meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Moed/Rosh Hashanah/English/William Davidson Edition - English.txt"}
text: Rosh Hashanah
  ראש השנה
  William Davidson Edition - English
  
  
  Rosh Hashanah
  
  
  
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  MISHNA: They are four days in the year that serve as the New Year, each for a different purpose: On the first of Nisan is the New Year for kings; it is from this date that the years of a king’s rule are counted. And the first of Nisan is also the New Year for the order of the Festivals, as it determines which is considered the first Festival of the year and which the last.
  On the first of Elul is the New Year for animal tithes; all the animals born prior to that date belong to the previous tithe year and are tithed as a single unit, whereas those born after that date belong to the next tithe year. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: The New Year for animal tithes is on the first of Tishrei.
  On the first of Tishrei is the New Year for counting years, as will be explained in the Gemara; for calculating Sabbatical Years and Jubilee Years, i.e., from the first of Tishrei there is a biblical prohibition to work the land during these years; for planting, for determining the years of <i>orla</i>, the three-year period from when a tree has been planted during which time its fruit is forbidden; and for tithing vegetables, as vegetables picked prior to that date cannot be tithed together with vegetables picked after that date.
  On the first of Shevat is the New Year for the tree; the fruit of a tree that was formed prior to that date belong to the previous tithe year and cannot be tithed together with fruit that was formed after that date; this ruling is in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai. But Beit Hillel say: The New Year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat.
  GEMARA: The New Year for kings; with regard to what <i>halakha</i> is it mentioned in the mishna? Why is it necessary to set a specific date to count the years of a king’s rule, rather than counting them from the day that he ascends to the throne? Rav Ḥisda said: It is for determining the validity of documents.
  It was the common practice to date documents in accordance with the years of the king’s rule; therefore, it was important that these years begin at a fixed time, so that one knows whether a particular document was antedated or postdated, as we learned in a mishna: Antedated promissory notes, i.e., promissory notes dated prior to the date on which the loan actually took place, are invalid because a loan document creates a lien on the borrower’s property. By dating the document earlier than the loan itself, the lender has a fraudulent mortgage on the property, which can be used against any future purchaser. Therefore, the Sages ordained that an antedated promissory note does not establish a lien, even from the true date of the loan. But postdated promissory notes bearing a date that is later than the date when the loan actually took place are valid, as postdating the note presents no opportunity for defrauding a purchaser.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a king ascended to the throne on the twenty-ninth of Adar, the month preceding Nisan, once the first of Nisan arrives, although he reigned for only one day, a year is counted toward his reign; his first year of rule is completed from the first of Nisan. But if he ascended to the throne only on the first of Nisan, one counts an additional year toward his reign only when the next Nisan arrives.
  The Master said, citing the <i>baraita</i>: If a king ascended to the throne on the twenty-ninth of Adar, once the first of Nisan arrives a year is counted toward his reign. The Gemara comments: This
  
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  teaches us that Nisan is the New Year for kings, and it also teaches us that one day in a year is considered a year; although this king ruled for only one day, a full year is counted toward his reign. The Gemara asks: Consider the next clause of the <i>baraita</i>: But if he ascended to the throne only on the first of Nisan, a year is not counted toward his reign until the next first of Nisan arrives. Isn’t this obvious?
  The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary for a case where the princes agreed to appoint him as king already in the month of Adar. Lest you say that since the decision to appoint him king was made already in Adar, once the first of Nisan arrives they should count it the second year of his reign, therefore the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that the count begins only from when he actually began his rule.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the king died in the month of Adar and another king succeeded him to the throne in that same Adar, one counts the year to this one, i.e., the previous king, as his final year, and to that one, i.e., the new king who began his reign in Adar. If the first king died in the month of Nisan and another king succeeded him in that same Nisan, one counts the year to this one, the previous king, and to that one, the new king. But if the first king died in Adar and another king succeeded him in Nisan, one counts the first year to the first king as his final year, and the second year to the second king as the first year of his reign.
  The Master said: If the king died in Adar and another king succeeded him to the throne in that same Adar, one counts the year to this one, i.e., the previous king, as his final year, and to that one, i.e., the new king, as the first year of his reign. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that one year cannot be counted toward two kings, and so the entire year should be counted only toward the previous king, the <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches us that the years of two kings can overlap and be counted in a single year.
  The Gemara cites the next phrase of the <i>baraita</i>: If the first king died in Nisan and another king succeeded him in that same Nisan, one counts the year to this one, the previous king, and to that one, the new king. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara explains: Lest you say that when we say that one day in a year is considered a full year, this only applies when the day is at the end of the year, i.e., since his reign will continue in the coming year the day is considered like a whole year, but if the day is at the beginning of the year we should not say that the beginning of Nisan is counted as another year for the previous king; therefore, it teaches us that there is no such a distinction.
  It was further taught in the <i>baraita</i>: But if the first king died in Adar and another king succeeded him in Nisan, one counts the first year to the first king as his final year, and the second year to the second king as the first year of his reign. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary for a case where the princes decided to appoint him as king in Adar, and he is also a king, son of the previous king, so that his succession to the throne is automatic. Lest you say that by the time the first of Nisan arrives, two years should be counted toward his reign, it therefore teaches us that one counts only from Nisan, when he actually succeeded his father to the throne.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that one counts the years of kings’ reigns only from Nisan? As it is stated: “And it came to pass in the four hundred and eightieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt, in the fourth year of Solomon’s reign over Israel, in the month Ziv, which is the second month, that he began to build the house of the Lord” (I Kings 6:1). This verse juxtaposes the reign of Solomon to the exodus from Egypt: Just as one counts the years since the exodus from Egypt from Nisan, when the Jewish people left Egypt, so too, one counts the years of Solomon’s reign from Nisan.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that we count the years from the exodus from Egypt themselves from Nisan? Perhaps we count them from Tishrei.
  The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “And Aaron the priest went up to Mount Hor at the commandment of the Lord, and died there, in the fortieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt, in the fifth month, on the first day of the month” (Numbers 33:38), and it is later written: “And it came to pass in the fortieth year, in the eleventh month, on the first of the month, that Moses spoke to the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 1:3). From the fact that when the Bible speaks of the month of Av, which is the fifth month, it calls that year “the fortieth year,” and when it speaks of the following Shevat, it also calls that year “the fortieth year,” the implication is that the New Year does not begin in Tishrei. Were it the case that the New Year begins in Tishrei, Av and the following Shevat would not be in the same year because the year would have changed in Tishrei.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Granted, in this case of Aaron’s death it is explicitly stated that the year is counted from the exodus from Egypt, as it states: “In the fortieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt.” But with regard to this other incident of Moses’ oration, from where is it known that the year is counted from the exodus from Egypt? Perhaps it is forty years since the establishment of the Tabernacle in the wilderness.
  The Gemara answers: In accordance with what Rav Pappa said in a different context, that the meaning of one instance of the expression “the twentieth year” may be inferred from another instance of the expression “the twentieth year” by way of a verbal analogy, here too, the meaning of one instance of the expression “the fortieth year” may be inferred from another instance of the expression “the fortieth year” by way of a verbal analogy: Just as here, with regard to Aaron’s death, the count is from the exodus from Egypt, so too, here, with regard to Moses’ oration, although this is not stated explicitly, the count is from the exodus from Egypt.
  The Gemara raises another question: Even if this serves as proof that these two events both took place in the fortieth year from the exodus from Egypt, from where is it known that the incident of Aaron’s death in Av took place first? Perhaps the incident of Moses’ oration in Shevat took place first, in which case it is possible that the years from the Exodus are counted not from Nisan, but from Tishrei.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written that Moses delivered his oration “after he had slain Sihon” (Deuteronomy 1:4), and when Aaron died Sihon was still alive, as it is written:
  
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  “And when the Canaanite, the king of Arad, who dwelt in the South, heard tell that Israel came by the way of Atharim; and he fought against Israel” (Numbers 21:1). What report did he hear? He heard that Aaron had died, and that the clouds of glory had withdrawn from the Jewish people, and he thought that he had been granted permission to wage war against the Jewish people. And this is as it is written: “And all the congregation saw that [<i>ki</i>] Aaron was dead, and they wept for Aaron thirty days, all the house of Israel” (Numbers 20:29).
  About this, Rabbi Abbahu said: Do not read the verse as: “And they saw [<i>vayiru</i>]”; rather, read it as: “And they were seen [<i>vayeira’u</i>]” by others, because the cover of the clouds of glory had been removed from them. And the next word, “that [<i>ki</i>],” should be understood as meaning because, in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: The word <i>ki</i> is used in the Bible in four senses: If, perhaps, but, and because. Therefore, the verse should be understood as follows: And all the congregation was seen, i.e., revealed, because Aaron had died. This shows that at the time of Aaron’s death Sihon was still alive; perforce, Moses’ oration, which was delivered after he had slain Sihon, must have occurred later.
  The Gemara raises an objection against this proof: Is it comparable? There, the verse is speaking of Canaan, king of Arad, whereas here, the verse is speaking of Sihon. What proof, then, can be brought from the one with regard to the other? The Gemara explains: A Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All three names are referring to the same person: He is Sihon, and he is Arad, and he is also Canaan. He was called Sihon because he was similar in his wildness to a foal [<i>seyyaḥ</i>] in the desert; and he was called Canaan after his kingdom, as he ruled over the Canaanite people; and what was his real name? Arad was his name. Some say an alternative explanation: He was called Arad because he was similar to a wild ass [<i>arod</i>] in the desert; and he was called Canaan after his kingdom; and what was his real name? Sihon was his name.
  The Gemara raises another question: Granted, when counting the years from the exodus from Egypt, Av and the following Shevat are both part of the same year, but it has not been established that the counting of years from the Exodus is specifically from Nisan. Say that the New Year for this purpose is in the following month, the month of Iyyar.
  The Gemara rejects this proposal: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “And it came to pass in the first month in the second year, on the first day of the month, that the Tabernacle was established” (Exodus 40:17), and it is written: “And it came to pass in the second year, in the second month, on the twentieth day of the month, that the cloud was taken up from over the Tabernacle of the testimony” (Numbers 10:11). It may be argued as follows: From the fact that when the Bible speaks of Nisan, which is the first month, it calls it “the second year,” and when it speaks of the following Iyyar, which is the second month, it also calls it “the second year,” by inference, Rosh HaShana is not at the beginning of Iyyar. Were it the case that the New Year begins in Iyyar, Nisan and the following Iyyar would not occur in the same year, as the year would have changed in Iyyar.
  The Gemara asks further: And say that the New Year for this purpose is in the third month, the month of Sivan. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “In the third month, after the children of Israel were gone out of the land of Egypt, the same day they came into the wilderness of Sinai” (Exodus 19:1). And if it is so that the New Year is the beginning of Sivan, the verse should have said: In the third month, in the second year after the children of Israel were gone out of the land of Egypt, as a new year had started.
  The Gemara continues: But perhaps one could say that the New Year for counting the Exodus is in the fourth month, the month of Tammuz; or say that it is in the fifth month, the month of Av; or say that it is in the twelfth month, the month of Adar. There is no clear refutation that these months are not the New Year.
  Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: It is from here that it is derived that the years of a king’s rule are counted from Nisan, as it is stated: “And he began to build in the second month, in the second, in the fourth year of his reign” (II Chronicles 3:2). What is the meaning of the words “the second”? Doesn’t it mean second to the month from which Solomon’s reign is counted? This is clear proof that the years of a king’s rule are counted from the first month, i.e., the month of Nisan.
  Ravina strongly objects to this: Why not say that the words “the second” are referring to the second day of the month? The Gemara answers: If so, it should have explicitly stated: “On the second of the month,” as that is the formulation usually used in the Bible to refer to a specific day of the month.
  The Gemara raises another objection: Why not say that the words “the second” are referring to the second day of the week? This argument is rejected for two reasons: First, we have not found the second day of the week ever being written; nowhere does the Bible give the day of the week on which a particular event transpired. And further, the verse juxtaposes the second instance of the word “second” to the first instance of the word “second”: Just as the first “second” is referring to a month, so too, the latter “second” is referring to a month.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is it derived that one counts the years of kings’ reigns only from the month of Nisan? As it is stated: “And it came to pass in the four hundred and eightieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt, in the fourth year of Solomon’s reign over Israel, in the month Ziv, which is the second month, that he began to build the house of the Lord” (I Kings 6:1). And it is written: “And Aaron the priest went up to Mount Hor at the commandment of the Lord, and died there, in the fortieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt, in the fifth month, on the first day of the month” (Numbers 33:38). And it is later written: “And it came to pass in the fortieth year, in the eleventh month, on the first of the month, that Moses spoke to the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 1:3).
  And it is written: “After he had slain Sihon, the king of the Amorites, who dwelt in Heshbon” (Deuteronomy 1:4). And it says: “And when the Canaanite, the king of Arad, who dwelt in the South, heard” (Numbers 33:40). And it says: “And all the congregation saw that Aaron was dead, and they wept for Aaron thirty days” (Numbers 20:29). And it says: “And it came to pass in the first month in the second year, on the first day of the month, that the Tabernacle was established” (Exodus 40:17).
  And it says: “And it came to pass in the second year, in the second month, on the twentieth day of the month, that the cloud was taken up from off the Tabernacle of the testimony” (Numbers 10:11). And it says: “In the third month, after the children of Israel were gone out of the land of Egypt, the same day they came into the wilderness of Sinai” (Exodus 19:1). And it says: “And he began to build in the second month, in the second, in the fourth year of his reign” (II Chronicles 3:2). This list of verses summarizes Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation.
  § Rav Ḥisda said: They taught that the years of a king’s rule are counted from the first of Nisan only with regard to the Jewish kings of Israel, but the years of the kings of the gentile nations of the world are counted from Tishrei, as it is stated: “The words of Nehemiah, son of Hachaliah. And it came to pass in the month Kislev, in the twentieth year, as I was in Shushan the capital” (Nehemiah 1:1). And it is written: “And it came to pass in the month Nisan, in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes the king, that wine was before him, and I took up the wine, and gave it to the king” (Nehemiah 2:1).
  From the fact that when the Bible speaks of the month of Kislev it calls it the twentieth year, and when it speaks of the following Nisan it also calls it the twentieth year, by inference, the New Year for gentile kings does not begin in Nisan. Were it the case that the New Year did begin in Nisan, Kislev and the following Nisan would not occur in the same year.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Granted, in this second verse it is explicitly stated that the count relates to the years of Artaxerxes. But as for that first verse, from where is it known that the count relates to the years of Artaxerxes? Perhaps
  
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  it follows some other count. Rav Pappa said: The meaning of the first instance of the expression “the twentieth year” may be inferred from the second instance of the expression “the twentieth year” by way of a verbal analogy: Just as there the reference is to the twentieth year of Artaxerxes, so too, here the reference is to the twentieth year of Artaxerxes.
  The Gemara raises another question: Even though those two events took place in the same year, from where is it known that the incident that occurred in Kislev took place first? Perhaps the incident that occurred in Nisan took place first, in which case it is possible that even the years of gentile kings are counted from Nisan.
  The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The words that Hanani told Nehemiah in the month of Kislev, Nehemiah told the king in the month of Nisan.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: The words that Hanani said to Nehemiah in Kislev are as it is stated: “The words of Nehemiah, son of Hachaliah: And it came to pass in the month Kislev, in the twentieth year, as I was in Shushan the capital, that Hanani, one of my brothers, came out of Judah, he and certain men; and I asked them concerning the Jews who had escaped, who were left of the captivity, and concerning Jerusalem. And they said to me: The remnant who are left of the captivity there in the province suffer much hardship and insult; and the wall of Jerusalem is broken down, and its gates are burned with fire” (Nehemiah 1:1–3).
  Nehemiah told these words to the king in Nisan, as it is stated: “And it came to pass in the month Nisan, in the twentieth year of Artaxerxes the king, that wine was before him, and I took up the wine and gave it to the king. Now I had not been before sad in his presence. And the king said to me: Why is your face sad, seeing that you are not sick? This is nothing else but sorrow of the heart. Then I was very much afraid, and I said to the king: Let the king live forever: Why should not my face be sad, when the city, the place of the tombs of my ancestors, lies waste, and its gates are consumed with fire?” (Nehemiah 2:1–3).
  “Then the king said to me: For what do you ask? So I prayed to the God of heaven. And I said to the king: If it please the king, and if your servant has found favor in your sight, that you would send me to Judea, to the city of the graves of my ancestors, that I may rebuild it. And the king said to me, the consort also sitting by him: For how long shall your journey be? And when will you return? So it pleased the king to send me; and I set him a time” (Nehemiah 2:4–6).
  Rav Yosef raised an objection against the rule established by Rav Ḥisda that the years of gentile kings are counted from Tishrei from the verse that states: “On the twenty-fourth day of the sixth month, in the second year of Darius the king” (Haggai 1:15), and it is written immediately afterward: “In the seventh month, in the second year, on the twenty-first day of the month, the word of the Lord came by the prophet Haggai, saying” (Haggai 2:1). And if it were so that the years of gentile kings are counted from Tishrei, what the verse needed to state is: In the seventh month in the third year, as a new year had already started for him.
  Rabbi Abbahu said in answer to this objection: Cyrus was a virtuous king, and consequently Haggai counted the years of his reign like those of the kings of Israel, i.e., from Nisan.
  Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation for two reasons: One objection is that if this is so, the verses contradict each other, as it is written: “And this house was finished on the third of the month Adar, which was in the sixth year of the reign of Darius the king” (Ezra 6:15), and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At that same time in the following year Ezra went up from Babylonia together with his company of exiles. And it is written in the Bible: “And he came to Jerusalem in the fifth month, which was in the seventh year of the king” (Ezra 7:8). And if it were so that this king’s years were counted like those of the kings of Israel, what the verse needed to state is: Which was in the eighth year of the king.
  And further, a second objection: Are Rav Yosef’s objection and Rabbi Abbahu’s resolution comparable? There, Rabbi Abbahu speaks of Cyrus, whereas here, the verses speak of Darius, and it was never said about Darius that he was a virtuous king. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All three names are referring to the same person: He is Cyrus; he is Darius; and he is also Artaxerxes. He was called Cyrus [<i>Koresh</i>] because he was a virtuous [<i>kasher</i>] king; he was called Artaxerxes after his kingdom, i.e., this was his royal title; and what was his real name? Darius was his name.
  The Gemara notes: In any case, it is difficult, as in one place his years are counted from Nisan, whereas in another place they are counted from Tishrei. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: This is not difficult, as it can be explained as follows: Here, where his years are counted from Nisan like the kings of Israel, it speaks of him before he became corrupt, whereas there, where his years are counted from Tishrei, it speaks of him after he became corrupt.
  Rav Kahana strongly objects to this explanation: Did he really become corrupt after Ezra went to Eretz Yisrael? But isn’t it written:
  
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  “And that which they need, both young bullocks, and rams, and lambs, for the burnt-offerings of the God of heaven, wheat, salt, wine, and oil, according to the word of the priests who are at Jerusalem, let it be given them day by day without fail” (Ezra 6:9)? Doesn’t Cyrus’ contribution to the Temple demonstrate his fear of Heaven? Rabbi Yitzḥak said to Rav Kahana: My teacher, a refutation can be brought from your own burden, from the text you yourself cited, as the next verse continues: “That they may sacrifice offerings of sweet savor to the God of heaven, and pray for the life of the king and of his sons” (Ezra 6:10). This shows that Cyrus did this solely for his own benefit, so that the Jews would sacrifice offerings and pray for him and his sons.
  The Gemara asks: And one who acts in this manner, is he not acting in exemplary fashion? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one gives charity, saying: I give this <i>sela</i> for charity in order that my children may live, or: I give it in order that through it I may merit life in the World-to-Come, he is still considered a full-fledged righteous person? If so, what was wrong with the king bringing offerings so that the Jews would pray for his life and the life of his children?
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the case of one who makes his charity conditional yet is considered to be righteous, it is referring to a Jew. This is because even if his condition is not fulfilled, he will not complain to God. However, there, where Cyrus was not given credit for his good deed because it was conditional, it is referring to gentiles. A gentile may come to regret his actions and complain to God if his condition is not fulfilled.
  And if you wish, say: From where do we derive that Cyrus became corrupt? As it is written with regard to the building of the Temple that he issued the following command: “Let the house be built…with three rows of great stones, and a row of new timber, and let the expense be paid out of the king’s house” (Ezra 6:4). Why did he do it in this manner and command that the Temple be built with a row of timber? He thought: If the Jews rebel against me, I will burn their Temple with fire, and it will be more flammable because of the wood.
  The Gemara raises a question: Is that to say that Solomon did not do this very same thing when he built the first Temple? Isn’t it written: “And he built the inner court, three rows of hewn stone and a row of cedar beams” (I Kings 6:36)? The Gemara answers: Solomon placed the wood above the stone foundation, so that even if the Temple were burned, the stone foundation would remain, whereas Cyrus placed it below, so that if he were to set fire to the Temple, the whole structure would collapse. Also, Solomon sunk the wood into the building in order to make it less flammable, whereas Cyrus did not sink it into the building. Furthermore, Solomon plastered the wood over with plaster to prevent it from catching fire, whereas Cyrus did not plaster the wood over with plaster.
  Rav Yosef said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yitzḥak who said: From where do we derive that Cyrus became corrupt? From here, as it is written: “And the king said to me, the consort [<i>shegal</i>] also sitting by him: For how long shall your journey be? And when will you return? So it pleased the king to send me, and I set him a time” (Nehemiah 2:6). What is the meaning of the word <i>shegal</i> in the verse? Rabba bar Lima said in the name of Rav: It means a she-dog that sat next to him, which he used for sexual relations.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: However, if that is so, there is a contradiction from that which is written about Belshazzar: “But you have lifted up yourself against the Lord of heaven; and they have brought the vessels of His house before you, and you, and your lords, your consorts [<i>shegal</i>] and your concubines, have drunk wine in them” (Daniel 5:23). If <i>shegal</i> means a she-dog, does a she-dog drink wine? The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as perhaps they trained it to drink wine.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: However, if that is so, there is a contradiction from that which is written: “Kings’ daughters are among your favorites; upon your right hand stands a consort [<i>shegal</i>] in gold of Ophir” (Psalms 45:10). Now, if <i>shegal</i> is a she-dog, what is the prophet heralding for the Jewish people? The Gemara explains: This is what the prophet is saying: In reward for the Torah being as precious to the Jews as a she-dog is to gentiles, you merited the gold of Ophir.
  And if you wish, say: Actually, the word <i>shegal</i> in all these other contexts means consort, but Rabba bar Lima had a tradition that in connection with Cyrus the word <i>shegal</i> means she-dog. And why was it called a consort [<i>shegal</i>]? It is because the dog was as precious to him as a consort; or else, because he set the dog next to him in place of a consort.
  And if you wish, say: From where do we derive that Cyrus became corrupt? It is from here, as it is stated: “Up to a hundred talents of silver, and up to a hundred measures of wheat, and up to a hundred <i>bat</i> of wine, and up to a hundred <i>bat</i> of oil, and salt without prescribed limit” (Ezra 7:22). Initially he gave without setting a limit, but now he introduced a limit.
  This is rejected: But perhaps initially he did not know what limit to set, as he was not familiar with the daily needs of the Temple, and afterward, when the matter became clarified, he set an appropriate limit. Rather, it is clear as we initially answered that the evidence that Cyrus became corrupt is based on his relationship with his consort rather than on his donations to the Temple.
  § The mishna teaches: And the first of Nisan is also the New Year for the order of the Festivals. The Gemara asks: Is the New Year for the Festivals really on the first of Nisan? Isn’t it on the fifteenth of Nisan, the first day of the festival of Passover? Rav Ḥisda said: What the mishna means is that the Festival that occurs in the month of Nisan is the New Year for Festivals.
  The Gemara comments: This ruling makes a practical difference to one who makes a vow, in order to determine when he is liable for violating the prohibition: You shall not delay. And the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Whether one makes a vow to bring an offering to the Temple, or consecrates an item to the Temple, or makes a valuation, promising to pay the value of a particular person to the Temple treasury, once three Festivals have passed from that day and he has not yet fulfilled his promise, he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, as stated in the verse: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22).
  Rabbi Shimon says: One transgresses the prohibition against delaying not when any three Festivals have passed, but when three Festivals have passed in their proper order, i.e., Passover, <i>Shavuot</i>, and <i>Sukkot</i>, with Passover first. And, so too, Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would say: The Festivals that must pass before a person is liable for violating the prohibition against delaying are sometimes three, sometimes four, and sometimes five. How so? If one made his vow before Passover they are three, as he may delay bringing his offering until the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>; if he made his vow before <i>Shavuot</i> they are five, as the counting of three Festivals begins only from the next Passover; and if he made his vow before the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, they are four.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to those who are liable for vows of monetary payment, or for vows of valuations, or for dedications, or for consecrations, sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, peace-offerings, vows of charity, tithes, firstborn offerings, animal tithes, or the Paschal offering,
  
  Daf 4b
  
  or for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, or produce of the corner of the field, three obligatory agricultural gifts that must be given to the poor, once three Festivals have passed they transgress the prohibition: You shall not delay. Rabbi Shimon says: These three Festivals must be in their proper order, with the festival of Passover first.
  Rabbi Meir says: Once even one Festival has passed, one transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Once two Festivals have passed, one transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Once the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> has passed, one transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.
  The Gemara proceeds to explain the various opinions: What is the rationale of the first <i>tanna</i>? Since the entire chapter (Deuteronomy, chapter 16) has just concluded a discussion of the three pilgrimage Festivals, why, after stating: “Three times a year shall all your males appear before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 16:16), do I need the Torah to write again: “On the festival of Passover, and on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>; and they shall not appear before the Lord empty-handed” (Deuteronomy 16:16)? Rather, learn from here that the verse comes to teach with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of: You shall not delay, that one does not transgress the prohibition unless these three Festivals have passed.
  And Rabbi Shimon, who said that one does not transgress the prohibition against delaying unless these three Festivals have passed in order, says in explanation of his opinion: It was not necessary for the verse to say again “on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>,” of which the immediately preceding text was speaking. Why, then, is it stated? It is to teach that this must be the last one, i.e., that the three Festivals must pass in order, so that <i>Sukkot</i> is the last of the three.
  And Rabbi Meir, who says that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying as soon as one Festival has passed, what is the rationale for his opinion? It is as it is written: “But to the place which the Lord your God shall choose out of all your tribes to put His name there, there shall you seek Him, at his dwelling, and there shall you come: And there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the offerings of your hand, and your vows, and your gift offerings, and the firstlings of your herds and your flocks” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6). This teaches that one transgresses the prohibition if he fails to bring the offerings for which he is liable as soon as the time has arrived that “there shall you come,” i.e., by the first Festival.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who say that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have passed, how do they understand this verse? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, this verse teaches that there is a positive mitzva to bring one’s vow-offerings on the first Festival; however, if one did not bring them, he has not transgressed the prohibition against delaying, although he has failed to perform the positive mitzva.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir counter this argument? The Gemara answers: He would say that since the Merciful One tells one to bring the offering at that time and he did not bring it, automatically he is liable for transgressing the prohibition: You shall not delay, as he has missed the time set by the Torah.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who said that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying once two Festivals have passed, what is the rationale for his opinion? The Gemara explains: It is as it is written: “These things you shall do to the Lord in your appointed times, besides your vows, and your gift offerings, for your burnt-offerings, and for your meal-offerings, and for your drink-offerings, and for your peace-offerings” (Numbers 29:39). According to this verse, the time set for the bringing of vows is at the “appointed times,” and the minimum number of appointed times in the plural is two.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis understand this verse? The Gemara explains: They say that the term “appointed times” is needed for the teaching of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona said: All the Festivals are equated with each other, insofar as all the goats brought as sin-offerings on the Festivals atone for the impurity of the Temple and its sacred objects, just like the goat brought as a sin-offering on the New Moon.
  The Gemara asks further: And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that once the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> has passed one immediately transgresses the prohibition against delaying, what is the rationale for his opinion? The Gemara explains: It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: It was not necessary for the verse to mention “the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:16), of which the immediately preceding text was speaking. If so, why is it stated? It is to say that this Festival is what causes a one to be considered late in fulfilling his vow, since by the end of the Festival he must bring all of his current vows to the Temple, whether he took his vow shortly before <i>Sukkot</i> or much earlier.
  And Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, what do they expound from this verse: “On the festival of Passover, and on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>”? The Gemara explains: They require this verse for the <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said, as Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: From where is it derived that the <i>Shavuot</i> offering has redress all seven days, i.e., that if one failed to bring the Festival peace-offering on the Festival itself, he has six more days to bring it? The verse states: “On the festival of Passover, and on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>,” thereby equating the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> to the festival of Passover. Just as the festival of Passover has redress all seven days, as Passover is seven days long, so too, the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> has redress all seven days, during the week following the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, draw an analogy from the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, which is also mentioned in close proximity to it, and say: Just as below, on <i>Sukkot</i>, the offering may be brought for eight days, so too, here, on <i>Shavuot</i>, it should be possible to bring the offering for eight days. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is not so, as even on <i>Sukkot</i> the Festival peace-offering may be brought only for seven days, as the eighth day is a separate Festival in and of itself.
  The Gemara raises a question: But can’t you say that we say that the Eighth Day of Assembly is a Festival in and of itself only with regard to <i>peh</i>, <i>zayin</i>, <i>reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>beit</i>, an acronym that stands for six unique aspects to the Eighth Day of Assembly. But with regard to the matter of redress for failing to bring a Festival peace-offering, everyone agrees that the Eighth Day of Assembly is still a day of redress for the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  As we learned in a mishna: If one did not bring his Festival peace-offering on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, he may still bring the Festival peace-offering during all of the Festival and even on the last day of the Festival, as the Eighth Day of Assembly is regarded as part of <i>Sukkot</i> for this purpose. If so, perhaps the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> can be compared to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> such that the Festival peace-offering of <i>Shavuot</i> may also be brought for eight days.
  The Gemara answers: It is preferable to equate <i>Shavuot</i> to Passover and not to <i>Sukkot</i> due to the general principle: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something. That is to say, in a case of doubt, choose the smaller number, as it is included within the larger number.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> did the Merciful One write the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> in this verse? The Gemara explains: It is to draw an analogy from <i>Sukkot</i> to the festival of Passover with regard to a different issue:
  
  Daf 5a
  
  Just as the festival of Passover requires remaining overnight in Jerusalem, and only on the following day may one return home, so too, the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> requires remaining overnight in Jerusalem before returning home.
  The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to Passover, from where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains: As it is written about the Paschal offering: “And you shall roast and eat it in the place which the Lord your God shall choose; and you shall turn in the morning, and go to your tents” (Deuteronomy 16:7).
  The Gemara asks: And the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> and Rabbi Shimon, who learn from the verse: “On the festival of Passover, and on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:16), that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have passed, from where do they derive the <i>halakha</i> that the <i>Shavuot</i> offering has redress for seven days?
  The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabba bar Shmuel taught, as Rabba bar Shmuel taught: The Torah states to count the days, as it is stated: “A month of days” (Numbers 11:20), and then sanctify a new month with offerings. And the Torah also said to count the days from Passover, as it is stated: “You shall count fifty days” (Leviticus 23:16), and then sanctify the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> with offerings. Just as the new month is sanctified for the unit of time by which it is counted, i.e., for one day, so too, <i>Shavuot</i> is sanctified for the unit of time by which it is counted, i.e., for one full week, as it is stated: “Seven complete weeks shall there be” (Leviticus 23:15).
  The Gemara asks: But if so, say that the <i>Shavuot</i> offering may be redressed for only one day, as <i>Shavuot</i> is determined by a count of fifty days from Passover. How, then, is it known that the <i>Shavuot</i> offering has seven days for redress? Rava said: Is that to say that we count only days until <i>Shavuot</i>, but we do not also count weeks? But didn’t the Master say: It is a mitzva to count fifty days, and it is also a mitzva to count seven weeks, which teaches that the Festival peace-offering brought on <i>Shavuot</i> may be sacrificed for an entire week. And further, it is written in the verse: “The festival of weeks [<i>shavuot</i>],” which teaches that it is a Festival that is established through a count of weeks.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i> that one becomes liable for transgressing the prohibition against delaying if he delays bringing the Paschal lamb. The Gemara expresses its astonishment about this ruling: But is the Paschal lamb fit to be sacrificed on the other Festivals? The Paschal lamb has a fixed time to be brought, on the fourteenth of Nisan; if one sacrificed it then, he has sacrificed it, but if he did not sacrifice it then, it is excluded forever from any use.
  Rav Ḥisda said: The Paschal lamb is cited here for no reason [<i>kedi</i>]; that is to say, the prohibition against delaying is not relevant to the Paschal lamb, and the latter was mentioned in the <i>baraita</i> only because firstborn offerings, animal tithes, and the Paschal lamb are often grouped together.
  Rav Sheshet said a different explanation: What is meant here by a Paschal lamb? It is the peace-offering that is brought in place of a Paschal lamb. If a lamb that had been set aside to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering was lost, and its owner took another lamb and sacrificed that as his Paschal lamb, and afterward the first animal was found, it must now be brought as a peace-offering. This offering is subject to all the <i>halakhot</i> of the prohibition against delaying.
  The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the peace-offerings listed earlier, and it is still redundant. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to peace-offerings brought in place of a Paschal lamb, and it also taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to peace-offerings brought independently. The reason for this repetition is that it might enter your mind to say: Since the peace-offerings are brought in place of a Paschal lamb,
  
  Daf 5b
  
  they are considered like the Paschal lamb itself, and so one transgresses the prohibition against delaying as soon as one Festival has passed. The <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches us that this is not so, as even this type of peace-offering is treated like the other offerings, and there is no liability until three Festivals have passed.
  § The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived that all the offerings and vows listed above in the <i>baraita</i> are subject to the prohibition against delaying? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). From the words “when you shall vow a vow,” I have derived only the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a vow-offering, where one says: I undertake to bring an offering, thereby assuming personal responsibility to bring an offering, no matter what happens to any particular animal. But as for the case of a gift-offering, one says: I undertake to bring this animal as an offering. He assumes responsibility only to bring that particular animal, without assuming a general responsibility to bring an offering. From where do I derive that this, too, is included in the prohibition against delaying?
  The Gemara now analyzes the words of Deuteronomy 23:22 cited above and looks at each component. It is stated here: “Vow,” and it is stated elsewhere: “But if the sacrifice of his offering be a vow or a gift-offering” (Leviticus 7:16). Just as there a gift-offering is together with the vow and is governed by the same <i>halakha</i>, so too, here, a gift-offering is together with the vow and is governed by the same <i>halakha</i>.
  The verse continues: “To the Lord your God.” This is referring to various types of consecrations that are allocated to Temple maintenance: Assessments, valuations, dedications, and consecrations. “You shall not delay paying it” teaches that one violates the prohibition against delaying if he is late in paying it, but not if he is late in paying its substitute, as will be explained below. “For the Lord your God will surely require it from you” comes to include all other things that one is required to bring; these are sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings.
  The words in the verse: “For the Lord your God” are an apparently superfluous phrase that in fact comes to include additional things in the prohibition; these are vows of charity, and tithes, and firstborn offerings. “From you”; this comes to include other items that one gives of one’s own for the sake of a mitzva, i.e., gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and produce of the corner of the field. “And it would be sin in you”; this teaches that the sin of delaying would be in you, but there would be no sin in your offering, i.e., the offering is not disqualified due to the delay.
  The Gemara clarifies certain points in the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said, citing the <i>baraita</i>: “You shall not delay paying it” teaches that one violates the prohibition if he is late in paying it, i.e., the original offering, but not if he is late in paying its substitute, i.e., an animal that substituted for his offering. The Gemara asks: A substitute for what offering? If you say that the <i>baraita</i> is speaking of a substitute for a burnt-offering or a peace-offering, i.e., if an animal was set aside to serve as a burnt-offering or a peace-offering and it was lost, and a substitute was set aside in its place, and then the original animal was found and sacrificed, in that case the substitute is sacrificed just like the first, and so it is certainly subject to the prohibition against delaying.
  If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a substitute for a sin-offering, i.e., if an animal was set aside as a sin-offering and it was lost, and a substitute was set aside in its place, and then the original animal was found and sacrificed, in that case the substitute is left to die, as it has become disqualified and can no longer be sacrificed on the altar. This being the case, there is no reason to say that it is subject to the prohibition against delaying. Rather, what is the substitute referred to in the <i>baraita</i>? It is the substitute for a thanks-offering.
  As Rabbi Ḥiyya taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a thanks-offering that became mixed up with its substitute, i.e., one substituted an animal for one designated as a thanks-offering, in which case both animals are considered consecrated, and then the original animal and its substitute became mixed up with each other, and one of them died, there is no remedy for the other one, and so it must be left to graze until it becomes blemished.
  The Gemara explains: What could he have done with the remaining animal? If you say that he may sacrifice it and sacrifice the bread with it, i.e., the forty loaves of bread that are brought as a meal-offering together with the animal component of the thanks-offering, perhaps this animal is not the one that had originally been set aside but rather the substitute, and the rule is that the substitute is sacrificed like the thanks-offering itself, but without bread. If you say that he should sacrifice it without bread, perhaps it is the original thanks-offering, which must be brought with bread. This, then, is the substitute that the <i>baraita</i> says is not subject to the prohibition against delaying.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But since the animal is not fit to be sacrificed, why do I need a special verse to exclude it from the prohibition against delaying? In any case it cannot be sacrificed on the altar, and so there is no need to state that it is not included in the prohibition.
  Rav Sheshet said: Actually, you can say that the verse comes to exclude the substitute for a burnt-offering or a peace-offering. And here we are dealing with a case where two Festivals already passed from the time that one had consecrated the original animal but did not bring it to the altar, and it became blemished, and he redeemed it by replacing it with another animal, as required. And then another Festival passed and he did not yet bring the substitute to the altar. In that case, it might enter your mind to say that since this second animal comes in place of the first one, as it was consecrated as a substitute for it, it should be considered as one for which three Festivals have already passed; therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, the three Festivals are counted from the time of the replacement animal’s consecration.
  The Gemara asks: This answers the question of which substitute the <i>baraita</i> is referring to according to the opinion of the Rabbis, but according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Once even the first Festival has passed one transgresses the mitzva: You shall not delay, what is there to say here? Rava said: Here, we are dealing with a case where the original animal became blemished during the Festival, and one redeemed it by replacing it with another animal, and the Festival passed without that animal being sacrificed. In that case, it might enter your mind to say that since this second animal comes in place of the first one, and the first one had already been consecrated before the Festival, it should be considered as one for which an entire Festival has already passed, so that he transgresses the prohibition against delaying; therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not the case. Rather, an entire Festival must pass for the replacement animal.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And it would be sin in you,” which teaches that the sin of delaying would be sin in you, but there would be no sin in your offering, i.e., the offering would not become disqualified due to the delay. The Gemara asks: Is it from here that this is learned? But isn’t it derived from the statement of <i>Aḥerim</i>? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say that one might have thought that a firstborn animal after its first year passed, during which time it was not sacrificed, should be like consecrated things that have become disqualified due to a blemish, and so it is disqualified from being brought to the altar.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23), thereby juxtaposing a firstborn animal to the tithe of grain. Just as tithe is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next, as it is explicitly stated that tithes may be eaten until the end of three years, so too, a firstborn animal is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next, despite the delay in being brought to the altar. Therefore, there is another source for the <i>halakha</i> that the offering itself does not become disqualified even if it is brought late.
  The Gemara answers: The first derivation cited was necessary. Had this <i>halakha</i> been learned only from the case of a firstborn animal, it might enter your mind to say that this <i>halakha</i> that the offering is not disqualified applies only to a firstborn, which is not for appeasement, i.e., it does not come to atone for any sin, not even for the neglect of a positive mitzva, but is merely a gift for the priest. But as for other consecrated animals, which appease, their role being to atone for the sins of their owners, one might say that they do not appease when brought late. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, the other offerings are also not disqualified when brought late.
  The Gemara asks further: But still, it may be argued that this derivation is unnecessary,
  
  Daf 6a
  
  as this <i>halakha</i> is derived from that which ben Azzai said, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that ben Azzai says: The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offering be eaten at all on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who offers it, it shall be <i>piggul</i>” (Leviticus 7:18).
  For what purpose does the verse state the word “it”? Since elsewhere it states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will surely require it from you, and it would be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), I might have interpreted from this verse that even one who is late in paying his vow is included in: It shall not be accepted. Therefore, the verse states “it.” It, an offering disqualified by improper intention [<i>piggul</i>], is included in the <i>halakha</i> of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in paying his vow is not included in the <i>halakha</i> of: “It shall not be accepted.”
  The Gemara rejects what was said above; rather, the explanation of the verse is as follows. The phrase: “And it would be sin in you” comes to teach that there would be a sin in you, but there would not be a sin in your wife.
  It was necessary to say that the lateness is not imputed to the other members of one’s household for the following reason: It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some say that it was Rabbi Elazar who said: A person’s wife dies only because others demand of him money and he does not have means with which to pay, as it is stated about one who commits himself to guarantee a loan: “If you have nothing with which to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27). The verse warns one who takes a loan that incurring debt may result in one losing the very sheets that he sleeps on to his creditor. The Gemara understands this homiletically: Why should you cause God to take away your wife, i.e., she who shares your bed, so that she dies? Consequently, you might say that one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, in that one fails to fulfill his commitment. Therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so. Rather, this sin is imputed to him alone.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That which is gone out of your lips you shall keep and do; as you have vowed as a gift to the Lord your God, which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). “That which is gone out of your lips”; this is a positive mitzva. “You shall keep”; this is a prohibition, as the phrase “you shall keep” is a warning to keep oneself from sinning. “And do”; this is an admonition to the court to make you fulfill your vow. “As you have vowed”; this is referring to a vow-offering. “To the Lord your God”; this is referring to sin-offerings, guilt-offerings, burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings, teaching that one must keep his word and bring them. “As a gift”; this is understood in its literal sense to be referring to a gift-offering. “Which you have promised”; this is referring to objects consecrated for Temple maintenance. “With your mouth”; this is referring to vows of charity, to which one commits himself with his mouth.
  The Gemara clarifies the details mentioned in this <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: “That which is gone out of your lips”; this is a positive mitzva. Why do I need this derivation? Isn’t the positive mitzva derived from the verse: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices, and your tithes, and the offering of your hand, and your vows, and your gift-offerings, and the firstborn of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6)? The <i>baraita</i> continues: “You shall keep”; this is a prohibition. Why do I need this derivation; this is derived from the verse: “You shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22).
  “And do”; this is a warning to the court to make you fulfill your vow. Why do I need this derivation? This rule is derived from the verse: “He shall offer it” (Leviticus 1:3), as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “He shall offer it,” which teaches that he must be forced to bring his offering. One might have thought that he may be forced to bring his offering even against his will. Therefore, the verse states: “In accordance with his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How so? The court coerces him until he says: I want to bring the offering. Now, since all of these <i>halakhot</i> are already known from other sources, what is the point of this repetition?
  The Gemara answers: One set of verses is referring to a case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, and one set of verses is referring to a case where he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar.
  And it is necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> in both cases, as had the Torah taught us only about the <i>halakha</i> of the case where one said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he did not keep his word; however, if he set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might say that anywhere that it is, it is in the treasure house of the Merciful One, as the world and everything in it belongs to God, and therefore it makes no difference if he delays in bringing it to the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that even when one has not set aside a specific animal he transgresses the prohibition.
  And had the Torah taught us only about the case where one set aside a specific animal for his vow but did not yet sacrifice it on the altar, one might have said that only in this case has he transgressed because he is keeping the animal for himself. But if he said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal for his vow, one might say that his mere speech is nothing, and there is no transgression provided he has not actually set aside an animal. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> in both cases.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you say that the Gemara is dealing with a case where one merely said that he vowed to bring an offering but did not yet set aside a specific animal? Isn’t a gift-offering mentioned in the verse, and we learned in a mishna: What is a vow-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering. And what is a gift-offering? It is an offering brought by one who says, concerning a particular animal: I undertake to bring this animal as a burnt-offering.
  And what is the difference between a vow-offering and a gift-offering? With regard to vow-offerings, if the animal died or was stolen, the one who took the vow is obligated to pay restitution for it. He undertook to bring a burnt-offering without specifying the animal, and therefore until he brings that offering he is not absolved of his obligation. With regard to a gift-offering, however, if the animal died or was stolen, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it because he undertook to bring a specific animal, and that is no longer possible. In the case of a gift-offering, then, a specific animal must have already been set aside as an offering.
  Rava said: You can find a case of a gift-offering where a specific animal has not yet been set aside; for example, where one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering on the condition that after I set an animal aside in fulfillment of my vow, I will not be liable to replace it should the animal die or be stolen.
  § The <i>baraita</i> stated: “With your mouth”; this is referring to vows of charity. Rava said: In the case of vows of charity, one is liable immediately if he is late in distributing the charity that he had promised to give. What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? It is that poor people to whom the charity may be given exist in all places, and so the charity can be distributed to them immediately, unlike an offering, which must be brought to the Temple.
  The Gemara asks: It is obvious that charity must be given to the poor without delay. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that since the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to vows of charity is written in the passage dealing with offerings, perhaps one does not transgress the prohibition against delaying until three Festivals have passed, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings, therefore Rava teaches us that this is not so. Rather, there, with regard to the offerings, the Merciful One made the timing of the transgression dependent upon the time of the Festivals, when one must go on pilgrimage to the Temple. However, here, with regard to charity vows, this is not so because poor people who are ready to accept charity are found in all places.
  Rava said: Although, according to most opinions one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only after three Festivals have elapsed, once even one Festival has passed and he has not sacrificed the offerings that he vowed to bring, he immediately violates a positive mitzva.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the following mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas testified about the offspring of peace-offerings. They said that if the mother animal was consecrated before it conceived or during its pregnancy, the offspring, too, must be sacrificed as a peace-offering. Rabbi Papeyyas said: I testify that we once had a cow that was sacrificed as a peace-offering, and we ate it on Passover [<i>beFesaḥ</i>], and we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival [<i>beḤag</i>], i.e., on <i>Sukkot</i>.
  The Gemara clarifies the details of this story: Granted, on Passover itself Rabbi Papeyyas and his family did not sacrifice the offspring, as one can say that the animal was lacking the requisite time, i.e., it was less than eight days old, and it is prohibited to sacrifice such a young animal. But how could they delay and not sacrifice the offspring on <i>Shavuot</i>, the first Festival after Passover, if, according to Rava, they would have violates a positive mitzva as soon as the first Festival passed?
  Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: For example, this occurs
  
  Daf 6b
  
  in a case where the offspring was sick on <i>Shavuot</i>, and therefore it could be brought to the altar only on the next Festival. Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation: What is the statement: And we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival, coming to teach? This is not referring to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, which is the usual meaning of the term the Festival; rather, it is referring to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>. Therefore, there is no difficulty here whatsoever.
  The Gemara asks: And what does the other <i>amora</i>, Rav Zevid, say to this? He argues that anywhere that the <i>tanna</i> teaches a <i>halakha</i> concerning Passover using the term <i>Pesaḥ</i>, he teaches the <i>halakha</i> concerning <i>Shavuot</i> using the term <i>Atzaret</i>, not the term <i>Ḥag</i>. In such a context, the term <i>Ḥag</i> is reserved exclusively for <i>Sukkot</i>.
  Rava said: Once three Festivals have passed, every day he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in the following <i>baraita</i>: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year without three Festivals has passed, or three Festivals have passed without a year elapsing, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.
  The Gemara first expresses its astonishment at the question itself: What is this objection? What is the comparison between this ruling and the statement of Rava? Rav Kahana said: He who raises an objection here raises a valid objection, and this is the way the question should be understood. Since the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is looking for prohibitions to add, and he shows that the prohibition applies in additional cases, then if Rava is correct, let the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> teach that once three Festivals have passed he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, every single day.
  And how does the other <i>amora</i>, Rava, explain the <i>baraita</i>? He understands that the <i>tanna</i> is trying to establish the action only as subject to a prohibition, i.e., he merely wishes to set the parameters of the prohibition; but once the action is established as prohibited, he is not looking for additional prohibitions.
  The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the <i>baraita</i> cited above, which stated: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed, even if three Festivals have not passed, or once three Festivals have passed, even if a whole year has not passed, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Granted, it is possible to have three Festivals without a year; you find it because three Festivals can pass in half a year, between Passover and <i>Sukkot</i>. But a year without three Festivals, under what circumstances can you find this case? How can a year pass without three Festivals also passing?
  The Gemara clarifies the question: This works out well according to the one who is of the opinion that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order. You can find a year without three Festivals in their proper order, e.g., if one made his vow shortly before <i>Shavuot</i>, in which case the year will end before <i>Shavuot</i> the following year, but three Festivals in order will not have elapsed until <i>Sukkot</i> of the third year. But according to the one who is not of the opinion that the three Festivals must be in their proper order, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?
  The Gemara clarifies again: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you find a year without three Festivals in a leap year, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of houses of walled cities, with regard to which an owner is given only one year to redeem his home if he sells it, after which it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser, the verse states: “And if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year” (Leviticus 25:30). How is the year determined? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One counts 365 days like the number of the days in a solar year, and not the usual lunar year, which is why it is called a full year.
  And the Rabbis disagree and say: One counts twelve months from day to day, from the date of the sale until that same date twelve months later, and if it is a leap year with an added month, the leap month is for the seller’s benefit, i.e., he has thirteen months to redeem his house. You can find a year without three Festivals according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. How so? It is possible in a case where one consecrated the animal after the festival of Passover, so that once he reaches the end of the second month of Adar in a leap year, the year is completed, but the Festivals are not yet completed, as the third Festival is still to come. But according to the Sages, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?
  The Gemara answers: As Rav Shemaya taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Shavuot</i> sometimes occurs on the fifth of Sivan, sometimes on the sixth of Sivan, and sometimes on the seventh. How so? If both the months of Nisan and Iyyar are full months of thirty days each, the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, which is celebrated fifty days after the second day of Passover, occurs on the fifth of Sivan; if both months are short, with twenty-nine days each, it occurs on the seventh of Sivan; and if one of them is full and the other is short, it occurs on the sixth of Sivan. According to this opinion, if both months were full and the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> occurred on the fifth day of Sivan, and one made his vow on the day after <i>Shavuot</i>, i.e., the sixth of Sivan, and in the following year both months were short, so that the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> occurred on the seventh of Sivan, a whole year would have passed without three Festivals.
  The Gemara comments: And who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rav Shemaya and says that a year has a fixed number of days? It is <i>Aḥerim</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say: The difference between <i>Shavuot</i> of one year and <i>Shavuot</i> of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it were a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.
  § Rabbi Zeira asks: In the case of an heir, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the prohibition of: You shall not delay? That is to say, does an heir transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is it that the Merciful One states in the Torah: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22), and this one, the heir, did not make a vow? Or perhaps the essence of the mitzva is as it says: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6), and this one, the heir, is obligated to come and bring his father’s offerings.
  Come and hear an answer to this, as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a <i>baraita</i> that says: The verse states: “For the Lord your God will surely require it from you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), which is interpreted to mean: To the exclusion of an heir. This teaches that an heir does not transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father.
  The Gemara asks: But this phrase “from you” is necessary to teach a different <i>halakha</i>, namely, that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying even for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce of the corner of his field. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥiyya derived two <i>halakhot</i> from this word. He read into the verse: “You [<i>imakh</i>],” which he expounded as coming to include gleanings, forgotten sheaves and the produce of the corner of the field in the prohibition, and he read into the verse: “From you [<i>me’imakh</i>],” with the extra letter <i>mem</i> coming to exclude an heir.
  § Rabbi Zeira asks another question on this topic: In the case of a woman who made a vow, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara explains: Do we say that since she is not obligated to appear in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, as this obligation is a positive, time-bound mitzva, from which women are exempt, she also does not transgress if she is late in bringing her offering? Or perhaps, since she is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, she should also be obligated in some of the other mitzvot connected to the day?
  Abaye said to him: Derive this from the fact that she is also obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival. The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this, that a woman is obligated to rejoice on a Festival? But didn’t Abaye say: As for a woman, her husband must make her joyful on a Festival? This means that the obligation falls not on the woman, but upon her husband. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira holds that women are bound by a positive mitzva to rejoice on a Festival. Since, according to Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, they are obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, they are also subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a firstborn animal, from when does one begin to count a year with regard to the prohibition against delaying? Abaye said: One counts from the time it is born. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: One counts from the time it is fit for appeasement, i.e., from its eighth day, when it is fit to be brought as an offering, as explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 22:27).
  The Gemara comments: The two Sages do not disagree. This one, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is fit for appeasement, is speaking about an unblemished firstborn, which must be brought to the altar for sacrifice.
  
  Daf 7a
  
  That one, Abaye, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is born, is speaking about a blemished animal. Since it was already fit to be slaughtered from the day of its birth, if one does not give it to the priest within a year of that day he transgresses the prohibition against delaying.
  The Gemara asks: Can an animal with a blemish really be eaten immediately on the day that it is born? Isn’t there a requirement to wait eight days before slaughtering it, in order to ascertain that the animal is viable and was not born prematurely? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where one is certain of when the animal was conceived and that its months of gestation have been completed, so that it may be presumed to be viable.
  § The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> that expands upon what was taught in the mishna: On the first of Nisan is the New Year for counting the months of the year, and for leap years, and for collection of the shekels that had been collected in Adar and used to purchase animals for communal offerings and other needs of the Temple; and some say that it is also the New Year for the renting of houses.
  From where do we derive that the first of Nisan is the New Year for months? As it is written: “This month shall be to you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year to you. Speak to all the congregation of Israel, saying: On the tenth day of this month they shall take to them every man a lamb, according to the house of their fathers, a lamb for a household…And you shall keep it until the fourteenth day of the same month: And the whole assembly of the congregation shall slaughter it toward evening” (Exodus 12:2–6). And elsewhere it is written: “Observe the month of ripening and keep Passover to the Lord your God; for in the month of ripening the Lord your God brought you forth out of Egypt by night” (Deuteronomy 16:1). Which is the month in which there is a ripening of grain? You must say that this is Nisan, and it is called the first month of the year.
  The Gemara asks: But one could say that it is the month of Iyyar. The Gemara answers: A month of ripening is required, and in Iyyar there is no ripening, as the grain has already ripened. The Gemara asks further: But one could say that it is the month of Adar, the month in which some of the grain begins to ripen. The Gemara answers: The month in which most of the ripening takes place is required, and this is not the case in Adar, as most of the grain ripens during the next month, the month of Nisan. The Gemara asks: But is most of the ripening written in the verse? The verse merely speaks of the month of ripening, and since there is some ripening in Adar, it is possible that this is the first month.
  Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: It is derived that Nisan is the first of the months from here. The verse states: “Also on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, when you have gathered in the fruit of the land” (Leviticus 23:39). Which is the month in which there is a gathering of the grain of the field before the rains begin? You must say that this is Tishrei, and it is called the seventh month. Therefore, Nisan is the first month of the year.
  The Gemara asks: But one could say that verse is referring to the month of Marḥeshvan, and what is meant by seventh? It is the seventh month from the month of Iyyar. The Gemara rejects this possibility: A month of gathering is required, and in Marḥeshvan there is no gathering, as the crops have already been gathered in, and the fields have already begun to be plowed to prepare them for the next year’s planting. The Gemara asks further: But one could say that it is the month of Elul, the month in which the gathering of the grain from the fields begins, and what is meant by seventh? It is the seventh month from the month of Adar. The Gemara answers: The month in which most of the gathering takes place is required, and this is not the case in Elul, as most of the gathering is done in Tishrei. The Gemara asks: But is most of the gathering written in the verse?
  Rather, Ravina said: This matter we did not learn from the Torah of Moses, our teacher; rather, we learned it from the texts of the tradition, i.e., the Prophets and Writings: “On the twenty-fourth day of the eleventh month, which is the month of Shevat” (Zechariah 1:7). If Shevat is the eleventh month, Nisan must be the first month. Rabba bar Ulla said: It is derived from here, as it is stated: “So Esther was taken to the king Ahasuerus into his royal house in the tenth month, which is the month of Tevet” (Esther 2:16).
  Rav Kahana said: It is derived from here: “On the fourth day of the ninth month, in Kislev” (Zechariah 7:1). Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: It is derived from here, as it is stated: “And the scribes of the king were called at that time in the third month, that is the month of Sivan” (Esther 8:9). Rav Ashi said: It is derived from here: “He cast <i>pur</i>, that is, the lot, before Haman from day to day, and from month to month, to the twelfth month, that is, the month of Adar” (Esther 3:7). And if you wish, say that it is derived from here: “In the first month, that is, the month of Nisan” (Esther 3:7).
  The Gemara asks: And all of the others, what is the reason that they did not say that it is derived from here, the last verse mentioned, which is explicitly referring to Nisan as the first month? The Gemara answers: It is because one could perhaps have said: What is meant here by first? It means the first in relation to its matter, i.e., the months of the decree, and so it cannot be proven from here that Nisan is the first of the months of the year.
  The Gemara asks: And why didn’t the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna list the first of Nisan as the New Year for months, as did the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>? The Gemara answers: He is dealing with matters connected to years, but he is not dealing with matters connected to months.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And on the first of Nisan is the New Year for leap years. The Gemara asks: Do we really count leap years from Nisan? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The court may not declare a leap year before Rosh HaShana, and if they did declare a leap year before Rosh HaShana, the declaration is not valid and it is not considered a leap year. But due to pressing circumstances, e.g., religious persecution, it may be declared immediately after Rosh HaShana. At that time, the Sages may declare that the coming year will be a leap year in accordance with their calculations. Even so, the additional month added to the leap year can be only a second Adar. In what sense, then, is Nisan the New Year for leap years?
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What is meant here by leap years? It means the end of the leap year. Once the month of Nisan has arrived, the previous year can no longer be declared a leap year, as we learned in a mishna: They, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas, testified that the court may declare a leap year all through the month of Adar, as there were Sages who said: A year may be declared a leap year only until Purim, and if the decision to declare a leap year was not made before Purim, the year can no longer be declared a leap year.
  The Gemara explains the dispute: What is the rationale of the one who said that a leap year can be declared only until Purim? It is since the Master said: One asks about the <i>halakhot</i> of Passover thirty days before Passover. Immediately following Purim, on the fifteenth of Adar, people already began to immerse themselves in the <i>halakhot</i> of Passover, which occurs on the fifteenth of Nisan. Were the court to declare a leap year after Purim, the festival of Passover would then be delayed for another month. In that case, there is concern that people will come to demean the prohibition against leavened bread and not observe Passover on its new date in the proper manner.
  And the other Sages, Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Papeyyas, who are not concerned about this, what do they say? They say that people know that a leap year is dependent on the calculation, and they will assume that the Sages did not complete the calculation until now, after Purim. Since this is a matter of common knowledge, there is no concern that declaring a leap year at that late time will lead to a disregard of the <i>halakhot</i> of Passover.
  The Gemara asks: And why didn’t the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna include the first of Nisan as the New Year for leap years? The Gemara answers: He is dealing with years that begin on the first of Nisan, but he is not dealing with years that end on that date. With regard to leap years, the first of Nisan is the end not a beginning.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And the first of Nisan is the New Year for collection of the shekels that had been collected in Adar and were used to purchase animals for communal offerings and other needs of the Temple. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Yoshiya said that the verse states: “This is the burnt-offering of each month in its month throughout the months [<i>leḥodshei</i>] of the year” (Numbers 28:14). The seemingly superfluous term: “Throughout the months [<i>leḥodshei</i>] of the year,” should be understood as follows: The Torah is saying here: Renew [<i>ḥaddesh</i>] the year and bring an offering from the new collection of the shekels. And it is derived by way of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word “year” and another instance of the word “year” that the year begins for this purpose from Nisan, as it is written with regard to Nisan: “It shall be the first month of the year to you” (Exodus 12:2).
  The Gemara asks: But let us learn by way of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word “year” and a different instance of the word “year” that the year begins for this purpose from Tishrei, as it is written with regard to Tishrei: “From the beginning of the year” (Deuteronomy 11:12). The Gemara answers: One derives the meaning of the word “year” together with which “months” are mentioned, as the verse states: “Throughout the months of the year,” from another instance of the word “year” together with which months are mentioned, as the verse states: “It shall be the first month of the year to you.” And one does not derive the meaning of the word “year” together with which months are mentioned from an instance of the word “year” together with which “months” are not mentioned, as the verse states: “From the beginning of the year.”
  § Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to communal offerings that are brought on the first of Nisan, there is a mitzva to bring them from the new contribution of shekels collected for that year. However, if one brought them from the old contribution, i.e., from last year’s shekels, he has fulfilled the obligation with regard to the offerings, but he lacks the mitzva of bringing them from the new shekels.
  The Gemara comments: This <i>halakha</i> is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to communal offerings that are brought on the first of Nisan, there is a mitzva to bring them from the new contribution of shekels. However, if one brought them from the old contribution, he has fulfilled the obligation with regard to the sacrifices, but he lacks the mitzva of bringing them from the new shekels. If a private individual volunteered to bring the communal offerings from his own property, they are fit for the altar, provided that he transfers them over to the community.
  The Gemara asks: It is obvious that one may donate of his own property to the community, provided that he transfers it to the community in the proper manner. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that we should be concerned that perhaps
  
  Daf 7b
  
  he will not transfer them over to the public without reservation, and in his heart he will hold on to them as his own, therefore the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not a matter of concern.
  The Gemara asks: And why didn’t the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna count the first of Nisan as the New Year for shekels? The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna lists only definite New Years. Since it is taught: If one brought them from the old contribution, he has fulfilled his obligation, he could not state this New Year as a definite rule, and so he did not teach it.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And some say that the first of Nisan is also the New Year for the renting of houses. The Sages taught the following <i>baraita</i>: If one rents out a house to another person for a year, he counts twelve months from day to day. But if he said that he was renting it for this year, then even if the agreement was made only on the first of Adar, once the first of Nisan arrived one month later, it is counted as a year, and the rental contract comes to end.
  The Gemara comments: Even according to the one who said that one day in a year is considered a year, it is different here, with regard to rental <i>halakhot</i>, as a person does not take the trouble to rent a house for less than thirty days. Therefore, if one rented a house after the first of Adar, the remaining days of Adar are not considered a full year.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say that the first of Tishrei is the New Year for the renting of houses, and so if one rents a house for a year in the summer the year would come to an end in Tishrei? The Gemara answers: A person who rents a house without specification intends to rent it for all of the rainy season, until Nisan, when the rainy season comes to a close.
  The Gemara asks: And why didn’t the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> and the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna include the first of Nisan as the New Year for the renting of houses? They hold that even in Nisan it is common that the sky becomes covered with clouds and rain falls. Therefore, one who rents a house does not have in mind to rent it only until the first of Nisan, as presumably he does not want to find himself in a situation where he is homeless when it is still raining.
  § The mishna states: On the first of Elul is the New Year for animal tithes. The Gemara comments: Who is the author of the opinion cited in this mishna? It is Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a mishna that Rabbi Meir says: On the first of Elul is the New Year for animal tithes.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Festivals, i.e., that the first of Nisan is the New Year for Festivals, who is the author of the opinion cited in the mishna? It is Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order, with Passover first. Say the last clause of the mishna, which states that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: The New Year for animal tithes is on the first of Tishrei. Can it be that the first clause and the last clause follow the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while the middle clause relating to animal tithes follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir?
  Rav Yosef said: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he takes the mishna according to the opinions of different <i>tanna’im</i>. With regard to the Festivals, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, while with regard to animal tithes he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, how are there four New Years? If the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds that the first of Elul is the New Year for animal tithes, there are five New Years: The first of Nisan, the fifteenth of Nisan, the first of Elul, the first of Tishrei, and the fifteenth of Shevat. Rava said: There are only four New Years according to each opinion: There are four according to Rabbi Meir, who removes the New Year for Festivals, as according to him there is no fixed time from which to begin counting the Festivals. According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion as well there are four New Years, for he removes the New Year for animal tithes, as according to him it is on the first of Tishrei, which is already listed.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said an alternative answer: The mishna is to be understood as follows: There are four months in which there are several New Years, since in Nisan, according to Rabbi Meir, there are two New Years: For kings on the first and for Festivals on the fifteenth.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the following <i>baraita</i>: The sixteenth of Nisan is the New Year for the <i>omer</i> offering, as from this date onward it is permitted to eat from the new crop of grain. The sixth of Sivan is the New Year for the two loaves, i.e., the public offering of two loaves from the new wheat brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, as from this day onward it is permitted to sacrifice meal-offerings in the Temple from the new grain. If so, according to Rava, let the mishna teach that there are six New Years, including the sixteenth of Nisan and the sixth of Sivan, and according to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak let it teach that there are five New Years, since Sivan is a month in which there is a New Year.
  Rav Pappa said: When the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna counts New Years, he counts only those that begin in the evening; those that do not begin in the evening he does not count. Since the New Years associated with the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves do not begin in the evening but only from the time that they are sacrificed, he does not include them.
  The Gemara asks: But there is the New Year for Festivals, which does not begin in the evening, as the prohibition against delaying is not transgressed in the evening, when the Festival begins, but only in the morning, after the daily offering has been brought and one is able to bring the vowed animal to the altar, and nevertheless the <i>tanna</i> counts it. The Gemara answers: Since he had to bring his vow by the Festival, he stands liable from the beginning of the Festival for transgressing the prohibition against delaying.
  The Gemara asks further: But there is New Year for the Jubilee, which does not begin in the evening but from the time of the <i>shofar</i> blast on Yom Kippur during the day, and nevertheless the <i>tanna</i> counts it. The Gemara answers: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who said that the Jubilee Year begins on Rosh HaShana, and the blowing of the <i>shofar</i> merely completes the release of the slaves. Therefore, the New Year for the Jubilee is included.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said a different explanation for why the New Year for the <i>omer</i> offering and the New Year for the two loaves are not mentioned in the mishna: When the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna counts New Years, he counts only those that do not depend upon an action; those that depend upon an action, e.g., the offering of the <i>omer</i> or the two loaves, he does not count.
  The Gemara asks: But there is the New Year for the Festivals, which depends upon an action, i.e., the sacrifice of the daily offering, since no offering may be brought before the daily offering, and nevertheless the <i>tanna</i> counts it. The Gemara answers: This is not so, as the transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, does not depend upon anything else; rather, it begins on its own as soon as the Festival begins.
  
  Daf 8a
  
  The Gemara asks further: But the New Year for the Jubilee depends upon a certain action, i.e., sounding the <i>shofar</i>, and nevertheless the <i>tanna</i> counts it. The Gemara answers: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who said that the Jubilee Year begins on Rosh HaShana, even without the <i>shofar</i> blast.
  The Gemara presents an alternative answer as to why the <i>tanna</i> did not include all the other New Years. Rav Ashi said: The <i>tanna</i> said that there are four New Years that fall on four New Moons. However, there are also other New Years that do not fall on New Moons.
  The Gemara raises a question: Does Rav Ashi count the first of Shevat as one of the New Years; but the first of Shevat is a New Year only according to Beit Shammai, and by the time of Rav Ashi, the <i>halakha</i> was known to be in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel? The Gemara answers that this is what Rav Ashi is saying: There are three New Years that all agree occur on the first of the month, and the first of Shevat is subject to a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: The New Year for animal tithes is on the first of Tishrei. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And both of them, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar, expounded the same verse in different ways. As it is stated in the verse: “The flocks are clothed in the meadows, and the valleys are wrapped in grain; they shout for joy, they also sing” (Psalms 65:14). Rabbi Meir holds: When are the flocks clothed in the meadows, i.e., when do the rams impregnate the ewes and thereby clothe them? It is at the time when the valleys are wrapped in grain, i.e., when they are covered in grain. And when are the valleys wrapped in grain? It is in Adar. Therefore, the sheep conceive in Adar and give birth five months later in Av, and so it is fitting that their New Year is on the first of Elul, as most of the year’s lambs have been born by then.
  Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: When are the flocks clothed in the meadows? At the time that the stalks of grain “shout for joy, and also sing.” When do the stalks break out in song, i.e., when are they full, so that they rustle in the wind and create the whispering sounds of song? It is in Nisan. Therefore, the sheep conceive in Nisan and give birth in Elul, and so it is fitting that their New Year is on the first of Tishrei.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Meir, as well, isn’t it written: “They shout for joy, they also sing”? The Gemara answers: That is referring to late sheep, which were conceived after the usual time, in Nisan. The Gemara asks: According to the other opinion of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon as well, isn’t it written: “And the valleys wrapped in grain,” which is in Adar? The Gemara answers: That is referring to early sheep, which were conceived in Adar.
  The Gemara asks further: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the verse can be understood as it is written: “The flocks are clothed in the meadows” at the time when “the valleys are wrapped in grain.” But there are also some that do not conceive until as late as when “they shout for joy, they also sing.” But according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, it should have been written in the reverse order: “The flocks are clothed in the meadows” at the time when “they shout for joy, they also sing,” but there are also some that conceive earlier, when “the valleys are wrapped in grain.” If so, according to them, the words in the verse were not written in their proper order.
  Rather, Rava said that the dispute must be explained as follows: Everyone is of the opinion that “the flocks are clothed in the meadows,” i.e., the sheep conceive, primarily at the time when “the valleys are wrapped in grain,” in the month of Adar. But here they disagree about the meaning of the following verse: “You shall tithe a tithe from all the increase of your seed that the field brings forth year by year. And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborn of your herds, and of your flocks; that you may learn to fear the Lord your God always” (Deuteronomy 14:22–23). The verse speaks here about two tithes, one being the animal tithe and the other the grain tithe.
  They disagree about the following: Rabbi Meir holds that the verse juxtaposes the animal tithe to the grain tithe. Just as the grain tithe is set aside close to the grain’s completion, after it dries out in the field, so too, the animal tithe is set aside close to its completion, after the animals are born. Just as the grain is completed in Elul and is set aside the following month, which is Tishrei, so too, the animals are born in Av and therefore must be set aside in the following month, which is Elul. On the other hand, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold: The verse juxtaposes the animal tithe to the grain tithe. Just as in the case of the grain tithe, its New Year is in Tishrei, so too, in the case of the animal tithe, its New Year is in Tishrei.
  § It is taught in the mishna: On the first of Tishrei is the New Year for counting years. The Gemara asks: With regard to which <i>halakha</i> is this stated? Rav Pappa said: It is stated for determining the validity of documents, as we learned in a mishna: Antedated promissory notes, which bear a date that is earlier than the date when the loan actually took place, are invalid. But postdated promissory notes, which bear a date that is later than the date when the loan actually took place, are valid. Therefore, it is essential to know the date on which the new year begins in order to determine whether or not a particular promissory note is valid.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we already learn in the mishna: On the first of Nisan is the New Year for kings; and we say about this: For what <i>halakha</i> is this stated? And Rav Ḥisda said: It is for determining the validity of documents. Therefore, the new year for documents begins in Nisan and not in Tishrei.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; here, where the document is dated according to the reign of the Jewish kings, the year begins in Nisan; and there, where the document is dated to the reign of the gentile kings of the nations of the world, the year begins in Tishrei.
  The Gemara asks: But that which Rav Ḥisda said in explanation of the mishna, that they taught that the New Year for kings is in Nisan only with regard to the Jewish kings, but as for the gentile kings of the nations of the world we count from Tishrei, did Rav Ḥisda come to teach us what was already taught in the mishna itself?
  The Gemara answers: No, Rav Ḥisda came to teach us the meaning of certain biblical verses, i.e., that they should not be understood as was suggested at the beginning of this chapter but as teaching that the New Year for gentile kings is in Tishrei.
  And if you wish, say that Rav Ḥisda teaches the mishna as did Rabbi Zeira, and he maintains that when it says that the first of Tishrei is the New Year for years, it is not referring to documents, as Rabbi Zeira said: The first of Tishrei is the New Year for years with regard to calculating the cycles of the sun and the moon. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The world was created in the month of Tishrei, and all the calculations with regard to the sun and the moon are based on when they were created.
  § Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: When the mishna says that the first of Tishrei is the New Year for years, it is with regard to judgment, as on that day God judges the world for the whole year, as it is written: “A land that the Lord your God cares for; the eyes of the Lord your God are always upon it, from the beginning of the year until the end of the year” (Deuteronomy 11:12); from the beginning of the year judgment is passed as to what will happen at the end of the year.
  The Gemara raises a question: From where is it known that the day of judgment is in Tishrei? As it is written: “Blow a <i>shofar</i> at the New Moon, at the covered time for our Festival day” (Psalms 81:4). Which is the Festival day
  
  Daf 8b
  
  on which the moon is covered, i.e., hidden? You must say that this is Rosh HaShana, which is the only Festival that occurs at the beginning of a month, when the moon cannot be seen. And it is written in the next verse: “For this is a statute for Israel, a judgment of the God of Jacob” (Psalms 81:5), implying that this is the day of judgment.
  With regard to this same verse, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “For this is a statute for Israel, a judgment of the God of Jacob”; this teaches that the heavenly court does not assemble for judgment until the earthly court has sanctified the month, once the Sanhedrin has declared that day as Rosh HaShana.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “For this is a statute for Israel.” From here I have derived only that this is the day of judgment for the Jewish people; from where do I derive that it is also the day of judgment for the gentile nations of the world? Therefore, the verse states: “A judgment for the God of Jacob,” Who rules over the entire world. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “A statute for Israel”? This teaches that the Jewish people enter for judgment first.
  The Gemara notes: This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: When a king and a community are brought before God for judgment, the king is brought in for judgment first, as it is stated: “And let these my words, with which I have made supplication before the Lord, be near to the Lord our God day and night, that He make the judgment of His servant and the judgment of His people Israel at all times” (I Kings 8:59). This verse is from King Solomon’s prayer at the dedication of the Temple, and he is referring to himself a servant of God.
  What is the reason that the king is brought in first? If you wish, say that it is not proper conduct for the king to stand outside and wait for the trial of his subjects to come to an end. And if you wish, say instead that the king is brought in first so that he may be judged before God’s anger intensifies due to the sins of the community, and he may thereby be saved from overly harsh judgment.
  § The mishna teaches: The first of Tishrei is also the New Year for calculating Sabbatical Years. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written: “But in the seventh year shall be a Shabbat of solemn rest for the land” (Leviticus 25:4), and we learn by way of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word “year” and another instance of the word “year” that the year begins for this purpose from Tishrei, as it is written: “From the beginning of the year” (Deuteronomy 11:12). The latter verse is referring to the year that begins at the onset of the rainy season, i.e., Tishrei.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But let us learn by way of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word “year” and another instance of the word “year” and conclude that for this purpose the year begins from Nisan, as it is written: “It shall be the first month of the year to you” (Exodus 12:2), and there the reference is to Nisan. The Gemara answers: The Sages derive the meaning of the word “year” that appears in the verse about the Sabbatical Year, where months are not mentioned with it, from the word “year” that appears in the verse in Deuteronomy above, where months are also not mentioned with it. And they do not derive the meaning of the word “year” where months are not mentioned with it from the word “year” that appears in the verse where months are mentioned with it, i.e., “It shall be the first month of the year for you.”
  § The mishna teaches: The first of Tishrei is also the New Year for Jubilee Years. The Gemara asks: Is the New Year for Jubilee Years on the first of Tishrei? Isn’t the New Year for Jubilee Years on the tenth of Tishrei, Yom Kippur? As it is written: “Then shall you cause the <i>shofar</i> to sound on the tenth day of the seventh month, on Yom Kippur shall you sound the <i>shofar</i> throughout all your land. And you shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land to all its inhabitants; it shall be a Jubilee for you” (Leviticus 25:9–10).
  The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the meaning when the verse states: “And you shall hallow the fiftieth year”? Since it is stated that the <i>shofar</i> is blown “on Yom Kippur,” one might have thought that the year is sanctified only from Yom Kippur and onward. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall hallow the fiftieth year,” which teaches that the year is sanctified from its beginning onward, from the first of Tishrei, when the year begins.
  From here, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, said: From Rosh HaShana until Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year, Hebrew slaves were not released to their homes because the <i>shofar</i> had not yet been sounded. And they were also not enslaved to their masters, as the Jubilee Year had already begun. Rather, they would eat, drink, and rejoice, and they would wear their crowns on their heads like free people. Once Yom Kippur arrived, the court would sound the <i>shofar</i>, slaves would be released to their houses, and fields that were sold would be returned to their original owners.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, how do they interpret the verse: “And you shall hallow the fiftieth year”? The Gemara answers: They derive from here that you sanctify years, but you do not sanctify months. According to this opinion, the court is commanded to sanctify the Jubilee Year with a proclamation: This year is sanctified; but it is not commanded to sanctify the months with a similar proclamation.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: What is the meaning when the verse states: “It shall be a Jubilee Year” (Leviticus 25:11)? Since it is stated: “And you shall hallow the fiftieth year,” one might have thought that just as the Jubilee Year is sanctified from its beginning onward, so too, it is sanctified at its end onward, i.e., it remains sanctified until Yom Kippur of the fifty-first year. And do not wonder why one might think this, as don’t we regularly add from the profane to the sacred, extending a sacred time period by adding to it both before and after from a profane time period? Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be a Jubilee Year, the fiftieth year,” to teach that you sanctify the fiftieth year, but you do not sanctify the fifty-first year, even partially.
  
  Daf 9a
  
  And the Rabbis, who do not require an additional verse to derive that the Jubilee Year does not extend until Yom Kippur of the fifty-first year, derive a this <i>halakha</i> from the verse: You count the fiftieth year as the Jubilee Year alone, but you do not count the fiftieth year as the Jubilee Year and also as the first year of the next Sabbatical cycle. This <i>halakha</i> comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that the fiftieth year is counted for here and for there, both as the Jubilee Year and also as the first year of the next Sabbatical cycle. Lest someone think that that is the case, therefore, the verse teaches us that this is not so; rather, the fiftieth year is the Jubilee Year, and the following year is the first year of the next Sabbatical cycle.
  § Apropos of the discussion of extending the Jubilee year, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive the principle that one extends a sanctified time period by adding from the profane to the sacred at both ends?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21). Rabbi Akiva says: It is unnecessary to state this about plowing and harvesting during the Sabbatical Year, as it is already stated: “But in the seventh year shall be a Shabbat of solemn rest for the land, a Shabbat for the Lord; you shall neither sow your field, nor prune your vineyard” (Leviticus 25:4). Rather, the verse: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest,” is referring to plowing in the year preceding the Sabbatical Year going into the Sabbatical Year, i.e., plowing in the sixth year that will benefit the crops growing in the Sabbatical Year, and about harvesting of the Sabbatical Year going into the year that follows the Sabbatical Year, i.e., harvesting grain that grew in the Sabbatical Year in the eighth year. This teaches that there is a requirement to add extra time to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, and not work the land both before and after.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yishmael says that the verse: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest,” is not referring to the prohibition against farming the land before and after the Sabbatical Year as Rabbi Akiva explains. He explains that the reason that the verse mentions these two particular forms of labor is to teach that just as the type of plowing that is prohibited during the Sabbatical Year is an otherwise voluntary act, as plowing is never required by the Torah, so too, the harvesting that is prohibited during that year is only voluntary harvesting. This comes to exclude the harvesting of the <i>omer</i> from the prohibition, as it is a mitzva. The barley for the <i>omer</i> must be harvested on the sixteenth of Nisan. Consequently, it is permitted to harvest the <i>omer</i> even during the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara asks: If so, from where does Rabbi Yishmael derive this principle that one extends a sacred time period by adding from the profane to the sacred both before and after? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states, in reference to Yom Kippur: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth of the month in the evening” (Leviticus 23:32). One might have thought that one must begin to fast the entire day on the ninth of the month. Therefore, the verse states: “In the evening.” But if it is so that Yom Kippur begins in the evening, one might have thought that one need only begin to fast from when it is dark, after nightfall, when the tenth day of the month begins. Therefore, the verse states: “On the ninth.” How so; how is this to be accomplished? One begins to fast on the ninth of the month while it is still day. This teaches that one extends a sacred time period by adding at the beginning from the profane to the sacred.
  From here I have derived only that this addition is made at the beginning of Yom Kippur. But from where do I derive that a similar addition is made at the end of Yom Kippur? The verse states: “From evening to evening shall you rest on your Shabbat” (Leviticus 23:32), which teaches that just as Yom Kippur is extended at the beginning, so too, it is extended at the end.
  From here I have derived only that an extension is added to Yom Kippur. From where is it derived that one must also extend Shabbat? The verse states: “You shall rest [<i>tishbetu</i>],” which is referring to Yom Kippur but alludes to Shabbat. From where do I know that the same applies to Festivals? The verse states: “Your Shabbat [<i>shabbatkhem</i>],” your day of rest. How so? Wherever there is a mitzva of resting, be it Shabbat or a Festival, one adds from the profane to the sacred, extending the sacred time at both ends.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, who learns that one adds from the profane to the sacred from the verse dealing with the Sabbatical Year, what does he do with this verse: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth of the month in the evening”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which was taught by Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti, as Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught the following <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth of the month.” Is the fasting on the ninth? But isn’t the fasting on Yom Kippur on the tenth of Tishrei? Rather, this verse comes to teach you: Whoever eats and drinks on the ninth, thereby preparing himself for the fast on the next day, the verse ascribes him credit
  
  Daf 9b
  
  as though he fasted on both the ninth and the tenth.
  § The Gemara continues with the topic of the Jubilee Year. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land to all its inhabitants; it shall be a Jubilee for you” (Leviticus 25:10). The words “it shall be a Jubilee” come to teach that although they did not release property to its original owners, and although they did not sound the <i>shofar</i>, it is nevertheless a Jubilee Year, and the <i>halakhot</i> of the Jubilee year apply. One might have thought that although they did not send free the slaves it is also still a Jubilee Year. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be,” this being a term of limitation. This teaches that at least one of the essential <i>halakhot</i> of the year must be observed, and if not, it is not a Jubilee Year. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Yosei says: “It shall be a Jubilee for you”; although they did not release property to its original owners, and although they did not send free the slaves, it is nevertheless a Jubilee Year. One might have thought that although they did not sound the <i>shofar</i>, it is also still a Jubilee Year. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be.” Some act must be performed. In this case, the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded, otherwise it is not a Jubilee Year.
  Rabbi Yosei explains his position: Since one verse includes situations where the Jubilee is in force, and another verse excludes such situations, for what reason do I say that it is a Jubilee Year although they did not send free the slaves, but it is a Jubilee Year only if they sounded the <i>shofar</i>? This is since it is possible that there would be no sending free of slaves, as perhaps no one has any slaves to release, but it is impossible that there would be no sounding of the <i>shofar</i>, as a <i>shofar</i> can always be found. Therefore, it must be that it is the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> that is the indispensable criterion for the Jubilee Year.
  Alternatively: This, sounding the <i>shofar</i>, is given over to the court, which is obligated to blow it. But that, setting the slaves free, is not given over to the court but to each individual slave owner. It stands to reason that the indispensable criterion is one that is in the hands of the court and not in the hands of individuals.
  The Gemara asks: What is the need for Rabbi Yosei to add: Alternatively? Why is his first explanation insufficient? The Gemara answers: It is necessary, as, if you say that it is impossible that there should not be at least one slave owner at the end of the world, and therefore it is inconceivable that there will ever be a time when there are no slaves that are set free, you can nevertheless say that this, sounding the <i>shofar</i>, is given over to the court, but that, setting the slaves free, is not given over to the court.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, this is clear according to Rabbi Yosei, as he has stated his reasoning. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, what is the reason that the indispensable criterion for the Jubilee Year is sending free the slaves? The Gemara explains: The verse states: “And you shall proclaim liberty [<i>deror</i>] throughout all the land to all its inhabitants,” and immediately afterward it says: “It shall be a Jubilee for you.” And Rabbi Yehuda holds that a verse may be expounded in reference to the immediately preceding clause, but not in reference to the clause before that. Therefore, the exclusion implied by the words “it shall be,” is referring to what is stated in the immediately preceding clause: “And you shall proclaim liberty throughout all the land,” i.e., the emancipation of slaves. It is not referring to what is stated in the clause before that: “On Yom Kippur shall you sound the <i>shofar</i> throughout all your land.”
  The Gemara asks: It is clear that according to everyone the term “<i>deror</i>” is a word meaning liberty. From where may this be inferred? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The word <i>deror</i> is a term meaning only liberty. Rabbi Yehuda said: What is the meaning of the word <i>deror</i>? It is like a man who dwells [<i>medayyer</i>] in any dwelling [<i>dayyara</i>] and moves merchandise around the entire country, i.e., he can live and do business wherever he wants.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, but the Rabbis say: All three of them are indispensable for the Jubilee Year: Releasing property, sounding the <i>shofar</i>, and liberating the slaves. They hold that a verse may be interpreted in reference to the immediately preceding clause, in reference to the clause before that, and it may also be interpreted in reference to the clause following it, as all of these <i>halakhot</i> are mentioned in this section, and the exclusion implied by the words “it shall be” applies to all of them.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written “Jubilee Year,” which is a term of inclusion that should counter the exclusionary function of the words: “It shall be”? The Gemara answers: That term “Jubilee Year” comes to teach that the mitzva of the Jubilee applies even outside of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it written: “Throughout the land,” implying that it applies only in Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: That term, “throughout the land,” comes to teach that when liberation applies in Eretz Yisrael, it applies outside of Eretz Yisrael as well, and when liberation does not apply in Eretz Yisrael, it does not apply outside of Eretz Yisrael either.
  § The mishna teaches: And the first of Tishrei is the New Year for planting. It determines the years of <i>orla</i>, the three-year period from when a tree has been planted during which time its fruit is forbidden. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written: “Three years shall it be prohibited [<i>arelim</i>] to you; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23), and it is written in the following verse: “And in the fourth year all its fruit will be sacred for giving praise to the Lord” (Leviticus 19:24). And it is derived by way of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word “year” and another instance of the word “year” that for this purpose the year begins from Tishrei, as it is written with regard to Tishrei: “From the beginning of the year” (Deuteronomy 11:12).
  The Gemara asks: But let us derive by way of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word “year” and another instance of the word “year” that for this purpose the year begins from Nisan, as it is written with regard to Nisan: “It shall be the first month of the year to you” (Exodus 12:2). The Gemara answers: The Sages derive the meaning of the word “year” as it appears in the verse about the <i>orla</i>, where months are not mentioned with it, from the word “year” as it appears in the verse in Deuteronomy above, where months are also not mentioned with it. And they do not derive the meaning of the word “year” where months are not mentioned with it from the word “year” as it appears in the verse where months are mentioned with it, i.e., “It shall be the first month of the year for you.”
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one plants a tree, or layers a vine shoot into the ground so that it may take root, or grafts a branch onto a tree on the eve of the Sabbatical Year thirty days before Rosh HaShana, as soon as Rosh HaShana arrives, a year is counted for him. The thirty days count as a full year with regard to the prohibition of <i>orla</i>, and it is permitted to preserve the plant during the Sabbatical Year, as this is not considered new growth. However, if one performed these actions less than thirty days before Rosh HaShana, then when Rosh HaShana arrives, a year is not counted for him for <i>orla</i>, and it is prohibited to preserve the new growth during the Sabbatical Year.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  And if the planting, layering, or grafting took place more than thirty days before Rosh HaShana, the fruit of this planting is prohibited until the fifteenth of Shevatof the fourth year since the tree’s planting, even though the three years were already completed the previous Rosh HaShana. This principle applies both for <i>orla</i> during the year of <i>orla</i>, when it is prohibited to eat the fruit, and for fourth-year produce during the year of fourth-year produce, which must be eaten in Jerusalem or redeemed before it is eaten outside Jerusalem.
  The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, that the prohibitions of <i>orla</i> and fourth-year produce extend past Tishrei until the fifteenth of Shevat? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some determined that it was stated in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The verse states: “Three years shall it be as prohibited to you; it shall not be eaten. And in the fourth year all its fruit shall be sacred for praise-giving to the Lord. And in the fifth year shall you eat of its fruit, that it may yield to you its increase; I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19:23–25).
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: The repetition of the word “and,” indicated by the conjunctive <i>vav</i> that joins these verses, teaches that there are times that the tree is already in its fourth year and yet the fruit is forbidden as <i>orla</i>, from the verses “three years…and in the fourth year”; and there are times that the tree is already in its fifth year and yet the fruit is forbidden as fourth-year produce, from the verses “in the fourth year…and in the fifth year.”
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this <i>baraita</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, didn’t Rabbi Meir say that even one day in a year is considered a year? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The term bullock [<i>par</i>] mentioned in the Torah without specification is referring to a bullock that is twenty-four months and one day old, as although it is known by tradition that a bullock is three years old, once it is one day into its third year, it is already considered three years old; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Elazar says: The term bullock is referring to an animal that is twenty-four months and thirty days old. As Rabbi Meir would say: Wherever a calf [<i>egel</i>] is stated in the Torah without specification, the reference is to a calf that is one year old; a young ox [<i>ben bakar</i>] is referring to a cow that is two years old; and a bullock is referring to a cow that is three years old. Since the <i>baraita</i> dealing with planting requires that the tree be planted thirty days before Rosh HaShana, rather than one day, it would seem that it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: Even if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it can be explained as follows. When Rabbi Meir said that one day in a year is considered a full year, this is only when the day is at the end of the year; since the count of a new year is about to begin, the day is considered like a whole year. But if the day is at the beginning of the year, that one day is not considered like a whole year.
  Against this claim Rava said: But can we not invoke an <i>a fortiori</i> argument to prove just the opposite? Whereas in the case of a menstruating woman, where the beginning of the day is not counted as a full day at the end of her seven-day period of ritual impurity and instead she must wait until the end of the seventh day and immerse in a ritual bath only in the evening, yet nevertheless the end of the day is counted as a full day at the beginning of her ritually impure period, since if she experienced bleeding shortly before sunset that day is considered as the first day of her seven-day period of impurity; if so, in the case of a year, where one day is counted as a full year at the end of the year,
  
  Daf 10b
  
  is it not right that one day should count as a full year at the beginning of the year?
  Rather, what opinion does it follow? If the <i>baraita</i> was not taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, does it follow the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that only thirty days are considered like a year? If so, then thirty days and another thirty days are required: Thirty days for the planting to take root, and another thirty days to count as a year. As we learned in a mishna: One may not plant, layer, or graft trees on the eve of the Sabbatical Year less than thirty days before Rosh HaShana, and if one planted, layered, or grafted, he must be uproot it, as the planting will take root only in the seventh year; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any grafting that does not take root within three days will never take root. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Two weeks are needed for the planting to take root.
  And on this topic Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: According to the statement of the one who says thirty days, this means that it requires thirty days for the planting to take root and another thirty days to count as a year. And according to the statement of the one who says three days, this means that it requires thirty-three days. And according to the statement of the one who says two weeks, this means that it requires two weeks for the planting to take root and another thirty days to count as a year. And if the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that only three days are needed for the planting to take root, it still requires three days for the planting to take root and thirty days to count as a year. If so, the <i>baraita</i> cannot be understood even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
  Rather, it must be understood as follows: The <i>baraita</i> was actually taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and when it says thirty days, it is referring to the time needed for the planting to take root.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, it requires thirty-one days; thirty days for the planting to take root and one more day to count as a year. The Gemara answers: This is theoretically correct, but he holds that the thirtieth day is counted for here and for there, i.e., it counts as both the thirtieth day for taking root and as a day that is counted as a year.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And both of them, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar, who disagree about how much time must pass to count as a year, expounded the same verse. As the verse states: “And it came to pass in the one and six hundredth year, in the first month on the first day of the month, that the waters were dried up from off the earth” (Genesis 8:13). Rabbi Meir holds: From the fact that it was only one day into the year, as it was still the first day of the first month, and yet it is called the six hundred and first year, learn from here that one day in a year is already considered a year.
  And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Elazar, expounds the verse as follows. If it had written: In the six hundred and first year, it would be as you said. However, now that it is written: “In the one and six hundredth year," I can say that the word “year” relates to “six hundredth,” thereby teaching that it is still considered the six hundredth year. And what is meant by “one”? That it is the beginning of one year, but not that the first day counts as a year.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Elazar, what is the rationale for his opinion? From where does he learn that thirty days are counted as a year? As it is written: “In the first month on the first day of the month.” Since it was only one day into the month, and yet it is called a month, learn from here that one day in a month is already considered a month. And since one day in a month is already considered a month, likewise thirty days in a year are already considered a year, as a month is calculated according to its unit, and a year is calculated according to its unit. If one unit by which a month is calculated, i.e., a day, counts as a full month, so too, one unit by which a year is calculated, i.e., a month, counts as a full year.
  § The Gemara comments: By inference, both of them, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar, hold that the world was created in Nisan and that the years are counted from that month, as, if the world were created in Tishrei and the count started then, the first day of the first month of the six hundred and first year would already have been six months into the year for the purpose of counting years.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the <i>tanna’im</i> disagreed about this point: Rabbi Eliezer says: In Tishrei the world was created; in Tishrei the Patriarchs were born; in Tishrei the Patriarchs died; on Passover Isaac was born; on Rosh HaShana Sarah, Rachel, and Hannah were remembered by God and conceived; on Rosh HaShana Joseph came out from prison;
  
  Daf 11a
  
  on Rosh HaShana our forefathers’ slavery in Egypt ceased; in Nisan the Jewish people were redeemed from Egypt; and in Tishrei in the future the Jewish people will be redeemed in the final redemption with the coming of the Messiah.
  Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees and says: In Nisan the world was created; in Nisan the Patriarchs were born; in Nisan the Patriarchs died; on Passover Isaac was born; on Rosh HaShana Sarah, Rachel, and Hannah were remembered by God and conceived sons; on Rosh HaShana Joseph came out from prison; on Rosh HaShana our forefathers’ slavery in Egypt ceased; in Nisan the Jewish people were redeemed from Egypt; and in Nisan in the future the Jewish people will be redeemed in the final redemption.
  The Gemara explains these matters in detail: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that the world was created in the month of Tishrei? As it is stated: “And God said: Let the earth bring forth grass, herb yielding seed, and fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind” (Genesis 1:11). Which is the month in which the earth brings forth grass and the trees are full of ripe fruit? You must say that this is Tishrei. And a further proof that the world was created in Tishrei is that when the world was first created, it needed rain so that the plants would grow, and the period beginning with Tishrei is a time of rain, and rain fell and the plants grew, as it is stated: “But there went up a mist from the earth, and watered the whole face of the ground” (Genesis 2:6).
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: From where is it derived that the world was created in the month of Nisan? As it is stated: “And the earth brought forth grass, herb yielding seed after its kind, and tree yielding fruit” (Genesis 1:12). Which is the month in which the earth is full of grass and the trees begin to bring forth fruit? You must say that this is Nisan. And further proof that the world was created in Nisan is that when the world was first created, the animals had to breed in order to fill the world, and the period beginning with Nisan is a time when cattle, and beasts, and birds mate with one another, as it is stated: “The flocks are clothed in the meadows, and the valleys are wrapped in grain; they shout for joy, they also sing” (Psalms 65:14).
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, isn’t it written: “And tree yielding fruit,” indicating that the world was created at a time when the trees were just beginning to form their fruit? The Gemara answers: That verse is written as a blessing for future generations, that then too they will form their fruit.
  The Gemara continues to ask: And according to the opinion of the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, isn’t it written: “Fruit tree,” indicating that the world was created in a season when the trees were already filled with their fruit? The Gemara answers: That verse may be understood in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All the acts of Creation were created with their full stature, immediately fit to bear fruit; they were created with their full mental capacities; they were created with their full form. As it is stated: “And the heavens and the earth were finished, and all their host” (Genesis 2:1). Do not read it as “their host [<i>tzeva’am</i>]”; rather, read it as their form [<i>tzivyonam</i>], which implies that the trees were created filled with ripe fruit.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that in Tishrei the Patriarchs were born? As it is stated: “And all the men of Israel assembled themselves before King Solomon at the feast in the month of the mighty [<i>eitanim</i>], which is the seventh month” (I Kings 8:2), i.e., Tishrei. What is the meaning of the phrase: The month of the mighty? It is the month in which the mighty ones of the world, i.e., the Patriarchs, were born.
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the term <i>eitan</i> denotes mighty? As it is written: “Strong [<i>eitan</i>] is Your dwelling place, and You put Your nest in a rock” (Numbers 24:21). And it says: “Hear, O mountains, the Lord’s controversy, and you strong [<i>eitanim</i>] foundations of the earth” (Micah 6:2), which is a call to the Patriarchs. And it says: “The voice of my beloved; behold, he comes leaping upon the mountains, skipping upon the hills” (Song of Songs 2:8): “Leaping upon the mountains” means that the redemption will arrive early in the merit of the Patriarchs, who are called mountains, and “skipping upon the hills” means that it will come in the merit of the Matriarchs.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: From where is it derived that in Nisan the Patriarchs were born? As it is stated: “And it came to pass in the four hundred and eightieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt, in the fourth year, in the month of Ziv” (I Kings 6:1). This means in the month in which the radiant ones [<i>zivtanei</i>] of the world, the Patriarchs, were born.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, isn’t it written: “In the month of the mighty,” which indicates that the Patriarchs were born in Tishrei? The Gemara answers: There, it means that the month is mighty in mitzvot, due to the many Festivals that occur in Tishrei.
  The Gemara asks further: And according to the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, isn’t it written: “In the month of Ziv”? The Gemara answers: Ziv is not an allusion to the Patriarchs. Rather, it means that Nisan is the month in which there is radiance [<i>ziv</i>] for the trees. As Rav Yehuda said: One who goes out during the days of Nisan and sees trees that are blossoming recites: Blessed…Who has withheld nothing from His world and has created in it beautiful creatures and beautiful trees for human beings to enjoy.
  The Gemara continues: The one who said that in Nisan the Patriarchs were born also holds that in Nisan they died. The one who says that in Tishrei they were born also holds that in Tishrei they died, as it is stated about Moses on the day of his death: “And he said to them: I am one hundred and twenty years old today” (Deuteronomy 31:2). As there is no need for the verse to state “today,” since it is clear that Moses was speaking on that day, what is the meaning when the verse states “today”? It is to teach that Moses was speaking precisely, as if to say: Today my days and years are exactly filled and completed. This comes to teach you that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and fills the years of the righteous from day to day and from month to month, as it is stated: “The number of your days I will fulfill” (Exodus 23:26). Similarly, the Patriarchs merited that their years be fulfilled to the day, and so they died on the same date they were born.
  It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: On Passover Isaac was born. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written that the angel who informed Sarah that she would bear a son told Abraham: “At the appointed time [<i>mo’ed</i>] I will return to you, at this season, and Sarah shall have a son” (Genesis 18:14). This is understood to mean: At the time of the next Festival [<i>mo’ed</i>]. When did the angel say this? If we say that it was on Passover and he said to him that Sarah would have a son on <i>Shavuot</i>, can a woman give birth after only fifty days? Rather, say that it was <i>Shavuot</i> and he said that she would give birth on the Festival that occurs in the month of Tishrei, i.e., <i>Sukkot</i>. But still, can she give birth after only five months? Rather, you must say that it was <i>Sukkot</i>, and he spoke about the Festival that occurs in the month of Nisan, i.e., Passover.
  The Gemara asks further: But still, can a woman give birth after only six months? The Gemara answers: A Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i>: That year was a leap year, in which an additional month of Adar was added before Nisan, and a woman can indeed give birth after seven months. The Gemara raises another question: Ultimately, if one deducts Sarah’s days of ritual impurity, as when the angel spoke Sarah had not yet conceived, and there is a tradition that on that day she began menstruating, as is alluded to in the verse: “After I am grown old, shall I have pleasure” (Genesis 18:12), there are less than seven months.
  Mar Zutra said: Even according to the one who said that if a woman gives birth to a viable baby in her ninth month, she cannot give birth prematurely, and if she does not complete nine full months’ gestation the baby will not survive, nevertheless, if a woman gives birth in her seventh month, she may give birth early, before the seventh month is complete. As it is stated about the birth of Samuel: “And it came to pass after cycles of days that Hannah conceived and bore a son” (I Samuel 1:20), which is understood as follows: The minimum of “cycles,” seasons of three months, is two, and the minimum of “days” is two. Consequently, it is possible for a woman to give birth after a pregnancy of six months and two days.
  It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: On Rosh HaShana, Sarah, Rachel, and Hannah were revisited by God and conceived children. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Elazar said: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between one instance of the term revisiting [<i>pekida</i>] and another instance of the term revisiting, and by means of a verbal analogy between one instance of the term remembering [<i>zekhira</i>] and another instance of the word remembering. It is written about Rachel: “And God remembered Rachel” (Genesis 30:22), and it is written about Hannah: “And the Lord remembered her” (I Samuel 1:19). And the meaning of these instances of the term remembering is derived from another instance of the term remembering, with regard to Rosh HaShana, as it is written: “A solemn rest, memorial proclaimed with the blast of a <i>shofar</i>” (Leviticus 23:24). From here it is derived that Rachel and Hannah were remembered by God on Rosh HaShana.
  And the meaning of one instance of the term revisiting is derived from another instance of the term revisiting. It is written about Hannah: “And the Lord revisited Hannah” (I Samuel 2:21), and it is written about Sarah: “And the Lord revisited Sarah” (Genesis 21:1). From here it is derived that just as Hannah was revisited on Rosh HaShana, so too, Sarah was revisited on Rosh HaShana.
  It was further taught in the <i>baraita</i>: On Rosh HaShana Joseph came out of prison. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written: “Sound a <i>shofar</i> at the New Moon, at the covered time of our Festival day. For this is a statute for Israel, a judgment of the God of Jacob” (Psalms 81:4–5). This is a reference to Rosh HaShana, the only Festival that occurs at the time of the New Moon, when the moon is covered and cannot be seen.
  
  Daf 11b
  
  And immediately afterward it is written: “This He ordained in Joseph for testimony, when he went out over the land of Egypt” (Psalms 81:6), implying that Joseph’s release from prison took place on Rosh HaShana.
  It was also taught in the <i>baraita</i>: On Rosh HaShana our forefathers’ slavery in Egypt ceased. From where is this known? It is written here: “And I will bring you out from under the burdens of Egypt” (Exodus 6:6); and it is written there, with regard to Joseph: “I removed his shoulder from the burden” (Psalms 81:7). From here it is derived by verbal analogy between the two instances of the word “burden” that just as Joseph was released from prison in Tishrei, so too, the slavery of our forefathers in Egypt ended in Tishrei.
  It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: In Nisan our forefathers were redeemed from Egypt, as it is explicitly stated in the Torah. The <i>baraita</i> continues: In Tishrei in the future the Jewish people will be redeemed in the final redemption. This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between one instance of the word <i>shofar</i> and another instance of the word <i>shofar</i>. It is written here, with regard to Rosh HaShana: “Sound a <i>shofar</i> at the New Moon” (Psalms 81:4), and it is written there, with regard to the final redemption: “And it shall come to pass on that day, that a great <i>shofar</i> shall be blown” (Isaiah 27:13).
  It was also taught in the <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehoshua says: In Nisan our forefathers were redeemed from Egypt; and in Nisan in the future the Jewish people will be redeemed in the final redemption. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the final redemption will be in Nisan? The verse states: “It is a night of watching for the Lord for bringing them out from the land of Egypt; this is the Lord’s night of watching, for all the children of Israel throughout their generations” (Exodus 12:42). This teaches that the night of Passover is a night that has been continuously watched, i.e., set aside for the purpose of redemption, from the six days of Creation, and it will continue to be so until the final redemption.
  The Gemara asks: And how does the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, understand this verse? He derives from it that this is a night that is continuously watched and protected from demons, meaning that demons have no power on the first night of Passover.
  And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua follow their lines of reasoning, as they disagreed about this same issue in another context as well. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “In the six hundredth year of Noah’s life, in the second month, on the seventeenth day of the month, on that day were all the fountains of the great deep broken open, and the windows of heaven were opened” (Genesis 7:11). Rabbi Yehoshua says: That day was the seventeenth of Iyyar, the second month of the year counting from Nisan, which is the day that the constellation of <i>Kima</i> sets during the day and the season that the springs diminish with the increased heat. But because the people of the generation of the flood changed their actions for the worse, the Holy One, Blessed be He, changed for them the acts of Creation, and instead of <i>Kima</i> setting, He caused the constellation of <i>Kima</i> to rise during the day and He removed two stars from <i>Kima</i>, and in this way He brought a flood to the world.
  Rabbi Eliezer disagrees and says: That day was the seventeenth of Marḥeshvan, the second month counting from Tishrei, which is the day that the constellation of <i>Kima</i> rises during the day and the season that the springs increase.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  But because the people changed their actions for the worse, the Holy One, Blessed be He, changed for them the acts of Creation and He caused the constellation of <i>Kima</i> to rise during the day, and He removed two stars from it and He brought a flood to the world.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that the flood began in the month of Iyyar, this is as it is written: “In the second month,” which is referring to the month of Iyyar, the second month from Nisan. But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the flood began in the month of Marḥeshvan, what is the meaning of “the second month”? The Gemara answers: It means second to the month that includes the day of judgment, which is the month of Tishrei.
  The Gemara asks further: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that the flood began in the month of Iyyar, this is what it means that He changed the acts of Creation with a flood, as rain does not usually fall in Iyyar. But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the flood began in Marḥeshvan, what did He change?
  The Gemara answers: Even according to Rabbi Eliezer a change was made, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: They sinned with boiling heat, and they were punished with boiling heat; they sinned with the boiling heat of the sin of forbidden sexual relations, and they were punished with the boiling heat of scalding waters. This is derived from a verbal analogy. It is written here, with regard to the flood: “And the waters abated” (Genesis 8:1), and it is written elsewhere, with regard to King Ahasuerus: “And the heated anger of the king abated” (Esther 7:10), which implies that the word “abated” means cooled. This indicates that at first the waters of the flood had been scalding hot.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Jewish Sages count the years from Creation and the flood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, from Tishrei, and they calculate the cycles of the sun and the moon in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, from Nisan. The sages of the gentile nations of the world, on the other hand, count both the years from Creation and the flood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, from Nisan.
  § The mishna taught: And the first of Tishrei is the new year for vegetables. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The first of Tishrei is the new year for vegetables, and for tithes, and for vows. The Gemara asks: What is meant by the term: For vegetables? It means for the vegetable tithe, i.e., one may not take <i>teruma</i> or tithes from vegetables picked before Rosh HaShana in order to fulfill the obligation for vegetables picked after Rosh HaShana.
  The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the meaning of the term for tithes, and yet the <i>baraita</i> distinguishes between them. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> taught first about a tithe that is by rabbinic law, i.e., the vegetable tithe, that its new year is the first of Tishrei, and then it teaches about a tithe that is by Torah law, i.e., the tithe of grain, wine, and oil, that its new year is also the first of Tishrei.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> teach that which is by Torah law in the first clause. The Gemara explains: Since the <i>halakha</i> with regard to vegetable tithes was dear to him, he mentioned it first. He taught first about the tithe that is by rabbinic decree, as it involves a greater novelty, and afterward he taught about the tithe that is by Torah law. The Gemara asks further: And with regard to the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna, who mentioned only vegetables but not tithes, what is his reasoning? The Gemara explains: He taught vegetable tithes, which are by rabbinic decree, and from which one may infer all the more so that the first of Tishrei is the new year for the tithe of grain, wine, and oil, which is by Torah law.
  The Gemara raises a question about the <i>baraita</i>: But let the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> teach: Tithe, in the singular. Why teach tithes in the plural? The Gemara answers: He uses this formulation to include both the animal tithe and the grain tithe. The Gemara asks further: But let him teach: Vegetable, in the singular. Why teach: Vegetables, in the plural? The Gemara answers: He means to include two categories of vegetables, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a type of vegetable that is usually made into bundles before being sold, the time of tithing is from when it is bundled; and with regard to a type of vegetable that is not usually made into such bundles, the time of tithing is from when one fills a vessel with it.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one picked vegetables on the eve of Rosh HaShana before the sun had set, so that they belong to the previous year, and then he returned and he picked more vegetables
  
  Daf 12b
  
  after sunset, so that they belong to the new year, one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithe from the one to the other, as one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithe from the new crop for the old nor from the old crop for the new. If it was the second year of the Sabbatical cycle going into the third year, the <i>halakha</i> is: From what he picked in the second year he must set aside first tithe, which he gives to a Levite, and second tithe, which he eats in Jerusalem; from what he picked in the third year, he must set aside first tithe and poor man’s tithe, which he gives to one who is needy.
  From where are these matters derived that during the third year one must set aside poor man’s tithe and not second tithe? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The verse states: “When you have made an end of tithing all the tithes of your produce in the third year, which is the year of the tithe” (Deuteronomy 26:12). This is referring to a year when there is only one of the two tithes that had been given in the previous years. How so? One sets aside first tithe and poor man’s tithe, which is explicitly mentioned in that section, and second tithe is nullified that year.
  Or perhaps it is not like this, but in fact even first tithe is nullified during the third year and only one tithe is set aside, i.e., the poor man’s tithe. Therefore, the verse states: “Thus speak to the Levites, and say to them: When you take of the children of Israel the tithes which I have given you from them for your inheritance” (Numbers 18:26). The verse juxtaposes the first tithe that is given to the Levites to an inheritance of land: Just as with regard to an inheritance there is no interruption, as by Torah law a landed inheritance cannot be sold in perpetuity, but rather it passes from one generation to the next without interruption, so too, with regard to the first tithe that is given to the Levites there is no interruption, but rather it is taken every year.
  The same <i>halakha</i> is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When you have made an end of tithing all the tithes of your produce in the third year, which is the year of the tithe.” This is referring to the year when there is only one of the two tithes that had been given in the previous years. How so? One sets aside first tithe and poor man’s tithe, and second tithe is canceled. One might have thought that even first tithe is canceled during the third year. Therefore, the verse states: “And the Levite, because he has no part or inheritance with you, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, who are within your gates, shall come, and shall eat and be satisfied” (Deuteronomy 14:29). Whenever the Levite comes, give him; every year you must give the Levite his tithe. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One need not learn this from here but from another source, as it says: “Thus speak to the Levites, and say to them: When you take of the children of Israel the tithes which I have given you from them for your inheritance.” The verse juxtaposes the first tithe to an inheritance of land: Just as with regard to a landed inheritance there is no interruption, so too, with regard to first tithe there is no interruption.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited above: And the first of Tishrei is the new year for vows. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another for a year counts twelve months from day to day, from the day that the vow was taken. This applies whether one took a vow not to derive any benefit from another for a year, or he was the subject of someone else’s vow prohibiting him from deriving any benefit from that individual’s property for a year. But if, when he took the vow, he said: For this year, then even if he took the vow only on the twenty-ninth of Elul, once the first day of Tishrei, the following month, has arrived, it is counted as a year, and he is permitted to derive benefit from the other.
  The Gemara comments: This is true even according to the one who said that one day in a year is not considered a year, since in the case of a vow the person accepted upon himself to suffer affliction, and he has already achieved his goal and suffered affliction, and so he has fulfilled his vow.
  The Gemara asks: But say that a year with regard to vows ends in Nisan. The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> is that with regard to vows, follow the ordinary language of people. The meaning of a vow is understood in accordance with the way that the words are used in common speech, and when people speak of a year, they ordinarily count it from the beginning of Tishrei.
  We learned in a mishna there (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 1:3): From when is produce obligated in tithes? Fenugreek is obligated from the time when it sprouts. Grain and olives are obligated from the time when they have reached one-third of their growth.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: From the time when it sprouts? Fenugreek begins to sprout almost immediately after it is planted. The Gemara answers: It means from the time when it sprouts for seed, i.e., from the time that its seeds are sufficiently developed to sprout into another crop.
  It was taught in the mishna: Grain and olives are obligated in tithes from the time when they have reached one-third of their growth. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, that the years of produce follow the first third of their growth? Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and some determined that this statement was said in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: The verse states: “At the end of every seven years, in the time of the year of release, in the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 31:10). What is the purpose of the Sabbatical Year being mentioned with the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? The festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is already the eighth year.
  Rather, it comes to tell you that the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year continue to apply on <i>Sukkot</i> of the following year, as you must treat all produce that reached one-third of its growth in the Sabbatical Year before Rosh HaShana with the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, even if it fully grows and is able to be used only in the eighth year.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi:
  
  Daf 13a
  
  But perhaps the verse is referring to produce that did not grow at all during the seventh year, and nevertheless, the Merciful One states in the Torah that all the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year continue to apply until the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> of the eighth year.
  The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “And the festival of gathering, which is at the end of the year, when you have gathered in your labors out of the field” (Exodus 23:16). What is the meaning of “gathering”? If we say that it means: A Festival that comes at the time of gathering the crops, isn’t it already written: “When you have gathered in your labors”? There is no need to repeat this a second time.
  Rather, what is meant here by “gathering”? It means harvesting. And the Sages have an accepted tradition that any grain that reaches full growth so that it is harvested on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is known to have reached one-third of its growth before Rosh HaShana, and the Torah calls that period of the year until <i>Sukkot</i> “at the end of the year,” thereby indicating that it is still subject to the <i>halakhot</i> governing the previous year.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: And are the Sages able to discern precisely between produce that reached one-third of its growth and produce that reached less than one-third of its growth? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Do I not always tell you that you must not take yourself out of the bounds of the <i>halakha</i>? All the measures of the Sages are like this; they are precise and exact.
  For example, one who immerses himself in a ritual bath containing forty <i>se’a</i> of water is rendered pure, but in forty <i>se’a</i> less the tiny amount of a <i>kortov</i>, he cannot immerse and become pure in them. Similarly, an egg-bulk of impure food can render other food ritually impure, but an egg-bulk less even the tiny amount of a sesame seed does not render food ritually impure.
  So too, a piece of cloth three by three handbreadths in size is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading, but a piece of cloth three by three handbreadths less one hair [<i>nima</i>] is not susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading.
  Rabbi Yirmeya then said: What I said is nothing, and my question had no basis, as it can be demonstrated that the Sages know how to determine that produce has reached one-third of its growth. As Rav Kahana was once asked by the other colleagues of the academy as follows: With regard to the <i>omer</i> offering that the Jewish people brought when they first entered Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua, from where did they bring it? If you say that this <i>omer</i> offering was brought from grain that grew in the possession of a gentile, there is a difficulty, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “You shall bring an <i>omer</i> of the first fruits of your harvest to the priest” (Leviticus 23:13), from which it can be derived that it must be your harvest, grown in the possession of a Jew, and not the harvest of a gentile.
  The Gemara first questions the assumption of Rav Kahana’s colleagues: From where is it known that the Jewish people actually brought an <i>omer</i> offering that year? Perhaps they did not offer it at all. The Gemara rejects this argument: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “And they did eat of the produce of the land on the next day after Passover” (Joshua 5:11), which teaches: Only on the next day after Passover did they eat from the new grain, but initially they did not eat from it. Why? It is because they first brought the <i>omer</i> offering on the sixteenth of Nisan as is required, and only afterward did they eat from the new grain. Therefore the question remains: From where did they bring the <i>omer</i> offering?
  Rav Kahana said to them: Anything that came into the possession of a Jew and did not reach one-third of its growth in the possession of a gentile is fit to be harvested for the sake of the <i>omer</i> offering.
  Rabbi Yirmeya concludes his proof: But there, too, one might ask: Perhaps the grain had in fact already reached one-third of its growth, but they could not discern with certainty between grain that had reached one-third of its growth and grain that had not. Rather, you must say that they were able to discern with certainty. Here, too, you can say that the Sages can discern with certainty between produce that has reached one-third of its growth before Rosh HaShana and produce that has not.
  The Gemara asks: This is not absolute proof, as perhaps the Jewish people brought the <i>omer</i> offering from grain that did not grow at all before they conquered the land, and the distinction was evident to all. But where produce reached one quarter of its growth, the Sages cannot discern with certainty the difference between one-third and less than one-third.
  The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say this, as it is written: “And the people came up from the Jordan on the tenth day of the first month” (Joshua 4:19). And if it enters your mind to say that the grain had not grown at all before the Jewish people entered the land, could it have reached full growth in just five days?
  The Gemara rejects this argument: Rather, what can one say? That the grain had reached one quarter or one-sixth [<i>danka</i>] of its growth before the Jewish people conquered the land? This too is difficult, as one can still ask: Could the grain have reached full growth in just five days? Rather, what have you to say? One could say that with regard to Eretz Yisrael it is written: “The land of the deer” (Daniel 11:41), implying that the grain of Eretz Yisrael ripens with the swiftness of a deer. Here, too, one can say that “the land of the deer” is written with regard to Eretz Yisrael and applies to the ripening of the grain, so that it can ripen in just a few days.
  § Rabbi Ḥanina strongly objects to the proof brought from the verse in Exodus cited above, which refers to <i>Sukkot</i> as the festival of gathering: How can you say that this “gathering” means harvesting? But isn’t it written: “You shall observe the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> seven days, after you have gathered in from your threshing floor and from your winepress” (Deuteronomy 16:13), and the Master said about this: The verse speaks here of the waste of the threshing floor and the winepress, which is used to make the roof of the <i>sukka</i>. If so, the gathering mentioned with regard to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> is referring not to harvesting but to gathering straw from the threshing floor.
  Rabbi Zeira said about this: This matter was in our hands, i.e., I thought that we had solid proof that the years for produce follow the first third of its growth, but Rabbi Ḥanina came and cast an axe upon it, cutting it down, as Rabbi Ḥanina’s objection has totally nullified the proof.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, from where do we derive that the years for produce follow the first third of its growth? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says: The verse states: “And it shall bring forth fruit for the three years” (Leviticus 25:21);
  
  Daf 13b
  
  do not read it as “for three [<i>lishelosh</i>]” but as: For one-third [<i>lishelish</i>]. And learn from here that the year for tithes is determined by the date on which the produce reaches one-third of its growth.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the phrase is necessary for the meaning of the verse itself, to teach that the sixth year will be blessed so that it yields three years’ worth of produce. The Gemara answers: It is written in another verse: “And you shall sow the eighth year, and eat yet of old produce until the ninth year” (Leviticus 25:22), so that the latter verse teaches about the three years’ worth of produce, and the first verse is available to derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one-third growth.
  § We learned in a mishna there: Rice, millet, poppy, and sesame that took root before Rosh HaShana are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, meaning that second tithe is set aside in the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the Sabbatical cycle, and poor man’s tithe is set aside in the third and sixth years, and they are permitted even if the following year is a Sabbatical Year. If they did not take root before Rosh HaShana, they are prohibited if it is the Sabbatical Year, and in ordinary years they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year.
  Rabba said: Say that the Sages said that the tithe year of a tree follows the time of the formation of its fruit, that of grain and olives follows the time that they reach one-third of their growth, and that of vegetables follows the time of their picking. The question may therefore be raised: With regard to these crops, i.e., rice, millet, poppy, and sesame, to what did the Sages equate them? Their tithe year is determined neither by their formation, nor by the time when they reach one-third of their growth, nor by their picking.
  Rabba then said: The reason for their uniqueness with regard to tithing is that since these crops do not ripen all at once, but rather, they ripen and are gathered little by little over an extended period of time, if their year were to follow the time of their picking, people might set aside tithes from that which was picked before Rosh HaShana for that which was picked after Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the Sages decreed that their tithe year follows the time of their taking root, which is the same for the entire field.
  Abaye said to him: Why should they have made such a decree? There is a better alternative: Let one pile the entire stock onto his threshing floor, into the middle of it, mix the stock together well, and then set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes, and consequently it will turn out that he has set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the new crop in the mixture for the new crop in it, and from the old crop in the mixture for the old crop in it.
  Abaye continued: Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar said in the name of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri: If the cowpea plant was planted for seed, not to be eaten as a vegetable but for the seeds, the beans themselves, either for eating or planting, and some took root already before Rosh HaShana, while some took root only after Rosh HaShana, one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> or tithes from this for that, as one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> or tithes from the new crop for the old or from the old crop for the new.
  How, then, should one act so that he not err and set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes incorrectly? He should pile the entire stock onto his threshing floor, into the middle of it, mix the stock together well, and then set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes, and consequently it will turn out that he has set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the new crop in the mixture for the new crop in it, and from the old crop in the mixture for the old crop in it. Why not do the same for rice, millet, poppy, and sesame?
  Rabba said to Abaye: You are speaking of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? You cannot raise an objection from what he says, as Rabbi Shimon Shezuri holds that there is mixing. He assumes that the old and new were thoroughly mixed, so that the <i>teruma</i> and tithes set aside from the mixture have the same proportions of old and new crops as did the original crops.
  But the Sages hold that there is no mixing; they do not assume that the old and new became thoroughly and evenly mixed. Therefore, piling the entire stock, mixing it together, and then setting aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes will not ensure that they are set aside correctly.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar that he said in the name of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri. Rabbi Zeira strongly objects to this: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn’t Shmuel say: There is no mixing for anything except for wine, oil, and other liquids? In the case of liquids he holds that everything is entirely mixed together, but not in the case of solids. How, then, could he have ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Zeira forgot that which Shmuel said: In all cases, the tithe year follows the time of the full ripening of the produce. Therefore, all of the cowpea seeds may be tithed together, whether the plants from which they grew took root before or after Rosh HaShana. This is not due to Rabbi Shimon Shezuri’s rationale that there is mixing, but because all of the beans reach full ripening at the same time, and consequently, they are all considered produce of the incoming year.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  The Gemara comments: It is necessary to state all three statements of Shmuel in order to clarify his position, as had Shmuel taught us only that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, I would have said that this is due to the fact that he holds that there is mixing even with regard to solids. Therefore, he teaches us the second statement, that there is no mixing for anything except wine, oil, and other liquids.
  And had Shmuel taught us only that there is no mixing for anything except liquids, I would have said that he holds like the Sages with regard to tithes, that the mixture of cowpeas cannot be tithed together. Therefore, he teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.
  And had Shmuel taught us only these two statements, I would have said in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira that it is difficult to reconcile one statement of Shmuel with another statement of Shmuel. Therefore, he teaches us that in all cases, the tithe year follows the time of the full ripening of the produce, and it is for this reason that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.
  And had Shmuel taught us only that in all cases the tithe year follows the time of the full ripening of the produce, I would have said that this applies even to grain and olives. Therefore, he teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri with regard to his dispute with the Sages, i.e., with regard to beans, but with regard to grain and olives the tithe year follows the time that they reach one-third of their growth.
  The Gemara asks: But let him teach us only these two statements, that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and that in all cases the tithe year follows the full ripening of the fruit, which would suffice to clarify Shmuel’s position. Why do I need to be told that there is no mixing for anything? The Gemara answers: This comes to teach us not that there is no mixing for solids, but that there is mixing for wine, oil, and other liquids.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The verse states: “After you have gathered in from your threshing floor and from your winepress” (Deuteronomy 16:13). This teaches that just as the grain that is brought to the threshing floor and the wine that is brought to the winepress are special in that they grow on the outgoing year’s water, i.e., the moisture in the ground from the previous winter’s rain, and the <i>halakha</i> is that they are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, so too, anything that grows on the outgoing year’s water is tithed in accordance with the outgoing year. This comes to exclude vegetables, which grow on the incoming year’s water, as their growth cycle is short and they are nurtured by the rain that falls while they are growing. Consequently, they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year.
  Rabbi Akiva says: This is the way the verse should be expounded: “After you have gathered in from your threshing floor and from your winepress”; this teaches us that just as the grain that is brought to the threshing floor and the wine that is brought to the winepress are special in that they grow on most water, i.e., rainfall is sufficient and they do not require irrigation, and the <i>halakha</i> is that they are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, so too, anything that grows on most water is tithed in accordance with the outgoing year. This comes to exclude vegetables, which grow on all water, i.e., they require irrigation as well. Consequently, they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva? Rabbi Abbahu said: There is a practical difference between them with regard to seedless onions and cowpeas, as we learned in a mishna: Seedless onions, which are cultivated for their greens and not for their bulbs or seeds, and the cowpea plant, which was planted to be eaten as a vegetable, from which one withheld water for thirty days before Rosh HaShana, so that their green portions stopped growing and they began to grow for seed, are tithed in accordance with the outgoing year, and they are permitted if the new year is the Sabbatical Year. And if not, they are prohibited if it is the Sabbatical Year, and in ordinary years they are tithed in accordance with the incoming year. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> depends not on the species of plant but on whether the crop is in fact nurtured by the previous year’s water or the new year’s water, and this mishna is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
  § The mishna taught: On the first of Shevat is the new year for trees, according to the statement of Beit Shammai. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the new year for trees was set on this date? Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: The reason is since by that time most of the year’s rains have already fallen, and most of the season, i.e., winter, is yet to come, as it continues until the spring equinox, which usually occurs in Nisan.
  The Gemara asks: What is he saying? The Gemara explains: This is what he said: Even though most of the winter season is yet to come, nevertheless, since most of the year’s rains have already fallen, it is considered the end of the previous year of rain, and anything that grows from then on is considered produce of the next year.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was once an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who picked an <i>etrog</i> on the first of Shevat and set aside two tithes. This occurred in the second or the fifth year of the Sabbatical cycle. In the second and fifth years one sets aside second tithe, whereas in the third and sixth years one sets aside poor man’s tithe. Rabbi Akiva set aside both second tithe and poor man’s tithe because he was in doubt about the <i>halakha</i>.
  
  Daf 14b
  
  One tithe was in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai that the new year for trees is on the first of Shevat, in which case it was already the third or sixth year, when one must set aside poor man’s tithe; and one tithe was in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel that the new year for trees is on the fifteenth of Shevat, so it was still the second or fifth year, when one must set aside second tithe.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: He did not act as he did in order to conform with the conflicting practices of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Rather, he acted as he did in order to conform with the conflicting practices of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer.
  As we learned in a mishna: The <i>etrog</i> tree is like an ordinary tree in three ways and like a vegetable in one way. How so? It is like an ordinary tree in three ways: With regard to <i>orla</i>, that the fruit of the first three years after the tree is planted is forbidden; with regard to fourth-year produce, that the fruit that grows in the fourth year after the tree is planted must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there or else it must be redeemed; and with regard to the Sabbatical Year, that the year is determined by the time of the formation of its fruit. And the <i>etrog</i> is like a vegetable in one way, which is that its tithe year follows the time of the picking of its fruit; this is the statement of Rabban Gamliel.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: The <i>etrog</i> is like fruit of a tree with regard to all matters, and so its tithe year also follows the time of the formation of its fruit. Since Rabbi Akiva was in doubt whether the <i>halakha</i> is ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel or Rabbi Eliezer, he set aside two tithes in order to follow both of their opinions.
  The Gemara questions Rabbi Akiva’s conduct: But do we adopt the respective stringencies of two authorities who disagree on a series of issues? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> is always in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, but one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai may do so, and one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel may do so. If he adopts both the leniencies of Beit Shammai and also the leniencies of Beit Hillel, he is a wicked person. And if he adopts both the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel, with regard to him the verse states: “The fool walks in darkness” (Ecclesiastes 2:14). Rather, one should act either in accordance with Beit Shammai, following both their leniencies and their stringencies, or in accordance with Beit Hillel, following both their leniencies and their stringencies. If so, why did Rabbi Akiva follow two contradictory stringencies?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva wished to act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, but he was in doubt about his tradition and did not know whether Beit Hillel said that the new year for trees is on the first of Shevat or whether they said that it is on the fifteenth of Shevat, and so he set aside two tithes in order to conform with both possibilities.
  The Gemara further clarifies the <i>baraita</i>, which states: Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: He did not act as he did in order to conform with the conflicting practices of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel; rather, he acted as he did in order to conform with the conflicting practices of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: Seeing that he did this on the first of Shevat, it would seem that he acted in accordance with the practice of Beit Shammai. According to Beit Hillel, both the formation of the fruit and its picking took place in the same year, as the new year does not begin until the fifteenth of Shevat, and so there would have been no need to set aside two tithes.
  Rabbi Ḥanina said, and some say that it was Rabbi Ḥananya who said: Here we are dealing with an <i>etrog</i> tree whose fruit was formed prior to the fifteenth of the other, previous, Shevat, in the second year, and it was picked on the first of the following Shevat, in the third year. According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that the tithe year of an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of the formation of its fruit, the fruit was obligated in second tithe, whereas according to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel that the tithe year of an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of its picking, it was obligated in poor man’s tithe, and so Rabbi Akiva set aside two tithes. And by right it should have taught that even if the fruit had been picked earlier, any time after the fifteenth of the previous Shevat, but the incident that took place, took place in this way, that the fruit was picked on the first of Shevat.
  Ravina said: Combine the two statements and teach the <i>baraita</i> as follows: It was not on the first of Shevat that Rabbi Akiva picked the fruit, but on the fifteenth of Shevat, and he did not act as he did in order to conform with the conflicting practices of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, but rather, he acted as he did in order to conform with the conflicting practices of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer, both in accordance with the practice of Beit Hillel.
  § Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Now that Rabban Gamliel has said that the tithe year of an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of the picking of its fruit, like a vegetable, its new year for tithing is Tishrei, like other vegetables.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the following <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: If one picked the fruit of an <i>etrog</i> tree on the eve of the fifteenth of Shevat before the sun had set, and then he picked more fruit after sunset, one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the one for the other, as one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the new crop for the old or from the old crop for the new. If he did this when it was the third year of the Sabbatical cycle going into the fourth year, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: From what he picked in the third year he must set aside first tithe and poor man’s tithe, and from what he picked in the fourth year he must set aside first tithe and second tithe.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  The Gemara clarifies this ruling: Whom did you hear that said the tithe year of an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of the picking of its fruit? It was Rabban Gamliel. And yet this <i>baraita</i> is teaching that the new year for tithing an <i>etrog</i> is the fifteenth of Shevat, against the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna, who says that according to Rabban Gamliel it is the first of Tishrei.
  Rather, if this was said, it was said as follows: Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Even though Rabban Gamliel said that the tithe year of an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of the picking of its fruit, like a vegetable, its new year is in Shevat, like a tree.
  The Gemara asks: What is different there, in the <i>baraita</i> with regard to one who picked vegetables on the eve of Rosh HaShana, such that it teaches the case when it was the second year of the Sabbatical cycle going into the third year, and what is different here, in the <i>baraita</i> dealing with one who was picking the fruit of an <i>etrog</i> tree on the eve of the fifteenth of Shevat, such that it teaches the case when it was the third year going into the fourth year? Why is the same example not brought in both cases?
  The Gemara answers: It teaches us a matter in passing, that it is damaging for an <i>etrog</i> when the tree is handled, and since everyone handles it in the Sabbatical Year, as all the orchards are declared ownerless and everyone is permitted to enter and pick produce, the tree does not bear fruit that is fit for eating for another three years.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan inquired of Rabbi Yannai: With regard to an <i>etrog</i>, when is its new year? Rabbi Yannai said to him: It is in Shevat. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked again: Are you referring to the lunar month of Shevat or to the Shevat of the solar season, which begins thirty days after the winter solstice, but on a different date each year? Rabbi Yannai said to him: I am referring to the lunar month of Shevat.
  Rava inquired of Rav Naḥman, and some say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who inquired of Rabbi Yannai: If it was a leap year, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does the new year for trees then move to the First Adar, which is the penultimate month in a leap year? He said to him: Follow the majority of years. Even in a leap year the new year for trees is in Shevat.
  Rabba said: An <i>etrog</i> from the sixth year of the Sabbatical cycle that entered into, and was picked in, the Sabbatical Year is exempt from tithes, like the produce of the Sabbatical Year, and is also exempt from the mitzva of elimination of Sabbatical Year produce from one’s house after produce of that particular species is no longer found in the field. A Sabbatical Year <i>etrog</i> that entered into, and was picked in, the eighth year is exempt from tithes but is subject to the mitzva of elimination of Sabbatical Year produce from one’s house.
  Abaye said to him: Granted, in the latter clause the <i>halakha</i> follows the more stringent approach, as it follows the time of the formation of the fruit, which was in the Sabbatical Year, and therefore the <i>etrog</i> is subject to the mitzva of elimination. But in the first clause, which states that the <i>etrog</i> is exempt from the mitzva of elimination, why is this so? It must be that we say to follow the time of the formation of the fruit, which was in the sixth year. But if so, it should be subject to tithes.
  Rabba said to him: Everyone’s hand is touching it, as all are permitted to enter the orchards and touch all the fruit, and so the etrog is regarded as ownerless, and yet you wish to say that it should be subject to tithes? Even if it is not exempt as fruit of the Sabbatical Year, it is exempt from tithes because it is now ownerless.
  Rav Hamnuna argued and said: An <i>etrog</i> from the sixth year of the Sabbatical cycle that entered into, and was picked in, the Sabbatical Year is always and for all purposes considered sixth-year produce. And an <i>etrog</i> from the Sabbatical Year that entered into, and was picked in, the eighth year is always and for all purposes considered produce of the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the following <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: An <i>etrog</i> from the sixth year that entered into, and was picked in, the Sabbatical Year is exempt from tithes, and it is also exempt from the mitzva of elimination of Sabbatical Year produce from one’s house, as there is nothing that is subject to tithes unless it both grew at a time of obligation in tithes and was also picked at a time of obligation. Likewise, an <i>etrog</i> from the Sabbatical Year that entered into, and was picked in, the eighth year is exempt from tithes, and it is also exempt from the mitzva of elimination, as nothing is subject to the mitzva of elimination unless it both grew in the Sabbatical Year and was also picked in the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara notes: The first clause of this <i>baraita</i> poses a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, who says that a sixth-year <i>etrog</i> that was picked in the Sabbatical Year is subject to tithes. And the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> poses a difficulty with regard to the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Hamnuna, as they both say that a Sabbatical-Year <i>etrog</i> that was picked in the eighth year is subject to the mitzva of elimination.
  The Gemara answers: The matter is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei said: Avtolemos testified in the name of five Elders: An <i>etrog</i> follows the time of its picking in the matter of tithes. But our Sages voted in Usha and said that an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of its picking, both in the matter of tithes and in the matter of the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara raises a question about this <i>baraita</i>: Who mentioned anything about the Sabbatical Year? The subject of the discussion was tithes.
  
  Daf 15b
  
  The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is incomplete and is teaching the following: Avtolemos testified in the name of five Elders: An <i>etrog</i> follows the time of its picking in the matter of tithes and it follows the time of the formation of its fruit in the matter of the Sabbatical Year. But our Sages voted in Usha and decided that an <i>etrog</i> follows the time of its picking, both in the matter of tithes and in the matter of the Sabbatical Year.
  It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> of Eretz Yisrael discussed this issue: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: An <i>etrog</i> from the sixth year of the Sabbatical cycle that entered into, and was picked in, the Sabbatical Year is always and for all purposes considered as sixth-year produce. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A sixth-year <i>etrog</i> that entered into, and was picked in, the Sabbatical Year, although at the beginning of the Sabbatical Year it was only the size of an olive-bulk and during the Sabbatical Year it grew to the size of a loaf of bread, is considered sixth-year produce that is subject to tithing, and if one eats it without tithing, he is liable for eating untithed produce.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A tree whose fruits were formed before the fifteenth of Shevat is tithed in accordance with the previous year, and if the fruits were formed after the fifteenth of Shevat it is tithed in accordance with the coming year. Rabbi Neḥemya said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a tree that produces two broods, two crops, in a single year.
  The Gemara interrupts with a question about the wording of this <i>baraita</i>: Does it enter your mind to say two broods? Animals produce broods, but trees do not. Rather, say: Like two broods, i.e., two seasons’ worth of crops.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: But in the case of trees that produce only one brood of fruit, for example, palm trees, and olive trees, and carob trees, which yield fruit only once a year, although their fruit took form before the fifteenth of Shevat, they are tithed in accordance with the coming year, since they follow the time of their fruit’s picking. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, most fruit will be tithed according to the time that the fruit is picked, since only a minority of fruit trees produce two crops a year.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The people were accustomed to act with regard to carobs in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, that their tithe year follows the time of the fruit’s picking.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mishna that teaches: In the case of white fig trees, the Sabbatical Year for them with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of eating and elimination is in the second year of the Sabbatical cycle, due to the fact that their fruit grows for three years, and so the fruit that ripens in the second year of the Sabbatical cycle had already taken form in the previous Sabbatical Year. This indicates that the tithe follows the time of the formation of the fruit and not the time of picking.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan was silent and did not respond, as though he had no answer. Rabbi Abba the priest said to Rabbi Yosei the priest: Why was Rabbi Yoḥanan silent? He should have said to Reish Lakish as follows: I am speaking to you of the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, and you say to me the opinion of the Rabbis?
  Rabbi Yosei the priest answered: He could not have made this argument, because Reish Lakish would then have said to him: Do you abandon the opinion of the Rabbis, who constitute the majority, and act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who express a sole dissenting opinion?
  Rabbi Abba the priest asked further: Rabbi Yoḥanan should have said to him: I am speaking to you only about how the people practice and that their custom follows the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, and you say to me that it is a prohibition? Rabbi Yosei the priest answered: He could not have said this, because Reish Lakish would then have said to him: Where there is a prohibition, even if they were accustomed to act in a particular manner, would we leave them to continue?
  Rabbi Abba the priest asked further: Rabbi Yoḥanan should have said to Reish Lakish as follows: I am speaking to you about the tithe of carobs, which is only by rabbinic decree, as by Torah law all fruits apart from grapes and olives are exempt from tithing, and you speak to me about the Sabbatical Year, which is by Torah law? This being an irrefutable argument, the Gemara once again clarifies this matter.
  Rather, Rabbi Abba the priest said: I wonder whether Reish Lakish actually raised this original objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, since it has such a clear refutation. The Gemara asks: Whether he asked it? But he did ask it, as is reported in the story. Rather, say: I wonder if Rabbi Yoḥanan accepted this question and was silent because he had nothing to answer, or he did not accept it but nevertheless remained silent because he thought the question was not worthy of an answer.
  
  Daf 16a
  
  MISHNA: At four times of the year the world is judged: On Passover judgment is passed concerning grain; on <i>Shavuot</i> concerning fruits that grow on a tree; on Rosh HaShana all creatures pass before Him like sheep [<i>benei maron</i>], as it is stated: “He Who fashions their hearts alike, Who considers all their deeds” (Psalms 33:15); and on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> they are judged concerning water, i.e., the rainfall of the coming year.
  GEMARA: The mishna taught that on Passover judgment is passed concerning grain. The Gemara asks: Which grain is judged on Passover? If we say it is the grain that is presently standing in the fields ready to be reaped between Passover and <i>Shavuot</i>, when was judgment passed with regard to all those events [<i>harpatkei</i>] that already happened to the grain while it was growing in the winter? Rather, the mishna must be referring to the grain that will be sown over the coming year.
  The Gemara asks further: Is this to say that only one judgment is passed concerning a particular crop, and no more? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If grain suffers an incident or accident before Passover, it was judged in the past, the previous Passover; if this occurs after Passover, it was judged this Passover for the future. And similarly, if a person suffered an incident or accident before Yom Kippur, he was judged in the past, the previous Rosh HaShana; if this occurred after Yom Kippur, he was judged this Rosh HaShana for the future.
  Rava said: Learn from here that two judgments are passed concerning each crop, one covering the period between the time it is sown and Passover and another covering the period between Passover and the time it is harvested. Abaye said: Therefore, if a person sees that his slow-growing crops, those that are sown at the beginning of the winter but ripen only in the spring or summer, are doing well, he should quickly sow fast-growing crops, such as barley, which can be sown at the end of the winter and still ripen before Passover, as before it is brought to judgment on the next Passover it will already have successfully grown, since he knows that this year’s crops were judged for a favorable yield.
  The Gemara raises a question about the mishna: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.
  The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All are judged on Rosh HaShana, and their sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: All are judged on Rosh HaShana, and their sentence is sealed each in its own time: On Passover the sentence is sealed concerning grain; on <i>Shavuot</i> concerning fruits that grow on a tree; on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> they are judged concerning water; and mankind is judged on Rosh HaShana, and the sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur.
  Rabbi Yosei says: A person is judged every day, and not just once a year, as it is stated: “You visit him every morning” (Job 7:18), meaning that every morning an accounting is made and a judgment is passed. Rabbi Natan says: A person is judged every hour, as it is stated: “You try him every moment” (Job 7:18).
  And lest you say that actually, the mishna is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and when the mishna is taught, it is taught with regard to the sentence, and not the judgments, which are all passed on Rosh HaShana, if so, it is difficult with regard to mankind, as the mishna should have stated that the sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur.
  Rava said: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna is a <i>tanna</i> from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as a <i>tanna</i> from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: At four times of the year the world is judged: On Passover concerning grain; on <i>Shavuot</i> concerning fruits that grow on a tree; on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> they are judged concerning water; and mankind is judged on Rosh HaShana and the sentence is sealed on Yom Kippur. And when the mishna is taught, it is taught with regard to the beginning of the judgment process, i.e., the judgment of mankind is initially passed on Rosh HaShana.
  Rav Ḥisda said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? The Gemara is astonished by this question: Why ask about his reason? He stated his reason, the verse that states: “You visit him every morning.” The Gemara explains: This is what we are saying: If Rabbi Yosei relies on this verse, what is the reason that he did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that a person is judged every hour? And if you say that he holds that the verse “You try him every moment” cannot serve as proof, because trying merely indicates examination and not actual judgment, then in the same way visiting merely indicates examination. If so, there is no clear proof from this verse.
  Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Yosei’s reason is from here, another verse, which states: “To make the judgment of His servant and the judgment of His people Israel at all times, as each day may require” (I Kings 8:19), which indicates that the entire world is judged every day.
  § About this verse Rav Ḥisda said: When a king and a community are brought before God for judgment, the king is brought in for judgment first, as it is stated: “To make the judgment of His servant,” and afterward: “And the judgment of His people Israel.” What is the reason for this? If you wish, say that it is not proper conduct for the king to stand outside and wait for the trial of his subjects to come to an end. And if you wish, say instead that the king is brought in first so that he may be judged before God’s anger intensifies due to the sins of the community, and consequently he may be saved from overly harsh judgment.
  Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion do we pray nowadays on a daily basis for the sick and afflicted? The Gemara repeats the question: In accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that one is judged every day, and so there is reason to pray every day in order to affect the outcome of his judgment. And if you wish, say that actually, normative practice is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one is judged only once a year, but also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Crying out to God is beneficial for a person both before his sentence has been issued and after his sentence has been issued.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: For what reason did the Torah say: Bring the <i>omer</i> offering on the second day of Passover? It is because Passover is the time of grain, the beginning of the grain harvest season, and therefore the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Bring the <i>omer</i> offering before Me on Passover so that the grain in the fields will be blessed for you. And for what reason did the Torah say: Bring the offering of the two loaves from the new wheat on <i>Shavuot</i>? It is because <i>Shavuot</i> is the time of the fruits that grow on a tree, when it begins to ripen, and therefore the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Bring the offering of the two loaves before Me on <i>Shavuot</i> so that the fruits that grow on a tree will be blessed for you.
  And for what reason did the Torah say: Pour water onto the altar in the Temple on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Pour water before Me on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> so that the rains of the year, which begin to fall after <i>Sukkot</i>, will be blessed for you. And recite before Me on Rosh HaShana verses that mention Kingships, Remembrances, and <i>Shofarot</i>: Kingships so that you will crown Me as King over you; Remembrances so that your remembrance will rise before Me for good; and with what will the remembrance rise? It will rise with the <i>shofar</i>.
  Similarly, Rabbi Abbahu said: Why does one sound a blast with a <i>shofar</i> made from a ram’s horn on Rosh HaShana? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Sound a blast before Me with a <i>shofar</i> made from a ram’s horn, so that I will remember for you the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham, in whose stead a ram was sacrificed, and I will ascribe it to you as if you had bound yourselves before Me.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Why does one sound [<i>tokin</i>] a blast on Rosh HaShana? The Gemara is astonished by the question: Why do we sound a blast? The Merciful One states in the verse: “Sound [<i>tiku</i>] a <i>shofar</i>” (Psalms 81:4). Rather, the question is: Why does one sound a staccato series of <i>shofar</i> blasts [<i>terua</i>] in addition to a long continuous <i>shofar</i> blast [<i>tekia</i>]? The Gemara is still surprised by the question: Sound a <i>terua</i>? The Merciful One states: “In the seventh month, in the first day of the month, shall be a solemn rest unto you, a memorial proclaimed with the blast of horns [<i>terua</i>]” (Leviticus 23:24). Rather, Rabbi Yitzḥak asked about the common practice in Jewish communities, which is not explicitly stated in the Torah: Why does one sound a long, continuous <i>shofar</i> blast [<i>tekia</i>] and then a staccato series of <i>shofar</i> blasts [<i>terua</i>] while the congregation is still sitting before the silent prayer,
  
  Daf 16b
  
  and then sound again a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> while they are standing in the <i>Amida</i> prayer? He answers: In order to confuse the Satan, for this double blowing of the <i>shofar</i> demonstrates Israel’s love for the mitzva, and this will confuse Satan when he brings his accusations against Israel before the heavenly court, and the Jewish people will receive a favorable judgment.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said, playing on the double meaning of the word <i>meri’in</i>, which can mean either sound a <i>terua</i> or cause misfortune: Any year during which, due to some mishap, the <i>shofar</i> was not sounded at its beginning will suffer evil and misfortune at its end. What is the reason? Because Satan was not confused, and he was able to put forward his accusations, so that the Jewish people would be punished.
  § The Gemara brings a series of statements in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak, all of which relate to judgment: And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Any year that is poor [<i>rasha</i>] and troubled at its beginning will be made rich at its end, for it is stated: “From the beginning [<i>mereishit</i>] of the year” (Deuteronomy 11:12). The word <i>meireishit</i> is written defectively, without an <i>alef</i>, so that it may also be understood in the sense of <i>rashut</i>, poverty. The verse continues: “And until the end [<i>aḥarit</i>] of the year,” which means that the end of the year will have expectations of good things in the end [<i>aḥarit</i>].
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A man is judged only according to his deeds at the time of his judgment, and not according to his future deeds, as it is stated with regard to Ishmael: “For God has heard the voice of the lad where he is” (Genesis 21:17). Although Ishmael and his descendants would act wickedly in the future, his prayer was heard and answered because he was innocent at the time.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Three matters evoke a person’s sins, and they are: Endangering oneself by sitting next to an inclined wall that is about to collapse; expecting prayer to be accepted, as that leads to an assessment of one’s status and merit; and passing a case against another to Heaven, for Rabbi Avin said: Anyone who passes a case against another to God is punished first. Praying for God to pass judgment on another causes one’s own deeds to be examined and compared with the deeds of the other, as it is stated: “And Sarai said to Abram: My anger be upon you; I have given my maid into your bosom, and when she saw that she had conceived, I was despised in her eyes; let the Lord judge between me and you” (Genesis 16:5), and it is written afterward: “And Abraham came to mourn for Sarah and to weep for her” (Genesis 23:2). Sarah called upon Heaven to pass judgment between her and her husband, and therefore she was punished and died first.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A person’s sentence is torn up on account of four types of actions. These are: Giving charity, crying out in prayer, a change of one’s name, and a change of one’s deeds for the better. An allusion may be found in Scripture for all of them: Giving charity, as it is written: “And charity delivers from death” (Proverbs 10:2); crying out in prayer, as it is written: “Then they cry to the Lord in their trouble, and He brings them out of their distresses” (Psalms 107:28); a change of one’s name, as it is written: “As for Sarai your wife, you shall not call her name Sarai, but Sarah shall her name be” (Genesis 17:15), and it is written there: “And I will bless her, and I will also give you a son from her” (Genesis 17:16); a change of one’s deeds for the better, as it is written: “And God saw their deeds” (Jonah 3:10), and it is written there: “And God repented of the evil, which He had said He would do to them, and He did not do it” (Jonah 3:10).
  And some say: Also, a change of one’s place of residence cancels an evil judgment, as it is written: “And the Lord said to Abram: Go you out of your county” (Genesis 12:1), and afterward it is written: “And I will make of you a great nation” (Genesis 12: 2). The Gemara explains: And the other one, i.e., Rabbi Yitzḥak, who does not include a change of residence in his list, holds that in the case of Abram, it was the merit and sanctity of Eretz Yisrael that helped him become the father of a great nation.
  The Gemara cites two more statements in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak, relating to the Festivals: And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A person is obligated to go out and greet his teacher on a Festival, as it is stated that the husband of the Shunamite woman asked, when she was readying herself to go to the prophet: “Why will you go to him today; it is neither the New Moon nor Shabbat” (II Kings 4:23). By inference, we learn that on the New Moon and on Shabbat, which in this context means a Festival that is a day of rest, she was required to go.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A person is obligated to purify himself on a Festival, as it is stated: “And their carcasses you shall not touch; they are impure to you” (Leviticus 11:8). This verse is referring to the Festivals, as taught in the following <i>baraita</i>.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And their carcass you shall not touch.” One might have thought that ordinary Jews are prohibited from touching an animal carcass. Therefore, the verse states: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: There shall none be defiled for the dead among his people” (Leviticus 21:1). It is derived from here that the sons of Aaron are prohibited from defiling themselves, but the children of Israel, i.e., non-priests, are not prohibited from doing so.
  But are these matters not an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? If, with regard to of severe impurity, i.e., contact with a human corpse, priests are prohibited from defiling themselves, while ordinary Israelites are not prohibited from doing so, in the case of light impurity, e.g., touching an animal carcass, is it not all the more so that Israelites be permitted to defile themselves? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And their carcass you shall not touch?” It means that on a Festival all are obligated to purify themselves.
  § The Gemara goes back to discuss the Day of Judgment. Rabbi Kruspedai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Three books are opened on Rosh HaShana before the Holy One, Blessed be He: One of wholly wicked people, and one of wholly righteous people, and one of middling people whose good and bad deeds are equally balanced. Wholly righteous people are immediately written and sealed for life; wholly wicked people are immediately written and sealed for death; and middling people are left with their judgment suspended from Rosh HaShana until Yom Kippur, their fate remaining undecided. If they merit, through the good deeds and mitzvot that they perform during this period, they are written for life; if they do not so merit, they are written for death.
  Rabbi Avin said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, but not be written with the righteous” (Psalms 69:29). “Let them be blotted out of the book”; this is the book of wholly wicked people, who are blotted out from the world. “Of the living”; this is the book of wholly righteous people. “But not be written with the righteous”; this is the book of middling people, who are written in a separate book, not with the righteous.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This matter is derived from here: “And if not, blot me, I pray You, out of Your book which you have written” (Exodus 32:32). “Blot me, I pray You”; this is the book of wholly wicked people, who are blotted out from the world. “Out of Your book”; this is the book of wholly righteous people, which is special and attributed to God Himself. “Which You have written”; this is the book of middling people.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Beit Shammai say: There will be three groups of people on the great Day of Judgment at the end of days: One of wholly righteous people, one of wholly wicked people, and one of middling people. Wholly righteous people will immediately be written and sealed for eternal life. Wholly wicked people will immediately be written and sealed for Gehenna, as it is stated: “And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall wake, some to eternal life and some to shame and everlasting contempt” (Daniel 12:2). Middling people will descend to Gehenna to be cleansed and to achieve atonement for their sins,
  
  Daf 17a
  
  and they will cry out in their pain and eventually ascend from there, as it is stated: “And I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried; they shall call on My name, and I will answer them” (Zechariah 13:9). This is referring to the members of the third group, who require refinement and cleansing. And about them, Hannah said: “The Lord kills, and gives life; he brings down to the grave, and brings up” (I Samuel 2:6).
  Beit Hillel say: He Who is “and abundant in kindness” (Exodus 34:6) tilts the scales in favor of kindness, so that middling people should not have to pass through Gehenna. And about them, David said: “I love the Lord, Who hears my voice and my supplications” (Psalms 116:1). And about them, David said the entire passage: “I was brought low [<i>daloti</i>] and He saved me” (Psalms 116:6). Although they are poor [<i>dalim</i>] in mitzvot, God saves them.
  The rebellious Jews who have sinned with their bodies and also the rebellious people of the nations of the world who have sinned with their bodies descend to Gehenna and are judged there for twelve months. After twelve months, their bodies are consumed, their souls are burned, and a wind scatters them under the soles of the feet of the righteous, as it is stated: “And you shall tread down the wicked; for they shall be ashes under the soles of your feet” (Malachi 3:21).
  But the heretics; and the informers; and the apostates [<i>apikorsim</i>]; and those who denied the Torah; and those who denied the resurrection of the dead; and those who separated from the ways of the Jewish community and refused to share the suffering; and those who cast their fear over the land of the living; and those who sinned and caused the masses to sin, for example, Jeroboam, son of Nebat, and his company; all of these people descend to Gehenna and are judged there for generations and generations, as it is stated: “And they shall go forth, and look upon the carcasses of the men that have rebelled against Me; for their worm shall not die; neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorrence to all flesh” (Isaiah 66:24).
  Gehenna will terminate, but they still will not terminate, as it is stated: “And their form shall wear away the netherworld, so that there be no dwelling for Him” (Psalms 49:15); that is to say, Gehenna itself will be worn away before their punishment has come to an end. And why are they punished so severely? Because they stretched out their hands against God’s dwelling, the Temple, and everything else that is sanctified, as it is stated: “So that there be no dwelling [<i>zevul</i>] for Him.” Dwelling [<i>zevul</i>] is referring here only to the Temple, as it is stated: “I have built You a house for dwelling [<i>zevul</i>] in” (I Kings 8:13). And about them Hannah said: “The adversaries of the Lord shall be broken in pieces” (I Samuel 2:10).
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avin said: And their faces on the Day of Judgment will be black and sooty like the bottom of a pot. And Rava said: And they shall include the most handsome, i.e., upstanding, of the people of Meḥoza, as Rava thought that even the most upstanding people of the city of Meḥoza were wicked, and they shall be called the people of Gehenna.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> above: It stated that Beit Hillel say: He Who is “and abundant in kindness” (Exodus 34:6) tilts the scales in favor of kindness, so that middling people will not have to pass through Gehenna. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And I will bring the third part through the fire” (Zechariah 13:9), implying that there is a third group, which is sent to Gehenna temporarily? The Gemara answers: There, the verse is referring to the rebellious Jews who have sinned with their bodies.
  The Gemara asks: Can the verse be referring to the rebellious Jews who have sinned with their bodies? But didn’t you say that they have no rectification? The Gemara responds: When do they have no rectification? When in addition to their having sinned with their bodies, the majority of their actions are sins. But here, the verse is referring to people for whom half of their actions are sins and half are meritorious deeds, and those sins include the sin of the rebellious Jews who sin with their bodies. It is not sufficient that they not be subject to the verse: “And I will bring the third part through the fire.” However, if their sins and meritorious deeds are equally balanced, and they did not sin with their bodies, He Who is “abundant in kindness” tilts the scales in favor of kindness. And about them, David said: “I love the Lord, Who hears my voice and my supplications” (Psalms 116:1).
  Rava interpreted the verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I love the Lord, Who hears my voice and my supplications”? The Congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, when do I know that I am loved by You? When You hear the voice of my supplications, as the verse states: “I was brought low [<i>daloti</i>], and He saved me” (Psalms 116:6). Although I am poor [<i>dala</i>] in mitzvot, nevertheless it is fitting to save me.
  The Gemara asks: The rebellious Jews who have sinned with their bodies, who are they? Rav said: This is referring to the skull that did not ever don phylacteries. The Gemara asks further: The rebellious ones of the nations of the world who sin with their bodies, who are they? Rav said: They are those who engage in the sin, i.e., forbidden sexual relations.
  And those who cast their fear over the land of the living, who are they? Rav Ḥisda said: This is referring to a communal leader [<i>parnas</i>] who casts excessive fear on the community not for the sake of Heaven. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Any community leader who casts excessive fear on the community not for the sake of Heaven will be punished and not see any Torah scholar among his sons, as it is stated: “Men do therefore fear him; he sees not any who are wise of heart” (Job 37:24). One who brings others to fear him will not merit having wise-hearted people in his family.
  § It was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: Beit Hillel say: He who is “and abundant in kindness” (Exodus 34:6) tilts the scales in favor of kindness, so that middling people will not have to pass through Gehenna. The Gemara asks: How does He do this? Rabbi Eliezer says: He pushes down on the side of the merits, tipping the scale in their favor, as it is stated: “He will again have compassion upon us; He will push down our iniquities” (Micah 7:19). Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: He bears, i.e., raises, the side of the sins, as it is stated: “He bears [<i>noseh</i>] sin and forgives transgression” (Micah 7:18).
  A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a <i>baraita</i>: He overlooks each and every first transgression, and that is the attribute of mercy, that God forgives one’s first sin, and therefore He tips the scale in favor of the merits. Rava said: But that sin itself, which God overlooks, is not completely erased; if the individual’s actions are still mostly sins, God counts the overlooked sin with them and metes out punishment accordingly.
  Rava understood this verse differently and said: With regard to whoever forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices done to him, the heavenly court in turn forgoes punishment for all his sins, as it is stated: “He bears sin and forgives transgression” (Micah 7:18). Whose sins does He bear? The sins of one who forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices committed against him.
  It is related that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, became sick, and Rav Pappa went into his home to inquire about his well-being. He saw that the world was growing weak for Rav Huna, i.e., he was dying. Rav Pappa said to his attendants: Prepare his provisions [<i>zavdata</i>], i.e., his shrouds. In the end, Rav Huna recovered. Rav Pappa was embarrassed to go and see him, as it seemed as if he had decreed Rav Huna’s death. Rav Huna’s friends said to him: What did you see when you were lying there suspended between life and death? He said to them: Yes, it was so, I was truly close to dying, but the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the heavenly court: Since he does not stand on his rights, i.e., he is ready to waive what is due him, you too should not be exacting with him in his judgment, as it is stated: “He bears [<i>noseh</i>] sin and forgives transgression.” Whose sins does He bear? The sins of one who forgoes his reckonings with others for injustices committed against him.
  That same verse continues: “He bears sins and forgives transgression for the remnant of His inheritance” (Micah 7:18). Rav Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: This is like the fat tail that has a thorn in it, i.e., something good that contains something bad. God forgives and pardons only “for the remnant of His inheritance,” but not for all His inheritance.
  
  Daf 17b
  
  That is to say, God forgives sins only for one who regards himself as a remainder, i.e., of only secondary importance.
  § Rav Huna raised a contradiction between the two halves of a verse. It is written: “The Lord is righteous [<i>tzaddik</i>] in all His ways” (Psalms 145:17), indicating that God acts in accordance with the attribute of strict justice [<i>tzedek</i>], and then it is written in the same verse: “And kind [<i>ḥasid</i>] in all His works,” implying that He acts with grace and loving-kindness [<i>ḥesed</i>], going beyond the letter of the law. Rav Huna explained: Initially, at the time of judgment, He is righteous, but in the end, at the time of punishment, He is gracious.
  Rabbi Elazar raised a similar contradiction: It is written: “But to you, O Lord, belongs kindness” (Psalms 62:13), implying that God acts beyond the letter of the law, and then it is written in the same verse: “For You render to a man according to his deeds,” implying that He rewards and punishes measure for measure. Rabbi Elazar answered: Initially, at the time of judgment: “For You render to a man according to his deeds”; but in the end, at the time of punishment: “But to You, O Lord, belongs kindness.”
  Ilfai, and some say it was the Sage Ilfa, also raised a contradiction: It is written in the list of God’s attributes: “And abundant in kindness” (Exodus 34:6), and it is written in the same verse: “And truth,” which implies the attribute of justice. He answered: Initially, at the time of judgment: “And truth,” i.e., God employs strict justice, but in the end, when He sees that the world cannot survive on judgment based only on truth and justice: “And abundant in kindness,” i.e., He is merciful.
  § The verse states: “And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed” (Exodus 34:6). Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Were it not explicitly written in the verse, it would be impossible to say this, as it would be insulting to God’s honor. The verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, wrapped Himself in a prayer shawl like a prayer leader and showed Moses the structure of the order of the prayer. He said to him: Whenever the Jewish people sin, let them act before Me in accordance with this order. Let the prayer leader wrap himself in a prayer shawl and publicly recite the thirteen attributes of mercy, and I will forgive them.
  The verse continues: “The Lord, the Lord,” and it should be understood as follows: I am He before a person sins, and I am He after a person sins and performs repentance, as God does not recall for him his first sins, since He is always “God, merciful and gracious” (Exodus 34:6).
  Rav Yehuda said: A covenant was made with the thirteen attributes that they will not return empty-handed, meaning that if one mentions them, he will certainly be answered, as it is stated in this regard: “Behold, I make a covenant” (Exodus 34:10).
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Great is repentance, for it tears up the sentence issued against a person, as it is stated: “Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and smear over their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and they will return, and be healed” (Isaiah 6:10), implying that if indeed they return and repent, they will be healed from all their sins.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: But perhaps this was said before the sentence was issued, but after one’s sentence has been decreed repentance no longer helps. Abaye said to him: It is written here: “And they will return and be healed” (Isaiah 6:10). What requires healing? An illness does. Consequently, you must say that the reference here is to a sentence that has already been issued, and even so, after repentance, they will be healed.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If one repents in the meantime, between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur, he is forgiven; if he does not repent in the meantime, then even if he later brings as offerings all the rams of Nebaioth in the world, which are of the best quality, they do not forgive him in the Heavenly court. This implies that once one’s sentence has been decreed, even repentance cannot alter it. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: Here, where repentance is effective only before the sentence on Yom Kippur, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to repentance of an individual; there, where forgiveness is granted even after a sentence is issued, it is referring to communal repentance.
  The Gemara raises an objection from another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “A land which the Lord your God cares for; the eyes of the Lord your God are always upon it” (Deuteronomy 11:12). God’s constant providence over Eretz Yisrael is sometimes for the good and sometimes for the bad. Sometimes for the good; how so? If the Jews were wholly wicked on Rosh HaShana, so that only a meager amount of rain was decreed for them for the year, but in the end they repented, what can be done? To add rain is impossible, as the decree was already issued. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, causes those sparse rains to fall at the appropriate times on land that needs it, e.g., fields, vineyards, and gardens, all according to requirements of the land, and those rains are just as effective as a lot of rain.
  Sometimes for bad; how so? If the Jewish people were wholly righteous on Rosh HaShana, so that much rain was decreed for them for that year, but in the end they regressed and sinned, what can be done? To reduce the amount of rain is impossible, as the decree was already issued. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, causes the rain to fall not at the appropriate time, and on land that does not need it, e.g., forests and deserts, and the ample rain is no more beneficial than meager rain.
  The Gemara asks: When it is for good, however, let Him tear up their sentence and add to the rain that had originally been decreed for them. Since the <i>baraita</i> explains that God does not do so, it implies that an evil sentence cannot be rescinded, even if the entire community fully repents. The Gemara answers: It is different there, because it is possible to achieve the same result in this manner, by causing the rain to fall at the proper time and in the proper place, without rescinding the original sentence.
  Come and hear a proof from a different <i>baraita</i>: The psalm states: “They that go down to the sea in ships, that do business in great waters; these saw the works of the Lord, and His wonders in the deep” (Psalms 107:23–24). The psalm continues: “For He commanded, and raised the stormy wind, which lifted up the waves thereof…They reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits’ end” (Psalms 107:25–27). It continues further: “Then they cry to the Lord in their trouble, and He brings them out of their distresses” (Psalms 107:28). And finally, “Let them give thanks to the Lord for His mercy, and for His wonderful works to the children of men” (Psalms 107:31).
  Markers were inserted here before each one of verses 23 through 28. These markers, which are the letter <i>nun</i> inverted, are similar in meaning to the words but and only in the Torah, to tell us that just as the Torah’s words are precise and cannot be changed, so too, these people cannot have their sentence changed. This tells you that if they cried out before the sentence was issued, they are answered, but if they cried out only after the sentence was issued, they are not answered.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, for those who go down to the sea in ships are also considered like individuals. Even if there are many such people, they do not constitute an entire community but only a small defined group within it.
  The Gemara continues: Come and hear: Beloreya the convert once asked Rabban Gamliel: It is written in your Torah: “The great, mighty, and awesome God who favors no one” (Deuteronomy 10:17), and elsewhere it is written: “The Lord shall show favor to you and give you peace” (Numbers 6: 26). How can this contradiction be resolved?
  Rabbi Yosei the priest joined the conversation with her and said: I will tell you a parable. To what is this matter comparable? To a person who lent his friend one hundred dinars and fixed a time for repayment of the loan before the king, and the borrower took an oath by the life of the king that he would repay the money. The time arrived, and he did not repay the loan. The delinquent borrower came to appease the king for not fulfilling the oath that he had sworn by the life of the king, and the king said to him: For my insult I forgive you, but you must still go and appease your friend. Here also the same is true: Here, the verse that states: “The Lord shall show favor to you,” is referring to sins committed between man and God, which God will forgive; there, the verse that states: “God favors no one,” is referring to sins committed between a person and another, which God will not forgive until the offender appeases the one he hurt.
  This is how the contradiction had at first been resolved, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught as follows:
  
  Daf 18a
  
  Here the verse is referring to the time before one’s sentence is issued, when God shows favor and forgives; and there the verse is referring to the time after the sentence has been issued, when He no longer forgives. This implies that after a sentence has been issued, there is no possibility of repentance, which seems to contradict the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara answers: Here too it is referring to an individual, but a community is granted forgiveness even after its sentence has been issued.
  § The question of whether or not an individual’s sentence can be rescinded is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: Two people take to their beds, and their illness is the same, or two people ascend to the tribunal [<i>gardom</i>] for judgment, and their potential sentence is the same; but this one comes down from his bed, while that one does not come down from his bed, and this one is saved from death, while that one is not saved.
  For what reason did this one recover and come down from his bed, while that one did not recover and come down from his bed; and why was this one saved from death, while that one was not saved? The difference between them is that this one prayed and was answered, while that one prayed, but was not answered. And for what reason was this one answered and that one not answered? This one prayed a prayer with his whole heart and consequently was answered, while that one did not pray a prayer with his whole heart and therefore was not answered.
  Rabbi Elazar said: Not so; rather, here he prayed before his heavenly sentence was issued, and so he was answered, whereas there the other one prayed after his heavenly sentence was issued, and therefore he was not answered. Rabbi Yitzḥak disagreed and said: Crying out to God is effective for a person, both before his sentence has been issued and also after his sentence has been issued, as even after his sentence has been issued, it can still be rescinded if he repents.
  The Gemara asks: Can a sentence of a community really be torn up because they have repented? But one verse says: “O Jerusalem, wash your heart from wickedness, that you may be saved” (Jeremiah 4:14), and elsewhere it is written: “For though you wash yourself with lye, and use much soap, yet the stain of your iniquity is before Me, says the Lord God” (Jeremiah 2:22). What, is it not that here the verse is referring to the time before the sentence, when the heart can still be washed with repentance, whereas there the verse is referring to the time after the sentence, when washing no longer helps, as the sentence cannot be canceled?
  The Gemara answers: No, both this verse and that verse refer to the time after the sentence has been decreed, and still it is not difficult: Here the verse is referring to a sentence accompanied by an oath taken by God not to cancel the sentence, whereas there the verse is referring to a sentence that is not accompanied by God’s oath not to cancel the sentence, and so the sentence can in fact be canceled through repentance.
  This is like what Rav Shmuel bar Ami said, as Rav Shmuel bar Ami said, and some say that it was Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani who said that Rabbi Yonatan said: From where is it derived that a sentence accompanied by God’s oath not to cancel it cannot be torn up or canceled? As it is stated: “And therefore I have sworn to the house of Eli, that the iniquity of Eli’s house will not be purged with sacrifice nor offering forever” (I Samuel 3:14).
  With regard to this verse Rava said: With sacrifice or offering the sin of Eli’s house is not atoned, but it can be atoned through Torah study. Abaye said: With sacrifice or offering the sin of Eli’s house is not atoned, but it is atoned through Torah study and the performance of acts of kindness. It is related that Rabba and Abaye came from the house of Eli, which was subject to the curse that most of its members would die young. Rabba, who engaged almost exclusively in Torah study, lived for forty years, whereas Abaye, who engaged in both Torah study and in the performance of acts of kindness lived for sixty years.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was a certain family in Jerusalem whose members used to die at the age of eighteen, and they did not know why. They came and told Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai about their situation. He said to them: Perhaps you are descended from the family of Eli, as it is written about them: “And all the increase of your house shall die young men” (I Samuel 2:33). If indeed this is so, the remedy is as follows: Go and engage in Torah study, in the merit of which you will live. They went and engaged in Torah study and lived. And people would call that family afterward by the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan in his honor.
  Rav Shmuel bar Inya said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that the sentence of a community is never sealed [<i>neḥtam</i>]? The Gemara immediately asks: Is never sealed? But isn’t it written: “Yet the stain [<i>nikhtam</i>] of your iniquity is before Me” (Jeremiah 2:22), which implies that the sentence of a community is indeed sealed. Rather, one must say that the question was as follows: From where is it known with regard to the sentence of a community that although it is sealed, it can still be torn up? As it is stated: “As is the Lord our God whenever we call out to Him” (Deuteronomy 4:7). This implies that there is always a way to draw close to God.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “Seek the Lord while He may be found; call upon Him when He is near” (Isaiah 55:6), which implies that there are times when He is not near and does not answer. The Gemara answers: There the verse is referring to an individual, to whom God is near only at certain times; here the verse is referring to a community, to which God is close whenever the people call out to Him.
  § The Gemara asks: With regard to an individual, when is God near to him? Rabba bar Avuh said: These are the ten days between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks further: The verse states: “And it came to pass about ten days after that the Lord smote Nabal, and he died” (I Samuel 25:38). These ten days, what are they doing here, i.e., why was there a delay of ten days before Nabal died? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: They correspond to the ten meals that Nabal gave the servants of David who came to visit him, as out of politeness he allowed David’s ten servants to eat, and therefore his punishment was delayed for ten days. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: These are the ten days between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur, during which everyone is given one last opportunity to repent for the sins he committed over the course of the previous year.
  § The mishna teaches: On Rosh HaShana all creatures pass before Him like <i>benei maron</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase <i>benei maron</i>? The Gemara answers: Here in Babylonia they interpreted it to mean: Like a flock of sheep [<i>kivnei imarna</i>]. Reish Lakish disagreed and said: Like the ascent of Beit Maron, which was very steep; one standing at the summit could discern all those climbing the mountain with a single look. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said another opinion: Like the soldiers of the house of King David, who could be surveyed with a single glance.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And they are all scanned in a single scan. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, learn this in the <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “He who fashions their hearts alike, who considers all their deeds” (Psalms 33:15). What is this verse saying? If we say this is what it is saying: That He created everyone and unites all their hearts together, there is a difficulty, since don’t we see that it is not so, as the hearts of people are not united and are not similar to one another? Rather, is this not what it is saying: The Creator sees their hearts together and considers all their deeds with a single scan?
  MISHNA: In six months of the year the messengers go out from the court in Jerusalem to report throughout Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora which day was established as the New Moon, the thirtieth or the thirty-first day since the previous New Moon. They go out in the month of Nisan, due to Passover, so that people will know on which day to celebrate it; in the month of Av, due to the fast of the Ninth of Av; in Elul, due to Rosh HaShana, which begins thirty days after the New Moon of Elul; in Tishrei, due to the need to establish the correct dates on which to celebrate the Festivals of Tishrei, i.e., Yom Kippur and <i>Sukkot</i>; in Kislev, due to Hanukkah; and in Adar, due to Purim.
  And when the Temple was standing, messengers would also go out in the month of Iyyar due to small Passover, i.e., second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, which occurs on the fourteenth of Iyyar. This holiday allowed those who were ritually impure or on a distant journey on the fourteenth of Nisan, and therefore incapable of bringing the Paschal lamb at that time, to bring their Paschal lamb a month later.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And if they go out for the month of Av due to the fast, let them go out also in the months of Tammuz and Tevet, as they too contain public fast days.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  As Rav Ḥana bar Bizna said that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Thus said the Lord of hosts: The fast of the fourth month, and the fast of the fifth, and fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth, shall become times of joy and gladness, and cheerful seasons, to the house of Judah” (Zechariah 8:19). It calls them days of “fast” and it calls them “times of joy and gladness.” How so? When there is peace in the world, they will be times of joy and gladness, on which eulogies and fasting are forbidden; but when there is no peace, they are days of fasting. In a time when there is no peace, why are messengers not sent out also for the fourth and tenth months, so that people can know when to observe the fasts?
  Rav Pappa said that this is what it is saying: When there is peace in the world and the Temple is standing, these days will be times of joy and gladness; when there is persecution and troubles for the Jewish people, they are days of fasting; and when there is no persecution but still no peace, neither particular troubles nor consolation for Israel, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If people wish, they fast, and if they wish, they do not fast. Since there is no absolute obligation to fast, messengers are not sent out for these months.
  The Gemara asks: If so, the Ninth of Av should also be like the other fast days, that sometimes it is observed and sometimes not, depending upon the wishes of the community at the time. Why does the mishna state that messengers go out for the month of Av? Rav Pappa said: The Ninth of Av is different, since the calamities that occurred on that day were multiplied. As the Master said: On the Ninth of Av the Temple was destroyed, both the first one and the second one; on this day the city of Beitar was captured; and on this day the city of Jerusalem was plowed over by the enemies of the Jewish people, as a sign that it would never be rebuilt. Consequently, the fast of the Ninth of Av is obligatory, and not optional like the other fasts. Messengers are consequently sent out so that people will know when to fast.
  § The Sages disagreed about the fasts alluded to in the words of the prophet, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Akiva would expound four verses, but I would not expound the texts as he did. One of the disputes relates to the fasts mentioned by Zechariah. Rabbi Akiva would expound the verse as follows: “The fast of the fourth,” this is the ninth of Tammuz, on which the city of Jerusalem was breached, as it is stated: “And in the fourth month, on the ninth day of the month, the famine was severe in the city, so that there was no bread for the people of the land. Then the city was breached” (Jeremiah 52:6–7). And why does the prophet call it the fast of the fourth? Because it is in Tammuz, the fourth of the months when counting from Nisan.
  “The fast of the fifth,” this is the Ninth of Av, on which the Temple of our Lord was burnt. And why does he call it the fast of the fifth? Because it falls in the fifth of the months. “The fast of the seventh,” this is the third of Tishrei, on which Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, was killed. And who killed him? Ishmael, son of Nethaniah, killed him (see II Kings 25:25; Jeremiah, chapter 41). The Sages established a fast to commemorate Gedaliah’s death to teach you that the death of the righteous is equivalent to the burning of the Temple of our Lord. And why did the prophet call it the fast of the seventh? Because Tishrei is the seventh of the months.
  “The fast of the tenth,” This is the tenth of Tevet, on which the king of Babylonia laid siege to Jerusalem, as it is stated: “And in the ninth year, in the tenth month, on the tenth day of the month, the word of the Lord came to me, saying: Son of man, write the name of the day, of this same day: The king of Babylonia has laid siege to Jerusalem on this very day” (Ezekiel 24:1–2). And why did he call it the fast of the tenth? Because it is in Tevet, which is the tenth of the months. Wouldn’t it have been fitting to write this fast first, as the series of events began with the laying of the siege. Why was it written here at the end of the list? This was done in order to list the months in their proper order, as the prophet began with the fourth month and ended with the tenth month. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Shimon disagreed and said: I do not say this, but rather I expound the verse as follows: “The fast of the tenth,” this is the fifth of Tevet, on which the report reached the Diaspora that the city had been smitten, as it is stated: “And it came to pass in the twelfth year of our exile, in the tenth month, on the fifth day of the month, that one that had escaped out of Jerusalem came to me, saying: The city is smitten” (Ezekiel 33:21); and they made the day of the report of the destruction like the day of the actual burning and decreed a fast on that day.
  And Rabbi Shimon added: And my statement seems more convincing than his statement, as I say about the first fast mentioned by the prophet that it marks the event that took place first, and about the last fast that it marks the event that took place last. According to Rabbi Shimon, the fasts are listed in accordance with the chronological order of the events. But he, Rabbi Akiva, says about the first fast mentioned by the prophet that it marks the event that took place last, and about the last fast mentioned that it marks the event that took place first, only that he lists the fasts in the order of the months, whereas I list them also in the order of the calamities that they mark.
  § It was stated that the Sages disagreed about the following matter: Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina both say: <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>, a listing of days on which fasting and eulogizing are forbidden, has been nullified, as in the present period of exile there is no reason to celebrate the joyous events that these days commemorate. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has not been nullified.
  The Gemara explains: Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina say that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has been nullified. This is what the prophet is saying: At a time when there is peace in the world, the dates listed will be times of joy and gladness, on which eulogies and fasting are forbidden; but when there is no peace, they are days of fasting. And those days mentioned in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> are also like these days of fasting, that is to say, the days of joy listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> are also nullified when there is no peace.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has not been nullified, and they reason as follows: It was those fast days mentioned in the Bible that the Merciful One makes contingent on the building of the Temple, but these festive days listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> remain as they were and have not been nullified.
  Rav Kahana raised an objection against Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina from a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident and the Sages decreed a fast on Hanukkah in Lod, and Rabbi Eliezer went down on that day and bathed in the bathhouse and Rabbi Yehoshua went down and cut his hair to show that they did not accept the fast. Furthermore, these two Sages said to the others: Go out and fast another fast as an act of penitence for what you have already fasted, as the days of Hanukkah are days of joy, on which fasting is forbidden. Hanukkah is one of the Festivals listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>. Even after the destruction of the Temple Hanukkah is celebrated, demonstrating that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has not been nullified.
  Rav Yosef said: Hanukkah is different, as there is the mitzva of lighting candles, and so, unlike the other days listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>, the festival of Hanukkah was not nullified. Abaye said to him: What is this argument? Let Hanukkah itself be nullified, and let its mitzva of lighting candles be nullified with it.
  Rather, Rav Yosef retracted his previous explanation and said: Hanukkah is different, as its miracle is well known, and it has become so widely accepted by all the Jewish people that it would be inappropriate to nullify it.
  Rav Aḥa bar Huna raised an objection: It is stated in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>: On the third of Tishrei the ordinance requiring the mention of God’s name in legal documents was abolished, and on that day fasting is forbidden. For the kingdom of Greece had issued a decree against the Jews forbidding them to mention the name of Heaven on their lips. When the Hasmonean kingdom became strong and defeated the Greeks, they instituted that people should mention the name of Heaven even in their legal documents. And therefore they would write: In year such and such of Yoḥanan the High Priest of the God Most High.
  And when the Sages heard about this they said: Tomorrow this one, the borrower, will repay his debt, the lender will no longer need to save the loan document, the document will be cast on a dunghill, and the name of Heaven written there will come to disgrace. And so they annulled the ordinance to mention God’s name in documents, and they made that day into a Festival. And if it enters your mind to say that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has been nullified, can you say that the first prohibitions against fasting they annulled, and then later ones were added?
  The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? This is referring to a time when the Temple was standing and all the days listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> were in force. From time to time new days of commemoration were added. When the <i>amora’im</i> stated that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> was nullified they were referring to the time after the destruction of the Temple.
  
  Daf 19a
  
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if this was at the time that the Temple was standing, derive the prohibition against fasting on the third of Tishrei from the fact that it is the day that Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, was killed. During the time of the Temple the biblical fast days were celebrated as days of joy. Rav said: It was only necessary to include the third of Tishrei in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> in order to prohibit fasting on the preceding day as well. Fasting was forbidden not only on the actual days listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>, but also on the preceding day and the following day.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: With regard to the prohibition against fasting on the preceding day, the second of Tishrei, also derive it because it is the day after the New Moon, and fasting is forbidden not only on festive days, but also on the preceding day and the following day. The Gemara rejects this argument: The New Moon is by Torah law, and festive days that are by Torah law do not require reinforcement. Therefore no decree was ever enacted prohibiting fasting on the days before and after.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: These days that are written in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> are days on which fasting is prohibited, as are both the day before them and the day after them. With regard to <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals, fasting on them is forbidden, but on the day before them and the day after them fasting is permitted. What is the difference between this class of days and that class of days? These days, <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals, are by Torah law, and Torah laws do not need reinforcement, and therefore even if a fast day were decreed on the day before or after them, the Festival itself would not be nullified; whereas those days mentioned in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> are by rabbinic law, and rabbinic laws need reinforcement, and therefore fasting is prohibited even on the day before and the day after.
  The Gemara raises yet another difficulty: The prohibition against fasting on the second of Tishrei, derive it from the fact that it is the day before the day that Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, was killed, and since in Temple times the fast of Gedaliah was celebrated as a festive day, fasting should also be prohibited on the preceding day. Rav Ashi said: The fast of Gedaliah, son of Ahikam, is derived from the texts of the tradition, i.e., Prophets and Writings, and as the texts of the tradition are treated like Torah statements for this purpose, they too do not need reinforcement.
  Rav Tovi bar Mattana raised an objection against the opinion that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> was nullified, from that which is written in it: On the twenty-eighth of Adar the good tidings came to the Jews that they should not turn away from the Torah, and on that day fasting is forbidden. And this is explained: For the wicked kingdom issued a decree against Israel that they should not occupy themselves with Torah study, and that they should not circumcise their sons, and that they should desecrate Shabbat. What did Yehuda ben Shammua and his colleagues do? They went and took advice from a certain matron [<i>matronita</i>] whom all the prominent men of Rome would visit regularly, thinking that she would know how to annul the decree.
  She said to them as follows: Come and cry out [<i>hafgginu</i>] at night in the streets and markets. They went and cried out at night, saying: O Heavens! Are we Jews not your brothers; are we not children of one father; are we not children of one mother? How are we different from every other nation and tongue that you issue such harsh decrees against us? And indeed the decrees were annulled, and the Sages made that day a festive day. And if it enters your mind to say that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has been nullified, can you say that the first prohibitions against fasting they annulled, and then later ones were added?
  And if you say that here too it is referring to the time when the Temple was standing, there is a difficulty, as Yehuda ben Shammua was a student of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir was after the destruction of the Temple. And proof that Rabbi Yehuda ben Shammua was a student of Rabbi Meir may be brought, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to glass vessels that had holes in them, which afterward were filled in with lead, the Sages dispute whether the utensil is considered a whole utensil, which can become ritually impure, or whether it is considered a broken utensil, which does not. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Yehuda ben Shammua declares that it becomes impure, in the name of Rabbi Meir;
  
  Daf 19b
  
  whereas the Sages declare it pure. According to them, it is still considered a broken utensil. Rabbi Meir himself lived after the destruction of the Second Temple. The festive day commemorating the annulling of the decree of Rome was instituted as a result of an incident involving his student, Rabbi Yehuda ben Shammua. From this, it is clear that <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> had not yet been nullified.
  The Gemara answers: The question whether or not <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i> has been nullified is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: These days, which are written in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>, both when the Temple is standing and when the Temple is not standing, are days on which fasting is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: When the Temple is standing, these days are prohibited for fasting because these days are a source of joy for Israel. But when the Temple is not standing, these days are permitted for fasting because these days are a source of mourning for them.
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that these days were nullified, and the <i>halakha</i> is that they were not nullified. The Gemara asks: This is difficult, as one <i>halakha</i> contradicts the other <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. Here, it is referring to Hanukkah and Purim. These Festival days were never nullified, and Hanukkah is listed among the Festivals of <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>. There, the <i>halakha</i> is referring to the rest of the days listed in <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>, all of which were nullified.
  § The mishna taught: Messengers go out to inform about the sanctification of the New Moon in Elul, due to Rosh HaShana, and in Tishrei, due to the need to establish the correct dates on which to celebrate the Festivals of Tishrei. The Gemara asks: Once the messengers have gone out in the month of Elul to inform the people when the New Moon was declared, why do they need to go out again in Tishrei, as the New Moon of Tishrei always falls on the thirtieth day after the New Moon of Elul?
  And if you say that messengers must go out for Tishrei as well, as perhaps the court added another day to the month of Elul, so that Rosh HaShana occurs on the thirty-first day after the New Moon of Elul, there is a difficulty. Didn’t Rabbi Ḥinnana bar Kahana say that Rav said: From the days of Ezra and onward, we have never found that the month of Elul had an additional day. Consequently, it is simple to calculate the days on which the Festivals of Tishrei occur, and there should be no need to send out messengers in Tishrei.
  The Gemara answers: When we say: We have not found that the month of Elul ever had an additional day, this does not mean that Elul cannot have an additional day, but only that it never happened because it was not necessary to add a day. But if it had been necessary, they would have added an additional day. Since it is possible that the month of Elul could have had another day added, there is reason to send out messengers for the month of Tishrei, so that all will know when to celebrate the Festivals.
  The Gemara asks: But if Elul has an additional day Rosh HaShana will be ruined, because people will celebrate it thirty days after the New Moon of Elul, when its real date is on the thirty-first day. The Gemara answers: Better that Rosh HaShana be ruined, and all the Festivals, i.e., Yom Kippur, <i>Sukkot</i>, and the Eighth Day of Assembly, not be ruined.
  The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Messengers go out in the month of Tishrei due to the need to establish the correct dates on which to celebrate the Festivals of Tishrei. The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, conclude from here that this is the correct understanding.
  § The mishna taught: Messengers go out in Kislev, due to Hanukkah, and in Adar, due to Purim. Whereas, it is not taught: If the year was a leap year, with an additional month of Adar, the messengers go out also in the second Adar due to Purim, which is celebrated in the second Adar. This indicates that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If the year was a leap year, the messengers go out also in the second Adar, due to Purim.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this. One Sage, the author of this mishna, holds that all the mitzvot observed in the second Adar, i.e., the special Torah readings and the mitzvot of Purim, are also observed in the first Adar. If they were observed in the first Adar and not in the second, the people have fulfilled their obligation. Therefore, there is no need to send messengers in the second Adar. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that all the mitzvot observed in the second Adar are not observed in the first. It is therefore necessary to send messengers in the second Adar, so that people will know when to keep the mitzvot of Adar.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: No, everyone agrees that the mitzvot observed in the second Adar are not observed on the first, and here they disagree about the length of the additional month in the leap year, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How long is the additional month in a leap year? Thirty days. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A month. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and since the additional month does not have a fixed number of days, it is necessary to send messengers also for the second Adar, so that people will know when to celebrate Purim. However, according to the first <i>tanna</i>, since the first Adar is always a fixed length, there is no need to send messengers.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about thirty days? It is different because people can count thirty days and know when the month ends and when Purim occurs. A month also, people know the length of it. The term month implies that it is a month of twenty-nine days, and based on that they know when to celebrate Purim. Rav Pappa said: The one who said that a month is added does not mean necessarily a month of twenty-nine days. Rather, if the judges of the court wish, they add a month of twenty-nine days; and if it wishes, they add thirty days. Therefore, it is necessary to send messengers also for the second Adar.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi testified in the name of the holy community of Jerusalem about the two months of Adar, that they are sanctified on the day that could have been added to make them a full month, i.e., the thirtieth day after the previous New Moon. That is to say, the thirtieth day after the New Moon of the first Adar is always the New Moon of the second Adar, and thirty days after the New Moon of the second Adar is always the New Moon of Nisan.
  The Gemara comments: That is to say that they make the two months of Adar short months, of twenty-nine days, but they do not make them full months, of thirty days. This is to the exclusion of what Rav Naḥman bar Ḥisda taught, as Rav Naḥman bar Ḥisda taught: Rabbi Simai testified in the name of Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi about two months of Adar in a leap year, that if the members of the court wish to make them both full, they may do so; and if they wish to make them both short, they may do so; and if they wish to make one full and one short, they may do so. And this is what they would do in the Diaspora, when they did not know which day was established as the New Moon. And in the name of our teacher, Rav, they said: The two months of Adar are always observed, one full and one short, unless it is known to you that the New Moon was fixed in its proper time, i.e., the first Adar is also short.
  A ruling was sent from Eretz Yisrael to Mar Ukva, the Exilarch in Babylonia: The Adar that immediately precedes Nisan is always short, both in a regular year and in a leap year. But the first Adar in a leap year, which does not immediately precede Nisan, is sometimes full.
  Rav Naḥman raised an objection from what was taught in a mishna: Witnesses who saw the new moon may desecrate Shabbat for the fixing of the New Moon of two months, for the month of Nisan and for the month of Tishrei, due to the important Festivals that occur in them. Granted, if you say that the Adar immediately preceding Nisan is sometimes full and sometimes short, due to that reason the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat, as if the witnesses come on the thirtieth, the month will be made short and that day will be declared the New Moon; otherwise, the month will be made full and the next day will be declared the New Moon.
  
  Daf 20a
  
  But if you say that the Adar immediately preceding Nisan is always short, why should they desecrate Shabbat? The court can calculate the time of the New Moon without witnesses. The Gemara answers: Because it is a mitzva to sanctify the New Moon on the basis of the testimony of witnesses who actually saw the new moon and not rely on calculations or established practices.
  Some say that Rav Naḥman said: We, too, learn in a mishna: Witnesses who saw the new moon may desecrate Shabbat to establish the New Moon for two months, for the month of Nisan and for the month of Tishrei. Granted, if you say that the Adar immediately preceding Nisan is always short, due to that reason the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat, because it is a mitzva to sanctify the month on the basis of the testimony of witnesses who actually saw the new moon.
  But if you say that the Adar immediately preceding Nisan is sometimes full and sometimes short, and there is no regularity to it, why should the witnesses desecrate Shabbat? Have the court add an extra day to the month now, since it can decide whether the thirtieth day or the thirty-first day is the beginning of the new month, and let the members of the court sanctify the next day as the New Moon.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: If the thirtieth of Adar falls on Shabbat, this is indeed what is done. The witnesses are not permitted to desecrate Shabbat. Rather, the month is made full and the next day is sanctified as the New Moon. Here we are dealing with a case where the thirty-first of Adar falls on Shabbat, and so the sanctification of the New Moon cannot be pushed off to the next day, as a month cannot be longer than thirty days. In that case, the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat because it is a mitzva to sanctify the month based on testimony of witnesses who actually saw the new moon.
  Rav Kahana raised an objection from the continuation of the mishna, which teaches: When the Temple was standing, the witnesses would desecrate Shabbat for establishing the New Moon even for all the months, in order to rectify the offering of the New Moon, i.e., ensure that it is at the proper time.
  From the fact that the reason that the witnesses are permitted to desecrate Shabbat for all the other months is not because it is a mitzva to sanctify the month based on testimony of witnesses who saw the new moon, the implication is that with regard to Nisan and Tishrei as well, the witnesses are permitted to desecrate Shabbat for another reason and not because it is a mitzva to sanctify the month based on the testimony of witnesses who saw the new moon.
  Granted, if you say that Adar is sometimes full and sometimes short, due to that reason the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat. But if you say that Adar is always short, why should they desecrate Shabbat? The court knows in advance when will be the New Moon of Nisan. The Gemara concludes: This is indeed a conclusive refutation to the proof brought by Rav Naḥman.
  § It is related that when Ulla came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: This year they added an extra day to the month of Elul. Ulla continued and said: Do our Babylonian colleagues understand what benefit we did for them? We pushed off Rosh HaShana for a day, so that the Festival would not occur adjacent to Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: What is the benefit in having a weekday between Shabbat and a Festival? Ulla said: Due to the vegetables that would not be picked for two days and those picked beforehand that would no longer be fresh. Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: Due to the dead who would not be buried for two days and consequently would begin to decompose.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two concerns? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case where Yom Kippur occurs directly after Shabbat. According to the one who said that the reason is due to the dead that would go unburied for two days, the court adds an extra day to Elul so that Yom Kippur will not occur on Sunday. But according to the one who said that the reason is due to the vegetables that would not be fresh, there is no need to add an extra day to Elul. When would he require the vegetables? Only in the evening following Yom Kippur; and if Yom Kippur falls on Sunday, he can go out in the evening after the fast and bring fresh vegetables.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that the reason is due to vegetables, the court should still make Elul full due to the dead, as this is also an important consideration. Rather, the practical difference between them is with regard to the case where the Festival of Rosh HaShana occurs adjacent to Shabbat, either before it or after it. According to the one who said that the reason is due to the vegetables that would wither, the court adds an extra day to Elul. But according to the one who said that the reason is due to the dead that would go unburied, there is no reason to make Elul full, because on a Festival it is possible to arrange that the dead be buried by gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the one who said that the reason is due to the dead, the court should still add an extra day to Elul due to the vegetables. The Gemara answers: According to him this is not an important consideration, because it is possible to soak the withered vegetables in hot water and thereby restore their freshness.
  The Gemara asks: If so, what is different about those who live in Babylonia and those who live in Eretz Yisrael? Why did Ulla specifically say that adding an extra day to Elul was beneficial to us, in Babylonia; it was beneficial to them as well. The Gemara answers: For us in Babylonia the weather is very hot, and so vegetables wither and corpses decompose quickly. But for them in Eretz Yisrael, the weather is not as hot, and vegetables and corpses can be kept for two days.
  § It was taught above that for various reasons a month can have an extra day added, even if the new moon was seen on the night before the thirtieth. The Gemara challenges this assumption: Is that so? But didn’t Rabba bar Shmuel teach in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that just as the court adds an extra month to a year for some pressing communal need, so too, the court adds an extra day to a month for some similar need. Therefore, the verse states: “This month shall be to you the beginning of months” (Exodus 12:2). This teaches that when there is a moon like this, see it and sanctify the month. When the new moon is seen, the month must be sanctified without delay.
  Rava said: This is not difficult: Here it is speaking of adding an extra day to the month, although the new moon was seen on the thirtieth, which is permitted; whereas there it is speaking of sanctifying the month on the thirtieth, although the new moon was not yet seen, which is prohibited. And this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: One might have thought that just the court adds to a year or a month for some pressing communal need, so too, a month can be sanctified early on the thirtieth even without seeing the new moon. Therefore, the verse states: “This month shall be to you the beginning of months,” which teaches: Only when the moon appears like this, see it and sanctify the month, but not before.
  The Gemara comments that this is like that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The court may intimidate witnesses through rigorous and confusing examination, so that they will give inadmissible testimony about the new moon that was seen at its due time, the thirtieth of the month. This is so that the court can add an extra day to it, and the New Moon will be sanctified on the thirty-first day. But the court may not intimidate witnesses into giving testimony about the new moon that was not seen on its due time, in order that to sanctify the New Moon early, on the thirtieth.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda Nesia, who was the <i>Nasi</i> of the Sanhedrin, send a message to Rabbi Ami: Be aware that all the days of Rabbi Yoḥanan he would teach us that witnesses may be intimidated into giving testimony about the new moon that was not seen in its due time. This was done in order that the new month may be sanctified early, already on the thirtieth. Although the witnesses did not see the moon, they may say: We saw it.
  Abaye said: This is not difficult: This ruling is referring to Nisan and Tishrei, which may be sanctified early in order to set the Festivals that occur in those months; that ruling is referring to the other months, which may not be sanctified early, even for some other pressing need.
  Rava said: That which Rabba bar Shmuel taught, that the court may not lengthen or shorten the months for reason of communal need, follows the opinion of <i>Aḥerim</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say: The difference between the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> of one year and the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it was a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.
  Rav Dimi from Neharde’a taught the <i>baraita</i> in the opposite manner: The court may intimidate the witnesses into giving testimony about the new moon that was not seen in its due time in order that the new month may be sanctified early, already on the thirtieth. But the court may not intimidate witnesses so that they do not give acceptable testimony about the new moon that was seen in its due time, in order to add an extra day to the old month, so that the New Moon is sanctified on the thirty-first.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rav Dimi’s opinion? Intimidating witnesses into testifying about something that they did not see is worse than intimidating them to withhold testimony about something that they did see.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  In this case, where the witnesses withhold testimony about what they saw and the New Moon is pushed off to the next day, it looks like a lie, as the moon might have been seen by others as well, and people will wonder why the New Moon was not sanctified the previous day. In that case, where the witnesses testify about something that they did not see and the New Moon is a day early, it does not look like a lie, as everybody knows that it is possible that only a few people saw the new moon.
  § Shmuel said: I am able to fix the calendar for the entire Diaspora without witnesses. Shmuel was an expert on the movement of the celestial bodies and on the principles governing leap years and additional days added to months.
  Abba, the father of Rabbi Simlai, said to Shmuel: Does the Master know the meaning of this statement, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> dealing with the secret of addition, which discusses calendric calculations: Differentiate between when the <i>molad</i> occurred before midday and when the <i>molad</i> occurred after midday? He said to him: No, I do not know what this means. He said to him: Since the Master does not know this, there are probably other matters that the Master does not know, and therefore you must not establish a calendar, relying upon calculations that were made based on faulty or insufficient knowledge.
  As for the meaning of this obscure <i>baraita</i>, when Rabbi Zeira went up from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he sent back a letter to his colleagues in Babylonia: In order for a day to be sanctified as the New Moon, it is necessary that both the night and the day be of the new month. That is to say, the <i>molad</i> must occur before the beginning of the night.
  And this is what Abba, the father of Rabbi Simlai, said: The <i>baraita</i> means as follows: They calculate the <i>molad</i>; if the <i>molad</i> occurred before midday, so that there are at least six more hours left of the day, it is known that the moon will be visible close to sunset. If, however, the <i>molad</i> did not occur before midday, so that there are fewer than six hours left of the day, it is known that the moon will not be visible close to sunset.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference that this statement makes? In any case, the court is dependent upon the testimony of witnesses. Rav Ashi said: This information is used to refute the witnesses, as if the witnesses claim that they saw the new moon at a time when it was not visible according to the calculations, they are clearly false witnesses.
  Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Naḥman said: For twenty-four hours the moon is covered, i.e., not visible. This occurs between the last sighting of the old moon and the first sighting of the new moon. For us, in Babylonia, it is not visible for six hours of the old moon and eighteen hours of the new; for them, in Eretz Yisrael, it is not visible for six hours of the new moon and eighteen hours of the old.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference that this statement makes? Rav Ashi said: It is used to refute the witnesses, as if they testify that they saw two moons, the old and the new, within a single twenty-four hour period, they are certainly false witnesses.
  § The Master said above: In order for a day to be sanctified as the New Moon, it is necessary that both the night and the day be of the new moon. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse states: “From evening to evening shall you celebrate your Shabbat” (Leviticus 23:32). This teaches that the day follows the night for all the calculations pertaining to the Festivals and New Moons.
  Reish Lakish said: It is derived from the verse that states: “In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at the evening, you shall eat unleavened bread, until the twenty-first day of the month at the evening” (Exodus 12:18). This teaches that the Festival terminates at the end of the day, and a new day begins in the evening.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two derivations? Abaye said: There is no practical difference between them. The interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them.
  Rava said: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the hours before midnight. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives the <i>halakha</i> from the verse: “From evening to evening,” the previous day ends at nightfall. Therefore, if the new moon was seen only at the beginning of the night of the thirtieth, the thirtieth is not sanctified as the New Moon. However, according to Reish Lakish, who derives the <i>halakha</i> from the verse with regard to Passover: “Until the twenty-first day of the month at the evening,” the moon may be sanctified if it was seen before midnight. Eating unleavened bread on Passover is an obligation only on the first night until midnight. After that time, it is optional. The verse states: “You shall eat unleavened bread, until the twenty-first day of the month at the evening,” implying that it is not obligatory but optional to eat unleavened bread. Since the optional time of eating unleavened bread begins at midnight, after the conclusion of the obligatory time, the conclusion of that time is also at midnight on the twenty-first day. This implies that there is a concept of a day beginning at midnight. Accordingly, if the new moon was seen at the beginning of the night of the thirtieth, the thirtieth can still be sanctified as the New Moon.
  § With regard to the extra Festival day of that is observed in the Diaspora, Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Naḥman said: Any time that an extra Festival day is observed out of uncertainty with regard to the calendar, we cast it forward, i.e., it is observed on the following day and not on the preceding day. That is to say, owing to the uncertainty we observe <i>Sukkot</i> in the Diaspora on the fifteenth and the sixteenth of Tishrei, but not on the fourteenth.
  The Gemara asks: But why not observe it also on the fourteenth, as perhaps both the month of Av and the month of Elul were made short? In that case, the day that is considered the fourteenth of Tishrei in the Diaspora would actually be the fifteenth of Tishrei, and therefore it should also be observed as <i>Sukkot</i>.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  The Gemara answers: It is a rare occurrence that two consecutive months are made short, and this would generate publicity, so that everyone would know about it.
  § It was related that Levi once arrived in Babylonia on what was observed there as the eleventh of Tishrei. He said: How tasty is the dish of the Babylonians on the great day of Yom Kippur, as they are observing Yom Kippur in the West, Eretz Yisrael. The month of Elul had been declared full in Eretz Yisrael, and according to the calendar there, it was only the tenth of Tishrei. They said to him: Testify that today is Yom Kippur and we shall observe it. He said to them: I myself did not hear the court proclaim: It is sanctified. Although I know that the month had been declared full, since I did not personally hear the proclamation, I cannot offer direct testimony such that you should change your calculations.
  It was further related that Rabbi Yoḥanan used to proclaim: Anywhere that can be reached by the messengers who go out in Nisan in time to inform the people when to observe Passover, but cannot be reached by the messengers sent out in Tishrei, let them also observe the festival of Passover for two days. The messengers did not travel on Rosh HaShana or Yom Kippur, and therefore they could travel three days further in Nisan than in Tishrei. The Sages instituted that two days must be observed in Nisan as a rabbinic decree due to Tishrei, for if they observe Passover for only one day, they will come to observe <i>Sukkot</i> for one day as well, and this they are not permitted to do.
  It was reported that Rabbi Aivu bar Naggarei and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, two disciples of Rabbi Yoḥanan, once arrived in a certain place that could be reached by the messengers who go out in Nisan, but could not be reached by the messengers who go out in Tishrei. And they saw that the locals observed only one day of Passover. They said nothing to them to correct their practice. Rabbi Yoḥanan heard this and he became angry with Rabbi Aivu and Rabbi Ḥiyya, for they had failed to rebuke the people who were acting contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explicit ruling. He said to them: Did I not say to you that anywhere that can be reached by the messengers sent out in Nisan but not by those sent out in Tishrei must observe two days of Passover, for the Sages instituted a rabbinic decree in Nisan due to Tishrei?
  § The Gemara relates that Rava would regularly sit in observance of the fast of Yom Kippur for two days, in case Elul had been declared a thirty-day month and Yom Kippur should be observed on what was observed in Babylonia as the eleventh of Tishrei. It once happened in accordance with his opinion. Elul had been declared a thirty-day month, and he was the only one who observed Yom Kippur on the correct day.
  It was related that Rav Naḥman had once fasted the entire day of Yom Kippur as usual. In the evening, toward the end of his fast, a certain man came and said to him: Tomorrow is the great day, Yom Kippur, in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and it is therefore necessary to fast tomorrow.
  Rav Naḥman said to him: From where do you come? He said to him: From a place called Damihareya. He said to him, playing on the name of his place: Blood will be his end, meaning Rav Naḥman’s own end. Due to this information, Rav Naḥman would have to fast two successive days, and thereby suffer greatly, as if his blood were being shed. He read the verse about him: “Our pursuers were swifter than vultures in the sky” (Lamentations 4:19), for had this messenger arrived just a little bit later, they would have eaten and drunk in the meantime.
  § Rav Huna bar Avin sent this instruction to Rava: When you see that, according to your calculations, the season of Tevet, i.e., winter, will extend to the sixteenth of Nisan, and the spring equinox will occur after the sixteenth of Nisan, add an extra month to that year, making it a leap year. And do not worry about finding an additional reason to justify making it a leap year, as it is written: “Observe the month of spring” (Deuteronomy 16:1). That is to say, see to it that the spring of the season, i.e., the spring equinox, is in the new part of Nisan, i.e., the first half, before Passover.
  It was related that Rav Naḥman said to those setting out to sea before Nisan: Since you will not know the determination of the first day of the new month, this is what you should do: When you see that the moon sets at daybreak, i.e., that it is visible all night from sundown to sunrise, know that it is the middle of the month of Nisan and burn your leaven.
  The Gemara asks: When does the moon set at daybreak? On the fifteenth of the month. But on the fourteenth of Nisan we burn leaven. The Gemara answers: For those out at sea, to whom the world is revealed, to whom the horizon is wide open and clearly visible, the moon completes its course at sunrise already on the fourteenth of the month. They can therefore rely on this sign to establish the date of Passover and the time for burning leaven.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  MISHNA: Only for the sake of two months may witnesses who saw the new moon desecrate Shabbat, should that be necessary in order for them to offer testimony before the court: For the month of Nisan and for the month of Tishrei, for in these months messengers are sent out to Syria, and by them, i.e., these months, the dates of the major Festivals are set: Yom Kippur, <i>Sukkot</i>, Passover, and <i>Shavuot</i>. And when the Temple was standing, the witnesses desecrated Shabbat for the fixing of the New Moon of all the months, due to the imperative of fixing the proper offering of the New Moon at the correct time.
  GEMARA: The mishna taught that messengers were sent out for two months. The Gemara asks: For only two months and no more? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the previous mishna, which teaches: For six months of the year messengers go out, not only for two months.
  Abaye said: This is what the mishna is saying: For all the other months the messengers go out already in the evening, if the new moon was clearly seen and if it is certain that the court will proclaim the day as the New Moon. But for Nisan and for Tishrei the messengers do not go out until they hear from the court that the day is declared as the New Moon, by saying: It is sanctified, so that they can offer proper testimony. The court convenes only during the daytime.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For all the other months the messengers go out already in the evening, but for the month of Nisan and for the month of Tishrei they do not go out until they have heard the court formally proclaim the day as the New Moon, by saying: It is sanctified.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that the witnesses who saw the new moon may desecrate Shabbat in order to testify before the court? The verse states: “These are the Festivals of the Lord, sacred gatherings, which you shall declare in their seasons” (Leviticus 23:4), thereby emphasizing that the Festivals must be set at their proper times. To ensure that they occur at the proper times, it is even permitted to desecrate Shabbat.
  One might have thought that just as Shabbat may be desecrated by the witnesses so that the months may be sanctified at the proper time, so too, Shabbat may be desecrated by the messengers who go to inform the people in Eretz Yisrael and the Diaspora which day was sanctified as the New Moon, so that the Festivals may be observed at the proper time. Therefore, the verse states: “Which you shall declare,” from which is derived that for the declaration of the New Moon you may desecrate Shabbat, but you may not desecrate Shabbat for the observance of the Festivals in their proper time.
  § It was taught in the mishna: And when the Temple was standing, the witnesses desecrated Shabbat for the fixing of the New Moon of all the months, due to the imperative of fixing the proper offering of the New Moon at the correct time. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At first, they would desecrate Shabbat for all of the months. When the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to the Sages: Is there now some offering due, for which it is necessary to desecrate Shabbat? Consequently, they instituted that the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat only for the months of Nisan and Tishrei.
  MISHNA: Whether the new moon was seen clearly [<i>ba’alil</i>] by everyone or whether it was not clearly seen, one may desecrate Shabbat in order to testify before the court. Rabbi Yosei says: If the moon was clearly seen, they may not desecrate Shabbat for it, since other witnesses, located nearer to the court, will certainly testify. If these distant witnesses go to court to testify, they will desecrate Shabbat unnecessarily.
  There was once an incident where more than forty pairs of witnesses were passing through on their way to Jerusalem to testify about the new moon, and Rabbi Akiva detained them in Lod, telling them that there was no need for them to desecrate Shabbat for this purpose. Rabban Gamliel sent a message to him: If you detain the many people who wish to testify about the new moon, you will cause them to stumble in the future. They will say: Why should we go, seeing that our testimony is unnecessary? At some point they will be needed, and no witnesses will come to the court.
  GEMARA: From where may it be inferred that the term <i>alil</i> denotes that the new moon is clearly revealed? Rabbi Abbahu said: The verse states: “The words of the Lord are pure words; silver refined in the clear sight [<i>ba’alil</i>] of the earth, purified seven times” (Psalms 12:7).
  The aforementioned verse states: “The words of the Lord are pure words…purified seven times [<i>shivatayim</i>].” Rav and Shmuel disagreed about a matter relating to this verse: One of them said: Fifty gates of understanding were created in the world, and all of them were given to Moses, except for one gate, for it is stated: “The words of the Lord are purified <i>shivatayim</i>,” which he understands to mean seven times seven, i.e., forty-nine, and it is stated: “And You have made him a little less than God” (Psalms 8:6). God created fifty gates of understanding, but He made man a little lower than God, giving him only forty-nine of them.
  “Kohelet sought to find out words of delight” (Ecclesiastes 12:10), which indicates that he sought to find the fiftieth gate but failed to do so. Kohelet, King Solomon, sought to be like Moses, but a Divine Voice issued forth and said to him: “And that which was written uprightly, even words of truth” (Ecclesiastes 12:10). This is referring to the words of the Torah; and what is written there? “And there has not arisen a prophet since in Israel like Moses, whom the Lord knew face-to-face” (Deuteronomy 34:10).
  And the other one said: Among the prophets there has not arisen one like Moses, but among the kings, one did arise, Solomon, who was as wise as Moses. How do I uphold the words “Kohelet sought to find words of delight”? Kohelet, King Solomon, sought to issue judgments of the heart, based solely on his intuition, without witnesses and without warning. But a Divine Voice issued forth and said to him: “And that which was written uprightly, even words of truth.” Which words is this referring to? “At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6). Punishment can be administered only based on the testimony of two witnesses.
  
  Daf 22a
  
  § It was taught in the mishna: There was once an incident where more than forty pairs of witnesses were passing through on their way to Jerusalem to testify about the new moon, and Rabbi Akiva detained them in Lod, telling them that there was no need for them to desecrate Shabbat for this purpose. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda said: Heaven forbid that Rabbi Akiva detained them, for he would certainly not have made such an error. Rather, it was that Zefer, the head of the city of Geder, detained them. And Rabban Gamliel sent and they removed him from his high office because he had acted inappropriately.
  MISHNA: If a father and his son saw the new moon, they should both go to the court in Jerusalem. It is not that they can join together to give testimony, for close relatives are disqualified from testifying together, but they both go so that if one of them is disqualified, the second may join together with another witness to testify about the new moon. Rabbi Shimon says: A father and his son and all their relatives are fit to combine together as witnesses for testimony to determine the start of the month.
  Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident with Toviyya the doctor. When he saw the new moon in Jerusalem, he and his son and his freed slave all went to testify. The priests accepted him and his son as witnesses and disqualified his slave, for they ruled stringently that the month may be sanctified only on the basis of the testimony of those of Jewish lineage. And when they came before the court, they accepted him and his slave as witnesses and disqualified his son, due to the familial relationship.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Levi said: What is the reason for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion permitting relatives to jointly testify about the new moon, despite the fact that relatives are generally disqualified from testifying together? It is as it is written: “And the Lord spoke to Moses and Aaron in the land of Egypt, saying: This month shall be to you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year to you” (Exodus 12:1–2). The words “to you” come to teach that this testimony concerning the new moon will be valid even when it is given by you two, i.e., Moses and Aaron, who are brothers and could not ordinarily testify together.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and prohibit relatives from testifying together about the new moon, how do they understand this verse? The Gemara answers: They interpret the verse as follows: This testimony is given over to you and others like you. That is to say, the months are to be established by the most outstanding authorities of each generation.
  § The mishna taught: Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident with Toviyya the doctor. When he saw the new moon in Jerusalem, he and his son and his freed slave all went to testify. Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Relatives are permitted to testify together about the new moon. Rav Huna said to Rav Ḥanan bar Rava: But Rabbi Yosei, whose position is usually accepted over those of his colleagues, ruled otherwise, and also, there was an incident in which the court actually ruled against Rabbi Shimon, and yet you say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon?
  Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said to him: But many times I said before Rav that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon on this matter, and never did he say anything to me to indicate that he disagreed. Rav Huna said to him: How did you teach the mishna? Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said to him: With the opposite attributions, that is say, the position that is attributed in the mishna to Rabbi Yosei, I would teach in the name of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Huna said to him: Due to that reason, he never said anything to you, for according to your version you ruled correctly. Tavi, son of Mari Tavi, said that Mar Ukva said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  MISHNA: The following are unfit to give testimony, as they are considered thieves and robbers: One who plays with dice [<i>kubbiyya</i>] or other games of chance for money; and those who lend money with interest; and those who race pigeons and place wagers on the outcome; and merchants who deal in produce of the Sabbatical Year, which may be eaten, but may not be an object of commerce; and slaves. This is the principle: Any testimony for which a woman is unfit, these too are unfit. Although in certain cases a woman’s testimony is accepted, e.g., to testify to the death of someone’s husband, in the majority of cases her testimony is not valid.
  GEMARA: This implies that any testimony for which a woman is fit, these too are fit. Rav Ashi said: That is to say, one who is regarded as a robber by rabbinic law, i.e., one who illegally came into possession of money but did not actually steal it from another, is like those mentioned in the mishna. Although they are generally unfit to give testimony, they are fit to give testimony to enable a woman to remarry.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who saw the new moon but is unable to go to Jerusalem by foot because he is sick or has difficulty walking, others may bring him on a donkey or even in a bed, even on Shabbat if necessary. And if the witnesses are concerned that bandits may be lying in wait for them along the road, they may take clubs or other weapons in their hands, even on Shabbat.
  And if it was a long journey to Jerusalem, they may take sustenance with them, although it is ordinarily prohibited to carry on Shabbat, since for a distance of a walk of a night and a day, the witnesses may desecrate Shabbat and go out to give testimony to determine the start of the month. This is as it is stated: “These are the Festivals of the Lord, sacred gatherings, which you shall declare in their seasons” (Leviticus 23:4). This teaches that, in all cases, the Festivals must be fixed at their proper times, even if it entails the transgression of Torah prohibitions.
  
  MISHNA: If the members of the Great Sanhedrin in Jerusalem are not familiar with that one who saw the new moon, i.e., that he is a valid witness, the members of his local court of twenty-three send another with him to testify about him. The mishna adds: Initially, the court would accept testimony to determine the start of the month from any person, as all are presumed to be qualified witnesses, absent any disqualifying factors. However, when the Boethusians, a sect whose members had their own opinions with regard to the establishment of the Festivals, corrupted the process by sending false witnesses to testify about the new moon, the Sages instituted that they would accept this testimony only from those men familiar to the Sanhedrin as valid witnesses.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement in the mishna that another would be sent along to testify with regard to the qualification of the witness to the new moon? If it means that one other individual would be sent,
  
  Daf 22b
  
  but is one witness deemed credible? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident in which one potential witness came to testify, and his witnesses were with him, as they came to testify about him? The use of the plural indicates that two witnesses are required to establish someone as a valid eyewitness. Rav Pappa said: What is the meaning of the term: Another? It means another pair of witnesses.
  The Gemara comments: This too stands to reason, for if you do not say so, then the opening statement of the mishna: If the members of the Great Sanhedrin are not familiar with that one, is problematic. What is the meaning of the term: That one? If we say it is referring to that one witness, is one witness deemed credible? The word: Judgment, is written with regard to the establishment of the New Moon and Rosh HaShana: “For it is a statute for Israel, a judgment of the God of Israel” (Psalms 81:5), and judgments require two witnesses. Rather, what is the meaning of the term: That one? That pair of witnesses. So too here, what is the meaning of the term: Another? Another pair of witnesses.
  The Gemara asks: And is one witness not deemed credible to testify about the eyewitness who saw the new moon? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving Rabbi Nehorai, who went with the witness to testify about him on Shabbat in Usha? Apparently, Rabbi Nehorai offered his testimony alone.
  The Sages say in explanation of this incident: In fact, two witnesses are necessary, and in the case of Rabbi Nehorai there was another witness with him. And the fact that he was not mentioned is due to the honor of Rabbi Nehorai, so as not to indicate that the other was his equal. Rav Ashi said: In the incident involving Rabbi Nehorai, there was already another witness waiting in Usha and Rabbi Nehorai went to join him.
  The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating this incident at all? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that in a case of uncertainty one does not desecrate Shabbat, i.e., perhaps the witness in Usha would not be present that day, which would mean that Rabbi Nehorai desecrated Shabbat for no reason. Therefore, the <i>Tosefta</i> teaches us that for the important purpose of the New Moon, Shabbat may be desecrated even in a doubtful case.
  § When Ulla came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: They sanctified the New Moon on a certain date in the West, Eretz Yisrael. Although Ulla was the only witness, his testimony was accepted. Rav Kahana said: It is not necessary to say that Ulla, who is a great man, is deemed credible with regard to such testimony. Rather, even an ordinary person is deemed credible in this case, and there is no need for two witnesses. What is the reason for this? With regard to any matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie about it.The Gemara comments that this is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one person comes from the other end of the world and says: The court sanctified the new month, he is deemed credible. There is no need for two witnesses.
  The mishna taught: Initially, they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month from any person, and this continued until the Boethusians began to corrupt the process. The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> that describes the decisive incident: What was the manner of the corruption in which the Boethusians engaged? Once, the Boethusians tried to mislead the Sages with regard to the day of the new moon. They hired two people for four hundred dinars to testify falsely that they had seen the new moon on the thirtieth day of the month. One of them was from our own, i.e., a member of the Pharisees and the Sages of Israel, and the other was one of theirs.
  When they went in to testify, their witness submitted his testimony that he had seen the new moon, and then he left. When our witness came to testify, they said to him, in the customary manner: Say how you saw the moon. He said to them: I was ascending in Ma’ale Adumim and I saw that the new moon was crouched between two rocks. Its head was like that of a calf, its ears were like those of a kid, its horns were like those of a deer, and its tail was lying between its thighs. And I looked at it and was frightened and I fell backward. And if you do not believe me that this is what I saw, there are two hundred dinars wrapped in my cloak that were paid to me to deliver this testimony.
  Realizing that the testimony of the first witness was also false, the Sages said to him: Who persuaded you to act in this manner? He said to them: I heard that the Boethusians were seeking to mislead the Sages, and I said to myself: I will go and hire myself out to give false testimony, and I will inform the Sages of the truth, lest unworthy people come and mislead the Sages.
  The Sages said to him: The two hundred dinars that you received from the Boethusians are given to you as a gift. Although you did not carry out your mission, the court is authorized to declare the money ownerless and award it to you. And the one who hired you shall be stretched out on the post for flogging. At that time the Sages instituted that they would accept testimony about the new moon only from those men who were familiar to the Great Sanhedrin as qualified witnesses.
  MISHNA: Initially, after the court sanctified the new month they would light torches on the mountaintops, from one peak to another, to signal to the community in Babylonia that the month had been sanctified. After the Samaritans [<i>Kutim</i>] corrupted and ruined this method by lighting torches at the wrong times to confuse the Jews, the Sages instituted that messengers should go out to the Diaspora and inform them of the start of the month.
  The mishna asks: How would they light the torches during that earlier period? They would bring items that burn well, e.g., long poles of cedar, reeds, pinewood, and beaten flax, and tie them together with a string. And someone would then ascend to the top of the mountain and light the torch on fire with them, and wave it back and forth and up and down, until he would see his colleague doing likewise on the top of the second mountain. In this manner he would know that the next messenger had received the message and passed it on. And similarly, the second torchbearer would wait for a signal from the one on the top of the third mountain, and so on. In this manner the message would reach the Diaspora.
  And from which mountains would they light the torches? They would transmit the message from the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem to Sartava, and from Sartava to Gerofina, and from Gerofina to Ḥavran, and from Ḥavran to Beit Baltin. And from Beit Baltin they would not move to light torches in any other predetermined location. Rather, the one who was appointed for this task would wave the torch back and forth and up and down, until he would see the entire Diaspora before him alight like one large bonfire, as they would light torches to continue transmitting the message from place to place all the way to the farthest reaches of the Diaspora.
  GEMARA: The mishna taught that they would light torches [<i>masi’in</i>]. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the term <i>masi’in</i> is an expression of burning? As it is written: “<i>Vayisa’em</i> David and his men” (II Samuel 5:21), and we translate the verse as: And David and his men burned them.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Torches were lit only for a new month whose moon was seen at its proper time, i.e., on the thirtieth day of the outgoing month, to sanctify the upcoming New Moon on that date and declare the previous month as containing twenty-nine days. In this case, the thirtieth day would be declared the first day of the following month. And when would they light the torches? It was on the eve of its additional day, the one that would have been added had it been a full, thirty-day month, i.e., on the eve of the thirty-first day of the outgoing month.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that for the conclusion of a deficient month of twenty-nine days one performs the sequence of lighting torches, but for a full month one does not perform it? What is the reason for this? Rabbi Zeira said: This is a rabbinic decree that was instituted due to the case of a New Moon following a deficient, twenty-nine-day month that occurs on Shabbat eve. In that case, when do they perform the lighting? At the conclusion of Shabbat, as it is prohibited to light a fire on Friday night. The reason for the decree is that if you say that one performs the lighting of torches for a full, thirty-day month as well, people might come
  
  Daf 23a
  
  to err. They will be unsure how to interpret the lighting of the torches, as they will say: Perhaps this month is deficient, i.e., of twenty-nine days, and the reason that the torch sequence was not performed yesterday, on Shabbat eve, is due to the fact that it was impossible to do so on Shabbat. Or perhaps it is a full, thirty-day month, and they are performing the sequence at its proper time. Therefore, the Sages instituted that the torches should be lit only after deficient months, and the absence of this signal means that the month was a full one.
  The Gemara suggests: And let them perform the ceremony both for a full, thirty-day month and for a deficient one, and when the New Moon occurs on Shabbat eve, in which case they would have to light the torches after Shabbat, let them not perform it at all. And since the torches are not lit this month at the conclusion of Shabbat, and one normally performs the sequence for a full month, people will know that the month is deficient. In this manner, it should be possible to light the torches for all the months, with this one exception.
  The Gemara answers: Even so, people might come to err, as they will say: This month is indeed full, and the reason that they are not performing the ceremony is that they were subject to circumstances beyond their control. Therefore, there might still be confusion as to the date of the New Moon that month.
  The Gemara asks: And let them perform the ceremony of torches only for a full, thirty-day month, and not perform it for a deficient month at all, in which case there will never be room for error. Abaye said: This cannot be done, because this would lead to a two-day suspension of work for the people, as it was customary to refrain from certain types of work on the New Moon. After a full month there will always be a suspension of work for two days, as the people must abstain from work on the thirtieth of the month in case it is declared the New Moon. However, if the torches are lit for a deficient month, then at least in that case people could return to work the following day. Therefore, the Sages instituted that the torches are lit only for a deficient month.
  § The mishna taught: How would they light the torches? They would bring long poles [<i>kelonsot</i>] of cedar and other materials that burn well, tie them all together, and set them on fire. Rav Yehuda said that there are four types of cedar: Cedar, <i>katrom</i>, pinewood, and cypress. With regard to the identification of the tree called <i>katrom</i>, Rav said: This is the <i>addera</i> tree. In the school of Rabbi Sheila, they say: This is the <i>mavliga</i> tree. And some say it is the <i>gulmish</i> tree.
  The Gemara comments: And this opinion of Rav Yehuda disagrees with that of Rabba bar Rav Huna. As Rabba bar Rav Huna said that they say in the school of Rav: There are ten species of cedar, as it is stated: “I will plant in the wilderness the cedar, the acacia tree and myrtle and the pine tree; I will set in the desert cypress, the plane tree, and the larch together” (Isaiah 41:19). The seven species mentioned in this verse are all types of cedars. The Gemara proceeds to identify these trees by their Aramaic names: Cedar is <i>arza</i>, acacia is <i>tornita</i>, myrtle is <i>asa</i>, pine tree is <i>afarsema</i>, cypress is <i>berata</i>, maple is <i>shaga</i>, and box tree is <i>shorivna</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Even if we count all the names in the verse, these are only seven, not ten. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Israel to Babylonia, he said: They added to them three more types of cedar: Terebinth, oak, and coral wood. The Gemara identifies them: Terebinth is the tree called <i>butmei</i>, oak is <i>balutei</i>, and coral wood is <i>kasita</i>. There are those who say that the additional three types are: Bay tree, plane tree, and coral wood. And their Aramaic names are as follows: Bay tree is <i>arei</i>, plane is <i>dulvei</i>, and coral wood is <i>kasita</i>.
  § Apropos coral, the Gemara cites a relevant verse: “Neither shall a <i>tzi adir</i> be able to cross it” (Isaiah 33:21), i.e., it will not be able to traverse the river that will issue forth from the Temple in the future. What is this <i>tzi adir</i>? Rav said: This is a great ship [<i>burnei</i>] used to collect coral from the sea.
  The Gemara explains: How do they perform this collection of coral? They bring six thousand men to work for twelve months of the year, and some say they bring twelve thousand men for six months of the year. And they load the ship with sand until it sinks to the bottom of the sea. A diver descends and ties flax ropes around the coral and ties the other ends of the ropes to the boat. And then they take the sand and cast it overboard, and the boat rises once again to the surface. And as it rises, it uproots and brings the coral with it.
  The Gemara comments: And this coral is so precious that it is exchanged for twice its weight in silver. The Gemara further notes: There are three ports in those places. Two belong to the Romans [<i>Armai</i>], and one belongs to the Persians. In the one belonging to the Romans, they raise up coral, whereas in the one belonging to the Persians, they raise up pearls. And the Persian ports are called royal ports.
  With regard to the aforementioned verse, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Each and every acacia tree that the gentiles took from Jerusalem will be returned to the city by the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “I will plant in the wilderness the cedar, the acacia tree and myrtle and the oil tree; I will set in the desert cypress, the plane tree and the larch together” (Isaiah 41:19). And the term wilderness is referring to nothing other than Jerusalem, as it is stated: “Zion is become a wilderness, Jerusalem a desolation” (Isaiah 64:9).
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan also said: Anyone who studies Torah but does not teach it to others is likened to a myrtle in the wilderness. The myrtle has a pleasant fragrance, but there is nobody to enjoy it in the wilderness. There are those who say a different version of this statement: Anyone who studies Torah and teaches it to others in a place where there are no other Torah scholars is likened to a myrtle in the wilderness, which is especially precious and thoroughly enjoyed by those who find it.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan further said: Woe to the nations of the world, as they have no remedy for the sins they committed against the Jewish people, as it is stated: “For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver, and for wood brass, and for stones iron” (Isaiah 60:17). For all things there is a remedy, as one can always exchange them for an item of equivalent or greater value. However, for Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues, whom the nations put to death, what can one bring to atone for their sin? And with regard to them it is stated: And I will hold them as innocent, but for their blood I will not hold them innocent (see Joel 4:21).
  § The mishna states: And from which mountains would they light the torches? From the Mount of Olives to Sartava, and from Sartava to Gerofina, and from Gerofina to Ḥavran, and from Ḥavran to Beit Baltin. And from Beit Baltin they would not light torches in any other pre-established places. The Gemara asks: What is this place called Beit Baltin? Rav said:
  
  Daf 23b
  
  This is the town called Biram.
  § The mishna taught: He would wave the torch back and forth and up and down, until he would see the entire Diaspora before him alight like one large bonfire. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning in this context of the term Diaspora, which certainly cannot be referring to the entire Diaspora across the world? Rav Yosef said: This is referring to the city of Pumbedita in Babylonia. The Gemara further asks. What is the meaning of the phrase: Like one large bonfire? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Each and every individual would take a torch in his hand and ascend to the top of his roof and light it. In this manner, the entire city would present the appearance of a large bonfire.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Torches were also lit at Ḥarim, and Kayar and Geder, and its neighboring places. There are those who say that the places added by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar are located between the places mentioned in the mishna, whereas there are those who say that they are located on the other side of Eretz Yisrael, on the side nearer Babylonia. The Sage in the mishna enumerates the places found on one side of Eretz Yisrael, whereas the Sage in the <i>baraita</i> enumerates the places found on the other side.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Between each and every one of the stations there was a distance of eight parasangs. The Gemara asks: How many parasangs are these in total? Thirty-two parasangs. The Gemara further asks: Isn’t the distance from the Mount of Olives to Beit Baltin now much greater than thirty-two parasangs? Abaye said: The direct routes have become blocked, and therefore people nowadays must use indirect routes, making the journey much longer.
  The Gemara provides a source for this claim. As it is written: “Therefore, behold, I will hedge up your way with thorns, and make a wall against her, that she shall not find her paths” (Hosea 2:8). Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is derived from here, as it is written: “He has made my paths crooked” (Lamentations 3:9), which indicates that over the course of the exile the routes have become longer.
  MISHNA: There was a large courtyard in Jerusalem, which was called Beit Ya’zek. And there all the witnesses coming to testify about the new moon would gather, and the court of seventy-one judges would examine them there. And they would prepare great feasts for them, so that they would be willing and accustomed to coming and submitting their testimony.
  Initially, when witnesses would arrive on Shabbat from a distant place, they would not move from there all day, as they had left their Shabbat limit, and it was consequently prohibited for them to walk more than four cubits in any direction once they had completed their mission. Concerned that this limitation would discourage witnesses from coming, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that the witnesses be permitted to walk two thousand cubits in each direction.
  The mishna continues: And not only these witnesses are granted two thousand cubits from their new place, but this applies also to a midwife who comes to deliver a child, and one who comes to rescue Jews from a fire, from an invasion of gentile troops, from a flooding river, or from the collapse of a building. All these are considered like the inhabitants of the city where they arrive, and therefore they have two thousand cubits in each direction.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the correct reading of the mishna? Did we learn: Beit Ya’zek, or did we learn: Beit Yazek? The Gemara explains the difference between these two versions. Did we learn: Beit Ya’zek, which is an lofty term, indicating that it was a fine place where the witnesses had a pleasant experience, as it is written: “And he dug it [<i>vaye’azzekehu</i>] and cleared it of stones” (Isaiah 5:2), which shows that the root <i>a-z-k</i> denotes improvement? Or perhaps we learned: Beit Yazek, which is a term of distress, reflecting the fact that the witnesses who arrived there on Shabbat were not permitted to move from there all day, as it is written: “And he was bound with chains [<i>bazikim</i>]” (Jeremiah 40:1).
  Abaye said: Come and hear the mishna: They would prepare great feasts for them there, so that they would be accustomed to come and submit their testimony. This indicates that the witnesses were made welcome, in accordance with the name Beit Ya’zek. The Gemara rejects this argument: Perhaps they performed two practices for them, i.e., they provided feasts but they also restricted their movement. Therefore, there is no proof from the mishna for this version of the name.
  MISHNA: How do they examine the witnesses who come to testify about the new moon? They deal with them in order, as the pair of witnesses that arrives first they examine first. They bring in the greater of the two witnesses, and they say to him: Say how you saw the moon. Was it in front of the sun or behind the sun? To its north or to its south? How high was the moon over the horizon, and in which direction did it tilt? And how wide was it? If, for example, he said that he saw the moon in front of the sun, he has not said anything of substance, as this is impossible and therefore he is either mistaken or lying.
  And after they finish hearing the first witness’s testimony, they would bring in the second witness and examine him in a similar manner. If their statements match, their testimony is accepted and the court sanctifies the New Moon. And the court then asks all the other pairs of witnesses certain general matters, without probing into all the details. They do this not because they require the additional testimony, but so that the witnesses should not leave disappointed, and so that the witnesses should be accustomed to coming to testify, and will not hesitate to come the next time, when they might be needed.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: In front of the sun is the same as to its north, and behind the sun is the same as to its south. Why would the court ask the witnesses both sets of questions? Abaye said: The first question does not refer to the moon’s position relative to the sun, but to the concave side of the moon, whether it was before the sun, pointing toward it, or behind the sun, pointing away from it. If he said that it was before the sun, he has said nothing.
  As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Dominion and fear are with Him, He makes peace in His high places” (Job 25:2)? It means that the sun has never seen the concave side of the new moon, nor has it ever seen the concave side of a rainbow, both of which always face away from the sun. It has never seen the concave side of the moon, as the moon would be distressed by a sense of inadequacy if its concave side faced the sun. Therefore the sun sees only the full roundness of its convex side. In this way He makes peace in His high places between the sun and the moon. Furthermore, the sun has never seen the concave side of a rainbow, so that the worshippers of the sun not say, as though the sun is a god,
  
  Daf 24a
  
  that the sun is shooting arrows at those who deny its divinity, using the rainbow as its bow. The concave side of the rainbow always faces away from the sun, so that it does not look like a bow held by the sun.
  § The mishna taught that the examination of the witnesses included the following questions: How high was the moon over the horizon, and in which direction did it tilt? It was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: If the witness testifies that he saw the moon to the north of the sun, his statement is valid. However, if he says that he saw it to its south, he has not said anything of significance, as this is impossible. The Gemara asks: Isn’t the opposite taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: If he testifies that he saw the moon to the south of the sun, his statement is valid. However, if he says he saw it to its north, he has not said anything.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the second <i>baraita</i> mentioned above, it is referring to the summer, when the moon is to the south of the sun; there, in the first <i>baraita</i> mentioned above, it is referring to the rainy season, when the moon is to the north of the sun.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one witness says that he saw the moon two plow handles high above the horizon, and the other one says it was three plow handles high, their testimony is valid, as a small discrepancy of this kind is reasonable. However, if one says that he saw the moon three plow handles above the horizon, and the other one says it was five plow handles high, their testimony is void, as that discrepancy is unacceptable. However, this does not mean that the witnesses themselves are disqualified, as either of them may join with another testimony, i.e., he may combine his account with that of another witness who testifies likewise.
  The Sages taught in another <i>baraita</i> that if the witnesses say: We did not actually see the moon, but we saw it reflected in the water, or we saw it reflected in a glass lantern, or we saw it through thin clouds, they may not testify about it, as only a direct sighting of the moon is acceptable. If they say: We saw half of the moon’s reflection in the water, or we saw half of it through the clouds, or we saw half of it in a lantern, they still may not testify about it.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: Now, if when one sees the entire moon in this manner, you said that this is not valid testimony, is it necessary to teach that one may not testify when he sees only half of it? Rather, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the witnesses saw half of the moon’s reflection in water and half of it directly in the sky, or half of it through the clouds and half of it in the sky, or half of it in a lantern and half of it in the sky, although they saw half of the moon directly, they may not testify about it until they see the entire moon in the sky.
  The Sages taught in another <i>baraita</i> that if the witnesses say: One moment we saw the new moon, but we did not see it again, they may not testify about it. The Gemara asks: Must they go on watching it to such an extent, i.e., why should they have to see it for a long period of time?
  Abaye said that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the witnesses say: We saw the moon on our own accord, i.e., by chance, without looking for it, and then we returned to look for it on purpose, to deliver precise testimony about it, but we did not see it again, they may not testify about it. What is the reason? Because one can say that the first time it was merely a small round white cloud that they saw, which they mistook for the moon, and that is why when they looked for it again they could not find it.
  MISHNA: After the witnesses have been examined and their testimony accepted, the head of the court says: It is sanctified. And all the people respond after him: It is sanctified; it is sanctified. Whether the moon was seen at its anticipated time, on the thirtieth day of the previous month, or whether it was not seen at its anticipated time, in which case witnesses are not necessary to establish the following day as the New Moon, the court sanctifies it and formally proclaims the day as the New Moon.
  Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: If the new moon was not seen at its anticipated time, the court does not sanctify the New Moon on the following day, as the celestial court in Heaven has already sanctified it, precluding the need for the additional sanctification by the earthly court.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the head of the court says: It is sanctified. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that the court must sanctify the New Moon, derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said that Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said that the verse states: “And Moses declared to the children of Israel the appointed seasons of the Lord” (Leviticus 23:44). From here it is derived that the head of the court says: It is sanctified, as it is evident from the verse that Moses, whose status was equivalent to that of the head of the Great Sanhedrin, declared the appointed times of the Festivals and New Moons in a formal manner.
  § The mishna further teaches that after the head of the court says: It is sanctified, all the people respond after him: It is sanctified; it is sanctified. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rav Pappa said that the verse states: “Which you shall proclaim them [<i>otam</i>] to be sacred convocations” (Leviticus 23:2). Instead of <i>otam</i>, read into the verse: You [<i>atem</i>], as though the verse stated: Which you shall proclaim, you. This superfluous word you teaches that the month must be proclaimed not only by the head of the court, but also by you, the people. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that it is derived from the phrase: “These are [<i>hem</i>] My appointed seasons” (Leviticus 23:2). The term <i>hem</i> can also mean: They, which indicates that they, the people, should likewise say and announce My appointed seasons.
  The Gemara further asks: Why do I need the people to declare: It is sanctified; it is sanctified, twice? The Gemara answers that the reason is that it is written: “Sacred convocations” (Leviticus 23:2) in the plural, which indicates that they must announce it twice.
  § The mishna taught that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: If the new moon was not seen at its anticipated time, the court does not sanctify the New Moon on the following day. The Gemara cites other opinions in this regard: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Sage Palaimo says: If the new moon was seen at its anticipated time, the court does not sanctify the New Moon, as the new moon appeared as expected and there is no need for any special sanctification. However, if the new moon was seen not at its anticipated time, the court must sanctify the New Moon.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: In either case, the court does not sanctify the New Moon formally, as it is stated: “And you shall sanctify the fiftieth year” (Leviticus 25:10), from which it is derived: You must formally sanctify years in court, but you do not have to formally sanctify months, as they are sanctified automatically by Heaven. Rather, it is enough merely to announce to the public that a certain day was established as the New Moon. Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, that if the new moon was seen at its anticipated time, the court sanctifies the new month; however, if it was not seen at its anticipated time, they do not sanctify it.
  Abaye said: We, too, learn in a mishna: If the court and all of the Jewish people saw the new moon, and the witnesses were interrogated, but the court did not manage to say: Sanctified, before nightfall, the previous month is rendered a full, thirty-day month. This indicates that full, yes; i.e., in this case, it is necessary to extend the previous month. However, sanctified, no; there is no need to formally sanctify the month, as the New Moon does not occur on its anticipated date in this case.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: There is no proof from here, as it was necessary for the mishna to mention that the month is rendered a full, thirty-day month. The reason is that it might enter your mind to say that since the court and the entire Jewish people saw the new moon, it has become public knowledge and therefore there is no need to render the previous month a full, thirty-day month. Consequently, the mishna teaches us that even in this case the previous month must be extended. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the New Moon must be formally sanctified on the following day.
  MISHNA: Rabban Gamliel had a diagram of the different forms of the moon drawn on a tablet that hung on the wall of his attic, which he would show to the laymen who came to testify about the new moon but were unable to describe adequately what they had seen. And he would say to them: Did you see a form like this or like this?
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to create these types of forms? Isn’t it written: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver, or gods of gold” (Exodus 20:19), which is interpreted as teaching: You shall not make images of My attendants, i.e., those celestial bodies that were created to serve God, including the sun and the moon?
  § Abaye said: The Torah prohibited only the images of those attendants with regard to which it is possible to reproduce an item in their likeness. Since it is impossible for anyone to reproduce the sun and the moon, the prohibition does not apply to these objects. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not construct a house in the exact form of the Sanctuary, nor a portico in the exact form of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary, nor a courtyard corresponding to the Temple courtyard, nor a table corresponding to the table in the Temple, nor a candelabrum corresponding to the candelabrum in the Temple. However, one may fashion
  
  Daf 24b
  
  a candelabrum of five or of six or of eight lamps. But one may not fashion a candelabrum with seven lamps even if he constructs it from other kinds of metal rather than gold, as in exigent circumstances the candelabrum in the Temple may be fashioned from other metals. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Also, one may not fashion a candelabrum of wood, in the manner that the kings of the Hasmonean monarchy fashioned it. When they first purified the Temple they had to prepare the candelabrum out of wood, as no other material was available. Since this candelabrum is fit for the Temple, it is prohibited to fashion one of this kind for oneself.
  The other Sages said to Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda: From there you seek to bring a proof? There the branches of the candelabrum were comprised of spits [<i>shippudin</i>] of iron and they covered them with tin. Later, when they grew richer and could afford a candelabrum of higher-quality material, they fashioned them from silver. When they grew even richer, they fashioned them from gold. Still, Abaye proves from this <i>baraita</i> that the prohibition against forming an image applies only to items that can be reconstructed in an accurate manner. Since this is not possible in the case of the moon, Rabban Gamliel’s forms were permitted.
  The Gemara asks: And is it really permitted to form images of those attendants concerning which it is impossible to reproduce their likeness? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver” (Exodus 20:19), comes to teach: You shall not make images of My attendants that serve before Me on high. Apparently, this includes the sun and the moon. Abaye said: This does not include the sun and the moon, as the Torah prohibited only the fashioning of an image of all four faces of the creatures of the Heavenly Chariot together (see Ezekiel, chapter 1). However, all other images, which are not the likeness of the ministering angels, are permitted.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: However, if that is so, let the fashioning of an image of a human face [<i>partzuf</i> ] alone be permitted. Why, then, is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All faces are permitted for ornamental purposes, except for the face of a person? Rav Huna, son of Rav Idi, said: From a lecture of Abaye I heard that there is a different reason why one may not form an image of a human face, as the verse states: “You shall not make with Me [<i>iti</i>]” (Exodus 20:19). This can be read as: You shall not make Me [<i>oti</i>]. Since man is created in the image of God, it is prohibited to form an image of a human being.
  The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to form images of other attendants? Isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver” (Exodus 20:19), teaches that you shall not make images of My attendants that serve before Me on high, for example, <i>ofanim</i> and seraphim and the sacred <i>ḥayyot</i> and the ministering angels. Abaye said: The Torah prohibited only those attendants that are found in the upper Heaven, i.e., the supreme angels in the highest firmament, but not the celestial bodies, e.g., the sun and the moon, despite the fact that they too are located in heaven.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: And is it permitted to form images of those bodies found in the lower heaven? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “You shall not make for yourself any graven image, nor any manner of likeness, of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:3). The phrase “that is in heaven” comes to include the sun, the moon, the stars, and the constellations. The term “above” serves to include the ministering angels. Apparently, it is prohibited to form an image even of the celestial bodies found in the lower Heaven. The Gemara answers: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is in reference to the prohibition against worshipping them. However, there is no prohibition against forming an image in their likeness.
  The Gemara asks: If that <i>baraita</i> is referring to the prohibition against worshipping them, then even a tiny worm should also be prohibited. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, as it is taught in the same <i>baraita</i> with regard to the continuation of the verse, “in the earth” comes to include mountains and hills, seas and rivers, streams and valleys; “beneath” comes to include a tiny worm. If so, it is indeed possible to explain that the entire <i>baraita</i> is referring to the prohibition against idol worship.
  The Gemara raises yet another objection: And is the mere fashioning of images of the celestial bodies permitted? Isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i>: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver” (Exodus 20:19). This verse teaches that you shall not make images of My attendants that serve before Me, for example the sun, the moon, the stars and the constellations. This is explicit proof that it is prohibited to form images of the sun and the moon; consequently, the solution proposed by Abaye is rejected, leaving the difficulty with Rabban Gamliel’s diagram unresolved.
  The Gemara proposes an alternative resolution: The case of Rabban Gamliel is different, as others, i.e., gentiles, fashioned those images for him, and it is prohibited only for a Jew to fashion such images; there is no prohibition against having them in one’s possession. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of Rav Yehuda, as others fashioned for him a seal in the form of a human being, and Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda, who was his student: Sharp-witted one, blind this one’s eyes, i.e., disfigure the image, as it is prohibited even to have the image of a human being in one’s possession.
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of Rav Yehuda, his was a protruding seal, i.e., the image projected from the ring, and Shmuel prohibited it due to the potential suspicion that he had an object of idol worship in his hand. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a ring, if its seal protrudes it is prohibited to place it on one’s finger, due to the suspicion of idol worship, but it is permitted to seal objects with it. In this case, the act of sealing creates an image that is sunken below the surface, which is not prohibited. However, if its seal is sunken, it is permitted to place it on one’s finger, but it is prohibited to seal objects with it, as that creates a protruding image.
  The Gemara asks: And are we concerned about arousing suspicion in a case of this kind? But what about that certain synagogue that had been destroyed in Eretz Yisrael and its stones were relocated and it was rebuilt so that it sat in Neharde’a, and there was a statue [<i>andarta</i>] of the king in it. And nevertheless Rav and Shmuel and Shmuel’s father and Levi would all enter and pray there and they were not concerned about arousing suspicion. The Gemara answers: When many Jews are present it is different, as a large group is not suspected of having idolatrous intentions. Rather, it is assumed that the statue is there exclusively for purposes of ornamentation.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t Rabban Gamliel an individual? According to this reasoning, his images of the moon should have been prohibited, as they would have aroused suspicion. The Gemara answers: Since he is the <i>Nasi</i>, the head of the Great Sanhedrin, many people were always found with him, and therefore there was no room for suspicion. The Gemara suggests an alternative answer: If you wish, say that these images were not whole; rather, they were formed from pieces of images that had to be put together. Only complete images are prohibited.
  The Gemara suggests yet another answer: If you wish, say: Rabban Gamliel did this to teach himself, which is not prohibited, as it is written: “You shall not learn to do after the abominations of those nations” (Deuteronomy 18:9), which indicates: However, you may learn to understand and to teach. In other words, it is permitted to do certain things for the sake of Torah study which would otherwise be prohibited.
  MISHNA: There was an incident in which two witnesses came to testify about the new moon, and they said: We saw the waning moon in the morning in the east,
  
  Daf 25a
  
  and that same day we saw the new moon in the evening in the west. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: They are false witnesses, as it is impossible to see the new moon so soon after the last sighting of the waning moon. However, when they arrived in Yavne, Rabban Gamliel accepted them as witnesses without concern.
  And there was another incident in which two witnesses came and said: We saw the new moon at its anticipated time, i.e., on the night of the thirtieth day of the previous month; however, on the following night, i.e., the start of the thirty-first, which is often the determinant of a full, thirty-day month, it was not seen. And nevertheless Rabban Gamliel accepted their testimony and established the New Moon on the thirtieth day.
  Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas disagreed and said: They are false witnesses; how can witnesses testify that a woman gave birth and the next day her belly is between her teeth, i.e., she is obviously still pregnant? If the new moon was already visible at its anticipated time, how could it not be seen a day later? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I see the logic of your statement; the New Moon must be established a day later. Upon hearing that Rabbi Yehoshua had challenged his ruling, Rabban Gamliel sent a message to him: I decree against you that you must appear before me with your staff and with your money on the day on which Yom Kippur occurs according to your calculation; according to my calculation, that day is the eleventh of Tishrei, the day after Yom Kippur.
  Rabbi Akiva went and found Rabbi Yehoshua distressed that the head of the Great Sanhedrin was forcing him to desecrate the day that he maintained was Yom Kippur. In an attempt to console him, Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yehoshua: I can learn from a verse that everything that Rabban Gamliel did in sanctifying the month is done, i.e., it is valid. As it is stated: “These are the appointed seasons of the Lord, sacred convocations, which you shall proclaim in their season” (Leviticus 23:4). This verse indicates that whether you have proclaimed them at their proper time or whether you have declared them not at their proper time, I have only these Festivals as established by the representatives of the Jewish people.
  Rabbi Yehoshua then came to Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas, who said to him: If we come to debate and question the rulings of the court of Rabban Gamliel, we must debate and question the rulings of every court that has stood from the days of Moses until now. As it is stated: “Then Moses went up, and Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel” (Exodus 24:9). But why were the names of these seventy Elders not specified? Rather, this comes to teach that every set of three judges that stands as a court over the Jewish people has the same status as the court of Moses. Since it is not revealed who sat on that court, apparently it is enough that they were official judges in a Jewish court.
  When Rabbi Yehoshua heard that even Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas maintained that they must submit to Rabban Gamliel’s decision, he took his staff and his money in his hand, and went to Yavne to Rabban Gamliel on the day on which Yom Kippur occurred according to his own calculation. Upon seeing him, Rabban Gamliel stood up and kissed him on his head. He said to him: Come in peace, my teacher and my student. You are my teacher in wisdom, as Rabbi Yehoshua was wiser than anyone else in his generation, and you are my student, as you accepted my statement, despite your disagreement.
  GEMARA: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Gamliel said to the Sages, in explanation of his opinion that it is possible for the new moon to be visible so soon after the last sighting of the waning moon: This is the tradition that I received from the house of my father’s father: Sometimes the moon comes by a long path and sometimes it comes by a short one.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason for the opinion of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, i.e., the house of the heads of the Great Sanhedrin, the source of Rabban Gamliel’s ruling? As it is written: “Who appointed the moon for seasons; the sun knows its going down” (Psalms 104:19). This verse indicates that it is only the sun that knows its going down, i.e., its seasons and the times that it shines are the same every year. In contrast, the moon does not know its going down, as its course is not identical every month.
  § The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ḥiyya once saw the waning moon standing in the sky on the morning of the twenty-ninth of the month. He took a clump of earth and threw it at the moon, saying: This evening we need to sanctify you, i.e., the new moon must be visible tonight so that we may declare the thirtieth of the month as the New Moon, and you are still standing here? Go and cover yourself for now, so that the new moon will be seen only after nightfall. The Gemara further relates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Go to a place called Ein Tav and sanctify the New Moon there, and send me a sign that you have sanctified it. The sign is: David, king of Israel, lives and endures.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Once the sky was covered with clouds, and the form of the moon was visible on the twenty-ninth of the month. The people thought to say that the day was the New Moon, and the court sought to sanctify it. However, Rabban Gamliel said to them: This is the tradition that I received from the house of my father’s father: The monthly cycle of the renewal of the moon takes no less than twenty-nine and a half days, plus two-thirds of an hour, plus seventy-three of the 1,080 subsections of an hour.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And on that day the mother of the Sage ben Zaza died, and Rabban Gamliel delivered a great eulogy on her behalf. He did this not because she was worthy of this honor; rather, he eulogized her so that the people would know that the court had not sanctified the month, as eulogies are prohibited on the New Moon.
  § The mishna taught that Rabbi Akiva went and found him distressed that the head of the Great Sanhedrin was forcing him to desecrate the day that he maintained was Yom Kippur. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Who was distressed? Was Rabbi Akiva distressed or was Rabbi Yehoshua distressed? The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Akiva went and found Rabbi Yehoshua in a state of distress, and he said to him: My teacher, for what reason are you distressed? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Rabbi Akiva, it is fitting for one to fall sick in bed for twelve months, rather than to have this decree issued against him that he should have to desecrate Yom Kippur.
  Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, allow me to say before you one matter that you yourself once taught me. He said to him: Speak. He said to him: It states with respect to the Festivals: “The appointed seasons of the Lord, which you shall proclaim them [<i>otam</i>] to be sacred convocations (Leviticus 23:2). And it is written: “These are the appointed seasons of the Lord, sacred convocations; you shall proclaim them [<i>otam</i>] in their season” (Leviticus 23:4). And it is written: “These are the appointed seasons of the Lord; you shall proclaim them [<i>otam</i>] to be sacred convocations” (Leviticus 23:37). Three times the verses use the term: Them [<i>otam</i>], which can also be read as you [<i>atem</i>], in plural.
  This comes to teach: You [<i>atem</i>] are authorized to determine the date of the new month, even if you unwittingly establish the New Moon on the wrong day; you, even if you do so intentionally; you, even if you are misled by false witnesses. In all cases, once the court establishes the day as the New Moon, it is sanctified, and God grants His consent. After hearing this, Rabbi Yehoshua said to him in these words: Akiva, you have consoled me; you have consoled me.
  § The mishna taught that Rabbi Yehoshua next came to Rabbi Dosa ben Horkinas, who proved to him that the court of Rabban Gamliel has the same legal status as the court of Moses. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Why were the names of these seventy Elders who sat together with Moses on his court not specified? The reason is so that a person not say: Is so-and-so the judge in my time, like Moses and Aaron? Is so-and-so like Nadav and Avihu? Is so-and-so like Eldad and Medad? Therefore, the names of the other elders were not specified, so that there is no way of knowing the qualifications of the elders in the time of Moses to compare them to later judges.
  And similarly it says: “And Samuel said to the people: It is the Lord Who made Moses and Aaron” (I Samuel 12:6). And it says further: “And the Lord sent Jerubaal and Bedan and Jephthah and Samuel” (I Samuel 12:11). The Gemara explains: Jerubaal, this is Gideon. And why is he called Jerubaal? The reason is that he waged a quarrel against Baal. Bedan, this is Samson. And why is he called Bedan? As he came from the tribe of Dan. Jephthah, in accordance with its regular meaning, i.e., this is referring to Jephthah himself and is not a nickname.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  And it says in another verse: “Moses and Aaron among His priests, and Samuel among those who call His name; they called upon the Lord, and He answered them” (Psalms 99:6). This verse equates Samuel to Moses and Aaron. In this manner, the verse weighed three light ones of the world, i.e., it considered the three less distinguished figures of Gideon, Samson, and Jephthah as equal to three significant ones of the world, Moses, Aaron, and Samuel, three of the greatest leaders of the Jewish people.
  This comes to tell you that Jerubaal in his generation is worthy of being treated like Moses in his generation; Bedan in his generation is like Aaron in his generation; and Jephthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation. This serves to teach you that even the lightest of the light, i.e., the least distinguished individual, once he has been appointed as a leader over the community, he must be treated like the greatest of the great, and all are required to heed him and obey his rulings.
  And it further says: “And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge who shall be in those days” (Deuteronomy 17:9). But can it enter your mind that a person can go to a judge that is not alive in his days? What, then, is the meaning of the phrase “in those days”? It teaches that you need to go only to the judge in one’s days, i.e., he is authorized to judge and decide matters. And it also says: “Do not say: How was it that the former days were better than these? For it is not out of wisdom that you inquire concerning this” (Ecclesiastes 7:10). Instead, one must accept the rulings of the leaders of his generation.
  § The mishna taught: Rabbi Yehoshua took his staff and his money in his hand, and appeared before Rabban Gamliel on the day on which Yom Kippur occurred according to his calculation, as Rabban Gamliel had ordered him to do. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When Rabban Gamliel saw Rabbi Yehoshua, he rose from his chair and kissed him on his head and said to him: Peace be on you, my teacher and my student. My teacher, as you have taught me Torah in public, and my student, as I issue a decree against you and you fulfill it like a student of mine. Fortunate is the generation in which the greater heed the lesser, and it is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that the generation in which the lesser heed the greater is certainly fortunate as well.
  The Gemara questions this last point: Is this derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? This is incorrect, as it is an obligation for the lesser to heed those who are greater than them. Rather, Rabbi Gamliel meant the following: Since the greater heed the lesser, the lesser apply an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to themselves and heed the leaders of the generation.
  
  MISHNA: If the court and all of the Jewish people saw the new moon, and the witnesses were interrogated, but the court did not manage to say: Sanctified, before nightfall, so that the thirtieth day already passed, the previous month is rendered a full, thirty-day month, and the following day is observed as the New Moon.
  If the court alone saw the new moon, two members of the court should stand and testify before the others, and the court should say: Sanctified, sanctified. If three people saw the new moon, and they are themselves members of a court for this purpose, two of them should stand and seat two of their colleagues next to the individual who remains of the three, thereby forming a new court of three. The two standing judges should then testify before the three seated judges that they saw the new moon and the seated judges say: Sanctified, sanctified. This procedure is necessary because an individual is not authorized to declare the month sanctified by himself. Rather, a court of three is required.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach: If the court and all of the Jewish people saw the new moon? Merely stating that the court saw the moon would have sufficed, since its sanctification depends on them. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to teach that even in that case, the month is intercalated. As it might enter your mind to say that since the court and all of the Jewish people saw the new moon, it was publicized that it was the New Moon that day, and let them no longer intercalate the month. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches us that even in the case where all the Jewish people saw the new moon, the New Moon must be declared by the court.
  The Gemara asks further: But once the mishna states: If the court and all of the Jewish people saw the new moon, why do I need it to say: And the witnesses were interrogated? Why are witnesses necessary if the new moon was already seen by the court? The Gemara answers that this is what the <i>tanna</i> is saying: Alternatively, if the witnesses were interrogated, but the court had no time to say: Sanctified, before nightfall, the previous month is intercalated and rendered a full month of thirty days.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty. But once the mishna taught: But the court did not manage to say: Sanctified, before nightfall, the previous month is rendered a full, thirty-day month, why do I need the mishna to teach about the interrogation of the witnesses? This <i>halakha</i> was already stated with regard to a case where the court itself saw the new moon.
  The Gemara explains: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Let the interrogation of the witnesses be regarded as the beginning of the judicial process, and let the declaration: Sanctified, sanctified, be regarded as the conclusion of the judicial process, and let them sanctify the month at night, because the process began during the day. This process would then be just as it is in cases of monetary law, as we learned in a mishna: In cases of monetary law, although they must be adjudicated during the day, the court may judge the majority of a case during the day, and complete the trial and issue the ruling at night. Here too, one might assume that the court may sanctify the month at night, as the process began during the day. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that the court may not do so.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: Why not say that, indeed, the sanctification of the month should be treated like monetary cases? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to Rosh HaShana: “For this is a statute for Israel, a judgment [<i>mishpat</i>] of the God of Jacob” (Psalms 81:5). When does the sanctification of the month become a statute? At the end of the judicial process, and the Merciful One calls it a judgment as well, thereby teaching that just as the primary time of a judgment is during the day, here too, with regard to the sanctification of the New Moon, the process must take place during the day, and not at night.
  § The mishna continues: If the court alone saw the new moon, two members of the court should stand and testify before the others. The Gemara ponders: If the court saw the new moon, why is it necessary for two of its members to testify before the others? Hearing their testimony should not be greater than actually seeing the new moon.
  The Gemara responds that Rabbi Zeira said: The mishna is addressing a case where the court saw the new moon at night. Because they saw it at night, their testimony is inadmissible at that time, as testimonies are admissible only during the day. They must therefore wait until the following day and testify as any ordinary person would.
  The mishna continues: If three people saw the new moon, and they are themselves members of a court for this purpose, two of them should stand and seat two of their colleagues next to the individual who remains of the three. The Gemara asks: Why is this necessary? Here too, let us say: Hearing their testimony should not be greater than actually seeing the new moon. And if you say that here too, the mishna is addressing a case where they saw the new moon at night, this case is identical to that previous one, and there would be no need for two separate rulings.
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach the last clause, which states: Because an individual is not deemed credible and authorized to declare the month sanctified by himself. For it might enter your mind to say that since we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by a court of three judges, but if a person was a publicly recognized expert, he may judge monetary matters even individually, then here too, one judge should be authorized to sanctify the month individually if he is a recognized expert. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not so, and that three judges are required for the sanctification of the month.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say that here too, a recognized expert can sanctify the month individually? The Gemara rejects this possibility: But certainly there was no publicly recognized expert among the Jewish people greater than our teacher Moses, and nevertheless the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: You may not sanctify the new month until Aaron is with you, as it is written: “And the Lord spoke to Moses and Aaron in the land of Egypt, saying, this month shall be for you the beginning of months” (Exodus 12:1–2), where the word “you” is in the plural form. And since, to avoid deadlock, a court cannot be composed of an even number of judges, another judge must be added. It is therefore apparent that three judges are required for the sanctification of the month by Torah law.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that a witness becomes a judge, i.e., that one who witnessed an event can himself serve as a judge concerning the matter? Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, for it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the Sanhedrin saw someone kill another person,
  
  Daf 26a
  
  some of them are rendered witnesses and testify before the others and some of them become judges in the case; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: They are all rendered witnesses, and a witness cannot become a judge. It seems therefore that the mishna contradicts Rabbi Akiva’s opinion.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: You can even say that the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, but we must distinguish between the cases. Rabbi Akiva states his position there only with regard to cases of capital law, for the Merciful One says: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall save” (Numbers 35:24–25), which requires a court to search for grounds to exonerate the defendant, but once they themselves have seen him kill a person, they will be unable to find grounds to exonerate him. But here, with regard to the sighting of the new moon, even Rabbi Akiva concedes that a witness can be rendered a judge.
  MISHNA: The mishna begins to discuss the primary mitzva of Rosh HaShana, sounding the <i>shofar</i>. All <i>shofarot</i> are fit for blowing except for the horn of a cow, because it is a horn [<i>keren</i>] and not a <i>shofar</i>. Rabbi Yosei said: But aren’t all <i>shofarot</i> called horn, as it is stated: “And it shall come to pass, that when they sound a long blast with the horn [<i>keren</i>] of a ram [<i>yovel</i>]” (Joshua 6:5), and a ram’s horn is a <i>shofar</i> fit for sounding on Rosh HaShana?
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yosei is saying well, i.e., presents a convincing argument. Why do the Rabbis not accept it? The Gemara explains that the Rabbis counter Rabbi Yosei’s argument as follows: Indeed, all other <i>shofarot</i> are called <i>shofar</i> and they are also called <i>keren</i>, but that of a cow is called <i>keren</i>, but it is not called <i>shofar</i>, as it is written: “His firstborn bull, grandeur is his, and his horns [<i>karnav</i>] are the horns of [<i>karnei</i>] a wild ox” (Deuteronomy 33:17). It is therefore clear that the horns of a bull are called <i>keren</i>, and nowhere are they called <i>shofar</i>.
  And how would Rabbi Yosei counter this argument? He could have said to you: The horns of a cow are also called <i>shofar</i>, as it is written: “And it shall please the Lord better than an ox bull [<i>shor par</i>] that has horns and hoofs” (Psalms 69:32). The wording of the verse is strange: If it is an ox [<i>shor</i>], why is it also called a bull [<i>par</i>], and if it is a bull [<i>par</i>], why is it called an ox [<i>shor</i>]? Rather, what is the meaning of <i>shor par</i>? These two words must be read as if they were one single word: Than a <i>shofar</i>. According to this reading, even the horn of a cow is called a <i>shofar</i>.
  And how do the Rabbis explain the difficulty in this verse? They explain it as it was explained by Rav Mattana, as Rav Mattana said: What is the meaning of <i>shor par</i>? An ox [<i>shor</i>] that is as large as a bull [<i>par</i>], as the animal is called a <i>shor</i> from birth, but is called a <i>par</i> only from the age of three.
  Ulla said: This is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who say that the horn of a cow is unfit for sounding on Rosh HaShana. They say this in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: For what reason does the High Priest not enter the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies, with his golden garments to perform the service there on Yom Kippur? It is because a prosecutor [<i>kateigor</i>] cannot become an advocate [<i>sanneigor</i>]. Since the Jewish people committed the sin of worshipping the Golden Calf, the High Priest may not enter the Holy of Holies to atone for the Jewish people wearing golden garments, as they would bring that sin to mind.
  The Gemara asks: But do we not use a cow in the Holy of Holies? But there is the blood of the bull that is brought there to be sprinkled on Yom Kippur, despite the fact that the Jewish people sinned with a calf. The Gemara answers: Since it has changed, i.e., it is not the bull itself, but only its blood, then it has changed, i.e., so it does not bring the sin of the Golden Calf to mind.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But there is the Ark, the Ark cover, and the cherub, all of which are plated with gold. If this is problematic, why are they in the Holy of Holies? The Gemara explains: What we are saying is that a sinner seeking atonement should not bring something made of gold into the Holy of Holies, as it would bring the sin of the Golden Calf to mind.
  The Gemara asks further: But there is the spoon and coal pan that are brought into the Holy of Holies, and they are made of gold. The Gemara answers: What we are saying is that a sinner seeking atonement should not adorn himself with ornaments of gold.
  The Gemara raises yet another question: But there are the golden garments the High Priest wears outside the Holy of Holies. The Gemara answers: What we are saying is that a sinner should not adorn himself with gold inside the Holy of Holies, but outside there is no concern. The Gemara continues this line of questioning: If so, the <i>shofar</i> is also outside, since it is not brought into the Holy of Holies. The Gemara answers: Since the <i>shofar</i> is sounded in order to evoke God’s remembrance, it is considered as if it were sounded inside the Holy of Holies.
  The Gemara asks: Is this indeed the reason that the Rabbis disqualify the use of a cow’s horn? But the <i>tanna</i> taught: The horn of a cow cannot be used because it is a <i>keren</i>. The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> stated one reason and also another reason: One reason is that a prosecutor cannot become an advocate, and another is because it is called a <i>keren</i> and not a <i>shofar</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Yosei counter these arguments? The Gemara explains: He could have said to you: That which you said, that a prosecutor cannot become an advocate, is indeed true, but this applies only inside the Holy of Holies, and the <i>shofar</i> is sounded outside. And with regard to that which you said, because it is a <i>keren</i>, all <i>shofarot</i> are also called <i>keren</i>.
  Abaye said: This is the reasoning of the Rabbis: The Merciful One says to sound a single <i>shofar</i>, and not two or three <i>shofarot</i> together, but this horn of a cow, since it is comprised of layers, looks like two or three <i>shofarot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But the <i>tanna</i> taught: The horn of a cow cannot be used because it is a <i>keren</i>. Since the Rabbis’ reasoning appears clearly in the mishna, how can the reasoning provided by Abaye be correct? The Gemara replies: The <i>tanna</i> stated one reason and also another reason. One reason is that the Merciful One says to sound a single <i>shofar</i>, and not two or three <i>shofarot</i> together, and another is because it is a <i>keren</i>.
  And Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: That which you said, that the Merciful One says in the Torah to sound a single <i>shofar</i>, and not two or three <i>shofarot</i>, is not a difficulty. Since the layers of the cow’s horn are connected to each other, it is considered a single <i>shofar</i>. And with regard to that which you said: Because it is a <i>keren</i>, all <i>shofarot</i> are also called <i>keren</i>.
  § It is taught in the mishna that Rabbi Yosei proves from a verse that a the horn of a ram [<i>yovel</i>] is called a <i>keren</i>. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this term <i>yovel</i> denotes the horn of a ram? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Akiva said: When I went to Arabia, I heard that they called a ram <i>yovla</i>, and from this we can infer the meaning of the term <i>yovel</i> in the related language of Hebrew.
  The Gemara records a series of similar statements: And Rabbi Akiva said: When I went to Galia, I heard that they called a menstruating woman <i>galmuda</i>, and this clarifies the meaning of that word in Scripture. It should be understood as follows: What does <i>galmuda</i> mean? She is separated [<i>gemula da</i>] from her husband, as all physical contact between a menstruating woman and her husband is forbidden. And Rabbi Akiva said: When I went to Africa, I heard that they called a <i>ma’a</i>, which is a certain coin, <i>kesita</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the practical significance of this? The Gemara answers: To explain that the words in the Torah relating to Jacob’s purchase of his field near Shechem: “And he bought the parcel of ground where he had spread his tent, from the sons of Hamor for a hundred <i>kesita</i>” (Genesis 33:19), denote a hundred <i>dankei</i>, i.e., a hundred <i>ma’a.</i>
  Similarly, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: When I went to the sea towns, I heard that they called a sale <i>kira</i>. And the Gemara asks: What is the practical significance of this? The Gemara answers: To explain the verse relating to Jacob’s burial plot: “In my grave which I purchased [<i>kariti</i>] for myself, there shall you bury me” (Genesis 50:5).
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: When I went to the district of Kan Nishrayya, I heard that they called a bride <i>ninfi</i> and a rooster <i>sekhvi</i>. The Gemara explains how this information serves to clarify the meanings of biblical verses: A bride is called <i>ninfi</i>; what is the verse that uses a similar term? “Beautiful view [<i>nof</i> ], the joy of the whole earth, Mount Zion” (Psalms 48:3), which therefore means beautiful like a bride. And a rooster is called <i>sekhvi</i>; Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: And if you wish, you can say that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said this: What is the verse that employs this term? “Who has put wisdom in the inward parts? Or who has given understanding to the <i>sekhvi</i>” (Job 38:36), which should be understood as follows: “Who has put wisdom in the inward parts”: These are the kidneys that are hidden in the body; “or who has given understanding to the <i>sekhvi</i>”: This is a rooster, who knows to crow at fixed times during the night.
  Incidental to the discussion of the meanings of certain words in foreign countries, it was related that Levi once happened to come to a certain place, where a man came before him to complain about what had been done to him. This man said to him:
  
  Daf 26b
  
  So-and-so <i>keva’a</i> from me. Levi did not understand what that man was saying to him, as he did not know the meaning of the word <i>kava</i>. So he went and asked in the study hall. They said to him: That man said to you: He robbed me, as it is written: “Will a man rob [<i>hayikba</i>] God?” (Malachi 3:8). Rava from a place called Barnish said to Rav Ashi: Had I been there in Levi’s place I would have tried to uncover the meaning of the word in a different way, for I would have said to him: How did he <i>keva’a</i> you? With what did he <i>keva’a</i> you? And why did he <i>keva’a</i> you? And from his answers I would have understood on my own what was being said. The Gemara comments: And Levi, who did not do this, thought that the man was talking about a matter of prohibition and not a monetary matter, and so asking the man these questions would not have helped, as they are relevant only to monetary matters.
  The Gemara continues its discussion of unusual words: The Sages did not know the meaning of the word <i>seirugin</i>, which is found in a mishna. One day they heard the maidservant in Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s house say to the Sages whom she saw entering the house not all at once, but intermittently: How long shall you enter <i>seirugin seirugin</i>? and from this they understood that the word <i>seirugin</i> means: At intervals.
  It is similarly recounted that the Sages did not know the meaning of the word <i>ḥaloglogot</i>, which is mentioned in various <i>mishnayot</i> and <i>baraitot</i>. One day they heard the maidservant in Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s house say to a certain man whom she saw scattering his purslane plants: How long shall you scatter your <i>ḥaloglogot</i>? So they understood that <i>ḥaloglogot</i> means purslane.
  The Sages also did not know the meaning of the word <i>salseleha</i> in the verse: “<i>Salseleha</i> and it will exalt you” (Proverbs 4:8). One day they heard the maidservant in Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s house say to a certain man who was curling his hair: How long shall you <i>mesalsel</i> your hair? And from this they understood that the verse means: Turn wisdom about, and it will exalt you.
  It is further related that the Sages did not know the meaning of the words in the verse: “And sweep it [<i>vetetetiha</i>] with the broom [<i>matatei</i>] of destruction” (Isaiah 14:23). One day they heard the maidservant in Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s house saying to her workmate: Take a broom [<i>tateita</i>] and sweep [<i>ta’ati</i>] the house,” and they understood the meaning of these words.
  The Sages also did not know the meaning of the word <i>yehavkha</i> in the verse: “Cast your load [<i>yehavkha</i>] upon the Lord and He will sustain you” (Psalms 55:23). Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: One day I was traveling with a certain Arab [<i>Tayya’a</i>], and I was carrying a load, and he said to me: Take your <i>yehav</i> and cast it on my camel, and from this I understood that <i>yehav</i> means a load.
  MISHNA: The <i>shofar</i> that was used on Rosh HaShana in the Temple was made from the straight horn of an ibex, and its mouth, the mouthpiece into which one blows, was plated with gold. And there were two trumpets, one on each of the two sides of the person sounding the <i>shofar</i>. The <i>shofar</i> would sound a long blast, whereas the trumpets would sound a short blast, because the mitzva of the day is with the <i>shofar</i>.
  And in contrast, the <i>shofarot</i> used on public fast days were made from the curved horns of rams, and their mouths were plated with silver. There were two trumpets in the middle between the <i>shofarot</i>, and the <i>shofar</i> would sound a short blast, whereas the trumpets would sound a long blast, for the mitzva of the day is with the trumpets.
  Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana with regard to both the <i>shofar</i> blasts that are sounded and the additional blessings that are recited in the <i>Amida</i> prayer. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says: There is a difference between the two days: On Rosh HaShana one blows with horns of rams, whereas in Jubilee Years one blows with horns of ibexes.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Levi said: The mitzva of Rosh HaShana and of Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is to blow with curved <i>shofarot</i>, and that of the rest of the year, on fast days, is to blow with straight <i>shofarot</i>. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn differently in the mishna: The <i>shofar</i> that was used on Rosh HaShana was made from the straight horn of an ibex? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Levi said his statement in accordance with the opinion of that <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: On Rosh HaShana they would blow with the curved horns of rams, and on the Days of Atonement of the Jubilee Years with the horns of ibexes.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let it simply say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Why was it necessary to quote the <i>baraita</i> in full, as if it provided new information? The Gemara explains: If you had said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would have said that he, Rabbi Levi, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda even with regard to the <i>shofar</i> used in the Jubilee Year, i.e., that one must blow with the horn of ibexes at that time. Therefore, the Gemara teaches us that he agrees with Rabbi Yehuda only with regard to Rosh HaShana, and not with regard to any other matter.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do these <i>tanna’im</i> disagree? One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that on Rosh HaShana the more a person bends his mind and humbles himself by bending in prayer, the better. Therefore, a curved <i>shofar</i> is sounded as an allusion to our bent minds and bodies. But on Yom Kippur, the more a person straightens his mind and prays with simplicity, the better. Therefore, a straight <i>shofar</i> is sounded. The other Sage, the anonymous <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, maintains the opposite: On Rosh HaShana, the more a person straightens his mind and avoids any crookedness, the better. On fasts, on the other hand, the more a person bends his mind and humbles himself, the better.
  
  Daf 27a
  
  § It was taught in the mishna: And the mouth of the <i>shofar</i> that was used on Rosh HaShana was plated with gold. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a <i>shofar</i> was plated with gold at the place where one puts his mouth, it is unfit for blowing; if it was plated, but not at the place where he puts his mouth, it is fit for blowing? Abaye said: When we learned in the mishna as well, we learned that it referred not to the place where one puts his mouth, but a little above it.
  § It was taught in the mishna: And there were two trumpets, one on each of the two sides of the person sounding the <i>shofar</i>. The Gemara asks: But is it really possible to properly discern two different sounds, that of the <i>shofar</i> and that of the trumpets, at the same time? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The two versions of the fifth of the Ten Commandments, “Remember the Shabbat day” (Exodus 20:8) and “Keep the Shabbat day” (Deuteronomy 5:12), were spoken by God simultaneously in a single utterance, something that the human mouth cannot speak and the human ear cannot hear? This indicates that it is impossible to take in two sounds at once, and so, due to the sound of the trumpets, it should be impossible to hear the blast of the <i>shofar</i>. The Gemara answers: For this reason they would sound a long blast with the <i>shofar</i>, to make it possible to hear the sound of the <i>shofar</i> on its own.
  The Gemara rejects this answer: Is this to say that if one hears the end of a blast without hearing the beginning of the blast he has fulfilled his obligation? In this case one hears only the end of the <i>shofar</i> blast, since the <i>shofar</i> was initially sounded together with the trumpets. If so, it would follow that if one hears the beginning of the blast without hearing the end of the blast, he has also fulfilled his obligation.
  This, however, is difficult. Come and hear that which was taught in a mishna: If one blew the initial <i>tekia</i>, a long, continuous <i>shofar</i> blast, of the first <i>tekia-terua-tekia</i> set, and then drew out the final <i>tekia</i> of that set so that it spans the length of two <i>tekiot</i>, it counts as only one <i>tekia</i> and is not considered two <i>tekiot</i>, i.e., the final <i>tekia</i> of the first set, and the initial <i>tekia</i> of the second set. But why is this so? Let it count for him as two <i>tekiot</i>, since as stated above, half a blast is considered a blast. The Gemara explains: If one hears only the beginning or the end of a <i>shofar</i> blast, he has indeed fulfilled his obligation, but nevertheless we do not divide a <i>shofar</i> blast into two.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: Come and hear that which was taught in a mishna: With regard to one who sounds a <i>shofar</i> into a pit, or into a cistern, or into a large jug [<i>pitas</i>], if he clearly heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i>, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he also heard the sound of an echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation. But why is this so? If half a blast is indeed considered a complete blast, let him fulfill his obligation with the beginning of the blast, before the sound is confused with the echo, since the beginning of the blast was heard clearly.
  Rather, we must retreat from the explanation offered above and say as follows: Two sounds coming from one source or person cannot be discerned, and this was the miracle at Sinai in which the people heard both “Remember the Shabbat” (Exodus 20:8) and “Keep the Shabbat” (Deuteronomy 5:12) in a single divine utterance. But two sounds from two different sources or people can be properly discerned.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But is it really true that two sounds coming from two different people can be properly discerned? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the public reading of the Torah, one person may read and one may translate, provided that there are not two people reading and two people translating. Consequently it is clear that two sounds cannot be properly heard, even when they come from two different people.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since our case is only similar to the case mentioned in the latter clause of that <i>baraita</i>, which reads: With regard to the reading of <i>hallel</i> and the Scroll of Esther, even ten people may read simultaneously. Apparently, since these readings are dear to their listeners, they direct their attention to them, listen attentively, and distinguish between the different readers. Here too, since the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> is dear to the listener, he directs his attention to the matter and discerns between the two sounds.
  The Gemara asks: But if it is indeed possible to discern the sound of the <i>shofar</i> even when it is sounded simultaneously with the trumpets, why does he sound a long blast with the <i>shofar</i>? The Gemara answers: This is so people should know that the mitzva of the day is specifically with the <i>shofar</i>.
  § It was taught in the mishna: The <i>shofarot</i> that were used on public fast days were made from the curved horns of rams, and their mouths were plated with silver. The Gemara asks: What is different there that the <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana is plated with gold, and what is different here that the <i>shofarot</i> of fast days are plated with silver? The Gemara answers: If you wish, you can say: Any <i>shofar</i> made for the purpose of gathering people together is made of silver, as it is written: “Make for yourself two trumpets of silver; of a whole piece shall you make them, and you shall use them for calling the assembly and for the journeying of the camps” (Numbers 10:2). And if you wish, you can say: The Torah spared the money of the Jewish people and therefore allows these <i>shofarot</i> to be made of silver, which is less costly than gold.
  The Gemara asks: If so, there too, the <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana should be made with silver plating. The Gemara answers: Even so, the duty of honoring the Festival is given priority, so that it is proper to beautify the <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana. On a fast day, however, since it is not a Festival, there is no need to use gold, and silver is sufficient.
  It is related that Rav Pappa bar Shmuel thought to act in accordance with the mishna regarding all the details of the <i>shofar</i> and the trumpets. But Rava said to him: They said this only with regard to the Temple. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement said? Only in the Temple, but in the provinces, anywhere outside the Temple, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: Wherever there are trumpets, e.g., on fast days, there is no <i>shofar</i>, and wherever there is a <i>shofar</i>, e.g., on Rosh HaShana, there are no trumpets.
  And similarly, Rabbi Ḥalafta established the custom in Tzippori as it is described in the mishna, and so did Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon in Sikhni, and when the matter came before the Rabbis they said: They acted in this manner only at the east gates of the Temple and on the Temple Mount.
  Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that said: What is the verse from which this is derived? As it is written: “With trumpets and the sound of a <i>shofar</i> make joyful noise before the Lord, the King” (Psalms 98:6), from which it may be inferred: Only before the Lord, the King, i.e., in His Temple, do we need both trumpets and the sound of a <i>shofar</i>, but in general, outside the Temple, we do not need both.
  § It was taught in the mishna: Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana with regard to both the <i>shofar</i> blasts that are sounded and the additional blessings that are recited in the <i>Amida</i> prayer. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: In accordance with whose opinion do we pray today on Rosh HaShana, saying: This day is the beginning of Your works, a commemoration of the first day? In accordance with whom? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: The world was created in the month of Tishrei. We therefore mention on Rosh HaShana that it is the first day.
  Rav Eina raised an objection: It was taught in the mishna: Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana with regard to both the <i>shofar</i> blasts that are sounded and the additional blessings that are recited in the <i>Amida</i> prayer. But there are the words: This day is the beginning of Your works, a commemoration of the first day, which can be recited on Rosh HaShana but cannot be recited on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year, which is neither: The beginning of Your works, nor: A commemoration of the first day. If so, how can one recite the same blessing on both occasions? The Gemara answers: When the mishna was taught, saying that the blessings of the Jubilee and Rosh HaShana are the same, it was taught with regard to the other parts of the blessings, but the line beginning: This day, is indeed omitted on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, taught the previous passage as follows: Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: That which we learn in the mishna, Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana with regard to both the <i>shofar</i> blasts that are sounded and the additional blessings that are recited in the <i>Amida</i> prayer; in accordance with whom was it taught? Apparently it was not taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as if it reflects the view of Rabbi Eliezer, there is a difficulty. Since he said that the world was created in Tishrei, then there are also the words: This day is the beginning of Your works, a commemoration of the first day, which can be recited on Rosh HaShana, but cannot be recited on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year. If so, how can one recite the same blessing on both occasions? The Gemara rejects this argument: When the mishna was taught, it was taught with regard to the other parts of the blessings, but this line is indeed omitted on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year.
  MISHNA: A <i>shofar</i> that was cracked and then glued together, even though it appears to be whole, is unfit. Similarly, if one glued together broken fragments of <i>shofarot</i> to form a complete <i>shofar</i>, the <i>shofar</i> is unfit.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  If the <i>shofar</i> was punctured and the puncture was sealed, if it impedes the blowing, the <i>shofar</i> is unfit, but if not, it is fit. If one sounds a <i>shofar</i> into a pit, or into a cistern, or into a large jug, if he clearly heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i>, he has fulfilled his obligation; but if he heard the sound of an echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  And similarly, if one was passing behind a synagogue,or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i> or the sound of the Scroll of Esther being read, if he focused his heart, i.e. his intent, to fulfill his obligation, he has fulfilled his obligation; but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. It is therefore possible for two people to hear the <i>shofar</i> blasts, but only one of them fulfills his obligation. Even though this one heard and also the other one heard, nevertheless, this one focused his heart to fulfill his obligation and has therefore indeed fulfilled it, but the other one did not focus his heart, and so he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a <i>shofar</i> was long and it was shortened, it is still fit. If it was scraped out, so that only its outer layer remains, it is also fit. If the <i>shofar</i> was plated with gold at the place where one puts his mouth, it is unfit; if it was plated not at the place where he puts his mouth, it is fit. If it was plated with gold on the inside, it is unfit, as one does not hear the sound of a <i>shofar</i> but the sound of a golden instrument. If, however, it was plated with gold on the outside, the following distinction applies: If its sound changed from what it was before the plating, it is unfit, but if not, the gold plating is mere ornamentation and it is therefore fit.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the <i>shofar</i> was punctured and the puncture was sealed, if it impedes the blowing, the <i>shofar</i> is unfit, but if not, it is fit. If one placed one <i>shofar</i> inside another <i>shofar</i> and blew, if he heard the sound of the inner <i>shofar</i>, he has fulfilled his obligation, because it is considered one <i>shofar</i>, but if he heard the sound of the outer <i>shofar</i> he has not fulfilled it, as the sound issues from two <i>shofarot</i> at once.
  The Sages taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: If a <i>shofar</i> was scraped down, whether on the inside or on the outside, it is fit. Even if it was scraped out to the point that only its outer layer remains, it is still fit. If one placed one <i>shofar</i> inside another <i>shofar</i> and blew, if he heard the sound of the inner <i>shofar</i>, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he heard the sound of the outer <i>shofar</i>, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If he inverted the <i>shofar</i> and blew it, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  Rav Pappa said: Do not say that this means that he softened the <i>shofar</i> and turned it inside out like a tunic. Rather, the meaning is that he widened the narrow end of the <i>shofar</i> and narrowed its wide end. What is the reason that this is unfit? It is according to the opinion of Rav Mattana, as Rav Mattana said that the verse states: “You shall proclaim [<i>veha’avarta</i>] with the <i>shofar</i>” (Leviticus 25:9), where the word <i>veha’avarta</i> literally means carry, thereby teaching that we need the <i>shofar</i> to be sounded the same way that it was carried on the head of the animal, and if a change was made, it is unfit.
  § It was taught in the mishna: If one glued together broken fragments of <i>shofarot</i> to form a complete <i>shofar</i>, the <i>shofar</i> is unfit. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If anything was added to a <i>shofar</i>, whether of the same substance, i.e., horn, or of a foreign substance, the <i>shofar</i> is unfit. If the <i>shofar</i> was punctured and sealed, whether with the same substance or with a foreign substance, it is unfit. Rabbi Natan says: If it was sealed with the same substance, it is fit; with a foreign substance, it is unfit.
  The <i>baraita</i> stated: If it was sealed with the same substance, it is fit. Concerning this Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This applies only where most of the original <i>shofar</i> is intact and only a small patch was added. The Gemara concludes: By inference, if it was sealed with a foreign substance, then even if most of the original <i>shofar</i> is intact, it is unfit.
  Some teach this ruling with regard to the last clause of the <i>baraita</i>, in which it was taught: If it was sealed with a foreign substance, it is unfit. Concerning this Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is only where most of the original <i>shofar</i> was missing, so that the patch constitutes the majority. The Gemara concludes: By inference, if it was sealed with the same substance, then even if most of the original <i>shofar</i> was missing, it is still fit.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the <i>shofar</i> was plated with gold on the inside, it is unfit. If, however, it was plated on the outside, and if its sound changed from what it was before the plating, it is unfit, but if not, it is fit. If the <i>shofar</i> was cracked lengthwise, it is unfit. But if it was cracked along its width, the following distinction applies: If, of the portion above the crack there remains a measure sufficient to sound a blast, it is fit, but if not, it is unfit.
  And how much is a measure sufficient to sound a blast? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel explained: Enough that when he holds it in his hand, it can be seen protruding on one side of his hand and on the other side. If the sound of the <i>shofar</i> is high or deep or dry, it is fit for blowing, as the Torah does not require a particular sound, and all sounds coming from a <i>shofar</i> are fit.
  It is related that the following ruling was sent from Eretz Yisrael to Shmuel’s father: If one drilled out the inside of a horn and blew it, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: It is obvious, for all <i>shofarot</i> are drilled, since after the horn is removed from the animal, the bone that fills the horn and connects it to the animal’s head must be removed. What, then, does this ruling teach us?
  Rav Ashi said: Here we are discussing a case where he drilled the bone that fills the horn instead of removing it in the usual manner. Lest you say that even something made of the same substance interposes, and the sound that is produced is emitted from the bone and not from the <i>shofar</i>, the ruling therefore teaches us that since the bone and the horn are considered to be of the same substance, the <i>shofar</i> is fit and he has fulfilled his obligation.
  § It was taught in the mishna: If one sounds a shofar into a pit or into a cistern, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Rav Huna said: They taught this only with respect to those standing at the edge of the pit, i.e., on the outside, as they can hear only the echo coming from the pit. But those standing in the pit itself have fulfilled their obligation, since they initially hear the sound of the <i>shofar</i>.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one sounds a <i>shofar</i> into a pit or into a cistern, he has fulfilled his obligation. But didn’t we learn in the mishna that in that case he has not fulfilled his obligation? Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that the contradiction must be reconciled in accordance with Rav Huna? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is so.
  Some had a different version of the previous passage. There are those who raise the following source as a contradiction: We learned in the mishna that if one sounds a <i>shofar</i> into a pit or into a cistern, he has not fulfilled his obligation. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that in that case he has fulfilled his obligation? Rav Huna said: This is not difficult; here, in the mishna, we are dealing with those standing at the edge of the pit, whereas there, in the <i>baraita</i> we are dealing with those standing in the pit.
  Rabba said:
  
  Daf 28a
  
  If one heard part of the blast in the pit and part of the blast at the edge of the pit, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he heard part of the blast before dawn, when it is not yet time to sound the <i>shofar</i>, and part of the blast after dawn, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  Abaye said to him: What is different there, in the case of one who heard part of the blast before dawn and part of it after dawn? If you say that there the entire blast needs to be heard in a time of obligation, and when he hears part of the blast before dawn and part after dawn it is not all within the same time of obligation, here too, in the case of the pit, the entire blast needs to be in a place where one can fulfill his obligation, and when he hears part of the blast in a pit and part at the edge, it is not all within a place where he can fulfill his obligation.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: How can these cases be compared? There, night is not a time of obligation at all, and sounding the <i>shofar</i> then has no meaning whatsoever, but here, a pit is a place of obligation for those standing in the pit. That is to say, the part of the blast that was heard in the pit is not inherently invalid, but merely disqualified due to an external factor, so that it is possible to connect it with the part of the blast that was heard at the edge of the pit.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabba maintains that if one heard the end of a blast without hearing the beginning of the blast, he has fulfilled his obligation? Because in the case where one heard the beginning of the blast in a pit, he is considered to have heard only the end of the <i>shofar</i> blast, which he heard at the edge of the pit. And it therefore follows that if one heard the beginning of a blast without hearing the end of the blast, he has also fulfilled his obligation.
  Come and hear a proof that this is not so, for we learned in the mishna: If one blew the initial <i>tekia</i> of the first set of <i>tekia-terua-tekia</i>, and then drew out the second <i>tekia</i> so that it spans the length of two <i>tekiot</i>, it counts as only one <i>tekia</i>, and is not considered two <i>tekiot</i>, i.e., the concluding <i>tekia</i> of the first set, and the initial <i>tekia</i> of the second set. But why is this so? If we consider part of a blast as a complete one, let it count as two <i>tekiot</i>. The Gemara explains: If one hears only the beginning or the end of a <i>shofar</i> blast, he has indeed fulfilled his obligation, but nevertheless, we do not divide a <i>shofar</i> blast into two.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: Come and hear that which was taught in a mishna: If one sounds a <i>shofar</i> into a pit, or into a cistern, or into a large jug, if he clearly heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i>, he has fulfilled his obligation; but if he heard the sound of an echo, he has not fulfilled his obligation. But why is this so? If indeed half a blast is considered a blast, let him fulfill his obligation with the beginning of the blast, before the sound of the <i>shofar</i> is confused with the echo, since he heard the beginning of the blast clearly.
  The Gemara answers: Indeed, half a blast is not considered a blast, and Rabba’s statement must be understood differently. When Rabba spoke, he was speaking not about other people hearing the blast, but about one who was sounding the <i>shofar</i> for himself in a pit and emerged from the pit as he was blowing. He has fulfilled his obligation, because he was located in the same place as the sound of the <i>shofar</i> at all times, and so he heard the entire blast clearly.
  The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of Rabba’s statement? The <i>halakha</i> in this case should be obvious, as there is no reason that the blast should be disqualified. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that his head might sometimes emerge from the pit while the <i>shofar</i> itself is still in the pit, and the sound may become confused with its echo, and so he would not fulfill his obligation. Therefore, Rabba teaches us that we are not concerned about this, and the obligation is considered to have been fulfilled.
  § Rav Yehuda said: One should not blow with the <i>shofar</i> of an animal consecrated as a burnt-offering, but if he nevertheless transgressed and blew, he has fulfilled his obligation. One should also not blow with the <i>shofar</i> of an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, and if he nevertheless transgressed and blew, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this distinction? A burnt-offering is subject to misuse of consecrated objects before being offered, and once one misuses it for mundane purposes, it becomes non-sacred, so that the one who blows with its <i>shofar</i> fulfills his obligation. In contrast, peace-offerings are not subject to misuse of consecrated objects before being offered, since in the case of sacrifices of lesser sanctity, misuse is restricted to the fats and other portions that are offered on the altar, and even this applies only after the sprinkling of the blood. Since one is not considered to be misusing peace-offerings when utilizing them for mundane purposes, the prohibition remains intact and they do not become non-sacred. Therefore, one who blows the <i>shofar</i> of an animal consecrated as a peace-offering does not fulfill his obligation.
  Rava strongly objects to this argument: When does he commit misuse? After he has sounded it, for only then has he misused the consecrated animal. If so, when he sounds it, he is sounding with something that is still prohibited, even in the case of the animal that was consecrated as a burnt-offering, and so he should not be able to fulfill his obligation with it.
  Rather, Rava said: Both this one, the <i>shofar</i> of a burnt-offering, and the other one, the <i>shofar</i> of a peace-offering, are governed by the same <i>halakha</i>: If he sounded them, he has not fulfilled his obligation. Later, Rava retracted his statement and then said the opposite: Both this one, the <i>shofar</i> of a burnt-offering, and the other one, the <i>shofar</i> of a peace-offering, are governed by the same <i>halakha</i>: If he sounded them, he has fulfilled his obligation. The reason for this is that mitzvot were not given for benefit. That is to say, the fulfillment of a mitzva is not in itself considered a benefit, and in the absence of benefit, one is not liable for misuse.
  Rav Yehuda said further: One should not sound a <i>shofar</i> that was used for idol worship, but if he nevertheless transgressed and sounded it, he has fulfilled his obligation. One should also not sound a <i>shofar</i> from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, where the majority of inhabitants committed idolatry, but if he nevertheless transgressed and sounded it, he has not fulfilled his obligation. What is the reason for this last ruling? With regard to any object found in a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, its size as required for the mitzva is seen by <i>halakha</i> as crushed into powder. Since a <i>shofar</i> from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry is destined for burning, it is considered as if it is already burnt, and it therefore lacks the requisite measurement for fulfilling the mitzva.
  Rava said: If one is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another, i.e., if he took a vow not to receive any benefit whatsoever from a certain person, that other person is nevertheless permitted to sound a blast for him so that he fulfills the mitzva, in accordance with the principle that the fulfillment of a mitzva is not in itself considered a benefit. For the same reason, if one is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from a particular <i>shofar</i>, he is nevertheless permitted to sound a blast with it so that he may fulfill the mitzva.
  And Rava said further: If one is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from another, that other person may nevertheless sprinkle the waters of purification on him, i.e., water mixed with the ashes of the red heifer, which was used to purify people and objects that had contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse, in the rainy season, for at that time the sprinkling is performed only in order to fulfill a mitzva. But he may not do so in the summer season, since then he also benefits from the very fact that water is being sprinkled on him. Similarly, if one is prohibited by vow from deriving benefit from a particular spring, he may nevertheless immerse in it an immersion performed in order to fulfill a mitzva in the rainy season, but not in the summer season, since then he also derives benefit from the very fact that he has immersed in cold water.
  § It is related that the following ruling was sent from Eretz Yisrael to Shmuel’s father: If one was forcibly compelled to eat <i>matza</i> on Passover, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara clarifies the matter: Who compelled him to eat the <i>matza</i>? If we say that a demon forced him, i.e., that he ate it in a moment of insanity, this is difficult. Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to someone who is at times sane and at times insane, at the times when he is sane, he is considered halakhically competent for all purposes and is obligated in all the mitzvot. And when he is insane, he is considered insane for all purposes, and is therefore exempt from the mitzvot. If so, someone who was compelled by a demon to eat <i>matza</i> is not considered obligated to perform the mitzvot at all.
  Rav Ashi said: We are dealing with a case where the Persians compelled him to eat. Rava said: That is to say that one who sounds a <i>shofar</i> for the music, having no intent to fulfill the mitzva, fulfills his obligation, since the critical issue is hearing the blast and not the intent of the blower.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is identical to that which was stated above, that one who was compelled to eat <i>matza</i> fulfills the mitzva even if he had no intention of doing so? The same should apply in the case of the <i>shofar</i>, that one who heard the blast of a <i>shofar</i> fulfills his obligation even if he had no intention of doing so. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that there is a difference between the two cases, there, the Merciful One says: Eat <i>matza</i>, and he indeed ate it, thereby fulfilling the mitzva.
  
  Daf 28b
  
  But here, with regard to a <i>shofar</i>, it is written: “A memorial of blasts” (Leviticus 23:24), which might have been understood as requiring conscious intent, and this one was merely acting unawares, without having any intent whatsoever of performing the mitzva. Therefore, Rava teaches us that the absence of intent does not invalidate fulfillment of the mitzva, even in the case of <i>shofar</i>. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, Rava maintains that the fulfillment of mitzvot does not require intent. That is to say, if one performs a mitzva, he fulfills his obligation even if he has no intention of doing so.
  The Gemara raised an objection to this conclusion from what we learned in a mishna: If one was reading the passage of <i>Shema</i> in the Torah, and the time of reciting <i>Shema</i> arrived, if he focused his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara reasons: What, is it not that he focused his heart to fulfill his obligation, and if he failed to do so, he has not fulfilled his duty, therefore implying that the fulfillment of mitzvot requires intent?
  The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the mishna means that he intended to read the passage. The Gemara asks in astonishment: To read? But he is already reading it, for the mishna explicitly states: If one was reading in the Torah. The Gemara answers: We are discussing one who was reading from a Torah scroll in order to correct it, uttering the words indistinctly. The mishna teaches that if such an individual intends to articulate the words correctly, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  The Gemara raises another objection: Come and hear that which we learned in our mishna: If one was passing behind a synagogue, or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i> or the sound of the Scroll of Esther, if he focused his heart, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. What, is it not that he focused his heart to fulfill his obligation, and if he failed to do so, he has not fulfilled his duty, therefore implying that the fulfillment of mitzvot requires intent?
  The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the mishna means that he intended to hear the sound of the <i>shofar</i>. The Gemara immediately asks: To hear? But he already hears it, since the mishna explicitly states: And he heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i>. The Gemara answers: We are discussing one who thinks that it is merely the sound of a donkey that he is hearing, and in this case, where the listener thinks that the sound was not that of a <i>shofar</i>, he does not fulfill his obligation. Therefore, the mishna teaches that it is sufficient that one have intent and know that he is hearing the sound of a <i>shofar</i>.
  The Gemara raised an objection to this answer from a <i>baraita</i>: If the hearer of the <i>shofar</i> had intent, but the sounder of the <i>shofar</i> did not have intent, or if the sounder of the <i>shofar</i> had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, he has not fulfilled his obligation, until both the hearer and the sounder have intent. Granted, with regard to the case where the sounder had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, Rava can say that this is referring to a case where the hearer thinks that it is merely the sound of a donkey and he did not have intent to hear the sound of a <i>shofar</i>. But with regard to the case where the hearer had intent, but the sounder did not have intent, under what circumstances can this case be found? Is it not where he sounds a <i>shofar</i> for music and despite the intent of the hearer he has not fulfilled his obligation? This implies that unless the sounder of the <i>shofar</i> has intent to fulfill the mitzva the hearer does not fulfill his obligation.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: Perhaps the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he sounded bark-like blasts with the <i>shofar</i>, i.e., he did not sound the <i>shofar</i> in the proper manner, but merely acted unawares without intent to perform the mitzva. The <i>baraita</i> teaches us that if he has intent to sound the blasts in the correct manner, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  Abaye said to Rava: However, if that is so, that the fulfillment of a mitzva does not require intent, one who sleeps in a <i>sukka</i> on the Eighth Day of Assembly should receive lashes for violating the prohibition against adding to mitzvot, since he is adding to the mitzva of: “You shall dwell in <i>sukkot</i> for seven days” (Leviticus 23:42). Since, according to Rava, even if one did not intend to observe the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> but slept in the <i>sukka</i> for a different reason, his sleeping in the <i>sukka</i> constitutes the fulfillment of a mitzva to dwell there, then, if one did so at an inappropriate time, he is considered to have transgressed the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot. Yet the Sages instituted that in the Diaspora one must observe <i>Sukkot</i> for eight days.
  Rava said to him: This is because I say that mitzvot can be transgressed only by adding to them in their prescribed times. But if one adds to a mitzva outside of the period of obligation for the mitzva, there is no violation of the prohibition against adding to mitzvot. On the Eighth Day of Assembly there is no longer a mitzva to sleep in the <i>sukka</i>. Therefore, sleeping in the <i>sukka</i> on that day does not constitute a prohibited act.
  Rav Shemen bar Abba raised an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that a priest who went up to the platform to recite the Priestly Blessing should not say: Since the Torah granted me permission to bless the Jewish people, I will add a blessing of my own, which is not part of the Priestly Blessing stated in the Torah, for example: “May the Lord God of your fathers make you a thousand times as many as you are” (Deuteronomy 1:11)? It is derived from the verse that states: “You shall not add to the word which I command you” (Deuteronomy 4:2). But here, since the priest already recited the Priestly Blessing, the time of the mitzva has passed, and according to Rava, after the prescribed time for performing a mitzva, one does not transgress the prohibition against adding to mitzvot, yet it nevertheless teaches that he has transgressed.
  The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where he did not complete the fixed text of the blessing but added to it in the middle.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Isn’t it taught explicitly in a parallel <i>baraita</i>: If he completed the Priestly Blessing. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> means that he completed one blessing, i.e., the first verse of the Priestly Blessing, but he still has two more blessings to recite.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i> dealing with the same issue: If he completed all of his blessings. The Gemara explains: Here, with regard to the Priestly Blessings, it is different, since if he encounters another congregation, he may recite the blessings again, from which we learn that the entire day is the prescribed time of the mitzva. Therefore, even if he added a blessing of his own only after he finished reciting all three verses of the Priestly Blessing, he is still considered to have added to the mitzva in its prescribed time, and he therefore transgresses the prohibition against adding to mitzvot.
  The Gemara comments: And from where do you say that if a mitzva may be performed again, the whole day is considered its prescribed time? As we learned in a mishna: If the blood of sacrifices that require only one sprinkling, such as the firstborn offering, became mingled with the blood of other sacrifices that require only one sprinkling, the mixture of blood is sprinkled once. Similarly, if the blood of sacrifices that require four sprinklings, such as burnt-offerings, became mingled with the blood of other sacrifices that require four sprinklings, the mixture is sprinkled four times.
  However, if the blood of an offering that requires four sprinklings became mingled with the blood of an offering that requires only one sprinkling, the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree: Rabbi Eliezer says: The mixture of blood is sprinkled four times. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is sprinkled once.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: But if he sprinkles the blood only once, he thereby transgresses the prohibition: Do not diminish, which renders it prohibited to take away any element in the performance of a mitzva, as he has not sprinkled the blood of an offering requiring four sprinklings, i.e., the burnt-offering in the proper manner. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: But according to your position, that he must sprinkle the blood four times, he thereby transgresses the prohibition: Do not add, which renders it prohibited to add elements to a mitzva, e.g. an offering requiring one sprinkling, like the firstborn animal.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: The prohibition: Do not add, is stated only in a case where the blood stands by itself, but not when it is part of a mixture. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: Likewise, the prohibition: Do not diminish, is stated only in a case where the blood stands by itself.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said further, in defense of his position: When you do not sprinkle four times, even if you transgress the prohibition: Do not diminish, you do not perform the act with your own hand, since it is merely an omission, not an action. Whereas when you sprinkle four times, you transgress the prohibition: Do not add, with regard to one of the sacrifices, and you perform the act with your own hand, i.e., you transgress the Torah’s command by means of a positive act. If one is forced to deviate from the words of the Torah, it is preferable to do so in a passive manner. The Gemara concludes the citation from the mishna.
  The Gemara proceeds to derive from here that if the mitzva may be performed again the whole day is considered its prescribed time: And here, once he has already offered one sprinkling of the blood of the firstborn as required, its time has passed, since he has already completed the mitzva of sprinkling the blood of the firstborn, and it nevertheless teaches that he transgresses the prohibition: Do not add. Is it not because we say as follows: Since if he encounters another firstborn to be sacrificed, he would sprinkle of its blood again? If so, the entire day is considered the prescribed time for the mitzva of sprinkling.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: From where do you conclude that this is so? Perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that mitzvot can be transgressed by adding to them even outside their prescribed times. Therefore, this source provides no proof.
  The Gemara explains: This is what we were saying when we cited this mishna: What is the reason that Rav Shemen bar Abba set aside the mishna, which deals with the sprinkling of blood, and raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>? He should have raised an objection from the mishna, which is more generally accepted. What is the reason that he does not raise an objection from the mishna? Since he knows that it can be argued as follows: Because if he encounters another firstborn he will be required to sprinkle its blood. Therefore the entire day is considered the prescribed time of the mitzva. If so, with regard to the <i>baraita</i> as well, it can be argued that because if he encounters another congregation, he may recite the Priestly Blessing again, the whole day is considered its prescribed time.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the opinion of Rav Shemen bar Abba, who raised the objection from the <i>baraita</i>? The Gemara explains: There, it is not possible to refrain from sprinkling the blood of another firstborn that comes his way, so the entire day is certainly its prescribed time. But here, if he wishes, he may bless the other congregation, and if he wishes, he may refrain from blessing them, since he is obligated to recite the Priestly Blessing only once a day.
  Rava himself said: There is no difficulty at all, since the fulfillment of a mitzva does not require intent, but the transgression of the prohibition: Do not add, or: Do not diminish, requires intent.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in the case of the sprinkling of blood, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, the transgression of the prohibition: Do not add, does not require intent, since he holds that if one added to the required sprinklings, he transgresses. Rather, Rava said: One must say as follows: The fulfillment of a mitzva does not require intent, and the transgression of the prohibition: Do not add, during the prescribed time of the mitzva, does not require intent, and the sprinkler of the blood therefore transgresses, as Rabbi Yehoshua maintains. However, the transgression of the prohibition: Do not add, when it is not in its prescribed time, e.g., in the case of sleeping in the <i>sukka</i> on the Eighth Day of Assembly, requires intent to fulfill the mitzva, and in the absence of such intent, there is no transgression.
  With regard to the intent required in order to fulfill the mitzva of <i>shofar</i>, Rabbi Zeira said to his servant:
  
  Daf 29a
  
  Have intent to sound the <i>shofar</i> on my behalf and sound it for me. The Gemara infers: Apparently, Rabbi Zeira maintains that he who sounds the <i>shofar</i> for others is required to have intent to discharge the hearer’s obligation.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the mishna: If one was passing behind a synagogue, or his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the <i>shofar</i> or the sound of the Scroll of Esther being read, if he focused his heart to fulfill his obligation, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not, he has not fulfilled his obligation. It may be asked: And, according to Rabbi Zeira, even if the hearer focused his heart, what of it? The other one, i.e., the one sounding the <i>shofar</i>, did not focus his intent to sound the <i>shofar</i> with him in mind? If indeed the intent of the one sounding the <i>shofar</i> is required, how does the passerby fulfill his obligation?
  The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with the representative of the community, i.e., one who sounds the <i>shofar</i> for the entire congregation and has everyone in mind. He does not sound it for a specific individual, but rather on behalf of the entire community, and therefore anyone who hears him sound the <i>shofar</i> fulfills his obligation.
  The Gemara raises another objection: Come and hear that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the hearer of the <i>shofar</i> had intent, but the sounder of the <i>shofar</i> did not have intent, or if the sounder of the <i>shofar</i> had intent, but the hearer did not have intent, he has not fulfilled his obligation, until both the hearer and the sounder have intent. The <i>baraita</i> teaches the <i>halakha</i> governing the sounder of the <i>shofar</i> in similar fashion to the <i>halakha</i> governing the hearer. From this it may be inferred that just as the hearer hears for himself, having intent to fulfill his own obligation, so too, the sounder sounds for himself, having intent to fulfill his own obligation, and not that of others. And the <i>baraita</i> teaches that if the sounder did not have this intent, the hearer has not fulfilled his obligation. But this indicates that if the sounder had intent to sound the <i>shofar</i> for himself, he need not have intent to sound it for others, therefore contradicting Rabbi Zeira’s opinion.
  The Gemara answers: This is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The hearer hears for himself, and the sounder sounds the <i>shofar</i> in his usual way, i.e., he need not intend to sound it for the sake of the hearer. Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? It was said in the case of a representative of the community. But in the case of an ordinary individual, the hearer does not fulfill his obligation until both the hearer and the sounder have intent to discharge the hearer’s obligation, as argued by Rabbi Zeira.
  MISHNA: Incidental to the discussion of the required intent when sounding the <i>shofar</i>, the mishna cites the verse: “And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, that Israel prevailed; and when he let down his hand, Amalek prevailed” (Exodus 17:11). It may be asked: Did the hands of Moses make war when he raised them or break war when he lowered them? Rather, the verse comes to tell you that as long as the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they prevailed, but if not, they fell.
  Similarly, you can say: The verse states: “Make for yourself a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole; and it shall come to pass, that everyone that is bitten, when he sees it, he shall live” (Numbers 21:8). Once again it may be asked: Did the serpent kill, or did the serpent preserve life? Rather, when the Jewish people turned their eyes upward and subjected their hearts to their Father in Heaven, they were healed, but if not, they rotted from their snakebites.
  Returning to its halakhic discussion, the mishna continues: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who sounds the <i>shofar</i> cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community. This is the principle with regard to similar matters: Whoever is not obligated to do a certain matter cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of the community.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught the following <i>baraita</i>: All are obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i>: Priests, Levites, and ordinary Israelites; converts; freed slaves; a <i>tumtum</i>, i.e., one whose sexual organs from birth are concealed or are so undeveloped that it is impossible to determine whether the individual is male or female; a hermaphrodite [<i>androginos</i>], i.e., one with both male and female reproductive organs; and a half-slave, half-freeman.
  A <i>tumtum</i> who sounds the <i>shofar</i> cannot discharge the obligation of one of his kind, i.e., a fellow <i>tumtum</i>, since men are bound by the obligation, whereas women are not, and it is possible that the sounder is female and the hearer is male, nor can he discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind, an ordinary man or woman. A hermaphrodite can discharge the obligation of one of his kind, a fellow hermaphrodite, since if the sounder is treated as a female, the hearer is also considered a female, but he cannot discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind. One who is half-slave and half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation of one of his kind, as the slave component of the sounder cannot discharge the obligation of the free component of the hearer, and he certainly cannot discharge the obligation of one who is not of his kind, i.e., a completely free individual.
  The Master said above in the <i>baraita</i>: All are obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i>: Priests, Levites, and ordinary Israelites. The Gemara asks in astonishment: Isn’t that obvious? If these people are not obligated to perform the mitzva, who then is obligated to perform it?
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva, for it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since it is written: “It is a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> to you” (Numbers 29:1), you might have said that with regard to one who is obligated to sound only one day, he is obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana. But with regard to these priests, since they are obligated to sound all year long, because they sound trumpets when they offer the sacrifices in the Temple, as it is written: “And you shall sound the trumpets over your burnt-offerings, and over the sacrifices of your peace-offerings” (Numbers 10:10), you might say that they are not obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> comes to teach us that this is not true, and that even priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva.
  The Gemara asks: Are these things comparable? There, the priests sound trumpets, and here, we are dealing with the sounding of a <i>shofar</i>. Rather, it was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva for a different reason, for it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since we learned in a mishna: Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana, with regard to both the <i>shofar</i> blasts and the additional blessings that are recited in the <i>Amida</i> prayer, I might have said: One who is fully included in the mitzva of the Jubilee is also included in the mitzva of Rosh HaShana. But these priests, since they are not fully included in the mitzva of the Jubilee, as we learned in a mishna: Priests and Levites may sell their fields forever and they may also redeem their lands forever, and they are not bound by the <i>halakhot</i> of the Jubilee Year, I might say that they should also not be obligated to fulfill the mitzva of Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> comes to teach us that this is not so, and that even priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva.
  § It was taught in the same <i>baraita</i>: A half-slave, half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of one of his kind, and he certainly cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of one who is not of his kind. Rav Huna said: Even though he cannot discharge the obligation on behalf of others, he can discharge the obligation on behalf of himself.
  Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: What is the difference whereby he may discharge the obligation on behalf of himself but not on behalf of others? Because his slave component cannot come and discharge the obligation on behalf of the free component of the other. If so, with regard to himself as well, his slave component should not be able to come and discharge the obligation on behalf of his free component.
  Rather, Rav Naḥman said: Even on behalf of himself he cannot discharge the obligation. The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A half-slave, half-freeman cannot discharge the obligation even for himself.
  Continuing the discussion of performing an obligation on behalf of others, Ahava, son of Rabbi Zeira, taught the following <i>ba-raita</i>: With regard to all the blessings, even if one already recited a blessing for himself and has consequently fulfilled his own obligation, he can still recite a blessing for others and thereby discharge their obligation, as all Jews are responsible for one another. This is true with regard to all blessings except for the blessing recited over bread and the blessing recited over wine, both before and after their consumption. With regard to these blessings, if he has not yet fulfilled his own obligation, he can discharge the obligation of others as well, but if he already fulfilled his own obligation, he cannot discharge the obligation of others, as these blessings are recited in appreciation of physical enjoyment, and can only be recited by one who is actually deriving pleasure at the time.
  Rava raised a dilemma:
  
  Daf 29b
  
  With regard to the blessing over bread that is recited before eating <i>matza</i> at the Passover seder and the blessing over wine recited as part of the sanctification of the day of Shabbat or a Festival, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara analyzes the question: Do we say that since there is an obligation to recite these blessings due to the mitzva involved, therefore one can discharge the obligation for others, even if he himself has already fulfilled his obligation? Or perhaps we say that the blessing itself is not an obligation, but rather the obligation lies in the eating and drinking, and the blessing is recited over one’s physical enjoyment; therefore, if he already fulfilled his own obligation, he cannot recite the blessing for others, as he derives no pleasure at this time.
  The Gemara answers: Come and hear an answer to this question from what Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the school of Rav Pappi, he would recite <i>kiddush</i> for us, and when his tenants would arrive from the field he would recite <i>kiddush</i> once again on their behalf. Therefore, it is clear that one may recite <i>kiddush</i> on behalf of others, including the blessing that is recited over the wine, even if he himself has already fulfilled his own obligation.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One should not break bread and recite a blessing for guests unless he is eating with them, so that he is obligated to recite a blessing for himself. But he may break bread for his children and for the other members of his household and recite the blessing, in order to educate them to perform the mitzvot, so that they know how to recite a blessing. And with regard to <i>hallel</i> and the Scroll of Esther, the <i>halakha</i> is that even if he already fulfilled his obligation, he can still discharge the obligation of others.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to the Festival day of Rosh HaShana that occurs on Shabbat, in the Temple they would sound the <i>shofar</i> as usual. However, they would not sound it in the rest of the country outside the Temple. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the people should sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat in every place where there is a court of twenty-three judges. Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted this practice only in Yavne, where the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges resided in his time, but nowhere else. They said to him: He instituted the practice both in Yavne and in any place where there is a court.
  The mishna adds: And Jerusalem in earlier times had this additional superiority over Yavne after Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted this practice, for in any city whose residents could see Jerusalem and hear the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> from there, and which was near to Jerusalem and people could come to Jerusalem from there, they would sound the <i>shofar</i> there as well, as it was considered part of Jerusalem. But in Yavne they would sound the <i>shofar</i> only in the court itself, not in the surrounding cities.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters; from where is it derived that the <i>shofar</i> is not sounded on Shabbat? Rabbi Levi bar Laḥma said that Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina said: One verse says, with regard to Rosh HaShana: “A solemn rest, a memorial of blasts” (Leviticus 23:24), which indicates that one should merely remember the <i>shofar</i> without actually sounding it. And another verse says: “It is a day of blowing for you” (Numbers 29:1), i.e., a day on which one must actually sound the <i>shofar</i>. This apparent contradiction is not difficult: Here, the verse in which the <i>shofar</i> is only being remembered but not sounded, is referring to a Festival that occurs on Shabbat; there, the verse in which the <i>shofar</i> is actually sounded, is referring to a Festival that occurs on a weekday.
  Rava said: This explanation is difficult, for if the distinction between Shabbat and the rest of the week applies by Torah law, how does one sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat in the Temple? If it is prohibited to sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat, it should be prohibited everywhere. And furthermore, there is an additional problem with this explanation: Although the Sages prohibited sounding a <i>shofar</i> and playing other musical instruments on Shabbat, by Torah law sounding a <i>shofar</i> is not a prohibited labor on Shabbat such that a verse is necessary to exclude it when Rosh HaShana occurs on Shabbat.
  The Gemara cites a proof for this last claim: As a Sage of the school of Shmuel taught in a <i>baraita</i>, with regard to the verse that prohibits performing prohibited labor on Festivals: “Any prohibited labor of work you shall not perform” (Numbers 29:1). This comes to exclude from the category of prohibited labors the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> and the removal of bread from the oven, each of which is a skill and not a labor, and therefore they are not included in the category of prohibited labor. Apparently, sounding the <i>shofar</i> is not prohibited by Torah law.
  Rather, Rava said: By Torah law one is permitted to sound the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana even on Shabbat, and it was the Sages who decreed that it is prohibited. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, as Rabba said: All are obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana, but not all are experts in sounding the <i>shofar</i>. Therefore, the Sages instituted a decree that the <i>shofar</i> should not be sounded on Shabbat, lest one take the <i>shofar</i> in his hand and go to an expert to learn how to sound it or to have him sound it for him, and due to his preoccupation he might carry it four cubits in the public domain, which is a desecration of Shabbat.
  The Gemara comments: And this is also the reason for the rabbinical decree that the palm branch [<i>lulav</i>] may not be taken on Shabbat, and this is likewise the reason for the decree that the Megilla of Esther may not be read on Shabbat. The Sages were concerned that one might carry the <i>lulav</i> or the Megilla four cubits in the public domain to take it to an expert who will teach him the proper manner to perform these mitzvot.
  § The mishna taught: After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the people should sound the <i>shofar</i> even on Shabbat in every place where there is a court of twenty-three judges. The background to this decree is related in greater detail in a <i>baraita</i>, as the Sages taught: Once Rosh HaShana occurred on Shabbat, and all the cities gathered at the Great Sanhedrin in Yavne for the Festival prayers. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to the sons of Beteira, who were the leading halakhic authorities of the generation: Let us sound the <i>shofar</i>, as in the Temple. They said to him: Let us discuss whether or not this is permitted.
  He said to them: First let us sound it, and afterward, when there is time, let us discuss the matter. After they sounded the <i>shofar</i>, the sons of Beteira said to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai: Let us now discuss the issue. He said to them: The horn has already been heard in Yavne, and one does not refute a ruling after action has already been taken. There is no point in discussing the matter, as it would be inappropriate to say that the community acted erroneously after the fact.
  § The mishna further stated that Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted this practice only in Yavne. They said to him: He instituted the practice both in Yavne and in any place where there is a court. The Gemara asks: This last statement of the Rabbis: They said to him, etc.; is the same as the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna. Why did the mishna repeat this opinion?
  The Gemara answers: The practical difference between the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> and the opinion of the Rabbis who issued that last statement is with regard to a temporary court, i.e., one that is not fixed in a certain place. According to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, the <i>shofar</i> is sounded there as well, whereas according to the opinion of the Rabbis who responded to Rabbi Elazar, the <i>shofar</i> is sounded only in a place where there is a permanent court, similar to that in Yavne.
  § The mishna taught that they said to him: He instituted the practice both in Yavne and in any place where there is a court. Rav Huna said:
  
  Daf 30a
  
  And they would sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat with the court. Rav Huna’s brief statement is obscure, and therefore the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: With the court? It means: In the presence of the court, i.e., in the place where the court convenes. This comes to exclude any place that is not in the presence of the court, as the <i>shofar</i> is not sounded there.
  § Rava raised an objection from the mishna: And Jerusalem had this additional superiority over Yavne. What is the meaning of the phrase: And this additional? If we say that it is referring only to that which it teaches in the mishna, it should have simply said: This, without mentioning that it is an additional superiority. Rather, it indicates that in Jerusalem even private individuals sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat, whereas in Yavne individuals do not sound it, but only agents of the court.
  And this too is difficult: Don’t individuals sound the <i>shofar</i> in Yavne? But when Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: When the prayer leader completed the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> in Yavne, nobody could hear the sound of his own voice in his ears due to the noise of the sounding of individuals. After the leader of the congregation finished sounding on behalf of the entire community, many individuals would take out their <i>shofars</i> and blast them, which created a loud noise. This indicates that individuals would sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat even in Yavne.
  Rather, is it not the case that in Jerusalem they sound the <i>shofar</i> both when the court was in session, i.e., until midday, and when the court was not in session. And by contrast, in Yavne, when the court was in session, yes, they would sound the <i>shofar</i>, whereas when the court was not in session, no, they would not sound it. If so, this indicates that when the court was in session they would in any case sound the <i>shofar</i> in Yavne, even though this was not in the presence of the court. This contradicts Rav Huna’s opinion that in Yavne they would sound the <i>shofar</i> only in the presence of the court.
  The Gemara rejects this argument. No, the term additional can be explained to mean that whereas in Jerusalem they would sound the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court, with regard to Yavne, in the presence of the court, yes, they would indeed sound it, but if it was not in the presence of the court, no, they would not sound the <i>shofar</i>.
  § Some teach this statement of Rav Huna not with regard to this mishna, but rather with regard to this <i>baraita</i> that deals with the Jubilee Year. As it is written: “On Yom Kippur you shall proclaim with the <i>shofar</i> throughout all your land” (Leviticus 25:9). This teaches that each and every individual is obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i>. In this connection Rav Huna said: And they sound it with the court. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: With the court? The Gemara explains: When the court is in session. This serves to exclude a case when the court is not in session, that the <i>shofar</i> is not sounded.
  Rava raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The sounding of the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana and on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year overrides the prohibitions of Shabbat even in the outlying areas outside the Temple, every man and his house. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: Every man and his house? If we say that it means, as usual: Every man and his wife, is a woman obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i>?Isn’t sounding the <i>shofar</i> a positive, time-bound mitzva, i.e., one that can be performed only at a certain time of the day, or during the day rather than during the night, or only on certain days of the year? And the principle is that with regard to any positive, time-bound mitzva, women are exempt.
  Rather, is it not the case that this phrase means: Every man in his house, and even at a time when the court is not in session? This presents a difficulty for the opinion of Rav Huna. The Gemara rejects this interpretation: No; actually it means that every man may sound the <i>shofar</i> in his house, but only at a time when the court is in session.
  Rav Sheshet raised an objection from another <i>baraita</i>: Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year is the same as Rosh HaShana with regard to both the <i>shofar</i> sounding and the additional blessings recited in the <i>Amida</i> prayer. However, the difference is that on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year they sound the <i>shofar</i> both in the court where they sanctified the month and in a court where they did not sanctify the month, and each and every individual is obligated to sound the <i>shofar</i>. Conversely, on Rosh HaShana they sound the <i>shofar</i> only in the court where they sanctified the month, and each and every individual is not obligated to sound it.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the clause: Each and every individual is not obligated to sound it? If we say that on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year individuals sound the <i>shofar</i>, whereas on Rosh HaShana individuals do not sound it at all, this is difficult: But when Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: When the prayer leader completed the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> in Yavne, nobody could hear the sound of his own voice in his ears due to the noise of the sounding of individuals. This indicates that individuals would sound the <i>shofar</i> even on Rosh HaShana.
  Rather, is it not the case that whereas on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year they sound the <i>shofar</i> both when the court is in session and when the court is not in session, on Rosh HaShana, when the court was in session, yes, they would indeed sound it, but at a time when the court was not in session, no, they would not sound the <i>shofar</i>. In any event, the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year they would sound the <i>shofar</i> both when the court was in session and when the court was not in session. This presents a difficulty for the opinion of Rav Huna.
  The Gemara rejects this argument. No; actually they sound the <i>shofar</i> only when the court was in session, and this is what the <i>baraita</i> is teaching: On Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year, when the court was in session they sound the <i>shofar</i> both in the presence of the court and not in the presence of the court; however, on Rosh HaShana they sound it only when the court was in session, and even then only in the presence of the court. It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said that Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: They sound the <i>shofar</i> only throughout the period when the court is sitting in session, and only in its presence.
  Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma: If the members of the court stirred themselves to rise at the end of the session, but there was some delay and they did not actually rise, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we require that the court be seated, and that is the case here, as the judges are still sitting? Or perhaps we require that the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded when the court is in session, and that is not the case, as they have stirred to rise. No relevant sources were found in this regard, and therefore the Gemara states that the question shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna stated: And Jerusalem had this additional superiority over Yavne. Any city that could see Jerusalem and hear the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> there, and was nearby, and people could come from there, they would sound the <i>shofar</i> there as well. The Gemara clarifies these requirements: The clause that the city had to be able to see Jerusalem comes to exclude a city that sits in a deep valley, from which one can hear but cannot see Jerusalem from afar.
  When the mishna states that the city must be able to hear, this serves to exclude a city sitting on a mountaintop, from where one can see Jerusalem but cannot hear sounds from it. As for the requirement that the city must be near, this comes to exclude a place sitting beyond the Shabbat limit of Jerusalem, even if one can see and hear from that place. And with regard to the statement that one can come, this serves to exclude a city that is separated from Jerusalem by a river, which renders it impossible for people to come to the city, even if it is close by.
  MISHNA: After the previous mishna mentioned Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s ordinance that applies to the sounding of the <i>shofar</i>, this mishna records other ordinances instituted by the same Sage: At first, during the Temple era, the <i>lulav</i> was taken in the Temple all seven days of <i>Sukkot</i>, and in the rest of the country outside the Temple, it was taken only one day, on the first day of the Festival. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the <i>lulav</i> should be taken even in the rest of the country all seven days, in commemoration of the Temple.
  And for similar reasons, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that for the entire day of waving the <i>omer</i> offering, i.e., the sixteenth of Nisan, eating the grain of the new crop is prohibited. By Torah law, when the Temple is standing the new grain may not be eaten until after the <i>omer</i> offering is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan, usually early in the morning. When the Temple is not standing it may be eaten from the time that the eastern horizon is illuminated at daybreak. However, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted a prohibition against eating the new grain throughout the entire sixteenth of Nisan, until the seventeenth, to commemorate the Temple.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that one performs actions in commemoration of the Temple? As the verse states: “For I will restore health to you, and I will heal you of your wounds, said the Lord; because they have called you an outcast: She is Zion, there is none who care for her” (Jeremiah 30:17). This verse teaches by inference that Jerusalem requires caring through acts of commemoration.
  § The mishna taught: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai also instituted that for the entire day of waving the <i>omer</i> offering, eating the grain of the new crop is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ordinance? The reasoning is that soon the Temple will be rebuilt and people will say: Last year, when the Temple was in ruins, didn’t we eat from the new crop as soon as the eastern horizon was illuminated on the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan, as the new crop was permitted immediately? Now too, let us eat the new grain at that time.
  And they do not know that last year, when there was no <i>omer</i>, the eastern horizon illuminating, i.e., the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan, served to permit the consumption of the new grain immediately. However, now that the Temple has been rebuilt and there is an <i>omer</i> offering, it is the <i>omer</i> that permits the consumption of the new grain. When the Temple is standing, the new grain is not permitted until the <i>omer</i> offering has been sacrificed.
  The Gemara clarifies: In this scenario, when is it that the Temple was built? If we say that it was rebuilt on the sixteenth of Nisan, then the Temple was not standing in the morning and therefore the eastern horizon illuminating indeed rendered eating the new grain permitted, as it was not yet possible to bring the <i>omer</i> offering.
  Rather, you must say that it was rebuilt on the fifteenth of Nisan or on some earlier date, in which case the new grain would not become permitted by the illumination of the eastern horizon. In that scenario, from midday onward let it be permitted to eat the new grain, as didn’t we learn in a mishna in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i>: The people distant from Jerusalem, who are unaware of the precise time when the <i>omer</i> was brought, are permitted to eat the new grain from midday onward, because the members of the court are not indolent with regard to the <i>omer</i> offering and would certainly have sacrificed it by midday. If so, now too, it should be permitted to eat the new grain beginning at that time. Why did Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai prohibit it for the entire day?
  The Gemara answers: This ordinance was necessary only in a case where the Temple was rebuilt on the fifteenth adjacent to sunset. Alternatively, in a situation where the Temple was rebuilt at night, on the evening of the sixteenth, and there was no opportunity to cut the <i>omer</i> that night. In either case there is insufficient time to complete all the preparations so that the offering can be sacrificed by noon the next day. If people eat the new grain at midday, they will have retroactively transgressed a prohibition. Therefore, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the new grain should be prohibited for the entire day of the sixteenth.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: That is not the reason. Rather, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai
  
  Daf 30b
  
  stated his decree in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: When the verse states: “And you shall eat neither bread nor parched corn, nor fresh stalks, until this selfsame [<i>etzem</i>] day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14), this does not teach that it is permitted to eat the new grain on the morning of the sixteenth when the eastern horizon is illuminated. Rather, it is prohibited until the essence [<i>atzmo</i>] of the day. And he holds that when the verse says: Until that day, it means until and including this date. If so, by Torah law, eating the new grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth, unless the <i>omer</i> offering was sacrificed, in which case it is permitted to eat the new grain immediately afterward.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But he disagrees with him, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Sukka</i> 41a): After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that for the entire day of waving the <i>omer</i> offering, eating the grain of the new crop is prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda said: But isn’t it prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “Until this selfsame day”? This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.
  The Gemara rejects this argument. There, it was Rabbi Yehuda who erred in his understanding. He thought that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was saying that eating new grain on the sixteenth of Nisan is prohibited by rabbinic law. But that is not so; he was actually saying that it is prohibited by Torah law.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty. But it is taught in the mishna: Instituted. This term is referring to a rabbinic ordinance, not a Torah law. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term instituted? It means that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai interpreted the verse, and instituted that this is how one should act from now onward. When the Temple was standing there was no need for this <i>halakha</i>, as it was permitted to eat the new grain after the sacrificing of the <i>omer</i>.
  MISHNA: Initially, they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month throughout the entire thirtieth day from the beginning of the month of Elul, before Rosh HaShana, and if witnesses arrived from afar and testified that they had sighted the New Moon the previous night, they would declare that day the Festival.
  Once, the witnesses tarried coming until the hour was late, and the Levites erred with regard to the song, i.e., the psalm that they were supposed to recite, as they did not know at the time whether it was a Festival or an ordinary weekday. From that point on, the Sages instituted that they would accept testimony to determine the start of the month only until <i>minḥa</i> time. If witnesses had not arrived by that hour, they would declare Elul a thirty-day month and calculate the dates of the Festivals accordingly.
  And if witnesses came from <i>minḥa</i> time onward, although the calculations for the dates of the Festivals would begin from the following day, the people would nevertheless observe that day, on which the witnesses arrived, as sacred, so that in future years they would not treat the entire day as a weekday and engage in labor from the morning on the assumption that the witnesses will arrive only after <i>minḥa</i> time. And they would also observe the following day as sacred. On the second day, they observed Rosh HaShana in full, both by sacrificing its offerings as well as by calculating the upcoming Festivals from that date.
  After the Temple was destroyed and there was no longer any reason for this ordinance, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that they would once again accept testimony to determine the start of the month the entire day.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What error did the Levites make with regard to the song they were supposed to recite? The Gemara answers: Here, in Babylonia, they interpreted that they did not recite any song at all, as they did not know which psalm should be sung, the one for an ordinary weekday or the special one for the Festival. Rabbi Zeira said: Their mistake was that they recited the song of an ordinary weekday with the daily afternoon offering. After the witnesses testified, it became clear that they should have recited the psalm of the Festival.
  Rabbi Zeira said to his son Ahava: Go out and teach the following <i>baraita</i> to the Sages of Babylonia: They instituted that on Rosh HaShana the court would accept testimony to determine the start of the month only if there was enough time left in the day to sacrifice the daily offerings and the additional offerings of the Festival and their libations, and to recite the appropriate song without a mistake. Granted, if you say that they recited the song of an ordinary weekday, this is a case in which there is a mistake. However, if you say that they did not recite any psalm at all, what mistake is there? The term: Mistake, indicates the performance of an incorrect action.
  The Gemara explains: Since they did not recite any psalm at all, you do not have a mistake greater than this. The failure to recite the appropriate psalm disrupts the entire sacrificial service.
  Rav Aḥa bar Huna raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the daily offering on Rosh HaShana, in the morning it is sacrificed in accordance with its regular <i>halakhot</i>, i.e., the Levites recite the regular psalm for that day of the week. When it comes to the additional offering of Rosh HaShana, what psalm does one recite? The psalm that includes the verse: “Sing aloud to God our strength; shout to the God of Jacob” (Psalms 81:2). With regard to the daily afternoon offering, what psalm does one recite? The psalm that includes the verse: “The voice of the Lord shakes the wilderness” (Psalms 29:8).
  And when Rosh HaShana occurs on a Thursday, whose regular psalm even on an ordinary weekday is: “Sing aloud to God our strength,” and the witnesses came before the daily morning offering was sacrificed, one would not recite: “Sing aloud to God our strength; shout to the God of Jacob” with the daily morning offering, because one goes back and repeats that section at the time of the additional offering.
  Rather, what does one recite? “I removed his shoulder from the burden” (Psalms 81:7), which is referring to Joseph, who was set free from prison on Rosh HaShana. In other words, the second half of Psalm 81 was recited with the morning offering, while the first half was recited with the additional offering. And if the witnesses came on a Thursday after the daily morning offering had already been sacrificed, one recites: “Sing aloud to God” at the additional offering, even though this means that one goes back and repeats that section again. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains the objection from this <i>baraita</i>: Granted, if you say that anywhere there is a doubt with regard to what to say, one recites the song of an ordinary weekday, this is the meaning of that which the <i>tanna</i> states: One recites the psalm for an ordinary weekday and then repeats it. However, if you say that in a case of doubt no psalm is recited at all, what is the meaning of the clause: One recites it and repeats it?
  
  Daf 31a
  
  The Gemara rejects this argument. It is different there, as in any case “Sing aloud” is the psalm of the day, either because it was an ordinary Thursday or because it was Rosh HaShana. However, there is no proof from here that in all uncertain cases they would recite the psalm for an ordinary weekday, as it is possible that they did not recite any psalm at all.
  § The Gemara expands on the topic of the daily psalms recited by the Levites. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Akiva: On the first day of the week, Sunday, what psalm would the Levites recite? The psalm beginning with the phrase: “The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness” (Psalms 24:1), in commemoration of the first day of Creation, because on that day He acquired the world and transferred it to man, and He was the only ruler in His world, as the angels were not created until the second day.
  On the second day of the week what psalm would the Levites recite? The psalm that begins: “Great is the Lord, and highly to be praised in the city of our God, His sacred mountain” (Psalms 48:2). This is because on the second day of Creation He separated His works, dividing between the upper waters and the lower waters, and ruled over them as King; and this psalm speaks of Jerusalem as “The city of a great King” (Psalms 48:3).
  On the third day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “God stands in the congregation of God” (Psalms 82:1), because on the third day of Creation He revealed the land in His wisdom and thereby prepared the world for His assembly that could now live on the dry land. On the fourth day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “O Lord God, to Whom vengeance belongs” (Psalms 94:1), because on the fourth day of Creation He created the sun and the moon, and in the future He will punish and take vengeance upon those who worship them.
  On the fifth day of the week the Levites would recite the psalm beginning: “Sing aloud to God our strength” (Psalms 81:2), because on the fifth day of Creation He created birds and fish to praise His name. On the sixth day of the week they would recite the psalm beginning: “The Lord reigns, He is clothed with majesty” (Psalms 93:1), because on that day He completed His labor and ruled over all of creation in full glory. On the seventh day of the week, Shabbat, they would recite the psalm beginning: “A psalm, a song for the day of Shabbat” (Psalms 92:1), as the future world will be a day that is all Shabbat.
  Rabbi Neḥemya said: What did the Sages see that led them to distinguish between these chapters, as they interpret the psalms recited on the six weekdays as referring to the past, whereas the psalm recited on Shabbat is referring to the future. Rather, all of the psalms refer to the past. The first six are as explained above: On the first day, the reason is that He acquired the world and transferred it to man, and He was the only ruler in His world; on the second day, the reason is that He separated His works and ruled over them as King; on the third day, the reason is that He revealed the land in His wisdom and thereby prepared the world for His assembly.
  On the fourth day, the reason is that He created the sun and the moon, and in the future He will punish those who worship them; on the fifth day, the reason is that He created birds and fish to praise His name; on the sixth day, the reason is that He completed His labor and ruled over all of creation. However, on the seventh day, the reason is that He rested from His work, as the phrase “A psalm, a song for the day of Shabbat” is referring to the first Shabbat of Creation.
  The Gemara comments: And these <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to a statement of Rav Ketina, as Rav Ketina said: The world will exist for six thousand years, and for one thousand years it will be destroyed, as it is stated: “And the Lord alone shall be exalted on that day” (Isaiah 2:11), and one day for God is a thousand years, as indicated in the verse: “For a thousand years in Your sight are but as yesterday when it is past” (Psalms 90:4). Rav Ketina’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Conversely, Abaye said: The world will be destroyed for two thousand years, as it is stated: “After two days He will revive us” (Hosea 6:2). According to the opinion of Abaye that the destruction will be for two days, there is no connection between the future world and the day of Shabbat, which is only one day.
  § The Gemara further asks: When it came to the additional offerings of Shabbat, what would the Levites recite? Rav Anan bar Rava said that Rav said: They would recite in accordance with the mnemonic <i>hei</i>, <i>zayin</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>lamed</i>, <i>kaf</i>. They would divide the song of <i>Ha’azinu</i> into six sections, each of which began with a letter of the mnemonic: “Give ear [<i>ha’azinu</i>], you heavens” (Deuteronomy 32:1); “Remember [<i>zekhor</i>] the days of old” (Deuteronomy 32:7); “He made him ride [<i>yarkivehu</i>] on the high places of the earth” (Deuteronomy 32:13); “The Lord saw it [<i>vayar</i>] and spurned” (Deuteronomy 32:19); “Were it not [<i>lulei</i>] that I dread the enemy’s provocation” (Deuteronomy 32:27); “For <i>[ki]</i> the Lord will judge His people” (Deuteronomy 32:36).
  And Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said that Rav said: In the manner that the verses of the song of <i>Ha’azinu</i> are divided here for the recitation of the additional offerings of Shabbat in the Temple, so too are they divided when they are read in the synagogue on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks another question: When it came to the daily afternoon offering on Shabbat, what would the Levites recite? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “Then sang Moses” (Exodus 15:1), and: “Who is like You” (Exodus 15:11), the two halves of the Song of the Sea, and: “Then Israel sang this song” (Numbers 21:17), the entire Song of the Well.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does one recite all these sections of the song of <i>Ha’azinu</i> on each Shabbat, or perhaps on each and every Shabbat they would recite one section? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei said: By the time that those who recite the first set, i.e., the verses for the additional offerings brought on Shabbat, recite it once, those who recite the second set, for the daily afternoon offering, would repeat their cycle twice, as the first set was comprised of six sections, whereas the second set included only three sections. Learn from here that each and every Shabbat they would recite only one section. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is correct.
  § Rav Yehuda bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Divine Presence traveled ten journeys, i.e., it left the Temple and Eretz Yisrael in ten stages at the time of the destruction of the First Temple, as derived from verses. And corresponding to them the Sanhedrin was exiled in ten stages at the end of the Second Temple period and after the destruction of the Temple, and this is known from tradition.
  The Gemara elaborates. The Divine Presence traveled ten journeys, as derived from verses. The ten journeys are: From the Ark cover to the cherub; and from one cherub to the other cherub; and from the second cherub to the threshold of the Sanctuary; and from the threshold to the courtyard; and from the courtyard to the altar; and from the altar to the roof; and from the roof to the wall of the Temple Mount; and from the wall to the city; and from the city to a mountain close to Jerusalem; and from that mountain to the wilderness; and from the wilderness it ascended and rested in its place in Heaven, isolated from humanity, as it is stated: “I will go and return to My place” (Hosea 5:15).
  The Gemara cites the sources for each of these stages: From the Ark cover the Divine Presence traveled to the cherub, and from one cherub to the other cherub, and from the second cherub to the threshold, as it is written with regard to Moses in the Tabernacle: “And there I will meet with you, and I will speak to you from above the Ark cover, from between the two cherubs” (Exodus 25:22). And it is written: “And He rode upon a cherub, and flew” (II Samuel 22:11), which indicates that the glory of the Divine Presence can rest upon one cherub. And it is written: “And the glory of the God of Israel had ascended from the cherub, on which it was, to the threshold of the House” (Ezekiel 9:3), i.e., the Divine Presence moved from the cherub to the threshold.
  And from the threshold of the Sanctuary the Divine Presence went to the courtyard, as it is written: “And the House was filled with the cloud and the courtyard was full of the brightness of the Lord’s glory” (Ezekiel 10:4). From the courtyard to the altar, as it is written: “I saw the Lord standing on the altar” (Amos 9:1). And from the altar to the roof, as it is written: “It is better to dwell in a corner of the roof than in a house together with a contentious woman” (Proverbs 21:9). From the roof to the wall, as it is written: “And behold, the Lord stood upon a wall made by a plumb line” (Amos 7:7). From the wall to the city, as it is written: “The Lord’s voice cries to the city” (Micah 6:9).
  And from the city the Divine Presence arose to the mountain nearest the Sanctuary, i.e., the Mount of Olives, as it is written: “And the glory of the Lord went up from the midst of the city, and stood upon the mountain, which is on the east side of the city” (Ezekiel 11:23). And from the mountain to the wilderness, as it is written: “It is better to live in the wilderness than with a contentious and fretful woman” (Proverbs 21:19). And from the wilderness it ascended and rested in its place in Heaven, as it is written: “I will go and return to My place until they acknowledge their guilt” (Hosea 5:15).
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For six months the Divine Presence lingered in the wilderness, waiting for the Jewish people, hoping that perhaps they would repent and it would be able to return to its place. When they did not repent, the Divine Presence said: Let them despair and be lost, as it is stated: “But the eyes of the wicked shall fail, and they shall have no way to flee, and their hope shall be the drooping of the soul” (Job 11:20). This concludes the discussion of the ten stages of the exile of the Divine Presence from the Holy of Holies.
  And corresponding to these ten stages, the Sanhedrin was exiled in ten stages at the end of the Second Temple period and after the destruction of the Temple, and this is known from tradition: From the Chamber of Hewn Stone, its fixed seat in the Temple, to <i>Ḥanut</i>, literally, shop, a designated spot on the Temple Mount outside the Temple proper; and from <i>Ḥanut</i> to Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem to Yavne;
  
  Daf 31b
  
  and from Yavne to Usha; and from Usha it returned to Yavne; and from Yavne it went back to Usha; and from Usha to Shefaram; and from Shefaram to Beit She’arim; and from Beit She’arim to Tzippori; and from Tzippori to Tiberias. And Tiberias is lower than all of them, as it is in the Jordan Valley. A verse alludes to these movements, as it is stated: “And brought down, you shall speak out of the ground” (Isaiah 29:4).
  Rabbi Elazar says: There are six exiles, if you count only the places, not the number of journeys, and a different verse alludes to this, as it is stated: “For He has brought down those who dwell high, the lofty city laying it low, laying it low, to the ground, bringing it to the dust” (Isaiah 26:5). This verse mentions six expressions of lowering: Brought down, laying it low, laying it low, to the ground, bringing it, and to the dust. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And from there, i.e., from their lowest place of descent, they are destined to be redeemed in the future, as it is stated: “Shake yourself from the dust, arise, sit, Jerusalem” (Isaiah 52:2).
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: And this, too, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, that even if the head of the court of seventy-one is in any other place, not where the Great Sanhedrin is in session, the witnesses should nevertheless go only to the place where the Great Sanhedrin gathers to deliver testimony to determine the start of the month. Although the date of the month is dependent on the head of the Great Sanhedrin, as it is he who declares that the month is sanctified (see 24a), nevertheless, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the members of the Great Sanhedrin may sanctify the month in the absence of the head of the court.
  GEMARA: The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who was called to judgment before Ameimar in Neharde’a. Ameimar temporarily went to Meḥoza, and she did not follow him to be judged there. He wrote a document of excommunication [<i>petiḥa</i>] concerning her, for disobeying the court. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Even if the head of the court of seventy-one is in any other place, the witnesses should go only to the place where the Great Sanhedrin gathers? This shows that one must appear in the court itself, rather than follow the head of the court.
  Ameimar said to him: This applies only to testimony to determine the start of the month, for which it is necessary to have a fixed place. The reason is that if so, if the witnesses come to court when the head of the court is absent and they will have to go to another place, consequently you will be obstructing them for future occasions, as they will consider it too much trouble and perhaps they will not come the next time. Therefore, the Sages said that these witnesses should go to the regular place where the Great Sanehdrin meets. However, here, with regard to monetary claims, the verse states: “The borrower is servant to the lender” (Proverbs 22:7), i.e., the defendant must act as is convenient to the claimant and the court.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Priests are not allowed to ascend with their sandals to the platform to recite the Priestly Blessing in the synagogue. And this is one of the nine ordinances that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted. Six are mentioned in this chapter: Sounding the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat in Yavne, taking the <i>lulav</i> all seven days, the prohibition against eating new grain the entire day of waving, accepting testimony to determine the start of the month all day, having the witnesses to the New Moon go to the place of meeting, and reciting the Priestly Blessing without sandals. And one is stated in the first chapter, that the witnesses to the New Moon may desecrate Shabbat only for the months of Tishrei and Nisan.
  And the other, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A convert who converts nowadays is required to set aside a quarter-shekel for his nest, i.e., his pair of doves. By Torah law a convert must bring two burnt-offerings of birds, in addition to his immersion and circumcision. After the destruction, it was instituted that he must set aside the value of two young pigeons in anticipation of the rebuilding of the Temple. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai already assembled a majority who voted and rescinded the ordinance due to a potential mishap. If a convert is obligated to set aside money, someone might unwittingly use this money, thereby violating the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property.
  And the other ordinance, the ninth, is the subject of a dispute between Rav Pappa and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. Rav Pappa said: The ordinance concerned the fruit of a fourth-year grapevine. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was with regard to the strip of crimson wool.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rav Pappa said that the ordinance is referring to the fruit of a fourth-year grapevine, as it is taught in a mishna (<i>Beitza</i> 5a): The fruit of a fourth-year grapevine has the status of second-tithe fruits, and therefore their owner would ascend to Jerusalem and eat the grapes there. If he is unable to do so, due to the distance involved or the weight of the load, he may redeem the fruits with money where he is, and later redeem that money for other fruits in Jerusalem. However, the Sages decreed that fruit from the environs of Jerusalem should not be redeemed; rather, the owners should bring the fruit itself to Jerusalem. The environs of Jerusalem for this purpose were defined as a day’s walk in each direction. And this is its boundary: Eilat to the north, Akrabat to the south, Lod to the west, and the Jordan river to the east.
  And Ulla said, and some say Rabba bar Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For what reason did the Sages institute this ordinance, that one who lives near Jerusalem must bring his fruit there? In order to adorn the markets of Jerusalem with fruit, as this decree ensures that there is always an abundance of fruit in Jerusalem.
  And it was further taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, a student of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, had a fourth-year grapevine located between Lod and Jerusalem, to the east of Lod alongside the village of Tavi. The vine was within the boundaries of Jerusalem for the purpose of this <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Eliezer could not bring the fruit to the Temple, as the Temple had been destroyed, and Rabbi Eliezer sought to render the fruit ownerless in favor of the poor, for whom it would be worth the effort to bring the fruit to Jerusalem.
  His students said to him: Our teacher, there is no need to do so, as your colleagues have already voted on the matter and permitted it, as after the destruction of the Temple there is no need to adorn the markets of Jerusalem. The Gemara explains: Who are: Your colleagues? This is referring to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The ordinance was with regard to the strip of crimson wool used on Yom Kippur. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At first they would tie a strip of crimson wool to the opening of the Entrance Hall of the Temple on the outside. If, after the sacrificing of the offerings and the sending of the scapegoat, the strip turned white, the people would rejoice, as this indicated that their sins had been atoned for. If it did not turn white they would be sad. When the Sages saw that people were overly distressed on Yom Kippur, they instituted that they should tie the strip of crimson wool to the opening of the Entrance Hall on the inside, where only a few could enter to see it.
  But people would still peek and see it, and once again, if it turned white they would rejoice, and if it did not turn white they would be sad. Therefore, the Sages instituted that they should tie half of the strip to a rock near the place where the one who sent the scapegoat stood and half of it between the horns of the scapegoat, so that the people would not know what happened to the strip until after the conclusion of Yom Kippur. This ordinance was instituted by Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai.
  The Gemara explains this dispute: What is the reason that Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak did not state his opinion with regard to the ordinance in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa? He could have said to you: If it enters your mind to say that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai rescinded the ordinance of the fruit of fourth-year grapevines, was he one of Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues, that the students would have referred to him in this manner? He was his teacher. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan cannot be the one who instituted this ordinance. And the other, Rav Pappa, what would he respond to this? He would say that since they were Rabbi Eliezer’s students it is not proper conduct for one to say to his teacher: Your teacher. Therefore, they referred to Rabbi Yoḥanan as Rabbi Eliezer’s colleague.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rav Pappa did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak? Rav Pappa could have said to you: If it enters your mind to say that this ordinance for Yom Kippur was instituted by Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, in the days of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was there in fact a strip of crimson wool? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All the years of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s life were 120 years: Forty years he was involved in business so that he could achieve financial independence and study Torah, forty years he studied Torah, and forty years he taught Torah.
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: During the forty years before the Second Temple was destroyed the strip of crimson wool would not turn white; rather, it would turn a deeper shade of red. And we learned in the mishna: When the Temple was destroyed Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted his ordinances. This shows that Rabban Yoḥanan lived and taught Torah after the destruction. Therefore the ordinance of the crimson wool must have been made while Rabban Yoḥanan was still studying Torah, before he instituted any ordinances. The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, what would he answer? According to him, that ordinance was instituted during those forty years that he studied Torah. He was then a student sitting before his teacher, and he said a matter, i.e., he suggested this ordinance, and his reasoning made sense to the Sages,
  
  Daf 32a
  
  and his teacher established it in his name. Consequently, it is counted as one of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai’s ordinances.
  MISHNA: The order of the blessings of the additional prayer on Rosh HaShana is as follows: One recites the blessing of the Patriarchs, the blessing of God’s Mighty Deeds, and the blessing of the Sanctification of God’s Name, all of which are recited all year long. And one includes the blessing of Kingship, containing many biblical verses on that theme, with them, i.e., in the blessing of the Sanctification of God’s Name, and he does not sound the <i>shofar</i> after it.
  Next, one adds a special blessing for the Sanctification of the Day, and sounds the <i>shofar</i> after it; followed by the blessing of Remembrances, which contains many biblical verses addressing that theme, and sounds the <i>shofar</i> after it; and recites the blessing of <i>Shofarot</i>, which includes verses that mention the <i>shofar</i>, and sounds the <i>shofar</i> after it. And he then returns to the regular <i>Amida</i> prayer and recites the blessing of God’s Service and the blessing of Thanksgiving and the Priestly Blessing. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.
  Rabbi Akiva said to him: If one does not sound the <i>shofar</i> for the blessing of Kingship, why does he mention it? Rather, the order of the blessings is as follows: One recites the blessing of the Patriarchs and that of God’s Mighty Deeds and that of the Sanctification of God’s Name. He subsequently includes the blessing of Kingship in the blessing of the Sanctification of the Day, and sounds the <i>shofar</i>. Next he recites the blessing of Remembrances, and sounds the <i>shofar</i> after it, and the blessing of <i>Shofarot</i> and sounds the <i>shofar</i> after it. He then recites the blessing of God’s Service and the blessing of Thanksgiving and the Priestly Blessing.
  GEMARA: The mishna taught that Rabbi Akiva said to him: If one does not sound the <i>shofar</i> for the blessing of Kingship, why does he mention it? The Gemara expresses surprise at this question: Why does he mention it? The Merciful One states that one should mention it. It is a mitzva to recite the blessing of Kingship, regardless of the sounding of the <i>shofar</i>. Rather, this is what Rabbi Akiva meant: Why does one mention ten verses of Kingship, as in the other blessings? Let him recite nine verses or fewer. Since the blessing is different in that it is not followed by <i>shofar</i> blasts, let it also be different with regard to the number of verses it includes.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that one recites the blessing of the Patriarchs? As it is stated: “Ascribe to the Lord, O you sons of the mighty” (Psalms 29:1), which is interpreted to mean that one should mention before God the greatness of the mighty, i.e., the righteous Patriarchs. And from where is it derived that one recites the blessing of God’s Mighty Deeds? As it is stated: “Ascribe to the Lord glory and strength” (Psalms 29:1). And from where is it derived that one recites the blessing of the Sanctification of God’s Name? As it is stated: “Ascribe to the Lord the glory due to His name; worship the Lord in the beauty of sanctity” (Psalms 29:2).
  And from where is it derived that on Rosh HaShana one recites the blessings of Kingship, Remembrances, and <i>Shofarot</i>? Rabbi Eliezer says: As it is written: “In the seventh month, on the first day of the month, you shall have a solemn rest, a memorial of blasts, a sacred convocation” (Leviticus 23:24). This verse is interpreted as follows: “A solemn rest,” this is referring to the blessing of the Sanctification of the Day; “a memorial,” this is Remembrances; “blasts,” this is <i>Shofarot</i>; “a sacred convocation” this means sanctify it by abstaining from performing prohibited labor.
  Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: For what reason isn’t it stated instead that the phrase “solemn rest” teaches that one must rest by abstaining from prohibited labor, as this is the term with which the verse opened first. It stands to reason that the verse would begin with the main issue, i.e., that this day is a Festival on which performing labor is prohibited. Rather, the verse should be explained as follows: “A solemn rest,” sanctify it by abstaining from performing prohibited labor; “a memorial,” this is Remembrances; “blasts,” this is <i>Shofarot</i>; “a sacred convocation,” this is the Sanctification of the Day.
  From where is it derived that that one recites the blessing of Kingship? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One verse states: “I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 23:22), which is referring to God’s Kingship over the world; and two verses later it states: “In the seventh month” (Leviticus 23:24). This teaches that God’s Kingship must be mentioned on Rosh HaShana.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: This is not necessary, as the verse states: “Also in the day of your gladness, and in your appointed seasons, and in your New Moons, you shall blow with the trumpets over your burnt-offerings, and over the sacrifices of your peace-offerings; that they may be to you for a remembrance before your God: I am the Lord your God” (Numbers 10:10). As there is no need for the verse to state: “I am the Lord your God,” and therefore what is the meaning when the verse states: “I am the Lord your God”? This is a paradigm that in all places where verses of Remembrances are stated, verses of Kingship should be recited with them.
  § The Gemara returns to the issue discussed in the mishna: And where does one recite the Sanctification of the Day? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One recites it with the blessing of Kingship, in the fourth blessing. He explains: Just as we find in all other places that the Sanctification of the Day is mentioned in the fourth blessing of the <i>Amida</i> prayer, so too here, it is recited in the fourth blessing.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One recites it together with the blessing of Remembrances, in the fifth blessing. He explains: Just as we find in all other places that the Sanctification of the Day is mentioned in the middle blessing of the <i>Amida</i> prayer, e.g., on Shabbat, when it is the fourth of seven blessings, so too here, it is recited in the middle blessing, which in the case of Rosh HaShana is the fifth blessing, as the Rosh HaShana <i>Amida</i> prayer is comprised of nine blessings.
  § And the <i>baraita</i> relates that when the court sanctified the year in Usha, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka descended as the prayer leader in the presence of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and he acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Nuri by including the blessing of Kingship in the blessing of the Sanctification of God’s Name. Rabban Shimon said to him: They were not accustomed to act in this manner in Yavne. On the second day, Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, descended as the prayer leader, and he acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva by including the blessing of Kingship in the blessing of the Sanctification of the Day. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: This is how they were accustomed to act in Yavne.
  The Gemara asks a question concerning this <i>baraita</i>: Is that to say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva? But didn’t Rabbi Akiva say that one recites the blessing of Kingship with the blessing of the Sanctification of the Day, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that one recites the blessing of the Sanctification of the Day with the blessing of Remembrances? Why then did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel indicate his agreement with Rabbi Akiva’s practice? Rabbi Zeira said: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel merely meant to say that he agrees that one sounds the <i>shofar</i> together with the blessing of Kingship, and that this was how they were accustomed to act in Yavne.
  The <i>baraita</i> taught that on the second day Rabbi Ḥanina descended as the prayer leader. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The second day? If we say that this is referring to the second day of the Festival day of Rosh HaShana, is that to say that they rendered Elul a full month, so that the thirtieth day of Elul was the first day of Rosh HaShana and the first day of Tishrei was the second day? But didn’t Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana say: From the days of Ezra onward we have not found that the month of Elul was ever rendered full. If so, it is difficult to believe that a case of this kind occurred in the time of the <i>tanna’im</i>. Rav Ḥisda said: What is the meaning of: The second day? It means on the second day, the next time it was Rosh HaShana, i.e., on Rosh HaShana of the following year.
  MISHNA: One does not recite fewer than ten verses in theblessing of Kingship, or fewer than ten verses in the blessing of Remembrances, or fewer than ten verses in the blessing of <i>Shofarot</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: If one recited three from each of them, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: These ten verses of Kingship, to what do they correspond? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: They correspond to the ten praises that David said in the book of Psalms. The Gemara asks: There are many more praises than that in the book of Psalms. The Gemara answers that he means those in which it is written by them: “Praise Him with the blast of the <i>shofar</i>” (Psalms 150:3). In that chapter the phrase “Praise Him” appears ten times.
  Rav Yosef said: The ten verses correspond to the Ten Commandments, which were said to Moses at Sinai. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They correspond to the ten utterances through which the world was created. The Gemara asks: Which are these ten utterances? The Gemara explains: This is referring to the ten times that the phrase “And He said” appears in the story of Creation in the first two chapters of Genesis.
  The Gemara asks: Does it refer to the repetition of the phrase: “And He said” in Genesis? There are only nine such phrases, not ten. The Gemara answers that the phrase “In the beginning” is also considered an utterance, as it is written: “By the word of the Lord were the heavens made” (Psalms 33:6), which indicates that all of creation came into existence through a single utterance, after which all matter was formed into separate and distinct entities by means of the other nine utterances.
  § The mishna taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: If one recited three from each of them, he has fulfilled his obligation. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is he teaching here? Does Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri mean that one must recite three verses from the Torah, three from the Prophets, and three from the Writings, which are nine in total, and if so the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the first <i>tanna</i> is only one verse? Or perhaps he means that one must recite one verse from the Torah and one from the Prophets and one from the Writings, which are three altogether, and the practical difference between them is a large number of verses, i.e., seven.
  The Gemara clarifies this matter: Come and hear a proof, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One does not recite fewer than ten verses of Kingship, or fewer than ten verses of Remembrances, or fewer than ten verses of <i>Shofarot</i>. And if one recited seven from each of them, he has fulfilled his obligation, as they correspond to the seven firmaments in heaven.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: One who recites fewer than the requisite ten should not recite fewer than seven, but if he recited three from each of them he has fulfilled his obligation, as they correspond to the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings. And some say: They correspond to the priests, the Levites, and the Israelites. This indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri means a total of three verses for each blessing. Rav Huna said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri.
  MISHNA: One does not mention verses of Remembrance, Kingship, and <i>Shofar</i> that have a theme of punishment. When reciting the ten verses, one begins with verses from the Torah and concludes with verses from the Prophets. Rabbi Yosei says: If he concluded with a verse from the Torah, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  GEMARA: The Gemara cites examples of verses that may not be used in Rosh HaShana prayers because they deal with punishment. With regard to verses of Kingship, for example: “As I live, says the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with fury poured out, will I be King over you” (Ezekiel 20:33). And although Rav Naḥman said about this verse: With regard to any anger like this, let the Holy One, blessed be He, express that anger upon us and let Him redeem us, if that is the process necessary for redemption, since the verse was said with anger it is not included, as one does not mention anger on Rosh HaShana.
  Similarly, verses of remembrance that speak of a punishment may not be used in Rosh HaShana prayers, for example: “So He remembered that they were but flesh, a wind that passes away, and does not come again” (Psalms 78:39). Nor verses of <i>shofar</i>, which refer to calamity, for example: “Sound the <i>shofar</i> in Giva, and the trumpet in Rama; sound an alarm at Beit Aven, behind you, O Benjamin” (Hosea 5:8).
  The Gemara qualifies the mishna’s ruling. However, if one comes to recite verses of Kingship, remembrance, and <i>shofar</i> with a theme of the punishment of gentiles, one may recite them. The Gemara offers examples of these verses: With regard to the verses of Kingship, for example: “The Lord reigns, let the peoples tremble” (Psalms 99:1), and, for example: “The Lord is King for ever and ever; the nations are perished out of His land” (Psalms 10:16). With regard to remembrance, for example: “Remember, O Lord, against the children of Edom the day of Jerusalem, who said: Raze it, raze it, to its very foundation” (Psalms 137:7). With regard to the verses of <i>shofar</i>, for example: “And the Lord God will sound the <i>shofar</i>, and will go with whirlwinds of the south” (Zechariah 9:14), and it is written: “The Lord of hosts will defend them” (Zechariah 9:15), i.e., God will defend the Jewish people against their enemies.
  The Gemara states: One does not recite a verse dealing with the remembrance of an individual, even if it is for good, for example: “Remember me, O Lord, when You show favor to Your people” (Psalms 106:4), and, for example: “Remember me, my God, for good” (Nehemiah 5:19).
  Verses that mention God’s revisitings [<i>pikdonot</i>] are equivalent to verses of remembrances [<i>zikhronot</i>], and therefore they may be counted in the ten verses.For example: “And the Lord revisited [<i>pakad</i>] Sarah” (Genesis 21:1), and, for example: “I have surely revisited [<i>pakadeti</i>] you” (Exodus 3:16). This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: They are not equivalent to verses of remembrances.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, although verses that speak of God revisiting man are equivalent to verses of remembrances, he cites the following verse as an example: “And the Lord revisited Sarah,” which is a revisiting of an individual. Despite the fact that it was stated above that a remembrance must refer to the collective, since many descendants came from her, as Sarah is the mother of the Jewish people, she is considered like many. Therefore, this verse is effectively dealing with the remembrance of the entire Jewish people.
  The Gemara discusses several verses from Psalms. “Lift up your heads, O you gates, and be lifted up, you everlasting doors, that the King of glory may come in. Who is the King of glory? The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle” (Psalms 24:7–8). The psalm continues: “Lift up your heads, O you gates, and lift them up, you everlasting doors; that the King of glory may come in. Who then is the King of glory? The Lord of hosts, He is the King of glory, Selah” (Psalms 24:9–10). The first section is counted as two verses of Kingship, as the term king is mentioned twice, while the second section is counted as three verses of Kingship; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: The first section is counted as only one verse of Kingship, as the question: “Who is the King of glory,” is not considered a verse of Kingship. By the same reasoning, the second section is counted as only two verses of Kingship.
  Similarly, the Gemara discusses the following verses: “Sing praises to God, sing praises, sing praises to our King, sing praises. For God is the King of all the earth; sing praises in a skillful song” (Psalms 47:7–8). These are counted as two verses of Kingship; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: They count as only one verse of Kingship, as the phrase: “Sing praises to our King,” is referring to God as the King of the Jewish people, not the King of the entire world. And they both agree with regard to the verse: “God reigns over the nations, God sits upon His sacred throne” (Psalms 47:9), that it is considered as only one verse of Kingship, as the phrase: “Sits upon His sacred throne,” is not referring to God explicitly as King.
  With regard to a verse of remembrance that also has a mention of sounding the <i>shofar</i>, for example: “A solemn rest, a memorial of blasts, a sacred convocation” (Leviticus 23:24), one may recite it with the verses of remembrances, and one may also recite it with the verses of <i>shofarot</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may recite it only with the verses of remembrances alone, as it does not explicitly mention a <i>shofar</i>.
  With regard to a verse of Kingship that also has a mention of sounding the <i>shofar</i>, for example: “The Lord his God is with him, and the sounding of a king is among them” (Numbers 23:21), one may recite it with the verses of Kingship and one may also recite it with the verses of <i>shofarot</i>; This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may recite it only with the verses of Kingship.
  With regard to a verse that mentions sounding the <i>shofar</i> that has nothing else with it, i.e., no mention of remembrances, Kingship, or an actual <i>shofar</i>, for example: “It is a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> to you” (Numbers 29:1), one may recite it with the verses of <i>shofarot</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not recite it at all, as it contains no explicit mention of a <i>shofar</i>.
  § The mishna taught: When reciting the ten verses, one begins with verses from the Torah and concludes with verses from the Prophets. Rabbi Yosei says: If he concluded with a verse from the Torah, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yosei’s formulation: If he concluded, indicates that after the fact, yes, he has fulfilled his obligation; <i>ab initio</i>, no, he has not fulfilled his obligation to recite the necessary verses. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: One who concludes the series of verses with a verse from the Torah is praiseworthy? The Gemara answers: Say that the text of the mishna must be modified so that it reads: Rabbi Yosei says: He concludes with a verse from the Torah, i.e., one should do so <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty. Doesn’t the mishna teach: If he concluded? This indicates that after the fact, yes, one has fulfilled his obligation; <i>ab initio</i>, no, he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: One begins with verses from the Torah and concludes with a single verse from the Prophets. Rabbi Yosei says: One concludes with a single verse from the Torah, and if he concluded with a single verse from the Prophets he has fulfilled his obligation. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Pious individuals [<i>vatikin</i>], who were scrupulous in their performance of mitzvot, would conclude the series with a single verse from the Torah. Presumably, Rabbi Elazar followed the opinion of his father, Rabbi Yosei.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, it is possible to conclude Remembrances and <i>Shofarot</i> with a verse from the Torah, as there are many such verses. However, with regard to Kingship, there are only three: “The Lord his God is with him, and the sounding of a king is among them” (Numbers 23:21); “And he was king in Jeshurun” (Deuteronomy 33:5); and: “The Lord shall reign for ever and ever” (Exodus 15:18). And we require ten verses, and according to Rabbi Yosei there are not enough, as he maintains that one should recite four verses from the Torah, the first three and the concluding one.
  Rav Huna said: Come and hear a solution from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> (2:11): The verse: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one” (Deuteronomy 6:4), is a verse of Kingship; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not a verse of Kingship.
  “Know this day, and lay it to your heart, that the Lord, He is God in heaven above, and upon the earth beneath; there is none else” (Deuteronomy 4:39), is a verse of Kingship; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not a verse of Kingship. “To you it was shown, that you might know that the Lord, He is God; there is none else beside Him” (Deuteronomy 4:35), is a verse of Kingship; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not a verse of Kingship. This shows that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei there are sufficient verses of Kingship in the Torah to recite three at the beginning and one at the end.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who is passing before the ark, as prayer leader, on the festival of Rosh HaShana, it is the second prayer leader, i.e., the one who leads the additional prayer, who sounds the <i>shofar</i> on behalf of the congregation. And on a day when the <i>hallel</i> is recited, the first prayer leader, i.e., the one who leads the morning prayer, recites the <i>hallel</i> on behalf of the congregation.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the second prayer leader, that he sounds the <i>shofar</i> during the additional prayer? Is it due to the principle that: “The splendor of the King is in the multitude of the people” (Proverbs 14:28)? In other words, is the <i>shofar</i> sounded during the additional prayer because all of the congregants will have arrived by then? If so, with regard to <i>hallel</i> too, let us say that it should be read by the second prayer leader, due to the principle that “The splendor of the King is in the multitude of the people.”
  Rather, what is different about <i>hallel</i> that it is recited by the first prayer leader? It is due to the principle that the vigilant are early in the performance of mitzvot. This is also difficult. With regard to the sounding of the <i>shofar</i>, too, let us perform it by means of the first prayer leader, due to the principle that the vigilant are early in the performance of mitzvot.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They taught the <i>halakha</i> that the <i>shofar</i> is sounded during the additional prayer in a time of religious persecution. The gentile authorities prohibited sounding the <i>shofar</i> and appointed guards during the morning to ensure that the Jews comply. Therefore, the Sages delayed the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> until after the guards had left. A similar decree was not imposed against the recitation of <i>hallel</i>, and therefore it was recited during the morning prayer, at the earliest possible time.
  § The Gemara comments: From the fact that the mishna states: When <i>hallel</i> is recited, one can conclude by inference that on Rosh HaShana there is no recitation of <i>hallel</i>. What is the reason that <i>hallel</i> is omitted on Rosh HaShana? Rabbi Abbahu said: The ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, for what reason don’t the Jewish people recite songs of praise, i.e., <i>hallel</i>, before You on Rosh HaShana and on Yom Kippur? He said to them: Is it possible that while the King is sitting on the throne of judgment and the books of life and the books of death are open before Him, the Jewish people are reciting joyous songs of praise? Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur are somber days of judgment whose mood is incompatible with the recitation of <i>hallel</i>.
  MISHNA: With regard to the <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana, one may not pass the Shabbat limit for it, i.e., to go and hear it, nor may one clear a pile of rubble to uncover a buried <i>shofar</i>. One may not climb a tree, nor may one ride on an animal, nor may one swim in water, in order to find a <i>shofar</i> to sound.And one may not cut the <i>shofar</i> to prepare it for use, neither with an object that is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree nor with an object that may not be used due to a prohibition by Torah law. However, if one wishes to place water or wine into the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana so that it emits a clear sound, he may place it, as this does not constitute a prohibited labor.
  One need not prevent children from sounding the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana, despite the fact that they are not obligated in mitzvot. Rather, one occupies himself with them, encouraging and instructing them, until they learn how to sound it properly. The mishna adds: One who acts unawares and sounds the <i>shofar</i> without any intention to perform the mitzva has not fulfilled his obligation. And, similarly, one who hears the <i>shofar</i> blasts from one who acts unawares has not fulfilled his obligation.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: There is a principle that a positive mitzva overrides a negative mitzva. With this in mind, what is the reason that one may not perform a prohibited labor on Rosh HaShana to fulfill the positive mitzva of sounding the <i>shofar</i>? The Gemara answers: Sounding the <i>shofar</i> is a positive mitzva, but performing prohibited labor on a Festival violates both the positive mitzva to rest and the prohibition against performing prohibited labor, and a positive mitzva does not override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva.
  § The mishna taught: One may not pass the Shabbat limit for it, i.e., to go and hear it, nor may one clear a pile of rubble to uncover a buried <i>shofar</i>. One may not climb a tree, nor may one ride on an animal to find a <i>shofar</i> to sound. The Gemara questions the order of these prohibitions: Now that you have said that to sound the <i>shofar</i> one may not perform an action that is prohibited by rabbinic law, i.e., passing the Shabbat limit or clearing a pile of rubble, is it necessary to say that one may not perform an action that could lead to an act prohibited by Torah law, i.e., climbing a tree or riding an animal? The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that. It begins with the more novel case before moving on to the more straightforward one.
  
  Daf 33a
  
  § The mishna stated: One may not cut the <i>shofar</i> if it needs to be prepared, neither with an object that is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree nor with an object that may not be used due to a Torah prohibition. The Gemara explains: An example of an object prohibited due to a rabbinic decree is a sickle, which is not ordinarily used for preparing a <i>shofar</i>; an example of an object that may not be used due to a prohibition by Torah law is a knife.
  The Gemara asks: Now that you have said that to sound the <i>shofar</i> one may not perform an action that is prohibited due to rabbinic law, is it necessary to say that one may not perform an action that violates a prohibition by Torah law? The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches employing the style: This, and it is unnecessary to say that.
  § The mishna continues. However, if one wishes to place water or wine into the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana, so that it should emit a clear sound, he may place it. The Gemara infers: Water or wine, yes, one may insert these substances into a <i>shofar</i>. However, urine, whose acidity is good for the <i>shofar</i>, no.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna? The Gemara answers: It is Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Abba Shaul says: With regard to water or wine, one is permitted to pour these liquids into a <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana in order to make its sound clear. However, with regard to urine, one is prohibited to do so due to the respect that must be shown to the <i>shofar</i>. Although urine is beneficial, it is disrespectful to place it in a <i>shofar</i>, which serves for a mitzva.
  § The mishna further teaches: One need not prevent children from sounding the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana. The Gemara infers: If women wish to sound the <i>shofar</i>, one indeed prevents them from doing so. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one does not prevent women or children from sounding the <i>shofar</i> on a Festival? The Gemara answers that Abaye said: This is not difficult: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “Speak to the children of Israel…and he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:2–4). The phrase “children of Israel” literally means sons of Israel, and this teaches that the sons of Israel place their hands upon offerings, but the daughters of Israel do not place their hands upon offerings; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: It is optional for women to place their hands on the head of an offering before it is slaughtered, although they are not obligated to do so. Apparently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, if a woman wishes to perform any mitzva that is not obligatory for her, she is permitted to do so. Here too, one does not prevent a woman from sounding the <i>shofar</i>.
  § The mishna further states: Rather, one occupies himself with them, encouraging and instructing children, until they learn how to sound it properly. Rabbi Elazar said: This applies even when Rosh HaShana occurs on Shabbat. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One occupies himself with children until they learn to sound the <i>shofar</i> properly, even on Shabbat. And one does not prevent the children from sounding the <i>shofar</i> on Shabbat, and needless to say one does not prevent them on the festival of Rosh HaShana that occurs on a weekday.
  The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult, i.e., there is an internal contradiction in the <i>baraita</i>. You said that one occupies himself with the children until they learn how to sound the <i>shofar</i>, and this applies even on Shabbat. Apparently, we say to them <i>ab initio</i>: Sound the <i>shofar</i>. And then the <i>baraita</i> taught: One does not prevent them from sounding the <i>shofar</i>, which indicates that although one does not prevent them from sounding it, we do not say <i>ab initio</i>: Sound it.
  The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. Here,
  
  Daf 33b
  
  in the first clause, the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a minor who has reached the age of training in mitzvot. This child is taught to sound the <i>shofar</i>, as one is obligated to teach him the proper way to perform mitzvot. However, here, in the second clause, the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a minor who has not yet reached the age of training. Although one need not prevent this child from sounding the <i>shofar</i>, one does not encourage him to do so.
  § The mishna taught: One who acts unawares while sounding the <i>shofar</i>, without any intention to produce a sound, has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara infers: One who sounds a <i>shofar</i> for music, even if he has no intention to perform the mitzva, has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: Let us say that the mishna supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: One who sounds a <i>shofar</i> for music has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. There is no clear proof from here, as perhaps one who sounds a <i>shofar</i> for music is also called one who acts unawares. It is possible that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna includes in this category anyone who sounds the <i>shofar</i> without a clear intention to fulfill the mitzva.
  § The mishna continues. And one who hears the <i>shofar</i> blasts from one who acts unawares has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: However, one who hears the <i>shofar</i> blasts from one who is sounding the <i>shofar</i> for himself, without intention of sounding it for others, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The mishna apparently indicates that he has fulfilled his obligation. Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira said to his attendant: Have the intention to sound the <i>shofar</i> on my behalf and sound it for me. This statement indicates that one must have the intention to enable the one who hears it to fulfill his obligation.
  The Gemara rejects this argument. Perhaps one can explain that since the first clause of the mishna taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who acts unawares, the latter clause also taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who acts unawares. If so, no inference may be drawn from here to the case of one who sounds the <i>shofar</i> for himself, with no intention of doing so for others.
  MISHNA: The order of the blasts is three sets of three blasts each, which are: <i>Tekia</i>, <i>terua</i>, and <i>tekia</i>. The length of a <i>tekia</i> is equal to the length of three <i>teruot</i>, and the length of a <i>terua</i> is equal to the length of three whimpers. If one sounded the first <i>tekia</i> of the initial series of <i>tekia</i>, <i>terua</i>, <i>tekia</i>, and then extended the second <i>tekia</i> of that series to the length of two <i>tekiot</i>, so that it should count as both the second <i>tekia</i> of the first set and the first <i>tekia</i> of the second set, he has in his hand the fulfillment of only one <i>tekia</i>, and he must begin the second set with a new <i>tekia</i>.
  With regard to one who recited the blessings of the additional prayer, and only afterward a <i>shofar</i> became available to him, he sounds a <i>tekia</i>, sounds a <i>terua</i>, and sounds a <i>tekia</i>, an order he repeats three times.
  Just as the prayer leader is obligated in the prayer of Rosh HaShana, so too, each and every individual is obligated in these prayers. Rabban Gamliel disagrees and says: Individuals are not obligated, as the prayer leader fulfills the obligation on behalf of the many.
  GEMARA: The Gemara raises a difficulty. Although the mishna taught that the length of a <i>tekia</i> is equal to the length of three <i>teruot</i>, isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the length of a single <i>tekia</i> is equal to the length of an entire <i>terua</i>, which is comprised of several shorter sounds? Abaye said: There is no difficulty. The <i>tanna</i> of our mishna counts the <i>tekia</i> of all the sets of blasts and the <i>teruot</i> of all the sets. He means that the length of the three <i>tekiot</i> is equal to the length of the three <i>teruot</i>. Conversely, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> counts the first <i>tekia</i> of only one set, and no more, and therefore he simply states that the length of one <i>tekia</i> is equal to the length of one <i>terua</i>.
  § The mishna continues. The length of a <i>terua</i> is equal to the length of three whimpers. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the length of a <i>terua</i> is equal to the length of three <i>shevarim</i>, i.e., broken blasts, which presumably are longer than whimpers?
  Abaye said: In this matter, the <i>tanna’im</i> certainly disagree. Although the first <i>baraita</i> can be reconciled with the mishna, this second <i>baraita</i> clearly reflects a dispute. As it is written: “It is a day of sounding [<i>terua</i>] the <i>shofar</i> to you” (Numbers 29:1), and we translate this verse in Aramaic as: It is a day of <i>yevava</i> to you. And to define a <i>yevava</i>, the Gemara quotes a verse that is written about the mother of Sisera: “Through the window she looked forth and wailed [<i>vateyabev</i>], the mother of Sisera” (Judges 5:28). One Sage, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, holds that this means moanings, broken sighs, as in the blasts called <i>shevarim</i>. And one Sage, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, holds that it means whimpers, as in the short blasts called <i>teruot</i>.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that the soundings of Rosh HaShana must be performed with a <i>shofar</i>? The verse states: “Then you shall make proclamation with the blast of the <i>shofar</i> on the tenth day of the seventh month; on the Day of Atonement you shall make proclamation with the <i>shofar</i> throughout all your land” (Leviticus 25:9).
  From this I have derived the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year. From where do I derive that the soundings of Rosh HaShana must also be with a <i>shofar</i>? The verse states: “Of the seventh month.” Since there is no need for the verse to state: “Of the seventh month,” as it already states: “On the Day of Atonement,” what is the meaning when the verse states: “Of the seventh month”? This comes to teach that all the obligatory soundings of the seventh month must be similar to one another.
  This verse states: “The blast [<i>terua</i>] of the <i>shofar</i>,” indicating that one must sound a <i>terua</i>. The Gemara asks: And from where is it derived that the <i>terua</i> sound is preceded by a straight blast, i.e., a <i>tekia</i>? The verse states: “Then you shall make proclamation with the blast of the <i>shofar</i> [<i>shofar terua</i>]” (Leviticus 25:9), indicating that the <i>terua</i> must be preceded by the basic sound of a <i>shofar</i>, i.e., by the straight blast of a <i>tekia</i>. And from where is it derived that the <i>terua</i> sound is followed by a straight blast? The same verse states again: “You shall make proclamation with the <i>shofar</i>,” which indicates that there must be another <i>tekia</i> after the <i>terua</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues. From this I have derived the <i>halakha</i> only that these <i>tekia</i> blasts before and after the <i>terua</i> must be sounded on Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year. From where do I derive that they must be sounded on Rosh HaShana as well? The verse states: “Of the seventh month.”
  
  Daf 34a
  
  Since there is no need for the verse to state: “Of the seventh month,” as it already states: “On the Day of Atonement,” what is the meaning when the verse states: “Of the seventh month”? This serves to teach that all soundings of the <i>shofar</i> of the seventh month must be similar to one another.
  And from where is it derived that there must be three sets of three blasts each? The verse states: “Then you shall make proclamation with the blast of the <i>shofar</i> [<i>shofar terua</i>]”(Leviticus 25:9); and another verse states: “A solemn rest, a memorial of blasts [<i>terua</i>]” (Leviticus 23:24); and a third verse states: “It is a day of sounding [<i>terua</i>] the <i>shofar</i> to you” (Numbers 29:1). <i>Terua</i> is mentioned three times in these verses, and a <i>terua</i> is always preceded and followed by a <i>tekia</i>.
  Since one of these verses deals with Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year, while two of them deal with Rosh HaShana, the Gemara asks: From where is it derived to apply what is said about that verse to this one, and what is said about this verse to that one? With regard to Rosh HaShana, the verse states: “Of the seventh month” (Leviticus 25:9), and with regard to Yom Kippur the verse likewise states: “In the seventh month” (Leviticus 23:24). It is derived by verbal analogy that any <i>shofar</i> blasts sounded on one of these days must also be sounded on the other. Consequently, on each day one must sound three sets of <i>tekia-terua-tekia</i>.
  How so? How does one actually perform the sounding of the <i>shofar</i>? One sounds three sets of three blasts each, which altogether are nine separate blasts. The length of a <i>tekia</i> is equal to the length of a <i>terua</i>, and the length of a <i>terua</i> is equal to the length of three <i>shevarim</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. This <i>tanna</i> initially derives his <i>halakha</i> from juxtaposition, based on the phrase: “Of the seventh month,” which teaches that every sounding of the <i>shofar</i> in the seventh month must be alike. And now he derives this <i>halakha</i> that one sounds three <i>tekia</i>-<i>terua</i>-<i>tekia</i> sets by verbal analogy from the recurrence of the term “seventh.” How can the <i>tanna</i> change his method of derivation in the very same <i>baraita</i>? The Gemara explains that this is what the <i>tanna</i> is saying: If there were no verbal analogy, I would have derived this <i>halakha</i> by juxtaposition. Now that it is derived through a verbal analogy, the juxtaposition is not necessary.
  The Gemara comments: And the following <i>tanna</i> derives this <i>halakha</i> by verbal analogy from the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> in the wilderness, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “And you shall sound [<i>utekatem</i>] a <i>terua</i>” (Numbers 10:5), indicates that a <i>tekia</i> is its own sound and a <i>terua</i> is its own sound. Do you say that a <i>tekia</i> is its own sound and a <i>terua</i> is its own sound? Or perhaps is it only that a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> are one and the same, i.e., the two terms are synonymous? When it says: “But when the assembly is to be gathered together, you shall sound a <i>tekia</i> [<i>titke’u</i>], but you shall not sound a <i>terua</i> [<i>tari’u</i>]” (Numbers 10:7), you must say that a <i>tekia</i> is its own sound and a <i>terua</i> is its own sound.
  And from where is it derived that a <i>terua</i> is preceded by a straight blast, i.e., a <i>tekia</i>? The verse states: “And you shall sound [<i>utekatem</i>] a <i>terua</i>” (Numbers 10:5), which indicates that one must first sound a <i>tekia</i> and then a <i>terua</i>. And from where is it derived that a <i>terua</i> is followed by a straight blast? The verse states: “A <i>terua</i> you shall sound [<i>titke’u</i>]” (Numbers 10:6), i.e., first a <i>terua</i> and then a <i>tekia</i>.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: This derivation is not necessary, as the verse states: “And you shall sound [<i>utekatem</i>] a <i>terua</i> a second time” (Numbers 10:6). As there is no need for the verse to state: “A second time,” since it is clear from the context that this is the second <i>terua</i>, what is the meaning when the verse states: “A second time?” This is a paradigm of the principle that in all places where it is stated <i>terua</i>, a <i>tekia</i> should be second to it. I have derived this <i>halakha</i> only in the wilderness. From where do I derive that the same applies to Rosh HaShana? The verse states “<i>terua</i>” with regard to the wilderness, and the verse states “<i>terua</i>” with regard to Rosh HaShana. This comes to teach by verbal analogy that the <i>halakha</i> of one applies to the other.
  And three <i>teruot</i> are stated with regard to Rosh HaShana: “A solemn rest, a memorial of blasts [<i>terua</i>]” (Leviticus 23:24); “It is a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>] to you” (Numbers 29:1); “Then you shall make proclamation with the blast of the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>]” (Leviticus 25:9). And there are two <i>tekiot</i> for each and every one of the <i>teruot</i>, one before and one after.
  Consequently, we are found to have learned that three <i>teruot</i> and six <i>tekiot</i> are stated with regard to Rosh HaShana. Two of the <i>teruot</i> are required by the statement of the Torah and one by the statement of the Sages, i.e., based on the verses but not derived directly from them. How so? “A solemn rest, a memorial of blasts [<i>terua</i>]” and “Then you shall make proclamation with the blast of the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>]”; these apply by Torah law. However, the verse “It is a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>] to you” comes for its own statement, i.e., for the verbal analogy, which teaches that the <i>halakhot</i> of the wilderness apply to Rosh HaShana as well. Consequently, the third <i>terua</i> is merely alluded to in that verse and its obligation applies by rabbinic law.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: One <i>terua</i> applies by Torah law, and two apply by rabbinic law: “Then you shall make proclamation with the blast of the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>]” applies by Torah law. However, the verses: “A solemn rest, a memorial of blasts [<i>terua</i>]” and “It is a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>] to you”; these two phrases come for their own statement.
  The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani mean when he says that the verse: “It is a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> [<i>terua</i>] to you,” comes for its own statement? What other <i>halakha</i> is derived from this verse? The Gemara explains: It is required to teach that the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded during the day and not at night, as indicated by the phrase: “A day of sounding the <i>shofar</i>.”
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, who does not derive this <i>halakha</i> from this verse, from where does he learn that the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded during the day and not at night? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which is stated with regard to the Jubilee Year: “On the Day of Atonement” (Leviticus 25:9), which indicates that the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded during the day, not at night.
  The Gemara asks: If that <i>tanna</i> derives this <i>halakha</i> from the phrase: “On the Day of Atonement,” let us also derive from it that one must sound a straight blast of a <i>tekia</i> before each <i>terua</i> and a straight one after it. Since he derives one <i>halakha</i> from the verses that deal with Yom Kippur of the Jubilee Year, why not derive this <i>halakha</i> from there as well? In that case, he would not need to derive it from the verses that deal with the wilderness. The Gemara answers: The phrases “Then you shall make proclamation [<i>veha’avarta</i>]” (Leviticus 25:9) and “You shall make proclamation [<i>ta’aviru</i>]” from the same verse do not indicate a <i>tekia</i> according to him, as they come to teach a different matter.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, what does he learn from those phrases? The Gemara answers: He expounds: “<i>Veha’avarta</i>,” in accordance with the opinion of Rav Mattana, as Rav Mattana said: “<i>Veha’avarta</i>,” which literally means: And you shall carry, indicates that the <i>shofar</i> must be shaped in the same way that the animal carries it on its head while alive, i.e., the natural narrow end must be maintained. One should not widen that side and narrow the naturally wide end. And the word “<i>ta’aviru</i>” teaches that the Merciful One states it so that one should not mistakenly explain as follows: Let us merely carry the <i>shofar</i> by hand throughout the land rather than sounding it.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does the other <i>tanna</i> derive these <i>halakhot</i>, as he used this verse to learn that the <i>terua</i> must be preceded by a <i>tekia</i>. The Gemara answers: He derives the <i>halakha</i> of Rav Mattana from the fact that the verse changed its normal language. It employs the term “<i>ta’aviru</i>” instead of <i>titke’u</i>, the more common expression for sounding the <i>shofar</i>.
  As for the concern that one might think the verse means: You shall merely carry the <i>shofar</i> by hand and not sound it, you cannot in any event say that, as that <i>tanna</i> derives by verbal analogy between the root <i>avara</i> used here and the same root <i>avara</i> that is found with regard to Moses. It is written here: “Then you shall make proclamation [<i>veha’avarta</i>] with the blast of the <i>shofar</i>,” and it is written elsewhere: “And Moses commanded, and they caused to be proclaimed [<i>vaya’aviru</i>] throughout the camp” (Exodus 36:6). Just as there, with regard to Moses, they proclaimed with a sound, so too here, the proclamation must be with a sound.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, who derives the <i>halakha</i> that each <i>terua</i> of Rosh HaShana must be preceded by a <i>tekia</i> from the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> in the wilderness at the time of the gathering of the assembly, one can argue as follows: If so, just as there, in the wilderness, there was sounding of trumpets, so too, here, on Rosh HaShana, there must be sounding of trumpets.
  Therefore, the verse states: “Sound the <i>shofar</i> at the New Moon, at the full moon [<i>keseh</i>] for our feast day” (Psalms 81:4). Which is the Festival on which the month, i.e., the moon, is covered [<i>mitkaseh</i>]? You must say that this is Rosh HaShana, the only Festival that coincides with the new moon, which cannot be seen. And the Merciful One states: “Sound the <i>shofar</i> at the New Moon,” which indicates that on Rosh HaShana one sounds a <i>shofar</i> and nothing else.
  § Rabbi Abbahu instituted in Caesarea the following order of sounding of the <i>shofar</i>: First a <i>tekia</i>, a simple uninterrupted sound; next three <i>shevarim</i>, broken sounds; followed by a <i>terua</i>, a series of short blasts; and, finally, another <i>tekia</i>. The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this is difficult. If, according to the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, the sound the Torah calls a <i>terua</i> is a whimpering, i.e., short, consecutive sounds, one should perform <i>tekia</i>-<i>terua</i>-<i>tekia</i> set. And if he holds that a <i>terua</i> is moaning, i.e., longer, broken sounds, he should sound a set as follows: <i>Tekia</i>, followed by three <i>shevarim</i>, and then another <i>tekia</i>. Why include both a <i>terua</i> and a <i>shevarim</i>?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu was uncertain whether a <i>terua</i> means moaning or whimpering, and he therefore instituted that both types of sound should be included, to ensure that one fulfills his obligation. Rav Avira strongly objects to this: But perhaps a <i>terua</i> is whimpering, and the addition of three <i>shevarim</i> interrupts between the <i>terua</i> and the initial <i>tekia</i>, which disqualifies the entire set. The Gemara answers: That is why one then performs a <i>tekia</i>-<i>terua</i>-<i>tekia</i> set, to account for this possibility. Ravina strongly objects to this: But perhaps a <i>terua</i> is moaning, and the <i>terua</i> interrupts between the <i>shevarim</i> and the final <i>tekia</i>, once again disqualifying the entire set. The Gemara likewise answers: That is why one then performs a <i>tekia</i>-<i>shevarim</i>-<i>tekia</i> set, to cover this possibility as well.
  The Gemara asks: But if in any case one must perform the two sets of blasts, for what purpose did Rabbi Abbahu institute that one should perform a <i>tekia</i>-<i>shevarim</i>-<i>terua</i>-<i>tekia</i> set? If a <i>terua</i> is moaning, one already did it; if it is whimpering, one already did this, too. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu was uncertain, and he thought that perhaps a <i>terua</i> consists of moaning followed by whimpering. Consequently, all three sets are necessary.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let one perform the opposite set as well: <i>Tekia</i>, <i>terua</i>, three <i>shevarim</i>, <i>tekia</i>, as perhaps a <i>terua</i> consists of whimpering and then moaning. The Gemara answers: The normal way of things is that when a person experiences a bad event, he first moans and then whimpers, but not the reverse.
  § The mishna taught: If one sounded the first <i>tekia</i> and then extended the second <i>tekia</i> of that series to the length of two <i>tekiot</i>, so that it should count as both the second <i>tekia</i> of the first set and the first <i>tekia</i> of the second set, it is considered as only one <i>tekia</i>, and one must begin the second set with a new <i>tekia</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one heard
  
  Daf 34b
  
  the requisite nine <i>shofar</i> blasts at nine different times of the day, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the blasts need not be heard in immediate succession.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one heard nine <i>shofar</i> blasts at nine different times of the day, he has fulfilled his obligation. If one heard the blasts from nine different people simultaneously, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If one heard a <i>tekia</i> from this one and afterward he heard a <i>terua</i> from this other one, he has fulfilled his obligation, as one does not have to hear all the blasts from the same individual. And this is true even if one heard the blasts from the different individuals at intervals, and even if it took the course of the entire day.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: During the reading of <i>hallel</i> or the Megilla of Esther, if one paused long enough to complete all of it, he must return to the beginning, as it must be read in one session? Why is the <i>halakha</i> different in the case of the <i>shofar</i>? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this ruling with regard to the <i>shofar</i> is his own opinion, and that case of <i>hallel</i> and the Megilla is his teacher’s opinion. It is Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak who holds that one may not pause in the middle of sounding the <i>shofar</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And is this not also his own opinion as well? Wasn’t Rabbi Abbahu once walking after Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Abbahu was reciting <i>Shema</i> as he walked? When he reached alleyways that were filthy with human excrement, where it is prohibited to utter words of Torah, he fell silent and stopped reciting <i>Shema</i>. After he passed through, Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to completing <i>Shema</i> from where I left off? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: If you remained in the alleyway for an interval sufficient to complete the entire <i>Shema</i>, return to the beginning and start again. This shows that Rabbi Yoḥanan himself holds that if one takes an extended break, he must start again from the beginning.
  The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as it is possible that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: I myself do not hold that one must start again after a long pause; however, according to you, as you hold that a delay is a problem, the <i>halakha</i> is that if you paused for an interval sufficient to complete the entire <i>Shema</i>, you must return to the beginning.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The various trumpet blasts on a fast day do not invalidate one another, i.e., if one was omitted, this does not invalidate the other blasts. Similarly, the additional blessings that are inserted into the <i>Amida</i> prayer on a fast day do not invalidate one another. However, the <i>shofar</i> blasts and additional blessings of Rosh HaShana and of Yom Kippur do invalidate one another.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that all the blasts and blessings are indispensable on Rosh HaShana? Rabba said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Recite before Me on Rosh HaShana Kingship, Remembrances, and <i>Shofarot</i>. Kingship, so that you will crown Me as King over you; Remembrances, so that your remembrance will rise before Me for good. And with what? With the <i>shofar</i>. Since these blessings constitute a single unit, one who did not recite them all has not fulfilled his obligation.
  § The mishna taught: In the case of one who recited the blessings of the additional prayer and only afterward a <i>shofar</i> became available to him, he sounds a <i>tekia</i>, sounds a <i>terua</i> and sounds a <i>tekia</i>; this is a set that he repeats three times. The Gemara explains: The reason that he may do this is that he did not have a <i>shofar</i> at the outset. This indicates that if he had a <i>shofar</i> at the outset, when he hears the blasts he must hear them by the order of the blessings, i.e., one set must be sounded after each special blessing.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa bar Shmuel once rose to pray on Rosh HaShana. He said to his attendant: When I signal to you that I have finished each of the blessings, sound the <i>shofar</i> for me. Rava said to him: They said that the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded after each blessing only where there is a quorum of ten [<i>ḥever ir</i>], not when it is sounded for an individual.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When one hears the <i>shofar</i> blasts, he must hear them in order, i.e., a <i>tekia</i>-<i>terua</i>-<i>tekia</i> set, and upon the order of the blessings. In what case is this statement said? Where there is a quorum of ten [<i>ḥever ir</i>]. However, where there is not a <i>ḥever ir</i>, one must hear them in order, but he need not hear them upon the order of the blessings. And in the case of an individual who has not sounded the <i>shofar</i>, another may sound it for him. But with regard to an individual who has not recited the blessings, another may not recite the blessings for him.
  And if one has to choose between hearing the <i>shofar</i> and reciting the blessings, the mitzva to be among those who sound the <i>shofar</i> is more important than the mitzva to be among those who recite the blessings. How so? If there are two towns, in one there are those who know how to sound the <i>shofar</i>, and in the other there are individuals who know how to recite the blessings, one should go to the place where they sound the <i>shofar</i>, and one does not go to the place where they know how to recite the blessings.
  The Gemara asks: This <i>halakha</i> is obvious. Sounding the <i>shofar</i> is a mitzva by Torah law, whereas the additional prayer applies by rabbinic law. A mitzva that applies by Torah law is clearly more important. The Gemara answers: No; this seemingly superfluous ruling is necessary to teach that although in this town it is certain that the additional prayer will be recited and in this other town it is uncertain whether or not the <i>shofar</i> will be sounded, one should still go to the place where they know how to sound the <i>shofar</i> rather than the location where they know how to recite the blessings.
  § The mishna states: Just as the prayer leader is obligated in the prayers of Rosh HaShana, so too, every individual is obligated in these prayers. Rabban Gamliel says: The prayer leader fulfills the obligation on behalf of the many. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Rabbis said to Rabban Gamliel: According to your statement, why does the congregation recite the silent <i>Amida</i> prayer beforehand? He said to them: In order that the prayer leader should have time to prepare and arrange his prayer.
  Rabban Gamliel said to the Rabbis: According to your statement, that the prayer leader does not fulfill the obligation on behalf of the many, why does the prayer leader descend before the ark and recite the <i>Amida</i> prayer? They said to him: He does so to fulfill the obligation of one who is not an expert in prayer. Rabban Gamliel said to them: Just as he can fulfill the obligation of one who is not an expert in prayer, so too, he can fulfill the obligation of the expert.
  With regard to this <i>baraita</i>, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ultimately, the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. But Rav said: It is still a dispute that remains unresolved. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabba bar Naḥmani, heard this and went and stated this <i>halakha</i> before Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana. He said to him that this is what Rav said: It is still a dispute. Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana said to him: This is what Rabba bar bar Ḥana also said: When Rabbi Yoḥanan said this <i>halakha</i>, that the Rabbis concede to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, Reish Lakish disagreed with him and said: It is still a dispute.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t Rabbi Ḥana from the city of Tzippori say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel? From the fact that he said: The <i>halakha</i>, one can conclude by inference that the Rabbis still disagree. The very fact that he issued a ruling in favor of Rabban Gamliel shows that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the Sages do not accept this opinion.
  
  Daf 35a
  
  The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Abba returned from his travels at sea, he explained the matter as follows: The Sages concede to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel with regard to the blessings of Rosh HaShana and of Yom Kippur, that in these cases the prayer leader fulfills the obligation on behalf of the many. And Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, which, by inference, indicates that the <i>tanna’im</i> still disagree, is referring to the blessings of the entire year.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty. Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Ḥana from the city of Tzippori say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel with regard to the blessings of Rosh HaShana and of Yom Kippur? Apparently, he holds that the <i>tanna’im</i> remain in dispute even with regard to these blessings.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statements must be attributed to different Sages, as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Who concedes to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel? Rabbi Meir. And with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, which, by inference, indicates that the <i>tanna’im</i> still disagree, this is referring to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the blessings of Rosh HaShana and of Yom Kippur, the prayer leader fulfills the obligation on behalf of the many. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Just as the prayer leader is obligated in these prayers, so too, every individual is obligated to recite them on his own. Clearly, Rabbi Meir agrees with Rabban Gamliel with regard to the blessings of Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur, while the Rabbis dispute this ruling.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about these blessings of Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur, that Rabbi Meir concedes to the opinion of Rabban Gamliel only with regard to them, but not about the blessings recited the rest of the year? If we say that it is due to the many verses that are included in these blessings, this is difficult. Didn’t Rav Ḥananel say that Rav said: Once one has recited the line of the prayer: And in Your Torah it is written, saying, it is no longer necessary to recite the verses themselves. Rather, it is because there are many blessings, and as the blessings are long, not everyone is capable of learning them by heart.
  The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said: Once one has recited the line of the prayer: And in Your Torah it is written, saying, it is no longer necessary to recite the verses themselves. The Gemara clarifies the scope of this ruling: Some understood from this that it applies only to an individual; however, with regard to a congregation, no, this is not the case. Nevertheless, it is stated that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Both with regard to an individual and a congregation, once one has recited: And in Your Torah it is written, saying, it is no longer necessary to recite the verses.
  § Rabbi Elazar said: A person should always arrange his prayer in his mind and only then pray. Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Elazar’s statement is reasonable with regard to the blessings of Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur and in the case of prayers that are recited only intermittently. However, with regard to blessings recited all year, no, this practice is not necessary.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Yehuda first arrange his prayer in his mind and only then pray, even on an ordinary day? The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda was different, since he would pray only once every thirty days. During the rest of the month he would not engage in prayer, as he was busy with Torah study. Therefore, for him even regular weekdays prayers were like prayers recited intermittently.
  Rav Aḥa bar Avira said that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida said: Rabban Gamliel would allow the prayer leader to exempt even the people who were in the fields and away from the synagogue. The Gemara challenges: This statement implies that the prayer leader exempts even the people in the fields, and needless to say, he exempts those who are here in the city but did not attend the prayer service in the synagogue.
  The Gemara questions this conclusion: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable: Those in the fields did not come to the synagogue due to circumstances beyond their control, and therefore they should be allowed to fulfill their obligation through the prayer leader. By contrast, those in the city were not prevented from coming to the synagogue due to circumstances beyond their control. Consequently, they should not fulfill their obligation through the prayer leader.
  As Abba, son of Rav Binyamin bar Ḥiyya, taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Those people standing in the synagogue behind the priests during the Priestly Blessing, who are not positioned in front of them, face-to-face, are not included in the blessing. They are expected to make the minimal effort to stand in front of the priests. However, those in the fields are included in the Priestly Blessing.
  Rather, Rabban Gamliel’s statement should be understood differently: When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Shimon bar Ḥasida said: Rabban Gamliel allowed the prayer leader to exempt only the people in the fields. What is the reason for this? Because the people in the fields are unable to come to the synagogue due to work circumstances beyond their control, and do not have time to prepare their prayers. However, Rabban Gamliel did not exempt those in the city who do not come to the synagogue, as they are able to prepare their prayers and pray by themselves.