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text: Introductions to the Babylonian Talmud
  הקדמות לתלמוד הבבלי
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -William Davidson Edition - English
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  Introductions to the Babylonian Talmud
  
  Berakhot
  
  Introduction to Berakhot
  
  Tractate Berakhot is the first tractate in the order of “Faith.”1 The primary focus of the tractate is the myriad ways in which a Jewish person expresses his faith throughout his life. The plethora of details with regard to the different blessings that one recites on various occasions over the course of his life, the prayer services and their customs, Shema with its associated blessings and halakhot, and numerous other laws connected with a person's the day-to-day existence are all comprehensively addressed in this tractate. In the background, the Gemara recounts in great detail the lives of Jews in Eretz Yisrael and Babylonia during the era of the Mishna and the Talmud. It describes their occupations, their prayers, their aspirations, and their dreams, from morning to evening, on weekdays and festivals, in felicitous times and calamitous times, citing numerous halakhic and aggadic sources to enlighten, guide, and explain.
  With all of the different nuances and abundance of detail in the tractate, there is one central, unifying theme that recurs throughout all of the many halakhot and aspects touched upon within it, which transforms it into a cohesive unit: The principle that the abstract should be concretized and the sublime realized in a practical, detailed manner.
  This theme is not unique to tractate Berakhot; to a certain degree, it appears in every tractate of the Talmud. In fact, it is one of the primary elements of the multifaceted world of halakha. Consequently, it is present in every Jewish literary work throughout history as an internal, essential characteristic. 
  In tractate Berakhot, this approach is more intensive and more conspicuous. This is because the theme of the tractate is faith: The total awareness in heart and mind that there is an everlasting connection between the Creator and man and that perpetual inspiration descends from the Creator to the world – inspiration which creates, generates, and sustains. Man reacts, thanking, requesting, praying, anticipating a response; waiting to be blessed, to be cured, for a miracle. This connection of faith, which in and of itself is exalted and sublime, achieves form and clarity when it is transformed into practical halakha through the halakhot of tractate Berakhot. Here, faith is manifest in the details of the halakhot, in the myriad blessings and in the formulation of prayer. However, alongside the de-emphasis of the abstract, faith as an integral part of real life is enhanced and established. This general consciousness evolves into halakha, guidance how to live one's life.
  The choice in favor of practical manifestation of a concept, despite the rigidity of this form of expression, is multifaceted. The fundamental outlook of Judaism is that the essence of the Torah and the objective of creation are the actualization of the Torah as a living Torah. “It is not in the heavens”;2 rather, it was given to man and for man. The closer Torah is to man, the more concrete and practical it is, the closer it is to fulfilling its objective.
  Therefore, the primary fulfillment and significance of most concepts in Judaism is when they are manifest in a concrete, practical manner. The manner and style in which they are actualized determine the significance of the concept. Therefore, throughout the generations, halakha has never stopped creating. As the structure and circumstances of life change, new forms and styles develop in order to actualize the general, abstract concepts in those specific circumstances.
  Furthermore, faith, despite its broad scope, is not a palpable presence in one's daily life. True, faith as a Weltanschauung and as a general approach exists, in one form or another, in the hearts of all people, at different levels of consciousness and acceptance. However, the distance between that faith and real life is too significant. There is no comparison between accepting the fundamental tenets of faith in one's heart and fulfilling them in practice, especially at all of those minor, uninspiring opportunities that constitute a majority of one's life. If the abstract concepts of faith are not manifest in a practical manner in all of the details of a person's life, faith will lose its substance; consequently, all of life's details and actions will be rendered worthless and pointless. Indeed, the fundamental demand of religion is well characterized in the phrase: “If you devote your heart and your eyes to Me, I know that you are Mine.”3 
  This issue of connecting abstract faith to real life is manifest in several verses in the Torah. Nowhere is that connection as conspicuous as in the section of Shema in Deuteronomy.4 “Hear, Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One” expresses the fundamental tenet of the Jewish faith; “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might” expresses the essence of its accompanying feeling. However, together with those abstract ideas, this short section also includes instruction and guidance regarding how to translate them into the world of action: “And you shall teach them diligently unto your children”; “and you shall bind them for a sign upon your hand”; “and you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house.” That is why this section constitutes the spiritual basis for the entire tractate of Berakhot. Not only do some of its chapters discuss the halakhot of Shema, but other chapters extrapolate from this approach, connecting pristine faith to its actualization by means of the meticulous fulfillment of mitzvot.
  Shema consists of three sections5 which, although they do not appear consecutively in the Torah, combine to form a single, meaningful unit. Shema is, first and foremost, a recitation of the fundamental tenets of Judaism. Reciting it each day provides the stabilizing foundation and the guidelines for Jewish life. It is conceivable that reciting Shema each morning and evening will not constitute a profound religious experience. However, it is accessible to all, and it provides the Jewish person with the ability to delve into the text and endow all of his thoughts and actions with the essence of Shema, thereby fulfilling the contents of those sections in the most profound sense.
  Prayer is substantively different. From the outset, prayer constituted a portal through which one could address God whenever he desired, in times of distress and need as well as times of thanksgiving and gratitude. One's ability to recite his own personal prayer was never restricted. This is optional prayer, in which one pours out his heart before God in his own style and his own words. However, this was insufficient, and therefore, the greatest of the Sages throughout the generations established a set, defined, obligatory formula for prayer, to be recited at fixed times. 
  The establishment of set times for prayer and a set formula common to all has the capacity to crystallize that barely perceptible feeling which exists in the heart of even the simplest person. This is because, although religious feelings exist in the hearts of all people, these feelings are not easily expressed; not every individual is conscious of them, nor does he always understand them. Fixed prayer provides the desired expression, the coherent language for the person unable to appropriately articulate the feelings in his heart.
  Furthermore, the very fact that prayer is, in its essence, communal, makes the person an integral member of the community at large. Each individual considers himself and is considered by those around him as belonging to a broad, all-encompassing world. 
  True, there is concern that the fixed nature of prayer, in terms of both the formula and the times that it may be recited, is liable to compromise the natural connection with God and one's ability to express himself in prayer, and could ultimately become a meaningless verbal framework. Therefore, unlike Shema, which one is obligated to recite regardless of the conditions and circumstances, the halakha is much more flexible regarding prayer in the sense that one principle supersedes all others: “Do not make your prayer fixed, rather make it a plea for mercy and an entreaty before God.”7
  Shema and prayer provide a general direction for integrating faith into daily life, with the eighteen blessings of the Amida prayer tying the fundamental tenets of faith that appear in Shema with all of the unique, specific problems that exist in the life of the Jewish people in general and in the life of each individual Jew in particular.
  Blessings are an additional step in that direction. Tractate Berakhot discusses dozens of different types of blessings: Blessings in prayer, blessings of thanksgiving, blessings prior to the performance of mitzvot, blessings over food and delicacies, blessings as expressions of suffering and mourning, and blessings as expressions of joy and wonder. Despite the differences in details, formulas and meaning, there is a common intent to all of the blessings: They are a way of creating a bond of meaning between an action, incident, or object and God. Life is full of directionless, meaningless, purposeless phenomena; the blessing rescues them from that purposelessness, renders them significant, and connects them to their origins and their destiny.
  The profusion of blessings is a result of the need for them; they draw a cloud of grace, sanctity, and meaning over the abundance of different phenomena in the world. Uniformity of formula and of custom can also lead to a general attitude of purposelessness toward the world around us, but the great number of blessings provide each object with a unique character, a significance all its own.
  In addition to the halakhic portion of tractate Berakhot, there is also an aggadic portion. If, as mentioned above, the halakhic portion directed us from the abstract to the concrete, the direction provided by the aggadic section is from the concrete to the abstract. As a result, all actions, including the seemingly insignificant details among them, whether from the Torah or from human life, become paradigmatic and teeming with significance and meaning. Even matters that appear to be peripheral or of secondary importance are revealed in all their significance and centrality. Similarly, events that befell people in the distant past now become contemporary and extremely significant. In this way, personalities from the past are integrated in determining the character of the present. Even halakhic patterns – fixed, clearly defined templates – assume profundity and significance in the aggadic sections, in which they are tied to wide-ranging, sublime ideas, biblical verses, and the personalities of the great leaders throughout the generations.
  The numerous aggadic sections in tractate Berakhot, as in all other tractates in the Talmud, are intermingled with the halakhic sections; they complement them and add additional perspective. There is no abrupt, disruptive transition between the practical world of halakha, which deals with matters that at first glance might seem inconsequential, and the aggada, which deals with the sublime mysteries of the world. Heavenly worlds and our world, discussions that delve into the smallest details, and the enigmas of faith are all cited together, as all things that exist in this world, with all of their positive and negative aspects, are one.
  Tractate Berakhot, which contains most of the halakhot of Shema, prayer, and blessing, is divided into nine chapters.
  The first three chapters deal with Shema:
  Chapter One, in which the obligation to recite Shema is discussed, along with the times when it may be recited and the details of this obligation. 
  Chapter Two, in which more specific problems related to the manner in which Shema may be recited are resolved, and regulations governing its recitation are discussed.
  Chapter Three, in which there is a discussion of special cases in which a person is exempt from reciting Shema and the Amida prayer.
  The following two chapters deal with prayer:
  Chapter Four, in which, parallel to Chapter One, determination of the times of the various prayers is discussed.
  Chapter Five, in which the halakhot of prayer are elucidated in greater detail and depth, along with an explanation of the essence of prayer and regulations governing prayer.
  The following three chapters deal with appropriate conduct at a meal as well as the blessings recited before and after eating:
  Chapter Six, in which the primary focus is on the blessings of enjoyment that one recites over food, drink, and other pleasures.
  Chapter Seven, which is devoted to Grace after Meals and the invitation [zimmun] to participate in joint recitation of Grace after Meals.
  Chapter Eight, in which, incidental to the discussion of blessings associated with a meal, a list of disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to appropriate conduct at a meal and the halakhot of blessings is cited. 
  The following chapter deals with blessings recited in response to various phenomena:
  Chapter Nine, in which the blessings recited in different circumstances are discussed – blessings which determine the attitude toward virtually every phenomenon, common and uncommon, that one encounters in the course of his life.
  Notes 
  1.	This is the name given to the first of the six orders of the Mishna, the order of Zera'im (Shabbat 31a).
  2.	Deuteronomy 30:12.
  3.	Translation of tractate Berakhot in the Jerusalem Talmud 8:5.
  4.	Deuteronomy 6:4–9.
  5.	Shema – Deuteronomy 6:4–9; VeHaya im Shamoa – Deuteronomy 11:13–21; VaYomer – Numbers 15:37–41.
  6.	Rambam Sefer Ahava, Hilkhot Tefilla ch. 1.
  7.	Avot 2:12.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  The fundamental issue discussed in the first chapter of Berakhot is: What are the practical implications of the text of Shema? Particularly, how is one to understand the terms “When you lie down, and when you arise” as a precise, practical halakhic directive? 
  Based on a reading of the text of the Torah itself, one could understand the content of these verses as general encouragement to engage in the study of Torah at all times. However, in the oral tradition, the obligation to recite Shema is derived from these verses. Once this obligation is established, it is incumbent upon us to ascertain how it is to be fulfilled. The obligation of Shema involves reciting three sections from the Torah: (1) Shema (Deuteronomy 6:4–9); (2) VeHaya im Shamoa (Deuteronomy 11:13–21); and (3) VaYomer (Numbers 15:37–41). There is a twice-daily obligation to recite these sections, in the morning and the evening, as per the verse: “When you lie down, and when you arise.” Through reciting these sections one expresses commitment to the fundamental tenets of the Torah and faith in God.
  The first question is with regard to the meaning of: “When you lie down, and when you arise.” Is the Torah merely establishing a time frame for reciting “these words,” or is it also describing the manner and the circumstances in which those words should be recited?
  Even if “when you lie down, and when you arise” merely establishes the time frame for reciting Shema, that time frame is not as clearly defined as it would have been had the Torah written “morning” and “evening.” It remains to be determined whether “when you lie down” refers to the hour that people usually go to sleep or, perhaps, the entire duration of that sleep. Similarly, is “when you arise” referring to the entire period of the day during which people are awake, or is it perhaps referring to the specific hour when each individual awakens? In general, is there a direct correlation between “when you lie down and when you arise” and morning and evening?
  These and many related questions are the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  Although not all of the problems related to Shema were resolved in the course of this chapter, the parameters of “when you lie down, and when you arise” were elucidated and the framework of the obligation of Shema was established.
  In Beit Shammai's opinion, the phrase “when you lie down, and when you arise” includes instructions with regard to the specific manner in which Shema is to be recited. There were Sages, even those affiliated with Beit Hillel, e.g., Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who ruled in accordance with this opinion. However, this opinion was not accepted as halakha. The accepted ruling was in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, who hold that “when you lie down, and when you arise” merely establishes the time frame for reciting Shema.
  There were many disputes with regard to the time defined by “when you lie down,” in terms of both the beginning and the end of that period. The Gemara concluded that the beginning of this period is the time established as the beginning of the night in all halakhot, i.e., the emergence of the stars. The conclusion of this period in exigent circumstances is at the conclusion of the night, i.e., dawn. Due to the identity of the time of lying down with night, some of the blessings that accompany Shema were formulated to reflect the time that it may be recited: One of the two blessings recited prior to Shema is a blessing on the radiant lights: Who brings on evenings, and one of the two recited after Shema notes the preparation for sleep: Help us lie down.
  The consensus with regard to Shema in the morning is that “when you arise” refers to the time when people arise from their beds, not the entire day. This period begins early in the morning, before sunrise, and ends early in the day, after one quarter of the day has passed, calculated either from dawn or from sunrise. Although the blessings accompanying Shema in the morning are fundamentally parallel to the blessings at night, with the exception of the blessing: Help us lie down, they are different in terms of their essence and emphasis.
  Although the halakhot of prayer are not the topic of this chapter, the connection between Shema and the Amida prayer in the morning and evening is discussed. Shema is not always recited together with the Amida prayer, as in the case when it is recited in bed; nevertheless, the halakha is that Shema and the Amida prayer should be juxtaposed to every possible extent, as each complements the other.
  Shema itself is analyzed in terms of the meaning of its component sections. The first two sections, Shema and VeHaya im Shamoa, include the mitzva of reciting Shema as well as the fundamental acceptance of the yoke of Heaven and the mitzvot. The third section, which deals with the mitzva of ritual fringes, mentions fulfillment of the mitzvot as well as the exodus from Egypt.
  Although some opinions suggest reciting additional sections from the Torah, among them some that were recited during the Temple period, e.g., the Ten Commandments, these three sections alone were established as obligatory. 
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  And these words, which I command you this day, shall be upon your heart; and you shall teach them diligently unto your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in your house, and when you walk along the way, and when you lie down, and when you arise. (Deuteronomy 6:6–7)
  This chapter is a continuation of the previous one. In the previous chapter, the fundamental parameters of Shema were discussed and its framework was established; its component sections, the accompanying blessings and the time frame in which it is recited were discussed. In this chapter, a number of issues are raised with regard to the manner in which the mitzva of Shema is fulfilled, including how one should conduct himself when faced with situations and circumstances that do not enable him to fulfill the mitzva of Shema in an ideal manner. Although the various issues have no direct connection to one another, they all revolve around one central theme: What is the scope of the mitzva to recite Shema? In order to answer this question, one must answer an even more fundamental question: What is the basic requirement to recite Shema? Is there really a distinction between primary and secondary elements within Shema? If so, what are the practical ramifications of this distinction?
  Although it is written: “You shall talk of them when you sit in your house, and when you walk along the way, and when you lie down, and when you arise,” a question which is both theoretical and practical remains: What happens if the course of one's life does not allow one to recite Shema properly, in its entirety? What takes precedence? Hindrances of this kind are quite common and can be divided into three categories: those that originate with the person himself, due to physical or spiritual difficulties; those that are caused by other people or the circumstances in which one finds oneself; and those that occur in the course of daily life.
  In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to clarify the fundamental question: Is Shema, as defined by halakha, a mitzva by Torah law? Or is it a mitzva by rabbinic law, in which case the verses cited by the Sages are merely biblical allusions to support their ordinance? Major differences in halakhic rulings are dependent upon the following basic question: To what extent can other factors, with varying degrees of significance, supersede Shema?
  In addition, it is necessary to clarify the practical ramifications of the phrase: “Upon your heart.” Does it add an obligation to pay special attention to the recited texts? Or perhaps, on the contrary, it creates a leniency by transforming the manner in which the mitzva is fulfilled from the realm of active speech to mere reflection? The phrase: “When you sit in your house, and when you walk by the way” also requires clarification. Does it mean that Shema should be treated as one of the various actions that one performs, in the sense that he must cease all of his usual activities, such as sitting, walking, and standing, in order to recite Shema? Or does it mean that the obligation to recite Shema is fulfilled in the context of a person's daily life, and it can be recited while one is engaged in mundane activities without interrupting or adjusting them? 
  The practical questions that arise in this chapter deal with a number of unusual cases: The sick, the weak, the deaf, the laborer at work, and the person walking in the street. However, the answers to these questions are drawn from a penetrating analysis of the chapter's central, fundamental question with regard to the essence of Shema, from which other more specific and, therefore, practical problems ensue.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  Most of the discussion in this chapter did not focus upon the ideal manner in which to recite Shema. Rather, it dealt with questions with regard to what extent can the recitation of Shema be altered or even abandoned when circumstances do not allow its standard recitation.
  Ideally, one should recite the entire Shema with all his heart; however, after the fact, if he only had the proper intention for the first verse alone and not for the rest of Shema, he fulfilled his obligation. The relative significance of the various component sections of Shema is manifest in the determination of where one may interrupt its recitation, due to honor that must be accorded or due to fear that one experiences, to greet another person or to respond to his greeting.
  There is also room to distinguish between ab initio and after the fact with regard to the quality of the recitation. Ab initio, one must carefully pronounce each letter and avoid ambiguity or lack of clarity in reciting Shema. However, after the fact, even one who was not appropriately precise in reciting Shema fulfilled his obligation. Similarly, although one reciting Shema is required to recite it audibly, nevertheless, after the fact, one who did not recite it audibly fulfilled his obligation. The principle is that intent and understanding the meaning of the words are crucial; consequently, one may recite Shema in any language that he understands. For that same reason, even after the fact, one who recites Shema out of order has not fulfilled his obligation, as that subverts the fundamental intent.
  Certain people, due to their unique situations, were permitted not to recite Shema or, at least, to read it with less devotion. Included among those people are hired laborers who, in order to assist them in the performance of their tasks, were permitted to recite Shema at their work site even though it is uncomfortable and their devotion is compromised. Beginning with the second section, they may even engage in their labor while reciting Shema. Work is not the only factor for which allowances are made in reciting Shema. Allowances are also made for one who is performing a mitzva or even preoccupied about performance of a mitzva. For that reason, a groom is exempt from the obligation to recite Shema on his wedding night. The Sages reluctantly permitted a groom who insists upon it to recite Shema on his wedding night.
  Additional cases in which people are exempt from their obligation to recite Shema due to performance of a mitzva or preoccupation related to performance of a mitzva will be discussed in the next chapter.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  When you go forth in camp against your enemies, then you shall keep yourself from every evil thing. If there be among you any man, that is not clean by reason of that which chance him by night, then shall he go abroad out of the camp, he shall not come within the camp. But it shall be, when evening comes on, he shall bathe himself in water; and when the sun is down, he may come within the camp. You shall have a place also without the camp, where you shall go forth abroad. And you shall have a paddle among thy weapons; and it shall be, when you sit down abroad, you shall dig with it, and shall turn back and cover that which comes from you. For the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp, to deliver you, and to give up your enemies before you; therefore your camp shall be holy; that He see no unseemly thing in you, and turn away from you. (Deuteronomy 23:10–15)
  This chapter is, in a sense, a continuation of the previous chapter. The previous chapter also dealt with problems that arise as a result of circumstances that hinder the recitation of Shema. However, those hindrances were primarily generated by external factors that prevent one from reciting Shema properly. In this chapter, hindrances of a different sort will be discussed; i.e., cases where one is in a place or a situation where it is inappropriate to engage in sacred activities.
  One problem discussed in this chapter is how one should act as far as Shema and prayer are concerned in various conditions of mourning, both in terms of the mourner himself and in terms of those engaged in burial of the deceased.
  Another problem related to the mitzvot of Shema and prayer is a by-product of their very essence; when a person accepts the fundamental tenets of his faith and stands before his Creator, he should do so while clean and ritually pure. However, there are circumstances which render a person ritually impure or constitute an unclean environment. Precise determinations are necessary to establish when those circumstances completely exempt one from the obligation to recite Shema and pray and when the obligation is merely postponed.
  The verses in Deuteronomy, which warn a person to avoid ritual impurity and filth in an army camp, apply everywhere, at all times. A Jew is always obligated to acknowledge: “For the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp,” especially when engaged in sacred activities.
  In halakha, this was consolidated into three categories: Ritual impurity, unseemly matters, and filth. Ritual impurity is not, in essence, tied to a concrete flaw; nevertheless, it is a spiritual flaw from which it is incumbent upon the person to purify himself before entering the camp. The Torah directive with regard to ritual impurity resulting from a seminal emission leads directly to the discussion of the ordinance instituted by Ezra. This ordinance established that one who is ritually impure due to a seminal emission, including a husband who engaged in conjugal relations with his wife, is forbidden to recite Shema, pray, or study Torah until he immerses himself and becomes ritually pure. Even though it never gained widespread acceptance, in many senses several appropriate modes of conduct with regard to caution and ritual purity while studying Torah and praying were established by virtue of that ordinance.
  The concept of unseemly matters also has far-reaching applications. It includes any exposed limb in the human body that is usually covered. On the one hand, this was instituted to prevent arousing sexual desire while engaged in sacred activity. However, there is another aspect, as it says in the Torah: All nakedness involves contempt for God, and consequently, covering that nakedness is an acknowledgement of the sanctity of the matters in which one is involved.
  What is true with regard to spiritual flaws also applies to actual filth. The Torah commandment to be vigilant about cleanliness within the camp was formulated as a general directive to avoid every evil thing. That includes avoiding all sights or smells that provoke disgust or unpleasantness, which should be avoided at all times, especially when reciting Shema and praying.
  Defining and illuminating these elements, and determining their precise parameters, are the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  Several problems were addressed in this chapter. Primary among them is how the recitation of Shema requires one to distance himself from anything disgusting, filthy, or ritually impure. However, other related halakhic and aggadic matters were also cited.
  In this chapter, halakhot were articulated with regard to the extent that dealing with burial of the dead exempts one from the obligation to recite Shema, and the guiding principles were clarified. It became clear that the basis of the myriad halakhot regarding respect for the dead is the comprehensive principle of maintaining human dignity. Due to that principle, several mitzvot are superseded due to both respect for the dead and human dignity. Several times in this chapter it was emphasized that the deceased should be treated like a person, and that his body is inexorably tied to his eternal soul.
  Another fundamental discussion in this chapter dealt with the ordinance of Ezra, which prohibits one who experienced a seminal emission from engaging in Torah study and prayer until he immerses himself and becomes ritually pure. This ordinance had considerable influence on the life of the Jewish people for several generations, and many of the Sages sought to clarify its practical ramifications. It never achieved widespread acceptance among the Jewish people, and the Sages agreed to abrogate it. Nevertheless, the ordinance remains in effect, even today, as a custom of the pious.
  In addition, there was considerable discussion devoted to the need to distance oneself from exposed nakedness while reciting Shema and praying. In this case, the reference is to exposed nakedness in its broadest sense, which includes not only exposure of the specific parts of the body usually associated with that term, but also all body parts that are usually covered. In practice, one must avoid exposure to any potentially alluring sights while reciting Shema and praying.
  With regard to that issue, as well as with regard to avoiding exposure to filth, some of the Sages expressed stringent opinions that called for extreme measures to ensure total separation. However the guiding principle is: The Torah was not given to ministering angels. Exaggerated caution is difficult to implement and is even liable to cause people to distance themselves from Torah. Consequently, the halakha adopted moderate standards of cleanliness and modesty.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  Now his windows were open in his upper chamber toward Jerusalem and he kneeled upon his knees three times a day, and prayed, and gave thanks before his God, as he had done before. (Daniel 6:11)
  The primary focus of this chapter is the Amida prayer, also called Shemoneh Esreh (Eighteen), which was the number of blessings originally instituted in the weekday prayer. It is recited on weekdays, on Shabbat, and on Festivals. The fundamental question is: What is the source of the Amida prayer? Is it tied to Shema, the course of a person's daily life, the days that turn into night and vice-versa? Or is the primary element its connection to the sacred service performed in the Temple, serving as a substitute form of worship since its destruction? This dilemma, manifest in the dispute amongst the Sages whether prayer was instituted by the Patriarchs or established parallel to the daily offerings in the Temple, touches upon the different characteristics of prayer and serves as a basis for the halakhic questions discussed in this chapter.
  Clearly, there is a consensus that beyond the essential obligation to pray, the source of which was subject to dispute, the various prayers must be recited at fixed times. It is, then, necessary to ascertain the parameters of those times: When is the earliest and latest time that each prayer can be recited? This is relevant to the morning prayer, which is parallel to the daily offering sacrificed early in the morning when the Temple stood, and to the afternoon prayer, which is parallel to the daily offering sacrificed in the afternoon.
  This close connection between the prayers and the communal offerings was already observed in practice when the Temple stood, as the people would recite a communal prayer together with the sacrifice of the offering. Consequently, there are two prayers that enjoy unique status in the context of this discussion: The additional prayer and the evening prayer.
  The additional prayer was clearly instituted parallel to the offering; there is no other possible explanation. Therefore, its status and the parameters of the time that it may be recited are clearer. Yet specifically for that reason, there is room to consider whether or not this prayer, like the sacrifice after which it was modeled, is a matter exclusively for the community. The question is: May it only be recited in the framework of communal prayer; or, perhaps, may the additional prayer be recited even individually?
  The opposite problem exists with regard to the evening prayer. Since this prayer is not directly parallel to a specific offering, it does not have a set time like the other prayers. On the other hand, in terms of its essence as a prayer recited at night, tied to the changes from day to night and to Shema of the day and the night, there is room to stipulate a set time and a fixed obligation as in the case of the other prayers.
  The dispute between the Sages regarding this issue, whose far-reaching consequences will be related in this chapter, constitutes a manifestation of another aspect of the fundamental question: What is the obligation of prayer? Is the primary obligation to recite the prayer communally, with the devotional aspect of prayer secondary in importance? Or, perhaps, the essence of prayer is turning to God, and the primary obligation is in its devotional aspect and the desire to draw closer to God.
  Between these two approaches, which differ with regard to the fundamental understanding of communal prayer, the more specific questions raised in this chapter are resolved.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  Many of the fundamental dilemmas raised in this chapter remained unresolved in the Gemara. Even where the Gemara did reach a conclusion, the conclusion did not always remain throughout the generations, as rulings in favor of one opinion were changed to favor the other. Consequently, many of the halakhot remain unresolved even today.
  A decision was reached with regard to the time of the morning prayer; this lasts until the end of the fourth hour of the day. However, with regard to the time of the afternoon prayer, the tanna'im disagreed whether it extends until the evening or until the midpoint of minha, an hour and a quarter before the evening. No clear halakhic ruling was reached regarding this issue. The Gemara's conclusion is: One who practices in accordance with this Sage has fulfilled his obligation, and one who practices in accordance with that Sage has fulfilled his obligation. In other words, the decision remains in the hands of each individual. This lack of clarity blurs the distinction between the times of the afternoon and evening prayers as well as the boundary between the weekday and Shabbat prayers, which are recited during this time frame.
  Another problem resolved in the Gemara concerns the evening prayer. In the dispute over this issue, which led to the temporary dismissal of the Nasi, the ruling was that the evening prayer is optional. Nevertheless, the custom adopted by the Jewish people throughout the generations was to treat the evening prayer as an obligation.
  On a similar note, there were two conflicting approaches to the obligation to recite the Amida prayer. One approach favored a fixed daily prayer, while the other advocated a prayer whose essence was primarily devotional; any time that a person was unable to pray with all his heart, he would pray an abridged prayer or even not pray at all. The halakhic conclusion took the middle ground. However, fundamentally, even Rabbi Akiva's opinion, which was adopted, accepts the principle that prayer and the language of the prayer are not a fixed obligation; rather, prayer reflects the individual's circumstances and state of mind at the time.
  Sages throughout Jewish history conducted themselves in this manner. Nevertheless, here too the custom adopted by the Jewish people corresponds with the first opinion that one must always recite the complete Amida prayer, even when he is incapable of praying with all his heart. 
  With regard to the additional prayer, the ruling was that the obligation to recite this prayer is incumbent even upon an individual praying alone, separate from the community.
  Ultimately, it seems that the ruling accepted throughout the Jewish people is based on the approach that “the prayers were instituted parallel to the daily offerings in the Temple.” At the same time, there is room for individual devotional prayer, which is not included in the framework of communal prayer.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  Chapter Four dealt primarily with clarifying the framework for prayer, i.e., establishing the times of the fixed prayers and defining the circumstances in which an individual is exempt from prayer. The primary focus of Chapter Five is the content of the prayer, the details within this framework. While the previous chapter discussed the individual's obligation to engage in the act of prayer, this chapter focuses on elucidating the spiritual demands, namely, the requisite and desired approach to prayer. In particular, the chapter deals with how one approaches prayer; what elements are required, permitted, or prohibited to introduce into the prayer formula; and what prayer is capable of accomplishing. Despite the legalistic manner in which the Gemara deals with issues, the halakha is very closely tied to the philosophical questions involved.
  There are various methods of preparation for prayer, such as adopting an approach of gravity, studying Torah, or engaging in performance of a mitzva and experiencing the joy associated with that performance. More than an expression of difference of opinion, these constitute a variety of complementary approaches to different aspects of prayer: Petition and submission, the joy of thanksgiving and the gravity of contemplation. The many aggadic passages in this chapter shed light on these different aspects of prayer.
  Even the additions to the daily prayers hold significance. Prayer is a specific framework that expresses particular approaches to supplication and perspectives on faith. A person may not introduce elements to prayer indiscriminately. This was especially significant at a time when there were various deviant sects very close to traditional Judaism, who secretly sought to introduce their deviant ideas into the accepted prayer formula. On the other hand, there are specific elements that one must emphasize and include in his requests. It was vital to determine the most significant, general needs that may and even must be incorporated into the various blessings, such as the request for rain, emphasis of the sanctity of the Festivals, and recitation of havdala between the sacred and the profane. 
  Although at times one is required to include additions to the standard prayer formula, it is incumbent upon the individual to ensure that he is not swept away in a wave of enthusiasm that might lead him to introduce elements to his prayer that deviate from the fundamental tenets of Judaism. 
  Prayer places numerous demands upon one engaged in it. Primary among them is the requirement that one achieve a sense of absolute self-negation as he stands before his Maker. Nevertheless, the Gemara also alludes to and elaborates upon the reward of one who prays and God's response to those who call out to Him with all their heart.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  Chapter Five contains discussions of ideas, mostly aggadic in nature, relating to the essence of prayer and its general role. Nevertheless, the aggada sections do not deal solely with the abstract and the sublime; they have practical halakhic ramifications in determining the appropriate manner of prayer. 
  Two discussions constitute the bulk of the chapter. The first deals with an individual's approach to prayer; the second relates to permitted and prohibited additions to the prayer formula.
  Discussion of the individual's approach to prayer, which appears at the beginning and the end of the chapter, establishes the need for absolute concentration on the prayer. The mitzva of prayer, as opposed to the mitzva to recite Shema, is not by Torah law.However, since the essence of prayer is the intent of the heart one must concentrate on his prayer with all his might. Only a clear and present danger to one's life exempts him from this absolute demand. Because of the obligation to concentrate in this manner, any error or slip of the tongue in the course of prayer renders it seriously flawed, which is disgraceful for the prayer leader and for those who sent him. 
  Most of the halakhot in this chapter deal with additions to the established prayers. At the same time, not all of the changes are discussed in this chapter. They appear in the prayer book, which details the additions and changes introduced on Shabbat, Festivals, and other days of a unique nature. Furthermore, any of the issues that relate to changes in the prayers are discussed throughout the Talmud in different contexts: The prayers for rain in tractate Ta'anit; the additions on Shabbat, the New Moon, and Hanukka in tractate Shabbat; and so on. 
  However, as Tosafot explains, the halakhot here can be seen as fundamental principles that serve as the basis for more detailed discussions in other tractates. In this chapter, only the general framework is presented: These types of additions to prayer exist, and they are to be recited at the appropriate times. The discussions in this chapter do not reach a clear conclusion even with regard to inappropriate additions. These include those that undermine the style of prayer, e.g., unnecessary repetition, or those that compromise the fundamental tenets of the Torah, e.g., additions that are liable to appear heretical. These issues are discussed in greater detail in other tractates. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  The origins of blessings of enjoyment, which are recited before partaking of any kind of pleasure, are ancient. Chapter Six seeks to clarify the details of these blessings, but not to establish the essential obligation to recite them. Consequently, the fundamental issue throughout the chapter is the question of parameters and definitions. What do these blessings include? Which blessings are appropriate for which items?
  From a practical perspective, blessings of enjoyment can be divided into two categories: Blessings recited over food and drink, and blessings recited over fragrances. Within each category, some blessings are more general, while others are more specific. Most of the discussions revolve around determining the parameters of each blessing.
  Blessings over food range from the general to the particular, from general blessings recited over different types of food to blessings recited over very specific items. The most comprehensive blessing: By whose word all things came to be, is applicable to all foods. The blessings over the fruit of the earth are more detailed and include a separate blessing for fruit of the trees. Within this category, there is an even more specific blessing over wine: Who creates fruit of the vine. 
  Within the category of fruit of the earth, there is also a specific blessing for cooked grains: Who creates the various kinds of nourishment, and there is even a blessing recited exclusively over bread: Who brings forth bread from the earth. 
  These are merely preliminary determinations. The criteria for defining the objects of the blessings must also be established. What constitutes fruit of the tree and fruit of the ground, for these purposes? What is considered a cooked food and what, exactly, is bread? Although some foods clearly fall into a specific category, there are many food items whose categorization is less obvious and whose blessing must be determined. Consequently, most of the discussion in this chapter focuses upon the categorization of these borderline items. There is one underlying principle common to all of these deliberations: A more specific blessing is preferable. The higher the quality and the more extensive the processing of the food item, the more specific and exceptional the blessing. Therefore, the discussion is an attempt to delineate those parameters and to determine the quality and degree of processing of each item.
  The discussion of blessings over fragrances is similar with regard to the categorization and the relative level of sophistication of each substance.
  Only toward the chapter's end does the Gemara begin a fundamental discussion of the blessings recited after eating. This is a prelude to the detailed analysis of the blessing mandated by Torah law, Grace after Meals, which appears in Chapter Seven. 
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  This chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of one issue: Determining the parameters of the various items over which there is a requirement to recite blessings of enjoyment before partaking of them. This analysis, by its very nature, deals with numerous details and specific, defined questions.
  The approach of the tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, and the other Sages who subscribed to his opinion seeks to increase the number of specific blessings and assign each food type, or limited group of food types, its own specific blessing. By contrast, the Rabbis ruled in favor of establishing a comprehensive system of blessings that progresses from the general to the specific. 
  Among the general distinctions in this chapter, the most central is the distinction between foods which do not grow in the ground, over which one recites: By Whose word all things came to be, and those which do grow in the ground. Within the latter category, there is a further distinction between fruits over which one recites: Who creates fruit of the ground, and those over which one recites: Who creates fruit of the tree. Furthermore, the Gemara arrives at a definition of the foods over which one recites: Who creates the various kinds of nourishment, i.e., various foods made from grains. A distinction is made between these foods and bread, which is made from the unadulterated five species of grain baked in the form of bread, over which one recites: Who brings forth bread from the earth. 
  Similarly, a general principle was established with regard to the halakhot of final blessings: If one is obligated to recite a blessing prior to eating a food item, then there is an obligation to recite a blessing thereafter as well. Although conclusions with regard to final blessings are only reached in the following chapter, the basis for these conclusions is established here.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  For the Lord your God is bringing you to a good land: a land with brooks of water, fountains and depths, springing forth in valleys and hills; a land of wheat and barley, vines and fig-trees and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey; a land in which you will eat bread without scarcity, you will lack nothing in it, a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills you will dig copper. You will eat and be satisfied, and bless the Lord, your God, for the good land He has given you. (Deuteronomy 8:7–10)
  After the blessings of enjoyment were discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter is devoted to the blessing recited after the meal, Grace after Meals. This blessing is unique and more significant than the blessings of enjoyment as it is a mitzva by Torah law. Its component parts are also longer and more numerous than the formula of the blessings of enjoyment, and its halakhot are also numerous. Therefore, an entire chapter was devoted to it; it is the central theme of Chapter Seven, around which all of its myriad topics revolve.
  Although there was also a discussion of Grace after Meals in the previous chapter, there it dealt with the question: What are the foods that obligate one to recite Grace after Meals? This chapter deals primarily with the prayer aspect of Grace after Meals. It also deals with the practical ramifications of the principle, which was accorded the authority of halakha, that blessings should not be recited over items that have been corrupted from a moral standpoint. The verse: “The covetous one who recites a blessing has blasphemed the Lord” (Psalms 10:3, according to the interpretation of one of the Sages), alludes to that fact and it is clear that reciting a blessing over any food whose consumption is prohibited is not a mitzva but quite the contrary. It is necessary to determine with regard to which food items these prohibitions apply.
  Grace after Meals is fundamentally a blessing over the meal, as it is stated: “You will eat, and be satisfied, and bless the Lord.” As one often dines in the company of others, the Gemara deals with various questions with regard to the procedure through which people dining may unite by means of the blessing of zimmun. The zimmun is a special blessing recited when several individuals happen to dine together. In this chapter, questions with regard to the number of people required to generate a zimmun, the essence of the connection between them in its formation and in its dissolution, and the formula of the zimmun blessing in various groupings are raised.
  The zimmun blessing is also pivotal in the discussion of another fundamental issue addressed in this chapter. Apparently, zimmun is a component of Grace after Meals. Beyond the obligation to recite the zimmun and the fact that it is an integral component of Grace after Meals when the requisite forum is present, the Gemara must still ascertain the fundamental components of the obligation to recite the rest of Grace after Meals: What are the fundamental components of the basic obligation? Are all four blessings that comprise Grace after Meals of equal significance? How and in what circumstances may one abridge or omit any of them? 
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  This chapter dealt with the halakhic determination that any meal in which several people were established as part of the group partaking of that meal requires a zimmun. Due to the significance of this mitzva, members of that group are forbidden to separate and recite Grace after Meals individually.
  With regard to the details of the halakhot of zimmun, although there were Sages who sought to add to the details of the zimmun formula, the conclusion reached in this chapter was that in terms of the number of participants there are but two formulas: The standard formula recited in a quorum of three diners and the formula that includes invocation of the name of God when there are ten or more diners. 
  Due to the affinity of the zimmun blessing to communal prayer, which requires a quorum of ten men, it is understandable why women were totally or at least to a large extent, exempted from it. 
  Although various Sages sought to integrate the zimmun blessing and Grace after Meals into one cohesive unit, ultimately they remained separate. Grace after Meals is a distinct unit comprised of four blessings even when it is not preceded by a zimmun.
  Within Grace after Meals, opinions differ whether the four blessings: Who feeds all, the blessing of the land, Who builds Jerusalem, and Who is good and does good, are all of equal standing. Some of the Sages held that all of the blessings are alluded to in the Torah. However, the conclusion reached was that the fourth blessing: Who is good and does good, is a rabbinic addition and the obligation to recite it is not on a par with the obligation to recite the first three blessings. Although their establishment and formulation developed over the course of many generations, their source is the Torah itself.
  Although the halakhic ruling is that in certain circumstances one may abridge or alter the formula of those blessings, their essence and certain key concepts, i.e., land, Torah, covenant, and life, are always required.
  A totally different area that was clarified in the course of the discussions with regard to the zimmun blessing relates to foods that have an element of prohibition associated with them, over which it is inappropriate to recite a blessing or to form a zimmun. There are various details involved in distinguishing between the food items; however, fundamentally the Sages arrived at the following division: Over those items where required gifts were not separated or a required action was not performed but nevertheless there is no prohibition to derive pleasure from them, one may recite a blessing. However, over those items where the failure to separate the gifts or perform the action results in a prohibition to derive pleasure from them, one may neither recite Grace after Meals nor the zimmun blessing. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  Grace after Meals, and even more so the zimmun blessing, lend an element of worship and prayer to every meal. However, even the meal itself is not merely an exercise in eating, but it contains a wide-ranging collection of laws of precedence with regard to the various food items consumed in the course of a meal.
  By the letter of the law, one is not required to avoid ritual impurity, other than when dealing with consecrated items or entering the Temple. However, the nation's elite, haverim and Torah scholars, were always vigilant in their observance of the halakhot of ritual impurity and observed a standard of purity equal to that observed by priests. The plethora of halakhot associated with ritual purity and impurity and the preponderance of rabbinic decrees in that area created a situation where it was necessary to be especially vigilant during every meal in order to avoid both becoming ritually impure himself and making the food ritually impure. Special care was required with regard to liquids, as by rabbinic decree, they become ritually impure by means of contact with any impurity and they then render impure all objects with which they subsequently come into contact. In fact, both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel seek to minimize as much as possible the potential of a person or food items becoming ritually impure in the course of a meal.
  Although most of the disputes cited in the mishna in this chapter deal with purity and impurity, there is a discussion in the Gemara with regard to the order of the blessings recited at the conclusion of Shabbat. Although the halakhot of Shabbat per se have no direct connection to tractate Berakhot, since the procedure for remembering the day and acknowledging its sanctity at its outset and at its conclusion: “Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:7), involves various blessings of enjoyment, e.g., blessings on wine, spices, etc., that is their connection to tractate Berakhot.
  The special blessing recited over light at the conclusion of Shabbat and Yom Kippur is unlike all other blessings of enjoyment. Although, on the one hand, one derives a modicum of pleasure from the light, due to other considerations, it falls into the category of the blessings discussed in the ninth chapter, blessings of praise and thanksgiving. A person recites the blessing over the very existence of light and not over any direct pleasure or benefit derived from it. Indeed, this dual characteristic stands at the center of the talmudic discussion surrounding the blessing over light.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter reviewed two sets of problems based on disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to meal protocol.
  The first set of problems dealt primarily with the halakhot of precedence in various components of a meal. These halakhot are tied to comprehensive halakhic frameworks associated primarily with the halakhot of sacrifices and ritual purity and impurity. As usual, the halakha was ruled in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in all of these cases, with one exception. There too, due to variant readings, the ruling is not unequivocally in accordance with Beit Shammai. Although the considerations of both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel are substantially similar, i.e., distancing oneself from all ritual impurity, both impurity of people and impurity of vessels, it can be said that Beit Hillel's primary emphasis is on distancing oneself from ritual impurity by Torah law, even if that entails a certain lack of vigilance vis-à-vis other forms of ritual impurity.
  Another dispute, with regard to the order in which various blessings are recited, especially those associated with kiddush and havdala, was not conclusively resolved in this chapter. Its conclusive resolution with regard to its most complex circumstance, i.e., a Festival that begins at the conclusion of Shabbat when kiddush and havdala converge, can be found in tractate Pesahim, where the definitive order of the blessings is: Wine, kiddush, candle, havdala, and Who has given us life, etc.
  Another set of problems discussed in great detail in this chapter is the blessing of havdala and the accompanying blessing over light. These blessings were highlighted because they constitute a basis for both blessings recited prior to fulfilling mitzvot and blessings of praise and thanksgiving, which are discussed in Chapter Nine. Among the significant halakhic conclusions drawn with regard to this matter is the fact that one may recite the blessings only over spices and candles that were specifically designated for that purpose. One may neither recite the blessings over incidental fragrances and lights nor over those that have an element of prohibition.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  In this chapter, which concludes tractate Berakhot, many different types of blessings are discussed. Despite the differences between these blessings, there are fundamental issues common to all of these blessings that fuse them into a single unit.
  The blessings in this chapter are neither blessings of enjoyment nor blessings over mitzvot. A significant number of them constitute the independent category of blessings of thanksgiving for God's beneficence.
  In addition to the blessings of thanksgiving, there are several other blessings that do not fall into this category. Nevertheless, all those blessings share a common denominator. They all instruct us that anything that deviates from the norm obligates one to recite a blessing, be it a permanent fixture in nature, e.g., mountains and seas; natural phenomena, e.g., thunder and lightning; unique creatures; or events of extreme benevolence, e.g., miracles or tragic events. The significance of these blessings is the acknowledgement that everything in this world is the work of God. We offer thanks for His goodness and miracles and accept the tragedies and disasters.
  Fundamentally, these blessings are not expressions of thanks. Rather, they are declarations of a faith-based approach that the Creator directs and supervises everything. Consequently, everything that transpires in the world should be tied to the understanding that “it is the Lord that does all these things” (Isaiah 45:7).
  The blessings recited over unique phenomena come to underscore God's involvement in every mundane occurrence as well. The epitome of this approach is the incorporation of God's name into the standard greeting exchanged when people meet. Although one might consider the introduction of God's name into routine exchanges as belittling His greatness, because of the rationale implicit in the verse: “It is time to work for the Lord; they have made void Your Torah” (Psalms 119:126), attributing everything in the world to God was made top priority.
  The vast topic of dreams and their interpretation, which arises in this chapter incidentally, is based upon the same fundamental perception that there is nothing in our existence that is meaningless. One must seek meaning and significance in even ethereal matters like dreams. Once meaning is ascertained, it should serve as a road map to guide the dreamer along the path of his life. 
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  The bulk of this chapter discusses the numerous blessings, which are recited on different occasions. Among these blessings, some are more specific and are recited on rare occasions; and some are more general and are recited on many different occasions.
  Among the more general blessings are: Who has given us life, and: Who is good and does good. These two blessings of thanksgiving are recited each time a person feels that something good has befallen him: A general event like rainfall; a private celebration like the birth of a son; joy over a new acquisition; or even the joy of meeting a friend. Detailed parameters were established in the halakha with regard to the time and manner in which these blessings are recited. Nevertheless, the personal feelings and considerations of the one reciting the blessing, who uses it to offer thanks to God, also play a role.
  Another general blessing, which is recited over an entire series of events, is: The true Judge. This blessing is recited as a faith-based acceptance and justification in response to any event involving misfortune or tragedy. Based on the fundamental concept of the mishna, the Gemara emphasizes that not only is there an obligation to recite a blessing over tragic events, but that one should recite the blessing joyfully, motivated by the profound belief that everything the Holy One, Blessed be He does, He does for the best. God's judgment is a true judgment; even though it may not be obvious at present, it is, at its core, a manifestation of good.
  In addition to general blessings, there are several blessings recited only in specific cases. For example: Over God's might in nature: Whose strength fills the world; over the wonders of creation in general: Author of creation; over strange creatures: Who makes creatures different. Some blessings are recited as an expression of sympathy, for example: The true Judge. Others express praise and thanksgiving, for example: Who created beautiful creatures. They all come to underscore that one should view every event and phenomenon encountered in the course of life as an act of God and a manifestation of His will.
  This chapter also discusses the halakhot governing the obligation of one who recovers from illness or is extricated from danger. In addition to the halakhic discussions, the chapter also includes fundamental philosophical determinations with regard to the role of miracles, the essence of dreams, the power of prayer, and the general problem of good versus evil.
  
  Shabbat
  
  Introduction to Shabbat
  
  And God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it because on it He rested from all His work that God in creating had made. (Genesis 2:3)
  Six days shall you labor and do all your work. But the seventh day is Shabbat unto the Lord your God; you shall not do any manner of work, you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your manservant, nor your maidservant, nor your cattle, nor your stranger who is within your gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them, and rested on the seventh day; therefore the Lord blessed the Shabbat day and hallowed it.  (Exodus 20:9–11)
  Therefore, you shall keep the Shabbat, for it is holy unto you; every one that profanes it shall surely be put to death, for whoever does any work on it, that soul shall be cut off from among his people.  (Exodus 31:14)
  If you turn away your foot because of the Shabbat, from pursuing your business on My holy day, and call the Shabbat a delight, the holy of the Lord honorable; and shall honor it, not doing your wonted ways, nor pursuing your business, nor speaking thereof. Then shall you delight yourself in the Lord, and I will make you to ride upon the high places of the earth, and I will feed you with the heritage of Jacob your father; for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it.  (Isaiah 58:13–14)
  Thus said the Lord: Take heed for the sake of your souls, and bear no burden on the Shabbat day, nor bring it into the gates of Jerusalem.  (Jeremiah 17:21)
  And if the peoples of the land bring ware or any food on the Shabbat day to sell, we would not buy from them on the Shabbat or on a holy day.  (Nehemiah 10:32)
  Tractate Shabbat is the first and the largest tractate in the order of Moed. It deals with the halakhot of the most sacred day of all,1 Shabbat.
  Numerous halakhot, veritable mountains of halakhot,2 are found among the mitzvot of Shabbat, both positive mitzvot and prohibitions. Included in these are mitzvot of biblical origin, those established by the Prophets, and many rabbinic decrees and ordinances. Shabbat has even been adorned with the aura of legend; it is a day of rest and sanctity, God's gift to a treasured nation.
  There are numerous facets to Shabbat in halakha and aggada. However, one aspect is fundamental and central: Abstention from creative labor. The only way to achieve a proper grasp of Shabbat and its halakhot, ranging from Torah statutes to rabbinic ordinances and decrees issued throughout the generations, is by means of gaining an understanding of this fundamental principle.
  The mitzva to abstain from labor and the prohibition to perform labor on Shabbat are both closely tied to the biblical depiction of the creation of the world and God's own abstention from work on the seventh day. The Shabbat of the Jewish people is, in a sense, an extension and emulation of the Shabbat of the Holy One, Blessed be He, from which our Shabbat draws its spiritual foundations. On the seventh day, God abstained “from all His work that God in creating had made.” In the Torah, the Jewish people were explicitly commanded to abstain from engaging in the construction of the Tabernacle on Shabbat.
  There are two equally fundamental aspects to these activities that are essential to the comprehension of the concept of labor prohibited on Shabbat: They are both creative acts of tangible labor and work done with prior intent. These two fundamental principles are captured in the following halakhic terminology: Planned, thoughtful, creative labor was prohibited by the Torah,3 and: For all destructive acts, one is exempt.4 The exceptions to the latter principle are those actions that are destructive in the short term, but in the long term are actually preparations for constructive acts that will follow.
  Labor on Shabbat is defined in this manner because of the aforementioned comparison between our Shabbat and God's Shabbat at the end of the creation of the universe. The degree of physical exertion expended to perform a particular action is not taken into consideration, nor does it matter whether or not the action produces results or brings profit to the worker, or whether it serves as the means of one's livelihood. It is for this reason that even activities in which the amount of energy expended is minimal and which serve only for enjoyment, e.g., writing or kindling a fire, are prohibited by the Torah and constitute labor, i.e., creating a tangible result with prior intent.
  Most of the halakhot of Shabbat, which are comprised of thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor and their subcategories, are the elaboration and detailed enumeration of these major principles in the definition of the various types of creative labor and the establishment of their parameters and limits. The ordinances and safeguards instituted by the Sages of blessed memory merely strengthen and reinforce the proper observance of the Shabbat in practical terms. They determine how to refrain from prohibited labor and from any action that could potentially lead to performance of a prohibited labor.
  Among the thirty-nine primary categories of labor enumerated with regard to Shabbat, there is only one that is anomalous, and its explication occupies a most significant place in the tractate of Shabbat: Carrying out an object from one domain to another. According to Torah law, it is prohibited to carry any object on Shabbat from the domain in which it is located to another domain. There is no element of physical exertion or toil involved in this labor, as one is liable even for carrying out minuscule objects. On the other hand, carrying out cannot be included in the category of truly creative labors either. In truth, this labor is in a category of its own, a distinct Torah law that underscores the nature of rest on Shabbat. 
  The term shabbaton means cessation of the creative activities that characterize the six active days of the week. Shabbaton also means silence, rest, cessation of the motility and hustle-bustle of the weekdays, cessation of the connection between the private domain of the individual and the public domain, and the transformation of the public domain into an environment of quiescence and tranquility. So that the tranquility of Shabbat will be complete, the parameters of these realms are delineated in a manner unique to Shabbat, unlike the definition of public and private domains in other areas of halakha, i.e., property law and the halakhot of ritual impurity. It is both prohibited to carry objects from one domain to another and to carry objects within the confines of the public domain.
  The subcategories and complex details of the prohibited labor of carrying out on Shabbat, along with the ordinances and decrees issued by the Sages to foster its observance, constitute a significant portion of the halakhot contained in tractate Shabbat.
  Although the essence of Shabbat lies in the observance of its restfulness, which is manifested in the prohibitions against creative labor and carrying out from one domain to another, there are also positive commandments involved in the observance of Shabbat, beyond the mitzva to sacrifice additional offerings in the Temple. These positive commandments are alluded to in the verse: “Remember the day of Shabbat to keep it holy.”5 The practical fulfillment of this mitzva is multifaceted. It begins with the essential commandment of kiddush, sanctification of Shabbat over a cup of wine, along with the special liturgy and customs unique to Shabbat; and it extends to the reference to each weekday in terms of its relative distance from Shabbat. This mitzva also includes the ordinance of taking delight in Shabbat, consistent with the words of the prophet Isaiah. This is accomplished by the enjoyment that is added to the Shabbat meal, the kindling of the Shabbat lights, and all means of celebration that do not conflict with the basic tenets of Shabbat observance.
  According to the oral tradition transmitted through the generations, an entire framework of ordinances and safeguards, categorized under the rubric of shevut, was instituted in the days of the earliest Prophets to ensure proper Shabbat observance. Included in this framework is the decree against engaging in commerce on Shabbat, already mentioned in the Bible. The institution of additional Shabbat domains originated long ago, along with the designation of additional areas in which the movement and transfer of objects is prohibited. The details of these ordinances are specified in the tractate Eruvin.
  Among the activities that fall into the category of shevut are both those prohibited due to their similarity to the prohibited acts of creative labor and those prohibited due to the concern that they might lead to the performance of a prohibited labor. The halakhot of set-aside [muktze], which prohibit the use of materials or utensils typically utilized in the performance of creative labor, fall into the category of shevut as well. The Sages also prohibited typical weekday activities, as it is inappropriate to engage in them on this sacred day. Therefore, tractate Shabbat is distinctive in its terminology. It distinguishes between liability and exemption by Torah law, between actions for whose performance one is exempt by Torah law but whose performance is prohibited by the Prophets and Sages, and actions that are expressly permitted.
  The halakhot of Shabbat in general, their fundamental principles and their details, and the elucidation of those halakhot that deviate from those principles, e.g., matters of life and death or circumcision on Shabbat, are all explained in the twenty-four chapters of tractate Shabbat. These twenty-four chapters are not arranged systematically by subject matter, but rather are ordered based on association between similar matters and the chronology of the activities performed on Shabbat eve leading up to Shabbat and those performed on Shabbat. 
  Chapter One, excluding its opening section, is mostly occupied with those matters with which a person must concern himself before Shabbat begins. The opening section deals with carrying in and between the various Shabbat domains. There is also an extensive treatment of eighteen decrees issued by Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to matters of ritual impurity.
  Chapter Two discusses the kindling of the Shabbat lights and other preparations that must be performed just before Shabbat begins.
  Chapter Three deals with food items that may be left upon the fire as Shabbat begins and with the prohibited labor of cooking in general. That discussion concludes in the next chapter.
  Chapter Four is concerned with the laws of insulating hot liquids and foods on Shabbat.
  Chapter Five lists the harnesses and other gear that may or may not be left upon a domesticated animal, due to the concern that the animal may carry it out on Shabbat.
  Chapter Six continues that discussion by enumerating articles of clothing, accessories, and other items that people customarily carry upon their persons and the manner in which one may wear them on Shabbat.
  Chapter Seven includes the basis for the entire tractate. In it, the legal force of the various Shabbat prohibitions is explained, along with the list of the prohibited labors.
  Chapter Eight and subsequent chapters provide details about carrying out on Shabbat, including discussions of the measures that determine liability for carrying out various substances and materials.
  Chapter Nine continues that discussion to a certain extent. However, most of the chapter is devoted to topics related conceptually, albeit not directly, to the rest of tractate Shabbat.
  Chapter Ten concludes the treatment of measures that determine liability for carrying out. 
  Chapter Eleven includes an exposition of the general principles of carrying out and two closely related activities, throwing and extending.
  Chapter Twelve elucidates the prohibited labors of building, plowing, and writing.
  Chapter Thirteen deals with the prohibited labors of weaving and sewing, as well as the other prohibited labors involved in the production of garments. In it, the prohibited labor of hunting is also discussed.
  Chapter Fourteen concludes the discussion of the creative labor of hunting and discusses additional actions prohibited by rabbinic decree.
  Chapter Fifteen discusses the prohibited labors of tying and untying knots, as well as similar actions that are permitted.
  Chapter Sixteen provides an explanation of what is permitted and what is prohibited to do in the case of a fire on Shabbat: Which objects may be carried out and which may be moved, and who can be enlisted to assist in these rescue activities? This discussion reaches general conclusions.
  Chapter Seventeen contains the primary analysis of the various categories of set-aside [muktze] objects.
  Chapter Eighteen deals with an issue that emerges from the analysis of the principle of set-aside. It elucidates actions that superficially resemble prohibited labors but are nonetheless permitted due to necessity engendered by the arrival of guests, the suffering of living creatures, or considerations of human health. 
  Chapter Nineteen presents a comprehensive discussion of one specific example of a prohibited labor permitted on Shabbat, circumcision. In the process, it discusses all of the halakhot of circumcision.
  Chapter Twenty addresses prohibitions due to deference to Shabbat or due to rabbinic decree, as well as actions that resemble prohibited labor but are permitted because they are essential or significant. In this chapter, certain actions similar to the prohibited labor of building are discussed, along with some prohibitions against moving certain objects.
  Chapter Twenty-one deals mainly with objects which may be moved on Shabbat.
  Chapter Twenty-two discusses actions that are not explicitly delineated as prohibited labor; some are subcategories of primary categories of prohibited labor, and some are permitted on Shabbat.
  Chapter Twenty-three clarifies halakhot associated with the prohibition against conducting commercial transactions on Shabbat and defines their parameters.
  Chapter Twenty-four deals with the principles governing the requirement to prevent one's animals from engaging in prohibited labor, along with several diverse halakhot related to actions that the Sages permitted on Shabbat.
  Notes
  1.	 See tractate Shabbat 113a.
  2.	 See tractate Hagiga 10a.
  3.	 Tractate Beitza 13b.
  4.	 Tractate Shabbat 105b.
  5.	 Exodus 20:8.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  The primary focus of this chapter is on the various details of the prohibitions of carrying out and moving objects on the Shabbat.
  The prohibited labor to carry out a burden on Shabbat is alluded to in the Torah and explicitly stated in the Prophets. Although it appears in the list of prohibited labors in the mishna, it constitutes its own discrete unit, and its parameters are significantly different from those of the other prohibited labors.
  There are two fundamental aspects to the prohibited labor of carrying out. The most significant of these is the prohibition to carry an object from one domain to another, e.g., from the private to the public domain. The definitions of these domains with regard to Shabbat are distinctive, and their parameters are by no means identical to the definitions of domains in other aspects of halakha, neither in terms of their ownership nor in terms of their use.
  There are four Shabbat domains: The private domain, the public domain, an intermediate domain [karmelit] whose precise definition will follow, and an exempt domain, which is a neutral domain within which carrying objects is not prohibited at all.
  Any area that is four handbreadths by four handbreadths and separated from its surroundings by ten handbreadths, either by a partition of that height that delimits it or because it stands on ground ten handbreadths higher or lower than its surroundings, is a private domain, even if legally it is publicly owned. The airspace of the private domain extends to the sky.
  An area that is a minimum of sixteen cubits wide and which the public, some say at least 600,000 people, use regularly is a public domain. The airspace of the public domain extends only ten handbreadths off the ground.
  To these domains, whose basis is in Torah law, the Sages added a third domain, the karmelit. A karmelit is defined as any place that is fit to be a private domain in terms of its area, but is not surrounded by an enclosure or is not sufficiently removed from its surrounding area to be an actual private domain. In addition, an area that is large enough to be a public domain but is not frequented by the public, e.g., a field or a body of water, is also a karmelit. The Sages decreed that those areas have the legal status of a public domain by rabbinic law.
  An exempt domain is defined as a place that is set apart from its surroundings, has an area of less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths, and has airspace more than ten handbreadths above the public domain or karmelit. There is absolutely no prohibition against carrying or moving objects in that domain on Shabbat.
  The other fundamental aspect of the prohibition to carry out is the prohibition to carry an object four cubits within a public domain. Carrying an object four cubits in a karmelit is prohibited by rabbinic law.
  One only violates the Torah prohibition to carry out on Shabbat if he lifts the object from one place and places it in another place. As is the case with regard to the other prohibited labors, one who performs this action intentionally is liable for the punishment of karet. If he does so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. 
  Based upon these principles, the Mishna and Gemara discuss the prohibitions of carrying out on Shabbat, its parameters, and the safeguards decreed by the Sages.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  The talmudic discussions in this chapter encompassed a wide variety of topics, some of which were not related to the laws of Shabbat. The main focus of this chapter was the explication of two major topics: The halakhot of carrying from one domain to another on Shabbat and activities that are permitted or prohibited on Shabbat eve.
  Although the discussion of a significant portion of the halakhot of carrying out will not be completed until Chapters 7–10 of this tractate, several select issues were analyzed exhaustively in this chapter: The various Shabbat domains and many of the rulings and details that pertain to them; halakhic rulings with regard to intermediate domains and areas, e.g., holes in a wall adjacent to the public domain; and even explanations of some of the fundamental principles upon which these halakhot are based. Similarly, in this chapter, the parameters of lifting and placing were clearly defined; the question of lifting from and placing upon a significant surface was addressed; and the definition of what constitutes a significant surface in this regard was discussed.
  Another series of halakhot discussed primarily in this chapter are those governing activities from which one must refrain on Shabbat eve. Among these halakhot are those that were decreed as safeguards by the Sages, who prohibited performance of certain actions on Shabbat eve lest one forget and come to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat itself, e.g., the tailor may not go out with his needle.
  This chapter also contained a significant, fundamental discussion of whether or not one is permitted to take action on Shabbat eve that will cause a prohibited labor to be performed on Shabbat on its own or by a gentile. In those cases, it is the opinion of Beit Shammai that gave extremely limited license to perform those actions, as they extended the prohibition to perform a prohibited labor to one's utensils as well. On the other hand, Beit Hillel, whose opinion in this case is the accepted halakha, are of the opinion that the prohibitions of Shabbat apply to the person and not to the utensils with which the labor is performed. Based upon that principle, automatic processes initiated before Shabbat that continue to function on Shabbat itself are permitted. In practice, there are many exceptions to this principle, but the basic halakha is based upon this foundation.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  You shall not kindle a fire throughout your settlements on the Shabbat day. (Exodus 35:3)
  You shall call the Shabbat a delight, the holy of the Lord honorable. (Isaiah 58:13)
  Delighting in Shabbat is not a mitzva by Torah law, but is first mentioned in the book of Isaiah. However, many of the halakhot and customs of Shabbat are based upon this mitzva.
  Kindling the Shabbat lights in deference to Shabbat is based on the mitzva of delighting in Shabbat, as there can be no delight or enjoyment, even in a festive meal, in a house that is dark and bereft of illumination. With the lighting of the Shabbat lights, there is thus an element of delight, as well as deference to Shabbat day. However, since there is a strict prohibition against kindling fire or extinguishing it on the Shabbat day, special care must be taken to ensure that the kindling of the lights on Shabbat eve will not lead to kindling or extinguishing fire once Shabbat begins. Therefore, the Sages instituted safeguards and precautions with regard to the various substances that may be used in kindling the Shabbat lights as well as with regard to the manner in which their light may be utilized on Shabbat eve and on Shabbat day.
  The primary focus of this chapter is the elucidation of the parameters of the prohibited labors of kindling and extinguishing, along with a discussion of precautionary measures enacted to enable use of the light of an oil lamp on Shabbat.
  Other related topics, including the mitzva of the Hanukkah lights, are discussed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  The nature of the mitzva of kindling the Shabbat lights is the fundamental problem that was addressed in this chapter. It was clearly resolved in one direction. The conclusion was that the Shabbat lights essentially have a functional purpose: To introduce light into the experience of delighting in Shabbat, to enhance the atmosphere, and to make partaking in the festive Shabbat meal more comfortable. Therefore, it was concluded that the oil suitable for kindling the Shabbat lights must provide a clear, consistent glow. Although there were Sages who sought to restrict the use of certain oils in an attempt to further enhance the stature of the mitzva, their opinions were not incorporated into the ultimate halakhic ruling. Certain oils and wicks were ultimately prohibited either because they do not provide effective illumination or because their use is liable to result in the desecration of Shabbat.
  The comprehensive discussion of the Hanukkah lights found in this chapter, which, in effect, included all the halakhot of Hanukkah, underscored the role of the Shabbat lights. The conclusion was that, in virtually every matter, there is a contrast between Hanukkah lights and Shabbat lights. The objective of the mitzva to kindle the Shabbat lights is to illuminate. The mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah lights has no such practical objective; the mitzva is the act of kindling itself. The Shabbat lights are kindled so that the entire family can derive benefit from them. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the Hanukkah candles at all. Consequently, the Shabbat lamp must be equipped with materials that burn clearly and consistently. There is no such requirement for the Hanukkah candles. Their sole purpose is to publicize the miracle of Hanukkah.
  Although the halakha has determined that the essence of the Shabbat lights lies in their practical function, the Sages, in a series of aggadic statements, enhanced the stature of the mitzva and its symbolic essence, transforming it into a manifestation of the very sanctity of Shabbat.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And he [Moses] said to them: This is what the Lord meant: Tomorrow is a day of rest, a holy Shabbat of the Lord. Bake what you would bake and boil what you would boil, and all that is left put aside to be kept until morning. (Exodus 16:23)
  Cooking on Shabbat is explicitly prohibited in the Torah, and this prohibited labor is listed among the thirty-nine primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat. Since cooking is generally completed as Shabbat begins, the discussion of the labor of cooking precedes the discussion of the other prohibited labors in the sequence of this tractate.
  This chapter occupies itself primarily with the clarification and precise definition of the prohibited labor of cooking. That undertaking carries with it numerous problems. Unlike other categories of labor, there is an interval between the action and the desired result. It is a process, and therefore the question arises: At what stage in the process can it be said that an act of cooking has been performed? Shall we say that one who undertakes any action in the course of the entire process is considered to have engaged in that prohibited labor? Or perhaps, that is the case only with regard to one who initiates the process? Moreover, since the cooking process, once initiated, continues without the need for any additional action by the one cooking, the question can be raised: Is the mere act of placing an item on the fire defined as labor, or is it considered an incomplete segment of that labor?
  There is a question as to whether the essence of the labor of cooking is transforming inedible into edible, unusable into usable, or whether it is the act of cooking that is prohibited, independent of the result. In practical terms, is it prohibited to further cook a cooked item?
  The fundamental definition of cooking requires clarification and precision. In a very general sense, one could posit that cooking or baking are activities that render substances fit for use by means of heat. However, that leaves open the question of whether any activity that renders a substance usable is considered cooking, or perhaps, the essence of cooking is merely the softening or hardening of that substance?
  It is also important to clarify whether the prohibited labor of cooking applies to all substances, or perhaps only to food, or perhaps only to specific types of food. Another related question is whether the halakhic definition of cooking depends upon some specific level of heat, e.g., the boiling point, or the intensity of the heat, or perhaps its effect is of no significance. Additionally, it must be ascertained whether the definition of cooking is restricted to the use of fire or whether it extends to other sources of heat. Similarly, is there a distinction between natural sources of heat and artificial ones in this context?
  Most of these problems are resolved in various manners in this chapter. Some are discussed in Chapter Four and some in Chapter Seven, which discusses the primary categories of prohibited labor.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  This chapter, whose primary focus was on the details of the labor of cooking on Shabbat, discussed the issue from a practical perspective. Matters relating to concluding the cooking process on Shabbat were underscored.
  First, the Gemara clarified the permitted and prohibited manners in which one may leave cooked food on different types of stoves, so that the cooking process may be completed, and the food will remain hot for Shabbat day. The Gemara concluded that it is permitted to leave the item upon the stove if the item is sufficiently cooked at the onset of Shabbat, i.e., it could be eaten in exigent circumstances, and if there is no room for concern lest one come to stoke the coals, e.g., in a case where the possibility of stoking the coals on Shabbat is physically precluded.
  The fundamental discussion of the halakhot of cooking concluded with the ruling that there is a distinction between cooking with fire, which is prohibited by Torah law, and cooking with other heat sources, e.g., the heat of the sun, which, if it is prohibited, the prohibition is only by rabbinic decree. It was also ruled that the prohibition of cooking applies to all types of foods, solids and liquids, in accordance with the level of heat that renders them cooked. There are also different substances that accelerate or impede the cooking process and influence the degree of heat required for cooking.
  Matters relating to moving utensils used for cooking and illuminating accompanied the discussion of the laws of cooking. The questions were: To what extent are these utensils that are designated for prohibited labor or objects that are unsuited for use on Shabbat set aside from use on Shabbat? To what extent is moving them prohibited on Shabbat?
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  In Chapter Three, the halakhot of cooking were discussed extensively. Although the Torah prohibited cooking on Shabbat, it is permitted to leave food on the fire on Shabbat eve so that its cooking will be completed on Shabbat, as explained in Chapter One and Chapter Three of this tractate. A series of related halakhot about insulating on Shabbat are discussed in Chapter Four.
  It was customary to place hot food and liquids into various substances with the capacity to preserve and even add heat. This act of insulating is comparable to placing a cooked dish in coals and embers, which is prohibited by rabbinic decree, lest one come to stoke the coals and ignite them. In this case, although there is an explicit principle that a decree is not issued due to concern lest one come to violate another rabbinic decree, the Sages prohibited insulating food for Shabbat in those cases most similar to placing a cooked dish in coals. In cases of this sort, the Gemara explains that the different decrees were issued contemporaneously. Therefore, it is not a case of a decree issued to prevent violation of another decree, as they are all one decree.
  The general discussion in this chapter includes a list of substances with which it is permitted and those with which it is prohibited to insulate hot food on Shabbat, as well as explanations and rationales for this halakha.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  This chapter dealt with the halakhot of insulating hot food and liquids for use on Shabbat. The distinction between substances that add heat, in which insulation is prohibited due to a decree lest one come to cover a cooked dish in coals, and substances that do not add heat, which merely preserve the heat of the cooked dish that was placed in them, in which insulation is permitted, served as a basis for all the halakhot in this chapter. Related to the discussion of this issue, some halakhot of set-aside items were also discussed. Some of the substances in which the cooked dishes are insulated are set-aside, and moving them is prohibited. When dealing with the insulated food, the manner in which those substances may be moved directly or indirectly was ascertained.
  A related problem discussed in this chapter is that of insulating cold food. Is it permitted to insulate cold food so that it will not get warm on Shabbat? Should insulating cold food be prohibited by decree lest one come to insulate hot food as well? The Gemara concluded that there is no room to add to the existing decrees, as even with regard to hot food, insulation is prohibited only by rabbinic decree.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  But the seventh day is a Shabbat unto the Lord your God; you shall not do any manner of work, you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your man-servant, nor your maid-servant, nor your cattle, nor your stranger who is within your gates. (Exodus 20:10)
  Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall rest; that your ox and your ass may have rest, and the son of your handmaid, and the stranger, may be refreshed. (Exodus 23:12)
  When the Torah commanded us to refrain from labor on Shabbat, it also commanded us to rest our animals. An animal may not perform labor on behalf of its owner on Shabbat. This chapter does not clarify the full extent of the mitzva to rest one's animal; it deals extensively with preventing one's animal from performing just one prohibited labor, the labor of carrying out on Shabbat. The halakhot of carrying out are cited first primarily because one must be aware at the onset of Shabbat which vessels and equipment may be left on the animal on Shabbat and which items must be removed.
  The central issue discussed in this chapter is: Which of the items that one customarily places on an animal, a saddle, reins, and chains, are considered a garment for the animal? If they serve the animal's needs, it is permitted to place them on the animal. Which items are considered a burden, and it is prohibited to place them on the animal? The assumption is that any item typically used for protection of the animal is considered to be serving the animal's needs, and leaving it on the animal is permitted. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the means of protection standard for each animal and whether or not excessive security measures constitute a burden. 
  This relates to another issue, discussed primarily in Chapter Six: The concern lest part of the animal's harness fall in the public domain, and the owner of the animal carry the item that fell. Therefore, it is also necessary to ascertain: What are those items that serve the needs of the animal but are, nevertheless, prohibited due to the concern lest they fall, leading the owner to perform an unwitting transgression?
  The detailed elucidation of these issues and other related issues is the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara clarified which items may and which items may not be placed on an animal on Shabbat, so that neither the animal nor its owner will perform the prohibited labor of carrying out or moving objects that may not be moved.
  Several principles were established in this chapter. It is permitted for the animal to bear any part of its harness necessary for its basic security. However, items that provide less than basic security for the animal and those that provide excessive security both constitute a burden and may not be borne by the animal because they do not meet the animal's standard security needs.
  Items intended for the animal's comfort, not for the owner's needs, may also be placed on an animal on Shabbat. With regard to some items, whether intended for comfort or security, there is concern lest they fall from the animal. This might lead the owner to unwittingly carry them in the public domain. If items are not valuable, or if they are fastened tightly in place on the animal and there is no concern lest one come to carry them, it is permitted to place them on the animal.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  By Torah law, it is prohibited to carry a burden from domain to domain on Shabbat, and it is similarly prohibited to carry an object four cubits in the public domain. Clearly, one's clothing is not considered a burden in this sense, and one who wears clothing in the typical fashion is not considered to be carrying a burden on Shabbat. 
  This principle requires clarification and specification: What items fall under the rubric of clothing? Not every item that a person wears on his body is clothing per se, and not every garment is typically worn. In a certain sense an ornament is like clothing; however, what items fall under the rubric of ornament? Are there objective criteria that determine whether or not an item is an ornament, or perhaps that determination is totally dependent on the individual taste of the one who places the ornament on his person? Furthermore, there are different items that one might bear on his body, e.g., bandages, prosthetic limbs, and other medical equipment, including amulets, which are neither ornaments nor clothing. In order to determine whether or not one may go out with these items into the public domain, the question as to whether they are considered either an integral part of the person bearing them or his garments must be resolved.
  With regard to these issues, the Sages were also concerned lest an ornament or some other valuable item fall from the person wearing it and lest a woman come to show her ornaments to another. In those cases, the person from whom an object fell or the woman wearing the ornament may come to carry the object in their hand in a manner not comparable to wearing clothing. This would violate the prohibition against carrying out on Shabbat. Clearly, this concern does not exist with regard to all people or all items.
  Clarification of these issues in principle and in practice is the focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  In this chapter numerous halakhot with regard to garments, ornaments, and other items that a person bears on his body were elucidated; those with which it is permitted to go out into the public domain and those with which it is prohibited were enumerated.
  A general distinction was made between men's ornaments and women's ornaments, based on the assumption that many ornaments suitable for one gender are a burden for the other. In the category of women's ornaments, it was established that a woman is prohibited to go out into the public domain on Shabbat with any item that she is likely to remove to show off its beauty. With regard to men's ornaments, this is also true to a limited extent. Similarly, some items may not be worn in the public domain because one may remove them due to embarrassment. One may go out into the public domain only with those items with regard to which there is no concern lest one remove them and carry them, either because it is impossible to remove them or because one wearing them does not typically remove them.
  Even concerning items that serve medicinal purposes, it was established that it is only permitted to go out into the public domain with those items that a person is unlikely or unable to remove.
  There was a fundamental conceptual discussion whether or not weapons have the legal status of an ornament. The halakhic conclusion was that a weapon is a necessary evil and may be carried on Shabbat only in life and death situations.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  You shall keep the Sabbath, for it is holy for you. He who profanes it shall be put to death; whoever does work on it, that person shall be cut off from among his people. (Exodus 31:14)
  If any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and is guilty, if his sin, which he has sinned, is known to him, then he shall bring his offering: a goat, a female without blemish, for his sin which he has sinned. (Leviticus 4:27–28)
  One who profanes Shabbat intentionally is subject to death by stoning, if he were forewarned by witnesses, or karet, if he were not, as stated in the Torah. One who desecrates Shabbat unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  In the halakhic midrash, the Sages derived through exegetical principles that the observance of Shabbat is different from other mitzvot. One who unwittingly performs several primary categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat can be liable to bring several sin-offerings.
  According to the accepted halakha, one who sinned unwittingly over the course of many Shabbatot is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each and every Shabbat on which he performed a transgression because the profaning of each Shabbat constitutes a separate transgression. In this chapter, details of this principle are elaborated. The circumstances in which numerous unwitting transgressions are considered as one transgression and the circumstances in which each Shabbat desecrated is considered to be a separate transgression are determined.
  Just as each Shabbat constitutes its own discrete unit, so too the various primary categories of prohibited labor constitute discrete units. Consequently, although all types of creative labor are prohibited by the verse: “You shall not do any manner of labor” (Exodus 20:9), each primary category of prohibited labor is considered a separate prohibition. For example, if one unwittingly performs several primary categories of prohibited labor during one specified time period, he is liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each primary category of prohibited labor violated. It is therefore imperative to ascertain the fundamental parameters of these primary categories of labor in order to ascertain which subcategories are attributed to each. Although other chapters in this tractate deal specifically with several of these categories of labor, the general discussion of this topic is found in this chapter. 
  This chapter includes a detailed discussion of the primary category of the prohibited labor of carrying out. The major theme of this chapter is an explication of the fundamental framework of the halakhot of Shabbat.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  Most of the fundamental principles of tractate Shabbat were clarified in this chapter.
  It was established that individuals who desecrate Shabbat unwittingly fall into three categories: There are those individuals who were totally ignorant of the existence of the mitzva of Shabbat; there are others who performed labor on Shabbat because they confused Shabbat with another day; and there are yet others who were fully aware that the day on which they performed the labor was Shabbat but were unaware of the fact that the type of labor they performed was prohibited. The conclusion is that even one who falls into the first category, one who is totally ignorant of the existence of Shabbat, is considered unwitting with regard to Shabbat. The number of unwitting violations for which the individual is liable is dependent upon the nature of his lack of awareness. 
  The details of prohibited labor, the thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor and all other conceivable types of labor that are subsumed under these categories as details or subcategories, is a halakhic tradition alluded to in the Torah. Details and parameters of several of these primary categories, minimum measures that determine liability for their performance and the subcategories subsumed under those primary categories, were discussed in this chapter.
  Special attention was paid to the primary category of carrying out. The minimum measure that determines liability for carrying out was established for different substances, based on the nature of that substance and its typical usage. Other details of this important prohibition were also discussed.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  In Chapter Seven, the fundamental principles used to define the minimum measures that determine liability for carrying out various substances were established. One who carries out any item fit to store into a prohibited domain on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering for that action. An item considered fit to store is one that people generally store and one whose measure is large enough to make it worthwhile to store for future use. Any measure less than that is considered insignificant, and there is no Torah prohibition against carrying it out. This principle determines the minimum measures that determine liability for carrying out on Shabbat; however, it does not specify the measures with regard to each and every substance.
  In this chapter, as in the latter part of Chapter Seven and in subsequent chapters, the Sages specified that which is considered a significant measure with regard to a wide range of substances. The challenge here is not merely to establish minimum measures for the various substances, but it extends to more fundamental issues. For example, with regard to substances that have several uses, and a different measure is typically utilized for each of its uses, the question arises whether one universal measure determines liability for carrying out this substance, or whether the measure that determines liability varies in accordance with the purpose for which the substance is being carried out.
  Moreover, even if one universal measure determines liability for carrying out a particular substance in all cases, is that measure determined by the substance's most common and significant use or by the largest or smallest of the measures? 
  In addition, the measure that determines liability for substances that have no independent utility but serve a purpose when combined with other substances is discussed. Is the measure of that substance alone deemed significant because that is the measure typically mixed with another substance, or would one be liable only for carrying out the entire mixture.
  The explication of these general issues and their details is the focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter defined the minimum measures that determine liability for carrying out or moving various substances on Shabbat.
  Although there are several fundamental principles with regard to the prohibited labor of carrying out in general and food items in particular, these principles do not establish the measures that determine liability for each and every substance. Each substance must be considered on its own terms. Various foods and liquids, and even certain objects, have several possible uses, and therefore different methods to assess their significance are employed. In each case, the most common form of use must be determined, and based on that determination the minimum measure for liability is established.
  In addition it was established that significant quantities are not determined based on the current status of the substance, but rather by its ultimate purpose, e.g., the measures that determine liability for carrying out substances such as undiluted wine or other raw materials are established based on the fact that the wine will be diluted with water and the raw material will become a finished product. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that these measures are subject to modification based on the manner in which people utilize these substances in practice.
  In this chapter, incidental to the halakhic discussions, many aggadic passages were cited. These, too, focus, albeit indirectly, on the central themes of the chapter: Appreciation of the value of various substances in the context of Creation and the importance of familiarity with the way of the world as part of the halakhic process.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  This chapter is comprised mostly of halakhot that are not directly related to the laws of Shabbat. They are placed together because of their conceptual similarities and common structure. The halakhot are all presented as answers to the fundamental question: How do we know...? In response to this question, proof texts from a variety of biblical sources are advanced. In this way, these halakhot are linked to the final mishna of the previous chapter, which shares a similar format. 
  This mode of presentation involves sequentially arranging halakhot based on superficial, structural parallels rather than by a common theme or topic. This method of organization results in halakhot that are not at all related in terms of subject matter being strung together into a single series because of their verbal structure.
  The decision to arrange the text in this way is attributable to the fact that, for many centuries, the Oral Torah was transmitted from mouth to mouth, from master to disciple. Even after the redaction of the Mishna, Torah scholars continued to study it by heart. It was therefore necessary to provide mnemonic devices and other helpful tools to facilitate the memorization of the study material, and these methods are frequently integrated into the text of the Mishna and the Talmud.
  In addition to the organization of material based on structure and form, the asmakhta is another technique that served as an aid to memorization. Asmakhta means the attribution of a halakha from the Oral Law to verses in the Written Law, despite of the fact that in many instances those verses are not, in fact, the basis of that halakha. In addition to being an aid to memorization, this use of texts had another purpose, namely, to reinforce the bond and relationship between the Written Torah and the Oral Torah, so that they not become separate entities. 
  Indeed, the major commentaries often disagree as to whether the Sages viewed these biblical verses as proof texts, rigorous proofs, or merely suggestive hints. Certainly, the verses taken from the Prophets and Writings should be understood as mere suggestive hints and are no more than aids to memory.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  In this chapter, very few matters directly related to the laws of Shabbat were discussed. Most of the chapter was devoted to diverse halakhic and aggadic subjects, which relate to each other in superficial form only and not in actual content.
  Only the very last mishna in this chapter related back to the subject matter of Chapter Eight, namely, the measures that are considered significant with regard to the prohibition of carrying from one domain to another on Shabbat. The other topics treated include discussions of ritual purity and impurity, specifically: The impurity of idols, the status of sea vessels with regard to ritual purity, laws related to abstaining from conjugal relations at specified times, and the laws of prohibited mixtures of species. What all of these halakhot have in common is that they are not based primarily upon the Written Torah. Rather, they were derived either from Sinaitic tradition or from rabbinic mandates and safeguards, or they were homiletic explications of biblical verses that support the halakhot in question but were, essentially, merely asmakhtot, suggestive hints. 
  This chapter contained a passage which is generally considered one of the most difficult in the entire Talmud, the passage known as aruga, meaning furrow. The discussion here focused on the complex laws of forbidden mixtures of seeds, which most halakhic authorities consider to be essentially of rabbinic origin. This passage was an excellent example of how the Talmud discusses, in detail, issues that do not derive from real-life circumstances but are hypothetical in nature. Such discussions are paradigmatic of studying Torah for its own sake, inasmuch as they thoroughly analyze every conceivable aspect of the subject at hand.
  With regard to the laws of ritual purity and impurity, the chapter focused on three exceptional examples. The impurity of idols has, as its source, a rabbinic decree designed to completely distance the Jew from the worship of alien divinities. Therefore, in addition to the biblical prohibitions against using and possessing idolatrous images and figures, the rabbis instituted stringencies against even touching them.
  The laws pertaining to the ritual impurity of semen, based upon explicit verses in the Torah, were expanded significantly by the Sages. These laws have implications for Jewish practice to this very day with regard to the purification of a menstruating woman. In addition, the halakhot governing the ritual purity of ships were also discussed here.
  A significant portion of Chapter Nine was devoted to the topic of the giving of the Torah, or the Revelation. The chapter included a very detailed discussion of the precise determination of the date of the giving of the Torah and the extent to which this date coincides with the festival of Shavuot. The chapter also included much aggadic material describing the miraculous way in which the Torah was given to the Jewish people.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  This chapter, like the previous ones, discusses the category of creative labor [melakha] known as carrying out. However, its primary focus is to clarify one aspect of this category. 
  Until this point, the discussions have focused on the volume of the object being carried out. In other words, what is the volume necessary for an object to be considered significant? Only a significant object renders its carrier liable for this labor. This chapter, however, deals with the manner in which the carrying is performed. Under which conditions are the actions involved in the carrying considered to have been performed in a standard and customary manner, so that the act qualifies as bona fide carrying, and under which conditions is the act done in what is considered an unusual manner, so that the person is not liable for bona fide carrying?
  Furthermore, if the carrying is performed by means of a vessel or utensil, what are the halakhic issues that then come into play? Do we assess the action in terms of the essence of what is being carried, i.e., the object in the vessel, or is the vessel itself also of import? For example, how do we assess the action if the vessel contains a measure of the object that is less than the minimum amount required for the person to be judged liable for carrying? To give another example, how do we assess the action if the vessel itself has been only partially removed from its domain, but the entire contents of the vessel are already in the other domain? Do we determine liability based on the container or based on the object contained?
  The following question arises frequently with regard to the primary category of carrying out, but it is also relevant to other categories of creative labor: What is the rule for labor done by more than one person? Do we consider all those involved in the labor equally liable, are only some of them liable, or are they all perhaps exempt from punishment?
  The clarification of these issues, as well as several matters that complete the topic of the fundamental rules of minimum measures, form the basis of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  Among the fundamental topics discussed in this chapter is the double distinction made with reference to the category of labor known as carrying out. On the one hand is the extent to which we consider the value of the act itself from the perspective of significant measures, and on the other hand is the extent to which a person's intentions determine whether there is cause to be strict or lenient with him. With regard to minimum measures, the halakha is strict. If an amount less than the minimum measure is significant to a particular person, that person may not carry out this lesser quantity. However, when defining a completed labor, the halakha is lenient. If a person performs a labor which, for his own subjective needs, that person does not consider finished, the labor is not defined as complete by the halakha, even if others would consider the labor complete.
  There is great importance to the rules established by the Rabbis with regard to the manner in which the carrying out is done. Therefore, only when the object is transported from one domain to the other in a usual and customary manner is one liable, whereas carrying out in an unusual manner, although prohibited, does not involve a violation of biblical law. Even with reference to carrying an object contained in a vessel or utensil, personal intentions are so crucial that a person carrying out an object in a vessel is liable only for the item one intended to transport.
  Another topic discussed here, although conclusive treatment is reserved for a later chapter, is the matter of when the labor is done in partnership, i.e., by more than one person. The general principle was established that it is impossible to consider labor done by more than one person a biblical violation, so long as no one person was the dominant participant in the labor. There is no liability for labor done partially or jointly, unless that is the manner in which the labor is customarily performed.
  Incidentally, this chapter dealt with other categories of labor with reference to its central theme. Chapter Ten asked: What is considered the customary manner in which fingernails are trimmed and objects uprooted from their source, and what are the unusual ways in which these activities are performed? It was decided that there are fixed conventions for performing these activities. If one performs the activity differently from the way in which most people perform it, or if the action performed is not generally considered significant, one is not liable.
  
  Introduction to Perek XI
  
  Although previous chapters of tractate Shabbat dealt with the laws of carrying out, the discussion is completed in this chapter, not only with regard to details but also with regard to many fundamental questions. Until this point, two aspects of carrying out were distinguished: Carrying out an object from one domain to another, and transporting an object more than four cubits in the public domain. In this chapter, an additional group of halakhot is discussed: The laws of throwing and extending an object from one domain to another via an intervening domain.
  Although the laws of throwing and extending are closely related to other details of carrying out, they nevertheless have a certain unique quality. A biblical decree [gezeirat hakatuv] distinguishes between throwing and extending, on the one hand, and the more common methods of carrying out, on the other. This distinction carries with it some implications that are lenient and others that are stringent.
  There is another question that is intrinsic to the very essence of throwing. While transporting an object is an action that is continuous over a period of time, throwing is one instantaneous act. The labor category of carrying out is contingent upon the transportation of an object from one point to another, based on lifting up [akira] and placing down [hanakha]. As a result, questions arise with regard to the connection between the act of throwing and the landing of the object in its place. Additionally, it is necessary to determine the extent to which the intention of the thrower is significant at each point in the flight of the object.
  In the course of the clarification of these particularly unique halakhot, an explication of basic principles is reached. A fundamental scriptural basis for all of the laws of carrying out is discovered, the underlying foundations of which are the flags in the wilderness, the configuration of the children of Israel as they made their way through the desert, and the method by which they transported the utensils of the Tabernacle and its walls. Based on this underlying foundation, it then becomes necessary to determine what can be derived from the biblical verses, which conclusions can be reached using a logical approach, and which matters we must accept on the basis of the traditions of the Oral Law.
  These general issues and the particular questions which stem from them, all of which touch upon the major principles of carrying out, constitute the main topic of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XI
  
  The main question addressed by the Sages in this chapter was: What is the relationship between the text of the Written Torah and the specific laws of carrying out? This question was answered definitively: An explicit Torah source could not be found for the details of the laws that comprise accepted halakhic practice; nor was it possible to directly infer these details from a biblical verse. In actuality, all of the fundamentals of the Shabbat prohibitions were transmitted orally to Moses from Sinai. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the manner in which the Tabernacle activities were performed serves as a model for the laws of Shabbat prohibitions. All of the detailed laws of the labor categories on Shabbat, particularly those of carrying out, are specified and assessed against this standard.
  In this chapter, the particular laws of throwing and extending were clarified, and other aspects of the prohibition of carrying out were summarized. Biblical prohibitions such as transporting from the public domain to the private domain were discussed, as were particular laws instituted by the Sages as safeguards. These safeguards include the laws of the intermediate domain known as karmelit, carrying through a puddle of water, and the laws pertaining to water in a boat and between boats. These prohibitions do not appear in the Written Torah; rather, they were instituted by the Sages, who assigned them parameters corresponding to those of the biblical prohibitions. 
  This chapter also discussed the significance of a person's intent at the time he begins performing a labor. This determines whether one would be liable for the acts of carrying out or throwing. The question was also raised whether one's intention can be revoked once an activity has been initiated and is in progress.
  
  Introduction to Perek XII
  
  This chapter is the first in this tractate to discuss in detail and clarify several of the thirty-nine categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat. It concentrates on three categories of labor: Building, plowing, and writing. The categories of building and plowing were partially addressed in Chapter Seven. Our chapter mainly discusses two questions concerning these categories of labor.
  First, what are some of the common subcategories [toladot] of these primary categories [avot], i.e., what are some specific activities included within the comprehensive definitions of the primary categories building and plowing? The definitions of these primary categories can be formulated in various ways, narrowly and precisely, or much more generally. They are comprised of many details, and the kinds of activities included within the parameters of each primary category must be clarified. 
  The second question in the chapter is how should the minimum measures that determine liability to bring this sin-offering, as defined by the Torah, be ascertained? 
  With regard to the category of writing, there are additional problems: Is it necessary to specify the typical manner of writing, i.e., what form and what method constitute the creative act known as writing? Additionally, how do we determine the minimum act that can be considered writing? And, furthermore, does the definition of writing include any symbol or design, or is it limited to the reproduction of letters of the alphabet or other specific figures? And are all writing materials and methods of writing treated equally with reference to liability for performing this category of labor on Shabbat? 
  These are the main issues that will be clarified in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XII
  
  Among the categories of labor discussed in this chapter, the category of building was not definitively explained, so that some of the laws pertaining to this type of labor will be dealt with later in the tractate, when the laws of constructing a tent are fully explicated. Nevertheless, it was concluded in our chapter that the labor category of building includes any constructive act by means of which a structure is fashioned, either fully or partially, or a significant portion of a structure is fashioned. All of these acts are subsumed within the primary category of building.
  The category known as plowing was defined as including any activity that repairs or improves the surface of the earth, whether it is plowing with a plowshare, pulling plants from the ground, or removing clumps of earth from the ground or replacing them elsewhere on the ground. All of the above constitute plowing.
  No minimum measure is provided for the categories of building and plowing, so that one who performs them is liable for the most minimal conceivable action.
  With regard to the primary category of writing, it was concluded that one is not liable for writing on Shabbat unless he has written in a usual and customary fashion, with materials that do not immediately fade but leave an enduring mark, and upon a solid writing surface. The minimum activity for which one is liable is the writing of two letters of the alphabet. With regard to the nature of these two letters, there is a dispute among the tannaitic Sages, but we conclude by accepting the opinion that any meaningful symbol of whatever type is considered a letter in this regard, so that a person who writes two symbols that can be joined together and read simultaneously is liable for the act of writing on Shabbat. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XIII
  
  This chapter discusses two groups of primary categories of labor [avot melakhot].
  One section of the chapter deals with the primary category of weaving and related categories of labor. All activities involved in the production of clothing from the spinning of the thread until the final utilization of the yarn; the arrangement of the loom; the weaving itself; and all other improvements made to the fabric, such as dyeing and cleansing it, can be combined by their very nature into one group of categories of labor. They are therefore treated in this chapter as if they were one unit.
  The main topic of this chapter is not the description of the nature or parameters of these various labor categories. Rather, it is the establishment of minimal measures for which one is liable should he perform any of these types of labor on Shabbat.
  The other section of this chapter deals with the category of trapping, specifically the definition of this category of labor and its parameters. The category of trapping is defined as the confinement of an animal within a space from which it cannot escape. First, however, it must be determined whether or not this prohibition applies to all animals, at which stage in the confinement process the trapping may be said to have been performed, and which methods of confinement may be considered typical modes of trapping for the various species of animals.
  Once again, the question arises concerning an activity jointly performed by two or more individuals. This is especially relevant in this chapter, because trapping is generally not performed by a single individual acting alone, so that we must clarify how we are to view this matter.
  
  Summary of Perek XIII
  
  Weaving and other categories of labor related to the production of yarn and fabric and their treatment were divided from a halakhic perspective into two groups. The first group was the category of weaving itself and other categories that serve as a basis for it or its subcategories [toladot]. These essentially involve the combination of several separate threads into one entity that has a function within the context of weaving, either by arranging the loom or otherwise facilitating the process of weaving. With regard to this group, it is generally determined that the minimum quantity is two threads, or two loops of thread [batei nirin], each with its own specific rules. 
  The second group of categories is comprised of those actions involved in the treatment of the threads of the fabric or the finished garment, whether by spinning, dyeing, or whitening. Here, the minimum length is established as the width of a sit, the distance between the tip of the thumb and the tip of the index finger when they are extended. This is also the minimum measure for other activities related to weaving. Indeed, some of the details related to these categories of labor, particularly the category of whitening, are treated in other chapters at greater length and with further clarification.
  The other subject of this chapter, the category of trapping, was defined from several perspectives: The basic nature of this category of labor was defined as causing an animal to enter a place from which it cannot leave, but only if that animal initially could have left that place on its own. Capturing a captured animal, whether because it was already trapped by another person, or because it cannot escape due to its weakness or injuries, is not considered a violation of the prohibited labor of trapping.
  It was also concluded that not every animal is subject to the biblically based prohibition of trapping, so that one is not liable for capturing animals that are not customarily trapped or hunted, or for which there is no practical use.
  Also, with regard to trapping performed cooperatively by two individuals, here too, the rule applies that one is not liable for an action performed jointly unless that action could not be performed by an individual acting alone.
  Several matters pertaining to trapping that are not comprehensively discussed in this chapter are clarified in Chapter Fourteen. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XIV
  
  This chapter deals with two subjects that are only minimally related to each other. It begins with a continuation of the discussion of the laws of trapping, which began in the previous chapter. Slaughtering is enumerated in the list of thirty-nine categories of primary labor after trapping. This primary category of slaughtering includes two major subcategories, wounding and killing. In order to advance the discussion and to specify the animals for which the prohibition to take a life applies, it is necessary to determine what is considered a living creature. 
  Clarification of the primary labor of wounding is even more complex. The term wounding as it is used in the Torah denotes shedding blood, whether by causing blood to flow out of the organism or by causing blood contained in the blood vessels to be displaced and accumulate underneath the skin, as in the case of a bruise. This definition necessitates the making of various distinctions pertaining to the laws of wounding on Shabbat. For example, is the skin of all living organisms considered skin in this regard, in which case one who causes any animal an internal wound is liable? Or perhaps there are creatures whose skin is not considered skin for these purposes. The first section of this chapter elucidates this and other questions.
  Most of this chapter deals with the laws of healing on Shabbat, a realm which is only indirectly related to wounding. It has already been explained in earlier chapters that the Sages prohibited medical treatment on Shabbat, except in life-threatening situations. It was determined that the reason for this prohibition is to prevent the preparation of medicinal substances on Shabbat. Such preparation involves the prohibited labors of grinding and crushing, as well as other Torah prohibitions. Due to this concern, various medical treatments, even many that do not involve the ingestion of medicine, were prohibited. Thus, this chapter specifies and defines various healing procedures. Some are prohibited because they are well-known cures. Others remain permitted because performance of these actions does not necessarily indicate that one is engaging in a healing practice, since perfectly healthy people also engage in these activities. The explanation of this rule, as well as an enumeration of the circumstances under which it applies, is the subject of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XIV
  
  In this chapter, it was concluded that one who kills a living creature of any kind is liable for taking a life on Shabbat. However, with regard to creeping animals, it was determined that one is liable for wounding on Shabbat only those eight creeping animals that are enumerated in the Bible with reference to the laws of impurity. One is not liable for wounding other creeping animals because there is no evidence that their skin is considered halakhic skin. Therefore, one who inflicts a wound upon them is liable only when blood actually flows from the body of the creature; internal bleeding is not considered a bruise from a legal perspective. 
  This chapter's discussion of healing on Shabbat provided minutely detailed descriptions of all sorts of medicines, especially those that have medicinal value but are typically eaten or drunk by healthy individuals. The rule was explained as follows: Any substance which is normally ingested for non-medicinal purposes can be consumed by a sick person for curative purposes. However, medical procedures a healthy person would not normally perform are prohibited on Shabbat because it is apparent to all that the procedure is medical. In that case, a sick person may only perform the procedure in an unusual and distinctive manner, not in the manner in which it is customarily practiced as a medicine. Of course, in any life-threatening situation, it is permitted to perform even primary categories of prohibited labor. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XV
  
  This chapter contains two distinct topics. The first topic is the primary labors of tying and untying knots. The Gemara specifies, explains, and identifies these labors. 
  Tying and untying, as is the case with regard to the labors of building and destroying, constitute a pair of labors for which one is liable for one labor only under the same conditions for which he liable for the other, e.g., one is liable for either tying or untying only if the knot is a permanent one.
  To understand these labors, it is first necessary to clarify what constitutes a knot. What are the types of knots that the Torah prohibited one to tie or untie on Shabbat? Several traditions were received by the Sages on this matter. They too require analysis and additional clarification.
  There is a fundamental principle that one is liable for tying or untying only a permanent knot, i.e., a knot designed to endure. This requirement precludes knots made to be immediately undone as well as knots meant to be undone in the near future. The definition of permanence as it pertains to a knot requires further clarification. Does permanence relate to the function of the knot, the method by which the knot was tied, or both? If permanence relates only to the method of tying, it is only necessary to ascertain if a knot was tied in such a manner that it can endure for a long period of time. If so, the person who tied the knot is liable for his action, even if he intended for the knot to be temporary and planned to immediately untie it.
  During this discussion, many sets of circumstances are described, including various types of knots and various uses of materials. Consideration is given to both knots tied in a common, simple manner and knots tied with utensils or parts of vessels, such as the knots of shoes, sandals, and the like. The central theme of this chapter is the qualifications of a knot for the purposes of both Torah law and rabbinic decree.
  The second topic included in this chapter, which appears only incidentally and to which a small portion of the chapter is dedicated, is the prohibition to prepare on Shabbat for the rest of the week. There are activities whose performance involves no Torah prohibition whatsoever, or at the most involves a minor risk of violating a rabbinic prohibition; however, the Sages prohibited them in cases in which their performance on Shabbat constitutes preparation for the weekdays. It is considered irreverent to prepare for the weekdays on the supremely holy day of Shabbat. This broad general principle requires elaboration: Which activities are permitted within this framework, and which preparatory activities remain prohibited? This issue is elucidated in detail in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XV
  
  In the course of discussing the labor category of tying, the opinions and arguments of several tanna'im were elucidated. For halakhic purposes, it was concluded that there are two components necessary for an act to constitute the labor of tying. First, the resulting knot must be one which requires the skill of a craftsman, i.e., a permanent knot, which is produced in a manner which will, in the normal course of events, endure and not easily be undone. For this reason, a necktie is not a type of knot. Second, the knot must be tied with the intention that it endure in its place and not be undone. A knot which is initially tied in order to be untied daily or at short intervals is not included in this category. 
  On the basis of these fundamental principles, it was possible to define which activities constitute the tying prohibited by the Torah. What remains to be determined is the nature of those knots which one is permitted to tie on Shabbat ab initio. This matter is clarified in commentaries and by halakhic authorities.
  The second topic of this chapter is preparation. It was determined that it is prohibited to prepare for a mundane day on a sacred day, such as preparation for a weekday on Shabbat. It is even prohibited to prepare on a day of greater sanctity for a day of lesser sanctity, e.g., preparing on Shabbat for Yom Kippur.
  It was also clarified that preparatory activities necessary for Shabbat can be performed on Shabbat, even if the products of these activities were not actually used on Shabbat. It is prohibited to perform only activities that one explicitly knows at the time are not at all necessary for that Shabbat. It must be understood that the above principle does not pertain to labor, which is in and of itself prohibited on Shabbat. Activities that constitute labor are permitted on Shabbat only in life-threatening situations. The Gemara's discussion of preparation only referenced activities which, in and of themselves, are permitted on Shabbat. These activities were prohibited to give Shabbat its due reverence, because they are mundane activities [uvdin dehol]. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XVI
  
  This chapter mainly deals with a single question: How is one to conduct oneself when a fire breaks out on Shabbat? The halakha maintains that it is prohibited to extinguish a fire on Shabbat, even in a situation of great financial loss. Therefore, the question arises: What is permissible to do in the case of a fire? Under what conditions is it permissible to rescue materials from a fire on Shabbat? 
  The decrees instituted by the Sages with reference to rescuing objects from a fire on Shabbat are the source of many of the questions pertaining to this matter. These decrees are based upon the concern that if one is permitted to evacuate his goods, he may, in his panic, perform the kind of extinguishing that is biblically prohibited, both because of his preoccupation with the act of evacuation and because people become panicked when their property is at stake. Therefore, the Sages permitted the rescue of domestic utensils and even foodstuffs in only limited quantities. Additionally, there is discussion of the numerous details related to permissible methods and stratagems that enable the rescue of more than the very minimum fixed by the law. 
  Another question related to rescuing materials from a fire is the problem of sacred writings and other holy objects. Because of their sanctity, the Sages permitted many procedures for rescuing them that may not be performed for other objects. According to many opinions, the Sages went to great extremes to grant permission in this matter, ruling leniently even when there are risks of violating rabbinic prohibitions, and sometimes even biblical prohibitions, because of their great concern for salvaging a wide variety of sacred materials. 
  The detailed explication of what one is permitted to and prohibited to rescue from a fire on Shabbat, the enumeration of the types of holy objects that are worthy of rescue, and guidelines for how to conduct oneself in the event of a fire are the main topics of this chapter. 
  Incidentally, as is typical of talmudic discourse, there are discussions of other subjects related to the chapter's central theme. 
  
  Summary of Perek XVI
  
  The halakhic principles presented in this chapter are based upon the idea that extinguishing a fire on Shabbat is biblically prohibited. In these circumstances, the fire poses no danger to human life. There are significant differences between the rules described in the Talmud and what is actual halakhic practice nowadays, for two main reasons. The risk to human life has increased, both because of the way houses are built and because of the prevalence of combustible materials in private homes. Also, most halakhic authorities have concluded that extinguishing a fire only involves a rabbinic prohibition.
  At any rate, the conclusions reached in this chapter were as follows: One can rescue from a fire on Shabbat only those materials that are essential for human consumption or use on that Shabbat, that are not detectable by an observer as superfluous materials, and whose rescue constitutes no additional burden.
  For many of the materials mentioned in this chapter, one can employ stratagems to rescue more than what would otherwise be permitted. This is because the core of the prohibition is based only upon rabbinic decree, and the Sages did not institute additional stringencies in these matters.
  Since this chapter discussed the rescue of sacred writings and elucidated many laws concerning under what circumstances rescuing them is permissible, it also elucidated which texts are not included in the category of holy writings .
  In connection with the subject of fire, various other problems arose, e.g., is it permissible to use objects gentiles produced on Shabbat, either while they were extinguishing a fire or through other means. Here too, an underlying principle was established that forms the basis of many laws. Essentially, anything produced through an act that was not performed directly at a Jew's behest or that was originally performed for the sole benefit of the gentile himself is permissible for a Jew to use, even if the act was performed on Shabbat. But it is prohibited for a Jew to use an item a gentile produced on Shabbat on the Jew's behalf, even if he did not explicitly request that the gentile do so. All the more so is this the case if the Jew instructed the gentile to perform labor on his behalf. 
  Requesting that a gentile perform labor on Shabbat constitutes a transgression of a shevut, a rabbinic prohibition.
  
  Introduction to Perek XVII
  
  This chapter is devoted to a thorough analysis of the prohibition against handling items that are muktze, set aside from use on Shabbat. This halakha has already been mentioned several times in tractate Shabbat, but it has not yet been addressed in a systematic and thorough fashion. The prohibition applies to items that one has mentally set aside from using on Shabbat for some reason, meaning that one assumes he will not use them over the course of Shabbat. 
  It is not entirely clear why handling items that have been set aside is prohibited. Some have explained that the decree against handling such items serves as a protective measure to ensure that one will not perform prohibited labors on Shabbat. If one may not handle the items used to perform prohibited labors, one will not perform the prohibited labors themselves. Others have suggested that the prohibition is meant to protect against violation of the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another. By limiting one's ability to handle a large number of items, the Sages sought to decrease the likelihood that one would carry items between domains. 
  Halakhic discussions generally focus on three types of set-aside [muktze] items: Items set aside because of repulsiveness, items set aside because of function, and items set aside because of monetary loss. The first group includes things that are not generally used or handled, either because they are dirty or because they are repulsive for some other reason. The second group includes objects whose primary function is for an activity that constitutes a prohibited labor on Shabbat. The third group includes items that are generally used only for a particular activity that is prohibited on Shabbat, and the owner of these items is careful not to use them for any other purpose, due to a concern that they will be damaged and he will suffer a financial loss. 
  This chapter cites the opinions of the tanna'im and a variety of different views with regard to the categories of items that are set-aside and that therefore are fully or partially forbidden to be handled on Shabbat. It also establishes the halakhic conclusions that are to be drawn based upon these opinions. 
  The laws and principles of the prohibition of set-aside form the primary subject matter of this chapter, but the topic is not exhausted here. Various aspects of this prohibition will be addressed in later chapters. 
  
  Summary of Perek XVII
  
  The halakhot of items that are set aside from use on Shabbat, as explained in this chapter, are unique in that earlier generations at the beginning of the Second Temple era were especially stringent with regard to these laws and forbade handling practically all utensils. Over the course of time, as the Sages saw that the nation as a whole was more meticulous in observing Shabbat, they became progressively more lenient with regard to this prohibition. 
  In the final halakhic conclusions in these matters, the lenient opinions of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei were accepted. In their view, items that are set-aside [muktze] because of monetary loss are entirely forbidden from being handled, while utensils whose function is prohibited on Shabbat may be handled in order to use them for a permitted purpose or if one needs the place on which they are located. Items that are repulsive are not prohibited to be handled. 
  Nonetheless, there are still several aspects of this area of halakha for which no leniencies apply. According to all opinions, anything that does not have the status of a utensil, such as raw materials and money, is set-aside. Additionally, according to most opinions, any item that was set aside at the beginning of Shabbat remains set-aside for the duration of Shabbat. It should also be emphasized that the decision to be lenient with the laws pertaining to items that are set-aside applies specifically to Shabbat. On Festivals, the halakha follows the stringent view with regard to this prohibition. This is based upon the assumption that the sanctity of Shabbat had been internalized by the nation to the point that it did not need further strengthening and safeguarding. Concerning the Festivals, however, since certain prohibited labors are permitted for the sake of food preparation, it was necessary to impose additional decrees and safeguards in order to ensure that the sanctity of the Festivals would not be disregarded. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XVIII
  
  This chapter addresses three different halakhot that are only slightly related to one another. One topic continues the discussion of some of the laws of items that have been set aside from Shabbat use; see Chapter Seventeen for the major principles. The second topic addresses caring for and handling animals on Shabbat. The third topic examines the situation of a woman who has given birth on Shabbat, and caring for her in ways that could constitute prohibited labors. These halakhot do not seem to be related, but they are all included in the category of shevut, prohibitions that are not from the Torah like the categories of prohibited labor, but which were instituted by the Sages on Shabbat and the Festivals in order to prevent the violation of Torah prohibitions or to enhance the sanctity of the day. 
  There are shevut decrees that apply to many different areas, and this chapter addresses only some of them. However, we can derive from these examples the scope of shevut restrictions in many areas, remembering that each one is based upon rabbinic decree. 
  The halakhot discussed in this chapter are further related. Since the Sages themselves instituted these prohibitions as protective measures to prevent violation of Torah law, they could also be lenient in certain cases. This is possible only with regard to rabbinic decrees, but not with regard to prohibitions that stem from Torah law; as the Sages expressed it: They said [it is prohibited] and they said [it is permitted in particular circumstances]. For example, in cases of significant need, such as for the honor of guests or to facilitate Torah study, the Sages permitted several actions that would otherwise have been prohibited due to muktze. Such leniencies also exist with regard to other shevut restrictions, such as caring for animals on Shabbat. Although there are restrictions due to several relevant rabbinic decrees and concerns, since these are not Torah prohibitions, the Sages were lenient when necessary in order to prevent significant monetary loss or to prevent animals from experiencing pain. 
  After addressing the permitted methods of caring for birthing animals on Shabbat, the chapter discusses how to care for a woman who gives birth on Shabbat. Here the Gemara even addresses activities that are prohibited by Torah law as well as those prohibited by rabbinic decree, as both are permitted in order to save a life. The halakha is very lenient in such cases, to the point that it is permissible to perform any prohibited labor in the event of even a small concern for danger to human life.
  
  Summary of Perek XVIII
  
  This chapter continued the discussion of the halakhot of items that have been set aside from Shabbat use. Until this chapter, the Gemara primarily addressed the laws of utensils that have been set aside from Shabbat use, whereas this chapter addressed the quite different laws of raw materials and other items that are not utensils. Since utensils by definition are made to be used, it is necessary to decide explicitly or implicitly not to use them in order to remove them from the category of items designated for use on Shabbat. In contrast, raw materials are not inherently considered ready for use, and one must explicitly designate them for use to ensure that they are not set-aside [muktze]. In this chapter, we saw how the Sages acted with regard to this issue and how they determined which items are permitted or forbidden to be handled. 
  The Gemara also established guidelines with regard to the application of the laws of muktze to the care of animals on Shabbat. When an animal is likely to suffer pain due to a prohibition of rabbinic origin, that prohibition is overridden in order to care for the animal, as cruelty to animals is itself a Torah prohibition. In this area, loss of money to the animal's owner is not a significant factor. 
  Finally, this chapter discussed the permissible methods of attending to the sick on Shabbat. First it addressed the case of a woman after childbirth, and then it proceeded to address the laws of treating people with other ailments. The halakha distinguishes between different levels of illness. Whenever there is a danger to life, no distinction is made between Torah law and rabbinic law; it is permitted to do whatever is necessary to save a person's life. However, the halakha is somewhat more stringent when there is only a concern for possible danger, or when the patient feels that his life is in danger but the expert doctors testify otherwise. 
  It is important to note that the halakha also takes into account the patient's feelings. The Sages were concerned that the patient's anxiety could cause his condition to deteriorate and become life-threatening. They therefore permitted preparing things for a patient in order to calm him, and under certain conditions they even permitted the performance of labors prohibited by Torah law. 
  The Sages agreed in this chapter that a newborn and a woman after childbirth are included in the category of the dangerously ill for the first few days after birth. Any medical attention they need immediately after childbirth is considered to be a medical procedure undertaken in order to save a life, and those caring for them may take all necessary measures without concern for any prohibitions that would otherwise apply. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XIX
  
  The Sages received an oral tradition that the mitzva of circumcision overrides Shabbat when it is performed at its proper time, on the eighth day after birth. Although all the Sages accepted this tradition, they disputed many details of its application. Such details include the handling of borderline cases, the precise definitions of the act of circumcision, and the actions necessary for its performance. 
  Several issues arise with regard to circumcision on Shabbat. The first question pertains to situations in which it is not entirely clear whether there is a mitzva to circumcise the child or whether the proper time for circumcision has arrived. Some Sages are of the opinion that circumcision overrides Shabbat only if there is absolutely no doubt as to its obligation. Others hold that in some circumstances an uncertain obligation to circumcise does override Shabbat, and these Sages debate which conditions are required.
  Another issue is whether the preparations for circumcision override Shabbat. The medical attention the baby will require immediately after the circumcision does override Shabbat, as his life could be endangered if he does not receive it. The Sages consider whether actions to prepare for the circumcision, such as bringing the knife and preparing it for use, also override Shabbat, and if so, which preparations are considered essential in this regard. 
  A more fundamental question that arises is whether circumcision is the only mitzva that overrides Shabbat prohibitions or whether all mitzvot override Shabbat if the optimal time for their performance occurs on Shabbat. If there are distinctions between different mitzvot, what are the reasons for these distinctions? 
  Another essential issue pertains to how broadly circumcision overrides Shabbat. Does circumcision override Shabbat at every stage of the operation no matter how it is performed, and is anyone involved in circumcision exempt from Shabbat prohibitions? Or perhaps circumcision overrides Shabbat only when one completes the mitzva properly and in its entirety? To address these questions it becomes necessary to clarify the scope of the mitzva and to identify its obligatory components. 
  
  Summary of Perek XIX
  
  This chapter thoroughly examined all topics related to circumcision on Shabbat or a festival. Most of the remaining laws of circumcision are discussed in tractate Yevamot.
  The Sages established that only the mitzvot of circumcision and the concomitant obligatory sacrifices override Shabbat. They also decided that only the mitzva of circumcision itself overrides Shabbat, whereas preparations and acts that facilitate its performance do not, even if this means that the circumcision will have to be delayed to another day. Similarly, they determined that circumcision must be delayed until after Shabbat in any case of doubt, such as uncertainty as to the baby's gender or as to whether the baby was born during the day or at night. A different kind of uncertainty arises in the unusual case of one who is born circumcised; the Sages agreed that drawing a drop of blood is part of the mitzva of circumcision and it therefore overrides Shabbat. 
  In contrast to the limitations regarding the circumstances in which circumcision overrides Shabbat, we also saw in this chapter how broadly circumcision overrides Shabbat once it is permitted. First, the mohel may perform the mitzva with all its components, and he is not limited to those components which are absolutely essential for fulfilling the mitzva by Torah law. Furthermore, even if a person intended to fulfill the mitzva of circumcision on Shabbat, and he unwittingly performed a prohibited labor without ultimately fulfilling the mitzva, he is not treated as others who unwittingly transgress. He is considered a person who unwittingly transgressed due to preoccupation with a mitzva, and he is therefore exempt from the punishments which generally apply to others who unwittingly transgress on Shabbat. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XX
  
  This chapter addresses a variety of issues related to rabbinical prohibitions on food preparation on Shabbat: Is it permitted to suspend a wine strainer on Shabbat, what food may one strain and how may he do it, and other questions related to food preparation for humans as well as the handling of hay and other types of animal feed. The chapter clarifies the various details of the prohibited labors that may be relevant to these activities. However, this connection is merely external and associative and explains only the reason why these different topics have been combined in one chapter. On the other hand, this chapter, as those that precede and follow it, addresses a range of fundamental halakhic problems.
  One of these problems addressed here is a continuation of the laws of building on Shabbat. Chapter Twelve was devoted to the laws of building a permanent structure, which is prohibited by Torah law. This chapter, on the other hand, discusses additional aspects of the labor of building, based upon an expanded definition of the labor that includes erecting a tent. This broadened definition includes the construction of any building or even the combination of different parts into any whole which could in any way be considered a structure. The construction of a tent can also mean combining parts of utensils or even attaching different fabrics together.
  Another topic addressed in this chapter is food preparation. The Torah forbade performing any of the prohibited labors on Shabbat even for the purpose of food preparation. This chapter examines at length various methods of food preparation to determine if they are permitted or if they constitute a violation of Torah law or rabbinic law, and establishes guidelines and boundaries for making these determinations. 
  
  Summary of Perek XX
  
  This chapter did not come to final halakhic conclusions about the topics it addressed, each of which will be discussed further in the tractate. The discussion regarding building on Shabbat clarified that there is a distinction between building a permanent structure, which constitutes the prohibited labor of building, and building a temporary structure, which is not prohibited by Torah law. However, the Sages issued several decrees regarding the construction of temporary structures and created many distinctions regarding what is permitted or prohibited in the construction of these structures. There are no absolute guidelines, and each case must be analyzed separately. 
  The discussion regarding food preparation on Shabbat also did not arrive at firm conclusions with regard to the full range of relevant topics. The general principle of food preparation on Shabbat is that an item that is already edible may be added to and improved for human consumption, provided one does not violate any full-fledged prohibited labor. Although the chapter also discussed guidelines for preparing animal feed, this topic will be fully explained only in Chapter Twenty-four. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XXI
  
  This chapter, too, deals with the laws of set-aside [muktze], items that are set aside and may not be handled on Shabbat, though from a fresh perspective. Here, too, the discussion is not about different items that are set aside, but about particular categories of items that all agree may not be moved on Shabbat because they are not utensils and are not fit to be handled. It was clear to the Sages that such items may not be handled directly; the discussion in this chapter primarily addresses the question of whether it is permitted to move these types of set-aside items, and set-aside items generally, through another object or for the sake of something else. In order to do this, it is necessary to clarify somewhat the scope of the concept of a base for a forbidden article. This refers to a utensil upon which a set-aside item rests; the utensil which serves as the base may not be handled, just as though it itself were set-aside. It is necessary to explain the circumstances in which it is permitted to remove the set-aside object in order to use the items that lie underneath or which are connected to it in some other way. The details of this halakha form the content of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XXI
  
  Most of the Sages accepted the halakha that one is forbidden on Shabbat to handle a base of a forbidden article. However, this chapter clarified that the rule applies only to moving the item in a normal fashion; when necessary, there is room for leniency with regard to moving such items in an unusual or indirect fashion. Similarly, when there is a need to move something connected to a set-aside item, such as a child who is holding a set-aside item, or a barrel upon which a set-aside item is resting, the Sages allowed it and did not apply the prohibition of a base for a forbidden article. It was also explained in this chapter that the halakha is generally not highly stringent with regard to the laws of set-aside on Shabbat, and it is permitted to move something in order to protect the honor of Shabbat or to remove an item that people find repulsive. This is especially true according to the view of Rabbi Shimon, which was accepted as normative.
  
  Introduction to Perek XXII
  
  This chapter also deals with different types of prohibitions subsumed under the category of shevut. Here, too, there is no single theme that unites all the topics addressed, although most of them deal with food preparation on Shabbat. Arranging the chapter's contents in a different order than is presented in the Mishna would allow us to identify several general questions that serve as the basis for the details that are discussed in this chapter. 
  One of these issues relates to the laws of squeezing on Shabbat. Squeezing is not listed as a primary category of prohibited labor. Its prohibition is not based on the act of squeezing alone; indeed, squeezing can be a subcategory of at least two primary categories of labor, depending on the circumstances: It can be a subcategory of the labor of threshing, which is defined abstractly as removing the desired contents from within an unwanted wrapping or shell, and it can be a subcategory of the labor of whitening, when the squeezing is performed in the process of washing. 
  However, the relationship between squeezing and threshing is not completely clear and uniform. For example, in the practical discussions regarding milking animals on Shabbat, the question arises as to the extent to which one should understand milking as a form or subcategory of squeezing or threshing. This leads to the question of whether milking should be viewed as a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic decree. Similarly, it is necessary to delineate the fine differences between types of squeezing that can be viewed as a subcategory of threshing and other types of squeezing that are externally similar to the first type but differ with regard to the intent of the person squeezing or the purpose of the act itself. 
  Also discussed in this chapter is breaking a barrel in order to remove food from inside it. The chapter likewise deals with various kinds of food preparation. These forms of food preparation all involve actions that are similar to squeezing and require one to identify the fine line separating a prohibited labor from actions that are externally similar to it but are different because of the intent of the person performing the action. Examples of this include heating up, soaking, and cooling foods on Shabbat: Are these acts forbidden because of their similarity to cooking, or are they perhaps totally permitted and not prohibited even by rabbinic decree? This chapter also comes to conclusions regarding some issues that the Gemara began to address in previous chapters but had not yet resolved. 
  
  Summary of Perek XXII
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara attempted to clarify the rules of squeezing on Shabbat. Its main conclusions were as follows: It is prohibited to squeeze an item if one's main intent in doing so is to make use of the liquid that emerges. At times this may constitute a Torah prohibition, while at other times it constitutes a rabbinic one. On the other hand, if one's intent is to improve the food item by squeezing liquid from it, even though the action is the same as in the case outlined previously, the act is not defined as a prohibited labor and is permitted according to Torah law. Nonetheless, in certain cases the Sages prohibited squeezing as a precautionary measure in order to ensure that one not perform a prohibited labor. 
  In the continuation of the chapter, the Gemara came to the following conclusions regarding food preparation: If a food can be eaten in its current state, it is permitted to enhance its taste. Thus, one may add hot water to improve a food unless it is otherwise inedible or the hot water changes the food into a completely different item. 
  The Gemara arrived at similar conclusions regarding breaking a barrel in order to eat the food that is inside: It all depends upon the extent to which the action improves the barrel. If the act improves the barrel, then breaking it is prohibited, whereas if it causes significant damage to the barrel and only slight improvement, it is permitted even ab initio. Additionally, if one's primary intent is to remove the food rather than to improve the receptacle, breaking the barrel is permitted. 
  The Gemara also arrived at some lenient conclusions regarding squeezing as a function of the labor of laundering, based on the view that this constitutes an unintentional act and a labor not necessary for its own sake, and that the Rabbis did not prohibit it.
  
  Introduction to Perek XXIII
  
  The prohibition of commercial activity on Shabbat is one of the earliest known decrees enacted by the Sages to protect Torah law. This decree is generally explained as a protective measure to prevent writing on Shabbat, as commercial activity generally requires writing in order to record and approve legally binding transactions. Although Torah law does not prohibit commercial activity itself on Shabbat, commercial transactions often entail numerous activities that are prohibited on Shabbat, such as carrying objects from one domain to another, fixing utensils or completing their production, and handling objects that may not be handled on Shabbat. 
  As the decree prohibiting commercial activity was already widely known and accepted in talmudic times, this chapter examines the scope of the prohibition and seeks to determine precisely which activities fall under the decree. In addition to prohibiting direct and explicitly formulated business transactions, the decree also encompasses related activities, such as hiring workers and granting or receiving a loan. However, since the source of this prohibition is rabbinic, there are instances where there is room for leniency, such as when the commercial activity is for the sake of a mitzva or when there is no concern for possible violation of Shabbat. 
  Respect for the dead is another factor that allows for the relaxation of some of the stringencies of Shabbat, as respect for the dead honors both the living and the deceased. However, the details of what exactly may be done for this purpose need to be spelled out, especially because a corpse is a severe form of a set-aside entity that may not be moved directly. This chapter also considers which activities may not be done even out of respect for the dead.
  
  Summary of Perek XXIII
  
  The discussion in this chapter of the halakhot relating to business activity on Shabbat can be summarized as follows: Not only is it forbidden to engage actively in any business activity or transaction on Shabbat, it is prohibited even to speak about such activities, even if they are for the purpose of Shabbat itself. Nonetheless, when necessary for the purpose of Shabbat, the Sages did permit conducting certain business activities in a roundabout fashion, by hinting or by avoiding common business expressions. This leniency stems from the fact that business activity is not inherently prohibited on Shabbat, but rather is forbidden by rabbinic decree. We do not add to rabbinic decrees with additional layers of safeguards meant to distance people from violation. Therefore, in these situations the Sages were satisfied with the requirement that people use particular formulations that would remind them of the sanctity of Shabbat and that would thereby ensure they not violate actual prohibited labors. 
  This decree against the discussion of monetary matters on Shabbat applies to mundane causes and personal needs. However, it is permissible and even fitting to discuss mitzva causes on Shabbat, even when they include preparation for the performance of prohibited labors after Shabbat; this does not demonstrate disregard for the honor of Shabbat. 
  Attending to the needs of the deceased is a mitzva and an important way of upholding human dignity. Consequently, the Sages permitted certain activities in order to ensure that the deceased not suffer unnecessary degradation when located in an undignified place, as it is forbidden to move a corpse on Shabbat. Yet, they did not allow burying or even moving a corpse on Shabbat. Although halakha is greatly concerned for of the dignity of the deceased, the wellbeing of the living is even more important, as the living are still obligated to fulfill mitzvot. Even the preservation of the dignity of the deceased does not override outright Shabbat prohibitions. 
  
  Introduction to Perek XXIV
  
  The halakhot discussed in this chapter relate primarily to what may and may not be done for animals on Shabbat. Some of these issues have already been addressed in earlier chapters, and Chapter Five was devoted to clarifying the laws of transporting items that are on an animal from one domain to another on Shabbat. This chapter addresses a more limited and specific issue, namely, the details of the prohibition of driving a laden animal on Shabbat. For example, what is the source of the prohibition? The Gemara considers whether the Torah expressly forbids driving a laden animal, whether the prohibition stems from a rabbinic decree not to make use of animals, or whether it is derived from the positive command to allow animals to rest. Similarly, the chapter examines the severity and scope of this prohibition. 
  This chapter also explores issues related to the preparation of food for animals on Shabbat. There are several considerations in this regard: One may not perform a labor prohibited by Torah law for the purposes of an animal, just as one may not do so for human beings. However, since it is necessary to care for one's animals, the Gemara clarifies which activities may be performed in order to provide food for them. The chapter seeks to establish the fundamental basis for determining the halakha in these cases. It also addresses whether the prohibition of set-aside objects is suspended for the purpose of attending to the needs of animals. 
  
  Summary of Perek XXIV
  
  Although driving a laden animal on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law, the Sages concluded that this activity is not one of the thirty-nine prohibited labors for which one is liable to be punished with stoning. Rather, it is an independent prohibition with its own source, and it is not as severe as the thirty-nine prohibited labors. Therefore, the Sages permitted making use of animals in cases of significant need, such as in order to avoid a financial loss, provided one does so differently than usual. With regard to the parameters concerning food preparation for animals on Shabbat, it appears that anything which is absolutely necessary for the animal may be done on Shabbat as long as it does not involve a full-fledged prohibited labor. This includes handling set-aside items and preparing food. However, even rabbinic prohibitions may not be violated for anything non-essential or in order to provide an animal a higher level of comfort.
  
  Eruvin
  
  Introduction to Eruvin
  
  See that God has given you the Shabbat, therefore He has given you on the sixth day the bread of two days; remain every man in his place, let no man go out of his place on the seventh day. (Exodus 16:29)
  If you turn away your foot because of the Shabbat, from pursuing your business on My holy day; and call the Shabbat a delight, and the holy of God honorable; and shall honor it by not doing your usual ways, nor pursuing your business, nor speaking of it; then you shall delight yourself in God, and I will make you ride upon the high places of the earth, and I will feed you with the heritage of Jacob your father; for the mouth of God has spoken it. (Isaiah 58:13–14)
  Neither carry forth a burden out of your houses on the Shabbat day, nor do any work; but make the Shabbat day holy, as I commanded your fathers. (Jeremiah 17:22)
  Tractate Eiruvin, in its entirety, is an elaboration and conclusion of the subject matter discussed in tractate Shabbat, as it focuses on one aspect of the halakhot of Shabbat that was not comprehensively elucidated. Tractate Shabbat opened with a discussion of the prohibited labor of carrying out on Shabbat. Tractate Eiruvin analyzes the details of the rabbinic laws that apply to this act. This prohibited labor is unique in that it is not an inherently creative act; rather, it is merely the act of transferring an object from one domain to another. 
  In essence, the labor of carrying out highlights the significance of Shabbat as a day of rest, not only a day during which specific activities are prohibited, but also a day on which a premium is placed on quiet, rest, and a sense of relaxation. Shabbat demands that one take a break from the everyday hustle and bustle of moving and carrying from the public to the private domain and vice versa. Similarly, the public thoroughfare calms down from its weekday business and trade. This is accomplished by the creation of domains that are unique to Shabbat. That is, they do not correspond to the domains in force with regard to the rules of commerce, nor those of ritual purity. Transference between different domains is forbidden, as is carrying in the public domain.
  The laws of Shabbat recognize four basic domains:
  A private domain 
  A public domain 
  A karmelit, which is an intermediate domain, neither public nor private 
  An exempt domain, which is not really a domain at all
  In effect, there are only three domains on Shabbat: the private and the public, both of which are domains by Torah law, and the karmelit, which is a domain by rabbinic law. All other areas fall into the category of exempt domain. 
  The private domain is an area of four handbreadths by four handbreadths; a handbreadth is the distance from the tip of the thumb to the tip of the little finger, or slightly more. A private domain is separated from the area around it by walls that are at least ten handbreadths high. In terms of the halakhot of Shabbat, an area is a private domain even if it is open to the public and available for use.
  The public domain is a thoroughfare at least sixteen cubits wide; a cubit is the distance from the elbow to the end of the index finger. According to some opinions, for an area to be defined as a public domain it must also be frequented by more than 600,000 people daily. The halakhot of the public domain apply only up to a height of ten handbreadths.
  According to Torah law, these are the two primary domains. The Sages added a third, the karmelit, whose legal status by rabbinic law is that of a public domain. The karmelit is at least four handbreadths by four handbreadths and not surrounded by walls. Examples of this domain are fields, lakes, etc. 
  An exempt domain is an area of less than four handbreadths by four handbreadths. In addition, the airspace above ten handbreadths in a public domain or a karmelit is an exempt domain, where the halakhot of carrying do not apply.
  For many years, these domains constituted the only restrictions with regard to carrying out and movement on Shabbat. After the Jewish people settled and began to develop their land, the rabbinic leadership grew concerned that in the course of mundane living in towns and villages, Shabbat was not accorded its due. In particular, the distinctions between the domains of Shabbat were obfuscated; their theoretical parameters did not correspond to the actual utilization of those areas, and the domains and their halakhot were interchanged. After all, a private domain full of people and activity could appear, at least superficially, indistinguishable from a public domain. Moreover, people were able to engage in most of their typical weekday activities without actually violating any of the Torah prohibitions. Consequently, the idea of Shabbat as a day of rest was not realized.
  Already in the First Temple era, the rabbinic Sages began to issue decrees intended to raise the general level of consciousness concerning Shabbat observance. These decrees fall into the category of shevut, prohibitions by rabbinic law designed to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. Such decrees severely limited the permitted uses of the private domains and placed renewed emphasis on the plain meaning of the passage in Exodus that is the source for all of the Shabbat domains: “Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day.” The Sages' decrees limited the designation of private domains to those places that actually belong to an individual and his family. Private domains utilized by more than one individual, e.g., a courtyard shared by several households, as well as the alleyways and paths into which courtyards open, were rendered public domains by rabbinic law. 
  The decrees issued by the Sages are the starting point for tractate Eiruvin. The tractate attempts to arrive at practical solutions for the problems created by these restrictions. The objective is not to abrogate the decrees, but rather to discover alternative methods to underscore the differences between the public and private domains. Similarly, the tractate attempts to discover how one could go beyond the Shabbat limits while maintaining the framework that requires limiting travel on Shabbat. The myriad ordinances that constitute the bulk of tractate Eiruvin work within the framework of the established principles of the halakhot of Shabbat. Within the halakhic framework, there is extensive use of a series of abstract concepts, e.g., domain, limit, partition, and space. Although these principles are often the basis for stringencies and restrictions, they can also serve as the basis for far-reaching leniencies. The two primary concepts analyzed in the framework of tractate Eiruvin are the essence of a partition and the essence of a residence.
  The partition is a fundamental component of domains, alleyways, courtyards, houses, and more. Clearly a solid wall with no openings is a partition; however, in most cases the demarcation is less clear-cut. At times, the wall is not sturdy enough to serve as a partition. At times, there are windows, doorways, and other spaces in the wall. At times, the wall does not cover the entire opening. It was therefore necessary to create broader criteria that apply to all forms of partitions, despite their quantitative and qualitative differences: Concepts like lavud, which determines that objects less than three handbreadths apart are considered joined; gode, through which an incomplete partition can be extended upward or downward; havot, through which a cross beam is lowered; and others that broaden the parameters of the concept of partition to include incomplete partitions, e.g., cross beam, side post, form of a doorway, and upright boards. 
  In a similar vein, it must be established what is considered one's fixed residence. Here too, there are clear-cut examples with regard to which there is no uncertainty. One who eats and sleeps and remains in a house that is his alone, certainly has a residence that is exclusively his. However, since reality is a bit more complex, as in practice most people do not live alone and do not spend all their lives in one place. Therefore, it was necessary to create a broader abstract definition of the concept of fixed residence and establish when it is that several people have the legal status of one person, where family relations and dependence unify them, and to what degree one must be tied to or be present at a certain place in order to be considered a resident. Once these definitions are determined, the simplistic distinction between resident and guest is no longer necessarily significant. The concept of one's residence can, on the one hand, be restricted to the individual alone, while on the other hand it can be expanded to include others. Based on the expansive interpretation of the concept of residence, the possibility of establishing the joining of courtyards, the merging of alleyways, and the joining of Shabbat boundaries becomes feasible.
  While some of these solutions might appear to be a disingenuous attempt to circumvent the fundamental halakha, in fact, life in accordance with halakhic principles requires their formulation and definition in an abstract and expansive manner. Especially in the case of eiruv, where the original prohibitions are rabbinic in nature, there is room for far-reaching leniency in implementing these halakhic principles.
  Tractate Eiruvin is divided into ten chapters:
  Chapter One of Eiruvin deals with an alleyway that is open to the public domain on one side, and into which several courtyards open. In order for all residents of the houses in those courtyards to carry in the alleyway, there are two requirements:
  Every household must contribute to a jointly owned food item. All the residents of the courtyard assume the legal status of one extended household. This is in fact the eiruv for which this tractate is named. 
  A physical change must be made in the alleyway to symbolically demarcate it from the public domain. This may be accomplished with the addition of a side post positioned near the entrance or a cross beam over the entranceway, which will facilitate awareness that one is leaving a private domain and entering a public domain. 
  Chapter Two discusses the special ordinances of upright boards and the halakhot of those parts of the private domain that are not used as residences.
  Chapter Three discusses the food items which may be used in establishing an eiruv. The chapter continues with a discussion of the halakhot of the joining of Shabbat boundaries and the uncertainties that arise with regard to the effectiveness of joining boundaries in different cases.
  Chapter Four continues the discussion of the joining of Shabbat boundaries. It treats the establishment of limits for one who goes beyond his designated limit, or for one who has no residence and seeks to acquire one for the purposes of joining the boundaries.
  Chapter Five deals with the methods used to measure the Shabbat limits for the city's residents, what are the borders of the city for that purpose, and how the two thousand cubits of the joining of Shabbat boundaries are measured.
  Chapter Six, in which the Gemara returns to the original discussion with regard to the halakhot of the joining of courtyards, asks: How and when can residents of a courtyard become as one, enabling them to move objects in their courtyard, and in what cases are they unable to do so?
  Chapter Seven continues the discussion of the joining of courtyards from a different perspective: Under what circumstances can two adjacent courtyards be considered as one, and when do the partitions between them render them two separate courtyards? Another topic addressed in this chapter is: How does one conduct oneself in practice when merging alleyways?
  Chapter Eight continues addressing this topic. In addition, it discusses the subject of an eiruv established for inhabitants of two residences located on different floors of a single structure. In what manner can these be transformed into a single courtyard in every sense? In addition, the halakhot of the joining of courtyards when there is a pool of water in the courtyard and the special provisions instituted in that case are discussed.
  Chapter Nine deals with clarification of the relationship between the various domains instituted by rabbinic ordinance with regard to Shabbat. It addresses houses, roofs, courtyards, and enclosures, and adjacent courtyards surrounded by fences and those not surrounded by fences. How and when is it permitted to move objects between them and beyond their borders?
  Chapter Ten begins with a discussion of the halakhot of eiruv and the special cases where the Sages were lenient. The bulk of the chapter, however, deals with several halakhot whose sole connection to tractate Eiruvin lies in the fact that they fall into the category of shevut, decrees and preventive measures issued by the Sages to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. The discussion centers on what is permitted and what is prohibited on Shabbat in those areas where the Sages issued decrees and instituted ordinances. In addition, the degree to which those rabbinic laws are in effect inside and outside the Holy Temple is discussed. 
  The halakhot in this tractate are not merely theoretical. Hundreds of eiruvin have been established in cities and towns throughout the United States and around the world based on real-world application of the principles found in this tractate. 
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  This chapter deals primarily with the modifications undertaken in order to render alleyways fit for one to carry within them on Shabbat. More specifically, it discusses the halakhot governing alleyways that open into the public domain on one side and are closed on the other three sides by virtue of the partitions of the courtyards and houses located there. Consequently, the public cannot pass through this closed alleyway. An open alleyway, on the other hand, is a small and narrow passageway that is so seldom used that it cannot be considered a public domain, yet, being that it is open on opposite ends, it serves as a passageway from one public domain to another.
  In order to establish an eiruv in an alleyway enabling the residents of the alleyway to carry objects there on Shabbat, two actions must be taken: First, every household must contribute to a jointly owned food item. All the residents of the courtyard then assume the legal status of one extended household and it is permitted for them to carry there on Shabbat. This action, the merging of alleyways, is elucidated in later chapters of this tractate. The second action involves modification of the alleyway itself. The purpose of this modification is to clearly demarcate the alleyway as distinct from the public domain. Accordingly, a symbolic fourth partition is placed at the point where the alleyway and the public domain intersect. There are three types of symbolic partitions; they are a cross beam, a side post, and the form of a doorway. A crossbeam is placed over the entrance to the alleyway. A side post is placed adjacent to the wall on the side of the entrance to the alleyway. The form of a doorway consisting of two doorposts and a lintel is considered an effective symbolic partition even in open-ended alleyways. These partitions accentuate the fact that the alleyway is closed to the public.
  These methods were universally accepted by the Sages. However, the details of these halakhot require elaboration. The focus of this chapter is, then, to elucidate in detail the halakhot of side posts, cross beams, and forms of doorways, how they are created, their dimensions, and the extent of their legal effect. These clarifications are tied to a more fundamental analysis of the essence of all these partitions: Are they merely symbolic partitions serving as conspicuous markers, or are they actual partitions that meet the minimal requirements of the halakha? This leads to another question: What is the legal status of the alleyway in terms of halakha in general, and in terms of the halakhot of Shabbat in particular? Clarification of these issues from several perspectives constitutes the primary focus this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  Most of the halakhot related to rendering an alleyway fit for one to carry within it on Shabbat were summarized in this chapter. It is apparent that the accepted halakhic opinion is that an area surrounded by partitions on three of its four sides is a private domain, and therefore an alleyway that is not open-ended is in fact a private domain. However, the Sages instituted a rabbinic ordinance to prevent violation of the halakhot of Shabbat, mandating creation of a divider at the point where the alleyway and the public domain intersect, in order to demarcate between them and prevent one from unintentionally carrying objects out from the alleyway into the public domain. 
  This can be accomplished by means of a cross beam, which, based on the halakhic determination in this chapter, serves merely as a conspicuous marker. A cross beam renders the alleyway fit for one to carry within it only when placed no higher than twenty cubits and no lower than ten handbreadths. Alternatively, this can be accomplished by means of a side post, whose legal status is that of a fourth partition. The result is that an alleyway with a side post is considered closed on four sides. In practice, it was determined that the side post must be attached to the wall of the alleyway and adjacent to the opening of the alleyway ab initio. It must be ten handbreadths high and can be of any width, and it must be clear that it is indeed serving as a side post. The Sages deliberated over the question: What form must a side post take in order to make it clear that it is serving that purpose? 
  An even more efficacious method of rendering the fourth side of the alleyway closed from a halakhic perspective is the creation of the form of a doorway. The form of a doorway is effective even in cases where cross beams and side posts are ineffective due to the fact that the openings are higher or wider than the dimensions dictated by halakha. The form of a doorway serves as an actual partition in every sense, and effectively renders even open alleyways permitted for one to carry within them. Although most Sages did not accept the opinion that two parallel partitions alone are sufficient to create a private domain, an open-ended alleyway is not considered a full-fledged public domain either. It is therefore sufficient to close the side where an open-ended alleyway and the public domain intersect with the form of a doorway. Indeed, it was mentioned incidentally in this chapter that it is possible to transform the public domain into a private domain by erecting doors on both open sides and partially close them. 
  This chapter also included a discussion with regard to the halakhot of establishing an eiruv for those in transit in a caravan. Here, the Sages allowed them to erect partitions that would not be considered actual partitions in other circumstances. Similarly, the Sages said that a military encampment at a time of war is exempt from all the halakhot of eiruv, as these halakhot were instituted only for those living at home in peace.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  This chapter deals primarily with two somewhat interrelated topics: The laws of upright boards surrounding a well and the matter of an enclosure [karpef ] that is for storage and not for residence.
  Continuing the discussion of the special leniencies cited in the first chapter with regard to establishing an eiruv for those in transit in a caravan, this chapter discusses the halakhic ruling with regard to the establishment of upright boards around a well. This involves a well that is ten cubits deep, which is a private domain that is located in the public domain. The well is surrounded with a virtual partition comprised of two boards forming a right angle at each corner of the well, with additional individual boards situated between the corners if a larger partition is necessary. The Sages declared that a partition of this sort renders the area surrounding the well a private domain, enabling one to draw water from the well on Shabbat and to give his animals water to drink. 
  In the course of the discussion of the halakhic validity of upright boards surrounding a well and their utilization, a related problem arises: Under what circumstances and to what extent is it permitted to move objects in areas that are not the residence of an individual, although they are surrounded by a partition that would accord them the legal status of objects in a private domain? The dilemma is: Are enclosures or yards considered private domains in every sense? Or, although it is prohibited to carry objects between them and the public domain, perhaps since those areas were not designated as residences, they are not full-fledged private domains to the extent that it is permitted to carry there? Although, by Torah law, partitions create a private domain, the Sages prohibited carrying within private domains that are similar to public domains. Therefore, here too the question arises: At which point do these enclosures cease to be full-fledged private domains and assume the legal status of an intermediate domain [karmelit], in which carrying is prohibited by rabbinic law? Clarification of the details and parameters of these fundamental issues constitute the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  In the course of the deliberation in the Mishna and Gemara in this chapter with regard to upright boards surrounding a well, one got a sense of the complexity of this leniency. On the one hand, there was a tendency to restrict the application of the halakhot of these upright boards. On the other hand, there was an effort to expand the scope of their validity and applicability. In practice, the leniency that allows placing upright boards around wells is in effect only in the specific circumstance of wells containing spring water. Similarly, the time and place where this leniency is in effect is limited to wells containing spring water located on roads used by pilgrims on their ascent to Jerusalem for the three Festivals. At the same time, the Sages determined that all of the halakhot that apply to partitions, including all fundamental leniencies, may be applied to upright boards surrounding a well. Indeed, any partition suitable for use in any other circumstances may be used to surround a well. 
  The other topic discussed in this chapter involves enclosures, gardens, or yards. From the perspective of their partitions, their status should be that of a private domain. However, they are not enclosed for residential purposes. The deliberations here, for all intents and purposes, revolved around a single fundamental principle: A comparison between an ordinary courtyard and the courtyard of the Tabernacle. Just as the construction of and service in the Tabernacle serve as a paradigm for many of the halakhot of Shabbat, the courtyard of the Tabernacle serves as the prototype from which the measures of all courtyards in the halakhot of Shabbat are ascertained. Through their deliberations, the Sages determined which enclosures or yards are deemed similar to the courtyard of the Tabernacle, in which it is permitted to carry as in a full-fledged private domain, and which are those that exceed two beit se'a, which was the area of the Tabernacle, and thus assume a distinct legal status. Although they are considered private domains by Torah law, the Sages prohibited carrying within them just as they prohibited carrying in courtyards and alleyways without an eiruv.
  This chapter also addressed additional topics. One was the concept of renunciation of rights, which can be effected by a resident of a courtyard who failed to contribute his part to the food designated for the joining of the courtyards before Shabbat. The manner in which renunciation of rights is accomplished, as well as its effect, were discussed in this chapter.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  Two topics are discussed in this chapter. One is placement of the eiruv, food for one meal, which is an inseparable component of the establishment of any eiruv, whether joining of courtyards, merging of alleyways, or joining of Shabbat boundaries. The necessity of contributing food to the eiruv is due to the fact that the place where one's food is located is considered his residence. Consequently, inclusion of several people in a common meal creates a form of common ownership of the residence, the precise nature of which is discussed in the Gemara. Placement of one's food in a specific location is, in a sense, tantamount to moving his residence to that location. The Gemara discusses several issues, among them, the types of food that may constitute a meal for the purpose of eiruv. Are there foods that are not suited for an eiruv? In addition, must all those who placed the eiruv have access to the food in order for the eiruv to be effective?
  Since the issue of the food suitable for placement in an eiruv applies both to halakhot of joining of the courtyards and joining of Shabbat boundaries, the Gemara in Chapter Three proceeds to discuss the latter subject: The halakhot of joining Shabbat boundaries. The halakha – some say by Torah law while others say by rabbinic law – is that one may not travel more than two thousand cubits outside his place on Shabbat. However, in certain cases the Sages permitted establishing a joining of Shabbat boundaries that allows one to travel a longer distance. This is accomplished by placing food sufficient for two meals in a specific location that is not his place of residence; that location, for all intents and purposes, becomes his residence, and he may travel two thousand cubits from that location. 
  There are many details involved in this universally accepted halakha, and in this chapter the Gemara elucidates how and when one places the food for the eiruv, as well as in what cases the eiruv is in effect and when it is invalidated due either to an inappropriate location or a problem with the food item itself. Similarly, the Gemara discusses whether the placement of the eiruv is an irreversible and unequivocal decision to reside at that location, or whether it is possible to place the eiruv conditionally and to decide in the course of Shabbat when and in which direction the eiruv takes effect. These questions with regard to the halakhot of a joining of Shabbat boundaries are elucidated in this chapter and in those that follow.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  In this chapter, several of the halakhot of eiruv were discussed, primarily the halakhot of the joining of Shabbat boundaries. The issues raised were divided into distinct units that are related as far as preparation of the eiruv is concerned, not necessarily in terms of their intrinsic principles. With regard to the question of what may be used to establish an eiruv, the conclusion was that any item considered food in an amount sufficient for two meals, or alternatively any ingredient used in the consumption of two meals, e.g., spices, is suitable. This food must be suitable for human consumption, but there is no stipulation demanding that the one who placed the eiruv must actually be able to eat it. Even if for some reason he cannot, the eiruv is valid. However, neither water nor salt may be used for the eiruv since these are not considered food.
  A second problem discussed with regard to the joining of Shabbat boundaries was: Who may establish the eiruv? The conclusion was that the one placing the eiruv must be of sound mind and acknowledge the halakhot of eiruvin. If he is not of sound mind, then he can only serve as an instrument for transferring the eiruv; however, he cannot serve as an emissary in placing the eiruv.
  With regard to the joining of boundaries, it was stated that the person placing the eiruv must do so in a location where he has access to it, enabling him to take the food the moment the eiruv takes effect, during twilight on Shabbat eve. Therefore, one may not place the eiruv in a place from where it would be prohibited to take it on Shabbat. For example, if one places the food outside the domain where he establishes residence on Shabbat, or if he were to place it in a location that it is prohibited for him to enter, the eiruv would be invalidated. 
  Uncertainties arose due to the various restrictions that apply to the placement of the eiruv. Is the eiruv valid in a case where it is unclear whether the eiruv remained in place or was moved? Is it valid if it is not known whether the eiruv was eaten, destroyed, or became ritually impure, rendering it no longer fit for human consumption prior to the time when the eiruv took effect? In general, the resolution of those dilemmas was based on the ruling by the Sages: An eiruv whose validity is uncertain is nevertheless valid, since in principle the halakhot of eiruv are by rabbinic law.
  The principle that one rules leniently in cases of eiruv since the halakhot are by rabbinic law resolved a different problem, which is the question of a conditional eiruv. An example is the case of an individual who seeks to establish residence not in one specific location, but rather places an eiruv in each of two different locations, stipulating that only later, on Shabbat, will he decide on which of the two he will rely. The dilemma that arises is whether or not one can rely on an indefinite eiruv. The halakhic conclusion was that even according to those who hold that there is no retroactive designation, i.e., the direction that one ultimately chooses was retroactively the direction that he originally intended, the eiruv is nevertheless valid. Since the halakha is by rabbinic law, the ruling is lenient and it is permitted to place a conditional eiruv. 
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  This chapter, too, deals with the halakhot of the joining of Shabbat boundaries; however, here the discussion focuses on different aspects of this topic. 
  The halakhic rulings in the previous chapter dealt primarily with cases of an individual who, although he already has a place of residence on Shabbat, seeks to establish residence elsewhere by means of an eiruv. This chapter discusses the case of an individual who does not have a bona fide place of residence, e.g., one traveling to another city, or one who establishes residence along the way. Similarly, this chapter deals with the legal status of one who intends to establish residence in a place other than the place where he is located at present, and also considers the halakha with regard to one who went outside his Shabbat limit and thereby forfeited his rights within that limit. 
  Addressing these questions necessitates an analysis of the fundamental problems with regard to the manner in which one acquires his Shabbat limit and the manner in which he loses it. One of the questions requiring consideration is the legal status of one who ventures beyond his Shabbat limit, whether unwittingly, intentionally, or for the purpose of performing a mitzva. Does he then acquire certain rights of residence in this other place? If so, what are they? 
  One of the essential questions discussed is: Does one's right to walk within the Shabbat limit stem from his decision and assertion: My residence is at such and such location, and in that way he acquires the right to walk two thousand cubits from that location? Or, is the Shabbat limit determined by the individual's very presence at a specific location? 
  A similar issue is the Shabbat limit as it applies to vessels and other objects. Is their Shabbat limit determined by their presence at a specific location? An example of this is the statement in the Gemara: Ownerless objects acquire residence. Or, perhaps, if they belong to a specific individual, the limit for these objects is determined by the limit of their owner. 
  An additional fundamental problem is with regard to the manner in which one acquires the eiruv. The joining of Shabbat boundaries is based upon one's decision to acquire residence at a given distance from his present location. The eiruv is generally established through the placement of food sufficient for two meals at the location where one seeks to acquire residence. However, the question arises: Are there other methods in which this may be accomplished? For example, does one's decision that he intends to establish residence at a specific location suffice even without placing the food there? Alternatively, is it sufficient for one merely to visit that location during the day, even if he neither stays there nor places an eiruv? 
  These problems require examination of the essence of the Shabbat limit, which will lead to a detailed understanding of how it takes effect, how it is acquired, and how it is lost. These are the topics discussed in this chapter. 
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The focus in this chapter was primarily on the question of how an individual who does not have a specific permanent residence acquires his Shabbat limit. The Sages established that one who forfeited his Shabbat limit by venturing beyond that limit may proceed only four cubits, as that is the basic area at the disposal of every person at any time, even if he no longer has the right to the greater Shabbat limit of two thousand cubits. However, this holds true only for one who ventured beyond his Shabbat limit without justification. If there was a justified reason for leaving, e.g., to rescue someone, give testimony, or go to war, one establishes residence and acquires the Shabbat limit at his destination.
  It was also concluded in this chapter that one acquires his Shabbat limit consciously or unconsciously. Indeed, even an individual who was sleeping in a specific location as Shabbat arrives acquires his Shabbat limit at that location, and he may walk two thousand cubits in any direction from there. Similarly, one who was adjacent to a city or some other place in which he desired to acquire residence, even if he did not know precisely where that residence would be, acquires that residence as long as he is near enough to that place that it is permitted to reach it.
  There are two methods in which one may establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries without placing food at the new residence. The first method, which is effective regardless of the circumstances, is establishing an eiruv with one's feet. One who seeks to establish an eiruv can, during the day, go to the place that he seeks to acquire as his residence, and declare: I acquire residence at this location. This is effective even if he then returns home and sleeps there. At times, he acquires residence even without a declaration. This is effective because the halakha requiring placement of food in establishing residence was instituted as a leniency enabling one to establish an eiruv by means of an agent. 
  An alternative method of joining the boundaries is by declaring that one seeks to establish residence in a specific location, even without being present at that location. However, the Sages allowed the acquisition of residence in this manner, without placing food, only in cases where there is no other alternative. Therefore, this method may be employed by people traveling who must establish Shabbat residence en route. One sitting at home who is able to establish an eiruv employing one of the other methods may not acquire residence utilizing this method.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  The primary focus of this chapter is the halakhot of the joining of Shabbat boundaries, concentrating on the joining of city boundaries. To this point, the discussions in the tractate have focused on the individual and how and when he measures his Shabbat limit. In this chapter the Gemara turns its attention to the Shabbat limit of a collective, an entire town. 
  The halakhot of the Shabbat boundaries of an individual are unlike those of a town, as the Shabbat limit of an individual is calculated from a single point from which one measures in all directions. In contrast, a town is a place with indeterminate contours and dimensions, which include sections, several houses, or even one isolated house that cannot be arranged into any uniform shape. 
  Since the objective of the ordinances of the Sages with regard to the halakhot of eiruv is leniency, not stricture, the first step must be delineation of the boundaries of the city itself, as anything inside the city is considered a single, four-cubit unit with regard to the Shabbat limit. 
  This determination of the boundaries of the city is no simple matter, as even a city surrounded by a wall is not typically constructed in a precise manner, and its borders are not straight lines. This is especially true when the fences, houses, and courtyards that are adjacent to the city on all sides, and are in many respects annexed to the city, are taken into consideration. Consequently, a method of determining when and how those areas are incorporated into the city proper must be adopted, so that its Shabbat limit can be measured from a defined border. In practice, the boundaries of the city must be delineated as straight lines, in order to simplify calculation of the measurement. Only then can the actual measurement of the Shabbat limit of the city begin. 
  The measurement of the Shabbat limits is also a complicated process, as only rarely is the area surrounding a city level and easily measured. When the city is surrounded by hills, numerous diverse difficulties confront one seeking to measure the Shabbat limits through mountains, valleys, and plains. Furthermore, cities are sometimes close enough to share the same Shabbat limit. When are they deemed a single unit, and when is each city or section of a city deemed an independent entity? These issues and related questions constitute the subject matter of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  With regard to the joining of Shabbat borders of a city and the determination of its Shabbat limit, the Gemara established several principles that apply to three areas: The essential city, the outskirts of the city, and the Shabbat boundaries of the city. 
  The essential city includes all contiguous residential areas in which the houses are no farther than slightly more than seventy cubits from each other. From that point, the outskirts of the city begin. Once the borders of the essential city are determined, additional areas are appended to the city on its various sides until it assumes the shape of a rectangle or square. No section of the essential city portion protrudes beyond the city boundaries. It is incorporated into the city, rendering it square. As for the measurement of the Shabbat boundaries of the city, the result is a square two thousand cubits by two thousand cubits. Accordingly, in certain places the Shabbat limit is greater than two thousand cubits, as the diagonal of the square is longer than two thousand cubits. 
  Since the halakhot of the Shabbat limits are by rabbinic law, several leniencies are applied in this measurement, including the use of estimates and assumptions even with regard to the measurement of the ground surface itself. As a result, hills and valleys are subsumed within the Shabbat limit without measurement. In the case of measurements mandated by Torah law, each and every section of the terrain must be measured. 
  Adjacent cities are deemed a single unit. Therefore, residents of one may walk two thousand cubits beyond the other even if that is farther than the Shabbat limit had the area been uninhabited. This is because a city incorporated within the Shabbat limit of another city is considered as merely four cubits. 
  Incidental to its discussion of the Shabbat limit, the Gemara also addressed certain halakhot of the outskirts of a city: How does a city assume the legal status of four cubits, not only with regard to traversing but also in terms of carrying inside it? Although there is no substantive link between the prohibitions of Shabbat boundaries and the prohibitions against carrying from one domain to another without a joining of courtyards, both issues deal with the needs of the community and with ensuring Shabbat observance in the city.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  After clarifying most of the issues relating to the various types of eiruv, the Gemara revisits the details of the halakot of the joining of courtyards and merging of alleyways. 
  It has been established that the residents of a courtyard must establish an eiruv if they wish to carry vessels from their houses into the courtyard on Shabbat. It has similarly been established that if one of the courtyard residents neglected to participate in the eiruv, it is prohibited for all residents of the courtyard to carry throughout the courtyard. This leads to a question of both fundamental and practical import: What is the definition of a residence in this respect? Who is classified as a resident of the courtyard or suited to be considered as living there? Is the legal status of everyone located in the courtyard, regardless of age, gender, or legal standing, that of a resident, prohibiting the residents of the courtyard from carrying in the courtyard if he fails to participate in the eiruv? Perhaps there are situations where one living in a courtyard e.g., a family member or visitor, is not considered a resident with regard to eiruv, as he is subordinate to others. The converse case must also be considered. What is the status of one whose permanent place of residence is in the courtyard, but that person is temporarily living elsewhere? Is he considered to be a resident despite his absence or not? There is also the fundamental issue of a gentile living in the courtyard; is he too considered a resident with regard to the halakhot of eiruv in terms of prohibiting the other residents from carrying if he does not participate in the eiruv? If so, can he establish an eiruv, or does this ordinance apply only to Jews? 
  The Gemara also discusses a different aspect of the definition of residency: Can a person who lives in a courtyard legally relinquish his rights in the courtyard or transfer his rights to others, so that he is no longer considered a resident who prohibits the other occupants from carrying? If that is indeed an option, how is it to be achieved? Must he completely renounce all rights and ownership in the courtyard, or is a partial renunciation sufficient? With regard to one who rents his house to another, at what point do his legal rights to the house cease? Is this similar to standard renunciation of one's property or not? 
  All the above comprise a single question: What is the definition of one who dwells in a courtyard from the perspective of the laws of eiruv? 
  In addition to this fundamental question, the Gemara addresses a series of ancillary problems with regard to the relationship between the right to use a courtyard and residence there. In the case of one who resides in one courtyard, yet passes through or carries in an adjacent courtyard on a daily basis, with or without permission, during the week or on Shabbat: When is he considered a partner to this courtyard who must participate in its eiruv, and when is he considered to be affiliated with a separate domain and does not prohibit members of the courtyard from carrying? Does his use of this domain join residents of the different courtyards into a partnership? Does one of the courtyards render it prohibited to carry in the other courtyard but the other courtyard does not render it prohibited to carry in the first?
  These questions, which all hinge on the definition of a resident in the courtyard, are clarified both in principle and in detail in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  The questions dealing with the basic definition of residence, which were analyzed and resolved in the chapter, can be divided into several categories. One resolution is that a gentile living in a courtyard prohibits all the other members of the courtyard from carrying, not because he is obligated to observe the halakhot of eiruv or included in an eiruv that is established, but for other reasons. Consequently, since he can neither participate in an eiruv nor can others include him in their eiruv, in order to establish an eiruv in that courtyard, the Jews in the courtyard must rent the gentile's domain for the purposes of the eiruv. 
  Another related matter discussed in this chapter was the renunciation of rights over one's property. The resident of a courtyard can relinquish his rights to use the courtyard on Shabbat. Once he has removed himself from that courtyard, he assumes the status of a guest. As his rights were transferred to others, he no longer prohibits the residents of the courtyard from carrying. The Gemara clarified when and how this renunciation can be performed. 
  In addition, ancillary members of a residence do not have to participate in a joining of the courtyards and a merging of the alleyways, as the eiruv of the homeowner is on their behalf as well. As a result, children, slaves, students, and partners do not require a separate eiruv of their own. It is sufficient that they live in the same courtyard or house as the homeowner. 
  With regard to courtyards so close to each other that the residents of one have the right to use or pass through the other, or if a sort of partnership exists between them, the Sages disputed in what cases the members of one courtyard prohibit the members of the other from carrying. The halakhic conclusion was that only in a case where the courtyards are not considered a single unit, and those who pass through the courtyard are prohibited from carrying in their own courtyard according to the halakhot of eiruv, do they prohibit the residents of the courtyard through which they pass or to which they are tied from carrying.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  At the end of the sixth chapter, the Gemara discussed several problems involving two adjacent courtyards each utilized by the residents of the other. The fundamental question is whether, under what circumstances, and in what manner they are considered one courtyard rather than two. This inquiry is pursued from a different perspective in this chapter, specifically with regard to determining the status of the area between the courtyards. The Gemara analyzes the requisite conditions for a partition between two courtyards to be considered as a barrier that separates them, as opposed to the circumstances under which the partition is considered nonexistent. In general, what types of partitions effectively divide courtyards? 
  There are, of course, some unambiguous cases, e.g., a tall, sealed partition between two domains, which is a clear, conspicuous barrier, or, in contrast, a flimsy, easily dismantled partition. However, there are many intermediate cases, each of which requires elucidation and analysis. Under what circumstances is the partition negated despite the fact that its remnants, or some indication that there was a partition, are still extant? What is the ruling of an intact partition that enables passage between the courtyards via an entrance, a window, or a ladder? Does an entrance of this kind negate the barrier, rendering the two courtyards a single unit in every sense, or do they retain the status of two courtyards? 
  These clarifications relate mainly to courtyards and houses for which an eiruv was established; however, it is also necessary to analyze the details of the practical factors of the merging of courtyards that open into a common alleyway. How is the placement of the meal common to the residents of the courtyards, which, for all intents and purposes, is the essence of the eiruv, accomplished? This question refers both to the amount of food as well as the type of food required. Another issue is the manner in which an eiruv is acquired. Must it always be acquired in the same manner, with each partner to the eiruv contributing a certain amount of actual food, after which all the food is collected as a shared meal, or are there ways to simplify the process, by allowing for partial funding of the meal, or by appointing an agent to acquire it on one's behalf? These issues are the primary focus of this chapter. 
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  The Gemara resolved the problems relating to the definition of the boundaries that demarcate between two courtyards by dividing the cases into three categories. 
  Any partition created by a ten-handbreadth height disparity either above or below the surface of the courtyard is considered a full-fledged barrier. Each courtyard on either side of a partition is a separate domain, whose residents establish their own eiruv. 
  If the barrier is lower than ten handbreadths, or if there is a breach wider than ten cubits, the two courtyards are considered a single unit, and the residents establish one eiruv together, as residents of one large courtyard. If the barrier was properly erected but includes an entrance, whether an actual passageway or merely a window large enough to transfer objects, the residents of the courtyards may opt to establish a single eiruv as residents of one courtyard, or to establish a separate eiruv in each of the courtyards. In the latter case, they may not carry into the other courtyard.
  Regarding the second issue, the manner in which the merging of courtyards that open into an alleyway is accomplished in practice, the consensus was that all types of eiruv, i.e., courtyards, alleyways, and Shabbat boundaries, can be established with anything characterized as food. However, the Sages instituted that the joining of courtyards should be performed only with a whole loaf of bread, to preclude quarrels between the residents. 
  As for the manner of participation in an eiruv, the Gemara concluded that it is not necessary for each member to contribute his portion in person, as one may acquire the eiruv through an agent acting on his behalf. Similarly, a person may acquire an eiruv on behalf of others. The principle is that any eiruv that is exclusively for the benefit and convenience of its participants, e.g., the joining of courtyards and the merging of alleyways, can be acquired on behalf of another even without his knowledge, as long as he is eventually informed that it was established. In the case of the joining of Shabbat boundaries, in contrast, since that eiruv involves a degree of loss as it prevents walking beyond the city limits in the opposite direction, the consent of the other party is required for its acquisition. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  In this chapter the discussion of details of the partnership of eiruv continues from the previous chapter, although its main focus is on two different matters. 
  The first matter is completing the definition of the essence of a residence. While the location and the boundaries of a residence as well as the manner in which one resides in a residence have already been addressed, some matters remain that require clarification. Once the structure has been classified as a residence, there are additional, adjacent areas beyond the residence proper to which the residents have access and which they have the right to use. Although the residents do not necessarily own the adjacent areas, the question with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat is to what degree the residents have the right to utilize that adjacent area and under what circumstances those rights are revoked, either because the residents were never entitled to make use of that area or because the rights of others take precedence over theirs. 
  In continuation of the discussion concerning what constitutes a residence, an additional question arises: Is every structure in which people reside considered a residence, or are there places that by their very nature are not considered residences as far as the halakhot of eiruv are concerned? Examples include places that are not fit for residence, dwellings that belong to others, and uninhabited dwellings whose owners are not present. Are all of these considered residences in terms of the halakhot of eiruv? 
  The other matter addressed in this chapter is the use of water on Shabbat, within the constraints of the halakhot of boundaries and of moving objects on Shabbat. Typically, the legal status of any body of water is that of a karmelit; however, since there are bodies in which the water is not stationary, e.g., rivers, streams, and canals, special guidelines are necessary in some cases. Water is needed for drinking and washing, and waste water must be poured out. The halakhot of Shabbat in general, and of eiruv in particular, pose problems as to how those needs can be met without violating prohibitions by Torah or rabbinic law.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  In addition to the halakhot of merging and joining cited again in this chapter, constituting a review and summary of matters discussed in the previous chapter, additional issues were elucidated. Emerging from the halakhot discussed in this chapter was the fact that the definition of residence in the context of the halakhot of eiruv differs from its definition in other areas of halakha. A principle governing the halakhot of eiruv is that the legal status of one who does not actually live in a given residence, even if he owns it, is not that of a resident; therefore, his status cannot impinge on the rights of the other residents of the courtyard. Furthermore, one who resides in a residence owned by another is not deemed a full-fledged resident if the owner maintains legal rights providing him access. The owner is deemed the primary resident for the purposes of the eiruv. 
  Similarly, the legal status of a place that serves as a passageway for several residences, e.g., a gatehouse or a balcony, is not that of a residence, and one who resides there is not deemed a resident. 
  While the concept of a residence may be restricted in one sense, it is expanded in the sense that a residence is not merely a place in which one has actual proprietary rights to reside. Any place adjacent to a residence to which tenants have access, and, in the formulation of the Sages, its use is convenient, is considered part of the residence. Based upon this principle, there was a discussion with regard to areas whose use is convenient for the residents of two separate residences or is inconvenient for residents of both.
  As for the use of water on Shabbat, many of the halakhot are based on the principle: The Sages were lenient with regard to water. The primary reason for this leniency is due to the fact that it is difficult to determine boundaries with regard to water the way that one does with regard to land, as in water the boundaries are not discernible. In addition, water lacks the stability of land, as it is often in motion. Consequently, its passage from one spot is not observable nor is its position constant. Therefore, the Sages were lenient in several areas related to water, e.g., considering a partition suspended above the water's surface as if it extended down below the water's surface, thereby effectively creating partitions within the water and dividing it into distinct domains. Similar ordinances obviating the need for actual partitions in the water were also discussed. 
  With regard to pouring out waste water on Shabbat, it was determined that as long as a person does not pour the water from his domain directly into the public domain, but rather does so indirectly via a pit or a drainage ditch, it is permitted. Although the Sages ruled stringently in most cases involving indirectly carrying out objects on Shabbat, they ruled leniently with regard to water and its usage.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  To this point, tractate Eiruvin has primarily addressed the problem of establishing an eiruv, i.e., how it is possible to combine residences, courtyards, and alleyways into one domain enabling the transfer of objects from one to another? It has also addressed the manner in which it is possible to expand the Shabbat limit, extending the distance that one is permitted to walk on Shabbat. However, some very fundamental issues require elucidation. What is the halakha when no eiruv was established at all or where the eiruv was breached? Only by means of clarification of these points can the nature of the relationship between the various secondary Shabbat domains, in both Torah and rabbinic law, be understood. The halakhot of the four primary Shabbat domains were fully elucidated in tractate Shabbat, leaving the status of the various forms of the private domain in need of clarification.
  Indeed, the primary focus of this chapter is the discussion of the relationship between various types of private domains, e.g., courtyards, rooftops, alleyways, and enclosures, when no eiruv has been established between them. Is each of these areas considered an independent unit requiring an eiruv to unite them? Or are they all components of one overriding domain and it is permitted to transfer objects from one to the other without establishing an eiruv? In other words, what is the criterion for distinguishing private domains from one another? Is it the existence of a partition between them; is it the fact that they have different owners; or is it the fact that they are utilized in different ways?
  Another issue is that all of the halakhot relating to partitions or the lack thereof were addressed from the perspective of the halakhot of eiruv. However, when the partitions are removed, when the courtyard is breached, or when one domain is completely open into a second domain, what is the halakhic status in that case? Does the domain that opens into another domain lose its independent status, or has its status merely been altered? Is the change in status dependent solely on the existence of the partitions, or are the use of the courtyard and the function it serves also significant factors? 
  These problems and others that arise from them constitute the crux of the discussions in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  In this chapter, the halakhot of limits and partitions were elucidated, with some fundamental differences of opinion surrounding the roots of these principles. Ultimately the halakhic conclusion was that those ordinances and decrees cited in tractate Eiruvin that established that one may not move objects from house to house and from courtyard to courtyard without an eiruv apply only to those objects that were in the house at the onset of the Shabbat. All private domains other than the house proper are considered a single domain. The fact that one area differs from another in its use, specifications, or ownership has no impact on the legal status domains. Therefore, all the adjacent courtyards, adjacent rooftops, and adjacent enclosures are considered one domain, and it is permitted to freely move objects from one to the other provided that the object was in that domain at the onset of the Shabbat.
  Another issue involved partitions that were destroyed, causing a change in the definition of the courtyards. Primarily, the issues addressed here pertained to courtyards that were breached and now open into each other, especially if the breach created a situation where one courtyard is completely open to the other. Had these two courtyards, and for all intents and purposes rooftops as well, not been equal in size, and the situation were one of a smaller courtyard opening into a larger courtyard, the independent status of the smaller courtyard would have been negated, creating a complex relationship between the two courtyards. On the basis of this, the relationship of a large courtyard to a smaller neighbor and that of a small courtyard to its larger neighbor were determined.
  Another matter that was elucidated with regard to partitions was the relationship between two parallel principles: First, that the determining factor in the halakhot of Shabbat is the existence of a partition or lack thereof during Shabbat itself; and second, that once it is permitted to carry in a domain on Shabbat it remains permitted. The halakhic conclusion was that where the matter is not dependent on the presence or absence of partitions, but rather on the residents and the residence, the latter principle prevails and once carrying is permitted it remains permitted. In cases where the matter depends on partitions, the former principle prevails and carrying is permitted only as long as the partitions are intact.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  The halakhot of eiruv comprise merely one halakhic category that falls under the rubric of rabbinic decrees issued to prevent performance of labor prohibited by Torah law and to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. The final chapter of tractate Eiruvin goes beyond the limited realm of the halakhot of eiruv and addresses additional decrees issued to achieve those objectives. However, it does not address all such decrees, but primarily those that in one sense or another relate to the prohibitions against moving objects on Shabbat. 
  The key question of concern is: To what degree must moving objects be prohibited within the confines of a single domain or within the confines of those domains established by rabbinic law, in order to prevent one from moving objects in a manner absolutely prohibited by Torah law? With regard to all rabbinic ordinances and decrees, the question arises: To what extent should application of these preventive measures be expanded in order to prevent one from performing a full-fledged prohibited labor on Shabbat? In what cases is it appropriate to enact preventive measures, and in what cases are they superfluous? Or, under what circumstances are the Sages less than insistent that people abide by these measures? As all these prohibitions are rabbinic ordinances and decrees, a fine line distinguishes the permitted from the prohibited. There is no fixed principle applicable in every case, and these decrees are not Torah decrees with regard to which there can be no flexibility. There were areas in which the Sages were concerned, ruled stringently, and issued decrees, and there were other areas where they ruled leniently and did not issue decrees.
  In general, the Sages adopted one approach with regard to the Temple precincts and consecrated items, as they were careful to avoid implementation of their decrees in the Temple and with regard to all other sacred matters. This is the rationale for the principle: There are no rabbinic decrees in the Temple, which is in effect almost universally. In any event, here too there is a plethora of issues that arise: In what cases did the Sages completely suspend their decree and in what cases were they lenient in applying certain aspects of the decree while maintaining the fundamental prohibition? Clarification of these matters is the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  Several aspects of the rabbinic decrees designed to preserve the integrity of Shabbat as a day of rest were discussed in this chapter. Essentially, what are the limits of rabbinic decrees? Under what circumstances do the Sages insist on full compliance and when are they more flexible? The prohibited labor of carrying out is an inferior labor, as, in contrast to the other primary categories of prohibited labor, no apparent change has been engendered in the object, and the lines demarcating the boundaries between the various domains of Shabbat are similarly not always apparent. Consequently, numerous rabbinic decrees were issued in an attempt to limit the possibility that one will transfer objects from one domain to another. The Sages prohibited transfer of objects from domain to domain even when it is accomplished through an intermediate domain, unless it was performed while observing numerous precautionary measures.
  Indeed, the principle established by Rabbi Shimon was, in a certain sense, the key to all of the halakhic issues discussed in this chapter; it applied to the rabbinic decrees issued to preserve the character of Shabbat as a day of rest: Wherever the Sages permitted you to perform a certain action, they merely gave you from that which was yours. As it was the Sages who issued these decrees, they, at times, permitted the performance of actions similar to those they prohibited for various reasons.
  Therefore, the Sages employed extensive leniency with regard to matters associated with sacred items, e.g., sacred writings, phylacteries, and the like. This approach was especially conspicuous with regard to the Temple precincts. There, many of the decrees issued by the Sages were not in effect, either due to the diligence of the priests and their meticulousness in the performance of mitzvot, in contrast to the general public, whose lack of attention could lead to failure in those matters, or due to the fact that stringency within the Temple precincts with regard to one matter could lead to laxity with regard to other mitzvot of the Temple that are Torah obligations.
  Nevertheless, not everything permitted by Torah law was actually performed within the Temple precincts. The suspension of decrees was implemented only for matters that were essential and with regard to which there was no danger that a Torah prohibition would be violated. Just as the Sages were lenient in applying decrees issued to preserve Shabbat as a day of rest within the Temple precincts, so too were they lenient with regard to other rabbinic decrees and stringencies there, limiting their decrees only to cases where there was concern lest even the priests in the Temple come to violate a Torah prohibition.
  
  Pesachim
  
  Introduction to Pesachim
  
  And this day shall be to you for a memorial, and you shall keep it as a feast to the Lord; throughout your generations you shall keep it as a feast by an ordinance forever. Seven days shall you eat matzot, yet on the first day you shall remove leaven out of your houses; for whoever eats leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel. And on the first day there shall be a sacred convocation, and on the seventh day there shall be a sacred convocation to you; no kind of labor shall be done on them, save that which every man must eat, only that may be done by you. (Exodus 12:14–16)
  Matzot shall be eaten seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your quarters. (Exodus 13:7)
  Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male of the first year; you shall take it from the sheep, or from the goats. And you shall keep it until the fourteenth day of this month, and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon...And they shall eat the meat on that night, roast with fire, and matzot; with bitter herbs they shall eat it. Do not eat of it raw, nor boiled in water; but roast it with fire, its head with its legs and with its inner parts. (Exodus 12:5–6, 8–9)
  Observe the month of aviv, and offer the Paschal lamb to the Lord your God; for in the month of aviv the Lord your God brought you out of Egypt by night. And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to the Lord your God from the flock and from the herd, in the place which the Lord shall choose to rest His name there. You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shall you eat matzot with it, the bread of affliction; for you came out of the land of Egypt in haste, that you may remember the day when you came out of the land of Egypt all the days of your life. (Deuteronomy 16:1–3)
  Speak to the children of Israel, saying: Any man of you or your generations who shall be impure by reason of a corpse, or on a distant journey, he shall keep the Passover to the Lord. On the fourteenth day of the second month at evening they shall keep it, and eat it with matzot and bitter herbs. They shall leave none of it to the morning, nor break any bone of it; according to the entire statute of the Paschal lamb they shall offer it. But the man who is ritually pure, and is not on a journey, and refrains from offering the Paschal lamb, that soul shall be cut off from his people; because he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed season, that man shall bear his sin. (Numbers 9:10–13)
  The Torah actually describes two distinct Festivals collectively referred to as Passover, although they are often thought of as a single holiday. First is the festival of Pesah, referring specifically to the Festival surrounding the Paschal lamb, which is sacrificed on the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan and consumed later that night. This parallels the events immediately preceding the exodus from Egypt. Distinct from this is the festival of Matzot, the weeklong Festival beginning on the fifteenth of Nisan and characterized by the prohibitions against consuming or possessing leaven throughout the week, and the obligation to eat matza on the first night. This commemorates the actual exodus. There is a confluence of these two Festivals on the evening of the fifteenth, when the Paschal lamb is eaten and the festival of Matzot begins.
  Tractate Pesahim, which deals with both Festivals, is classically divided into two sections. The first, tractate Pesah Rishon, discusses the halakhot of the festival of Matzot, including the prohibition of leaven, its elimination from one's possession, and the mitzva to consume matza. The second, tractate Pesah Sheni, deals with the festival of Pesah and the halakhot of the Paschal lamb. Some suggest that it is for this reason that the tractate as a whole is entitled Pesahim, the plural of Pesah, since it includes within it these two tractates of Pesah.
  The tractate also deals with two Pesahim in a different sense. Ideally, the Paschal lamb is to be sacrificed on the fourteenth of Nisan and consumed later that night. However, those who are unable to do so have a second opportunity a month later, on the fourteenth of Iyyar and later that night. The first opportunity is called Pesah Rishon, the first Passover, and the second is called Pesah Sheni, the second Passover.
  As stated, the festival of Matzot is characterized by the prohibition against eating or possessing leaven. Remarkably, the reason for this prohibition is neither explained by the Torah nor discussed in the Gemara. It is instructive, however, that a similar prohibition of leaven also applies to the sacrificial rite; namely, that no leaven may be offered on the altar. Instead, all grain-based offerings are unleavened. This may indicate that the exclusive consumption of unleavened produce achieves elements of purity and sanctity.
  The Torah states the prohibitions concerning leaven only in general terms but never defines precisely what is intended: Which types of food can become leavened, what is the precise definition of being leavened, and does the prohibition apply to items that will not be eaten? Similarly, the prohibition against possessing leaven necessitates that it be removed from one's home. However, the many practical implications of this are not explained by the Torah. When and how should the leaven be removed from one's possession? Obviously, throughout the year leaven is constantly found in the home. Which areas of the home need to be checked? In what manner and to what extent? The prohibition against leaven includes both eating it and deriving benefit from it. What is included in this prohibition? This question itself raises more general issues regarding other prohibited foods and items from which one is not allowed to gain benefit. All these topics are discussed in the first section of the tractate, Pesah Rishon.
  The second section of the tractate, Pesah Sheni, provides a detailed discussion of all aspects of the rite of the Paschal lamb and the Temple service surrounding it. This section closely resembles tractates within the order of Kodashim, which deals with the sacrificial rite. The style of the Gemara's analysis of the sacrificial rite differs significantly from that employed by the Gemara in other areas. Heavy emphasis is placed on hermeneutics, and references to halakhot given to Moses at Sinai are more prominent. Principles derived in one area of the Temple service are not always immediately applied to another, as each aspect of the service maintains an independent identity.
  Owing to the great sanctity of the offerings, there is a plethora of rules that apply to every stage of their rites. Significantly, and unlike most other mitzvot, emphasis is placed not only on the correct physical performance of the rite but also on the intentions of those involved. Improper intent can even, at times, entirely disqualify an offering.
  The Paschal lamb is, in one regard, just one of the many different offerings sacrificed in the Temple. As such, all the halakhot that apply to regular offerings apply to a Paschal lamb. For example, the sacrifice of all offerings comprises four sacrificial rites, all indispensable: The animal is slaughtered; its blood is collected in a holy vessel; it is carried to the altar; and then the blood is sprinkled upon the altar. Each of these rites must be performed correctly, and failure to do so can disqualify the offering. In addition, the many types of offerings are grouped into different subcategories, each with its own halakhot. The Paschal lamb is included within various subcategories, which provide a second level of halakhot that must be followed. 
  However, there are many halakhot that are unique to the Paschal lamb. For most offerings, the consumption of its meat, whether by the priests or by those bringing the offering, is of minor importance. Even if an offering might never be consumed, it may still be permissible to bring it. Not so for the Paschal lamb. The consumption of its meat by those bringing it is one of its central purposes, and a Paschal lamb that will not be eaten may not be brought at all. There are therefore numerous halakhot pertaining to its preparation and consumption. This includes the way it is roasted, the need for those who wish to partake of it to be registered into a group beforehand, and the manner in which it is eaten. 
  The Paschal lambs that were sacrificed by the children of Israel in Egypt provide a paradigm for the Paschal lambs that are to be sacrificed each year throughout the generations. Accordingly, many of the halakhot of the Paschal lamb parallel those that were given to the children of Israel in Egypt. In this way the Paschal lamb is able to serve as a remembrance of the exodus from Egypt throughout the generations.
  The tractate is structured chronologically, beginning with the required preparations before the Festival begins, including the elimination of leaven from one's possession. It then proceeds to discuss the sacrificing of the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan, and concludes with the details of the Seder night on the fifteenth. In the first few chapters of the tractate, incidental to the discussion of the elimination of leaven from one's possession, it provides a more general discussion of the nature of the prohibitions pertaining to leavened bread.
  Tractate Pesah Rishon, which forms the first section of the tractate, is comprised of the first four chapters:
  Chapter One deals primarily with the search for leaven and its elimination.
  Chapter Two discusses the prohibitions against eating and deriving benefit from leaven, when they begin, and their nature. The chapter proceeds to discuss some of the laws pertaining to the mitzvot of matzot and bitter herbs.
  Chapter Three further delineates the prohibition against leaven, including a precise discussion of the point at which a dough is considered to be leavened. 
  Chapter Four clarifies the rabbinic prohibition of performing labor on Passover eve, created in order to facilitate the necessary preparations for the Festival.
  The following chapters comprise tractate Pesah Sheni:
  Chapter Five discusses the time and the manner in which the Paschal lamb is sacrificed.
  Chapter Six deals with the special case in which the fourteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat. It discusses how the Paschal lamb is to be sacrificed in such a case. It delineates which aspects of the rite are maintained just as they are when it occurs on a weekday and which ones are changed in consideration for the sanctity and prohibitions of Shabbat.
  Chapter Seven describes the manner in which the Paschal lamb is roasted as well as other more general topics that pertain to offerings. It also includes a discussion of what should be done if an animal consecrated as a Paschal lamb is lost or disqualified in some other way before its consumption.
  Chapter Eight delineates for whom a Paschal lamb may be sacrificed and some of the halakhot pertaining to registering in a group for a Paschal lamb.
  Chapter Nine discusses the rules of who fulfills his obligation with the first Pesah and who is considered unable to do so and must postpone his fulfillment to the following month with the second Pesah, as well as the halakhot of the second Pesah. It also discusses the differences between the Paschal lamb in Egypt and the ones sacrificed throughout the generations. 
  Chapter Ten is considered part of tractate Pesah Rishon. It details the halakhot of the seder and describes the various practices involved, including the recitation of the Haggadah and its associated songs and praises.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  Seven days shall you eat matzot, yet on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses; for whoever eats leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel. (Exodus 12:15)
  Seven days shall there be no leaven found in your houses; for whoever eats that which is leavened, that soul shall be cut off from the congregation of Israel, whether he is a stranger, or born in the land. (Exodus 12:19)
  Matzot shall be eaten seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders. (Exodus 13:7)
  The Torah prohibits the possession of any leaven or leavened bread throughout the week of Passover, mandating its removal beforehand. However, the correct way to practically fulfill these obligations is left undefined. At what point before the Festival is a person obligated to remove leaven from his or her possession? How should this be done? 
  Furthermore, what is the legal definition of leaven being in one's possession? The Torah formulates the prohibition by stating that leaven or leavened bread should not be found in one's house or quarters. This raises the question of leaven that is physically found in one's property but is owned by a gentile: Does such leaven have to be removed? Similarly, what should be done with the leaven in order for it to be considered removed from one's possession? Is it necessary to physically remove or destroy it, or is it sufficient to renounce ownership or nullify it? Many of these questions are addressed in the first chapter of tractate Pesahim. 
  Although the Torah requires only that the leaven be removed from one's possession, the Sages enacted that a search be conducted and that all leaven be identified, in order to ensure its removal before the onset of the Festival. What method should be used? When should the search ideally be conducted, and is it valid if conducted at other times? Who is obligated to perform the search, especially in cases where more than one person is responsible for a property? A full discussion of these issues provides a major focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  The major focus of this chapter was a discussion of the rabbinic enactment to conduct a search for leaven before the onset of the Festival. The Gemara concluded that the search should ideally be conducted on the night preceding Passover; however, if the search was not conducted then, one is obligated to perform it on the following morning in order to allow for the removal of all leaven from his or her possession by the appropriate time. Furthermore, the search needs to be conducted only in areas of one's property where there is a possibility that leaven will be present.
  The Gemara explained that by Torah law, it is sufficient to nullify any leaven in one's possession, and one does not have to physically remove it from his or her property. The search, then, is not essentially necessary to prevent one from transgressing the prohibition against possessing leaven. The Gemara therefore explained that the true goal of the search is to ensure that leaven is not physically found on one's property even after it has been nullified. This is required due to the concern that a person might come across some leaven remaining in his or her property on the Festival and absentmindedly decide to take ownership of it or to eat it, transgressing the biblical prohibitions involved.
  Since the search is not required to prevent a biblical transgression but is due to a rabbinic concern, various leniencies exist. One is not required to search in places where it would be dangerous to do so or would involve excessive effort. One does not need to consider farfetched situations such as the possibility that animals may have brought new leaven into an area that was already searched or where leaven is never brought.
  The Gemara also discussed the time by which all leaven must be removed from one's possession – whether by physically destroying it or by nullifying it. Its conclusion was that the biblical prohibition of possessing leaven begins at the end of the sixth hour. However, by rabbinic decree, one is already prohibited from benefiting from leaven from the fifth hour and from eating it from the fourth.
  The discussion surrounding the removal of leaven concerned many cases in which the presence of leaven is doubtful to begin with, thus highlighting similar cases involving doubts and the principles of how to legislate for them. 
  Incidental to the Gemara's discussion of the removal of leaven, the chapter introduced further discussions about the laws of ritual purity and impurity of foods, including the different degrees of ritual impurity; the special rules that apply to sacrificial foods that become ritually impure; and whether liquids can become ritually impure, and if they can, whether they can impart impurity to other foods. Also highlighted was whether these principles are of biblical or rabbinic origin. The ramifications of these discussions affect the question of what to do with sacred leavened foods that have become impure and whether they may be destroyed before the biblical prohibition against possession of leaven begins.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  Seven days shall you eat matzot, yet on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses; for whoever eats leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel. (Exodus 12:15)
  You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shall you eat matzot with it, the bread of affliction; for you came out of the land of Egypt in haste; that you may remember the day when you came out of the land of Egypt all the days of your life. (Deuteronomy 16:3)
  And they shall eat the meat on that night, roast with fire, and matzot; with bitter herbs they shall eat it. (Exodus 12:8)
  Aside from the prohibition against possessing leaven on Passover, it is prohibited to eat it or derive any benefit from it. Although the prohibition against eating leaven is stated explicitly in the Torah, the prohibition against deriving benefit is not. This elicits the question of what exactly is the source for the prohibition. Also, what is the relationship between the two prohibitions? Is the prohibition against deriving benefit an independent prohibition parallel to that of eating, or is there really only one broadly defined prohibition of consuming leaven in any manner, which includes both eating and benefiting? These issues, as they relate both to leaven and to other items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit, are discussed at length in this chapter.
  The prohibition against possessing leaven relates specifically to leaven owned by a Jew during the week of Passover. To what extent does this also apply to the prohibition against deriving benefit from leaven? May one eat or derive benefit from leaven owned by a gentile? What is the status of leaven that was illegally in the possession of a Jew over Passover? May one derive benefit from it after the Festival has ended? 
  This chapter also begins to discuss the mitzvot to consume three items: Matzot, bitter herbs, and the Paschal lamb, on the first night of Passover. Which kinds of grains may be used to make the matzot? Which liquids may be used knead them? The Gemara similarly considers which vegetables qualify for the mitzva to eat bitter herbs. May only one kind of vegetable be used, or are there different options, and if so, is there a preference? With regard to both the matza and bitter herbs, the question arises what the halakha is in cases where they are produced from foods that are prohibited for various reasons or with various halakhic statuses, such as teruma or tithes.
  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the preparation of the Paschal lamb, the obligation to roast it, and the prohibition against cooking it.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter focused on two main issues: The prohibition against deriving benefit from leaven and the delineation of which foods may be used for the mitzvot of eating matza and bitter herbs. 
  With regard to the prohibition against eating leaven, the Gemara established that there is a biblical prohibition against deriving benefit from leaven throughout the Festival. This prohibition applies to any leaven owned by a Jew, whether in his possession or under the control of a gentile. According to Torah law, leaven that remained in a Jew's possession during the Festival is permissible afterward. However, in order to discourage any laxity in this regard, the Sages forbade one to gain any benefit from such leaven. 
  The commandment to eat matza is integrally connected to the prohibition concerning leaven. Therefore, only those grains that can become leavened when left unattended may be used to produce matza. The Gemara limits them to the classic five grains: Wheat, barley, spelt, rye, and oats. 
  The vegetables that may be used for the bitter herbs are limited to those with a bitter taste, that come from plants with a sap, and that are eaten by people within a meal.
  With regard to both matza and bitter herbs, the Gemara concluded that if prohibited produce is used in their preparation, whether the produce is prohibited by biblical or rabbinic force, one does not fulfill the mitzva of eating matza or bitter herbs with them. However, if the only issue is that a mitzva should have been performed with the produce before eating it, and it wasn't performed, i.e., if tithes for the priesthood were not separated, then despite the neglect, one still fulfills his obligation of eating matza. However, one should ensure that the mitzva is fulfilled before eating it ab initio.
  This chapter addresses only the basic definitions of matza and bitter herbs. Other issues pertaining to their actual consumption at the seder on the evening of Passover are addressed in the final chapter of tractate Pesahim, Chapter Ten.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  Seven days shall there be no leaven found in your houses; for whoever eats that which is leavened, that soul shall be cut off from the congregation of Israel, whether he is a stranger or born in the land. You shall eat nothing leavened; in all your habitations shall you eat matzot. (Exodus 12:19–20)
  Matzot shall be eaten seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders. (Exodus 13:7)
  While the previous chapters dealt with the various prohibitions concerning leaven, the precise definition of the types of foods that are included in the prohibitions was not discussed. This issue forms the central theme of this chapter. The Torah states explicitly only that leaven and leavened bread are prohibited. However, it remains unclear whether other foods that contain leavened ingredients should also be covered by this prohibition. Is one permitted to retain possession of a mixture of leaven and other foods? Does its consumption entail the same punishment of karet as one who eats leavened bread? What proportion of the mixture needs to be leaven in order to entail the various prohibitions? Furthermore, what are the halakhot pertaining to leavened material that is not meant for consumption? Is there nevertheless a prohibition to eat it, or to be in possession of it?
  Another issue discussed here is at what point in the leavening process is a food considered to have become fully leavened and therefore included in the prohibitions? This immediately gives rise to other questions: When does one need to be concerned that a food might have become leavened, and what is the status of foods that were only partially leavened?
  The discussion surrounding these issues also serves to highlight the relationship between the two prohibitions concerning leaven. Is the prohibition against possessing leaven merely a biblical safeguard to ensure that one does not come to eat it, or is it an independent prohibition that exists parallel to the prohibition against eating it?
  In short, this chapter serves to complete the discussions concerning the prohibitions of leaven by defining what precisely is included in the various prohibitions.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  Although only leaven and leavened bread are explicitly prohibited in the Torah, the Gemara derived that the prohibition includes other forms of leaven as well: A mixture of leaven, even if it contains only a minute amount of actual leaven, is entirely prohibited. So too, foods that were soaked or cooked together with leaven and have absorbed its taste are prohibited even if no actual leaven is present. Furthermore, even produce that was never fully leavened is prohibited. In all these cases it is prohibited both to eat and to be in possession of them over Passover. Nevertheless, one distinction does exist; the punishment of karet for eating leaven applies only to eating outright leaven or leavened bread.
  The Gemara further concluded that any items containing leaven that are suitable for human consumption are prohibited. Only once an item is not suitable to be eaten at all does it become permitted. 
  Since the prohibition of leaven applies also to partially leavened foods, the Sages were particularly stringent when it came to cases of doubt. They therefore created various safeguards to prevent any possibility that one will come to be in possession of leaven on Passover. For example, various stringent rules were put in place for one who wishes to knead dough for matzot on Passover, to preclude any possibility that the dough will rise.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  The beginning of tractate Pesahim focused on the preparations for the Festival. The first three chapters discussed the various issues regarding the removal of leaven from one's home and by extension clarified the nature and definition of leaven. This chapter deals with an entirely different element. Many diverse things need to be organized before the Festival begins: All leaven needs to disposed of, the matzot must be baked, the Paschal lamb needs to be brought and prepared correctly, in addition to all the regular preparations for any festive meal.
  In order to ensure that a person will have time to prepare appropriately, the Sages prohibited a person to be involved in labor on the eve of the Festival. The precise parameters of this prohibition are not clearly defined. Furthermore, its fulfillment differed from place to place; some locales ceased from engaging in labor throughout the entire day, others only from midday.
  Although this chapter begins by addressing this prohibition specifically, it quickly expands the discussion to a broader question of the nature and force of customs. What is the basis of the obligation to observe customs? What is their force, and which customs are considered halakhically binding? Is a person bound by the customs of his or her hometown or family forever, or are there ways to adopt new customs or exempt oneself from them entirely?
  The specific question that is the focus of this chapter is the case of a person who goes from a place where one custom is observed to another place with a different custom. Should a person continue to act in the manner of the place he came from, or may he, or perhaps should he, adopt the practices of the new place? The following chapter provides many examples of different cases and discusses them at length.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The Gemara explained that the prohibition against performing labor on the eve of Passover is not absolute but is similar in scope to the restrictions on the intermediate days of a Festival. This prohibition was not observed in a universal manner; in some places people were accustomed to refrain from labor only from midday, while others refrained from labor throughout the day. Either way, a person is bound to the practice of the place he or she lives and may not veer from it. 
  The main discussion of the chapter concerned the case of a person who travels from a place where one custom is observed to a place with a different custom. The Gemara explained that in such a case a person should act in accordance with the stringencies of both customs. This principle applies not just to the specific case of labor on Passover eve, but is true for all customs. Furthermore, this applies even if the customs of the person's hometown are intrinsically linked to the environment of that place and logically should not apply elsewhere. All this is true, however, only where an individual continues to associate himself with his point of origin. Once a person is not just visiting a different place but has decided to relocate, he is bound only by the customs of his new locale.
  The acceptance of a custom is considered akin to taking a vow upon it. Therefore the customs observed by a whole locale have particular force, as a public vow cannot easily be revoked. For this reason, as long as a person identifies himself as a resident of that locale he is fully bound by its customs. However, for the same reason, a person is not technically bound by the customs observed in a place he is only visiting. The reason he is nevertheless required to observe those customs is to avoid the discord that could arise by acting differently to those around him. Because of this concern, in certain cases a person will be unable to observe the stringencies of his hometown's customs because that itself may cause discord, and he would continue to observe his hometown's customs only in private. 
  Essentially, when dealing with changing customs, two values have to be preserved. A person's personal obligation to the customs he is bound to and a person's responsibility not to act in a way that could lead to discord.
  The Gemara also discussed the relative importance of different customs. This can be dependent on place, i.e., customs of Eretz Yisrael, due to the importance of the land, take preference over customs of the diaspora. This may also be dependent on who originally developed the custom, and whether they were Torah scholars or not. Some customs are considered to be unfounded and may therefore, in certain cases, not be binding at all.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  But only at the place which the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell in, there you shall sacrifice the Paschal lamb at evening, at the going down of the sun, at the season when you came out of Egypt. (Deuteronomy 16:6) 
  And you shall keep it until the fourteenth day of the same month, and the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon. (Exodus 12:6) 
  You shall not sacrifice the blood of My offering with leavened bread; neither shall the fat of My Festival offering remain all night until the morning. (Exodus 23:18)
  You shall not sacrifice the blood of My offering with leavened bread; neither shall the offering of the festival of Passover be left until the morning. (Exodus 34:25) 
  So the service was prepared, and the priests stood in their place, and the Levites in their divisions, according to the king's commandment. And they slaughtered the Paschal lambs, and the priests sprinkled [the blood, which they received] from their hand, and the Levites flayed them.
  (II Chronicles 35:10–11) 
  This chapter marks the beginning of the second section of tractate Pesahim: Tractate Pesah Sheni, which deals with the laws of the Paschal lamb. Chapter Five focuses specifically on the laws of its slaughter.
  The primary issue requiring clarification is the correct time for the slaughter. Many offerings are sacrificed on any given afternoon. What is the correct order in which to bring them, and where should the Paschal lamb be placed within that schedule? When Passover eve occurs on Friday or Shabbat, how will the scheduling be affected?
  This chapter also deals with some of the factors that can disqualify an offering. For example, if at the time of slaughter a person intends to eat the offering outside of the time within which it is supposed to be eaten, his intention invalidates the entire process. The chapter considers various disqualifications and how they apply to the Paschal lamb.
  One of the halakhot unique to the Paschal lamb is the prohibition against offering it “with leavened bread” (Exodus 23:18). The meaning of this prohibition needs to be clarified, as does the status of a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered in contravention of this rule. 
  This chapter also describes how the Paschal lamb was offered in practice, and how the different services and responsibilities were delegated to ensure it was offered in the ideal manner.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  The main focus of the chapter was a delineation of the halakhot that apply to the slaughter of the Paschal lamb.
  According to the normal schedule in the Temple, the afternoon daily offering was the last offering to be brought. The Paschal lamb provides the exception to this rule as it must be brought at the conclusion of the day. To facilitate this, the slaughter of the afternoon daily offering was moved back to an earlier time. If Passover eve occurred on a Friday, the whole schedule was advanced even earlier to allow for everything to be completed before the onset of Shabbat.
  The Gemara discussed three types of disqualifying intentions that can invalidate the Paschal lamb. First, intention at the time of slaughter to consume the lamb either after the time at which it must be eaten, i.e., the night of Passover, or outside the place in which it must be eaten, i.e., Jerusalem, disqualifies the Paschal lamb in the same way such intention disqualifies any offering. Second, the Paschal lamb is disqualified if slaughtered with the intention that it will be used as a different type of offering. Such intention disqualifies only a Paschal lamb and a sin-offering. Third, and unique to the Paschal lamb, it may be slaughtered only with the intention that it will be eaten by those who can legitimately eat it, i.e., those who were registered in a group for that Paschal lamb beforehand and are ritually pure and available to eat it.
  Another halakha that is unique to the Paschal lamb is the prohibition against offering it “with leavened bread” (Exodus 23:18). The Gemara explained that this prohibition is violated if any of the group registered for that Paschal lamb have leaven in their possession inside the Temple courtyard while the lamb is being slaughtered. Although it is prohibited to slaughter the Paschal lamb in such a case, if it were slaughtered nonetheless, the offering is not disqualified. Some opinions expand this prohibition to include any offerings sacrificed during Passover.
  The chapter also described how the Paschal lamb was offered in practice. The elaborate order of services that was followed was not only aimed at aggrandizing the mitzva but also ensured that it would be performed to perfection without anyone violating the various prohibitions mentioned in the chapter. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  Let the children of Israel offer the Paschal lamb in its appointed time. In the fourteenth day of this month, at evening, you shall offer it in its appointed season; according to all its statutes and according to all its ordinances shall you offer it. (Numbers 9:2–3)
  And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to the Lord your God from the flock and from the herd, in the place which the Lord shall choose to rest His name there. (Deuteronomy 16:2)
  And they roasted the Paschal offering with fire according to the ordinance; but the other sacred offerings they boiled in pots and in cauldrons and in pans, and carried them swiftly among all the people. (II Chronicles 35:13) 
  The previous chapter discussed the slaughter of the Paschal lamb in broad terms. This chapter focuses on the specific case of when Passover eve occurs on Shabbat. Tradition teaches that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered even on Shabbat. However, clearly not every action associated with the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat, and it must be clarified which aspects of the rite may be performed in the same manner as they are on a weekday and which aspects must be adjusted or even neglected so as not to desecrate the sanctity of Shabbat. 
  It must be identified which aspects of the rite of the Paschal lamb are a fundamental part of it. Just as the Paschal lamb itself overrides Shabbat, these aspects do as well. In addition, it must be clarified whether the dispensation to sacrifice the Paschal lamb on Shabbat always applies to all the activities performed for that goal or whether it is limited to cases in which a valid Paschal lamb is sacrificed properly. For example, if one slaughtered a Paschal lamb, and it turns out to have been invalid, is he considered to have desecrated Shabbat, obligating him to bring a sin-offering? In essence, the question is whether a person's attempt to fulfill a mitzva exempts him from any unwitting violation of Shabbat caused in the process.
  Essentially an independent topic, the Festival peace-offering that is often brought together with the Paschal lamb is also dealt with in this chapter. While hinted to in the Torah, the details of this offering are not clear. The chapter attempts to clarify many of the halakhot of this offering, especially whether it may be sacrificed on Shabbat.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  Tradition teaches that the Paschal lamb is sacrificed even on Shabbat. However, this dispensation applies only once the Paschal lamb is ready to be slaughtered. At that point, any activities may be performed that are necessary for it to be brought as an offering. However, activities that are necessary only in order to prepare the lamb for sacrificing, but could have been completed the previous day, do not override Shabbat. This applies even to activities whose performance violates a rabbinic decree. Furthermore, the Gemara concluded that all this holds true even in the event that the preparatory activities were not performed the previous day and even if the result is that the Paschal lamb will not be brought at all.
  The principle that preparatory activities do not override Shabbat applies equally to other mitzvot whose performance overrides Shabbat. For example, the activities that are an integral part of a circumcision override Shabbat, but not the preparations necessary for the circumcision. 
  The chapter also discussed the Festival peace-offering that is often brought together with the Paschal lamb. The Gemara established that it is an optional offering. As such, it is clear that it may not be sacrificed on Shabbat.
  Given the above principles, the question arose whether one who sacrifices a Paschal lamb that is later found to be invalid is considered to have unwittingly violated Shabbat and is therefore obligated to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara concluded that any labor performed while engaged in trying to perform a mitzva that overrides Shabbat does not render one liable to bring a sin-offering. Although he did not succeed in fulfilling the mitzva of the Paschal lamb, he is not considered to have violated Shabbat because he was involved in an activity that is essentially permitted in order to enable the fulfillment of the mitzva.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  And they shall eat the meat on that night, roast with fire and matzot; with bitter herbs they shall eat it. Do not eat of it raw, nor boiled in water; but roast it with fire, its head with its legs and with its inner parts. And you shall not leave any of it until morning; and that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire. (Exodus 12:8–10)
  And they roasted the Paschal offering with fire according to the ordinance; but the other sacred offerings they boiled in pots, and in cauldrons, and in pans, and carried them swiftly among all the people. (II Chronicles 35:13) 
  The Torah provides many halakhot concerning the consumption of the Paschal lamb: It must be roasted, not cooked; it must be prepared and eaten in ritual purity; when eating it, one is not allowed to break the bones; and any of the meat left over must be burned. Each one of these halakhot needs to be fully defined.
  With regard to the roasting of the lamb: What precisely is considered roasting, especially in contradistinction to cooking? Is there one specific method that must be used, or are there different options? 
  An individual who is ritually impure may not prepare or partake of a Paschal lamb. Instead, his fulfillment of the mitzva is postponed until the second Pesah. This is true unless the majority of the Jewish people are ritually impure, in which case there is a special dispensation and the Paschal lamb may be brought despite the impurity. It remains to be clarified, though, which categories of ritual impurity disqualify a person from participating in the mitzva of the Paschal lamb, or in the case where the majority of the people are impure, which allow for it to be brought in impurity.
  Concerning the prohibition against breaking the bones of the Paschal lamb, which bones are included in the prohibition, and when does the prohibition apply? Furthermore, does this prohibition also apply to a Paschal lamb that became impure or was disqualified? 
  Any meat that remains after the night of Passover must be burned. It needs to be clarified how exactly the meat should be burned, where is it burned, and with which types of wood. Also, which sections of the lamb must be burned and which do not need to be?
  The Torah defines that the Paschal lamb should be eaten by a group within a single house. Immediately the question arises as to how to define a house for this purpose. Does any structure qualify? Can more than one house be used?
  All these issues and related ones are discussed and clarified in this chapter, including whether these obligations are only the ideal way for the mitzvot to be performed or whether their violation actually disqualifies the offering.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  The halakhot relating to the consumption of the Paschal lamb may be divided into two distinct categories: The principles and mitzvot relating to the manner in which it must be eaten, and the various halakhot of ritual purity and impurity as they apply.
  The Paschal lamb must be entirely roasted directly over a fire. The chapter discussed how this is practically achieved and how to ensure that no part of the lamb is cooked through any other method.
  The Gemara concluded that the prohibition against breaking the bones of the Paschal lamb applies only to parts of the lamb that are objectively categorized as bones, irrespective of whether they are soft or hard. Consequently, there is no difference in this regard between a tender kid whose bones are soft and a tougher older goat. 
  The requirement to burn the remains of the Paschal lamb applies to any parts of the lamb that are edible. The actual burning does not override Shabbat or the Festival; rather, the leftovers are burned at the first opportunity during the intermediate days.
  The Torah mandates that the Paschal lamb be eaten by a group within a single house. The definition of a house is any closed-in, self-defined unit. A few groups may share a single house, but meat from one group's lamb may not be shared with another group.
  The halakhot of ritual purity and impurity as they relate to the Paschal lamb are as follows: Ideally, the Paschal lamb should be sacrificed in a state of ritual purity. This means that both the lamb and the owners of the lamb, who will eat it, must remain in a state of purity throughout. In the event that a state of purity was not maintained, the halakha depends on whether the problem arose before or after the blood of the lamb was sprinkled on the altar. If the blood was sprinkled while both the lamb and the owners were still ritually pure, it is considered a valid offering and the owners fulfill their obligation. However, due to the impurity, they may not partake of the lamb's meat, and it must be burnt. In the event that the problem arose before the blood was sprinkled, the lamb is disqualified from use, its blood may not be sprinkled, and those sacrificing it must bring another Paschal lamb. If the owners became impure and are unable to become pure in time to bring another Paschal lamb that day, they must wait until the second Pesah. 
  There is an exception to the rule that an owner who is impure defers bringing the offering until the second Pesah, and that is when the majority of the Jewish people have become impure. In that case, there is a specific dispensation, and the Paschal lamb may be brought despite the impurity. However, this dispensation applies only to impurity imparted by a corpse. Those who have become impure due to a different type of impurity are still not permitted to sacrifice the Paschal lamb in a state of impurity.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  Speak to all the congregation of Israel, saying: On the tenth day of this month they shall take to them every man a lamb, according to their fathers' houses, a lamb for a household; and if the household be too little for a lamb, then shall he and his neighbor next to his house take one according to the number of the souls; according to every man's eating you shall make your count for the lamb. Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male of the first year; you shall take it from the sheep, or from the goats.
  (Exodus 12:3–5) 
  But every man's servant that is bought for money, when you have circumcised him, then shall he eat from it. A sojourner and a hired servant shall not eat from it. In one house shall it be eaten; you shall not remove any of the meat from the house to the outside, and you shall not break a bone in it.
  (Exodus 12:44–46) 
  And when a stranger shall sojourn with you, and will offer the Paschal lamb to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it; and he shall be as one that is born in the land; but no uncircumcised person shall eat from it. (Exodus 12:48) 
  This chapter deals entirely with one topic: The group of people who join together to be registered for a Paschal lamb. That the Paschal lamb may be eaten only by those who registered as a group was already mentioned at the end of the previous chapter. This chapter details who may be registered in a group, when and how it is possible to be registered, and when one can withdraw from being registered. Other questions also arise: Are women, slaves, and minors able to create their own groups, or must they join an already existing group? Must a group consist of a number of people, or may a single individual constitute his own group? 
  The discussion about registration also considers the protocol in various cases of doubt. What happens when there is a doubt about which group a person is registered with? What if there is doubt about which animal belongs to the group; either because different animals were intermingled, or because they are unsure which animal they registered for?
  As discussed in the previous chapter, one who is ritually impure may not partake of the Paschal lamb. This chapter continues that discussion and examines which types of impurity exclude a person. What should be done if a person is still impure at the time the Paschal lamb is sacrificed, but by the evening, when it will be eaten, he will have already become pure?
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter primarily focused on the halakhot pertaining to the group a person must be part of in order to partake of the Paschal lamb. 
  A person may not be registered with two different groups. As such, the Gemara considered situations in which a person is unsure with which group he is registered. In such cases, sometimes it is assumed the person is registered with whichever group he expressed a preference for, and other times the Sages provided specific guidelines to determine which group a person is assumed to be registered with. 
  A similar problem presents itself when a group is unsure for which animal they are registered, since they may not be registered for two animals. For example, if an agent is appointed by a group to slaughter the Paschal offering, but it was never specified whether he should slaughter a lamb or a kid, it is assumed the group intends to be registered with whichever animal the agent selects. If they did specify a specific type, but the agent doesn't recall what was said, the only recourse is for him to slaughter two animals using the specific stipulation developed by the Gemara, and then, when he returns to the group, they will identify for him which one they had instructed him to slaughter. If they themselves don't recall which one they specified, they may certainly not partake of either animal, but in certain cases they still fulfill their obligation to sacrifice it.
  The Gemara recorded a debate concerning at which point a person may register with a group and withdraw from being registered and concluded that movement is possible only before the lamb is slaughtered.
  The Gemara also delineated which compositions of groups are permitted. It is permitted for a single individual to be registered alone for a Paschal lamb. It is also permitted to form a group comprised entirely of women or slaves. However, the Sages warned against creating groups of certain combinations of people, such as slaves and women, out of concern for improprieties. 
  One who will be unable to partake of the Paschal lamb, for example, if he will be ritually impure or if he will be physically unable to do so, is not permitted to join a group. However, where there is a realistic possibility that a person will be able to consume the Paschal lamb, even if he is currently in a state in which he is unable to do so, he may join a group with others. Even in such a case, it is permitted for him only if he will join other people who will definitely be able to eat, but a lamb may not be slaughtered exclusively for him, due to the possibility that he will not be fit to partake of the Paschal lamb by the evening.
  The Gemara related to cases where, due to various rabbinic decrees, a person would not be permitted to partake of sacrificial foods on the night of Passover. In certain cases, due to the importance of partaking of the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which carries the punishment of karet, the Sages waived their decrees. For example, the Sages permitted an acute mourner following his or her day of acute mourning to partake of the Paschal lamb despite the standard rabbinic decree prohibiting that person from eating sacrificial foods. However, in certain cases the Sages maintained their decrees, despite the fact that doing so would prevent a person from partaking of the Paschal lamb, for example, in the cases of a gentile who converted during the week prior to Passover.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  Speak to the people of Israel, saying: If any man of you or of your generations shall be ritually impure due to a dead body, or is on a journey far away, he shall still offer the Paschal lamb to the Lord. The fourteenth day of the second month at evening they shall offer it; they shall eat it with matzot and bitter herbs. They shall leave none of it to the morning, nor break a bone in it; according to the entire statute of the Paschal lamb they shall offer it. But the man who is ritually pure, and is not on a journey, and refrains from offering the Paschal lamb, that soul shall be cut off from his people; because he did not bring the offering of the Lord in its appointed season, that man shall bear his sin. And if a stranger shall sojourn among you, and will offer the Paschal lamb unto the Lord: According to the statute of the Paschal lamb, and according to its ordinance, so shall he do; you shall have one statute, both for the stranger, and for him that is born in the land. (Numbers 9:10–14)
  Your lamb shall be without blemish, a male of the first year; you shall take it from the sheep, or from the goats. (Exodus 12:5) 
  This chapter addresses two central issues: The halakhot of the second Pesah and the halakhot of a Paschal lamb with various problematic statuses or one that was lost or intermingled with other animals. 
  Although the basic halakhot of the second Pesah are explained in the Torah, there remain some unanswered questions. The central issue is the precise relationship between the first and second Pesah. Does the second Pesah exist only as a second opportunity for those who failed to bring the Paschal lamb on the first Pesah, or is it viewed as an independent Festival? The distinction lies in the case of one who was not obligated in the first Pesah. Can he nevertheless be required to participate in the second? Similarly, one who is liable to receive karet for willingly neglecting to bring a Paschal lamb on the first Pesah may still achieve atonement for his error on the second Pesah. Is this true only if he succeeds in actually bringing a Paschal lamb then, or even in cases in which he is exempted from the second Pesah, such as in a case where he was ritually impure at that point? Another matter that requires clarification is the extent to which the halakhot of the Paschal lamb on the two Pesahim are similar.
  This chapter also deals with problematic statuses and disqualifications that apply to offerings, for example, an offering whose owners have died, an offering that was to be brought at a specific time but was not, or an animal that was substituted for another that has already been consecrated, in which case the substitute attains a certain level of sanctity. In all these circumstances, the halahka depends in part on the type of offering involved. This chapter therefore seeks to determine the halakhot as they apply to the Paschal lamb.
  Also discussed is the protocol in a case in which a Paschal lamb is mixed up with other animals, including cases in which it is mixed up with other types of offerings or even with another Paschal lamb belonging to a different group.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  The Gemara established that the second Pesah is considered an independent Festival. Therefore, one who is unable to participate in the first Pesah and willingly neglects to participate in the second is liable to receive karet. However, one who is entirely exempt from participating in the first Pesah is not liable to receive karet even if he willingly neglects to bring a Paschal lamb on the second Pesah.
  There are two classes of halakhot of Passover. The halakhot relating directly to sacrifice of the Paschal lamb itself are identical for both the first and second Pesah. However, associated halakhot and mitzvot, such as the command to destroy leaven, apply only on the first Pesah.
  There are two cases in which one is considered exempt from the first Pesah: One who was ritually impure and could not become pure by the time of sacrifice and one who was a distance of more than fifteen mil from the Temple at that time. 
  This chapter also addressed the halakhot of an invalid Paschal lamb. A Paschal lamb is categorized as a type of peace-offering. As such, in many cases, when a Paschal lamb is disqualified from being used for its purpose, it defaults to a peace-offering. For example, a Paschal lamb that was lost and located only after it was supposed to be sacrificed and an animal that has been substituted for such an animal are treated as if they are peace-offerings. Similarly, a Paschal lamb that was lost and then found in time to be sacrificed must be left to graze until it develops a disqualifying blemish, at which point it may be sold and its money used to purchase peace-offerings. Also, a Paschal lamb whose owners died is brought as a peace-offering. 
  If two Paschal lambs belonging to different groups became mixed up or it was unclear for some other reason which lamb belonged to which group, if the animals had still not been slaughtered, then all the members of the groups had to withdraw their registration and then reregister with a particular animal using the appropriate stipulations. If the slaughter had already taken place, or the stipulations could not be made, then although the members were considered to have fulfilled their obligations to sacrifice the Paschal lamb, they may not partake of it.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  That you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord's Paschal offering, for He passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when He smote the Egyptians, and delivered our houses. And the people bowed the head and worshipped. (Exodus 12:27) 
  And you shall tell your son on that day, saying: It is because of this which the Lord did for me when I came forth out of Egypt. (Exodus 13:8)
  And it shall be when your son asks you in time to come, saying: What is this? that you shall say to him: By strength of hand the Lord brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage. (Exodus 13:14)
  You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shall you eat matzot with it, the bread of affliction; for you came out of the land of Egypt in haste, that you may remember the day when you came out of the land of Egypt all the days of your life. (Deuteronomy 16:3) 
  You shall have a song as in the night when a feast is hallowed; and gladness of heart, as when one goes with a flute to come into the mountain of the Lord, to the Rock of Israel. (Isaiah 30:29) 
  This chapter forms the conclusion of the second section of Pesahim, tractate Pesah Sheni. It deals with the order of Passover night and the customs and halakhot associated with the consumption of the Paschal lamb and other mitzvot of the night. 
  There are three mitzvot on Passover night mandated by Torah law: The consumption of the Paschal lamb together with matza and maror, the consumption of the matza, and the mitzva to recount the narrative of the Exodus. Additionally, the Sages introduced several enactments in order to emphasize the nature of the holiday and to publicize its miracle. These include the requirement to drink four cups of wine as an expression of freedom and grandeur. A further expression of one's freedom is achieved by the requirement to recline while eating. Other practices are described whose goal is to spark even young children's interest in order to encourage them to ask their fathers questions about the activities of the night, therefore providing the ideal context in which to recount the events of the Exodus. 
  All these practices, their details, and the order in which they are to be fulfilled form the content of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  Despite its changing face in each generation and in disparate communities, the order of Passover night has nevertheless retained its basic structure. This structure is grounded in the words of the Torah and the early customs developed in the times of the Prophets. Its full expression, which is barely different from its current form, was delineated by the Gemara in this chapter. 
  Even after the destruction of the Temple, when the Paschal lamb ceased to provide the central focus of the evening, the essential structure of the night remains the same. This includes the various requirements of washing one's hands and the consumption of matza, bitter herbs, karpas, and haroset. All this is in the context of a family meal, including the children, as the narrative of the Exodus is recounted.
  The ageless four questions and the customary answers in their traditional style form a single unit that focuses on the redemptive night in Egypt and the yearning for the future redemption. The various rabbinic enactments, customs, insights, and biblical exegeses have become a fixed part of the night's order. Even the various tactics designed to spark the children's interest are still employed, together with the leaning and the other expression of royal freedom, including the four cups of wine that express the hope and joy of redemption. 
  
  Beitzah
  
  Introduction to Beitzah
  
  Tractate Yom Tov, better known as Beitza after its first word, deals with the general halakhot of Festivals. Whereas other tractates in Seder Mo'ed address the laws of Shabbat and the mitzvot that are specific to each of the major Festivals, this tractate deals with the laws common to all Festivals. These halakhot include the commandment to rest from work, in the form of positive and negative mitzvot that apply to all Festivals. They are derived from the verses “It shall be a solemn rest unto you, a memorial proclaimed with the blast of shofarot, a sacred convocation” (Leviticus 23:24) and “You shall do no manner of servile work” (Leviticus 23:7, 8). 
  There is no difference between Shabbat and Festivals with regard to the basic definition of prohibited labor. On Festivals, as on Shabbat, the definition of labor is any action that entails creative work, performed intentionally. The details of the halakhot of prohibited labor on Festivals, and the decrees and enactments of the Sages to safeguard people from transgression and to emphasize the sanctity of the day, are very similar to the halakhot and enactments for the mitzva of rest and the prohibition against labor on Shabbat. Therefore, the main topics in this tractate can also be found in the tractates that deal with the laws of Shabbat, i.e., Shabbat and Eiruvin. Indeed, in terms of structure and content, tractate Beitza can be seen as a kind of addendum to Shabbat, not only in terms of the fundamental concepts but also with regard to the details of its halakhot. Consequently, this tractate addresses neither the sources of its halakhot nor the basic definitions of prohibited labor and the mitzva of rest. Its main focus is the elucidation of the differences between Shabbat and Festivals.
  The differences between prohibited labor on Shabbat and that on Festivals come to the fore in two main areas. The first distinction concerns the severity of the sin. The prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat is one of the most severe transgressions in the Torah, as it states: “Everyone who profanes it shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). Conversely, the prohibition against performing labor on a Festival is not as severe; rather, it is a regular negative commandment, punishable by lashes. Furthermore, the scope of the prohibition is different. All labor is prohibited on Shabbat, as the verse states: “Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh day is a Shabbat of solemn rest, a holy convocation; you shall do no manner of work; it is Shabbat to the Lord in all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:3). On Festivals, the prohibition is limited to servile labor: “A holy convocation; ye shall do no manner of servile work.” (Leviticus 23:7). The Sages explained the difference based on a different verse that refers to the festival of Passover: “No manner of work shall be done in them, save that which every man must eat, that only may be done by you” (Exodus 12:16). Accordingly, on Festivals the Torah permits labor that is for the purpose of sustenance, i.e., labor related to the preparation of food. The central topic of tractate Beitza is the elaboration and explication of this more limited prohibition against performing labor. 
  It was clear to the Sages that not all acts of labor involved in the preparation of food are included in this leniency. The early authorities debate whether the exclusion of certain labors is a rabbinic decree to safeguard the Festival, or if its source is from the Torah itself. There is a fundamental distinction between labors that merely prepare items that can be processed into food, e.g., hunting, harvesting, and similar actions, and labors that actually prepare food for eating, such as cooking and baking. 
  The significance of the different categories of labor is discussed at length by the early authorities. One possibility is that only those labors whose prohibition would prevent the consumption of the food or enable its spoilage on the Festival itself are permitted. Alternatively, only labors usually performed on the day the food will be eaten are allowed on Festivals, whereas labors usually done beforehand are prohibited, even for the sake of the Festival. Likewise, there is some doubt as to whether certain labors are prohibited solely on Shabbat and not at all on a Festival, as they are not labors in the full sense of the term. This debate applies primarily to the labors of carrying out from one domain to another and kindling fire, which are certainly permitted on Festivals. The question is whether these prohibitions are waived only for the sake of food preparation on the Festival, or if they are never applied to Festivals at all.
  Although the Torah permitted labor for the purpose of sustenance on Festivals, the Sages deemed it necessary to create limits and restrictions on this halakha, both so that the sanctity of the Festivals would be preserved and to prevent a Festival from turning into a regular workday, albeit with a few restrictions. Consequently, the Sages established many enactments and safeguards to limit the performance of labor to essential actions that are necessary for the Festival. They also sought to avoid the appearance of industrial labor or commercial transactions. Furthermore, in several areas the Sages were stricter with regard to Festivals than Shabbat, as the less severe punishments and the permission to perform certain labors are liable to cause people to disparage the Festivals. 
  The concerns that led the Sages to limit the scope of permitted actions on a Festival, however, are counterbalanced by another consideration: On Festivals there is a special mitzva to be joyful, as stated in the Torah: “And you shall rejoice in your Festival...and you shall be altogether joyful” (Deuteronomy 16:14–15). This joy, as evident from the context of this passage and its interpretation by the Sages, is expressed and actualized by means of eating, drinking, and wearing beautiful clothing, among other activities (Pesahim 109a and elsewhere). Therefore, one must ensure that the restrictions on labor are not so great that they negate the joy of the Festival. Indeed, the appropriate balance between these two considerations, the honor of the Festival as a day of rest on the one hand and a day of joy on the other, is one of the central dilemmas that arise in many discussions in this tractate. 
  The relationship between Shabbat and Festivals concerns not only the halakhic comparisons between them but also the problems that arise when a Festival immediately follows or, especially, precedes Shabbat. The Sages established several enactments for this situation, primarily the joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin], both to make it possible to prepare food on the Festival for Shabbat and to ensure that this preparation does not lead one to show disrespect for or neglect the Festival due to the approaching day of rest.
  Another issue that is specific to the halakhot of Festivals is the ancient enactment that people living outside Eretz Yisrael must observe the second Festival day of the Diaspora, in addition to the single day observed in Eretz Yisrael. Initially, this halakha was established due to problems and difficulties in communication between Eretz Yisrael and distant places in the Diaspora. Since the New Moon was declared in Eretz Yisrael, and the dates of the Festivals were determined by the first of the month, inhabitants of distant places would not always know the correct day when the Festival began. The Sages therefore decreed that residents of the Diaspora celebrate two Festival days, one of which would certainly be correct. However, aside from this technical difficulty, many other considerations also motivated this enactment. Consequently, those living outside Eretz Yisrael celebrate two Festival days even in modern times, when the dates of the Festival are established by a fixed calendar.
  Tractate Beitza consists of five chapters. Although the topics of these chapters are interrelated, each focuses on a particular central issue.
  Chapter One mainly discusses the halakhot of set-aside [muktze] and preparation, and the related issue of moving and carrying out objects.
  Chapter Two deals with the issue of an eiruv tavshilin, and the manner of sacrificing offerings that may be brought on a Festival.
  Chapter Three addresses the halakhot of hunting, slaughtering, and other matters connected with the preparation of meat on and for the sake of a Festival.
  Chapter Four analyzes the halakha of transferring objects from one place to another on a Festival. It also discusses other limitations, whether from the Torah or from the Sages, imposed on the performance of permitted labors on a Festival.
  Chapter Five deals with the general definitions of permitted and prohibited acts on a Festival, and with the halakhot of the joining of borders [eiruvei tehumin] on a Festival.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  One of the restrictions the Sages added to the prohibition of labor on Shabbat and Festivals is the proscription against moving set-aside [muktze] objects. A set-aside item, as the name indicates, is something that one has removed from his mind and does not plan to use on Shabbat. This setting aside can be performed intentionally, or it can be dictated by circumstance. The main reason for the prohibition of muktze is to safeguard against the performance of prohibited labor on the day of rest.
  Although there is a general definition of muktze, there are many different opinions with regard to the details of this concept. One disputed issue is the definition of an article removed from one's mind, whether this categorization is established by his thoughts or based on a general definition.
  Furthermore, there are several different types of muktze. One general category includes raw materials that are not fit for use on a day of rest. An object of this kind is called muktze because of itself. Certain processed items are included in other categories of muktze: Muktze due to a prohibition, in the case of utensils whose function is prohibited; muktze because of repulsiveness; and muktze because of monetary loss, in the case of an important and expensive item that people would not use for anything other than its designated purpose. In addition, there are items that are actively set aside by a person who decides that he will not utilize them for a period of time because they are currently unfit for use. Another, stricter category of muktze is an item that came into being on the day of rest. Not all the Sages agree on these definitions of muktze, and there any many disputes among the tanna'im on this matter.
  These differences of opinion, which already existed between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, were continued by later tanna'im. Some were strict with regard to the halakhot of muktze and even added further categories, whereas others, like Rabbi Shimon and his son, were lenient and classified only special cases as muktze. These dilemmas, which are addressed mainly in tractate Shabbat, feature in Beitza with regard to the halakhot of Festivals. The pertinent questions derive from the essential differences between Shabbat and Festivals: Since certain labors are permitted on the Festival, there is apparently no reason to prohibit as muktze anything connected to those activities. However, there is a concern that if the Sages are too lenient concerning Festivals, people might show disrespect for the holy day. Consequently, many authorities maintain that the halakhot of muktze are actually stricter on Festivals than on Shabbat. With that said, one must be careful that the extra stringencies of the Festival halakhot should not minimize the joy of the Festival, which is a Torah obligation. These considerations form the main issues of this chapter, although many other problems arise in connection with these fundamental dilemmas.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  This chapter essentially dealt with the clarification of the halakhot of muktze, although it broadened the discussion to address the more general issue of which items may or may not be moved on a Festival. Since it is permissible to perform certain labors on Festivals, including carrying out from one domain to another, which, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, is entirely permitted on a Festival, the Sages limited the general movement of objects on Festivals. The chapter consists of a list of disputes, mainly between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai, in which Beit Shammai are generally strict with regard to muktze, moving items, and carrying from one domain to another, whereas Beit Hillel are lenient in all of these cases. With regard to carrying out, Beit Hillel are lenient because they hold that this prohibition fundamentally does not apply to Festivals. In the other cases, they are lenient because they maintain that a stringent ruling might lessen the joy of the Festival.
  Nevertheless, the consensus is that in contrast to Shabbat, one must be stringent with regard to muktze on Festivals, in order to preserve the sanctity of the day. The principle is that anything that could have been moved and prepared before the Festival, as well as actions that might seem to others as disrespectful of the Festival or that have the appearance of a commercial transaction, are prohibited on a Festival, even according to the lenient opinion. Similarly, several prohibitions were enacted with the aim of encouraging people to prepare the requirements of the Festival beforehand, and to ensure that the proper observance of the Festival does not impinge upon its joy.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  And on the first day there shall be a holy gathering, and on the seventh day there shall be a holy gathering to you; no manner of work shall be done on them, only that which every person must eat, that alone may be done for you. (Exodus 12:16)
  And he said to them: This is that which the Lord has said. Tomorrow is the rest of the holy Shabbat to the Lord; bake that which you will bake today, and what you will boil, boil today; and that which remains over lay up for you to be kept until the morning. (Exodus 16:23)
  As stated in the Torah, labors associated with preparing food, e.g., cooking, baking, and slaughtering, are permitted on a Festival. This allowance raises many dilemmas, and this chapter focuses upon two areas. First, the Torah permitted cooking and baking on a Festival, but this allowance was understood to apply only to what is needed for the Festival itself and not for another day, certainly not for a weekday. The question arises: What should one do when a Festival occurs on a Friday, so that certain preparations for the Shabbat that immediately follows the Festival must perforce be made on the Festival, such as lighting a candle and preparing cooked food? 
  In order to emphasize the sanctity of the Festival, and to highlight the prohibition of preparing on the Festival for another day, the Rabbis enacted the joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin]. This eiruv, similar to the other eiruv enactments of the Rabbis, involves a formal act that unites two different entities into a single unit. Here the eiruv mixes together the Festival and Shabbat, so that the meals on the two days are considered not as separate meals but rather as one continuous meal. Therefore, everything that is prepared on the Festival will necessarily be prepared also for Shabbat, without any sense of separation between the two. The Rabbis, however, disagreed about the details of this law: How one must prepare this eiruv, why it is necessary, and to what does it apply. 
  The second dilemma regarding the scope of the dispensation to perform certain labors on a Festival concerns slaughtering that is not performed for a Jew's sustenance. The most important question relates to the bringing of sacrificial offerings on a Festival. Should one view an offering brought by an individual that is not eaten, or even one that is eaten by its owner, as something that is needed on the Festival, so that the offering may be brought on the Festival itself? Or perhaps the dispensation extends to people's physical needs alone. This issue was a matter of dispute, and it is actually the first recorded halakhic dispute, dating back to the period of the Hasmoneans. Due to its antiquity, there are many opinions regarding its scope and the issues included in it.
  Other issues that arise and are relevant even after the destruction of the Temple relate to food preparation for a Jew's animals and for gentiles who come to visit a Jew or are forced upon him on a Festival. The essence of the question is: Does the dispensation to perform certain labors on a Festival extend also to these cases? These issues are the main subject matter of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter, too, strung together a series of disputes between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai regarding Festivals, adding disagreements relating to the limits of the dispensation to perform certain labors on a Festival.
  Regarding the joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin], the Gemara concluded that an eiruv may be established with one loaf of bread and one cooked food that are prepared on the eve of the Festival for use on Shabbat. Relying on the eiruv, one may prepare more food on the Festival for the Festival, and thereby also for Shabbat. It further concludes that by making this eiruv, one may bake, cook, insulate hot food, and light a candle on the Festival for Shabbat, and one need not prepare a separate eiruv for each of these actions.
  Regarding the question whether one may immerse items in a ritual bath on a Festival for Shabbat, it was concluded that anything that can be immersed on the eve of the Festival must be immersed prior to the Festival, and that preparations not involving food may not be made on a Festival for Shabbat, even in the case of immersion, which involves a rabbinic prohibition. The only non-food items that may be prepared on a Festival for Shabbat are cases in which the preparation is not noticeable or significant.
  As for the ancient dispute regarding the bringing of sacrificial offerings on a Festival, the Gemara concluded that one is permitted to sacrifice all offerings that are in some way dependent upon the Festival, whether because one is obligated to offer them on the Festival or because they add to its joy. No distinction is made between peace-offerings, which are eaten, and burnt-offerings, which are not. Even the practice of placing hands on the head of the animal to be sacrificed continues on a Festival as on a weekday, and no distinction is made between actions that are avoidable and ones that are absolutely necessary.
  Even though the dispensation to perform labor that is “for you” is broadened in the case of offerings brought on the altar, in the case of non-sacred labor, the allowance applies only to labor performed for a Jew. It is therefore prohibited to perform a labor for the sake of a gentile, unless it is done incidentally, as an addition to that which is being performed for a Jew. Similarly, one may not perform a prohibited labor on a Festival for the sake of an animal.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  Saying: When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell grain? And the Shabbat, that we may set forth corn? (Amos 8:5)
  The dispensation to perform labor for the purpose of food preparation on a Festival extends only to labors performed immediately prior to eating, such as baking, cooking, and slaughtering. The labors that precede these actions, however, are not permitted, even though they too are performed for the sake of food preparation.
  This chapter addresses two main issues connected in some way to the preparation of meat for eating, or, more precisely, to the labors that precede its preparation. One issue is trapping animals in order to eat them. The labor of trapping itself is not included among those permitted on a Festival; however, it is necessary to clearly define this prohibited labor in this specific context. From a certain perspective, it is possible to say that any apprehension of an animal and removal of it from its natural habitat is in some sense considered trapping. Therefore, it must be determined when catching an animal is considered trapping and when it is considered merely taking hold of an animal that had been designated to be slaughtered and eaten. 
  Just as a dilemma exists with respect to catching animals, there is a parallel need to clarify how one may prepare and examine animals before slaughter. This question is sharpened in the case of a firstborn kosher animal that has developed a blemish. This firstborn, which has become non-consecrated and is considered the property of the priest, is fit to be eaten on a Festival. However, the question arises whether the actions of examining and preparing the animal are included among the actions that in themselves are permitted on a Festival, or whether one should view the procedure as a court action that is prohibited by rabbinic decree on a Festival.
  Another central topic relates to the purchase of food products. Commercial activity is prohibited on a Festival as it is on Shabbat. Although commerce is not itself a prohibited labor, it can lead to the performance of many labors. This restriction against trade on Shabbat and Festivals dates back to the time of the prophets. The question is whether a way can be found to allow a person to take items from a friend's home or from a shopkeeper's store, without violating the prohibition against commerce on a Festival. These dilemmas and related matters are the essential issues addressed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  The fundamental conclusion is that the labor of trapping applies only to non-domesticated animals that do not live in one's house on a permanent basis; taking hold of domesticated animals, however, does not constitute trapping. Regarding non-domesticated animals, even if they are in one's domain, and even if catching them does not require a full-fledged act of trapping, nevertheless if it is not within one's ability to take hold of them at any moment, then their capture constitutes trapping and is prohibited on a Festival.
  The procedure of permitting a blemished firstborn animal is prohibited on a Festival if the entire procedure is performed on the Festival. However, if the essence of the judgment was completed before the Festival, it is permitted to conclude the procedure on the Festival itself. There are even certain methods by which one may use circumvention and raise a blemished animal from a pit into which it fell, though in that case there is the added element of concern for the animal's suffering. 
  Many restrictions were instituted by the Sages in order to prevent any action similar to commerce on a Festival. Therefore, weighing and measuring were prohibited, as well as cutting up an animal into standard, family-sized portions, if it is done in a manner similar to the customary commercial practice in that area. Nevertheless, a person may take items, whether from a friend or a shopkeeper, provided that it is done in the manner of borrowing from a neighbor, without stipulating a price or a defined measure as in a commercial transaction. A general principle was established in these matters: All actions of apportioning or counting that people generally do in their homes for their families may be done also with another person, provided that the commercial aspect is not mentioned explicitly.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  If you turn away your foot because of Shabbat, from pursuing your business on My holy day; and call Shabbat a delight and the sanctity of the Lord honorable; and shall honor it, not doing your wonted ways, nor pursuing your business, nor speaking thereof... (Isaiah 58:13)
  Even in the case of labors that were permitted on a Festival, the Sages saw fit to establish various restrictions in order to preserve its holiness. Their concern was that the Festival not become similar to a weekday by the performance of unnecessary labor, work that involves great effort even if it is not technically a prohibited labor, or actions done in public that appear to show disrespect for the holiness of the day.
  Furthermore, a labor that is itself permitted on a Festival often requires preparatory acts that sometimes contain an aspect of desecration of the Festival or even a full-fledged prohibited labor, either due to the prohibition of set-aside [muktze] or because the preparatory act itself is not truly for the sake of sustenance.
  The dilemmas and discussions in this chapter essentially focus on defining boundaries: When is an action considered insignificant, not constituting labor, and when does a process qualify as an act of creative labor? This question is further complicated by the fact that sometimes even a full-fledged labor does not appear to be work, because it is a simple action that requires no special skill. Testing these boundaries, and weighing the issue of celebrating the Festival joyfully against limiting effort and work, are the main topics of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  It was essentially concluded in this chapter that even when an action is permitted on a Festival, care must be taken not to perform it in the manner of a weekday, because this constitutes disrespect for the Festival's sanctity. Nonetheless, it was clarified that in each case, one must carefully weigh whether the modifications done for the sake of the sanctity of the Festival will cause increased effort and hassle and therefore decrease the joy of the Festival, or alternatively whether they will cause one to perform extra prohibited actions. 
  Another issue discussed is that despite the permission to do various things that are not considered labor and which contribute to the joy of the Festival, the laws of muktze are not completely disregarded. Therefore, anything that is set aside, whether due to a prohibition or because it is designated for other needs, may not be used on a Festival. 
  Another topic discussed and decided in this chapter concerns the labors involved in preparing the requirements of the Festival, such as what the Sages call acts that facilitate the preparation of food [makhshirei okhel nefesh]. According to the opinion of most of the Sages, one may not perform a full-fledged labor in such a case. Therefore, he must refrain even from acts that he generally does for the sake of sustenance on a weekday, such as setting up stones for use, setting up a pot for cooking, or making a fire. Since these include the labor of building or the creation of something new on a Festival, they too are prohibited, even though they are necessary for the Festival. 
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  This chapter serves as a conclusion to the laws of Festivals and deals mainly with two topics. The first relates to actions that do not actually involve forbidden labors, but their performance either shows disrespect for the Festival or is rabbinically prohibited to protect the character of the day of rest. The second issue is the laws of boundaries, dealing with the limit beyond which a person may not travel on Shabbat or Festivals.
  Shevut, meaning “rest,” is the name given to many actions that the Sages prohibited on Shabbat and Festivals in order to emphasize the nature of the day as one of rest and refraining from labor. In general, an action considered a shevut is not actually a prohibited labor, but the Sages prohibited it nevertheless because it is similar to or related to other labors and is likely to lead one to perform an actual forbidden labor. There are also certain restrictions not due to set-aside [muktze], but due to a shevut restriction.
  This chapter addresses actions that are prohibited because they show disrespect for the Festival. It also discusses the general rules of shevut, whose prohibitions apply on Festivals as on Shabbat.
  The Shabbat limit is a special restriction for days of rest. Even though on a Festival there is no prohibition of carrying out items from one domain to another, nevertheless the Shabbat limit, i.e., the boundary beyond which one may neither go himself nor transport items, applies on Festivals as on Shabbat.
  The main laws of boundaries are explained in detail in tractate Eiruvin, but due to the dispensation to perform labor for the sake of food preparation on a Festival, additional issues arise, mostly regarding the use of items that have been brought from outside the Festival limit. In such a case, one must clarify which of those items are prohibited, not from the perspective of the laws of prohibited labors or muktze, but due to the prohibition of boundaries.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  In this chapter it was concluded that all actions rabbinically prohibited due to maintaining Shabbat as a day of rest [shevut] are prohibited on Festivals as well. Included in this restriction are both acts that have no element of a mitzva to them and those that do; even certain actions that are full-fledged mitzvot are nevertheless prohibited on a day of rest, lest they lead one to perform an actual prohibited labor. The Sages' concern in such situations is focused mainly on anything similar to commercial transactions, which are themselves prohibited, especially due to the prohibited labor of writing that usually accompanies them. A second concern is with regard to the prohibition of preparing and fashioning implements that are used for those actions. 
  The laws of boundaries on Festivals are the same as those on Shabbat. However, additional discussion was necessary to cover cases that do not occur on Shabbat because the items in question are prohibited to use on Shabbat. Therefore, discussed here were not only produce and other items that are fit for immediate use, but also animals that are intended for slaughter, ingredients for cooked foods, and the like. The general principle is: Anything that was outside the boundary before the onset of the Festival, and a joining of borders [eiruv tehumin] was not prepared for it, is not only prohibited to bring into the boundary, but is prohibited to use even if it was already brought inside.
  This chapter, the last of the tractate, ends with a halakha that relates somewhat to the laws of boundaries, regarding animals that are outside the settled area and those that are within the boundary of the community. However, this issue also touches upon the laws of muktze, and the tractate thereby concludes with the same issue with which it began.
  
  Chagigah
  
  Introduction to Chagigah
  
  Tractate Hagiga deals with the halakhot of the mitzva to ascend and appear in the Temple on the three pilgrimage Festivals. The analysis of these halakhot can be divided into two main categories: The offerings which the pilgrims must bring, and ritual purity and impurity, especially those aspects which are relevant to the Festivals.
  The mitzvot of the Torah to ascend to the Temple and to celebrate and rejoice on the Festivals are expressed in both general and specific terms. The general obligation, “Three times a year all your males shall appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17), is supplemented by a practical means of implementation by the Torah itself: “And none shall appear before Me empty-handed” (Exodus 23:15). As is clear from several places in the Torah (e.g., Deuteronomy 12:11–12), this means that pilgrims must bring with them special offerings for the Festivals. In other words, in addition to the fixed, communal Festival offerings, the details of which are set out mainly in Leviticus 23 and Numbers 28–29, each individual pilgrim must sacrifice special offerings brought for the Festival. Similarly, the other, undefined commandments, i.e., the celebration of and rejoicing in the Festival, are fulfilled in a highly practical manner, through the sacrifice of certain animal offerings.
  The Torah itself does not state which offerings must be brought by individuals, as the verses themselves provide mere allusions in this regard. However, by tradition of the Sages there are three types of Festival offerings: The burnt-offering of appearance, the Festival peace-offering, and the peace-offering of rejoicing. Every individual pilgrim who appears before God in the Temple must bring a burnt-offering of appearance. The Festival peace-offering is likewise obligatory, while the peace-offering of rejoicing is a separate offering that has no fixed requirement; it is brought if more meat is necessary for the rejoicing of the Festival. 
  In addition to these offerings, pilgrims would ascend to Jerusalem for the Festivals with the other offerings and gifts they were obligated to bring to the Temple or to the city. These included the various obligatory offerings, e.g., burnt-offerings, sin-offerings and guilt-offerings for specific sins, offerings brought in fulfillment of a vow, firstborns, animal tithe, and second tithe produce and its redemption money. These were typically brought on the Festival, not only for reasons of convenience so as to avoid several trips to Jerusalem, but also because the connection between one's sacrificial obligations and the rejoicing of the Festivals is established by the Torah itself (see, for example, Deuteronomy 12:6–12). 
  The numerous offerings brought by pilgrims raises the problem of the relationship between the obligatory Festival offerings and those which are not connected to the festivities of the day. The general principle that one cannot fulfill the duty to bring one offering by the sacrifice of another is applicable here, and therefore one must bring special offerings for the Festival. However, it is necessary to determine the minimum requirement of these offerings, as well as whether this measure applies by Torah law or whether the Torah simply imposes a general obligation and the Sages established a fixed value for these offerings. In the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'a 1:1 and the beginning of Hagiga) this is treated as a general inquiry with regard to all halakhic measurements that are not mentioned in the Torah itself. Conversely, the Babylonian Talmud apparently considers this a specific problem involving the Festival offerings, which are not detailed at all in the Torah. 
  In any case, there are certain ways to combine an obligatory offering with animals or money that are designated for a different offering. Furthermore, they can be used for the fulfillment of the peace-offerings of rejoicing, whose obligation is less clearly delineated than that of the other two categories. 
  The classification of these offerings as Festival offerings raises a series of questions. First, the period of the Festival must be defined: Does it refer only to the Festival itself, or are the intermediate days of the Festival also included? If the obligation applies solely on the Festival day, how should one treat the animals sacrificed thereon? 
  It is prohibited to perform labor on a Festival, and several of the mitzvot of an animal offering involve the performance of labor, especially the placing of one's hands on an offering, an act that is not indispensible for the sacrificial rite. Although these mitzvot were performed regularly, and therefore one would expect there to have been an established custom in this regard, certain details of the rite were nevertheless subject to ancient disputes that were left unresolved. 
  Another topic dealt with in this tractate is the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity. These halakhot are tightly bound to the Temple and to consecrated items. In essence, the use of ritually impure objects is not forbidden in and of itself, but only when one will come into contact with teruma or the Temple and its sacred articles. 
  Nevertheless, many Jews would be careful to remain in a state of ritual purity at all times, even when they dealt with non-sacred objects and foods. These people were called haverim. The opposite category of people, i.e., those who were not scrupulous with regard to ritual purity and impurity as well as with regard to several other areas of halakha, were known as amei ha'aretz. Due to the care that must be taken to preserve ritual purity, and because of the severity of the halakhot of ritual impurity, which include numerous rabbinic ordinances, the Sages decreed that amei ha'aretz should be considered ritually impure at all times. However, this level of caution and separation could be maintained only in the rest of the country and not in the Temple itself, which is shared by all Jews.
  The problem of the ritual purity of sacred articles was resolved in two main ways. On the one hand, the Sages instituted a large number of restrictive decrees with regard to ritual purity and impurity which went far beyond the halakhot of the Torah. These ordinances and restrictions were designed to ensure that no ritual impurity that applied by Torah law would be found in the Temple precincts, especially concerning the red heifer and the waters of the purification offering. On the other hand, even amei ha'aretz, who were not particular about the observance of every mitzva, treated the Temple with great respect and were careful about its sanctity and ritual purity. Consequently, they too were considered trustworthy when it came to any questions involving the ritual purity of sacred articles. Furthermore, the Sages added a special decree that applied to the Festival period: When all Jews ascend to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage Festivals they are considered “Knit together [haverim] as one man” (Judges 20:11) in every regard. In the words of the psalmist, “Jerusalem is built as a city that is compact together,” at those times when “the tribes ascended there...to give thanks to the name of the Lord” (Psalms 122:3–4). 
  Ritual purity and impurity is the most difficult and complex area of halakha. An entire order of the Mishna is devoted to the analysis of these halakhot (see the introduction of the Rambam to the order of Teharot in his Commentary on the Mishna). The discussion in tractate Hagiga focuses mainly on the differences between the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity in general and their particular application to sacred articles, concerning which many stringencies and higher standards are imposed both by Torah law and by rabbinic law. At the same time, the tractate also deals with the trustworthiness of all Jews in this regard, and the leniencies that are invoked during the pilgrimage Festivals. 
  Incidental to the general discussion concerning the halakhot of the Festival offerings, which are only alluded to in the Torah, an entire section of the tractate deals with areas of the Torah that are not detailed and elucidated in the Torah itself. In some cases these topics are halakhot mentioned in Torah in the form of allusions, while their main explication is found in the traditions of the Oral Law. Other matters are kept hidden by their very nature, as they are not meant to be studied by all people. These issues, which were not taught in public lectures, were called Ma'aseh Bereshit, the Act of Creation, which deals with the secrets of the creation of the world, and Ma'aseh Merkava, the Design of the Divine Chariot, which concerns the lofty, upper world and Divine Providence. 
  Tractate Hagiga does not clarify these esoteric subjects, but it does explain their permitted and prohibited areas of inquiry as well as why the Sages were reluctant to publicize these ideas. Moreover, they are not matters of halakha and are not connected at all to the mitzvot of the pilgrimage Festivals, yet the main analysis in the Talmud of these esoteric issues appears in this tractate. Indeed, there is an intimate connection between esoterica, which involve the heavenly entourage and the Temple of above, and tractate Hagiga, which deals with the obligations of those pilgrims who ascend to “appear before the Lord God.”
  Tractate Hagiga consists of three chapters, which move back and forth from one topic to another. 
  Chapter One deals with the basic pilgrimage obligation and the Festival offerings, as well as the various areas of the Torah that are merely alluded to in the Torah itself and which are elucidated by the tradition of the Sages. 
  Chapter Two covers those matters which may not be taught in public, the manner of bringing offerings on a Festival day, and the differences between the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity as they apply to non-sacred items, teruma, and the sacred articles of the Temple. 
  Chapter Three discusses the higher standard that is conferred on sacred articles beyond that of teruma, and the leniencies that the Sages applied to the ritual purity of consecrated items in Jerusalem, particularly during the Festival period.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  Three times you shall keep a feast to Me in the year. (Exodus 11:11–12)
  And you shall keep the feast of weeks to the Lord your God after the measure of the free-will offering of your hand, which you shall give, as the Lord your God blesses you. And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you, and your son, and your daughter, and your servant, and your maidservant, and the Levite who is within your gates, and the stranger, and the orphan, and the widow, who are in your midst, in the place that the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell there. (Deuteronomy 16:10–11)
  Three times a year shall all your males appear before the Lord your God at the place that He shall choose; on the feast of unleavened bread, and on the feast of weeks, and on the feast of tabernacles; and they shall not appear before the Lord empty-handed. Every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the Lord your God that He has given you. (Deuteronomy 16:16–17)
  The mitzvot of the pilgrimage Festivals: To “keep a feast,” to “rejoice before the Lord your God,” and to “appear before the Lord your God,” are not fully clarified in the Torah. Not only are the details of these commandments left unstated, their very meaning is vague. According to the tradition of the Sages, in addition to their broader connotations, these mitzvot are fulfilled by means of defined actions. One who undertakes the pilgrimage to the Temple must bring a burnt-offering of appearance, and two types of peace-offerings: The Festival peace-offering and the peace-offering of rejoicing. The relationship between the general meaning of these mitzvot and their precise manner of fulfillment is the subject of much debate. Furthermore, the details of the performance of these mitzvot in practice require elucidation. 
  Several practical questions must be addressed. First, who is obligated in the mitzva of the Festival pilgrimage and who is exempt from this obligation? Is there a connection between those who are required to fulfill this mitzva and those who are obligated to bring the Festival offerings? Second, what exactly are these offerings? Must they be of a particular value, or does this depend on the wishes and funds of each individual pilgrim? Furthermore, do these differ from voluntary offerings? May one fulfill these obligations by means of a combination with other obligatory offerings? 
  Another question concerns the days of the Festival on which one can fulfill this mitzva. Does the mitzva, or at least the main obligation, apply only on the first day or on all the Festival days, or even after the conclusion of the Festival? 
  The detailed analysis and elucidation of these questions is the topic of this chapter. 
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  With regard to the question of who is obligated to ascend to the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, the Gemara established several general principles. First of all, as this is a positive, time-bound mitzva, only men are obligated to ascend to the Temple, in accordance with the verse: “All your males” (Exodus 23:17), which includes emancipated slaves. Children who have reached the age of training in mitzvot are obligated by rabbinic law. Excluded from this obligation are women and slaves, even if they are half-free. Second, one who is unable to ascend by foot, due to either illness or weakness, is likewise exempt from the mitzva. Furthermore, a man is who unable to arrive together with the rest of the Jewish people because everyone shuns his company is also exempt. 
  The Festival offerings must be worth a minimum amount. The burnt-offering of appearance must be at least one silver ma'a in value, while the Festival peace-offering must be worth no less than two ma'a. However, there is no set value for the other peace-offering brought on a Festival, the peace-offering of rejoicing. The obligatory offerings for which there is a fixed sum must be brought from non-sacred funds, although one can add money designated for other offerings to increase the size of the peace-offering.
  The general obligation to rejoice on the pilgrimage Festivals applies to women as well as men. However, in the case of men this obligation is fulfilled in a defined manner, by eating the peace-offerings of rejoicing. This mitzva is performed through the consumption of any animal offering that may be eaten.
  The main mitzva of Festival offerings applies on the first Festival day. However, one who neglected to sacrifice his offerings on the first day can redress this deficiency on the rest of the days of the Festival. In the case of Shavuot, redress can be performed even after the Festival, as will be explained in the next chapter.
  Incidental to these halakhot, this chapter discussed two broader issues: Which transgressions of positive mitzvot and prohibitions can be remedied by means of repentance, and which cannot be fully atoned for through repentance alone. It also analyzed the relationship between those halakhot that are explained in great depth by the Sages and their sources in the Torah itself, especially those whose source verse is brief and obscure, occasionally no more than a mere allusion.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  And he shall lay his hand upon the head of his offering, and slaughter it before the tent of meeting; and Aaron's sons shall sprinkle its blood against the altar round about. (Leviticus 3:8)
  Three times a year shall all your males appear before the Lord your God at the place that He shall choose; on the feast of unleavened bread, and on the feast of weeks, and on the feast of tabernacles; and they shall not appear before the Lord empty-handed. (Deuteronomy 16:16)
  Continuing the discussion in the previous chapter concerning matters that the Bible does not mention explicitly but only alludes to or conceals, and which are explained and expanded in the Oral Law, this chapter relates to additional matters that are to be kept concealed. This is due to the complexity of these topics, which may lead unworthy students to err. It is necessary to explain which topics may not be taught publicly and openly like all other sections of the Torah, and to provide the reasons for this prohibition.
  Later, the chapter returns to the main concern of the tractate: The Festival offering brought on the Festival. The most ancient rabbinic dispute in a halakhic matter known to us is discussed in this chapter. It concerns whether or not one may place his hands on the head of the Festival offering. Another related dispute concerns the types of offerings one is allowed to bring on the actual day of the Festival: Whether only peace-offerings, most of which are consumed by the owner and the priests, are permitted, or whether one may also bring burnt-offerings, although people do not consume them.
  The pilgrimage to the Temple is a time when the entire people of Israel ascends to Jerusalem as one: Wise sages and ignorant simpletons alike, those who are stringent regarding mitzva observance along with those who are less stringent. The pilgrims were accustomed to bringing their teruma and tithes along with them, in accordance with rabbinic ordinances and decrees. It was therefore necessary to review the laws of ritual purity and impurity regarding these items and others. According to both Torah law and rabbinic law, with regard to the laws of ritual impurity and the process of purification, there are differences between non-sacred food, teruma, and sacred offerings. Different levels of stringency apply to each, according to their level of sanctity and importance. The main concern of this chapter is the clarification of these issues and other related topics.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  Three major Torah issues may be taught in public, but only in very small groups: The laws of forbidden sexual relations, the Act of Creation, and the Design of the Divine Chariot. This chapter focused on the two latter issues, which are related to divine secrets. The Gemara discussed which topics are included in the Act of Creation and the Design of the Divine Chariot, emphasizing how critical it is to take care not to study these topics, which are directly related to God's honor, unless one is thoroughly prepared. Even then, one who studies them may be in great danger, as the chapter described in detail.
  The dispute with regard to placing the hands on Festival offerings, which continued throughout the generation of the pairs until Hillel and Shammai and their students, ended in favor of Beit Hillel, who ruled that one may bring both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings on the Festival and that one may place the hands on them.
  With regard to the topic of purity and impurity, several levels of purity were discussed: Non-sacred food, i.e., tithes; teruma; sacred offerings; and the purifying waters of the red heifer. An additional difference between levels of purity pertains to washing one's hands from the impurity. The Rabbis ordained that with regard to the hands, in order to eat non-sacred food and teruma washing one's hands is sufficient, but in order to consume sacred offerings or for the sprinkling of the purifying waters a full immersion is required. 
  The major principle with regard to levels of purity was also explained in this chapter. Anything that is on a lower level of sanctity is considered as if it were impure with regard to things on a higher level of sanctity. An additional principle is that with regard to whether an item is completely ritually pure or not, one must have full intention and awareness that it has indeed maintained its pure status. In the absence of such awareness its status may no longer be relied upon, especially with regard to items that are of a higher level of sanctity.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  They shall keep My charge, lest they bear sin for it, and die thereby, if they profane it: I am the Lord Who sanctifies them. (Leviticus 22:9)
  Our feet were standing within your gates, O Jerusalem. Jerusalem, that is built as a city that is compact together. (Psalms 122:2–3)
  The Torah stresses several times its insistence on maintaining teruma and sacrificial items in a state of ritual purity, as well as the severe penalties for eating teruma or sacrificial food in a state of ritual impurity. In light of the Torah's directives to make safeguards for its commandments in general and for the maintenance of ritual purity for holy foods in particular, the Sages instituted various stringencies and decrees in order to, in their words: Make safeguards for the safeguards.
  These rabbinic safeguards and decrees for the maintenance of ritual purity are stricter or more lenient in accordance with the level of sanctity of the item for which they were intended. Thus, they were more stringent regarding sacrificial food than regarding teruma, and stricter still for the purification ashes of the red heifer. 
  The concept of instituting stricter standards for sacrificial food is found in the Torah itself. To this the Sages added various decrees to the effect that the slightest possibility of defilement or lack of care in the handling of sacrificial food should render it unfit or impure. The difference between unfit and impure is that the former would invalidate the item for use but would not defile other foods that came into contact with it, while the latter indicates something whose impurity can be passed on to other sacred foods. 
  Despite this general trend, there are certain situations in which the Sages were stricter with teruma than with sacrificial food. This is because teruma is set aside by everyone and is eaten by any priest in his own house, without the rabbinic supervision that prevailed in the Temple's sacrificial service, and not all priests were well versed in the laws or sufficiently meticulous about them. 
  In general, there were many people who lived during the Second Temple period who were not meticulous about observing the laws of ritual purity. These people are referred to as amei ha'aretz, common folk, while those who did maintain the strictures of ritual purity at all times were called haverim, literally, colleagues. Since teruma perforce often involved contact with amei ha'aretz, the Sages on occasion saw fit to apply stricter standards to teruma than to sacred foods, for which even amei ha'aretz could be relied upon to adhere to the highest standard.
  The elaboration of the Sages' enactments and decrees in these matters, both the strictures they imposed for sacrificial food and the leeway they occasionally granted for an item, in Jerusalem and specifically in the Temple, and especially during the Festival periods, are the major focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  The Sages enumerated ten stringencies that apply to sacrificial food and the vessels used in its preparation and storage which do not apply to teruma and its vessels, owing to the greater level of sanctity inherent in the former. Some of these stringencies have a basis in the Torah or are hinted at in verses, but they were expanded in scope and breadth by the Sages. Others are rabbinic decrees designed to avoid outright contamination of the sacred food. On the other hand, in view of the fact that everyone, including amei ha'aretz, adhered to the strictest standards in the preparation of sacrificial items, the Sages relied on amei ha'aretz for certain matters pertaining to sacrificial food, though ordinarily such people were not considered trustworthy regarding issues of ritual impurity.
  In actuality the trustworthiness afforded by the Sages in matters pertaining to sacrificial food was expanded beyond the sacrifices themselves, and was applied as well to other items that have a relationship to sacrifices. Consequently, the people of Judea, which is in close proximity to the Temple, were considered more trustworthy than others regarding the observance of ritual purity. The Sages showed leniency regarding certain other matters pertaining to the honor and sanctity of Jerusalem.
  Perhaps most sweeping of all was the leniency shown by the Sages during the time of the pilgrim Festivals. These occasions, when all of Israel assembled before God at the Temple, were considered times in which it was possible to rely completely on amei ha'aretz in all matters regarding ritual purity. This was based on the necessity to maintain harmony among all the various factions and individuals in Israel at this time of unity, when, in the words of the biblical verse, “All the men of Israel gathered...knit together [haverim] as one man” (Judges 20:11).
  
  Gittin
  
  Introduction to Gittin
  
  Tractate Gittin, according to the accepted arrangement of the tractates of the Mishna, is the penultimate tractate in the order of Nashim. This tractate deals mainly with a single topic, the manner in which divorce is performed. The situations in which divorce is permitted, justified, or even obligatory are discussed in other tractates, especially Ketubot.
  The uniqueness of divorce is that it cancels the marriage bond, a bond that created the severe prohibition against sexual intercourse with a married woman. This prohibition differs from the prohibition against forbidden relatives, in that it does not result from a blood relationship but is created via an action, i.e., betrothal. In the same way, this prohibition can be canceled by means of an action, i.e., divorce. Admittedly, a divorce does not entirely nullify the marriage bond, as there are several categories of forbidden relatives created by marriage that are not negated by a bill of divorce, e.g., a man is permanently forbidden to his wife's mother and daughter, even if the latter is not his daughter, and he is also forbidden to his wife's sister during his wife's lifetime. Likewise, after divorce the woman remains forbidden to his corresponding relatives. Nevertheless, the main prohibition, which is due to the married status of the woman herself, is canceled by a divorce.
  One fundamental aspect of the halakhot of bills of divorce is the juxtaposition of betrothal to divorce, which is derived from: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man's wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2; see 82b). Due to the severity of the consequences of a woman remarrying without having received a proper divorce, the Sages devoted an entire tractate to the clarification of the act of divorce and demanded that it be performed with great precision.
  The manner of a divorce is discussed in the Torah (Deuteronomy 24:1–4) but is treated with extreme brevity, and the Sages derived the many and varied requirements of a bill of divorce both by expounding every word and even every letter of these verses and through applying the detailed traditions of the Oral Law.
  The central feature of a divorce, as stated explicitly in the Torah and clarified by the Sages, is that the husband gives the wife a document that is called a bill of divorce in the language of the Sages. This document serves to release her from the marriage bond with him. In a betrothal, it is the man who betroths and marries the woman; so too, a divorce is performed by transmission of the document from the husband to his wife.
  Since the transmission of the bill of divorce from husband to wife effects the divorce and the consequent halakhic change in the woman's status, the document itself is an essential part of an act of divorce. Unlike bills of sale or other contracts, the main purpose of this document is not to serve as a written record of an act that was performed but rather to make that very act occur. Consequently, a bill of divorce must be written in the form of a declaration on the part of the husband: I hereby divorce. It is not written as a testimony. Furthermore, the document must be composed specifically for the particular couple undergoing the divorce. Although the Sages dispute whether this latter principle refers to the stage of writing, signing, or transmission, the principle itself is accepted unanimously.
  As stated above, the content of a bill of divorce is a declaration on the part of the husband that he is releasing his wife from all ties to him. The Torah states that this must be a “severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1), i.e., it must completely sever the marriage bond. Problems arise if the husband adds conditions to a bill of divorce, as the imposition of certain conditions can prevent the full severance of the ties between husband and wife.
  A bill of divorce effects the divorce itself and also serves as a document of proof, both with regard to matters involving prohibitions, e.g., from when is the woman considered divorced and permitted to all men apart from priests, and with regard to monetary obligations. The woman becomes entirely responsible for her own finances upon her divorce, and any property of hers that was held by her former husband reverts to her possession. Consequently, a bill of divorce must include a date and witnesses, like other legal documents.
  The requirement of a “scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:1) entails that the written document be authentic and reliable. To this end, it is necessary to define carefully the act of writing that fulfills the verse “And he writes her” (Deuteronomy 24:1). Similarly, it is important to determine what is considered a bill for the purposes of this halakha. Due to the possibly grave consequences of a bill of divorce, the Sages were particular about its wording and manner of composition. These details are significant both so that the divorce will in fact be effective and to prevent the husband or anyone else from contesting the validity of the document.
  The second part of the act of divorce is the transmission of the bill of divorce from husband to wife. The Torah states: “And gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The Sages derived from the verses that the bill of divorce need not literally be given into her hand. Rather, in this context her hand means her domain. Therefore, a bill of divorce can be transmitted via an agent, both an agent appointed by the husband to give the document to his wife, i.e., an agent for delivery, as well as an agent appointed by the woman to receive the bill of divorce from her husband on her behalf, i.e., an agent for receipt. The option to transmit a bill of divorce through the medium of an agent is important, as this enables a woman to be released from her ties to her husband even if she is located far from him. However, the possibility of divorce through an agent can also lead to many complications. For example, the husband might wish to nullify the bill of divorce or the agency, or he might later contest the validity of the document by claiming that it is a forgery. For the betterment of the world and to help deserted wives, the Sages instituted various ordinances whose requirements have become part of the act of divorce. These ordinances include the requirement that agents who deliver a bill of divorce to a different country must state the declaration: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, and the halakha is that a husband can nullify a bill of divorce he has sent only if he makes his decision known to the agent to whom he gave the document.
  Mainly in the fourth and fifth chapters, tractate Gittin includes a long list of rabbinic decrees and ordinances that relate to all walks of life and that are designed for the betterment of the world, i.e., to prevent certain mishaps and stumbling blocks, and for the betterment of people, i.e., to establish various social arrangements to prevent interpersonal quarrels and disputes.
  As do other tractates, Gittin includes aggadic portions, some of which elucidate issues discussed in the tractate, while others are cited incidentally. Two large sections of aggada are unrelated to the main topic of the tractate. The first section, in the fifth chapter, is a discussion of the destruction of the Temple and the devastation of Eretz Yisrael, and the second section, in the seventh chapter, provides a list of medical treatments and folk remedies. At the end of the tractate, there is an aggadic section that deals with divorce in general. Although halakhically a husband may divorce his wife even for superficial reasons, the Gemara stresses that it is important to avoid divorce whenever possible, especially from the wife of one's youth.
  There are nine chapters in this tractate. Generally, they all address various matters relating to divorce. While there is some overlap between the chapters concerning the topics they discuss, each chapter has a primary focus: 
  Chapter One deals with bills of divorce sent via an agent when the husband and wife are in different locations. Additionally, it compares and contrasts the halakhot of bills of divorce and bills of manumission.
  Chapter Two delineates additional halakhot concerning agency with regard to bills of divorce. It also mentions stringencies associated with the writing of a bill of divorce.
  Chapter Three explains the requirement that a bill of divorce be written for the sake of the husband and wife using it. Another topic discussed in this chapter is the application of the following presumption: One who was alive, remains alive; an item that was in existence, remains in existence.
  Chapter Four analyzes several ordinances that the Sages instituted for the betterment of the world, both with regard to divorce and with regard to other matters. Another topic discussed in this chapter is the emancipation of slaves.
  Chapter Five discusses the halakhot and ordinances associated with collecting payment of a marriage contract. Other ordinances, primarily relating to avoiding monetary disputes, are mentioned as well.
  Chapter Six explains matters concerning the appointment of an agent, particularly with regard to the writing, delivery, and reception of bills of divorce. 
  Chapter Seven discusses who is fit to grant a divorce. It also enumerates stipulations that are often included in bills of divorce.
  Chapter Eight reviews the manner by which one must transmit a bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Additionally, it discusses bills of divorce that are disqualified for a variety of reasons, e.g., the way they were written, the disqualification of the witnesses, or because they were given before they should have been given.
  Chapter Nine discusses qualifications and limitations added to the text of a bill of divorce. It also specifies the manner in which witnesses sign a bill of divorce and explains under which circumstances one is permitted or even encouraged to divorce.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house. (Deuteronomy 24:1)
  And whoever lies carnally with a woman who is a bondmaid, designated for a man, and not at all redeemed, nor was freedom given her; there shall be inquisition; they shall not be put to death, because she was not free. (Leviticus 19:20)
  This chapter focuses on several of the halakhot that distinguish a bill of divorce and a slave's bill of manumission from other legal documents. Some of these differences stem from the very nature of these bills, while others are based on special rabbinic decrees.
  To prevent anyone from contesting the validity of the document, the Sages enacted that an agent who delivers a bill of divorce outside of Eretz Yisrael must pronounce the following declaration: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. The Gemara in this chapter analyzes at length the function of this enactment. One possible reason given for the declaration is that it serves as testimony that the bill of divorce was written with the proper intent, in case the residents of the place where it was drafted are not experts in the requirement that a bill of divorce must be written specifically for the sake of the woman in question. Another possibility is that the declaration affirms the authenticity of the document and ratifies the signatures of its witnesses in places where there are no witnesses available to ratify it. One issue that must be clarified for the purposes of this halakha is the definition of the borders of Eretz Yisrael, as well as the question of whether there are other places that have the same status as Eretz Yisrael with regard to the need for the witnesses to state the declaration.
  There are a number of similarities between bills of divorce and bills of manumission. In addition to a verbal analogy in the Torah that links these two types of documents, they share several characteristics. Both bills of divorce and bills of manumission are not mere documents of proof, as the very acts of their composition and delivery have halakhic ramifications. Furthermore, in both cases the documents effect a change in the personal status of the recipient. Consequently, it is clear that many of the features that differentiate bills of divorce from other documents apply equally to bills of manumission. However, in addition to addressing the slave's change of status, the Gemara inquires as to whether or not emancipation is in his interest. This inquiry has halakhic ramifications, e.g., if his emancipation is in his interests then an agent can accept his bill of manumission in his absence and his master cannot later retract his decision.
  The fact that a bill of divorce functions as more than just a document of proof has consequences with regard to the validity of its witnesses, specifically concerning whether gentiles or Samaritans are eligible to sign a document of this kind. These matters are particularly important in light of the fact that a woman will be likely to need this document if she wishes to marry again in the future.
  Since bills of divorce and bills of manumission must be composed by a particular individual, the husband and master, respectively, a further problem arises: To what extent do these documents take effect after this individual's death?
  These questions are the main topics of discussion in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  If delivery of a bill of divorce is entrusted to an agent, he must say: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. The Gemara examines the rationale for this and concludes that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion that the reason for this declaration is that there are no witnesses available to ratify it.
  Although the Gemara states that since the establishment of the great academies in Babylonia that land has the same status as Eretz Yisrael with regard to bills of divorce, the practical halakha is that all agents of a bill of divorce must state the declaration: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence. If the agent failed to state the declaration, the bill of divorce can be ratified in the manner of other legal documents, by means of witnesses who can attest to the authenticity of its signatures.
  Most of the special halakhot of bills of divorce apply equally to bills of manumission. One difference is that a bill of divorce is considered to be to the woman's detriment, whereas a bill of manumission is in the interest of a slave, and therefore it can be acquired for him by others in his absence.
  Due to the concern that the woman might be left as a deserted wife, the Sages were lenient with regard to bills of divorce. In a certain period, one of the witnesses who signed this document could be a Samaritan, although this practice was later prohibited. Conversely, while other legal documents may sometimes be written and signed by gentiles, bills of divorce of this type are invalid. Furthermore, while bills of acquisition and gifts that were written and signed in the owner's lifetime are valid even if delivered after his death, this is not the case for bills of divorce and bills of manumission. The reason is that these documents are completed only when they are handed to the wife or slave, and therefore they are invalidated by the prior death of the husband or master.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house. (Deuteronomy 24:1)
  The first part of the chapter continues the discussion about the requirement that agents who transfer a bill of divorce from outside of Eretz Yisrael must state that it was written and signed in their presence. The following problems are discussed: What if they are unable to testify about the entire bill of divorce but only with regard to part of it? What if one of the witnesses can testify only about the writing and the other only about the signing? Finally, what if only one of the witnesses can testify? Is the agency valid in these cases?
  Another matter analyzed is the definition of the delivery of a bill of divorce: Is this simply a means of transferring the document from one place to another, or is it an act that has halakhic ramifications? If so, the qualifications of the agents must be discussed. Can one who is ordinarily disqualified from testifying, e.g., a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, deliver a bill of divorce?
  Yet another issue addressed in this chapter is the dating of a bill of divorce. Despite the fact that its essential purpose is to effect a divorce, a bill of divorce may at times be used as evidence in court, both in financial cases and concerning forbidden sexual relations. It is therefore necessary to determine if a bill of divorce without a date or with improper dating is disqualified.
  The Torah states concisely: “And he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand.” This requires clarification with regard to several halakhot. Does the phrase “he writes her” indicate that the husband must write the bill of divorce by himself? If not, are there any limitations as to who is qualified to compose the document? What is defined as writing in this context: Any formation of letters, or perhaps only the standard manner of writing? Are there any restrictions with regard to the ink or paper that may be used in the writing of a bill of divorce?
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  With regard to the statement: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, the Gemara concludes that if the agent cannot issue this statement about the entire bill of divorce but only about a portion of it, or if the bill of divorce is brought by two people who can say only part of this formula, then their statement is of no consequence, and the bill of divorce must be confirmed through its signatures. However, if two valid witnesses bring the bill of divorce, it is not necessary for them to issue this declaration at all, as they may testify to the validity of the bill of divorce without making use of the rabbinic decree enabling a witness to merely state: It was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence.
  An agent who brings a bill of divorce must be a Jew, halakhically competent, and able to see. The agent can also be someone who under most circumstances is disqualified from testifying in court. Consequently, a woman can also serve as an agent for bringing such a bill, even the woman who is being divorced. Even those women who are not deemed credible to testify with regard to the death of a woman's husband are deemed credible to bring her bill of divorce.
  A bill of divorce must include the date, though it is not invalidated if an imprecise date was written. However, if it was written on a certain date but signed on a later date, then it is invalidated. There are those who consider it to be valid after the fact in exigent circumstances.
  It is not necessary for the bill of divorce to be written by the husband; any Jew may write it. A halakhically competent person is required to write the part of the bill of divorce that must be written for her sake.
  The writing on the bill of divorce must be permanent. Therefore, although there are no halakhot concerning which particular ink may be used, it must be a type of ink that is long-lasting. The bill may also be written without using ink, e.g., by engraving or embossing the letters. The engraving or embossing must be similar to writing in that the act of writing forms the actual letters. If the letters were formed indirectly, through chiseling the area surrounding them, the bill of divorce is invalid.
  A bill of divorce need not be written on a specific surface. Any surface that one can write on may be used, including live animals. However, based on the verse “And he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand,” the Sages derived that it must be possible to transfer the bill of divorce to the woman immediately after it is written, without any intervening steps. Therefore, a bill of divorce written on an object that is attached to the ground is invalid, as one who writes such a bill will need to detach it before giving it to the woman.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes for her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house. (Deuteronomy 24:1)
  This chapter deals primarily with two topics, although as is common in the Talmud it addresses other subjects as well. One topic is a continuation of the discussion concerning the writing of a bill of divorce. The verse states that a bill of divorce must be written “for her,” from which the Sages derived a requirement that the bill of divorce be written for the sake of the woman being divorced. A bill of divorce cannot be reused by another person after the original recipient of it was divorced; it must be written specifically with regard to the couple themselves. Although this is agreed upon by all, there is still room for deliberation as to the precise parameters of a bill of divorce written for the sake of the woman, and whether the entire text of the bill of divorce, or only part of it, must be written specifically for her sake. This is also related to the debate as to whether the writing of the bill of divorce refers to the literal writing of the bill of divorce, or whether the signing of the bill of divorce is considered the principal act of writing it.
  Since a bill of divorce that was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, a question arises with regard to a situation where the bill of divorce was lost and subsequently found. The Gemara examines the circumstances in which there may be concern that although the bill of divorce contains the same names as the lost bill of divorce, in fact it may not be the original bill of divorce and cannot be used.
  The husband need not transmit the bill of divorce to his wife in person; rather, he may appoint an agent to transmit it. This chapter addresses an aspect of that halakha, as the agent can be sent to a distant place and might not know for certain whether the husband is still alive when he transmits the bill of divorce to the wife. As the Gemara explained previously, in the first chapter, the bill of divorce is effective only if it is received during the husband's lifetime. Although in this situation the marriage has definitely been terminated, as the wife is either divorced or widowed, there are practical differences between the two situations: If the wife is widowed, she might be obligated in levirate marriage, and if she is divorced she is prohibited from marrying a priest. The principal concern is the extent to which one may rely on the presumption that a person or item remains in their current state. This question becomes particularly germane in situations where a significant amount of time has passed, or where events transpire that could cause a change in the presumed status. This issue arises with regard to the halakhot of divorce, but the Gemara also discusses its broader implications.
  Another issue explored in this chapter, also related to the matter of agents, is the question of whether or not an agent is empowered to appoint another agent in his stead. The Gemara details the conditions under which it is permitted or prohibited to do so.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  The Gemara concludes that a bill of divorce must be written specifically for the sake of the woman who is being divorced. Any bill of divorce that is not written in this manner is not valid, whether it was written without the intention of being used as a bill of divorce or whether it was written for the sake of another woman with an identical name. This requirement is in effect only with regard to bills of divorce but not with regard to other legal documents. The section of the bill of divorce that lists the names of the husband and wife, the date, and the expression: You are hereby permitted to any man, is the essential part of the bill of divorce, and it is this part that must be written for the sake of the woman who is being divorced. Therefore, it should have been permitted for scribes to write the standard part of bills of divorce in advance and to fill in only the essential part specifically for the sake of the woman. However, the Sages decreed that one should not do so.
  Since a bill of divorce that was not written for the sake of the woman cannot be used, there are potential problems in a case where a bill of divorce was lost and then found. If the bill of divorce was lost for a long period of time but then found, and the agent who was sent to transmit it can identify it, either because he recognizes it or by providing distinguishing marks, then he may deliver the bill of divorce to the wife. If there are no distinguishing marks, then an assessment must be made as to whether there is a concern that this bill of divorce is not the original bill of divorce but a different one, written for the sake of another couple. Wherever this concern applies, it is prohibited to transmit the bill of divorce to the wife.
  In general, the presumptive status of the husband is that he is still alive, and therefore an agent may transmit a bill of divorce without being concerned that perhaps the husband died after appointing him. However, if the husband was in a situation of acute danger, e.g., if he was dying, on board a sinking ship, or in a besieged town, or if he was elderly, though not if he had reached an exceptionally old age, then there is a concern that perhaps he died. In connection to this discussion, the Gemara also addresses other halakhot that relate to one's presumptive status of being alive, and an item's presumptive status of remaining in its current state. One can separate teruma and tithes on the basis of money lent to a priest or Levite, as one may presume that they are still alive. Similarly, one may set aside produce and wine for the purpose of separating teruma and tithes with them; one may then separate the teruma and tithes based on the presumption that the produce and wine are still in existence and have not spoiled. In these cases, if there is reason to believe that the produce or wine has been lost or spoiled, one must first check to see that this has not occurred.
  An agent who was sent to transmit a bill of divorce may appoint another agent and transfer his agency. However, if he is obligated to state: The bill of divorce was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence, then he must appoint the new agent in the presence of a court; the second agent is an agent of the court and is not required to state that the bill of divorce was written and signed in his presence. This is true in a case where the agent was not also instructed to perform another action that cannot be transferred, e.g., taking a deposit from the wife. However, if the agent was given a task like this as well, he may not transfer his agency and appoint a second agent.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And whoever lies carnally with a woman that is a bondmaid designated for a man, and not at all redeemed, nor was freedom given to her; there shall be inquisition; they shall not be put to death, because she was not free. (Leviticus 19:20)
  It is possible for a bill of divorce to be delivered by agents. However, there is the possibility that a husband will render void either the bill of divorce or the agency before the agent delivers the bill of divorce. According to the basic halakha, the husband has the ability to render void a bill of divorce that has not yet been delivered even when not in the presence of his agents, and the agents might then deliver the bill of divorce to the wife, not knowing that it had been rendered void and that it no longer effects a divorce. This situation could lead to the woman remarrying when she is in fact still married to her first husband, leading to serious violations of Torah law, as well as the possibility that the children from her second marriage will be mamzerim. In order to avoid this scenario, the Sages instituted an ordinance that a husband may render the bill of divorce or the agency void only in the presence of the agents.
  After discussing this ordinance, the Mishna lists a series of ordinances instituted throughout the generations for the betterment of the world. These ordinances are relevant to disparate domains of halakha and are of different types. In some instances the Sages instituted that specific formulations should be employed; in others they instituted new practices, whether leniencies or stringencies. The common denominator in all of these cases is that their underlying purpose is for the betterment of the world, to help people avoid transgressing mitzvot or to assist people in fulfilling mitzvot, and to help people avoid causing harm to others or to society.
  This chapter begins by addressing topics that are directly related to the subject of the tractate, before moving on to other topics.
  The ordinances discussed in this chapter are: The prohibition against rendering a bill of divorce void when not in the presence of the agents assigned to deliver it; the obligation to write all of the names of the husband and wife in the bill of divorce; the ordinance to require the taking of a vow instead of an oath in the case of a widow who desires to collect the payment of her marriage contract; the requirement to write the names of the witnesses in a bill of divorce in order to enable its ratification; the ordinance of the prosbol, which enables the circumvention of the abrogation of debts in the Sabbatical Year, so as to encourage people to continue to lend money to the poor; the ordinance that in certain circumstances, a slave who was redeemed will continue to be a slave; the ordinance that a slave who was mortgaged for the repayment of a debt and was emancipated should repay the debt; the ordinance that a half-slave half-freeman should be emancipated in order to enable him to fulfill the mitzva of procreation; the ordinance that a slave sold to a gentile or to a Jew living outside of Eretz Yisrael is emancipated; the ordinance not to redeem captives or purchase sacred objects from gentiles for more than their monetary value, so as not to encourage the capture of Jews or the theft of sacred objects; the ordinance not to assist a captive to escape, so as not to cause hardship to other captives; the ordinance that a man who divorces his wife under certain circumstances may not remarry her; the ordinance not to redeem one who sold himself to gentiles; and the ordinance that one who sells his field in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile must continue to bring the first fruits from that field, in order to discourage the selling of fields to gentiles.
  In addition to these discussions, other topics are discussed at length, specifically the cancellation of debts in the Sabbatical Year and various halakhot pertaining to Canaanite slaves.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  Many halakhic topics were explored in this chapter. Although the laws discussed relate to disparate areas of halakha, they are related in that they were all instituted for the betterment of the world, i.e., either to assist people in avoiding transgressions or to remove an impediment to fulfilling the mitzvot incumbent upon them.
  In addition to the various ordinances detailed in the mishnayot, other important topics were addressed as well. With regard to bills of divorce, the Gemara concluded that although a husband is able to render void a bill of divorce, he can do so only if he states this desire explicitly. The mere disclosure of intent is insufficient.
  This chapter serves as the primary source for the talmudic discussions with regard to the prosbol. Although there were Sages who questioned the use of this device, it was agreed for practical purposes to leave this ordinance of Hillel in place in order to serve the greater goal of encouraging people to lend money to one another, so that lenders should not be concerned that they will suffer a loss. The Sages instituted various leniencies with regard to the prosbol, as well as enabling debts to be returned after the Sabbatical Year using certain methods. These leniencies are in part predicated upon the ruling that the abrogation of debts in modern times is by rabbinic law.
  While the Sages accepted the opinion that one should not emancipate his Canaanite slave ab initio, there are circumstances in which, for the betterment of the world, the master may do so. One such case is with regard to a half-slave half-freeman, whom a master emancipates in order to enable him to fulfill the mitzva to procreate. Similarly, a master emancipates a half-maidservant half-free woman if doing so will lead to a reduction in licentious behavior. A master emancipates a slave sold to a gentile, or to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, in order to enable him to continue fulfilling the mitzvot as he had until that point. There are circumstances in which the Sages required a master to write a bill of manumission for his slave. They also instituted an ordinance that if a master causes a financial loss to another by emancipating his slave, he must reimburse the other for his loss.
  Despite the fact that the mitzva to redeem captives is a great one, which can even save lives, the Sages nevertheless placed limitations on the performance of this mitzva for the betterment of the world, so as not to encourage the capture of Jewish prisoners. They instituted an ordinance that captives may not be redeemed for more than their actual monetary value, and that one who willingly sold himself to gentiles may not be redeemed. Similarly, they instituted that sacred objects should not be purchased from gentiles for much more than their actual monetary value.
  The Gemara taught the halakha that one who sold his field in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile must continue to bring the first fruits of that field, but it did not issue a conclusion concerning to what degree a gentile's acquisition of land in Eretz Yisrael abrogates the sanctity of that land. The Gemara also discussed whether the acquisition of the produce of an item is tantamount to the acquisition of the actual item, and concluded that there is in fact a distinction between the acquisition of the rights to the produce and the acquisition of the item itself.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  This chapter continues the subject matter of the previous one, addressing various enactments instituted by the Sages. The distinction between them has to do with their purpose. Those discussed in the previous chapter were instituted for the betterment of the world, i.e., to help achieve certain aims in the observance of Torah and mitzvot. Those discussed in this chapter were instituted primarily for the betterment of society, i.e., to establish peaceful relations among members of a society. 
  Most of the enactments enumerated here are in the sphere of monetary law. This is an area in which the court has tremendous authority, as it can even deprive one of ownership rights to his property in order to grant the property to another. In this chapter, some of the enactments assist in establishing a just civil order, some grant those who were halakhically unable to acquire property the ability to acquire it, and some enumerate sundry penalties and fines.
  One topic discussed is the collection of monies one owes to another. Depending on the type of debt, the creditor can collect it from different types of the debtor's property. There is discussion of found items, stolen items, and the responsibilities of a steward. There are several leniencies established with regard to these actions out of concern that if these tasks were too onerous, people would not be willing to perform them.
  Other enactments for the benefit of children in general and orphans in particular deal with their ability to participate in financial transactions, as well as with the ability of minors to marry and divorce. Likewise, there are enactments concerning deaf-mutes with regard to all these matters.
  Another topic explored in this chapter is damage that is not evident, e.g., damage caused when one lowers the value of another's property by changing its halakhic status, not its physical characteristics.
  The Sages instituted enactments concerning the purchase of land from those who seize it unlawfully. Several others were instituted because of the desire to increase peace and avoid enmity. Included in this category are the halakhot requiring one to treat sinners, and even gentiles, in the same manner as one would treat a Jew in good standing.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  Among the enactments instituted by the Sages are those concerning the collection of debts. It was established that payment for damage is collected from superior-quality land, while a debt resulting from a loan is collected from intermediate-quality land, and the payment of a marriage contract is collected from inferior-quality land. This is the halakha only if these properties currently belong to the debtor. If these properties were sold to another, even if they are liened to the creditor, collection is first performed from whatever property the debtor currently owns, regardless of its quality.
  The court appoints a steward to administer the estate of orphans and to care for their needs. The court does not subject the decisions of a steward to excessive scrutiny, so as to not create a disincentive against people agreeing to serve as stewards. Debts of a deceased person can be collected only from inferior-quality land that his beneficiaries received as an inheritance.
  The Sages instituted that in order to enable orphans to function better in society, they have the ability to conduct financial transactions from the age that they are able to comprehend the consequence of these transactions. Additionally, they have the right to retract their agreement to a transaction, provided that it has not been finalized.
  The Sages enacted that other people of limited halakhic competence, e.g., deaf-mutes, have the ability to marry and divorce, and to acquire lost items they find.
  In order to further the interests of justice, the Sages penalized those who damage the property of others, even in cases where by Torah law one would be exempt, e.g., in the case of one who causes damage that is not evident. If one who did this type of damage then dies, his inheritors are not required to pay for the damage caused.
  To encourage robbers to repent, the Sages instituted that they do not need to return the actual stolen item if doing so entails significant financial loss. Rather, they can return its value. For example, if one stole a beam and built it into a house, he is not required to dismantle the house.
  A transaction performed under duress is of no significance. For example, if a married woman agrees to sell her property to another when pressured to do so by her husband, the sale is not effective. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that if a gentile acquired land in Eretz Yisrael from its Jewish owner following the war with the Romans, where it is assumed that the Jew did not transfer the land to him willingly, one can purchase it from the gentile, in order to establish Jewish possession of Eretz Yisrael. In this case, some degree of compensation must be paid to the prior owner.
  The Sages instituted that a priest is the first to read from the Torah in public Torah readings, followed by a Levite. This order is relevant with regard to other public matters as well. The Sages also instituted the method by which different communities sharing a water source should apportion the water.
  In order to increase peace, the Sages established that in certain circumstances, sinners should be treated as others are, provided that one does not assist them in sinning. Charity and other forms of assistance are given to gentiles for the same reason.
  Having mentioned the land seized following the war with the Romans, the Gemara engages in a lengthy discussion of the events surrounding the destruction of the Second Temple.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  This chapter continues the treatment of the halakhot of agency with regard to a bill of divorce, primarily in two areas: The different forms of agency to facilitate transfer of the bill of divorce from husband to wife and the halakhic ramifications of those methods, and the various methods through which one designates representatives to write and deliver a bill of divorce to the wife.
  There are two primary forms of agency to facilitate transfer of the bill of divorce. The first is agency for delivery, in which the husband designates the agent and the divorce takes effect only when the bill of divorce reaches the woman. The second is agency for receipt, in which the agent is a representative of the woman, and the divorce takes effect at the moment the bill of divorce reaches the agent, before the woman receives it.
  Due to the fundamental differences between these two forms of agency, there are numerous halakhic ramifications with regard to the choice of the form of agency. In this chapter, several related dilemmas are explored, e.g., whether the woman can designate an agent for delivery; what the halakha is in a case where the agent, knowingly or unwittingly, characterizes his agency in a manner that differs from his designation; and how one designates an agent for receipt.
  There are additional differences that stem from the time that the bill of divorce takes effect. For example, in what case and until when can the husband void the bill of divorce? And from when is there concern that the divorce took effect? The latter has ramifications with regard to an Israelite woman married to a priest, as she may no longer partake of teruma once the divorce takes effect.
  When appointing agents to deliver the bill of divorce, the husband is required to tell them to write the bill of divorce and deliver it to his wife, ab initio. The Sages ask what the halakha is if the husband deviates from that formula in designating the agent. They also analyze a case where the husband says only: Write a bill of divorce for my wife. Although in this statement he does not explicitly state that he wants the bill of divorce to be given, in exigent circumstances the court assumes that he intended for the bill of divorce to be given, not only written. It is necessary to determine in which cases one may presume that it was the husband's intent to write and deliver the bill of divorce and in which cases one may presume that his intent was to write the bill of divorce but not to deliver it. 
  Other dilemmas raised in this chapter relate to the nature of the agent's obligation. Is he required to write and deliver the bill of divorce himself, or may he designate others to perform those actions in his place?
  Resolution of these dilemmas is the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  In the discussion of the halakhot of agency for transfer of a bill of divorce from husband to wife, it was concluded that the husband can designate an agent, male or female, to deliver the bill of divorce to his wife, in which case the divorce takes effect only when the document reaches his wife. Likewise, the wife can designate an agent, male or female, to receive the bill of divorce, in which case the divorce takes effect once the document reaches the agent. There must be two men witnessing the designation of the agent for receipt, and there must be two men witnessing the document being handed to the agent. 
  When the designation and transfer of the bill of divorce to the agent for receipt is performed properly, the bill of divorce takes effect immediately, and the husband can no longer void it. Once a woman designates an agent for receipt, she must act stringently, as if she already received the bill of divorce from the husband or his agent. For instance, if she was the wife of a priest, it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma from the moment of designation. An adult woman may designate an agent for receipt, and the father may designate an agent for receipt for his betrothed daughter who is a minor.
  In designating an agent to write and deliver a bill of divorce to his wife, the husband must clearly state that he seeks to divorce his wife. If he expressed his intention ambiguously, the agent may not deliver the bill of divorce on his behalf. If the husband says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, it is not considered designation of an agent for delivery; nevertheless, in exigent circumstances, e.g., if he is taken out for execution, if he departs on a long journey, or if he is dangerously ill, his intention is presumably not only that the agents write the document but that they deliver it as well.
  The same is true with regard to a husband located in a dangerous area. Even if it is impossible to determine his identity beyond a shadow of a doubt, allowances are made in order to avoid rendering the woman a deserted wife. In principle, if a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the agents have no mandate to deliver it. However, if it is discovered that the husband intended to later commit suicide, the agents deliver the bill of divorce based on the assumption that this was the husband's intention and that he failed to articulate that intention due to his preoccupation.
  If a man instructs two people to give a bill of divorce to his wife, his intention is that they themselves will write and deliver it, and they may not designate others to do so. If they do not know how to write, they must learn to do so and write the document. If the husband told a group of people to write a bill of divorce for his wife, one of them writes the document and two sign it. If he said: All of you write a bill of divorce for my wife, they are all required to sign it. Failure to do so, even if one of them died, voids the bill of divorce, as they did not fulfill the condition. In order to avoid that pitfall, one should explicitly state that when he said all he meant that any of the members of the group may write and sign the document.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  This chapter addresses two main topics. First, it continues the discussion from the previous chapter that focused on one who instructs others to give his wife a bill of divorce on his behalf. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the issue of a conditional bill of divorce.
  A husband may instruct an agent to give his wife a bill of divorce. If he is not mentally competent, his instructions are not reliable. This chapter discusses to what degree his instructions with regard to a bill of divorce are valid. Similarly explored is the case of one who is unable to verbally express his intent, and to what extent his written instructions or actions express his will.
  A husband may give his wife a conditional bill of divorce. Sometimes he is concerned that he might die and leave his wife with a levirate bond, or he might be traveling to a far-off place and be concerned that he will not return, leaving her a deserted wife. Under such circumstances the husband may give a bill of divorce that will take effect only once a certain period of time has passed or a specific condition has been fulfilled. There are also cases in which the husband wishes to receive some benefit from his wife in exchange for the giving of the bill of divorce, such as a monetary payment or service. There are other instances where he intends to cause her suffering by imposing a burdensome condition upon her.
  The discussion of conditions in general, and whether the conditions for a bill of divorce are unique, continues in the following chapters. Also enumerated is the requirement for a compound condition, specifying both what happens if the condition is fulfilled and what happens if it is not fulfilled. There is also discussion with regard to whether the condition follows the husband's words or his intent. Furthermore, since a bill of divorce may not be given after the husband's death, it is essential to ascertain, from the language and intent of the condition, when the document takes effect.
  This chapter also explores the status of the wife who has received a conditional bill of divorce, from the time she receives the document until the condition is fulfilled.
  Included in the chapter is a considerable amount of aggadic material, primarily the listing of remedies for various maladies that proved effective during the talmudic era.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  While this chapter focused mainly on the giving of bills of divorce and the conditions appended to them, it also included many aggadic discussions, such as the story of King Solomon and the demon Ashmedai. It also described medicinal remedies and charms.
  A man who is not mentally competent is unable to give a bill of divorce to his wife. Therefore, even if he instructs others to give a bill of divorce on his behalf, but becomes incompetent before they do so, the document cannot be written or given until the husband recovers his sanity. Once he is restored to sanity, the document may be written and given even without new instructions from the husband.
  If a husband is unable to speak, he must demonstrate his sanity. He can then instruct others, through writing or gestures, to write and give a bill of divorce on his behalf.
  Any condition placed on a bill of divorce must follow the halakhic principles concerning conditions: It must be a compound condition, the affirmative statement must precede the negative statement, the condition must precede the resultant action, and the condition and the resultant action must concern two separate matters.
  Since a bill of divorce can be given only during the lifetime of the husband, any condition indicating that the document takes effect only after the husband's death invalidates the document. In this chapter, there was much discussion with regard to different phrases used verbally to give the instructions, and how they indicate when the bill of divorce takes effect.
  Everyone agrees that if the husband says to his wife that the bill of divorce takes effect immediately provided that certain conditions are fulfilled in the future, the document is valid, even if the conditions are fulfilled after the death of the husband. If the husband does not specify that the document is valid immediately, there is no assumption that the date written in a document proves when it takes effect.
  If the husband made the bill of divorce conditional on his wife's giving him a certain amount of money, or performing certain actions such as caring for his father or his child, the wife must fulfill his condition for the document to be valid.
  During the time between when the bill of divorce is given and when it becomes valid, the woman must separate from her husband to avoid the possibility of the bill of divorce being classified as an outdated bill of divorce, or of the bill of divorce being canceled entirely. Her status during this time is uncertain with regard to whether or not she is divorced. Even though the husband is liable to support her and provide her with sustenance, she is not considered to be his wife.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house. And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man's wife. And the latter husband hates her, and he writes her a bill of divorce, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house. (Deuteronomy 24:1–3)
  The Sages received a tradition that the words: “And gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), do not refer only to the woman's actual hand, but include her vicinity and property.
  One of the main issues explored in this chapter is the clarification of the exact limitations of this halakha. What is considered to be the equivalent of her hand? Is only an area adjacent to her included, or any property that belongs to her? Is a bill of divorce that is deposited near her considered to be in her domain, and how far does that area extend?
  Another question pertaining to the giving of a bill of divorce is defining the phrase: “And gives it.” Is the divorce effective only if the husband or his agent places the bill of divorce in the woman's hand, or is it effective even if it is thrown to her? Is the divorce effective if she takes the bill from his hand, or is it essential that he give it to her?
  This chapter also addresses problems unrelated to the actual giving of the bill of divorce, such as the use of an outdated bill of divorce, meaning that after the writing of the bill of divorce the man and woman were secluded together again; the use of a bill of divorce that was not dated as stipulated by the rabbis; or a specific kind of bill of divorce called a folded and tied bill of divorce, in a case where it is lacking some of the necessary signatures.
  With regard to these issues, there are various opinions, ranging from the strictest, which views anything that diverges from the formula coined by the Sages for bills of divorce as totally invalid, to more lenient opinions, which see these halakhot as recommendations to be adhered to ab initio, but which do not invalidate the bill of divorce after the fact.
  An additional issue discussed in the chapter relates specifically to bills of divorce that are technically invalid. The question raised is whether there is sufficient validity to such a divorce to render a woman a divorcée, which disqualifies her from marrying a priest.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter established that the words: “And gives it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1), do not refer only to a woman's actual hand. If a husband places a bill of divorce in his wife's lap or in a vessel attached to her, it is considered as if he placed the bill of divorce in her hand, and the divorce is effective. Similarly, if a husband threw a bill of divorce into an area that belongs to his wife, such as her house or courtyard, and he threw it in such a way that it entered the airspace over the partitions that delineate the boundaries of her domain, the divorce is effective; or if he threw it and it landed next to her in a public domain, the divorce is effective. Nevertheless, the Sages taught that ideally none of these methods should be employed, and a husband should place a bill of divorce in his wife's hand in order to avoid any uncertainty.
  While the Sages explain the meaning of “her hand” in broad terms, they are specific in their explanation of: “He gives it.” The bill of divorce must reach the wife through an act of giving performed by the husband. If the bill of divorce reaches her hand without an act of giving by the husband, the bill of divorce is not valid.
  After the writing of the bill of divorce, if the man and woman were again secluded, the bill of divorce is considered to be an outdated bill of divorce, which is invalid ab initio. The husband must give his wife another bill of divorce. Nevertheless, if a woman received an outdated bill of divorce, she may remarry. An outdated bill of divorce was invalidated by the Sages as a rabbinic decree to prevent aspersions being cast on the children. Though the husband is required to provide a second bill of divorce, if he does not, the wife is still permitted to remarry.
  The Sages instituted that the date on a bill of divorce should be written in terms of the years since the establishment of the government of the area in which the bill of divorce is given. If another calendrical system was used, the bill of divorce is valid after the fact, i.e., if she was divorced with it. This halakha is no longer relevant because after the days of the Talmud, it became customary to write the date counting the years from the creation of the world or from the founding of Alexander the Great's empire.
  In the times of the Talmud, there was a custom to write a folded and tied bill of divorce, on which three or more witnesses would sign. If a signature is lacking, the bill of divorce can be completed by any Jewish man, even by someone who is ordinarily unfit to bear witness. If a woman remarried on the basis of a bill of divorce that was missing a signature, she must leave her second husband, though the lineage of any children who were born is unflawed.
  A bill of divorce in which the name of the man or woman was changed is totally invalid. Likewise, if the bill of divorce was accidentally given to the husband and a receipt for the payment of the marriage contract was given to his wife, the bill of divorce is totally invalid. If a woman remarried based on such a divorce, she is like a married woman who cohabited with someone else, and a child resulting from their union is a mamzer.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  This chapter assembles different halakhot of divorce that are not necessarily related to one another, completing the discussion of the halakhot of divorce. It continues to examine the topic of conditional divorce, which was discussed in Chapter Seven. The conditions, or qualifications, that are discussed here are those that invalidate the divorce entirely, either because they negate the essence of the bill of divorce as a scroll of severance, i.e., a document that severs the bond between husband and wife, or because they cannot be fulfilled. The chapter discusses cases in which the qualification nullifies the divorce, those in which the qualification is disregarded and the divorce is valid, and those in which the divorce and the qualification are both valid.
  A second topic analyzed is the formulation of a bill of divorce. Both the essential, critical formula of the bill of divorce, and the manner in which it should be written ab initio are discussed.
  The chapter also continues to explore a topic that began in the previous chapter, namely, bills of divorce that were written in a manner that is valid by Torah law but not in accordance with the ordinances of the Sages.
  In addition, the chapter details a list of problems that arise when two or more bills of divorce are written on the same paper and it is unclear which bill or bills of divorce the witnesses intended to sign. Cases dealt with are those of bills of divorce that were written one above the other, in opposite directions from one another, one beneath the other, or one next to the other. The latter case can be even more complicated if the witnesses signed in different languages from one another.
  Different forms of witnesses' signatures on the bill of divorce are also delineated, e.g., a witness's signature with or without his father's name, with or without adding the word witness, and the use of a nickname for the signature.
  Another topic discussed is the manner in which rumors are treated vis-à-vis a woman's marital status. The chapter describes which rumors are treated seriously and which rumors are not, and whether or not a rumor that is found to be baseless should be suppressed by the court.
  Finally, the chapter examines the question of when a husband may, should, or must divorce his wife.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  The main principle formulated in this chapter with regard to the halakhot of conditions or qualifications is that a divorce must sever the relationship between the husband and wife, leaving no bond between them and no limitation to the woman's freedom. Any qualification that limits the wife's right to remarry, e.g., a condition that she will not marry a certain man, negates the essence of the divorce and therefore invalidates it. By contrast, a condition that restricts the wife for only a limited period of time, or one that predicates the divorce on a specific action, even a prohibited action, which the woman is capable of performing, is a valid condition, and the divorce is therefore valid as well. If the condition cannot be fulfilled by the wife, the divorce is valid and the condition is null. Any condition written in the essential part of the bill of divorce invalidates it.
  The essential formula of a bill of divorce is the statement permitting her to marry any man she wishes. The wording of the bill of divorce should be clear and unequivocal ab initio. It should be written and worded with great care to prevent it from being contested in any fashion.
  Although it is important to write a bill of divorce accurately, not every deviation from its proper form invalidates it after the fact. Three cases are listed in which, although the bill of divorce is invalid ab initio, if the wife remarries after receiving it she need not leave her second husband. These are a case in which the bill of divorce was written by the husband but was not signed by witnesses, a case in which it was signed by one witness, and a case in which the date was not written on it. According to the accepted halakha, if the bill of divorce was given to the wife in the presence of two witnesses, it is valid ab initio even if it was not signed by any witnesses, as the witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce.
  If two identical bills of divorce were written for two different couples with the same names and they were mixed up, both bills of divorce should be given to both women, and they are both consequently divorced, even though it is unknown which bill of divorce was written for whom.
  In a case where several bills of divorce are written on the same paper one below the other, and the signatures are at the bottom, if a common date is written for all the bills of divorce and the names of each couple are specified separately, the signatures count for all the bills of divorce and they are all valid. If they do not have a common date, only the bottommost bill of divorce is valid.
  If two bills of divorce are written on the same paper in any other form, and the witnesses signed only once, it is presumed that they intended to sign the one that is above their signatures and adjacent to them. If the bills of divorce are written parallel to one another and the signatures extend from one bill of divorce to the other, the one that they appear to be associated with is validated by them.
  A witness may sign in any language and in several different forms. He may sign his nickname or surname. What matters is that it is clear that he is the one signing the bill of divorce.
  Although generally a divorce is valid only if it is performed willingly by the husband, a Jewish court can compel a husband to divorce his wife in a case where he is obligated to do so. If the husband is compelled by a gentile court, the divorce is invalid.
  If a rumor circulates that a certain woman is betrothed or divorced, the court must seek out the source of the rumor. If a substantial basis is found, e.g., specific eyewitnesses are mentioned, the rumor is treated seriously, with stringent ramifications. If the rumor has a reasonable explanation, it is often disregarded.
  If a husband divorces his wife, the divorce takes effect regardless of the reason that led him to do so. However one should refrain from divorcing his wife against her will, especially if she is the wife of his youth. Rabbeinu Gershom Meor HaGola decreed excommunication against any husband who divorces his wife against her will. If she commits adultery or behaves with licentiousness, it is a mitzva for the husband to divorce her.
  
  Ketubot
  
  Introduction to Ketubot
  
  Ketubot is the central tractate in the order of Nashim. It provides clarification of most of the matters that constitute the relationship between husband and wife: Conjugal relations, mutual obligations, and monetary arrangements between them. In a general sense it addresses the entirety of marital life. Due to the abundance and variety of the topics, which branch out into many different areas of halakha, the early commentaries called tractate Ketubot the miniature Talmud or the key to the Talmud.
  The marital bond is, from its inception, a sacred bond, which explains the fact that the term for betrothal is sanctification [kiddushin]. That bond can be terminated only by the death of one of the parties or by means of a special document, a bill of divorce. Violation of this bond by means of adultery engenders severe punishments administered both by man, i.e., execution by stoning or strangulation, and by Heaven, i.e., karet, in addition to fines and monetary penalties. 
  At the same time, according to halakha, the relationship between husband and wife within the framework of marriage is founded upon a system of mutual commitments fashioned on the basis of provisions and arrangements agreed upon by the parties. This system of arrangements is set out in a marriage contract [ketuba] formulated between the husband and wife or their representatives. This ketuba is fundamentally a written [katuv] contract, and is characterized in that manner because it is, for all intents and purposes, the only written document that every person requires. Since the provisions between husband and wife are articulated in the marriage contract, it is clear that the discussion in tractate Ketubot is fundamentally a comprehensive analysis of the marital rights and obligations.
  The significance of the marriage contract is not merely as a practical apparatus regulating married life. The Sages established that marital ties not regulated by a marriage contract do not constitute marriage at all. The fundamental difference between a casual relationship, licentious relations, and marriage is contingent upon both the existence of an agreement between the parties articulating their mutual commitments for the duration of their relationship and the arrangements governing their potential separation. Any marital relationship that is not regulated by a marriage contract is tantamount to a licentious relationship.
  The details of the agreement between husband and wife are like the details of any contract; both parties entering into marriage establish the provisions on the basis of which they intend to live their life together. Certain restrictions exist, as the marriage agreement, like any other agreement, cannot include stipulations that are against halakha, because of the principle: Anyone who stipulates a condition counter to what is written in the Torah, his condition is void. This includes stipulations that call for violation of a prohibition as well as those that abrogate obligations incumbent upon the parties by Torah law. Furthermore, over the generations, a system of permanent provisions was instituted, which constitute the standard formula of the marriage contract. 
  Although husband and wife can agree to abrogate certain details, or to add details and other arrangements, the standard marriage contract has a fixed configuration that establishes the guidelines for the marriage, unless additional provisions were stipulated. Analysis of these provisions, ranging from the commitments that stem from the marriage by Torah law to the various rabbinic ordinances, as well as the cases where the standard formula can be amended and the manner in which these changes are effected, constitute the primary topics of this tractate.
  Most of the provisions and arrangements in the marriage contract are universally accepted. However, the Sages of the Mishna and the Gemara disputed the details: Which provisions and halakhot are by Torah law and which are by rabbinic law; which provisions are compulsory for all and which of them are merely customary and can be amended. Fundamentally, the conclusion reached is that there is a distinction between provisions that govern interpersonal relations, which cannot be abrogated, and monetary agreements, even those by Torah law, which can be amended or abrogated at the agreement of the two parties.
  Based on Exodus 21:10, the obligations of a husband to his wife by Torah law are food, clothing, and conjugal rights. Food refers to the husband's obligation to provide sustenance to his wife according to her needs; clothing, his obligation to provide her with garments; and conjugal relations, his obligation to engage with her in sexual relations at regular intervals. Also by Torah law, the husband is entitled to nullify certain vows taken by his wife. After her death he inherits her property, although not everyone agrees that this is by Torah law. By rabbinic law, the husband is obligated to pay his wife's medical bills and to redeem her from captivity. 
  The Sages instituted that the wife perform certain tasks in the home as well as contribute to supporting the family. Income that the wife earns from work, as well as any profits accrued from property belonging to her, and any lost item that she finds, belong to the husband. The Sages also instituted ordinances relating to the rights of the woman after the ties between them are severed by means of divorce or death.
  One primary ordinance is the fixed sum of money identified as payment of the bill of divorce, which the husband is obligated pay his wife if he divorces her, or the heirs are obligated to pay the wife if she is widowed. For this payment, there is a distinction between a virgin, whose marriage contract is two hundred dinars, and one who is not a virgin, whose marriage contract is one hundred dinars. The husband is permitted to add to that sum any amount of money that he chooses, but he may not reduce the fixed sum. If he does, that is tantamount to nullification of the marriage contract, and the couple's relations are considered licentious and not marital relations. 
  The early Sages instituted that all the husband's property is liened to payment of the marriage contract. After the woman dies, the husband is obligated to bury her. After the death of the husband, the widow may continue to live in his house and be supported from his property for the duration of her widowhood. Likewise, there is a fixed condition that by the authority of the marriage contract, daughters born to the husband from this wife are supported from his property after his death, and sons born to this woman inherit the sum of her marriage contract in addition to their share in the inheritance.
  This system of marital obligations and rights is typically in effect in every marriage, as even if a particular stipulation is omitted from the document, it is in effect as a stipulation of the court. However, the precise application of these provisions in different cases requires analysis. Similarly, the question arises: Which are the provisions that cannot be amended or abrogated, either due to their essence or because the Sages decreed that they cannot be changed or eliminated? And with regard to the provisions that can be amended, what is the legal way to effect this?
  Marriage is based on agreement, and as such, conflict is apt to arise between the parties. Quarrels or incompatibility require intervention of the courts or halakhic authorities only if the couple decides to separate. However, there are additional conflicts that require halakhic resolution. One example is when husband and wife each accuse the other that he or she violated the provisions of the agreement. These claims can be with regard to the marriage itself, e.g., when one of the parties claims that he was misled to the extent that he would not have agreed to marry had he been privy to that information. Cases where this problem arises after betrothal and prior to marriage are discussed in tractate Kiddushin; cases where this problem arises after marriage belong in tractate Ketubot. There are additional claims with regard to fulfillment of the provisions of the agreement between the parties, where each accuses the other of failure to fulfill the obligations. 
  When these disputes come before the court, there are two stages to the halakhic deliberation. First, the court seeks to ascertain whether or not the claims are true. In this case, more than in any other agreement, there are various details that are difficult or impossible to ascertain. For example, if the husband claims that he discovered on the wedding night that his wife was not a virgin, there is rarely external testimony supporting either the husband's claim or the bride's counterclaim. In order to resolve the dispute, the court must rely on general determinations with regard to the credibility of the people and their claims. 
  The second stage involves ameliorating the situation. Based on the severity of the claims of the husband or wife, there are different manners of resolution, e.g., annulment of the marriage; mandating that the husband divorce his wife, paying her marriage contract if he was the guilty party and not paying it if she was the guilty party; or imposing fines and penalties to compel fulfillment of the terms of the ketuba.
  All these topics, both in terms of whether certain actions are permitted or prohibited as well as with regard to the monetary ramifications of those actions, constitute the primary focus of tractate Ketubot. In addition, several related matters are discussed, e.g., the halakhot of lineage, victims of rape and seduction, and the halakhot of the slanderer. Typically, the Gemara addresses various tangential matters that arise in the course of discussion of these matters. 
  There are three general sections in this tractate: The first deals with the halakhot of a virgin; her marriage, as a victim of rape, and as a victim of slander. The second explores the details of the standard provisions of the marriage contract. The third discusses the halakhot of the wife's property and payment of the marriage contract. There are thirteen chapters in the tractate. Typically, some chapters address one defined issue and some address several issues, while some topics are discussed in a number of different chapters.
  Chapter One deals primarily with the marriage of a virgin and the credibility of the husband and the wife with regard to the claim concerning virginity.
  Chapter Two deals with those cases where testimony is deemed credible from those whose testimony is typically not accepted, e.g., the testimony with regard to oneself or his relatives, or the testimony of one disqualified from testifying, such as a slave or a maidservant. The chapter also discusses the halakhot of a captive.
  Chapter Three deals with the halakhot of a rapist and a seducer and analyzes the relationship between corporal and monetary punishment.
  Chapter Four discusses in general the mutual rights of father and daughter, husband and wife, and specifically the halakhot of the slanderer. The primary provisions of the marriage contract are also explained.
  Chapter Five discusses the details of the ordinances instituted with regard to the marriage contract and especially in cases where they alter the fixed provisions, either through mutual agreement or unilaterally.
  Chapter Six deals primarily with the monetary aspects of the marriage contract, in terms of the sums that are to be paid and the relationship between the marriage contract and the usufruct property that the woman brings to the marriage.
  Chapter Seven explores the partial or total abrogation of the marriage contract due to vows or blemishes of the husband or the wife.
  Chapter Eight discusses the extent of the control that the husband has over the usufruct property of the wife.
  Chapter Nine analyzes the authority of a marriage contract, both in terms of the ability to waive some of the rights included therein and in terms of the relationship between the marriage contract and other monetary commitments.
  Chapter Ten discusses the manner in which the husband's property is divided among several wives and the division of property between various claimants.
  Chapter Eleven deals with the rights of a widow in the marriage contract and the circumstances under which she collects her marriage contract. On a related note, it deals with women who are not entitled to the marriage contract because of flawed lineage.
  Chapter Twelve explores the halakhot of a widow, including the rights stemming from the provisions of her marriage contract and special monetary agreements.
  Chapter Thirteen discusses problems stemming from relocation, including the woman's right to sustenance when her husband is out of the country and the rights of both the husband and the wife to relocate.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  This chapter deals primarily with the initial stages of marriage: The appropriate time, the marriage ceremony, and the monetary and ritual ramifications of the initial act of intercourse. Most of the questions analyzed are related to the halakhot of the marriage contract, specifically the marriage contract of the virgin. 
  The sum of the marriage contract of a virgin is two hundred dinars, and of a non-virgin, one hundred dinars. A fundamental question relates to the definition of a virgin for these purposes: Is this a medical-biological definition or is it merely a legal definition? Is a virgin a woman whose hymen is intact, a woman who never engaged in intercourse, or a woman who never married? On a related note, who are the women with the presumptive status of a virgin, and who are the women who have lost that presumptive status?
  Various questions arise when a man marries a woman based on the assumption that she is a virgin and later discovers that she is not. His claim can be grounds for annulment, for reduction of the sum of the marriage contract, or for concern that the bride is forbidden to her husband as an adulteress. However, before these questions are analyzed, there is another fundamental problem: Was she or was she not a virgin when she married, and if she was not a virgin, how did she lose her virginity? Typically, there is no clear evidence or testimony in that case. There are instances where the woman admits that she was not a virgin, and there are instances where she explains the phenomenon in different ways. Therefore, it must be determined to what degree are the claims of the woman deemed credible. In what cases is the claim of the husband deemed credible, and in what cases is the claim of the wife deemed credible?
  Stemming from these dilemmas, whose answers are largely dependent upon the credibility accorded to the husband's claim, another series of dilemmas is raised, not directly related to the halakhot of the marriage contract but related to matters of lineage. In the case of an unmarried woman who was suspected or proven to have engaged in intercourse with an unidentified man, to what degree is she deemed credible to claim that the man was of unflawed lineage and therefore she is not disqualified from marrying a priest? Likewise, if she was impregnated by an unidentified man, is she deemed credible if she says that the father of the fetus is of unflawed lineage?
  These are the central issues raised in this chapter. However, in the course of clarifying them, difficulties with regard to the marriage ceremony are addressed. In addition, questions related to engaging in intercourse on Shabbat with one's virgin bride are discussed, as well as questions relating to other prohibitions.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  The Sages designated certain days for marriage because they were assiduous in seeing to the well-being of Jewish women and ensuring that the wedding feast be appropriately elaborate. They also valued the integrity of marriage by scheduling the wedding on a day that would not delay a husband from bringing to court a claim, if he suspected his bride was forbidden to him. Throughout later generations as well, when a wedding could take place any day of the week, including Friday, one must take those two ordinances into account. It is possible to have a wedding on Friday due to the halakhic ruling that it is permitted to engage in intercourse with a virgin on Shabbat. Since there is sanctity and blessing in the wedding celebration, the Sages instituted six special blessings recited whenever and wherever there is a wedding celebration.
  With regard to the definition of a virgin in the context of a marriage contract, the Sages determined that a woman who never married and whose hymen is intact is a virgin. The legal status of a woman who married but did not engage in intercourse, or that of a woman whose hymen was ruptured by wood, even though she never engaged in intercourse, is that of a non-virgin. The presumptive status of an unmarried woman with regard to whom there is no information to the contrary is that of a virgin, unless she converted, was liberated from slavery, or was redeemed from captivity after reaching the age of three.
  The Gemara concluded that a husband who claims that his bride was not a virgin is deemed credible unless the bride is in possession of proof that his claim is false. However, when there are conflicting claims with regard to the manner in which the bride lost her virginity, with the husband claiming that she engaged in licentious intercourse or that she deceived him and the bride claiming that the circumstances were different, the bride is deemed credible as long as the husband can bring no proof to support his claim.
  Just as one relies on the credibility of the bride in this case, so too one relies on her credibility with regard to lineage when she claims that she engaged in intercourse with a man who does not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. Likewise, one relies on her credibility to establish the unflawed lineage of an offspring that she conceived while single. The Sages imposed strictures with regard to the halakhot of lineage, especially when the woman is unable to identify the father of her unborn child. In order to establish the unflawed lineage of both mother and child, a double majority is required, i.e., a majority of people with unflawed lineage in the place where she engaged in intercourse and a majority of people with unflawed lineage in the place where she originated.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  The halakha clearly delineates the parameters of valid testimony. For instance, valid testimony requires two valid witnesses, i.e., Jewish males above the age of majority who are related neither to one of the litigants nor to each other. Additionally, one is not allowed to incriminate himself, although he is permitted to obligate himself to pay money by his own admission; and one is not deemed credible to testify about himself.
  However, there are various areas that, by Torah law or by rabbinic ordinance, the court deems credible testimony that does not meet all those criteria. The reasons vary. There are cases where the court characterizes the statement of the witnesses as merely revealing a matter, i.e., revealing a fact that by its very nature would have been revealed and publicized. In other cases, the Sages relied on flawed testimony because the problem is rabbinic in nature and they determined that in that case, full-fledged testimony is not required. Furthermore, there are the cases that constitute the bulk of the discussion in this chapter where there is testimony that must either be accepted in its entirety or rejected in its entirety. In those cases, e.g., the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, one relies on testimony that would not have been accepted in and of itself.
  In this chapter, various topics are discussed, such as the halakhot relating to both ritual matters, e.g., lineage, priesthood, ritual purity and impurity; and monetary matters, e.g., ratification of documents and repayment of debts, in which one relies on the testimony of witnesses with various flaws, and the parameters of their credibility in each case are delineated. One of the central topics discussed is the testimony of a captive woman. Generally, the assumption is that a woman taken captive is likely to be raped by her captors. Since the wife of a priest who was raped, and any Jewish woman who engages in intercourse with a gentile, are forbidden to a priest, it is prohibited for all women taken captive to marry a priest due to that uncertainty. However, since this prohibition is based upon mere suspicion, the Sages rely on flawed testimony in order to permit a captive woman to marry a priest.
  These issues constitute the bulk of this chapter, and related topics will be discussed in the course of the analysis of its central topics.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  One of the main topics analyzed in this chapter is the principle: The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted. In other words, in any case where one relies on testimony or the admission of one of the parties, if it is deemed credible it should be accepted in its entirety. Therefore, when one testifies, establishing a fact, whether it relates to him or it relates to another, and he adds certain details that limit or negate the halakhic significance of that testimony, the entire statement of the witness is accepted. This principle applies to ritual matters, e.g., the testimony of a woman regarding with whom she engaged in intercourse, or if she said: I was taken captive but was not violated, or if she said: I was married but now I am divorced; and to monetary matters, e.g., this field belonged to your father and I purchased it from him, or if one said: That is my signature but we were compelled to sign.
  There are two restrictions to this form of credibility. First, it is accorded only when there is no independent source of information with regard to that matter. When there is such information, i.e., witnesses or some other source of objective information that is incriminating, the fact that the party admitted it but then negated its significance does not grant him credibility. Second, when a party's claim involves self-incrimination or is suspect of being false for some external reason, it is not granted credibility. 
  A similar halakha exists in cases where one relates a matter that could subject him to a prohibition and he then denies his original statement. In that case, his denial is accepted only if he can provide a rationale explaining why he made his original statement.
  Two other significant matters addressed in this chapter were the halakhot of ratification of documents and the halakhot of a captive woman. With regard to ratification of documents the Gemara concluded that when one seeks to undermine the validity of a document by claiming, for example, that it is a forgery, the document is brought before the court and the court determines, by means of testimony or by comparing the signatures of the witnesses with their signatures on documents previously ratified by the court, whether the witnesses' signatures are legitimate. Since the assumption is that witnesses who sign a document ascertained its validity, their testimony is sufficient to ratify it. It was also concluded that the testimony in the ratification of documents relates to the signatures and not to the content of the document, which led to various conclusions in cases where separate testimony is required for each of the signatures.
  With regard to a captive woman, or a woman who was subject to the control of gentiles, e.g., she was in a city under their occupation or she was incarcerated by them, the Sages were concerned that she was raped and therefore forbidden to a priest. However, since it is merely a suspicion, the Sages ruled leniently and relied on testimony that she was not violated from those whose testimony is generally invalid, e.g., one witness, a woman, or a minor. Only the testimony of the woman herself, when there is independent knowledge that she was in captivity, and the testimony of her husband, are invalid.
  On a similar note, the Sages relied on flawed testimony from one witness, from a relative, or from a witness who witnessed the incident as a minor in various cases involving rabbinic law, e.g., elevation to priesthood for matters of rabbinic law and for matters of lineage, and for determining the Shabbat boundaries, especially in those matters that entail merely revealing a fact that by its very nature would have been revealed and publicized.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And if a man seduce a virgin who was not betrothed, and lies with her, he shall pay a dowry for her to be a wife to him. If her father refuses to give her to him, he shall weigh money like the dowry of the virgins. (Exodus 22:15–16)
  If a man finds a young woman who is a virgin who was not betrothed, and lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; and the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the young woman fifty shekels of silver, and to him she shall be as a wife, because he tormented her; he may not put her away all his days. (Deuteronomy 22:28–29)
  The halakhot of the seducer and the rapist are explicit in the Torah; however, since they are written succinctly, many questions remain that demand practical halakhic resolution.
  One of the primary questions relates to the attitude toward the language of the verses: Do the halakhot of the seducer and the rapist apply only in the cases delineated in the verse; or does the verse merely cite a specific case in order to illustrate the halakha, which applies in other cases as well? This question relates to several details. Does this apply only to a young woman who is a virgin or does it apply to a minor girl and a grown woman as well? Does this apply only to a young woman whose father is alive, or even to an orphan? Is the right of refusal for the marriage of the victim exclusively that of the father and is it applicable only in the case of seduction?
  Another related fundamental problem is: What is the halakha when there is an additional prohibition associated with this intercourse beyond the seduction and the rape? It could be that the woman is forbidden to the rapist by rabbinic law, due to a positive mitzva, due to a prohibition, or even due to a prohibition punishable by death. Is the perpetrator required to marry his victim in all these cases? Is he obligated to pay the fine? Does he receive only one punishment, or is he is subject to both punishments? These questions require a comprehensive analysis of the general principles of punishment: What is the halakha when there is more than one punishment for violating a single prohibition?
  Another basic question involves the nature of the payment paid by the seducer and the rapist. Is the sum mentioned in the Torah the total compensation to the victim or is it merely a special fine paid in addition to other payments of compensation like those paid to any other victim of violence? If there are additional payments, how are they assessed and to whom are they paid? 
  These problems and others that emerge from their resolution constitute the focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara concluded that one who rapes or seduces a young woman who is forbidden to him, regardless of whether the prohibition is by Torah law or by rabbinic law, need not and may not marry her. However, he is required to pay her father the fine mentioned in the Torah. However, if she was forbidden to him by a prohibition punishable by death, then even if in this particular case the death penalty is not administered, the perpetrator is exempt from paying the fine.
  These halakhot are based on several principles analyzed in this chapter. One is that a person is not punished with two punishments for one prohibited action; rather he receives the more severe punishment. Another is that in the case of any prohibition whose violation incurs both lashes and monetary payment, one pays and is not flogged. One is obligated to make that payment even if the prohibition was punishable by karet.
  With regard to the details mentioned in the verse, the Gemara concluded that the rapist is obligated to pay the fine only if the victim is a virgin and not one who lost her presumptive virgin status, e.g., an emancipated maidservant or a woman who participated in a marriage ceremony; however, the rapist is obligated to pay even if he raped a minor girl and not only if the victim is a young woman. Furthermore, even if the victim was a young woman who was betrothed and widowed from betrothal, he is obligated to pay. In addition, although the verse refers to a young woman with a father, even if the victim was an orphan the rapist pays a fine. However, with regard to this detail, there is a difference between the victim of rape and the victim of seduction, as one who seduces an orphaned young woman is exempt, because she was complicit in performing the action. With regard to refusal to marry the perpetrator, the Sages derived that this applies to both the victim of rape and the victim of seduction, and both the father and the daughter have the right of refusal.
  The Gemara concluded that the sum written in the Torah is a fine and the perpetrator pays it to every young woman that he victimizes. However, in addition, like any person who injures another, he pays for pain, humiliation, loss of livelihood, medical costs, and degradation. The fine is payment for the act of intercourse alone. Since that sum is a fine and not a monetary obligation, like all fines it is collected only through the testimony of witnesses and not by his own admission and it may be levied and collected only by ordained judges.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And if a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant, she shall not go out as the menservants do. If she does not please her master, who has espoused her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemed; he shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people, seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her. And if he espouse her to his son, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters. If he takes another wife for himself, her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he shall not diminish. And if he does not do these three for her, then she shall go out for nothing, without money.
  (Exodus 21:7–11) 
  If a man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her, and place wanton charges against her, and bring up an evil name upon her, and say: I took this woman, and when I came near to her, I did not find in her the tokens of virginity; then the father of the young woman, and her mother, shall take and bring forth the tokens of the young woman's virginity to the Elders of the city in the gate. And the young woman's father shall say to the Elders: I gave my daughter to this man as a wife, and he hates her; and he has placed wanton charges, saying: I did not find in your daughter the tokens of virginity; and these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity. And they shall spread the garment before the Elders of the city. And the Elders of that city shall take the man and chastise him. And they shall fine him a hundred shekels of silver, and give them to the father of the young woman, because he has defamed a virgin of Israel; and she shall be his wife; he may not send her away all his days. (Deuteronomy 22:13–19)
  The Torah states that the fine of the rapist of a young woman must be paid to her father. This chapter analyzes the nature of this rule, which leads to a broader discussion of a father's rights over his daughter. The main sources in the Torah for these rights are the verses that deal with the sale of one's daughter as a maidservant, and there are also several rabbinic ordinances in this regard. The Gemara debates whether these are personal rights, or monetary rights that can be bequeathed to the father's heirs. 
  Another area of halakha in which a father is a party to his daughter's claim is the case of a defamer. Although this situation is described in detail in the Torah, many of its details require clarification. The discussion here focuses on the extent to which the verses must be fulfilled in a literal manner. All agree, for instance, that no punitive measures may be taken as prescribed in the Torah without the testimony of witnesses, which is not mentioned in these verses. 
  The analysis of the rights of a father over his daughter leads to the central topic of this chapter: The husband's rights with regard to his wife, and his corresponding obligations toward her. The focus of this debate is the marriage contract and its stipulations, which define these rights and obligations. This chapter deals with the obligations of the husband that apply by Torah law, which are derived from the case of the Hebrew maidservant who marries her master. In addition, it discusses those obligations that apply by rabbinic law.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  With regard to a father's rights over his daughter, the general principle established by the Sages is that money earned by a daughter in her youth belongs to her father. Until she is a grown woman, a father receives the money of his daughter's betrothal, fines that are paid to her, and any other payment to which she is entitled. Furthermore, her earnings and any articles she finds go to him. However, he may not make use of her personal property, e.g., those items she inherited or received from others. In addition, a father has the right to betroth his minor daughter to the man of his choice, to accept her bill of divorce on her behalf, and to nullify her vows. Most of these rights are personal, and therefore the father cannot bequeath them to his sons. Consequently, his heirs can claim only those payments that were already owed before the father passed away.
  These rights of a father are in effect until his daughter becomes a grown woman or marries. Once she has married she has left her father's authority entirely and does not return even if her marriage was annulled. From the perspective of halakha she is considered an orphan even though her father is alive. 
  With regard to a defamer, the verses are fulfilled in accordance with the halakhic midrash, not their literal meaning. In short, the case of the defamer is as follows: A man married a young woman, i.e., neither a minor nor a grown woman, who is not a convert, and he engaged in regular sexual intercourse with her. Subsequently, he claimed in court that she was not a virgin, and he brings witnesses that she committed adultery when she was betrothed to him. If the testimony of these witnesses is accepted, she is stoned at the door of her father's house. Even if she does not have a father, or if her father does not have a house, she is executed regardless. If the father brings witnesses who testify that the first pair were false, conspiring witnesses, the guilty witnesses themselves are stoned, in accordance with the halakha of false, conspiring witnesses, while the husband is flogged and must pay the father of the young woman one hundred shekels of silver. Furthermore, he must retain her as his wife and may not divorce her unless she wants to leave him. 
  The rights of a husband are basically similar to those of a father, as he may nullify his wife's vows, collects her earnings and the articles she finds, and shares the payments for damages that she receives. Unlike a father, a husband is also entitled to the revenue generated by his wife's property, although the wife retains ownership of the property itself. Several obligations are imposed on a husband, corresponding to these rights. By Torah law, he must provide his wife with food, clothing, and fulfill his conjugal duties. In addition, he is obligated by rabbinic law to pay her medical expenses, to redeem her from captivity, and to pay for her burial. There are also several stipulations of the marriage contract that apply after his death. His widow may continue living in his house while receiving her sustenance from his estate, her daughters are also sustained from his property until their marriage or maturity, and her sons inherit their mother's marriage contract in addition to their share of his inheritance. These last two stipulations are known as the marriage document concerning female children and the marriage document concerning male children.
  In connection to the marriage document concerning female children, the Gemara discussed the obligation of a father to feed his children during his lifetime. While they are very little, up to the age of six, a father is obligated to provide them with sustenance. Beyond this age, the court will pressure him to feed them until their maturity. If he is wealthy and can afford to do so, he will even be compelled to pay for the sustenance of his children.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  This chapter is a continuation of the topics discussed in the previous chapter: The halakhot of the marriage contract payment and the stipulations within the contract.
  One issue to be determined is the value of the marriage contract payment, both the minimum amount to which the husband must commit and the question of whether this minimum amount is an absolute requirement or can be waived. There is also a discussion concerning an additional sum that the husband may wish to add to his wife's marriage contract and the manner of collecting this additional sum.
  Another question that relates to the marriage contract itself is the date at which the stipulations in the marriage contract, particularly the husband's obligation to sustain the wife, take effect. There are three possible points at which this could take place: At the betrothal, at the appointed time designated for the wedding, or when the couple is actually married. In addition to the question of the husband's financial responsibility, there is a non-monetary aspect to this question as well: An Israelite woman married to a priest is entitled to eat teruma, and therefore there is a need to clarify when this right begins.
  Among the stipulations in the marriage contract is the wife's obligation to perform various tasks for her husband's benefit. This obligation requires definition, in terms of both the nature and the quantity of these tasks. There is also the question of whether this is an absolute obligation for the wife, or whether it is possible to modify it under certain circumstances. This question also has a non-monetary aspect to it: Do the husband or the wife have the power to consecrate the wife's earnings or to prohibit them by means of a vow?
  Another fundamental aspect of marriage is the obligation to engage in conjugal relations. Discussing this obligation raises a number of issues, such as the frequency of the set intervals at which the husband is obligated to engage in relations with his wife and the question of how to treat a man or a woman who refuses to fulfill this obligation to his or her spouse.
  There is also a need to set a minimum amount to define the husband's obligation to provide his wife with food and clothing. This is particularly necessary during periods when the husband and wife are not together and the husband appoints a third party to provide these necessities for his wife. 
  The primary topics of this chapter clarify the fundamental and practical aspects of these questions.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  With regard to the sums in the marriage contract, the conclusion is that a man can add as large an additional sum as he likes. However, the additional sum can be collected only by a woman who was widowed or divorced after marriage. If the relationship ends during the betrothal stage, the woman receives only the main sum of her marriage contract, but not the additional sum.
  By rabbinic law, the husband is prohibited from reducing the sum below the minimum amount, even if his wife agrees. If a man does not write a marriage contract at all, or writes one for less than the minimum amount, their relationship amounts to licentious sexual intercourse.
  After betrothal, unless the couple agrees otherwise, there is generally an appointed date set for the marriage. Once this date arrives, the woman is entitled to be sustained from the husband's assets. Nevertheless, due to various considerations, the Sages ruled that a woman who is betrothed to a priest may not partake of teruma until they are actually married.
  With regard to the wife's obligation to perform tasks, the conclusion is that she is responsible for the primary maintenance of the household: Preparing food and caring for the young children, and other household duties. Additionally, she must do some work to aid in producing income for the family. Nevertheless, these are not absolute obligations, as a woman has the prerogative to declare that she will forfeit the right to sustenance from her husband in return for being able to keep her earnings. Additionally, if the wife brings property into the marriage from her dowry, or if the husband or wife is from a family that is not accustomed to performing household tasks, she is exempt from those tasks, due to the halakha that a woman ascends with her husband to his social status but does not descend from her status if his is lower.
  Despite this, even a wealthy woman must perform certain acts of affection for her husband. These are tasks that do not require great effort but create feelings of closeness between them. Also, a woman may not be completely idle, as this leads to sin. For these and other reasons, the conclusion is that the husband cannot consecrate his wife's earnings.
  The Sages delineated specific intervals at which the husband must engage in sexual relations with his wife, depending on his occupation, and he is not permitted to reduce the frequency of his conjugal obligations below this minimum without the wife's agreement. Nevertheless, he is permitted to leave her for a time in order to study Torah, despite the resultant neglect of his conjugal obligations during his absence.
  The conjugal obligations are so significant that if one of the parties becomes completely unable to fulfill them, the couple is required to get divorced. If the husband is the one who deprives his wife of sexual intercourse, he must divorce her and give her the payment of her marriage contract. If the wife deprives the husband, she may be divorced without payment of her marriage contract. Furthermore, if one spouse refuses to engage in conjugal relations with the other due to a disagreement between them, this spouse is declared rebellious and is subject to monetary fines. And the Sages decreed that if the disagreement is not resolved within a short time, the couple should get divorced.
  The Sages also set minimum amounts of food, clothing, and household necessities that the poorest of Jewish husbands must provide for their wives. These amounts, like other details of the stipulations in the marriage contract, fluctuate with the accepted practice in each community. Additionally, the couple has the right to stipulate different terms between them.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  This chapter begins with a short discussion of a husband's rights to various kinds of property and wealth that his wife acquires by means other than work. It deals primarily with the halakhot surrounding the dowry that a woman brings into the marriage.
  Torah law does not dictate that a woman must bring a dowry into her marriage from her father's home, and the dowry is not considered an essential component of a marriage. Nevertheless, certain conventions relating to the dowry crystalized over the generations, and the Sages afforded these conventions halakhic weight.
  One primary issue surrounding the dowry concerns the nature of the father's responsibility to provide a dowry for his daughter. Is this responsibility purely personal, so that only he is obligated to provide the dowry, or is it a debt that also falls upon his estate? With regard to specific details of the dowry, is the amount of the dowry fixed, so that there is a minimum that the father must provide for this purpose? In addition, the Gemara examines the place of the dowry within the father's total estate, particularly with respect to the hierarchy of collectable debts and obligations.
  The Sages also established certain standards for the husband's financial obligations, categorized as supplemental conditions of the marriage contract, corresponding to the assets the woman brings into the marriage as part of her dowry. These obligations go beyond the basic sums of the marriage contract and whatever supplemental stipulations the husband adds of his own accord. The obligatory supplements vary not only depending upon the amount of property that a woman brings in as a dowry, but also depending on the type of property. For these purposes, there is a critical distinction between liquid assets, which are readily available for business and investments, and illiquid assets, which are not fit for spending. Determining the proper exchange for the gifts of the bride's dowry was complicated by the common practice of exaggerating the value of the dowry for the honor of the bride.
  Another question that concerns the dowry relates to the woman's right to control property that her father has earmarked for her dowry. May she do with it as she wishes, or is she bound by her father's terms? These questions are addressed in detail in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  Items that a married woman finds belong completely to her husband, but inheritances that she receives have the status of her usufruct property, from which the husband may derive benefit only from the profits. If the woman is injured and receives compensation for humiliation and degradation, the compensation is divided. With respect to concealed injury, one-third is awarded to her husband and the balance becomes the woman's usufruct property.
  Concerning the dowry, it is concluded that Torah law does not demand that fathers provide dowries for their daughters, and dowries do not have the status of supplemental stipulations of the marriage contract. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted that a father is obligated to provide support, i.e., a dowry, and this obligation falls upon his estate in the event of his death.
  The minimum sum for the dowry is set at fifty dinars, which is also the amount a woman is given if she is supported by charity funds. Nevertheless, the standard amount for a dowry is one-tenth of her father's estate, such that each daughter receives one-tenth of the estate's value at the time that she becomes married. When her father is alive, he may provide a dowry of whatever size he sees fit. However, after his death, the daughter has a legal right to receive this one-tenth share of the estate, and she may demand it of the other inheritors. The daughter receives her one-tenth of the estate only from real estate. Although the ge'onim later ruled that movable property may also be collected for the settlement of marriage contracts, this allowance was never extended with respect to her right to collect for her dowry.
  With respect to the amounts the husband writes into the marriage contract as obligatory supplements, corresponding to the cash she brings into the marriage, it is concluded that he records an amount corresponding to one and a half times the sum that she brings in. By contrast, for utensils and movable property, he obligates himself to pay only the amount of their worth, presuming that these items have been appraised for their actual values. However, if their worth has been exaggerated in honor of the woman, the husband is responsible to pay only the true value of the items.
  If a father orders that real estate be purchased for his daughter's dowry after his death, an adult daughter may intercede and give her husband the money to purchase real estate. However, if she is a minor, or if she is an adult who has not yet married, the father's instructions are honored and carried out.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  The marriage contract is a fundamental part of the contractual relationship between a husband and wife. As such, any conditions the couple stipulates in the contract are binding, unless they contradict Torah law. However, there can be situations in which either the husband or the wife violates the terms of the marriage so fundamentally that the court mandates a conclusion to the marriage.
  A violation of the contract can occur due to a misrepresentation of the facts at the time of betrothal, or due to actions perpetrated following the betrothal but prior to the marriage, or during the marriage itself. Although there are differences in detail between these various scenarios, the same matters are considered a violation of the marriage, regardless of when they occur. Three categories of matters are characterized as fundamentally violating the conditions of the marriage: Vows, inappropriate conduct, and blemishes.
  The Sages penalized the party responsible for violating the agreement, whether the violation concerns the general rules of marriage or a specific stipulation inserted by the parties. If the wife is the guilty party, she may be divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract, and if the husband is responsible, the court orders him to divorce his wife and pay the sums delineated in the marriage contract.
  The main focus of this chapter is to clarify the details of these three categories. While certain prohibitions created by vows may in fact interfere with ordinary married life, at times this is due to the specific predilections of the other spouse. The details discussed in this chapter, however, are standard matters with universal relevance. Therefore, the Gemara must clarify which types of vows create intrinsic disruptions to married life, which types of conduct are deemed fundamentally inappropriate, and which blemishes are considered serious enough to invalidate a betrothal or require divorce.
  In all of these categories, the Gemara must also clarify whether in the case of a violation of terms there are differences between a man and a woman, as there are important distinctions between the responsibilities and expectations of the husband and those of the wife on some of these matters. It is also necessary to determine when and how the court orders a divorce and enforces compliance.
  These discussions form the basis of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, there are three primary categories of situations that can result in a court-mandated conclusion to a marriage: Vows, inappropriate conduct, and blemishes.
  With regard to vows, the conclusion is that the Sages intervened to establish halakhot only about vows that impinge directly on the married life of the couple. If the couple got married with an explicit stipulation that there would be no vows incumbent upon them, and it was later discovered that there were in fact vows at the time of the betrothal, this can invalidate the marriage retroactively and render the marriage contract irrelevant.
  Vows taken during the time of the marriage present additional complications. After a fundamental discussion with regard to how it is possible to take a vow that contradicts prior obligations, the conclusion is that any vow that withholds from the wife benefits to which she is entitled, whether directly or indirectly, grants her the right to a divorce and to full payment of her marriage contract. This is true regardless of whether the vow concerns a fundamental part of the marriage, such as conjugal rights or the right to sustenance, or whether the vow relates to the ordinary life of a married couple. Although the wife is entitled to a divorce and payment of her marriage contract in all of these cases, there are distinctions between them with regard to the amount of time allotted to the husband to alleviate the problem before being compelled to divorce her. In situations where the distress or difficulty to the wife is greater, the court will compel a divorce with greater urgency.
  Inappropriate conduct by the wife constitutes a direct violation of the implicit terms of the marital agreement. Therefore, immodest behavior or violations of halakha that relate to interactions between the husband and wife constitute grounds to divorce the wife without payment of her marriage contract. This is equally true of situations where the husband compels the wife to act in a manner that contradicts norms of appropriate behavior; in such cases the husband will be compelled to divorce his wife with full payment of her marriage contract. 
  With regard to physical blemishes, the conclusion is that certain types of esthetic flaws constitute grounds for invalidating the marriage or forcing a divorce. However, in this regard there is a distinction between the husband and the wife. Whereas relatively minor defects are considered blemishes when it comes to the wife, only the existence of major blemishes in the husband, as defined in the Mishna and Gemara, are grounds to compel him to divorce her and pay for her marriage contract if she so desires.
  There is also a distinction between visible blemishes and hidden ones. With regard to visible blemishes, the husband is generally assumed to have seen them and agreed to accept them, so that he cannot subsequently claim to have been deceived. However, hidden blemishes that he discovers only after getting married can be grounds for invalidating the betrothal retroactively. The detailed analysis of this topic led to a more general discussion about the burden of proof in civil cases where opposing claims are advanced by the two parties with regard to the timing of an event that could potentially invalidate a transaction retroactively. The accepted halakhic conclusion is that the burden of proof falls on the individual in whose domain the uncertainty developed.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  This chapter discusses the halakhot that govern usufruct property that a woman brings into a marriage. There is a principle that any property that is not part of a woman's dowry that she owns prior to marriage, or property that she inherits during the marriage, remains hers. However, it is permitted for the husband to use it and eat from its produce.
  This dual ownership of usufruct property, whereby the wife owns the principal and the husband owns the rights to the produce, raises a host of problems concerning the rights to sell the property or transfer its produce to someone else. There are also numerous details and distinctions concerning this issue, such as the difference between the husband's rights to the property during betrothal and during marriage, and his rights if he is a yavam performing levirate marriage.
  Another issue that arises is how to care for the usufruct property so that it does not deteriorate, as well as ensure that it yields produce from which the husband benefits. To resolve this issue, it is necessary to define precisely what is considered the principal and what is considered produce, which is not at all obvious in certain cases where the principal does not renew itself and is slowly consumed.
  Yet another relevant issue is the status of the usufruct property if the wife gets divorced, especially in cases where certain processes taking place are not yet complete, e.g., a usufruct field whose fruits have not yet been picked, or a husband who spent money on caring for his wife's usufruct field but was not yet reimbursed for his expenses.
  These questions and the issues related to them will be the primary topics of discussion in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  The Gemara concluded that according to all opinions, a widow who inherits property while waiting for her yavam may use the property as she chooses before the marriage and the husband may not protest. The same principle likewise applies to a betrothed woman who inherited property before she was betrothed. In contrast, a betrothed woman who inherited property after betrothal may not sell it ab initio, but if she already did so, the transaction is binding. A married woman may not sell or do business with usufruct property, and if she transferred the property to someone else, the husband may repossess it from the purchasers. This applies specifically to property that is known to the husband, but if she inherits property in a distant location that is unknown to him, she may sell it and do business with it.
  The wife's usufruct money is used to purchase land, which itself belongs to the woman, while its produce belongs to the husband. Concerning property where the principal does not reproduce, all benefit from it is included in the category of produce, and the husband may use it even if this produce is eventually consumed entirely. Property that does not yield any produce is sold and the proceeds are used to purchase property that does yield produce, unless there is some special reason for the woman not to sell it, e.g., if it is an asset of her paternal family.
  Produce attached to the ground at the time of marriage belongs to the husband, and produce attached at the time of divorce belongs to the wife. The opposite principle applies to produce that is detached from the ground: At the time of marriage it belongs to the wife, while if it is detached at the time of divorce, it belongs to the husband. The expenditures that the husband spends on his wife's property are not assessed to see if they correspond with the profits. Rather, whatever he spent is spent, and he need not return the value of whatever he benefited from. This is the case unless he outlays expenditures but does not benefit at all, in which case he takes an oath as to the amount of his expenses and claims that amount for himself.
  Building on the previous topics, the Gemara also discussed differences between property mortgaged to the marriage contract of a regular wife and property mortgaged to that of a yevama. In the former case, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the husband may not designate specific movable items to serve as payment for the marriage contract; rather, all of his property should be mortgaged for this purpose. This way, the husband may still sell his property, but the woman also has a mortgage on the property from the beginning of the marriage. In contrast, in a case of the marriage contract of a yevama, all of the assets belonging to the first husband are mortgaged, and the yavam may never sell them.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  This chapter discusses the details of two ways in which the husband relinquishes rights that he would otherwise have. Since with regard to monetary matters the marriage agreement is dependent on the desires of both the husband and the wife, it is conceivable that the husband would waive his rights to the obligations that the wife has toward him. The first example is when the husband partially or completely relinquishes his right to benefit from his wife's property. The second example is a case where he relinquishes his right to administer an oath to her when she comes to collect payment for her marriage contract.
  This chapter deals with the husband's agreement to forgo his rights to his wife's usufruct property. It establishes the precise language used in such a case and clarifies the parameters of the legal ramifications of each statement. 
  It also discusses several situations in which the wife is compelled to take an oath. One situation is where a woman concedes that she was already partially paid the sum of her marriage contract and comes to collect payment for the remaining sum. She is obligated to take an oath before she can collect payment because there is a concern that she might have already received all or part of the sum that she is demanding. Similarly, a woman who comes to collect her marriage contract after her husband's death is required to take an oath that she never previously received any payment before she can demand payment from her husband's heirs. This is due to a rabbinic ordinance that anyone who wishes to collect payment from orphans must take an oath beforehand.
  A woman is also required to take an oath when she is in charge of all or part of her husband's property. Here, her oath is mandatory for the same reason that a partner or employee can be asked to take an oath, to clear oneself from any suspicion of having stolen or misappropriated anything. An extreme formulation of this idea is expressed in the debate as to whether a woman can be required to take an oath to prove her honesty in running her household. This chapter contains discussions of situations in which a woman can be compelled to take an oath and the ways in which a husband can release his wife from her obligation to take one.
  The woman's obligation to take an oath when she collects payment for her marriage contract leads to several other issues. The first is establishing her standing relative to all the other claimants to her husband's property when she comes to collect payment. The second concerns the nature of the document that she must provide to collect payment. May she use only the marriage contract itself, or are there other ways through which she can collect payment for her marriage contract? Another case that is addressed is one where the woman possesses several marriage contracts from one husband.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  With regard to the husband's relinquishment of his rights to his wife's usufruct property, the conclusion is that he can forgo his rights to the produce of his wife's property, provided that this written or verbal stipulation was made before they were married. However, he cannot waive his right to inherit from her should she die during his lifetime. 
  With regard to oaths, it was concluded that in order to ensure marital harmony, the husband cannot administer an oath to her concerning her conduct in running the household. However, he or his heirs may administer an oath to her if he appointed her to be a storekeeper or a steward of his property. Generally speaking, a woman can collect payment for her marriage contract without taking an oath if it is in her possession. This, however, is not the halakha in the case of a woman who claims that she received partial payment of her marriage contract, or that the sum of the marriage contract is less than what is recorded therein. In any event, if she was widowed, she must take an oath in order to collect payment from the heirs. The husband is able to release her of her obligation to take an oath in most situations, and the extent to which he waives his right to administer an oath to her is dependent on what he specifies. For example, he can release only her from her obligation to take an oath or he can also release inheritors. He may also release them from their obligation to take an oath at his request, or also release them from any obligation to do so at the request of his inheritors.
  Where there are several claimants to the husband's property, but there are insufficient assets to repay all of the debts, the heirs have prior claim to the assets. This is true with the exception of a case where one of the other claimants seized assets during the lifetime of the deceased, in payment of a debt owed to him.
  Although the marriage contract itself is the primary document she can use to collect payment, if the woman is not in possession of it, she can collect the main sum by producing either her bill of divorce or witnesses to her husband's death. If a woman is in possession of two marriage contracts from her husband, she can collect payment from both documents if there is proof that the second contract was meant to be in addition to the first contract. If this is not clear, then she can collect payment from only one of them.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  This chapter deals extensively with a problem initially discussed in the previous chapter: In the case of a man who was married to a number of women and then died, how do the wives and their heirs distribute the property of the deceased to which they are entitled as payment for their respective marriage contracts? 
  Obviously, if the value of the estate of the deceased husband exceeds the total amount claimed by all the wives or their heirs, there is no problem distributing the funds. However, several questions arise when the sum required to pay out all the claims is higher than the value of the estate: First, which of the wives takes priority in collecting payment of her marriage contract, and how is this priority determined in practice? Additionally, how is the property to be distributed when the value of each of the marriage contracts is different, meaning that one woman's claim is for a higher sum than that of the other wives? In such a case, as in a case where a partnership is dissolved and each partner has a different share in the business, there are several possibilities: Either each claimant receives an equal share, or the assets are divided in proportion to the amounts of the different claims, or preference is given to one of the claimants. 
  A third issue concerns the stipulation in the marriage contract which states that each male offspring inherits his mother's marriage settlement, in addition to his fair share of his father's estate. Because the amounts specified in the different marriage contracts are not always identical, and because one of the wives may have fewer sons than the others, it is essential to clarify how the claims of the sons of the different wives are to be settled.
  All of these issues become even more complex in a case where one of the wives waives her rights toward just one of the parties. This can bring about a set of lawsuits where different claimants have relative rights of priority, and a practical solution is necessary. 
  These issues and similar ones comprise the central topic of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  This chapter discussed the priorities in collecting payment for marriage contracts where there are several wives. It was determined that the woman whose marriage contract was written on an earlier date takes priority over the women who hold marriage contracts written on later dates. This halakha is similar to cases where an individual owes money to multiple creditors. The time of a document's issue is determined according to the day, month, and year it was written. Documents written on the same day are considered as if they were written at the same time, unless they were issued at a location where it was customary to explicitly state the hour of issue as well. 
  This order of priorities exists only when all the wives are still alive or when they are all deceased. However, if one wife is alive and another is deceased, the one who is alive collects her marriage settlement as a creditor and takes priority over the sons of the wife who is deceased, whose claim to their mother's marriage settlement is through the halakhot of inheritance. 
  There is a range of opinions with regard to a case where the marriage contracts are not of equal value and none of the wives takes priority over the others. Most of the authorities were of the opinion that the holder of the marriage contract of the lowest value ends up receiving the highest percentage of her claim, while the holder of the marriage contract of the highest value collects more than the others only after the others have collected the full amounts of their claims. Conversely, in the case of partners who invested different amounts in a joint business endeavor and decide to dissolve their partnership, they split the assets and profits in proportion to the amounts they invested. 
  With regard to the stipulation in the marriage contract that each male offspring inherits his mother's marriage settlement, it was determined that this stipulation applies only when there was a surplus of one dinar, in the form of real estate, belonging to the estate after deducting the amounts owed for each of the marriage contracts. If such a surplus does not exist, the biblical laws of inheritance cannot be left completely unfulfilled. Consequently, the sons divide the entire estate equally among themselves. Furthermore, this stipulation in the marriage contract applies only to property already in the estate and does not apply to potential property expected in the future. 
  In a case in which one of the wives waived her lien on her husband's property vis-à-vis a particular creditor, a situation is created where several counterclaims exist that cannot be resolved unless the parties agree to a compromise.
  
  Introduction to Perek XI
  
  This chapter deals primarily with the ways in which a widow collects payment of what is due her from her late husband's property. In principle, a widow is entitled to receive two financial benefits from her late husband's estate. The first is sustenance, which is provided only in cases where the husband died after the couple was fully married, not only betrothed. The second is payment of her marriage contract. A widow is entitled to sustenance only as long as she has not collected payment of her marriage contract. Once she has collected payment, her husband's heirs have no monetary obligation toward her.
  The central issue concerning the widow's collection of payment and marriage contract is the process by which she can collect payment. When the husband's heirs are adults, they allocate these payments to the widow. When they are minors, the widow must collect payment herself, and it is necessary to ascertain how and under what conditions she sells the estate's property to receive her due. This leads to other questions relating to what happens in a case where the widow sells property for a price that is different from its market value: When would such a sale be valid; under what circumstances would it be void; and who bears the burden of responsibility in these situations? 
  Another issue discussed in this chapter concerns cases where there is a halakhic problem with the marital relationship. In such cases, when is the woman entitled to a marriage contract? These issues and the secondary discussions that arise from treatment of them are the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XI
  
  A widow is provided sustenance from her deceased husband's property. Once every six months, the widow sells enough property to provide for her sustenance for the upcoming six months. The purchaser gives her the money for the purchase in six monthly payments, so that each month she receives the amount necessary to provide her sustenance for that month. If the widow did not demand sustenance for an extended period of two or three years, she forfeits her right to receive sustenance for that period of time. However, she is entitled to provisions for her sustenance from that point forward. A widow may sell her deceased husband's property in order to receive payment of her marriage contract, and she can choose either to sell property as payment of the entire marriage contract or to sell property in increments. She does not have to sell the property in court but can simply sell it in the presence of three people who are experienced in assessing the prices of property.
  If a widow sold property for less than its value, the sale is void. The same is true in the case of one who sold property as an agent on behalf of another. However, a sale of the court is void only if the judges erred by one-sixth of the value of the property, and if they made an announcement before the sale, then the sale is valid in any event. There is a principle that an agent's actions are ineffective and void when he deviates from the wishes of his employer. However, there are situations where he is seen as supplementing the instructions of the employer and not completely disregarding them.
  With regard to cases where there is a defect in the marriage, the Sages established the following: If the woman is forbidden to her husband by rabbinic law as a secondary prohibited relative; or if the woman is an ailonit whose husband was not aware of her condition before the marriage; or if a minor orphan girl who was married off by her mother or her brother refuses to continue living with her husband, then she is not entitled to the principal or to the money specified in the stipulations of the marriage contract. However, women whose marriage, though effective, is prohibited by Torah law, are entitled to payment of their marriage contracts. Women who are divorced because of their transgressions are not entitled to the principal or additional sums of the marriage contract.
  
  Introduction to Perek XII
  
  This chapter begins with the halakha concerning one who promises to support his wife's daughter from a previous marriage, the halakhic ramifications of such a guarantee, and its relationship to other stipulations in the marriage contract. However, the main subject of this chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter's discussion of the rights and privileges of a widow.
  Two aspects of this subject will be discussed here. The first is the housing to which a widow is entitled, including where she may live and how she may make use of her living quarters. The second relates to the length of time during which a widow may demand payment of her marriage contract from the heirs of her husband's estate. Whereas a regular promissory note never expires and can always be claimed, in this situation, where the widow benefits from her husband's estate, there is room to suspect that she may have waived her rights to her marriage contract.
  The chapter will deal with clarifying these subjects as well as related matters.
  
  Summary of Perek XII
  
  The chapter began with a discussion of one who promises to support his wife's daughter from another marriage. The Gemara established that such a guarantee is treated like a gift that one is contractually obligated to give, and it is unrelated to the marital agreements between the husband and the mother of the girl. Consequently, even if the marriage to the girl's mother is terminated, the guarantee to her daughter remains binding.
  With regard to the living quarters of a widow, it was established that a widow continues to reside in the residence of her husband, where she enjoys all of the amenities she had during the lifetime of her husband. The rights of a widow to her husband's residence are limited to the specific home in which they resided together. If he did not own a home or if it was destroyed, the heirs are obligated to find her a place to live but are not obligated to bring her into their own home. If the widow simply prefers to return to her father's home, the heirs may calculate the cost of her sustenance according to what it would have been had she been living as a member of their household, if the cost would be less under those circumstances. However, if she has legitimate reasons for wishing to return to her father's home, they may not make that deduction.
  A widow who dwells in her father's home may claim payment of her marriage contract within twenty-five years of her husband's death. If she did not claim the payment within that time, it is assumed that she has decided to forgo her rights to her marriage contract. However, if she continues to reside in her husband's home, she may demand payment of her marriage contract even after more than twenty-five years have passed. 
  The chapter also related various incidents that occurred prior to and following the death of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, including the instructions he gave immediately before his passing.
  
  Introduction to Perek XIII
  
  This chapter completes the discussion of several halakhot involving the obligations of a marriage contract. In addition, as the chapter mentions a dispute between Sages of the Second Temple period, it proceeds to analyze other disagreements between those Sages on matters unrelated to the topic of the tractate. 
  One issue debated here is the case of a man who went overseas and left his wife without sustenance. If the woman comes to the court to claim her sustenance from her absent husband's estate, the court must determine that he did not in fact leave her money for this purpose, in which case she would be unlawfully claiming part of his property. Another question that arises in this situation concerns a third party who willingly pays for her sustenance. To what extent is the husband legally bound to repay the donor for his expenses upon his return?
  Another issue involving marriage is a couple's place of residence. Under what circumstances can one spouse force the other to relocate? Yet another matter discussed in this chapter is the money for the payment of a marriage contract. In a case where the precise currency of this sum was not specified in the marriage contact, it must be determined whether the husband must pay in the currency of the place where the contract was written or the location where payment is made.
  Among the other disputes mentioned in this chapter, only two are related to the topics of the tractate. One is the case of a man who died and left behind only a small estate that is not sufficient both to provide a livelihood for his daughters, in accordance with the conditions of the marriage contract, and to provide for his sons. Does the obligation toward the daughters take precedence over the claim of the legal heirs, the sons? The second case concerns a father-in-law who does not pay the dowry he promised. The Sages dispute whether the groom may delay the marriage as a result. 
  The other disputes recorded in this chapter involve various forms of imperfect admissions. The general question is whether conclusions may be drawn from indirect proofs, even when they can be explained away in other ways. The cases discussed include one who issues a partial admission of a different type from that claimed, but which is connected to the claim, e.g., he admits that he owes the container of the claimed item; one who claims that certain property definitely belongs to him but he is unable to sue a particular person for it, e.g., a lost path that ran through several fields; and one who performed an action or testified to a matter that apparently negates his own claim, e.g., if he signed as a witness to a contract that described a field as belonging to someone else but that he would later claim as his own.
  
  Summary of Perek XIII
  
  This chapter recorded several discussions concerning halakhot related to spouses' obligations toward one another. With regard to a husband who traveled overseas, the court apportions sustenance for his wife in all cases, and she is required to take an oath only when she comes to claim her marriage contract. This means that the court is obligated to sustain the wife from the husband's estate. However, if a third party willingly paid for her sustenance, he cannot force the husband to reimburse him unless he expressly stipulated at the time that that the money was given as a loan. 
  Concerning a couple's place of residence, one partner cannot compel the other to move to a different land. Furthermore, even within the same country, one cannot force one's spouse to move from one settlement to another, regardless of whether it is smaller, larger, inferior, or superior. However, there is one exception to this principle, and that is Eretz Yisrael. Either spouse may coerce the other to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael, even if this entails a lower standard of living. The same applies to a move to Jerusalem from elsewhere in Eretz Yisrael.
  Returning to the topic of a marriage contract, one of the leniencies of these halakhot is that the husband may choose whether he will pay its sum in the currency of the place the contract was written or that of the location where it is actually paid, whichever is more convenient for him. 
  Another case discussed in this chapter is that of a man who died and left behind a small estate. The halakha is that the daughters receive their sustenance from his property, in accordance with the conditions of the marriage contract, while the sons are left to fend for themselves. With regard to a groom who did not receive the promised dowry from his father-in-law, provided that the wife is not responsible for the mishap, she can demand that he either marry her or release her with a bill of divorce. 
  As for the disputes concerning incomplete admission, in a case where it can be understood that the accused is admitting to part of the claim, he is considered to have made a partial admission and must take an oath. One who lost his path but does not know in whose field it ran is entitled to a new path only if he can issue a definitive claim to a particular person. If he is unable to do so, all the owners of the fields around him will defer his claim to the others until he can reach some sort of compromise with them. One who claims ownership over a field which is described as belonging to someone else in a document that he himself signed as a witness, forfeits his claim to the field. However, if he lent money to another and subsequently borrowed from that same individual or sold a field to him, these acts do not constitute an admission that he never lent the money in the first place. 
  Incidental to these discussions, the Gemara analyzes the prohibition against a judge accepting any item from the litigants, not merely a bribe but any form of payment. A judge may receive only a sum which is clearly reimbursement for his lost work time, or a salary from the community if his only means of employment is in public service.
  The aggadic material of this chapter deals with the praises of Eretz Yisrael. These praises apply even nowadays, and all the more so in the future era.
  
  Kiddushin
  
  Introduction to Kiddushin
  
  The order of Nashim primarily deals with all things that relate to marriage: The life of the couple, the financial aspects of the relationship between a husband and wife, widowhood, levirate marriage, the halakhot with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, unfaithful spouses, and the willing dissolution of a marriage. It also touches upon vows and naziriteship. It is only tractate Kiddushin, the final tractate in this order, that is primarily devoted to the different elements of the act of Kiddushin, betrothal.
  There are many elements of marital life, and tractate Kiddushin is focused primarily on clarifying how the first stage of the marital bond, betrothal, is established. In other words, how do a man and woman become a married couple? How are they transformed into one new entity, a family? The bond of marriage is not formed by virtue of the couple residing together, nor does it result from bringing shared offspring into the world. The marital relationship, while not a blood relationship, is in some ways stronger than any other familial bonds. There are ramifications that result from this union with regard to different areas of halakha.
  Betrothal is, from a legal perspective, a positive mitzva. When a man wishes to marry a woman, which he is obligated to do in order to fulfill the mitzva of procreation, he must first betroth her. Tractate Kiddushin does not discuss the biblical source for this mitzva, nor does it discuss the details of the wedding ceremony. Instead, this tractate clarifies the halakhot of betrothal.
  In the Torah, this betrothal is called eirusin, but the Sages refer to it as kiddushin (see Kiddushin 2b). Similarly, the Torah uses the verb “take” to connote the effecting of betrothal. The betrothal bond on its own does not constitute a complete marriage, as there still remains the wedding ceremony, or nisuin, as it is referred to by the Sages. Although the betrothed couple does not enjoy the rights that come along with marriage until that point, their connection and their mutual obligation to one another is created through the act of betrothal.
  The Torah does not elaborate on how the betrothal process is carried out. These details were instead transmitted through the Oral Law and are derived through precise readings of the Written Torah.
  There are differences of opinion in the Talmud with regard to the specifics, but the main components of betrothal are agreed upon by everyone. They include four fundamental elements. The first is the manner in which betrothal is effected. The second is the intent of the man and the woman with regard to the betrothal. The third is the requirement that witnesses see the act of betrothal. The fourth is the requirement that the man and the woman be halakhically eligible to become betrothed to one another.
  There are three modes of acquisition, i.e., ways in which the betrothal bond can be effected. A woman can be betrothed by means of money or an item of monetary value being given to her from a man; via a document in which the man writes that the document should effect betrothal; or through an act of intercourse with the stated intention that it effect betrothal. Although there are those who say that betrothal can also be performed by means of the couple entering a wedding canopy, this opinion is not accepted as halakha.
  In each case, it must be clear that the act is being performed for the sake of the betrothal, most often via a clear and explicit statement made by the man who wishes to betroth the woman. Betrothal does not take effect without the knowledge and consent of both sides; nevertheless, a father can betroth his daughter to a man provided that the daughter is not yet an adult. Both parties to the betrothal must be competent, and therefore an imbecile, a male minor, or a female minor on her own cannot be party to betrothal. Since betrothal is dependent on the will and consent of both parties, the Sages provide different conditions, both with regard to the time and the circumstances, under which a betrothal takes effect.
  The witnesses for betrothal are not meant to serve as witnesses for authentication; rather, their participation is an intrinsic element of the betrothal. Consequently, betrothal that was performed without witnesses is disregarded, even if both parties agree that the act of betrothal took place.
  In some cases, the halakhic status of one or both of the parties prevents betrothal from taking effect. If one of the parties is either a Canaanite slave or a gentile, then the betrothal does not take effect. Similarly, the betrothal does not take effect when the two parties are forbidden to each other due to a prohibition punishable by karet, either because they are relatives or because she is a married woman. By contrast, when a less severe prohibition is involved, the betrothal takes effect after the fact, although intercourse between the parties is forbidden. The punishment incurred for their act of intercourse will depend on the details of the prohibition.
  Betrothal is an act of acquisition, and therefore it is similar to other types of acquisition in a number of ways. Once the betrothal takes place, the bond between the couple no longer depends on will or agreement. Instead, the boundaries of their bond are set and stand firm, as they do with regard to other prohibitions. With regard to this, there is a similarity between betrothal and consecration, to which the term kiddushin is related. The act of consecration also depends on the will of the person who consecrates the item, and once it is performed an essential change takes effect that cannot be canceled or altered.
  At the time of betrothal, an essential halakhic bond is formed between the man and the woman, rendering the woman forbidden to every other man and rendering both parties forbidden to engage in intercourse with each other's relatives. This bond can be canceled or altered only via the options specified in the Torah, i.e., through a bill of divorce or death. Even these methods do not cancel the bond with her former husband entirely; rather, they allow the woman to marry another man who is not his relative. Nevertheless, the familial bond created by the betrothal, which renders the woman's relatives forbidden to the man and the man's relatives forbidden to the woman, remains in place.
  As an act of acquisition, betrothal includes a number of elements that are common to other acts of acquisition. These include the possibility of setting conditions with regard to the amount of money used for betrothal, provided it is sufficient to effect an acquisition; setting conditions with regard to the time when the betrothal will take effect, i.e., immediately or after a specified period of time; and with regard to the possibility of appointing an agent to effect betrothal. A betrothal is canceled in the event of a mistaken transaction, if it becomes clear that that there was deception or a fundamental error with regard to the personalities, status, or living conditions of the couple. This is in contrast to conditions that were agreed upon by both parties from the outset.
  The dual nature of the bond of betrothal means that, although it constitutes a bond of acquisition, the ordinary halakhot of acquisition do not apply. Instead there are unique halakhot that do apply. Additionally, the complexity of the bond cannot be defined through the simple terms of buyer and seller, or giver and receiver. Betrothal should be seen as a legal act of acquisition that establishes a relationship that is essentially non-acquisitional; rather, it unifies two individuals as one new entity.
  Tractate Kiddushin contains four chapters that explore a variety of topics. While some of these topics are discussed throughout multiple chapters, each chapter has its unique focus:
  Chapter One deals primarily with the modes of acquisition through which a woman can be betrothed and released. Tangentially, it discusses the halakhot of acquisition in all areas, the obligations with regard to mitzvot for parents and their children, the differences between men and women with regard to the obligation to perform mitzvot, and the differences between mitzvot that are obligatory only in Eretz Yisrael and those that obligatory even outside of Eretz Yisrael.
  Chapter Two discusses the halakhot of agency with regard to betrothal, provides an explanation of items that can and cannot be used to betroth a woman, and discusses the effect of different conditions stated by the couple at the time of the betrothal.
  Chapter Three addresses the halakhot of conditions made with regard to betrothal. When a condition is nullified, will it cause the betrothal to be nullified? What is the proper way to phrase such a condition? Additionally, the chapter deals with situations in which there is a mistake or uncertainty concerning the identity of the betrothed parties. The end of the chapter contains general halakhot with regard to the couple: Which unions are permitted, which are forbidden, and the relevant halakhot concerning both types of unions and the children born from such relationships.
  Chapter Four deals primarily with the status of those born from permitted and forbidden unions, and it addresses the prohibition against seclusion with a woman other than one's wife.
  Notes
  1	This is the common order of the tractates. The Rambam explains that tractate Kiddushin is placed after tractate Gittin in order to preserve the ordering of the verse: “And she departs out of his house and goes and becomes another man's wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). By contrast, according to the Meiri this tractate is the first in the order. The ge'onim maintain likewise.
  2	In the Torah, the word appears only as a verb: “Betrothed a wife” (Deuteronomy 20:7), and: “A maiden who has been betrothed” (Deuteronomy 22:25).
  3	The verb “take” used in reference to a woman can either be a reference to betrothal, as in the verse: “For when a man shall take a woman and engage in sexual intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 22:13), or a reference to marriage as in the verse: “Who betrothed a wife but did not take her” (Deuteronomy 20:7). Additionally, the term is used as a euphemism for sexual intercourse, as indicated in the verse: “When a man shall take his sister” (Leviticus 20:17). Consequently, the Sages required precision with regard to the manner in which each term should be understood in its context. There are disagreements with regard to certain details, both in the Gemara and among later halakhic authorities.
  4	By Torah law, a father's right to betroth his minor daughter is unique to him. The Sages later established that a minor girl's mother or brothers can betroth her in the event that the father has died. Nevertheless, because such a betrothal does not take effect by Torah law, it can be canceled through the girl's refusal alone.
  5	The Sages instituted betrothal for deaf-mutes, who were not considered to be halakhically competent, but such a betrothal applies by rabbinic law only.
  6	This applies to all instances where intercourse between the parties would render them liable to receive karet, with the exception of intercourse with a menstruating woman, with whom betrothal takes effect according to everyone.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  When a man takes a woman and engages in sexual intercourse with her; and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes for her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house. And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man's wife. (Deuteronomy 24:1–2)
  If you buy a Hebrew slave, six years he shall labor; and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. (Exodus 21:2)
  But if the slave shall say: I love my master, my wife, and my children, I will not go out free. Then his master shall bring him to the judges, and shall bring him to the door, or to the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever. (Exodus 21:5–6)
  As a hired worker and as a settler he shall be with you; he shall labor with you until the Jubilee Year. (Leviticus 25:40)
  And if a man sells his daughter as a maidservant she shall not go out as the men slaves do. If she does not please her master who did not designate her then he shall let her be redeemed. He shall have no power to sell her to a foreign people, seeing that he has dealt deceitfully with her...And if he does not do these three to her, then shall she go out for nothing, without money. (Exodus 21:7–11)
  And as for your slaves and your maidservants, whom you may have, of the nations that are round about you, of them you shall buy slaves and maidservants. (Leviticus 25:44)
  And if you sell any item to your neighbor or buy from your neighbor's hand, you shall not defraud one another. (Leviticus 25:14)
  This chapter begins by discussing the halakhot of the acquisition of a woman. The mishna establishes that a woman can be betrothed by three methods: By accepting money or a document, or via sexual intercourse. The similarities and differences between these types of acquisition, as well as between the acts of betrothal and divorce, will be discussed in this chapter.
  Due to the unique nature of this particular acquisition with money, in which a woman transfers herself to the authority of a man as his wife, the focus is on several key issues: The precise formula that must be said; whether this statement must be issued by the man or if it can be said by the woman; and whether it must be the man who gives the money to the woman or if she can give it to him. Furthermore, the Gemara discusses the required response from the woman. If she does not overtly reject the betrothal but acts in a manner that can be interpreted as a refusal, e.g., by discarding the money or by insisting on receiving an item she had asked for while ignoring his request to turn the transaction into a betrothal, what is the status of this betrothal? How clear must her acceptance or refusal of the betrothal be?
  The Gemara will also compare the method of acquisition of betrothal to the establishment of other legal relationships, e.g., the obligations of a guarantor and the purchase of a Canaanite slave. Also discussed are the differences between betrothal and the marriage canopy. Likewise, the Gemara discusses the difference between a standard betrothal and the other primary forms of acquisition of a woman, namely levirate marriage and the purchase of a young girl as a maidservant, a transaction that can later result in marriage between the maidservant and her master or his son.
  Another central topic that will be addressed is the item with which a woman is betrothed. How much must the man give her? Must it be actual money, or can he give her an item worth money? Must she accept a physical item into her possession, or does it suffice that she gains some sort of intangible benefit? Is the avoidance of a loss also considered a benefit in this context?
  After debating at length the characteristics of the acquisition of betrothal, the chapter proceeds to analyze various other forms of acquisition. In particular, the acquisition and release of Hebrew slaves and maidservants, and Canaanite slaves and maidservants, is discussed at length. The main focus of this section of the chapter is not the nature of an acquisition but the modes of acquisition. In other words, the formal actions by which ownership is transferred from one party to another. The differences between the modes of acquisition are a result of several factors: The basic nature of the acquisition in question, i.e., whether it is the purchase of an item itself or the right of use of an item; the item that is acquired, which might be a person or a vessel; and the physical nature of the item, i.e., whether it is fixed in one spot, like real estate, or mobile.
  If the item is movable, the key issue is the manner in which it is generally moved: Is it pulled, lifted, or transported by some other method? Typically, the mode of acquisition will match the manner in which the item is usually handled. Each mode of acquisition must be discussed both on its own terms and in relation to the others in order to determine the most appropriate form of transfer in each particular case.
  Another broad topic that will be discussed in this chapter is an entirely different type of acquisition: The eternal acquisition of life through Torah and mitzvot. One must study all areas of the Torah: Bible, Mishna, and Talmud, while ensuring that he can earn an honest living at the same time. Not all six hundred and thirteen mitzvot apply equally to all Jews. There are differences between the obligations of men and women: Just as certain mitzvot apply only to priests, so too, there are mitzvot that are incumbent solely on men. Likewise, there is a distinction between mitzvot that can be fulfilled only in Eretz Yisrael and those that are not dependent on the land but are obligatory in all places.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  Most of the methods of acquisition, which were the central focus of this chapter, are discussed in greater detail in other tractates, e.g., Bava Metzia and Bava Batra. Therefore, while this chapter dealt with a great variety of issues, a full analysis of their details is found elsewhere.
  A man can acquire a woman to be his wife in three ways: Through the giving of money in the amount of at least one peruta or an item of equivalent value; by the writing and delivery of a document stating that she is betrothed; and by means of sexual intercourse. Although acquisition through intercourse is halakhically valid, the Sages prohibited it in practice as licentious behavior. A husband's acquisition of his wife can be severed either via a bill of divorce or through his death. By Torah law, a yevama can be acquired by her yavam only through intercourse. The Sages instituted an ordinance that the yavam should first perform a standard act of betrothal, called ma'amar, literally, a statement. A yevama who has not performed levirate marriage can be released from her obligation to do so by performing halitza or upon the death of her yavam.
  With regard to the acquisition of a Hebrew slave, a male slave is acquired via money or a document. He is released from his master after six years of servitude; or upon the onset of the Jubilee Year; or by repaying his master the price of his sale or the sum remaining, in accordance with the term he has already served. A Hebrew maidservant can be acquired and emancipated by the same methods as a Hebrew slave, and there are additional conditions of release that apply only to a Hebrew maidservant. She is emancipated when she develops physical signs indicating puberty or upon the death of the master. Another halakha that applies only to a male slave is the boring of his ear with an awl. A slave who requests this action and has it performed upon him remains in servitude until the advent of the Jubilee Year or the master's death.
  A Canaanite slave is acquired via money, a document, or an act indicating possession, i.e., if the master makes use of him in a manner consistent with servitude or lifts him. He is emancipated with money given by others to the master for this purpose or via a bill of manumission he receives from the master.
  An animal is acquired through pulling, lifting, or passing, depending on the size of the beast and the custom of the place where it is acquired.
  Real estate is acquired via money, a document, or possession, whereas movable property can be acquired only by pulling or symbolic exchange. One exception to this principle is money, which cannot be acquired by symbolic exchange.
  All of these methods of acquisition are required when the recipient of the item is a commoner. When one consecrates an item to the Temple treasury, his statement of consecration suffices to effect the acquisition.
  With regard to obligations that are dependent on person and place, there is a difference between men and women concerning positive mitzvot. Women are exempt from most positive mitzvot that are time bound, i.e., that must be performed at a particular time. These include the majority of sacrificial rites, which must be performed during the daytime. The exceptions are kiddush on Shabbat, eating matza on the first night of Passover, the slaughter and eating of the Paschal offering, rejoicing on a Festival, and assembly, performed on Sukkot following the Sabbatical Year. Conversely, women are obligated in most positive mitzvot that are not time bound, apart from Torah study, procreation, and mitzvot that a father must perform on behalf of his son. With regard to negative mitzvot, women have the same requirements as men, with the exceptions of the prohibition against rounding the corners of one's head, the prohibition against shaving one's beard, and the prohibition against priests contracting ritual impurity imparted by a corpse.
  Concerning mitzvot that are dependent on a particular place, all those that involve the land or the produce of the land are applicable only in Eretz Yisrael, although some of them apply partially in Syria and other neighboring countries by rabbinic law. Exceptions include orla, diverse kinds of food crops in a vineyard, and the new crop. These prohibitions are in effect even outside of Eretz Yisrael, albeit not by Torah law. All other mitzvot, which are personal obligations as opposed to duties that apply to the land, are in effect in all places.
  This chapter also included the most comprehensive discussion in the Talmud of the mitzva of honoring one's parents, including an analysis of the mitzva from both halakhic and aggadic perspectives.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  This chapter addresses various issues related to betrothal.
  The first issue discussed is the efficacy of a betrothal performed by an agent. The Gemara elaborates on the Torah source for the institution of agency, with regard both to betrothal and to other areas of halakha. The Gemara investigates the question of who can appoint an agent, who can be appointed as one, and under which circumstances agency is effective.
  The Gemara also examines situations in which there is an error or deviation in the betrothal procedure. This is tangentially related to errors or deviations in other forms of transactions. The Gemara also deals with cases where the betrothal is contingent upon something particular concerning the husband or wife being true or not true, e.g., family lineage or financial status.
  In addition, this chapter considers how money effects betrothal. As was taught in the previous chapter, a woman can be betrothed with one peruta or an item worth one peruta. This chapter clarifies the possibility of using items that are in the possession of the groom but are not considered his property for betrothal, e.g., an item from which one is prohibited to derive benefit.
  Finally, the Gemara speaks about betrothal in which the act of acquisition was not performed appropriately, as well as cases where the man tried to betroth multiple women simultaneously but it was prohibited for some of the women to become betrothed to him.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter discusses various halakhot related to betrothal, including betrothal via an agent, stipulations stated at the time of betrothal, and the items via which a betrothal can be performed. The Gemara explains that the act of betrothal can be performed by means of an agent, although it is preferable, as with all mitzvot, to perform this act on one's own. The Gemara concludes that agency can be carried out only by a halakhically competent, adult Jew, and with the consent of the one for whom one is acting. The one designating the agent must also be a halakhically competent, adult Jew. One cannot act as an agent with regard to an area of halakha in which he or she is not obligated. Despite the fact that an agent is considered to be acting on behalf of the one who designated him, this is not so with regard to transgressions, where the full responsibility, with several exceptions, rests upon the agent alone.
  If one betroths a woman and explicitly stipulates that a certain condition be met, if the stipulation is not fulfilled, the betrothal does not take effect. This is true whether the stipulation is with regard to the actual act of betrothal, the lineage of the man or woman, their place of residence, their financial status, or another similar condition. It is irrelevant if the existing situation is regarded by the general public to be superior or inferior to the stipulated situation. Additionally, only explicit conditions are taken into account. If one of the parties claims later that he intended for the betrothal to take effect only subject to certain conditions being met, the principle that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters applies.
  The Gemara outlines certain limitations with regard to the item given to effect the betrothal. There are certain items that, although they are in the possession of a man, he may not use them for betrothal, as he is not in fact their owner. Included in this category is the portion that a priest receives from an offering, or second tithe. Items from which one is prohibited to derive benefit also cannot be used for betrothal. With regard to most items from which one is prohibited to derive benefit, if the man sold them it is permitted for him to betroth a woman with the proceeds from the sale. An exception to this would be an item which is forbidden because it was used for idol worship. A man can betroth a woman with an item that possesses sanctity, e.g., teruma, tithe, or produce of the Sabbatical Year. Even if the woman will not be able to consume these items herself, as long as she can sell them for at least one peruta, she will be betrothed.
  The Gemara also concluded that if a man sends gifts to a woman on the incorrect assumption that he had previously betrothed her, the gifts are not regarded as betrothal money.
  Betrothal that is not halakhically given to consummation takes effect nevertheless, and the woman can be released only by receiving a bill of divorce.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And Moses said to them: If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben pass over the Jordan with you, every man armed for battle, before the Lord, and the land shall be subdued before you, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession. But if they will not pass over with you armed, they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan. (Numbers 32:29–30)
  This chapter deals with three topics: The conditions stipulated between a man and woman at the time of their betrothal; betrothals concerning which there is uncertainty with regard to the identity of one of the partners; and principles with regard to permitted and forbidden betrothals, those that are valid and those that are not.
  This chapter provides a fundamental analysis of the halakhot of conditions in general: How must a condition be formulated for it to be binding? It also discusses the meaning of various conditions stipulated at the time of a betrothal. One case concerns a condition that the betrothal take effect after a certain period of time or after a change in the personal status of the man or woman. These discussions focus on both the precise formula of the condition as well as the woman's status between the moment of the betrothal and the date when it goes into effect.
  Another matter addressed in this chapter is situations where the identity of one member of the couple is uncertain. An uncertainty of this kind can result either due to the failure of one partner to clarify fully whom he is betrothing, which is especially likely to occur when the betrothal is performed by means of an agent, or when the claim of a man to have betrothed a woman is denied by her. There are two aspects to these problems: First, the precise meaning of various statements expressed at the time, and second, the credibility of the claimants. To what extent can the statement of one person be relied upon, and to what extent does his claim obligate him?
  The third main subject of this chapter, which is discussed in detail, concerns the question of who is eligible for betrothal. Certain betrothals are entirely permitted. Others are valid despite the fact that they involve a prohibition. In other words, the halakhot of marriage are binding upon the couple, but due to the prohibition entailed in their relationship it is not permitted for them to remain together. Instead, the husband is obligated to give his wife a bill of divorce. Incidental to this issue, the chapter analyzes another important matter, which is closely connected with the topic of the tractate: What is the halakhic status of the offspring of various unions, both permitted and forbidden ones?
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  With regard to conditions in general, the principle is that all conditions must be modeled after the example given in the Bible concerning the tribes of Gad and Reuben. Specifically, the condition must be stated before the action to which it refers. Furthermore, it must be a compound condition, i.e., one must detail what will happen both if the condition is fulfilled and if it remains unfulfilled. In addition, the positive formulation of the condition must precede its negative side. Finally, it must be possible for the condition to be performed by means of an agent. One important aspect here is the language of the condition, since if the person specifying the condition uses the phrase: On the condition, none of the above stipulations apply.
  With regard to betrothal, both the man and woman can stipulate that the betrothal take effect only at a later stage. Nevertheless, there is a difference between a case in which they stipulate that the betrothal not go into effect until a later date, and a case where they stipulate that the betrothal should be effective: From now and after a certain period of time. In the former case, there is no betrothal at all until that later date, and the woman can betroth herself to another man in the meantime. In the latter case, if the woman accepts a betrothal from someone else before that time arrives, it is uncertain which of the two betrothals is valid.
  All conditions appended to a betrothal are examined in accordance with the situation at the time of the betrothal. A betrothal is not valid if it is made dependent upon a state of affairs that does not exist at the time, including a change in the family or halakhic status of the man or woman.
  In a situation where the betrothal itself is uncertain, if one of the parties says he knows for sure what occurred and the other side does not deny his claim, the first party is deemed credible. If the other party denies his account, the statement of the first person is effective only insofar as it renders him forbidden to all those people to whom he would be forbidden assuming his claim were true. This is because a person has the right to declare himself forbidden. The other party remains unaffected by his claim.
  The Torah grants a father credibility with regard to his minor daughter, and therefore any statement he issues concerning her betrothal or divorce is binding. Likewise, a father is believed with regard to the ages and competence of his children, and he can also declare a particular son his firstborn.
  This chapter included the main principles concerning the halakhot of betrothal and lineage. If one of the partners to a betrothal is not a member of the Jewish people, e.g., a Canaanite slave or a gentile, the betrothal is entirely ineffective. In this case, the lineage of the offspring follows the mother, which means that the child of a gentile father and a Jewish mother is a Jew. If the members of a couple are forbidden to each other with the punishment of karet, their offspring is a mamzer, with the exception of one who engages in sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman. In all other cases the betrothal is valid, even if it is prohibited by the Torah. As far as the offspring of these unions are concerned, if the betrothal was entirely permitted then the children's lineage follows that of the father. The exception to this principle is the case of two mamzerim who married one another, as, although the match is permitted, their child is also a mamzer. If the betrothal is forbidden, the lineage of the offspring is like that of the parent with the flawed lineage.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  They shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband; for he is holy unto his God. (Leviticus 21:7)
  And he shall take a wife in her virginity. A widow, or one divorced, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife. And he shall not profane his seed among his people; for I am the Lord Who sanctify him. (Leviticus 21:13–15)
  A mamzer shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to the tenth generation shall none of his enter into the congregation of the Lord. An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to the tenth generation shall none of them enter into the congregation of the Lord forever. (Deuteronomy 23:3–4)
  You shall not abhor an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not abhor an Egyptian, because you were a stranger in his land. The children of the third generation that are born to them may enter into the congregation of the Lord. (Deuteronomy 23:8–9)
  There are people who may become betrothed to each other ab initio, and there are others whose betrothal entails transgressing a prohibition. Generally speaking, when the betrothal involves a transgression, there will be a flaw in the lineage of the children born to such a couple. Even if the parents' marriage is accepted after the fact, the children will still have flawed lineage if they inherit that status from one of the parents.
  In terms of who may marry whom, the Torah divides Jews into three categories: Priests, who have particular restrictions dictating whom they may marry; the general Jewish population, who have unflawed lineage; and those Jews who are prohibited from entering into the congregation through marriage. Most of these halakhot are delineated explicitly in the Torah. The details not stated there are the primary topic of this chapter.
  With regard to those who are prohibited from entering into the congregation through marriage, it is asked: May they marry each other? What will be the status of their descendants? Children that are born from a union of a priest and a woman whom it was prohibited for him to marry due to prohibitions specific to the priesthood are called halalim. In this chapter, the Gemara defines the precise circumstances in which this status is acquired and passed on. Are converts considered to be a full part of the congregation? Or are they perhaps a category of their own, with their own restrictions and allowances as far as whom they may marry?
  As a continuation of the topic of betrothal, and as a final topic of the order of Nashim, the Gemara discusses the prohibition against men and women being secluded. The strength of human sexual desire and the severity of prohibitions of this type require additional safeguards to ensure that people will not come to sin. By Torah law, a man may not be secluded with a married woman other than his wife. The Sages added restrictions against being secluded with unmarried women as well. The Gemara in this chapter addresses what constitutes seclusion, how many people must be present for it to be considered that people are not secluded, and what other steps people should take, particularly in their professional lives, to avoid forbidden contact with the opposite sex.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  Ten types of lineage are listed in the beginning of the chapter, each of which entails restrictions concerning whom one with this lineage may marry. Other special cases are High Priests; Egyptian, Edomite, and Ammonite converts; and those disqualified from marrying due to having mutilated genitals. The Gemara concludes with regard to those who may not marry into the congregation due to a definite flaw in lineage that they may nevertheless marry into each other's families. Those whose lineage is of uncertain status, such as a shetuki and a foundling, may not marry those whose lineage is definitely flawed.
  With regard to members of the priesthood with flaws specific to the priesthood, i.e., halalim, the status of their children is determined by the status of the father.
  Converts are not considered to be part of the congregation of the Lord with regard to marriage, and may marry even those with flawed lineage. A female convert may not marry a priest, but the child of a convert and a born Jew may marry a priest ab initio.
  The general presumption is that all Jewish families are of unflawed lineage. If there is a particular family about whom an uncertainty has arisen as to their lineage, one must investigate the lineage of the preceding four or five generations of the family, or until one discovers a member of the family that was otherwise confirmed to be of unflawed lineage, before marrying a member of that family. The working assumption is that young children who cling to a woman are her children, and if she is of unflawed lineage, they are assumed to be of unflawed lineage as well.
  The prohibition against a man being secluded with a woman whom he is prohibited from marrying is alluded to in the Torah. The Sages later instituted an ordinance that a man may not be secluded with an unmarried woman or with a gentile woman. It is permitted for a man to be secluded with his mother or daughter, or with his wife even if she is currently forbidden to him as the result of her status as a menstruating woman. It is likewise permitted to be secluded with a person of the same gender or with an animal. Two men may be secluded with one woman, but if they are known to be steeped in sexual immorality it is prohibited. Many women may not be secluded with one man. If there is a door open from a room to the public domain, those inside the room are not considered to be secluded. Those men whose professions bring them in close, constant contact with women must take additional precautions not to be secluded with them.
  The Sages recommended that one learn a trade that will allow him time for Torah study and will not tempt him to transgress any prohibitions, specifically those involving theft and forbidden sexual intercourse. One whose main occupation is Torah study is protected from all evil and will inherit the World-to-Come.
  
  Megillah
  
  Introduction to Megillah
  
  Tractate Megilla primarily focuses on explaining all of the halakhot that apply to the holiday of Purim. Additionally, it devotes considerable space to the general halakhot of synagogues and Torah readings. 
  The holiday of Purim and its laws are mentioned in the Scroll of Esther but not in the Torah itself, as the events that the holiday commemorates occurred hundreds of years after the giving of the Torah. Although there is a biblical basis for this commemorative holiday, based upon the mitzvot of remembering and defeating Amalek, Purim has a halakhic status in between those of Torah law and rabbinic law, and some of its mitzvot are treated as purely rabbinic enactments. 
  The Purim story took place during the period of exile between the two Temples and is typical of a time of exile: There was a threat to the very existence of the Jewish people due to the arbitrary decision of a foreign ruler. Even the salvation merely removed the threat, but did not substantially change the living conditions of the Jews at that time. Furthermore, both the threat and the salvation came at a time when the Divine Presence was concealed. This is expressed by the Gemara's statement: From where in the Torah is the name Esther derived? As it is stated: “And I will hide [haster astir] My face on that day” (Deuteronomy 31:18). 
  The fact that the Divine Presence was concealed does not mean that God did not direct the course of events, but that He did so in a way that was not apparent to all, through events that can be seen as random or natural. This makes the miracle of the Purim story different from other miracles described in the Bible, in which the general rules of nature were overridden and the miracle was therefore evident to everyone. Corresponding to the nature of the miracle, the Megilla does not explicitly mention God at all; it simply records the actions and motives of individuals and explains how the events developed as they did. Consequently, one of the basic goals of celebrating Purim is to reveal that which is hidden by publicizing the miracle. There is a greater command to publicize this miracle than to publicize other, more obvious miracles, and Purim is celebrated in a more joyous manner than other holidays. 
  A further result of the Purim story's taking place during a time of exile relates to the timing of the celebration. Whereas most locations experienced relief on the fourteenth of Adar, the Jews of the capital city of Shushan experienced relief on the fifteenth. In commemoration of this, the Sages declared that Purim must be celebrated on the fifteenth of Adar in Shushan, as well as in any city that was surrounded by a wall in the time of Joshua. The reason that the status of a city is determined by its state at the time of Joshua is in order to emphasize the importance of Eretz Yisrael. 
  The primary manner in which the miracle of Purim is publicized is through the reading of the Megilla, and this tractate devotes considerable attention to the details of this mitzva. The Sages required that one read the Megilla twice, once at night and once by day. They also established additional days when the Megilla may be read, aside from the days mentioned in the Megilla itself. Similarly, the Gemara delineates how the Megilla must be read in public or by a single individual, the languages in which it may be read, who is obligated to hear the reading of the Megilla, and who may read the Megilla for the entire congregation. 
  The other mitzvot of Purim were established in order to make the holiday a particularly joyous occasion, based upon the verse: “That they should make them days of feasting and gladness, and of sending portions one to another, and gifts to the poor” (Esther 9:22). The feasting is fulfilled through partaking of a festive meal on Purim. Because it is a day of gladness, it is therefore prohibited to eulogize or to fast on Purim. The phrase “sending portions one to another” is the basis of the requirement for each individual to give gifts of food items to another individual. Furthermore, there is a mitzva to give gifts to the poor so that they too can rejoice fully on Purim. One participates in all of these activities to a greater degree than on other holidays and with a particularly high level of joy. 
  Since tractate Megilla devotes significant attention to issues regarding the reading of the Scroll of Esther, it is the only tractate that addresses the subject of a public reading of the Bible in the synagogue. Furthermore, there are four special Torah portions read on Shabbat over the course of the month of Adar, and therefore the Sages saw fit to expand on these themes and to designate this tractate as the primary source of discussion of the laws of Torah readings, as well as the sanctity of the synagogue and the sacred items therein. This includes a discussion of the days when the Torah is read publicly, a ceremony of ancient origin but one that is not mandated by Torah law. The days on which the Torah is read publically are Shabbat, Festivals and commemorative holidays, the New Moon, public fast days, and every Monday and Thursday. There is also a discussion of how many verses must be read, how many individuals are called to read from the Torah, and how the verses are divided among the different readers. There is a further discussion of the haftara, the additional reading from the Prophets upon concluding the Torah reading on certain days. 
  Additionally, this tractate addresses a synagogue's status and level of sanctity. Because it is a place designated for public prayer gatherings, it is considered like a mini-Temple. Consequently, comparable to the Temple, one must treat a synagogue with reverence while it is functional and even after it has been destroyed. Nonetheless, there are ways to remove the sanctity of a synagogue, either by transferring that sanctity to another item of equal or greater status, or by selling the synagogue with the agreement of the community and its representatives. 
  Tractate Megilla contains four chapters: 
  Chapter One addresses the days when one may read the Scroll of Esther and contains a section of aggadic exposition of the Megilla. It also discusses a number of unrelated topics, which are cited due to the structural similarity between their presentation in the Mishna and the presentation of one of the laws of the Megilla. 
  Chapter Two addresses the halakhot of how to read the Megilla and who may do so for the public. As an extension of this discussion, this chapter also enumerates mitzvot that must be fulfilled specifically during the day or during the night.
  Chapter Three addresses the halakhot of reading the Megilla but is primarily devoted to the halakhot of public Torah readings, public prayer, the haftara, and the Aramaic translation of the Torah reading. 
  Chapter Four addresses the sanctity of the synagogue and the Torah scroll, and the reading of special Torah portions in honor of particular days during the year.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  Therefore the Jews of the villages, who dwell in the unwalled towns, make the fourteenth day of the month of Adar a day of gladness and feasting, and a good day, and of sending portions one to another. And Mordecai wrote these things, and sent letters to all the Jews that were in all the provinces of the king Ahasuerus, both near and far, to enjoin them that they should keep the fourteenth day of the month of Adar and the fifteenth day of the same, in each and every year, as the days on which the Jews rested from their enemies, and the month that was turned for them from sorrow to gladness, and from mourning into a good day; that they should make them days of feasting and gladness, and of sending portions one to another, and gifts to the poor. 
  (Esther 9:19–22) 
  The Jews confirmed, and took upon them, and upon their seed, and upon all who joined themselves to them, and it shall not pass, that they would keep these two days according to their writing, and according to their time, in every year; and that these days should be remembered and observed throughout every generation, every family, every province, and every city; and that these days of Purim should not cease from among the Jews, nor the memorial of them perish from their seed. (Esther 9:27–28)
  From the time of its origin, the holiday of Purim has always been celebrated at different times in different locations. As the Megilla itself states, only “the Jews of the villages, that dwell in the unwalled towns” celebrate Purim on the fourteenth of Adar. On the other hand, residents of walled cities celebrate Purim on the fifteenth of Adar. Additionally, in ancient times the Sages instituted that the Megilla may be read by residents of some locations at other times as well. The residents of villages were permitted to advance the reading of the Megilla to the day of ingathering, the Monday or Thursday preceding the fourteenth of Adar. This allowance was made for the benefit of the villagers, who would customarily travel to the larger towns on these days, when the courts were in session, the markets were open, and the Torah was read during the prayer service. Chapter One addresses the details of this institution, as well as related topics, such as when to read the Megilla when Purim occurs on Shabbat. 
  This chapter will also clarify the criteria for walled and unwalled cities with regard to reading the Megilla. This includes a description of the physical characteristics of a walled city, as well as a discussion of when the city needed to have been surrounded by a wall in order for the Megilla to be read there on the fifteenth of Adar. 
  As a continuation of its discussion of when to celebrate Purim and read the Megilla, this chapter also includes a summary of the differences between the first and second months of Adar with regard to both the reading of the Megilla and the other mitzvot of Purim and the month of Adar. Following this mishna, the chapter includes several other mishnayot that follow a similar structure, which is: There is no difference between A and B except for C. These mishnayot are related to the previous mishna in form, although they are not thematically connected to the rest of the chapter or to each other. 
  Finally, the chapter includes extensive aggadic expositions of numerous verses from the Megilla.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  This chapter began with a discussion of the various times that the Megilla is supposed to be read. The two primary days are the fourteenth of Adar for large towns and villages, and the following day, the fifteenth of Adar, for walled cities. 
  This chapter also discussed the leniency allowing villagers to advance their reading of the Megilla to the day of ingathering, the Monday or Thursday market day prior to the fourteenth of Adar, in order to enable the villagers to supply food and drink to the city dwellers on Purim. This leniency for the villagers was annulled at the end of the period of the Mishna; since then, the villages must read the Megilla as in large towns, on the fourteenth of Adar. 
  In order for a city to be considered a walled city for the purposes of reading the Megilla on the fifteenth of Adar, it must have an organized Jewish societal apparatus, including the supporting of ten so-called idlers who study Torah on behalf of the community and are designated to take care of communal needs. The wall around the city must also be from the days of Joshua, and be a real wall, not just a fortification.
  The Gemara also mentioned that in the event that Purim falls out on Shabbat the Megilla cannot be read on its appropriate day, as the Sages feared that one might transport it in a public domain. Therefore, they decreed that the Megilla may not be read on Shabbat. According to our fixed calendar, however, the fourteenth of Adar can never fall on Shabbat, although the fifteenth can. On years when it does the Megilla is read earlier, on the fourteenth, the same day as in unwalled cities. This is the only extant possibility for the Megilla not being read on its appropriate day.
  This chapter dealt with other facets of the holiday of Purim and its unique mitzvot as well, such as the laws of the festive meal, the portions of food given to one's acquaintances, and the unique gifts given to the poor.
  Finally, the chapter quoted numerous homiletical explications of various verses of the Megilla, with a focus on revealing some of the hidden miracles that occurred in the Purim story. These aggadic interpretations also express the divine inspiration inherent in the text of the Megilla, as well as indicate the relationship of the miracle of Purim to the fulfillment of the obligation to destroy Amalek.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  And that these days shall be remembered and observed throughout every generation, every family, every province, and every city; and that these days of Purim should not cease from among the Jews, nor their memorial perish from their seed. Then Esther the queen, the daughter of Abihail, and Mordecai the Jew, wrote about all the acts of power, to confirm this second letter of Purim. And he sent letters unto all the Jews, to the one hundred and twenty-seven provinces of the kingdom of Ahasuerus, with words of peace and truth, to confirm these days of Purim in their appointed times, as Mordecai the Jew and Esther the queen had enjoined them, and as they had ordained for themselves and for their seed, the matters of the fastings and their cry. (Esther 9:28–31)
  This chapter continues the discussion of the reading of the Scroll of Esther. Here, however, the topic is not the proper time for its reading but the manner in which it is read: How it is read, from what kind of text, from which point in the text, by whom, and at what time of day?
  The Scroll of Esther is referred to as a specific document within the Megilla itself. The obligation to read it is learned only from the words: “And that these days shall be remembered” (Esther 9:28), referring to a remembrance read from a written text. Consequently, as we see in this chapter, it is a matter of discussion whether or not the entire scroll must be read to fulfill this obligation. 
  The Scroll of Esther is referred to both as a book, i.e., a biblical text, and as a letter, i.e., an informal document. Consequently, the Rabbis discuss to what extent the scroll of the Megilla must resemble a Torah scroll, whether it must be written with the full accuracy of a Torah, whether or not there is leeway in terms of its reading, and who may read it for the public.
  The time designated for reading the Megilla is Purim day, but no particular time of day is specified for this. Having mentioned this fact, the Mishna tangentially discusses many other mitzvot that are assigned to a specific day but not to any particular time during that day.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  The halakha requires that the Scroll of Esther be read in order. Having noted this fact, the Gemara then discussed other texts and formulas that must be recited in their proper order. 
  Although the Megilla must be written like a book, i.e., like a Torah scroll, when it comes to reading it, it has many characteristics of a less formal letter or document. Some of the halakhot established for reading the Torah are not followed for the reading of the Megilla. Someone who is not completely mentally competent may not read the Megilla for others. Although several Sages prescribed shorter or longer excerpts of the Megilla as the minimum to fulfill the obligation of reading, the halakha is established that it must be read in its entirety.
  The obligation to hear the Megilla during the day extends to the entire day, and similarly the nighttime reading may be done at any time during the night. This is in fact a principle: Any daytime mitzva can be performed at any time during the day, and a nighttime mitzva can be performed at any time during the night. Although there are recommended times for performing some of these mitzvot, these are given only to prevent their being neglected or to encourage alacrity in their performance. Technically, the accepted time frame for their performance is throughout the entire corresponding day or night.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And Ezra the priest brought the Law before the congregation, both men and women, and all that could hear with understanding, upon the first day of the seventh month. (Nehemiah 8:2)
  And Ezra opened the book in the sight of all the people, for he was above all the people; and when he opened it, all the people stood up. And Ezra blessed the Lord, the great God. And all the people answered: Amen, Amen, with the lifting up of their hands; and they bowed their heads, and fell down before the Lord with their faces to the ground. 
  (Nehemiah 8:5–6) 
  And they read in the book, in the Law of God, distinctly; and they gave the sense, and caused them to understand the reading. (Nehemiah 8:8)
  The requirement to read the Torah publicly at specific times of the week dates back to the days of Moses. In the time of Ezra, the Men of the Great Assembly added further structure to this enactment, including additional public Torah readings and specific details with regard to how many readers are called to the Torah and how many verses they are required to read. 
  In the time of the Second Temple, and certainly after that, Hebrew was no longer the spoken language of many Jews, and many individuals needed a translator to aid them in comprehending the public Torah readings. As many individuals could not recite the prayers on their own, it was established that a prayer leader would recite the prayer aloud for them. Consequently, it was necessary to establish guidelines concerning the translation of the Torah readings, which prayers could be recited only in public, and the circumstances under which public prayers could be recited.
  Additionally, the formation of various sects with different customs made it necessary to establish clear guidelines as to which customs are acceptable during the prayer service and which are not. The details of these questions form the main concern of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  Although divergent customs exist even nowadays with regard to prayer and public Torah readings, this chapter addressed aspects of these areas where clear halakhic guidelines were established.
  Concerning Torah readings, it was determined that seven readers are called to the Torah on Shabbat; six on Yom Kippur; five on Festivals; four on the intermediate days of Festivals and on New Moons; and three on Monday and Thursday mornings, during the afternoon prayer on Shabbat, and on public fast days. Regular Torah portions have been established for Shabbat mornings. In Eretz Yisrael it was customary to read the entire Torah once every three or three and a half years, whereas in Babylonia it was customary to read the entire Torah every year, a practice that has become adopted universally. On Monday and Thursday mornings and during the afternoon prayer on Shabbat, the beginning of the next week's Torah portion is read. On Festivals, even when they occur on Shabbat, a portion that is related to the Festival is read.
  This chapter also established procedures that apply while reading the Torah. It is prohibited to begin or conclude a reading within three verses of the beginning or end of a paragraph. Blessings are recited before and after the reading. In the time of the tanna'im, only the first and last readers recited blessings, but in the time of the amora'im it was established that each reader recites blessings both before and after reading from the Torah.
  Public prayer services, and any ritual that is performed only in public, must be performed in the presence of ten adult males. The main reason for this is that sanctification of God's name must be performed in a dignified manner. 
  In addition to concern for the honor of God, the honor of the congregation must be taken into account as well. Therefore, the Sages issued decrees to ensure that the prayer leader is someone who represents the congregation in a dignified manner. Similarly, there are requirements that govern whether a priest may recite the Priestly Benediction in public.
  The Sages also instituted guidelines due to other reasons. They instituted procedures governing the distribution of honors during the prayer service in order to prevent strife. They prohibited individuals who act in particular ways that indicate they might hold heretical views from serving as prayer leaders, in order to distance the community from these views. And they decreed that certain portions of the Bible not be read or translated publicly, as these portions may reflect poorly on the leaders of the nation when they are not accompanied by a proper explanation, which it is not always possible to provide in the context of a public Torah reading.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  Therefore say: So says the Lord God, Although I have removed them far off among the nations, and although I have scattered them among the countries, yet I have been to them as a little sanctuary in the countries where they have come. (Ezekiel 11:16)
  The concept of a synagogue as a fixed place of prayer had already been established during the Second Temple period. Indeed, in the Temple complex itself, a synagogue existed for those visiting the Temple, in order for them to be able to participate in the communal prayers that were held there. 
  The primary use of a synagogue was for the daily prayers that were instituted in parallel to the communal sacrifices, and for the public reading of the Torah from the regular weekly portion. In addition, many synagogues were also used as study houses for children and eventually as a place where people would gather to hear words of Torah from the Sages. With this, the synagogue became a so-called little sanctuary that was endowed with its own sanctity in addition to the sanctity it gained by virtue of the Torah scrolls it housed.
  This chapter deals with the issues relating to the sanctity of the synagogue. What level of decorum is required inside a synagogue, how does one treat the synagogue structure and place after it has been destroyed, what happens to its sanctity when it is sold, and under what circumstances is it permitted to do so? Closely related to this, the chapter also discusses the status of other items that are also endowed with differing degrees of sanctity due to their use and association with the Torah and various mitzvot.
  Another issue dealt with at length in this chapter is the reading of the special Torah portions at various points throughout the year. First discussed are the four special Torah portions read on the Shabbatot during and immediately prior to the month of Adar. Which passages of the Torah are selected for those portions, and what are the determining factors regarding which portion is read on which Shabbat? Following this, the chapter focuses on which portions are read on the various Festivals and other special days throughout the year.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  This chapter opened with a discussion of the sanctity of the synagogue and other sacred items. There is a scale of varying degrees of sanctity for each of them. A Torah scroll is considered to have the highest degree of sanctity. Then, as a general rule, the more similar to, or more closely associated an item is with a Torah scroll, the greater its degree of sanctity. Therefore, items that are used with or for a Torah scroll, such as its wraps or the ark, and similarly other sacred scrolls, all have a high degree of sanctity, albeit not as great as a Torah scroll itself. The synagogue, which merely houses the Torah scroll and provides a place of prayer, has the least degree of sanctity. The Gemara explains that it is permitted to sell or exchange an item of sanctity only in order to procure an item of greater sanctity. 
  Despite its relatively low degree of sanctity, a synagogue is nevertheless afforded the status of a “little sanctuary” (Ezekiel 11:16), and as such one is required to treat it with great reverence. This applies both when the synagogue is still used by the community and even after it has become desolate. Furthermore, even when it is permitted to sell the synagogue, it is permitted to do so only with the consent of the whole community.
  The second major topic of this chapter is the special Torah portions that are read at various occasions during the year. Initially, this chapter focused on the four special portions that are read immediately prior to and during the month of Adar. The goal of these portions is to publicly mention the mitzvot that apply in that month, i.e., the collection of shekels for the Temple and the obligation to recall the destruction of Amalek, as well as to begin to prepare for the upcoming festival of Passover though the reading of the portion beginning “this month” (Exodus 12:2) and that of the Red Heifer. The Gemara established that each portion is to be read before the fulfillment of that mitzva it relates to, in order that the reading may serve as a reminder for the community.
  The chapter then discussed the portions to be read on the special days and Festivals throughout the year. With regard to this, the Gemara pointed out that already in the period of the amora'im, the custom of which portions to read had veered from that which is recorded in the Mishna. And indeed, in the post-talmudic period, the customs changed and developed beyond that which was decided by the Gemara. Nevertheless, this was not considered a breach of authority. Rather, each community with its customs was ultimately seeking to achieve the similar goal of choosing a portion that appropriately expressed the unique character of the day. As such, there is room for variation, and each community should continue to follow the practice of its forebears.
  
  Moed Katan
  
  Introduction to Moed Katan
  
  Tractate Moed Katan1 deals mainly with the halakhot pertaining to the intermediate days of the Festival, which are often referred to as simply: The Festivals, in rabbinic literature.2 The discussion of these halakhot leads to a comprehensive treatment of two other fundamental areas of halakha: The halakhot of mourning and the halakhot of ostracism.
  Combining the halakhot of days of rejoicing with the halakhot of days of sadness in one tractate is seemingly contradictory, yet there exists a double connection between the two topics. First, there is a practical halakhic connection between these areas of halakha, as the labors that are prohibited on the intermediate days of the Festival are similar to the labors that are prohibited both during the period of mourning and with regard to one who is ostracized, as he must act as if he is in mourning. It is reasonable, then, to discuss these prohibitions in the same context. Second, there is an intrinsic connection between the halakhot of the intermediate days of the Festival and the halakhot of mourning in that they are derived in a parallel manner. 
  The essential elements of both the intermediate days of the Festival and the period of mourning are mentioned in the Torah, and some of the broader details are alluded to as well. However, they do not appear as explicit commandments or obligations, and consequently are treated in talmudic literature as rabbinic commandments3 that are part of the oral tradition. This is the case despite the fact that they are mentioned in the written Torah and were practiced in the time of Moses. Even the Sages who maintain that these halakhot have a basis in Torah law agree that with regard to the specific details, the Bible delegated them to the Sages.4 As a result, the halakhot discussed in this tractate are not based on the objective categories that characterize Torah law, but like most rabbinic commandments are dependent on circumstances and relative to the situation. 
  This means that there is a basic difference between the labor prohibitions on the intermediate days of the Festival and those on Shabbat and the first or last days of the Festival. On Shabbat and Yom Kippur, “all labor” (Exodus 20:10), i.e., all creative, physical labor as defined by the Sages, is prohibited, and similar prohibitions apply to Festivals with a few exceptions, one of which is labor performed for the purpose of food preparation. In contrast, on the intermediate days of the Festival and during the period of mourning there is no objective prohibition against labor in its usual halakhic definition. Rather, the prohibition is against work, which is defined based on the amount of effort, exertion, or professional expertise that is involved in a given activity. 
  Additionally, these halakhot of prohibited work are not absolute, as their main function is to preserve the unique nature of the day in order to ensure that it is not treated like an ordinary weekday. They therefore include certain leniencies such as, inter alia, in cases of incurred loss. These are not objective categories that depend on the nature of the labor, but rather they are categories that depend on the relationship between the person performing the action and the labor he needs to perform. Thus, on the intermediate days of the Festival one is permitted to do work that is specifically related to and necessary for the Festival. However, he may not treat these days as ordinary weekdays by performing labor that is unrelated to its celebration.
  It is the Sages who determine the criteria of what is prohibited on these days. They take into account issues such as when does a certain labor constitute degrading the Festival by treating it as a non-sacred day, and when, due to a specific need or for the purpose of enjoyment of the Festival, is it permitted to perform that labor? These same considerations play a role in determining what is permitted during the period of mourning. These days do not have a fundamental prohibition against labor, but rather one has an obligation to direct his attention to mourning and not turn them into ordinary days of routine where he is occupied with his normal work and occupations and cannot give appropriate attention to his mourning.
  As there are no comprehensive categories governing the prohibition of labor on these days, the Sages were forced to establish many isolated halakhot that address specific situations. The Gemara in one place calls these: Sterile halakhot,5 in that each instance must be addressed separately: Does this activity involve a desecration of the Festival either due to excessive exertion or by resembling an activity performed on weekdays that would make this day seem ordinary and routine? Additional considerations include the indispensable needs of the individual and of society, and considerations such as the unrecoverable loss that will be incurred by not working on the Festival. Therefore, this tractate contains many individualized rulings which do not fit under one rubric. 
  Due to the fact that so many activities were permitted, the Sages wondered if it would not be better to simply cancel the prohibition of work on the intermediate days of the Festival completely. As these celebratory days did not have any specific ritual obligations, there was concern that they would turn into sole days of idleness.6 In certain places the Sages in fact drastically limited the scope of the prohibitions of the intermediate days of the Festival.7
  In a similar vein, the halakhot of mourning, despite the fact that many of them are mentioned in the Torah and books of the prophets, were never formulated as obligatory commandments. Rather, the Sages consolidated all of the traditions and early customs8 within general parameters. The halakhot of mourning establish a specific and defined framework for the expression of sorrow and mourning, the role of which is to provide an opportunity to feel and recognize the extent of the loss, while at the same time limiting the flow of emotions so that they do not destabilize the progression of life. The exemption of acute mourners from all positive commandments as well as the prohibition of labor for all mourners was intended to allow them to deal with the burial of the deceased in a proper and respectful way, as well as to provide time and space for thinking about and feeling the loss of the deceased, expressing sorrow over this loss, and receiving comfort from others. 
  Another aspect of the halakhot of mourning involves the public expression of the pain and loss: The mourner is required to rend his clothes, sit on the ground, and overturn his bed. Furthermore, the mourner is required to refrain from both pleasure and expressions of human grandeur: The prohibition against taking haircuts and doing laundry is an expression of the former, and the prohibition against donning phylacteries during the first day of mourning is an example of the latter.
  The halakhot of ostracism, which are explored in depth in this tractate, are related to the halakhot of mourning. Excommunication and ostracism are not simply punishments involving social isolation; they are a form of banishment that requires one to act as though in mourning. Many of these halakhot are derived from and connected to those of a leper, who in a certain respect is ostracized and in mourning as well.
  There is another point of contact between the halakhot of mourning and those of the intermediate days of the Festival: When the period of mourning overlaps with Shabbat and Festivals. This raises the difficulty of the conflict between the commandments of rejoicing and delight on these days with the obligation to feel sorrow and mourning. Essentially, it was determined that the general obligations of taking delight in Shabbat and rejoicing on the Festival cancel the obligation of outward expression of personal mourning.
  There are three chapters in tractate Moed Katan. The first two mainly discuss the halakhot of the intermediate days of the Festival, while the third focuses on the halakhot of mourning, ostracism, and excommunication. Although this division is not absolute, as the Talmud often merges the discussion of various topics, each chapter has specific topics to which the discussion therein is dedicated:
  Chapter One discusses the activities that are prohibited during the course of the Festival, both those that are prohibited because they are considered work and those that would minimize the joy of the Festival.
  Chapter Two deals with the details of work that is permitted on the Festival due to the financial loss that would be incurred by abstaining from this work and due to other considerations.
  Chapter Three briefly addresses the halakhot of shaving and writing during the Festival. The main discussion, however, revolves around a comprehensive analysis of the halakhot of mourning and the halakhot of ostracism and excommunication. Additionally, this chapter takes a brief look at the related halakhot of leprosy.
  Notes
  1	In earlier generations, this tractate was referred to only as Moed, but it was changed to Moed Katan in order to distinguish between the tractate and the order Moed. In many earlier sources, Moed Katan is referred to as Mashkin, its opening word.
  2	The statement in the mishna that one who disparages the Festivals has no part in the World-to-Come (Avot 3:11) should be understood to refer to the intermediate days of the Festivals, and is a condemnation of one who acts as though they are ordinary weekdays.
  3	There is a dispute among the early commentaries as to whether the halakhot of the intermediate days of the Festival and the halakhot of mourning contain an element that is based on Torah law, or if their authority is entirely by rabbinic law.
  4	Hagiga 18a.
  5	Moed Katan 12a.
  6	Jerusalem Talmud, Moed Katan 2:3.
  7	See B.M. Levin, Compendium of Differences in Custom between the Land of Israel and Babylonia. Jerusalem: 1942 (Hebrew).
  8	Some of these are mentioned in the book of Genesis, chapters 23 and 50.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  These are the appointed seasons of the Lord, which you shall proclaim to be holy convocations, to bring an offering made by fire unto the Lord, a burnt-offering, and a meal-offering, a sacrifice, and drink-offerings, each on its own day. (Leviticus 23:37)
  And on the fifteenth day of this month shall be a feast; seven days shall unleavened bread be eaten. The first day shall be a holy convocation; you shall do no manner of servile work. (Numbers 28:17–18)
  And on the fifteenth day of the seventh month you shall have a holy convocation; you shall do no manner of servile work, and you shall keep a feast unto the Lord seven days. (Numbers 29:12)
  The unique status of the intermediate days of the Festival, in that they are not full-fledged Festivals but at the same time are not ordinary weekdays, requires specific categories and halakhic definitions with regard to which activities are prohibited and which are permitted on those days. The central question clarified in this chapter is: Which labors are prohibited or permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival? 
  It is clear that there is no absolute prohibition against performing labor on these days, and therefore one cannot issue a blanket ban on all work during this time. On the other hand, it is necessary to maintain the special and holy nature of these days, as they are called “appointed seasons,” and therefore should not be desecrated by being treated as workdays. As all agree that there are no clear principles set out in the Torah with regard to these issues, and the Bible delegated them to the Sages (Hagiga 18a), it is necessary to clarify the criteria the Sages established with regard to the work that is prohibited or permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival, while comparing them to similar areas of halakha such as the agricultural labors of the Sabbatical Year.
  Another aspect that requires explication is how to achieve the sanctity and celebration of the intermediate days of the Festival. As these weekdays occur within a period of festivity, nested between two Festivals, the commandment: “And you shall rejoice in your feast” (Deuteronomy 16:14) applies to them as well. This principle determines which activities should be avoided during the intermediate days of the Festival due to the fact that they interfere with the holiness and celebration of the time. This is either because the activity disrupts the rejoicing of the Festival by introducing other components that distract from the essence of the day or because it contains elements of grief and mourning that are inappropriate for times of celebration.
  The elucidation of these issues is the topic of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  Despite the fact that the Sages stated that the halakhot of the Festival are sterile, i.e., isolated, and may not be learned one from the other (Moed Katan 12a), there are clear criteria that can be used to determine which activities are prohibited or permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival.
  Among the activities permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival are those that are defined as incurring financial loss, i.e., refraining from this work will cause significant loss, and therefore the Sages permitted them on the intermediate days of the Festival.
  Another category of permitted activity on the intermediate days of the Festival includes labors that are not performed by craftsmen, i.e., those that do not require a specific skill, or that are not performed in the manner of the craftsmen. Additionally, an activity that is necessary for the celebration of the Festival would be permitted on the intermediate days of the Festival. In general, the Sages prohibited labors that involved significant exertion, especially those that were directly related to agricultural labor.
  Because there was often a clash between the various criteria delineated above, the Sages established individualized rulings on a case by case basis. In each case, in order to determine the halakha they applied the principles that had been set in place.
  With regard to the injunction to rejoice on the Festival, it was concluded that one should not do anything on the intermediate days of the Festival that would likely lead to distress. Thus, a priest may not examine a leper on the intermediate days of the Festival, and one may not make public eulogies during this period. Out of a similar concern for the commandment to rejoice on the Festival, the Sages prohibited marrying during this time, as this would impinge upon the preparations for the Festival as well as introduce a conflicting source of celebration.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  The clarification of the conditions and considerations that permit or prohibit labor on the intermediate days of a Festival is the central topic of this chapter.
  In the previous chapter the justifications for a person's performing labor on the intermediate days of a Festival were discussed. One of the most common and important dispensations to work on the intermediate days of a Festival would be for a matter for which there is a high probability that loss will occur if timely action is not taken to safeguard it. In the present chapter the discussion of various issues, with regard to which such a concern is significant, continues.
  One question is: What exactly is a matter that, if left unattended, will result in meaningful loss? Would an item suffering any amount of damage or monetary loss be considered a matter that will be lost? Or perhaps only the probability of serious damage or monetary loss would permit the performance of labor on the intermediate days of a Festival.
  Another fundamental question concerns employment of artifice, since a person could intentionally create circumstances that require performing labor on the intermediate days of a Festival such that, if he does not perform it at that time, it will cause a great loss. The question, therefore, is whether we operate according to the existing situation, which has been caused by artifice, in which we have a matter that will be lost that can justify performing labor, or whether we punish the perpetrator for his trickery.
  Two other justifications for the performance of labor on the intermediate days of a Festival are discussed in this chapter: Performance of labor for the community and performance of labor in order to enable the laborer to have food for the days of the Festival.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  The conclusive ruling on permitting labor on the intermediate days of a Festival for a matter that, if unattended, will result in significant loss, is that it is permissible to perform labor to prevent a loss of any size. Additionally, once a labor is deemed permissible it may be performed in its usual manner without any change.
  Despite that, the Sages were very strict with regard to one who engages in artifice and directs his labor to the intermediate days of a Festival. In such a case, the Sages ruled that even if he incurs a great loss, the perpetrator must not perform the labor and therefore must lose everything. However, they specified that such a penalty falls only on the perpetrator himself, and not on the object, so that his heirs, if he should die, are permitted to complete the labor in such a case.
  The blanket authorization to perform labor on the intermediate days of a Festival was extended to include one who has to work in order to buy food for the days of the Festival. Clearly this does not mean only in a case of a life-threatening lack of food; he is allowed to work on those days even where performing labor is for the purpose of increasing his provisions for the Festival. 
  In order for celebrants to honor the Festival and in order to provide for the community's needs, the Sages permitted merchants to operate stores during the intermediate days of a Festival and to sell their merchandise in their usual weekday manner, even if it is not perishable merchandise. Though in many places the residents adopted a more stringent practice, various labors are permitted on the intermediate days of a Festival as long as they are for community needs or for the sake of the Festival itself.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And the children of Israel wept for Moses in the plains of Moab thirty days; so the days of weeping in the mourning for Moses were ended. (Deuteronomy 34:8)
  And Joab sent to Tekoa, and fetched from there a wise woman, and said to her: “I pray you, feign yourself to be a mourner, and put on mourning apparel, I pray you, and do not anoint yourself with oil, but be as a woman that had a long time mourned for the dead.” (II Samuel 14:2)
  Also the word of the Lord came to me, saying: “Son of man, behold, I take away from you the desire of your eyes with a stroke; yet neither will you make lamentation nor weep, nor shall your tears run down. Sigh in silence; make no mourning for the dead, bind your headwear upon yourself, and put your shoes on your feet, and do not cover your upper lip, and eat not the bread of men.” (Ezekiel 24:15–17)
  Then Job arose, and rent his mantle, and shaved his head, and fell down upon the ground, and worshipped. (Job 1:20)
  And that whoever does not come within three days, according to the counsel of the princes and the elders, all his substance should be forfeited, and himself separated from the congregation of the captivity. (Ezra 10:8)
  The mishnayot in this chapter deal primarily with the halakhot of the intermediate days of the Festival. Specifically, they discuss the prohibitions of laundering, hair-cutting, and writing during these days. Also discussed are the various circumstances when the Sages permitted these activities for particular reasons. The Gemara brings in other topics, particularly regarding the halakhot of mourning and of ostracism. These halakhot are included here because there is a certain similarity between the seven days of rejoicing of a Festival and the seven days of mourning. Furthermore, the Gemara discusses how to behave when both a Festival and a mourning period occur at the same time.
  Many of the halakhot of mourning, as well as those of ostracism and excommunication, are mentioned in various places in the Bible. However, they are not written as a complete, systematic description of the halakha. Therefore, when it comes to matters of practical halakha there are many unresolved issues. For example, there is a custom of tearing garments when one is in mourning, but the Bible gives no details of when, for whom, or how to tear. Concepts such as comforting mourners and overturning the beds are alluded to in the Bible, but again no halakhic details are provided, such as when or how these activities are to be performed. Even the number of days of mourning isn't fixed. The Gemara explains which of the activities mentioned in the Bible are halakha and obligatory on all mourners, and which are only customs of suffering that certain people took upon themselves.
  There are many other, related issues and practical questions. For example, when precisely does mourning begin? What is the halakha in a case when someone heard of a relative's death some time later? Also, how must one act when the days of mourning occur on Shabbat or Festivals?
  The halakhot of ostracism and excommunication are likewise only alluded to in the Bible, yet the Torah does not explicate many of their numerous practical aspects therein. For example, when and for what violations are people ostracized? For how long is someone ostracized? How should one who has been ostracized or excommunicated behave, and how should others act toward him?
  These questions and others are the main topics discussed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  Many different areas of halakha were discussed and ruled on in this chapter. With regard to the intermediate days of a Festival, it was explained that one who was prevented due to duress is permitted to cut his hair and wash his clothing on these days, whether the duress was due to an external factor, such as being locked up in prison, or whether due to his halakhic status, for example if he was a mourner or had been excommunicated. Similarly, even though it is normally prohibited to write on the intermediate days of a Festival, it is permitted to do so in cases of loss, or for the sake of dire financial need.
  This chapter also discussed those halakhot and restrictions of the intermediate days of a Festival that are shared by a leper, a mourner, and one who is ostracized, e.g., hair-cutting, laundering, and greeting others. Similarly, they are prohibited from wearing leather shoes, from engaging in marital relations, and from donning phylacteries, and all are required to wrap their heads. 
  The Gemara explained that there is a difference between the more lenient form of ostracism and the more stringent excommunication, which are applied to those who transgress various prohibitions or who do not listen to the rulings of the court. The most stringent form of excommunication involves a higher degree of isolation from others, and contains an aspect of curse.
  This chapter is the main source in the Talmud for the halakhot of mourning. It explained most of the halakhot of mourning, of rending garments, and of comforting mourners. There is a distinction made between rending at the time of death over any person, particularly an upright person, rending over a relative for whom one is obligated to mourn, and rending over a parent, a teacher, or the Nasi. For a relative other than one's parents there is a specific time to rend and a minimum size for the tear. For a mother, father, teacher, or Nasi one must make a tear that is more visible, and it may never be fully mended. The Gemara also discusses other times when one must rend one's garments as a sign of mourning.
  The halakhot of the meal of comfort for the mourners were also explained in this chapter, as well as how one comforts the mourners, both during their mourning period and afterward.
  The Gemara discussed the various degrees of mourning, which lessen with the passage of time. Acute mourning begins before the burial of the deceased; mourning is most stringent on the first day; for seven days the mourner must remain in his home, may not work, and must observe all the stringencies of mourning; for thirty days there are public signs of mourning for relatives; and for twelve months there are mourning practices observed after the death of a parent. The halakhot of distant tidings, i.e., if one hears of the death only after some time has passed, were also discussed.
  The Gemara concluded that on Shabbat and Festivals there is no public mourning, and even during the intermediate days of a Festival one may not eulogize excessively or do other activities that lead to emotional pain. Furthermore, the days of a Festival sometimes cancel the mourning, or at least shorten the length of the mourning period.
  
  Nazir
  
  Introduction to Nazir
  
  Tractate Nazir is located in the order of Nashim, usually after tractate Nedarim and before tractate Sota.1 The content of the tractate is not directly related to the order of Nashim, and the Gemara (2a) discusses this problem. However, since the passage in the Torah that speaks of the nazirite (Numbers, chapter 6) is juxtaposed to the passage in the Torah that speaks of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [sota] (Numbers, chapter 5), tractate Nazir was similarly placed next to tractate Sota in the Mishna. The entire tractate deals with the halakhot of a nazirite and with some of the halakhot of vows, offerings, and ritual purity and impurity.
  A nazirite vow is a special form of a vow that one accepts upon himself. It obligates him in the rules and regulations established for a nazirite in the Torah. As with other types of vows, one might take a nazirite vow for a variety of reasons, e.g., to be absolved of a sin or to express gratitude to God for His kindness. Alternatively, one might take a nazirite vow in order to merit divine favor as one makes a request of God, or one might take the vow out of anger or spite. At its best, when accepted with pure intentions, naziriteship is considered a way to achieve holiness, as the Torah states: “All the days of his naziriteship he is holy to the Lord” (Numbers 6:8).
  The term nazirite [nazir] refers to one who abstains [mitnazer] from certain actions. It also alludes to the uncut hair of the nazirite, which is comparable to a crown [nezer] (see Numbers 6:7). Although the Torah never establishes a general prohibition against becoming ritually impure or drinking wine, abstaining from these actions is considered a prerequisite for holiness, as demonstrated by the fact that it is prohibited for one to enter the Temple courtyard after drinking wine or while in a state of ritual impurity. Additionally, because of their inherent sanctity, priests are prohibited from becoming impure through contact with a corpse. A nazirite, who voluntarily accepts these prohibitions, is considered to have temporarily elevated himself to a status similar to that of a priest.2
  A nazirite is called “a nazirite of God” (Judges 13:5), and the verse praises the Jewish people by saying (Amos 2:11): “And I raised up of your sons for prophets, and of your young men for nazirites” (see Rambam Sefer Hafla'a, Hilkhot Nezirut 10:14). The Rabbis differ with regard to their appraisal of naziriteship. Though according to all it is considered praiseworthy to abstain from contracting impurity and from inebriation, according to some it is considered a transgression to entirely prohibit oneself from becoming impure or from drinking wine. Additionally, sometimes people became nazirites due to ulterior motives or out of spite, and at times nazirites would regret ever having taken a nazirite vow. Under these circumstances, the observance of naziriteship is not considered praiseworthy.
  The main halakhot of a nazirite are stated explicitly in the Torah. A nazirite is prohibited from cutting his hair, eating or drinking anything originating from a grapevine, and becoming ritually impure through contact with a corpse. When he completes the term of his naziriteship, he brings a sheep as a burnt-offering, a ewe as a sin-offering, and a ram as a peace-offering, along with unleavened loaves and unleavened wafers. Afterward, he is released from the restrictions of naziriteship. If a nazirite became impure through contact with a corpse during his term of naziriteship, then after completing the standard purification process of sprinkling on the third and seventh days and immersing in a ritual bath, he shaves his hair and on the eighth day brings two doves or pigeons, one for a sin-offering and the other for a burnt-offering, and a sheep in its first year as a guilt-offering. He then must begin his term of naziriteship anew.
  As with most of the halakhot recorded in the Torah, even the halakhot that are explicitly delineated in the Torah with regard to naziriteship do not provide guidance for every scenario that could arise when one attempts to implement these halakhot practically. This tractate attempts to explain and clarify the halakhot of naziriteship as they apply in practice.
  One of the main topics of this tractate is the clarification of the ways in which the halakhot of naziriteship conform to or deviate from the general halakhot of vows. As explained earlier, acceptance of naziriteship is a form of a vow. There is no obligation to become a nazirite, and naziriteship takes effect only when one willingly takes a nazirite vow. However, unlike a standard vow, the guidelines that pertain to one who takes this vow are not up to the discretion of the individual. The rules that apply to a nazirite have already been determined by the Torah. Therefore, one who takes a nazirite vow is bound by all of the halakhot incumbent upon a nazirite, even if he states that he is accepting only some of them. However, the duration of the period for which he becomes a nazirite is up to his discretion, provided that it is no less than thirty days.
  Tractate Nazir also addresses the language that effects a nazirite vow. When one accepts naziriteship using clear and precise language, the halakha is clear. However, sometimes the wording that one uses is so ambiguous and confusing that it must be clarified whether the statement is considered a nazirite vow and how long the term of naziriteship will last. Sometimes, one takes a vow using substitutes for the language of nazirite vows, e.g., by saying the word nazik instead of nazir, or using intimations of nazirite vows. In these cases, it must be clarified which expressions obligate the speaker in a nazirite vow. Similarly, the implication of one's statement must be determined in cases where it is not clear whether the speaker accepted upon himself a nazirite vow or a different vow, or where he accepted upon himself a partial term of naziriteship. Sometimes, one accepts a nazirite vow conditionally, because of a mistake, as a result of outside intervention, or to demonstrate that he is telling the truth in a different context. In all of these cases, it is necessary to determine whether one has become a nazirite.
  Although the Torah explicitly states the restrictions that apply to a nazirite, there are halakhot pertaining to naziriteship that were transmitted via oral tradition. One of these traditions is that an unspecified term of naziriteship lasts for thirty days, which is the minimum term of naziriteship. Another is that one can become a permanent nazirite, in which case he is a nazirite forever but may trim his hair once a year. Additionally, one can become a nazirite like the judge Samson, whereby one is a nazirite for his entire life but with unique halakhot. It is permitted for him to become impure through contact with a corpse but prohibited for him ever to cut his hair or drink wine.
  These halakhot lead to questions concerning one who took a nazirite vow obligating himself in partial periods of naziriteship, e.g., half of a term of naziriteship or naziriteship for one hour. They also lead to questions pertaining to a situation where one took several nazirite vows simultaneously. Additionally, the Gemara must clarify the practical differences between a permanent nazirite; one who takes upon himself a term of naziriteship that will, in practice, last for the duration of his lifetime; and one who takes a vow whereby he is obligated in continuous, consecutive terms of naziriteship.
  Another unique halakha of nazirite vows relates to minors. The halakha is that a father, and only a father, can obligate his son in a vow of naziriteship. Additionally, a minor who is close to the age of majority can take a nazirite vow and become a nazirite.
  The prohibitions specified in the Torah as pertaining to a nazirite require elaboration and explanation. The Torah specifies that “all the days of his vow of naziriteship no razor shall come upon his head” (Numbers 6:5). However, it must be clarified whether this prohibition applies only to one who shaves off all his hair with a razor, as with the prohibition against removing one's beard, or if it applies to any removal of hair. Similarly, it is necessary to clarify how much hair one must remove in order to be liable to receive lashes. The tractate clarifies the circumstances in which one is liable to receive lashes, and whether it is only the nazirite who is liable or also one who cuts the nazirite's hair. Additionally, a variety of circumstances could result in the nazirite's hair being cut. This could occur because the nazirite intentionally or accidentally had his hair cut or because he was obligated for a separate reason to shave his hair. The question then becomes whether a nazirite can complete his term of naziriteship with his hair shaven.
  It is prohibited for a nazirite to eat anything that is “made of the grapevine” (Numbers 6:4), although the prohibition primarily applies to drinking wine. This is supported by the language of the Torah: “He shall abstain from wine and strong drink” (Numbers 6:3), and: “And after that the nazirite may drink wine” (Numbers 6:20). It is necessary to clarify whether this prohibition applies to all or only parts of the grape and what quantity the nazirite has to ingest of each part or combination of different parts of the grape to violate this prohibition. Another question that arises is with regard to the status of a mixture of grape products and other foods.
  It is prohibited for a nazirite to contract ritual impurity from a corpse. If he does become impure, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the days of his term of naziriteship that he already observed are void and he must begin his term anew. Ritual impurity is imparted not only through touching a corpse, but also from carrying a corpse without direct contact or by standing under the same structure as a corpse. Even parts of an incomplete corpse, such as limbs, bones, blood, and skin, impart ritual impurity. An individual also becomes impure by touching certain items after they have made contact with a corpse. The Gemara clarifies when a nazirite becomes impure in a manner that negates his term of naziriteship and when his term is not negated despite his impurity. Additionally, the Gemara discusses whether there are unique circumstances where even a nazirite is obligated to become ritually impure from a corpse.
  It is explained in the Torah that if a nazirite becomes ritually impure, the days of naziriteship that he has already observed are negated. The Gemara discusses whether or not this halakha is equally true throughout the entire term of naziriteship. The Gemara also discusses whether this is unique to the prohibition against becoming impure from a corpse, or whether it also applies to one who violates the other prohibitions of naziriteship. There is also a discussion concerning one who becomes impure after his term of naziriteship is completed but before he has brought the requisite offerings, which release him from nazirite restrictions. The Gemara also raises a question as to whether one who is ritually impure can take a nazirite vow and when such a vow would take effect. The Gemara also discusses the halakha in situations where a nazirite violates one of the prohibitions of naziriteship multiple times.
  For a variety of reasons, a situation could arise where a nazirite never completed his term of naziriteship. This could occur if a husband nullified the nazirite vow of his wife, or a nazirite vow was dissolved by a Sage, or if the nazirite died before completing his term of naziriteship. In these situations, if the nazirite had already designated money or animals for his offerings, many questions arise with regard to the status of these items. The many halakhot in these cases are dependent on the manner in which the nazirite set aside his offering, whether he set aside only money or the animals themselves, and if he set aside animals, whether he specified which offering each animal was intended for or if he set them aside without specification. Additionally, the Gemara discusses whether a nazirite may use animals for his offerings after they were designated by another nazirite for his offerings.
  This tractate addresses the principle halakhot of the offerings brought by both a nazirite who became impure and a nazirite who completed his term of naziriteship. However, many of the details relevant to the offerings are discussed in tractates Zevahim and Menahot, which deal more generally with the halakhot of offerings.
  It should be noted that the commentary printed on the inside column of the Vilna Talmud for tractate Nazir is not the commentary of Rashi but a commentary of unknown authorship, which is referred to here as the Commentary on Nazir.
  Tractate Nazir contains nine chapters. Some of the chapters deal with one clearly defined topic. Others deal with several issues, some of which are spread out over several chapters.
  Chapter One deals with the language of nazirite vows, including substitutes for nazirite vows, intimations of nazirite vows, nazirite vows for unspecified lengths of time, and vows that specify short or extensive periods of naziriteship. It also addresses the halakhot of a permanent nazirite and a nazirite like Samson. The chapter also addresses manners in which one can take a vow by extending the forbidden status of a forbidden item.
  Chapter Two discusses the level of intent that is required to accept naziriteship upon oneself, cases where it is uncertain if the vow is considered a nazirite vow, and situations where different terms of naziriteship overlap.
  Chapter Three deals primarily with how impurity negates naziriteship. It discusses when ritual impurity obliterates the entire period observed by the nazirite, when it prevents naziriteship from taking effect, and the negation of a term of naziriteship because of the impurity decreed upon lands outside of Eretz Yisrael.
  Chapter Four discusses taking a nazirite vow by extending the prohibition of particular items that are already forbidden. It also addresses the dissolution of a nazirite vow and the question of what is done with animals that a nazirite designated as offerings but that were never sacrificed. The chapter also discusses the halakha that a father can obligate his son in a vow of naziriteship and the halakha that a son inherits the nazirite offerings of his father.
  Chapter Five deals with statements that constitute nazirite vows or that declare items consecrated, when the statements were made mistakenly, conditionally, or due to uncertainty.
  Chapter Six compares and contrasts the different prohibitions incumbent upon a nazirite, primarily the prohibitions against drinking wine and becoming impure from a corpse. It also compares and contrasts the halakhot of the process whereby a nazirite shaves and brings offerings at the completion of his term of naziriteship to those of the process by which he shaves and brings offerings if he becomes impure from a corpse.
  Chapter Seven deals with the halakhot of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, as pertains to a nazirite.
  Chapter Eight deals with individuals whose status as a nazirite is uncertain and discusses how they fulfill their vows.
  Chapter Nine discusses who can become a nazirite and uncertainties that exist with regard to different types of ritual impurity.
  Notes
  1.	 The Meiri places it after tractate Sota, in accordance with the order of the passages in the Torah.
  2.	 See the mishna on 47a, which compares a nazirite to a priest.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When either a man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord. (Numbers 6:2)
  In order for a nazirite vow to take effect, one must “clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord.” This chapter identifies problems that arise with terminology used in making such declarations. The many details in this chapter can be divided into two categories: First, issues related to clarifying the terms one might use to take a nazirite vow; and second, the meaning of different expressions used to describe the duration of the term of naziriteship or to accept multiple terms of naziriteship at once.
  With regard to the first issue, it is clear that one becomes a nazirite if he says: I am hereby a nazirite. The Gemara considers other, less direct ways that one can express his desire to become a nazirite, both by using substitutes for nazirite vows and by using intimations of nazirite vows. The Gemara discusses situations where these less direct expressions are effective, as well as situations where the speaker's statement does not give clear expression to this intent, and he is not a nazirite even if his intention was to take a nazirite vow.
  The second issue concerns setting the duration of the term of naziriteship. It is clear that when one explicitly states the duration or the number of terms of naziriteship that he accepts, he becomes a nazirite for the period that he articulated. The difficulty facing the Gemara is establishing the duration of a term of naziriteship in a situation where he used vague expressions of length or when it is unclear whether he accepted a single term or multiple terms of naziriteship.
  The Sages established that the minimum time frame for a term of naziriteship is thirty days, and one who does not specify the length of his term of naziriteship becomes a nazirite for this amount of time. The Gemara investigates the source for this principle and questions whether the term of naziriteship ends at the end of the twenty-ninth day or only after the thirtieth day.
  These issues and related questions comprise the subject matter of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  In this chapter the Gemara established the following: Commonly used substitute terms for the language of nazirite vows and substitute terms that were set by the Sages are effective expressions to use when accepting upon oneself a nazirite vow. Similarly, intimations of nazirite vows that clearly express one's intent to become a nazirite are effective nazirite vows, although they are incomplete statements. Occasionally, the meaning of a statement is understood from its context. For example, if one takes a vaguely articulated vow while a nazirite is passing by or while holding on to one's hair, his statement is considered a nazirite vow. Additionally, one who accepts upon himself some of the restrictions of a nazirite becomes a full-fledged nazirite. However, expressions that are themselves only substitutes for substitute terms of nazirite vows, and ambiguous intimations of nazirite vows that are completely obscure are not considered nazirite vows. They do not obligate the speaker to become a nazirite.
  The Gemara determined that the minimum duration of a term of naziriteship is thirty days. If one takes a nazirite vow without specifying the duration of the naziriteship, he becomes a nazirite for thirty days. This is true even if he says that he will be a nazirite for one large period, or for one small period, without specifying the precise length of the period. If he accepts upon himself a period of a naziriteship and a half, he is obligated to observe two thirty-day periods, unless it was clear that he intended to accept upon himself one term of naziriteship that would last longer than the duration of an unspecified term of naziriteship. If one compares the number of naziriteship periods that he is accepting upon himself with separate, distinct items, he becomes obligated in multiple, consecutive terms, equal to the number of items with which he compared his naziriteship.
  This chapter discussed the three different ways that one can become a nazirite for the duration of his lifetime and the different halakhot that apply to each type of lifelong nazirite. One who accepts upon himself consecutive terms of naziriteship or a single term of naziriteship that will last longer than his life span is a nazirite forever. In the case of consecutive terms, the nazirite treats each period as a separate term of naziriteship. He shaves his hair and brings offerings at the conclusion of each term. One who takes a nazirite vow and specifies that it applies for the duration of his life is also a nazirite forever. In this case, the individual is known as a permanent nazirite and is obligated in one long term of naziriteship that lasts for the duration of his lifetime. However, once a year he trims his hair and brings the nazirite offerings. Finally, some Sages explain that it is possible to vow to be a nazirite like Samson. This type of naziriteship lasts for the duration of one's life but differs from a permanent nazirite in that the individual is permitted to become impure from a corpse but is prohibited from ever cutting his hair.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  This chapter addresses instances where unusual terminology is employed in uttering vows of naziriteship. This chapter discusses statements that can be interpreted in multiple ways, vows of naziriteship that are made with a variety of stipulations, or vows made in circumstances that complicate their implementation.
  The first issue the Gemara considers is a situation in which the language or context of a statement might indicate an acceptance of naziriteship or might be a different vow altogether. A second set of problems concerns instances where an individual takes a vow of naziriteship without a full understanding of its halakhot or without the willingness to accept all of the restrictions involved in naziriteship.
  One is able to vow to pay for the offerings of a nazirite rather than to become one himself. The Gemara addresses the extent of the obligations incurred by one who states such a vow, and the obligations incurred by one who obligates himself to pay for only a part of the nazirite offerings.
  Another discussion in this chapter examines a naziriteship vow made conditional on the speaker having a child. The Gemara addresses whether he meant to become a nazirite both if he had a boy or a girl, or perhaps only if he had a boy.
  This chapter also discusses the halakha in a case where one vowed to observe a term of naziriteship that would begin on a certain day or when a certain event occurs, and then accepts another vow of naziriteship whose term will interfere with the implementation of the previous vow.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter discussed the terminology used upon taking a vow of naziriteship, and highlighted how distinctions in the phrasing can render one vow binding and another invalid. If an individual declares his intention to become a nazirite and therefore will refrain from an item that is in fact not forbidden to a nazirite, his statement is treated as a standard vow of prohibition and not as a vow of naziriteship. His use of the phrase: I am hereby a nazirite, is understood to mean only that he is vowing that a particular item is forbidden to him. There are even circumstances in which one may take a vow of naziriteship with regard to wine and it will be interpreted as a standard vow of prohibition, if circumstances indicate that one was merely vowing that a particular glass of wine being offered to him would be forbidden to him.
  If one vows to become a nazirite on the condition that he does not accept all of the nazirite prohibitions, his condition is disregarded and he is a full-fledged nazirite. On the other hand, if he uttered a vow of naziriteship but believed that only some of its restrictions were applicable to him, either because of ignorance or due to an assumption that the Sages would grant him a dispensation because of his unique circumstances, the vow is considered to be in error and is entirely void.
  If an individual vows to become a nazirite and to bring the offerings of a nazirite, his vow obligates him to observe a term of naziriteship and to pay for the offerings of another nazirite. Should two people state such a vow, each may pay for the other's offerings. If one vows to pay for the offerings of half a nazirite, his obligations are dependent upon the precise wording of his vow. He may be obligated to pay for half the offerings of a nazirite, or he might be obligated to pay for all of the offerings. In connection with this topic, the Gemara examines cases where an individual overhears someone vowing to be a nazirite and adds: And I, or: And it is incumbent upon me. Such a person becomes a nazirite despite the brevity of his statement.
  If one vows to become a nazirite when he has a son, only the birth of a son causes his naziriteship to take effect. If he vows to accept naziriteship upon the birth of a child, his vow takes effect regardless of the baby's gender, even if its genitalia make its gender indeterminate. However, the vow does not take effect if the baby is stillborn.
  If one utters multiple vows to observe overlapping naziriteship terms, the term about which he vowed first takes precedence, even if he needs to interrupt the term of another vow to observe his first vow. In such a situation the days of the term that was interrupted might count toward the completion of that term or they might not, depending on how many days remain at the time of the interruption. There are similar halakhot that address cases in which a nazirite becomes ritually impure in the middle of one of his terms.
  In connection with the possibility of impurity negating the observed days of a naziriteship term, the Gemara examines related halakhot and concludes that if a nazirite first becomes leprous, and then contracts impurity from the dead while he is a leper, the days of his naziriteship term that he had previously observed are not negated. Similarly, his observance of the days of his term is not negated if he became impure after having finished his term but before having brought his offerings or shaved.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And if any man dies very suddenly beside him, and he defiles his consecrated head, he shall shave his head on the day of his purification, on the seventh day shall he shave it. And on the eighth day he shall bring two turtledoves, or two young pigeons, to the priest, to the door of the tent of meeting. And the priest shall prepare one for a sin-offering, and the other for a burnt-offering, and make atonement for him, for he sinned by the soul; and he shall sanctify his head on that day. And he shall consecrate to the Lord the days of his naziriteship, and he shall bring a lamb in its first year for a guilt-offering; but the first days shall be void because his consecration was ritually impure. (Numbers 6:9–12)
  This chapter addresses the issues that relate to the duration of the term of naziriteship and its precise end point. The main situations that require clarification are those that involve consecutive terms of naziriteship or when an individual's naziriteship is interrupted by his becoming ritually impure from contact with a corpse.
  Unless otherwise specified, the length of a term of naziriteship is a full thirty days. However, if the nazirite shaves his hair on the thirtieth day of his term, he has fulfilled his obligation. The reason for this is subject to an amoraic dispute appearing in the first chapter of this tractate. The present chapter tries to determine how the days are counted when one is observing two terms one after the other, in light of the different opinions in the first chapter.
  The Torah writes that if a nazirite comes into contact with a corpse, all the days he had observed until that point are negated, and he begins his naziriteship from the beginning after undergoing his purification process. This chapter discusses whether the entire term of naziriteship is negated if the individual becomes ritually impure on the last day of his term, before having shaved. Is he considered to be still within his term? Must he observe an additional term from the start? 
  Another situation examined in this chapter is one where a person states a vow of naziriteship while he is ritually impure. Does the obligation take effect immediately? When does his counting begin?
  This chapter also discusses the halakha of one who takes a vow of naziriteship in one of the lands outside of Eretz Yisrael, which the Sages decreed are ritually impure. Finally, the Gemara considers a case where there are conflicting testimonies with regard to how long a naziriteship, or how many terms of naziriteship, one has vowed.
  Some of the issues discussed in this chapter have been partially addressed in earlier chapters. 
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  In a standard term of naziriteship, the nazirite shaves on the day after the close of his term, the thirty-first day. One who shaved on the final day of his term, the thirtieth day, has fulfilled his obligation. If one vowed to observe two consecutive terms of naziriteship, he shaves for the end of the second term on the sixty-first day from the start of the first term, as that is the thirty-first day of the second term. If one shaved for the first term on the thirtieth day, then even if he shaved for the second term on the fifty-ninth day, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  This chapter considered different possibilities with regard to the negation of the tally of the days of naziriteship due to ritual impurity from a corpse. If a nazirite comes into contact with a corpse during his term, the impurity negates the days he had observed of his naziriteship. After completing the purification process, the nazirite shaves and begins counting his term anew. The Gemara rules that this halakha applies even if one became impure on the final day of his term. On the other hand, if one contracts impurity on the day following the end of the term, before he has brought his offerings, only thirty days are negated, even if the original term was much longer.
  If one who had contracted impurity from a corpse, for example one who was standing in a cemetery, took a vow of naziriteship, the naziriteship takes effect immediately with regard to the prohibition against drinking wine or cutting hair, but he begins counting the days of his term only once he completes his purification process.
  A nazirite who became impure may only start to count his term again once the blood from his sin-offering has been sprinkled on the altar.
  If one residing outside Eretz Yisrael vowed to observe a term of naziriteship and then observed the entire term outside of Eretz Yisrael, he must observe his term again upon arriving in Eretz Yisrael. This halakha applies even if the vow comprised multiple terms or a lengthy term. The reason for this is that naziriteship kept outside of Eretz Yisrael is considered to be one observed in ritual impurity.
  Finally, should one vow to keep several terms of naziriteship but forget how many terms he vowed to complete, and witnesses provide conflicting reports as to what he said, the testimony of the set of witnesses who say the smaller amount is accepted.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord. (Numbers 6:2)
  This chapter deals with many, varied topics relating to naziriteship. Some of these are novel issues, while other matters have been addressed earlier in the tractate. The underlying theme of these disparate discussions is the naziriteship of women, as the analysis of women's naziriteship sheds light on the institution as a whole. There are two unique factors involved in the case of a woman who vows to become a nazirite. First, this vow shares a feature common to all vows of a woman, which is the right of her father or husband to nullify the vow. This nullification has further ramifications if another person linked his naziriteship vow to that of this woman before her father or husband nullified it. Additionally, it must be established what is to be done in the case of a woman who intentionally violates a vow that has been nullified without her knowledge, and what becomes of the animals that have been set aside as offerings for this vow. Finally, at what point during the term of naziriteship is the option to nullify a woman's vow no longer available to her father or husband?
  A second dimension of a woman's naziriteship concerns two halakhot that are not explicitly stated in the Torah. A father has the right to establish his minor son as a nazirite and thereby obligate him in all of the restrictions of naziriteship. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, a son may make use of the animals his father set aside for his naziriteship offerings if the father dies and he and the son were both nazirites. The Sages determined that these halakhot apply to sons but not to daughters, and to fathers rather than mothers.
  Despite the fact that most of the issues raised in this chapter are not limited to women, the applications of these halakhot to women serve as starting points for general discussions about naziriteship.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The conclusion reached in this chapter is that one may take a vow by associating himself with the naziriteship of another. The exact language used by the second speaker determines his obligation in the event that the initial vow is nullified by a woman's father or husband, or uprooted altogether by an act of dissolution performed by a halakhic authority. In this chapter it was also stated that a father or husband is entitled to nullify the vow of his daughter or wife at any point during her term, but not once she begins to bring her sacrificial animals.
  There is a difference between a case in which one states that certain animals or sums of money should serve as specific offerings and a case where no such specification is made. In the first situation an individual declares which animals should be the sin-offering, burnt-offering, guilt-offering, and peace-offering, or which sum of money should pay for each offering. In the second scenario the nazirite merely sets aside animals or the equivalent sums without specifying how they are to be used. The Gemara considers what happens in these cases if the naziriteship vow is canceled, e.g., it is nullified by a woman's husband, or the individual dies. The basic halakha is that each animal is treated differently when its use was determined beforehand, but other principles govern situations where no specifications were made. These rulings also apply when a nazirite wishes to use the animals his nazirite father set aside before dying. Despite the fact that in general one cannot achieve atonement with an animal designated for another person, a unique halakha permits this in the case of a nazirite who inherits animals from his father.
  Another halakha of naziriteship concerns the power of a father to declare his son a nazirite. This option exists until the son reaches the age of maturity, and it is available only for a father and with the son's acquiescence. The vow does not take effect if the son rejects the naziriteship, either on his own accord or at the behest of his relatives. Animals set aside as offerings for a son's naziriteship are sacrificed if he completes the term, or are treated like the offerings of a nazirite who dies if the vow is not observed.
  The chapter strays somewhat from its main topics to consider the case of a woman who does not observe her naziriteship properly. If a wife violates her naziriteship, unaware that her husband has in fact nullified it, she incurs lashes for rebelliousness by rabbinic law. This halakha shows that one's intentions are significant beyond the strict observance of the halakha. God holds an individual accountable if he attempts to sin, even if his attempt at transgression actually fails. Conversely, one is credited for trying to perform a mitzva even when his behavior is flawed in some way.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord. (Numbers 6:2)
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your evaluation. (Leviticus 27:2)
  And all the tithe of the herd or the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord. (Leviticus 27:32)
  This chapter will address several issues which all stem from the same basic problem: Does a consecration founded on error or uncertainty take effect?
  The consecration of an item is considered not merely a promise, but a legal act in and of itself. Therefore, a consecration of an item to the Temple treasury is legally equivalent to transferring ownership of that item to another person. For this reason it can be argued that even if uttered in error, an act of consecration is binding. The same would be the case with regard to a vow of naziriteship or a vow of prohibition, as the phrase “to the Lord” is used in the Torah with regard to both of these. An error may occur if the individual was mistaken about the circumstances, or if he supposed that events in the future would unfold differently. Similarly, one might link his declaration to facts that cannot be verified.
  Conversely, it is possible that the act of consecration depends on one's intention, and one's statement is merely a verbal confirmation of one's inner intention. The resolution of this dilemma has important ramifications: The dissolution of vows is based on the ability of a halakhic authority to detect a discrepancy between one's thoughts and his statements. Can a halakhic authority dissolve a vow of consecration by identifying extenuating circumstances or regret on the part of the individual who took the vow?
  Although a vow of naziriteship is apparently just another type of vow, it is also similar to a consecration, as a nazirite is obligated to set aside offerings for the completion of his term.
  A related topic which will be addressed in this chapter is whether a conditional vow results in an obligation with regard to situations where the stipulation was possibly unfulfilled.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara explained that with regard to vows of consecration, one's intention is critical in determining whether his vow takes effect. This requirement applies to other vows as well, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Consequently, an act of consecration or a vow of naziriteship is worthless if issued in error. This is the case whether the mistake occurred as a result of the language one used to express his purpose, or if the vow was based on a mistaken assumption. A vow might also not take effect if the verbalized statement did not match the speaker's intention.
  For example, if someone consecrated an item based on a condition which was subsequently unfulfilled, his vow does not take effect. Likewise, if one designated an offering for a naziriteship, and the vow of naziriteship was then dissolved, his act of consecration is rendered void. Finally, a vow of naziriteship is ineffective if it was undertaken with the belief that the individual possessed animals he could sacrifice, but later discovered that he had no such animals.
  A vow can be dissolved by a halakhic authority only when it is determined that it was erroneous from the outset. It cannot be dissolved due to a new situation that arises after the vow was taken.
  This chapter also analyzed the obligation of one who takes a vow of naziriteship in unclear or ambiguous circumstances. The Gemara concluded that when someone undertakes to become a nazirite pending a certain condition, the vow takes effect both if the condition is realized and even if there merely exists a possibility that it has come true. The uncertainty of the situation might stem from the individual's being unable to ascertain the truth of the matter, or in a case where the truth cannot be objectively determined.
  The Gemara also mentioned a halakha unique to the tithing of animals. In the event that an owner counting off his cattle mistakenly labels the ninth or the eleventh animal as the tenth one, those animals become consecrated as well. This ruling is a Torah edict, and therefore it is limited to the domain of animal tithes alone.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord, he shall abstain from wine and strong drink: He shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, neither shall he drink any liquor of grapes, nor eat fresh grapes or dried. All the days of his naziriteship he shall eat nothing that is made of the vine, from pits to grape skin. All the days of his vow of naziriteship no razor shall come upon his head; until the days are fulfilled, in which he consecrated himself to the Lord, he shall be sacred, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long. All the days that he consecrated himself to the Lord he shall not come near to a dead body. For his father or his mother, for his brother or for his sister, he shall not become impure for them when they die; because his naziriteship to God is upon his head. All the days of his naziriteship he is sacred to the Lord. And if any man dies very suddenly beside him, and he renders impure his consecrated head, then he shall shave his head on the day of his purification, on the seventh day he shall shave it. And on the eighth day he shall bring two turtledoves, or two young pigeons, to the priest, to the door of the Tent of Meeting. And the priest shall prepare one for a sin-offering, and the other for a burnt-offering, and make atonement for him, for that he sinned by reason of the dead; and he shall hallow his head that same day. And he shall consecrate to the Lord the days of his naziriteship, and shall bring a male sheep of the first year for a guilt-offering; but the former days shall be void, because his consecration was rendered impure.
  And this is the law of the nazirite, when the days of his consecration are fulfilled: He shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting; and he shall present his offering to the Lord, one male sheep of the first year without blemish for a burnt-offering, and one female sheep of the first year without blemish for a sin-offering, and one ram without blemish for a peace-offering, and a basket of unleavened bread, cakes of fine flour mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and their meal-offering, and their libations. And the priest shall bring them before the Lord, and shall sacrifice his sin-offering and his burnt-offering. And he shall sacrifice the ram for a sacrifice of a peace-offering to the Lord, with the basket of unleavened bread; the priest shall also sacrifice its meal-offering, and its libation. And the nazirite shall shave his consecrated head at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, and he shall take the hair of his consecrated head and put it on the fire which is under the sacrifice of the peace-offering. And the priest shall take the cooked foreleg, and one unleavened loaf out of the basket, and one unleavened wafer, and shall put them upon the palms of the nazirite after he has shaven his naziriteship. And the priest shall wave them for a wave-offering before the Lord; this is sacred for the priest, together with the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving; and after that the nazirite may drink wine. This is the law of the nazirite who takes a vow, and of his offering to the Lord for his naziriteship, beside that for which his means suffice; according to his vow which he takes, so he must do after the law of his naziriteship. (Numbers 6:1–21)
  When his naziriteship term is complete, a nazirite must come to the entrance to the Israelite Courtyard with the following offerings: An unblemished male sheep less than one year old for a burnt-offering; an unblemished female sheep less than one year old for a sin-offering; an unblemished ram, i.e., a male sheep aged more than one year, for a peace-offering; and a basket containing unleavened wheat loaves kneaded with oil, and flat matzot saturated with oil, along with the appropriate meal-offerings and libations. A priest prepares his sin-offering and burnt-offering inside the Temple courtyard, followed by the ram as a peace-offering, along with the basket of unleavened bread. The priest also sacrifices the meal-offering and libation. Meanwhile, the nazirite shaves off the hair of his head at the entrance to the Israelite Courtyard. He then takes this hair and places it on the fire that is under the pot that contains the peace-offering. After the nazirite has shaved, the priest takes the cooked foreleg of the ram along with one unleavened loaf and one unleavened wafer, and places them on the nazirite's open palms, and waves them. These portions belong to the priest, along with the animal's breast and thigh. Afterward, the nazirite may drink wine.
  This chapter discusses the main halakhot of naziriteship, what prohibitions apply to a nazirite due to his vow, what the halakha is for an individual who willingly or inadvertently violates these prohibitions, and what specific offerings are required of a nazirite.
  Three categories of activity are prohibited to a nazirite: First, he may not eat or drink any product of a grapevine. This chapter describes which items are included in this prohibition and the quantity a nazirite must consume to be liable to receive lashes. Second, a nazirite may not shave his hair. The Gemara analyzes the definition of shaving and whether the prohibition is violated only by the use of certain implements. The Gemara also considers the amount of hair that must be cut before one is liable to receive lashes, as well as the amount of hair that must be removed for the obligatory shaving at the end of the term of naziriteship. Finally, a nazirite may not become impure by contact with a corpse. This topic is addressed in general terms here, as its particulars are examined in Chapter Seven.
  In this chapter, the three prohibitions of a nazirite are discussed from two perspectives: The Gemara clarifies under what circumstances the fulfillment of a different mitzva overrides each of the restrictions. The Gemara further addresses the issue of whether a nazirite must begin counting some or all of his days again if his term is interrupted.
  Certain offerings are brought and certain rituals are performed when the naziriteship term has been fulfilled properly. These offerings and the attendant rituals are called the shaving of purity. Different offerings are sacrificed and rituals are performed if the period is interrupted by ritual impurity. These are known as the shaving of impurity. The Torah lists the offerings a pure and an impure nazirite must bring, and this chapter discusses various details relevant to these rites. The Gemara asks about the primary offering that formally ends the naziriteship term, the exact stage in the ritual when the hair is shaved, and what must be done if one of the sacrificial animals is invalidated.
  These are the main issues of this chapter, and they are complemented by other, tangential, topics associated with these halakhot.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara concluded that a nazirite is liable to receive lashes for eating or drinking any grape product. This includes those parts that are not usually consumed, as well as the main part of the fruit. However, branches, which are never consumed, are excluded. One is liable to be punished for violating the prohibition of eating a grape product if he eats an olive-bulk, while the minimum amount for incurring liability for drinking wine or wine vinegar is a quarter-log. Although the ingestion of all grape products is technically a single prohibition, the Torah imposes separate punishments of lashes for the consumption of different items.
  With regard to shaving, a nazirite who removes even a single hair is liable to receive lashes. A nazirite is also liable to receive lashes if another person removes a hair from his head, if this was done with his consent. This is the case whether the hair was cut with an instrument or removed manually. Nevertheless, the naziriteship term is negated and considered interrupted only if most of the nazirite's head was shaved with a razor or a similar implement. At the end of his naziriteship term, the individual is obligated to shave his entire head, and the performance of this mitzva is invalid if he leaves even two hairs on his head. This shaving of purity must be performed with a razor, like the shaving of a leper.
  The three prohibitions of naziriteship, namely the consumption of products of the grapevine, shaving, and contracting ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, differ with regard to those occasions when they are suspended. For example, a nazirite who becomes a leper must shave for his ritual purification from his leprosy, and he is permitted to contract impurity to tend to a corpse with no one to bury it [met mitzva]. By contrast, a nazirite may never drink wine. There are other differences between the three prohibitions: If a nazirite becomes impure, his entire term of naziriteship is negated, and he must bring offerings for his impure naziriteship before starting naziriteship afresh. Conversely, if a nazirite shaves, his term of naziriteship is not negated. However, he must wait thirty days for his hair to grow again, even if he was shaved against his will. Finally, if a nazirite drinks wine, his term continues uninterrupted, although he is liable to receive lashes. This is the case even if he did so intentionally.
  Once a nazirite's term has been completed, he brings the offerings of a pure nazirite. If the blood of even one of his offerings has been sprinkled on the altar in the proper manner, his purification is complete after the fact and the prohibitions of a nazirite no longer apply to him. In this case he must still bring the other required offerings.
  Other matters discussed in this chapter in connection with these topics include the halakhot of permitted food combining with forbidden substances, the principle that a forbidden substance imparts a taste to the permitted food, and the prohibition against rounding the head in a situation when shaving is required. Additionally, the chapter considered various issues associated with a priest contracting ritual impurity from a corpse, e.g., when exactly he may come into contact with a corpse of a close relative. The Gemara also discussed the differences between various ways of contracting impurity imparted by a corpse: Direct contact, concurrent contact, and ritual impurity imparted by a corpse in a tent.
  Finally, the chapter analyzed exegetical principles such as a detail, a generalization, and a detail, and the like.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  All the days that he consecrated himself to the Lord he shall not come near to a dead body. He shall not become defiled for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister, when they die; because his naziriteship to God is upon his head. (Numbers 6:7)
  And the Lord said to Moses: Speak to the priests the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall defile himself for the dead among his people, except for his kin, that is near to him, for his mother, and for his father, and for his son, and for his daughter, and for his brother, and for his sister a virgin, that is near to him, that has had no husband, for her may he defile himself. (Leviticus 21:1–3)
  And the priest that is highest among his brothers, upon whose head the anointing oil is poured, and that is consecrated to put on the garments, shall not let the hair of his head go loose, nor rend his clothes; neither shall he go in to any dead bodies, nor defile himself for his father, or for his mother. (Leviticus 21:10–11)
  This chapter investigates the details of the prohibition against a nazirite becoming ritually impure from a corpse. This restriction is not limited to a nazirite, as it is also incumbent upon common priests and the High Priest to avoid the impurity of corpses. Additionally, one who is impure may not enter the Temple precincts or partake of sacrificial meat. To a certain extent, the discussions in this chapter involve a comparison between the halakhot pertaining to a priests and those pertaining to a nazirite.
  The phenomenon of impurity from a corpse involves a range of halakhot and various measurements with regard to the ritual impurity of different body parts. Furthermore, the methods of contracting impurity from a corpse, i.e., through contact, carrying, and in a tent, are governed by separate halakhot.
  The chapter addresses the issue of which types of ritual impurity from a corpse cause a nazirite to negate his naziriteship term. The status of a nazirite afflicted with leprosy is also considered.
  A comparison between the prohibitions against a nazirite and a priest contracting ritual impurity from a corpse gives rise to certain questions: How should these individuals behave when they come across a corpse with no one available to bury it [met mitzva]? Does the sanctity of the priest take precedence over that of the nazirite in this situation, or vice versa? The chapter also discusses other matters concerning impurity from a corpse, including various states of impurity established by rabbinic law.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  Concerning the halakhot of ritual impurity with regard to a nazirite, there is a distinction between situations for which the nazirite's entire term of naziriteship is nullified due to contact with a corpse, and cases where his impurity requires sprinkling of the purification waters and immersion but does not negate the days of naziriteship he has already observed. If one's term of naziriteship is negated due to impurity, then following his purification the individual must bring the offerings of an impure nazirite, after which he starts counting his term of naziriteship afresh. Some Sages suggest that those impurities that do not negate the term of a nazirite are those imposed by rabbinic law or those that are due to uncertainty. Consequently, a nazirite with this type of impurity is not punished for entering the Temple or for eating sacrificial meat. Even those who dispute this opinion concede that the details of these halakhot were transmitted to Moses from Sinai, although there is textual support for them in the Torah. These details include the amounts of body material that impart impurity and the ways in which impurity is imparted, i.e., through contact, carrying, and in a tent.
  Since the prohibition of a nazirite contracting impurity is limited to that of a corpse, a nazirite's term is not nullified or otherwise affected if he comes into contact with other forms of impurity. The lone exception to this principle is the impurity of a leper, which shares some of the characteristics of that of a corpse. Impurity from a leper does not negate a nazirite's term of naziriteship. However, if a nazirite becomes a confirmed leper, the days during which he is affected are not counted toward the tally of days required to fulfill his term of naziriteship.
  Just as a priest, and even a High Priest, who are both prohibited from coming into contact with a corpse, must become ritually impure to tend to a met mitzva, the same applies to a nazirite. The Gemara concludes that if only a nazirite and a priest are available to perform the task, the nazirite must bury the corpse, because his sanctity is temporary, whereas that of the priest is permanent. This is the halakha, despite the fact that a nazirite must subsequently bring an offering for this impurity and resume the tally of his term of naziriteship from the beginning.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  All the days of his vow of naziriteship no razor shall come upon his head; until the days are fulfilled in which he consecrated himself to the Lord, he shall be sacred, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long. (Numbers 6:5)
  And if any man dies very suddenly beside him, and he renders impure the head of his naziriteship, then he shall shave his head on the day of his purification, on the seventh day he shall shave it. (Numbers 6:9)
  And this is the law of the nazirite, when the days of his consecration are fulfilled: He shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting; and he shall present his offering to the Lord...And the nazirite shall shave the head of his naziriteship at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, and he shall take the hair of the head of his naziriteship and put it on the fire that is under the sacrifice of the peace-offering. (Numbers 6:13–14, 18)
  And he shall sprinkle upon him that is to be cleansed from the leprosy seven times, and shall pronounce him clean, and shall let go the living bird into the open field. And he that is to be cleansed shall wash his clothes, and shave off all his hair, and bathe himself in water, and he shall be clean; and after that he may come into the camp, but shall dwell outside his tent seven days. And it shall be on the seventh day, that he shall shave all his hair off his head and his beard and his eyebrows, all his hair he shall shave off; and he shall wash his clothes, and he shall bathe his flesh in water, and he shall be clean. (Leviticus 14:7–9)
  This chapter essentially deals with a single problem: How should a nazirite behave if he might have been rendered impure? Due to this uncertainty, he must accept some of the stringencies of both an impure nazirite and a pure nazirite.
  This situation is doubly complex. On the one hand, the impurity nullifies the initial naziriteship, and the nazirite must shave before observing his term of naziriteship anew. On the other hand, if he did not become impure he ought to continue his term without interruption. A second difficulty concerns the nazirite's obligation to bring offerings. Not only do an impure nazirite and a pure nazirite at the completion of their terms bring different sets of offerings, but the possibility that a nazirite may not have any obligation to bring these offerings raises a whole series of problems. These include the order in which the animals are brought, the manner in which they are sacrificed, and the consumption of offerings brought in uncertainty. 
  This central problem is expressed in two basic cases. The first concerns an uncertainty in which one of two nazirites became impure from a corpse and it is unclear which of them it was. The other case is that of a nazirite who might have been rendered impure from a corpse and who also might be a leper. This second case is especially complicated, as the purification of a leper includes the obligation to shave twice. In addition to the fact that the requirement of a nazirite and a leper to shave do not apply at the same time, there is a conflict between the leper's requirement to shave and the nazirite's prohibition against doing so. An additional question is whether one act of shaving can fulfill the obligation of both conditions. The analyses of these problems comprise the central material of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  To resolve the predicament of a nazirite who might have become impure, the individual in question is required to observe two full naziriteship terms. At the end of the first period he brings the offerings of a nazirite who has become impure, while adding the stipulation that if he was in fact not impure the offerings should be considered those of a pure nazirite or as gift offerings. He then begins a conditional naziriteship term in purity: If he was impure, the new period is obligatory, whereas if he was not impure it is an additional voluntary term. With regard to an uncertainty that involves two nazirites, at the end of the first term they bring offerings of impurity and offerings of purity and stipulate that the offerings for impurity should satisfy the obligation of the individual who was impure, while the other should be for the pure nazirite. At the end of the second term they bring offerings of purity for the one who was impure in the first term, while issuing a corresponding stipulation.
  If a nazirite might have become impure from a corpse and might be a leper, he observes four periods of naziriteship. This is because one act of shaving does not count toward both the obligation of naziriteship and that of a leper. After the first term has been completed, he performs the first shaving of a leper; after the second, he undergoes the second shaving for his leprosy; following the third term he shaves as an impure nazirite; and when the fourth term is over he performs the shaving for the completion of naziriteship in purity.
  Since some of the offerings are sacrificed only due to uncertainty, e.g., those of an impure nazirite and a leper, this individual does not bring a guilt-offering but only a bird sin-offering brought for uncertainty, and other offerings that can be stipulated as voluntary.
  The Gemara analyzed the issue of why one cannot satisfy the obligation of a leper to shave and the shaving of a nazirite with the same act. The Gemara also discussed the tangential issue of the prohibitions against rounding one's head and shaving one's beard. A more in-depth study concerned the relationship between a positive mitzva and a prohibition with regard to the order of preference when two or more mitzvot conflict.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord. (Numbers 6:2)
  Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation. (Leviticus 27:2)
  And if any man shall die very suddenly beside him, and he defile his consecrated head, then he shall shave his head in the day of his cleansing, on the seventh day shall he shave it. (Numbers 6:9)
  This chapter completes the various topics associated with naziriteship and incidentally addresses issues of a similar halakhic nature. The first topic concerns individuals who are unable to become full-fledged nazirites, e.g., gentiles, who may not adopt any measure of naziriteship. It also addresses those who are under another's authority and are therefore incapable of adhering to the strictures of this vow, e.g., women, Canaanite slaves, and minors. The Gemara seeks textual support for these halakhot and contrasts the rulings that apply to these different individuals.
  Another topic addressed is the procedure of a nazirite who contracted ritual impurity from a corpse but discovered that fact only after he completed his term of naziriteship. The halakhot of impurity of a nazirite depend on the degree of one's awareness of the source of impurity, and therefore this chapter considers various uncertainties involving different sources of impurity. The Gemara discusses when one must search for unknown graves and when one must be concerned for a possible plague of leprosy or the discharge of a zav. In addition, the chapter examines halakhot concerning a source of impurity that is not fixed in place but is floating.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara concluded that gentiles cannot undertake a vow of naziriteship, although it is permitted for them to sacrifice some of the offerings associated with it. Canaanite slaves are categorized as Jews with respect to naziriteship obligations. However, their masters can prevent them from observing this vow in practice, in which case the Canaanite slave must wait until he is emancipated before he can fulfill it. A married woman can accept naziriteship upon herself, but under certain circumstances her husband can nullify the vow and thereby absolve her from any obligation to fulfill it.
  A case can arise where a nazirite discovers his impurity only after the completion of his term. If the impurity in this situation was imparted by a grave in the depths, i.e., if the grave was unknown to anyone, the nazirite's term is not negated. However, if the impurity could have been known, whether or not one can determine it was known in practice, his term is negated, and he must restart his naziriteship once he is purified. The leniency of the halakha of impurity imparted by a grave in the depths applies both to a nazirite, in that his term is not negated, and to an individual on his way to bring a Paschal offering, in that he need not bring an offering on the second Pesah.
  This topic led to discussion in the Gemara about other cases involving uncertain impurity. With regard to impurity imparted by a corpse, the chapter addressed the issue of how to relocate a grave that has been discovered, including the size of the radius that must be examined outward from the grave to ascertain if there are other graves nearby.
  On a separate note, if an individual has not yet been determined to be a leper or a zav, the halakha is generally lenient in a situation where he might have been rendered impure. However, once one is definitely a leper or a zav, cases of uncertainty are treated stringently. In light of this ruling, the chapter examines a case where an individual beat another and the victim was diagnosed as fatally injured. If the victim improves but subsequently deteriorates and dies, one attributes his death to the beating and not to another factor.
  The chapter and the tractate as a whole end with aggadic statements praising a nazirite and a discussion as to whether the great prophet Samuel was a nazirite.
  
  Nedarim
  
  Introduction to Nedarim
  
  Tractate Nedarim is similar to tractates Nazir, Shevuot, and to a degree, Arakhin, in that they all address obligations that are not imposed by the Torah but are voluntarily created by an individual. In a broad sense, the category of vows includes nazirite vows, oaths, and consecrations, which are the primary topics addressed in those tractates. These tractates are connected not only with regard to their general topic but also with regard to the structure of the tractates and the halakhic details that are common to these different manifestations of vows. Tractate Nedarim, which addresses the topic of vows in a more narrow sense, is found in the order of Nashim because most of the verses in the Torah that address this topic refer to vows of women. However, the halakhot apply equally to vows made by anyone.
  Most usages of the term vow in the Torah itself refer to vows of consecration, whereby an individual invests an item with sanctity. Conversely, in rabbinic literature, the term vow generally refers to vows of prohibition, whereby one causes a particular item to become forbidden for his use. Nevertheless, vows of prohibition must be understood within the context of vows of consecration. 
  With regard to the impact of a vow upon people, there is a significant difference between vows of consecration and those of prohibition in that vows of consecration render an item forbidden for use by anyone, whereas vows of prohibition cause an item to be forbidden only for the individuals specified in the vow. One can declare any item to be forbidden for use for himself, and one can declare anything he owns to be forbidden for use by anyone else. 
  Although vows are taken voluntarily and one does not fulfill a mitzva by taking a vow, once an individual takes one, he is required by Torah law to keep his word. There is a positive mitzva to keep his vow, expressed in the phrase “he shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth” (Numbers 30:3), and one violates a prohibition if he breaks his vow, as expressed in the same verse: “He shall not profane his word.” Due to the fact that once one takes a vow the content of his vow is no longer a personal decision but a formal halakhic requirement, there are specific guidelines as to which declarations cause a vow to take effect. 
  For a vow to take effect, three conditions must be met. First, the individual must intend to take a vow. Next, he must give clear verbal expression to this intent. Finally, there must be an object upon which the vow takes effect, and the vow must be expressed in a way that allows it to apply to that object. If these conditions are not met, the vow does not take effect, at least by Torah law. A large portion of this tractate is dedicated to clarifying each of these conditions and to explaining their relationship to one another.
  The intent of the individual making the vow is of great importance with regard to the halakhot of vows, and if everyone could be trusted to recall their intent, vows would be interpreted on the basis of this intent alone. However, there is a halakhic principle that intentions that are not verbalized have no legal standing. Nevertheless, in cases where the intention of the individual is clear to all, his intent is the determining factor even when his verbal statement indicates something different, e.g., in the cases of vows of urging or of exaggeration, discussed at the beginning of the third chapter. At the same time, intent alone does not create a vow; a vow does not take effect unless it is verbalized. 
  The verbal expression of a vow can lead to questionable situations, e.g., where one did not express his vow clearly and his intention is understood only from context, which is known as an intimation of a vow; where he used substitute terms instead of the terms generally used to express a vow; or when he employed terminology whose precise meaning is unclear. A large portion of tractate Nedarim is dedicated to clarifying unclear terminology, including ambiguous expressions or expressions that can be interpreted in either a limited or a broad manner. In particular, this tractate defines various elements that one might refer to in a vow: different types of foods and other products, groups of people, and dates and times. 
  Even when the intent and verbal expression of the individual are clear, there are situations in which a vow cannot take effect. These include cases where one declares an item to be like another item that is inherently forbidden rather than forbidden due to a vow. Additionally, a vow can take effect only if it can apply to an item that has concrete substance. 
  When a vow does take effect, it can apply in a variety of ways. One can cause an item to be forbidden from being eaten, or to become forbidden from having benefit derived from it more generally. The manner in which a vow is expressed indicates whether it is limited to the item specified or whether it applies even to replacement items or to products of the original item. Similarly, it will determine whether the vow applies as long as the item belongs to a particular individual, or whether it continues to apply even if the item later belongs to someone else. Another variable is whether the vow renders a particular item forbidden to the individual making the vow, or whether he is declaring an item that belongs to him to be forbidden to other individuals. 
  While the halakhot of vows are discussed in the Torah, the Sages did not perceive vows to be a positive phenomenon. This is due to a general perspective that it is not advisable to add new prohibitions to those already mentioned in the Torah, and because vows are generally taken when one is angry or embroiled in dispute and often contribute to the perpetuation of the dispute. Consequently, the Sages recommended dissolving vows. 
  The possibility of dissolving a vow is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, but it stems from the very nature of a vow itself. Since a vow stems from the intent of the individual who makes it, when he is no longer interested in the vow, it should no longer be relevant. Nevertheless, one cannot decide on his own that a vow no longer applies; he must submit a request to an ordained judge or to a rabbinical court to dissolve it. 
  Vows can be dissolved in one of two cases. One case is when there is an opening, i.e., when the judge discovers that the individual did not take into account all of the ramifications of his vow when he originally made it. The other case is due to regret, i.e., the individual regrets ever having made the vow. In these cases the judge can dissolve the vow, abrogating it retroactively. 
  The Torah also introduces the concept of nullification of vows. A father has the authority to nullify the vows of his daughter until she attains majority. Similarly, a husband can nullify the vows of his wife. If this is done, the vows are not abrogated retroactively but are simply canceled from the time of the nullification. The rights of a father or husband to nullify vows are limited with regard to the time frame for nullification, as they can nullify vows only on the day they hear of them. Additionally, a husband can nullify only vows of affliction or those that directly or indirectly affect the relationship between himself and his wife. According to many opinions, a father is also empowered to nullify only vows of affliction or those that affect his relationship with his daughter. In the case of a young betrothed woman, who is still a member of her father's household, the father and husband must both nullify the vow in order for it to be canceled.
  It should be noted that although the Vilna Talmud includes a commentary identified on the page as Rashi, it is generally presumed not to have been written by Rashi himself. This commentary will be referred to in the notes on this tractate as the Commentary on Nedarim. Unlike in other tractates, the commentaries of the Ran and the Rosh are printed on the page of the Vilna Talmud in tractate Nedarim. They are accorded great significance by those who study this tractate. 
  Tractate Nedarim has eleven chapters, some of which address one clearly defined topic, and some of which discuss several topics that are also addressed elsewhere. 
  Chapter One addresses the topics of substitute terms for vows and intimations of vows. 
  Chapter Two discusses vows that do not take effect because one associated the object of his vow with an item that did not itself become forbidden by a vow, or because there is no object of his vow that is subject to vows. It also discusses the differences between vows and oaths. 
  Chapter Three lists vows that do not cause a prohibition because they were not made wholeheartedly. It also defines who is included when one takes a vow that pertains to groups of people. 
  Chapter Four is concerned with the differences between one who vows not to eat an item and one who vows not to derive benefit from an item. It also clarifies what is permitted to one who vows not to derive benefit from another individual. 
  Chapter Five clarifies that if one vows not to derive benefit from another individual, it is prohibited for him to derive benefit even from items that are not owned in their entirety by that individual. 
  Chapter Six defines the terms used to express a vow with regard to various food items. 
  Chapter Seven explains the meanings of various terms used to express a vow, and the prohibition of items that are replacements for or that have grown from items forbidden by a vow. 
  Chapter Eight discusses the periods of time one might specify in a vow. 
  Chapter Nine deals with the dissolution of vows by a judge and the openings necessary to allow their dissolution. 
  Chapter Ten is concerned with the nullification of vows by a father or husband, including the case of a betrothed woman. 
  Chapter Eleven clarifies the particulars of the process of the nullification of vows and completes other details concerning the general halakhot of vows.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say unto them: When either a man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite, to consecrate himself to the Lord. (Numbers 6:2)
  When a man takes a vow to the Lord, or swears an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not profane his word; he shall do according to all that proceeds out of his mouth. (Numbers 30:3)
  For a vow to take effect, an individual must intend to take a vow and he must verbally express that intent in a clear manner. This chapter addresses cases where the individual expressed his vow in a way that is unclear, and it ascertains whether various statements are considered vows. 
  The cases of unclear expressions of vows can be divided into two categories: Substitute terms for vows and intimations of vows. There are certain terms that clearly indicate a vow, e.g., if one says that a particular item shall be considered like an offering [korban] or like an item dedicated to the Temple [herem], or if one declares himself to be a nazirite [nazir]. If one substitutes similar words, e.g., konam instead of korban, herekh instead of herem, or naziah instead of nazir, he has employed a substitute term. Some of these words may be so commonly used as substitutes for the terms that express a vow that the two terms may be considered synonymous. Other substitute words express the same idea in another language. In these cases, it is clear that the vow takes effect. Nevertheless, it is necessary to specify which words directly indicate a vow and which do not. 
  An intimation of a vow is when one expresses a vow in an incomplete manner, such that it is possible to understand the individual's intent, although he has not given full expression to it. This category may be further divided between instances where it is clear what the individual had in mind, known as obvious intimations, and instances where the individual's statement may be interpreted in more than one way, i.e., ambiguous intimations. 
  The status of intimations is also addressed with regard to other areas of halakha where an individual's statement has legal standing, e.g., betrothal, divorce, and consecrations. However, the main focus of the discussion in this chapter is with regard to intimations of vows: When a vow expressed in this manner takes effect and when it does not. At times, it may be obvious that an incomplete statement expresses a vow, but it may not be clear what type of vow it expresses, e.g., a regular vow, a vow of naziriteship, or a consecration. 
  These issues, which are essentially questions of the meaning of language and the relationship between the individual's intent and his verbal expression of that intent, comprise the principal subject matter of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  It was stated in this chapter that a vow may take effect even if one does not state explicitly that he is taking a vow, but rather employs substitute terms that indicate a vow. Only certain specific terms are valid substitute terms for vows. The amora'im debated whether these terms are words that actually mean vow in other languages or whether the Sages invented these terms specifically for use as substitute terms for vows. Other terms, even if they are alternate forms of the substitute terms, are not valid expressions of a vow. 
  It was further stated that intimations of vows, whereby one expresses a vow in an incomplete manner, are also considered valid expressions of vows. However, this applies only to obvious intimations, where the intent of the speaker is clear due to his statement or based upon context. Ambiguous intimations, which are statements that can be interpreted in more than one way, are not considered to be statements of vows. Along with this discussion of intimations, the Gemara determined that intimations are considered valid statements in other areas of halakha as well, such as betrothal, divorce, consecrations, and charity. 
  The Gemara also addressed other unusual formulations of vows, such as one who accepts an obligation upon himself with the phrase: Like the vows of the wicked, or one who says that food should not be considered non-sacred, which implies that it shall be considered sacred. 
  Although this chapter reinforced the idea that people are generally to be discouraged from taking vows, one is not discouraged from taking vows to fulfill mitzvot. 
  An additional topic that is discussed is expressing a vow by associating one item with another item that is prohibited, e.g., by saying: This item should be like that item. If the second item is consecrated or is prohibited due to a vow, one is considered to have effectively taken a vow that prohibits the first item.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  When a man takes a vow to the Lord, or swears an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not profane his word; he shall do according to all that comes out of his mouth. Numbers 30:3
  A vow creates a prohibition by associating a permitted item with an item forbidden by means of a vow, e.g., an offering or consecrated property. In other words, one must say: This item will be forbidden like an offering. If the permitted item is associated with an item that is forbidden by the Torah, the vow does not take effect. Several examples of this rule are discussed in this chapter.
  In addition, the prohibition created by the vow must be imposed upon a tangible item. If it is not, and instead is applied to an act of sorts, the vow does not take effect. An oath, by contrast, does take effect when it is applied to actions. This distinction leads the chapter to discuss other differences between vows and oaths.
  A separate problem with regard to vows is one that contains a double meaning, or that is explained by the one who took the vow in a manner that renders it ineffective. 
  Some types and cases of vows that do not take effect are treated stringently by the Sages, lest people take vows lightly as result of their inability to distinguish between vows that take effect and vows that do not. This chapter discusses which ineffective vows are treated stringently and which do not take effect even by rabbinic law.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  A vow that is phrased to associate a permitted item with an item forbidden by Torah law does not take effect. However, the Sages treated several of these vows stringently, requiring the one who took the vow to request of a halakhic authority to dissolve it. Similarly, a vow imposed on an action does not take effect by Torah law, as an action does not have actual substance; however, it must be observed by rabbinic law.
  With regard to vows that carry two meanings, one of which is referring to an item forbidden by means of a vow and the other referring to an item forbidden by the Torah, the vow takes effect if it remains unexplained. However, if the one who took the vow explains it in a manner that renders it ineffective, the object of the vow is permitted. If the simple meaning of the vow is such that it should take effect, and the one who took it claims that he meant otherwise, the ruling depends on his status. If he is a Torah scholar, the vow does not take effect. If he is an ignoramus, and he mentions this explanation as extenuating circumstances to allow dissolution of the vow, the vow is treated stringently lest he come to take vows lightly.
  A fundamental difference between vows and oaths is that whereas a vow that is imposed on a matter that does not have actual substance does not take effect, an oath of that type does. This is because an oath is imposed upon a person and can prohibit him from taking an action, whereas a vow imposes a prohibition on an item. One consequence of this distinction is that an oath to nullify a mitzva does not take effect, as one is already under oath from Mount Sinai to fulfill the mitzvot. It is therefore rendered an oath in vain. By contrast, one can impose a prohibition on an item by means of a vow even if it is an item designated for a mitzva. Additionally, one may take several identical vows and they will all take effect. If he transgresses the prohibition he is in violation of each and every vow. An oath, by contrast, does not take effect where an oath was already taken.
  A topic discussed tangentially is sexual intercourse between husband and wife, as well as the ways of modesty in general.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  When one takes a vow, he must have the proper intention in order for it to take effect. If he does not intend for his vow to be binding, then his words are meaningless. However, it is generally assumed that a person's intention is for the vow to take effect, and he may not claim later that the vow is invalid simply due to lack of proper intention. Nevertheless, there are exceptional situations where the Sages stated that the intention was clearly not to vow, and therefore, despite being formulated properly, the vow does not take effect. The Sages categorized the situations where a person did not truly intend to vow into four groups: Vows of exhortation, vows of exaggeration, vows that are unintentional, and vows whose fulfillment is impeded by circumstances beyond one's control. The definitions and precise parameters of these four groups constitute one of the primary themes of this chapter. 
  The Sages here discuss the relationship between an individual's intention and his spoken statement, which also leads them to discuss the implications of his choice of particular language for a vow. One sometimes formulates a vow using general terminology when he actually intends to refer to a much more specific situation, and the Sages discussed the halakhic parameters of what is included in such a vow. Although this issue is dealt with in more detail in later chapters, this chapter focuses on one group of such cases, where a vow is taken to render benefit forbidden to a group of individuals, e.g., a certain nation or certain profession, but the language of the vow is ambiguous as to precisely who is included and who is not. The discussion therefore focuses on what is generally included in such imprecise expressions in colloquial language.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  There are four categories of vows for which it is clear that the one taking the vow did not intend to do so. Therefore, one is not prohibited by it, despite the fact that the words were articulated in the form of a vow.
  The first category relates to vows of extortion. These are vows taken in an exaggerated manner in order to encourage another to do something specific. It is common knowledge that one did not say his words as a vow but rather as encouragement. 
  Similarly, the second category consists of vows of exaggeration. This refers to a vow aimed at demonstrating that something one said is true, but it is common knowledge that his statement is somewhat exaggerated. 
  The third category, unintentional vows, includes vows taken based on a faulty premise that one later discovers to be incorrect.
  The fourth category, vows impeded by circumstances beyond one's control, do not require dissolution by a halakhic authority, but rather are immediately dissolved. This category can be divided into two groups: The first includes vows taken under the assumption that one will be capable of fulfilling a certain condition. If circumstances beyond his control then arise that prevent him from fulfilling his vow, it is assumed that he did not intend for the vow to take effect in such a situation. The second group includes cases where one is compelled to vow due to financial or other types of distress. In this case, although the vow was verbally expressed in a proper manner, one had no mental intention whatsoever that the vow take effect. Concerning this issue, there is no difference whether a vow or oath was taken, since in both cases one's words do not take effect. 
  In connection with these issues, the Gemara discussed a number of questions related to the dissolution of vows, e.g., what types of openings may be suggested by a halakhic authority to induce the one taking the vow to declare that they never would have intended for it to take effect had they initially considered other factors. Through this process, the vow is transformed into an unintentional vow, which may be dissolved. 
  With regard to the question of understanding the implication of various ambiguous expressions used in a vow, the primary principle is that a vow should be understood based on colloquial language. Therefore, a vow will occasionally be expressed using very general terms, yet colloquially the expression is much more limited in scope. 
  Because the distinction between those who are circumcised and those who are not is mentioned in this chapter in the context of vows, the Mishna and the Gemara cite numerous statements concerning the greatness of the mitzva of circumcision, which is a sign that demonstrates the uniqueness of the Jewish people.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  Many vows are reactions to interpersonal disputes or results of these interactions. The one who vows seeks to chastise the other person or to modify his conduct, and consequently prohibits that person from deriving benefit from him. This vow can assume one of two forms: That benefit from his food is forbidden to the other, and that all benefit from him is forbidden to the other. This chapter addresses those vows and raises several questions, particularly with regard to the latter type of vow.
  The first issue is defining the difference between these two vows. Since benefit from one's food is not limited to food alone but includes any monetary gain that could facilitate the purchase of food, when one vows that benefit from his food is forbidden, he prohibits the other from deriving any benefit with monetary value. Therefore, the difference between those two vows must be delineated.
  An additional series of issues stems from an analysis of the relationship between the one who vowed and the one subject to the prohibition in the vow. Typically, relations between people with close familial or collegial ties are precisely those that tend to deteriorate into quarrels that lead to vows. Therefore, situations could arise where one of the parties seeks to assist the other in times of need, but is prevented from doing so by the vow. Therefore, the Gemara first explains those actions that are not considered benefit and that the one who vowed may consequently perform for the one for whom benefit is forbidden. In addition, in circumstances where the one for whom benefit is forbidden is in dire straits and the other seeks to help him, the question is whether there are ways to circumvent the prohibition and assist him despite the vow. The Gemara in this chapter will address these and other related questions. 
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The difference between benefit from another's food being forbidden by vow and all benefit from another being forbidden by vow is a minor one, as in the former case, any benefit that can be translated into food, i.e., all monetary benefit, is forbidden. For one for whom all benefit from another is forbidden it is prohibited even to borrow utensils unrelated to food. Actions that provide no monetary benefit are also forbidden. Furthermore, it is prohibited for him to work for or serve the one who vowed. The prohibition of benefit includes seemingly insignificant benefits. The principle is that for one for whom all benefit from another is forbidden, that other person may not perform even actions that people typically overlook.
  On the other hand, there are actions that are halakhically not considered benefit, primary among them performance of mitzvot. It is permitted for one to perform a mitzva on behalf of a person for whom benefit from him is forbidden, based on the principle: Mitzvot were not given to benefit from them. Furthermore, it is permitted even if by performing the mitzva for him he provides him with indirect monetary benefit.
  The Sages said that if one for whom benefit from another is forbidden is in dire straits, that other person may intimate to a third party to perform certain actions or to provide sustenance for the first, provided that he does not undertake any halakhic commitment to reimburse him. In such a case any indirect giving by means of a third party, or even by means of declaring property ownerless, is permitted. In the course of the discussion of these issues, several matters relating to the general halakhot of ownerless status were raised.
  The chapter discussed the fact that it is permitted to teach Torah to one for whom benefit from him is forbidden. Matters relating to whether it is permitted to take payment for the study of Torah, to the punctuation of the Torah text with cantillation notes, and to rabbinic traditions with regard to the Bible were also discussed. In addition, the Gemara discussed the praiseworthiness and significance of the mitzva of visiting the ill as part of the question of whether one may visit a sick person from whom benefit is forbidden for him.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  As explained in the previous chapter, if one is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another, even the most minimal benefit is forbidden. Therefore, the one who takes the vow will be enjoined not only from deriving benefit from the other's property, but also from deriving benefit from shared property, lest he benefit from the other's share.
  This chapter deals primarily with issues of deriving benefit from property shared by multiple owners. This occurs primarily through partnerships or from benefit gained through communal or public property, although shared ownership can result from a number of other situations. In the case of public property, one must determine each party's degree of ownership, since their share may be so small as to be negligible, thereby rendering the property ownerless.
  The chapter also discusses effective and ineffective ways of circumventing vows in order to indirectly benefit the prohibited individual. While some methods may be considered legitimate means of offering indirect benefit, loopholes that are solely legal fictions are rendered invalid. 
  Finally, this chapter explores the possibility of rendering entities forbidden to oneself or to another that have not yet come into or have already left one's possession.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  With regard to property owned in partnership, the Gemara rules leniently that one partner does not have the ability to prevent the other from entering the property or deriving benefit from his share. The reason for this is that one can prohibit another from benefiting from his own property only by means of a vow, and the Gemara rules that the principle of retroactive clarification makes it possible for each partner to benefit exclusively from his share. In principle, however, even partial ownership of something gives one the power to ban by means of a vow another who is not also a partner from deriving benefit from that property. Accordingly, when one prohibits another from deriving benefit from him, all property belonging to the community of the person who took the vow becomes prohibited to the object of the vow. The only way that person can then benefit from community property is if the person who took the vow transfers his share to a third party. This is the case with regard to property that belongs to a particular community. However, property that belongs to the whole community of Israel is not considered to be held in partnership and one does not have the power to prohibit another from benefiting from it. 
  The Gemara rules that vows that take effect on objects one owns remain in effect even after the objects are sold or given away. However, it is inconclusive with regard to whether vows can take effect on objects that do not yet exist. 
  It is possible to circumvent a prohibitory vow by giving a gift to a third party with the understanding that he will then give it to the object of the vow. However, the gift must be unconditional, and the third party is not legally bound to pass the gift along. The event that took place in Beit Horon (48a–b) serves as an example of such a conditional gift and of how important it is to take one's vows seriously without using legal fictions to circumvent them. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  This chapter resumes discussion of the exact meaning of terms and expressions used in vows. As in Chapter Three, the discussion here pertains to a specific vocabulary, namely foods and the manners in which they are processed and prepared for consumption.
  Also discussed in this chapter is the distinction between expressions such as: That which is cooked, cooked food, food cooked in a dish, and: That which enters a dish. Additionally, there are distinctions between one who prohibits himself from eating a certain food and one who vows not to taste it. There is also a distinction between a vow not to eat a particular food item and a vow not to eat a type of food. A practical question that pertains to the latter two distinctions is whether one who vows that a particular food item is forbidden to him is prohibited from eating another food into which it was mixed. 
  The Gemara also discusses whether one is allowed to eat the liquid that emerges from a food that he has deemed forbidden to himself. It distinguishes between produce that is eaten in and of itself and produce that is used only for its juice, and it also distinguishes between a derivative of the food that carries the name of its source and a derivative that has its own name. Furthermore, this chapter explores how the definition of a word or phrase is established.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  This chapter discussed the meaning of terms and names of various types of food, including those which have a wide literal meaning but a narrower meaning in the vernacular. For example, the expression: Roasted food, was used only in reference to roasted meat. It was established that the vernacular is followed with regard to the interpretation of vows. Accordingly, the interpretation of a term or expression may change from place to place and from generation to generation. 
  A type of food that has a modifier in its name is not included in the vow if the modifier was not mentioned. Therefore, wild vegetables are not included in a vow that refers to vegetables.
  If one has vowed that a particular food is forbidden to him, a derivative of that food is permitted to him unless the vow referred to a particular food item. In that case, if the forbidden food got mixed into another food, the mixture is prohibited, provided that the flavor of the forbidden food is noticeable in the mixture. 
  Stories about how some Sages studied Torah in poverty and others became very wealthy were related tangentially.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter in terms of the issues addressed by the Gemara, and it deals with the precise definitions of various terms and the delineation of the parameters relevant to those terms.
  Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter addresses several different topics, beginning with the definition of terms relating to food and proceeding to garments, houses, beds, and places. In all these areas, the Gemara seeks to cite proofs from language usage, some from the Bible, and some from the vernacular employed in everyday conversation and the practical understanding of the scope of those terms.
  Another question discussed in this chapter is: Does a prohibition generated by a vow with regard to a specific item take effect exclusively on that item, or does the prohibition remain in effect for every item that comes into being due to that item, e.g., growths from produce that was forbidden by vow, or an item exchanged for an item forbidden by vow? This question exists with regard to various Torah prohibitions as well: To what extent does the prohibition take effect upon items that grow from or are exchanged with forbidden items? To what Torah prohibition is the prohibition of vows comparable? Does the extension of the prohibition to growths apply with regard to all produce or are there differences between different kinds of produce?
  At the end of the chapter, issues related to conditional vows are discussed, specifically concerning cases where the condition relates to an action that will take place in the future, while the vow is in the present.
  These, among others, are the topics that will be addressed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  A significant portion of this chapter addressed the definition of various terms: What is considered a vegetable? What is considered grain? What is considered a garment? What is considered a bed? What is considered a house? What is considered a city? Although each category is discussed individually, the Gemara concludes that when a person employs a general term, any item with regard to which an agent would ask the sender whether it is included in the general term, is included in that term with regard to vows. The Gemara also stated that with regard to one who vows that a general category is forbidden to him, all items in that category are rendered forbidden. However, with regard to one who vows that a particular item is forbidden to him, only that specific item is forbidden and it is not viewed as a representative example of an entire category.
  Just as the item that one prohibits by vow is forbidden to him, growths from and exchanges for that item are also forbidden to him. This principle applies only in a case where he vowed that a certain item is forbidden to him; however, if he vowed that eating that item is forbidden, its growths are forbidden only when the original item that he sowed or planted remains intact, e.g., a tree. If it does not remain intact, its growths are permitted in that case. On a related note, the Gemara discusses additional halakhic dilemmas in cases where prohibitions take effect on plants, e.g., if and when subsequent growths neutralize the original prohibition.
  In vows taken on condition that the vow will take effect only if a condition is fulfilled, it was determined that if the vow was to take effect before the condition in question is fulfilled, one must be careful to refrain from violating the vow until the condition is fulfilled, due to the concern that the condition will be fulfilled and the vow will take effect. Once the condition is fulfilled, the vow takes effect and one who violates it is liable to receive lashes. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  In line with the theme of the previous chapters, which dealt with interpreting the precise meaning of the wording of various vows, this chapter clarifies an additional aspect of unclear vows: Situations where the time frame of the vow is ambiguous. When one takes a vow, he may determine that the vow be valid for a certain time period, or that it expire on a specific date. These options give rise to various difficulties. 
  When one takes a vow for a specified period of time, using wording such as: Today, or: This year, or alternatively by using the expressions one day, or one year, the meaning of his words must be clarified more precisely: Does the vow remain in effect until the conclusion of that day or year, or for a full day or year starting from the time when he took the vow? 
  An additional problem with regard to the duration of a vow arises when the person does not specify a clear, defined date but instead refers to a certain Festival or season. In such cases, it must be determined whether the individual was referring to the beginning of that period, its conclusion, or some point in between. 
  At times, although one may mention an unspecified time, it can be obvious what his exact intention was due to the context in which he took his vow. The question that arises in such cases is: To what extent is the vow to be interpreted in accordance with the intention of the person making the vow even when the details were not mentioned by him explicitly? An additional problem arises within this context: When one mentions a specific time but it is clear from the context that he must not have intended exactly what he said, which takes precedence, the wording of the vow or the actual intent of the person making it?
  The discussion in this chapter revolves around the above issues, although additional, tangential issues are discussed as well. 
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter clarified various details with regard to determining times and dates in the context of vows. If one takes a vow and sets a specific, limited time for it to remain in effect, e.g., a day, the vow is in effect for a full twenty-four-hour period from the time he took the vow. 
  However, the halakha is different if one states that the vow is in effect today. In these cases the vow expires at the conclusion of the day on which it was made, even though it will have been in effect for less than a full twenty-four-hour period. Nevertheless, the Sages ruled that in such a case, the individual must request that a halakhic authority dissolve his vow at nightfall, due to the possibility that he has confused these slightly different manners of expression. 
  It was also clarified that if one takes a vow for this week, it remains in effect for the Shabbat that occurs at the end of that week. Similarly, when one takes a vow for this seven-year cycle, it remains in effect for the Sabbatical Year that occurs at the conclusion of that cycle. However, when one takes a vow for this month or this year, the vow does not remain in effect for the upcoming New Moon or Rosh HaShana. A vow for this year remains in effect until the end of the year, even if it is declared to be a leap year. 
  When one sets a fixed date for a vow to expire, e.g., a Festival, there is a difference whether he said the vow remains in effect until the Festival, in which case the vow remains in effect until the beginning of the Festival, or whether he said it applies until it will be the Festival, in which case it remains in effect until the end of the Festival. However, if one says that his vow applies until it will be a particular season, rather than a fixed date, it is taken to mean until that season begins. If one takes a vow until an agricultural season, and that season varies from place to place, the vow applies until the beginning of the season in the location where he took the vow. 
  At times, the meaning of the vow is not determined literally but according to context. For example, it is clear that one who vows that wine is forbidden to him until it will be Passover intends for the vow to remain in effect only until the Festival begins, so that he can fulfill the mitzva of drinking the four cups of wine at the Passover Seder. Similarly, if one takes a vow that prohibits a woman from deriving benefit from him because another person is urging him to marry her, his intention is not to prohibit all types of benefit, but only the benefit of marriage. 
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  This chapter addresses various halakhot of the dissolution of vows by a halakhic authority or by a court. The issue has been mentioned in passing in other chapters, but the main discussion of the topic takes place in this chapter.
  One of the ways to dissolve a vow is by finding an extenuation. This means that it is brought to the attention of the one who took the vow that his vow also served to render forbidden something he had not taken into consideration when he uttered the vow.
  This chapter will discuss several questions with regard to what is considered an extenuation. One question is: What can be used as a basis in order for the halakhic authority or court to broach dissolution with the one who stated the vow, to clarify if he had that outcome in mind when stating his vow?
  Another question that will be addressed in this chapter is whether a new situation or set of circumstances that developed after the vow was taken can be used as a basis to dissolve the vow.
  This chapter will also discuss vows that include multiple or wide-ranging prohibitions. If some details of the vow are dissolved by means of finding an extenuation, do the rest of the prohibitions of the vow remain in force, or is the entire vow dissolved?
  These are the main topics of this chapter, while there are other topics that arise incidentally, as is typical of the Gemara.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  The Sages concur that a halakhic authority may not broach dissolution of a vow by mentioning an extenuation that may cause the one who took the vow to falsely claim that he would not have vowed had he been aware of its consequences. Therefore, a halakhic authority may not broach dissolution by raising the issue of the disgrace brought upon the parents of one who stated a vow and other such issues.
  Another angle that may not be used to broach dissolution of a vow is that of a new situation. If a new situation developed, or if changes occurred to the previous situation, either of which causes the one who took the vow to regret having done so, this cannot be used as an extenuation to dissolve the vow. The reason is that the dissolution of a vow is dependent upon the discovery of a condition, which, had the one taking the vow considered it, would have caused him to reconsider taking the vow in the first place. A situation that arose after the vow was stated could not have been considered at the time the vow was taken, and one does not regret having stated the vow under the circumstances that existed at the time.
  Even if the situation has changed, if this change could have been reasonably expected at the time of the vow, it is not considered to be a truly new situation, and it can be used as a basis for dissolution. It is considered a new situation only if something actually changed, but if it becomes clear that the one who stated the vow had a mistaken impression of the situation at the time, it is a mistaken vow and is consequently dissolved. 
  A vow that has been partially dissolved, either due to the one who stated the vow expressing regret or because the vow has been deemed a mistaken vow, is entirely dissolved. This is because all prohibitions expressed together are viewed as one vow. This is true if the person stated a broad vow, or if he linked the individual prohibitions together. If he stated each individual prohibition as a separate vow, the dissolution of one prohibition does not affect the other prohibitions, and they remain in force. 
  In connection with this topic, several stories are told illustrating the lengths to which the Sages would go in order to help women who had been forbidden to their husbands as the result of a vow.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  Also when a woman takes a vow to the Lord, and binds herself with a bond, being in her father's house, in her youth, and her father hears her vow, or her bond by which she has bound her soul, and her father holds his peace at her, then all her vows shall be ratified, and every bond by which she has bound her soul shall be ratified. But if her father disallows her on the day he hears, none of her vows, or of her bonds by which she has bound her soul, shall be ratified, and the Lord will forgive her, because her father disallowed her. And if she be to a husband, and her vows are upon her, or the clear utterance of her lips by which she has bound her soul, and her husband hears it, on the day that he hears it, and holds his peace at her, then her vows shall be ratified, and her bonds by which she has bound her soul shall be ratified. But if her husband disallows her on the day that he hears it, and he nullifies her vow which is upon her, and the clear utterance of her lips by which she has bound her soul, then the Lord will forgive her. Numbers 30:4–9
  Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may ratify it, or her husband may nullify it. But if her husband altogether holds his peace at her from day to day, then he causes all her vows to be ratified, or all her bonds, which are upon her, he has ratified them, because he held his peace at her on the day that he heard them. But if he shall make them null and void after he has heard them, then he shall bear her iniquity. Numbers 30:14–16
  This chapter explains some of the halakhot pertaining to a situation where a father or husband nullifies a woman's vows. The discussion focuses primarily on borderline situations where it is necessary to clarify who has the authority to nullify the vow or at what point the nullification takes effect.
  The first topic in the chapter is the status of a betrothed young woman, who is under both her father's authority and the authority of her betrothed. The Sages derived from the verses in the Torah that address the nullification of vows that a betrothed young woman's vows are nullified only if both her father and her husband nullify them. Many questions arise from this situation, such as: What is the relationship between the nullifications of these two partners, and what is the halakha if one of them dies? Also, how is this halakha fulfilled when the young woman was betrothed several times, e.g., after she was divorced or widowed during the betrothal period?
  Another question is about the status of a yevama waiting for her yavam to perform levirate marriage: Is she considered a betrothed woman, as she is about to marry the yavam, or is she not so considered, since she has not actually undergone betrothal?
  Another group of questions centers upon the time period for nullification, which is to be done “on the day that he hears it” (Numbers 30:9). What is the exact definition of this phrase? May one nullify vows on Shabbat? Can a man nullify his wife's vows in advance or only after she has taken them? Additionally, is one allowed to appoint an agent for nullifying vows?
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  If a betrothed young woman took a vow, then in order to effect nullification both her father and her betrothed must nullify the vow together. The Gemara's ultimate understanding of this joint nullification is that each of these men weakens the force of the entire vow rather than nullifying half of the vow. In this joint nullification process, the power of the father is stronger than the power of the husband, in that if the husband dies the father can nullify vows on his own, which is not the case in the reverse situation. The joint nullification process is used for a betrothed young woman even if she has been betrothed and divorced several times. The tanna'im differ with regard to the right of a yavam to nullify the vows of his yevama. The accepted ruling is that for the purposes of nullification, she is not considered to be betrothed to the yavam.
  Nullification of vows can be performed only in the specific manner detailed in the Torah. Therefore, nullification of a vow can never be performed preemptively, before the vow is taken. Also, one cannot appoint an agent to nullify the vows of one's wife or daughter. The Torah states that a man can nullify a vow only on “the day that he hears it” (Numbers 30:9), i.e., the day on which he first learned of the existence of the vow, but not after that day. For these purposes, a day begins in the evening when the stars first appear and continues until dark on the following night. Consequently, if one hears his daughter's or his wife's vow soon after the night begins, he has the entire day, until the next evening, to nullify it. However, if he hears of it only in the late afternoon, he has only a short time in which to nullify it. Since the period for nullifying vows is limited, one can nullify them even on Shabbat, but in deference to Shabbat one alters the language he uses for nullification.
  One aspect of the relationship between the ratification and the nullification of a vow is that once a vow is ratified, irrespective of the manner of its ratification, it can no longer be nullified. There are several ways for a man to ratify a vow, including making statements that, without saying so explicitly, indicate that he wants the vow to remain in effect. Deciding in his heart to ratify it, even without speaking, is another manner of ratification, as is remaining silent, even if only to annoy his wife, until the time for nullification has past. No matter which manner of ratification is utilized, once the vow is ratified it can no longer be nullified.
  This chapter also discussed certain aspects of the dissolution of vows by a halakhic authority. Although the dissolution of vows is prefaced by the phrase “the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel” (Numbers 30:2), indicating dissolution by experts, that is not the only manner in which it can be performed, as dissolution of vows by three laymen is also acceptable. Dissolution of vows also does not have the same strictures as regular court activities and can be performed even by a single expert alone, as well as when those dissolving the vow are standing. It can be performed at night and on Shabbat.
  
  Introduction to Perek XI
  
  But every vow of a widow, or of her that is divorced, with which they have bound their souls, shall stand against her. And if she vowed in her husband's house, or bound herself by a bond with an oath, and her husband heard it, and held his peace at her, and disallowed her not, then all her vows shall stand, and every bond with which she bound her soul shall stand. But if her husband nullified them on the day he heard them, then whatever proceeded out of her lips concerning her vows, or concerning the bond of the soul, shall not stand: Her husband has nullified them; and the Lord shall forgive her. Every vow and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may uphold it, or her husband may nullify it. (Numbers 30:10–14)
  This chapter continues the discussion of the nullification of vows, especially the issue of which vows can and cannot be nullified. Based on a precise reading of the biblical text, the Sages learn that a husband's ability to nullify the vows taken by his wife is limited to vows of particular types: Those that “afflict the soul” (Numbers 30:14), i.e., that cause the woman distress, and those that are “between a man and his wife” (Numbers 30:17), i.e., that negatively impact on the marital relationship. This chapter deals with the precise definitions of these two categories of vows and the halakhic differences between them. It also addresses the types of vows that are not subject to nullification, whether because the husband is not authorized to nullify them, or because they do not require nullification, as they are not binding. 
  A question arises with regard to the halakha in a case where a woman takes a comprehensive vow and the husband has the authority to nullify only part of it: Does partial nullification of the vow invalidate the entire vow, or is that part of the vow that was not nullified still valid? A woman's vows can be nullified only when she is not independent, either because she is in her father's house or she is in her husband's house, and under their respective authority. Since the vows of an independent woman cannot be nullified, this chapter defines which women are no longer considered to be under the authority of their father or husband. A question that stems from this relates to the halakha that applies when there is a change in the woman's status, e.g., when an adult woman marries or when a married woman leaves her husband's authority. What is the critical moment with regard to the nullification of vows? 
  This chapter will also discuss various errors that can arise in connection with the nullification of vows. The person nullifying the vow may be mistaken about the content of the vow, and he nullifies a vow that the woman did not take. Alternatively, he may be mistaken about the person who took the vow, thinking that his wife took the vow when it was his daughter who did so. Another possibility is that he is mistaken about the halakha, not knowing that he has the authority to nullify a vow, or that the vow that was taken is subject to nullification. 
  Along with these issues directly related to the subject matter of the chapter, other issues, some relating to the halakhot of vows and some tangential to them, will be discussed as well. 
  
  Summary of Perek XI
  
  A husband can nullify vows taken by his wife that involve affliction of the soul, i.e., where the woman took a vow depriving herself of a certain pleasure, small as it may be. After such vows are nullified they are completely void. A husband can also nullify vows described as: Between him and her, i.e., vows that adversely affect their marital relationship. Such vows are nullified only for as long as she is married to her husband, but if he divorces her the vows are in force. There are differing opinions with regard to borderline cases whether or not certain vows are considered vows of affliction or vows that adversely affect the marital relationship. As for other vows, whether they relate to the woman herself or to her relationships with other people, the husband has no authority to nullify them. There are certain vows that the husband need not nullify, as they are not binding, though at times the Sages said that he should nullify them lest he not be careful about the particulars of a vow and come to sin. 
  Although the halakhic authorities disagree about the matter, the majority opinion is that a vow that was partially nullified is not entirely invalidated, and therefore when a woman takes a comprehensive vow and her husband cannot or does not want to nullify it completely, that aspect of the vow that he nullified is nullified, but the rest is still valid. 
  A man can nullify the vows of a woman only if she is under his authority. Therefore, a father cannot nullify the vows of his adult daughter, even if she is still living in his house. He also cannot nullify the vows of his daughter after she marries, even if she was afterward divorced or widowed while still a minor. So too, the vows of a girl orphaned of her father cannot be nullified. A husband can nullify the vows that his wife took while under his authority, even if she stipulated that they should take effect after she leaves his authority, but he cannot nullify them after she has actually left his authority, even if afterward she returns to his authority. If there was some error in the nullification, e.g., a man erred and nullified the vows of his daughter rather than the vows of his wife, or he thought that she took a vow with regard to one thing and it turned out that she had taken a vow with regard to something else, he must nullify the vow a second time. Similarly, if he was mistaken about the halakha and did not know that he is authorized to nullify his wife's vows, or he did not know that a certain vow could be nullified, he may nullify the vow when he learns of his mistake. 
  While these are the main issues discussed in the chapter, certain other halakhot were discussed as well. It is also explained that a woman may be given a gift even if her husband took a vow that benefit from the donor is forbidden to him, provided that the gift be given in such a way that the husband does not attain possession of it. Incidental to the discussion concerning a woman who takes a vow that renders benefit from her husband forbidden to her, the Gemara brings several cases where the husband is not forced to divorce his wife because of her words, but rather the matter is left to the husband's discretion.
  
  Rosh Hashanah
  
  Introduction to Rosh Hashanah
  
  The term Rosh HaShana appears only once in the Bible, in the book of Ezekiel: “In the beginning of the year [rosh hashana], in the tenth day of the month” (Ezekiel 40:1). Here, Rosh HaShana is the first month of the year rather than a specific day. In fact, the verse is referring to Yom Kippur in the Jubilee Year (Arakhin 12a).
  If Rosh HaShana refers to the first month of the year, however, then it should refer not to Tishrei, but to Nisan. In Nisan, prior to the exodus from Egypt, God explicitly instructed Moses: “This month shall be unto you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year to you” (Exodus 12:2). The Torah consistently lists months as the first, the second, etc., counting from Nisan.
  The Sages resolved this apparent contradiction by distinguishing between four different New Years, each on a different date, depending on what type of year is being discussed. They also defined four different times when the world is judged. Nisan marks the New Year for historical dating. The agricultural year begins in Tishrei (see Deuteronomy 11:12 and Exodus 23:16). In addition, there are other significant annual cycles.
  For certain matters, time is not fixed with a single New Year; rather, it is based on the actual age of people or animals and their physical development. The Sages established how to measure time for each concept based on its unique considerations. Tractate Rosh HaShana lists the various New Years and explains which calendars should be used for various counts, e.g., dating documents, interpreting vows, and giving tithes.
  The Jewish calendar is based to a large degree on the lunar cycle, which is approximately twenty-nine and one half days. The Jewish calculation of months is based on the appearance of the new moon. However, certain times of the year must also correspond to certain seasons, which are related to the solar year. Since most of the Festivals and events in the Jewish calendar are connected to specific days in the lunar month, the Gemara grapples with questions such as: To what extent must the court rely on the natural, heavenly cycles? Is it possible to create a fixed calendar based solely on mathematical calculations, or must it be based entirely or at least somewhat on direct observation?
  The conclusion of the Sages is that time, and even more so Festivals, cannot be measured as an abstract concept, but must be connected and intertwined directly with observed reality. Therefore, they preferred to base the calendar on witnesses who saw the new moon, along with the science and mathematics of astronomical calculations. Notwithstanding the many practical difficulties caused by requiring witnesses and testimony, there is also one great benefit. It provides an empirical check of the theoretical knowledge and calculations.
  Furthermore, the Sages recognized that time on earth is not uniform on all parts of the globe. Therefore, they set fixed locations as the basis for their calculations. Just as the secular world uses Greenwich Mean Time, locating the center of their calculations near London, the Sages used the location of the Sanhedrin in Eretz Yisrael and derived from that various other geographical markers for their calculations. These calculations were used to verify the witnesses' testimony, and they served as a theoretical basis for a calendar that could be independent of a court and witnesses. Due to the many harsh decrees against the Jewish people, eventually the Nasi, Hillel the Second, established the fixed calendar, which is based solely on these calculations. The early authorities discussed its halakhic basis and its details. This calendar is used to this day.
  The task of setting calendar events, including the Festivals, was primarily given to humanity, through the witnesses who observed the occurrences and through the court, which accepted and authorized their testimony and fixed the dates of the Festivals. Through this process, the court and the Jewish people became partners with God. Additionally, it ensured the centrality of Eretz Yisrael, where the court was located and from where the calculations were made. Setting the calendar based on the Jewish people, in their chosen land, based on the words of the Torah of God, ensures that the Festivals symbolize the relationship between the nation and God.
  Establishing the Festivals in one central location creates many obstacles. The witnesses must reach the court, their testimony must be examined, and the decisions of the court must be made known to the residents of Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora. Technical communication difficulties, as well as intentional sabotage perpetrated by those with ulterior motives, required the establishment of a complex system of laws in order to ensure a single, accurate calendar. The Sages established a second Festival day in the Diaspora both to safeguard against possible errors due to faulty communications and to stress the centrality of Eretz Yisrael.
  Although there are up to six different New Years in the Jewish calendar (see 7b), there is only one New Year that is called simply Rosh HaShana. This is the first of Tishrei. This Festival is described by the Torah as “A day of blowing the shofar” (Numbers 29:1), and “A memorial proclaimed with the blast of shofar” (Leviticus 23:24). Sounding the shofar is the unique and central mitzva of the day. Unlike the sounding of the shofar in the Temple accompanying the choir of Levites, the shofar blasts on Rosh HaShana are not intended to create a pleasant, musical sound. Their essence combines elements of remembrance, proclamation, warning, and majestic coronation. These shofar blasts must be done in a specific manner. The Gemara discusses the precise details of fulfilling this mitzva, including the specifications of the shofar itself, the timing of the blasts, and the manner in which they are sounded. 
  Since the shofar of Rosh HaShana is not sounded solely in the Temple, but in every place for every Jewish person, rabbinic decrees were instituted to prevent unintentional transgression of Torah laws. For this reason, the Sages decreed that the shofar may not be sounded on Shabbat, except for inside the borders of the Temple or the central court. 
  Tractate Rosh HaShana has four chapters. Each has a central theme. 
  Chapter One discusses the various New Years and the practical application of each. It also begins the topic of the testimony of witnesses to the court. 
  Chapter Two discusses the manner of examining the witnesses and their testimony. 
  Chapter Three is primarily concerned with the sounding of the shofar. 
  Chapter Four discusses Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat and the prayer service on Rosh HaShana.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  This month shall be for you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year to you. (Exodus 12:2)
  And you shall observe the festival of Shavuot, even of the first-fruits of wheat harvest, and the festival of gathering at the turn of the year. (Exodus 34:22)
  In the twenty-fifth year of our captivity, in the beginning of the year, in the tenth day of the month, in the fourteenth year... (Ezekiel 40:1)
  In the Jewish calendar, there is no single New Year but several beginnings of the year, depending on the context. Defining these New Years is the main topic of this chapter. The Gemara examines the dates of the New Years, the textual sources that establish these days as beginnings of the year, and their individual functions. 
  Many concepts in halakha are connected to time, and it is necessary to know how the year is being defined and which New Year applies to it. Some acts, e.g., planting a tree, involve more than one area of halakha; it is therefore necessary to clarify the parameters of dates and years for each halakha.
  This chapter also discusses the concept of judgment on Rosh HaShana and at other times of the year.
  Other issues in this chapter relate specifically to fixing the date of Rosh HaShana and New Moon and the practical aspects of accepting testimony. It discusses how the witnesses may come to the court, and the importance of their testimony, and the fact that they are permitted to desecrate Shabbat in order to testify. Finally, the chapter discusses the question of who is fit to testify regarding the new moon.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  For most areas of halakha New Year is Rosh HaShana, the first of Tishrei. However, there are several other dates that mark the New Year for different aspects of halakha. Nisan has the New Year for months and festivals. Two of the New Years are dependent upon the cycles of plant growth and animal breeding. These are the New Year for trees on the fifteenth of Shevat, according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the New Year for animal tithes on the first of Elul. The years of a person's life or of an animal's life are counted from the actual date of birth. 
  A year has no fixed length. For most calculations the year is the lunar year, comprised of twelve lunar months, or in a leap year thirteen. However, for certain purposes a year is comprised of festivals, calculated according to the number of festivals that have passed.
  The focus of fixing the months and the year was the special court chosen for this purpose in Eretz Yisrael, to which witnesses would come to testify on the first appearance of the new moon, and from where messengers would go out to notify the Jews of the Diaspora. Due to the importance and urgency of the witnesses' testimony, it was permitted to desecrate Shabbat to come to the court to testify. In this way the court could establish the correct dates for Festivals and appointed times of each year. When the Temple was standing it was permitted to desecrate Shabbat every month to testify about the appearance of the new moon. However, despite the importance of notifying the Diaspora of the date of the New Moon, it was not permitted for the messengers to desecrate Shabbat as they went to make the dates of the calendar known.
  There were boundaries beyond which the messengers of the court could not reach before Sukkot or Passover, and therefore the Sages decreed the observance of two days of each Festival in the Diaspora, to circumvent the uncertainty of the correct date.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  If there arise a matter too hard for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, even matters of controversy within your gates; then you shall arise, and ascend to the place which the Lord your God shall choose. And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge that shall be in those days; and you shall inquire; and they shall declare to you the sentence of judgment. And you shall do according to the tenor of the sentence which they shall declare to you from that place which the Lord shall choose; and you shall observe to do according to all that they shall teach you. According to the law which they shall teach you, and according to the judgment which they shall tell you, you shall do; you shall not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare to you, to the right hand, nor to the left. (Deuteronomy 17:8–11)
  Since the dates of New Moons and Rosh HaShana, as determined by the Sanhedrin, are based on eyewitness testimony, the witnesses bear a great responsibility. An error of perception, a lack of care, and in some cases even willful deception can lead to mistakes in the calendar and the dates of the Festivals. The basic issue addressed in this chapter is how to examine and ascertain the trustworthiness of both the witnesses themselves and the testimony they deliver. Various problems arise in this regard, some of which apply to all forms of testimony, e.g., witnesses who are unsure about exactly what they saw, a pair of witnesses who contradict one another with regard to the details of their testimony, errors of identification, and mistakes in the narration of events. However, a unique issue applies to testimony for the New Moon, as the court has its own reckoning for when the new moon should appear. To what extent must the court accept at face value the testimony it hears, or may it rely on its own mathematical and astronomical calculations? It is possible that these calculations can be used as a method of determining the truth or otherwise of the eyewitness testimony. Alternatively, the court's expectations might be considered mere guidelines, a reason for the court to be skeptical about a certain testimony. 
  These questions, which are related to the fundamental issue of the power of the court to establish the calendar, will form the main topic of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  Various subversive cults, both from within the Jewish people and without, and likewise certain foreign rulers of Eretz Yisrael attempted in different periods to sabotage both the determination of the precise dates of the beginning of new months, as established by the court, as well as the transfer by messengers of these dates around the land and to the Diaspora. Owing to these problems, and due to the unique importance of testimony to determine the beginning of the month, far more severe demands were placed on the witnesses to the appearance of the new moon than for any other testimony. One requirement in particular stands out in this regard: The demand that testimony be provided by others concerning the reliability of these witnesses. In this case the court did not accept the general presumption that one who comes to testify is considered qualified in the absence of grounds for suspecting otherwise. Furthermore, the Sages established several ordinances designed to encourage witnesses to come to the court even from far away, so that the establishment of the Festival could be performed in the proper time and manner.
  With regard to the fundamental question of the establishment of the calendar, i.e., whether the dates of Festivals can be fixed in a formal manner by means of astronomical calculations, the answer is negative. In other words, in practice, the calendar established by the court is final. The court's decision is more important than the testimony they receive, even if we are sure that the witnesses provided a factually accurate account. Not only is human error of the judges overlooked in this case, but the court is even authorized to act in an arbitrary manner to a certain extent. In this regard, the power of the court is greater than in other areas of halakha, as the dates of Festivals are not predetermined but are fixed by the Jewish people by means of their representatives, the judges of the court.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, saying: In the seventh month, the first day of the month shall be a solemn rest for you, a memorial of blasts of a shofar, a holy convocation. (Leviticus 23:24)
  And in the seventh month, on the first day of the month, you shall have a holy convocation; you shall do no manner of servile work; it is a day of sounding the shofar to you. (Numbers 29:1)
  But when the assembly is to be gathered together, you shall blow, but you shall not sound an alarm. And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall blow with the trumpets; and they shall be to you a statute forever throughout your generations. (Numbers 10:7–8)
  Then shall you proclaim with the blast of the shofar on the tenth day of the seventh month; on the Day of Atonement you shall proclaim with the shofar throughout all your land. (Leviticus 25:9)
  Although the principal mitzva of Rosh HaShana is the sounding of the shofar, the Torah mentions this mitzva in only a brief, general manner. In order to put the mitzva into practice, its details must be clarified on a halakhic level. The first matter that requires clarification is the type of instrument used to perform the mitzva. The Torah employs the term shofar; it is necessary to clarify what this term includes and excludes, e.g., what material it is made of; how it is made; what its size is; whether it must have a specific shape, and so forth. The other issue that will be discussed is the manner in which the shofar may be sounded. The Torah mentions different types of sounds, so that it must be clarified whether one fulfills his obligation by hearing any type of sound or whether specific sounds are required. Is there a precise formula for the shofar's sounding, or may it be sounded in any desired fashion? These issues will form the main discussion in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara concluded that on Rosh HaShana, the mitzva is to sound the shofar, as opposed to other instruments such as those acceptable for proclaiming the Jubilee, and that the type of shofar that is fit for this mitzva is the horn of a sheep, an ibex, or other similar animals. The choicest option is a shofar made from a ram's horn. In contrast, horns of other animals, such as bovines, and all the more so trumpets of wood or metal, are not considered shofarot. The minimal size of a shofar was determined to be a little over a handbreadth. It must be prepared for use in a manner that only slightly modifies it from the way it was situated while still attached to the ram's head. Therefore, cracks, punctures, and gluing all disqualify the shofar if they effect a significant change in the shofar's shape. With regard to the sound itself, the Gemara concluded that the main point of the mitzva is hearing the sound of the shofar, and the Torah did not specify the type of sound required. As long as the sound heard is that of a shofar, one has fulfilled his obligation. In order to explain this, the Gemara emphasized that it is not the sound itself that is significant but the spiritual effect of its sounding, awakening the Jewish people to direct their hearts to their Father in Heaven.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  In the seventh month, on the first day of the month, you shall have a solemn rest, a memorial of blasts, a sacred convocation. (Leviticus 23:24)
  But when the assembly is to be gathered together, you shall sound a tekia, but you shall not sound a terua. And the sons of Aaron the priest shall blow with the trumpets; and they shall be to you for a statute forever throughout your generations. (Numbers 10:7–8)
  Then he said to them: Go your way, eat the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions to him for whom nothing is prepared; for this day is sacred to our Lord, neither may you be grieved; for the joy of the Lord is your strength. (Nehemiah 8:10)
  The mitzva of sounding the shofar on Rosh HaShana is performed first and foremost in the place that serves as the center of Jewish life, the Temple, the seat of the Great Sanhedrin. Here the mitzva of shofar was performed in the most complete manner. Yet the mitzva to sound the shofar applies also outside the Temple, as well as in the generations following the destruction of the Temple. Since there is a concern that outside the Temple those sounding the shofar on Shabbat might commit a transgression, either through the sounding itself or in preparation for the mitzva, the chapter will examine whether the sounding should be limited or even prohibited in those places where this danger exists. 
  Another basic issue that will be discussed is the order in which the recitation of the Rosh HaShana prayers and the sounding of the shofar take place. The chapter will analyze the content of the special prayers and blessings for Rosh HaShana that the Sages instituted, and it will attempt to establish which sections of these prayers are indispensable. Likewise, the sounding of the shofar is a ritual that is interwoven with the prayers of the day, and therefore it must be determined when it is sounded and how many blasts must be heard at which time. What is the definition of the different sounds of the shofar, the tekia and terua, and must these sounds be heard in a particular sequence? This chapter will clarify these issues.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The mitzva of sounding the shofar applies every Rosh HaShana, even when it occurs on Shabbat. However, on Shabbat the shofar is sounded only in the central location of the Temple. The Sages prohibited sounding the shofar outside the Temple, due to the concern that one might carry it in the public domain. After the destruction of the Temple, it was permitted to sound the shofar only in the place of the main court, and even this permission was annulled over the course of time. 
  Incidental to the above, this chapter discussed other ordinances that were instituted in the wake of the destruction. The upheavals suffered by the Jewish people in this period necessitated changes in various areas of halakha, some of which led to stringencies, while others involved leniencies. Certain activities that were permitted only due to the sacred service were subsequently prohibited, while other matters were left intact, both in commemoration of the Temple and in the hope that it would be speedily rebuilt. 
  With regard to the shofar, it was concluded that it does not have to be sounded at a fixed time of day. However, the Sages established an order of prayers and blessings, according to which the shofar soundings are integrated into the additional service of Rosh HaShana, performed both before and during the Amida. Furthermore, the soundings must proceed in a specific set of tekia-terua-tekia blasts. Since even in early times there were different opinions and customs with regard to the precise definition of these blasts, the number and types of soundings increased over the course of the generations so as to enable the listeners to fulfill their obligation according to all opinions.
  
  Sotah
  
  Introduction to Sotah
  
  Tractate Sota deals primarily with the halakhot associated with a sota, a woman whose husband suspects that she is unfaithful, and warns her not to seclude herself with a specific man. In the event that she secludes herself with that man, she is considered a sota, and it is prohibited for her to remain married to her husband unless she is taken to the Temple and undergoes an evaluation rite in order to determine whether she was in fact unfaithful. This rite includes the offering of a special meal-offering, the taking of an oath, and the drinking of the bitter water of a sota. However, the tractate also discusses the halakhot of those who go out to battle, the blessing given by the priests, and other topics.
  The process by which a woman is given the status of a sota and the subsequent evaluation of her fidelity comprises two separate stages: First, seclusion with another man, the means by which a woman becomes a sota. Second, the evaluation rite by which it is determined miraculously whether the woman is guilty of infidelity. Although the evaluation rite might bring about the death of a guilty woman, nevertheless, the purpose of such a procedure is to return peace and harmony to the marriage (see Shabbat 116a). This rite is not practiced in every instance when the husband suspects his wife of infidelity. Rather, it is performed when the level of suspicion is sufficient to suggest that the woman was unfaithful. The sota process involves a warning, which is likely the result of suspected promiscuous behavior on the part of the wife. If the woman is subsequently seen by two witnesses secluding herself for a sufficient amount of time to engage in sexual intercourse with the man about whom she was warned, then she must undergo the evaluation rite. Even if she didn't actually commit adultery, the woman's behavior is referred to by the Torah as an act of betrayal, both to her husband and to God, Who commanded the couple with regard to the sanctity of marriage (Midrash Tanhuma, Numbers 5).
  Under these circumstances, the husband is permitted to divorce his wife due to her immodest behavior, and therefore, if he opts to evaluate whether she is permitted to him by means of the sota rite, it is indicative of the fact that he is interested in removing his doubts about her fidelity and rebuilding the relationship. Additionally, the wife has the prerogative to refuse to undergo the rite, and to be divorced without any payment of her marriage contract. If she opts to undergo the demeaning rite to prove her innocence, it is indicative of her remorse for her suspicious behavior and of her desire to put an end to their marital distrust and strife. In such a situation, where logic would call for dissolution of the marriage, the Torah provides a miraculous means of evaluating the woman's fidelity, which is ordinarily not verifiable by means of witnesses. The purpose of this rite is to bring peace to a marriage where the woman is, in fact, innocent, and the various elements of the rite would seem not only to evaluate whether she was faithful but also to contribute to rebuilding the necessary trust of the husband in his wife if she did not engage in adulterous sexual intercourse.
  In a number of places (see 8b, 9a, 14a) the Gemara explains that the actions of the sota are like the actions of an animal. This description of her actions is clearly true if she actually engaged in adulterous sexual intercourse, a transgression punished by capital punishment or excision, but the description of her actions as animal-like is accurate even if she merely secluded herself with the man after the warning. Since she has degraded herself by engaging in such behavior, the evaluation rite in the Temple calls for certain acts that serve to degrade the woman and remind her of her behavior: The priest publicly tears her upper garment and then ties it up with a thick rope; he removes her hair covering and unbraids her hair; the woman drinks the bitter water from a plain, earthenware vessel; and the meal-offering of the sota is brought from barley, which is animal food, unlike virtually all other meal-offerings, which are brought from wheat, a human staple. Additionally, no oil or frankincense is added to the meal-offering, to ensure that it is very plain.
  One of the unique elements of the sota evaluation rite is that it is the only mitzva in the Torah whose entire essence is rooted in a miraculous process. The evaluation of the woman through the drinking of the bitter water is not a natural act, as the ingredients alone are not responsible for the death of an adulterous woman. Rather, it is a supernatural test, which results in guilty women meeting a unique death, while women who were not adulterous receive an extra blessing concerning their childbearing abilities. Additionally, the woman's drinking of the water evaluates not only her fidelity; if she is guilty, her paramour, wherever he may be, will die the same terrible death.
  Another unique aspect of this mitzva is that the preparation of the bitter water involves the erasing of God's name, an act that is prohibited under all other circumstances due to a negative mitzva. Because of these exceptional aspects of the mitzva of the sota rite, both the miraculous nature of the evaluation as well as the need to erase God's name, the court would try to discourage a woman from drinking the bitter water unless she was entirely convinced of her innocence. They would try to dissuade her through either explanation, invoking fear, or attempting to weaken her resolve if she was in fact guilty.
  In order for the evaluation rite to be effective, the husband himself had to be free of any iniquity, which is understood to mean either that he never committed any act of illicit sexual activity in his adult life, or that he did not have relations with his wife after her seclusion with the paramour. The Gemara also discusses a dispute initially recorded in the mishna as to whether a woman's punishment can be delayed due to her observing the mitzvot, learning Torah, or enabling her husband's or children's Torah study.
  Due to the miraculous nature of the evaluation rite and the fact that not every generation is worthy of having such open miracles performed in its midst, the Sages no longer allowed the rite to be performed from the time of the generation prior to the destruction of the Second Temple.
  Although the halakhot involving a sota comprise an independent unit of halakhot, they also overlap with a number of more general aspects of halakhot involving marriage. A woman who was warned by her husband and secluded herself with the suspected man essentially puts into question her fidelity to her husband, and her halakhic status with regard to certain marital issues is altered. Until she is able to prove her innocence through the evaluation rite, it is prohibited for her to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband. And even in the event of divorce from her husband, it is forbidden for her to marry her paramour. Additionally, if she is married to a priest it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma. Furthermore, due to the strong basis of suspicion that her seclusion has raised, she almost always loses the right to payment of her marriage contract, unless she proves her innocence. Finally, even one witness testifying to her engaging in sexual intercourse with her paramour suffices to render it prohibited for her to attempt to prove her innocence through the sota rite.
  In connection with the discussions of the sota process and the evaluation rite, a number of other issues are discussed in the tractate. Some of these issues are discussed at length, particularly matters that aren't directly related to any particular tractate in the Talmud. For example, ceremonial mitzvot that involve a lengthy process and are also associated with the Temple and performed by priests are discussed here. Also discussed are the halakhot involved in going out to battle, which involve a speech by the priest appointed to prepare the soldiers for battle. The blessings and the curses that were said by the people upon their arrival to Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua; the mitzva of assembly, consisting of a public reading of the Torah in the Temple area; as well as the halakhot of the heifer whose neck is broken at the scene of an unsolved murder are all discussed at great length.
  Tractate Sota also contains a large amount of aggadic material, much of it stemming from the unique nature of the punishments discussed in the tractate. The miraculous nature of the evaluation rite, and its purpose in identifying whether or not adultery occurred, is also the source for a larger discussion about the nature of sin in general, and the nature of particular transgressions of famous biblical figures. This also leads to discussion with regard to divine retribution in general, and the aspects of measure for measure, which are used to define the means of God's system of reward and punishment.
  The statement at the end of the tractate discussing the need to discontinue the use of the evaluation rite when the nation was no longer worthy of such a miraculous occurrence in their midst leads to the discussion of other, similar procedures that were discontinued for the same reason. This opens the text for a discussion of the unfortunate downfall of the Jewish people from their glorious spiritual levels to the depths of disgrace, which camouflaged the inner, spiritual beauty of the nation.
  The tractate contains nine chapters, the majority of which deal primarily with clearly defined topics:
  Chapter One deals with the halakhot of the husband's warning to his wife, the definition of seclusion, and the initial process of the husband's bringing his wife to the Temple for the evaluation rite. It also contains a lengthy description of the measure-for-measure nature of divine retribution.
  Chapter Two describes bringing the meal-offering of the sota, writing the scroll of the sota, the oath of the sota, and the preparation of the bitter water.
  Chapter Three deals with the meal-offering of the sota, the instances in which the meal-offering may not be brought, the punishment of the sota, and the merits that can delay divine execution of these punishments.
  Chapter Four discusses which women are permitted to take part in the sota evaluation rite, and lists and discusses those who may not.
  Chapter Five records a number of statements that were taught in the study hall on the day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was appointed to lead the Sanhedrin.
  Chapter Six deals with the type of testimony that can be used to determine that the accused woman has indeed committed adultery.
  Chapter Seven lists several mitzvot that may be recited in any language alongside those mitzvot that may be recited only in Hebrew.
  Chapter Eight deals with the halakhot of going out to battle.
  Chapter Nine addresses the halakhot of the heifer whose neck is broken, and discusses matters that were discontinued due to the diminishing spiritual commitment of certain generations.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: If any man's wife goes aside, and acts unfaithfully against him; and a man lie with her carnally, and it was hidden from the eyes of her husband, and she was defiled secretly, and there is no witness against her, and she was not taken in the act. And the spirit of jealousy came upon him, and he warned his wife, and she had become defiled; or if the spirit of jealousy came upon him, and he warned his wife, and she was not defiled. Then shall the man bring his wife to the priest, and shall bring her offering for her, the tenth part of an ephah of barley meal; he shall pour no oil upon it, nor put frankincense thereon; for it is a meal-offering of jealousy, a meal-offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance. (Numbers 5:11–15)
  And the priest shall stand the woman before the Lord and uncover the hair of the woman's head, and put the meal-offering of memorial in her hands, which is the meal-offering of jealousy; and the priest shall have in his hand the bitter water that causes the curse. (Numbers 5:18)
  The above verses describe the formal process by which a husband issues a warning to his wife whom he suspects of unfaithful behavior and the result of the woman's violations of his warning by secluding herself with the man that aroused her husband's suspicion. A woman who secludes herself with such a man after being warned by her husband is a sota, and her questionable faithfulness to her husband must be evaluated by the sota rite, discussed in the rest of chapter 5 of Numbers and in this tractate, to determine if it is permitted for her to remain married to her husband.
  In this chapter, the nature and details of this warning will be discussed. For instance, is the husband obligated to warn his wife if he suspects her of engaging in promiscuous behavior? Is it sufficient to warn one's wife privately, or must it be done in the presence of one or more witnesses?
  Additionally, it is unclear from the verses what degree of knowledge is necessary to determine that the woman has, in fact, secluded herself after the warning, and how it is to be known if the woman actually defiled herself through adulterous sexual intercourse. In this chapter there will be discussions concerning whether the husband's word suffices in these matters or whether it is necessary to hear testimony from one or more witnesses.
  The husband's bringing his wife to the priest is discussed as well (see Numbers 5:15), including at what point the husband must bring his wife, and how it is done.
  The chapter also discusses the evaluation rite, the miraculous procedure for determining the woman's guilt or innocence, where, as the verse states: “The priest shall set the woman before the Lord” (Numbers 5:18). The discussion includes the question of where this is done, and what exactly is done to the woman at the outset of the rite.
  Also addressed is the issue of why the woman is subjected to such a miraculous yet demeaning procedure in order to evaluate her faithfulness, as well as other aggadic issues relating to the nature of divine retribution and additional matters.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  The chapter began with a discussion of the three initial stages of the sota process: The warning issued by the husband, the woman's seclusion with the man about whom she was warned, and the defilement of the woman through adulterous sexual intercourse. There is a dispute as to whether the warning need be issued in the presence of witnesses, as well as a dispute as to whether the woman's seclusion needs to be known through the testimony of two witnesses. The halakhic conclusion is that the warning must be issued in the presence of two witnesses and the seclusion must be known through the testimony of two witnesses. Once these conditions are met, the wife and husband may not engage in sexual intercourse until and unless it has been proven through the sota evaluation (see Numbers, chapter 5) that she is innocent of any wrongdoing. However, it is sufficient for one witness to testify to the woman's actual defilement in order to render her forbidden to her husband and deny her the possibility of proving her innocence through the drinking of the bitter water.
  The wording to be employed when issuing a warning was also discussed, specifically, that the warning must state that the woman should not seclude herself with a particular man. A man who suspects his wife of adultery is enjoined to issue a warning to her. In order for the woman to assume the status of a sota, her seclusion with the man must be for a specific duration, as recorded in the Gemara.
  After the woman secludes herself with the man, the husband does not immediately bring his wife to the Temple. First he goes to his local court, which decides whether the evidence requires that the wife be brought to the Temple for the sota evaluation rite. If the court decides in the affirmative, it appoints two Torah scholars to escort the couple to the Temple. After arriving at the Temple the woman is taken to the Sanhedrin, where its members attempt to persuade her not to drink the water if she is guilty. Only if the woman is adamant in her desire to drink and be evaluated is she then brought before a priest, who has her stand at the eastern gate of the Temple in the presence of the public. He then tears part of her outer garment and removes her head covering.
  A fair amount of aggada was taught in this chapter, including a discussion of some devastating character traits that can bring about one's downfall, as well as the power of repentance. The nature of divine retribution in the case of an unfaithful sota also generated a discussion of divine retribution in general. God's administration of punishments and rewards measure for measure for sins or good deeds was also discussed at length.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  And the priest shall bring her near, and set her before the Lord.
  And the priest shall take holy water in an earthen vessel; and of the dust that is on the floor of the Tabernacle the priest shall take, and put it into the water.
  And the priest shall set the woman before the Lord, and let the hair of the woman's head go loose, and put the meal-offering of memorial in her hands, which is the meal-offering of jealousy; and the priest shall have in his hand the water of bitterness that causes the curse.
  And the priest shall cause her to swear, and shall say to the woman: If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone astray to defilement while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse;
  But if you have gone astray while under your husband, and if you are defiled, and some man has lain with you besides your husband;
  Then the priest shall cause the woman to swear with the oath of cursing, and the priest shall say to the woman: The Lord shall make you a curse and an oath among your people, when the Lord will cause your thigh to fall away, and your belly to swell;
  And this water that causes the curse shall go into your bowels, and cause your belly to swell, and your thigh to fall away; and the woman shall say: Amen, amen.
  And the priest shall write these curses in a scroll, and he shall blot them out into the water of bitterness. (Numbers 5:16–23)
  This chapter clarifies many of the halakhot recorded in these verses. It enumerates the sacrifice of the meal-offering of the sota, the drinking of the bitter water of a sota, and the oath administered to the sota, and describes the acts of the priest administering the ritual. Furthermore, it discusses the source of the water to be drunk and the proper amount of water to use, as well as the source of the dust described in the verses and the amount that must be placed in the water. The Gemara also elaborates on the order in which the water and dust are applied and the type of drinking utensil used.
  Also addressed are various questions concerning the scroll of the sota: Which curses must be written in the scroll? Must the entire passage of the Torah be written? What ink should be used, and on what surface are the words to be written?
  Finally, the chapter addresses the range of cases that are to be included in the oath of the sota.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  The chapter began by enumerating the differences between the meal-offering of a sota and other meal-offerings. The meal-offering of a sota consists of barley, while most other meal-offerings contain wheat. Additionally, the meal-offering of a sota is not accompanied by oil and frankincense. The reason for these distinctions is that since the sota performed an animalistic and degrading act, her meal-offering must reflect this, with a grain that is usually used as animal fodder.
  The chapter also discussed the procedure for drinking the bitter water. The woman drinks from a new earthenware drinking utensil, to which half a log of water from the Temple basin is added. Enough dust is added to be visible in the water. Ideally, the dust should be taken from a special place on the Temple floor; however, other dust is acceptable if this proves too difficult.
  The scroll of the sota is written with the same ink and parchment as Torah scrolls, but the ink must be prepared in a way that makes it erasable in the water. The scroll must be written by a priest for the sake of the specific sota, and it is unfit for use by any other sota.
  The Sages disagree as to which verses must appear on the scroll of the sota. The Gemara concluded that the priest must write all of the conditions and curses recorded in verses concerning the sota (Numbers 5:19–22), excluding the descriptions of the ritual itself.
  The Gemara also addressed the oath of the sota. She must include in her oath that she never engaged in sexual intercourse that would render her forbidden to her husband, regardless of the identity of the paramour.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  And he shall make the woman drink the water of bitterness that causes the curse; and the water that causes the curse shall enter into her and become bitter. 
  And the priest shall take the meal-offering of jealousy out of the woman's hand, and shall wave the meal-offering before the Lord, and bring it unto the altar. 
  And the priest shall take a handful of the meal-offering, as the memorial part of it, and burn it upon the altar, and afterward he shall make the woman drink the water.
  And he shall make her drink the water, and then it shall come to pass, if she is defiled, and acted unfaithfully against her husband, that the water that causes the curse shall enter into her and become bitter, and her belly shall swell, and her thigh shall fall away; and the woman shall be a curse among her people. 
  And if the woman were not defiled, but she is untainted; then she shall be cleared, and shall conceive seed. (Numbers 5:24–28)
  The order in which the ritual of the sota should be performed is not clear from the above verses. It appears from the order of the description that the woman drinks the bitter water of a sota before the meal-offering is sacrificed. However, verse 26 states: “And afterward he shall make the woman drink the water,” indicating that the meal-offering is sacrificed before the sota drinks the bitter water. This difficulty is one of the subjects discussed in this chapter.
  Other issues related to the drinking ritual and the meal-offering of the sota are also discussed, including how the order is affected when certain aspects of the ritual cannot be performed. Also addressed are questions such as what should be done if the woman admits her guilt during the process or if she refuses to drink the bitter water, what happens if witnesses come forward during the ritual and testify as to her infidelity, and what is to be done if the meal-offering of the sota becomes ritually impure.
  The chapter also enumerates the punishment of the sota, and what happens to a sota who is not affected by drinking the bitter water. The Sages discuss the possibility that if a woman drinks the water and survives, it is not always indicative of her innocence, as it is possible that her punishment is merely delayed due to her merits. This leads to a discussion concerning whether women are required or even permitted to study Torah. The chapter continues with the halakhot concerning the meal-offering of a sota who is married to a priest, and concludes with discussions about the halakhic differences between men and women.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  The chapter commenced with a discussion concerning the correct order of the Temple ritual for a sota. The Gemara concluded that first the woman drinks the bitter water of a sota, and afterward her meal-offering is sacrificed.
  The chapter then proceeded to discuss the halakha in the case of a woman who refuses to drink the water or admits that she is defiled. If she recants before the scroll is erased she is not forced to drink the bitter water, but if she recants once the scroll is erased she is forced to drink unless she admits that she is defiled. With regard to the meal-offering of the sota, if the woman refuses to drink the water or admits to being defiled, her offering is scattered and burnt in the place of the ashes. The same halakha applies to a meal-offering that was rendered impure, and to a meal-offering that was invalidated because witnesses came and testified that the woman was unfaithful.
  The Torah describes the death of a sota who is found to be unfaithful: Her belly swells, and her thigh falls away. The Talmud teaches that sometimes her death is delayed due to her merits, and she suffers while she slowly deteriorates until her death.
  Also discussed in this chapter was whether it is proper to teach women Torah. Although the Talmud cites different opinions on this matter, the Gemara's conclusion is that women should not be taught those parts of the Torah that they are not required to learn, even though a woman who studies Torah attains reward.
  This chapter also listed and discussed a number of halakhic distinctions between men and women.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say unto them: If the wife of any man goes astray, and acts unfaithfully against him. (Numbers 5:12)
  But if you have gone astray while under your husband, and if you are defiled, and some man has lain with you besides your husband. (Numbers 5:20)
  And the man shall be clear from iniquity, and that woman shall bear her iniquity. (Numbers 5:31)
  The previous chapters detailed the manner in which a husband issues a warning to his wife not to seclude herself with another man, and explained under what circumstances the woman becomes a sota if she disregards the warning. The particulars of the ritual in which the sota drinks the bitter water were also discussed.
  This chapter discusses situations in which certain aspects of the sota ritual do not apply. The cases discussed here fall primarily into two categories. The first consists of cases where the marriage has not yet been completed, such as the case of a betrothed woman or a yevama, a widow waiting for her brother-in-law to perform levirate marriage. The second concerns cases where the marriage was prohibited in the first place. The chapter also explores whether the woman collects payment of her marriage contract in cases where the sota ritual cannot be performed.
  Additionally, the limits of the husband's ability to issue a warning to his wife are discussed. For example, can a husband warn his wife against secluding herself with another man, even if he does not suspect that she will engage in sexual intercourse with that man?
  The chapter also deals with whether issuing a warning is exclusively the husband's prerogative or whether the court can issue a warning if a woman acts promiscuously during her husband's absence. In situations where the court is entitled to issue a warning, the parameters of that warning are enumerated.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  In this chapter the Talmud taught that there are cases where the sota ritual is not performed, despite the fact that the woman secluded herself with another man after being warned by her husband. There are a several restrictions that define who may undergo the entire sota ritual and drink the bitter water.
  A woman may drink the bitter water only if the marriage bond between the couple is complete. This excludes a couple who are only betrothed, or a woman who has only a levirate bond with her yavam and is waiting for him to perform levirate marriage. Even after a marriage has been consummated, if the marriage is prohibited the woman cannot drink the bitter water.
  The Torah states that if a sota drinks the bitter water and it is evaluated that she is innocent of adultery, she will conceive. It is understood, based on this, that women who cannot conceive are excluded from the sota ritual.
  A sota drinks the bitter water only if her husband engaged in sexual intercourse with her at least once before she secluded herself with her paramour. If the husband or wife is blind, deaf, mute, lame, or missing a hand, then the woman does not drink the bitter water, as certain aspects of the sota ceremony cannot be properly fulfilled.
  The chapter also discussed in which cases a sota who does not drink the bitter water is entitled to collect payment of her marriage contract, and when she forfeits that right. The Gemara concludes that whenever she secludes herself with another man after being warned she forfeits her right to collect payment of her marriage contract, unless she drinks the bitter water and is found to be innocent of adultery. The only exception is in a case where the husband prevented her from drinking the bitter water, either because he did not want her to drink it or because he engaged in sexual intercourse with her after she became forbidden to him.
  The chapter also explained in which cases a husband can issue a warning to his wife. He can issue a warning with regard to any man, including the wife's close relatives, such as her father or son, and a gentile. However, he cannot issue a warning with regard to a minor, or with regard to animals.
  In a case where a woman is acting promiscuously and her husband is unable to issue a warning to her, either because he is not present or because he is mentally ill, the court issues a warning to the woman on the husband's behalf. This warning is sufficient to cause the woman to forfeit her right to collect payment of her marriage contract; however, a woman may drink the bitter water only when warned by her husband.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  And the spirit of jealousy comes upon him, and he warns his wife, and she is defiled; or if the spirit of jealousy comes upon him, and he warns his wife, and she is not defiled. (Numbers 5:14)
  And he shall make the woman drink the water of bitterness that causes the curse; and the water that causes the curse shall enter into her and become bitter. (Numbers 5:24)
  And he shall make her drink the water, and then it shall come to pass, if she is defiled, and acted unfaithfully against her husband, that the water that causes the curse shall enter into her and become bitter, and her belly shall swell, and her thigh shall fall away; and the woman shall be a curse among her people. (Numbers 5:27)
  This is the law of jealousy, when a wife, being under her husband, goes astray and is defiled. (Numbers 5:29)
  And the open land about the cities, which you shall give to the Levites, shall be from the wall of the city and outward one thousand cubits round about. And you shall measure outside the city for the east side two thousand cubits, and for the south side two thousand cubits, and for the west side two thousand cubits, and for the north side two thousand cubits, the city being in the middle. This shall be for them the open land outside the cities. (Numbers 35:4–5)
  This chapter begins with a homiletical interpretation of a verse concerning the halakhot of sota that was apparently taught on the day that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya was appointed Nasi of the Sanhedrin in place of Rabban Gamliel. On that day the manner of discussion in the study hall of the Sanhedrin changed, as permission was granted to various Sages to present traditions with which they were familiar, as well as their own interpretations of biblical verses. Therefore, many new halakhot were revealed on that day; they serve as the basis for tractate Eduyyot.
  As the first mishna of this chapter cites a halakha concerning a sota that was taught on that day, a number of other interpretations of verses that were taught on the same day are cited in this chapter, although they bear no relation to the halakhot of sota. The homiletical interpretations found in this chapter comprise statements of both halakha and aggada.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  The halakhot mentioned in this chapter are primarily derived from interpretations of biblical verses. The first halakha mentioned is that just as the bitter water of a sota evaluates the fidelity of the sota and causes her death if she was unfaithful to her husband, so too, her drinking evaluates the behavior of her alleged paramour; he too dies if he was a party to her adultery, even though he does not drink the bitter water.
  Additionally, there was a discussion of the prohibition of the woman to her paramour after she secluded herself with him in the wake of her husband's warning. In the same way that she is forbidden to her husband unless she proves her fidelity by drinking the bitter water, likewise she is forbidden to her paramour. She may not marry him even if her husband dies or divorces her without her having been evaluated by the bitter water.
  A number of statements concerning ritual impurity were cited as well in this chapter. Among them is Rabbi Akiva's exposition that even non-sacred food can contract a third-degree ritual impurity. However, his opinion is not the accepted halakha, even though Rabbi Yehoshua praised the opinion.
  The chapter also mentioned Rabbi Akiva's opinion that the Shabbat limit is two thousand cubits by Torah law. Here too, his opinion is not the accepted halakha; all halakhic authorities maintain that this limit is by rabbinic law. While some of them recognize a wider limit by Torah law, others claim there is no Shabbat limit at all by Torah law.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: If any man's wife goes astray, and acts unfaithfully against him; and a man lie with her carnally, and it was hidden from the eyes of her husband, she was defiled secretly, and there was no witness against her, and she was not taken in the act. (Numbers 5:12–13)
  The halakhot of sota described in the fifth chapter of the book of Numbers refer to a woman whose husband warned her not to seclude herself with a certain man and she subsequently did so, raising the suspicion of her infidelity. This chapter will discuss the halakhot that apply to a woman suspected of infidelity, where there is some form of corroboration of the suspicion. Generally only the testimony of two valid witnesses can be accepted as proof that a woman has committed adultery. However, this chapter discusses cases in which a woman had previously been warned, and in such cases even corroboration by one disqualified from bearing witness may suffice.
  The discussion here centers on what degree of outside corroboration is sufficient to establish the infidelity of a sota. Also discussed is the question of which specific suspicions can be corroborated by one disqualified from bearing witness, as well as what should be done in the event of conflicting testimony.
  Although some aspects of the issues addressed here were touched upon briefly in earlier chapters, they are discussed in this chapter in more detail.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  This chapter discussed the different types of testimony that are required in order to question a woman's fidelity and establish her status as a sota. In order to establish a woman as a sota of uncertain fidelity there is a requirement that either the warning, the act of seclusion, or both be corroborated through the testimony of two valid witnesses, as discussed in the first chapter of the tractate. Nevertheless, after it is determined that the woman is a sota, even lesser forms of corroboration are sufficient to impact the halakhot of the woman.
  In order to put the woman to death two witnesses are necessary. To disqualify the woman from drinking the bitter water of a sota, however, one witness is sufficient. Even one generally disqualified from bearing witness can testify in this regard, and even the testimony of the five women normally suspected of hating this woman is accepted. Additionally, even an unsubstantiated public rumor that has become the widespread gossip of the city, e.g., after being discussed by the women who spin thread by the light of the moon, is sufficient to prohibit the woman from drinking the bitter water.
  Although all these lesser forms of corroboration are sufficient to prevent the woman from drinking the bitter water, there are differences between them as to the degree of their acceptability. For instance, if the corroboration was based only on a public rumor or the testimony of one of the women who is known to hate the sota, then the sota will still receive payment of her marriage contract. However, if the corroboration is based on the testimony of a single witness, even if it is someone who is generally disqualified from testifying such as a woman or a slave, then the testimony is sufficient to cause the woman to lose her rights to the marriage contract.
  These halakhot apply in situations where there is no testimony available to contradict the testimony concerning the woman's guilt. However, if others testify that the woman did not commit adultery, it is not always considered valid. In the event that one valid witness testified to her infidelity and his testimony was accepted initially, but it was later contradicted by another, then so long as only one individual contradicts the initial witness the woman remains disqualified from drinking. However, if there are two witnesses contradicting the testimony concerning her guilt then the individual witness's testimony is not accepted. If, however, all the witnesses testify at the same time, then the witness to her guilt is not accepted and the woman can drink the bitter water. If, however, all the witnesses are those who are usually disqualified from giving testimony, then the majority of witnesses are followed, either concerning guilt in order to prevent her from drinking, or concerning her innocence in order to allow her to drink.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  And it shall come to pass, when the Lord your God shall bring you into the land where you go to possess it, that you shall give the blessing on Mount Gerizim and the curse on Mount Ebal. Are they not beyond the Jordan, behind the way of the coming of the sun, in the land of the Canaanites that dwell in the Arabah, over against Gilgal, beside the oaks of Moreh? (Deuteronomy 11:29–30)
  Then his brother's wife shall draw near him in the presence of the Elders, and remove his shoe from off his foot, and spit in his face; and she shall speak and say: So shall be done to the man that does not build up his brother's house. (Deuteronomy 25:9)
  And you shall speak and say before the Lord your God: A wandering Aramean was my father, and he went down into Egypt, and sojourned there, few in number; and he became there a nation, great, mighty, and populous. (Deuteronomy 26:5)
  These shall stand on Mount Gerizim to bless the people, when you are passed over the Jordan: Simeon, and Levi, and Judah, and Issachar, and Joseph, and Benjamin; and these shall stand on Mount Ebal for the curse: Reuben, Gad, and Asher, and Zebulun, Dan, and Naphtali. And the Levites shall speak and say to all the men of Israel with a loud voice: Cursed is the man who makes a graven or molten image, an abomination unto the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and sets it up in secret. And all the people shall answer and say: Amen. (Deuteronomy 27:12–15)
  And Moses commanded them, saying: At the end of every seven years, in the Festival of the Sabbatical Year, in the festival of Sukkot, when all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place that He shall choose, you shall read this Torah before all Israel in their hearing. Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones, and your stranger that is within your gates, so that they may hear, and so that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to perform all the words of this law. (Deuteronomy 31:10–12)
  This chapter, as well as the following chapters, lists a series of halakhot that are tangentially related to the halakhot of a sota. The chapter begins discussing whether various recitations mentioned in the Torah, including the warning and the oath administered by the priest to a sota, must be recited in Hebrew, or whether they may be recited in any language. Subsequently, the chapter discusses in detail several mitzvot that appear in the list of recitations that must be said in Hebrew. Despite the lack of an inherent connection between these issues and the tractate, tractate Sota became the primary source for their halakhot, since there is no tractate devoted to explaining these issues.
  One such topic is the mitzvot that were incumbent upon the generation that entered Eretz Yisrael during the time of Joshua, such as setting up stones and writing the Torah upon them, and delivering the blessings and the curses on Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal. As these halakhot pertain only to that generation, the discussion has no practical ramifications. However, the Gemara examines these halakhot as it analyzes all aspects of the Torah.
  The chapter also discusses the Priestly Benediction extensively, describing the manner in which it is recited in the Temple and in synagogues.
  Another topic considered in this chapter is the mitzva of assembly, where the king reads the Torah before the nation. The chapter discusses who reads from the Torah, what portions are read, and how the event takes place in practice.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  The determination whether or not each particular recitation discussed in the chapter must be said in Hebrew is derived from verses written in the context of each of these recitations. Nevertheless, there are apparently certain general similarities among the recitations that may be recited in any language in contrast to those that must be said in Hebrew: The recitations that require either the speaker or the listener to fully understand the statement may be recited in any language, whereas those that are part of a ritual or ceremony are required to be said in Hebrew. While the Mishna establishes that certain recitations, e.g., the Amida prayer and Shema, may be stated in any language, in practice it is accepted that one should recite them in Hebrew ab initio.
  The chapter presented different opinions with regard to the details of the mitzvot that were incumbent upon the generation that entered Eretz Yisrael in the times of Joshua. Naturally, there is no room for halakhic ruling with regard to matters that already took place; the Sages can only describe what occurred. It is concluded that the generation that entered Eretz Yisrael set up three sets of stones upon which they wrote the Torah in seventy languages: In the Jordan River, at their place of lodging, and at the place where an altar was built. With regard to the blessings and curses, the chapter described that the priests and Levites, or some of them, stood between Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal. They recited the blessings while facing Mount Gerizim and the curses while facing Mount Ebal.
  There are some differences between the manner in which the Priestly Benediction was recited in the Temple and the manner in which it is recited in the synagogue. In the Temple, the priests said all three verses as one blessing, and they uttered the Tetragrammaton. In the synagogue, the congregation answers amen after each verse, and the substitute name of Lordship is used. Furthermore, in the Temple, the priests lifted their hands above their heads when reciting the blessing, and in the synagogue they lift their hands only to the height of their shoulders. The chapter also discussed other issues with regard to the Priestly Benediction, e.g., how the priests are called up to recite the blessing, how they stand while uttering the blessing, and what the congregation recites during the blessing.
  This chapter is the source for most of the halakhot of the mitzva of assembly. The mitzva of assembly takes place every seven years, on the first intermediate day of the festival of Sukkot that takes place after a Sabbatical Year. The Sages derive that the Torah is read by the king while he is sitting or standing on a special wooden platform in the Temple courtyard. The king reads from parts of the book of Deuteronomy that contain warnings about the importance of fulfilling mitzvot and from some other sections that discuss mitzvot related to that time of year.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  When you go forth to battle against your enemies, and see horses, and chariots, and a people more than you, you shall not be afraid of them; for the Lord your God is with you, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt. And it shall be, when you draw near to battle, that the priest shall approach and speak to the people. And he shall say to them: Hear Israel, you draw near today to battle against your enemies; let not your heart faint; fear not, nor be alarmed, and do not be terrified of them; for the Lord your God is He that goes with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to save you. And the officers shall speak to the people, saying: What man is there that has built a new house, and has not dedicated it? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man dedicate it. And what man is there that has planted a vineyard, and has not used the fruit thereof? Let him go and return unto his house, lest he die in the battle and another man use the fruit thereof. And what man is there that has betrothed a wife, and has not taken her? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man take her. And the officers shall speak further to the people, and they shall say: What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go and return unto his house, lest his brethren's heart melt as his heart. (Deuteronomy 20:1–8)
  When a man takes a new wife, he shall not go out with the army, neither shall he be charged with any business; he shall be free for his house one year, and shall cheer his wife whom he has taken. (Deuteronomy 24:5)
  On the heels of topics discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter deals primarily with the preparations for battle, and the question of who is exempt from going out to war. The addresses of the priest and the officers are stated explicitly in the Torah; however, the details still require clarification.
  Among the many issues raised are: Which priest gives this address? When and where does the priest address the ranks? What exactly is said by the priest, and what is said by the officers?
  In addition, the chapter will clarify and define a number of terms and circumstances mentioned in the verses, among them: What is included in the word vineyard, what is considered a house, and which wife is considered a new wife. Similarly, the Gemara explores the definition of the “fearful and fainthearted.” The Torah relates directly to those who are about to dedicate their homes, or enjoy their vineyards, or marry the women whom they have betrothed. In parallel, this chapter explores the status of those who have dedicated a home, begun to benefit from a vineyard, or married over the past year.
  This chapter will also address the issue of determining which kind of war is subject to these exemptions. Do these terms apply equally in every manner of military campaign and activity, or are there certain wars for which these exemptions are inapplicable?
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  It has been determined that, in preparation for war, a singular priest is appointed to address the nation. This priest, who in several respects resembles the High Priest, is termed the priest anointed for war. While the nation is still within the borders of Eretz Yisrael, the priest anointed for war announces to the assembled that men in any of three circumstances are released from combat: “What man is there that has built a new house, and has not dedicated it? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man dedicate it. And what man is there that has planted a vineyard, and has not used the fruit thereof? Let him go and return unto his house, lest he die in the battle and another man use the fruit thereof. And what man is there that has betrothed a wife, and has not taken her? Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another man take her” (Deuteronomy 20:5–7). The officers repeat his words more audibly, and then they add the statement: “What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?” (Deuteronomy 20:8), also sending home any man who is afraid in the face of battle.
  When the ranks come to the battle front and are preparing to engage the enemy, the priest again addresses the people. First, he recites the verses: “Hear Israel, you draw near today to battle against your enemies; let not your heart faint; fear not, nor be alarmed, and do not be terrified of them; for the Lord your God is He that goes with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to save you” (Deuteronomy 20:3–4). Thereafter, the priest and the officers repeat the announcements from the first assembly.
  With respect to the terms mentioned in the verses, a vineyard is defined as any group of five fruit-bearing trees, whether they have been newly planted, layered, or grafted. A house is defined as any permanent structure that is fit for a domicile. Finally, a new wife is defined as either one whom the man has betrothed or his recently widowed yevama, who is waiting for him to perform levirate marriage. In addition, the vineyard and the home need not be truly new but merely new to him, e.g., purchased or inherited. Furthermore, this halakha applies only if the assets in question are lawfully acquired or produced; if they are forbidden to him in some way he does not return home. With respect to the term “fearful and fainthearted,” it has been resolved that the phrase should be understood literally, indicating one who is terrified or is emotionally unfit to participate in the war.
  All of those who are exempt from the battle for any of the aforementioned reasons must nevertheless support the troops logistically, through repairing roads and providing food. By contrast, one who in the past year has built a new house and has already dedicated it, has planted a new vineyard and has begun to enjoy its fruits, or who has married a new wife, is exempt from assisting the army altogether. Such a person is likewise exempt from all other communal work.
  It has also been resolved that all these exemptions apply only to an elective war, which is a war the nation undertakes voluntarily in order to broaden its borders. However, when the Jewish people are fighting an obligatory war mandated by a mitzva for the sake of conquering Eretz Yisrael, fighting against Amalek, or fighting in self-defense against attackers, everyone is required to go to battle. In those circumstances as well, the priest anointed for war recites words of encouragement and inspiration before the battle.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  If one be found slain in the land which the Lord your God has given you to possess it, lying in the field, and it is not known who has smitten him; then your Elders and your judges shall come forth, and they shall measure unto the cities which are round about him that is slain. And it shall be, that the city that is nearest to the slain man, the Elders of that city shall take a heifer of the herd, that has not been worked with and that has not pulled a yoke. And the Elders of that city shall bring down the heifer into a hard valley, which may be neither worked nor sown, and shall break the heifer's neck there in the valley. And the priests the sons of Levi shall come near, for the Lord your God has chosen them to minister unto Him, and to bless in the name of the Lord; and every controversy and every stroke shall be according to their word. And all the Elders of that city, who are nearest unto the slain man, shall wash their hands over the heifer whose neck was broken in the valley. And they shall speak and say: Our hands did not spill this blood, nor did our eyes see. Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel, whom You have redeemed, and suffer not innocent blood to remain in the midst of Your people Israel. And the blood shall be forgiven them. So shall you put away the innocent blood from the midst of you, when you shall do that which is right in the eyes of the Lord. (Deuteronomy 21:1–9)
  This chapter covers two main topics. The first, which continues the theme of the previous chapters, is the ritual of the breaking of the heifer's neck. The chapter discusses the identity of the Elders who come to take the measurement. Who is defined as a slain victim for the purposes of this mitzva: Is it any murder victim, or could the definition be more limited? The Gemara also discusses other details of this ritual: From where the measurements are taken, and what type of city can be classified as the city closest to the victim. Furthermore, the Gemara examines the requirements in terms of the animal to be used: What is a heifer? What “work” disqualifies it? What does the Torah mean by “a hard valley”? How is the animal killed, and what halakhot apply to the place where it is killed?
  This ritual is performed only if the identity of the murderer is unknown. This also requires clarification, e.g., what if there is conflicting testimony with regard to whether the murderer was seen, who is eligible to testify about this matter, what happens if the murderer is discovered during the performance of the ritual, and what happens if the murderer is discovered afterward.
  The other main topic addressed in this chapter is the list of things that became null over the generations, due to either a deterioration in the performance of mitzvot, tragedies that happened to the Jewish people, or the death of specific Sages. Some of these changes had halakhic implications, both in the cessation of certain mitzvot and in the enactment of new decrees, while others were spiritual losses not linked to any specific mitzva.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  The halakhot of the ritual of the heifer whose neck is broken were addressed in this chapter. When a murder victim is found and the identity of the murderer is not known, five members of the Great Sanhedrin in Jerusalem come to measure the distance from the body of the victim, specifically from his nose, to the nearest city. This act of measurement is an independent mitzva, and is performed even where there is no doubt which city is closest to the victim. They would measure only to a city that had a rabbinical court with twenty-three judges, and they would not measure to Jerusalem.
  After it has been determined which city is closest to the victim, the Elders of that city bring a heifer to perform the ritual. This heifer cannot be older than two years of age and cannot have performed any work for its owner. However, it is not disqualified if it has a blemish. It is preferable that the heifer be brought to a stream with a strong flow of water. A priest then breaks the neck of the animal from behind using a cleaver, and the Elders of the city state a declaration that they were not responsible for the death, directly or indirectly. The land upon which the ritual is performed may not be farmed in any way.
  The Sages inferred from the wording of the verse that the performance of the ritual is required only for one killed with a sword. The victim must be found in the open, lying on the ground, and not hanging, floating on water, or covered on the ground. The ritual is only performed when there is no testimony as to the identity of the murderer. Any testimony, even that of a person ordinarily disqualified from testifying, obviates the need for the performance of the ritual. If there is conflicting testimony, then if the witnesses are qualified, the statement of two overrides the statement of a single witness. If they are witnesses that are ordinarily disqualified, whichever testimony is backed by more witnesses is followed.
  There are several mitzvot that were nullified over the years due to a deterioration in the behavior of the Jewish people. Among them are the ritual of the heifer whose neck is broken, the ritual of giving the bitter water to a sota, and the declaration of tithes. Several decrees were enacted over the years due to changes in the circumstances of the Jewish people, e.g., decrees to separate tithes from doubtfully tithed produce, to prohibit the playing of music, and to prohibit the study of Greek wisdom.
  The Gemara also tells of other effects of the regression in the spiritual level of the Jewish people. The Divine Presence was not as tangibly felt after the destruction of the First Temple, and even less so after the destruction of the Second Temple. The death of certain Sages left a vacuum, as there was no one who manifested the qualities in which each Sage particularly excelled. This deterioration will continue until the time preceding the arrival of the Messiah, upon whose arrival the decline will be ameliorated.
  
  Sukkah
  
  Introduction to Sukkah
  
  The name used in the Torah for the month of Tishrei is the Seventh Month, HaHodesh HaShevi'i. The Sages interpreted the name homiletically and said that the month is replete with mitzvot, where the word for replete, mesuba, is from the same root as hashevi'i (Vayikra Rabba 29). More specifically, they characterized Sukkot as a Festival whose mitzvot are abundant. This wealth of mitzvot is manifest in the Torah in the numerous verses devoted to the halakhot governing the Festival. However, beyond the mitzvot explicitly mentioned in the Torah, there are additional mitzvot that were received as halakhot transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and they too impart a unique character to the Festival. 
  The festival of Sukkot is multifaceted, and its halakhot are not all associated with only one central theme; rather, there are several themes that differ from those of all other Festivals. In addition to the general mitzvot of a Festival, detailed in tractate Beitza, and the mitzvot of the pilgrim Festivals, detailed in tractate Hagiga, the festival of Sukkot is characterized by its distinctive mitzvot: The mitzva of sukka, which entails moving one's residence and dining area; the special ceremony that involves taking the four species; the plethora of additional offerings unique to Sukkot; and the mitzvot and special ceremonies performed in the Temple.
  In essence, the festival of Sukkot does not commemorate a specific historical event, in contrast to Passover, which commemorates the Exodus, and Shavuot, which commemorates the revelation at Sinai. Nor does it correspond to a specific stage in the agricultural cycle, unlike Passover, when the omer offering is sacrificed from the new barley crop, and Shavuot, when the offering of the two loaves is sacrificed from the new wheat crop. Nevertheless, there is one element that ties together the various, distinct aspects of the Festival: Sukkot is the conclusion and summary of the entire year's Festivals. It is both the culmination of the calendar year and the encapsulation of the historical events that comprise the history of the Jewish people. This summation does not entail merely remembering the past and giving thanks, but it also contains prayer for success in the vital, creative year that is beginning. One remembers with gratitude one way of life whose culmination is represented by the festival of Sukkot, and one prays for the initiation of a new path that commences with the festival of Sukkot.
  The sukka does not come to commemorate a particular event; rather, it commemorates the entirety of the experience of the children of Israel in the desert, the life of a people without a country, without claim to land, and without stability. This commemoration includes gratitude for all the miracles of the Exodus that transpired in the past, the clouds of glory, and the contrast between the life of a people wandering in the wilderness and the conclusion of the harvest of the produce of the fields and the trees in Eretz Yisrael. The four species, too, serve on the one hand as a kind of victory procession, celebrating past accomplishments (Vayikra Rabba 30); and on the other hand taking the four species includes saying a prayer for rainfall and a successful crop in the coming year, the very essence of the mitzva.
  Although the thanksgiving and requests voiced during the festival of Sukkot are intimately connected to the Jewish people, they also include a universal theme. Expressing thanks to God for past kindness and prayer and supplication for future success, and likewise, thanksgiving for the past harvest and prayer for rainfall in the coming year, are not unique to the Jewish people. In that sense, the festival of Sukkot becomes a Festival for the entire world, as an expression of both thanksgiving and entreaty. Therefore, the Sages associated the seventy bulls sacrificed within the framework of the additional offering on the festival of Sukkot with the seventy nations of the world. And the prophet says that the festival of Sukkot is the Festival when, in the future, all the people of the world will participate in the pilgrimage to the Temple (see Zechariah 14:16).
  In the verses in the Torah addressing the festival of Sukkot, the elements of thanksgiving and rejoicing are conspicuous. Beyond the rejoicing that characterizes all the Festivals, there is a special mitzva of rejoicing on Sukkot, to the extent that the name of the Festival coined by the Sages in the prayers recited during the Festival is: The time of our rejoicing. As an extension of the thanksgiving and rejoicing, there are the special mitzvot received as halakhot transmitted to Moses from Sinai, which include mention of and prayer for rain and blessing for the coming year. The mitzva of the libation of water on the altar, a central component of the rejoicing of the Festival in the Temple; the mitzva of surrounding the altar with willow branches; and the waving of the willow branch on the seventh day of the Festival all evoke and inspire prayer for rain during the coming year. These are not explicit prayers and are certainly not accompanied by fasting and pleading. Rather, rain is a theme that arises in the course of the great rejoicing. 
  Indeed, though the primary mitzvot of Sukkot were elucidated at length in the Torah, most of the discussion in tractate Sukka is based on halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai and on tradition, primarily due to the need to translate the verses in the Torah into a structured system of halakhot with clearly demarcated limitations. While in many tractates in the Talmud, most of the discussion is dedicated to clarifying the details of the mitzvot or to analyzing the myriad possibilities and intermediate cases, in this tractate the central problems relate to definition of terms. The fundamental concepts associated with the mitzvot of the Festival, e.g., sukka and the four species, require precise definitions in terms of determining their essence, size, measures, and the manner of their use. Most of these definitions are learned through the traditions transmitted from previous generations. The significance of tradition is even more conspicuous with regard to those mitzvot of the Festival that have no clear source in the Torah. Specifically because those mitzvot aroused the resistance of the various deviant sects, e.g., Sadducees and Boethusians, the Sages were compelled to greatly underscore their significance.
  Another category of fundamental problems addressed in tractate Sukka stems from the contrast between the mitzvot of the Festival practiced in the Temple and those practiced outside the Temple. Although there are some mitzvot associated with Sukkot totally independent of the Temple, e.g., the mitzva of sukka, and there are others exclusive to the Temple, e.g., the additional offerings, there are many mitzvot associated with Sukkot in which there is a special connection between the mitzva and the Temple. Although they are mitzvot whose practice is not limited to the Temple, there is a difference between the practice in the Temple and the practice outside the Temple, e.g., the four species. The problematic nature of these mitzvot while the Temple was standing was exacerbated after its destruction, which severed the connection between the mitzva and the Temple. This led the Sages to institute ordinances to commemorate the Temple, which involved the introduction of many new halakhot.
  Halakhically, the Eighth Day of Assembly is a Festival in and of itself, fundamentally independent of the festival of Sukkot, yet it is closely related to Sukkot and in a certain sense resembles Shavuot vis-à-vis Passover. Due to the proximity of the Eighth Day of Assembly and Sukkot and due to their similarities, e.g., the Eighth Day of Assembly is also called: The time of our rejoicing, there is a discussion of that Festival within the framework of this tractate. Although not all matters associated with that day are discussed, the basis for the prayer for rain recited on that Festival is located here; it is treated in more detail in tractate Ta'anit. In addition, the basis for the custom of future generations to celebrate the conclusion of the cycle of Torah reading on that day, Simhat Torah, is discussed.
  There are five chapters in tractate Sukka, each dealing with a well-defined topic:
  Chapter One defines of the concept of sukka in terms of its structure and dimensions.
  Chapter Two determines the parameters of the mitzva of residing in the sukka and its obligations.
  Chapter Three defines the essence and the measures of the four species and describes the manner in which the mitzva is fulfilled.
  Chapter Four determines the relationship between the mitzvot of the Festival performed in the Temple and those performed outside the Temple, and explains the halakhot of the festival of Sukkot transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  Chapter Five discusses the celebration of the festival of Sukkot in the Temple, the mitzva of rejoicing on the Festival, and the special offerings sacrificed on Sukkot.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  In sukkot shall you reside seven days; all that are homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot. So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in sukkot when I took them out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God. (Leviticus 23:42–43)
  And that they should publish and proclaim in all their cities, and in Jerusalem, saying: Go forth to the mount and fetch olive branches, and branches of wild olive, and myrtle branches, and palm branches, and the boughs of dense-leaved trees in order to make sukkot as written. (Nehemiah 8:15)
  The mitzva by Torah law to reside in a sukka immediately raises the fundamental question: What is a sukka? Clearly there is a difference between a sukka and a house. However, that difference must be defined and elucidated in order to ascertain in practical terms what are the meaning and parameters of the term sukka. 
  This primary question can be divided into several independent secondary questions. First, what are the minimum and maximum measures of a sukka? Is a sukka of any size fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva, or are there certain restrictions in terms of height or area? Second, what is the appropriate structure of a sukka? Can it take any form, with any number of walls and any type of configuration, or is a sukka fit for use only if it takes a particular form? Third, what material may be used in construction of a sukka? Are all materials fit for use, or are certain materials restricted? Further, must the entire sukka be constructed from the same material or are there differences between various parts of the sukka in that regard? Fourth, how does one build a sukka? Are there specific times during which it may be constructed, or may it be constructed at any time? Are there specific halakhot or directives governing the method or sequence of construction? Must construction of one section of the sukka precede construction of another, or is the order irrelevant? Fifth, what about the location of the sukka? May it be constructed anywhere or perhaps, in order for it to be considered a sukka, must it be constructed only in certain locations? 
  These questions, all of which address the question of the definition of the sukka, constitute the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  This chapter summarized most of the halakhot relating to the sukka itself and its construction: Its structure, its dimensions, the materials with which it is constructed, and the manner in which it is constructed.
  In terms of the height of the sukka, there are two significant parameters. A sukka may be no less than ten handbreadths high and no more than twenty cubits high. With regard to its area, the sukka may be no less than seven by seven handbreadths. There is no upper limit for its area.
  A sukka may be square, round, or any other shape, as long as its walls and roof are distinct. With regard to a square sukka, a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai says that there must be at least two full-fledged walls that extend the full length of the sukka and a third wall that is at least one handbreadth long. There was extensive discussion with regard to a sukka whose walls are incomplete, as two of the walls must be actual, conspicuous walls and not merely symbolic walls. Therefore, it was necessary to define what is considered a wall for the purposes of a sukka.
  The essence of a sukka is its roofing. While the walls may consist of any material, provided that they are sturdy and support the roofing, the roofing must consist of material that grows from the ground and is no longer connected to the ground when placed on the sukka and that is not susceptible to ritual impurity. The Sages were stringent with regard to the latter criterion; they prohibited not only the use of complete vessels, but also the use of broken vessels, even though once broken they are no longer susceptible to impurity. Similarly, they prohibited the use of certain objects, e.g., mats, even though their status with regard to becoming ritually impure is indeterminate.
  Even in terms of its construction, the roofing is the essence of the sukka. Although halakhically, the construction of a sukka has no set time, and one is not required to have specific intention when building it, there is a principle that applies here and in other areas of halakha: Prepare it, and not from that which is already prepared, which requires one to place the roofing after the walls are already standing and to do so with the express intent of using it as roofing. This halakha invalidates a sukka whose roofing was placed on a structure for a purpose other than roofing the sukka and subsequently declared that it is roofing for a sukka.
  The halakha is that a sukka may be constructed anywhere, on public or private property. However, in addition to being properly constructed, a sukka must be fit for use. Therefore, one may construct a sukka neither beneath another sukka, nor beneath a tree or a house.
  The details of these halakhot as well as other halakhot of sukka, e.g., the halakha of a curved wall, were elucidated in this chapter. In addition, several other areas of halakha were discussed as they relate to fundamental issues of sukka.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  In sukkot shall you reside seven days; all the homeborn in Israel shall reside in sukkot. (Leviticus 23:42)
  So the people went forth, and brought them, and made themselves sukkot, every one upon the roof of his house, and in their courts, and in the courts of the House of God, and in the broad place of the water gate, and in the broad place of the gate of Ephraim. And all the congregation of them that came back out of the captivity made sukkot, and resided in the sukkot; as since the days of Joshua bin Nun until that day had not the children of Israel done so. And there was very great gladness. (Nehemiah 8:16–17)
  The Torah commands the children of Israel to reside in a sukka for seven days. This chapter deals primarily with defining the phrase: Shall you reside. What are the nature and parameters of this residence?
  Here too, this question includes several aspects. One is the duration of this residence. When is one obligated to reside in the sukka? Is it only during the day, or is it at night as well? Must one stay in the sukka throughout the day, or is the obligation restricted to specific times?
  Another question concerns the essence of this residence. Is the mitzva simply to reside in the sukka, or is one obligated to eat and sleep there as well? If the latter, are there objective measures that characterize eating, drinking, and sleeping that must be performed in the sukka, or are these determined by the desires of each individual? 
  In addition, who is obligated to fulfill the mitzva? Are all Jewish men, women, and children obligated to reside in the sukka, or is the mitzva incumbent only on certain individuals? Is the obligation in effect throughout the Festival without exceptions, or only under certain conditions?
  Others questions arise with regard to the manner of this residence. Must one sit in the sukka without any barriers or obstructions between him and the roofing of the sukka, so that it is clear that he is residing in the sukka? Or in the interest of comfort, may one place a barrier between himself and the roofing? In particular, may one cover himself or cover the sukka, or does putting any barrier between him and the roofing prevent fulfillment of the mitzva in its fullest sense?
  When the mitzva of residence in the sukka is analyzed, it leads to different conclusions with regard to the manner in which the sukka is constructed and its basic structure. The question is whether in order to fulfill the mitzva, one must reside in a sukka that will be fit for residence for the entire Festival, or whether it is sufficient that the sukka is fit for residence at the moment in question and its status throughout the rest of the Festival is irrelevant.
  Resolving the fundamental problems with regard to residence in the sukka and the peripheral problems that stem from questions about preparing the structure of the sukka is the focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter dealt primarily with analyzing the mitzva to reside in the sukka and with other halakhot that emerge from that analysis.
  The obligation to reside in the sukka is derived from the verse “In sukkot shall you reside seven days.” That verse is also the basis for the principle: Reside as you dwell. During the Festival, one must reside in his sukka in the same manner in which he resides in his house during the rest of the year. This principle leads to some strictures and some leniencies. On the one hand, one's permanent abode during the festival of Sukkot must be in the sukka, and therefore, one is obligated to eat, drink, and sleep in the sukka. However, one is not obligated to reside in the sukka under circumstances in which he would not typically remain in his permanent residence. Therefore, one who is ill or for whom residing in the sukka causes discomfort is exempt from the mitzva. Similarly, one is not obligated to remain in the sukka in the rain. Travelers are also exempt, as are those whose business dealings compel them to be on the road. Fundamentally, one is obligated to eat in the sukka only food upon which one bases a meal. There is no obligation to eat a particular number of meals in the sukka; one need eat only if he chooses to do so, as he would at home.
  There is no obligation to reside in one sukka all seven days of the Festival. It is even permitted for one to build a sukka that, due to rabbinic decrees, he will be unable to use on Shabbat and on the first Festival day, provided that the structure of the sukka is sufficiently sturdy to last all seven days. Since the obligation is merely that the sukka be fit for residence, it is fit whether it is stationary or movable, on land or at sea. 
  The shade of the sukka must be from its roofing; it is prohibited to place any permanent barrier between one sitting in the sukka and the sky other than the roofing. Therefore, placing a cover over the sukka or any type of sheet or netting over a bed inside the sukka prevents fulfillment of the mitzva. However, a temporary barrier and sukka decorations do not constitute an obstruction and do not prevent the mitzva's fulfillment. 
  The obligation to reside in the sukka is a positive, time-bound mitzva. Therefore, based on established halakhic principles, women and Canaanite slaves are exempt from the mitzva. Minors, who are exempt from all mitzvot, are obviously exempt from this mitzva as well. However, there is an obligation by rabbinic law to train a child in performance of mitzvot, and the Sages determined the age at which the child should be trained to reside in the sukka.
  As is the case with regard to other mitzvot, one who is engaged in the performance of another mitzva is exempt from residing in the sukka.
  These and related halakhot and their various details were the main focus of this chapter.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  However, on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, when you have gathered in the fruits of the land, you shall keep the feast of the Lord seven days; on the first day shall be a solemn rest, and on the eighth day shall be a solemn rest. And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook. (Leviticus 23:39–40)
  The Torah verses that command the children of Israel to take the four species on the festival of Sukkot raise various questions. The names provided in the Torah are not clearly defined, distinctive names of the species; rather, they are allusions and descriptions. The first question therefore concerns identifying these species. After that initial determination, it is necessary to determine the numerous details with regard to fulfillment of the mitzva. The number and measure of each of the species must be ascertained. Can the mitzva be fulfilled with any one of the species of tree mentioned in the verse, or are there restrictions with regard to the specific tree or part of the tree required? Questions arise with regard to a plethora of minute details. Among them: In what condition must these species be? What precise form must they take? Are there other restrictions with regard to their nature? Can trees that are prohibited for one reason or another be used in fulfilling the mitzva?
  Similarly, various questions are raised with regard to the purchase and taking of these species, ranging from the question of their ownership to issues related to taking the species during the Sabbatical Year and thereafter.
  The mitzvot of taking the species are also unclear. How is this taking performed? Are all the species taken together? Must they be attached or bound together? What is the nature and manner of the act of taking them? Must one merely hold them, or is there an additional requirement?
  There is an additional series of questions: Where is the taking of the species performed? Is it an obligation incumbent on each individual everywhere; or is it tied to the sacrificial service in the Temple? Is one obligated to take the species just one day or for all seven days? How many times a day? 
  These questions, raised specifically with regard to each of the species and with regard to all the species together, along with practical questions that emerge from them, will be addressed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  Virtually the entire chapter dealt with analyzing the mitzva of the four species.
  The identity of the species taken on the festival of Sukkot is determined from a tradition transmitted by our ancestors. For all intents and purposes, there is no dispute with regard to major elements of the mitzva in terms of its performance, its time, and its place. “Branches of a date palm,” written in the Torah, refers to the lulav, one closed palm branch; “boughs of a dense-leaved tree” refers to three myrtle branches of the type that have three leaves emerging together from each level of the stem; “willows of the brook” refers to two willow branches that typically grow alongside a brook; “fruit of a beautiful tree” refers to the etrog. The mitzva is to take all the species together, with the lulav, myrtle branches, and willow branches in the right hand and the etrog in the left, and to wave them. In the interest of performing the mitzva aesthetically, the branches of the three species are bound together.
  Myriad halakhot were stated with regard to flaws that render the species unfit. Most of these flaws preclude their meeting the criterion of beauty, thereby rendering them unfit, as the Torah commands that these species be as beautiful as possible. This is especially true with regard to the etrog, which the verse characterizes as the fruit of a beautiful tree. Indeed, there are numerous halakhot that determine the imperfections that undermine the beauty of the etrog and render it unfit for the mitzva.
  Similarly, measures for the various species were established: The myrtle and willow branches must be three handbreadths; the lulav must be at least one handbreadth more; and the etrog must be large enough that its taking will be noticeable, i.e., an egg-bulk. Obviously, as is the case with regard to all other mitzvot, one must not fulfill the mitzva through performance of a transgression. Furthermore, on the first day of the Festival, one is obligated to fulfill the mitzva with four species that belong to him.
  When is one obligated to take the species? The Sages understood the verses as saying that on the first day, taking the four species is an obligation everywhere. While in the Temple, “before God” in the formulation of the verse, the obligation is to take the species all seven days. After the destruction of the Temple, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that everywhere the species are to be taken all seven days, with the exception of Shabbat.
  Since the taking of the species is performed at the beginning of the year, a problem arises with regard to use of the species during the Sabbatical Year. Fundamentally, the conclusion is that the restrictions of the Sabbatical Year apply to the only fruit among the species, the etrog. One does not fulfill the mitzva with an etrog purchased with money that was exchanged for produce of the Sabbatical Year.
  These halakhot and others that emerge from them, e.g., the halakhot of disqualification with regard to mitzvot, were the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And you shall take for yourselves on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, and boughs of a dense-leaved tree, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days. (Leviticus 23:40)
  With joy you shall draw water out of the springs of salvation. (Isaiah 12:3)
  The mitzvot of the festival of Sukkot are divided into two categories, those whose obligation is in effect everywhere and those tied to the Temple. There are certain mitzvot whose fulfillment in the Temple is different from their fulfillment in outlying areas. The mitzva of taking the four species has one form and one procedure when performed in the outlying areas and another form and procedure when performed in the Temple. The fundamental connection between the mitzva of the four species and the Temple is derived from the verse in Leviticus (23:40). 
  The first section of this chapter deals with analysis of different aspects of that connection. There are various problems in that regard as far as time is concerned: When does the obligation to take the species begin, and what are the differences in that regard between the Temple and outlying areas? How is the mitzva of the four species performed on Shabbat, on a Festival day, and during the intermediate days of the Festival? Destruction of the Temple engendered a new definition of halakhic time. What are its ramifications vis-à-vis the mitzva of lulav? What pre-destruction practices remain in effect after the destruction of the Temple, and which cease to be relevant once the Temple is no longer standing? And likewise, what is the procedure for taking the four species in the Temple relative to the procedure everywhere else? Answering the last question requires explaining how these procedures were performed in the Temple and how they were performed everywhere else.
  The second section of the chapter deals with another mitzva, the mitzva of the water libation on the festival of Sukkot. This mitzva, in addition to the standard, daily libation of wine, is not written in the Torah; rather, it is a tradition dating back to the revelation at Sinai. However, the general halakha contains within it numerous practical halakhot, and the Gemara explains the procedure in detail: Which water is used? From where is it brought? How is it poured on the altar? What mitzvot accompany this libation?
  Discussion of the mitzva of the four species in the Temple and in the outlying areas as well as a description of the water libation constitute the main focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  This chapter included an analysis of the mitzvot of the festival of Sukkot practiced in the Temple, as well as a discussion of what can be learned from those mitzvot with regard to the mitzvot of the Festival practiced everywhere else.
  One fundamental problem was related to the fulfillment of these mitzvot on Shabbat, as, above and beyond the Torah prohibitions, the Sages issued decrees prohibiting several activities on Shabbat. Although most of those decrees were not in effect in the Temple, some were. With regard to the mitzva of the four species, although the mitzva in the Temple was to take the species all seven days, the Sages instituted that even in the Temple, only on the first day does fulfillment of the mitzva override Shabbat, and outside the Temple, it does not override Shabbat at all. Likewise, the Sages determined that the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple overrides Shabbat only on the seventh day of the Festival. In addition, drawing water for the water libation does not override Shabbat. However, a device was fashioned that enabled the water libation to be poured even on Shabbat.
  Two significant mitzvot were performed in the Temple during the festival of Sukkot, the mitzva of the water libation and the mitzva to encircle the altar with willow branches. Neither is written in the Torah; they are traditions transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The mitzva of the water libation was detailed extensively in this chapter: How they drew water from the Siloam pool and how they took it up to be poured on the altar in a procession accompanied by trumpet blasts. In addition, the mitzva of the willow branch in the Temple was detailed extensively, both the surrounding of the altar with upright willow branches and the circling of the altar with willow branches in hand, as were the accompanying pronouncements.
  Another problem addressed in this chapter relates to the Eighth Day of Assembly, which follows the seven days of Sukkot. On the one hand, it is characterized as a pilgrim Festival in and of itself, independent of Sukkot. However, due to its proximity to the festival of Sukkot, several problems arise, e.g., how does one make the transition from one Festival to another without undermining the sanctity and distinctiveness of each? This is even more problematic in the Diaspora, where there is uncertainty whether the Eighth Day of Assembly is actually the seventh day of Sukkot. Fundamentally, the Eighth Day of Assembly is a Festival in and of itself in every respect, and one recites the blessing of time at the outset of the Festival. However, with regard to residing in the sukka, there are numerous opinions. Even today, there is no firm ruling governing this practice and the custom varies in different areas in the Diaspora. 
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  You shall prepare for you the festival of Sukkot for seven days, as you gather from your threshing floor and from your winepress. And you shall rejoice in your Festival, you, and your son, and your daughter, and your manservant, and your maidservant, and the Levite, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow that are within your gates. Seven days shall you keep a feast unto the Lord your God in the place which the Lord shall choose; because the Lord your God shall bless you in all your increase, and in all the work of your hands, and you shall be altogether joyful. Three times in a year shall all your males appear before the Lord your God in the place which He shall choose; on the festival of Passover, and on Shavuot, and on Sukkot; and they shall not appear before the Lord empty. (Deuteronomy 16:13–16)
  And on the fifteenth day of the seventh month you shall have a holy convocation: you shall do no manner of servile work, and you shall keep a Festival unto the Lord seven days; and you shall present a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor unto the Lord: thirteen young bulls, two rams, fourteen he-lambs of the first year; they shall be without blemish; and their meal-offering, fine flour mingled with oil, three tenth parts for every bull of the thirteen bulls, two tenth parts for each ram of the two rams, and a several tenth part for every lamb of the fourteen lambs; and one tenth part for every lamb of the fourteen lambs; and one he-goat for a sin-offering beside the daily burnt-offering, the meal-offering thereof, and the drink-offering thereof. And on the second day you shall present twelve young bulls, two rams, fourteen he-lambs of the first year without blemish. (Numbers 29:12–17)
  There are two elements that characterize the sacred Temple service on the festival of Sukkot: Rejoicing and offerings. Those two elements are not unique to this Festival; however, quantitatively and in terms of emphasis, this Festival is indeed unique with regard to those two elements relative to the other Festivals.
  One mitzva that is especially conspicuous during the festival of Sukkot is the mitzva of rejoicing. Although there is a mitzva to rejoice on all the Festivals, on the festival of Sukkot the mitzva of extreme rejoicing takes center stage. To enhance this mitzva, different innovations and services beyond the standard practice in the Temple were introduced: Musical instruments were played more than on other days, additional lights were added, and in general, ordinances were instituted and other measures were taken to facilitate great rejoicing and at the same time to ensure that it did not become excessive. 
  Another mitzva unique to the festival of Sukkot is the myriad additional offerings. Although there is an additional offering sacrificed on every Festival beyond the daily offerings, the sheer number of additional offerings sacrificed on Sukkot render it unique. The added offerings and the manner in which they were sacrificed, as well as the division of labor between the various priestly watches, are subject to analysis and elucidation.
  These two matters will be analyzed and described in great detail in this chapter. Related questions will also be addressed, e.g., what is the procedure when Shabbat coincides with the festival of Sukkot? In addition, more general questions will be raised with regard to procedures of the Temple service incidental to analysis of the chapter's central topics.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  This chapter was devoted completely to the customs practiced in the Temple during the seven days of the festival of Sukkot. The Celebration of Drawing Water was a public event accompanied by great pomp and ceremony. To facilitate that celebration and to ensure that it did not cross the line into immorality, the Sages undertook several special practices to achieve separation between men and women and to ensure that those singing and dancing were prominent Torah luminaries.
  In the discussion of the Celebration of Drawing Water, the general procedures for playing music in the Temple were also discussed. The conclusion was that there are three types of music. Music in the context of the Celebration of Drawing Water, which is to promote extreme rejoicing, was played only during the week, and anyone could participate in playing the musical instruments. Music that accompanied the sacrificial service was played every day, even on Shabbat and Festivals, because it was for the purpose of sacrificing the offerings, and all the more so, the sounding of the shofar and the trumpets for the various offerings were performed, as they are a Torah obligation. 
  Since the chapter dealt with the music played at the Celebration of Drawing Water, it also discussed the shofar and trumpet blasts that accompanied the offerings throughout the Festival, as well as the blasts sounded throughout the year during the week on Shabbat and Festival eves and at their conclusion.
  Another topic dealt with in this chapter was the division of the additional offerings. The additional offerings on Sukkot are more numerous than those on any other Festival; in addition, unlike on other Festivals, the number of offerings sacrificed vary from day to day. Therefore, a special division of labor was required by means of which all the priestly watches, who ascended to Jerusalem to serve during the pilgrim Festivals, would divide the additional offerings among themselves. The objective was to ensure that all the priestly watches would sacrifice an equal number of each type of offering. On a related note, also addressed were several matters concerning the division of the Temple service among the priestly watches on Shabbat and Festivals throughout the year.
  
  Taanit
  
  Introduction to Taanit
  
  Tractate Ta'anit, as its name indicates, focuses mainly on the halakhot and themes of fast days [ta'aniyot], covering both communal fasts and private, individual fasts and addressing both those that have fixed dates and those that are established from time to time in response to various negative events. In the Jerusalem Talmud and certain works of the early authorities, the tractate is called by the plural term, Ta'aniyot.
  The concept of a fast day as a mitzva in its own right does not appear in the Torah. It is true that the Torah refers to Yom Kippur as an affliction of the soul; see, for example, Leviticus 16:29. However, the Torah's description means that unlike regular fasts, this particular fast is for the purification of the soul. Nevertheless, there is a connection between Yom Kippur and the fasts discussed in this tractate, on both the theoretical and the practical levels. 
  There are many references to fasts in the Prophets and Writings. Numerous verses teach about the meaning and purpose of fast days, as well as the manner of their observance, both communal and individual, as they were practiced by the Jewish people in ancient times. Consequently, the content of tractate Ta'anit is based on oral traditions transmitted to Moses at Sinai, as expressed in practical terms in many books of the Bible.
  The fundamental idea of fast days is based on the assumption that events in the world do not happen by chance and for no reason. Rather, just as there are physical causes for occurrences, there are also spiritual and moral explanations. In general terms, reward is bestowed for good deeds and punishment for evil. Human action is scrutinized by Divine Providence, again both on the level of the individual as well as that of the community, or indeed, the entire nation. Therefore, any misfortune visited upon a congregation or an individual has a purpose and a meaning. Sometimes it serves as a warning that one's actions are corrupt and must be amended; on other occasions it is a punishment for sins, as explained at length by the Torah in the chapter of rebuke (Leviticus, chapter 26). Accordingly, in every time of trouble and distress, one should increase his prayers, repent, and make amends for any wrongs he has committed. He should sanctify himself so that his previous transgressions will be forgiven, and pray and beseech God to avert the evil decree. 
  As indicated by the Hebrew word ta'anit, a fast is a time of affliction [inui]. As explained in the Gemara and in the books of the Prophets and Writings, on a fast day one abstains from eating and drinking. For the most important fasts, the Sages added the prohibitions against wearing shoes, engaging in conjugal relations, anointing, and bathing. Nevertheless, both the prophets and the Sages stress that the fasting and other suffering that one accepts upon himself are not the purpose and ultimate aim of the fast day. See, for example, Isaiah, chapter 57, which is read on Yom Kippur. The fasting and other suffering are merely a means of achieving atonement and purity of the soul. It is prayer, charity, and repentance, i.e., a reconsideration of past actions and an acceptance of improvement for the future, which constitute the main focus of fast days. For this reason tractate Ta'anit does not focus on the detailed halakhot of fasting, but on the other aspects of the day: The additional prayers and spiritual awakening through study and action. 
  The most common misfortune that should stir feelings of repentance is a lack of rain, and therefore most of the tractate deals with this issue. As stated in the Torah (Deuteronomy 11:17), a drought is a sign of God's anger, as both a warning and a punishment. At a time of a dearth of rain, even more than with other disasters, one has no way to improve the situation other than by turning to God and praying. Furthermore, a lack of rain is not simply a local or temporary problem; it can bring catastrophe on the entire country. Much of tractate Ta'anit, and indeed many of the halakhot of fast days, concern fasts established to entreat God for rainfall.
  Since a drought of rain causes increasingly severe difficulties as time goes on, the fasts become correspondingly severe as well. The Sages did not simply establish one fast day, but several complex cycles of fasts, which become more and more stringent as a drought continues.
  Any communal fast that does not have a fixed date, i.e., which is neither a response to a current emergency nor commemorates a historical event, is established on a Monday or Thursday, the days on which the Torah is read in public and the courts would convene. The cycle of fast days does not occur on the other days of the week but only on these two days, in consecutive order.
  Naturally, there is a gloomy, even mournful, aspect to fasts, as they are declared for sad events and are intended to prevent misfortunes from continuing or becoming worse. One exception to this rule is Yom Kippur, which is classified as a Festival, and which includes the joy of purification. Furthermore, as explained at the end of the tractate, this date was established as a joyful holiday, on which marriageable young girls would go out, dance in the vineyards, and seek husbands.
  These apparently negative features of fast days are designed to awaken one's heart to repentance and have the same goal as public gatherings for prayer, readings from the Torah, speeches of moral reproof and instruction, and all other such activities. The aim is for all the participants to correct their errors and shortcomings, both as a community and as individuals.
  Although drought is the most common and prolonged cause for fasting, any misfortune that befalls a community should be met with prayers and calling out to God. See, for instance, I Kings, chapter 8. This applies to natural disasters such as flooding and storms, attacks of wild animals or locusts, and infectious diseases, as well as to man-made events, e.g., wars or persecution by the ruling authorities. Under certain circumstances, any of these misfortunes could be a reason for the decreeing of a fast. Furthermore, the purpose of the fast can vary. One might pray that a punishment that has already been imposed be canceled or diminished, or entreat God to avert an impending danger. A fast can even be an act of solidarity with the sufferings of another Jewish community, especially one in Eretz Yisrael. This applies to individual fasts as well. 
  Sometimes a person will accept a fast upon himself, generally by means of a declaration during the afternoon service of the previous day, as part of a broader effort to achieve atonement for his sins, or as a request that he will not suffer a certain misfortune, e.g., one that appeared in his dreams. Naturally, the status of a fast of an individual, or even a collection of individuals, is unlike that of a communal fast, with regard to both its severity and to the manner of its initiation. In the case of a community these are determined by the events of the day and the needs of the public. 
  In addition to those fasts, which are a response to current misfortunes and are established in hope of a better future, there are also fixed fast days of memorial which were established to commemorate disasters and occurrences of earlier generations. Yet here too the fast is directed toward the future, as remembering past events is meant to awaken hearts to the general redemption that will be at the end of days. However, these days, which commemorate national disasters, especially those involving the destruction of the First and Second Temples, are not only days of fasting and memorial, but also days of mourning. The most prominent of these dates is the Ninth of Av, which has become a symbol of all the tribulations of the Jewish people, due to the many misfortunes that occurred on this day. Virtually all the mitzvot and prohibitions that apply to someone in mourning for the dead are obligatory for everyone on the Ninth of Av. 
  With the exception of Yom Kippur, all fast days apply by rabbinic law. Admittedly, the fixed fast dates, i.e., the Ninth of Av, the tenth of Tevet, the seventeenth of Tammuz, and the third of Tishrei, are of ancient origin, as they were instituted by the prophets (see Zechariah, chapter 7). However, as they have no basis in the Torah itself, they are considered to be by rabbinical law.
  Since the fasts were established by the Sages, they may not occur on fixed days of delight and rejoicing mandated by Torah law, i.e., Shabbat and Festivals. However, there are other days mentioned in the Torah whose status is not as clear-cut. It must be determined whether fasts can be established on New Moons or the intermediate Festival days, which are days of celebration but not full-fledged Festivals. A similar question applies to festive days established by the Sages over the generations as memorials of happy occasions. When a fast is decreed for a calamity, or when a fast occurs as part of the lengthy cycles of fasts or as a fast of the non-priestly watches, it is possible that it will coincide with one of these days of rejoicing. It is therefore necessary to establish which of these days can be overridden by a fast. 
  Tractate Ta'anit consists of four chapters, each dealing with its own topic:
  Chapter One focuses on rainfall, the common dates for the various rainfalls of the year, the significance of rain in general, and the order of the cycles of fasts for rainfall.
  Chapter Two addresses the special prayers and customs of fast days, especially those of the major communal fasts.
  Chapter Three contains a broad discussion of the events for which fasts are decreed. This chapter focuses on the misfortunes mentioned in the previous chapters, as well as other calamities of various kinds. 
  Chapter Four primarily addresses days on which fasting is prohibited, due to the fact that those days have been established as permanent days of rejoicing. It also discusses certain fixed communal fasts in memory of general disasters that befell the Jewish people.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  And the land, where you are going over to possess it, is a land of hills and valleys, and it drinks water as the rain of heaven comes down; a land which the Lord your God cares for; the eyes of the Lord your God are always upon it, from the beginning of the year until the end of the year. (Deuteronomy 11:11–12)
  And the anger of the Lord will be kindled against you, and He will close up the heavens, and there will be no rain, and the earth will not give its fruit, and you will perish quickly from off the good land which the Lord gives you. (Deuteronomy 11:17)
  When heaven is closed up, and there is no rain, when they sin against You; if they pray toward this place, and confess Your name and turn from their sin, when You afflict them; then You hear in heaven, and forgive the sin of Your servants and of Your people Israel, when You teach them the good way in which they should walk; and send rain upon Your land, which You have given to Your people as an inheritance.
  (I Kings 8:35–36)
  This chapter deals with the times of fasts decreed for lack of rainfall. Essentially, it addresses two main issues: The appropriate dates for rainfall, and the order of fasts for a drought. 
  Before discussing the lack of rain, the proper dates of rainfall must be established. The halakhic relevance of this issue involves the times when one mentions and prays for rain, as these formulations are incorporated into the daily prayer service only during the rainy season. It is therefore necessary to establish the start and end of the rainy season. Since the Mishna was composed in Eretz Yisrael and is concerned with life there, the halakhot in it are geared primarily toward its climate. Consequently, it remains to be determined how Jews living elsewhere should behave, especially residents of places where the rainy season differs greatly from that of Eretz Yisrael. 
  A second question is the declaration of fast days for rainfall: When is a lack of rain considered significant and a possible sign of a drought, which necessitates prayer and even a fast? As more time goes by without rain the position of farmers steadily worsens, and the various sets and cycles of fasts that the Sages decreed likewise increase in severity. These sets of fasts differ from each other in number and rigor. 
  The details of these issues, as well as statements and comments with regard to rain in general, form the subject matter of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  The prayers for rain can be divided into two time periods. Initially, one merely mentions rain, by means of the statement: He makes the wind blow and the rain fall, in the Amida prayer in the second blessing, without actually requesting rainfall. This period begins on the Eighth Day of Assembly immediately following Sukkot. During the second period, one also requests rain, adding the phrase: And give dew and rain, in the ninth blessing of the Amida. In Eretz Yisrael one first recites this prayer on the seventh of Heshvan, while in Babylonia one starts sixty days after the vernal equinox. The halakha for other countries is to act in accordance with the custom of Babylonia, even in places with an entirely different climate. 
  If no rain has fallen a short while after one starts to request rain, i.e., at the proper time for the first rainfall, marking the beginning of the rainy season, Torah scholars start observing private fasts on behalf of the community. If no rain falls, the entire community observes three fasts that start in the morning, on which they pray for rain. If these fasts have passed and still no rain has fallen, three additional, more severe fasts are declared, again for the entire community. These fasts, which commence at nighttime, involve not only a prohibition against eating and drinking but also against other types of comfort. If the lack of rain continues after this set of three fasts, seven more fast days are decreed. These are even more severe than the previous three, as they include many public displays of mourning, designed to awaken the hearts of the community to prayer. 
  Incidental to these discussions, the chapter also addressed the halakhot of an individual fast. Fast days of this kind must be accepted by the individual in question in the afternoon service of the day before. Private fasts generally start in the morning, and they must be fulfilled like any other vow an individual accepts upon himself. 
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  When heaven is closed up, and there is no rain, when they sin against You; if they pray toward this place, and confess Your name and turn from their sin, when You afflict them; then You hear in heaven, and forgive the sin of Your servants and of Your people Israel, when You teach them the good way in which they should walk; and send rain upon Your land, which You have given to Your people as an inheritance. (I Kings 8:35–36)
  Blow the horn in Zion, sanctify a fast, call a solemn assembly, gather the people, sanctify the congregation, assemble the elders, gather the children, and those who suck the breasts. Let the bridegroom go forth from his chamber, and the bride out of her pavilion. Let the priests, the ministers of the Lord, weep between the Entrance Hall and the altar, and let them say: Spare Your people, O Lord, and give not Your heritage to reproach, that the nations should make them a byword. Why should they say among the peoples: Where is their God? Then the Lord was jealous for His land, and had pity upon His people. And the Lord answered and said to His people: Behold, I will send you corn, and wine, and oil, and you shall be satisfied with it; and I will no more make you a reproach among the nations. (Joel 2:15–19)
  Since the main aspect of a fast day is not the fast itself but the gathering of the community for prayer and the awakening of the general populace to repentance, the Sages instituted a fixed practice for fast days to further these ends. In addition to abstaining from food and drink, the community recites extra prayers and engages in many rituals to emphasize the importance of the fast and encourage people to amend their behavior and spiritual state. These rituals are an especially prominent feature of the severe fast days, when it is vital to arouse the people's hearts to repentance. 
  This chapter mainly describes the special order of prayers of the last set of fasts for rain. The details elucidated include the place where the congregation gathers to recite the prayers, as well as other rituals designed to encourage repentance, by stressing the significance of the event and by demonstrating the mourning and suffering experienced by the entire community. Of especial importance are the many additional blessings of these fasts, and the manner of their recitation in public. 
  Other issues addressed in this chapter are those days on which a fast cannot be declared, and which individuals are exempt from fasting. Apart from Shabbat and Festivals, on which it is prohibited to fast by Torah law, and on which it is even prohibited to display any sign of mourning in public, there are other commemorative days that were established over the course of the generations that are unsuitable for fasts. These holidays came into being either through force of custom or by decree of the Sages. Likewise, there are certain categories of people who do not fast, whether due to weakness or illness or because they are occupied by a sacred service. 
  Finally, the chapter offers an analysis of the weight of those days on which fasting is prohibited relative to the severity and importance of fast days, as well as the significance of the service performed by those exempt individuals and their obligation to participate in the suffering of the community.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  The important communal fasts, especially the last set of fasts for rain, include two main features designed to emphasize the severity of the trouble and to stir the hearts of the people. The first includes rituals and customs such as the recitation of prayers in the city thoroughfare instead of the synagogue; the placement of ashes on the heads of the people; the removal of the ark, with ashes placed on it, to a public arena; and many other customs all meant to express dread in the face of the developing calamity. Likewise, the second feature was the Sages' institution of seven additional lengthy blessings recited on fast days by the prayer leader. The texts of these blessings are cited in the Mishna and Gemara. 
  In the Temple, they would add an impressive ritual in which the shofar and trumpets were sounded by priests between each blessing. In all places they would recite additional blessings and read passages from the Torah and the Prophets that deal with fasting and prayers for salvation.
  With regard to the individuals exempt from fasting, the broad conclusion is that priests assigned to the Temple service, particularly those members of the patrilineal family who are actually involved in the sacred service, are exempt from fasting in practice. However, so as not to separate themselves from the community, they perform symbolic gestures of solidarity with their lay brethren. The more severe the fast, the greater the participation of these exempt individuals, although the members of a ministering patrilineal family never observe a full fast.
  Apropos the discussion of these exempt individuals, the chapter also addressed other halakhot of the non-priestly watches, the priestly watches, and the patrilineal family. These halakhot are designed to prepare the members of these groups for the sacred service, and to prevent them from erring in the performance of their duties. For example, it is prohibited for ministering priests to drink wine or to grow their hair long.
  Some dates were established as days of rejoicing to commemorate various happy events that occurred to the Jewish people during the Second Temple period, and on these dates fasting and eulogies were prohibited. The Gemara concludes that none of those dates are in effect nowadays, with the exception of Hanukkah and Purim. 
  A special halakhic status applies to Hanukkah, Purim, and the New Moon. The court may not decree a fast on these days, ab initio. However, if these dates occur in the middle of a sequence of fasts, the order is not changed on their account and the fast is observed as planned.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  If there is famine in the land, if there is pestilence, if there is blasting or mildew, locust or caterpillar; if their enemy besiege them in the land of their cities; whatever plague, whatever sickness there be; any prayer and any supplication made by any man of all Your people Israel, who shall know every man the plague of his own heart, and spread forth his hands toward this house. Then may You hear in Heaven, Your dwelling-place, and forgive, and do, and render to every man according to all his ways, whose heart You know, for You, You alone, know the hearts of all the children of men. (I Kings 8:37–39)
  Up to this point the tractate has discussed the most commonly decreed fast day, i.e., that which is due to a lack of rain. However, it is certainly appropriate to fast and pray concerning any catastrophe that might strike a community. Several issues arise with regard to this. First, the events that warrant a fast must be clarified, as one should fast only over disasters or very serious troubles, not for every problem encountered. Similarly, there are intermediate cases that are not cause for a fast, but for which it is proper to awaken the congregation to repentance by means of prayers and supplications. 
  In addition to the appropriate conditions for decreeing a fast day, the timing of this declaration is equally important. The order of fasts for rain is more or less fixed, as they depend on the yearly seasons. In contrast, when an event occurs that poses an immediate danger, there is no time to wait before fasting. 
  An additional question concerns the extent of these fasts. There is a difference between disasters and catastrophes that involve the Jewish people as a whole, and events that affect only a particular place or a small group of people. Sometimes a local occurrence is considered a general threat, and occasionally communities are obligated to participate in the distress of Jews living elsewhere. The clarification of these matters is the main issue of this chapter. 
  Another issue discussed here is how to proceed when God answers the prayers and rescues the people from the disaster for which a fast was declared. Is it appropriate to conclude the fast as originally planned, or should it be stopped when the reason for its declaration has been removed? Finally, it is necessary to establish how the community should express its gratitude toward God for responding favorably to its prayers.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  It is appropriate to fast over any event that is likely to have serious adverse effects on the livelihood, health, or well-being of the Jewish people. If the danger is immediate, the fast day is decreed as near as possible to the event in question. However, it is not necessary for the event to pose an urgent threat. Even a potential hazard, e.g., an army that is merely passing through the country, is worthy of a fast. 
  The general principle is that if a misfortune is limited to a certain place, only the residents of that location fast, while Jews living elsewhere pray for them without fasting. However, if the disaster is liable to spread, such as an infectious disease and the like, all those living in that country or region must fast as well. An exception to this rule is a calamity visited upon Eretz Yisrael. In this case, all Jews everywhere must fast, as Eretz Yisrael is considered the center and heart of the nation.
  The early commentaries call this chapter: The Chapter of the Pious, as although it contains several halakhic discussions, it is mainly a collection of stories of righteous people who prayed in times of trouble and of how their prayers were answered. These narratives serve an instructional purpose by providing a vivid demonstration that God indeed answers the prayers and requests of the worthy. They also suggest a broad definition of the righteous individual, as they indicate that the identity of the truly righteous is not always known. Furthermore, these narratives teach that anyone who exerts himself in good deeds should pray for assistance on behalf of the community, even if he is not recognized as an especially sacred individual.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentation; and I will bring up sackcloth upon all loins, and baldness upon every head; and I will make it as the mourning for an only son, and its end as a bitter day. (Amos 8:10)
  Thus says the Lord of hosts: The fast of the fourth month, and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth, shall be to the house of Judah joy and gladness, and cheerful Festivals; therefore love truth and peace. (Zechariah 8:19)
  The fasts discussed in the tractate up until this chapter are those decreed upon the public due to a calamity. These fasts, which include fasts for rain, do not occur on fixed dates but are declared in response to a catastrophe that afflicts the Jewish people. However, there is another category of fast days, those that occur on fixed dates every year. 
  The fasts discussed in this chapter are of two very different types. One was observed by the members of the non-priestly watch when the Temple was standing. These fasts were not decreed in response to an event that might have occurred at the time, but were designed for general supplications for the continuation of normal life, for health, and for success. This chapter discusses the halakhot of these fasts, the special prayers for the non-priestly watches, and the relationship between them and the various holidays throughout the year.
  An entirely different type of fast day also discussed in this chapter is the memorial fast, which consists of fasts on dates already decreed following the destruction of the First Temple and reestablished after the Second Temple was destroyed. There are four standard fast days that commemorate general calamities that befell the Jewish people, especially the destruction of the Temple, an event that brought many other catastrophes upon the Jewish people in its wake.
  The clarification of the halakhot of these memorial days, which are not merely fasts but days of national mourning, especially the Ninth of Av, is the main topic of this chapter. Incidental to this issue, the chapter also addresses the customs of other special dates of the year which were celebrated as days of rejoicing when the Temple was in existence.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The common denominator of the non-priestly watches and the dates the wood offerings are brought is that they both are occasions when the Jewish people participate to a certain extent in the Temple service. Although the service itself is performed solely by priests, the entire people, or at least a representative group, symbolically join them in their ministering. In addition to the various details of the non-priestly watches and the wood offerings, the Gemara established that on any commemorative day, whether a fixed Festival from the Torah or a day on which hallel is recited, the prayers and fasting of the watches are diminished and the joy of the day is emphasized. 
  Another topic that was addressed in this chapter was the fixed days of communal fasts. The Mishna and Gemara explained why these dates were chosen for the memorial fasts, and why they were established as permanent fast days. The main focus was on the Ninth of Av which, due to the numerous national disasters that occurred on this date, is not only established as a fixed communal fast, but is equal in severity to the extreme fasts for rain in that it begins at nightfall and requires all five categories of affliction to be observed. 
  Certain practices of mourning are observed on the Ninth of Av. Essentially, all halakhot that apply to an individual mourner are obligatory for everyone on this day, as no actions that gladden the heart may be performed. Moreover, certain periods before the Ninth of Av, specifically the week in which it occurs and the previous eight days of the month, are included in various aspects of the mourning.
  The tractate ends on a positive note, as the Mishna mentions the celebratory atmosphere of Yom Kippur and of the fifteenth of Av, on which special festive events were staged for the entire nation with the aim of bringing the Jewish people together and increasing joy among them.
  
  Yevamot
  
  Introduction to Yevamot
  
  Yevamot is the first tractate in the order of Nashim. Admittedly, some commentaries place Yevamot after Gittin (Meiri), but this is not widely accepted. While the tractate focuses mainly on the halakhot of levirate marriage, the elucidation of these halakhot necessitates an in-depth clarification of the halakhot of marriage in general. These include forbidden and disqualified marriages, i.e., those women with whom relations are forbidden with a certain man, whether by Torah law or by rabbinic law, as well as the definition and severity of these prohibitions. Consequently, the comprehensive discussions of tractate Yevamot form the basis of the entire order of Nashim.
  As stated above, in addition to the halakhot of levirate marriage, this tractate serves as an important and sometimes the only source for various aspects of forbidden sexual relations, as well as the halakhot of converts and conversion, and the definition of separation between man and wife, which concerns mainly the halakhot of refusal and the case of a deserted wife. Many of these discussions are complemented in Kiddushin, the last tractate in Nashim.
  The issue of levirate marriage is explicitly stated in the Torah in only one short passage (Deuteronomy 25:5–10). In addition, there are two episodes in the Bible that are connected to the idea of levirate marriage: The incident involving Judah, his sons, and Tamar (Genesis, chapter 38), and the marriage of Ruth and Boaz (Ruth, chapters 3–4). Both early and later commentaries discuss the relationship between these stories and the halakhot of levirate marriage set out in Deuteronomy. In any case, levirate marriage, as well as being a far-from-rare occurrence, is such a fundamental concept that an entire tractate is devoted its many details, on both the theoretical and the practical levels.
  Levirate marriage is a novel halakha; see the Gemara on 17b. In other words, it deviates from the norms of the legal system of the Torah. Generally, one who engages in relations with the wife of his brother violates a severe prohibition that makes him liable to karet (Leviticus 18:16, 20:21). However, if this woman's husband dies childless, not only is she permitted to the brother, it is actually a mitzva for him to marry her. Since forbidden sexual relationships are among the most severe of Torah prohibitions, indeed one of the three cardinal sins for which one must allow himself to be killed rather than transgress, the fact that one is permitted and even commanded to marry his brother's wife renders levirate marriage a highly exceptional case.
  Several halakhic discussions in this tractate concern the basic question of whether the mitzva of levirate marriage merely overrides the prohibition with regard to a brother's wife to a limited extent, or whether, in these special circumstances, the prohibition does not apply at all. One of the ways the Sages express this dialectic tension is with the statement that the verses “You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother's wife” (Leviticus 18:16) and “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5) were pronounced together (Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 3:5). 
  According to this line of reasoning, it is incorrect to say that a forbidden sexual relationship is permitted in the case of levirate marriage. In fact, the opposite is the case: The mitzva of levirate marriage applies only when no prohibition is in effect. If a potential levirate marriage would violate any other forbidden sexual relationship apart from that of a brother's wife, not only is there no mitzva to marry the woman, the obligation of levirate marriage does not apply in this case at all and she is actually forbidden to the brother. 
  Levirate marriage is unique not only with regard to the performance of the mitzva itself, but also in the fact that the obligation can be released by the act of halitza. Typically, the Torah imposes either absolute obligations that every Jew must fulfill at all times, e.g., the love of God; or mitzvot that are incumbent upon certain people part of the time, such as donning phylacteries; or commandments that apply if particular conditions are met, e.g., the halakhot of commerce or ritual slaughtering. In all these cases, once the mitzva is in force, one cannot release himself from the obligation. 
  By contrast, the option of halitza effectively provides the brother-in-law with the choice of whether or not he wants to perform levirate marriage. Consequently, the Sages apparently viewed halitza not as the negation of levirate marriage but as an alternative mitzva. Accordingly, the Torah allows the brother-in-law in this situation to select between two equivalent mitzvot. Some even maintain that halitza is preferable to levirate marriage; see 39b. This issue is also possibly connected to the debate in the Jerusalem Talmud as to whether halitza is itself a form of acquisition or simply an act that exempts the brother-in-law and releases the yevama. 
  With these points in mind, these mitzvot can be explained in the following terms. When a man dies childless, he leaves behind a void in a soul that was unable to come to full fruition in the world. Consequently, his surviving brother must replace him by marrying his widow. In this manner the surviving brother is considered to be continuing his late brother's life. For this reason, by Torah law there is no new ritual of betrothal or a wedding ceremony in the case of levirate marriage, as it carries on the previous bond. This consideration also affects the halakhot of inheritance and the marriage contract, among other matters. If the brother-in-law bears a child he is viewed as completing his brother's mission.
  See the Ramban's Commentary on the Torah with regard to both the episode of Judah and Tamar and the chapter on levirate marriage itself, where he discusses the fundamental idea of levirate marriages in light of these passages. Indeed, the story of Judah and Tamar, among other things, teaches the great responsibility of this task and the punishment of those who refuse to fulfill it in the proper manner.
  Conversely, halitza is essentially a ritual of atonement and purification, through which the brother-in-law and his yevama are released from their mutual bond and from the weighty obligation placed on their shoulders. Moreover, this is the means by which the life cycle of the deceased brother is brought to a close. 
  Another feature of levirate marriage is that in contrast to a regular marriage, in which the man chooses the woman he wishes to wed, the yevama and brother-in-law are tied together by a decree of the Torah. This connection, called by the Sages the levirate bond, is one of the central topics of the tractate. Some Sages view this link as merely an obligation to marry a particular woman, which in practical terms simply means that she is not permitted to marry anyone else until the obligation has been released by means of halitza. This opinion is expressed as: There is no bond. However, the halakha is that there is a bond, i.e., the link between a brother-in-law and a yevama is virtually akin to a marital bond, as she is considered betrothed to him to a certain extent. One of the ramifications of this ruling is that her close female relatives are forbidden to the brother-in-law. 
  In light of the above, to preserve the boundaries of modesty and to prevent any miscomprehension of the halakhot of marriage, the Sages enacted that a brother-in-law should perform an act of betrothal with his yevama. This is called a ma'amar, a levirate betrothal. Furthermore, if he gives her a bill of divorce while she is waiting for either levirate marriage or halitza, his act is effective to a certain extent. On the one hand, these rabbinic enactments draw levirate marriage closer to a regular marriage, but on the other hand they can cause many problems for the marriage and for halitza. 
  Likewise, other decrees of the Sages involving marriage, such as those concerning the marriage of a minor girl who is an orphan and the annulment of this tie by her refusal of her husband, as well as the marriage of deaf-mutes, also complicate the halakhot of levirate marriage, despite the fact that these enactments serve the public welfare. Some of these prohibitions stem from sanctity, i.e., they were enacted in order to preserve the sanctity of the Jewish people or the priesthood, and some of them apply to the entire people, such as having a sexual relationship with a mamzer or a man with crushed genitals or other genital wounds, or with converts from different nations. Other forbidden sexual relationships are secondary forbidden relatives prohibited by rabbinic law. 
  All these cases require not only a thorough analysis on their own account, but they must be properly defined before one can establish the relationship between these marriages and levirate marriage, which applies by Torah law. This matter concerns the validity of levirate marriage and halitza, the whole range of monetary issues that arise with regard to inheritance and the marriage contract, and the concomitant prohibitions and rights, e.g., the permission to partake of teruma and the conditions of the marriage contract.
  Furthermore, numerous other problems with levirate marriage can result from various causes, either due to complicated family relationships, e.g., if the yevama is permitted to only one of several brothers, or if a few deaths occur in succession, or because of factual or halakhic uncertainties. These might be doubts with regard to the halakhic and family status of a certain person, or unclear and possibly erroneous testimony concerning someone's death.
  The debates and analysis of all these problems, both separately and in various combinations, is why tractate Yevamot is considered one of the hardest, most complex tractates in the entire Talmud. 
  Tractate Yevamot is comprised of sixteen chapters. Some deal with one clearly defined topic, while others discuss several issues spread over different chapters.
  Chapter One focuses on the halakhot of women to whom the duty of levirate marriage does not apply, either because they are among those with whom relations are forbidden or for some other reason. Additionally, the chapter discusses the basic halakhic principles of when one mitzva overrides another.
  Chapter Two deals with the prohibition with regard to the wife of a brother with whom the yavam did not coexist. It also discusses the basic principles of the types of women who are obligated in levirate marriages, and those who have no option but to perform halitza due to a prohibition that would be violated by a sexual relationship; whether it is a definite or an uncertain prohibition, and whether it applies by Torah law or by rabbinic law.
  Chapter Three discusses those cases in which women who are relatives of each other are liable in levirate marriage, as well as a woman who is bound by an obligation of levirate marriage with two brothers.
  Chapter Four contains many topics: The case of erroneous halitza and levirate marriage, the halakhot of inheritance and the marriage contract of a brother-in-law and his yevama, the basic definitions of mamzer status, and the halakhot of conversion.
  Chapter Five discusses a single issue: The validity of a levirate betrothal [ma'amar] and the bill of divorce of a brother-in-law to his yevama, including all various permutations and combinations of these actions. 
  Chapter Six deals with the definition and halakhot of the act of intercourse, particularly with regard to a yevama, but also as it concerns marital relations in general. A portion of the chapter also discusses the prohibitions that apply only to priests, specifically to the High Priest, and the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. 
  Chapter Seven focuses on the halakhot of partaking of teruma as they apply to the daughter or the wife of a priest, and those actions that disqualify them from eating teruma.
  Chapter Eight discusses physical blemishes, particularly genital defects. These have ramifications with regard to eating teruma, permitted sexual relations, and the definition of a eunuch and a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], statuses that affect their eligibility for levirate marriage, among other matters.
  Chapter Nine provides a list of women who are forbidden to a husband, a yavam, or both. It also discusses the halakhot of those who are permitted to partake of teruma due to their marriage.
  Chapter Ten debates the range of problems that can result from an erroneous rumor of the death of a wife or a husband. These reports can cause complications if the surviving member of the couple remarries under these false pretenses. 
  Chapter Eleven focuses mainly on doubtful familial relationships, e.g., babies who were mixed up with each other, and the relationship status of a family that converted together. 
  Chapter Twelve deals with the halakhot of halitza; how, when, and in whose presence this ritual is performed. It also defines the shoe used for halitza and discusses other aspects of the ritual.
  Chapter Thirteen focuses mainly on issues that arise from problematic marriages, e.g., the marriage of a minor girl and its annulment through refusal; and the broader topic of the marriage of incompetents, such as minors, deaf-mutes, and imbeciles.
  Chapter Fourteen is concerned with the marriage of deaf-mutes and its halakhic status, both concerning the rights ensuing from marriage and the possibility of levirate marriage.
  Chapter Fifteen concentrates on the status and reliability of various forms of testimony concerning the death of a husband.
  Chapter Sixteen discusses the circumstances in which one may rely on testimony that a husband is dead, what the witnesses must say for their account to be accepted, and when one can rely on rumors and invalid witnesses in these cases.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  You shall not uncover the nakedness of your brother's wife; it is your brother's nakedness. (Leviticus 18:16)
  If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her and take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage. (Deuteronomy 25:5)
  By definition, the commandment of levirate marriage refers to an unusual situation: Generally, it is prohibited to marry one's brother's wife even after their divorce or after his brother's death. However, if the deceased brother did not leave any children, it is a mitzva for the surviving brother to marry his former wife. In other words, the mitzva of levirate marriage overrides the severe prohibition proscribing a brother's wife. 
  One of the practical questions of levirate marriage is whether this mitzva overrides other sexual prohibitions between the brother-in-law, who is referred to as the yavam, and his potential yevama, his brother's widow. In this regard, the tradition of the Sages in unambiguous: The mitzva of levirate marriage overrides the prohibition with regard to a brother's wife alone, not those who are forbidden by another prohibition. However, the precise halakhic definition of this tradition must be clarified. Does this mean that the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply at all in these cases, and the prohibition against marrying a brother's wife remains in force, as in the case of a deceased brother who did have children? Or is this a case in which the mitzva of levirate marriage applies, but due to other prohibitions it cannot be performed in practice, and the yavam must perform halitza instead? 
  A related issue is whether in a case of this kind the mitzva of levirate marriage is entirely canceled with regard to this brother, or whether the prohibition affects only his relationship with that particular woman. If so, he would have the option, either practical or at least theoretical, of entering into levirate marriage with another wife of the deceased brother, a so-called rival wife. 
  To resolve these problems, it is necessary to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the Torah's resolution of practical cases of conflict between two mitzvot, i.e., cases when the fulfillment of a certain positive commandment entails the violation of a prohibition. 
  The clarification of these issues and their practical ramifications form the main topics of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  This chapter discussed three problems in detail, all of which pertain to the issue of yevamot and their rival wives but have broader ramifications. 
  It is a principle in halakha that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition. One might think that the mitzva of levirate marriage is a perfect example of this principle, as this positive commandment overrides a prohibition that entails karet, i.e., a brother's wife. However, a closer analysis reveals that in fact a positive mitzva overrides a regular prohibition alone, and it does so only in situations when both commandments cannot be fulfilled. Furthermore, a positive mitzva does not override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva.
  The discussion of the source for the exemption of the rival wife of a woman who may not enter into levirate marriage led the Gemara to touch upon the question of whether halitza merely releases the couple from the obligation of levirate marriage or whether it is a different form of levirate marriage that changes the relationship between the brother-in-law and the yevama. 
  The exemption of rival wives itself is the subject of a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. This chapter discussed various aspects of this disagreement, e.g., whether Beit Shammai acted upon their own ruling or if the dispute was merely theoretical. The Gemara also debated several related issues, including when and to what extent the prohibition against splitting into factions, i.e., different practical implementations of the halakha, is in effect.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her and take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage. (Deuteronomy 25:5)
  In the first chapter, the Gemara discussed women who are prohibited from entering into levirate marriage due to their being close relatives of, and therefore severely forbidden to, their yavam, together with the rival wives of such women. It was explained that these women are exempt from both levirate marriage and halitza. However, there are other problems that can arise in cases of levirate marriage. Some women are not forbidden to their yavam with a prohibition of karet but are forbidden due to another prohibition or by rabbinic law. In these instances does the mitzva of levirate marriage override the prohibition?
  Another issue discussed in this chapter is the definition of some fundamental concepts in levirate marriage. The Torah states that the brother must perform the levirate marriage, but the question of who exactly is considered a brother requires clarification. The first chapter mentioned the concept of: A brother with whom he did not coexist, to whom the halakhot of levirate marriage and halitza do not apply. In such a case the exemption from levirate marriage is not due to a forbidden union but rather from the halakhot of levirate marriage themselves, as the verse states: “If brothers dwell together.” This chapter defines this concept, and clarifies the details and application of the halakha. 
  Another issue discussed in this chapter is what the Torah means when it uses the term “brother.” Does it refer to any brother or only the eldest, and does it apply equally to paternal and maternal half brothers? Must the brother performing levirate marriage be legitimate, or are illegitimate brothers included as well? 
  Another topic clarified in this chapter is the term “child” used in the verse. Since the Torah uses the masculine word for “child” does it also include a daughter? Does it include grandchildren and descendants? Does it refer only to legitimate children or also to illegitimate children? In cases of doubt as to whether or not there is a surviving child when the yavam dies is there an obligation to perform levirate marriage and halitza?
  These questions, along with several other corollary issues, constitute the primary substance of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter, in addition to touching on a wide range of topics, primarily discusses several difficulties that arise in the halakhot of levirate marriage. It also deals with difficulties inherent in the general halakhot of marriage.
  The halakha is that a brother is exempt from levirate marriage with the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist. This means that if a brother was born after the death of the childless man whose wife requires levirate marriage, this newborn brother is exempt from performing levirate marriage. This applies even if the yevama had in the meantime been married to another brother who later died childless as well, whereby she would once again happen before a yavam for levirate marriage. She is exempt from both levirate marriage and halitza and causes her rival wives to be exempt as well.
  Although the eldest brother is specified by the Torah for the mitzva of levirate marriage, all of the brothers are eligible to perform the mitzva. The brother referred to by the Torah for the purposes of levirate marriage is specifically a paternal brother. Any paternal brother is included, even if he was born outside of marriage or is a mamzer. However, it does not include a brother whose mother was a gentile or a Canaanite maidservant.
  The term “child” in the verse “If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child...” (Deuteronomy 25:5), is understood in the widest possible sense; it includes any descendants of the deceased brother. Whether it is a son, a daughter, or a grandchild, and whether that child is fit to enter the community or is disqualified, provided the descendant is not the child of a gentile woman or Canaanite maidservant, that child absolves the widow from the obligation of levirate marriage. 
  The Gemara concludes that in every case where the yevama is forbidden to the yavam, whether due to a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or a prohibition stemming from sanctity, including those prohibitions specific to the priestly class or those instituted by rabbinic law, even though she may not enter levirate marriage she must undergo halitza. This is because the mitzva itself still applies to her by Torah law. If she had a rival wife who was not forbidden, then that rival wife is permitted to enter into levirate marriage. Halitza rather than levirate marriage is also required in cases where it is uncertain whether the mitzva applies or to whom it applies. 
  As part of the deliberations over these issues, the matter of forbidden secondary relatives was also summarized in this chapter. These were defined as closely related women who did not fall under the category of forbidden relatives by Torah law, but were prohibited by rabbinic decree to create a safeguard, so that one not be confused between them and those women who are forbidden relatives by Torah law. The primary source for these halakhot is this chapter, and several issues were left unresolved, leading to disputes among halakhic authorities.
  Another subject mentioned in this chapter is the general prohibition against marrying a woman if that marriage would raise suspicions of previous misconduct or cast doubt upon the veracity of testimony or the uprightness of judges.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her and take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage. (Deuteronomy 25:5)
  The first two chapters of this tractate discussed the essential halakhot of levirate marriage in and of themselves. From Chapter Three onward, the Gemara's discussion concerns both how these halakhot apply to specific combinations of circumstances and the evaluation of different instructive examples. All of this is grounded in the principles that were clarified in the previous chapters. Based on these principles, the rulings are determined for situations where related women who were married to two or more brothers happen before their brothers-in-law, i.e., become candidates for levirate marriage with them, and the various possible relationships between these women and their brothers-in-law are evaluated as well. In the process it becomes clear that the relationship between brothers-in-law and yevamot, known in the Gemara as the levirate bond, requires further clarification. 
  From the verses, it is apparent that a sister-in-law requiring levirate marriage is bound to her brother-in-law and cannot marry another man until he releases her from the levirate bond via levirate marriage or halitza. The Torah itself, however, does not provide any definition of this bond. Perhaps the bond can be understood simply as a one-sided obligation, whereby the sister-in-law is compelled to wait for her brother-in-law to perform some act. This opinion asserts that the levirate bond is not substantial. Alternatively, one could explain that the levirate bond is substantial, and the relationship between the parties obligated in levirate marriage is similar to that of those who are engaged, in that it would be prohibited for the yavam to marry the relatives of the yevama, in the same way that it would be prohibited for him to marry the relatives of his wife. Indeed, this perspective raises a certain difficulty, for there should apparently be some difference between the simple case of a yevama who is bonded to a single brother-in-law and the case where she is bonded to two brothers-in-law or more. However, by defining the levirate bond as a relationship that is substantial enough to create prohibitions for the parties involved, a fundamental contradiction arises in the case of a woman who is simultaneously bound to two different men.
  Defining the parameters of the levirate relationship is also problematic when complex familial relations exist between the brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law. It must be determined precisely when the levirate bond is formed. Is it formed at the moment of the husband's death, following the opinion that a woman's status at the time of her husband's death determines her status with regard the levirate bond created between her and her brothers-in-law? Or, perhaps the original moment of marriage between the woman and her late husband created a levirate bond between her and her brothers-in-law, following the opinion that marriage determines a woman's status with regard to the levirate bond?
  This chapter explores and clarifies these issues along with other questions that arise incidentally within the Gemara's discussions.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  The nature of the levirate bond is not conclusively defined in this chapter. It is clear that the issue, which is disputed among the amora'im, is in fact a matter of dispute among the tanna'im as well. The various opinions and their conclusions on this matter are found within the many mishnayot of this chapter and in disputes pertaining to related fields that touch upon the status of women requiring levirate marriage.
  The general halakhic conclusion is that the levirate bond is substantial, and it begins at the moment of the husband's death. The bond created is of a unique nature, at once similar in effect to the bond of betrothal yet with clear differences. Due to its unique status, the levirate bond can exist between a single woman and several yevamin at once, and need not be limited to a single yavam. 
  The problems that arise from combinations of possible situations involving different relatives led to discussion of a wider question in this chapter: To what extent might a prohibition take effect where another prohibition already exists? All of the different opinions were clarified, from those that maintain that prohibitions do take effect where others already exist to those that propose that they can take effect only under special circumstances, e.g., when there are more inclusive prohibitions, expanded prohibitions, or simultaneous prohibitions.
  This chapter also discussed halakhic rulings in cases involving uncertainties. For example, the status of a woman who happens before a yavam is unclear because her betrothal or divorce is in doubt. In such cases, it was determined that the woman, and sometimes it is two women, require the act of halitza in order to resolve the situation.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  The chapter begins with a consideration of cases in which there was no requirement to perform levirate marriage or halitza but nevertheless they were mistakenly performed, e.g., if they were performed with a pregnant woman who later gave birth to a viable offspring. When halitza is performed in such cases, the question arises of how to relate to it. Does such an act of halitza have any significance? Does it effect any change in the woman's status? Does it render the woman unfit to marry a priest, and will it impact the levirate bond of her rival wife? 
  If the yavam and yevama engaged in relations together under the assumption that doing so would achieve the consummation of a levirate marriage, the situation is far more serious. This is because in cases where there is no requirement of levirate marriage, the two are prohibited from engaging in relations with each other by an explicit Torah prohibition. The Gemara discusses their liability for doing so and then further considers the status of a child born from such relations. Is it considered a mamzer? Will it be permitted to marry into the priesthood? 
  In many cases, if a child is born several months after the relations, there could be an uncertainty whether the child is actually the offspring of the original husband or of the yavam. If so, the child's status will be subject to uncertainty that will possibly render him a mamzer. Moreover, this uncertainty raises issues with regard to the legal status of the child vis-à-vis inheritance. The Gemara considers these issues in depth and discusses what the halakha is in various cases that might arise. Following this, the Gemara discusses the steps that should be taken to ensure such uncertainties never arise. 
  Another central issue discussed in the chapter is the relationship between a yavam and his yevama before any action has been taken, when there is only a levirate bond between them. In such cases, what rights does the yavam have over the property of the yevama? Is there a distinction between different categories of property, e.g., property that was bequeathed to her or her previous husband's property? This leads into a discussion of the legal obligations of a yavam to a yevama following the levirate marriage, especially with regard to the marriage contact.
  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the halakhot of slaves and of conversion. Upon purchase, a slave must immerse in a ritual bath for the sake of becoming a slave. This is a process similar to conversion, and the Gemara discusses the similarities and the distinctions between the two.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The chapter began with a discussion of a case in which a woman performed halitza or entered into levirate marriage under the assumption that she was required to do so, but it eventually emerged that she was pregnant at the time. The Gemara concludes that the validity of the halitza or levirate marriage depends on whether she ultimately required them or not. Therefore, if she ultimately miscarries, in which case it is apparent that she did require them, they are valid. However, if she ultimately gave birth to viable offspring, then the levirate marriage or halitza is of no significance.
  As part of that discussion, the Gemara considered cases in which a child is born to the yevama following levirate marriage and it is unclear whether the child is the offspring of her first husband or the yavam. The Gemara then considered the steps that must be taken in all marriages to prevent such uncertainties from arising and to ensure that the lineage of the Jewish people is clear and apparent. The Gemara explained that for this purpose the Sages decreed that no woman should remarry until three months have passed since the end of her previous marriage and it is clear whether or not she is pregnant. With regard to a pregnant or nursing woman the Sages likewise decreed that she should wait a certain period before remarrying.
  The Gemara proceeded to examine which cases of forbidden relations produce offspring with mamzer status. Although many views on the issue were presented, the accepted opinion is that only offspring from forbidden relations for which one is liable to receive karet are mamzerim, with the exception of a child born from a union with a menstruating woman, for which the punishment is not karet.
  The chapter also considered the issues relating to the property of the yevama and of her deceased husband. As long as the yevama is still awaiting levirate marriage, her property remains her own and under her control. If she dies during that period then that property is bequeathed to her heirs, while the money promised to her in her marriage contract is inherited by her husband's heirs. However, after the levirate marriage the yevama is considered to be the wife of the yavam in every sense, and therefore the yavam has the same level of control over her property as any other husband has over his wife's property. The only exception to this principle is that her marriage contract remains payable from her first husband's estate.
  The Gemara also discussed the halakhot of conversion and concluded that in order to convert it is necessary to be both circumcised and immersed for the sake of conversion before a court of three judges. A similar process is required for a slave; however, the Gemara examined whether there might be a distinction between the case of a convert and that of a slave with regard to whether it is necessary to willingly accept upon oneself the yoke of the mitzvot.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  This chapter deals exclusively with one issue: The relationship between the various acts that a yavam might perform with a yevama. In total, there are four options: Intercourse or halitza, which are effective by Torah law, and levirate betrothal [ma'amar] or a bill of divorce [get] by rabbinic law. This chapter clarifies the nature of the relationship between these options by discussing the relative efficacy of the modes of acquisition, i.e., intercourse or levirate betrothal, on the one hand, and the modes of release, i.e., halitza or a bill of divorce, on the other. These issues come to the fore when two or more of these acts are performed successively, whether they are performed by a single yavam with a single yevama, a single yavam with two yevamot who are co-wives, several yevamin with one yevama, or several yevamin with several yevamot.
  Examination of these various combinations helps clarify the relative legal validity of each of these acts. Does a given act conclusively determine the relationship between the yavam and the yevama, or does it leave room for a further act that might, if performed, alter matters?
  This clarification proves especially important with regard to the two acts that are of rabbinic ordinance: The levirate betrothal and the bill of divorce for a yevama. Indeed, the Sages were in dispute with regard to the exact nature of levirate betrothal and its power of acquisition: Does it constitute a fully valid act of acquisition like regular betrothal, does it grant only partial acquisition, or is it merely symbolic and bereft of any legal validity whatsoever? Similarly, with regard to a bill of divorce given to a woman requiring levirate marriage, in what way is this bill similar to an ordinary bill of divorce? To what extent does it serve only as a symbol and merely resemble standard bills of divorce?
  The clarification of these relationships and the various rabbinic ordinances involved constitute the subject matter for this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  From the discussion in this chapter it became clear that neither performing levirate betrothal nor giving a bill of divorce is a completely efficacious act for a woman requiring levirate marriage. While levirate betrothal effects some degree of acquisition and a bill of divorce effects some degree of release, there is room for subsequent acts to be applied, and if performed they are legally binding. This is true regardless of whether the act was performed by the original yavam with a different yevama or by a different yavam with the original yevama.
  Insofar as intercourse and halitza are concerned, we find that their halakhot are not identical. On the one hand, intercourse with a yevama is completely efficacious, and so long as the intercourse occurred first, i.e., before any other act that might invalidate it, any subsequent act is halakhically insignificant. However, if the act of intercourse followed a different previous act, the intercourse is considered invalid and other subsequent acts have legal implications. On the other hand, with regard to halitza, it makes no difference whether it was performed first or after another act; after halitza no other act of nullification, neither halitza nor a bill of divorce, holds any legal validity. However, acts of acquisition, i.e., intercourse or levirate betrothal, are still efficacious.
  In practice, it makes no difference whether any one of these combinations was performed by a single yavam with a single yevama or two yevamot, or by two yevamin with a single yevama or two yevamot. However, if a single yavam performed levirate betrothal and engaged in sexual relations with a single yevama, this is the proper way to perform the mitzva of levirate marriage. If he engaged in intercourse and then gave her a bill of divorce, then he performed the mitzva of levirate marriage and subsequently divorced the woman.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  If brothers dwell together and one of them dies and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin; her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her and take her to him to be his wife and consummate the levirate marriage. (Deuteronomy 25:5)
  By Torah law it is the act of intercourse itself by which the yevama is acquired by the yavam in fulfillment of the mitzva of levirate marriage. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the exact parameters of the act defined as intercourse for this purpose; both the objective definition of the act as well as the required intentions of the parties involved. Must they intend that the act be for the sake of performing a mitzva, or for the sake of validating the legal transaction? Or are their intentions irrelevant?
  The clarification of what is considered a sexual act is useful for other areas of halakha as well. With regard to forbidden sexual relations, which acts constitute full-fledged violation of a prohibition? What is the severity of the punishment for a given act? Furthermore, when does a forbidden act of intercourse disqualify a woman from marrying a priest? In the case of marriage, when is a marriage considered to be consummated? These issues are discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
  The chapter then turns to address the details governing women disqualified from marrying priests, especially the High Priest. How do these disqualifications come about? Who is included in these categories? Finally, the institution of marriage is addressed, with a particular emphasis on the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. What is necessary in order to fulfill this mitzva? Who is included in the obligation to have children? 
  These matters form the bulk of this chapter, but, as is the way of the Talmud, several secondary matters stemming from these primary questions are also discussed.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  The Torah decrees that a woman is acquired by her yavam in levirate marriage through sexual intercourse. This chapter clarified that as long as they intended to engage in an act of intercourse it makes no difference whether they did so willingly or whether they intended only to fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage; the very act itself serves to consummate and validate the levirate bond. With regard to the definition of the sexual act, even the first stage of sexual intercourse is considered an act of intercourse and consummates the levirate marriage.
  With regard to other forbidden sexual relations, the intention of the parties involved is relevant with regard to punishment, as one is not punished unless he intentionally violates a prohibition. However, other ramifications of forbidden relations apply regardless of intent. This includes the disqualification of a zona, i.e., a woman who had relations with a man whom she is forbidden to marry, from marrying a priest.
  With regard to women disqualified from the priesthood, the Gemara clarified that even if a woman is considered reserved for an invalid act of intercourse, she is, at least temporarily, disqualified from partaking of teruma. A common priest may not marry a zona, a divorcée, a woman who underwent halitza, or a convert. The High Priest may marry only a minor or a maiden, i.e., a woman within the first twelve months of adulthood, who is a virgin and has never been betrothed. However, if a priest betrothed a widow and was then appointed to be High Priest, he may marry her.
  All Jewish men are obligated by Torah law to marry and have children in order to fulfill the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. One has fulfilled this mitzva if he has both a son and a daughter. If his children die after bearing children of their own, he may still be in fulfillment of the mitzva through his grandchildren. One is even required to divorce his wife in order to marry another woman and fulfill the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, if his wife is unable to bear children. This chapter further clarified when this obligation applies, when a woman is presumed to be unable to bear children, and what the rights of a woman who cannot bear children are when she is divorced from her husband. Also included were aggadic statements pertaining to marriage in general, and the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply in particular.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  They [the priests] shall not take a woman who is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman divorced from her husband, for he is holy to his God. (Leviticus 21:7)
  A widow, or one divorced, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these he shall not take; but a virgin of his own people he shall take as a wife. (Leviticus 21:14)
  But if a priest buys any soul, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it; and such as are born in his house, they may eat of his bread. And if a priest's daughter be married to a common man, she shall not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred. But if a priest's daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned to her father's house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father's bread; but there shall no common man eat of it. (Leviticus 22:11–13)
  One of the topics discussed in the previous chapter is the halakha that a woman who has intercourse with a man who is unfit for her is rendered disqualified from marrying a priest. If she is the daughter of a priest, she may no longer partake of teruma. This chapter discusses the matter at length, although it is connected only tangentially to the main subject of the tractate.
  The Torah states that all the members of a priest's household, i.e., his wife, his sons and daughters, and their slaves, may partake of teruma. If the priest dies or divorces his wife, she may continue to partake of teruma only if she has children from him. Conversely, a priest's daughter who is married to a non-priest may not partake of teruma. If she is widowed or divorced from him, and has no children from him, she resumes partaking of teruma.
  These principles raise questions with regard to different types of unions between a priest and an Israelite woman or between the daughter of a priest and an Israelite man: If a priest betroths a woman who is unfit for him but whose betrothal to him is nevertheless valid, are she and her slaves entitled to partake of teruma? If not, are the slaves that she brings into the marriage considered his or hers? Also, what is the ruling with regard to a levirate bond between a priest and an Israelite woman?
  Precisely what constitutes the definition of a woman's having children from her husband is also discussed. Is a pregnant woman considered one who already has children from her husband, or is she still considered childless? Does the term children here refer specifically to their children, or does it apply to all of their descendants? Do children who are unfit to marry into the assembly of Israel qualify, or do only unflawed children count?
  This chapter discusses these issues both in principle and in detail.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  There is a principle, discussed in this chapter, that in a forbidden marriage between a priest and an Israelite woman, the wife may not partake of teruma, even if the marriage is valid. Therefore, her slaves may not partake of teruma either. However, her slaves of guaranteed investment may partake of teruma, as they are considered to be in the husband's possession.
  This chapter also dealt with the principle that the daughter of a priest can be disqualified from partaking of teruma more easily than an Israelite woman can be entitled to partake of it. The daughter of a priest is disqualified from partaking of teruma by having a levirate bond with an Israelite, being impregnated by an Israelite, or engaging in intercourse with a man who is unfit for her, even if he is only nine years old. Only actual marriage to an adult priest or bearing his child entitle her to partake of teruma.
  With regard to the definition of a woman who has children from a priest or a non-priest, any living Jewish offspring counts. This includes descendants and those who are unfit to marry into the assembly of Israel. However, descendants from gentile women or maidservants are excluded.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  A man wounded with crushed testicles or a severed penis shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord. A mamzer shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to the tenth generation shall not of his enter into the congregation of the Lord. An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord; even to the tenth generation shall none of them enter into the congregation of the Lord forever; because they did not meet you with bread and with water on the way, when you came forth out of Egypt; and because they hired against you Balaam, son of Beor, from Pethor of Aram Naharaim, to curse you. (Deuteronomy 23:2–5)
  You shall not abhor an Edomite, for he is your brother; you shall not abhor an Egyptian, because you were a stranger in his land. The sons of the third generation that are born to them may enter into the congregation of the Lord. (Deuteronomy 23:8–9)
  This chapter continues the discussion in the previous chapter and addresses a number of issues related to women who, as a result of their marriages, are entitled to eat teruma or are disqualified from doing so. Parallel to the case where it is permitted for a man to eat teruma while his wife is disqualified because their union itself is forbidden, there is a case where it is prohibited for the priest himself to eat teruma, but nevertheless he enables his wife to eat teruma on his account.
  The Gemara then clarifies the halakhot governing those who are prohibited from entering into the congregation of the Lord, i.e., marrying an individual who is fit and Jewish from birth. These restrictions may result from a physical injury, e.g., crushed testicles; from the individual's Ammonite, Moabite, Egyptian, or Edomite origins; or from his status as a child born of an incestuous or adulterous union [mamzer]. This chapter also discusses the differences between these cases and the implications for the status of their descendants.
  When the Torah speaks of a man with crushed testicles or a severed penis, it is referring to one whose sexual organs were impaired as a result of accident or injury. However, there are also others who are unable to have children due to a flaw in their sexual development. This includes both a man who is infertile due to natural causes [seris hamma] and a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit]. A significant portion of this chapter is dedicated to defining these cases and establishing their halakhic status on different counts, including determining the point at which they reach maturity and their eligibility for ordinary and levirate marriages. The discussion expands to include other cases of abnormal sexual development: A tumtum, one whose external sexual organs are indeterminate and it is unclear whether the person is male or female; and a hermaphrodite, who possesses both male and female genitals. Since the gender of such people is in doubt, this discussion is relevant to many areas of halakha. This chapter deals primarily with their standing with respect to marriage and the implications of their sexual relations.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter dealt with subject matter that is unrelated to the central issues of tractate Yevamot and appears here merely to complete the discussion started in the previous chapter. Discussion of the halakha that an uncircumcised or ritually impure priest enables his wife and slaves to partake of teruma, although he himself is prohibited from doing so, led to a clarification of the source of the halakha that an uncircumcised man is disqualified from eating teruma. Incidental to the discussion concerning a man with crushed testicles, who may himself partake of teruma but does not enable his wife to do so, the Gemara clarified the details of the halakhot governing a man with crushed testicles. What is the nature of his injury? Is there a medical remedy that can influence his halakhic status?
  As for the other cases of those disqualified from entering into marriage, the conclusion is reached that with regard to Ammonite and Moabite converts it is necessary to differentiate between males and females. Males, along with their male descendants, are permanently prohibited from entering into the congregation. Females, however, are permitted to do so even in the first generation. In the case of Egyptian and Edomite converts, on the other hand, male and female converts are equally prohibited from entering into the congregation, as are their direct descendants. However, the third-generation descendants are permitted. Those of mamzer status, as well as the Gibeonites, who by rabbinic decree have been given the same status, are prohibited from entering into the congregation forever, whether male or female.
  A man with crushed testicles or a severed penis is prohibited from entering into the congregation. However, the mitzva of levirate marriage still applies to these men and their wives. Those who are incapable of having children due to illness or some flaw in their development, including a sexually underdeveloped male or a sexually underdeveloped female, are not prohibited from entering into marriage, although the mitzva of levirate marriage does not apply to them. However, owing to the absence of secondary sexual characteristics, e.g., pubic hair, the point at which they reach maturity is uncertain. The Gemara concluded that if their status is clearly identified, then they are considered to have reached adulthood at the age of twenty. 
  Since a hermaphrodite has male genitals, he is considered male and may marry a woman. He is also considered male with regard to sexual relations. As for a tumtum, since he is subject to an uncertainty that cannot be clarified, the halakhot of marriage do not apply to him at all.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  This chapter begins with a summary of the tractate's previous chapters, including a detailed review of all of the possible combinations of men and women whose either regular or levirate marriages are prohibited. Following this, the chapter turns to a matter that has not yet been discussed: Clarification of the rights of women in prohibited marriages.
  In general, the property rights of a married woman depend on the circumstances of her marriage. During the time she is married, she is entitled to receive provisions for her sustenance from her husband, while he is entitled to the profits from usufruct properties that she brings into the marriage. 
  If the marriage is terminated as a result of the husband's death or a divorce, the woman is entitled to the main and additional sums specified in her marriage contract. The usufruct properties, which remained in her ownership even as her husband enjoyed the profits, now revert to her complete possession and control. Additionally, she retains possession of any articles of clothing that she brought into the marriage and wore.
  If, however, the marriage is annulled retroactively because it is deemed to have been invalid, the woman is entitled to receive all the profits her husband accrued from use of her usufruct properties.
  This chapter also deals with cases of marriage that, while prohibited by rabbinic or Torah law, are nevertheless deemed valid in the sense that they cannot be terminated without a bill of divorce. On this matter, a question arises: Is the woman bereft of rights in these cases of illegal marriage? Or perhaps, since she was in fact married, she retains some partial entitlements?
  Similarly, this chapter summarizes the right of women married to priests to partake of teruma during their husbands' lifetimes and after their deaths, as well as the right of women married to Levites to partake of the tithes during their husbands' lives and after their deaths.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  There are four categories of women involved in prohibited ordinary or levirate marriages: Women who are permitted to both their husbands and their yevamin, women who are permitted to their husbands but not to their yevamin due to some prohibition with regard to marriage to one but not the other; women who are permitted to their yevamin but not to their husbands for the same reason; and women who are forbidden to both their husbands and their yevamin due to a prohibition that applies to both.
  With regard to women's property rights, the conclusion is that in every case of forbidden marriage, the husband is forced to divorce his wife. In cases that stand in violation of Torah law, whereby the children are disqualified, the woman receives the sum specified in her marriage contract, while in cases where there is a violation of rabbinic law, the Sages imposed a penalty that denies all benefits to the wife, so as to hasten the divorce.
  It was concluded that so long as the marriage is in effect, wives of priests and Levites may partake of teruma and tithes, respectively. However, after the husband's death, the principle is that the woman may continue to benefit from these gifts by virtue of her descendants from the priest or Levite, only as long as she has no subsequent offspring. Similarly, the daughter of a priest or a Levite who was married to an Israelite may again receive benefits from the gifts given to her father's household after her husband's death, provided she has no descendants from her non-priest or non-Levite husband.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  Up to this point, tractate Yevamot has dealt primarily with different problems that arise due to the death of a husband and brother who did not leave behind any descendants. The deliberations focused on halakhic questions and uncertainties, sometimes touching upon various factual details. But in any case, there was never a doubt that there was a death. This chapter begins to discuss cases in which a husband or wife was informed of the death of their spouse, and later it turns out that this basic piece of information was incorrect.
  As a result of this mistaken information, the woman might enter into another marriage or a levirate marriage while technically she is still considered a married woman. Alternatively, a husband might marry his wife's sister, in violation of halakha. These forbidden marriages are sometimes performed by sanction of the court. However, the fact that the court issued a mistaken instruction does not change the facts; the prohibition remains in place.
  The majority of this chapter discusses a variety of situations which result from these forbidden marriages: The status of the man and the woman; their liability to bring a sin-offering for their inadvertent action; the status of the children born from this union; the question of whether or not the man or woman might return to their previous spouse; and the issue of property entitlements for a woman who entered an unlawful marriage.
  Another issue debated in this chapter is the sexual intercourse of a nine-year-old male child. According to halakha, only intercourse with a mature individual who is at least thirteen years of age and has developed two pubic hairs is considered full-fledged intercourse for all purposes. Intercourse with a male child under the age of nine is not considered to be intercourse at all. Intercourse with a male child of nine years and one day has the status of intercourse, but as the child is a minor, the act lacks the legal force to validate an acquisition. Therefore, the halakhic ramifications of this type of intercourse and its implications for levirate marriage must be clarified.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  With regard to a woman who inadvertently married another man while her husband was still alive, even if witnesses came forth to testify to her husband's death and the court allowed her to remarry, since the transgression did occur, the woman is forced to leave the husband whom she married in error and she is not permitted to return to her first husband. She even forfeits all property rights which generally pertain to a divorced woman.
  Some additional repercussions apply by Torah law. For example, her child from her second marriage is considered a mamzer. Other consequences are penalties imposed by the Sages. These penalties are designed on the one hand to hasten the termination of the unlawful marriage and on the other hand to ensure that a woman will remarry only after she knows with certainty that her first husband is indeed dead. In fact, it is due to these severe penalties that the halakha accepts the wife's testimony in this matter.
  In the case where a man marries his wife's sister by error, his wife is not thereby rendered forbidden to him. Nevertheless, the wife's sister remains forbidden to him, and their marriage is entirely invalid. The halakha with regard to both her and her children is the same as any other case of a woman involved in an incestuous union.
  With regard to sexual intercourse between a woman requiring levirate marriage and a nine-year-old yavam, it was determined that this act is equivalent to levirate betrothal, and therefore it serves to acquire the sister-in-law only partially, while leaving room for other acts of acquisition to take effect to a certain extent.
  
  Introduction to Perek XI
  
  This chapter deals with anomalous family relationships. Its main objective is to inquire into the halakhot of levirate marriage that pertain to these relationships, as that is the central topic of the tractate. However, other halakhic issues pertaining to these relationships are discussed as well.
  Aberrant family relationships can be caused in several manners. One such cause is non-marital intercourse, e.g., rape or seduction. Because several sexual relationships are prohibited only if the man and woman are related through marriage, bizarre family relationships can be created when a man marries a woman with whom his father or son engaged in nonmarital intercourse.
  Another possible cause of such relationships is conversion. The principle that a convert is considered reborn causes two convert brothers, even twins, to be considered unrelated by halakha with regard to levirate marriage and other issues. The chapter will also discuss the status of a child whose mother converted while she was pregnant with him.
  Another abnormal type of family relationship exists when babies are intermingled with each other at birth and their lineage is consequently indeterminate. This can happen to both related and unrelated infants. It is necessary to determine the halakhic relationship between these children and their indeterminate families with regard to levirate marriage. Other halakhic issues must be resolved as well, e.g., if the son of a priest is intermingled with the son of a maidservant, their status must be determined with regard to priestly rights and obligations. The chapter will discuss these halakhot as well.
  
  Summary of Perek XI
  
  Prohibitions with regard to sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are related through marriage apply only if they are related through actual marriage, not through nonmarital intercourse. Therefore, a man is permitted by Torah law to marry the close relatives of a woman he raped or seduced. However, the Sages decreed that this is prohibited, lest he continue his relationship with her even after marrying her relative. Marrying a woman who was raped or seduced by one's father, on the other hand, is permitted by rabbinic law as well. This can potentially cause the formation of bizarre family relationships that are recognized by halakha.
  Conversely, gentile relatives who convert to Judaism are not considered relatives by Torah law at all, neither with regard to levirate marriage nor with regard to prohibited sexual intercourse. The same is true with regard to slave relatives who get freed by their masters. Here too, some Sages maintain that with regard to prohibited sexual intercourse, certain relatives are considered related by rabbinic law even after conversion, lest people be lenient with regard to non-convert relatives as well. Additionally, there is a concern lest a convert believe that he converted from higher to lesser sanctity, as relatives who were permitted to him as a gentile are now permitted as well.
  Twin brothers whose mother converted while she was pregnant with them are considered related by Torah law with regard to prohibited sexual relations, but not with regard to levirate marriage. Brothers whose mother converted before their conception are considered related with regard to all matters.
  The chapter's rulings with regard to cases of intermingled children conformed to the principle of uncertainty in Torah law, i.e., the stringent halakhot of both sides are accepted to ensure that no prohibitions will be transgressed.
  If the sons of a priest and his maidservant are intermingled, although the stringent halakhot of both sides are accepted, they partake of teruma, as slaves of priests partake of teruma as well. When they grow up, they must release one another, as it is unknown which of them is the slave and which is the master. Afterward, they are considered uncertain priests and must follow the stringencies of both priests and of Israelites.
  The relationship between intermingled children and their parents is rendered uncertain as well. They are therefore obligated to honor their parents, but they are not liable to receive punishment for striking or cursing them.
  
  Introduction to Perek XII
  
  And if the man does not wish to take his yevama, his yevama shall ascend to the gate to the Elders and say: My brother-in-law refused to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he did not wish to consummate the levirate marriage. And the Elders of his city shall call him and speak to him; and if he stands and he says: I do not wish to take her. His yevama shall approach him, before the Elders, and remove his shoe from on his foot and spit before him and respond and say: So shall it be done to the man who does not build his brother's house: And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of he who had his shoe removed. (Deuteronomy 25:7–10)
  These verses describe the process by which a yevama, the wife of a childless man who dies and leaves a brother, the yavam, can be freed of her levirate bonds in lieu of consummating her marriage to her brother-in-law. This ritual is known as halitza.
  This chapter details the practical applications of the halakhot of halitza. While it is possible to understand the general notion of halitza from the scriptural verses themselves, a number of details require clarification. For instance, the Torah mentions the “Elders,” before whom one performs halitza. However, the number of Elders required and the conditions that must be met for their appointment are not explicitly explained. Similarly, the Torah's description of halitza mentions the removal of a shoe from the foot of the yavam, a matter that raises several practical questions: What is the nature of this shoe? On which foot does one perform halitza, and what portion of the foot must be uncovered?
  This chapter will clarify these issues, along with other pertinent matters such as the appropriate time and place for conducting halitza. In addition, the chapter will raise and elucidate questions with regard to the status of the yavam and yevama. For example, must they be adults, and must the act of halitza be done with the knowledge and consent of both parties? The chapter will include discussions on the relationship between the different components of halitza mentioned in the Torah and whether the performance of all the parts and all the details is strictly necessary.
  
  Summary of Perek XII
  
  In this chapter, the Gemara discussed the details with regard to the proper performance of halitza. Although the Torah describes those who oversee the halitza as “Elders,” the judges overseeing halitza need not be ordained scholars; even laymen who are capable of dictating the Torah verses read during the halitza ceremony suffice. The Gemara concluded that although halakhically, as is customary in other legal matters, only three judges are necessary for the halitza ceremony, ideally five people should convene after establishing a specific location to conduct the halitza, in order to publicize it.
  The chapter cited a number of discussions with regard to the shoe used in the process of halitza, concluding that the shoe must fit adequately and cover the foot and be made entirely, or mostly, of leather. During the talmudic period halitza was generally performed with a sandal, but in the course of the generations it became accepted to use a special type of shoe for halitza, by which all the necessary conditions were met.
  For the purposes of halitza, the shoe must be removed from the right foot of the yavam, and although the yevama should also remove the shoe with her right hand ab initio, after the fact, even if she removed the shoe using her teeth, the halitza is valid. If someone's foot was amputated above the knee, or if his foot is extremely crooked, it is impossible for him to perform halitza.
  Although the halitza should also involve the spitting and recitation of verses ab initio, only the removal of the shoe is essential after the fact. Nevertheless, a yevama who spat before her yavam in the presence of a court may no longer enter levirate marriage, although she would require valid halitza in order to be permitted to remarry.
  Halitza may be performed only by men and women who have adequate intellectual capacity, to the exclusion of minors and those who are intellectually challenged. It must be executed with full understanding of its implications ab initio, as the yevama removes the shoe from the yavam consensually, with both the yavam and the yevama intending to remove the levirate bond. After the fact, however, even mistaken halitza, when, for example, a sum of money is promised to the yavam for the halitza and he does not receive it, is still efficacious.
  Many other details with respect to how the mitzva of halitza should be performed, including the recitation of the halitza verses in Hebrew and the removal of the shoe and spitting, were discussed in the chapter.
  
  Introduction to Perek XIII
  
  This chapter deals with the various difficulties that arise in the context of the marriage of a minor orphan girl who was married off by her relatives. Some of these difficulties concern the nature and the validity of the marriage, and other issues concern the methods that are effective in dissolving the marriage. The chapter also addresses how levirate marriage and halitza apply to the marriage of a minor orphan.
  By Torah law, only a father may give his minor daughter in marriage, and he may do so only once. However, the Sages instituted that other members of the minor's family, i.e., her mother or brothers, are empowered to marry her off when the father is deceased, because of the risk of sexual exploitation of a fatherless young girl. Marriage can afford her protection and security.
  Nevertheless, marriages involving a minor are of lesser legal status than ordinary marriages. The Sages instituted that the minor girl may declare at any time that she does not want to be married to her husband and thereby dissolve the marriage retroactively, as if she had never been married.
  There is a consensus about this framework; however, it is necessary to address the halakhic details, such as: What is the minimum age for a minor girl to be married off? What is the validity of the marriage with respect to the mutual rights of the husband and wife, specifically with regard to the financial arrangements of the marriage settlement? Does the minor's right of refusal apply only to betrothal or to marriage as well? May a minor girl refuse a husband, remarry him, and then refuse him again? May she refuse different husbands? What is the appropriate time for refusal, i.e., can it take place while she is still very young, or must it wait until after she has reached a level of intellectual capacity?
  Understanding the nature of the marriage of a minor orphan girl sheds light on both standard marriage as ordained by Torah law and other types of marriage instituted by the Sages, namely, the marriage of deaf-mutes. It is also valuable to compare the marriage of an orphan with the levirate bond. Some of these issues take on practical significance when two sisters become eligible for levirate marriage in parallel and there is a need to establish who takes precedence. 
  
  Summary of Perek XIII
  
  The halakhic conclusion concerning marriage of a minor girl is that as long as she is married, all the rights and obligations that come with marriage apply to both the husband and the wife. The only exception is that these marriages can be dissolved not only by means of a divorce or the husband's death, but also by means of refusal on the part of the minor girl. This sort of marriage of a minor takes effect only if she is mature enough to understand what it means to be married, consents to it, and is capable of taking care of the money used in her betrothal. If these conditions are not fulfilled, she is not married and does not even need to refuse. 
  A minor may refuse both a betrothal and a full marriage, and may do so for more than one marriage. The declaration of refusal does not have a fixed text nor does it require the presence of a court. It is sufficient that she indicate in the presence of witnesses that she does not want to be married, and her marriage is instantly dissolved retroactively. Since the refusal annuls the marriage entirely, all prohibitions associated with that relationship are dissolved as well. The exception to this is that the Sages decreed that she may not remarry a husband who divorced her after she was married to another man. 
  Since marriages of minors are by rabbinic law, their attendant levirate marriages are by rabbinic law as well. The halakha with regard to two minor girls who were widowed by childless husbands parallels that of two adult women in every way. However, a minor widowed by a childless husband does not have the same status as an adult yevama. If the minor is a forbidden relative, her being a yevama does not exempt an adult rival wife as it would if both were adults. Even if the other yevama is a deaf-mute, whose marital bond also exists by rabbinic law, their statuses are not equal. As a result, there are complex arrangements when one yevama is a minor and the other a deaf-mute.
  
  Introduction to Perek XIV
  
  This chapter is largely a continuation of the previous one, as it too deals with the marriages of people of unsound mind, specifically the marriages of deaf-mutes and imbeciles and the range of problems involved.
  Deaf-mutes, i.e., people who can neither hear nor talk, were considered to be of weak, unstable intellect, while imbeciles were assumed to lack mental capacity altogether. Naturally, one who is incompetent cannot perform an act of acquisition, including betrothal. However, it is possible that the marriages of these unfortunates are valid to a certain extent, at least by rabbinic law. Consequently, the status of their relationships must be clarified, as well as the manner by which a marriage of this kind can be terminated.
  In addition to these issues, which are somewhat similar to the problems discussed in the previous chapter, other questions are raised that address the particular circumstances of the marriage of a deaf-mute or an imbecile. To be more specific, it is possible for one partner of a regular marriage to lose his or her sanity as a result of illness. It must be determined whether divorce is possible in these circumstances.
  These discussions lead to numerous secondary problems involving levirate marriage, as the validity of marriages of deaf-mutes and imbeciles has repercussions for the levirate bond, the exemption of rival wives, and other issues. Furthermore, there is a unique problem concerning levirate marriage. In contrast to betrothal or halitza, this ritual does not require legal competence. Consequently, there are cases in which levirate marriage is possible, whereas halitza and divorce are not. The analysis of these issues is the topic of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XIV
  
  With regard to the marriages of people of unsound mind, the Sages enacted marriage for deaf-mutes, as they can both betroth and divorce by intimation. However, in the case of imbeciles, as well as minor boys, the Sages did not institute marriage at all.
  Since the divorce of an imbecile is not valid by Torah law, one who became a deaf-mute or an imbecile after marriage cannot divorce his wife. In the case of a healthy wife who became imbecilic, if she is unable to guard her bill of divorce she cannot be divorced by Torah law. If she can guard her bill of divorce but cannot take care of herself, she may not be divorced by decree of the Sages.
  These rulings have ramifications for the halakhot of levirate marriage. The marriage of deaf-mutes applies by rabbinic law, and therefore this marriage does not entirely exempt a rival wife. However, if the marriage was valid by Torah law, i.e., if the betrothal was performed when both parties were healthy, the obligation of levirate marriage applies from the Torah, despite the fact that in practice the bond cannot be released by means of halitza.
  These discussions led to a general question: Is it the duty of the court or of the parents to prevent one who is not legally competent from performing a prohibited act? This issue is left unresolved in this chapter.
  
  Introduction to Perek XV
  
  This chapter is a continuation of the concepts discussed in Chapter Ten, as it too deals with the question of whether or not a woman may remarry or enter into levirate marriage based on incomplete testimony concerning the death of her husband. As explained there, the Sages were very lenient with regard to testimony enabling a woman to remarry, both due to the suffering of a deserted wife as well as the fact that they relied upon the woman herself to examine the matter carefully. 
  Another leniency in cases of this type is that the wife herself may testify that the husband is dead, despite her obvious self-interest in the matter. The Sages debated the extent of this halakha: Is her account considered proper testimony in all regards, or is she deemed credible in limited cases, and only with regard to particular ramifications of his death?
  A more general problem concerning testimony enabling a woman to remarry is the issue of suspect testimony, i.e., people who might distort the truth, willingly or otherwise. It is also unclear how the court should rule in cases of conflicting testimonies. 
  Yet another issue is whether this weak testimony, which is sufficient to enable the woman to remarry, is considered full-fledged testimony that the man is dead, or whether its acceptance is limited to a single case, the release of a deserted wife, but is rejected with regard to other matters. 
  These problems form the main topic of this chapter, but as usual the Gemara also discusses cases from other areas of halakha that involve similar legal principles. 
  
  Summary of Perek XV
  
  The Sages instituted that a woman testifying with regard to the death of her husband is deemed credible. This is highly significant, as she can thereby permit herself to marry, enter into levirate marriage, and also to actualize her rights from the marriage contract. However, the Sages placed limits on this credibility: She is not deemed credible if there is any suspicion that she came to this conclusion in reliance upon her own reasoning, if she was influenced by her bad relations with her husband, or if she testifies about an unclear situation. Likewise, this testimony is limited in that it is accepted only with regard to the woman herself. Others may not rely upon her testimony for monetary matters or with regard to marriage.
  In cases of contradictory testimonies concerning the death of a husband, the Sages established that as one witness is considered like two witnesses in this type of testimony, the court relies upon the testimony of the first witness even when it is refuted by another witness. However, if there are two witnesses who testify that the husband is still alive, their testimony refutes that of a lone witness who testifies that he died. Furthermore, as disqualified witnesses are trusted in testimony of this kind, the majority is followed in conflicts involving these testimonies.
  Another limitation to the credibility of a woman who testifies about her husband's death is that she is not trusted to testify with regard to certain close relatives whose kinship is established through marriage, as she is suspected of lying so as to cause them injury or ruin. This principle established by the Sages sometimes leads to strange results: It is possible for a woman to be trusted concerning her husband's death, which means that from then onward her husband is considered dead in every respect as it pertains to her, but at the same time another woman, e.g., her rival wife, is not permitted to remarry based on this testimony. Consequently, in relation to the rival wife the husband is considered alive in every respect.
  
  Introduction to Perek XVI
  
  This chapter deals with testimony pertaining to the death of a woman's husband, and it focuses on three issues.
  The beginning of the chapter continues the Gemara's discussion from the previous chapter concerning a woman testifying about her husband's death, when it is not known with certainty whether or not she has a levirate marriage obligation.
  The other two issues relate to the actual testimony about a person's death. There is the matter of identification: Under which circumstances, and based upon which indications, are witnesses permitted to assume that a dead body that they saw is actually the person they think it is? There is another issue: Under which circumstances, and to what extent, may we rely upon the assumption that a certain person in a specific precarious state of health has not survived, although his death was not actually witnessed?
  Other issues related to testimony include the extent to which direct testimony is required to substantiate the death of a woman's husband, and under which circumstances it is possible to rely on indirect testimony, somewhat substantiated hearsay, or disclosure of events in ways not conforming to the halakhot of testimony.
  The details of these issues and their examination is the focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek XVI
  
  If a man dies childless, his widow may not marry or enter into levirate marriage until trustworthy testimony is brought before the court. If the widow wishes to remarry a man of her choosing, she requires testimony that she has no living yavam. If she wishes to enter into levirate marriage, she requires testimony that her husband had no children. The Sages said that in these matters there is the legal presumption both that one is alive until witnesses testify that he is dead and that a woman will give birth to viable children. In order to override these presumptions, one must bring clear testimony. In these matters, the woman's testimony alone is insufficient.
  With regard to the identification of a corpse, the Sages said that ideal identification is recognition of the individual's face, which includes the forehead, cheeks, and nose. This is possible as long as significant deterioration of the facial features has not yet taken place. Identification based on distinguishing marks or body build is not at all simple. All agree that extremely unambiguous distinguishing marks are sufficient evidence of an individual's identity. However, there is significant debate about whether distinguishing marks that are not unambiguous may be relied upon, or even about whether several such marks may be relied upon. This topic, whose essential details were discussed in this chapter, has been examined extensively and in great detail in the halakhic literature throughout the generations.
  With regard to establishing an individual's death, the Gemara concludes that one may testify to a person's death only if he saw his corpse or if he saw him in a condition from which there is no reasonable possibility of survival. In any other situation, one may not testify that an individual died, even if there is great likelihood that this is the case, e.g., he was lost in an endless body of water.
  The Sages ruled that formal testimony is not required in order to establish a man's death and allow his wife to remarry. Consequently, hearsay testimony is deemed credible, as are reports issued by those considered unfit for formal testimony in court, e.g., women, relatives, and children. It is also permitted to rely upon the statements of a gentile, provided he is speaking offhandedly. 
  Furthermore, although witnesses are generally interrogated and cross-examined in cases pertaining to capital law, those who testify that a woman's husband has died are not subjected to these procedures. As long as the report seems accurate, it is deemed credible even if it contains minor inconsistencies. This is because Torah scholars are supposed to increase peace in the world and should aim to improve the lives of others.
  
  Yoma
  
  Introduction to Yoma
  
  Tractate Yoma deals with the Day, that unique day of the year, Yom Kippur. It stands apart from all other days of the year as a time of special sanctity that exceeds the sanctity of all other Festivals. Yom Kippur is the day when reality transcends standard boundaries and conventions, as it is stated in the Torah: “For on this day shall atonement be made for you, to purify you; from all your sins shall you be purified before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). It is the Festival celebrating the elimination of all flaws and transgressions and a return to the initial state of purity.
  When Yom Kippur was observed in its fullest sense, it was a day on which the three sublime sanctities, the sanctity of time, the sanctity of place, and the sanctity of man, would converge: The sanctity of time, as this day was established as the day of purification and absolution for transgressions; the sanctity of place, as “once each year” (Leviticus 16:34) the sacred Temple service was performed in the most sacred place, the Holy of Holies, where it is prohibited for any person to enter under any other circumstances; and the sanctity of humanity, as the Temple service is performed on this day exclusively by the High Priest, the most sanctified person in the congregation of Israel.
  The convergence of these three sanctities is the primary activity on Yom Kippur, as it is described in the Bible, the Mishna, and the Talmud. Therefore, most of the matters addressed in tractate Yoma pertain to the sacred Temple service, the numerous and complex offerings sacrificed on that day, and the preparation and service of the High Priest. Consequently, most of the subject matter in this tractate belongs in the talmudic order of Kodashim, in terms of the problems raised and in terms of its unique methodology. Only a relatively small section of tractate Yoma addresses the halakhot of Yom Kippur that relate to the entire Jewish people.
  The halakhot of offerings comprise a significant portion of the Torah, and likewise Kodashim, an entire order of the six orders of the Mishna and Talmud, is devoted to those matters. The significance of the sacrificial service in the Temple is so great that the Sages have said that it is one of the pillars upon which the world stands (Avot 1:2). Although the offerings ceased with the destruction of the Temple, they are still significant and central in Judaism. The offerings are special mitzvot that facilitate drawing nearer to God. All the types of offerings, despite the many differences between them, manifest the close relationship between man and his Creator.
  The convergence of the person bringing the offering, the priest who sacrifices it, and the altar, which represents the presence of God and His participation in the offering, constitute the connection between man and God, symbolized by their partnership in the offering. There are some offerings, e.g., those that atone for sin, where the person who sacrifices the offering provides only the sacrifice and presents it as an expression of regret and appeasement. With these offerings, the blood of the sacrifice, which symbolizes its soul, “for the blood is the soul” (Deuteronomy 12:23), is sprinkled on the altar and the meat is eaten by the priests. There are other offerings, e.g., peace-offerings, where the person who brings the offering, the priests, and the altar unite in a type of celebratory feast of peace and unity. The sacrificial service is a completely symbolic form of worship, and very few of the symbols are clearly understood. However, each component and ritual in that service is a refined act of intimacy and participation.
  Practically speaking, the structure of the Temple was most complex, to enable it to fulfill its numerous roles. However, its general blueprint was already found in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness. The two Temples, the First Temple and the Second Temple, were greater than the Tent of Meeting only in terms of their size and complexity. The epicenter of the Temple was the Holy of Holies, in which the Ark of the Covenant was located. On it were the Ark cover and the cherubs, symbolizing God's seat within mundane worldly existence. The Holy of Holies is the inner sanctum, the place where the Divine Presence resides. Outside of it is the Sanctuary, whose structure represents an interior room in a house, with a table on which is arranged the shewbread, the candelabrum for illumination, and the incense altar. Outside the Sanctuary is the Temple courtyard, where the outer altar is located. It serves as an entrance and reception area, and it is there that the Jewish people came to sacrifice their offerings and pray.
  The Yom Kippur service is performed in all of these areas. However, its essence and its primary element is the entrance of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies to burn the incense and sprinkle the sacrificial blood, to atone for and purify the Jewish people once each year. The preparations for the entrance of the High Priest into the inner sanctum, his purification, his special garments, and the offerings he sacrifices on his behalf and on behalf of the congregation of Israel, all these are the components of the Yom Kippur service. The service culminates with the atonement for and purification from all sin, iniquity, and transgression. 
  The two aspects of purification and atonement are intertwined. On the one hand, the High Priest, who is the agent of the Jewish people, ascends to the highest level of sanctity and reaches the inner sanctum. On the other hand, sin and iniquity are removed and cast away from the Jewish people. The ritual that symbolizes these two aspects of atonement reaches its climax in the service of the two Yom Kippur goats. In this service, twin goats are brought to participate in a lottery. One of them expresses the sublime purifying sanctity, and its blood is brought into the Holy of Holies, while the other, which symbolizes all the sins and iniquities of the Jewish people, is sent away outside the Temple, outside the settled area to the wilderness, to Azazel. It is cast from one of the cliffs in the wilderness, symbolizing the casting away of all sins and iniquities to their source, “the waste and howling wilderness” (Deuteronomy 32:10).
  The backdrop to all these rituals in the Temple, the participation of the entire Jewish people, their preparation for this day of purification and atonement, is the Sabbath of solemn rest [Shabbat shabbaton], a day of rest from all labor, a day without eating or drinking, a day of abstaining from all the pleasures of this world. It is a day when the entire people transcends the constraints of daily life and involves itself in preparation for the atonement provided by God.
  Fundamentally, the tractate is arranged chronologically in describing the sacred Yom Kippur service, from the preparations for that service until its conclusion, with the final chapter addressing the halakhot of Yom Kippur that pertain to all of Israel. This is the order of its chapters:
  Chapter One deals with the preparations of the High Priest for Yom Kippur, beginning seven days beforehand until the start of the service on the morning of Yom Kippur.
  Chapter Two discusses the order of the morning Temple service.
  Chapter Three describes the morning Temple service as it was performed on Yom Kippur and the remaining preparations for service, until the confession recited over the bull of the High Priest.
  Chapter Four discusses the lottery of the goat to God and the scapegoat, the second confession and the slaughter of the bull of the High Priest, and the raking of coals from the altar.
  Chapter Five deals with taking the handful of the incense and bringing it into the Holy of Holies, the slaughter of the goats, and the sprinkling of the blood in the Holy of Holies and the Sanctuary.
  Chapter Six describes the great care invested in keeping the order of the sacrificial service and correcting errors in performance of that service, the confession, and the dispatch of the scapegoat.
  Chapter Seven discusses the Torah reading, the performance of the remainder of the day's offerings, and the end of the service until the conclusion of Yom Kippur.
  Chapter Eight deals with the laws of the fast and the prohibition against performing labor, as well as the repentance and atonement involved on Yom Kippur.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  And you shall not go out from the opening of the Tent of Meeting seven days, until the days of your consecration be fulfilled; for He shall consecrate you seven days. As has been done this day, so the Lord has commanded to do, to make atonement for you. (Leviticus 8:33–34)
  And the Lord said unto Moses: Speak unto Aaron your brother, that he come not at all times into the Sanctuary within the veil, before the Ark cover which is upon the Ark; that he die not; for I appear in the cloud above the Ark cover. (Leviticus 16:2)
  And the glory of the Lord abode upon Mount Sinai and the cloud covered him six days, and He called to Moses on the seventh day from the midst of the cloud (Exodus 24:16)
  The sacred Yom Kippur service is enormous in scope and places great responsibility on the shoulders of the High Priest. He performs the entire Temple service, including numerous rites that are typically performed by an entire patrilineal family of priests. Furthermore, on this day, the High Priest enters the inner sanctum, the Holy of Holies. He goes behind the curtain and performs the most sublime of services, unique to this day.
  Clearly, it was necessary to prepare the High Priest for Yom Kippur. The Sages derived the nature of the preparations from the preparations for the dedication of the Tabernacle in the wilderness, when the original priests, Aaron and his sons, were trained for the priesthood. They were commanded to remain in the Tabernacle for all seven days of their inauguration and to perform all the services that they were going to perform in the future. The Sages also learned about the Yom Kippur preparations from other instances of preparing to enter into sanctity. 
  The need to prepare the High Priest for Yom Kippur became more crucial during the Second Temple period. Ideally, the High Priest should be a righteous Torah luminary. However, circumstances during that period led to a situation in which the High Priest did not always meet these expectations. Often the High Priest was not sufficiently expert in the Temple service. At times he was inclined to follow deviant sects that advocated altering the standard ritual procedures. This reality forced the Sages to institute several ordinances designed to familiarize the priest with the service and accustom him to its performance, in order to ensure that he perform the service appropriately, down to the most minute details.
  The focus of this chapter is the preparations performed prior to Yom Kippur to train the High Priest for the service of the day. These preparations began seven days before Yom Kippur and continued until the start of the service on the day itself.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  The sequestering of the High Priest before the Yom Kippur service was addressed at length. This chapter discussed the source for this practice. There are practical ramifications to the following question: Was it derived from the sequestering of Aaron and his sons during their inauguration before the dedication of the Tabernacle or from that of Moses prior to the revelation at Sinai?
  Incidental to the priest's stay in the Parhedrin Chamber, a series of additional halakhot unrelated to Yom Kippur were analyzed at length. The Gemara discussed the halakhot of mezuza and determined which houses, gates, and rooms require one. Since there was a discussion of the chamber of the High Priest, the Gemara then analyzed the Temple structure in general, its general parameters and the internal configuration of the various chambers located therein.
  The central theme of this chapter is the High Priest's preparations for the Yom Kippur service. The Gemara discussed how the High Priest became accustomed to the numerous Temple services, including the sprinkling of the purification waters to purify him from any possible impurity imparted by a corpse and his oath that he not diverge from halakhic tradition while performing the service in the Holy of Holies.
  As the Gemara addressed the need to ensure the High Priest's expertise and fitness during the Second Temple period, it then cited halakhic and aggadic statements pertaining to the overall differences between the First Temple and the Second Temple, particularly the difference between the High Priests that served in the two Temples. 
  This was followed by a depiction of the activities that were performed on the evening of Yom Kippur itself to ensure that the High Priest not fall asleep and thereby run the risk of becoming impure. Included was a description of how he would be occupied. The Gemara then proceeded to discuss the time for the removal of the ashes, which began the service in the Temple every day.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen trousers shall he put on his flesh; and he shall remove the ashes from what the fire had consumed of the burnt-offering on the altar, and he shall put them beside the altar. 
  And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry the ashes out of the camp to a clean place. (Leviticus 6:3–4)
  The one lamb you shall offer in the morning; and the other lamb you shall offer in the afternoon. 
  And with the one lamb a tenth of an ephah of fine flour mingled with a fourth of a hin of beaten oil; and a fourth of a hin of wine for a libation. And the other lamb you shall offer in the afternoon, and shall do to it according to the meal-offering of the morning, and according to its libation, for a sweet savor, an offering made by fire unto the Lord. (Exodus 29:39–41)
  And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord; and the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall sacrifice the blood, and throw the blood round about against the altar that is at the door of the tent of meeting.
  And he shall flay the burnt-offering and cut it into its pieces. And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put fire on the altar and lay out wood in order upon the fire. And Aaron's sons, the priests, shall lay out the pieces, the head and the fat, upon the wood that is on the fire which is upon the altar. And its innards and its legs shall he wash with water; and the priest shall burn all of it on the altar for a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a sweet savor unto the Lord. (Leviticus 1:5–9)
  Before providing the details of the special sacred services performed on Yom Kippur, tractate Yoma begins with a description of some of the services that were performed in the Temple on a daily basis. The description of these services, which involved great fanfare and the participation of many priests, stands in stark contrast to the unique and more subdued Yom Kippur service, when only a single individual, the High Priest, performed all the day's sacrificial tasks himself.
  The chapter focuses mainly on two of the daily services: The ceremonial removal of a small amount of ash from the altar, and the sacrifice of the morning daily offering and its conveyance to the altar for burning.
  Since there were many priests who were eligible and eager to perform these services, various methods were used to determine who would win the privilege of performing given tasks each day. Moreover, our Sages saw it appropriate, in order to stress the great importance of the sanctity of the Temple and its sacrificial service, that this process of determination of roles should be done amid great publicity and fanfare and with the participation of a large number of priests, both those who ended up performing the sacred tasks and those who merely prepared themselves in hope of winning such participation.
  The description of the process through which the various tasks were assigned to particular priests, and the method of distribution of these services among the many who won the right to perform them, are the central topics of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  The assignment of some tasks to the priests was at first determined by a race. However, when it became apparent that this system presented a potential for physical danger among the competitors, it was decided that all the major daily services would be assigned by lottery. This list of major services included: The removal of the ash from the altar, the slaughter of the daily offering, the conveyance of its pieces to the ramp leading up to the altar, the burning of incense, and the conveyance of the sacrificial limbs from the ramp to the altar itself. The lotteries were performed as follows: All priests who were eligible to perform the service at hand stood in a circle. The appointee in charge instructed one of the priests to remove his mitre. A number much larger than the number of gathered priests was chosen at random. Each priest extended his finger, and the appointee, beginning with the bareheaded priest, counted all the fingers, going around the circle, several times if necessary, until the selected number was reached. The priest upon whom the count ended won the privilege of performing the coveted task.
  The service of removal of ashes from the altar, although it was done by a priest who, owing to the innately dirty nature of the task, wore an inferior quality of priestly garments, was nevertheless considered an important task, since it marked the very first step of the daily services.
  The daily offering, consisting of a lamb that was sacrificed as a burnt-offering, was cut into pieces, as is generally required of all burnt-offerings. However, unlike a private offering, the pieces were conveyed to the altar ceremoniously by several priests, each one carrying one or more of the parts. Moreover, two teams of priests participated in this process: One who carried the limbs to the base of the ramp leading up to the altar, and another team which brought the limbs up to the altar itself. In the meantime, as this procedure was going on, other morning services, involving the candelabrum and the inner altar, were performed. 
  The privilege of burning incense on this inner altar was assigned though a special lottery, in which only first-timers were allowed to participate. This is because of the tradition that whoever performed this task would be materially blessed, and it was desired to spread this blessing around to as many different priests as possible.
  Having discussed the procedure for conveying the daily lamb offering to the altar, the mishna goes on and describes the parallel procedure for other public burnt-offerings that were not lambs, such as the bulls and rams that were offered on certain occasions. Due to the greater size of these animals, as well as the greater amounts of flour and wine that accompanied them, the conveyance process for these sacrifices was expanded and required the participation of more priests.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  With this shall Aaron come into the Sanctuary: With a young bullock for a sin-offering, and a ram for a burnt-offering. He shall be dressed in a sacred linen tunic, and with linen trousers next to his flesh, and shall be girded with a linen belt, and he shall wear a linen mitre; they are the sacred garments, and he shall wash his flesh in water and then put them on. And he shall take of the congregation of the children of Israel two he-goats for a sin-offering, and one ram for a burnt-offering. And Aaron is to offer his own bull as a sin-offering and atone for himself and for his household. And he shall take the two goats, and set them before the Lord at the door of the tent of meeting. And Aaron shall place lots on the two goats: one lot for God, and one lot for Azazel. (Leviticus 16:3–8)
  Beginning with this chapter, the Yom Kippur service is described in order, from the first immersion of the High Priest until the conclusion of the day's service. This chapter is essentially an introductory chapter, as it does not depict services unique to Yom Kippur; rather, it depicts the preparations and modifications that were undertaken to facilitate the service.
  The chapter begins with a depiction of the fixed Temple service, which was performed daily. It is not addressed at length, as the essential elements of this service were treated in the previous chapter, and the only difference on Yom Kippur is that it was performed exclusively by the High Priest. 
  However, elaboration is required with regard to those matters unique to Yom Kippur, beginning with the immersion of the High Priest. His immersions, which were performed, as mandated by the Torah, in a sacred place, are an integral part of the service of the day, and there is a special tradition pertaining to the number and order of the immersions. These immersions are extremely significant, so much so that, in order to accommodate them, the order of the performance of the service diverges from the order as it appears in the verses. 
  In addition, this chapter features a depiction of the priestly vestments unique to Yom Kippur: The white linen garments of the High Priest. It explains how the external simplicity of the garments dovetails with both the obligation to show deference to the sanctity of this special day and the Torah's statement that the priestly vestments be “for splendor and for beauty” (Exodus 28:2).
  The verse, “And Aaron is to offer his own bull as a sin-offering and atone for himself and for his household” (Leviticus 16:6), marks the beginning of the service of the day. The Sages proved that the Torah is not referring to the sprinkling of blood on the altar, which is typically the manner in which atonement is achieved. Rather, the reference is to spiritual atonement achieved through confession, like the confession mentioned explicitly in the Torah with regard to the scapegoat. The Gemara then explains the formula for the confession and its content.
  Another preparatory action that requires special elaboration is performance of the lottery of the goats, which is also unique to Yom Kippur. These and associated topics are addressed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  The start of the Temple service was at dawn. The mishna explained why a special ritual was established to announce that this time had arrived.
  There is a tradition transmitted by the Sages that the High Priest immerses five immersions on Yom Kippur. The Gemara discussed the essence of these immersions; the difference between these immersions and those of any other person entering and serving in the Temple; and the sanctification of the hands and feet associated with them.
  Incidental to the brief depiction of the order of the service on the morning of Yom Kippur, the Gemara cited a significant passage in which all the services performed each day in the Temple were enumerated. Although that order is the individual opinion of one tanna, Abba Shaul, and it does not completely correspond to the halakhic ruling, it served as a basis for explaining the procedure of the sacred service. For this reason, it is included in the daily prayer book.
  Although the priestly vestments unique to Yom Kippur were white linen garments, the Sages sought an especially high quality material in deference to the Sanctuary and in deference to the priest.
  This chapter did not mention the verse that details the mitzva of confession on Yom Kippur, yet the confession recited over the bull of the High Priest is discussed, and the Gemara established the formula for confession: For the sins, and for the wrongs, and for the rebellions. It explained what is being confessed over this and other offerings.
  In the course of describing the box used for the lottery on Yom Kippur, the Sages saw fit to mention that ben Gamla, the High Priest, donated large amounts of gold. The Gemara continued and mentioned several personalities associated with the Temple, some of whom made a significant contribution. They were privileged to be praised throughout the generations. This is based on the verse: “The memory of the righteous shall be for a blessing” (Proverbs 10:7). Others did not conduct themselves properly and their ignominy is mentioned in order to teach generations that it is despicable to keep significant knowledge to oneself and not share it with the public.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats: One lot for the Lord, and the other lot for Azazel. And Aaron shall present the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, and offer it as a sin-offering. But the goat on which the lot came up for Azazel shall be stood alive before the Lord, to make atonement over him, to send him away for Azazel into the wilderness.
  And Aaron shall present the bull of the sin-offering, which is for himself, and shall make atonement for himself, and for his house, and shall slaughter the bull of the sin-offering which is for himself. 
  And he shall take a pan full of coals of fire from upon the altar from before the Lord, and his hands full of finely ground aromatic incense, and bring it within the veil. (Leviticus 16:8–12)
  Come now, and let us reason together, said the Lord; though your sins be as crimson, they shall be white as snow. Though they be red like scarlet, they shall be as wool. (Isaiah 1:18)
  The previous chapter discussed the preparatory stages of the Yom Kippur service. This chapter begins to detail the service itself. The main focus of the chapter is the rite of the two goats, one of which is brought as a sin-offering and the other that will be sent away to Azazel. 
  The chapter opens with the lottery that is held to designate the two goats for their respective purposes. This unique ritual raises various questions: How exactly is the lottery to be conducted? Is the lottery considered a full part of the sacrificial service, or is it just a preparatory step in order to designate the goats? Is the lottery indispensable, or can the designation be achieved by other means? 
  A strip of crimson thread is tied to the goats to identify them. The Gemara discusses whether this was done to one or both of the goats, how it was done, and where it was tied. The Gemara also discusses the nature of the strip, its size, and its weight. 
  The next stage in the service is the High Priest's confession upon the bull offering “for him and his household.” This is his second confession of the day; however, this time the term household is understood not only in the more limited sense of his immediate family, but also as referring to the entire priesthood.
  The High Priest was involved simultaneously in different stages of different rites. Thus, following the slaughter of the bull and receiving its blood, he was required to collect the coals for the incense and then bring them into the Holy of Holies to burn the incense. During this time, the blood had to be looked after by another priest until the High Priest was ready to sprinkle it. The Gemara discusses how all this was achieved. 
  While the High Priest is inside the Holy of Holies, it is forbidden for anyone else to be in the Sanctuary. The Gemara addresses the nature and scope of this prohibition.
  The collection of the coals for the incense was performed in a unique way on Yom Kippur. The Gemara discusses the reasons for these departures from the norm and then continues to discuss many of the other unique changes to the Temple service that were made on this special day.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  The chapter began with a lengthy discussion of the lottery with which the two goats were designated. The Gemara concluded that while the lottery is not to be classified as part of the sacrificial service, it is indispensable in designating the goats, and no other method can achieve that end. However, besides the drawing of the lots themselves, all the other halakhot of the lottery, such as placing the lots upon the goats, the nature of the lots and the lottery box, and how the lots are to be drawn, are not indispensable. Nevertheless, there is certainly a mitzva to fulfill all those halakhot correctly, and the Gemara considered the various details. 
  Since the goats were not slaughtered and sent away immediately, a strip of crimson thread was tied to them in order that they be clearly identifiable and not be confused with each other or with other goats that might be around. On the goat sin-offering the strip was tied to the neck, symbolic of the fact that it was to be slaughtered there, and the second strip was tied around the horns of the goat to be sent to Azazel.
  Apropos the discussion concerning the crimson strip of the goats, the Gemara turned its attention to the crimson strip used in the rite of the red heifer and then proceeded to analyze many of the other details pertaining to the rite. The Gemara expounded many of the verses in the Torah passage of the red heifer and specifically considered a number of halakhot that are common to both the red heifer and the goats on Yom Kippur.
  The next stage in the day's service was the confession of the High Priest upon the bull. After the confession, the High Priest slaughtered the bull and collected its blood. However, the blood was not used immediately. The High Priest first went to collect the coals for the burning of the incense in the Holy of Holies, and the blood of the bull was sprinkled only later. Therefore, in the meantime, the blood was given to a priest to hold and stir to ensure that it did not congeal. 
  The burning of the incense in the Holy of Holies was the high point of the Yom Kippur service. As such, there were many unique parts of the service and preparations for it that were performed only on Yom Kippur. For example, the coals were scooped in a way that was different from the normal manner, a special arrangement of wood was made to provide the coals with which to burn the incense, and the incense was ground much more finely that it normally was. The Gemara considered these and many other distinctions between how the service was performed on Yom Kippur and how it was performed during the rest of the year, with regard to both the incense and the other rites of the day. 
  The chapter also expanded on various halakhot that are mentioned concerning the Yom Kippur service but are in fact applicable throughout the year. This included a discussion of the various arrangements of wood and the prohibition against extinguishing coals from the fire on the altar.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  And he shall take a coal pan full of coals of fire from off the altar from before the Lord, and his hands full of sweet incense beaten small and bring it within the veil. And he shall put the incense upon the fire before the Lord, and the incense cloud shall cover the Ark cover that is upon the Testimony, and he will not die. And he shall take from the blood of the bull, and he shall sprinkle it with his finger upon the Ark cover to the east, and before the Ark cover he shall sprinkle seven times from the blood with his finger. And he shall slaughter the goat of the sin-offering that is for the people, and bring its blood within the veil, and he shall do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull, and sprinkle it upon the Ark cover and before the Ark cover. And he shall make atonement for the sacred place because of the impurities of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions, even all their sins; and so shall he do for the Tent of Meeting that dwells with them in the midst of their impurity. And there shall be no man in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to make atonement in the sacred place, until he comes out and has atoned for himself and for his household and for the assembly of Israel. And he shall go out to the altar that is before the Lord, and make atonement for it; and he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat, and put it on the corners of the altar round about. And he shall sprinkle of the blood upon it with his finger seven times, and cleanse it and sanctify it from the impurities of the children of Israel. (Leviticus 16:12–19)
  And you shall make an altar to burn incense, of acacia wood you shall make it. A cubit shall be its length and a cubit its breadth, it shall be square, and two cubits shall be its height, and its corners shall be one piece with it...And Aaron shall make atonement upon its corners once a year; with the blood of the sin-offering of atonement once a year he shall make atonement for it throughout your generations; it is most sacred to the Lord.
  (Exodus 30:1–2; 10)
  This chapter continues to describe, following the order of the verses and the service of the day, the rites of the High Priest. It focuses mainly on the services that are at the heart of Yom Kippur, namely the rites performed within the inner sanctum, the Holy of Holies. The High Priest is permitted to enter this chamber only on Yom Kippur, and solely for the purpose of these services.
  The first stage of these rites is the scooping of a handful of incense and its presentation. The practical performance of this action entails numerous difficulties with regard to the scooping itself, the amount of incense required, and the manner in which it is burned inside the Holy of Holies. 
  Furthermore, the Second Temple differed from both the First Temple and the Tabernacle in the wilderness in that it lacked the Ark of the Covenant and possessed certain structural differences. Therefore, the precise route of the High Priest's entrance into the Holy of Holies and his service inside the inner sanctum require elucidation. Likewise, the commandment that the High Priest be alone in the Sanctuary while performing the service in the Holy of Holies raises various issues, particularly with regard to the exact delineation of the Sanctuary area.
  After concluding the service in the Holy of Holies, the High Priest performed additional rites in the Sanctuary, i.e., the sprinkling of the blood on the curtain and the golden altar, also called the incense altar. These rites too are performed almost exclusively on Yom Kippur. The order of the sprinklings on the curtain and the altar must be clarified in detail, from the spot where they are performed to the disposal of the remainder of the blood.
  The Yom Kippur service differs from the regular Temple service in two ways: On the one hand, it is especially important that the Yom Kippur service is performed in the exact order prescribed by the Torah. If the High Priest deviates from this order, the service is invalid. On the other hand, generally speaking, the High Priest does not complete all the rites of one offering from start to finish without interruption; rather, he is constantly moving from one rite to another, and from one offering to another. Consequently, it is easy to fall prey to error in one of the rites, particularly with respect to their order. This chapter addresses those cases where the High Priest made a mistake in this regard, and discusses which errors disqualify the service and which do not. Similarly, if a certain rite was disqualified or interrupted, the Gemara inquires as to at what point in the service the High Priest is obligated to start over. 
  These and related issues form the content of Chapter Five. 
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  The amount of incense scooped by the High Priest is determined by the size of his hands, and the vessels he uses for this purpose are made to fit him. Although this service is unique to Yom Kippur, the analysis of its halakhot and manner of performance leads to a discussion of the handful of flour separated from a regular meal-offering, which resembles the handful of incense in many ways. 
  The entrance of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies in the Second Temple was via the two dividing curtains. Several steps were taken to ensure that the rites of Yom Kippur were performed in the proper manner in the Second Temple, despite the lack of the Ark of the Covenant and the fact that the structure of the Sanctuary and the inner sanctum was different from that of the First Temple. 
  For each set of sprinklings in the Holy of Holies the High Priest sprinkles the blood of the bull and the goat once and then seven times, i.e., the first sprinkling is directed slightly upward while the next seven are aimed downward. Any change in the order or number of sprinklings disqualifies the service. 
  The sprinklings inside the Holy of Holies are performed exclusively on Yom Kippur. The sprinklings outside, on the curtain and the golden altar in the Sanctuary, are also performed with the blood of certain other special sin-offerings, i.e., the bull brought by the anointed priest and the bull brought for an unwitting communal sin. The Gemara clarifies some of the differences between these rites. 
  There are several differences of opinion with regard to the manner of the sprinkling on the golden altar, and the discussion in the Gemara indicates that there were various customs with regard to its performance even during the period of the Temple itself. 
  Everyone agrees that not only are certain rites of the Yom Kippur service indispensable for atonement, but so is the order of their performance. Consequently, if the High Priest performed a later service first, he must go back and start over from the beginning. However, this requirement is limited to the special rites of the day, those performed by the High Priest in his white garments inside the Holy of Holies. 
  With regard to the other services, each is considered a distinct unit, which means that if one of them was impaired in some way the High Priest must begin that rite afresh. This impairment might be caused by an error in the performance of the rite, or due to the inability of the High Priest to complete the service of this holiest day. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  And when he has made an end of atoning for the Sanctuary, and the Tent of Meeting, and the altar, he shall present the live goat. And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins; and he shall put them upon the head of the goat, and shall send it away with an appointed man into the wilderness. And the goat shall bear upon it all their iniquities to a land which is cut off; and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness. (Leviticus 16:20–22)
  And the fat of the sin-offering he shall make smoke upon the altar. And he that dispatched the goat to Azazel shall wash his clothes, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterward he may come into the camp. And the bull of the sin-offering, and the goat of the sin-offering, whose blood was brought in to gain atonement in the sacred place, shall be taken outside the camp and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung. (Leviticus 16:25–27)
  This chapter primarily addresses the laws of the scapegoat, and begins by addressing the relationship between the scapegoat and the goat sacrificed as a sin-offering on Yom Kippur. These two goats must be identical and equally suitable for each of the two services. Lots are drawn that determine which goat will be sacrificed as the sin-offering and which will be used as the scapegoat. Even after the lottery, if one of the goats becomes disqualified, the other goat also becomes unfit for its role. It therefore needs to be clarified until when, and to what extent, these goats remain interdependent. 
  Another topic addressed in this chapter is the confession recited by the High Priest over the scapegoat, and the sins for which the scapegoat brings atonement. 
  The chapter also discusses the process of sending the scapegoat to the wilderness. This ritual generates both theological and practical questions: What is the ritual's meaning? The scapegoat is not a sacrificial offering, as it is not slaughtered and it is sent out of the Temple. The meaning of the ritual must be clarified so that it not appear as though it contains traces of idolatrous worship. 
  On a practical level, who accompanies the scapegoat and what halakhot apply to him? How is the scapegoat sent out of the Temple and how is it brought to the proper location in the wilderness? Does the term Azazel refer to a location in the wilderness or to the ritual of the scapegoat? And how does one conclude the ritual of the scapegoat? 
  This chapter focuses on all of these issues, as well as other details related to the scapegoat.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  This chapter discussed the scapegoat and the goat sacrificed as a sin-offering to God, which must be as similar as possible. Each one must be suitable for use as the sin-offering, and it is only the lottery that determines which goat is used for which purpose. If one of the goats dies before it is used for its intended purpose, the other goat is disqualified as well; a new pair of goats must be brought and new lots must be drawn. There are only limited circumstances in which a single new goat may be brought and paired with the remaining goat. These halakhot do not pertain only to the service on Yom Kippur; they also help clarify the general guidelines that apply to sin-offerings and other communal offerings that become disqualified. 
  The ritual of the scapegoat concludes with the pushing of the goat off a cliff in the Judean Desert. In the times of the Tabernacle, before the Temple was constructed, the goat was pushed off a cliff in a different location, in a wilderness located near the Tabernacle. 
  The Sages instituted several practical innovations with regard to the procedure of leading the scapegoat to the cliff. These include the construction of a ramp in order to lead the scapegoat out of the Temple and the preparation of huts in the wilderness in order for the man leading the goat to be able to rest, if necessary. 
  Additionally, protocols were established in the case of various difficulties, including if the goat or the man leading it takes ill, and if the goat does not die upon being pushed from the cliff. The guiding principle is that the ritual must be completed, even if it is done in a manner that departs from the general order of events. 
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  And Moses said unto the congregation: This is the thing which the Lord commanded to be done. (Leviticus 8:5)
  And Aaron shall come into the Tent of Meeting, and shall put off the linen garments, which he put on when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there. And he shall bathe his flesh in water in a holy place, and put on his other garments, and he shall exit and make his burnt-offering and the burnt-offering of the people, and make atonement for himself and for the people. (Leviticus 16:23–24)
  And on the tenth day of this seventh month you shall have a holy convocation; and you shall afflict your souls; you shall do no manner of work. And you shall sacrifice a burnt-offering to the Lord of pleasing odor: One young bull, one ram, seven unblemished year-old lambs shall be unto you. And their meal-offering, fine flour mingled with oil, three-tenth parts for the bull, two-tenth parts for the one ram. A several-tenth part for every lamb of the seven lambs. One goat for a sin-offering besides the sin-offering of atonement and the daily burnt-offering, and its meal-offering, and their libations. (Numbers 29:7–11)
  And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land which is cut off; and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness. (Leviticus 16:22)
  The order of the day involves not only the sacrifice of the various offerings but also the High Priest's public reading of the Torah from the relevant passages describing the order of the day. The notion that in addition to bringing the offerings, the details as to how they are brought should also be publically announced is foreshadowed by the inauguration of the Tabernacle, when Moses not only performed the various rites involved but was also required to explain them to the people. The details of the High Priest's Torah reading and associated issues are discussed in this chapter.
  Despite the detailed presentation in the Torah of the order of the day, there are some points that remain unclear. There are two sets of offerings that must be brought on Yom Kippur: Those detailed in the chapter in Leviticus that delineates the unique rites of the day, and also the daily and additional offerings, due on each Festival, which are described in the book of Numbers. At what point in the day the daily and additional offerings are sacrificed is not explicitly stated in the Torah. The chapter begins to organize the details to present a complete picture. 
  In addition, the precise order of the sacrifices as described in the verses in Leviticus is not absolutely clear. Tradition teaches that despite the order of the verses, which suggest otherwise, after entering the Holy of Holies and performing the primary rites of the day there, the High Priest would leave and perform the other parts of the sacrificial order, returning to the Holy of Holies only at a later point. If so, it must be clarified at what point those offerings, which are not associated with the Holy of Holies, are sacrificed.
  The High Priest changes his garments many times throughout the day, both at the beginning and end of the day, when he changes his personal garments for the priestly vestments, and throughout the day, when he changes from the white to the golden garments and vice versa. This raises various questions concerning the priestly vestments: To what extent are priests allowed to derive benefit from the priestly vestments? How are the priestly vestments fashioned? What are the differences between the dress of the common priest and that of the High Priest? Are the garments of the High Priest uniquely worn by him, or may the priest anointed for war or a previous High Priest also wear them? The chapter also discusses the unique function of the Urim VeTummim and when and how it is consulted. 
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  The chapter discussed the High Priest's public reading of the Torah. Since he reads from different places within the Torah, he must furl the Torah during the reading. The Gemara expands on this issue and discusses in what circumstances one may or may not skip over sections during the public reading of the Torah and the Prophets. 
  The chapter also focused on issues concerning the priestly vestments. The Gemara discusses whether the priests may derive benefit from them. It concludes that while in the Temple they may wear them and use them even when they are not engaged in the Temple service, they are not permitted to do so outside the Temple confines.
  The precise order of the day is not fully explained either by the Torah or even by the Mishna. The Gemara draws on various sources to clarify the day's schedule. According to the Gemara's conclusion, following the daily morning offering, the bull and seven lambs of the additional offering of Yom Kippur are sacrificed. Then the High Priest begins the special Yom Kippur service which he performs in the white garments. He then changes back into the golden garments and completes the sacrifice of the remaining offerings of the day. Then, in the white garments, he reenters the Holy of Holies to retrieve the items he had left there earlier. He then leaves, and in the golden garments completes the day with the sacrifice of the daily afternoon offering. Upon the safe and full completion of the day's service, the High Priest returns to his home, accompanied by the people. He makes a party and rejoices with his friends to celebrate the successful completion of his mission.
  Continuing its focus on the priestly vestments, the chapter discussed their creation: What materials are used, how the threads are spun, and many other pertinent halakhot. In addition, the Gemara considers some of the halakhot of the UrimVeTummim and how it is to be consulted. This includes the question of who may wear it in order for it to be consulted.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  There are essentially two mitzvot of Yom Kippur that are relevant to all of the Jewish people: Refraining from forbidden labor and afflicting oneself. The concept of refraining from forbidden labor is well known from the laws of Shabbat and the Festivals. The verses in the Torah teach that those labors that are forbidden on Shabbat are the same ones that are forbidden on Yom Kippur. These can be defined as planned, thoughtful, creative work. 
  However, the mitzva to afflict oneself is unique to Yom Kippur. This chapter focuses primarily on the mitzva to afflict oneself: What is the definition of affliction? Is the required affliction passive or active? Who is included in the mitzva to afflict oneself? Is there an obligation for parents to educate their children in this mitzva? What about ill and weak people whose lives might be endangered by the mitzva of afflicting oneself? Are they obligated to fast under all conditions and situations? Perhaps there are exceptions because of the danger to their lives and well-being. Indeed, this question may be asked about all the mitzvot in the Torah. However, with respect to the mitzva of afflicting oneself, it is not merely a peripheral question but fundamental to the nature of the day. Therefore, this chapter is the place for clarification of the details of the mitzva and the laws of saving lives.
  Another aspect of Yom Kippur is atonement from sin. This chapter investigates the parameters of that atonement: Is it always effective, unlimited, and unconditional? Or perhaps the atonement of Yom Kippur depends on one's actions or situation.
  This chapter deals primarily with these issues and related topics.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  This chapter discussed the Sages' tradition that the mitzva to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur is expressed by refraining from five major types of physical benefit: Eating and drinking, washing, anointing with oil, wearing shoes, and engaging in conjugal relations. The most stringent of these is the prohibition against eating and drinking, which incurs the punishment of karet. Food itself is not forbidden on Yom Kippur; rather, it is prohibited to refrain from afflicting oneself. Consequently, the measure that determines liability is a date-bulk of food or a cheekful of drink, amounts which lessen the affliction to a certain degree.
  Notwithstanding the stringency of the prohibition and the holiness of the day, the principle that all mitzvot of the Torah are overridden in cases of illness or danger is applied even on Yom Kippur. The Torah was given “to live by” (Leviticus 18:5). Therefore, on Yom Kippur the mitzva of affliction, along with almost all the mitzvot, is superseded by any risk to life or health. The only exceptions to this principle are the three cardinal sins of idolatry, forbidden relations, and murder.
  The concern for saving life is so great that if there is any risk at all, whether in the opinion of the doctors or in the opinion of the sick person himself, the fast, the prohibitions involving affliction, and the sanctity of the day are overridden.
  The obligation to afflict oneself, like all mitzvot of the Torah, applies only to adults. The Torah considers children who have reached puberty, i.e., boys from the age of thirteen and girls from the age of twelve, to be adults in this regard. However, the Sages instructed that parents should begin to educate their children before they become obligated by Torah law. Children should be encouraged to fulfill whichever mitzvot they are able to, either entirely or in part, from the appropriate age.
  The Torah states that on Yom Kippur all sins committed before God are forgiven. This applies only to sins that are purely between man and God. Sins committed against other people, which are really twofold sins since they are also transgressions against God, cannot be atoned for without appeasing the one who has been wronged. Only after receiving forgiveness from the injured party can one hope for forgiveness from Heaven. 
  Divine forgiveness does not exempt one from his obligations, such as bringing a sin-offering, or repaying moneys owed, and the obligations remain even after Yom Kippur. Furthermore, there are certain sins, such as public desecration of God's name, that are so severe that even Yom Kippur does not fully atone for them. These sins remain with a person after Yom Kippur until he has undone the damage caused or until he dies.
  In addition, Yom Kippur atones only for those who abandon their sins and repent. For this reason the Sages established five prayer services on Yom Kippur, with the mitzva of confession in each service, to help one come to true repentance, and to merit through this atonement from sin and forgiveness of transgressions.
  
  Bava Kamma
  
  Introduction to Bava Kamma
  
  Tractate Bava Kamma was originally the first section of a large tractate named Tractate Nezikin, which comprised what are now the first three tractates in the Order of Nezikin. From this placement it derived its name, Bava Kamma, the first gate. The remaining part of this super-tractate was divided into Bava Metzia, the middle gate, and Bava Batra, the last gate.
  These three tractates generally address monetary cases and incorporate within their chapters almost the entire range of Jewish civil law, while punishments for criminal offenses and religious transgressions are addressed only tangentially.
  Tractate Bava Kamma treats one specific area of law, the law of torts, in the narrowest meaning of the term. This means that it deals with the range of responsibility and compensation for which one is liable after causing damage to another's body or property, both when the damage was caused by an individual and when it was caused by his possessions, in a direct or indirect fashion.
  The principles of these halakhot are founded on the passages of the Torah appearing in the portion of Mishpatim (Exodus 21:18–37, 22:1–14). The Torah does not present these halakhot in a dry exposition of abstract legal principles but in the form of lively examples drawn from everyday life. In order to be able to apply these examples to other cases, it is necessary to first determine which facets of the cases provided by the Torah are essential elements that define the halakha and which facets are just incidental details of the provided example. This is done with the help of the authoritative traditions of the Oral Law and with the tools of legal exegesis.
  Tractate Bava Kamma is subdivided into two sections. The first section (chapters 1–6) covers the topic of damage caused by one's property or by actions that he initiated. The second section (chapters 7–10) concerns damage caused by a person with his own body.
  The laws of torts also include a religious aspect. Many cases involve the transgression of the halakhic prohibitions against robbery, theft, and injury. Nevertheless, one's liability to pay damages is not limited to cases where there was a willful transgression of a prohibition. Rather, even when the damage was caused with no purposeful intent to harm or through neglect, one is liable to pay restitution to the injured party.
  In the first section of Bava Kamma, which concerns damage caused by one's property, the key issue is that of the owner's responsibility. It is clear that an owner is responsible for the damage caused by his possessions; what requires clarification are the exact limitations of his responsibility. Does this responsibility extend to include any damage that results from his property or does it include only certain kinds of damage? Does taking the proper precautionary measures exempt one from liability for the damage that occurs despite one's efforts? Is there any difference between compensation payments made for actions performed with premeditation and purposeful intent and actions that were performed unintentionally, through neglect, or as a result of insufficient precautionary measures?
  One's liability for damage depends on the nature and the form of the damage. For this reason, acts that cause damage are classified as being subcategories of various primary categories of damage. 
  From the verses in the Torah it is readily apparent that a distinction exists between damage to property caused by one's animals, since, in the words of the opening mishna, they have a living spirit, and damage caused by one's inanimate possessions. With regard to damage caused by one's animals, a difference exists between cases where the animal's objective was to cause damage and cases where the damage was a consequence of the animal's typical behavior. Damage of the former type is classified as being of the category of Goring. This includes damage caused by goring, kicking, or biting done for the purpose of damaging. Cases of such damage can be further subdivided into instances in which the belligerent animal was innocuous and cases where the animal had already repeatedly caused that form of damage, and the owner had been warned about it, in which case the animal is considered forewarned. Once an animal is forewarned, the level of the owner's responsibility for any damage caused by it is intensified in terms of the extent to which he is required to safeguard his animal to prevent it from causing damage, the amount of restitution he is liable to pay, and the form of payment. Furthermore, the owner incurs liability for such damage in almost every place, whether on private property or in the public domain.
  By contrast, in cases where the damage was a consequence of the animal's typical behavior, the animal's owner is liable only if the damage took place on the property of the injured party and only if such behavior is considered typical for that animal. One category of damage of this type is Eating, in which an animal's actions are motivated by the pleasure it receives in the course of the damage that is causes. Another category is Trampling, where the damage is caused by the animal's typical movements, such as by trampling on items while walking. As liability is incurred only when such behavior is considered typical for that animal, if an animal eats something it does not normally eat, or moves in an atypical manner, the owner is not liable to pay for the damage. Furthermore, in these cases, if the owner took the standard precautionary measures to prevent damage from occurring, he is also exempt from liability.
  In cases of damage caused by one's movable property, a distinction exists between damage caused by one's property when it remains stationary, classified as damage in the category of Pit, and damage caused when a person initiates a hazardous situation that then moves to a different location by itself or due to an additional force such as the wind, classified as damage in the category of Fire. In cases classified as Pit, liability is incurred only where one placed his property in a domain not his own, whether in the public domain or someone else's private property. Furthermore, liability is limited to damage caused to animals and people but does not extend to damage caused to vessels. In cases classified as Fire, one is liable wherever damage is caused, although in some cases one is not liable for the full extent of the damage. Also, with regard to these primary categories, one who took standard precautionary measures to prevent damage from occurring is exempt from liability.
  An additional primary category of damage, Man, includes damage caused directly by a person. One is liable for any damage that is a direct result of his actions or his force. One bears an extensive level of responsibility for his actions and therefore is liable for the full cost of the damage even if it was caused unwittingly and without awareness. The only exceptions to this are damage caused by those of limited intellectual capacity, who in general are not responsible for their actions, and damage caused by one's Canaanite slaves. In the latter case, the exemption applies to the master and is the result of an enactment for the betterment of the world, as it prevents a slave from maliciously causing damage in order to cause his owner great loss. The slave himself, if he is emancipated, will then be liable to pay for the damage he caused.
  The second section of Bava Kamma deals with damage caused by one person to another and by one person to the property of another. This topic is generally subdivided into the laws of bodily injury and the laws of robbery and theft.
  As the Gemara derives from verses in the Torah, one that injures another is liable for one or more of five types of indemnity payments. These are the payments:
  Cost of the damage: For all types of irreversible harm, such as severing an arm or a leg, which reduces the injured party's market value.
  Pain: For pain inflicted.
  Humiliation: For embarrassment caused by the injury that was inflicted, such as in the rape of a woman or by causing a blemish that humiliates the person.
  Medical expenses: For all medical expenses incurred as a consequence of the injury.
  Loss of livelihood: For missed work and loss of income due to the injury.
  These indemnities are not automatically paid for every injury caused; rather, each case is judged individually. At times one may have to pay all five types of indemnity payments, and at other times one may have to pay only some of them. Here too, there is a distinction between one who injured another willfully and purposefully, who is liable to pay all five indemnity payments when they apply, and one who injured another unintentionally or because of neglect, who is liable to pay only for the cost of the damage but not the other four types.
  Injuring another person is a violation of a Torah prohibition although one is rarely punished with lashes for doing so. Accordingly, one who injures another is required not only to compensate the injured party, but he must make amends by placating him as well.
  Robbery and theft differ from cases of damage in that not only does the victim suffer a loss, but the perpetrator benefits from the property he took. The talmudic discussion about this concerns two central issues.
  First, the fines imposed by the Torah on the thief, and to a lesser degree, on the robber, obligate him to make a double payment to the victim of his crime, and in cases where the crime of theft is followed by the slaughtering or sale of the stolen ox or sheep, he is required to pay four or five times the value of the stolen animal. Because these payments are fines leveled by the Torah, only a court of ordained judges, an institution that lapsed over the course of time, is authorized to collect them. Even then, the fine is imposed only in limited circumstances. For example, guilt must be confirmed on the basis of testimony from two witnesses and not based on a confession of the guilty party, and in some cases a fine is imposed only after the guilty party has taken a false oath that he is not guilty.
  The second issue involves the requirement for the thief and the robber to return the item that they stole or to pay restitution for its value. Should they not do so willingly, the court is authorized to coerce them. The Gemara enters into a detailed discussion as it attempts to define this obligation. When are a robber and a thief obligated to return the very item they stole and when are they required only to pay restitution? How is the amount one has to pay determined in cases where the value of the item changed over time? Is there a difference in this regard if the change was due to fluctuations in the item's market value or due to a physical change in the item itself?
  How the stolen item should be returned is also the subject of much discussion. Can he just return the item to its owner or must he inform him that he has done so? To what lengths does he need to go to find the owner? The Sages enacted that in order to facilitate a thief's full repentance he does not always need to return the item itself. It needs to be clarified when that enactment applies and when it does not apply. Furthermore, is the requirement to return the item an obligation on the thief alone, or does the victim retain rights of ownership to the item so that even if the thief dies he may continue to claim it back from the thief's heirs?
  These are the principal discussions contained in this tractate, although Bava Kamma also includes discussions about other types of payments and fines as well as false claims made with regard to instances of theft and robbery. Very little aggadic material appears in this tractate, and what does appear is mainly related to the tractate's primary subject, the responsibility one bears for the damage he caused.
  Tractate Bava Kamma contains ten chapters. Some chapters deal with a single subject, while others address several.
  Chapter One focuses on defining the essential characteristics of each of the four primary categories of damage and the liability incurred for damage caused.
  Chapter Two deals principally with details of the primary categories of damage caused by animals, namely Trampling, Eating, and Goring.
  Chapter Three expands on damage in the category of Pit. It also addresses cases in which two people caused damage to each other, as well as cases where one cannot determine with certainty who is the one that caused the damage and who is the one that was damaged.
  Chapter Four covers the subject of an ox that gored, including what defines whether an animal is considered to be innocuous or forewarned. It also contains a discussion of the forms of restitution payments and a case in which an ox kills a person.
  Chapter Five concludes the discussion of a goring ox and in its latter half returns to a discussion of damage classified as Pit.
  Chapter Six returns to a discussion of the categories of Trampling and Eating and presents a wide-ranging discussion of damage classified as Fire.
  Chapter Seven begins the tractate's discussion of the laws of theft. It focuses primarily on the liability incurred by a thief, both with regard to the double payment and with regard to the fourfold and fivefold payments. At its conclusion, the chapter lists the enactments that were promulgated concerning Eretz Yisrael and Jerusalem.
  Chapter Eight addresses cases of bodily injury and the methods of payment for the five types of indemnity.
  Chapter Nine delineates when a stolen item must be returned and when the thief or robber pays restitution only. It also explores the methods of achieving atonement for the sin of robbery as it examines the case of one who steals from a convert.
  Chapter Ten discusses the details of the laws of robbery, defining when an action is deemed to be a robbery as opposed to theft, and examining the methods of returning the stolen item.
  1	In the Tosefta, Tractate Kelim, owing to its great length, is similarly divided into three gates: Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra. 
  2	Not included in Tractate Nezikin are those monetary cases directly related to matters of matrimony that are expounded in the Order of Nashim, principally in Tractate Ketubot.
  3	And as the Sages put it: What holds true for the ox holds true for any domesticated animal, as well as for wild animals and birds. If that is the case, why did the verse specifically mention ox or ass? Rather, the verse presents the common example (Bava Kamma 54b).
  4	Rambam retains this division in his Mishne Torah. The section addressing these issues is divided as follows: Hilkhot Nizkei Mamon, addressing damage to property; Hilkhot Geneiva, addressing the laws of theft; Hilkhot Gezeila VaAveda, addressing robbery and lost articles; Hilkhot Hovel UMazik, addressing injury and damages; and finally Hilkhot Rotze'ah UShmirat HaNefesh, addressing capital crimes and other life-or-death matters.
  5	With regard to damage caused by an individual's person, there exists an even stricter measure – at times one may be obligated to pay compensation even when an action was caused without one's knowledge and by accident. The early authorities discuss whether there are any circumstances under which an unavoidable accident would exempt the person from having to pay any form of compensation for the damage caused.
  6	One exception to this is when the injured party entered the property of the owner of the belligerent animal without first gaining permission to do so. 
  7	According to the opinion of Rav, cited at the beginning of the tractate, this is one of the four primary categories of damage, the one known as Maveh.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  And when an ox gores a man or a woman, and they die, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be absolved. But if the ox was a goring ox in time past, and warning has been given to its owner, and he has not secured it, and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is placed upon him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is placed upon him. Whether it has gored a son or has gored a daughter, according to this judgment shall it be done to him. If the ox gores a slave or a maidservant, he shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned. (Exodus 21:28–32)
  And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein, the owner of the pit shall pay, he shall recompense money to its owners and the carcass shall be for him. (Exodus 21:33–34)
  And if one man's ox hurts the ox of another, and it dies; then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value, and the carcass they shall also divide. Or if it is known that the ox was a goring ox in time past, and its owner has not secured it, he shall pay an ox for an ox and the carcass shall be his. (Exodus 21:35–36)
  If a man causes a field or a vineyard to be eaten and he set his animal loose and it consumed in the field of another, the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay. (Exodus 22:4)
  If a fire breaks out and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation. (Exodus 22:5)
  The Torah teaches that one is responsible for damage caused by the animals in his possession – by goring, eating, or trampling – or for damage caused as a result of his actions – by digging a pit or igniting a fire.
  This chapter, which serves as a general introduction to the principles of damage caused by one's property, addresses one's liability to pay restitution in cases of damage. The chapter delineates in which cases one is exempt and in which cases he is liable, and the extent of his liability; in some cases one is liable to pay the full cost of the damage and in others only half the cost of the damage. Included is a discussion of when the location of the damaged item is a factor in determining one's liability. Also considered is the form of payment, the way in which the cost of the damage is appraised, and how the payment is collected.
  The opening discussion in this chapter concerns the four primary categories of damage. The cases presented in the Torah are paradigms from which the principles defining these primary categories are derived.
  The Torah differentiates between two forms of payment that one can pay for damage caused. The first is a payment of restitution worth the full cost of the damage. The one liable for the damage makes the payment from the “best of his field” (Exodus 22:4). The other form is a payment of half the cost of the damage, which is made from the proceeds of the sale of the body of the belligerent animal. The chapter addresses the precise meaning of paying restitution from the “best of his field”: How is this accomplished, and what is done in cases where it is not possible to do so?
  Another issue considered is in which cases one is liable to pay the full cost of the damage and in which cases one pays for only half the cost of the damage. Accompanying this is a discussion of whether the payment of half the cost of the damage is considered to be monetary restitution or a fine imposed by the Torah.
  During all these discussions, the Gemara also discusses the basic halakhic exegesis of the verses that detail the cases of damage caused by one's property. The Gemara also tangentially covers the subject of the payment for damage caused by a person willfully or due to negligence on his part.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  It has been established that one must pay for any damage caused as a result of his actions or of his failure to properly safeguard his property.
  Liability to pay restitution is incurred only when the damage is caused to the property of a Jew, but not in the case of damage caused to ownerless property or property belonging to a gentile, or to property that was consecrated to the Temple.
  Generally, the one liable for the damage pays restitution for the full cost of the damage, and he pays from his best-quality land. An exception to this principle is damage caused by an animal that was innocuous but nevertheless caused damage with destructive intent, i.e., damage in the category of Goring. In that case, the owner is liable to pay for only half the cost of the damage, and the payment is made from the proceeds of the sale of the body of the belligerent animal. Similarly, the owner of the animal is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of his animal as it was walking. The Gemara considered the nature of these payments and concluded that the payment of half the cost of the damage in the case of the innocuous animal is considered to be a fine, whereas the payment for damage caused by pebbles is considered to be a reduced form of monetary restitution. Since the former is considered a fine, the various halakhot of fines apply, most significantly that one does not pay based on one's own admission; rather, one pays based only on the testimony of witnesses.
  The primary categories of damage can be enumerated in various ways. The Gemara cited one opinion whose list included twenty-four different categories, most of them being forms of damage caused directly or indirectly by a person. On the whole, the discussion in this chapter was limited to damage caused by one's property, which may be divided into the following primary categories:
  Goring: This includes all forms of damage caused by an animal where the intention was to cause damage, and doing so was a departure from its typical behavior. This includes goring, biting, and kicking. Liability for such damage is incurred for damage both on private property and in a public domain, although there is a distinction between a case where the animal was innocuous and where it was forewarned.
  Eating: The essential characteristics of Eating are that the damage is caused through the normal actions of the animal and the animal derived pleasure from his actions. This includes consuming a person's produce, or rubbing itself up against a wall for its pleasure. Liability for this damage is limited to damage caused to property within the injured party's private property. Accordingly, if an animal consumed someone's produce in the public domain, its owner is exempt.
  Trampling: This refers to any damage resulting from the animal's normal movement, including treading on items while it walks or other forms of damage resulting from its normal motions, such as knocking items over and breaking them as it passes. Also in these cases, liability is limited to damage caused to property within the injured party's private property.
  Pit: The classic case of this mentioned in the Torah is one who digs a pit on property that does not belong to him and people or animals are damaged by falling into it. This category also includes the creation of any public hazard, such as placing an obstacle in the public domain, although the halakhot of when such acts are classified as Pit is subject to a dispute among the amora'im. One who creates the hazard is liable to pay damages for any injury caused to an animal or a person, but he is exempt from liability in a case in which damage was caused to vessels or in a case in which a person was killed.
  Fire: One who lights a fire that spreads and causes damage, or who sets in motion any other type of obstacle that causes damage to others while in motion, is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. Liability is incurred irrespective of whether it occurred on the injured party's private property or in the public domain.
  As mentioned, for damage of the category of Goring only, a distinction exists between an innocuous and a forewarned animal. Until an animal has repeatedly caused damage and has been warned for doing so, it is considered to be innocuous. Accordingly, if an innocuous animal causes damage it is considered to be an aberration, and so the owner is liable for only half the cost of the damage. Once the animal has been forewarned, the owner is required to pay for the full cost of any subsequent damage. For all other categories of damage, since the damage is caused by the animal's typical behavior, the animal is deemed to be forewarned even if it had never previously caused damage of that form. Accordingly, the owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage even the first time it causes that form of damage.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  If a man causes a field or a vineyard to be eaten and he set his animal loose and it consumed in the field of another, the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay. (Exodus 22:4)
  If a fire breaks out and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation. (Exodus 22:5)
  And if one man's ox hurts the ox of another, and it dies; then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value, and the carcass they shall also divide. Or if it is known that the ox was a goring ox in time past, and its owner has not secured it, he shall pay an ox for an ox and the carcass shall be his. (Exodus 21:35–36)
  This chapter is primarily a continuation of the previous one, analyzing in greater detail the principles outlined there.
  At the conclusion of the previous chapter it was established that for primary categories of damage, the animal or person that caused the damage can be deemed forewarned, either due to the intrinsic nature of the one who caused the damage or by being formally warned in court. In this chapter the Gemara discusses more precise specifications to determine in exactly which situations an animal is deemed forewarned.
  The Gemara first discusses damage classified as Trampling in order to determine what type of walking and behavior is ordinary for an animal, as, if it causes damage while behaving in its normal manner the owner must pay the full cost of the damage. In this context, the Gemara also examines the unique halakha with regard to pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of a walking animal.
  Similarly, the halakhot of damage classified as Eating are also explored: What type of eating by an animal is considered routine, for which the animal is deemed forewarned and its owner obligated to pay the full cost of the damage? Conversely, in what situations will the animal be determined to have eaten unusual items or to have eaten in an unusual way, classifying the damage the animal caused as Goring by an innocuous ox, for which the owner must pay for only half the cost of the damage? The Gemara also enumerates the locations in which the owner of the animal is liable for damage in a case of Eating and the method of payment of damages in such a case.
  With regard to Goring, the Gemara clarifies the process by which an animal is rendered forewarned, and how this designation can be reversed, thereby returning the animal to its former innocuous status.
  With regard to Eating and Trampling there is legal significance to the location where the damage took place; one is responsible to pay the full cost of the damage only if the incident happened “in the field of another.” This requires exact definition in order to determine exactly which locations are included in this halakha.
  The Gemara also examines the opinion of the one who maintains that with regard to Goring, there is a distinction between the public domain and the property of the injured party. According to this opinion, the owner of an innocuous ox must pay the full cost of the damage if the incident happened on the property of the injured party but he pays only half the cost of the damage if it took place in the public domain.
  Among those deemed forewarned is a person who directly causes injury or damage to another or to another's possessions. There are many questions with regard to this matter: Is one liable only for the damage he intended to cause or does he have a responsibility to pay even for damage caused unintentionally? Are there any cases in which he is completely exempt from liability for damage caused? Furthermore, is there any distinction with regard to his liability between the different types of indemnity paid for personal injury?
  These are the primary issues explored in this chapter. Some other halakhic matters, including a brief analysis of damage caused by Fire, are also discussed.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter discussed the details of several primary categories of damage for which an animal is deemed forewarned from the start.
  In the preceding chapter it was stated that for Trampling an animal is automatically deemed forewarned, and therefore one must always pay the full cost of the damage classified as Trampling. In this chapter it was clarified that the category of Trampling includes damage caused by the body of an animal moving about in its typical manner. This, therefore, includes not only objects trampled underfoot but also damage caused by any other body parts, including damage caused by an animal's feet and a bird's wings. If the animal was jumping in an atypical manner this is not classified as Trampling but rather as Goring, and therefore the owner must pay for only half the cost of the damage.
  Trampling includes only the damage caused directly by the body of the animal or by articles tied to the body of the animal, even loosely. Nevertheless, if an animal propels debris as it walks, and these flying objects strike other things and cause damage, this constitutes the unique category of pebbles, according to which the owner of the animal must pay for only half the cost of the damage. This category also includes damage caused by wind stirred up by a bird flapping its wings.
  Eating is another category of damage for which an animal is automatically deemed forewarned, but this applies only if the animal ate an item that it normally eats and did so in an ordinary manner. If an animal eats something which it does not typically consume, such as clothing, or if it eats items in an atypical manner, this is considered a situation where the animal intended to cause damage and the owner is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage.
  If the animal caused damage on its way to get to the food, if it acted in its typical manner the owner must pay the full cost of the damage, in accordance with the halakhot of Eating. Furthermore, in a case where an animal ate something in an ordinary manner but indirectly caused greater damage in the process, such as the case of a dog that took a cake that had been baked on coals, and in doing so caused a stack of grain to catch on fire and be burned, the halakha then differentiates between the two aspects: He must pay the full cost of the damage to the cake in accordance with the halakhot of Eating, but he must pay for the damage to the stack of grain in accordance with the relevant category, which could be either Fire or pebbles.
  It was further explained that while one is exempt from paying in a case of Eating in a public domain, the owner does need to reimburse the injured party for the benefit the animal derived. It was also clarified that if the damage was caused in an atypical manner, he would have to pay for a case of Eating in a public domain, albeit for only half the cost of the damage.
  Rabbi Tarfon is of the opinion that an animal that causes damage by goring within the domain of the injured party is deemed forewarned, and therefore the owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. This, however, is not the final ruling; the halakha maintains the distinction between an innocuous and a forewarned animal in all cases of Goring, including damage caused on the private property of the injured party.
  It was also determined that with regard to Goring, an animal can be classified as forewarned if it intentionally caused damage three times at fixed intervals, provided that following each incident witnesses came and testified, issuing warnings to the owner in court. As long as a warning has not been issued the animal remains classified as innocuous, and its owner must pay for only half the cost of the damage it caused. Furthermore, even an animal that was classified as forewarned can revert to innocuous status if experience demonstrates that it no longer poses a threat, such as if children petted it and it did not gore them.
  A person who causes damage with his body is always deemed forewarned, regardless of whether he caused this damage with intent and awareness or without intent and awareness. In all such cases he is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage. The only case in which one is exempt from liability is a case in which he had absolutely no control over the situation or ability to prevent the accident.
  The obligation to fully compensate the injured party applies only to the actual damage; the other punishments and fines imposed upon a person who injures another person are somewhat dependent on the intention of the assailant, and there can therefore be situations in which the assailant does not have to make the additional payments.
  In addition to the above topics, this chapter also included a number of tangential discussions. In conjunction with the obligation to reimburse the injured party for the benefit derived by one's animal from eating another's produce in the public domain, the Gemara discussed the broader topic known as: This one benefits and that one does not suffer a loss. The conclusion is that if one does not suffer any loss whatsoever he cannot demand payment from another who derived benefit from his property.
  The Gemara also discussed the question of liability for damage classified as Fire: Is this similar to the damage caused by arrows that one shot, meaning it is as if he caused the damage directly with his hands, or is Fire similar to damage caused by one's possessions? The conclusion is that the one who ignited the fire is responsible on account of both aspects.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  In continuation of the discussion in the previous chapter with regard to one's lia-bility in directly causing damage to another, this chapter discusses two types of situations.
  The first concerns one who creates an obstacle in the public domain or one who becomes an obstacle himself. A central element of this analysis is whether all obstacles are judged under the category of Pit, or whether certain obstacles are treated differently. One fundamental question is whether or not one is responsible for an obstacle he creates unintentionally or due to circumstances beyond his control.
  The second situation concerns a case where two people collide and one causes injury to the other. The liability in this case depends on the answer to several questions: To what degree must one take precautions so as not to cause injury or damage to others? Is one who is sufficiently careful exempt from liability for any damage he causes? Is a pedestrian obligated to watch for obstacles in the road?
  The Gemara then examines how damages are calculated in a situation of mutual injury caused between two people, between a person and an animal, or between two animals that collide. With regard to injury caused by an animal, a major factor in calculating payment for damage is whether the animal is innocuous or forewarned. Subsequently, the chapter compares one's liability for damage he himself causes with damage his animal causes. Last, the chapter describes what happens in a situation where an animal causes an injury, and its identity is uncertain or disputed.
  In many of these discussions, the Gemara examines the practical halakha through analyzing relevant verses and exploring the underlying concepts involved, specifically in relation to the primary categories of Pit and Goring.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  This chapter explored various topics. The first topic was obstacles in the public domain, whether human obstacles, obstacles that merely belong to a person, or those that are placed by a person. The second subject was collision, two people or animals that collide with each other and thereby cause damage or injury. The third topic was the halakhic differences between damage inflicted by a person and damage caused by his animal. The last topic in the chapter concerned situations where the identity of the animal that caused an injury is uncertain.
  Just as one is responsible for damage he causes with his own body, he is likewise responsible for damage caused by his property. Generally speaking, an obstacle that one creates in the public domain, whether deliberately or out of negligence, is categorized as a pit, and he is liable for damage it causes unless he is completely blameless. For example, one who leaves a utensil, pours water, or puts out garbage in the public domain is liable for any damage caused as a result. One is liable for damage to a person or an animal caused by his pit, but not for damage caused to utensils. The Sages instituted an ordinance that if one puts out his straw or hay in the public domain at a time when he is not permitted to do so, it is rendered ownerless and anyone can take possession of it, although there is a dispute whether one may take possession of it ab initio.
  If two people were walking in a normative manner in a place where it is permitted for them to walk, and one caused injury or damage to the other, he is exempt. If the one who caused the damage was running, which is not a normative manner of moving on the street, or if he stopped suddenly without warning, he is liable. If two people collide and cause mutual damage to one another, the amount each is liable to pay is evaluated, and the one who is liable to pay the greater sum must pay the difference of the two sums. The same holds for a case where two animals, two people, or a person and an animal injure each other: The amount each party is liable to pay is evaluated separately, and the one who is liable to pay more than the other pays the difference.
  When an innocuous ox gores and kills another ox, the halakha is that the injured party receives a share of ownership of the belligerent ox, contrary to the opinion that the ox is merely designated repayment for the damage. The carcass of the dead ox belongs to its owner and is not shared by the liable party, but any increase in its value subsequent to the incident is deducted from the share its owner receives in the belligerent ox.
  Four types of indemnity for injury, i.e., humiliation, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood, are owed only when a person injures another, not when his ox injures someone. Similarly, one is liable to emancipate his slave only if he himself mutilates the slave, not if his animal does so. Conversely, if one causes damage through an action that carries the death penalty, he is exempt from monetary restitution, since the death penalty is the more severe punishment. If one's ox causes damage in such a manner, he is liable to pay damages.
  If an ox is injured by another ox, but the identity of the belligerent ox is a subject of dispute between the two owners, e.g., one innocuous ox and one forewarned ox were involved in a confrontation, the halakha is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant; in the absence of such proof, he receives nothing. Furthermore, even if the owner of the belligerent oxen admits that he owes compensation to the claimant, but the latter demanded compensation from a different ox, the former's admission does not render him liable to pay. This is analogous to the halakha that if one claims that he is owed wheat by another, and the latter admits to owing barley, he is not liable to give him even barley, as his admission is ineffective.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And if one man's ox hurts the ox of another, and it dies; then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value, and the carcass they shall also divide. Or if it is known that the ox was a goring ox in time past, and its owner has not secured it, he shall pay an ox for an ox and the carcass shall be his. (Exodus 21:35–36)
  And when an ox gores a man or a woman, and they die, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear. But if the ox was a goring ox in time past, and warning has been given to its owner, and he has not secured it, and it killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is placed upon him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is placed upon him. Whether it has gored a son or has gored a daughter, according to this judgment shall it be done to him. If the ox gores a slave or a maidservant, he shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned. (Exodus 21:28–32)
  This chapter discusses halakhot concerning the primary category of damages known as Goring. These include the case of an ox goring another ox and the case of an ox that injures or kills a person. In both cases the Torah distinguishes between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox.
  Following the discussion in the previous chapter concerning the calculation of compensation for damage caused by an innocuous ox, this chapter opens with a discussion of a case where the ox injured or killed several other animals. Since compensation is paid exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox, in a case where several animals were injured or killed, the proceeds must be divided among their owners. The manner in which the compensation is divided depends on the definition of the damaged parties' rights to the belligerent ox; is it considered a partnership between the owner and the damaged parties, or is it considered a debt, to which the ox is liened?
  The Torah distinguishes between a forewarned ox that causes damage, for which the owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage, and a non-forewarned, or innocuous ox, for which he is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage. The definition of a forewarned ox is clarified; once an ox is established as forewarned, is it considered forewarned with regard to goring and causing all forms of damage, at all times, and with regard to all targets, or is it considered forewarned only with regard to those for which it has an established pattern of belligerent behavior? Another issue is whether and when a forewarned ox can revert to its former status of innocuousness.
  Concerning an innocuous ox, the chapter discusses the significance of the expression: “One man's ox hurts the ox of another” (Exodus 21:35), in determining the nature of the owners to whom this halakha is relevant. This chapter also examines cases where the ox is consecrated to the Temple or belongs to a gentile, where the ox belongs to a halakhically incompetent person, and where it is under the custody of a steward.
  With regard to a forewarned ox that causes damage, the Torah states: “And the owner has not secured it.” This raises the question of whether or not there is a degree of safeguarding that would deem the ox's owner exempt from paying damages. The chapter also explores whether the responsibility for damage caused by the ox can be transferred by its owner to a bailee.
  The Torah states that an ox that kills a person, whether it was innocuous or forewarned, is liable to be killed by stoning. Issues that require clarification are whether or not this applies to an ox that kills a person unintentionally, and whether the age or sex of the victim is of any consequence. There is also a discussion here as to whether the Torah's explicit mention of the ox's owner indicates that an ox that is not owned by a specific person is not killed.
  The sentencing of an ox to stoning has ritual ramifications as well. Not only is it prohibited to eat the ox, it is prohibited to derive any benefit from it. This chapter discusses the stage at which this prohibition takes effect, and its ramifications concerning the acquisition and ownership of the ox.
  If the ox that killed was forewarned, its owner is liable to pay ransom. The purpose of this ransom is investigated: Is it in order to compensate the victim's family or to atone for the owner? The manner in which the ransom is calculated is discussed as well. The chapter investigates whether or not the owner is liable to pay the victim's monetary value to his family, in a case where he is exempt from paying ransom, e.g., where the ox was innocuous. Similarly, the chapter discusses a case where an ox killed a slave but the owner is exempt from paying the slave's owner the thirty-shekel fine.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  This chapter discussed the halakhot of innocuous and forewarned oxen.
  Since restitution for damage caused by an innocuous ox is paid exclusively from the proceeds from the sale of the ox, if the ox injures or kills several other oxen while retaining its innocuous status, its value is not usually sufficient to cover the damages. The ruling in such a case is that the last damaged party receives the entire amount that he deserves, namely, half the value of the belligerent ox. Since each damaged party becomes a partner in the ownership of the ox, the next most recently damaged party receives half of what remains of the ox's value. Similarly, the damaged party prior to that receives half of what then remains and so forth.
  The Gemara ruled that a forewarned ox is not considered hazardous at all times and for all purposes but only for those types of behavior for which it was rendered forewarned. For example, if it was rendered forewarned for goring a certain species of animal, or at a specific time, it is considered forewarned only with regard to that species or that time, and it retains its innocuous status with regard to other cases.
  There are exceptions to the standard halakhot of compensation for Goring. If an animal consecrated to the Temple causes damage, the Temple treasury is exempt, as is a person whose ox gores a consecrated animal. A gentile who is tried under the jurisdiction of a Jewish court is liable to pay the full cost of the damage caused by his ox, even if it was innocuous; whereas if a Jew's ox gores a gentile's ox, the Jew is exempt from liability. One who is halakhically incompetent is not liable to pay compensation for damage caused by his ox. To protect society, the court appoints a steward to safeguard this person's animals, and consequently, if they cause damage, compensation can be collected.
  The halakha that an ox that kills a person is sentenced in court to death by stoning, provided there are two witnesses, applies whether the victim is male or female, young or old, a freeman or a Canaanite slave. A stadium ox, which is an ox trained to gore in bullfights, is exempt from being put to death because it is considered a victim of circumstances beyond its control. An ox that kills a person unintentionally is also not killed.
  The purpose of paying ransom when one's ox kills a person is for the owner's atonement. The amount of the ransom is based on the monetary value of the victim. If the ox killed a Canaanite slave, his owner is paid a set amount of thirty shekels, as specified in the Torah.
  This chapter delineated additional halakhot pertaining to the killing of an ox that killed a person: An ox that kills a person is killed even if it is ownerless, or if its owner is not halakhically competent. If it has an owner, its verdict is issued only in his presence. Once the verdict is issued, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the ox.
  The chapter concludes with a return to its discussion of damage caused by an ox. Although the owner of an ox is liable to pay for damage it causes, if he entrusts it to a bailee, the latter accepts this responsibility and is liable to pay for damage the ox causes, whereas the owner is exempt from liability. If a forewarned ox was safeguarded adequately, the owner is exempt from paying damages. With regard to an innocuous ox the Torah requires superior safeguarding; otherwise the owner is liable.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  And if one man's ox hurts the ox of another, and it dies; then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value, and the carcass they shall also divide. (Exodus 21:35)
  And if men struggle and hurt a pregnant woman and her offspring emerge and there is no tragedy, he shall be punished as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him and he shall give as the judges determine. But if any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, a burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a stripe for a stripe. (Exodus 21:22–25)
  And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein, the owner of the pit shall pay, he shall recompense money to its owners and the carcass shall be for him. (Exodus 21:33–34)
  This chapter completes the discussion of the halakhot of Goring, though the bulk of the chapter focuses on the halakhot of Pit.
  The first issue raised in the chapter concerns a pregnant cow that gores or one that is gored. If a pregnant cow gores another animal, one must address whether the fetus has the same status as the mother and if payment may be collected from the proceeds of the sale of its body or not. If the pregnant cow is gored, then the question becomes whether the fetus has the status of the mother with regard to estimating the value of the damage. In both cases, this may depend on the status of the fetus at the time of the goring, i.e., whether it already emerged from the womb, or if the cow miscarried at that time.
  The second issue explored in this chapter is a more general one, involving what happens when one brings his animal into another's property and it does damage or is damaged there. In this case, the halakha depends on whether the animal enters with permission. The questions posed relate to whether granting an animal's owner permission for the animal to enter one's property causes the property owner to be responsible for any damage that might occur to that animal, as well as whether the animal's owner is responsible for preventing his animal from doing damage.
  Based on the discussions about Goring, the Gemara goes on to analyze a halakha that is not directly related to the case of a pregnant cow: The Torah requires one who injures a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry, to pay the husband compensation for the miscarried offspring. What is the halakha when an ox gores a woman and causes a miscarriage? The Gemara enumerates a number of details with regard to these circumstances, such as when one must pay, whom he pays, how the value of the compensation is assessed, and what the other payments are that the one who causes damage must pay.
  After this chapter addresses the halakhot of Goring, the bulk of it deals with the halakhot of Pit, which were not comprehensively detailed in previous chapters. The Mishna and Gemara elaborate on a number of different facets of Pit that are only briefly mentioned in the Torah, for instance, the definition of what constitutes a pit are clarified, including its form and depth. Similarly, the issues of ownership and location of the pit are discussed, in addition to the question of whether one who digs a pit must have some element of ownership over the area in which the pit is found in order to be liable for damage caused or whether he is liable irrespective of his ownership of the property. The chapter also addresses a fundamental question concerning the nature of the damage classified as Pit: Does the damage occur due to the impact of hitting the ground, although the ground is not the property of the one who digs the pit? Or is the damage due to the animal's exposure to fumes when falling into the pit, which is unrelated to the impact with the ground?
  The Torah requires that a pit be covered. Therefore, the definition of a covering that exempts the owner from liability must be clarified. A related question this chapter explores concerns the status of a pit jointly owned by multiple partners, and how to divide the payment of damages between them.
  Yet another issue examined in this chapter is the type of damage the owner of the pit is liable to pay for. Is he liable to pay for any type of damage or only for damage caused to animals? If the latter, are only the animals listed explicitly by the Torah included, or are those specific cases expanded to include other types of animals as well?
  In addition to these issues, the Gemara also explains a number of other points that are not directly related to the main themes of the tractate.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  This chapter dealt with two main subjects, the completion of the halakhot of Goring and the halakhot of Pit.
  Continuing a discussion in the previous chapter about compensation, this chapter concludes that in a situation of uncertainty with regard to the measure of liability of one who causes damage, one follows the principle that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Based on this, if an ox gores a pregnant cow and a dead fetus is subsequently found at its side, the owner of the cow must bring proof that the miscarriage was directly caused by the goring in order to receive compensation. Similarly, if an innocuous pregnant cow gored, although the fetus is considered to be part of the cow that caused damage, payment is not collected from the proceeds of the sale of the fetus unless proof is brought that the cow was still pregnant at the time of the goring.
  Another topic explored in this chapter concerns one who brought his own animal or a movable item into the courtyard of another, and damage was caused either to the animal who entered the courtyard, or to the owner of the courtyard. In this case, the halakha is that the owner of the courtyard is not responsible for safeguarding the property of one who enters his courtyard unless he obligates himself to do so. Similarly, one who enters another's property with permission is not responsible for damage caused to the property of the owner of the courtyard unless he obligates himself to this effect. If damage is caused by an animal through goring, eating, or trampling, or if the animal itself is injured, if the one responsible for the damage explicitly obligated himself to compensate the other for it, he must do so. If he had not explicitly obligated himself, he is exempt from liability. If one entered another's courtyard without permission and damage was caused, the owner of the courtyard is exempt from liability for damage caused by his property; but the one who entered without permission is responsible for any damage caused by his possessions. All of these halakhot apply only to damage caused by property. By contrast, one who causes damage himself is liable, unless it was completely accidental.
  Another topic raised in the Gemara concerns compensation paid for miscarried offspring. The halakha is that this payment is not applicable unless an individual intended to injure his friend and instead struck a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry. The compensation for miscarried offspring is generally given to the father of the fetus even if he is not married to the mother at that time. If the father dies, the money is given to his heirs. In a case where he has no heirs, such as in the case of a convert, the one responsible for the damage does not have to pay damages.
  Most of this chapter focused on the halakhot of Pit. The digger of a pit is liable for damage caused by it if he dug the pit on property that does not belong to him and if he did not cover or seal it properly. The Sages had a tradition stating that a pit must be a minimum of ten handbreadths deep in order for the pit's owner to be liable for the death of any animals that fall inside. If the pit was partially filled with water, the owner is liable even if the pit is less than ten handbreadths deep. No minimum measurement exists with regard to the digger's responsibility for injuries caused by the pit, and the digger would consequently be liable in every case. Excluding depth, there is no specific form or structure that determines liability. Any hole dug in the ground with the minimum depth of ten handbreadths qualifies as a pit.
  In a case where a death occurs due to a pit, one is liable only for animals, not for people, that die. Even concerning animals, the owner is liable only if the death occurred at specific times, such as at night; or if it occurred with specific animals, such as a very young animal or one of substandard intelligence for its species; or if the pit's covering was insufficiently strong for that particular animal and as a result it fell into the pit. Although the owner of the pit is liable for damage caused to animals and humans, he is not liable for damage caused to vessels, including those that were attached to the animals at the time of the fall.
  With regard to the reason for liability for damage that occurs in a pit, it is concluded that liability stems from both the actual impact of hitting the ground as well as from the exposure to fumes during the fall itself.
  One who digs a pit or owns the pit has responsibility for covering a pit properly, and he is liable for damage incurred. If the pit is owned jointly by two partners, if each one individually dug a part of the pit in a manner that was sufficient to cause damage, both of them are liable. If the damage was caused because the pit was not covered appropriately, the last partner who attended to the pit is responsible.
  The Gemara used this last discussion as a springboard to describe other scenarios where damage is caused by multiple parties. For example, in the case of an ox that pushes another ox into a pit, the Gemara concluded that the owner of the belligerent ox and the owner of the pit are considered to be liable. Concerning compensation, the halakha is that if one of the partners cannot pay, the entire sum is collected from the other partner.
  Although the Torah mentions specifically an ox or donkey that falls into a pit, the halakha applies to any animal. In fact, it is stated that the principle that all animals are included in a halakha, even if the Torah mentioned specific animals, applies to many other areas of halakha as well, such as animals working on Shabbat, the mitzva of returning lost items, unloading or loading an animal with a heavy burden, and the prohibition of diverse kinds. The only reason the Torah specifically mentions an ox and a donkey as examples is that they are more commonly found in the scenarios described in the verses.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  If a man causes a field or a vineyard to be eaten and he set his animal loose and it consumed in the field of another, the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay. (Exodus 22:4)
  If a fire breaks out and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation. (Exodus 22:5)
  This chapter concludes the discussion of the halakhot of damage caused by one's possessions. The chapter focuses on two topics that are adjacent in the Torah: Damage caused by Eating and Trampling, and damage caused by Fire.
  Even though several of the halakhot of Eating and Trampling have been addressed in previous chapters, there are many fundamental issues that have not yet been clarified. One of these is the extent to which the owner of the animal is liable. Is he required to pay in every case, or is he exempt if he has safeguarded his animal adequately? What is considered adequate safeguarding of an animal? Similarly, the Gemara discusses whether or not he can pass the responsibility for safeguarding an animal to another.
  Another issue that is examined in this chapter is how to evaluate the amount of damages that must be paid to the injured party. If an animal eats or tramples a particular item, it is clear how much damage was caused. But if an animal tramples part of a field in which the produce is not yet fully grown, there are several possible ways of assessing the damage caused. Is the value of the trampled furrow assessed in isolation or as part of the entire field? Is it assessed by the current value of the crop or by its future potential value?
  With regard to damage caused by Fire, there are several issues that require investigation. Since fire is not a possession, it is clear that the liability for damage lies with the one who caused the fire. At times, it can be difficult to determine who that person is, as in a case where many people together create a fire or where one person instructs another to transport fire, either as a coal or as a torch. The Gemara must also determine liability when the wind causes the damage by blowing fire.
  Another question discussed in this chapter: If one takes all due precautions and care, is he exempt from liability for damage caused by fire? If so, what kinds of precautions and care are considered sufficient?
  The Gemara also explores which items generate liability for the person who caused the fire that damaged them. Is one liable only for plants or also for earth and stones? There is also a halakha learned through tradition, supported by most of the tanna'im, that one is liable to compensate the injured party only for items that were visible, e.g., the stack of grain and standing grain mentioned in the verse (Exodus 22:5). One is not liable to compensate him for items that were concealed and that were subsequently destroyed by fire. With regard to this tradition, the Gemara asks whether it applies in every case or only in cases of negligence. Furthermore, does it include items that are normally concealed in a certain place or only items that are not expected to be there?
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  This chapter addressed two primary topics. The first section completed the halakhot of acts of damage classified as Eating or Trampling. The second section dealt with acts of damage classified as Fire.
  The Sages said that the Torah is not as stringent with the requirements for safeguarding with regard to Eating and Trampling as it is with regard to Goring. For this reason, if one puts his animal in a safe enclosure that is locked properly, and yet the animal emerges and causes damage, he is exempt from liability. In such cases the owner pays only for the value of his own benefit from the damage, e.g., the money he saved by not having to feed the animal. He is not required to pay compensation for the damage caused.
  In terms of the amount of compensation paid for damage, if the animal ate unripe produce, the damage is assessed relative to an area sixty times larger than the area that was damaged. The amount for which one is liable is the prior value of the larger area less the current value of that larger area. This is the assessment whether the animal damaged a part of a field, a tree, a bush, or any produce that has not fully ripened. If the animal damaged ripe produce, the compensation is simply the value of the produce that was damaged.
  In general, one is liable for acts of damage classified as Eating only if that damage occurred in private property belonging to another. Nevertheless, if one gave permission to another to store produce in his field, the owner of the field is liable if his animal damages that produce.
  Tangential to the discussion of damages, the Gemara cited several instances in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. Although, for technical reasons, the court does not obligate one to pay compensation for these kinds of damage, there is nevertheless a moral imperative to pay for the damage. One who does not pay for causing damage in instances such as these is considered evil both in the eyes of Heaven and in the eyes of others.
  The main topic of this chapter is acts of damage classified as Fire. One who kindles a fire and does not adequately safeguard it is liable to pay for the damage caused. This is the halakha whether an item is destroyed completely, singed, or damaged in any other way due to the fire. An act of damage classified as Fire has a unique exemption: One is not liable for damage caused to items that are hidden from view. This exemption applies to items concealed within a stack of grain in a field and to similar cases. Despite this, if one's fire destroys the home of another, he must pay full compensation for everything contained within it that is common to keep there. This latter principle applies not only to an act of damage classified as Fire, but to any damage caused to items that it is common to keep in that location.
  The Torah is lenient with the halakhot of an act of damage classified as Fire, and provided one safeguards his fire adequately, he is not liable for damage caused. Therefore, one who kindles a fire within his own property and exercises all due caution, distancing it appropriately from the borders of his property or ensuring that a fence, body of water, or empty space separates the fire from anything that it could potentially damage, is not liable to pay compensation for damage caused.
  In a case where there is liability for damage caused by a fire, the one who caused the fire to spread is liable for the damage. If there were several partners involved in kindling the fire, the one who is the proximate cause is liable. For example, if an animal caused a previously controlled fire to blaze beyond control and cause damage, the owner of the animal is liable.
  If one appoints a halakhically competent agent to kindle a fire on his behalf, the agent is liable for any damage subsequently caused. If the agent is not halakhically competent, the one who designated him is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. If he gave combustible materials to the agent that would definitely cause a fire, the court can also obligate him to pay compensation.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep. (Exodus 21:37)
  If the theft shall be found in his possession alive whether it is an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, he shall pay double. (Exodus 22:3)
  If a man gives his neighbor money or vessels to safeguard and it was stolen from the house of the man, if the thief shall be found he shall pay double. If the thief shall not be found, the owner of the house shall approach the judges to determine if he misappropriated his neighbor's goods. For any matter of trespass, from an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment, for any lost item about which one shall say: This is it, the claims of both of them shall come before the judges, the one whom the judges convict shall pay double to his neighbor. (Exodus 22:6–8)
  This chapter deals mainly with the fines imposed upon a thief: Double payment in ordinary circumstances, and a fourfold or fivefold payment if the thief steals a sheep or an ox and then slaughters or sells it. Whereas repayment of the principal amount stolen is a simple monetary reimbursement, specific halakhot apply to the fines imposed by the Torah, which take effect in a limited set of circumstances. 
  Several basic questions are addressed, such as: In which precise cases is a thief obligated to pay these fines? What is the relationship between the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold payment? 
  Other issues discussed in this chapter involve cases in which the thief, during the course of the act of theft, commits a transgression involving a serious punishment. At times this can lead to a cancellation of the monetary obligations incurred through the theft itself. Another question is whether the testimony of two separate sets of witnesses, one concerning the theft of an animal and the other its slaughter or sale, can be combined into a single incriminating testimony. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish the punishment for conspiring witnesses who testify about the theft of an animal, or about its slaughter or sale, or both.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  With regard to the liabilities of a thief, one must distinguish between the basic monetary obligation of reimbursement on the one hand and the fines imposed by the Torah on the other. A different set of regulations applies to the collection of fines than to ordinary monetary compensation. For instance, a fine may be imposed only by a court composed of judges who have received proper ordination. Furthermore, a fine is waived if the perpetrator of the act engendering the fine admits his liability without having been incriminated by witnesses.
  The double payment applies to the theft of any item, with the exception of land, slaves, and bonds, whereas the fourfold or fivefold payment is prescribed only for slaughtering or selling a stolen sheep or ox, respectively.
  Additionally, the double payment applies not only to a thief, but also to a bailee who embezzles the item or money entrusted to him and subsequently takes a false oath in court that it was stolen by someone else.
  There are certain specific requirements that must be met for the fourfold or fivefold payment to be imposed. For instance, this fine does not apply in the case of an animal of diverse kinds, nor when the slaughter is not carried out according to halakhic requirements, and likewise it does not apply when the animal is sold in an incomplete manner. Moreover, the fine is not imposed when the stolen animal was fully acquired by the thief before the slaughter or sale.
  The last section of the chapter dealt with various sets of ancient ordinances that were instituted in biblical times by Joshua and Ezra. A further list of regulations instituted by the Sages that apply specifically to Jerusalem is also discussed.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  And if men contend, and one smite the other with a stone, or with his fist, and he not die, but keep his bed; if he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit; only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed. (Exodus 21:18–19)
  An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot, a burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a stripe for a stripe. (Exodus 21:24–25)
  And one who strikes an animal mortally shall pay its compensation, a life for a life. And if a man maims his neighbor; as he has done, so shall it be done to him: A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; as he has given a blemish to a person, so shall it be given unto him. (Leviticus 24:18–20)
  When men strive together one with another; and the wife of the one draws near to deliver her husband out of the hand of him that smites him, and puts forth her hand, and takes him by the genitals; then you shall cut off her hand, your eye shall have no pity. (Deuteronomy 25:11–12)
  There are several elements associated with the transgression by Torah law of injuring another. In addition to the wrongdoing vis-à-vis God and the transgression of causing another pain and anguish, one who causes an injury also incurs a monetary obligation. He is liable to compensate the victim for any damage he suffered, both directly and indirectly. 
  The Gemara, based on verses from the Torah, proves that ransom cannot be paid only for court-imposed capital punishment and the obligation to be exiled for unintentional manslaughter. Therefore, one who injures another must pay monetary restitution for the damage caused, and does not receive corporal punishment, as the verse “an eye for an eye” is not to be understood literally.
  From the examples of injury mentioned in the Torah, it is taught that one who injures another is liable to compensate the injured party for the actual injury, which includes compensation for a damaged limb, physical pain, and psychological suffering, i.e., humiliation. Additionally, the victim must be compensated for loss suffered as a secondary result of the injury, including reimbursement for the victim's loss of livelihood during his convalescence and for his medical costs. 
  This chapter discusses the methods of calculating the amounts of the various indemnities, different methods of payment, and situations in which one might be exempt from payment. This exemption could be due to the nature of the people involved or to other factors, and may include an exemption from all indemnities or from only some of them. 
  Among the issues addressed in this chapter is the question of how to assess liability when one inflicts several types of damage through one assault, and how the sums for the appropriate compensation are calculated. 
  The method of assessing payment of the indemnity of humiliation is particularly challenging, since by definition it does not have a purely objective system of evaluation, and requires the consideration of many factors, such as the time and place of the assault and the nature of the individuals involved. 
  The clarification of these issues, which includes the identification of sources in the Torah as well as the elucidation of the specific halakhot, forms the basis of this chapter. 
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  Any adult who intentionally injures another person is liable to reimburse the victim with five payments that compensate for the damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation of the victim. Depending on the nature of the damage, the assailant will be liable to pay all of the payments or only some of them. 
  Compensation for damage applies when the victim suffers irreversible damage to his body. The amount of payment is assessed based on the depreciation in value of a person of the same age, condition of health, and profession of the victim were he to be sold as a slave.
  Compensation for pain is assessed according to how much a person with the victim's level of tolerance for pain would be willing to pay in order to prevent himself from suffering such pain. 
  Compensation for loss of livelihood is assessed by calculating how much income is lost during convalescence by one with this sort of injury.
  Compensation for medical costs is paid directly to the doctor treating the victim. These costs, as well as compensation for loss of livelihood, can be paid either in their entirety at the outset according to the estimation of the total costs or on an ongoing basis. 
  Compensation for humiliation is paid only when a physical action was performed on the victim that resulted in his humiliation. One is not liable to pay for having caused humiliation alone, despite having violated a grave prohibition. With regard to certain actions causing humiliation, the Sages established a set sum to be paid, while with others the court decides upon the amount. When determining the sum to be paid, various factors are taken into consideration, such as the stature of the people involved and the place where the event occurred. 
  The assailant's obligation to pay the victim serves to negate all monetary claims of the victim. In addition, the assailant is obligated to employ any means at his disposal to appease the victim in order to obtain the latter's forgiveness. The victim is likewise called upon to be appeased by his assailant, and to forgive him for what he did.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying: If anyone sin, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and he defrauds his counterpart with regard to a deposit, or with regard to a pledge, or with regard to a robbery, or if he exploited his counterpart; or he has found that which was lost, and deal falsely with it, and swears to a lie; in any of all these that a man does, sinning therein. Then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took by robbery, or the thing that he has gotten by oppression, or the deposit that was deposited with him, or the lost thing that he found. Or anything about which he has sworn falsely, he shall restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more to it; unto him to whom it appertains shall he give it, in the day of his being guilty. And he shall bring his forfeit unto the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock, according to the valuation, for a guilt-offering, unto the priest. And the priest shall make atonement for him before the Lord, and he shall be forgiven, concerning whatsoever he does so as to be guilty thereby. (Leviticus 5:20–26)
  And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying: Speak unto the children of Israel: When a man or woman shall commit any sin that men commit, to commit a trespass against the Lord, and that soul be guilty. Then they shall confess their sin that they have done; and he shall make restitution for his guilt in full, and add unto it the fifth part thereof, and give it unto him in respect of whom he has been guilty. But if the man have no kinsman to whom restitution may be made for the guilt, the restitution for guilt that is made shall be the Lord's, even the priest's; besides the ram of the atonement, whereby atonement shall be made for him. (Numbers 5:5–7)
  In order to fulfill the obligation detailed in these verses in its most straightforward manner, a robber must return the actual item stolen to the robbery victim. If a stolen item has remained in the possession of the robber for an extended period of time, many practical questions arise: What should the halakha be if the stolen item underwent a significant change? Does the robber consequently acquire the stolen item and become liable to pay monetary restitution? What type of change in the item is deemed significant? Additionally, is it sufficient for the robber to return the stolen item, or must the robber also reimburse the robbery victim for his use of the stolen item during the time it was in his possession? What is the halakha in a case where the stolen item did not undergo any physical change, but something has happened to reduce or eliminate its value in a manner that is not evident, e.g., a change in the legal or halakhic status of the stolen item?
  A related topic is the case of a professional craftsman: What is the halakha if he damages or ruins an item that was given to him for the purpose of his work, e.g., an item given to him for repair, or raw material given to him to craft an object? What happens if a craftsman produces a product that is not according to the agreement he entered into with the owner? Is he considered a type of a robber, who acquires the item or materials given to him, in which case he must reimburse the owner with money? Or does the owner retain what he originally owned, while the craftsman must pay compensation calculated in some other manner?
  In addition to the monetary obligation that a robber must pay restitution to the robbery victim, there is also a requirement that he atone for committing the sin of robbery. The Gemara discusses a robber who compounded his sin by taking a false oath that he did not in fact commit the robbery, and the means by which he can achieve atonement. He must return the principal value of the stolen item, pay an additional one-fifth penalty, and bring a guilt-offering, known as the guilt-offering for robbery. In this chapter, the Gemara discusses the circumstances in which the robber must pay the additional one-fifth. Is the additional one-fifth payment for the act of robbery or for the act of taking a false oath? What differences in halakha are there between the requirement to pay back the principal and the requirement to pay the additional one-fifth payment?
  The Torah discusses the case of one who robs a convert, and the convert then dies without heirs. In this case, the robber pays restitution to the priests, then brings his guilt-offering. The Gemara discusses details of this case: When does the obligation to pay the additional one-fifth payment take effect? What is the halakha of one who brings his guilt-offering before paying restitution? To which priests does he pay restitution?
  This chapter aims to clarify all of these halakhot relating to the return of a stolen item.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  When a stolen item undergoes an irreversible change while in the possession of the robber, he becomes its owner and is henceforth liable to return only the monetary value it possessed at the time of the robbery. The Gemara concludes, contrary to the opinion of several Sages, that the robber is obligated to return only the stolen item or its monetary value, but is not obligated to give the owner the profits that he accrued while using it during the time it was in his possession.
  If during the time the robber possessed the stolen item it underwent a change that is not physically evident, but that reduced or negated its value, such as leavened bread stolen before Passover over which Passover elapsed, rendering it prohibited for any Jew to derive benefit from it, or stolen coins that are taken out of circulation by the government while in the robber's possession, the robber nevertheless fulfills his obligation if he returns the item as is. If the robber is unable to return it, he pays the monetary value of the stolen item at the time of the robbery.
  The Gemara rules that skilled workers hired to manufacture or repair an item who ruin it or diverge from the owner's stated desire are considered akin to robbers. Consequently, they acquire the item and incur liability to pay the owner the monetary value of the raw materials he gave to them, at the time that he gave them.
  One who robs another person, denies it, and takes a false oath to that effect does not achieve atonement for this sin until he returns the stolen item to the owner, even if that requires great effort. To ease this burden and encourage repentance, the Sages instituted an ordinance whereby a repentant robber may return the stolen item to the owner via an agent of the court or of the owner.
  The robber is also obligated to give the owner an additional one-fifth of the value of the stolen item. Failure to pay the additional amount does not preclude atonement, but failure to give the principal does. This one-fifth payment liability is imposed on account of the robber taking a false oath denying culpability. If he subsequently takes additional false oaths denying culpability, he is liable for an additional one-fifth payment for each false oath. Additionally, the robber must bring a guilt-offering, but he cannot achieve atonement by means of the guilt-offering until he has paid the principal to the owner.
  If a robber does not remember from whom he robbed and several parties claim to have been the robbery victim, he fulfills his obligation to Heaven only when he pays each of them.
  If one robs a convert who then dies without heirs, the robber must pay the value of the stolen item and an additional one-fifth to the priests whose priestly watch is performing the Temple service at the time he ascends to Jerusalem to pay restitution, and only thereafter may he bring his guilt-offering and achieve atonement. He should give both the money and the guilt-offering to the priests serving at that time, but if he gave the money to the priests serving at that time and the guilt-offering to the following priestly watch, he still fulfills his obligation and achieves atonement. By contrast, if he first gave the guilt-offering to the priests serving at that time and then gave the money to the subsequent priestly watch, he does not fulfill his obligation and does not achieve atonement until he returns and gives the money and the guilt-offering in the proper order.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  Then it shall be, if he has sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore the item that he robbed, or the thing that he has gotten by oppression, or the deposit that was deposited with him, or the lost thing that he found. (Leviticus 5:23)
  The halakhot pertaining to robbery are the primary concern of this chapter. This includes the definition of robbery, a robber's obligation to return what he has stolen, and the situations in which one is not liable to return stolen property.
  When one inherits a stolen item, the obligation to return it depends on the circumstances. In some circumstances, one must return it due to the general halakha requiring one to return stolen items, and in other circumstances, one must do so to preserve his father's honor.
  Another case discussed is one where the stolen property is forcibly removed from the possession of the robber by a third party. At times, this absolves the robber of liability, but in other cases he still must reimburse the individual he robbed. Another discussion pertains to one who was forced to aid others in confiscating property from a third party.
  This chapter also addresses the protocol of returning a stolen item: Is the robber obligated to inform the owner when he returns the item to his possession, or is it sufficient for him to return it even without informing the owner?
  This chapter also attempts to define what is considered an act of theft. For instance, craftsmen often receive raw materials from a customer and use them to produce a finished product. During this process, some of the raw materials may become separated or are left over. When can the artisan take these materials for himself, based on the assumption that this is part of his agreement with his customer? Similarly, when can it be assumed that workers or family members have a right to possess certain items? These questions have ramifications not only for the individual who takes the item, but also for consumers: When must one refrain from purchasing an item due to a concern that the seller has no right to be selling it?
  The discussions surrounding all of these issues and their halakhic ramifications form the theme of the final chapter in tractate Bava Kamma.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  When a robber dies and leaves stolen property to his children, they are obligated to return these items only if the robber left his children land, or if the stolen items are easily identifiable and it is a disgrace to their father's honor if they remain in his children's possession. One who informs gentiles of the whereabouts of another's property to facilitate its seizure is considered to be a robber unless he was coerced into doing so. Furthermore, if the informer enabled the gentiles to access the property by performing an action, he is liable even if he acted under coercion. One who had his own possessions replaced with another's by bandits is permitted to keep them due to the presumption that their owner has despaired of retrieving his belongings. If one unwittingly purchased stolen property and the owner recognizes the items as his own, he may take the items from the purchaser, but he must compensate him for the money that the purchaser innocently spent on those items.
  The Gemara also examined the rights and limitations of one who handles another's property with the permission of the owner and the ramifications for potential purchasers. It is generally assumed that the trivial, leftover parts of a repaired item may be kept by craftsmen, as it may be presumed that they are of little interest to the customer. Accordingly, it is permitted to purchase these items from craftsmen. Similarly, it is permitted to purchase small items from women and children, as it is reasonable to assume they are offering them with the approval of their husbands or fathers. As a general guideline, if merchandise is being sold by employees or family members in a public, conspicuous fashion or in large quantities, it may be presumed that they are being sold with the owner's permission, and one may therefore purchase it. If the buyer is asked to conceal his purchase, it is prohibited for him to engage in the transaction as there is reason to question its legality. The halakhic criteria that define what is considered trivial or significant in this context are largely based on the prevailing social conventions of a particular community.
  
  Bava Metzia
  
  Introduction to Bava Metzia
  
  Tractate Bava Metzia was originally part of a large tractate called tractate Nezikin, meaning damages, which comprised what are now the first three tractates in the order of Nezikin. Bava Metzia was the middle section of tractate Nezikin, and from this placement it derived its name, which means the middle gate. The remaining part of this super-tractate was divided into Bava Kamma, the first gate, which precedes Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra, the last gate. Each of these three parts has its own central topic.
  Bava Metzia deals with issues relating to business, specifically those that the Torah mentions explicitly. The topics discussed in this tractate include the halakhot of lost and found items, the loading and unloading of animals, verbal mistreatment, exploitation, charging interest, feeding workers, depositing and borrowing items, withholding wages, and the prohibition against damaging collateral.
  Bava Metzia expresses one of the unique aspects of Torah law, namely, that it does not distinguish between civil law and ritual law. Jewish civil law is based not on a social contract but on requirements defined by Torah law and rabbinic law. Accordingly, interpersonal relationships and civil laws are viewed as part of the relationship between the Jewish people and God. Although there are certain distinctions made by the Torah between civil and ritual law, in general they are interwoven in the Torah text, as can be seen, for example, in Exodus, chapters 21–23; Leviticus, chapter 19; and Deuteronomy, chapters 21–25.
  A basic element in Jewish civil law is the integration of compassion with justice. To a large extent, the halakha goes beyond the requirements of justice. The obligation to relate to others with compassion and generosity is not merely a supererogatory addition to one's legal obligations; it is normative halakha that is derived from the conception of the Jewish people as one family. This is the reason for the distinction that one finds between general halakhot that structure economic life, which apply to all, and specific halakhot that apply only to interactions with fellow Jews. The general halakhot are as much a part of the Noahide mitzva to construct a fair legal system, which is incumbent upon all humanity, as they are aspects of Jewish law. By contrast, halakhot addressing interpersonal relationships, such as the obligation to return lost property and the prohibition against charging or paying interest, are not features of a legal system whose only purpose is justice. Rather, they reflect the requirement to have compassion on and care for one's fellow Jew.
  The halakhot discussed in tractate Bava Metzia can be divided into four categories. The first category involves halakhot relating to transactions that are an essential part of any legal system. The second category includes halakhot that apply only to transactions between Jews, the rationale for which has been explained above. The third category describes acts that are not punishable by the courts but are discouraged by the Sages. An example of the court's response to one such act would be the curse administered by the court to one who does not keep his word. Finally, the fourth category states halakhot of ethical behavior. These behaviors were practiced by people of high integrity, and they are based on the verse: “That you may walk in the way of good men, and keep the paths of the righteous” (Proverbs 2:20).
  There is one concept that is common to all of these areas of halakha and is found throughout Bava Metzia, and that is the concept of ownership. Although an item is usually owned by the person in whose possession it is held, sometimes that is not the case, e.g., when an item is loaned or rented to another, or when it is deposited with another for safekeeping or as collateral for a loan. At other times, the item is not in the possession of its owner because it has been stolen or lost. In each of these cases, the tractate discusses who has halakhic ownership of the item, and who is responsible for safeguarding it and liable for damage caused to the item or by the item.
  Ownership of movable property is transferred through specific modes of transaction, whose details are discussed mostly in this tractate. Even in cases where it is clear that someone performed a valid act of acquisition, it is necessary to determine the exact point in time when the ownership was transferred in order to resolve issues of multiple claims of ownership of the item. It is also necessary to determine the point after which neither party can withdraw from a transaction.
  The tractate contains ten chapters.
  Chapter One primarily discusses how to determine ownership of an item that is claimed by two individuals.
  Chapter Two details the halakhot of returning lost items in general, and those of loading and unloading animals.
  Chapter Three examines the halakhot of safeguarding a deposit, the responsibilities of bailees, and the halakhot of misappropriation.
  Chapter Four discusses the definition of money and business transactions in which one party exploits the other.
  Chapter Five contains the halakhot of interest.
  Chapter Six addresses hiring craftsmen and their liability for damage.
  Chapter Seven describes the halakhot of hiring workers and whether they may eat from the crops they are harvesting.
  Chapter Eight contains the halakhot of bailees in general, including the responsibilities of a borrower, as well as the halakhot of renting houses.
  Chapter Nine addresses the halakhot of sharecroppers and contractors working a field, as well as the prohibition against withholding wages and destroying an item given as collateral.
  Chapter Ten discusses the halakhot relevant to shared ownership of a building or land.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  This chapter deals primary with cases of a lost item that was found and is claimed by two individuals. Whereas the fundamental halakhot concerning lost items are discussed in the second chapter, the discussions in this chapter focus on questions relating to ownership and methods of acquisition, in particular, how the court adjudicates conflicting claims to the same rights or property. The chapter addresses the process of clarifying these conflicting claims and the apportioning of rights and ownership.
  In analyzing this topic, the chapter addresses many specific questions, both conceptual and practical: Does the fact that two people lay claim to the same item mean that one is deliberately lying? If so, how does the court act against the deceitful party? When is it appropriate for the court to use methods of clarification and coercion, such as requiring a litigant to take an oath, in the context of litigants who are suspect? How is the court to act if it is believed that both litigants may be somewhat justified in their claims and neither is actually lying? How does a court allocate rights to a contested property when it is not possible for the court to fully clarify the facts of the case?
  Another issue that arises in this context is the question of how the court relates to the status and rights of people who are peripherally involved in a case. What is the status of one who is not a litigant but is impacted by the case? As an example, the conflict between a debtor and creditor will affect a broader circle of people, such as one who purchased a field from the debtor and may now be subject to a lien on his land.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  One of the key conclusions of this chapter is that, contrary to the opinion of Sumakhos, in the case of a dispute between litigants the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Therefore, the chapter dealt at length with questions of how the court should rule when it is not clear which litigant has presumptive ownership of the property and which is considered the claimant.
  The chapter established that merely sighting an ownerless item or declaring one's acquisition of it is ineffective. The intent to acquire it must be expressed through a valid act of acquisition. Acquisition can also be effected by placing the item in one's courtyard, or, by extension, in the four square cubits surrounding one's person, provided that one had intent to acquire the item in question and no one else had prior rights to it.
  The court's basic presumption, to the degree that it is not contradicted by known facts, is that neither litigant is being deliberately deceitful. Furthermore, even when it is clear that the claim of one of the litigants must be false, the court assumes that he is not necessarily lying outright. Rather, the assumption is that he is trying to avoid payment temporarily, and he does not lose his basic credibility as a result. Therefore, one who is suspect with regard to financial dishonesty is not consequently suspect with regard to oaths. This is the basis for the ability of an oath to provide final clarification of the validity of a litigant's claims.
  Another matter discussed in the chapter is the rights of those who are indirectly affected by the litigation. Where their rights will be affected by a ruling of the court, and there is no way to ensure that they will not be harmed, the matter is frozen.
  In a case where the claim of one of the parties is completely unreasonable, the claim of the other party is accepted, even without proof.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  If you encounter your enemy's ox or his donkey going astray, you shall return it to him. If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, you shall forgo passing him by; you shall release it with him. (Exodus 23:4–5)
  You shall not see your brother's ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother. And if your brother be not near to you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it home to your house, and it shall be with you until your brother require it, and you shall restore it to him. And so shall you do with his donkey; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost item of your brother, which shall be lost from him, and you have found it; you may not disregard it. You shall not see your brother's donkey or his ox fallen down by the way, and disregard them; you shall lift them with him. (Deuteronomy 22:1–4)
  The halakhot of returning a lost item in a case where the identity of its owner is clear are stated in considerable detail in the Torah. Less clear is the disposition of a lost item when it is temporarily or permanently impossible to locate the owner. It is necessary to examine the rights of the finder with regard to that item during the period that it is in his possession. Even in the relatively simple circumstance when the finder proclaims his find and another person claims ownership, the process through which that claim is verified also requires elaboration.
  More fundamental questions arise in a case where it is impossible to identify the owner of the lost item. While in that case the lost item presumably belongs to the finder, there is a fundamental question with regard to the conditions under which one may conclude that it is impossible to return the item. In other words, which lost items belong to the finder? How does one define the legal status of the ownership rights of the one who lost the item, and how does the finder eliminate those rights and acquire that item?
  The determining factor in this process is the owner's despair of recovering the item. When the owner of the lost item despairs of its recovery, it is tantamount to renouncing ownership of it, thereby rendering it available to all takers. Therefore, it is crucial to ascertain whether the owner despaired of its recovery and at what point that despair occurred. This question is tied to the matter of distinguishing marks on the item, the relationship between those marks and the owner's despair, the validity of those marks as definitive proof of ownership, and more.
  The Gemara also addresses issues related to a lost item that is not acquired by the finder, e.g., the finder's obligation vis-à-vis the item and the degree of his responsibility. It further considers whether the finder has the right to utilize the item, and under what circumstances.
  The mitzva of returning a lost item is related to the mitzva of assisting another to load or unload his animal, e.g., if it collapsed under a burden, both in terms of their juxtaposition in the Torah and in terms of their essence. The Gemara analyzes when one is obligated to assist in unloading and loading, who is obligated, and who is exempt. The Gemara also clarifies whether the requirement to prevent suffering to animals plays a role in determining the application of this mitzva.
  These problems and others that emerge from them are the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter is devoted primarily to halakhot of returning lost items, and it examines situations where the owners despair of recovering an item and situations where the owners do not despair. In principle, when there are clear-cut distinguishing marks on the item, one may assume that the owner would not despair of recovering it unless the item remained in the place that it was discovered for an extended period, or it was swept from the owner's domain by means of a natural disaster or other circumstances beyond his control. Even with regard to items on which there are no distinguishing marks, the Gemara concluded that the location where it was found, its size, its weight, and the number of its units can serve as distinguishing marks.
  The most fundamental dispute in this chapter is with regard to despair that is not conscious. The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye that despair is effective only when it is conscious. Therefore, unless it is clear that the despair predated finding the item, the finder does not acquire the lost item.
  With regard to an item that the finder is obligated to proclaim that he found, the Gemara determined that it is permitted for the finder to utilize the item for its sake, i.e., to maintain it in good condition, but not for his own sake. The Gemara also issued rulings concerning the period during which the finder is obligated to tend to found animals or other items that require extensive care. It is permitted for the finder to make use of money he receives when selling a lost item, but his legal status with regard to that money is that of a paid bailee.
  There are three mitzvot tied to the return of lost items: A prohibition against disregarding the lost item, an obligation to see to its return, and a prohibition against keeping an item that belongs to its owner. These mitzvot apply in most circumstances, with few exceptions, e.g., when return of the lost item is not in keeping with the dignity of the finder, when there is a prohibition preventing the finder from returning it, or when return of the item will engender monetary loss for the finder. Although the Torah lists specific examples of lost items that one is obligated to return, the Gemara established that the obligation includes not only return of lost items, but also assistance to others in any case where it is possible to spare them monetary loss.
  The Gemara concluded that return of a lost item to one's teacher takes precedence over return of a lost item to one's father, and the return of an item to his father takes precedence over the return of an item to another. Recovering one's own item takes precedence over returning a lost item to anyone else.
  Various aspects of the halakhot of assisting another in unloading a burden from his animal and loading it were discussed. Primarily, the Gemara investigated the dispute with regard to the requirement to prevent suffering to animals. There are many elements in common between the halakhot of unloading and loading an animal and the halakhot of returning a lost item.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  If a man delivers unto his neighbor money or vessels to keep, and it is stolen out of the man's house; if the thief is found, he shall pay double. If the thief is not found, then the master of the house shall approach the judges, to see whether he has not misappropriated his neighbor's goods. For every matter of sin, whether it is for ox, for donkey, for sheep, for garment, or for any manner of lost item, whereof one says: This is it, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; he whom the judges shall condemn shall pay double unto his neighbor. (Exodus 22:6–8)
  The Torah states that a bailee who safeguards a deposit must return to the owner the item that was entrusted to his care. If it was lost or stolen while in his possession, the bailee may take an oath and exempt himself from payment, unless it is discovered that he himself misappropriated the deposit.
  One fundamental issue concerns the matter of ownership of the stolen deposit. Is the bailee who compensated the owner for the loss of his item considered the owner of the item immediately? If so, if the thief is found, he returns the item to the bailee and pays him the fine. Or perhaps the depositor remains the owner of the item, and when the thief is located, the owner recieves the item and the fine. The owner then returns to the bailee only the amount of money the bailee gave him as compensation.
  Another question that requires clarification is the essence of safeguarding an item. The bailee commits himself to providing a reasonable level of security for the item, but what is the definition of reasonable here? In a case where the bailee discovers that the deposit is deteriorating over time, does he have the right or obligation to take action to preserve the deposit, or is the obligation of the bailee limited to avoiding misappropriation of the deposit?
  The essence of misappropriation as far as a bailee is concerned requires analysis. Is misappropriation another word for theft perpetrated by the bailee, so that cases of misappropriation are treated like cases of theft? Or is misappropriation a unique halakhic concept that involves betraying the trust of the depositor and breaching their agreement, so that using the deposit is merely the second stage of a betrayal that began with misappropriation? If it is the latter, is the bailee liable for the mere intention to steal the deposit, or is he liable only if he actually stole it?
  The resolution of these issues and the dilemmas that emerge from them are the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  In this chapter, it was determined that after a bailee who has safeguarded a deposit accepts responsibility to pay for an item stolen from his possession, he acquires ownership rights over that item. Legally, there is an assumption that this acquisition is a condition, implicit or explicit, of the deposit agreement. Therefore, transfer of those ownership rights is not contingent on the actual payment of compensation. The mere agreement of the bailee to waive his right to take an oath and thereby exempt himself from payment for the lost or stolen deposit effects transfer of those rights. The ownership rights of the bailee are limited to those conditions stipulated by the depositor from the outset. If the bailee conveys the deposit to another, even if this entails no misappropriation, he acquires no ownership rights, unless the conveyance was with the approval of the owner.
  Ownership rights to a deposited item are not transferred to the bailee in their entirety. Rather, the transfer stems from and is contingent upon fulfillment of the conditions of the guardianship that he accepted upon himself. Therefore, even when the bailee compensates the owner, he is obligated to take an oath that the deposit is not in his possession, as he has no right to take the item and pay for it without the approval of the owner. The bailee takes an oath that he provided a reasonable level of safeguarding for the deposit, commensurate with the manner in which one safeguards his own belongings. A higher level of safeguarding is required for deposits of money.
  The bailee calculates a certain sum of reasonable depreciation, in accordance with the measures delineated in the mishna. If he discovers that the depreciation of the deposit is greater than expected, the bailee must inform the owner. If that is impossible, he must sell the item to prevent its total loss and return the money to the owner. Doing so constitutes safeguarding a deposit and returning of a lost item.
  Misappropriation is not simple theft, but rather an abrogation of the depositor-bailee relationship. Consequently, one who misappropriates a deposit is liable to pay for the item from the moment that he performs an action involving unauthorized use of the deposit, even if that action did nothing to damage the item. Nevertheless, the bailee is liable only if he takes action. He is not liable for intent, even if he stated that intent. Since the legal status of misappropriation is that of theft, the halakha is that from the moment of misappropriation the item is considered stolen by the bailee. Like any other thief, he is responsible to pay for the item and for any decrease in its value.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  And if you sell to your colleague an item that is sold, or acquire from your colleague's hand, you shall not exploit his brother. (Leviticus 25:14)
  And you shall not mistreat one man his colleague; and you shall fear your God; for I am the Lord your God. (Leviticus 25:17)
  And a convert shall you neither mistreat, nor shall you oppress him; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. (Exodus 22:20)
  And when a convert lives in your land, you shall not mistreat him. (Leviticus 19:33)
  This chapter examines two topics, transactions of money and commodities, and the halakhot of exploitation and of verbal mistreatment. One of the key questions with regard to transactions is: When and how does the transaction take effect? When ownership of an item is transferred from one person to another, at precisely what point does the one receiving the item assume ownership?
  Specifically, this chapter addresses a complex question relating to the unique problem of the essence and validity of a monetary transaction: In what way is money different from other commodities? The resolution of this problem is a vital prerequisite for determining the halakhot of both exploitation, discussed in this chapter, and interest, discussed in Chapter Five, as in both these areas the criteria used for determining the value of items are especially significant. There is a difference between monetary transactions and other types of transactions, and the timing of the transaction is crucial for accurately assessing an item's value.
  The halakhot of exploitation that involves monetary loss resulting from deceit and the halakhot of verbal mistreatment are both discussed in the Torah using the Hebrew term ona'a.
  The Torah prohibition of commercial exploitation invites several questions. What is considered exploitation? Is there a fixed measure or fixed percentage of disparity between the value of a commodity and its sale price that constitutes exploitation, or does any disparity constitute exploitation? If commercial exploitation occurs, what can be done? What is the outcome of an exploitive transaction: Does the transaction take effect or is it null and void? Is one who is guilty of exploitation obligated to pay compensation? If so, how much does he pay? Furthermore, do the halakhot pertaining to exploitation apply universally, or are there individuals, items, or transactions to which they do not apply?
  With regard to the prohibition of verbal mistreatment, it is necessary to ascertain its limitations. What is considered mistreatment? Are there circumstances in which it is permitted? Does the prohibition apply equally to all people?
  This chapter addresses all of these questions in detail.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  In this chapter, several conclusions were reached with regard to the halakhot of transactions. One conclusion is that, by Torah law, monetary transactions are proper transactions. By rabbinic law, a commodity can be acquired only by pulling it or lifting it, i.e., modes of transaction that involve physically taking possession of the item. Evidently, what is defined as money is not fixed. Even coins used in commerce are not always considered currency, but rather a commodity. The principle is that market value is calculated based on the price of silver, and even other coins are considered commodities vis-à-vis silver. At the same time, all coins have the legal status of currency relative to commodities.
  With regard to the halakhot of exploitation, several fundamental halakhot were decided. The halakhot of exploitation do not apply to transactions involving land, slaves, or documents. Rather, exploitation can exist only in transactions involving movable property. There is a minimum measure when considering the question of which transactions constitute exploitation: The disparity between the value of a commodity and its sale price must be at least one peruta, and a transaction is exploitive only if the seller overcharged or undercharged the buyer by one-sixth of the item's market value. If the disparity is less than one-sixth, it is a standard transaction, not an exploitive one. If the disparity is greater than one-sixth, the transaction is null and void if either party in the transaction wishes to void it. The one-sixth measure pertains specifically to the value of the items. In cases of exploitation that involve objectively definable features of the commodity, e.g., measure or weight, the transaction is nullified even if the disparity is less than one-sixth. The prohibition and halakhot of exploitation apply whether it is the seller or the buyer that is exploited, although there is a difference between the buyer and the seller with regard to how long after the transaction he can challenge its validity. Likewise, the halakhot of exploitation apply whether the exploited party is a layman or a merchant, and even if he is an expert merchant.
  The halakha is established that the prohibition of verbal mistreatment is more stringent than the prohibition of exploitation, both because no compensation can be paid for it and because the damage caused by verbal mistreatment is greater. It is impossible to prove whether the verbal mistreatment was intentional, and consequently there is no way to adjudicate the matter in court. Therefore, the sentence of the guilty party is adjudicated in the Heavenly court, whose sentences are more severe. Verbal mistreatment includes any statement that could offend one who hears it, whether it is an insult or a reprimand. Even a remark said jokingly or playfully is included in the prohibition. There is a prohibition against verbally mistreating anyone, but the violation is especially serious if the offended party is disadvantaged, and it is particularly severe when the offended party is a convert, with regard to whose mistreatment there is an explicit Torah prohibition.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  If you lend money to any of My people, even to the poor with you, you shall not be to him as a creditor; nor shall you place interest upon him. (Exodus 22:24)
  And if you brother waxes poor, and his means fail with you, then you shall uphold him; as a stranger and a settler shall he live with you. Do not take from him interest or increase, but fear your God, in order that your brother may live with you. You shall not give him your money with interest, nor give him your food for increase. I am the Lord your God, who brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, to be your God. (Leviticus 25:35–38)
  You shalt not lend with interest to your brother, whether interest of money, interest of food, interest of any matter that is lent with interest. Unto a foreigner you may lend with interest, but unto your brother you shall not lend with interest, in order that the Lord your God may bless you in all that you put your hand on, in the land into which you are going, to possess it. (Deuteronomy 23:20–21)
  By Torah law, the fundamental prohibition of interest applies to cases of fixed interest, where the borrower agrees to pay the lender an additional predetermined sum or percentage of the loan in addition to the principle he borrowed. As in the case of many other prohibitions, the Sages added additional prohibitions to safeguard the law and rendered prohibited other types of loans that, although they do not contain explicit provisions for interest payments, nevertheless are likely to bring about the payment of interest, including those brought about by changes in the market value of merchandise.
  Although the Torah prohibition against fixed interest is clear, in the real world of commerce there are many situations where it is not clear whether a particular payment constitutes forbidden interest or whether it is actually a completely permitted payment of a different type.
  One fundamental problem is determining the distinction between a loan with interest and an investment in a business venture. A common form of business venture is one in which one party invests money and the other party manages the venture. The questions in such cases are: Under what conditions can the investor's profit be viewed as his legitimate share in the profits of the joint venture? Under what conditions is the entire investment viewed as a loan, and the profit is viewed as forbidden interest?
  Another fundamental question concerns discounts. In many instances a seller will want to offer a discount, either in the form of a lower payment for the merchandise or in the form of improved terms of sale, in consideration of receiving the payment before providing the merchandise or of receiving the entire payment in a single sum when the merchandise is delivered. Here as well, the question is when should this be considered a legitimate business practice and when should it be considered forbidden interest.
  Another question concerns uncertain interest. Often, a situation arises where a lender is repaid in such a way that he receives additional profit at the borrower's expense but in a manner that was not a necessary outcome of the transaction, as there was a possibility that the outcome would not involve any interest payment at all. The question, therefore, is whether this uncertain interest is included in the prohibition.
  Additionally, it must be clarified whether the prohibition of interest is limited to payments of money, goods, and services with monetary value, or whether it includes any possible sort of benefit.
  All of these issues, and the various dilemmas raised by them, are the subject of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  In this chapter, several principles with regard to the nature of interest were defined. The most basic definition is that any additional payment in return for delaying the repayment of the loan is prohibited as a form of interest, no matter how this interest is paid, whether with money, in the form of other benefits that have monetary value, or even in the form of various types of benefits that have no monetary value, such as greeting someone or engaging in other forms of verbal interest.
  Guidelines were also established to distinguish between legitimate partnerships and business ventures, from which one is entitled to enjoy a profit, and forbidden loans with interest, whether these are conducted directly, indirectly, or through the use of artifice. With regard to joint business ventures, the halakha is that the investor must accept upon himself a higher percentage of risk than the profit he receives, either by increasing his responsibility for possible losses or by decreasing the share of profit he receives from the venture. The principle is that a transaction is permitted if, from the lender's perspective, it is close to loss and far from profit.
  With regard to other forms of transactions, one must distinguish between an actual sale, where it is permitted for the seller to give various discounts to the buyer in consideration of early payment, and a fictitious sale, in which it is prohibited to provide a discount because it is a hint of interest. 
  The question of uncertain interest was also resolved, with the strict opinion being accepted. Even if it is uncertain whether interest will be paid by the borrower to the lender, nevertheless, if the lender benefits from the borrower's property as a result of the loan, this is prohibited as interest.
  Another fundamental discussion concerned whether a court can compel a lender to return interest that he collected from a borrower. The fundamental question is whether the prohibition of interest should be viewed as a sin between man and God, and therefore the punishment will be delivered at the hand of Heaven, or whether interest is viewed as money gained illegitimately, even if the borrower agreed, and therefore can be removed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges. The conclusion is that fixed interest, which is forbidden by Torah law, can be removed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges, but interest forbidden by rabbinic law cannot be removed.
  The prohibition of interest applies to transactions between two Jews but not to a transaction involving a gentile, whether he is a borrower or a lender. The Sages rendered prohibited complex transactions where a gentile is brought in for the purpose of granting legitimacy to what is actually a loan with interest between two Jews. The Sages also added words of rebuke for anyone who participates or aids in the violation of Torah law and thereby leads to a desecration of the name of God.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  When one hires another to perform any sort of work, there are two halakhic aspects to their relationship. The first includes the Torah and rabbinic laws dealing with employers and their employees in general. For the most part, these halakhot are discussed in the seventh chapter of the tractate. The second relates to the specific nature of the agreements between the parties, or where those agreements are tacitly accepted in accordance with local custom.
  In standard hiring practice, especially for short-term assignments, the parties do not typically draft detailed contracts stipulating the various problems that might arise in the course of the work. This chapter focuses on several basic questions concerning average labor agreements, for which conditions or penalties for diverging from or reneging on the agreement have not been clearly defined at the outset.
  Three fundamental problems are addressed: First, how binding is a standard work agreement and what is the halakha when one party reneges? Second, when one rents an animal to ride on or to perform work, what standard requirements apply to each party, and under what conditions is either party entitled to monetary compensation for damage caused by the violation of the agreement by the other side? Finally, what level of liability applies to artisans or skilled laborers for damage caused to goods with which they are working, whether during the period they are working with them or afterward, whether they had fulfilled the terms of the work agreement or violated them?
  Three concepts from the Torah guide this chapter's evaluation of these questions: The halakhot of exploitation, both monetary and verbal; tort and personal injury law, concerning damage caused both directly by one's person and indirectly through commission or omission; and lastly, the halakhot of liability of paid bailees, unpaid bailees, borrowers, and renters. Throughout the chapter, the Sages assess to what extent these legal categories apply to labor agreements.
  Practical questions and to some extent conceptual analyses of these issues are the focus of this chapter, although, in typical talmudic style, other matters are explored along the way.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  In the course of this chapter's discussions and analyses, several basic points were clarified with regard to agreements between employers and laborers. On the one hand, work agreements do not completely shackle laborers, as the Torah states that God proclaims: “For to Me the children of Israel are servants” (Leviticus 25:55). The Sages infer from this verse that Jews can be servants only to God, but not to other servants of God. Consequently, labor relations depend on human freedom, which means that employers do not have the authority to force laborers to work.
  On the other hand, this freedom for laborers does not grant them the right to cause their employers financial loss. Laborers must compensate employers for monetary loss due to their refusal to work commensurate with the loss caused. In this way, there is a balance between the two sides, so that market forces, the employer's needs, the type of labor, and the skill level of the laborers are all factors guiding their negotiations, both prior to the beginning of the work and whenever disputes arise during the course of the assignment. Furthermore, in each specific case, the reason the party in question reneged is also taken into consideration, as people generally do not enter into agreements with the intent to take responsibility for incidents that occur due to circumstances beyond their control.
  With regard to renting animals, the bulk of halakhic restrictions apply to the owners renting them out, as they may not unilaterally renege on their commitments to the renters. Yet here too there are limits. For example, the renter is not entitled to compensation for damage caused to the animal in the course of sensible fulfillment of the agreement if the reason for the damage is not the owner's fault. Additionally, there is a principle that whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage. Although there are disputes with regard to precisely what defines a change from the terms of an agreement, nevertheless, it can be broadly stated that if damage occurs and one party has diverged from the agreement, that party is liable for compensatory damages.
  Concerning artisans' and skilled laborers' responsibility for the item in their possession, the consensus is that they are considered paid bailees: Although they are not actually paid for safeguarding the item, they are liable for theft and loss, as they do derive financial benefit from the fact that the item is in their custody. With regard to hired porters, not only are they liable to pay for damage that occurred to items while they transported them, but they also bear a presumption of negligence from which they can free themselves only by taking an oath to the contrary.
  This chapter also distinguished between basic obligations and pious acts that are not formally required and yet are considered to constitute the heart and spirit of halakha. These pious acts result from a consideration of not only the minimal, formal requirements of an employer, but also the personal needs and problems of the laborers.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  Man goes forth to his work and to his labor until the evening. (Psalms 104:23)
  When you come into your neighbor's vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure; but you shall not put any in your vessel. When you come into your neighbor's standing grain, then you may pluck ears with your hand; but you shall not move a sickle on to your neighbor's standing grain. (Deuteronomy 23:25–26)
  You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing. (Deuteronomy 25:4)
  If a man deliver to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to keep, and it dies, or is hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it; the oath of the Lord shall be between them both, to see whether he has not put his hand to his neighbor's goods; and its owner shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution. But if it is stolen from him, he shall make restitution to its owner. If it is torn in pieces, let him bring it for witness; he shall not make good that which was torn. (Exodus 22:9–12)
  The main halakhot dealing with the hiring of laborers and terms of employment between a worker and his employer were clarified in the sixth chapter of this tractate. Several halakhot concerning hired laborers, however, were not addressed, particularly the right granted laborers by the Torah to eat from their employer's produce while engaged in their work. 
  This halakha is based on the tradition of the Sages that the verse: “When you come into your neighbor's vineyard, then you may eat grapes,” is speaking of a laborer working in a vineyard or in any other field where there is produce. As is invariably the case, the verse itself does not provide all the details of the halakha. Does this right to eat apply to one who performs any type of work or only specific forms of labor? When are laborers permitted to eat, and how much may they consume? The central issue from a legal perspective is whether the right of laborers to sustenance is a monetary right, which can be transferred to another, or whether it is a personal right that can be exercised only by the worker himself.
  Incidental to the discussion of laborers' rights, this chapter addresses a similar halakha, the prohibition against muzzling an ox when it threshes grain. This halakha also requires clarification: Does it apply only to an ox, or are other animals also included in the prohibition? Similarly, does it refer solely to the specific action of threshing grain or to other forms of animal labor as well? The Gemara also discusses in which cases this mitzva applies, and whether or not one may use artifice to avoid this obligation.
  The chapter moves on to a different topic, the halakha of bailees. This subject, which is mentioned many times in Bava Metzia, is brought to a conclusion through a definition of the various categories of bailees, with their different levels of responsibility for the item that was entrusted to their possession. Since these halakhot involve monetary matters, it must be established whether all bailees are necessarily classified as one of these fixed types, or whether the parties have the option of forming other agreements between them if they so choose.
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  The rights of a laborer to eat from produce while working in the field were clarified thoroughly in this chapter. The fundamental principle: Everything is in accordance with the regional custom, applies to laborers' terms of employment and the length of a workday for a day laborer, as well as the meal that an employer provides for his workers. Nevertheless, it is accepted that the verses: “When you come into your neighbor's vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure; but you shall not put any in your vessel. When you come into your neighbor's standing grain, then you may pluck ears with your hand; but you shall not move a sickle onto your neighbor's standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:25–26), are discussing a laborer working for the owner of a vineyard.
  This halakha does not apply only to a vineyard or to standing grain, as might have been inferred from a straightforward reading of the verses, but to all forms of labor in the field. The specific examples mentioned in the verses serve to teach that a laborer is entitled to eat solely from that which grows from the ground, and only when he is occupied with harvesting the crop, which is considered the completion of the work of the produce, or near the completion of its work in the case of detached produce. Laborers who are busy with other agricultural work, even if it involves produce, including produce whose work has been completed, do not have the right to eat from it by Torah law. Nevertheless, the standard custom is that various kinds of watchmen may also eat from the produce under their care.
  The right of a laborer to eat from the produce of the field in which he is working is not a monetary right, but a personal entitlement granted to him by the Torah. In the words of the Gemara: He eats from the property of Heaven.
  As stated earlier, by Torah law a laborer may eat from the produce only while he is actually performing labor. The Sages instituted an ordinance that a laborer may also eat while he moves from one place to another within the field, in order to save time. Since by Torah law there is no connection between the work the laborer performs and the produce that he eats, in theory he may eat more than the worth of his wages, and he may even consume produce worth more than the benefit he provides to the employer through his labor. Nevertheless, the Sages advise laborers not to be greedy, as this will deter potential employers from hiring them in the future.
  The prohibition stated in the verse: “You shall not muzzle an ox in its threshing” (Deuteronomy 25:4), was also discussed in detail. One may not prevent any animal from eating while it is engaged in performing labor with crops. It is permitted for the owner of the produce to give the animal other food as substitute for the produce with which it is working, but he may not take any measures which cause it not to eat, even if these fall short of actual muzzling.
  One who muzzles an ox while it is threshing has violated a prohibition, and he is liable to be flogged. In addition, there is a relevant monetary aspect: The owner of the animal can demand a certain amount of food from the owner of the produce who prevented the animal from eating.
  With regard to the halakhot of bailees, the basic principle is that an unpaid bailee is exempt from liability for loss or theft, although the owner of the item that was lost or stolen can demand of him to take an oath concerning the claim by which he exempts himself. A paid bailee, whether he receives money or any other form of benefit, is liable for theft or loss but is exempt from liability for a loss due to circumstances beyond one's control. If he claims that a circumstance beyond his control befell the item that was deposited in his trust, he can be compelled to take an oath concerning his statement. The same halakhot that apply to a paid bailee also apply to one who rents an item; the only difference is that one who rents an item or animal is not liable if it was damaged or injured while it was used for labor. A borrower is liable even for a loss due to circumstances beyond one's control, if they were not due to working with the borrowed item, and he is exempt only if the owner was working with the borrower when he borrowed the item.
  These are the basic halakhot concerning bailees by Torah law, and they are binding in every case where the parties did not agree otherwise. If they so desire, they may amend the conditions between them, as is the case with regard to all monetary arrangements. Accordingly, the parties may consent to increase or decrease the level of responsibility of the bailee, as they see fit.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  “And when a man borrows [an animal ] from another, and it is injured or dies, if its owner is not with him, he shall pay. If its owner is with him, he does not pay. If he is a renter, he comes with his rent.” (Exodus 22:13–14)
  A borrower and renter are considered to be bailees, in that they must safeguard the item entrusted to them. They are unlike the standard unpaid bailee in that a borrower or renter intends to actually use the item, and consequently he bears a higher level of liability. As it is understood that the owner of the item takes an extra risk in entrusting his item to them, they must accept upon themselves a commensurate level of responsibility and liability.
  As one who borrows an item to use it does so without having to pay for that privilege, he bears the highest level of liability; in the language of the Gemara: All benefit from the transaction is his. From the text of the Torah, it is apparent that he is liable to compensate the owner in the event of any mishap, whether or not it was due to the borrower's negligence, and even if the mishap was due to circumstances beyond his control.
  In discussing a borrower's all-encompassing liability, the Torah states a significant exception: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14). This exception, which the Gemara teaches applies to all types of bailees, provides that the presence of the owner can at times exempt a bailee from his liability. From the verse alone it is unclear how and when this applies, but the Gemara explains that in order for the exemption to apply, the owner must be working for the borrower. The discussion in the Gemara analyzes whether the owner needs to be physically involved with his item, or if it is sufficient to be legally bound to the borrower with regard to another task. The Gemara also examines at what point it is necessary for the owner to be working for the borrower in order for the exemption to apply. Is the critical moment the actual borrowing of the item or the time of the mishap; or must the owner be working for the borrower throughout the borrowing period? Does the commencing of the employment of the owner need to take place at the critical moment, or can it precede the borrowing? To this end, and also to define when a borrower or renter bears liability, it is necessary to define the precise moments that the period of borrowing or renting is considered to begin and end, both in the case when the borrower takes charge of the item himself and also when it is passed to him by means of an intermediary.
  As a renter pays for the right to use another person's item, it is obvious that he does not share the same high level of liability borne by a borrower. But the verses detailing the halakhot of a renter are not overly explicit and there is a dispute among the tanna'im as to the level of liability he does bear.
  Despite the distinction in the level of liability, it is clear that overall there is a great similarly between renting and borrowing an item, since in both cases the item was taken in order to use it. Indeed, there are many cases where a person initially takes an item as a borrower and later as a renter, or vice versa. Similarly, there are cases where a person borrows one item from an owner while also renting another item from him. Since the level of liability of a borrower and renter are different, it becomes crucial to clarify when the person taking the item is considered to be a borrower and when he is considered to be a renter. The Gemara discusses this question and the protocol in cases in which the two sides dispute the nature of the agreement between them, both in cases where one or both of the parties state claims with certitude and also where they admit that they do not remember what the agreement was. In its discussion of these issues, the Gemara diverts its attention from a narrow discussion of the halakhot of borrowing and renting to a broader discussion of monetary disputes in which the parties involved have some basis to their claims and how to proceed when the court is unable to come to a clear-cut decision with regard to who is entitled to the money.
  The chapter also discusses the rental of houses and the responsibilities and liabilities of the landlord and the renter. This includes what a landlord is expected to provide for his renter and his responsibility in a case in which the house collapses. Additionally, the chapter considers the length of the rental period and from which point and under what circumstances a landlord must provide his renter with notice before evicting him.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  The Torah provides that when a borrower receives another's item and the owner is “with him” (Exodus 22:14), he no longer bears his usual level of responsibility. The Gemara discussed at length the precise limitations of this exception and concludes as follows: Although the Torah states the exemption only with regard to a borrower, the exemption actually applies to all four categories of bailees. In order for a bailee to be exempt, the owner of the item must be working for the bailee at the time that the latter received the item, irrespective of whether the owner was already working for the borrower before that time or if the owner's services were contracted and his item was borrowed simultaneously. The exemption applies both where the owner's services are borrowed by the bailee and also where he was hired.
  The Gemara discussed additional issues that pertain to borrowing and renting:
  In a case in which the item to be borrowed or rented is conveyed to the borrower through an agent, the borrower or renter becomes liable only once the item reaches his domain, unless the parties agreed that his liability would begin the moment the item was conveyed to the agent.
  In cases in which two parties have both borrowing and rental agreements between them, disagreements can arise with regard to the precise nature of their agreement and the status of the lost or damaged item at the time of the mishap. In some cases one or both parties claim with certitude that the arrangement was of a certain nature and in other cases they will admit that they are unsure. The Gemara discusses these cases and concludes that a claim made with certitude is more powerful than one in which the other party admits he is unsure, and it is certainly more powerful than one where the other party claims he simply does not remember what happened. In general, there are two guiding principles. The first is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. The second is that in cases in which proof cannot be provided, if the claims between the parties are of a type that generate an obligation for the defendant to take an oath, and because he admits that he does not know for certain what happened he is unable to take that oath, he is liable to pay.
  The chapter also discusses the rental of houses and various complications that could arise. The Gemara explains that when a property is rented out and the parties never agreed between them when the rental period should end, the halakha is that in general, each side may unilaterally end the rental. The Gemara notes various limitations to this, primarily that a landlord may not evict his renter during the rainy season unless he had given prior notice during the summer. The length of the notice he must provide depends on the purpose of the property being rented, with a minimum of thirty days for a house rented for residence and three years for certain types of businesses.
  A landlord must ensure that his house can provide all the basic needs of his renter, including those features that require that a craftsman install them. Features that are not part of the house's structure and that do not require that a craftsman install them are the responsibility of the renter.
  A rental agreement for an unspecified house obligates the landlord to provide a house for the entire rental period even in the event that the house he initially provided collapses. A replacement house can be different than the original house, unless it was implicit in the initial agreement that a house of a certain size or structure was being rented.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  Do not oppress your neighbor and do not steal; the wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning. (Leviticus 19:13)
  If you take as collateral your neighbor's garment, you shall restore it to him by when the sun goes down. For that is his only covering, it is his garment for his skin; where shall he sleep? And it shall come to pass, when he cries to Me that I will hear, for I am gracious. (Exodus 22:25–26)
  He shall not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral, for he takes a man's life as collateral. (Deuteronomy 24:6)
  When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside. And if he is a poor man, you shall not sleep with his collateral. You shall restore to him the collateral when the sun goes down, so that he may sleep in his garment and he will bless you, and it shall be righteousness to you before the Lord your God. You shall not oppress a hired laborer that is poor and needy, whether he is from your brothers or from your stranger that is in your land within your gates. On the same day you shall give him his wages, and the sun shall not set upon him. (Deuteronomy 24:10–15)
  You shall not pervert justice due to the stranger or due to the fatherless, nor take a widow's garment as collateral. (Deuteronomy 24:17)
  This chapter consists of three sections. The first discusses the halakhot of sharecroppers and contractors leasing fields, the second focuses on delayed payment of wages, and the third discusses the halakhot of taking collateral.
  An individual would often give a portion of his field to another to be worked. This person would work either as a sharecropper, who receives a certain percentage of the produce, or as a contractor, who gives a set amount of the produce to the owner. Generally speaking, individuals could contract business arrangements in any manner they chose, without the Sages intervening.
  The majority of the halakhic discussion in the chapter revolves around specific cases of these agreements, especially with regard to issues that are not explicitly dealt with in the written agreement. Problems often arise with regard to determining which methods of working the land are acceptable and unacceptable. In addition, difficulties also arise in situations of natural disasters, such as droughts, flooding, or crop disease, which may prevent the cultivator from fulfilling his responsibilities as stipulated in the agreement, and also remove the possibility of the landowner's earning a profit. The bulk of the halakhic analysis of this chapter involves finding the proper, just manner in which to resolve these types of disputes between the cultivator and the landowner.
  An important principle to keep in mind when discussing such matters is that even when the two sides enter an agreement concerning an issue where the halakha is not clearly defined, not everything is entirely arbitrary, and the sides must take care to uphold the principle, stated in the Torah: “And you shall do that which is right and good” (Deuteronomy 6:18).
  The second section of the chapter discusses situations where the Torah itself sets the standards for the definitions of what is considered “right and good.” It is possible to suggest that these halakhot themselves are considered beyond the letter of the law and are a demonstration of doing that which is “right and good.”
  The Torah obligates an employer to pay his workers for their labor immediately and without any delay. This raises numerous practical questions. First, does this apply to all workers or only certain types of workers? Second, when is payment due for a worker who is not a day laborer but who is hired out for a set period of time that may be shorter or longer than a day? After what point does one violate the prohibition of delaying payment of wages and who precisely is liable?
  Concerning the appropriation of collateral, the Torah greatly limits its permissibility, both with regard to the method of taking the collateral, as well as with regard to retaining it at times when the debtor needs it. Similarly, a prohibition exists with regard to appropriating collateral from specific individuals as well as taking certain types of items. One of the fundamental issues here is identifying the nature of this collateral: Is it taken to ensure that the debtor pays back his debt, or does the collateral itself constitute the collection of the debt? In addition, what is the permitted method of appropriating items as collateral? Moreover, does the prohibition against taking collateral from a widow apply to any widow or only to a poor widow? Finally, what are the methods for determining which items may not be taken as collateral?
  All of these and many related questions are the primary focus of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  The first section of this chapter included discussions concerning the halakha that one does not deviate from the local custom, and any matter that is not addressed directly in the contract is presumed to be in accordance with the local custom. In addition, although the formulation of contracts is determined by the custom of the people in that location and the local vernacular, the Sages nevertheless attach special significance to the wording of these agreements and derive certain halakhic details from them. This is true not only of contracts concerning an agreement between a landowner and a cultivator but also for other cases where it is accepted to use a fixed text for the contract.
  The Sages generally interpret the conditions of an agreement in the simplest manner and require the cultivator to abide by them, yet they do permit him to change the conditions in certain situations where the potential profit can also benefit the landowner. In addition, when a natural regional disaster occurs, the cultivator is exempt from his obligations. In any other situation, including circumstances beyond his control, the cultivator must abide by the rules of the agreement.
  Following the discussion with regard to fields and the obligations of the cultivator to the landowner, the Gemara explored another topic that is related to the ownership of fields. The halakha known as the law of one whose field borders the field of his neighbor is based on the principle: “You shall do that which is right and good” (Deuteronomy 6:18), and dictates that when a field is put up for sale, those whose fields directly border it have the right of first refusal. This obligation is rooted in the concept that the court coerces individuals that exhibit conduct characteristic of Sodom; i.e., one may not prevent another from benefiting if no loss is suffered on his part. Therefore, the limitations to the law of one whose field borders the field of his neighbor are simple: In any case where the seller would suffer a loss of either money or time if he were to sell the property to his neighbor, he is not obligated to do so.
  In the second section of the chapter, which addressed the halakhot of delaying payment of wages, it was established that for many type of payments, including wages for one's own labor and a rental fee of one's animal or utensils, the obligation of giving the payments takes effect immediately upon the completion of the term. If the employee demands his wages, the employer violates at least one prohibition and sometimes more if he delays the payment of wages for more than twelve hours, and in some exceptional cases if he delays for more than twenty-four hours. As an extension of the mitzva to pay a worker on time, the Sages instituted that in a case where there is some doubt as to whether the wages were paid or not, the employee may take an oath and receive his salary.
  The Torah provides additional protection for the poor through the halakhot of taking collateral. It is prohibited for the creditor to enter the house of the debtor to take collateral. Rather, he must request that the debtor bring the collateral outside to him. In addition, if the debtor does not own other items similar to the collateral, the creditor must return the collateral to him at any time that he needs it, even daily. This is the halakha with regard to collateral that was appropriated to be used as security to ensure that the loan will be returned. These halakhot do not apply if the creditor takes items to be used as payment of the debt. Even in such cases, the court makes arrangements to help the debtor so that his most important utensils and critical work tools are not taken away.
  The Torah renders it prohibited to take collateral in two situations: First, it is prohibited to take collateral from a widow. According to the practical halakhic conclusion, this is true for both a wealthy widow as well as a poor one. Second, it is prohibited to appropriate utensils that are used for the preparation of food. One who violates the latter of these prohibitions is liable for each utensil taken, and if the utensil consists of a pair of items, one is liable for both parts. Aside from the heavenly punishment received for this transgression, the court also forces him to return any item that he took without sanction.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  This short chapter primarily deals with issues that arise from one situation: A house of two or more stories that belonged to different people and that collapsed entirely or partially.
  If the house collapsed entirely, questions include how to divide the stones from the collapsed structure and what the owner of the upper story should do if the owner of the lower story refuses to rebuild his part.
  In a case where only part of the structure collapsed, there are several questions as well. If the resident of the collapsed upper story is a renter, to what degree is he responsible to find another residence and to what degree is this the responsibility of the owner. Other questions pertain to a case where the floor separating two stories broke, and the repair work is divided between the residents of the upper and lower stories. These questions are not limited to a house, but to any case of two stories where one is built on top of the other, such as in the case of a garden that was built on top of another structure.
  The cases of a structure that collapses into the property of someone else and one that collapses in the public domain are also discussed. In these situations, questions include who is obligated to clear away the debris, and whether or not it is permitted to pay the one who cleared the area with the materials that he cleared. A related discussion pertains to the proper use of the public domain for the sake of building, shipping, delivery, or any other use. In a case of materials that were delivered to the public domain, who is liable: the owner or the one that made the delivery? A related question concerns two adjacent gardens that are not on the same level. In such a case, to whom does the wall of soil between the two gardens belong, and who owns the vegetables that grow out of it?
  These issues, as well as related topics that are connected to the discussions, are the subjects of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  Although this chapter discussed somewhat limited topics, in order to clarify the questions concerning the relationship of two residents of a house that collapsed, it was necessary to examine some fundamental points that have wider ramifications.
  This chapter discussed the halakha that if one of the residents of a house that collapsed recognizes his stones, he may take them. In the case of a house and an upper story that was rented out, and the floor of the upper story broke, the renter can force the owner to make the necessary repairs, and in the meantime, the renter may live in the owner's house. If a house owned by two people collapsed entirely, they both must rebuild it as it previously stood, and any change that may negatively affect the sturdiness of the building may be implemented only with mutual consent. If the resident of the lower story refuses to rebuild, the owner of the upper story may rebuild the lower story and reside in it until the other pays his expenses, at which time he rebuilds the upper story.
  In this chapter it was determined that if someone is performing an action in his own domain that can potentially be harmful to someone else or someone else's property, the one who may be damaged is responsible to distance himself from the damage, and one cannot compel another to refrain from actions that can cause harm indirectly. If the damage is a direct result, or if it includes an act on the part of the perpetrator that directly causes damage to the injured party, the one who causes the damage is obligated to distance himself.
  The question of whether one may make use of the public domain was also discussed. It was concluded that anyone may place his items in the public domain temporarily in order to ship them elsewhere, but may not keep them there for an extended period of time. Likewise, one may not use the public domain to do work there. Also, the right to leave things temporarily in the public domain does not exempt the owner, or the one responsible for the shipping of the goods, from paying for damage that may occur from the items placed there.
  Another issue discussed in this chapter was the manner in which one pays wages to his laborers. It was concluded that only in specific scenarios is it permitted to pay the laborer with the materials that he cleared; generally speaking, payment must be made with money, unless specifically stipulated otherwise.
  The discussion of vegetables growing out of a wall of soil between two adjacent gardens that are not on the same level digressed to the broader questions of whether a plant is defined by its leaves or its roots, and whether the ownership of a tree is decided by its physical location or by its source of nourishment. The Tur writes that in a situation where the halakha is unclear the vegetables should be divided equally, as this prevents disagreement and increases peace in the world.
  
  Bava Batra
  
  Introduction to Bava Batra
  
  Tractate Bava Batra was originally part of a large tractate called Nezikin, meaning damages, which was composed of what are now the first three tractates in the Order of Nezikin. Bava Batra was the third and last section of the super-tractate; from this placement it derived its name, which means the last gate. The first two parts of the original tractate Nezikin were tractate Bava Kamma, meaning the first gate, and tractate Bava Metzia, the middle gate. Each of these three parts has its own central topic.
  Bava Batra differs from Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia in two major ways. These first two parts examine halakhot that at least in part relate to prohibitions, whereas Bava Batra is primarily occupied with civil law, including the halakhot of contracts, property, and estates. Furthermore, much of what is recorded in Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia is based on biblical verses and their rabbinic interpretations, whereas the halakhot discussed in Bava Batra are mostly rabbinic ordinances based on the Sages' understanding of human nature, societal conventions, and the need to establish limits and guidelines to regulate business relationships.
  The regulations established by the Sages are, of course, based on the fundamental principles underlying monetary law: The prohibition against taking what belongs to another person: “You shall not steal” (Leviticus 19:11), “You shall not defraud your neighbor, neither rob him” (Leviticus 19:13); the prohibition against deceiving one's neighbor or causing him any type of pain: “You shall not deal falsely, neither lie one to another” (Leviticus 19:11), “You shall not exploit one another” (Leviticus 25:17); and the principles that guide all of the Sages' enactments: “And you shall do that which is right and good in the sight of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 6:18), “You shall put the evil away from the midst of you” (Deuteronomy 13:6). By themselves, these principles do not create a basis for organizing economic and social life. The Sages, therefore, instituted a system of rules, on the basis of which the practical solutions to real-life problems can be established.
  Since this tractate deals primarily with monetary law and monetary relationships, the principles governing these issues differ in their very essence from those governing ritual matters, or the halakhot and judgments of the Torah in general. One of the central components is the enormous authority granted to courts to ordain laws and enactments. By power of the principle that property declared ownerless by a court is ownerless, a court is authorized to declare one's property ownerless or grant it to another person. Therefore, whatever is done by power of the court, and in great measure also that which is done by the community's leaders, has the force of halakha, even when not explicitly stated in the Torah.
  Another difference between Jewish monetary law and Jewish ritual law follows from the fact that one may give away his money or waive rights granted to him by halakha. For this reason, many of the laws and enactments in this tractate are directives for deciding the halakha when no agreement has been reached between the parties. But when the parties are prepared to reach an agreement, they can decide monetary matters between them as they see fit.
  Tractate Bava Batra addresses four principal issues: Relations between neighbors, the halakhot of presumption of ownership and deeds, the halakhot of sales, and the halakhot of inheritance.
  Most of these halakhot are based on hazaka, a concept that has multiple meanings, some of which are clarified in this tractate in a comprehensive and profound manner.
  In its most general sense, a hazaka is a presumption with regard to the nature of reality, and in the special context of this tractate it is a presumption with regard to the nature and behavior of human beings, i.e., how an ordinary person behaves in a particular situation, and how an ordinary person understands and formulates agreements. With regard to the details, there is, of course, room for disagreement: Does one suffer when another can see into his property, and to what extent does he suffer? Is a foul odor or excessive noise beyond what an ordinary person is prepared to accept? At what point does one protest when an unauthorized person uses his property? How long does the average person hold on to written records?
  Similar questions arise with regard to the halakhot of sales. When one buys or sells property, whether by way of a written or an oral agreement, how are his intentions to be understood? Of course, a precise and detailed contract prevents misunderstandings and disagreements. But in the absence of a clear contract, such matters must at times be decided by a court. This tractate provides the definition of certain items, e.g., house, vineyard, boat, and the like. What does each of these terms include, and what is not included? If one buys an item that turns out to be defective or deficient, can he cancel the transaction or demand compensation? When is it said that a defect is insignificant and no reasonable person would raise objections about it?
  Another fundamental issue in commercial transactions relates to gemirut da'at, final intention or making up of the mind of the parties to a transaction. Here too, the matter is decided in accordance with normal human behavior: When is an action performed under compulsion considered void, and when does it have legal force?
  Since the halakhot in these areas are not established according to objective criteria dictated by Torah law, they enjoy considerable flexibility. Much depends on regional custom and the manner in which the people of a particular place conduct their affairs. The principle that everything is in accordance with the regional custom is important with regard to these halakhot, because general agreement can establish the halakha in a particular place, whether it was reached through a formal decision of the local residents or expresses the general consensus without any explicit decision ever having been reached. Similarly, many of the matters discussed in this tractate are decided in practice in accordance with the discretion of the judges, who must take into account the circumstances of the time and place, and the particular parties.
  The halakhot of inheritance differ slightly from the rest of the topics discussed in the tractate, because they are based on what is written in the Torah, and for this reason they do not depend solely on the intentions of the deceased and the heir. While the halakhot of inheritance are by Torah law and are not subject to change, they can be circumvented in various ways, e.g., through a deed of gift or through a deathbed declaration. The requirement that the marriage contract to a widow or a divorcée be paid, and the complex conditions attached to it with regard to providing for the needs of the widow and those of the sons and daughters of the deceased, create an additional factor that must be addressed. Some of the discussions in the tractate come to resolve the problems, and occasionally the contradictions, stemming from this additional consideration.
  The printed editions of tractate Bava Batra are longer than any other tractate in the Babylonian Talmud because most of the commentary to the tractate was written not by Rashi, whose writing is a shining example of brevity, but by his grandson and disciple Rabbeinu Shmuel ben Meir, the Rashbam,1 whose detailed and expansive style lies somewhere between that of Rashi and that of Tosafot.
  Tractate Bava Batra is composed of ten chapters. While issues occasionally spill over from one chapter to another, in general each chapter deals with a particular and well-defined set of problems.
  Chapter One addresses the halakhot governing the division of jointly owned property, especially land.
  Chapter Two delineates the actions one may not perform on his own property when they involve causing damage to his neighbor or to the public.
  Chapter Three discusses the halakhot of presumptive status and proof of ownership, especially with regard to land.
  Chapter Four explores sale agreements concerning land, houses, courtyards, fields, and cities.
  Chapter Five deals with various aspects of the sale of movable property, ordinary sale agreements, leasing contracts, and appropriate business practices.
  Tractate Bava Batra also contains sections of aggada that are connected to issues mentioned in the tractate. They are found primarily in the first and the fifth chapters.
  Chapter Six discusses two issues: The halakhot governing the sale of defective goods and the details of agreements and rights with regard to the sale of real estate.
  Chapter Seven explores the sale of fields and the fixed definitions of the conditions of their sale.
  Chapter Eight clarifies the halakhot of inheritance and wills.
  Chapter Nine discusses the division of property and obligations between the various heirs, as well as the halakhot governing deathbed declarations.
  Chapter Ten describes the halakhot of promissory notes: The manner in which they are written, the liens they create, and the ways in which they are repaid. 
  Tractate Bava Batra deals primarily with halakha and includes many detailed halakhic clarifications and records of judicial actions. However, it also contains sections of aggada that are connected to issues mentioned in the tractate. They are found primarily in the first and the fifth chapters.
  Notes 
  1	Various scholars, including Rabbi Raphael Natan Rabinowitz in Dikdukei Soferim, maintain that from 87a to 89b, and again from 130b to 131b, the commentary attributed to Rashbam was not written by him. They prove this by comparing quotes of the Rashbam as found in some early commentaries to the commentary attributed to the Rashbam, which reveals significant discrepancies. In light of this claim, the publisher of the classic Vilna edition printed an extra commentary on the page believed to be the authentic commentary of Rashbam, calling it Peirush HaRashbam HaIkari, the primary commentary of the Rashbam. This commentary will be referred to in this volume as Rashbam Commentary. Plain references to Rashbam refer to the commentary attributed to Rashbam.
  
  Introduction to Perek I
  
  People generally live in a society, and therefore their personal properties are located one next to the other. This is true of houses in a courtyard, of courtyards in an alleyway, and of parcels of land in an expanse of fields. In many cases, properties are jointly owned by more than one person. Sometimes it is more convenient for people to live side by side with other people without marking a boundary between them; at other times people prefer to divide up jointly owned property and erect a barrier between them and their neighbors.
  This chapter addresses issues concerning the division of jointly owned property and the erection of barriers. One series of questions relates to the separating wall: Are there fixed halakhot concerning the height or thickness of the wall, or the materials of which the wall must be constructed? Where exactly is the wall erected, and who enjoys the rights to the wall, both the right to use it and the right to possess the materials from which it is constructed, should it one day collapse?
  When the two co-owners agree to build a barrier, the matter is relatively simple. But what is the halakha when only one of the co-owners wishes to divide the property and erect a barrier? Can one compel the other to contribute to the construction costs? There are even more basic questions: Can one party insist that jointly owned property be divided? Are all properties subject to the halakha of division, or are there certain properties that cannot be divided, whether the division is made unilaterally by one of the parties or with the consent of both parties?
  These questions are to a certain degree connected to the issue of damage caused by sight, that is, whether the invasion of one's privacy when he is exposed to the gaze of others is considered actual damage, or merely a matter of personal sensitivity.
  Over and beyond the discussion of the division of jointly owned property and the preservation of privacy, a general question arises: What can neighbors, in a house, a courtyard, an alleyway, or a city, compel each other to do for the sake of their jointly owned property, or for the sake of the other neighbors?
  These are the basic issues that are addressed in this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek I
  
  This chapter established that with regard to walls that form partitions in a courtyard, regional custom dictates the materials out of which such walls must be constructed, as well as the thickness of those walls. When two neighbors agree to build a wall between their respective properties, each party contributes half of the space upon which the wall is to be constructed and pays half of the construction costs. If the wall later collapses, the space and the materials are divided equally between them. If one of the neighbors builds the wall on his own, he builds it wholly on his property and at his expense, and he fashions a border mark to indicate that he alone built the wall.
  The Gemara also concluded that invasion of privacy resulting from exposure to the gaze of one's neighbor is considered damage, and therefore in a place where there is such an invasion of privacy one party can compel the other to build a barrier, which must be at least four cubits high.
  One party can compel the other to build a partition in three other instances: Where there is an invasion of privacy in one's courtyard or in a garden where it is customary to erect a barrier; when a neighbor who initially opposed building a wall demonstrates that he is pleased that it was built, e.g., by completing a fence erected by his neighbor; or when the initially reluctant neighbor derives benefit from the barrier, such as by building another wall close to it in order to cover both walls with a roof.
  Just as neighbors can compel each other to build a wall, so too, the residents of a courtyard or a city can compel each other to build whatever is necessary for their protection. Mention is therefore made in this chapter of various ordinances with regard to communal obligations that are cast upon all the residents of a city, such as charity and municipal improvements. The Gemara determined that responsibility for funding whatever brings benefit to all of the city's residents is imposed upon all of them, including minor orphans, whereas funds for that which is merely for protection are not collected from Torah scholars.
  The Sages established that every property is subject to the halakha of division, provided that it is large enough that each of its co-owners will receive a portion that can still be used and the division will not interfere with the original use of the property. In such a case each party can compel the other to either buy his portion or sell him his.
  The above applies to a division of property demanded by one of the co-owners. If both parties agree to divide their jointly owned property, every property can be divided, with the exception of books of the Bible contained in a single volume, which owing to the honor that must be shown them may not be divided.
  Incidental to the discussion of these issues, the chapter addressed some of the halakhot governing charity, taxes, and the authorship of the books included in the Bible.
  In addition to the halakhic discussions in this chapter, there were also two large sections of aggada, which were not directly connected to the subject matter of the chapter but were discussed incidentally to matters arising in the course of the halakhic discussion. The first dealt primarily with the mitzvot of charity, while the second discussed a Torah scroll in particular and the Bible in general. The latter section also explored the biblical character of Job, along with his era and character.
  
  Introduction to Perek II
  
  This chapter discusses those occasions in which one performs an activity on his own property and thereby causes damage to his neighbor.
  Damage to one's neighbor comes in various forms and results from different types of actions. The problems discussed in the Gemara concern the limit of private activities: To what extent is an individual entitled to act within his own property, and when is the damage he inflicts considered so severe that he is barred from certain activities, notwithstanding the fact that they are performed in his private domain?
  Some actions cause immediate damage to the property of another, in which case they can be compared to an act of direct harm, or, in the language of the Gemara, the shooting of one's arrows. In other situations the damage is not immediate, and its effects on the neighbor's property are apparent only at a later stage.
  Likewise, there are certain types of damage that are tangible, while others are intangible, e.g., the ability to peer into another's house. Some types of damage cause only a slight loss or a sense of discomfort; others are unbearable, might lead to extensive financial loss, or might even entail physical danger.
  An analysis of these issues raises several fundamental questions. Is it correct to say that in general, there is a principle that it is the responsibility of the one who has the potential to cause damage to distance himself from another's property or person in order to ensure that he avoids causing damage, or does an individual generally have the right to do as he pleases on his own property, and it is the neighbor's responsibility to distance himself if he is likely to sustain damage? This leads to a further issue: If one distances his activities from his neighbor so as not to cause damage, is he entitled to compensation, or is he simply fulfilling an obligation for which he does not receive payment? Yet another dilemma concerns a case where one took precautions to avoid causing damage to another, and nevertheless his activity damaged his neighbor's property. Do his efforts serve to exempt him from responsibility? Or must he still pay for the damage he caused, in which case the instructions of the Sages can be considered mere good advice that does not have legal ramifications in the event of damage?
  Just as one's actions can damage the property of another individual, they can also damage public property. This chapter discusses the right of the public to prevent an individual from harming their collective interest, and the differences between one who causes damage to another individual and one who causes damage to the public.
  The discussion and resolution of these matters and are the main topics of this chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek II
  
  This chapter examined cases in which one performs an activity on his own property and thereby causes damage to his neighbor. With regard to damage inflicted upon a neighbor, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei that the responsibility to distance oneself is not on the one whose activities might cause damage to his neighbor. Consequently, one who performs an activity on his own property that might cause damage to another at a later stage is not required to take steps to avoid this scenario. This principle applies only if the damage he inflicts is indirect. If the damage occurs immediately, or it begins to take effect immediately and its effects gradually increase, it is considered as though he has shot his neighbor with his arrows, and the neighbor can object to his activity. This applies to damage that is caused by one's actions to the neighbor's property, e.g., his walls, pit, and various plantings on his property, as well as damage that is caused by noise or foul odors. Similarly, if one plants trees and the like whose roots or branches extend into his neighbor's property and potentially cause damage, that neighbor is entitled to chop them down as necessary.
  The Sages established certain limits within which the damaged party may compel a neighbor to distance the source of the damage from his private or jointly owned property. If one did distance these activities from a neighbor, he is nevertheless still liable for any damage he may cause.
  Neighbors who live in the same courtyard can prevent one another from performing an activity that will lead to an increase in visitors to the courtyard, whether their objection is due to the noise or simply because they do not want crowds passing through their property. This right to protest applies only to visitors who will enter the outdoor area of the courtyard. If one wishes to work within the confines of his own home, the neighbors cannot prevent him from doing so even if his activity is noisy.
  As neighbors and residents of the same courtyard can prevent someone from causing them damage, this applies all the more so to residents of a town that are suffering from the acts of a private individual. The rights of the public in this regard include the removal of stumbling blocks, items that interfere with traffic, and articles that spread ritual impurity, and imposing restrictions on activities that discharge foul odors into the city. Likewise, the residents can prevent an individual from spoiling the city landscape. The community can cut down interfering trees and the like, even if the owner originally planted them in a permitted manner. Furthermore, in a case of uncertainty the public can remove such obstructions without having to pay compensation.
  Incidental to these discussions, the Gemara discusses several halakhot concerning teachers of children, and it includes a short aggadic passage about the different effects of winds that come from various directions.
  
  Introduction to Perek III
  
  According to halakha, one must perform a formal act of acquisition in order to become the owner of property, whether movable property or real estate. Mere possession of movable property, the farming of land, or living in a house is not in and of itself an act of acquisition. Therefore, if one was, for example, living in a house, and another claimed that the house in fact belongs to him and is able to prove that he had been the owner in the past, the one living in the house would be required to substantiate his ownership by producing documentation or witnesses who testify that he had acquired it.
  The Sages understood that it is unrealistic to expect those who purchase property to retain their documentation indefinitely. They therefore ruled that if the one in possession is able to prove that for a significant duration he had been in possession of and profited from a property as an owner would, and the prior owner had not lodged a protest concerning his usage, this is sufficient to establish the presumption of ownership, and no further proof is needed. This presumption of ownership is referred to as hazaka.
  The chapter addresses many details of this principle: What is the requisite time for establishing the presumption of ownership? Is it the same with regard to all types of property? What types of use are considered to be indicative of ownership? How is testimony with regard to presumptive ownership presented?
  Additionally, the chapter explores the aspects of this issue that pertain to what is expected of one who claims to own property that another has taken possession of. How does he lodge a protest? Must the protest be lodged in the presence of the one in possession of his property? Must it be lodged in front of a court, or in front of witnesses?
  A similar issue discussed is the methods by which one can obtain an acquired privilege, also referred to as hazaka, to make use of the property of another for a specific purpose.
  The term hazaka is employed in an additional manner. It is a mode of acquisition, in addition to giving money or writing a bill of sale, with regard to land. Here, it refers to a specific act of taking possession, by which ownership of the property is transferred. This chapter examines how one takes possession using this act of acquisition with regard to different types of landed property.
  These issues were often the subject of real-world dilemmas, as there were often conflicts between litigants pertaining to ownership of property. For this reason, many incidents that occurred in the courts of the talmudic Sages are quoted throughout the chapter.
  
  Summary of Perek III
  
  This chapter dealt both with establishing the presumption of ownership by means of profiting from a property and the act of acquisition of real estate, clarifying many details of the pertinent halakhot. It clarified that in and of itself, working on and profiting from a property, thereby establishing the presumption of ownership, does not render one an owner, but rather can be used to prove ownership in a case where one is not expected to retain other evidence such as documentation. For this reason, possession that is not accompanied by a claim as to how one became the owner is disregarded.
  The presumption of ownership is established by means of profiting from a property in the normal manner, as an owner would. Absent this, the lack of protest on the part of the prior owner is inconclusive. In addition, there must be no special relationship between the possessor and the prior owner of the property that would serve to explain the prior owner's failure to protest. Examples of such relationships include sharecropping arrangements and various familial bonds.
  The requisite duration for presumptive ownership varies according to the type of property. Many types of fields require a standard three-year period. Orchards require harvesting the fruit three times. Movable property is generally considered as belonging to whoever is in possession of it at any given time, with the exception of livestock and slaves, as they can move from place to place of their own volition.
  In order to challenge the ownership of one in possession of his property, one must present in court proof of prior ownership. If he is unable to do so, for example due to constraints of distance, he may lodge a protest in the presence of two witnesses. The owner is required to lodge a protest during each three-year period in order to prevent the possessor from establishing the presumption of ownership. If the owner is able to demonstrate that there were extenuating circumstances preventing him from knowing that another was in possession of his property, a protest may be lodged even after three years have passed.
  One can also establish an acquired privilege with respect to usage rights of the property of another. These acquired privileges can be established in a much briefer period of time.
  The means by which one can acquire real estate through an act of acquisition was also clarified in this chapter. An act of acquisition is accomplished by causing a change in the property, for example, by improving it or by altering its boundaries and entrances. Using the property without transforming it is not considered to be an act of acquisition.
  In the process of clarifying these central issues, the question of how a court should rule in a case of uncertainty was also touched upon. Various means of resolving uncertainty were mentioned, among them assignation of the burden of proof, judicial discretion, and various forms of compromise.
  
  Introduction to Perek IV
  
  This chapter discusses the interpretation of sales agreements and contracts relating to various types of landed properties.
  When a buyer and seller draw up a detailed agreement defining all the particulars of a transaction, it is clear what exactly is being sold and what is not. Since this is a monetary matter, the parties are entitled to introduce stipulations and conditions as they wish.
  The chapter examines sales that are formulated in general terms, and it discusses how to interpret the wording of general sales agreements for the sale of different types of real estate.
  As the Gemara phrases it, the central question is as follows: When one sells property, does he sell it generously or sparingly? In other words, should a sales agreement be interpreted in a way that expands the rights of the buyer or in a manner that restricts them as much as possible? This issue gives rise to secondary questions, e.g., whether there is a difference with regard to this matter in the case of a sale and in the case of a gift, and whether land that was consecrated using general wording is treated in yet another manner.
  Many questions arise with regard to the details of these issues. Some of the questions relate to the limits of what is being sold. When one sells a house, does the sale include rooms that open into the house? When one sells a field but fails to define its boundaries in their entirety, what is included in the sale? What rights, if any, does the buyer have to the land underneath the property he purchases or the airspace above it?
  Another topic of discussion relates to the items found in the property being sold. When one sells a house, are all or only some of its accompaniments included in the sale? Does the sale include the furniture and other items located in the house at that time? With regard to the sale of buildings that serve a particular purpose, such as an olive press or a bathhouse, which accompaniments are considered an integral part of the building and are therefore included in the sale, and which are not? Does the sale of a courtyard include all of the houses and the accompaniments in that courtyard? With regard to the sale of a field or a vineyard, does the sale include the utensils and equipment needed to cultivate it? Does such a sale also include any buildings or trees located in the field or vineyard?
  This chapter's primary concern is the detailed clarification of these issues.
  
  Summary of Perek IV
  
  This chapter analyzed the sale of various types of landed property, what is included in the sale of land, and how the boundaries of sold property are established. The Gemara's discussion revolved around properties such as a house, courtyard, olive press, bathhouse, field, vineyard, and even an entire city.
  The principle that emerges is that when one sells one of these properties without specifying what is included in the sale, any item situated on the property is included in the sale, provided that it is affixed to the ground and serves a function with regard to that property. Similarly, when one sells a field, the trees in the field are included in the sale. By contrast, items that are attached to the ground are not included in the sale of the property if they are considered important in their own right, for example, a cistern when a house is sold; or a dovecote, sycamore trees, or carob trees in a field.
  In general, movable property is not included in the sale of land, even if it serves a purpose on the land. Nevertheless, in the case of a field, movable property found in the field is included in the sale, provided that it serves a function in either working or protecting the field.
  All of the above applies when the seller sells the land without specifying what is included in the sale. If he explicitly states that he is selling the land and everything that is in it, all the movable property that serves any function with regard to the land is included in the sale, but other movable property, such as money or merchandise, is still excluded. In the case of the sale of a field, this specification is even more inclusive, as it includes all of the movable property found in the field, even items such as harvested produce that was left in the field.
  Since the presumption is that a seller sells generously, if certain fixed items that were not included in the sale are situated on the land transferred to the buyer, the seller is obligated to purchase a path in order to access those items. If he states that he is reserving such a path for himself, or if he specifies that he is excluding these items from the sale, he is not required to purchase a path. One who sells a field and retains the trees for himself is not required to purchase a path, as he reserves for himself the land needed to tend the trees even without specifying his intent.
  All of these limitations with regard to what is included in the transaction apply only in the case of a sale, as the seller relies on the fact that the buyer could have stipulated that he wanted specific items to be included in the sale. But in cases where one gives the property as a gift or consecrates it, all movable property found in the land is included, with the exception of those items that are clearly not connected to the land. The halakha is the same with regard to one who takes possession of land that had belonged to a convert or brothers who divide between themselves the property of their father's estate.
  With regard to the boundaries of the land being sold, the Gemara established that when one sells a house, the sale does not include the gallery or a room behind the house. It also does not include the pit, cistern, tunnels, or roof, as these are all considered separate entities. Additionally, the seller has not sold that which is found above the roof or below the ground unless he specifies that he is also selling the depths and the heights of the house. With regard to the sale of a city, everything within the city's borders is sold, but the nearby villages and lands are not, unless they serve some function only for that city.
  When one sells a field that is situated between two other fields, he must delineate the boundaries on all sides. If only some of the boundaries were specified, the buyer receives the smallest area that those boundaries can define. Similarly, when one sells a house or field that is part of a larger unit and specifies only the boundaries of the larger area as opposed to the land that is being sold, it is assumed that the seller expanded the boundaries for the buyer but he in fact meant to sell him only the particular house or field.
  
  Introduction to Perek V
  
  Although this chapter discusses several topics, it is primarily focused on the sale of various types of movable property and food. Continuing from the previous chapter, it begins by discussing what is included in the sale of various movable items. It seeks to clarify which items are sold when they are found inside a larger item, e.g., a ship; whether items that are usually sold together, or are adjacent or attached, are included in a sale; and whether the sale of a mother animal includes the sale of its offspring.
  Another series of issues concerning the limitations of a sale arises with regard to trees, which are purchased mainly for their fruit. In addition to establishing the extent of the sale, such as whether the ground is also included, and if so, how much ground, it is necessary to define precisely the rights of the new owner to the tree itself and its fruit.
  The chapter proceeds to analyze general halakhot concerning sales of movable property. It addresses the issues that ensue when the characteristics of a sold item do not accord with the statements of the buyer and seller, whether the discrepancy relates to the quality of the merchandise or the merchandise is a different type of item than the one agreed upon. In certain cases where the sold merchandise differs from the stipulated product, one or both parties may renege on the sale. This leads to another question: At what stage is a transaction considered final? Since one party may change his mind and seek to renege on the transaction or change its terms, it is necessary to ascertain at what point it is final and too late to make changes. Another reason why it is important to determine the end of a sale is that if the merchandise is broken or spilled, whoever is in possession of the goods suffers the loss.
  The Gemara also discusses the halakhot of a common scenario in which a father sends his young child to purchase an item on his behalf. If it is lost or destroyed, it is necessary to ascertain whether the merchant or the father is financially responsible for the lost merchandise.
  An important aspect of every sale is the act of acquisition that effects the transfer of ownership. This chapter analyzes the various methods through which one can acquire movable property.
  In the case of the sale of movable property, especially dry and liquid food products, the scales and measures that are used must be accurate. In order to supervise their accuracy, the Sages instituted guiding principles, both with regard to the accuracy and reliability of the measures and the proper manner of weighing and measuring.
  
  Summary of Perek V
  
  Just as was previously stated with regard to the sale of houses and other structures, if a buyer purchases a ship without specifying precisely what he is acquiring, he has a right to the parts that are usually found on the ship and that are essential for its function. It is only if he specifies that he is purchasing the ship and everything that is on it that he acquires everything actually found on the ship, even if it is not part of the ship's functional equipment, e.g., slaves and merchandise on the ship.
  With regard to items that are generally used in tandem, sometimes the sale of one includes the sale of the other, while in other situations this is not the case. For example, if one sells a yoke that harnesses two oxen together, he has not sold the oxen themselves, and likewise in the reverse case the yoke is not sold along with the oxen. Similarly, if one buys a wagon he does not acquire the mules that pull it, and if one buys a donkey he does not acquire its equipment. One who buys a cow does not receive its calf, but one who buys a female donkey does acquire its foal along with it. One who buys the head of a large domesticated animal does not acquire its forelegs, whereas one does acquire the forelegs along with the head of a small domesticated animal. The rulings in these cases are affected by the terms and customs of the particular place.
  The Gemara further states that the price of an item serves as proof with regard to determining what was included in the sale. Therefore, in a case where there is a discrepancy between the known price of the item and the amount paid for it, the halakha is as follows: If the difference in price could be attributed to a mistake on the part of the buyer, the standard halakhot of exploitation apply. If the difference in price is so great that it could not be attributed to an error on his part, it is assumed that the additional sum is a gift to the seller.
  If one sells a pit, dovecote, or dunghill, he sells its contents as well, as the sale was conducted primarily for the contents. But with regard to one who sold the offspring of his dovecote or beehive, the Sages established that the buyer must leave a certain number of them for the seller, to ensure the continued function of the dovecote or beehive.
  If one buys three trees in a field belonging to another he acquires the ground beneath and around the trees, to allow him to tend to the trees. Conversely, one who buys one tree acquires only the tree itself and the right to use the ground on which it rests for as long as the tree remains alive. The same halakha applies to one who buys two trees.
  More generally, it is established that if one sells merchandise claiming that it is of a superior quality, and it is found to be poor in quality, or the reverse, whoever suffers a loss has the right to renege on the sale. By contrast, if both parties agree on the sale of one type of item and the item is discovered to be of a different kind, the sale is considered to be an error and both parties can renege on the sale.
  When merchandise is sold, there are many variables that affect when the transaction is finalized. The important factors include whether the sale takes place in the domain of the buyer or the seller. If neither of them owns the domain, there is a further distinction between the public domain, an alleyway, and a domain that belongs to another individual. Another important issue is whether a measuring vessel being used to measure the merchandise belongs to the buyer, the seller, or someone else. In practical terms, these variables affect whether each party can renege on the transaction, e.g., if the market price of the merchandise suddenly changes, and who is responsible for the measuring vessel and its contents.
  One particular transaction discussed in this chapter is that of a young child sent to purchase an item from a storekeeper on behalf of his parent. In this case, the Gemara rules that if one sends a child and gives him money and a vessel to hold the merchandise that he purchases, the storekeeper is responsible for the money and for the merchandise he pours in the vessel. He is not responsible for the vessel itself unless he picks it up for the purpose of using it.
  There are different methods of acquiring movable property. All such items can be acquired by means of lifting, even when the acquisition is performed in the public domain. Heavy and large items, which are not easily lifted, are acquired by means of pulling. Acquisition through pulling is not effective in the public domain. Items that can be pulled only with difficulty, e.g., a ship, are acquired by means of passing, which is performed in the public domain or in a domain that belongs to neither of them. Other options include the acquisition of movable property by means of the land on which it is located or by using a cloth in a symbolic exchange. The acquisition of a promissory note requires both the act of passing and the writing of an additional bill of sale, as they are not acquired by means of passing alone.
  The Sages caution that a seller must take great care not to cause a loss for the buyer due to a defect in one's scales or measurement implements, and he must ensure that he measures accurately. Anyone who is not careful in this regard, and certainly one who employs false measures, steals from the public.
  This chapter includes several aggadic passages. The main discussion, which appears in the context of ships, ostensibly describes the travels of Sages in the oceans and deserts. These tales are generally interpreted as allusions to ideas about the nature of the world and historical events, as well as visions of the future.
  
  Introduction to Perek VI
  
  The chapter opens with a discussion of a sale in which the merchandise does not fulfill the requirements of the buyer. In some cases, a defect in the merchandise entirely nullifies the sale as a mistaken transaction. In other cases, the defect is considered so common that the buyer should have specified if he did not want it. Similarly, if the merchandise is suitable for several purposes, it may be the responsibility of the buyer to specify the purpose for which he is purchasing the merchandise.
  The chapter proceeds to discuss cases in which a certain percentage of the merchandise is of substandard quality. What percentage is considered significant enough to require the seller to replace the substandard goods, and what percentage is considered acceptable?
  This chapter also addresses questions concerning land purchases. When one purchases land, sometimes he does not mention the size of the plot he is purchasing but instead specifies what he wishes to do with it. For example, he may purchase land to build a certain structure, without specifying the size of the building he intends to construct there. Similarly, one may hire a contractor to construct a particular type of building without specifying the exact dimensions or specifications of the building. The details of the sale or contract are defined by the standard dimensions of the type of building mentioned, which the chapter delineates for several types of buildings.
  One of these types of structures is a catacomb, for which land is usually purchased by a community or family. The chapter analyzes the purchase of land suitable for a catacomb, as well as the standard dimensions and structure of a catacomb.
  In previous chapters, the issue of access rights through other people's land was discussed. The question of access rights can arise if one sells land but retains rights to pass through the land. Another possibility is where one purchases land together with the right to access it through the seller's remaining land. This chapter explains in detail the rights that one has on access paths. Is he limited to walking there at certain times, and does he require the permission of the landowner? May he allow others to also pass through or is the right granted solely to him?
  The chapter also considers the rights of the public to a public thoroughfare that passes through private property. Does the owner of the property have the right to prevent or limit public access to that thoroughfare? May he instead grant access to a thoroughfare in a different location?
  These are the main topics dealt with in this chapter. Other related issues are discussed in passing.
  
  Summary of Perek VI
  
  The chapter opened with a discussion of the cases in which a buyer purchases merchandise but subsequently finds it was not fit for his intended purpose, e.g., one who purchased seeds for planting and finds that they did not sprout. The principle is that if the buyer specified his purpose beforehand and he receives merchandise that does not suit his purpose, it is considered a mistaken transaction. If he did not specify his purpose, the seller can claim that since what he sold him is fit for a different purpose, the sale should stand; even if the majority of people do not purchase such merchandise for that purpose, it is irrelevant, because the halakha is that one does not follow the majority of cases in monetary matters.
  This chapter also delineated the guiding principles for one who purchases merchandise that contains impurities or merchandise where a certain percentage is of substandard quality. The assumption is that a buyer accepts that a certain proportion of the merchandise may not be as he desired, and the Gemara explains what is considered an acceptable level for each type of merchandise. The seller is not required to remove impurities that were naturally mixed in during the course of production, but it is prohibited for him to intentionally mix impurities into his merchandise, as this is deceitful.
  Related to these questions is the issue of wine purchases, as wine, which often sours quickly, has unique consumer protection halakhot. If the seller sells good-quality wine, he bears no further responsibility for it. But if the buyer specifies that he wishes to purchase good-quality wine that will not sour quickly, and it does sour, the buyer has the upper hand, provided that the wine is still in the original containers in which it was sold.
  Apropos the discussion of wine, the Gemara considered whether different types and qualities of wine may be regarded as wine with regard to the blessing one recites over wine, the sanctification of the Shabbat day, and for wine used as libations, poured upon the altar.
  The Gemara also addressed issues of land purchase. When one buys land for a specific purpose, but the size of the land he purchased was not specified, the seller must provide enough land to enable the buyer to fulfill his intentions. How much land is necessary is determined by a general standard, e.g., if a person purchases land for a house, he acquires a plot of land of a size necessary in order to build a standard-sized house. To this end, the chapter listed the standard sizes for a small house, a large house, a banquet hall, a bridal home, and other structures. It also mentioned the dimensions of a catacomb, including its burial niches, chambers, and courtyards. These standard sizes are also relevant in a case in which a person contracts another to construct one of these structures without specifying the required dimensions. In such a case, the structure must be built according to the standard dimensions of such a structure.
  Similarly, the chapter mentions the standard dimensions for different types of paths. A private path is four cubits wide, an intercity road is eight cubits wide, a public thoroughfare is sixteen cubits wide, and the road to a city of refuge is thirty-two cubits wide. A king's thoroughfare and the path for a funeral have no maximum measure, and can occupy as much space as required.
  Related to the discussion of different types of paths, the Gemara specified their permitted uses. One who has access rights through the house, courtyard, or field of another may not bring others through with him. He may enter only at acceptable times, and may not use the access path for any other purpose. If they agreed beforehand that he could use a path from the side, then he may use it as he wishes. In such a case, neither the owner of the land, nor the one with rights to the path may plant it.
  These halakhot of access rights apply to an individual. If there is a public thoroughfare passing through private property, the owner of that property may not block the public's access. If he does so, the public may still continue to use that thoroughfare, in addition to any new thoroughfare he gives them.
  
  Introduction to Perek VII
  
  This chapter, like the one preceding it, deals with the sale of various types of real estate. It opens with a discussion of imperfections in the property being sold. It is necessary to clarify which imperfections the buyer is prepared to accept because they are part and parcel of the nature of real estate, and which defects he is unwilling to accept because they are more severe. It is natural that not all fields are completely level; rather, they are liable to contain inclines, slopes, rocks, and crevices. Due to this reality, it is necessary to define when such imperfections in a field are considered part of the nature of landed property and when they are considered a loss to the buyer to the extent that he is entitled to a refund of part of the purchase price paid for the field or to compensation in the form of additional land.
  Similarly, at times one purchases a plot of land of a particular size, and it turns out that the actual measurements are not exactly the same as those stipulated in the agreement. In such a case the precise conditions of the sale must be examined, to clarify whether the seller committed himself to selling a field of a precise size or whether he intended to sell a field of approximately that size. Even when the parties agree in advance that the measurements need not be precise, there is still a standard for deviation from the stipulated measurements, and when that standard is exceeded, the party who stands to suffer a loss must be compensated. With regard to the compensation, the Gemara discusses whether the difference must be returned in money or in land.
  Other questions that are raised relate to one who sells half of his field to another person without specifying the borders of the plot being sold. What should be done when the field consists of choice and defective sections? How are the seller and the buyer to divide the field between them?
  Other related issues are dealt with, such as what to do when a deed of sale contains contradictory conditions. Cases pertaining to the division of inherited or joint property are also considered: What should be done if after the property was divided it becomes clear that there was an essential flaw in the division? Must the property be redivided or does one of the recipients forfeit his rights?
  
  Summary of Perek VII
  
  When one sells a plot of land of a certain size, such as a beit kor, and the field contains rocks more than ten handbreadths high or crevices more than ten handbreadths deep, they are not measured along with the rest of the field. This is the case when the seller specified a precise measurement of land, but if he said: Approximately a beit kor, or made a similar statement, then even crevices and rocks are measured as part of the field, as he did not commit himself to a precise measurement. Even when the rocks and crevices are measured along with the field, this applies only when specific conditions related to their location and concentration are met. If the rocks are few but they are arranged in formations that make working the land difficult, such as in a circle, a triangle, a zigzag shape, or the like, the halakha is uncertain, and the principle invoked is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
  The wording of the deed of sale is also significant in cases where the actual measurements of the field are not precisely as stipulated between the parties. If it was emphasized that the area was to be measured with a rope, i.e., precisely, then even if the difference is minimal, the buyer must return the surplus to the seller or the seller must deduct the difference from the purchase price. But if a measurement was mentioned without specification, and all the more so if the parties added the words: More or less, then if the discrepancy is less than one part in twenty-four, the sale is valid as is. The precise halakhot as to how to compensate the injured party in the case of a discrepancy depends on the specific details of each case.
  One who sells half of his field to another person gives him land worth half the value of the entire field, and that land can be given to the buyer from the leaner part of the field. If he specified the side of the field he was selling, such as the northern or southern side, he gives him land on that side worth half the value of the entire field.
  All of the above applies when the seller sells a tract of land without specifying its borders. But if he sold a specific area within certain demarcations and borders, the buyer receives the demarcated area, and if the discrepancy between the actual size of the field and the size stipulated by the seller does not exceed one-sixth, the sale is valid as is. If the discrepancy is greater than one-sixth, the party who benefited must return the surplus.
  With regard to the general issue of contradictory expressions in a sale agreement, the halakha is that if the contradictory expressions cannot be resolved, the less inclusive expression is followed, as the holder of the deed of sale is at a disadvantage.
  In the course of its discussion of errors in the assessment and evaluation of property, the Gemara considers several issues pertaining to erroneous assessments, including what margin of error is accepted, and when a division of property that is based on an erroneous assessment is voided. In this context, the Gemara examines issues concerning brothers who divide their father's estate between them.
  
  Introduction to Perek VIII
  
  And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: The daughters of Zelophehad speak right: You shall give them a possession of an inheritance among their father's brothers; and you shall pass the inheritance of their father to them. And you shall speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a man dies, and has no son, then you shall pass his inheritance to his daughter. And if he has no daughter, then you shall give his inheritance to his brothers. And if he has no brothers, then you shall give his inheritance to his father's brothers. And if his father has no brothers, then you shall give his inheritance to his kinsman that is next to him of his family, and he shall possess it. And it shall be to the children of Israel a statute of judgment, as the Lord commanded Moses. (Numbers 27:6–11)
  If a man has two wives, the one beloved, and the other hated, and they have borne him children, both the beloved and the hated; and if the firstborn son is hers that was hated; then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he has, that he may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn before the son of the hated, who is the firstborn; but he shall acknowledge the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he has; because he is the first fruits of his strength, the right of the firstborn is his. (Deuteronomy 21:15–17)
  The topic of this chapter is inheritance. Although the Torah delineates who a person's heirs are and the order in which the inheritance is apportioned, several details, e.g., a husband's right to inherit from his wife, and whether an heir's heir inherits in a case where the heir is already dead, are not explicit and are inferred by the Talmud from the verses. In addition, the chapter examines whether an inheritor can deviate from the Torah's laws of inheritance by bequeathing his property to other people. Even if it is possible to do so, the question remains as to whether or when it is appropriate.
  An additional issue is primogeniture, a firstborn son's right to a double portion of the inheritance. The chapter analyzes the definition of a firstborn in this regard, whether a firstborn receives a double portion only of his father's inheritance or whether he receives a double portion of his mother's inheritance as well, and whether he receives a double portion of the entire inheritance or only of a certain part of it.
  The chapter also discusses a father's credibility in identifying a person as his child or as his firstborn son, thereby including him in the inheritance.
  Besides one's heirs, there are others who have the right to collect from an estate debts or monetary obligations after the death of the owner. For example, a widow has the right to collect her marriage contract or money for her sustenance. The relationship between these collectors and the heirs is discussed in this chapter and the next.
  Another aspect of inheritance involves a situation where the inheritance has not yet been divided between the heirs and remains the common property of the sons or daughters. The Talmud discusses the management of the property in this case, i.e., the rights and obligations of each partner.
  
  Summary of Perek VIII
  
  The order in which relatives inherit formulated in the Talmud includes both the halakhot stated in the Torah and halakhot that are not explicit in the Torah. Precedence is granted to one's offspring, i.e., to one's sons or daughters and their descendants. If a man has no descendants, his paternal family members inherit from him, starting with his father, and if his father is deceased then his father's descendants inherit from him. If his father has no descendants, the inheritance goes to his paternal grandfather and his descendants, or to his paternal great-grandfather and his descendants, and so forth. In all cases, sons and their descendants precede daughters and their descendants.
  An exception is that a husband takes precedence with regard to his wife's inheritance despite the fact that they are not blood relatives. Although there are different opinions as to whether a husband's inheritance of his wife's property is by Torah or rabbinic law, even those who hold that it is by rabbinic law concede that it takes precedence over that of other heirs.
  In principle, an heir does not lose his right to the inheritance after his death; if the heir is dead, his heirs receive it. Nevertheless, a husband does not inherit property inherited by his wife after her death, nor do brothers inherit property inherited by their brother after his death.
  A firstborn son receives a double portion of the property his father possessed at the time of his death, but not of the property that was due to be paid to the deceased. He does not receive a double portion of his mother's inheritance. The definition of a firstborn is a son who is the first viable offspring of his father. Whether he is his mother's firstborn is immaterial. If the firstborn was born by caesarean section, he does not receive a double share, nor does the following son. If there are twins, the midwife's attestation at the time of their birth as to which baby was born first is deemed credible. The mother's testimony during the first seven days after their birth is also deemed credible. The father's testimony that a specific son of his is the firstborn is deemed credible at any time.
  One cannot bequeath his estate to one who is not his heir by Torah law. Despite this, one can apportion his estate to his heirs unevenly, with the exception of the firstborn's double portion, which may not be reduced. This principle is relevant only with regard to inheritance; if one distributes his property to others during his lifetime, even if he reserves the rights of usage until after his death, he can distribute the property to whomever he wishes. The Sages are displeased with one who distributes his entire property to people other than his heirs.
  Although one's sons take precedence with regard to inheritance, a wife's marriage contract guarantees her and her daughters sustenance from the estate. This right precedes the sons' right to receive their inheritance.
  As long as the inheritance has not yet been divided between the children, each child must keep an account of his expenditures from the inheritance, as no child may take more than the others. Money that was spent on the children during their father's lifetime is not taken into consideration.
  Several halakhot that have only historical significance are also discussed in the chapter, i.e., the distribution of Eretz Yisrael among the tribes in the days of Joshua, and a particular halakha that pertained to that period with regard to the transfer of inheritance from the possession of members of one tribe to the possession of members of another.
  
  Introduction to Perek IX
  
  This chapter continues the discussion commenced in the previous chapter with regard to the halakhot of inheritance. It focuses on halakhot that are based on rabbinic decrees and local custom rather than Torah law. Four fundamental issues are addressed in the chapter.
  The first issue concerns the division of an estate between the sons of the deceased, who are the heirs, and the deceased's daughters. Every marriage contract includes the following stipulation: Any female children you will have from me will live in my house and be sustained from my property until they are married (see Ketubot 52b). This stipulation ensures that the daughters are provided with sustenance from their father's estate until they either reach the age of majority or marry. This chapter discusses the division of the deceased's estate when it is insufficient to support both the sons and the daughters. It further discusses whether a tumtum, i.e., one whose sexual organs are indeterminate, is considered a male or a female with regard to this matter.
  The second issue concerns a situation where the heirs enhance their inheritance before dividing the property between them. In this case it is necessary to determine how to divide the profits accrued due to the enhancement of the property. The Gemara explores several cases where the manner of dividing the enhancement is not evident, e.g., when only some of the heirs invested in the property, or when some of the heirs are adult sons and some are minor sons.
  The third issue concerns instructions issued by a person on his deathbed. The Sages instituted that unlike the gift of a healthy person, the gift of a person on his deathbed does not require a formal act of acquisition, but is acquired by means of the verbal instruction of the person on his deathbed. This applies only if he transfers ownership of all his property. Furthermore, under certain circumstances he can retract the gift or transfer it to a different recipient.
  The fourth issue concerns a case where two relatives die under circumstances in which it is impossible to ascertain which of them died first. It is therefore unclear who inherits from whom, and to whom the property should now be transferred. This chapter examines the manner of adjudicating these cases of uncertainty.
  
  Summary of Perek IX
  
  Several fundamental issues were discussed in this chapter. With regard to the division of the estate of the deceased between the sons and the daughters, the Gemara says that when the estate is large, the sons inherit it, and they are required to provide the daughters with sustenance out of their inheritance. If the estate is insufficiently large to provide for both the sons and the daughters, the daughters' claim takes precedence over the sons' claim, since their right to sustenance is based on the stipulations of the marriage contract. The daughters are therefore provided with sustenance from the estate, while the sons are required to provide for themselves.
  A tumtum, whose sexual organs are indeterminate, is unable to prove his claim either to the rights of a son or to the rights of a daughter. The tumtum is therefore excluded from receiving the inheritance of the sons in the case of a large estate and the sustenance of the daughters in the case of a small estate. The tumtum is still a child of the deceased and inherits from the father if there is no other child.
  The Gemara examined the related issue of the legal status of a fetus. It concluded that a fetus is not considered a legal person and cannot acquire property. There is one exception to this principle: One can transfer ownership of his property to his own unborn child.
  When some of the heirs are adults and others are minors, the income from and expenditures spent due to the inheritance are divided equally between the heirs until the property is divided. This also applies to profits or losses incurred by one of the brothers due to the honor of the family and social obligations such as the gifts of groomsmen. The adult sons may declare at the outset that they intend to engage in business, enhancing the property for themselves. Furthermore, if the property was enhanced due to the efforts or expenditure of the adult sons, in any event the enhancement belongs entirely to the adult sons. The same applies with regard to a wife who inherited her husband's property.
  The Sages instituted that a person on his deathbed can transfer ownership of his property by verbal instruction, without performing a formal act of acquisition. This was instituted due to the concern that the sick person's condition might be exacerbated by the anxiety and anguish caused by his inability to ensure the implementation of his will. The Gemara's conclusion is that the gift of a person on his deathbed bestowed by verbal instruction is valid whether it was bestowed on a weekday or on Shabbat. With regard to several matters the gifts of a person on his deathbed have the legal status of inheritance, e.g., the transfer of ownership is effected only when the giver dies.
  The Sages distinguish between several forms of gifts of a person on his deathbed. If a person on his deathbed transfers the ownership of all his property, his gift has the legal status of a gift of a person on his deathbed, and if he recovers he can retract the gift. Furthermore, during his illness he can retract the gift or transfer it to another, and the last instruction that he issues takes effect. If a person on his deathbed transfers the ownership of only some of his property, reserving part of his property for himself, his gift does not have the status of the gift of a person on his deathbed, and he cannot retract the gift even if he recovers. If the person on his deathbed clearly indicates that he is bestowing the gift due to his expectation of imminent death, his gift has the status of the gift of a person on his deathbed, even if he transfers ownership of only some of his property.
  The chapter concluded with several discussions pertaining to the division of inheritance in cases where two relatives died under circumstances that rendered it impossible to ascertain which of them died first. If a son and his father died under such circumstances, the father's heirs inherit the property, even if the son owed money to creditors. If the heirs of the two relatives are not the same individuals, e.g., in the case of a mother and son who died, the property is inherited by the heirs whose status is certain. If a husband and wife died under such circumstances, the sum of the marriage contract is inherited by the husband's heirs, the usufruct property is inherited by the wife's heirs, and the guaranteed property is divided between them.
  
  Introduction to Perek X
  
  And I bought the field that was in Anathoth from Hanamel, my uncle's son, and weighed him the money, seven shekels and ten pieces of silver. And I subscribed the deed, and sealed it, and called witnesses, and weighed the money in the balances. So I took the deed of the purchase, that which was sealed, the terms and the conditions, and that which was open. (Jeremiah 32:9–11)
  So said the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel: Take these deeds, this deed of the purchase, that which is sealed, and this deed that is open, and put them in an earthen vessel, that they may continue many days. (Jeremiah 32:14)
  In this chapter, the Gemara discusses the above verses and concludes that no practical halakhic deductions may be drawn from these verses in Jeremiah. Nevertheless, it is possible to learn from them that already in First Temple times there were distinct procedures involved in the formulation of deeds and intricate methods of acquisition associated with them. Since the Torah itself does not mention legal documents, with the exception of the bill of divorce mentioned in Deuteronomy 24:1, all the halakhot pertaining to such documents are rabbinic ordinances instituted through the ages, from the time of Moses down to the latter generations of talmudic Sages. This chapter, the final chapter of the tractate, discusses several fundamental issues concerning the legal documents relevant to the various kinds of business transactions dealt with throughout the tractate.
  One issue is the correct method of writing the text and signing of witnesses on a document. In mishnaic times there were two types of documents: Ordinary documents and tied, or folded, documents. The proper procedure for preparing each of these documents is examined in this chapter: Where and how the witnesses should sign, under what circumstances a document may be written upon paper or parchment that had its original text written and erased, how to erase or correct errors in documents, and how to resolve apparent contradictions found in a document's text.
  Other issues discussed are: May a document for a legal transaction be written with the consent of only one of the parties involved, or is it necessary to consult with and receive the consent of all the parties? Which party is required to pay the wages of the one who writes the document?
  The Gemara also considers a somewhat related issue: If one has a document that has become erased or is fading and is bound to become illegible, is there a way to have the contents copied into a replacement document? The chapter addresses yet another question: If a promissory note is paid in part, should a new promissory note be written for the balance, or is the original promissory note to be retained, with a receipt issued to the debtor to protect him from subsequent collection of the full amount?
  Toward the end of the chapter, the concept of a loan guarantee is raised. The basic idea of a guarantee is mentioned in the Torah, but its application to a loan guarantee is not clear. One question that arises is: What is the legal relationship between the creditor and the guarantor? Is the guarantor obligated to repay the loan only if the debtor defaults, or can the creditor approach the guarantor directly? Other issues discussed include the following: Is a guarantor legally bound by merely stating he will serve as a guarantor, or must his commitment be recorded in writing? What is the precise formulation that obligates a guarantor to honor his pledge? Can property that a guarantor has sold to others subsequent to undertaking the guarantee be seized as repayment?
  Along with its analysis of these and similar topics, the Gemara addresses certain other subjects of a tangential nature, some of which are explored quite thoroughly.
  
  Summary of Perek X
  
  Already in mishnaic times the tied document was a rarity, so that some of the Sages were not familiar with it and its halakhot. The preparation of such a document was intentionally rendered complicated. It had to be folded and tied several times, and the early commentaries disagree with regard to the details of these procedures. The tied document differed from an ordinary document in how the witnesses signed it, as these signatures were affixed to the reverse side of the document. In addition to these differences, the signing of the document was dated as having taken place a year after the actual signing of the document.
  Most of the halakhot discussed in this chapter address not tied documents but ordinary ones. The Sages instituted many ordinances intended to prevent forgery and falsification of written documents, including the following: 
  The final line of text in a document has no legal standing and should consist of a review of the main points of the document. Also, the witnesses should sign close to the final line of text, not leaving a large enough gap for words to be added at a later time.
  Effort should be made to ensure that the document is written in a uniform manner, with no words written outside the lines. Whenever an erasure or correction is required, a validation of the correction must be recorded in the body of the document. It is permitted to write a complete document on paper or parchment whose writing, including the witnesses' signatures, had been erased. Nevertheless, if the text of the document is written over an erasure while the signatures are signed on a part of the paper whose text had not been erased, the document is not valid.
  If there is a contradiction between two statements in the text of a document, or if there is some ambiguity, the meaning of the document is derived from the summation at the end of the document, unless there is a disparity in the recording of the sum of the transaction in the different parts of the document, in which case the lowest sum mentioned is adopted.
  A document that has become accidentally erased or smudged may have its contents reprised in a replacement document and verified by the court, based on the testimony of the original witnesses.
  If a debt recorded in a promissory note is repaid in part, the creditor may keep the original promissory note and give the debtor a receipt for the amount paid. If the debt is paid in full, the creditor must return the promissory note to the debtor. If this is impossible, for example, in a case where the creditor claims that the promissory note has been lost or destroyed, a receipt is written for the debtor to prevent the creditor from demanding a repeat collection in the event the document is later found.
  The party who undertakes an obligation in a legal transaction, e.g., the debtor or seller in a loan or sale, may have a document written testifying to his obligation even without consulting the other party involved in the transaction. By contrast, a creditor or a purchaser of property may not write a document without the other party's consent, as it is that other party who is undertaking the obligation. In documents concerning mutual obligations, both parties must give their consent.
  The beneficiary of the transaction recorded in a document is the one who must pay the cost of writing the document, e.g., the borrower, or the purchaser or renter of property. For documents in which both sides are beneficiaries, the cost is shared.
  A creditor cannot collect a debt from a guarantor without first attempting to collect the amount owed from the debtor, unless he has undertaken to become an unconditional guarantor, or unless the creditor stipulated from the outset that he maintains the right to collect from either party, according to his choice. If a guarantor takes a loan from a creditor and gives it to a debtor, the guarantor becomes solely responsible for repaying the debt to the creditor.
  A guarantor is obligated to repay a debt only if the guarantee was undertaken at the time of the loan. Nevertheless, if the guarantee was accompanied by an act of acquisition, or if it was accepted in the presence of the court, it is binding even if it was undertaken at a later time.
  When a creditor collects a debt from a guarantor, he can collect it only from property presently owned by him, as opposed to property sold to others after the time of the guarantee. If the guarantee was added as part and parcel of the text of the promissory note, he can collect the debt even from the guarantor's liened property that has been sold.
  One who undertakes a guarantee to pay a marriage contract is not bound to honor his pledge, unless he is the father of the groom, or unless he accepted to act as an unconditional guarantor.
  Several other halakhot were discussed in this chapter as well. A promissory note or deed of sale is automatically considered to include the right of collection from liened property that has been sold, unless it explicitly states otherwise. According to most authorities, the right to collect a debt from property owned by the debtor at the time of the loan, even if such property was subsequently sold, is by Torah law.