulav</i> and thereby carry it in the public domain. The Gemara objects: If so, with regard to the willow branch as well let us issue a decree due to the same concern. The Gemara answers: The two cases are different. With regard to the willow branch, agents of the court bring it to the priests who perform the mitzva in the Temple, and they carefully prepare the willow branch prior to the onset of Shabbat and will not come to carry it in a prohibited manner on Shabbat. However, performance of the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is incumbent upon every individual. Therefore, there is concern lest one unwittingly perform the prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat.
  The Gemara objects: If so, i.e., because the willow branch is supplied by agents of the court there is no concern that Shabbat will be desecrated, let the mitzva of the willow branch override Shabbat on every day of the Festival as well. The Gemara answers: In that case people would come to raise doubts about the significance of the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, as, unlike the mitzva of the willow branch, it would override Shabbat on only one day of the Festival and not on all seven. The Gemara asks: And let the mitzva of the willow branch override Shabbat on the first day of the Festival, just as the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> does, and not on the seventh day. The Gemara answers: The matter of publicizing that the mitzva of willow branch is a mitzva by Torah law would not be apparent, as people would say that it is really the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> that overrides Shabbat, and once <i>lulav</i> is permitted the willow branch is permitted as well.
  The Gemara asks: And let the mitzva of the willow branch override Shabbat on one of these other days of <i>Sukkot</i>; why specifically the seventh day? The Gemara answers: Once you moved it from the first day, establish it on the seventh day, which is also a unique day of <i>Sukkot</i>, and not on one of the other intermediate days of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the mitzva of the willow branch is so significant that it overrides Shabbat, let it override Shabbat today as well, even though the Temple is not standing. The Gemara answers: We do not know when precisely the establishment of the month was determined by the court. Therefore, it is possible that the day observed as the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i> is not the seventh day at all. Certainly, one does not violate the rabbinic decree to fulfill a mitzva that is not definitely a mitzva by Torah law.
  The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the people of Eretz Yisrael, who know the establishment of the month, let them override Shabbat for the mitzva of willow branch on the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i> even today. When bar Hedya came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: That is not a practical question, as the seventh day does not coincide with Shabbat, since the Sages fixed the calendar to avoid that possibility. When Ravin and all those emissaries who descended to Babylonia, or who originally left Babylonia for Eretz Yisrael and returned, came, they said: It does coincide with Shabbat, but it does not override Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: But then it is difficult; why doesn’t the mitzva of the willow branch override Shabbat on the seventh day today? Rav Yosef said: Who will say to us definitively that the mitzva of the willow branch is performed by taking it? Perhaps it is performed by standing the branches upright against the altar. Since there is no altar today, the mitzva does not override Shabbat.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from the mishna, which states: The <i>lulav</i> is taken and the altar is encircled with the willow branch either six or seven days. What, is it not learned from the juxtaposition of these mitzvot in the mishna that the mitzva of the willow branch is like the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> in that just as the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is performed by taking it, so too, the mitzva of the willow branch is performed by taking it and not by standing it upright? He answered him: Are the cases necessarily comparable? Perhaps this mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is as it is, by means of taking, and this mitzva of the willow branch is as it is, by means of standing it upright.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from a mishna: On every day the people circle the altar one time, and on that day, the seventh day of the willow branch, they circle it seven times. What, is the mishna not referring to circling the altar with the willow branch in hand? He answered him: No, it is referring to circling the altar with a <i>lulav</i>. Abaye objects: But didn’t Rav Naḥman say that Rabba bar Avuh said: They would circle the altar with the willow branch? Rav Yosef said to him: He said to you with the willow branch; however, my authority is no less than his, as we are both <i>amora’im</i>, and I say that they circle the altar with a <i>lulav</i>. It was stated that this was the subject of dispute between other <i>amora’im</i> as well. Rabbi Elazar says: They circle the altar with a <i>lulav</i>. Rav Shmuel bar Natan said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: They circle the altar with the willow branch. And likewise, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: They would circle the altar with the willow branch.
  Rava said to Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabba bar bar Ḥana: Son of Torah [<i>bar urya</i>], come and I will tell you an outstanding statement that your father would say. With regard to that which we learned in a mishna: On every day the people circle the altar one time, and on that day, the seventh day of the willow branch, they circle the altar seven times; this is what your father said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: They circle the altar with a <i>lulav</i>.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from the <i>Tosefta</i> (<i>Sukka</i> 3:1): The mitzva of <i>lulav</i> overrides Shabbat at the start of the Festival, and the willow branch overrides it at the end of the Festival. One time, the seventh day of the willow branch occurred on Shabbat, and they brought branches of the willow tree on Shabbat eve, before Shabbat, and placed them in the Temple courtyard for use on Shabbat. The Boethusians in the Temple, who disagreed with the Sages and held that there is no mitzva of the willow branch on the seventh day of the Festival, noticed them and took them and concealed them under the stones. This was an attempt to prevent fulfillment of the mitzva, as they knew that the Sages would prohibit moving the stones, which are set-aside on Shabbat.
  The next day, some of the ignoramuses noticed the branches concealed under the stones. And since the ignoramuses identified with the opinion of the Sages, and at the same time were ignorant of the details of the mitzvot, they extracted them from under the stones. And the priests brought them and stood them upright at the sides of the altar. This happened because the Boethusians do not concede that waving the willow branch overrides Shabbat.
  Apparently, based on the conclusion of the incident, the mitzva of the willow branch is fulfilled by taking it, as it is referring to waving the willow branch and not just standing it upright at the sides of the altar. The Gemara notes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation of Rav Yosef’s opinion.
  Given the refutation of Rav Yosef’s opinion, the original question is difficult: Rather, let them in Eretz Yisrael override Shabbat for the mitzva of the willow branch on the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i> nowadays as well. The Gemara answers: Since we in the Diaspora do not override Shabbat for this purpose, they in Eretz Yisrael also do not override it. The Gemara objects: But doesn’t the first day of the Festival refute that contention, as for us in the Diaspora it does not override Shabbat and we do not take the <i>lulav</i>, and for them in Eretz Yisrael it overrides Shabbat and they take the <i>lulav</i>?
  
  Daf 44a
  
  The Sages say: For them in Eretz Yisrael it also does not override Shabbat. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, the contradiction between these two sources is difficult, as it was taught in one mishna: All the people bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the Temple Mount on Friday, and it was taught in another mishna that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the synagogue. And we resolved this contradiction as follows: Here, where the mishna says that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the Temple Mount, it is referring to when the Temple is standing, and there, where the mishna says that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the synagogue, it is referring to when the Temple is not standing. Based on the above, when the Temple is not in existence the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> does not override Shabbat.
  The Gemara resolves the contradiction: No, both this mishna and that mishna are referring to Eretz Yisrael when the Temple is in existence; and nevertheless, it is not difficult. Here, where the mishna says that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the Temple Mount, it is referring to the procedure in the Temple. And there, where the mishna says that they bring their <i>lulavim</i> to the synagogue, it is referring to the procedure in the outlying areas in the rest of Eretz Yisrael, where they knew when the new month was established. However, today, neither in the Diaspora nor in Eretz Yisrael does the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> override Shabbat.
  Abaye said to Rava: What is different about <i>lulav</i> such that we perform the mitzva seven days in commemoration of the Temple, and what is different about the willow branch that we do not perform the mitzva seven days in commemoration of the Temple? Rava said to him: Since a person fulfills his obligation with the willow branch in the <i>lulav</i>, no additional commemoration is necessary. Abaye said to him: That is not a satisfactory answer, as he is performing that action due to the mitzva of taking the <i>lulav</i> and the other species. And if you say that he lifts the willow branch bound with the <i>lulav</i> to fulfill the mitzva of the four species and then lifts it again in commemoration of the willow branch in the Temple, aren’t actions performed daily proof that we do not do so, as no one lifts the <i>lulav</i> twice?
  Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: Since the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is a mitzva by Torah law, we perform it seven days in commemoration of the Temple even today. Since the mitzva of the willow branch is a mitzva by rabbinic law, we do not perform it seven days in commemoration of the Temple.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rava say this? If we say that Rava said this in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, didn’t he say that it is written: Willows of the river, i.e., in the plural, indicating two willow branches, one for the <i>lulav</i> and one for the Temple? In his opinion, the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple is also a mitzva by Torah law. If Rava said this in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, they learned this as a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Neḥunya of the valley of Beit Ḥortan: The <i>halakha</i> of the ten saplings, the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple, and the mitzva of the water libation on the altar during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> are each a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  Rather, Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: With regard to the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, which has its basis written explicitly in the Torah, in the outlying areas we perform it seven days in commemoration of the Temple. With regard to the mitzva of the willow branch, which does not have its basis written explicitly in the Torah, in the outlying areas we do not perform it seven days in commemoration of the Temple.
  Apropos the willow branch in the Temple, Reish Lakish said: Priests with physical defects enter between the Entrance Hall and the altar in order to fulfill the obligation of the mitzva of the willow branch. Although due to their blemishes it is prohibited for them to pass there, as they circle the altar with the willow branches they inevitably pass between the Entrance Hall and the altar. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Who stated this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara wonders about Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question: Who stated it? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself state it? As Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Neḥunya of the valley of Beit Ḥortan: The <i>halakha</i> of the ten saplings, the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple, and the mitzva of the water libation on the altar during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> are each a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question was: Who said that the mitzva is fulfilled by taking the willow branch and circling the altar? Perhaps the mitzva is only fulfilled by standing the willow branches upright surrounding the altar. Who said that the mitzva may be fulfilled even by those with physical defects? Perhaps it may be fulfilled only by unblemished priests.
  It was stated that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. One said that the mitzva of the willow branch is an ordinance of the prophets, as Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi instituted it in the Temple as obligatory. And one said that the mitzva of the willow branch is an ancient custom practiced by the prophets and adopted by others as well. It was not instituted as a binding ordinance. The Gemara suggests: Conclude that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said that it is an ordinance of the prophets, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mitzva of the willow branch is an ordinance of the prophets. The Gemara concurs: Indeed, conclude that it is so.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abbahu: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Neḥunya of the valley of Beit Ḥortan: The <i>halakha</i> of the ten saplings, the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple, and the mitzva of the water libation on the altar during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> are each a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? How then could he attribute the origin of the mitzva of the willow branch to the prophets? “He was astonished for a while” (Daniel 4:16), and after considering the apparent contradiction he said that indeed Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the mitzva of the willow branch is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. However, over the course of time during the Babylonian exile they forgot some <i>halakhot</i>, including the mitzva of the willow branch, and then the prophets reinstituted them.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that it is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? And didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: Yours, i.e., the Babylonian Sages, say that this ordinance is theirs, instituted by the Sages, and it is neither a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai nor an ordinance instituted by the prophets. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult;
  
  Daf 44b
  
  Here, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that it is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, he is referring to the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple; there, where he said that it was established by the prophets, he was referring to the taking of the willow branch in the outlying areas.
  § Rabbi Ami said: The willow branch taken to fulfill the mitzva requires a certain measure, and it is taken only in and of itself and not with the <i>lulav</i>, and a person does not fulfill his obligation with the willow branch that is bound with the <i>lulav</i>. The Gemara asks: Since the Master said: It is taken only in and of itself, it is obvious that a person does not fulfill his obligation with the willow branch that is bound with the <i>lulav</i>. Why are both statements necessary?
  The Gemara answers: It is necessary lest you say that this applies only to a case where he did not lift the willow branch bound with the <i>lulav</i> and then lift it again to fulfill the mitzva of the willow branch; however, in a case where he lifted the <i>lulav</i> and then lifted it again, say no, he fulfills his obligation with the willow branch in the <i>lulav</i>. Therefore, he teaches us that even if one takes the four species a second time with the express intent of fulfilling the mitzva of the willow branch, he did not fulfill his obligation, as he must take the willow branch by itself. And Rav Ḥisda said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A person fulfills his obligation with the willow branch that is bound with the <i>lulav</i> on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  Rabbi Ami said that the willow branch requires a certain measure. The Gemara asks: And what is its requisite measure? Rav Naḥman said: It is three branches of moist leaves. And Rav Sheshet said: It is even one leaf and one branch. The Gemara wonders about the statement of Rav Sheshet: Does it enter your mind that one takes a single leaf and a single branch separately? Rather, emend Rav Sheshet’s statement and say: One fulfills his obligation even with one leaf on one branch.
  § The Gemara relates that Aivu, father of the <i>amora</i> Rav, said: I was standing before Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, and a certain man brought a willow branch before him to fulfill the mitzva. He took it and waved it; he waved it and did not recite a blessing. This indicates that he holds that the mitzva of the willow branch is a custom of the prophets and is therefore performed without a blessing. Similarly, the Gemara relates that Aivu and Ḥizkiya, sons of the daughter of Rav, brought a willow branch before Rav to fulfill the mitzva. He waved it; he waved it and did not recite a blessing. This indicates that he, too, holds that it is a custom of the prophets.
  Apropos the exchange between Aivu and Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, the Gemara cites another <i>halakha</i> that was transmitted in the same manner. Aivu said: I was standing before Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, and a certain man came before him and said to him: I have villages, I have olive groves, and I have olives, and the villagers come and hoe the olive groves during the Sabbatical Year and eat from the olive trees. Is it appropriate or inappropriate to allow this to continue? He said to him: It is inappropriate. As the man was leaving him and going on his way, Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: I have already resided in this land for forty years and I have not seen a person walk in a path as straight as this man does. The man came back to Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok and said to him: What should I do to ameliorate the situation? He said to him: Declare the olives ownerless for the poor, and give <i>perutot</i> coins to hired laborers as payment to hoe the olive groves.
  The Gemara asks: Is hoeing olive groves permitted during the Sabbatical Year? But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “But the seventh year you shall let it rest and lie fallow” (Exodus 23:11); meaning you shall let it rest from hoeing, and lie fallow from clearing the field of rocks? Apparently, hoeing is prohibited during the Sabbatical Year. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama said: There are two types of hoeing, one whose objective is to seal cracks in the ground and one to enhance the trees’ health. Enhancing the trees’ health is prohibited; sealing cracks is permitted, as it is merely to prevent the trees from dying and not to accelerate their growth.
  An additional <i>halakha</i> was transmitted in the same manner. Aivu said in the name of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok: A person should not walk on Shabbat eves more than a distance of three parasangs [<i>parsaot</i>]. Rather, he should reach the place where he will stay on Shabbat early enough to ensure that he will have meals prepared for Shabbat. Rav Kahana said: We said that restriction only with regard to a case where he is returning to his house. However, if he is going to an inn, he relies on the food that he took with him. As he cannot assume that he will find lodgings with food, he brings food sufficient for his needs. Therefore, it is permitted for him to travel a greater distance.
  Some say that Rav Kahana said: This restriction that one may not walk a distance of more than three parasangs on Shabbat eves was required even with regard to one traveling to his house, and all the more so with regard to one traveling to an inn, as he cannot assume that he will find food there. Rav Kahana said: There was an incident that happened with me where I traveled a distance to reach my home on Friday and I did not find even small fried fish [<i>deharsena</i>] to eat in the house. One must prepare for Shabbat well in advance of the onset of Shabbat.
  § The mishna continues: How is the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> fulfilled in the Temple when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat? The mishna then explains how the attendants arrange their <i>lulavim</i> on the bench in the Temple. The <i>tanna</i> who recited <i>mishnayot</i> in the study hall taught a version of the mishna before Rav Naḥman: The attendant arranges them on the roof over the bench in the Temple. Rav Naḥman said to him:
  
  Daf 45a
  
  And does he need to dry them? Clearly, that is not his intention. Why, then, would he place the <i>lulavim</i> on the roof? Rather, emend your version and say: On the bench beneath the roof, in a place designated for that purpose. Raḥava said that Rav Yehuda said: The Temple Mount was a double colonnade [<i>setav</i>], a colonnade within a colonnade, and there was room there to place the <i>lulavim</i>.
  MISHNA: How is the mitzva of the willow branch fulfilled? There was a place below Jerusalem, and it was called Motza. They would descend there and gather willow branches [<i>murbiyyot</i>] from there. And they would then come and stand them upright at the sides of the altar, and the tops of the branches would be inclined over the top of the altar. They then sounded a <i>tekia</i>, a simple uninterrupted blast, sounded a <i>terua</i>, a broken sound and/or a series of short staccato blasts, and sounded another <i>tekia</i>. Each day they would circle the altar one time and say: “Lord, please save us. Lord, please grant us success” (Psalms 118:25). Rabbi Yehuda says that they would say: <i>Ani vaho</i>, please save us. And on that day, the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i>, they would circle the altar seven times. At the time of their departure at the end of the Festival, what would they say? It is beautiful for you, altar; it is beautiful for you, altar. Rabbi Elazar said that they would say: To the Lord and to you, altar; to the Lord and to you, altar.
  The mishna notes: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat; except for the fact that they would gather the branches from Shabbat eve and place them in basins of gold so that they would not dry. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: There was a unique custom on the seventh day. They would bring palm branches to the Temple and place them on the ground at the sides of the altar, and that seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i> was called: The day of the placing of palm branches. Immediately after fulfilling the mitzva of taking the four species on the seventh day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, children remove their <i>lulavim</i> from the binding and eat their <i>etrogim</i> as an expression of extreme joy.
  GEMARA: It was taught: Motza, which was mentioned in the mishna, was a Roman military colony [<i>kelanya</i>]. The Gemara asks: And the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna, what is the reason that he called it Motza? The reason is that since it is exempted from the king’s tax [<i>karga</i>], they call it Motza, meaning removed.
  § The mishna continues: And after gathering the willow branches, they would then come and stand them upright at the sides of the altar. It was taught: The willow branches were numerous and long, and eleven cubits high, so that they would lean over the altar one cubit.
  Mareimar said in the name of Mar Zutra: Learn from it that one places them on the base of the altar and not on the ground, as, if it enters your mind that one places them on the ground, it would pose a difficulty in understanding the mishna. Now, since the following is stated with regard to the structure of the altar: The altar ascended one cubit high and indented one cubit and that is the base, and it ascended five additional cubits and indented one cubit and that is the surrounding ledge, and it ascended three additional cubits and that is the location of the horns of the altar, as the height of the altar totaled nine cubits; consequently, where can you find a case where the willow branches lean over the altar one cubit? Due to the indentations, the branches would need to stand inclined. Eleven cubits would not be sufficiently high to lean one cubit over the altar. Rather, is it not that one must conclude from this that the branches were placed on the base, adding a cubit to their height? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that it is so.
  Rabbi Abbahu said: What is the verse that alludes to the fact that the branches must lean one cubit over the top of the altar? It is as it is stated: “Encircle [<i>isru</i>] with branches on the Festival until the horns of the altar” (Psalms 118:27), indicating that willow branches should surround the horns of the altar. That is facilitated by standing the branches on the base. The Gemara cites derivations based on different interpretations of the terms in that verse. Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to anyone who takes a <i>lulav</i> in its binding and a myrtle branch in its dense-leaved form, the verse ascribes him credit as though he built an altar and sacrificed an offering upon it, as it is stated:
  
  Daf 45b
  
  “Bind [<i>isru</i>] with dense-leaved branches [<i>ba’avotim</i>] on the Festival until the horns of the altar” (Psalms 118:27), which alludes to both the binding of the <i>lulav</i> and to the myrtle branch, referred to in the Torah as the branch of a dense-leaved tree [<i>anaf etz avot</i>]. Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon HaMeḥozi, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaMakkoti: With regard to anyone who establishes an addition [<i>issur</i>] to the Festival on the day after the Festival by eating and drinking, the verse ascribes him credit as though he built an altar and sacrificed an offering upon it, as it is stated: “Add [<i>isru</i>] to the Festival with fattened animals [<i>ba’avotim</i>] until the horns of the altar.”
  § Apropos the <i>halakha</i> cited by Rabbi Yirmeya in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, the Gemara cites additional <i>halakhot</i>. Ḥizkiya said that Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to all objects used in performance of each and every one of the mitzvot, a person fulfills his obligation only when the objects are positioned in the manner of their growth. One must take the <i>lulav</i> with the bottom of the branch facing down, as it is stated with regard to the beams of the Tabernacle: “Acacia wood, standing” (Exodus 26:15), indicating that the beams stood in the manner of their growth.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “Acacia wood, standing,” indicating that they stand in the Tabernacle in the manner of their growth in nature. Alternatively, standing means that the beams support their gold plating that is affixed to the beams with nails. Alternatively, standing teaches: Lest you say that after the destruction of the Tabernacle their hope is lost and their prospect is abolished, and they will never serve a sacred purpose again, therefore the verse states: “Acacia wood, standing,” meaning that they stand forever and for all time and will yet be revealed and utilized again.
  And Ḥizkiya said that Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: I am able to absolve the entire world from judgment for sins committed from the day I was created until now. The merit that he accrued through his righteousness and the suffering that he endured atone for the sins of the entire world. And were the merit accrued by Eliezer, my son, calculated along with my own, we would absolve the world from judgment for sins committed from the day that the world was created until now. And were the merit accrued by the righteous king, Jotham ben Uzziah, calculated with our own, we would absolve the world from judgment for sins committed from the day that the world was created until its end. The righteousness of these three serves as a counterbalance to all the evil deeds committed throughout the generations, and it validates the ongoing existence of the world.
  And Ḥizkiya said that Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: I have seen members of the caste of the spiritually prominent, who are truly righteous, and they are few. If they number one thousand, I and my son are among them. If they number one hundred, I and my son are among them; and if they number two, I and my son are they. The Gemara asks: Are they so few? But didn’t Rava say: There are eighteen thousand righteous individuals in a row before the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “Surrounding are eighteen thousand” (Ezekiel 48:35)? Apparently, the righteous are numerous. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai is referring to the very few who view the Divine Presence through a bright, mirror-like partition, while that statement of Rava is referring to those who do not view the Divine Presence through a bright partition.
  The Gemara asks further: And are those who view the Divine Presence through a bright partition so few? But didn’t Abaye say: The world has no fewer than thirty-six righteous people in each generation who greet the Divine Presence every day, as it is stated: “Happy are all they that wait for Him [<i>lo</i>]” (Isaiah 30:18)? The numerological value of <i>lo</i>, spelled <i>lamed vav</i>, is thirty-six, alluding to the fact that there are at least thirty-six full-fledged righteous individuals in each generation. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement of Abaye is referring to those who enter to greet the Divine Presence by requesting and being granted permission, while that statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai is referring to those who enter even without requesting permission, for whom the gates of Heaven are open at all times. They are very few indeed.
  § The mishna asks: At the time of their departure at the end of the Festival, what would they say? The mishna answers that they would praise the altar and glorify God. The Gemara challenges this: But in doing so aren’t they joining the name of Heaven and another entity, and it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Anyone who joins the name of Heaven and another entity is uprooted from the world, as it is stated: “He that sacrifices unto the gods, save unto the Lord only, shall be utterly destroyed” (Exodus 22:19)? The Gemara answers that this is what the people are saying when they depart the Temple: To the Lord, we acknowledge that He is our God, and to you, the altar, we give praise; to the Lord, we acknowledge that He is our God, and to you, the altar, we give acclaim. The praise to God and the praise to the altar are clearly distinct.
  § The mishna continues: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat. And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, on the seventh day of the Festival they would bring palm branches to the Temple. Rav Huna said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? It is as it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm” (Leviticus 23:40). Branches in the plural indicates that two branches must be taken, one for the <i>lulav</i> and one for placement around the altar. And the Rabbis say: Although the word is vocalized in the plural, based on tradition it is written <i>kappot</i>, without the letter <i>vav</i>. Therefore, it is interpreted as if it were written <i>kappat</i>, indicating that only one palm branch need be taken.
  Rabbi Levi says: The rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka is not based on a verse. Rather, it is a custom that developed to express praise for the Jewish people, likening them to a date palm. Just as the date palm has only one heart, as branches do not grow from its trunk but rather the trunk rises and branches emerge only at the top, so too, the Jewish people have only one heart directed toward their Father in Heaven.
  § Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The blessing over the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is recited seven days and the blessing over the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is recited one day. What is the rationale for this distinction? It is written explicitly in the Torah that the mitzva to sit in the <i>sukka</i> applies all seven days. The Gemara explains: With regard to the <i>lulav</i>, where the nights are distinct from the days, as the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is not in effect at night, each day is a mitzva in and of itself. A separate blessing is recited over each mitzva. However, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, where the nights are not distinct from the days, as the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is in effect at night just as it is during the day, the legal status of all seven days of the Festival is like that of one long day.
  But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The blessing over the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is recited seven days and the blessing over the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is recited one day. What is the rationale for this distinction? The Gemara explains: The mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is a mitzva by Torah law all seven days of the Festival. Therefore, a blessing is recited for seven days. However, the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, other than on the first day, is a mitzva by rabbinic law, as the Sages instituted an ordinance to take the <i>lulav</i> for all seven days to commemorate the practice in the Temple. Therefore, it is enough to recite the blessing one day, on the first day.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One recites a blessing over both this, the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, and over that, the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, all seven days. Rav Yosef said: Take the statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana in your hand, as all the <i>amora’im</i> who transmitted statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan hold in accordance with his opinion in matters related to <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection based on a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 46a
  
  One who prepares a <i>lulav</i> for himself, but not one who prepares for others, recites when preparing it on the eve of the Festival: Blessed…Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he takes it during the Festival in order to fulfill his obligation, he says: Blessed…Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us concerning the taking of a <i>lulav</i>. And even though he recited the blessing over the <i>lulav</i> on the first day of the Festival, he repeats and recites the blessing over the <i>lulav</i> all seven days when fulfilling the mitzva. One who establishes a <i>sukka</i> for himself recites: Blessed…Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he enters to sit in the <i>sukka</i>, he recites: “Blessed…Who has sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to reside in the <i>sukka</i>. And once he recited the blessing on the first day, he no longer recites it on the rest of the days, as all seven days are considered a single unit.
  Now, the <i>halakha</i> cited in this <i>baraita</i> that the blessing over <i>lulav</i> is recited all seven days is difficult; it contradicts the <i>halakha</i> stated by Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that the blessing over <i>lulav</i> is recited only on the first day. The <i>halakha</i> cited in this <i>baraita</i> that the blessing over <i>sukka</i> is recited only on the first day is likewise difficult, as it contradicts the <i>halakha</i> that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, that the blessing over <i>sukka</i> is recited all seven days.
  The Gemara continues: Granted, the contradiction between the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>lulav</i> in the <i>baraita</i> and the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>lulav</i> stated in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult. Here, in the <i>baraita</i>, where the <i>halakha</i> is to recite the blessing each day, it is referring to a time when the Temple is in existence, where the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is performed all seven days. There, in the case of the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that the blessing is recited only on the first day, it is referring to a time when the Temple is not in existence. However, the contradiction between one <i>halakha</i> of <i>sukka</i> and the other <i>halakha</i> of <i>sukka</i> remains difficult, as Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement indicates that the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> during the Festival is considered seven separate mitzvot, while the <i>halakha</i> in the <i>baraita</i> indicates that it is one extended mitzva.
  The Gemara answers: This matter is related to a general dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to phylacteries, every time one dons them he recites the blessing over them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: One recites the blessing only in the morning. Apparently, these <i>tanna’im</i> would dispute the issue of <i>sukka</i> as well: Does one recite the blessing each time he performs the mitzva or only the first time he performs it at the beginning of <i>Sukkot</i>?
  Apropos phylacteries, it was stated that Abaye said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rav Mari, son of the daughter of Shmuel, said: I observed Rava, who did not act in accordance with his own <i>halakha</i> and recite the blessing over phylacteries only once. Rather, he rises early, and enters the bathroom, and exits, and washes his hands, and dons phylacteries, and recites the blessing. And when he needs to go another time, he enters the bathroom, and exits, and washes his hands, and then dons phylacteries, and then recites the blessing. And we too, in the case of <i>sukka</i>, act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and recite the blessing all seven days.
  Mar Zutra said: I observed Rav Pappi, who recited the blessing whenever he donned phylacteries. The Sages of the school of Rav Ashi recited the blessing whenever they touched the phylacteries that they were donning.
  § Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The blessing over the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is recited all seven days of the Festival. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: On the first day, there is the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> by Torah law, and one recites a blessing. From that point onward it is a mitzva of the Elders, a rabbinic ordinance to commemorate the Temple, and one is not required to recite a blessing. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: On each day of <i>Sukkot</i> it is a mitzva of the Elders. The Gemara wonders: Even on the first day? But don’t we maintain that on the first day the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is by Torah law? The Gemara emends the citation. Say that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: On each day of <i>Sukkot</i> except for the first day. The Gemara asks: If so, that opinion is the same as that of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi; but they appear to disagree. The Gemara answers: Emend the citation and say: And likewise, Rabbi Yitzḥak said, in agreement with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.
  The Gemara notes: And Rav also held that the blessing over the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> is recited all seven days, and one recites the blessing even on the six days when the mitzva is by rabbinic law, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: One who lights a Hanukkah light must recite a blessing. Rabbi Yirmeya said: One who sees a burning Hanukkah light must recite a blessing. What blessings does one recite? Rav Yehuda said: On the first day of Hanukkah, the one who lights recites three blessings: To light the Hanukkah light, Who has performed miracles, and the blessing of time. The one who sees burning lights recites two blessings. From this point onward, from the second day of Hanukkah, the one who lights recites two blessings, and the one who sees recites one blessing.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the first blessing that one recites? He recites: Blessed…Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us to light the Hanukkah light. The Gemara asks: And where did He command us? The mitzva of Hanukkah is not mentioned in the Torah, so how can one say that it was commanded to us by God? The Gemara answers: The obligation to recite this blessing is derived from the verse: “You shall not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto you, to the right, nor to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11). From this verse, the mitzva incumbent upon all Jews to heed the statements and decrees of the Sages is derived. Therefore, one who fulfills their directives fulfills a mitzva by Torah law. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the mitzva to heed the voice of the Elders is derived from the verse: “Ask your father, and he will declare unto you, your Elders, and they will tell you” (Deuteronomy 32:7).
  The Gemara asks: What blessing does he omit on the other days of Hanukkah? The Gemara answers: He omits the blessing of time: Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. The Gemara asks: And say that he omits the blessing of the miracle: Who has performed miracles. The Gemara answers: The miracle is relevant on all of the days, whereas the blessing: Who has given us life, is pertinent only to the first time one performs the mitzva each year. In any event, from the statement of Rav it is clear that one recites a blessing over a rabbinic mitzva, and therefore one recites the blessing over the <i>lulav</i> all seven days. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak taught this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav explicitly, and it is unnecessary to infer Rav’s opinion from statements in other areas of <i>halakha</i>. Rav said: On all seven days, one recites the blessing over the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who establishes a <i>sukka</i> for himself recites: Blessed…Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he enters to reside in the <i>sukka</i>, he recites: “Blessed…Who has sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to reside in the <i>sukka</i>. If the <i>sukka</i> was already established and standing and was not constructed for the sake of the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, then if he is able to introduce a novel element in the <i>sukka</i> for the sake of the mitzva, he recites the blessing: Who has given us life. And if not, then when he enters to reside in the <i>sukka</i> on the Festival he recites two blessings: To reside in the <i>sukka</i>, and: Who has given us life. Rav Ashi said: I observed Rav Kahana, who recites all these blessings over the cup on which he recites <i>kiddush</i>.
  The Sages taught: If one had several mitzvot before him to fulfill, he recites: Blessed…Who has sanctified us with His mitzvot, and commanded us concerning the mitzvot. Rabbi Yehuda says: He recites a blessing over each and every one in and of itself. Rabbi Zeira said, and some say that it was Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa who said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Zeira said, and some say that it was Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa who said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written: “Blessed is the Lord, day by day” (Psalms 68:20). The question arises: Is it so that one blesses Him by day and does not bless Him at night? Rather, the verse comes to tell you: Each and every day, give the Lord the blessings appropriate for that day. Here too, with regard to each and every matter, give Him blessings appropriate to that matter, and do not group the blessings together.
  Apropos the <i>halakha</i> transmitted by this pair of <i>amora’im</i>, the Gemara continues: Rabbi Zeira said, and some say that it was Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa who said: Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is unlike the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that an empty vessel
  
  Daf 46b
  
  holds that which is placed within it, while a full vessel does not hold it. However, the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is: If God adds to someone who is a full vessel in terms of knowledge or good attributes, he holds it; a person who is an empty vessel will not hold it. This is alluded to by the verse where it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, if you will hearken diligently [<i>shamoa tishma</i>] unto the voice of the Lord your God, to observe to do all his commandments” (Deuteronomy 28:1). This verse is interpreted homiletically: If you hearken [<i>shamoa</i>] in the present, you will hearken [<i>tishma</i>] in the future as well; and if not, you will not hearken. Alternatively: If you hearkened to the old, i.e., if you review what you already learned, you will hearken to the new as well. “But if your heart turns away” (Deuteronomy 30:17), you will no longer be able to hearken.
  § The mishna continues: Immediately after fulfilling the mitzva of taking the four species on the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i>, children remove their <i>lulavim</i> from the binding and eat their <i>etrogim</i> in an expression of extreme joy. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited to derive benefit from the <i>etrog</i> on the seventh day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>; however, on the eighth day it is permitted. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the <i>sukka</i> even on the eighth day. And Reish Lakish said: It is permitted to derive benefit from the <i>etrog</i> even on the seventh day, once the mitzva has been fulfilled.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the <i>etrog</i> was set aside for its mitzva; once the mitzva has been fulfilled there is no legal barrier to eating the <i>etrog</i> on the seventh day. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the <i>etrog</i> was set aside for the entire day. Therefore, one may not derive benefit from it even after he fulfills the mitzva.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna: Immediately after fulfilling the mitzva, children remove their <i>lulavim</i> from the binding and eat their <i>etrogim</i>. What, is it not that the same is true for <i>etrogim</i> belonging to adults, and it would be permitted to eat those as well? Apparently, it is permitted to derive benefit from the <i>etrog</i> immediately after the mitzva is performed. Rabbi Yoḥanan rejected this: No, the mishna is referring to children specifically, who are not obligated by Torah law to fulfill the mitzva. However, <i>etrogim</i> belonging to adults were set aside for the entire day.
  Some say another version of the exchange between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from mishna: Immediately after fulfilling the mitzva, children remove their <i>lulavim</i> from the binding and eat their <i>etrogim</i>. One can conclude by inference: <i>Etrogim</i> belonging to children, yes, they may be eaten; <i>etrogim</i> belonging to adults, no, they may not be eaten until the conclusion of the Festival. Reish Lakish responded: The same is true for <i>etrogim</i> belonging to adults, i.e., it would be permitted to eat those as well, and the reason that the mishna is teaching specifically about <i>etrogim</i> belonging to children is that it is teaching the manner in which the matter typically occurs, because children are entertained by eating the <i>etrogim</i>.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that an object set aside for a mitzva is set aside for the entire day, what is different with regard to a <i>sukka</i> such that it is prohibited even on the eighth day, and what is different with regard to an <i>etrog</i>?
  Abaye said to him: With regard to a <i>sukka</i>, it is suitable for use even during twilight at the end of the seventh day, as, if a meal happens to present itself to him at that time, he is required to sit in the <i>sukka</i> and eat in the <i>sukka</i>. Therefore, the <i>sukka</i> is set aside for the mitzva for the twilight period, and since it is set aside for the twilight period, it is set aside for the entire eighth day. Since the status of the twilight period is uncertain, it may be the evening of the eighth day, and once it is set aside for the potential start of the eighth day, it is set aside for the entire eighth day. However, with regard to an <i>etrog</i>, which, once the mitzva has been fulfilled, is not suitable for use during the twilight period, it is not set aside during the twilight period. Since it was not set aside then, it is not set aside for the entire eighth day.
  And Levi said: It is prohibited to use the <i>etrog</i> even on the eighth day. The father of Shmuel said: It is prohibited to use the <i>etrog</i> on the seventh day, and it is permitted on the eighth day. The Gemara notes that ultimately, the father of Shmuel reconsidered his opinion and assumed the opinion of Levi. Rabbi Zeira, however, assumed the opinion of the father of Shmuel, as Rabbi Zeira said: With regard to an <i>etrog</i> that was rendered unfit for any reason, it is prohibited to eat it all seven days, as it was set aside for the mitzva until the end of the Festival.
  Rabbi Zeira said: A person should not transfer ownership of the four species to a child by means of a gift on the first day of the Festival. What is the rationale for this <i>halakha</i>? It is due to the fact with regard to acquisition, a child is able to acquire objects; however, with regard to transferring ownership, he is not able to transfer ownership to others. In other words, a child is legally able to acquire an item given to him, but he does not have the legal cognizance to transfer ownership of an item to another. In this case, if an adult gives the child the four species as a gift before having fulfilled the mitzva himself, the child will be unable to effect the transfer of ownership back to the adult. And in that case, a situation will result where the adult is seeking to fulfill his obligation with a <i>lulav</i> that is not his.
  And Rabbi Zeira said: A person should not say to a child: I will give you something, and then not give it to him, because he thereby comes to teach him about lying, as it is stated: “They have taught their tongues to speak lies” (Jeremiah 9:4). One must not accustom a child to fail to honor commitments.
  The Gemara notes: And other <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to the matter of the dispute of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as it was stated: If one designated seven <i>etrogim</i> for the seven days of the Festival. Rav said: With each and every one, he fulfills his obligation with it and he may then eat it immediately. And Rav Asi said: With each and every one, he fulfills his obligation with it and he may then eat it the following day. With regard to what principle do they disagree? One Sage, Rav, holds: The <i>etrog</i> was set aside for the mitzva; once the mitzva has been fulfilled it is no longer prohibited to derive benefit from the item. The other Sage, Rav Asi, holds: It was set aside for the entire day. Deriving benefit from the <i>etrog</i> remains prohibited until the end of the day, even after one has fulfilled the mitzva.
  The Gemara asks: And we, who live outside of Eretz Yisrael, who have two days of the Festival due to uncertainty whether the eighth day is actually the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i>, how do we act with regard to deriving benefit from the four species? Abaye said: On the eighth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day, it is prohibited, as due to that uncertainty, the day retains the sanctity of <i>Sukkot</i>. However, on the ninth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty as it might be the eighth day, it is certainly permitted. Mareimar said: Even on the eighth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day, it is permitted. Since that is also the first day of the Eighth Day of Assembly, no vestige of the sanctity of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is attached to it.
  The Gemara notes: In Sura they acted in accordance with the opinion of Mareimar and derived benefit from the <i>etrog</i> on the eighth day. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, acted in accordance with the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara notes: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.
  § Apropos the matter of the Eighth Day of Assembly in the Diaspora, the Gemara notes: Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: Outside of Eretz Yisrael, on the eighth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i>, its status is like that of the seventh day with regard to the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> and like that of the eighth day with regard to the blessing, i.e., in Grace after Meals, in <i>kiddush</i>, and in the <i>Amida</i> prayer, the Eighth Day of Assembly is mentioned. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Its status is like that of the eighth day both with regard to this, the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, and to that, the blessing. The Gemara explains: Everyone, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, agrees that we reside in the <i>sukka</i> on the eighth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day. When they disagree is
  
  Daf 47a
  
  with regard to whether or not to recite the blessing over residing in the <i>sukka</i>. According to the one who says that the status of the eighth day is like that of the seventh day with regard to the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, we also recite the blessing: To reside in the <i>sukka</i>. However, according to the one who says that its status is like that of the eighth day both with regard to this and to that, we do not recite the blessing. Rav Yosef said: Take the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that on the eighth day outside Eretz Yisrael one does not recite the blessing: To reside in the <i>sukka</i>, in your hand, i.e., adopt it as your practice. As Rav Huna bar Bizna and all the prominent scholars of the generation happened to visit a <i>sukka</i> on the eighth day, with regard to which there was uncertainty that it might be the seventh day, and they were sitting in the <i>sukka</i>, but they did not recite the blessing.
  The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the reason they did not recite a blessing is that they hold in accordance with the opinion of the one who said: Once he recited the blessing on the first Festival day he does not recite it again on the subsequent days, and not because it was the eighth day. The Gemara answers: That is not the reason that they did not recite the blessing, as the Sages learned through tradition that these Sages were coming from the fields, where they had been herding their flocks, and that was the first time during the Festival that they sat in a <i>sukka</i>.
  Some say a different version of the dispute: Everyone agrees that we do not recite the blessing; when they disagree it is with regard to whether to reside in the <i>sukka</i>. According to the one who says that the status of the eighth day is like that of the seventh day with regard to the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, we reside in the <i>sukka</i>. However, according to the one who says that its status is like that of the eighth day both with regard to this and to that, neither do we reside in the <i>sukka</i>. Rav Yosef said: Take the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan in your hand, as who is the Master responsible for dissemination of the <i>halakha</i>? It is Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, and on the eighth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day, he himself resides outside of the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that we reside in the <i>sukka</i> on the eighth day, with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day, but we do not recite the blessing.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one recites the blessing: Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time, on the eighth day of the Festival, as the eighth day is a Festival distinct from <i>Sukkot</i>, and one does not recite the blessing of time on the seventh day of Passover because it is not a Festival distinct from Passover.
  And Rabbi Levi bar Ḥama said, and some say it was Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina who said: Know that the eighth day of <i>Sukkot</i> is a Festival in and of itself and therefore requires its own blessing, as it is distinct from the seven days of <i>Sukkot</i> with regard to three matters: With regard to <i>sukka</i>, as one is not obligated to sit in the <i>sukka</i> on the eighth day; and with regard to <i>lulav</i>, as one is not obligated to take the four species on the eighth day; and with regard to the water libation, as one does not pour the water libation on the altar on the eighth day. The Gemara notes: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said: With a vessel measuring one <i>log</i> the priest pours the water libation all eight days, including the eighth day, the eighth day is nevertheless distinct from the rest of the Festival with regard to the other two matters.
  The Gemara asks: If so, the seventh day of Passover should be considered distinct as well, as it is distinct from the first day in terms of the obligation of eating <i>matza</i>, as the Master said: On the first night of Passover, it is an obligation to eat <i>matza</i>. From that point onward, it is optional; if one chooses, he eats <i>matza</i>, and if he chooses not to eat <i>matza</i>, he need not, provided that he does not eat leavened foods. The Gemara retorts: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of Passover, the <i>halakha</i> of the seventh day is distinct from the first night; however, it is not distinct from the first day, as on the first day there is no obligation to eat <i>matza</i>. Here, in the case of <i>Sukkot</i>, the eighth day of the Festival is distinct even from the first day.
  Ravina said a different reason for the distinction between the two Festivals: This, the eighth day of <i>Sukkot</i>, is distinct in terms of its <i>halakhot</i>, even from the day just before it, the seventh day. However, that, the seventh day of Passover, is distinct in terms of its <i>halakhot</i>, only from a day previous to the day before, i.e., the first day alone. There is no distinction between the sixth and seventh days.
  Rav Pappa said another reason why the eighth day of <i>Sukkot</i> is considered a distinct Festival. Here, with regard to the additional offering sacrificed on the Eighth Day of Assembly, it is written: “And you shall present a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor unto the Lord: One bull” (Numbers 29:36). There, with regard to the additional offering sacrificed on the first day of <i>Sukkot</i>, it is written: “And you shall present a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor unto the Lord: Thirteen bulls” (Numbers 29:13), and on each subsequent day one bull fewer is sacrificed: Twelve on the second day, eleven on the third day, and so on, until seven are sacrificed on the seventh day. Were the eighth day part of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, the additional offering on that day should have included six bulls. The fact that it includes only one bull indicates that it is a distinct Festival.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Here, it is written: “On the eighth day you shall have a solemn assembly; you shall do no manner of servile labor” (Numbers 29:35). This indicates that this day is distinct from the others, as there, with regard to the other days of <i>Sukkot</i>, it is written: And on the day, indicating that each of the days from the second through the seventh are all continuations of the first day.
  Rav Ashi said: Here, with regard to the eighth day, it is written: “Their meal-offering and their libations, for the bull, for the ram, and for the lambs, shall be according to their number, as per the regulation” (Numbers 29:37). However, there, with regard to the seventh day, it is written: “And their meal-offering and their libations, for the bulls, and for the rams, and for the lambs, according to their number, as per their regulation” (Numbers 29:33). The Gemara understands the use of the plural pronoun: Their, to indicate that the offerings sacrificed on all seven days are related.
  The Gemara asks: Let us say that the following supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one recites the blessing of time on the eighth day. Failure to bring either the bulls, or the rams, or the sheep on the Festival prevents fulfillment of one’s obligation with the other animals, as they are considered one offering. Rabbi Yehuda says: Failure to bring the bulls does not prevent fulfillment of one’s obligation with the other animals, since they decrease progressively each day. The Torah displays flexibility with regard to the bulls. Therefore, apparently, even if they are not brought at all one fulfills his obligation with the others.
  The Sages said to Rabbi Yehuda: But don’t the numbers of all the animals eventually decrease on the eighth day, as on the other days two rams and fourteen sheep are sacrificed and on the eighth day it is one ram and seven sheep? Rabbi Yehuda said to them: The Eighth Day of Assembly is a Festival in and of itself. As just as the seven days of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> require an offering, and a song sung by the Levites, and a blessing unique to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, and there is a mitzva of staying overnight in Jerusalem after the first Festival day, so too, the eighth day requires an offering, and a song sung by the Levites, and a blessing unique to the Eighth Day of Assembly, and there is a mitzva of staying overnight in Jerusalem at its conclusion.
  
  Daf 47b
  
  What, is it not that the blessing mentioned is the blessing of time, in support of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara rejects this possibility: No, the blessing here is Grace after Meals and the <i>Amida</i> prayer, where mention is made of the Eighth Day of Assembly and not of <i>Sukkot</i>. Therefore, there is no support for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one recites the blessing of time on the Eighth Day of Assembly.
  The Gemara says: So too, it is reasonable that this is the proper understanding of the <i>baraita</i>, as should it enter your mind that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the blessing of time, is there a blessing of time all seven days of <i>Sukkot</i>? One recites the blessing only on the first day. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, and that is no proof that the <i>baraita</i> is not referring to the blessing of time, as the <i>baraita</i> could mean that if one did not recite the blessing today, on the first day, he recites the blessing on the next day or on another day of the Festival. Under those circumstances the blessing of time may be recited on any of the seven days.
  The Gemara asks: How could one recite the blessing of time on each of the days of <i>Sukkot</i> if in any case we require the blessing to be recited over a cup of wine, and not everyone has access to wine during the intermediate days of the Festival? From the fact that the Gemara does not consider this factor, let us say that this <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said: One recites the blessing of time even in the marketplace, without wine, as, if you say that we require a cup of wine in order to recite the blessing of time, is there a cup of wine available every day that would enable one to recite the blessing during the intermediate days of the Festival? The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where a cup of wine happened to become available to him. The <i>baraita</i> is not describing the preferred method of reciting the blessing but merely a possibility.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda really hold that the Eighth Day of Assembly requires one to stay overnight at its conclusion? But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: From where is it derived that the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, when the Paschal lamb is brought by those who were impure and unable to sacrifice it on the first <i>Pesaḥ</i>, does not require staying overnight at its conclusion? As it is stated with regard to the first <i>Pesaḥ</i>: “And you shall turn in the morning and go unto your tents” (Deuteronomy 16:7), and immediately thereafter it is written: “Six days you shall eat <i>matzot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:8). From the juxtaposition of these two verses Rabbi Yehuda derives the following: That which requires observance of the six subsequent days requires staying overnight; that which does not require observance of the six subsequent days does not require staying overnight. What does this juxtaposition come to exclude? Is it not to exclude the eighth day of the Festival, as it is not followed by the observance of six days?
  The Gemara rejects this: No, it comes to exclude the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, which is similar to the first <i>Pesaḥ</i> in terms of its offering, and it teaches that since it is not followed by the observance of six days there is no obligation to stay overnight. The Gemara says: So too, it is reasonable to say that Rabbi Yehuda is excluding the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, as we learned in a mishna: The first fruits require a peace-offering to be brought with them, a song unique to the occasion, sung by the Levites, waving, and staying overnight. Whom did you hear who said that first fruits require waving? It is Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna is saying that first fruits require staying overnight. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda excludes only the second <i>Pesaḥ</i> from the requirement of staying overnight.
  Rabbi Yehuda holds that first fruits require waving, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that it is stated with regard to first fruits: “And you shall set it down before the Lord your God,” (Deuteronomy 26:10), and this is referring to waving before the altar the basket containing the first fruits. Do you say that this is referring to waving, or perhaps it is referring only to actually setting it down adjacent to the altar? When the Torah says: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand and set it down before the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 26:4), setting it down is already stated. How, then, do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And you shall set it down”? This is referring to waving.
  The Gemara asks: And perhaps the <i>baraita</i> that requires one to stay overnight when bringing first fruits to Jerusalem is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. Rather, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who also holds that first fruits require waving. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand” (Deuteronomy 26:4), which taught concerning first fruits that they require waving. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? How does he derive the waving of the first fruits from this verse? The Gemara answers: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term “hand” written with regard to first fruits and the term “hand” written with regard to a peace-offering. It is written here, with regard to first fruits: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand,” and it is written there, with regard to a peace-offering: “His own hands shall bring the offerings of the Lord made by fire; the fat with the breast shall he bring, that the breast may be waved before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30).
  In addition, one can derive by means of the verbal analogy that just as here, with regard to first fruits, a priest performs the waving, so too, with regard to a peace-offering, a priest performs the waving. And just as there, with regard to a peace-offering, the owner performs the waving, so too here, with regard to first fruits, the owner performs the waving. How so? How can both the priest and the owner perform the waving? The owner places his hands beneath the peace-offering or under the first fruits, and the priest places his hand under the hand of the owner and waves it together with him. In any event, Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov requires waving of the first fruits. Therefore, it is possible that the <i>baraita</i> is stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and no conclusive proof can be cited with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  What halakhic conclusion was reached concerning the blessing of time? Rav Naḥman said: One recites the blessing of time on the eighth day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. And Rav Sheshet said: One does not recite the blessing of time on the eighth day of the Festival. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that one recites the blessing of time on the eighth day of the Festival.
  The Gemara notes: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: The eighth day
  
  Daf 48a
  
  is a Festival in and of itself with regard to the matter of: <i>Peh</i>, <i>zayin</i>, <i>reish</i>; <i>kuf</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>beit</i>. This is an acronym for: A lottery [<i>payis</i>] in and of itself, i.e., a new lottery is performed on that day to determine which priests will sacrifice the offerings that day, and the order established on <i>Sukkot</i> does not continue; the blessing of time [<i>zeman</i>], i.e., Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time, in and of itself, as it is recited just as it is recited at the start of each Festival; a Festival [<i>regel</i> ] in and of itself, and there is no mitzva to sit in the <i>sukka</i> (see <i>Tosafot</i>); an offering [<i>korban</i>] in and of itself, as the number of offerings sacrificed on the Eighth Day is not a continuation of the number sacrificed on <i>Sukkot</i> but is part of a new calculation; a song [<i>shira</i>] in and of itself, since the psalms recited by the Levites as the offerings are sacrificed on the Eighth Day are not a continuation of those recited on <i>Sukkot</i>; a blessing [<i>berakha</i>] in and of itself, as the addition to the third blessing of Grace after Meals and to the <i>Amida</i> prayer (see <i>Tosafot</i>) is phrased in a manner different from that of the addition recited on <i>Sukkot</i>.
  MISHNA: This mishna elaborates upon the first mishna in this chapter. The obligation to recite <i>hallel</i> and the mitzva of rejoicing on the Festival by sacrificing and eating the meat of peace-offerings are always for eight days. The mishna explains: How so? This teaches that a person is obligated in <i>hallel</i>, and in the mitzva of rejoicing, and in reverence for the last day of the Festival like he is for all the other days of the Festival.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that on the eighth day of the Festival one is obligated to rejoice, derived? It is as the Sages taught that the verse states with regard to <i>Sukkot</i>: “And you shall be altogether joyful” (Deuteronomy 16:15). The verse comes to include the evenings of the last day of the Festival, i.e., then too, one is obligated to rejoice by partaking of the meat of the peace-offerings sacrificed the previous day. The Gemara asks: Does the verse come to include the evening of the eighth day? Or perhaps it comes to include only the evening of the first day of the Festival. The Gemara answers: When the verse says: Altogether, it is exclusionary, and it has distinguished this night from the other nights of the Festival.
  The Gemara asks: What did you see that led you to include the evenings of the last day of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing and to exclude the evenings of the first day of the Festival? Why not require one to sacrifice peace-offerings on the afternoon preceding the Festival to be eaten on the first night? The Gemara answers: I include the evenings of the last day of the Festival, before which there is a day of rejoicing, as it is reasonable that the rejoicing should continue, and I exclude the evenings of the first day of the Festival, before which there is not a day of rejoicing, as there is no obligation to sacrifice offerings on the afternoon preceding the Festival.
  MISHNA: The mitzva of <i>sukka</i> is seven days. How does one fulfill this obligation for seven full days? When one finished eating on the seventh day, he should not dismantle his <i>sukka</i> immediately, because the obligation continues until the end of the day. However, he takes the vessels down from the <i>sukka</i> into the house from <i>minḥa</i> time and onward in deference to the last day of the Festival, when he will require the vessels in the house.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: If one does not have vessels to take down from the <i>sukka</i>, what should he do? The Gemara asks: One does not have vessels? But when he utilized his <i>sukka</i> during the Festival, with what vessels did he eat when he utilized the <i>sukka</i>? Rather, this is the question: If he has no place into which he can take down his vessels and he must continue eating in the <i>sukka</i>, what is the <i>halakha</i>? What can he do to underscore the fact that he is eating there not to fulfill a mitzva, thereby violating the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot of the Torah, but only due to the lack of an alternative? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav said: He reduces the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> by four handbreadths, thereby rendering the <i>sukka</i> unfit. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: He lights a lamp inside the <i>sukka</i>, which is prohibited during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  The Gemara notes: And they do not disagree with regard to the <i>halakha</i>. Instead, they are providing different solutions for different locations. This is for us, who live outside Eretz Yisrael, and this is for them, who live in Eretz Yisrael. Those who live in Eretz Yisrael reduce the roofing, since the obligation to sit in the <i>sukka</i> no longer applies. However, those who live outside of Eretz Yisrael, who are obligated to sit in the <i>sukka</i> on the eighth day with regard to which there is uncertainty that it might be the seventh day, must find another way to distinguish the eighth day from the days of the Festival of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well with regard to a small <i>sukka</i>, since it is prohibited to light a lamp due to the danger of a conflagration, and lighting a lamp will underscore the distinction. However, with regard to a large <i>sukka</i>, in which there is no prohibition and therefore no distinction, what can be said? The Gemara answers: One underscores the distinction in that he brings eating vessels, e.g., pots in which food was cooked, into the <i>sukka</i>, as Rava said: Eating vessels are taken out of the <i>sukka</i>; drinking vessels remain in the <i>sukka</i>. By leaving the pots and pans in the <i>sukka</i>, he indicates that the <i>sukka</i> is no longer involved in fulfillment of the mitzva.
  MISHNA: With regard to the rite of water libation performed in the Temple during the Festival, how was it performed? One would fill a golden jug with a capacity of three <i>log</i> with water from the Siloam pool. When those who went to bring the water reached the Gate of the Water, so called because the water for the libation was brought through this gate leading to the Temple courtyard, they sounded a <i>tekia</i>, sounded a <i>terua</i>, and sounded another <i>tekia</i> as an expression of joy. The priest ascended the ramp of the altar and turned to his left. There were two silver basins there into which he poured the water. Rabbi Yehuda said: They were limestone basins, but they would blacken due to the wine and therefore looked like silver. The two basins were perforated at the bottom
  
  Daf 48b
  
  with two thin perforated nose-like protrusions. One of the basins, used for the wine libation, had a perforation that was broad, and one, used for the water libation, had a perforation that was thin, so that the flow of both the water and the wine, which do not have the same viscosity, would conclude simultaneously. The basin to the west of the altar was for water, and the basin to the east of the altar was for wine. However, if one poured the contents of the basin of water into the basin of wine, or the contents of the basin of wine into the basin of water, he fulfilled his obligation, as failure to pour the libation from the prescribed location does not disqualify the libation after the fact.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: The basin for the water libation was not that large; rather, one would pour the water with a vessel that had a capacity of one <i>log</i> on all eight days of the Festival and not only seven. And the appointee says to the one pouring the water into the silver basin: Raise your hand, so that his actions would be visible, as one time a Sadducee priest intentionally poured the water on his feet, as the Sadducees did not accept the oral tradition requiring water libation, and in their rage all the people pelted him with their <i>etrogim</i>.
  Rabbi Yehuda continues: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat, except that on Shabbat one would not draw water. Instead, on Shabbat eve, one would fill a golden barrel that was not consecrated for exclusive use in the Temple from the Siloam pool, and he would place it in the Temple chamber and draw water from there on Shabbat. If the water in the barrel spilled, or if it was exposed overnight, leading to concern that a snake may have deposited poison in the water, one would fill the jug with water from the basin in the Temple courtyard, as exposed wine or water is unfit for the altar. Just as it is prohibited for people to drink them due to the potential danger, so too, they may not be poured on the altar.
  GEMARA: With regard to the customs accompanying the drawing of the water, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Eina said that it is as the verse states: “With joy [<i>sason</i>] you shall draw water out of the springs of salvation” (Isaiah 12:3), indicating that the water was to be drawn from the spring and the rite performed in extreme joy.
  Apropos this verse, the Gemara relates: There were these two heretics, one named Sason and one named Simḥa. Sason said to Simḥa: I am superior to you, as it is written: “They shall obtain joy [<i>sason</i>] and happiness [<i>simḥa</i>], and sorrow and sighing shall flee” (Isaiah 35:10). The verse mentions joy first. Simḥa said to Sason, On the contrary, I am superior to you, as it is written: “There was happiness [<i>simḥa</i>] and joy [<i>sason</i>] for the Jews” (Esther 8:17). Sason said to Simḥa: One day they will dismiss you and render you a messenger [<i>parvanka</i>], as it is written: “For you shall go out with happiness [<i>simḥa</i>]” (Isaiah 55:12). Simḥa said to Sason: One day they will dismiss you and draw water with you, as it is written: “With joy [<i>sason</i>] you shall draw water.”
  The Gemara relates a similar incident: A certain heretic named Sason said to Rabbi Abbahu: You are all destined to draw water for me in the World-to-Come, as it is written: “With <i>sason</i> you shall draw water.” Rabbi Abbahu said to him: If it had been written: For <i>sason</i>, it would have been as you say; now that it is written: With <i>sason</i>, it means that the skin of that man, you, will be rendered a wineskin, and we will draw water with it.
  § The mishna continues: The priest ascended the ramp of the altar and turned to his left. The Sages taught: All who ascend the altar ascend and turn via the right, and circle the altar, and descend via the left. This is the case except for one ascending to perform one of these three tasks, as the ones who perform these tasks ascend via the left, and then turn on their heel and return in the direction that they came. And these tasks are: The water libation, and the wine libation, and the bird sacrificed as a burnt-offering when there were too many priests engaged in the sacrifice of these burnt-offerings in the preferred location east of the altar. When that was the case, additional priests engaged in sacrificing the same offering would pinch the neck of the bird west of the altar.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehuda said that they were limestone, not silver, basins, but they would blacken due to the wine. The Gemara asks: Granted, the basin for wine blackened due to the wine; however, why did the basin for water blacken? The Gemara answers: Since the Master said in the mishna: However, if one inadvertently poured the contents of the basin of water into the basin of wine or the contents of the basin of wine into the basin of water, he fulfilled his obligation. Then even the basin for water would come to blacken over the course of time as well.
  § The mishna continues: And the two basins were perforated at the bottom with two thin, perforated, nose-like protrusions, one broad and one thin. The Gemara asks: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and not with that of the Rabbis, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: One would pour the water with a vessel that had a capacity of one <i>log</i> on all eight days of the Festival, unlike the wine libation, for which a three-<i>log</i> basin was used. According to his opinion, there is a difference between the capacity of the wine vessel and that of the water vessel; therefore, it is clear why the opening in the wine vessel was broader. As, if the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, they are the same as the capacity of the water basin, three <i>log</i>. Why, then, were there different sized openings?
  The Gemara answers: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the reason for the different-sized openings is that wine is thick and water is thin, and therefore wine flows more slowly than water. In order to ensure that the emptying of both basins would conclude simultaneously, the wine basin required a wider opening.
  So too, it is reasonable to establish that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, unlike the description of the two openings in the mishna as broad and thin, elsewhere he is of the opinion that the openings as wide and narrow, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: There were two small pipes there, one for water and one for wine. The mouth of the pipe for wine was wide and the mouth of the pipe for water was narrow, so that the emptying of both basins would conclude simultaneously. The disparity between wide and narrow is greater than the disparity between broad and thin, thereby facilitating the simultaneous emptying of the three-<i>log</i> and one-<i>log</i> basins according to Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  § The mishna continues: The basin to the west of the altar was for water, and the basin to the east of the altar was for wine, and they would tell the one pouring the water to raise his hand. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one Sadducee priest who poured the water on his feet, and in anger all the people pelted him with their <i>etrogim</i>. And that day, the horn of the altar was damaged as a result of the pelting and the ensuing chaos. They brought a fistful of salt and sealed the damaged section, not because it rendered the altar fit for the Temple service, but in deference to the altar, so that the altar would not be seen in its damaged state.
  
  Daf 49a
  
  As any altar that lacks a ramp, or a horn, or a base, or the shape of a square, either because it was not erected as a square or due to damage, is disqualified for use in the Temple service. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Even the surrounding ledge must be complete, and if it is lacking it disqualifies the altar.
  § Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The drainpipes [<i>shittin</i>] built into the altar and extending beneath it were created from the six days of Creation, as it is stated: “The hidden of your thighs are like the links of a chain, the handiwork of a skilled workman” (Song of Songs 7:2). The Gemara interprets the verse homiletically: “The hidden of your thighs”; these are the drainpipes that are concealed within the altar; “are like the links of a chain [<i>ḥala’im</i>]”; they are hollow [<i>meḥolalin</i>] and descend to the depths; “the handiwork of a skilled workman”; this is the handiwork of the Holy One, Blessed be He. On a similar note, it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael that it is written: “In the beginning [<i>bereshit</i>]” (Genesis 1:1); do not read it as: <i>Bereshit</i>, but rather as: <i>Bara shit</i>, meaning that God created the pipeline descending from the altar.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: These drainpipes are hollow and descend to the depths, as it is stated: “Let me sing of my well beloved, a song of my beloved touching his vineyard. My well beloved had a vineyard in a very fruitful hill, and he dug it, and cleared it of stones, and planted it with the choicest vine, and built a tower in the midst of it, and also hewed out a vat therein” (Isaiah 5:1–2). Rabbi Yosei interprets these verses homiletically as referring to the Temple. “He planted it with the choicest vine”; this is referring to the Temple; “he built a tower therein”; this is referring to the altar; “and hewed out a vat therein”; this is referring to the drainpipes. As the owner of the vineyard is a parable for God, this indicates that the drainpipes are a natural part of Creation.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: There was a small gap between the ramp and the altar west of the ramp, and once in seventy years young priests would descend there and gather from there the congealed wine left over from the libations that set over time, which resembled round cakes of dried and pressed figs. They would then come and burn it in sanctity in the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation of strong drink unto the Lord” (Numbers 28:7);
  
  Daf 49b
  
  just as its pouring is in sanctity, so too must its burning be in sanctity. From where may it be inferred that this is referring to burning? Ravina said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term sanctity written with regard to libations and sanctity written with regard to leftover offerings. It is written here, with regard to libations: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation” (Numbers 28:7), and it is written there, with regard to leftover offerings: “You shall burn the leftovers in fire; they are not to be eaten, for they are sanctity” (Exodus 29:34). Through the verbal analogy it is derived that leftover libations must also be burned.
  The Gemara notes: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in this mishna? With regard to libations, initially, prior to being poured, one can misuse consecrated property with them, as is the case with all consecrated items. However, once they descended to the drainpipes, one does not violate the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property with them, because the mitzva was already fulfilled. Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, who holds that the libations did not descend to the depths but would collect between the ramp and the altar and would be collected once every seventy years. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, how could the libations be misused? Didn’t they already descend to the depths through the drainpipes?
  The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it could be referring to a case where some of the wine landed outside the drainpipes and was collected in the space between the ramp and the altar.
  And some say a different version of this exchange. Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, then the wine that collected between the ramp and the altar remains in its sanctity, as it must be burned, and the prohibition against misuse would still apply. The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, there is no item whose mitzva has been performed with which one can violate the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property. Reish Lakish said: When they pour wine onto the altar, they plug the top of the drainpipes so that the wine does not descend to the depths, in order to fulfill that which is stated: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation of strong drink [<i>shekhar</i>] unto the Lord” (Numbers 28:7).
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this is referring to plugging the drainpipes? Rav Pappa said: <i>Shekhar</i> is an expression of drinking, of satiation, of intoxication. In order to underscore all three aspects of the libations, the space between the altar and the ramp would fill with wine. Rav Pappa said: Conclude from this that when a person is satiated from drinking wine, it is from his throat being filled with wine that he is satiated. Unlike food, wine does not satiate a person when it fills his stomach. Rava said: Therefore, let a young Torah scholar, who does not have much wine, swallow his wine in large swigs, filling his throat each time, as he will thereby maximize his enjoyment. And Rava himself, when drinking a cup of blessing, would swallow large swigs so as to drink the wine accompanying the mitzva in an optimal manner.
  § Apropos the homiletic interpretations of the verses from Song of Songs with regard to the drainpipes, the Gemara cites additional interpretations. Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “How beautiful are your steps in sandals, O prince’s daughter” (Song of Songs 7:2)? How beautiful are the feet of the Jewish people at the time when they ascend to Jerusalem for the Festival. “O prince’s daughter”; this is referring to the daughter of Abraham our Patriarch, who was called prince, as it is stated: “The princes of the peoples are gathered, the people of the God of Abraham” (Psalms 47:10). The verse calls the Jewish people the people of the God of Abraham and not the God of Isaac and Jacob. Why are the Jewish people associated specifically with Abraham? Rather than referring to the three Patriarchs, the verse is referring to the God of Abraham, who was first of the converts, and therefore it is reasonable for the princes of other nations to gather around him.
  In the school of Rav Anan it was taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The hidden of your thighs” (Song of Songs 7:2)? Why are matters of Torah likened to a thigh? It is to tell you that just as the thigh is always concealed, covered by clothes, so too, matters of Torah are optimal when recited in private and not in public.
  And this is what Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “It has been told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord does require of you; only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God” (Micah 6:8)? “To do justly”; this is justice. “To love mercy”; this is acts of kindness. “To walk humbly with your God”; this is referring to taking the indigent dead out for burial and accompanying a poor bride to her wedding canopy, both of which must be performed without fanfare. The Gemara summarizes: And are these matters not inferred <i>a fortiori</i>? If, with regard to matters that tend to be conducted in public, as the multitudes participate in funerals and weddings, the Torah says: Walk humbly, then in matters that tend to be conducted in private, e.g., giving charity and studying Torah, all the more so should they be conducted privately.
  § Rabbi Elazar said: One who performs acts of charity is greater than one who sacrifices all types of offerings, as it is stated: “To perform charity and justice is more acceptable to the Lord than an offering” (Proverbs 21:3), including all types of offerings. And Rabbi Elazar said: Acts of kindness, assisting someone in need, are greater than charity, as it is stated: “Sow to yourselves according to charity, and reap according to kindness” (Hosea 10:12). This means: If a person sows, it is uncertain whether he will eat or whether he will not eat, since much can go wrong before the seed becomes food. However, if a person reaps, he certainly eats. In this verse, charity is likened to sowing, while acts of kindness are likened to reaping.
  And Rabbi Elazar said: The reward for charity is paid from Heaven only in accordance with the kindness and generosity included therein and in accordance with the effort and the consideration that went into the giving. It is not merely in accordance with the sum of money, as it is stated: “Sow to yourselves according to charity, and reap according to kindness.”
  The Sages taught that acts of kindness are superior to charity in three respects: Charity can be performed only with one’s money, while acts of kindness can be performed both with his person and with his money. Charity is given to the poor, while acts of kindness are performed both for the poor and for the rich. Charity is given to the living, while acts of kindness are performed both for the living and for the dead.
  And Rabbi Elazar said: Anyone who performs charity and justice is considered as though he filled the whole world in its entirety with kindness, as it is stated: “He loves charity and justice; the earth is full of the kindness of the Lord” (Psalms 33:5). Lest you say that anyone who comes to leap and perform an act of kindness may simply leap and do so without scrutiny, the verse states: “How precious is your kindness, O God” (Psalms 36:8). It is a precious and rare occurrence to perform an act of kindness properly. One might have thought that even a God-fearing individual does not always encounter the opportunity to perform acts of kindness. Therefore, the verse states: “But the kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him” (Psalms 103:17).
  Rabbi Ḥama bar Pappa said: With regard to any person who has grace about him, it is certain that he is God-fearing, as it is stated: “But the kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him.” When one sees that a certain individual is endowed with grace and kindness, one can be certain that he is a God-fearing person. And Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “She opens her mouth with wisdom, and a Torah of kindness is on her tongue” (Proverbs 31:26)? The Gemara asks: Is there, then, a Torah of kindness and a Torah that is not of kindness? Rather, it is Torah studied for its own sake that is a Torah of kindness, as one studies it wholeheartedly; and it is Torah studied not for its own sake but for some ulterior motive that is a Torah that is not of kindness. Some say that it is Torah studied in order to teach it to others that is a Torah of kindness; it is Torah studied with the intent of not teaching it to others that is a Torah that is not of kindness.
  § The mishna continues: As its performance during the week, so is its performance on Shabbat, except that on Shabbat one would not draw water. Instead, on Shabbat eve, one would fill a golden barrel that was not consecrated and would place it in the Temple chamber, and water would be drawn from there on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And why should one do so? Let him bring the water in a consecrated barrel. Ze’iri said: The <i>tanna</i> in the mishna holds that there is no requisite measure for the water to be poured for libation, and therefore more than three <i>log</i> could be consecrated; and that Temple vessels consecrate their content if it is fit to be consecrated, even without intent to consecrate it.
  
  Daf 50a
  
  And if he brings the water in a consecrated barrel, the water will become disqualified for use in the libation by remaining overnight, just as all consecrated items, e.g., offerings, are rendered unfit after remaining overnight. Ḥizkiya said: Temple vessels consecrate only with specific intent. Therefore, in theory, one could bring water to the Temple in a consecrated vessel, provided he has no intent to consecrate it. And the reason one may not do so is due to a rabbinic decree lest people say, upon seeing the water poured in the morning, that the water was intentionally consecrated. In that case, they might draw the mistaken conclusion that remaining overnight does not disqualify liquids for use in libations.
  Rabbi Yannai said that Rabbi Zeira said: Even if you say that there is a requisite measure for the water to be poured for libation and no more than three <i>log</i> can be consecrated, and that Temple vessels consecrate only with intent, here there is a rabbinic decree lest they say the barrel was filled with water for sanctifying the hands and the feet of the priest, for which there is no measure. Then, when they see the water poured in the morning, they will draw the mistaken conclusion that remaining overnight does not disqualify liquids for use in libations.
  § The mishna continues: If the water in the barrel spilled or was exposed overnight, the water is disqualified. The Gemara asks: Why is the water disqualified? Let him pass it through a strainer, eliminating the poison. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A vessel covered with a strainer is subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure if the vessel is left unsupervised. Rabbi Neḥemya said: When is this so? It is when the lower vessel, in which the liquid collects after passing through the strainer, is exposed. However, if the lower vessel is covered, even if the upper vessel is exposed, it is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, because the poison of a snake is like a sponge in that it floats and stays in place.
  The Gemara answers: Even if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, say that Rabbi Neḥemya said his opinion permitting strained water for a common person. However, did he actually say that strained water is permitted even to be sacrificed to God? Even if it is possible to render this water potable, it is certainly not of the select quality that would render it eligible for use in the Temple service. Isn’t Rabbi Neḥemya of the opinion that it is inappropriate to sacrifice on the altar any item that one would not give to someone of prominent stature? As it is stated: “And when you offer the blind for sacrifice, it is no evil; and when you offer the lame and sick, it is no evil. Present it now unto your governor; will he be pleased with you or will he accept your person, says the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 1:8).
  
  MISHNA: The flute is played on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> for five or six days. This is the flute of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, whose playing overrides neither Shabbat nor the Festival. Therefore, if the first Festival day occurred on Shabbat, they would play the flute for six days that year. However, if Shabbat coincided with one of the intermediate days of the Festival, they would play the flute for only five days.
  
  Daf 50b
  
  GEMARA: It was stated that Rav Yehuda and Rav Eina disagreed: One of them teaches that the celebration was called the Celebration of Drawing [<i>sho’eva</i>] and one of them teaches that it was called the significant [<i>ḥashuva</i>] celebration. Mar Zutra said: The one who taught <i>sho’eva</i> is not mistaken, and the one who taught <i>ḥashuva</i> is not mistaken. The one who taught <i>sho’eva</i> is not mistaken, as it is written: “And you shall draw [<i>ushavtem</i>] water with joy from the wells of salvation” (Isaiah 12:3), and its name reflects the fact that it is a celebration of the water libation. And the one who taught <i>ḥashuva</i> is not mistaken, as Rav Naḥman said: It is a significant mitzva and it originated from the six days of Creation.
  § The Sages taught: The flute overrides Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: It does not override even a Festival. Rav Yosef said: The dispute is with regard to the song that the Levites sang accompanying the daily offering. As Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda holds that the primary essence of song is the accompaniment by musical instruments, and consequently these instruments are a component of the Temple service and override Shabbat. The Rabbis hold that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth, and consequently the instruments are not a component of the service; they merely accompany the singing on occasion and therefore they do not override Shabbat. However, with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water, everyone agrees that it is rejoicing and not a component of the Temple service; therefore it does not override Shabbat.
  Rav Yosef said: From where do I say that they disagree about this matter? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to Temple service vessels that one crafted of wood, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems them unfit and Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda deems them fit. What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this matter? The one who deems the wooden vessel fit holds that the primary essence of song is accompaniment by musical instruments, and we derive that sacred vessels may be crafted of wood from the wooden flute of Moses, which according to this opinion was a service vessel. And the one who deems the wooden vessel unfit holds that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth, and therefore we do not derive any <i>halakha</i> relevant to service vessels from the wooden flute of Moses, as according to this opinion it was not a service vessel. The Gemara rejects this explanation of the <i>baraita</i>.
  No, that is not necessarily the matter that they dispute, as one could say that everyone agrees: The primary essence of song is singing accompanied by musical instruments. And here, it is with regard to whether one derives the possible from the impossible that they disagree. Can one establish a principle that applies in all cases based on a case with a unique aspect? The one who deems wooden service vessels fit holds that one derives the possible, i.e., Temple service vessels, from the impossible, i.e., the flute of Moses. Although there was no alternative to crafting the flute of Moses from wood, one may derive from this that sacred service vessels, even when the alternative to craft them from metal exists, may be crafted from wood. And the one who deems wooden service vessels unfit holds that one does not derive the possible from the impossible.
  And if you wish, say instead in rejection of Rav Yosef’s proof that everyone agrees that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth, and one does not derive the possible from the impossible. And here, it is with regard to deriving the <i>halakhot</i> of the Temple candelabrum by means of the hermeneutic principle of generalizations and details or by means of the principle of amplifications and restrictions that they disagree. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi interprets verses by means of the principle of generalizations and details, and Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda interprets verses by means of the principle of amplifications and restrictions.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi interprets the verse “And you shall make a candelabrum of pure gold: of beaten work shall the candelabrum be made” (Exodus 25:31), by means of the principle of generalizations and details. “And you shall make a candelabrum of,” is a generalization, as the material of the candelabrum is not specified; “pure gold,” that is a detail, limiting the material exclusively to gold; “of beaten work shall the candelabrum be made,” the verse then generalized again. The result is a generalization and a detail and a generalization, from which you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items that are similar to the detail; just as the detail is explicit that the candelabrum is crafted from gold, which is a metal, so too all other materials used in crafting the candelabrum must be of metal. The candelabrum is a prototype for all other Temple service vessels.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, however, who deems wooden Temple service vessels fit, interprets verses by means of the principle of amplifications and restrictions. “And you shall make a candelabrum of,” is an amplification, as the material of the candelabrum is not specified; “pure gold,” is a restriction, limiting the material exclusively to gold; “of beaten work shall the candelabrum be made,” the verse repeated and amplified. The result is amplification and restriction and amplification, from which one derives to amplify all items except for those items most dissimilar to the restriction. What did the verse amplify? It amplified all materials, even wood. And what did the verse exclude with this restriction? It excluded a candelabrum crafted of earthenware.
  Rav Pappa said: Rav Yosef stated that the dispute between Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and the Rabbis concerning whether or not the flute overrides Shabbat and Festivals is based on the significance and the role of song in the sacrifice of offerings.
  
  Daf 51a
  
  This dispute is parallel to another dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a mishna in tractate <i>Arakhin</i>: The Temple musicians were slaves of priests; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: The musicians were not slaves; they were Israelites from the family of the House of Happegarim and the family of the House of Tzipperaya. And they were from the city of Emma’um, and their lineage was sufficiently distinguished that they would marry their daughters to members of the priesthood.
  Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: They were Levites. What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this; that the one who said that the musicians were slaves holds that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth. Since the instrumental music is mere accompaniment, it could be performed by slaves. And the one who said that the musicians were Levites holds that the primary essence of song is accompaniment by musical instruments. Therefore, the musicians were Levites, who were tasked with the song that was part of the Temple service.
  The Gemara asks: And how can you understand the mishna that way? According to that explanation, what does Rabbi Yosei hold? If he holds that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth, then even slaves can also play the instruments. Why then does he require that the musicians be from Israelite families of distinguished lineage? If he holds that the primary essence of song is accompaniment by musical instruments, he should have said: Levites, yes, they may play the instruments, but Israelites, no, they may not.
  Rather, the explanation of the dispute is that everyone agrees that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth and the musical instruments are merely for accompaniment. And it is with regard to this that they disagree: It is that one Sage holds that the event took place in this manner, i.e., slaves played the instruments, and one Sage holds that the event took place in this manner, i.e., Israelite families of distinguished lineage played the instruments.
  The Gemara asks: What practical halakhic difference is there whether one group or another played the instruments? The Gemara answers: It is with regard to whether one elevates a Levite from the platform to the presumptive status of distinguished lineage and eligibility to receive tithes that they disagree. Is it possible to draw the conclusion that a family is of distinguished lineage or eligible to receive tithes based on the fact that a member or ancestor of that family played a musical instrument on the Temple platform?
  The one who said that the musicians were slaves holds that one does not elevate from the platform to the presumptive status of distinguished lineage and eligibility to receive tithes. And the one who said that the musicians were Israelites holds that one elevates a Levite from the platform to the presumptive status of distinguished lineage but not eligibility to receive tithes. And the one who said that the musicians were Levites holds that one elevates a Levite from the platform to the presumptive status of distinguished lineage and eligibility to receive tithes.
  § The Gemara cites an opinion that disagrees with that of Rav Yosef. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: The dispute between Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and the Rabbis is with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda holds that extra rejoicing also overrides Shabbat, and the Rabbis hold that extra rejoicing does not override Shabbat. However, with regard to the song that the Levites sang accompanying an offering, everyone agrees that it is part of the Temple service, and overrides Shabbat.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yosef that the dispute is with regard to the song that the Levites sang accompanying the daily offering: The song of the Drawing of the Water overrides Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: It does not override even the Festival. Apparently, their dispute is with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water. Say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yosef. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say, based on this <i>baraita</i>, that it is with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water alone that they disagree; however, with regard to the song that the Levites sang accompanying the daily offering, everyone says that it overrides Shabbat. If so, let us say that this will be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yosef on two counts. According to Rav Yosef, the dispute is with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water, and not with regard to the song the Levites sang accompanying the daily offering. The above suggestion refutes both aspects of his opinion.
  Rav Yosef could have said to you: They disagree with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water and the same is true for the song that the Levites sang accompanying an offering. And the fact that they disagree specifically with regard to the song of the Drawing of the Water and do not specifically mention the song that the Levites sang accompanying the daily offering is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, that even the song of the Drawing of the Water also overrides Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the mishna: This is the flute of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, which overrides neither Shabbat nor the Festival. By inference, this is the flute that does not override Shabbat; however, the flute that accompanies the daily offering overrides Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna? If we say it is Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, didn’t he say that the song of the Drawing of the Water also overrides Shabbat? Rather, is it not the Rabbis, and say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rav Yosef on two counts. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of the one who said: The primary essence of song is singing accompanied by musical instruments? The Gemara answers: It is as it is written: “And Hezekiah commanded to sacrifice the burnt-offering upon the altar. And when the burnt-offering began, the song of the Lord began also, and the trumpets, together with the instruments of David, king of Israel” (II Chronicles 29:27), indicating that the song of God that accompanies the offering is played by trumpets and other instruments.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of the one who said: The primary essence of song is singing with the mouth? The Gemara answers: It is as it is written: “And it came to pass, when the trumpeters and the singers were as one to make one sound” (II Chronicles 5:13). Since the verse does not mention any musical instrument played with the singing other than the trumpets, and the trumpets were not sounded as accompaniment for the singers, apparently the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth. The trumpets were sounded in order to accompany the sacrifice of the daily and additional offerings with the requisite sounds of <i>tekia</i> and <i>terua</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other <i>tanna</i> too, who holds that the primary essence of song is singing with the mouth, isn’t it written: “And Hezekiah commanded…the song of the Lord began also, and the trumpets, together with the instruments,” indicating that the instruments are the primary essence? The Gemara answers: This is what the verse is saying: “The song of the Lord began,” indicates that the primary essence is with the mouth; “with the instruments of David, King of Israel,” is to sweeten the sound, as the instruments are merely to accompany and enhance the singing.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other <i>tanna</i> too, who holds that the primary essence of song is singing accompanied by musical instruments, isn’t it written: “And it came to pass, when the trumpeters and the singers were as one,” indicating that the primary essence is with the mouth? The Gemara answers: This is what the verse is saying: Through their juxtaposition, one derives that the singers are similar to the trumpeters; just as trumpeters produce their sound with an instrument, so too the singers produce their song with an instrument.
  MISHNA: One who did not see the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water never saw celebration in his days. This was the sequence of events: At the conclusion of the first Festival day the priests and the Levites descended from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, where they would introduce a significant repair, as the Gemara will explain. There were golden candelabra atop poles there in the courtyard. And there were four basins made of gold at the top of each candelabrum. And there were four ladders for each and every pole and there were four children from the priesthood trainees, and in their hands were pitchers with a capacity of 120 <i>log</i> of oil that they would pour into each and every basin. From the worn trousers of the priests and their belts they would loosen and tear strips to use as wicks, and with them they would light the candelabra. And the light from the candelabra was so bright that there was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated from the light of the Place of the Drawing of the Water.
  The pious and the men of action would dance before the people who attended the celebration,
  
  Daf 51b
  
  with flaming torches that they would juggle in their hands, and they would say before them passages of song and praise to God. And the Levites would play on lyres, harps, cymbals, and trumpets, and countless other musical instruments. The musicians would stand on the fifteen stairs that descend from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, corresponding to the fifteen Songs of the Ascents in Psalms, i.e., chapters 120–134, and upon which the Levites stand with musical instruments and recite their song.
  And this was the ceremony of the Water Libation: Two priests stood at the Upper Gate that descends from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, with two trumpets in their hands. When the rooster crowed at dawn, they sounded a <i>tekia</i>, and sounded a <i>terua</i>, and sounded a <i>tekia</i>. When they who would draw the water reached the tenth stair the trumpeters sounded a <i>tekia</i>, and sounded a <i>terua</i>, and sounded a <i>tekia</i>, to indicate that the time to draw water from the Siloam pool had arrived. When they reached the Women’s Courtyard with the basins of water in their hands, the trumpeters sounded a <i>tekia</i>, and sounded a <i>terua</i>, and sounded a <i>tekia</i>.
  When they reached the ground of the Women’s Courtyard, the trumpeters sounded a <i>tekia</i>, and sounded a <i>terua</i>, and sounded a <i>tekia</i>. They continued sounding the trumpets until they reached the gate through which one exits to the east, from the Women’s Courtyard to the eastern slope of the Temple Mount. When they reached the gate through which one exits to the east, they turned from facing east to facing west, toward the Holy of Holies, and said: Our ancestors who were in this place during the First Temple period who did not conduct themselves appropriately, stood “with their backs toward the Sanctuary of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; and they worshipped the sun toward the east” (Ezekiel 8:16), and we, our eyes are to God. Rabbi Yehuda says that they would repeat and say: We are to God, and our eyes are to God.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: One who did not see the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, never saw celebration in his life. One who did not see Jerusalem in its glory, never saw a beautiful city. One who did not see the Temple in its constructed state, never saw a magnificent structure. The Gemara asks: What is the Temple building to which the Sages refer? Abaye said, and some say that it was Rav Ḥisda who said: This is referring to the magnificent building of Herod, who renovated the Second Temple.
  The Gemara asks: With what materials did he construct it? Rava said: It was with stones of green-gray marble and white marble [<i>marmara</i>]. Some say: It was with stones of blue marble and white marble. The rows of stones were set with one row slightly protruded and one row slightly indented, so that the plaster would take better. He thought to plate the Temple with gold, but the Sages said to him: Leave it as is, and do not plate it, as it is better this way, as with the different colors and the staggered arrangement of the rows of stones, it has the appearance of waves of the sea.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who did not see the great synagogue [<i>deyofloston</i>] of Alexandria of Egypt never saw the glory of Israel. They said that its structure was like a large basilica [<i>basileki</i>], with a colonnade within a colonnade. At times there were six hundred thousand men and another six hundred thousand men in it, twice the number of those who left Egypt. In it there were seventy-one golden chairs [<i>katedraot</i>], corresponding to the seventy-one members of the Great Sanhedrin, each of which consisted of no less than twenty-one thousand talents of gold. And there was a wooden platform at the center. The sexton of the synagogue would stand on it, with the scarves in his hand. And because the synagogue was so large and the people could not hear the communal prayer, when the prayer leader reached the conclusion of a blessing requiring the people to answer amen, the sexton waved the scarf and all the people would answer amen.
  And the members of the various crafts would not sit mingled. Rather, the goldsmiths would sit among themselves, and the silversmiths among themselves, and the blacksmiths among themselves, and the coppersmiths among themselves, and the weavers among themselves. And when a poor stranger entered there, he would recognize people who plied his craft, and he would turn to join them there. And from there he would secure his livelihood as well as the livelihood of the members of his household, as his colleagues would find him work in that craft.
  After depicting the glory of the synagogue, the Gemara relates that Abaye said: All of the people who congregated in that synagogue were killed by Alexander the Great of Macedonia. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they were punished and killed? It is due to the fact that they violated the prohibition with regard to Egypt in this verse: “You shall henceforth return no more that way” (Deuteronomy 17:16), and they returned. Since they established their permanent place of residence in Egypt, they were punished.
  When Alexander arrived, he found them, and saw that they were reading the verse in the Torah scroll: “The Lord will bring a nation against you from far, from the end of the earth, as the vulture swoops down; a nation whose tongue you shall not understand” (Deuteronomy 28:49). He said, referring to himself: Now, since that man sought to come by ship in ten days, and a wind carried it and the ship arrived in only five days, apparently the verse referring a vulture swooping down is referring to me and heavenly forces are assisting me. Immediately, he set upon them and slaughtered them.
  § The mishna continues: At the conclusion of the first Festival day, etc., the priests and the Levites descended from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, where they would introduce a significant repair. The Gemara asks: What is this significant repair? Rabbi Elazar said that it is like that which we learned: The walls of the Women’s Courtyard were smooth, without protrusions, initially. Subsequently, they affixed protrusions to the wall surrounding the Women’s Courtyard. Each year thereafter, for the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, they placed wooden planks on these projections and surrounded the courtyard with a balcony [<i>gezuztra</i>]. And they instituted that the women should sit above and the men below.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Initially, women would stand on the inside of the Women’s Courtyard, closer to the Sanctuary to the west, and the men were on the outside in the courtyard and on the rampart. And they would come to conduct themselves with inappropriate levity in each other’s company, as the men needed to enter closer to the altar when the offerings were being sacrificed and as a result they would mingle with the women. Therefore, the Sages instituted that the women should sit on the outside and the men on the inside, and still they would come to conduct themselves with inappropriate levity. Therefore, they instituted in the interest of complete separation that the women would sit above and the men below.
  The Gemara asks: How could one do so, i.e., alter the structure of the Temple? But isn’t it written with regard to the Temple: “All this I give you in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by His hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern” (I Chronicles 28:19), meaning that all the structural plans of the Temple were divinely inspired; how could the Sages institute changes?
  Rav said: They found a verse, and interpreted it homiletically and acted accordingly:
  
  Daf 52a
  
  It is stated: “The land will eulogize, each family separately; the family of the house of David separately, and their women separately, the family of the house of Nathan separately, and their women separately” (Zechariah 12:12). This indicates that at the end of days a great eulogy will be organized during which men and women will be separate. They said: And are these matters not inferred <i>a fortiori</i>? If in the future, at the end of days referred to in this prophecy, when people are involved in a great eulogy and consequently the evil inclination does not dominate them, as typically during mourning inappropriate thoughts and conduct are less likely, and nevertheless the Torah says: Men separately and women separately; then now that they are involved in the Celebration of the Drawing of the Water, and as such the evil inclination dominates them, since celebration lends itself to levity, all the more so should men and women be separate.
  Apropos the eulogy at the end of days, the Gemara asks: For what is the nature of this eulogy? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Dosa and the Rabbis disagree concerning this matter. One said that this eulogy is for Messiah ben Yosef who was killed in the war of Gog from the land of Magog prior to the ultimate redemption with the coming of Messiah ben David. And one said that this eulogy is for the evil inclination that was killed.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that the lament is for Messiah ben Yosef who was killed, this would be the meaning of that which is written in that context: “And they shall look unto Me because they have thrust him through; and they shall mourn for him, as one mourns for his only son” (Zechariah 12:10). However, according to the one who said that the eulogy is for the evil inclination that was killed, does one need to conduct a eulogy for this? On the contrary, one should conduct a celebration. Why, then, did they cry?
  The Gemara answers: This can be understood as Rabbi Yehuda taught: In the future, at the end of days, God will bring the evil inclination and slaughter it in the presence of the righteous and in the presence of the wicked. For the righteous the evil inclination appears to them as a high mountain, and for the wicked it appears to them as a mere strand of hair. These weep and those weep. The righteous weep and say: How were we able to overcome so high a mountain? And the wicked weep and say: How were we unable to overcome this strand of hair? And even the Holy One, Blessed be He, will wonder with them, as it is stated with regard to the eulogy: “So says the Lord of hosts: If it be wondrous in the eyes of the remnant of this people in those days, it should also be wondrous in My eyes” (Zechariah 8:6).
  Apropos the evil inclination and the battle against it, the Gemara cites that which Rav Asi said: Initially, when it begins to entice someone, the evil inclination is like a strand of a spider’s web [<i>bukhya</i>]; and ultimately it is like the thick ropes of a wagon, as it is stated: “Woe unto them that draw iniquity with cords of vanity, and sin as if it were with a wagon rope” (Isaiah 5:18). Initially, the enticement is almost imperceptible, like a thin strand; however, after one sins, it is like wagon ropes tied tightly around him.
  The Sages taught: To Messiah ben David, who is destined to be revealed swiftly in our time, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: Ask of Me anything and I will give you whatever you wish, as it is stated: “I will tell of the decree; the Lord said unto me: You are My son, this day have I begotten you, ask of Me, and I will give the nations for your inheritance, and the ends of the earth for your possession” (Psalms 2:7–8). Once the Messiah ben David saw Messiah ben Yosef, who was killed, he says to the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, I ask of you only life; that I will not suffer the same fate. The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to him: Life? Even before you stated this request, your father, David, already prophesied about you with regard to this matter precisely, as it is stated: “He asked life of You, You gave it to him; even length of days for ever and ever” (Psalms 21:5).
  § Rabbi Avira, and some say Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, taught: The evil inclination has seven names. The Holy One, Blessed be He, called it evil, as it is stated: “For the inclination of a man’s heart is evil from his youth” (Genesis 8:21). Moses called it uncircumcised, as it is stated: “And circumcise the foreskin of your hearts” (Deuteronomy 10:16). David called it impure, as it is stated: “Create for me a pure heart, O God” (Psalms 51:12); by inference, there is an impure heart that is the evil inclination.
  Solomon called it enemy, as it is stated: “If your enemy is hungry, give him bread to eat, and if he is thirsty, give him water to drink; for you will heap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord will reward you” (Proverbs 25:21–22). Do not read it as: And the Lord will reward you [<i>yeshalem lakh</i>]; rather read it as: And the Lord will reconcile it to you [<i>yashlimenu lakh</i>]. God will cause the evil inclination to love you and no longer seek to entice you to sin.
  Isaiah called it a stumbling block, as it is stated: “And He will say: Cast you up, cast you up, clear the way, take up the stumbling block out of the way of My people” (Isaiah 57:14). Ezekiel called it stone, as it is stated: “And I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh” (Ezekiel 36:26). Joel called it hidden one, as it says: “But I will remove the northern one [<i>hatzefoni</i>] far off from you” (Joel 2:20). The Sages taught concerning the verse: “But I will remove the northern one [<i>hatzefoni</i>] far off from you,” that this is referring to the evil inclination. And why is the evil inclination referred to as <i>tzefoni</i>? It is due to the fact that it is always hidden [<i>tzafun</i>] in the heart of man.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues interpreting the verse in the book of Joel. “And will drive it to a land barren and desolate” (Joel 2:20), where there are no people for the evil inclination to incite. And what damage does the evil inclination cause? “With its face toward the eastern [<i>hakadmoni</i>] sea” (Joel 2:20), as it set its eyes on the First [<i>mukdam</i>] Temple and destroyed it, and killed the Torah scholars that were in it; “and its end toward the western [<i>ha’aḥaron</i>] sea” (Joel 2:20), as it set its eyes on the Second [<i>aḥaron</i>] Temple and destroyed it, and killed the Torah scholars that were in it; “its foulness may come up, and its ill odor may come up” (Joel 2:20), as it forsakes the nations of the world and incites the enemies of the Jewish people: In this context, the term the nations is a euphemism for the Jewish people. The evil inclination seeks to corrupt the Jews more than it does the members of any other nation. “Because it has done greatly” (Joel 2:20): Abaye said: And it provokes Torah scholars more than it provokes everyone else.
  The Gemara illustrates that point. It is like this incident, as Abaye once heard a certain man say to a certain woman: Let us rise early and go on the road. Upon hearing this, Abaye said to himself: I will go and accompany them and prevent them from violating the prohibition that they certainly intend to violate. He went after them for a distance of three parasangs in a marsh among the reeds, while they walked on the road, and they did not engage in any wrongful activity. When they were taking leave of each other, he heard that they were saying: We traveled a long distance together, and the company was pleasant company.
  Abaye said: In that situation, if instead of that man it had been one whom I hate, a euphemism for himself, he would not have been able to restrain himself from sinning. After becoming aware of so great a shortcoming he went and leaned against the doorpost, thinking and feeling regret. A certain Elder came and taught him: Anyone who is greater than another, his evil inclination is greater than his. Therefore, Abaye should not feel regret, as his realization is a consequence of his greatness.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A person’s inclination overcomes him each day, as it is stated: “Only
  
  Daf 52b
  
  evil all day” (Genesis 6:5). All day long his thoughts and desires are for evil. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: A person’s evil inclination overcomes him each day and seeks to kill him, as it stated: “The wicked watches the righteous and seeks to kill him” (Psalms 37:32); the wicked here is referring to the wickedness inside one’s heart. And if not for the Holy One, Blessed be He, Who assists him with the good inclination, he would not overcome it, as it is stated: “The Lord will not leave him in his hand, nor suffer him to be condemned when he is judged” (Psalms 37:33).
  The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: If this scoundrel, the evil inclination, accosted you, seeking to tempt you to sin, drag it to the study hall and study Torah. If it is like a stone, it will be dissolved by the Torah. If it is like iron, it will be shattered. The Gemara elaborates: If it is like stone, it will be dissolved, as it is written: “Ho, everyone who is thirsty, come you for the water” (Isaiah 55:1), water in this context meaning Torah; and it is written: “Stones were worn by water” (Job 14:19). If it is like iron, it will be shattered, as it is written: “Is not My word like fire, says the Lord; and like a hammer that shatters rock” (Jeremiah 23:29).
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The evil inclination incites a person to sin in this world, and then testifies against him in the next world, as it is stated: “He that delicately brings up his servant from a child shall have him become a master [<i>manon</i>] at the last” (Proverbs 29:21). Initially, in one’s youth, the evil inclination, which should have been enslaved to him, takes control of him and causes him to sin. Then, ultimately, that same evil inclination becomes his <i>manon</i>. <i>Manon</i> means witness, as in Rabbi Ḥiyya’s coded alphabet in which <i>alef</i> and <i>tet</i> and <i>beit</i> and <i>ḥet</i>, etc., are interchanged. Witness [<i>sahada</i>] is called <i>manon</i>. The letters <i>mem</i> and <i>samekh</i>, <i>nun</i> and <i>heh</i>, and <i>vav</i> and <i>dalet</i> are interchanged with other letters.
  Rav Huna raised a contradiction between two verses. It is written: “For the spirit of harlotry caused them to err” (Hosea 4:12), indicating that this spirit was a temporary phenomenon and not an integral part of their persona. And it is also written: “For the spirit of harlotry is within them” (Hosea 5:4), indicating that it is an integral part of their persona. The Gemara explains: Initially, it causes them to err from without, and ultimately, it is from within them.
  Rava said: Initially, the verse called the evil inclination a traveler coming from afar. Subsequently, the verse calls it a guest, as one welcomes it. Ultimately, the verse calls it man, indicating significance, as it became the homeowner. As it is stated in the parable of the poor man’s lamb that Nathan the prophet said to David: “And there came a traveler to the rich man, and he was reluctant to take of his own flock and of his own herd, to prepare for the guest” (II Samuel 12:4). And it is written in the same verse: “And he took the poor man’s lamb, and prepared it for the man that was come to him.” In other words, the evil inclination that began as a traveler gradually rose in prominence.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A man has a small organ used in sexual relations. If he starves the organ, and does not overindulge, it is satiated; however, if he satiates the organ and overindulges in sexual relations, it is starving, and desires more, as it is stated: “When they were fed, they became full, they were filled, and their heart was exalted; therefore have they forgotten Me” (Hosea 13:6).
  Rav Ḥana bar Aḥa said that the Sages in the school of Rav say: There are four creations that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created, yet He, as it were, regrets that He created them, as they do more harm than good. And these are they: Exile, Chaldeans, and Ishmaelites, and the evil inclination. Exile, as it is written: “Now therefore, for what am I here, says the Lord, seeing that My people is taken away for naught” (Isaiah 52:5). God Himself is asking: For what am I here? Chaldeans, as it is written: “Behold the land of the Chaldeans, this is the people that was not” (Isaiah 23:13), meaning, if only they never were.
  Ishmaelites, as it is written: “The tents of robbers prosper, and they that provoke God are secure, in whatsoever God brings with His hand” (Job 12:6). God brought upon Himself these Arabs that dwell in the deserts in tents. The evil inclination, as it is written: “On that day, says the Lord, will I assemble her that is lame, and I will gather her that is driven away, and her that I corrupted” (Micah 4:6). God is saying that He created the evil inclination that led the people to sin and to be cast into exile.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Were it not for these three verses that follow that indicate that God controls people’s hearts, the legs of the enemies of the Jewish people, a euphemism for the Jewish people themselves, would have collapsed, unable to withstand the repercussions of their sins. One, as it is written: “And her that I corrupted,” indicating God’s regret for doing so. And one, as it is written: “Behold, as the clay in the potter’s hand, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel” (Jeremiah 18:6). And the other verse: “And I will take away the heart of stone out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh” (Ezekiel 36:26), indicating that the matter is not solely in human hands, but in the hands of God as well.
  Rav Pappa said: It is derived from this verse as well: “And I will put My spirit within you, and cause you to walk in My statutes, and you shall keep My ordinances, and do them” (Ezekiel 36:27).
  § Apropos the end of days, the Gemara cites another verse and interprets it homiletically. It is stated: “The Lord then showed me four craftsmen” (Zechariah 2:3). Who are these four craftsmen? Rav Ḥana bar Bizna said that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida said: They are Messiah ben David, Messiah ben Yosef, Elijah, and the righteous High Priest, who will serve in the Messianic era. Rav Sheshet raised an objection: If so, if that is the identity of the four craftsmen, then that which is written in the previous verse: “And he said to me: These are the horns that scattered Judea” (Zechariah 2:4), is difficult; these four in the first verse are coming for their enemies, and are not redeemers.
  Rav Ḥana said to Rav Sheshet: Go to the end of the verse: “These then are come to frighten them, to cast down the horns of the nations, which lifted up their horn against the land of Judah to scatter it.” This indicates that the horns refer to the nations that exiled the Jewish people and that the four craftsmen will hurl those horns aside. Rav Sheshet said to him: Why should I disagree with Rav Ḥana in matters of <i>aggada</i>, where he is more expert than I, and I cannot prevail?
  The Gemara continues homiletically interpreting verses that relate to the end of days. It is stated: “And this shall be peace: When the Assyrian shall come into our land, and when he shall tread in our palaces, then shall we raise against him seven shepherds, and eight princes among men” (Micah 5:4). The Gemara asks: Who are these seven shepherds? The Gemara explains: David is in the middle; Adam, Seth, and Methuselah are to his right; Abraham, Jacob, and Moses are to his left. And who are the eight princes among men? They are Yishai, Saul, Samuel, Amos, Zephania, Zedekiah, Messiah, and Elijah.
  § The mishna continues: And there were four ladders for each pole. One of the Sages taught: The height of the candelabrum upon the pole is fifty cubits. And there were four children from the priesthood trainees holding and in their hands jugs of oil with a capacity of 120 <i>log</i> of oil. A dilemma was raised: Was it 120 <i>log</i> altogether, or perhaps each and every child carried that amount? Come and hear proof from this <i>baraita</i>: And in their hands were jugs of oil, each with a capacity of thirty <i>log</i>, that were all together 120 <i>log</i>.
  One of the Sages taught: And these young priests who held the pitchers were superior in strength to the son of Marta, daughter of Baitos, who was a priest renowned for his might. They said about the son of Marta, daughter of Baitos, that he would take two thighs of a large bull that was so large that it would be purchased for one thousand <i>zuz</i>, and walk up the ramp in small steps, heel to toe, without hurrying, due to his strength. However, his brethren the priests would not allow him do so, due to the principle: “In the multitude of people is the King’s glory” (Proverbs 14:28). The more priests engaged in the Temple service, the greater glory for God. Therefore, it is preferable for the thighs to be carried to the altar by multiple priests.
  The Gemara asks: In what sense were these young priests superior? If we say it is due to the weight of the pitchers that they carried, these two thighs are heavier than the thirty <i>log</i> of oil. The Gemara answers: Rather, the difference is that there, in the case of the son of Marta, he walked on a ramp that was wide, and with a moderate gradient of only one cubit every four cubits of length, and it is not steep; here they climbed ladders, and those are very steep.
  § The mishna continues: And there was not a courtyard in Jerusalem that was not illuminated from the light of the Place of the Drawing of the Water. One of the Sages taught:
  
  Daf 53a
  
  It was so bright that a woman would be able to sort wheat by the light of the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water.
  § The mishna continues: The pious and the men of action would dance before the people who attended the celebration. The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that some of them would say in their song praising God: Happy is our youth, as we did not sin then, that did not embarrass our old age. These are the pious and the men of action, who spent all their lives engaged in Torah and mitzvot. And some would say: Happy is our old age, that atoned for our youth when we sinned. These are the penitents. Both these and those say: Happy is he who did not sin; and he who sinned should repent and God will absolve him.
  It is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: They said about Hillel the Elder that when he was rejoicing at the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water he said this: If I am here, everyone is here; and if I am not here, who is here? In other words, one must consider himself as the one upon whom it is incumbent to fulfill obligations, and he must not rely on others to do so. He would also say this: To the place that I love, there my feet take me, and therefore, I come to the Temple. And the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: If you come to My house, I will come to your house; if you do not come to My house, I will not come to your house, as it is stated: “In every place that I cause My name to be mentioned, I will come to you and bless you” (Exodus 20:20).
  The Gemara cites another statement of Hillel the Elder. Additionally, he saw one skull that was floating on the water and he said to it: Because you drowned others, they drowned you, and those that drowned you will be drowned. That is the way of the world; everyone is punished measure for measure. Apropos following one’s feet, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The feet of a person are responsible for him; to the place where he is in demand, there they lead him.
  The Gemara relates with regard to these two Cushites who would stand before Solomon: “Elihoreph and Ahijah, the sons of Shisha” (I Kings 4:3), and they were scribes of Solomon. One day Solomon saw that the Angel of Death was sad. He said to him: Why are you sad? He said to him: They are asking me to take the lives of these two Cushites who are sitting here. Solomon handed them to the demons in his service, and sent them to the district of Luz, where the Angel of Death has no dominion. When they arrived at the district of Luz, they died.
  The following day, Solomon saw that the Angel of Death was happy. He said to him: Why are you happy? He replied: In the place that they asked me to take them, there you sent them. The Angel of Death was instructed to take their lives in the district of Luz. Since they resided in Solomon’s palace and never went to Luz, he was unable to complete his mission. That saddened him. Ultimately, Solomon dispatched them to Luz, enabling the angel to accomplish his mission. That pleased him. Immediately, Solomon began to speak and said: The feet of a person are responsible for him; to the place where he is in demand, there they lead him.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They said about Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that when he would rejoice at the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, he would take eight flaming torches and toss one and catch another, juggling them, and, though all were in the air at the same time, they would not touch each other. And when he would prostrate himself, he would insert his two thumbs into the ground, and bow, and kiss the floor of the courtyard and straighten, and there was not any other creature that could do that due to the extreme difficulty involved. And this was the form of bowing called <i>kidda</i> performed by the High Priest.
  The Gemara relates: Levi demonstrated a <i>kidda</i> before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and strained his thigh and came up lame. The Gemara asks: And is that what caused him to be lame? But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: One should never speak impertinently toward God above; as a great person once spoke impertinently toward God above, and even though his prayers were answered, he was still punished and came up lame. And who was this great person? It was Levi. Apparently his condition was not caused by his bow. The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction. Both this and that caused him to come up lame; because he spoke impertinently toward God, he therefore was injured when exerting himself in demonstrating <i>kidda</i>.
  Apropos the rejoicing of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel at the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, the Gemara recounts: Levi would walk before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi juggling with eight knives. Shmuel would juggle before King Shapur with eight glasses of wine without spilling. Abaye would juggle before Rabba with eight eggs. Some say he did so with four eggs. All these were cited.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya said: When we would rejoice in the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water, we did not see sleep in our eyes the entire Festival. How so? In the first hour of the day, the daily morning offering was sacrificed and everyone came to watch. From there they proceeded to engage in prayer in the synagogue; from there, to watch the sacrifice of the additional offerings; from there, to the synagogue to recite the additional prayer. From there they would proceed to the study hall to study Torah; from there to the eating and drinking in the <i>sukka</i>; from there to the afternoon prayer. From there they would proceed to the daily afternoon offering in the Temple. From this point forward, they proceeded to the Celebration of the Place of the Drawing of the Water.
  The Gemara wonders: Is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: One who took an oath that I will not sleep three days, one flogs him immediately for taking an oath in vain, and he may sleep immediately because it is impossible to stay awake for three days uninterrupted. Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehoshua is saying: We did not experience the sense of actual sleep, because they would merely doze on each other’s shoulders. In any case, they were not actually awake for the entire week.
  § The mishna continues: The musicians would stand on the fifteen stairs that descend from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, corresponding to the fifteen Songs of the Ascents in Psalms. Rav Ḥisda said to one of the Sages who was organizing <i>aggada</i> before him: Did you hear with regard to these fifteen Songs of Ascents in Psalms, corresponding to what did David say them? He said to him that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: At the time that David dug the drainpipes in the foundation of the Temple, the waters of the depths rose and sought to inundate the world. Immediately, David recited the fifteen Songs of the Ascents and caused them to subside. Rav Ḥisda asked: If so, should they be called fifteen Songs of the Ascents? They should have been called Songs of the Descents.
  Rav Ḥisda continued and said to him: Since you reminded me of this matter, this is what was originally stated: At the time that David dug the drainpipes, the waters of the depths rose and sought to inundate the world. David said: Is there anyone who knows whether it is permitted to write the sacred name
  
  Daf 53b
  
  on an earthenware shard? If it is permitted, we will write it and throw it into the depths, and they will subside. There was no one who said anything to him. David said: Anyone who knows what to say and does not say anything may he be strangled in his throat. Then Ahithophel raised an <i>a fortiori</i> argument on his own and said: And just as in order to make peace between a man and his wife in the case of <i>sota</i>, when the husband suspects his wife of having committed adultery, the Torah said: My Name that was written in sanctity will be erased on the water to establish peace for the whole world in its entirety, all the more so it is permitted. He said to David: It is permitted.
  He wrote the sacred name on an earthenware shard and cast it into the depths, and the waters in the depths subsided sixteen thousand cubits. When he saw that they subsided excessively, he said: The higher the waters in the aquifers, the moister and more fertile the soil of the world. He recited the fifteen Songs of the Ascents and elevated them fifteen thousand cubits, and established them at a depth of one thousand cubits. Ulla said: Learn from here that the thickness of the earth above the waters of the depths is one thousand cubits. The Gemara asks: But don’t we see that when we dig a little, significantly less than one thousand cubits, water emerges? Rav Mesharshiyya said: That is from the ascent of the Euphrates River, which flows at a higher altitude than do other rivers. The water flows up through underground passages to reach the river. That is why water emerges when one digs in the hills of Babylonia.
  § The mishna continues: And two priests stood with two trumpets at the Upper Gate that descends from the Israelites’ courtyard to the Women’s Courtyard, and when those drawing the water reached the tenth stair they sounded the trumpets. Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: Does the phrase reached the tenth stair mean that he would descend five stairs and stand on the tenth from the bottom? Or perhaps it means that he would descend ten stairs and stand on the fifth from the bottom? The Gemara notes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  The mishna describes: When they reached the gate through which one exits to the east, they turned from facing east to facing west toward the Holy of Holies, and said: Our ancestors who were in this place during the First Temple period did not conduct themselves appropriately and stood “with their backs toward the Sanctuary of the Lord, and their faces toward the east; and they worshipped the sun toward the east” (Ezekiel 8:16), and we, our eyes are to God. The Sages taught: By inference, from the fact that it is stated: “And their faces toward the east,” don’t I know that “their backs were toward the Sanctuary of the Lord”? The Sanctuary was to the west.
  Rather, to what purpose does the verse state: “Their backs toward the Sanctuary of the Lord”? It is an allusion to the fact that in addition to turning their backs on the Sanctuary of the Lord, they performed an additional evil. It teaches that they would expose themselves and defecate downward, a euphemism for the direction of the Divine Presence.
  The mishna continues: In the Second Temple period they would say: We are to God, and to God are our eyes. The Gemara asks: Is that so? May one pray in that manner? Didn’t Rabbi Zeira say: One who repeats himself while reciting <i>Shema</i> and says: Listen, listen, is like one who says: We give thanks, we give thanks, and he is silenced, as it appears that he is worshipping two authorities. How then did they recite God’s name twice, consecutively? Rather, this is what they said: They bow toward the east, while we give thanks to God, and our eyes turn in hope to God, so that they would not recite God’s name consecutively.
  MISHNA: One sounds no fewer than twenty-one trumpet blasts in the Temple, and one sounds no more than forty-eight. The mishna elaborates: Each day there were twenty-one trumpet blasts in the Temple: Three blasts were sounded for the opening of the gates in the morning, nine for the daily morning offering, and nine for the daily afternoon offering, totaling twenty-one. And on a day when the additional offerings were sacrificed, e.g., the New Moon, with the additional offerings they would add nine additional blasts.
  And on Shabbat eve they would add six blasts sounded adjacent to the onset of Shabbat: Three to stop the people from their labor, as the blasts inform the people that Shabbat is approaching and they stop working, and three at the onset of Shabbat to demarcate between sacred and profane.
  On Shabbat eve during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, there were forty-eight blasts. How so? Three in the morning for the opening of the gates; three for the upper gate; and three for the lower gate; and three for the filling of the vessel with water, as described in the sequence of the ritual of drawing the water for the water libation (48b); and three when pouring the water libation upon the altar; nine for the daily morning offering; and nine for the daily afternoon offering; and nine for the additional offerings; three to stop the people from work; and three more to demarcate between sacred and profane, totaling forty-eight blasts.
  GEMARA: The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: The one who seeks to minimize the number of blasts shall not minimize their number to fewer than seven blasts. And one who seeks to add to the number of blasts shall not add beyond sixteen. The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda holds: A series of blasts consisting of <i>tekia</i>, <i>terua</i>, <i>tekia</i> is counted as one blast. And the Rabbis hold: A <i>tekia</i> is counted separately and a <i>terua</i> is counted separately. They agree with regard to the sequence and the number of the blasts, and disagree only with regard to how the blasts are tallied.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as the verse states: “And you shall sound [<i>utkatem</i>] a <i>terua</i>” (Numbers 10:5), and it is written: “A <i>terua</i> they will sound [<i>yitke’u</i>]” (Numbers 10:6). How is it that the Torah uses a verb from the root of <i>tekia</i> to describe the sounding of a <i>terua</i>? Apparently, a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> together compose one blast. And how do the Rabbis interpret these verses? This comes to teach that each <i>terua</i> blast is accompanied by a plain unembellished blast, a <i>tekia</i>, preceding it and following it. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yehuda derive that each <i>terua</i> must be accompanied by a <i>tekia</i> preceding it and following it? The Gemara explains: He derives it from the verse when it says: “And you shall sound [<i>utkatem</i>] a <i>terua</i> a second time” (Numbers 10:6), indicating an additional <i>tekia</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis? It is as it is written: “And when congregating the people you shall sound a <i>tekia</i> and shall not sound a <i>terua</i>” (Numbers 10:7). And if it enters your mind that a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> are considered one blast, would the Merciful One say to perform half a mitzva and not to perform the other half of the mitzva? Apparently, each is a separate mitzva. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda interpret the verse? The Gemara answers: That single <i>tekia</i> mentioned in the context of congregating the people came merely as a signal to the camps and was not for the purpose of fulfilling the mitzva, which, in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, always comes in groups of three.
  And how do the Rabbis counter that assertion? They say: Indeed, it is a signal to assemble the people; however, the Merciful One rendered it a mitzva. Therefore, one can derive that a single <i>tekia</i> blast is a distinct mitzva. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement of Rav Kahana: There is no pause between a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> at all and they are sounded in one continuous blast? In accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: If Rav Kahana’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; that is obvious. Why was it necessary for the Gemara to raise the matter at all?
  
  Daf 54a
  
  The Gemara answers: It is not obvious that Rav Kahana’s statement was stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Lest you say that Rav Kahana’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that he is coming to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: If one heard nine blasts in nine different hours on the day of Rosh HaShana, despite the considerable gap between them, he fulfilled his obligation. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that Rav Kahana holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda alone and he does not allow even a brief pause between the sounds of the <i>shofar</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And say it is indeed so that Rav Kahana holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and he merely comes to exclude the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara answers: If so, what is the meaning of the phrase: At all, in Rav Kahana’s statement: There is no pause between a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> at all? This indicates that Rav Kahana does not allow even a slight pause between blasts, and that could be only in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.
  § The mishna enumerates the number of blasts sounded on Shabbat eve during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. Among those blasts were three sounded when pouring the water libation upon the altar. The Gemara infers: However, the mishna is not teaching that the trumpet blasts were sounded when the person carrying the water reached the tenth stair. According to whose opinion is the mishna? It is according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Three blasts were sounded when arriving at the tenth stair. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Three blasts were sounded when pouring the water libation upon the altar.
  The Gemara explains: The one who says that the trumpets were sounded upon arriving at the tenth stair does not say that they sounded the trumpets when pouring the water libation upon the altar; and the one who says that they sounded the trumpets when pouring the water libation upon the altar does not say that the trumpets were sounded upon arriving at the tenth stair.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? The Gemara answers: Since he sounded the trumpet for the opening of the gates, for what do I need to sound it again when arriving at the tenth stair? That is not a gate. Therefore, it is preferable to sound the trumpets when pouring the water libation upon the altar. And the Rabbis hold that since he sounded the trumpets for the filling of the vessel with the water, why do I need an additional trumpet blast when pouring the water libation upon the altar? Therefore, it is preferable to sound the trumpets when arriving at the tenth stair.
  § When Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina came from the south of Eretz Yisrael, from Judea, he brought a <i>baraita</i> with him that he received from the Sages there. It is written: “And the children of Aaron, the priests, will sound the trumpets” (Numbers 10:8). There is no need for the verse to state: “Shall sound,” as it is already stated: “And you shall sound the trumpets for your burnt-offerings and your peace-offerings” (Numbers 10:10). And what then is the meaning when the verse states: “Shall sound”? It appears to be teaching a new <i>halakha</i>; it is all according to the additional offerings that one sounds trumpet blasts. The Gemara notes: Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina teaches the <i>baraita</i>, and he said its explanation: The verse comes to say that one sounds trumpet blasts for each and every additional offering in and of itself.
  The Gemara asks: We learned in the mishna: On Shabbat eve during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> there were forty-eight blasts, and that was the highest number of blasts sounded on any day in the Temple. And if it is so, Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says: Let the mishna teach the case of Shabbat during the Festival, when you find that there are fifty-one blasts, including additional blasts for the additional offerings of Shabbat. Rabbi Zeira said: Although based on the <i>baraita</i> taught by Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina there would indeed be additional blasts for the additional offerings of Shabbat, they would total forty-eight blasts, because one does not sound the three blasts for the opening of the gates on Shabbat; those blasts were merely a signal.
  Rava said: Who is this who is not concerned about the flour that his mill is producing, i.e., who is making unconsidered statements? First, the mishna contradicts the explanation of Rabbi Zeira, as, with regard to the order of the blasts, including those for the opening of the gates, we learned that this was the practice each day, including Shabbat. And furthermore, even if they are equal to each other, i.e., the same number of blasts were sounded on Shabbat during the Festival and on Friday during the Festival, let the mishna teach: On Shabbat during the Festival there are forty-eight blasts. You would learn two matters from that case: You would learn from it that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov that the trumpets are not sounded at the tenth step but when pouring the water libation upon the altar. And you would learn from it that <i>halakha</i> of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, that the trumpet is sounded for each and every additional offering.
  Rather, Rava said: The reason that the number of offerings on Shabbat during the Festival does not exceed forty-eight is because one does not sound the trumpet for filling the vessels with water on Shabbat, as the mishna stated that they did not draw water from the Siloam pool on Shabbat. Therefore, the blasts sounded on Shabbat during the Festival were considerably fewer than those sounded on Friday. The Gemara asks: And let the mishna also teach the case of Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat, as in that case there are three additional offerings: The additional offering of Rosh HaShana, the additional offering of the New Moon, and the additional offering of Shabbat. The total would be forty-eight blasts. The fact that the mishna did not cite this case indicates that it is contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina.
  The Gemara rejects that conclusion. The reason that the mishna did not cite the case of Rosh HaShana is that the <i>tanna</i> held that the case of Shabbat eve during the Festival is necessary in order to teach that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov that one does not sound the trumpet at the tenth stair. The Gemara asks: Is anyone saying: Let the <i>tanna</i> teach this case and let him not teach that case? Let him teach this case and let him teach that case, as there is a novel element in each. The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> did not list all the possible cases; he taught one case and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What other case did he omit, that he omitted this case of Rosh HaShana as well? While the <i>tanna</i> does not typically list all relevant cases, if there are only two that are relevant, he typically cites them in the mishna.
  The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of Passover eve. The Paschal lamb was sacrificed in three shifts. When the Paschal lamb was sacrificed they would recite <i>hallel</i>, and the recitation of <i>hallel</i> was accompanied by three blasts. Due to the great number of Paschal lambs sacrificed, they would often recite <i>hallel</i> three times during each shift. Consequently, there could be as many as twenty-seven additional blasts sounded on that day. Added to the twenty-one blasts sounded each day, the total is forty-eight blasts.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  The Gemara rejects this answer. If it is due to the case of Passover eve, that is not an omission, as who is the <i>tanna</i> of this mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Although there were three shifts in the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb, never in the all the days of the third shift did it reach the point in <i>hallel</i> to recite: “I love that the Lord hears my voice” (Psalms 116:1), which is the second paragraph of <i>hallel</i>, because the people participating in the third shift were few. Therefore, when they reached that section of <i>hallel</i> they had already completed the slaughter of all the offerings, and consequently only one set of blasts was sounded during this shift, for a total of forty-two.
  The Gemara wonders: But didn’t we establish that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: And perhaps this <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds in accordance with his opinion in one case, with regard to the third shift on Passover eve, and disagrees with him in one case, with regard to tallying the number of blasts.
  But the question remains: What other case did he omit, that he omitted this case of Rosh HaShana as well? The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat eve, in which case you eliminate six blasts of the third shift and incorporate six blasts sounded each Friday. The total is forty-eight blasts.
  § The mishna continues: And one sounds no more than forty-eight trumpet blasts on any given day. The Gemara wonders: And are there no more than forty-eight on any day? But isn’t there Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat, where if it is according to Rabbi Yehuda, there would be fifty-one blasts, i.e., twenty-one daily blasts, nine for the additional offering of Shabbat, nine for the <i>hallel</i> of each of the first two shifts sacrificing the Paschal lamb, and three for the third shift; and if it is according to the Rabbis, who hold that nine blasts were sounded for the third shift as well, there would be fifty-seven blasts? According to both opinions, there are more than forty-eight.
  The Gemara answers: When the <i>tanna</i> teaches the mishna, he is teaching matters that occur every year; the case of Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat, which is a matter that does not occur each and every year, he does not teach. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Shabbat eve during the Festival occurs every year? There are times when you do not find a Friday during the intermediate days of <i>Sukkot</i>. And what are the circumstances? It is a case where the first Festival day occurs on Shabbat eve, and therefore the following Friday is the Eighth Day of Assembly.
  The Gemara answers: That cannot be, as when the first Festival day of <i>Sukkot</i> would happen to occur on Shabbat eve, we postpone it by adding a day to the month of Elul and observing both Rosh HaShana and the first day of <i>Sukkot</i> on Shabbat. What is the reason for doing so? The reason is: Since if the first Festival day occurs on Shabbat eve, when is Yom Kippur that year? It is on Sunday. Therefore, in order to avoid two consecutive days, Shabbat and Yom Kippur, when there is a severe prohibition against performing labor, we postpone Rosh HaShana. The first Festival day never coincides with Friday.
  The Gemara asks: And do we postpone it to prevent Yom Kippur from occurring on Sunday? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: The fats of the offerings slaughtered and sacrificed on Shabbat that were not yet burned on the altar may be sacrificed on Yom Kippur that begins at the conclusion of Shabbat?
  And Rabbi Zeira said: When we were studying in the school of Rav in Babylonia, they said with regard to that which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: On Yom Kippur that occurs on Shabbat eve they did not sound the trumpets to stop the people from their labor and signify the onset of Shabbat, and if it occurred at the conclusion of Shabbat they would not recite <i>havdala</i> after Shabbat, that it is undisputed, as everyone agrees to that <i>halakha</i>. However, when I ascended to there, to Eretz Yisrael, I found Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, who was sitting and saying that this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the other Sages disagree. From both of these sources, it is apparent that Yom Kippur can occur both before and after Shabbat. The question remains: Why did the <i>tanna</i> cite a case that does not occur every year?
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, the mishna, from which it is understood that there will always be a Friday during the Festival, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that Rosh HaShana is postponed to ensure that Yom Kippur will not occur adjacent to Shabbat. However, this mishna, which teaches that the fats of Shabbat may be sacrificed at the conclusion of Shabbat on Yom Kippur, and Rosh HaShana is not postponed, is in accordance with the opinion of <i>Aḥerim</i>, who maintain that there are a fixed number of days in a year and a fixed number of days in a month.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say: Between the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> one year and the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana one year and Rosh HaShana the following year, there is a difference of only four days of the week. And if it was a leap year there is a difference of five days between them. The 354 days in the year are divided among twelve months; six months are thirty days long and six months are twenty-nine days long. Since according to <i>Aḥerim</i> the number of days is constant, Rosh HaShana could occur on any day of the week.
  § The Gemara returns to analyze the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, who holds that the trumpet was sounded for each additional offering sacrificed on a given day. The Gemara raises an objection: In the case of the New Moon that occurs on Shabbat, the song of the New Moon supersedes the song of Shabbat. And if it is so, as Rabbi Aḥa asserts, let us recite the song of Shabbat and let us recite the song of the New Moon. Since only one song is recited, apparently only one set of blasts is sounded.
  Rav Safra said: What is the meaning of supersedes? Supersedes means to precede, and the song for the New Moon would precede the song of Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And why does the song of the New Moon precede that of Shabbat? Doesn’t the principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice, dictate that the song of Shabbat should be recited first?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said, the New Moon takes precedence here, contrary to the general principle, in order to inform the people that the New Moon was established at its proper time by the court. The Gemara asks: And is that the indicator that we implement to indicate that the month was established at its proper time? Don’t we implement a different indicator, as it is taught in a mishna: In order to avoid confusion between the fats of earlier offerings and the fats of later offerings, prior to be being placed on the altar the fats of the daily morning offering were placed from the midpoint of the ramp and below on the east side of the ramp, and those of the additional offerings were placed from the midpoint of the ramp and below on the west side of the ramp. And the fats of the offerings of the New Moon offering were placed under the surrounding ledge of the altar and slightly beneath it.
  
  Daf 55a
  
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Why was it placed in this manner? It was as an indicator for the people to know that the New Moon was established at its proper time, after the twenty-ninth day of the previous month. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as they implemented two indicators: One who saw this one, i.e., the sequence of the songs, saw it; and one who saw that one, i.e., where the fats were placed, saw it, and there is no contradiction.
  The Gemara raises another objection to the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa, as Rava bar Shmuel taught this <i>baraita</i>: I might have thought that just as when Shabbat and the New Moon do not coincide they sound the trumpets for the additional Shabbat offering in and of itself, and for the additional New Moon offering in and of itself, so too would they sound the trumpets for each and every additional offering when the days coincide. Therefore, the verse states: “And on the day of your rejoicing, and at your appointed times, and on your New Moons, and you shall sound the trumpets for your burnt-offerings and your peace-offerings, and they will be a memorial for you before your God. I am the Lord your God” (Numbers 10:10), indicating that one blast is sounded for all. The Gemara suggests: This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  Since the <i>baraita</i> was cited, the Gemara asks: What is the derivation cited in this <i>baraita</i>? How does the phrase: And on your New Moons, prove that the trumpets are sounded once for all the additional offerings? Abaye said: The verse states: “And on your New Moons,” in plural, indicating that all the months are equated to each other, and just as on a typical New Moon the trumpets are sounded once for the additional offering, so too when Shabbat and the New Moon coincide the trumpets are sounded once and no more. Rav Ashi said that in this verse it is written: Your moon [<i>ḥodshekhem</i>], without a <i>yod</i>, in the singular, and in the same verse it is written: “And on your new [<i>uverashei</i>],” in the plural. And which is the month that has two new beginnings? You must say it is Rosh HaShana, which is the beginning of both the new year and the new month. And yet the Merciful One says: Your moon, in the singular, indicating it is one and the trumpets are sounded once.
  And furthermore, contrary to the statement of Rabbi Aḥa, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On the intermediate days of the Festival, on the first day, what would they say as the song accompanying the offering on that day? “Ascribe [<i>havu</i>] unto the Lord, O you sons of might” (Psalms 29:1). On the second day, what would they say? The psalm that contains the verse: “But unto the wicked [<i>velarasha</i>] God says: What have you to do to declare My statutes?” (Psalms 50:16). On the third day, what would they say? The psalm containing the verse: “Who [<i>mi</i>] will rise up for me against the evildoers?” (Psalms 94:16).
  On the fourth day, what would they say? “Consider [<i>binu</i>], you brutish among the people” (Psalms 94:8). On the fifth day, what would they say? “I removed [<i>hasiroti</i>] his shoulder from the burden” (Psalms 81:7). On the sixth day, what would they say? “All the foundations of the earth are moved [<i>yimotu</i>]” (Psalms 82:5). And if Shabbat occurred on any of the intermediate days of the Festival, since Shabbat has its own song (Psalms 92), the last of the songs of the intermediate days, i.e., “All the foundations of the earth are moved,” is superseded, and all the other songs are recited in their proper sequence.
  Rav Safra established a mnemonic for the sequence of the psalms recited during the intermediate days of the Festival: <i>Heh</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>yod</i>, the first letters of the transliterated word in the verses cited. Rav Pappa established a different mnemonic for a different sequence of the Psalms: <i>Heh</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>yod</i>, as in his opinion, the psalm containing: “I removed” is recited before the psalm containing: “Consider.” The Gemara notes: A mnemonic to identify which <i>amora</i> established which mnemonic is the expression: Convoy [<i>ambuha</i>] of scribes [<i>desafrei</i>], as the spelling of <i>ambuha</i> is like the mnemonic of Rav Safra.
  The Gemara concludes: This <i>baraita</i> is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, as on Shabbat the song for Shabbat was recited alone without the song for the Festival, and similarly, separate trumpet blasts are not sounded for the various additional offerings. Rabbi Aḥa’s opinion was rejected based on several sources. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Aḥa say a verse and a <i>baraita</i> in support of his opinion? How can those citations be rejected?
  Ravina said: The verse and the <i>baraita</i> that he cited do not teach that trumpet blasts were sounded for each additional offering. Rather, they come to say that one extends the duration of the blasts to honor the added additional offerings, but does not sound even one additional blast. The Sages of Caesarea, in the name of Rabbi Aḥa, said: The verse and the <i>baraita</i> cited by Rabbi Aḥa come to say that one increases the number of trumpeters to honor the added additional offerings, but not the number of blasts sounded.
  Apropos the psalms recited during the Festival, the Gemara asks: And we, outside Eretz Yisrael, who have two days of Festival due to the uncertainty, as well as uncertainty with regard to each of the intermediate days, how do we conduct ourselves with regard to the mention of the additional offerings in the additional prayer of the Festival during the intermediate days, and with regard to Torah reading on those days? Abaye said: Mention of the second day will be superseded. Since the first of the intermediate days outside Eretz Yisrael is the third day of the Festival in Eretz Yisrael, the additional offering for the third day alone is mentioned, and the offerings for the fourth day on the fourth day, etc. No mention is made of the second day outside Eretz Yisrael.
  Rava said: Mention of the seventh day will be superseded. On the first of the intermediate days outside Eretz Yisrael, the third day of the Festival, the passage beginning “And on the second day” (Numbers 29:17) is mentioned in the additional <i>Amida</i> prayer and read in the Torah, and on each succeeding day the succeeding passage is mentioned and read. There is no mention of the seventh day on the eighth day, as that is no longer <i>Sukkot</i> but rather the Eighth Day of Assembly. The Gemara notes: A <i>baraita</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rava: And if Shabbat occurs on any of the intermediate days of the Festival, the song of the seventh day of <i>Sukkot</i>: “All the foundations of the earth are moved,” is superseded.
  The Gemara cites a third opinion: Ameimar instituted in his city of Neharde’a that during the intermediate days, one repeats the second of the additional offerings that he mentioned the day before and adds the additional offerings of the subsequent day. On the first of the intermediate days in the Diaspora, one mentions the additional offerings of both the second and third days of <i>Sukkot</i>. On the second of the intermediate days, one repeats the verses of the third day of <i>Sukkot</i> and adds the verses of the fourth day.
  
  Daf 55b
  
  MISHNA: On the first Festival day of <i>Sukkot</i> there were thirteen bulls, two rams, and one goat there. The mishna proceeds to discuss the division of labor for the Festival offerings among the twenty-four priestly watches, all of which serve in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals. The sixteen offerings mentioned above were divided among sixteen priestly watches, one offering per watch. Fourteen sheep remained to be divided among the eight remaining watches. On the first day of the Festival, six of the eight remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each for a total of twelve, and the remaining two watches sacrifice one sheep each.
  On the second day of the Festival, i.e., the first day of the intermediate days, when twelve bulls were sacrificed, fifteen of the priestly watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, five of the remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining four watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the third day of the Festival, when eleven bulls were sacrificed, fourteen of the priestly watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, four of the remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining six watches sacrifice one sheep each.
  On the fourth day of the Festival, when ten bulls were sacrificed, thirteen of the priestly watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, three of the remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining eight watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the fifth day, when nine bulls were sacrificed, twelve watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, two of the twelve remaining watches sacrifice two sheep each, and the remaining ten watches sacrifice one sheep each. On the sixth day, when eight bulls were sacrificed, eleven watches sacrifice the bulls, rams, and goat, one of the remaining watches sacrifices two sheep, and the remaining twelve watches sacrifice one sheep each.
  On the seventh day they are all equal and bring one offering each. On the eighth day, when there was a completely different configuration of offerings, they returned to the standard lottery system used to determine which of the priestly watches would sacrifice the offerings, as they did on the other pilgrimage Festivals, which do not have as many offerings as does <i>Sukkot</i>. They said about the ordering of the priestly watches: One who sacrificed bulls today will not sacrifice bulls tomorrow; rather, they will sacrifice one of the other types of offerings. They rotate, so that each of the watches will have the opportunity to sacrifice bulls as well as other animals.
  GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna that says that on the eighth day they returned to the standard lottery of the other pilgrimage Festivals is according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and not according to the Rabbis. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: To determine the priestly watch that would sacrifice the bull that comes as an additional offering on the Eighth Day of Assembly, they draw lots over it from the beginning; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: One of the two watches that did not sacrifice three bulls during <i>Sukkot</i> sacrifices it. Only two of the twenty-four watches sacrifices two bulls over the course of <i>Sukkot</i>. Each of the other watches sacrifices three bulls. Since the mishna mentions that a lottery was held, apparently the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, is that to say that the two remaining priestly watches are not required to draw lots to determine which will merit sacrificing the bull?
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All of the priestly watches sacrifice a bull twice and three times, except for two watches that sacrifice a bull twice and do not sacrifice a bull three times? Let us say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as they hold that one of those watches sacrifices a third bull on the Eighth Day of Assembly. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis; what is the meaning of the phrase: They did not sacrifice a bull three times? It means that with regard to the bulls of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> they did not sacrifice a bull three times.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the bulls sacrificed on <i>Sukkot</i>, what does the <i>baraita</i> teach us? It is a simple calculation that seventy bulls divided by twenty-four watches leaves two watches that sacrificed only two bulls. The Gemara answers: This is what the <i>baraita</i> comes to teach us: One who sacrificed bulls today will not sacrifice bulls tomorrow; rather, they rotate. Therefore, each watch sacrifices at least two bulls, and most of them sacrifice three.
  Rabbi Elazar said: These seventy bulls that are sacrificed as additional offerings over the course of the seven days of <i>Sukkot</i>, to what do they correspond? They correspond to the seventy nations of the world, and are brought to atone for their sins and to hasten world peace. Why is a single bull sacrificed on the Eighth Day of Assembly? It corresponds to the singular nation, Israel.
  The Gemara cites a parable about a king of flesh and blood who said to his servants: Prepare me a great feast that will last for several days. When the feast concluded, on the last day, he said to his beloved servant: Prepare me a small feast so that I can derive pleasure from you alone.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Woe unto the nations of the world that lost something and do not know what they lost. When the Temple is standing, the seventy bulls sacrificed on the altar during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> atones for them. And now that the Temple is destroyed, who atones for them?
  MISHNA: At three times during the year, all twenty-four priestly watches have equal status, in that all receive a share in the Temple service independent of the standard order of the watches and all receive a share in the accompanying gifts of the priesthood: In the portions of the offerings of the Festivals sacrificed on the altar and in the distribution of the shewbread on Shabbat during the Festivals.
  On <i>Shavuot</i> that coincides with Shabbat, when the two loaves offered on <i>Shavuot</i> would be distributed together with the distribution of the shewbread, the priest charged with the distribution says to each priest: Here is <i>matza</i> from the shewbread for you, and here is leavened bread from the two loaves for you. The principle is that the priestly watch whose time is fixed during the Festival sacrifices the daily offerings during the Festival, as well as vow-offerings, free-will offerings, and all other communal offerings. And that watch sacrifices all of them even during the Festival, when other aspects of the service are shared by all the watches.
  GEMARA: The Gemara wonders: How is it that the priests divide those portions of the Festival offerings? Don’t they belong to God, and must be placed on the altar? How do the priestly watches share these portions? Rav Ḥisda said: The mishna is referring not to portions sacrificed on the altar [<i>eimurim</i>] but to what was stated [<i>amur</i>] with regard to the pilgrimage Festivals, all those portions of the offerings that the Torah commanded to sacrifice at the Temple that are not burnt on the altar and are shared by the priests, e.g., hides of the burnt-offerings of appearance and the breast and thigh of the Festival peace-offerings.
  The Sages taught: From where is it derived that all of the priestly watches have equal status in the portions of the Festival offerings? The verse states: “And if a Levite comes from any of your gates out of all Israel, where he sojourns, and comes with all the desire of his soul unto the place that the Lord shall choose; then he shall minister…as all his brethren…They shall have like portions to eat, besides the transactions of their fathers’ houses” (Deuteronomy 18:6–8). Based on these verses, one might have thought that this is the case even on the rest of the days of the year and the priestly watches would have equal status. Therefore, the verse states: From one of your gates. I said that all have equal status only when all of Israel enters through one gate, i.e., on a pilgrimage Festival.
  The mishna continues: And in the distribution of the shewbread on the three pilgrimage Festivals, all twenty-four priestly watches have equal status. The Sages taught: From where is it derived that all of the priestly watches have equal status in the distribution of the shewbread?
  
  Daf 56a
  
  The verse states: “They shall have like portions to eat” (Deuteronomy 18:8); just as all the watches receive an equal portion of the service, so too all the watches receive an equal portion in the eating. The Gemara asks: What is the eating mentioned in this verse? If you say it is the eating of offerings, the verse is superfluous, as it is derived from there: “And every meal-offering…shall be the priest’s that offers it” (Leviticus 7:9), which, although it was written with regard to meal-offerings, applies to all offerings. Moreover, it teaches that a priest who participates in the sacrifice of the offering shares in eating the offering. Rather, the verse is referring to the shewbread that was not part of the service this Shabbat, as it was baked the previous Shabbat.
  One might have thought that all the watches should be equal even with regard to obligations that come not due to the Festival but are brought on the Festival nevertheless, as there were many vow-offerings and free-will offerings brought to the Temple that were not part of the Festival rite, but simply the result of people taking advantage of their presence in Jerusalem to fulfill their outstanding obligations. Therefore, the verse states: “Besides the transactions of their fathers’ houses” (Deuteronomy 18:8). What did the forefathers of each watch sell each other? They agreed with regard to the service of the watches: I will serve during my week, and you will serve during your week. Each watch has the right to perform the Temple service during its appointed weeks and to receive all priestly gifts offered during those weeks.
  § The mishna continues: On <i>Shavuot</i> that coincides with Shabbat the priest charged with the distribution says to each priest: Here is <i>matza</i> from the shewbread for you, and here is leavened bread from the two loaves for you. It was stated that there is a dispute between the <i>amora’im</i>, and Rav said: When one enters the <i>sukka</i>, he recites the blessing of the <i>sukka</i>: Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us to sit in the <i>sukka</i>, and then the blessing of time: Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: One recites the blessing of time, and then the blessing of the <i>sukka</i>.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rav said that one recites the blessing of <i>sukka</i> and then the blessing of time because the obligation of the day takes precedence. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that one recites the blessing of time and then the blessing of the <i>sukka</i> because when a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice, and the blessing of time is recited more frequently.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Rabba bar bar Ḥana disagree in the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: These are the matters of dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of a meal. Beit Shammai say: When one recites <i>kiddush</i> over wine, he recites a blessing over the sanctification of the day and then recites a blessing over the wine. And Beit Hillel say: One recites a blessing over the wine and then recites a blessing over the day.
  The Gemara elaborates: Beit Shammai say: One recites a blessing over the sanctification of the day and then recites a blessing over the wine, as the day causes the wine to come before the meal. And Beit Shammai offer an additional reason: The day has already been sanctified and the wine has not yet come. Since Shabbat was sanctified first, it should likewise be mentioned first. And Beit Hillel say: One recites a blessing over the wine and then recites a blessing over the day, as the wine causes the <i>kiddush</i> to be recited. Were there no wine, <i>kiddush</i> would not be recited. Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: The blessing over wine is recited frequently, and the blessing over the day is not recited frequently, and when a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it was Rav who stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that the blessing over the sanctification of the day takes precedence over the blessing over the wine, and it was Rabba bar bar Ḥana who stated his opinion in accordance with Beit Hillel, i.e., that the frequent blessing takes precedence.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion. Rav could have said to you: It is I who stated my opinion even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, as Beit Hillel stated their opinion there in the case of <i>kiddush</i> only due to the additional reason that the wine causes the <i>kiddush</i> to be recited. But here there is no similar connection between the two blessings, and if there was no blessing on time, wouldn’t we recite the blessing of the <i>sukka</i> anyway? The fact is that the blessing on the <i>sukka</i> is recited throughout the week of the Festival, when no blessing on time is recited.
  And Rabba bar bar Ḥana could have said to you: It is I who stated my opinion even in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as Beit Shammai only stated their opinion there in the case of <i>kiddush</i>, and only due to the additional reason that the day causes the wine to come before the meal. However, here, if there was no blessing of <i>sukka</i>, wouldn’t we recite the blessing of time even without sitting in the <i>sukka</i>, simply due to the onset of the Festival?
  The Gemara cites proof from that which we learned in the mishna: On <i>Shavuot</i> the priest charged with the distribution of the shewbread and the two loaves says to each priest: Here is <i>matza</i> for you, here is leavened bread for you. But here, where the <i>ḥametz</i> is primary and the <i>matza</i> is subordinate to it, as it is the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> when the two loaves of leavened bread are the offering of the day, and yet the mishna teaches: Here is <i>matza</i> for you, and here is leavened bread for you, it accords precedence to the frequent shewbread over the obligation of the day. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav.
  The Gemara responds that Rav could have said to you: This matter is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the priest charged with distribution says: Here is <i>matza</i> for you, here is leavened bread for you. Abba Shaul says that he would say: Here is leavened bread for you, here is <i>matza</i> for you.
  With regard to the final <i>halakhic</i> decision: Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the statement of Rav, who said: One recites the blessing of <i>sukka</i> and then the blessing of time; rather, one recites the blessing of time and then the blessing of <i>sukka</i>. Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: One recites the blessing of <i>sukka</i> and then the blessing of time, in accordance with the opinion of Rav. And the Gemara concludes that the <i>halakha</i> is: One recites the blessing of <i>sukka</i> and then the blessing of time.
  § The mishna continues: The priestly watch whose time is scheduled during the Festival, sacrifices the daily offerings during the Festival, as well as vow-offerings, free-will offerings, and all other communal offerings. The Gemara asks: What additional communal offerings does the mishna come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include a bull brought for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought by the community due to a transgression committed by the community as a whole as a result of an erroneous halakhic decision issued by the Great Sanhedrin, although it has no fixed time and need not be brought during the Festival; and it includes goats brought for the unwitting transgression of the prohibition against idol worship. If these offerings are brought during the Festival, they are sacrificed by members of the watch whose shift is scheduled for that week.
  The mishna concludes: And that watch sacrifices all of them. The Gemara asks: What does this phrase come to include? The Gemara explains: It comes to include the summer fruits of the altar. Whenever the altar was inactive, special burnt-offerings were sacrificed as communal donations in deference to the Divine Presence so that the altar would not remain empty. These offerings were sacrificed by the scheduled watch.
  MISHNA: In the case of a Festival that occurs adjacent to Shabbat, both when it occurs preceding it and when it occurs following it, all the watches that arrived early or remained late to serve in the Temple were of equal status in the distribution of the shewbread on that Shabbat. If one day happened to separate between the Festival and Shabbat, the watch whose time was scheduled would take ten of the twelve loaves of shewbread, and the watch that was detained after the Festival because there was insufficient time to get home before Shabbat takes two loaves. And during the rest of the days of the year, when the changing of the watches takes place on Shabbat, the incoming watch takes six loaves and the outgoing watch takes six loaves. Rabbi Yehuda says: The incoming watch takes seven loaves and the outgoing takes five.
  The standard procedure was that the members of the incoming watch divide the shewbread in the north section of the courtyard, and the outgoing watch in the south. However, there was one exception: The watch of Bilga, due to a penalty imposed upon it, always divides the shewbread to its members in the south, even when it is the incoming watch. And its ring used to facilitate slaughter of the animals was fixed in place, rendering it useless, and its niche among the niches in the wall of the Chamber of Knives, where the priests would store their knives and other vessels, was sealed.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning in the mishna of preceding it and what is the meaning of following it? If we say preceding it is referring to the first Festival day preceding Shabbat and following it is referring to the last day of the Festival following Shabbat, then this is the case of Shabbat that is during the Festival, and that is how the mishna should have presented it.
  Rather, preceding it is referring to the last day of the Festival that precedes Shabbat and following it is referring to the first Festival day that follows Shabbat. What is the reason that the watches share equally in these cases? Since these are coming early, as the arriving watch cannot arrive after Shabbat because the Festival begins right away, and these remain late, as the outgoing watch cannot leave at the end of the Festival due to the immediate onset of Shabbat, the Sages instituted this matter so that they would eat the shewbread together.
  The mishna continues: If one day happened. During the rest of the days of the year, the incoming watch takes six loaves and the outgoing watch takes six loaves. Rabbi Yehuda says: The incoming watch takes seven loaves and the outgoing takes five.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  The Gemara asks: And these two extra loaves received by the incoming watch, what is their purpose? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: They are as compensation for locking the doors of the Temple. The Gemara asks: Let the outgoing watch say to the incoming one: Remove your claim to the extra loaves this week and divide the loaves equally and next week’s incoming watch will remove its claim next week. Abaye said: A ripe cucumber now is better than a gourd that has yet to ripen. A small, immediate profit is preferable to a large, potential profit.
  Rav Yehuda said: And they divide the hides of the additional offerings between them. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The outgoing watch performs the rite of the daily morning offering and the additional offerings, and the incoming watch performs the rite of the daily afternoon offering and the service of the vessels of frankincense for the shewbread. And the <i>baraita</i> teaches nothing about dividing the hides of the additional offerings. The Gemara answers: This <i>tanna</i> is not speaking of division of the hides, but is addressing the division of the Temple service, so sharing the hides is not mentioned.
  Rava said: But didn’t the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Shmuel, who speaks of division between the incoming and the outgoing watches, fail to teach division of the hides of the additional offerings mentioned by Rabbi Yehuda, as the school of Shmuel taught: The outgoing watch performs the daily morning offering and the additional offerings; the incoming watch performs the daily afternoon offerings and the service of the vessels. And how was this service performed? Four priests would enter the Sanctuary, two from this outgoing watch and two from that incoming watch, and they divide the shewbread. But it teaches nothing about dividing the hides of the additional offerings. The Gemara suggests: This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  § The mishna continues: Members of the incoming watch divide the shewbread in the north section of the courtyard, and members of the outgoing watch in the south. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Members of the incoming watch divide the shewbread in the north, which was an area of greater sanctity in the Temple courtyard, so that it would be seen that they are incoming, and members of the outgoing watch divide the shewbread in the south, so it would be seen that they are outgoing.
  We learned in the mishna that Bilga always divides the shewbread in the south, even when it is the incoming watch. The Gemara elaborates: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving Miriam, the daughter of a member of the Bilga watch, who apostatized and went and married a soldier [<i>sardeyot</i>] serving in the army of the Greek kings. When the Greeks entered the Sanctuary, she entered with them and was kicking with her sandal on the altar and said: Wolf, wolf [<i>lokos</i>], until when will you consume the property of the Jewish people, and yet you do not stand with them when they face exigent circumstances? And after the victory of the Hasmoneans over the Greeks, when the Sages heard about this matter and how she denigrated the altar, they fixed the ring of the Bilga watch in place, rendering it nonfunctional, and sealed its niche.
  And some say that the watch was penalized for a different reason. It happened once that some members of the Bilga watch tarried in arriving at the Temple. The members of the previous watch, the watch of Yeshevav, his brother, entered together with the members of the Bilga watch who had arrived, and served in the place of the absent members of his brother’s watch. The Gemara notes: Although neighbors of the wicked do not typically profit, according to the principle: Woe unto the wicked, woe unto his neighbor, Bilga’s neighbors profited, as Bilga always divides the shewbread in the south, even when the watch is incoming, and his brother Yeshevav always divides in the north, even when the watch is outgoing.
  The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to the one who said that Bilga was penalized because members of his watch tarried in arriving at the Temple; that is why the entire watch is penalized. However, according to the one who said it is due to Miriam, daughter of Bilga, who apostatized, do we penalize the entire watch of Bilga because of his daughter? Abaye said: Yes, as people say, the speech of a child in the marketplace is learned either from that of his father or from that of his mother. Miriam would never have said such things had she not heard talk of that kind in her parents’ home.
  The Gemara asks: And due to Miriam’s father and mother, do we penalize an entire watch? Abaye said: Woe unto the wicked, woe unto his neighbor. To conclude the tractate on a positive note, the Gemara says: Good for the righteous, good for his neighbor, as it is stated: “Say you of the righteous that it shall be good for him, for they shall eat the fruit of their doings” (Isaiah 3:10); the neighbors of a righteous man who witness and acknowledge the good that befalls him will benefit from their proximity to him.