meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Nashim/Kiddushin/English/Daf Shevui.txt"}
text: Kiddushin
  קידושין
  Daf Shevui
  
  
  Kiddushin
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  A woman is acquired in three ways and acquires herself in two: She is acquired by money, by document, or by intercourse. “By money”: Bet Shammai says: a denar or the equivalent of a denar; Bet Hillel says: a perutah or the equivalent of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar.
  And she acquires herself by divorce or by her husband's death. A yevamah is acquired by intercourse. And she acquires herself by halitzah or by the yavam’s death.
  GEMARA. A woman is acquired. Why is it different here in that it states, “a woman is acquired,” and elsewhere it teaches “A man betroths.”
  Because he wishes to teach “money”; and from where is it derived that money [effects betrothal]? He derives it by connecting “taking” with the “taking” from the field of Ephron:   Here it is written: “When a man takes a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:13); while it is written there: “I will give you money for the field: take it from me” (Genesis 23:13).
  And “taking” is called acquisition, for it is written, “the field which Abraham acquired.”
  
  Daf 2b
  
  Alternatively, “Fields, they shall acquire for money” (Jeremiah 32:44). Therefore, it teaches: a woman is acquired.
  Then let him teach there, “A man acquires”?  He [the Tanna] first taught Biblical language, but subsequently, rabbinic language. And what is the [meaning] of the Biblical language? That he [the husband] prohibits her to all [other men] like hekdesh.
  But, let it teach here, “A man acquires”?  Because it wants to teach the second clause, “and acquires herself,” which refers to her [the woman], it therefore teaches the first clause also in reference to her.
  But, let it teach here, “A man acquires”?  Because it wants to teach the second clause, “and acquires herself,” which refers to her [the woman], it therefore teaches the first clause also in reference to her.
  If you want you can say, if it had taught “he acquires” I might have thought, even against her will, hence it taught “a woman is acquired,”-- with her consent, but not without.
  Now, why does it to teach shalosh? Let it teach sheloshah?  Because it wants tostate derekh [way], which is feminine, as it is written, “And you shall show them the way [bah] in which they must go” (Exodus 18:20).
  If so, that which is taught, “a zav is examined in seven [shiv'ah] ways [derakhim]” let it teach “sheva”? Because it wants to state “derekh”, and we find “derekh” as masculine, as it is written, “They shall come out against you in one way [be-derekh ehad], and flee before you seven ways [shiv'ah derakhim]” (Deuteronomy 28:7).
  If so, the verses are contradictory, and the mishnayot are contrary? The verses are not contradictory: here [the first verse quoted], the reference is from the Torah, which is a feminine noun, as it is written, “The law [Torah] of the Lord is perfect [temimah], restoring [meshivat] the soul” (Psalms 19:8), so the feminine form was used. There the reference is to war, and it is the practice of man to wage war, not of woman. Therefore the masculine is used.
  The mishnayot are not contradictory: here, since the reference is to a woman, it is taught in the feminine. There, the reference is to a man, since it is the nature of a man to be examined, but not of a woman, for a woman becomes unclean even through an accident, the masculine form is employed.
  Now, why does it teach shalosh? Because [of the word] derakhim [ways]!  Then let it teach devarim [things] and sheloshah? Because it wishes to teach “intercourse,” and intercourse is called a “way,” as it is written, “And the way of a man with a young woman. . . Such is the way of an adulterous woman” (Proverbs 30:19-20).
  This makes sense with regard to intercourse; but what can you say about money and document? [They are taught as “ways”] on account of “intercourse.”   
  And are two taught on account of one? These too are for the sake of intercourse. 
  Alternatively I can say: The author of this [Mishnah] is R. Shimon. For it was taught: R. Shimon said: Why did the Torah state, “When a man takes a wife” and not “when a woman is taken by a man”? Because it is the way of a man to go in search of a woman, but it is not the way of a woman to go in search of a man. This may be compared to a man who lost something: who goes in search of whom? The one who lost something goes in search of what is lost.
  Now, that which it taught: “a zav is examined in seven ways”: let it state [seven] “things’?   — It teaches us: it is the nature [way] of excessive eating to cause zivah, and it is the nature [way] of excessive drinking to cause zivah.
  And as to that which we learned: “An etrog is comparable to a tree in three ways” let it teach [in three] things? Because it wants to teach the second clause: and to vegetables in one way. Then in the second clause too let its state, [and to vegetables in one] “thing”? 
  
  
  Daf 3a
  
  It teaches us that the nature [way] of an etrog is like that of vegetables. Just as it is the nature of vegetables to grow by means of all waters, and its tithing is determined by the time when it is harvested; so is it the nature of the etrog to grow by means of all waters, and [therefore] its tithing is determined by its harvesting. 
  And that which we learn: A koy is in some ways, similar to a wild beast and in other ways to domesticated animals; and in some ways similar to both wild beasts and domesticated animals, and in other ways to neither beasts of chase nor domesticated animals, let it be taught, “things”? And also, that which we learn: This is one of the ways in which women's divorce deeds are similar to slaves writs of manumission, let it teach, “things”?
  Rather, whenever there is distinction, it teaches “ways”: wherever there is no distinction, it teaches “things”.  This is also derived from a precise reading for the second clause teaches: R. Eliezer says: The etrog is equal to trees in all things.  Learn from this.
  What does the number of the first clause exclude, and what does the number of the second exclude?
  The number of the first clause excludes huppah. But according to R. Huna, who holds that huppah does acquires [a woman through betrothal], from a kal vehomer argument, what does it exclude? 
  It excludes a symbolic exchange, lest I would think that since we learn the meaning of “taking” from Ephron's field then just as a field may be acquired by a symbolic exchange, so too may a woman be acquired by a symbolic exchange: therefore it teaches us [that she is not].
  And let us say that it is so [that she can be acquired by symbolic exchange]?  Symbolic exchange is possible with less than the value of a perutah
  
  Daf 3b
  
  will not give herself over in marriage for less than a perutah.
  The number of the second clause excludes halitzah.  Lest I would have said that this may be inferred by a kal vehomer from a yevamah: just as a yevamah, who does not go out with a divorce document, does go out through halitzah; so too [a married woman], who does go out through a divorce document, should go out through halitzh. Therefore it teaches us [that she does not].
  And let us say that it is indeed so? The verse says, “[then he shall write her] a writ of divorce”  a document severs the marriage, but nothing else severs it.
  By money. From where do we know this? Moreover, when we learned, a father has authority over his daughter in her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, document or intercourse:  How do we know that she can be acquired by money and that the money belongs to her father?
  Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: Scripture said, “Then she shall go out for nothing, without money” (Exodus 21:11), [which implies that] this master receives no money but that another master does receive money; And who is he? Her father.
  But might it not be suggested that it belongs to her? Now that her father who contracts her betrothal, as it is written in Scripture, “I gave my daughter to this man,” (Deuteronomy 22:16) would she take the money!
  But might it not be suggested that this applies only to a minor who has no legal right [to betroth herself], but a na'arah who has such rights may herself contract her betrothal, and she herself receives the money? Scripture stated, “Being in her youth in her father's house” (Numbers 30:17), [implying that] all the advantages of her youth belong to her father.
  But what about that which R. Huna said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that a daughter’s handiwork belongs to her father? As it is said, “And if a man sells his daughter to be a maidservant” (Exodus 21:7): just as the handiwork of a maidservant belongs to her master so does the handiwork of a daughter belong to her father.  Now why do I need this verse, deduce it from “Being in her youth in her father's house”?
  Rather, that verse was written in connection only with the annulment of vows, [here too it was written in connection with vows]. And should you suggest that we might infer this from it, monetary matters cannot be inferred from ritual matters.
  And should you suggest that we might infer it from [the laws of] fines, monetary payments cannot be inferred from fines.
  And should you suggest that it might be inferred from [the laws of compensation for] shame and blemish, shame and blemish are different, since the father is also involved in it?
  Rather, it is logical that when the Torah excluded [one “going out”]
  
  
  Daf 4a
  
  it excluded a “going out” that was similar.
  But this “going out,” is not like that of the other: For in the case of the master [the maidservant] goes entirely out of his control while in the “going out” from the control of her father she still needs to be brought into the huppah? In respect of the annulment of vows, at any rate, she goes out of his control; for we have learned: In the case of a betrothed na’arah, the father and her husband jointly annul her vows.
  Now, this verse “and she goes out for nothing”, does it come to teach this? Surely it is needed for what was taught, ‘And she goes out for nothing” this refers to the days of bagrut [when she reaches majority age]; “without money” to the days of na’arut!
  Ravina said: If so, Scripture should have written, “en kesef [without money]”; what does “ey kesef” mean? There is no money for this master, but there is money for another. And who is he? The father.
  And how do you know that we may derive from verses in this way?  Because it was taught: [If a priest's daughter is married to a non-priest, she may not eat of the sacred gifts. But if the priest's daughter is a widow, or divorced,] and has no [eyn] child [. . . she may eat of her father's food]” (Leviticus 22:13). 
  I only know [that] her own child [disqualifies her]; from where do I know [that she is disqualified] by her child's child?  From the verse: “and has no [eyn] child”, examine (ayen) her. Again, I only know [that] legitimate seed [disqualifies her]: from where do I know that illegitimate seed does as well?   From the verse, “and has no [eyn] child”: examine her.
  But you have used this [derashah] for her child's child? For her child's child no verse is required, because grand-children are as children; the verse was required only for illegitimate offspring.
  Now, how does the tanna himself know that such exegesis is permissible? I can say to you “It is written: “Baalam refused” (Deuteronomy 25:7), “and my husband's brother refused [me'en]” neither of which contain a yod, whereas here [in the verses under discussion] a yod is written: Learn from this that it comes to make a derashah.
  It was necessary to write that her kiddushin money belong to her father and it was necessary to write that products of her labor belong to her father. For had the Torah written that her kiddushin money belongs to her father, I might have thought, that is because she does not work to earn it, but her labor, for which she does work, I would say is her own.  
  And if it had taught about her handiwork, that is because she is sustained from it; but her kiddushin, which comes from elsewhere, I would think is hers: thus both are necessary.
  The [above] text [says:] “And she shall go out for nothing” this refers to the days of bagrut; “without money” this refers to the days of na'arut.” Let the Torah say na’arut, and it would not need to say “bagrut”?
  Rabbah said: One comes and teaches about the other.
  As is the case with the toshav and sakhir, as was taught: Toshav (Leviticus 22:10): this refers to [a Hebrew slave] acquired in perpetuity; sakhir: this refers to one purchased for a period of [six] years.
  Now, let it say toshav, but not sakhir, and I would reason: if one acquired in perpetuity may not eat, how much more so one purchased only for a period of [six] years? 
  Were it so, I would say, toshav is one purchased for a period of [six] years, but one acquired in perpetuity may eat. Therefore sakhir comes and teaches [the meaning of] toshav, that although he is purchased for perpetuity, he may not eat.
  Abaye said to him: Is this so! There they are two persons, and even had the Torah [explicitly] written, a toshav whose ear was bored, and then added the other, sakhir would be something which might be inferred from a kal vehomer; and a thing which is derived from a kal vehomer the Torah takes the trouble to write.
  But here [in the case of the Hebrew handmaiden] she is only one person: and since she departs at na'arut, what would she be doing with him in bagrut.
  Rather Abaye said: It is necessary only for a girl who reaches majority age and is an aylonit:
  I might have thought, she [a Hebrew maidservant] is freed only by na'arut, but not by bagrut: therefore it teaches us otherwise.
  Mar bar Rav Ashi raised a difficulty: But is this not a kal vehomer? If signs [of her reaching puberty], which do not free her from the domain of her father, do free her from her master's authority: then bagrut, which frees her from the domain of her father, surely frees her from her master's authority!
  Mar bar Rav Ashi raised a difficulty: But is this not a kal vehomer? If signs [of her reaching puberty], which do not free her from the domain of her father, do free her from her master's authority: then bagrut, which frees her from the domain of her father, surely frees her from her master's authority! but with one who will not produce such evidence the sale is not valid:
  
  Daf 4b
  
  therefore it teaches us “and she shall go out for nothing.”
  Now, according to Mar bar R. Ashi, who said “is this not a kal vehomer”, have we not said: Something which can be inferred by a kal vehomer, Scripture will write [explicitly]?  This is only if no other answer is possible; but if it is, we answer. 
  But the Tanna brings [proof] from the following. As it was taught: “When a man takes a wife, and has intercourse with her, then it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes, because he has found” (Deuteronomy 24:1). “Taking” can only mean money, and thus it also says: “I will give the money for the field: take it from me” (Genesis 23:13).
  But can this not be proven through logic: if a Hebrew maidservant, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money; this one [a wife], who may be acquired by intercourse, can surely be acquired by money?
  Let a yevamah prove [the contrary:] she may be acquired by intercourse, yet she is not acquired by money. As for a yevamah, that may be because she cannot be acquired by document: will you say the same of this one [a wife], who can be acquired by document?
  Therefore Scripture teaches: “When a man takes” etc. But why do I need a verse: it has been deduced [through logic]! R. Ashi said: Because it would be possible to say, from the outset this was a refutable deduction. 
  From where did you deduce it? From a Hebrew maidservant! As for a Hebrew maidservant, [she can be acquired by money] because she goes out with money: will you say the same of this one [a wife], who does not go out by money? Therefore Scripture says: “when a man takes a wife.”
  And it needed to write “she goes out for nothing” and “when a man takes.” For had the Torah written, “when a man takes,” I would have thought, the kiddushin [money] given to her by the husband is her own: therefore Scripture writes, “and she goes out for nothing.”
  And had Scripture written, “and she goes out for nothing,” I would have thought, if she [the wife] gives him [the husband] money and betroths him, it is valid kiddushin, therefore Scripture wrote, “when a man takes” but not, “when a woman takes.”
  “And has intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1): this teaches that she may be acquired by intercourse. But can this not be proven from logic? If a yevamah, who cannot be acquired by money, is acquired by intercourse; then this one [a wife], who is acquired by money, can surely be acquired by intercourse!
  Let a Hebrew maidservant prove [the contrary], for she may be acquired by money, yet she is not acquired by intercourse. As for a Hebrew maidservant, that is because her acquisition is not for the sake of marriage; will you say the same of this one, who is acquired for conjugal purposes? 
  Therefore it is stated: “and has intercourse with her.” But why do I need a verse? It has been deduced! R. Ashi said: Because it would be possible to say from the outset this was a refutable deduction. From where did you deduce it?? From a yevamah! 
  As for a yevamah [she is acquired through intercourse] because she is already connected [to the yavam]; can you say [the same] of this one, who is not already connected? Therefore, Scripture says “and has intercourse with her.”
  
  Daf 5a
  
  And from where do we know that [a woman may be acquired] by a document? This is derived through logic: if money, which does not take her out of marriage, brings her in; then a document, which does take her out, can surely bring her in.
  [No]. As for money, that is because one can use it to redeem sacred property and second tithe. Can you say the same for a deed, which cannot be used to redeem sacred property and second tithe, as it is written, “And he will give the money and it will be assured to him” (Leviticus 27:19).
  Therefore the verse says, “And she goes out [of his house] and then she becomes [another man's wife]” (Deuteronomy 24:2):  the verse compares her “becoming” [betrothal] with her “going out” [divorce]; just as the “going out” is by deed, so is “becoming” is by deed. Then let him also compare “going out” with “becoming”: just as “becoming” may be performed with money, so “going out” may be effected by money? 
  Abaye said: Then they will say: Money brings in [a wife] and money sends out [a wife]. Shall the defender become the prosecutor! If so, with regard to a document as well: Document sends out and a document brings in: shall the prosecutor become the defender! 
  The contents of each document are different.  So too, this money is different from that money! Nevertheless, the stamp [on the coin] is the same.
  Rava said: The verse says, “Then he shall write her [a writ of divorce]” (Deuteronomy 24:1): She can be divorced by writing, not by money. But why not say she can be divorced by “writing” but not betrothed by writing?  It is written, “and she goes out…and she becomes” comparing [divorce with betrothal].
  And why do you choose to read this way?  It is logical: when discussing divorce, the Torah excludes [a particular method of] divorce; but when discussing divorce, would it exclude [a form of] marriage?
  Now, according to R. Yose Hagalili, who uses this verse [“then he shall write”], for a different purpose, how do we know that she cannot be divorced by money? The verse says, “a bill of divorce” a bill can divorce her, but nothing else can divorce her.
  Now, how do the rabbis use this word “severing (divorce)”?  They need it [to teach] that it must be something which [completely] cuts them off from each other.
  As it was taught: [If the husband says,] “Behold, here is your divorce, on condition that you do not drink wine or do not visit your father's house forever,” this is not “severing”: “for thirty days,” this is “severing.”
  And R. Yose Hagalili [how does he derive this halakhah]?  He deduces it from the use of keritut instead of karet.  And the rabbis?  They do not ascribe significance to karet, keritut.
  One could not be derived from the other; but let one be inferred from two others?   Which could be inferred? The Torah could have not written [betrothal] through a document, and it could be derived from the others? But as for the others, that is because their pleasure is great!  
  Let the Torah not write intercourse, that it might be inferred from the others? But as for the others, that is because their powers of acquisition are great!   
  Let the Torah not write money, that it might be inferred from the others? But as for the others, that is because they can be done against her will!
  And should you argue, money too can work in the case of a Hebrew maidservant, nevertheless, we do not find this in respect to marriage.
  R. Huna said: Huppah acquires [a woman], from a kal vehomer. If money, which does not allow one to eat terumah, acquires; then huppah, which allows one to eat terumah, surely acquires!
  And money does not allow her to eat terumah? But has not Ulla stated: The daughter of an Israelite who is betrothed [to a priest] is, according to Torah law, permitted to eat terumah, for it said,  a person who is a priest’s property by purchase (Lev 22:11) and that [woman] also is his acquisition through money.
  What is the reason why they ruled that she is not permitted to eat [terumah]? Lest they mix her a cup [of terumah] in her father's home and she gives it her brother or sister to drink.
  Rather argue thus: if money, which does not complete [marriage], acquires [in marriage],
  
  Daf 5b
  
  then huppah, which completes [marriage], surely acquires! As for money, that is because sacred things and second tithe are redeemed with it! Let then intercourse prove it.
  As for intercourse, that is because it acquires in the case of a yevamah! Then let money prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the distinguishing feature of one is not like that of the other, nor is the distinguishing of this one like that of the other; the feature common to both is that they acquire elsewhere, and acquire here [in marriage]; so too I will include huppah, which acquires elsewhere and acquires here too
  [No.] The feature common to both is that they are greatly pleasurable! Let the document then prove it.  As for the document, that is because it frees an Israelite woman in divorce. Then let money and intercourse prove it.
  And thus the argument revolves: the distinguishing feature of one is not that of another, nor is the distinguishing feature of this one that of the other: the feature common to all is that they acquire in general and here too; so too I will include huppah, that it acquires in general and here too.
  [No.] As for the common feature, it is that they can be done against her will.  And R. Huna? Money at least in matters of marriage is not found against her will.
  Rava said: There are two refutations of the matter: First, we learned three [means of betrothal], not four;
  and moreover, does not huppah complete [marriage] only through [prior] betrothal; can we then deduce huppah, which is not preceded by betrothal, from huppah when preceded by betrothal?
  Abaye answered him: That which you said, we learned three [means of betrothal], not four: the tanna taught [only] what is explicitly stated [in the Torah], but not what is not explicitly stated.  
  And when you said; does not huppah complete [marriage] only through [prior] betrothal, Rav Huna also said this: if money, which cannot complete [marriage] after money, nevertheless acquires; then huppah, which completes [marriage] after money, can surely acquire. 
  Our rabbis taught: How [is a woman acquired] by money? If he gave her money or its equivalent and declared to her, “Behold, you are consecrated (mekudeshet) to me,” [or] “you are betrothed (me’ureset) to me,” [or] “Behold, you are a wife to me”, then she is betrothed.    But if she gives him [money or its equivalent] and says “Behold, I am consecrated to you,” “I am betrothed to you,” “I am a wife to you,” she is not betrothed. 
  R. Papa raised a difficulty: The reason it is valid is that he gave [the money] and made the declaration; but if he gave the money and she made the declaration, she is not betrothed. Then say the second clause: But if she gave the money, and she made the declaration, the kiddushin is not valid. The reason is that she gave [the money] and made the declaration, but if he gave the money and she made the declaration, the kiddushin is valid?
  The first clause is exact, while the second is mentioned incidentally. But does it teach a second clause that contradicts the first?
  Rather this is the meaning: If he gives [the money] and he speaks, the kiddushin is obviously valid; [but] if he gives, and she says the declaration, it is as though she both gives and speaks, so that the kiddushin is not valid. And if you want you can say, if he gives and speaks, she is betrothed; if she gives and speaks, she is not betrothed; but if he gives and she speaks, it is doubtful, and we are concerned about the validity of the [kiddushin] from rabbinic law.
  Shmuel said: In respect to kiddushin, if he gave her money or its equivalent and said to her, “Behold, you are mekudeshet,” “Behold, you are betrothed,” [or] “Behold, you are a wife,”-- she is betrothed. [If he declares,] “Behold, I am your husband,” ‘Behold, I am your master,” “Behold, I am your betrothed,” there are no grounds for fear [that she is betrothed].
  Shmuel said: In respect to kiddushin, if he gave her money or its equivalent and said to her, “Behold, you are mekudeshet,” “Behold, you are betrothed,” [or] “Behold, you are a wife,”-- she is betrothed. [If he declares,] “Behold, I am your husband,” ‘Behold, I am your master,” “Behold, I am your betrothed,” there are no grounds for fear [that she is betrothed].
  R. Papa said to Abaye: Shall we say that Shmuel holds that ambiguous abbreviations are [valid] abbreviations?
  But have we not learned: If one declares, “I will be,” he becomes a nazir. And we asked about this: but perhaps he meant, “I will fast”?   And Shmuel said, That is only if a nazir was passing before him. The reason is because a nazir was passing before him, but if not so, then he would not be [a nazir].
  Here we are dealing with a case where he said “to me.” If so, what does he teach us?
  
  Daf 6a
  
  He teaches us these latter expressions.[For] here it is written, “When a man takes [a woman],”but not that causes himself to be taken by her, and there it is written, “And when he send her away,”  but not that he sends himself away.
  Our Rabbis taught: [if one declares,] “Behold, you are my wife,” “Behold, you are my arusah,” “Behold, you are acquired to me,” she is betrothed; “Behold, you are mine,” “Behold, you are under my authority,” “Behold you are tied to me,” she is betrothed. Then let them all be taught in one clause?  — The tanna heard each three separately, and recited them [in that order].
  It was asked: [What if one declares,] “You are unique to me,”  “You are designated to me,”  “You are my help,”  “You are my counterpart,”  “You are gathered to me,” “You are my rib,”   “You are my closed on,”   “You are my replacement,”   “You are kept [seized] by me,” [or,] “You are taken by me”? 
  One at least you may solve. For it was taught: If one declares, “You are taken by me,” she is betrothed, for it is written, “when a man takes a wife.”
  They asked the question: What about “you are my harufah [designated]”?  Come and hear: For it was taught: If a man declares, “you are my harufah,” she is betrothed, for in Judea a betrothed woman is called harufah. Is Judea then most of the world?
  This is what it means: If he declares, “you are my harufah, she is betrothed, for it is said: “with a woman who is a slave and has been designated נחרפת for another man;” moreover, in Judea a betrothed woman is called harufah. [The practice in] Judea and Scripture!   Rather it means thus: If he says in Judea, “You are my harufah,” she is betrothed, because in Judea betrothed woman is called harufah.
  What are we dealing with here? If we say that he was not speaking to her about her divorce or kiddushin, how does she know what he means? 
  But if he was speaking to her about her divorce or kiddushin, then even if he said nothing at all [but gave her money], she is also [betrothed]. For we have learned: If a man was speaking to a woman on matters concerning her divorce or betrothal, and gave her her get or kiddushin, but made no explicit declaration: R. Yose said: It is sufficient; R. Judah said: He must make an explicit declaration. And R. Huna said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah agrees with R. Yose! 
  I will tell you: Actually it refers to a case where he was speaking to her about her divorce or betrothal; had he given her [the money or the get] and remained silent, that indeed would be so. But what are we dealing with here? When he gave [them] to her and made one of these declarations.
  And this is what we are asking: Did he use these expressions in the sense of kiddushin, or perhaps he meant them in reference to work? The question stands.
  The [above] text [stated]: If a man was speaking to a woman on matters concerning her divorce or betrothal, and gave her her get or kiddushin, but made no explicit declaration: R. Yose said: It is sufficient; R. Judah said: He must make an explicit declaration. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: Providing that they were engaged in that topic.
  R. Eliezer said likewise in the name of R. Oshaia: Providing that they were engaged in that topic. This is like a tannaitic dispute; Rabbi said: Providing that they were engaged on that topic; R. Elazar son of R. Shimon said: Even if they were not engaged on that topic. 
  But if they were not engaged on that topic, how does she know what he meant? Abaye answered: [They were moving] from one matter to another matter within the same topic.
  R. Huna said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah follows R. Yose. R. Yemar asked R. Ashi: When Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: He who does not know the nature of divorce and betrothal you should have no business with them, is this true even if he has not heard the ruling of R. Huna in the name of Shmuel? He said: Yes, indeed. 
  The same applies to divorce: If he gives her [the get,] and declares, "Behold, you are sent out," "Behold, you are divorced," [or] "You are permitted to any man," then she is divorced.’ Now it is obvious, if he gives a divorce to his wife and says to her, ‘Behold, you are a free woman,”
  
  
  Daf 6b
  
  he has said nothing.  If he says to his female slave, “You are permitted to all men,” he has said nothing.
  [But] if he says to his wife, ‘Behold, you are for yourself,” what is the rule? Do we say, he meant it with regard to work; or perhaps he meant it completely?
  Ravina said to R. Ashi: Come and hear: For we have taught: The body of a document of manumission is, “Behold, you are a free person,” “Behold, you are for yourself.” Now if a Canaanite slave, whose body belongs to him [his master], when he says to him, “Behold, you are for yourself,” he means it absolutely; how much more so in the case of a wife, whose body does not belong to him.
  Ravina asked R. Ashi: What if he says to his slave, “I have no dealing with you”? Do we say, he means, “I have absolutely no dealing with you” or perhaps he says it to him about work?
  R. Nahman said to R. Ashi, and others say R. Huna of Hoza'ah to R. Ashi: Come and hear: If one sells his slave to a non-Jew, he goes free, and requires a deed of manumission from his first master.
  R. Shimon b. Gamaliel: When is this so? If the seller did not make out for him an “ono”; but if he did, that is his [deed of] manumission.  What is an “ono”? R. Shesheth said: If he wrote for him, “If you escape from him [the non-Jewish buyer], I have no dealings with you.”
  Abaye said: If a man betroths [a woman] with a loan, she is not betrothed; with the benefit of a loan, she is betrothed; but it is forbidden to do so, as it constitutes an evasion of the prohibition of interest.
  This “benefit of a loan,” what is the case? If we say, that he fixed [the interest] as a loan, having said, [I am lending you] four [zuz] for five, that is real interest!  Moreover, this is the same as [betrothing] with a loan!
  It was only necessary to say this if he extended the term [for repayment].  
  Rava said: [If one says,] “Here is a maneh on condition that you return it to me,” in respect to purchase, he has not made an acquisition; in the case of a woman, she is not betrothed; in the matter of a redemption of the firstborn, the firstborn is not redeemed:
  in respect of terumah, he fulfils the obligation of “giving” yet it is forbidden to do so, as it looks like a priest who assists in the threshing floor.
  What does Rava hold? If he holds that a gift on condition that it be returned is a valid gift, then even the others too [are valid]; but if he holds that it is not a valid gift, then even in the case of terumah it is not [valid]?
  Furthermore, it was Rava who said: A gift on condition that it is returned is valid. For Raba said: [If one says to another,] “This etrog is yours, on condition that you return it to me,” if [the other] takes and [then] returns it, he fulfils his duty; if not, he does not fulfil [it]! 
  Rather R. Ashi said: In all of these cases [the conditional gift] is valid, with the exception in that of a woman, because a woman cannot be acquired by symbolic exchange. R. Huna Mar, son of R. Nehemiah, said to R. Ashi: We teach in Rava’s name as you [have stated].
  Rava said: One who says, 
  
  Daf 7a
  
  “[If she says] give a maneh to so-and-so and I will be betrothed to you” she is betrothed by the law of a guarantor: a guarantor, although he personally derives no benefit [from the loan], he nevertheless obligates himself [to repayment]; so too this woman, though she personally derives no benefit [from the money], obligates and gives herself [in betrothal].
  [If a man says,] “Take this maneh and be betrothed to So-and-so,” she is betrothed by the law of a Canaanite slave: a Canaanite slave, though he himself loses nothing, he acquires himself, so too this man he loses nothing, he acquires this woman.
  [If the woman declares,] “Give a maneh to So-and-so, and I will become betrothed to him,” she is betrothed by the laws of both: a guarantor, though he personally derives no benefit, obligates himself, so this woman too though she personally derives no benefit, cedes herself. 
  [And should you object:] Is this the same? As for the guarantor, he who acquires loses money, but this man acquires the woman without losing anything? Then let a Canaanite slave prove it, who loses no money and yet acquires himself.
  [And should you object:] Is this the same? There, he who gives ownership acquires [the money given for the slave's freedom]; but here, can this woman cede herself without acquiring anything? Then let a guarantor prove it: though he personally receives no benefit, he obligates himself.
  Rava asked: What [if a woman declares,] “Here is a maneh and I will become betrothed to you?” Mar Zutra said in the name of R. Papa: She is betrothed. R. Ashi objected to Mar Zutra: If so, property which serves as a guarantee [real estate] is acquired as together with property which does not serve as a guarantee [movables]; 
  whereas we learned the reverse: Property which does not serve as a guarantee may be acquired together with property which does serve as a guarantee by money, deed, or hazakah? He said to him: Do you think that she said to him, “Along with”?   Here we are referring to an important person and in return for the benefit [she derives] from his accepting a gift from her, she completely cedes herself.
  It has been stated likewise in Rava’s name: The same applies to monetary matters.
  Now, both are necessary: had it taught us this about kiddushin [only], that is because a woman is pleased [even] with very little, in accordance with Resh Lakish, for Resh Lakish said: It is better to dwell in a partnership than to dwell in widowhood; but as for money, I might have said it is not so.
  And if he had taught us this regarding monetary matters, that is because it can be waived; but as for kiddushin, I would say it is not so. Hence both are necessary.
  Rava said: [If a man declares,] “Be betrothed to half of me,” she is betrothed: “Half of you be betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. Abaye said to Rava: Why is “half of you be betrothed to me” different, that she is not betrothed? Because the Torah said, “[When a man takes] a wife,” but not half a wife? Here too the verse says, “a man,” but not half a man?
  He said back to him: Is that so! There, a woman is not fit to marry two [men]; but is not a man fit to marry two [women]? Hence this is what he said to her: “Should I want to marry another, I may do so.”
  Mar Zutra, son of R. Mari, said to Ravina: Yet let the kiddushin spread through the whole of her. Has it not been taught: If one declares, “Let the foot of this [animal] be a burnt offering,” the whole animal is a burnt-offering.
  And even according to the one that holds that it is not all a burnt-offering, that is only if one dedicates a limb upon which life is not dependent; but if he dedicates a limb upon which life is dependent, it is all a burnt-offering!
  Are the two the same? There it is an animal, whereas here there is another mind.
  This can only be compared with that which R. Yohanan stated: An animal belonging to two partners: if one [of them] dedicates half, and then purchases it [the other half] and dedicates it, it is holy, yet cannot be sacrificed;
  and it causes its substitute to be sacred, and the substitute is like it.
  Learn from this three things:
  
  
  Daf 7b
  
   1) Live animals may become [permanently] deferred; 
   2) something that is rejected ab initio is fully deferred forever;  3) deferral applies to monetary sanctity.
  Rava asked: What [if one declares,] “Half of you [be betrothed to me] for half a perutah, and your [other] half for half a perutah”? Since he says to her, “for half a perutah,” he divided his statement; or perhaps, he was proceeding and counting?
  Rava asked: What [if one declares,] “Half of you [be betrothed to me] for half a perutah, and your [other] half for half a perutah”? Since he says to her, “for half a perutah,” he divided his statement; or perhaps, he was proceeding and counting? 
   Should you say: Providing it was on the same day, he was proceeding and counting, what [if he declares,] “Half [of you is betrothed to me] for a perutah today, and your [other] half for a perutah tomorrow”? Since he said to her, “Tomorrow,” he divided it; or perhaps he meant thus: the kiddushin begins immediately, but shall not be completed until tomorrow?
  [Further,] what [if he says], “Your two halves for a perutah” here he certainly made his statement to her all at once; or perhaps a woman cannot be betrothed at all by halves? The questions stand.
  Rava asked: What [if he declares,] “Your two daughters [be betrothed] to my two sons for a perutah”? Do we consider the giver and the receiver, so that there is money; or perhaps, we consider them and there is not? The question stands.
  R. Papa asked: What [if he declares,] “You daughter and your cow for a perutah”? Do we say [it means,] your daughter for half a perutah, and your cow for half a perutah, or perhaps [he meant,] “Your daughter by a perutah, and your cow by drawing it near”?  The question stands.
  R. Ashi asked: What [if one declares,] “Your daughter and your land for a perutah”? Does he mean, “Your daughter for half a perutah and your land for half a perutah;” or perhaps, “Your daughter for a perutah, and your land by hazakah”? The question stands.
  A certain man betrothed [a woman] with silk. Rabbah said: It does not need to be evaluated; R. Joseph said: It must be evaluated.
  If he said to her, “[Be betrothed to me] for whatever it is worth,” all agree that it does not need to be evaluated. If he declared to her, “[Be betrothed to me] for fifty [zuz],” and the [the silk] is not worth fifty: then it is not worth it! They disagree only if he stipulated fifty and it was worth fifty. Rabbah said: It does not need to be evaluated, since it is worth fifty: R. Joseph said: It does need to be evaluated: Since the woman is not an expert in its evaluation, she is not assured of its value.
  There are those who say : They also disagree in the case of “for whatever it is worth.”. R. Joseph said: The equivalent of money must be as money itself: just as the latter is definite, 
  
  
  Daf 8a
  
  so must the equivalent be definite. 
  R. Joseph said: From where do I know this? As it was taught: [He shall give back the price of his redemption] out of the money that he was bought for” (Leviticus 25:51): He may be acquired by money, but not by produce or utensils.
  Now, what is meant by “produce or utensils”? If we say, that he cannot be acquired through these at all? “He shall return the price of his redemption,” to include the equivalent of money as money?
  And if they are worth less than a perutah, why specify “produce and utensils”? Even money [would not be effective if it is less than a perutah]. Rather it must refer to a case where they are worth a perutah, but since they are not definite, they cannot [acquire the slave]. 
  And the other?  This is what it means: he can be acquired through the law of money, but not through the law of “produce or utensils.” And what is this? Exchange.
  But according to R. Nahman, who ruled: produce cannot effect exchanges, what can be said? Rather, it does after all refer to a case where they are not worth a perutah: and as to your objection, why specify “produce and utensils”? The same applies to money? It was a “not even necessary to say” statement. 
  It is unnecessary [to state] that money, only if worth a perutah is it valid, but if it is not valid. But as for produce and utensils, I might argue, Since the benefit derived is immediate,   he resolves and lets himself be acquired. Therefore he teaches us that this is not so.
  R. Joseph said: How do I know it? For it was taught: [If one declares,] “This calf is for my son’s redemption,” “this garment is for my son’s redemption,” his declaration is invalid. “This calf, worth five selas, is for my son’s redemption,” or “this garment, worth five selas, is for my son’s redemption,” his son is redeemed. 
  Now, how is this redemption done? If we say that it [the calf or the garment] is not worth [five selas]? does he have the power! Rather it must mean even if it is worth it; yet since it was not defined, it is not valid!
  No, it means, after all, that it was not worth [it], but, we suppose the priest accepted it [for the full value], as in the case of R. Kahana, who accepted a scarf for a son’s redemption. He said to him, “To me it is worth five selas.”
  R. Ashi said: This holds good only of [a man like] R. Kahana, who is a great man and needs a scarf  for his head; but not of people in general.  Thus it happened that Mar, son of R. Ashi, bought a scarf from the mother of Rabbah of Kubi worth ten for thirteen.
  R. Elazar said: [If a man states,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he gives her a dinar, she is betrothed, and he must give her the rest [of the amount]. Why [is she betrothed]? Since he stated a maneh but gave her a dinar, it is as if he had said to her “on condition [that I give you a maneh],” ...
  and R. Huna said in the name of Rava: One who says “on condition,” it is as though he says “from now.” 
  They objected: [If a man states,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and is proceeding with the counting out [of the money], and either party wishes to retract, even at the last dinar they have permission to do so.   
  What are we dealing with here? With one who says, “with this maneh.”
  But since the second clause refers to “this maneh,” the first clause must refer to a case where he said “maneh” without qualification? For the second clause teaches: If he declares to her, “Be betrothed to me by this maneh,” and it is found to be a maneh short a dinar or containing a copper dinar, she is not betrothed: [if it contained] a bad dinar, she is betrothed, but he must change it.
  No: the first and the second clauses [both] refer to a case where he said “with this maneh,” and the second clause explains the first. If either party wishes to retract, even at the last dinar, he [or she] can do so. How so? If he said to her, “for this maneh.” 
  This is also reasonable, for should you think that the first clause refers to an unspecified maneh: now that it is not kiddushin in the case of an unspecified maneh, is it necessary [to teach it] in the case of “for this maneh?”
  As for that [logic], it does not prove it, for the second clause may be stated in order to reveal the meaning of the first, that you should not say: The first clause deals with “this maneh,” but in the case of an unspecified maneh it is valid kiddushin: therefore the second clause is taught as “this maneh,” from which it follows that the first clause refers to an unspecified maneh, yet even so, the kiddushin is not valid.
  R. Ashi said: If he is proceeding with the counting it is different, because [then we assume] her mind is set on the whole sum.
  This “copper dinar,” what is the case? If she knew about it, then she understood and accepted?  It is relevant only if he gave it to her at night. Alternatively, she found it among the other zuz.
  What is the case of the “bad dinar”? If it cannot be used, is it not the same as a copper dinar?  R. Papa said: For instance it circulates with difficulty.
  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: If he says to her, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and gives her a pledge on it, she is not betrothed,
  
  Daf 8b
  
  there is neither a maneh here nor a pledge. Rava raised an objection against R. Nahman: “If he betroths her with a pledge she is betrothed.” That case refers to a pledge belonging to others, and it is in accordance with R. Yitzchak,
  for R. Yitzchak said: How do we know that a creditor acquires a pledge? As it is said, “You shall surely restore him the pledge when the sun goes down that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be righteousness to you” (Deuteronomy 24:13),  if he does not acquire the pledge, what righteousness is there? From here [we learn] that the creditor acquires the pledge.
  The sons of R. Huna b. Abin bought a female slave for copper coins. They did not have [the coins] at hand, so they gave a silver ingot as a pledge. Subsequently the slave's value increased. They came before R. Ami. He said to them: There are no coins here, nor is there a silver ingot.
  Our Rabbis taught: [If a man says to a woman,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and she takes [the kiddushin money/object] and throws it into the sea, the fire, or into anything where it is lost, she is not betrothed. Our Rabbis taught: [If a man says to a woman,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and she takes [the kiddushin money/object] and throws it into the sea, the fire, or into anything where it is lost, she is not betrothed.
  He [the tanna] stated this as a “it was not even necessary to state [argument].” It is not necessary [to state that] if she throws it down before him it is not kiddushin; but if she throws it into the sea or the fire, I might say that since she is liable for it, she has certainly permitted herself to be betrothed: and the reason that she acted thus was because she thought, “I will test this man, whether he is hot-tempered or not.” Therefore it teaches us [that she is not]. Our Rabbis taught: [If a man says to a woman,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” [and she replies,] “Give it to my father” or “your father,” she is not betrothed; “on condition that they accept it for me,” she is betrothed.
  It teaches “my father” to inform you of the power of the first clause, and “your father” to inform you of the power of the second clause.
  It teaches “my father” to inform you of the power of the first clause, and “your father” to inform you of the power of the second clause.
  [If he says] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” [and she replies] “Give it to So-and-so,” she is not betrothed. “On condition that So-and-so accepts it for me,” she is betrothed. And both these cases are necessary. 
  For if it had taught us the law with respect to “my father” and “your father,” [I might have thought that] there the kiddushin is valid when she replies, “on condition that they accept it for me,” because she relies upon them, thinking, “They will [certainly] act as agents for me.” But in the case of “So-and-so,” this is not so.
  And if it had taught us the case of “So-and-so,” [I might have thought that] there the kiddushin is invalid when she says: “Give it to So-and-so,” because she is not close enough to him that she would give it [the maneh] to him as a gift. But as for “my father” or “your father,” with whom she is close, I might think that she was giving them a gift. Thus both are necessary.
  Our Rabbis taught: [If he says,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” [and she replies,] “Put it on a rock,” she is not betrothed; but if the rock was hers, she is betrothed. R. Bibi asked: What if the rock belonged to both of them? The question stands.
  [If he says,] “Be betrothed to me for a loaf of bread,” [and she replies,] “Give it to the dog,” she is not betrothed; but if it was her dog, she is betrothed. R. Mari asked: What if the dog was chasing after her? 
  [Do we say that] in return for the benefit of saving her from it she resolves and gives herself to him [in betrothal]; or perhaps she can say to him, “By Biblical law you are obligated to save me”? The question stands.
  [If he says,] “Be betrothed to me with a loaf,” [and she replies,] “Give it to a poor person”: she is not betrothed, even if it was a poor man who relies on her. Why? She can say to him, “Just as I have an obligation to him, so do you have an obligation to him.”
  There was a man selling glass beads. 
  
  Daf 9a
  
  A woman came and said to him, “Give me a string [of these].” He said to her: “If I give them to you, will you become betrothed to me?” She said to him: “Give, give”! R. Hama said: Every case of “give, give” is nothing
  A man was drinking wine in a tavern. A woman came and said to him, “Give me a cup.” He replied, “If I give it you will you become betrothed to me?” She responded, “Give me a drink, give me a drink.” R. Hama said: Any case of “give me a drink, give me a drink” means nothing. 
  A man was throwing down dates from a palm tree. A woman came and said to him, “Throw me down two.” He replied, “If I throw them down to you will you be betrothed to me?” She said to him: “Throw them down, throw them down.” R. Zevid said: Every such case of “throw them down, throw them down” means nothing.
  They asked the question: What [if she replies,] “Give,” “Give me a drink,” or “throw them down?” Ravina said: She is betrothed. R. Sama b. Rakta said: By the crown of the king, she is not betrothed. And the halakhah is: She is not betrothed.
  And the halakhah is: the silk does not need to be evaluated; And the halakhah agrees with R. Elazar; And the halakhah agrees with Rava who said in the name of R. Nachman.
  Our Rabbis taught: [A woman is betrothed] by document: How so? If he writes for him on a paper or a shard, even if it is not worth a perutah, “Your daughter is consecrated to me,” “your daughter is betrothed to me,” [or] “your daughter is my wife,” she is betrothed.
  R. Zera b. Mammel raised an objection: This document is not the same as a document of sale: There the seller writes, “My field is sold to you,” whereas here the husband writes, “Your daughter is consecrated to me!”
  Rava said: There it is determined by the context of the verse, and here too it is determined by the context of the verse. There it is written, “And he sells of his possessions” (Leviticus 25:25): the Torah made it dependent on the seller: whereas here it is written, “When a man [takes a wife]” (Deuteronomy 22:13),  the Torah makes it dependent on the husband.
  But there too it is written, “They shall buy fields for money” (Jeremiah 32:44)?  Read: “They shall transfer [i.e., sell].” Now, why do you read “transfer”? Because it is written: “And he sells”! Then here too read: “If a man be taken,” for it is written: “I gave my daughter to this man for a wife” (Deuteronomy 22:16)?
  Rather Rava said: These are halakhot, which the Rabbis supported by verses.  Alternatively, there too it is written, “So I took the deed of the purchase” (Jeremiah 32:11).
  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: If one writes on paper or a shard, even if it is not worth a perutah, “Your daughter be consecrated to me,” “Your daughter be betrothed to me,” [or] “Your daughter be my wife,” whether [she accepts it] through her father or by herself, she is betrothed upon his [the father’s] consent, providing that she has not reached majority age.
  If he writes on  paper or on a shard, even if it is not worth a perutah, “Behold, you are consecrated to me,” “Behold, you are my wife,” “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” she is betrothed, whether [it is accepted] by her father or herself, with her consent, providing that she is of age.
  R. Shimon b. Lakish asked: What if a deed of betrothal was not written expressly for her sake? Do we compare ways of betrothal with divorce:
  
  Daf 9b
  
  just as the divorce [document] must be written expressly for her sake, so too must betrothal be written for her sake; or perhaps, different ways of betrothal are compared to each other: just as betrothal by money need not be for her sake, so betrothal by deed need not be for her sake? 
  After he asked it, he resolved it: we do compare betrothal to divorce, for the verse says, “And she departs [i.e., divorced] . . . and she becomes [another man's wife]” (Deuteronomy 24:2).
  It was stated: If it [the deed of betrothal] is written for her sake, but without her knowledge: Rava and Ravina say: She is betrothed; R. Papa and R. Sheravia say: She is not betrothed. R. Papa said: I will explain their reason and I will explain mine. I will explain their reason: “And she departs [i.e., divorced] . . . and she becomes [another man's wife]” (Deuteronomy 24:2): this compares betrothal to divorce: just as divorce must be [written] for her sake but may be written without her consent, so too betrothal must be written for her sake, but may be written without her consent. 
  And I will explain my reason: “And she departs [i.e., divorced] . . . and she becomes [another man's wife]” (Deuteronomy 24:2): this compares betrothal to divorce: just as in divorce, the giver's knowledge is required, so too in betrothal, the giver's knowledge is required.
  They raised an objection: Deeds of betrothal and marriage may be written only with the consent of both. Does this not refer to actual deeds of betrothal and marriage?
  No: [this refers to] deeds of stipulation and it is in accordance with that which R. Giddel said in the name of Rav: How much do you give your son? Such and such an amount. How much do you give your daughter? Such and such an amount. If they arose and made a betrothal, they acquire a title [to the promised sums], and these are the things which are acquired verbally.
  Or by intercourse. From where we know this? R. Abbahu said in the name of R. Yohanan: Because the verse says, “And she had had intercourse with her husband,” (Deuteronomy 22:22) this teaches that he became her husband through intercourse. R. Zera said to R. Abahu, and others says, Resh Lakish said to R. Yohanan: Is what Rabbi taught so ugly: “[When a man takes a wife] and has intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1): this teaches that she is acquired by intercourse? 
  If from there, I might have thought: He must first betroth her [by money] and then have intercourse with her, [therefore] he teaches us [otherwise].
  R. Abba b. Mammel raised an objection: If so, with regard to the betrothed girl [who commits adultery] for whom the Torah decrees stoning, how is it possible?
  If he [first] betrothed and then cohabited with her, she has had intercourse; if he betrothed her but did not have intercourse  with her, it is nothing. The Rabbis answered this before Abaye; It is possible if the betrothed man had intercourse with her unnaturally. 
  Abaye said to them: Even Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi] and the Rabbis dispute [this matter] only in reference to a stranger: but as for the husband, all agree that if he has unnatural intercourse with her he renders her a non-virgin! 
  What is this? For it was taught: If ten men had intercourse [unnaturally] with her [a betrothed virgin] and she is still a virgin, all are stoned. Rabbi said: I say the first is stoned, but the rest are strangled.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: It would be possible if he betrothed her by deed: since it completely divorces, it completely brings her into marriage.
  And R. Yohanan: What does he do with the verse, “And has intercourse with her”? He needs that [to teach]: this one is acquired by intercourse, but not a female slave.
  For I might have thought, it may be inferred through a kal vehomer from a yevamah: if a yevamah, who cannot be acquired by money, is acquired by intercourse; this one [a Hebrew female slave] who can be acquired by money, may surely be acquired by intercourse.
  [No.] As for a yevamah, that is because she is already tied! I might have thought, since it is written: “If he takes another wife” (Exodus 21:1): The verse compares her to the “other” [the wife]: just as the other is acquired by intercourse, so is a Hebrew slave woman acquired by intercourse; therefore we are informed [that she is not]. 
  And Rabbi: how does he know this halakhah? If so, the verse should have written; “and has intercourse”: why [state] “and has intercourse with her?” Learn from this both.
  And Rabbi: how does he know this halakhah? If so, the verse should have written; “and has intercourse”: why [state] “and has intercourse with her?” Learn from this both.
  If so, the verse should have written, or “has intercourse with her”: why [state], “and has intercourse with her?”   Learn from this all [three halakhot].
  And Rabbi: how does he use this phrase, “who had intercourse [be'ulat] with a husband?” He uses it [to teach:] her husband renders her a non-virgin through unnatural intercourse, but a stranger does not. 
  But does Rabbi hold this view? Has it not been taught: If ten men had intercourse [unnaturally] with her [a betrothed virgin] and she is still a virgin, all are stoned. Rabbi said: I say the first is stoned, but the rest are strangled.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  R. Zera said: Rabbi agrees with respect to the fine, that they must all pay. Why does this differ from the death penalty? There it is different, because the verse says, “then the man alone that lay with her shall die” (Deuteronomy 22:25).  
  And the Rabbis: what do they do with this word “alone”? They need it as it was taught: “[If a man is found lying with a woman married to a husband], then they shall both of them die” (Deuteronomy 22:22):  [this implies,] they must both be equal as one, the words of R. Yoshaya. R. Yonatan said: “then the man alone that lay with her shall die.”
  And R. Yohanan: how does he know this ruling?  If so, the verse should have written, “who had intercourse with a man” what does it mean by saying “who had intercourse with a husband”? Hence both are inferred.
  They asked a halakhic question: Does the beginning of intercourse acquire [the woman] or the end of intercourse? The practical difference is if he performed the first stage of intercourse, and then she stretched out her hand and accepted kiddushin from another man. 
  Alternatively whether a High Priest may acquire a virgin by intercourse. What then [is the ruling]? Amemar said in the name of Rava: All who have intercourse, have their mind on the completion of intercourse.
  They asked the question: Does intercourse effect marriage or betrothal?
  The practical difference is in respect of his inheriting her, defiling himself on her account or annulling her vows. If you say it effects marriage, he [the husband] succeeds her as heir, he must defile himself for her, and he can annul her vows. But if you say that it effects only betrothal, he does not inherit her, he may not defile himself on her account, and cannot annul her vows. What is the ruling? 
  Abaye said: Come and hear: 1A father has authority over his daughter in her betrothal [whether it was effected] by money, document or intercourse. He is entitled to anything she finds, to her handiwork and to annul her vows. He receives her get but he has no usufruct [from her property] during her lifetime. When she marries, the husband surpasses him [in his rights] in that he has usufruct during her lifetime.
  Now, intercourse is taught, and yet he also teaches: If she was married! When it taught “When she marries” it was taught in reference to the other [rights].
  Rava said: Come and hear: A girl aged three years and a day may be betrothed by intercourse, and if the yavam has intercourse with her, he acquires her. The penalty of adultery may be incurred through her: [if a menstruant,] she defiles him who has connections with her,
  
  Daf 10b
  
  so that he in turn defiles that upon which he lies, the bottom as the top.
  If she married a priest, she may eat terumah. If any of the forbidden degrees of incest found in the Torah had intercourse with her, they are executed on her account, but she is exempt. If an unfit person  had intercourse with her, he disqualifies her from priesthood.  
  Thus [here too] it teaches intercourse, and also “if she is married”! This is what it might mean: If this marriage was with a priest, she may eat terumah.
  Come and hear: Yohanan b. Bag Bag had already sent [word] to R. Judah b. Batera at Nisibis: I have heard of you that you say that a daughter of an Israelite betrothed [to a priest], may eat terumah. He sent back: And you do not say the same? I am certain of you that you are well versed in the rooms of Torah [and you know how] to derive a kal vehomer. Do you not know:
  if a female non-Jewish slave, with whom intercourse does not permit her to eat of terumah, yet [acquisition by] money does permit her to eat of terumah; then this one, [a betrothed girl], whose intercourse [with a priest] permits her to eat terumah, surely money permits her to eat terumah! But what can I do, seeing that the Sages ruled: A betrothed daughter of an Israelite, may not eat terumah until she enters huppah?
  What is the case? If [the reference is to] intercourse with huppah, and money with huppah, in both cases she may certainly eat [terumah]. 
  But if to intercourse with huppah, and money without huppah: here there are two, while there is only one, Hence it must surely refer to both intercourse without huppah and money without huppah.
  Now, if you say that it [intercourse] effects marriage it is for this reason that it is obvious to him that intercourse is stronger than money [in its acquiring power].   But if you say that it effects only kiddushin [betrothal], why is he certain in the one case and doubtful in the other?
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: In the end, I can say to you that [the reference is to] intercourse with huppah and money without huppah. And as to your objection, here there are two, while there there is only one: nevertheless there is still a kal vehomer argument.
  And this is what he sent to him: If a non-Jewish slavewoman, with whom intercourse does not permit her to eat of terumah even after huppah, yet [acquisition by] money even without huppah allows her to eat terumah, then this one, with whom intercourse when accompanied by huppah permits her to eat terumah, surely [acquisition by] money even without intercourse permits her to eat terumah.  
  But what can I do, seeing that the sages ruled: A betrothed daughter of an Israelite does not eat terumah until she enters huppah, on account of Ulla's statement.
  And Ben Bag Bag? In the case of the non-Jewish slave woman he has not left out any part of her acquisition; but here he has left out part part of her acquisition.
  Ravina said: From the Torah he was certain that she may eat [terumah] and it was only concerning rabbinic law that he [R. Yohanan b. Bag Bag] sent word to him [that she is forbidden],
  and this is what he sent to him: I have heard of you that you rule: An daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a Kohen may eat of terumah, and you are not concerned about the possibility of nullification. He sent back: And do you not rule the same? I am certain that you are well versed in the rooms of the Torah, [and able] to infer a kal vehomer argument. Do you not know:
  if a non-Jewish female slave whose intercourse does not permit her to eat terumah, yet [acquisition by] money does, and we are not concerned about the possibility of nullification; then this one [a betrothed girl], whose intercourse does permit her to eat terumah, surely [acquisition by] money does, and we should not be concerned about the possibility of nullification. But what can I do, seeing that the Sages ruled: A daughter of an Israelite betrothed to a Kohen may not eat terumah
  
  Daf 11a
  
  on account of Ulla's statement.
  And Ben Bag Bag? He holds that there is no simpon for slaves, for if it is external, he would have seen it [and bought the slave anyways] and if it is internal, he wants the slave for the purpose of work, and if it is hidden, he does not care.
  If it turns out that the slave is a thief or a gambler, the acquisition is still valid. An armed robber or assigned to death by the government—these are well-known. 
  Since both agree that she [a betrothed woman] may not eat, what do they disagree about? 
  They differ where he [the husband] accepted [bodily defects], or he [the father] delivered [her to the husband's agents to be taken to her husband's home], or if they [the father's messengers] went on the way with [the husband's agents to escort the bride to her new home]. 
  “By money: Beth Shammai says: by a dinar” etc. What is Beth Shammai's reasoning? R. Zera said: Because a woman is particular about herself and will not [permit herself to] become betrothed with less than a dinar.
  Abaye objected to him: If so, then R. Yannai's daughters, who are particular about themselves and will not become betrothed with less than a tarkava of denarii, if she stretches out her hand and accepts a zuz from a stranger [as kiddushin], so too the kiddushin would be invalid? 
  Abaye objected to him: If so, then R. Yannai's daughters, who are particular about themselves and will not become betrothed with less than a tarkava of denarii, if she stretches out her hand and accepts a zuz from a stranger [as kiddushin], so too the kiddushin would be invalid? 
  R. Joseph said: Beth Shammai’s reason is in accordance with what Rav Judah said in the name of R. Assi: Wherever “money” is mentioned in the Torah it refers to Tyrian coinage; but if it is a case of rabbinic law, it refers to provincial coinage.
  It was stated above: Rav Judah said in the name of R. Assi: Wherever “money” is mentioned in the Torah it refers to Tyrian coinage; but if it is a case of rabbinic law, it refers to provincial coinage.
  
  Daf 11b
  
  But what of a claim, concerning which it is written: “If a man gives to his neighbor money or utensils to keep” yet we learned: “The oath taken before judges [is imposed] for a [minimum] claim of two silver [ma'ahs] and an admission of a perutah”? 
  There it is similar to “utensils”: just as “utensils” implies [at least] two, so must “money” refer to two [coins],  and just as “money” is something of value,  so “utensils” are something of value.
  But [what about second] tithe, [in regard to which] it is written, “And bind up the money in your hand,” (Deuteronomy 14:25).  Yet we taught: “If one changes a sela of second tithe [copper] coins . . .”?  “The money” came to include [even lesser amounts].
  But what of dedicated property, concerning which it is written, “Then he shall give the money, and it shall be assured to him” (Leviticus 27:19) and yet Shmuel said: If dedicated property worth a maneh is redeemed with the equivalent of a perutah, it is redeemed? There too, we deduce the meaning of “money” from tithes.  
  But what of a woman's kiddushin, concerning which it is written: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her” and we derive the meaning of “taking” from the “taking” mentioned with regard to the field of Ephron, yet we learned: Bet Hillel rules: with a perutah or the value a perutah. Shall we say [then] that R. Assi ruled in accordance with Bet Shammai?
  Rather if stated, it was stated thus: Rav Judah said in the name of R. Assi: Whenever a fixed sum of money is mentioned in the Torah, Tyrian coinage is meant; whereas in rabbinic law, it refers to provincial currency.
  Then what does he teach us? We have already learned it: The five sela's [for redeeming] a firstborn, the thirty [for accidentally killing] a slave, the fifty [shekel penalty for killing] a rapist and a seducer, and the hundred [shekel penalty for] a slanderer, all these are [reckoned] in the holy shekel according to the Tyrian maneh!
  Then what does he teach us? We have already learned it: The five sela's [for redeeming] a firstborn, the thirty [for accidentally killing] a slave, the fifty [shekel penalty for killing] a rapist and a seducer, and the hundred [shekel penalty for] a slanderer, all these are [reckoned] in the holy shekel according to the Tyrian maneh!
  R. Shimon b. Lakish said: Beth Shammai's reason is in accordance with Hizkiyah. For Hizkiyah said: The verse says, “Then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8), this teaches that she deducts from her redemption [money] and goes out [free]. 
  Now, if you say that he [the master] gave her a dinar, it makes sense, she can continue deducting until a perutah. But if you say that he gave her a perutah: what can be deducted from a perutah? But perhaps this is what the Torah said: if he gave her a dinar, she can go on deducting until a perutah; [but] if he gave her a perutah, she does not deduct at all?
  
  
  Daf 12a
  
  You cannot think so, [for] it is similar to designation: just as designation, even though he [the master] can designate her or not, in a case where he cannot designate her, the sale is invalid; so too here, where he cannot deduct, the sale is invalid. 
  And a woman's kiddushin, according to Beth Shammai, is deduced from a Hebrew female slave: just as a Hebrew female slave cannot be acquired for a perutah, so a woman cannot be betrothed for a perutah.
  Then say half a dinar, or two perutahs? Since it excluded a perutah, they established it at a dinar. 
  Rava said: This is Beth Shammai's reason: that the daughters of Israel should not be treated like ownerless property.
  And Bet Hillel says: by a perutah. R. Yosef thought to rule: A perutah, no matter its size. Abaye said to him: But was it not taught about this: And how much is a perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar.
  And should you say: That was only in the time of Moses, but now it is as generally considered by people, but when R. Dimi came, he said: R. Simai estimated in his time: how much is the perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar. And when Rabin came, he said: R. Dostai, R. Yannai and R. Oshiah estimated: how much is a perutah? A sixth of an Italian issar!
  R. Yosef said back to him: If so, when we taught, Go out and estimate: how many perutahs are there in two sela's? More than two thousand. Seeing that there are not even two thousand, can he [the Tanna] call it more than two thousand? A certain old man said to him: I taught it, close to two thousand. But even so, it is only one-thousand-five-hundred-thirty-six! Since it go beyond half [a thousand], it is called close on two thousand. 
  When R. Dimi came, he said: R. Simai estimated in his time: how much is the perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar. And when Rabin came, he said: R. Dostai, R. Yannai and R. Oshiah estimated: how much is a perutah? A sixth of an Italian issar. Abaye said to R. Dimi: Shall we say that you and Rabin disagree in accordance with the dispute of the following Tannaim?
  For it was taught: The perutah which the Sages mentioned is an eighth of an Italian issar. [Thus:] one dinar =six silver ma'ahs; one ma'ah =two pundion, one pundion = two issars, one issar = two musmis, one musmis = two kuntrunk, one kuntrunk =two perutahs. Hence the perutah is an eighth of an Italian issar. 
  R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: three hadrisin = one ma'ah, two hantzin = one hadris, two shamnin = one hanetz, two perutahs = one shamin: hence a perutah equals one sixth of an Italian issar. Shall we say that you agree with the first Tanna, whilst Rabin holds with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel?
  He replied: Both Rabin and I agree with the first tanna, yet there is no difficulty: here the issar bears its full value; there, it had depreciated. Here the issar bears its full value, twenty-four going to the zuz; there it had depreciated, thirty-two going to the zuz.
  Shmuel said: If a man betrothed a woman with a date, even if a kor stood at a dinar, she is betrothed, for we are concerned that it may be worth a perutah in Medea. 
  But have we not learned: Bet Hillel say: by a perutah or the worth of a perutah. There is no difficulty: the one refers to certain kiddushin; the other to doubtful kiddushin. 
  A certain man betrothed [a woman] with a bundle of rags. R. Shimi b. Hiyya sat before Rav and examined it: if worth a perutah, she is [betrothed], if not, she is not.  And if it is not worth a perutah, she is not [betrothed]? But didn’t Shmuel say: “We are concerned…”! There is no difficulty: the one refers to certain kiddushin; the other to doubtful kiddushin.
  A certain man betrothed [a woman] with a black marble stone. R. Hisda was sitting and appraising it: if worth a perutah, she is [betrothed]; if not, she is not. Now, if not worth a perutah, she is not betrothed? But didn’t Shmuel say: “We are concerned..” R. Hisda did not agree with Shmuel.
  His mother said to him: But on the day he betrothed her it was worth a perutah! He said to her: It is not within your power to prohibit her to the latter one.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  For is this not comparable to the case of Judith, R. Hiyya's wife, who had severe pains during childbirth. She said to him: My mother told me: “Your father accepted kiddushin on your behalf [from another man] when you were a child.”  He replied to her: Your mother does not have the power to forbid you to me.
  The rabbis said to R. Hisda: Why? But are there not witnesses in Idit who know that on that day it was worth a perutah! [R. Hisda responded]: Nevertheless, at present they are not in front of us.
  Is this not like what R. Hanina said: Her witnesses are in the north and she is to be forbidden!  
  Abaye and Rava do not agree with this ruling of R. Hisda. If they [the Rabbis] were lenient in with regard to a captive woman, who will make herself unappealing to her captors,shall we be [equally] lenient in the case of a married woman?
  Some of that family remained in Sura, and the rabbis separated themselves from them, not because they agreed with Shmuel, but because they agreed with Abaye and Rava.
  A certain man betrothed [a woman] with a myrtle branch in a market place. R. Aha b. Huna sent [a question] to R. Joseph: What is the rule in such a case? He sent back: Have him lashed, in accordance with Rav; and require from him a divorce, in accordance with Shmuel.
  For Rav lashed any man who betrothed [a woman] in a market place, or by intercourse, or without [previous] shiddukhin,
  or who annulled a divorce, or who issued a declaration annuling a divorce, or harassed an agent of the Rabbis, or permitted a ban to remain on him thirty days, and a son-in-law who dwells in his mother-in-law's house thirty days.
  One who dwelt [with his mother-in-law] he would [lash], but not one who merely passed by [his mother-in-law's house]? But wasn’t there a certain son-in-law who passed by his mother-in-law's door, and R. Sheshet lashed him for it?  In that case there was suspicion about him and his mother-in-law.
  The Nehardeans said: Rav would only lash for betrothing [a woman] by intercourse without shiddukin. And there are those who say even with shiddukhin, because of licentiousness.
  A certain man betrothed [a woman] with a mat of myrtle twigs. They said to him, “But it is not worth a perutah!” He said back, “Then let her be betrothed with the four zuz that are in it.” She took it and remained silent. Rava said: It is silence after receipt of the money, and such silence has no significance. 
  Rava said: How do I know this? For it was taught: If he says to her, “Take this sela as a deposit and then he says to her, “Be betrothed to me with it,” [if he made the declaration] when giving the money, she is betrothed; after giving the money, if she consented, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. 
  What is meant by “she consented,” or “she did not consent”? If we say: “she consented” means that she said “yes,” and “she did not consent,” that she said: “no”? Then it follows that the first clause
  
  Daf 13a
  
  means that even if she said “no,” it is [valid] kiddushin. But why? She said “no”? Rather, “she consented” means that she said “yes”, while “she did not consent, means she kept silent. Learn from this that silence after receipt of money has no significance. 
  They raised a difficulty in Pum Nehara in the name of R. Huna, son of R. Joshua: Are the two cases the same? There he gave it to her as a deposit, and she might have thought, “If I throw it back at him and it breaks, I am liable for it.” But here he gave it to her as kiddushin: if she did not want it [as such], she should have thrown it away!
  R. Ahai raised a difficulty: Do all women know the law? Here too she might have thought, “If I throw it away and it is broken, I will be held responsible for it.” R. Aha b. Rav sent a question to Ravina: What is the ruling in such a case? He sent back: We have not heard this [objection] of R. Huna, son of R. Joshua;  but you, who have heard it,  must take it into consideration.
  A certain woman was selling belts. A man came and snatched one away from her. She said to him, “Give it back to me.” He said back, “If I give it to you, will become betrothed to me?” She took it and was silent. R. Nahman ruled: She can say: “Indeed, I took it, but it was my own.”
  Rava raised an objection against R. Nahman: If he betroths her with [something obtained] by robbery, violence, or theft, or if he snatches a sela from her hand and betroths her, she is betrothed? In that case, he had already made a shiddukh [marriage arrangement].
  And on what basis do I say that we draw a distinction between one who made a shidukh and one who did not? As it was taught: If one says to a woman, “Take this sela which I owe you,” and then he says: “Be betrothed to me with it”: [if he said this] when giving the money and she consented, she is betrothed; if she did not consent, she is not betrothed; After giving the money, even if she consented, she is not betrothed.
  Now, what is the meaning of  “she consented,” “she did not consent”? If we say: “she consented” means that she said “yes,” “she did not consent,” that she said “no”:  [We would then have to deduce] that if she remained silent, the kiddushin is valid?  Then it should simply have been taught: “she is betrothed,” just as there. 
  But [we must say,] “she consented” means that she said “yes,” while “she did not consent,” that she was silent, and it was taught that she is not betrothed. What is the reason? Because she can say: “Indeed, I took it, and I took what was mine.” 
  But then there is a difficulty, “If he betroths her with [something obtained] by robbery, violence, or theft, or if he snatches a sela from her hand and betroths her, she is betrothed.” Rather, learn from this that in the one case he had made a shidukh, whereas in the other he had not. 
  When R. Assi died, the rabbis went up to collect his legal traditions. One of the rabbis said to them, and R. Jacob was his name: Thus R. Assi said in the name of R. Mani: Just as a woman cannot be acquired for less than a perutah, so too real estate cannot be acquired with less than a perutah. They said to him: But was it was not taught: Although a woman cannot be acquired for less than the worth of a perutah, land can be acquired for less than the worth of a perutah?
  He said to them: That was taught only in respect to exchange, as it was taught: Acquisition can be effected through a vessel, even if it is not worth a perutah.
  Again they sat and said: About that which R. Judah said in the name of Rav, anyone who does not know the nature of divorce and betrothal, one should have no business with them, R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: And they are more harmful to the world than the generation of the flood, for it is written: “Swearing and lying, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery. They break all bounds, and blood touches blood” (Hosea 4:2). 
  How does this mean [what R. Assi says it means]? As R. Joseph translated: They bring forth children by their neighbor's wives, thus adding sins upon sins.
  And it is written: “Therefore shall the land mourn and everyone that dwells on it shall languish, with the beasts of the field and the fowls of heaven: even the fish of the sea also shall be taken away” (Hosea 4:3). Whereas in the case of the generation of the flood nothing was decreed against the fish of the sea, for it is written, “Of all that was on dry land, died” (Genesis 7:22): but not the fish in the sea, while here even the fish of the sea [were destroyed].
  But say that this is so only when they do all of these? You should not think so, for it is written, “For because of swearing the land mourns” (Jeremiah 23:10).
  Yet perhaps swearing stands alone, and these others [combined] alone?
  
  Daf 13b
  
  Is it then written “and they break all bound”:  “they break all bounds” is written.
  Again they sat and said: That which we taught: If a woman brought her sin-offering [after childbirth] and then died, her heirs must bring her burnt-offering, Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: As long as she had separated it during her lifetime, but if she did not separate it during her lifetime, [they do not need to bring it].
  Thus he holds that debt obligation is not from the Torah. [But] R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: Even if she did not separate it during her lifetime. Thus he holds that debt obligation is from the Torah. 
  But have they not already disputed this matter once. For Rav and Shmuel both said: A debt [contracted] by word of mouth cannot be collected from heirs or purchasers;  while R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish both say: A debt [contracted] by word of mouth can be collected both from heirs and purchasers.
  Both are necessary. For if it were stated in the latter case [alone], in that case [I would say] that Shmuel holds [thus] because it is not a debt written in the Torah; but in the other case, I might say that he agrees with R. Yohanan and Resh Lakish.
  And if we were taught this case only, only here, [would I say,] that R. Yohanan ruled [thus], because a debt decreed in the Torah is as like one written in a document; but in the latter case, I might say that he agrees with Shmuel. Hence both are necessary.
  R. Papa said: The halakhah is: A debt [contracted] by word of mouth can be collected from heirs, but not from purchasers. It can be collected from heirs: debt obligation is from the Torah. And it cannot be collected from the purchasers: because it [the debt] is not generally known.
  And she acquires her freedom by divorce or her husband's death. As for divorce, it is well, since it is written, “then he shall write her a bill of divorce” (Deuteronomy 24:1);   
  But from where do we know [that she is freed by] her husband's death? It is logic: he [the husband] bound her; he frees her.
  But what of prohibited relations, whom he binds, and nevertheless does not free?   Rather since the Torah stated that a yevamah without children is forbidden [to the outside world], it follows that if she has children she is permitted. 
  Perhaps if she has no children she is forbidden to the world but permitted to the yavam, whereas if she has children she is forbidden to all? Rather since the Torah states that a widow is forbidden to a High Priest, it follows that she is permitted to an ordinary priest.  
  Yet perhaps [she is forbidden] to a High Priest by a negative mitzvah, and to all others by an positive mitzvah? This positive commandment, what is it’s nature? If her husband's death has effect, let her be entirely free; and if not, let her remain in her original status!
  Why not? It [her husband's death] could take her out from [the penalty of] death [for adultery] and places her under [the punishment for transgressing] a positive commandment.
  For this may be like consecrated animals that are unfit [for sacrifice], which originally [before they became unfit] involved a trespass-offering and cannot be sheared or worked with; yet when they are redeemed, they no longer involve a trespass-offering, but may still not be sheared or worked with?
   Rather since the verse says, “Lest he die in the battle and another man take her” (Deuteronomy 20:7). R. Shisha son of R. Idi raised a difficulty: Perhaps I could say that “another man” the yavam?
  R. Ashi said: There are two answers to this: first, the yavam is not called “another man” and furthermore, it is written, “And if the latter husband hates her, and write her a bill of divorce . . . or if the latter husband dies” (Deuteronomy 24:3) thus death is compared to divorce: just as divorce completely frees her, so does death completely free her.
  A yevamah is acquired by intercourse. From where do we know [that she is acquired] by intercourse?
  
  Daf 14a
  
  The verse says, “Her husband's brother shall have sexual relations with her, and take her to him to wife” (Deuteronomy 25:5). But why not say she is [acquired] as is a wife in all respects? You should not think so. For it was taught: I might think that money or document can complete her acquisition, just as intercourse does; therefore it is written, “and perform levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5): intercourse completes her acquisition, but money or document do not complete her acquisition.
  Yet perhaps you could say “and perform levirate marriage with her” means that he can have levirate marriage against her will. If so, the verse should have stated: “and perform levirate marriage”?  Why [add] “with her”? Hence both are learnt from it.
  [And acquires her freedom] by halitzah. From where do we know this?  As it is written: “And his name shall be called in Israel, ‘The house of him that had his shoe removed’” (Deuteronomy 25:10): once he had his shoe removed by her, she is permitted to all Israel.
  Does then [word] “Israel” come to teach this? Is it not necessary for what R. Shmuel b. Judah learned: [Halitzah must be performed] at a court of Israelites, but not at non-Jewish court. “In Israel” is written twice.
  Yet it is still required for what was taught: R. Judah said: We were once sitting before R. Tarfon, when a woman came to perform halitzah. He said to us: All of you respond and say, “He has had his shoe loosed, he has had his shoe loosed”?   That [law] is derived from, “and his name shall be called.”  
  Or the yavam’s death. How do we know this? It can be learned from an “all the more so” argument: If a married woman, who is [forbidden to others] by the penalty of strangulation, is freed by her husband's death; then a yevamah, who is [forbidden only] by a negative commandment, is surely [freed by the yavam's death].
  As for a married woman, [it may be asked] that is because she goes free by divorce! Will you say [the same] of this one [a yevamah], who does not go free by a divorce? She too is freed by halitzah.
  Rather as for a married woman, that is because he who binds her frees her! R. Ashi said: In her case too, he who binds her frees her: the yavam binds her, the yavam frees her.
  Now, let a married woman go out through halitzah, on the basis of a kal vehomer argument: if a yevamah, who does not go out through a get, does go out through halitzah; then this one [a married woman], who does go through a get, certainly goes out through halitzah! The verse says “[then he shall write her] a bill of divorce” (Deuteronomy 24:1) a document divorces her, but nothing else can divorce her.
  Now, let a yevamah go out of her marriage with a get on the basis of a kal vehomer argument: if a married woman, who does not go out through halitzah, does go out through a get: then this one [a yevamah], who does go out through halitzah, should also go out through a get! The verse says: “Thus” (Deuteronomy 25:9) and “thus” implies indispensableness.
  Now, wherever there is word that implies indispensableness, we cannot make a kal vehomer? But what about Yom Hakippurim, where “lot” and “statute” are written, 
  yet it was taught: “[And Aaron shall present the goat upon which the lot fell for the Lord,] and offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:8):
  the lot renders it a sin-offering, but designation does not render it a sin-offering. For I might have thought: In a place where the lot does not sanctify, designation does, how much more would designation sanctify where the lot does!
  Scripture says: “and offer it for a sin-offering,” the lot renders it a sin-offering, but designation does not render it a sin-offering. Thus, it is only because Scripture excluded it [designation]; otherwise we would draw a kal vehomer argument, even though “statute” is written!
  The verse says, “[then he shall write] her [a bill of divorce]’: for “her” but not for a “yevamah.” But say that “her” teaches that it must be for her sake? 
  “Her” is written twice. Yet even so they are both needed: one “her” to teach that it must be for her sake; and the other “her” teaching, but not for her and her companion? 
  Rather Scripture says, “[The house of him that has a] shoe [loosed]” (Deuteronomy 25:9) only a shoe [can set her free], but nothing else can.                                                                
  This word “shoe” does it come to teach this? Is it not necessary for what was taught: “[And she shall loosen] his shoe”: I know only that this works with his shoe.
  From where do I know [that it may be] any person’s shoe?  From the verse: “[The house of him whose] shoe [was loosened]:” “shoe” adds [anyone’s shoe]. If so, why state, “his shoe”? “His shoe” [implies that it must fit him, excluding one [too] large, in which he cannot walk, excluding one [too] small, which does not cover the greater part of his foot,
  
  
  Daf 14b
  
  which has no heel! If so,  Scripture should have written “shoe”; why “the shoe”? Learn from this both.
  1) A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by document; 2) And acquires himself by years, by Jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price.  3) A Hebrew maidservant is greater in that she acquires herself by ‘signs [of physical maturity]’. 4) He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by Jubilee or his master's death.
  GEMARA. A Hebrew slave is acquired by money. How do we know this? The verse states, “[He shall give back the price of his redemption] out of the money that he was bought for” (Leviticus 25:51): this teaches that he was acquired by money. We have [thus] found this in the case of a Hebrew slave sold to a non-Jew, since his [the non-Jew’s] sole method of acquisition is by money:
  How do we know it of one sold to an Israelite?  The verse says: “Then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8): this teaches that she deducts [part] of her redemption money and goes out [free].
  We have thus found it in the case of a Hebrew slave-woman: since she is betrothed with money,   she is acquired with money; how do we know it of a Hebrew slave? The verse says, “If your brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman be sold to you, and serve you for six years” (Deuteronomy 15:12) thus a Hebrew male slave is compared to a Hebrew female slave.
  We have now learned it of one sold by the court, since he was sold against his will; how do we know it of one who sells himself?
  We learn it from the repeated use of “sakhir.” Now, this works for the one who learns from the repetition of “sakhir”; but according to the one who does learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir,” what can be said? 
  The verse states, “And if a resident alien among you has prospered” (Leviticus 25:47), thus continuing the preceding section,  so that [the subject] above may be deduced from [that] below.
  And which Tanna does learn from the repeated use of sakhir? The following Tanna, For it was taught: He who sells himself may be sold for six years or more than six years; if sold by the court, he is sold for six years only. 
  He who sells himself may not have the hole bored in his ear; if sold by the court, he may have the hole bored in his ear. He who sells himself, they do not grant him a gift; if sold by the court, they do grant him a gift. He who sells himself, his master cannot give him a Canaanite slave-woman [as a wife]; if sold by the court, his master can give him a Canaanite slave-woman.
  R. Elazar said: Neither may be sold for more than six years; both may have their ears bored; to both a gift is made; and to both the master may give a Canaanite slave-woman. The suggestion as to the basis for their dispute is that the tanna kamma does not use the work “sakhir” to connect the two passages such that the laws in one apply to the other, while R. Elazar does.
  R. Tavyomi said in the name of Abaye: All agree the that we do learn from the repetition of the word sakhir, but here they differ on the following verse: What is the reason of the tanna kamma, who held that he who sells himself may be sold for six years or more than six years? [Because] Scripture excluded [this rule] in connection with one sold by the court: “And he shall serve you for six years” (Deuteronomy 15:12): “he,” but not one who sells himself.
  And the other?  “And he shall serve you”—[he shall serve] you, but not an heir.   
  And the other?   Another “serve you” is written. And the other?  That comes [to teach] that the master should be willing [to send the slave out]. 
  What is the reason of the tanna kamma who holds that one who sells himself is not bored? Because Scripture excluded [this rule] in connection with one sold by the court: “And his master shall bore his ear through with an awl” (Exodus 21:6), his ear, but not the ear of the one who sold himself.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  And the other?  That comes for the purpose of a gezerah shavah. For it was taught: R. Eliezer said: How do we know that the boring must be done through the right ear? Here is said: “ear”: and elsewhere is said, “[And the priest shall take some of the blood . . . and put it upon the tip of the right] ear” (Leviticus 14:14):  just as there it is the right [ear], so too here it is the right [ear].
  And the other? If so, Scripture should have written “ear,” why “his ear”?  
  And the other?  That is needed to teach “his ear,” but not her ear. And the other? He deduces that from, “but if the slave should say”:  the male slave, but not the female slave. 
  And the other? He needs that [to teach]: he must say it while yet a slave.
  And the other? That is derived from “the slave” [instead of] “slave.” And the other? [The difference between] does not derive anything from the difference between “the slave” and “slave.”  
  What is the reason of the first tanna who holds that he who sells himself into slavery, they do not make a gift to him (on his departure)? The Torah excluded him with regard to one sold by the court: “You shall grant him a gift” (Deuteronomy 15:14): “him” but not one who sells himself.
  And the other [R. Elazar]?  He needs it to teach “him” but not his heirs. “His heirs”: why not? The Torah called him a hired servant [sakhir]: just as the wages of a hired servant belong to his heirs, so too these earnings belong to his heirs?
  Rather [say]: “him”, but not to his creditor. [This is necessary,] because elsewhere we agree with R. Natan, as it was taught: R. Natan said: How do we know that if a man holds a debt over another and another holds a debt over another, that we collect from this last one and give it to the first [one]? From the verse, “And he shall give it to him to whom he is indebted” (Numbers 5:7)....
  Therefore “him” comes to exclude [the case of a slave who sells himself into slavery]. And the other one in general does not agree with R. Nathan.
  What is the reason of the tanna kamma who holds, to the one who sells himself, his master cannot give a Canaanite slave woman? The Torah excluded this with regard to one sold by the court: “If his master gives him a wife” (Exodus 21:4), him, but not one who sells himself.
  And the other [R. Elazar]? “Him”-- even against his will. And the other?  That is derived from, “For double the work of a hired servant [he has served you]” (Deuteronomy 15:18). For it was taught:
  “For double the work of a hired servant [he has served you]” a hired servant works by day only, whereas a Hebrew slave works by day and night. Could you really think that a Hebrew slave works by day and night: is it not written, “Because it goes well for him with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16), [this teaches] that he must be equal with you in food and drink? And R. Yitzchak said: From this it follows that his master can give him a Canaanite handmaid [as a wife].
  And the other?  If from there, I might have said: That is only with his consent, but not against his will; therefore we are told [otherwise].
  Then which Tanna does not learn from the repetition of “sakhir”? — It is this Tanna, as it was taught: “[And if your brother sells himself to you . . . he shall serve you till the years of Jubilee. And then . . . he shall return to his family” (Leviticus 25:41): R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said: Of whom does the verse speak? If of him who sells himself, then it was already stated. If of him whose ear was bored, that too was already stated.   
  Thus Scripture must refer [here] to one whom the court sold two or three years before Jubilee, that the Jubilee takes him out of slavery. Now, should you think that he [R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov] learns from the repetition of the word “sakhir,” why is it [the verse cited] necessary; let him learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir”?
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: In the end, he does learn from the repetition of the word sakhir; But still [the verse quoted] is necessary, lest I would have thought that only he who sells himself, because he did not commit a transgression [goes free at the Jubilee]; but as for one sold by the court, who committed an transgression, I might say: Let him be punished [and not go free]; therefore he teaches us [that he is not].
  The Master said: “If with regard to him whose ear was bored — that too was already stated.” What is this?  As it was taught: “And you shall restore every man to his possession, and you shall return every man to his family” (Leviticus 25:10). 
  What is the verse speaking about? If it is about one who sells himself — it was already stated;  if to one sold by the court — that [too] was already stated.   Hence the verse can only refer to one whose ear was bored two or three years before Jubilee, [teaching] that the Jubilee sets him free. How does this mean this?  Rava b. Shila said: The verse says, “[And you shall return every] man”: now, what thing is practiced in the case of a man but not of a woman? Say: boring [a hole in the ear].
  It had to write [both] one sold by the court, and one whose ear was bored. For if it had taught us with regard to one sold by the court, [I might say] that is because his term had not expired; but as for him whose ear was bored, seeing that his term had already expired, I might have said: let him be punished!
  And if it had told us [this] of him whose ear was bored, [I might say] that is because he had already served six years; but as for him who has been sold by the court, who had not yet served six years, I might have argued: he does not go free. Thus both are necessary
  Now, both “and you shall return” and ‘[and he shall serve him] forever” (Exodus 21:6) needed to be written. For had the Torah written “forever” [only], I would have thought, literally forever; therefore the Torah wrote “and you shall return”. 
  And had the Torah written “and you shall return” [only], I would have thought: this refers only to a case where he had not served six years [after being bored]; but if he had already served six years, his last phase should not be more stringent than his first: just as his first phase was for six years, so should his last be for six years [only]; hence “forever” teaches us, forever until the Jubilee.
  Then which Tanna does learn from the repetition of “sakhir”? It is Rabbi. For it was taught:
  
  Daf 15b
  
  “And if he is not redeemed by these” (Leviticus 25:54):  Rabbi said: He may be redeemed by these, but not by six [years].
  For I might have argued, Does it not follow from a kal vehomer argument: if he who cannot be redeemed by these is redeemed by six [years], then this one, who may be redeemed by these, is surely redeemed by six years? Therefore it is written: “by these”: teaching, he may be redeemed by these, but not by six years. 
  Now, if you thought that he [Rabbi] learns from the repetitions of the word “sakhir”, why does he say, “if he who cannot be redeemed by these”: let us learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir.”
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: In fact, he does learn from the repetition of the word “sakhir”; but here it is different, because Scripture says, “[One of his brethren] shall redeem him” him, but not another.
  And what Tanna disagrees with Rabbi? R. Yose the Galilean and R. Akiva. For it was taught: “And if he is not redeemed by these”: R. Yose the Galilean said: “By these”, he goes free, if by any other man, it is for servitude. R. Akiva said: “By these”, it is for servitude: if by any other man, it is for freedom.
  What is the reason of R. Yose the Galilean? The verse says, “And if he is not redeemed by these” — but by a stranger — “then he shall go out in the year of Jubilee”. While R. Akiva interprets: “And if he be not redeemed” by anyone but only “by these,” then he shall go out in the year of Jubilee.” And R. Yose the Galilean?   Is it written: “by anyone but only by these”?    
  Rather they differ in respect of the following verse: “Or his uncle, or his uncle's son may redeem him” (Leviticus 25:49): this refers to redemption by a relative; “Or if he becomes rich” (ibid): this refers to self-redemption: “and he shall be redeemed,” this refers to redemption by others.
  Now, R. Yose the Galilean holds: a verse is interpreted with what precedes it. [Hence] link redemption by relatives with self-redemption: just as self-redemption is for freedom, so is redemption by relatives. While R. Akiva holds: a verse is interpreted with what follows: [hence] link redemption by others with self-redemption: just as the latter is for freedom, so is the former.
  If so, why state “by these”?  If it were not for the word “by these”, I would have said: the verse is interpreted with what precedes and what follows it, so that [any redemption] is for freedom. 
  If so, the difficulty returns to its place? Rather they differ on a matter of logic.
  R. Yose Hagalili holds: It is logical that redemption by strangers is for servitude; for should you say it is for freedom, they would refrain from redeeming him. While R. Akiva holds: It is logical that redemption by relatives is for servitude: for should you say that it is for freedom, he will go every day and sell himself!
  R. Hiyya b. Abba said: These are the words of R. Yose Hagalili and R. Akiva: but the Sages hold, [The redemption of] anyone is for freedom. 
  Who are the Sages? Rabbi, who uses this “by these” for a different derashah, and the verse is interpreted with both what precedes and what follows it.
  And Rabbi, how does he use this [verse] “then he shall go out in the year of Jubilee”? He needs it for what was taught: “Then he shall go out in the year of Jubilee”:
  
  Daf 16a
  
  this refers to a Gentile who is under your rule. Or might it refer to a Gentile who is not under your rule? — You can answer; [If so,] what can be done to him?  Hence the verse speaks only of a Gentile who is under your rule.
  And by document. From where do we know this? Ulla said: The verse says, “If he takes for himself another [wife]” (Exodus 21:10):  The verse compared her [the Hebrew maidservant] to another [wife]: just as the other [the wife] is acquired by document, so is a Hebrew maidservant acquired by document.
  Now, this works for the one that holds that the document of a Hebrew maidservant is written by her master; but for the one that holds that her father writes it, what can be said? For it has been stated: As to the document of a Hebrew maidservant, who writes it? R. Huna said: The master writes it; R. Hisda said: Her father writes it. This makes sense for R. Huna; but to R. Hisda, what can be said?
  R. Aha b. Ya’akov said: The verse says, “She shall not go out as male slaves do” (Exodus 21:7):  but she may be acquired as male slaves are; and how is that? By document.
  But why not say: But she may be acquired as male slaves are, and how is that? Through hazakah (presumption of ownership)! The verse says, “And you shall pass them [non-Jewish slaves] down as an inheritance for your children after you” (Leviticus 25:46): only they [non-Jewish slaves are acquired] by hazakah, but others are not acquired by hazakah.
  Then say: Only they [are acquired] by document, but not another? 
  But it is written, “She shall not go out as male slaves do.” And why do you prefer to read it this way? It is logical that “document” is included [as a means of acquisition], since it divorces an Israelite woman. On the contrary, hazakah should be included, since it acquires the property of a convert?  Still we do not find it in the context of marriage. If you want you can say, if “he take another” comes to teach this. 
  And R. Huna : This verse, “She shall not go out as the male slaves do,” how does he expound on it?   He uses it to teach that she does not go out [free] through [the loss of her] major limbs, as a [non-Jewish] slave does. And R. Hisda?  If so, Scripture should have written: “she shall not go out as male slaves”; what does it mean “as male slaves go out”?   Learn both from this.
  And acquires himself by years. As it is written, “Six years he shall serve: and in the seventh] he shall go out free for nothing” (Exodus 21:2).
  And by the Jubilee: As it is written, “Until the year of Jubilee he shall work with him” (Leviticus 25:40).
  And by deduction from the purchase price. Hezekiah said: For Scriptures says, “Then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:18): This teaches that she reduces from her redemption money and goes free. A Tanna taught: And he may acquire himself by money, its equivalent, and by document. 
  This makes sense for money for it is written, “[He shall give back the price of his redemption] out of the money he was bought for” (Leviticus 25:51). Its equivalent also makes sense [for it is also written], “He shall give back the price of his redemption,”(ibid) this comes to include the equivalent of money as being equal to money. But this deed, what is the case? If we say that he [the slave] writes a document for the [redemption] money? This is the same as money! 
  But if it is [a document of] manumission, why is a document necessary? Let him say to him in the presence of two, or in the presence of a court “Go free”? Rava said: This proves that a Hebrew slave belongs bodily [to his master] and if the master forgives him the deduction, the deduction is not forgiven.
  A Hebrew maidservant has more [ways of being acquired] than him: Resh Lakish said: A Hebrew maidservant acquires herself by her father's death, from a kal vehomer argument: if signs [of puberty] which do not free her from her father's authority, free her master’s authority; then how much more so the  death [of her father], which frees her from her father's authority, should free her from her master's authority! 
  R. Hoshaya raised an objection: A Hebrew maidservant has more [ways of being acquired] than him in that she acquires herself by “signs”; but if this [Resh Lakish's statement] is correct, let it also teach father's death?
  He [the Tanna] teaches [some ways,] and omits [others]. But what else does he omit, that he omits this?  He omits her master's death. If it is on account of her master's death, then that that is not considered an omission; since that applies to a male [slave] too, it is not taught.
  Then let it be taught!  That which is fixed is taught; that which is not fixed is not taught.
  But “signs,” which are not fixed, are nevertheless taught? R. Safra said: They are not fixed above, yet they are fixed below.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  fixed below.
  For it was taught: If a male, aged nine years, grew two hairs, it is a mole. From nine years and a day until twelve years and a day, and they are still there, they are a mole. R. Yose son of R. Judah said: They are a “sign.”  At thirteen years and one day, all admit that they are a “sign.”
  R. Sheshet raised a difficulty: R. Shimon said: Four are presented with gifts [on becoming free], three in the case of a man, and three in the case of a woman. 
  And you cannot say four in the case of either, because “signs” do not apply to a man, and boring does not apply to a woman.  Now if this  be correct, the father's death should also be taught? And if you say: Here too he teaches [some] and omits [others], but he states “four”? And if you says: He teaches [only] that which is fixed, but not that which is not fixed, but what about “signs,” which are not fixed and which he nevertheless teaches?
  And if you say: Here too it goes according to R. Safra, but there is the master's death, which is likewise not fixed, and yet it is taught? The master's death too is not taught.
  Then what are the four? Years, the Jubilee, the Jubilee for him whose ear was bored, and a Hebrew maidservant by “signs.”
  This is also reasonable, for the second part teaches: “And you cannot say four in the case of either, because ‘signs’ do not apply to a man, nor boring to a woman. Now if [Resh Lakish’s ruling] was correct, then in the case of a woman at least four may be found. This proves it.
  R. Amram raised an objection: Now these are the ones that are presented with gifts: He who is freed by [six] years, by the Jubilee, by his master's death, and a Hebrew maidservant by “signs.” 
  But if [Resh Lakish] was correct, the father's death should also be taught.  And should you answer: He teaches [some] and omits [others] but he stated “these are the ones”? And should you answer: He teaches that which is fixed, but not that which is not fixed, but what of “signs” which are not fixed, and which he nevertheless teaches? And should you answer: Here too, it goes according to R. Safra — but there is the master's death! This is a refutation of Resh Lakish. It is indeed a refutation.
  But Resh Lakish used a kal vehomer! It is a kal vehomer which can be refuted. For one can refute it [in the following way]: as for “signs,” that is because there is a physical change [in her]; will you say [the same] of her father's death, seeing that there is no physical change?
  One [baraita] taught: The gift granted a Hebrew male slave belongs to himself, and that of a Hebrew female slave to herself. While another [baraita] taught: the gift granted a Hebrew female slave, and her findings, belong to her father, and the master can claim only for loss of time.
  Now is it not that one [baraita] refers to a case where she went free by “signs,”  while the other means that she went free by her father's death? 
  No: both refer to a case where she went free by “signs,” yet there is no difficulty. In the one case she has a father, in the other she does not have a father.
  It makes sense that “the gift granted a female slave belongs to herself,” comes to exclude her brothers. For it was taught: “And you shall bequeath them as an inheritance for your sons after you” (Leviticus 25:46) “them” for your sons, but not your daughters for your sons. Hence we learn that one cannot transmit his rights in his daughters to his sons.
  But as for “the gift granted a Hebrew male slave belongs to himself” — that is obvious! To whom else could it belong?
  R. Joseph said: I see here a yod [turned into a] town. Abaye said: Thus did R. Sheshet say: Whose baraita is this? Totai. For it was taught: Totai said: “[You shall grant] him”  him, but not his creditor. 
  [To return to] main text [above:] These are the ones to whom the master must give a gift: He who is freed by years, by the Jubilee, by his master's death, and a Hebrew maidservant [freed] by “signs.” But not to a runaway, or to one who is freed by a deduction from his purchase price. R. Meir said: They do not provide a gift to a runaway; but to one who is freed by a deduction they do provide a gift. 
  R. Shimon said: Four are presented with gifts, three in the case of a man, and three in the case of a woman. And you cannot say four in the case of either, because "signs" do not apply to a man, nor boring to a woman.
  How do we know this? For our rabbis taught: I might think that only he who is freed by six [years] is furnished with a gift; how do I know to include one who is freed by the Jubilee or by his master's death, and a Hebrew maidservant [freed] by signs? From the verses, “You shall send him free” “and when you send him free” (Deuteronomy 15:12).
  I might think that I include a runaway and one who goes out through a deduction from the purchase price — Scripture says: “and when you send him free from you,” only he who is sent from you, excluding a runaway and one who is freed by deduction from the purchase price, whose dismissal is not from you. R. Meir said: A runaway is not provided with a gift, since his dismissal is not from you: but one who is freed by deduction from the purchase price, whose dismissal is from you, [is given a gift].
  A runaway? But he must complete [his term]?   For it was taught: How do we know that a runaway is bound to complete [his term]? Scripture says, “Six years he shall serve” (Exodus 21:2).
  
  Daf 17a
  
  I might think, even if he fell sick, Scripture says, “And in the ‘seventh he shall go out”!
  R. Sheshet said: What are we dealing with here? With one who escaped, and then the Jubilee arrived:  What might I have thought, since the Jubilee sends him free, we apply to him “his dismissal from you,” and do not punish but furnish him with a gift. Therefore we are informed [that he does not receive a gift].
  The Master said: I might have thought that even if he fell sick [he must serve the six years], Scripture says: "And in the seventh he shall go out free” even if he was sick the whole six [years]? But it was taught: If he was sick three years and served three years, he is not obligate to complete [his term]; but if he was sick the whole six years, he is obligated to make it up! R. Sheshet said: This means that he was able to perform needle-work.
  The baraita is self-contradictory. You said: “If he was sick three years and served three years, he is not obligated to complete [his term],” if four years he must complete [his term]. Then what about the last clause: “but if he was sick the whole six years, he is obligated to make it up.” But if [he is sick for only] four, he is not? This is what it means: If he was sick for four years, it is as if he was the whole six years, and he must make it up.
  Our Rabbis taught: How much is he [the freed slave] granted? Five sela's [worth] of each kind, which is fifteen sela's in all: the words of R. Meir. R. Judah said: Thirty, as the thirty [paid] for [the accidental killing of a slave] slave.  R. Simeon said: Fifty, as the fifty of ‘arakin.  
  The master said: “Five sela's [worth] of each kind, which is fifteen sela's in all: the words of R. Meir.” Does then R. Meir come to teach us a number? He teaches us this: He may not diminish the total, but if he gives him less of one kind and more of another, we have no objection.
  What is R. Meir's reason?  He derives the meaning of “empty” from a firstborn:  just as there it refers to five sela's, so too here it refers to five sela's.
  Then say five sela's total from all [flock, threshing floor and winepress]? If “empty” had been written at the end [of the verse],  [it would be] as you say. Now, that “empty: is written at the beginning, apply [the word] “empty” to “flock,” “threshing floor,” and “winepress.”
  But let us learn the meaning of “empty” from the pilgrimage burnt-offering?   Scripture says, “As the Lord your God has blessed you.”
  R. Judah said: Thirty, as the thirty [paid] for a slave. What is R. Judah's reason? He derives the meaning of “giving” from a slave: just as there, the amount is thirty, so too here it is thirty.
  But let us learn the meaning of “giving” from evaluations:  just as there, fifty, so here too, fifty?
  Firstly, because if you seize much, you have not seized; if you seize a little, you have seized; Moreover, it is better for him to rather deduce a law about slaves from another law about slaves.
  Rabbi Shimon said: Fifty, as the fifty of evaluations. What is R. Shimon's reason? He derives the meaning of “giving” from evaluations: just as there, fifty, so here too, fifty. But why not say with the least [sum] of the evaluations? It is written, “As the Lord your God has blessed you.”
  But let us derive the meaning of “giving” from a slave: just as there, thirty, so here too thirty: [for] firstly, if you seize much, you have not seized; if you seize little, you have seized; and moreover, he should rather deduce slave from slave? R. Shimon deduces “poverty” from “poverty.”
  Now, as for R. Meir, it makes sense that “flocks, threshing floor and wine press” are written. But to R. Judah and R. Shimon, why are these necessary?
  They are necessary, as it was taught: I might have thought that the gift can be made only of flocks, the threshing floor, and the wine-press: how do I know that all things are included? From the verse: “As the Lord your blessed you, you shall give him.” If so, why state “flocks, threshing floor, and wine-press”? To inform you: just as these are exceptional in that they are included in “blessing,” so must everything [given to the slave] be included “blessing,” thus excluding money, the words of R. Shimon. R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: excluding mules.
  And R. Shimon?  Mules, their own bodies grow. And R. Eliezer b. Jacob?  One can engage in business with money. 
  Now, they are [all] necessary. For had the Torah written “flocks,” I would have thought, only animals [may be given], but not agricultural produce: [therefore] the Torah wrote “threshing floor.” And had it written “threshing-floor”, I would have said, only agricultural produce; [therefore] Scripture wrote “threshing-floor.” And had it written “threshing-floor,” I would have said, only agricultural produce, but not livestock: hence the Torah wrote “flocks”. Why do I need “wine-press”?
  
  Daf 17b
  
  According to one Master, to exclude money; according to the other, to exclude mules.
  Our Rabbis taught : “As the Lord your God has blessed you”: I might have thought, if the house was blessed on his account a gift is made to him; but if the house was not blessed on his account, no gift is made to him; therefore Scripture states, “you shall grant him,” in all cases.  If so, what does Scripture mean by “has blessed you”? Give him according to your blessing.  
  R. Elazar b. Azariah said: The matter is as it is written: if the house was blessed on his account, a gift is made to him; if the house was not blessed on his account, no gift is made to him. If so, what does it mean by “you shall grant him”? The Torah speaks in human language.
  Our Rabbis taught: A Hebrew male slave serves [his master's] son, but does not serve [his] daughter; a Hebrew female slave serves neither son nor daughter; one who was bored, or sold to a non-Jew, serves neither the son nor the daughter. The Master said: “A Hebrew male slave serves [his master's] son, but not [his] daughter.” How do we know this? For our Rabbis taught: “He shall serve you six years” (Deuteronomy 15:12), you and not your heir.
  You say: “You and not your heir”: yet perhaps it should be read, “you and not your son”? When it is said, “Six years he shall serve” (Exodus 21:2) the son is included; then how can I fulfill, “He shall serve your six years? You and not your heir. 
  Why do you choose to include the son and exclude the brother? I include the son, because he stands in his father's place for designation, and in respect of an ancestral field.
  On the contrary, I should include the brother, since he stands in his brother's place for yibum? Is there yibum except in a place where there is no son? But if there is a son, there is no yibum.
  Now it is only because there is this refutation; but if this refutation did not exist, the brother would be preferable?  But you could also derive this from the fact that here [in the case of a son] there are two [points in his favor], whereas there [in the case of the brother], there is only one?
  An ancestral field is likewise inferred from this same refutation: is there yibum except in the absence of a son?
  “A Hebrew female slave serves neither son nor daughter.” From where do we know this? R. Papa said: Because the verse says, “[You shall take an awl and put it through his ear into the door, and he shall become your slave in perpetuity.] Do the same with your female slave” (Deuteronomy 15:17) the verse compared her to one who is bored. Just as one who is bored serves neither son nor daughter, so a Hebrew female slave serves neither son nor daughter. Now this [verse,] “Do the same with your female slave” does it come to teach this? Is it not necessary for what was taught: “Do the same with your female slave,” grant [her] a gift. You say, grant her a gift or perhaps is it said in respect to boring? When it is stated: “But if the slave says” and not the female slave—this refers to boring. How then do I fulfill “Do the same with your female slave”—this refers to granting a gift?
  If so, the verse should write, “and to your female slave” why state, “Do”? Learn from this both. “One who was bored, or was sold to a non-Jew, serves neither the son nor the daughter.” One who was bored, as it is written, “And his master shall bore his ear through with an awl: and he shall serve him forever” (Exodus 21:6) but neither the son nor the daughter.
  If so, the verse should write, “and to your female slave” why state, “Do”? Learn from this both.
  “One who was bored, or was sold to a non-Jew, serves neither the son nor the daughter.” One who was bored, as it is written, “And his master shall bore his ear through with an awl: and he shall serve him forever” (Exodus 21:6) but neither the son nor the daughter. One who is sold to a non-Jew—from where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: The verse says, “And he shall reckon with his purchaser” (Leviticus 25:50), but not with his purchaser's heirs.
  Rava said: According to biblical law, a non-Jew inherits from his father, for it is said: “And he shall reckon with his purchaser” [implying,] but not with his purchaser's heirs, from which it follows that he has heirs. A convert inheriting [the estate of] a non-Jew is not biblical law but the law of the scribes. 
  For we learned A convert and a gentile who inherited [the property of] their father, a gentile: he (the convert) can say [to his brother the gentile]: “You take the idols and I will take the money,” or: “You take the wine and I will take the produce.” But from the time [that any part of the inheritance] came into the possession of the convert, he is forbidden [to say so].
  Now, should you think that [the convert inherits] by Biblical law, even if they have not yet come into his possession, when he takes [the money or the produce], he takes something in exchange for an idol! 
  Rather the rabbis made [his inheritance] to be [only] from rabbinic law, lest he return to his wayward path. It was also taught in a baraita: When was this said? If they inherited [the property]. But if they went into partnership, it is forbidden.
  A non-Jew does not inherit from a convert, or a convert from another convert neither by Biblical law nor by the law of the scribes. As we have learned: If a man borrows money from a convert whose children were converted together with him, he must not return it to his children, and if he does, the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with him.
  But it was taught: The spirit of the Sages is pleased with him? There is no difficulty. The former refers to a case where both his conception and birth were not in sanctity: 
  
  Daf 18a
  
  the latter to where his conception was not in sanctity, but his birth was.
  R. Hiyya b. Abin said in the name of R. Yohanan: A non-Jew inherits from his father by Biblical law, since it is written, “Because I have given Mount Seir to Esau for an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 2:5). Yet perhaps an apostate Israelite is different? Rather from here: For to the descendants of Lot I have given Er as a heritage” (Deuteronomy 2:9).
  Now, R. Hiyya b. Abin, why does he not say as did Rava? Is it then written: “And he shall reckon with his purchaser but not with his purchaser's heirs!” 
  And Rava, why does he not say as did R. Hiyya b. Abin? On account of Abraham's honor, it is different.
  Our Rabbis taught: A Hebrew male slave has features which a Hebrew female slave lacks, and a Hebrew bondwoman has features which a Hebrew bondman lacks. A Hebrew bondman has the following features: He goes out [free] at [six] years, at the Jubilee, and at his master's death, which is not so in the case of a Hebrew female slave. And a Hebrew female slave has the following features: a Hebrew female slave goes out by ‘signs’, she cannot be sold and re-sold, and she is redeemed against her will, which is not so in the case of a Hebrew slave.
  The Master said: “A Hebrew slave has features which a Hebrew female slave lacks.” But against this they raised the following: A Hebrew female slave has more [ways of going free] than him, in that she acquires herself by “signs”!  R. Sheshet said: If he designated her [as his wife].  
  “He designated her?” But that is obvious: she needs a divorce! What might I have thought? The laws [applicable to her] are not annulled in her case. Hence he teaches us otherwise. If so, why does she go out free by “signs”? This is what it means: If he [her master] did not designate her, she goes out free by “signs” too. 
  “And she cannot be sold and re-sold.” From here it follows that a Hebrew male slave may be sold and re-sold. But has it not been taught: “[If he lacks the means, he shall be sold] for his theft” but not [to recover] his double repayment; “for his theft,” but not for his refuted testimony; for his theft: having been sold once, he may not be sold again!
  Rava said: There is no difficulty: the latter refers to one theft, the former to two thefts.
  Abaye said to him: “For his theft” implies even many thefts. Rather Abaye said: there is no difficulty; the latter refers to one man, the former to two men.
  Our Rabbis taught: If his theft was thousand [zuz], and he was worth five hundred, he is sold and then sold again. If his theft was five hundred, and he was worth thousand, he is not sold at all. R. Eliezer said: If his theft corresponded to his purchase price, he is sold; if not, he is not sold.
  Rava said: In this matter R. Eliezer triumphed over the Rabbis. For why is it different if his theft was five hundred and he was worth thousand, that he is not sold. Because the Torah said, “then he shall be sold”—all of him, but not half. Here too, the Torah said, “He shall be sold for his theft,” but not for half his theft.
  “And she is redeemed against his will:” Rava thought to say that this meant against the master's will. Abaye said to him: How is this done? That one writes a document for him for her value? But why? He holds a pearl in his hand — shall we give him a shard?
  Rather Abaye said: against her father's will on account of the family disgrace. If so, in the case of a Hebrew male slave too, we should force the members of his family to redeem him on account of the family disgrace? Then he will go and sell himself again. Her too, he [the father] will go and sell her again?
  Was it not taught: She cannot be sold and then sold again? And whose opinion is this? R. Shimon. For it was taught: A man may sell his daughter for marriage, and then repeat; for servitude, and then repeat; for marriage after servitude, but not for servitude after marriage. R. Shimon said: Just as a man cannot sell his daughter for servitude after marriage, so a man cannot sell his daughter for servitude after servitude. 
  And this is the same dispute as the following Tannaim. As it was taught: “[He shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people,] seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her [bevigdo vah]”
  
  Daf 18b
  
  once he spread his cloak over her, he can no longer sell her, the words of R. Akiva.  R. Eliezer says: Once he has dealt deceptively with her, he can no longer sell her.
  What do they argue about? R. Eliezer holds: the traditional text [i.e., letters without vowels] is authoritative;  R. Akiva holds: the text as read is authoritative; whereas R. Shimon holds: both the traditional text and the vocalization are authoritative.
  Rabbah b. Abbuhah asked: Does designation effect marriage or betrothal? The practical difference is in respect of inheriting her property, defiling himself on her account, and annulling her vows. What is the law?
  Come and hear: “Since he broke faith with her [be-bivgdo bah]” (Exodus 21:8): once he spread his cloak over her, he can no longer sell her. He may not sell her, but he may designate her. But if you say, it effects marriage, once she was married, her father has no more authority over her. Learn from this that it effects marriage.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: The reference here is to betrothal in general, and this is what it means: Once her father delivers her to one who becomes responsible for “her food, clothing and conjugal rights,” he may no longer sell her.
  Come and hear: He [the father] may not sell her to relatives. In the name of R. Eliezer they said: He may sell her to relatives. And both agree that he may sell a widow to a High Priest, and a divorcee, or a halutzah to a common priest. 
  Now [as to] this widow, what is the case? If we say that she accepted kiddushin for herself: can she be called a widow! Rather, if it means that her father betrothed her — but a man cannot sell his daughter for servitude after marriage!
  And R. Amram said in the name of R. Yitzchak: Here we are dealing with kiddushin of designation, and [this was taught] according to R. Yose son of R. Judah, who said: The original money was not given as kiddushin. But if you say: It effects marriage: once she is married, her father no longer has any authority over her!
  What then: it effects betrothal? [But] “and both agree that he may sell her” but a man cannot sell his daughter to servitude after marriage! Then what can you say: her own betrothal differs from her father's? Then even if you say that it effects marriage: her own marriage differs from her father's.
  How now? It makes sense for betrothal [by her father] to differ from betrothal [by her]
  
  Daf 19a
  
  but can marriage differ from marriage?
  Now, according to R. Nahman b. Yitzchak, who said: Even according the view of R. Yose son of R. Yehudah, the original money was given for kiddushin, how can he explain it? He can explain it as agreeing with R. Eliezer, who held: For servitude after servitude he may not sell her, but he may sell her for servitude after marriage.
  Resh Lakish asked: Can a man designate [his female slave] for his minor son? “His son” the Torah said, his son, whatever his state; or perhaps, “his son” must be similar to himself: just as he is an adult, so must his son be an adult?
  R. Zera said: Come and hear: [“And a man that commits adultery with another man's wife”]: “a man” excludes a minor; “that commits adultery with another man's wife” excludes the wife of a minor.
  But if you say that he can designate, if so, we find marriage in the case of a minor. Then what? He cannot designate [her to his minor son]? Why then does Scripture exclude it?  Learn then from this that he can designate! R. Ashi said: Here we are dealing with a yavam, aged nine years and a day, who had intercourse with his yevamah, who is connected to him by biblical law.
  What might you have said? Since she is tied to him by biblical law and his intercourse is intercourse, another man who has intercourse with her incurs the penalty for [adultery with] a married woman: thus it teaches us that he is not....
  What is our decision on the matter? Come and hear: For R. Aibu said in the name of R. Yannai: Designation can be performed only by an adult; designation is only by consent. [Are these] two [statements]?   He states the reason: What is the reason that designation can be performed only by an adult? Because designation is only by consent.
  Alternatively, what is the meaning of, “by consent”? “By her consent.” For Abaye son of R. Abbahu taught: “Who has not designated her,” this teaches that he must inform her [that he intends to designate her.]
  He recited it and he explained it: This refers to betrothal by designation, and is in accordance with R. Yose son of R. Judah, who maintained, the original money was not given as kiddushin. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: Even if you say that it was given as kiddushin, here it is different, because Scripture expressed [betrothal by the word] “ye’adah.”
  What is the reference to R. Yose son of R. Yehudah? As it was taught: [Who did not designate her,] then he shall let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8): [this teaches that for her to be designated] that there must be time for her to be redeemed. 
  From here R. Yose son of R. Yehudah ruled that if there is enough time in the day for her to work for him the value of a perutah she is betrothed, but if not, she is not betrothed. This proves that he holds the original money was not given as kiddushin.
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: You may even say that it was given as kiddushin, yet here it is different, since the Torah said: “then he shall let her be redeemed.”
  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: A man can say to his minor daughter, “Go out and accept your kiddushin.” [This follows] from R. Yose son of R. Yehudah,
  for did he not say: The original money was not given as kiddushin? Yet when he [the master] leaves her a perutah's worth [of her labor] it is kiddushin. Here too it is not different.
  And Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: If a man betroths [a woman] with a loan on which there is collateral, she is betrothed. [This follows] from R. Yose son of R. Yehudah, for did he not say: The original money was not given as kiddushin? [Hence] this [her labor] is a loan,
  
  Daf 19b
  
  yet when he [the master] leaves her a perutah's worth [of her work] and designates [her with this perutah], it is kiddushin; so too here, it is not different.
  Our Rabbis taught: How is the law of designation [carried out]? He [her master] says to her in the presence of two people, “Behold, you are designated to me,” [or] “Behold, you are betrothed (mekudeshet) to me,” [or] “Behold, you are betrothed (me’ureset) to me”: even at the end of the six [years], even just before sunset. He must then treat her as a wife, not as a slave woman. R. Yose son of R. Yehudah said: If there is sufficient time on that day for her to work for him the value of a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.
  This may be compared to a man who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me from now and after thirty days,” and then another man comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the first.
  According to whom is this parable? If we say, the parable supports R. Yose son of R. Yehudah, but did he not say “If there is sufficient time on that day for her to work for him the value of a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.”
  R. Aha the son of Rava: The parable supports the rabbis. 
  But that is obvious? What might I have thought? He [her master] did not say “from now” therefore he teaches us [that it is as if he did].
  Another [baraita] taught: If a man sells his daughter and then goes and betroths her to another man, he has mocked the master, and she is betrothed to the second, the words of R. Yose son of R. Yehudah. But the sages say: If he [the master] wishes to designate her, he can do so. This may be compared to a man who declares to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another man comes and betroths her within the thirty days—she is betrothed to the second.  
  Whom does the parable come to support? If we say the sages, but didn’t they say:
  If he wishes to designate her, he can do so”! 
  Rather R. Aha the son of Rava said: The parable comes to support the view of R. Yose son of R. Yehudah. But isn’t this obvious?
  What might I have thought? He did not say to her, “after thirty days,” hence he teaches us that this is so.
  Another baraita teaches: If a man sells his daughter and stipulates on condition that he [her master] shall not designate [her], the condition is valid, the words of R. Meir. But the sages say: If he [the master] wishes to designate her, he can do so, because he [her father] has made a stipulation against that which is written in the Torah, and anyone who makes a stipulation against that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.
  Does then R. Meir hold that this stipulation is valid? But was it not taught: If a man says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claims on me for sustenance, clothing, or conjugal rights,” she is betrothed, but the condition is void, the words of R. Meir. R. Yehudah said: In respect of financial matters, his condition is valid.
  Hizkiyah said: This case is different, because the verse says, “[And if a man sells his daughter] to be a slave” sometimes he can sell her only to be a slave.
  And the rabbis? What do they do with this word “to be a slave”? They use it for that which was taught: “To be a slave”: this teaches that he can sell her to those unfit [for marriage with her].
  But is this not logical: if he can betroth her to those unfit to her, should he not be allowed to sell her to those unfit to her?  As for betrothing her to those unfit to her, that may be because a man can betroth his daughter as a na'arah: shall he then sell her to those unfit to her, seeing that a man cannot sell his daughter as a na'arah?  Therefore Scripture states: “to be a slave”, teaching that he can sell her to those unfit to her.
  R. Eliezer said: If it is to teach that he can sell her to those unfit for her, behold, it was already said: “if she is found not pleasing to her master [so that he has not designated her]” (Exodus 21:8) which means, she was displeasing in respect of marriage. What then is meant by, “to be a slave”? It teaches that he may sell her
  
  Daf 20a
  
  to relatives.
  But is this not logical: If he can sell her to those unfit for her, shall he not sell her to relatives? As for selling her to those unfit for her, that may be because if he wishes to designate her he can do so, shall he then sell her to relatives, seeing that if he wishes to designate her, he cannot? Therefore the verse says, “to be a slave,” teaching that he can sell her to relatives.
  And R. Meir?  [From where does he derive that she can be sold] to those unfit for her? He deduces it from the same verse from which R. Eliezer deduces it; and in the matter of relatives he agrees with the rabbis, who maintain: he may not sell her to relatives.
  One [baraita] taught: He may sell her to his father, but he may not sell her to his son. Another [baraita] taught: He may not sell her to his father or to his son. It makes sense to teach “He may not sell her to his father or to his son” for this agrees with the sages. But “he may sell her to his father but he may not sell her to his son” — with whom does this agree;   
  neither with the sages nor with R. Eliezer? In the end it follows the sages: The sages agree [that he can sell her] where there is a possibility of designation.
  Our Rabbis taught: “If he came in [be-gapo], he shall go out [be-gapo],” if he came in with his [whole] body [be-gufo] he goes out with his [whole] body. R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: If he came in single, he goes out single. What is meant by “if he came in with his [whole] body he goes out with his [whole] body”? Rava said: It means that he is not freed through [the loss of his] major limbs, as is a non-Jewish slave. Abaye said to him: But that is deduced from, “she shall not go out as slaves do” (Exodus 21:7)?
  If from there, I would have thought, He must pay for his eye, and then he goes free. Therefore he teaches us [otherwise].
  R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said: If he comes in single, he goes out single. What is meant by “he goes out single”? R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: This is what it means: If he has a wife and children [when entering servitude], his master may give him a non-Jewish slave; if he has no wife and children, his master may not give him a non-Jewish slave woman.
  Our rabbis taught: If he was sold for a maneh, and appreciated [in value] and stood at two hundred, how do we know that he is assessed only at a maneh?  As it is said, “[he shall pay back for his redemption] in proportion to his purchase price” (Leviticus 25:51). 
  If he was sold for two hundred and depreciated and stood at a maneh, how do we know that he is assessed only at a maneh?  Scripture says, “[he shall make payment for his redemption] according to his years” [Leviticus 25:52]
  Now, I know this only of a slave sold to a non-Jew: since he may be redeemed by his relatives, his [the master] is at a disadvantage.
  If he is sold to a Jew, how do we know this? Because “sakhir” [a hired servant] is stated twice, for the purpose of a gezerah shavah.
  Abaye said: Behold I am like Ben Azzai in the streets of Tiberias. One of the rabbis said to Abaye: Since these verses may be interpreted leniently and stringently: why do you choose to interpret them leniently [to the slave's advantage]; let us interpret them stringently?  
  [Abaye responded]: Do not even think such a thing, since the Torah was lenient with him. For it was taught: “Because he (the Hebrew slave) fares well with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16): he must be with you in food and with you in drink,
  that you should not eat white bread while he eats dirty bread, you should not drink old wine and while he drinks new wine, you should not sleep on a feather bed while he on straw. Hence it was said: Whoever buys a Hebrew slave is like buying a master for himself. 
  Yet perhaps that is only in respect to food and drink, that he should not be in physical distress, but in the matter of redemption, let us be stringent with him, [as follows] from R. Yose son of R. Hanina. For R. Yose son of R. Hanina said: Come and see how hard are the results of [violating even the “dust” of] the sabbatical year.
  A man who trades in sabbatical year produce must eventually sell his movable property, for it is said: “In this year of Jubilee you shall restore every man unto his possession,” (Leviticus 25:13) and adjacent to this [it teaches], “And if you sell anything to your neighbor, or buy of anything from your neighbor,” [which refers to] what is acquired from hand to hand.   
  If he disregards this, he eventually sells his fields, for it is said: “If your brother grows poor, and sells some of his possessions” (Leviticus 25:25). He does not have a chance to repent, until he comes to sell his house, for it is said: “And if a man sells a house in a walled city” (Leviticus 25:29).
  (Why state there “if he disregards this,” but here, “He does not have a chance to repent”? This is in accordance with R. Huna. For R. Huna said: Once a man has committed a transgression and repeated it, it is permitted to him. “Permitted to him!” Can you think so? Rather say, it becomes to him as permitted.)  
  He does not have a chance to repent until he sells his daughter, for it is said, “And if a man sell his daughter to be a slave” (Exodus 21:7);   (and though [the sale of] his daughter is not mentioned in this section, it teaches us that one should [rather] sell his daughter and not borrow with interest. What is the reason? His daughter makes a deduction [in her purchase price] and goes free, whereas this [his debt] grows ever larger.)
  He does not have a chance to repent until he borrows with interest, as it is written, “And if your brother grows poor, and his hand fail with you” (Leviticus 25:35) and juxtaposed to it [is stated,] “Do not take interest from him” (Leviticus 25:36).He does not have a chance to repent until he sells himself, as it is said, “And if your brother grows poor with you and sells himself to you” (Leviticus 25:25).  
  And not just to you, but to a convert, as it is said “[And sell himself] to a convert” (Leviticus 25:47). And just to a righteous convert, but to a resident alien, as it is said, “or to the resident alien” And the family of a convert refers to a non-Jew.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  And it says: “To the offshoot,” it refers to one who sells himself to idolatry itself!
  Abaye responded to him: Behold the verse restored him, for the School of R. Ishmael taught: Since this man went and became a priest in the service of idolatry, I might have said: Let us cast a stone after the fallen, Scripture says, “after he is sold he shall be redeemed,” one of his brethren shall redeem him.
  But say “he shall be redeemed” so that he is not assimilated among the non-Jews, but in respect to redemption we should be stringent with him, in accordance with R. Yose son of R. Haninah?
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: Two verses are written: “If there remain increased years” (Leviticus 25:51); “And if there remains but little in the years” (Leviticus 25:52):  are there then increased [i.e., prolonged] years and decreased [i.e., shortened] years? Rather [the meaning is:] if his value increases, [then his redemption shall be] out of the money that he was bought for; if his value decreases, [the basis of redemption is] according unto his years [yet remaining].
  But perhaps the meaning is this: If he served two [years], and he has four remaining, he must repay him for four years out of the money that he was bought for; while if he served four [years], two remaining, he must repay him for two, ‘according unto his years’? 
  If so, Scripture should write, “If there be yet many years” . . . “If there remain but few years” why “in years” [bashanim]? [To teach:] if his value increased in [these] years, [his redemption is] “out of the money that he was bought for”; if his value decreased in [these] years, “[he is redeemed] according unto his years.” R. Joseph said: R. Nahman  interpreted these verses as Sinai.  
  (Mnemonic: Slave, House, Half, Slave, Relations.) R. Huna b. Hinena asked R. Sheshet: Can a Hebrew slave sold to a non-Jew be half redeemed, or can he not be half redeemed? 
  [Do we say] that “his redemption” is derived from the laws regard “an ancestral field” just as an ancestral field cannot be half redeemed, so too he cannot be half redeemed; or perhaps, we may invoke this comparison to create a leniency but not a stringency?   
  He answered him: Did you not say there, “he may be sold in his entirety, but not half of him,” here too, he may be redeemed in his entirety but not half of him.
  Abaye said: If you say that he can be half redeemed, it will turn out that there could be both a leniency and stringency. The leniency: If he [the non-Jew] bought him for a hundred, and he [the slave] then gave him fifty, half of his value, and then he appreciated and stood at two hundred: if you say that he can be half redeemed, he pays him [an additional] hundred and goes out [free]; And if you say, he cannot be half redeemed, he must pay him a hundred and fifty, and [then] go out. 
  But did you not say: “if his value increased,” [his redemption is] out of the money that he was bought for”! This could happen in a case where he was valuable [when bought], then became cheaper, then rose again.
  “It will be a stringency”: If he bought him for two hundred and he [the slave] paid him a hundred, half of his value, and then his value decreased to a hundred. If you say, he can be half redeemed, he must pay him fifty and go out; but if you say that he cannot be half redeemed, then this hundred is considered to be a deposit to his master, he [the slave] gives it to him and goes out [free].
  R. Huna b. Hinena asked R. Sheshet: If one sells a house in a walled city, can it be half-redeemed? Do we learn the meaning of “his redemption” [stated in the case of selling a house in a walled city] from “his redemption” from an ancestral field: just as an ancestral field cannot be half redeemed, so too this cannot be half redeemed; 
  or perhaps, where [Scripture] revealed it, it revealed it; where not, it did not?...
  He said to him: From the midrash of R. Shimon we learn that he can borrow and redeem, and he can redeem half. For it was taught: “And if he [that sanctified the field] will redeem it” (Leviticus 27:19): this teaches that he can borrow and redeem, and redeem half.
  R. Shimon said: What is the reason? Because we find in the case of he who sells an ancestral field, that [since] he has enhanced power, in that if Jubilee comes and it has not been redeemed, it reverts to its owners, [as a consequence] his rights are weakened in that he cannot borrow and redeem, or redeem half;
  He who sanctifies [an ancestral field] whose rights are impaired in that if Jubilee comes and it has not been redeemed, it goes out to the priests at the Jubilee, [therefore] his privilege is strengthened in [so far] that he may borrow and redeem, and redeem half.
  This one who sells a house in a walled city, since his rights are impaired in that if a complete year elapsed and it is not redeemed, it is [sold] in perpetuity, therefore his privilege is strengthened in that he can borrow and redeem, and redeem half.
  He raised an objection: “And if he will indeed redeem it” (Leviticus 27:19) this teaches that he may borrow and redeem, and redeem half.
  For it would have been logical [to argue the following]: if he who sells “an ancestral field,” whose power is great in that if the Jubilee comes and it has not been redeemed it reverts to its original owner, yet his power is impaired in that he cannot borrow and redeem, and redeem half; then he who sanctifies, whose rights are impaired in that if the Jubilee comes and it has not been redeemed it goes out to the priests at the Jubilee, it surely follows that his rights are [also] impaired in that he cannot borrow and redeem, and redeem half.
  As for one who sells an “ancestral field”, that is because his power is weak in that he [cannot] redeem it immediately; will you say [the same] of one who sanctifies, whose power is strong, that he can redeem it immediately?
  Let one who sells a house in a walled city prove it, whose power is strong to redeem it immediately, and yet he cannot borrow and redeem, and redeem half! There is no difficulty: 
  
  Daf 21a
  
  the one agrees with the Rabbis, the other with R. Shimon.
  One [baraita] taught: He [who sells a house in a walled city] may borrow and redeem, and redeem half. Another taught: He may not borrow and redeem, nor redeem half. There is no difficulty: the latter agrees with the sages, the former with R. Shimon. 
  (Mnemonic; Harash, Habash, Zeman.)  
  R. Aha, son of Rava, said to R. Ashi: It can be refuted: as for one who sells a house in a walled city, that is because his power is impaired, in that he cannot redeem it [forever]; will you say the same of him who sanctifies, in that his power is great, in that he can redeem it forever? 
  R. Aha Saba said to R. Ashi: Because one can say: Let the argument return, and let it be inferred by what is common [to both.] One who sells an ancestral field can prove it, since his power is great, in that he can redeem it forever, and yet he may not borrow and redeem, or redeem half. But [countering this we could argue] one who sells an ancestral field, that is because his power is impaired, in that he [cannot] redeem it immediately. Then let one who sells a house in a walled city prove it.  
  And thus the argument returns: the feature of one is not that of the other. What is common to both [cases] is that they may be redeemed, and he [the seller] cannot borrow and redeem, nor redeem half. So may I also add the case of one who sanctifies [an ancestral field]: it may be redeemed, and he cannot borrow and redeem, nor redeem half.
  Mar Zutra son of R. Mari said to Ravina: This may be refuted. When it comes to their common feature, in that their power is impaired, for they [cannot] be redeemed in the second year; will you say [the same] of him who sanctifies, seeing that his power is strong in that he can redeem in the second year?
  Ravina answered him: Because one may say. Let a Hebrew slave sold to a non-Jew prove it: his power is great. for he may be redeemed in the second year, and yet he cannot borrow and redeem, nor redeem by half.
  R. Huna b. Hinena asked of R. Sheshet: If one sells a house in a walled city, can [the house] be redeemed by relatives or not? Do we learn the meaning of “his redemption” from an ancestral field: just as an ancestral field cannot be half redeemed, but can be redeemed by relatives, so too this cannot be half redeemed, but can be redeemed by relatives;
  or perhaps, “redemption” is written only in reference to redeeming a half, but not in reference to relatives? He answered: It cannot be redeemed [by relatives].
  He raised a difficulty against him: “Throughout the land that you hold, you must provide for the redemption of the land” (Leviticus 25:24): this comes to include houses and Hebrew slaves. Does this not mean houses in a walled city? No. It means houses in villages.
  But about houses in villages it is explicitly written, “they shall be classed as a field in the land” (Leviticus 25:31). That is to make it an obligation, and it follows R. Eliezer.
  For it was taught: “And he shall redeem that which his brother has sold” (Leviticus 25:25): this is an option. You say it is an option: yet perhaps it is not so, but rather it is an obligation? Scripture says: “And if a man has no redeemer” (Leviticus 25:26). But is there a person in Israel who has no redeemer? Hence it must refer to one who has [a redeemer,] who but who does not want repurchase it, [thus teaching] that it is an option. 
  R. Eliezer said: “And he shall redeem that which his brother has sold” [this teaches that it is] an obligation.
  You say, an obligation; yet perhaps it is not so, but an option? Hence it is taught: “And in all of your ancestral land you shall grant redemption for the land” (Leviticus 25:24). The rabbis said to R. Ashi, and others say, Ravina said to R. Ashi: It makes sense to the one that says that it includes houses in walled cities, that is why it says “in all;” but to the one who says that it includes [only] houses in villages, what does “in all” mean? This is indeed a difficulty. 
  Abaye raised an objection before him: Why does Scripture states, “He shall redeem him,” “he shall redeem him” “he shall redeem” three times? To include all cases of redemption, that they are to be redeemed in this order. Surely that refers to houses in walled cities and Hebrew slaves?
  No, it was stated about houses in villages and ancestral fields. But about houses in villages and ancestral fields it is explicitly written, “they shall be classed as a field in the land” (Leviticus 25:31). It is as R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said [elsewhere], to teach that the nearest relative comes first; so here too, the nearest relative comes first. 
  In what context was R. Nahman's statement made? On that which was asked: Can a Hebrew slave sold to an Israelite be redeemed by relatives or not? On Rabbi's view, that is no question, since he said: He who cannot be redeemed by these [relatives] can be redeemed by [the passage of] years, thus proving that he cannot be redeemed [by relatives]. 
  When we asked, it was about the opinion of the Rabbis. What is the law? Do we derive “sakhir” from “sakhir” and not expound [the emphasis of, “one of his brothers] may redeem him”  or perhaps, “[one of his brothers] may redeem him” implies him, but not another?
  Come and hear: “In all . . . you shall grant redemption” this is to include houses and Hebrew slaves. Surely that means houses in a walled city, and Hebrew slaves sold to Israelites? No; it means Hebrew slaves sold to non-Jews.
  But a Hebrew slave sold to a non-Jew is explicitly stated, “or his uncle, or his uncle's son, may redeem him?” (Leviticus 25:49).
  
  Daf 21b
  
  That is to make it an obligation, and even according to R. Joshua.
  Come and hear: Why does Scripture state, “He shall redeem him,” “he shall redeem him” “he shall redeem” three times? To include all cases of redemption, that they are to be redeemed in this order. Surely that refers to houses in walled cities and Hebrew slaves sold to Israelites? No, it was stated about houses in villages and ancestral fields. But about houses in villages and ancestral fields it is explicitly written, “they shall be classed as a field in the land” (Leviticus 25:31). R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: This comes to teach that the nearest relative comes first.
  He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring. As it is written, “then his master shall bore his ear through with an awl” (Exodus 21:6), etc.  
  And acquires himself by Jubilee or by his master's death. As it is written: “and he shall serve him”, but not his son or daughter; “for eternity” — until the eternity of the Jubilee.
  Our Rabbis taught: “[With] an awl”: I only know [that he can be bored with] an awl. From where do I include a sharp thorn, a thorn, a needle, a borer, or a stylus? From the verse, “You shall take,” (Deuteronomy 15:17) to include anything that may be taken by hand: the words of R. Yose son of R. Judah. 
  Rabbi said: Just as an awl is special, in that it is made of metal, so must anything [used for boring] be of metal. An alternative interpretation: “the awl” this comes to include a large awl.  
  R. Elazar said: Yudan b. Rabbi used to expound: When they bore, they only bore the lobe. But the Sages say: A Hebrew slave, [who is] a priest, cannot be bored, as he is thereby blemished; and should you say that the lobe is bored, how could they let a Hebrew slave who is a priest be blemished? Rather, he was bored through the upper part of his ear. What are they disputing about? 
  Rabbi interprets [by the method of] generalization and specification.  [Thus:] “You shall take” —is a generalization;   “an awl” —is a specification: “through his ear to the door” is again a generalization. Now [in a sequence of] generalization, specification and generalization, you can include only what is similar to the specification: just as the specification is explicit to be of metal, so must everything [used for boring the ear] be of metal.
  R. Yose interprets [by the method of] inclusions and exclusions. [Thus:] “You shall take”— is an inclusion;   “an awl” —is an exclusion; . . . “through his ear to the door” is again an inclusion. [A sequence of] inclusion, exclusion and inclusion comes to include everything.
  What is included? All instruments. And what is excluded? Chemicals.
  The Master said: “The awl” comes to include a large awl. How is this implied? As Rava said: “[Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sinew of the hip which is upon the hollow of] the thigh” the most important part of the thigh; so too here “the awl” implies the most important of awls.
  R. Elazar said: Yudan b. Rabbi used to expound: When they bore, they only bore the lobe. But the Sages say: A Hebrew slave, [who is] a priest, cannot be bored, as he is thereby blemished; and should you say that the lobe is bored, how could they let a Hebrew slave who is a priest be blemished? Then let him be blemished! Rabbah son of R. Shila said: The verse says, “And he shall return to his own family” (Leviticus 25:41):  to the status of his family.
  They asked a question: A Hebrew slave [who is] a priest — can his master give him a non-Jewish female slave? This is an innovation, and so there is no difference between priests and Israelites;
  or perhaps, priests are different, since the verse imposed on them additional mitzvot?  Rav said: It is permitted; Shmuel said: It is forbidden.
  R. Nahman said to R. Anan: When you were at Mar Shmuel's academy you wasted your time with tokens.
  Why did you not say back to him this: “But the Sages say: A Hebrew slave, a priest cannot be bored, as he is thereby blemished.” Now if you say that his master cannot give him a non-Jewish slave woman you could derive it from “I love my master, my wife and my children” (Exodus 21:5) which he cannot say. And nothing more can be said [against this].
  They asked: May a priest take “a beautiful woman” (captured in war)?   This is an innovative law and so there is no difference between priests and Israelites: or perhaps priests are different, since the verse imposed extra mitzvoth on them? Rav said: It is permitted; while Shmuel said: It is forbidden.
  With respect to the first intercourse all agree that it is permitted, since the Torah only allowed this due to man’s evil inclination; 
  They dispute only about the second intercourse. Rav said: It is permitted; and Shmuel said: It is forbidden. Rav said: It is permitted, once it was permitted once, it is permitted. Shmuel said: It is forbidden; for she is a convert, and a convert is ineligible to marry a priest.
  There are those who say that with respect to the second intercourse all agree that it is forbidden, since she is a convert. They dispute only about the first intercourse: Rav said, It is permitted, since the Torah only provided for man's evil inclination. Shmuel said: It is forbidden: In any case where I can read, “Then you shall bring her into your home” (Deuteronomy 21:12), I also read, “and you see her in captivity.” But in any case where I cannot read, “Then you shall bring her into your home” (Deuteronomy 21:12), I also cannot read, “and you see her in captivity.”
  Our rabbis taught: “And you see among the captives,” when taking her captive;  “a woman” — even married; “of beautiful appearance” — the Torah spoke against the evil inclination: it is better for Israel to eat flesh of [animals] about to die,
  
  Daf 22a
  
  yet [ritually] slaughtered, than eat flesh of dying animals which have died natural deaths;  “and you desire” — even if she is not beautiful; “her” — but not her and her companion;  
  “you shall take” you have the ability to marry her;  “as a wife for you,” that he must not take two women, one for himself and another for his father, or one for himself and another for his son: “then you shall bring her [into your house]” you may not engage with her (in sexual intercourse) on the field of battle.
  Our Rabbis taught: “But if the servant shall surely say” (Exodus 21:5); he must say and reiterate [it]. If he said [this] at the beginning of his six years but not at the end, he is not bored, for it says. “I will not go out free”: [hence] he must say it when about to depart.
  If he says it at the end of the six[th year], but not at the beginning, he is not bored, for it is said: “But if the slave shall surely say”: he must say it while still a slave.
  The Master said: “If he said [this] at the beginning of his six years but not at the end, he is not bored, for it says, ‘I will not go out free.’” Why specifically [learn this] from “I will not go out free”: deduce it because we require [that he can say]. “I love my master, my wife, and my children,” and this is not possible. 
  Furthermore, “if he says it at the end of the six[th year], but not at the beginning, he is not bored, for it is said . . . ‘the slave’”: is he then not a slave at the end of the sixth year? Rava said: [It means the following:] At the beginning of the last perutah’s worth of service, and at the end of the last perutah’s worth of service.
  Our Rabbis taught: If he has a wife and children, but his master has no wife and children, he may not be bored, for it is said, “Because he loves you and your house” (Deuteronomy 15:16). If his master has a wife and children, but he has no wife and children, he may not be bored, for it is said: “I love my master, my wife, and my children.”
  If he loves his master but his master does not love him, he may not be bored, for it is said: “because it goes well for him with you” (Deuteronomy 15:16). If his master loves him but he does not love his master, he may not be bored, for it is said: “because he loves you.” If he is unwell but his master is well, he may not be bored, for it is said, “because he is well with you.” If his master is unwell but he is not well, he may not be bored, for it is said, “with you.” 
  R. Bibi b. Abaye asked: What if both are unwell? Do we require, “with you” [to be applicable], and it is; or perhaps we require, “because he is well with you,” which we do not have? The question stands.
  Our Rabbis taught: “Because it goes well for him with you”: he must be with [i.e., equal to] you in food and drink, that you should not eat white bread and he black bread, you should not drink old wine and he new wine, you should not sleep on a feather bed and he on straw. From here it was said: Whoever buys a Hebrew slave is like one who buys a master for himself.
  Our Rabbis taught: “Then he shall leave you, he and his children with him” (Leviticus 25:41):   R. Shimon said: If he is sold, are his sons and daughters sold?   From here [we learn] that the master is liable for his children's sustenance. Similar to this: “If he is married, then his wife shall go out with him”: R. Shimon said: If he is sold, is then his wife sold? From here we learn that the master is responsible for his wife's maintenance.
  Now, both are necessary. For if he taught us [this] with regard to his children, [I would say] that this is because they cannot work for to provide their food and drink; but as for his wife, who can work to provide her food and drink, I would say: Let her work for her food.
  But if he taught us [this] with regard to his wife, that is because it is not her way to go begging; but as for his children, for whom it is the way to go begging, I might say: It is not so. Hence both are necessary. 
  Our Rabbis taught:
  
  Daf 22b
  
  His ear to the door, I would think, Let a hole be bored against his ear through the door; through the door, but not through the ear. 
  “But not through the ear!” Is it not written: “and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl” (Exodus 21:6). Rather, I would have said, the ear is to be bored outside and then placed on the door and a hole bored through the door opposite the ear:  Scripture says, “Through his ear to the door.” How so? He continues boring until he reaches the door. 
  “The door”: I would hear [from this,] whether it is removed [from its hinges] or not: therefore it is stated, “the doorpost”;  just as the doorpost must be standing, so must the door be standing.
  Rabban Yohanan b. Zakkai used to expound this verse as if it were a precious wreath.  Why was the ear different from all the other limbs of the body? The Holy One, blessed be He, said: This ear, which heard my voice on Mount Sinai when I proclaimed, “For to Me the children of Israel are slaves” (Leviticus 25:55), and not slaves to slaves, and yet this [man] went and acquired a master for himself  — let it be bored!
  R. Shimon b. Rabbi expounded this verse as if it were a precious wreath. Why are the door and doorpost different from all other parts of the house? The Holy One, blessed be He, said: The door and the doorpost, which were witnesses in Egypt when I passed over the lintel and the doorposts and proclaimed, “For to Me the children of Israel are slaves” (Leviticus 25:55), and not slaves to slaves, and yet this [man] went and acquired a master for himself — let him be bored in their presence! 
  A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, deed, or by possession, A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, deed, or by possession,
  GEMARA. How do we know this?  Because it is written: “And you shall pass them down as an inheritance for your children after you, to possess as an inheritance (ahuzah)” (Leviticus 25:46);  just as an ancestral field (ahuzah) is acquired by money, document or hazakah, so a non-Jewish slave is acquired by money, document, or hazakah.
  If so, just as an ancestral field reverts to its [original] owner at the Jubilee, so should a non-Jewish slave revert to his [former] owner at the Jubilee? Therefore it is stated, “you shall work them forever” (Leviticus 25:46).
  A Tanna taught: [He may be acquired] by halifin (symbolic barter) too. And our Tanna (why does he not include this)?  Something which is absent in the case of movable property he teaches; what is present in the case of movable property he does not teach.   
  Shmuel said: A non-Jewish slave may be acquired by meshikhah. How so? If he [the purchaser] seizes him [the slave] and he goes to him, he acquires him; if he [merely] calls him and he goes to him, he does not acquire him.
  It makes sense that our tanna [omitted meshikhah]: what is applicable to movable property he did not teach, but what is not applicable to movable property he did teach. But according to the outside Tanna, let him teach meshikhah? He teaches only what applies to both land and movable property, but meshikhah, which applies to movable property but not land, he does not teach.
   “How so? If he seizes him and he goes to him he acquires him; if he [merely] calls him and he goes to him, he does not acquire him.” But if he calls him [he does not acquire him]? Was it not taught: How [is an animal acquired] by transfer (mesirah)? If he grabs it by its hoof, hair, the saddle which is on it, the saddle-bag on it, the halter in its mouth, or the bell round its neck, he acquires it. 
  How [does one acquire] by drawing [meshikhah]? He calls it and it comes, or he strikes it with a stick and it runs before him, once it lifts a foreleg and a hindleg, he acquires it. Rabbi Assi and others say R. Aha said: It must walk its full length before him!
  Say an animal walks by its master's will; a slave walks on his own will. R. Ashi said: A slave who is a minor is like an animal.
  Our Rabbis taught: How [is a non-Jewish slave acquired] by hazakah? If he unties his shoes for him, or carries his clothese after him to the bathhouse; if he undresses, washes him, anoints, scrapes, dresses him, puts on his shoes, or lifts him, he acquires him. R. Shimon said: Let hazakah not be greater than lifting, for lifting acquires everywhere. What is he saying? 
  R. Ashi said: [The first Tanna implies,] if he [the slave] lifts his master, he acquires him; if his master lifts him, he does not acquire him. R. Shimon said: Hazakah should not be greater than lifting, for lifting acquires everywhere.  
  Now that you say that if he lifts his master he acquires him, if so, a non-Jewish slave woman should be acquired by intercourse? When do we say this, when one derives pleasure and the other pain; but here both derive pleasure. 
  Then what can be said of unnatural intercourse? R. Ahay b. Adda of Aha: Who can say that both do not derive pleasure? Moreover, it is written, “With the lyings of a woman” (Leviticus 18:22): thus the verse compared unnatural to natural intercourse.
  R. Judah the Indian was a convert who had no heirs. He fell sick and Mar Zutra went to check on his welfare. He saw that he was deathly ill. He said to his [R. Judah's] slave, “Take off his shoes and take them to my house.” Some say: He [the slave] was an adult:
  
  Daf 23a
  
  he [R. Judah] departed to death, and the other [the slave] departed [from his former master] to life.
  Others say: He was a minor, and this was not in accordance with Abba Shaul. For it was taught: If a convert dies [without heirs] and Jews plundered his property which includes slaves, whether adults or minors, they become free. Abba Shaul said: Adults become free, but as for minors, whoever takes possession of them gains a title to them.  
  And acquires himself by money etc. . . . by money through the agency of others, but not through his own. What are the precise circumstances? If we say without his [the slave's] knowledge, since we know that R. Meir maintains: It is to a slave's disadvantage to leave his master for freedom; and we learned: They may cause merit to a person in his absence, but they may not cause disadvantage.
  Rather it obviously means with his consent, and it teaches us: only through the agency of others [can he be freed,] but not through his own, Thus a slave cannot acquire things without his master.
  If so, cite the second clause: by document through his own agency: only through his own agency, but not through that of others. But if with his consent, why not through the agency of others?
  And should you say, what does it mean through his own agency? Even through his own agency, and it teaches us that his document [of emancipation] and his hand [i.e., the right to acquire for himself] come simultaneously. But it was not taught thus! For it was taught: By document through his own agency, but not that of others: the words of R. Meir?
  Abaye said: After all, [it means] without his knowledge. Yet money is different: since he [the master] may acquire him [the slave] against his will, he can free him against his will.
  If so, the same should apply to the document? This document is a separate issue and this document is a separate issue 
  But here too, this money is a separate issue and that money is a separate issue!  The stamp is nevertheless the same.
  Rava said: In the case of money, its receipt by the master effects it [his liberation]: but as for document, its receipt by others effects it.
  The sages say: by money through his own agency. By money through his own agency, but not through the agency of others? Why not? Granted that it is without his knowledge, but we know that the rabbis hold that it is to his advantage to go out from his master's authority to freedom, and we learned: One may cause merit to a person not in his presence, but one may not cause to disadvantage to a person except in his presence.
  And should you say, what does it mean through his own agency? Even through his own agency, and it teaches us that his document [of emancipation] and his hand [i.e., the right to acquire things for himself] come simultaneously. If so, what about the second clause: by document, through the agency of others, [implying] but not through his own: but we hold that his document and hand come simultaneously? 
  And should you say, what is the meaning of, through the agency of others? Even through the agency of others too, and it thus teaches us that it is to the slave's advantage to leave his master for freedom: if so, they should be combined and taught together: By money and by document through the agency of others or his own?
  Rather [it means this:] By money, both through the agency of others and through his own agency; by document, through the agency of others but not his own, and it is the opinion of R. Shimon b. Elazar. For it was taught: R. Shimon ben Elazar said: Even by document only through the agency of others, but not his own. Thus there are three differing opinions in the matter.
  Rabbah said: What is R. Shimon b. Elazar's reason? He derives the meaning of “lah” [to her] here from “lah” in the context of [married] woman: just as a woman [is not freed] until she takes the divorce document into a domain that is not his [her husband's], so a slave too [is not free] until he takes his deed [of emancipation] into a domain that is not his [the master's].
  Rabbah asked: 
  
  Daf 23b
  
  According to R. Shimon b. Elazar, can a Canaanite slave appoint an agent to receive his deed of emancipation from his master:  since he deduces “lah” “lah” from a woman [being divorced], he [the slave] is like woman:
  or perhaps, a woman, who can accept the divorce herself, can also appoint an agent; whereas a slave, who cannot accept his deed of emancipation himself, cannot appoint an agent either? After asking it, he solved it himself: We derive “lah,” “lah,” from a woman being divorced, [hence] he is like a woman.
  If so, when R. Huna son of R. Joshua said: These priests are agents of God, for should you think they are our agents, is there anything which we ourselves may not do while they may do [it on our behalf]?  
  But is there not? Behold there is a slave, who cannot accept his deed of manumission himself, can yet appoint an agent?
  But that analogy does not stand: an Israelite has no connection with the laws of sacrifices at all; whereas a slave has a connection with deeds of manumission. For it was taught: It seems correct that a slave can accept his fellow’s deed from his fellow’s master, but not from his own master.
  Providing that the money comes from others. Shall we say that they differ in this: R. Meir holds: A slave cannot acquire property independently of his master, nor a wife apart from her husband; whereas the Rabbis maintain, A slave can acquire independently of his master and a wife from her husband?
  Rabbah said in the name of R. Sheshet: All hold that a slave cannot acquire independently of his master, nor a wife of her husband. But what are we dealing with here? Where someone gave him a maneh, saying, “On condition that your master has no right to it.” 
  R. Meir holds: When he says to him, “Acquire [it,]” the slave acquires it and so does his master; and when he says to him, “on condition [etc.],” he says nothing. Whereas the Rabbis hold: Since he says, “on condition,” the stipulation is effective. 
  R. Elazar said: In such a case all agree that the slave acquires it and his master acquires it as well. What are we dealing with here? For instance a stranger gave him a maneh, saying: “On condition that with it you go free.” 
  R. Meir holds: When he says to him, “Acquire [it,]” the slave acquires it and so does his master; and when he says to him, “on condition [etc.],” he says nothing. Whereas the Rabbis hold: He did not give transfer ownership of it [even] to him [the slave], since he said to him, “On condition that with it you go free.”
  Now, cast R. Meir against himself, and the rabbis against themselves. For it was taught:
  
  
  Daf 24a
  
  Now, cast R. Meir against himself, and the rabbis against themselves. For it was taught: A woman cannot redeem second tithe without [adding] a fifth. R. Shimon b. Elazar said in the name of R. Meir: A woman can redeem second tithe without [adding] a fifth. Now, what is the case? 
  If we say, [she redeems it] with her husband's money, and it is her husband’s second tithe, then she is acting as her husband's agent. But if with her money and his tithe, the Torah said, 
  “[And if] a man [will redeem anything of his tithe, then he shall add to a fifth]” (Leviticus 27:31),  but not his wife? Rather it surely refers to a case such as this, where a stranger gave her a maneh, and said, “On condition that you redeem the tithe with it,” and thus we learn that they hold contrary opinions.   
  Abaye said: Then reverse them. Rava said: In the end you do not need to reverse them, but here it refers to tithe which came [to her] from her father's estate. R. Meir following his opinion that tithe is sacred property, so that her husband does not acquire it.
  The Rabbis follow their opinion that tithe is non-sacred property, and her husband acquires its usage. Therefore she is doing her husband’s agency.
  A Tanna taught: He [the Canaanite slave] goes out free through [the loss of] his eye, tooth, and projecting limbs which do not return. Now, as for [the loss of] his tooth or eye, it makes sense, for these are written. But how do we know [the loss of] the projecting limbs? They are similar to tooth and eye: just as these are exposed blemishes, and do not return, so too [he goes free for the loss of] all [limbs which are] exposed blemishes and do not return.
  But let us say that “tooth” and “eye” are two laws which come as one, and whenever two verses come as one, they do not teach about [other cases]. Both are necessary. For had the Torah written only “tooth” I would have said, 
  
  Daf 24b
  
  [it refers] even to a milk tooth;  therefore the Torah wrote eye. And had the Torah written “eye” I would have said, just as the eye is created with him [at birth], so all limbs [for which he would go free] must be created with him [iat birth], but not a tooth. Thus both are necessary.
  But let us say, “[And] if [a man] strike” this is general statement; “the tooth . . . the eye,” these are specific statements; in the case of a general statement followed by a specific one, the former includes only that contained in the latter: hence, only “tooth” and “eye” but nothing else!
  “He shall send him free” (Exodus 21:26) is another general statement. And in a sequence of general statement, followed by a specific example and then another general statement, you can include only what is similar to the specification: just as the specification is explicit that it is an exposed blemish that does not return, so to [he goes free for loss] for all exposed blemishes that do not return.
  If so, [say] that just as the specification is explicit as an exposed blemish, and it ceases to function, and does not return, so for all exposed blemishes, which cease to function, and do not return [the slave is freed]! Why [then] was it taught: If he [the master] plucked out his beard and thereby dislocates his [jaw.] bone, the slave goes free? “He shall let him go free” includes [something else]. But if it is an inclusion,
  even if he struck his hand and it withered, but it will ultimately heal, he should also [be freed]? Why was it taught: If he struck his hand and it withered, but it will ultimately heal, the slave does not go free? If so, of what use are “tooth” and “eye”? 
  Our Rabbis taught: On account of all these a slave goes free, and he needs a deed of emancipation, the words of R. Shimon. R. Meir said: He does not need one. R. Elazar said: He does need one. R. Tarfon said: He does not need one. R. Akiba said: He needs one. 
  Those who sought to make a decision before the Sages said: R. Tarfon's view is preferable in respect of tooth and eye, for the Torah merited him his freedom [on their account] and R. Akiba's view in respect of other limbs, since it is a fine [against the master] enacted by the Sages. “A fine”? [They derived this] from verses. Rather it is a midrash of the Sages.  
  What is R. Shimon's reason? He derives the meaning of “sending” here from “sending” in the case of a [married] woman: just as a woman [is sent forth] by deed, so is a slave too [sent forth] by deed. And R. Meir?  If “to freedom” had been written at the end [of the verse, it would be] as you say; now that it is written “to freedom shall he send him away” it implies that he is free at the very outset.   
  Our Rabbis taught: If he smites his eye and blinds it, [or] his ear, and deafens it, the slave goes out [to freedom] on their account; near his eye, so that he cannot see, [or] near his ear, and he cannot hear, the slave does not go out [free] on their account.
  R. Shemen said to R. Ashi: That is to say sound is nothing? But didn’t Rami b. Yehezkel teach: If a rooster stuck its head into the cavity of a glass vessel, and crowed there and broke it, he [its owner] must pay for it in full. And R. Yosef said: They said in the house of Rav: If a horse neighs or an ass brays and breaks utensils in a house, he [their owner] must pay for half the damage!  
  He said to him: A person is different since he is an intelligent being, he frightens himself. As it was taught: If one frightens his neighbor, he is exempt by the law of man, yet his liable by the law of Heaven. How so? If he makes a loud noise into his ear and deafens him, he is exempt; but if he seizes him, and makes a loud noise into his ear, and deafens him, he is liable.
  Our Rabbis taught: If he strikes his eye and it grows dim, his tooth, and loosens it: if he can still use them, the slave does not go out free on their account; if not, the slave goes out free on their account. It was taught in another baraita: If his eye was dim, and he blinds him, or his tooth was loose, and he knocks it out: if he could use them before, the slave goes out free on their account; if not, the slave does not go free on their account. 
  Now, both are necessary. For if he taught us only the first, [I would say] that is because his eyesight was originally sound and now it is weak; but here [in the second baraita], where at first his eyesight was already weak, I would say [that he does] not [go free].
  And if we were taught the second: that is because he completely blinds him; but there [in the first baraita] where he does not completely blind him, l would say [that he does] not [go free]. Hence both are necessary.
  Our Rabbis taught: If his master is a doctor and he asks him to paint his eye [with an ointment], and he blinds him, [or] to drill his tooth, and he knocks it out, he has played his master and he goes out free. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: “And destroys it” (Exodus 21:26) [the slave does not go free] unless he intends to destroy.
  And the Rabbis: How do they use “and he destroys it”? They need it for what was taught: R. Elazar says: If he inserts his hand in his maidservant’s womb and blinds the child within her, he is exempt [from sending the slave free].  What is the reason?  Because Scripture said: “and he destroy it” only when he intends to destroy it. 
  And the other?   From “and he destroy it’, [instead of] “and he destroy.” And the other? He does not derive meaning from “he destroy” [and] “he destroy it.”
  R. Sheshet said: If he has a blind eye and he [the master] removes it, the slave is freed on its account. What is the reason? He now lacks a limb.
  And a Tanna taught this: Unblemished and male sex are required in animals but not in birds. 
  I might think, [even] if its wing is withered, its foot cut off, or its eye plucked out [the bird is still fit]: Scripture says: “And if [the burnt offering be . . .] from birds” (Leviticus 1:14), but not all birds.
  R. Hiyya b. Ashi said in the name of Rav:
  
  Daf 25a
  
  and he [his master] cut if off, the slave goes out free. R. Huna said: Provided that it is counted as part of his hand. 
  The elders of Nizunia did not come to R. Hisda's study session. He (R. Hisda) said to R. Hamnuna: “Go put them under the ban.” He went and said to them, “Why did you not attend the session?” They said to him: Why should we attend, when we ask him questions which he cannot answer? He said back: “Have you ever asked me anything which I could not solve?”
  They asked him: A master who castrates his slave’s testicles, is it an open blemish or not? He did not have an answer. They said to him, “What is your name?” “Hamnuna,” he replied. They said back: You are not Hamnuna, but Karnuna. 
  When he came before R. Hisda, he said to him: They asked you a Mishnah. For we learned: As to the twenty-four tips of limbs of a man, none of them become unclean on account of unaffected skin.
  And these are they: the tips of the fingers of the hands and [the toes of] the feet, the tips of the ears, the tip of the nose, the tip of the penis, and the nipples of a woman. R. Judah said: Also those of a man. And it was taught about this: For [the loss of] all these a slave goes free. Rabbi said: For castration too. Ben Azzai said: [For] the [loss of the] tongue too.
  The master said: “Rabbi said: For castration too.” Castration of what? If we say: Castration of the member? But that is identical with the [loss of the] penis. Rather it means castration of the testicles.
  “Rabbi said: Castration too.” And Rabbi, [does] not [include] the tongue? But they raised the following as a contradiction. If he [a priest] is sprinkling, and it sprinkles on to his [the unclean man's] mouth: Rabbi said: He has [validly] sprinkled him; but the Sages say he has not validly sprinkled him.
  Does this not mean on his tongue? No: upon his lips. “Upon his lips!” but that is obvious? What might you have said? Sometimes his lips are tightly pressed together. Hence he teaches [that they are still regarded as exposed]. 
  But was it not taught: on his tongue? Moreover, it was taught: and if the greater length of the tongue was removed; Rabbi said: [even] the greater length of the speaking part of the tongue!
  Rather Rabbi said: Castration too and the tongue goes without saying Ben Azzai said: [The loss of the] tongue, but not castration. Then to what does “too” refer? To the first clause. If so, then why did he not put Ben Azzai’s statement first? 
  The Tanna [first] heard Rabbi's view and inserted it [in the teaching]; then he learned Ben Azzai's view and inserted it, while the teaching remained unchanged.
  Ulla said: All agree that the tongue is [considered] exposed when it comes to impurity by contact with a sheretz. What is the reason? The Torah said: “And whomever it touches” (Leviticus 15:5) and this too can be touched.
  Ulla said: All agree that the tongue is [considered] exposed when it comes to impurity by contact with a sheretz. What is the reason? The Torah said: “And whomever it touches” (Leviticus 15:5) and this too can be touched.
  They only argue in respect to sprinkling: Rabbi compares it to impurity, whereas the Rabbis compare it to immersing.
  And both differ on this verse: “And the pure person shall sprinkle upon the impure” (Numbers 19:19). Rabbi holds, [the verse reads thus:] “And the pure person shall sprinkle upon the impure on the third day, and on the seventh day and purify him.”   
  Whereas the rabbis hold, [the verse is read thus:] “and on the seventh day he shall purify him, and he shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water.”
  And the sages too: let it be compared with impurity? Purification should be learned from purification. And Rabbi: let it be compared with immersion? “And he shall wash his clothes” disconnects the subject. 
  Now, does Rabbi hold that it [the tongue] is considered concealed with regard to immersion? But did not Rabin say in the name of R. Adda in the name of R. Yitzchak: It once happened that a bondmaid of Rabbi's household immersed, came out [from the water], and a bone was found between her teeth, and Rabbi ordered her [to perform] a second immersion.
  Granted that we do not require the water to enter, we do require that there shall be room for it to enter.
  And it is in accordance with R. Zera, who said: Whatever is fit for mixing, the mixing is not indispensable; whatever is not fit for mixing, the mixing is indispensable.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  This is like a tannaitic dispute: “And that which is bruised, or crushed, or broken, or cut [you shall not offer unto the Lord]” (Leviticus 22:24) all these refer to the testicles, the words of  R. Judah.
  To the testicles and not to the penis!  Rather all these refer even to the testicles, the words of R. Judah. R. Eliezer b. Jacob said: They all refer to the penis. R. Yose said: “Bruised and crushed” refer even to the testicles, whereas “broken or cut” refer only to the penis but not to the testicles.
  Large animals are acquired by being handed over and small animals by lifting, the words of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar.  sages say: small animals are acquired by being led.
  GEMARA. Rav taught in Kimhunia: Large cattle are acquired by meshikhah. Shmuel found Rav’s students. He said to them: Did Rav rule that large cattle are acquired by meshikah? But didn’t we teach: “By mesirah,” and Rav too said by mesirah!  Did he then retract that statement. He ruled in accordance with this Tanna, as it was taught: But the Sages say, Both [large cattle and small] are acquired by meshikah. R. Shimon said: Both by lifting.
  R. Joseph raised a difficulty: If so, to R. Shimon, how could one acquire an elephant? Abaye said to him: By symbolic exchange. Alternatively, he rents its place.
  R. Zera said: He [the purchaser] brings four utensils and places them under its feet. Learn from this that when the purchaser's utensils are in the seller’s domain [and the object being sold is placed in them] the purchaser acquires them. What are we dealing with here? In an alley.    
  
  Daf 26a
  
  Alternatively, [this refers] to bundles of sticks.
  Property which has security is acquired by money, by deed or by possession. [Property] which does not have security is acquired only by being drawn [to the purchaser]. Property which does not have security may be acquired in conjunction with property which does have security by money, deed, or possession;
  And it obligates the property which provides security, to take an oath concerning them.
  GEMARA. By money: From where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: The verse says, “They shall acquire fields with money” (Jeremiah 32:44). GEMARA. By money: From where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: The verse says, “They shall acquire fields with money” (Jeremiah 32:44).
  Rav said: They taught this only of a place where they do not write a deed; but in a place where they do write a deed, money alone does not acquire. Yet if he [the purchaser] explicates [that he is buying without a deed], it is valid. 
  Like R. Idi b. Abin who when he would sell land used to say: “If I wish, I acquire it by money; if I wish, I acquire it by deed.”  “If I wish, I acquire it by money,” so that if you want to retract [after I have paid], you cannot. “And if I wish, I acquire it by deed,” so that if I want to retract, I can.
  And by deed. From where do we know this? If we say, because it is written, “And write [the transaction] in a scroll, and seal it, and have witnesses testify” (Jeremiah 32:44), but didn’t you just say that this deed is merely evidence? And by deed. From where do we know this? If we say, because it is written, “And write [the transaction] in a scroll, and seal it, and have witnesses testify” (Jeremiah 32:44), but didn’t you just say that this deed is merely evidence? Shmuel said: This was taught only of a deed of gift. But in the case of sale, he does not acquire until the money is paid.
  R. Hamnuna objected: By deed: How so? If he [the seller] writes for him [the buyer] on paper or a shard, even if worth less than a perutah, “My field is sold to you,” “my field is given to you,” it is sold or given! He raised the objection and he resolved it: This refers to one who sells his field because of its poor quality.
  R. Ashi said: He wanted to give it to him as a gift; why then did he write it as a sale? In order to strengthen his rights to it.
  And by hazakah. From where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: The verse says, “And dwell in the cities that you have seized” (Jeremiah 40:10): How did you seize them? By dwelling therein. The School of R. Ishmael taught: “And you shall possess it, and dwell therein” (Deuteronomy 11:31): How did you possess it? By dwelling therein. 
  [Property] which does not have security is acquired only by being drawn [to the purchaser] (meshikhah).  From where do we know this? Because it is written, “And if you sell an article to your neighbor, or buy from your neighbor’s hand” (Leviticus 25:14), an article is acquired [by passing] from hand to hand.
  But according to R. Yohanan, who said, By Biblical law, money acquires, what can be said? The Tanna teaches a rabbinical enactment.
  Property which does not provide security [may be acquired in conjunction with property which does have security by money, deed, or possession]. From where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: For the verse says, “And their father gave them gifts . . . with walled cities in Judah.”
  Property which does not provide security [may be acquired in conjunction with property which does have security by money, deed, or possession]. From where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: For the verse says, “And their father gave them gifts . . . with walled cities in Judah.”
  
  Daf 26b
  
  and [is fit] for a prosbul to be written on it, and to buy with it property which does not provide security. And if you say: They must be heaped on it, for what is a very small piece of land fit?
  R. Shmuel b. Bisna explained it in front of R. Joseph: For example, he stuck a needle on it. R. Joseph said to him. You are bothering us! Would the tanna trouble to teach us about a needle! R. Ashi said: How do we know that he did not suspend a pearl on it, worth a thousand zuz? 
  Come and hear: R. Elazar said: It once happened that a certain Madonite was in Jerusalem and had a large quantity of movables, which he wanted to give away as a gift. They told him he had no other means but to transfer them along with land. What did he do? He went and bought a bet sela’s worth of land near Jerusalem and declared: “The north of this belongs to So-and-so, and together with it go a hundred sheep and a hundred barrels.”  When he died, they upheld his word.
  But if you say: They [the movables] must be heaped up thereon, for what is beth sela’ fit? Do you think that by “bet sela” literally means a sela [coin]? What is “sela”? A large area; and why was it called sela? Because it was as hard as a rock.
  Come and hear: For Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: It once happened that a certain man who fell ill in Jerusalem (that is in accordance with the view of R. Eliezer) and others state, he was in good health, (in accordance with the view of the rabbis)
  and he had a large quantity of movables which he desired to give as a gift. They said to him that he had no other option but to transfer it along with land. What did he do? He went and purchased [a field] a quarter [a kav] near Jerusalem and declared: “Let a square handbreadth belong to So-and-so, and with it go a hundred sheep and a hundred barrels.”  On his death, the Sages confirmed his testimony. Now, if you say that they [the movables] must be heaped on the land, for what is a square handbreadth fit?
  What are we dealing with here? With money. This is also reasonable, for should you think that a hundred sheep and a hundred barrels are meant literally, he should have transferred them by exchange! 
  What then was it, money? Then he could have transferred it to him by meshikah? But [it must mean] that the recipient is absent; then here too, it means that the recipient is absent.
  Then he should have transferred it to him by another? He was not reliant on another, fearing that the other would steal and consume it.
  Then what does it mean “he had no other option”? This is what it means: in view [of the fact] that he was not reliant on the stranger, there is no other course but to transfer through land.
  Come and hear: Rabban Gamaliel and some elders were once travelling in a ship. Rabban Gamaliel said to the elders, “The tithe which I in the future will measure out
  
  Daf 27a
  
  will be given to Joshua, and its place [where it is lying] is rented to him; and the other tenth which I am to measure out, let it be given to Akiva b. Joseph, that he shall acquire it on behalf of the poor,  and its place be rented to him.” This proves that they must be heaped on it. [No:] there it was different, for he did not wish to trouble them.
  Come and hear: That Rava bar Yitzchak said in the name of Rav: There are two [different kinds of] deeds. [If one declares,] “Acquire this field on behalf of So-and-so, and write a deed for him,” he can retract from the deed but not from the field. [But if he stipulates,] “On condition that you write a deed for him,” he can retract from both the deed and the field.  
  R. Hiyya b. Abin said in the name of R. Huna: There are three [kinds of] deeds. Two that we just stated. The other one: If the seller before [payment] writes a deed for him [the buyer], in accordance with what we learnt: A deed may be written for the seller even though the buyer is not with him, then as soon as he takes possession of the land, the deed is acquired wherever it is.
  This proves that they need not be heaped up on it! A deed is different, as it is the bit of the land. 
  But was it not taught about this: This is [an example of] what we learned, Property which does not have security may be acquired in conjunction with property which does have security by money, deed, or possession. This proves that they need not be heaped up on it! This proves it.
  The question was asked: Do we require [the seller to say] “by means of [the land] or not? Come and hear: For all these [cases] are taught, and yet “by means of” is not mentioned.
  And according to your reasoning did it teach “Let him acquire it”? Rather, [it is not valid] until he says: “Acquire it,” then here too, [it is not valid] until only he says: “By means of.” Now, the law is: they need not be heaped on it; “Acquire it,” and “by means of” are required.  
  The question was asked: What if the field is sold and the movables are given as a gift? Come and hear: “The tithe which I in the future will measure out will be given to Joshua, and its place [where it is lying] is rented to him.” Learn from it.
  The question was asked: What if the field is sold and the movables are given as a gift? Come and hear: “The tithe which I in the future will measure out will be given to Joshua, and its place [where it is lying] is rented to him.” Learn from it. Come and hear: “The other tenth which I am to measure out, let it be given to Akiva b. Joseph, that he shall acquire it on behalf of the poor, and its place be rented to him.”
  [No]. What does it mean by “rented”? Rented for the tithe.  Alternatively, R. Akiva was different, for he was the hand of the poor. 
  Rava said: This was taught only if he [the purchaser] paid the money for them all. But if he did not pay the money for them all, he acquires only to the extent of his money.
  It was taught in agreement with Rava. The power of money is superior to that of a deed, and the power of a deed is superior to that of money. The power of money is superior in that sacred property and the second tithe are redeemed with it, which is not so in the case of deed. And the power of a deed is superior, for a deed can free an Israelite daughter, which is not so in the case of money.
  And the power of both is superior to that of hazakah (ownership by assumption), and the power of hazakah is superior to that of both. The power of both is superior in that both acquire a Hebrew slave, which is not so in the case of hazakah. And the power of hazakah is superior to that of both: For with hazakah, if A sells B ten fields in ten countries, as soon as B takes possession of one, he acquires all.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  When is this? If he has paid him for all; but if he has not paid the money for all, he gains a title only to the extent of his money. This supports Shmuel. For Shmuel said: If A sells B ten fields in ten countries, as soon as B takes possession of one, he acquires them all.
  R. Aha son of R. Ika said: Know, that if he delivered him ten cows [tied] by one cord, and said to him, “Acquire them” would he not acquire them [all]? He said to him: Is it the same?  There the tie is in his hand, whereas here the tie is not in his hand.
  There are those who say R. Aha son of R. Ika said: Know that he does not acquire [them all] for if he delivered him ten cows [tied] by one cord and said to him, “Acquire this one”: would he acquire them all?
  Is this the same? There they are separate entities; but here, the earth is one mass.
  And it obligates the property etc. Ulla said: How do we derive [the law of] the extension of the oath from the Torah?
  Because it is said: “And the woman shall say: ‘Amen, Amen’” (Numbers 5:22).  And we taught: To what does she say: Amen, Amen? Amen to the curse, Amen to the oath, Amen that [she was] not [unfaithful] by this man, Amen that [she was] not [unfaithful] by any other man. Amen that I did not stray as a betrothed wife, or a married wife, or when waiting for the yavam, or when married through levirate marriage.
  And it obligates the property etc. Ulla said: How do we derive [the law of] the extension of the oath from the Torah? Because it is said: “And the woman shall say: ‘Amen, Amen’” (Numbers 5:22).  And we taught: To what does she say: Amen, Amen? Amen to the curse, Amen to the oath, Amen that [she was] not [unfaithful] by this man, Amen that [she was] not [unfaithful] by any other man. Amen that I did not stray as a betrothed wife, or a married wife, or when waiting for the yavam, or when married through levirate marriage.
  But if it means that he warned her as a betrothed woman, and she secluded herself [with the man against whom she was warned] likewise when she was betrothed, 
  and he makes her drink when she was married, can the water test her? Surely Scripture said: “And the man shall be free from iniquity” (Numbers 5:31) [which means,] when the husband himself is free from sin, water tests his wife; if the husband himself is not free from sin, water cannot test his wife! 
  Hence [it is possible only] by means of the extension of an oath.
  Now, we have found this [an oath extension] in the case of sotah, which is a prohibition. How do we know the same is true in monetary law? The School of R. Ishmael taught: This is a kal vehomer: if we extend [an oath] in the case of a sotah,
  
  Daf 28a
  
  though it [the oath] cannot be demanded of her on the evidence of one witness; then in the case of a monetary claim, where a demand [for an oath] can be made on the evidence of one witness, it surely follows that we can extend [an oath].
  Now, we have thus learned this of a certain claim; how do we know it of a case of doubt?  
  It was taught: R. Shimon b. Yohai said: An oath was stated outside [the Temple],  and an oath was stated within [the Temple]: just as in the case of the oath stated within, doubt was made equal to certainty; so too in the case of the oath stated without, doubt was made equal to certainty. 
  How far does the oath extension [go]? Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: [Even] if he demands of him, “Swear to me that you are not my slave.”
  How far does the oath extension [go]? Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: [Even] if he demands of him, “Swear to me that you are not my slave.”
  Rather Rava said: [He may demand of him:] “Swear to me that you were not sold to me as a Hebrew slave.” But that is a proper claim? He [is claiming that] he owes him money!  Rava follows his own view. For Rava said: A Hebrew slave belongs bodily [to his master].
  If so, it is the equivalent of land? I might have thought, only land is it usual for people to sell secretly: had he sold it, it would not be generally known; but as for this, had he sold himself, it would have been known.
  Therefore he teaches us [that it is not so].
  Whatever can be used as payment for another object, as soon as this one takes possession [of the object], the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, as soon as this one takes possession, the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange.
  GEMARA. What is the barter? Money! Learn from this that coin can become [an object of] barter. Rav Judah said: This is what it means: Whatever is assessed as the value of another object,
  
  Daf 28b
  
  as soon as one party takes possession, the other assumes liability for what is given in exchange. This can also be derived from a precise reading in the mishnah: “How so? If one barters an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox.” This proves it.
  Now, with regard to that which you thought, that coin can become an object of barter, what is meant by the “How so”?  This is what it means: And produce too can effect a barter. How so? If one barters the meat of ox for a cow, or the meat of donkey for an ox, as soon as one party takes possession, the other assumes liability for what is given in exchange.
  Now, this agrees with R. Sheshet, whosaid: Produce can effect barter. But to R. Nahman, who holds that produce cannot effect barter, what can be said?
  This is what it means: Money sometimes counts as [an object of] barter. How so? If one barters the money of an ox for a cow, or the money of an ass for an ox. 
  What is the reason? He agrees with R. Yohanan, who said: From the Torah, money effects acquisition. Why then did they say that only meshikhah acquires? As a decree lest he say to him, “Your wheat was burnt in the loft.”
  Now, the Rabbis enacted a preventive measure only for a usual occurrence, but not for an unusual occurrence. 
  Now, according to Resh Lakish, who holds that meshikhah is explicitly required by biblical law: it is well if he agrees with R. Sheshet, who rules [that] produce can effect a barter; then he can explain it as R. Sheshet.
  But if he holds like R. Nahman, that produce cannot effect a barter, and money does not acquire [at all], how can he explain it? You are forced to say that he agrees with R. Sheshet. 
  The sanctuary’s title to property [is acquired] by money; the title of an ordinary person’s property by hazakah. Dedication to the sanctuary is equal to delivery to an ordinary person.
  GEMARA. Our rabbis taught: How does the Sanctuary [acquire] by money? If the [Temple] treasurer pays money for an animal, even if the animal is at the end of the world, he acquires it; whereas an ordinary person does not acquire it until he performs meshikhah.
  How is dedication to the Sanctuary equal to delivery to an ordinary person? If one declares, “This ox will be a burnt-offering” or “This house be sacred,” even if they are at the end of the world it [the Temple] acquires them; whereas an ordinary person gains no title 
  
  Daf 29a
  
  until he performs meshikhah or hazakah. If one [an ordinary person] performs meshikhah with it when it is worth a maneh, but has no time to redeem it [pay the money] until it rises to two hundred [zuz,] he must pay two hundred. What is the reason? “Then he shall pay the money, and it shall be assured to him” (Leviticus 27:17). 
  If he performs meshikhah when it is worth two hundred and has no time to redeem it until it falls to a maneh, he must pay two hundred. What is the reason? The rights of an ordinary person should not be stronger than those of hekdesh. 
  If he redeems it when it is worth two hundred, and has no time to perform meshikhah before it falls to a maneh, he must pay two hundred.  What is the reason? “Then he shall pay the money, and it shall be assured to him.” If he redeems it at a maneh, and has no time to perform meshikah before it rises to two hundred, what he has redeemed is redeemed, and he pays only a maneh. 
  Why? Here too, let us say: The rights of an ordinary person should not be stronger than those of hekdesh?
  Is an ordinary person not subject [to the curse,] “He who punished [etc.]?”
  All obligations of the son upon the father, men are obligated, but women are exempt. But all obligations of the father upon the son, both men and women are obligated. All positive, time-bound commandments, men are obligated and women are exempt. But all positive non-time-bound commandments both men and women are obligated.
  And all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, both men and women are obligated, except for, the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard], and the prohibition [for a priest] to become impure through contact with the dead.
  GEMARA. What is the meaning of “all obligations of the son upon the father”? If we say, “all commandments the son must perform for his father”? Are then women [i.e., daughters] exempt? But was it not taught: “Every man,” his mother and his father shall you fear]” (Leviticus 19:3). “Every man:” I know this only of a man; from where do I know it of a woman? When it is said: “Every man, his mother and his father shall you fear: behold, two are [mentioned] here. 
  Rav Judah said: This is the meaning: “All obligations of the son which lie upon the father to do to his son, men are obligated, but women [mothers] are exempt. 
  We have taught this, as the Rabbis taught: The father is obligated in respect of his son, to circumcise him, redeem him, teach him Torah, find a wife for him, and teach him a craft. Some say, to teach him to swim too. R. Judah said: He who does not teach his son a craft, teaches him banditry. “Banditry”! Do you really think so! Rather it is as though he taught him banditry.
  “To circumcise him.” How do we know this? As it is written: “And Abraham circumcised his son Yitzchak” (Genesis 21:4). And if his father did not circumcise him, the court is obligated to circumcise him, as it is written: “Every male among you shall be circumcised” (Genesis 17:10). And if the court did not circumcise him, he is obligated to circumcise himself, as it is written: “And the uncircumcised male who will not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, he shall be cut off” (Genesis 17:14).
  How do we know that she [the mother] is not obligated? As it is written, “[And Abraham circumcised his son . . .] as God had commanded him” (Genesis 21:4): “him,” but not “her” [the mother].
  Now, we find that this was an obligation at that time; how do we know it for all times?   — The School of R. Ishmael taught: Whenever “command” is stated, its only purpose is to exhort for then and all time.   
  To exhort: As it is written, “But command Joshua, and strengthen him, and give him bravery” (Deuteronomy 15:23). Then and for all time, as it is written, “From the day that the Lord commanded, and onward throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:23). 
  “To redeem him.” How do we know this? Because it is written, “And all of your firstborn sons you shall redeem” (Exodus 34:20). And if his father did not redeem him, he is obligated to redeem himself, for it is written, “You shall surely redeem” (Numbers 18:15). 
  And how do we know that she [his mother] is not obliged [to redeem him]? Because it is written, “You shall [tifdeh]” [which may also be read] “You shall be redeemed [tippadeh]”: one who is obligated to redeem oneself is obligated to redeem others; whereas one who is not obligated to redeem oneself is not obligated to redeem others. 
  And how do we know that she is not obligated to redeem herself? Because it is written, “You shall redeem [tifdeh],” [which may be read] “You shall be redeemed” the one whom others are commanded to redeem is commanded to redeem oneself: the one whom others are not commanded to redeem is not commanded to redeem oneself.  And how do we know that others are not commanded to redeem her? Because the verse said, “And all of your firstborn sons you shall redeem” “your sons”, but not your daughters. 
  Our Rabbis taught: If he has himself to redeem and his son to redeem, he takes precedence over his son. R. Judah said: His son takes precedence over him, for the commandment in respect to him (the son) lies [primarily] upon his father, whereas that concerning his son lies [primarily] upon himself.
  R. Yirmiyah said: All agree
  
  Daf 29b
  
  that if only five sela’s are available, he takes precedence over his son. What is the reason? A commandment affecting his own person is more important. They differ when there are five sela’s of encumbered property and five sela’s free. 
  R. Judah holds: A debt decreed in Scripture is as one written in a document:  hence, with these five sela’s [that are free] he redeems his son, while the kohen goes and seizes the five encumbered sela’s [worth] on account of himself [the father].
  But the Rabbis hold, A debt decreed in Scripture is not as one written in a document; therefore a commandment affecting his own person is more important.  
  Our Rabbis taught: If one has his son to redeem and the duty of making the Festival pilgrimage, he must [first] redeem his son and then make the Festival pilgrimage. R. Judah said: He must first make the Festival pilgrimage and then redeem his son, for the one is a passing commandment whereas the other is not a passing commandment.
  As for R. Judah, it is well, for he states the reason. But what is the reason of the Rabbis? Because the verse states: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem,” and then it says, “and none shall appear before me empty-handed” (Exodus 34:20).
  Our Rabbis taught: How do we know that if one has five [firstborn] sons by five wives, he is obligated to redeem them all? From the verse: “All the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem.” But that is obvious, [since] the Torah made it dependent upon the opening of the womb? 
  I might have argued, Let us learn the meaning of “firstborn” here from inheritance.  Just as there, “the beginning of his strength” [is meant], so here too; therefore he teaches us [that it is not so].
  “To teach him Torah.” How do we know this? As it is written, “And you shall teach them your sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19). And if his father did not teach him, he must teach himself, as it is written, “And you shall study.”
  How do we know that she [the mother] is not obligated [to teach her children]? Because it is written, “velimadetem [and you shall teach],” [which also can be read] “ulemadetem [and you shall study]:” whoever is commanded to study, is commanded to teach; whoever is not commanded to study, is not commanded to teach.
  And how do we know that she is not obligated to teach herself? Because it is written, “velimadetem [and you shall teach],” [which also can be read] “ulemadetem [and you shall study]:” the one whom others are commanded to teach is commanded to teach oneself; and the one whom others are not commanded to teach, is not commanded to teach oneself. How then do we know that others are not commanded to teach her? Because it is written: “And you shall teach them your sons,” but not your daughters.
  Our Rabbis taught: If he has himself to teach and his son to teach, he takes precedence over his son. R. Judah said: If his son is industrious, bright, and can retain his learning, his son takes precedence over him. Like the story of R. Ya’akov, son of R. Aha b. Ya’akov, was once sent by his father [to study] under Abaye. On his return he [his father] saw that his learning was not so sharp. He said to him: “I am better than you. You stay here, so that I can go.”
  Abaye heard that he was coming. There was a certain demon that haunted Abaye’s schoolhouse, so that when [only] two entered, even by day, they were injured. He [Abaye] said, “Let no man give him a place to stay, perhaps a miracle will happen.”
  So he [R. Aha b. Ya’akov] entered and spent the night in that schoolhouse, during which it [the demon] appeared to him in the guise of a seven-headed dragon. Every time he [the R. Ya’akov] fell on his knees [in prayer] one head fell off. The next day he said to them: “Had not a miracle occurred, you would have endangered my life.”
  Our Rabbis taught: If one has to study Torah and to marry a wife, he should first study and then marry. But if he cannot [live] without a wife, he should first marry and then study. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah is: [A man] first marries and then studies.
  R. Yohanan said: [With] a millstone around the neck, shall one study Torah! But they do not disagree: the one refers to ourselves [Babylonians]; the other to them [Israelis].
  R. Hisda praised R. Hamnuna in front of R. Huna as a great man. He said to him, “When he visits you, bring him to me.” When he arrived, he saw that he wore no head-covering. He said to him:  “Why do you not have a head-covering?” He replied, “Because I am not married.” Thereupon he [R. Huna] turned his face away from him. He said to him, “See to it that you do not appear before me [again] before you are married.” 
  R. Huna followed his own reasoning. For he said: He who is twenty years of age and is not married spends all his days in sin. “In sin” do you really think so? Rather say: He spends all his days in sinful thoughts.
  Rava said, and so too the School of R. Ishmael taught: Until the age of twenty, the Holy One, blessed be He, sits and waits. When will he take a wife? As soon becomes twenty and has not married, He exclaims, “Blast his bones!”
  R. Hisda said: The reason that I am superior to my colleagues is that I married at sixteen. And had I married at fourteen,
  
  Daf 30a
  
  I would have said to Satan, “An arrow in your eye.” Rava said to R. Nathan b. Ammi: While your hand is still upon your son's neck, [marry him off], between sixteen and twenty-two. Others state, Between eighteen and twenty-four. 
  This is like a tannaitic dispute. “Educate a youth in the way he should go” (Proverbs 22:6):  R. Judah and R. Nehemiah: One holds: Between sixteen and twenty-two; the other holds: Between eighteen and twenty-four.
  To what extent is a man obliged to teach his son Torah? Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: Like Zevulun, the son of Dan, whom his grandfather taught Mikra [Scripture], Mishnah, Talmud, halakhot and aggadot. They objected: If he [his father] taught him Mikra, he need not teach him Mishnah; And Rava said: Mikra means Torah.  
  Like Zevulun b. Dan, yet not altogether like Zevulun b. Dan, whom his grandfather taught: and not like Zevulun b. Dan, for whereas there [he was taught] Mikra, Mishnah, Talmud, halakhoth and aggadoth, whereas here Mikra alone [suffices].
  Now, is the grandfather obligated? Was it not taught: “And you shall teach them to your sons, but not your sons’ sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19). How then do I fulfill [the verse], “And you shall make them known to your sons, and your sons’ sons” (Deuteronomy 4:9)?  This is to teach you that anyone who teaches his son Torah, the Torah ascribes merit to him as though he had taught him, his son and his son's son until the end of all time!   
  He agrees with the following Tanna. For it was taught: “And you shall teach them to your sons”: I only know, your sons. How do I know your sons’ sons? From the verse: “you shall make them known to your sons, and your sons’ sons.” If so, why state, “your sons”? To teach: “your sons, but not your daughters.”
   R. Joshua b. Levi said: He who teaches his grandson Torah, the Torah regards him as though he had received it [direct] from Mount Sinai, for it is said; “And you shall make them known to your sons and your sons’ sons” which is followed by, “the day that you stood before the Lord your God in Horeb” (Deuteronomy 4:10).
  R. Hiyya b. Abba found R. Joshua b. Levi wearing a cheap cloth on his head and taking a child to the synagogue [for study]. He said to him, “What is the meaning of all this?” He replied, “Is it then a small thing, that it is written: ‘And you shall make them known to your sons and your sons’ sons’; which is followed by, ‘That is the day that you stood before the Lord your God in Horeb’”? From then onwards R. Hiyya b. Abba did not taste meat before reading with a child and adding [to the previous day’s lesson]. Rabbah son of R. Huna did not taste meat until he took the child to the bet midrash.
  R. Safra said in the name of R. Joshua b. Hanania: What is it that is written, “And you shall teach them diligently [ve-shinnantem] to your children” (Deuteronomy 6:7)?  Do not read ve-shinnantem, but Ve-shillashtem: [you shall divide into three].
  One should always divide his years into three: [devoting] a third to Mikra, a third to Mishnah, and a third to Talmud. Does one then know how long he will live? This refers only to days.
  The early [rabbis] were called soferim because they used to count all the letters of the Torah. Thus, they said, the vav in “gahon” (Leviticus 11:42) marks half the letters of the Torah; “Darosh darash,”(Leviticus 10:16) half the words; “Vehitgalah,” (Leviticus 13:33) half the verses. “The boar out of the wood [mi-ya'ar] ravages it” (Psalms 80:14), the ayin of “ya'ar” marks half of Psalms. “But he, being full of compassion, forgives their iniquity” (Psalms 74:38), half the verses.
  R. Joseph asked: Does the vav of gahon belong to the first half or the second? They said to him, Let’s bring a Sefer Torah and we will count them! Did not Rabbah b. Bar Hanah say, They did not move from there they brought a Sefer Torah and they counted them? He said to them: They were experts in defective and full readings but we are not.
  R. Joseph asked: Does vehitgalah belong to the first half or the second? Abaye said to him, For the verses, at least, we can bring [a Scroll] and count them! In the verses too we are not experts. For when R. Aha b. Adda came, he said: In the West [Eretz Yisrael] they divide the following verse into three: “And the Lord said to Moses, behold I come to you in a thick cloud, [that the people may hear when I speak with you, and may also believe you forever; And Moses told the words of the people to the Lord]” (Exodus 19:9).
  Our Rabbis taught: There are five thousand, eight hundred and eighty-eight verses in the Torah; the Psalms exceed this by eight; while Chronicles are less by eight.
  Our Rabbis taught: “And you shall teach them diligently” (Deuteronomy 6:7)   [this means] that the words of the Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if anyone asks you something, you should not stutter and then answer him, but [be able to] answer him immediately,
  
  
  Daf 30b
  
  for it is said, “Say unto wisdom, You are my sister” (Proverbs 7:4); and it says, “Bind them on your fingers; write them upon the table of your heart” (Proverbs 7:3); and it also says: “As arrows are in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of your youth” (Psalms 127:4); and it also says, “Sharp arrows of the mighty” (Psalms 45:6); and it also says: “Your arrows are sharp; the peoples fall under you” (Psalms 45:6); and it also says: “Happy is the man that has his quiver full of them; They shall not be ashamed, when they speak with their enemies in the gate” (Psalms 127:5).
  What is meant by “with their enemies in the gate”? R. Hiyya b. Abba said: Even father and son, master and disciple, who study Torah at the same gate become enemies of each other. Yet they do not move from there until they come to love each other, for it is written, “[Therefore it is said it, the book of the wars of the Lord,] vahav besufah” (Numbers 21:14); read not “besufah” but “besofah.”
  Our Rabbis taught: “Vesamtem” (Deuteronomy 11:18) [read] sam tam [a perfect drug]. This may be compared to a man who struck his son a strong blow, and then put a plaster on his wound, saying to him, “My son! As long as this plaster is on your wound you can eat and drink at will, and bathe in hot or cold water, without fear. But if you remove it, it will break out into sores.”
  So too did the Holy One, blessed be He, speak unto Israel: “My children! I created the Evil Desire, but I [also] created the Torah, as its antidote; if you occupy yourselves with the Torah, you will not be delivered into his hand, for it is said: “If you do well, shall you not be exalted” (Genesis 4:7)?
  But if you do not occupy yourselves with the Torah, you shall be delivered into his hand, for it is written, “Sin crouches at the door”.  Moreover, all of his occupation is with you [to make you sin], for it is said, “And to you shall be his desire.” Yet if you will, you can rule over him, for it is said, “And you shall rule over him.”
  Our Rabbis taught: The Evil Inclination is difficult since even his Creator called him evil, as it is written, “The inclination of man's heart is evil from his youth” (Genesis 8:21). R. Yitzchak said: A person’s Evil Inclination renews itself daily against him, as it is said, “It is only evil every day” (Genesis 6:5).   
  And R. Shimon b. Levi said: A person’s Evil Inclination gathers strength against him daily and seeks to slay him, for it is said: “The wicked watches the righteous, and seeks to slay him” (Psalms 37:32); and were not the Holy One, blessed be He, to help him, he would not be able to prevail against him, for it is said: “The Lord will not leave him in his hand.”
  The School of R. Ishmael taught: My son, if this scoundrel attacks you, drag him to the Bet Midrash: if he is of stone, he will dissolve; if iron, he will shatter [into fragments], for it is said: “‘Is not my word like fire?’ says the Lord, ‘and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?” (Jeremiah 23:29). If he is of stone, he will dissolve, for it is written: “Ho, everyone that thirsts, come to the water” (Isaiah 55:1); and it is said: “The waters wear out the stones” (Job 14:19).
  “To marry him off to a wife.” From where do we know this? Because it is written: “Take wives, and give birth to sons and daughters; and take wives for your sons, and give your daughters to husbands” (Jeremiah 29:6).
  As for [marrying] his son, it is well, for it is within his capacity; but with respect to his daughter, is it within his capacity? This is what it should say: Let him give her [a dowry], clothe her and adorn her, that men should be eager to marry her.
   “To teach him a craft.” From where do we know this? Hizkiyah said: For the verse says, “See to a livelihood with the wife whom you love” (Kohelet 9:9). If “wife” is literal, [this teaches,] that just as he [the father] is obligated to take a wife for him, so is he obligated to teach him a craft [for a livelihood]; if it is [a metaphor for] Torah, then just as he is obligated to teach him Torah, so is he obligated to teach him a craft. 
  “And some say, [He must teach him] to swim in the river too.” What is the reason? — His life may depend on it. 
  “R. Judah said: He who does not teach him a craft teaches him banditry.” “Banditry”! Do you really think so? 
  Rather it is like teaching him banditry. What do they differ about? They differ when he teaches him business.
  But all obligations of the father upon the son etc.: What is meant by “All obligations of the father upon the son?” If we say: all mitzvot which the father is obligated to perform for his son — are women obligated? But was it not taught: “The father is obligated in respect of his son, to circumcise and redeem him”: only the father, but not the mother? 
  Rav Judah said: This is what it means: All mitzvot concerning a father, which fall on a son to perform for his father, both men and women are obligated. We have already taught this, for our Rabbis taught: “A man [shall fear his father, and his mother]” (Leviticus 19:3) “a man” I know this only of man; how do I know it of a woman? When it is said: “You (pl.) shall fear,” two are mentioned. 
  If so, why does Scripture state “man”? A man has the means to fulfill this, but a woman does not have the means to fulfill this, because she is under the authority of others. R. Idi b. Abin said in the name of Rav: If she is divorced, both are equal.    
  Our Rabbis taught: It is said: “Honor you father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12); and it is also said: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9): thus the verse compares the honor due to parents to the honor due to God. 
  It is said: “Every man shall fear his father, and his mother” (Leviticus 19:3); and it is also said: “The Lord your God you shall fear, and him you shall serve” (Deuteronomy 6:13);   thus the verse compares the fear due to parents to the fear due to God. 
  It is said: “And he that curses his father, or his mother, shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 21:17); and it is also said: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15): thus the verse compares cursing parents with cursing God. But in respect of striking, it is certainly impossible [to make a comparison].
  And it is also logical, since the three are partners in him [the child]. Our Rabbis taught: There are three partners in creating a person, the Holy One, blessed be He, the father, and the mother. When a person honors his father and his mother, the Holy One, blessed be He, says: “I ascribe [merit] to them as though I had dwelt among them and they had honored Me.” 
  It was taught: Rabbi said: It is revealed and known to He Who decreed, and the world came into existence, that a son honors his mother more than his father, because
  
  
  Daf 31a
  
  she persuades him with words; therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, placed the honor of the father before that of the mother.  It is revealed and known to He Who decreed, and the world came into existence, that a son fears his father more than his mother, because he teaches him Torah, therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, put the fear [reverence] of the mother before that of the father.
  A tanna recited before R. Nahman: When a man troubles his father and his mother, the Holy One, blessed be He, says: “I did right in not dwelling among them, for had I dwelt among them, they would have troubled Me.” R. Yitzchak said: One who transgresses in secret it is as though he pushed away the feet of the Shekhinah for it is written: “Thus says the Lord, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool” (Isaiah 66:1). 
  R. Yehoshua ben Levi said: One may not walk four cubits with an upright posture, for it is said, “The whole earth is full of His glory” (Isaiah 6:3). R. Huna son of R. Joshua would not walk four cubits bareheaded, saying: The Shekhinah is above my head. 
  A widow's son asked R. Eliezer: If my father says, “Give me a drink of water,” and my mother says “Give me a drink of water,” which takes precedence? He said to him: “Leave aside your mother’s honor and fulfill the honor due your father, for both you and your mother are obligated to honor your father.” Then he went before R. Joshua, who answered him the same. 
  He said to him, “My master? What if she is divorced?” He replied, “From your eyelids it is obvious that you are a widow's son. Pour some water for them into a basin, and screech for them like chickens!”
  Ulla Rabbah taught at the entrance to the Patriarch’s house:  What is meant by, “All the kings of the earth shall give You thanks, O Lord, For they have heard the words of Your mouth?” (Psalms 138:4): Not the word of Your mouth, but “the words of Your mouth” is said. When the Holy One, blessed be He, proclaimed, “I am [the Lord Your God]” and “You shall have none [other Gods before me],” the nations of the world said: He teaches merely for His own honor.
   As soon as He declared: “Honor your father and your mother,” they recanted and admitted [the justice of] the first command [too]. Rava said, [This may be deduced] from the following: “The beginning of Your word is true” (Psalms 119:160): “the beginning of Your word,” but not the end! Rather from the end of Your word it may be seen that the beginning of Your word is true.
  They asked of R. Ulla: How far does the honor of parents [extend]? He replied: Go out and see what a certain gentile, Dama ben Netinah is his name, did in Ashkelon. Once the sages wanted to buy merchandise from him, at a profit of six-hundred-thousand [gold dinars], but the key was lying under his father’s head, and so he did not bother him.
  Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: They asked R. Eliezer: How far does the honor of parents [extend]? He said: Go out and see what a certain gentile, Dama ben Netinah is his name, did in Askhkelon. The Sages sought jewels for the breast-plate, at a profit of six-hundred thousand [gold dinars] (R. Kahana taught: at a profit of eight-hundred thousand) but the key was lying under his father's head, and he did not bother him. 
  The following year the Holy One, blessed be He, gave him his reward. A red heifer was born in his herd. When the Sages of Israel went to him [to buy it], he said to them, “I know you, that [even] if I asked you for all the money in the world you would pay me. But I ask of you only the money which I lost through my father's honor.”
  And R. Hanina said: If one who is not commanded [to honor his parents], yet does so, is thus [rewarded], how much more so one who is commanded and does so! For R. Hanina said: He who is commanded and fulfills [the command], is greater than he who fulfills it though not commanded.   
  R. Joseph said: At first, I thought that if anyone would tell me that the halakhah agrees with R. Judah, that a blind person is exempt from the mitzvot, I would make a holiday for the rabbis, for I am not obligated, and yet I do them. Now, however, that I have heard R. Hanina's statement that he who is commanded and fulfills [the commandment] is greater than he who is not commanded and fulfills it; on the contrary, if anyone should tell me that the halakhah does not agree with R. Judah, I would make a holiday for the Rabbis. 
  When R. Dimi came, he said: He [Dama ben Netinah] was once wearing a gold embroidered silken cloak and sitting among Roman nobles, when his mother came, tore it off from him, struck him on the head, and spat in his face, yet he did not shame her. 
  Abimi, son of R. Abahu taught: There is one who feeds his father pheasants as food, yet [this] drives him from the world; whereas another may make him grind in a mill 
  
  Daf 31b
  
  and [this] brings him to the world to come!
  R. Abahu said: Like my son Abimi who has fulfilled the commandment of honoring [parents]. Abimi had five ordained sons  in his father's lifetime, yet when R. Abahu came and called out at the door, he himself speedily went and opened it for him, crying, “Yes, yes”  until he reached it. 
  One day he said to him, “Give me a drink of water.” By the time he brought it he had fallen asleep. Thereupon he bent and stood over him until he awoke. For this Abimi received divine help and succeeded in interpreting, “A psalm of Asaf” (Psalms 79:1).
  R. Ya’akov b. Abahu asked Abaye: Someone like me, for before I return from the bet hamidrash my father has poured out a cup [of wine] and my mother has mixed it, what should I do’?  He said back: Accept it from your mother but not from your father; for since he is a scholar, he may be disheartened.
  R. Tarfon had a mother for whom, whenever she wished to climb into bed, he would bend down to let her ascend; and when she wished to descend, she would step down on him. He went and boasted about this in the school. They said to him, “You have not yet reached half the honor [due her]: has she then thrown a wallet before you into the sea without your shaming her?”
  When R. Joseph heard his mother”s footsteps he would say: “I will arise before the approaching Shekhinah.” R. Yohanan said: Happy is he who has not seen them. R. Yohanan’s father died when his mother conceived him, and his mother died when she bore him. And the same thing happened to Abaye. But is this so. But didn’t Abaye say, my Mother told me! That was his foster-mother.
   R. Assi had an aged mother. She said to him, “I want jewelry.” So he made them for her. “I want a husband.” “I will look for one for you. “I want a husband as handsome as you.” Thereupon he left her and went to Eretz Yisrael. 
  He heard that she was following him. He went to R. Yohanan and asked him, “May I leave Eretz Yisrael for abroad?”  He said back: “It is forbidden.” He asked further, “But what if it is to meet my mother?” He answered, “I do not know.” He waited a short time and went before him again. He said, “Assi you have determined to go; [may] God bring you back in peace.” 
  He then went before R. Elazar and said to him, “Perhaps, God forbid, he was angry?” He asked, “What [then] did he say to you?” He said back, “May God bring you back in peace.” He responded, “Had he been angry he would not have blessed you”. In the meanwhile he learned that her coffin was coming.  He said, “Had I known, I would not have gone out.”
  Our Rabbis taught: He must honor him in life and must honor him in death. “In his life”: How so? One who is listened to in a place on account of his father should not say: “Let me go, for my own sake”, “Hurry up, for my own sake”, or “Free me, for my own sake”, but all “for my father’s sake.” 
  “In his death”: How so? If one is stating something heard from his mouth, he should not say: “Thus did my father say”, but, “Thus said my father, my teacher, may I be an atonement for his resting place.”   But that is only within twelve months [of his death].   Thereafter he must say: “His memory be for a blessing, for the life of the World to come.” 
  Our Rabbis taught: A sage must change his father’s name and his teacher’s name, but the meturgaman does not change his father’s name and his teacher’s name. Whose father? If we say, the father of the meturgaman?  Is then the interpreter not obliged [to honor his parents]? 
  Rather Rava said, [it means] the name of the sage’s father or the name of the sage’s teacher. As when Mar, son of R. Ashi, lectured at the pirka; he said [to the meturgeman]: My father, my teacher [said thus], whereas his interpreter said: Thus did R. Ashi say. 
  Our Rabbis taught: What is “fear” and what is “honor”? “Fear” means that he [the son] must neither stand in his [the father’s] place nor sit in his place, nor contradict his words, nor tip the scales against him. “Honor” means that he must give him food and drink, clothe and cover him, bring him in and out.
  They asked the question:
  
  Daf 32a
  
  From whose money? Rav Judah said: From the son. R. Nahman b. Oshaia said: From the father. The Rabbis instructed R. Yirmiyah — and others say R. Yirmiyah’s son — in accordance with the view that it come from the father.
  They objected: It is said: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11);  and it is also said: “Honor the Lord with your property” (Proverbs 3:9):  just as the latter means at personal cost, so the former means at personal cost. But if you say: At the father's [expense], what does it matter?  It matters for loss of work opportunity.
  They objected: It is said: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11);  and it is also said: “Honor the Lord with your property” (Proverbs 3:9):  just as the latter means at personal cost, so the former means at personal cost.
  But if you say: At the father's [expense], what does it matter? It matters for loss of work opportunity.
  If so, could it be taught about this, R. Judah said: May a curse come on he who feeds his father with poor tithe! But if the reference is to an extra quantity, what does it matter? Even so, doing so is humiliating [to the father].
  Come and hear: R. Eliezer was asked: How far does the honor of parents [extend]? He said: That he should take a purse, throw it in his presence into the sea, and not shame him. But if you say, at the father's expense, what does he care? It refers to a potential heir.
  As in the case of Rabbah son of R. Huna, for R. Huna tore up silk in the presence of his son Rabbah, saying: “I will go and see whether gets angry or not.” But perhaps he would get angry, and then he [R. Huna] would trangress, “Do not put a stumbling-block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14)? He forgave the honor due him.
  But he [R. Huna] transgressed, “You shall not destroy” (Deuteronomy 20:19)? He did it in the seam. Then perhaps that was why he did not get angry? He did it when he was [already] angry.
  R. Yehezkel taught his son Rami: If criminals sentenced to be burned [become mixed up] with others sentenced to be stoned, R. Shimon said: They are executed by stoning, because burning is the more severe.
  R. Judah his son said to him: Father, do not teach it this way. For, why state the reason because burning is severer? Derive it from the fact that the majority are for stoning. Rather teach it thus: If criminals sentenced to be stoned are mixed up with [others sentenced] to be burned.
  He said to him: If so, say the second clause: But the Sages say: They are executed by burning, because stoning is more severe. But why particularly because stoning is more severe: deduce it from the fact that the majority are to be burned?
  He said to him: There it is the rabbis who are responding to R. Shimon: As to what you say that burning is more severe, that is not so, stoning is more severe.
  Shmuel to Rav Judah: Toothy one! Do not talk that way to your father. For it was taught: If one's father is unwittingly transgressing a commandment in the Torah, he should not say to him, “Father, you are transgressing a biblical commandment,” rather, “Father, thus it is written in the Torah.” “Thus it is written in the Torah”—surely this will cause him grief? Rather, he must say to him, “Father, this is how the verse is written in the Torah.”
  Elazar b. Matya said: If my father says to me, “Give me a drink of water” and I have a commandment to perform, I should leave aside my father's honor and perform the commandment, since both my father and I are obligated to fulfill the commandment. Issi b. Yehudah holds: If the commandment can be performed by others, it should be performed by others, while he should go and do his father's honor. R. Matena said: The halakhah follows Issi b. Judah. 
  R. Yitzchak b. Shila said in the name of R. Matena who said in the name of R. Hisda: If a father forgives the honor due to him, it is forgiven; but if a rabbi forgives his honor, it is not forgiven.
  R. Joseph ruled: Even if a rabbi forgives his honor, it is forgiven, for it is said: “And the Lord went before them by day” (Exodus 13:21). Rava said: Is this so! There, with respect to the Holy One, blessed be He, the world is His and the Torah is His; [hence] He can forgive His honor.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  But here, is then the Torah his [the rabbi's]? Subsequently Rava said: Indeed, the Torah is his [the sage’s], for it is written, “And in his Torah he meditates day and night” (Psalms 1:2).
  But is this really so? For Rava was serving drinks at his son's wedding, and when he offered a cup to R. Papa and R. Huna son of R. Joshua, they stood up before him; but [when he offered] R. Mari and R. Pinchas son  of R. Hisda, they did not stand up before him. Thereupon he was offended and said: “Are these rabbis and the others not!”
  It also happened that R. Papa was serving drink at the wedding of Abba Mar, his son; when he offered a cup to R. Yitzchak son of Rav Judah, he did not rise before him, and he was offended! Even so, they should have shown him respect. 
  R. Ashi said: Even according to the one who holds that if a sage forgives his honor it is forgiven, yet if a Nasi forgives his honor, his honor is not forgiven. They objected: It once happened that R. Eliezer, R. Joshua and R. Zadok were reclining at a banquet for Rabban Gamaliel's son [wedding], while Rabban Gamaliel was standing over them and serving them drink. When he offered a cup to R. Eliezer, he did not accept it; but when he offered it to R. Joshua, he did. R. Eliezer said to him, “What is this, Joshua: we are sitting, while Rabban Gamaliel is standing over us and serving us drink!”
  He replied, “We find that even a greater than he served. Abraham was the greatest man of his generation, yet it is written of him, “And he stood over them” (Genesis 18:8). And should you say that they appeared to him as Ministering Angels — they appeared to him only as Arabs.  Then for us, should not R. Gamaliel (Berabbi) stand over us and offer drink!
  R. Zadok said to them: “How long will you disregard the honor of God and occupy yourselves with the honor of men! The Holy One, blessed be He, causes the winds to blow, he raises the clouds, he brings down rain, and he causes the earth to blossom, and sets a table before each and every person. Then for us, should not R. Gamaliel (Berabbi) stand over us and offer drink!
  Rather if it was stated, thus it was stated: R. Ashi said: Even to the one who hold that if a Nasi forgives his honor, it is forgiven, if a king forgives his honor it is not forgiven, for it is said, “You shall surely set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15)—that the fear of him should be upon you.
  Our Rabbis taught: “Before a hoary head you shall stand” (Leviticus 19:32): I might have thought even before an aged sinner; therefore Scripture says, “elder (zaken)” and “zaken” can only refer to a Sage, for it is said: “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Numbers 11:16). R. Yose the Galilean said: “Zaken” [means] only he who has acquired wisdom, for it is said: “The Lord acquired me [wisdom] as the beginning of his way” (Proverbs 8:22).
  I might have thought that one must stand up before him [even] at a great distance: Scripture says, “You shall rise up,” and “You shall honor,” [implying], I said to rise up only where there is honor.   
  I might have thought that one must honor him with money, Scripture says: You shall rise up,” and “You shall honor,” just as rising up involves no monetary loss, so does honoring involve no monetary loss. I might have thought that one must rise up before him out in a privy or a bathhouse, Scripture says, “You shall rise up,” and “You shall honor,” , [implying] I said to rise up only where there is honor.
  I might have thought that one may shut his eyes as though he has not seen him: Scripture says, “You shall rise up” and “You shall fear your God”; about anything which is known only to the heart it is said, “And you shall fear your God.”
  R. Shimon b. Elazar said: How do we know that the Sage must not trouble [others to rise]?  Scripture says, “Elder and you shall fear.” Issi b. Judah said: “You shall rise up before the hoary head” implies any hoary head.
  But is not R. Yose the Galilean the same opinion as the first Tanna? They differ in respect to a young sage: the first Tanna holds that a young sage is not [included in the mitzvah], whereas R. Yose the Galilean holds that he is.
  What is R. Yose the Galilean’s reason? He could say to you: If you should have thought as the first Tanna says, if so, the Torah should have written: “You shall rise up before the hoary headed zaken and honor [him]”; why did the Torah divide them? To teach that this one is not that one, and that one is not this one. This proves that even a young sage [is included]. 
  And the first Tanna?  That is because it is wanted to place “zaken” in proximity to “and you shall fear.” And what is the first Tanna's reason? Should you have thought as R. Yose the Galilean said, if so, the Torah should have written,
  
  Daf 33a
  
  “In front of the hoary head you should rise up, and revere; you shall rise up before and revere the zaken.” And since it is not written thus, we learn from this that they are identical.
  I might have thought that one must honor him with money, Scripture says: You shall rise up,” and “You shall honor,” just as rising up does not involve a monetary loss, so honoring does not involve a monetary loss. But is there no monetary loss involved in rising? Does it not refer [even] to him who is piercing pearls, and while he rises up before him he is disturbed from his work?  
  Rather rising is compared to honoring: just as honoring does not involve stopping work, so too rising does not involve stopping work. And honoring is compared to rising: just as rising does not involve monetary loss, so honoring does not involve a monetary loss. From here it was said: Artisans may not rise before scholars while they are engaged in their work.
  And they may not? But have we not learned: All artisans rise before them, give them greeting, and exclaim to them, “Our brethren, men of such and such a place, enter in peace.” R. Yohanan: Before them they must stand up, yet before scholars they may not.
  R. Yose b. Abin said: Come and see how beloved a commandment is when fulfilled in its time;  for behold, they rose up before them, yet not before scholars. But perhaps it is different there, for otherwise you may cause them to stumble in the future!
  The Master said: “I might think that one must rise up before him in a bathroom or a bath-house.” And he does not? But was not R. Hiyya sitting in a bath-house, when R. Shimon son of Rabbi passed by, and he did not rise before him, and he was offended. He went and complained to his father, “I taught him two-fifths of the Book of Psalms, yet he did not rise up before me!”
  It also happened that Bar Kappara, and others say R. Ishmael son of R. Yose, was sitting in a bath-house, when R. Shimon b. Rabbi entered and passed by, yet he did not rise before him. And he was offended and went and complained to his father, “I taught him two-thirds of Torat Kohanim (the midrash on Leviticus).  He said to him, “Perhaps he was sitting and thinking about it.”
  Thus, it is only because he might have been sitting and thinking about it; but otherwise, it would not be allowed to not rise?
  There is no difficulty: the one refers to the inner rooms, the other to the outer rooms.   
  This is also logical, for Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said: One may think [about his Torah learning] everywhere except at the baths and in a bathhouse. [That deduction does not follow:] maybe it is different when [done] involuntarily.
  “I might have thought that he may shut his eyes as though he has not seen him.” 
  Are we then dealing with the wicked! Rather [say it this way:] I might have thought that one may shut his eyes before the obligation arises, so that when it does, he will not see him that he should stand up before him; therefore it is stated: “You shalt shall rise up and you shall fear.”
  A tanna taught: What kind of rising shows reverence? Say, that is four cubits. Abaye said: That was said only of one who is not his primary teacher; but as for his primary teacher [he is obligated to rise] as far as his eyes reach.   
  Abaye used to rise as soon as he saw the ear of R. Joseph's donkey approaching.  Abaye was riding a donkey, and going along on the bank of the River Sagya. R. Mesharsheya and other rabbis were sitting on the opposite bank, and they did not rise before him.  He said to them: “Am I not your primary teacher!” They said to him: “We didn’t think of it.”
  R. Shimon b. Elazar said: How do we know that the sage must not trouble [the people to rise]? From the verse: “Elder and you shall fear.” Abaye said: We have a tradition that if he [the Sage] walks around, he will live [long]. Abaye would walk around. R. Zera would walk around.
  Ravina was sitting before R. Yirmiyah of Difti when a certain man passed by without covering his head. He exclaimed: How much chutzpah does that man have! He said to him: Perhaps he is from the town of Mehasia, where rabbis are common.   
  Issi b. Judah said: “Before the hoary head, you shall rise” this implies any hoary head. R. Yohanan said: The halakhah accords with Issi b. Judah. R. Yohanan used to rise before a non-Jewish elder, saying: “How many experiences have passed over these!” Rava would not rise up, yet he showed them respect. 
  Abaye used to give his hand to the aged. Rava sent his agent. R. Nahman sent his guardsmen, [for] he said: “Were it not for the Torah, how many Nahman b. Abba are there in the market place!”
  R. Aibu said in the name of R. Yannai:
  
  Daf 33b
  
  A Torah scholar may rise before his teacher only morning and evening, so that his honor may not exceed the honor of Heaven. They objected: R. Shimon b. Elazar said: How do we know that a Sage must not trouble [others to rise in his presence]? From the verse: “Elder and you shall fear.”
  But if you say, [he rises] only in the morning and evening, why should he not trouble [them]. It is an obligation! Rather it surely follows [that one must rise] all day? No. After all, [he should rise only in] the morning and evening, nevertheless, as far as it is possible, one should not trouble [others to rise in his presence].
  R. Elazar said: Any Torah scholar who does not rise before his master is called wicked, will not live long, and he will forget his learning, as it is said, “But it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days which are as a shadow, because he fears not before God” (Kohelet 8:13).  Now, I do not know what this fear is, but when it is said, “[Before the hoary head you shall rise] and you shall fear your God,” behold this fear means rising. 
  But perhaps it means the fear of usury and [false] weights! R. Elazar derives this from the use of pene [“before”] in both cases
  They asked the question: What if his son is his teacher? Must he rise before his father? Come and hear: For Shmuel said to Rav Judah: Toothy one!  Rise before your father! R. Yehezkel was different, because he had [many] good deeds to his credit, for even Mar Shmuel too stood up before him.
  Then what did he tell him?  He said thus to him: Sometimes he may come behind me; then you should stand up before him, and do not fear for my honor. 
  They asked the question: What if his son is his teacher; must his father stand up before him? Come and hear: For R. Joshua h. Levi said: As for me, It is not appropriate that I should stand up before my son, but rather due to the honor of the Nasi's house.
  Thus the reason is that I am his teacher: but if he were my teacher, I would rise before him.  [No]. He meant thus: As for me, it is not appropriate that I should stand up before my son, even if he were my teacher, for I am his father, but [I do stand in front of him] because of the honor of the Nasi’s house.
  The question was asked: Is riding the same as walking, or not? Abaye said: Come and hear:
  If an impure person sits under a tree and a pure person stands, he is defiled; if the impure person stands under the tree and the pure person sits, he remains clean; but if the impure person sat down, the clean one is defiled. 
  And the same applies to a leprous stone. And R. Nahman b. Cohen said: This proves that riding is the same as walking. Learn from this.
  The question was asked: Must one rise before a Sefer Torah? R. Hilkiah, R. Shimon and R. Elazar say: It is a kal vehomer: if we rise before those who study it, how much more before it itself! 
  R. Ilai and R. Yaakov b. Zavdi were sitting when R. Shimon b. Abba passed by. They rose before him. He said to them: [You should not have risen;] firstly, because you are sages, whereas I am but a haver: moreover, shall then the Torah rise before its students!
  He holds like R. Elazar, who said: A Torah scholar must not stand up before his teacher when he [the disciple] is engaged in studying. Abaye cursed anyone [who acted according to this teaching.]
  “And they looked after Moses, until he was gone into the tent” (Exodus 33:8). R. Ammi and R. Yitzchak Nafha—one interpreted it in a derogatory manner and the other in a complimentary way. He who explained it in a derogatory manner, as is known. But the one who interpreted it in a complimentary manner: Hezekiah said:
  R. Hanina son of R. Abbahu told me in the name of R. Abbahu in the name of R. Avdimi of Haifa: When a Hakham  passes, one must rise before him [at a distance of] four cubits, and when he has gone four cubits beyond [him], he sits down; when an Av Bet Din passes, one must stand up before him as soon as he comes in sight, and when he passes four cubits beyond he may sit down; but when the Nasi passes, one must rise as he comes in sight and may not sit down until he takes his seat, as it is said, “And they looked after Moses, until he was gone into the tent.”
  All positive commandments that have a set time etc. Our Rabbis taught: What are positive commandments that have a set time? Sukkah, lulav, shofar, tzitzit,
  
  Daf 34a
  
  and tefillin.
  And what are positive commandments that do not have a set time? Mezuzah, guard rail, [returning] lost property, and sending away the mother bird.
  Now, is this a general rule? But matzah, rejoicing [on Festivals], and “assembling” [in Jerusalem at the end of the Sabbatical year] are positive commandments with a set time, and yet women are obligated. Furthermore, study of the Torah, procreation, and the redemption of the son, are not positive commandments with a set time, and yet women are exempt?
  R. Yohanan said: We cannot learn from general principles, even where exceptions are stated.
  For we learned: Every [food item] can be used to make an eruv or a shittuf, except water and salt. And are there no other [exceptions]: Isn’t there mushrooms! Rather [we must answer that] we cannot learn from general principles, even where exceptions are stated.
  And positive time-bound commandments, women are exempt. From where do we know this? It is derived from tefillin: just as women are exempt from tefillin, so they are exempt from all positive time-bound commandments. And tefillin are derived from the study of the Torah: just as women are exempt from the study of the Torah, so are they exempt from tefillin.
  But let us [rather] compare tefillin to mezuzah? Tefillin are compared to the study of the Torah in both the first section and the second sections of Shema; whereas they are not compared to mezuzah in the second section.
  Then let mezuzah be compared to the study of the Torah?  You cannot think this, because it is written, “[And you shall write them upon the mezuzah of your house . . .] that your days may be multiplied” (Deuteronomy 11:21): do then men need life, but women not need life!
  But what of sukkah, which is a positive time-bound commandment, as it is written, “You shall dwell in booths seven days,” (Leviticus 23:42) but the reason women are exempt is that Scripture wrote “ha’ezrah,” to exclude women, but otherwise women would be liable?
  Abaye said: It is necessary: I would have thought, since it is written: “You shall dwell in booths seven days” “You shall dwell” as you [normally] dwell [in your house]: just as [normal] dwelling [implies] a husband and wife [together], so must the sukkah be a husband and wife!
  But Rava said:
  
  Daf 34b
  
  It is necessary [for another reason]: I might have thought, we derive “fifteen” “fifteen” from the Festival of Matzot:  just as there, women are liable, so too here. Hence it is necessary.
  But what of pilgrimage to the Temple, which is a positive time-bound commandment, yet the reason [women are exempt] is that the Torah wrote, “[Three times a year all] your males [shall appear before the Lord your God]” (Exodus 23:17) this excludes women; but were it not for this word, they would be liable? 
  It is necessary: Lest I would say that we learn about the laws of pilgrimage from the laws of gathering.
  Now, instead of deriving an exemption from tefillin, let us derive an obligation from [the mitzvah of] rejoicing [on the festival]? Abaye said: As for a woman, her husband must make her rejoice.  
  Then what can be said of a widow?  It refers to the one she is with.
  Now, let us derive [the rule] from [the mitzvah of] “assembling”? Because matzah and “assembling” are two verses that come as one, and wherever two verses come as one, they cannot teach about other verses.
  If so, tefillin and pilgrimage are also two verses that come as one, and they do not teach [about other commandments]? They are both necessary: for had the Torah stated tefillin but not pilgrimage, I would have thought, let us deduce the meaning of “pilgrimage” from “assembling.”  
  And if the Torah had written pilgrimage but not tefillin, I would have said, Let tefillin be compared to mezuzah. Thus both are necessary.
  If so, matzah and “assembling” are also necessary? For what are they necessary? Now, it would make sense if the Torah had stated “assembling” but not matzah: for I would argue, let us deduce “fifteen” “fifteen” from Sukkot.   
  But let the Torah write matzah, and “assembling” would not be necessary, for I would reason, if children are obligated, how much more so women! Hence it is a case of two verses that come as one, and they do not teach.
  Now, that goes well according to the one who  holds that they do not teach, but on the view that they do, what may be said?
  Furthermore, how do we know that women are exempt from positive non-time-bound commandments? Because we learn from fear: just as fear is binding upon women, so too women are obligated in all positive non-time bound commandments.
  But let us [rather] learn from the study of the Torah?  Because the study of the Torah and procreation are two verses which come as one, and wherever two verses come as one they do not teach.
  
  Daf 35a
  
  But according to R. Yohanan b. Beroka, who holds, Concerning both [Adam and Eve] it is said: “And God blessed them: and God said to them, Be fruitful and multiply,” (Genesis 1:28) what can be said? Because the study of the Torah and redemption of the firstborn are two verses that come as one and all two verses that come as one do not teach.
  But according to R. Yohanan b. Beroka too, let procreation and fear be regarded as two verses that come as one, which do not teach? Both are necessary. For if the Torah had written fear and not procreation, I would say, The Torah said, [“Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth,] and conquer it”: only a man, whose nature it is to conquer, but not a woman, as it is not her nature to conquer.
  And if the Torah had written procreation and not fear, I would reason: A man, who has the opportunity to do this [to show to his parents] is obligated, but not a woman, for she does not have the opportunity to do this;  and since she does not have the opportunity, she has no obligation at all.  Thus both are necessary.
  Now, that makes sense to the one that holds that two verses that come as one do not teach [about others]: but to the one that holds that they do, what can be said?  
  Rava said: The Papunians know the reason for this matter, and who is it? R. Aha b. Jacob. The verse says, “And it shall be a sign for you on your hand, and for a memorial between your eyes, that the Torah of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9): the whole Torah is compared to tefillin: just as tefillin are a positive time-bound commandment, and women are exempt, so they are exempt from all positive time-bound commandments. And since women are exempt from positive time-bound commandments, it follows that they are obligated to positive non-time bound commandments. 
  This makes sense to the one that holds that tefillin are a positive time-bound commandment; but to the one that holds that tefillin are a positive non-time bound commandment, what can we say?  Whom do you know to hold that tefillin are a positive non-time bound commandment? R. Meir. But he holds that two verses that come as one do not teach about others.
  But according to R. Judah, who holds that two verses that come as one do teach about [others], and [also] that tefillin are a positive non-time bound commandment, what can be said? Matzah, rejoicing [on festivals], and “gathering” are three verses that come as one and three verses that come as one do not teach
  And all negative commandments etc. From where do we know this? Rav Judah in the name of Rav, and it was also taught in the School of R. Ishmael, the verse says, “A man or woman if they commit any sin that a person commits” (Numbers 5:6) the verse equated women and men with regard to all the punishments in the Torah.    
  The School of R. Eliezer taught: The verse says, “[Now these are the laws] which you shall set before them” (Exodus 21:1): The verse equated a woman to a man with regard to all civil laws in the Torah. The School of Hezekiah taught: The verse said, “And it kills a man or woman [the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death]” (Exodus 21:29) the verse equated women with men for all death penalties in the Torah. 
  All three are necessary. For if it had taught us only the first, [I would say] that the Torah has mercy because of atonement; but as for civil law, I might argue that it applies only to men, who engage in commerce, but not to women, who do not.
  But if it had taught the second case, I might have argued that is because one’s livelihood depends on it; but as for ransom, I might argue, 
  
  Daf 35b
  
  it applies only to men, who are subject to mitzvot, but not to women, who are not subject to them. And if it taught the last one only, I might have argued that the Torah has mercy because of loss of life; but in the first two I might say that it is not so. Thus they are [all] necessary.
  Except for the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard] etc. The [exception] for defiling oneself for the dead makes sense because it is written: “Speak to the priests the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1): the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron. But how do we know [that she is exempt from] the prohibition against rounding [etc.] and marring [etc.]? Because
  it is written, “You shall not round the corner of your heads, neither shall you mar the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27): whoever is included in [the prohibition of] marring is included in [that of] rounding; but women, since they are not subject to [the prohibition of] marring, are not subject to [that of] rounding.
  And how do we know that they are not subject to [the prohibition against] marring?  If you want, you can say from logic, for they have no beard. 
  Or if you want you can say from a verse, for the verse says, “You shall not round the corner of your (plural) heads, neither shall you mar the corner of your (sing.) beard” since Scripture changed its speech, for otherwise the Torah should have written, “the corner of your beards”; why, “your (sing.) beard”? [To teach], “your beard,” but not “your wife's beard.”
  Are they not?  But was it not taught: The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch which grew hair, are like a [man's] beard in all matters. Does this not mean in respect to marring?
  Abaye said: You cannot say that in respect to marring, for we learn “corner” “corner” from the sons of Aaron:  just as there, women are exempt; so here too, women are exempt.
  But if we hold that “the sons of Aaron” is written with reference to the whole section, let the verse be silent from it, and it could be derived through a kal vehomer. For I can argue: If [of] priests, upon whom Scripture imposes additional commandments, [we say] “the sons of Aaron” but not the daughters of Aaron, how much more so of Israelites!
  Were it not for the gezerah shavah I would have thought that the connection is broken.
  Then now too let us say that the connection is broken; and as for the gezerah shavah, that is required for what was taught: “They shall not shave” (Leviticus 21:5): I might think that if he shaves it with scissors, he is liable, Scripture says, “You shall not mar” (Leviticus 19:27).
  I might think that if he plucks it [his hair] out with pincers or a remover, he is liable, Scripture says: “They shall not shave.” How then is it meant? Shaving which involves marring. Say that this refers to a razor.
  If so, let the verse write, “That which is of your beard”? Why say “the corner of your beard”? Learn from this both.
  Then when it was taught: “The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch who grew hair, are like a [man's] beard in all respects”: to what law [does it refer]? Mar Zutra said: To the impurity of scale disease.   
  “The impurity of scale disease” is written explicitly: “If a man or a woman has an affliction upon the head or the beard” (Leviticus 13:29)? Mar Zutra said: [it is] in respect of purification from scale disease.
  But purification from scale disease too is obvious; since she is liable to impurity [through her beard], she needs [the same] purification! It is necessary, lest I would say, it is written with separate subjects: “If a man or a woman have an affliction upon the head” [and] “or the beard” reverts to the man [alone]; Therefore it teaches us
  Issi taught: Women are also exempt from the prohibition against making a bald spot. What is Issi's reason? For he interprets thus: “You are sons of the Lord your God: you shall not cut yourselves, nor make a bald spot between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1-2):  Sons and not daughters for the matter of baldness.
  You say, in respect of baldness; yet perhaps it is not so, but rather in respect of cutting? When it says: “For you are a holy people unto the Lord your God,” it refers to cutting.  Then how can I interpret “sons” and not daughters? In respect to baldness.
  And what did you see to include cutting and exclude baldness? I include cutting which is possible both where there is hair and where there is no hair, and I exclude baldness which is possible only in the place of hair.
  But say “sons” not daughters applies to both baldness and cutting, while “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God” relates to gashing (Leviticus 21:5)! Issi holds that gashing [seritah] and cutting [gedidah] are identical.
  
  Daf 36a
  
  identical.
  Abaye said: Issi’s reasoning is that he learns “baldness,” “baldness,” from the sons of Aaron: just as there, women are exempt, so here too, women are exempt. 
  But if we hold that the phrase [“the sons of Aaron”] relates to the whole section, let the verse not say it, and I would [derive women’s exemption] from a kal vehomer. For I would say: If [of] priests, for whom the verse imposes additional commandments, [we say] “the sons of Aaron” but not the daughters of Aaron, how much more so of Israelites!
  Were it not for the gezerah shavah I would think the connection is broken.
  Then now too, let us say that the connection is broken; and as for the gezerah shavah, that is required for what was taught: “They shall not make a bald spot”:  I might think that even if one makes four or five bald patches he is liable for only one [transgression]; therefore it is stated, karhah [a baldness], to make him obligated for each separate act. 
  “On their head”? Why is this stated? Because it is said: “You shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead”: I might think that one is liable only for between the eyes. From where do I know to include the whole head? Scripture says: “On their head,” to make him liable for the [whole] head as for between the eyes.
  Now, I know this only of priests, for whom the verse imposes additional commandments; from where do I know this of the rest of Israel? It says here, “karhah [baldness],” and it says there “karhah”; just as there, one is liable for every act of making baldness, and for the [whole] head as for between the eyes, so here too, one is liable for every act of baldness and in respect of the whole head as for between the eyes. 
  And just as below, [baldness] for the dead [is meant], so here too it is for the dead! If so, let the verse write “kerah [baldness]”: why “karhah”? Learn from this both.
  Rava said: Issi’s reasoning is that he derives “between your eyes” from tefillin: just as there, women are exempt, so too here, women are exempt. Now, why does Rava not say as Abaye? [The distinction between] kerah and karhah does not seem correct to him.
  And why does Abaye reject Rava’s reason? He would say to you: Tefillin themselves are learned from this: just as there, [“between the eyes” means] the place where a bald spot can be made--on the upper part of the head, so too here the place for wearing [tefillin] is on the upper part of the head.
  Now, according to both Abaye and Rava, how do they interpret this [verse], “You are sons [etc.”]?  That is needed for what was taught: “You are sons of the Lord your God”; when you behave as sons you are called sons; if you do not behave as sons, you are not called sons: the words of R. Judah. 
  R. Meir said: In either case you are called sons, for it is said, “They are foolish children” (Jeremiah 4:22);  and it is also said: “They are children who have no faith” (Deuteronomy 32:20); and it is also said, “A seed of evil-doers, sons that deal corruptly” (Isaiah 1:4); and it is also said, “And it shall come to pass that, in the place where it was said to them, You are not my people, it shall be said unto them, You are the sons of the living God” (Hosea 2:1). 
  What does it add by “and it says”?   For should you say, the foolish are called sons, but those who lack faith are not called sons, come and hear: And it says: “They are children who have no faith.”
  And should you say, when they have no faith they are called sons, but when they serve idols they are not called sons —come and hear: And it says: “a seed of evil-doers, sons that deal corruptly.” And should you say, those that are corrupted are called son, but not good sons —come and hear: And it says, “And it shall come to pass that, in the place where it was said to them, You are not my people, it shall be said unto them, You are the sons of the living God.”
  The [rites of] laying hands, waving, presenting [the meal-offering], taking the handful, burning [the fat], pinching off [the neck of bird sacrifices], sprinkling and receiving [the blood] are performed by men but not by women, except the meal-offering of a sotah and a female nazirite, where they [themselves] wave the offering.
  Gemara. The laying of [hands], because it is written: “Speak to the sons of Israel. . . and he shall lay [his hand upon the head of the burnt-offering]” (Leviticus 1:2): the sons of Israel lay [hands], but not the daughters of Israel.
  Waving: “Speak to the sons of Israel . . and he shall wave” (Leviticus 7:29-30):  the sons of Israel wave, but not the daughters of Israel.
  Presenting [the minchah-offering]: AS it is written: “And this is the law of the meal-offering: the sons of Aaron shall offer it” (Leviticus 6:7): the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron.
  Taking the handful. As it is written: “And he shall bring it to Aaron's sons the priests: and he shall take out of it his handful [of the fine flour]” (Leviticus 2:2): the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron.
  Burning [the fat]. As it is written: “And Aaron's sons shall burn it” (Leviticus 3:5) the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron.
  Pinching off [the neck of bird sacrifices]. As it is written, “And he shall cut [off its head,] and burn it [on the altar]” (Leviticus 1:15: thus pinching off the neck is compared to burning.
  Receiving [the blood]. As it is written, “And Aaron's sons shall offer”: and a Master said,
  
  Daf 36b
  
  “and they shall off” refers to the receiving of the blood.
  And sprinkling. The sprinkling of what?  If that of the [red] cow, Elazar is written about it (Numbers 19:4)? If [that sprinkled] inside [the Holy of Holies] the anointed priest (Leviticus 4:16) is stated in connection with it! Rather it refers to the sprinkling of a bird's [blood],
  which can be derived from a kal vehomer from a sheep offering: if a sheep offering, for which it did not specify a priest for its slaughtering, it did specify a priest for its sprinkling, a bird offering, for which it did specify a priest for pinching its neck, is it not logical that it would specify a priest for its sprinkling.
  Except the meal-offering of a sotah and a nezirah. R. Elazar said to R. Yoshaya of his generation: Do not sit down on your legs until you have told me this law: How do we know that the meal offering of a sotah requires waving? How do we know! If is written in the very section, “and he shall wave the offering [before the Lord]” (Numbers 5:25). Rather how do we know that the waving must be by the owner?
  It is derived from the use of “hand” [here] and “hand” from a peace-offering. Here is written: “Then the priest shall take [jealousy-offering] out of the woman’s hand” (Numbers 5:25): while there [in reference to peace-offerings] it is written, “His hands [the owner’s] shall bring [the offerings of the Lord made by fire]” (Leviticus 7:30) just as here the priest [is stated], so too there the priest [is meant]; and just as there the owner [is specified], so here too the owner [is required]. 
  How so? The priest places his hand under the owner's and waves. We have found [this in the case of] sotah; how do we know [it of] a nezirah? 
  It is derived from the use of the word “kaf” (hand) in sotah.
  Every commandment which is dependent on the land is practiced only in the land [of Israel]; and every commandment which is not dependent on the land is practiced both in and outside the land,  
  
  
  Daf 37a
  
  except orlah and kilayim. Rabbi Elazar says:  also [the prohibition of] new produce. 
  GEMARA. What is the meaning of “dependent” and “not dependent”? If we say: “dependent” refers to those [commandments] where “[when you] come [into the land] is written,” and “not dependent” to those where “[when you] come [into the land]” is not stated?  But tefillin and the [redemption of] the firstborn son of a donkey are practiced both within and without the land, even though “[when you] come [into the land]” is written in connection with them?  
  Rav Judah said: This is its meaning: every commandment which is a personal obligation is practiced both inside and outside the Land; but what is an obligation of the soil is practiced only within the Land.
  How do we know these things? For our Rabbis taught: “These are the laws”—this refers to midrashim; “And the rules” —this refers to civil law;  “Which you shall observe”—this refers to [the study of the] Mishnah; “To do” — this refers to actual practice; 
  “In the land”: I might have thought that all mitzvoth are practiced in the Land only. Therefore it is stated, “All the days that you live on the earth.” If “all the days” I might have thought that [all commandments] must be practiced both inside and outside the Land, therefore Scripture says: “in the Land.”
  Now, since the verse extends and limits, go out and learn from what is stated in that passage: “You shall utterly destroy all the places, where the nations served their gods” (Deuteronomy 12:2):  just as [the destruction of] idolatry is singled out as being a personal duty, and is obligatory both in and outside the land,  so everything which is a personal duty is obligatory both in and outside the land.
  Except orlah and kilayim [etc.]. 
  The question was asked: Does R. Elazar disagree in the direction of leniency or stringency? In the direction of stringency he disagrees and this is what the tanna kamma says: “except orlah and kilayim,” concerning which there is a tradition [that it applies outside of the Land] even though one might argue that it is a duty connected with the soil, but hadash (the prohibition of new produce) is observed inside the Land, and not outside the land. 
  What is the reason? “Settlement” implies after taking possession and settling down.
  And R. Elazar comes to say that hadash too applies both inside and outside the Land: What is the reason? “Settlement” implies wherever you may be living.
  Or perhaps, he disagrees in the direction of leniency and this is how it reads: this is what the tanna kamma says: “except orlah and kilayim,” concerning which there is a tradition, and all the more so hadash, for “settlement” implies wherever you are living.   
  And R. Elazar comes to say that hadash is observed only in the land, for “settlement” implies after taking possession and settling down. And what does “also” refer to? To the first [clause].
  Come and hear: For Abaye said: Which tanna disagrees with R. Elazar [in our Mishnah]? R. Ishmael. For it was taught: This is to teach you that wherever “settlement” is stated, it means only after taking possession and settling down, the words of R. Yishmael.
  R. Akiva said to him: But what about Shabbat, in connection with which “settlements” is stated, and yet it is practiced both inside and outside the land? He replied he to him: Shabbat is inferred from a kal vehomer argument: if light commandments are practiced both inside and outside the land, Shabbat, which is more stringent, all the more so! 
  Since Abaye said: “Which tanna disagrees with R. Elazar? R. Ishmael,” it follows that R. Elazar differs in the direction of [greater] stringency. This proves it.
  Now to what does R. Yishmael refer? To libations. But in the case of libations
  
  
  Daf 37b
  
  This is what it means: This is to teach that wherever “entrance” and “settlement” are stated, it means only after taking possession and settling down, the words of R. Yishmael.
  If so, “R. Akiva said to him, ‘But what about Shabbat, in connection with which “settlements” is stated” and he answered him, “Shabbat is inferred from a kal vehomer,” he should have answered him, “I spoke of ‘entering’ and ‘settlement”? He said to him one reason, but there is yet another.  Firstly, I refer to “entering” and “settlement.” Moreover, when you say: “Behold Shabbat, in connection with which “dwellings’ is stated,” Shabbat is inferred from a kal vehomer.
  What are they arguing about? Over whether they offered libations in the wilderness: R. Yishmael maintains that they did not offer libations in the wilderness, whereas R. Akiva holds that they did offer libations in the wilderness.
  Abaye said: This tanna of the School of R. Yshmael contradicts another tanna of the School of R. Yishmael.
  For the School of R. Yishmael taught: Since there are many cases of unspecified “entrances” in the Torah, and the verse explained in one of them [that it means] after possession and settling down, so all instances mean after possession and settling down.
  Abaye said: This tanna of the School of R. Yshmael contradicts another tanna of the School of R. Yishmael. For the School of R. Yishmael taught: Since there are many cases of unspecified “entrances” in the Torah, and the verse explained in one of them [that it means] after possession and settling down, so all instances mean after possession and settling down.
  And the other?  Both are necessary. For if the Torah had written the case of the king but not first-fruits, I would have said, [the mitzvah] of first fruits [is effective immediately] for he enjoys them immediately. And if the case of first-fruits were stated but not that of a king, I would have said, [the mitzvah to appoint a king is effective] immediately since it is the way of the king to conquer. 
  And the other? Let the Torah state the case of a king, and then first-fruits become unnecessary, for I would state: If a king, who is for conquest, [is appointed only] after possession and settling down, how much more so are first-fruits [obligatory only then]!
  And the other? If it were thus written: I would have that [first-fruits] is analogous to hallah;   hence it teaches us [that it is not so].
  Now that you say that a personal duty must be practiced both inside the Land and outside the Land, “settlement,” which the Torah wrote in connection with Shabbat, why do I need it? It is necessary. Lest I would say: Since it is written in the chapter on Festivals, it requires sanctification, like the Festivals; therefore it teaches us [that it is not so].
  Now that you say that a personal duty must be practiced both inside the Land and outside the Land, “settlement,” which the Torah wrote in connection with Shabbat, why do I need it? It is necessary. Lest I would say: Since it is written in the chapter on Festivals, it requires sanctification, like the Festivals; therefore it teaches us [that it is not so].
  “Settlement” written by the Torah in connection with matzah and marror, what do I need it for?   It is necessary, lest I would have said, since it is written: “They shall eat it [the Passover sacrifice] with matzah and marror” (Numbers 9:11), when there is a Passover sacrifice, [these must be eaten], when there is no Passover sacrifice, they need not [be eaten], therefore it teaches us [that it is not so].
  “Entrance” which the Torah wrote in connection with tefillin and the first born of a donkey, why do I need it?  It is needed for what the School of Ishmael taught: Perform this mitzvah, for on its account you shall enter the land.
  Now it goes well according to the one that holds that “settlement’ implies wherever you live, as it is written, “And they ate the produce of the land on the day after the Passover” (Joshua 5:11): on the day after the Passover they ate, but not before, thus
  
  Daf 38a
  
  the omer was first offered and then they ate.
  But on the view that [“settlement” implies] after possession and settling, they could have eaten immediately? They did not need to,
  for it is written, “And the children of Israel ate the manna forty years, until they came to a land inhabited; they ate the manna, until they came to the borders of the land of Canaan.  (Exodus 16:35) Now, it is impossible to say [literally], “until they came to a land inhabited,” since it is also said: “[until they came] to the borders of the land of Canaan;”  and it is also impossible to say, [until they came] “to the borders of the land of Canaan,” since it is also said: “until they came to a land inhabited!” How then [are these to be reconciled]? Moses died on the seventh of Adar and the manna ceased to descend, but they used the manna which was in their vessels until the sixteenth of Nisan. 
  Another [baraita] taught: “And the children of Israel ate the manna forty years.” Did they really eat [it] forty years: surely they ate it for forty years less thirty days?  Rather this is to teach you that they experienced the taste of manna in the cakes which they brought out Egypt.
  Another [baraita] taught: On the seventh of Adar Moses died, and on the seventh of Adar he was born. How do we know that he died on the seventh of Adar? As it says: “And Moses, the servant of the Lord died there” (Deuteronomy 34:5); and it is written, “And the children of Israel wept for Moses in the plains of Moab thirty days” (ibid 34:8);  and it is written, “And it came to pass after the death of Moses, the servant of the Lord” (Joshua 1:1), and it is written, “Moses, my servant is dead; now therefore arise, go over [this Jordan]” (Joshua 1:2);
  and it is written, “Pass through the midst of the camp, and command the people, saying: ‘Make preparations; for within three days you are to pass over this Jordan’” (Joshua 1:11); and it is written, “And the people came up out of Jordan on the tenth day of the first month” (Joshua 4:19);   deduct  the preceding thirty three days, thus you learn that Moses died on the seventh of Adar.
  And how do we know that he was born on the seventh of Adar? As it is said: “And he [Moses] said to them, I am a hundred and twenty years old this day; I can no more go out and come in” (Deuteronomy 31:2).  For Scripture would not have stated “this day.” So why then did it state “this day”? To teach that the Holy One, blessed be He, sits and completes the years of the righteous [exactly] from day to day and month to month, as it is said, “The number of your days I will fulfill” (Exodus 23:26).
  It was taught in a baraita: R. Shimon b. Yohai said: The Israelites were commanded to keep three mitzvoth on their entry into the Land, yet they are observed both inside and outside the Land,
  and it is logical that they should be observed. If new produce, whose prohibition is not permanent, and whose prohibition is not one of deriving benefit, and whose prohibition can be released, is [nevertheless] observed both inside and outside the Land;
  then mixed kinds, which are permanently forbidden, and whose prohibition is one of deriving benefit, and whose prohibition cannot be released, it surely follows that it is observed both inside and outside the Land; and the same logic applies to orlah on two [grounds].
  R. Elazar son of R. Shimon said:
  
  Daf 38b
  
  Any commandment which the Israelites were commanded before their entry into the Land  are observed both inside and outside the Land; after their entry into the Land, are observed only within the Land, except release of money [debts] and liberation of slaves: though they were commanded concerning these after their entry into the Land, they are observed both inside and outside the Land.
  But the release of debts is a personal obligation?
  It is necessary [to state it] only because of what was taught. For it was taught: Rabbi said: “And this is the manner of release: release” (Deuteronomy 15:2): the verse speaks of two releases, the release of land and the release of debt. At the time when you release land, you release debts; and at the time when you do not release land, you do not release debts.
  But the release of debts is a personal obligation?  It is necessary [to state it] only because of what was taught. For it was taught: Rabbi said: “And this is the manner of release: release” (Deuteronomy 15:2): the verse speaks of two releases, the release of land and the release of debt. At the time when you release land, you release debts; and at the time when you do not release land, you do not release debts. 
  [Again], freeing of slaves is a personal obligation! I might have thought, since it is written, “And you shall proclaim liberty throughout the land” (Leviticus 25:10), it applies only in the Land, but not outside of the Land; therefore Scripture says, “It is a Jubilee,” implying, under all circumstances. 
  If so, why does Scripture say “the Land”? To teach you, when liberation [of slaves] is practiced in the Land, it is practiced outside the Land; when it is not practiced in the Land, it is not practiced outside the Land.
  We taught there: New produce is forbidden by the Torah everywhere; [the prohibition of] Orlah [outside the Land] is a halakhah, and [that of] kilayim is from the words of the Scribes. What is meant by “halakhah”? Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: It is a law of the country. Ulla said in the name of R. Yohanan: It is a halakhah of Moses from Sinai.  
  Ulla said to Rav Judah: It makes sense according to my view that it is a halakhah of Moses from Sinai; for we distinguish between doubtful orlah and doubtful kilayim.
  For we learnt: Doubtful orlah is forbidden in the Land, permitted in Syria, while outside the Land one may enter [a Gentile’s field] and buy it, as long as he does not see him [the Gentile] gather it.   
  Whereas in respect to kilayim we learnt: If a vineyard is planted with vegetables, and the vegetables are sold outside it: in the Land they are forbidden; permitted in Syria;
  while outside the Land, he [the Gentile owner of the vineyard] may enter and gather them, providing, however, that he [the Jew] does not gather them himself.
  But on your view, 
  
  
  Daf 39a
  
  let it be taught in both cases either that he [the Jew] may enter and buy, or that he [the Gentile] may enter and gather [them]? Shmuel did indeed say to R. Anan, Read in both cases either that he [the Jew] may enter and make a purchase, or that he [the Gentile] may enter and gather [them]. Mar son of Rabbana taught it in the direction of leniency: In both cases he [the Gentile] may enter and gather them, provided that he [the Jew] does not gather them himself.
  Levi said to Shmuel: Aryoch (Shmuel’s nickname): Give me some of it and I will eat it. R. Avia and Rabbah son of R. Hanan gave each other [orlah outside the Land]. The sharp scholars of Pumbedita said. There is no orlah outside of the Land..
  When Rav Judah sent [this ruling] to R. Yohanan, he sent back: Conceal [the law of] doubtful [orlah], destroy certain [orlah], and proclaim that these fruits must be hidden, and whoever says that there is no [prohibition] of orlah outside the Land will have no offspring “who shall cast the line by lot in the congregation of the Lord” (Michah 2:5).
  And they (the sharp scholars of Pumbedita), according to whom do they hold? With that which was taught: R. Elazar son of R. Yose who said in the name of R. Yose b. Durmaskah, who said in the name of R. Yose the Galilean, who said in the name of R. Yohanan b. Nuri, who said in the name of R. Elazar the Great: There is no orlah outside of the Land.
  Is there not? But we learned: R. Elazar said, also new produce? Teach: New produce.
  R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: [The prohibition of] orlah outside of the Land is a halakhah of Moses from Sinai. R. Zera said to R. Assi: But have we not taught: Doubtful orlah is forbidden in the Land but permitted in Syria. He was quiet for a moment. [Then] he answered him: Say it [the halakhah of Moses from Sinai] was stated [in the following way]: Doubtful [orlah] is permitted [outside the Land], certain [orlah] is forbidden.
  R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: One is lashed for [violating the prohibition of] kilayim [outside the Land] by Torah law. R. Elazar b. R. Yose said to him: But have we not taught, kilayim [is forbidden] by the words of the scribes? There is no difficulty: the one refers to kilayim of the vineyard, and the other to grafting onto a tree.
  As Shmuel said, for Shmuel said: “My statutes you shall keep” (Leviticus 19:19): the statutes which I have already decreed for you. “You shall not let your cattle gender with a diverse kind; you shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (ibid).
  Just as [the prohibition of] “your cattle” [means] by copulation, so “your field” means by grafting; and just as [the law in regard to] “your cattle” is observed both inside and outside the Land, so is [that concerning] “your field” observed inside and outside the Land. 
  But is it not written “your field”! That is to exclude [diverse] seeds in outside the Land.
  R. Hanan and R. Anan were walking along a path, when they saw a man sowing [diverse] seeds together. One said to the other, “Let the master come and ban him.” He replied, “This halakhah is not clear to you.”
  Again they saw another man sowing wheat and barley among vines.  One said to the other, “Let the master come and ban him.”  He replied, “These halakhot are not clear to you. Do we not hold like R. Yoshayah, that [he is not liable] unless he sows wheat, barley, and grapeseed in the [same] hand-throw?”
  R. Joseph mixed seeds and sowed [them]. Abaye said to him: But we learnt: Kilayim is forbidden [outside the Land] by the words of the Scribes! He said to him: There is no difficulty, this one, [the Mishnah] refers to kilayim of the vineyard; this [my action] refers to kilayim of seeds. Kilayim of the vineyard, which in the Land is prohibited to derive benefit from, outside the Land, the rabbis also decreed against it; kilayim of seeds, however, of which [even] in the Land it is not prohibited to derive benefit therefrom, are not prohibited by the rabbis outside the Land.
  Subsequently R. Joseph said: What I have said is not valid, for Rav sowed the garden of the rabbinic academy in rows [of separate species]. What is the reason? Surely in order [to avoid] the mixture of kilayim? Abaye said to him: If it had taught us  
  
  
  Daf 39b
  
  four by four sides of the furrow and one in the middle, this would go well. But here he did so on account of beauty. Alternatively, in order to save the attendant trouble.
  He who performs one commandment is rewarded, his days are prolonged, and he inherits the land, But he who does not perform one commandment, is not rewarded, his days are not prolonged, and he does not inherit the land. 
  GEMARA. But they cast the following against this: These are the things the fruit of which one eats in this world, while the principal remains for the future world: honoring one's parents, the practice of loving deeds, bringing in guests, and making peace between a person and his neighbor; and the study of the Torah surpasses them all.
  Rav Judah said: This is what it means: Anyone who does one mitzvah in addition to his merits is rewarded, and it is as if he had fulfilled the whole Torah. Hence it follows that for these others [one is rewarded] even for a single one! R. Shemaiah said: It teaches if he was even, it tips the scale.
  And one who performs one mitzvah beyond his merits is rewarded? But against this they raised the following difficulty: One whose merits outnumber his sins is punished, and it is as though he had burnt the whole Torah, not leaving even a single letter. And one whose sins outnumber his good merits is rewarded, and it is as though he had fulfilled the whole Torah, not omitting even a single letter!
  Abaye said: Our Mishnah means that they prepare for him a good day and a bad day.Rava said: With whom does this agree? With R. Ya’akov, who said: There is no reward for mitzvot in this world. 
  For it was taught: R. Ya’akov said: There is not a single mitzvah in the Torah whose reward is [stated] at its side which is not dependent on the resurrection of the dead. [Thus:] in connection with honoring parents it is written, “That your days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with you” (Deuteronomy 5:15). And in reference to shooing away the mother bird it is written, “That it may go well with you, and that you may live a long life” (Deuteronomy 22:7).
  Now, if one's father said to him, “Go up to the top of the building and bring me young birds,” and he ascends to the top of the building, sends away the mother bird and takes the young, and on his return falls and is killed — where is this goodness of this one’s days? And where is the lengthening of this one’s days? Rather, “that it may go well with you” in a world that is wholly good; and “that you may live a long life,” in a world that is entirely long.   
  Yet perhaps this never happened? R. Jacob saw an actual occurrence. Then perhaps he was thinking about [doing] transgressions? The Holy One, blessed be He, does not combine an evil thought with an [evil] act.
  Yet perhaps he was thinking about idolatry, and it is written, “That I may trap the house of Israel in their own heart” (Ezekiel 14:5)? That too was what he said: should you think that there is a reward for mitzvoth in this world, why did these mitzvoth not shield him from being led to [such] thoughts?    
  But didn’t R. Elazar say: Those on their way to perform a mitzvah are not injured? There, when they are going [to fulfill the mitzvah], it is different.
  But R. Elazar said: Those on their way to perform a mitzvah are not injured, neither when going nor when returning? It was a rickety ladder, so that its damage was likely, and where damage is likely one must not rely on a miracle, for it is written, “and Shmuel said: How can I go? If Shaul hears it, he will kill me” (I Samuel 16:2).
  R. Joseph said: Had Aher interpreted this verse as R. Jacob, his daughter's son, he would not have sinned. Now, what happened with Aher? Some say, he saw something like this.
  Others say, he saw the tongue of Huzpith the Interpreter dragged along by a swine.  He said, “The mouth that uttered pearls licks the dust!” He went out and sinned.
  R. Tobi son of R. Kisna pointed out a contradiction to Rava: We learnt: He who performs one mitzvah is rewarded; hence, if he [actively] performs it yes, but if not, no. But the following contradicts this: If he sits and does not commit a transgression he is rewarded as though he has fulfilled a mitzvah! He said to him: There it means, that he had the possibility of transgressing, and he was saved from it.
  As in the case of R. Hanina b. Pappi, whom a certain matron urged [to engage in relations]. He pronounced a certain [magical] formula, whereupon his body was covered with boils and scabs; But she did something and he was healed. He fled and hid in a bath-house in which [even] when two entered, even in daytime, they would suffer harm. The next morning the Rabbis asked him, “Who protected you?” He said to them, “Two
  
  Daf 40a
  
  emperor bearers guarded me all night.” They said to him, “Perhaps you were tempted with fornication and successfully resisted?” For it was taught: Anyone who has the temptation to commit sexual sin and he is protected from it, they make for him a miracle. “Mighty in strength who fulfill His word, hearkening to the voice of His word” (Psalms 103:20): this refers to R. Zadok and his companions. 
  A certain matron enticed R. Zadok. He said to her, “My heart is faint and I am unable; is there anything to eat?” She responded, “There is unclean (non-kosher) food.” He said to her, “What does this matter? He who does this, eats this. She let the oven and was placing it [the forbidden meat] in, when he went in and sat in it. She said to him, “What is the meaning of this?”  He said to her, “One who does this, falls into the this.” She said to him, “Had I known all this, I would not have tormented you.”
  R. Kahana was selling baskets, A certain matron enticed him. He said to her, “I will first adorn myself.” He went up and threw himself  from the roof towards earth, but Elijah came and caught him.  He said to him, “You have troubled me [to come] four hundred parasangs.” He responded, “What caused me to do this? Is it not poverty?” He gave him a shifa [full] of denarii. 
  Rava pointed out a contradiction to R. Nahman. We learned: These are the things the fruit of which one enjoys in this world, while the principal remains for the world to come: And these are they: Honoring one's parents, deeds of loving kindness, and making peace between a person and their neighbor, while the study of the Torah surpasses them all.
  With regard to honoring one’s parents it is written, “That your days may be long, and that it may go well with you” (Deuteronomy 5:15). With regard to deeds of lovingkindness it is written: “He that pursues righteousness and loving kindness finds life, righteousness and honor” (Proverbs 21:21).
  Concerning peacemaking it is said: “Seek peace and pursue it” (Psalms 34:15) and R. Abahu said: We derive “pursuing” from “pursuing.” It is written here: “Seek peace and pursue it” and elsewhere it is written: “He that pursues after righteousness and loving kindness.” Of the study of Torah it is written, “For it is your life, and the length of your days” (Deuteronomy 30:20).   
  But with respect to the shooing of the mother bird from the nest it is also written, “That it may go well with you, and that you live a long life” (Deuteronomy 22:7): then let this be taught too? He teaches [some] and omits [others]. [But] the Tanna states: “These are the things,” yet you say that he teaches [some] and omits [others]! 
  Rava said: R. Idi explained it to me: “Say you of the righteous, when he is good, that they shall eat the fruit of their actions” (Isaiah 3:10): Is there then a righteous person who is good and a righteous person who is not good? Rather one who is good to Heaven and good to people, that one is a righteous person who is good; good to Heaven but not good to people, that one is a righteous person who is not good.   
  Similarly you read: “Woe unto the wicked [that is] evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given unto him” (Isaiah 3:11): Is there then a wicked person that is evil and one that is not evil? Rather, one who is evil to Heaven and evil to people, that one is a wicked person that is evil; One who is evil to Heaven but not evil to people, that one is a wicked person that is not evil. 
  Merit has both a principal and it bears fruit, for it is said: “Say you of the righteous, when he is good [they shall eat of the fruit of their actions”  Transgression has principal but not fruit, for it is said: “Woe unto the wicked when he is evil [for the fruit of his hands shall be done to him].”
  Then how do I interpret, “Therefore they [the wicked] shall eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices” (Proverbs 1:31): Transgression which bears fruit has fruit; that which does not bear fruit has no fruit. 
  Good intention is combined with deed, for it is said: “Then they that feared the Lord spoke one with another: and the Lord hearkened, and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before him, for them that feared the Lord, and that thought upon his name” (Malachi 3:16). Now, what is the meaning of “that thought upon his name”? R. Assi said: Even if one [merely] thinks of performing a mitzvah but is forcibly prevented, the verse ascribes it to him as though he has performed it.
  Evil intention is not combined with deed, for it is said: “If I regarded iniquity in my heart, The Lord would not hear” (Psalms 66:18). Then how do I interpret, “Behold, I will bring evil upon this people, even the fruit of their thoughts” (Jeremiah 6:19)? Intention which bears fruit the Holy One, blessed be He, combines with deed; intention which does not bear fruit the Holy One, blessed be He, does not combine with deed.
  Then what of that which is written, “That I may take the house of Israel in their own heart” (Ezekiel 14:5)? R. Aha b. Ya’akov said: That is written about idolatry, for a Master said: Idolatry is most serious for he who rejects it is as though he admits [the truth of] the whole Torah.
  Ulla said: [This is to be explained] as R. Huna. For R. Huna said: Once a man does wrong and repeats it, it is permitted him. “It is permitted him”! Do you really think so? Rather it becomes as something permitted to him.
  R. Abahu said in the name of R. Hanina: Better that a person sin in private and not profane God’s name in public, as it is said: “As for you, O house of Israel, thus says the Lord God: Go you, serve everyone his idols, even because you will not hearken to Me, but My sacred name you shall not profane” (Ezekiel 20:39).
  R. Il’ai the Elder said: If one sees that his [evil] desire is conquering him, let him go to a place where he is unknown, wear black clothes, cover himself with black, and do as his heart desires, but let him not profane God's name in public.
  But that is not so, for we learned: He who is careless of his Master’s honor, it would have been better had he not come into the world. What is this one? Rabbah said: One who gazes at the [rain]bow. R. Joseph said: One who secretly transgresses!   
  There is no difficulty: the one refers to a case where he can conquer his evil desires; the other, where he cannot. 
  We learned elsewhere: Credit is not granted for the profanation of the [Divine] Name, whether it was done unwittingly or intentionally. What is meant by “credit is not granted?” Mar Zutra said: They [the Divine court] do not act like a shopkeeper. Mar the son of Ravina said: This is to say that if [one's sins and merits] are equally balanced, [the profanation of God’s name] tips the scale. 
  Our Rabbis taught: A person should always 
  
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  regard himself as though he were half guilty and half meritorious: if he performs one mitzvah, happy is he for tilting himself down on the scale of merit; if he commits one transgression, woe to him for tilting himself down on the scale of guilt, as it is said, “But one sinner destroys much good” (Ecclesiastes 9:18):  on account of a single sin which he commits he loses many of the [merits] for the good things [he has done].
  R. Elazar son of R. Shimon said: Because the world is judged by its majority, and an individual [too] is judged by his majority [of deeds, good or bad], if he performs one good deed, happy is he for tilting the scale both for  himself and for the whole world on the side of merit; if he commits one transgression, woe to him for tilting the scale for himself and the whole world on the side of guilt, for it is said: “But one sinner, etc.” — on account of the single sin which this man commits he and the whole world lose much good. 
  R. Shimon b. Yohai said: Even if he is perfectly righteous all his life but rebels at the end, he loses his former [good deeds], for it is said: “The righteousness of the righteous shall not save him one the day of his transgression” (Ezekiel 33:12).  
  Yet let it be regarded as half transgressions and half meritorious deeds! Resh Lakish said: It means that he regretted his former deeds. 
  He who is familiar with Bible, Mishnah, and the ways of the land will not easily sin, as it is said, “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecclesiastes 4:12). But he who is not familiar with Bible, Mishnah and the ways of the land does not belong to civilization.
  GEMARA. R. Elazar son of R. Zadok said: To what are the righteous compared in this world? To a tree standing wholly in a place of purity, but whose branches overhang a place of impurity; when the branches are lopped off, it stands entirely in a place of purity. Thus the Holy One, blessed be He, brings suffering upon the righteous in this world, in order that they may inherit the future world, as it is said, “And though your beginning is small, yet your latter end shall greatly increase” (Job 8:7).
  And to what are the wicked compared in this world? To a tree standing wholly in a place of impurity, but whose branches overhang a place of purity. When the branches are lopped off, it stands entirely in a place of impurity. Thus the Holy One, blessed be He, makes them prosper   in this world, in order to destroy and consign them to the lowest rung, for it is said: “There is a way which seems right to man, But at the end of it are the ways of death” (Proverbs 14:12).
  R. Tarfon and the Elders were once reclining in the upper chamber of the house of Nitza in Lod, when this question was raised before them: Is study greater, or practice? R. Tarfon answered, saying: Practice is greater. R. Akiba answered saying: Study is greater, for it leads to practice. They answered and said:  Study is greater, for it leads to action.  
  It was taught: R. Yose said: Great is learning, since it preceded hallah by forty years, terumoth  and tithes by fifty-four years, sabbatical years by sixty-one, and jubilees by one hundred and three.   
  One hundred and three? But it was actually a hundred and four! He holds that Jubilee effects a release at the beginning of the year.
  And just as learning preceded practice, so does the judgment [for learning] precede [the judgment] for practice, in accordance with R. Hamnuna. For R. Hamnuna said: The beginning of a person’s judgment is only over Torah study, for it is said: “The beginning of judgment is as one let’s out water” (Proverbs 17:14). 
  And just as the judgment for study takes precedence over that of practice, so it does for reward, as it is said: “And he gave them the lands of nations; and they took the labor of the people in possession: that they might keep His statutes, and observe His laws” (Psalms 105:44)
  But he who is not familiar with Bible, Mishnah [and the ways of the land does not belong to civilization]: R. Yohanan said: And he is disqualified from serving as a witness. Our Rabbis taught: He who eats in the market-place is like a dog; And there are those who say that he is disqualified from serving as a witness. R. Idi b. Abin said: The halakhah agrees with “there are those who say.”
  Bar Kappara taught: A bad tempered man 
  
  Daf 41a
  
  gains nothing but his temper; but a good man is fed with the fruit of his deeds. And he who lacks Bible, Mishnah and the ways of the land, one should vow not to benefit from him, as it is said: “Nor sits in the seat of the scoffers” (Psalms 1:1):  his seat is the seat of scoffers.
  May we return to you chapter “a woman is acquired.” 
  A man can betroth [a woman] through himself or through his agent. A woman may be betrothed through herself or through her agent. A man may give his daughter in betrothal when a young girl [either] himself or through his agent. 
   GEMARA. If he can betroth through his agent, is it necessary [to state] through himself? R. Joseph said: It is a greater mitzvah through himself than through his agent. Just as R. Safra [himself] singed an [animal's] head. Rava salted a shibbuta fish.
  Others say that in this matter there is even a prohibition, in accordance with what Rav Judah said in the name of Rav; for Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: A man may not betroth a woman before he sees her, lest he [subsequently] see something repulsive in her, and she becomes loathsome to him, whereas the Torah said, “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18).
  And as to R. Joseph's statement, it relates to the second clause: a woman may be betrothed through herself or through her agent. Now, if she can be betrothed through her agent, is it necessary [to state] through herself? R. Joseph said: It is a greater mitzvah through herself than through her agent. Just as R. Safra [himself] singed an [animal's] head; Rava salted a shibbuta fish. 
  But in this case, there is no prohibition in this case, in accordance with Resh Lakish, who said: It is better to dwell in grief than to dwell in widowhood.
  A man may give his daughter in betrothal when she is a na'arah. Only when a na'arah, but not when a minor: this supports Rav. For Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: One may not give his daughter in betrothal when she is a minor, [but must wait] until she grows up and says: “I want So-and-so.”
  From where do we know [the principle of] agency?  As it was taught: “[Then he shall write her a bill of divorcement . . .] and he shall send [her out of his house]” (Deuteronomy 24:1): this teaches that he may appoint an agent; 
  “then she shall send”:   this teaches that she may appoint an agent; “then he shall send, then he shall send her”: this teaches that the agent can appoint an agent.  
  Now, we have found [the principle of agency] in divorce: how do we know it in respect to betrothal? And should you say that it is derived from divorce [by analogy]; [I would answer] as for divorce, [agency may be valid] because it can take place against her [the wife's] consent?  Scripture says, “Then she shall depart . . . and she shall become [another man's wife],” (Deuteromony 24:2): [the verse] compares marriage to divorce; just as an agent may be appointed for divorce, so may one be appointed for marriage.
  Now, as to what we learned: One who says to his agent: “Go and give terumah [for me],” he should give terumah in accordance with the mind of the owner. If he does not know the mind of the owner, he gives according to the average amount— one fiftieth. 
  
  Daf 41b
  
  If he gave ten parts less or more, the terumah is terumah. If, however, his intention was to add even one part more, his terumah is not terumah. How do we know this? And should you answer that it is derived from divorce, [I would respond:] as for divorce, that [may be] because it is a secular matter! The verse says, “You” “Also you [shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes]” (Numbers 18:3). This comes to include the agent.
  But let Scripture write [it] in respect to terumah, and these [marriage and divorce] would come and be derived from it? Because one can refute [the analogy], since it is possible [to separate terumah] by [mere] thought.  
  Again, as to what we learned:  A company lost their pesah and they said to one [who was registered with them], “Go and seek it, and slaughter it on our behalf”; and he went, found, and slaughtered it, and they [also] took an animal and slaughtered [it]: If his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat with him.
  How do we know this? And should you say that it is derived from these, [I would respond:] as for these, [that may be] because they rank as secular in relation to sacred animals!
  It is derived from R. Yeshoshua b. Korha, for R. Yehoshua b. Korhah said: How do we know that one’s agent is as himself? As it is said, “And the whole assembly of the congregation shall slaughter it [the pesach sacrifice] at dusk” (Exodus 12:6): Does then the whole assembly really slaughter it? Surely, only one person slaughters it. From here it follows that one’s agent is as himself.
  Now, let the Torah write [the principle of agency] in respect to sacrifices, and we can bring the others derive them from it? Now, let the Torah write [the principle of agency] in respect to sacrifices, and we can bring the others derive them from it?
  One cannot be derived from another: but let one be derived from two [others]?   
  Which one should be thus derived? Let the Torah not state it with respect to sacrifices, and we could derive it from these others?  As for these, [it might be argued] that [one may appoint an agent] because they are secular in comparison with sacrifices. Let the Torah not write it in the case of divorce, and we could derive it from the others: As for these, that is because they can be performed with intention.
  But let the Torah not write it of terumah, and it could be derived from the others!
  That indeed is so. Then what is the purpose of “you,” “also you”? It is needed for that which R. Yannai said, for R. Yannai said, “Also you”: just as you are members of the covenant, so must your agents be members of the covenant.
  For this, why do I need a verse? It may be derived from the statement of R. Hiyya b. Abba in the name of R. Yohanan! For R. Hiyya b. Abba said in the name of R. Yohanan: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a divorce from a woman’s husband, because he himself is not subject to the law of marriage and divorce!
  It is necessary, lest I would have said that a slave [cannot serve as an agent], since he is not permitted [to marry]. But a non-Jew, since he is qualified to [separate] terumah from his own [produce], as we learned: If a non-Jew or Samaritan separates terumah, it is valid: I might think that he can also be appointed an agent [for a Jew]; hence it teaches us [otherwise]. 
  Now, according to R. Shimon who exempts [them], as we have taught: The terumah of a non-Jew creates a [forbidden] mixture, and one is liable to an [additional] fifth on its account. But R. Shimon exempts [it], “you” “also you” why do I need it? 
  [It is necessary]: Lest I would say that since the Master said: “You,” but not share-croppers; “You” but not partners; “You” but not guardians;  “You” but not one who separates terumah from what is not his, then I might also say, “You” but not your agents. Hence he teaches us [that it is not so].
  Now, that goes well according to R. Yehoshua b. Korhah. But according to R. Yonatan, who uses this verse for a different derashah, from where do we [derive agency]?
  
  Daf 42a
  
  with a single pesah sacrifice?  Because it is said: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it at dusk” (Exodus 12:6): Does the whole assembly slaughter: surely, only one slaughters! Rather from here [it follows] that all Israel [may] fulfill their obligation by a single pesah sacrifice. Then how does he know that an agent [may be appointed] for sacrifices? 
  From that itself. Yet perhaps it is different there, because he [the slaughterer] has a partnership in it?
  Rather [it is derived] from this: “They shall take to them every man a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for each household” (Exodus 12:3). But perhaps there too [the reason is] that he has a partnership in it? If so, what is the need of two verses? [Hence,] if it has no purpose where it does belong, teach the matter to where it does not belong. 
  But this verse is needed for R. Yitzchak. For R. Yitzchak said: An adult can acquire [on behalf of others], but a minor cannot acquire! That is deduced from, “According to every man's eating [you shall make your count for the lamb]” (Exodus 12:4).
  But that is still required to teach that a pesach sacrifice may be slaughtered [even] for a single person! He holds according to the opinion that the pesach may not be slaughtered for an individual. 
  Then that which R. Giddal said in the name of Rav: How do we know that a person’s agent is as himself? As it is said, “[And you shall take] one prince of every tribe [to divide the land for inheritance],” (Numbers 34:18) let him derive agency from here? Then that which R. Giddal said in the name of Rav: How do we know that a person’s agent is as himself? As it is said, “[And you shall take] one prince of every tribe [to divide the land for inheritance],” (Numbers 34:18) let him derive agency from here?
  Rather [it must be understood] in accordance with Rava son of R. Huna. For Rava son of R. Huna said in the name of R. Giddal in the name of Rav: How do we know that a right can be conferred on a person in his absence? As it is said, “And one prince of every tribe…” Now is that reasonable? Was this an advantage [to each]? Surely there is also a disadvantage, for some like the mountain but not the valley, and others like the valley but not the mountain?
  Rather it must be understood in accordance with Rava son of R. Huna, for Rava son of R. Huna said in the name of R. Giddal in the name of Rav: How do we know that when [minor] orphans come to divide their father's estate, the court appoints a guardian on their behalf, whether to their advantage or disadvantage? (“To their disadvantage”! Why? Rather, to their disadvantage, which will lead to an advantage?) Scripture says, “And one prince of every tribe shall take.”
  R. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: When orphans come to divide their father’s estate, the court appoints a guardian for them, and they select a fair portion for each [orphan]. And when they grow up, they can protest against [the division]. R. Nahman himself said: When they grow up they cannot protest, for if so, how strong is the court’s authority.
  Now, does then R. Nahman agree [with this principle,] “if so, how strong is the court’s authority.” But have we not learned: If the judges’ evaluation was one sixth too little or one sixth too much, their sale is null. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: Their sale is valid, [for] otherwise, how strong is the court’s authority? And R. Huna b. Hinena said in the name of R. Nahman: The halachah is in accordance with the Sages!  
  There is no difficulty: 
  
  Daf 42b
  
  In the one case, they [the judges] erred; in the other, they did not err. If they did not err, what does it mean “[the orphans] may protest”? — They may protest against the directions.
  R. Nahman said: When brothers divide, they are reckoned as purchasers from each other:  [for an error of] less than a sixth, the transaction is valid; exceeding a sixth, it is void; [exactly] one sixth, it is valid, but he returns the amount of error.
  Rava said: That which we said, that [for an error of] less than a sixth the transaction is valid, that is only if one did not appoint an agent; but if he appointed an agent, he can say, “I sent you to benefit me, not to injure me.”
  And that which we said, “exceeding a sixth, the transaction is void”, that is only if one did not say: ‘We will divide according to the court’s evaluation”; but if he said “We will divide according to the court’s evaluation,” the transaction is valid. For we learned: If the judges’ valuation was at one sixth too little or at one sixth too much, their sale is void. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: Their sale is valid.
  And that which you said: “One-sixth, it is valid, but he returns the amount of error,” that was said only of movables, but as for real estate, the law of overcharging does not apply to real estate. When it comes to real estate, this was said only if the division was by evaluation, but not if the division was made by measure, in accordance with Rabbah, who said, Everything which [in which an error was made] in measure, weight or number, even if less than the standard of overcharging, is returnable.
  Now, that which we taught: He who sends forth a fire by a deaf-mute, one not of sound senses, or a minor, is not liable [for the damage caused] by human law, yet liable by the law of Heaven.   
  But if he sends it by a person of sound senses, the person of sound senses is [legally] liable. Yet why so? Let us say that one’s agent is as himself. There it is different, for there is no agent for wrongdoing, for we say: The words of the master and the words of the pupil, to whom does one listen?
  Then when we learned: An agent that does not carry out his instructions, the agent is liable for trespass: if he carries out his instructions, the owner is liable for trespass. In any case, if he carries out the owner’s instructions, the owner is liable for trespass. Why? Let us say: There is no agent for wrongdoing.
  Trespass is different, because the meaning of “sin” is derived from terumah: just as an agent can be appointed for [separating] terumah, so one can be appointed in respect of trespass.
  Then let us learn [a general law] from it? [We cannot] because trespass and misappropriation are two verses which teach the same thing, and we do not learn from two verses that teach the same thing.
  “Trespass,” as we stated. “Misappropriation”—what is that? As it was taught: “For every matter of trespass” (Exodus 22:8): Beth Shammai holds: This is to make liable for intention as for actual deed. But Beth Hillel says: He is not responsible unless he actually misappropriates it, for it is said, “Whether he has not put his hand,” etc. 
  Beth Shammai said to Beth Hillel: But is it not said: “For every matter of trespass”! Beth Hillel responded to Beth Shammai: But is it not said: “To see whether he has not put his hand to his neighbor’s goods?” Beth Shammai said to Beth Hillel: If so, what is the meaning of, “for every matter of trespass?” [They answered]: For I might think, I know it only of himself [the guardian]; how do I know it if he instructs his slave or agent?  Scripture says: “For every matter of trespass.”
  This goes well according to Bet Hillel. But according to Beth Shammai who interpret this verse as [teaching] that intention is reckoned as an act,
  
  Daf 43a
  
  let us learn from it?  Because trespass and slaughtering and selling are two verses with the same teaching, and any two verses that teach the same thing do not teach. “Trespass,” as we said. “Slaughtering and selling,” what does this mean? The verse said, “[If a man steals an ox, or a sheep,] and slaughters it, or sell its; [he shall pay five oxen for an ox etc.,]” (Exodus 21:37):  just as selling is done through another, so may the slaughtering be [done] by another.
  The School of R. Yishmael taught: “or” to include an agent. The School of Hizkiyah taught “for” to include an agent.
  This works well to the one who holds that two verses that come as one cannot teach [concerning other issues]; but to the one that says they can teach, what is there to say? The Torah revealed [the matter] in reference to [sacrifices] slaughtered outside [the Tabernacle]: “Blood shall be imputed unto that man: he has shed blood” (Leviticus 17:4):  ‘that [man’, who slaughtered without], but not his agent.
  Now, we have found this of [sacrifices] slaughtered outside [the Tabernacle]: how do we know it of the whole Torah?  It is derived from [sacrifices] slaughtered outside.
  Instead of learning from [sacrifices] slaughtered outside, let us learn from these others? The Torah went back and wrote, “And that man shall be cut off:” (Leviticus 17:4) since it is irrelevant for its own subject, apply its teaching to the rest of the Torah.
  But to the one who maintains that two verses that come as one do not teach, these words “that man” how does he interpret them? One is to exclude the case of two men who hold the knife and slaughter. And the other, “that [man],” but not one who is compelled; “that [man],” but not one who does so unwittingly; “that [man],” but not one who does so in error.  
  And the other?  [He derives it from] “hu” “hahu.”  And the other?  He does not derive anything from “hu” “hahu.”
  Now, that which was taught: If one says to his agent, “Go out and kill someone,” he is liable, and his sender is exempt. Shammai the Elder said in the name of Haggai the prophet: His sender is liable, for it is said, “You have killed him with the sword of the children of Ammon” (II Samuel 12:9).  What is the reasoning of Shammai the Elder? 
  He holds that two verses that come as one [do teach], and he does not use “hu” “hahu” as the basis for exegesis. Alternatively, he does derive [from “hu” “hahu”]; and what is meant by liable? He is liable by the laws of Heaven.
  From here it follows that the first tanna holds that he is exempt even by the law of Heaven! Rather they differ in respect to a greater or a lesser penalty.   
  And if you want you can say: there it is different, because the Torah revealed it: “You have killed him with the sword of the children of Ammon.”
  And the other?  It counts to you as “the sword of the children of Ammon:” just as you cannot be punished for the sword of the children of Ammon, so will you not be punished for [the death of] Uriah the Hittite. What is the reason? He was a rebel against the kingship, for he said to him [David], “And my lord Yoav, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open field, [shall I then go into my house, to eat and to drink, and to lie with my wife?]” (II Samuel 11:11).
  Rava said: Should you say that Shammai holds that two verses that come as one do teach about [other cases], and that he does not derive anything from “hu” “hahu”: [yet] he agrees that if one says to his agent, “Go out and have incestuous intercourse, [or] eat forbidden fat,” the latter is liable and his sender exempt, because we never find in the whole Torah that one derives pleasure [from wrongdoing] and the other is liable.
  It was stated: Rav said: An agent can be a witness. The school of R. Shila said: An agent cannot become a witness. What is the reason of the school of R. Shila? If we say, because he does not [explicitly] tell him, “Be a witness for me”? If so, if he betroths a woman in the presence of two, and does not instruct them, “You are my witnesses,” is this also not kiddushin?
  Rather [the reasons are thus:] Rav said: An agent can be a witness, for we strengthen his words. The school of R. Shila holds: An agent cannot become a witness; since the master said: “A man's agent is as himself,” it is as if it is he himself.
  They objected: If one says to three, “Go out and betroth the woman on my behalf,’ one is an agent and the other two are witnesses, the words of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: They are all his agents, and an agent cannot be a witness. And they only disagree about three, but as for two, all agree that they cannot [be witnesses]! 
  He [Rav] holds like the following Tanna. As it was taught: R. Natan said: Beth Shammai holds: An agent and one witness [can testify]; but Beth Hillel says: An agent and two witnesses [are required]. Does then Rav rule according to Beth Shammai? Reverse [the opinions in the baraita]. R. Aha son of Rava taught it reversed: Rav said: An agent cannot be a witness; The school of R. Shila ruled: An agent can be a witness. And the law is that an agent can be a witness.
  Rava said in the name of R. Nahman: If one says to two, “Go out and betroth a woman for me,” they are both his agents and his witnesses. And the same is true in respect to divorce;
  
  
  Daf 43b
  
  and also in monetary cases. 
  Now, these are all necessary. For if it had taught us this of kiddushin, [I would say] that is because they make her forbidden; but as for divorce, we might fear that he [one of these] desired her for himself.
  Again, if he had taught us [thus] of divorce, that may be because a woman is not eligible to two men; but as for a monetary matter, I might argue that these [witnesses] are sharing the proceeds. Thus they are [all] necessary.
  What does he hold? If he holds that he who lends [money] to his neighbor in the presence of witnesses must repay him in the presence of witnesses, then these are interested witnesses, for should they say: “We did not repay him,” he [the debtor] can say to them, “Then pay me!”
  Rather he holdw that he who lends money to his neighbor in the presence of witnesses need not repay him in the presence of witnesses, and since they can say, “We returned it to the debtor,” they can also say, “We repaid the creditor.”
  Now, however, that the Rabbis have instituted an oath of inducement, these witnesses [the agents] must swear that they repaid him [the creditor], the creditor swears that he did not receive it [the repayment], and the debtor must repay the creditor.
  A man may give his daughter [etc.]. We learned elsewhere: A na'arah, who has been betrothed,  she or her father can accept her get. R. Yehudah said: Two hands cannot have the same rights. Rather [only] her father can accept her divorce. And anyone who cannot take care of her get cannot be divorced. 
  A man may give his daughter [etc.]. We learned elsewhere: A na'arah, who has been betrothed,  she or her father can accept her get. R. Yehudah said: Two hands cannot have the same rights. Rather [only] her father can accept her divorce. And anyone who cannot take care of her get cannot be divorced. 
  R. Yose son of R. Hanina said: What is R. Yohanan’s reason according to the rabbis? Divorce, since she brings herself back into her father’s domain, both she and her father [can accept it]. But kiddushin, which takes her out of her father’s domain, only her father [can accept it], but not she herself.
  But what of ma’amar, which takes her out of her father’s domain, yet we learned:
  
  
  Daf 44a
  
  A minor [widowed] from betrothal, cannot perform ma’amar except with her father's consent; whereas in the case of a na'arah, either her own consent or her father's consent! 
  Rather if it was stated, it was thus stated: R. Yose son of R. Hanina said: What is R. Yohanan’s reasoning according to the Rabbis? Kiddushin, which requires her consent, [only] her father [can accept it] but not she; divorce, which is even against her will, either she or her father [can accept it].
  But ma’amar [too] requires her consent, yet it is taught, either she or her father [can accept it]? There the reference is to ma’amar [done] against her will, and it is in agreement with Rabbi. For it was taught: One who performs ma’amar with his yevamah without her consent,  Rabbi ruled: He acquires her; but the Sages say: He does not.
  What is Rabbi’s reason? He deduces it from intercourse with a yevamah: just as intercourse with a yevamah [acquires her even] against her will, so here too [ma’amar is valid even] against her will. But the Rabbis hold: We learn from kiddushin: just as kiddushin must be done with her consent, so too [ma’maar] must be done with her consent.
  What are they arguing about? Rabbi holds: Matters related to a yevamah should be learned from a yevamah. But the Rabbis hold: Kiddushin should be learned from kiddushin.
  Reason too supports R. Yohanan's response, since the second clause teaches: Which is not so in the case of kiddushin. Shall we then say that this refutes Resh Lakish? Resh Lakish could say to you: That agrees with R. Judah, who ruled: Two hands cannot merit simultaneously.
  If [this clause is] R. Judah, [why state,] “which is not so in the case of kiddushin”; let it teach, which is not so in the case of divorce? That indeed is so, but since he teaches [the laws of] ma’amar, which are similar to kiddushin, he also states: “which is not so in the case of kiddushin.”
  Now, to R. Judah, why is ma’amar different?  Since she is already tied [to the yabam]. Now that you have come to this, you should also have no difficulty on R. Yohanan at the very outset—ma’amar is different, because is already tied. 
  We learned: A man may give his daughter in betrothal when she is a na'arah, himself or through his agent: “himself or through his agent,” yes,  but not through herself or her agent. This refutes Resh Lakish. Resh Lakish could say to you: This too is in accordance with R. Judah.
  Can you really interpret this as R. Judah’s [ruling]? But the second clause teaches: If one says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this one etc.”   
  And we said: Which tanna teaches, “Be betrothed, be betrothed?” And Rabbah replied: It is R. Shimon, who maintained: Unless he declared to each separately, [I take] an oath.
  And should you answer: It is all the opinion of R. Judah, and in the matter of detailed enumeration he agrees with R. Shimon, yet does he really hold this? 
  Surely it was taught: This is the general rule: If he made a comprehensive statement, he is liable for only one [sacrifice]; a detailed enumeration, he is liable for each one separately, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah said: [If he declares, “I take] an oath [that I am] not indebted to you, not to you, not to you,” he is liable for each one. R. Elazar said: [If he declares, “I am] not [indebted] to you, not to you, not to you, and not to you: [for this I take] an oath” he is liable for each one.   R. Shimon said: He is never liable [for each separately] unless he declares [I take] an oath to each separately! 
  Rather the whole mishnah accords with R. Shimon, and in the matter of agency he agrees with R. Judah.
  R. Assi did not go to the Bet Hamidrash. He found R. Zera. He said to him, “What was said just now in the Bet Midrash?” He said back, “I also did not go, but R. Abin went, and he told me that the entire community agreed with R. Yohanan; and Resh Lakish cried like a bird, “And she goes out…and she becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2) but no one listened to him. He asked him, “Is R. Abin reliable?” He replied, “Yes. He is as from the sea into the frying pan!” 
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: I [read in this story] neither R. Abin b. R. Hiyya nor R. Abin b. Kahana, but simply R. Abin. What is the implication? In raising self-contradictions.
  Rava asked R. Nahman
  
  Daf 44b
  
  Can a na'arah appoint an agent to receive her get from her husband? Is she similar to her father's hand, or is she similar to her father’s courtyard? Is she similar to her father’s hand: just as her father can appoint an agent, so too she appoint an agent. Or perhaps, she is as her father's courtyard, and [hence] she is not divorced until the get actually reaches her hand.
  Now, is Rava doubtful about this? But didn’t Rava say: If he [the husband] wrote a get and placed it in her slave's hand while he is asleep and she is watching over him, it is a valid divorce; but if he is awake, it is not a valid divorce. Now, why is it not a [valid] divorce if he is awake? [Surely] because he is like a courtyard guarded without her awareness. And if you think that she [a na'arah] is like her father's courtyard, then she should not be divorced even when the get reaches her hand, since she is like her father's courtyard that is guarded without his awareness! 
  Rather it is obvious to him [Rava] that she is like her father's hand, but this is what he was asking: is she as strong as her father’s hand, so that she can appoint an agent, or not? He said to him: She cannot appoint an agent. 
  He raised an objection: If a minor [ketanah] says: “Receive my get on my behalf,” it is not a valid divorce until it reaches her hand. Behold in the case of a na'arah it is a [valid] divorce! What are we dealing with here? With one who has no father.
  But since the second clause teaches: If her father says to him [the agent], “Go and accept the get for my daughter,” should her husband wish to retract, he cannot. From here we can deduce that the first clause refers to one who has a father? The text is defective, and should read thus: If a minor says: “Accept my get for me,” it is not a [valid] divorce until it reaches her hand; but in the case of a na’arah it is a [valid] divorce. When was this said? If she has no father. But if she has a father and he says: “Go and accept the get for my daughter,” and [then] the husband wishes to retract, he cannot.
  It has been stated: A minor [ketanah] who was betrothed without her father's knowledge, Shmuel said: She requires both a get and mi'un. Karna said: This is inherently difficult: if [she needs] a get, why mi’un, and if mi’un, why a get?   
  They said to him: But didn’t Mar Ukba and his court at Kafri reverse it and sent it to Rav. He said to them, “By God! She requires both a get and mi'un, yet Heaven should have mercy that the seed of Abba b. Abba should say such a thing.”
  And what is the reason? R. Abba son of R. Ika: She needs a divorce, in case her father consented to the kiddushin, while she needs mi’un, in case her father did not consent to the kiddushin, and it is said that the kiddushin with her sister [by the same man] is invalid.
  R. Nahman said: This refers to a case where they arranged the match.
  Ulla said: She does not even require mi'un. [What!] even though there was an arrangement? He who taught this did not learn the other. Others say: Ulla said: If a minor [ketanah] is betrothed without her father's knowledge, she does not even require mi'un.   
  R. Kahana objected: And if [any among] all these died, protested, were divorced, or found to be barren, their rival-wives are permitted [to the yabam]. 
  Now, who betrothed her?  If we say that her father betrothed her? Is then mi’un sufficient? She requires a proper get! Hence it must surely mean that she betrothed herself, yet it is taught that she requires mi'un! 
  He raised the objection and he [himself] answered it: For instance she had been treated as an orphan during her father's lifetime.
  R. Hamnuna objected: He [her father] may not sell her to a relative. In the name of R. Elazar it was said: He may sell her to a relative.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  And both agree that he may sell her, as a widow, to a high priest, and as a divorcee or a halutzah, to an ordinary priest. Now, this widow, what is the case? If we say that her father betrothed her, can he [subsequently] sell her? Behold a man cannot sell his daughter as a slave after she has already been married!  Rather it must mean that she betrothed herself, and yet it calls her a widow?
  R. Amram said in the name of R. Yitzchak: Here we are dealing with the kiddushin of designation, and it is in accordance with R. Yose son of R. Judah, who held: The original money was not given for the purpose of kiddushin.
  It was stated: If he [who betrothed her without her father’s knowledge] dies, and she falls before his brother for yibum: R. Huna said in the name of Rav: She must perform mi'un on account of his ma’amar, but requires no mi'un on account of his levirate ties. How so? If he [the yavam] performed ma’amar with her, she requires a get, halitzah, and mi'un.  
  She needs a get, lest her father consented to the kiddushin of the second one [the yavam]. She needs halitzah lest her father consented to the first [brother's] kiddushin. She needs mi'un, lest her father did not consent to the kiddushin of either the first or the second, and people would say: Kiddushin with her sister has no validity.
  But if he does not perform ma’amar with her, she merely requires halizah. What might you say: let her also require mi'un, lest it be said that kiddushin with her sister is not valid. Everyone knows that [marriage with] the sister of a halutzah is [forbidden] by rabbinic law only, for Resh Lakish said: Here Rabbi taught: The sister of a divorced woman is [forbidden] by biblical law, whereas the sister of a haluzah, by rabbinic law.
  Two men were drinking wine under poplar trees in Babylonia. One of them took a goblet of wine, gave it to his fellow and said: “Betroth your daughter to my son.” Ravina said: Even according to the one who said we are concerned that the father
  
  Daf 45b
  
  may have consented, we [certainly] do not say: “Perhaps the son consented.” The rabbis said to Ravina: Perhaps, he [the son] had appointed him [the father] his agent? A man is not so brazen as to appoint his father as an agent. But perhaps he [the son] had made his desire for her known in his presence? Rabbah b. Shimi said to them: The Master [Ravina] has explicitly stated that he does not accept the view of Rav and Shmuel.
  A certain man betrothed [a minor] with a bunch of vegetables in the market place. Ravina said. Even according to the one who says we are concerned lest her father consented, that is only [when it is done] in an honorable manner, but when it is done in a disgraceful manner, no.
  R. Aha of Difti asked Rabina: What aspect was disgraceful? Was it the disgrace that it was done with vegetables, or [the fact that it was done in] a market-place? The practical difference arises if he betroths her with money in the market place, or with a bunch of vegetables at home. What then? He said to him: Both are disgraceful.
  A certain man said, “[Our daughter must be married] to my relative;” whereas she [his wife] said, “To my relative.” She pressured him until he told her that she could be [married] to her relative. While they were eating and drinking, his relative went up to the roof and betrothed her.
  Abaye said: It is written: “The remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity, nor speak lies” (Zephaniah 3:13). Rava said: It is a presumption that one does not bother to prepare a banquet and then destroy it.  
  What case would they disagree about? — They would disagree in the case where he did not trouble.
  If she [a minor] became betrothed with her father's consent, and her father then went overseas, and she arose and married: Rava said: She may eat terumah until her father comes and protests [against the marriage]. R. Assi said: She may not eat, lest her father return and protest, and so a non-priest will retrospectively be found to have eaten terumah. Such a case occurred, and Rav was concerned about R. Asi's opinion. 
  R. Shmuel b. Yitzchak said: Yet Rav admits that if she dies he [her husband] does not inherit from her, [because] we place the money in the hands of its [previous] possessor.  
  If she became betrothed with [her father’s] knowledge and married without his knowledge, and her father is present: R. Huna said: She may not eat [terumah]; R. Yirimiyah b. Abba said: She may eat.
  If she became betrothed with [her father’s] knowledge and married without his knowledge, and her father is present: R. Huna said: She may not eat [terumah]; R. Yirimiyah b. Abba said: She may eat. R. Yirmiyah b. Abba said: She may eat: even according to R. Assi, who ruled that she may not eat: it is only there, for her father might return and protest; but here, since he is silent, [it shows that] he does consent.
  If she became betrothed without her father’s knowledge and married without her father's knowledge, and her father is present, R. Huna said: She may eat [terumah]: R. Yirmiyah b. Abba said: She may not eat. Ulla said: This [ruling] of R. Huna is “as vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes” (Proverbs 10:26). Now if there, where her kiddushin was biblically valid, you say that she may not eat, how much more so here!
  
  Daf 46a
  
  [Hence] the disciple's view is preferable. Rava said: What is R. Huna’s reason? Because she was treated as an orphan during her father's lifetime.
  It was stated: If a minor became betrothed without her father’s knowledge: Rav said: Both she and her father can prevent [it]. R. Assi said: Her father, but not her. It was stated: If a minor became betrothed without her father’s knowledge: Rav said: Both she and her father can prevent [it]. R. Assi said: Her father, but not her.
  Rav said to them Do not follow sources that can be interpreted in an opposite manner: He could resolve for you that it refers to a case where he seduced her not for the purpose of marriage. If he did not seduce her for the sake of marriage, is a verse even necessary!  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: [It is necessary] to teach that he [her seducer] must pay the fine as for a seduced young girl.
  R. Joseph said to him: If so, this is what was taught: “He shall surely pay a dowry for her to be his wife” (Exodus 22:15): [this means] that she needs kiddushin from him. But had he seduced her with marital intent, why is kiddushin required? Abaye said: She needs kiddushin with her father's knowledge. 
  He who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this one” if any one of them is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. He who says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this one” if any one of them is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. If she eats them one by one, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah.
  GEMARA. Which tanna taught: “Be betrothed, be betrothed”? Rabbah said: It is R. Shimon who said, until he declares [“I take] an oath” to each one separately.
  With this and with this and with this [and they are all together worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. If she eats them one by one, she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah]. To what does this refer? If we say, to the first clause, why specifically if she eats them; even if she put them down she is also [betrothed], since he says: “Be betrothed to me with this one.” Rather it refers to the second clause.
  And even [if there is a perutah's worth] in the first one [only]? But it is a debt! R. Yohanan said: Behold a table, meat and knife, yet we have no mouth to eat!
  Rav and Shmuel said: After all, it refers to the first clause, and it is stated in the form of “it is not even necessary to state.” It is not even necessary to state that if she put them down she is [betrothed] only if [one] is worth a perutah, and not otherwise. But if she eats them, I might argue that since her benefit is immediate, she resolves to give over herself [even for less than a perutah]. Hence we are informed [otherwise].
  R. Ammi said: After all, it applies to the second clause; and what is meant by, unless one of them is worth a perutah? Unless the last one is worth a perutah.
  R. Ammi said: After all, it applies to the second clause; and what is meant by, unless one of them is worth a perutah? Unless the last one is worth a perutah.
  
  
  Daf 46b
  
  her mind is set upon the perutah. [3] Learn that money in general is returned.
  It was stated: One who betroths his sister: Rav ruled: The money returns [to the man]; And Shmuel ruled: The money is a gift. Rav said: The money returns: A man knows that kiddushin with his sister is invalid, hence he resolved and gave it as a deposit. Then let him tell her that it is a deposit? He thought that she would not accept it.
  It was stated: One who betroths his sister: Rav ruled: The money returns [to the man]; And Shmuel ruled: The money is a gift. Rav said: The money returns: A man knows that kiddushin with his sister is invalid, hence he resolved and gave it as a deposit. Then let him tell her that it is a deposit? He thought that she would not accept it.
  Ravina raised an objection: If one separates his hallah from the flour, it is not hallah, and it is robbery in the priest's hand. Now why is it robbery in the priest's hand? Let us say that a man knows that hallah is not separated from flour, and therefore he resolved and gave it as a gift?
  There it is different, as it may result in a transgression. For the priest may happen to possess less than five quarters of flour and this [flour given to him]; he will then knead them together and think that his dough is fit [to be eaten], and thus come to eat it in the state of tevel.
  But didn’t you say that a man knows that hallah is not separated from flour! He knows, yet he does not really know.He knows that hallah is not separated from flour, yet he does not really know: for he thinks: What is the reason? Because of the priest's trouble; and the priest has forgiven his trouble.
  Yet let it be terumah [i.e., hallah], and let it not be eaten until hallah has been separated  for it from elsewhere?   Did we not learn: [If one separates terumah] from a perforated [pot] for [the produce grown in] an unperforated pot, it is terumah, but it may not be eaten until terumah and tithes are separated for it from elsewhere!
  In two pots, he will obey, but with one pot he will not obey.
  Alternatively: the priest will indeed obey; but the owner will think that his dough has been made fit, and so come to eat it in a state of tevel.
  But did you not say that “a man knows that hallah is not separated from flour”? He knows, yet he does not really know. He knows that hallah is not separated from flour, yet he does not really know: for he thinks: What is the reason? Because of the priest's trouble; and the priest has forgiven his trouble.
  Yet let it be terumah [i.e., hallah], and say that he [the Israelite] should separate again. Did we not learn: [If one separates terumah] from an unperforated pot upon [the contents of] a perforated one, it is terumah, yet he must separate terumah again. Yet let it be terumah [i.e., hallah], and say that he [the Israelite] should separate again. Did we not learn: [If one separates terumah] from an unperforated pot upon [the contents of] a perforated one, it is terumah, yet he must separate terumah again.
  Does he not obey [in the case of one pot]? Surely we learned: If one separates a cucumber [as terumah] and it is found to be bitter, or a melon, and it is found to be rotten, it is terumah, but he must make another separation.
  There it is different, for according to the Torah it is proper terumah, from R. Elai. For R. Ilai said: How do we know that if one separates bad [produce] for good produce, the terumah is valid?  Because it is said, “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it the best thereof,” (Numbers 18:32). Now if it not sacred, why would he bear sin? From it follows that if one separates from bad for good [produce], his separation is terumah.
  Rava said:
  
  Daf 47a
  
  This was taught only if he said to her, “With this one and with this one and with this one.” But if he said to her, “[Be betrothed to me] with these,” even if she eats [them one by one], she is betrothed: when she eats, she is eating from her own.
  It was taught in accordance with Rava: [If he says] “Be betrothed to me with an acorn, a pomegranate and a nut”; or if he says to her, “Be betrothed to me with these” if they are all together worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. “[Be betrothed to me] with this and this and this” — if they are all together worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. “With this one” and she took and ate it; “with this one,” and she took it and ate it; “and also with this one, and also with this one” — she is not betrothed unless one of them is worth a perutah.
  Now, this [clause], “with an acorn, a pomegranate, and or a nut,” what is the precise situation? If we assume that he said to her, “or with an acorn, or with a pomegranate, or with a nut”? “If they are altogether worth a perutah she is betrothed”! But he said: “or”! Alternatively, if he said, “with an acorn and a pomegranate and a nut” then it is identical with “with this and with this!” Rather it must surely mean that he said to her, “With these.” But since the second clause teaches: or if he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with these,” it follows that the first clause does not refer to “with these”! 
  The [second clause] explains] the first clause, “Be betrothed to me with an acorn, a pomegranate and a nut,” How so? For instance he said to her: “Be betrothed to me with these.” 
  Now, the final clause teaches: “With this one” and she took and ate it: if one of them is worth a perutah she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. 
  Whereas the first clause draws no distinction whether she eats or lays it down.  This proves that whenever he says to her, “with these,” if she eats, she eats her own. This proves it.
  That goes well to the one that said that it refers to the second clause, and what is meant by, “unless one of them is worth a perutah”? Unless the last is worth a perutah. Then here too [in the baraita just quoted] it means, unless the last is worth a perutah.
  But according to Rav and Shmuel, who says that it refers to the first clause, and it was necessary to state this because of eating: here general statements are given, but separate statements are not given?
  Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi, who said: There is no difference between “the size of an olive, the size of an olive,” and “the size of an olive and the size of an olive”: they are [both] separate enumerations.
  Rav said: If one betroths [a woman] with a debt, she is not betrothed: a loan is given to be expended. Shall we say that this is disputed by tannaim: If one betroths [a woman] with a debt, she is not betrothed; but some say she is betrothed. Do they not disagree about this: one master holds that a loan is given to be expended, whereas the other holds that it is not?
  Now, is that plausible? Consider the second clause: And both agree in respect to purchase that he acquires it; but if you say that a loan is given to be expended, how does he acquire it?
  R. Nahman said: Huna our companion relates this [baraita] to another matter. What are we dealing with here? For instance he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and the maneh was found to be short of a dinar: one Master holds that she is ashamed to claim it;  the other, that she is not.
  But rather with regard to what R. Elazar said: [One who says,] “Be betrothed to me with a maneh,” and he gives her a dinar, she is betrothed, and he must pay the rest; shall we say that he stated this ruling as one side in a tannaitic dispute?  I will say: when the maneh lacks [but] a dinar, she may be embarrassed to claim it; when the maneh is short ninety-nine, she is not embarrassed to claim it.
  They objected: If one says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me with the deposit which I have in your possession,” and she goes and finds that it is stolen or destroyed; if the value of a perutah is left of it, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. But in the case of a loan, even if a perutah’s worth of it is not left, she is betrothed. R. Simeon b. Elazar said in the name of R. Meir:
  
  Daf 47b
  
  A loan is the same as a deposit.  They differ only in so far as one master holds that a loan, even if there is not a perutah's worth left [is valid kiddushin], whereas the other holds it is [valid] only if a perutah's worth is left, but not otherwise: but all agree that if one betroths [a woman] with a loan [and the money is still in her possession], she is betrothed!
  Rava said: Is this reasonable? Is this baraita correct; surely it is corrupt! [For] this deposit, what is the case?
  If she guaranteed against loss, it is identical with a loan. If she did not guarantee against loss, if so, instead of the second clause teaching, “but in the case of debt, even if a there is not a perutah's worth left, she is betrothed,” let a distinction be made and taught in the case [of deposit] itself: When is this so? Only if she did not guarantee against loss; but if she did, even if there is not a perutah's worth left, she is betrothed.
  Rather, resolve [the baraita] in this manner: in the case of debt, even if a perutah's worth is left, she is not betrothed.
  R. Shimon b. Elazar said in the name of R. Meir:  A loan is the same as a deposit. What are they arguing about? Rabbah said: I found the rabbis at the academy sitting and explaining. They differ as to whether a loan rests in the possession of the owner [the creditor] in respect of retraction, and likewise in respect of unpreventable accidents:
  one Master holds that a loan rests in the possession of the debtor, and likewise in respect of unpreventable accidents; and the other holds that it rests in the possession of the creditor, and likewise in respect of unpreventable accidents. 
  But I told them, as for unpreventable accidents, all agree that it is in the possession of the debtor. What is the reason? It is no less than a loaned item: if for a loaned item, which is returnable as it is, one is liable in respect of unpreventable accidents, how much more so for a debt! Rather they [merely] differ as to whether a loan is the possession of the owner with respect to retraction.
  If so, when R. Huna said: If one borrows an axe from his neighbor, if he chopped [wood] with it, he acquires it; if not, he does not acquire it. Shall we say that he gave his ruling as dependent upon [a dispute of] tannaim?
  No. They differ only in respect of a [monetary] loan, which does not need to be returned as it is; but with the loan of an item which is returnable as it is, all agree that if he chopped with it he does [acquire it,] but if he did not chop with it he does not acquire it.
  Shall we say that this [Rav’s statement] is disputed by tannaim? [For it was taught: If a man says to a woman:] “Be betrothed to me with a debt document,” or if he has a loan in the hands of others and transfers it to her: R. Meir said: She is betrothed; the Sages say: She is not betrothed. This “debt document” what is the case? If we say, a debt document against others; then it is identical with “a loan in the hands of others?” Hence it must surely mean a debt document of her debt, and thus they differ in respect to betrothing [a woman] by a debt! 
  After all, it means a debt document against others, and here they differ both on a debt contracted with a document and a debt contracted verbally.
  Concerning a debt contracted with a document, what are they arguing about? They argue about the dispute between Rabbi and the sages. For it was taught: A note is acquired by transfer, the words of Rabbi. But the sages say: Whether he writes [a bill of sale] without delivering [the note itself] or whether he delivers it without writing [a bill of sale], he does not acquire it unless he both writes [a document of sale] and delivers [the original note].
  One Master agrees with Rabbi; the other does not agree with Rabbi.
  Alternatively, no one accepts Rabbi's view, but here they differ with regard to R. Papa’s statement, for R. Papa said: When one sells a document to his fellow he must write for him, “Acquire it together with all its obligations”: one Master agrees with R. Papa; the other does not agree with R. Papa.
  Alternatively, all agree with R. Papa. But here they differ over Shmuel’s statement. For Shmuel said:
  
  Daf 48a
  
  If one sells a note of debt to his neighbor and then renounces it [the debt], it is renounced; and even an heir can renounce it. One Master agrees with Shmuel; the other does not agree with Shmuel.
  Alternatively, all agree with Shmuel, and here they differ in respect to the woman. One Master holds: The woman relies on him, reasoning, he will not leave me [without any benefit] and renounce [the debt] in favor of another; whereas the other Master holds: The woman does not rely on him.
  With regard to a debt contracted verbally, what do they disagree about? With regard to the statement of R. Huna in the name of Rav. For R. Huna said in the name of Rav: [If A says to B,] “The maneh which I have in your possession, give it to C”: [if said] in the presence of the three of them [viz., A, B and C], he acquires it. 
  One Master holds, when Rav said this, he said it only of a deposit, but not of a loan; and the other holds that there is no difference between a deposit and a loan.
  Let us say that this is disputed by tannaim? [For it was taught: If he says:] “Be betrothed to me with a document:” R. Meir said: She is not betrothed; R. Elazar said: She is betrothed. The sages say: They evaluate the paper: if it is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.
  This document, what is the case? If we say, a note of debt against others, then R. Meir would contradict himself. Hence it must mean her own debt document, and thus they differ in respect to betrothal by debt!
  R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: What are we dealing with here? Where he betroths her with a document without witnesses,
  and R. Meir follows his own view that the witnesses who sign dissolve [the marriage]; while R. Elazar follows his own view that the witnesses to the delivery dissolve it; while the Rabbis are in doubt whether it is as R. Meir or R. Elazar; therefore the paper is evaluated, [and] if it is worth a perutah she is betrothed, and if not, she is not betrothed.
  Alternatively, it was a case where it was not written specifically for her sake, and they differ in respect to Resh Lakish’s [statement]. For Resh Lakish asked: What if a deed of betrothal is not written expressly for her [the betrothed's] sake? Do we compare betrothal to divorce: just as divorce must be expressly for her sake, so must betrothal be expressly for her sake; or perhaps, [different] forms of betrothal are compared to each other: just as betrothal by money need not be for her sake, so betrothal by deed need not be for her sake?
  After asking the question, he resolved it: Betrothal is compared to divorce, [for Scripture writes] “and when she goes . . . and she becomes [another man's wife]” (Deuteronomy 24:2).   One Master agrees with Resh Lakish; the other does not.
  Alternatively, all agree with Resh Lakish, and what are we dealing with here? Where he wrote it for her sake but without her knowledge, and they differ in the same dispute as Rava and Ravina, R. Papa and R. Sheravia. For it was stated: If it is written for her sake but without her knowledge, — Rava and Ravina maintain: She is betrothed; R. Papa and R. Sheravia rule: She is not betrothed.
  Shall we say that it [Rav’s statement] is similar to the debate between the following tannaim? For it was taught: [If a woman says to a man,] “Make me a necklace, earrings and [finger] rings, and I will be betrothed to you,” as soon as he makes them, she is betrothed, the words of R. Meir. But the Sages say: She is not betrothed until the money reaches her hand. 
  This money, what does it refer to? If we say, the same money, it would follow that according to the first view even if that money does not [reach her hand]; but if so, with what would he be betrothing her?   Hence it must surely refer to other money, which proves that they differ over betrothal by debt.
  And they reason that according to all tannaim wages are owed from beginning to end, hence it is a loan. And do they not differ on the following: one Master holds, If he betroths [a woman] with a loan, she is betrothed, and one master holds that if he betroths with a loan she is not betrothed?
  No: all agree that if he betroths with a loan, she is not betrothed, but here they differ as to whether wages are incurred from beginning to end. One Master holds,
  
  Daf 48b
  
  Wages are incurred only at the end; while the other holds that wages are incurred from beginning to end.
  Alternatively, all hold that wages are incurred from beginning to end, and that one who betroths by a loan is not betrothed, but here they dispute whether an artisan acquires by improvement of the vessel; one Master holds that an artisan does acquire title by the improvement of the vessel, and the other holds that an artisan does not acquire title by the improvement of the utensil.
  Alternatively, all hold that an artisan does not obtain a title by the improvement of the vessel, and that wages are incurred from beginning to end, and that betrothal with debt is not valid, but what are we dealing with here? When he added a jewel of his own: one Master holds, [When one betroths a woman with a] debt and a perutah, her mind is on the perutah; the other holds, her mind is on the debt
  And [they differ] in the [same] dispute as the following Tannaim. For it was taught: “[Be betrothed to me] with the wage for what I have done for you,” she is not betrothed; with “the wage for what I will do for you,” she is betrothed. . Natan said: ‘With the wage for what I will do for you,” she is not betrothed; all the more so, “with the wage for what I have done for you.”
  R. Yehudah Hanasi said: In truth it was stated, whether [he said], “with the wage for what I have done for you” or “with the wage for what I will do for you,” she is not betrothed; yet if he adds something of his own, she is betrothed.
  The first tanna and R. Natan differ in respect to wages. R. Natan and R. Yehudah Hanasi differ in respect to [betrothal by] debt and a perutah: one holds that then her mind is on the debt, whereas the other holds that it is on the perutah.
  1) [If a man says to a woman], “Be betrothed to me with this cup of wine,” and it is found to be of honey, or “of honey” and it is found to be of wine; 2) “with this silver denar,” and it is found to be of gold, or “of gold” and it is found to be of silver; 3) “on condition that I am wealthy,” and he is found to be poor, or “poor” and he is found to be rich, she is not betrothed.  4) Rabbi Shimon says: if he deceives her to [her] advantage, she is betrothed.
  GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: [If he says] “Be betrothed to me with this cup”: one [baraita] taught: [he meant] with it and with its contents;  another [baraita] taught; with it, but not with its contents; and another [baraita] taught: with its contents, but not with it. Yet there is no difficulty: one refers to water, one to wine, and one with brine. 
  If he deceives her to [her] advantage, she is betrothed: But does not R. Shimon agree [that if one sells] wine, and it is found to be vinegar, or, vinegar and it is found to be wine, both [the vendor and the purchaser] can retract? This proves that some prefer wine and others prefer vinegar. So here too, some are pleased with silver and not with gold? 
  If he deceives her to [her] advantage, she is betrothed: But does not R. Shimon agree [that if one sells] wine, and it is found to be vinegar, or, vinegar and it is found to be wine, both [the vendor and the purchaser] can retract?  This proves that some prefer wine and others prefer vinegar. So here too, some are pleased with silver and not with gold? 
  If so, “Be betrothed to me” should have read “be betrothed to him”; “if he deceives her to [her] advantage” should have read “if he deceives him to [his] advantage is required,” “it is found [to be of gold]” but at the very outset it was of gold!
  Rather Rava, I and the lion of our company, and who is he, R. Hiyya b. Avin, explained it, What are we dealing with here? If she said to her agent, “Go and accept kiddushin on my behalf from So-and-so, who said to me, ‘Be betrothed to me with a silver denar’”; and he went and was given a gold denar. One Master holds [she was] particular [about this]; the other, that she indicated the place to him. And what is [the meaning of] “It was found”?  It was wrapped up in a cloth. 
  Abaye said: R. Shimon, R. Shimon b. Gamaliel, and R. Elazar, all hold that one merely indicates the place. R. Shimon, as stated. R. Shimon b. Gamaliel: for we learned:
  
  Daf 49a
  
  A plain get, its witnesses are on the inside; a tied one, its witnesses are on the outside. If the signatures of a plain one are written on the outside, or of a tied one on the inside, both are invalid. R. Hanina b. Gamaliel said: If the signatures of a tied one are written on the inside it is valid, because it can be converted into a plain one.  R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: It all depends on local custom.  
  Now, we asked about this: does not the first Tanna agree that local custom [is the determining factor]? To which R. Ashi  replied: In the place where a plain one is customary and a tied one is made, or in the place where a tied one is customary and a plain one is made, all agree that he certainly cares [what kind of get is made].
  Where do they disagree? Where both are customary, and he [the husband] instructs him [the scribe], “Make me a plain one,” and he goes and makes him a tied one. One Master holds that he cares [about what type is made]; the other Master holds that he merely indicated a place to him.
  R. Elazar, as we learned: If a woman says: “Accept a divorce on my behalf at such and such a place,” and he accepts it elsewhere: R. Elazar ruled it valid. Thus he holds that she merely indicated a place to him.
  Ulla said: The dispute [in the Mishnah] refers to a monetary improvement. But if the improvement is of lineage, all agree that she is not betrothed. What is the reason? [She could say]: I do not want a shoe too large for my foot. It was taught likewise. R. Shimon agrees that if he deceives her by a superiority of lineage she is not betrothed.
  Ulla said: The dispute [in the Mishnah] refers to a monetary improvement. But if the improvement is of lineage, all agree that she is not betrothed. What is the reason? [She could say]: I do not want a shoe too large for my foot. It was taught likewise. R. Shimon agrees that if he deceives her by a superiority of lineage she is not betrothed.
  Mar bar R. Ashi, raised an objection: If so, when it is stated: “On condition that I have a daughter or maidservant who is an adult,” whereas he has none; or on condition that he has not, and he has, which is a monetary improvement, here too he does not disagree!
  Rather, he disagrees in the first clause, and the same is true of the second; so here too he disagrees in the first clause, and the same applies to the last clause.
  Is that really so! There, since both refer to a financial advantage, he disagrees in the first clause and the same is understood of the last. Here, however, where the case is one of superiority of lineage, if it is so that he disagrees, it should be taught. 
  Alternatively, here too superior birth [is meant]. Did you really think that “megudelet” literally means an adult; “megudelet” means “one who braids hair,” for she [the betrothed woman] can say: “It does not please me that she should take up my words and carry them about to the neighbors.’
  Our Rabbis taught: “On condition that I am a reader (karyana),” if he has read three verses [of the Torah] in the synagogue, she is betrothed. R. Judah said: He must be able to read and translate it. Our Rabbis taught: “On condition that I am a reader (karyana),” if he has read three verses [of the Torah] in the synagogue, she is betrothed. R. Judah said: He must be able to read and translate it.
  These words apply if he said to her “karyana.” But if he says: “I am a kara,”  he must be able to read the Torah, Prophets and Writings with precision.
  [If he says,] “On condition that I [know how to] recite”: Hizkiyah said: Halakhot. R. Yohanan said: Torah.
  They raised an objection: What is considered “mishnah”?   R. Meir said: Halakhot. R. Yehudah said: Midrash.  
  
  Daf 49b
  
  What is meant by Torah? The Midrash of the Torah. Now, that is only if he says to her [“on condition that I am] taneina” but if he says to her, “I am a tanna,” he must have learned hilkheta, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta.
  “On condition that I am a disciple [talmid],” we do not say, such as Shimon b. Azzai and Shimon b. Zoma, but rather, one who when asked a single question on his studies in any place can answer it, even in the Tractate of the Kallah. “On condition that I am a Sage,” we do not say, like the sages of Yavneh  or like R. Akiva and his companions, but one who can be asked a matter of wisdom  in any place and he can answer it.
  “On condition that I am mighty,” we do not say, [he must be] like Avner the son of Ner  and Yoav son of Zeruiah, but as long as he is feared by his friends on account of his strength. “On condition that I am righteous,” even if he is absolutely wicked, she is betrothed, for he may have thought of repentance in his mind. 
  “On condition that I am wicked,” even if he is completely righteous, she is betrothed, for he may have thought of idolatry in his mind. “On condition that I am wealthy,” we do not say, like R. Elazar b. Harsom and R. Elazar b. Azariah,  but anyone whose fellow citizens honor him on account of his wealth. 
  Ten kavs of wisdom descended to the world: nine were taken by Eretz Yisrael and one by the rest of the world. Ten kavs of beauty descended to the world: nine were taken by Jerusalem and one by the rest of the world. Ten kavs of wealth descended to the world: nine were taken by the early Romans and one by the rest of the world. Ten kavs of poverty descended to the world: nine were taken by Babylon and one by the rest of the world. Ten kavs of arrogance descended to the world: nine were taken by Elam  and one by the rest of the world.
  But arrogance did not descend to Babylonia! But isn’t it written: “Then I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: ‘To where do they take the measure?’ And he said to me: ‘To build her a house in the land of Shinar’” (Zechariah 5:9–11). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia. 
  Yes, it did come down there [in Babylonia] but made its way there [to Elam]. This also can deduced for it says, “to build her a house”: this proves it. 
  But is that so, for has not a Master said: A sign of arrogance is poverty, and poverty is found in Babylonia! What does poverty mean?  Poverty of Torah, as it is written, “We have a little sister, and she has no breasts,” (Song of Songs 8:8).  And R. Yohanan said about this: This refers to Elam, which was privileged to study but not to teach. 
  Ten kavs of strength descended to the world: nine were taken by the Persians, etc. Ten kavs of lice descended to the world: nine were taken by Media, etc. Ten kavs of sorcery descended to the world: nine were taken by Egypt, etc. Ten kavs of plagues descended to the world: nine were taken by swine, etc. Ten kavs of fornication descended to the world: nine were taken by Arabia, etc.
   Ten kavs of impudence descended to the world: nine were taken by Meshan. Ten kavs of gossip descended to the world: nine were taken by women, etc. Ten kavs of drunkenness descended to the world: nine were taken by Ethiopians, etc. Ten kavs of sleep descended to the world: nine were taken by slaves, and one by the rest of the world.
   “[Be betrothed to me] on condition that I am a priest,” and he is found to be a Levite, or “a Levite” and he is found to be a priest; “a natin,” and he is found to be a mamzer, or “a mamzer” and he is found to be a natin; “a townsman,” and he is found to be a villager, or “a villager” and he is found to be a townsman; “on condition that my house is near the bathhouse,” and it is found to be far, or “far” and it is found to be near; 
  “on condition that I have a daughter or maidservant that braids hair” and he does not have, “or on condition that I do not have”, and he has; “on condition that I have no sons”, and he has, or “on condition that I have sons,” and he does not have In all these cases, even if she declares, “In my heart I would have agreed to be betrothed to him in any case,” she is not betrothed. Similarly if she deceives him.
  GEMARA. A certain man sold his property with the intention of moving to the Land of Israel, but when selling he said nothing. Rava said: Matters that remain in one’s heart have no significance. From where does Rava derive this? If we say, from what we learned:
  
  Daf 50a
  
  “He shall offer it” (Leviticus 1:3) this teaches that they compel him.  I might think, against his will, Scripture says, “with his free will.”
  How is this possible? They force him, until he declares, “I am willing.” Yet why, seeing that in his heart he is unwilling! Hence it must surely be because we say “matters of the heart are not significant.” But perhaps it is different there, for we are witnesses that he is pleased to gain atonement.
  Rather [we can derive Rava’s principle] from the second clause: and you find it likewise in the case of women's divorce and slaves’ manumission: they compel him [the husband or master], until he declares, “I am willing.” Yet why: seeing that in his heart he is unwilling! Hence it must surely be because we say: Matters of the heart are not significant! But perhaps it is different there, because it is a mitzvah to obey the words of the Sages!
  Rather R. Joseph said: [It is deduced] from the following: If one betroths a woman and [then] declares, “I thought her to be a priest's daughter, whereas she is the daughter of a Levite,” or “a Levite's daughter and she is the daughter of a priest”; “is poor, whereas she is wealthy,” or “is wealthy whereas she is poor” she is betrothed, because she has not deceived him. Yet why, seeing that he declares, “I thought [etc.]”? Rather it must be because we say: Matters of the heart are not significant. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, for that [ruling] is a stringency! 
  Rather Abaye said, [it is deduced] from this: In all these cases, even if she declares, “it was my intention to become betrothed to him in any case,” she is not betrothed. Yet why, seeing that she declares, “It was my intention”? But perhaps it is different there, for since he stipulated, it does not rest with her to set aside his stipulation!
  Rather R. Hiyya b. Abin, this occurred at R. Hisda's, and R. Hisda [went] to R. Huna's [to discuss the matter], and they solved it from the following: If one says to his agent, “Bring me [money] from the window [sill] or the chest,” and he brings it to him, even if the master says: “I was thinking only of this [purse],”  yet since he brought him the money from this [place], the master is guilty of trespass. Yet why, seeing that he says: “I was thinking…”? Hence it must surely be because we say that matters of the heart are not significant.
  Yet perhaps it is different there, because he comes to exempt himself from a sacrifice? 
  Then let him declare that he did it intentionally. A person does not declare himself wicked. 
  Then let him say: “I remembered” for it was taught: If the master remembers [that it is of hekdesh] but not his agent, the latter is guilty of trespass.
  A certain man sold his property with the [express] intention of moving to Eretz Yisrael. He moved, but did not settle there. Rava said: When one goes there, it is with the intention of settling, and this man has not settled. Others state [that he ruled]: [He sold it] with the intention of moving, and he has done so.
  A certain man sold his property with the [express] intention of moving to Eretz Yisrael. He moved, but did not settle there. Rava said: When one goes there, it is with the intention of settling, and this man has not settled. Others state [that he ruled]: [He sold it] with the intention of moving, and he has done so.
  1) If he says to his agent, “Go out and betroth to me so-and-so in such and such a place,” and he goes and betroths her elsewhere, she is not betrothed. 2) “She is in such and such a place,” and he betroths her elsewhere, she is betrothed.
  GEMARA. Now, the same was taught about divorce: If he says: “Give my wife a get in such and such a place,” and he gives it to her elsewhere, it is invalid. “She is in such and such a place,” and he gives it to her elsewhere, it is valid.  
  And both are necessary. For if it taught us this of kiddushin, where he comes to draw her near to himself, [he may have thought:] “In this place they love me and they will not say anything against me, but in that place I am hated and they will they say things against me.” But in respect to divorce, where he comes to distance her, I might argue that he does not care. 
  And if it taught us this of divorce, [I might argue] in this place he is willing to be disgraced, but not in the other; [whereas] in respect to betrothal, I might argue that he does not care. Thus [both are] necessary.
  Mishnah: If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah.
  [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.
  Gemara: And the same was taught with regard to ketubot in this manner. Here, it needed to teach about kiddushin, so it also taught it about ketubot. There it needed to teach it about ketubot, so it also taught it about kiddushin. 
  Mishnah: If he betroths two women with the value of a perutah, or one woman with less than the value of a perutah, even if he subsequently sends gifts,
  
  Daf 50b
  
  because he sent them on account of the first kiddushin. The same is true if a minor betroths. 
  GEMARA. And it is necessary [to state both]. For if it taught us the case of a perutah's worth [for two women], [I might argue,] since money has gone forth from him, he may err [and think the kiddushin valid]. But [with respect to] less than a perutah's worth, I might say that he knows that kiddushin with less than a perutah's worth is invalid, and so when he sends gifts, he sends them as kiddushin.  
  And if it had taught us these two cases, that is because one may not be able to distinguish between a perutah and less than a perutah; but when a minor betroths, all know that a minor’s betrothal is nothing; hence when he sends gifts, I might have said that he sends them as kiddushin. Therefore it teaches us [that even in this case, the gifts are not considered kiddushin].
  It was stated: R. Huna said: We are concerned about gifts: and Rabbah also said: We are concerned about gifts. Rabbah said: They raised an objection against our teaching: even if he subsequently sends gifts, she is not betrothed! Abaye answered him: There the reason is as stated: because they were sent on account of the first kiddushin.
  There are those who say: Rabbah said: From where do I know this?  From the reason stated: because they were sent on account of the first kiddushin: Here, where he made a mistake [the gifts are not kiddushin];  but elsewhere, they [the gifts] may be kiddushin.
  And Abaye?   It was stated in the form of “it was not necessary.”  It is unnecessary to state in general [that gifts are not betrothal], seeing that he has not entered into the laws of kiddushin at all. But even here, when he has entered into the laws of kiddushin, I might think that they [the gifts] are kiddushin: hence it teaches us that it is not.
  What do we have to say about this? R. Papa said: In a place where one [first] betroths and then sends gifts, we are concerned about [the gifts being kiddushin]; but in a place where gifts are [first] sent and then one betroths, we are not concerned.
  “[Where] one [first] betroths and then sends gifts.” But that is obvious! It is necessary [to state it] only where the majority [first] betroth and then send gifts, but the minority first send gifts and then betroths: What might you have said? Let us be concerned for the minority; hence it teaches us [otherwise]. 
  R. Aha son of R. Huna asked of Rava: If a ketubah document was established in the marketplace, what is the rule [is she assumed to be married]? He said to him: Simply because a ketubah document was established in the marketplace we should assume her to be a married woman! What did they say about this? R. Ashi said: In a place where they first betroth and then write a ketubah, we are concerned; but in a place where they first write a ketubah and then betroth we are not concerned. 
  In a place where they first betroth and then write? That is obvious! It is necessary to state it only where scribes are not common: What might you have said? He found a scribe. Therefore, it teaches us [that this is not so].
  If one betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister at one time, they are not betrothed. And it once happened that five women, among whom were two sisters, that a man gathered a basket of figs, which was theirs, and which was of the seventh year, and he said, “Behold, you are betrothed to me with this basket,” and one accepted it on behalf of them all and the sages said: the sisters are not betrothed.
  GEMARA. From where do we know this? —Rami b. Hama said: For the verse says, “Do not take a woman and her sister to become rival wives” (Leviticus 18:18). The Torah said that at the time when they become rivals to each other, he can have no marital acquisition with [even] one of them. Rava said to him: If so, how is it written, “And those that do so shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29): if kiddushin with her is not valid, is he then liable to karet?   
  Rather the verse refers to consecutive [marriage], and our mishnah is in accordance with Rabbah, who said: Anything which cannot be [done] consecutively cannot be [done] simultaneously.
  The text [stated]: Rabbah said: That which cannot be [done] consecutively cannot be done simultaneously.’ Abaye
  
  Daf 51a
  
  raised an objection against him: If one gives excessive tithes, his produce is made fit, but his tithes are unfit. But why; let us say: That which cannot be [done] consecutively cannot be [done] simultaneously?  
  He said to him: Tithes are different, because it is possible in the case of half [grains]; for if one says, “Let half of each grain be sanctified [as tithe],” it is sanctified. 
  But cattle tithes are cannot be done in halves, and also [should be impossible] consecutively; yet Rava said: If two [animals] came forth at the tenth, and he [their owner] proclaimed them both as “tenth” the tenth and the eleventh are intermingled!
  Cattle tithe is different, because it is valid when done in error. For we learned: If he called the ninth “tenth,” the tenth, “ninth,” and the eleventh, “tenth,” all three are sanctified.
  But what of the thanksgiving-offering which can neither be in error nor consecutively, yet it was stated: If the thanksgiving-offering is slaughtered over eighty loaves, Hizkiyah said: Forty out of the eighty are sanctified; R. Yohanan said: Not even forty out of the eighty are sanctified!
  Was it not stated on this: R. Joshua b. Levi said: All agree that if he declared: “Let forty out of the eighty be sanctified,” they are sanctified; “forty are not to be sanctified unless eighty are sanctified,” they are not sanctified.
  They argue only where no specific statement is made: one Master holds that his intention is [to arrange] was to take responsibility; the other, that his intention was to make a large offering.
  Now, why did Rava explain the mishnah according to Rabbah; let him deduce it from the fact that it cannot be followed by intercourse?
  He [merely] explains it according to the view of Rami b. Hama.
  It was stated: Kiddushin which cannot be followed by intercourse: Abaye says: It is valid kiddushin; Rava said: It is not valid kiddushin. Rava said: Bar Ahina explained it to me: “When a man takes a woman and has intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 24:1): kiddushin that can be followed by intercourse is [valid] kiddushin; kiddushin which cannot be followed by intercourse is not [valid] kiddushin. 
  We taught [in a mishnah]: If a man betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister simultaneously, they are not betrothed. This implies, [if he betroths] one of a woman and her daughter or of a woman and her sister [without specifying which], she is betrothed: yet why, this is kiddushin which may not be followed by intercourse? This is refutation of Rava.
  Rava could answer you: According to your view, consider the second clause: And it once happened to five women, amongst whom were two sisters, that a man gathered a basket of figs, which was theirs, and which was of the seventh year, and he declared, “Behold, you are all betrothed to me with this basket,” and one accepted it on behalf of all. The sages then ruled, the sisters are not betrothed. Thus, it is only the sisters who are not betrothed, but the strangers (the non-sisters) are. What is the precise case? If we say that he said: “All of you” this is a case of “you and the donkey acquire” and you and the donkey do not acquire.  Rather it must surely mean that he said: “One of you,” and it is taught that the sisters are not betrothed.  
  What is the precise case? If we say that he said: “All of you” this is a case of “you and the donkey acquire” and you and the donkey do not acquire. 
  
  Daf 51b
  
  Rather it must surely mean that he said: “One of you,” and it is taught that the sisters are not betrothed. On Rava’s view, the first clause is difficult; on Abaye’s, the second. 
  Abaye resolves it according to his opinion: If he betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister simultaneously, they are not betrothed; but if [he betrothed] one of a woman and her daughter or of a woman and her sister, she is betrothed. 
  But if he says: “The one of you who is eligible for intercourse, let her be betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. And thus it once happened to five women, among whom were two sisters, that a man gathered a basket of figs and said, “The one of you who is eligible [for intercourse], let her be betrothed to me.” The sages then ruled: the sisters are not betrothed.
  On Rava’s view, the first clause is difficult; on Abaye’s, the second. Abaye resolves it according to his opinion: If he betroths a woman and her daughter or a woman and her sister simultaneously, they are not betrothed; but if [he betrothed] one of a woman and her daughter or of a woman and her sister, she is betrothed. But if he says: “The one of you who is eligible for intercourse, let her be betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. And thus it once happened to five women, among whom were two sisters, that a man gathered a basket of figs and said, “The one of you who is eligible [for intercourse], let her be betrothed to me.” The sages then ruled: the sisters are not betrothed.
  Come and hear: If one gives his daughters in betrothal without specifying which, the adult daughters are not included. But the minors are included. Yet why, seeing that it is kiddushin which cannot be followed by intercourse?  This refutes Rava.
  Rava would answer you: We are dealing here with a case where there is only one adult [daughter] and one minor [daughter].
  But it teaches “adult daughters (bogrot)”! What is bogrot? Bogrot in general. If so, what does this even state?
  Here we are dealing with a case where she [the bogeret] appointed him [her father] as an agent. I might have thought that when he accepted kiddushin he did it on her behalf: hence we are informed that a man does not put aside that by which he benefits.
  But do we not refer [even] to a case where she said to him, “Let my kiddushin money be yours!” Even so, a person does not leave abandon a mitzvah which falls on him, and perform a mitzvah which does not. 
  Come and hear: If one has two sets of daughters by two wives, and he says, “I have betrothed my senior daughter, but do not know whether the senior of the seniors or the senior of the juniors, or the junior of the seniors who is senior to the senior of the juniors,” all are forbidden, excepting the junior of the juniors: the words of R. Meir!
  Here we are dealing with a case where they were [originally] known, and [only] subsequently mixed up. This is also indicated by a precise reading of the mishnah, for it taught: “I do not know,” not, “it was not known.” This proves it.
  If so, why state it? To counter R. Yosi, who said: A person does not permit himself to be brought into doubt; hence we are informed that one does bring himself into doubt.
  Come and hear: If a man betrothed one of two sisters and does not know which, he must give a divorce to both! Here we are dealing with a case where they were [originally] known, and [only] subsequently mixed up. This is also indicated by a precise reading of the mishnah, for it taught: “I do not know,” not, “it was not known.” This proves it.
  If so, what is this saying? The second clause is necessary: If he dies, and has one brother, he must perform halizah with both; if he has two [brothers], one performs halizah and the other yibum; yet if they jump the gun and marry them, they are not compelled to divorce them.
  Specifically he must perform halizah and then yibbum, but not yibum and then halizah, because he may encounter the sister of one bound to him by the Levirate tie (zekukah).  
  Come and hear: If two [non-brothers] betroth two sisters, and this one does not know whom he betrothed and this one does not know whom he betrothed, this one gives two gittin and this one gives two gittin. 
  If so, what is this saying? The second clause is necessary: If they died and this one has a brother and this one has a brother, this brother performs halitzah for both widows and this brother performs halitzah for both widows. If one has one brother and the other has two brothers,
  
  Daf 52a
  
  one brother performs halitzah for both widows and [as regards] the two, one performs halitzah and the other may perform yibbum. If they both preempted and married they do not take [the women] away from  them.    
  Specifically he must perform halizah and then yibbum, but not yibum and then halizah, because he may encounter a yevamah getting married to a member of the public.
  Come and hear: For Tavyumi taught: If the one has five sons and this one five daughters, and he says; “Let one of your daughters be betrothed to one of my sons,” each requires five gittin. If one dies, each requires four divorces and halitzah from one of them!  
  And should you answer, here too it means that they were [originally] known and only subsequently mixed up — but it is taught: “One of your daughters to one of my sons!” This refutation of Rava is indeed a refutation. The agrees with Abaye in Y'AL KGM. 
  It happened to five women. Rav said: Learn from our mishnah four halakhot; yet Rav was sure only of three: 
  [i] If one betroths [a woman] with seventh year produce, she is betrothed. And learn from this if he betroths her with a stolen goods, even things stolen from her, she is not betrothed.  How is this learned? Because it is stated: it was theirs, and it was of the seventh year: thus, it is only because it was of the seventh year, and thus ownerless; but if of any other year, it is not so. 
  And learn from this a woman can be an agent for her fellow, even when she thereby becomes her rival.
  And what is the other [halakhah learned from the mishnah]? Kiddushin which cannot be followed by intercourse. Then let him count it? Because he is doubtful whether it is [to be explained] according to Abaye or Rava.
  When R. Zera went up [to Eretz Yisrael, from Babylonia], he recited this teaching [of Rav] before R. Yohanan. He said to him: Did Rav really say this! But did he not say the same? Didn’t R. Yohanan say: If one stole [an article] and the owner did not despair of recovery, both cannot consecrate it: the one [the thief], because it is not his; the other, because it is not [actually] in his possession! This is what he said to him: Did Rav rule as I [did]? 
  They raised an objection: If one betroths a woman with an article of robbery, violence, or theft, or if he snatches a sela out of her hand and betroths her with it, she is betrothed? There it refers to her own stolen goods.
  But since the second clause teaches “or if he snatches a sela” out of her hand,’ it follows that the first clause refers to robbery in general [from others]? It is an explanation. If one betroths a woman with robbery. How so? If he snatches an article out of her hand and betroths her with it.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  But our Mishnah [deals with] her own robbery, yet Rav said: She is not betrothed? There is no difficulty: in the one case, he had arranged marriage with her, but in this case he did not arrange marriage with her.
  There was a woman who was washing her feet in a bowl of water. A man came, snatched a zuz from his neighbor, threw it to her and exclaimed: “You are betrothed to me!” That man went before Rava, who said to him; There is no one who pays attention to that which R. Shimon said: Robbery in general involves the owner's despair.
  A certain sharecropper  betrothed [a woman] with a handful of onions. When he came before Rava he said to him, Who relinquished [these onions to you]?” Now, that applies only to a handful; but a bundle, he [the sharecropper] can say to him [the landowner], “As I have taken a bundle, you take a bundle: one bundle is the same as another.”
  A certain brewer betrothed [a woman] with a measure of beer. Then the owner of the beer came and found him. He said to him, “Why did you not give [her] this [beer, which is] stronger?” He came before Rava. He said to him: They only said “go to the better ones” in reference to terumah.
  For it was taught: In which case did they say that if one separates [terumah] without [the owner's] knowledge, his separation is valid? If one enters his neighbor's field, gathers [the crops] and separates [terumah] without permission: and he [the owner] is concerned that this was [akin to] theft, his separation is not valid; otherwise, it is.
  And how does one know whether he is concerned that it is theft? If the owner comes and finds him, and says to him, “Go to the better [crops]”: and better [crops] are found, the separation is valid; if not, it is invalid.   If the owner gathers [crops] and adds [to that already separated], in both cases his separation is valid.
  But here he acted in this way because of shame and she is not betrothed.
  If he [a priest] betroths [a woman] with his portion, whether it is of higher holiness or of lower holiness, she is not betrothed. [If one betroths] with second tithe, whether unwittingly or deliberately, he has not betrothed [her]: the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her]; if deliberately, he has betrothed [her].
  [If] with sanctified property, if deliberately, he has betrothed her; if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has betrothed her; if deliberately, he has not betrothed her.
  GEMARA. Shall we say that our Mishnah does not agree with R. Yose Hagalili? For it was taught: “[If anyone sin] and commit a trespass against the Lord [. . . then he shall bring his guilt-offering]” (Leviticus 5:21) this comes to include sacrifices of lower holiness, which are the property of the owner, the words of R. Yose Hagalili.
  You may even say that it agrees with R. Yose Hagalili: For when he stated [his view] it applied only when the animal is still alive, but not after it has been slaughtered. 
  What is the reason? When they acquire it, it is from the table of the Most High that they acquire [it]. This may be deduced too; because it is stated: If he [a priest] betroths [a woman] with his portion, whether it is of higher holiness or of lower holiness, she is not betrothed.
  Our Rabbis taught: After R. Meir's death, R. Yehudah said to his disciples, “Do not let R. Meir's disciples enter, because they are disputatious and do not come to learn Torah but to overwhelm me with halakhot.” Summachus forced his way through and entered. He said to them: “Thus R. Meir taught me: If one betroths [a woman] with his portion, whether of higher or lower sanctity, he has not betrothed [her].” 
  R. Judah became angry with them. He said: “Did I not say to you, ‘Let not R. Meir's disciples enter here, because they are disputatious and do not come to learn Torah but to overwhelm me with halakhoth:’ how then does a woman come to be in the Temple Courtyard?”
  R. Yossi said: They will say: Meir is dead, Yehudah is angry, and Yossi is silent. The words of Torah, what is to become of them? Can a man not accept kiddushin on his daughter's behalf in the Temple Court? And can a woman not authorize a messenger to receive her kiddushin in the Temple Court? And furthermore, what if she forces herself in?
  It was taught: R. Yehudah said: She is betrothed; R. Yossi said: She is not betrothed. R. Yohanan said: Both derive [their views] from the same verse: “This shall be yours of the most holy things, the offerings by fire” (Numbers 18:9). R. Yehudah holds, “yours” and for all your needs;   whereas R. Yossi holds it is like [what is offered by] “the fire” just as [what is burned on the] fire is for consumption only, so too this is for consumption [by the priest] only.
  R. Yohanan said:
  
  Daf 53a
  
  They took a vote and it was resolved: He who betroths with his portion, whether of the higher or of the lower sanctity, has not betrothed. But Rav holds: The dispute continues. 
  Abaye said: Reason supports R. Yohanan. For it was taught: How do we know that meal-offerings are not apportioned in exchange for sacrifices?  Scripture says, “and every meal-offering that is baked in the oven . . . it shall be for all the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 7:10).
  I might have thought that meal-offerings may not be apportioned in exchange for sacrifices, seeing that they cannot replace them in poverty, yet meal-offerings may be apportioned in exchange for fowl-offerings, since they do replace them in poverty:  Scripture says, “and all that is prepared in the deep pan . . . it shall be for all the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 7:9).
  I might have thought that meal-offerings cannot be apportioned in exchange for fowl-offerings, since the latter are types of blood and the former are types of flour, but fowl-offerings may be apportioned in exchange for [animal] sacrifices, since both are types of blood; Scripture says, “and on the griddle” (Leviticus 7:9).
  I might have thought, “fowl-offerings may not be apportioned in exchange for animal sacrifices, since these are made by hand, whereas these are made with a utensil; but meal-offerings may be apportioned in exchange for meal-offerings,  since both are prepared by hand:  Scripture says, “and every meal-offering mingled with oil . . . shall be for all the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 7:10.
  I might have thought that a baking pan [offering] may not be apportioned in exchange for a frying pan [offering], or a frying pan [offering] in exchange for a baking pan [offering], because one is made soft and the other hard;  but that one baking pan [offering] may be apportioned in exchange for another, and one frying pan [offering] may be apportioned in exchange for another, since both are hard or both are soft; Scripture says, “or dry, shall be for all the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 7:10). 
  I might have thought that sacrifices of the higher sanctity may not be [so] apportioned, yet those of the lower sanctity may be; Scripture says: “[all the sons of Aaron shall have], one man as his brother,” (Leviticus 7:10) and next to this it says, “if [he offers it] for a thanksgiving” just as higher sanctity sacrifices may not be [so] apportioned, so also offerings of the lower sanctity.
  “A man” [this teaches]: a man takes a share, even if he has a blemish, but not a minor, even if he is without blemish. Now, who is the author of an anonymous teaching in the Sifra? R. Judah: And he states that nothing may be apportioned in exchange. Learn from this.
  Rava said: And was it not taught in accordance with Rav too? Was it not taught: The modest withdrew their hands, but the gluttonous shared [their portions]. [No.] By “shared” is meant snatched [other priests’ shares]. As the second clause states: It happened that one snatched his own and his neighbor's portion, and he was called Ben Hamtzan [snatcher] until the day of his death. 
  Rabbah son of R. Shila said: What is the verse? “O my Lord, rescue me out of the hand of the wicked, Out of the hand of the unrighteous and violent [hometz]” (Psalms 71:4). Rabbah said: [We learn it] from here: “Learn to do well, seek judgment, set right the man of violence (hometz)” (Isaiah 1:17).
  With second tithe, whether unwittingly or deliberately, he has not betrothed [her], the words of R. Meir. R. Judah said: if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her]; if deliberately, he has etc. How do we know this? R. Aha son of Rava said in the name of the tradition: “And all the tithe of the land, whether of the seed of the land, or the fruit of the tree, is the Lord’s: it is holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:3): It is to the Lord and not for betrothing a woman.
  But what of the terumah of the tithe, as it is written, “So you also shall set apart a gift of the Lord” (Numbers 18:28):  Yet we taught: If one betroths with terumah, she is betrothed? That is because “to the Lord” is not written there.   
  But what of hallah, about which it is written, “[From the first of your dough] you shall give to the Lord” (Numbers 15:21), yet we learned: If one betroths [a woman] with terumoth, she is betrothed? That is because “holy” is not written there.
  But what of seventh year [produce], about which it is written: “For it is a Jubilee; it shall be holy to you,” yet we learned: If one betroths with seventh year produce, [the woman is] betrothed? That is because “to the Lord” is not written there.
  But what of seventh year [produce], about which it is written: “For it is a Jubilee; it shall be holy to you,” yet we learned: If one betroths with seventh year produce, [the woman is] betrothed? That is because “to the Lord” is not written there.
  
  Daf 53b
  
  But does that not follow automatically?  Rabin the Elder explained it before Rav: The verse says, “It is for the Lord” it must remain in its natural form.
  [If] with hekdesh (money dedicated to the Temple), if deliberately, he has betrothed her; if unwittingly, he has not, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah said: if unwittingly, he has betrothed her; if deliberately, he has not. R. Jacob said: I heard from R. Yohanan two [reasons for the laws concerning] the unwitting [use of] tithes [for betrothal], according to R. Judah, and the unwitting [use of] hekdesh, according to R. Meir, [that] in both cases a woman is not betrothed with them. 
  One [reason] is that the woman does not want this, the other, that neither wants this. But I do not know which is which. R. Yirmiyah: Let us consider. As for tithes, she does not want [to be betrothed with them] because of the trouble of the journey; he, however, is pleased that the woman is acquired on her own. But as for hekdesh, both are unwilling that hekdesh should become desacralized through them.
  But R. Ya’akov said the opposite: Can we not say with regard to tithes, she does not want to on account of the trouble of the journey and he does not want to on account of the risks of the journey. But as for hekdesh, it makes sense that she does not want to so that hekdesh should not be desacralized by her; but as for him, is he not pleased that the woman should become his on her own? 
  Rava asked R. Hisda: The woman is not betrothed; does the money become non-sacred? He said to him: The woman is not betrothed, how could the money become non-sacred?
  R. Hiyya b. Abin asked R. Hisda: What is the rule in the case of purchase? He said to him: In the case of purchase too, he does not acquire.
  He raised an objection against him: A shopkeeper is reckoned as a private individual, the words of R. Meir. R. Judah holds: A shopkeeper is reckoned as a money-changer.
  Thus, they differ only in so far as one Master holds that a shopkeeper counts as a money-changer and the other says he counts as a private individual. Yet all [including R. Meir] agree that if he uses the money, he has committed trespass. R. Meir is arguing against R. Yehudah’s opinion. In my view, even if he uses the money he has not committed trespass; but even according to your view,   you should at least agree with me that a shopkeeper is like a private individual. And he answered him: No; he is like a money-changer.
  Rav said:
  
  Daf 54a
  
  We have closely examined R. Meir‘s views from every angle, and have not found that hekdesh if unwittingly does not become non-sacred and if used intentionally that it does become non-sacred.  
  But our Mishnah refers to priestly clothing which was not worn out, since they were given for deriving benefit, for the Torah was not given to angels.
  Come and hear: Worn out priestly clothing involves trespass, the words of R. Meir. Does this not refer even to a case where they are not worn out? No: only when they are worn out. 
  Come and hear: Trespass can be committed with the new [shekels], but not with the old. R. Meir said: Trespass can be committed even with the old shekels; for R. Meir used to say: Trespass can be committed with the surplus of the Chamber.  
  Yet why; let us say, since they stand to be used, for the Torah was not given to angels [no trespass is committed with them]. For the walls of the city and its towers came out of the Chamber surplus, as we learned: The city wall and its towers and all city requirements were provided for out of the chamber surplus! Say not R. Meir, but R. Judah.
  Come and hear: For it was taught: R. Yishmael b. R. Yitzchak said: If the stones of Jerusalem fall out [of their place in the walls], one may commit trespass with them, the words of R. Meir! Say not, R. Meir but, R. Judah.
  If R. Judah, is then Jerusalem [the city itself] sanctified? But we learnt: “As the lamb,” “As the Temple sheds of cattle” or “As the wood”, “As the [altar] fire”, “As the altar”, “As the Temple”, [or] “As Jerusalem”… R. Judah said: He who says: “Jerusalem”, has said nothing.
  And should you answer, that is because he did not say: “As Jerusalem”,   — surely it was taught: R. Judah said: He who says: “as Jerusalem” has said nothing, unless he relates his vow to that which is sacrificed in Jerusalem!  
  
  Daf 54b
  
  Two Tannaim differ as to R. Judah's view. 
  Ulla said in the name of Bar Pada: R. Meir used to say that hekdesh, if used intentionally, is desacralized; unwittingly, it is not desacralized. And when they said that it is desacralized by unwitting [use] it was in reference to a sacrifice. But since it is not desacralized, how does he become liable for a sacrifice?  
  Rather when Rabin came [from Eretz Yisrael], he explained it the name of Bar Pada: R. Meir used to say that hekdesh, if used intentionally is desacralized; unwittingly, is not desacralized. And they only said it was desacralized if done unwittingly with regard to eating. 
  R. Nahman said in the name of R. Ada b. Ahava: The halakhah agrees with R. Meir in respect to tithe, since it is taught according to his view anonymously;  and the halakhah agrees with R, Judah in respect to hekdesh, since is taught according to his view anonymously.
  [We learned anonymously] as R. Meir in respect to second tithe. What is this? As we taught. 1)	Bet Shammai says: the laws of the added fifth and removal do not apply to them; a)	But Bet Hillel says: they do.
  2)	Bet Shammai says: the laws of peret and the defective clusters apply to them, and the poor can redeem the grapes for themselves. a)	But Bet Hillel says: all [of them] go to the wine-press. 
  b)
  Now, when Beth Hillel rule that it is like second tithe, according to whom do they hold? If like R. Judah, why is it all for the winepress, did he not hold that the second tithe is secular property?  Hence surely [they agree] with R. Meir.
  “[We taught anonymously] like R. Judah in respect to hekdesh.” What is this? As we learned: If one sent one of sound senses and remembers [that the money belongs to Temple property] before it has come into the possession of the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper will be guilty when he spends it. 
  And did we not learn [anonymously] as R. Yehudah in respect to second tithe? Have we not learned: If one redeems his own second tithe, he must add a fifth, whether it was his [in the first place] or given to him as a gift. Whose [view] is this? If we say, it is R. Meir? Can one give it as a gift: surely he maintains that second tithe is sacred property? Hence it must surely be R. Yehudah’s! 
  No. After all, it is R. Meir's view, and what are we dealing with here? He gave it to him [mixed up] while it was still in a state of untithed produce and he holds that unseparated gifts count as unseparated.
  Come and hear: If one redeems his own fourth year plantings, he must add a fifth, whether it was [originally] his or given to him as a gift. Who is the author of this? If we say: R. Meir? Can one give it away; behold he derives “holy” “holy” from second-tithe?   Hence it must surely be R. Yehudah!
  [No.] After all, it is R. Meir; and what are we dealing with here? For instance when he gave it to him when it was budding and this does not agree with R. Yosi, who hold: Budding fruit is forbidden [as orlah], because it counts as fruit.
  Come and hear: If he drew into his possession another person’s second tithe to the value of a sela, and had no time to redeem it before it appreciated to two, he must pay a sela and thus profits a sela and the second-tithe is his. Now, whose view is this? If we say: R. Meir’s; why does he profit a sela, “And he shall give the money, and it shall be assured to him?”   Thus it must surely be R. Yehudah's!
  It is indeed R. Yehudah's, but here we have one anonymous teaching, whereas there we have two. 
  But if an anonymous [ruling] was intentionally taught, what does it matter whether there is one or two? R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: The halakhah follows R. Meir, since we learnt his view in Behirta (Tractate Eduyot).
  
  Daf 55a
  
  We learned elsewhere: If a domesticated animal is found between Jerusalem and Migdal Eder or an equal distance [from the city] in any direction: the males are burnt-offerings; the females are peace-offerings.  
  Now, can males be only burnt-offerings and not peace-offerings! R. Oshaia said: Here we are dealing with one who comes to accept responsibility for its value; and this is what it means: we fear that they may be burnt-offerings; and it is in accordance with R. Meir, who ruled: Hekdesh can be desacralized intentionally. 
  But can [an object of] intrinsic holiness be desacralized? Did we not learn: There cannot be trespass after trespass with sacred objects, except in the case of animal[s] and vessels of ministry.  
  How so? If a man rode on a beast [dedicated to the Temple], then his neighbor came and rode, and then another came and rode, all are guilty of trespass. If he drank out of a golden goblet [dedicated to the Temple], then his neighbor came and drank, and then another, all are guilty of trespass? The latter is according to R. Yehudah; the former, R. Meir.
  But from R. Yehudah we may understand R. Meir's view. Did not R. Yehudah say that hekdesh used unwittingly is desacralized, and yet items with intrinsic sanctity cannot be desacralized; hence according to R. Meir too, although hekdesh, by deliberate use, is desacralized, yet items with intrinsic sanctity cannot be desacralized! There he does not intend to desacralize it; here he does.
  Say that you heard R. Meir to hold this in the case of things with the highest sanctity; do you know him [to hold this view] in respect to lower sanctity? One of the Rabbis said to him [the questioner], and R. Jacob is his name: It follows from a kal vehomer: If objects of the higher sanctity can be desacralized, surely those of the lower sanctity can be! 
  It was also stated: R. Hama b. Ukba said in the name of R. Yosi son of R. Hanina: R. Meir used to say: Hekdesh used deliberately is desacralized, but used unwittingly is not desacralized; this applies both to items of higher and lower sanctity, from a kal vehomer: if objects of higher sanctity can be desacralized, all the more so those of lower sanctity can.
  
  Daf 55b
  
  R. Yohanan was surprised at this: Do we say to a person, “Get up and sin, that you may achieve merit!” Rather R. Yohanan said: We wait until it is blemished; then two animals are brought, and a stipulation made. 
  The Master said: “Males are burnt-offerings.” But maybe it is a thanksgiving-offering?  He also brings a thanksgiving-offering.  But they require loaves?  He also brings loaves.
  Yet perhaps it is a guilt-offering?  A guilt-offering requires a two year old [animal], whereas a yearling was found. Then perhaps it is a guilt-offering of a leper or a nazir? These are rare. 
  Yet perhaps it is a Pesah sacrifice? A Pesach sacrifice in its season, people are careful about it. And when not in its season it is a peace offering.
  Yet perhaps it is a firstling or tithe? In what respect? That it may be eaten when blemished? Here too, it is eaten when blemished. 
  The Master said: Females a peace-offerings. But maybe it is a thanksgiving-offering? He also brings a thanksgiving-offering. But they require loaves?  He also brings loaves.
  But perhaps it is a sin-offering? A sin-offering is a yearling, whereas a two year old was found. Yet perhaps it is a sin-offering which has passed its year?  That is rare.
  Then what if a yearling is found? It was taught: Hanina b. Hakinai said: A yearling she-goat is [sacrificed] as a sin-offering. “As a sin-offering” do you really think so!   Rather Abaye said: It is [treated] as a sin-offering: it is led into a pen and it dies on its own.
  Our Rabbis taught: An animal may not be bought with second-tithe money; 
  
  Daf 56a
  
  and if one does buy: if unwittingly, the money must be returned to its place; if deliberately, it must be brought up and consumed in the place. R. Yehudah said: When is this so? When he intentionally bought it in the first place for a peace-offering; but if it was his intention to turn the second-tithe money into non-sacred money, whether unwittingly or deliberately, the money must be returned to its place.  
  But did we not learn: R. Yehudah said: if deliberately, he has betrothed [her]? R. Elazar: The woman knows that the second-tithe money does not become hullin through her [acceptance of it as kiddushin], and so she will go up and expend it in Jerusalem.
  R. Yirmiyah raised a difficulty: But what of unclean animals, slaves, and real estate, about which a person knows that second-tithe money is not descralized by purchasing them; yet we learned: Unclean animals, slaves, and land may not be bought with second-tithe money, even in Jerusalem; and if he does purchase [them], he must eat their equivalent in value?
  Rather here [in the mishnah] we are dealing with a woman who is a haverah, who knows.
  The Master said: “If he does purchase [them], he must eat their equivalent in value.” Yet why: let the money return to its place, like the other case? 
  Shmuel said:
  
  Daf 56b
  
  This refers to a case where the seller fled. Thus, the reason is that he has fled, but otherwise, we penalize the seller. But let us penalize the purchaser? It is not the mouse steals, but the hole that steals!
  Yet but for the mouse, what harm is done by the hole! It is reasonable that where the transgression lies, there we impose a penalty.
  1) If he betroths [a woman] with orlah, or kilayim of the vineyard, or an ox condemned to be stoned, or the heifer whose neck is to be broken, or a leper’s bird-offerings, or a nazirite’s hair, or the first-born of a donkey, or meat [boiled] in milk, or non-sacred meat slaughtered in the Temple court, she is not betrothed.   2) If he sells them and betroths [her] with the proceeds, she is betrothed.   
  GEMARA. With orlah: How do we know this? Because it was taught: “They shall be forbidden (arelim) to you: it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). I know only the prohibition of eating; from where do we know [that all] benefit [is forbidden], that one must derive no benefit from it, and not dye with it, nor light a lamp with it? Scripture says: “Then you shall count the fruit of it as forbidden (orlato)” (ibid.)” this comes to include everything.
  [With] kil’ayim of the vineyard. How do we know this?  Hizkiyah said: The verse says, “[You shall not sow your vineyard with diverse kinds; lest the growth of the seed that you have sown] be forbidden [pen tikdash], [together with the yield of the vineyard]” (Deuteronomy 22:9): lest it be burned (tukad esh). 
  R. Ashi said: Lest it be as sanctified (kadesh). If so, just as a sanctified things transfer [their holiness] to money [used to purchase them] and then become non-sacred, so should kilayim of the vineyard transfer [their holiness] to money [used to purchase them] and then become non-sacred?  Rather, it is clear that it must be explained as Hizkiyah. 
  [With] an ox condemned to be stoned. How do we know this? As it was taught: From that which the verse said, “the ox shall be surely stoned,” (Exodus 21:28) do I not know that it is nevelah (improperly slaughtered meat), and a nevelah is forbidden as food? Why then does Scripture say, “and its flesh shall not be eaten”?   To teach you that if it was killed after the trial was ended, it may not be eaten.
  How do we know that it is forbidden to derive benefit from it? Scripture says, “and the owner of the ox shall be clear” (Exodus 21:28). How does this mean that?Shimon b. Zoma said: As a man says to his friend, “So-and-so has gone out clear from his property, and has no benefit whatsoever from it.”
  Now, how do you know that this [verse], “and his flesh shall not be eaten,” refers to a case where it was slaughtered after the trial ended: perhaps when it is slaughtered after the trial, it is permitted, and this [verse], “and it shall not be eaten,” refers to when it is indeed stoned, and it is like that which R. Abahu said in the name of R. Elazar.
  For R. Abahu said in the name of R. Elazar: Wherever it is said: “It shall not be eaten,” “you shall not eat” “you (pl.) shall not eat,” it refers both to a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit, unless the verse expressly states [otherwise], as it does in the case of nevelah!
  That is only where the prohibition of food is derived from, “it shall not be eaten”;  but here the prohibition of eating follows from, “It shall surely be stoned”: for should you think that it is written to prohibit deriving benefit, the verse should have said, “and he shall not benefit”
  or, “it shall not be eaten”: Why do I need “its flesh”? [To teach that] even if it is slaughtered like [other] flesh, it is [still] forbidden.
  Mar Zutra objected: Yet perhaps that is only if one examines a stone, [finds its edge perfectly free from a notch] and kills it with the stone, for it looks like stoning; but not if it is slaughtered with a knife? Is then a knife written in the Torah?  Moreover, it was taught: One may slaughter with everything with a stone, glass, or the stalk of a reed.
  But now that the prohibitions of both eating and benefit are derived from, “it shall not be eaten,” what is the purpose of, “and the owner of the ox shall be clear”?   To derive benefit from its hide, lest I would have thought “its flesh shall not be eaten” is written: [hence] its flesh is forbidden while its hide is permitted.
  Now, according to those tannaim who use this verse: “and the owner of the ox shall be clear” as referring to half ransom and paying for offspring, how do they know [that] the benefit of the hide [is forbidden]?
  From “et besaro (its flesh)” meaning that which is joined to its flesh.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  He does not interpret “et.”  As it was taught: Shimon Ha’amasoni, and others say, Nehemiah Ha’amasoni, interpreted every et in the Torah. When he came to, “You shall fear [et] the Lord your God,” (Deuteronomy 6:13) he refrained.  
  His students said to him, “Master, what is to happen with all the etin which you have interpreted?” He said to them: “Just as I received a reward for interpreting [them] so do I receive a reward for refraining.”  Subsequently  R. Akiva came and taught: “You shall fear [et] the Lord your God” this comes to include the sages.
  The heifer whose neck is broken: How do we know this? The School of R. Yannai said: “Atonement” is written in connection with it, as with sacrifices. 
  A leper’s bird-offerings: How do we know this? For the School of R. Yishmael taught: A [mitzvah] that enables and a mitzvah that atones are mentioned within [the Temple], and a [mitzvah] that enables and a mitzvah that atones are mentioned outside the Temple:
   just as with the mitzvoth that enable and atone mentioned within [the Temple], the mitzvah that enables is made equal to the one that atones, so with the mitzvot that enables and atone mentioned outside the Temple, the mitzvah that enables is made equal to that which atones.  
  It was stated: From what point are a leper's birds forbidden? R. Yohanan said: From the time of slaughter. Resh Lakish said: From the time they are taken.   R. Yohanan said, “From the time of slaughter” it is the slaughter that renders it forbidden. Resh Lakish said: “From the time they are taken” — this is derived from the heifer whose neck is to be broken. Just as the heifer whose neck is to be broken is [forbidden] while it is still alive, so are the leper's birds [forbidden] while they are still alive.
  And from what point is the heifer whose neck is to be broken itself forbidden? R. Yannai said: I have heard a time limit for it, but have forgotten it. But the colleagues maintain, its descent to the wadi renders it forbidden. If so, just as the heifer whose neck is to be broken is not forbidden from the time it is taken, so the leper's birds should not be forbidden from when they are taken? Is that so! There it has another determining point; but here, is there any other determining point.
  R. Yohanan raised an objection against Resh Lakish: “All clean birds you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:11): this includes the bird that is set free.  “But these are they of which you may not eat” this includes the slaughtered bird. But should you think that it is forbidden while yet alive, is it necessary [to state it] after slaughter? What might you have said: It is like sacrifices, which are forbidden while alive, yet the slaughtering comes and permits them [as food]; therefore it teaches us [that they are prohibited].
  He raised an objection: If it is slaughtered and found to be trefa, he must take a companion for the second, and it is permitted to derive benefit from the first. But should you think that it is forbidden while yet alive, why may one benefit from the first! He said to him: What are we dealing with here? When it was found to be trefa in its inwards, so that no sanctity fell upon it at all.
  He raised an objection: If it is slaughtered without the hyssop, the cedar wood and the scarlet thread: R. Ya’akov said: Since it was set aside for its mitzvah it is forbidden; R. Shimon said: Since it was not slaughtered according to its mitzvah, it is permitted. 
  Now, they differ only in that one Master holds that an unfit slaughtering is still called slaughtering; while the other Master holds that an unfit slaughtering is not called slaughtering; but all agree at least that it is not forbidden while yet alive?
  This is a dispute between tannaim. For the School of Ishmael taught: “Enabling” and “atoning” are mentioned within [the Temple], and “enabling” and “atoning” are mentioned outside the Temple:
  just as with the “Enabling” and “atoning” mentioned outside the Temple, “Enabling” is made equivalent to “atoning,” so with the “enabling” and “atoning” mentioned outside the Temple, “enabling” is made equivalent to “atoning.”
  The text [above stated]: “Of all clean birds you may eat”: this includes the bird that is set free. “But these are those which you may not eat”: this includes the slaughtered bird. 
  But why shouldn’t I reverse it? R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: We do not find live animals [permanently] forbidden. The text [above stated]: “Of all clean birds you may eat”: this includes the bird that is set free. R. Shmuel son of R. Yitzchak raised a difficulty: Are they not?
  
  Daf 57b
  
  But what about an animal set aside [to be an offering to an idol] and a worshipped animal, which though living creatures, are yet forbidden? They are forbidden only for the Most High, but they are permitted for ordinary use.   
  R. Yirmiyah raised a difficulty: But animals, active or passive participants in bestiality attested by witnesses, are living creatures and are yet forbidden? Rather R. Yohanan said we do not find it typical that live animals are [permanently] forbidden. 
  The School of R. Ishmael taught: For the verse says, "And he shall send the living bird out to the open field” (Leviticus 14:7):  just as the field is permitted, so too is this [bird] permitted. The School of R. Ishmael taught: For the verse says, "And he shall send the living bird out to the open field” (Leviticus 14:7):  just as the field is permitted, so too is this [bird] permitted.
  And the other?  If so, Scripture should write, “field”: why “the field”? Learn from this two things.
  Rava said: The Torah did not say, “Send it away,” for it to be a stumbling block.
  With a Nazirite’s hair: How do we know this? For the verse says: “He shall be holy, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5)  [teaching], his growth shall be holy.   
  If so, just as a holy object transfers [its holiness] to its purchase price and becomes non-sacred, so should the nazirite's hair transfer [its holiness] to its purchase price and becomes non-sacred? Do we then read kodesh? We read kadosh.
  With the firstborn of a donkey. Shall we say that our Mishnah does not agree with R. Shimon? For it was taught: It is forbidden to derive benefit from the firstborn of a donkey, the words of R. Yehudah. But R. Shimon permits it! R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Avuha: This means after its neck was broken, and it agrees with all.  
  Meat [boiled] in milk. How do we know this? For the School of R. Ishmael taught: “You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk” (Exodus 23:19; 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21) [is stated] three times: one is a prohibition against eating, one a prohibition of deriving benefit, and one a prohibition of cooking.
  Our mishnah does not agree with the following Tanna. For it was taught: R. Shimon b. Judah said: Meat [cooked] in milk may not be eaten, but benefit is permitted, for it is said: “For you are a holy people to the Lord you God. You shall not seethe a kid in its mother's milk” and elsewhere it is said: “And you shall be a holy people to me: [therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dogs]” (Exodus 22:30):   just as there it may not be eaten, but benefit is permitted, so too here, it may not be eaten but benefit is permitted.
  And non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard: How do we know this? R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Meir: The Torah decreed: Slaughter mine [sacrifices] in mine [the Temple] and yours [hullin] in yours [outside the Temple]: just as mine [slaughtered] in yours is forbidden, so is yours [slaughtered] in mine forbidden. 
  If so, just as yours in mine is punished by karet, so mine in yours should be punished by karet? The verse says: “And he did not bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, to offer it as a sacrifice to the Lord . . . then he shall be cut off” (Leviticus 17:4): for a sacrifice [slaughtered outside the Temple ] there is punishment of karet, but not for hullin slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard.
  We could reject the analogy: As for mine in yours [being forbidden], that is because it is punished by karet!
  Rather Abaye said, [it is deduced] from the following: “And he shall slaughter it [at the door of the Tabernacle of the congregation]” (Leviticus 3:2), “And he shall slaughter it [before the Tabernacle of the congregation]” (3:8), “And he shall slaughter it [before the Tabernacle of the congregation]” (3:13): 
  these are three superfluous verses. Now, what does Scripture say? Because it is said: “If the place [which the Lord your God shall choose to put his name there] shall be far from you . . . then you shall kill [of your herd etc.]” (Deuteronomy 12:21) you may slaughter far from the place [the Temple], but not in the place, thus excluding hullin, that it may not be killed in the Temple Court.
  I know this only of unblemished animals, which are eligible to be sacrificed: how do I know to include blemished ones? I include blemished animals, since they are of a fit species. I know this only of unblemished animals, which are eligible to be sacrificed: how do I know to include blemished ones? I include blemished animals, since they are of a fit species.
  I might have thought one may not slaughter [hullin in the Temple Court]; yet if he does, it is permitted [to eat it]: Scripture says: “If the place [which the Lord your God shall choose to put his name there] shall be far from you . . . then you shall kill” (Deuteronomy 12:21) that which you slaughter far from [the Temple] you may eat. But you may not eat what you slaughter near the place, thus excluding hullin slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard.
  I know this only of unblemished animals,
  
  
  Daf 58a
  
  which are eligible to be sacrificed: from where do I know to include blemished ones? I include blemished animals, since they are of a fit species. From where do I know to include wild beasts?   I include beasts, since they require ritual slaughtering, as a [domestic] animal. How do I know to include birds?   Scriptures says, “and he shall kill it,” “and he shall kill it,” “and he shall kill it.”
  which are eligible to be sacrificed: from where do I know to include blemished ones? I include blemished animals, since they are of a fit species. From where do I know to include wild beasts?   I include beasts, since they require ritual slaughtering, as a [domestic] animal. How do I know to include birds?   Scriptures says, “and he shall kill it,” “and he shall kill it,” “and he shall kill it.”
  Mar Judah met R. Joseph and R. Shmuel, son of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah, standing by the door of Rabbah’s academy. He said to them: It was taught: If one betroths [a woman] with the firstborn of a donkey, meat [cooked] in milk, or hullin killed in the Temple Courtyard, R. Shimon holds: She is betrothed; while the Sages says: She is not betrothed. This proves that hullin killed in the Temple Courtyard to R. Shimon is not biblically forbidden.
  And they raised the following contradiction against it: R. Shimon said: Hullin that was killed in the Temple Courtyard must be burned, and likewise a wild beast killed in the Temple Courtyard!
  They were silent. When they came before Rabbah [and put the difficulty to him], he said to him: A divisive person [Mar Judah] has stood [this question] up to you! What are we dealing with here? For instance it was killed and found to be a trefa. And R. Shimon follows his own view.
  For it was taught: If one kills  a trefa, or if one kills [an animal] and it is discovered to be a trefa, both being hullin in the Temple Courtyard: R. Shimon holds that benefit is permitted; but the Sages forbid it.
  If he sells them and betroths her with the proceeds, she is betrothed. How do we know this? Since the Torah revealed in reference to idolatry, “And you shall be banned like it” (Deuteronomy 7:26) [which means,] whatever you produce out of it is as itself, it follows that all other objects forbidden in the Torah are permitted.  
  Let us learn from it?  Because idolatry and seventh year [produce] are two verses that come with the same teaching, and any two verses that come with the same teaching do not teach [about others].
  Idolatry, as stated. What is the source about seventh year [produce]? “It is the Jubilee; it shall be holy to you” (Leviticus 25:21): just as a holy thing transfers its holiness to the purchase money, so does seventh year [produce] likewise transfer holiness to its purchase money.
  If so, just as a holy thing transfers it holiness to the purchase price but itself becomes hullin, so would the seventh year [produce] transfers it holiness to the purchase price but itself becomes hullin? Scripture says: “It shall be,” [meaning], it shall remain in its present form.
  How so? If one buys meat with seventh year produce, both must be removed [from the house] in the seventh year; [if he trades the] fish for meat, the meat passes out [from the status of seventh year produce] and the fish enters [takes its place]; [if he trades] the fish for wine, the fish passes out and the wine enters; oil for the wine, the wine passes out and the oil enters. How is this so? The last one takes [the nature of] the seventh year produce, while the [original] produce itself remains forbidden.
  Now, that makes sense to the one that holds that [two verses that come to teach the same thing] do not teach about [others]; but on the view that they do, what can be said? Limitations are written. Here it is written: “and you shall be banned like it” and there it is written, “It is the Jubilee”: only it, but nothing else. 
  If he betroths with terumot, tithes, priestly gifts, the water of purification or the ashes of purification—behold she is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite.
  GEMARA. Ulla said: The benefit of discretion does not count as money. R. Abba raised an objection against Ulla: If he betroths with terumot, tithes, priestly gifts, the water of purification or the ashes of purification—behold she is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite.
  He answered: This refers to an Israelite who inherited tevel produce from his maternal grandfather [who was] a priest. And he [the tanna of the Mishnah] holds that unseparated gifts are as though already separated.  
  R. Hiyya b. Abin asked R. Huna: Does the benefit of discretion count as money or not? He said him: We have taught this: If he betroths with terumot, tithes, priestly gifts, the water of purification or the ashes of purification—behold she is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite. He said back: But did we not interpret it as referring to an Israelite who inherited tevel produce from his maternal grandfather [who was] a priest?
  
  Daf 58b
  
  He replied: You are hutza’ah. He became embarrassed, for he thought that he meant it because of the teaching he taught.  He said to him: This is what I meant: R. Assi of Huzal agrees with you.
  Shall we say that it is a dispute between tannaim? [For it was taught.] He who steals his neighbor’s tevel must pay him the value of his tevel, the words of Rabbi. R. Yose son of R. Yehudah said: He must pay only for the hullin it contains. Do they not differ over this: one Master holds that the benefit of discretion counts as money and one holds that it does not?
  Shall we say that it is a dispute between tannaim? [For it was taught.] He who steals his neighbor’s tevel must pay him the value of his tevel, the words of Rabbi. R. Yose son of R. Yehudah said: He must pay only for the hullin it contains. Do they not differ over this: one Master holds that the benefit of discretion counts as money and one holds that it does not?
  And if you want you can say, all agree that they are regarded as separated, and the benefit of discretion is not money. And here they disagree about Shmuel’s statement, for Shmuel said: One grain of wheat exempts the whole stack:
  One Master accepts Shmuel's ruling; the other does not accept it.
  If you want you can say: No one agrees with Shmuel’s rule, but Rabbi's reason is that the rabbis penalized the thief.
  If you want you can say: all agree with Shmuel; but R. Yose son of R. Judah's reason is that the Rabbis penalized the owner, for he should not have held on to his tevel.
  We learned: If one betroths [a woman] with terumoth, tithes, [priestly] gifts, the water of purification and the ashes of purification, she is betrothed, even if he is an Israelite. But they cast the following against it: If one accepts payment for judging, his judgments are void; for testifying, his testimony is void; for sprinkling and mixing [with water] the ashes [of the Red Heifer], his water is cavern water and his ashes are ashes of a hearth! 
  Abaye said: There is no difficulty: here it [the Mishnah] refers to payment for bringing [the ashes] and drawing [the water]; there, it refers to payment for sprinkling and mixing.
  This may also be proved from a close reading: for here it is taught, with the water of purification and the ashes of purification, while there it is taught, for sprinkling and mixing. Learn from this.
  May return to you “a man betroths”
  If he says to his fellow, “Go out and betroth me such-and-such a woman,” and he goes and betroths her to himself, she is betrothed. Similarly, if he says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second, [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest may eat terumah.
  [But if he says, “Be betrothed to me] from now and after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed [to both]:  [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest, or a priest’s daughter [betrothed] to an Israelite, may not eat terumah.
  GEMARA. If he says to his neighbor . . . A Tanna taught: What he did is done, but he has behaved toward him in a deceptive manner. And our Tanna?  When he states: “and he goes”, he indeed means, he goes in a deceptive manner.  
  Why is it taught here, “one who says to his neighbor,” 
  
  Daf 59a
  
  while elsewhere it is taught, “one who says to his agent”?  
  Here it teaches us something new, and there it teaches us something new. Here it teaches us something new: for had it taught “his agent”: I might have said, Only his agent is called deceptive, because he relied upon him, thinking, “He will perform what I sent him to do”;  but as for his neighbor, seeing that he does not rely upon him,  I might say that he is not considered deceptive. 
  There too it teaches us something new. For had it taught: “If one says to his neighbor,” I might have said, only if his neighbor betroths her elsewhere is she not betrothed, because he thinks that he will not trouble himself [to find her elsewhere]; but as for his agent, who will trouble himself, I might think, he merely indicates the place to him. Hence it teaches us [otherwise].
  Rabin the pious went to betroth a certain woman for his son, but betrothed her for himself. But was it not taught, What he did is done, but he has behaved toward him deceptively? They would not give her to him [his son]. Then he should have informed him! He feared that in the meantime another man might come and betroth her.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hanah gave money to Rav [and] told him, “Buy this land for me.” He went and bought it for himself. But did we not learn, “What he did is done, yet he has behaved toward him in a deceptive manner”? It was in an area belonging to violent men. To Rav they showed respect but to Rabbah b. Bar Hanah they did not show respect. Then he should have informed him. He feared that in the meantime another person might come and buy it.
  R. Gidel was trying to buy a certain piece of land. R. Abba went and bought it. Thereupon R. Gidel went and complained about him to R. Zera, who went and complained to R. Isaac Nafha.   He said to him, “Wait until he comes up to us for the Festival.” When he came up he found him and asked him, “If a poor man is trying to buy a loaf of bread and another comes and takes it away from him, what then?” 
  He said to him: “He is called wicked.” “Then why did you, Master, do this?” He responded: “I did not know [that he was trying to buy it].” “Then let the master give it to him now.” He said to him, “I will not sell it to him because it is the first field [which I ever bought] and it is not a [good] omen; but if he wants it as a gift, let him take it.” 
  R. Gidel would not take possession of it because it is written: “But he that hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27). Nor would R. Abba take possession of it because R. Giddal was seeking to buy it; and so neither took possession, and it was called “the Rabbis’ land.”
  Likewise, if one says to a woman, be betrothed to me etc. What if another does not come and betroth her within these thirty days? Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed, even if the money [of betrothal] has been consumed.
  What is the reason? This money is neither like a loan nor like a deposit.
  It is not like a deposit [because] a deposit is consumed in its owner's possession, whereas this is consumed in her possession. It is not like a loan, [because] a loan is given to be used, whereas this was given to her for betrothal. 
  What if another does not come and betroth her, but she changes her mind? R. Yohanan said: She can change her mind, [because] words can come and nullify words. Resh Lakish said: She cannot change her mind, [because] words cannot come and nullify words.
  R. Yohanan raised a difficulty against Resh Lakish: If he annuls, if before he [his agent] has made a separation, his separation is invalid. Now here it is speech against speech, yet one comes and nullifies the other? Giving money into a woman's hand is different, because it is like an action, and speech cannot come and annul action. 
  He raised another difficulty against him: If one sends a get to his wife, and then overtakes the messenger or sends [another] messenger after him and says to him, “The divorce which I gave you is null,” it is indeed null. Now, giving the divorce into the messenger’s hand is like giving money into a woman’s hand, and yet it is taught: “it is indeed null”?
  There too, as long as the get has not reached her hand, it is speech against speech, and so one comes and annuls the other.
  Resh Lakish objected to R. Yohanan: All utensils become liable to impurity by intention, but come out of their impurity only by an act that changes them.
  
  
  Daf 59b
  
  An act can nullify both act and intention, but intention can nullify neither act nor intention. Now, it makes sense that it [intention] cannot nullify an act, because speech cannot nullify action; yet let it nullify intention?
  Intention, in respect to impurity, is different, because it counts as action, and in accordance with R. Papa. For R. Papa pointed out a contradiction between verses. It is written, “And if one put [yitten],” (Leviticus 11:38) whereas we read, “and if it be put [yuttan].” How is this so?
  “If it be put” [must be] similar to “if one put”: just as when one puts, it must be something he wants, so when it is put, it must be something he wants.
  R. Zevid taught this discussion in reference to the following: Likewise, if she authorized her agent to betroth her, and went and betrothed herself: if hers came first, her kiddushin is valid; if her agent’s came first, her own kiddushin is not valid.  
  Now, what if she did not betroth herself, but retracted? R. Yohanan said: She can retract; Resh Lakish said: She cannot retract. R. Yohanan said: She can retract: Speech comes and nullifies speech. Resh Lakish said: She cannot retract: speech cannot come and nullify speech.
  R. Yohanan raised a difficulty against Resh Lakish: If he annuls, if before he [his agent] has made a separation, his separation is invalid. Now here it is speech against speech, yet one comes and nullifies the other? Rava said: What are we dealing with here? When the owner got there before [his agent] and separated terumah for his stacks, which is an action.
  Resh Lakish objected to R. Yohanan: All utensils become liable to impurity by intention, but come out of their impurity only by an act that changes them. An act can nullify both act and intention, but intention can nullify neither act nor intention.  Now, it is well that it [intention] cannot nullify an act, because speech cannot nullify action; yet let it nullify intention?
  Intention, in respect to impurity, is different, because it counts as action, and in accordance with R. Papa. For R. Papa pointed out a contradiction between verses. It is written, “And if one put [yitten],” (Leviticus 11:38) whereas we read, “and if it be put [yuttan].” How is this so? “If it be put” [must be] similar to “if one put”: just as when one puts, it must be something he wants, so when it is put, it must be something he wants.
  R. Yohanan objected to Resh Lakish: If one sends a divorce to his wife, and then overtakes the messenger or sends a messenger after him and says. “The get which I gave you is null,” it is null. This is a refutation of Resh Lakish. It is indeed a refutation. 
  R. Yohanan objected to Resh Lakish: If one sends a divorce to his wife, and then overtakes the messenger or sends a messenger after him and says. “The get which I gave you is null,” it is null. This is a refutation of Resh Lakish. It is indeed a refutation.
  One halakhah contradicts another! For you say; The law follows R. Yohanan, while we hold that the law follows R. Nahman, For the scholars asked: Can he change his mind and divorce with it?
  R. Nahman said: He can change his mind and divorce with it; R. Sheshet ruled: He cannot change his mind and divorce with it. And we hold that the halakhah follows R. Nahman. Granted that he nullified his agency, he did not nullify it from being considered a get.
  She is betrothed to the second: Rav said: She is permanently betrothed to the second; Shmuel said: She is betrothed to the second until [the end of the] thirty days, after which the betrothal of the second is removed and that of the first is completed.
  R. Hisda sat, and found this difficult: How is the betrothal of the second removed? R. Joseph said to him: You, Master, taught this in connection with the first clause, and so find it difficult; but Rav Judah teaches it in connection with the second clause, and finds no difficulty:...
  From now and after thirty days…. Rav said: She is betrothed and not betrothed permanently: Whereas Shmuel ruled: She is betrothed and not betrothed only until [the end of the] thirty days, after which the betrothal of the second is removed and that of the first is completed.
  Rav is in doubt whether it is a stipulation or a retraction; whereas Shmuel is certain that it is a stipulation.  
  [The amoraim argue about the same thing as the] following Tannaim: [If one declares, “Be divorced] from today and after my death,’ it is a divorce and not a divorce, the words of the Sages. Rabbi ruled: It is indeed a divorce. 
  Then let Rav say: The halakhah agrees with the Sages, and let Shmuel say: The halakhah agrees with Rabbi? It is necessary. For if Rav had said: The halakhah agrees with the Sages, I would have [that is only] there, where he comes to distance her; but here, where he draws her near, I might say that he agrees with Shmuel that it is a stipulation. 
  And if Shmuel said: The halakhah agrees with Rabbi, I might have said that is only there, because there is no divorce after death; but here, seeing that the kiddushin can take effect thirty days later, I might say that he agrees with Rav. Thus it is necessary.
  Abaye said: According to Rav’s reasoning, if one came and said to her, ‘Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after thirty days” and then another came and said to her, ‘Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after twenty days”:
  
  Daf 60a
  
  and then another came and said to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me from now and after ten days”: she requires a get from the first and the last, but not from the middle one. 
  For what else could you hold: if it is a stipulation, then that of the first is [valid] kiddushin, but not those of the others if it is retraction, that of the last is kiddushin, but not of the others.
  But is this not obvious? What might I have thought? This language implies both stipulation and retraction, and she requires a divorce from each:  hence it teaches us [otherwise].
  Ulla said in the name of R. Yohanan: Even a hundred are effective with her. And so too R. Assi said in the name of R. Yohanan: Even a hundred are effective with her. R. Mesharasheya son of R. Ammi said to R. Assi: I will explain R. Yohanan’s reason to you: they made themselves like a row of bricks, each leaving room for the next. 
  R. Hanina raised an objection: [If one declares, “Be divorced from me] from today and after my death,” it is a divorce and not a divorce, and if he dies, she must perform halitzah, but not yibum.  
  Now, according to Rav this goes well, for this supports him; According to Shmuel too, [there is no difficulty,] for [he may say], This agrees with the Rabbis, whereas I hold according to Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi].  
  But according to R. Yohanan who holds that something he left room [for others to betroth her]: every get which leaves something in her [tied to her husband] is entirely invalid:  then let him perform yibum?
  Rava said: The divorce is to free [her], and death is likewise to free her; [hence] what the divorce leaves [undone] is completed by death. Abaye said to him: Is it the same! Divorce frees her from the yavam’s authority, whereas death places her in the yavam’s authority?
  Abaye said to him: Is it the same! Divorce frees her from the yavam’s authority, whereas death places her in the yavam’s authority?
  Then let us decree that [if he says,] “From today, if I die,’ she should perform halitzah on account of “from today and after death!” Should you say that she must perform halitzah, she may come to have yibum.
  Then here too, if you say that she must perform halitzah, she may come to have yibum? Then let her, and it does not matter, seeing that it is only a rabbinic concern.
  Mishnah: If one says to a woman. “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that I give you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, and he must give it. “On condition that I give you [two hundred zuz] within thirty days from now”: if he gives her within thirty days, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.
  “On condition that I have two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, providing he has [two hundred zuz]. “On condition that I show you two hundred zuz,” she is betrothed, and he must show her. But if he shows her [money lying] on the table, she is not betrothed.  
  GEMARA. It was stated: R. Huna said: [The mishnah means] and he must give it. Rav Judah said: When he gives it: R. Huna said: and he must give it’: it is a condition, [and so] he fulfills the condition and goes on. Rav Judah said: When he gives it: when he gives it, the kiddushin is valid; nevertheless now it is not kiddushin. 
  What is the practical difference between them? They differ over a case where she stretches out her hand and accepts kiddushin from another: according to R. Huna view it is not kiddushin; according to Rav Yehudah it is kiddushin.
  Now, we taught similarly with regard to divorce. If one says to his wife, “Behold this is your divorce on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” she is divorced, and she must give [it]. It was stated: R. Huna said: And she must give it; Rava Judah said: When she gives it. “R. Huna said: And she must give it”: it is a condition, [and so] she proceeds to fulfill the condition and goes on. “Rav Judah said: When she gives it”: when she gives it to him, then it is a divorce; now, however it is not a divorce.What is the practical difference between them? They differ where the get is torn or lost [before the money is given]: according to R. Huna, it is a divorce; according to Rav Judah, it is not a divorce.
  
  Daf 60b
  
  What is the practical difference between them? They differ where the get is torn or lost [before the money is given]: according to R. Huna, it is a divorce; according to Rav Judah, it is not a divorce.
  Now, it is necessary [to state both cases]. For if we were told this of kiddushin [only, I would say] in that case R. Huna says [that it is valid immediately and he must give the money], because he comes to draw her near [to himself]; but as for divorce, where he comes to distance her, I might say that he agrees with Rav Judah.
  And if only this were taught: only there does R. Huna rule thus, for he [the husband] is not ashamed to demand it of her; but here [in the case of betrothal], seeing that she is ashamed to demand it of him, I would argue that he agrees with Rava Judah. Thus both are necessary.
  An objection was raised: “Behold this is your get, on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” she is divorced even though the get is torn or lost. But she may not marry another until she has given it.
  And it was also taught: If he said to her, “Behold this is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz,” and then he dies, if she gave it [before his death], she is not bound to the yavam; if not, she is bound to the yavam.  R. Shimon b. Gamaliel said: She can give it to his brother, father, or one of his relations. 
  Now, they differ only in so far as one Master holds, “To me” [implies] “but not to my heirs,” while the other Master holds: “Even to my heirs” but all agree that it is a condition. This is a refutation of Rav Judah!
  R. Yehudah could say you: Whose opinion is this? Rabbi [Yehudah Hanasi]. For R. Huna said: Rabbi said: Anyone who says, “On condition,” is as though he says: “From now” but the other rabbis disagree with him, and I hold like the other rabbis.
  The text [says]: R. Huna said in the name of Rabbi: One who says “on condition,” it is as though he said, “From now.” R. Zera said: When we were in Babylonia we used to say that that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rabbi, “One who says ‘on condition,’ it is as though he said, ‘From now’”: the other rabbis dispute it.
  When I went up to [the land of Israel], I found R. Assi sitting and expounding in the name of R. Yohanan: All agree that if he says: “on condition,” it is as though he said, “From now.” They differ only in the case of “from today and after death.”
  And it was also taught: “From today and after death”: it is a get, yet not a get, the words of the Sages. Rabbi said: Like this is a get.
  Now, according to R. Yehudah who holds that they also disagree over “on condition” instead of disputing in [the case of] “from today and after death,” let them dispute over “on condition.”
  To teach you the extent of Rabbi's view, that even in the case of “from today and after death,” it is a valid divorce. Then let them dispute with regard to “on condition” to teach you the extent of the rabbis’ view? The extent of what is permitted is preferable.
  “On condition that I give it to you from now [until thirty days]” etc. But that is obvious? I might have thought that it is not a condition, and he said it to urge himself on; hence we are told [that it is not so.] 
  On condition that I possess two hundred zuz etc. But let us fear that he does actually possess it? Moreover, it was taught: We are concerned that he does possess it.
  There is no difficulty: The one refers to certain kiddushin; the other, to doubtful kiddushin.
  On condition that I show you two hundred zuz etc. A Tanna taught: Her purpose was to see nothing but his money. But if he show her [money lying] on the counter, she is not betrothed. This is obvious! It is necessary [to teach it] only if he holds the money in an investment.  
  Mishnah: [If he says to her “Be betrothed to me] on condition that I own a bet kor of land,” she is betrothed, providing he does own it. “On condition that I own it in such and such a place”, if he owns it there she is betrothed, but if not she is not betrothed. “On condition that I show you a bet kor of land,” she is betrothed, providing that he does show it to her. But if he shows it to her in a plain, she is not betrothed.
  GEMARA. But let us fear that he does actually possess it? Moreover, it was taught: We are concerned that he does possess it.There is no difficulty: The one refers to certain kiddushin; the other, to doubtful kiddushin.
  Why was it taught with respect to both land and money? It is necessary: for if we were told this of money, [I would say] that is because people are accustomed to hide money; but as for land I would say: If he possesses land, it is known:  hence we are informed [otherwise].  
  “On condition that I possess it in such and such a place,” if he possesses it. etc. But this is obvious? I might argue that he can say to her, “What does it matter to you? I will take the trouble of bringing [its produce where you want it].” Hence it teaches us [that it is not so].
  On condition that I show you a beth kor of land. A Tanna taught: Her meaning was to see nothing but his [land]. But if he shows it to her in a plain, she is not betrothed. But that is obvious? It is necessary [to teach it] only if he holds it as a sharecropper.
  With respect to sanctified property we learned:
  
  Daf 61a
  
  He who sanctifies his field when the Jubilee is observed, must pay [for its redemption] fifty silver shekels for [an area requiring] a homer of barley seed. If it contains ravines ten handbreadths deep, or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not measured with it; if less than this, they are measured with it.
  Now we asked about this: Granted that they are not sanctified together with the [rest of the] field, yet let them be sanctified separately? And should you answer, whatever is less than a bet kor is not counted. But the following contradicts it:
  “[And if a man shall sanctify to the Lord part of a] field [of his possession, etc.]” (Leviticus 27:16):  why is this stated? Because it is said, “the sowing of a homer of barley shall be valued at fifty [shekels of silver]”; I know it only if he sanctifies in such a manner. How do I know to include a letekh, half a lethek, a se'ah, a tarkava, half a tarkav, and even a quarter [se’ah]? Because it is stated: “a field,” whatever its size!
  Mar Ukba b. Hama said: Here we are referring to ravines filled with water, because they are unfit for sowing. This also may be proved because of the precise reading, as it is taught “like high rocks.”  This proves it.
  If so, [it should be the same] even if less than this? Those are called basins of the field and ridges of the field.
  With respect to purchase we learned: If one says to his neighbor, “I am selling you a bet kor of land,” and it contains ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not measured with it. And Mar Ukba b. Hama said: Even if they are not filled with water. 
  What is the reason? R. Papa said: Because one does not wish to pay his money for one field and it should appear as two or three plots.  
  How is it here: do we compare it with hekdesh or purchase? It makes sense that we compare it to hekdesh because he can say to her, “I will trouble myself to sow it, and bring [you the crop].”
  Rabbi Meir says:  every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30).   
  Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit.
  GEMARA. R. Hanina b. Gamaliel responded well to R. Meir? R. Meir could have answered you: Should you think that it does not come for [teaching] a double stipulation, it [Scripture] should write, “but if they will not pass over . . . they shall have possession among you”: why state, “in the land of Canaan”? 
  
  Daf 61b
  
  This proves that it comes to necessitate a double stipulation.
  And R. Hanina b. Gamaliel? If the Torah had not written, “in the land of Canaan,” I would have said that “they shall have possession among you” in the land of Gilad, but not at all in the land of Canaan. And R. Meir? “Among you” implies--wherever you have possessions.
  It was taught: R. Hanina b. Gamaliel said: To what may this matter be compared? To a man who divided his estate among his sons, and directed, “That son shall inherit that field, that son shall inherit that field, while that son shall pay two hundred zuz and inherit that field. But if he does not give it, he shall inherit the rest of my estate together with his brothers.” Now, what causes him to receive an inheritance together with his other brethren in the rest of the estate?
  His doubling [of the stipulation] effects it for him.
  But the parable is not similar to our Mishnah. There it teaches, “[For otherwise] it implies that they should have no inheritance even in Canaan,” which proves that the doubling served a purpose in respect of Gilad too;
  whereas here he states: “What causes him to receive an inheritance together with his other brothers in the rest of the estate? His doubling effects it for him,” which proves that the doubling is necessary [only] in respect to the rest of the estate? 
  There is no difficulty: the former was before R. Meir told him [the implication of], “then they shall have possession;”
  the latter [the illustration], after R. Meir told him [the implication of], ‘then they shall have possession”.
  It makes sense for R. Meir what is written: “If you do well, you shall be rewarded? And if you do not do well, sin crouches at the door” (Genesis 4:7).  But according to R. Hanina, what is its purpose? I might have thought, “If you do well, there is reward, but if you do not do well, there is neither reward nor punishment.” Hence it teaches us [otherwise].
  It makes sense for R. Meir, that it is written: “Then you shall be free from my adjuration” (Genesis 24:41); but according to R. Hanina b. Gamaliel, what do I need it for?
  It is necessary: Lest I would say, If she were willing but not they [her family], he was to bring her against their will. Hence it teaches us [otherwise].
  What is the purpose of, “and if the woman be not willing” (Gen. 24:8)? It is necessary lest I would say, If they [her family] were willing but not she, he should bring her against her will. Hence it teaches us [otherwise]. 
  It goes well for R. Meir that which is written. “If you follow my statutes . . . and if you reject my statutes” (Leviticus 26:3, 15). But according to R. Hanina b. Gamaliel, why do I need this? It is necessary, lest I would say, “If you walk in my statutes” [you shall have] a blessing; “but if you reject my statutes,” [you will have] neither a blessing nor a curse. Hence it teaches us [otherwise]. 
  It goes well for R. Meir that which is written: “If you are willing and obedient etc. . . . but if you refuse and rebel” (Isaiah 1:19). But according to R. Hanina b. Gamaliel, why do I need it? It is necessary, lest I would say, “If you are willing,” [it will go] well; “but if you refuse,” [it will be] neither well nor good. Thus it teaches us [that it is not so].
  What is the meaning of,
  
  Daf 62a
  
  “you shall eat the sword” (Isaiah 1:20)?  Rava said: Coarse salt, hard baked barley bread, and onions; for a Master said: Stale bread baked in a large oven with salt and onions is as harmful to the body as swords.
  It goes well for R. Hanina b. Gamaliel, that which is written: “If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone aside to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free” (Numbers 5:19). But according to R. Meir, it should [also] state, “[And if a man has lain with you], you will be strangled.” R. Tanhum said: hinnaki (without a yod) is written.  
  This goes well for R. Meir, thus it is written hinnaki. But according to R. Hanina b. Gamaliel, why do I need this?  It is necessary, lest I would have said, If no man has lain [with you] . . . be free; but if a man has lain [with you], be neither free nor strangled, but merely [guilty of violating] a prohibition. Hence it teaches us [otherwise]. 
  It goes well for R. Meir, that it is written: “He shall purify himself with it on the third day, and on the seventh day, [then] he shall be clean: but if he does not purify” (Numbers 19:12) etc.  But according to R. Hanina b. Gamaliel, why do I need this?
  It is necessary, lest I would say, the mitzvah of sprinkling is [to be performed] on the third and the seventh [days]; yet if it is done only on one of these days, it has been successfully performed. Therefore it teaches us [that both days are essential].
  “And the pure person shall sprinkle upon the impure person on the third day, and on the seventh day” (Numbers 19:19), why do I need this? It is necessary, lest I would say, the third excludes the second, and the seventh excludes the sixth, because he thereby diminishes the days of purification; but if it is performed on the third and the eighth days thereby increasing the period of purification, I might say that it has been successfully performed. Hence it teaches us [otherwise].
  “And on the seventh day he shall purify him” (Numbers 19:19)? It is necessary, lest I would say, that [the sprinkling on these days] is only to enable him to eat sacred food, but for terumah even one is sufficient: hence it teaches us [that it is not so]. 
  If he betroths a woman and then declares, “I thought that she was a priest’s daughter, and behold she is [the daughter of] a Levite” or “a Levite’s daughter whereas she is [the daughter of] a priest”; “Poor, whereas she is wealthy”, or “wealthy, whereas she is poor,” she is betrothed, since she did not deceive him. 
  If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”;  “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”; “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed. 
  Similarly, if he says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, behold she is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. [If his wife is pregnant, and her fetus is discernible, his words are valid, and if she bears a female, she is betrothed.] 
  GEMARA. We learned elsewhere: Terumah must not be separated from detached [grain] for that which is attached, and if one does separate, his separation is not considered terumah.
  R. Assi asked R. Yohanan: What if one declares, “The detached produce of this furrow will be terumah for the detached produce of this one, when it is detached” and then it is detached? He answered him: Whatever lies in his power to do, is not as though that act were lacking. 
  He raised an objection: If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”;  “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”;  “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed. As for all, it is well, for they are not in his power; but [to be] convert surely lies in his power! 
  To convert is not in his power either, for R. Hiyya b. Abba said in the name of R. Yohanan: 
  
  Daf 62b
  
  A convert requires [a court] of three. What is the reason? Judgment [mishpat] is written in connection with conversion, as in a case of a court. Who can say that these three will assemble for him? 
  R. Abba b. Mamal raised a difficulty:  If so, if a man gives a perutah to his slave woman and says to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I free you,” it should be [valid] kiddushin?  Is that so! There, she was originally like an animal, whereas now [after being set free] she is an independent mind. 
  Then when R. Oshaia said: If one gives his wife a perutah and says to her, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I divorce you” she is not betrothed: according to R. Yohanan she should be betrothed? Granted that it he has the power to divorce her, does he have the power to betroth her?
  Then solve what R. Oshaia asked: [What] if one gives two perutoth to a woman: With one he says to her, “Be betrothed to me today” and with the other he says to her, “Be betrothed to me after I divorce you” from this [then] deduce that it is not [valid] kiddushin! [No.] Perhaps just as kiddushin can be effective now, it can be effective afterwards. 
  It was taught in accordance with R. Yohanan: One must not separate from detached [produce] for attached; and if one does separate, his separation is not terumah. How so? If he declares, “The detached produce of this furrow will be terumah for the attached produce of that one,” or “the attached produce of this furrow will be terumah for the detached produce of that one,” he has said nothing. But if he declares, “when it is cut off,” and then it is cut off, his declaration is valid.
  Moreover, R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov said, Even if he declares, “The detached produce of this furrow will be terumah for the attached produce of this one,” or, “the attached produce of this furrow will be terumah for the detached produce of this one when it [the attached] is a third grown and cut off,’ and it then grows to a third [of its full maturity] and is cut off, his declaration is valid.
  Rabbah said: R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov ruled thus only of fodder, but not of agam (soft plants). R. Yosef said: [He ruled thus] even of soft plants. Where is it implied that this word “agam” refers to soft plants? R. Elazar answered: For the verse says, “Is it to bow down his head as a rush [ke-agmon]” (Isaiah 58:5)? 
  With whom does the following that we taught accord: If one says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, let her be betrothed to me” he has said nothing [of legal validity]. And R. Hanina said about this: This was taught only if his wife is not pregnant; but if she is pregnant, his declaration is valid. With whom [does it agree]? If it is according to Rabbah, it means that her child was discernible; if as R. Yosef, even if her child is not discernible. 
  Others state, Rabbah said: R. Eliezer b. Jacob said this only of the fodder of a naturally watered field, but not of the fodder of an artificially irrigated field. R. Yosef said: Even of the fodder of an artificially irrigated field.
  With whom does the following that we taught accord: If one says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, let her be betrothed to me” he has said nothing [of legal validity]. And R. Hanina said about this: This was taught only if his wife is not pregnant; but if she is, his declaration is valid.With whom [does it agree]? It means that her child was discernible, and agrees with all.
  Abaye said: R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, Rabbi, and R. Meir, all hold that one may transfer the title for an object which has not come into the world. R. Eliezer b. Ya’akov, as stated.
  
  Daf 63a
  
  Rabbi, for it was taught: “You shall not deliver to his master a servant [who escaped]” (Deuteronomy 23:16):  Rabbi said: The verse refers to one who buys a slave on condition that he free him. How so? R. Nahman b. Yitzhak: For example, he wrote for him, “When I buy you, you will be to yourself from now.”
  R. Meir, as it was taught: If one says to a woman, “Behold you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or, “after you convert,” “after I am freed,” or “after you are freed,” “after your husband dies,” or, “after your sister dies,” “after your yavam performs halitzah for you” she is not betrothed. R. Meir said: She is betrothed. R. Yohanan the sandal maker said: She is not betrothed. 
  R. Judah the Nasi said: [By rights] she is betrothed, yet why did they [the sages] say, she is not betrothed? Because of bad feeling.   
  Then let R. Judah HaNasi be counted too? Rabbi and R. Judah HaNasi are identical.
  And let R. Akiva be counted too? For we learned: [If a woman says to her husband,] “Konam be what I make for your mouth,” he need not annul it.
  R. Akiva said: He should annul it, lest she do for him more than she is obliged to do for him! Was it not stated on this, R. Huna son of R. Joshua said: When she said, “Let my hands be sanctified to their Maker,” and her hands are in existence?  
  If he says to a woman, “Behold you are betrothed to me on condition that I speak to the government on your behalf”, or “That I work for you as a laborer”, if he speaks to the government on her behalf or works for her as a laborer, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed.
  GEMARA. Resh Lakish said: Providing that he gives [her] the value of a perutah. But with the payment [for speaking on her behalf to the government] she is not [betrothed]? Was it not taught: “[Be betrothed to me] in payment for driving you on a donkey,” or “seating you in a carriage or ship,” she is not betrothed.   
  “In payment that I will drive you on a donkey,” or “that I will seat you on a carriage or ship,” she is betrothed? And should you say: Here too it means that he also gave her the value of a perutah: but it states: “in payment?” 
  And it was also taught: [If a woman says,] “Sit with me as a companion, and I will be betrothed to you,” “Entertain me,” “Dance before me,” “Do for me as was done in this building,” we assess it: if it is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. And should you say, here too it means that he gives her the value of a perutah [in addition]; surely it states, we assess it. This is a refutation of Resh Lakish.
  Resh Lakish could answer you: The Tanna of these baraitot holds: Wages are incurred only at the end; whereas our Tanna holds, wages are incurred from beginning to end.
  Now, what forced Resh Lakish to explain our Mishnah in accordance with the opinion that wages are incurred from beginning to end and that he gives her [a perutah in addition]? 
  Rava said: Our mishnah was difficult for him: why state particularly, “on condition”: let it teach, “in payment for”? Hence this proves that wherever “on condition” [is taught], it means that he gives her [something in addition].
  [If he says,] “Behold you are betrothed to me] on condition that [my] father consents,” if his father consents, she is betrothed; if not, she is not betrothed. If his father dies, she is betrothed; If the son dies, the father is instructed to say that he does not consent.
  GEMARA. What does it mean by “On condition that [my] father consents?” If we say, providing that my father [explicitly] says “yes”? Then what about the middle clause: if his father dies, she is betrothed. Surely he did not say “yes!” Rather [it must mean],
  
  Daf 63b
  
  “on condition that my father is silent.” Then what about the last clause: “If the son dies. They instruct the father to say that he does not consent” yet why, seeing that he was silent? Hence [it must mean that] he said to her, “on condition that my father does not [explicitly] object”:
  thus the first clause has one meaning, while the middle and the last clauses have a different meaning? R. Yannai said: Yes. Resh Lakish said: This proves that in R. Yannai's opinion we strain to contextualize the Mishnah in two different meanings, so that it agrees with one Tanna, rather than give it one context and saying that it reflect [the views of] two Tannaim.  
  R. Joseph b. Ammi said: In the end [the mishnah] has one reasoning. What does it mean by “on condition that [my] father consents”? On condition that he does not protest within thirty days from now.
  [If a father declares,] “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I have betrothed her,” and then a man comes and states, “I betrothed her,” he is believed. [If a father declares,] “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I have betrothed her,” and then a man comes and states, “I betrothed her,” he is believed.
  GEMARA. Rav said: he is believed to give her a divorce, but he is not believed to marry her. He is believed to give her a divorce: no man sins without profit. But he is not believed to take her: his desire may have overcome him.
  R. Assi said: He is even believed to marry her. But R. Assi agrees that if she declares, “I have been betrothed, but do not know to whom,” and one comes and says: “I betrothed her,” he is not believed to marry her.
  We learned [in the mishnah]: but if they wish, one gives a divorce and the other takes her: this is a refutation of Rav. Rav could answer you. There it is different: since another is with him, he is indeed afraid. 
  It was taught as R. Assi: “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I betrothed her,” and one comes and says: “I betrothed her,” he is believed, even to marry her. If he marries her and [then] another comes and says: “I betrothed her,” he does not have the power to forbid her to him [the first]. 
  [But] if a woman says: “I have been betrothed, but do not know to whom,” and one comes and declares, “I betrothed her,” he is not trusted to take her, because she will protect him.
  The question was asked: Is someone stoned based on his statement?   
  Rav said: We do not stone; R. Assi said: We do stone. Rav said: We do not stone: the Torah believed the father in respect of a prohibition but to execute, the Torah did not believe him. R. Assi said, We do stone: The Torah believed the father for every matter. R. Assi said: Yet I admit that if she herself says: “I was betrothed,” we do not stone.
  R. Assi said further: These rulings of mine break roofs! Now if you say that we stone in a case where one who comes to marry her, may marry her, how much the more should we stone in a case where one who comes to marry her may not marry her!
  Yet it is not so. The Torah believed the father, but did not believe her.
  But R. Hisda said: In both cases we do not stone. Now, R. Hisda follows his own reasoning [elsewhere], for R. Hisda said: [If a man declares,] “This son of mine is nine years and a day” [or] “this daughter of mine is three years and a day,” he is believed in respect of a sacrifice, but not in respect of lashes or [other] punishment.  
  It was taught in accordance with R. Hisda: [If a man declares,] “This son of mine is thirteen years and a day,” [or] “this daughter of mine is twelve years and a day,”
  
  Daf 64a
  
  [or] “this daughter of mine is twelve years and a day,” he is believed in respect of vows, dedications, sanctifications, and evaluations; but not in respect of lashes and [other] punishments.
  [If a man declares] “I have given my daughter in betrothal,” [or] “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is [now] a minor, he is believed. “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is now of majority age, he is not believed. “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” whether she is a minor or of majority age he is not believed.
  Why are the first and the second clauses different? In the first clause, it is in his hand; in the second, it is not in his hand. 
  Is it not? Surely it is in his power to marry her to a halal, whereby he disqualifies her to the priesthood! 
  That is no difficulty: it [our Mishnah] agrees with R. Dostai b. Judah, who said: The daughters of Israel are a purifying mikweh for disqualified priests (halalim). 
  But it is in his power to marry her to a mamzer? This agrees with R. Akiva, who maintained, Kiddushin has no validity with those [marriages forbidden by] negative commandments.
  But it is in his power to marry her, if a widow, to a High Priest, and in accordance with R. Simai; for it was taught: R. Simai said: R. Akiva declares any [offspring of a prohibited marriage] to be a mamzer, except that of a widow [married] to a High Priest, since the Torah said, “He shall not take, and he shall not profane [his seed]” (Leviticus 21:6): he renders [his seed] profane, but not a mamzer!  
  This is according to R. Yeshvav, who said: “Come, let us cry out against Akiva son of Joseph who declared: Anyone who has no entry into Israel, the child is a mamzer.”
  Now, this works according to R. Yeshvav’s opinion, if he states his own independent opinion [of R. Akiva's ruling]. But if he [merely] comes to contradict R. Simai, then it is [still] in his [the father's] power to marry her to a person forbidden by a positive commandment?  
  R. Ashi answered: Is it really logical, that the first clause [states that he is believed] because it is in his power? Granted that it is in his power to betroth her, is it in his power to divorce her? Moreover, if this person [to whom he desires to betroth her] says that he does not want her, can he then betroth her against his will?
  Rather R. Ashi said: in the first clause the Torah declared him trustworthy, as R. Huna [said]. For R. Huna said in the name of Rav: How do we know that a father is believed to prohibit his daughter by Biblical law? Because it is said: “I gave my daughter to this man [as a wife]” (Deuteronomy 22:16): by “to a man,” he renders her forbidden [to all]; by “this”, he frees her.
  The Torah believed the father in regard to marriage  but in regard to captivity it did not believe him.
  If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed.
  If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed. Shall we say [then] that our Mishnah does not agree with R. Nathan? 
  For it was taught: If at the time of betrothal one declares that he has sons, but at the time of his death he says that he has no sons; If at the time of betrothal he declares that he has brothers, but at the time of his death he declares that he has no brothers: he is believed to permit, but not to prohibit, the words of Rabbi. R. Nathan said: He is believed to prohibit too!
  Rava said: There it is different: since he retracts at the time of his death, I says that he may be speaking the truth. Abaye said to him: Is this not an “all the more so” situation: If there, though he contradicts his [former] words, you say that he may be speaking truth; surely it is all the more so in our Mishnah, where he does not contradict his [former] words!
  Rather Abaye said our Mishnah refers to one who is not presumed to have brothers or sons: hence we rule, since he is not presumed to possess either brothers or sons. If he says, “I have sons,” he is believed; but if he says, “I have brothers,” he is disbelieved, [because] he does not have the sole power to forbid her to the whole world.  [Whereas] the baraita
  
  Daf 64b
  
  refers to one who is presumed to have brothers but not sons. So we argue: Why should he lie? Why might he have said it? To exempt her from the yavam! Then he could say, “I could have exempted her by a divorce [just before my death].” 
  Now, Rabbi holds that [the argument,] “why should I lie” is as [strong as] witnesses, so that the witnesses come and cancel the presumption. But R. Nathan holds, [The argument,] “why should I lie” is [only] as [strong as] a presumption, and one presumption cannot come and completely cancel out another.
  Mishnah: If one betroths his daughter without specifying which, the daughters of majority age are not included. If one has two groups of daughters by two wives, and he declares, “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors,” all are forbidden [to marry other men], except the youngest of the juniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the eldest of the seniors.
  “I have betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know whether the youngest of the juniors or the youngest of the seniors, or the eldest of the juniors who is younger than the youngest of the seniors,” they are all forbidden, except the eldest of the seniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the youngest of the juniors.
  GEMARA. But minors are included?
  This proves that kiddushin that cannot be followed by intercourse is kiddushin?  The circumstances are that there is only one bogeret and one minor. 
  But “bogrot” is taught! By “bogrot”, “bogrot” in general are meant.
  It is obvious: what do bogrot belong here? What are we dealing with here? Where she appointed him [her father] to be an agent [to accept her kiddushin]. What might I have thought? That when he accepted kiddushin he did so on her behalf; hence it teaches us that a person does not put aside something by which he benefits to do something by which he does not benefit.
  But do we not refer [even] to where she said to him, “Let my kiddushin be yours!” Even so, a man does not put aside a mitzvah which rests on him and perform one which does not rest on him.
  If one has two groups of daughters: Now, both are necessary. For if it taught us the first one, [I would say only] here R. Meir rules [so], for since there is yet a younger one than this, he calls this one “elder,” but in the latter [clause], I might say that he agrees with R. Yose that he only calls the youngest of them all “young.”
  And if it [the last clause only] was stated: I would say that only there does R. Yose rule thus, but in the former he agrees with R. Meir. Thus both are necessary. 
  Shall we say that R. Meir holds that a person places himself in a position of doubt, while R. Yose holds that a person does not place himself in a position of doubt?   But we have heard the opposite, for we learned: If one vows, “[This shall be forbidden me] until Pesah,” it is forbidden until Pesah arrives; “until Pesah shall be,” it is forbidden until Pesah is over.
  “Until pene [before] Pesah”: R. Meir says: It is forbidden until it arrives; R. Yose says: Until it is over! 
  R. Hanina b. Avdimi said in the name of Rav: The passage [on vows] must be reversed. And it was taught so: This is a general principle: Anything that has a fixed time and one vows, “until before” R. Meir said: It means: Until it ends; R. Yose said: Until it arrives.
  Abaye said: The dispute refers [only] to two groups of daughters; but in the case of one group, all agree that “elder” and “younger” are literal, [for] the middle one is called by name.
  R. Adda b. Mattena said to Abaye: If so,
  
  Daf 65a
  
  If so, let the middle one of the second group be permitted? What are we dealing with here? When there are only an elder and a younger [daughter].  
  And this is also reasonable, for if it is so, that there is [a middle one], let her be mentioned! But according to your opinion; the middle one of the first [older] group, who is certainly doubtful and forbidden, was she taught?    
  Is that so! There [even] the one younger than her is taught as being forbidden, and the same applies to this [middle] one, who is older than her;
  but here, if it is so that there is [a middle one], let her be mentioned!
  R. Huna, son of R. Yehoshua, said to Rava:  But Pesah is as one group, and yet they dispute? 
  He said back to him: There they differ merely on language: one Master holds, “until pene Pesah” means until [just] before Pesah, and the other holds, until Pesah has passed.
  If he says to a woman, “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You did not betroth me”: he is prohibited to her relatives, but she is permitted to his relatives. If she says, “You betrothed me,” and he says, “I did not betroth you,” he is permitted to her relatives but she is prohibited to his relatives. 
  “I betrothed you,” and she says, “You betrothed my daughter,” he is forbidden to the relatives of the senior [the mother], but the senior is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the junior’s [the daughter’s] relatives, and the junior is permitted to his relatives.
  [If a man says to a woman], “I betrothed your daughter,” and she replies, “You betrothed me”; he is forbidden to the junior’s [the daughter’s] relatives, while the junior is permitted to his relatives; he is permitted to the senior’s [mother’s] relatives, while the senior is forbidden to his relatives.
  GEMARA. If he says to a woman, I have betrothed you etc. [Both clauses] are necessary. For if it taught us this about him, [that is] because a man does not care [about making such a statement], and so it happens that he might say this.
  But as for her, I might have said, were she not certain of her statement, she would not have said it, and so her relations are forbidden to him. Hence it teaches us [that this is not so].
  “I have betrothed you,” and she replies etc. Why do I need this too? It is necessary. Lest I would have said law the Torah believed the father and the rabbis believed her [the mother], and so her daughter is prohibited on her statement. Hence it teaches us [otherwise]. 
  I have betrothed your daughter etc. Why do I need another example? Since the one is taught, the other is taught too.
  It was stated: Rav said: We force [him to divorce her]; Shmuel said: We request. To what [does this refer]? If we say: To the first clause: there is neither compulsion nor request? But if it refers to the second clause:
  as for requesting, that is well; but we compel why? He can protest, “I do not want to be forbidden to her relations!”
  Rather these sayings were stated in reference to each other. Shmuel said: He is asked to give her a divorce; Rav said: If he gives a divorce of his own accord, then we force him to pay the ketubah.
  It was stated likewise: R. Aha b. Adda said in the name of Rav and others say R. Aha b. Adda said in the name of R. Hamnuna in the name of Rav: We force and request. Both? Rather this is what he said: We ask him to give a get; but if he gives a get of his own accord, we force him to pay the kethubah. 
  Rav Judah said: If a man betroths in the presence of one witness, we are not concerned that his kiddushin are valid. It was stated: R. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: If a man betroths in the presence of one witness, we do not consider his kiddushin valid even if both admit it.
  Rava raised a difficulty against R. Nahman: if one says to a woman, “I have betrothed you” and she says, “You did not betroth me” her relatives are forbidden to him, while his relatives are permitted to her. Now, if there are witnesses, why are his relatives permitted to her? And if there are no witnesses, why are her relatives forbidden to him? Rather it refers to a case where there is one witness.
  What are we dealing with here? When he says to her, “I betrothed your in the presence of So-and-so, and So-and-so” who have [since] gone overseas.
  He raised an objection: If one divorces his wife and then stays overnight with her in an inn: Beth Shammai says: She does not require a second divorce from him; while Beth Hillel says: She does require a second divorce from him. What is the case? If there are witnesses, what is Beth Shammai's reason? And if there are no witnesses, what is Beth Hillel's reason? Hence it must refer to a case where there is one witness!
  But according to your view, what about the second clause: But they agree that if she was divorced after betrothal, she does not require a second divorce from him, because he was not intimate with her. Now if you think that one witness is believed, what does it matter whether [the divorce was] from betrothal or marriage?
  Rather what are we dealing with here? With a case that there are witnesses who say they were alone together, but there are no witnesses that say they had intercourse. Beth Shammai holds: we do not
  
  Daf 65b
  
  say that witnesses of seclusion are witnesses of intercourse;  Beth Hillel holds we do say that the witnesses of seclusion are witnesses of intercourse. But they certainly agree that if she was divorced from betrothal, we do not say that the witnesses of seclusion are witnesses of intercourse, because he was not intimate with her.
  R. Yitzchak b. Shmuel b. Marta said in the name of Rav: If a man betroths in the presence of one witness, we disregard his kiddushin, even if both admit it. Rabbah son of R. Huna said: If a man betroths in the presence of one witness, the Great Court rules: We disregard his kiddushin. Who is the Great Court? Rab. Others state, Rabbah b. R. Huna said in the name of Rav: If a man betroths in the presence of one witness, the Great Court rules: We disregard his kiddushin. Who is the Great Court? Rabbi.
  R. Ahdavoi b. Ammi raised an objection: If two come from overseas and a woman is with them and a bundle  is with them: One says, “This is my wife, this is my slave, and this is my bundle”, while the other says: “This is my wife, this my slave, and this is my bundle” while the woman claims, “These two are my slaves and bundle is mine,” she requires two divorces, and collects her kethubah from the bundle.
   How so? If this one has witnesses and the other has witnesses, can she claim, “These two are my slaves and the bundle is mine?” Rather it means that there is one witness.
  Now, is that logical? Is one witness believed when he is rebutted?
  Rather as for permitting her to the world, all agree that she is permitted; here, this is what it means: she needs two divorces in order to collect her ketubah from bundle, and it is according to R. Meir, who ruled: Movables are subject to the ketubah.
  What is the conclusion about this? R. Kahana said: We disregard his kiddushin; R. Papa said: We are concerned that his kiddushin are effective. R. Ashi said to R. Kahana: What is your opinion? That we learn the meaning of “davar” [matter] here from monetary matters?   
  If so, just as there the admission of the litigant is like a hundred witnesses, then so too here, the admission of the litigant should be as a hundred witnesses! He said to him: There he does not obligate others; here, he does obligate others.
  Mar Zutra and R. Ada the elder, sons of R. Mari b. Issur, divided their property between them. They went before R. Ashi and asked him: When the Torah said: “on the basis of two witnesses . . . shall a matter be established,” (Deuteronomy 19:15) is it so that they [the litigants] cannot retract if they wish, and we do not want to retract;
  or perhaps, a transaction can be established only by witnesses? He said to them: Witnesses were created only against liars. 
  Abaye said: If one witness says to a person, “You ate forbidden fat” and he is silent, he [the witness] is believed. Now, a Tanna supports this: If one witness says to a person, “You ate forbidden fat” and he replies, “I did not eat,” he is not liable. The reason [he is not liable is he said], “I did not,” but if he is silent, he is believed. 
  Abaye also said: If one witness says to a person, “Your clean [food] has been defiled” and he is silent, he [the witness] is believed. Now, a Tanna supports this: If one witness declares, “They have been defiled,” and he [their owner] replies, ‘They have not been defiled,” he is not liable. The reason [he is not liable is he said], “They are not,” but if he is silent, he is believed. 
  And Abaye said: If one witness says to him,
  
  Daf 66a
  
  “Bestiality was committed with your ox,” and he is silent, he is believed. And a Tanna supports it: Or [an ox] with which a transgression was committed, or which killed [a person] on the testimony of one witness, or by admission of its owner, he [the one witness] is believed. This “on the testimony of one witness” what is the case? If the owner admits, then it is “by admission of the owner”? Hence it surely means that he is silent.
  Now, it is necessary [to teach all of these cases]. For if he taught us this first one, [I would argue:] if he were not certain [that he ate forbidden fat], in which case he would be sacrificing hullin in the Temple Court, he would not bring [an offering].
  But as for, “Your pure food has been defiled,” we might say, the reason of his silence was that it is fit for him when he is unclean.
  And if we were told this: that is because he causes him a loss while he is clean, but as for bestiality having been committed with his ox, he may say [to himself], “Not all oxen are for the altar.” Thus all are necessary.
  The question was asked: What if his wife [is accused] of committing adultery on the testimony of one witness, and he [the husband] is silent? Abaye said: He is believed. Rava said: He is no believed, because it is a sexual matter, and no sexual matter can be established by less than two. 
  Abaye said: From where do I know this? For there was a certain blind man who used to organize his mishnayot in front of Mar Shmuel. One day it was late, but he did not come; so he sent a messenger for him. While the messenger was going by one road, he came by another. When the messenger returned, he stated that his [the blind man's] wife had committed adultery. When he came before Mar Samuel he said to him, “If you believe him, go and divorce her;
  if not, do not divorce her.” Does not “if you believe him” means that he is not a robber? And Rava?  “If you believe him” as if he were two [witnesses], go and divorce her; if not, do not divorce her. 
  Abaye also said: From where do I know this? Because it was taught: It once happened that King Yannai went to Kohlit in the wilderness and conquered sixty towns there. On his return he rejoiced greatly and invited all the sages of Israel. He said to them, “Our ancestors ate mallows when they were occupied with the building of the Temple; let us too eat mallows in memory of our ancestorys.” So mallows were served on golden tables, and they ate.
  Now, there was a man there, a scoffing, evil-hearted and worthless man, and Elazar son of Poirah.  And Elazar son of Poirah said to King Yannai,  “Yannai, the hearts of the Pharisees are set against you.” “Then what shall I do?” “Test them with the frontlet between your eyes.” So he tested them with the frontlet between his eyes.
  There was an elder there named Yehudah son of Gedidiah. He said to King Yannai, “King Yannai! The royal crown is enough for you. Leave the priestly crown to the seed of Aaron.” (For it was rumored that his mother had been taken captive in Modi'im.) The matter was investigated, but not confirmed, and the Sages of Israel departed in anger.
  Then Elazar b. Poirah to King Yannai: “King Yannai! Even for the lowest person in Israel, thus is his ruling, and you, a King and a High Priest, should that be your law too?” “Then what shall I do?” “If you would take my advice, crush them.”  “But what shall happen with the Torah?” “Behold, it is bound up and lying in the corner: whoever wishes to study, let him go and study!”
  R. Nahman b. Isaac said: Immediately a spirit of heresy was cast into him, for he should have replied, “That is well for the Written Law; but what of the Oral Law?” Immediately, the evil burst forth through Elazar son of Poirah, and all the Sages of Israel were massacred, and the world was desolate until Shimon b. Shetah came and restored the Torah as of old.
  What was the precise case?  If we say that two testified that she was captured and two that she was not? Why would you rely on these rely on these?   
  Rather it must mean there was one witness, and the reason [that his evidence was rejected] was that two contradicted him; but otherwise, he would have been believed.
  And Rava? [He could say to you]: After all, there were two against two, but it follows R. Aba b. R. Manyomi who said [elsewhere]: that it refers to witnesses of refutation [hazamah]; so too here, there were witnesses of refutation.
  Alternatively, this agrees with R. Yitzchak, who said: They substituted a handmaiden for her.
  Rava said:
  
  Daf 66b
  
  From where do I know this?  As it was taught: R. Shimon said: It once happened that the water reservoir of Diskim in Yavneh, which stood in the presumption of being full, was measured and found lacking
  Everything which had been rendered pure through it: R. Tarfon declared pure and R. Akiva pure. R. Tarfon said: This mikveh stands in the presumption of being full, and you come to declare it lacking on the basis of a doubt. Do not declare it lacking because of a doubt. R. Akiva said: This man stands in the presumption of being impure, and you wish to declare him pure on the basis of doubt. Do not purify him on the basis of a doubt. 
  R. Tarfon said: This may be compared to one [a kohen] who stood and sacrificed on the altar, and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah, in which case his service is [retrospectively] fit. R. Akiva said: This may be compared to one who stood and sacrificed on the altar, and it became known that he was [physically] blemished, in which case his service is [retrospectively] unfit.
  R. Tarfon said: You have compared it to a man with a blemish, while I have compared it to the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah. Let us then consider, to whom is it similar: if it is similar to the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah, we shall judge it like [the law] of a son of a divorced woman or a halutzah; if it is similar to a man with a blemish, we shall judge it like [the law] of one who has a blemish.
  R. Akiva began to argue: the unfitness of a mikveh is by one, and the unfitness of a man with a blemish is by one; hence let not the son of a divorced woman or a haluzah prove it, since his unfitness [must be attested] by two.
  Another interpretation: the unfitness of a mikveh is in itself, and that of a man with a blemish is in himself: let not the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah prove it, seeing that his unfitness is through others. R. Tarfon to him: Akiva! Whoever separates himself from you is as though he separated himself from life!
  Now, this case of a man with a blemish, whose unfitness is by one, what is the case? If he contradicts him, is he [the witness] believed! Rather, it must mean that he is silent, 
  and similarly, in the case of a son of a divorced woman or of a halutzah, he is also silent; and it is taught: “The unfitness of a mikveh is by one, and the unfitness of a man with a blemish is by one; but let not the son of a divorced woman or of a halutzah prove it, since his unfitness [must be attested] by two!” 
  And Abaye could say to you: After all, it means that he contradicts him; yet as to your argument. Why is he believed? Because he can say to him, “Strip, and I will show you [the blemish].” And that is meant when it is taught: ‘The unfitness of a mikveh is in itself and the unfitness of a man with a blemish is in himself, but let not the son of a divorced woman or a haluzah prove it, whose unfitness is through others.”
  And how do we know that the service of the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah is [retroactively] fit? R. Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: For the verse says, “And it shall be to him, and to his seed after him, [the covenant of an everlasting priesthood]” (Numbers 25:13): this applies to both fit and unfit seed.   
  The father of Shmuel said: [It is deduced] from the following: “Bless, Lord, his substance [ḥeilo], and accept the work of his hands” (Deuteronomy 33:11): accept even the non-sacred [hullin] in his midst. 
  R. Yannai said, [It is deduced] from this: “And you shall come to the priest that shall be in those days” (Deuteronomy 26:3): now, would you really think that a person would go to a priest who was not in his days? Rather this [must refer to one who] was [originally assumed to be] fit, and then became non-sacred.
  How do we know that the service of a priest with a blemish is [retroactively] invalid? R. Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: For the verse said, “Therefore say, ‘I hereby grant him my covenant of wholeness (read as shalem)” (Numbers 25:12): when he is whole, but not when he is lacking. But shalom [peace] is written! R. Nahman: The vav of shalom is broken off [in the middle].
  Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this?  When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite.  
  And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this?  When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin.
  And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this?  One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this?  The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.
  GEMARA. Wherever there is kiddushin: R. Shimon said to R. Yohanan: Is it then a general principle that wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression the offspring follows the status of the male? But what of 
  
  
  Daf 67a
  
  a convert who marries a mamzeret, where the kiddushin is valid and there is no transgression, and yet the offspring follows the status of the flawed one?  For it was taught: If a convert marries a mamzeret, the offspring is a mamzer, the words of R. Yose! He said back: Do you think that our Mishnah agrees with R. Yose?  Our Mishnah follows R. Yehudah, who holds: A convert may not marry a mamzeret; hence there is kiddushin, but there is a transgression, [and so] the offspring follows the status of the flawed one. 
  Then let it be taught [in the Mishnah]?  “In any case” of the second clause comes to include this.
  And if you want I could say, it does after all, follow R. Yose, and “this is the case” is taught as a limitation.
  Does then the “this is the case” imply that there are no others? But what of a halal who marries the daughter of an Israelite, where there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, yet the offspring follows the male?  That is no difficulty: He [the Tanna of our Mishnah] holds according to R. Dostai son of R. Judah.  
  But what of an Israelite who marries a halalah, where there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, and yet the offspring follows the male? “In any case” is stated in the first clause to include. 
  Then let it be explicitly taught? Because it cannot be [easily] taught. [For] how should it be taught: “The daughter of a priest, a Levite, or an Israelite or a halalah who marries a priest, a Levite, or an Israelite?” Is then a halalah fit to [marry] a priest?
  But there is the case of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah. For Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: If an Egyptian of the second degree marries an Egyptian woman of the first degree, her son ranks as third degree!
  But there is the case of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah. For Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: If an Egyptian of the second degree marries an Egyptian woman of the first degree, her son ranks as third degree!
  But is there not the following: For when Ravin came, he said in the name of R. Yohanan: In the case of [other] nations, follow the male;
  if they convert, follow the more inferior status of the two! “This is the case” comes to exclude.
  [Reverting to the issue of the authorship of the Mishnah:] How now! If you say that our Mishnah agrees with R. Judah, it goes well: “In any case” of the first clause includes an Israelite who marries a halalah and the case of Rabbah b. Bar Hanah; while “this is the case” excludes the cases of R. Dimi and Ravin
  
  Daf 67b
  
  And “in any case” of the second clause includes a convert who marries a mamzeret. But if you say that it agrees with R. Yose: “In any case” of the first clause is [to be explained] as we have said: “This is the case” [likewise] as we have said: but what does “In any case” of the second clause come to include?
  Now on your view, according to R. Judah, what is the purpose of the “this is the case” of the second clause? Hence [you must say] because the first clause states “this is the case”, the second also states: “this is the case”. So here too, because the first clause states “in any case” the second also states “in any case”.
  The above text states: when Ravin came, he said in the name of R. Yohanan: In the case of [other] nations, follow the male; if they convert, follow the more inferior status of the two.
  What is meant by “In the case of [other] nations, follow the male”? As it was taught: How do we know that if one of the nations has intercourse with a Canaanite woman and bears a son, you may buy him as a slave?
  Scripture says: “Moreover of the children of the residents that sojourn among you, from them you shall buy” (Leviticus 25:45). I might think that even if a Canaanite slave has intercourse with a woman of other nations and bears a son, you may buy him for a slave; Scripture says, “Which they have given birth to in your land” (Leviticus 25:45) only of those who are born in your land, but not of those who dwell in your land.
  “If they convert, follow the more inferior status of the two.” What is the case? If we say, in the case of an Egyptian man who marries an Ammonite woman? What inferior status is there? “An Ammonite [shall not enter unto the assembly of the Lord . . . even to the tenth generation]”,  but an Ammonite woman may.
  Rather [it means] an Ammonite who marries an Egyptian woman: If [the child] is male, he follows him [the father]; and if [the child] is female, she follows her [the mother]. 
  Whatever [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person: How do we know this? For R. Hiyya b. Avin said in the name of R. Yohanan, and some said it was on the authority of R. Yannai, while R. Aha son of Rava said that it was on the authority of R. Yose the Galilean: the verse says, “And she leaves his house, and she goes to another man” (Deuteronomy 24:2) “to another man” and not to a relative.
  R. Abba raised a difficulty on this: Yet say: “another man” but not [her husband’s] son? The son is explicitly written: “A man shall not take his father's wife” (Deuteronomry 23:1); what then is the purpose of “another [man].” Learn from this “to another man”, but not to relatives.
  Yet perhaps both refer to the [husband's] son, one referring to an ab initio prohibition, the other, to an ex post facto one! 
  The prohibition ab initio is deduced from a wife's sister: if one may not betroth a wife's sister, who is [forbidden by penalty of] karet; how much the more so is this of those on account of whom death by a court is incurred.
  Then perhaps both refer to a wife's sister, one [forbidding it] ab initio, the other, ex post facto!  That indeed is so. 
  Thus we have found [this] of a wife’s sister; how we do know it of other incestual relationships? We learn then from a wife's sister: just as a wife's sister is distinguished in that she is a incestuous relationship punishable if committed intentionally by karet, and resulting in a sin-offering if done unwittingly, and kiddushin with her is invalid; so with every incestuous relationship with whom an intentional offence involves kareth and an unwitting offence involves a sin-offering, kiddushin is invalid.
  Now, as for all [others], it goes well, for they may be derived; but as for a married woman and a brother's wife, we can raise a difficulty: As for a wife's sister, [the invalidity of kiddushin] is because she is not permitted [even] where there is a commandment; will you say [the same] of a brother's wife, who is permitted where there is a commandment?
  [The analogy with] a married woman also may be refuted: as for these, [the invalidity of kiddushin] is because she cannot be permitted while they who make her prohibited are alive; will you say [the same] of a married woman, who can be permitted during the lifetime of him who renders her forbidden? 
  Rather R. Jonah said, and others say, R. Huna son of R. Joshua, the verse says, “For whoever shall do any of these abominations, they shall be cut off” (Leviticus 18:29): thus all incestuous relations are compared to a wife's sister: just as kiddushin with a wife's sister is invalid, so is kiddushin with all other incestuous relations invalid.
  If so,
  
  Daf 68a
  
  even with a menstruating woman?  Why then did Abaye say: All agree that if one has intercourse with a menstruating woman or a sotah,  the offspring is not a mamzer? Hezekiah said: The verse says, “[And if any man lie with her,] her menstruation will be on him” (Leviticus 15:24): even during her menstrual period, betrothal with her is valid.
  Since [all other incestuous relations] can be compared to niddah, and they can be compared to a wife's sister: what did you see to compare them to a wife's sister, instead, compare them to niddah? [In a choice between] leniency and stringency, we compare to the case of stringency.  
  R. Aha b. Ya’akov said: It can be derived using a kal vehomer from the case of a yevamah: if kiddushin with a yevamah is invalid, though she is [prohibited only] by a negative commandment, how much the more so with those who are forbidden by penalty of death or kareth! If so, should not others, prohibited [only] by negative commandments also be the same?
  R. Papa said: Those prohibited by negative commandments are explicitly stated: “If a man has two wives, the one beloved, and the other hated” (Deuteronomy 21:15). Now is there before the God a hated [woman] or a beloved one! Rather “beloved” means beloved in her marriage, and “hated” means hated in her marriage;   yet the Torah states: “and if there be.”
  Now R, Akiva, who holds that kiddushin are invalid with those who are prohibited by a negative commandment, to what does he apply [the words], “if there be”? 
  To [the betrothal of] a widow to a High Priest, and in accordance with R. Simai. For it was taught: R. Simai said: R. Akiva declared that any [offspring] of [a marriage forbidden by a negative commandment] is a mamzer, except that of a widow [married] to a High Priest, since the Torah said, “[A widow . . . he shall not take,] and he shall not profane [his seed]” (Leviticus 21:6): he profanes [his seed], but he does not make a mamzer.
  But according to R. Yeshvav, who said: Come, and let us cry out against Akiva son of Joseph, who declared: He who has no entry in Israel, the offspring is a mamzer. It goes well if R. Yeshvav comes to combat R. Simai; then it is right.
  But if he states his own opinion, and [R. Akiva declares a mamzer the offspring] even of those who are prohibited by a positive commandment, to what does he apply it? 
  To a non-virgin [married] to a High Priest. And how is this different?  Because it is a positive commandment not applicable to all.
  And the Rabbis: instead of explaining [the verse] as referring to those prohibited by negative commandments, let them refer it to those forbidden by positive commandments?
  Those who are forbidden by positive commandments, who are they? If both are Egyptian women, both are “hated”? If one is an Egyptian woman and the other a Jew, we require that the “two wives” be from one people: if [one is] a non-virgin [married] to a High Priest, is it then written, [If] there be [two wives] to a priest?
  And R. Akiva?  You are forced to leave the verse to be difficult and explain itself.
  And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin etc. How do we know [this of] a Canaanite slave woman?   R. Huna said: The verse says, “Stay here with [im] the donkey” (Genesis 22:5) it is a people [am] like a donkey. We have thus found that kiddushin with her is invalid:
  
  Daf 68b
  
  how do we know that her offspring has her status? For the verse says, “The wife and her children shall be her master's” (Exodus 21:4).
  How do we know [this of a free] Gentile woman? The verse says, “You shall not make marriages with them” (Deuteronomy 7:3). We thus find that kiddushin with them is invalid. How do we know that her offspring has her status? 
  R. Yohanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yohai: The verse says, “For he will turn away your son from following me” (Deuteronomy 7:4):  you son by an Israelite woman is called your son, but your son by a Gentile woman is not called your son. 
  Ravina said: This proves that your daughter's son by a non-Jew is called your son.  Shall we say that Ravina holds that if a non-Jew or a [non-Jewish] slave has relations with a Jewish woman the offspring is mamzer?
  [No.] Granted that he is not [regarded as] fit, he is not mamzer either, but merely as unfit.
  That [verse] refers to the seven nations! From where do we know it of other nations? The verse says, “For he will turn away your son” (Deuteronomy 7:4) which includes all who may turn your offspring away.
  That goes well according to R. Shimon, who interprets the reason of Scripture.   But according to the Rabbis, what is the reason?   
  The verse says, “And after that you may go in to her, and be her husband” (Deuteronomy 21:13), from which it follows that before that kiddushin with her is invalid.
  We have thus found that kiddushin with her is invalid. How do we know that her child has her status? The verse says, “If there be to a man [two wives] . . . and they bear him [children]” (Deuteronomy 21:15): where we read “if there be,”   we also read: “and they bear to him,” but where we do not read: “If there be” we do not read: “and they bear to him.”
  If so, the same should be true for a female slave? Indeed, this is true. Then for what do I need “the wife and her children shall be her master's”? For what was taught:
  
  Daf 69a
  
  If he [the master] says to his female slave, “Behold, you are free, but your child [yet to be born] shall be a slave,” the child is as herself, the words of R. Yose the Galilean. But the Sages say: His words are valid, for it is said: “the wife and her children shall be her master's.”
  How does this mean that? Rava said: This refers to R. Yose the Galilean’s [ruling]. 
  Rabbi Tarfon says: mamzerim can be purified. How is this so? If a mamzer marries a slave woman, her son is a slave; if he frees him, it is found that the son is a free man. Rabbi Eliezer says: behold, he is a slave mamzer. 
  Rabbi Tarfon says: mamzerim can be purified. How is this so? If a mamzer marries a slave woman, her son is a slave;
  if he frees him, it is found that the son is a free man.  Rabbi Eliezer says: behold, he is a slave mamzer. 
  Come and hear: For R. Simlai's host was a mamzer, and he [R. Simlai] said to him, “Had I known you earlier, I would have purified your sons.” Now, if you say that [R. Tarfon was speaking ab initio] is at the very outset, it is well: but if you say, only ex post facto, what is it [that he could have advised him]?  
  He could have advised him by saying to him, “Go and steal, and then be sold as a Hebrew slave.” Were there then Hebrew slaves in R. Simlai's time? Surely a Master said: [The institution of] a Hebrew slave is practiced only when Jubilee is practiced? Hence it surely follows that R. Tarfon means ab initio. This proves it. Rav Judah said in the name of Shmuel: The halakhah follows R. Tarfon.
  R. Eliezer said: Behold, he is a slave mamzer. R. Elazar said: What is R. Eliezer's reason? Because the verse said, “Even to the tenth generation none of his shall enter the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:3) [this teaches,] follow his disqualification.
  And the Rabbis? That refers to an Israelite who marries a mamzeret. Lest I say, “by their families, by their father's house” (Numbers 4:2): [therefore] “of his” comes and excludes him.
  And R. Eliezer?  Surely, though it is written “by their families, by their father's house,” yet “of his” comes and excludes him; so here too, though it is written , “the wife and her children shall be her master's,” yet “of his” comes and excludes him. And the Rabbis? Every child in the womb of a Canaanite slave woman is like the child in the womb of an animal.
  May we return to you, chapter “the one who says”
  Ten genealogical classes went up from Babylonia [in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah]:   Priests, Levites, Israelites, halalim, converts, freed slaves, mamzerim, netinim, hushlings and foundlings.
  Priests, Levites and Israelites may marry each other. Levites, Israelites, halalim, converts, and freed slaves may marry each other. Converts, freed slaves, mamzerim and netinim, hushlings and foundlings, may marry each other.
  These are they: a hushling (shtuki): he who knows who his mother is but not his father; A foundling (asufi): he who was gathered in from the marketplace and knows neither his father nor his mother. Abba Shaul used to call the hushling (shtuki), “checked one” (b’duki).
  GEMARA. Ten genealogical classes went up from Babylon. Why does it specifically teach: “went up from Babylon”; let it teach, immigrated to Eretz Yisrael? It teaches us something in passing: As it was taught: “Then you shall rise and go up to the place which the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8): this teaches that the Temple is higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is higher than all [other] countries.
  As for the Temple being higher than the rest of Eretz Yisrael, this goes well, for it is written,
  
  Daf 69b
  
  “Matters of controversy within your gates, and you shall arise and go up [to the place that the Lord, your God, shall choose]” (Deuteronomy 17:8). But how do we know that Eretz Yisrael is higher than all [other] countries? Because it is written: “Therefore behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when they shall no more say: As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt, but: As the Lord lives, Who brought up and Who led the seed of the house of Israel out of the north country, and from all the countries where I had driven them” (Jeremiah 23:7–8). 
  Why does it specifically teach, “went up from Babylon”: let it teach, went up to Eretz Yisrael? This supports R. Elazar. For R. Elazar said: Ezra did not go up from Babylon until he made it like pure sifted flour: then he went up.
  Abaye said: We taught: they went up voluntarily; Rava said: We taught: He [Ezra] brought them up [against their will]. And they differ over R. Elazar [‘s statement,] Ezra did not go up from Babylonia until he made it like pure sifted flour: then he went up. Abaye does not agree with it and Rava does.
  If you want you can say, all accept R. Elazar's statement, but they differ in this: One Master [Abaye] holds that he [merely] separated them, and they voluntarily went up [to Eretz Yisrael]:  the other Master holds that [even so] he led them up against their will.
  Now, on the view that they went up [voluntarily], that is what Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: All countries are as dough in comparison with Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is as dough in comparison with Babylonia. But on the view that he [forcibly] led them up, they knew their lineage?  Granted that they were known to that generation, they were not known to another generation.  
  It goes well for the one who said that they went up, that is what is written: “And I gathered them together to the river that runs to Ahava, and we camped there for three days; and I viewed the people and the priests, and found there none of the sons of Levi” (Ezra 8:15).
   But according to the one who says he brought them up, surely he was most careful with them! Granted that he had been careful with the unfit, yet he had not been careful with the fit. 
  Priests, Levites, and Israelites. How do we know that they came up? Because it is written, “So the priests, and the Levites, and some of the people, and the singers, and the porters, and the netinim, dwelt in their cities, and all Israel in their cities” (Ezra 2:70). 
  Halalim, converts and freed slaves. How do we know halalim? For it was taught: R. Yose said: Presumptive status [hazakah] is great, as it is said: “And of the children of the priests: The children of Habaiah, the children of Hakkoz, the children of Barzillai, who took a wife of the daughters of Barzillai the Gileadite, and was called after their name. These sought the registry of their genealogy, but it was not found. Therefore, they were deemed polluted and put out from the priesthood. And the Tirshatha said to them that they should not eat of the offerings of the most sacred order until there arose a priest with the Urim VeTummim” (Ezra 2:61–63).
  Now he said to them, Behold, you remain in your presumptive status as far as what your ate in Exile? Of the sacred food [eaten] outside of Jerusalem. So too here [you may eat] sacred food [eaten] outside of Jerusalem.
  But on the view that we promote from terumah to family purity, those who ate terumah, they would come to promote them? That case is different, because their presumptive status was weakened. 
  But on the view that we promote from terumah to family purity, those who ate terumah, they would come to promote them? That case is different, because their presumptive status was weakened. 
  Alternatively, now too they would eat only rabbinic terumah, not Biblical; and when do we promote from terumah to lineage? [Only when it is terumah] by Biblical law, but [when it is terumah] by rabbinic law we do not.
  If so, why [state], “Presumptive status is great?” Because before there was no reason to prohibit it on account of Biblical terumah, but now, where we might have prohibited it on account of Biblical terumah, they [nevertheless] ate of rabbinic but not biblical [terumah].  
  But it is written: “and the Tirshatha said to them, that they should not eat of the most holy things” (Ezra 2:63): thus, only of the most holy things they may not eat, but everything else they may eat?
  This is what he said: [They were to eat] neither what is called kodesh [holy], nor what is called kodashim [holies]. “Neither what is called kodesh”, as it is written: “No stranger shall eat kodesh” (Leviticus 22:10); “nor what is called kodashim,” as the verse says: “And if a priest's daughter is married to a stranger, she shall not eat of the heave-offerings of the kodashim” (Leviticus 22:12), and a Master said: from what is given to the priests [as parts of sacrifices]
  
  Daf 70a
  
  she may not eat.
  R. Hisda: For the verse says: “And all such as had separated themselves to them from the impurity of the nations of the land” (Ezra 6:21).
  Mamzerim. How do we know this? As it is written: “And Sanballat the Horonite and Tobiah the servant, the Ammonite, heard” (Nehemiah 2:19), and elsewhere it is written: “For there were many in Judah sworn to him because he was the son-in-law of Shechaniah the son of Arah; and his son Yehohanan had taken the daughter of Meshullam the son of Berechiah” (Nehemiah 6:18) Now he [the tanna of our Mishnah] holds that if a non-Jew or a slave has intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, the offspring is mamzer.
  That is well on the view that the offspring is mamzer; but on the view that it is valid [kasher], what can be said? Moreover, how do you know that they had children :  perhaps they did not have children? Moreover, how do you know that they were [originally] here [in Babylonia] and then went up; perhaps they were there [in Eretz Yisrael, from the outset]? 
  Rather [it is learned] from this: “And these were they that ascended from Tel Melah, Tel Harsha, Cherub, Addon, and Immer; but they could not tell their fathers’ houses, nor their offspring, whether they were of Israel” (Nehemiah 7:61).  “Tel-melah” refers to those people whose deeds were like those of Sodom, which was turned into a heap of salt: “Tel-harsha,” to those who cry out “Father” and their mothers silence them; “But they could not tell their fathers’ houses, nor their offspring whether they were of Israel” — this refers to foundlings, gathered in from the streets.
  “Cherub, Addon and Immer”:   R. Abbahu said: The Lord said: “I said that Israel should be as precious to me as the cherub, whereas they made themselves like the leopard [namer].” Others state, R. Abbahu said: The Lord said: “Though they have made themselves like the leopard, yet they are as precious to me as a cherub.”
  Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said: He who takes a wife who is not fitting for him, the verse treats him as though he had ploughed the whole world and sown it with salt, as it is said: “And these were they which went up front Tel-melah, Tel-harsha” (Nehemiah 7:61).
  Rabbah son of R. Adda said in the name of Rav: He who takes a wife for the sake of money will have unworthy children, as it is said: “They have dealt treacherously against the Lord; for they have borne strange children [now shall the new moon devour them with their portions” (Hosea 5:7). 
  And should you think, their money will be preserved [for them], Scripture says: “Now shall the new moon devour them with their portions”. And should you think, his portion, but not hers: Scripture says: “their portions.” And should you think [only] after a long time, Scripture says: “the new moon.” What does this mean? R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: A month comes and a month goes and their money is lost. 
  Rabbah son of R. Adda also said, and others say, R. Salla said in the name of R. Hamnuna: He who marries a wife who is not fit for him, Elijah binds him and the Holy One, blessed be He, lashes him. And a Tanna taught: Concerning all these Elijah writes and the Holy One, blessed he He, seals: “Woe to him who disqualifies his seed, blemishes his family and he who takes a wife one who is not fit for him. Elijah binds and the Holy One, blessed be He, lashes him.”
  And he who declares [others] unfit is [himself] unfit and never speaks in praise [of people]. And Shmuel said: With his own blemish he disqualifies [others] as unfit.
  A certain man from Nehardea entered a butcher's shop in Pumbeditha. He said to them, “Give me meat!” They said to him, “Wait until Rav Judah b. Yehezkel’s attendant takes his and then we will serve you.” He exclaimed, “Who is Judah b. Shveskel to take precedence over me and be served before me!” A certain man from Nehardea entered a butcher's shop in Pumbeditha. He said to them, “Give me meat!” They said to him, “Wait until Rav Judah b. Yehezkel’s attendant takes his and then we will serve you.” He exclaimed, “Who is Judah b. Shveskel to take precedence over me and be served before me!”
  That man went and summoned him to a lawsuit before R. Nahman. They brought the writ of summons. He [Rav Judah] went before R. Huna [and] asked him, “Should I go or not?” He said: “You need not go since you are a great man; yet in honor of the Nasi's house, get up and go.”
  He came and found him making a railing. He said to him, “Do you not hold by R. Huna b. Idi's statement in the name of Shmuel: Once a man is appointed leader of a community, he may not do [manual] labour in the presence of three?” He replied: “I am [merely] making a small portion of a gundritha.” He replied, “Is not ma'akeh, as written in the Torah, or mehitzah, as used by the Rabbis, good enough?”
  He came and found him making a railing. He said to him, “Do you not hold by R. Huna b. Idi's statement in the name of Shmuel: Once a man is appointed leader of a community, he may not do [manual] labour in the presence of three?” He replied: “I am [merely] making a small portion of a gundritha.” He replied, “Is not ma'akeh, as written in the Torah, or mehitzah, as used by the Rabbis, good enough?”
  He suggested, “Let [my daughter] Donag come and serve drink.” He replied, “Thus said Shmuel: One must not make use of a woman.” “[But] she is a child!”“Shmuel explicitly said: One must make no use at all of a woman, whether adult or child.” 
  “Let the master send a greeting to [my wife] Yalta.”He said to him, “Thus said Shmuel: A woman's voice is considered nakedness. “It is possible through a messenger.” He responded, “Thus said Shmuel:
  
  Daf 70b
  
  One must not enquire after a woman's welfare.” “Then by her husband!” He said, “Thus said Shmuel: One must not enquire after a woman's welfare at all.” His wife sent to him, “Settle his case for him, lest he make you like any ignoramus!”
  He asked him, “What is the reason the Master is here?” He responded, “You sent me a writ of summons.” He said, “Now that I do not even know your way of speech would I send you a writ of summons!” He took the summons out from his bosom and showed [it] to him and said to him, “Here is the man and here is the summons!” He said: “Since the master has come here, let us discuss the matter, that it may not be said that the rabbis show favor to each other.”
  He asked him, “Why did you place that man under the ban?” “Because he abused the rabbis’ messenger.” “Then you should have lashed him, for Rav lashed one who abused a messenger of the Rabbis.”“I dealt with him more severely.”
  “Why did you proclaim that he is a slave?” He answered: “Because he regularly called [other] people slaves, and he who declares [others] unfit is [himself] unfit, and never praises anyone, and Shmuel said: With his own blemish he disqualifies [others] as unfit.” “Say that Shmuel said this in order to suspect the other person; yet to proclaim him [a slave], did he say that?”
  Meanwhile the man with whom he had a dispute arrived from Nehardea. His opponent said to Rav Yehudah, “Me, you called a slave, I who am descended from the royal house of the Hasmoneans!” He said back, “Thus said Shmuel, Whoever says: I am descended from the house of the Hasmoneans is a slave.” 
  He said to him, “Do you not agree with what was said by R. Abba in the name of R. Huna in the name of Rav: Every sage who issues a ruling: if he issued it before the event, we listen to him; if not, we do not listen to him?” He said back, “But there is R. Matanah who holds like me.”
  Now, R. Matanah had not seen Nehardea for thirteen years, but on that day he came. He said to him, “Do you remember what Shmuel said when he stood with one foot on the bank and one foot on the bridge.” He replied, “Thus said Shmuel: He who claims, ‘I am descended from the royal house of the Hasmoneans’ is a slave, because there remained of them only one young woman who went up to the roof, lifted up her voice and cried out, ‘Whoever says I am descended from the house of the Hasmoneans is a slave.’ ...
  She then fell from the roof and died.”
  They proclaimed him a slave. On that day many ketubot were torn up in Nehardea.  When he went out, they came out after him to stone him. [But] he threatened them, “If you will be silent, be silent; if not, I will reveal to you what Shmuel said: There are two families in Nehardea, one called The House of Jonah [dove] and the other, The House of the Raven, and your sign is, “the unclean is unclean and the clean clean.” Thereupon they threw away the stones out of their hands, which created a stoppage in the Malka river.
  Rav Yehudah proclaimed in Pumbedita: Adda and Yonatan are slaves; Yehudah b. Papa is mamzer: Bati b. Toviah in his arrogance refused to accept a deed of manumission. Rav proclaimed in Mehoza: The members of Bela, Dena, Tela, Mela and Zega   — all these are unfit. R. Judah said: The members of Guba are Gibeonites; Durnunitha is a village of Nethinim. R. Joseph said: This Be Kubi [near] Pumbedita consists entirely of slaves.
  R. Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: Pashchur son of Immer had four hundred slaves — others say, four thousand slaves — and all became mixed up in the priesthood, and every priest who displays impudence is [descended] from one of them. Abaye said: And they all reside in the row of honor [in] Nehardea. Now he [R. Yehudah] differs from R. Elazar. For R. Elazar said: If you see an insolent priest, do not suspect him, for it is said: “Your people are as those who quarrel with a priest” (Hosea 4:4).
  R. Abin b. R. Adda said in the name of Rav: Whoever takes a wife who is not fit for him, when the Holy One, blessed be He, causes His Divine Presence to rest [on Israel], he testifies concerning all the tribes [that they are His people], but does not testify about him, for it is said: “The tribes of the Lord, as a testimony to Israel” (Psalms 122:4): when is it “a testimony to Israel”? When the tribes are “tribes of the Lord.”
  R. Hama b. R. Hanina said: When the Holy One, blessed be He, causes His Divine Presence to rest, it is only upon those families in Israel who have unflawed lineage, for it is said: “At that time, says the Lord, I will be the God to all the families of Israel” (Jeremiah 31:1) to all Israel was not stated, rather, “to all the families of Israel” is said.
  “And they shall be my people.” Rabbah son of R. Huna said: This is the extra advantage which Israel possesses over converts. For with regard to Israel it is written, “and I will be their God, and they shall be my people” (Ezekiel 37:27); whereas of converts it is written, “For who is he that has pledged his heart to approach unto Me? says the Lord. And you shall be My people, and I will be your God” (Jeremiah 30:21).
  R. Helbo said: Converts are as difficult to Israel as a scab, for it is said: “And the stranger shall join himself with them, and they shall cleave [ve-nispehu] to the house of Jacob” (Isaiah 14:1).   Here it is written: “venispehu”; while there it is written. “And for a sore and for a scab [sappaḥat]” (Leviticus 14:56).
  Rami Hama b. Hanina said: When the Holy One, blessed be He,
  
  
  Daf 71a
  
  purifies the tribes, he will first purify the tribe of Levi, for it is said: “And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver; and he shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver; and there shall be they that shall offer to the Lord offerings in righteousness” (Malachi 3:3).
  R. Yehoshua b. Levi said: Money purifies mamzerim, for it is said, “And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver.” What is meant by, “and there shall be they that shall offer to the Lord offerings in righteousness?” R. Yitzhak said: The Holy One, blessed be He, performed charity with Israel, in that a family once mixed up remains so.
  The [above] text [states]: Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: All countries are as dough relative to Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is as dough relative to Babylonia. In the days of Rabbi they wanted to render Babylonia as dough relative to Eretz Yisrael. He said to them: You are putting thorns between my eyes!  If you want, R. Hanina b. Hama will join [issue] with you.
  R. Hanina b. Hama joined [issue] with them and said to them, “I have this tradition from R. Yishmael son of R. Yose who said on his father's authority: All countries are as dough in comparison with Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is as dough relative to Babylonia.”
  In the days of R. Pinchas they wanted to declare Babylonia as dough vis a vis Eretz Yisrael. He said to his slaves, “When I have made two statements in the Beth Hamidrash, pick me up in my litter and run away.” When he entered he said to them, “Birds do not require slaughter by Biblical law.” 
  While they were still sitting and looking into this matter, he said to them, “All countries are as dough in comparison with Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael is as dough in comparison with Babylonia.” They [his slaves] took him up in his litter and ran away. They ran after him, but could not overtake him. Then they sat and examined [their lineage], until they came to danger and then they stopped.
  R. Yohanan said: By the Temple! It is in our power; but what shall I do, seeing that the greatest men of our time are mixed up with them. He holds like R. Yitzchak, who said: Once a family becomes mixed up, it remains mixed up.
  Abaye said: We have also taught in a tannaitic source: The clan of Bet Hatzerifa, was in Transjordan and Ben Zion forcibly distanced them. There was another, and Ben Zion forcibly brought them near. Such as these, Elijah will come to declare unclean or clean, to distance or draw near. But only families such as these, who are known; but once a family becomes mixed up, it remains mixed up.
  It was taught: There was yet another, which the Sages declined to reveal, but the Sages passed [the knowledge] down to their children and their disciples once every seven years, and some say once twice every seven years. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: It makes sense that that it was once every seven years, as it was taught: [If one vows,] “Behold, I will be a nazir if I do not reveal the families [which are impure],” he must be a nazir, and not reveal the families.
  Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Yohanan: The [pronunciation of the Divine] Name of four letters, the Sages transmit it to their disciples once every seven years, and others say twice every seven years. R. Nahman b. Yitzchak said: Reason supports the view that it was once every seven years, for it is written, “This is my name for ever [le'olam]” (Exodus 3:15) le'allem (to conceal) is written.
  Rava thought to expound upon it at the public sessions (parka). A certain old man said to him, “le'allem (to conceal) is written.” R. Avina contrasted [two verses]: It is written: “this is my name” and it is also written: “and this is my remembrance”?  The Holy One, blessed be He, said: I am not called as I am written: I am written yod he, but I am read, alef dalet.
  Our Rabbis taught: Originally they would transmit [God's] twelve-lettered name to all people. When unruly men increased, it was confided to the discreet members of the priesthood, and these “swallowed it” during the chanting of their brothers, the  priests.  It was taught: R. Tarfon said: “I once ascended after my mother's brother to the platform, and inclined my ear to the High Priest, and heard him swallowing the name during the chanting of his brothers the priests.”
  Rav Judah said in the name of Rav: The forty-two lettered name is entrusted only to one who is discreet, humble, middle-aged, does not get agree or drunk, and does not insist on his rights. And one who knows it, and is careful with it, and observes it in purity, is beloved above and popular below, the fear of him is on all people, and he inherits two worlds, this world and the future world.
  Shmuel said in the name of an old man: [A family] in Babylonia is in the presumption of being fit, until you know how it became unfit; [a family] from any other country is presumed to be unfit, until you know how it is fit. As for Eretz Yisrael, he who has the presumption of being unfit is unfit; he who has the presumption of being fit is fit. 
  But this is self contradictory: you say, he who has the presumption of unfitness is unfit. Hence, when undetermined, he is fit; then you teach, he who has the presumption of fitness is fit. Hence, when undetermined, he is unfit. R. Huna b. Tahlifa said in the name of Rav: There is no difficulty: 
  
  Daf 71b
  
  here it is to permit him to take a wife; there it is to take the wife away from him. 
  R. Yosef said: Anyone whose speech is Babylonian is permitted to marry a woman [of good lineage]. But nowadays, that there are deceivers, we must be concerned.
  Ze'iri was evading R. Yohanan, who was urging him, “Marry my daughter.” One day they were travelling on a road, when they came to a pool of water. He [Ze’iri] put R. Yohanan on his shoulder and carried him across.  He said to him: “Our learning is fit but our daughters are not?
  [On] what is your view [based]? If we say, because we learned, ten genealogical classes went up from Babylonia: priests, Levites [etc.]? Did then all the priests, Levites and Israelites go up? Just as some of these were left, so were some of those [the unfit classes listed in the Mishnah] left [in Babylonia].” He forgot what R. Elazar said: Ezra did not go up from Babylonia until he made it like pure fine flour: then he went up. 
  Ulla visited R. Yehudah in Pumbedita. He saw that R. Yitzchak, the son of R. Yehudah, was grown up, but had not married. He asked him, “Why have you not taken a wife for your son?” He replied, “Do I know from where to take one? He said to him, “Do we know from where we are descended? Perhaps from one of those of whom it is written: ‘They ravished the women in Zion, the maidens in the cities of Judah’ (Lamentations 5:11).
  And should you answer: A non-Jew or slave who has intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, the offspring is fit. Then perhaps [we are descended] from those of whom it is written, “that lie on beds of ivory, and stretch themselves [seruhim] upon their couches” (Amos 6:4).  And R. Yose son of R. Hanina said: This refers to people who urinate in front of their beds naked. 
  But R. Abbahu ridiculed this interpretation: If so, that is what is written: “Therefore now shall they go captive at the head of them that go captive” (Amos 6:7). Just because they urinate before their beds naked they will go captive with the first that go captive! 
  Rather R. Abbahu said, this refers to people who eat and drink together, join their couches, exchange their wives and make their couches foul [masrihim] with semen that is not theirs.
  He said to him, “Then what should I do?” He replied, Follow the silence. As do those from Eretz Yisrael who make a test: When two quarrel, they see which becomes silent first and say: This one is of superior birth. 
  Rav said: The silence of Babylonia, is [the mark of] its lineage. But is that so, for Rav visited those of the house of Bar Shafei Hala and examined them; surely that means as to their genealogy? No, by their silence. This is what he said to them: Examine [them], whether they are silent or not.
  R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: If you see two people quarreling, there is a blemish of unfitness in one of them, and they are not allowed to cleave to each other. R. Yehoshua b. Levi said: If you see two families quarreling, there is a blemish of unfitness in one of them, and they are not allowed to cleave to each other.  
  R. Papa the elder said in the name of Rav: Babylonia is healthy; Mishon is dead; Medea is sick, and Elam is dying. And what is the difference between sick and dying? Most sick are [destined] for life; most dying are for death.   
  How far does Babylonia extend? Rav said: As far as the river Azak; Shmuel said: as far as the river Yo’ani. How far on the upper [reaches of] Tigris? Rav said: as far as Bagda and Avana; Shmuel said: as far as Moshchani. Is then Moshchani itself not included? But did not R. Hiyya b. Abba say in the name of Shmuel: Moshchani is as the land of Exile in respect to genealogy? Rather as far as and including Moshchani.
  How far on the lower reaches of the Tigris? R. Shmuel: As far as lower Apamea. There were two Apameas, an upper and a lower; one was fit [in respect to marriage] and the other unfit, and one parsah lies between them; and they [their inhabitants] were particular with each other, and did not even lend fire to each other.   And the sign to recognize the unfit is the one that speaks [the] Meshan [dialect].
  How far [does it extend] on the upper reaches of the Euphrates? Rav said: To the fortress of Tulbakene. Shmuel said: To the bridge of Be Prat; R. Yohanan said: As far as the ford of Gizama. Abaye, and others say, R. Yosef, cursed Rav’s [definition].   
  Only Rav’s, but not Shmuel’s! Rather he cursed Rav’s, and all the more so Shmuel's. And if you want you can say, he cursed [only] Rav’s, after all, and not Shmuel's, and the bridge of Be Prat [originally] lay below;
  
  
  Daf 72a
  
  but now the Persians have set it higher. Abaye said to R. Joseph: How far does it extend on this [the west] side of the Euphrates?  He said to him: What is your motive [in asking]: on account of Biram? The most distinguished [families] of Pumbedita took [wives] from Biram!
  R. Papa said: Just as they differ over lineage, so they differ over divorce. But R. Yosef said: They differ only in respect to lineage, but as for divorce, all agree that it is as far as the second willow clump beyond the bridge.
  Rami b. Abba said: Habil Yamma is the glory of Babylonia. Shunya and Gubya are the glory of Habil Yamma. Rabina said: Tzitzura too. It was also taught in a baraita: Hanan b. Pinhas said: Habil Yamma is the glory of Babylonia: Shunya and Gubya and Titzura are the glory of Habil Yamma. R. Papa said: But nowadays Samaritans have become mixed up with them. But this is not so: They [the Samaritans] sought a wife from them, but they did not give him.What is Habil Yamma? R. Papa said: The Euphrates near Borsi.
  A certain man said: “I come from Shot-Mishot.” R. Yitzchak Nafha stood up on his feet and declared: Shot-Mishot lies between the rivers. And so what if it lies between the rivers? Abaye said in the name of R. Hama b. Ukba in the name of R. Yose son of R. Hanina: Between the rivers is as the Exile [i.e. Babylonia] in respect of lineage. And where is that located? R. Yohanan said: From Ihi de Kira and upwards. But didn’t R. Yohanan say: [The upper limit of Babylon is] as far as the ford of Gizma. Abaye said: A strip extends [beyond that limit].
  R. Ika b. Avin said in the name of R. Hananel who said in the name of Rav: Hilazon and Nihavnad are as the Exile in respect to lineage. Abaye said to them [his disciples]: Do not listen to him: a yevamah has fallen to him there. R. Ika b. Avin said in the name of R. Hananel who said in the name of Rav: Hilazon and Nihavnad are as the Exile in respect to lineage. Abaye said to them [his disciples]: Do not listen to him: a yevamah has fallen to him there.
  Now, he disagrees with R. Abba b. Kahana, who said: What is meant by, “[And the king of Assyria carried Israel away into Assyria,] and he put them in Halah, and in Habor, on the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes” (II Kings 18:11).  Halah is Hilazon; Habor is Adiabene; the river of Gozan is Ginzak; the cities of the Medes are Hamadan and its environs; and others say, Nihavnad and its environs. 
  What are its environs? Shmuel said: Karag, Moschi, Hidki and Rumki. R. Yohanan said: And all these are unfit. Now if you think that Moschi is identical with Moshchani, but did not R. Hiyya b. Abin say in the name of Shmuel: Moshchani is as the Exile in respect to lineage? Rather Moschi is distinct from Moshchani.
  “And it had three ribs in its mouth between its teeth” (Daniel 7:5): R. Yohanan: This refers to Hilazon, Adiabene and Nesibin, which it [Persia] sometimes swallowed and sometimes spat out.
  “And behold another beast, a second, like to a bear” (Daniel 7:5): R. Joseph taught: This refers to the Persians, who eat and drink like a bear, are corpulent like a bear, who grow their hair like a bear, and have no rest like a bear. When R. Ammi saw a Persian riding he would say: “There is a wandering bear!”
  Rabbi said to Levi: “Show me the Persians.” He said to him: “They are like the armies of the House of David.” “Show me the Habarim.” “They are like the destroying angels.” “Show me the Ishmaelites.” “They are like the demons in the outhouse.” “Show me the scholars of Babylonia.” “They are like the Ministering Angels.”
  When Rabbi was dying he said: “There is a place called Humania in Babylonia, which consists entirely of Ammonites; there is a place called Misgaria in Babylonia, which consists entirely of mamzerim; there is a place called Birka in Babylonia, in which there are two brothers who exchange their wives; there is a place called Birta di Satya in Babylonia: today they have turned away from God: a fishpond overflowed on the Sabbath, and they went and caught the fish on the Sabbath, and R. Ahai son of R. Yoshaya put them in the ban, and they apostate themselves. There is a place called Akra De’agma in Babylonia. Adda b. Ahabah dwells there.
  
  Daf 72b
  
  Today he sits in Abraham’s lap; Today Rav Judah was born in Babylonia.”
  For a Master said: When R. Akiva died, Rabbi was born; when Rabbi died, Rav Judah was born; when Rav Judah died, Rava was born; when Rava died, R. Ashi was born. This teaches that a righteous person does not depart from the world until [another] righteous person like him is created, as it is said, “The sun rises and the sun goes down” (Koheleth 1:5): before Eli's sun was extinguished, the sun of Shmuel of Ramoth rose, as it is said, “And the lamp of God was not yet gone out, and Shmuel was lying [etc.]” (I Samuel 3:3).
  ““The Lord has commanded concerning Jacob, that they that are round about him should be his adversaries” (Lamentations 1:17). R. Judah said: Like Humania is close to Pum-Nehara.
  “And it came to pass, when I prophesied, that Pelatiah the son of Benaiah died. Then fell I down upon my face, and cried with a loud voice, and said: Ah Lord God!” (Ezekiel 11:13): Rav and Shmuel: one said: His words were for good; the other, that his words were for bad. He who said that it was for good [explains it] as follows: For the governor of Meshan was Nebuchadnezzar's son-in-law. He sent [word] to him: “Of all the captivity which you have brought for yourself, you have sent none to stand before us.”
  He wanted to send him one of the Israelites, [but] Pelatiah son of Benaiah said to him, “We, who are more worthy [of higher rank], let us stand before you here; and let our slaves go there.” Thus the prophet cried, ‘That he who did good for Israel should die in middle age!”
  And he who said that it was for bad, as it is written, “Then a spirit lifted me up, and brought me unto the east gate of the Lord’s House, which looked eastward; and behold, at the door of the gate five and twenty men; and I saw in the midst of them Jaazaniah the son of Azzur, and Pelatiah the son of Benaiah, princes of the people” (Ezekiel 11:1), and it is written: “And He brought me into the inner court of the Lord’s House, and, behold, at the door of the Temple of the Lord, between the porch and the altar, were about five and twenty men, with their backs toward the Temple of the Lord, and their faces toward the east” (Ezekiel 8:16).  
  Now, from the implication of what is said: “and their faces toward the east,” do I not know that their backs were toward the west?   So why does Scripture say: “with their backs toward the Temple of the Lord”? This teaches that they exposed themselves defecated towards the Most High. Therefore the prophet said: “Shall he who did this evil in Israel die [peacefully] on his bed!”
  Conclude that Shmuel was the one who interpreted it to his discredit. For R. Hiyya b. Abin said in the name of Shmuel: Moshchani is as the Exile in respect to lineage. Mishan—they were not concerned about it on account of slavery or on account of mamzerim, but the priests who dwelt there were not scrupulous about marrying divorced women!
  In any case, I could tell you that it could have been Shmuel who interpreted it to his credit; and Shmuel is consistent with his own opinion: for he said: If one renounces ownership of his slave, he goes free and does not require a deed of manumission, for it is said, “But every man’s slave that is bought for money” (Exodus 12:44): a man's slave, but not a woman's slave? [This cannot be. Rather, it means this]: a slave whose master has authority over him is called a slave; a slave whose master has no authority over him is not called a slave.
  R. Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: This is the view of R. Meir. But the Sages hold: All countries have the presumption of fitness.
  Amemar permitted R. Huna b. Nathan to take a wife from Mehoza. R. Ashi said to him: What are you basing this on? That R. Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: This is the view of R. Meir. But the Sages hold: All countries have the presumption of fitness? But the School of R. Kahana did not teach this, and the School of R. Papa did not teach this, and the School of R. Zevi did not teach this? Nevertheless he did not accept this [ruling] from him, because he had heard it from R. Zevid of Nehardea.
  Our Rabbis taught: Mamzerim and Nethinim will become pure in the future: this is R. Jose's view. R. Meir said: They will not become pure. Said R. Jose to him: But was it not already stated: And I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean?   R. Meir replied. When it is added, from all your filthiness and from all your idols,   [it implies] but not from bastardy. Said R. Jose to him: When it is [further] said, will I cleanse you,   you must say: From bastardy too. 
  As for R. Meir, it is well: hence it is written, and the bastard shall dwell in Ashdod.   But according to R. Jose, why ‘and the bastard shall dwell in Ashdod’? — As R. Joseph translated it: The house of Israel shall dwell in security in their land, where [formerly] they were as strangers. 
  Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: The halachah agrees with R. Jose. R. Joseph said: Had not Rab Judah ruled in Samuel's name that the halachah is as R. Jose, Elijah would have come and sent entire gangs away from us. 