meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Nezikin/Makkot/English/Sefaria Community Translation.txt"}
text: Makkot
  מכות
  Sefaria Community Translation
  
  
  Makkot
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNA: How are witnesses [which come before a rabbinical court to testify] made zomemim [false witnesses]? Witnesses [proven false] testify that this person is a son of a divorcee or a son of a Levirite marriage. We don't say that they become like a son of a divorcee or a son of a Levirite marriage, rather they are lashed forty times.
  Witnesses testify that this person is subject to exile, we don't say that they [the false witnesses] are exiled in his place, rather they are lashed forty times.
  GEMARA: Why does the Mishna ask 'How do witnesses become false witnesses?' [since this is not the topic of the Mishnah] and furthermore, later on we learn [the definition of a false witness] But they [different witnesses come and] say to them [the false witnesses]. 'How can you testify? On that day and in that place, you were with us [in a different place, and therefore lying].
  It was taught previously [in the end of Sanhedrin] Every false witness is punished the same [punishment that they tried to cause], except for the case of accusing a Cohen's daughter of adultery...
  ...[now our Mishnah continues] and [then] there are false witnesses who are not given [this kind of] punishment at all, rather they receive forty lashes. How so? Witnesses testify that this person is a son of a divorcee or a son of a Levirite marriage. We don't say that they [the false witnesses] become like a son of a divorcee or a son of a Levirite marriage, rather they are lashed forty times.
  What is the source? R' Yehoshua ben Levi said (in the name of R' Raish Lakish) And you shall do to him as HE plotted, [meaning] to him, and not to his offspring.  [So] then revoke just his priesthood and not his offspring's, [but] the laws of false witnesses requires the same punishment, and it is missing here.
  Bar Pada said It stands to reason, a fortiori, since a priest who successfully takes away priesthood from his fellow keeps his priesthood, a priest who is unsuccessful remains a priest. Ravina argues, if so, false witnesses can never be punishede
  
  Daf 2b
  
  The [false witnesses that succeed in] getting a person stoned to death are not stoned [after the miscarriage of justice is carried out], surely the [false witnesses] then that do not succeed should not be stoned. Rather we follow the first opinion [of R' Lakish]
  We testify that this person is subject to exile... What is the source? R' Lakish said It says, he flees to a city, [the murderer], and not the witness.
  R' Yochanan says A fortiori, if the one that intentionally acted is not exiled then the one that did not act [i.e. he spoke], even though he did it intentionally, should not be exiled.
  That should be proof. The one that intentionally acted is not exiled because we do not give atonement. The accidental murderer we exile for the sake of atonement. Rather we follow R' Lakish
  R' Ulah said Where is there a hint to the laws of false witnesses in the Torah? A hint to the laws of false witnesses?? It is written [explicitly] And you shall do to him as he plotted... No, a hint for the forty lashes It is written And you shall exonerate the innocent and condemn the guilty and if the wicked deserves to be beaten because they [the court] exonerated the innocent party and they condemned the guilty party (in a case of civil dispute), the guilty deserve to be beaten?
  Rather it refers to witnesses that testified against the innocent party, and new witnesses come and exonerate the innocent party and make those witnesses guilty [of false testimony], and they deserve to be beaten.
  But it [already] says 'do not bear false witness'. However it is a sin that is not an action, and for a sin that is not an action there is no lashes.
  It is taught four things regarding false witnesses [that are exceptions to the rule] We don't [revoke the priestly status in the case of] a son of a divorcee or a son of a Levirite marriage, and we don't exile to a city of refuge, and we don't [make them] pay atonement and we don't make them slaves. They said in the name of R' Akiva, they do not pay under self-confession.
  We don't make them a son of a divorcee or a son of a Levirite marriage, as we said before and we don't exile them to a city of refuge as we said before, and we don't make them pay compensation (regarding a violent ox that kills) [because] the compensation is an atonement, and false witnesses do not need atoning.
  Which Tanna holds that it is atonement? R' Hisda said, R' Yishmael, the son of R' Yohanan ben Broka, as it is taught, 'he gave a ransom from his life', that is the money of the victim. [However] R' Yishmael, the son of R' Yohanan son of Broka says,  it means the money of the owner. Is it not that the difference here is that one [the Rabbis] explains it is monetary compensation, and the other [R' Yishmael] explains it is an atonement
  R' Papa said, no. Everybody agrees that it is atonement, where they disagree is that, one explains the value is according to the victim, and one explains the value is according to the owner
  What is the reasoning of the Rabbis? It is said above, (in a similar case regarding causing miscarriage) value is according to the victim (fetus), so to here value is according to the victim.
  And R' Yishmael? it is written '[The] ransom from HIS life', [meaning the life of the owner]  And the Rabbis [intepretion of this verse] Yes, it is written ransom is from his life, however the value is assessed according to the victim.
  And they are not sold as Hebrew slaves. R' Hamnuna held here it applies when the accused thief has money, since they would not be sold. Here also they [witnesses] would not be sold. But in the case where the accused does not have money, the witnesses are sold, even though they have money.
  Rava said to him, Let the witnesses say if you had, would you be sold? So likewise we should not be sold. Rather R' Hamnuna meant to say If either the accused or the witnesses have, they are not sold, but if neither the accused nor the witnesses have, they are sold. Rava said to him, The Torah states, he is sold for his theft, meaning theft and not conspiring.
  They said in the name of R'Akiva etc. What is the reasoning of R' Akiva? He holds that it is a fine, and you do not pay a fine under self-confession. Rava said, there was no action [and they are killed] and they are fined.  R' Nachmun said, the accused still has the money [he was accused of owing], and they [the witnesses] pay.
  
  Daf 3a
  
  What does it mean there was no action? This is Rava! Let's say Yes, and also R' Nachmun.
  R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, a false witness pays proportionally. What does proportionally mean? If you say this one pays half and this one pays half, then we've already learnt this! 'We divide money and we don't divide lashes.'
  Rather, in a case of one witness proven false, he must pay his half. He pays? Didn't we learn 'No witness pays unless both are proven false'
  Rava said, this is speaking of self-confession. But he is not believed since once he testifies he cannot retract his testimony.
  Rather it's saying we testified and we lied in a different court.  Who is this like? It is not R' Akiva, R' Akiva said 'you do not pay under self-confession'.
  Rather it's saying we gave false testimony in a different court and we were sentenced to pay by them.
  I would think, since you can't obligate a friend, so too you can't obligate yourself. It comes to teach us [he does pay].
  MISHNA: [They say] We testify so-and-so divorced his wife and didn't give to her [money from] the Ketubah. In the end the money will have to be given betwen
  It is assessed how much one would pay if she was widowed or divorced. Or how much if she would die and the husband would inherit.
  GEMARA: How is it valued? R' Hisda said, [according] to the husband.
  R' Natan bar Oshia says, [according] to the wife.
  R' Papa, [according] to the wife and her Ketubah.
  MISHNA: We testified that so-and-so owes 1000 zuz to his friend in thirty days, and he says  it is a ten-year loan.
  We assess how much one would pay for the loan to be in thirty days instead of ten years.
  GEMARA: R' Yehudah said, Shmuel said, the Sabbatical year clears a ten-year loan.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  Even though you would not be able to collect the loan , in the end he can come to collect.
  R' Kahana responds, We assess how much a person would give to have the one thousand zuz in his hand in thirty days instead of ten years. If you were to say the Sabbatical year cancels all debts, then the false witnesses would have to pay the whole debt.
  Rava said, maybe it's in the case of the lending on collateral, or if he gives documentation to the court As we have learnt, a loan on collateral or where documentation is given to the court is not cancelled [by the Sabbatical].
  Some say, R' Yehudah said in the name of R' Shmuel a loan for ten years is not cancelled. And even though eventually he will come to collect, however you cannot collect it.
  R' Kahana said, we also learnt, 'We assess how much he would pay to have the thousand zuz in his possession in thirty days instead of a ten years.' and if you were to say that the Sabbatical cancels the loan, the witnesses would have to pay the whole debt.
  Rava said, it's in the case of a loan on collateral or when the loan is transferred to the court. as we learnt, A loan on collateral or transferred to the court is not cancelled by the Sabbatical.
  And R' Yehudah said in the name of R' Shmuel, He says to his fellow, [I will lend money] only on condition that the Sabbatical year does not cancel, the Sabbatical still cancels.  Is this to say that Shmuel explains this as a condition that is against the Torah? And all conditions that contradict the Torah are null and void.
  Has it not been said, he says to his fellow, [I will lend] on condition that you have no refund of a fraud. Rav says, he does have a refund and Shmuel says he doesn't have a refund.
  No, R' Anan said, Shmuel explained it to me himself, on condition that you have no fraud against me, there is no fraud, [but if he says] there is no fraud [at all], there is fraud.
  Here also, on condition that you do not cancel the debt, the Sabbatical does not cancel. On condition that there is no Sabbatical, the Sabbatical does cancel.
  A Tanna taught, 'A loan to his fellow without any conditions, he may not demand it back less than thirty days.' Rava b. Bar Chana explained in the presence of Rav here it refers to a written loan because a person doesn't bother to write a loan for less than thirty days but not a verbal loan. Rav said to him, my beloved uncle has said [elsewhere], 'a written loan and a verbal loan [are equivalent]'
  so too here it teaches an informal loan to his fellow cannot be demanded back within thirty days, whether it is written or verbal.
  Shmuel said to R' Matana, do not sit down until you explain the origin of the Rabbis' dictum an informal loan to his fellow cannot be demanded back within thirty days, whether written or verbal.
  He said to him, it is written, 'the seventh year is close, the year of clearing loans'. From what is said, the seventh year, do I not know it's the year of clearing loans? Rather it is teaching you there is a different type of clearing loans, this is an informal loan to a fellow that cannot be demanded within thiry days, that the Master has said [elsewhere], 'thirty days is like a year'.
  R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, opening the neck of a new garment on Shabbat is forbidden. R' Kahana argued, and what is the difference between this and opening a barrel? He replied to him, one is all connected, whereas one is not all connected.
  And R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, one kortob of wine fell in three logs of water, and it looks like wine, and this fell in a mikvah, it [the mikvah] is not impure. R' Kahana argued, and what is the difference between this and coloured water? As we learnt, R' Yosi says,  coloured water makes a mikvah impure. Rava said to him, there it is called coloured water, here it is called diluted wine.
  Didn't R' Hiyah teach, it reduces the efficacy of the mikvah? Rava said, there is no issue one is R' Yochanan ben Nuri and one is the Rabbis, that taught, three logs of water
  
  Daf 4a
  
  less than a kortov, that fell in a kortov of wine and looks like wine, and that fell in a mikvah, the mikvah is not disqualified. So too if three logs minus a kortov fell in a kortov of milk and looks like water, and that fell in a mikvah, the mikvah is not disqualified.
  R' Yochanan ben Nuri says, everything depends on how it looks.
  This is what R' Papa came to solve, R' Papa asked [whether] Rav learnt one kortov minus three logs in the first clause [of the Mishnah] then a Tanna who holds this, holds the mikvah is ineffectual and R' Yochanan came to say, 'everything goes by it's appearance', and Rav says like R' Yochanan b. Nuri.
  Or alternatively, Rav did not learn [anything] missing from the kortov in the first clause [of the Mishnah] and when R' Yochanan b. Nuri disagreed, he disagreed only the last clause,
  and Rav says like the majority.
  R' Papa was doubtful, Rava was certain.
  R' Yosef said,  I never heard this. Abaye said to him, You told us and this is how you told us, that Rav did not learn [anything] missing from a kortov in the first clause, R' Yochanan disagreed only the last clause and Rav says like the majority.
  R' Yehudah said in the name of Rav, a barrel full of water that falls into the Mediterranean Sea and someone immerses, it is not considered valid because we are afraid three logs of water are in one place and this applies specifically to the Sea, which is stationary, but does not generally apply to rivers.
  It is also taught, a barrel full of wine that falls into the Mediterranean Sea and someone immerses, it is not considered valid because we are afraid three logs (of wine) are in one place likewise if a holy loaf of bread fell there it is impure.
  What is the need for this 'likewise'? I would think there the person keeps his ritual status, here too the holy bread keeps it's status.
  MISHNAH: Witnesses testify this person owes his friend two hundred zuz and they are found to be false, they are lashed and made to pay because the category of lashes is not of payment. These are the words of R' Meir,  and the Rabbis say everyone who pays does not receive lashes.
  Witnesses testify this person should get forty lashes and are found to be false are lashed eighty times, for 'do not bear false witness' and for 'and you shall do unto him as he wished to do'. These are the words of R' Meir,  and the Rabbis say they are only lashed forty times. GEMARA: 
  
  Daf 4b
  
  The Rabbis' opinion is perfectly fine, [as] it is written, 'according to his evil act'. Because of one singular evil act you punish him, and you do not punish him for many evil acts. Rather what is the reasoning of R' Meir?
  Ulah said, It is brought down from the defaming [husband], just as the defamer is lashed and pays so to every individual is lashed and pays. What is the connection to the defamer, that is really a penalty? [R' Meir] holds like R' Akiva, that has said, false witnesses are [under the category of] penalties.
  There are those that learn that what Ulah taught from what has been taught, 'And ye shall let nothing of it remain until the morning; but that which remaineth of it until the morning' etc. Scripture came to give an action after the forbidden sin, meaning there aren't lashes. These are the words of R' Yehudah.
  R' Akiva says, No. This isn't the source, rather it's from the fact that there is no forbidden action, and a sin without an action has no lashes [as a punishment]. It seems from what R' Yehudah explained that a sin without action, there are lashes. From where is this?
  Ulah said, ... It is derived from the defaming husband; just as the defaming husband is a sin without action, so too here all sins without action are liable to lashes. [This cannot be correct.] What do we find regarding the defaming husband? He receives lashes and still pays.
  Rather Reish Lakish said, is is derived from false witnesses. Just as false witnesses is a sin without action, so too here a sin without action is liable to lashes. What [is the connection] to false witnesses, that does not require a warning?
  The sin of a defaming husband does require a warning. And the argument will resume, neither sin is similar to the other. The common characteristic of them is that they are both sins without action and liable to lashes. So too all sins without action are liable to lashes.
  What [can be derived] from the common characteristic of the sins, that is a penalty.  This isn't a question, because Rebbi Yehuda doesn't hold like Rebbi Akiva [who says that false witnesses is penalty].
  Rather what [can be derived] from the common characteristic of the sins that possesses a stringency? Rebbi Yehuda doesn't consider a stringency to be a question.
  And what do the Rabbis derive from the verse (Exodus 20, 12) "Do not bear false testimony on your fellow"?
  They use it to drive a scriptural warning for false witnesses. And from where does Rabbi Meir derive the scriptural warning for false witnesses?  Rebbi Yermiah says, he derives it from the verse (Deuteronomy 19, 20) "The remaining ones should hear, fear, and do no more evil".
  And the Rabbis use that verse,
  
  Daf 5a
  
  [The Rabbis use the verse in Deuteronomy to drive] the proclamation [for false witnesses]. And Rabbi Meir derive the proclamation from the words "hear and fear".
  MISHNA: [The false witnesses] divide the monetary payment but not the lashes. How is this? If they testified that a person was obligated to pay 200 zuz [a unit of currency] to his fellow and were then found to be false, they split the payment between them, but if they testified that a person was liable to forty lashes and were then found to be false, each [of the false witnesses] gets forty lashes.
  GEMARA: From where is this known [that lashes can not be divided]? Abaye says, The word "rasha" (wicked person) is said by the laws of lashes (Deuteronomy 25, 2) and the word "rasha" is said by the laws of the death penalty (Numbers 35, 31). Just as there is no half of a death penalty, so too there is no half of lashes.
  Rava says, We need to fulfill the requirement of (Deuteronomy 19, 19) "as he plotted to do his brother" and we can not. [He plotted to make his fellow liable a full forty lashes.] If so, than money should also [not be able to be divided].  Money combines, while lashes do not combine.
  MISHNA: Witnesses are not made into zomemim (false witnesses) until they themselves are proven false.
  How is this? If they [the first set of witnesses] said, "We testify about this person, that he killed a man" [A second set of witnesses] said to them [the first set], "How can you testify, because the murderer or the victim was with us on that day in a different place?" They [the first set of witnesses] do not become zomemim. But if they [the second set of witnesses] said, "How can you testify, because you [the first set] were with us on that day in a different place?", then they [the first set] do become zomemim, and get executed on their [the second set's] words.
  If others [a third set] came and were found to be zomemim [by the testimony of the second set], if others came and were found to be zomemim, even if there were one hundred [sets of witnesses], they all get executed. Rebbi Yehudah says, this group [the second set] is considered to be a 'plotting group' and no one gets executed besides for the first set of witnesses.
  GEMARA: From ever do we know these words [that witnesses need to be personally disqualified to become zomemim]?  Rav Ada says, The Torah says, (Deuteronomy 19: 18) "And behold, a false witness, he has testified falsely", [we derive that they doesn't become zomemim] until the body of the testimony [the witnesses themselves] get contradicted.
  In the school of Rebbi Yishmeal it was taught, (Deuteronomy 19, 16) "to bear perverted testimony against him" [we derive from this verse that witnesses do nitty before zomemim] until the bodies of the testimony[the witnesses] become prevented.
  Rava says, If two [witnesses] come and say that they saw a person murder on the east east side of a building, and another two [witnesses] come and say that you [the first set] were with us on the west side of the building, then we see: If from standing at the west side of that building one can see to the east side of that building, they do not become zomemim, and if not then they do become zomemim.
  Isn't this obvious? You might have thought we would take into account [the possibility] that he had extremely good eyesight. This [Rava] comes to teach us [that we don't worry about that possibility].
  And Rava also said, If two [witnesses] come and say, In we witnessed a murder in Sura [a town] on Sunday morning, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first set] was with us on Sunday evening in Neharda [a town], we see if from morning to evening one can travel from Sura to Neharda, then they do become zomemim, but if not then they do not become zomemim.
  Isn't this obvious? You might have thought... we would take into account [the possibility] that he had used an extremely fast method of transport [Lit. a flying camel]. This [Rava] comes to teach us [that we don't worry about that possibility].
  And Rava said, If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed a murder on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the murder did happen on Monday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the murder occurred on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found guilty of death.
  What is this [statement of Rava] coming to reach us?  We [already] learned this in a mishna. "Therefore, if one of the [two groups that testified someone was liable for the death penalty] is found to be zomemim, he [the person they were testifying against] and they [the zomemim] are executed, and the second [group of witnesses, who haven't been found to be zomemim] is free.
  He [Rava] needs to say it for its ending which talks about [after the] verdict having a different rule If two [witnesses] come and say that they witnessed the court issue a guilty verdict [for the death penalty] on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the verdict was given on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say, the verdict  occurred on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not executed [as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found guilty of death.
  And [we find a] similar [rule] with regard to paying a fine. If two [witnesses] come and say that a person stole [an animal], and slaughtered or sold it on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal and slaughter or sell it on Monday,
  and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal] and slaughtered or sold it  on [the previous] Friday, they [the first group of witnesses] are found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was not yet found liable to the fine.
  If two [witnesses] come and say, A person stole [an animal], slaughtered or sold it, and had a [guilty] verdict on Sunday, and two [other witnesses] come and say that you [the first group] were with us on Sunday, but the person did steal the animal, slaughter or sell it, and receive a [guilty] verdict on [the previous] Friday, and even if they [the second group of witnesses] say that the person stole [the animal], slaughtered or sold it, and received a [guilty] verdict  on Monday, they [the first group of witnesses] are not found liable to pay [the intended fine as zomemim] because at the time that they testified, the man [the accused] was already found liable to the fine.
  Rabbi Yehuda says this is a plotting group etc.:
  
  Daf 5b
  
  If this [the second group of witnesses] is a plotting group, and even the first group shouldn't be executed. Rebbi Abahu says, [The case in the mishna is] when they were already executed.
  But what happened already happened? [and there isn't anything else that we could do either-way] Rather Rava says that this this is what the mishna is saying, If there is only one group it gets executed, if there are more than they don't get executed. But the mishna used the word "belvaad" [only]?  It's a question.
  There was a woman who had brought in witnesses who were find to be liars, [and she] had brought in [a second set] of witnesses who were [also] found to be liars. She went and brought in author set [of witnesses] who were not find to be liars. Reish Lakash said, She has been established [as someone who brings in false witnesses]. Rebbi Elazar responded, does the fact that she has been established [as bringing in false witnesses] cause all of Israel to be established [as being false witnesses]!? 
  At a different time they [Reish Lakash and Rebbi Elazar] were sitting before Rebbi Yochanon and this story came before them. Reish Lakash said, She has been established [as someone who brings in false witnesses]. Rebbi Yochanon responded, does the fact that she has been established [as bringing in false witnesses] cause all of Israel to be established [as being false witnesses]!?  He [Reish Lakash] then proceeded to look at Rebbi Elazar crossly. He said [to Rebbi Elazar], You heard this from the blacksmith's son [Rebbi Yochanon], and you didn't say it over in his name?!
  Let's say that Reish Lakash [the woman is established to bring in false witnesses] holds like Rebbi Yehudah [It's a plotting group] and Rebbi Yochanon [not all of Israel has been established] holds like the Rabbis [all the witnesses are executed].
  Reish Lakash would say to you, I can even say like the Rabbis, that the Rabbis only said [that we trust the witnesses] over there because there wasn't anyone seeking them out. But here there is one [the woman] seeking out the witnesses.
  And Rebbi Yochanon would say to you, I can even say like Rebbi Yehudah that Rebbi Yehudah only said [that we don't believe the witnesses] over there, because we can't expect the whole world to have been by them [the same two witnesses]. But over here [by this woman], these [witnesses] knew their testimony, and these [witnesses] did not know their testimony.
  MISHNA: Zomemim witnesses are nut executed until they succeed in having a verdict given for their victim. Because the tzudukim had said, Until they succeed in having their victim executed like the Torah says (Deuteronomy 19,21) "A soul for a soul".
  The Sages said to them, But the Torah already says (Deuteronomy 19, 19), "And you should do to them [the zomemim] as they had plotted to do to their brother", which would imply that their brother [the victim] is still alive. If  so then why does [the Torah] say, "a soul for a soul"?  You  might think that they [the zomemim] would be liable to be killed from the time that their testimony was accepted, Therefore the Torah says "a soul for a soul" to teach us that they [zomemim] aren't executed until they succeeded in having a verdict [for their victim].
  GEMARA: We learned [in a beraisa], Beribi says, If the witnesses didn't succeed in having their victim killed they are executed if they did succeed in having him killed they aren't executed. His father asked him, My son isn't this a fortiori? [which would imply the opposite ruling]
  He answered him, You taught us, our rebbi, that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori.  We see this in a beraisa [From what the Torah says,] (Leviticus 20, 17) "If a man should take his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother", I can only derive [that a person is forbidden from] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the prohibition for] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The Torah teaches us this with the words ערות אחותו גילה.
  Without these words, I would still be able to derive it [punishment for a full sister] with a fortiori, If one gets punished for the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother], shouldn't he certainly [be punished] for the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? Thus we see that one cannot derive a punishment from a fortiori.
  We see [the source for being unable to derive] punishment [from a fortiori], but from where do we derive [the rule of not being  able to derive] a scriptural warning [from a fortiori]?  The  Torah says (Leviticus 18,9) "ערות אחותך בת אביך או בת אמך". [From this] I can only derive [a scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother]. From where can I derive [the scriptural warning against] the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? The  Torah teaches us this with the words (Leviticus 18,11) "ערות בת אשת אביך מולדת אביך אחותך היא".
  Without these words, I would still be able to derive it [the scriptural warning for a full sister] with a fortiori, If one gets a scriptural warning for the daughter of his father who isn't the daughter of his mother [half-sister from the father] and the daughter of his mother who isn't the daughter of his father [half-sister from the mother], shouldn't he certainly [be scripturally warned] for the daughter of his father and the daughter of his mother [his full sister]? Thus we see that one cannot derive a scriptural warning from a fortiori.
  From where do we learn this rule [that zomemim aren't liable if the victim had no verdict] by lashes? The Torah uses a gezariah shava of Rasha Rasha
  From where do we learn this rule [that zomemim aren't liable if the victim had no verdict] by exile? The Torah uses a gezariah shava of Rotzaich Rotzaich
  We learned in a beraisa: Rebbi Yehudah ben Tavai said I will not seek comfort until I execute a zommeim witness, to go against the Tzudukim, who say zommemim witnesses aren't executed unless they succeeded in having their victim executed.
  Shimon ben Shatach said to him, I will not seek comfort if you continue to spill innocent blood. That the sages say, zommemim witnesses aren't executed until they both become zommemim, and they also don't receive lashes until they both become zomemim.
  Immediately Rebbi Yehudah ben Tavi accepted upon himself to only issue halachic rulings in front of Shimon ben Shatach, and for all the remaining days of Rebbi Yehudah ben Tavi, he would prostrate himself on the grave of that witness, and his voice would ring out. And the passerby thought to themselves, saying that it was the voice of the killed. He told them, it's my voice. I'll bring you a proof, that tomorrow when I die the voice will no longer be heard.
  Rav Acha the son of Rava said to Rav Ashi perhaps, they took their argument up [to the heavenly court], or maybe he appeased him.
  MISHNA: (Deuteronomy 17,6) "By the mouth [the testimony] of two witnesses or three witnesses the [perpetrator] shall surely be put to death." If the testimony can be established with two [witnesses], why does the Torah specify three?  Rather, the Torah is juxtaposing (three to two). Just as three [witnesses] can make two [witnesses] into zomemim, so too two [witnesses] can make three [witnesses] into zomemim. And from where do we know [that two witnesses can] even [make] one hundred [witnesses into zomemim]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
  Rebbi Shimon says, Just as two [witnesses] aren't executed unless they are both zomemim, so too three [witnesses] aren't executed unless all three of them are zomemim. And from where do we know even one hundred [witnesses all must be zomemim for any to be executed]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
  Rebbi Akiva says, The third [witness] isn't coming to make things lenient, but rather to make things more stringent upon him, and make his fate like theirs.
  And if this is how the Torah punishes to one who facilitated the doing of a transgression like the ones transgressing, how much more so will the Torah grant reward to those who facilitate the doing of a mitzvah like the ones doing the mitzva.
  And just as by two [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed, so too by three [witnesses] if one is found to be relative or disqualified, the whole testimony gets dismissed.  And from where do we know that even [the testimony of] one hundred [witnesses can be dismissed if one is found to be relative or disqualified]? The Torah teaches us this with the word "Witnesses".
  
  Daf 6a
  
  Rebbi Yosi says, In what are these words [that one disqualified witness can disqualify three] said? Only by capital cases, but by monetary cases the testimony can be maintained with the remaining [two witnesses]. Rebbi says, This [ruling] applies by both monetary cases and capital cases.
  But when [does it apply]? Only when they [the witnesses in question] had warned the perpetrator. But [if it would] apply in a time when they [the witnesses in question] had not warned the perpetrator, then what would two brothers who together witnesses a murder be able to do?
  GEMARA:Rava says, and this [that one can disqualify the whole group of witnesses] is only when they all testified בתוך כדי דיבור. Rav Acha mDifti said to Revina, let's see, how long is בתוך כדי דיבור? The amount of time that it takes for a student to greet his teacher. A hundred [witnesses] is too many [to all give testimony in this time slot]?! 
  He answered him, Each and every one of them testifies בתוך כדי דיבור of the previous witness. 
  Rebbi Akiva says the third on didn't come etc. and just as by two [one could disqualify the group] etc. Rav said to Rav Papa But now, let the victim [who is a witness to his own murder] save [the murderer from being executed]? [The case] is where he was killed from behind.
  Let the sodomized man save the sodomizer? Where he was sodomized from behind.
  Let the murderer and the sodomizer save them selves? He was silent. When he came before Rava, [Rava] told him, (Deuteronomy 19, 15) "The matter should be established" implies that the Torah is exclusively referring to those who establish the matter.
  Rebbi Yosi says, in what were these words said? etc. what should two brothers do? etc.: What do we say to the witnesses?
  Rava answered, this is what we say to them, Did you come to see or did you come to testify?  If they respond that they came to testify, then if one of them is found to be a relative or a disqualified [witness], the whole [group of] testimony is dismissed. But if they respond that they came to see, [then they can't disqualify the whole group because otherwise] what should two brothers do who together witnessed a murder? 
  It has been said, Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel, The law follows Rebbi Yosi. And Rav Nachman says, The law follows Rebbi.
  
  Daf 6b
  
  MISHNA: If there were two [witnesses] observing from this window, and two [witnesses] observing from this window, and one warner in the middle, In a time where some of them [the witnesses] saw one another, it is considered one [group] of witnesses. And if [they do] not [see one another] then it is considered two [groups of] witnesses. Therefore, if one [of the two groups of witnesses] becomes zomemim, then he [the murderer] and they [the zomemim] are executed, but the second [group of witnesses] are exonerated.
  Rebbi Yosi says, A person is never executed unless he has two witnesses warn him, as the Torah says (Deuteronomy 17, 6), "by the mouths of two witnesses". Another interpretation of "by the mouths of two witnesses" is that the court cannot here a case through an interpreter.
  GEMARA: Rav Zutra bar Tuvia said in the name of Rav, From where is it derived that a individual testimon[ies i.e separated]] isn't valid? That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 17, 6), "he shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness". What does the Torah mean with the word "one"? If it meant literally one witness, then I would know that from the beginning of the verse which says, "by the mouth of two witnesses". rather what does "one" mean? One and one. [separated]
  A beraisa taught this as well, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", this comes to include the case of two [witnesses] that witness [a murder], one from this window and one from this window without then seeing one another, that they do not combine. And not only that, but furthermore, [the case of] one [witness] after the other from the same window do not combine.
  Rav Pappa asked Abayi, Now that we've established that they [the witnesses] do not combine [in the case of] one [witness] from this window and one [witness] from this window where this [witness] observed the entire action and this [witness] observed the entire action, Do we need to say [the case of] one [witness] after the other [from the same window] where they each only observed half of the action?  He answered him, We only need it for [the case of witnesses to] a cohabitation.
  Rava says, If they [the two witnesses] saw the warner or the warner saw them, they combine. Rava says, This warner that we mentions can even be himself, and can even be a demon.
  Rav Nachman said, Individual testimonies are valid by monetary cases, as the Torah says, "He shall not be executed by the mouth of one witness", which implies that only by capital cases are [individual testimonies] not valid, but by monetary cases they are valid.
  Rav Zutra asked a question, But now let us ave him ny capital cases as well [which we are more lenient by]. So why do we learn in a Mishna, He and they are executed? It's a question.
  Rebbi Yosi says, etc.: Rav Papa asked Abaii, And does Rebbi Yosi indeed adhere to that logic? But we learned in a mishna, Rebbi Yosi says, An enemy is killed, because he is like someone who had purpose and was warned.
  He answered That was Rebbi Yosi bar Yehuda, That we learned in a beraisa, Rebbi Yosi bar Yehudah says, A sage does not require a warning because a warning is only given to differentiate between purpose and accident.
  Another interpretation of, by the mouth of two witnesses is that the court cannot hear a case through an interpreter. etc.: There was these foreigners that came before Rava; Rava appointed an interpreter between them. But how was he able to this? We learned in a mishna, That the court cannot hear a case through the mouth of an interpreter? Rava knew what they were saying, but he did not know how to answer back.
  
  Daf 7a
  
  Illah and Tuvia were relatives of the guarantor. Rav Papa had thought to say, [They should be valid witnesses because] regarding the creditor and the borrower they are unrelated. Rab Huna brei dRav Yehushua said to Rav Papa, If the borrower doesn't have [the funds] won't the creditor go to the guarantor? 
  MISHNA: One has had a verdict and then flees and comes before a different court, we do not retry his case. Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed.
  We establish courts both in Israel and in Diaspora. A court that executes once in seven years is called a "killing [court]" Rebbi Eliezer ben Azarya says, Once in seventy years. Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva say, If we were in court no one would ever get executed. Raban Shimon ben Gamlial responded, Then you would be increasing murder in Israel.
  GEMARA: Only before the same court is when his case is not retried, but brute a different court his case is retried. But the latter part of the mishna teaches, "Any circumstance where two witnesses get up and say that they testify about a certain man that he had his verdict in this-and-this court and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, that person gets executed."? 
  Abaye answered, It isn't a contradiction. Here [where we retry the case] is in Israel; here [where we do not retry the case] is in Diaspora.
  Like we learned in a beraisa, Rebbi Yehuda ben Dostai says in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Shetach, If he ran from Israel to Diaspora, we do not retry his case; if he ran from Diaspora to Israel, we do retry his case due the merit of Israel.
  We establish courts...etc.: From where do we derive these words? That the rabbis thought in a beraisa, (Numbers 35,29) "And these should be for you as laws for your generations". This teaches us that courts are established both in Isreal and in Diaspora.
  If so then why does the Torah say (Deuteronomy 17,8) "In your gates"? In your gates [Isreal] you should set up courts in each and every district and in each and every city, but in the Diaspora you should set up [courts] in each and every district but you should not set up [courts] in each and every city.
  A court that executes...etc.: They inquired, Is it [executing] once in seventy years that acquires then the name "killing court", or maybe that is the acceptable amount [and more than that is what gets the name]?  Let [the question] stand.
  Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva said, If we were part of court...etc.: What would they have done? Rebbi Yochanon and Rebbi Elezer said together, [they would ask the witnesses,] did you see if the victim was a Terefah or viable?
  Rav Ashi says, If it came out that they said that they saw that the victim was viable [prior to being killed, they would say that] maybe in the place that the sword entered there was a hole.
  By a cohabitation related crime what would they do? Abaye and Rava said together, Did you see [the equivalent] of a brush being out into a tube? And what would the Rabbis do [to execute in such a case]? They would go like Shmuel, that Shmuel says, They are sinners when they act in a manner like sinners.
  We will return to you, "How are witnesses"
  Mishnah: These are the exiles: One who kills someone accidentally. One was rolling with a roofer and it fell on him [a passerby] and killed him; one who was pulling up a barrel and it fell on him and killed him; one who was descending a ladder and it fell on him and killed him—[in all these cases] behold he is exiled. However, if he was pulling with a roofer and it fell on him [a passerby] and killed him; or he was lowering a barrel and the rope broke and it [the barrel] fell on him and killed him; 
  
  Daf 7b
  
  [Or] if he was ascending on a ladder and if he fell and killed him, this one is not [liable for] exile. This is the general rule: Anyone on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile. Anyone that is not on his way down, [that person is liable for] exile.
  Gemara: From where is it derived [that downward motion that kills someone is punished by exile]? Shmuel said that the verse said: “And he cast it upon him, and he died” (Numbers 35:23) [meaning] until it falls in the way of falling. 
  Our Rabbis taught [in a baraita]: “Through error” (Numbers 35:11) this excludes acting willfully. “Without awareness” (Deuteronomy 19:4) this excludes intentionality. 
  Acting willfully is obvious! He is liable for death!? (Rather) Rava said: Say [instead: “Through error”] excludes the one who says it is permitted [to do a prohibited action]. Abaye said to him: If he is one who says it is permitted, [then he falls into the category of] one who had no choice. [Rava] said to him: It is because I say that the one who said it is permitted [falls into the category of] one who was grossly negligent. 
  “Without awareness” (Deuteronomy 19:4) excludes intentionality. Intentionality is obvious! He is liable for death!? Rabbah said: This excludes [when] he intends to kill an animal and kills a person, [when he intends to kill] a Cutite and kills a Jew, [when he intends to kill] a stillbirth and kills a viable infant. 
  Our Rabbis taught [in a baraita]: “If he came upon him suddenly” (Numbers 35:22) this excludes a [case when someone turns quickly] around a corner. “Without hatred” (Numbers 35:22) excludes the one who hates [their victim]. “He pushed him” (Numbers 35:22) [means] when he pushed his body. “Or hurled upon him” (Numbers 35:22) includes downward motion that is for a need of upward motion. “Without lying in wait (tz’diyah)” (Numbers 35:22) excludes the one who intends [to throw something] to one side (tzad) and it goes to the other side. “And if one does not lie in wait (tzadah)” (Exodus 21:13) excludes the one who intends to throw [something] two cubits and he threw [it] four cubits.
  “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5) Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there.
  R' Abahu asked R' Yohanan a question: If a person was ascending a ladder and a rung broke under him and it fell and struck someone below and killed him, is this a situation of ascent [where he would be exempt] or descent [where he would be held liable]? He said to him: You've already touched on this [in an earlier baraita]—in a case of descending for the purpose of ascent [here, we mean that the rung is going downward for the purpose of the person ascending].
  He challenged him "This is the general rule: anything that is within a downward movement, [that person] is sent to exile. Anything not in a downward movement [that person who initiated the act] is not exiled." And what does this "anything not in a downward movement include?" Does it not include this case?! [where the rung is downward and you are moving up, where, according to this general rule, that person would not be culpable for the rung falling]. But according to your reasoning, [the rule that] anything that is in the way of descent includes what?!
  Does it not include a butcher? Here too, it also comes to include the case of the butcher— as it is taught in a baraita: a butcher who was cutting [meat]. One tanna teaches that [if he struck someone who was standing] before him, he would liable and [if the person was behind him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that [if he struck someone behind him] he would be liable and if [he struck someone before him], he would be exempt. Another tanna teaches that whether the person was before him or behind him, he would liable. And another tanna teaches that whether he was before him or behind him, he would be exempt. This is not a difficulty.
  Here [where he would be liable for the person standing before him but exempt if he were behind him] is when the knife is descending in front of him and ascending behind him. Here [where he is he is exempt for the person standing before him but liable for the person standing behind him] is when the upward motion is in front of him but the downward motion is behind him.
  Here [where he is liable in both situations] is when the downward motion is both in front of him and behind him. And here [where he is exempt in all cases] is when the upward motion is both in front of him and behind him.
  [Now we return back to the debate between R' Abahu and R. Yohanan about the case of the fallen rung]. Let us say this same issue was the matter of a Tannaitic debate: One who is ascending a ladder and a rung falls. One tanna taught that he is liable and another taught that he is exempt.  Was it not about this that they were disagreeing? One of them held that it was a case of descent [where he is liable] and one of them holds that he is ascending [where he is exempt].
  No [that's wrong], everybody agrees that it is a case of ascent. And this is not a problem [they still have a disagreement]. Here [one is talking about the issue of] damages [where he would be obligated to pay the compensation for damages caused] and the other [is talking about the issue of] exile [from which he would be exempted].
  If you want, say that both cases are talking about exile and there is [still] not a difficulty. They are disagreeing about it being rotten. Here, [where he would be obligated for exile] is when (the rung) is rotten. Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when it is not rotten.
  And if you want, say that they both agree that the wood was not rotten and it is [still] not a difficulty:  Here [where he would be exempt from exile] is when the rung has been fastened. Here, [where he would be liable] is when he did not fasten it.
  Mishnah: If the iron axe head slipped from its handle and it killed someone, Rebi says he isn't exiled, and the Sages say that he is exiled. If [a wood chip] from the tree broke off [and that wood chip killed someone], Rebi says he is exiled, and the Sages say that he isn't exiled.
  Gemar: It was taught: Rebi said to the Sages:  Does it say, "and the iron [flies off] from ITS wood?" Does it not only say "from the wood?" And furthermore, the word "wood" is said below and the word "wood" is said above. Just as the word "wood" is said above [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped, so too the word "wood" is said below [and refers to wood that comes] from the tree being chopped.
  Rav Chiyah bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Both [the Sages and Rebi] interpreted one verse. The iron breaks off from the wood [Ve'neshal]. Rebi holds that the transmission [how the written word appears in the text] is what matters, and 'Ve'Neyshal' it is written [the form of which implies that the phrase should be understood as meaning that the axe blade caused something else—i.e., a wood chip—to come loose], but the Sages hold that the pronunciation [how we actually read the word] is what matters and "nashal" we read [the form of which implies that the actual axe head flew off].
  But does Rebi hold that the transmission [how the written word appears in the text] is what matters?
  
  Daf 8a
  
  But it was stated: Rav Yitzhak bar Yoseph said [in the name of] Rabbi Yohanan: Rebi, and Rabbi Yehudah ben Roetz, and the School of Shammai, and Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Akiva, all of them hold that the pronunciation [how we actually read the word] is what matters! This is why Rebi said "and furthermore!" [He needed to give another reason because in general he does hold that pronunciation is what matters.]
  Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of dirt at a palm tree, and [the clod of dirt] knocked dates, and the dates fell and killed someone—[in this case] we have arrived at the disagreement between Rebi and the Sages! But this is obvious! Since you might have said that [the death in this instance is] like a case of secondary force, therefore this teaches you that this is not the case [and that this is a case where the death is a result of primary force, and therefore this case is parallel to the Mishnah].
  However, where can we find a case where Rebi [would exempt someone from exile] in an instance of secondary force? This is like [a case where] someone threw a clod of dirt and it struck a twig and the twig then went and hit a cluster of dates and the dates then fell and killed. 
  Mishnah: The one who throws a stone into the public domain and killed [someone], behold, he is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: If, from when the stone left his hand, another person stuck out their head and received [the stone and was killed], behold, he is exempt [from exile].  
  The one who threw a stone into his courtyard and he killed [someone], if there was permission for the victim to enter there, [the thrower] is exiled. And if [the victim does] not [have permission], he is not exiled. As it was said: “When a person comes upon his friend in a forest” (Deuteronomy 19:5). Just as in a forest it is permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there [because it is public space], so too [the same rules apply in] any [place where it is] permitted for the perpetrator and the victim to enter there, except the courtyard [in which] the owner has not given permission to the victim (or the perpetrator) to enter there.
  Abba Shaul says: Just as cutting wood is optional [for someone and therefore he should not be punished], so too, anything that is optional [should not receive punishment] except the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student [through beating], and the messenger of the court [who gives punishments through lashings].
  Gemara: [The one who throws a stone] into the public domain is an intentional [sinner]! Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall. He should have been paying attention! [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall at night. At night also, he should have been paying attention!
  [Rather this is in a case when] he is taking down his wall towards the garbage heap. This garbage heap, what is the case? If it is common for many [people] to be in it [the garbage heap], he is [considered] a criminal. If it is not common for many [people] to be in it, it is [considered a situation of] one who had no choice [meaning that it was a freak accident or totally unexpected].
  Rav Papa said: This is only necessary to teach [a case of] a garbage heap that is regularly used [as a bathroom] at night, and not one that is regularly used during the day, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there, [therefore] he is not a [considered] a criminal. [In a case] that it is not regularly used during the day, it is also not [considered] totally unexpected, because it is possible that someone will be sitting there.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says, etc. Our Rabbis taught [in a baraita]: And “and found [his neighbor]” (Deuteronomy 19:5) excludes the one who places himself [in danger]. From here [it follows that] Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov said: If, from when the stone left his hand, another person stuck out their head and received [the stone and was killed], he is exempt [from exile].
  Is that to say that “found” [means that the person] was already there from the outset? And pit them against each other [this baraita and the baraita that follows]: “And he found” (Leviticus 25:26) [This verse describes a case in which someone has a third party redeem a field because they do not have funds. If that person is trying to subvert the system and already has the money to redeem, he is not permitted to go through this process of including a third party] excludes [what was already] found, because he may not sell a far [field] and redeem it with [a field that is] close, [nor a field that is] bad and redeem it for a good [quality field].
  Rava said: here, the verse [in the second baraita] is according to its context, and there, the verse [in the first baraita] is according to its context. There, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as “he obtained it in his hand” (Leviticus 25:26). Just as he obtained it in his hand from now [meaning already in the past] so too, he also found from now [meaning already in the past]. Here, according to the context of the verse, “he found” is the same as the forest. Just as the forest something was there from the outset, so too, also [in the case of] “he found” something was there from the outset.
  The one who throws the stone, etc. One of the rabbis said to Rava: From what [basis are we stating the case] that he is cutting wood because it is optional? Perhaps he is cutting wood because [it is for a] sukkah or cutting wood [for the altar] (which would be a requirement and not an option), and even this, Scripture said, he should be exiled [for doing something required]?! He (Rava) said to him: since he found it cut and he does not cut [it himself], it is not a mitzvah, also now [regarding cutting wood] is not a mitzvah.
  Ravina challenges this to Rava: [this case] excludes the father who strikes his son, the teacher who rebukes his student, and the messenger of the court, lets say, that since [the child is already] learned, it is not a mitzvah [to strike his son], also now [regarding cutting wood] is not a mitzvah [and therefore not required]. There, even though he is learned, it is a mitzvah [to strike him], as it is written: ... “correct your son and he will please you. He will give delight to your soul.” (Proverbs 29:17).
  Rava returned and said: "I said nothing! [This is what I should have said:] 'When he comes with his friend into a forest' (Deuteronomy 19:5). What [does it mean] 'forest'? If he goes or if he didn't go [i.e. it's an optional act]. And if you were to think it were a mitzvah, could he be sufficient [in meeting his obligation] if he didn't go?"
  Rav Ada bar Ahavah said to Rava: "Is every case where it's written 'when (asher)' an optional action? From this [reasoning], 'When (asher) anyone has become impure fails to purify himself [they will be cut off from their people]' (Numbers 19:20)—if he wants to [touch a corpse], he can be impure, and if he doesn't want to he isn't impure; and a mitzvah corpse (of an unknown stranger) where it is not possible that [the finder] would become impure—would he be exempt [from the penalty of entering the Sanctuary while impure]?"
  "That is different, since the verse says:
  
  Daf 8b
  
  'He shall be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—[i.e.] in any case." [Hence in the case of the corpse impurity it is not optional like the chopping wood case].
  "But he [i.e. you, Rava] needs this [verse] for [a case like] this baraita?!: 'He will be impure' (Numbers 19:13)—to include a day immerser (one who is impure and has immersed but needs to wait until nightfall to be pure). 'His impurity is in him' (Numbers 19:13)—to include one waiting for atonement." He said to him: "I say [that I derive my position] from 'more (od)' (Numbers 19:13)." 
  There are those that teach this on the following (Rava's statement, instead of being related to inadvertent killing will now be compared to laws of shemitah). "From the reaping and the plowing you shall rest" (Exodus 34:21). Rabbi Akiva says the text did not need to speak of reaping and plowing of the seventh year as it already said, "your field, do not plant and your vineyard do not prune" (Leviticus 25:4). Rather, it is teaching (the first verse) that even the plowing of the year before shemitah (is forbidden as its produce) will go into the 7th year and the (sanctity of shemitah is applied) for the reaping of the 7th year that will go out (continue to grow) after the 7th year.
  Rabbi Yishmael says (his response because he sees the verse as referring to Shabbat): Just as plowing is optional (not a Mitzvah) so too reaping is optional (i.e. these acts are only forbidden on Shabbat if they are done voluntarily as opposed to for Mitzvah reasons). It excludes the reaping for the omer (offering) as it is a Mitzvah.
  A certain Rabbi asked Rava: From where do you know (really R. Yishmael) that this plowing is voluntary? Maybe it is plowing for the Mitzvah of the Omer and even in this case, God said, "you shall desist." He said to him: If he were to find the (field) already plowed, then he would not have to plow again.(Therefore), plowing is not a Mitzvah. 
  Ravina challenged Rava (all the cases to follow are where the person is in pursuit of a Mitzvah so they would not be punished with exile): This excludes the case of a father who strikes his son (and kills him inadvertently), and the teacher who rebukes his student (and inadvertently kills him) and the court agent (who inadvertently killed). So, why (is this a mitzvah to hit one's son, etc?). Let us say that since he was already learned (the son), it's not actually a Mitzvah to strike him (again) so here too, it is also not a Mitzvah.  (Rava:) There, despite the fact that he's already learned, it is still a Mitzvah to hit him, as it is stated, "rebuke your son and he will bring you rest."
  He returned and said: That which I said before is not a thing (I could have given a better answer). Reaping is similar to plowing. Just as with plowing, if one found already plowed material, he does not have to plow another, so too with reaping, if he found it reaped, he does not have to reap again. And if you should think (that reaping, as brought by the verse) is a Mitzvah, if he found grain, (would he) not have to still reap? (Rather), it is a Mitzvah to reap and bring (new grain).
  Mishnah: A father is exiled because of [killing accidentally] his son and the son is exiled by way of [killing accidentally] his father. Any person is exiled by way [killing accidentally] an Israelite and an Israelite is exiled by way of [killing accidentally] them except for a foreign resident. A foreign resident is only sent to exile for a [killing a fellow] foreign resident. 
  Gemara: "The father is exiled for his son."  But didn't you say (in an earlier Mishnah) that a father who strikes his son is not exiled? But he was learned (which is why he would be exiled, since it was not a hit of a Mitzvah). But you said, even when he is learned, it actually is a Mitzvah that he is doing [so he would not be exiled]. [Here, we're talking about when the father is a carpenter and his son] is a carpenter's apprentice [so he is just teaching him a trade—and he would not be exiled].
  Learning [to be] a carpenter's apprentice is a livelihood that he is teaching him! [Actually] he is teaching him another trade [that is not his livelihood—so striking and killing him inadvertently will result in exile). 
  "And the son is exiled by way of [killing accidentally] his father..." And they pitted the following: "One who strikes a person" (Numbers 35:11) excludes one who strikes his father! Rav Kahana says: It is not a difficulty. This [is the opinion] of Rabbi Shimon and this [is the opinion] of the Rabbis.
  According to Rabbi Shimon who says strangulation is more severe than decapitation [in the realm of punishment]. So, for the unwitting sin [in which, if he committed it intentionally, he would be punished with] beheading, he is given atonement [through exile]. But, an unwitting sin [which, if were done intentionally, would be punished with] strangulation, is not given atonement [through exile].
  For the Rabbis who say beheading is more severe than strangulation: one who inadvertently kills his father, this is inadvertent sin [that would be punished, if done intentionally, with] beheading, so such an inadvertent sin would be given atonement [through exile—so this is the opinion of our Mishnah].
  Rava says:... [This case of non-exile for a son] is when he just hits [wounds] his father inadvertently. Since, you may have thought that if he would have killed him intentionally, he would be executed, then let him also be so in a case of inadvertent striking, this comes to teach us [that no, in fact, exile is specifically in cases of inadvertent killing and not striking/wounding].
  "Everyone is exiled by way of [killing accidentally] an Israelite." "Everyone is exiled by way of [killing accidentally] an Israelite." To include what?  To include a slave and a Samaritan.  We have already taught about this as they taught in a baraita: A slave and a Samaritan are exiled or lashed by way of [committing a crime against] an Israelite. And an Israelite is exiled or lashed by way of a slave or Samaritan.
  This works out well if a slave or Samaritan is exiled by way of an Israelite or lashed. [He is exiled in a case where] he killed him [accidentally] and lashed [in a case where] he cursed him. But an Israelite who is exiled or lashed by way of Samaritan?! It works well with exile [in a case where] he killed him [accidentally]. But lashing, why? [If you say] because he cursed him, "the chieftain of your people do not curse" (Exodus 22:27)! [I.e. a Samaritan is not on of your people and thus this prohibition for which the punishment is lashes should not apply in this case]
  Rather, Rav Aha son of Yaakov said: It's a case where he [the Israelite] testified against him [the Samaritan that he would be liable for lashing] and he was found guilty of falsely testifying [so whatever punishment he tried to give the Samaritan, he would suffer]. Similarly regarding a slave who testified against [an Israelite that would be punished with lashes] and was found to be a false witness—can a slave even give testimony?! [Therefore, this solution must be wrong because this half of the baraita doesn't make sense]. Rather, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: Here is what we are dealing with [where slave and Samaritan are lashed because of Israelite]: a case where he struck him with a wound
  
  Daf 9a
  
  that does not [even] have the value of a perutah. As Rabbi Ami said Rabbi Yohanan said: One who strikes and makes a wound that is not worth a perutah is lashed. And we do not make an analogy from striking to cursing.
  "Everyone gets exiled for killing an Israelite accidentally, and vice versa] except through [killing accidentally] a foreign resident." Therefore, a foreign resident is [considered] an idol worshiper! But read the end [of the Mishnah]! "A foreign resident is exiled on account of [killing accidentally] a foreign resident [which would imply that they aren't like idol worshipers as they actually get exiled]! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [where the punishment is exile] is where a foreign resident kills a foreign resident, and here [where he does not get exile] is where a foreign resident kills an Israelite.
  Some say that they contrasted the two verses together. It's written: "For the children of Israel, and for the foreign resident in your midst there shall be six cities" (Numbers 35:15). And it is written: "There shall be for you all cities of refuge" (Numbers 35:12)—for you—not for the resident foreigners! Rav Kahanah said: This is not a difficulty. Here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed an Israelite, and here [in the second verse] is where a resident foreigner killed a resident foreigner.
  They raised a contradiction [from a baraita]: Therefore, a resident foreigner and a idol worshiper who killed are put to death. This teaches that a resident foreigner is comparable to an idol worshiper! Just as in the case of an idol worshiper, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind—he is put to death; so too [in the case] of a resident foreigner, there is no difference if he killed one of his own kind or if he killed one who was not his own kind, he is put to death!
  Rav Hisda said: This is not a difficulty! Here [where he is exiled] is where he killed in a downward motion, and here [where he is not exiled] is where he killed in an upward motion. [I.e:] If [he killed him] in a downward motion, [in which case] an Israelite would be exiled, then exile should be enough for the [resident foreigner] as well. If [he killed him] in an upward motion, [in which case] an Israelite is exempt, then the resident foreigner is put to death. 
  Rava said to him: And is it not a kal vahomer (logical inference from a light to serious case)!? [This kal vahomer will show that your argument doesn't work]. Just as [in the case of] a downward motion an Israelite would be exiled, exile should be enough for a resident foreigner too; then [in the case of] an upward motion, an Israelite is an exempt, should [the resident foreigner really] be killed?!
  Rather, Rava said: [This is an instance where the resident foreigner] said that it was permitted. Abaye said to him: Someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] a freak accident?! He said to him: I say that someone who said that it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence.
  And they [Rav Hisda and Rava] go according to their principles, as it was stated [in an Amoraic teaching]: He thought that it was an animal and [after he killed him] it was found to be a person, or if he thought it was a non-Jew and it was found to be a resident foreigner, Rava says: He is liable. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] gross negligence. Rav Hisda says: He is exempt. One who says it was permitted is [a case of] freak accident.
  Rava raised an objection to Rav Hisda [from the following verse]: "Behold, you should die because of the woman you have taken" (Genesis 20:3) [regarding Avimelekh and taking Sarah as his wife when he thought that she was Abraham's sister]. Does this not mean that he should die at the hands of people?
  No, at the hands of heaven! There is also support, as it is written: "[I stopped you] from sinning against Me" (Genesis 20:6).
  [Rava:] But according to your reasoning, [regarding the verse about Joseph speaking of adultery says] "I sinned against God,"—against God and not against people! Rather, his judgment has been handed over to people. So too here, his judgment has been handed over to people.
  Abaya raised an objection to Rava: "Will You slay people even thought innocent? (Genesis 20:4)" [Avimelekh was innocent totally; he should not be punished]. [Rava:] There (God) responded to him, "And now return the man's wife for he is a prophet" (Genesis 20:7)
  
  Daf 9b
  
  [It was only because of the fact that Sarah was the] "Wife of a prophet" that he [Avimelekh] returned [her]. If he [Abraham] were not a prophet, he would not have returned [her]?
  Rather, it is like that which was said by Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahamni. For Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachamni said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This is what [God] said [to Avimelech] "But now return the man's wife"—in any instance. And regarding that which you said, "Will you slay people even though innocent" (Genesis 20:4)? Did he not tell me, "She is my sister!" [God]: He is a prophet, and from you one should learn, when a visitor comes to a city, regarding maters of food and drink you should ask him, but you should not ask him "is this your wife or your sister?"
  From here we learn that a descendent of Noah is put to death, because he should have learnt, but he did not learn.
  Mishnah: "The blind person is not exiled—words of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Meir says: He is exiled. The hater is not exiled. Rabbi Yose says: "The hater is put to death because he is like a forewarned [ox]". Rabbi Shimon says: "There are haters which are exiled and haters which are not. This is the rule: Anyone for whom it is possible to say that they knew they were killing is not exiled; that they didn't know they were killing, behold they are exiled."
  Gemara: Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: "'Without vision' (Numbers 35:23)—to exclude the blind person—words of Rabbi Yehudah. Rabbi Meir says: '"Without vision" (Numbers 35:23)—to include the blind person.'"
  What's the reason of Rabbi Yehudah? As it is written: "When he comes with his friend into a forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5)—even the blind person is included. "Without vision"—excludes him.
  And Rabbi Meir?: "Without vision"—to exclude [the blind person]. "Without knowledge"—to exclude. Thus its an exclusion after an exclusion, and an exclusion after an exclusion only includes.
  And Rabbi Yehudah?: "Without knowledge"—[this verse] comes to exclude the one who intends.
  "Rabbi Yose says: The hater is killed." etc. But they didn't warn him? [In order to be executed in Jewish law, one has to be warned that their action is punishable by death by two witnesses]. Our mishnah is Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah, as it is taught [in a baraita]: Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says: "A colleague does not need warning because warning was only given to distinguish between accidental and intentional." [And we assume that colleagues know the law and are thus, if sinning, sinning intentionally].
  Rabbi Shimon says: There is a hater that is exiled... etc. It was taught [in a baraita]: How [is it that] Rabbi Shimon said there are haters which are exiled and haters which are not exiled? If the rope breaks—he is exiled. If the rope slips—he is not exiled. [These seem to refer to cases in the first mishnah of the chapter].
  But it was taught [in a baraita]: Rabbi Shimon says: "He is never exiled until the handle slips from his hand." A difficulty of "breaking" on "breaking", and a difficulty of "slipping" on "slipping". [While the first baraita said one whose rope broke which resulted in an accidental death was exiled, here it implies that they would not be. Similarly, while the first baraita said that the rope slipping out of her hand would not make her liable for exile, the second quotes this as the only criteria. Thus there is a difficulty in both cases.]
  "Breaking" on "breaking" is not a difficulty—one is about the one who loves [i.e. who never hated the victim, who is exiled], the other about the hater [who is not exiled].
  "Slipping" on "slipping is not a difficulty—one is Rabbi, one is the Sages [from their disagreement above about the axehead].
  Mishnah: "To where are they exiled? To the cities of refuge—to the three that are across the Jordan, and to the three that are in the land of Canaan. As it is said, 'The three cities you will make across the Jordan and the three cities you will make in the land of Canaan' (Numbers 35:14). While they hadn't chosen the three [cities] in the land of Israel, the three across the Jordan were not effective at providing refuge, as it is said: 'Six cities of refuge will be for you' (Numbers 35)—when there are all six, they are effective at providing refuge as one.
  They prepared roads from each to the other, as it is said: 'Prepare yourself the road and split [the land] into thirds' (Deuteronomy 19:3).
  They handed them [the manslayer] over to two students of the Sages lest the [blood avenger] kill him on the road, and they spoke with him [the blood avenger]. Rabbi Meir says: 'He [the manslayer] could (even) speak for himself, as it is said: "And this is the word of the murderer" (Deuteronomy 19:4).'
  Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says: 'Originally, both unintentional and intentional [murderers] would rush to the cities of refuge, and the courts would send for them and bring them out of there [for judgement]. One who was liable for death by the court, they would put him to death; one who was not liable for death they would exempt him; one who was liable for exile, they would return him to his place, as it is said: "The congregation will return him to the city of his refuge" (Numbers 35:25).'"
  Gemara: Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: Moses set aside three cities across the Jordan. And opposite them, Joshua set aside [three cities] in the land of Canaan. They were arranged such that they resembled two rows in a vineyard: Hebron in Judah opposite Betzer in the wilderness; Shkhem on the mountain of Efraim opposite Ramot in Gilead; Kedesh on the mountain of Naftali opposite Golan in Bashan. And they divided [the length] into thirds so that they should be thirds: from the south to Hebron was like Hebron to Shkhem; from Hebron to Shkhem was like Shkhem to Kedesh; from Shkhem to Kedesh was like Kedesh to the north.
  Across the Jordan—three [cities]; in the land of Israel—three?! [How can such diverse sized populations need the same number of cities?] Abaye said: In Gilead [more generally a term for the other side of the Jordan], there were a lot of murderers.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  as it is written, "Gilead is a city of evildoers, akuva mi-dam [NJPS: tracked up with blood]" (Hosea 6:8). What is "akuva (ayin-kuf-vet) mi-dam"? Rabbi Elazar said: "That they would scheme [okvin (ayin-kuf-vet)] to kill people."
  But what [is the reason for the] difference between [those manslayers] on this side or that side [at the top or bottom of the land of Israel] such that [the cities of refuge] are far away, and [those] in the middle [between the cities] such that [the cities of refuge] are close? [Why do some people have to travel farther than others to get to the cities of refuge?]
  Abaye said: "In Shkhem there are also many murders, as it is written, 'The haveir kohanim [NJPS: gang of priests] is like the ambuscade of bandits, who murder on the road to Shkhem' (Hosea 6:9)." What is "haveit kohanim"? Rabbi Elazar said: "That they would join together to kill people like those priests who would join together to separate terumah [gifts to the priests] in the granary."
  And there are no more [cities, beyond the six]? But it is written, "And upon them you will make forty-two cities" (Numbers 35:6)! Abaye said: "Those [six] are effective in providing refuge whether the [manslayer] knew it or not. Those [forty-two] are only effective in providing refuge if they knew it; if they did not, they are not effective."
  But Hebron is a city of refuge?! But it is written, "They gave Hebron to Caleb as Moses had said" (Judges 1:20)! Abaye said: "The outskirts [were given to Caleb], as it is written, 'The field of the city and its courtyards were given to Caleb son of Yifneh' (Joshua 21:12). [The city itself was made into a city of refuge]."
  But Kedesh is a city of refuge?! But it is written, "The fortified towns: Tzidim, Tzar and Hamat, Rakat and Khineret... and Kedesh, and Edrai and Ein Hatzor? (Joshua 19:35-37)" [which means that Kedesh is a fortified town]. And it is taught [in a baraita]: "Those cities [of refuge]—make them neither small villages nor large cities but medium-sized towns"?! [Which means that Kedesh cannot be a fortified town and still qualify as a city of refuge]. Rav Yoseif said: "There were two Kedesh's." Rav Ashi said: "Like Seleucia and the acropolis of Seleucia." [Kedesh had a separate, administrative section known as Kedesh as well as a distinct town called Kedesh, like the case we know of in Seleucia].
  The main [text]: "Those cities [of refuge]—make them neither small villages nor large cities but medium-sized towns. And don't set them up except in a place of water; if there is no water, then bring to them water. And don't set them up except in a place of market streets. And don't set them up except in a place [where there are] guard legions; if the legions get reduced, add to them. If the residencies get reduced, bring to them priests, Levites and Israelites.
  'And don't sell in them [the cities] weapons or traps'—words of Rabbi Nehemyah; but the Sages permit [it]. But they agree that they don't spread in them traps and do not weave in them ropes in order that that leg of the blood avenger should not be found there [in the city]."
  Rabbi Yitzhak said: "What is the [meaning of] the verse: 'And he will flee to one of these cities and live' (Deuteronomy 4:42)? We make him [the manslayer] something that can be his livelihood [in the city of refuge]."
  It was taught [by a tanna]: "A student that is exiled—they exile his teacher with him." As it is said, "and live" (Deuteronomy 4:42)? We make him [the manslayer] something that can be his livelihood [in the city of refuge]. Rabbi Z'eira said: "From here [we learn] that one should not teach a student that is not discerning."
  Rabbi Yohanan: "The teacher that is exiled—they exile his yeshiva with him." Is this so?! But Rabbi Yohan said: "From where [do we learn] that the words of Torah are effective at providing refuge? As it is said: 'Betzer in the wilderness...' (Deuteronomy 4:43), (and afterwards it is written) 'And this Torah' (Deuteronomy 4:44)"?! [I.e., why is a teacher being exiled at all? Why don't the words of Torah protect him?].
  Not a difficulty. This one [the second statement] is [a case where] he is currently occupied with it [the Torah], and that one is [a case where] he is currently not occupied with it.
  And if you want to say [another solution]: What [does Rabbi Yohanan mean when he says the words of Torah] are effective at providing refuge? [Refuge] from the angel of death. For when Rav Hisda was sitting and studying in the yeshiva, the messenger, the angel of death, was not able to come near him since his mouth was never quiet from his learning. He climbed and sat on the cedar tree of the yeshiva. The cedar broke and he was silent, and [then] the [angel of death] was able [to take him].
  Rabbi Tanhum bar Hanilai: "Because of what did Reuben merit to be counted in saving (hatzalah) first? [I.e. Why is Reuben's city mentioned first in the list of cities of refuge?] Because it was he who opened with saving (hatzalah) first, as it is said: 'Reuben heard [what his brothers had decided to do to Joseph] and he [decided to] save him (va-yetzileihu) from their hands (Genesis 37:21)."
  Rabbi Smalai expounded: "What is that which it was written, 'Then Moses separated three cities across the Jordan in the east (mizraha shamesh)' (Deuteronomy 4:41)? The Holy Blessed One said to Moses: 'The sun will rise (hizrah shemesh) on the murderers.'" There are those who say: "[God] said to [Moses]: "You caused the sun to rise (hazrahta shemesh) on the murderers."
  Rabbi Simai expounded: "What is that which is written, 'One who loves money will not be satisfied with money, nor one who loves wealth with income' (Ecclesiastes 5:9)?  'One who loves money will not be satisfied with money'—that's Moses our teacher, who knew that the three cities across the Jordan would not be effective at providing refuge until the three in the land of Canaan were chosen, but he said: 'A mitzvah has come to my hand and I will fulfil it!' [Understanding 'money' here to be 'mitzvot].
  'Nor one who loves wealth (hamon) will have income (t'vu'ah)'—for whom it is fitting to teach in public (hamon)? One who all of the reward (t'vuah) is his." [This drash plays on ambiguity in the Masoretic text between lamed-aleph ("lo" as in "no") and lamed-vav ("lo" as in "his")]. And this is [similar to] what Rabbi Elazar said: "What is that which is written, 'Who can sing the mighty deeds of God, [who can] recount all His praises?' (Psalms 106:2)? For whom is it filling to sing the mighty deeds of God? To the one who is able to recount all His praises."
  And the Rabbis (and some say Rabbah bar Mari) say: "Who loves wealth, that is his reward? Anyone who loves to teach in public—that is his reward." The rabbis put their eyes on Rava son of Rabbah.
  (Pneumonic: Ashi lilmod, Ravina lelameid). Rav Ashi said:
  "Anyone who loves to learn in public, that is his reward." And this is [similar to] what Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Hanina said: "What is that which is written, 'The sword on the sorcerers (badim), that they be made fools of!' (Jeremiah 50:36)? A sword on the necks of those who hate the students of the Sages who sit and busy themselves with Torah alone (bad ve-bad). And that is not all, for they are foolish! It is written here 'that they be made fools of' (Jeremiah 50:36), and it is written there 'that we have done foolishly' (Numbers 12:11). And that is not all, for they are sinners! As it says, 'and that we have sinned' (Numbers 12:11)." And if you want to say from [that they are sinners] from here: "Princes of Zoan have become fools" (Isaiah 19:13).
  Ravina said: "Anyone who loves to teach in public, that is his reward." And this [is similar to] what Rabbi said: "I have learnt a lot of Torah from my teachers, and my colleagues are greater than them—and my students are greater than all of them!"
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: "What is that which is written, 'Our legs were standing in your gates, Jerusalem' (Psalms 122:2)? Who causes our legs that they should stand in war at the gates of Jerusalem? Those who are occupied with Torah."
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: "What is that which is written, 'A song of ascents. Of David. I am happy for they tell me: "We will go to the house of the Eternal"' (Psalms 122:1). David said before the Holy Blessed One: 'Master of the Universe, I heard people saying: "When will this elder [i.e. me] die, and Solomon his son will come and build the Temple, and then we can go up [there] on food and I will be happy?"' The Holy Blessed One replied: '"One day in your courtyards is better for me than a thousand [days]" (Psalms 84:11). One day when you are occupied with Torah before me is better for Me than a thousand burnt offerings that in the future your son Solomon will bring to the altar!'"
  "And they prepared for them [the cities] roads..." etc. It was taught [in a baraita]: "Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov says:
  
  Daf 10b
  
  "'Refuge' was written at crossroads in order that the murderer would recognise it and turn to there [the cities]." Rav Kahana said: "What is [the meaning of] the verse: 'Prepare for yourself the road' (Deuteronomy 19:3)? Make for yourself preparations for the road." [The point is that "prepare"/"takhin" is a word that has multiple meanings. Rav Kahana is clarifying that it should be translated here as "prepare"].
  Rav Hama var Hanina began a sermon on this section from here: "'The Eternal is good and upright. Therefore, He shows the paths to sinners' (Psalms 25:8). If He shows [the paths] to sinners, all the more so to the righteous!"
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish began a sermon on this section from here: "'If he didn't lie in wait, and God guided his hand' [and he ends up killing accidentally] (Exodus 21:13). 'As the ancient proverb says, "from the wicked comes wickedness"' (1 Samuel 24:14). What is this verse referring to? With two people that killed someone—one killed accidentally, and one killed intentionally—but for neither of them were there any witnesses,
  the Holy Blessed One arranged one marketplace. The one who killed intentionally sits beneath the ladder, and the one who killed accidentally is descending the ladder, and he falls on him and kills him [the murderer]. That one who killed intentionally is killed, and that one who killed accidentally is exiled." 
  Rabbah bar Rav Huna said (and some say Rav Huna said that Rabbi Elazar said): "From the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings [we can learn that] on the road the a person wants to travel on [to the cities of refuge], they permit him to go.
  From the Torah, as it is written: 'Do not go with them' (Numbers 22:12); and it is written, 'Get up, go with them!' (Numbers 22:20) [regarding Bilaam]; from the Prophets, as it is written: 'I am the Eternal your God who teaches you for your profit, to lead you on the paths that you go' (Isaiah 48:17); from the Writings, as it is written: 'If he is of the scorners, he will scorn; and if he is of the poor, he will be given grace' (Proverbs 3:34)."
  Rav Huna said: "A murderer that is exiled to a city of refuge, and the blood avenger finds him and kills him—he is exempt." He [Rav Huna] thinks "And for him there is no death penalty" (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the blood avenger it is written. [Pay close attention to this verse and you will see that it's actually ambiguous, though at first it seems obvious what it means].
  They challenged [from a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the murderer the verse speaks. You say it's about the murderer or perhaps it's actually about the blood avenger? When it says, 'And he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:4)—thus [you would] say that the verse is speaking about the murderer." [Just as the earlier phrase "he didn't hate him" is clearly referring to the murderer, so too when the phrase appears in verse 6 it is also referring to the murderer. Thus the rest of the verse should also be read as referring to the murderer].
  He [Rav Huna] said according to this tanna, as it is taught [in a baraita]: "'And for him there is no death penalty' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—about the blood avenger the verse speaks. You say it's about the blood avenger or maybe the verse is actually speaking about the murderer? When it says, 'Since he didn't hate him recently' (Deuteronomy 19:6)—this is speaking about the murderer, [but then] how can I uphold 'and for him there is no death penalty'? [This should have been obvious because it has already been established by the fact that he's a manslayer!]. [Therefore], the verse speaks about the blood avenger."
  It was taught [in a Mishnah]: "They handed him [the manslayer] over to two students of the Sages lest he [the blood avenger] kill him on the road, and they will speak to him." Is it not so that they are warning him that if he kills [the manslayer] he would be liable for the death penalty?
  No! It is like as it is taught [in a baraita]: "And they speak to him words appropriate to him, saying to him: 'Do not do this practice of shedding blood! It was accidentally that the deed came to his hand!' Rabbi Meir says: 'He speaks for himself, as it is said: "And this is the word (davar) of the murderer" (Deuteronomy 19:4)' [lit. this is the matter (davar) of the murderer]. They [the rabbis] said to him: There is much that an agent can accomplish (that he alone would not be able to do).
  Mar [the tannah]  had just said, 'It was accidentally that the deed came to his hand' Isn't this obvious!? If it was willfully would he be subject to exile?  Yes,
  It's as was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yosi bar Yehuda says, Initially, both accidental [murderers] and wilful [murderers] would proceed to the cities of refuge, and the court would summon them from there,
  Whomever was liable to execution they would execute, as the Torah says (Deuteronomy 19,12), "and the elders of his city would and send for him, and take him from there, and place him in the clutches of the goal hadam, and he would die". Whomever was not liable, they would exonerate, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "and the congregation would save the murderer from the hands if the goal hadam". Whomever was liable for exile, they would return to his place, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "and that congregation will return him to his city of refuge which he had fled to".
  Rebbi says, They  exile themselves, because they had thought that both accidental and willful [murderers] are protected [by the cities of refuge], but the didn't know that only accidental [murderers] are protected and willful [murderers] aren't protected.
  Rebbi Elezar says, a city that is mostly murderers does not provide protection as the Torah says (Joshua 20,4) "And he should speak his matter into the ears of the elders city" And not that his matter should be the same as theirs.
  And Rebbi Elezar also said, a city that has no elders does not provide protection because we need "elders of the city", and they are lacking. It was said, a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It provides protection. And one says, It does not provide protection. According to the opinion that it doesn't provide protection, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it does provide protection, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
  And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can make a ben sorer omorer [a rebellious son]. And one says, It can not make a ben sorer omorer. According to the opinion that it can not make a ben sorer omorer, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can make a ben sorer omorer, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
  And a city that has no elders [is subject to a dispute between] Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Assi. One says, It can bring an eglah arufah [a decapitated cow]. And one says, It can not bring an eglah arufah. According to the opinion that it can not bring an eglah arufah, we need "elders of the city" and they are lacking. According to the opinion that it can bring an eglah arufah, it is just a mitzvah [to use elders].
  Rebbi Chama bar Chanina says, what was the reason that the section of murderers in the Torah was said in...
  
  Daf 11a
  
  In a harsh tone? That  it is written: (Joshua 20,1-2) "And the Lord spoke (דבר) to Yehoshua, saying, speak (דבר) to the children of Israel, saying, designate for yourself the cities of refuge that I had spoken (דבר) to you about." [It was written in a harsh tone] because it is if the Torah.
  Does this mean to say that all occurrences of the word "דבר" (speak) connotate a harsh tone? Yes, as the Torah writes (Genesis 42, 30) "The matter if the land spoke (דבר) to us harshly". But we learned [otherwise] in a baraisa, (Malachi 3,16) "They spoke (דבר)" there is no use of "They spoke (דבר)" except to connote a gentle tone. And so too it is said (Psalms 47, 4) "He will subdue people under us". דבר connotes one thing. ידבר connotes another thing.
  (A mnemonic: Rabbis, helpers, and scribes)
  Rebbi Yehuda and the Rabbis argue [as to why the passage if cities of refuge is written in a harsh tone]. One says, Because they delayed. And one says, Because they are of the Torah.
  (Joshua  24,26) "And Yehoshua wrote these words in the Torah scroll of God". Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Nechemiah argue [abut what "these words" refers to]. One says, The eight verses [that are after Moshe Rabeninu died]. And one says, [The passage of the] cities of refuge.
  It is understandable according to the opinion that it was the eight verses, as that would be why it says "in the Torah scroll of God". However according to the opinion that it was the cities of refuge, why does it say "in the Torah scroll of God"?  This is what it was saying, And Yehoshua wrote in his book these matters that were written in the Torah scroll of God.
  A [Torah] scroll that was tied with flax is subject to a dispute between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Meir one says, it is valid. And one says, it is invalid.
  According to the opinion that it is invalid [the reason is] that the Torah says (Exodus 13, 9) "In order that the Torah of God should be in your mouth" which compares the whole Torah to Tefillin. Just as Tefillin is a law from Moshe at [Mt.] Sinai to tie them with sinews, so too the whole [Torah] has to be tied with sinews. And the other [opinion holds], in what aspect was it compared? That it must be [from an animal] permitted to the mouth. For the rest of it's laws, it wasn't compared.
  Rav says, I saw the Tefillin of my uncle [Rebbi Chia], that they were tied with flax, but the law is not in accordance with him.
  MISHNA: The [high priest] anointed with the anointing oil, the [high priest] appointed through the vestments, and the [high priest] who stepped down from his position all return the murderer [from exile if they die]. Rebbi Yehuda says, Even the [high priest] anointed for a war returns the murderer [if he dies].
  Therefore the mothers of the [high] priests would prepare for the murderers food and clothing in order that they should not pray that their children would die.
  From where do we derive these words [that the murderer gets released by three types of high priests]?  Rav Kahana says, That the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25) "and he shall dwell there until the death of the high priest", and the Torah says (Numbers 35, 28) "for in the city of refuge he shall dwell until the death of the high priest", and the Torah also says, (Numbers 35, 28) "and after the death of the high priest".
  And [what is] Rebbi Yehudah['s reason]?  The Torah says elsewhere (Numbers 35, 32) "to dwell in the dwellings of the land until the death of the priest etc.". And [what does] the other opinion [do with this verse]?  From the fact that it doesn't say "high", it must be referring to one of [the three already mentioned].
  Therefore the mothers of the high priests etc.: The reason [that their mother's would distribute food] is so that they [the murderers] would not pray [for the high priests deaths]. This implies that if they would prey, they would die. But the Torah says, (Proverbs 26, 2) "Like a wondering sparrow, like a flying swallow, so too a curse in vain will not come"? An old man replied, From the lectures of Rava I heared that the reason was that he should have beseeched [God] for mercy on his generation and he didn't beseech [God].
  And there are others whom teach it [differently], "In order that they [the murderers] would pray that their children would not die". The reason [that the high priests don't die] is that they pray for them. This implies that if they wouldn't pray for them then they would die. But what should [the high priest] have done?! Here [in Babylonia] we say, "Tuvia sinned and Zigud gets lashes?!"
  There [in Isreal] they say, "Schem gets married and Mavgui must get circumcised?!"
  An old man replied, From the lectures of Rava I heared that the reason was that he should have beseeched [God] for mercy on his generation and he didn't beseech [God]. Like the incident of the person whom was devoured by a lion within three parsah's of Rebbi Yehoshua, and Eliyahu [haNavi] didn't visit him for three days.
  Rav Yehuda says in the name of Rav, A curse of a sage even if in vain will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]?  From Achitofel. That at the time when Dovid was digging the foundation [for the beis hamikdash], the [water of the] deeps rose up and threatened to destroy the world. [Dovid] asked, Is it permissible to write [God's] name on a shard and throw it into the deeps in order that [the water] should remain in its place?  There was no one who said anything to him. [Dovid] said, Whoever knows this matter and doesn't speak shall strangle by their throat.
  Achitofel reasoned to himself with a fortiori. He said to himself, If in regards to making peace between a man and his wife the Torah says, "My name that was written with holiness should be erased in water", then [in order to make peace] for the entire world is it not even more so?  [Achitofel] said to [Dovid], It is permissible. [Dovid] wrote [God's] name on a shard and threw it into the deeps. [The water] calmed and remained in its place.
  And even so, still it is written (Samuel 2 17,23), "and Achitofel saw that his counsel was not accepted, he saddled his donkey, he got up and went to his house and to his city, he gave order to his household, and he strangled himself etc."
  Rebbi Abahu says, The curse of a sage, even on an [unfulfilled] condition will be fulfilled. From where [is this derived]?  From Eli. That Eli said to Shmuel (Samuel 1 3, 17) "So will God do to you and so will he add on if you withhold from me anything". And even though it is written (Samuel 1 3, 18) "And Shmuel related to him all of the matter and did not withhold from him", it is still written (Samuel 1 8, 3) " And his sons did not follow in his ways etc.".
  
  Daf 11b
  
  Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, A ban made conditionally needs to be annulled. From where [is this derived]? From Yehuda. That the Torah says (Genesis 43, 9), "If you do not bring him back to me etc.". And Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rebbi Yonason, What is the meaning of the verse (Deuteronomy 33, 6), "Let Reuvan live and not die etc. And this is for Yehuda?!"?
  All forty years that Isreal was in the wilderness, the bones of Yehuda were rolloing in his coffin until Moshe got up and beseeched [God] for Mercy on him. [Moshe] said before [God], Master of the Universe, who caused for Reuvan to admit? Yehuda. (Deutermony 33, 7) "And this is for Yehuda?! Hearken, God, to the voice of Yehuda."
  His limbs returned to their sockets, but he could still not ascend to the hevenly accademy. (Deutermony 33, 7) "And return him to his people". He was still didn't know how get involved in the discussions of the rabbis. (Deutermony 33, 7) "Let hands fight for him" He didn't know how to answer questions. (Deutermony 33, 7) "And you should aid him against his enemies."
  They inquired, Is it with the death of all of [the types of high priest enumerated in the mishna] that [the murderer] returns [from exile]? Or maybe it's with death of any of them? 
  Come and learn [a proof from our mishna], If his verdict was concluded without a high priest, he never leaves [the city of refuge] for ever. And if it was true [that the death of any high priest would release him], let him return with [the death of] one of them. [The mishna was discussing a case were] there were no [other high priests].
  MISHNA: If after his verdict was handed down [but before he went exile] the high priest had died he does not go to exile. If before he was given a verdict the high priest died, and they appointed another one is his place, and then afterwards he had his verdict, he returns with the death of the second one. If he had his verdict whem their was no high priest or one who killed the high priest or a high priest who killed do not ever leave exile.
  And [a killer] can not go out [of the city of refuge], not to testify fro a mitzvah, not to testify for monetary cases, not to testify for capital cases. And even if Isreal needs him, and even if he is a great general of Isreal like Yoav ben Tzruyah, he can not ever go out, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "that he fled there". "There" shall be his dwelling. "There" shall be his death. "There" shall be his grave.
  Just as the city protects, so to it's boundary protects. A killer who went outside of the boundrary [of the city of refuge] and the goel hadam found him. Rebbi Yosi haGalili says, It's a mitzvah in the hands of the goel hadam [to kill him], and permitted for everyone else. Rebbi Akiva says, It's permitted in the hands of the goel hadam [to kill him], and everyone else is liable for [killing] him.
  GEMARA: What is the reason [that he doesn't go to exile if the high priest dies before he gets there]? Abaye says it's a fortiori, And just as someone who was already in exile goes out [with the death the high priest], then now, someone who never went to exile should certainly not be exiled. But maybe the one was exiled got an atonement, and the one who wasn't exiled didn't [get his atonement]?  Is exile the thing that grants atonement?  The death of the high priest is what grants atonement.
  If before his verdict was finalized, etc.: From where are these words derived [that he can go out with the new high priest's death]. Rav Kahana says, That the Torah says (Numbers 35, 25), "And he shall dwell there until the death of the high priest that he appointed with the holy oil". And did he [the murderer] appoint him? Rather, [the verse is referring to] this [high priest] that was annointed during his lifetime.
  What should [this high priest] have done [he was appointed after the murder]? He should have beseeched [God] for mercy that his judgement should find a merit, and he didn't beseech.
  Abaye says, we have a tradition, If one's judgment is finished and then dies [before reaching the city of refuge], we bring his bones there as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 32), "to dwell in the dwelling of the land until the death of the priest". And what type of dwelling is "in" the land? You must say this is [referring to] burial. It was taught, if he dies before the high priest dies, then we bring his bones to his ancestral graves [after the high priest subsequently dies] as the Torah says (Numbers 35,28), "the murderer should return to the land of his possession". What type of dwelling is "in the land of his possession? You must say this is [referring to] burial.
  If his judgment was finalized and subsequently the [high] priest was found to be the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah, the matter is subject to a dispute between Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Yitzchak Nafkah. One says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood died, and one says, [It is comparable to a case where] the priesthood got disqualified [retroactively].
  Let us say that they are arguing the same dispute as Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Yehoshua. That we learned in a mishna, If he [the priest] was standing and sacrificing upon the alter, acc it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who received chalitzah,  Rebbi Eliezer says, All of the sacrifices that he ever brought are [retroactively] disqualified. And Rebbi Yehoshua validates then.
  [Let's say that] the one who says [it's like] he dies [holds] like Rebbi Yehoshua, and the one who says [it's like] he got disqualified [holds] like Rebbi Eliezer.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  According to Rebbi Eliezer there is no disagreement, when us the disagreement? According to Rebbi Yehoshua. The one who says [it's like the high priest] died goes like Rebbi Yehoshua, And the one who holds[it's like t he high priest was] disqualified holds that Rebbi Yehoshua only held his opinion there [by the sacrifices] because the Torah says (Deuteronomy 33,11) "God shall bless his labor and accept the work of his hands" even the dissatisfied ones. But here even Rebbi Yehoshua would agree.
  If his judgement was finalized. etc.: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, Yoav made 2 mistakes in that time. As the Torah says (Kings 1 2, 28) "And Yoav fled to the tent of God, and grabbed on to the corners of the alter". He made a mistake, that only the roof protects and he graped the corners.
  He made a mistake, that only of the alter of the eternal Temple protects, and he grabbed on to the alter of [the Tabernacle] in Shiloh. Abaye says, In this also he made a mistake, that only a preist in the midst of the avodah is protected, and he was a Zar [a non-preist]
  Reish Lakash says, The Satan will make three mistakes as it is written (Isaiah 63, 1) "Who is this coming with stained garments from Batzra?". He made a mistake, that only Betzer protects, and he exiled himself to Batzra. He made a mistake, that only inadvertent murderers are protected and he was a deliberate murderer. He made a mistake, that only people are protected and he was an Angel.
  Rebbi Abahu says, Cities of refuge were not given for burial, as the Torah says (Numbers 35, 3) "And their open lands should be for their cattle, their flocks, and all of their livelihoods" For "life" they were given and not for burial. They inquired, "Their" (Numbers 35,25) implies that their should be his living there should be his death and there should be his burial. [so how can we say that cities of refuge aren't fit for burial]? A murderer is different because the Torah exiled him.
  Just like the city protects... etc.: And a contradiction, (Numbers 35, 25) "And he shall dwell there" "there" implies not in the boundary [so how can we say that the boundary also protects]? Abaye says, It is not a difficulty. Here [by our Mishna] it's referring to [receiving] protection. Here [by the verse in Numbers] it's referring to [not being permitted to] dwell.   
  [Is it needed to teach us that it's forbidden do] dwell [in the boundary of the city of refuge]? Derive that from the rule that we can't make a field into an open area, nor an open area into a field, nor an open are into a city, nor a city into an open area. Rav Sheises says, We only need [the verse] to teach us about tunnels. [that it's forbidden to dwell in an underground tunnel which extends into the boundary.]
  A murderer who exits the boundary etc.: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,27) "And the goel hadam will kill the murderer" [we can derive that] it is a mitzvah in the hands of the goel hadam. If there is no goel hadam, it's permissible for anyone else. These are the words of Rebbi Yossi Hagalili. Rebbi Akiva says, It's permissible for the Goel Hadam, and anyone else is liable [for killing the murderer].
  What is the reason of Rebbi Yossi Hagalili? [He would say,] does [the Torah] write, "If" he kills? And Rebbi Akiva? [He would say,] Does [the Torah] write, he "shall" kill?
  Mar Zutra bar Tuvia says in the name of Rav, If a murderer leaves the boundrary and the Goel Hadam finds him and kills him, he [the Goel Hadam] is executed. Who is this in accordance with? It isn't like Rebbi Yossi Hagalili nor like Rebbi Akiva?
  He says like the following Tanna, that we learned in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says, (Numbers 35, 12) "Untill he stands before a court for judgement" what is the Torah teaching us? Since it says (Numbers 35,27) "And the Goel Hadam will find the murderer" I might think that it means [he can kill him immediately] [therefore] the Torah teaches us "until he stand before a court for judgement"
  And what do Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Akiva and derive from (Numbers 35, 12) "until he stand before a court for judgement"? that [verse] is needed for [that which is taught] in a baraisa, Rebbi Akiva says, From where is it derived that a court which witnesses a murder cannot execute him [the murderer] until he stands before a different court? The Torah says "until he stands before a court for judgment" [which means] until he stands before a different court.
  The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], (Numbers 35,36) "If the killer shall surely go out" [from this] I can only derive [that he may be killed if he left] intentionally, from where [can I derive that he may also be killed if he left] inadvertently?  The Torah says "if he shall surely go out" (יצא יצא) [the word go out is repeated, which implies that he may be killed] in any event [even if he left inadvertently].
  But contrast that with a baraisa, [If he left] intentionally he is executed, [if he left] inadvertently he is [re-]exiled. It is not a difficulty, this [baraisa that says only an intentional leaving is penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah sometimes speaks in the vernacular, while this [baraisa that says only an inadvertent leaving is also penalized] is like the opinion that the Torah does not speak in the vernacular.
  Abaye says, It is logical according to the opinion that the Torah speaks in the vernacular, so that his end should not be more stringent then his beginning. Just like in the beginning [when he murdered] if it was intentional he is executed and if it was inadvertent he is exiled, so too his end [when he leaves the city of refuge] if it was intentional he should be executed and if it was inadvertent he should be [re-]exiled.
  One baraisa teaches, A father that killed, his son can become his Goel HaDam, and another baraisa teaches, His son cannot become his Goel HaDam. Let us say that this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbe Yossi HaGalili and this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is [like the opinion of] Rebbi Akiva.
  But I'd this logical?! Whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is a mitzvah [for the Goel HaDam to kill the murderer] or whether [one holds like] the opinion that it is permissible, is it permitted [for a son to kill his father]?  But Rabba bar Rav Huna said, and so too was taught in a baraisa of the academy of Rebbi Yishmael, For everything a son may not be made into an agent [of the court] against his father to hit him or curse him, except in the case of one who instigates [idolatry] upon which the Torah says (Deuteronomy 13,9) "do not spare him and do not conceal him".
  Rather it's not a difficulty, [because] this [baraisa that says the son cannot become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his son, and this [baraisa that says the son can become a Goel Hadam] is referring to his grandson.
  MISHNA: A tree which stands inside the boundary [of a city of refuge] but its branches extend outside of the boundary, or [a tree which] stands outside the boundary but its branches extend inside - everything goes after the branches.
  GEMARA: But note a contradiction [from a baraisa regarding maiser sheni, the 2nd tithe], A tree which stands inside [of Jerusalem] but its branches extend outside [the city], or [a tree] which stands outside but its branches extend inside, from the wall and inside is considered inside [with regard to redeeming maiser shenei], and from the wall and outside is considered outside.
  Are you asking a question on [cities of] refuge from maiser [shenei]!?  Maiser [shenei] the Torah made dependent on the wall [of Jerusalem]; cities of refuge the Torah made dependent on dwelling, in the branches one can dwell, in the truck one cannot dwell.
  But note a contradiction from maiser to maiser, that it was taught in a baraisa, By Jerusalem go after the branches, by cities of refuge go after the branches. Rav Kahana said, It's not a difficulty, This [second baraisa that says maiser goes after the branches is like] Rebbi Yehuda, and this [first baraisa that says maiser shenei goes after the wall is like] the Rabbis. That it [Rebbi Yehuda's opinion] was taught in a baraisa,
  
  Daf 12b
  
  Rebbi Yehuda says, Regarding a cave go after the opening, regarding a tree go after the branches.
  Say that you heard [this view ascribed] to Rebbi Yehuda regarding maiser [shenei when it would result in a] stringency. If the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches one may not redeem [the maiser shenei], so too on the trunk one may not eat redeem [the maiser shenei], If the trunk is inside and the branches outside, just as on the branches one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it, so too on the trunk one may not eat [the maiser shenei] without redeeming it.
  But with regards to cities of refuge [going after the branches doesn't always result in a stringency], it is understandable if the trunk is outside and the branches inside, just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may not kill him [the murderer], so too on the trunk he may not kill him. But if the trunk is inside and the branches outside [then it won't result in a stringency to say that] just as on the branches [the Goel Hadam] may kill him, so too on the trunk he may kill him, Because he is inside [the boundary]!? 
  Rava says, On the trunk everyone agrees that he may not kill him. If he is on the branches and [the Goel Hadam] is able to kill him with arrows and pebbles everyone agrees that he is able able to kill him.
  When do they argue? On whether the trunk may be used as a ladder to reach the branches. One opinion [Rebbi Yehuda] holds that the trunk may be used as a ladder to reach the branches, and the other opinion [the Rabbis] hold that the trunk may not be used as a ladder to reach the branches.
  Rav Ashi says, What does [Rebbi Yehuda] mean "after the branches"? Even after the branches.
  MISHNA: If one killed in that city [a city of refuge] he is exiled from neighborhood to neighborhood, And a Levite is exiled from city to city.
  GEMARA: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa],... (Exodus 21, 13) "And I have set aside for you a place etc." "And I have set aside for you" [implies] during your lifetime. "A place" [implies] from your place. "where he shall flee to" This teaches us that when Jews where exiled [while] in the wilderness, they would be exiled to the Levite camp.
  From here it was said, A levite that killed is exiled from district to district, but if he exiled himself to his own district, then his district protects [him]. Rav Acha brei dRav Ikka says, What is the meaning of the verse, (Numbers 35,28) "For in a city of refuge he shall dwell"? A city which previously afforded him protection.
  MISHNA: Similarly, if a murderer that was exiled to a city of refuge and the people of the city wish to honor him, he must say to them "I am a murderer". If they tell him "even so" he may except [honor] from them, as the Torah says, (Deuteronomy 19, 4) "and this is the word of the murderer"
  
  Daf 13a
  
  [The murderers] would have to pay up rent to the Levites [who inhabited the city of refuge]. These are the words of Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Meir says, [The murderers] would not have to pay up rent. And [upon release, the murderers] would return to their positions that they had held [prior to exile]. These are the words of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Yehuda says, [The murderers] would not return to their previous positions.
  GEMARA: Rav Kahana says, The dispute [in our Mishna] only concerns the six [primary cities of refuge]. That one opinion [Rebbi Yehuda] holds (Numbers 35,12) "For you" implies [only] for protection. And the other opinion [Rebbi Meir] holds "For you" implies for all of your needs. But by the forty two [additional cities of refuge] everyone agrees that [the murderers] would pay rent.
  Rava said to him [Rav Kahana], "For you" most definitively implies for all of your needs. Rather Rava says, The dispute concerns the forty two [additional cities of refuge], that one opinion [Rebbi Yehuda] holds (Numbers 35, 6) "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities only] with regards to protection. And the other opinion [Rebbi Meir] holds "and besides then you should designate" [implies] that they should be like those [the six primary cities]. Just as those [the six] are for all of your needs, so too these [the forty two] are for all of your needs. But with regards to the six [primary cities], everyone agrees that [the murderers] would not pay rent.
  He returns to the position that he had previously occupied etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa regarding a freed Jewish slave], (Leviticus 25,41) "And he shall return to his family and to his ancestral holdings he shall return" [this implies that] to his family he returns but that he does not return to his ancestral positions. These are the words of Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Meir says, He even returns to the positions of his ancestors [as the Torah says] "to his ancestral holdings" [which implies] like his ancestors.
  And similarly by an exile [because] when [the Torah] said [a second time] "he shall return" it was to include the murderer.
  What do we mean "and similarly by an exile"?  Like we learned in a baraisa, (Numbers 35,28) "The murderer shall return to his family and to his ancestral land" [this implies that] to his ancestral lands he returns but that he does not return to his ancestral positions. These are the words of Rebbi Yehuda. Rebbi Meir says, He even returns to the positions of his ancestors. [Rebbi Meir] learns [a gezaira shava of] שיבה שיבה from there [the Jewish slave].
  We shall return to you, Chapter "Aielu hein haGolen"
  MISHNA: And these are the ones who receive lashes. One who cohabits with his sister, with his father's sister, with his mother's sister with his brother' wife's sister, with his brother's wife, with his father's brother's wife, or with a nidda [i.e. a menstruating lady]. A  widow with a high priest, a divorcee or a arkham who received chalutzah with a regular priest, a mamzeres [i.e. illegitimate woman] or nasina [i.e. a Gibeonite woman] with an Israelite, the daughter if a priest with a nasan or a mamzer. [All of these aforementioned cohabitations are subject to lashes.]
  A  widow [who is] a divorcee [cohabiting with a high priest] is liable because of two prohibitions. A divorcee [who had also] received chalutzah [cohabiting with an ordinary priest] is only liable to one prohibition alone.
  [Continuing the list] someone who was impure and ate sacred food, or one who entered the Temple while impure, or one who ate chalev [forbidden fats], blood, noser [sacrifices left passed their allotted time], piggul [sacrifices offered with the wrong intentions], or impure foods.
  Or one who slaughtered and brought up an animal outside [the Temple]. One who ate chometz on Pesach, one who ate or did work on Yom Kippur, One who replicated the anointing oil, one who replicated the ketoras, one who anointed himself with the anointing oil, one who ate carcasses, treif animals, insects, or reptiles.
  One who eats tevel [untithed produce] or maiser reshon from which terumah was not separated or maiser shenei and hekdesh that were unredeemed.
  How much must one eat from tevel to be liable?  Rebbi Shimon says any amount, and the sages say one k'zais. Rebbi Shimon said to them [the sages], Will you not agree with me that one who eats an ant of any size is liable?  They responded, That is because it is in the form that it was created. He [Rebbi Shimon] said back to them, Also a kernel of wheat is in the form that it was created.
  GEMARA: Liabilities of kares are taught in our mishna, liabilities of court execution are not taught in our mishna. Who is the author of our mishna?  Rebbi Akiva. That we learned in a baraisa, Both liabilities of kares and liabilities of court execution
  
  Daf 13b
  
  Are subject to forty lashes. These are the words of Rebbi Yishmael,
  Rabbi Akiva says  liabilities of kares are subject to forty lashes for if he repents the heavenly court will forgive him. liabilities of court execution[, however,] are not subject to forty lashes for if he repents the earthly court can not forgive him.
  Rebbi Yitzchak says  liabilities of kares are included [in the punishment of malkus], but why is kares singled out by [the prohibition of cohabiting] with his sister? [To teach us that liabilities of kares] are only subject to kares but not malkus.
  What is the reason of Rebbi Yishmael? The Torah says (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "If you do not guard yourself to perform all of these laws" and (Deuteronomy 28, 59) "And G-d make wondrous (הפלאה) your plagues" I do not know what this word "הפלאה" means. But when the Torah elsewhere says (Deuteronomy 25, 2) "And the judge should cast him down and hit him before his face", then I must say that this word "הפלאה" means malkus. And the Torah said over there (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "If you do not guard yourself to perform all etc.". [showing that all prohibitions are punishable with malkus.]
  If so then not performing a positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? "If you do not guard yourself (תשמור)" was written, and [Rav Yitzchak holds] like what Rebbi Avin said in the name of Rebbi Illui, that Rebbi Avin said in the name of Rebbi Illui any place where the Torah uses the words, "השמר",  "פן", or "אל", it's referring to a negative commandment.
  If so then a prohibition not involving an action should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "to perform" is written.
  A prohibition remedied by an positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? [All malkus prohibitions must] similar to the prohibition of muzzling (Deuteronomy 25,4). [The prohibition of muzzling did not have a positive commandment to remedy it.]
  Now that we have arrived at this, all of the previous could have also [been answered by saying that they weren't] comparable to the prohibition of muzzling. 
  And what is Rebbi Akiva's reason [for saying that kares liabilities are not subject to malkus]? [The Torah says] (Deuteronomy 25, 2) "according to his wickedness" which implies that according to one wickedness you can punish him but that you can not punish him according to two wickednesses.
  And [what does] Rebbi Yismael [do with that verse]? Those words are referring to death and money or malkus and and money, but death and malkus is considered one long death.
  and according to Rebbi Akiva if so [that kdei reshaso prevents malkus by court execution] then liabilites of kares should also [not be subject to malkus]? What is his answer of if he repents, now, however,he hasn't [repented]?
  Rebbi Abahu answers, the Torah explicitly compared liabilities of kares to malkus that we learn out [through a gezaria shava] (Leviticus 20,17) "לעיני" from (Deuteronomy 25,3) "לעיניך". Rebbi Abba bar Mamal inquired, If so [that we can learn out to kares from a gezaria shava], then liabilities of court execution should also be [subject to malkus, as we should] learn out [through a gezaria shava]  (Numbers 15,24) "מעיני" from (Deuteronomy 25,3) "לעיניך"?
  We may learn out "לעיני" from "לעיניך", but we may not learn out "מעיני" from "לעיניך". But what is the practical difference? 
  It was taught in a barasia of the house of Rebbi Yishmael, (Leviticus 14, 39) "And the priest left (שיבה)", (Leviticus 14, 44) "And the priest came (ביאה)". This is "שיבה" and this is also "ביאה". [A gezaria shava can be made because they have the same meaning dispute being different words.]
  And furthermore, let us learn out "מעיני" from "לעיני", for "לעיני" was already learned out of "לעיניך"?
  Rebbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak accepted [as an answer], "According to his wickedness" according to one wickedness you can punish him, according to two wickednesses you cannot punish him. This rule it's only referring to punishments given by court [i.e. not kares].
  Rava[, who explains the dispute between Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yishmael differently,] says, If [the witnesses] warned him [the sinner that he would be liable] to court execution, then everyone would agree that he is not both flogged and executed. When do they disagree? When [the witnesses] warned him [that he would be liable] to malkus, for Rebbi Yishmael holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution can also be liable to malkus, and Rebbi Akiva holds that a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for court execution cannot also be liable to malkus.
  And according Rebbi Akiva, if so then by liabilites of kares also, [we also should] say that a a prohibition that has a scriptural warning for kares [cannot also be liable to malkus]. Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi that this is what Avimi from Hagronia had said in the name of Rava, liabilities of kares do not need a scriptual warning [to obligate one with kares, thus freeing the warning to teach malkus], for the Pesach offering and circumcision are punished [with kares for not performing them] even though they have no scriptural warning.
  But maybe the scriptural warning is necessary to obligate one to bring a conciliatory sacrifice, that Pesach and circumcision which don't have a scriptual warning also don't have a conciliatory sacrifice.
  There [by Pesach and circumcision] that isn't the reason [why one doesn't bring a sacrifice], rather it's because the whole Torah is compared to [the prohibition of] idolatry.  Just as idolatry is a "sit and don't do" [a passive prohibition] so to all [times that one is obligated to bring a conciliatory sacrifice] is by a "sit and don't do", which excludes these [Peasch and circumcision] which are each a "get up and do" [an active commandment]
  Ravina says, actually,
  
  Daf 14a
  
  [the dispute] is as we said previously, that [Rebbi Akiva's reason for giving malkus by liabilities of kares is that] if he repents the heavenly court will forgive him. What did you ask? That he hasn't yet repented? Kares is not definite. [He can still repent.]
  Rebbi Yitzhak says, Liabilities of kares were included [in the Torah's prohibition of malkus], only why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister [kares b'achoso]? To punish him with kares and not malkus.
  And why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister according to the Rabbis [Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva]? To [teach us that sacrifices are] separated [with regards to bringing a sacrifice for an inadvertent offence], as Rebbi Yochanon said that if a person did all [of these kares prohibitions] in one lapse of unawareness he is liable [to bring a chatos sacrfifice] for each and every one of them.
  And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak [who uses kares b'achoso to teach us that kares is not subject with malkus] derive the principle of separating? He derives it from (Leviticus 18,19) "And to a woman (אשה) impure by her uncleanliness", to make one liable for each and every woman.
  And let the Rabbis also derive it from here. Yes this is so[, everyone actually does derive the principle of separation from here]. So rather then why do the Rabbis need the verse of kares b'achoso for [if they aren't learning the principle of separation]? To make one liable [to three korban chatoses if he inadvertently cohabited in the same of lapse of unawareness] with his sister, his father's sister, and his mother's sister.
  This should be obvious!? They are separate bodies and they are separate prohibitions, [why do the Rabbis need a verse to teach us this?] Rather to make one liable [separate offerings for cohabiting with] his sister who is his father's sister, and who is [also] his mother's sister. And how can we find such a case, with a sinner the son of a sinner [re'shia bar re'shia. cf. Rashi].
  And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn [re'shia bar re'shia]? He learns it out from a kal v'chomer (fortiori), That it was taught in a barasia, Rabbi Akiva says, I asked Raban Gmaliel ad Rebbi Yehosua [while] in the meat market of Iemus, (that they had traveled to to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel's son), If one had [inadvertently] cohabited with his sister, who was his father's sister, who his mother's sister, what would the halacha be? Would he only be liable one sacrifice for all of them, or would he be liable [a separate sacrifice] for each one?
  They reponded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one labse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?
  And [the rabbis, who learn re'shia bar re'shia from kares b'achoso] would say that it is a flawed kal v'chomer, because what comparison can you make to niddah which involves separte bodies?
  And according to [Rebbi Yitzchak] also it is definitly a flawed kal v'chomer, rather then [Rebbi Yitzchak] learns out [re'shia bar re'shia] from achoso d'seifa [the extra repeated word 'sister' at the end of the verse].
  And why do the Rabbis need achoso d'seifa? To make one liable for his sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter [his full sister], to teach that we can't derive punishment from a kal v'chomer [specifically that we don't derive it from the prohibitions on both half sisters].
  And [as for where Rebbi Yitzchak derives the principle against deriving punishments] you can either say that he derives [the principle against deriving] punishment from [the principle against deriving] scriptural warnings, or you can say that he learns it out from
  
  Daf 14b
  
  from the extra word "sister" at the beginning of the verse [achoso d'reisha]
  And [what do the Rabbis, i.e. Rebbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael do with achoso d'reisha, if they do not learn out the principle of not deriving punishments]? That verse is needed to teach us that there is a separate kares prohibition for concocting [the anointing oil] and for anointing [with the original anointing oil].
  And [where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn to separate the two]? He holds like what Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah. That Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah, any place that you find two prohibitions with one kares, they are separated with regards to [bringing] a sacrifice [for an inadvertent transgression].
  Or if you prefer you can say, that he does not hold like Rebbi Elezar, [rather] he derives it from (Leviticus 20, 18) "And if a man shall lie with a woman sick".
  And the Rabbis need that verse to teach Rebbi Yochanon's ruling, that Rabbi Yochanon said in the name of Rebbi Shimoen ben Yochai, from where do we know that a woman is not made impure until the flux exits through the ervah? That the Torah says (Leviticus 20, 18) "And if a man shall lie with a woman sick and he uncovers her ervah". This teaches us that a woman is not made impure until the flux exits through the ervah.
  And an impure person who ate sacrificial food: [Receiving malkus by] enters the Temple while impure is understandable as both the punishment and the scriptural warning are written in the Torah. The punishment is written (Numbers 19,13) "The Tabernacle of G-d he has defiled and he shall be cut off". The scriptural warning is written (Numbers 5,3) "And he shall not defile the camps". But as for an impure person who ate sacrificial [meats] the punishment is easily understandable as it is written (Leviticus 7,20) "And the soul that eats meat from the alter of the Sh'lamim that are for G-d while his impureness is upon him will be cut off", only from where is the scriptual warning derived?
  Reish Laksash says [it is derived from] (Leviticus 12,4) "In all holiness he he shall not touch" [b'chol kodesh lo sigah]. Rebbi Yochanon says that Bardala taught,
  [that we derive it from the gezaira shava of] טומאתו טומאתו. It says here [by entering the temple impure] (Leviticus 7,20) "and his impureness (טומאתו) is upon him and he will be cut off" and it says there [by touching sacfical meats while impure] (Numbers 19,13) "Impure he shall be; his impureness (טומאתו) is still upon him". Just as there [by entering the temple impure] there is both punishment and scriptural warning, so too here [by touching sacfical meats while impure] there is both punishment and scriptual warning.
  It is understandable why Reish Lakash does not hold like Rebbi Yochanon, [as he can say that] he does not learn that gezaira shava. But what is the reason that Rebbi Yochanon does not say like Reish Lakash? [Rebbi Yochanon] would say to you, [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is giving a scriptual warning for [consuming] Terumah [while impure],
  And then where does Reish Lakash derive a scriptual warning for Terumah [if he uses b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach against eating sacrificial meats]? He derives it from (Leviticus 22,4) "Any man from the seed of Ahron, who is a lepor or zav". What is fit [only] for the seed of Ahron? You must say that this is referring to Terumah. And what does Rebbi Yochanon use that verse for [if he learns Terumah from elsewhere]? That verse is for consuming [Terumah while one is impure] and this verse [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is for touching [Terumah while one is impure].
  And does Reish Lakash indeed use b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach this [eating sacrificial meats while one is impure]? But he needs it to teach about an impure person who touched sacrificial meats. That it was said about an impure person who touched sacrificial meats. Reish Lakash says he is liable to malkus, and Rebbi Yochanon says that he is not liable to malkus. Reish Lakash says that he is liable to malkus because of b'chol kodesh lo sigah, and Rebbi Yochanon says that he is not liable to malkus because [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] is just a scriptural warning for Terumah [not for touching sacrificial meats].
  [Nevertheless we see that Reish Lakash uses b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach touching sacrificial meats, not consuming them. How do we resolve this contradiction?] An impure person who touches sacrificial meats [is learned] out from the fact that the Torah uses the expression of touching. The scriptural warning for eating is derived from the hekesh [juxtaposition] of sacrificial meats to the temple.
  But still I ask does Reish Lakash indeed use [b'chol kodesh lo sigah] to teach this? But he needs it to teach about an impure person who ate sacrifical meats before the blood was thrown. [z'rikas hadam]. That it was said about an impure person who ate sacrifical meats before z'rikas hadam. Reish Lakash says he is liable to malkus, and Rebbi Yochanon says that he is not liable to malkus.
  Reish Lakash says that he is liable to malkus because of b'chol kodesh lo sigah, [which teaches] that it makes no difference if it was before z'rikas hadam or after z'rikas hadam. and Rebbi Yochanon says that he is not liable to malkus because Rebbi Yochanon is saying according to his own reasoning. That the Torah says [the g'zaira shava] of טומאתו טומאתו and where is "טומאתו" written? It is written after z'rikas hadam. [Therefore one would not be liable for eating before z'rikas hadam according to Rebbi Yochanon.] [Nevertheless we see that Reish Lakash uses b'chol kodesh lo sigah to teach before z'rikas hadam and not to teach the scriptural warning for consuming sacrificial meats while one is impure. How do we resolve this contradiction?] That law is learned from "In all meats". [the extra word "all" is what teaches us even before z'rikas hadam.]
  A baraisa was taught in accordance with [the view of] Reish Lakash, "B'chol kodesh lo sigah" is a scriptural warning for eating [sacrificial foods while one is impure]. You say that it is a warning for eating? Or maybe it's only a warning for touching? The Torah therefore says, "In all sanctity he shall not touch and into the Temple etc." The Torah juxtaposes sacrificial foods with the Temple. Just as the Temple is a thing that involve the loss of life [one who enters while impure is subject to kares], so too the whole [verse] most involve the loss of life. And does touching [sacrificial foods, which is punishable with malkus] involve any loss of life? Rather you must say that the "b'chol kodesh lo sigah" refers to eating [sacrificial foods].
  Rabba bar bar Channa said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, Any negative prohibition preceded by a positive commandment, [Lo saseh sh'kadmu asheh] is subject to malkus.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  They asked him [Rebbi Yochanon] Did you say this? [that any prohibition preceded by a positive commandment is subject to flogging i.e. a lo saseah s'kedmu asseah]... He responded to them, No. [I retract what I said.] Rabbah said, By God! He said it. And it is backed by a posuk [verse] and a mishnah. It is written (Numbers 5,2) "And they shall send forth from the camp. etc. And they shall not defile their camps" [which is a lo saseah s'kedmu asseah] and it was taught in a mishna "One who enters the temple whilst impure [receives lashes].
  So rather, what is the reason that [Rebbi Yochanon] retracted [his veiw]? Because he found [his veiw point] problematic with the case of a rapist [Ohneis] For it was taught in a barasiah An Ohneis who divorced his wife [in violation of the Torah's commandment], If he is a Yisroel [i.e. a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not receive malkus. If he is a Kohen, he receives malkus and doesn't take her back.
  If he is a Yisroel he takes her back and doesn't receive malkus? Why? This is a case of a lo saseh sh'kadmu asseh, and [according to Rebbi Yochanon's origanl ruling] he should get malkus.
  Ullah said [a possible resolution] [The Torah] need not have said "she should be to him for a wife" by Oneis, and it could have been derived from Motzei Shem Rah. And if by the case of Motzei Shem Rah where no action was performed, the Torah says (Deutermany 22,19) "She should be to him for a wife", then by Oneis [which does involve an action] is it not even more so?
  Why then was it repeated? If it is not needed for before [he divorces her], then let us use it for afterwards, that if he divorces her, he must take her back.
  But still Oneis from Motzei Shem Rah can not be derived as you could ask on it, What comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which has [a more stringent punishment of] malkus and a monetary payment?
  So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated by Motzei Shem Rah, and it could have been derived from Oneis. If by Oneis which doesn't have [the double punishment] of malkus and monetary payment, the Torah says, "she shall be to him for a wife", then is not Motzei Shem Rah even more so? Why then is it repeated [by Motzei Shem Rah, if it can just be derived from Oneis]? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
  But Motzei Shem Rah from Oneis also can not be learned out, because you can ask what comparison can be made to Oneis which [is more stringent] as it involves an action?
  So rather "she shall be to him for a wife" should not have been stated with regards to Motzei Shem Rah, because she is already his wife. Why then was it said? If it is not needed to teach us anything by Motzei Shem Rah, then apply this commandment by Oneis. If it is not needed before [he divorces her], apply it afterwards.
  But you can say, If it is not applicable before the Motzei Shem Rah [divorces his wife] apply it afterwards by itself [Motzei Shem Rah] that he does not recieve malkus for divorcing his wife [because he can remarry her].
  Yes this is imndeed so, but Oneis comes and is derived from this. With what is it derived? Whether by a Kal V'chomer or by a Mah Matzhino, I can ask as I have previosly asked, what comparison can be made to Motzei Shem Rah which [is less] as it involves no action?
  Rather Rava said "all his days" is a commandment to take her back. And similirly when Ravan came he said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, "all his days" is a commandment to take her back.
  Rav Pappa said to Rava But [a lo saseh sh'kedmu asseh] is not similar to the prohibition of muzzling, [so how can Rebbi Yochanon rule that one receives malkus]? Rava answered him, Just because the Torah writes by it an additional commandment, does that make it any less stringent?!
  If so [that an extra commandment shouldn't detract from it, then the same argument can be made by] a lav sh'nituk l'asseh also, say that just because the Torah writes by it an extra commandment, does that make it any less stringent?! Rava explained [the differnece] to him, That one [by a lav sh'nituk l'asseh the commandment] is coming to remove the prohibition.
  [Rava and Ravin's answer] works well with the opinion of Bitlu v'lo Bitlo,
  but according to the opinion of Kimu v'lo Kimu, what is there to say?
  
  Daf 15b
  
  Is [Rava and Ravin's] explanation coming to teach us anything but the reason of Rebbi Yochanon? Why Rebbi Yochanon is the one who told the teacher of baraisas to teach that he is liable for nullifying and exempt for not nullifying.
  That a teacher of baraisas taught in the presence of Rebbi Yochanon, Any prohibition that includes a [remedial] positive commandment, if he fulfills the commandment he is exempt, if he nullifys  the commandment is he is liable.
  [Rebbi Yochanon] asked him, What are you saying? Either fulfilling will exempt it him and not fulfilling it will implicate him, or nulifying it will imp[licte him and not nullifying it wil expemt him. Rather teach, Bitlo v'lo Bitlo [he nullified it and he did not nullify it]. And Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash said [to Teach] Kimu v'lo Kimu [he fulfilled it and he did not fulfill it].
  In what aspect are they [Rebbi Yochanon and Reish lakash] arguing in? They are arguing in [the validity of] an uncertain warning. One opinion holds that an uncertain warning is a valid warning. And the other opinion holds that
   an uncertain warning is not a valid warning.
  And they both go according to their resoning, as it is said elsewhere, If one makes an oath that he will eat this loave today, and the day passes without him eating it, Rebbi Yochanon and Riesh Lakash both say that he is not flogged. Rebbi Yocahnon says that  he is not flogged
  
  Daf 16a
  
  because he had done a lav sh'ein bo maiseh [no action] and any lav sh'ein bo maiseh is not punishable with flogging. Reish Lakash says he is not flogged because it involved only a questionable warning, and a questionable warning does not constitute a valid warning.
  And they both derive their views from [the same statement] of Rebbi Yehudah. For It was taught in a barasia, (Exodus 12, 10) "And do not leave anything over until morning. And anything leftover until morning [must be burned in fire] etc." the Torah comes to give a positive commandment following a negative commandment to teach that he is not liable to malkus. These are the words of Rebbi Yehudah. Rebbi Yochanon expounds thus, the reason [Rebbi Yehudah says that he isn't flogged] is because the Torah comes [with a remedial positive commandment], but if the Torah would not have came then he would be flogged. We therefore see that a questionable warning constitutes as a valid warning.
  And Reish Lakash as expounds thus, the reason [Rebbi Yehudah says that he isn't flogged] is because the Torah comes [with a remedial positive commandment], but if the Torah would not have came then he would be flogged. We therefore see that a lav sh'ein bo maiseh is subject to lashes.
  But according to Reish Lakash, this certainly is also a case of a questionable warning. [Why then does he not make the diuk that Rebbi Yochanon made?]
  he holds like the other opinion of Rebbi Yehudah's views, that it was taught in a baraisa If one hit this [person who might have been his father] and then hit the other [person who might have been his father], or if he cursed this one and then that one, or if he hit them both simultaneously, or cursed them both simultaneously, Rebbi Yehudah says, If it was simultaneously he is liable, if not he is exempt [because it would be only an questionable warning.]
  But according to Rebbi Yochanon, this certainly is also a case of a prohibition without an action. [Why then does he not make the diuk that Reish Lakash made?]
  He holds like that which Rav Idei bar Avin said from Rav Amram from Rebbi Yitzchok from Rebbi Yochanon. Rebbi Yehuda says  in the name of Rebbi Yossi Haggilli Any prohibition in the Torah, if it involves an action one receives malkus on it. If it does not involve an action, one does not receive malkus on it, except in the cases of a Nishbah, a Meimer, and one who curses his friend with the name [of God].
  One statement of Rebbi Yehudah is in contridiction with another satement of Rebbi Yehudah?!
  According to Reish Lakash, there is no difficulty, it is a case of two differing opinion on what Rebbi Yehudah held. According to Rebbi Yochanon, there is no difficulty, one statement [of Rebbi Yehuda's] is his own and one is his rebbi's [Rebbi Yosi Haggilli.
  It was taught in a mishna over there, One who takes a mother bird while with its young [in violation of the Torah's prohibition]. Rebbi Yehuda says  that he receives malkus and need not send her away. And the Sages say that he must send away [the mother bird] and is not flogged. This is the general rule, any prohibition that has an active positive commandment one is not liable for. Rebbi Yochanon said, We do not have any examples of this [where one can receive malkus by nullifying a remedial positive commandment] besides for this case [of sending away the mother bird] and one other case.
  Rebbi Ellazer asked him, Where is [the other case]? [Rebbi Yochanon] responded to him, when you look for it [you will find it]. He looked hard and found it. For it was taught in a baraisa An Oneiss who divorces his wife, if he is a Yisroel [a non-Kohen] he takes her back and does not recieve malkus. If he is a Kohen, however, [who is forbiden to marry a divorcee,] he is flogged and does not take her back.
  This [case] harmonizes with the view that teaches Kimu v'lo Kimu.
  But according to the one who teaches Bitlo v'lo Bitlo, then while [a way to nullify the remedial commandment] can be found regarding Shiloach Haken [i.e. sending away the mother bird, for example where he kills the mother bird], but with regards to Oneiss how can you find a case of Bitlo v'lo Bitlo?
  If he kills her [thus nullifying his ability to perform the remedy of remarrying her], the [he would be exempt based of the principle of] Kim Leih B'dirabah Me'neih [that anyone liable to the death penalty is exempt from all else.] Rav Shimi miChuznah proposed in a case where he accepted on her behalf Kidushin from another man. Rav asked If she had appointed him as her agent, then is he the one nullifying it? And if she had not appointed him as her agent then is anything even coming from his actions? They would be meaningless!
  Rather Rav Shimi miNardeah proposed, in a case where he publicly made a vow [against marring her]. This is good according to the opinion that a vow made in public can not be annulled. But according to the opinion that [such a vow] can be annulled, what can be said? Where it was made with the consent of the public. That Ameimar said, The halacha is that a vow made publicly can be annulled, but a vow made with the consent of the public can not be annulled.
  And are there no other cases [of a lav sh'nituk l'aseah where it is possible to nullify the asseah]? But there are other cases, (A memonic: Theft, Pledge, Corner) Theft. That the torah says (Leviticus 19,13) "Don't steal" and (Leviticus 5,23) "Return that which you stole". A pledge. That the Torah says (Deuternomy 24, 10) "Do not enter into his house to take his pledge" and (Deuteronomy 24, 13) "You shall surely return him his pledge befor the sun sets". And both of these can be found in Kimu v'lo Kimu and in Bitlo v'lo Bitlo (he can destroy the stolen object/pledge).
  Over there, since he is still liable in paying [their value] he isn't flogged and made to pay.
  Rebbi Zeira asked, but there still is [the case someone who unlawfully took] the pledge of a proselyte, and then the proselyte died?
  
  Daf 16b
  
  There [he isn't nullifying the remedial commandment] because he is still liable to repay [the proselyte's pledge], it is only the proselyte's claim that stopped.
  But there is Pea'uh. That the Torah says (Leviticus 23,22) "You shall not begin [to reap] the corner. etc." "to the pauper and the proselyte you should give them. etc." That you find in this both Kimu v'lo Kimu and Bitlo v'lo Bitlo.
  That we learned in a baraisa, The mitzvah of pea'uh is to separate from the standing grain. If one did not separate from the standing grain, he should separate from the bundles. If he did not separate from the bundles, he should separate from the pile until he smooths it. Once he smoothes it, [making it subject to maiser] he should separate maiser and then give it [to the poor. Thus it is subject to nullification if he makes it into dough. So why is this not also a good example of a case where it's possible to nullify the remedial commpandment?].
  [Because Rebbi Yochanon holds] according to Rebbi Yishmael who says, He may even separate pe'uh from the dough. But according to Rebbi Yishmael a way to nullify the commandment can also be found, in a case where he eats the dough?
  Rather [when Rebbi Yochanon said] this and one other case, he was referring to [Pe'uh], but not oniess. Because where do we say that a vow made on public consent cannot be annulled? For an optional matter. But [a vow] related to performing a mitzvah is subject to annulment.
  Like by the schoolteacher that would hit the children. Rav Acha made a vow against him teaching, but Ravina annulled it, because there couldn't be found one as precise as he.
  And one who eats carcasses and impure animals, things that are abominable and things that creep. Rav Yehudah said, one who eats a cabbage worm is liable to malkus because of the verses that start (Leviticus 11,29) "the swarming things that swarm upon the ground". There was a person who ate a cabbage worm and Rav Yehuda gave him malkus.
  Abaye says, if one ate a poetissa [a type ow water creature] he gets four sets of malkus. [two for all insects + two for aquatic insects]
  [If one eats] an ant, he gets five malkus [two for insects + three for land insects] because of the verses that start (Leviticus 11,29) "the swarming things that swarm upon the ground".
  [If one eats] a hornet, he gets six malkus [two for insects + three for land insects and one for flying insects] because of the verse (Deuteronomy 14,19) "that swarm in the air".
  Rav Achai says, One who holds back his bodily functions transgresses the verses (Leviticus 20, 25) "Do not makes yourself abominable" Rav Bivi bar Abaye said, A person who drinks from a bloodletter's tube transgresses the prohibition of "do not make yourself abominable".
  Rava bar Rav Huna says, If one mashes up nine ants and brings in one live [ant] and they combine to form an olive's volume, he is liable to six sets of malkus [for eating it]. Five for the live ant and one for eating an olive's volume of a carcass. Rava said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, [A person is liable to those six malkus] even if it was two [dead ants] and the one [live ant]. Rav Yosef said, Even if it is one [dead ant] and the one [live ant]. But they do not argue. This one is [talking about] larger [ants], while this one is [discussing] smaller [ants].
  If one eats Tevel [untithed foods] or Maiser Rishon etc. Rav said, If one ate tevel of maiser ani [all the tithes besides maser ani were already separated] he is liable to malkus.
  Who is this ruling in accordance with? It's in accordance to the following Tanna, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yossi said, I might think that a person is only liable for tevel which no tithes were separated from. But if he separated terumah gedolah but did not separate maiser rishon, or he separated maiser rishon but did not separate maiser sheni, or even if maeser ani [was the only tithe unseparated], where do we know [that he is still liable for eating it]?
  The Torah teaches us, (Deuteronomy 12, 17) "Do not proceed to eat within your gates etc." and then later on the Torah writes, (Deutermony 26, 12) "And they may eat it in their gates and be satisfied", just as over there the verse is refering to maiser ani, so to here the verse is refering to maiser ani, and the Torah here says about it "You shall not eat".
  Rav Yosef says, It is subject to a tannaic dispute. Rebbi Meir says One need not designate by name maiser ani of demai [questionable produce bought from an ignoramus], but the sages say
  
  Daf 17a
  
  he must designate [maser ani, i.e. the poor man's tithe of demai i.e food purchased form an ignoramus] by name, but he is not required to physically separate it.
  is it not that in this facet they are arguing, that one holds [produce is still] considered tevel [i.e. untithed, until maser ani is removed as well]. And the other one holds [maser ani] does not render the produce tevel. Abaye said to him. If so [that they argue about whether maser ani can render the produce tevel], then rather than arguing in a case of questionable produce [demai] they should argue in a case where it was known [that maser ani] was not separated.
  Rather, everyone holds that [failing to separate maser ani] renders produce tevel. But here it is in this that thay argue. One opinion holds the people of the land are not suspect regarding maser ani of demai, that since it is only a monetary matter, they will certainly separate it. But the sages hold that since the matter is a bother they do not separate.
  How much must one eat from tevel to be liable? etc.: Rav Bibi said in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash, The dispute only concerns wheat kernels, but with regard to flour everyone agrees that the minimum is a k'zias [an olive's volume]. But Rebbi Yirmiya said in the name of Rebbi Shimon ben Lakash, just as there is a dispute by this [wheat], so is there a dispute by this [flour].
  [We can bring a proof to Rav Bibi's understanding of the disput to only concern wheat kernels from what] was taught in a mishna. Rebbe Shimon said to them [the sages], will you not [at least] agree with me [in the case of] where one consumes an ant of any size that he would be liable to malkus? The sages responded to him that is because [an ant] is in the form in which it was created. Rebbi Shimon said back to them, Even a single [kernel of] wheat is in the form that it was created. [This implies that Rebbi Shimon would hold only that by a] wheat [kernel] one is [liable for less then a k'zias], but not by flour.
  [No,] he was just saying an answer according to their words, according to me, even flour also one is liable for, but even according to your opinion, agree to me at least that one wheat kernel is in the form that it was created. And [what would] the sages [answer to that]? A living soul is significant, but a wheat kernel is not significant. A baraisa was taught in accordance with Rebbi Yirmiya's view. Rebbi Shimon says any amount [makes one liable] to malkus. The measurement of a k'zias was only stated regarding making one obligated to bring a sacrifice.
  MISHNA: One who eats bikorim [first fruits] before the verses are recited; [or eats] kadshai kadshim [offerings of greater sanctity] outside the curtain [of the temple courtyard; or one who eats] kadshai kalim [offerings of lesser sanctity] or maiser sheni outside the wall [of Jerusalem]; or one who breaks the bone of a pure Pesach offering. All of these incur forty lashes. But one who leaves over from [even a tahor i.e. a pure] offering, or one who breaks a bone of a tamai [impure] offering does not incur malkus.
  [Regarding] one who takes a mother bird while on her young, Rebbi Yehuda says he incurs malkus, and need not send her away, but the sages say that he must send her away and does not receive malkus. This is the general rule, any prohibition that has an active positive commandment [to remedy it] does not make one liable to malkus.
  GEMARA: Rabah bar bar Channa said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, these are the words of Rebbi Akiva, the unnamed authority. The sages, however, say that regarding bikorim, their placement is essential to them, but the recital [or their verses] is not essential to them.
  But lets say that these are the words of Rebbi Shimon, [and that he is] the unnamed authority, [which would be collaborated by a baraisa]? This is what he is saying, that Rebbi Akiva holds like Rebbi Shimon.
  What is the view of Rebbi Shimon? That it was taught in a baraisa, (Deutermany 12, 17) "And the terumah of your hand" this is refering to bikorim.
  Rebbi Shimon said,  What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating bikorim] outside the wall [of Jerusalem, then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser, which is more lenient, that if one incurs malkus by eating the more lenient example of maiser outside of the wall, then wouldn't one certainly incur malkus for eating bikorim outside of the wall? Rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats bikorim before the verses are recited incurs malkus.
  (Deutermany 12, 17) "and your voluntary gifts", this refers to the Todah and Sh'lamim offerings. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem, then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from the Todah or the Sh'lamim before the z'rika [the sprinkling of the blood] incurs malkus.
  (Deutermany 12, 17) "And your firstborn", this refers to a Bechor offering. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us? If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Bechor even after the z'rika incurs malkus.
  (Deutermany 12, 17) "Your cattle and your sheep", this refers to the Chatos and Asham offerings. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us?
  If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor, rather the Torah only comes to teach us that one who eats from a Chatos or an Asham even after the z'rika, but outside of the [Temple] curtains incurs malkus.
  (Deutermany 12, 17) "Your vows", this refers to the Olah offering. Rebbi Shimon said, What is this verse coming to teach us?
  If to [make one liable for eating them] outside the wall [of Jerusalem], [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from maiser; if to [make one liable for eating them] before the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Todah and Sh'lamim; if to [make one liable for eating them] after the z'rika, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Bechor; if to [make one liable for eating them] outside the [Temple] curtain, [then we could have just learned it out from] a kal v'chomer from Chatos and Asham rather the Torah comes
  
  Daf 17b
  
  only to teach us that one who eats from an Olah after the z'rika, even inside [the Temple courtyard] incurs malkus.
  Rava said, if a mother is giving birth, she should give birth like Rebbi Shimon, (and if not, then she should not give birth). And this is even though there is a refutation.
  That what is the stringency of bikorim over maaser [sheni]? That [bikorim] is forbidden to non-Kohanim. But, to the contrary, Maaser [sheni] is more stringent, as it is forbidden to an onien.
  And what is the stringency of Todah and Shelamim over maaser [sheni]? That [Todah and Shelamim] require the placement of blood and sacrificial parts on the alter. But, to the contrary, Maaser [sheni] is more stringent, as it requires a minted coin.
  And what is the stringency of Bechor over Todah and Shelamim? That [a Bechor] is sanctified from birth. But, to the contrary, Todah and Shelamim are more stringent, as they require leaning, libation, and the waving of the breast and thigh.
  And what is the stringency of Chatos and Asham over Bechor? That [Chatos and Asham] are of high sanctity. But, to the contrary, Bechor is more stringent, as it is sanctified from birth.
  And what is the stringency of Ollah over Chatos and Asham? That [Ollah] is entirely burnt. But, to the contrary, Chatos and Asham are more stringent, as they atone.
  And they are all more stringent then Ollah, as they include two eatings. [1)the alter 2)people]
  So then why should a mother give birth like Rebbi Shimon [if all of his points can be refuted]. That according to his explanation, he inverts the verse,and expounds on it.
  But, can we even derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer? That even according to the opinion that we can derive a punishment from a kal v'chomer, we still cannot derive a scriptural warning from a kal v'chomer. Rebbi Shimon just means to learn out a prohibition [but not malkus]
  But Rava had said that a non-Kohen that eats from an Ollah before the zerika outside of the wall would get five sets of malkus according to Rebbi Shimon? He means five prohibitions, [but no malkus].
  But we have in our mishna, "these are thew ones who incur malkus"?
  
  Daf 18a
  
  rather, he derives it from the existence of an extra verse. Let's see, the Torah says (Deutermony 12,6) "And bring them and eat them in front of Hashem your God in the place etc. The Torah could have just written over there "You may not eat them". Why then does the Torah repat them all in a later verse?
  Only to assign separte prohibitions for each one.
  The text is: Rava said a non-Kohen who eats from an ollah before the zerikah outside of the wall, according to Rebbi Shimon incurs five sets of malkus. But let him also incur malkus from (Exodus 29,33) "And a non-Kohen may not eat them for they are sanctified"? Those words only apply in a case where it is fit for Kohenim, but here it is also not fit for Kohenim.
  But let him also incur malkus from (Exodus 22,30) "And torn meat in the field he shall not eat", that once the meat goes outside of it's bounds it is forbidden? Those words only apply in a case where it is fit when in it's bounds, but here it is also not fit in it's bounds.
  But let him also incur malkus according to Rebbi Eliezer, that Rebbi Eliezer had said, (Exodus 22,30) "And he may not eat for they are sanctified"
  
  Daf 18b
  
  which means, that regarding any "holy" that got disqualified, the verse comes to add a prohibition against eating it. [Why doesn't Rava say he incurs malkus for that]. These words only apply in a case where they are fit [for consumption] before becoming disqualified, but here [by ollah] before being disqualified they are also not fit.
  But let him also incur malkas according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says anything that is subject to being "entirely burnt" has an additional prohibition on its consumption. Yes this is so, but Rava was only talking about prohibitions derived from that one verse. 
  Rav Gidal says in the name of Rav (a menmoonic: KUZA) A Kohen who eats from a chatas or an asham before the zerikah gets malkus. What is the reason? That the verse states (Exodus 29,33) "And they should eat it that which grants atonement" which implies that only after it grants atonement may it be eaten but not beforehand. And a prohibition implied by a positive commandment [carries the force of] a prohibition.
  Rava asked, (Deuteronomy 14,6) "And any animal that has split hooves and has the hoove completley split into two and chews its cud,among the animals that you may eat". "That" you may eat, but a different anoimal you may not eat. And if it is as you say then why do I need (Deuteronomy 14,7) "This you may not eat"?
  Rather if this was stated, this was how it was stated: Rav Gidal says in the name of Rav A non-Kohen who eats from a chatas or an asham before the zerikah is exempt. What is the reason? That the verse states (Exodus 29,33) "And they should eat it that which grants atonement" which implies that any place where we can apply "that which grants atonement" we can apply "and a non-Kohen shall not eat for it is holy", but any place where we cannot apply "that which grants atonement" we cannot apply "and a non-Kohen shall not eat for it is holy".
  Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah the placement of Bikorim is essential, but the recital is not.
  But did Rebbi Elezar really say this? But Rebbi Elezar in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah that if one separates bikorim before Sukkos [when they are subject to recital] and then Sukkos passes, they must be left to rot. Is it not because the recital can no longer be performed? But if [Rebbi Elezar] holds that the recital is not essential, then why must they be left to rot?
  [He holds] according to Rebbi Zeira, that Rebbi Zeira said Regarding anything that is fit for mixing, mixing is not essential, but anything that is not fit for mixing, mixing is essential for them.
  Rav Acha bar Yaakov teaches taught this ruling in the name Rebbi Assi in the name of Rebbi Yochanon and accordingly found a contradiction between one statement of Rebbi Yochanon and another statement of Rebbi Yochanon. That, could Rebbi Yochanon have said that the placement of Bikorim is essential to them, but that the recitation is not essential to them? But Rav Assi had asked of Rebbi Yochanon, Bikorim, from when do they become permitted to the Kohanim? And [Rebbi Yochanon] had answered him that those which are subject to recitation [i.e. brought before Sukkos] from when he recites [the verses], and those which are not subject to recitation from when they enter the Temple. 
  This is a contradiction between [one case of] recitation and [another case of] recitation. This is a contradiction between [one case of] placement and [another case of] placement.
  Recitation on recitation is not a contradiction. This is [the opinion of] Rebbi Shimon [who says that recitation is essential] and this is [the opinion of] the Rabbis [who argue on Rebbi Shimon] Placement on placement is also not a contradiction. This is [the opinion of] Rebbi Yehuda [who says that placement is not essential] and this is the opinion of the Rabbis [who argue on Rebbi Yehudah.]
  What is this opinion of Rebbi Yehuda? That it was taught it a baraisa, Rebbi Yehudah says, (Deuteronomy 26,10) "And he shall place" it this is a reference to the waving. You say that it is referring to the waving or maybe it is really referring to the actual placement? But when the Torah also says, (Deuteronomy 26,4) "And he shall place", the [requirement of] placement has already been stated. So how will I maintain (Deuteronomy 26,10) "And he shall place"? It [must be referring to] waving.
  And who is the Tanna that argues with Rebbi Yehuda? It is Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. As it was taught in a baraisa (Deuteronomy 26,4) "And the Kohen will take the basket from his hand" this teaches ud that Bikorim require waving. These are the words of Rebbi Elezier ben Yaakov. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov?
  He makes [a gezariah shave] of "yad" "yad" (יד יד) from Shelamim, It is written here "And the kohen will take the basket from his hand (יד)", and it is written (Leviticus 7, 30) "His hands (יד) shall bring the fire-offerings of Hashem". Just as here it is referring to the Kohen, so too there it is referring to the Kohen, and just as there it is referring to the owner, so too here it is referring to the owner. How is this accomplished? The Kohen places his hands under where the owner places his hands and waves.
  Rava bar Ada said in the name of Rebbi Yitzchak, Bikorim.
  
  Daf 19a
  
  when is one liable for eating them? From when they see the face of the Temple. Who is this in accordance with? It's in accordance with the following Tanna, That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer said, [Regarding] Bikorim that are part inside [the temple] and part outside [the temple], those that are outside are like non-sanctified foods in every facet, and those which are inside are like sanctified foods in every facet.
  Rav Sheises says, [regarding] Bikorim, their placement is essential to them, but their recital is not essential to them.
  Who is this statement in accordance with? It is in accordance with the following Tanna, That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Yosi said over three things from three elders. Rebbi Yishmael said, A person may ascend with his maaser sheni to Jerusalem and eat it nowadays. And this can be logically derived, A Bechor needs to be brought to "the place" and maaser sheni needs to be brought to "the place". Just as bechor is only possible in the time of the Temple, so is Maaser only possible in the time of the Temple.
  But what comparison can be made to a Bechor which needs the blood and sacrificial parts placed on the alter? Bikorim will then prove it. But what comparison can be made to Bikorim which need placement before the alter?
  Therefore the Torah teaches us with (Deutermony 16,7) "And you shall eat them before Hashem your God", juxtaposing maaser to bechor. Just as bechor is only possible in the time of the Temple, so too is Maaser only possible in the time of the Temple. And if this is was true [that the recital was essential for Bikorim] then we should have asked What comparison can be made to Bikorim which need both recital and placement?
  Rav Ashi says, granted that their is no requirement [for recitial], but is there not at least a mitzvah? Let him say the mitzvah and ask [from that]! Rather, Rav Ashi says, Since there is the Bikorim of a proselyte, where since he would need to say (Deutermony 26, 3) "That Hashem swore to our forefather" and is unable to say it, he doesn't mention it as a the proof.
  But let the argument return, and derive it from a common characteristic! Because you could refute it, [by saying] What comparison can be made to the common characteristic, as it has in it something involving the alter?
  And what does [Rebbi Yishmael] hold? If he holds that the original sanctity of the Temple was for its time and also all future time, then even a Bechor should be able to be brought nowadays. And if he holds that the original sanctity of the Temple was for its time but did not extend to future time, then he also should inquire about a Bechor!
  Ravina says Actually he holds that the original sanctity of the Temple was for its time but not also all future time, but here we are dealing with a Bechor that the blood was sprinkled before the destruction of the Temple, and then the Temple was destroyed with the meat still extant. And we make a hekesh [juxtapose] from the meat to the blood. Just as the blood needs the alter, so does the meat need the alter. And we alos make a hekesh from Maaser to Bechor.
  But can something derived through a hekesh proceed to teach something else through a hekesh? Maaser of wheat is a non-sanctified item [and thus not subject to the two-hekesh rule].
  
  Daf 19b
  
  This reconciles according to the opinion that we go after the thing derived, but according to the opinion that we go after the source, what is there to say?
  Blood and meat [of a bechor] is considered one thing.
  [offerings of] higher holiness. etc.: It was taught already taught in [the previous] Mishna, Maaser sheni and Hekdesh that were not redeemed. [Why then, does our Mishna need to repeat this?] Rebbi Yosi bar Chanina says The latter is referring to [a case where the] maaser sheni is tahor [spiritually pure] and the man [eating it] is also tahor but is eating it out of the wall [of Jerusalem]. The former, however, is referring to [a case where the] maaser sheni is tamai [spiritually impure] or the man [eating it] is tamai and is eating it inside Jerusalem].
  And from where do we know that one is liable for eating [maaser sheni] while tamai? That it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Shimon says (Deuteronomy 26,14) "I did not partake of it in tamai" means regardless of whether I was tamai and it was tahor or whether I was tahor and it was tamai. But as for where one is scripturally warned against it's consumption-- I do not know.
  Why, [the scriptural warning against consuming maaser sheni whilst in a state of] bodily tumah [impurity] is explicitly written, (Leviticus 22,6) "The soul that touches it and is tamai until the evening may not eat from the holy. etc."! Rather from where is [the scriptural warning against consuming maaser sheni when] it itself is tamai derived from?
  that the Torah says, (Deuteronomy 12, 17) "Do not eat it in your gates" and then later on says, (Deuteronomy 15,22) "In your gates you shall eat it--both the tamai and the tahor", and a baraisa was taught about this in the academy of Rebbi Yishmael
  that even a tamai person and a tahor person can eat from the same plate without worry, the Torah is therefore saying that this tamai that I permitted by a tahor person aver there, here you may not eat.
  And from where do we know that [tamai masser sheni] is subject to redemption?
  that Rebbi Elezer says, from where is it derived that maaser sheni which became tamai may be even redeemed in Jersalem? The Torah says (Deutermony 14,24) "For you may not proceed to carry (שאת) it" and the word "שאת" can only refer to eating, as the Torah says (Genesis 43,34) "And portions (שאת) were taken from before him"
  Rav Bibi says in the name of Rav Assi from where is it derived that Maaser Sheni may be redeemed even one step outside of the wall? That the Torah says (Deutermony 14,24) "For you may not proceed to carry (שאת) it" But that is needed to teach us the ruleing of Rebbi Elezar!
  If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to eat it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? [Rather, it must also mean to bring it.] So then let's say that it is exclusively coming to teach us this. If so then the Torah would have said "you may not proceed to bring it", why then does it say "שאת", carry it? Infer from this both rulings.
  Rav Chanina and Rav Hoshiah were siting and asking, [If one had maaser sheni] at the entrance to Jeraslem, what would the law be? It's obvious if he was outside and his load was inside, that the boundaries had already swallowed it, but if he is inside and his load outside, what would be the law?
  A certain elder taught in the academy of Rebbi Shimon ben Yochai, (Duetermony 14,24) "For the place is far from him" which means from his load.
  Rav Pappa inquired, If he had [the maaser sheni] on a stick, what would be the law? Let [the question] stand.
  Rebbi Assi said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon From when does one become liable [for eating unredeemed] maaser sheni]? From when it sees the face of the wall. What is the reason? That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 12,18) "Before Hashem your God you should eat" And it's written, (Deuteronomy 12,17) "You may not proceed to eat in your gates", we derive that anywhere where we can read "Before Hashem your God you should eat" [i.e. where it entered Jerusalem] we also read "You may not proceed to eat in your gates" and anywhere where we can not read "Before Hashem your God you should eat" [i.e. where it never entered Jerusalem] we also do not read "You may not proceed to eat in your gates".
  Rebbi Yossi asked [a possible contradiction from the following baraisa,] A Kohen that held in his hand a fig of tevel [untithed produce], and said that this fig has its Terumah portion in its stem, its maaser rishon in its northern part, and its maaser sheni in its southern part, and it is in a year of Maaser Sheni and he is in Jerusaelem or it is in a year of maaser ani and he is in the outskirts, if he then eats it
  
  Daf 20a
  
  He receives one set of malkus.
  But if he was a zar [non-Kohen] he would have received two sets of malkus. But if he had originally eaten it [without designating any tithes] he would have only been liable one set of malkus.
  The reason [why he would only be liable two] is that he was in Jersulselm, but if he would have been in the provinces, he would have liable three even though it never "saw the face of the wall"! The baraisa was referring to a case where he brought it in and out.
  If so then what would be the need to say it? [It should have been obvious.] Here we are dealing with a case where he brought it into [Jerusalem] in an untithed state, and he is of the opinion that gifts that weren't yet given are considered as if they were given.
  But does Rebbi Yossi hold that gifts that weren't yet given are considered as if they were given? But, it was taught in a baraisa that Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rebbi Yossi, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel did not argue about produce where the processing was unfinished when it passed through Jerusalem, that the maaser sheni from them can [still] be redeemed and eaten anywhere.
  On what do they argue? Concerning produce which had the processing finished prior to passing through Jerusalem. That Beis Shammai say that he must return it's maaser sheni and eat it in Jerusalem. But Beis Hillel say that it can be redeemed and eaten anywhere. And if we were to conclude that gifts that weren't yet given are considered as if they were given, why the walls already encompassed [the maaser sheni, and it would have to be brought back to Jerusalem even according to Beis Hillel!?]
  Rava says, the boundary regarding eating is Biblical, but the boundary regarding encompassing is only Rabbinical. And when did the Rabbis decree this rule? Only when it is actually there, but in a case where it is untithed the Rabbis did not apply this rule.
  Ravina said, The Barasia is referring to where he carried the Maaser Sheni on a stick, and thus we can answer the question of Rav Pappa.
  MISHNA: One who balds a bald spot on his head, or one who cuts the corners of his head, or one who destroys the corners of his beard, or one who incised an incision [in his skin] over someone's death, is liable [to malkus]. One who makes a single incision over five deaths or makes five incisions over one death is liable for each and every one.
  For [shaving the entire] head, one would be liable twice, once on this side and once on that side. For [shaving the entire] beard, one would be liable twice on this side, twice on that side, and once below. Rebbi Eliezer says, If he removed all [of the five spots] simultaneously, he would only be liable once.
  And he is not liable unless he removes them with a razor. Rebbi Eliezer says, Even if removes them with wood planes and tweezers, he would be liable.
  GEMARA: The Rabbis taught in a baraisa (Leviticus 21,5) "Do not make a bald spot", I might think may mean that even one who made four or five bald spots is only liable once, the Torah therefore says, "A bald spot" to make one liable for each and every bald spot. Why does the Torah say "On the head"? Because it says (Deuteronomy 14,1) "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness between your eyes the dead", I may think that this would mean that one is only liable for between the eyes, from where do I know to include the rest of the head? The Torah therefore says "On the head" to include the entire head.
  And I currently only know that this applies to Kohenim, where the Torah added many mitzvos. From where would I know that this also applies to lay Israelites?
  It says here "a bald spot" and it says there "a bald spot", just as there, one is liable for each and every bald spot and one is liable to the entire head as he is to between the eyes, so too here one is liable for each and every bald spot and one is liable to the entire head as he is to between the eyes. And just as there one is only liable [for making a bald spot] on a death, so too here [it must be] on a death.
  What are the circumstances regarding these four or five bald spots [that we had mentioned]? If you will say that they are one after the other with five separate warnings, then it would be obvious [that he incurs five separate sets of malkus]!
  
  Daf 20b
  
  Rather there was only one warning. But then would he be liable [five times]? Bit it was taught in a mishna, A Nazir who was drinking wine all day is only liable once. If they said to him, "Don't drink. Don't drink.", and he drank, than he would be liable for each individual time. Rather [the ruling] was necessary where one dipped his five fingers into a cream and placed them [on his beard] simultaneously, that it constitutes as a warning for each one.
  And how much is the measerment of a "bald spot"? Rav Huna says, enough to see the head. Rebbi Yochanon says in the name of Rebbi Elazer b'Rebbi Shimon, like a bean (like the tannanic dispute concerning the size of a bald spot, like a bean.) Others say, enough to see the head.
  Rav Yehuda bar Chaviva says Three tannaim dispute in this matter. One says like a bean, one says enough to see the head, and one says two hairs, and there are those who take out "two hairs" and insert "like a lentil". And your mnemonic would be: "The white spot is like a bean, and the live skin like a lentil."
  It was taught in a baraisa, One who removes a scissortip full of hair on Shabbos is liable. And how much is a scissortip full? Rav Yehuda says, two hairs But it was taught in a baraisa "For a bald spot - two [hairs]" [implying that for Shabbos something else.] [rather,] say "And also for a bald spot - two [hairs]"
  It was taught in a baraisa as well, One who removes a scissortip full [of hair] on shabbos is liable, and how much is a scissortip full? Two [hairs]. Rebbi Eliezer says, One [hair]. And the sages agree to Rebbi Eliezer in a case where one is removing the white from the black, then even one hair would make one liable. And this would even be prohibited on the weekday, because it says (Deuteronomy 22, 5) "A man shall not wear a woman's garment"....
  And one who rounds the corners of his head. etc.: The rabbis taught in a baraisa, The corners of his head are the extremities of his head. And what are the extremities of his head? This refers to someone who smooths out his side from behind his ears to his forehead.
  A tanna taught in the presence of Rav Chisdah, Both the barber and the one who's hair gets cut incur malkus. [Rav Chisdah] asked him, Is one who eats dates from a sieve liable? That he would say to you, who is this Tanna? It's Rebbi Yehudah, who says  that a lav sh'ein bo maaseh [a prohibition without tangible action] incurs malkus.
  Rava says, [the barasia is referring to a case where] one rounds his own head, and therefore it can accord with everyone. Rav Ashi says, [the barasia is referring to a case where] one assisted the barber, and therefore it can accord with everyone.
  And one who destroys the corners of his beard. etc.: The Rabbis taught in a baraisa "the corner of his beard" refers to the extremities of his beard. And what are the extremities of his beard? The pointy corn-like parts of the beard.
  And the incisor who makes one incision: Our rabbis taught (from Leviticus 19:28) an incision- could the rule [that this is forbidden] apply even if [one made] the incision because of one's house that fell or one's ship that sank at sea? What the verse (Leviticus 19:28) comes to teach is "for a person" (La-nefesh)- one is not culpable [for having violated the injunction of Leviticus 19:28) until one has made the incision because of one who has died. From where do we learn that one who makes 5 incisions for 1 is culpable [for the punishment of lashes] for each individual incision? It is learned [from Leviticus 19:28 in the word] "incision" (seret)- that each individual incision is warranting of punishment. 
  Rebbi Yosi says, From where do we learn that one who makes 1 incision for 5 dead is culpable [for the punishment of lashes] for each person [incised for]? It is learned [from Leviticus 19:28 in the word] "for a person"  (La-nefesh) that a person is culpable for each individual dead person.
  And does this not come to exclude [an incision] for a house that fell or a ship that sank at sea?
  
  Daf 21a
  
  As Rabbi Yossi reasoned: "an incision [serita] and a gash [gedidah] are one in the same, and it is written there [in Deteruonomy 14:1] that is [specifically for the dead]". 
  Shmuel said: "One of makes an incision with a tool (kli) is culpable [for the punishment of lashes]." But there's a contradiction here: [it has just been said that] an incision (serita) and a gash (gedidah) are one in the same, but an incision is made by hand and a gash is made by a tool. This one who spoke in accordance with Rabi Yossi,
  a Tanna who taught before Rabi Yochanan: [if one made an incision/gash] for the dead, whether it was by hand or by a tool, the person is culpable [for the punishment of lashes]. If the person did it for idolatry, by hand- the person is culpable, by a tool- the person is exempt (patoor) [from the punishment of lashes]. But isn't the opposite written (I Kings 18:28): "And they gashed themselves according to their practices, with knives and spears"? Rather, one should say: if it [the incision/gash] is done by hand, one is exempt [from the punishment] but if done with a tool one is culpable. 
  And one is liable for the head.: Rav Sheises demonstrated with the corners of his head.: And for the beard, two on this side, two on this side, two on this side, and one below.: Rav Sheises demonstrated with the corners of his beard.:
  Rebbi Eliezer says if one removes them all simultaneously. etc.: He holds that they are all one prohibition.:
  And one is not liable until he removes them with a razor.: The rabbis taught in a baraisa, (Leviticus 21, 5) "And the corners of their beards they shall not shave" From this I may think that even if they shaved it with scissors, they would be liable [to malkus]. The Torah therefore says, (Leviticus 19,27) "You shall not destroy". If it only had said "You shall not destroy", then I might think that one who cut it with wood planes or tweezers would be liable. The Torah therefore says, "they shall not shave".
   How is this? A shaving that has in it destroying? I must say this is a razor.
  Rebbi Elezar says, even if one removed them with wood planes or tweezer, he would be liable: Either way, if he learns the gezirah shava [linking "destroying" to "shaving"], then he should require a razor. If he does not learn the gezirah shava, then scissors also should be prohibited.
  Actually, he learns the geziara shava, but he also holds that these [wood planes and tweezers] too are deemed shaving.
  MISHNA: One who writes a tattoo, If he inks it without needling or he needles it without inking, he isn't liable unless he both inks and needles [the tattoo] with black ink, blue ink, or anything else that leaves a mark. Rebbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rebbi Shimon, One is not liable unless he writes the name of HaShem that it is said (Leviticus 19, 28) "And a tattoo you shall imprint in yourselves, I am the Lord".
  GEMARA: Rav Acha brei d'Rava said to Rav Ashi, Is [one not liable for a tattoo] until he actually writes "I am Hashem"? [Rav Ashi] responded, no, it's as bar Kafra taught, one is not liable until he writes the name of a false deity, that the Torah says, "a tatto you shall not imprint on yourselvs, I am Hashem.
  Rav Malkiah said in the name of Rav Adah bar Ahava, It is forbidden for a person to place ashes on a wound because it resembles a tattoo. Rav Nachman brei d'Rav Ikka said The [rulings concerning] the spits, the maidservents, and the pores [are attributed to] Rav Malkio. The [rulings concerning] the white spots, the ashes, and the cheese [are attributed to] Rav Malkia.
  Rav Pappa said, The [rulings that concern] mishnas and baraisas  [are attributed to] Rav Malkio. The [rulings that concern] amorahic teachings [are attributed to] Rav Malkio. And your menominc would be, A mishna is a queen. What is the difference between [Rav Nachman's opinion and Rav Pappa's opinion]? The difference between them is [the ruling concerning] maidservants.
  Rav Bibi bar Abaye was stringent even on the tiniest puncture. Rav Ashi says, anyplace where there is a wound, the wound shows.
  MISHNA: A Nazir who was drinking wine all day is only liable to one [set of malkus]. If they told him, "Don't drink", "Don't drink", and he nevertheless drunk, then he is liable for each every [warning]. If he was contaminating himself with corpses all day, he is only liable to one [set of malkus]. If they told him, "Don't contaminate yourself", "Don't contaminate yourself", and he nevertheless contaminated himself, then he is liable for each every [warning]. If he was shaving all day, he is only liable to one [set of malkus]. If they told him, "Don't shave", "Don't shave", and he nevertheless shaved, then he is liable for each every [warning].
  If he was wearing shatnez all day, he is only liable to one [set of malkus]. If they told him, "Don't wear shatnez", "Don't wear shatnez", and he nevertheless wore shatnez, then he is liable for each every [warning].
  
  Daf 21b
  
  There is a case of where on plows a single row, and is liable on it due to eight separate prohibitions. One who [1]plows with an ox and a donkey, [2,3]which are sanctified, over [4]mixed seeds in a vineyard [5]on the sabbatical year, [6]on a holiday, and he is a [7]Kohen and a [8]Nazir in a house of tumah.
  Chananya ben Chachinai said also one who is wearing shatnez. They responded that is not from [the same action]. He said back also a Nazir is not from [the same action].
  GEMARA: (Rav Bibi asked in the name of Rebbi Yosi, Is wearing considered literally wearing or is it) even if he just took in ant out his hand from his sleeve? Rav Acha brei dRav Ikka demonstrated by inserting [his hand] and removing [it]. Rav Ashi said that even if one only waited the amount of time in which he could have undressed and redressed, he would be liable.
  There is a single plowing... etc.: Rav Yanai said, In the group, they voted and decided that one who [merely] covers Kilayim [mixed seeds] incurs malkus. Rebbi Yochanon asked him, Wasn't that already stated in our Mishna? There is a case of where on plows a single row, and is liable on it due to eight separate prohibitions. One who plows with an ox and a donkey, which are sanctified, over mixed seeds in a vineyard" This plowing that one is liable on because of Kilayim, how would [such a case] be found? Would it not be where he covers them as he is plowing?
  [Rabbi Yani] responded, If I hadn't lifted up that shard, would you have found the beautiful pearl? Reish Lakash explained to Rebbi Yochanon, If not for the fact that the great man praised you [by referring to you explanation as a pearl], I would have said that our Mishna is authored by Rebbi Akiva who says that one who maintains Kilayim incurs malkus.
  What is this ruling of Rebbi Akiva? That it was taught in a baraisa, One who weeds or covers Kilayim incurs malkus. Rebbi Akiva says,  also one who merely maintains [Kilayim still incurs malkus].
  What is the reason of Rebbi Akiva? That it was taught in a baraisa. (Leviticus 19,19) "Your fields you shall not plant with Kilayim" only teaches us the planting [kilayim is forbidden]. From where do we derive maintaining [kilayim is also forbidden]? "Kilayim in your field don't".
  Ullah asked Rav Nachman, Let him also incur malkus for planting on a Yom Tov [festival]. Rav Nachman answered him, The tanna teaches some and leaves outs some.
  Ullah asked him, The Tanna says "eight", and you will say that he teaches some and leaves outs some!? Rava answered, There is a separation of forbidden labors with regards to Shabbos, but there is no separation of forbidden labors with regards to Yom Tov. Ullah said, that will sufice.
  Abaye asked, And is there really no separation of forbidden labors with regards to Yom Tov? But it was taught in a Mishna, One who cooks a Gid Hanasha [sciatic nerve] in milk on Yom Tov and subsequently eats it incurs five sets of malkus. [1]He incurs malkus for eating the Gid Hanasha. [2]He incurs malkus for cooking on Yom Tov without need. [3]He incurs malkus for cooking a sinew in milk. [4]He incurs malkus for consuming meat with milk. And [5]He incurs malkus
  
  Daf 22a
  
  for lighting the fire. And if this is true [that there is no separation of forbidden labors with regards to Yom Tov], then he should not be liable for lighting fire since he is already liable on the cooking!-?- Take out lighting and insert Gid Hanashe of a carcass.
  But Rebbi Chiya had taught that he incurs two sets of malkus on the consumption and three on the cooking. And if this is true [that he is liable for eating a carcass, the Rebbi Chiya should have said that] he would liable three [sets of malkus] on eating. Rather, take out lighting and insert the wood of an asheira tree [a tree used for idolatry] which has it's scriptural warning derived from the following. (Deuteronomy 13,18) "And it should not cleave to your hand. etc.".
  Rav Acha brei dRava challenged Rav Ashi, but then let him also incur malkus because of (Deuteronomy 7,26) "Do not bring an abomination into your house". Rather what case are we dealing with here? Where he cooked with sanctified wood, which has its azhara [scriptural warning] from here: (Deuteronomy 12,3) "And their asheria trees you should burn in fire", (Deuteronomy 12,4) "but you should not do so to HaShem your God."
  A mnemonic: SHNAB"Y SHNA"Z:
  Rav Hoshiah asked, But let's also consider [in our mishna] one who sows a Nachal Ayson, which has its azhara from here: (Deuteronomy 21,4) "That you should not work it nor plant it".
  Rav Chanania asked, But let's also consider one who erases God's name in his going, which has its azhara from here: (Deuteronomy 12,3) "And you shall destroy their name. etc." (Deuteronomy 12,4) "But you should not do so to HaShem your God."
  Rebbi Abahu asked, But let's also consider one who cuts off his bahares spot, which has its azhara from here: (Deuteronomy 24,8) "Guard your afflection of Tzeraas"
  Abaye asked, But let's also consider one who removes the Choshen [breastplate] from the Eiphod [apron] and one who removes the poles from the Ark, which has its azhara from here: (Exodus 25,16) "You shall not remove them" and (Exodus 28,28) "And you shall loosen the Choshen".
  Rav Ashi asked, But let's also consider one who plow with wood from an Asheia tree, which has its azhara from here: (Deuteronomy 13,8) ""And no abominable thing should cleave to your hand. etc."
  Ravina asked, But let's also consider one who cuts down fruit bearing trees, which has its azhara from here: (Deuteronomy 20,19) "For you may eat from them, but you may not cut them down".
  Rebbi Zeira asked to Rebbi Mani But let's also consider one who made a vow not to plow on Yom Tov? [Rebbi Mani answered,] There, the vow does not go into effect because it stands against what was sworn at Mount Sinai. [Rebbi Zeira] said to him, How about if he swore to not plow whether on a weekday or on Yom Tov, that since the oath takes effect on weekday, it also takes effect on YomTov? The mishna does not teach things that are subject to annulment.
  But doesn't it? There is Hekdesh? [The mishna] is refering to a Bechor [firstling], But there is still Nazir? [The mishna] is refering to a Nazir Shimshon.
  But a Nazir Shimshon can become containment with copses? Rather the Tanna does not hold of an inclusive prohibition.
  Rebbi Hoshiah said, One who breeds a disqualified sacrificial bull incurs two sets of malkus. Rebbi Yitzchak says, One who leads a disqualified sacrificial ox incurs malkus, because although it is one body, the Torah considers it like two distinct bodies.
  MISHNA: How much do we flog him? Forty minus one, as the Torah says, (Deuteronomy 25,2) "In the count of forty" the number which is next to forty. Rebby Yehudah says, He is administered forty full lashes, and where is he lashes the extra one? Between his shoulders.
  We only evaluate him for an amount of lashes which can be divided into three. If we evelauted him to be able to withstand forty, and flogged some of them,
  
  Daf 22b
  
  and then we reevaluated to not be able to withstand forty, he is exonerated. If we evaluated him to be able to withstand eighteen and then after he was flogged we reevaluated him to be able to withstand forty, he is exonerated.
  GEMARA: What is the reason [that a sinner only recieves thirty-nine lashes]? If the Torah would have written "forty in number" I would have said that it means exactly forty. Now, however, that it says "in the number of forty" I would say the number which counts to forty [i.e. thirty-nine]. Rava said, How foolish are people that they stand up for a Sefer Torah, but do not stand up for a Torah scholar [lit: great man]. For in the Torah it is said "forty", and the Rabbis came and subtracted one.
  Rebbi Yehudah said forty full... etc. between his shoulders.: Rebbi Yitzchak said, What is the reason of Rebbi Yehuda? That it is written (Zechariah 13,6) "What are these wounds between your hands? And he will say that I was hit in the house of those who loved me." And according to the Rabbis? [Who say that there is no fortieth lash which would be administered between the shoulders.]  That verse is referring to the schoolchildren.
  We only evaluate for malkus that are fit to. etc.: If he was already flogged then yes, [a differing evaluation would exonerate him. This implies that] if he wasn't already flogged then [a differing evaluation] would not [exonerate him.].
  But I'll challenge that [with the following baraisa:] If they evaluated him to be able to withstand forty and then reevaluated him to be unable to withstand forty, he is exonerated. If they evaluated him to be [only] able to withstand eighteen and then reevaluated him to be able to withstand [the full] forty, he is exonerated. [Thus implying that he gets exonerated even if he wasn't yet flogged at all!]
  Rav Sheises anwered, It is not a contradiction. [Our mishna which says that he is still flogged] is where they reexamined him on the same day. [The baraisa, however, which says that he is exonerated] is referring to where he was reexamined the following day or the day after.
  MISHNA: If one commits a sin involving two prohibitions and they evaluated him once, then he gets flogged and is exonerated. But if not, then he is flogged, allowed to recuperate, and flogged again.
  GEMARA: But it was taught in a baraisa, we do not use a single evaluation for two prohibitions!?
  Rav Sheises said, it is not a contradiction. Here is where they evaluated him to be able to withstand forty-one lashes [which would be rounded down to thirty-nine - only one set]. Here is where they evaluated him to be able to withstand forty-two lashes [which would include three of the second set as well]. 
  MISHNA: How do flog him? We tie his two hands to the post here and here. The superintendent of the synagogue grabs his clothes. If they tear they tear, and if they rip at the seams they rip at the seams. until he reveals his heart. A stone is placed behind him. The superintendent of the synagogue stands on it and a strap is in his hand of a calf doubled once into two and then again into four.  And two straps of donkey hide go up and down through it. The handle is a handbreadth and its width is a handbreadth and its tip reaches his stomach.
  And he is striked one third in front of him and two parts behind him. And we do not strike him standing or sitting but rather bent over as the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25,2) "And the judge will cast him over".
  And the striker strikes him with one hand with all of his might, and the reader reads: (Deuteronomy 28,58) "If you do not guard yourself to perform etc. And Hashem will afflict you with wonders and the plagues etc. And then he returns to the beginning of the verses. (Deuteronomy 29, 8) "And you should guard these words of the covenant etc." And he concludes with (Psalms 78,38) "And He is full of compassion and forgives all sin etc." And then returns to the beginning of the verses.
  And if he dies under his hand, [the agent of court] is exonerated. If he added one additional lash and he died, then [the agent] is exiled on his account. If he soiled himself, whether with excrement or urine, he is exempt [from any further lashes]. Rebbi Yehuda says, A man [is exempt only with] excrement, but a woman with [is even exempt with] urine. GEMARA:
  
  Daf 23a
  
  GEMARA: What is the reason?
  Rav Sheises says in the name of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, From where do we know that the strap should be of calfskin? That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25,3) "Forty you should hit him" and next to it, (Deuteronomy 25,4) "Do not muzzle an ox while it's threshing.".
  And Rav Sheises also said in the name of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, From where do we know that a yevama who falls to one with blisters, that we do not "muzzle" her? That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25,4) "Do not muzzle an ox while it's threshing." and next to it, (Deuteronomy 25,5) "When two brothers dwell together. etc."
  And Rav Sheises also said in the name of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, Anyone who disgraces the hollidays is like one worships idolatry, as the Torah says, (Exodus 34,17) "You shall make so no molten gods" and next to it (Exodus 34,18) "The holiday of the matzos you should observe".
  And Rav Sheises also said in the name of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah, Anyone who tells over Lashon Hara and anyone who accepts Lashon Hara, and anyone who gives false testimony is fit to be thrown to the dogs as the Torah says, (Exodus 22, 30) "To the dogs you should throw it" and next to it (Exodus 23,1) "Do not bear a false report etc." Read it also "Do not cause to be accepted.
  And two straps. etc.: It was taught in a baraisa, of donkey.... As a certain Galelien expounded to Rav Chisdah. (Issiah 1,3) The ox knows its master and the donkey knows its master's trough. Isreal does not know etc." Hashem says let the one who recognizes his master's trough come and exact punishment from the one who does not recognize his master's trough.
  Its handle should be one handsbreadth. etc.: Abaye said Learn from here that everyone has a strap made for him. Rava said to him, if so then we would need many different straps. Rather, said Rava, There was an [adjustable] knot. When they need to they would tighten it, when they needed to, they would loosen it.
  We flog him etc.: From where do we know these words [that one third are on the front]? Rav Kahana said. That the Torah says, (Duetermony 25,2) "And the judge shall cast him down and flog him in front according to his wickedness in number." One wickedness is on his front, and two wickedness are on his back.
  We do not flog him etc.: Rav Chisdah said in the name of Rebbi Yochanon, From where do we know that the strap is doubled? That the Torah says "And he shall cast down". But that is needed for itself. [to teach that the sinner should be bent over.]? If so than the Torah should have written "bend over" what does "cast over" mean? Learn from here both things.
  The striker strikes with his hand: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], We only appoint attendants [to flog] who are lacking in strength but have superior intellect. Rebbi Yehuda says that we even appoint those lacking intellect but possessing superior strength.
  Rava says, the apoion of Rebbi Yehuda is more logical, for it is written (Duetermony 25,3) "Do not add, lest you'll add". This harmonizes if you say those lacking intellect, that would be why we would need to warn them, but if you say those possessing superior intellect, then why must we warn them? And the Rabbis? [How would they respond to this?] We only motivate one who can be motivated.
  It was taught in a baraisa: When he lifts [the strap], he lifts it with both hands. And when he strikes, he strikes with one hand in order that it will come from him....
  And the reader reads. etc.: The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], The greatest of the judges reads, the second counts, and the third one says "strike him". In times when the lashes are many, he lengthens [the recital]. In times when the lashes are few, he shortens [the recital].  But we learned in our mishna, that he returns the beginning of the verses. [Why then does the baraisa say to adjust the length]? The mitzvah is to be precise, but if one is not precise then he returns to the beginning of the verses.
  The rabbis taught [in a baraisa], From (Deuteronomy 25,3) "many lashes", I only know [that it is prohibited for the attendant to add] many lashes. From where do I learn out also few lashes? The Torah says "do not add" If so, the why does the Torah say "many lashes"? to teach us a bout the first [extra lashes] that they are considered "many lashes"
  If he soiled himself. etc.: The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], Both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement, but not urine, these are the words of Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Yehuda says, a man [is exempt] with excrement and a woman with urine. And the sages say, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with either excrement or urine.
  But it was taught in a different baraisa, Rebbi Yehuda says, both a man and a woman [are exempt] with excrement? Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answered,... [The second baraisa means that] both of them are equal with regards to excrement....
  Shmuel said if they tied him [to the post] and then he fled from court, he is exempt. They challenged this [from the following baraisa], If he soiled himself whether after the first lash or after the second lash, he is exempt. If the strap broke, by the second lash, we exonerate him, by the first lash, however, we do not exonerate him. Why is this? Let him be like the one fled? There he fled [which is humiliation enough]. Here, however, he did not flee.
  The Rabbis taught [in a baraisa], If they evaluated him that he would soil himself when lashed, then we exonerate him. [If they evaluated him] that he would soil himself after leaving Beis Din, we nevertheless flog him. And not only that, but even [if they evaluated him to soil himself beforehand, we still flog him. That the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25,2) "And he strikes him etc. And he becomes demeaned" And not that he was already demeaned in Beis Din.
  MISHNA: Anyone liable to kares who is flogged is exempt from their kares as the Torah says (Deuteronomy 25, 3)"And your brother should be flogged in your eyes" [this implies] when he gets flogged he is considered your brother. These are the words of Rebbi Channaia ben Gamliel.
  And Rebbi Chanania ben Gamliel also said, If one who transgresses a single sin looses his soul over it, one who performs a single mitzvah how much so does his soul be given to him. Rebbi Shimon says, It can be learned from its own place. That the Torah says (Leviticus 18, 29) "And the soul which performs will be cut off etc" and it says elsewhere
  
  Daf 23b
  
  (Leviticus 18,5) "That a person will perform and live through them". This means that anyone who refrains and does not transgress a sin is given reward as if he does a mitzvah.
  Rebbi Shimon bar Rebbi says, behold the Torah says (Deuteronomy 12,23) "Only be steadfast in not eating blood, for blood is the soul. etc." And now if by blood, which a person naturally holds back from, one who separates himself from it receives reward, then by robbery and immorality which a person's natural inclination seeks out and wants, how much more so will one who separates from them receive reward and for generations and generations afterwards until the end of all generations.
  Rebbi Chanania ben Akashia says, Hashem wanted to give merit to Isreal. Therefore he gave them many mitzvas as the Torah says (Isaiah 42,21) "Hashem was pleased, for His righteousness’sake, To make the teaching great and glorious."
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yochanon says, Rabbi Chananya ben Gamliel's colleagues disputed what he had said. Rav Adda bar Ahava said in the name of the school of Rav, "We learned in a Mishna, there is no difference between Shabbos and Yom Kippur besides for that one is punishable by man and one is punishable with kares" Now if this is true [that malkus works in place of kares] then both are punishable by man?
  Rav Nachman (bar Yitzchak) says, Who is this tanna? Rabbi Yitchak who says  that there is no kares by liabilities of malkus, that we learned in a baraisa, Rebbi Yitzchak says, Liabilities of kares are included in the punishment of malkus, and why was kares bachoso singled out? To punish him with kares alone but not malkus.
  Rav Ashi says, You can even say that the tanna is the Rabbis, only that this one's main punishment is through man and this one's main punishment is through heaven.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava says in the name of Rav, The halacha is like Rabbi Chanania ben Gmaliel. Rav Yosef asked, Who went up to heaven, returned and said this? Abaye responded, rather it's like that which Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, Three things that Beis Din shel mattah [court] did that Beis din shel malleh [the heavenly court] agreed to. Who ascended returned and told us? Rather we expounded verses, so too here we expound verses.
  The text said, Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi says, Three things that Beis Din shel mattah [court] did that Beis din shel malleh [the heavenly court] agreed to. These are they, Reading Miggilah [on purim], greeting with the name of G-d, and bringing maiser.
  Reading the Meggilah, as it is written (Esther 9,27) "The Jews upheld and accepted", which means that they upheld above what was accepted below. Greeting with the name of G-d, as it is written (Ruth 2,4) "And behold, Boaz was coming from Beis Lechem and he said to the workers, 'May Hashem be with you'.". And it is also said (Judges 6,12) "May Hashem be with you, man of valor."
  What does [the baraisa mean with] "And it also said"? That if you will attemp to say that Boaz was acting from his own intuitiuon, but Heaven did agree with him, then come and learn, "And he said 'Hashem is with you, man of valor'.".
  Bringing maiser, as it is written (Malachi 3,10) "Bring all of the maiser to the storehouses, that there be food in My house, and test me now in this says Hashem, the master of legions, if I do not open up for you the windows of heaven and shower you with blessing until you are weary with enough". What does it mean "until you are weary with enough"? Rami bar Rav said, Until your lips grow weary from saying "enough".
  Rebbi Elazar said, in three places the divine presence made an appearence. In the court of Shem, in the court of Shmuel HaRamasi, and in the court of Shlomo. In the court of Shem, as it is written, (Genesis 38,26) And Yehudah recognized her and said she is righteous, it is from me". How did he know? Maybe the same way that he had went to her, a different man also had went to ho her? A hevenly voice called out and said "From me" these hidden things have come forth.
  In the court of Shmuel, as it is written, (Samuel 1,12,3) "Behold, testify before me and before his anointed one, who's ox have I taken? And they answered him, you have wrongfully taken from us, and you have not robbed us. And he said let Hashem be a witness, and let his annointed one be a witness that you have not found in my hand anything. And he said 'A witness'." "And he said"? "And they said" it should have said!? A heavenly voice called out and said, "I am witness in this matter".
  In the court of Shlomo, as it is written, (I Kings 3,27) "And the king answered and said, give her the living child and do not kill it, for she is the mother. How did he know? Maybe she was deceiving him? A heavenly voice called out and said she is the mother
  Rava said, how do we know [that it was a heavenly voice]? Maybe by Yehuda, once he counted the days and nights and reasoned that we can make a presumption from what we know but we can not make a presumption from what we do not know.
  Shmuel also, all of Israel is referred to in a singular term, as it is written (Isaiah 45,17) "Israel is saved by Hashem".
  Shlomo also, from this that this one was compassionate and this one was no compassionate. Rather, [we must say that it was] a tradition....
  Rebbi Simlai expounded, Six hundred and thirteen mitzvos were told to Moshe. Three hundred and sixty five prohibtions in accordance with the days of the sun. And two hundred and forty eight positive commandments in accordance with the limbs of a person. Rav Hamnunya said what is the meaning of the verse (Deuteronomy 33,4) "Moshe commanded us a law ("Torah"), an inheritance"? "Torah" has a numerical value of
  
  Daf 24a
  
  six hundred and eleven. "I am..." and "There should not be to you.." were heard directly from The Mighty.
  (A mnemonic: Dmasma"k Sa"k)
  Dovid came and established them on eleven, as it is written, (Psamls 15,1) "A psalm  of Dovid. Hashem, who shall dwell in your live? Who will dwell upon your holy mountain? One who walks upright, and works righteously, and speaks truth in his heart, That has no slander upon his tongue, nor does evil to his fellow, nor takes up a reproach against his neighbor; In whose eyes a vile person is despised, But he honors those that fear Hashem; He swears to his own hurt, and does not changes; one who doesn't lend out his money on interest, Nor take a bribe against the innocent. He that does these things shall never falter.
  "One who walks upright", this is Avraham, as it is written (Genesis 17,1) "Walk before me and be perfect.
  "Who works righteously", like Aba Hilkia
  "And speaks truthfully in his heart", like Rav Safra. 
  "has no slander upon his tongue" this refers to Yakov, our forefather, as it is written (Genesis 27,12) "Maybe my father will feel me and I will be in his eyes like a deceiver".
  "Has done no evil to his fellow" that he doesn't enter his fellows trade.
  "Who does not takes up a reproach against his neighbor" This refers to one who brings his relatives near him.
  "In whose eyes a vile person is despised" This refers to King Chizkiyahu who dragged the bones of his father on a bed of ropes.
  "But he honors those that fear Hashem" This refers to Yehoshafut the King of Yehuda, who whenever he would see a Torah scholar would get up from throne, embrace them and kiss them, and call them (my father, my father), my Rebbi, my Rebbi, my master, my master.
  "He swears to his own hurt, and does not changes" like Rebbi Yochanon. That Rebbi Yochanon once said, I will be fasting until I reach my house.
  "Who doesn't lend out his money on interest" even with interest to an idol worshiper.
  "Nor does he take a bribe against the innocent" like Rebbi Yishmael Ben Yosi
  It is written, "He that does these things shall never falter" Whenever Raban Gamliel would reach this verse, he would weep. He would say one who does all of these is the one who will not falter, but if he only does one of them, then he will falter.
  They told him is it written "who does all of these things"? it is written, "one who does these things" which would imply even one of them. That if you will not say this, it is written elsewhere (Leviticus 18, 24) "Do not contaminate yourself with all of these". There also, is only one who touches all of the things one who becomes tamai, but if he only [touched] one of them not? Rather it refers to one of these. So too here it refers to one of these.
  Yeshaya came and established these on six, as it is written (Issiah 33,15) "He who walks righteously, and speaks uprightly; He who despises unlawful gain, who shakes his hands from accepting a bribe, who stops his ears from hearing bloodshed, and shuts his eyes from seeing evil."
  "He who walks righteously", this refers to Avraham our forefather, as it is written (Genesis 18, 19) "For now I known that he may command etc.".
  "And speaks uprightly" this refers to one who does not embarrass his fellow in public.
  "He who despises unlawful gain", like Rebbi Yishmael ben Elisha.
  "Who shakes his hands from accepting a bribe", like Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yosi.
  "Who stops his ears from hearing bloodshed", that he does not hear a degradation of one of the Rabbis and remain silent, like Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon.
  "And shuts his eyes from seeing evil" this is like what Rebbi Chia bar Aba said. That Rebbi Chia bar Aba said this refers to one who does not gaze at woman at the time that they are doing their laundry.
  And it is written [about one who does these six things], (Issiah 33,16) "He will dwell on high, etc."
  Micha came and established them on three, as it is written "It has been told  to you, O man, what is good, and what does Hashem require of you?: Only to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk discreetly with your God."
  "To do justly", this refers to laws. "To love mercy", this refers to kind deeds. "And to walk discreetly with your God" this refers to bringing out the dead and bringing in the bride. And is it not a kal v'chomer? If matters which are usually not done discretely [like funeral and bridal processions], the Torah says to perform them with discretion, then matters which usually are done discreetly [like charity], how much more so [should they be performed discreetly.
  Yeshaya returned and established these on two, as it is said (Issiah 56,1) "So says, God, guard justice, and do righteousness". Amos came and established these on one, as it is said (Amos 5,4) "Thus said Hashem to the house of Israel: Seek me Me, and live." Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak challanged this, maybe it means to seek out the entire Torah? Rather, Chabakuk came and established these on one as it said (Habakkuk 2,4) "The righteous shall live by his faith."
  Rebbi Yosi bar Chanina says, four decrees were decreed by Moshe Rabainu on Israel. Four [later] prophets came and nullified them. Moshe said (Deuteronomy 33,28) "And Israel dwells in safety, The fountain of Yakov alone". Came Amos and nullified it as it is said, (Amos 7,5) "Please now, How can Yakkov stand? etc." And it is written later, (Amos 7,3) "God repented concerning this etc.".
  Moshe said (Deuteronomy 28, 65) "and among these nations you shall have no rest". Came Yirmeyah, and said, (Jeremiah 31,2) "Proceed to bring peace to Israel".
  Moshe said (Exodus 34,7) "visiting the sins of the fathers on their children". Came Yechezkal and nullified it, (Ezekiel 18,4) "The soul that sins, it shall die.".
   Moshe said (Leviticus 26,38) "And you will become lost among the nations". Came Yeshaya, and said, (Issiah 27,13) "And it shall come to pass in that day that a great horn will be blown".
  Rav said, I am worried from that verse, "and you will become lost among the nations". Rav Pappa challenged him, Perhaps, it refers to a lost article that one searches for, as it is written, (Psalms 119, 176) "I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek your servant". Rather, [Rav was worried] from the later part of the verse. (Leviticus 26,38) "And you will be consumed in the land of your enemies". Mar Zutra challenged him, Perhaps it refers to the eating of cucumbers and gourds [which still survive after some of them are consumed].
  And once Rabban Gamaliel, Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah, Rabbi Joshua, and Rabbi Akiva, were traveling together, when they heard the sound of the crowds of Rome from the plaza one hundred and twenty mil away. They started to cry, but Rebbi Akiva was laughing. They said to him Because of why are you laughing? He said to them And you, why do you weep? They told him, these Goyim that bow down to wood and burn frankincense to the worship of the stars are living in peace and tranquility. While us, our house - the footstool of our God is burnt
  
  Daf 24b
  
  in fire, and we should not cry!? He responded to them, that is why I am laughing. If this is what happens to those who transgress His will, how much so to those who fulfill His will!
  Another time, they were ascending to Jerusalem, .When they came to Har haTzofim, they tore their clothes. When they reached the Temple Mount, they saw a fox emerging from the place of the Holy of Holies. They started to cry, but Rabbi Akiva was laughing. The other sages said to him, Why are you laughing? He said to them, Why do you weep? They replied The place about which was written (Numbers 1,51) "and the non-Kohen that draws near shall be put to death", is now a haunt of foxes and we should not weep!?
  He replied That is why I laugh. It is written (Isaiah 8,2) "and I will take unto Me faithful witnesses to record, Uriah the priest, and Zechariah the son of Yeberechiahu." Now what was the connection between Uriah and Zechariah? Uriah was during the period of the First Temple, and Zechariah was during the period of the Second Temple. Rather, the verse was making the prophecy of Zechariah dependent on the prophecy of Uriah.
  Regarding Uriah, it is written, (Micah 3,12) Therefore shall Zion for your sake be plowed etc.". Regarding Zechariah it is written (Zechariah 8,4) "There shall yet old men and old women sit in the broad places of Jerusalem. Until the prophecy of Uriah was fulfilled, I was afraid that the prophecy of Zechariah would likewise be unfulfilled. Now that the prophecy of Uriah was fulfilled, I know that the prophecy of Zechariah will be fulfilled. In this way they answered him, Akiva, you have consoled us. Akiva, you have consoled us.
  We will return to you and we have acquired Tractate Makkos. 