meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Tahorot/Niddah/English/merged.txt"}
text: Niddah
  נדה
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -William Davidson Edition - English
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  Niddah
  
  
  
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  MISHNA: Shammai says: For all women who do not have a fixed menstrual cycle, their time is sufficient. Women who discern that menstrual blood emerged do not need to be concerned that perhaps the flow of blood began before they noticed it. Rather, they assume their ritual impurity status begins at that moment, in terms of rendering impure <i>teruma</i> and ritually pure items with which they come in contact. Hillel says: From examination [<i>mipekida</i>] to examination, i.e., she assumes ritual impurity status retroactive to the last time she examined herself and determined that she was ritually pure, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even if her examination took place several days earlier. Any ritually pure item with which she came in contact in the interim becomes ritually impure.
  And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is neither in accordance with the statement of this <i>tanna</i> nor in accordance with the statement of that <i>tanna</i>; rather, the principle is: A twenty-four-hour period reduces the time from examination to examination. In other words, if her final self-examination took place more than twenty-four hours earlier, she need only concern herself with ritual impurity for the twenty-four-hour period prior to discerning the blood. And from examination to examination reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period. In other words, if she examined herself in the course of the previous day and discovered no blood, she was certainly ritually pure prior to the examination.
  For any woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle [<i>veset</i>], and she examined herself at that time and discovered blood, her time is sufficient, and it is only from that time that she transmits ritual impurity. And with regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths [<i>be’edim</i>] before and after intercourse, with which she ascertains whether her menstrual flow began, the halakhic status of such an action is like that of an examination, and therefore it reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period, and reduces the time from examination to examination.
  Her time is sufficient, how so? If the woman was sitting in the bed and engaged in handling ritually pure items, and she left the bed and saw blood, she is ritually impure and those items are ritually pure.
  Although the Rabbis said that a woman without a fixed menstrual cycle transmits ritual impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, a woman with a fixed cycle counts her menstrual days only from the moment that she saw blood.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that when a woman discerns that her menstrual blood emerged, Shammai holds that her impurity status starts from that moment, while Hillel maintains that it begins from the time of her most recent self-examination. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Shammai? The Gemara answers: Shammai holds that as there is a principle that when the status of an item is uncertain it retains its presumptive status, here too: Establish the woman in her presumptive status, and a woman remains with the presumptive status of being ritually pure. And what is the reasoning of Hillel? He claims that when one states the principle: Establish an item in its presumptive status, that applies only where there is no weakening in the presumptive status that is a result of the item itself. But in the case of a woman,
  
  Daf 2b
  
  since it is her nature to see blood flow from her body at regular intervals, we do not say: Establish her in her presumptive status of ritual purity. Her body is constantly changing, and therefore she has no such presumptive status.
  With regard to the opinions of both Shammai and Hillel, the Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from that of a ritual bath? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 2:2): In the case of a ritual bath that was known to have contained the requisite forty <i>se’a</i>, which was then measured and found lacking in its quantity of water, all pure items that had been rendered pure in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in this ritual bath, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is found in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure.
  The Gemara explains: According to the opinion of Shammai, the mishna poses a difficulty from its statement that the change in the ritual bath’s status is assumed retroactive to the time when it was last measured, as he maintains that a menstruating woman’s status changes only at the present moment, not retroactive to the last time she examined herself.
  According to the opinion of Hillel, the mishna also poses a difficulty with regard to its ruling that the items purified in the ritual bath are deemed impure with certainty, whereas a menstruating women does not assume retroactive impurity with certainty. In other words, although according to the Rabbis there is a twenty-four-hour period of retroactive ritual impurity in the case of a menstruating woman, and according to Hillel the retroactive impurity extends back to her most recent examination, nevertheless any <i>teruma</i> that she touched during that period is not deemed definitely impure to the extent that it must be burned. Rather, the impure status of the items she touched is uncertain and the status of the <i>teruma</i> is suspended, i.e., one may neither eat it nor burn it. Whereas here, in the case of the ritual bath, any item purified in it is retroactively deemed definitely impure.
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a ritual bath, it is different, since it can be said: Establish the impure item in its presumptive status and say that it was not properly immersed. In other words, the presumptive status of the item as ritually impure is in keeping with the current deficient state of the ritual bath. The Gemara raises a difficulty: On the contrary, one should establish the ritual bath in its presumptive state of validity and say that the ritual bath was not previously lacking the requisite measure of water. The Gemara responds: There is no presumptive state of validity, as the ritual bath is lacking before you, i.e., at present, and this offsets the presumptive status that it was full.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Here too, in the case of a menstruating woman, she is one who has experienced a discharge of blood before you, i.e., at present. Just as the ritual bath’s presumptive status of validity is offset by its present lack of the requisite measure of water, so too the woman’s previous presumptive status of ritual purity is offset by her present state of impurity due to menstruation. The Gemara answers: In the case of the menstruating woman, it is possible that it is only now that she saw the first emission of her menstrual blood. The Gemara retorts: One can say the same with regard to the ritual bath: Here too, it is only now that it became lacking in the requisite measure of water.
  The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the ritual bath, it can be said that the water slowly trickled out and consequently the amount of water was continuously diminishing. Therefore, it is possible that the ritual bath lost its valid status long ago without anyone realizing. By contrast, here, with regard to a menstruating woman, can it be said that she was continuously seeing menstrual blood? The Gemara responds: And what is the difficulty? The same possibility does in fact exist in the case of a menstruating woman, as perhaps she saw the blood depart bit [<i>hagas</i>] by bit.
  The Gemara states a different answer: There, in the case of the ritual bath, there are two factors that weaken the suggestion that the items are ritually pure: First, the ritual bath is lacking at present; second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity. Here, by contrast, there is only one factor that weakens the possibility that the items touched by the currently menstruating woman were rendered ritually impure, i.e., that she is currently experiencing a menstrual flow. Therefore, according to Shammai she assumes impurity status only from that moment onward, and according to Hillel her retroactive impurity status applies only as an uncertainty.
  § The Gemara asks: And according to Shammai, who holds that her time is sufficient and there is no retroactive impurity, what is different in the case of a barrel? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 2:8): If someone would inspect the contents of a barrel to see if it still contained enough wine to continually mentally separate <i>teruma</i> from it, i.e., to exempt other untithed wine of his until all the wine in this barrel will be <i>teruma</i>, and afterward the contents of the barrel were found to have turned to vinegar, which cannot be set aside as <i>teruma</i> for untithed wine, then for all of the first three days following his most recent inspection, it is definitely considered to have been wine. Therefore, any of the untithed wine for which <i>teruma</i> was separated during those days is tithed.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From that point forward, i.e., more than three days after the most recent inspection, it is uncertain whether it had already turned to vinegar, and consequently any untithed wine for which <i>teruma</i> was separated during those days remains uncertainly tithed. This poses a difficulty for Shammai, who maintains that there is no such retroactive consideration in the case of a menstruating woman.
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the barrel, it is different, since it can be said: Establish the untithed produce in its presumptive status, as when it first grew it was definitely untithed, and say it was not amended, i.e., exempted, and its status continues to be untithed produce. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, one should establish the wine in its presumptive status, and say that it had not turned to vinegar.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is impossible, as it is turned to vinegar before you, i.e., at present. The Gemara replies: Here too, in the case of a menstruating woman, one who has experienced a discharge of blood is before you, at present, so what is the difference? The Gemara explains: With regard to the woman, it is possible that it is only now that she saw the beginning of her menstrual blood. The Gemara responds: There too, it is possible that it is only now that it turned to vinegar, but not earlier.
  The Gemara again answers: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the wine, it can be said that it was continuously turning to vinegar. Therefore, it is possible that the wine turned to vinegar much earlier without anyone realizing. By contrast, in the case of the menstruating woman, can it be said that she was continuously seeing menstrual blood? Once again, the Gemara responds: And what is the difficulty? The same possibility does in fact exist in the case of a menstruating woman, as perhaps she saw the blood depart bit by bit.
  The Gemara provides a different answer: There, in the case of the barrel, there are two factors that weaken the suggestion that the wine is tithed: First, it is vinegar at present; second, the wine has a presumptive status that it is untithed. Here, by contrast, there is only one factor that weakens the possibility that the items touched by the menstruating woman were rendered ritually impure, i.e., that she is currently experiencing a menstrual flow.
  § And the Gemara raises a contradiction between the <i>halakha</i> of the barrel and that of the ritual bath: What is different here, in the case of the ritual bath, where the items are definitely impure, and what is different there, with regard to the barrel, where it is only uncertain that the produce remains untithed? In both cases the current situation, that the ritual bath is deficient and the contents of the barrel have turned to vinegar, should lead to a definite status.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura says: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught the <i>halakha</i> of the barrel? It is Rabbi Shimon, who, with regard to a ritual bath also considers it as a matter of uncertainty, rather than as definitely impure. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two <i>halakhot</i>.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 2:2): In the case of a ritual bath that was known to have contained the requisite forty <i>se’a</i>, which was then measured and found lacking in its quantity of water, all pure items that had been rendered pure in it, i.e., any impure items that had been purified through immersion in this ritual bath, retroactive to when the ritual bath was last measured, whether this ritual bath is located in the private domain or in the public domain, are impure.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Shimon says: If the impure items were immersed in a ritual bath that was in the public domain, they are deemed pure. But if they were immersed in a ritual bath that was in a private domain, the status of any <i>teruma</i> that touched them is suspended, i.e., it is neither consumed nor burned. Rabbi Shimon holds that even in the case of a ritual bath, the items are not retroactively deemed definitely impure. Rather the status is uncertain, just as in the case of the barrel.
  
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  The Gemara explains their reasoning: And both <i>tanna’im</i> derived their respective opinions only from the case of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [<i>sota</i>], who is forbidden to engage in intercourse with her husband just like a definite adulteress.
  The Rabbis hold: This case of a ritual bath is like the case of a <i>sota</i>. Just as in the case of a <i>sota</i> it is uncertain whether she was actually unfaithful, and nevertheless the Torah rendered her like one who definitely committed adultery in that she is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the water of a <i>sota</i>; here too, in the case of a ritual bath, it is uncertain whether it was lacking the requisite measure of water and yet the Torah rendered it as though it was definitely lacking water, to the extent that <i>teruma</i> that touched an item that had been immersed in it must be burned.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the <i>halakhot</i> of the ritual bath are derived from those of a <i>sota</i>, then one can say that it should be like the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>sota</i> in another respect: Just as a <i>sota</i> who is suspected of having been unfaithful in a public domain is considered pure, i.e., she does not undergo to rite of a <i>sota</i>, here too, any impure item that was immersed in a currently deficient ritual bath that is situated in a public domain should be considered pure.
  The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? One cannot apply the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>sota</i> in a public domain to any other case. There, the reason why a <i>sota</i> is treated as having definitely been unfaithful is due to her seclusion with another man. And as a proper seclusion in the public domain is not possible, she does not assume the status of a <i>sota</i>. By contrast, here, in the case of the ritual bath, the uncertainty is due to the lack of the requisite measure of water in the ritual bath. If so, what difference is it to me if the ritual bath is lacking in a public domain or if it is lacking in a private domain?
  The Gemara comments: And if you would say that the guiding principle in any case of uncertainty involving impurity in a public domain is that it is ritually pure, and therefore all items immersed in a ritual bath situated in the public domain should be pure even if there is uncertainty about its status of purity, that suggestion can be rejected, as follows: Since there are two factors that weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure: First, the ritual bath is currently lacking, and second, the item has a presumptive status of impurity, it is therefore considered as an item of definite impurity.
  After analyzing the reasoning of the Rabbis, the Gemara turns to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Shimon holds: This case of a ritual bath is just like the case of a <i>sota</i>. Just as a <i>sota</i> who is suspected of having been unfaithful in a public domain is considered pure, here too, any impure item that was immersed in a currently deficient ritual bath that is situated in a public domain is considered pure.
  The Gemara asks: If the <i>halakhot</i> of the ritual bath are derived from those of a <i>sota</i>, then one can say that it should be like the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>sota</i> in another respect: Just as a <i>sota</i> who secluded herself with the man in a private domain is deemed definitely impure, i.e., she is forbidden to her husband until she undergoes the rite of the <i>sota</i>, here too, any ritually impure item that was immersed in a currently deficient ritual bath situated in a private domain should be considered definitely impure. If so, any <i>teruma</i> that comes in contact with the immersed vessel should be burned. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon rule that its status is suspended and it is neither consumed nor burned?
  The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of a <i>sota</i>, there is a basis for the matter. She is considered definitely impure, as her husband issued a warning to her about this particular man and she then secluded herself with him. By contrast, here, in the case of a ritual bath, what basis for the matter is there? Why should one assume impurity with certainty?
  And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: He does not base his ruling on the case of a <i>sota</i>; rather, he derives the end of impurity from the beginning of impurity, i.e., he derives the <i>halakha</i> of the immersion of an impure item into a ritual bath from the <i>halakha</i> of the initial contraction of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara explains: Just as with regard to the beginning of impurity, if there is uncertainty whether or not a pure item came into contact with a source of impurity, if this occurred in the public domain it is considered ritually pure; so too in the case of the end of impurity, if there is uncertainty whether or not the impure item was immersed in a ritual bath with the requisite amount of water, the <i>halakha</i> is that if the ritual bath is located in the public domain, the item is considered pure.
  The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis respond to this claim? They would respond: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the beginning of impurity, the man who might have touched an impure item remains with the presumptive status of ritual purity. Consequently, we do not lower his status to one who has contracted ritual impurity merely due to uncertainty. Here, in the case of the ritual bath, the man who immerses in that ritual bath has the presumptive status of ritual impurity. Therefore, we do not remove him from his status of ritual impurity due to uncertainty.
  § The Gemara returns to its analysis of the mishna. Shammai said: For all women, their time is sufficient, i.e., women who discern that menstrual blood emerged do not need to be concerned that perhaps the flow of blood began before they noticed it. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that of an alleyway? As we learned in a mishna (66a): With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal that is found in an alleyway, it renders any item in the alleyway ritually impure retroactively to the time that a person can say: I examined this alleyway and there was no carcass of a creeping animal in it, or until the time of the last sweeping of the alleyway.
  The Gemara answers: There too, one can explain: Since there are two types of carcasses of creeping animals that are likely to be found in the alleyway, creeping animals from the alleyway itself and creeping animals that came from the world at large, it is compared to a case where there are two factors that weaken the possibility that the items are ritually pure. Therefore, even Shammai agrees that in such a case the impurity extends retroactively back in time.
  And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason for the opinion of Shammai: Since a women senses within herself if she is experiencing a flow of blood, if she felt the flow only at present, it is certain that she did not experience a flow previously. And Hillel holds that she might have experienced a flow earlier while she was urinating and she thought it was all the sensation of her flow of urine.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Shammai, isn’t there the case of a sleeping woman, who would not sense her flow of menstrual blood? The Gemara answers: A sleeping woman would also sense her flow, and due to her discomfort she would awaken, just as it is with the sensation of the need to urinate.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty with regard to the opinion of Shammai: But there is the case of a mentally incompetent woman, who does not properly understand what she is sensing. She might have previously experienced a flow of menstrual blood that she did not notice. The Gemara answers: Shammai concedes in the case of a mentally incompetent woman that she is impure retroactively. The Gemara asks: But the mishna explicitly teaches that Shammai mentioned all women, which apparently includes even the mentally incompetent. The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches: All women, it is referring to all mentally competent women.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, let the mishna teach that Shammai’s opinion applies to: Women, rather than referring to all women. The Gemara answers: The inclusive statement: All women, serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As Rabbi Eliezer said in a mishna (7a): There are four women with regard to whom the <i>halakha</i> is that their time is sufficient. This indicates that there are only four, and no more. Therefore, the mishna teaches us: All women, to include all mentally competent women, not only the four mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara raises yet another difficulty against the opinion of Shammai: But there is the case of blood stains. The mishna teaches (66a) that a woman who finds a blood stain is impure retroactive to the last time she examined her clothing and found them clean. Shall we say that we learned the mishna with regard to stains not in accordance with the opinion of Shammai? Abaye said: Shammai concedes in the case of stains. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The reason is that she neither engaged in handling a slaughtered bird nor did she pass through a marketplace of butchers. If so, from where could this blood stain on her clothing have come? Since it must be from her last menstrual flow, Shammai agrees that she is impure retroactively.
  The Gemara suggests another analysis: Or if you wish, say that this is the reason for the opinion of Shammai: She is impure only from that point onward, as, if it is so that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset, i.e., at the earlier time. The Gemara explains why Hillel maintains that there is ritual impurity retroactively, in light of this analysis: And as for Hillel, he holds that the walls of the womb, i.e., the walls of the vaginal canal, held back the menstrual blood from leaving the body entirely, and therefore there might have been a previous emission from the uterus into the vaginal canal that was not visible on the outside. The Gemara asks: And how does Shammai respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Shammai maintains that the walls of the womb do not hold back blood.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth in the form of a wad that she inserts in her vagina at the opening of her womb so as not to become pregnant, what is there to say? In other words, how does Shammai explain why there is no retroactive impurity status in such a case, as it cannot be claimed that any previous menstrual blood would have flowed out earlier. Abaye says: Shammai concedes with regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive cloth that she is impure retroactively.
  Rava says: Here as well, in a case where a woman engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth, any previous menstrual blood would have flowed out, as the absorbent cloth does not hermetically seal the womb. The reason is that the cloth wrinkles due to perspiration, leaving space for blood to pass through. The Gemara adds: And nevertheless Rava concedes to Abaye that Shammai agrees that she is retroactively impure in a case where a woman engages in intercourse while using a tightly packed absorbent cloth.
  § The Gemara suggested that the reasoning for Shammai’s opinion is that the woman would have felt any previous menstrual flow, or that any prior menstrual blood would have flowed out previously. Yet, earlier the Gemara suggested that his reason was that the woman retains her presumptive status of ritual purity. With regard to the explanations given for the opinion of Shammai, the Gemara asks: What difference is there between these versions and that version suggested earlier?
  
  Daf 3b
  
  The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to the possibility of raising a contradiction between Shammai’s ruling here and the cases of a barrel, a ritual bath, and an alleyway. According to that version, that Shammai’s reasoning is based upon the principle that an item retains its presumptive status, there is room to raise these contradictions, as the Gemara explained. By contrast, according to these other versions, that the woman would have felt any previous menstrual flow or that any prior menstrual blood would have flowed out previously, there is no room to raise such contradictions, as those rulings do not contradict the <i>halakha</i> here, where a unique factor is relevant.
  The Gemara further asks: And what difference is there between this version, that any prior menstrual blood would have flowed out, and that version, that she would have felt any previous menstrual flow? The Gemara answers: According to Abaye, who maintains that Shammai agrees that a woman who engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive cloth is impure retroactively, there is a difference in a case where the woman engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive cloth. If Shammai’s reasoning is that a woman senses the emission of blood, in this case too it is assumed that she did not emit blood earlier. By contrast, if his reasoning is that any prior menstrual blood would have come out at the outset, it is possible that the cloth blocked the emission of blood, and she already emitted blood. Consequently, she is impure retroactively.
  According to Rava, who maintains that blood can emerge even if the woman engages in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth, there is a difference between the two interpretations in a case where she engages in intercourse while using a tightly packed absorbent cloth, as such a cloth will prevent the blood from flowing out, but it does not affect her ability to sense an emission.
  It is taught in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 4:4) in accordance with this version, i.e., that Shammai’s reasoning is that if it is so, that there was menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset: Hillel said to Shammai: Don’t you concede to the following <i>halakha</i>: In the case of a basket that was used as a container for ritually pure items, and those items were placed in one corner, and subsequently the carcass of a creeping animal was found in a different corner of the basket, the <i>halakha</i> is that the items initially considered ritually pure are now retroactively considered impure? Shammai said to him: Indeed, that is correct.
  Hillel continues: And if so, what difference is there between this case of the pure items stored in the basket, which are now considered retroactively impure, and that case of the ritually pure woman who experiences a menstrual flow, who is impure only from that point onward? Shammai answers: This one, the basket, has a base on which it rests, and therefore the creeping animal might have been there earlier unseen. That one, the menstruating woman, has no base, i.e., there is nothing to impede her menstrual blood from flowing out. Shammai’s response indicates that she is not retroactively impure because if she had experienced a previous menstruation it would have flowed at that stage.
  § Rava says: The reason for the opinion of Shammai that a woman who experiences menstruation is not deemed ritually impure retroactively is due to the dereliction of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. If woman is always deemed retroactively impure, she and her husband might abstain from engaging in sexual intercourse out of fear that she is already impure even if she has not yet experienced bleeding. The Gemara adds that this explanation is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Shammai said to Hillel: If it is so, that a woman is rendered retroactively impure as you claim, you will have caused the Jewish women to be derelict in the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the one who taught this version, i.e., Rava, there is a difficulty: Isn’t it taught in the aforementioned mishna in accordance with that other version, that Shammai’s reasoning is that if it is so, that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset? The Gemara answers: There, in that mishna, it is Hillel who erred. He thought the reason of Shammai is that if it is so, that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset. And therefore, he raises a difficulty against Shammai’s opinion from the case of the basket.
  And Shammai said to Hillel: You are mistaken. My reasoning is actually due to the dereliction of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. But even according to your erroneous reasoning that led you to raise a difficulty from the case of the basket, I have an answer for that as well: This basket has a base, and therefore the creeping animal could have been there earlier, unseen; but that menstruating woman has no base.
  The Gemara asks the reverse question: And according to the one who teaches this other version, that Shammai’s reasoning is that if there was previous menstrual blood it would have come out at the outset, isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with that other version, that Shammai’s reasoning is due to the dereliction of the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply?
  The Gemara answers: That <i>baraita</i> was recorded at a later point in their discussion, as this is what Hillel is saying to Shammai: Yes, the reason that you say for your opinion has merit, that if it is so, that there was any menstrual blood previously, it would have come out at the outset. Nevertheless, you should enact a safeguard for your statement and render her retroactively impure, as in what way is this case different from the rest of the entire Torah, where the Sages enact safeguards?
  Shammai said to Hillel: If so, i.e., if she is considered impure retroactively as a safeguard, you will have caused the Jewish women to be derelict in the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply. The Gemara asks: And how does Hillel respond to Shammai’s reasoning with regard to the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply? The Gemara explains that Hillel would answer: Although I rule that she is retroactively impure, did I say that she is forbidden to her husband and must therefore abstain from the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply? I said only that she renders impure any ritually pure items that she touched.
  The Gemara asks: And how would Shammai reply to this? The Gemara answers: Shammai maintains that even a safeguard that renders ritually pure items impure should not be imposed. The reason is that if it were so, the heart of a scrupulous husband might strike him with pangs of conscience over sins that he could transgress and he would separate from his wife, out of fear that she is impure.
  The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the ensuing discussions: A base; examined; covered; in a corner. It was stated: If one has a basket that was used as a container for holding ritually pure produce, and those items were placed in one corner of the basket, and subsequently the carcass of a creeping animal was found in a different corner of the basket, Ḥizkiyya says: That produce initially considered ritually pure is still pure. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The produce initially considered ritually pure is now retroactively deemed impure. The Gemara asks: But how can Ḥizkiyya rule that it is pure? After all, don’t Shammai and Hillel agree in the case of the basket that the produce initially considered pure is now retroactively impure?
  The Gemara answers: When do Shammai and Hillel agree that all the produce is retroactively impure? With regard to a basket that has a base. In such a case, the carcass of the creeping animal might have previously been in the basket and it went unnoticed when one removed the pure produce items. When Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree, it is with regard to a basket that has no base, i.e., both ends were open and the basket was used while it was lying on its side. In that situation, the contents of the basket are emptied by raising one end, which causes all items inside to fall out. Consequently, any creeping animal that was found subsequently must have entered the basket only after that produce was removed, which is why Ḥizkiyya rules that the produce remains pure.
  The Gemara asks: If this is referring to a case where the basket has no base, what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan for ruling that the produce is ritually impure? The Gemara answers: The basket has no base but it does have an inward-curved rim. Therefore, it is possible that the carcass of a small creeping animal might have been held back by the rim and remained inside the basket even after it was turned over. Rabbi Yoḥanan rules that the produce is retroactively impure, due to the possibility that the creeping animal might have been in the basket previously together with the initially pure produce.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who draws ten pails of water one after another, i.e., he draws out water in one pail and from it he fills another ten pails with water, and the carcass of a creeping animal is found in one of them, that pail of water is ritually impure but all the rest of them are pure. And Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yannai: This <i>halakha</i> was taught only in a case where the pail has no inward-curved rim. Consequently, its contents are entirely emptied each time it is overturned, which means that the creeping animal must have entered only this pail. But if the pail has a rim, all of the water that had been drawn is impure, as the creeping animal might have entered the pail earlier and the rim held it back each time the pail was overturned.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: Shall we say that Ḥizkiyya, who is not concerned that the rim of the basket might have held back the creeping animal, does not agree with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai? The Gemara answers that there is a difference between the two cases: Water is slippery, whereas produce is not slippery. In order to pour water out of the pail it is not necessary to turn it over completely. Therefore, the rim might hold back a creeping animal. By contrast, a basket must have one end fully raised in order to empty out all the produce it contains. In such a case Rabbi Yannai would agree that nothing could have been held back, and therefore the emptied produce remains pure.
  Alternatively, there is a different reason why one does not overturn a pail of water entirely: In the case of water, one is not particular about it, i.e., he does not mind if some is left over. Therefore he does not overturn the pail completely. By contrast, in the case of produce one is particular about it, so he raises one end of the basket entirely to ensure that every last piece of produce is emptied. Consequently, in the case of produce Rabbi Yannai would agree that even if the basket has a rim, all the produce remains pure.
  As an alternative to its previous resolution that Ḥizkiyya is discussing the case of a rimmed receptacle, the Gemara suggests another resolution of the apparent contradiction between Ḥizkiyya’s ruling and the opinions of Hillel and Shammai. And if you wish, say: When do Shammai and Hillel agree? In the case of a basket that was not examined. Since he did not examine the basket when he placed the pure produce there, a creeping animal might have already been inside. Consequently, they agree that the produce does not retain its presumptive state of purity but is considered retroactively impure.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  When Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree, it is with regard to a basket that was examined. One Sage, Ḥizkiyya, holds that since it was examined before the produce was placed inside and was found to be clean of creeping animals, it is reasonable to assume that the creeping animal entered only after the ritually pure produce was removed. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that one can say that it is possible that when he removed his hand after feeling around to examine the basket, the creeping animal fell in.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t the case of a basket taught as being similar to the case of a menstruating woman? Hillel had cited the case of the basket as a difficulty with regard to Shammai’s opinion in the case of a menstruating woman. And since a woman is considered fully examined, since she examines herself with examination cloths twice a day, the other case must also be referring to a basket that had been examined. The Gemara answers: Since blood is commonly found flowing from her, as women regularly experience menstrual flows, it is considered as though she were not examined.
  The Gemara suggests another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the ruling of Ḥizkiyya and the opinions of Hillel and Shammai. And if you wish, say: When Shammai and Hillel agree, it is with regard to a basket that is not covered. When do Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree? With regard to a basket that is covered. The Gemara asks: If the basket is covered, how did the creeping animal fall inside? The Gemara answers: For example, if the basket is used by removing its lid. Ḥizkiyya holds that the creeping animal must have fallen in after the produce was removed, because as long as the produce was inside one would be careful not to allow anything else inside. Rabbi Yoḥanan is concerned that perhaps while the basket was uncovered a creeping animal could have fallen inside without one noticing.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t the case of a basket taught as being similar to the case of a menstruating woman? And just as a woman is considered covered, since no outside blood can enter her, so too in the case of a basket, it must be one where it is constantly covered. The Gemara explains: Since blood is commonly found flowing from her, as women regularly experience menstrual flows, it is considered as though she is not always covered.
  The Gemara suggests another resolution. And if you wish, say: When do Shammai and Hillel agree? In a case where the produce was stored in the corner of a basket. By contrast, when Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree, it is in a case where the produce was stored in the corner of a house. The Gemara expresses puzzlement at this suggestion: But the Gemara on 3b explicitly states that they are referring to a case of a basket.
  The Gemara explains that this is what the Gemara on 3b is saying: If one has a basket that was used as a container for ritually pure produce in this corner of the house, and after the produce was removed it was subsequently carried to another corner, and the carcass of a creeping animal was found in the basket while it was in that other corner, Ḥizkiyya holds: The produce remains ritually pure, as we do not presume that ritual impurity moved from place to place. In other words, the impure creeping animal is not assumed to have moved from the first corner where the produce was kept. Instead, it fell inside while the basket was in the second corner, and therefore the produce that it previously contained remains pure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: The produce is retroactively considered impure, as we do presume that ritual impurity, i.e., the carcass of the creeping animal in the basket, moved from place to place.
  The Gemara asks a question with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: And do we presume that ritual impurity moved from place to place? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 5:7): If someone touched one other person at night, and he does not know whether the person he touched was alive or dead, and on the following day he arose and found him dead, and he is uncertain whether or not he contracted ritual impurity from contact with a corpse, Rabbi Meir deems him ritually pure. It is assumed that the deceased was still alive until the point that it is known with certainty that he was dead.
  And the Rabbis deem him ritually impure, as it is presumed that all ritually impure items had already been in the same state as they were at the time they were discovered. Just as the deceased was found dead in the morning, so too, it is presumed that he was dead when he was touched in the middle of the night.
  The Gemara concludes its question: And it is taught with regard to this mishna: It is presumed that ritually impure items had been in the same state as they were at the time they were discovered, but only in the place in which they were discovered. In other words, if the corpse had been found in a different spot than he was at night, it is not presumed that he was already dead in the first spot, and the man who touched him remains ritually pure. If so, how can Rabbi Yoḥanan maintain that we presume impurity moved from place to place?
  And if you would say in response: This statement, that impurity is presumed only in the place in which it was discovered, applies specifically with regard to definite impure status, i.e., to burn <i>teruma</i>, but with regard to uncertain impurity, i.e., to suspend the status of <i>teruma</i>, we do in fact suspend its status and it may be neither burned nor eaten; is this distinction correct? Do we in fact suspend the status of ritually pure items in such a case, due to the concern that the dead man whom this individual touched might have already been dead in the first location?
  But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 3:5): With regard to a previously impure needle that is found on top of <i>teruma</i> and it is full of rust or broken, and therefore no longer contracts or transmit ritual impurity, the <i>teruma</i> remains pure, as it is presumed that in all cases of impurity, the items in question had already been in the same state as they were at the time they were discovered? But why should that be the case? Let us say that initially, when it had fallen onto the <i>teruma</i>, this needle was a proper, non-rusty and unbroken, needle, capable of contracting and transmitting ritual impurity, and it is only now that rust had formed on it. The status of the <i>teruma</i> should at least be held in suspension. Rather, it is evident that the <i>teruma</i> is considered definitely pure and is not held in suspension due to the possibility that it might have become impure from the nail at a previous time or, presumably, in a previous place.
  And furthermore, we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 9:9): If one found the carcass of a burned creeping animal on top of a pile of olives, and that animal no longer transmits impurity as it is burned, and similarly if one finds a tattered rag of a <i>zav</i>, which likewise no longer transmits impurity, on top of a pile of olives, the olives are pure. The reason is that it is presumed in all cases of impurity, the items in question had already been in the same state as they were at the time they were discovered. Once again, this demonstrates that when this presumption is applied, the item is considered definitely pure, and is not held in suspension due to uncertainty.
  And if you would say that there is a difference between these last cases, where the items did not move, and the case of the basket that moved, this distinction is not correct. The suggestion is that in the last cases the items are treated entirely as if they had always been as they were at the time they were discovered, whether this leads to a leniency, as in the cases of the needle and the rag, and whether it leads to a stringency, in the case of one who touched someone at night, when he is considered to be definitely impure, but this is the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to the place where they were discovered, i.e., if they did not move. But with regard to a location that is not the place where they were discovered, we do suspect that ritual impurity moved from place to place, and therefore although we do not burn the <i>teruma</i> in question, we hold it in suspension.
  The Gemara refutes this suggestion: But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 4:3): There was a loaf resting on top of a shelf, and there was an item of light impurity, e.g., a garment of a <i>zav</i>, which transmits impurity to food but not to people or vessels, lying underneath it, and the loaf was later found on the ground. Even though the situation was such that if the loaf fell to the ground it would be impossible for it to have done anything other than touch the impure garment on its way down, nevertheless the loaf is pure. The reason is that I say that a ritually pure man entered there and took it off the shelf and placed it onto the ground without it touching the impure garment.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: This ruling applies unless someone says: It is clear to me that no person entered there. And Rabbi Elazar says: This principle is necessary only when the top shelf is an inclined surface. In other words, even if it is very likely that the loaf rolled off the shelf and touched the garment on its way down to the ground, nevertheless it is assumed to be pure. This indicates that one does not presume that the loaf contracted impurity and then fell to the ground where it was found. Since such a possibility is not even entertained to the extent that the <i>teruma</i> is held in suspension, this demonstrates that in a case involving a movement from one place to another there is no presumption of ritual impurity at all.
  The Gemara explains that no proof can be cited from there, as that <i>baraita</i> explicitly teaches the reason for its ruling:
  
  Daf 4b
  
  The reason is not that one does not presume that ritual impurity moved from place to place, but because I say that a ritually pure man entered there and took it off the shelf and placed it onto the ground, avoiding the impure garment it would have hit had it fallen. When there is no such explanation, the principle that one presumes impurity moved from place to place does apply, e.g., in the case of the basket where the carcass of a creeping animal was found inside.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Here, too, let us say that a raven, which often touches creeping animals, came and threw the creeping animal into the basket when it was in the second corner, after the produce had been emptied from it. The Gemara rejects this claim: In the case of a person, who acts with intent, we can say that perhaps a person moved the loaf from the shelf onto the ground. By contrast, with regard to a raven, which does not act with intent, we do not say that perhaps it committed such a purposeful act.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the ruling of the <i>Tosefta</i>: Now the status of this loaf found on the ground is one of uncertain impurity found in a private domain, and the guiding principle in any case of uncertainty involving impurity in a private domain is that the item with uncertain status is deemed impure. If so, shouldn’t the loaf be deemed impure? The Gemara answers: No, as this is an entity that lacks consciousness in order for it to be asked, and the guiding principle is that with regard to any entity that lacks consciousness in order for it to be asked, whether it is found in a public domain or in a private domain, the item with uncertain status is deemed pure.
  And if you wish, say instead: That principle, that in any case of uncertainty involving impurity in a private domain the item with uncertain status is deemed impure, applies to a case of impurity by Torah law, whereas here we are dealing with ritual impurity by rabbinic law. The Gemara adds: The language of the <i>Tosefta</i> is also precise, as it teaches: There was a loaf resting on top of a shelf, and there was an item of light impurity [<i>madaf</i> ] lying underneath it. The term <i>madaf</i> is similar to that which is written: “A driven leaf [<i>niddaf</i> ]” (Leviticus 26:36), i.e., a light item. Likewise, the <i>Tosefta</i> is referring to a light, or rabbinic, impurity.
  § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is neither in accordance with the statement of this <i>tanna</i> nor in accordance with the statement of that <i>tanna</i>. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is neither in accordance with the statement of this <i>tanna</i> nor in accordance with the statement of that <i>tanna</i>. It is not accordance with the statement of Shammai, who rules that her time is sufficient and she does not need to be concerned that her menstrual flow started earlier, as he did not enact any safeguard for his statement. And is it not in accordance with the statement of Hillel, who rules that she assumes ritual impurity status retroactive to the time of her most recent examination, as he went beyond [<i>hifriz</i>] his bounds with his safeguard.
  The Rabbis continue: Rather, a twenty-four-hour period reduces the time from examination to examination, i.e., if her most recent self-examination took place more than twenty-four hours earlier, she need concern herself with ritual impurity only for the twenty-four-hour period prior to discerning the blood. And from examination to examination reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period, i.e., if she examined herself in the course of the previous day and discovered no blood, she was definitely pure prior to the examination.
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: A twenty-four-hour period reduces the time from examination to examination, how so? A woman examined herself on Sunday and found that she was ritually pure, and then she sat through Monday and Tuesday and did not examine herself. And then on Wednesday she examined herself and found that she was impure. In such a case we do not say that she should be impure retroactively from the time of this examination extending back until the time of her most recent examination. Rather, she is impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And from examination to examination reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period, how so? A woman examined herself in the first hour of a day and found that she was ritually pure, and then she sat through the second and third hours of the day and did not examine herself. And then at the fourth hour she examined herself and found that she was impure. In such a case we do not say that she should be impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. Rather, she is impure retroactively from the time of this examination extending back until the time of her most recent examination, three hours earlier.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: This <i>halakha</i> is obvious. Since she examined herself at the first hour and found that she was pure, there is no reason to render her impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. Why does the <i>baraita</i> state such an obvious <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: Since the <i>baraita</i> taught that according to the Rabbis a twenty-four-hour period reduces the time from examination to examination, it also taught the parallel case, that from examination to examination reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period, despite the fact that this <i>halakha</i> is obvious.
  Rabba says: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? A woman can sense within herself if she is experiencing a flow of blood. Abaye said to Rabba: If so, her time should be sufficient, as there should be no concern that her flow began earlier. The Gemara explains: And Rabba did not in fact mean this explanation seriously; rather, he wanted to hone the mind of Abaye. The Gemara asks: But if so, what is the real reason for the opinion of the Rabbis?
  The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel says: The Sages instituted that the Jewish women should examine themselves twice each day, morning and evening. The morning examination is in order to render fit the ritually pure items of the night, i.e., any items that she touched the night before. And the evening examination is in order to render fit the pure items that she touched during the day.
  The Gemara continues its explanation: And this woman, since she did not examine herself in accordance with the rabbinic enactment, she loses the status of the ritually pure items she touched over the period [<i>ona</i>] of a day or a night. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Period of a day or a night? Doesn’t her retroactive impurity status extend back for a twenty-four-hour period? The Gemara answers: It means an additional period of a day or a night, i.e., twenty-four hours in total.
  Rav Pappa says to Rava: But occasionally you find three periods of day or night within a twenty-four-hour period. For example, if she examined herself on Monday afternoon and finds blood, then the twenty-four-hour period extending back to Sunday afternoon includes three periods of day or night: Monday day, Sunday night and Sunday day from the time of her most recent examination, as these twenty-four hours do not fit precisely into two such periods. The Gemara answers: The Sages rendered their measures equal, so that one should not differentiate between cases. In other words, they wanted to issue a uniform ruling that applies universally and therefore they established a set twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity, regardless of the circumstances.
  And if you wish, say instead that they established the set twenty-four-hour period so that the sinner should not profit from his transgression. If the extent of retroactive impurity would be fixed at one additional period of day or night, a woman who remembers and examines herself in the early morning would be impure retroactively for a full twenty-four hours, back to early morning the previous day, whereas one who waits until noon would be impure only for the period of the morning and the previous night.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two answers? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in a case where she was prevented by outside circumstances and did not perform an examination. According to the second answer she would not be considered a sinner and therefore she would be impure only for an additional period of a day or night. By contrast, according to the first answer her impure status would span twenty-four hours regardless of the circumstances.
  § The mishna teaches: For any woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, and she examined herself at that time and discovered blood, her time is sufficient, and she transmits impurity only from that time onward. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: There are four categories of women for whom the <i>halakha</i> is that their time is sufficient: A virgin, i.e., a girl who has never experienced menstruation, a pregnant woman, a nursing mother, and an elderly woman. Rabbi Dosa says: For every woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, and she examined herself at that time and discovered blood, her time is sufficient, and it is only from that stage that she transmits ritual impurity.
  The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Dosa only in the case of a woman who discovers blood at an irregular time, not at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle. But if she discovers blood at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle, they agree with him that her time is sufficient and there is no retroactive impurity. And the mishna is referring to a woman who discovers blood at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle, and therefore everyone agrees that her time is sufficient.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: By inference, one can conclude that Rabbi Dosa says that her time is sufficient even if she discovers blood not at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle. If so, who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught the following <i>baraita</i>? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle who finds a blood stain, her blood stain is impure retroactively from when the garment in question was laundered. The reason is that if she sees a flow of menstrual blood not at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle, it renders her impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. Therefore, the blood stain likewise renders her retroactively impure.
  The Gemara concludes its question: Shall we say that this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa? The Gemara answers: You may even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, as one can claim that Rabbi Dosa disagrees with the Rabbis only in a case where a woman sees menstrual blood at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle. But if she sees blood not at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle, he agrees with them that she is impure retroactively. And according to this answer the mishna, which deals with a woman who discovers blood at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle, is only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, in contrast to the earlier claim.
  
  Daf 5a
  
  And as for the ruling of the <i>baraita</i>, that a woman who discovers menstrual blood not at her fixed time for menstruation is impure retroactively, this is a <i>halakha</i> with which everyone agrees.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But let us interpret the mishna in the opposite manner. Why interpret the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa and the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with everyone, when we can give precedence to the mishna, which is more authoritative, by interpreting it in accordance with all opinions, as was first explained, and the <i>baraita</i> only in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  The Gemara answers: Since there is a way to interpret it as a leniency, i.e., that all agree that blood discovered at the fixed time of menstruation renders items impure only from that point onward, and it can also be interpreted in a manner that leads to a stringency, i.e., everyone agrees that blood discovered not at her fixed time for menstruation causes retroactive impurity, and furthermore the Rabbis hold that this is the <i>halakha</i> even when blood is discovered at her fixed time of menstruation, we interpret it the way that leads to a stringency.
  § It is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: If a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle finds a blood stain, her blood stain is retroactively impure. The reason is that if she sees a flow of menstrual blood not at the fixed time of her menstrual cycle, it renders her ritually impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. The Gemara analyzes this statement: The reason for this ruling is that she is a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle; therefore, the Rabbis distinguish between her blood stain, which causes retroactive impurity like a sighting not at her fixed time, and her sighting of her menstrual flow at its fixed time, which does not cause retroactive impurity.
  It can be inferred from here that in the case of those other women, e.g., a pregnant or elderly woman, with regard to whom the Sages stated: Their time is sufficient and their menstrual flow never causes retroactive impurity, the same <i>halakha</i> applies to their blood stains as to their sighting of their menstrual flow, i.e., the stains do not cause retroactive impurity.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i> taught? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to all women is that their blood stains are impure retroactively. But any women with regard to whom the Sages stated: Their time is sufficient, their blood stains share the same ruling as their sighting of their menstrual flow, i.e., they do not cause retroactive impurity. This is the <i>halakha</i> except for the case of a young girl whose time to see the flow of menstrual blood has not arrived. With regard to her, even if her sheets are soiled with blood one need not be concerned for it, i.e., her blood stains do not cause any impurity at all, even from that point onward.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus hold that a blood stain causes ritual impurity at all? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to all women is that their blood stains are impure. And similarly, women with regard to whom the Sages stated: Their time is sufficient, their blood stains are also impure. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The <i>halakha</i> of women with regard to whom the Sages stated: Their time is sufficient, is that they do not have the ritual impurity of a blood stain. What, is it not correct to say that this means they have no impurity caused by a blood stain at all? The Gemara answers: No, it means that they do not have impurity caused by a blood stain retroactively, but they do have the impurity caused by a blood stain from here onward.
  The Gemara asks: From the fact that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus holds that a blood stain imparts ritual impurity from that point onward, does this not indicate that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that it causes ritual impurity even retroactively? The Gemara answers: Yes, the ruling of the first <i>tanna</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is stringent with regard to blood stains. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to all women is that their blood stains are impure retroactively. And similarly, women with regard to whom the Sages stated: Their time is sufficient, their blood stains are also impure retroactively. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The <i>halakha</i> of women with regard to whom the Sages stated: Their time is sufficient, is that their blood stains share the same ruling as their sighting of their menstrual flow, i.e., they cause ritual impurity from that point onward. And in the case of a young girl, if her time to see the flow of menstrual blood has arrived, then she has impurity status when she finds a blood stain. But if her time to see the flow of menstrual blood has not yet arrived, she does not have impurity status when she finds a blood stain. The Gemara asks: And when does a young girl arrive at her time to see the flow of menstrual blood? The Gemara answers: When the days of her young womanhood have arrived.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths, with which she ascertains whether the menstrual flow began, since the halakhic status of that act is like that of an examination, it reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period and reduces the time from examination to examination. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The examination cloth with which she examined herself before intercourse does not reduce the time from a twenty-four-hour period like a regular examination.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Shmuel? Rav Ketina says: Since she is excited [<i>shemehuma</i>] and hurried for intercourse with her husband, it is not considered a proper examination. The Gemara asks: And even if she is excited for intercourse with her husband, what of it? Why does that invalidate her examination? The Gemara answers: Since she is excited and hurried for intercourse with her husband, she does not insert the examination cloth into her recesses and folds.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: And a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths, the halakhic status of that act is like that of an examination. The mishna refers to examination cloths in the plural. What, is it not speaking of one cloth used before intercourse and one cloth used after intercourse? The Gemara answers: No, this cloth and that cloth are both used after intercourse; and the reason why the mishna uses the plural is that one cloth is for his use and one is for her use. As we learned in a mishna (14a): It is the custom of Jewish women to engage in intercourse with their husbands with two examination cloths, one for his use and one for her use.
  The Gemara asks: What is this? Granted, if you say that the mishna is referring to one cloth used before intercourse and one used after intercourse, it was necessary for the mishna to mention both examinations, as it might enter your mind to say that since she is excited and hurried for intercourse with her husband, she did not examine herself properly. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that her examination with a cloth before intercourse is considered as a halakhically valid examination. But if you say that this cloth and that cloth are his and her cloths used after intercourse, isn’t it obvious that they are treated as halakhic examinations? Why is this ruling necessary?
  The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> that the examinations performed after intercourse count as valid examinations is necessary, lest you say that perhaps she might see a drop of blood corresponding to the size of a mustard seed and a drop of semen covered it. In other words, it is possible that she discharged a tiny amount of menstrual blood that went undetected, as it was covered by a drop of semen. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that one does not need to be concerned for this possibility.
  And if you wish, say instead: The mishna is referring only to her examinations, but the reason the mishna mentions two examinations is not to give them the status of valid examinations, but to teach that they are both obligatory. As the Sages required her to perform two examinations: One before intercourse and one after intercourse. And when the mishna teaches: The halakhic status of that act is like that of an examination, it is referring specifically to the examination performed after intercourse. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the mishna teaches: A woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths. This formulation indicates that the examination is voluntary and is not mandated by the Sages. The Gemara explains that one should emend the text of the mishna so that it teaches: And a woman must engage in intercourse while using examination cloths.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to a woman who engages in intercourse while using examination cloths, as the halakhic status of that act is like that of an examination, it reduces the time from a twenty-four-hour period, and reduces the time from examination to examination. The Gemara asks: Now that the mishna teaches that this examination reduces time from a twenty-four-hour period,
  
  Daf 5b
  
  is it necessary to teach that an examination reduces the time from examination to examination, which is less than twenty-four hours?
  The Gemara answers: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that with regard to the significant passage of a twenty-four-hour period the Sages are concerned for the possible loss of ritually pure items, but with regard to the smaller period from examination to examination, the Sages are not concerned for the loss of pure items, and therefore the use of an examination cloth should not reduce the time of possible impurity between that and her next examination. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that it does reduce this time.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle: Her time is sufficient, how so? If the woman was sitting in a bed and engaged in handling ritually pure items, and she left the bed and saw blood, she is impure and those items are pure. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach: If the woman was sitting in a bed and engaged in handling pure items? Let the mishna teach the same ruling without mentioning the bed: If she was engaged in handling pure items and she left and saw blood. The detail that she was sitting in a bed is apparently superfluous.
  The Gemara answers: This detail teaches us that the reason why the bed is not rendered impure is that her time is sufficient and there is no retroactive impurity. It can be inferred that in a case where she is impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, her bed is also rendered impure. This supports the opinion of Ze’eiri, as Ze’eiri said: The level of impurity of the retroactive twenty-four-hour period of a menstruating woman renders impure a bed upon which she lies and a chair upon which she sits, to the extent that they transmit impurity to a person who comes in contact with them, to the extent that he transmits impurity to the garments he is wearing.
  This Gemara raises a difficulty: Now, this bed upon which she sat is an entity that lacks consciousness in order for it to be asked, and the principle with regard to any entity that lacks consciousness in order for it to be asked is that the item with uncertain status is deemed pure. The Gemara explains: Ze’eiri interpreted his ruling as applying specifically to a case where her friends are carrying her in the bed, where the bed is considered as the extended hand of her friends. In other words, it is part of an entity that has consciousness in order for it to be asked, and therefore the item with uncertain status is deemed impure.
  The Gemara provides another answer: And now that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In a case of uncertain ritual impurity that comes about by the hand of a person, i.e., through his involvement, the owner of the vessel must consult a Sage about it, i.e., it is considered an entity that has consciousness in order for it to be asked, as in such a case even with regard to a vessel that is placed upon the ground, which is certainly incapable of providing an answer if asked, its halakhic status is like that of an item that has consciousness in order for it to be asked. With this statement in mind, one can explain that according to Ze’eiri a menstruating woman transmits impurity to a bed even though her friends are not carrying her in the bed. Rather, as the bed’s ritual impurity was caused by the hand of a person, it has the halakhic status of an item that has consciousness in order for it to be asked.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case of uncertain ritual impurity that comes about by the hand of man, its owner must consult a Sage about it, i.e., it is ritually impure, as in such a case even with regard to a vessel that is placed upon the ground, its halakhic status is like that of an item that has consciousness in order for it to be asked.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 4:1): If a man who contracted ritual impurity was wrapping himself in his cloak and there were pure items beside him; or if he was pure and there were impure items beside him as he was wrapping his cloak; or if there were pure items and impure items above his head at the time and there is uncertainty whether he touched the impure items with his cloak and then touched the pure items with his cloak, and uncertainty whether it did not touch them, the <i>halakha</i> is that the pure items remain pure. But if it is impossible for him to have wrapped himself unless his cloak had touched the impure items in the process, then those previously pure items become impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that we say to him: Repeat your action. And he repeats the action of wrapping himself with his cloak, and it can then be determined whether or not the cloak and the other items came in contact with each other. The Rabbis said to him: We do not rely on repeated actions with regard to the determination of ritually pure items. Since the second action may not exactly mimic the first, it cannot be relied upon to determine ritual purity status.
  The Gemara explains the objection: But according to the Rabbis, why is the <i>halakha</i> that the items in question remain pure? Isn’t this a case of uncertain ritual impurity that comes about by the hand of man, which, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, is considered as having consciousness in order for it to be asked? If so, these items should be ritually impure.
  The Gemara answers: Except for that one, i.e., do not raise a difficulty from that <i>baraita</i>, since it is referring to a specific case. As Rav Hoshaya teaches with regard to an item whose purity status is uncertain: When it is in the private domain, the item with uncertain status is deemed impure; when it is in the public domain, it is deemed pure. The <i>baraita</i> is referring to an item located in the public domain. Consequently, even if it is considered as having consciousness in order to be asked, nevertheless it is pure, as its uncertainty occurred in the public domain.
  § The Gemara analyzes the matter of Ze’eiri’s ruling itself. Ze’eiri says: The level of impurity assumed during the retroactive twenty-four-hour period of a menstruating woman renders a bed upon which she lies and a chair upon which she sits impure to the extent that they transmit impurity to a person who comes in contact with them to the extent that he transmits impurity to the garments he is wearing.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai, he came and brought the following <i>baraita</i> with him: The level of impurity during the retroactive twenty-four-hour period of a menstruating woman renders her bed upon which she lies and her chair upon which she sits impure like the impurity level caused by her touch. The Gemara explains the difficulty: What, is it not correct to say that this means that just as an item rendered impure by her touch does not render another person impure, so too, her bed does not render another person impure?
  Rava says: And how can you understand it in that manner? There is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference here: And if an earthenware vessel sealed with a tightly bound cover, which is spared from impurity when it is in a tent that has a corpse in it, is nevertheless not spared from impurity if the woman moved it during the twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman and is impure as though she moved it after she experienced bleeding; so too, with regard to beds and chairs, which are not spared from impurity in a tent that has a corpse in it, is it not logical that they are also not spared from impurity when used during the twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman and are impure as though she used them after she experienced bleeding?
  The Gemara asks: But Avimi from Bei Ḥozai cited a <i>baraita</i> that apparently does not accept Rava’s <i>a fortiori</i> inference. The Gemara answers: One can say that the <i>baraita</i> does not mean that her bed and chair are rendered impure with the light level of impurity caused by her touch, but rather: Her bed upon which she lies and her chair upon which she sits
  
  Daf 6a
  
  are like her touch itself. Just as her touch transmits impurity to a person who comes in contact with them to the extent that he transmits impurity to the garments he is wearing, so too her bed and her chair transmit impurity to a person who comes in contact with them to the extent that he transmits impurity to the garments he is wearing.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rava: If a woman sees menstrual blood, it renders her impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. And what does she render impure during that period? Beds and chairs, food and drink, and an earthenware vessel sealed with a tightly bound cover [<i>tzamid patil</i>], if she moves it. But she does not disrupt her count of the periods of menstruation and <i>ziva</i>, i.e., she starts her cycle only from that day when she saw the blood, and she does not render impure retroactively a man who engaged in intercourse with her. Rabbi Akiva says: She does render impure a man who engaged in intercourse with her. And she counts her seven days of impurity only from the time that she saw her menstrual blood, not retroactively.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to a woman who sees a blood stain, it renders her impure retroactive to when the garment was last checked. And what does she render impure during that period? Food and drink, beds and chairs, and an earthenware vessel sealed with a tightly bound cover, if she moves it. And it also disrupts her count of eleven days during which emission of blood renders the woman a <i>zava</i>, as the time of the stain is unknown, and she renders ritually impure a man who engaged in intercourse with her. And she counts her seven days of impurity only from the time that she saw her menstrual blood, not retroactively.
  The <i>baraita</i> further teaches: With regard to both this, one who sees menstrual blood, and that, one who sees a blood stain, if they had touched <i>teruma</i>, its status is suspended. It is not eaten, as impure <i>teruma</i> is prohibited in consumption, but it is not burned either, since it is prohibited to burn pure <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: And as for Rava, why is the <i>halakha</i> of an earthenware vessel more obvious to him than the <i>halakha</i> of a bed and a chair? If he had heard this <i>baraita</i>, which states the <i>halakha</i> of an earthenware vessel, then let him say that the <i>baraita</i> itself is proof for his opinion with regard to a bed and a chair as well, as the <i>baraita</i> states both <i>halakhot</i>. And if he had not heard this <i>baraita</i>, from where did he learn his <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which is based on the <i>halakha</i> that an earthenware vessel sealed with a tightly bound cover is not spared from impurity if a menstruating woman moved it during her twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity?
  The Gemara answers: Actually, he did hear the <i>baraita</i>. But if his proof had been merely from the <i>baraita</i>, I would say that a different <i>halakha</i> applies to a bed and chair than to the earthenware vessels, as the <i>baraita</i> means that the bed and chair render impure a person or garments that they touch, but they do not render a person impure to the extent that he then transmits impurity to his garments. It is due to that reason that Rava says the <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  § Rav Huna says: The twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman applies only to sacrificial food but not to <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: If so, let the mishna in <i>Ḥagiga</i> 20b teach this among the other higher levels of purity that apply to sacrificial foods but not to <i>teruma</i>. That mishna lists stringencies of ritual purity that are in effect with regard to sacrificial foods and not <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara answers: When that mishna teaches those higher levels of purity, it is referring only to types of impurity that have a connection [<i>derara</i>] to impurity as defined by Torah law. But it does not teach a case where there is no connection to impurity as defined by Torah law, and the retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman is by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> that deals with the retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman: What does she render impure during that period? Food and drink. The Gemara asks: What, is it not correct to say that this is referring both to sacrificial food and to <i>teruma</i>? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring only to sacrificial food, not to <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (11a): With regard to women of priestly families who must examine themselves before partaking of <i>teruma</i>, Rabbi Yehuda says: Even when they conclude partaking of <i>teruma</i>, they still need to examine themselves. And we discussed this statement of Rabbi Yehuda and asked: Why do they need to examine themselves after they finish eating <i>teruma</i>? What was, was; i.e., if a woman was impure when she ate the <i>teruma</i>, what is achieved by an examination now?
  And Rav Ḥisda says in explanation: It was necessary only in order to amend the situation of the remaining <i>teruma</i> that is left before her, i.e., to prevent it from being rendered ritually impure. In other words, if she later experiences a flow of menstrual blood, her retroactive impurity status will not render the remaining <i>teruma</i> impure. This ruling apparently contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna, who said that the retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman affects only sacrificial foods, not <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara answers: According to Rav Huna, Rabbi Yehuda teaches that since impure <i>teruma</i> must be burned, she must examine herself in order to determine whether it is correct to burn the remaining <i>teruma</i> that was in her hands. If she examined herself immediately after eating the <i>teruma</i>, in the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation (see 14b), and she found that she was impure, it is assumed as a certainty that she was impure when she ate the <i>teruma</i>. Consequently, the remaining <i>teruma</i> must be burned, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> that was definitely rendered impure. But in fact, Rav Huna maintains that she does not render that remaining <i>teruma</i> impure retroactively, in a case where she did not examine herself.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear another difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rav Huna from a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi performed an action by ruling that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a woman who passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding is presumed not to be menstruating any longer, and therefore any menstrual blood that she emits later renders her ritually impure only from then onward, but not retroactively. By contrast, the Rabbis contend that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to an older woman, for whom it is natural to stop menstruating, but not to a young woman, even if three typical periods have passed without bleeding.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: After Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi remembered that Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues disagree with Rabbi Eliezer on this matter and that he had apparently ruled incorrectly, he nevertheless said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy [<i>kedai</i>] to rely upon
  
  Daf 6b
  
  in exigent circumstances [<i>bishe’at hadeḥak</i>]. And we discussed it and asked: What is the meaning of: After he remembered? If we say that this means after he remembered that the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer but in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, if so, how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer even in exigent circumstances, since the <i>halakha</i> has been decided against him?
  Rather, is it not correct that the <i>halakha</i> had not been stated on this matter, neither in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, nor in accordance with the opinion of that Sage, i.e., the Rabbis. And once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi remembered that it was not a single authority who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, but it was several Sages who disagreed with him, and there is a principle that the <i>halakha</i> follows the opinion of the many over that of an individual, he nevertheless said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances.
  The Gemara explains the proof from the <i>baraita</i>: Granted, if you say that it was a case of a menstruating woman who had touched <i>teruma</i> during the previous twenty-four hours, this is fine, as <i>teruma</i> still existed in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. But if you say that it was a case of a woman who touched sacrificial food, was there still sacrificial food in days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, after the destruction of the Temple? Clearly, the case involved <i>teruma</i>, and according to the Rabbis, whose opinion is accepted as <i>halakha</i>, this woman who had skipped three menstrual cycles nevertheless renders <i>teruma</i> impure retroactively. This ruling apparently contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna.
  The Gemara answers: This can be answered in accordance with the testimony of Ulla, as Ulla said: <i>Ḥaverim</i> purify their wine and oil in the Galilee, i.e., they produce their wine and oil by the standards of purity used for sacrificial food, in the hope that the Temple will be rebuilt in their lifetime. Here, too, in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there were those who kept the standards of purity observed for sacrificial food.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving the maidservant of Rabban Gamliel, who was baking loaves of <i>teruma</i> bread. And in between each and every one she would wash her hand in water and examine herself. After the last one she examined herself and found that she was impure due to menstrual blood, and she came and asked Rabban Gamliel about the status of the loaves. And he said to her: They are all impure, due to her retroactive impurity for the previous twenty-four hours. She said to him: My teacher, didn’t I perform an examination in between each and every one? Rabban Gamliel said to her: If so, then this last one is impure and the rest are all pure, as your retroactive impurity is reduced until the time of the most recent examination.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that the case involved loaves of <i>teruma</i> bread. This apparently contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rabban Gamliel applied retroactive impurity in a case of <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara answers: What is meant by: <i>Teruma</i>? It means <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, i.e., the four loaves of the thanks offering that were separated from the total of forty and eaten by the priests. These are sacrificial foods, not <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this interpretation: What was she doing baking the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering alone? All forty loaves of the thanks offering are baked together, and only afterward are four set aside as <i>teruma</i> to be eaten by priests.
  The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where dough for the <i>teruma</i> loaves was separated and designated for the priests during its kneading. And this <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with that which Rav Tovi bar Rav Ketina said: If one baked the loaves of the thanks offering as four loaves, rather than the requisite forty loaves, he has fulfilled his obligation. And we discussed it and asked: Isn’t one required to bring forty loaves with the thanks offering, ten loaves of each of the four different types? The Gemara answers: One must bake forty loaves in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation with four loaves, one of each type.
  The Gemara continues its answer by further elucidating the statement of Rav Tovi bar Rav Ketina. And we asked with regard to this opinion: But he is required to separate <i>teruma</i> from it, i.e., to designate one loaf from each type that is given to the priests. And if you would say that he separates a slice from each one of the four loaves and gives them to the priest, this cannot be the case, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And of it he shall present one out of each offering for a gift to the Lord; it shall be the priest’s” (Leviticus 7:14). The word “one” indicates that he may not take a slice, but rather he takes a complete loaf. The Gemara answers: Rather, we must say that he separated dough for the <i>teruma</i> loaves during its kneading. Here too, in the incident involving Rabban Gamliel’s maidservant, she separated the dough during its kneading.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: There was another incident involving the maidservant of Rabban Gamliel who was sealing barrels of wine. And in between each and every one she would wash her hands in water and examine herself. And after the last one she examined herself and found that she was ritually impure, and she came and asked Rabban Gamliel about the wine. And he said to her: They are all impure. She said to him: My teacher, didn’t I perform an examination in between each and every one? Rabban Gamliel said to her: If so, this last one is impure and the rest are all pure.
  The Gemara clarifies the difficulty with regard to Rav Huna’s opinion: Granted, if you say that one incident involved a case of sacrificial food and one incident involved a case of <i>teruma</i>, this is the reason that she returned and again asked Rabban Gamliel what to do. But if you say that both this incident and that incident involved sacrificial food, why did she need to return and ask him the same question a second time? The Gemara answers: Each incident that occurred was with sacrificial food and they happened with two different maidservants.
  Some say another version of Rav Huna’s statement. Rav Huna says: During the twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman, she renders impure both sacrificial food and <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: From where is this derived? The Gemara answers: It can be inferred from the fact that the mishna in <i>Ḥagiga</i> (20b) does not teach this matter among the other matters where higher levels of purity are required only for sacrificial foods but not for <i>teruma</i>. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i> explicitly teach in a <i>baraita</i>: The retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman applies only with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>?
  The Gemara answers: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak received the following explanation from Rav Naḥman: The <i>baraita</i> means that this retroactive impurity applies to non-sacred food that was prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, but not to non-sacred food that was prepared according to the standards of purity of <i>teruma</i>. It does apply to <i>teruma</i> itself.
  § With regard to a non-sacred food prepared according to the standards of purity of <i>teruma</i>, we learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Ḥalla</i> 3:2): In a case of dough where uncertainty developed as to whether it was ritually impure, if the uncertainty developed before it was kneaded, it may be prepared even in definite impurity, i.e., with impure vessels. If it developed after it was kneaded, it must be prepared in purity.
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: Before it was kneaded it may be prepared even in definite impurity because it is non-sacred food, and the <i>halakha</i> is that it is permitted to cause impurity to non-sacred food in Eretz Yisrael. After it was kneaded it must be prepared in purity, since non-sacred food that is untithed with regard to the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>, i.e., its <i>ḥalla</i> has not yet been separated, is considered like <i>ḥalla</i>, and it is prohibited to cause impurity to <i>ḥalla</i>.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 7a
  
  And as the <i>ḥalla</i> of this kneaded, untithed dough is in a state of uncertain purity, its status is suspended: It is neither eaten like ritually pure <i>ḥalla</i>, nor is it burned like impure <i>ḥalla</i>. With regard to which uncertainty did they state this <i>halakha</i>? With regard to <i>ḥalla</i> of uncertain status. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the concept of <i>ḥalla</i> of uncertain status? This apparently indicates a scenario of possible ritual impurity that applies specifically to <i>ḥalla</i>, not to non-sacred food.
  Abaye and Rava both say: One should not say that we learned this case of <i>ḥalla</i> of uncertain status among the cases of equal proofs, i.e., an unresolvable uncertainty, such as the case of two paths, where someone walked down one of two paths, one of which was ritually impure and the other ritually pure, and he does not remember which one he walked down. As there, even regular non-sacred food is also rendered ritually impure due to uncertainty.
  Rather, the uncertainty referred to here is similar to the less likely case of leaning, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Zavim</i> 3:2): In a case of a <i>zav</i> and a ritually pure person who were unloading a package from a donkey or who were loading a package onto a donkey, when their package is heavy the pure person is rendered impure, as perhaps the <i>zav</i> leaned on him while they handled the package together. If their package is light, he remains pure. And in all those cases, he remains ritually pure even if he is one of the members of a synagogue whose congregants handle non-sacred food according to the standards of sacrificial food, as this is not a true case of a <i>zav</i> moving a pure person. But he is impure with regard to matters involving <i>teruma</i>, by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara asks: And is non-sacred food that is untithed with regard to the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> really considered like <i>ḥalla</i> to the extent that it is rendered impure even in a case of leaning? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, she may separate <i>ḥalla</i>: She may knead the dough, and separate its <i>ḥalla</i> from it, and place the separated dough into a wicker basket or a wooden board [<i>be’anḥuta</i>], and subsequently she may bring it near the rest of the dough, and she may then designate it <i>ḥalla</i> by name.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The reason that this is allowed, despite her impurity, is because the dough is impure by third-degree ritual impurity, and an item that has third-degree impurity is considered pure with regard to non-sacred food. The Gemara concludes its question: And if you say that non-sacred food that is untithed with regard to the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> is considered like <i>ḥalla</i>, then she should render it impure with her touch, just as she would render actual <i>ḥalla</i> impure.
  Abaye says: With regard to any item that when it is definitely impure renders non-sacred food impure, as in the case of the <i>zav</i>, the Sages issued a decree that its uncertain impurity should also render non-sacred food items impure, due to its status as non-sacred food that is untithed with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>. But with regard to this case of one who immersed that day, since even when she is definitely impure she does not render non-sacred food impure, they did not issue a decree that she should render that dough impure due to its status as non-sacred food that is untithed with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But what about the twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman? As a definitely impure menstruating woman renders non-sacred food impure and nevertheless with regard to untithed dough the Sages did not issue a decree to treat her uncertain impurity as definite impurity due to the dough’s status as non-sacred food that is untithed with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>.
  The Gemara cites its source for this claim: As the Master said: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak received from Rav Naḥman: The retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman transmits impurity to non-sacred food items that were prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, but not to non-sacred food items that were prepared according to the standards of purity of <i>teruma</i>. It is assumed that the level of purity required for non-sacred food items prepared according to the standards required of <i>teruma</i> is the same as that of dough from which <i>ḥalla</i> has not been separated, i.e., it is not treated as real <i>ḥalla</i>, which is rendered impure by her retroactive twenty-four-hour period of impurity.
  The Gemara answers: The level of purity required for non-sacred food items that were prepared according to the standards of purity of <i>teruma</i> is actually lower than the level required for dough from which <i>ḥalla</i> has not been separated. The reason is that there, in the case of non-sacred food items, there is no actual <i>teruma</i> mixed in it. By contrast, here, in the case of untithed dough, there is <i>teruma</i>, i.e., <i>ḥalla</i>, mixed in it, which will eventually be separated from this dough.
  If you wish, say instead: Leave aside the twenty-four-hour period of retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman, as it applies by rabbinic law. One cannot raise a difficulty against the principle that untithed dough is treated with the same level of purity as <i>ḥalla</i> from the case of the retroactive impurity of a menstruating woman, since that retroactive impurity is a rabbinic decree, and therefore there is more room for leniency.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: Unlike the women with regard to whom it was taught that they transmit impurity retroactively, there are four women who discern menstrual blood and their time is sufficient, i.e., they transmit impurity only from the moment that they saw the blood: A virgin, a pregnant woman, a nursing woman, and an elderly woman. Rabbi Yehoshua says: I heard this <i>halakha</i> from my teachers only with regard to a virgin,
  
  Daf 7b
  
  but the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Who is the woman characterized as a virgin in this context? It is any woman who has not seen the flow of menstrual blood in all her days, even if she was married and has experienced bleeding as a result of intercourse consummating her marriage. The time of a pregnant woman is from the point in her pregnancy when the existence of her fetus is known to all who see her. The time of a nursing woman is until she weans her child from nursing. If she stopped nursing, e.g., she gave her child to a wet nurse, weaned him from nursing, or her child died, and she saw menstrual blood, Rabbi Meir says: She transmits impurity for a twenty-four-hour period or from her most recent examination. And the Rabbis say: Even in those cases, her time is sufficient.
  Who is the woman characterized as an elderly woman in this context? It is any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles of thirty days passed during which she saw no menstrual blood, at a stage of her life close to her old age. Rabbi Eliezer says: In the case of any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles passed during which she saw no menstrual blood, if she then experiences bleeding, her time is sufficient. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a pregnant woman and a nursing woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles passed during which they saw no menstrual blood, if they then saw blood, their time is sufficient.
  And in the above cases, with regard to what did the <i>tanna</i> say her time is sufficient? It is with regard to the first sighting of blood, but with regard to the second sighting, her status is like that of any other woman, and she transmits impurity for a twenty-four-hour period or from her most recent examination. And if she saw the first sighting as a result of unnatural circumstances, even with regard to the second sighting, the <i>halakha</i> is that her time is sufficient.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Eliezer teaches in the mishna that there are four women who transmit impurity only from the moment that they saw menstrual blood, not retroactively. Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard this <i>halakha</i> from my teachers only with regard to a virgin. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: You did not hear, but I did hear it. In other words, you may not have received a tradition from your teachers with regard to any other woman, but I did receive such a tradition. Furthermore, you heard a halakhic ruling with regard to only one woman, and I heard rulings with regard to many women.
  Rabbi Eliezer continued his rebuttal with a metaphor from the practice of sanctifying the new moon, which required the testimony of witnesses: We do not say to one who had not seen the new moon to come and testify. Rather we give such an instruction only to he who saw it. Similarly, my opinion is weightier with regard to this issue, as I heard many rulings about the matter, whereas you did not. The Gemara reports: All the days of the life of Rabbi Eliezer, they would practice in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, i.e., only a virgin would be exempt from retroactive impurity. After Rabbi Eliezer’s passing, Rabbi Yehoshua returned the matter to its former custom, which was to follow the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they did not act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer during his lifetime? The Gemara answers: Because Rabbi Eliezer was a <i>Shammuti</i>, i.e., a follower of the rulings of Beit Shammai, and the <i>halakha</i> is generally in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in their disputes with Beit Shammai. And the Sages held that if we act in accordance with his opinion in one matter, people will act in accordance with his opinion in other matters.
  And that would be a problem, as if so, then during his lifetime, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, we will not be able to protest against them. But after Rabbi Eliezer’s passing, when we are able to protest against those who act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in other matters, Rabbi Yehoshua returned the matter to its former custom of deciding the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in this matter.
  § The Gemara mentions other instances in which the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases. One is the <i>halakha</i> that we just mentioned, of the four women who transmit ritual impurity only from the time of their sighting and onward.
  And another is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a woman who experiences labor pain as a result of which she sees a flow of blood. Her discharge is attributed to childbirth rather than <i>zava</i> blood. The <i>baraita</i> asks: For how long must she be relieved from pain in order to be considered a <i>zava</i> due to her flow of uterine blood? She must have relief for a twenty-four-hour period. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his statement.
  And another case in which the <i>halakha</i> follows Rabbi Eliezer is taught in a mishna (68b): A <i>zav</i> and a <i>zava</i> must observe seven days without a discharge in order to attain ritual purity. With regard to a <i>zav</i> or a <i>zava</i> who examined themselves on the first day and found themselves to be pure, and they examined themselves on the seventh day and found themselves to be pure, but on the rest of the intervening days they did not examine themselves, Rabbi Eliezer says: The presumptive status of the <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i> is one of ritual purity. Rabbi Yehoshua says: In that case, the <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i> have counted only the first day and the seventh day, two of the seven clean days, and they must count another five days to complete the tally.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Akiva says: Since any impure discharge that they might have experienced in between the first and seventh days would negate their count and require them to restart the seven-day period, the <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i> have counted only the seventh day, and must count another six days to complete the tally. And with regard to this dispute, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei say: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer appears more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, and the statement of Rabbi Akiva appears more correct than the statement of all of them. But the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  And the other case in which the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 8:7): With regard to the exterior of vessels that contracted ritual impurity through contact with impure liquids, i.e., with liquids that had touched the carcass of a creeping animal, Rabbi Eliezer says, with regard to this impurity that applies by rabbinic law: These exteriors transmit impurity to liquids that come in contact with them, but they do not disqualify foods with which they come into contact. The mishna elaborates: They transmit impurity to other liquids, and even non-sacred liquids. And they do not disqualify foods, and even <i>teruma</i>. Rabbi Yehoshua says: These exteriors transmit impurity to liquids and they disqualify <i>teruma</i> foods, as well.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: I derived my ruling via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of one who was ritually impure, who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed. And if one who immersed that day, who has second-degree ritual impurity status and therefore he does not transmit impurity to non-sacred liquids, nevertheless disqualifies <i>teruma</i> foods with which he comes into contact, then with regard to the exteriors of vessels, which do transmit impurity to non-sacred liquids, is it not logical that they should render <i>teruma</i> food disqualified?
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, how does he refute this inference? The Gemara answers: He would counter that the <i>halakha</i> that the exterior of vessels are rendered impure through contact with impure foods or liquids is by rabbinic law, and the <i>halakhot</i> of one who immersed that day apply by Torah law. And there is a principle that one does not apply <i>a fortiori</i> inferences to derive conclusions by rabbinic law from cases that apply by Torah law. As by Torah law impure foods do not transmit impurity to vessels, and similarly, impure liquids do not transmit impurity to vessels.
  The Gemara continues: And it was the Sages who issued a decree that the exterior of a vessel is rendered impure when it comes into contact with impure liquids, and they decreed that only liquids, not foods, are rendered impure when they come into contact with impure vessel exteriors. The reason for this is due to the liquids secreted by a <i>zav</i> or <i>zava</i>, e.g., their saliva and urine, which have a primary degree of ritual impurity and therefore transmit impurity to vessels. Consequently, with regard to liquids, which are apt to contract impurity, the Sages issued a decree that they contract impurity when they come in contact with these impure vessel exteriors. But with regard to foods, which are not as apt to contract impurity, as they must first be rendered susceptible to impurity through contact with a liquid, the Sages did not issue such a decree with regard to them.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Rabbi Eliezer agrees that if the interior of a vessel is rendered impure by contact with impure liquids, it renders impure any <i>teruma</i> foods that come into contact with it. But what is different about the exterior of vessels, that Rabbi Eliezer cited them as having a more lenient status? The Gemara answers: This is due to the fact that their <i>halakhot</i> are more lenient than those of the other parts of the vessel. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 25:6): With regard to a vessel whose exterior was rendered impure by contact with impure liquids, its exterior is impure, while its others parts, such as its interior, its ear, i.e., its looped handle, its rim, the edge of the vessel that protrudes outward, and its handles, are pure. But if its interior was rendered impure, it is all impure.
  These are the four cases with regard to which Shmuel said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? In all of these cases we learned explicitly that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  And if you would say that he is teaching us the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the exterior of vessels, whose <i>halakha</i> we did not learn from the mishna, let Shmuel simply state that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the exterior of vessels. The Gemara explains: Rather, this is what Shmuel teaches us: That a final <i>halakha</i> may not be learned directly from the Talmud, i.e., from a statement of a mishna or <i>baraita</i> that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with a specific opinion, unless the ruling is confirmed by <i>amora’im</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And is there nothing more that can be added to the list of cases in which the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But isn’t there another case that we learned in a mishna (<i>Yevamot</i> 109a): Two brothers married two sisters, one an adult and the other a minor. If the husband of the adult dies, the Torah obligation of levirate marriage applies to the other brother, which is not abrogated by the rabbinic prohibition of the <i>yevama</i> as the sister of his minor wife. In such a case, Rabbi Eliezer says:
  
  Daf 8a
  
  We instruct the minor, i.e., the surviving brother’s wife, to refuse to continue to stay married to him so that her marriage is dissolved, and he may then enter into levirate marriage with her adult sister, the widow of his childless brother. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara explains: When Shmuel says that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, what he meant was four cases within <i>Seder Teharot</i> in the Mishna, the order that deals with ritual purity. But in the other orders, there are many instances where the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara adds: This too stands to reason, as we learned in a mishna in the order of <i>Zera’im</i> (<i>Ḥalla</i> 2:4) that Rabbi Eliezer says: Even with regard to one who removes loaves of bread from an oven and places them in a basket, the basket serves to combine them to reach the quantity from which one is required to separate <i>ḥalla</i>, despite the fact that each of the loaves does not contain the necessary measure for <i>ḥalla</i> on its own. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Conclude from this that Shmuel’s general statement applies only to <i>Seder Teharot</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: The case of <i>ḥalla</i> was cited as proof that there is an exception to Shmuel’s principle that there are only four cases where the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, after a difficulty was raised from the case of levirate marriage with the sister of one’s minor wife. But in what way is this case of <i>ḥalla</i> greater proof than that case of the levirate marriage? Neither case appears in <i>Seder Teharot</i>. The Gemara answers: The case of the levirate marriage is different, as there Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  As we learned in the mishna (<i>Yevamot</i> 111b): A <i>yavam</i> may perform levirate marriage with only one of his deceased brother’s wives. Once he does so, the other wives are forbidden to him, because they had been married to his brother. If a deceased brother had two wives, an adult and a minor, and the <i>yavam</i> engaged in sexual intercourse with the minor and then engaged in intercourse with the adult, the Rabbis maintain that he disqualifies the minor from staying married to him, as her levirate bond is uncertain, and the adult wife is also prohibited to him, because the levirate marriage with the minor is considered effective by rabbinic law. Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse him, thereby annulling her marriage retroactively, and he may then perform levirate marriage with the adult. Accordingly, the case of <i>ḥalla</i> is a stronger example, as there the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer exclusively, as his opinion is not supported by another <i>tanna</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar in fact hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? But doesn’t the Gemara (<i>Yevamot</i> 111b) explain that both the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Elazar are necessary, as they apply to different cases, and therefore they are not comparable to each other? The Gemara suggests a new answer: Rather, the ruling with regard to levirate marriage is a weaker example of a case where the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with his opinion.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified about five matters of <i>halakha</i>: Normally, marriage refusals of girls married off by their mother or brothers are discouraged. Yet, in specific instances where it is clear that if the marriage were to remain in effect it would engender problems related to levirate marriage and <i>ḥalitza</i>, the court persuades minor girls to refuse to continue living with their husbands, thereby resolving the complications involved in the case.
  And he also testified that one may allow a woman who seeks to remarry after hearing of her husband’s death to marry based on the testimony of one witness, as opposed to the two witnesses required for other matters of testimony. And he further testified that a rooster was stoned to death in Jerusalem for killing a person, in order to teach that the Torah law requiring the stoning of an ox that killed a person (see Exodus 21:28) applies to other animals as well. And he testified about forty-day-old wine that was used for libation on the altar. And finally, he testified about the daily morning offering that was sacrificed at four hours of the day.
  The Gemara concludes its proof: When the <i>baraita</i> teaches that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava testified that the court persuades minor girls to refuse to continue living with their husbands, what is the significance of the reference to minor girls in the plural? Is this not referring to the one minor girl who is the subject of the ruling of Rabbi Elazar and the other one that is the subject of the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer? Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the case of the minor’s refusal. If so, this ruling is a weaker proof that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in cases outside of <i>Seder Teharot</i>. The Gemara answers: No, what is meant by the plural: Minor girls? It means minor girls in general, i.e., all minor girls in such cases where the ruling of Rabbi Elazar applies.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, with regard to the <i>halakha</i> listed in the <i>baraita</i> that one may allow a woman to marry based on the testimony of one witness, let it also teach: Women, in the plural, and we will say that it is referring to women in general. Rather, from the fact that here it teaches: A woman, and yet here it teaches: Minor girls, conclude from this discrepancy that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava is teaching his ruling specifically about two minor girls: The one who is the subject of Rabbi Elazar’s ruling and the one who is the subject of Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling. The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  § And similarly, Rabbi Elazar says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases. The Gemara asks: And are there no more? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: The court instructs the minor to refuse to stay married to him, and Rabbi Elazar said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara adds: And if you would say that when Rabbi Elazar said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, he meant four cases within <i>Seder Teharot</i>, but in the other orders of the Mishna there are many cases, are there really other such cases?
  But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 7:6) that the <i>halakha</i> of the following fragrant plants: The rose, the henna, the rockrose, and the balsam, is that they have the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, and money exchanged for them has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Additionally, they have the <i>halakha</i> of eradication and money exchanged for them has the <i>halakha</i> of eradication. And with regard to this mishna, Rabbi Pedat said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that balsam has the status of a fruit, and is not merely sap, and therefore it has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year? It is Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Pedat: One can see that from you and from your father, i.e., between the two of you, you have permitted balsam to the world, since the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer is certainly not accepted. As you said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that balsam has the status of a fruit? It is Rabbi Eliezer. And your father, Rabbi Elazar, said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in only four cases.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, that Rabbi Elazar was referring only to <i>Seder Teharot</i>, then let Rabbi Pedat say to Rabbi Zeira: When my father said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in four cases, he meant only four cases within <i>Seder Teharot</i>, but in the other orders there are other such cases. From the fact that Rabbi Pedat did not reply in this manner, evidently there are no cases in the other orders of the Mishna where, according to Rabbi Elazar, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara asks: But that case, where the <i>amora</i> Rabbi Elazar said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to persuading a minor to refuse to stay married to her husband, is difficult. This apparently conflicts with the statement that there are only four cases in which Rabbi Elazar rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara answers: There the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer only because the <i>tanna</i> Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with his opinion. As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Elazar says: The court instructs the minor to refuse to stay married to him, thereby annulling her marriage retroactively.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case of the minor? But doesn’t the Gemara in <i>Yevamot</i> explain that both the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Elazar are necessary, and therefore they are not comparable to each other? Rather, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case because Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava holds in accordance with his opinion, as explained earlier.
  The Gemara asks: And are there no more cases in which Rabbi Elazar maintains that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Berakhot</i> 33a): One recites the prayer of distinction between the holy and the profane [<i>havdala</i>], said in the evening prayer following Shabbat and festivals, in the fourth blessing of the <i>Amida</i> prayer: Who graciously grants knowledge. Rabbi Akiva says: One recites <i>havdala</i> as a fourth blessing by itself. Rabbi Eliezer says that one recites it in the blessing of thanksgiving. And with regard to this dispute, Rabbi Elazar says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rabbi Abba said, in explanation: That case is different, as that is not the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer himself. Rather, he stated that ruling in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Akiva says: One recites <i>havdala</i> as a fourth blessing by itself; Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: One recites it in the blessing of thanksgiving.
  
  Daf 8b
  
  The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Eliezer much older than Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel? How could Rabbi Eliezer have cited the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel? The Gemara answers: Rather, the reason Rabbi Elazar ruled that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in that case was because Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel held in accordance with his opinion.
  And does Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel really hold in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On the night of Yom Kippur, one prays seven blessings in the <i>Amida</i> prayer and confesses; in the morning prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; in the additional prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; in the afternoon prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; and in the <i>ne’ila</i> prayer, one also prays seven blessings and confesses. For the evening prayer at the conclusion of Yom Kippur, one prays seven blessings in an abridged version of the eighteen blessings of the weekday <i>Amida</i> prayer. One recites the first three blessings, the final three, and a middle blessing that includes an abbreviated form of the other weekday blessings.
  Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says in the name of his forefathers: One recites the complete eighteen blessings, due to the fact that he is required to recite <i>havdala</i> in the fourth blessing of the <i>Amida</i>: Who graciously grants knowledge. <i>Havdala</i> cannot be inserted into the abridged version. Evidently, Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel does not agree with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling that one recites <i>havdala</i> in the blessing of thanksgiving, one of the final three blessings of the <i>Amida</i> prayer. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says in explanation: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel said this opinion in the name of his forefathers, but he himself does not hold accordingly.
  § Earlier, Rabbi Zeira questioned the claim of Rabbi Pedat, son of Rabbi Eliezer, that the Sage who holds that balsam is considered to be fruit and therefore has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year is Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: And you? Do you not hold that the <i>tanna</i> who taught that balsam sap has the status of fruit is Rabbi Eliezer? As, didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 1:7) that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who curdles cheese in the sap of <i>orla</i>, the cheese is prohibited, as the sap is considered to be fruit of the tree.
  The Gemara answers: You may even say that the mishna that deals with balsam is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the sap of the tree, but in the case of the sap of the fruit they agree with him. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 1:7) that Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard explicitly that in the case of one who curdles cheese in the sap of the leaves or the sap of the roots of an <i>orla</i> tree, the cheese is permitted. But if it is curdled in the sap of unripe figs it is prohibited, because that sap is considered to be fruit.
  And if you wish, say instead: When the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, it is with regard to a tree that bears fruit. But in the case of a tree that does not bear fruit, they agree that its sap is considered to be its fruit. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 7:6) that Rabbi Shimon says: The sanctity of the Sabbatical Year does not apply to sap. And the Rabbis say: The sanctity of the Sabbatical Year does apply to sap, because its sap is its fruit.
  The Gemara explains the proof: Who are these Rabbis? Are they not the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer? If so, this demonstrates that they agree in the case of a tree that does not bear fruit. The Gemara rejects this proof: A certain elder said to Rabbi Zeira that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Who are the Rabbis in this mishna? It is Rabbi Eliezer, who said that its sap is considered to be its fruit.
  The Gemara asks: If it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, why are they specifically discussing the case of a tree that does not bear fruit? Even in the case of a tree that does bear fruit, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that its sap is like its fruit. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis themselves, as follows: According to my opinion, even with regard to a tree that bears fruit, its sap is also considered to be its fruit. But according to your opinion, you should at least agree with me in the case of a tree that does not bear fruit, that its sap is considered to be its fruit. And the Rabbis said in response to Rabbi Eliezer: It is no different. Sap is not considered fruit whether it comes from a fruit-bearing tree or a barren tree.
  § The mishna teaches: Who is the woman characterized as a virgin in this context? It is any woman who did not see the flow of menstrual blood in all her days, even if she was married and experienced bleeding resulting from intercourse consummating her marriage. The Sages taught: If she was married and she saw a flow of blood due to her marriage, i.e., blood resulting from the tearing of her hymen; or if she gave birth and saw blood due to the birth, I still call her a virgin in this context. The reason is that when they said: Virgin here, they meant a menstrual blood virgin, i.e., one who did not yet see a menstrual flow, and not a hymen-blood virgin, i.e., one who did not experience bleeding from a torn hymen.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Kahana say that a Sage taught: There are three types of virgins: A virgin human, virgin ground, and a virgin sycamore. A virgin human is a woman for as long as she has not engaged in intercourse. The relevance of this designation is that only a virgin is permitted to marry a High Priest (see Leviticus 21:13–14). Alternatively, the relevance is that her marriage contract is two hundred dinars, instead of the one hundred dinars in the marriage contract of a non-virgin.
  Virgin ground is ground for as long as it has not been worked. The relevance of this designation is with regard to the rough dried-up stream mentioned in the Torah. When the corpse of a murder victim is found between two towns and the murderer is unknown, the Torah states that a heifer’s neck is broken in a place that was not worked. Alternatively, the relevance is with regard to buying and selling. If one stipulates that he is buying virgin land, it is defined as land that has never been worked.
  Finally, a virgin sycamore is a sycamore for as long as it has not been felled, i.e., cut to promote growth. The relevance of this designation is with regard to buying and selling. If one stipulates that he is buying virgin sycamore, it is defined as one that has never been felled. Alternatively, the relevance is with regard to the prohibition against felling it in the Sabbatical Year, as we learned in a mishna: (<i>Shevi’it</i> 4:5): One may not fell a virgin sycamore in the Sabbatical Year, because it is considered work, as this promotes the growth of the tree. The Gemara explains its question: And if it is so, that there is a concept of a virgin from menstrual blood, let the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> also teach this type of virgin.
  The Gemara cites several answers. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that does not have a modifier, but he does not teach an item that has a modifier. A virgin human, virgin land, and a virgin sycamore can be referred to without another modifier. Conversely, a virgin with regard to menstrual blood cannot be referred to simply by the unmodified term: Virgin. Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that is dependent upon an outside action, e.g., intercourse in the case of a human virgin or felling in the case of a virgin sycamore. But he does not teach an item that is not dependent upon an outside action, such as a woman’s menstrual flow.
  Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that will not later revert to its original state. But he does not teach an item that will later revert to its original state, such as a woman’s menstrual flow that ceases when she reaches old age. Ravina says: When the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item about which a buyer is particular, such as one who purchases a virgin sycamore tree. But he does not teach an item about which a buyer is not particular, e.g., a woman’s menstrual blood.
  The Gemara asks: And is a buyer, i.e., a potential husband, not particular about her menstrual blood? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥiyya says: Just as leaven is fortuitous for dough, so too, blood is fortuitous for a woman; and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Meir: Any woman whose blood is plentiful, her children are plentiful? A potential husband would certainly be particular about this factor. The Gemara provides an alternative answer: Rather, when the Sage teaches the list of virgins, he includes only an item that buyers are eager to purchase. But he does not teach an item that buyers are not eager to purchase, e.g., a woman without menstrual blood.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is virgin ground? It is any ground that raises up hard clumps of earth and whose dirt is not loose. If one finds a shard of earthenware in the earth, it is thereby known that it was once worked and is not virgin ground. If one finds hard rock, it is virgin ground.
  § The mishna teaches: The time of a pregnant woman is sufficient from the point in her pregnancy when the existence of her fetus is known to all who see her. The Gemara asks: And how much time must pass for the fetus to be known? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: Three months. And although there is no explicit proof for the matter, that a fetus is discernable after three months of pregnancy, there is an allusion to the matter, as it is stated: “And it came to pass about three months after, that it was told to Judah, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has played the harlot” (Genesis 38:24).
  The Gemara asks: Why does Rabbi Meir call this a mere allusion to the matter? An explicit verse is written, and that is a significant proof. The Gemara answers: It is only an allusion because there are some women who give birth after nine months and there are others who give birth after seven months. Although the verse indicates that a fetus is known to all after three months, it is possible that this applies only to a nine-month pregnancy. Since in the case of a nine-month pregnancy the fetus is recognizable after a third of the full term, with regard to a seven-month pregnancy, the fetus would likewise be noticeable after a third of the full pregnancy, i.e., at two and one-third months. Therefore, Rabbi Meir teaches that in all cases the fetus is known only after three months.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who had a presumptive status that she was pregnant and she saw blood, and afterward she miscarried air, or anything that is not a viable fetus, she retains her presumptive status, and therefore her time is sufficient from that flow of blood, i.e., it renders her impure only from then on, not retroactively, as even a non-viable fetus gives her full pregnancy status.
  And even though there is no explicit proof for this matter, that even a pregnancy that ends in a miscarriage is like a full-fledged pregnancy, there is an allusion to the matter, as it is stated: “We have been with child, we have been in pain, we have as it were brought forth wind” (Isaiah 26:18). This verse indicates that even one who miscarries wind is considered as having been with child. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that this is called a mere allusion to the matter? This explicit verse is a significant proof. The Gemara answers: When that verse was written, it was written with regard to males as bearing children. The allusion to child-bearing in the verse is symbolic, so halakhic inferences may not be drawn from it.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman experienced labor pain for two days, during which she saw a discharge of blood, and on the third day she miscarried air or anything that is not a viable fetus, that woman gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, and the blood is treated as blood of a <i>zava</i> in all regards. The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if you say that miscarrying a non-viable fetus is considered a proper birth, this is problematic,
  
  Daf 9a
  
  as with regard to blood emitted while experiencing labor pain close to the time of a proper birth, the Merciful One deems it pure, and it should not be treated as the blood of a <i>zava</i>. Rav Pappi says: The miscarriage is not considered a proper birth and therefore her blood is considered the blood of a <i>zava</i>. And leave aside the first <i>baraita</i> and do not raise a contradiction from it, as the <i>halakha</i> that a woman who sees menstrual blood is retroactively impure for a twenty-four-hour period, which is the topic under discussion in that <i>baraita</i>, applies by rabbinic law, and they did not impose this stringency in the case of a woman who miscarries.
  Rav Pappa says: That reason for the <i>halakha</i> that a pregnant woman is not retroactively impure when she experiences bleeding is only because her head and limbs feel heavy to her. Her physical state is compromised, which also causes her regular menstrual cycle to cease. Here, too, in the case of a pregnancy that precedes a miscarriage, even if it is not considered a proper birth, her head and limbs felt heavy to her during her pregnancy, and therefore it can be assumed that she did not experience a prior menstrual flow.
  With regard to the mishna’s ruling that the time of a pregnant woman is sufficient, Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If she saw blood and only afterward her fetus became known to all who see her, what is the <i>halakha</i>? One can claim that since at the time when she saw the blood her fetus was not yet known, therefore she becomes impure; or perhaps, since she saw blood in close proximity to the time that her fetus became known, she does not become impure.
  Rabbi Zeira said to him: That reason for the <i>halakha</i> that a pregnant woman’s time is sufficient is only because her head and limbs feel heavy to her. In this case, where she was yet unaware of her pregnancy at the time when she saw her menstrual flow, neither her head nor her limbs felt heavy to her. Therefore she is impure retroactively, like any other woman.
  § A certain elder asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: If the time of a woman’s fixed menstrual cycle arrived during her pregnancy and she did not perform an examination, what is the <i>halakha</i>? I raise this dilemma only according to the opinion of the one who said that the obligation for a woman to perform a self-examination during her fixed menstrual cycle applies by Torah law. What is the <i>halakha</i>? According to that opinion, one can claim that since the obligation of an examination during one’s fixed menstrual cycle is by Torah law, she is required to perform an examination even during her pregnancy. Or perhaps, since her blood has stopped, as a pregnant woman generally does not experience a flow of menstrual blood, she is not required to perform an examination.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: You learned the answer to your dilemma from a mishna (39a): Rabbi Meir says: If a woman was in hiding from danger, and the time of her fixed menstrual cycle came and she did not examine herself, nevertheless she is ritually pure, as it may be assumed that she did not experience bleeding because fear dispels the flow of menstrual blood. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the proof: The reason she is pure is that there is fear, from which it may be inferred that in a case where there is no fear and the time of her fixed menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself, she would be impure.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan concludes: Evidently, from the fact that Rabbi Meir rules that a woman is impure if the time of her period passed without a proper examination, he maintains that the obligation for a woman to perform an examination at the time of her fixed menstrual cycle applies by Torah law. And, nevertheless, since there is fear, her blood has stopped and she is not required to perform an examination. Here, too, in the case of a pregnant woman, her blood has stopped and therefore she is not required to perform an examination.
  § The mishna teaches: The time of a nursing woman is sufficient until she weans her child from nursing. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Tosefta</i> 2:1): With regard to a nursing woman whose child dies within twenty-four months of his birth, she is like all other women with regard to her impurity status after seeing menstrual blood, and therefore she transmits ritual impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination. Therefore, if a woman continued to nurse her child for four or five years, her time is sufficient and she does not retroactively transmit impurity for the entire four or five years. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon all say: With regard to nursing women, their time is sufficient for an entire twenty-four months. Therefore, if she nursed him for four or five years, then after the first twenty-four months have passed, she transmits ritual impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  The Gemara discusses the reasoning of each opinion: When you analyze the matter you will find that one must say that according to the statement of Rabbi Meir the case is that menstrual blood spoils and becomes milk. Therefore, it follows that this status continues for as long as she is nursing. By contrast, according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, her limbs become dislocated and her spirit, i.e., her full strength and her regular menstrual cycle, does not return to her until twenty-four months have passed.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need the statement of Rabbi Meir: Therefore, if a woman continued to nurse her child for four or five years, her time is sufficient? Since his reasoning is that the menstrual blood of a nursing woman spoils and becomes milk, it is obvious that this applies as long as she continues to nurse him. The Gemara answers: This statement is indeed extraneous. It merely serves to form a parallel between the statement of Rabbi Meir and that of the other Sages. In other words, it was appended due to the statement: Therefore, if she was nursing him for four or five years, then after the first twenty-four months have passed, she transmits ritual impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination, which is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  The Gemara further asks: And why do I need the statement: Therefore, if she was nursing him for four or five years, then after the first twenty-four months have passed, she transmits ritual impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination, which is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? The Gemara explains that this clause is necessary, lest you say that Rabbi Yosei holds that there are two reasons that a pregnant woman’s time is sufficient, both because her blood spoils and because her limbs become dislocated. Therefore, the additional clause teaches us that Rabbi Yosei maintains that the reason is only that her limbs become dislocated, and consequently she transmits retroactive impurity after twenty-four months.
  That explanation is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Menstrual blood spoils and becomes milk; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: Her limbs become dislocated and her spirit does not return to her until twenty-four months have passed. The Gemara analyzes their respective reasons. Rabbi Ilai says: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir? It is based upon a verse, as it is written: “Who can bring a pure thing out of an impure? Is it not the One?” (Job 14:4). In other words, is it not true that the One, i.e., God, can bring a pure thing, such as milk, out of an impure thing, such as menstrual blood?
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sages, i.e., Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon, how do they interpret this verse? Rabbi Yoḥanan says that according to those Sages this verse is referring to semen, which is impure, and yet the person that is formed from it is pure.
  And Rabbi Elazar says: Those Sages maintain that this verse is referring to the water of sprinkling, i.e., the purification water mixed with the ashes of the red heifer. As the individual who sprinkles the water and the one upon whom the water is sprinkled are both pure, and yet one who touches the purification water is rendered impure. The Gemara asks: Is the one who sprinkles the water actually pure? But isn’t it written: “He who sprinkles the water of sprinkling will wash his clothes, and he who touches the water of sprinkling will be impure until evening” (Numbers 19:21)? The Gemara responds: What is the meaning of the term: “He who sprinkles”? It means: He who touches.
  The Gemara asks: But it is written: “He who sprinkles,” and it is written in the same verse: “And he who touches.” How can these two terms be referring to the same individual? And furthermore, that verse states that one who sprinkles requires the washing of his clothes, indicating a severe level of impurity, whereas one who touches does not require the washing of his clothes. Evidently, the phrase “he who sprinkles” is not referring to one who touches. Rather, the Gemara explains: What is the meaning of: “He who sprinkles”? This is referring to one who carries the purification waters.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, let the Torah write explicitly: One who carries. Why does it state “he who sprinkles” when it is referring to carrying? The Gemara answers: The use of the term sprinkling in reference to carrying teaches us that one becomes impure only by carrying the measure required for sprinkling. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that sprinkling requires a minimum measure of water. But according to the one who said that sprinkling does not require a minimum measure of water, what can be said? According to this opinion, there is apparently no concept of a measure required for sprinkling.
  The Gemara answers: Even according to the one who said that sprinkling does not require a minimum measure of water, that statement applies only to the measure of purification water that must be sprinkled onto the back, i.e., onto the body, of the impure man. In this regard, any amount will suffice. But with regard to the vessel into which one dips the hyssop in order to sprinkle the water, it requires a certain measure of water. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 12:5): How much water must be in the vessel so that it will be enough for sprinkling? It must be enough to dip the tops of the stems of the hyssop branch, used in the rite of purification, into the water and sprinkle it.
  The Gemara concludes the discussion of the purification waters with the following observation: And that is the meaning of that which King Solomon said: “I said I would become wise, but it eludes me” (Ecclesiastes 7:23). According to tradition, even Solomon in his great wisdom could not understand the contradictory nature of the sprinkling of purification water, as it renders an impure person pure, and a pure person impure.
  § The mishna teaches: Who is the woman characterized as an elderly woman in this context? It is any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles of thirty days passed at a stage of her life close to her old age, during which she saw no menstrual blood. The Gemara asks: What is considered close to old age? Rav Yehuda says: Any woman about whom her friends say that she is an elderly woman. And Rabbi Shimon says:
  
  Daf 9b
  
  It is any woman who is old enough that people call her: Mother [<i>Imma</i>], Mother, and she is not embarrassed. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak disagree with regard to this matter. One says that the definition is any woman who does not take offense about being called: Mother, Mother. And the other one says that it is any woman who is not embarrassed by this. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between their definitions? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where a woman is embarrassed but she does not take offense when called: Mother.
  The Gemara asks: And how long is a typical menstrual cycle? Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: The average menstrual cycle is thirty days long. And Rava says that Rav Ḥisda says: It is twenty days. The Gemara notes: And they do not disagree. One Sage, Rav Yehuda Nesia, counts all the days of her cycle, including the days of impurity and days of purity. And the other Sage, Rav Ḥisda, does not count the days of impurity, i.e., the seven days of impurity of a menstruating woman and the three days of the sighting of <i>ziva</i>.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an elderly woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles of thirty days passed and then she saw a discharge of menstrual blood, her time is sufficient. And if a further three typical menstrual cycles of thirty days passed for her and she subsequently saw a discharge of menstrual blood, her time is sufficient. And if yet a further three typical menstrual cycles of thirty days passed for her and then she saw a discharge of menstrual blood, after this third time she is now like all normal women, and she transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And it is not necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> in a case where she experienced the three sightings in even intervals of ninety days, as in such a case it is obvious that she assumes the status of a normal woman who transmits impurity retroactively. Rather, even if she had intervals where she decreased, i.e., experienced bleeding at intervals smaller than that, or even if she increased and experienced bleeding at greater intervals, she still assumes the status of a woman who transmits impurity retroactively.
  The Gemara infers: The wording of the <i>baraita</i>: Even if she had intervals where she decreased, indicates that it is not necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a woman who experienced bleeding at even intervals. This is puzzling, as on the contrary, if she experienced bleeding at even intervals she thereby fixes her menstrual cycle as being every thirty days, and according to Rabbi Dosa (4b) the <i>halakha</i> is that her time is sufficient.
  And if you would say that this is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Dosa, as they say that a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, then the <i>baraita</i> should have been written in the opposite fashion: Let it say: And the <i>halakha</i> that an elderly woman who sees menstrual blood at intervals returns to the status of normal women and transmits impurity retroactively applies not only to a case where she had intervals where she decreased or increased, i.e., she experienced bleeding less or more than ninety days apart, but this <i>halakha</i> applies even if she experienced bleeding at even intervals.
  The Gemara answers: Teach in the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with this altered version: And the <i>halakha</i> applies not only to a case where she had intervals where she decreased or increased, but this is the <i>halakha</i> even if she experienced bleeding at even intervals. And if you wish say instead that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: The <i>halakha</i> that an elderly woman is retroactively impure does not apply to a case when she saw menstrual blood at even intervals. Rather, it applies only if she decreased or increased, i.e., she experienced bleeding at intervals less or more than ninety days apart. But if she saw blood at even intervals, she thereby fixes a set menstrual cycle of ninety days and her time is sufficient. The Gemara adds: And if so, in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to any woman for whom three typical menstrual cycles passed during which she saw no menstrual blood, if she experiences bleeding, her time is sufficient. Rabbi Yosei says: In the case of a pregnant woman and a nursing woman for whom three menstrual cycles passed during which they saw no menstrual blood, if she then saw blood her time is sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer cites a proof for his opinion. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving a certain girl in the village of Hitlo who stopped menstruating for three typical menstrual cycles, after which she experienced menstruation. And the matter came before the Sages, and they said that her time is sufficient and she does not transmit impurity retroactively.
  The other Sages said to Rabbi Eliezer: Decisions rendered in exigent circumstances are no proof. The Gemara asks: What were the exigent circumstances? Some say that it was during the years of famine, and some say that the girl had handled many ritually pure items and the Sages were concerned for the loss of those pure items if they were ruled retroactively impure.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted by ruling that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. After he remembered that Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues disagree with him on this matter and that he had apparently ruled incorrectly, he nevertheless said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: After he remembered? If we say that this means after he remembered that the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, but in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, if so, how could he act in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer even in exigent circumstances, since the <i>halakha</i> has been decided against him?
  Rather, one must say that the <i>halakha</i> had not been stated on this matter, neither in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, nor in accordance with the opinion of that Sage, the Rabbis. And what is the meaning of: After he remembered? After Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi remembered that it was not a lone authority who disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, but it was several Sages who disagreed with him, and there is a principle that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the many over the opinion of an individual, he nevertheless said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances.
  The Gemara continues the discussion of a woman who fails to experience menstruation for three typical menstrual cycles. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a young girl, less than twelve years old, whose time to see the flow of menstrual blood has not arrived and she saw menstrual blood, after the first time her time is sufficient. After the second time, again her time is sufficient. After the third time, she is like all normal adult women, and therefore she transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If she then passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding, and then she saw menstrual blood, she returns to the status of a young girl and her time is sufficient. And if it further happens that she again passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding, and then she saw menstrual blood, her time is sufficient. And if she passed three further cycles without experiencing bleeding, and she subsequently saw menstrual blood, she is like all normal adult women. She is considered a woman who experiences regular menstruation at long intervals with breaks of ninety days. And therefore she transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: And with regard to a girl whose time to see the flow of menstrual blood has arrived, i.e., she has reached the age of twelve, when she sees menstrual blood for the first time, her time is sufficient. After the second time, she transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination. If three menstrual cycles then passed without her experiencing bleeding, and afterward she saw menstrual blood, her time is sufficient. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that any woman who passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding is presumed not to be menstruating.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: If the young girl who had started menstruating passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding and then saw menstrual blood, she returns to the status of a young girl and her time is sufficient.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> if she then sees menstrual blood at regular intervals of thirty-day cycles? Is her time sufficient, or does she transmit impurity retroactively? Rav Giddel says that Rav says: With regard to the first time and the second time that she sees menstrual blood, her time is sufficient. After the third time, she transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  The <i>baraita</i> further teaches, with regard to a young girl who did not experience bleeding for three typical cycles and then saw blood, and three further expected menstrual cycles passed without her experiencing bleeding and then afterward she saw menstrual blood, that her time is sufficient. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> if she then sees menstrual blood at regular intervals of thirty-day cycles?
  The Gemara answers: Rav Kahana says that Rav Giddel says that Rav says: The first time that she sees menstrual blood, her time is sufficient. After the second time, she transmits impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>? The Gemara answers: Since the <i>baraita</i> teaches that she attains the status of a regular adult woman upon the third sighting of menstrual blood, apparently it is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that presumption is established by two occasions.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say the latter clause: If she then passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding, and then she saw menstrual blood, she returns to the status of a young girl and her time is sufficient. In this ruling we come to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that any woman who passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding is presumed not to be menstruating and her time is sufficient. Is the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi or Rabbi Eliezer?
  And if you would say that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and in the case of a woman who passes three menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, but does he really hold in accordance with this opinion? Doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> state that after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi remembered that several authorities disagreed with the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer, he said: Rabbi Eliezer is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances, i.e., only in exigent circumstances. The Gemara concludes: Rather, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is Rabbi Eliezer, and with regard to menstrual cycles he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that a presumptive cycle is established after two occasions of seeing menstrual blood.
  § With regard to a young girl who was just starting to menstruate, the Gemara states: If she finds a blood stain between the first and second time that she sees menstrual blood, she is pure. If it is between the second and the third time, Ḥizkiyya says: She is impure; Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She is pure. The Gemara explains the reasoning behind their respective opinions. Ḥizkiyya says: She is impure, since if she had seen menstrual blood it would render her impure. Consequently, her blood stain is also impure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She is pure, since she has not yet attained the presumptive status of one who sees menstrual blood. Therefore, we also do not render her impure on account of her blood stain.
  
  Daf 10b
  
  Rabbi Ilai objects to this ruling of Ḥizkiyya: And what is the difference between this case of a girl who has not yet started menstruating and a recently married menstrual virgin whose stain is deemed pure for as long as her blood is pure, since the stain is presumed to be from her torn hymen? Rabbi Zeira said to him: With regard to this menstrual virgin, her secretion [<i>sirfah</i>] is common, i.e., blood from her torn hymen is normally found during this period. Therefore, any blood stain that is found is also assumed to be from her hymen. But in the case of this young girl, her secretion is not common. Therefore, if a blood stain is found, it is assumed to be menstrual blood.
  § Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: With regard to a young girl whose time to see the flow of menstrual blood has not arrived and she saw menstrual blood one time and then a second time, but not the third time that would render her a woman who regularly sees menstrual blood, her saliva and her garment that she treads upon that are found in the marketplace are pure if we do not know whether she has menstruated. Likewise, her blood stain is also pure. Ulla added: And I do not know if this ruling with regard to the stain is merely Rabbi Yoḥanan’s own conclusion or if that is also part of the opinion of his teacher.
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there? That is, what does it matter who said it? The Gemara explains: It makes a difference for it to be considered the statement of one Sage in the place of two dissenting opinions. As stated above, Ḥizkiyya disagrees with this ruling and maintains that a young girl’s blood stain is impure after she sees menstrual blood twice. If this statement is both Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak’s opinion and that of Rabbi Yoḥanan, then Ḥizkiyya’s ruling is opposed by two Sages, which means that his is a minority opinion. If it is Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion alone, then the two sides are equal, with one Sage maintaining each opinion.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia along with all the seafarers [<i>naḥotei yamma</i>], they stated this ruling as the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak. If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan was relating his own opinion, which echoed that of his teacher, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak, and therefore the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with this majority opinion.
  § Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi says: With regard to a young girl whose time to see menstrual blood has not arrived, even if she continuously discharges menstrual blood for all seven days of a typical menstrual period, it is considered as only one sighting of blood and she remains in the category of one who lacks blood until she sees menstrual blood twice more. The Gemara asks: Why did Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi stress: Even if she continuously discharges menstrual blood, which indicates that it is not necessary to teach that this is the <i>halakha</i> if she stops seeing a discharge and then starts again? On the contrary, if she stops and restarts it is as though she has had two sightings of menstrual blood.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi meant: With regard to a young girl whose time to see menstrual blood has not arrived, and she then continuously discharges menstrual blood for all seven days of a typical menstrual period, it is considered as only one sighting of blood. In other words, he did not state the word: Even.
  Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya says: The case of woman who constantly drips menstrual blood is not considered like a full sighting of blood. The Gemara expresses surprise at this claim: But she saw blood. The Gemara answers: Say that what Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya meant was that she is not considered like one who continuously discharges blood, but rather like one who stops and starts again, even if she drips constantly.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: From the fact that Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya claims that a different <i>halakha</i> applies to a woman who constantly drips menstrual blood, it can be inferred that the blood of one who continuously discharges menstrual blood streams like a river for seven days. But this is physically impossible. The Gemara explains: Rather, say that Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya meant that the status of a woman who constantly drips menstrual blood is nothing other than the status of a woman who continuously discharges blood. In both cases, it is all considered as one sighting.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The presumption with regard to the daughters of Israel is that until they have reached their physical maturity they have the presumptive status of ritual purity, and adult women do not need to examine them to check if they are ritually pure before they handle consecrated items or <i>teruma</i>. Once they have reached their physical maturity, they have the presumptive status of ritual impurity, due to the possibility of an unnoticed menstrual discharge, and if they are still minors, adult women must examine them to check if they are ritually pure.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: They should not examine them by hand, because that is likely to scratch them and ruin their status, as it will be assumed that they are ritually impure with menstrual blood. Rather, they should smear them with oil inside and wipe them off on the outside. And through this method they are automatically examined, i.e., if at that age they are ready to menstruate, the oil will cause the blood to flow.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a pregnant woman and a nursing woman for whom three expected menstrual cycles passed during which they saw no menstrual blood, if she then saw blood, her time is sufficient. A <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rabbi Elazar: Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to a pregnant woman and a nursing woman for whom three expected menstrual cycles passed during which they saw no menstrual blood, if she then experienced bleeding her time is sufficient. Rabbi Elazar said to him: The structure of your <i>baraita</i> is inconsistent. You opened with two categories of women: A pregnant woman and a nursing woman, and you ended your quote with one, as you concluded in the singular form: Her time is sufficient.
  Rabbi Elazar continued: Perhaps you are saying that this is a case of a pregnant woman who was also nursing. And if so, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us a matter in passing, that with regard to tallying three menstrual cycles in which she saw no menstrual blood, her days of pregnancy count toward, i.e., combine with, her days of nursing and her days of nursing count toward her days of pregnancy. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Her days of pregnancy count toward her days of nursing and her days of nursing count toward her days of pregnancy.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: How so? If a woman stopped seeing menstrual blood for two expected menstrual cycles during her days of pregnancy and then for one more cycle during her days of nursing, or she passed two expected menstrual cycles during her days of nursing and one more during her days of pregnancy, or one and a half cycles during her days of pregnancy and one and a half cycles during her days of nursing, in all these cases the missed cycles spanning her pregnancy and nursing combine to a total of three missed cycles, and therefore her time is sufficient.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the claim that her days of pregnancy count toward her days of nursing, you can find it in a case where she was nursing continuously and then she became pregnant. But the scenario mentioned in the <i>baraita</i> where her days of nursing count toward her days of pregnancy, how can you find these circumstances? Since she certainly experienced bleeding when she gave birth, how can there be three consecutive menstrual cycles where she did not experience any discharge of blood?
  The Gemara provides several answers: If you wish, say that it is referring to a case of a dry birth, i.e., one without any discharge of blood. Or, if you wish, say: The blood of a menstruating woman is discrete and the blood seen during birth is discrete. Blood seen during birth does not disrupt the count of menstrual cycles during which a woman does not see menstrual blood. Therefore, the cycles before and after the birth combine to form the requisite three cycles according to Rabbi Eliezer. Or, if you wish, say: Teach only one of these scenarios. In other words, teach only the case where the days of pregnancy count toward the days of nursing, but not the case where the days of nursing count toward the days of pregnancy.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to what did they say that her time is sufficient? It is with regard to the first sighting of blood. But with regard to the second sighting, her status is like that of any other woman and she transmits impurity for a twenty-four-hour period or from her last examination. The Gemara inquires concerning which case this clause is referring to. Rav says: This qualification is stated with regard to all of them, i.e., all four cases of the mishna: The menstrual virgin, the elderly woman, the pregnant woman, and the nursing woman.
  And Shmuel says: They taught it only with regard to a menstrual virgin and an elderly woman. But in the case of a pregnant woman and a nursing woman, their time is sufficient for all their days of pregnancy and their time is sufficient for all their days of nursing.
  The Gemara notes that another pair of Sages had the same dispute. And similarly, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: This qualification applies to all of them; and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught it only with regard to a menstrual virgin and an elderly woman. But in the case of a pregnant woman and a nursing woman, their time is sufficient for all their days of pregnancy and their time is sufficient for all their days of nursing. The Gemara suggests: This is like a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> in the following <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a pregnant woman and a nursing woman who were
  
  Daf 11a
  
  continuously discharging menstrual blood, their time is sufficient for all their days of pregnancy and their time is sufficient for all their days of nursing. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon all say: They said that her time is sufficient only with regard to the first sighting of blood, but with regard to the second sighting, her status is like that of any other woman, and she transmits impurity for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination.
  § The mishna teaches: And if she saw the first sighting as a result of unnatural circumstances, then even with regard to the second sighting her time is sufficient. Rav Huna says: If she jumped and saw menstrual blood, and again she jumped and saw menstrual blood, and a third time she jumped and saw menstrual blood, she has established a fixed menstrual cycle. The Gemara asks: For what occurrence has she established a fixed cycle? If we say that it is a cycle of days alone, this cannot be correct, as every day that she did not jump, she also did not see menstrual blood. Therefore, her cycle cannot be a mere pattern of days.
  The Gemara explains: Rather, the established menstrual cycle is caused by jumps, i.e., by observing a pattern of jumping and seeing blood three times, she has established that jumping causes the onset of her menstrual period. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Any woman who establishes a pattern of seeing menstrual blood due to a recurring accident, even if the pattern repeats, still has not established a fixed menstrual cycle? An accidental menstrual pattern brought about by external causes does not create a menstrual cycle. The Gemara explains the difficulty: What, is it not correct to say that the <i>baraita</i> means that she has not established a fixed menstrual cycle at all?
  The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> means that she has not established a fixed menstrual cycle of days alone, nor of jumps alone, but she has established a fixed menstrual cycle for a combination of days and of jumps. In other words, she has established a fixed menstrual cycle when she jumps on specific days. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that she does not establish a cycle for days alone? Why is it necessary to state this? Rav Ashi says: It is necessary to teach this in a case where she jumped on Sunday and saw menstrual blood, and again she jumped on Sunday and saw menstrual blood, and then on the following Shabbat she jumped and did not see blood, but on Sunday, the next day, she saw menstrual blood without jumping.
  Rav Ashi explains: Lest you say that the matter is revealed retroactively that it was the day that caused her to experience menstruation and not the jumping, and therefore she has established a menstrual cycle of menstruating on Sundays, regardless of jumping, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that it was also the jumping of yesterday, on Shabbat, that caused the menstruation today, on Sunday. And as for the fact that she did not see menstrual blood then, that was because the time when jumping causes menstruation had not yet arrived.
  The Gemara presents another version of Rav Huna’s statement. Rav Huna says: If a woman jumped and saw menstrual blood, and again she jumped and saw menstrual blood, and a third time she jumped and saw menstrual blood, she has established a fixed menstrual cycle for a pattern of days and not for a pattern of jumps. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? Rav Ashi says: This is referring to a case where she jumped on Sunday and saw menstrual blood, and then again she jumped on Sunday and saw menstrual blood, and then on the following Shabbat she jumped and did not see blood, but on Sunday, the next day, she saw menstrual blood without jumping. In that case there, the matter is revealed retroactively that it is the day that causes her to menstruate, not the jumping.
  MISHNA: Although the Rabbis said that for a woman with a fixed menstrual cycle her time is sufficient and she does not transmit impurity retroactively, she is required to examine herself each day to ensure that she is ritually pure and will not impurify pure items that she is handling. All women must examine themselves each day except for a menstruating woman, whose impure status is known, and a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity, whose ritually pure status is known even if she experiences bleeding.
  And even a woman with a fixed menstrual cycle engages in intercourse while using examination cloths to ascertain whether her menstrual flow began, except for a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity, and a virgin whose blood is ritually pure for four days after engaging in intercourse for the first time.
  And she is required to examine herself twice each day: In the morning, to ascertain if she menstruated during the night, and at twilight, to ascertain if she menstruated during the day. And she is also required to examine herself at a time that she is about to engage in intercourse with her husband. The obligation of women of priestly families is greater than that of other women, as they are also required to examine themselves when they seek to partake of <i>teruma</i>. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even when they conclude partaking of <i>teruma</i> they are required to examine themselves, in order to ascertain whether they experienced bleeding while partaking of <i>teruma</i>.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All women must examine themselves each day, except for a menstruating woman. The Gemara explains: Such a woman does not need to examine herself, as during the days of her menstruation she does not need examination.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said that a woman can establish a fixed menstrual cycle even during the days that she has <i>zava</i> status, but a woman does not establish a fixed menstrual cycle during the days of her impurity due to menstruation, as any bleeding during these seven days is merely a continuation of her original menstruation. According to this opinion, it is well, and one can understand the mishna. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that a woman can establish a fixed menstrual cycle during the days of her menstruation, let her examine herself, as perhaps she will establish a fixed menstrual cycle.
  The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you: When I say that a woman can establish a fixed menstrual cycle during the days of her menstruation, that applies only in a case where the first two instances of her fixed cycle were established when she first saw blood from a stopped source, i.e., she saw blood on those particulars days at the outset of her period. But when she first saw blood from an open source, i.e., when the first two instances that she experienced bleeding on those particular days was in the middle of her menstrual period, I did not say that she establishes a fixed menstrual cycle, and therefore there is no need for her to examine herself.
  § The mishna teaches: All women must examine themselves each day, except for a menstruating woman, whose impure status is known, and a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity. The Gemara explains: It may enter your mind that when the mishna mentions a woman who is observing the period of the blood of purity, it is referring to one who is finishing the period of impurity following a birth and is anticipating observing the period of the blood of purity. In other words, her days of impurity are ending and she is about to start her days `of purity, and the mishna is stating that there is no need for an examination to conclude her days of impurity before starting her days of purity.
  The Gemara analyzes the mishna in accordance with this interpretation. This works out well according to the opinion of Rav, who said that blood after birth and blood of purity both come from one source, and the Torah deemed blood after birth impure, and the Torah deemed blood of purity pure. According to this opinion, it is well, and one can understand the mishna, since even if she emits blood continuously through the end of her days of impurity into her days of purity, the blood during her days of purity is pure.
  But according to the opinion of Levi, who said that there are two distinct sources, one for blood after birth and one for blood of purity, she should be required to examine herself at the end of the period following birth, as perhaps that impure source of blood after birth had not yet stopped flowing. The Gemara explains that Levi could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling?
  
  Daf 11b
  
  It is the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that there is only one source for the two types of blood (see 35b). The Gemara asks: But can it be that the <i>tanna</i> taught us an unattributed mishna, which is generally accepted as the <i>halakha</i>, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, whose opinion is usually not accepted as <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: It is a case where the mishna first records an unattributed opinion and afterward it records a dispute with regard to the same matter. And there is a principle that any time the mishna first records an unattributed opinion and afterward it records that the ruling is subject to a dispute, then the <i>halakha</i> is not necessarily in accordance with the unattributed opinion.
  And if you wish, say instead: Does the mishna teach: A woman is anticipating observing the period of the blood of purity? Rather, it teaches: Who is observing the period of the blood of purity. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to a woman who is already observing the period of the blood of purity, what is the purpose of stating that she is exempt from performing examinations? Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that she should examine herself, as perhaps she will find that she established a fixed menstrual cycle through blood found on her examination cloths, the mishna teaches us that a woman does not establish a cycle from sightings of blood that came from a pure source that transfers to the period when she sees blood from an impure source.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer: This answer works out well according to Levi, who said that there are two distinct sources, one for blood after birth and one for blood of purity; one can understand that she does not establish a cycle with regard to blood from one source, from a sighting of blood from a different source. But according to Rav, who said that blood after birth and blood of purity both come from one source, she should be required to examine herself during the period of the blood of purity, as perhaps she established a fixed menstrual cycle. The Gemara answers: Even so, i.e., that both types of blood come from the same source, nevertheless a woman does not establish a cycle from her days of purity that transfers to her days of impurity.
  § The mishna teaches: And even a woman with a fixed menstrual cycle engages in intercourse while using examination cloths to ascertain whether her menstrual flow began, except for a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity, and a virgin whose blood is ritually pure for four days after engaging in intercourse for the first time. In this connection, the Gemara notes that we learned in a mishna there (64b): With regard to a young girl whose time to see the flow of menstrual blood has not arrived, as she has not yet reached puberty, and she married, Beit Shammai say: The Sages give her four nights after intercourse during which the blood is attributed to her torn hymen and she is ritually pure. Thereafter, any blood is menstrual blood and she is impure. And Beit Hillel say: The blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the wound heals.
  With regard to Beit Hillel’s statement, Rav Giddel says that Shmuel says: They taught this only in a case where she does not stop seeing blood due to intercourse. In other words, every time she engages in intercourse she experiences bleeding. In that case, even if she saw blood not due to intercourse, Beit Hillel still attribute the blood to the torn hymen. But if she stops seeing blood due to intercourse, and then she subsequently saw blood on another occasion, that blood renders her impure.
  He continues: Similarly, if one night passed without them engaging in intercourse and she subsequently saw blood without connection to intercourse, this indicates that the blood is no longer from her torn hymen and therefore she is deemed impure. Likewise, if the appearance of her blood had changed since her initial blood from her torn hymen, she is impure. Rabbi Yona raises an objection to this last <i>halakha</i> from the mishna: And a virgin whose blood is ritually pure is not required to examine herself when she engages in intercourse. Why not? She should engage in intercourse while using examination cloths, as perhaps she will find that the appearance of her blood has changed, which would mean that her blood is no longer ritually pure blood from her torn hymen.
  Rava says: Say the first clause: All women must engage in intercourse while using examination cloths, except for a menstruating woman whose impure status is certain and a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity. It can be inferred from here that these two exceptions are not required for women to examine themselves, but a virgin whose blood is pure is required to perform an examination. This ruling apparently supports Shmuel’s opinion that examination is required to determine if there is a change in the appearance of her blood. But if so, then the two clauses of the mishna are difficult, as they contradict each other.
  The Gemara explains: Here, in the latter clause that indicates that a virgin requires no examination, it is referring to a case where she had engaged in intercourse. In such a situation an examination would be inconclusive, as even if the appearance of her blood had changed, one can say that it was because the man’s organ soiled it, i.e., perhaps the intercourse caused the change of appearance in her blood. By contrast, there, in the first clause, it is referring to a case where she had not engaged in intercourse, and therefore she is required to perform an examination to determine if there was a change in appearance in her blood, as any difference in appearance would indicate a change from pure blood to impure blood.
  The Gemara notes that this <i>halakha</i> is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. With regard to the opinion of Beit Hillel that blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the wound heals, the <i>baraita</i> asks: In what case is this statement said? In a case where she does not stop seeing blood due to intercourse, i.e., every time she engages in intercourse she experiences bleeding. If so, even when she sees blood not due to intercourse, it is deemed pure.
  But if she stopped seeing blood due to intercourse, and she subsequently sees blood at a different time, that sighting renders her impure. Similarly, if one night passed without her engaging in intercourse and then she saw blood without connection to intercourse, she is deemed impure. Furthermore, if she sees blood and the appearance of her blood had changed from her initial blood from her torn hymen, she is impure.
  § The mishna teaches: And she is required to examine herself twice each day, in the morning and at twilight. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The mishna taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to touching ritually pure items. But with regard to her husband, she is permitted to him without any requirement to perform examinations. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious, as we learn in the mishna that she must examine herself twice a day, and the first time is in the morning? This indicates that the mishna is concerned about the status of ritually pure items that she will handle during the day, but not about intercourse with her husband, as a couple usually engages in relations at night rather than during the day.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, if the statement of Rav Yehuda citing Shmuel was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: And she is also required to examine herself at a time that she is about to engage in intercourse with her husband. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The mishna taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a woman who is engaged in handling pure items. She alone is required to examine herself before intercourse. The reason is that since she is required to perform an examination in preparation for handling pure items, she also requires an examination in preparation for intercourse with her husband. But with regard to a woman who is not engaged in handling pure items, she is not required to perform an examination in preparation for intercourse with her husband.
  The Gemara asks: What is Rav Yehuda teaching us? We already learn this from the mishna (15a): All women have the presumptive status of purity to their husbands, and therefore the husband does not need to ascertain whether she is ritually pure before engaging in intercourse. The Gemara answers: If this <i>halakha</i> is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that this statement applies only to a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle. But in the case of a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, she is required to perform an examination before intercourse. Consequently, Rav Yehuda teaches us that even a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle is not required to perform an examination before intercourse, unless she handles pure items.
  The Gemara asks: But aren’t we are dealing in the mishna with a case of a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle? The Gemara answers: The mishna is dealing both with a case where she has a fixed menstrual cycle and with a case where she does not have a fixed menstrual cycle. And this is what the mishna teaches us: That even though she has a fixed menstrual cycle, and therefore one might think that she is exempt from examination, nevertheless if she handles pure items, since she is required to perform an examination in preparation for handling those pure items, she is also required to perform an examination in preparation for intercourse with her husband.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t Shmuel already state this <i>halakha</i> on another occasion? As Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: With regard to a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, it is forbidden for her to engage in intercourse with her husband until she examines herself and determines that she is pure. And we interpreted this <i>halakha</i> as referring to a case where she is engaged in handling pure items. The Gemara answers: Shmuel did not in fact issue two statements; rather, one was stated by inference from the other. In other words, Shmuel said one of these statements explicitly; the other was reported by his students in his name based on an inference from what he had said.
  The Gemara adds: This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement, that a woman requires an examination, said? It is said with regard to a woman who is preparing for handling pure items. But with regard to engaging in intercourse with her husband, she is permitted to do so without performing an examination. The <i>baraita</i> qualifies this ruling: And in what case is this statement, that she is not required to perform an examination, said? It is said when her husband traveled and left her with the presumptive status of ritual purity. If so, upon his return she does not need to perform an examination before they engage in intercourse. But if he left her with the presumptive status of ritual impurity, she remains forever in her status of impurity, until she says to him: I am ritually pure.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  § Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma before Rav Yehuda: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a woman should examine herself before engaging in intercourse with her husband? Rav Yehuda said to him: She should not examine herself. Rabbi Zeira asked: And let her examine herself; what would be the problem with that? Rav Yehuda answered: If so, the heart of a scrupulous husband might strike him with pangs of conscience over sins that he could transgress, and he will separate from his wife out of fear that she is impure.
  Rabbi Abba raised a similar dilemma before Rav Huna: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a woman should examine herself immediately after engaging in intercourse, within the minimum period of time needed for the onset of menstruation, in order to render her husband liable to bring a sin offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman?
  Rav Huna said to him: Can you find a case where it is physically possible to perform a full examination after intercourse within the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation? This is comparable to a male organ and an examination cloth that are standing alongside the doorpost, i.e., at the entrance to the vagina; upon the exit of the organ the examination cloth immediately enters.
  The Gemara explains: It is apparent that the period of time that they stated is the time required for an external wipe, and not for a full internal examination. Therefore, if she did an internal examination and found blood, one cannot be certain that she was already menstruating during intercourse and thereby render the husband liable to bring a sin offering. Rather, this is Rabbi Abba’s dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a woman should wipe herself immediately after engaging in intercourse? Since this action can be performed quickly, if she were to find blood her husband would be liable to bring a sin offering.
  Some say that this is the dilemma that Rabbi Abba raised before Rav Huna: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a woman should examine herself immediately after engaging in intercourse, in order to render her husband liable to bring a provisional guilt offering brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering? Rav Huna said to him: She should not examine herself. Rabbi Abba asked: And let her examine herself; what would be the problem with that? Rav Huna answered: If so, the heart of a scrupulous husband might strike him with pangs of conscience over sins that he could transgress, and he will separate from his wife out of fear that she is impure.
  § The mishna teaches: And she is also required to examine herself at a time that she is about to engage in intercourse with her husband. Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yannai says: And this examination performed before intercourse is known as: The examination cloth of virtuous women, as this examination is not strictly required. Rabbi Abba bar Memel said to Rabbi Ami: The <i>tanna</i> teaches that women are required to perform this examination, and yet you teach that only virtuous women perform it. Rabbi Ami said to him: Yes, as I say that anyone who fulfills the statements of the Sages is called virtuous. Rabbi Ami did not mean that this examination is beyond the letter of the law. He was simply praising those who abide by the established <i>halakha</i>.
  With regard to Rabbi Ami’s claim, Rava says: And according to your opinion, with regard to one who does not fulfill the statements of the Sages, he is not called virtuous. But this indicates that he is not called wicked either. This cannot be correct, as one who does not heed the instructions of the Sages is certainly wicked. Rather, Rava said: Virtuous women are those who do not reuse the examination cloth that they used to examine themselves before this intercourse. Even if no blood was found on it, they do not examine themselves with it prior to another act of intercourse, as once it was used once, it is not as clean as before. And those who are not virtuous women reuse the same examination cloths and examine themselves with them and they are not particular about this matter.
  § The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: With regard to a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, it is forbidden for her to engage in intercourse until she examines herself. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya: Does Shmuel mean that if she does not have a fixed menstrual cycle she is required to perform an examination, but if she has a fixed menstrual cycle she is not required to perform an examination? This is difficult, as the mishna teaches that even a woman with a fixed menstrual cycle is required to perform an examination before she engages in intercourse.
  Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya said to him: The mishna means that if she has a fixed menstrual cycle and she is awake, she is required to perform an examination; if she is sleeping she is not required to perform an examination before intercourse, as this would involve much effort. If she does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, then whether she is awake or sleeping, she is required to perform an examination.
  Rava says: And let Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya say a different answer to Rabbi Zeira: Shmuel means that if she has a fixed menstrual cycle, then in the case of a woman who handles pure items, she is required to perform an examination for the sake of intercourse as well. If she does not handle pure items, then for the sake of intercourse with her husband alone she is not required to perform an examination. By contrast, if she does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, then she is required to perform an examination even for the sake of intercourse with her husband. Rava concludes: And from the fact that Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya did not say this answer, one can learn from it that Shmuel holds that in any case where an examination is only for the purpose of intercourse with her husband, she is not required to perform an examination.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to donkey drivers and laborers who return home, and those who come home from the house of mourning or from the house of feasting for a wedding, their wives remain in a presumptive status of purity. And therefore they may come and remain with them, i.e., engage in intercourse with them, whether they are sleeping or awake. The <i>baraita</i> clarifies: In what case is this statement said? When the husbands left their wives in a presumptive state of purity. But if the husbands left them in a presumptive state of impurity, she remains forever in a status of impurity, until she says to him: I am ritually pure.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya, with regard to what case does Shmuel interpret this <i>baraita</i>? If the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, it is difficult, as Shmuel holds that such a woman who is awake is required to perform an examination, whereas the <i>baraita</i> indicates that no examination is necessary. And if the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, it is also difficult, as Shmuel holds that she always is required to perform an examination, whether she is awake or sleeping.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where she has a fixed menstrual cycle, and since her husband came home from his travels and requested of her that they engage in intercourse, there is no greater examination than this. Since she had time to consider the matter while he was asking her, she would have remembered had she sensed the onset of her menstrual cycle, whereas under regular circumstances she might not have time to recall. Based upon this explanation, Rav Pappa said to Rava: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to acting in accordance with this <i>baraita</i>? Perhaps it is necessary to wake her and ask her whether she is ritually pure.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  Rava said to Rav Pappa: Wise one [<i>sudani</i>]! No, won’t she be demeaned before him? It is embarrassing for her if she is awoken and has to think about whether or not she is pure. Rav Kahana says: I asked the members of the households, i.e., the wives, of Rav Pappa and of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: When the Sages, your husbands, came home from the study hall, did they require you to perform an examination prior to intercourse? And they said to me: No. The Gemara asks: But why ask their wives? Why not ask those Sages themselves? The Gemara answers: Perhaps they might rule leniently for others, while acting stringently with themselves. Therefore, their wives were asked, to determine how the Sages conducted themselves in their personal lives.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, she is forbidden to engage in intercourse, and she does not have the right to receive payment of her marriage contract if divorced or widowed, nor is she entitled to payment from her husband for the produce of her property that he consumed, nor is she entitled to provisions for her sustenance from his estate, nor does she get back her worn clothes or other items she brought with her to her marriage as part of her dowry. And furthermore, her husband must divorce her and he may never remarry her. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: She is permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband, but she must examine herself with two examination cloths, one prior to intercourse and one afterward. They may be to her detriment if she finds blood on the cloths, or they may lead to her betterment, since if she finds no blood she is permitted to her husband. They said in the name of Abba Ḥanan: Woe to her husband!
  The Gemara explains each clause of the <i>baraita</i>: She is forbidden to engage in intercourse, as perhaps she will ruin her husband if she emits blood during intercourse. And with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that she does not have the right to receive payment of her marriage contract, the reason is that since she is not fit for intercourse, she is not entitled to payment of her marriage contract.
  The Gemara continues its explanation: And she is not entitled to payment for the produce of her property, nor is she entitled to provisions for her sustenance from his estate, nor does she get back her worn clothes. The reason for all these is because stipulations in the marriage contract are considered like the marriage contract itself. Since she is not entitled to a marriage contract, she is likewise not entitled to these additional provisions that are stipulated in the marriage contract.
  The Gemara analyzes the next clause in the <i>baraita</i>: Her husband must divorce her and he may never remarry her. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this in a case where her situation was subsequently amended, i.e., she established a fixed menstrual cycle. Lest you say that he may remarry her, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not permitted, as sometimes such a woman might go and marry someone else and her status is subsequently amended.
  And the problem in this scenario is that her first husband might say: If I would have known that it is like this, that she would be cured, even if you would have given me one hundred times one hundred dinars to divorce her I would not have divorced her. And if so, the bill of divorce will be found to be void, and her children from her second husband will be considered <i>mamzerim</i>. Therefore it must be made clear to him from the outset that this divorce is final.
  The Gemara analyzes the final clause of the <i>baraita</i>: They said in the name of Abba Ḥanan: Woe to her husband! Some say that he said this to Rabbi Meir, as Abba Ḥanan maintains that the husband is required to settle her payment of her marriage contract upon their divorce. And some say that he said this to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, since Abba Ḥanan disagrees with his opinion and holds that it is forbidden to engage in intercourse with her, as perhaps she will ruin him if they engage in intercourse when she is menstruating.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus. The Gemara asks: And with regard to what case did Shmuel issue this ruling of <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara elaborates: If it is referring to a woman who is engaged in handling ritually pure items, didn’t Shmuel already say on another occasion that a woman without a fixed menstrual cycle must examine herself prior to intercourse?
  And if it is referring to a woman who is not engaged in handling ritually pure items, doesn’t Shmuel say that in any case where an examination is only for the purpose of intercourse with her husband, not for handling pure items, she is not required to perform an examination? As Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Abba bar Yirmeya says that Shmuel says: A woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle is forbidden to engage in intercourse until she examines herself, and we interpreted this statement as referring to cases where she is engaged in handling ritually pure items. The Gemara answers: He who teaches this does not teach that, i.e., Shmuel’s ruling is in fact referring to a woman engaged in handling pure items, and the two rulings were cited in his name by different Sages.
  
  
  Daf 13a
  
  MISHNA: With regard to any hand that is diligent to examine bodily emissions to ascertain ritual impurity, among women such a hand is praiseworthy. But among men such a hand should be severed, as this action is apt to lead to a seminal emission for naught.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about women and what is different about men, that women are praised for examining for bodily emissions while men are castigated for the same? The Gemara answers: Women are not susceptible to sexual arousal by this action, and therefore when a woman is diligent to examine herself she is considered praiseworthy; whereas men, who are susceptible to sexual arousal and may experience a seminal emission as a result of this contact, may not do so, and the hand of a man who conducts frequent examinations for emissions should be severed.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why does the mishna state specifically among men that only the hand that is diligent to examine, i.e., that does so often, should be severed? Even when a man is not diligent to examine, but does so occasionally, this action is also apt to cause a seminal emission. The Gemara answers: When the mishna teaches: Any hand that is diligent to examine, it states this only with regard to women, as men should not examine even occasionally.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the examination of men for seminal emissions. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement, that men should not examine themselves, said? It is said with regard to an examination for semen. But with regard to a man who examines himself for gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zov</i>], he too is praiseworthy for examining diligently, as women are. The reason is that a man who experiences two such discharges is ritually impure but is not obligated to bring an offering, whereas one who experiences three such emissions must bring an offering as a <i>zav</i>. Therefore, it is important for a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge to examine and count his emissions carefully.
  The <i>baraita</i> adds: And even with regard to semen, if one wants to examine himself with a rock or with a piece of earthenware, which are hard and will not warm the body, he may examine himself in this manner.
  The Gemara asks: And may a man not examine himself with a linen cloth? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A man may examine himself with a cloth, to see if he has emitted semen, or with any similar item that he wants? The Gemara answers: Just as Abaye said, with regard to a different issue, that it is referring to a coarse cloth, which will not warm one’s body, here too, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a coarse cloth, which will not lead to a seminal emission.
  The Gemara asks: And where was this statement of Abaye stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna (40a): If a priest was eating <i>teruma</i> and he sensed that his limbs quaked, indicating that a seminal emission was imminent, he should firmly hold his penis to prevent the emission from leaving his body, and swallow the <i>teruma</i> while ritually pure.
  A difficulty was raised with regard to this mishna: May he actually hold his penis? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to anyone who holds his penis and urinates, it is considered as though he is bringing a flood to the world, as masturbation was one of the sins that led to the flood (<i>Sanhedrin</i> 108b)? Abaye says in resolution of this difficulty that the mishna is referring to one who holds his penis with a coarse cloth.
  Rava says with regard to that mishna: You may even say that it is referring to a priest who holds his penis with a soft cloth, and the reason it is permitted is that once the semen has already been uprooted from his body, it is uprooted, and his subsequent holding of the penis, even with a soft cloth, does not increase the emission of semen. And Abaye prohibits the use of a soft cloth even here, as he is concerned that perhaps due to the contact of this cloth one might come to increase the emission of semen. But Rava is not concerned that perhaps one might come to increase the emission.
  The Gemara asks: And is Rava not concerned for this possibility? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: To what is this repeated examination of a man comparable? To one who places a finger in his eye, for as long as the finger is in the eye, the eye will tear and continue to tear. Here too, the priest’s action will lead to an increased emission of semen.
  The Gemara answers: And Rava would claim that if the priest’s limbs were not quaking and the semen was coming out in drops, there is indeed a concern that an examination might increase the emission. But when he feels his limbs quaking, this concern does not apply. The reason is that with regard to any warming of the body that leads to a seminal emission and that is then followed by another warming at the time when the semen is being uprooted, it is uncommon for the latter warming to increase the emission. Consequently, in this case the priest may hold his penis even with a soft cloth.
  The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to anyone who holds his penis and urinates, it is considered as though he is bringing a flood to the world. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: But if one does not hold his penis, small drops are sprayed on his legs, and he appears as one whose penis has been severed. A man with that affliction is incapable of fathering children. People who see urine on his legs might suspect that he is suffering from that condition and as a result they will cast aspersions about his children and say that they are children born from a forbidden relationship [<i>mamzerim</i>].
  Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is preferable that people cast aspersions about his children that they are <i>mamzerim</i>, and he should not render himself wicked even one moment before the Omnipresent.
  With regard to the same issue, it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said to the other Rabbis in response: It is possible for one to avoid spraying urine on his legs. How so? Let a person stand on an elevated place and urinate downward, or urinate into an area where there is loose soil, which absorbs the urine, so that it does not ricochet upward, and he should not render himself wicked even one moment before the Omnipresent.
  The Gemara asks: Which of these replies did Rabbi Eliezer say to the Rabbis first? If we say that it was the first statement, i.e., that one should not hold his penis even if people might cast aspersions about his children, that he said to the Rabbis first, and subsequently he told them that there was a way to avoid urine being sprayed on his legs, this is difficult; after saying to them that it is a prohibition, would he then say to them a practical remedy? By saying that one can avoid urine being sprayed on his legs, Rabbi Eliezer indicated that if one cannot do so he may hold his penis, which contradicts his other statement.
  Rather, clearly he said this practical solution to the Rabbis first, and they then said to him: If one does not have an elevated place or loose earth upon which he can urinate, what should he do? In response to this question, he said to them: It is preferable that people cast aspersions about his children that they are <i>mamzerim</i>, and he should not render himself wicked even one moment before the Omnipresent.
  The Gemara asks: And why must one refrain to that extent from holding his penis? Because as the result of holding his penis he might emit semen for naught. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who emits semen for naught is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated with regard to Onan, son of Judah: “And it came to pass, when he engaged in intercourse with his brother’s wife, that he spilled it on the ground, lest he should give seed to his brother. And the thing that he did was evil in the eyes of the Lord, and He slew him also” (Genesis 38:9–10).
  Rabbi Yitzḥak and Rabbi Ami say: One who emits semen for naught is considered as though he sheds blood, as it is stated: “But draw near here, you sons of the sorceress, the seed of the adulterer and the harlot…Are you not children of transgression, a seed of falsehood, you that inflame yourselves among the terebinths, under every leafy tree, that slay [<i>shoḥatei</i>] the children in the valleys, under the clefts of the rocks?” (Isaiah 57:3–5). Do not read this word as <i>shoḥatei</i>; rather, read it as <i>soḥatei</i>, i.e., one who squeezes out [<i>soḥet</i>] semen is considered to have shed the blood of the children who could have been born from that seed.
  Rav Asi says: It is considered as though he worships idols, as it is written here: “Under every leafy tree,” and it is written there, with regard to the mitzva of eradicating idols from Eretz Yisrael: “You shall destroy all the places, where the nations that you are to dispossess worshipped their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree” (Deuteronomy 12:2).
  § With regard to the issue of holding one’s penis for the purpose of urinating, the Gemara relates that Rav Yehuda and Shmuel were standing on the roof of the synagogue that was destroyed and rebuilt in Neharde’a. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: What can I do? I need to urinate. Shmuel said to him: <i>Shinnana</i>, hold your penis, so that the water does not fall onto the synagogue roof, and urinate outward, away from the synagogue.
  The Gemara asks: How could Rav Yehuda do so? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to anyone who holds his penis and urinates, it is considered as though he is bringing a flood to the world?
  Abaye says: The Sages rendered the halakhic status of this situation like that of a troop of marauders, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Avoda Zara</i> 70b): With regard to a troop of marauders that entered a town, if they did so in a time of peace, open casks of wine are forbidden, in case the marauders used the wine for libations in idol worship, whereas sealed casks are permitted. In a time of war, both these and those are permitted, because the marauders do not have leisure to pour libations. Evidently, since these marauders are afraid, they will not come to pour libations. Here too, in this incident involving Rav Yehuda, since he is afraid he will not come to have sexual thoughts.
  The Gemara asks: And what fear is there here, in the case of Rav Yehuda? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that there is the fear of the night and of the roof, i.e., that he might fall. And if you wish, say that the awe of his teacher, Shmuel, is upon him. And if you wish, say that the awe of the Divine Presence that dwells in the synagogue is upon Rav Yehuda. And if you wish, say that the awe of his Master, God, is upon him. Rav Yehuda was renowned for his fear of Heaven, as Shmuel declared about him: This one is not born of a woman, but is like an angel.
  And if you wish, say a different answer, that Rav Yehuda was allowed to hold his penis while urinating because he was married; as Rav Naḥman said: If one is married, it is permitted for him to hold his penis while urinating, as his improper sexual urges are not as strong.
  And if you wish, say that Shmuel ruled for Rav Yehuda in accordance with this <i>baraita</i>, which Abba, son of Rabbi Binyamin bar Ḥiyya, teaches: One may not hold the penis itself while urinating, but a man who wishes to urinate may assist the process by holding the testicles from below. Shmuel instructed Rav Yehuda to act in this manner. And if you wish, say that Shmuel ruled for Rav Yehuda in accordance with that which Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a clear demarcation in the prohibition against holding one’s penis while urinating: From the corona and below, toward the tip of the penis, it is permitted to hold, as this will not lead to arousal.
  
  Daf 13b
  
  From the corona and above, toward the body, it is prohibited.
  § Rav says: One who intentionally causes himself an erection shall be ostracized. The Gemara suggests: And let Rav say simply that it is prohibited. The Gemara explains that it is proper to ostracize such a man, as he arouses the evil inclination upon himself. And Rabbi Ami says: He is called a habitual transgressor, as this is the craft of the evil inclination. Today he says to a person: Do this sin, and when the individual obeys his inclination, on the following day the evil inclination says to him: Do that sin, and on the following day he says to him: Go and worship idols, and he goes and worships idols.
  Some say that Rabbi Ami says: With regard to anyone who brings himself into a state of arousal, they do not bring him within the boundary of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The proof is that it is written here, with regard to Onan, son of Judah: “And the thing that he did was evil in the eyes of the Lord, and He slew him also” (Genesis 38:10), and it is written there: “For You are not a God who has pleasure in wickedness; evil shall not sojourn with You. The boasters shall not stand in Your sight…But as for me, in the abundance of Your kindness will I come into Your house; I will bow down toward Your holy Temple in fear of You” (Psalms 5:5–8). This demonstrates that whoever does evil, like Onan, shall not sojourn with God.
  And Rabbi Elazar says, with regard to the severity of this transgression: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And when you spread forth your hands, I will hide My eyes from you; even when you make many prayers, I will not hear; your hands are full of blood” (Isaiah 1:15)? These are those men who commit adultery with the hand, by masturbating. Likewise, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: When it is stated in the Ten Commandments: “You shall not commit adultery” (Exodus 20:13), this means that there shall not be adultery among you, whether you masturbate by hand or whether with one’s foot.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Converts and those who play with children delay the coming of the Messiah. The Gemara asks: Granted with regard to converts, this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥelbo, as Rabbi Ḥelbo says: Converts are as harmful to the Jewish people as a leprous scab on the skin, as they are not proficient in the performance of the mitzvot and born Jews learn from them. But with regard to the category of those who play with children, to what is it referring?
  If we say that this is referring to homosexuality, such men are liable to be executed by stoning, and their behavior is criticized not simply because they delay the Messiah. Rather, one might suggest that this is referring to those who emit semen by way of other limbs, i.e., without engaging in intercourse; if so, they are considered as though they are bringing a flood, and are therefore liable to be punished themselves with a flood.
  Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means that they marry minor girls who are not yet capable of bearing children, consequently emitting semen for naught. As Rabbi Yosei said: The Messiah, son of David, will not come until all the souls of the body have been finished, i.e., until all souls that are destined to inhabit physical bodies do so. As it is stated: “For the spirit that enwraps itself is from Me, and the souls that I have made” (Isaiah 57:16). The verse is interpreted as follows: The spirit, i.e., the souls about which it has been decreed by Me that they are to be born, if they are not born, they enwrap the Messiah and prevent him from coming.
  § The mishna teaches that with regard to any hand that is diligent to examine bodily emissions, among men, such a hand should be severed. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do we learn this statement as a practical <i>halakha</i>, i.e., that the court should actually sever his hand, or do we learn it as a mere curse, but not as an actual instruction to punish him in that manner? The Gemara elaborates: Do we learn it as a practical <i>halakha</i> like that prohibition against striking another, in which the same expression is used: With regard to anyone who raises his hand upon another, his hand should be severed, and Rav Huna indeed acted accordingly and severed the hand of an offender? Or perhaps do we learn it as a mere curse?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Tarfon says: If one’s hand goes to his penis, his hand should be severed upon his navel. The Rabbis said to him: If so, in a case where a thorn was stuck in one’s belly, should he not remove it? Rabbi Tarfon said to them: Indeed, he should not remove it, and if he does so his hand should be severed. The Rabbis replied: But if his hand is severed while it is upon his navel, won’t his belly be split open? Rabbi Tarfon said to them: It is preferable that the belly of one who acts in this manner should be split open, and he should not descend into the pit of destruction.
  The Gemara analyzes this discussion: Granted, if you say that we learn the statement in the mishna as a practical <i>halakha</i>, this is the meaning of that which the Rabbis said: But if his hand is severed upon his navel, won’t his belly be split open? But if you say that we learn the statement in the mishna as a mere curse, what is the meaning of the phrase: Won’t his belly be split open? The Gemara responds: Rather, what explanation is the alternative? That we learn the mishna as stating a practical <i>halakha</i>? That would not explain the exchange between the Rabbis to Rabbi Tarfon, because is it not sufficient that the hand be severed not upon his navel? In other words, even if the hand must actually be severed, it is not clear why it should be severed while it is upon his navel.
  Rather, this is what Rabbi Tarfon is saying: With regard to anyone who inserts his hand below his navel, his hand should be severed. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Tarfon: If a thorn was stuck in one’s belly, should he not remove it? Rabbi Tarfon said to them: He should not. They responded: But won’t his belly be split open due to the thorn? Rabbi Tarfon said to them: It is preferable that his belly be split open, and he should not descend into the pit of destruction.
  MISHNA: In the case of a woman who is deaf [<i>haḥereshet</i>], or an imbecile, or blind, or who went insane, and is therefore unable to examine herself reliably, if such women have competent friends, those friends prepare them by examining them and immersing them in a ritual bath. And on that basis the incompetent women may partake of <i>teruma</i> after the sun sets.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that competent women must assist a deaf woman. The Gemara asks: Let her examine herself; as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: There was a deaf woman in our neighborhood who was so proficient in these matters that not only did she examine herself, but when her friends would see stains similar to blood and were unsure whether or not the stains were ritually impure, they would show her the stains.
  The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is referring to a woman who can speak but cannot hear. It is possible for such a woman to be an expert in examining blood. But here, the mishna is dealing with a woman who can neither speak nor hear, and she is therefore considered incompetent and incapable of examining herself. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 1:2): The deaf person of whom the Sages spoke everywhere is one who can neither hear nor speak, i.e., a deaf-mute.
  § The mishna further teaches that competent women must assist a blind woman. The Gemara similarly asks: Let her examine herself and show the cloth to her friend. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: The correct version of the mishna does not mention a blind woman.
  § The mishna also states that competent women must assist a woman who went insane. The Gemara asks: With regard to her ability to examine herself, isn’t this the same as an imbecile, who is already mentioned in the mishna? The Gemara answers: Here, the mishna is referring to a woman who went insane due to illness, which is a different category than that of an imbecile.
  The Gemara further discusses <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to an imbecile. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an imbecile priest who was ritually impure, competent men deal with his purification: They immerse him, and then enable him to partake of <i>teruma</i> in the evening, like any other priest who was impure. And those taking care of him must watch over him to ensure that he does not sleep before he partakes of <i>teruma</i>, in case he experiences a seminal emission, which would render him impure. If he slept, he is once again impure, and may not partake of <i>teruma</i>; if he did not sleep he is pure.
  Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says that there is another method of allowing an imbecile priest to partake of <i>teruma</i>: One prepares for him a leather pouch, which is wrapped around his penis, and before giving him <i>teruma</i> to partake of one checks this pouch to see if he has emitted semen. The other Sages said to him: It is improper to do this, as all the more so he will be prevented from partaking of <i>teruma</i>; this pouch warms him and increases the likelihood of a seminal emission. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said to them: According to your statement, an imbecile priest has no remedy that will enable him to partake of <i>teruma</i>.
  They said to him: According to our statement there is a way he can partake of <i>teruma</i>, as stated above: If he slept, he is impure; if he did not sleep he is pure. But according to your statement, that one wraps a pouch around his penis, this is not a reliable method, as perhaps he will see, i.e., experience the emission of, a drop of semen as small as a mustard seed, and it will be absorbed in the pouch and will not be noticed, which would mean that he is eating <i>teruma</i> in a state of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the methods by which an imbecile priest can partake of <i>teruma</i>. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: One prepares for him a metal pouch, which is placed on his penis and does not warm it.
  In explanation of this statement, Abaye says: And when this <i>tanna</i> speaks of metal, he means that the pouch should be made of copper, which does not absorb liquid, and therefore any drop of semen would be visible. This is as it is taught in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 12:5), with regard to the amount of water of purification that must be sprinkled on an individual who is impure due to impurity imparted by a corpse, that Rabbi Yehuda says: One considers those hyssop stems, with which the waters of purification are sprinkled, as though they are made of copper, which does not absorb any of the water.
  Rav Pappa says: One can learn from the statement of the Rabbis that a pouch wrapped around one’s penis can warm it enough to cause a seminal emission, that trousers are prohibited to be worn, as they too warm the penis, by being placed so they are tight against it. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the priestly garments: “And you shall make them linen trousers to cover the flesh of their nakedness, from the loins even to the thighs they shall reach” (Exodus 28:42)?
  The Gemara explains: That garment, the trousers worn by priests, was different, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The trousers of priests, to what are they comparable? They are similar to riding trousers [<i>pamalanya</i>] of horsemen, and this is what they look like: Above, they reach up to the loins; below, they go down to the thighs, and they have straps, and they have no opening, neither at the back nor at the front.
  Abaye says:
  
  Daf 14a
  
  It is prohibited for camel riders to partake of <i>teruma</i>, due to the concern for a seminal emission that might result from the friction. The Gemara notes: This opinion of Abaye is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Camel riders are all wicked, as they are suspected of emitting semen for naught. Sailors are all righteous, because they are in a constant state of danger at sea, and therefore their hearts are always turned to God in prayer.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: As for donkey drivers, some of them are wicked while some of them are righteous. With regard to the difference between wicked and righteous donkey drivers, there are those who say that this donkey driver is righteous, as his donkey is saddled, and therefore his penis does not rub against it, whereas that donkey driver is wicked, as his donkey is not saddled, which can cause a seminal emission. And there are those who say: This donkey driver is wicked, as he spreads [<i>demittartein</i>] his thighs on either side of the donkey, whereas that donkey driver is righteous as he does not spread his thighs in this manner, but rides with both legs on one side of the donkey, so that his penis does not rub against the donkey.
  The Gemara further discusses actions that are apt to lead to a seminal emission. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would curse one who sleeps lying on his back [<i>aparkeid</i>], as this might lead to a seminal emission. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Yosef say: One who is lying on his back may not recite <i>Shema</i>? From this it may be inferred that it is only <i>Shema</i> that one may not recite in this position, but to sleep lying in that position is permitted.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to the prohibition against sleeping while lying on one’s back, when one leans slightly to the side it is permitted. But with regard to reciting <i>Shema</i> while lying face upward, even when one leans slightly to the side it is prohibited. The Gemara asks: But wouldn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan lie on his back leaning slightly to the side and recite <i>Shema</i> in this manner? The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> in the case of Rabbi Yoḥanan is different, as he was corpulent, and consequently he could lean only slightly.
  MISHNA: It is the custom of Jewish women that they engage in intercourse with their husbands while using two examination cloths, one for the husband, to see if there is any of the wife’s blood on him after intercourse, and one for her, to ascertain after intercourse whether her menstrual flow has begun. And the modest women prepare a third examination cloth, to examine themselves and prepare the pubic area for intercourse.
  If blood was found on his cloth, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure for seven days, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of a menstruating woman and of one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman, and are each liable to bring a sin offering for unwittingly performing an action punishable with excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>]. If blood was found on her cloth immediately [<i>otyom</i>] after intercourse, the woman and her husband are likewise ritually impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both ritually impure due to uncertainty, as it is possible that the blood appeared only after intercourse, and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering.
  What is considered as being: After time passed? It is a period of time equivalent to the time needed for her to descend from the bed and rinse her face, a euphemism for her pubic area. And afterward, she retroactively transmits impurity to all ritually pure items with which she came into contact for the preceding twenty-four-hour period, by rabbinic law, but she does not transmit seven-day impurity to the man with whom she engaged in intercourse. He is impure with this impurity by rabbinic law only until the evening, like one who came in contact with a menstruating woman. Rabbi Akiva says: In the case where blood was found on her cloth after time passed, she even transmits seven-day impurity by rabbinic law to the man with whom she engaged in intercourse.
  The mishna concludes: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Akiva in the case of a woman who sees a blood stain and then engages in intercourse, that she transmits seven-day impurity to the man with whom she engaged in intercourse, although this impurity also applies by rabbinic law.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that if blood is found on the husband’s cloth after intercourse the husband and wife are both definitely impure. The Gemara asks: But let us be concerned that perhaps it is the blood of a louse, as it is possible that there was a louse in the woman’s pubic area that was squashed during intercourse, and its blood was found on the husband’s penis. Accordingly, it should be uncertain if they are impure. Rabbi Zeira says: There is no concern for this possibility, as that place, a woman’s genitals, is considered examined [<i>baduk</i>] with regard to the appearance of a louse, i.e., it is clear that no louse was there. And some say a different version of Rabbi Zeira’s statement: That place is too narrow [<i>daḥuk</i>] for a louse to enter, and therefore this is not a concern.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two versions of Rabbi Zeira’s statement? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where a squashed louse was found on the husband’s cloth, near the blood: According to this version, which states that a woman’s genitals are considered examined with regard to a louse, this louse certainly came from elsewhere, as a louse is never found in her pubic area, so the blood on the cloth is clearly from the woman, and therefore the couple is ritually impure. By contrast, according to that version, which states that the place is too narrow for a louse to enter, one can say that although it is generally too narrow, in this case one did enter and the man’s organ squashed it during intercourse, and therefore their impurity is uncertain.
  It was stated: If the woman examined herself with a cloth that was examined by her before she used it and found free of blood, and after the examination she pressed it against her thigh, and did not look at the cloth, and on the following day she found blood on her thigh, Rav says: In such a case she is definitely impure as a menstruating woman. Since it is known that the cloth was clear of blood before the examination, the blood on her thigh must be from her examination, and it must have passed onto her thigh after the cloth was pressed there. Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said to Rav: But didn’t you say to us with regard to this case that she needs to be concerned for ritual impurity, which indicates that her impurity is uncertain?
  In this regard it was also stated that Shmuel says: She is definitely impure as a menstruating woman. And they likewise rule as a practical <i>halakha</i> in the study hall that this woman is definitely impure as a menstruating woman.
  With regard to a similar case, it was stated: If a woman examined herself with a cloth that was not examined by her before its use, and she then placed it in a box without looking at it, and on the following day she found blood on this cloth, the question is whether the blood was on the cloth before the examination and the woman is consequently not impure, or whether the blood is from the examination, and she is impure. Rav Yosef says: All the days of Rabbi Ḥiyya he would deem such a woman impure, but in his old age he would deem her pure.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to this statement of Rav Yosef: With regard to what type of impurity status is he speaking? Does he mean that all his days Rabbi Ḥiyya would deem the woman definitely impure as a menstruating woman, and therefore any <i>teruma</i> with which she came into contact required burning; and in his old age he would deem her pure from the definite impurity status of a menstruating woman, but would deem her impure as a woman who discovered a stain, which is an uncertain source of impurity? If so, according to his ruling from his old age any <i>teruma</i> she touches is not burned but may not be eaten.
  Or perhaps does Rav Yosef mean that all his days Rabbi Ḥiyya would deem the woman impure as a matter of uncertainty due to the stain, and in his old age he would deem her pure from any type of impurity status?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution for this dilemma, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman examined herself with a cloth that was not examined by her before its use, and she placed it in a box, and on the following day she found blood on this cloth, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: She is definitely impure as a menstruating woman, and Rabbi Ḥiyya says: She is impure as a matter of uncertainty due to the stain.
  
  Daf 14b
  
  Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Do you not concede that for her to become ritually impure she requires that the size of the blood stain on the cloth be more than the size of a split bean? If the stain is smaller, it is assumed to have been caused by a squashed louse. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Indeed [<i>aval</i>], that is correct. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: If so, you too render this blood found on the cloth in the box a stain, which renders one impure as a matter of uncertainty. If you had considered it definitely impure, there would have been no distinction between a small stain and a large one.
  The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who deems the woman definitely impure in this case, maintains that although we require that the size of the blood stain be more than the size of a split bean, this is necessary only to exclude the possibility that this is the blood of a louse; and since the possibility that it is the blood of a louse has been excluded, as its size is more than that of a split bean, it certainly came from her body, and therefore she is definitely impure.
  The Gemara analyzes this statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya with reference to the dilemma under discussion: What, is it not correct to assume that Rabbi Ḥiyya was in his old age when he disagreed with his teacher, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He would not have done so when he was young. And if he deemed the woman impure as a matter of uncertainty in his old age, it can be inferred that in his youth he would deem her definitely impure as a menstruating woman. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from here that this is the case.
  § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would praise Rabbi Ḥama bar Bisa to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, by saying that he is a great man. Rabbi Yishmael said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: When he comes to you, bring him to me.
  When Rabbi Ḥama came before him, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Ask me about a halakhic matter. Rabbi Ḥama asked him: If a woman examined herself with a cloth that was not examined by her before its use, and she placed it in a box, and on the following day she found blood on this cloth, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rabbi Yishmael said to him: Shall I say to you an answer in accordance with the statement of father, Rabbi Yosei, or shall I say to you an answer in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Which would you prefer? Rabbi Ḥama said to him: Say to me an answer in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Yishmael said: Is this the one that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says about him that he is a great man? How can he neglect the statement of the teacher, Rabbi Yosei, and listen to the statement of the student, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi?
  The Gemara explains: And Rabbi Ḥama bar Bisa did so because he maintains that the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is preferable, as he is the head of the yeshiva, and the Sages are frequently in his presence, and due to the constant disputes his statements are sharper than those of Rabbi Yosei, despite the fact that Rabbi Yosei was his teacher.
  The Gemara asks: What is this statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and what is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, referred to by Rabbi Yishmael? Rav Adda bar Mattana says that the reference is to that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this case: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems the woman impure and Rabbi Yosei deems her pure.
  And Rabbi Zeira says, in explanation of this dispute: When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deemed the woman impure, he ruled in accordance with the line of reasoning of Rabbi Meir, and when Rabbi Yosei deemed her pure, he deemed her pure in accordance with his own line of reasoning.
  As it is taught in a mishna (59b): In the case of a woman who was urinating and saw blood mixed in the urine, Rabbi Meir says: If she urinated while standing, she is impure, as the blood could have originated in the uterus. If she was sitting, she is pure, as the blood is clearly from the urethra.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Whether she urinates in this manner, standing, or whether she urinates in that manner, sitting, she is pure. Like Rabbi Meir, who disregards the possibility that the blood originated in the urethra in a case where the woman was standing, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems a woman impure in the case where blood is found on the cloth in the box, despite the possibility that it could have been on the cloth before she used it to examine herself. Rabbi Yosei, by contrast, maintains that wherever there is a reasonable uncertainty, the woman is not impure.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: But doesn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, say that when Rabbi Meir deemed the woman impure in the case involving urination, he merely deemed her impure as a matter of uncertainty, due to contact with a blood stain, whereas Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said that in the case involving a stained cloth the woman is definitely impure as a menstruating woman? Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: This is what we are saying: When that comment of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, concerning the ruling of Rabbi Meir was stated, it was stated that he deemed the woman impure as a menstruating woman.
  § The mishna states: If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure and are each liable to bring a sin offering. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation, i.e., what is considered to be immediately after intercourse? This is comparable to a male organ and a cloth that are standing alongside the doorpost, i.e., at the entrance to the vagina; at the exit of the organ the cloth immediately enters.
  The Gemara comments: This is the period of time concerning which the Sages said: During this period any blood on the cloth renders both the woman and the man ritually impure and liable to bring a sin offering. Yet this period is referring only to an external wipe of the pubic area with the cloth after intercourse, to see if there was a flow of blood during intercourse. But this time frame was not stated with regard to a full internal examination. If the woman conducts a full examination of herself, too much time would have passed since the intercourse for the man to be considered definitely impure.
  § The mishna further states: If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both ritually impure due to uncertainty, as it is possible that the blood appeared only after intercourse, and therefore they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: But they are each liable to bring a provisional guilt offering brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. The Gemara asks: And the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna, what is the reason that he does not render each of them liable to bring a provisional guilt offering?
  The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of our mishna holds that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering in every case involving the uncertain violation of a prohibition that, were it certain, would render one liable to bring a sin offering. Rather, we require it to be a case akin to that of one piece from two pieces, e.g., one had two pieces of meat before him, one of which was definitely forbidden while the other was permitted, and he does not know for certain which he ate. But when the uncertainty involves a single item, which may or may not have been forbidden, one does not bring a provisional guilt offering. In the case discussed in the mishna there is only one woman, as it is uncertain whether or not engaging in intercourse with her was permitted, which depends on whether menstruation began before or after intercourse.
  § The mishna states: What is considered after time passed? It is a period of time equivalent to the time needed for the woman to descend from the bed and rinse her pubic area. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: What is considered after time passed? Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, explained: It is a period equivalent to the time in which she may extend her hand under the cushion or under the blanket and take a cloth and examine herself with it. This is a shorter period than that required for her to get out of bed and rinse her pubic area.
  Rav Ḥisda says: What is the meaning of: After, in the mishna? After, after. In other words, this is referring to the period after the period of time mentioned by Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, who said it is after the amount of time it takes for the woman to extend her hand under the cushion and take a cloth and examine herself. The mishna is referring to the period of time that follows the time frame referred to by Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, as: After time passed. If blood is found after this amount of time has elapsed the man is not ritually impure for a seven-day period, but only until evening, according to the Rabbis.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in the mishna with regard to this time period: If blood was found on her cloth after time passed, they are both ritually impure due to uncertainty, and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. And the mishna continues: What is considered after time passed? It is a period of time equivalent to the time needed for her to descend from the bed and rinse her face, i.e., her pubic area. This indicates that the period of time that follows the ability to perform an immediate examination is that which is mentioned in the mishna, and the mishna is not discussing the third time frame concerning which the husband is impure only until the evening.
  The Gemara explains that this is what the mishna is saying: What is considered after time passed? It is a period equivalent to the time in which she may extend her hand under the cushion or under the blanket and take a cloth and examine herself with it, as stated by Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok. And with regard to the other time frame, i.e., equivalent to the time needed for her to descend from the bed and rinse her face, i.e., her pubic area, there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis as to whether the man is impure for seven days or only until the evening.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis, doesn’t the mishna teach: Afterward, which indicates that they disagree concerning blood found in the time period that comes after the period in which she can descend from the bed and rinse her pubic area? The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: And this time frame, i.e., which is equivalent to the time needed for her to descend from the bed and rinse her pubic area, is that period of time labeled: Afterward, with regard to which Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree.
  Rav Ashi says a different resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i>: Both this and that are one period, as it all depends on the situation. If the cloth is already in her hand, she does not need to extend her hand, and therefore the time frame is as stated in the mishna: Equivalent to the time needed for her to descend from the bed and rinse her face. If the cloth is not in her hand, the period is equivalent to the time in which she may extend her hand under the cushion or under the blanket and take a cloth and examine herself with it, while she is still in bed.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s interpretation from a <i>baraita</i>: What is considered after time passed, at which point the blood found on the woman’s cloth renders them both impure as a matter of uncertainty for seven days? About this matter Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, asked the Sages in Usha, and he said to them:
  
  Daf 15a
  
  Perhaps you say in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, that the woman transmits impurity to the man with whom she engaged in intercourse, just as she retroactively transmits impurity to any pure items she touched in the preceding twenty-four-hour period? The Sages of Usha said to Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok: We have not heard this opinion of Rabbi Akiva, i.e., we do not accept it as <i>halakha</i>, and therefore we would like to know what this period of: After time passed, is.
  Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said to them: This is how the Sages of Yavne explained it: As long as the woman did not wait before examining herself after intercourse for a period of time equivalent to the time in which she may descend from the bed and rinse her face, this is considered within the period of time referred to in the mishna as: After time passed. And if blood is found on the cloth she used to examine herself during this period, they are both impure for seven days due to uncertainty, and they are exempt from bringing a sin offering, as this offering is brought only for an unwitting sin that was definitely committed. But they are each obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering.
  If she waited before examining herself after intercourse for a period of time equivalent to the time in which she may descend from the bed and rinse her face, this is considered: After time, i.e., after the time frame referred to in the mishna as: After time passed.
  In this case, and likewise in a case when she waited for a twenty-four-hour period or from examination to examination, i.e., she examined herself before intercourse and was pure, and then examined herself within twenty-four hours after intercourse and was impure, the man with whom she engaged in intercourse becomes impure until evening due to contact with a menstruating woman, but he does not become impure for seven days as one who engaged in intercourse with a menstruating woman. Rabbi Akiva says: He even becomes impure for seven days as one who engaged in intercourse with a menstruating woman. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, says: In such a case, not only is her husband not impure for seven days, but he is not even deemed impure until evening by rabbinic law. Therefore, if he is a priest he may enter the Sanctuary and burn incense.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty with Rav Ashi’s interpretation of the mishna according to this <i>baraita</i>: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who maintains that the period of: After time passed, during which if the woman found blood on her cloth the man with whom she engaged in intercourse is rendered impure for seven days, is equivalent to the time it takes for her to extend her hand and examine herself, this is the reason that the Rabbis deem him pure if she discovered blood after this period has passed.
  But according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, who holds that if she has a cloth in her hand then she renders the man with whom she engaged in intercourse impure if she discovers blood within the amount of time it takes for her to descend from the bed and rinse or clean her pubic area with the cloth she is holding in her hand, why do the Rabbis deem him pure if the amount of time that has passed is the time it takes for her to descend and clean her pubic area? She should still render him impure during that time span.
  And if you would say that the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a case where the cloth is not in her hand, and for this reason the time period that it is referring to is after the amount of time it would take for the woman to extend her hand and examine herself, this cannot be the case, as if so, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> should have taught two cases: A cloth is in her hand, and: A cloth is not in her hand, to differentiate between the situations. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this <i>baraita</i> poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Ashi.
  § The <i>baraita</i> teaches that Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, says: If the examination took place following this period called: After time passed, her husband is not ritually impure at all, and therefore if he is a priest he may enter the Sanctuary and burn incense. The Gemara asks: And let him derive that the husband is impure because he is one who touched a menstruating woman during the twenty-four-hour period before she discovered blood, as the Sages decreed that pure items touched by a menstruating woman in the twenty-four hours before she noticed the bleeding are impure retroactively.
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who said the ruling, holds like Shammai, who said in a mishna (2a): For all women, their time is sufficient, i.e., women who discern the emergence of menstrual blood do not need to be concerned that the flow of blood began before they noticed it, and they assume ritual impurity status only from that moment.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai: And let him derive that the husband is impure because he is one who experienced a seminal emission. The Gemara answers that he is referring to a case where the husband did not complete his act of intercourse.
  § The mishna states: And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Akiva in the case of a woman who sees a blood stain, that she transmits seven-day impurity to the man with whom she engaged in intercourse. The Gemara cites a dispute of <i>amora’im</i> in this regard. Rav says that she renders the man with whom she engaged in intercourse impure retroactively, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a woman who sees a blood stain renders pure items impure retroactively (see 5a).
  And Shmuel says that she does not render him impure retroactively, but only if he engages in intercourse with her from now and onward, i.e., after she sees the blood stain, and this is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a woman who sees a blood stain renders pure items impure only from that moment onward. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the opinion of Shmuel: Why does the mishna find it necessary to state that she renders him impure from now and onward? Isn’t it obvious?
  The Gemara explains that it was necessary for the mishna to state this ruling, lest you say: Since the woman’s retroactive impurity for a twenty-four-hour period is a decree that applies by rabbinic law, and the impurity of blood stains also applies by rabbinic law, one might claim as follows: Just as her retroactive impurity of a twenty-four-hour period does not render impure the man with whom she engaged in intercourse, so too, her blood stains should not render impure the man with whom she engaged in intercourse. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that she does render him impure from that point onward.
  The Gemara asks: But perhaps one can say that indeed, she does not transmit impurity to him? The Gemara explains that there is a difference between the two types of rabbinic impurity: There, with regard to retroactive impurity, it is not a case of: The slaughtered ox is before you, i.e., the evidence of impurity did not exist at the time, as she had yet to experience menstruation. Therefore, the Sages did not apply the stringency of retroactive impurity to the husband. By contrast, here, with regard to the impurity of blood stains, it is a case of: The slaughtered ox is before you, as blood has appeared on the cloth.
  The Gemara notes: And Reish Lakish similarly says, like Rav, that the woman transmits impurity to the man with whom she engaged in intercourse retroactively, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says, like Shmuel: She renders him impure from now and onward, i.e., after she sees the blood stain, and this is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  MISHNA: All women have the presumptive status of purity for their husbands, and therefore one is not required to ascertain whether his wife is ritually pure before engaging in intercourse with her. Even with regard to husbands returning from a journey, if their wives were ritually pure when they left, their wives have the presumptive status of purity for them.
  GEMARA: Why does the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna need to teach the <i>halakha</i> of husbands returning from a journey? In what manner are they different from other husbands? The Gemara explains that it might enter your mind to say: This statement, that women have the presumptive status of purity, applies only in a case where the husband is in the city of his residence, as the woman takes upon herself the responsibility of being ready for her husband at all times, and therefore she examines herself. But in a case where the husband is not in the city, since she does not take upon herself the responsibility of being constantly ready for him, perhaps she should not have the presumptive status of purity. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches us that even in this case she has a presumptive status of purity.
  The Gemara notes that in this regard, Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: And this <i>halakha</i> that the wife of a husband returning from a journey has a presumptive status of purity is applicable only in a case where the husband came and found that his wife was within the days of her projected period, i.e., within thirty days of her previous menstruation. In this case he may assume that she has not yet experienced a new period, and therefore he may rely on her presumptive status of purity. But if he arrived after thirty days had elapsed from her previous menstruation, it is assumed that she experienced menstruation at the usual time and therefore it is not permitted for him to engage in intercourse with her unless she examined herself and found herself pure.
  § With regard to the presumptive status of purity of wives, Rav Huna says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in the case of a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle. But with regard to a woman who does have a fixed menstrual cycle, it is prohibited for her husband to engage in intercourse with her.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it the opposite? On the contrary; the reverse claim stands to reason: If the wife does not have a fixed cycle, one can say that perhaps she saw blood, and therefore she should be forbidden to him; whereas if she has a fixed cycle, since her cycle is fixed for her she knows when she will become impure and is presumed to be pure beforehand.
  Rather, if Rav Huna’s differentiation was stated, it was stated like this: Rav Huna says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case when the projected time of the woman’s period had not arrived before her husband returned from his journey. But if the projected time of her period had arrived, she is forbidden to him. Rav Huna maintains that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law, as this is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. If a woman did not examine herself at this time she is presumed to have experienced bleeding, even if she did not sense the emission of blood, though there is no formal obligation to examine herself at this time. Accordingly, a husband returning home from a journey cannot rely on the assumption that his wife has examined herself at the projected time of her period, unless he positively establishes that she has done so.
  By contrast, Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: Even if the projected time of her period had arrived, she is permitted to her husband. Rabba bar bar Ḥana maintains that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by rabbinic law, and therefore she is not considered to have experienced bleeding, though by rabbinic law she must still examine herself to ascertain that she is pure.
  Rav Ashi teaches the opinions of Rav Huna and Rabba bar bar Ḥana like this: Rav Huna says:
  
  Daf 15b
  
  The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i>, that a woman has a presumptive status of purity to her husband, only in a case where she does not have a menstrual cycle of days alone, but has a menstrual cycle that is determined both by fixed days and by physical actions she might perform, such as jumps. The reason is that since the matter is also dependent on a particular action, one can say that she did not jump and therefore she did not see blood, and consequently she is presumed to be pure. But with regard to a woman who has a menstrual cycle of days alone, and the projected day of her period arrived, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse with her husband.
  The Gemara explains that Rav Huna maintains that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law. Since she has an uncertain status of impurity by Torah law when the projected day of her period arrives, it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband only after an examination.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: Even if she has a menstrual cycle of days alone, she is permitted to her husband. Rabba bar bar Ḥana maintains that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by rabbinic law. Consequently, she is not considered to have experienced bleeding, though by rabbinic law she should have examined herself to ascertain if she was pure.
  Rav Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, and her husband was away for seven days after the expected onset of her period, at which point he returned home, her husband calculates the days of her cycle; and if in the elapsed time it was possible for her to immerse and purify herself, he can presume that she did so, and he may engage in intercourse with her even without asking her whether she is pure.
  Rav Shmuel bar Yeiva said to Rabbi Abba: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan state this ruling even with regard to a young girl, who is embarrassed to go and immerse herself, in which case one can claim that if her husband was away she would not have gone to the ritual bath?
  Rabbi Abba said to Rav Shmuel bar Yeiva: Is that to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan applied this <i>halakha</i> to all cases? Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that a woman who definitely saw blood is also permitted to her husband? You can say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said his ruling with regard to a case where it is uncertain whether the woman saw blood and it is uncertain whether she did not see blood, and therefore her husband may engage in intercourse with her, as one can reason as follows: If you say that she saw blood, one can still say that perhaps she immersed.
  But if she definitely saw blood, it is not permitted for the husband to engage in intercourse with her. The reason is: Who is to say that she immersed? It is a conflict between an uncertainty as to whether or not she immersed, and a certainty that she saw blood, and there is a principle that an uncertainty does not override a certainty. In the case of a young girl, since it is uncertain whether she saw blood, and it is uncertain whether she immersed, she is permitted to her husband.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with this principle: And does an uncertainty not override a certainty? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a <i>ḥaver</i> who died and left a storehouse filled with produce, even if the produce was there only that day, it has the presumptive status of produce that was ritually prepared, i.e., properly tithed. This is due to the presumption that the <i>ḥaver</i> tithed the produce himself or instructed others to do so. The Gemara infers: And here, the produce was definitely untithed at the outset, and there is uncertainty whether the <i>ḥaver</i> tithed it, and there is uncertainty whether he did not tithe it. And despite this conflict, the uncertainty whether it was tithed comes and overrides the certainty that it was untithed produce.
  The Gemara rejects this claim: There, the conflict that leads to the question with regard to the produce’s status is between certainty and certainty, as the <i>ḥaver</i> certainly tithed the produce. This presumption is in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a; as Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a presumption with regard to a <i>ḥaver</i> that he does not release an item from his possession that is not ritually prepared.
  And if you wish, say instead that in that case the conflict is between uncertainty and uncertainty, as it is possible that there was never an obligation to tithe this produce, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya. As Rabbi Oshaya said: A person can employ artifice to circumvent obligations incumbent upon him in dealing with his grain, and bring it into his courtyard in its chaff, so that his animal may eat from it, and this grain is exempt from tithe. Although the obligation to tithe produce applies even to animal fodder, it is permitted to feed one’s animal untithed produce that was brought into one’s home before being fully processed. Consequently, the case involving produce is a conflict between two uncertain factors, as it is uncertain whether or not the owner was obligated to tithe the produce in the first place, and even if he was required to do so, it is uncertain whether or not he tithed it.
  The Gemara challenges: And still, is it correct that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving the maidservant of a certain olive gatherer [<i>massik</i>] in the city of Rimon, who cast a non-viable newborn into a pit, and a priest came and looked into the pit to ascertain whether the baby was male or whether it was female, as the length of time of a woman’s ritual impurity after childbirth, even if she gave birth to a non-viable newborn, depends on whether the child was male or female (see Leviticus, chapter 12).
  And the incident came before the Sages to rule whether or not the priest contracted ritual impurity while standing over the corpse, and they deemed him ritually pure. The basis for this ruling was: Due to the fact that martens and hyenas are common there, it is likely that the body was dragged away before the priest arrived at the pit.
  The Gemara explains the challenge from this <i>baraita</i>: And here, where it is certain that the maidservant cast the non-viable newborn into the pit, and it is uncertain whether an animal dragged it away and it is uncertain whether no animal dragged it away, the Sages nevertheless ruled that an uncertainty comes and overrides a certainty.
  The Gemara rejects this challenge: Do not say in the <i>baraita</i> that the woman certainly cast a non-viable newborn into a pit; rather, say
  
  Daf 16a
  
  that she cast an item similar to a non-viable newborn into a pit. Perhaps it was not a non-viable newborn; it might simply have been congealed blood, which does not transmit impurity. Therefore, this is a conflict between uncertainty and uncertainty. It is unclear whether there was anything in the pit that could have rendered the priest ritually impure, and even if there was, it might already have been dragged away.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And a priest came and looked into the pit to ascertain whether it was male or whether it was female? This indicates that the only uncertainty was with regard to its sex; it was certainly a non-viable newborn.
  The Gemara answers that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: And a priest came and glanced at the baby to ascertain whether the woman discharged a non-viable newborn, or whether she discharged an amorphous mass. And if you say that she discharged a non-viable newborn, he sought to ascertain whether it was male or whether it was female.
  And if you wish, say instead that this was not a conflict between certainty and uncertainty; rather, it was between two certainties. Since martens and hyenas are common there, they certainly dragged it away immediately. Consequently, the ruling in this case does not contradict the principle that an uncertainty does not override a certainty.
  § The Gemara returns to the issue of a woman’s examination at the projected time of her period. The Sages asked Rav Naḥman: Does the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods, and in turn the obligation for her to perform an examination at that time, apply by Torah law? If so, if a woman did not examine herself she is ritually impure, even if she later examined herself and did not find any blood, as it is assumed that she emitted blood without her seeing it. Or perhaps the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods, and in turn the obligation for her to perform an examination at that time, applies by rabbinic law? If so, a woman who did not examine herself at the time and did not sense the emission of blood can still examine herself after that time and would be ritually pure.
  Rav Naḥman said to them: A resolution can be found for your dilemma from that which Huna our colleague said in the name of Rav: With regard to a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, and the projected time of her period arrived and she did not examine herself, and ultimately, when she did examine herself, she saw blood, the <i>halakha</i> is that she must be concerned for ritual impurity from the projected time of her period and that therefore any pure items she touched since then are impure. And additionally, she must be concerned for ritual impurity with regard to the twenty-four hours prior to her seeing the blood, and any items she touched during those twenty-four hours are impure, even if she saw the blood a short while after the projected time of her period. Evidently, the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law, which is why the <i>halakha</i> is stringent.
  There are those who say that this is what Rav Naḥman said to the other Sages: The reason for Rav’s ruling that pure items she touched are retroactively considered impure is that she ultimately saw blood, from which it may be inferred that if she did not see blood, one is not concerned about the status of pure items that she touched from the projected time of her period, despite the fact that she neglected to examine herself at the time. Evidently, the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by rabbinic law.
  § Since the Gemara mentioned Rav’s ruling it cites the dispute between Rav and Shmuel with regard to this <i>halakha</i>. It was stated that these <i>amora’im</i> disagree about a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, and the projected time of her period arrived and she did not examine herself, and ultimately she examined herself. Rav says: If she examined herself at this later time and found that she was ritually impure, she is impure; and if she found that she was pure, she is pure. And Shmuel says: Even if she later examined herself and found that she was pure, she is impure. This is because the manner of women, i.e., a women’s menstrual period, comes at its usual time.
  The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the concern for impurity of women at the pro-jected time of their periods? As one Sage, Shmuel, who rules that the woman is impure in both cases, holds that this concern for impurity applies by Torah law, and one Sage, Rav, who says that if her subsequent examination came out clean then she remains pure, holds that this concern for impurity applies by rabbinic law.
  Rabbi Zeira says: It is possible that everyone, even Rav, agrees that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law, and the reason Rav deems the woman pure in this case is that here it is a situation where she examined herself within the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation, i.e., very close to the projected time of her period, and therefore it is assumed that if there was blood at the projected time of her period she would have seen it upon this examination. By contrast, there, in other cases of subsequent examinations, she did not examine herself within the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Actually, Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the matter of the projected time of their periods itself, as one Sage, Shmuel, holds that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law, and one Sage, Rav, holds that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara continues to discuss this dispute between Rav and Shmuel. Rav Sheshet says: This disagreement between Rav and Shmuel is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says that a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle but who did not examine herself at the projected time of her period is ritually impure as a menstruating woman, which indicates that in his opinion the examination at the projected time of a woman’s period applies by Torah law.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua says that she should be examined now, despite the elapsed time, and if the examination came out clean she is pure retroactively as well. Apparently, Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that this examination applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara adds: And the dispute of these <i>tanna’im</i> is parallel to the dispute of those <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir says: She is ritually impure as a menstruating woman, and the Rabbis say: She should be examined now.
  Abaye said: We, too, learn likewise in a mishna, as we learned in a mishna (39a): Rabbi Meir says: If a woman was in hiding from danger, and the projected time of her period arrived and she did not examine herself, nevertheless she is ritually pure, as it may be assumed that she did not experience bleeding because fear dispels the flow of menstrual blood, and therefore there is no concern that she might have emitted blood without sensing it. By inference, the reason she is pure is that there is fear of danger; but if there is no fear upon this woman, she is impure. Evidently, Rabbi Meir maintains that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law.
  The Gemara further suggests: Shall we say that these following <i>tanna’im</i> also disagree with regard to this matter of whether the examination at the projected time of a woman’s period is required by Torah law? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who sees blood due to a wound in her pubic area, even if she saw the blood during the days of her menstruation, including the projected time of her period, she is pure, as it is assumed that the blood came from the wound; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that if the woman does not have a fixed menstrual cycle then the blood can be attributed to the wound. But if she has a fixed menstrual cycle, and she saw blood on the projected day of her period, even if the blood was from the wound she must be concerned that blood from her period might be mixed with this blood from the wound, and must therefore observe impurity status.
  The Gemara clarifies its suggestion: What, is it not the case that these Sages disagree with regard to this matter, i.e., that one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by Torah law, and though she can examine herself and ascertain that she is pure, if she did not she is presumed impure, and therefore he is stringent in the case of a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle; and one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by rabbinic law, and consequently he rules leniently even with regard to a woman who has a fixed cycle?
  Ravina says: No; they do not necessarily disagree with regard to this point, as it is possible that everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, agrees that the concern for impurity of women at the projected time of their periods applies by rabbinic law, and here they disagree as to whether the location of a woman’s source, i.e., her uterus, is impure, and therefore any blood that passes through there is impure, even if it is blood from a wound.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the woman herself is pure from the seven-day impurity status of a menstruating woman, as the requirement of an examination upon the projected time of her period applies by rabbinic law, but the blood is impure, even if it is from a wound, as it came through her source, and was thereby rendered impure. Consequently, the blood renders the woman impure until the evening.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If you are concerned due to the possibility that this is blood of her menstrual period, then the woman should also be impure as a menstruating woman. And if you are not concerned due to the possibility that this is blood of her menstrual period, then her source does not transmit impurity to the blood that passes through its location, as that blood is pure.
  MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: A woman is required to examine herself with two cloths, once before and once after each and every act of intercourse in which she engages throughout the night, and she must inspect them for blood the following morning, or she must engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp and inspect the cloths before and after each act of intercourse. Beit Hillel say: She is not required to examine herself between each act of intercourse. Rather, it is sufficient for her to examine herself with two cloths throughout the night, once before the first act of intercourse and once after the final act of intercourse.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Beit Shammai it is permitted to engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp. In this regard, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Even though the Sages said with regard to one who engages in intercourse by the light of a lamp, that this is disgraceful, Beit Shammai say: A woman is required to examine herself with two cloths, once before and once after each act of intercourse, or she must engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp. And Beit Hillel say: It is sufficient for her to examine herself with two cloths throughout the night, once before the first act of intercourse and once after the final act of intercourse.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your statement that a woman may engage in intercourse several times in one night without an examination between each act of intercourse, let us be concerned lest she will see, i.e., emit, a drop of blood the size of a mustard seed during the first act of intercourse, and will thereby become impure, and semen from the second act of intercourse will cover it. Since the examination after the last act of intercourse will not reveal the drop of blood, the woman will erroneously think she is pure.
  Beit Hillel said to them in response: Even according to your statement, let us be concerned that while the saliva was still in the mouth, i.e., while the blood was in her vagina, perhaps it was squashed and disappeared. Even if she examines herself after each act of intercourse, as mandated by Beit Shammai, it is possible that the semen of that act covered the blood, and it will not be revealed by the examination.
  Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: One cannot compare the two situations, as a squashed drop of blood after the woman has engaged in intercourse once is not similar to a squashed drop of blood after the woman has engaged in intercourse twice, and therefore our concern is more reasonable.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehoshua said: I see as correct the statement of Beit Shammai in this case. His students said to him: Our teacher, how you have weighed [<i>he’erakhta</i>] us down with this stringent ruling. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: It is preferable that I weigh you down in this world, so that you do not sin by engaging in prohibited intercourse, i.e., so that your days in the World-to-Come will be lengthened [<i>sheya’arikhu</i>].
  § Rabbi Zeira says: From the statements of all of them, i.e., both Beit Shammai, who permit engaging in intercourse a second time only after an examination, and Beit Hillel, who rule that the second examination must be performed only after the final act of intercourse of the night, we can learn that their dispute relates only to that which is permitted after the fact. But a pious person [<i>ba’al nefesh</i>] should not engage in intercourse and repeat his act without an examination between each act.
  Rava says: Even a pious person may engage in intercourse and repeat the act without an examination in between, as when that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is referring to a woman who handles pure items. But with regard to intercourse with her husband, there is no cause for concern.
  This opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that a woman must examine herself before and after every act of intercourse according to Beit Shammai, or before the first act and after the last act, according to Beit Hillel? It was said with regard to a woman who handles pure items; but a woman is permitted to her husband even without any examination, and he is not required to ask her if she is pure. But in what case is this lenient statement said? When her husband traveled and left her with the presumptive status of ritual purity. But if he left her with the presumptive status of ritual impurity, she remains forever in her presumptive status of impurity until she says to him: I am pure.
  § Rabbi Abba says that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav says: If a woman examined herself at night with a cloth, and the cloth was then immediately lost, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse again until she examines herself with another cloth, as perhaps there was blood on the cloth that was lost. Rabbi Ila objects to this: If this cloth were intact, i.e., if it were not lost, couldn’t this woman engage in intercourse with her husband that night, on the basis that she will examine the cloth only the following day, and isn’t this the <i>halakha</i> even though she does not know at the time of intercourse whether there is blood on the cloth? Now too, although the cloth is lost, let her engage in intercourse with her husband.
  Rava said to him: There is a difference between the two cases, as when the cloth is intact, this woman’s proof exists, and if she discovers on the following day that she was impure they will be obligated to bring sin offerings for engaging in intercourse in a state of ritual impurity. But with regard to that woman who lost her cloth, her proof does not exist, and therefore they will never know if they require atonement.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is prohibited for a person to engage in intercourse by day. Rav Hamnuna says: What is the verse from which this is derived? As it is stated: “Let the day perish on which I was born, and the night on which it was said: Conceived is a man-child” (Job 3:3). It is derived from here that nighttime is meant for conception, but daytime is not meant for conception. Reish Lakish says that the proof is from here: “But he who despises his ways shall die” (Proverbs 19:16). One might see something unpleasing in his wife in the daylight and come to despise her.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Reish Lakish interpret this verse cited by Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers that he requires that verse for that which Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa taught. As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa interpreted that verse in the following manner: That angel that is appointed over conception is called: Night. And that angel takes the drop of semen from which a person will be formed and presents it before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and says before Him: Master of the Universe, what will be of this drop? Will the person fashioned from it be mighty or weak? Will he be clever or stupid? Will he be wealthy or poor?
  The Gemara notes: But this angel does not say: Will he be wicked or righteous? This is in accordance with a statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: Everything is in the hand of Heaven, except for fear of Heaven. People have free will to serve God or not, as it is stated: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you other than to fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 10:12). The fact that God asks of the Jewish people to fear Him indicates that it is a person’s choice to do so.
  The Gemara explains: And Rabbi Yoḥanan derives two <i>halakhot</i> from the verse “and the night on which it was said: Conceived is a man-child,” as he holds as follows: If so, i.e., if it is referring only to the statement of the angel, let the verse write: And the night that said: A man-child is conceived. What is the meaning of: “Conceived is a man-child”? It is derived from the juxtaposition of the word “night” and the word “conceived” that nighttime is meant for conception but daytime is not meant for conception.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, how does he interpret that verse cited by Reish Lakish? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan requires that verse: “But he who despises his ways shall die,” to teach that which is written in the book of ben Sira: Three people I have hated, and a fourth I have not loved: A minister who frequents [<i>hanirgal</i>] drinking houses, as he disgraces himself and leads himself to ruin and death; and some say a different version of the text: A minister who chats [<i>hanirgan</i>] in drinking houses; and some say a third version: A minister who is short-tempered [<i>hanirgaz</i>] when in drinking houses.
  That is the first that he hated. And the others are one who dwells at the highest point of the city, where everyone sees him; and one who holds his penis and urinates. And the fourth, whom he has not loved, is one who enters the house of another suddenly, without warning. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this includes even one who comes into his own house without prior warning, as the members of his household might be engaged in private activities.
  The Gemara cites a similar saying. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Four matters the Holy One, Blessed be He, hates, and I do not love them, and they are: One who enters his house suddenly, and needless to say one who suddenly enters the house of another; and one who holds his penis and urinates;
  
  Daf 17a
  
  and a man who urinates naked next to his bed; and one who engages in intercourse in the presence of any living being. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: Does the phrase: In the presence of any living being, mean even in the presence of mice? Shmuel said to him: <i>Shinnana</i>, that is not the case. Rather, it is referring to a situation such as in so-and-so’s house, where they engage in intercourse in the presence of their Canaanite slaves and maidservants.
  The Gemara asks: And those members of that household, who act in that manner, what verse do they interpret in a manner that allows them to do so? The Gemara answers: They reference the verse in which Abraham said to his two servants: “Remain here with [<i>im</i>] the donkey” (Genesis 22:5). This verse is interpreted as meaning that they are a nation [<i>am</i>] comparable to a donkey. The members of the aforementioned household thought that it is permitted to engage in intercourse in the presence of animals, and therefore one can do so in the presence of his Canaanite slaves and maidservants.
  The Gemara cites practices of modesty observed by the Sages. Rabba bar Rav Huna would sound the bells [<i>zagei</i>] of the canopy above his bed when engaging in intercourse, so that people would know to keep away. Abaye would even drive away flies [<i>didevei</i>] from around his bed, so that he would not engage in intercourse in their presence, and Rava would drive away gnats [<i>peruḥei</i>].
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai further says: There are five actions with regard to which one who performs them is held liable for his own life, and his blood is upon his own head, i.e., he bears responsibility for his own demise. They are as follows: One who eats peeled garlic or a peeled onion or a peeled egg, and one who drinks diluted drinks; all these are referring to items only when they were left overnight. And one who sleeps at night in a cemetery, and one who removes his nails and throws them into a public area, and one who lets blood and immediately afterward engages in intercourse.
  The Gemara analyzes this statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, beginning with the case of one who eats peeled garlic, a peeled onion, or a peeled egg, when they were left overnight. The Gemara notes: And these peeled foods are dangerous even if they are placed in a basket and they are tied and sealed in that basket throughout the night, as an evil spirit rests upon them. And we said that eating them is dangerous only if one did not leave on them their roots or their shells. But if one left on them their roots or their shells, we have no problem with it.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai further mentions one who drinks diluted drinks that were left overnight. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And that is dangerous only when they were left overnight in metal vessels. Rav Pappa says: And natron vessels are considered like metal vessels in this regard. And Rabbi Yoḥanan likewise says: And that is dangerous only when they were left overnight in metal vessels, and natron vessels are considered like metal vessels in this regard.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai also says: And one who sleeps in a cemetery places himself in danger. The Gemara notes that this is the case if he does so in order that a spirit of impurity will rest upon him, as sometimes the evil spirits in the cemetery endanger the one who sleeps there.
  The next case is one who removes his nails and throws them into a public area. The Gemara explains that this is dangerous because a pregnant woman might pass over them, and this can cause her to miscarry. And we said this <i>halakha</i> only when one removes his nails with scissors [<i>bigenosteri</i>]. And furthermore, we said this <i>halakha</i> only when one removes the nails of his hand and his foot together. And we said this <i>halakha</i> only when he did not cut anything else after his nails, but if he cut something else after them, we have no problem with it. The Gemara comments: And that is not so; rather, we are concerned with regard to the entire matter, i.e., in all cases.
  With regard to removing one’s nails, the Sages taught: Three matters were stated with regard to removing nails: One who burns them is pious, as he eradicates them entirely; one who buries them is on the slightly lower level of a righteous individual, as they might be dug up; and one who simply throws them where a person might step upon them is wicked.
  The Gemara discusses the final clause of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai’s statement: And one who lets blood and immediately afterward engages in intercourse. This is as the Master said: With regard to one who lets blood and afterward engages in intercourse, he will have weak [<i>vittakin</i>] children conceived from this act of intercourse. If both of them, husband and wife, let blood and engaged in intercourse, he will have children afflicted with a disease known as <i>ra’atan</i>. Rav says: And we said this only in a case when he did not taste anything after letting blood, but if he tasted something then we have no problem with it.
  § Rav Ḥisda says: It is prohibited for a person to engage in intercourse by day, as it is stated: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18). The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? Abaye says: If one engages in intercourse by day, perhaps the husband will see some repulsive matter in his wife and she will become repugnant to him, which will cause him to hate her, and he will thereby violate this mitzva. Rav Huna says: Jews are holy, and they do not engage in intercourse by day.
  Rava says: And if the house is dark, it is permitted to engage in intercourse by day there. And in the case of a Torah scholar, he may cause darkness with his garment and engage in intercourse even during the daytime, as he will certainly do so with modesty.
  The Gemara challenges: We learned in the mishna: Or she must engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp. This indicates that one may engage in intercourse in the light. The Gemara answers: Say that the mishna reads: She must examine the cloth by the light of a lamp, but not engage in intercourse in this manner.
  The Gemara cites a relevant source. Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: Even though the Sages said that one who engages in intercourse by the light of a lamp is repulsive, nevertheless Beit Shammai say: Or she must engage in intercourse by the light of a lamp and inspect the cloths before and after each act of intercourse. The Gemara similarly explains: Say that the <i>baraita</i> reads: One who examines herself before or after intercourse by the light of a lamp is repulsive, as this examination would not be conducted properly, since the light of the lamp may not be sufficient. Nevertheless Beit Shammai say that a woman who engages in many acts of intercourse in one night must examine the cloth by the light of a lamp.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: And the household of King Munbaz would perform three matters, and the Sages would mention them favorably for their behavior in this regard. They would engage in intercourse by day; and they would examine before and after intercourse with wool [<i>bemeila</i>] of Parhava, which is very white and would show any stain; and they would practice ritual impurity and purity with regard to snow. Regardless of the meaning of the last two matters, in any event this <i>baraita</i> teaches that they would engage in intercourse by day, which indicates that this practice is not prohibited.
  The Gemara answers: Say that they would examine their beds, i.e., check the examination cloths, by day. The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable that this is the correct explanation, as if it should enter your mind that it means that they would engage in intercourse by day, even if it is permitted, would the Sages have mentioned them favorably for this practice? The Gemara refutes this proof: Yes, it is indeed so. There is a praiseworthy aspect to engaging in intercourse by day, as at night there is a risk of being overcome by sleep, because the husband might be too tired after the exertions of the day, and consequently his wife who desires sexual intercourse might be repulsive to him.
  The Gemara further analyzes the <i>baraita</i>, which teaches: And the household of King Munbaz would examine before and after intercourse, with wool of Parhava. The Gemara notes: This statement supports the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: One may examine a bed, i.e., use an examination cloth for intercourse, only with a cloth made of linen [<i>befakolin</i>], or with one made of clean and soft wool. Rav says: This is the explanation of that which I heard when I was there, in Eretz Yisrael, on Shabbat evenings, which is the time when Torah scholars engage in intercourse with their wives; people would offer and say: Who needs linen cloths for eating bread [<i>benahama</i>], a euphemism for intercourse. And I did not know what they were saying until now.
  Rava says: Those worn-out flax clothes are good for examination. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t the school of Menashe teach: One may not examine a bed with a red cloth, nor with a black cloth, nor with flax, but with a cloth made of linen, or with one made of clean and soft wool?
  The Gemara answers that this is not difficult, as this statement that one may not examine with flax is referring to flax itself, whereas that statement of Rava, that flax is good for an examination, is referring to flax garments. And if you wish, say instead that both this statement and that statement are referring to flax garments, and the difference is that this ruling that one may not use flax is referring to new garments, whereas that ruling of Rava is referring specifically to worn-out garments, which are brighter.
  It was further stated that the household of King Munbaz was praised by the Sages because its members would practice ritual impurity and purity with regard to snow. The Gemara comments: We learned in a <i>baraita</i> there (see <i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 2:5): Snow is neither food nor drink with regard to ritual impurity. If one designated it for consumption, his intention is disregarded, and it does not impart the ritual impurity of food. But if one planned to use it as a drink, it imparts the ritual impurity of liquid.
  If part of the snow became impure, it does not all become impure, but only the area that came into contact with the item of ritual impurity, as a pile of snow is not considered a single unit. If impure snow in a vessel is lowered into a ritual bath, even if the waters of the ritual bath touched only the snow on the mouth of the vessel, since part of the snow is purified, all of it is purified.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: This <i>baraita</i> itself is difficult. You initially said that if part of the snow became impure, it does not all become impure, and then the <i>baraita</i> teaches that if part of the snow is purified, all of it is purified, which is to say that all of it became impure. In other words, the last clause of the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a lump of snow all of which is ritually impure, whereas according to the previous clause this is impossible: How could the source of the impurity have touched all of the snow?
  Abaye says: It is possible for all the snow to become impure, in a case where one passed the snow within the airspace of an earthenware vessel, such as an oven, in which the source of impurity was located. This renders the entire lump of snow impure, as the Torah testifies with regard to an earthenware vessel that contains a source of impurity that all items inside its airspace are rendered impure, as the verse states: “Whatever is in it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33).
  
  Daf 17b
  
  Therefore, even if the earthenware vessel was full of items as small as mustard seeds, only a few of which touched the sides of the vessel or the impure item inside it, all the items inside the vessel are rendered ritually impure. Likewise, with regard to snow that passes through the vessel’s airspace, all of it becomes impure.
  MISHNA: A woman’s reproductive organs are composed of different parts, and the halakhic status of blood that emerges from one part differs from the halakhic status of blood that emerges from another part. The Sages stated a parable with regard to the structure of the sexual organs of a woman, based on the structure of a house: The inner room represents the uterus, and the corridor [<i>perozdor</i>] leading to the inner room represents the vaginal canal, and the upper story represents the bladder.
  Blood from the inner room is ritually impure. Blood from the upper story is ritually pure. If blood was found in the corridor, there is uncertainty whether it came from the uterus and is impure, or from the bladder and is pure. Despite its state of uncertainty, it is deemed definitely impure, due to the fact that its presumptive status is of blood that came from the source, i.e., the uterus, and not from the bladder.
  GEMARA: Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, were learning tractate <i>Nidda</i> in the study hall of Rav Huna. Rabba bar Rav Huna found them sitting and saying an interpretation of this mishna: The room, i.e., the uterus, is the inner part of the reproductive organs, and the corridor is the outer part. And the upper story, the bladder, is built, i.e., found, above them both. And there is an open vestibule between the upper story and the corridor.
  They continued: If blood is found from the opening of this vestibule and inward toward the uterus, i.e., inside the vagina, there is uncertainty whether it came from the uterus and is impure, or from the bladder and is pure, but its state of uncertainty renders it definitely impure. If it is found in the area from the opening of this vestibule and outward, on the outer surface of the vulva, the blood is more likely to have come from the bladder, through the urethra, and therefore its state of uncertainty renders it pure.
  Rabba came and said to his father, Rav Huna: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> of blood that is found from the vestibule and inward, did the Master say to us that its state of uncertainty renders it impure, as I heard in the study hall, from which it may be inferred that this is a case of uncertain impurity? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: The blood is impure due to the fact that its presumptive status is of blood that came from the source, i.e., the uterus? This indicates that it is a case of definite impurity. If so, the mishna cannot be referring either to blood found from the vestibule and inward or from the vestibule and outward.
  Rav Huna said to his son Rabba: This is what I said: If the blood was found from the vestibule inward it is definitely impure, as it is presumed to come from the uterus. This is the case mentioned in the mishna. If the blood was found from the vestibule outward its state of uncertainty renders it impure. Although it can be claimed that if this was blood from the uterus it would not have been found in this area, it is possible that when the woman bent over, the blood went from the uterus into this area. Consequently, she is impure due to the uncertainty.
  Abaye says: What is different about a situation where the blood was found from the vestibule outward, where its state of uncertainty renders it impure? The reason for that <i>halakha</i> is that perhaps the woman bent over and leaned forward, and the blood came from the room, i.e., the uterus. If so, in the case where the blood was found from the vestibule inward, concerning which you ruled that she is definitely impure, you can also say that it is possible that the woman staggered backward and as a result the blood came from the upper story to the back of the canal. Accordingly, she should be impure merely out of uncertainty.
  Rather, Abaye says: If you follow the concern, i.e., if your ruling of <i>halakha</i> is based on a concern that the blood might have moved due to the woman leaning forward or backward, then in both this case and that, whether the blood is found in the inner or outer section of the canal, the source of the blood is uncertain. And if you follow the presumption based on where the blood found in a particular place is usually from, then blood found from the vestibule inward is definitely impure, whereas blood found from the vestibule outward is definitely pure.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: Blood that is found in the corridor is considered definite menstrual blood, and therefore if she engages in intercourse, both she and her partner would be liable as a result of this blood to receive <i>karet</i> for entering the Temple intentionally when ritually impure, or to bring an offering for entering unwittingly. And one burns <i>teruma</i> due to it, if the woman touches such produce. And Rav Ketina says: It is impure merely as a matter of uncertainty; therefore, the woman is not obligated, due to that blood, to bring an offering for entering the Temple when ritually impure, and one does not burn <i>teruma</i> on its account.
  The Gemara discusses the relationship between this dispute and the previous statements of <i>amora’im</i>. According to this formulation, i.e., option, that Abaye stated: If you follow the concern that the blood might have moved due to the woman leaning forward or backward, there is uncertainty whether the blood was found in the inner or outer section of the canal, this supports the opinion of Rav Ketina, who likewise deems blood found in the canal impure due to uncertainty. And this option suggested by Abaye contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who deems the blood definitely impure.
  According to that formulation that Abaye stated: If you follow the presumption that blood found in the inner section is definitely impure, while blood found in the outer section is definitely pure, this supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, whose ruling that the blood is definitely impure is understood as referring to blood found in the inner section.
  
  Daf 18a
  
  And this option contradicts the opinion of Rav Ketina, who deems the blood impure due to uncertainty.
  And according to the opinion of Rav Huna, who said that if the blood was found in the inner section it is definitely impure, as it is presumed to come from the uterus, and if the blood was found in the outer section it is impure due to uncertainty, one can say that Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rav Ketina do not disagree, as they were referring to different cases. Here, where Rabbi Ḥiyya deems the blood definitely impure, he is speaking of blood found from the vestibule and inward, whereas there, Rav Ketina deems it impure due to uncertainty when it is found from the vestibule and outward.
  But according to the opinion of Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, who say that if the blood is found from the vestibule and outward, its state of uncertainty renders it pure, whereas if it is found in the area from the vestibule and inward, its state of uncertainty renders it impure, with regard to what case can the dispute between these Sages, Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rav Ketina, be interpreted? It must be referring to a situation where the blood was found from the vestibule and inward, as according to Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, if the blood is found from the vestibule and outward it is pure.
  If so, shall we say that Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who deems the blood definitely impure, whereas they maintain that it is impure merely due to uncertainty?
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. It is possible that Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, agree with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as they maintain that there is no dispute between Rav Ketina and Rabbi Ḥiyya. Once again the reason is that Rav Ketina and Rabbi Ḥiyya might be referring to two different cases: Here, Rabbi Ḥiyya deems the blood definitely impure because he is speaking of a case where it is found on the floor of the corridor, in which case the blood is presumed to come from the uterus rather than the bladder. And there, Rav Ketina, who deems the blood impure due to uncertainty, is referring to blood that is found on the roof of the corridor, and therefore it is uncertain whether the blood came from the bladder or the uterus.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In three places where there is uncertainty the Sages followed the majority, and based on that majority they established the <i>halakha</i> in these cases as though they involved a certainty. The three cases are as follows: The source, the afterbirth [<i>shilya</i>], and a shaped limb. The Gemara elaborates: The source is that which we just said, i.e., that blood found in the corridor from the vestibule and inward it is ritually impure, because the majority of blood found there is from the uterus.
  The afterbirth is as we learned in a mishna (26a): If a woman miscarried and the afterbirth is in the house, the house is ritually impure, in the sense that everything under the roof becomes impure due to impurity imparted by a corpse. And the reason is not that the afterbirth itself has the status of an offspring; rather, it is that there is no afterbirth without an offspring. It is clear that the afterbirth contained an offspring, which disintegrated after the miscarriage. That offspring renders the contents of the house impure. Rabbi Shimon says: The offspring was squashed before it emerged with the afterbirth. Consequently, the house is not rendered impure, because the squashed fetus is nullified by the majority of blood that accompanied the miscarriage.
  The third case of an uncertainty where the Sages followed the majority is that of a shaped limb, as we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who miscarries a shaped hand, i.e., its fingers are discernible, or a shaped foot, its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it certainly came from a full-fledged fetus, and we are not concerned that perhaps it came from a fetus with a sealed, i.e., deficient body, in which case the miscarriage does not have the status of childbirth with regard to ritual impurity. The reason is that most pregnant women give birth to a fully formed fetus, and therefore it is presumed that the hand or foot came from a whole fetus that was squashed during childbirth. Once again the Sages established the impurity as a certainty, based on a majority.
  The Gemara asks: And are there no more cases of uncertainty in which the Sages determined the <i>halakha</i> according to the status of the majority, treating the case as though it involved a certainty? But isn’t there the case of nine stores?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from slaughtered animals, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person bought meat from one of the stores and he does not know from which store he bought the meat, in this case of uncertainty, the meat is prohibited. With regard to an item of uncertain status, if it separated from its fixed location it is presumed to have separated from the majority of items like it in that location, and has their halakhic status. But in the case of an item that remained in its fixed location, i.e., didn’t separate, it is viewed as an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority. This ruling is based on the principle: The halakhic status of uncertainty with regard to any item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced, and one does not follow the majority.In this case, when it comes to determining whether or not this meat comes from a kosher store, since the uncertainty stems from the act of buying the meat in the store, and the stores are fixed in their places, the two types of stores are regarded as though they were equal in number.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And in the case of meat found in the street, outside the stores, follow the majority of stores. If most stores in the city sell kosher meat one can assume that the meat he found is kosher, based on the principle: Any item separated, i.e., not fixed in its place, is presumed to have been separated from the majority. Similar to the previous cases, this meat is treated as certainly kosher on the basis of a majority.
  The Gemara answers: We say that this list of cases mentioned by Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to matters of ritual impurity, whereas we do not say that the list includes cases that involve prohibitions, such as that of non-kosher meat.
  The Gemara further asks: But isn’t there the case where there were nine dead frogs, which do not impart ritual impurity, and one carcass of a creeping animal among them, which does impart impurity, and someone touched one of these ten dead creatures, and he does not know which of them he touched? The <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If this occurred in the private domain the item’s uncertain impurity renders it impure, as it is derived from the Torah that in cases of uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity in the private domain, the item is deemed impure. If the contact occurred in the public domain, the item’s uncertainty leaves it pure.
  The Gemara continues: And in a case where one of these creatures was separated from the rest and was found elsewhere, and the person touched it there, follow the majority. Since most of the animals do not impart ritual impurity, this individual remains pure. This is another case involving uncertain impurity where the Sages established the <i>halakha</i> as certain based on the majority.
  The Gemara explains: We say that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s list is referring to matters of ritual impurity of a woman, whereas we do not say that the list includes cases that involve ritual impurity in general.
  The Gemara further asks: But isn’t there that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: With regard to a pregnant woman who passed across a river
  
  Daf 18b
  
  and she miscarried her fetus into the river, but she does not know whether or not the fetus was fully formed, she brings the offering of a woman after childbirth, i.e., a burnt offering and a sin offering. And the sin offering, which is a bird, is eaten after the nape of its neck has been severed, in the manner of a regular bird sin offering. This is the <i>halakha</i> despite the uncertainty, i.e., this fetus might not have been fully formed, in which case the woman is not obligated to bring this offering, and a bird that is not an offering may not be eaten if its nape was severed.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains the reasoning behind this ruling: One must follow the majority of pregnant women, and most pregnant women give birth to full-fledged offspring. If so, this is another case involving an uncertainty where the Sages established the <i>halakha</i> as a certainty based on the majority. Furthermore, this case involves the ritual impurity of a woman. Why then did Rabbi Yoḥanan list only three cases of this kind?
  The Gemara answers: We say that only cases taught in the Mishna or a <i>baraita</i> are included in this list, whereas we do not say that those derived from an amoraic halakhic statement, e.g., the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, are included.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this explanation: But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina raises an objection against the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from a <i>baraita</i> that deals with an unsure woman, i.e., one who does not know when she gave birth. Ravin added: And I do not know what his objection was from that <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara discusses Ravin’s statement: What, is it not correct to say that Ravin meant that this <i>baraita</i> is not a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi but actually provides support for that opinion? If so, that would mean that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s opinion is effectively taught in a <i>baraita</i> as well, and therefore according to the above consideration Rabbi Yoḥanan should have included it in his list.
  The Gemara answers: This is not necessarily the correct inference, as perhaps Ravin meant simply that the ruling of this <i>baraita</i> is neither a refutation nor a support for the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.
  § When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that in three places where there is uncertainty the Sages followed the majority and established the <i>halakha</i> as though it involved a certainty, he is clearly indicating that some cases are excluded from this category. The Gemara asks: Rabbi Yoḥanan says this to exclude what?
  If we say that he says this to exclude an uncertain case where on the one hand there is a majority that indicates the woman should be deemed ritually impure and on the other hand there is a presumptive status along with it that opposes that majority, which is why the uncertainty is not treated as a certainty, and therefore one does not burn <i>teruma</i> due to contact with that impurity, this cannot be the case. The reason is that Rabbi Yoḥanan already said it on another occasion, with regard to other cases of ritual impurity, that if the consideration of a majority indicates that an item should be impure while its presumptive status indicates that it should be pure, it is not considered definitely impure.
  The Gemara cites the source for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion in this regard. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 3:8): If a ritually impure child is found alongside ritually pure started dough that has not yet risen, and he has risen dough in his hand that may have been removed from the larger portion of started dough, Rabbi Meir deems the started dough pure, since there is no proof the child touched it, as he might have been given the piece by someone else. And the Rabbis deem it impure, as they assume that he touched the started dough. The child is presumed to be impure, because it is the norm of a child to handle items.
  And we say with regard to this dispute: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? He holds that a majority of children handle items that are within reach, in this case the dough, and a minority do not handle items within reach, and this dough retains a presumptive status of purity, since its impurity has not been definitively determined. Therefore, one should append the fact that the minority of children do not handle items within reach to the presumptive status of purity of the dough, and the force of the majority of children who handle items within reach is weakened. Therefore, the dough is considered pure.
  And the Rabbis contend that in a case where the majority is followed, the minority is considered like it does not exist. And consequently, there is a conflict between the determining factors of the majority of impure children who handle items within reach and the presumptive status of purity of the dough. Therefore, the majority takes precedence.
  And Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: This <i>halakha</i> of a child is an example of a presumption, that children handle items within reach, over which <i>teruma</i> is burned, as the Rabbis hold that it is sufficiently certain that the dough has become impure to allow it to be burned. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is not a presumption over which <i>teruma</i> is burned. Rather, the dough is left aside, and can be neither eaten nor burned, due to the uncertainty whether it is impure. In this context, Rabbi Yoḥanan has already stated that when a majority is contradicted by a presumption, the status of uncertainty applies. Therefore, there was no need for him to specify the three cases he mentioned in order to exclude situations of this kind.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that there are only three cases in which uncertainty is treated as certainty is meant to exclude a specific situation involving a majority, as discussed by Rabbi Yehuda. As we learned in a mishna (21a): In the case of a woman who miscarries an amorphous piece of flesh, if there is blood that emerges with it, the woman is ritually impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. And if not, she is pure, as she is neither a menstruating woman nor a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Yehuda says: In both this case, where blood emerged, and that case, where no blood emerged, the woman is impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman, as there was certainly undetected blood that emerged with the flesh.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Rabbi Yehuda deemed the woman impure, despite the fact that no blood emerged, only in the case of a piece of flesh that has the color of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, as stated in the mishna below (19a). But if it has the color of other types of blood, the woman is pure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If a woman miscarries a piece of flesh that has the color of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, all, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, agree that she is impure. And likewise, if the piece has the color of other types of blood, all agree that she is pure. The Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree only with regard to a case where the woman miscarried an amorphous piece of flesh,
  
  Daf 19a
  
  and she herself does not know exactly what the appearance of the piece of flesh that she miscarried was, e.g., if it was lost. In this case Rabbi Yehuda holds: Follow the majority of miscarriages of amorphous pieces of flesh, and the majority of pieces of flesh have the appearance of one of the four types of impure blood. And the Rabbis hold: We do not say: Follow the majority of miscarriages of amorphous pieces of flesh. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s mention of three cases is meant to exclude this statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who rules that the woman is definitely impure based on a majority.
  MISHNA: There are five distinct colors of ritually impure blood in a woman: Red, and black, and like the bright color of the crocus [<i>karkom</i>] flower, and like water that inundates red earth, and like diluted wine. Beit Shammai say: Even blood like the water in which a fenugreek plant is soaked, and like the liquid that drips from roast meat, are ritually impure, and Beit Hillel deem blood of those colors ritually pure. With regard to blood that is green, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems it impure and the Rabbis deem it pure.
  Rabbi Meir said: Even if the green blood does not transmit impurity due to the <i>halakhot</i> of a blood stain or the blood of a menstruating woman, it is blood in that it renders food susceptible to ritual impurity due to its status as one of the seven liquids that render food susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Yosei says: Neither in this sense, as the blood of a menstruating woman according to Akavya ben Mahalalel, nor in that sense, as a liquid that renders food susceptible to impurity according to Rabbi Meir, is green blood considered blood.
  The mishna asks: What is the red color that is impure? It is as red as the blood that flows from a wound. What is the black color that is impure? It is blood as black as <i>ḥeret</i>. If the black is deeper than that, the blood is ritually impure; if the black is lighter than that, the blood is ritually pure. And what is the color that is like the bright color of the crocus flower that is impure? It is like the brightest part in the flower, which is harvested to produce the orange-colored spice saffron.
  And what is the color that is like water that inundates red earth that is impure? It is specifically earth from the Beit Kerem Valley and specifically when one inundates the earth with enough water until it pools on the surface. And what is the color that is like diluted wine that is impure? It is specifically when the dilution consists of two parts water and one part wine, and specifically when it is from the wine of the Sharon region in Eretz Yisrael.
  GEMARA: The fact that the mishna discusses the colors of ritually impure blood in a woman indicates that there is blood that is not impure. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is pure blood in a woman? Perhaps any type of blood that emerges from a woman is impure?
  Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosef says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The verse states with regard to those who come before the court: “If there arise a matter too hard for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between leprous mark and leprous mark, even matters of controversy within your gates, then you shall arise, and get up unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8). When the verse states: “Between blood and blood,” it means between pure blood and impure blood, which demonstrates that there must be types of pure blood that are emitted by a woman.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, then does the other expression in the verse: “Between leprous mark and leprous mark,” also mean: Between a pure leprous mark and an impure leprous mark? And if you would say that indeed, this is what it means, is there a type of pure leprous mark? And if you would say that there is in fact a pure leprous mark, according to the verse: “Then the priest shall look; and behold, if the leprosy has covered all his flesh, he shall pronounce pure the one that has the leprous mark; it is all turned white: He is pure” (Leviticus 13:13), that mark is not classified as a leprous mark; rather, it is called a paleness, as a leprous mark is by definition impure.
  Rather, the phrase “between leprous mark and leprous mark” must mean the following: Between the leprous marks that afflict man (see Leviticus 13:1–46) and the leprous marks of houses (see Leviticus 14:33–53) and the leprous marks of garments (see Leviticus 13:47–59), as different <i>halakhot</i> pertain to these categories of leprous marks, and yet they are all ritually impure. Therefore, here too, when the verse states: “Between blood and blood,” it means: Between the blood of a menstruating woman and the blood of a discharge [<i>ziva</i>], and they are all ritually impure. If so, this verse cannot be cited as proof that there is a type of blood emitted by a woman that is pure.
  The Gemara questions this interpretation: This verse serves as the source for the areas of <i>halakha</i> for which a rebellious elder is liable to receive the death penalty for publicly ruling in contradiction to a decision of the Sanhedrin, as it states: “And the man who does presumptuously, in not listening to the priest that stands to minister there before the Lord your God, or to the judge, that man shall die; and you shall exterminate the evil from Israel” (Deuteronomy 17:12). With this in mind, the Gemara asks: What is this explanation? Granted, there, with regard to leprous marks, even if all the leprous marks are impure, one can disagree with the Sanhedrin with regard to the leprous marks that afflict man, and therefore the rebellious elder could potentially disagree with the court with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 4:11): If the snow-white leprous mark [<i>baheret</i>], which is one sign of leprosy, preceded the white hair, which is another sign, he is ritually impure, as stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 13:3). And if the white hair preceded the <i>baheret</i> he is pure, as this is not considered a sign of impurity. If there is uncertainty as to which came first, he is impure. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is dull [<i>keha</i>]. And Rabba says, explaining the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua: In the case of uncertainty, the leprous mark is deemed as though it is of a dull shade, and therefore the person is ritually pure.
  Likewise, with regard to the leprous marks of houses one can find a case where the rebellious elder might dispute the ruling of the Sanhedrin, such as that dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 12:3): Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: A house is never deemed impure with leprosy unless the leprous mark will be seen to be the size of two split beans, and it is found on two stones on two walls in a corner between two walls. The length of the mark is that of two split beans, and its width is that of one split bean.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? The word “wall” is written in the verse, and the word “walls” is written in the same verse: “And he shall see the leprous mark…in the walls of the house with hollow streaks, greenish or reddish, and their appearance is lower than the wall” (Leviticus 14:37). Which is one wall that is like two walls? You must say: This is a corner between two walls.
  Similarly, with regard to the leprous marks on garments, it is possible that the rebellious elder disputed the ruling of the Sanhedrin with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos and the Rabbis. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolemos says: From where is it derived with regard to a case where there is a spread of leprosy in garments that culminates with the garment’s being completely covered with leprous marks, that the garment is pure, just as the <i>halakha</i> is with regard to a leprous mark that fully covers a person?
  It is derived via a verbal analogy: A bareness within [<i>karaḥat</i>] and a bareness without [<i>gabbaḥat</i>] are stated with regard to leprosy of garments: “And the priest shall look, after that the mark is washed; and, behold, if the mark has not changed its color, and the mark has not spread, it is impure; you shall burn it in the fire; it is a fret, whether the bareness be within or without” (Leviticus 13:55); and a bald head [<i>karaḥat</i>] and a bald forehead [<i>gabbaḥat</i>] are stated with regard to leprosy of a person: “But if there is in the bald head, or the bald forehead, a reddish-white mark, it is leprosy breaking out in his bald head, or his bald forehead” (Leviticus 13:42).
  Just as there, with regard to a person, if the leprosy spread to his entire body he is pure, as the verse states: “Then the priest shall look; and behold, if the leprosy has covered all his flesh, he shall pronounce pure the one who has the leprous mark; it is all turned white: He is pure” (Leviticus 13:13), so too here, with regard to garments, if the leprosy spread to the entire garment it is pure.
  The Gemara concludes: But here, concerning the phrase “between blood and blood,” if there is no type of pure blood at all, with regard to what issue could the rebellious elder disagree with the Sanhedrin? It must be that this verse is alluding to the fact that there is a type of blood of a woman that is pure.
  § Once it has been established that there are types of blood that are pure and other types that are impure, the Gemara asks: And from where is it derived that those types of blood that are not listed in the mishna are pure, and these ones that are mentioned in the mishna are impure? Rabbi Abbahu said that the verse states: “And the sun shone upon the water, and the Moabites saw the water some way off as red as blood” (II Kings 3:22), which indicates that blood is red. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that blood is red? If so, one can say that only blood that is red like the blood of a wound is ritually impure, and no more colors of blood are impure.
  Rabbi Abbahu said in response: The verse states, with regard to a menstruating woman: “And she shall be purified from the source of her blood [<i>dameha</i>]” (Leviticus 12:7). The plural form of the word blood, <i>dameha</i>, indicates at least two types of blood. And another verse states: “And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness, and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked her source, and she has uncovered the source of her blood [<i>dameha</i>]; both of them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 20:18). The use of the plural form of blood once again indicates another two types, which means that there are four types of blood stated here.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that there are five types of impure blood in a woman, whereas the verses indicate that there are only four? Rabbi Ḥanina says: The black blood mentioned in the mishna is actually red, but its color has faded, which is why it looks black. Therefore, although the mishna lists five kinds of blood, there are only four basic types.
  This opinion, that black blood is actually red blood, is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The black color of blood that is impure is blood as black as <i>ḥeret</i>. If the black is deeper than that, the blood is ritually impure; if the black is lighter than that, even if it is still as dark as blue, the blood is ritually pure. And this black blood does not blacken from its outset, when it is inside the body; rather, it blackens only when it is removed from the body. This is comparable to the blood of a wound, which is initially red, but when it is removed from the body it blackens.
  § The mishna states that Beit Shammai say: Even blood like the water in which a fenugreek plant is soaked, and like the liquid that drips from roast meat, are ritually impure. The Gemara asks: But do Beit Shammai not accept the exposition of Rabbi Abbahu that the two mentions of the plural form of blood: “<i>Dameha</i>” (Leviticus 12:7), and “<i>Dameha</i>” (Leviticus 20:18), indicate that there are four types of blood here?
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that Beit Shammai do not accept this opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, and they maintain that there are more than four types of blood in a woman. And if you wish, say instead that Beit Shammai do accept Rabbi Abbahu’s exposition, and the apparent contradiction can be resolved as follows: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say with regard to the black blood mentioned in the mishna that it is not an additional type, as it is actually red but its color has faded? So too, with regard to the colors of blood mentioned by Beit Shammai, that of water in which a fenugreek plant is soaked, and that of the liquid that drips from roast meat, one can say that these are not additional types of blood. Rather, they too were initially red but their color faded.
  § The mishna states: And Beit Hillel deem blood of those colors, i.e., the color of water in which a fenugreek plant is soaked or of the liquid that drips from roast meat, ritually pure. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this opinion of Beit Hillel identical to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>?
  The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between them
  
  Daf 19b
  
  with regard to whether to leave in abeyance, i.e., to treat as uncertain, blood the color of water in which a fenugreek plant is soaked, or the color of the liquid that drips from roast meat. According to the first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna there are five types of blood that are definitely impure, whereas other types, such as those mentioned by Beit Shammai, are deemed impure due to uncertainty. By contrast, Beit Hillel maintain that blood of these colors is entirely pure.
  § The mishna states: Blood that is green, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems it impure. The Gemara asks: But does Akavya ben Mahalalel not accept the exposition of Rabbi Abbahu that the two verses: “<i>Dameha</i>” (Leviticus 12:7), and: “<i>Dameha</i>” (Leviticus 20:18), indicate that there are four types of blood here?
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that Akavya ben Mahalalel does not accept this opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as he maintains that there are more than four types of blood in a woman. And if you wish, say instead that Akavya ben Mahalalel accepts Rabbi Abbahu’s exposition, and the apparent contradiction can be resolved as follows: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say, with regard to the black blood mentioned in the mishna, that it is actually red but its color has faded? Here too, with regard to the green mentioned by Akavya ben Mahalalel, one can say that it was initially red but its color faded and turned green.
  § The mishna states with regard to blood that is green: And the Rabbis deem it pure. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this opinion of the Rabbis identical to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to whether to leave in abeyance blood that is green. According to the first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna there are five types of blood that are definitely impure, whereas other types, such as green, are impure due to uncertainty. By contrast, the Rabbis maintain that green blood is entirely pure.
  § The mishna states that Rabbi Meir said: Even if the green blood does not transmit impurity due to the <i>halakhot</i> of a blood stain or the blood of a menstruating woman, it is blood in that it renders food susceptible to ritual impurity due to its status as one of the seven liquids that render food susceptible.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir accepted the opinion of Akavya ben Mahalalel and deemed green blood impure as blood of a menstruating woman. And as for his statement in the mishna, this is what Rabbi Meir was saying to the Rabbis: Granted that in a case where a woman finds a green stain on an article of clothing you do not deem her ritually impure, as its greenness is an indication that it did not come from her body. But in a case where she actually sees green blood come from her body, she shall be impure.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with this interpretation: If so, why did Rabbi Meir say: Even if it does not transmit impurity due to the <i>halakhot</i> of a blood stain, it renders food susceptible to ritual impurity due to its status as a liquid? According to the above explanation, he should have said: If the woman saw the emission of this blood, she is impure as a menstruating woman.
  Rather, this is what Rabbi Meir was saying to the Rabbis: Granted that in a case where the woman sees green blood from the outset you do not deem her ritually impure, but in a case where she sees red blood and then sees green blood, she shall be impure. This is just as it is with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of the fluids of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] and a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>]. All fluids emitted by a <i>zav</i> or <i>zava</i>, such as saliva and urine, are impure. Likewise, green blood that is emitted by this woman who has already emitted red blood should be impure.
  The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis respond to this? The Gemara answers: They maintain that the impure fluids of a menstruating woman are only those that are similar to saliva: Just as when saliva leaves one’s mouth it is first gathered together and then expelled from the body, so too, all impure fluids are those that are gathered together and then expelled. This definition serves to exclude this green blood, which is not gathered together and expelled. The Gemara asks: If so, the Rabbis spoke well to Rabbi Meir, i.e., their answer is convincing. Why does Rabbi Meir deem green blood impure?
  Rather, this is what Rabbi Meir was saying to the Rabbis: Let green blood be at least like one of the seven liquids that render seeds upon which they fall susceptible to ritual impurity. Why is green blood deemed pure even with regard to this matter? And the Rabbis disagree because they require that every type of blood that renders food susceptible to ritual impurity be like that mentioned in the verse: “And drink the blood of the slain” (Numbers 23:24), i.e., the blood that flows at the time of death; and green blood is not the type that flows at the time of death. Therefore, it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara again asks: If so, the Rabbis spoke well to Rabbi Meir. Why does he disagree with them?
  Rather, this is what Rabbi Meir was saying to the Rabbis: Learn this <i>halakha</i> that green blood renders food susceptible to ritual impurity from the following verbal analogy: It is written here, in a description of the beloved woman that alludes to her menstrual blood: “Your shoots [<i>shelaḥayikh</i>] are an orchard of pomegranates” (Song of Songs 4:13), and it is written there: “Who gives rain upon the earth, and sends [<i>veshole’aḥ</i>] waters upon the fields” (Job 5:10). This verbal analogy indicates that menstrual blood is similar to water in that both render food susceptible to ritual impurity.
  And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir, as they do not have a tradition that this is an accepted verbal analogy, and there is a principle that although a person may derive an <i>a fortiori</i> inference on his own, i.e., even though he was not taught that particular logical argument by his teachers, a person may not derive a verbal analogy on his own, but only if he received it by tradition.
  § The mishna states that Rabbi Yosei says: Neither in this sense, as the blood of a menstruating woman according to Akavya ben Mahalalel, nor in that sense, as a liquid that renders food susceptible according to Rabbi Meir, is green blood considered blood. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t this the same as the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>? The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is teaching us: Who is the first <i>tanna</i>? Rabbi Yosei. And the reason Rabbi Yosei’s name is mentioned is due to the principle that anyone who reports a statement in the name of the one who said it brings redemption to the world.
  § The mishna states: What is the red color of blood that is impure? It is as red as the blood that flows from a wound. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: As the blood that flows from a wound? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Like the blood of a slaughtered ox.
  The Gemara inquires: But if so, let the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna say explicitly that it is as red as the blood of slaughter. The Gemara explains: If the <i>tanna</i> had said that it is as red as the blood of slaughter, I would say that it means as red as the blood that flows throughout the entire slaughter, and it would apply to the shades of all blood emitted during the process. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that it is as red as the blood that flows from a wound, i.e., as the blood that flows at the beginning of the slitting with the slaughtering knife.
  The Gemara cites other definitions of the color described in the mishna as: Red as the blood that flows from a wound. Ulla says: It is red like the blood that flows from a living bird that was wounded. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Ulla specified that the bird is living, did he mean that it was not dead, to exclude the blood of a slaughtered bird? Or perhaps he meant that the bird was healthy, to exclude the blood of a weak bird. No answer was found, and therefore the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  The Gemara cites another definition: Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: It is red like the blood that comes from a squashed head louse. The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna that discusses a stain found on a woman’s garment (58b): If a woman killed a louse and subsequently found a blood stain on her garment or body, this woman may attribute the stain to that louse, and she remains pure. The Gemara explains the objection: What, is it not correct to say that this is referring to a louse from all parts of her body, not just the head, as claimed by Rabbi Ḥanina? If so, the color of impure blood is like the color of the blood of a louse from anywhere on the body. The Gemara answers: No; this <i>halakha</i> is referring specifically to a louse that was on her head.
  The Gemara cites yet another definition of the color described in the mishna as: Red as the blood that flows from a wound. The Sage Ami of Vardina says that Rabbi Abbahu says: It is red as the blood that flows from the smallest finger of the hand, which was wounded and later healed and was subsequently wounded again. And this is not referring to the finger of any person, but specifically to the finger of a young man who has not yet married a woman. And furthermore, this does not mean any young man; rather, until what age must he be? Until twenty years old.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the aforementioned mishna (58b): If the woman’s husband or son suffered an injury, she may attribute a blood stain she finds on her garment to her son or to her husband, and she remains pure. The Gemara analyzes this <i>halakha</i>: Granted, with regard to the ruling that she may attribute it to her son, you can find a case where this meets all the requirements specified by Rabbi Abbahu, i.e., he could be younger than twenty and unmarried. But with regard to the ruling that she may attribute it to her husband, how can you find a case where her husband is unmarried?
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: It is possible in a case where this woman entered the marriage canopy but has not yet engaged in intercourse with her husband. In such a situation, although he is her husband he is physically akin to an unmarried young man. Therefore, she can attribute the blood stain to his wound.
  Rav Naḥman says: This red is like the blood spilled in the process of bloodletting. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: An incident occurred involving a blood stain found on a woman’s garment, and Rabbi Meir attributed
  
  Daf 20a
  
  it to an eye salve [<i>bekilor</i>], which the woman had previously handled. And likewise, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi attributed a stain to the sap of a sycamore tree the woman had touched. The Gemara explains the objection: What, is it not the case that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi attributed red bloodstains to these causes because they are red, albeit not as red as blood? Evidently, the color of impure blood can be similar to such shades of red as well, which means that all these distinctions mentioned by the <i>amora’im</i> above are irrelevant.
  The Gemara answers: No; Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi attributed stains to an eye salve and the sap of a sycamore tree because those stains were like the other types of blood mentioned in the mishna.
  The Gemara relates that Ameimar and Mar Zutra and Rav Ashi were sitting before a bloodletter, to receive treatment. The bloodletter removed blood in a bloodletter’s horn from Ameimar for his first treatment. Ameimar saw the blood and said to his colleagues: The red color that we learned about in the mishna is like this blood in the horn. The bloodletter again removed blood from Ameimar, this time using another horn. Upon seeing the blood in this horn, Ameimar said to them: The color of this blood has changed compared to the blood in the first horn. Rav Ashi, who saw both types of blood, said: Any Sage such as myself, as I do not know how to distinguish between this blood and that blood, should not see, i.e., examine, different types of blood to issue a ruling as to whether they are pure or impure.
  § The mishna teaches: What is the black color that is impure? It is blood as black as <i>ḥeret</i>. Rabba bar Rav Huna says: This <i>ḥeret</i> of which the Sages spoke is ink. The Gemara notes that this opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This black color is like <i>ḥeret</i>, and the black of which the Sages spoke is ink. The Gemara asks: But if so, why does the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> mention both terms? Let him say simply: Ink. The Gemara explains: If the <i>tanna</i> had said only: Ink, I would say that he means that it is like the clear part of the ink, i.e., the upper portion of ink in an inkwell, which is very bright. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that it is like the blackness [<i>ḥaruta</i>] of the ink, the lower part of the inkwell, which is darker.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: To which type of <i>ḥeret</i> were the Sages referring? Were they referring to moist or dry <i>ḥeret</i>? Come and hear a resolution from a practical ruling, as when black blood was brought before Rabbi Ami he would break up pieces of dried ink and examine blood with it.
  § The mishna states that if the blackness of the blood is deeper than ink, it is impure, whereas if it is lighter it is pure. In this regard, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If a woman saw blood whose color was like black wax [<i>kekir</i>] or like black ink or like a black grape, she is ritually impure. And this is the meaning of that which we learned in the mishna: If the black is deeper than that, it is ritually impure. Rabbi Elazar says: If a woman saw blood whose color was like a black olive, or like black tar, or like a black raven, this blood is pure. And this is the meaning of that which we learned in the mishna: If the black is lighter than that, it is ritually pure.
  Ulla says: When the mishna states that black blood is impure, it means like the garments of the inhabitants of Siva’a, which were extremely black. The Gemara relates that when Ulla happened to go to Pumbedita, he saw a certain Arab [<i>tayya’a</i>] who was dressed in a black garment. Ulla said to the Sages of Pumbedita: The black color that we learned about in the mishna is like this color. Since people wanted a sample of the shade of blood mentioned in the mishna, they tore the Arab’s garment from him bit by bit, and in recompense they gave him four hundred dinars.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The black blood that the mishna says is impure is like these cloths of the bath attendants [<i>haolyarin</i>] who come from overseas. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that these are black cloths? But didn’t Rabbi Yannai say to his sons: My sons, do not bury me in black cloths nor in white cloths. Not in black, lest I be acquitted in judgment and I will be among the righteous like a mourner among the grooms. And not in white, lest I not be acquitted in judgment and I will be among the wicked like a groom among the mourners. Rather, bury me in the cloths of the bath attendants who come from overseas, which are neither black nor white. Apparently, these cloths of the bath attendants are not black.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as a distinction can be made. When Rabbi Yannai indicates that they are not black, that is referring to a regular garment, whereas with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that indicates that they are black, that is referring to a cloth placed on an item such as a table or a bed.
  § With regard to the examination of the five types of blood mentioned in the mishna, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: And with regard to all of them, in their various shades, one examines them only when they are placed on a white linen cloth, as only in this fashion can one properly discern the precise color of the blood. Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: And in the case of black blood, one must place it on a red linen cloth.
  Rav Yirmeya of Difti says: And Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi do not disagree, as this statement of Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi is referring specifically to black blood, whereas that ruling of Shmuel that one must use a white cloth is referring to the other four types of blood listed in the mishna. Rav Ashi objects to this interpretation: If so, let Shmuel say: With regard to all of them except for black, one examines them only when they are placed on a white linen cloth. Rather, Rav Ashi says: Shmuel and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi disagree with regard to black blood itself, whether it should be examined against the background of a white or a red cloth.
  Ulla says: With regard to all of these five types of blood enumerated in the mishna, if the color is deeper than that which is described in the mishna the blood is ritually impure; if it is lighter than it, the blood is ritually pure, as explicitly stated in the mishna with regard to black.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, what is different about black, that the mishna mentions this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to that color? The Gemara answers: The reason is that it might enter your mind to say that since Rabbi Ḥanina says: The black blood mentioned in the mishna is actually red but its color has faded, therefore, even if it is lighter than that which is described in the mishna, it should also be impure. Consequently, the mishna teaches us that even with regard to black blood, if the color is lighter than the shade mentioned in the mishna, it is pure.
  Rabbi Ami bar Abba says: And with regard to all of these five types of blood, if the color is deeper than that which is described in the mishna, the blood is ritually impure; if it is lighter than that which is described in the mishna, it is also ritually impure, except for black, which is pure if it is lighter. The Gemara asks: But if these types of blood, except for black, are impure whether they are deeper or lighter than the specific shade described in the mishna, what purpose do the measures specified by the Sages in the mishna serve? The Gemara answers that these descriptions are to the exclusion of a color that is lighter than lighter, i.e., the color is so faint that it does not qualify as impure blood.
  And there are those who say a different version of the above statement. Rami bar Abba says: And with regard to all of these five types of blood, if the color is deeper than that which is described in the mishna, it is ritually pure; if it is lighter than that, it is also ritually pure, except for black, which is impure if it is deeper. And for this reason the measures, i.e., descriptions, of the Sages are effective, as any discrepancy from these descriptions means that the blood is pure.
  Bar Kappara says: And with regard to all of them, if the color is deeper than that, the blood is impure; if it is lighter than that, it is pure, except for blood the color of diluted wine, with regard to which if the color is deeper than that, the blood is pure, and if it is lighter than that, it is also pure. The Gemara relates that in an effort to test bar Kappara, the Sages brought before him blood that had the appearance of diluted wine and they lightened it, and bar Kappara deemed it pure. On another occasion they deepened the color of blood that looked like diluted wine, and again bar Kappara deemed it pure. Rabbi Ḥanina says in astonishment: How great is this man whose heart, which is so sensitive it can distinguish between such similar shades of blood, is in accordance with his ruling of <i>halakha</i>.
  § The mishna teaches, with regard to the colors of impure blood: And what is the color that is like the bright color of the crocus flower that is impure? It is like the brightest part of the flower, which is used to produce the orange-colored spice saffron. The Sages taught: This is referring to the appearance of moist saffron that is still fresh and not to its dry counterpart.
  With regard to this color, it is taught in one <i>baraita</i> that it is like the lower part of the crocus flower, not like its upper part; and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that it is like the upper part of the flower and not like its lower part; and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that it is like its upper part, and all the more so blood whose color is like its lower part is impure; and it is taught in yet another <i>baraita</i> that it is like its lower part, and all the more so blood whose color is like its upper part is impure.
  Abaye says that these <i>baraitot</i> do not contradict one another, as the crocus has three layers of the brightly colored parts of the crocus flower harvested for saffron, one above the other, and in each layer there are three leaves, i.e., styles or stigmata.
  In order to examine blood whose color is similar to saffron, you should grasp the middle leaf of the middle layer in your hand and compare it to the blood. If they are similar, the blood is impure. Consequently, the four <i>baraitot</i> do not contradict one another: The first two <i>baraitot</i> are referring to the layer of leaves that must be examined. The first <i>baraita</i> says that it is the lower one, as the middle layer is lower than the upper one, while the second <i>baraita</i> states the reverse because the middle layer is higher than the lower one. Meanwhile, the last two <i>baraitot</i> are dealing with the leaves within the middle layer. The <i>baraita</i> that states: Like its lower part, and all the more so like its upper part, means: Like the lowest of the three leaves and all the more so like the middle leaf, which is above that leaf, while the other <i>baraita</i> states a similar idea with regard to the upper and middle leaves. In any event, all four <i>baraitot</i> are referring to the part of the crocus flower that is called by the mishna its brightest part.
  The Gemara relates: When people would come before Rabbi Abbahu for him to examine blood whose color was similar to saffron, he would say to them: We learned that the mishna is referring specifically to crocus flowers that are still in their clumps of earth in which they grew, as once they are detached from that earth their color changes.
  § The mishna states: And what is the color that is like water that inundates red earth that is impure? In this regard the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In order to examine blood that is like water that inundates red earth, one brings fertile earth from the Beit Kerem Valley and one inundates the earth with enough water until it pools on the surface; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Akiva says: One brings earth from the Yodfat Valley. Rabbi Yosei says: From the Sikhnei Valley. Rabbi Shimon says: One can even bring earth from the Genosar Valley or from similar places.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: And to test whether blood is like water that inundates red earth, one brings fertile earth from the Beit Kerem Valley and one inundates the earth with an amount of water that rises above the earth by the thickness of the husk of garlic. And there is no required measure for the water, because there is no required measure for the earth with which the examination must be performed; it is sufficient to use a small amount of earth with a small amount of water. And one does not examine it when the water is clear, as it does not have the color of the earth, but rather when it is muddy from the earth. And if the water became clear because the earth settled, one must muddy it again. And when one muddies it he does not muddy it by hand but rather with a vessel.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does the statement that one does not muddy it by hand but rather with a vessel mean that one should not put the dirt into his hand and muddy the water with dirt in his hand, but in a case where the earth is in a vessel, when one muddies it by mixing the earth and water with his hand one may well do so? Or perhaps the <i>baraita</i> means that even when the earth is in a vessel one should not muddy the water by mixing it with earth with his hand, but rather with a vessel?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: When one examines this water, he examines it only with a cup. Evidently, it is necessary to use a vessel. The Gemara rejects this proof: But you still have a dilemma. This <i>baraita</i> merely states that the examination must be performed while the water is in a cup, but with what is the muddying performed? Must this be done by means of a vessel alone, or may one use his hand as well? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The Gemara relates: When people would come before Rabba bar Avuh to examine blood that is similar to water that inundates red earth, he would say to them: We learned that the examination must be conducted in its place, i.e., the location the earth was taken from. But if the earth was transported elsewhere, the examination is no longer effective. The Gemara further relates that Rabbi Ḥanina would break up a clump of earth and examine with it, without mixing it in water. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, would curse anyone who used this method that they should be punished with diphtheria.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, explained: It is only Rabbi Ḥanina who is permitted to examine the blood in this fashion, as he is wise, but everyone else is not so wise that they can successfully perform the examination without water.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Ḥanina’s wisdom causes me not to see blood for a halakhic examination. When I would examine blood and deem it impure, he would deem it pure, and when I would deem it pure, he would deem it impure. Conversely, Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Ḥanina’s humility causes me to see blood, as I reason to myself: If Rabbi Ḥanina, who is humble, places himself into a situation of uncertainty and sees various types of blood to determine their status, should I, who am not nearly as humble, not see blood for an examination?
  Rabbi Zeira says: The complex nature of the residents of Babylonia causes me not to see blood for a halakhic examination, as I say to myself: Even matters involving the complex nature of people I do not know; can I then claim that I know about matters of blood?
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the matter of the appearance of blood is dependent on the nature of people, i.e., that it changes in accordance with their nature? But Rabba is an example of someone who knew about the complex nature of the people of Babylonia, and yet he did not know how to distinguish between different types of blood. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Zeira took this factor into account and said to himself: All the more so; if Rabba, who knew about the complex nature of these people, nevertheless would not see blood, should I, who am unknowledgeable about the nature of these people, see blood for examination?
  The Gemara relates that Ulla happened to come to Pumbedita, where they brought blood before him for an examination, but he would not see it, as he said: If Rabbi Elazar, who was the master of Eretz Yisrael in wisdom, when he would happen to come to the locale of Rabbi Yehuda, he would not see blood, shall I see blood here?
  The Gemara asks: And why would they call Rabbi Elazar the master of Eretz Yisrael in wisdom? The Gemara explains that there was an incident involving a certain woman who brought blood before Rabbi Elazar for examination, and Rabbi Ami was sitting before him. Rabbi Ami observed that Rabbi Elazar smelled the blood and said to the woman: This is blood of desire, i.e., your desire for your husband caused you to emit this blood, and it is not the blood of menstruation. After the woman left Rabbi Elazar’s presence, Rabbi Ami caught up with her and inquired into the circumstances of her case. She said to him: My husband was absent on a journey, and I desired him. Rabbi Ami read the following verse about Rabbi Elazar: “The counsel of the Lord is with those who fear Him; and His covenant, to make them know it” (Psalms 25:14), i.e., God reveals secret matters to those who fear Him.
  The Gemara further relates that Ifera Hurmiz, the mother of King Shapur, sent blood before Rava for examination, as she sought to convert and was practicing the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruation. At that time Rav Ovadya was sitting before Rava. Rav Ovadya observed that Rava smelled the blood and later said to the woman: This is blood of desire. She said to her son: Come and see how wise the Jews are, as Rava is correct. Her son said to her: Perhaps Rava was like a blind man who escapes from a chimney, i.e., it was a lucky guess.
  Ifera Hurmiz then sent Rava sixty different types of blood, some impure and others pure, and with regard to all of them Rava accurately told her their origin. The Gemara adds: That last sample of blood sent by Ifera Hurmiz was blood of lice, and Rava did not know what it was. He received support in this matter in the form of heavenly guidance, as he unwittingly sent her as a gift a comb for killing lice. She said in exclamation: Jews, you must dwell in the chamber of people’s hearts.
  § The Gemara cites more statements of the Sages with regard to the examination of blood. Rav Yehuda says: At first I would see blood, i.e., perform examinations of blood, but I changed my conduct when the mother of my son Yitzḥak, i.e., my wife, said to me that she acts as follows: With regard to this first drop of blood that I see, I do not bring it before the Sages, because it is not pristine blood, i.e., other substances are mixed with it. After hearing this, I decided I would no longer see blood, as it is possible that the first drop, which I do not get to see, was impure.
  Rav Yehuda continues: But with regard to the examination of blood that a woman who gave birth emitted after the completion of her days of purity, i.e., at least forty days after giving birth to a male, or eighty after giving birth to a female (see Leviticus, chapter 12), in order to determine whether she is ritually impure or pure, I certainly see this blood and determine her status based on its color. This blood is clean, as the woman has been bleeding for a long period of time.
  § The Gemara relates that Yalta, Rav Naḥman’s wife, brought blood before Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and he deemed her ritually impure. She then brought it before Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, and he deemed her pure.
  The Gemara asks: But how could Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, act in this manner? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a halakhic authority who deemed an item impure, another halakhic authority is not allowed to deem it pure; if one halakhic authority deemed a matter prohibited, another halakhic authority is not allowed to deem it permitted?
  The Gemara explains that initially Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, deemed her impure, but he changed his mind when Yalta said to him: Every day that I bring blood of this kind of color to Rabba bar bar Ḥana he deems me pure, and specifically now he issued a different ruling, as he feels pain in his eye. Upon hearing this, Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, deemed her pure.
  The Gemara asks: But are people deemed credible to present claims such as the one presented by Yalta? The Gemara answers: Yes; and likewise it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman is deemed credible if she says: I saw blood like this color, but I lost it before it could be examined.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a woman states to her friend who showed her blood: My blood, which has an appearance like this, so-and-so, the halakhic authority, deemed it pure, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is she deemed credible concerning its status?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the <i>baraita</i> cited above: A woman is deemed credible if she says: I saw blood like this color, but I lost it. This demonstrates that a woman may issue claims of this kind. The Gemara rejects this proof: There it is different, as in that case the blood is not before her, and therefore the Sages were lenient. But here, the woman’s friend can take her blood to a halakhic authority for examination.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear the incident cited above, as Yalta brought blood before Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and he deemed her ritually impure; she then brought it before Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, and he deemed her pure. And the Gemara asked: How could Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, act in this manner? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a halakhic authority who deemed an item impure, another halakhic authority is not allowed to deem it pure?
  And we say in response that initially Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, deemed her impure, but he changed his mind when she said to him that every day that she brings blood of this kind of color to Rabba bar bar Ḥana he deems her pure, and specifically now he issued a different ruling, as he feels pain in his eye. The Gemara summarizes: The conclusion of the story was that upon hearing this, Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, then deemed her pure. Evidently, when a woman issues claims with regard to blood that is presented, we deem her claims credible.
  The Gemara answers: That incident does not provide proof, as Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, relied on his studies in his lenient ruling. At first, he was reluctant to issue his ruling, in deference to Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who had said the blood was impure. But when he heard Yalta’s explanation he deemed the blood pure, as he had originally thought. Therefore, there is no proof from there that a woman’s statements of this kind are accepted.
  § The Gemara further relates: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once saw a woman’s blood at night and deemed it impure. He again saw that blood in the day, after it had dried, and deemed it pure. He waited one hour and then deemed it impure again. It is assumed that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not conduct another examination at this point; rather, he reasoned that the previous night’s examination had been correct, and the blood’s color should be deemed impure because of how it had looked when it was moist. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi then said: Woe is me! Perhaps I erred by declaring the blood impure, as based on its color it should be pure.
  The Gemara questions this statement: Perhaps I erred? He certainly erred, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that a halakhic authority may not say: If the blood were moist it would certainly have been impure, and yet here, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deemed the blood impure based on that type of reasoning.
  The Gemara explains that the incident did not unfold as initially assumed. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi examined the blood three times, as he said: A judge has only what his eyes see as the basis for his ruling. Initially, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi established the presumptive status of the blood as ritually impure, but when he saw in the morning that its color had changed, he said: It was definitely pure last night as well, and only because it was at night I thought that it was impure, because it could not be seen well. Subsequently, when he saw after a short while that its color again changed, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This blood is impure, and it is gradually becoming lighter as its color fades.
  With regard to the manner in which the Sages would examine blood, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would examine blood by candlelight. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosef, would examine blood between the pillars of the study hall even on a cloudy day, despite the fact that it was not very light there. Rav Ami bar Shmuel says: And in all these cases, one examines blood only between sunlight and shade. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: One stands in a place lit by the sun, and he conducts the examination under the shadow of his hand, i.e., he places his hand over the blood. In this manner the color of the blood can be best discerned.
  § The mishna states: And what is the color that is like diluted wine that is impure? It is specifically when the dilution consists of two parts water and one part wine, and specifically when it is from the wine of the Sharon region in Eretz Yisrael. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 21a
  
  For the purposes of the examination of blood, the wine of the Sharon region in Eretz Yisrael has the same status as undiluted Carmelite wine and not diluted Carmelite wine, new Carmelite wine and not old Carmelite wine.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: And in all cases of blood that has the color of diluted wine, one examines blood only with a simple Tiberian cup. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Abaye says: Containers are designed according to a universal standard, such that a cup that can contain a <i>log</i> of wine, one fashions it from material weighing one hundred dinars, whereas a cup that can contain two <i>log</i>, one fashions it from material weighing two hundred dinars. By contrast, in the case of a simple Tiberian cup, even one that can contain two <i>log</i>, one fashions it from material weighing one hundred dinars. And since the material from which the cup is made is weak, it is more transparent and therefore the redness of the wine inside is more noticeable. Consequently, one must compare the blood to wine in a cup of this kind.
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, if there is blood that emerges with it, the woman is ritually impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. And if not, she is pure, as she is neither a menstruating woman nor a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Yehuda says: In both this case, where blood emerged, and that case, where no blood emerged, the woman is impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman, as there was certainly undetected blood that emerged with the flesh.
  In the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a shell, or similar to a hair, or similar to soil, or similar to mosquitoes, if such items are red, she should cast them into water to ascertain their nature: If they dissolved, it is blood, and the woman is impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman; and if not, she is pure.
  In the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to fish or to grasshoppers, repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, if there is blood that emerges with them, the woman is impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. And if not, she is pure.
  With regard to a woman who discharges tissue in the form of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, whether it had the form of a non-kosher species or a kosher species, if it was a male fetus, then she observes the periods of impurity, seven days, and purity, thirty-three days, established in the Torah (see Leviticus 12:2–5) for a woman who gives birth to a male. And if the fetus was a female, the woman observes the periods of impurity, fourteen days, and purity, sixty-six days, established in the Torah for a woman who gives birth to a female.
  And if the sex of the fetus is unknown, she observes the strictures that apply to a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. Accordingly, she is prohibited from engaging in intercourse for fourteen days, but after that, she will be permitted to engage in intercourse despite a discharge of uterine blood until thirty-three days pass after the seven days she would have been prohibited if the fetus were male. The prohibition to enter the Temple will continue until eighty days have passed from the discharge of the fetus. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Any fetus that is not of human form is not regarded as an offspring with regard to observance of these periods, and she is permitted to engage in intercourse provided that she does not experience a discharge of uterine blood.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a woman discharges an amorphous piece of tissue and no blood emerges with it, the Rabbis say that she is pure, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says that she is impure. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Rabbi Yehuda deemed the woman impure, despite the fact that no blood emerged, only in the case of a piece of tissue that has the appearance of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, as in such a case the piece has the status of blood. But if it has the appearance of other types of blood, the woman is pure.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says there is a different explanation of the dispute: If a woman discharges a piece of tissue that has the appearance of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, everyone, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, agrees that she is impure. Likewise, if it has the appearance of other types of blood, everyone agrees that she is pure.
  They disagree only with regard to a case where the woman discharged an amorphous piece of tissue, and she herself does not know exactly what was the appearance of the piece of tissue that she discharged, e.g., if it was lost. Rabbi Yehuda holds: Follow the majority of discharges of amorphous pieces of tissue, and the majority of pieces of tissue are of the appearance of one of the four types of impure blood. And the Rabbis hold: We do not say that the majority of pieces of flesh have the appearance of one of the four types of impure blood.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Rav Hoshaya came from Neharde’a, he came and brought a <i>baraita</i> with him that states: In the case of a woman who discharges a piece of tissue that is red, black, green, or white, if there is blood that emerges with it, the woman is impure, and if not, she is pure. Rabbi Yehuda says: Both in this case, where blood emerged, and in that case, where no blood emerged, the woman is impure. This <i>baraita</i> poses a difficulty to the statement of Shmuel with regard to one aspect of his opinion, and it poses a difficulty to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to two aspects of his opinion.
  The Gemara elaborates: It poses a difficulty to the statement of Shmuel with regard to one aspect of his opinion, as Shmuel said that Rabbi Yehuda deemed the woman impure only in the case of a piece of tissue that has the appearance of one of the four types of impure blood, and yet the <i>baraita</i> teaches that according to the Rabbis the woman is pure if the piece of tissue is green or white, which are not among the four colors of ritually impure blood, and that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with their opinion.
  And if you would say that when Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis, it is with regard to the case of a red or black piece of tissue, as these are among the four colors of ritually impure blood, but with regard to the case of a green or white piece he does not disagree with them, i.e., he concedes that the woman is pure, this cannot be correct. The Gemara explains why that explanation of the <i>baraita</i> is not possible: But if so, for the sake of clarifying whose opinion does the <i>baraita</i> teach the case of a green or white piece of tissue?
  If we say that it comes to clarify the opinion of the Rabbis, that is unnecessary: Now that in a case of a red or black piece of tissue, which are among the four colors of ritually impure blood, the Rabbis deem the woman pure, is it necessary to state that they deem her pure in a case of a green or white piece? Rather, is it not coming to clarify the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, teaching that the Rabbis deem the woman pure in this case, but Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with them and deems her impure? This contradicts the explanation of Shmuel.
  And furthermore, the <i>baraita</i> poses an additional difficulty to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, in addition to the first difficulty explained above, as he said that if the piece of tissue has the appearance of one of the four types of ritually impure blood then everyone agrees that the woman is impure, and yet the <i>baraita</i> teaches the case of a red or black piece and states that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and deem the woman pure.
  And if you would say that when the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, it is with regard to the case of a green or white piece of tissue, but in the case of a red or black piece they do not disagree with him, as they concede that the woman is impure; but if that is so, then for the sake of clarifying whose opinion does the <i>baraita</i> teach the case of a red or black piece?
  If we say that it comes to clarify the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this is unnecessary: Now that Rabbi Yehuda holds that in a case of a green or white piece the woman is impure, despite the fact that they are not among the four colors of ritually impure blood, is it necessary to state that she is impure in a case of a red or black piece? Rather, is it not coming to clarify the opinion of the Rabbis, teaching that Rabbi Yehuda deems the woman impure in this case, but the Rabbis disagree with him and maintain that she is pure?
  Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says there is a different explanation of the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda: They disagree with regard to whether or not opening of the womb is possible without a discharge of blood. And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman experienced difficulty in labor during which blood emerged on two consecutive days, and on the third day she discharged, but she does not know what she discharged, i.e., whether it was a stillborn human fetus, and whether blood emerged during the miscarriage,
  
  Daf 21b
  
  it is uncertain whether that woman has the status of one who gave birth, and it is uncertain whether she has the status of a woman who experiences an irregular discharge of blood from the uterus [<i>ziva</i>]. Therefore, she brings an offering, like any woman after childbirth or after <i>ziva</i>, but the offering is not eaten by the priests. The reason is that perhaps she neither gave birth nor experienced <i>ziva</i>, and is therefore exempt from bringing an offering. Consequently, her bird sin offering is disqualified, and is forbidden in consumption, as a bird offering is killed by pinching its neck, which is not the valid manner of slaughtering a non-sacred bird.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: The woman brings an offering, and it is eaten. The reason is that she is certainly either a woman after childbirth or a <i>zava</i>, as opening of the womb is not possible without a discharge of blood. The <i>tanna’im</i> in the <i>baraita</i> disagree about whether opening of the womb is possible without a discharge of blood. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak maintains that this is also the issue in dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis in the mishna.
  § Some say another version of the above discussion. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Rabbi Yehuda deemed the woman impure, despite the fact that no blood emerged, only in the case of a piece of tissue that has the appearance of one of the four types of ritually impure blood, but if it has the appearance of other types of blood, the woman is pure.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Rav Hoshaya came from Neharde’a, he came and brought a <i>baraita</i> with him that states: In the case of a woman who discharges a piece of tissue that is red, or black, green, or white, if there is blood that emerges with it, the woman is impure, and if not, she is pure. And Rabbi Yehuda says: In both this case, where blood emerged, and that case, where no blood emerged, the woman is impure.
  The Gemara concludes its challenge: The <i>baraita</i> teaches both a case where the piece of tissue is red or black, and a case where it is not one of the four types of impure blood but it is green or white, i.e., in all of these cases the Rabbis hold that the woman is pure, and yet Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with their opinion.
  And if you would say that when Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis, it is with regard to the case of a red or black piece of tissue, but with regard to the case of a green or white piece he does not disagree with them, as he concedes that the woman is pure; but if that is so, for the sake of clarifying whose opinion does the <i>baraita</i> teach the case of a green or white piece of tissue?
  If we say that it comes to clarify the opinion of the Rabbis, that is unnecessary: Now that in the case of a red or black piece of tissue the Rabbis deem the woman pure, is it necessary to state that they deem her pure in a case of a green or white piece? Rather, is it not coming to clarify the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, teaching that the Rabbis deem the woman pure in this case, but Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with them and deems her impure? This contradicts the explanation of Shmuel.
  Rather, Rav Yehuda says there is a different explanation of the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda: They disagree with regard to whether or not opening of the womb is possible without a discharge of blood. And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman experienced difficulty in labor during which blood emerged on two consecutive days, and on the third day she discharged, but she does not know what she discharged, it is uncertain whether she has the status of a woman who gave birth, and it is uncertain whether she has the status of a woman who experienced <i>ziva</i>. Therefore she brings an offering, but it is not eaten by the priests.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: The woman brings an offering, and it is eaten. The reason is that she is certainly either a woman after childbirth or a <i>zava</i>, as opening of the womb is not possible without a discharge of blood. This is also the matter in dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir, and likewise Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya would say in accordance with his statement: A Sage who is presented with this piece of tissue should tear it to examine it. If there is blood inside it, the woman is ritually impure, and if not, she is pure.
  The Gemara compares this <i>baraita</i> to the ruling of the mishna: This statement is basically in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna, but it is more far-reaching, i.e., more stringent, than that ruling of the Rabbis. It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as they say that opening of the womb is possible without a discharge of blood, whereas Rabbi Yehuda maintains that opening of the womb is impossible without a discharge of blood. But the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is more far-reaching than that ruling of the Rabbis, as they hold that if blood emerges with the piece of tissue, then yes, the woman is impure, but if blood is found inside the piece of tissue, she is not impure; and Sumakhos holds that even if blood is found inside the piece, the woman is impure.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> with regard to a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, that Rabbi Aḥa says: One tears it open, and if its interior looks red, even if it contains no blood, the woman is impure; and if it does not have a red appearance, she is pure.
  The Gemara compares this <i>baraita</i> to the aforementioned opinion of Sumakhos: This ruling of Rabbi Aḥa is basically in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, as Rabbi Aḥa also requires that the interior of the piece of tissue must be examined to see if there is blood on the inside, but it is more far-reaching than the opinion of Sumakhos, as Rabbi Aḥa deems the woman impure even if the piece of tissue merely looks red on the inside but does not contain blood.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> with regard to a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, that Rabbi Binyamin says one tears it open to examine it. If it contains a bone, it is considered a fetus, and its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman who gave birth. Rav Ḥisda says: And this applies in the case of a white piece of flesh; only in such a situation does the existence of a bone render it a fetus. And likewise, when a pair of Torah scholars came from Ḥadyab, they came and brought a <i>baraita</i> with them: In the case of a woman who discharges a white piece of tissue, one tears it open to examine it, and if it contains a bone, its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman who gave birth.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, one tears it open to examine it. If it contains a quantity of accumulated blood, the woman is impure; and if not, she is pure. The Gemara comments: This is basically in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, that blood found inside the piece of tissue renders the woman impure, but it is more lenient than all the previous opinions, i.e., Sumakhos and Rabbi Aḥa, as according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai the woman is rendered impure only if there is a quantity of accumulated blood.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: In the case of a woman who inserted a tube into her vagina and sees blood, i.e., she found blood in the tube, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yirmeya clarified his question: Since it is stated: “And if a woman has an issue, and her issue in her flesh is blood, she shall be in her impurity seven days” (Leviticus 15:19), perhaps the Merciful One states in this verse that the woman is impure only if the blood is discharged through “her flesh” and not through a tube. Or perhaps this term: “In her flesh,” is necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> that a woman becomes impure by finding blood inside her vagina just as she becomes impure by experiencing bleeding outside her vagina, i.e., once the blood enters the vaginal canal from the uterus the woman is ritually impure.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The Merciful One states: “In her flesh,” meaning that the woman is impure only if the blood is discharged through “her flesh” and not through a tube. As, if the term “in her flesh” is necessary to teach that a woman becomes impure by finding blood inside her vagina just as by seeing blood outside her vagina, if so, let the verse say: In the flesh. What is the significance of the fact that the verse states: “In her flesh”? Conclude two conclusions from the term, both that a woman becomes impure by the presence of blood inside her vagina, and that a woman who experiences bleeding that emerged through a tube is ritually pure.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, one tears it open to examine it; if it contains a quantity of accumulated blood, the woman is impure, and if not, she is pure? If a woman who sees blood that emerged inside a piece of tissue becomes impure, the same should apply to a woman who sees blood that emerged through a tube.
  The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to a piece of tissue, the woman is impure, as it is the manner of a woman to see blood inside such a piece of tissue. Therefore, this blood fulfills the condition stated in the verse: “In her flesh.” By contrast, here, in the case of a tube, the woman should not be impure, as it is not the manner of a woman to see blood that emerged through a tube.
  The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a tube is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, even though the piece is full of blood, if there is blood on the outside that emerges with it, the woman is impure; and if not, she is pure. Rabbi Eliezer says: The term “in her flesh” teaches that a woman is rendered impure only by blood that emerges through direct contact with her flesh, and not by blood that emerges in a gestational sac, nor by blood that emerges in an amorphous piece of tissue.
  The Gemara interrupts its citation of the <i>baraita</i> and asks: Isn’t the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer identical to that of the first <i>tanna</i>? The first <i>tanna</i> also says that a woman does not become impure due to blood found in a piece of tissue. Rather, the entire <i>baraita</i> is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and one must say that the <i>baraita</i> should read as follows: Even if the piece of tissue is full of blood the woman is pure, as Rabbi Eliezer says that the term “in her flesh” teaches that a woman is rendered impure only by blood that emerges through direct contact with her flesh, and not by blood that emerges in a gestational sac, nor by blood that emerges in a piece of tissue.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And the Rabbis say: If there is blood in the piece of tissue, this is not menstrual blood, but rather the blood of the piece of tissue. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the first <i>tanna</i> also deem the woman pure? What is the difference between the opinion of the Rabbis and that of the first <i>tanna</i>? The Gemara answers: Rather, the difference between the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> and that of the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the piece of tissue is cracked, and its blood comes in direct contact with the woman’s body.
  The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the term “in her flesh” teaches that a woman is rendered impure only by blood that emerges through direct contact with her flesh, and not by blood that emerges in a gestational sac, nor by blood that emerges in a piece of tissue. And the same is true with regard to blood that emerges through a tube. But this statement applies only in a case where the piece of tissue is smooth, but if it is cracked, the woman is impure. What is the reason for this exception? Since the blood comes in direct contact with the woman’s flesh, we read the term “in her flesh” with regard to it, i.e., it fulfills that condition.
  And the Rabbis come to say: Even though the piece of tissue is cracked, the woman is pure, as this is not menstrual blood but rather the blood of the piece of tissue. It can be inferred from here that if the blood is menstrual blood, the woman is certainly impure, and this is true even if the blood emerges through a tube. Accordingly, the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a tube is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>.
  Abaye says that this suggestion should be rejected: In the case of a tube, everyone agrees that the woman is pure, as derived from the term “in her flesh.”
  
  Daf 22a
  
  When they disagree, it is with regard to the case of blood that is found in a piece of tissue. One Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, who follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, holds that it is the manner of a woman to see menstrual blood in a piece of tissue that she discharges. Therefore, the term “in her flesh” applies to the blood in the cracks. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that it is not the manner of a woman to see menstrual blood in a piece of tissue that she discharges. Therefore, the blood found in the piece of tissue is not considered menstrual blood, and it does not render the woman impure.
  Rava says there is another explanation of this dispute: Everyone, both the first <i>tanna</i> and the Rabbis, agrees that it is not the manner of a woman to see menstrual blood in a piece of tissue that she discharges. Consequently, the blood that emerges from the cracks in the piece of tissue is not considered menstrual blood, and it does not render the woman impure.
  And here, they disagree as to whether it is possible that the woman herself is pure but the location of the source, i.e., the uterus, is impure. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that the woman is pure, i.e., she was not rendered a menstruating woman with the discharge of the blood, but the blood is impure, despite the fact that it emerged in a piece of tissue, as it emerged through the source, which is impure. Therefore, when the blood comes into contact with the woman’s body she contracts first-degree impurity, and the woman subsequently transmits impurity to foods that she touches. And the Rabbis hold that the woman is entirely pure, and the location of the source is also pure. Therefore, pure food that she touches is not rendered impure.
  § Rabba asked Rav Huna a similar question to the case of the tube: With regard to a man who sees semen by extracting it from his penis with a sliver of wood, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does he assume the impurity status of one who experiences a seminal emission? The Gemara explains the question. The verse states: “A man from whom the flow of semen emerges” (Leviticus 22:4). Since the Merciful One states: “From whom,” is it derived that the man is not impure unless the semen emerges from his flesh by itself, and not when it is extracted with a sliver of wood? Or perhaps from this term: “From whom,” it is derived merely that the man is not impure unless his impurity, i.e., his semen, emerges outside his body, but he is impure even if this is achieved with a sliver of wood.
  Rav Huna said to Rabba: Derive that the man is pure from the fact that semen itself becomes impure only in a case where the discharge is substantial enough to cause a blockage of the tip of the penis. Since this amount cannot be extracted with a sliver of wood, it is not impure.
  Rabba replied to Rav Huna: Since a minimum measure is required for this impurity, is this to say that the reason a man who experiences a seminal emission is impure is that his penis touches the semen after it is emitted? If he was rendered impure merely by the emission of the semen then no minimum measure would apply, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a menstruating woman. But if that is so, then a seminal emission should not negate the count of seven clean days for a man who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>ziva</i>]. A <i>zav</i> does not stop his counting when he touches a source of impurity, e.g., the carcass of a creeping animal.
  If so, why is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is derived from the verse’s juxtaposition between a <i>zav</i> and one who experienced a seminal emission: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of one from whom the flow of semen emerges” (Leviticus 15:32), that just as <i>ziva</i> during the seven clean days negates the count, so too, a seminal emission negates the count. If it is not the emission itself that renders the man impure but only his contact with the semen, why does the emission negate the count of seven clean days?
  Rav Huna said to Rabba in response: The <i>halakha</i> of negation is not difficult, as this is the reason that a seminal emission negates the count of seven clean days: Because it is impossible for a <i>zav</i> to experience a seminal emission without it containing bits of [<i>tzaḥtzoḥei</i>] <i>ziva</i>.
  Rabba further objected: If that is so, then a seminal emission should negate the entire count of seven clean days, just like an emission of <i>ziva</i>, not merely the day on which the seminal emission occurred. But then why is it taught in the <i>baraita</i>: It is derived from the verse: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of one from whom the flow of semen emerges, so that he is impure by it” (Leviticus 15:32), that just as <i>ziva</i> during the seven clean days negates the count, so too, a seminal emission negates the count.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If a seminal emission is compared to <i>ziva</i>, then it might be suggested that just as <i>ziva</i> negates the entire count of seven days, so too, a seminal emission should also negate the entire count of seven days. Therefore, the verse states: “So that he is impure by it,” to teach that in the case of a seminal emission you have a negation of the count that is equivalent only to the impurity that is stated by it, i.e., impurity for one day. Accordingly, a seminal emission negates only one day of the count, not the entire count. This apparently contradicts Rav Huna’s statement that the reason a seminal emission negates the count at all is that the seminal emission of a <i>zav</i> always contains <i>ziva</i>.
  Rav Huna said to Rabba: It is a Torah edict that an emission that is purely <i>ziva</i>, when semen is not mixed in it, negates the entire count of seven days, whereas bits of <i>ziva</i> in which some semen is mixed negate only one day of the count.
  § Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, asked Rabbi Elazar: If a woman discharges dry blood, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does she have the status of a menstruating woman? The Gemara explains the dilemma: Since the Merciful One states: “And if a woman has a flow of her blood many days” (Leviticus 15:25), does this indicate that the woman is not impure unless the blood flows, i.e., if it is wet, yes, she is impure, whereas if it is dry she is not impure? Or perhaps this phrase: “If a woman has a flow of her blood,” is merely referring to the normal manner that menstrual blood emerges, but actually even dry blood renders the woman impure.
  Rabbi Elazar said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in a mishna (54b): The blood of a menstruating woman and the flesh of a corpse impart impurity whether they are wet or dry. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said to him in response: I do not raise the dilemma about blood that was wet when it came out and subsequently dried, as such blood is certainly impure. When I raise the dilemma, it is with regard to blood that was dry at the outset, when it emerged.
  Rabbi Elazar responded: You learned the solution to this dilemma as well, in the mishna here: In the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a shell, or similar to a hair, or similar to soil, or similar to mosquitoes, if these are red, she should cast them into water to ascertain their nature.
  
  Daf 22b
  
  If they dissolved, it is blood, and the woman is impure; and if not, she is ritually pure. Evidently, dry blood is impure, as these items are all dry until they are soaked in water. The Gemara asks: If so, that dry blood is impure, these items are impure also in a case where they do not dissolve in water. Why is this examination necessary at all? Rabba says: In a case where they do not dissolve, this indicates that the item is not blood at all; rather, it is a distinct entity.
  The Gemara asks with regard to these instances discussed in the mishna: But are there actually cases like this? The Gemara answers: Yes there are, and it is taught likewise in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: My father raised two incidents from Tivin to the Sages in Yavne for discussion.
  The first was an incident involving a woman who would repeatedly discharge items similar to red shells, and the local residents came and asked my father whether this rendered the woman impure. And my father asked the other Sages, and the Sages asked the doctors what causes this to happen. And the doctors said to them: This woman has a wound in her womb from which she discharges red items similar to shells. The Sages therefore ruled that the woman should cast them into water to ascertain their nature. If they dissolved, it is blood and the woman is impure.
  And again there was a similar incident involving a woman who would discharge items similar to red hairs, and she came and asked my father whether she was impure. And my father asked the other Sages, and the Sages asked the doctors, and the doctors said to them: The woman has a mole in her womb from which she discharges items similar to red hairs. The Sages therefore ruled that the woman should cast them into water, and if they dissolved, she is impure.
  § Reish Lakish says: And this examination is conducted only with lukewarm [<i>uvefoshrin</i>] water. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The woman should cast the item into water, and this examination is conducted only with lukewarm water. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The woman mashes the item with saliva, using the fingers of one hand on a fingernail of her other hand. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two opinions? Ravina says: The difference between them is whether an item is considered blood if it can be mashed by pressing on it, or only if the item dissolves by itself.
  We learned in the mishna there (54b) with regard to an animal carcass or the carcass of a creeping animal that dried up, which is examined by soaking it in water to determine whether or not it still imparts impurity: For how long is its soaking in lukewarm water necessary? It is for a twenty-four-hour period. The Gemara asks: Here, with regard to the examination of an item discharged by a woman, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do I need it to be soaked in lukewarm water for a twenty-four-hour period, or not?
  The Gemara explains the question: Perhaps with regard to a carcass of a creeping animal and an unslaughtered animal carcass, which are hard when they dry up, we require soaking for a twenty-four-hour period, but blood, which is relatively soft after it dries up, does not need to be soaked for that long. In other words, if the item did not dissolve after even a shorter period of time, it is not blood. Or perhaps the examination of a discharged item is no different, and it also must be soaked for twenty-four hours. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: In the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to fish or to grasshoppers, repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, if blood emerges with it, the woman is impure, and if not, she is pure. The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Yehuda disagree with the Rabbis with regard to this <i>halakha</i> as well, just as he disagrees with them in the first clause of the mishna, in the case where a woman discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, as he maintains that she is impure whether or not blood emerges with it.
  Reish Lakish says: This case is also subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and the opinion cited in the mishna is that of the Rabbis. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as when Rabbi Yehuda says that the woman is impure even if blood does not emerge, it is only there, in the case of an amorphous piece of tissue, as the blood is likely to dry and turn into the form of a piece of tissue. But blood is not likely to become the form of a creature, such as a fish or a grasshopper.
  The Gemara challenges: But this is difficult according to that version in which Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to whether opening of the womb is impossible without a discharge of blood (see 21b). Since Rabbi Yehuda holds that blood automatically emerges whenever the womb opens, and therefore the woman is impure even if she did not notice any blood, he should disagree with the Rabbis in this case too, i.e., if a woman discharges an item similar to a fish or one of the other creatures.
  The Gemara answers: The one who teaches that version of the above discussion teaches an alternative version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion here as well, like this: With regard to a woman who discharges an item similar to fish, or to grasshoppers, repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that this case is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and the opinion stated in the mishna is that of the Rabbis.
  § The mishna teaches: In the case of a woman who discharges tissue in the form of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, whether of a kosher or non-kosher species, if it is male, the woman observes the periods of impurity and purity for a woman who gives birth to a male. If it is female, the woman observes the periods of impurity and purity for a woman who gives birth to a female. And if its sex is unknown, the woman observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth to both a male and a female. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges a fetus in the form of an animal has the same status as one who discharges a fetus with human form or gives birth to a human? It is since the Torah uses a similar formulation in the two cases, as a term of formation is stated with regard to the creation of these types of animals, in the verse: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field, and every fowl of the air” (Genesis 2:19), just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man: “And the Lord God formed man” (Genesis 2:7).
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to a woman who discharges an item with the form of a sea monster, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the concept of formation is stated with regard to its creation, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man. As it is stated: “And God created the great sea monsters” (Genesis 1:21).
  The Sages say in response: One derives <i>halakhot</i> of a matter with regard to which formation is stated by means of a verbal analogy from another matter with regard to which formation is stated, but one does not derive <i>halakhot</i> of a matter with regard to which creation is stated from a matter with regard to which formation is stated.
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there between formation and creation? A verbal analogy can be drawn between different words with similar meanings. For example, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses. The verse states: “And the priest shall return [<i>veshav</i>] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [<i>uva</i>] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning, and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the <i>halakha</i> that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week.
  And furthermore, the <i>halakha</i> of a woman who discharges an item similar to a sea monster, with regard to which creation is stated, can be derived by a different verbal analogy from the <i>halakha</i> of human offspring, since here it also states creation, as it is written: “And God created man in His own image” (Genesis 1:27).
  The Sages say in response: The verse “And God created man” is necessary to teach the matter itself, i.e., the creation of man. By contrast, the term “And the Lord God formed man,” serves to render it free, i.e., the mention of the formation of man is superfluous in its context and was stated for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. And therefore one derives the <i>halakhot</i> of animals, with regard to which formation is stated, from the <i>halakhot</i> of man, with regard to which formation is stated.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: On the contrary, one can say that the verse “And the Lord God formed man” was stated to teach the matter itself, whereas the term “And God created man” serves to render it free; and therefore one derives the <i>halakhot</i> of sea monsters, with regard to which creation is stated, from the <i>halakhot</i> of man, with regard to which creation is stated.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the reason it is animals and not sea monsters that are compared to man is that the term “and…formed” is free on both sides, i.e., it is free with regard to man and it is free with regard to animals. By contrast, the term “and…created” is free with regard to man, but it is not free with regard to sea monsters.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the term “and…formed” that appears with regard to animals is considered free? If we say it is due to the fact that it is written: “And God made the animals of the earth after its kind, and the cattle after their kind, and everything that creeps on the ground after its kind” (Genesis 1:25), and it is similarly written: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field” (Genesis 2:19), and therefore this verse is superfluous, but with regard to the sea monster as well, the expression “and…created” is free, as it is written: “And God made…and everything that creeps on the ground after its kind” (Genesis 1:25), and it is also written: “And God created the great sea monsters.” Consequently, the term “and…created” is also free on both sides of the verbal analogy.
  The Gemara answers: The creeping animal that is written there is referring to creeping animals of the land, not of the sea. Therefore, the term: “And…created,” stated with regard to sea monsters is not superfluous. The Gemara asks: But what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and a verbal analogy that is free on both sides?
  The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, with regard to the exegetical principle of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one cannot derive <i>halakhot</i> from it. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it, and one cannot refute it through logic, even if there are valid counterarguments. According to the Rabbis, one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it, but one can also refute it logically if there are grounds to distinguish between the two cases. If a verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it and one cannot refute it logically.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and a verbal analogy that is free on both sides? In both cases, he holds that one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it and one cannot refute it. The Gemara answers: He holds that the difference is that in a case where there are two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is free on both sides, we disregard the analogy that is free on one side,
  
  Daf 23a
  
  and derive the <i>halakha</i> from the analogy that is free on both sides. And it is for this reason that the Merciful One rendered the verbal analogy between animal and man free on both sides, so that one would not derive the <i>halakha</i> from the verbal analogy between sea monster and man, which is free on only one side.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches in the name of Rabbi Elazar a more lenient version of the aforementioned principle of exegesis of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it, but one can also refute it logically. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it, and one cannot refute it. According to the Rabbis, one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it, but one can also refute it. If the verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from it and one cannot refute it.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, according to the Rabbis, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and one that is not free at all? In both cases, the Rabbis hold that one can derive <i>halakhot</i> from such a verbal analogy but one can also refute it.
  The Gemara answers: The difference is in a case where you find two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is not free at all, and neither does this one have a logical refutation nor does that one have a logical refutation. In such a case, we disregard the analogy that is not free at all, and we derive the <i>halakha</i> from the one that is free on one side.
  The Gemara asks: And here, with regard to the verbal analogy between man and sea monster, which was rejected because it is free on only one side, what logical refutation is there on account of which this verbal analogy is rejected? The Gemara answers: The verbal analogy between man and sea monster is rejected because it can be refuted as follows: What is unique about man? Man is unique in that a person can become impure while he is alive, unlike an animal, which can become impure only after it dies, or a sea monster, which cannot become impure at all.
  And likewise, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges an item similar to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird is impure: It is because formation is stated with regard to the creation of these animals, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man.
  Rabbi Ami said to him: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the shape of a mountain, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it is stated with regard to the creation of mountains: “For He Who forms the mountains and creates the wind” (Amos 4:13). Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Does she discharge a mountain? The discharged item cannot possibly be that large. It is an item with the form of a stone that she discharges, and that is called a clod, not a mountain.
  Rabbi Ami further inquired: If that is so, in the case of a woman who discharges an item having an amorphous form [<i>ruaḥ</i>], its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since creation is stated with regard to it, just as it is stated with regard to man, as it is written: “And creates the wind [<i>ruaḥ</i>].” And if you would say that no verbal analogy can be drawn here, because the verse is not free, i.e., it is not superfluous, as it is necessary to recount the creation of the wind, that is not so. Rabbi Ami explains: From the fact that the verse could have written: Who forms the mountains and the wind, and instead it is written: “Who forms the mountains and creates the wind,” conclude from it that the superfluous word “creates” serves to render it free for drawing a verbal analogy between <i>ruaḥ</i> and man.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: One derives matters that are stated in the Torah from matters that are stated in the Torah, i.e., from verses in the Torah, but one does not derive matters that are stated in the Torah from the words of the tradition, i.e., verses in the Prophets or the Writings, such as the verse in Amos.
  § Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: Since the eyes of these animals are similar to those of a human, a woman who discharges an item of that type is impure.
  The Gemara objects: If that is so, then in the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake, its mother should likewise be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the pupil of a snake is round, like that of a human. And if you would say that indeed, this is the <i>halakha</i>, then let the mishna teach this case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a snake among the other cases where the woman discharges an item of an unusual form.
  The Gemara explains: If the mishna had taught the case of a snake, I would say that it is only in the case of a woman who discharges an item having the form of a snake that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and rule that the woman is not impure, as a term of formation is not written with regard to the creation of the snake. But with regard to a woman who discharges an item having the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, they do not disagree with Rabbi Meir, as the concept of formation is written with regard to them.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of blemishes that render the slaughter of a firstborn animal permitted, it is taught in a mishna (<i>Bekhorot</i> 40a) that an animal whose pupil is round like that of a human is considered blemished. Evidently, the eyes of animals are dissimilar to those of humans. The Gemara answers that it is not difficult; this statement, that the eyes of animals are similar to those of humans, is referring to the pupil, and that statement, that the eyes of animals are not similar to those of humans, is referring to the entire eyeball in the socket.
  § Rabbi Yannai said: This is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir: It is because the eyes of these animals are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, unlike the eyes of birds and snakes, a woman who discharges an item of that kind is impure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a bird, whose eyes are not fixed in the front of its head, and nevertheless Rabbi Meir says that the woman is impure. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yannai’s explanation. Abaye said: Rabbi Meir is referring to the little owl [<i>bekarya</i>] and the great owl [<i>vekifofa</i>], whose eyes are fixed in the front of their heads, but in the case of a woman who discharges any of the other species of birds, Rabbi Meir does not deem her impure.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this answer from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a woman who discharges the form of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the statement of the Rabbis seems correct in the case of birds.
  The Gemara asks: To what birds is Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus referring? If we say he is referring to the little owl and the great owl, what is the difference between this case and the cases of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, with regard to which Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus accepts the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If the key factor is that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads like those of a human, Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus should accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the case of a little owl or a great owl as well, as their eyes are also fixed in the front of their heads.
  Rather, it is obvious that when Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says that he does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Meir, he is referring to the other species of birds. From the fact that it is necessary for Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus to reject Rabbi Meir’s opinion in those cases, it may be concluded that Rabbi Meir himself disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to the other species of birds as well, despite the fact that their eyes are not fixed in the front of their heads.
  The Gemara explains that the <i>baraita</i> is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: The statement of Rabbi Meir seems correct in the case of a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal, and the same is true with regard to a little owl or a great owl. And the statement of the Rabbis appears correct even to Rabbi Meir with regard to the other species of birds. The reason is that even Rabbi Meir agrees that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of one of the other species of birds, she is not impure, i.e., he disagrees with them only with regard to a little owl or a great owl, but he concedes to their opinion with regard to the other species of birds.
  The Gemara cites proof for Abaye’s claim that Rabbi Meir differentiates between an owl and other species of birds, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of a type of domesticated animal or undomesticated animal, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir it has the halakhic status of a full-fledged offspring, and according to the statement of the Rabbis, it does not have the status of a full-fledged offspring. In the case of a woman who discharges an item that has the form of birds, it must be examined.
  The Gemara asks: According to whom must it be examined? Is this not referring to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if she discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure? Consequently, the item must be examined to determine what type of bird it resembles.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: No, this <i>baraita</i> does not prove that Rabbi Meir differentiates between owls and other species of birds, as perhaps the statement that the discharged item must be examined applies according to the Rabbis, as they say that if a woman discharges an item that has the form of a little owl or a great owl, yes, she is impure, but if a woman discharges an item that has the form of other birds, she is not impure.
  The Gemara asks: But if the Rabbis hold that a woman who discharges an item similar to a land animal is not impure, why would they hold that if she discharges an item that has the form of owls she is impure? What is the difference between a little owl and a great owl on the one hand, and a domesticated animal and an undomesticated animal on the other? The Gemara answers: Since owls have cheeks like those of a human, therefore a woman who discharges an item similar to an owl is impure, whereas if she discharges an item that has the form of a land animal she is pure, despite the fact that their eyes are fixed in the front of their heads.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the <i>halakha</i> in a case where it is a female, and her father accepted betrothal for her, i.e., he married her off by accepting betrothal money from a man, or a document of betrothal? Is such a betrothal valid? Rabbi Yirmeya elaborated: What practical difference is there whether it is valid? The difference is with regard to whether it is prohibited for the man to marry her sister. If the betrothal is valid, it is prohibited for the husband to marry her sister, as one may not marry his wife’s sister.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that such an offspring can live? This factor is important, as a man is prohibited from marrying his wife’s sister only during his wife’s lifetime. But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are other animals of its type that can live, i.e., there are animals similar to the discharged item that do survive, but not that creature itself. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: Rabbi Yirmeya tried this hard to cause Rabbi Zeira to laugh, but he did not laugh. In other words, Rabbi Yirmeya was not asking his question seriously.
  The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Meir said that a woman who discharges an item that has the form of an animal is impure only since there are animals of its type that can live. Rav Yirmeya of Difti says:
  
  Daf 23b
  
  We, too, learn in a mishna (<i>Bekhorot</i> 46a) that the fetus of a woman that has the form of an animal cannot survive: In the case of a woman who had previously discharged a fetus with the appearance similar to that of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or bird before giving birth to any children, and subsequently she gives birth to a son, the son is considered a firstborn with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of inheritance, but he does not require redemption, as the fetus is considered a full-fledged offspring in that regard. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The son is not exempted from the requirement of redemption from a priest unless it follows the birth of a fetus that takes the form of a person; otherwise, it is not considered the offspring that “opens the womb” (Exodus 13:2), and the son requires redemption as a firstborn.
  And in the case of a woman who discharges a fetus in the form of a sandal fish, or from whom an afterbirth or a gestational sac in which tissue developed emerged, or who delivered a fetus that emerged in pieces, the son that follows them is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest. The Gemara explains the proof: And if it enters your mind that a fetus that has the form of an animal can survive, is the son that follows it a firstborn with regard to inheritance?
  Rava said, in rejection of this proof: Actually, it is possible that a fetus shaped like an animal can survive; but it is different there, with regard to inheritance. The son that follows such a fetus has the status of a firstborn, as the verse states with regard to the inheritance of a firstborn: “By giving him a double portion of all that he has; for he is the first fruits of his strength [<i>ono</i>]; the right of the firstborn is his” (Deuteronomy 21:17). It is derived from the verse that the status of a firstborn applies only to a son over whose death a father would mourn. The word <i>ono</i> is interpreted homiletically based on its similarity to the word <i>onen</i>, acute mourner. This offspring that has the form of an animal is therefore excluded, as its father would not mourn over its death.
  § Rav Adda bar Ahava asked Abaye: According to Rabbi Meir, who said that an item that is similar to an animal in the womb of a woman is considered a full-fledged offspring, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a human fetus in the womb of an animal? The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference of this inquiry? The difference is with regard to permitting the fetus in consumption. A full-fledged fetus found inside its slaughtered mother is permitted to be eaten, despite the fact that it was not slaughtered itself.
  The Gemara suggests: But one can resolve the dilemma from that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds in it an item that has the form of a pigeon, the pigeon is prohibited for consumption. Evidently, the ritual slaughter of a pregnant animal renders its fetus permitted to be eaten only if the fetus is of the same species as the mother. Accordingly, if the fetus has the form of a human, it is prohibited for consumption.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to a pigeon fetus, there are no split hooves, and there is not even a hoof at all. Since a pigeon is completely different from the slaughtered animal, the fetus is forbidden. By contrast, here, in the case of a human fetus, although there are no split hooves, there is at least a hoof, i.e., solid feet. Therefore, it is possible that the human fetus is permitted for consumption, and the dilemma remains unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: Any discharged entity that is not of human form does not render the woman impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: All concede that if a woman discharged an entity whose body is that of a goat and whose face is that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, i.e., even the Rabbis rule that the woman is impure in this case. Likewise, if its body is that of a human and its face is that of a goat, Rabbi Meir concedes that it is nothing, and the woman is pure.
  They disagree only in a case where its face is that of a human, but it was created with one human eye and one eye like that of an animal. As Rabbi Meir says that if the offspring has part of the form of a human face, even if one eye is not like that of a human, it is considered a human offspring, and the woman is impure. And the Rabbis say that it must have the entire form of a human face to be considered a human offspring, and otherwise the woman is not impure.
  One of the Sages said to Rav Yirmeya bar Abba: But isn’t the opposite taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Meir says that a woman who discharged is impure if the fetus has any part of the form of a human face, and the Rabbis say that the woman is impure only if the fetus has a recognizable part of the form of a human face, e.g., half of a human face? According to this <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Meir does not even require that a significant part of it must look human. In his opinion, even if it has only one human eye or one human cheek and the rest of the face is like that of an animal, the woman is impure. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said to the Sages: If this <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it. I have my tradition from Rav, and you should rule in accordance with the <i>baraita</i> that you received.
  Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A woman who discharges an entity is impure only if the entire face of the fetus has a human form. This includes its forehead, and the eyebrows, and the eyes, and the cheeks, and its chin. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form. Rava says that Ḥasa says: It is sufficient for the fetus to have the appearance of a human on one side of its face; its forehead, and one eyebrow, and one eye, and one cheek, and its chin are enough. The woman is not impure unless these facial features all as one have the human form.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Ḥasa do not disagree about whether the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or that of the Rabbis, as they both accept the opinion of the Rabbis. The difference between them is that this <i>amora</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require the entire form of the face to be human, and that <i>amora</i>, Ḥasa, holds like the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face.
  Ḥasa evidently interprets the version of the Rabbis’ statement that only part of a human face is required as referring to half of a human face. The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation from a <i>baraita</i>: The miscarriage of a fetus with the form of a human face, which the Rabbis said renders the woman impure, includes even one of the facial features, apart from the ear. Apparently, that is to say that even if the fetus has only one facial feature of a human, this is also sufficient to render the woman impure.
  Abaye says: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of rendering all of the facial features indispensable for the fetus to be defined as human, except for the ear. And this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require that the entire form of the face must be human. And if you wish, say that actually this ruling is in accordance with the one who says that the Rabbis require only a recognizable part of the form of a human face. And what is the meaning of the claim that it is sufficient for the fetus to have one facial feature of a human? It means one of each facial feature of which a human has two, i.e., one eye, one eyebrow, and so on.
  Rava says: In a case where a fetus was created with one eye or with one thigh, if the eye is located to the side on the middle of the face, or the thigh is located at the side of the hip, where a human eye or thigh is normally located, the fetus is considered human, and its mother is impure. If it appears in the middle of the face or hip, the fetus is not considered human, and its mother is pure.
  Rava says: If its esophagus is punctured, although the fetus is considered a <i>tereifa</i>, i.e., one that has a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, its mother is impure. But if its esophagus is sealed, i.e., it is closed at one end, it does not have the status of a human fetus, and therefore its mother is pure.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus that has a sealed body, its mother is not impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. And what is a sealed body? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is a body which is lacking a limb that when removed from a living person would cause him to die.
  And how much of the lower part of a person’s body when removed from a living person would cause him to die, because one cannot survive such a wound? Rabbi Zakkai says:
  
  Daf 24a
  
  Until above the knee. Rabbi Yannai says: Until his orifices. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Yehoshua: Until the location of his navel.
  The Gemara explains the dispute between the <i>amora’im</i>: The difference between the opinion of Rabbi Zakkai and that of Rabbi Yannai is whether a <i>tereifa</i> can survive beyond twelve months. One Sage, Rabbi Yannai, holds that a <i>tereifa</i> can survive beyond twelve months. Therefore, although one whose legs were removed until above the knee has the status of a <i>tereifa</i>, if a woman discharges a fetus of this form she is impure. Only if the fetus lacks legs until his orifices is the woman pure, as such a person cannot survive. And one Sage, Rabbi Zakkai, holds that a <i>tereifa</i> cannot survive beyond twelve months. Therefore, even if the fetus lacks legs only from above the knee and not from his orifices, the woman is not impure.
  The difference between the opinion of Rabbi Yannai and the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who both agree that a <i>tereifa</i> can survive, is with regard to a statement of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: If the thigh, i.e., the hind leg of the animal, and its recess were removed from an animal before slaughter, the animal is considered an unslaughtered carcass; consequently, it is forbidden in consumption and imparts ritual impurity even while still alive. Rabbi Yannai agrees with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, and accordingly holds that if the lower part of a person’s body until his orifices is missing or removed, the person immediately assumes the halakhic status of a corpse. Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with Rabbi Elazar and holds that one whose lower part of his body was missing or removed has the status of a corpse only if it is removed until his navel.
  Rav Pappa says: The dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> is with regard to a fetus that is lacking part of its body from below to above, i.e., the lower part of his body; but if it is lacking part of its body from above to below, even any amount of its skull, the woman is pure. And likewise, Rav Giddel says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus whose skull is sealed, i.e., deficient, its mother is pure.
  The Gemara cites another <i>halakha</i>: And Rav Giddel says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus that looks like the part of a palm tree that branches out, i.e., the lower part of its body is formless while the upper part has arms and legs coming out of its shoulders like branches, its mother is pure.
  § It was stated with regard to a woman who discharges a fetus whose face is mashed but not completely flattened, that Rabbi Yoḥanan says its mother is impure, and Reish Lakish says its mother is pure.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who discharges a shaped hand, i.e., a hand whose fingers are discernible, or a shaped foot, its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it certainly came from a full-fledged fetus, and we are not concerned that perhaps it came from a fetus with a sealed, i.e., deficient, body. And if it is so, that a fetus with a mashed face does not render its mother impure, let the <i>baraita</i> teach: We are not concerned that perhaps it came from a fetus with a sealed body or from one whose face is mashed.
  Rav Pappi says: In a case where its face is mashed, everyone agrees that the woman is impure. When they disagree, it is in a case where its face is completely flat, i.e., none of its features are discernible; and the opposite was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that its mother is pure, and Reish Lakish says that its mother is impure.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But according to this version of the dispute, let Reish Lakish raise an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from this <i>baraita</i>, from which Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish according to the previous version of the dispute: If a woman who discharges a fetus whose face is flat is pure, the <i>baraita</i> should have stated that there is no concern that the hand or foot might have come from a fetus with a sealed body or one whose face is flat. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish did not raise the objection, because Rabbi Yoḥanan would have responded to him that the status of a sealed body is the same as that of one whose face is flat. There is no reason to mention both types of deformities.
  The Gemara relates: The sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya went out to the villages to inspect their father’s fields. When they came back to their father, he said to them: Wasn’t any incident brought to you for a halakhic ruling? They said to him: A case of a woman who discharged a fetus with a flat face was brought to us, and we deemed her impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: Go out and deem pure that which you have deemed impure. What was your thinking when you ruled that she is impure? Did you reason that as the matter is subject to a dispute, one should rule stringently? But your ruling is a stringency that leads to a leniency, as you have given the woman thirty-three days of purity after the birth of a male, following her period of impurity, which are the minimum days of purity established in the Torah for a woman who gave birth.
  § It was stated: With regard to a woman or female animal who discharges an entity that has two backs and two spines, Rav says that in the case of the woman, her discharged fetus is not considered an offspring, as it cannot survive, and therefore the woman does not have the ritual impurity caused by childbirth, and in the case of the animal, its fetus is prohibited for consumption. And Shmuel says: In the case of a woman, the discharged fetus is considered an offspring, and the woman is impure, and in the case of an animal, the fetus is permitted for consumption.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what do Rav and Shmuel disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree concerning the statement of Rav Ḥanin bar Abba, as Rav Ḥanin bar Abba said: The verse states: “Nevertheless these you shall not eat of them that only chew the cud, or of them that only have the hoof cloven [<i>umimafrisei haparsa hashesua</i>]: The camel, and the hare, and the rock badger” (Deuteronomy 14:7). The apparently superfluous term <i>hashesua</i> is not a redundant description of the cloven hoof; it is referring to a separate entity that has two backs and two spines and therefore looks like an entirely cloven animal.
  It is with regard to this prohibition that Rav and Shmuel disagree. Rav says that there is no such living entity in the world, and when the Merciful One taught this prohibition to Moses, he taught it to him with regard to a fetus that has two backs and two spines that is found in the womb of its mother after slaughter. And Shmuel says that there is such an entity in the world, and when the Merciful One taught this prohibition to Moses, he taught it to him with regard to a living animal in the world, but a fetus that has two backs and two spines in the womb of its mother is permitted for consumption.
  Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya raised an objection to Rav from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Any priest who has two backs and two spines is disqualified from the Temple service, as he is blemished. Evidently, an entity that has two backs and two spines can survive, and this is difficult for the opinion of Rav. Rav said to him: You are clearly Shimi, i.e., you asked well. Yet the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus is not referring to one who literally has two backs and two spines, but rather to one whose spine is crooked and therefore appears as though he has two spines. One who actually has two backs and two spines cannot survive.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Among discharged animal fetuses, there are those that are forbidden in consumption, as they have the halakhic status of carcasses of unslaughtered animals. Specifically, if an animal fetus is born in the fourth month of pregnancy in the case of small domesticated animals, where the pregnancy is normally five months long, or it is born in the eighth month of pregnancy in the case of large livestock, where the pregnancy is normally nine months long, or if the miscarriage occurred from this stage of the pregnancy and earlier, i.e., if the pregnancy ended before this stage, the animal is forbidden. This excludes one that has two backs and two spines.
  The Gemara asks: What does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it states that an animal with two backs and two spines is excluded? Does it not mean that it is excluded from the category of those fetuses, which are permitted for consumption if found inside their mother’s womb, as such animals are forbidden even while they are in the wombs of their mothers? This contradicts the opinion of Shmuel, who holds that an animal fetus of that type is permitted for consumption.
  The Gemara answers: Rav explains the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning, and Shmuel explains the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning. Rav explains the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning, as was assumed above: If an animal fetus is born in the fourth month of pregnancy in the case of small domesticated animals, or it is born in the eighth month of pregnancy in the case of large livestock, or if it was born from this stage of the pregnancy and earlier, the animal is forbidden.
  In what case is this statement said? In a case where the animal emerged into the airspace of the world; but if it was found in its mother’s womb after its mother was slaughtered, it is permitted for consumption. This excludes the case of a fetus that has two backs and two spines, as even if it is found in the womb of its mother it is prohibited.
  
  Daf 24b
  
  And Shmuel explains the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning, in the following manner: If an animal fetus is born in the fourth month of pregnancy in the case of small domesticated animals, or it is born in the eighth month of pregnancy in the case of large livestock, or if it was born from this stage of the pregnancy and earlier, the animal is forbidden. In what case is this statement said? In a case when the fetus’s months of gestation were not completed; but in a case when its months of gestation were completed, it is permitted for consumption even outside the womb. This excludes a fetus that has two backs and two spines, as even in a case where its months of gestation were completed, if it emerged into the airspace of the world, it is forbidden, whereas if it is found in the womb of its mother, it is permitted.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav: In the case of a woman who discharges an entity that has a shapeless body, i.e., it does not have the outline of limbs, or an entity that has a shapeless head, one might have thought that its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. Therefore, the verse states: “If a woman bears seed and gives birth to a male, she shall be impure seven days; as in the days of the menstruation of her sickness she shall be impure. And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:2–3).
  Those verses teach that the impurity of a woman after childbirth applies only to one who gave birth to a child that is fit for circumcision on the eighth day, excluding these cases, where the child is not fit for circumcision on the eighth day, as it cannot survive that long. Consequently, this woman does not have the impurity of a woman after childbirth. Rav said to the <i>tanna</i>: And conclude the <i>baraita</i> like this: Excluding these cases, where the child is not fit for circumcision on the eighth day, and excluding the case of a woman who discharges a child that has two backs and two spines.
  Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba thought to perform an action, i.e., to issue a ruling, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, that a woman who gives birth to a child with two backs and two spines is impure. Rav Huna said to him: What is your thinking? That as this matter is subject to a dispute, one should rule stringently? Your ruling is a stringency that leads to a leniency, as you have given the woman a period of thirty-three days following her period of impurity when any blood that emerges is blood of purity. In any event, you should perform, i.e., issue your ruling, in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as we maintain that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav with regard to ritual matters, whether his opinion leads to a leniency or to a stringency.
  § Rava says: The Sages said that a woman can give birth to a viable offspring after nine months of pregnancy or after seven months of pregnancy; but if a woman gives birth after eight months of pregnancy, the child cannot survive and is stillborn. Similarly, a large domesticated animal gives birth to a viable offspring after nine months of pregnancy, and if it discharges a fetus after only eight months, the newborn animal cannot survive. With this in mind, Rava asked: Can a large domesticated animal give birth to a viable offspring after seven months of pregnancy, like a human, or can such an animal not give birth to a viable offspring after only seven months?
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>: If an animal discharges from this stage of the pregnancy and earlier, the fetus is forbidden in consumption as an unslaughtered animal carcass. What, is it not referring to large livestock, which indicates that large livestock do not give birth to a viable offspring after only seven months of pregnancy? The Gemara answers: No, the reference is specifically to small domesticated animals, which do not give birth to a viable offspring until after five months of pregnancy.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer: What is this? Granted, if you say that the reference is to large livestock, it is necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to state that an animal does not give birth to a viable offspring after less than a complete period of pregnancy, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since in the case of a woman who gives birth after seven months the baby survives, it is logical that in the case of a large domesticated animal that gives birth after seven months the newborn also survives, and it is therefore permitted for consumption. Consequently, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that such an animal does not survive.
  But if you say that the ruling in the <i>baraita</i>, that if an animal discharged a fetus before the period of gestation was completed then the fetus is prohibited, was stated with regard to small domesticated animals, isn’t it obvious that if a sheep or goat fetus was discharged at this stage it cannot survive? Can it survive after only three months of gestation?
  The Gemara answers that in fact it is necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to state this <i>halakha</i> with regard to small domesticated animals, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that any mammal that is born two months less than its complete gestation survives, just as a human born at seven months of gestation survives. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that a sheep or goat that is born at three months of gestation cannot survive and is forbidden for consumption.
  § Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: In the case of a woman who discharges a fetus that has the form of a lilith, a female demon with wings and a human face, its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as it is a viable offspring, only it has wings. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei said: An incident occurred in Simoni involving a certain woman who discharged a fetus that had the form of a lilith, and the incident was brought before the Sages; and they said that it is a viable offspring, only it has wings.
  There was a case of a woman who discharged an item that had the form of a snake. Ḥanina, the son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, ruled that its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Yosef went and told this matter to Rabban Gamliel. Rabban Gamliel sent to Rabbi Yehoshua: Take hold of your nephew and come to me, so that I may admonish him for his ruling.
  While they were going to Rabban Gamliel, Ḥanina’s daughter-in-law went out to greet Rabbi Yehoshua, and said to him: My teacher, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a woman who discharges an item that looks like a snake? Rabbi Yehoshua said to her: Its mother is pure. She said to him: But my mother-in-law said to me in your name that its mother is impure in such a case, and that you said to her: For what reason is she impure? It is because the pupil of a snake is round like that of a human. Due to her statement, Rabbi Yehoshua remembered that he had issued such a ruling. He subsequently sent a message to Rabban Gamliel: Ḥanina issued the ruling based on my own statement.
  Abaye said: Conclude from this incident that a Torah scholar [<i>tzurva merabbanan</i>] who says a halakhic matter should say the reason for his statement, so that when his colleagues remind him of his reasoning, he will remember that ruling, as happened to Rabbi Yehoshua.
  MISHNA: A woman who discharges a gestational sac full of fluid, full of blood, or full of different colors need not be concerned that it was an offspring. But if the sac was one in which tissue developed, her halakhic status is that of a woman after childbirth. Since the sex of the embryo is unknown, the woman observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female; she is impure for fourteen days like a woman who gave birth to a female, but blood that she sees thereafter is pure only until forty days after birth, like a woman who gave birth to a male. A woman who discharges a sandal fetus, i.e., one that has the form of a sandal fish, and one who discharges an afterbirth observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female.
  GEMARA: The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, one can understand why a woman who discharges a gestational sac full of blood or water is pure, as such an item is nothing, i.e., it is not an offspring. But if the gestational sac was full of different colors, let us be concerned that perhaps it was an offspring and it liquefied. Abaye says in response: How much undiluted wine, which can be harmful to an embryo, did the mother of this purported embryo drink, that her embryo was liquefied in her womb? In other words, there is no such concern.
  Rava says that there is a different explanation: We learned in the mishna that the gestational sac was full of different colors, and if it is so, that there was an embryo in the sac that liquefied, the sac would have been lacking some of the mass of the liquified portion. Rav Adda bar Ahava says that there is yet another explanation: We learned in the mishna that the gestational sac is full of different colors, and if it is so, that there was an embryo there that liquefied, it would all be of one color.
  With regard to the effect of drinking wine on a person’s body, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Abba Shaul says: I used to be a gravedigger, and I would observe the bones of corpses. I discovered that the bones of one who drinks too much undiluted wine during his lifetime look burnt, the bones of one who drinks too much diluted wine are black, and the bones of one who drinks the appropriate amount of wine are fat, i.e., full of marrow. And furthermore, I discovered that the bones of anyone who drinks much more than he eats look burnt, the bones of one who eats much more than he drinks are black, and the bones of one who eats and drinks appropriate amounts are fat.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Abba Shaul says the following, and some say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said it: I used to be a gravedigger. Once I ran after a deer, and I entered the thighbone of a corpse; and it was so large that I ran after the deer for three parasangs inside the thighbone, and although I did not reach the deer, the thighbone did not end. When I came back and related this to the Sages, they said to me: It was evidently the thighbone of Og, king of Bashan, a known giant.
  It is likewise taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Abba Shaul says: I used to be a gravedigger. Once a burial cave opened up underneath where I was standing, and I found myself standing in the eye socket of a corpse until my nose. When I came back and told this to the Sages, they said to me: It was evidently the eye of Absalom.
  And lest you say that Abba Shaul was a midget, and therefore he was capable of standing in an eye socket until his nose, Abba Shaul was the tallest person in his generation. And Rabbi Tarfon reached only his shoulder, and Rabbi Tarfon was the tallest person in his generation. And Rabbi Meir reached only the shoulder of Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Meir was the tallest person in his generation. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reached only the shoulder of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was the tallest person in his generation.
  The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Ḥiyya reached only the shoulder of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Ḥiyya was the tallest person in his generation. And Rav reached only the shoulder of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rav was the tallest person in his generation. And Rav Yehuda reached only the shoulder of Rav, and Rav Yehuda was the tallest person in his generation. And Adda the attendant [<i>dayyala</i>] reached only the shoulder of Rav Yehuda,
  
  Daf 25a
  
  and when the governor [<i>parashtevina</i>] of Pumbedita would stand next to Adda the attendant, he would reach only half of his height. And when everyone else in the world would stand next to the governor of Pumbedita, they would reach only his loins [<i>ḥartzeih</i>].
  § The students asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: In the case of a woman who discharges a gestational sac full of flesh, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does she have the impurity of a woman after childbirth? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: I have not heard from my teachers the <i>halakha</i> in this case.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: This is what my father, i.e., Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta, one of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s teachers, said: If a woman discharged a gestational sac full of blood, she is impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. If it is full of flesh, she is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: If you had told us an entirely new statement in the name of your father, no part of which was also stated by another Sage, we would have listened to you, i.e., we would have accepted the statement as <i>halakha</i>. But now that you stated two <i>halakhot</i>, one with regard to a woman who discharged a gestational sac full of blood, and the other with regard to a woman who discharged a gestational sac full of flesh, the entire statement cannot be accepted as <i>halakha</i>.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains: From the fact that Rabbi Yosei said this first clause of his statement, with regard to a gestational sac full of blood, in accordance with an individual opinion, i.e., in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos, who said in the name of Rabbi Meir that the woman is impure, contrary to the opinion of the other Sages, it follows that with regard to this latter statement as well, with regard to a gestational sac full of flesh, one can say that perhaps Rabbi Yosei said it in accordance with the opinion of another individual Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua. And the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who discharges a gestational sac in which tissue did not develop, Rabbi Yehoshua says: It has the status of an offspring, and the woman has the impurity of a woman after childbirth; and the Rabbis say: It is not an offspring, and the woman is pure. The opinion of Rabbi Yosei that a woman who discharged a gestational sac full of flesh is impure might be in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua, which is not accepted as <i>halakha</i>, since the majority of the other Sages disagree with him. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> cannot be decided in accordance with either part of the statement of Rabbi Yosei.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: The dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid, as Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the turbidity indicates that there was likely an embryo in the sac that liquefied. But in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear, everyone agrees that the discharged sac is not considered an offspring. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The dispute applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What does Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi mean? Does he mean that the dispute applies only in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear, but in a case where it is turbid, everyone agrees that it has the halakhic status of an offspring? Or perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi means that the dispute applies in this case and in that case, i.e., the Rabbis hold that the sac does not have the status of an offspring even if the amniotic fluid is turbid. The Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis applies only in a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who is the same Rabbi Yehoshua who disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to the case of a woman who discharges a gestational sac in which tissue did not develop, taught this following proof for his opinion that the woman is impure: It is stated: “And the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins, and clothed them” (Genesis 3:21). This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not make skin for a person unless he is already created, as God first created Adam and Eve, and then gave them skin. Consequently, the existence of a gestational sac proves that there is an offspring.
  Evidently, according to Rabbi Yehoshua the matter of whether or not an embryo is considered offspring is dependent on whether or not there is skin, and there is no difference whether the amniotic fluid is turbid, and there is no difference whether it is clear.
  Granted, if you say that the dispute applies in a case where it is clear, that is why it was necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua to derive from a verse that an embryo that has skin is considered an offspring. But if you say that the dispute applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid, but Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that the woman is pure if it is clear, why do I need a verse to teach that if the amniotic fluid is turbid the woman is impure? It is logical that where the amniotic fluid is turbid there was probably an embryo that liquefied. Rather, conclude from it that the dispute applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that this is correct.
  And likewise, just as Rabbi Oshaya interprets the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis as referring to a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid; but in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear, everyone agrees that the discharged sac is not considered an offspring.
  Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a mishna that specifies the obligations that apply to firstborn animals (<i>Bekhorot</i> 19b):But the Sages said that not only does a viable offspring exempt any subsequent offspring from being counted a firstborn, but the same applies to an indication of the offspring that is discharged from the womb. The indication in a small animal is a murky discharge from the womb, in a large animal it is the emergence of an afterbirth, and in a woman the indication is a gestational sac or an afterbirth.
  Rava infers: And yet the miscarriage of a gestational sac in the case of a large animal does not exempt the animal’s subsequent offspring from being counted a firstborn. Granted, if you say that the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear, it is due to that reason that the mishna differentiates between a large animal and a woman with regard to a gestational sac.
  Rava explains: With regard to a woman, as the aforementioned verse: “And the Lord God made for Adam and for his wife garments of skins,” includes in the definition of offspring a gestational sac, i.e., skin, one can say that such a gestational sac exempts subsequent births from the obligations of primogeniture. By contrast, in the case of an animal, as the verse does not include a gestational sac in the definition of offspring, discharging a gestational sac does not exempt the animal’s subsequent offspring from being considered a firstborn.
  But if you say that the dispute applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems the woman impure due to the likelihood that there was an embryo that liquefied, since this <i>halakha</i> is based on logic, what is different in the case of a woman, and what is different in the case of an animal? Rabbi Yehoshua’s reasoning applies equally to both. Evidently, the dispute applies in a case where the amniotic fluid is clear.
  The Gemara answers: Do you hold that it is obvious to Rabbi Yehoshua that a gestational sac in which the amniotic fluid is turbid has the halakhic status of an offspring? That is not so; rather, Rabbi Yehoshua is uncertain of its halakhic status, and therefore here, in this case, he rules stringently, and there he also rules stringently.
  The Gemara elaborates: First of all, with regard to a situation where a woman discharged a gestational sac in which the amniotic fluid was turbid, in which case the obligation of primogeniture is a monetary matter, i.e., the obligation to redeem the newborn child by paying money to a priest, the subsequent births are exempt, in accordance with the principle that uncertainty with regard to monetary matters is treated leniently.
  By contrast, with regard to an animal, in which case firstborn status is a ritual matter, as there are prohibitions involving, i.e., against, shearing the animal’s wool and using the animal for labor before it incurs a blemish, the discharged gestational sac is not considered an offspring and does not exempt subsequent births from the obligations of firstborn status, as uncertainty with regard to ritual matters is treated stringently. So too, with regard to the impurity of a woman who discharged a gestational sac, she is deemed impure, as uncertainty with regard to impurity is treated stringently, which means that for the purposes of this <i>halakha</i> a gestational sac is considered an offspring.
  The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yehoshua uncertain about the <i>halakha</i> of a woman who discharges a gestational sac? But doesn’t he cite a verse as proof that the woman has the impurity of one who gave birth? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that the woman is impure by rabbinic law, and the verse he cites is a mere support for this <i>halakha</i>; it is not the actual source.
  Rav Ḥanina bar Shelamya said to Rav: This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who told his students that he did not hear from his teachers the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a woman who discharged a gestational sac full of flesh; and this is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, who cited his father’s opinion that in such a case the woman is impure. And this is the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya, that the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and the Rabbis applies only in a case where the amniotic fluid is turbid; and finally this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who holds that the dispute applies if the amniotic fluid is clear. In accordance with whose opinion does the Master hold?
  Rav said to Rav Ḥanina bar Shelamya: I say that both in this case, where the amniotic fluid is turbid, and in that case, where the fluid is clear, the woman does not need to be concerned that she has the status of a woman who gave birth to an offspring.
  And Shmuel says: In both this case and that case, the woman must be concerned that the discharged gestational sac has the status of an offspring, and therefore she is considered impure like a woman who gave birth. And Shmuel follows his standard line of reasoning here, as when Rav Dimi came and transmitted many halakhic traditions, the latter said: In Neharde’a the Sages never deemed a woman who discharged a gestational sac pure, except for the case of a certain gestational sac that came before Shmuel, who placed a hair on this side of that sac, and it was visible from that side. Shmuel said, based on this test: If it were so, that there was an offspring in the sac, it would not have been so transparent. He therefore deemed the woman pure, but his ruling applied only in that extreme case.
  § The mishna teaches: But if the sac was one in which tissue developed, the halakhic status of the woman is that of a woman after childbirth. Since the sex of the embryo is unknown, she observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female; she is impure for fourteen days like a woman who gave birth to a female, but blood that she sees thereafter is pure only until forty days after birth, like a woman who gave birth to a male. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the definition of a gestational sac in which tissue developed? Abba Shaul says: The beginning of the formation of the embryo is from its head, and its two eyes look like two drops, similar to the eyes of a fly. Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: These eyes must be distant from each other. Furthermore, its two nostrils look like two drops, similar to the nostrils of a fly.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: And these eyes must be close to each other. And its mouth stretches along the width of its face like a strand of hair. And its body is like the size of a lentil. And if it was female, its vagina can be discerned by the appearance of a line like a cracked grain of barley oriented along the length of its body.
  And it does not have the shape of arms and legs at this stage. And it is said with regard to an embryo at this stage, in the texts of tradition, the Prophets: “Have You not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese? You have clothed me with skin and flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews. You have granted me life and favor, and Your providence has preserved my spirit” (Job 10:10–12).
  And one does not examine it with water to discover its sex, as water is too strong,
  
  Daf 25b
  
  and dissolves it. Rather, one examines it with oil, as oil is soft and cleans the embryo so that its sex can be discerned. And one views it only in the light of the sun.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: How does one examine the embryo? The Gemara expresses surprise at this question: How does one examine it to determine whether it has the halakhic status of an offspring? Clearly, one examines it as we just said. Rather, the question is as follows: In what manner does one examine it to ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female?
  Abba Shaul bar Nash, and some say Abba Shaul bar Remash, says: One brings a sliver of wood whose top is smooth, and he moves it along the embryo in that place, i.e., the sex organ. If the sliver is caught, i.e., its movement is not smooth, it is known that the embryo is male, as its member interfered with the movement of the sliver. And if the sliver is not caught, it is known that it is female.
  Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: They taught this <i>halakha</i>, that if the movement of the sliver is not smooth then the embryo is male, only if the sliver was moved along the sex organ of the embryo from below to above; but if it was moved from the sides, from one side to the other, the fact that it was not smooth does not prove that the embryo is male, as one can say that the sides of the womb interfered.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The complete version of the <i>baraita</i> is taught as follows: If it was female, its vagina can be discerned by the appearance of a line like a cracked grain of barley oriented along the length of its body. Rav Naḥman objects to this: But perhaps it is not the vagina but the recess between the testes, and the embryo is male. Abaye said to him: Now, at this stage of development, the testes of the embryo themselves are not discernible. Is it possible that the recess between the testes is discernible?
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that at this stage an embryo does not have the shape of arms and legs. Rabbi Amram says that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that when an embryo’s arms and legs start to take shape, its two thighs look like two strings of crimson thread [<i>zehorit</i>]. And Rabbi Amram says with regard to this matter that the thighs look like two strings of the woof, which are thicker than those of the warp. The <i>baraita</i> adds: And its two arms look like two strings of crimson thread. And Rabbi Amram says with regard to this matter that the arms look like two strings of the warp.
  Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: <i>Shinnana</i>, do not perform an action, i.e., do not issue a practical ruling deeming a woman who discharges an embryo at this stage of development impure, unless the embryo has grown hair. The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say that? But doesn’t Shmuel say with regard to a woman who discharged a gestational sac that both in this case, where the amniotic fluid is turbid, and in that case, where the fluid is clear, the woman must be concerned that the discharged gestational sac might have the status of an offspring, which would mean that she is impure even without the growth of hair on the embryo?
  Rav Ami bar Shmuel says: This matter was explained to me by Mar Shmuel: As for being concerned that perhaps she is impure, the woman must be concerned, due to the uncertainty whether she discharged an offspring. But we do not give her the days of purity that follow the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth, unless the embryo has grown hair.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Shmuel is uncertain whether a gestational sac has the halakhic status of an offspring? But there was an incident involving a certain gestational sac that was brought before Mar Shmuel, and Shmuel said: This embryo is forty-one days old. And Shmuel subsequently calculated the amount of time that had passed from the day that the woman went to perform immersion in a ritual bath until that day, and it was only forty days.
  And he said to the local court: This husband engaged in intercourse with his wife when she was a menstruating woman. They bound the husband and he confessed. Since Shmuel was so proficient in embryology, why was he unsure about the halakhic status of a gestational sac? The Gemara answers: Shmuel himself is different, as his strength, i.e., his proficiency, was great. His general ruling that the halakhic status of a gestational sac is uncertain applies to people who are not as proficient as he is.
  § The mishna teaches that a woman who discharges a sandal fetus or one who discharges an afterbirth observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A sandal fetus has a similar appearance to a certain fish of the sea known as a sandal fish;it looks as though it is a full-fledged offspring from the outset, but it was mashed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A sandal fetus has an appearance that is similar to the tongue of the large bull. Students testified in the name of our teachers that for a sandal fetus to have the halakhic status of an offspring, it requires the shape of a face.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is that a sandal fetus requires the shape of a face for it to have the status of an offspring. Rav Adda says that Rav Yosef says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A sandal fetus requires the shape of a face, but the face does not need to be in its proper location; even if the face is on the back of its head, the fetus has the status of an offspring. A parable to which this situation can be compared is that of a person who slapped another in the face and pushed his face back. Here too, the face of the sandal fetus was pushed back due to external pressure.
  The Gemara relates: In the days of Rabbi Yannai, the other Sages wished to deem pure a woman who discharges a sandal fetus that does not have the shape of a face. Rabbi Yannai said to them: You have deemed pure women who discharge offspring. Rabbi Yannai holds that even a sandal fetus that does not have the shape of a face is considered an offspring.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that students testified in the name of our teachers that for a sandal fetus to have the halakhic status of an offspring it requires the shape of a face? Rav Beivai bar Abaye says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in response: This mishna, i.e., the ruling to which the students testified, is taught from the testimony of Rabbi Neḥunya. In other words, this ruling is the opinion of an individual <i>tanna</i>, which is not accepted. Rabbi Zeira says: Rav Beivai merited that his ruling of <i>halakha</i>, which he transmitted in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, was accepted. As he and I were both sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan when Rabbi Yoḥanan said this <i>halakha</i>, but Rav Beivai said it first to the other Sages, and thereby merited that it was ascribed to him.
  § The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna mention that if a woman discharged a sandal fetus she observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female? Since there is no such thing as a sandal fetus that does not have another offspring with it, which mashed it and gave it the form of a sandal fish, in any case the woman has the impurity of a woman after childbirth.
  The Gemara answers: If it is a female offspring that is born with the sandal fetus, it is indeed unnecessary to mention the <i>halakha</i> of the sandal fetus, as the woman is in any case impure for two weeks. But here we are dealing with a case where a male is born with it, on account of which the woman would be impure for only seven days were it not for the sandal fetus.
  In this case, it is necessary for the mishna to state that the woman observes the strictures of one who gave birth both to a male and to a female, lest you say that since Rav Yitzḥak bar Ami says that the sex of a fetus is determined at the moment of conception, as, if the woman emits seed first she gives birth to a male and if the man emits seed first she gives birth to a female, therefore, it can be concluded from the fact that this offspring that was born with the sandal fetus is male, that this sandal fetus is also male.
  Lest this reasoning be accepted, the mishna teaches us that the woman must observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a female as well. This is because one can say that perhaps both the man and the woman emitted seed at the same time, and consequently this offspring is male and that sandal fetus is female.
  Alternatively, it can be suggested that it is necessary for the mishna to state this <i>halakha</i> even with regard to a case where the twin of the sandal fetus is female, as, if the woman gives birth to the female before sunset and gives birth to the sandal fetus after sunset, which is considered the next day, the sex of the sandal fetus affects the count of the woman’s periods of impurity and purity.
  If the sandal fetus is male, the woman’s status as a woman after childbirth ends after the eightieth day from the birth of the female offspring, and she counts the beginning of the period when seeing blood renders her impure as a menstruating woman from the birth of the first offspring, i.e., the female. But if the sandal fetus is female, the woman has the status of a woman after childbirth until after the eightieth day from its birth, which is the eighty-first day from the birth of the first offspring. If so, she counts the beginning of the period when seeing blood renders her impure as a menstruating woman from the birth of the last offspring, i.e., the sandal fetus.
  The Gemara discusses why the case of a woman who discharged a sandal fetus is mentioned in other <i>mishnayot</i>, given that a sandal fetus always has a twin. First the Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> of a woman who discharged a sandal fetus that we learned in a mishna
  
  Daf 26a
  
  with regard to firstborns (<i>Bekhorot</i> 46a), which states that the son who is born after a sandal fetus has the status of a firstborn with regard to inheritance but not with regard to the obligation of redemption from a priest. The Gemara asks: For what matter is that <i>halakha</i> relevant? Since the sandal fetus has a twin that is born with it, the subsequent son is in any case exempt from redemption.
  The Gemara answers: That <i>halakha</i> is relevant for a case where the sandal fetus’s twin comes out of the womb after it. The mishna teaches that as the sandal fetus was born first, its twin is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance, but it is not a firstborn with regard to redemption from a priest.
  The Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a woman who discharged a sandal fetus that we learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Karetot</i> (7b), which states that such a woman brings the offering of a woman who gave birth. The Gemara asks: For what matter is that <i>halakha</i> relevant? In any case that woman is obligated to bring the offering of a woman who gave birth, due to the twin.
  The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the mishna to state that if a woman gives birth to a full-fledged offspring by means of caesarean section, and to a sandal fetus in a regular manner through the womb, in such a case she brings an offering for giving birth to the sandal fetus, despite the fact that she does not bring an offering for the full-fledged offspring, as one does not bring an offering for a birth by caesarean section.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who said that an offspring which is delivered by means of caesarean section is considered a full-fledged offspring, and its mother does bring an offering, what is there to say? Why is it necessary for the mishna to state this <i>halakha</i> if the woman must bring an offering regardless of the sandal fetus?
  Rabbi Yirmeya says: It is necessary for the mishna to state that if a woman gives birth to the full-fledged offspring while she is a gentile, when the <i>halakhot</i> of a woman after childbirth do not apply to her, and she immediately converts to Judaism and gives birth to the sandal fetus after she converted and became obligated to observe the <i>halakhot</i> of a woman after childbirth, that she brings an offering for the sandal fetus.
  The Sages said the answers to these questions before Rav Pappa, and they asked him: And are these answers correct? Can it be suggested that the sandal fetus was born before or after the twin fetus? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that when a sandal fetus and the full-fledged offspring exit the womb, they exit only wrapped around one another?
  Rav Pappa said in response: Conclude from it that the sandal fetus and its twin do not lie side by side, but rather the full-fledged offspring encounters the sandal fetus at half its height, i.e., the head of the full-fledged offspring presses into the abdomen of the sandal fetus. And when they are born, the full-fledged offspring pushes the sandal fetus toward the direction its head is pointing, to the entrance of the womb, causing the sandal fetus to be born first. Therefore, the mishna with regard to firstborns can be explained as referring to a case where the fetuses exited the womb with their heads first, as in such a case the sandal fetus emerges first. By contrast, the mishna in tractate <i>Karetot</i> is referring to a case where they emerged with their feet first, as in such a case the full-fledged offspring emerges first.
  Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa says in the name of Rava: You may even say that the two fetuses lie precisely side by side, and you should reverse Rav Pappa’s <i>halakha</i> so that it reads as follows: With regard to firstborns, the reference is to a case where the fetuses emerged with their feet first. In such a case, the full-fledged offspring, which has life, hangs on and does not emerge so quickly, whereas the sandal fetus, which does not have life, slides out and emerges first. In tractate <i>Karetot</i>, it is referring to a case where the fetuses came out with their heads first. In such an instance, with regard to the full-fledged offspring, which has life, once its head emerges it is considered a birth, whereas the sandal fetus is considered to have been born only when the majority of its body emerges.
  MISHNA: If there is an afterbirth in the house, the house is ritually impure, in the sense that everything under the roof contracts impurity imparted by a corpse. The reason is not that the status of an afterbirth is that of an offspring; rather, it is that there is no afterbirth without an offspring. It is clear that the afterbirth contained an offspring that disintegrated after the miscarriage. That offspring rendered the contents of the house impure.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The house does not become a tent over a corpse, as although there had been an offspring in the afterbirth, the offspring disintegrated, turning to blood, before it emerged from the womb, and it was negated by the majority of blood that accompanied the miscarriage.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the appearance of the afterbirth: At the outset of the pregnancy, the afterbirth is so thin that it is similar to a string of the woof, and at the end of the pregnancy it is much wider, similar in width to a lupine. And the afterbirth is hollow like a trumpet, and there is no afterbirth whose length is less than a handbreadth. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: An afterbirth is similar to the craw of roosters, from which the small intestine emerges.
  Since the <i>baraita</i> states that the minimum length of an afterbirth is a handbreadth, the Gemara cites another <i>baraita</i> that lists different items whose halakhic status is dependent on a minimum measure of a handbreadth. It is taught by Rabbi Oshaya, the youngest [<i>ze’eira</i>] of the company [<i>demin ḥavrayya</i>] of Sages: There are five items whose minimum measure is one handbreadth, and these are they: An afterbirth, the shofar for blowing on Rosh HaShana, the spine of a <i>lulav</i> that must be taken on <i>Sukkot</i>, the width of the wall of a <i>sukka</i>, and the hyssop [<i>veha’ezov</i>]. Hyssop is used for the purification of a leper and for the preparation of the ashes of a red heifer in order to sprinkle them with water on someone who is ritually impure due to impurity imparted by a corpse.
  The Gemara elaborates: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to an afterbirth is that which we stated above. The <i>halakha</i> of a shofar is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How much is the measure of the length of a shofar for blowing on Rosh HaShana? Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel explained: It must be long enough that when one holds it in his hand with four fingers, it can be seen protruding on one side of his hand and on the other side, i.e., at least one handbreadth.
  What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a spine of a <i>lulav</i>? It is as Rabbi Parnakh said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The spine of a <i>lulav</i> must protrude at least one handbreadth beyond the myrtle branch that is tied together with it. The <i>halakha</i> of the wall of a <i>sukka</i> is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A <i>sukka</i> is valid only if it has two full-fledged partitions in the standard sense, completely closing each of those two sides and measuring at least seven handbreadths, and a third wall that measures even one handbreadth. If the third wall is less than a handbreadth long, the <i>sukka</i> is unfit. Finally, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the hyssop is stated in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: The hyssop used for the purification of a leper and for the preparation of the ashes of a red heifer must measure at least one handbreadth.
  Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa says that Sheila of Kefar Temarta taught as a mnemonic: There are three <i>baraitot</i>, with regard to an afterbirth, a shofar, and the wall of a <i>sukka</i>, and there are two independent <i>halakhot</i> of <i>amora’im</i>, of the spine of a <i>lulav</i> and the hyssop, where the minimum measure of one handbreadth is required. The Gemara asks: Are there two <i>halakhot</i> of <i>amora’im</i> in this list? There is only one statement, with regard to the spine of a <i>lulav</i>. The <i>halakha</i> of the hyssop is taught in a <i>baraita</i> by Rabbi Ḥiyya. Abaye says: Revise the wording of that statement, so that it should not read that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a <i>baraita</i>; rather, say that Rabbi Ḥiyya says himself that the hyssop must measure at least one handbreadth, i.e., that <i>halakha</i> is not taught in a <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And are there no more cases where the minimum measure is one handbreadth, other than those five listed by Rabbi Oshaya? But isn’t there the following mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 3:7) that deals with the minimum size of a tent that transmits ritual impurity: A cubic space measuring one handbreadth by one handbreadth with a height of one handbreadth transmits ritual impurity. If a corpse is in that space, the impurity is transmitted to all people, vessels, and food in that space. And a space of that size serves as a barrier before, i.e., stops the spread of, ritual impurity beyond that space.
  The Gemara answers: We said that there are five items whose minimum measure is one handbreadth; we did not say anything about a space whose measure is one handbreadth by one handbreadth.
  The Gemara further asks: But isn’t there the following mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 5:2): A stone that protrudes from the oven by one handbreadth, which is used as a handle for lifting and carrying the oven, and similarly a stone that protrudes from the stove three fingerbreadths is considered as having a connection to the oven or stove with regard to ritual impurity. Consequently, if the oven or stove becomes impure, then the stone handle, which is classified as part of the oven, is likewise rendered impure. If the handle is longer than that, the additional length will be removed, so it is not considered to be part of the oven.
  The Gemara answers: When we said that there are five items whose minimum measure is one handbreadth, we were referring to cases where if it less than one handbreadth it is unfit for the purpose of the item. But here, where a protruding stone one handbreadth long is considered a handle of the oven, it is all the more so the case that a protruding stone less than one handbreadth long is considered a handle of the oven.
  The Gemara asks: But aren’t there
  
  Daf 26b
  
  toy ovens with which girls play, whose minimum measure with regard to ritual impurity is also one handbreadth? As it is taught in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 5:1): A clay oven in its original, unbroken, state is susceptible to ritual impurity if it is four handbreadths tall. And with regard to an oven that became impure and was subsequently broken, if its remains include a piece four handbreadths tall, that piece remains impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  And the Rabbis say: In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a large oven, made for regular use; but with regard to a small oven made for girls to play with, in its original state, any size is sufficient for it to be susceptible to contract impurity. Once its construction is completed, if the oven then becomes impure and is subsequently broken, if its remains include a piece that contains the majority of the oven, that piece remains impure.
  The Gemara explains: And how small is the size defined by the mishna as any size? Rabbi Yannai says: One handbreadth, as people fashion toy ovens for girls one handbreadth high. This is another example of an item that has a minimum measure of one handbreadth, in addition to the five items listed by Rabbi Oshaya. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not speaking of matters that are subject to dispute, such as the minimum measure of an oven.
  The Gemara adds: Now that you have arrived at this answer, the fact that Rabbi Oshaya does not mention a stone protruding from an oven can be explained in the same manner, since this <i>halakha</i> is also subject to a dispute. As the latter clause of that mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 5:2) teaches that Rabbi Yehuda said: When the Sages said that a stone protruding from an oven is considered a handle if it protrudes one handbreadth, they said so only with regard to a stone that protrudes from the oven and toward the wall. If the stone protrudes more than that, it is not considered a handle, as it is likely to be removed so that the oven can be moved closer to the wall. But if the stone protrudes toward the airspace of the house, it is considered an oven handle even if it protrudes more than one handbreadth.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t there the frame of the Table in the Temple, which is one handbreadth wide, as stated in the Torah (Exodus 25:25)? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not dealing with matters that are written in the Torah. The Gemara further asks: But isn’t there the Ark Cover, which is one handbreadth thick, and its measure is not written explicitly in the Torah? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not dealing with consecrated items.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the <i>halakha</i> of a cross beam, which is placed over the entrance to an alleyway in order to permit carrying items in the alleyway on Shabbat, and the <i>halakha</i> is that it is enough for a cross beam to be one handbreadth wide? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya is not dealing with matters of rabbinic law. Rather, he is speaking only of matters that are written in the Torah but whose measure is not explicit in the Torah.
  § Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta sat before Rav Kahana, and he sat and said that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: For all of the first three days after a woman gives birth, if she discharges afterbirth, we attribute the afterbirth to the offspring. There is no concern that this afterbirth indicates the miscarriage of another offspring. From this point forward, once three days have passed since the birth, if the woman discharges an afterbirth, we are concerned that there might have been another offspring in the afterbirth, and the <i>halakhot</i> of a woman who discharged an offspring apply to her.
  Rav Kahana said to Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel: And did Rav say this? But didn’t Rav say that an offspring does not remain in the womb at all after another offspring was born? Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel was silent. Rav Kahana said to him: Perhaps there is no contradiction between Rav’s two statements, as here, where he indicates that a second offspring can emerge even three days after the first, the reference is to a case where the first offspring is a non-viable newborn, whereas there, in the statement that a second offspring does not remain in the womb after the first offspring was born, he is referring to a case where the first offspring is a viable offspring.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel said to him: Are you the one who says this explanation of Rav’s <i>halakha</i> of your own accord? Indeed, Rav said this explicitly: If a woman discharged a non-viable newborn and subsequently discharged an afterbirth, for all of the first three days we attribute the afterbirth to the offspring. From this point forward, if she discharged an afterbirth we are concerned that it contained another offspring. If she gave birth to a viable offspring and subsequently discharged an afterbirth, even from now until ten days after the birth we are not concerned that the afterbirth contained another offspring.
  The Gemara relates: Shmuel, Rav’s students, and Rav Yehuda were sitting together. Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of D’vil, was passing by and walking toward them, i.e., he was walking in their direction, and he was hurrying and coming along. Shmuel said to his company: A man is coming toward us whom one can knock down with a straw of wheat, and he falls and stays down. In other words, he cannot refute even a minor challenge to his opinions.
  In the meantime, Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya, arrived. Shmuel said to him: What did Rav say with regard to an afterbirth? Rav Yosef said to him that this is what Rav said: One attributes an afterbirth only to a viable item, i.e., a viable offspring. Shmuel subsequently asked all of Rav’s students who were present whether Rav actually said this, and they said to him that Rav indeed said so. Shmuel then looked at Rav Yehuda harshly, as Rav Yehuda was also a student of Rav, but he had not transmitted this <i>halakha</i> to Shmuel after Rav’s death.
  § Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: In the case of a woman who discharges an item in the form of a crow and there is also an afterbirth, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the afterbirth attributed to the discharged item, or is there concern that the afterbirth might have contained another offspring? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: One attributes an afterbirth only to an item whose species has an afterbirth. Since crows do not have an afterbirth, the afterbirth cannot be associated with that discharged item.
  Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul then asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If the afterbirth is tied to the item that has the form of a crow, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: You asked about a matter that does not exist. Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul raised an objection to this response from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who discharges a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, and she discharges an afterbirth with them, in an instance when the afterbirth is tied to them we are not concerned about the possibility of another offspring. If the afterbirth is not tied to them, we are concerned that the afterbirth contained another offspring. And I impose upon them
  
  Daf 27a
  
  the stringency of two offspring, as I say: Perhaps the gestational sac of this afterbirth, which contained the offspring, disintegrated, and the afterbirth of the gestational sac containing the fetus shaped like an animal also disintegrated. If so, there are two offspring, and as it is possible that one is male and the other female, the mother must observe the strictures of one who gave birth to both a male and a female. In any event, this <i>baraita</i> is a conclusive refutation of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s claim that it is impossible for an afterbirth to be tied to a fetus that has the form of a bird.
  § Rabba bar Sheila says that Rav Mattana says that Shmuel says: An incident occurred where the Sages attributed the afterbirth that a woman discharged to an offspring that was born up to ten days beforehand. And Shmuel added that the Sages said that one attributes an afterbirth to an offspring that was born only in the case of an afterbirth that emerges after the offspring is born. By contrast, an afterbirth that emerges before the offspring is born is not attributed to that offspring.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There was an incident where the Sages attributed the afterbirth to an offspring that was born up to twenty-three days beforehand. Rav Yosef said to him a correction of his statement: You said to us on another occasion that the offspring was born up to twenty-four days beforehand.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avira, says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: There was an incident where a woman was pregnant with twins, and one offspring remained in the womb for thirty-three days after the other offspring was born. Rav Yosef said to him: You said to us on another occasion that the second offspring was born thirty-four days after the first.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that if a woman gives birth to a baby in her ninth month, she can give birth prematurely (see <i>Rosh HaShana</i> 11a). You find a situation where there could be such a difference between the births of the two twins if the form of one of the twin fetuses was completed at the end of the seventh month, and it is born at that stage, and the form of the other one was completed at the beginning of the ninth month, and it is born then. In such a case, there can be a difference of thirty-four days between the births. But according to the one who says that a woman who gives birth to a baby in her ninth month cannot give birth prematurely, but rather she gives birth at the end of the ninth month, what is there to say?
  The Gemara answers that one should reverse the statements: The difference of thirty-three days was stated with regard to a case of an afterbirth that was discharged an extended period after the birth of the offspring, whereas the gap of twenty-three days was stated with regard to a case of an offspring that was born after its twin.
  Rabbi Avin bar Rav Adda says that Rav Menaḥem of the village of She’arim, and some say that he was from Beit She’arim, says: An incident occurred where one offspring remained in the womb after the other was born for three months, and both twins are sitting before us in the study hall. And who are they? They are Yehuda and Ḥizkiyya, the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say that a woman cannot become pregnant and again become pregnant with another offspring while she is pregnant with the first? Abaye says: Both twins were conceived at the same time; it was one drop of semen and it split into two. The form of one was completed at the beginning of the seventh month, and the form of the other one was completed at the end of the ninth month.
  § The mishna teaches that if there is an afterbirth in the house, the house is impure in the sense that everything under the roof contracts impurity imparted by a corpse. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If there is an afterbirth in the house, the house is impure. The reason is not that the status of an afterbirth is that of an offspring; rather, it is that there is no afterbirth without an offspring, and the offspring rendered the contents of the house impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon deem the contents of the house pure.
  These Sages said to Rabbi Meir: Do you not concede that if people removed the afterbirth to the outer room of the house in a basin, that the room is pure? Rabbi Meir said to them in response: Indeed, that room is pure; but why so? Because the offspring does not exist anymore, i.e., it presumably disintegrated while it was moved from place to place.
  These Sages said to him: Just as the offspring does not exist when the afterbirth is moved to the outer room, so too, it does not exist when the afterbirth is in the inner room either. In other words, the offspring presumably disintegrated while it was moved from the woman’s womb to the place in the house where it is located. Rabbi Meir said to them: A situation in which the offspring disintegrated once, when the afterbirth was moved to its first location in the house, is not comparable to a case where the offspring disintegrated twice, i.e., when the afterbirth was first moved to the interior room of the house and then moved to the outer room.
  § Rav Pappa sat behind Rav Beivai in the study hall before their teacher Rav Hamnuna, and he sat and said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that a house in which there is an afterbirth is pure? He holds that with regard to any item that has ritual impurity with which there was mixed an item of another type, it is nullified by the other item and is pure. Consequently, in the case of an offspring that disintegrated, the disintegrated offspring is nullified by the blood of the childbirth.
  Rav Pappa said to Rav Beivai, who was a greater scholar than he, and to Rav Hamnuna his teacher: This is also the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, who agree with Rabbi Shimon in the above <i>baraita</i>. Rav Beivai and Rav Hamnuna laughed at him: What is different about the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei? Since the statement of Rabbi Shimon is attributed to them as well, it is obvious that their reasoning is the same.
  Rav Pappa said with regard to this incident: A person should say a matter even as obvious as this one, and one should not be silent in the presence of his teacher, despite the possibility that other people might laugh at him, because it is stated: “If you have done foolishly in lifting up yourself, or if you have planned devices [<i>zammota</i>], lay your hand over your mouth” (Proverbs 30:32). One who acts “foolishly” over matters of Torah by not hesitating to issue statements that might be ridiculed will ultimately be exalted and lifted up. Conversely, one who muzzles [<i>zamam</i>] himself due to embarrassment will end up with his hand over his mouth, unable to answer questions that are posed to him.
  With regard to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that the woman is pure because the offspring is nullified by the blood of childbirth, the Gemara notes: And Rabbi Shimon follows his standard line of reasoning, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a ladleful [<i>melo tarvad</i>] of dust from a corpse, which is the minimum amount that renders everything in a house impure, into which any amount of dirt fell, the house is impure; and Rabbi Shimon deems it pure.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Why is the house pure when it contains a ladleful of dust from a corpse? Rabba said: I found the Sages of the study hall of Rav sitting and saying: The reason Rabbi Shimon deems the house pure is that it is impossible for there not to be two grains of dirt that are more than one grain of dust from the corpse, in a certain place in the mixture. And as that grain of dust from the corpse is nullified by the dirt, the amount of dust that remains is insufficient for rendering the house impure.
  And I said to them: On the contrary, according to this reasoning the house should certainly be impure, as it is impossible for there not to be two grains of dust from the corpse that are more than
  
  Daf 27b
  
  one grain of dirt in a certain place in the mixture. That grain of dirt is thereby nullified by the dust of the corpse, and consequently the measure of the dust increases.
  Rather, Rabba said that this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to a corpse in its ultimate state of dust is like the <i>halakha</i> in its initial state of decomposition: Just as with regard to its initial state, if another matter is mixed with the decomposing corpse it serves as a nullification [<i>gangilon</i>] of the corpse’s impurity, as the dust of a decomposed corpse can impart impurity only if it is not mingled with the dust of any other substance, so too, in the corpse’s ultimate state of dust, if another matter is mixed with it, that serves as a nullification of the impurity of the dust.
  The Gemara asks: What is the source for the <i>halakha</i> that the dust of a corpse imparts impurity only if it is not mingled with the dust of any other substance? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Which is a corpse that has the <i>halakha</i> of dust, i.e., whose dust imparts impurity; and which is a corpse that does not have the <i>halakha</i> of dust? If a corpse was buried naked in a marble coffin or on a stone floor, that is a corpse that has the <i>halakha</i> of dust that imparts impurity. Since any dust found there must have come from the corpse, it imparts impurity.
  And what is a corpse that does not have the <i>halakha</i> of dust? If a corpse was buried in its cloak, or in a wooden coffin, or on a brick floor, that is a corpse that does not have the <i>halakha</i> of dust that imparts impurity, as it is assumed that some of the dust is from particles of the clothes, wood, or bricks, and the dust from a decomposed corpse imparts impurity only if it is not mingled with the dust of any other substance. The <i>baraita</i> adds another <i>halakha</i> with regard to the impurity of the dust of a corpse: And the Sages said that the dust of a corpse is impure only with regard to the corpse of a person who died naturally, excluding one who was killed, whose dust is not impure.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the <i>baraita</i> cited above that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: In the case of a ladleful of dust from a corpse into which any amount of dirt fell, the house is impure; and Rabbi Shimon deems it pure. The <i>baraita</i> continues: In the case of a ladleful of dust from a corpse that was scattered in the house, the house is impure. Provided that there is a sufficient amount of dust in the house, the house is impure, even if the dust is scattered. And Rabbi Shimon deems it pure.
  The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to state both of these <i>halakhot</i>. As, if the <i>baraita</i> had taught us only the first <i>halakha</i>, with regard to dust from a corpse in which dirt was mixed, one might have thought that it is specifically in that case that the Rabbis say the house is impure, because the dust is concentrated in one place; but if the dust was scattered, one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon that the house is pure. The reasoning is that if an item overlies a collection of dust of a corpse that is insufficient to render it impure and also overlies another collection of similar size, where together these collections constitute a sufficient amount to render the item and everything under it impure, it is not impure.
  And if the <i>baraita</i> had taught us the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to this second case, where the dust of the corpse was scattered, one might have thought that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Shimon says that the house is pure, as an item that overlies an insufficient collection of the dust of a corpse and also overlies another collection, where together these collections constitute a sufficient amount to render the item impure, is not impure. But in that first case, where dirt was mixed with the dust of the corpse, one might say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to the Rabbis that the house is impure. Therefore, it is necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach both cases.
  There is a different dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis that is taught in another mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 2:2): If a house contains a ladleful of dirt from a cemetery and slightly more, the house is impure; and Rabbi Shimon deems it pure. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis? The Gemara answers: They deem the house impure as it is impossible for slightly more than a ladleful of dirt from a cemetery not to contain a ladleful of dust from a corpse.
  § The Gemara asks: Now that you say that the reason that Rabbi Shimon deems the house pure, in a case where it contains dust from a corpse in which dirt was mixed, is that in his opinion the <i>halakha</i> of a corpse in its ultimate state of dust is like the <i>halakha</i> in its initial state of decomposition, then with regard to a case where there is an afterbirth in the house, what is the reason that Rabbi Shimon deems the house pure? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages touched upon it, i.e., deemed the house pure, due to the nullification of the disintegrated offspring by the majority of the blood that emerged during the miscarriage, in which the afterbirth was mixed.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his line of reasoning in this regard, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov both said the same thing, i.e., they both issued rulings based on the same principle. The relevant statement of Rabbi Shimon is that which we said, i.e., that if a woman discharged an afterbirth the house is pure, as the offspring is nullified by the blood that emerged during the miscarriage. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that which is taught in a mishna (<i>Bekhorot</i> 21a): Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In the case of a large animal that expelled a mass of congealed blood, that mass must be buried, as perhaps there was a male fetus there, which was consecrated as a firstborn when it emerged, and the animal is exempt from having any future offspring being counted a firstborn.
  And Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a <i>baraita</i> with regard to that <i>halakha</i>: The mass of congealed blood does not impart ritual impurity, neither through physical contact nor through carrying it. It does not have the status of an unslaughtered animal carcass, which does impart impurity in such manners. The Gemara asks: But since the mass does not impart impurity, neither through contact nor through carrying, which indicates that it is not considered a fetus, why must it be buried? The Gemara answers: It must be buried in order to publicize that the animal is exempt from having its future offspring being counted a firstborn.
  The Gemara asks: If the animal’s subsequent offspring is not counted a firstborn, evidently the mass is treated like a full-fledged offspring. But if so, why does Rabbi Ḥiyya teach that it does not impart impurity, neither through physical contact nor through carrying? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is due to the halakhic nullification of a foreign substance in a majority of permitted substances that the Sages touched upon it, to exclude it from impurity through contact or carrying. In other words, the fetus is considered a full-fledged offspring, but it does not impart impurity, because it is nullified by the rest of the congealed mass.
  § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that if a woman discharges an afterbirth in a house, the house is pure. Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And Rabbi Shimon concedes that its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth.
  A certain elder said to Rabbi Ami: I will explain to you the reason for the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. As the verse states: “If a woman bears seed and gives birth to a male, she shall be impure seven days, as in the days of the menstruation of her sickness she shall be impure” (Leviticus 12:2). This indicates that even if a woman gives birth to an offspring that is similar only to the seed that she bore, i.e., if the offspring liquefied and became similar to semen, the woman is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth.
  § Reish Lakish says: In the case of a fetus in a gestational sac, that was mashed in its amniotic fluid by being shaken violently, it is rendered like a corpse that was deformed, and therefore it does not impart impurity to other items that are under the same roof.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: From where do we derive that a corpse that was deformed is pure? If we say it is derived from that which Rabbi Shabbtai says that Rabbi Yitzḥak from Migdal [<i>Migdala’a</i>] says, and some say from that which Rabbi Yitzḥak from Migdal says that Rabbi Shabbtai says, that cannot be correct. The Gemara cites the relevant statement: With regard to a corpse that was burned but its form [<i>veshildo</i>] still exists, i.e., it still has the form of a human corpse, it is impure. There was an incident involving such a corpse, and the Sages deemed impure all items that were under the large openings of the house where the corpse was located, as these openings were fit for the removal of the corpse from the house through them.
  
  Daf 28a
  
  But they deemed pure all items that were under the small openings to the house, i.e., those whose width was less than four handbreadths. And you infer from this statement that the reason the large openings are impure in such a case is that the form of the corpse still exists; but otherwise, i.e., if the corpse was deformed, then even the large openings are pure.
  The Gemara explains why one cannot infer from here that a deformed corpse does not impart impurity to other items that are under the same roof: On the contrary, one can infer from this statement in the opposite manner: It is only because the form of the corpse still exists that the Sages deemed pure the small openings of the house; but otherwise, the small openings are also impure, as each and every one of them is fit for taking out the corpse through them, each limb one by one. Consequently, no proof can be derived from this statement in support of the opinion of Reish Lakish.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that a deformed corpse imparts impurity to items that are under the same roof? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 2:2): With regard to the ashes of burned corpses that are not mixed with other types of ashes or dirt, Rabbi Eliezer says that its measure for imparting impurity to items that are under the same roof is a quarter of a <i>kav</i>. Clearly, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a deformed corpse imparts impurity to items that are under the same roof.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case of a corpse that was burned but its form still exists? How is this possible? Abaye says: It is possible in a case where one burned the corpse on top of a hard leather spread [<i>katavla</i>], which does not burn, and therefore the corpse retains its shape even after it is burned. Rava says: It is possible in a case where one burned the corpse on top of a marble slate [<i>apoderim</i>]. Ravina says: It is possible in a case where the corpse was charred without being reduced to ashes.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who discharges a shaped hand, i.e., its fingers are discernible, or a shaped foot, its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, as the hand or foot certainly came from a full-fledged fetus. And we are not concerned that perhaps they came from a fetus with a sealed, i.e., deficient, body, in which case the miscarriage does not have the status of childbirth with regard to ritual impurity. The reason is that most pregnant women give birth to a fully formed fetus, and therefore it is presumed that the hand or foot came from a whole fetus that was squashed during childbirth.
  Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna both say: Although the woman observes the period of impurity of a woman after childbirth, we do not give her the days of purity following the period of impurity. What is the reason? Although it is presumed that the discharged limbs came from a full-fledged fetus, it is unknown whether or when the woman discharged the rest of the fetus, and the principle is that a woman who discharges observes her periods of impurity and purity when the majority of the limbs of the fetus emerge. Therefore, one can say that perhaps her childbirth was distant, i.e., the woman discharged the majority of the limbs of the fetus long before she discharged this hand or foot, and consequently her period of purity has already ended.
  Rav Yosef raises an objection from a mishna (29a): In the case of a woman who discharges and it is not known what sex fetus she discharged, she shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. And if it enters your mind that in any case like this one should say that perhaps the woman’s childbirth was distant, let the mishna teach that the woman shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth to both a male and a female, and also observes the strictures of a menstruating woman. Since it is possible that the item she discharged was a limb from a fetus the majority of which she discharged a long time beforehand, then she must forgo the period of purity observed by a woman who gave birth, and treat any blood that emerges during this period like the blood of a menstruating woman.
  Abaye says in response: If the mishna had taught that the woman observes the strictures of a menstruating woman, I would say that as her status as a woman after childbirth is uncertain, since she observes the strictures of a menstruating woman with regard to any blood that emerges, she brings an offering like any woman after childbirth, but it is not eaten by the priests. It might be thought that perhaps the woman did not give birth at all and is not obligated to bring the offering, and therefore her bird sin offering cannot be eaten. By omitting the <i>halakha</i> that the woman observes the strictures of a menstruating woman, the mishna teaches us that her offering is eaten. This indicates that she certainly discharged an offspring; the uncertainty is only about when she discharged it.
  § Rav Huna says: If a fetus extended its hand out of the womb and then returned it, its mother is impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth. This is considered childbirth, as it is stated with regard to Tamar, Judah’s daughter-in-law: “And it happened when she gave birth that one put out a hand…and it happened that as he drew back his hand, his brother came out” (Genesis 38:28–29). Evidently, the fetus extending out its hand was considered childbirth, despite the fact that it subsequently drew back the hand.
  Rav Yehuda raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If a fetus extended its hand out of the womb, its mother need not be concerned that she is considered a woman after childbirth with regard to any matter. Rav Naḥman says in response: The meaning of this statement was explained to me personally by Rav Huna himself: With regard to being concerned that she has the status of a woman after childbirth, the woman must be concerned, i.e., she must observe the strictures of a woman after childbirth. But we do not give her a period of days of purity like any woman after childbirth, until most of the fetus emerges.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> say that its mother need not be concerned that she is considered a woman after childbirth with regard to any matter? Abaye says: The <i>baraita</i> means that the woman need not be concerned with regard to any matter by Torah law; but by rabbinic law she must be concerned, i.e., she is required to observe the strictures of a woman after childbirth. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Huna cite a verse as proof for his statement that if a fetus extended its hand out it is considered childbirth? The Gemara answers: This <i>halakha</i> applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as mere support for it, i.e., it is not an actual source.
  MISHNA: A woman who discharges or gives birth to a <i>tumtum</i>, whose sexual organs are obscured, or to a hermaphrodite [<i>ve’androginos</i>], who has both male and female sexual organs, shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. She is impure for fourteen days like a woman who gave birth to a female, but blood that she sees thereafter is pure only until forty days after birth, like for a woman who gave birth to a male.
  In a case where she gave birth to twins, if they are a <i>tumtum</i> and a male, or a hermaphrodite and a male, she observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. But if the twins are a <i>tumtum</i> and a female, or a hermaphrodite and a female, she shall observe the periods of purity and impurity established by the Torah for a woman who gives birth to a female alone. Regardless of the status of the <i>tumtum</i> and the hermaphrodite, the woman’s seven days of impurity and her succeeding thirty-three days of purity are subsumed in the fourteen days of impurity and sixty-six days of purity for a female.
  If the fetus emerged in pieces, or if it emerged reversed, i.e., feetfirst rather than headfirst, when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born, with regard to the impurity of a woman after childbirth. If the fetus emerged in the usual manner, headfirst, it is not considered born until most of its head emerges. And what is considered most of its head? It is from when its forehead emerges.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Now that with regard to a woman who gives birth to a <i>tumtum</i> alone, or a hermaphrodite alone, the mishna states that she shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female, as the sex of the offspring is uncertain, is it necessary for the mishna to rule that if a woman gives birth to twins, a <i>tumtum</i> and a male, or a hermaphrodite and a male, she shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth to both a male and a female?
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to state this <i>halakha</i>, lest you say that since Rabbi Yitzḥak says that the sex of a fetus is determined at the moment of conception, in that if the woman emits seed first she gives birth to a male, and if the man emits seed first she gives birth to a female, therefore one might say that since this offspring that was born with the <i>tumtum</i> or hermaphrodite is male, that <i>tumtum</i> or hermaphrodite is also male. Consequently, the mishna teaches us that the woman shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a female as well, as one can say that perhaps both the man and the woman emitted seed at the same time, which would mean that this offspring is male and that <i>tumtum</i> or hermaphrodite is female.
  § Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: In the case of a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite who saw a white gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>ziva</i>], for which a man is impure, or who emitted a red discharge that had the appearance of menstrual blood, for which a woman is impure, if they entered the Temple they are not liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, as perhaps they are pure, in accordance with their true sex. And if they touched <i>teruma</i> after such a discharge, one does not burn the <i>teruma</i> due to their contact, as although impure <i>teruma</i> must be burned, the impurity in this case is uncertain.
  If a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite saw white <i>ziva</i> and red blood as one, i.e., they emitted both <i>ziva</i> and blood and are therefore impure regardless of their sex, they are still not liable for entering the Temple, but one does burn <i>teruma</i> due to their contact. The reason they are not liable for entering the Temple, despite the fact that they are definitely impure, is that it is stated: “Both male and female
  
  Daf 28b
  
  you shall send out, out of the camp you shall send them, so that they not impurify their camp, in the midst of which I dwell” (Numbers 5:3). It is derived from the verse that only a definite male or a definite female is liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, but not a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rav: In the case of a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite who saw white <i>ziva</i> or red blood, they are not liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, and if they touch <i>teruma</i>, one does not burn the <i>teruma</i> due to their contact. If they saw white <i>ziva</i> and red blood as one, i.e., they emitted both <i>ziva</i> and blood, they are still not liable for entering the Temple, but one burns <i>teruma</i> due to their contact.
  The Gemara reasons: What is the reason that they are not liable for entering the Temple despite the fact that they are definitely impure? Is it not because it is stated in the verse: “Both male and female you shall send out,” from which it is derived that only a definite male or a definite female could be liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, but not a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite? Ulla says: No, Rav’s opinion cannot be proved from this <i>baraita</i>, as in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Shevuot</i> 14b) that Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing…or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2). A precise reading of this verse indicates that if one has a lapse of awareness that he contracted ritual impurity by touching a carcass of a creeping animal, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for defiling the Temple or the sacrificial food, but he is not liable to bring such an offering for a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food.
  Rabbi Akiva says that it is derived from the phrase: “And it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2), that for a lapse of awareness that one had contracted ritual impurity, he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, but he is not liable to bring an offering for a lapse of awareness that he is entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food.
  And we say with regard to this mishna: What is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva? They are apparently stating the same <i>halakha</i>. And Ḥizkiyya says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where one initially knew that he had contracted ritual impurity, but he did not know whether the impurity was contracted from a carcass of a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that for one to be liable to bring an offering, we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a carcass of a creeping animal or whether he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering. And Rabbi Akiva holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we do not require that he know this detail, since he knows in general terms that he contracted impurity.
  The Gemara infers: Doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer say there, in that mishna, that we require one to bring an offering for entering the Temple in a state of impurity only if he knew initially whether he contracted impurity from a carcass of a creeping animal or whether he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass? Here, too, with regard to a hermaphrodite or a <i>tumtum</i> who emitted both <i>ziva</i> and blood, they are not obligated to bring an offering according to Rabbi Eliezer, as we require one to bring an offering only if he knew whether he became impure due to the white <i>ziva</i> he emitted or whether he became impure due to the red blood he emitted.
  But according to Rabbi Akiva, who said that one is obligated to bring an offering due to his initial knowledge of his impurity even if he did not know the exact cause of his impurity, here too, in the case of a hermaphrodite or a <i>tumtum</i> who emitted both <i>ziva</i> and blood, he is obligated to bring an offering due to his initial knowledge of his impurity, despite the fact that he does not know whether he is impure due to the blood or the <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rav, who holds that an impure <i>tumtum</i> or hermaphrodite is not liable for entering the Temple but that any <i>teruma</i> that he touches is burned, what is different with regard to entering the Temple, for which he is not liable? The reason it is different is that it is written: “Both male and female you shall send out,” from which it is derived that a definite male or a definite female is liable for entering the Temple in a state of impurity, but not a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite.
  If so, we should not burn <i>teruma</i> that he touches either, as it is written in a verse dealing with these types of impurity: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of one from whom the flow of semen emerges, so that he is thereby impure; and of her that is sick with her menstrual status, and they who have an issue, whether a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:32–33). It can similarly be derived from this verse that these types of impurity apply only to a definite male or a definite female, but not to a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite.
  The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for the <i>halakha</i> of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The term “whether a male” serves to include a male leper as a primary source of impurity with regard to the sources of his bodily emissions. In other words, the various emissions of a leper, e.g., his saliva and urine, have the status of a primary source of impurity, and therefore they transmit impurity to a person or utensil that touches them. And the term “or a female” serves to include a female as a primary source of impurity with regard to the sources of her bodily emissions.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: This verse: “Both male and female you shall send out” (Numbers 5:3), from which Rav derives that the prohibition against an impure person entering the Temple does not apply to one whose sex is uncertain, is also necessary for another <i>halakha</i>. That <i>halakha</i> is that the obligation to remove from the Temple any impure person or item applies only to one that has the option of attaining ritual purity by immersing in a ritual bath; this excludes an impure earthenware vessel, which cannot be purified by immersing it in a ritual bath. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Consequently, Rav’s <i>halakha</i> cannot be derived from that verse.
  The Gemara answers: If so, that the verse serves to teach Rabbi Yosei’s <i>halakha</i> alone, let the Merciful One write: Any person you shall send out, as this would also exclude earthenware vessels. Rav’s <i>halakha</i> is derived from the fact that the wording of the verse is: “Both male and female.”
  And if you would say in response that if the Merciful One had written: Any person you shall send out, I would say that impure metal vessels need not be removed from the Temple either, as they are not included in the term: Any person, this is not correct. The Gemara elaborates: The <i>halakha</i> that impure metal vessels must be removed from the Temple is derived from the previous verse: “That they put out of the camp every leper, and every one that has an issue, and whatever is impure by the dead” (Numbers 5:2). Therefore, why do I need the verse to write: “Both male and female you shall send out,” instead of simply stating: Any person you shall send out? Clearly, the phrase: “Both male and female,” is necessary for the <i>halakha</i> of Rav.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, one can say that the entire phrase comes for Rav’s <i>halakha</i>, and not the <i>halakha</i> of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse write: Male and female. What is the meaning of the phrase: “Both male and female”? The verse is referring to any ritually impure item that has the same <i>halakha</i> that applies to both males and females, i.e., it can attain purity by being immersed in a ritual bath; this excludes earthenware vessels.
  With regard to Rav’s <i>halakha</i> that the prohibition of entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity does not apply to one who is a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite, the Gemara asks: If so, then even when they become impure with other types of impurity, in addition to the impurity of a <i>zav</i> or a menstruating woman, a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite should likewise not be sent out of the Temple, as the passage from which a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite are excluded is also referring to other types of impurity: “That they put out of the camp every leper, and every one that has an issue, and whatever is impure by the dead” (Numbers 5:2). The Gemara answers: The next verse states: “Both male,” which is referring to impurity caused by a substance that is emitted from the male organ, i.e., <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rav’s derivation: And is it correct that anywhere that the phrase “both male and female” is written in the Torah, this comes to exclude a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite? But isn’t a similar expression stated with regard to valuations, as it is written: “For the male…fifty shekels of silver, after the shekel of the Sanctuary. And if she is a female, then your valuation shall be thirty shekels” (Leviticus 27:3–4).
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is derived from the term “the male”: But not a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite. One might have thought that a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite shall not be valuated according to the valuation of a man, which is fifty shekels, but shall be valuated according to the valuation of a woman, which is thirty shekels. Therefore, the verse states: “The male,” and the following verse states: “And if she is a female,” indicating that these <i>halakhot</i> apply only to a definite male or a definite female, but not to a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: The reason a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite are excluded is that it is written: “The male…and if she is a female,” which indicates that if the verse had written: Male and female, without the superfluous words “the” and “if,” it would not have been derived that the verse excludes a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite. This apparently contradicts the opinion of Rav, who excludes a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite from the prohibition of entering the Temple in a state of impurity merely due to the phrase: “Male and female” (Numbers 5:3). The Gemara answers: In that verse with regard to valuations, the words “male” and “female” are themselves necessary
  
  Daf 29a
  
  in order to differentiate between the valuation of a man and the valuation of a woman. Therefore, it could not have been derived from that verse that a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite are excluded from the <i>halakha</i> of valuations, were it not for the superfluous words “the” and “if.”
  § The mishna teaches that if the fetus emerged in pieces, or if it emerged reversed, i.e., feetfirst rather than headfirst; when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born, with regard to the impurity of a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the head is among the limbs that emerged, provided that the majority of the limbs did not yet emerge, the fetus is not considered born.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught in the mishna that the woman is not impure unless most of the fetus’s limbs emerged only in a case where the head is not among the limbs that emerged; but if the head is among them, the head exempts the woman’s future offspring from the obligation of primogeniture, as the fetus is considered born.
  The Gemara asks: Shall we say that these Sages disagree with regard to the opinion of Shmuel? As Shmuel said that if a woman is pregnant with twins, and the head of one of the fetuses emerges and then disappears back into the womb, this does not exempt the other fetus from the obligation of primogeniture should it be born first. Shmuel says this specifically in a case of non-viable newborns, i.e., where the fetus whose head emerged was a non-viable newborn and the one that was eventually born first is a viable offspring. But if both are viable offspring, the emergence of the head is considered birth. The suggestion is that Rabbi Elazar agrees with the opinion of Shmuel, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel and maintains that the emergence of the head is considered birth even in the case of a non-viable newborn.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion, as it is possible that in the case of a whole non-viable newborn, everyone, i.e., Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan, agrees that the emergence of the head is considered a birth, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel. When they disagree, it is in the case of a fetus that emerged in pieces. As one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that it is specifically in the case of a whole non-viable newborn that the emergence of the head is considered birth, whereas with regard to a fetus that emerged in pieces it is not considered birth; and one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that in the case of a fetus that emerged in pieces as well, the emergence of the head is considered birth.
  The Gemara cites another version of this discussion. The reason it is necessary for most of the limbs of the fetus to emerge for it to be considered born is that it emerged in pieces, or that it emerged reversed, i.e., feet first. It may be inferred from here that if it emerged in its proper manner, headfirst and whole, it is considered born, even according to Rabbi Elazar. Therefore, if the woman is pregnant with twins, the emergence of the head exempts the other twin from the obligations of primogeniture. Evidently, both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar do not hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said that the emergence of the head of one of the twins does not exempt the other in a case of non-viable newborns.
  There are those who teach this <i>halakha</i> by itself, i.e., not in reference to the mishna: Rabbi Elazar says: The emergence of the head of a non-viable newborn is not considered like the emergence of most of the limbs; and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The emergence of the head of a non-viable newborn is considered like the emergence of most of the limbs. And they disagree with regard to the opinion of Shmuel; Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with Shmuel’s opinion, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the opinion of Shmuel.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna that if the fetus emerged in pieces or if it emerged reversed, when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born. The Gemara infers: From the fact that the mishna states: Or reversed, by inference in the case of a fetus that emerged in pieces it emerged in its proper manner, i.e., the head first and then the body, and nevertheless the mishna states that it is only when most of its limbs emerge that its status is like that of a child born. This is difficult for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as he maintains that once the head emerges, the fetus is considered born.
  The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: Say that the mishna is referring to a case where the fetus emerged in pieces and reversed, whereas if it emerged with its head first, it is considered born even if most of its limbs did not emerge yet.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the mishna teach that the fetus emerged in pieces or reversed? If so, it cannot be explained as referring to a case where the fetus emerged both in pieces and reversed. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: If the fetus emerged in pieces or whole, and in both this case and that case it emerged reversed, then when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born.
  Rav Pappa says: This dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is stated in a <i>baraita</i>: If the fetus emerged in pieces or reversed, when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born. Rabbi Yosei says: Its status is like that of a child born when it emerges in its proper manner. The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yosei saying? His statement apparently indicates that if a fetus emerges with its feet first, then even after most of its limbs emerge it is not considered born.
  Rav Pappa says that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the fetus emerged in pieces or reversed, when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born; but by inference, if the fetus emerged in its proper manner, then the emergence of the head exempts its twin, should it eventually be born first, from the obligations of primogeniture. And Rabbi Yosei says: The status of a fetus that emerged in pieces is like that of a child born when most of its limbs emerge, provided that it emerged in its proper manner, i.e., both requirements are necessary. The suggestion is that the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is in accordance with the ruling of the first <i>tanna</i>, that even if a fetus emerges in pieces, once its head emerges it is considered born; whereas the opinion of Rabbi Elazar follows the ruling of Rabbi Yosei that even if such a fetus emerges headfirst, it is not considered born.
  Rav Zevid objects to Rav Pappa’s interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>: Since Rabbi Yosei issued his statement that both requirements are necessary, i.e., a majority of limbs and emergence in the proper manner, with regard to the two cases mentioned by the first <i>tanna</i>, by inference in the other case, where the fetus emerged reversed, even when most of its limbs emerge it does not exempt its twin from the obligations of primogeniture. But this is difficult, as we maintain that the majority of an item is considered like all of it. Accordingly, when most of the fetus’s limbs emerge it should be considered born even if it came out feetfirst.
  Rather, Rav Zevid says that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the fetus emerged in pieces and reversed, when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born; but by inference, if the fetus emerged in its proper manner then the emergence of the head exempts its twin from the obligations of primogeniture, even if it was born in pieces. Rabbi Yosei says: The fetus is considered born once its head emerges only in a case when it emerges in its proper manner alive; if it emerges in pieces, the fetus is considered born only when most of its limbs emerge.
  This explanation is also taught explicitly in another <i>baraita</i>: If the fetus emerged in pieces and reversed, then when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born; but if the fetus emerged in its proper manner, the emergence of the head exempts its twin. Rabbi Yosei says: The fetus is considered born once its head emerges only in a case where it emerges in its proper manner alive.
  And what is the exact stage when a fetus that emerged in its proper manner alive is considered born? When most of its head emerges. And what is the stage when most of its head emerges? Rabbi Yosei says: When its temples emerge. Abba Ḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: When its forehead emerges. And some say: When the corners of its head, i.e., the projection of the head above the neck, are visible.
  MISHNA: In the case of a woman who discharges and it is not known what is the fetus’s sex, she shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. She is impure for fourteen days, like a woman who gave birth to a female, and any blood the woman sees only until forty days after birth, not eighty days thereafter, is pure, like a woman who gave birth to a male. If it is unknown whether it was a male or female offspring or whether it was not an offspring at all, she shall observe the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male and for a woman who gave birth to a female; and for any blood that she sees, she observes the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman. Since it is possible that what she discharged was not an offspring at all, any blood she sees might be due to menstruation, not childbirth.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: With regard to a pregnant woman who passed across a river and she discharged her fetus into the river, and she does not know whether the fetus was fully formed, she brings the offering of a woman after childbirth, which is a burnt offering and a sin offering. And the sin offering, which is a bird, is eaten after the nape of its neck has been pinched, in the manner of a regular bird sin offering. This is the <i>halakha</i> despite the uncertainty that this fetus might not have been fully formed, in which case the woman would not be obligated to bring this offering, and a bird that is not an offering may not be eaten if its nape was pinched. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains the reasoning behind this ruling: One must follow the majority of pregnant women, and most pregnant women give birth to full-fledged offspring.
  The Gemara analyzes this claim. We learned in the mishna: If it is unknown whether what the woman discharged was a male or female offspring or whether it was not an offspring at all, she shall observe the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male and for a woman who gave birth to a female; and for any blood that she sees, she observes the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, why must the woman observe the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman? Let us say that one must follow the majority of women, and the majority of women give birth to full-fledged offspring. If so, she should observe a period of purity, during which any blood she sees is pure, after her period of impurity, like all women after childbirth.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> in the mishna is referring to a case where the woman had not been presumed to be pregnant prior to her miscarriage; and when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that a woman who discharges is presumed to have discharged an offspring, he was speaking of a case where the woman had been presumed to be pregnant prior to her miscarriage.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from a <i>baraita</i>: There is the case of a kosher animal that had not yet given birth, which went to the pasture full, i.e., pregnant, and came back the same day empty, i.e., with no live offspring.It clearly discharged, but it is unknown whether or not it discharged an offspring, which would exempt the animal’s subsequent offspring from the status of a firstborn. In this case, the offspring that comes after it is a firstborn of uncertain status.
  The Gemara asks: But why is this the <i>halakha</i>? According to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, one should follow the reality among the majority of animals, and the majority of animals give birth to full-fledged offspring. And if so, this subsequent offspring of the animal is a regular offspring, i.e., it is definitely not a firstborn.
  Ravina says in response: In this case, the <i>halakha</i> does not follow the majority of animals, because it can be said that the majority of animals give birth to an item that exempts the animal’s subsequent offspring from firstborn status, but a minority of animals give birth to an item that does not exempt the animal’s subsequent offspring from firstborn status, i.e., an item that is not a full-fledged offspring. And an additional factor is that all animals that give birth to full-fledged offspring discharge turbid liquids one day before giving birth, and since this animal did not discharge turbid liquids before going to the pasture, the effect of the majority is undermined. Consequently, the status of the animal’s birth is uncertain, and for this reason its subsequent offspring is considered a firstborn of uncertain status.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If all animals that give birth to full-fledged offspring discharge turbid liquids before giving birth, then it should be concluded from the fact that this animal did not discharge turbid liquids that it did not discharge a full-fledged offspring, and therefore the animal’s subsequent offspring is a proper firstborn, not a firstborn of uncertain status. Rather, one should say that Ravina meant the following: The majority of animals that give birth discharge turbid liquids beforehand, and therefore, since this animal did not discharge turbid liquids, the effect of the majority is undermined.
  § When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from the <i>halakha</i> of a forgetful woman; but I do not know what the objection is. The Gemara asks: This <i>halakha</i> of a forgetful woman, which forms the basis of the objection, what is it? The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 29b
  
  A woman left home for an extended period of time while she was full, i.e., pregnant, and came back when she was empty, as she discharged the fetus, but it is unknown exactly when and what she discharged; and she spent three weeks in our presence during which she was pure, i.e., she did not experience any bleeding, and for the following ten weeks she alternated between one impure week, in which she experienced bleeding every day, and one pure week, in which she did not experience bleeding at all.
  In such a case, the woman may engage in intercourse with her husband at the end of the fifth week following her return, on the eve of the thirty-fifth day, after which she is again prohibited from engaging in intercourse with her husband. And we require her to immerse in a ritual bath a total of ninety-five immersions. This is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say that she is required to immerse thirty-five times. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: She is required to immerse only once, as it is sufficient for the immersion to be at the end of the period when she is required to immerse every day. The entire <i>baraita</i> will be explained below.
  The Gemara explains the objection from the <i>baraita</i> to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: Granted in the first week following her arrival the woman may not engage in intercourse with her husband, despite the fact that she did not experience bleeding during that week, as one can say that perhaps she is a woman who gave birth to a male just before her arrival, which would mean that the first week is her seven-day period of impurity. Likewise, it is clear that the woman may not engage in intercourse with her husband during the second week after her arrival, as one can say that she is a woman who gave birth to a female, and consequently her period of impurity is two weeks long.
  It is also clear why she may not engage in intercourse during the third week, as one can say that perhaps she is a woman who gave birth to a female as a <i>zava</i>, i.e., a woman who experienced a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period for three days without the pain of labor, and therefore assumed the status of a <i>zava</i> before giving birth. If so, she must count seven clean days after her two-week period of impurity, and subsequently immerse.
  But in the fourth week, even though the woman sees blood during that period, let her engage in intercourse with her husband, as it is pure blood. At this stage the woman’s period of purity is certainly underway. Why does the <i>baraita</i> state that she may not engage in intercourse with her husband in this week? Is it not due to the concern that she might have discharged an item that was not a full-fledged offspring? Evidently, although most pregnant women give birth to full-fledged offspring, we do not follow the majority, which contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, as this is apparently a valid objection, what is the reason that Ravin said: I do not know what the objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is? The Gemara explains: Perhaps it is in fact assumed that the woman gave birth to a full-fledged offspring, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, and the reason she is not considered pure in the fourth week after her arrival is that one can say that her birth was distant, i.e., she gave birth a long time before her arrival, and therefore her period of purity had already ended before the fourth week.
  § The Gemara further analyzes the above <i>baraita</i>: During this fifth week, when the woman is pure, as she did not experience any bleeding, let her engage in intercourse with her husband. Why is she permitted to do so only on the eve of the thirty-fifth day, at the end of the fifth week?
  The Gemara answers: During this fourth week, when she experiences bleeding every day, we are uncertain with regard to each and every day as to whether it is the end of the woman’s period of purity as a woman after childbirth, and that it is therefore the beginning of the seven-day period that she must observe as a menstruating woman. And with regard to the twenty-eighth day itself, the last day of the fourth week, one can also say that it is after the last day of her period of purity and the beginning of her period as a menstruating woman, and therefore she is required to observe seven days for her menstruation, which end on the thirty-fourth day after her arrival. Consequently, the woman may engage in intercourse with her husband only on the eve of the thirty-fifth day.
  The Gemara further inquires: As explained above, the reason it is prohibited for the woman to engage in intercourse during the third week is that she might have given birth just before arriving and had been a <i>zava</i> at the time, and therefore after observing the two weeks of impurity of a woman after childbirth, she must observe an additional seven days of impurity as a <i>zava</i>. A <i>zava</i> may undergo her purification process on the seventh day of her impurity, following which she is permitted to engage in intercourse. Accordingly, let the woman engage in intercourse on the twenty-first day after her arrival.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> in this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that it is prohibited for a woman to do so, i.e., to engage in intercourse on the seventh day of her <i>ziva</i> after immersing in a ritual bath, lest she come to a case of uncertainty. If she engages in intercourse on that seventh day after immersion, and subsequently experiences bleeding on that same day, it retroactively nullifies her entire seven clean days, and it turns out that she engaged in intercourse while she was impure. The Gemara continues to ask: Even so, let her engage in intercourse that night, after having completed seven clean days. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case when the woman saw blood in the evening, i.e., her fourth week of experiencing bleeding started in the nighttime.
  § The Gemara analyzes the statement of Beit Shammai: And we require the woman to immerse in a ritual bath for a total of ninety-five immersions. The Gemara explains: During the first week she is required to immerse at night, every night of the week. The reason is that as the date of her childbirth and the sex of the offspring are unknown, one can say that she is a woman who gave birth to a male. If so, the seven days of impurity might have ended on any night of the first week, and therefore she must immerse in a ritual bath on each night.
  During the second week, she is required to immerse at night, every night, as one can say that she is a woman who gave birth to a female, and therefore it is possible that her fourteen-day period of impurity ended on any of the nights of the second week. She must also immerse every day of the second week in the daytime, as one can say that she is a woman who gave birth to a male as a <i>zava</i>. If so, it is possible that her seven-day period of impurity as a woman after childbirth ended on any given day during the first week, after which she must start to count seven clean days as a <i>zava</i>. These seven days necessarily culminate during the second week, and the <i>halakha</i> is that a woman must immerse in a ritual bath on the morning when her seven clean days of <i>ziva</i> conclude.
  During the third week, she is required to immerse every day in the daytime, as one can say that she is a woman who gave birth to a female as a <i>zava</i>, and consequently her fourteen-day period of impurity as a woman after childbirth ended during the second week. Therefore, the woman’s seven clean days as a <i>zava</i> might end on any day of the third week, and she is obligated to immerse on that morning.
  She is also required to immerse on every night of the third week, according to Beit Shammai. Beit Shammai conform to their line of reasoning, as they say in a mishna (71b) that a woman who finished her period of purity after childbirth, referred to as a woman who immersed that long day and is waiting for her purification process to be completed, requires immersion at the end of this period. The woman must therefore immerse on every night of the third week, in case that night is the end of her period of purity, for a total of thirty-five immersions by the end of the week. She must continue to immerse every night until her period of purity is certainly over, no matter when she gave birth, i.e., until the eightieth day since her arrival.
  
  Daf 30a
  
  The Gemara asks: Now consider, how many days of purity are there, in the case of a woman who gave birth to a female? There are sixty-six days. Therefore, in order to account for all of the nights that might occur immediately after the woman’s period of purity, she must immerse on sixty-six nights, according to Beit Shammai. Remove from this sum the immersions of the third week, when we require the woman to immerse seven times, and sixty less one are left. These sixty-less-one times she immerses after the third week and the thirty-five times she immerses during the first three weeks are together ninety-four immersions. If so, those ninety-five immersions, required by Beit Shammai, what is their purpose? Why do they require an extra immersion?
  Rav Yirmeya of Difti says: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the woman came before us, i.e., she returned from her journey, during twilight, when it is halakhically uncertain whether it is day or night. The ruling is that in this case we give her another immersion, i.e., she is obligated to immerse on an additional day, in case she completed her days of impurity on the day she arrived, and that night is the night she must immerse.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Beit Hillel, who say that a woman who immersed that long day, i.e., a woman observing her period of purity after childbirth, does not require immersion once her period of purity is over, those thirty-five immersions that they require, what is their purpose?
  The Gemara answers: Twenty-eight immersions are required as we said above, i.e., due to the end of the period of impurity in case the woman gave birth to a male or to a female, and due to the completion of the woman’s seven clean days in case she gave birth as a <i>zava</i>. In addition, during this fifth week we require the woman to immerse each and every night, as one can say that it is the end of her seven-day period as a menstruating woman.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Why do I need the <i>baraita</i> to state that after the woman did not experience any bleeding for the first three weeks after arriving, she alternated for ten weeks between experiencing bleeding every day for a week and not experiencing any bleeding for a week. How does this detail contribute to Beit Shammai’s ruling that the woman must immerse ninety-five times? After all, eight and a half weeks are sufficient. Combined with the first three weeks after the woman’s arrival, this period amounts to eighty days, which is the number of days on which the woman must immerse according to Beit Shammai, as each day might be the last of her period of purity.
  The Gemara answers: Although eight and a half weeks are sufficient, since the <i>baraita</i> must teach half a week, it completes that week, for a total of nine weeks. And since the <i>baraita</i> teaches with regard to the ninth week that the woman is impure, it also taught with regard to the tenth week that the woman is pure, in accordance with the pattern of a week of purity following every week of impurity.
  With regard to the opinion of Beit Hillel that the woman immerses only thirty-five times, the Gemara asks: But isn’t there the immersion that the woman is obligated to perform due to the possibility that she is a <i>zava</i>? It is possible that by the fourth week, the woman’s period of purity after childbirth has already ended, and the bleeding she experiences that week is menstrual blood, in which case the next week that she sees blood renders her a <i>zava</i>. If so, she must immerse at the end of that week, after counting seven clean days. The same applies to all the other weeks on which she experiences bleeding, apart from the fourth. Consequently, there are additional immersions not counted by Beit Hillel.
  The Gemara answers: Beit Hillel count only the times that the woman is obligated to immerse before she is permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband, which amount to thirty-five. They do not count the times that she must immerse after she is permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Beit Shammai, who count the times that the woman is obligated to immerse after she is permitted to engage in intercourse in their total of ninety-five immersions, let them also count those immersions in which the woman is obligated due to the possibility that she is a <i>zava</i>. The Gemara answers: Beit Shammai deal with immersions that are due to the woman’s childbirth; they do not deal with immersions that are due to the possibility of <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara questions this response: But there are immersions counted by Beit Shammai that are due to the possibility that she is a woman who gave birth as a <i>zava</i>. These immersions serve to purify the woman from her status as a <i>zava</i>, not as a woman after childbirth. The Gemara answers: Beit Shammai count immersions that are due to the possibility that she is a woman who gave birth as a <i>zava</i>. In such a scenario, immersion is delayed due to the childbirth, and is performed when the woman’s impurity period of <i>ziva</i> following childbirth is over. Therefore, these immersions are considered as connected to the childbirth. But Beit Shammai do not count immersions that are due to <i>ziva</i> alone.
  § With regard to the statement of the <i>baraita</i> that the woman immerses on every night of the first week in case her period of impurity after childbirth just ended, the Gemara asks: Besides immersing on every night of the first week after she came before us, let the woman immerse during the daytime of every day of that week as well, as perhaps she is a <i>zava</i>, and on each and every day it is possible that her counting of clean days are completed, and she must therefore immerse that morning. Accordingly, seven more immersions should be added to the count.
  The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that we require that the seven clean days of a <i>zava</i> must be counted in our presence, i.e., they must actually be counted. Since she did not know she should count before she arrived, she did not begin counting prior to her arrival. Therefore, her seven clean days begin only once she arrives, and she cannot immerse from her status as a <i>zava</i> of uncertain status before the end of the first week.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Even so, let her immerse at the end of the first week, on the morning of the seventh day, after counting seven clean days following her return. This adds one more immersion to the count. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is not dealing with immersions that the woman is obligated to perform once a week.
  The Gemara further inquires: Let the woman immerse on the first day that she came before us, as perhaps she is a lesser <i>zava</i>, i.e., a woman who experienced a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period for one or two consecutive days, and who therefore observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a greater <i>zava</i> alone, i.e., one who experienced a discharge for three consecutive days and must therefore count seven clean days before immersing; it is not dealing with a lesser <i>zava</i>.
  § The Gemara summarizes its analysis of the <i>baraita</i>: Conclude from it three conclusions. Conclude from it that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that we require that the seven clean days of a <i>zava</i> must be counted in our presence.
  And conclude from it that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that it is permitted in principle for a <i>zava</i> to engage in intercourse with her husband on her seventh clean day after immersing in a ritual bath, but that the Sages said that it is prohibited for her to do so, lest she come to a case of uncertainty, i.e., in case she experiences a discharge of blood after engaging in intercourse, which retroactively nullifies her entire seven clean days and renders her impure.
  And finally, conclude from it that immersion at its proper time is a mitzva, which is why the woman immerses every day despite the fact it remains prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. But Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is sufficient for the immersion to be at the end, and we do not say that immersion at its proper time is a mitzva in its own right. Consequently, the woman is obligated to perform only one immersion.
  MISHNA: A woman who discharges on the fortieth day since she immersed herself and engaged in intercourse with her husband need not be concerned that it might have been an offspring and she became impure with its miscarriage, as the formation of the offspring in the womb occurs only forty days after conception. But in the case of a woman who discharges on the forty-first day after immersion, there is concern that perhaps it was an offspring. Since its sex is unknown, she shall observe the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male and for a woman who gave birth to a female; and for any blood that she sees, she observes the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman.
  Rabbi Yishmael says: A woman who discharges on the forty-first day after immersion observes the seven days of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male; and for any blood that she sees after seven days, she observes the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman. But a woman who discharges on the eighty-first day after immersion observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female, and also the strictures of a menstruating woman, as the formation of the male offspring concludes on the forty-first day and the formation of the female offspring concludes on the eighty-first day. And the Rabbis say: With regard to both the formation of the male and the formation of the female, this and that conclude on the forty-first day.
  GEMARA: The Gemara discusses the statement of the mishna that a woman who discharges on the forty-first day after immersion observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth to both a male and a female, and the strictures of a menstruating woman. Why are the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a male mentioned in this statement? What additional strictures must the woman observe due to the possibility that she gave birth to a male, over and above those she observes for the birth of a female?
  If these strictures are mentioned due to the days of impurity that a woman who gave birth to a male must observe, doesn’t the mishna in any case teach that the woman observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a female? The seven days of impurity that are observed by a woman who gave birth to a male are included in the fourteen days of impurity that she observes for a female. And if these strictures are mentioned due to the days of purity that are observed by a woman who gave birth to a male, which are fewer than the days of purity that are observed for the birth of a female,
  
  Daf 30b
  
  doesn’t the mishna teach that the woman observes the strictures of a menstruating woman, i.e., she is considered ritually impure every time she experiences bleeding, and does not observe any period of purity at all?
  The Gemara answers: The mishna mentions that the woman observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a male to teach that if she sees blood on the thirty-fourth day after her miscarriage and again sees blood on the forty-first day, her purity status shall be ruined, i.e., she shall be prohibited from engaging in intercourse, until the forty-eighth day. If she were not observing the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a male, but only those of a menstruating woman and one who gave birth to a female, she would not have to wait seven days after seeing blood on the forty-first day. Instead, she would wait only one day, as her possible seven-day period of menstruation began on the thirty-fourth day and ended on the fortieth. Yet, as she might have given birth to a male, the forty-first day might be the first day after her period of purity, and therefore the first of her seven days of menstruation. Consequently, she must consider herself impure until the forty-eighth day.
  And similarly, with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that she observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a female, one ramification is that if she sees blood on the seventy-fourth day and again sees blood on the eighty-first day, her purity status shall be ruined until the eighty-eighth day. Although she observes ritual impurity after discovering bleeding on the seventy-fourth day, as perhaps she has the status of a menstruating woman, when she discovers bleeding on the eighty-first day she must begin the count of seven days of menstruation again, in case the seventy-fourth day was during her period of purity after having given birth to a female.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says: A woman who discharges on the forty-first day after immersion observes both the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a male, and those of a menstruating woman, but not the strictures of a woman who gave birth to a female, as the formation of a male offspring takes forty-one days, whereas the formation of a female offspring takes eighty-one days. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael says, in explanation of his opinion: In the case of a woman who gave birth to a male, the verse deems her impure for seven days and deems her pure for an additional thirty-three days, for a total of forty days; and with regard to a woman who gave birth to a female, the verse deems her impure for fourteen days and deems her pure for another sixty-six days, for a total of eighty days.
  It can therefore be inferred that just as when the verse deems a woman impure and then deems her pure for a total of forty days in the case of a male, its amount of time is parallel to the time of the formation of a male embryo; so too, when the verse deems a woman impure and deems her pure for a total of eighty days in the case of a female, its amount of time is parallel to the time of the formation of a female embryo. Accordingly, the formation of a female ends on the eighty-first day after conception. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yishmael in response: One cannot derive the amount of time of the formation of an embryo from the extent of a woman’s period of impurity after giving birth.
  Furthermore, the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yishmael that there is a proof against his opinion from an incident involving Cleopatra, Queen of Alexandria. Since her maidservants were sentenced to death by the government, she took advantage of the opportunity and experimented on them in order to examine the amount of time it takes for an embryo to develop. She had her maidservants engage in intercourse and operated on them following their execution in order to determine the stage at which an embryo is fully formed, and found that both in this case, when the embryo is male, and that case, when it is female, the formation is complete on the forty-first day after conception. Rabbi Yishmael said to them in response: I bring you proof from the Torah, and you bring me proof from the fools?
  The Gemara asks: What proof from the Torah does Rabbi Yishmael bring for his opinion? If we say that his proof is the aforementioned derivation that in the case of a woman who gave birth to a male, the verse deems her impure for seven days and deems her pure for an additional thirty-three days, for a total of forty days; and in the case of a female, the verse deems her impure for fourteen days and deems her pure for an additional sixty-six days, for a total of eighty days, didn’t the Rabbis say to him in response that one cannot derive the amount of time that the formation of an embryo takes from the extent of a woman’s period of impurity after giving birth?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael’s derivation is that the verse states: “If a woman bears seed and gives birth to a male…and if she gives birth to a female” (Leviticus 12:2–5). The verse adds another explicit mention of childbirth with regard to a female, besides the mention of childbirth in the case of a male, when it could have simply stated: And if it is a female. Rabbi Yishmael derives from here that not only are the periods of ritual impurity and purity of one who gives birth to a female double those of a woman who gives birth to a male, but the formation of a female embryo also takes twice the time.
  The Gemara asks: And for what reason does Rabbi Yishmael refer to the proof that the Rabbis cited from Cleopatra’s experiment as a proof from the fools? The Gemara answers: One can say that the maidservant who was pregnant with a female embryo became pregnant first, forty days before the maidservant who was pregnant with a male embryo. Consequently, it took the female embryo eighty days to be develop, not forty.
  The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Cleopatra gave the maidservants a purgative medicine to drink before they engaged in intercourse, which would have terminated any previous pregnancy. And Rabbi Yishmael would respond that there are bodies that are not affected by this medicine, i.e., certain pregnancies are not terminated by the medicine. Consequently, the maidservant who was pregnant with a female embryo might have been pregnant prior to the experiment.
  The Gemara cites another <i>baraita</i> that presents a different version of this exchange between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis: Rabbi Yishmael said to the Rabbis that there is a proof for his opinion from an incident involving Cleopatra, the Greek queen, as her maidservants were sentenced to death by the government, and she experimented on them and found that a male embryo is fully formed on the forty-first day after conception, and a female embryo is formed on the eighty-first day. The Rabbis said to him: One does not bring proof from the fools.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason the Rabbis consider this a proof from the fools? They claim that it is possible that this woman who was pregnant with a female embryo did not conceive when Cleopatra had her engage in intercourse; rather, she waited forty days, and then became pregnant when she again engaged in intercourse. Therefore, the embryo was formed in forty days.
  And how would Rabbi Yishmael respond to this claim? He would claim that the maidservants could not have conceived on a later date, as Cleopatra transferred them to the custody of a steward, who made sure that they did not engage in intercourse during the experiment. And the Rabbis would say that there is no steward [<i>apotropos</i>] for restraining sexual intercourse, and therefore one can say that the warden himself engaged in intercourse with the maidservant.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabbi Yishmael’s proof: But how can one be sure that the female embryo was formed after eighty-one days? Perhaps if the womb of the woman carrying this female embryo would have been torn open on the forty-first day after conception, the female embryo would have already been found in it, just as in the case of a male embryo. Abaye says in response: It was a case where the indications of the ages of the two embryos, e.g., their hairs and fingernails, were identical. Evidently, the female embryo developed in eighty days to the same degree that the male embryo developed in forty days.
  § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: Both the formation of the male and the formation of the female conclude on the forty-first day. The Gemara asks: The statement of the Rabbis is identical to the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>. Why does the mishna repeat this opinion in the name of the Rabbis?
  And if you would say that the purpose is to teach that the unattributed opinion mentioned in the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and therefore it is the <i>halakha</i>, as when there is a disagreement between an individual Sage and many Sages, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the many, this cannot be the reason. The Gemara explains: It is obvious that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the unattributed opinion mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, as this is a general halakhic principle.
  The Gemara answers: Lest you say that from the fact that the explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael stands to reason, as the verses apparently support it, the <i>halakha</i> should be in accordance with his opinion, therefore the mishna teaches us that the majority of Sages agree with the unattributed opinion mentioned in the first clause of the mishna.
  § Rabbi Samlai taught: To what is a fetus in its mother’s womb comparable? To a folded notebook [<i>lefinkas</i>]. And it rests with its hands on its two sides of its head, at the temples, its two arms [<i>atzilav</i>] on its two knees, and its two heels on its two buttocks, and its head rests between its knees, and its mouth is closed, and its umbilicus is open. And it eats from what its mother eats, and it drinks from what its mother drinks, and it does not emit excrement lest it kill its mother. But once it emerges into the airspace of the world, the closed limb, i.e., its mouth, opens, and the open limb, its umbilicus, closes, as otherwise it cannot live for even one hour.
  And a candle is lit for it above its head, and it gazes from one end of the world to the other, as it is stated: “When His lamp shined above my head, and by His light I walked through darkness” (Job 29:3). And do not wonder how one can see from one end of the world to the other, as a person can sleep here, in this location, and see a dream that takes place in a place as distant as Spain [<i>beAspamya</i>].
  And there are no days when a person is in a more blissful state than those days when he is a fetus in his mother’s womb, as it is stated in the previous verse: “If only I were as in the months of old, as in the days when God watched over me” (Job 29:2). And the proof that this verse is referring to gestation is as follows: Which are the days that have months but do not have years? You must say that these are the months of gestation.
  And a fetus is taught the entire Torah while in the womb, as it is stated: “And He taught me and said to me: Let your heart hold fast My words; keep My commandments, and live” (Proverbs 4:4). And it also states: “As I was in the days of my youth, when the converse of God was upon my tent” (Job 29:4).
  The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of the statement: And it also states: “When the converse of God was upon my tent”? Why is it necessary to cite this verse in addition to the previously quoted verse from Proverbs? The Gemara explains: And if you would say that the verse in Proverbs is insufficient, as it is a prophet who is saying that he was taught the entire Torah in his mother’s womb, but this does not apply to ordinary people, come and hear the verse in Job: “When the converse of God was upon my tent.”
  And once the fetus emerges into the airspace of the world, an angel comes and slaps it on its mouth, causing it to forget the entire Torah, as it is stated: “Sin crouches at the entrance” (Genesis 4:7), i.e., when a person enters the world he is immediately liable to sin due to his loss of Torah knowledge.
  And a fetus does not leave the womb until the angels administer an oath to it, as it is stated: “That to Me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear” (Isaiah 45:23). The verse is interpreted as follows: “That to Me every knee shall bow”; this is referring to the day of one’s death, as it is stated: “All those who go down to the dust shall kneel before Him” (Psalms 22:30). “Every tongue shall swear”; this is referring to the day of one’s birth, as it is stated in description of a righteous person: “He who has clean hands, and a pure heart, who has not taken My name in vain, and has not sworn deceitfully” (Psalms 24:4), i.e., he has kept the oath that he took before he was born.
  And what is the oath that the angels administer to the fetus? Be righteous and do not be wicked. And even if the entire world says to you: You are righteous, consider yourself wicked. And know that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is pure, and His ministers are pure, and the soul that He gave you is pure. If you preserve it in a state of purity, all is well, but if you do not keep it pure, I, the angel, shall take it from you.
  The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a parable: This matter is comparable to a priest who gave <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, to one who is unreliable with regard to ritual impurity [<i>am ha’aretz</i>], and therefore it is suspected that he might not maintain the purity of the <i>teruma</i>. And the priest said to him: If you keep it in a state of ritual purity, all is well, but if you do not keep it pure, I shall burn it before you.
  Rabbi Elazar said:
  
  Daf 31a
  
  What is the verse from which it is derived that a fetus is administered an oath on the day of its birth? “Upon You I have relied from birth; You are He Who took me out [<i>gozi</i>] of my mother’s womb” (Psalms 71:6). From where may it be inferred that this word: “<i>Gozi</i>,” is a term of administering an oath? As it is written: “Cut off [<i>gozi</i>] your hair and cast it away” (Jeremiah 7:29), which is interpreted as a reference to the vow of a nazirite, who must cut off his hair at the end of his term of naziriteship.
  And Rabbi Elazar says: To what is a fetus in its mother’s womb comparable? It is comparable to a nut placed in a basin full of water, floating on top of the water. If a person puts his finger on top of the nut, it sinks either in this direction or in that direction.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: During the first three months of pregnancy, the fetus resides in the lower compartment of the womb; in the middle three months, the fetus resides in the middle compartment; and during the last three months of pregnancy the fetus resides in the upper compartment. And once its time to emerge arrives, it turns upside down and emerges; and this is what causes labor pains.
  With regard to the assertion that labor pains are caused by the fetus turning upside down, the Gemara notes: And this is the explanation for that which we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: The labor pains experienced by a woman who gives birth to a female are greater than those experienced by a woman who gives birth to a male. The Gemara will explain this below.
  And Rabbi Elazar says: What is the verse from which it is derived that a fetus initially resides in the lower part of the womb? “When I was made in secret, and I was woven together in the lowest parts of the earth” (Psalms 139:15). Since it is not stated: I resided in the lowest parts of the earth, but rather: “I was woven together in the lowest parts of the earth,” this teaches that during the initial stage of a fetus’s development, when it is woven together, its location is in the lower compartment of the womb.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about the labor pains experienced by a woman who gives birth to a female, that they are greater than those experienced by a woman who gives birth to a male? The Gemara answers: This one, a male fetus, emerges in the manner in which it engages in intercourse. Just as a male engages in intercourse facing downward, so too, it is born while facing down. And that one, a female fetus, emerges in the manner in which it engages in intercourse, i.e., facing upward. Consequently, that one, a female fetus, turns its face around before it is born, but this one, a male fetus, does not turn its face around before it is born.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: During the first three months of pregnancy, sexual intercourse is difficult and harmful for the woman and is also difficult for the offspring. During the middle three months, intercourse is difficult for the woman but is beneficial for the offspring. During the last three months, sexual intercourse is beneficial for the woman and beneficial for the offspring; as a result of it the offspring is found to be strong and fair skinned.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with his wife on the ninetieth day of her pregnancy, it is as though he spills her blood. The Gemara asks: How does one know that it is the ninetieth day of her pregnancy? Rather, Abaye says: One should go ahead and engage in intercourse with his wife even if it might be the ninetieth day, and rely on God to prevent any ensuing harm, as the verse states: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6).
  § The Sages taught: There are three partners in the creation of a person: The Holy One, Blessed be He, and his father, and his mother. His father emits the white seed, from which the following body parts are formed: The bones, the sinews, the nails, the brain that is in its head, and the white of the eye. His mother emits red seed, from which are formed the skin, the flesh, the hair, and the black of the eye. And the Holy One, Blessed be He, inserts into him a spirit, a soul, his countenance [<i>ukelaster</i>], eyesight, hearing of the ear, the capability of speech of the mouth, the capability of walking with the legs, understanding, and wisdom.
  And when a person’s time to depart from the world arrives, the Holy One, Blessed be He, retrieves His part, and He leaves the part of the person’s father and mother before them. Rav Pappa said: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Remove the salt from a piece of meat, and you may then toss the meat to a dog, as it has become worthless.
  § Rav Ḥinnana bar Pappa taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Who does great deeds beyond comprehension, wondrous deeds without number” (Job 9:10)? Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is unlike the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that if one puts an article in a flask, even if the flask is tied and its opening faces upward, it is uncertain whether the item is preserved from getting lost, and it is uncertain whether it is not preserved from being lost. But the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms the fetus in a woman’s open womb, and its opening faces downward, and yet the fetus is preserved.
  Another matter that demonstrates the difference between the attributes of God and the attributes of people is that when a person places his articles on a scale to be measured, the heavier the item is, the more it descends. But when the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms a fetus, the heavier the offspring gets, the more it ascends upward in the womb.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I will give thanks to You, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made; wonderful are Your works, and that my soul knows very well” (Psalms 139:14)? Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is unlike the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that when a person plants seeds of different species in one garden bed, each and every one of the seeds emerges as a grown plant according to its species. But the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms the fetus in a woman’s womb, and all of the seeds, i.e., those of both the father and the mother, emerge when the offspring is formed as one sex.
  Alternatively, when a dyer puts herbs in a cauldron [<i>leyora</i>], they all emerge as one color of dye, whereas the Holy One, Blessed be He, forms the fetus in a woman’s womb, and each and every one of the seeds emerges as its own type. In other words, the seed of the father form distinct elements, such as the white of the eye, and the seed of the mother forms other elements, such as the black of the eye, as explained above.
  Rav Yosef taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And on that day you shall say: I will give thanks to You, Lord, for You were angry with me; Your anger is turned away, and You comfort me” (Isaiah 12:1)? With regard to what matter is the verse speaking?
  It is referring, for example, to two people who left their homes to go on a business trip. A thorn penetrated the body of one of them, and he was consequently unable to go with his colleague. He started blaspheming and cursing in frustration. After a period of time, he heard that the ship of the other person had sunk in the sea, and realized that the thorn had saved him from death. He then started thanking God and praising Him for his delivery due to the slight pain caused to him by the thorn. This is the meaning of the statement: I will give thanks to You, Lord, for You were angry with me. Therefore, it is stated at the end of the verse: “Your anger is turned away, and You comfort me.”
  And this statement is identical to that which Rabbi Elazar said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Blessed be the Lord God, the God of Israel, Who does wondrous things alone; and blessed be His glorious name forever” (Psalms 72:18–19)? What does it mean that God “does wondrous things alone”? It means that even the one for whom the miracle was performed does not recognize the miracle that was performed for him.
  Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You measure [<i>zerita</i>] my going about [<i>orḥi</i>] and my lying down [<i>riv’i</i>], and are acquainted with all my ways” (Psalms 139:3)? This verse teaches that a person is not created from the entire drop of semen, but from its clear part. <i>Zerita</i> can mean to winnow, while <i>orḥi</i> and <i>riv’i</i> can both be explained as references to sexual intercourse. Therefore the verse is interpreted homiletically as saying that God separates the procreative part of the semen from the rest. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a parable: This matter is comparable to a person who winnows grain in the granary; he takes the food and leaves the waste.
  This is in accordance with a statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu raises a contradiction: It is written in one of King David’s psalms: “For You have girded me [<i>vatazreni</i>] with strength for battle” (II Samuel 22:40), without the letter <i>alef</i> in <i>vatazreni</i>; and it is written in another psalm: “Who girds me [<i>hame’azreni</i>] with strength” (Psalms 18:33), with an <i>alef</i> in <i>hame’azreini</i>. What is the difference between these two expressions? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, You selected me [<i>zeiritani</i>], i.e., You separated between the procreative part and the rest of the semen in order to create me, and You have girded me [<i>zeraztani</i>] with strength.
  Rabbi Abbahu taught: What is the meaning of that which is written in Balaam’s blessing: “Who has counted the dust of Jacob, or numbered the stock [<i>rova</i>] of Israel” (Numbers 23:10)? The verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and counts the times that the Jewish people engage in intercourse [<i>revi’iyyoteihem</i>], anticipating the time when the drop from which the righteous person will be created will arrive.
  And it was due to this matter that the eye of wicked Balaam went blind. He said: Should God, who is pure and holy, and whose ministers are pure and holy, peek at this matter? Immediately his eye was blinded as a divine punishment, as it is written: “The saying of the man whose eye is shut” (Numbers 24:3).
  And this statement is the same as that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written, with regard to Leah’s conceiving Issachar: “And he lay with her that night” (Genesis 30:16)? The verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, contributed to that act. The manner in which God contributed to this act is derived from another verse, as it is stated: “Issachar is a large-boned [<i>garem</i>] donkey” (Genesis 49:14). This teaches that God directed Jacob’s donkey toward Leah’s tent so that he would engage in intercourse with her, thereby causing [<i>garam</i>] Leah’s conceiving Issachar.
  § Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Ami says: The sex of a fetus is determined at the moment of conception. If the woman emits seed first, she gives birth to a male, and if the man emits seed first, she gives birth to a female, as it is stated: “If a woman bears seed and gives birth to a male” (Leviticus 12:2).
  The Sages taught: At first, people would say that if the woman emits seed first she gives birth to a male, and if the man emits seed first, she gives birth to a female. But the Sages did not explain from which verse this matter is derived, until Rabbi Tzadok came and explained that it is derived from the following verse: “These are the sons of Leah, whom she bore to Jacob in Paddan Aram, with his daughter Dinah” (Genesis 46:15). From the fact that the verse attributes the males to the females, as the males are called: The sons of Leah, and it attributes the females to the males,in that Dinah is called: His daughter, it is derived that if the woman emits seed first she gives birth to a male, whereas if the man emits seed first, she bears a female.
  This statement is also derived from the following verse: “And the sons of Ulam were mighty men of valor, archers, and had many sons and sons’ sons” (I Chronicles 8:40). Is it in a person’s power to have many sons and sons’ sons? Rather, because
  
  Daf 31b
  
  they delay while in their wives’ abdomen, initially refraining from emitting semen so that their wives will emit seed first, in order that their children will be male, the verse ascribes them credit as though they have many sons and sons’ sons. And this statement is the same as that which Rav Ketina said: I could have made all of my children males, by refraining from emitting seed until my wife emitted seed first. Rava says another method through which one can cause his children to be males: One who wishes to make all of his children males should engage in intercourse with his wife and repeat the act.
  § And Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Ami says: A woman becomes pregnant only by engaging in intercourse close to the onset of her menstrual cycle, as it is stated: “Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity” (Psalms 51:7). This iniquity is referring to intercourse close to the woman’s menstrual cycle, when intercourse is prohibited. Accordingly, David is saying that his mother presumably conceived him at this time.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A woman becomes pregnant only by engaging in intercourse near the time of her immersion in a ritual bath, through which she is purified from her status as a menstruating woman, as it is stated in the continuation of the same verse: “And in sin [<i>uvḥet</i>] did my mother conceive me” (Psalms 51:7).
  The Gemara explains this derivation: From where may it be inferred that this term “<i>ḥet</i>” is a reference to purity? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to leprosy of houses: “<i>Veḥittei</i> the house” (Leviticus 14:52), and we translate the verse into Aramaic as: And he shall purify the house. And if you wish, say that the interpretation is derived from here: “Purge me [<i>teḥatte’eni</i>] with hyssop, and I shall be pure” (Psalms 51:9). Evidently, the root <i>ḥet</i>, <i>tet</i>, <i>alef</i> refers to purification.
  § And Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Ami says: When a male comes into the world, i.e., when a male baby is born, peace comes to the world, as it is stated: “Send the lambs [<i>khar</i>] for the ruler of the land” (Isaiah 16:1). This <i>khar</i>, or <i>kar</i>, a gift one sends the ruler, contributes to the stability of the government and peace, and the word male [<i>zakhar</i>] can be interpreted homiletically as an abbreviation of: This is a <i>kar</i> [<i>zeh kar</i>].
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak from the school of Rabbi Ami says: When a male comes into the world, his loaf of bread, i.e., his sustenance, comes into his possession. In other words, a male can provide for himself. This is based on the aforementioned interpretation of the word male [<i>zakhar</i>] as an abbreviation of: This is a <i>kar</i> [<i>zeh kar</i>], and the term <i>kar</i> refers to sustenance, as it is written: “And he prepared great provision [<i>kera</i>] for them” (II Kings 6:23).
  By contrast, when a female comes into the world, nothing, i.e., no sustenance, comes with her. This is derived from the homiletic interpretation of the word female [<i>nekeva</i>] as an abbreviation of the phrase: She comes clean [<i>nekiya ba’a</i>], i.e., empty. Furthermore, until she says: Give me sustenance, people do not give her, as it is written in Laban’s request of Jacob: “Appoint me [<i>nokva</i>] your wages, and I will give it” (Genesis 30:28). Laban used the word <i>nokva</i>, similar to <i>nekeva</i>, when he said that he would pay Jacob only if he explicitly demanded his wages.
  The students of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai asked him: For what reason does the Torah say that a woman after childbirth brings an offering? He said to them: At the time that a woman crouches to give birth, her pain is so great that she impulsively takes an oath that she will not engage in intercourse with her husband ever again, so that she will never again experience this pain. Therefore, the Torah says that she must bring an offering for violating her oath and continuing to engage in intercourse with her husband.
  Rav Yosef objects to this answer: But isn’t the woman an intentional violator of her oath? And if she wishes that her oath be dissolved, so that she may engage in intercourse with her husband, the matter depends on her regret of her oath. One is obligated to bring an offering for violating an oath of an utterance only if his transgression is unwitting. And furthermore, if the purpose of the offering that a woman brings after childbirth is to atone for violating an oath, then she should be required to bring a female lamb or goat as an offering, which is the requirement of one who violated an oath, rather than the bird offering brought by a woman after childbirth.
  And the students of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai further inquired of him: For what reason does the Torah say that a woman who gives birth to a male is ritually impure for seven days, but a woman who gives birth to a female is impure for fourteen days? Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai answered them: When a woman gives birth to a male, over which everyone is happy, she regrets her oath, that she will never again engage in intercourse with her husband, already seven days after giving birth. By contrast, after giving birth to a female, over which everyone is unhappy, she regrets her oath only fourteen days after giving birth.
  And the students further asked him: For what reason does the Torah say that circumcision is performed only on the eighth day of the baby’s life, and not beforehand? He answered them: It is so that there will not be a situation where everyone is happy at the circumcision ceremony but the father and mother of the infant are unhappy, as they are still prohibited from engaging in intercourse.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: For what reason does the Torah say that a menstruating woman is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with her husband for seven days? It is because if a woman were permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband all the time, her husband would be too accustomed to her, and would eventually be repulsed by her. Therefore, the Torah says that a menstruating woman shall be ritually impure for seven days, during which she is prohibited from engaging in intercourse with her husband, so that when she becomes pure again she will be dear to her husband as at the time when she entered the wedding canopy with him.
  § The students of Rabbi Dostai, son of Rabbi Yannai, asked him: For what reason is it the norm that a man pursues a woman for marriage, but a woman does not pursue a man? Rabbi Dostai answered them by citing a parable of a person who lost an item. Who searches for what? Certainly the owner of the lost item searches for his item; the item does not search for its owner. Since the first woman was created from the body of the first man, the man seeks that which he has lost.
  And the students of Rabbi Dostai further asked him: For what reason does a man engage in intercourse facing down, and a woman engage in intercourse facing up toward the man? Rabbi Dostai answered them: This man faces the place from which he was created, i.e., the earth, and that woman faces the place from which she was created, namely man.
  And the students also inquired: For what reason is a man who is angry likely to accept appeasement, but a woman is not as likely to accept appeasement? Rabbi Dostai answered them: It is because this man behaves like the place from which he was created, i.e., the earth, which yields to pressure, and that woman behaves like the place from which she was created, i.e., from bone, which cannot be molded easily.
  The students continued to ask Rabbi Dostai: For what reason is a woman’s voice pleasant, but a man’s voice is not pleasant? He answered: This man is similar to the place from which he was created, the earth, which does not issue a sound when it is struck, and that woman is similar to the place from which she was created, a bone, which makes a sound when it is struck. The proof that a woman’s voice is pleasant is that it is stated in Song of Songs that the man says to his beloved: “For sweet is your voice, and your countenance is beautiful” (Song of Songs 2:14).
  
  MISHNA: Samaritan girls are considered menstruating women from the time they lie in their cradle. And the Samaritan men impart ritual impurity to the lower bedding like the upper bedding, i.e., all layers of bedding beneath them are impure, and their status is like the bedding above a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>]: The status of both levels of bedding is that of first-degree ritual impurity, which can impart impurity to food and drink. This is due to the fact that Samaritan men are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women.
  And they are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women because Samaritan women observe the seven-day menstrual period of ritual impurity for each and every emission of blood, even for blood that does not render them impure. Accordingly, if a Samaritan woman has an emission of impure blood during the seven-day period, she will nevertheless continue counting seven days from the first emission. It is therefore possible that the Samaritan men will engage in intercourse with their wives while they are still halakhically considered menstruating women, as the seven-day period of impurity should have been counted from the emission of the impure blood.
  But one who enters the Temple while wearing those garments upon which a Samaritan had lain is not liable to bring an offering for entering the Temple in a status of impurity, nor does one burn <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with those garments, because their impurity is uncertain.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that Samaritan girls are considered menstruating women from the time they lie in their cradle. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this statement? If the mishna is referring to girls who already see menstrual blood, then even our own, i.e., Jewish girls, are also considered menstruating women under such circumstances. And if it is referring to girls who do not yet see menstrual blood, then their girls, i.e., those of the Samaritans, should also not have the status of menstruating women.
  Rava, son of Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna, says that Rav Sheshet says: Here we are dealing with an unspecified case, i.e., it is unknown whether these girls have experienced their first menstrual period. Since there is a minority of girls who see menstrual blood, we are concerned with regard to each Samaritan girl that she might be from this minority. The Gemara asks: And who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that one must be concerned for the minority?
  
  Daf 32a
  
  The Gemara responds: It is Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A minor boy and a minor girl may not perform the ritual through which a <i>yavam</i> frees a <i>yevama</i> of her levirate bonds [<i>ḥalitza</i>], nor may they enter into levirate marriage. In other words, a minor boy whose brother died childless may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his brother’s widow, nor may he enter into levirate marriage with her, even if she is an adult. Likewise, a minor girl whose husband died childless may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her husband’s brother, nor may she enter into levirate marriage with him, even if he is an adult. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: You have aptly stated that they may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, since “man” is written in the passage of the Torah discussing <i>ḥalitza</i> (Deuteronomy 25:7), and we compare a woman to a man, as the aforementioned verse states: “And if the man does not want to take his brother’s wife.” Consequently, neither a minor boy nor a minor girl may perform <i>ḥalitza</i>. But what is the reason that they may not enter into levirate marriage?
  Rabbi Meir said to them: A minor boy may not enter into levirate marriage lest, once he is older, he be found to be a sexually underdeveloped man, who is incapable of fathering children. Likewise, a minor girl may not enter into levirate marriage lest, once she is older, she be found to be a sexually underdeveloped woman. And if a sexually underdeveloped boy or girl enters into levirate marriage they will be found to be infringing upon prohibitions against forbidden sexual intercourse where no mitzva applies, as the entire purpose of levirate marriage is to bear children in the name of the deceased.
  The Gemara notes: And the Rabbis maintain that one follows the majority of minor boys, and most minor boys are not going to be sexually underdeveloped men; likewise, one follows the majority of minor girls, and most minor girls are not going to be sexually underdeveloped women. In any event, the <i>baraita</i> indicates that Rabbi Meir is concerned for the minority.
  The Gemara objects: You can say that you heard that Rabbi Meir is concerned for a common minority, e.g., the minority of sexually underdeveloped men and sexually underdeveloped women. But did you hear him say that one is concerned for an uncommon minority, such as the minority of young girls who menstruate?
  The Gemara explains: This minority of young girls who menstruate is also a common minority. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident in the town of Ein Bul where they immersed a baby girl in a ritual bath before her mother. In other words, the baby girl experienced bleeding so soon after birth that her immersion in a ritual bath occurred before her mother immersed fourteen days after giving birth. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi likewise said: There was an incident in Beit She’arim where they immersed a baby girl before her mother. And Rav Yosef said: There was an incident in Pumbedita where they immersed a baby girl before her mother.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, the immersions reported by Rabbi Yosei and by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi are understandable, due to the <i>teruma</i> of Eretz Yisrael, i.e., these incidents occurred in Eretz Yisrael, where the touch of a menstruating girl disqualifies <i>teruma</i>. But in the incident reported by Rav Yosef, which occurred in Babylonia, why do I need to immerse the baby girl? But doesn’t Shmuel say: The <i>teruma</i> of outside of Eretz Yisrael is prohibited only to one whose impurity is due to an emission from his body, e.g., a menstruating woman, or one who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>]. And this statement applies only with regard to eating <i>teruma</i>, but with regard to touching <i>teruma</i>, there is no prohibition. Since the touch of a menstruating woman does not disqualify <i>teruma</i> outside Eretz Yisrael, why was it necessary to immerse the baby girl in the incident reported by Rav Yosef?
  Mar Zutra says: That immersion was necessary only for smearing oil of <i>teruma</i> of outside of Eretz Yisrael. Since smearing is equivalent to eating, it would have been prohibited to smear such oil on the baby girl, were it not for her immersion in a ritual bath. And from where is it derived that smearing is like eating with regard to <i>teruma</i>? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse discussing the prohibition against consuming <i>teruma</i> in a state of ritual impurity states: “And they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart for the Lord” (Leviticus 22:15). The verse serves to include in this prohibition one who smears and one who drinks.
  Mar Zutra continues: Why do I need a verse to teach that one who drinks <i>teruma</i> in a state of impurity is liable? Isn’t drinking included in the category of eating? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means that the verse serves to include one who smears, teaching that he is like one who drinks. And if you wish, say that one may derive that smearing is like drinking from here: “And it came into his innards like water, and like oil into his bones” (Psalms 109:18).
  As it stands, the <i>halakha</i> that Samaritan girls are considered menstruating women from the time they lie in their cradle is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is concerned for the minority of young girls who menstruate. The Gemara objects: If so, let us be concerned for the same minority with regard to our girls as well.
  The Gemara explains: There is no need to be concerned with regard to our young girls, as we interpret the verse: “And if a woman has an issue” (Leviticus 15:19), and derive from the fact that the verse does not merely state: “A woman,” but: “And if a woman,” that even minor girls are included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman. And consequently, when our girls see menstrual blood, we separate them in the manner of all menstruating women. Therefore, the Sages did not decree with regard to them that all young Jewish girls assume the status of menstruating women. By contrast, with regard to them, Samaritans, who do not interpret the difference between “a woman” and “and if a woman,” when their girls see menstrual blood they do not separate them, and therefore the Sages decreed with regard to them that all Samaritan girls assume the status of menstruating women.
  § The Gemara asks: What is this interpretation of the difference between “a woman” and “and if a woman”? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that from “a woman” I have derived only that the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruation apply to an adult woman. From where do I derive that the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman also apply to a one-day-old girl? The verse states: “And if a woman.”
  The Gemara asks: Apparently, when the verse includes young girls through the word “and” it includes even a one-day-old. But you can raise a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>, which discusses the verse: “And the woman with whom a man shall lie carnally, they shall both bathe themselves in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:18). From the word “woman” I have derived only that the sexual intercourse of an adult woman is considered intercourse that renders her impure. From where do I derive that the sexual intercourse of a girl aged three years and one day is also classified as intercourse? The verse states: And the woman. Evidently, the word “and” includes only a girl aged three years and one day.
  Rava said: These are <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the Sages merely supported them with verses. There is therefore no contradiction. The Gemara asks: Which <i>halakha</i> is derived from a verse and which is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? If we say that the <i>halakha</i> that the status of a menstruating woman may apply to a one-day-old girl is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the <i>halakha</i> that the intercourse of a girl aged three years and one day is considered intercourse is derived from a verse, then one may object: But the verse is written in an unspecified manner; consequently, a one-day-old girl should be included by the verse in the same manner as a three-year-old girl.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the intercourse of a girl aged three years and one day is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, whereas the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the menstruation of a one-day-old girl is derived from a verse. The Gemara asks: And now that it has been established that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the intercourse of a three-year-old girl is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, why do I need a verse?
  
  Daf 32b
  
  The Gemara responds: The verse serves to exclude a man from contracting ritual impurity due to red semen.
  The Gemara objects: But what about that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>]: The verse states: “And if a woman has an issue of her blood many days” (Leviticus 15:25). From the word “woman” I have derived only that <i>ziva</i> applies to an adult woman. From where do I derive that a ten-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i>? The verse states: “And if a woman.” Why do I need the verse? Let one derive that a ten-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> from the fact that a one-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman, as a woman may become a <i>zava</i> only after seven days of menstruation and three subsequent days of experiencing uterine discharge.
  The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the verse to teach that the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> apply to a ten-day-old girl. As, if the Merciful One had written only that a one-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman, I would say: The <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman apply to a one-day-old girl because of their stringency, as when a woman sees blood on only one day she is required to sit for the seven days of menstruation. But with regard to a <i>zava</i>, since the <i>halakha</i> is that if a woman sees blood on only one day she has the status of a lesser <i>zava</i>, and it is enough for her to observe a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge, one might say that the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> do not apply to a ten-day-old girl. It was therefore necessary for the verse to indicate otherwise.
  The Gemara objects: And let the Merciful One write that a ten-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zava</i>, and it would not be required to write that a one-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman, and I would know that as a girl cannot become a <i>zava</i> without first assuming the status of a menstruating woman, she must also be included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman. The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so; the fact that a one-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman can be derived from the fact that a ten-day-old girl is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zava</i>. Rather, why do I need the verse: “And if a woman,” that is stated with regard to a menstruating woman? The verse serves to exclude a man from contracting ritual impurity due to red semen.
  The Gemara objects: But the Torah already excluded this case on another occasion, as stated earlier. The Gemara explains: One verse serves to exclude a man from contracting ritual impurity due to red semen, and one verse serves to exclude a man from being rendered a <i>zav</i> due to blood that emanates from his penis.
  § The Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> of <i>ziva</i> with regard to a male: And so with regard to males, the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i> apply even to minor boys. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states concerning a <i>zav</i>: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue is impure” (Leviticus 15:2). What is the meaning when the verse states “any man”? The verse serves to include a one-day-old baby, teaching that even he is susceptible to impurity of <i>ziva</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: This derivation is not necessary, as the verse states: “And of them that have an issue, whether it be a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33). “Whether it be a male” includes anyone who is a male, whether he is an adult or whether he is a minor; “or a female” includes anyone who is a female, whether she is an adult or whether she is a minor. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “any man”? The Torah spoke in the language of people, and one is not meant to derive anything from this verse.
  The Gemara asks: Apparently, when the verse includes a minor boy it includes even a one-day-old. But raise a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>, which addresses the verse: “And if the flow of seed go out from a man, then he shall bathe all his flesh in water and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:16). From the word “man” I have derived only that a man is rendered ritually impure through a seminal emission. From where do I derive that the seminal emission of a boy aged nine years and one day renders him impure as well? The verse states: “And a man.” Evidently, the verse does not include a one-day-old boy.
  Rava said: These are <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the Sages merely supported them with verses. Therefore, there is no contradiction. The Gemara asks: Which is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and which <i>halakha</i> is derived from a verse? If we say that the <i>halakha</i> that a one-day-old boy is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i> is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the <i>halakha</i> that the seminal emission of a boy aged nine years and one day renders him impure is derived from a verse, then one may object: But the verse is written in an unspecified manner; consequently, even a one-day-old boy should be included in the verse.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the seminal emission of a boy aged nine years and one day is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and the <i>halakha</i> that a one-day-old boy is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i> is derived from a verse. The Gemara asks: And now that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the seminal emission of a boy aged nine years and one day renders is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, why do I need a verse? The Gemara answers: The verse serves to exclude a woman from contracting the impurity of a <i>zava</i> due to a white discharge.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need for the Merciful One to write that a one-day-old is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> with regard to males, and why do I need for the Merciful One to write that a one-day-old is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman and a ten-day-old is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> with regard to females?
  The Gemara answers that both verses are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only concerning males, one might say: A one-day-old boy is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> because the <i>halakha</i> is more stringent with regard to males, as they are rendered impure through three sightings of <i>ziva</i> on one day just like through sightings on three consecutive days. But with regard to females, who are not rendered impure through three sightings on one day as they are through sightings on three consecutive days, one might say that the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> do not apply to ten-day-old girls.
  And by contrast, if the Merciful One had written only with regard to females, one might say: The <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i> apply to ten-day-old girls, because of the fact that they are rendered impure even on account of sightings that occur due to circumstances beyond their control. But with regard to males, who are not rendered impure on account of sightings that occur due to circumstances beyond their control, one might say that one-day-old boys are not included in the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ziva</i>. Therefore, both verses are necessary.
  § The mishna teaches: And the Samaritan men impart ritual impurity to the lower bedding like the upper bedding. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the clause: The lower bedding like the upper bedding? If we say it means that if there are ten mattresses stacked one upon the other and a Samaritan man sat upon them, the lowest mattress, like the upper mattresses, is rendered impure, this <i>halakha</i> is obvious, since he presses on all of them when he sits on them. In other words, since Samaritan men impart impurity to the bedding beneath them because they are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women, there is no reason to distinguish between the lowest mattress and the other mattresses above it.
  Rather, the mishna means that the status of the lowest mattress beneath a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman is like that of the bedding above a <i>zav</i>, i.e., the bedding beneath a Samaritan man assumes first-degree ritual impurity and does not become a primary source of impurity like the bedding beneath a <i>zav</i>. That is, just as the upper bedding of a <i>zav</i> is not a primary source of impurity and imparts impurity only to food and drink but not people or vessels, so too, the bedding beneath a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman imparts ritual impurity only to food and drink.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the bedding above a <i>zav</i> imparts ritual impurity only to food and drink? As it is written with regard to a <i>zav</i>: “And whoever touches any thing that was under him shall be impure” (Leviticus 15:10). What is the meaning of the expression “under him”?
  
  Daf 33a
  
  If we say the verse is teaching that a mattress beneath a <i>zav</i> is impure, this is already derived from the verse: “And whoever touches his bed” (Leviticus 15:5). Rather, the verse is referring to that which touches any item under which the <i>zav</i> will be. And what is this item? It is the bedding above a <i>zav</i>. The verse teaches that the bedding above a <i>zav</i> imparts ritual impurity.
  The verse further states: “And he who bears [<i>vehanoseh</i>] these things shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:10), indicating that he who bears also becomes impure. And what is this? This is an item borne [<i>nisa</i>] by a <i>zav</i>. What is the reason, i.e., how is this indicated by the verse? The term <i>vehanisa</i> is written in the verse.
  The Gemara continues: The verse removed the <i>halakha</i> of the bedding above a <i>zav</i> from the status of severe impurity and brought it to the status of lesser impurity, to tell you that it imparts impurity only to food and drink, but not to people or garments.
  The Gemara objects: Say that the verse removed the bedding above a <i>zav</i> from severe impurity, in the sense that it does not impart impurity to a person to the extent that he may in turn impart impurity to the garments he is wearing. But let the bedding above a <i>zav</i> impart impurity to people or garments. The Gemara explains that the verse states: “And whoever touches anything that was under him shall be impure” (Leviticus 15:10), which indicates lesser impurity.
  § The mishna teaches that Samaritan men are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women, and consequently they impart impurity to the bedding beneath them. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the bedding beneath one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman is impure? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a menstruating woman: “And if any man lie with her, and her impurity be upon him, he shall be impure seven days, and every bed upon which he lies shall be impure” (Leviticus 15:24).
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: One might have thought that the phrase: “And her impurity be upon him,” indicates that the man assumes the impure status of the menstruating woman with whom he engaged in intercourse, such that if they were together on the sixth day of her menstruation he may elevate himself at her time, i.e., he may immerse in a ritual bath the next day, just like the menstruating woman. Therefore, the verse states: “He shall be impure seven days.”
  But if so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And her impurity be upon him”? As, one might have thought that a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman will not impart impurity to people and earthenware vessels. Therefore, the verse states: “And her impurity be upon him,” to teach that he imparts impurity like a menstruating woman. In other words, just as she imparts impurity to people and earthenware vessels, so too, he imparts impurity to people and earthenware vessels.
  If so, i.e., that one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman is compared to the woman herself, then say: Just as she renders the bedding beneath her and the seat upon which she sits impure to the extent that they impart impurity to a person to in turn impart impurity to the garments he is wearing, so too, he renders the bedding beneath him and the seat upon which he sits impure to the extent that they impart impurity to a person to in turn impart impurity to the garments he is wearing. Therefore, the verse states: “And every bed upon which he lies shall be impure” (Leviticus 15:24).
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: As, there is no need for the verse to state: “And every bed upon which he lies shall be impure,” since it is already written: “And her impurity be upon him,” which indicates that just as a menstruating woman imparts impurity to her bedding, so too does one who has intercourse with her. And if so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And every bed upon which he lies shall be impure”? The verse separated the <i>halakha</i> of one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman from the severe impurity of the menstruating woman herself, and brought him to lesser impurity, to tell you that he imparts impurity only to food and drink, but not to people or garments.
  Rav Aḥai refutes this derivation: Say that the verse removed the <i>halakha</i> of one who has intercourse with a menstruating woman from severe impurity and brought it to lesser impurity, in the sense that his bedding does not impart impurity to a person to in turn impart impurity to the garments upon him. But let his bedding impart impurity to people or garments. Rav Asi says: The verse states: “And every bed upon which he lies shall be impure,” which indicates a lesser impurity.
  The Gemara objects: But say that the phrase: “And her impurity be upon him,” is a generalization, and the phrase: “And every bed upon which he lies shall be impure,” is a detail. If so, the verse constitutes a generalization and a detail, and it is a hermeneutical principle that in such a case the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. Accordingly, with regard to the bedding and seat upon which the man rests, yes, they are rendered impure, but other items are not.
  Abaye says that when the verse states: “He shall be impure seven days,” between the generalization and the detail, this interrupts the matter. Accordingly, this is a case of a generalization and a detail that are distant from one another, and with regard to any generalization and detail that are distant from one another, one does not derive a <i>halakha</i> from them in accordance with the principle of a generalization and a detail.
  Rava says: Actually, one may derive a <i>halakha</i> from a generalization and a detail that are distant from one another. But this verse does not constitute a case of a generalization and a detail, as the verse states: “And every bed upon which he lies.” The term “and every” is an amplification.
  Rabbi Ya’akov objects to this: Say that as the verse compares a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman to the woman herself, the man should be like her, i.e., just as with regard to her you did not differentiate between her touch and her bedding in terms of imparting impurity to a person and imparting impurity to garments, as the <i>halakha</i> is stringent concerning both in that her touch and her bedding impart impurity to people to in turn impart impurity to their garments; so too, with regard to him, you shall not differentiate between his touch and his bedding in terms of imparting impurity to a person and imparting impurity to garments, and the <i>halakha</i> should be lenient in both cases: Neither his bedding nor his touch should impart impurity to people to in turn impart impurity to their garments.
  Rava says in response that when the verse states: “And her impurity be upon him,” this indicates that the Torah intends for the impurity to weigh upon him, i.e., in a stringent manner.
  § The mishna teaches that the impurity of Samaritan men is due to the fact that Samaritan men are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women, and this is because they observe the seven-day menstrual period of impurity for each and every emission of blood. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that all Samaritan men are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women? Aren’t there some unmarried men who do not engage in intercourse with menstruating women? Rabbi Yitzḥak of Migdal says: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to men to whom women are married.
  The mishna further teaches: And Samaritan men are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women because they observe the seven-day menstrual period of impurity for each and every emission of blood. In this regard it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir said: If Samaritan women would begin observing a seven-day period of impurity for each and every emission of blood, it would be a great remedy for them, i.e., this practice would not lead to sin, as they would observe a seven-day period from each emission. But this is not their practice.
  Rather, when Samaritan women see green blood, which does not render them impure, they begin counting seven days of impurity from that emission. As, if they see red blood, which is impure, during that period, they do not begin observing another seven days. Instead, they consider it an additional emission of blood and they complete the remaining days from the seven days they began observing for the green blood. Consequently, the women will have immersed in a ritual bath while still impure.
  Alternatively, a Samaritan woman is considered ritually impure because she counts the day on which she ceases to experience three consecutive days of emissions of <i>ziva</i> toward the total of seven clean days that a <i>zava</i> must experience before being able to immerse in a ritual bath. Accordingly, she does not wait seven full days, as is required by <i>halakha</i>.
  Rami bar Ḥama objects to this: And let her count that day on which she ceases to experience emissions of <i>ziva</i>, and we, i.e., Jewish women, shall also count it, as we maintain that the halakhic status of part of the day is like that of an entire day.
  Rava says in response: If so, that even with regard to <i>ziva</i> the halakhic status of part of the day is like that of an entire day, one can object: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if a <i>zav</i> experiences an emission of semen while counting seven clean days toward his purity, the seminal emission negates the day on which he experiences it. How can you find the circumstances of this <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>ziva</i>? Isn’t the halakhic status of part of the day is like that of an entire day? If so, let the remainder of the day on which he experiences the emission count as a day.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Perhaps even with regard to <i>ziva</i> the halakhic status of part of the day is like that of an entire day, and if the <i>zav</i> sees the seminal emission in the middle of the day, the remainder of the day is indeed counted as a whole day. But here we are dealing with a <i>zav</i> who sees a seminal emission adjacent to sunset, when there is no remaining time in the day that can be counted as an entire day.
  The Gemara objects: But the <i>halakha</i> that a seminal emission negates a day from the count of a <i>zav</i> is derived from the verse: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of him from whom the flow of seed goes out, so that he is impure thereby” (Leviticus 15:32). Is it right that one will stand and say about the verse that when it is written, it is written specifically with regard to a seminal emission that occurs adjacent to sunset? The Gemara explains: Yes, perforce you must leave aside the plain meaning of this verse, as it compels itself to be established as referring to such limited circumstances because it must conform to the principle that the halakhic status of part of the day is like that of an entire day.
  § The Gemara mentioned earlier that if a <i>zav</i> experiences a seminal emission while counting seven clean days toward his purity, the seminal emission negates the day on which he experiences it. On a similar note, Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: In the case of a woman who discharges semen after engaging in intercourse with her husband, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether she negates her counting with regard to <i>ziva</i>? Rami bar Ḥama elaborates: In general, a woman who discharges semen is impure, but the reason for this <i>halakha</i> is uncertain. Is it because she was considered one who saw semen, i.e., the emission of semen itself renders her impure just like a man who experiences a seminal emission? And if so, this woman negates her count.
  
  Daf 33b
  
  Or perhaps it is because she was touching the semen, and if so she has not thereby negated her count, just as a <i>zav</i> does not negate his count if he touches semen.
  Rava says: Commensurate with the sharpness of Rami bar Ḥama is the extent of his error, as this is not a dilemma at all, since even if one could suggest that a <i>zava</i> who discharges semen has indeed negated her count, one must ask: How much should she negate? If one suggests she should negate all seven days of her counting, this is untenable, as it is enough for her that she should negate her count like the man who engages in intercourse with her, i.e., like a <i>zav</i> who discharges semen, who negates only one day.
  And if one suggests that she should negate one day alone, this too is untenable, as the Merciful One states: “But if she is purified from her <i>ziva</i> then she shall count to herself seven days, and after that she shall be pure” (Leviticus 15:28). The word “after” indicates that she shall be pure only after all of them, i.e., after seven consecutive clean days, such that there should be no impurity separating between them. If so, there cannot be a situation where a <i>zava</i> negates a single day, and consequently it cannot be that a <i>zava</i> who discharges semen negates any part of her count.
  The Gemara rejects Rava’s response: And according to your reasoning, how does a <i>zav</i> himself negate only one day from his count due to a seminal emission? After all, the Merciful One states: “And when the <i>zav</i> is purified of his <i>ziva</i>, then he shall count for himself seven days for his purification, and wash his clothes, and bathe his flesh in running water, and he shall be pure” (Leviticus 15:13). The phrase: “Seven days for his purification,” indicates that there should be no impurity separating between them.
  Rather, what have you to say? The verse means only that there should not be an impurity of <i>ziva</i> separating between them. Here too, with regard to a <i>zava</i>, the verse means only that there should not be an impurity of <i>ziva</i> separating between them; a discharge of semen is not included in this restriction. It is therefore possible that a discharge of semen from a <i>zava</i> negates only one day from her count. Accordingly, the dilemma raised by Rami bar Ḥama remains in place.
  § The mishna teaches: But one who enters the Temple while wearing those garments upon which a Samaritan had lain is not liable to bring an offering for entering the Temple, nor does one burn <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with those garments, because their impurity is uncertain. In connection to these <i>halakhot</i>, the Gemara relates that Rav Pappa happened to come to the city of Tavakh. He said: If there is a Torah scholar here I will go and greet him. A certain elderly woman said to him: There is a Torah scholar here and Rav Shmuel is his name, and he teaches <i>mishnayot</i>; may it be God’s will that you should be like him.
  Rav Pappa said to himself: From the fact that they bless me through this Rav Shmuel that I should be like him, I may conclude from it that he is a God-fearing individual. Rav Pappa went to visit him, and Rav Shmuel raised a bull for him, i.e., he slaughtered a bull in honor of Rav Pappa, and he also raised a difficulty between two <i>mishnayot</i> that apparently contradict one another: We learn in the mishna: One who enters the Temple while wearing those garments upon which a Samaritan had lain is not liable to bring an offering for entering the Temple, nor does one burn <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with those garments, because their impurity is uncertain. Evidently, we do not burn <i>teruma</i> due to uncertain impurity.
  And one can raise a contradiction from another mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 4:5): For six cases of uncertain impurity one burns the <i>teruma</i> if it came into contact with them, or if a person came into contact with them and subsequently touched the <i>teruma</i>. One of these is for the uncertain case of the garments of one who is unreliable with regard to ritual impurity [<i>am ha’aretz</i>]. Such garments impart impurity through contact and through carrying, due to a concern that the wife of the <i>am ha’aretz</i> might have sat on them while she was menstruating. Evidently, one burns <i>teruma</i> due to uncertain impurity.
  Rav Pappa began his response with a supplication and said: May it be God’s will that this bull shall be eaten peacefully, i.e., that I will provide a satisfactory resolution of this contradiction. Since the bull was slaughtered in my honor, failing to resolve the contradiction might spoil the meal. Rav Pappa continued: Here we are dealing with a Samaritan who is devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, <i>teruma</i>, and tithes [<i>ḥaver</i>]. There is therefore less concern with regard to his ritual purity than that of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. Consequently, the mishna here states that <i>teruma</i> is not burned on account of him.
  Rav Shmuel rejected this response: Since the mishna is referring to men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women, are you equating a Samaritan <i>ḥaver</i> with a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman?
  Rav Pappa left Rav Shmuel in embarrassment and came before Rav Shimi bar Ashi, to whom he related this incident. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to him: What is the reason that you did not respond to him that the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a Samaritan who immersed in a ritual bath and arose from his impure status, and subsequently trod on the garments of a <i>ḥaver</i>, which means they are now considered the bedding of the Samaritan, and then those garments of the <i>ḥaver</i> went and touched <i>teruma</i>? In such a case one does not burn the <i>teruma</i>.
  As, if one would say to burn it due to the impurity of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, he has immersed in a ritual bath. And if one were to suggest that it should be burned because the Samaritan is one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman, this too is an unsatisfactory reason. This is because it is uncertain whether he recently engaged in intercourse with his wife, in which case his immersion does not remove his impurity; and it is uncertain whether he did not recently engage in intercourse with his wife, in which case he is in fact pure.
  And even if you say that he recently engaged in intercourse with his wife, another uncertainty remains: It is uncertain whether his wife began counting seven days from an emission of green blood and ignored any subsequent emission of red blood and completed her count for the green blood, which would mean that she was in fact a menstruating woman when she engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband; and it is uncertain whether she did not complete a count of seven days from the emission of the green blood, rather from the emission of red blood, in which case she was not a menstruating woman when her husband engaged in intercourse with her. And therefore this is a compound uncertainty, and there is a principle that one does not burn <i>teruma</i> on account of a compound uncertainty.
  Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rav Shimi bar Ashi: And let one derive that the garments of the <i>ḥaver</i> are impure because they came into contact with the garments of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. As the Master said: The garments of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> are considered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>, which means they impart impurity to people and to garments, for individuals who are scrupulous with regard to impurity [<i>perushin</i>]. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: The mishna is referring to a naked Samaritan. Consequently, none of his garments came into contact with the garments of the <i>ḥaver</i>.
  MISHNA: With regard to Sadducee girls, when they were accustomed to follow in the ways of their Sadducee ancestors their status is like that of Samaritan women, whose <i>halakha</i> was discussed in the previous mishna. If the Sadducee women abandoned the customs of their ancestors in order to follow in the ways of the Jewish people their status is like that of a Jewish woman. Rabbi Yosei says: Their status is always like that of a Jewish woman, until they will abandon the ways of the Jewish people in order to follow in the ways of their Sadducee ancestors.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> in an unspecified case, i.e., when the custom of a Sadducee woman is unknown? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear evidence from the mishna: With regard to Sadducee girls, when they are accustomed to follow in the ways of their Sadducee ancestors their status is like that of Samaritan women. It can be inferred from the mishna that in an unspecified case their status is like that of a Jewish woman. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Say the latter clause: If the Sadducee women abandoned the customs of their ancestors in order to follow in the ways of the Jewish people their status is like that of a Jewish woman. One may infer from this that in an unspecified case their status is like that of Samaritan women. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the last clause of the mishna, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yosei says: Their status is always like that of a Jewish woman, until they will abandon the ways of the Jewish people in order to follow in the ways of their Sadducee ancestors. By inference, one may conclude that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that in an unspecified case their status is like that of Samaritan women. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is the case.
  § The Sages taught: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who was conversing with the High Priest in the marketplace, and as he was speaking, saliva [<i>tzinora</i>] sprayed from his mouth and fell onto the garments of the High Priest. And the face of the High Priest turned green, as he feared that his garments had been rendered ritually impure. And he rushed to the Sadducee’s wife to inquire whether she properly observed the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruation, in which case his garments were not rendered impure by the saliva of her husband, as he is not considered one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman.
  She said to him: Even though women such as myself are the wives of Sadducees, who do not follow in the ways of the <i>perushim</i>, they are scared of the <i>perushim</i> and they show their blood to the Sages when an uncertainty arises. The garments of the High Priest are therefore pure, as the Sadducee wives properly observe the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruation.
  Rabbi Yosei says: We are familiar with the wives of Sadducees more so than everyone else, as they are our neighbors, and I can testify that they all show their blood to the Sages, except for a certain woman who was living in our neighborhood who did not show her blood to the Sages, and she died, as a punishment for her behavior.
  The Gemara objects: And let the High Priest derive that his garments are impure due to the saliva of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, which imparts impurity. Abaye said: That case involved a Sadducee <i>ḥaver</i>, who was particular with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity. Rava said: Are you equating a Sadducee <i>ḥaver</i> with a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman? After all, the High Priest was initially concerned that the Sadducee might engage in intercourse with his wife while she is still menstruating. Rather, Rava said:
  
  Daf 34a
  
  This incident occurred during a pilgrimage Festival, either Passover, <i>Sukkot</i>, or <i>Shavuot</i>, and the Sages rendered the ritual impurity of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> during a pilgrimage Festival as purity. As it is written: “And all the men of Israel gathered to the city, like one man, united [<i>ḥaverim</i>]” (Judges 20:11). Whenever all the Jewish people gather in a single place, such as on a pilgrimage Festival, the verse renders all of them <i>ḥaverim</i>, even one who is an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. There was therefore no concern for impurity due to the saliva of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. Yet, the High Priest was concerned that this Sadducee was one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman.
  MISHNA: With regard to the blood of a menstruating gentile woman or a gentile <i>zava</i>, and the blood discharged by a female Jewish leper during the days of purity of a woman who gives birth, Beit Shammai deem them ritually pure, and Beit Hillel say: The halakhic status of the blood of the gentile woman is like that of her saliva and her urine, which impart impurity only while moist. Likewise, the blood discharged by a Jewish leper during the days of purity imparts impurity only when moist.
  With regard to the blood of a woman who gave birth and reached the conclusion of her days of impurity, i.e., seven days after giving birth to a male or fourteen days after giving birth to a female, but who did not yet immerse in a ritual bath, Beit Shammai say: Although she has yet to immerse in a ritual bath, the blood does not retain the halakhic status of menstrual blood. Rather, the status of the blood is like that of her saliva and her urine, and it imparts impurity only while moist. And Beit Hillel say: Since she did not immerse in a ritual bath, her blood is considered like that of a menstruating woman, and it imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  And Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel in the case of a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, where the woman must count seven clean days from the conclusion of her days of impurity, that any blood she sees during those seven days imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Beit Shammai the blood of a gentile woman does not impart impurity. The Gemara objects: And do Beit Shammai not accept that which is taught with regard to the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, when any man has an issue [<i>zav</i>] out of his flesh, his issue is impure” (Leviticus 15:2), from which it is inferred: By Torah law, the children of Israel become impure through <i>ziva</i> and gentiles do not become impure through <i>ziva</i>, but the Sages decreed concerning them that they shall be like <i>zavin</i> in all their matters of ritual purity.
  The Gemara responds: Beit Shammai could say to you that this was stated only with regard to males, not females. As, if it was stated even with regard to females, how should one act with regard to this impurity? Should their blood impart impurity whether it is moist or dry? If so, you have rendered it like blood that imparts impurity by Torah law, and people will mistakenly come to burn <i>teruma</i> that comes into contact with it. Perhaps one will suggest that it should impart impurity only while it is moist and it should not impart impurity when it is dry. But if so, you will have differentiated between moist and dry blood even with regard to blood that is impure by Torah law, i.e., one might mistakenly conclude that the blood of Jewish women imparts impurity only when it is moist, when in fact it imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  The Gemara objects: If so, then with regard to the saliva and urine of a gentile <i>zava</i>, which impart impurity by rabbinic law only when moist, Beit Shammai should also rule that they do not impart impurity at all, in order to distinguish their saliva and urine from that of a Jewish <i>zava</i>, which by Torah law impart impurity only when moist (see 54b). The Gemara responds: Since we implement a conspicuous marker with regard to the blood of a gentile woman, i.e., it is clear that her status is different from that of a Jewish woman in that her blood does not impart impurity whatsoever, everyone will know that the impurity of her saliva and her urine is only by rabbinic law, and there is no concern that people might come to mistakenly burn <i>teruma</i> that comes into contact with the saliva and urine of a gentile <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara persists: And let them implement a conspicuous marker with regard to the saliva and urine of a gentile woman, that they should not impart impurity whatsoever, and let them deem her blood impure even when dry. In this manner, everyone will know that the impurity of a gentile woman applies only by rabbinic law, and they will not come to treat that which is impure by Torah law in the same manner. The Gemara responds: With regard to her saliva and her urine, which are relatively common, the Sages decreed that they are impure, but with regard to her blood, which is not as common, the Sages did not decree that it is impure.
  § With regard to a gentile man, Rava says: The <i>ziva</i> of a gentile man is ritually impure, even according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, who maintain that the <i>ziva</i> of a gentile woman does not impart impurity whatsoever. By contrast, the semen of a gentile is pure, even according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, who hold that the blood of menstruating gentiles and the blood of their <i>ziva</i> imparts impurity when it is moist.
  Rava elaborates: The <i>ziva</i> of a gentile man is impure, even according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it is possible to implement a conspicuous marker with his semen, i.e., since his semen does not impart impurity whatsoever, everyone will know that the impurity imparted by the <i>ziva</i> of a gentile applies by rabbinic law, and they will not come to burn <i>teruma</i> that comes in contact with the <i>ziva</i> of a gentile.
  And the semen of a gentile is ritually pure, even according to the opinion of Beit Hillel. This is because the Sages had to implement a conspicuous marker with regard to it to indicate that the <i>ziva</i> of a gentile imparts impurity only by rabbinic law in order that they will not come to burn <i>teruma</i> and consecrated items that come into contact with their <i>ziva</i>, as must be performed with <i>teruma</i> and consecrated items that contract impurity by Torah law.
  The Gemara objects: And let the Sages implement a conspicuous marker with regard to the <i>ziva</i> of a gentile man, that it should not impart impurity whatsoever, and let them deem his semen impure. The Gemara explains: With regard to his <i>ziva</i>, which is not dependent on an action he performs but is emitted on its own, the Sages decreed that it is impure; with regard to his semen, which is dependent on an action he performs, the Sages did not decree that it is impure.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 8:4) supports Rava’s opinion: In the case of a gentile woman who discharged semen that came from a Jew who engaged in intercourse with her, the semen is impure, as it came from a Jew. And in the case of a Jewish woman who discharged semen that came from a gentile, the semen is pure. What, is it not correct to say that the mishna means the semen of the gentile is entirely pure, in accordance with the opinion of Rava? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No, perhaps the mishna means that the semen of a gentile is pure by Torah law but impure by rabbinic law, whereas according to Rava, the semen of a gentile is pure even by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara cites another source that possibly supports Rava’s opinion: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: You are found to say the semen of a Jew is impure wherever it is found,
  
  Daf 34b
  
  even if it is in the womb of a gentile woman. If she discharges this semen, it imparts ritual impurity. And by contrast, the semen of a gentile is ritually pure wherever it is found, even if it is in the womb of a Jewish woman, except for any urine that intermingled with it. In other words, if the semen of a gentile intermingled with his urine, the mixture is impure due to the urine it contains, as the Sages decreed that a gentile is considered like a <i>zav</i> in all matters. Consequently, his urine imparts impurity.
  The Gemara continues: And if you would say in rejection of this proof: Here as well, the <i>baraita</i> means that the semen of a gentile is ritually pure by Torah law but impure by rabbinic law, one may respond: Since the <i>baraita</i> states that the urine of a gentile is impure, is that to say that her urine, i.e., the urine of the gentile that intermingled with his semen and is now inside the womb of the Jewish woman, is ritually impure by Torah law? Isn’t it impure only by rabbinic law? Rather, conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that the semen of a gentile is pure even by rabbinic law. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
  The Master said above in a <i>baraita</i>: The semen of a Jew is impure wherever it is found, even if it is in the womb of a gentile woman. The Gemara suggests: Let one resolve from this <i>baraita</i> a dilemma that Rav Pappa raises. As Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the semen of a Jew in the womb of a gentile woman? Let one conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that the semen is impure.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rav Pappa does not raise his dilemma with regard to the semen of a Jew that is in the womb of a gentile woman within three days of their intercourse, as such semen is impure. Rather, when Rav Pappa raises his dilemma it is with regard to semen in the womb of the gentile more than three days after their intercourse. What is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case?
  The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that as Jewish women are concerned about the proper fulfillment of mitzvot, their bodies are hot and semen in their wombs becomes foul within three days, whereas gentile women are not concerned about the proper fulfillment of mitzvot and therefore their bodies are not hot and semen in their wombs does not become foul within three days? Or perhaps, since gentiles eat repugnant creatures and creeping animals, their bodies are also hot and semen in their wombs becomes foul within three days? Since no resolution is found, the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to blood discharged by a female Jewish leper during the days of purity of a woman who gives birth, Beit Shammai deem it ritually pure and Beit Hillel say it imparts impurity only while moist. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Beit Hillel, i.e., from where is their opinion derived? Rabbi Yitzḥak says: The verse states at the conclusion of the passage discussing impure individuals: “Whether it be a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33). “Whether it be a male” serves to include the sources of bodily emissions of a male leper, teaching that they also impart impurity. Likewise, the phrase “or a female” serves to include the sources of bodily emissions of a female leper, teaching that they too impart impurity.
  What is meant by the sources of bodily emissions of a female leper? If we say that this is referring to the rest of her sources, e.g., her saliva and urine, this can be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a male leper. Rather, it is referring to her blood, and the verse serves to render impure the blood of a leper discharged during the days of her purity.
  The Gemara asks: And how do Beit Shammai, who maintain the blood is ritually pure, interpret the verse? They contend that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the emissions of a female leper cannot be derived from that of a male leper, as such a comparison can be refuted as follows: What is unique about a male leper? He is unique in that he is required to let his hair grow and rend his garments, and he is prohibited to engage in sexual intercourse. Can you say, then, that the same <i>halakhot</i> should apply to the emissions of a female leper, to whom all the aforementioned requirements do not apply? Consequently, the verse is necessary to teach that the saliva and urine of a female leper are impure.
  The Gemara asks: And how do Beit Hillel respond? They respond as follows: If the verse serves to include only the saliva and urine of a female leper, then let the Merciful One write this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a female leper. And there will be no need to write it with regard to a male leper, as I will say that the saliva and urine of a male leper are impure by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And what, if with regard to a female leper, who is not required to let her hair grow and rend her garments, and it is not prohibited for her to engage in sexual intercourse, the Merciful One nevertheless includes her sources of bodily emissions as impure, then in the case of a male leper, to whom all the aforementioned requirements apply, is it not all the more so that his emissions are impure?
  Therefore, if the phrase “whether it be a male” is not needed for the matter of a male leper, as this <i>halakha</i> may be derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, apply it to the matter of a female leper. And if it is not needed for the matter of her other sources of bodily emissions, as they are derived from the phrase “or a female,” apply it to the matter of her blood, i.e., to render impure the blood of her days of purity.
  The Gemara asks: And how do Beit Shammai respond? They would answer that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the emissions of a male leper cannot be derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a female leper, as it can be refuted as follows: What is unique about a female? She is unique in that she is rendered impure as a <i>zava</i> even by sightings that occur due to circumstances beyond her control. Can you say that the same <i>halakhot</i> should apply to the emissions of a male, for whom this is not the case?
  The Gemara asks: And how do Beit Hillel respond? They respond as follows: Can it be that we are standing and dealing with the <i>halakhot</i> of a leper, and Beit Shammai are attempting to refute the <i>a fortiori</i> inference by citing matters pertaining to a <i>zav</i>? The Gemara asks: And as for Beit Shammai? According to Beit Shammai, this is a legitimate refutation of the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as they refute it through the common name of impurity that applies to both a leper and a <i>zav</i>.
  And if you wish, say that Beit Shammai could say to you: That phrase “whether it be a male” is necessary to teach another <i>halakha</i>, that the phrase “whether it be a male” serves to include anyone who is a male, whether an adult or a minor, in the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i>. And how do Beit Hillel respond? They derive this <i>halakha</i> from the following verse: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of him from whom the flow of seed goes out, so that he is unclean through it” (Leviticus 15:32). The verse indicates that the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i> apply to any male, whether he is an adult or whether he is a minor.
  § The Gemara mentioned earlier that a minor is included in the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i>. In this regard Rav Yosef says: When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish taught the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i>, he raised this dilemma: With regard to the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> of a <i>zav</i> who is a minor, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether it imparts impurity through contact? Does one say that as the Merciful One states: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of him from whom the flow of seed goes out” (Leviticus 15:32), one’s <i>ziva</i> is thereby compared to his semen?
  Accordingly, with regard to any male whose semen imparts impurity, his first sighting of <i>ziva</i> imparts impurity. And with regard to this minor, since his semen does not impart impurity, his first sighting does not impart impurity either. Or perhaps, since if this minor sees two emissions of <i>ziva</i> the first sighting combines with the second sighting to render him impure as a <i>zav</i> for seven days, this indicates that the first sighting of a minor is significant, and consequently it should render him impure until the evening, just like an adult male.
  Rava says: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>,” whether he is an adult or whether he is a minor. Since the verse equates an adult and a minor, just as with regard to an adult his first sighting imparts impurity, so too, with regard to a minor, his first sighting imparts impurity as well.
  The Gemara earlier stated that the phrase “whether it be a male” serves to include the sources of bodily emissions of a male leper, teaching that they impart impurity. In this regard Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: Granted, the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> of an otherwise ritually pure individual imparts impurity only through contact, as stated above, and only the second sighting imparts impurity through carrying. But with regard to the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> of a leper, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether it imparts impurity even through carrying? Does one say that the place of <i>ziva</i> in one’s body is considered a source, and therefore his <i>ziva</i> imparts impurity through carrying, like all the sources of bodily emissions of a leper? Or perhaps the place of <i>ziva</i> is not considered a source, in which case the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> does not impart impurity through carrying.
  Rava says: Come and hear proof from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue [<i>zovo</i>] is unclean” (Leviticus 15:2). The verse teaches with regard to the <i>zov</i> that it is impure, and that it imparts impurity through carrying. To what case is the verse referring? If we say it is referring to one who is just a <i>zav</i> and not a leper as well, and the verse is teaching that any drop of <i>ziva</i> emitted by him imparts impurity through carrying,
  
  Daf 35a
  
  there is no need for the verse to teach this. After all, if this drop of <i>ziva</i> causes impurity for others, i.e., if the person emitting the drop imparts impurity through carrying, is it not all the more so that the drop itself imparts impurity through carrying? Rather, it is obvious that the verse is referring to a drop of <i>ziva</i> from a <i>zav</i> who is also a leper. And it was necessary for the verse to teach this <i>halakha</i>, as it could not be derived by means of the <i>a fortiori</i> inference. This is because this drop of <i>ziva</i> is not what causes the leper to impart impurity through carrying; rather, it is his leprosy that causes him to impart impurity through carrying.
  Rava concludes: And as the verse mentions the word “issue” twice, it is evident that it is referring to a second sighting of <i>ziva</i>. From the fact that a verse was necessary to include a second sighting of <i>ziva</i> of a leper, teaching that his <i>ziva</i> imparts impurity through carrying, conclude from it that the place of <i>ziva</i> is not considered a source. If it were a source, then even the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> would impart impurity through carrying.
  Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said to Rava: From where do you know that the verse is referring to a <i>zav</i> who is also a leper? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the verse is referring to the <i>ziva</i> of one who is just a <i>zav</i>. And as for that <i>a fortiori</i> inference that you said: If this drop of <i>ziva</i> causes impurity for others, is it not all the more so that the drop itself imparts impurity through carrying, one can counter that inference. The case of the scapegoat brought on Yom Kippur will prove that this <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not valid, as it causes impurity to others, since the dispatcher of the scapegoat is rendered ritually impure, and yet the goat itself is pure, as a living animal cannot be rendered impure.
  With regard to the dilemma raised by Rav Yosef about the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> of a leper, Abaye said: What is the reason he raises such a dilemma? But it was he who said that when the verse states: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>” (Leviticus 15:32), it thereby teaches that the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zav</i> apply whether he is an adult or whether he is a minor. And since he derives this <i>halakha</i> from there, the verse: “And of them that have an issue [<i>vehazav</i>] of <i>ziva</i>, whether it be a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33), remains available for him to derive as follows: “Whether it be a male” serves to include a male leper with regard to his sources of bodily emissions, and “or a female” serves to include a female leper with regard to her sources of bodily emissions.
  And as this verse discusses a full-fledged <i>zav</i>, and the word “issue” is mentioned twice, the Merciful One compares a leper to a full-fledged <i>zav</i>: Just as a full-fledged <i>zav</i> imparts impurity through carrying, so too, the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> of a leper imparts impurity through carrying.
  § Rav Huna says: The first sighting of <i>ziva</i> of a <i>zav</i> imparts ritual impurity to one who comes into contact with it, even if the emission occurred due to circumstances beyond his control, as it is stated: “This is the law of the <i>zav</i>, and of him from whom the flow of seed goes out” (Leviticus 15:32). The verse compares the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> to a seminal emission: Just as semen imparts impurity even if it occurs due to circumstances beyond his control, so too, the first sighting of a <i>zav</i> imparts impurity even if it occurs due to circumstances beyond his control.
  The Gemara analyzes the statement of Rav Huna: Come and hear a mishna (<i>Zavim</i> 2:2): With regard to a man who saw a first sighting of <i>ziva</i>, one examines him to determine whether the discharge was caused by circumstances beyond his control. What, is it not that the purpose of this examination is to clarify that he does not have ritual impurity, i.e., if the discharge was due to circumstances beyond his control he remains pure, which contradicts the statement of Rav Huna? The Gemara responds: No, the purpose of this examination is to determine whether he will be obligated to bring an offering if he experiences another two discharges of <i>ziva</i>. If the first sighting was caused by circumstances beyond his control, it is not counted toward the three sightings that render one liable to bring an offering.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the latter clause of the same mishna: When he experiences the second sighting of <i>ziva</i>, one examines him to determine whether the discharge was caused by circumstances beyond his control. For what purpose does one examine him? If we say that it is to exempt him from bringing an offering in the event that he experiences a third discharge but not to clarify that he does not have ritual impurity, this is untenable, as one may read here the verse: “An issue out of his flesh” (Leviticus 15:2), from which it is derived that one is not rendered a <i>zav</i> if the discharge occurred due to circumstances beyond his control. Rather, is it not that the examination serves to clarify that he does not have ritual impurity? And from the fact that the examination in the latter clause is for purposes of impurity, one may conclude that the examination of the first clause is also for purposes of impurity.
  The Gemara rejects this: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. In other words, it is possible that each examination is intended for a different purpose. In particular, the first examination is meant to exempt him from bringing an offering, and the second examination pertains to both the offering and ritual impurity.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the same mishna, which states that Rabbi Eliezer says: Even after the third discharge one examines him, because of the offering. In other words, if the third discharge occurred due to circumstances beyond his control, he is not liable to bring an offering. From the fact that according to Rabbi Eliezer the examination is due to the offering, one may conclude by inference that the first <i>tanna</i> is saying the examinations are for ritual impurity. If so, then according to the mishna one who has an initial discharge of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond his control remains pure.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is not the proper explanation of the mishna. Rather, everyone agrees that the examination serves to exempt him from bringing an offering. And here they disagree with regard to whether one interprets instances of the word “<i>et</i>” in a verse. With regard to a <i>zav</i>, the verse states: “And of them that have an issue of <i>ziva</i> [<i>vehazav et zovo</i>], whether it be a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33). The Rabbis do not interpret instances of the word “<i>et</i>,” and Rabbi Eliezer interprets instances of the word “<i>et</i>.”
  The Gemara elaborates: The Rabbis do not interpret instances of the word “<i>et</i>.” Therefore, they explain the verse as follows: “<i>Hazav</i>” is referring to one sighting; “<i>zovo</i>” makes two sightings, and when the verse states: “Whether it be a male,” this indicates that for the third sighting the Merciful One compares the <i>halakha</i> of a male to that of a female, i.e., just as a woman is rendered impure even through an emission of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond her control, so too, the third sighting of <i>ziva</i> by a man renders him impure even if it occurs due to circumstances beyond his control. Accordingly, the Rabbis maintain that there is no need for an examination after the third sighting.
  And Rabbi Eliezer interprets instances of the word “<i>et</i>.” Therefore, he explains the verse as follows: “<i>Hazav</i>” is referring to one sighting; “<i>et</i>” makes two sightings; “<i>zovo</i>” totals three sightings. Accordingly, even for the third sighting of <i>ziva</i> one must examine whether it was caused due to circumstances beyond his control. If it was, he is not liable to bring an offering. When the verse states: “Whether it be a male,” this indicates that for the fourth sighting the Merciful One compares the <i>halakha</i> of a male to that of a female, in that it is counted as a sighting even if it occurred due to circumstances beyond his control.
  The Gemara attempts to refute the statement of Rav Huna: Come and hear that which Rabbi Yitzḥak says: But wasn’t a <i>zav</i> included in the category of one who experienced a seminal emission? Why, then, was he taken out and discussed in a separate passage? In order to be lenient with him and to be stringent with him relative to the <i>halakhot</i> of one who experienced a seminal emission. Rabbi Yitzḥak elaborates: The separate passage serves to be lenient with him, as he is not rendered impure through an emission that occurs due to circumstances beyond his control, unlike one who experienced a seminal emission. And the separate passage serves to be stringent with him,
  
  Daf 35b
  
  as he renders impure the bedding upon which he lies and the seat upon which he sits, like a primary source of ritual impurity, which is not the case for one who experienced a seminal emission.
  The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Yitzḥak’s statement: When does this statement apply, i.e., to which sighting of <i>ziva</i> is Rabbi Yitzḥak referring? If we say he is referring to the second sighting this is untenable, for where in the verse was such a person included in the category of one who experienced a seminal emission? After the second sighting one is considered a full-fledged <i>zav</i>. Rather, it is obvious that he is referring to the first sighting. And yet Rabbi Yitzḥak teaches: The separate passage discussing a <i>zav</i> serves to be lenient with him, as a <i>zav</i> is not rendered impure through an emission that occurs due to circumstances beyond his control. This contradicts the statement of Rav Huna.
  The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand that Rabbi Yitzḥak is referring to the first sighting of <i>ziva</i>? But Rabbi Yitzḥak also says: The separate passage serves to be stringent with him, as he renders impure the bedding upon which he lies and the seat upon which he sits. With the first sighting of <i>ziva</i> is one fit to render impure his bedding or his seat?
  Rather, this is what he is saying: Rabbi Yitzḥak says: But wasn’t a <i>zav</i> with his first sighting included in the category of one who experienced a seminal emission? Why, then, was he taken out and discussed in a separate passage with regard to his second sighting? In order to be lenient with him and to be stringent with him. In other words, the passage serves to be lenient with him, as he is not rendered impure through an emission that occurs due to circumstances beyond his control. And it serves to be stringent with him, as he renders impure the bedding upon which he lies and the seat upon which he sits.
  With regard to <i>ziva</i>, Rav Huna says: The discharge of <i>ziva</i> is similar to water of barley dough. Whereas the discharge of <i>ziva</i> comes from dead flesh, i.e., when one’s penis is flaccid, semen comes from living flesh, when one’s penis is erect. Moreover, the discharge of <i>ziva</i> is runny, and is similar in appearance to the white of a unfertilized egg. By contrast, semen is viscous, and it is similar in appearance to the white of an egg that is not unfertilized, i.e., a fertilized egg.
  § The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to the blood of a woman who gave birth and reached the conclusion of her days of impurity, but did not yet immerse in a ritual bath. Beit Shammai say: The blood does not retain the halakhic status of menstrual blood; rather, it imparts impurity only while moist. And Beit Hillel say: Since she did not immerse in a ritual bath, her blood is considered like that of a menstruating woman, and it imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  With regard to this dispute, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Do you not concede with regard to a menstruating woman who did not immerse after seven days and thereafter saw blood, that she is impure as a menstruating woman in every sense? If so, a woman who failed to immerse after childbirth should likewise be impure as a menstruating woman. Beit Shammai said to them: No, this is not a legitimate comparison. Even if you say this is true with regard to a menstruating woman, there the <i>halakha</i> is that even in a case where she immersed and immediately saw blood thereafter, she is impure. Will you say that this <i>halakha</i> applies with regard to a woman who gave birth, where the <i>halakha</i> is that if she immersed and then saw blood she is pure? Therefore, even if a woman who gave birth neglected to immerse and experienced bleeding, she is not considered a full-fledged menstruating woman, and the blood does not impart impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: The <i>halakha</i> of a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i> will prove this is in fact a legitimate comparison. A woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i> may immerse only after experiencing seven clean days. The <i>halakha</i> is that if she immersed in her days of purity and then saw blood after the seven days of counting for <i>ziva</i>, she is pure, as she is in her days of purity. But if she did not immerse and she saw blood, she is impure. If so, the same should apply to a woman who gave birth and did not immerse at the conclusion of her days of impurity: She should be considered a full-fledged menstruating woman as long as she has not immersed.
  Beit Shammai said to them: The same is true and this is the refutation, i.e., we maintain that even in the case of a woman who gave birth as a <i>zava</i> and failed to immerse after seven clean days, her blood imparts impurity only while moist. Accordingly, one cannot compare this case to that of a typical menstruating woman.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to a woman who gave birth as a <i>zava</i> and counted seven clean days but did not immerse? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel in the case of a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, that any blood she sees imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry?
  The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, in the <i>baraita</i>, Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai disagree with regard to a woman who counted seven clean days for her <i>ziva</i>. In such a case Beit Shammai maintain that any blood she sees imparts impurity only when moist. There, in the mishna, they agree with regard to a woman who did not yet count seven clean days for her <i>ziva</i>. In such an instance, even Beit Shammai concede that her blood imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  The Gemara notes: And it is taught likewise in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, who counted seven clean days after the conclusion of her days of impurity but did not yet immerse, and she subsequently saw blood, Beit Shammai follow their opinion with regard to any woman who gave birth and concluded her days of impurity but did not yet immerse, and Beit Hillel likewise follow their opinion. In other words, according to Beit Shammai her blood imparts impurity only while moist, whereas according to Beit Hillel it imparts impurity whether moist or dry.
  § With regard to blood emitted by a woman during her days of purity after childbirth, it was stated that there is a dispute between the Sages. Rav says: It is from one source in a woman’s body that pure and impure blood are emitted, but the Torah rendered impure the blood emitted during her days of impurity and the Torah rendered pure the blood emitted during her days of purity.
  And Levi says: There are two sources in a woman’s body. Blood emitted during her days of impurity emerges from one source, while blood emitted during her days of purity emerges from the other, and these two sources are not active simultaneously. Rather, when the source of the impure blood is closed, i.e., following her days of impurity, the source of the pure blood opens, and when the source of the pure blood is closed, at the conclusion of her days of purity, either thirty-three days for a male child or sixty-six days for a female child, the source of the impure blood is opened.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rav and Levi? The Gemara responds: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the following cases: A woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within seven days of giving birth to a male until sometime after those seven days, during her days of purity; and likewise, a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within fourteen days of giving birth to a female until sometime after those fourteen days, during her days of purity; and a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within forty days of giving birth to a male until sometime after those forty days, i.e., after the conclusion of her days of purity; and a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within eighty days of giving birth to a female until sometime after those eighty days, i.e., after the conclusion of her days of purity.
  The Gemara elaborates: According to Rav, who maintains that both pure and impure blood emerge from the same source, in the cases described in the first clause, i.e., if she continuously discharged menstrual blood from within her days of impurity until sometime during her days of purity, one is to be lenient, In other words, any blood emitted during her days of purity is pure, since the Torah rendered it pure. And in the cases described in the latter clause, when the discharge begins during her days of purity and continues until after the conclusion of her days of purity, one is to be stringent, as the Torah deemed impure any blood emitted after her days of purity.
  According to Levi, who says that there are two different sources in the body, in the cases described in the first clause one is to be stringent, as the continuous flow of blood indicates this blood is emanating from the source of the impure blood, and the Torah deemed pure only the blood that emerges from the source of the pure blood. And in the cases described in the latter clause one is to be lenient, as the continuous flow of blood indicates this blood is from the source of the pure blood.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the mishna: With regard to the blood of a woman who gave birth and reached the conclusion of her days of impurity but did not yet immerse, Beit Shammai say: The blood is like her saliva and urine, and it imparts impurity only while moist. And Beit Hillel say: Her blood is considered like that of a menstruating woman, and it imparts impurity whether moist or dry.
  It enters your mind to explain that the mishna is referring to a case where a woman’s discharge of menstrual blood ceased during her days of impurity, and she subsequently experienced bleeding after the conclusion of her days of impurity. If so, granted the mishna is clear according to the opinion of Rav, who said pure and impure blood emanate from one source, as it is due to that reason that Beit Hillel maintain that the blood imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry, since she did not yet immerse. But according to the opinion of Levi, who said there are two separate sources, why do Beit Hillel maintain that the blood imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry? After all, blood emitted during her days of purity comes from the source of pure blood.
  The Gemara explains that Levi could say to you: Here we are dealing with a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within her days of impurity until sometime during her days of purity. Since the continuous flow of blood indicates that this blood emanates from the source of the impure blood, Beit Hillel rule that it imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is dealing with a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood, what is the reason that Beit Shammai maintain this blood imparts impurity only while moist? Isn’t it evident that it is impure menstrual blood? The Gemara responds: Beit Shammai hold that it is from one source that pure and impure blood emanate, and the Torah deemed pure any blood emitted during her days of purity.
  The Gemara questions the opinion of Rav: Granted, the mishna is clear according to Levi, who maintains there are two separate sources, as that is how there is a practical difference between the opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Beit Hillel hold there are two sources, and the continuous flow of blood from her days of impurity into her days of purity indicates that the blood emanates from the source of the impure blood, whereas Beit Shammai contend that pure and impure blood emanate from one source, and the Torah deemed pure the blood of her days of purity. But according to Rav, what is the reason for the difference between them?
  The Gemara responds: The difference between them is due to their opinions with regard to the significance of the days and the immersion at the conclusion of her days of impurity. As, Beit Shammai hold that the Merciful One rendered the purity of her blood dependent on days, which means that once she begins her days of purity her blood is pure regardless of whether or not she immersed. And Beit Hillel hold that it is dependent on both days and immersion. Accordingly, if she fails to immerse after her days of impurity, any blood she sees is impure.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the continuation of the mishna: And Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel in the case of a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, that any blood she sees imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry. It enters your mind to explain that here too, the mishna is referring to a case where a woman’s discharge of menstrual blood ceased during her days of impurity, and she then experienced bleeding during her days of purity. Since she is still a <i>zava</i> at the beginning of her days of purity, the blood imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  The Gemara continues: If so, granted, the mishna is clear according to Rav, who said that pure and impure blood emanate from one source, as it is due to that reason that the blood imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry, since she is still a <i>zava</i> and the Torah has not yet deemed her pure. But according to Levi, who said there are two sources, why does the blood impart impurity whether it is moist or dry? Let it be considered like the saliva or urine of a <i>zava</i>, which imparts impurity only when moist.
  The Gemara explains that Levi could say to you: Here too, we are dealing with a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within her days of impurity until her days of purity. The continuous flow of blood indicates that the blood emanates from the source of the impure blood. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is dealing with a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood, for what purpose was it necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i>? It is obvious that this blood is impure.
  The Gemara answers that it was necessary for the opinion of Beit Shammai. The mishna is teaching that even though Beit Shammai say there is one source, and the Merciful One rendered the purity of her blood dependent on days alone, that statement applies only in the case of a woman who only gave birth, as her days of impurity have been completed at this point. But with regard to a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, who requires the counting of seven clean days from the end of her days of impurity, that statement does not apply, and blood emitted before she counted seven clean days imparts impurity whether moist or dry, like the blood of a menstruating woman.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>, which addresses the verse: “If a woman be delivered, and bear a male, then she shall be impure seven days; as in the days of her menstrual sickness she shall be impure” (Leviticus 12:2). The superfluous phrase “her menstrual sickness she shall be impure” serves to include a man who engages in intercourse with her, teaching that he is rendered impure like a menstruating woman and imparts impurity like her.
  Furthermore, the phrase “Her menstrual sickness she shall be impure” serves to include the nights; although the verse states: “As in the days,” she is impure during the night as well. Finally, “her menstrual sickness she shall be impure” serves to include a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, teaching that she must observe seven clean days. The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: Granted, the <i>baraita</i> is clear according to Rav, who said there is one source, as it is due to that reason that a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i> requires seven clean days.
  
  Daf 36a
  
  But according to Levi, who said there are two sources, why do I need this woman to wait seven clean days? It should be enough for her to wait seven days after experiencing any amount of cleanliness from the conclusion of her days of impurity. After all, according to Levi, once the blood ceases to flow from her days of impurity, any blood emitted thereafter is from the source of pure blood. Consequently, even if she experiences a flow of blood during the seven clean days this should not negate her count.
  The Gemara explains that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: She requires that the blood flow should stop for any amount of time after her days of impurity, so that she will have entered her days of purity, and consequently, the next seven days will be considered for her as the seven clean days required by a <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: There are certain women with regard to whom the <i>halakha</i> is that if they notice an emission of menstrual blood they are deemed impure only from when they saw the blood, and one is not concerned they might have experienced the emission from an earlier time. Two such women are one who is pregnant and one who is nursing. This applies only to a pregnant woman who has been noticeably pregnant for three periods, each thirty days in length, and has not experienced bleeding during the three periods; and to a nursing woman who has been nursing for three periods, each also thirty days in length, and did not experience bleeding during that time. With regard to this the <i>baraita</i> teaches: The days of her pregnancy in which she saw no blood count for her toward the days of her nursing in which she saw no blood, to complete three periods, and likewise, the days of her nursing count for her toward the days of her pregnancy.
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: How so? If a woman stopped experiencing bleeding for two periods during her days of pregnancy and one period during her days of nursing; or if she did not experience bleeding for two periods during her days of nursing and one period during her days of pregnancy; or if she did not experience bleeding for one and a half periods during her days of pregnancy and one and a half periods during her days of nursing, the days count for her as three periods in which she did not experience bleeding, and if she experiences bleeding she is deemed impure only from the hour that she saw the blood.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: Granted, the <i>baraita</i> is clear according to Rav, who said there is one source, as it is due to that reason that the woman requires a cessation of menstrual emissions for three periods in order that she may be considered a woman whose menstrual emissions have ceased. But according to Levi, who said there are two sources, why do I need a cessation of menstrual emissions for three periods? Provided the woman’s menstrual emissions cease for any amount of time at the completion of her days of impurity, it should be enough, as any blood she may emit thereafter is pure and should not negate her count of three periods.
  The Gemara explains that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: She requires that the blood flow should stop for any amount of time at the conclusion of her days of impurity, in order that her days of purity will be counted for her as part of the three periods, even if she experiences bleeding during her days of purity.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: And although Shammai and Hillel disagree with regard to all women who experience bleeding (see 2a), as Shammai maintains they are impure only from when they saw the blood while Hillel holds that they assume ritual impurity status retroactively from the last time they examined themselves and were found to be pure, they agree with regard to a woman who sees blood after seeing blood during her days of purity, that it is sufficient for her to be considered impure from the hour of her seeing the blood.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: Granted, the <i>baraita</i> is clear according to Levi, who said there are two sources, as it is due to that reason that it is sufficient for her to be considered impure from the hour of her seeing the blood. In other words, although she experienced bleeding during her days of purity, until this emission she was still considered a woman whose menstrual emissions have ceased. But according to Rav, who said there is one source, if this woman experienced bleeding during her days of purity, she cannot be considered a woman whose menstrual emissions have ceased. If so, why is it sufficient for her to be considered impure from the hour of her seeing the blood? She should be considered impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, like all other women.
  The Gemara responds: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where there is no time between the conclusion of her days of purity and the subsequent emission of blood. In such a situation, she cannot be considered impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, as the previous twenty-four hours are part of her days of purity.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But still, why is she impure only from when she sees the blood? She should be considered impure from examination to examination, i.e., from the last time she examined herself and found that she was pure. The Gemara responds: Since there is no possibility of her being impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, with regard to impurity from examination to examination as well, the Sages did not decree impurity with regard to her.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, who counted seven clean days after the conclusion of her days of impurity but did not yet immerse, and subsequently saw blood, Beit Shammai follow their opinion with regard to any woman who gave birth and concluded her days of impurity but did not yet immerse, and Beit Hillel likewise follow their opinion. In other words, according to Beit Shammai her blood imparts impurity only while moist, whereas according to Beit Hillel it imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: Granted, the <i>baraita</i> is clear according to Rav, who said there is one source, as it is due to that reason Beit Hillel maintain that the blood imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry. In other words, as she has not yet immersed, the Torah does not deem pure her menstrual emissions. But according to Levi, who said there are two sources, any blood she may emit after counting seven clean days must have come from the source of pure blood. If so, why does it impart impurity whether it is moist or dry?
  The Gemara explains that Levi could say to you: I say my opinion in accordance with the opinion of the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> cited above, that Shammai and Hillel agree that with regard to a woman who experiences bleeding after experiencing bleeding during her days of purity, it is sufficient for her to be considered impure from the hour that she saw the blood. That <i>baraita</i> apparently indicates that there are in fact two sources.
  And if you wish, say instead that this <i>baraita</i> is referring to a woman who continuously discharges menstrual blood from within her days of impurity into her days of purity. Accordingly, the blood she sees during her days of purity is still from the source of impure blood. The Gemara objects: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches that the woman counted seven clean days.
  The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a woman who gave birth to a female as a <i>zava</i>, and therefore her days of impurity are two weeks in length. And this is a case where in the first week her menstrual emissions ceased, and in the latter week her menstrual emissions did not cease, and they continued until her days of purity. And the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> holds: The days of her birth, i.e., the days of impurity, in which she does not see blood, count for her toward the counting of her <i>ziva</i>. Accordingly, although she is considered to have counted seven clean days, the blood emitted during her days of purity is from the source of impure blood.
  § With regard to the dispute between Rav and Levi, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Rav Shemen from Sikhra said to us: Mar Zutra happened to come to our locale, and he taught that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav as a stringency, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Levi as a stringency. In other words, if a woman continuously discharges menstrual blood from within her days of purity until sometime after the conclusion of her days of purity, the blood emitted after her days of purity is impure, in accordance with the opinion of Rav. By contrast, if she continuously discharges menstrual blood from within her days of impurity into her days of purity, the blood emitted during her days of purity is impure, in accordance with the opinion of Levi.
  Rav Ashi said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, whether as a leniency or as a stringency. Likewise, Mareimar taught: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, whether as a leniency or as a stringency. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, whether as a leniency or as a stringency.
  
  Daf 36b
  
  MISHNA: With regard to a pregnant woman who experiences labor pains, and they are accompanied by an emission of blood, her status is that of a menstruating woman. If she experienced these pains accompanied by emissions of blood for three consecutive days within the eleven days between periods of menstruation, during which time emissions of blood render a woman a <i>zava</i>, and she rested from labor for a twenty-four-hour period, i.e., the pangs subsided, and she then gave birth, it indicates that the emissions were not due to her imminent labor, and this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: She is considered a <i>zava</i> only if the pangs subsided for a twenty-four-hour period of a night and the following day, like Shabbat evening and its accompanying day. Additionally, she is considered a <i>zava</i> in a case where she rested from the pain of labor but not necessarily from the flow of blood. In other words, the presence of labor pangs determines whether this blood is due to labor or the impure blood of <i>ziva</i>. Accordingly, if the pangs cease for twenty-four hours, she is considered a <i>zava</i> even if blood was discharging continuously from when she experienced her labor pains.
  How long before birth is pain attributable to her labor pains, which means that the blood is not considered blood of <i>ziva</i>? Rabbi Meir says: Even forty or fifty days before the birth, any blood she sees during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> is not considered blood of <i>ziva</i>. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is sufficient that this <i>halakha</i> applies only from within one month of her due date. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Labor pains do not occur more than two weeks before birth. Accordingly, if she experiences bleeding for three consecutive days during eleven days of <i>ziva</i> that occur before this time, she is a <i>zava</i>.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a pregnant woman who experiences an emission of menstrual blood due to labor pains is considered a menstruating woman. This statement apparently applies to all blood due to labor. The Gemara therefore asks: Is this to say that any woman who experiences an emission due to labor pains is a menstruating woman? But if a woman experiences an emission due to labor pains in the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>, she is not rendered a <i>zava</i>, nor can this render her a menstruating woman.
  Rav said: It is correct that a woman who experiences an emission of blood due to labor during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> is not rendered a <i>zava</i>, or even a lesser <i>zava</i>, who must observe one clean day for the day she experienced an emission. But she is a menstruating woman for one day, i.e., she is prohibited to her husband on the day of the emission, and in the evening she may immerse and become permitted to him. And Shmuel said: It is a rabbinic decree that she must observe a clean day, as we are concerned lest she rest from labor and thereby be rendered a lesser <i>zava</i>, as the cessation of pangs would indicate that her emission was not due to her imminent labor.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A woman who experiences labor pains during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> is nothing, i.e., she is completely pure and is permitted to her husband. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the mishna that a woman who experiences labor pains is a menstruating woman? This apparently includes all women who experience an emission due to labor, even if it occurs during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>.
  Rava said: The mishna means that if she experienced an emission due to labor during the days of menstruation, she is considered a menstruating woman; if she experienced the emission during the days of <i>ziva</i>, she is pure. And it is taught likewise in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman who experiences labor pains during the days of menstruation is a menstruating woman; if she experiences them during the days of <i>ziva</i>, she is pure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: How so, i.e., when does an emission during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> render a woman one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>? If she experienced labor pains for one day and then rested from labor for two days, and she experienced an emission on all three days; or if she experienced labor pains for two days and rested from labor for one day, and she experienced bleeding on all three days; or if she rested from labor for one day and she then experienced labor pains for one day, and again rested from labor for one day, and she experienced bleeding on all three days; in each of these cases this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, as the cessation of labor pains indicates that the emission of blood is not due to her imminent labor.
  But if she rested from labor for one day and then experienced labor pains for two days; or if she rested from labor for two days and experienced labor pains for one day; or if she experienced labor pains for one day and then rested from labor for one day, and again experienced labor pains for one day; this woman is not considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, since the labor pains indicate that the blood is due to her imminent labor. This is the principle of the matter: If she experienced labor pains adjacent to giving birth, this woman is not considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>; if she was resting from labor adjacent to giving birth, this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>.
  Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, says: In any situation where she experiences an emission due to her labor pains that occur on her third day, she is not a <i>zava</i>. Even if she was in a state of resting from labor for the entire third day, with the exception of one hour of labor pains, this woman is not considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, since a woman is considered to be resting from labor on the third day only if she was resting for the entire day.
  The Gemara asks: The statement that this is the principle of the matter serves to add what? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the ruling of Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, that for a woman to be considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, she must have rested from labor for the entire third day.
  § The mishna teaches that if a woman experiences bleeding due to labor pains during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> she is not considered a <i>zava</i>. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a <i>zava</i>: “And if a woman has an issue of her blood many days” (Leviticus 15:25). The term “her blood” indicates that only her blood that comes due to herself is impure as blood of <i>ziva</i>, but not blood that comes due to her child.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: Do you say the verse excludes blood that comes due to her child? Or is it only excluding blood that comes due to circumstances beyond her control? When the verse states: “And if a woman has an issue of her blood,” the inclusion of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond her control is already stated in the inclusive phrase: Has an issue. If so, how do I realize the meaning of the term “her blood”? The verse is teaching that only her blood that comes due to herself is impure as blood of <i>ziva</i>, but not blood that comes due to her child.
  The Gemara asks: But given that the verse contains both an inclusion and an exclusion, what did you see to deem pure the blood emitted due to the child, and to deem impure the blood she sees due to circumstances beyond her control? Perhaps the opposite is the case, that blood emitted due to circumstances beyond her control is pure, whereas blood caused by labor is impure. The Gemara answers: I deem pure the blood emitted due to the child, as there is a period of purity after it, i.e., her days of purity following her days of impurity; and I deem impure the blood she sees due to circumstances beyond her control, as there is no period of purity after it.
  The Gemara objects: On the contrary, I should deem the blood pure in a case where it was emitted due to circumstances beyond her control, as an emission of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond one’s control in the case of a male <i>zav</i> is pure. The Gemara explains: Now, in any event, we are dealing with the <i>halakha</i> of a woman, and in the case of a woman we do not find that an emission caused by circumstances beyond her control is pure. It is therefore preferable to deem impure an emission caused by circumstances beyond her control, and to deem pure an emission due to childbirth.
  The Gemara adds: And if you wish, say instead: What is your opinion, that one should deem the blood pure in a case where it was emitted due to circumstances beyond her control, and deem the blood impure in a case where it was emitted due to the child? But you have no greater instance of circumstances beyond her control than this, the experience of labor pains.
  The Gemara objects: If it is so that the above verse is interpreted in such a manner, then in the case a menstruating woman as well, with regard to whom the verse states: “And a woman, if she has an issue, and her issue in her flesh is blood, she shall be in her menstruation seven days” (Leviticus 15:19), let us say that when the verse states “her issue” this indicates that only her issue that comes due to herself renders her a menstruating woman, but not an issue that comes due to her child.
  The Gemara elaborates: Do you say that the verse excludes an issue that comes due to her child? Or is it excluding only an issue that comes due to circumstances beyond her control? When the verse states: “And a woman if she has an issue,” the inclusion of an issue due to circumstances beyond her control is already stated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of the term “her issue”? The verse is teaching that only her issue that comes due to herself renders her a menstruating woman, but not an issue that comes due to her child. If the verse can be interpreted in this manner, why does the <i>baraita</i> teach that a woman who experiences labor pains during the days of menstruation is considered a menstruating woman?
  Reish Lakish said: The verse states with regard to the days of purity after childbirth: “She shall observe the blood of purity” (Leviticus 12:5). This indicates that you have another instance of an observance that is like this one, i.e., where the woman is not rendered impure by an emission of blood. And which is this other case? This is the case of blood that is emitted due to labor pains during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>. An emission during the days of menstruation, by contrast, renders the woman a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: But one can say that this other case is where a woman has an emission of blood due to labor pains during the days of menstruation, not where she experiences an emission during the days of <i>ziva</i>.
  Rather, Shmuel’s father said the verse states: “And she shall be impure two weeks, as in her menstruation” (Leviticus 12:5), and not: As in her <i>ziva</i>. By inference, one may conclude that there is an instance in which an emission of blood that occurs during her days of <i>ziva</i> is pure. And which case is this? This is the case of blood that is emitted due to labor pains during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And now that it is written: “And she shall be impure two weeks as in her menstruation,” why do I need the term “her blood” (Leviticus 15:25) from which it is likewise derived that blood emitted due to labor pains during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> is pure? The Gemara answers: If not for the term “her blood,” I would say the verse is teaching that a woman who gives birth is impure as in her menstruation, and not as in her <i>ziva</i>, and therefore, even if she experienced bleeding during her days of <i>ziva</i> in a state of resting from labor pains, she remains pure. Consequently, the term “her blood” teaches us that this <i>halakha</i> applies only if she experiences bleeding due to labor pains.
  § According to Rav, a woman who emits blood during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> due to labor pains is considered like a menstruating woman for that day, i.e., she is prohibited to her husband until she immerses in the evening. The Gemara relates that Sheila bar Avina ruled in an actual case in accordance with the opinion of Rav. The Gemara further relates that when Rav was dying, he said to Rav Asi: Go and hide this <i>halakha</i>, i.e., inform Sheila bar Avina that my ruling is incorrect. And if he does not listen to you, drag him [<i>garyei</i>] to your side with convincing claims. Rav Asi misheard and thought that Rav said to him <i>gadyei</i>, excommunicate him.
  After Rav died, Rav Asi went to Sheila bar Avina and said to him: Retract your ruling, as Rav himself retracted his opinion. Sheila bar Avina said to Rav Asi: If it is so, that he retracted his opinion, he would have told me, as I was his student; he would not have sent a messenger to inform me of such a retraction. Consequently, Sheila bar Avina did not listen to Rav Asi. Rav Asi excommunicated him, as he thought that this was Rav’s instruction. Sheila bar Avina said to Rav Asi: But is the Master not afraid of the fire, i.e., of a punishment for offending me?
  Rav Asi said to him, linking in a fanciful manner his own name to the various names of an important <i>tanna</i>: I am Isi ben Yehuda, who is Isi ben Gur Arye, who is Isi ben Gamliel, who is Isi ben Mahalalel, and this name alludes to a copper mortar [<i>asita</i>], over which rot has no power, i.e., no harm will befall me. Sheila bar Avina said to Rav Asi: And I am Sheila bar Avina, and my father’s name alludes to an iron pestle [<i>bukhna</i>], which smashes a copper mortar, i.e., harm may befall you through the merit of my ancestors.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Asi fell ill and contracted one sickness after another, so that when he entered the heat of a fever, he exited a sickness where he felt cold, and when he entered into a sickness where he felt cold, he exited the heat of a fever. Eventually, Rav Asi died.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  Immediately upon Rav Asi’s death, Sheila bar Avina went and said to his wife: Prepare for me provisions [<i>zevadata</i>], i.e., shrouds for my burial, as I will soon die. This is in order that Rav Asi will not go and tell Rav matters of criticism about me, that I did not listen to Rav Asi and that I caused his death because I took offense when he excommunicated me. His wife prepared for him the provisions, and Sheila passed away. The biers of Rav Asi and Sheila bar Avina were brought together for burial. Those accompanying the dead saw that the myrtle that was customarily placed on a bier was flying from this bier to that bier. They said: Conclude from it that the Sages, i.e., Rav Asi and Sheila bar Avina, have made peace with one another.
  § The mishna teaches that a woman who experiences an emission of blood due to labor pains is not rendered a <i>zava</i> if she sees the blood in days when she can become a <i>zava</i>, but rather a menstruating woman if she sees the blood on days during which she can be a menstruating woman. In this regard Rava raises a dilemma: In general, if a <i>zava</i> experiences an emission of blood while counting seven clean days, her count is negated and she must begin a new count of seven clean days. But what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a <i>zava</i> who experienced an emission of blood due to labor pains? Does this emission negate her count with regard to <i>ziva</i>?
  Rava elaborates: Does every substance that imparts impurity negate the count of seven clean days? If so, as this emission imparts impurity like blood of the days of menstruation, it negates her count as well. Or perhaps only a substance that causes a woman to become a <i>zava</i> negates her count, and as this blood is not a substance that causes her to become a <i>zava</i> it does not negate her count.
  Abaye said to Rava: The case of an emission of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond one’s control will prove the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this dilemma, as such an emission does not cause one to be rendered a <i>zav</i>, and yet it negates one’s count of seven clean days.
  Rava said to him: This is not so [<i>la’ei</i>], as this emission of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond one’s control is also a substance that causes one to be rendered a <i>zav</i>, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Zavim</i> 2:2): With regard to a man who saw a first sighting of <i>ziva</i>, one examines him to determine whether the discharge was caused by circumstances beyond his control. After the second sighting of <i>ziva</i> as well, one examines him. But after the third sighting one does not examine him, as even if the third sighting occurred due to circumstances beyond his control he is nevertheless rendered a <i>zav</i> on its account.
  Abaye asked Rava: And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who said: Even after the third discharge one examines him, will you indeed say that since an emission of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond one’s control does not cause one to be rendered a <i>zav</i>, it does not negate his count? Rava said to Abaye: According to Rabbi Eliezer, this is indeed the case.
  The Gemara attempts to reject Rava’s explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: Even after the third discharge one examines him to establish whether he must bring an offering, but after the fourth discharge one does not examine him. What, is it not correct to say that as he was already rendered a <i>zav</i> after three discharges, an examination after the fourth discharge is for the matter of negating any clean days counted thus far? If so, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that an emission of <i>ziva</i> due to circumstances beyond one’s control negates one’s count.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that the purpose of the examination after the fourth discharge is to determine whether to render impure that drop of <i>ziva</i> such that it imparts impurity through carrying. According to Rabbi Eliezer, the discharge of a <i>zav</i> imparts impurity through carrying, even if the discharge occurred due to circumstances beyond his control.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the third discharge, Rabbi Eliezer says that one examines him, but after the fourth discharge one does not examine him. The reason is as I said, that the purpose of these examinations is to determine liability to bring an offering, and they do not pertain to the matter of negating any clean days counted thus far. Since the fourth sighting does not affect liability to bring an offering there is no need for an examination. Evidently, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a discharge that occurs due to circumstances beyond one’s control does negate his count.
  The Gemara concedes: Rather, according to Rabbi Eliezer, one can resolve the dilemma and conclude that even a substance that does not cause one to be rendered a <i>zav</i> negates one’s count. But what is the <i>halakha</i> according to the opinion of the Rabbis?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which the father of Rabbi Avin teaches with regard to the question of why a discharge of <i>ziva</i> causes a <i>zav</i> to negate his entire count of clean days, whereas a seminal emission negates only the day of the emission itself: What did his <i>ziva</i> cause for him? An impurity of seven days. Therefore, a discharge of <i>ziva</i> causes him to negate his count of seven clean days. By contrast, what did his seminal emission cause for him? An impurity of one day alone. Therefore, a seminal emission causes him to negate only one day of his count.
  The Gemara analyzes this statement: What is the meaning of the claim that <i>ziva</i> causes an impurity of seven days? If we say it means merely that <i>ziva</i> renders him impure for seven days, then the father of Rabbi Avin should have stated: Just as his <i>ziva</i> causes him to be impure for seven days, so too, it negates his count of seven clean days. Rather, is it not that the mention of causation indicates that this is what he is saying: A substance that causes one to be rendered a <i>zav</i> negates one’s count of seven clean days, whereas a substance that does not cause one to be rendered a <i>zav</i>, e.g., an emission of blood due to labor pains, does not negate one’s count. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the opinion of the Rabbis.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i>, Abaye said: We have a tradition that blood emitted by a woman due to labor pains does not negate the seven clean days of <i>ziva</i>, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And if you a find <i>tanna</i> who said that it does negate them, the statement of that <i>tanna</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Marinus says: In the case of a <i>zava</i> who gave birth in the middle of counting seven clean days, the birth does not negate her count of seven clean days of <i>ziva</i>. With regard to this statement, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether her days of impurity may be counted toward the seven clean days of <i>ziva</i>? Abaye says: The birth does not negate her count, but it does not count toward the seven clean days. Rava says: The birth does not negate her count and it also counts toward the seven days.
  Rava said: From where do I say that the birth is counted toward the seven days? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “But if she is purified from her <i>ziva</i> then she shall count for herself seven days, and after that she shall be pure” (Leviticus 15:28). The word “after” indicates that she shall be pure only after counting all of them, i.e., that there should not be an impurity separating between any of the seven clean days.
  Rava explains: Granted, if you say the birth counts toward the seven clean days, this is in accordance with the requirement that there should not be an impurity separating between any of the seven clean days, as they remain consecutive. But if you say the birth does not count toward the seven clean days, then the birth separates between the seven clean days. The Gemara notes: And Abaye could have said to you that the <i>baraita</i> means that there should not be an impurity of <i>ziva</i> separating between them. There is no problem with a separation due to birth.
  Rava further said: From where do I say that the birth is counted toward the seven clean days? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “But if she is purified from her <i>ziva</i> then she shall count for herself seven days” (Leviticus 15:28). This indicates that she counts seven clean days from her <i>ziva</i> and not from her leprosy, i.e., she begins counting seven days from the cessation of her <i>ziva</i>, even if she is a leper. Likewise, she counts seven clean days from her <i>ziva</i> and not from her giving birth, as she counts seven clean days even if they continue through her days of impurity. The Gemara notes: And Abaye could have said to you: From this verse teach one derivation, i.e., from her <i>ziva</i> and not from her leprosy, but do not teach: From her <i>ziva</i> and not from her giving birth.
  And Rava would respond: What is this suggestion? Granted, if you say that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> taught: From her <i>ziva</i> and not from her giving birth, one can understand why the <i>tanna</i> also teaches: From her <i>ziva</i> and not from her leprosy: Since it was necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to teach this <i>halakha</i> with regard to birth, he taught it with regard to her leprosy, due to the fact that he taught it with regard to birth. But if you say that the <i>tanna</i> taught only: From her <i>ziva</i> and not from her leprosy, then the verse is unnecessary, as this <i>halakha</i> is already derived from another verse: “And when the <i>zav</i> is purified of his <i>ziva</i>” (Leviticus 15:13), i.e., from his <i>ziva</i> and not from his leprosy.
  And Abaye could respond: One verse discusses the case of a <i>zav</i> and the other one discusses the case of a <i>zava</i>, and both verses are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written
  
  Daf 37b
  
  this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a <i>zav</i>, one might have thought that the Torah was lenient solely in the case of a <i>zav</i>, because a <i>zav</i> is not rendered impure on account of an emission that occurs due to circumstances beyond his control. But in the case of a <i>zava</i>, who is rendered impure on account of an emission that occurs due to circumstances beyond her control, one might say this <i>halakha</i> does not apply. It was therefore necessary for the verse to teach that a <i>zava</i> may count her seven clean days even if she is a leper.
  And if the Merciful One had written this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a <i>zava</i>, one might have thought that the Torah was lenient with regard to a <i>zava</i>, because she is not rendered impure through three sightings on one day, as she is through sightings on three consecutive days. But with regard to a <i>zav</i>, who is rendered impure through three sightings on one day, as he is through sightings on three consecutive days, one might say that this <i>halakha</i> does not apply. It was therefore necessary for the verse to teach that a <i>zav</i> may count his seven clean days even if he is a leper.
  Abaye says: From where do I say that although the birth does not negate the count of a <i>zava</i>, it does not count toward the seven clean days? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> which addresses the verse: “If a woman be delivered, and bear a male, then she shall be impure seven days; as in the days of her menstrual sickness she shall be impure” (Leviticus 12:2). The superfluous phrase: “Her menstrual sickness she shall be impure,” serves to include a man who engages in intercourse with her, teaching that he is rendered impure as a menstruating woman and imparts impurity like her.
  Furthermore, the phrase: “Her menstrual sickness she shall be impure,” serves to include the nights, i.e., although the verse states: “As in the days,” she is impure during the night as well. Finally, the phrase: “Her menstrual sickness she shall be impure,” serves to include a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, teaching that she must observe seven clean days.
  Abaye continues: What, is it not correct that the <i>baraita</i> means she must observe seven days that are clean from the impurity of birth? Evidently, her days of impurity do not count toward her count of seven clean days. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, the <i>baraita</i> means that these days must be clean of blood. If she does not experience bleeding during her days of impurity, they may be counted toward her seven clean days.
  And Abaye said: From where do I say that the birth does not count toward the seven clean days? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the aforementioned verse: The verse compares the <i>halakha</i> of the impurity of birth to the impurity of menstruation, indicating that the days of her menstruation are like the days of her giving birth: Just as the days of her menstruation are unfit for <i>ziva</i>, as a woman may be rendered a <i>zava</i> only through emissions during the eleven days following the seven days of menstruation, and the counting of seven clean days of <i>ziva</i> is not reckoned from them because as long as she remains a <i>zava</i> she cannot be deemed a menstruating woman; so too, with regard to the days of her giving birth, which are unfit for <i>ziva</i> because a woman cannot be rendered a <i>zava</i> on account of blood emitted due to childbirth, the counting of seven clean days of <i>ziva</i> is not reckoned from them.
  The Gemara notes: And Rava, who maintains that the days of impurity may be counted toward the seven clean days, could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that not only is the birth not counted toward the seven clean days, it also negates any days counted thus far.
  The Gemara analyzes the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>, which compares the <i>halakha</i> of the impurity of birth to the impurity of menstruation, with regard to <i>ziva</i>: But does one derive the possible from the impossible? In other words, how can the <i>halakha</i> with regard to impurity after giving birth be derived from that of the days of menstruation? While it is possible for a woman to give birth as a <i>zava</i>, it is impossible for a <i>zava</i> to simultaneously attain the status of a menstruating woman.
  Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami says: This <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one derives the possible from the impossible. And Rav Sheshet says a different explanation: Although generally one does not derive the possible from the impossible, perforce the verse juxtaposed the days of impurity after birth and those of menstruation, and a juxtaposition in the verse is expounded even if one case is possible while the other is not. Some say a different attribution of these answers, that Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami says that Rav Sheshet says: This <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one derives the possible from the impossible. And Rav Pappa says: Perforce the verse juxtaposed the days of impurity after birth and those of menstruation.
  § The mishna teaches that if a woman experienced labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for three consecutive days within the eleven days between periods of menstruation, and the pangs subsided for a twenty-four-hour period, and she then gave birth, this indicates that the emissions were not due to her imminent labor, and this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>. Additionally, the mishna states that she is considered a <i>zava</i> in a case where she rested from the pain of labor, but not necessarily from the flow of blood. Accordingly, if the pangs cease for twenty-four hours, she is considered a <i>zava</i> even if blood was discharging continuously.
  In this regard, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If she rested from both this and that, from labor pains and emissions of blood, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Ḥisda says that as she rested from labor pains it is evident that the emissions of blood were not due to her imminent labor, and she is ritually impure. Rabbi Ḥanina says that as the emissions of blood also ceased it is apparent that they were due to her imminent labor, and she is ritually pure.
  Rabbi Ḥanina says, in explanation of his opinion: Hear a parable; to what is this case comparable? It is comparable to a king who left his palace, and his soldiers left before him. Although the king travels behind them, it is known that they are the soldiers of the king. Likewise, although both the labor pains and the blood subsided, it is clear that the blood she emitted was due to the approaching birth, and therefore she is not a <i>zava</i>.
  And Rav Ḥisda says: By the same parable, i.e., assuming that the soldiers arrive before the king, all the more so that there must be many more soldiers accompanying the king upon his arrival. The lack of soldiers before the arrival of the king indicates that they are not in fact soldiers of the king. Likewise, the cessation of labor pains before the birth indicates that the previous emissions of blood were not due to her imminent labor. She is therefore rendered a <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion of Rav Ḥisda: We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua says: She is considered a <i>zava</i> only if the pangs subsided for a twenty-four-hour period of a night and the following day, like Shabbat evening and its accompanying day. Additionally, she is considered a <i>zava</i> in a case where she rested from the pain of labor but not from the flow of blood. The Gemara infers: The reason she is rendered a <i>zava</i> is that she rested from the pain of labor and not from the flow of blood. But if she rested from both this and that, from labor pains and emissions of blood, she is ritually pure. The mishna is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥisda.
  The Gemara explains that Rav Ḥisda could say to you: It is not necessary to teach that if she rested from both this and that she is impure, as, in terms of the above parable, the king’s soldiers have ceased entirely, i.e., both the labor pains and the blood have completely subsided. But with regard to a case where she rested from the pain but not from the blood, one might say that just as she did not cease emitting blood, so too, she did not cease experiencing labor pains, and the fact that she does not sense any pain is because she was seized by a general disorientation, i.e., she was so weakened by the labor that she was unable to discern pain. Consequently, she should remain pure. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that if she does not feel labor pains, this is indicative that the previous emissions of blood were not due to her imminent labor, and she is a <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara poses a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina: We learned in the mishna: If a woman experienced labor pains for three consecutive days within the eleven days between periods of menstruation, and she rested from labor for a twenty-four-hour period, and she then gave birth, this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes the mishna: What are the circumstances of the scenario described in the mishna? If we say that it is as is taught, i.e., she rested from labor pains but continued to emit blood, then why do I need for her to experience three days of labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood in order for her to be rendered a <i>zava</i>? If she experienced bleeding during two days of labor pains and one day of resting, it would be sufficient to render her a <i>zava</i>, as she experienced bleeding even on the day she rested from labor pains.
  Rather, is it not correct that this is what the mishna is saying: If she experienced labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for three days and she then rested from both this and that, or if she experienced labor pains for two days and she then rested from labor pains for a twenty-four-hour period, this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>? And if so, the mishna is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina.
  The Gemara explains that Rabbi Ḥanina could say to you: No, actually the mishna is to be understood as it is taught, that she experienced labors pains for three days and then rested from the pain but continued to emit blood. And this is what the mishna is teaching us: That even though she began experiencing labor pains at beginning of the third day, and she then rested from labor pains for a twenty-four-hour period during which she continued to emit blood, she is impure. And this serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, i.e., Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, who maintains that if a woman experiences labor pains during even part of her third day of experiencing emissions of blood she is not a <i>zava</i>, even if the pain then subsided for a twenty-four-hour period (see 36b).
  The mishna teaches: How long before birth is pain attributable to her labor pains, such that the blood is not considered blood of <i>ziva</i>? Rabbi Meir says: Even forty or fifty days before the birth. The Gemara asks: Now that you have said that even fifty days before the due date a woman can experience labor pains, is it necessary to teach that she can experience them forty days before? Rav Ḥisda says: This is not difficult. Here, where the mishna states that she can experience labor pains fifty days before birth, it is referring to a sick woman; there, where the mishna states that she can experience labor pains forty days before birth, it is referring to a healthy woman.
  § With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that a woman who experiences labor pains does not contract the impurity of <i>ziva</i>, Rabbi Levi says: The birth of a child renders the mother ritually pure from <i>ziva</i> only if she experienced bleeding during the eleven days that are fit for her to become a <i>zava</i>. But if she experienced bleeding due to labor pains during the days of menstruation that precede or follow those eleven days, she is a menstruating woman. And Rav says: Even if she continued to experience bleeding during the days that are fit for the counting of a <i>zava</i>, i.e., in the seven days following the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>, which are also part of her days of menstruation, she remains pure. Rav Adda bar Ahava says: And according to the reasoning of Rav,
  
  Daf 38a
  
  even if she continues to experience bleeding during the days that are fit for the new counting following the negation of the days counted by a <i>zava</i>, she remains pure. If a woman experiences bleeding during her seven clean days, she negates any days counted thus far, and must begin a new count of seven clean days. Accordingly, all the days that follow her days of <i>ziva</i> are effectively considered days that are fit for the counting of a <i>zava</i>. Therefore, blood emitted due to labor pains during these days is also ritually pure. Consequently, the blood that accompanies labor pains is ritually impure only if she begins to emit it during her days of menstruation.
  The Gemara poses a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Levi: We learned in the mishna: How long before birth is pain attributable to her labor pains? Rabbi Meir says: Even forty or fifty days before the birth. Rabbi Meir apparently maintains that a woman who experiences continuous labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for forty or fifty days remains pure.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: Granted, the mishna is clear according to Rav, as you find that it is possible that she will remain pure for such a long period, i.e., in accordance with the explanation of Rav Adda bar Ahava that Rav deems the blood pure even during the days that are fit for the new counting following the negation of the days counted by a <i>zava</i>. Accordingly, as long as the woman begins to experience labor pains during her days of <i>ziva</i>, she remains pure until birth, provided the labor pains continue without a twenty-four-hour period of resting. But according to Levi, who maintains that blood accompanying labor pains is pure only during the days of <i>ziva</i>, the mishna is difficult, as it is impossible for her blood to remain pure due to labor pains for fifty days.
  The Gemara explains that Levi could say to you: Does the mishna teach that she is pure during all these days, i.e., that she remains pure throughout the days of menstruation and <i>ziva</i>? Not so. Rather, if she emitted blood due to labor pains during the days of menstruation she has the status of a menstruating woman, whereas if she emitted the blood during the days of <i>ziva</i> she is pure. The mishna is teaching only that she will not be deemed a <i>zava</i> on account of this blood.
  Some Sages state another version of the above disagreement: Rabbi Levi says: The birth of a child renders the mother ritually pure only if she experienced bleeding during the eleven days that are fit for her to become a greater <i>zava</i>, i.e., if she experienced bleeding on three consecutive days during that time. But if she experienced bleeding on only one or two days she is rendered a lesser <i>zava</i>, and she must observe a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge. What is the reason? It is written: “And if a woman has an issue of her blood many days…all the days of the issue of her impurity she shall be as in the days of her menstruation: She is impure” (Leviticus 15:25). The verse is referring specifically to a greater <i>zava</i>, indicating that the <i>halakha</i> that a woman is not rendered a <i>zava</i> on account of an emission of blood caused by labor pains applies only to a greater <i>zava</i>.
  Abba Shaul says in the name of Rav: The birth of a child renders the mother ritually pure even if she experienced bleeding on the days that are fit for her to become a lesser <i>zava</i>. What is the reason? “Days” and “many days” are written there, from which the impurity of a lesser <i>zava</i> is derived. Accordingly, the verse includes a lesser <i>zava</i> in this <i>halakha</i> as well.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: How long before birth is pain attributable to her labor pains? Rabbi Meir says: Even forty or fifty days before the birth. Rabbi Meir apparently maintains that a woman who experiences continuous labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for forty or fifty days remains pure. If so, the mishna is difficult according to both opinions, as all agree that only emissions of blood due to labor pains that occur during her days of <i>ziva</i> are pure. The Gemara responds: Does the mishna teach that she is pure during all fifty days? Not so. Rather, if she experienced labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood during the days of menstruation she has the status of a menstruating woman, whereas if she experienced them during the days of <i>ziva</i> she is pure.
  With regard to the above statement of Rabbi Meir, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: There is a scenario in which a woman experiences labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for one hundred and fifty days, and the impurity of <i>ziva</i> is not included in those days, i.e., she will not be rendered a greater <i>zava</i>. How so? First, a woman emits blood for two days not at the time of her menstruation, e.g., she experiences bleeding on the tenth and eleventh days of <i>ziva</i>. She is not rendered a menstruating woman by these emissions, as they occurred during the days of <i>ziva</i>, nor does she become a greater <i>zava</i>, since she experienced bleeding on only two days.
  Rabbi Meir continues: And then she continues to experience bleeding throughout the seven days of menstruation. She is not considered to have experienced bleeding of <i>ziva</i> for three consecutive days, as the third emission occurred during her days of menstruation. And she then experiences bleeding for the first two days after the days of menstruation, i.e., on the first and second days of the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>. And on the third day of <i>ziva</i> she begins the period of fifty days before giving birth, during which the child renders her pure. This constitutes a period of sixty-one days during which she is not rendered a greater <i>zava</i>.
  Rabbi Meir continues: And this period is followed by eighty days of purity from <i>ziva</i> after giving birth to a female, for a total of 141 days during which she does not become a greater <i>zava</i> on account of blood emitted. And there are then seven days of menstruation following her days of purity, and another two days after the days of menstruation, i.e., the first and second days of <i>ziva</i>, during which she experiences bleeding, for a total of 150 days during which she does not become a greater <i>zava</i> on account of blood emitted.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: If so, there is also a scenario in which a woman experiences emissions of blood due to labor pains for all the days of her life, and the impurity of <i>ziva</i> is not included in them. For example, she gives birth to a female, and at the conclusion of her days of impurity engages in intercourse with her husband and becomes pregnant. She continues to experience bleeding throughout her days of purity, after which she experiences bleeding during the seven days of menstruation and the first two days of the next cycle of <i>ziva</i>. She then experiences labor pains accompanied by blood for fifty days, after which she miscarries a female. She subsequently becomes pregnant again within eighty days of the miscarriage, and the above process repeats itself. In this manner, she will never become a greater <i>zava</i>.
  Rabbi Meir said to them: What is your opinion, that a woman is not rendered a <i>zava</i> due to the birth of non-viable newborns? The <i>halakha</i> that blood emitted due to labor pains does not render a woman a <i>zava</i> does not apply to non-viable newborns.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There is a scenario in which a woman sees blood for one hundred days, and the impurity of greater <i>ziva</i> is not included in them. How so? She emits blood for two days not at the time of her menstruation, and then throughout the seven days of menstruation, and then for the first two days after the days of menstruation. And this period is followed by eighty days of purity from <i>ziva</i> after giving birth to a female, and seven days of menstruation following her days of purity, and another two days after the days of menstruation. This amounts to one hundred days.
  The Gemara asks: What is this <i>baraita</i> teaching us? The Gemara responds: The <i>baraita</i> serves to exclude the opinion of the one who said that it is impossible for there to be an opening of the womb [<i>hakever</i>] without an emission of blood. According to this opinion, if a woman gives birth after experiencing bleeding on the first two days after the days of menstruation, it is certain she experienced bleeding on the third day as well, as every birth is accompanied by an emission of blood. Consequently, she has experienced bleeding on three consecutive days during the days of <i>ziva</i> and is rendered a greater <i>zava</i>. The <i>baraita</i> teaches us that it is possible for there to be an opening of the womb without an emission of blood. Therefore, if she gave birth on the third day of <i>ziva</i> and she did not experience bleeding, she is not rendered a greater <i>zava</i>.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: It is sufficient that a woman is not rendered a <i>zava</i> on account of blood that is emitted due to labor pains only from within one month of her due date. In this regard, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: It is sufficient for her not to be rendered a <i>zava</i> from within one month of her due date. And there is an aspect of leniency and an aspect of stringency in the matter.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: How so? If she experienced labor pains accompanied by an emission of blood for two days at the end of her eighth month of pregnancy, which are days in which she can be rendered a <i>zava</i>, and for one day at the beginning of her ninth month, then even if she gave birth at the beginning of the ninth month, the one day from the ninth month joins together with the two days from the eighth month, and this woman is considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>. This is an aspect of stringency.
  But if she experienced labor pains accompanied by an emission of blood for one day at the end of her eighth month, and for only two days at the beginning of her ninth month, then even if she gave birth at the end of the ninth month, this woman is not considered one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>, and she is pure. This is an aspect of leniency.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava says: Conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the blast of the shofar at the beginning of the ninth month causes the blood emitted during that month to be pure. That is to say, once the ninth months begins, any blood emitted does not render her a <i>zava</i>. The Gemara asks: Is that so, that the entire ninth month of pregnancy is suitable for giving birth, and therefore any blood seen during the ninth month is attributed to the imminent labor? But doesn’t Shmuel say that a woman becomes pregnant and gives birth only after 271 days, which is a full nine months, or after 272 days, or after 273 days? She will not, however, give birth during the ninth month itself.
  The Gemara responds: Shmuel said his statement in accordance with the opinion of the early generations of pious men. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The early generations of pious men would engage in sexual intercourse only on a Wednesday, so that their wives should not come
  
  Daf 38b
  
  to a desecration of Shabbat. If they were to engage in sexual intercourse on a Sunday, Monday, or Tuesday, their wives might give birth on Shabbat, either 271, 272, or 273 days after conception either. The Gemara asks: If this was indeed the concern of the early generations of pious men, why would they engage in intercourse only on a Wednesday, and nothing more? After all, if they engaged in intercourse on a Thursday, Friday, or Shabbat, they would likewise avoid any desecration of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Say that the <i>baraita</i> means that the early generations of pious men would engage in intercourse each week only from Wednesday onward.
  Mar Zutra said: What is the reasoning of the early generations of pious men, who state that a woman does not give birth before 271 days have passed from the time of insemination? As it is written with regard to Boaz and Ruth: “And he went in unto her, and the Lord gave her conception [<i>herayon</i>]” (Ruth 4:13). The letters that constitute the word <i>herayon</i> are 271 in numerical value.
  Mar Zutra says: Even according to the one who said, e.g., Shmuel and the early generations of pious men, that a woman who gives birth at nine months does not give birth after an incomplete number of months, i.e., she carries for a full nine months, nevertheless, a woman who gives birth at seven months can give birth after an incomplete number of months. As it is stated with regard to the birth of Samuel: “And it came to pass, when the seasons of the days had come, that Hannah conceived, and bore a son” (I Samuel 1:20). The minimal number of “seasons” is two, and as each season of the year is three months, this amounts to six months. And the minimal number of “days” is two. If so, Samuel was born in the seventh month of Hannah’s pregnancy.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Labor pains do not occur more than two weeks before birth. Shmuel said: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon? As it is written with regard to a woman who gives birth to a female: “And she shall be impure two weeks, as in her menstruation” (Leviticus 12:5). The verse indicates that she is impure as in her menstruation but not as in her <i>ziva</i>. By inference, one may conclude that her <i>ziva</i> is pure, i.e., if she emits blood accompanied by labor pains she is not rendered a <i>zava</i>. And for how long is this the case? For two weeks.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that blood emitted due to labor pains does not impart impurity of <i>ziva</i>, the Sages taught: There is a scenario in which a woman experiences labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for twenty-five days before birth, and the impurity of greater <i>ziva</i> is not included in them. How so? She emits blood for two days not at the time of her menstruation, i.e., on the tenth and eleventh days of <i>ziva</i>, and then for the seven days of menstruation, and then for the first two days of <i>ziva</i> that come after the days of menstruation. And this period is followed by fourteen days during which the impending birth of a child renders pure the blood she sees.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And it is impossible for a woman to experience labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for twenty-six days without a child, such that she will not be a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>. Since a span of twenty-six days includes at least five days of <i>ziva</i>, there will inevitably be three consecutive days of <i>ziva</i> during which she experienced bleeding, therefore rendering her a greater <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: Is the <i>baraita</i> really dealing with a case without a child, i.e., where she is not even pregnant? If there is no child, then experiencing bleeding on three consecutive days after the days of menstruation is also sufficient to render her a greater <i>zava</i>. Rav Sheshet said one should say the <i>baraita</i> as follows: Twenty-six days in a case where there is a child, i.e., where she is pregnant. Rava said to Rav Sheshet: But the <i>baraita</i> explicitly teaches: Without a child.
  Rather, Rava said that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: It is impossible for a woman to experience labor pains accompanied by emissions of blood for twenty-six days in a case where there is a child, such that she will not be a woman who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>. And in a case where there is no child born but there is a non-viable newborn, with three consecutive days of emissions she also becomes a <i>zava</i>. What is the reason? The <i>halakha</i> that blood emitted due to labor pains does not render a woman a <i>zava</i> does not apply to non-viable newborns.
  MISHNA: A woman who experiences labor pains within eighty days of giving birth to a female, e.g., she conceived during the sixty-six days of purity, or she initially conceived twins and she gave birth to a female and the birth of the second fetus was delayed, all blood that she sees is ritually pure, as she is currently within her days of purity. And this remains the <i>halakha</i> until the child emerges from the womb, at which point she is rendered impure as a woman who gives birth. And Rabbi Eliezer deems ritually impure the blood that occurs due to these labor pains.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: And what, if in an instance where the verse was stringent with regard to blood emitted while resting, namely if a pregnant woman emits blood after her days of purity without any labor pains she is rendered impure, the verse was lenient with regard to blood that accompanies the labor pains; then in an instance where the verse was lenient with regard to blood emitted while resting, i.e., during a woman’s days of purity, is it not right that we will be lenient with regard to blood that accompanies the labor pains?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to them: When deriving a <i>halakha</i> by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, there is a principle that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source. In other words, the status of blood emitted due to labor pains during her days of purity should not be more lenient than that of blood emitted due to labor pains after her days of purity. Rabbi Eliezer elaborates: Concerning what type of impurity was the verse lenient with regard to a woman who experiences an emission of blood due to labor pains? Concerning the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. But she may still be rendered ritually impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. So too, if a woman experiences emissions of blood due to labor pains during her days of purity, she is rendered a menstruating woman.
  GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis concerning a woman who emits blood due to labor pains during her days of purity, the Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> that addresses a verse discussing a woman who gives birth to a female: “And sixty-six days she shall observe the blood of purity” (Leviticus 12:5). The term “She shall observe” serves to include a woman who experiences labor pains within eighty days of giving birth to a female, teaching that all blood that she sees is ritually pure. And this remains the case until the child emerges from the womb. And Rabbi Eliezer deems ritually impure the blood that occurs due to these labor pains.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: And what, if in an instance where the verse was stringent with regard to blood that is emitted while resting before the birth of the child, as such blood renders her a <i>zava</i>, the verse was lenient with regard to blood that is emitted while resting after the birth of the child, i.e., during her days of purity; then in an instance where the verse was lenient with regard to blood emitted due to labor pains before the birth of the child, is it not right that we will be lenient with regard to blood that is emitted due to labor pains after the birth of the child?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source. Rabbi Eliezer elaborates: Concerning what type of impurity was the verse lenient with regard to a woman who experiences an emission of blood due to labor pains? Concerning the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. But an emission of blood renders her impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. So too, if a woman experiences emissions of blood due to labor pains during her days of purity, she is rendered a menstruating woman.
  The Rabbis said to him: But we will respond to you with another version of the <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And what, if in an instance where the verse was stringent with regard to blood that is emitted while resting before the birth of the child the verse was lenient with regard to blood that is emitted due to labor pains that come with it, i.e., which precede the birth of the child; then in an instance where the verse was lenient with regard to blood emitted while resting, namely during a woman’s days of purity, is it not right that we will be lenient with regard to blood that accompanies the labor pains that come with it?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Even if you respond by citing <i>a fortiori</i> inferences of that type throughout the entire day, the principle remains that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source. Concerning what type of impurity was the verse lenient with regard to a woman who experiences an emission of blood due to labor pains? Concerning the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. But an emission of blood renders her impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman.
  Rava said: With this response Rabbi Eliezer triumphed over the Rabbis: Didn’t you say that the reason why a woman is not rendered a <i>zava</i> on account of blood that is emitted due to labor pains before birth is because the verse states: “And if a woman has an issue of her blood many days” (Leviticus 15:25)? The term “her blood” indicates that only her blood that comes due to herself is impure due to <i>ziva</i>, but not blood that comes due to her child. So too, one can say that as the verse states with regard to a woman who gives birth: “And she shall be purified from the fountain of her blood” (Leviticus 12:7), this indicates that only her blood that comes due to herself is pure from <i>ziva</i>, but not blood that comes due to her child.
  This Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: If so, one can say that if she emits blood due to labor pains during the days of menstruation she is a menstruating woman, but if she emits blood in the days of <i>ziva</i>, i.e., after the days of menstruation, she is pure. The Gemara explains that the verse states: “She shall observe the blood of purity” (Leviticus 12:5), which indicates that there is one observance for all the days of her purity, i.e., all the blood she emits due to labor pains during her days of purity is either pure or impure.
  MISHNA: For all the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> that follow the seven days of menstruation, a woman has the presumptive status of ritual purity, as it is unusual for her to experience bleeding on these days.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  If a woman sat and did not examine herself every morning and evening to determine whether she emitted blood and is impure, it makes no difference whether she failed to examine herself unwittingly or due to circumstances beyond her control, or even if she acted intentionally and did not examine herself; she remains ritually pure. She is rendered impure only if she examined herself and was found to have emitted blood.
  By contrast, if the time of her menstrual cycle arrived, when she is required to examine herself, and she did not examine herself, that woman is ritually impure, as it is typical for a woman to discharge blood at that time. Rabbi Meir says: If a woman was in hiding from danger, and the time of her menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself on that day, that woman is pure, because fear drives away blood. There is therefore no concern that she might have emitted blood.
  But with regard to the seven clean days of the <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i>, and with regard to a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge during her days of <i>ziva</i>, if she fails to examine herself on those days, these women have a presumptive status of ritual impurity, as they already experienced a discharge.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that throughout the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> that follow the seven days of menstruation, a woman has the presumptive status of ritual purity. The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this stated? Rav Yehuda says: This serves to say that she does not require an examination during these days. The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: If she sat and did not examine herself she remains ritually pure, it can be inferred that she requires examination <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara explains: In the latter clause we arrive at the case of a woman who is in the days of menstruation, not in the days of <i>ziva</i>. And this is what the mishna is saying: For all the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> that follow the days of menstruation, a woman has the presumptive status of ritual purity and she does not require examination. But during the days of her menstruation she requires examination. Nevertheless, if she sat and did not examine herself, whether unwittingly or due to circumstances beyond her control, or even if she acted intentionally and did not examine herself, she remains ritually pure.
  Rav Ḥisda said a different answer: The first clause of the mishna is necessary only for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: With regard to a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, she is forbidden to engage in intercourse, lest she emit blood during intercourse. The mishna is teaching that this statement applies only during the days of her menstruation, but during the days of her <i>ziva</i> even Rabbi Meir concedes that she stands in her presumptive status of purity and may engage in intercourse with her husband.
  The Gemara asks: If so, that even according to Rabbi Meir there are days in which a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle is permitted to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband, why did Rabbi Meir say that her husband must divorce her and he may never take her back, even if she eventually develops a fixed menstrual cycle? Let them engage in intercourse during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>. The Gemara answers: He must divorce her lest the matter lead to failure during the days of menstruation, i.e., in case they come to engage in intercourse during the days of menstruation, when she might experience regular menstrual bleeding.
  The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: If the time of her menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself, that woman is ritually impure, it can be inferred that we are dealing with a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle. The Gemara explains: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: For all the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> that follow the days of menstruation, a woman has the presumptive status of ritual purity and she is permitted to her husband, but during the days of menstruation she is prohibited to her husband.
  In what case is this statement said? In the case of a woman who does not have a fixed menstrual cycle, where there is a concern she might experience bleeding during any of the days of menstruation. But in the case of a woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, she is permitted to engage in sexual intercourse with her husband, and she requires examination. Nevertheless, if she sat and did not examine herself, whether unwittingly or due to circumstances beyond her control, or even if she acted intentionally and did not examine herself, she remains ritually pure. If the time of her menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself, she is impure.
  The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the last clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it can be inferred that the first clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara explains that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and this is what it is saying: If she was not in hiding and the time of her menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself, she is impure, as Rabbi Meir says: If a woman was in hiding and the time of her menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself, she is pure, as fear drives away blood.
  Rava says a different explanation of the first clause of the mishna: The mishna is coming to say that if a woman experiences bleeding during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>, as she previously had the presumptive status of purity she does not impart impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period to any ritually pure items she touched. It is assumed that she did not emit any blood before this emission.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a menstruating woman, and a <i>zava</i>, and a woman who observes a day for a day, and a woman who gave birth, they all impart impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. A woman who observes a day for a day is one who experiences bleeding for one or two days during her days of <i>ziva</i>, and the <i>baraita</i> teaches that even such a woman imparts impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. If so, this is a conclusive refutation of Rava’s explanation.
  Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya says another explanation of the first clause of the mishna in the name of Shmuel: The mishna is coming to say that a woman does not fix a menstrual cycle for herself during the days of her <i>ziva</i>. In other words, a sighting during these days does not combine with sightings during the previous two periods of <i>ziva</i> to establish a fixed menstrual cycle. The Gemara relates that this statement was recited before Rav Yosef, who said: I did not hear this <i>halakha</i> from Shmuel.
  Abaye said to him: But you yourself told us this <i>halakha</i>, and it was with regard to that mishna you told it to us, as we learned in a mishna (63b): If the woman was accustomed to see an emission of blood on the fifteenth day, so that this was her fixed menstrual cycle, and she deviated from her cycle to see an emission on the twentieth day, then on both this day, the fifteenth, and that day, the twentieth, it is prohibited for her to engage in sexual intercourse due to the concern that she might have an emission on either day. If she deviated from her cycle twice, to see an emission on the twentieth day, then on both this day and that day it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. If she deviates a third time to see on the twentieth she has established for herself a new fixed menstrual cycle.
  Abaye continues: And you said to us with regard to this mishna that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a woman who normally experiences bleeding fifteen days from her immersion, which are twenty-two days from her sighting of menstrual blood. This means that there, she stands in her days of menstruation. But if she normally experiences bleeding fifteen days from her sighting of menstrual blood, so that she stands in her days of <i>ziva</i>, she has not fixed a menstrual cycle, and the previous cycle is uprooted even if she deviates from it only once.
  § With regard to the ruling that a woman’s menstrual cycle cannot be fixed during her days of <i>ziva</i>, Rav Pappa said: I said this <i>halakha</i> before Rav Yehuda of Diskarta, and I asked him for a clarification of the following matter: Granted, she does not fix a menstrual cycle during the days of <i>ziva</i>, and there is no need for three deviations to uproot her cycle; rather, it is uprooted by even one deviation. But what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether we should be concerned that she might experience bleeding? In other words, if she normally experiences bleeding on a particular day during her days of <i>ziva</i>, must she avoid engaging in sexual intercourse with her husband on that day out of concern that she might emit blood?
  Rav Yehuda of Diskarta was silent and did not say anything to Rav Pappa. Therefore, Rav Pappa said: Let us see and try to resolve this ourselves. The mishna cited above states: If the woman was accustomed to see an emission of blood on the fifteenth day, and she deviated from her cycle to see an emission on the twentieth day, then on both this day and that day it is prohibited for her to engage in sexual intercourse.
  
  Daf 39b
  
  And with regard to this mishna, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a woman who normally experiences bleeding fifteen days from her immersion, which are twenty-two days from her sighting of menstrual blood, which means that there, she stands in her days of menstruation.
  And when the mishna states that she deviated from her cycle and experienced bleeding on the twentieth day, it means she experienced bleeding twenty days from her immersion, i.e., twenty-seven days from her previous sighting, not twenty-two. This means that when twenty-two days again elapse from when she usually experiences bleeding, she stands within what is now the eleven days of her <i>ziva</i>. And the mishna teaches that both this, the twenty-second day, and that, the twenty-seventh day, are prohibited, despite the fact that the twenty-second day now stands during her days of <i>ziva</i>. Evidently, we are concerned for an emission of blood during the days of <i>ziva</i> if she is accustomed to experiencing bleeding on that day.
  The Gemara elaborates: And Rav Pappa holds that we count twenty-two days of her menstrual cycle from twenty-two days, i.e., from when she usually begins to menstruate, whereas we count the beginning of the days of menstruation from day twenty-seven, when she actually experiences bleeding. Consequently, the twenty-second day of her normal menstrual cycle falls during the days of <i>ziva</i>, according to the actual day of menstruation.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: From where do you know this is the correct reckoning of her days? Perhaps one also counts those twenty-two days from day twenty-seven, such that when twenty-two days again arrive from day twenty-seven, she stands within her days of menstruation. Accordingly, there is no proof from the mishna with regard to a sighting during the days of <i>ziva</i>.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, adds: And so too, it is reasonable that the twenty-two days are counted from when she actually experiences bleeding. As if you do not say so, then consider the case of this chicken that normally lays an egg on one day and withholds an egg the next day, and lays an egg on the third day and withholds an egg on the fourth day. And the chicken deviated from its routine, so that after laying eggs on the first day and third day, it withheld an egg for two days and then laid an egg on one day, i.e., on the sixth day.
  When this chicken again takes hold of its previous routine and starts laying an egg on one day and withholding an egg on the next, does it take hold of the order of the routine ahead of it, i.e., will it withhold an egg on the next day, or does it take hold of its routine as it was from the outset, so that it will lay an egg on the seventh day, as if there had been no deviation? Perforce it takes hold of the order of the routine ahead of it. Likewise, a woman who deviated from her normal menstrual cycle counts the days of her cycle according to the order of the cycle ahead of her, i.e., from the time that she experiences bleeding.
  Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: But if so, a question arises with regard to that which Reish Lakish said: A woman fixes a menstrual cycle for herself during the days of her <i>ziva</i>, but a woman does not fix a menstrual cycle for herself during the days of her menstruation, i.e., when she is already a menstruating woman. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A woman fixes a menstrual cycle for herself during the days of her menstruation. One could ask: What are the circumstances of this dispute? Rabbi Yoḥanan cannot be referring to a case where all her sightings occurred while she was a menstruating woman, as everyone agrees that a woman’s menstrual cycle is not fixed in such a situation (see 11a).
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where she saw blood on the first of the month; and then again on the fifth of that same month, when she was a menstruating woman; and subsequently she saw blood on the first of the next month and then again on the fifth of that month; and now in the third month she saw blood on the fifth of the month but on the first of the month she did not see blood? In such a situation, the woman experienced an emission of blood on the fifth of the month for three consecutive months.
  Rav Pappa concludes: And it is with regard to this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A woman fixes a menstrual cycle for herself during the days of her menstruation. Although she was not actually a menstruating woman before she experienced bleeding on the fifth day of the third month, this is nevertheless considered a sighting during her days of menstruation. Evidently, one counts her menstrual cycle from the first of the month, despite the fact that she did not actually experience bleeding. Likewise, with regard to the case involving twenty-two days, one counts from when she generally experiences bleeding, not from the day she emitted blood in practice.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: These are not the circumstances of the dispute. Rather, this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The dispute is referring to a case where she saw blood on the first of the month; and then again on the first of the next month, and then again on the twenty-fifth day of that month; and again on the first of the next month, which occurs during her days of menstruation. Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that although she is in her days of menstruation, this sighting on the first of the third month serves to fix her menstrual cycle, as we say with regard to the sighting on the twenty-fifth day of the previous month that it is extra blood that gathered inside her. Therefore, it does not negate her regular cycle.
  The Gemara notes: And likewise, when Ravin and all the sea-farers came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia and transmitted statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan, they said this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan in accordance with the explanation of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua..
  
  
  Daf 40a
  
  MISHNA: After the birth of an offspring by caesarean section, the mother does not observe seven or fourteen days of impurity and thirty-three or sixty-six days of purity for male and female offspring, respectively, and she is not obligated to bring for it the offering brought by a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Shimon says: The halakhic status of that offspring is like that of an offspring born in a standard birth.
  All women become ritually impure with the flow of blood from the uterus into the outer chamber, i.e., the vagina, although it did not leave the woman’s body, as it is stated: “And her issue in her flesh shall be blood, she shall be in her menstruation seven days” (Leviticus 15:19), indicating that even if her menstrual blood remains in her flesh, she becomes impure. But one who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] and one who experiences a seminal emission do not become ritually impure until their emission of impurity emerges outside the body.
  If a priest was partaking of <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, and sensed a quaking of his limbs indicating that a seminal emission was imminent, he should firmly hold his penis to prevent the emission from leaving his body, and swallow the <i>teruma</i> while ritually pure. And the emission of a <i>zav</i> and a seminal emission impart impurity in any amount, even like the size of a mustard seed or even smaller than that.
  GEMARA: The mishna cites a dispute as to whether or not a birth by caesarean section is considered a birth with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to childbirth. Rabbi Mani bar Patish said: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that it is not considered a birth? It is because the verse states: “If a woman emitted seed and gave birth to a male, then she shall be impure seven days…And when the days of her purification are fulfilled, for a son, or for a daughter, she shall bring a lamb of the first year for a burnt offering, and a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:2–6). It is derived from here that the <i>halakhot</i> mentioned in that passage do not apply unless she gives birth through the place where she emits seed.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Shimon interpret the term “emitted seed”? The Gemara answers: That word serves to teach that even if she gave birth only to a fluid that resembles the seed that she emitted, i.e., the fetus died and entirely decomposed and dissolved before emerging, its mother is ritually impure due to childbirth.
  The Gemara further asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason for his opinion that the <i>halakhot</i> of childbirth apply in the case of a caesarean section? Reish Lakish said that it is because the verse states: “But if she gives birth to a female” (Leviticus 12:5). The term “she gives birth” is superfluous in the context of the passage, as it was mentioned previously, and it therefore serves to include the birth of an offspring by caesarean section.
  The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from this superfluous expression? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that expression is necessary to include the birth of a child whose sexual organs are indeterminate [<i>tumtum</i>] or a hermaphrodite. As it might enter your mind to say that as the words “male” (Leviticus 12:2) and “female” (Leviticus 12:5) are written in the passage, these <i>halakhot</i> apply only to a definite male and a definite female, but not to a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite. Therefore, the term “she gives birth” teaches us that it is the birth itself, not the sex of the offspring, that matters.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Shimon derive that these <i>halakhot</i> apply to a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite? The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which bar Livai teaches, as bar Livai teaches a <i>baraita</i> that discusses the verse: “And when the days of her purity are fulfilled, for a son, or for a daughter” (Leviticus 12:6). Since the verse uses the terms “son” and “daughter,” rather than male and female, it is derived from the term “for a son” that these <i>halakhot</i> apply to a son in any case, even if his masculinity is not definite. Similarly, the term “for a daughter” teaches that these <i>halakhot</i> apply to a daughter in any case, even if her femininity is not definite.
  The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from the terms “for a son” and “for a daughter”? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, that term is necessary to obligate the mother to bring an offering for each and every son to whom she gives birth, rather than one offering after having given birth to several sons; and likewise to obligate her to bring an offering for each and every daughter to whom she gives birth.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Shimon derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers that he derives it from a <i>baraita</i> that a <i>tanna</i> taught before Rav Sheshet: The verse states: “This is the law for one who gives birth, whether to a male or a female” (Leviticus 12:7). This teaches that a woman brings a single offering for many offspring born within a short time, e.g., after a multiple birth. One might have thought that she may bring an offering for her childbirth and an offering for an irregular discharge of blood from the uterus [<i>ziva</i>], in a case where she is required to bring one, as one, i.e., that she may fulfill her two obligations with a single offering.
  The Gemara interrupts the <i>baraita</i> to raise a difficulty: But how could it possibly enter your mind that a woman may bring one offering for two obligations? In the case of a woman after childbirth who consumed blood, or a woman after childbirth who ate forbidden fat, is one offering sufficient for her? One who eats blood or forbidden fat is obligated to bring a sin offering for atonement (see Leviticus 7:25–27). There is no reason to think that a woman after childbirth, who is required to bring a sin offering for a reason other than her childbirth, may bring one offering for both obligations. Similarly, there are no grounds for suggesting that a single offering might suffice for both childbirth and <i>ziva</i>.
  Rather, the statement of the <i>baraita</i> should be revised, as follows: One might have thought that a woman may bring an offering for a childbirth that occurred before the completion of her term of postpartum purity, and for a second childbirth that happened after the completion of that period, as one, i.e., she may fulfill her two obligations with a single offering. Therefore, the verse states: “This is the law for one who gives birth” (Leviticus 12:7), indicating that each birth, unless it occurred within the period of purity following another birth, requires its own offering. The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this derivation? The Gemara answers that in their opinion, even though it is written: “This is the law,” it was still necessary for the verse to state: “For a son, or for a daughter.”
  The Gemara explains: Had the Torah stated only the verse: “This is the law,” it might enter your mind to say that one offering does not suffice for two births that occurred as a result of two pregnancies, as the second one was a miscarriage whose conception occurred during the woman’s period of purity following the first birth. But if both births occurred as a result of one pregnancy, such as in the case of Yehuda and Ḥizkiyya, the twin sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who were born three months apart (see 27a), I would say that one offering for both births is sufficient for her. Therefore, the verse “for a son, or for a daughter” teaches us otherwise.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that childbirth by caesarean section has the halakhic status of regular childbirth, concedes in the case of consecrated animals that if one attempts to consecrate an animal born by caesarean section, it is not consecrated. What is the reason for this opinion? He derives it by means of a verbal analogy from the word birth that is written with regard to consecrated animals (see Leviticus 22:27), and the word birth that is written in connection with a firstborn animal (see Deuteronomy 15:19). Just as there, in the case of the firstborn, the <i>halakhot</i> apply specifically to one who “opens the womb” (Exodus 13:15), so too here, in the case of consecrated animals, the <i>halakhot</i> apply only to one who opens the womb.
  The Gemara objects: And let Rabbi Shimon derive a different conclusion by a similar verbal analogy, as the word birth is written with regard to consecrated animals, and the word birth is also written with regard to a person, i.e., a woman who gives birth (see Leviticus 12:2): Just as there, in the case of humans, childbirth by caesarean section has the status of childbirth according to Rabbi Shimon, so too here, in the case of consecrated animals, an animal born by caesarean section is considered the same as an animal born via a natural birth.
  The Gemara answers: It is more reasonable for Rabbi Shimon to derive the <i>halakha</i> of a consecrated animal from a firstborn animal, rather than from the <i>halakha</i> of childbirth, as it is written with regard to a consecrated animal: “Its mother” (Leviticus 22:27), and it is likewise written with regard to a firstborn animal: “Its mother” (Exodus 22:29). The Gemara objects: On the contrary, he should derive it from human births, as that would be a derivation of the <i>halakha</i> concerning consecrated animals that are ordinary, i.e., not firstborns, from the <i>halakha</i> concerning human births of children that are ordinary, and not firstborns.
  The Gemara adopts a different line of reasoning: Rather, Rabbi Shimon should derive it from a firstborn animal, as they both share the following five characteristics: In both cases it is written: “its mother”; both are cases of a sacrificial animal; both are subject to <i>piggul</i>, the disqualification of an offering through improper intent during its sacrificial rites; both are subject to <i>notar</i>, the disqualification of sacrificial meat after a prescribed time; and finally, both are subject to disqualification by becoming ritually impure. By contrast, humans do not share any of these characteristics.
  The Gemara objects: On the contrary, he should derive it from human births, as both cases share the following four characteristics: They are both instances of ordinary, non-firstborn offspring; they both apply to the offspring of either sex, and are not exclusively males; they are both dealing with offspring that are not automatically sacred at birth; and they both apply to offspring that are not a gift to a priest, but belong to an individual non-priest. By contrast, firstborn animals do not share any of these characteristics. The Gemara answers that the comparison to firstborn animals is preferable to the comparison to human childbirth because these shared characteristics are more numerous. The comparison to consecrated animals includes five shared characteristics, whereas the comparison to human births involves only four.
  Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, said in the name of Rava: A <i>baraita</i> is taught which supports the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Yehuda says: “This is the law of the burnt offering; that is the burnt offering that goes up on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). It is derived from this verse that the <i>halakha</i> is that if a part of a disqualified offering is taken up to the altar it should be burned there, rather than taken down, despite its unfit status. There are three expressions which indicate exclusion in this verse: The term “this is,” which indicates this one and not another one; the term “that is,” indicating that one and not another one; and the term “the burnt offering” instead of “a burnt offering.”
  
  Daf 40b
  
  These three expressions allude to the exclusion of the following three cases from the above principle: An offering that was disqualified because it was slaughtered at night, and an offering whose blood spilled before it could be sprinkled on the altar, and an offering whose blood was disqualified because it was taken outside the curtains [<i>lakela’im</i>] surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle in the wilderness, i.e., it left the Temple courtyard. These three cases are excluded, as in these instances, if parts of the disqualified offering ascended, i.e., were brought upon the altar, they must descend, i.e., be taken down.
  Rabbi Shimon says: From the verse’s reference to a burnt offering, I have derived only that a valid burnt offering should not be taken down from the altar. From where is it derived that the verse also serves to include the following disqualified offerings: An offering that is invalid because it was slaughtered at night; and one whose blood spilled before sprinkling; and one whose blood was taken outside the curtains, i.e., the Temple courtyard; and one whose blood was left overnight; and one that was itself taken out of the Temple courtyard; and one that became ritually impure; and one that was left overnight; and one that was slaughtered with the intent to eat its flesh beyond its designated time or outside its designated area.
  And likewise, from where is it derived that the verse serves to include offerings that those who are unfit for performing the Temple service collected or sprinkled their blood; and offerings whose blood is supposed to be placed above the red line of the altar but which one placed below that line; and offerings whose blood is supposed to be placed below the red line of the altar but which one placed above it; and offerings whose blood should be placed on the altar situated outside the Sanctuary but which one instead placed on the altar inside the Sanctuary; and offerings whose blood should be placed on the altar inside the Sanctuary but which one placed on the altar outside; and a Paschal offering and a sin offering that one slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., while slaughtering he actually intended to sacrifice a different offering? From where is it derived that although these offerings are disqualified, if they were brought up to the altar they are not taken down?
  The verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering.” The verse thereby included in one law all items that ascend upon the altar, even disqualified offerings, teaching that if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend.
  Rabbi Shimon continues: One might have thought that I should also include an animal that copulated with a person; and an animal that was the object of bestiality; and an animal that was set aside for idol worship; and an animal that was worshipped as a deity; and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog; and an animal that is an offspring of diverse kinds, i.e., crossbreeding; and an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>]; and an animal born by caesarean section. Therefore, the verse states: “This,” to exclude these disqualifications.
  Rabbi Shimon elaborates: And what did you see, i.e., what is the reason to include these particular cases and to exclude those particular cases?
  
  Daf 41a
  
  Rabbi Shimon explains: After the verse both included some disqualified offerings in this principle and excluded others, you should say: I include in the items that should not be taken down if they had been placed on the altar those whose disqualification occurred in the sacred area, i.e., the Temple courtyard, in the course of the sacrificial service, e.g., an offering that was slaughtered at night, or whose blood spilled before sprinkling. And I exclude those whose disqualification was not in the sacred area, such as an animal that copulated with a person, as these animals were disqualified before their sacrificial process began. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains how this <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The <i>baraita</i> teaches, in any event, that an animal born by caesarean section is not fit for sacrifice. What, is it not referring to one who consecrates an animal born by caesarean section and renders it a sacrificial animal? Evidently, although Rabbi Shimon maintains that a human birth by caesarean section has the halakhic status of a regular birth, he concedes that animals born in this manner are unfit for sacrifice. Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said: No, the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a firstborn animal born by caesarean section, and it is this animal that is disqualified as an offering. A firstborn animal is sacred only if it emerged from the womb.
  The Gemara objects to this interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>: How can it be referring to a firstborn animal? The <i>halakha</i> that firstborn status does not apply to an animal born by caesarean section is derived from the phrase “opens the womb,” which teaches that only animals born in the natural manner are endowed with the sanctity of firstborn animals and may be sacrificed on the altar. Since an animal born by caesarean section is not sacred at all, and it is clear that a non-sacred animal cannot be sacrificed upon the altar, it is obvious that the animal must be taken down if it was placed there in error.
  The Gemara responds to this objection: Rather, what would you say? Would you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to an ordinary animal, not a firstborn, that had been consecrated as a sacrificial animal? But this animal is not sacred either, as derived from the verbal analogy of the term “its mother” stated with regard to the firstborn and the term “its mother” stated in connection with consecrated animals, as Rabbi Yoḥanan taught earlier. If one seeks to consecrate as an offering an animal that was born by caesarean section, it is not rendered sacred at all. Accordingly, the same reasoning applies as before: It is evident that a non-sacred animal may not be placed on the altar, and it must be removed if placed there in error.
  The Gemara rejects this response: What is this comparison between firstborn animals and consecrated animals? Granted, if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to animals that are consecrated to be offerings, that is why two verses are necessary: One verse, the verbal analogy between consecrated animals and firstborn animals, teaches that a non-sacred animal whose mother gave birth to it by caesarean section and whose owner subsequently consecrated it as an offering is not sacred at all, and must therefore be removed from the altar if it was placed there in error.
  And one verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering; that is the burnt offering that goes up on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), teaches with regard to a sacrificial animal that gave birth by caesarean section, that although the offspring is sacred by virtue of its mother’s sanctity, it may not be sacrificed and must be removed from the altar if placed there in error. And the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> maintains that the offspring of sacrificial animals are automatically sacred upon their emergence from the womb. But if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a firstborn animal that was born by caesarean section, the <i>halakha</i> that this animal is not sacred is derived from the phrase “opens the womb.”
  The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to interpret the <i>baraita</i> in this manner, that it is referring to an offspring born to a sacrificial animal by caesarean section, from the fact that the <i>baraita</i> teaches that an animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and an animal that was set aside for idol worship, and an animal that was worshipped as a deity, and an animal that is an offspring of diverse kinds, must all be removed from the altar if placed there in error.
  The Gemara explains: Now are these disqualifications derived from here, from the verse adduced by the <i>baraita</i>? No, they are derived from elsewhere, as taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2). The expression “from the cattle” serves to exclude from eligibility as an offering an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality. The expression “from the herd” serves to exclude an animal that was worshipped as a deity. “From the flock” serves to exclude an animal set aside for idol worship. The word “or” in the expression “or from the flock” serves to exclude an animal that gored a person, killing him. In all these cases the animal cannot be consecrated at all, and therefore it is not necessary for the Torah to teach that they must be removed from the altar if placed there in error.
  And furthermore, is the disqualification of an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds derived from here? No, it is derived from elsewhere, as taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; but from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering” (Leviticus 22:27). The term “a bull” serves to exclude an offspring of diverse kinds from being used as an offering, The phrase “or a goat” serves to exclude an animal that resembles another, i.e., a sheep that is the offspring of sheep but that looks like a goat, or vice versa. Once again, as these animals cannot be consecrated at all, it is not necessary for the Torah to teach that they must be removed from the altar if placed there in error.
  Rather, it must be that two verses are necessary for each of these cases: One to teach that a non-sacred animal that is subject to any of these disqualifications cannot be consecrated, and the other one to teach that with regard to a sacrificial animal that was born with this status by virtue of its mother’s sanctity, if it is subject to one of these disqualifications it may not be sacrificed and must be removed from the altar if placed there in error. Accordingly, it stands to reason that here too, in the case of an animal born by caesarean section, two verses are necessary for the same reason: One for a non-sacred animal, to teach that it cannot be consecrated, and another for the offspring of a sacrificial animal.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Although a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period is rendered a <i>zava</i> and must count seven clean days before immersing and purifying herself, if a pregnant woman experiences birth pangs accompanied by bleeding for three days after her menstrual period, at the end of which she gives birth, she is not rendered a <i>zava</i>, as the bleeding is attributed to the childbirth. And if the offspring emerged by caesarean section, she is considered one who has given birth during a period of <i>ziva</i>. But Rabbi Shimon says: She is not considered one who has given birth during a period of <i>ziva</i>. And the blood that emerges from there is ritually impure, but Rabbi Shimon deems it pure.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: Granted, the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is clear: Rabbi Shimon conforms to his line of reasoning, cited in the mishna, that birth via caesarean section has the halakhic status of childbirth; and the Rabbis, i.e., the first <i>tanna</i>, conform to their line of reasoning, that birth via caesarean section does not have the halakhic status of childbirth. But in the latter clause, with regard to what matter do they disagree? Ravina said: The latter clause is referring to a case where the offspring emerged by caesarean section,
  
  Daf 41b
  
  and blood emerged through the womb, i.e., vaginally, during the three days preceding the birth. And Rabbi Shimon conforms to his line of reasoning, that a caesarean birth is a full-fledged birth, and therefore the blood that emerged prior to the birth is ritually pure, and the Rabbis conform to their line of reasoning, that a caesarean birth is not halakhically considered a birth, which means that the blood which emerged beforehand is considered the blood of <i>ziva</i>, and is ritually impure.
  Rav Yosef objects to this explanation: One difficulty is that according to this interpretation, the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> is superfluous, as the dispute recorded there is identical to that of the first clause. And furthermore, the words: From there, in the phrase: The blood that emerges from there, indicate that this is referring to a place already mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, i.e., the place from which the offspring emerged, which is the abdominal incision of the caesarean section, not the vagina.
  Rather, Rav Yosef said that this is the explanation of the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: It is referring to a situation where both the offspring and blood emerged through the incision in the abdomen. It is in such a case that the first <i>tanna</i> deems the blood which emerged impure and Rabbi Shimon deems it pure.
  And the matter with regard to which they disagree is whether or not the location of a woman’s source, i.e., her uterus, is ritually impure. One Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that the location of a woman’s source is ritually impure, and therefore any blood that emerges from it, regardless of how it came out of her body, is impure as well. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that the location of a woman’s source is pure, and blood that emerges from there is also pure. Only uterine blood which emerges vaginally is impure.
  § Reish Lakish says: According to the statement of the one who deems the blood impure, the first <i>tanna</i>, he deems the woman impure as well, as though it were blood of menstruation. Likewise, according to the statement of the one who deems the blood pure, Rabbi Shimon, he deems the woman pure as well. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even according to the statement of the one who deems the blood impure, the first <i>tanna</i>, he deems the woman pure.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his standard line of reasoning here, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: From where is it derived that a woman does not become impure due to menstruation unless the flow of blood emerges from her nakedness, i.e., genitalia? As it is stated: “And a man who lies with a woman having her flow, and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked her source” (Leviticus 20:18) This teaches that a woman is not impure due to menstruation unless the flow emerges from her nakedness.
  Reish Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: If a woman’s source, i.e., her uterus, became dislodged and fell out of her body onto the ground, she is ritually impure, as it is stated: “Because your foundation was poured out, and your nakedness was uncovered” (Ezekiel 16:36). The word “foundation” alludes to the uterus, and the verse is referring to it after it has been “poured out,” i.e., detached, as an uncovering of nakedness, which indicates that it is still a source of impurity even after it has been detached from its place.
  The Gemara asks: To what kind of impurity is this woman subject in this situation? If we say that she is subject to the impurity of seven days of menstruating women, that is impossible, as the Merciful One states in the Torah that such impurity is caused by “blood” (Leviticus 15:19), and not a piece of flesh. Rather, she is subject to impurity that lasts until the evening, as a result of the surface of her body having come into contact with the uterus, which is a source of impurity.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of a woman’s source that discharged two whitish, clear, pearl-like [<i>margaliyyot</i>] drops, she is impure. The Gemara asks: To what kind of impurity is this woman subject in this situation? If we say that she is subject to the impurity of seven days of menstruating women, that is impossible, as the mishna (<i>Nidda</i> 19a) states that there are five distinct colors of ritually impure blood in a woman, but no more, and pearly white is not one of those colors. Rather, she is subject to impurity that lasts until the evening, as a result of her body having come into contact with a discharge from the uterus, which is a source of impurity. And this is the <i>halakha</i> specifically if there were two drops, but if there was only one such drop she is not impure, as I can say that the drop came from elsewhere, not from the uterus.
  § The mishna teaches: All women become ritually impure with the flow of blood from the uterus into the outer chamber, i.e., the vagina, as it is stated: “And her issue in her flesh shall be blood” (Leviticus 15:19). The Gemara asks: What exactly is the outer chamber? Reish Lakish says: Any place which can be seen when a little girl sits with her legs spread. When the blood reaches that area in the vagina, the woman becomes ritually impure.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish in objection: That place is considered exposed even with regard to contact with the carcass of a creeping animal. If one comes into contact with the carcass of a creeping animal he becomes impure. This is the <i>halakha</i> only if the animal touches a part of the body that is exposed, not an internal cavity such as the inside of the mouth. Since the area of the vagina described by Reish Lakish is considered an exposed part of the body for the purposes of the impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, it should not be necessary for the mishna to derive the <i>halakha</i> of her impurity from the expression “in her flesh.” Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The term outer chamber extends until the area between the teeth-like projections inside the vagina.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the area between the teeth-like projections itself considered as internal, which would mean that blood there would not render the woman impure, or as external? Come and hear a resolution, as Rabbi Zakkai teaches a <i>baraita</i>: The term outer chamber extends to the area between the teeth-like projections, but the area between the teeth-like projections themselves is considered as internal.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that a woman becomes impure when the blood reaches the place of threshing, which is a euphemism. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of this euphemism, the place of threshing? Rav Yehuda says: It is referring to the place in the vagina where the penis threshes, i.e., reaches, during intercourse.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is written concerning a menstruating woman: “And if a woman has an issue, and her flow in her flesh shall be blood, she shall be in her menstruation seven days” (Leviticus 15:19). The term “in her flesh” teaches that she becomes impure while the blood is still inside her flesh just as when the blood emerges outside her body. I have derived only that this applies in the case of a menstruating woman. From where is it derived that it applies to a <i>zava</i> as well? The same verse states: “Her flow [<i>zovah</i>] in her flesh.”
  From where is it derived that this also applies to a woman who discharges semen after intercourse? The same verse states the apparently superfluous term “shall be.” And Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of discharging semen, it is sufficient for her to be like the man who engaged in intercourse with her: Just as the man who engaged in intercourse with her does not become impure until the source of impurity, the semen, emerges outside his body, so too, she does not become impure until her source of impurity, the semen, emerges outside her body. It does not render her impure while it is still inside her body.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon in fact hold that it is sufficient for her to be like the man who engaged in intercourse with her? But isn’t it taught to the contrary in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “The woman also with whom a man shall lie carnally, they shall both bathe themselves in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:18). Rabbi Shimon said: And what does this verse come to teach us? If it teaches with regard to one who comes into contact with semen that they are impure, it is already stated below (Leviticus 22:4): “Or a man from whom the flow of seed goes out,” from which it is derived that coming into contact with semen renders one impure.
  Rather, this verse is necessary because in the case of intercourse the contact with the source of impurity occurs in a concealed part of the body, and contact with impurity by a concealed part of the body generally does not render one impure. But here it is a Torah edict that the woman does become impure in this manner. This <i>baraita</i> proves that according to Rabbi Shimon a woman is rendered impure by semen even when it is inside her body.
  The Gemara answers that this is not difficult. Here, this second <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a woman who engages in intercourse, whereas there, the first <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a woman who discharges semen after intercourse. It is only during the act of intercourse that a woman becomes impure due to the semen. If she later discharges semen, she does not become impure, according to Rabbi Shimon, until the semen leaves her body and touches her on the outside.
  The Gemara objects: But in the case of a woman who discharges semen, one can derive that she is impure due to the fact that she engaged in intercourse prior to the discharge. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon is referring to a case where she immersed herself, thereby purifying herself from the impurity from her intercourse, and she subsequently discharged semen.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that in the case of a woman who engages in intercourse it is sufficient for her to simply immerse herself, and then she is in a state of impurity only until evening? But didn’t Rava say: A woman who engages in intercourse is prohibited from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, even if she is married to a priest, for the entire three days following the intercourse, as it is impossible for her not to discharge semen throughout this period, and <i>teruma</i> may not be consumed by one who is impure?
  The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where others immersed the woman while she was still in bed, and she remained there. If she remains lying down, it is possible for her not to discharge semen following intercourse, and the immersion after intercourse purifies her. The Gemara asks: By inference, one can conclude that when Rava said that a woman is in a constant state of impurity for three days after intercourse, he was referring to a case where she walked to the ritual bath by foot and immersed herself. But if so, perhaps while she was walking she released all the semen in her body even before the three days were over, and therefore will not subsequently become impure.
  
  Daf 42a
  
  And if you would say that it is certainly possible that she released all the semen, but Rava’s concern was that perhaps some of it might have remained, if so, he should have said: We are concerned that perhaps some semen remained and will be discharged, rather than: It is impossible for her not to discharge semen throughout this period.
  Rather, according to Rava too, this is referring even to a case where others immersed her while she was still in bed and she remained there for three days. And the contradiction is not difficult: Here, in the statement of Rava, he is referring to a woman who turns around in bed from side to side. It is therefore certain that she will discharge semen over the course of three days. There, in the statement of Rabbi Shimon, he is speaking of a woman lying in bed who does not turn around from side to side. Such a woman will not discharge semen at all.
  And the statement of Rava is referring to a verse in the Torah, and this is what he is saying: When the Merciful One writes in the Torah, with regard to a man and woman who engaged in intercourse: “They shall both bathe themselves in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:18), which indicates that when evening comes the woman’s purification is complete, it is dealing with a case where she is in bed and does not turn around from side to side. But in a case where she does turn around, she is prohibited from partaking of <i>teruma</i> for the entire three days following the intercourse, as it is impossible for her not to discharge semen throughout this period.
  Rav Shmuel bar Bisna asked Abaye: With regard to a woman who discharges semen, is her status that of one who experienced an emission of an impure substance, or is her status that of one who came into contact with an impure substance?
  The practical difference between these two possibilities is threefold: Whether or not the discharge negates her counting of seven clean days at the end of the <i>ziva</i> period, whether or not it renders her impure by any amount, and whether or not it renders her impure while still inside her body as it would after emerging out of her body. If it is considered an emission of an impure substance, it negates her count of seven clean days, and it renders her impure even in the slightest amount, and it renders her impure even before it emerges from her body. If it renders her impure because she came into contact with it, it does not negate her count, it renders her impure only if a certain minimum amount emerges, and it renders her impure only after touching the outside of her body.
  Before addressing the dilemma, the Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav Shmuel bar Bisna’s question itself: Whichever way you look at it, the question is problematic. If he had heard the <i>baraita</i> cited above, the answer is obvious: According to the Rabbis, her status is that of one who experienced an emission of an impure substance, as the <i>baraita</i> clearly states that in the Rabbis’ opinion the woman is rendered impure even before the semen emerges from her body. And according to Rabbi Shimon, her status is that of one who came into contact with the impure substance, as Rabbi Shimon states that the woman is impure only when the semen emerges from her body.
  And if Rav Shmuel bar Bisna did not hear the <i>baraita</i> and was unaware of it, it is certainly more reasonable to assume that her status should be that of one who came into contact with the semen. Why would he think otherwise, as after all, the emitted substance did not originate in her body?
  The Gemara answers: Actually, Rav Shmuel bar Bisna had heard the <i>baraita</i>, and he did not raise the dilemma according to the opinion of the Rabbis. According to their opinion it is clear that the woman has the status of one who experienced an emission of an impure bodily substance. Rather, when he raises the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  And he does not raise the dilemma with regard to the question of whether or not the semen renders her impure when it is inside the body as it would after emerging outside the body, as Rabbi Shimon states explicitly that the woman is impure only when the semen leaves her body. Rather, when he raises the dilemma, it is only with regard to the other two issues mentioned above: Whether or not the discharge negates her counting of seven clean days at the end of the <i>ziva</i> period, and whether or not it renders her impure in any amount. He therefore asked: What is the status of her discharge of semen with respect to these two matters?
  The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: It is possible that when Rabbi Shimon says: It is sufficient for her to be like the man who engaged in intercourse with her, this statement applies only with regard to the question of whether or not the semen renders her impure when it is inside the body as it would after emerging outside the body. It does not render her impure unless it touches her body on the outside. But with regard to the question of whether or not the discharge negates her counting of seven clean days at the end of the <i>ziva</i> period and whether or not it renders her impure in any amount, perhaps she is considered impure as one who experienced an emission of an impure substance. Or perhaps there is no difference. Rather, with regard to all three issues she has the status of one who came into contact with an impure substance.
  There are those who say a different explanation of Rav Shmuel bar Bisna’s dilemma: Actually, he did not hear the <i>baraita</i> and was unaware of it. And as for the question of why he would think that the woman should have the status of one who experienced an emission of an impure bodily substance, this was his dilemma: Since the Merciful One was stringent before the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai with regard to men who had experienced a seminal emission, in that they were prohibited from attending that event, as it is stated: “Be ready on the third day; do not come near a woman” (Exodus 19:15), whereas those who had come into contact with other impure items were not prohibited from attending, perhaps the stringency of this particular source of impurity should likewise be applied to a woman who discharges semen. If so, her status should be like one who experienced a seminal emission, rather than one who merely came into contact with semen.
  The Gemara explains the other side of the dilemma: Or perhaps we should not derive any <i>halakhot</i> from the instructions given before the revelation at Sinai, as that was a novelty. The Gemara cites a proof for this claim: As that was the case with regard to <i>zavin</i> and lepers, whose impurity is even more stringent than that of one who experiences a seminal emission, but nevertheless the Merciful One was not stringent with regard to them, as He permitted them to attend the ceremony of the giving of the Torah.
  After clarifying Rav Shmuel bar Bisna’s dilemma, the Gemara cites Abaye’s answer to him. Abaye said to him: The woman’s status is that of one who experienced an emission of semen. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna came and asked Rava the same question, and he too said to him: The woman’s status is that of one who experienced an emission. He came before Rav Yosef, and he too said to him: Her status is that of one who experienced an emission. Rav Shmuel bar Bisna came back to Abaye and said to him: You are all spewing the same saliva. None of you are teaching anything new, as you all repeat the same unsatisfactory answer.
  Abaye said to him: I said well to you, i.e., my response was correct. Rabbi Shimon says that it is sufficient for the woman to be like the man who engaged in intercourse with her only with regard to the question of whether or not the semen renders her impure while still inside her body as it would after emerging out of her body. Rabbi Shimon rules that it does not render her impure until it touches her on the outside. But with regard to the other two issues, i.e., negating the woman’s count of seven clean days at the end of a <i>ziva</i> period and rendering her impure in any amount, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the woman’s status is that of one who experienced an emission. Therefore, the discharge negates her count and renders her impure by any amount.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss types of ritual impurity that apply whether the impure substance is still inside the body or has been discharged from it. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a menstruating woman, a <i>zava</i>, a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge, and a woman after childbirth, they all become impure while the blood is still inside their bodies just as they would be when the blood emerges outside their bodies.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to all those other cases, it is well, i.e., one can understand this ruling with regard to blood that has not left the body. But the <i>halakha</i> of a woman after childbirth is puzzling, since if this is referring to blood that she discharges in her days of menstruation, then she is a menstruating woman, and she is included in the earlier category. Likewise, if the <i>baraita</i> is referring to blood that she discharges in her days of <i>ziva</i>, she has the status of <i>ziva</i>, and once again is included in a previously mentioned category.
  The Gemara answers: No, the mention of a woman after childbirth is necessary only in a case where the days of ritual impurity after childbirth, which are seven for a male and fourteen for a female, have passed, and the woman descended to immerse in a ritual bath in order to emerge from her status of impurity to purity.
  And the <i>halakha</i> here is like that which Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: In the case of a woman after childbirth who descended to immerse in a ritual bath in order to emerge from her status of impurity to purity, and blood was uprooted from her uterus but it did not leave her body, her status is as follows: If this occurred on her descent to the ritual bath, she remains impure, as the immersion is ineffective. If it happened on her ascent from the bath, she is pure, as her period of purity, which is thirty-three days for a male and sixty-six for a female, has commenced.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira, with regard to this <i>halakha</i>: If the blood emerged on her descent to immerse, why is she impure? After all, the blood is a substance of impurity that is encapsulated inside a body, and there is a <i>halakha</i> that an encapsulated source of impurity does not impart impurity to other items (see <i>Ḥullin</i> 71a). Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Go and ask Rabbi Avin, as I explained to him the reason for this <i>halakha</i>, and he nodded [<i>vekharkish</i>] his head to me in the study hall, in affirmation of my explanation.
  The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yirmeya indeed went and asked Rabbi Avin the reason, and Rabbi Avin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The Sages rendered this blood like the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, which imparts impurity even to the garments of the one who eats it, when there is an olive-bulk of it in his throat, despite the fact that this source of impurity is encapsulated in his body. Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Avin: Are these cases comparable? How can one compare the impurity of a woman after childbirth to the impurity of one who eats the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird?
  
  Daf 42b
  
  Rabbi Yirmeya elaborates: There, with regard to the impurity contracted by swallowing an unslaughtered bird carcass, this unusual type of impurity does not have an equivalent form of impurity outside, since if one merely touches an unslaughtered bird carcass, he and his garments remain pure. By contrast, here, with regard to the blood of a woman after childbirth, let it become impure only when it emerges outside her body, like all other items that impart impurity by contact once they are no longer encapsulated. Rather, due to this difficulty one must explain that here too, Rabbi Zeira is referring to a case where the blood emerged outside her body after her immersion; otherwise she remains pure.
  The Gemara asks: If the reason that the woman is pure is that the blood emerged outside her body, what is the purpose of stating this <i>halakha</i>? Certainly, this blood renders the woman impure upon contact. The Gemara answers that this ruling is necessary, lest you say: Since the woman’s immersion is effective for any blood that is inside her, i.e., it prevents that blood from rendering her impure, let it also be effective for this blood, which did not leave her body until after the immersion. Therefore, Rabbi Zeira teaches us that this is not the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara objects: We have resolved our <i>halakha</i>, the statement of Rabbi Zeira, but the difficulty remains with regard to the case of a woman after childbirth. In light of the explanation of Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, the <i>baraita</i> cited at the beginning of the discussion, which states that a woman after childbirth becomes impure by blood that is still inside her body, cannot be interpreted in accordance with his opinion, as Rabbi Zeira maintains that the blood does not render her impure unless it emerges outside her body. Accordingly, the original difficulty remains: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to blood that she discharges in her days of menstruation, then she is a menstruating woman, and if the <i>baraita</i> is referring to her days of <i>ziva</i>, it has the status of <i>ziva</i>, both are which are already listed in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a dry birth, without the emission of blood, and the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that the woman is rendered impure despite the fact that no blood emerged. The Gemara asks: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a dry birth, what blood is there that becomes impure while still inside the woman’s body just as it would when emerging outside her body? There is no blood at all in the case of a dry birth.
  The Gemara answers that this clause is not referring to blood; rather, this is a situation where the offspring put his head out of the corridor, in which case it is considered born and renders its mother impure, despite the fact that the rest of its body has not emerged. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Oshaya, as Rav Oshaya said: If a midwife inserted her hand into the womb of a woman whose fetus is dead, she is rendered impure due to contact with a corpse. This is a rabbinic decree lest the midwife touch it after the offspring puts his head out of the corridor and it dies afterward, in which case the fetus is considered born and therefore she would be ritually impure by Torah law.
  The Gemara adds: And this is similar to an incident involving a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether one may circumcise on Shabbat? Rava said to him: One may well do so. After that man left, Rava said to himself, perplexed: Can it enter your mind that that man did not know that it is permitted to circumcise on Shabbat, and he approached me to inquire about such a basic matter? There must be an unstated aspect to his question. Rava therefore went after him and said to him: Say to me, my friend [<i>izi</i>], how did the incident itself happen?
  The man said to Rava: I heard the child making a noise at nightfall on Shabbat eve, before Shabbat began, but it was not born until Shabbat. Rava said to him: This is a baby who put his head out of the corridor, as otherwise his voice would not have been heard. Consequently, it is considered born already on Friday, which means that it should be circumcised on the following Friday, the eighth day after its birth. And if it is circumcised afterward, this is a circumcision performed not at its appointed time, and there is a <i>halakha</i> that although circumcision on the eighth day overrides Shabbat, nevertheless, with regard to any circumcision performed not at its appointed time, one does not desecrate Shabbat for its performance.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to that place in a woman, i.e., her vagina, how is it defined? Is an impure substance located there considered encapsulated, or is it considered to be located in a concealed part of the body?
  The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference as to whether it is considered encapsulated or concealed? The difference is in a case where another woman inserted an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, which is the size that imparts impurity, into that place. If you say that it is considered encapsulated, an encapsulated source of impurity does not impart impurity. But if you say that it is considered located in a concealed part of the body, although the woman does not become impure by contact, she at least becomes impure by carrying the olive-bulk of the carcass.
  Abaye said: It is considered encapsulated. Rava said: It is considered located in a concealed part of the body. Rava further said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “The woman also with whom a man shall lie carnally, they shall both bathe themselves in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:18). Rabbi Shimon said: Now what does this verse teach? If it teaches that one who touches semen is rendered impure, this is derived from the verse: “Or a man from whom the flow of seed goes out” (Leviticus 22:4). Rather, it must be teaching that a woman who engages in intercourse is rendered impure by the man’s semen, despite the fact that the semen did not touch her on the outside of her body.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: This is a novelty because the semen is a source of impurity located in a concealed part of the body, and ordinarily contact with a source of impurity by a concealed part of the body does not render one impure. But here it is a Torah edict that the woman does become impure in this manner. Evidently, an impure substance in the vagina is considered located in a concealed part of the body.
  The Gemara asks: And Abaye, how does he respond to Rava’s proof? The Gemara answers that Abaye would explain that the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Shimon, states one reason and adds another: One reason that this <i>halakha</i> is a novelty is that semen in the vagina is an encapsulated substance of impurity, and another reason is that even if you were to say that the semen is considered located in a concealed part of the body, which ordinarily does not render one impure, but here, it is a Torah edict that the woman does become impure in this manner.
  § A similar dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the place in a person’s throat where an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird renders him ritually impure, how is it defined? Is the meat of the carcass considered encapsulated, or is it considered located in a concealed part of the body?
  The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference? The difference is in a case where another individual inserted an olive-bulk of an animal carcass into his mouth. If you say that an impure item located in one’s throat is considered encapsulated, an encapsulated source of impurity does not impart impurity. But if you say that it is considered located in a concealed part of the body, although the one swallowing the meat of the carcass indeed does not become impure by contact, he at least becomes impure by carrying the meat.
  Abaye and Rava disagree with regard to this issue as well. Abaye said: It is considered encapsulated, and Rava said: It is considered located in a concealed part of the body. Abaye further said: From where do I say that it is considered encapsulated? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that an animal carcass should impart impurity to garments when it is in one’s throat, like an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird. Therefore, the verse states: “That which dies of itself, or is torn of animals, he shall not eat to render himself impure through it” (Leviticus 22:8).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: This verse, which is dealing with impurity through eating, applies to that which has impurity only by means of its consumption, i.e., an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, which imparts impurity solely when it is in one’s throat. Therefore, the verse excludes this animal carcass from impurity by consumption, as it is impure, i.e., it imparts impurity, even before one eats it, by touch and carrying. This ruling, that other sources of impurity do not impart impurity in the throat, supports Abaye’s opinion that an item located in the throat is considered encapsulated, which is why it does not impart impurity.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the <i>baraita</i>: And let it be derived that an animal carcass imparts impurity to garments when it is in one’s throat by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, in the following manner: If an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, whose status is relatively lenient, as it does not have impurity outside the body, since if one touched it or carried it he is not rendered impure, and yet it has impurity inside the throat, then with regard to this animal carcass, whose status is more stringent, as it does have impurity outside the body, is it not right that it should have impurity inside the throat?
  The Gemara answers that the verse states: “That which dies of itself, or is torn of animals, he shall not eat to become impure through it,” which indicates that one becomes impure when the item is in the throat only through it, i.e., an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird, and not through another, i.e., an animal carcass.
  The Gemara asks: If so, what is the meaning when the verse states with regard to an animal carcass: “And he who eats of its carcass shall wash his clothes and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:40), which indicates that an animal carcass does impart impurity by means of consumption?
  The Gemara explains that this verse is written to provide a measure for the impurity of an animal carcass, but this measure applies only to one who touches and to one who carries it, not to one who eats the carcass. This measure is like the amount that one eats. Just as the minimum amount that one eats is an olive-bulk, i.e., this is the minimum measure that has the halakhic status of consumption, so too, the minimum measure of an animal carcass that imparts impurity to one who touches or carries it is an olive-bulk.
  § The Gemara further discusses the impurity of a concealed part of the body. Rava says: If the carcass of a creeping animal is found in the folds [<i>bekometo</i>] of one’s body, e.g., the armpit, he is ritually pure. If the flesh of an animal carcass is found in the folds of one’s body, he is impure.
  Rava elaborates: If the carcass of a creeping animal is found in the folds of one’s body he is ritually pure, as it is through contact that a creeping animal imparts impurity, and a concealed part of the body is not susceptible to impurity through contact. By contrast, if the flesh of an animal carcass is found in the folds of one’s body he is impure, as although it does not impart impurity through contact, since it is in a concealed part of the body, it at least imparts impurity by carrying, and he is considered to be carrying the animal carcass.
  Rava further said: If there was the carcass of a creeping animal in the folds of one’s body, and he brought the creeping animal that was in the fold into the airspace of a large earthenware vessel, such as an oven, the oven is thereby rendered impure, as is the <i>halakha</i> when a creeping animal is placed in its airspace. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that as the Merciful One states with regard to the impurity of creeping animals: “And any earthenware vessel into whose interior any of them fall, whatever is in it shall be impure, and it you shall break” (Leviticus 11:33), this teaches that impurity applies only if the creeping animal fell inside the vessel itself,
  
  Daf 43a
  
  and not if it was in the interior of its interior, i.e., contained within something else, such as a fold, which is inside the vessel, therefore Rava teaches us that a fold in one’s body is not considered like the interior of the interior of a vessel. Rather, this definition applies only when the carcass of the creeping animal was actually inside another vessel whose opening was outside the oven.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the folds in the body with regard to ritual impurity. Reish Lakish says: If there was a pole or a stick placed in the folds of an individual impure with the impurity of a <i>zav</i>, and he moved a ritually pure person with it, that individual is pure, despite the fact that a <i>zav</i> imparts impurity by moving an item. If the pole was placed in the folds of one who is pure, and he moved the <i>zav</i> with it, the pure individual is thereby rendered impure, as is the <i>halakha</i> of one who carries a <i>zav</i>.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason that if a <i>zav</i> moved another with a pole in his own folds he does not render the other person impure? As the verse states: “And whoever a <i>zav</i> touches, without having rinsed his hands in water, he shall wash his clothes, and bathe himself in water” (Leviticus 15:11). This is referring to the impurity imparted by the movement of a <i>zav</i>, as we have not found an impurity similar to it in the entire Torah. Only a <i>zav</i> imparts impurity to items by moving them.
  And the Merciful One expresses this impurity imparted by movement using the language of touch, in order to say that the moving and touch of a <i>zav</i> are like his hands: Just as there, with regard to the impurity imparted by contact with the hands, it occurs external to the body, so too here, impurity by means of movement applies only to moving an item with the external portions of the body of the <i>zav</i>.
  § The mishna teaches that a woman becomes ritually impure with the flow of blood from the uterus into the vagina, even if it did not leave the woman’s body. But the <i>zav</i> and one who experiences a seminal emission do not become ritually impure until their emission of impurity emerges outside the body. The Gemara explains: This is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a <i>zav</i>, as it is written: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh” (Leviticus 15:2). The verse teaches that a <i>zav</i> is not impure until his issue emerges out of his flesh. With regard to one who experiences a seminal emission, the reason is that it is written: “And if the flow of seed goes out from a man” (Leviticus 15:16), which indicates that the flow must exit his body.
  § The mishna further states that if a priest was partaking of <i>teruma</i> and sensed a quaking in his limbs, indicating that a seminal emission was imminent, he should firmly hold his penis to prevent the emission from leaving his body, and swallow the <i>teruma</i> while ritually pure. The Gemara asks: May one hold his penis? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who holds his penis and urinates is considered as though he is bringing a deluge to the world, as masturbation was one of the sins that led to the flood?
  Abaye said, in resolution of this difficulty, that the mishna is referring to one who holds his penis with a coarse cloth. Rava said: You may even say that the mishna is referring to a priest who holds his penis with a soft cloth, and the reason it is permitted is that once the semen has already been uprooted from his body, it is uprooted, and his subsequent holding of the penis, even with a soft cloth, does not increase the flow of semen. And Abaye prohibits the use of a soft cloth, as he is concerned that perhaps one might come to increase the emission of semen, due to the contact of this cloth. But Rava is not concerned that one might come to increase the emission.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rava. Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: To what is this holding of a penis comparable? It is comparable to one who places a finger in his eye, in that as long as the finger is in the eye, the eye will tear and continue to tear. Here too, the priest’s action will lead to an increased emission of semen.
  The Gemara answers that Rava would maintain that if the priest’s limbs were not quaking and the semen was coming out in drops, there is indeed a concern that holding the penis might increase the emission. But when he feels his limbs quaking, this concern does not apply. The reason is that any such event, i.e., a heating of the body that leads to a seminal emission and which is then followed by another heating of that kind at the time when the semen has been uprooted, is uncommon. Consequently, in this case the priest may hold his penis even with a soft cloth.
  Shmuel says: Any emission of semen that is not felt by one’s entire body does not render him impure. What is the reason? The Merciful One states: “The flow of seed” (Leviticus 15:16), which indicates that it is referring to an emission that is fit to fertilize, i.e., it is referring only to the kind of emission which is felt as it exits the body.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 8:3): If one was having sexual thoughts at night and he arose and found that his flesh was warm, he is ritually impure, despite the fact that he did not sense the emission of semen. This shows that the impurity of a seminal emission applies even if one did not feel it in his entire body. The Gemara answers: Rav Huna interpreted this mishna as referring to one who engaged in intercourse in his dream. Since it is impossible to engage in intercourse without the accompanying sensation, he certainly must have felt it, despite the fact that he was unaware of this when he awoke.
  The Gemara cites another version of the above statement. Shmuel says: Any semen that is not shot like an arrow does not render one impure. The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between this version of Shmuel’s ruling and that version of Shmuel’s ruling? The Gemara answers that the difference between them is a case where the semen was uprooted accompanied by a sensation, but it emerged without a sensation. According to the first version the man is rendered impure, as he sensed the uprooting of the semen, whereas according to the second version he is not impure, as this is not considered semen shot like an arrow.
  The Gemara notes that this matter, which is obvious to Shmuel, is raised as a dilemma by Rava. As Rava raises a dilemma: If semen was uprooted accompanied by a sensation but it emerged without a sensation, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the man ritually impure or not?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 8:3): With regard to one who experienced a seminal emission, and who subsequently immersed but did not urinate before doing so, when he later urinates he is rendered impure, as some semen will also be emitted. The reason that he is rendered impure by this emission, which he does not sense, must be because the uprooting of the semen was accompanied by a sensation. The Gemara refutes this proof: There it is different, as the majority of the semen emerged accompanied by a sensation, and therefore he is rendered impure by this small amount even without a sensation.
  Some say another version of the previous discussion. Shmuel says: Any semen that is not shot like an arrow cannot fertilize, i.e., impregnate a woman. The Gemara infers: It cannot fertilize, but it does render the man who emits it ritually impure, as it is stated: “If there be among you any man who is not ritually pure by reason of that which happened to him by night” (Deuteronomy 23:11). This teaches that even mere semen which cannot fertilize renders one impure.
  Rava raises a similar dilemma: With regard to a gentile who had sexual thoughts, on account of which semen was uprooted but not emitted from his body, and he subsequently descended and immersed for the purpose of conversion, which means that he is now Jewish, and he then emitted semen, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to his status of ritual purity?
  The Gemara explains the dilemma: Even if you say that we follow the moment of uprooting, at which point he was still a gentile, one can maintain that this statement applies only when it entails a stringency, as is the case with regard to a born Jew. But here, where this would lead to a leniency, as the gentile would be ritually pure, perhaps we do not say that one follows the moment of uprooting. Or perhaps there is no difference in the application of this principle between a born Jew and a convert, but rather, one always follows the moment of uprooting. The Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rava raises a further dilemma: With regard to a woman who experienced a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], whose urine, which imparts impurity like all liquids that she discharges vaginally, was uprooted but not emitted from her body, and she descended to the ritual bath and immersed to purify herself from her <i>ziva</i>, and urinated afterward, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Even if you say that generally we follow the moment of uprooting, and therefore she should be impure, since the urine was uprooted when she was a <i>zava</i>, nevertheless one can claim that this statement applies only with regard to semen, as the man cannot hold it back from emission. But with regard to the urine of a <i>zava</i>, which she can hold in, one does not follow the moment of uprooting. Or perhaps there is no difference in the application of this principle between urine and semen, but rather, in both cases one follows the moment of uprooting. Here too, the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rava raises yet another dilemma: With regard to a gentile <i>zava</i>, who is not impure by Torah law, although by rabbinic law she is considered a <i>zava</i> in all regards, whose urine was uprooted when she was a gentile,
  
  Daf 43b
  
  and she descended to the ritual bath and immersed for the sake of conversion, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Once again, the Gemara explains the dilemma: If you say that we follow the moment of uprooting even though she can hold in the urine, nevertheless one can claim that this statement applies specifically to a Jewish woman, who is impure by Torah law. But with regard to a gentile <i>zava</i>, who is impure by rabbinic law, it is possible that one does not follow the moment of uprooting. Or perhaps there is no difference in the application of this principle between the case of a Jewish woman and a gentile woman, as in both cases one follows the moment of uprooting. The Gemara again concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches that the emission of a <i>zav</i> and a seminal emission impart impurity in any amount. Shmuel says: In order for a <i>zav</i> to become ritually impure, he must experience a discharge substantial enough to cause a blockage of the tip of the penis, as it is stated: “And this shall be his impurity in his issue: Whether his flesh run with his issue, or his flesh be stopped from his issue, it is his impurity” (Leviticus 15:3).
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the emission of a <i>zav</i> and a seminal emission impart impurity in any amount? The Gemara answers that Shmuel said his ruling in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: In order for a <i>zav</i> to become ritually impure, he must experience a discharge substantial enough to cause a blockage of the tip of the penis, but the Rabbis did not concede to his opinion, as they maintain that any amount is sufficient. The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna agrees with the opinion of the Rabbis, whereas Shmuel agrees with the statement of Rabbi Natan in the name of Rabbi Yishmael.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, i.e., what is the source in the Torah for his ruling? The Gemara answers: His source is, as mentioned above, that the verse states: “And this shall be his impurity in his issue: Whether his flesh run with his issue, or his flesh be stopped from his issue, it is his impurity” (Leviticus 15:3). This verse indicates that the emission must be enough to cause a blockage of his penis.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yishmael, what do they derive from this verse? The Gemara explains that according to the Rabbis, that verse is necessary to teach a different <i>halakha</i> with regard to a <i>zav</i>, that it is only a discharge which is moist, and which therefore could cause a blockage of the organ, that imparts impurity, but a dry discharge does not impart impurity.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yishmael derive that only a moist discharge imparts impurity? The Gemara answers: That <i>halakha</i> is derived from the word “run” in the verse “And this shall be his impurity in his issue: Whether his flesh run with his issue.”
  The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from this word? The Gemara explains that according to the Rabbis, that verse comes to teach the number of emissions by which a <i>zav</i> is rendered impure, as follows: The term “his issue” is one emission, the term “his flesh run” is another emission so that there are two emissions, and the term “with his issue” makes a total of three emissions. The verse thereby teaches with regard to a <i>zav</i> who experienced three emissions that he is obligated to bring an offering as part of his purification process.
  The Gemara continues: From the last section of the verse: “Or his flesh be stopped from his issue, it is his impurity,” it is derived that one is impure even by means of part of his issue, i.e., even if he did not experience three emissions. Here the verse teaches with regard to a <i>zav</i> who experienced two emissions that although he is not obligated to bring an offering, he renders a surface designated for lying and a surface designated for sitting ritually impure by lying or sitting on them, even without touching them directly. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yishmael, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i> of the requisite number of emissions? The Gemara answers that he derives it from that which Rabbi Simai said.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Simai says: The verse enumerated two emissions and called the <i>zav</i> impure: “When any man has an emission out of his flesh, due to his issue he is impure” (Leviticus 15:2). And yet, another verse enumerates three emissions and it too called him impure: “And this shall be his impurity in his emission: Whether his flesh runs with his emission, or his flesh be stopped from his emission, it is his impurity” (Leviticus 15:3). How can these verses be reconciled? If one is impure after two emissions, for what purpose does the Torah mention three? It is to teach that two emissions are necessary to establish impurity, and three are necessary to render a <i>zav</i> liable to bring an offering.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who derives both the <i>halakha</i> of impurity and the obligation to bring an offering from the single verse: “And this shall be his impurity in his issue,” what do they, i.e., the Rabbis, do with the other verse: “When any man has an emission out of his flesh”? The Gemara answers that this verse is necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> that a <i>zav</i> is not impure unless the discharge emerges from his flesh.
  The Gemara further asks: Why do I need the last part of the previous verse, which can be read as: His issue is impure (Leviticus 15:2)? The Gemara explains that this teaches with regard to the issue itself that it is impure, i.e., not only does it render the man who emitted it impure, but the substance itself is impure and imparts impurity to others by contact.
  § With regard to the statement of the mishna that the issue of the <i>zav</i> and a seminal emission render them impure in any amount, Rav Ḥanilai says in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: Semen imparts impurity to the man who emits it in any amount, whereas with regard to one who touches semen, it imparts impurity only in the amount of a lentil-bulk. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the emission of a <i>zav</i> and a seminal emission impart impurity in any amount? What, is it not referring to one who touches semen? The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the man who emits it.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: There is an element of stringency which applies to the impurity of semen that does not apply to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal, and likewise there is an element of stringency which applies to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal that does not apply to the impurity of semen. The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: The stringency which applies to the carcass of a creeping animal but not to semen is that with regard to the carcass of a creeping animal there is no differentiation in its impurity, which is not the case with regard to semen, as certain types of semen impart impurity while others do not. The stringency which applies to semen but not to the carcass of a creeping animal is that semen imparts impurity in any amount, which is not the case with regard to the carcass of a creeping animal, which must be at least a lentil-bulk.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: What, is it not referring to one who touches semen, and the <i>baraita</i> rules that he is rendered impure by any amount? The Gemara again answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> is speaking of the man who emits semen, whereas one who touches it becomes impure only if it is at least as large as a lentil-bulk.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches the case of semen as similar to that of the carcass of a creeping animal, which indicates that just as the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal is imparted by contact, so too, the impurity discussed in the <i>baraita</i> with regard to semen is imparted by contact. Rav Adda bar Ahava said in response: The <i>baraita</i> teaches the category of the carcass of a creeping animal, and it likewise teaches the category of semen, i.e., it is referring to these types of impurity in general, but this does not mean that these types of impurity are contracted in the same manner.
  The Gemara asks: And does the carcass of a creeping animal not impart impurity in any amount? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 1:7): The limbs of impure bodies that are whole have no minimum measure with regard to imparting ritual impurity. Even if a limb is less than an olive-bulk of a human corpse, or less than an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or less than a lentil-bulk of the carcass of a creeping animal, it imparts ritual impurity. If so, how can the <i>baraita</i> state that there is a minimum measure of a lentil-bulk with regard to the impurity of a creeping animal?
  The Gemara answers that the <i>halakha</i> of a limb is different, as when all of it is intact it stands in place of a lentil-bulk, i.e., a whole limb is considered like a lentil-bulk of the carcass of a creeping animal, regardless of its actual size. The proof is that if it were lacking any slight bit, thereby causing this limb of a creeping animal to be less than a lentil-bulk, would it impart impurity? Certainly not. Clearly, then, the impurity of a limb is due to its wholeness, not its size.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches: The stringency that applies to the carcass of a creeping animal but not to semen is that with regard to a creeping animal there is no differentiation concerning its impurity, which is not the case with regard to semen. The Gemara asks: What is the differentiation with regard to the impurity of semen? If we say that this is referring to the difference between the semen of Jews, to which this impurity applies, and the semen of gentiles, to which it does not apply, there is also a differentiation with regard to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal between a sea mouse, which is not impure, and a land mouse, which is impure.
  Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the differentiation between the emission of a minor, which is not classified as semen and which does not render him impure, and that of an adult, which does render him impure. By contrast, there is no such differentiation with regard to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal, as it imparts impurity regardless of its age and size.
  § Rav Pappa said: The amount of semen which imparts impurity to one who touches it is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is stated in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that the Torah includes one who touches semen, in addition to one who emits semen, as impure? The verse states with regard to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal: “Or whoever touches any creeping animal, whereby he may become impure” (Leviticus 22:5). It is inferred from the inclusive phrase “or whoever” that one who touches semen is also impure.
  And in general, <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to the possibility of deriving a <i>halakha</i> in this manner. As some say with regard to a <i>halakha</i> that is inferred from another <i>halakha</i>: Infer from it, and derive the details of the <i>halakha</i> from it as well. And some say with regard to such a <i>halakha</i>: Infer from it, but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, i.e., not all aspects of the source case are applied to this <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara explains how this general dispute applies to the case at hand. According to the one who says that one infers from it and again from it, the derivation is as follows: Just as the carcass of a creeping animal imparts impurity by contact, so too, semen imparts impurity by contact. And one again infers from the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal that just as the carcass of a creeping animal imparts impurity in the amount of a lentil-bulk, so too, semen imparts impurity in the amount of a lentil-bulk.
  And according to the one who says: Infer from it, but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, one derives as follows: Just as the carcass of a creeping animal imparts impurity by contact, so too, semen imparts impurity by contact. But one must interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place: Just as semen imparts impurity to the one who emits it in any amount, so too, it imparts impurity to the one who touches it in any amount.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: From where do you infer that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> derives the impurity of one who touches semen from the phrase “or whoever” that is stated with regard to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal? Perhaps he derives it from the previous verse: “Or from whoever the flow of seed goes out” (Leviticus 22:4), and everyone agrees that when a <i>halakha</i> is derived from a verse dealing with the same matter, one should infer from it and derive the details of the <i>halakha</i> from it as well. If so, the amount of semen that imparts impurity by contact should be derived from the amount that renders the one who emitted it impure, which is any amount.
  The Gemara relates that the Sages asked the <i>tanna’im</i>, i.e., those who recite <i>mishnayot</i> and <i>baraitot</i>, whether the derivation of the <i>baraita</i> is from the verse dealing with the carcass of a creeping animal or from the one dealing with semen. They discovered that there are those who teach this <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the assumption of Rav Pappa, that it is derived from a creeping animal, and there are those who teach this <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, that the source is the verse referring to semen.
  MISHNA: A baby girl, even one who is one day old, who experiences an emission of blood, becomes impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. A baby girl who is ten days old who experiences an emission of blood for three consecutive days after the conclusion of the seven days fit for menstruation becomes impure with the impurity of <i>ziva</i>, and is therefore obligated to observe seven clean days before immersion.
  A baby boy, even one who is one day old, becomes impure with the impurity of <i>ziva</i>; and becomes impure with the impurity of leprous marks; and becomes impure with impurity imparted by a corpse; and he creates a levirate bond requiring the widow of his childless brother to enter into levirate marriage with him; and he exempts his widowed mother from the obligation of levirate marriage, freeing her to marry anyone she chooses; and he enables his mother, an Israelite woman who is no longer married to his father, a priest, to continue to partake of <i>teruma</i>; and he disqualifies his mother, the daughter of a priest who is no longer married to his father, an Israelite man, from continuing to partake of <i>teruma</i>, because the child is unfit to partake of <i>teruma</i>;
  
  Daf 44a
  
  and he inherits the estate of his mother if she died on the day of his birth; and if he dies, he bequeaths that inheritance to his paternal brothers; and one who kills him is liable for his murder, as it is written: “And he that smites any man mortally shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), i.e., any man, including a child who is one day old; and if he dies, his status in relation to his father and to his mother and to all his relatives, in terms of the <i>halakhot</i> of mourning, is like that of a full-fledged groom [<i>keḥatan shalem</i>], whose death is deeply mourned.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruation apply even to a one-day-old baby girl, derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And if a woman has an issue, and her issue in her flesh is blood, she shall be in her impurity seven days” (Leviticus 15:19). When the verse states “a woman,” I have derived only that the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruation apply to an adult woman. From where do I derive that the impurity of a menstruating woman also applies to a one-day-old baby? The verse states: “And a woman,” to include even a baby girl.
  The mishna further teaches that a baby girl who is ten days old who experiences an emission of blood for three consecutive days after the conclusion of the seven days fit for menstruation, becomes impure with the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. Again, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And if a woman has an issue of her blood many days not in the time of her menstruation…she shall be as in the days of her menstruation: She is impure” (Leviticus 15:25). When the verse states “a woman,” I have derived only that the <i>halakhot</i> of a <i>zava</i> apply to an adult woman. From where do I derive that the impurity of <i>ziva</i> also applies to a ten-day-old baby? The verse states: “And a woman,” to include even a baby girl.
  The mishna further teaches that a baby boy, even one who is one day old, can become impure with the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. Once again, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a <i>zav</i>: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue is impure” (Leviticus 15:2). It would have been enough for the verse to state “a man.” Why must the verse state “any man”? It is in order to include even a one-day-old baby boy who has such a discharge, to teach that he becomes impure with the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says that this derivation is not necessary, as the verse states: “And of those who have an issue, whether it be a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33). The phrase “whether it be a male” includes anyone who is a male, whether he is an adult or whether he is a minor; “or a female” includes anyone who is a female, whether she is an adult or whether she is a minor. If so, why must the earlier verse state “any man”? The Torah spoke in the language of people, i.e., this emphasis is not unusual and therefore one should not derive a <i>halakha</i> from the superfluous word.
  The mishna teaches: And a one-day-old baby becomes impure with the impurity of leprous marks. The Gemara explains that this is derived from that which is written with regard to leprous marks: “When a person shall have in the skin of his flesh” (Leviticus 13:2). This serves to include anyone who is a person, irrespective of age.
  The mishna further teaches: And a one-day-old baby becomes impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. The Gemara explains that this is derived from that which is written in the context of purification from impurity imparted by a corpse: “And a pure person shall take hyssop, and dip it in the water, and sprinkle it upon the tent, and upon all the vessels, and upon the people that were there” (Numbers 19:18). This apparently superfluous mention of “people” serves to include anyone who is a person, irrespective of age.
  The mishna also teaches: And a one-day-old baby creates a levirate bond requiring the widow of his childless brother to enter into levirate marriage with him. The Gemara explains that this is derived from that which is written: “If brothers dwell together and one of them dies, and he has no child, the wife of the dead man shall not be married outside of the family to one not of his kin. Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her and take her to him to be his wife, and consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:5). This verse is referring to brothers who had one dwelling in the world, i.e., who were alive at the same time, which includes a baby who was born the day his brother died.
  The mishna teaches: And a one-day-old baby exempts his widowed mother from the obligation of levirate marriage. The Gemara explains the derivation: The Merciful One states: “And one of them dies, and he has no child” (Deuteronomy 25:5), and this late husband has a child, albeit one who is one day old.
  The mishna teaches: And a one-day-old baby enables his mother, an Israelite woman who is no longer married to his father, a priest, to continue to partake of <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara explains that this is as it is written, with regard to those who are entitled to partake of <i>teruma</i> on account of a priest: “And those who are born in his house, they may eat [<i>yokhelu</i>] of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11). Read into the verse: Those who are born in his house enable others to eat [<i>ya’akhilu</i>] of his bread, i.e., on account of her son the priest, the Israelite mother may continue to partake of <i>teruma</i> even after the death of his father.
  § The mishna also teaches: And a one-day-old baby disqualifies his mother, the daughter of a priest who is no longer married to his father, an Israelite man, from continuing to partake of <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara explains that the reason is that the Merciful One states: “But if a priest’s daughter becomes a widow, or divorced, and has no child, and is returned to her father’s house, as in her youth, she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13), and this daughter of a priest has a child.
  The Gemara asks: Why state specifically that she has a child? Even if she has a fetus in her womb from an Israelite man, the same <i>halakha</i> applies, as it is written: “As in her youth,” which excludes a pregnant woman, since her pregnancy has changed her physical state from that of her youth.
  The Gemara answers that both derivations are necessary. As, if the Merciful One had written only: “And has no child,” I would say that the reason the daughter of a priest who has a child from an Israelite man may no longer partake of <i>teruma</i> is due to the fact that at the outset, before she married, she was one body, and now she has developed into two bodies, herself and her child. But here, in a case when she is merely pregnant, when at the outset she was one body and now she remains one body, one might say that she should be permitted to partake of <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “As in her youth.”
  And by contrast, if the Merciful One had written only: “As in her youth,” I would say that the reason that the daughter of a priest who is pregnant from an Israelite man may no longer partake of <i>teruma</i> is due to the fact that at the outset she had an empty body and now she has a full body, and consequently she is not returning to her father’s household in her initial state. But here, after she has given birth, where at the outset she had an empty body and now she still has an empty body, one might say that she should be permitted to partake of <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And has no child.” Therefore, both derivations are necessary.
  The Gemara asks: The need for both verses has been resolved, but the mishna remains difficult: What is the reason the mishna is referring specifically to a baby who is one day old, when, as stated above, the same <i>halakha</i> applies even to a fetus? Rav Sheshet said: Here we are dealing with a priest who has two wives: One who is a divorcée, as she was previously divorced from another man, and who was therefore married to this priest in violation of <i>halakha</i>, and one who is not a divorcée. And he has sons from the wife who is not a divorcée, and he has a baby boy who is one day old from the wife who is a divorcée. This son is disqualified from the priesthood and may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.
  Rav Sheshet continues: The mishna is teaching that this baby disqualifies his father’s Canaanite slaves from partaking of <i>teruma</i> again. Since this child is entitled to a portion of his father’s inheritance, which includes his slaves, they may no longer partake of <i>teruma</i> due to his presence in the world. And the mishna teaches this to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that a fetus also disqualifies his father’s slaves from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. For this reason, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches us that with regard to a one-day-old baby boy, yes, he disqualifies his father’s slaves from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, but a fetus does not.
  § The mishna teaches that this baby inherits and he bequeaths. The Gemara asks: From whom does he inherit? It must be from his father. And to whom does he bequeath? Presumably, he bequeaths to his paternal brother, in a case where the baby inherited his father’s property and then died on the same day, as maternal half-brothers do not inherit from each other. The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this interpretation: What is the novelty of the <i>halakha</i> that the brother of this one-day-old baby inherits from him? After all, if the surviving brother wants, let him inherit from his father, and if he wants, let him inherit from the one-day-old baby. Either way, he receives his late father’s property.
  Rav Sheshet said: The mishna is teaching that a one-day-old baby inherits his mother’s property if she died on the day he was born, so that he is able to bequeath it, even if he dies after a day, to his heirs who are not the mother’s heirs, e.g., a paternal half-brother. And in such a case it is specifically when he is at least one day old that he inherits from his mother and bequeaths the property to his paternal half-brothers, but a fetus, whose mother died before he emerged, does not inherit from his mother. What is the reason for this? The reason is that presumably the fetus died first, before its mother died, and there is a <i>halakha</i> that a son does not inherit from his mother
  
  Daf 44b
  
  while in the grave, i.e., after death, in order to bequeath to his paternal half-brother.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so, that it is presumed that the fetus died before its mother? But wasn’t there an incident in which the mother died and the fetus made up to three spasmodic motions afterward? Mar, son of Rav Ashi, said: That is just as it is with the tail of the lizard, which twitches after being severed from the lizard, but it is merely a spasmodic motion which does not indicate that it is still alive.
  Mar, son of Rav Yosef, said a different explanation of the mishna’s ruling in the name of Rava: The mishna teaches that a one-day-old baby inherits in order to say that such a child reduces the portion of the firstborn. A firstborn is entitled to a double portion of the inheritance, which is calculated by taking into account the portion due to his dead brother. And Mar, son of Rav Yosef, further said in the name of Rava: A son who was born after his father’s death does not reduce the portion of the firstborn. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna does not apply to a fetus. What is the reason for this? We require fulfillment of the verse: “If a man has two wives, the one beloved, and the other hated, and they bore him children” (Deuteronomy 21:15), and this does not apply to a fetus not yet born at the time of the father’s death.
  The Gemara notes: In Sura they taught Mar’s statement that way, whereas in Pumbedita they taught it this way: Mar, son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: A firstborn who was born after his father’s death does not receive a double portion. What is the reason for this? We require fulfillment of the verse: “But he shall acknowledge the firstborn…by giving him a double portion” (Deuteronomy 21:17), and in this case the father is not there to acknowledge him.
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with all these versions of the statement of Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, i.e., a one-day-old baby reduces the portion of the firstborn, a son born after his father’s death does not reduce the portion of the firstborn, and a firstborn born after his father’s death does not receive a double portion.
  § The mishna teaches: And one who kills a one-day-old baby is liable for his murder. The Gemara explains that the reason for this is as it is written: “And he who smites any man mortally shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), where the phrase “any man” indicates that this verse applies in any case, even in the case of a one-day-old baby.
  The mishna further teaches: And if a one-day-old baby dies, his status in relation to his father and to his mother and to all his relatives is like that of a full-fledged groom. The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this stated? Rav Pappa said: With regard to mourning.
  The Gemara comments: In accordance with whose opinion is this stated? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said: With regard to humans, any child that remained alive thirty days after birth is not considered a non-viable newborn. It can be inferred from this statement that if he did not remain alive for thirty days after birth, he is of uncertain status. The Gemara refutes this proof: Here we are dealing with a case where one is certain that its months of gestation were completed, and therefore it is certainly a viable newborn.
  MISHNA: A girl who is three years and one day old, whose father arranged her betrothal, is betrothed through intercourse, as the halakhic status of intercourse with her is that of intercourse in all halakhic senses. And in a case where the childless husband of a girl three years and one day old dies, if his brother the <i>yavam</i> engages in intercourse with her, he acquires her as his wife; and if she is married, a man other than her husband is liable for engaging in intercourse with her due to violation of the prohibition against intercourse with a married woman.
  And if she is impure due to menstruation, she imparts impurity to one who engages in intercourse with her who then renders impure all the layers of bedding beneath him, rendering them impure like the upper bedding covering a <i>zav</i>, in the sense that it assumes first-degree ritual impurity and does not become a primary source of ritual impurity, and it renders impure food and drink, but it does not render impure people and vessels.
  If she marries a priest, she may partake of <i>teruma</i>, like any other wife of a priest; if she is unmarried and one of the men who are unfit for the priesthood, e.g., a <i>mamzer</i> or <i>ḥalal</i>, engaged in intercourse with her, he disqualifies her from marrying into the priesthood, and if she is the daughter of a priest, she is disqualified from partaking of <i>teruma</i>. Finally, if one of all those with whom relations are forbidden, as stated in the Torah, e.g., her father or her husband’s father, engaged in intercourse with her, they are executed by the court for engaging in intercourse with her, and she is exempt, because she is a minor.
  If the girl is less than that age, younger than three years and one day, the status of intercourse with her is not that of intercourse in all halakhic senses; rather, it is like placing a finger into the eye. Just as in that case, the eye constricts, sheds tears, and then returns to its original state, so too, in a girl younger than three years and one day old, the hymen returns to its original state.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A girl who is three years old is betrothed through intercourse; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She must be three years and one day old. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between their opinions, as both agree that she cannot be betrothed before the age of three? The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: There is a difference between their opinions in the case of a girl on the eve of the first day of the fourth year of her life. According to Rabbi Meir, she can be betrothed through intercourse, as on this day three years are complete, whereas the Rabbis maintain that she cannot be betrothed in this manner, as she has not yet entered the first day of her fourth year.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is a difference between their opinions with regard to the issue of whether thirty days in a year are considered equivalent to a year. Rabbi Meir maintains that thirty days in a year are considered equivalent to a year, and therefore a girl aged two years and thirty days is already considered like a three-year-old and may be betrothed through intercourse. By contrast, the Rabbis contend that thirty days in a year are not considered equivalent to a year, and she may be betrothed through intercourse only upon reaching the age of three years and one day.
  The Gemara raises an objection against the explanation of Rabbi Yannai from a <i>baraita</i>: A girl who is three years old, and even one who is two years and one day old, is betrothed through intercourse; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She must be three years and one day old.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, just as there is a <i>tanna</i> who says that one day in a year is considered equivalent to a year, so too, there is a <i>tanna</i> who says that thirty days in a year are considered equivalent to a year.The <i>baraita</i> states that according to Rabbi Meir, a girl two years and one day old is considered like a three-year-old, following the opinion that one day in a year is equivalent to a full year. Similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that there is a second <i>tanna</i> who says that thirty days in a year are considered equivalent to a full year, and therefore a girl can be betrothed by intercourse from the age of two years and thirty days.
  But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, that Rabbi Meir requires a full three years, this <i>baraita</i> is difficult, as it explicitly states that in Rabbi Meir’s opinion even a girl aged two years and one day can be betrothed by intercourse. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this <i>baraita</i> is difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai.
  § The last clause of the mishna teaches that if the girl is less than that age, i.e., younger than three years and one day, the status of intercourse with her is like placing a finger into the eye. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What happens to this hymen, i.e., to the hymen of a girl under three with whom a man engaged in intercourse? Does it disappear and come back again later, or perhaps it is not removed at all until after she reaches the age of three?
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there in <i>halakha</i> between these two suggestions? The Gemara answers that there is a practical ramification in a case where a priest engaged in intercourse with a girl to whom he is married within her first three years, and found blood on her due to that intercourse, and again engaged in intercourse with her many times, including after she turned three, but on that occasion he did not find blood. If you say that after engaging in intercourse when the girl is younger than three, the hymen disappears and comes back again, here one can maintain that it disappeared due to the first time they engaged in intercourse and did not grow back because there was not enough time without intercourse for it to grow back.
  But if you say that the hymen is not removed at all until after she reaches the age of three, the fact that this girl did not emit blood after three years must be because another man engaged in intercourse with her after she turned three, in which case she is classified as a <i>zona</i>, a woman who has engaged in sexual intercourse with a man forbidden to her by the Torah, and is forbidden to her husband the priest. The Gemara reiterates: What, then, is the resolution of the dilemma?
  Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Ika, objects to this explanation of the practical ramifications of the dilemma: But even if one maintains that the hymen of a girl younger than three disappears and grows back, one can still contend that this girl engaged in intercourse with another man, as who will say to us that a wound that was inflicted within three years of a girl’s birth is not restored and healed immediately? Perhaps it is restored immediately, and this girl did not emit blood because another man engaged in intercourse with her previously, and she is therefore a <i>zona</i> who is forbidden to a priest.
  Rather, the practical difference between the two suggestions relates to a case where the husband engaged in intercourse with this girl within her first three years, and found blood, and engaged in intercourse with her again after she turned three, and again found blood. If you say that the hymen disappears and comes back again, this blood emitted when she is less than three years old is blood from the tearing of the hymen, which does not render her impure. But if you say that the hymen is not removed at all until after she reaches the age of three, then this blood she emitted when she was younger than three is menstrual blood, which renders her impure. What, then, is the resolution of the dilemma?
  Rav Ḥisda said: Come and hear the mishna: If the girl is less than that age of three years and one day, intercourse with her is like placing a finger into the eye. Why do I need the mishna to teach: Like placing a finger into the eye? Let it teach simply: If she is less than that age, intercourse with her is nothing. What, is it not correct that this is what the mishna teaches us, by its comparison to an eye: Just as placing a finger in an eye causes it to tear and tear again, when another finger is placed in it, so too after the intercourse of a girl under three the hymen disappears and comes back again?
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving a gentile woman called Yusteni, the daughter of Asveirus, son of Antoninus, a Roman emperor, who came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. She said to him: My teacher, at what age is a woman fit to marry, i.e., at what age is it appropriate for a woman to engage in intercourse, which would therefore be the appropriate time to marry? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to her: She must be at least three years and one day old.
  Yusteni further inquired: And at what age is she fit to become pregnant? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to her: When she is at least twelve years and one day old. She said to him: I married when I was six, and gave birth a year later, when I was seven. Woe for those three years, between the age of three, when I was fit for intercourse, and the age of six, when I married, as I wasted those years in my father’s house by not engaging in intercourse.
  The Gemara asks: And can a minor of that age become pregnant? But didn’t Rav Beivai teach a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Naḥman: Three women may engage in intercourse while using a contraceptive absorbent cloth, a soft fabric placed at the entrance to the womb to prevent conception, despite the fact that this practice generally is prohibited. They are a minor; a pregnant woman; and a nursing woman.
  The <i>baraita</i> specifies the reason for allowing these women to use contraceptive absorbent cloths: A minor, lest she become pregnant and perhaps die from this pregnancy; a pregnant woman, lest she be impregnated a second time and her older fetus become deformed into the shape of a sandal fish, by being squashed by the pressure of the second fetus; and a nursing woman, lest she become pregnant and her milk dry up, in which case she weans her son too early, thereby endangering him, and he dies.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And who is considered a minor? It is a girl from the age of eleven years and one day until the age of twelve years and one day. If she was younger than that or older than that, she may go ahead and engage in intercourse in her usual manner, i.e., without contraception. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Since it is assumed that a minor who is less than eleven years old cannot become pregnant, she is considered to be in no danger.
  And the Rabbis say: Both in this case of a minor girl who can become pregnant and in that case of a minor girl who cannot become pregnant, she may go ahead and engage in intercourse in her usual manner, and Heaven will have mercy upon her and prevent any mishap, as it is stated: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6). In light of the statement of Rabbi Meir, how could Yusteni have become pregnant at age seven?
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that Yusteni was able to become pregnant at such a young age because she was a gentile, and the verse states with regard to gentiles: “Their flesh is the flesh of donkeys” (Ezekiel 23:20). And if you wish, say instead that Yusteni was lying when she said she became pregnant at age seven, as it is stated with regard to gentiles: “Whose mouth speaks falsehood, and their right hand is a right hand of lying” (Psalms 144:8).
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving a certain woman who came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him: My teacher, I engaged in intercourse within three years of my birth; what is my status with regard to marrying into the priesthood? Rabbi Akiva said to her: You are fit to marry into the priesthood.
  She said to him: My teacher, I will tell you a parable; to what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a baby whose finger one forcibly dipped in honey. On the first time and the second time, he moans at his mother for doing so, but on the third occasion, once he is used to the taste of honey, he willingly sucks the finger dipped in honey. She was insinuating to Rabbi Akiva that she engaged in intercourse several times, and although the first couple of times were against her will, the third incident was with her consent. Rabbi Akiva said to her: If so, you are disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.
  Rabbi Akiva saw his students looking at each other, puzzling over this ruling. He said to them: Why is this matter difficult in your eyes? They said to him: Just as the entire Torah is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, so too this <i>halakha</i> of a girl who engaged in intercourse when she was less than three years old, i.e., that she is fit to marry into the priesthood, is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and it applies whether she engaged intercourse against her will or with her consent. The Gemara notes: And even Rabbi Akiva did not say to the woman that she was unfit to marry into the priesthood because that is the <i>halakha</i>; rather, he did so only to sharpen the minds of his students with his statement, to see how they would respond.
  MISHNA: In the case of a boy, nine years and one day old, whose brother had died childless, who engaged in intercourse with his <i>yevama</i>, his brother’s widow, the status of the intercourse is that of halakhic intercourse and he acquires her as his wife; but he cannot give her a bill of divorce, if he chooses to end the marriage, until he reaches majority.
  And he becomes ritually impure after engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman to the degree that he renders impure all the layers of bedding beneath him, such that they become impure like the upper bedding covering a <i>zav</i>. Accordingly, the bedding assumes first-degree ritual impurity status and does not become a primary source of ritual impurity, and it renders impure food and drink and does not render impure people and vessels.
  And if he is disqualified from the priesthood and the woman with whom he engages in intercourse is the daughter of a priest, he disqualifies her from partaking of <i>teruma</i>; but if he is a priest who marries an Israelite woman, he does not enable her to partake of <i>teruma</i>. And if he engages in bestiality, he disqualifies the animal from being sacrificed upon the altar, and the animal is stoned due to his act. And if he engaged in intercourse with one of all those with whom relations are forbidden, as stated in the Torah, e.g., his aunt or his mother, they are executed by the court due to having engaged in intercourse with him, because they are adults; but he is exempt, as he is a minor.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a boy aged nine years and one day cannot give his <i>yevama</i> a bill of divorce until he reaches majority. The Gemara asks: And even when he reaches majority, is a bill of divorce enough to enable her to marry any man? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Sages rendered the halakhic status of the act of intercourse of a boy nine years and one day old like that of levirate betrothal by means of money or a document performed by an adult man, which is an acquisition by rabbinic law? Accordingly, she is not his full-fledged wife.
  Therefore, one can assert as follows: Just as after a levirate betrothal performed by an adult man, the <i>yavam</i> must give the <i>yevama</i> a bill of divorce to release her from his levirate betrothal and perform <i>ḥalitza</i> to release her from his levirate bond, so too with regard to the intercourse of a boy nine years and one day old, the <i>halakha</i> should be that he must give her a bill of divorce for his levirate betrothal and perform <i>ḥalitza</i> to release her from his levirate bond.
  Rav said in response that this is what the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna is saying:
  
  Daf 45b
  
  When he reaches majority he may engage in intercourse with her, and thereby acquire her as his full-fledged wife, and if he wished to divorce her he can then give her a bill of divorce without having to perform <i>ḥalitza</i>.
  MISHNA: With regard to a girl who is eleven years and one day old, her vows are examined to ascertain whether she is aware of the meaning of her vow and in Whose name she vowed. Once she is twelve years and one day old and has grown two pubic hairs, which is a sign of adulthood, even without examination her vows are in effect. And one examines her vows throughout the entire twelfth year until her twelfth birthday.
  With regard to a boy who is twelve years and one day old, his vows are examined to ascertain whether he is aware of the meaning of his vow and in Whose name he vowed. Once he is thirteen years and one day old and has grown two pubic hairs, even without examination his vows are in effect. And one examines his vows throughout the entire thirteenth year until his thirteenth birthday.
  Prior to that time, eleven years and one day for a girl and twelve years and one day for a boy, even if they said: We know in Whose name we vowed and in Whose name we consecrated, their vow is not a valid vow and their consecration is not a valid consecration. After that time, twelve years and one day for a girl and thirteen years and one day for a boy, even if they said: We do not know in Whose name we vowed and in Whose name we consecrated, their vow is a valid vow and their consecration is a valid consecration.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But since the mishna teaches: With regard to a girl who is eleven years and one day old her vows are examined, why do I need the mishna to further state: Once she is twelve years and one day old her vows are in effect? After all, by this stage she is already an adult. The Gemara answers that this ruling is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that one examines her vows forever, even when she is an adult. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that the vows of an adult are valid even without examination.
  The Gemara further asks: And since the mishna teaches: Once she is twelve years and one day old her vows are in effect, why do I need it to further state: One examines her vows throughout the entire twelfth year? The Gemara answers that this ruling is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the Master says that thirty days in a year are considered equivalent to a year, in a case where we examine her for thirty days after she turned eleven and she did not know how to utter a vow properly, i.e., she did not have a clear understanding of the meaning of the vow, one might say that one should examine her no further until she reaches the age of twelve. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that she is examined throughout her twelfth year.
  The Gemara asks: And let the mishna teach only these two clauses: Once she is twelve years and one day old her vows are in effect, and one examines her vows throughout the entire twelfth year. Once both of these have been taught, why do I need the ruling: With regard to a girl who is eleven years and one day old, her vows are examined?
  The Gemara answers that this clause was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: In an ordinary case, a girl requires examination in her twelfth year, whereas in her eleventh year she does not require examination. But in a case where we discern about her that she has a very sharp mind, perhaps she should be examined already in her eleventh year. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that she is not examined in her eleventh year irrespective of how intelligent she is, as she is too young.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach that prior to that time their vows and consecration are always not valid and after that time they are always valid? These <i>halakhot</i> can be inferred from the previous statements of the mishna. The Gemara answers that these rulings are necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: These matters apply only in a case where they do not say: We know in Whose name we vowed, when they are younger than the periods mentioned in the mishna, or: We do not know in Whose name we vowed, when they are older. But in a case where they do say such statements, perhaps we rely on their claim. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that when they are younger than the periods stated in the mishna their vows are never valid, and when they are older, their vows are always valid.
  § The mishna indicates that the intellectual development of a girl is faster than that of a boy. In this regard, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This opinion, with regard to the periods of vows for girls and boys, is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. But Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says the opposite, that the matter stated here with regard to a girl is actually stated with regard to a boy, whereas the matter stated with regard to a boy is in fact stated with regard to a girl, as the intellectual development of males is faster than that of females.
  Rav Ḥisda said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? As it is written, with regard to the creation of woman: “And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, He made [<i>vayyiven</i>] a woman, and brought her to the man” (Genesis 2:22). This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, granted a woman a greater understanding [<i>bina</i>] than that of a men.
  The Gemara asks: And what does the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, derive from this verse? The Gemara answers: He requires that verse for that which Reish Lakish taught, as Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya with regard to the verse: “And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, He made a woman, and brought her to the man.” This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, braided the hair of Eve, and then brought her to Adam the first man. As in the cities overseas [<i>bikhrakei hayyam</i>] they call braiding hair, building [<i>benayita</i>].
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, what is the reason that he maintains that the intellectual development of males is faster than that of females? Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: Since a boy frequents his teacher’s house, cleverness enters his mind first.
  § The mishna teaches that there are three periods in the development of girls and boys: When their vows are examined, i.e., the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy, which will be termed below: During the time; the period beforehand, when their vows are entirely invalid, called: Before the time; and after that period, when their vows are always valid, known as: After the time. But the mishna does not address the issue of their physical development during these periods, with regard to the appearance of two pubic hairs. In this regard, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a boy or girl developed pubic hairs during the time, is this year considered like the development of signs indicating puberty before the time that the child reaches majority, and therefore they are not treated as signs indicating puberty, or is it considered as after the time?
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this dilemma raised? If it is with regard to vows, the development of pubic hairs is not considered as before the time, but it is not considered as after the time either. Instead, the status of the vow is determined in accordance with the examination of the child’s understanding, as stated in the mishna.
  Rather, the dilemma is raised with regard to punishments, i.e., whether such a boy or girl is punished like an adult for violating the prohibitions of the Torah. What, then, is the <i>halakha</i>? The Sages disagree. Rav and Rabbi Ḥanina both say: The development of pubic hairs during that time is considered as before the time, and therefore the boy or girl is not liable to receive punishment for his or her actions. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi both say: The development of pubic hairs during that time is considered as after the time, and they are punished.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: And your mnemonic, to remember which Sages said which ruling, is the verse: “Now this [<i>vezot</i>] was the custom in former times in Israel” (Ruth 4:7). The Sage whose name has a feminine form like the word <i>vezot</i>, namely, Rav Ḥanina, maintains that the development of pubic hairs during the time is considered as before the time, like the former times mentioned in the verse.
  Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from the mishna: After that time, twelve years and one day for a girl and thirteen years and one day for a boy, even if they say: We do not know in Whose name we vowed and in Whose name we consecrated, their vow is a valid vow and their consecration is a valid consecration. Rav Hamnuna infers from this ruling that if they issued this statement during the time, it is considered as before the time, even if they had developed two hairs.
  Rava said to Rav Hamnuna, in rejection of this proof: Say the former clause in the mishna: Prior to that time, eleven years and one day for a girl and twelve years and one day for a boy, even if they said: We know in Whose name we vowed and in Whose name we consecrated, their vow is not a valid vow and their consecration is not a valid consecration. One can infer the opposite from here, that if they issued this statement during the time, it is considered as after the time.
  The Gemara responds: And that is not so, as Rava erred. He thought that Rav Hamnuna inferred from the superfluous statement of the mishna, i.e., that the clause Rav Hamnuna cites is unnecessary for the <i>halakha</i> it states, which is why Rav Hamnuna inferred his conclusion from it. And therefore Rava responded that rather than inferring from the latter clause of the mishna that if the boy or girl claims not to know in Whose name he or she vowed during the time, it is considered as before the time, let him infer from the former clause that it is considered as after the time, as Rava demonstrated.
  The Gemara continues: But it is not so; rather, Rav Hamnuna inferred that it is considered as before the time from the statement of the mishna itself, without assuming that it is superfluous, as follows: In that mention in the mishna of: After that time, what are the circumstances? If it is referring to a case where the boy has not yet developed two pubic hairs, he is a minor. Rather, is it not referring to a case where the boy has developed two pubic hairs,
  
  Daf 46a
  
  and the reason that the development of two hairs renders him an adult is that the onset of his matter, i.e., his reaching puberty, was completed for him after the time? Rav Hamnuna infers from here that if the child developed two hairs during the time, it is considered as before the time, and he or she is not classified as an adult.
  And furthermore, Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to the opinion that the development of signs indicating puberty during the time is equivalent to their development after the time. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> which deals with the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When either man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2). What is the meaning when the verse states “man,” after it has already stated “the children of Israel”? This serves to include anyone who is thirteen years and one day old, that even if he does not know how to utter clearly and articulate the meaning of his statements, his vows are in effect.
  Rabbi Zeira analyzes this <i>baraita</i>. What are the circumstances? If it is referring to a case where the boy has not yet developed two pubic hairs, then he is a minor, and the <i>halakha</i> with regard to him cannot be derived from the word “man.” Rather, is it not referring to a case where the boy has developed two pubic hairs? And by inference, the reason that he is considered a man due to his development of pubic hairs is that he is thirteen years and one day old, but if the boy developed two hairs during the time, it is considered as before the time. The Gemara concludes: This is indeed a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi that developing pubic hairs during the time is equivalent to developing hairs after the time.
  Rav Naḥman said that the <i>baraita</i> is not a refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as this matter is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, since there is another <i>baraita</i> which teaches the following: Everyone agrees with regard to a nine-year-old boy who developed two hairs that this is not considered a sign of puberty, as they are treated as hairs that grow on a mole. From nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day, even if the hairs have not fallen out, this is still considered a mole. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: At this stage it is a sign indicating puberty. If he is thirteen years and one day old and has grown two hairs, all agree that it is a sign indicating puberty.
  Rav Naḥman analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. This <i>baraita</i> itself is difficult, as you initially said that from nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day it is a mole, from which it can be inferred that if he developed two pubic hairs in the thirteenth year itself, it is a sign indicating puberty. And then the <i>baraita</i> teaches that if he is thirteen years and one day old and has grown two hairs, this is a sign indicating puberty, which indicates that if he developed the hairs in the thirteenth year itself, it is a mole.
  Rav Naḥman concludes: What, is it not correct to say that there is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as one Sage, the <i>tanna</i> who states the first line of the <i>baraita</i>, holds that during that time is considered as after the time, and one Sage, the <i>tanna</i> of the last line of the <i>baraita</i>, holds that during that time is considered as before the time? If so, the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is one side of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone, i.e., the <i>tanna’im</i> of both clauses of the <i>baraita</i>, agrees that during that time is considered as before the time, and this clause and that clause of the <i>baraita</i> are both referring to a young girl. And the difference between them is that the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that the thirteenth year for a female is considered after the time, and therefore the development of two pubic hairs at this stage is a sign of maturation; and the last clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that the thirteenth year for a female is considered before the time.
  And if you wish, say that this clause and that clause are both dealing with a young boy, and the first clause is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the last clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that the thirteenth year for a boy is considered before the time.
  And if you wish, say that both this clause and that clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the difference between them is that this last clause of the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a young boy, whereas that first clause is referring to a young girl. And if you wish, say that both this clause and that clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and that first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a young boy, whereas this last clause is referring to a young girl.
  The <i>baraita</i> further teaches that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says with regard to hairs from nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day, that it is a sign indicating puberty. In explanation of this opinion, Rabbi Keruspedai, son of Rabbi Shabbtai, says: And this is the <i>halakha</i> only when the hairs are still upon him, i.e., they had not fallen out when he reached the age of puberty, as otherwise they are considered a mole.
  The Gemara notes that this opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a boy nine years and one day old who developed two hairs, this is considered a mole. If the boy is from nine years of age until the age of twelve years and one day, and the hairs are still upon him, it is still considered a mole. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: It is a sign indicating puberty.
  § In summary of the rulings cited above, Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> is that the development of two hairs during the time is considered as before the time, and it does not render one an adult. Rav Shmuel bar Zutra teaches this <i>halakha</i> of Rava in this formulation: Rava says: With regard to a minor girl whose father has passed away and whose mother or brothers accepted betrothal on her behalf, a form of betrothal instituted by the Sages, throughout her entire twelfth year she has the continuous right to perform refusal with regard to this marriage and thereby annul it. From that point forward, when she is already an adult, she may no longer perform refusal, and she may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with the brother of her husband, if he died without children.
  The Gemara asks: This statement of Rava itself is difficult: You first said that once she is twelve she may not perform refusal. Evidently, she is an adult woman. But if she is an adult woman, let her perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, like any other adult woman.
  And if you would say that Rava is uncertain whether a twelve-year-old girl is presumed to have developed two hairs and is therefore an adult, or whether it is presumed that she has not yet grown two hairs and remains a minor, and consequently he is stringent on both counts, that she may not perform refusal, like an adult, but she may also not perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, like a minor, this suggestion is problematic, as is Rava actually uncertain in this regard? But doesn’t Rava say: A minor girl who reached her full age of maturity, i.e., twelve years and one day, does not require examination to determine whether she has grown two hairs, as there is a presumption that she has developed signs indicating puberty.
  The Gemara answers that this statement, that it is presumed that a twelve-year-old girl has developed two hairs, applies only in an ordinary situation. But here Rava is referring to a case where they examined her and did not find hairs. In such an instance, Rava did not say that the presumption is in effect.
  The Gemara asks: If so, that she was actually examined, she should be considered a minor in all regards and she should be able to perform refusal. The Gemara answers: We are concerned that perhaps the girl had already developed pubic hairs but they fell out. Consequently, although the girl is not treated with the presumption that she is an adult, she does not have the certain status of a minor either, and cannot perform refusal.
  The Gemara objects: This works out well according to the one who says that we are concerned that the pubic hairs fell out. But according to the one who says that we are not concerned that they have fallen out, what is there to say? As it was stated that <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to this matter. Rav Pappa says: We are not concerned that perhaps the pubic hairs fell out; Rav Pappi says: We are concerned that they might have fallen out. The Gemara answers that this statement of Rav Pappa, that there is no concern that perhaps the pubic hairs fell out, applies only with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>, but with regard to refusal everyone agrees that we are concerned that they might have fallen out.
  The Gemara asks: By inference, does the one who says that we are concerned that perhaps the hairs fell out maintain that this twelve-year-old performs <i>ḥalitza</i>? But this cannot be correct, as he says that we are merely concerned that the hairs might have fallen out, not that this is certainly the case. How, then, can she perform <i>ḥalitza</i> like an adult?
  Rather, Rava is actually referring to a case where one did not examine the girl, and with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i> we are concerned that she might not have developed hairs and is still a minor. And when Rava said that there is a presumption that a twelve-year-old has developed signs indicating puberty, he was referring to refusal, but with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i> she requires examination.
  With regard to the issue of whether there is concern that hairs might have fallen out, Rav Dimi of Neharde’a said: The <i>halakha</i> is that if a girl reached the age of twelve and she was examined and the signs of puberty were not found, we are concerned that perhaps the pubic hairs fell out. Consequently, if her mother or brothers had accepted betrothal for her when she was a minor, she cannot perform refusal at that stage.
  The Gemara adds: And this statement applies only in a case where her husband betrothed her during the time, before she reached the age of twelve years and one day, and engaged in intercourse with her after the time, when she was already twelve years and one day old. This is a situation where there is an uncertainty with regard to Torah law, since if she had developed two hairs and is an adult, the marriage applies by Torah law, due to the intercourse. But if he engaged in intercourse with her only at the outset, before she turned twelve, there is no concern that perhaps she developed pubic hairs and they fell out, as this marriage applies by rabbinic law.
  § With regard to a minor who vowed, Rav Huna says: If the minor is aware of the meaning of his vow and in Whose name he or she vowed, and the minor’s age is during the time, i.e., the twelfth year for a girl or the thirteenth year for a boy, and he consecrated an item of food and subsequently ate it, he is flogged, which is the punishment for one who eats consecrated food.
  Rav Huna explains: As it is stated: “When either a man or a woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), from which it is derived that if one on the brink of adulthood is able to articulate that his vow is in the name of God, his vows are valid. And another verse states: “He shall not profane his word” (Numbers 30:3). This indicates that any person who is included in explicitness of intent is also included in the prohibition: “He shall not profane his word,” and anyone who is not included in explicitness of intent is not included in the prohibition: “He shall not profane his word.”
  Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection to Rava, in support of the opinion of Rav Huna:
  
  Daf 46b
  
  Since we find that the verse equates a minor, i.e., one on the brink of adulthood, to an adult with regard to an intentional violation of an oath and with regard to a vow of prohibition, where one renders an item prohibited to himself through a vow, and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, one might have thought that this minor, like an adult, should also be liable to bring an offering for misuse of his consecrated property, e.g., if he ate an item that he consecrated.
  Therefore, the verse states with regard to vows: “This is the matter which the Lord has commanded. When a man vows a vow to the Lord, or takes an oath” (Numbers 30:2–3). The emphasis of “this” indicates that it is only with regard to this matter, i.e., prohibitions resulting from vows, that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult, but he is not rendered liable to bring an offering for his misuse.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult with regard to a vow of prohibition and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, which indicates that he is liable for violating this prohibition. This supports the opinion of Rav Huna that a minor is flogged for eating food he consecrated. The Gemara refutes this proof: There is room to say that the word: And, in the phrase: With regard to a vow of prohibition and with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, should be omitted, and the <i>baraita</i> is comparing a minor to an adult with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, but it does not indicate that he is liable to receive lashes for violating this prohibition.
  The Gemara asks: Can the <i>baraita</i> actually mean that a minor is compared to an adult with regard to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, but he is not flogged? Whichever way you look at it, this is problematic: If a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, he should be flogged too, for his violation. And if a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is not considered an adult by Torah law, there is no prohibition violated here either. The Gemara answers that according to the <i>baraita</i> the prohibition does not apply to the minor himself, but to those who are warned to keep him away from the prohibited item.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that if a minor eats meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses or violates other prohibitions, the court is commanded to prevent him from doing so. This is problematic, as elsewhere it is stated that this matter is subject to dispute (see <i>Yevamot</i> 114a). The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a case where the minor consecrated the food item and others ate it. They are liable to receive lashes for their consumption, but if he ate it he is not liable.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: This works out well according to the one who said that if a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, they are flogged. But according to the one who said that in such a case they are not flogged, what can be said? As it was stated that <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to this issue: If a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, Rav Kahana says that they are not flogged; Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that they are flogged.
  The Gemara therefore reverts to the interpretation that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the prohibition of he shall not profane his word, not the punishment for violation of the vow. And the reason lashes are not administered is that the prohibition is by rabbinic law. And as for the verse mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, when it states that the verse equates a minor to an adult, which indicates that it is dealing with Torah law, this verse is a mere support for a rabbinic law.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself, i.e., the dispute cited above. If a minor consecrated a food item and others ate it, Rav Kahana says that they are not flogged; Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that they are flogged. With regard to what principle do these Sages disagree? One Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, holds that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, which is why others are liable for eating an item he consecrated; and one Sage, Rav Kahana, holds that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by rabbinic law.
  Rav Yirmeya raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a minor girl who is an orphan from her father and her mother or brothers accepted betrothal on her behalf, who vowed, her husband may nullify her vow, like any other husband, despite the fact that this marriage is valid merely by rabbinic law. Rav Yirmeya analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: Granted, if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by rabbinic law, one can explain that a husband whose marriage is by rabbinic law comes and negates a vow that also applies by rabbinic law. But if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is considered an adult by Torah law, can a husband whose marriage is by rabbinic law come and negate a vow that applies by Torah law?
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Her husband may nullify her vows, whichever way you look at it: If the validity of the vows of such a minor applies by rabbinic law, the husband may nullify her vows, as the validity of their marriage is likewise by rabbinic law. And if the validity of a vow by a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is by Torah law, which means she would be violating a Torah prohibition, this is the same as the case of a minor who may eat meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses or violate other prohibitions, and the court or any other adult, including her husband in this case, is not commanded to prevent him from doing so,and it does not matter if his nullification was not effective.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is still concern for a violation, as when she grows and becomes an adult she will eat the food that she rendered forbidden to herself, relying on the initial nullification of her vow by her husband, which was not valid. At that stage she is an adult, whom the court is certainly commanded to prevent from violating prohibitions.
  Rabba bar Livai said that this is not a concern, as her husband nullifies her vows each and every moment, and therefore when she reaches majority he will nullify her vow in a manner that is valid by Torah law. And this is the <i>halakha</i>, that the nullification takes effect by Torah law, only in a case where her husband engaged in intercourse with her after she became an adult, thereby rendering their marriage valid by Torah law.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But there is a principle that a husband cannot nullify vows of his wife that preceded their marriage; and as she is considered his wife by Torah law only when she becomes an adult, her vow when she was a minor preceded their marriage. The Gemara answers that he can still nullify her vow, in accordance with the statement of Rav Pineḥas in the name of Rava, as Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava: Any woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Since the minor was married by rabbinic law, she vowed on the condition that her husband should agree to her vow, and therefore the nullification is valid by Torah law.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the validity of the vows of a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood. Abaye said: Come and hear a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 1:3): With regard to a minor who has not grown two hairs, Rabbi Yehuda says: His <i>teruma</i> is not valid <i>teruma</i>. Rabbi Yosei says: Until he has reached the age of vows, i.e., when he does not yet have the status of a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood, his <i>teruma</i> is not valid <i>teruma</i>, but once he has reached the age of vows, his <i>teruma</i> is <i>teruma</i>.
  The Sages assumed that Rabbi Yosei holds that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by Torah law. They therefore objected: Granted, if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is an adult by Torah law, one can understand that one who is a man by Torah law with regard to vows can come and prepare untithed produce [<i>tivla</i>] for consumption by tithing it, which also applies by Torah law. But if you say that a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood is an adult by rabbinic law, can one who is a man by rabbinic law come and prepare untithed produce, which is prohibited by Torah law? The Gemara refutes this proof: No, perhaps Rabbi Yosei holds that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by rabbinic law, and this is why he rules that a minor on the brink of adulthood can set aside <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by rabbinic law? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the anthology called <i>Seder Olam</i>: The verse that states with regard to the Jewish people’s return to Eretz Yisrael following their exile: “And the Lord your God will bring you into the land that your fathers possessed, and you shall possess it” (Deuteronomy 30:5).
  These two expressions of possession indicate that the Jewish people had a first possession of Eretz Yisrael in the days of Joshua, when Eretz Yisrael was first sanctified with regard to the obligation of its mitzvot, and they had a second possession at the time of Ezra and the return of the Babylonian exile. In other words, the sanctity of the land lapsed when the First Temple was destroyed and the Jews were exiled to Babylonia, and therefore a second sanctification was necessary when they returned to their land. But they will not have a third possession. That is, it will never be necessary to sanctify the land a third time, as the second sanctification was permanent.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> that taught <i>Seder Olam</i>? Rabbi Yosei. Since Rabbi Yosei maintains that the second sanctification of Eretz Yisrael did not lapse even after the destruction of the Second Temple, he must also maintain that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by Torah law.
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei taught <i>Seder Olam</i> but he does not maintain in accordance with its ruling here. The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable that this is so, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to non-sacred dough that became mixed with <i>teruma</i> dough, or which was leavened with leaven of <i>teruma</i>,
  
  Daf 47a
  
  it is subject to the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i>, the portion of the dough designated for the priest. And although <i>teruma</i> fell into it, that produce does not have the status of <i>teruma</i>, as the <i>teruma</i> was nullified by a majority of non-sacred produce. Consequently, it is not rendered unfit for consumption, i.e., rendered ritually impure, by one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for his purification process to be completed. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon deem the dough exempt from the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i>, as this obligation does not apply to <i>teruma</i>, and the entire dough is exempt due to the mixture of <i>teruma</i> it contains.
  The Sages assumed that the one who said that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by Torah law maintains that <i>ḥalla</i> likewise applies in the present by Torah law, whereas the one who said that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by rabbinic law holds that <i>ḥalla</i> also applies by rabbinic law. If so, granted, if you say that Rabbi Yosei holds that <i>ḥalla</i> in the present applies by rabbinic law, one can understand that a mixture which has the status of <i>teruma</i> by rabbinic law comes and abrogates the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i>, which also applies by rabbinic law.
  But if you say that <i>ḥalla</i> in the present applies by Torah law, can a mixture that has the status of <i>teruma</i> by rabbinic law come and abrogate the mitzva of <i>ḥalla</i> which is by Torah law? Evidently, according to Rabbi Yosei the obligation of separating <i>ḥalla</i> in the present is by rabbinic law, and therefore <i>teruma</i> likewise applies by rabbinic law. If so, Rabbi Yosei does not agree with the opinion he cites in <i>Seder Olam</i>, according to which <i>teruma</i> applies in the present by Torah law.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps Rabbi Yosei maintains that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by Torah law and yet <i>ḥalla</i> applies by rabbinic law, and therefore the mixture discussed in the above <i>baraita</i>, which has the status of <i>teruma</i> by Torah law, abrogates the obligation of <i>ḥalla</i>, which is by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara adds: And this answer is as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, responded to the statement of the other Sages. As Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: I once found the Sages of the study hall of Rav sitting and saying: Even according to the one who said that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by rabbinic law, the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> is by Torah law.
  The reason is that during the seven years that the Jewish people conquered Eretz Yisrael led by Joshua and during the seven years that they divided the land, they were obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i> but they were not obligated to separate <i>teruma</i> and tithe. In the present as well, although there is no obligation to set aside <i>teruma</i> in Eretz Yisrael by Torah law, the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> applies by Torah law.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, continued: And I said to them: On the contrary, even according to the one who said that <i>teruma</i> in the present applies by Torah law, the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> applies by rabbinic law, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>: “When you come into the land where I bring you…from the first of your dough you shall set apart a cake for a gift” (Numbers 15:18–20). If the obligation applies “when you come” into the land, one might have thought that it took effect from the moment that two or three spies entered the land. Therefore the verse states: “When you come,” from which it is derived that the Torah is saying: I said that the obligation applies when all of you come, and not when some of you come.
  According to this <i>baraita</i>, the separation of <i>ḥalla</i> is an obligation by Torah law only when the entire Jewish people come to Eretz Yisrael. And when Ezra brought the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael at the beginning of the Second Temple period, not all of them ascended. Since the majority of the Jewish people stayed behind, separating <i>ḥalla</i> was not restored to the status of an obligation by Torah law.
  MISHNA: The Sages stated a parable based on the development of the fruit of a fig tree with regard to the three stages of development in a woman: Minority, young womanhood, and grown womanhood. An unripe fig, a ripening fig, and a ripe fig. An unripe fig represents the stage when she is still a child and has not yet developed the signs of puberty; a ripening fig represents the days of her young womanhood, when she reaches twelve years and one day and has developed two pubic hairs.
  With regard to the periods both during this stage, minority, and during that stage, young womanhood, the Sages said that her father is entitled to any lost object that she finds that cannot be returned to its owner, and to her earnings, and to nullification of her vows. A ripe fig represents the stage of grown womanhood: Once she has reached her majority, her father no longer has authority over her. He can no longer nullify her vows, and he does not have a claim to lost objects found by her and her earnings belong to her.
  What are the signs that indicate grown womanhood? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Grown womanhood begins from when her breast grows sufficiently so that a fold appears below the breast. Rabbi Akiva says: It begins from when the breasts sag onto the chest. Ben Azzai says: It begins from when the areola at the tip of the breast darkens. Rabbi Yosei says: It begins when the breasts have developed to a size where a person places his hand on the nipple and it depresses and slows to return.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that an unripe fig [<i>paga</i>] represents the stage when a woman is still a child. The Gemara explains that the meaning of the word <i>paga</i> is as it is written: “The fig tree puts forth her green fruits [<i>fageha</i>]” (Song of Songs 2:13). The mishna further teaches that a ripening fig [<i>boḥal</i>] represents the days of her young womanhood. The Gemara explains that the meaning of this word is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 1:2): The obligation of tithes applies to the figs from when they begin to ripen [<i>misheyyibaḥalu</i>]; and Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rav says that this means from when the heads of the figs whiten.
  The Gemara adds: And if you wish, say instead that the source is from here: “For My soul became impatient of them, and their soul also grew in disgust [<i>baḥala</i>] toward Me” (Zechariah 11:8). The verse indicates that this word denotes growth. As for the third term in the mishna, a ripe fig [<i>tzemel</i>], it is as one would say: A fruit has come forth complete [<i>yatzeta mele’a</i>].
  § The mishna teaches: And what are the signs that indicate grown womanhood? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Grown womanhood begins from when her breast grows sufficiently so that a fold appears below the breast. Shmuel says: This does not literally mean from when her breast grows sufficiently so that a permanent fold appears below the breast. Rather, it means that the breast has grown enough so that if she were to stretch her hand behind her back, it would appear as though her breast has grown sufficiently that there is a fold below the breast.
  The Gemara relates that Shmuel examined these stages in his Canaanite maidservant, and subsequently gave her four dinars as payment for her humiliation. The Gemara notes that in this regard Shmuel conforms to his line of reasoning, as Shmuel said that the verse: “You may enslave them forever” (Leviticus 25:46) teaches: I gave them to you for the service of slaves, but not for humiliation. Consequently, if a master humiliated his Canaanite slave, he must pay him damages.
  The Gemara further relates, with regard to the attitude toward maidservants, that Shmuel would designate a particular slave for each of his maidservants for intercourse, and he would not allow his slaves to engage in intercourse with whichever maidservant they chose. By contrast, Rav Naḥman would exchange his maidservants between his slaves, while Rav Sheshet handed his maidservants to an Arab, and said to them: You may engage in intercourse with whomever you choose, but take care not to engage in intercourse with a Jew.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: Grown womanhood begins when the breasts have developed to a size where if a person places his hand on the nipple [<i>oketz</i>] it depresses and slows to return. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>oketz</i>? Shmuel said: It means the protrusion [<i>oketz</i>] of the breast, i.e., the nipple.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What are the signs of maturity? Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: From when the breasts knock against each other, due to their size. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: From when the head of the protrusion in the center of the nipple darkens. The Gemara asks with regard to this suggestion: From when it darkens? One thereby renders her old, i.e., if one accepts this sign, the beginning of maturity is delayed significantly. Rather, Rav Ashi said: From when the head of the protrusion splits. Rabbi Yosei says: From when the nipple grows to such an extent that it is surrounded by a circle. Rabbi Shimon says: From when there is a softening
  
  Daf 47b
  
  of the protuberance above the womb, the mons pubis.
  And Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would likewise say: The Sages provided three signs indicating puberty in a woman below, i.e., near her vagina, and they stated three corresponding signs above. If a woman has the signs of an unripe fig above, it is known that she has not grown two pubic hairs; if she has the signs of a ripening fig above, it is known that she has grown two hairs; and if she has the signs of a ripe fig above, it is known that the protuberance has softened.
  The Gemara asks: What is this protuberance? Rav Huna says: There is a swollen place in a woman’s body, above that place, a euphemism for the vagina. It is initially hard, but when a girl grows it increasingly softens. The Sages asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: With regard to the signs of maturity in woman, in accordance with whose statement is the <i>halakha</i>? He sent them in response: The <i>halakha</i> is stringent in accordance with all of their statements, i.e., if any one of these signs mentioned by the Sages cited above appears in a girl, she must be treated as an adult with regard to all stringent aspects of this classification.
  Rav Pappa and Rav Ḥinnana, son of Rav Ika, disagree about the context of this statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that the <i>halakha</i> is stringent in accordance with all of the Sages’ statements. One of them teaches it with regard to this matter, of a woman’s signs of puberty, and the other one teaches it with regard to the case of a Tyrian courtyard, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 3:5): What is a Tyrian courtyard, which renders food brought inside it to be required to be tithed? Rabbi Shimon says: A Tyrian courtyard is one inside of which vessels are safe.
  The Sages discuss this mishna: What is the meaning of a Tyrian courtyard? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The courtyard is called by this name as the custom in the city of Tyre is to place a watchman at the entrance of the courtyard to guard the articles inside. Consequently, any courtyard in which vessels are safe is called a Tyrian courtyard. Rabbi Akiva says: In any courtyard where there is no permanent watchman who locks and unlocks it, but rather one of its residents opens the courtyard and another one locks it, e.g., a courtyard shared by several partners, each of whom can do as he chooses without asking the other, the produce inside it is exempt from the obligation of separating tithe, as such a courtyard is not considered one in which vessels are safe.
  Rabbi Neḥemya says: Any courtyard which is hidden from the gaze of outsiders, and therefore a person is not ashamed to eat inside it, that courtyard renders produce inside it obligated to have tithe separated from it. Rabbi Yosei says: Any courtyard that one who does not live there can enter it, and the residents do not say to him: What do you want here, produce inside such a courtyard is exempt from tithe.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: If there are two courtyards, one within the other, positioned in such a manner that the residents of the inner courtyard cannot enter their houses without passing through the outer courtyard, whereas the residents of the outer courtyard do not traverse the inner one, the inner courtyard renders any produce located inside it obligated to have tithe separated from it, but produce located in the outer courtyard is exempt from tithe. It is not safe, as residents of a different courtyard pass freely through it.
  According to the opinion of one of the <i>amora’im</i> mentioned above, i.e., either Rav Pappa or Rav Ḥinnana, son of Rav Ika, it was with regard to this issue that the Sages asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: In accordance with whose statement is the <i>halakha</i>? He said to them: The <i>halakha</i> is stringent in accordance with all of the Sages’ statements. In other words, with regard to any courtyard in which produce must be tithed according to any of these opinions, the <i>halakha</i> is that tithe must be separated from this produce.
  MISHNA: A girl twelve years and one day old who grew two pubic hairs is classified as a young woman. Six months later, she becomes a grown woman. But a woman who is twenty years old who did not grow two pubic hairs and was never classified as a young woman shall bring proof that she is twenty years old, and from that point forward she assumes the status of a sexually underdeveloped woman [<i>ailonit</i>], who is incapable of bearing children. If she married and her husband died childless, she neither performs <i>ḥalitza</i> nor does she enter into levirate marriage, as the mitzva of levirate marriage applies only to a woman capable of conceiving a child. An <i>ailonit</i> is excluded from that mitzva.
  In the case of a man who is twenty years old who did not grow two pubic hairs, they shall bring proof that he is twenty years old and he assumes the status of a sexually underdeveloped man [<i>saris</i>], who is excluded from the mitzva of levirate marriage. Therefore, if his married brother dies childless, he neither performs <i>ḥalitza</i> nor enters into levirate marriage with his <i>yevama</i>. This is the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: For both this case of a woman and that case of a man, they shall bring proof that they are eighteen years old, and they assume the status of a sexually underdeveloped woman and man respectively.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: The status of the male is determined in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, i.e., he assumes the status of a sexually underdeveloped man at the age of twenty; and the status of the female is determined in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, i.e., she assumes the status of a sexually underdeveloped woman at the age of eighteen. The reason is that the woman is quick to reach physical maturity, and reaches that stage before the man reaches physical maturity.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a sexually underdeveloped man does not enter into levirate marriage with the widow of his childless brother. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another mishna (<i>Yevamot</i> 96b): A boy who is nine years and one day old, who has not developed two hairs, and a man who is twenty years old who has not grown two hairs, are one and the same to me with regard to levirate marriage, in that if they engaged in intercourse with the widow of their childless brother, this levirate marriage is partially effective, to the extent that this woman requires both a bill of divorce and <i>ḥalitza</i>.
  Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says that Rav says in explanation of the ruling of the mishna here: And this <i>halakha</i> applies only in a case where he developed physical signs of a sexually underdeveloped man (see <i>Yevamot</i> 80b) by the age of twenty. By contrast, the mishna in <i>Yevamot</i> is referring to one who did not develop signs of a sexually underdeveloped man. Rava said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: And he is a sexually underdeveloped man, which indicates that he had already developed physical signs of such a condition. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that this is the correct interpretation of the mishna.
  The Gemara asks a question with regard to the <i>halakha</i> itself: And in a case where he does not develop the signs of a sexually underdeveloped man, until what age is he considered a minor? Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: Until most of his years have passed, i.e., until he reaches the age of thirty-five, halfway to seventy, which is the standard length of a person’s life.
  The Gemara relates: When people would come before Rabbi Ḥiyya to inquire about someone who had reached the age of puberty but had not yet developed the physical signs of maturity, if the person in question was thin, he would say to them: Go and fatten him up before we decide on his status. If he was fat, Rabbi Ḥiyya would say to them: Go and make him thin. As these signs indicating puberty sometimes come due to thinness and sometimes they come due to fatness. It is therefore possible that after his bodily shape is properly adjusted this individual will develop the signs indicating puberty and will not have the status of a sexually underdeveloped man.
  § Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> in this entire chapter with regard to all of the places where an age is mentioned in years is that even when the phrase: And one day, is not explicitly noted, they are all calculated from the time of year of birth until that same time of year in the age specified. And Ulla said: With regard to cases where we learned in the mishna a quantity of years including the phrase: And one day, we learned that the reference is to full years; and with regard to cases where we did not learn this phrase, i.e., where a quantity of years is mentioned in the mishna without the phrase: And one day, we did not learn it, and part of the final year is equivalent to a whole year.
  The Gemara discusses these two opinions. Granted, according to Ulla, this is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> teaches there, in previous <i>mishnayot</i> (44b, 45a, 45b): And one day; and here, in this mishna, the <i>tanna</i> does not teach this phrase. But according to Rav, let the <i>tanna</i> be consistent and teach this phrase in all cases, including the mishna here.
  And furthermore, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of a sexually underdeveloped man and a sexually underdeveloped woman: The twentieth year, of which thirty days have passed, i.e., from the age of nineteen and thirty days, is considered like the twentieth year in all regards; and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi similarly issued a practical ruling of <i>halakha</i> in the city of Lod, that the eighteenth year of which thirty days have passed is considered like the eighteenth year in all regards.
  Granted, according to the opinion of Ulla, it is not difficult that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is referring to the eighteenth year whereas Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar discusses the twentieth year, as this statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai with regard to the age of a sexually underdeveloped woman, and that statement of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. But according to the opinion of Rav, who maintains that full years are required for a sexually underdeveloped man or woman, this <i>baraita</i> poses a difficulty.
  The Gemara answers that this matter is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, and Rav maintains in accordance with the opinion that full years are required. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Full years are required with regard to the period of one year stated with regard to sacrificial animals, e.g., “a lamb in its first year” (Leviticus 12:6); the one year stated with regard to houses of walled cities, during which one can redeem a house he has sold in a walled city (see Leviticus 25:29); and the two years stated with regard to an ancestral field, during which one cannot yet redeem an ancestral field he has sold (see Leviticus 25:15).
  The six years stated with regard to a Hebrew slave (see Exodus 21:2) and similarly the years of a son and of a daughter, as will be explained, all of these are years from the time of the first year until that same time of year in the year specified, i.e., these periods are units of whole years instead of expiring on predetermined dates, as at the end of the calendar year. This supports the opinion of Rav that the years mentioned with regard to a sexually underdeveloped man or woman are full years.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one year stated with regard to sacrificial animals is calculated by whole years and not by calendar years? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said that the verse states: “A lamb in its first year” (Leviticus 12:6). Since the verse does not state: A one-year-old lamb, it means a year based on calculation of its life, and not a year of the universal count, i.e., the calendar year.
  The Gemara further asks: From where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> that the one year stated with regard to houses of walled cities is calculated by a whole year and not by calendar year? The verse states: “Then he may redeem it within a whole year after it is sold, for a full year he shall have the right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:29). The verse is referring to a year counted from the day of its own sale, and not the year of the universal count. From where do we derive that the two years stated with regard to an ancestral field are whole years? The verse states: “According the number of years after the Jubilee you shall buy from your neighbor, and according to the number
  
  Daf 48a
  
  of years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15). The plural form of both “years” and “crops” indicates that the number of years does not necessarily correspond to the quantity of crops. Consequently, sometimes you might sell three yields of crops in two years. If one purchases a field in the summer, when the produce has not yet been harvested, and he harvests that yield and subsequently grows and harvests two more crops before the completion of the whole two years, he will have gained three yields in less than two years.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> that the six years stated with regard to a Hebrew slave is calculated by whole years? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “Six years he shall work, and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing” (Exodus 21:2). The word “and” in the phrase “and in the seventh” indicates that he shall also work in the seventh calendar year, if six full years have not passed since he was sold. For example, if he was sold in the month of Nisan, it means that five years and six months have passed when Tishrei, the first month of the seventh year, arrives; he has not yet completed six years of service, and he must work in this seventh calendar year as well, until the date on which he was sold.
  The <i>baraita</i> mentions the years of a son and of a daughter among those calculated as full years. The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this stated? Rav Giddel says that Rav says: With regard to valuations, i.e., the age of a valuated male or female is calculated in whole years from the date of his birth, not by calendar years. And Rav Yosef says: The <i>halakha</i> is stated with regard to the matters taught in our fifth chapter in tractate <i>Nidda</i>, which is named after its opening words: <i>Yotze Dofen</i>, meaning an offspring born by caesarean section. In other words, when a mishna in this chapter mentions years, it means full years, even when it does not state this explicitly.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Do you and Rav disagree with regard to this matter? In other words, as you interpreted the mention of a son and a daughter differently, does each of you reject the halakhic application of the other? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: No, he said one matter, and I said one different matter, but we do not disagree.
  The Gemara notes: And this, too, stands to reason, as if it enters your mind that they disagree with regard to this matter, then the one who said full years are required for determining valuations does not say that full years are necessary for the <i>halakhot</i> of this chapter, <i>Yotze Dofen</i>. But doesn’t Rav say, like Rav Yosef, that the <i>halakha</i> in this entire chapter with regard to all of the places where an age is mentioned in years is that even when the phrase: And one day, is not explicitly noted, they are all calculated from the time of year of birth until that same time of year in the age specified, not by calendar years?
  The Gemara asks: But if that is correct, then according to Rav, who is the one who said that full years are required for determining valuations, what is the reason that he does not say in his interpretation of the <i>baraita</i> that full years are required for the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>Yotze Dofen</i>? The Gemara answers: Rav maintains that the years of a son and of a daughter mentioned in the <i>baraita</i> are similar to those other cases mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>: Just as those numbers of years are written in the Torah, so too these years of a son and of a daughter are referring to matters where the years are written in the Torah, i.e., the years of valuations, unlike the topics discussed in <i>Yotze Dofen</i>, where the years are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah.
  The Gemara asks: And how would the other <i>amora</i>, Rav Yosef, respond to this contention? The Gemara answers: He would maintain that if the <i>baraita</i> were referring to the years of valuations, which are written in the Torah, then this expression in the <i>baraita</i>: Of a son and of a daughter, is unsuitable. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> should have stated: Of the male and of the female, which are the terms the Torah uses with regard to valuations, whereas the terms: Son and daughter, are used in <i>Yotze Dofen</i>.
  § Rav Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Elazar says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar, who said his ruling in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, that a man nineteen years and thirty days of age who has not developed signs of puberty is deemed a sexually underdeveloped man. In this regard, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira said: May it be God’s will that I merit to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and that I learn this <i>halakha</i> from the mouth of its Master, Rabbi Elazar.
  The Gemara recounts that when Rabbi Zeira eventually ascended to Eretz Yisrael he indeed found Rabbi Elazar and said to him: Did you say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar? Rabbi Elazar said to him: I said that it stands to reason that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion. He elaborated: From the fact that throughout the entire chapter the Mishna teaches: And one day, but here, in the last mishna, it does not teach this phrase, one can conclude from it that it stands to reason that there is a reason for this discrepancy, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar.
  
  MISHNA: If the lower sign of puberty, two pubic hairs, appeared in a young woman before the upper sign, development of the breasts, appeared, then she is an adult, as the pubic hairs are an unequivocal sign. Therefore, if her childless husband died and she came before her husband’s brother [<i>yavam</i>] for levirate marriage, she either performs the ritual through which a <i>yavam</i> frees a <i>yevama</i> of her levirate bonds [<i>ḥalitza</i>] or enters into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother.
  If the upper sign indicating puberty appeared before the lower sign appeared, i.e., the two pubic hairs are not visible, although that order of development is apparently impossible, Rabbi Meir says: In fact, it is possible for the breasts to develop before the growth of two pubic hairs, and the concern is that the two hairs did not grow and fall out but rather they never grew in the first place, which would mean that she remains a minor. Therefore, if her childless husband dies, she neither performs <i>ḥalitza</i> nor does she enter into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother.
  And the Rabbis say: She has reached majority, and therefore if her childless husband dies she either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother. That is due to the fact that the Sages said: It is possible for the lower sign of puberty to appear before the upper sign appears; but it is impossible for the upper sign to appear before the lower sign appears.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the <i>halakha</i> when the upper sign of puberty appears before the lower sign. The mishna stated about that case: Although that order of development is impossible. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the mishna explicitly states that it is referring to a situation where the upper sign did appear before the lower one. The Gemara explains: When the mishna states that it did appear, that is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that such an occurrence is possible, whereas when the mishna teaches: Although that order of development is impossible, it is referring to the opinion of the Rabbis, who contend that it is not possible.
  The Gemara objects: But why is it necessary at all to mention the phrase: Although that order of development is impossible. Instead, let the mishna simply teach: If the upper sign of puberty appeared, Rabbi Meir says: She neither performs <i>ḥalitza</i> nor does she enter into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother; and the Rabbis say: She either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother. And I would know that the ruling of the Rabbis is due to the fact that it is impossible for the upper sign of puberty to appear before the lower sign.
  The Gemara explains: If the mishna had not taught: Although that order of development is impossible, I would say that with regard to most women the lower sign appears first, before the upper sign; but in a minority of women, the upper sign appears first. And Rabbi Meir, who rules that she is a minor who may not perform either <i>ḥalitza</i> or enter into levirate marriage, conforms to his standard line of reasoning, that one must be concerned for the minority. In other words, Rabbi Meir takes into account the minority of women in whom the upper sign appears first, and therefore he considers her to be a minor. And the Rabbis likewise conform to their standard line of reasoning that one need not be concerned for the minority, and therefore they consider the young woman to have reached majority.
  And this statement, that one can rely on the assumption that if a woman has the upper sign then she certainly has the lower sign, while the minority of cases are not taken into account, applies only in an ordinary case, where the woman was not examined to determine if she had the lower sign. But in a case where we examined her and did not find the lower sign, one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that the upper sign appeared before the lower sign, and therefore she neither performs <i>ḥalitza</i> nor enters into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother.
  Therefore, the mishna teaches us that according to the Rabbis it is impossible for the upper sign to precede the lower sign, which means that even if she was examined and no lower sign was found, the assumption is that the two hairs of the lower sign had certainly appeared, but later they fell out.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that it is possible for the upper sign to precede the lower, that accounts for that verse which is written with regard to a maturing young woman: “And you increased and grew up, and you came to excellent beauty; your breasts were fashioned, and your hair was grown” (Ezekiel 16:7). This verse mentions the upper sign before the lower sign. But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the verse should have said the reverse, first stating “your hair has grown,” and then stating “your breasts were fashioned.” The Gemara answers that this is what the verse is saying: Since your breasts were fashioned, it is known that your hair was already grown.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this accounts for that which is written: “When they from Egypt bruised your breasts for the sprouting forth of your young womanhood” (Ezekiel 23:21). This verse, which compares the Jewish people to a promiscuous girl, describes how, in her childhood, Egyptian men would play with her by pressing her breasts in order to engage in licentious sexual intercourse with her when she became a young woman, i.e., once the pubic hairs that indicate puberty developed. This indicates that it is possible for the upper sign to appear before the lower sign. But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the verse should have said the reverse.
  The Gemara similarly answers that this is what the verse is saying: Since your breasts appeared, it is known that the pubic hairs, which are the sign of your young womanhood, have already appeared. Or if you wish, say instead: What is the meaning of the phrase: The sprouting forth of [<i>shedei</i>] your young womanhood? It is not speaking of the lower sign, but rather of the upper sign, i.e., the entire verse is written in reference to the breasts, <i>shadayim</i> in Hebrew. And this is what the Holy One, Blessed be He, is saying to the Jewish people:
  
  Daf 48b
  
  Although your breasts began to develop, you still did not reform your ways, and you continued to act licentiously. And furthermore, even when your breasts grew fully, you also did not reform your ways.
  § The Gemara asks: In any event, everyone, both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, agrees that we rely on the lower sign. From where do we derive that we rely exclusively on the lower sign and do not require the appearance of the upper sign as well? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states: “A man or woman, when they commit any of the sins of men” (Numbers 5:6). The Torah thereby rendered a woman equal to a man with regard to all punishments of the Torah. Just as a man is considered to have reached majority based on one sign, i.e., the lower sign of two pubic hairs, so too, a woman reaches majority based on one sign, the lower sign.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one can say that although a woman’s status, like that of a man, depends on one sign, in the case of a woman she reaches majority either through this, the lower sign, or that, the upper sign. From where is it derived that it must be specifically the lower sign? The Gemara answers: This is based on the same comparison of men and women. Her <i>halakha</i> is like that of a man: Just as a man reaches majority based on the lower sign and not the upper sign, as this is not applicable to him, so too, a woman reaches majority based on the lower sign and not the upper sign.
  The Gemara notes that this <i>halakha</i>, that the lower sign is sufficient by itself for a woman, is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said: This is how the Sages would explain it in the study hall of Yavne. They said: Once the lower sign has appeared, we no longer concern ourselves with the appearance of the upper sign in order to establish a woman’s status, as she is considered to have reached her majority by virtue of the lower sign.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>, with regard to the appearance of signs indicating puberty in young women, that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the case of young women who reside in cities, the lower sign appears more quickly than the upper sign, because they frequent the bathhouses, which stimulates the growth of the hair. By contrast, in the case of young women who reside in villages, the upper sign appears more quickly than the lower sign, because they grind with mills, which develops their breasts.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: There are differences in the rate of development of the breasts. In the case of the daughters of the wealthy, the growth of the breast on the right side arrives more quickly than that of the left side, as it rubs against their upper body cloaks, which are worn by the wealthy. By contrast, in the case of the daughters of the poor, the growth of the breast on the left side arrives more quickly than that of the right side, because they draw jugs of water on that side. And if you wish, say instead that the left breast develops more quickly because they carry their younger brothers on their left sides.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The growth of the breast on the left side arrives before that of the right side. Rabbi Ḥanina, son of the brother of Rabbi Yehoshua, says: It never occurred that the growth of the breast on the left side arrived before that of the right side, except for the case of one young woman who was in my neighborhood, as the growth of the breast on her left side arrived before that of the right side, and later the right breast returned to its normal condition and developed normally.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All girls who are examined to determine whether or not their signs indicating puberty have appeared are examined based on the testimony of women. And likewise, Rabbi Eliezer would follow this <i>halakha</i> in practice and give the girls to his wife to examine, and Rabbi Yishmael would similarly give the girls to his mother to examine.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: Before the minimum age at which pubic hair is considered a sign, i.e., eleven years and one day, when any hair that is found is considered to be merely a mole and not a sign, and similarly after the age of majority, twelve years and one day, when a female is presumed to have grown pubic hair like most girls her age, women may examine them and their testimony is accepted. But during the time between eleven years and one day and twelve years and one day, women may not examine them. The reason is that one does not resolve cases of uncertainty based on the testimony of women. Rabbi Shimon says: Even during the time between eleven years and one day and twelve years and one day, women may examine them. And a woman is deemed credible, and her testimony is accepted, to be stringent but not to be lenient.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: How so, i.e., how is a woman’s testimony accepted with regard to the girl she has examined as a stringency but not a leniency? If the woman said that the girl is a female who reached majority, her claim is accepted to the extent that she does not perform refusal. The refusal of a husband, which applies in the case of a girl whose father had died and who was married off by her mother or brother, can be performed by the girl only until she reaches majority. If the woman said that this girl is a minor, her testimony is accepted to the extent that she does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: But the woman who examined the girl is not deemed credible to say that she is a minor girl to the extent that she performs refusal. And likewise, the woman is not deemed credible to say that she is a female who reached majority to the extent that she performs <i>ḥalitza</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said that Rabbi Yehuda says: Before the minimum age at which pubic hair is considered a sign, and similarly after the age of majority, women may examine them. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, one can understand that before the minimum age there is a requirement for examination, so that if they find hair after the minimum age which they already saw before the minimum age, these hairs are evidently a mere mole, not a sign of maturity.
  But why do I need a girl to undergo an examination after the age of majority? Didn’t Rava say: A minor girl who reached her full years, i.e., her age of majority, twelve years and one day, does not require an examination, as there is a presumption that she has developed signs indicating puberty? The Gemara explains: When Rava said that one relies on this presumption, he was referring specifically to her inability from now on to perform refusal. But with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>, she requires an examination to determine that she has reached maturity.
  The <i>baraita</i> stated that according to Rabbi Yehuda, women are deemed credible to examine girls who are either younger than eleven years and one day or older than twelve years and one day. But during the time between eleven years and one day and twelve years and one day, women may not examine them. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the period during this time is considered like after the age of majority. In other words, the signs indicating puberty that a girl develops during this time are considered to be full-fledged signs, which means that she has reached majority even before the age of twelve and one day. Accordingly, the testimony of women is not accepted for this period, as her change of status enables her to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with her husband’s brother.
  But after the minimum age of twelve years and one day, when there is the presumption of Rava that a girl has already developed signs indicating puberty, one may rely on women and have them examine the girl. During this age, between eleven and twelve, when there is no presumption of Rava that she has already developed signs indicating puberty, one may not rely on women, and therefore women may not examine the girl.
  By contrast, Rabbi Shimon says that even during this age, between eleven years and one day and twelve years and one day, women may examine girls to determine if they have grown pubic hair. This is because Rabbi Shimon holds that the period during this age is considered like before the minimum age, which means that the girl is a minor based on her age, regardless of the results of the examination. And the only reason she requires an examination is that if they find hair after the minimum age, which they had already seen before the minimum age, these hairs are deemed a mere mole, not a sign of maturity.
  The <i>baraita</i> further teaches: And a woman is deemed credible to testify to be stringent with regard to the girl who she examined but not to be lenient. The Gemara asks: Who taught this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and it is referring to during the age between eleven years and one day and twelve and one day.
  
  Daf 49a
  
  And if you wish, say instead that the <i>tanna</i> who taught this ruling was Rabbi Shimon, and the <i>baraita</i> is referring to an examination conducted after the age of majority. And Rabbi Shimon does not accept the presumption of Rava that a girl of this age has already developed signs indicating puberty.
  § The mishna teaches that according to the Rabbis a young woman who apparently developed the upper sign before the lower sign has reached majority, and therefore if her childless husband died she either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother. This ruling is due to the fact that the Sages said: It is possible for the lower sign of puberty to appear before the upper sign, but it is impossible for the upper sign to appear before the lower sign. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this additional repetition of this point? It was already taught in the first clause that it is impossible for the upper sign to appear without the lower sign having already appeared.
  And if you would say that it is repeated because the <i>tanna</i> wants to teach an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, in order to establish that the <i>halakha</i> follows their opinion in their dispute with Rabbi Meir, that cannot be the case. The Gemara explains why this suggestion is incorrect: This is obvious, as there is a principle that in a dispute between an individual Sage and a majority of other Sages, the <i>halakha</i> is always decided in accordance with the opinion of the majority.
  The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to state that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis despite the fact that they are the majority, lest you say that the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Meir is more reasonable. One might have thought this, as the verses cited above support it: “Your breasts were fashioned, and your hair was grown,” and: “When they from Egypt bruised your breasts for the sprouting forth of your young womanhood.” Therefore, the mishna teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And if you wish, say instead that the <i>tanna</i> repeated the claim that the upper sign cannot precede the lower one because he wants to teach a case in the next mishna which is similar to this one, i.e., this summary provides a transition to the <i>halakha</i> brought in the following mishna.
  MISHNA: Similar to the order of the appearance of the signs of puberty in a girl, where it is impossible for the upper sign to appear before the lower sign, there is an analogous principle with regard to the mutual dependency of two items: Any earthenware vessel with a hole that enables entry of liquid into the vessel certainly enables exit of liquid through that hole, and it thereby ceases to be a vessel fit for sanctification of the waters mixed with the ashes of the red heifer. And there are holes that enable exit of liquids from the earthenware vessels but do not enable entry of liquids from outside the vessel, and therefore it remains a vessel.
  Likewise, in any limb of the body where there is a nail, there is certainly a bone in it as well. If it is the limb of a corpse, it transmits ritual impurity through contact, movement, and in a tent, even if its size is less than that of an olive-bulk. And there are limbs in which there is a bone but yet there is not a nail in it. That limb does not transmit impurity in a tent if its size is less than that of an olive-bulk.
  Similarly, any item that becomes ritually impure with impurity of a <i>zav</i> imparted by treading, e.g., a vessel designated for sitting, becomes ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. And there are vessels that become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse but do not become ritually impure with impurity of a <i>zav</i> imparted by treading.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that any earthenware vessel with a hole that enables entry of liquid into the vessel certainly enables exit of liquid through that hole, whereas there are holes that enable exit of liquids but do not enable entry. The Gemara explains the halakhic significance of this distinction. A vessel that contains a hole that is large enough to enable liquid to enter is no longer considered a vessel and is therefore unfit to contain the water of purification. And it is also disqualified as a shard [<i>gastera</i>] of a vessel. A shard still has some utility and is therefore susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, an earthenware vessel that contains a small hole that enables only the exit of liquids is fit for the water of purification, but is disqualified as a shard of a vessel.
  Rav Asi says that they teach the following <i>halakha</i>: In the case of an earthenware vessel, its measure of a hole that renders it no longer ritually impure is one that is large enough to enable liquid to enter it. And they said that the measure of a small hole is that which enables the exit of liquids only with regard to a shard. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason for this? Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: It is because people do not say: Bring another shard to seal the leak of a shard; rather, they throw it out immediately. A shard is used as a plate beneath a perforated earthenware vessel. If the shard itself is also perforated and leaks, it is no longer of any use.
  § On the topic of holes in earthenware vessels, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How does one test a broken earthenware vessel to know if it was pierced with a hole that enables liquid to enter it or not? One brings a tub filled with water and places the broken pot into it. If the water from the tub enters the pot, it is known that the pot contains a hole that enables liquid to enter. And if the water does not enter the pot, it is known that the vessel contains only a small hole that merely enables the exit of liquids.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  Rabbi Yehuda says that the method for determining whether an earthenware vessel contains a hole that allows liquid to enter is as follows: One takes the handles of the pot and turns it over,placing it upside down in an empty tub, and he then covers the pot with water. If water enters the pot, it is known that it contains a hole that enables liquid to enter, and if the water does not enter the pot, it is known that the vessel contains a small hole that enables only the exit of liquids.
  Or one can determine the size of the hole by the following method: One places the pot, with liquid in it, on the fire. If the fire holds the liquid back and does not allow it to exit the vessel, then it is known that the vessel contains a small hole that enables only the exit of liquids. And if the fire does not hold the liquid back and does not prevent it from exiting the vessel, then it is known that it contains a hole that enables liquid to enter.
  Rabbi Yosei says: One should not place the pot with liquid in it on the fire. This is not a reliable test for determining the size of the hole, as it is possible that the hole is actually large enough to enable liquid to enter, but nevertheless the fire prevents the liquid from exiting. Rather, one places the pot with liquid in it on hot ash. If the hot ash holds the liquid back and does not allow it to exit the vessel, then it is known that the vessel contains a small hole that enables only the exit of liquids. But if the hot ash does not hold the liquid back and does not prevent it from exiting the vessel, it is known that it contains a hole that enables liquid to enter. Another manner of testing is to fill the vessel with liquid. If it drips one drop after another drop, it is known that it contains a hole that enables liquid to enter.
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the method of testing stated by the first <i>tanna</i>, placing the vessel in a tub of water, and that of Rabbi Yehuda, placing the vessel upside down into the tub and then covering it with water? Ulla said: The difference between their opinions is whether liquid that enters through a hole with difficulty, i.e., as the result of force, is considered entering. According to Rabbi Yehuda, placing the vessel directly into a tub of water constitutes the use of force to a certain degree, and he maintains that if water enters the vessel in such a case, this does not count as liquid entering the vessel. Therefore, he rejects the testing method of the first <i>tanna</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: In any limb of the body where there is a nail, there is certainly a bone in it as well. But it is possible for there to be limbs that contain a bone without a nail. The Gemara explains the halakhic significance of this distinction. A limb in which there is a nail and which therefore certainly contains a bone has the status of a full-fledged limb. Therefore, it transmits impurity through contact, movement, and in a tent, even if its size is less than that of an olive-bulk. By contrast, if there is a bone in the limb but there is no nail, it transmits impurity through contact and movement even if its size is less than that of an olive-bulk, but it does not transmit impurity in a tent unless its size is that of an olive-bulk.
  Rav Ḥisda says: The following matter was stated by our great rabbi, Rav, may the Omnipresent come to his assistance. An extra finger on one’s hand in which there is a bone but there is no nail transmits impurity through contact and movement even if its size is less than that of an olive-bulk, but it does not transmit impurity in a tent.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And this is the <i>halakha</i>, that it must contain both bone and a nail for it to be considered a limb, only in a case where this finger cannot be counted along the back of the hand, i.e., the extra finger is not aligned with the others. But if it is aligned with the other fingers then it is considered like any other limb and imparts impurity in a tent, whether or not it contains a nail.
  § The mishna further teaches: Similarly, any item that becomes ritually impure with impurity of a <i>zav</i> imparted by treading becomes ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. The Gemara explains that this means that any item that is fit to become impure with the impurity of a <i>zav</i> imparted by treading is fit to become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse.
  The mishna continues: And there are vessels that become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse but do not become ritually impure with impurity of a <i>zav</i> imparted by treading. The Gemara asks: What is added by this statement? The Gemara answers: This serves to add a measuring vessel, e.g., the measure of a <i>se’a</i> or a half-<i>se’a</i> [<i>vetarkav</i>].
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the impurity of the treading of a <i>zav</i>: “And he who sits on any object whereon the <i>zav</i> sits shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water, and is impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:6). One might have thought that if a <i>zav</i> turned over a vessel used to measure a <i>se’a</i> and sat on it, or if he turned over a vessel used to measure a half-<i>se’a</i> and sat on it, that vessel should be rendered impure as a seat upon which a <i>zav</i> sat.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And he who sits on any object whereon the <i>zav</i> sits” (Leviticus 15:6). The wording of the verse indicates that it is speaking of an object that is designated for sitting, i.e., upon which people generally sit, excluding such a vessel, with regard to which we say to someone sitting on it: Stand up and allow us to use it to do our work, i.e., to measure. This is not defined as a vessel used for sitting, as it serves another function.
  MISHNA: Any person who is fit to adjudicate cases of capital law is fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law, and there are those who are fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law but are unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said: The statement of the mishna that some are fit to adjudicate cases of monetary law but are unfit to adjudicate cases of capital law serves to add the case of a <i>mamzer</i>. Although he may not adjudicate cases of capital law, nevertheless he may adjudicate cases of monetary law.
  The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to teach this here? We already learned this on another occasion, in a mishna (<i>Sanhedrin</i> 32a): All are fit to judge cases of monetary law, but not all are fit to judge cases of capital law. And we discussed it, and asked what is added by the phrase: All are fit to judge. And Rav Yehuda said in response that this serves to add the case of a <i>mamzer</i>. The Gemara answers: One mishna serves to add the case of a convert, and one other mishna serves to add the case of a <i>mamzer</i>.
  The Gemara explains: And both additions are necessary. As, if the <i>mishnayot</i> had taught us only that a convert is fit to judge cases of monetary law, one might have said that the <i>halakha</i> is lenient in the case of a convert because he is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., marry a Jewish woman. But with regard to a <i>mamzer</i>, who is unfit to enter into the congregation, one might say that he is not fit to judge cases of monetary law.
  And if the <i>mishnayot</i> had taught us only that a <i>mamzer</i> is fit to judge cases of monetary law, one might have said that the <i>halakha</i> is lenient in the case of a <i>mamzer</i> because he comes from a fit drop of semen, i.e., his father is Jewish. But with regard to a convert, who comes from an unfit drop, as he was born a gentile, one might say that he is not fit to judge cases of monetary law. Therefore, it is necessary to teach the <i>halakhot</i> of both a convert and a <i>mamzer</i>.
  MISHNA: Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by this statement, that some people are fit to testify but not to adjudicate? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This serves to add one who is blind in one of his eyes. And in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling?
  
  Daf 50a
  
  It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states: “According to their word shall every dispute and every leprous mark be” (Deuteronomy 21:5)? What do disputes have to do with leprous marks? The verse juxtaposes disputes to leprous marks, to teach that just as leprous marks are viewed by a priest only in the daytime, as it is written with regard to leprous marks: “And on the day when raw flesh appears in him he shall be impure” (Leviticus 13:14), so too, disputes are adjudicated only in the daytime.
  And just as leprous marks are seen by priests who can see, but not by blind priests, as it is written: “As far as appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12), which teaches that they must be viewed by priests who can see with both eyes, so too, disputes are not adjudicated by blind judges, even if they are blind in only one eye. And the verse juxtaposes leprous marks to disputes to teach that just as disputes may not be judged by relatives of the litigants, so too, leprous marks may not be viewed by a priest who is a relative of the afflicted party.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If these two <i>halakhot</i> are compared, one can also say that just as disputes are judged specifically by three judges, so too, leprous marks must be viewed by three priests. And this suggestion is supported by a logical inference: If a case that only involves one’s money is adjudicated by three judges, all the more so is it not clear that leprous marks, which afflict the person himself, should be viewed by three priests? To counter this notion, the verse states: “And he shall be brought to Aaron the priest or to one of his sons, the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). You have learned from this that even one priest may view leprous marks.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain blind person who was living in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yoḥanan who would render judgments, and Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say anything to him. The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Yoḥanan do this? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna?
  And we learned in the mishna: Any person who is fit to adjudicate a case and serve as a judge is fit to testify as a witness, and there are those who are fit to testify but are not fit to adjudicate. And we said: What is added by this <i>halakha</i>, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It serves to add one who is blind in one of his eyes, as he is fit to testify but unfit to judge. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan evidently maintains that one who is blind even in one of his eyes is not fit to judge, why did he not admonish this judge?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found another unattributed mishna which indicates a different conclusion. As we learned in the mishna in tractate <i>Sanhedrin</i> (32a): In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues their ruling even at night. This is not the <i>halakha</i> with regard to leprous marks, which may not be viewed at night at all. Accordingly, one does not compare judging cases of monetary law to viewing leprous marks. Since this comparison was the source for disqualifying a blind judge, one cannot derive from it that a blind judge is disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: And in what manner is the strength of that unattributed mishna in tractate <i>Sanhedrin</i> greater than the strength of this unattributed mishna here? Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan accept the ruling of that mishna? The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that an unattributed mishna that records the opinion of many Sages, as in <i>Sanhedrin</i>, is preferable, whereas the mishna here was established as in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Meir. And if you wish, say instead that it is because the mishna in <i>Sanhedrin</i> teaches this <i>halakha</i> in the context of the <i>halakhot</i> of judges. Since that chapter is the primary source for all of the <i>halakhot</i> of court matters, its rulings are of greater weight.
  MISHNA: Any food from which one is obligated to separate tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food; and there is food that becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food but from which one is not obligated to separate tithes.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of this mishna? The Gemara answers: This serves to add meat, fish, and eggs. Although they are subject to the ritual impurity of food, one is not obligated to separate tithes from them.
  MISHNA: With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate produce in the corner of the field given to the poor [<i>pe’a</i>], as commanded in the Torah (see Leviticus 19:9, 23:22), one is obligated to separate tithes from it; and there is produce from which one is obligated to separate tithes but from which one is not obligated to designate <i>pe’a</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the last clause of the mishna? The Gemara answers: It serves to add figs and vegetables, for which one is not obligated to designate <i>pe’a</i>, although the obligation of tithes does apply to them. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Pe’a</i> 1:4): The Sages stated a principle with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>pe’a</i>: With regard to anything that is food, and is protected, and that grows from the earth, and is gathered as one, i.e., there is one fixed time for gathering it, and that one brings in to store for preservation, its owner is obligated to designate <i>pe’a</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes each criterion of the mishna. The clause: Anything that is food, serves to exclude the <i>sefiḥin</i>, produce that grew without being intentionally planted, of woad [<i>setim</i>] and safflower [<i>vekotza</i>]. These plants are used as dyes rather than for food. The clause: And is protected, serves to exclude ownerless crops, which no one protects. The clause: And grows from the earth, serves to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which do not draw sustenance from the ground. The clause: And is gathered as one, serves to exclude the fig tree, whose fruit is gathered over an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen at the same time. Finally, the clause: And that one brings in to storage for preservation, serves to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.
  And yet in the case of tithe, we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 1:1) with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the earth is obligated in tithes. And whereas some of the conditions overlap, the following criteria are not taught with regard to tithes: Gathered as one, and that one brings in to storage for preservation. Evidently, the obligation of tithes applies to fig trees and vegetables, despite the fact that the obligation of <i>pe’a</i> does not apply.
  The Gemara notes that if these vegetables that are exempt from <i>pe’a</i> contained garlic and onions, which are stored for an extended period of time, then they are obligated in <i>pe’a</i> as well. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Pe’a</i> 3:4): If one has garden beds of onions that are between the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves a separate <i>pe’a</i> from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say one leaves <i>pe’a</i> from one garden bed for all of them.
  § Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of endives that were initially planted to be fed to animals, and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption
  
  Daf 50b
  
  they require intent to be used for human consumption once they are detached from the ground, in order for them to be susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in this manner because he holds that intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.
  Rava said: We learn in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 1:1) as well: Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: In order for such a carcass to be susceptible to impurity and to be capable of imparting impurity to food through contact, it requires a person’s intention to eat it, but it does not require exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. Even if one had intent to eat the bird while it was still alive, intent is still required after it became a carcass for it to transmit impurity. Rava concludes: Evidently, intent that the bird be eaten while the bird is alive is not considered intent. Here too, intent to designate produce while it is attached to the ground is not considered intent.
  Rabbi Zeira said: Rava’s proof is inconclusive, as here we are dealing with a young bird that fell from a height, where the bird was not before us prior to it becoming a carcass, so that one could have had intent that it is food. Consequently, it requires intent afterward for it to impart impurity, but had there been intent while it was still alive, that would have sufficed.
  Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: What is there to say about the case of the chicken in Yavne? In that instance the Sages deemed the chicken impure due to intent only after it became a carcass, despite the fact that it was present before them while it was alive. This apparently indicates that intent which occurred while the bird was alive is not considered intent. Rabbi Zeira said to Abaye: That was actually a wild chicken, which was not before them while it was alive, and therefore there was no intent that it should be food while it was alive.
  Those who heard this comment laughed at Rabbi Zeira’s interpretation: A wild chicken is a non-kosher bird, and does a non-kosher bird impart impurity? Abaye said to them: A great man has stated a matter; do not laugh at him. Rabbi Zeira means that this is referring to a chicken that rebelled against its owner, ran away to the wild, and raised its kosher chicks there. One of those chicks subsequently returned from the wild. Consequently, it had not been present before the Sages while it was alive. And what did Rabbi Zeira mean when he mentioned a wild [<i>bara</i>] chicken? He meant one that was created [<i>de’ivrai</i>] from a chicken that rebelled.
  Rav Pappa stated an alternative interpretation: It was a marsh [<i>de’agma</i>] hen. Since no one lives in a marsh, there was no opportunity for intent while it was alive, and therefore intent was necessary afterward. The Gemara adds: Rav Pappa conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rav Pappa said: The animal called the marsh rooster is prohibited, as it is a non-kosher bird, whereas the marsh hen is kosher and permitted.
  And your mnemonic to remember which animal is permitted and which is prohibited is the well-known statement of the Sages with regard to the verse: “An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 23:4). An Ammonite man is unfit to enter the assembly but not an Ammonite woman. Here too, the animal with a female name is permitted, whereas the one with a male name is prohibited. Mareimar taught: The marsh hen is prohibited, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa, as the Sages saw that it mauled and ate its prey. And this is the <i>geiruta</i>, a non-kosher bird.
  § Apropos the case of a young kosher bird that fell and died, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A young kosher bird that fell into a winepress and died there, where the owner intended to draw it up from the press for a Samaritan to eat, is ritually impure, like any carcass of a kosher bird. If he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is ritually pure. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Even if he intended to draw it up from the press for a dog to eat, it is impure, as the bird does not require intent for it to be impure.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says in explanation of his opinion: This <i>halakha</i> can be derived by the following <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity, i.e., it renders one’s garments impure when an olive-bulk of it is in the throat, without thought, i.e., even if no one had intent that a person should eat it, should it not transmit a lenient impurity of food, by touch alone, likewise without thought?
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid <i>a fortiori</i> inference. If you said that there is no requirement of intent with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because severe ritual impurity does not assume its status with that requirement of thought, i.e., intent is not relevant to that type of impurity. Shall you also say that there is no requirement of thought with regard to lenient impurity, which does assume its status with that requirement of thought? The Gemara will soon explain the precise meaning of this concept of assuming its status with the requirement of thought.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to the Rabbis: The case of the chicken in Yavne can prove that the question of whether or not intent is required does not depend on that factor. The case in Yavne involved an item that does assume its status with that requirement of thought, and yet the Sages declared it impure without intent. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: Will you cite proof from there? In that case there were Samaritans there, and the people in Yavne intended that it be eaten by the Samaritans.
  The Gemara analyzes the case of a young kosher bird that fell into a winepress: What type of situation are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with cities, where there are many people available to consume all sorts of food, including the carcass of a kosher bird, why does it require intent? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Okatzin</i> 3:3): An unslaughtered carcass of a kosher animal in any location, whether the population is large or small, and the carcass of a kosher bird or the fat of a kosher animal found in cities [<i>bakerakim</i>], require neither intent for human consumption nor contact with liquid for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity?
  Rather, it must be referring to villages, where the population is small and there are not many people who would eat the carcass. But this too is difficult: Is there anyone who said that intent is not required in the case of a carcass of a non-kosher bird for the impurity of food? Didn’t we learn in the beginning of that same mishna: A carcass of a non-kosher animal found in any location, and an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird in the villages both require intent to consume them, but they do not require contact with a liquid to become susceptible to ritual impurity?
  Rabbi Zeira bar Ḥanina says: Actually, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case that occurred in a city, and even so intent is required. The reason is that the young bird fell into a winepress, and the winepress rendered it disgusting and thereby rendered it like the carcass of a kosher bird in a village, where there are few people who would eat it.
  The Gemara analyzes the exchange cited above. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says that this <i>halakha</i> can be derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If the carcass of a kosher bird transmits severe ritual impurity without thought, should it not transmit lenient impurity without thought?
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, this is not a valid <i>a fortiori</i> inference. If you said so with regard to severe ritual impurity, that is because it does not assume its status with that requirement of thought.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the clause: It does not assume its status with that requirement of thought? In what manner is thought required for the lenient impurity of food it imparts in the case of a bird carcass but not required for the severe impurity it imparts when it is in the throat? Rava said that this is what the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: No, if you said that there is no requirement of thought
  
  Daf 51a
  
  in a case of severe ritual impurity, i.e., when the carcass of a kosher bird renders one’s garments impure while it is in his throat, which does not render impure another item similar to it, i.e., a person who is rendered impure by the carcass does not render another man impure; shall you also say that there is no requirement of thought in the case of lenient impurity, i.e., when the carcass transmits impurity as food, which does render impure another item similar to it? Food that became impure transmits impurity to other food, albeit by rabbinic law.
  Abaye said to Rava: But in that case, all the more so impurity as food should apply without thought. If severe impurity, i.e., the unique impurity of the carcass of a kosher bird, which is lenient in the sense that it does not render impure another item similar to it, nevertheless imparts impurity without thought, i.e., without one knowing what is in his throat, then with regard to lenient impurity, i.e., the carcass’s impurity as food, which is more severe in the sense that it renders impure another item similar to it, isn’t it logical that it should impart impurity without thought?
  Rather, Rav Sheshet said that this is what the Rabbis, who replied to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, are saying: No, if you said that thought is not required with regard to severe impurity, i.e., the carcass of a kosher bird in the throat, as it does not require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, shall you also say that thought is not required with regard to lenient impurity, i.e., its impurity as food, where it does require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity?
  The Gemara asks: And does the carcass of a kosher bird require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to impurity as food? But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i>: Three matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird: In order for it to be susceptible to impurity as food, it requires a person’s intent to eat it; and it transmits impurity to garments by rendering one who swallows it ritually impure only when an olive-bulk of it is in the throat; and it does not require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity?
  The Gemara answers: Although it does not require contact with a creeping animal for it to be rendered susceptible to impurity, i.e., it is inherently impure, nevertheless it does require contact with water or another liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about being rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by contact with a creeping animal that it does not require this contact? This ruling is in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. If so, it should also not require contact with water or another liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, likewise in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught.
  As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states that seeds contract impurity from the carcass of a creeping animal only if they first come into contact with water: “And if any part of their carcass fall upon any sowing seed that is to be sown, it is pure. But if water be put upon the seed, and any part of their carcass fall thereon, it is impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38). This passage teaches that as long as water did not fall on the seeds, they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. This <i>halakha</i> applies to all items similar to seeds.
  Accordingly, just as seeds, which will never transmit impurity severe enough to transmit to humans, like any food, require contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity, so too, all items that will never transmit severe impurity require contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. This excludes the carcass of a kosher bird, which will ultimately transmit impurity severe enough to be transmitted to a human, i.e., when it is in his throat, and therefore it does not require contact with liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity.
  Rather, Rava said, and some say that it was Rav Pappa who said: The Rabbis’ rejection of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not based on the specific <i>halakha</i> of impurity of food imparted by the carcass of a bird. Rather, they are referring to the fact that in general there is no item under the common name of severe impurity that requires contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, with regard to the common name of lenient impurity as food, in general the items in this category require contact with a liquid for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity, despite the fact that the particular case of the carcass of a kosher bird is an exception. Therefore, intent is required for lenient impurity even in the case of a carcass of a kosher bird.
  § Rava says: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the obligation to tithe, that intent while the produce is attached to the ground is considered intent. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the <i>halakha</i>? It is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 3:9) that deals with the obligation to tithe: Savory, hyssop [<i>veha’ezov</i>], and thyme [<i>vehakoranit</i>], i.e., various types of hyssop plants, that were growing in a courtyard, are eaten by some people although they are not specifically intended for human consumption. Therefore, if they were protected by the owners, those owners are obligated to separate tithes from them.
  The Gemara clarifies the mishna: What are the circumstances of this ruling? If we say that it is referring to a case where one initially planted them for human consumption, does it need to be said that there is an obligation to tithe if they are protected by the owners? It is clear that in such a situation the criteria for the obligation to tithe, i.e., that it is human food which is protected, have been met. Rather, is it not referring to a case where one initially planted them to be fed to an animal, and nevertheless the mishna teaches: If the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption and they were protected by the owners, the owners are obligated to tithe them. This apparently indicates that intent while the produce is attached to the ground is considered intent.
  Rav Ashi said that Rava’s proof is inconclusive, for the following reason: Here we are dealing with a courtyard where these various types of hyssop plants grew by themselves, and where they are unspecified, they are intended for human consumption. Therefore, they meet the first criteria for the obligation to tithe, as they are considered food. And the mishna addresses the second requirement, that the food must be protected, and this is what it is saying: If the courtyard protects its produce, the owners are obligated in tithes, and if not, they are exempt.
  Rav Ashi raises a further objection to Rava’s explanation from a mishna (50a): Any food from which one is obligated to separate tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. But if it is so, as Rava claimed, that intent while the produce is attached to the ground is considered intent with respect to the obligation to tithe, despite the fact that it is not considered intent with regard to impurity, then the mishna’s blanket statement is inaccurate. Rav Ashi elaborates: After all, there are these endives that were initially planted in order to feed to an animal and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption, from which one is obligated to separate tithe, but which do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food.
  Rava said in response that this is what the mishna is saying: Any type of food from which one is obligated to separate tithe becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. In other words, this is referring to types of food, not to all situations. It is possible for a particular circumstance to be an exception to this principle.
  The Gemara adds that this too stands to reason, that the mishna is referring only to types of food, not situations, from the fact that the latter clause teaches (51b): With regard to any animal from which the owner is obligated to give the first shearing of its wool, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, if it was slaughtered. And there are animals from which one is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it, but from which he is not obligated to give the first shearing.
  And if it is so, that the principles of the mishna are all-inclusive, one can raise the following difficulty: But there is the specific case of an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], from which one is obligated to give the first shearing, but one is not obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it, as it may not be eaten. This proves that Rava is correct, that the mishna is not referring to all circumstances, but only to general categories.
  Ravina said, rejecting this proof: It is possible that the mishna is referring to all circumstances, and as for the difficulty with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, one can say that in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon exempts the owner of a <i>tereifa</i> from the mitzva of the first shearing.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i> that the mishna is not referring to all circumstances, but only to general categories: With regard to one who declares his vineyard ownerless, and who arose the next morning and picked grapes from the vineyard before anyone else took possession of them, he is obligated in the mitzva of leaving for the poor individual fallen grapes [<i>peret</i>], and in the mitzva of leaving for them incompletely formed clusters of grapes [<i>uve’olelot</i>], and in the mitzva of forgotten clusters, and in <i>pe’a</i>. The Torah includes such cases in the phrase: “Leave them for the poor and for the stranger” (Leviticus 19:10, 23:22), which is written with regard to all these mitzvot. And he is exempt from the obligation to separate the tithe from the grapes. Since the vineyard is ownerless, there is no obligation to tithe the produce.
  The Gemara explains the proof: But didn’t we learn in the mishna (50a): With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate <i>pe’a</i>, one is likewise obligated to separate tithes? Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that Rava is correct in asserting that the mishna is teaching only principles with regard to each type of produce, but there are exceptions in certain circumstances? The Gemara answers that one should in fact conclude from the mishna that Rava is correct.
  § With regard to the obligations of <i>pe’a</i> and tithes, the Gemara notes that we learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Pe’a</i> 3:2): The Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to a case where one harvested several separate patches in a field. Rabbi Akiva rules that each patch requires its own <i>pe’a</i>, whereas the Rabbis maintain that one <i>pe’a</i> is required for all of the patches. Nevertheless, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Akiva in the case of one who sows dill or mustard in two or three separate locations in a single field, that he leaves <i>pe’a</i> for each and every one of these plots on its own, rather than one corner for all of them.
  
  Daf 51b
  
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to dill, from which one is obligated to designate <i>pe’a</i>, as stated in the mishna, one must also be obligated to separate tithe, since if the obligation of <i>pe’a</i> applies then the obligation of tithes likewise applies. As we learned in the mishna (50a): With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate <i>pe’a</i>, one is likewise obligated to separate tithe.
  And from the fact that with regard to dill one is obligated to separate tithe, it follows that it becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. As the mishna on 50a states: Any food that is obligated in tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. Apparently, any item that is prepared in order to add taste to food, such as dill, becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food, as this dill is prepared in order to add taste to food.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this conclusion from a mishna (<i>Okatzin</i> 3:5), which deals with the ritual impurity of food: With regard to spices such as costus, amomum, chief spices, root of crowfoot, asafoetida, peppers, and a cake of safflower, although their function is merely to add taste to food, they are considered food for the purposes of the following <i>halakha</i>: They may be bought with second-tithe money, which must be taken to Jerusalem and used to purchase food. But they are not considered food insofar as they do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to Rabbi Akiva: If they are considered food to the extent that they may be bought with second-tithe money, for what reason are they not considered food in terms of becoming impure with the ritual impurity of food? And if they do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food because they are not considered food, then they should also not be bought with second-tithe money.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said with regard to this <i>halakha</i>: They counted the opinions of the Sages, and they concluded that these spices may not be bought with second-tithe money, and they do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food. This apparently contradicts the previous claim that dill, which is a spice, becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food.
  Rav Ḥisda says the following resolution of the difficulty: When that <i>baraita</i>, which indicates that dill is considered food and can contract the impurity of food, is taught, it is referring to dill that is prepared for a spice dish [<i>likhmakh</i>], i.e., to be ground and placed in a Babylonian spice, <i>kutaḥ</i>, which is used as a dip.
  Rav Ashi said: I said this <i>halakha</i> of Rav Ḥisda’s before Rav Kahana, and he commented: Do not say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring specifically to a case where the dill was prepared for a spice dish from the outset, which would indicate that if dill is undesignated then it is intended to be an ingredient in a pot of food. Rather, undesignated dill is also prepared for a spice dish. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Okatzin</i> 3:4): With regard to <i>teruma</i> dill, once it imparted flavor in a pot of food and was removed from the pot, it is no longer subject to the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of <i>teruma</i>, and it can no longer become impure with the ritual impurity of food.
  Rav Kahana explains the proof: It can be inferred from this mishna that until the dill has imparted flavor in a pot of food it is subject to the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of <i>teruma</i>, and it can become impure with the ritual impurity of food. And if it enters your mind that undesignated dill is intended as an ingredient in a pot of food, then even when one did not place the dill in a pot, the same <i>halakha</i> with respect to <i>teruma</i> and impurity should apply, as when it is undesignated the dill is intended as an ingredient in a pot of food. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that undesignated dill is prepared for a spice dish? The Gemara concludes: Learn from the mishna that this is the case.
  MISHNA: With regard to any animal, i.e., sheep and rams, from which one is obligated by Torah law (see Deuteronomy 18:4) to give the first shearing of its wool to a priest, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, which must be removed from slaughtered animals, taken from it (see Deuteronomy 18:3). And there are animals from which one is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from them, e.g., cattle and goats, but from which he is not obligated to give the first shearing.
  The mishna teaches a similar principle: For all Sabbatical-Year produce to which there applies the obligation of eradication from the house when it ceases to be available to the animals in the field, there is the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce upon it, i.e., it may not be used for commerce and is ownerless while it is attached to the ground. And there is produce for which there is the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce, but for which there is no obligation of eradication from the house, e.g., produce that is preserved in the ground and does not cease to be available in the field.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce applies to any produce upon which there is an obligation of eradication, but the converse is not necessarily the case. The Gemara cites an example of plants whose various parts illustrate these <i>halakhot</i>: Plants such as the wild arum leaf and the ceterach, which cease to be available in the field during the rainy season, are subject to eradication and to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Examples of the second <i>halakha</i> of the mishna, that there is produce for which there is the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce but for which there is no obligation of eradication from the house, include the root of the wild arum and the root of the ceterach.
  The Gemara explains that it is written in connection to the Sabbatical Year: “And for the cattle and the beasts that are in your land, all its produce may be eaten” (Leviticus 25:7), from which it is derived: As long as the undomesticated animals eat a type of produce from the field, you may feed that type of produce to your domesticated animal in the house, as it still remains in the field. But if that type of produce has ceased for the undomesticated animals in the field, you must cease feeding it to your domesticated animal in the house. This is the obligation of eradication. And these, the root of the wild arum and the ceterach, have not ceased for undomesticated animals in the field, and therefore there is no obligation of eradication.
  MISHNA: It is written: “Whatever has fins and scales in the waters, in the seas, and in the rivers, you may eat them” (Leviticus 11:9). There is a principle with regard to the signs indicating that fish are kosher: Any fish that has scales has fins; and there are fish that have fins but do not have scales. Similarly, with regard to kosher animals it is written: “Whatever parts the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews the cud, among the beasts, that you may eat” (Leviticus 11:3). Any animal that has horns has hooves; and there are animals that have hooves but do not have horns.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that any fish that has scales also has fins and therefore is a kosher fish. The mishna also stated that there are fish that have fins but do not have scales. Such a fish is a non-kosher fish. The Gemara asks: Since we rely exclusively upon the sign of the scales, as a fish that has scales necessarily has fins as well, why do I need the sign of fins that the Merciful One writes in the Torah as one of the criteria of kosher fish?
  The Gemara answers: If the Merciful One had not also written the sign of fins in the Torah, I would say: What does the word <i>kaskeset</i>, scales, that is written in the Torah mean? It does not mean scales, but fins. And I would therefore say that even a non-kosher fish, which has fins but no scales, is permitted. Therefore, the Merciful One writes both signs, fins and scales.
  The Gemara further asks: But now that the Merciful One wrote in the Torah fins and <i>kaskeset</i>, from where do we derive that <i>kaskeset</i> denotes clothing, i.e., scales, rather than fins? The Gemara answers: We derive it from a verse, as it is written about Goliath the Philistine: “And he was clad with a coat of mail [<i>kaskasim</i>]” (I Samuel 17:5).
  The Gemara asks: But if there is proof that <i>kaskeset</i> means scales, the question returns: Let the Merciful One write only “scales” and then there would be no need to write “fins.” Rabbi Abbahu says, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that this is in accordance with the verse: “The Lord was pleased, for His righteousness’ sake, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21).In this context, this means that it is fitting for the Torah to state all the characteristics of a kosher animal rather than merely state that which is absolutely necessary.
  MISHNA: This mishna teaches a generalization that is similar to the previous ones: Anything that requires a blessing after one partakes of it requires a blessing beforehand. And there exist items that require a blessing before but do not require a blessing thereafter.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that there are items that require a blessing before but not after. The Gemara inquires: What case does this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the case of vegetables, as one recites a blessing before eating them but not afterward. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who maintains that one recites a blessing on vegetables after eating them, what case does this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the case of water, as one recites a blessing before drinking it but not afterward.
  The Gemara further asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Pappa, who rules that one recites a blessing on water after drinking it, what case does this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna serve to add? The Gemara answers that the mishna, which does not explicitly mention food, serves to add mitzvot. In other words, one recites a blessing before performing a mitzva, e.g., wearing ritual fringes or taking the <i>lulav</i> and the like, but one does not recite a blessing after its fulfillment. The Gemara asks: And according to the residents of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who recite the following blessing after they remove their phylacteries: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to keep His laws, what does this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna come to add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the case of
  
  Daf 52a
  
  fragrant spices.
  MISHNA: A young girl who reached the age of puberty and grew two pubic hairs is an adult. If her childless husband dies, she either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> and is thereby permitted to marry anyone, or enters into levirate marriage with her husband’s brother. And furthermore, such a girl is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot stated in the Torah in which women are obligated.
  And likewise, a young boy who reached the age of puberty and grew two pubic hairs is an adult and is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot stated in the Torah. And he is fit to be declared a stubborn and rebellious son if he performs the actions that warrant that designation, from when he grows two pubic hairs until his beard will form a circle. During that period, although he is an adult and punishable for his actions, he is incapable of fathering a child. Consequently, as he is a son and not a father, he can be designated a stubborn and rebellious son.
  The mishna explains that the reference is to the lower, pubic, hair, and not to the upper, facial, hair. But the term beard is used, despite its being subject to misinterpretation, due to the fact that the Sages spoke euphemistically.
  A young girl who reached the age of puberty and grew two pubic hairs can no longer perform refusal to end a marriage with a husband to whom she was married as a minor by her mother and brothers after her father’s death. Rabbi Yehuda says: She retains the right to perform refusal until the pubic hair will grow to the extent that the black hair will be preponderant in the pubic area.
  GEMARA: The Gemara raises an objection: But since we learned in the mishna that a young girl who reached the age of puberty and grew two pubic hairs is considered an adult and is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot stated in the Torah, why do I need the mishna to also teach: She either performs <i>ḥalitza</i> or enters into levirate marriage. These specific examples are included in the broader statement.
  The Gemara explains: This emphasis serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: Man, i.e., an adult man, is written in the passage of <i>ḥalitza</i>: “And if the man does not wish to take his brother’s wife” (Deuteronomy 25:7). But with regard to the woman, whether she is an adult or whether she is a minor, she can be released by <i>ḥalitza</i>, as the Torah does not specify her age. The mishna teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rather, if she grew two pubic hairs, then yes, she can perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, whereas if she did not grow two hairs, she may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> or enter into levirate marriage. What is the reason for this ruling? It is that the <i>halakha</i> of the woman is like that of the man, as a woman is juxtaposed to man in this passage.
  The Gemara asks further: And since we learned in the continuation of the mishna: And likewise, a young boy who reached the age of puberty and grew two pubic hairs is an adult, why do I need the mishna to add explicitly: Is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot stated in the Torah?
  And if you would say that the mishna specified this because it wanted to teach the particular <i>halakha</i>: And he is fit to be declared a stubborn and rebellious son, that cannot be the reason, as we already learned that <i>halakha</i> on another occasion in a mishna (<i>Sanhedrin</i> 68b): When is such a boy liable to receive the death penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son? From when he grows two pubic hairs until his beard will form a circle. The reference is to the lower, pubic, hair and not to the upper, facial hair, but the term beard is used, due to the fact that the Sages spoke euphemistically.
  The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, i.e., it is not necessary for the mishna to specify with regard to a boy that he is obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot stated in the Torah. But since the mishna specified this matter in the case of a young girl, it also specified this matter in the case of a young boy.
  § The mishna teaches: A young girl who reached the age of puberty and grew two pubic hairs can no longer perform refusal to end a marriage with a husband to whom she was married as a minor by her mother and brothers after her father’s death. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that she retains the right of refusal until the pubic hair grows to the extent that the black hair is preponderant in the pubic area. Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Elazar says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  And Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Rabbis that if she engaged in intercourse with her husband after she grew two pubic hairs, she can no longer perform refusal. This is because the act of intercourse renders her betrothed to him by Torah law, and refusal is a rabbinic enactment that is effective only with regard to a betrothal that applies by rabbinic law.
  Rav Kahana’s colleagues thought to perform an action in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, and to permit a young girl who had grown two pubic hairs to perform refusal, even though she had engaged in intercourse with her husband after growing two hairs. They held that until the pubic hair grows to the extent that the black hair is preponderant in the pubic area, her betrothal does not apply by Torah law.
  Rav Kahana said to his colleagues: Didn’t the incident involving Rabbi Yishmael’s daughter, who was married as a minor by her mother and brothers after her father’s death, transpire in that manner? As she came to the study hall to refuse her marriage, and her son was riding on her shoulders. And on that very day, Rabbi Yishmael’s statement, that a young girl may perform refusal even if she engaged in intercourse with her husband after growing two hairs, was mentioned in the study hall. And she cried with a great weeping in the study hall, as a result of the incident.
  The Sages who were in the study hall said: Could it be that with regard to a matter that that righteous Rabbi Yishmael said, i.e., that she can perform refusal, his offspring would stumble upon it? The consequence of her refusal is that she is considered to have borne the child retroactively out of wedlock.
  As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: The verse states with regard to a <i>sota</i>: “And neither was she taken” (Numbers 5:13), i.e., raped. In this case she is prohibited to her husband. It may be inferred that if she was taken forcefully she is permitted to her husband. And there is a case of another woman where, even though she was not taken forcefully, but was willing, she nevertheless remains permitted. And which case is this? This is referring to one whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal, as, even if her son from this marriage is riding on her shoulders she may perform refusal and go off as pleases her. Although she engaged in intercourse with her husband after growing two pubic hairs, she was relying on the original betrothal, which was a mistaken betrothal, and did not intend to become betrothed to him by means of this intercourse, which would have rendered her betrothed by Torah law. She may therefore nullify the betrothal by means of refusal.
  And the Gemara relates that as a result of the event involving Rabbi Yishmael’s daughter, the Sages assembled, counted the votes, and concluded: Until when may a young girl perform refusal? Until she grows two pubic hairs. Once Rav Kahana’s colleagues heard this, they retracted and did not perform an action in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, to permit the girl to perform refusal as they had originally planned.
  The Gemara further relates that Rabbi Yitzḥak and the disciples of Rabbi Ḥanina performed an action in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, and permitted a young girl who had grown two pubic hairs to perform refusal, even though she had engaged in intercourse with her husband after growing two hairs. Rav Shemen bar Abba subsequently went and stated this story before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Yoḥanan went and stated it before Rabbi Yehuda Nesia. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia sent a constable [<i>ballasha</i>] and removed that girl from her second husband.
  With regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, that the black hair must be preponderant in the pubic area, Rav Ḥisda says that Mar Ukva says: This does not mean that the black hair must literally be preponderant in the pubic area. Rather, there must be two hairs lying down, so that it appears as though the black hairs in the pubic area cover an area greater than the white area uncovered by hair. Rava says: Rabbi Yehuda means that there are two hairs that surround the pubic area from end to end.
  § The mishna teaches that the growth of two hairs is a sign of becoming an adult. The Gemara clarifies the details of this <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Ḥelbo says that Rav Huna says: These two hairs that the Sages said are a sign of adulthood must have follicles at their roots. Rav Malkiyyu says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If there are two follicles next to each other, they constitute a sign of adulthood even if there are no hairs in them. The assumption is that follicles do not exist without hair, and therefore there must have been hairs there that fell out.
  This <i>halakha</i> was stated by a Sage by the name of Rav Malkiyyu. To prevent confusion between his rulings and those of the similarly named Rav Malkiyya, Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, says: The <i>halakha</i> involving a skewer, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to maidservants, and the <i>halakha</i> involving hair follicles were all stated by Rav Malkiyyu. By contrast, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the forelock [<i>belorit</i>], the <i>halakha</i> involving burnt ashes, and the <i>halakha</i> with regard to cheese were all stated by a different Sage named Rav Malkiyya.
  Rav Pappa says: The aforementioned <i>halakhot</i> that relate to a mishna or a <i>baraita</i> were stated by Rav Malkiyya, whereas <i>halakhot</i> that do not refer to a mishna or <i>baraita</i> but are independent statements of <i>amora’im</i> were taught by Rav Malkiyyu. And a mnemonic to remember this is: The mishna is a queen [<i>malketa</i>], i.e., the comments that are referring to a mishna were issued by Rav Malkiyya, whose name is similar to the Aramaic term for queen.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, and Rav Pappa? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to which Sage taught the <i>halakha</i> involving maidservants. Rav Pappa maintains that it was taught by Rav Malkiyya, as it is referring to a dispute in a mishna. By contrast, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, this <i>halakha</i> was stated by Rav Malkiyyu.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> of Rav Malkiyyu itself, concerning follicles, Rav Ashi says: Mar Zutra told me that Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura posed the following difficulty: If it is correct that follicles suffice as a sign of adulthood, let the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna not evade the issue, but rather let him teach us explicitly that follicles are a sign of adulthood even if they do not contain hair. The Gemara answers: If the mishna had taught us the case of follicles, I would say that they are not considered a sign of adulthood until there are two hairs in two follicles. By omitting any mention of follicles in the mishna, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that even two hairs in one follicle are a sign of adulthood.
  The Gemara asks: And is there actually a case like this, of two hairs in one follicle? But isn’t it written: “He crushes me with a tempest, and multiplies my wounds without cause” (Job 9:17); and Rava said with regard to this verse: Job blasphemed with a tempest, and with a tempest he was answered. He blasphemed with a tempest, as Job said before God: Master of the Universe, perhaps a tempest passed before You and You confused Iyyov, Job, with <i>oyev</i>, enemy. With a tempest he was answered, as the verse states: “Then the Lord answered
  
  Daf 52b
  
  Job out of the tempest, and said” (Job 38:1–3) to him: Greatest imbecile in the world! I have created many hairs on a person’s head, and for each and every hair I created its own distinct follicle, so that two hairs should not draw sustenance from one follicle. As, were two hairs to draw sustenance from one follicle, it would weaken a man’s vision. Now if I did not confuse one follicle with another, would I confuse a man named Iyyov with <i>oyev</i>? This indicates that two hairs do not grow from one follicle.
  The Gemara answers: It is not difficult; that statement above, that two hairs in one follicle is a valid sign of adulthood, is referring to the hairs in the rest of a person’s body, whereas this statement, that there cannot be two hairs in one follicle, is referring to the hairs on a person’s head.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The two hairs that the Sages said are signs of adulthood are valid signs even if they are not adjacent; but rather one hair is on the spoon-shaped area above his organ and one is on the young boy’s testicles.
  The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The two hairs that the Sages said are signs of adulthood are valid signs even if one hair is on the young girl’s back, below her pubic area, and one on her lower abdomen. The same applies if one hair is on the finger joints of her hand and one hair is on the toe joints of her foot. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, of the village of Akko, who said it in the name of Rabbi Shimon. And what do the Rabbis say about this matter? Rav Ḥisda says: According to the Rabbis, they are not a valid sign of adulthood unless the two hairs are in one place.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to when a young girl can perform refusal. According to the Rabbis, it is until she grows two pubic hairs after she reaches the age of twelve years and one day. According to Rabbi Yehuda she still retains the right to perform refusal at that point, until the majority of the pubic area is filled with hair. In this regard, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Until when can a young girl perform refusal? Until she grows two pubic hairs; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: She can perform refusal until the area covered by the black pubic hairs is greater than the white skin of the genital area. Rabbi Yosei says: Until the nipple is surrounded by hair. Ben Shelakot says: Until the pubic area is filled with hair.
  And Rabbi Shimon said: Ḥanina ben Ḥakhinai found me in the city of Tzaidan and said to me: When you reach Rabbi Akiva, say to him: Until when can a young girl perform refusal? If he says to you that she may perform refusal until she grows two pubic hairs, say to him: But didn’t ben Shelakot testify in the presence of all of you in Yavne that she may perform refusal until the pubic area is filled with hair [<i>shetekhalkel</i>], and you did not say anything to him, thereby indicating that you conceded to him?
  Rabbi Shimon continued: When I reached Rabbi Akiva, and I said what I had been told to say to him, he said to me: I do not know what this filling with hair [<i>kilkul</i>] is, I don’t know any ben Shelakot, and my opinion with regard to your question, until when can a young girl perform refusal, is that she can perform refusal until she grows two pubic hairs.
  MISHNA: The two white or black hairs that are mentioned with regard to disqualification of a red heifer; and the two white hairs mentioned with regard to leprous marks, i.e., that if they grow within a white leprous mark, it is impure; and the two hairs that are mentioned in every place, i.e., with regard to a young boy and girl, are significant only if they are long enough to bend the top of the hairs to reach their roots. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Eliezer says: They must be long enough to grasp them and cut them with a fingernail. Rabbi Akiva says: They must be long enough to be cut with a pair [<i>bezug</i>] of scissors.
  GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda says that Mar Ukva says with regard to the various opinions in the mishna on the measure of hairs: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statements of all of them to be stringent. One should consider it hair only if all of the criteria are met, or consider it to be hair if any one condition is met, depending on which standard yields the more stringent result.
  MISHNA: With regard to a woman who sees a red stain on her garment, that woman’s reckoning is distorted. Since she does not know when the blood that caused the stain appeared, she does not know when the seven days of menstrual flow end and when the eleven days of the flow of the <i>zava</i> begin.
  And therefore she must be concerned due to the possibility that it might have been caused by the flow of a <i>zava</i>. If she wore the same garment for three days on which she can assume the status of a <i>zava</i>, and subsequently discovered a stain with an area that is the size of at least three split beans, the concern is that on each of those three days a stain with the area of at least one split bean, the minimum area that transmits impurity, was formed. The result is that she is a greater <i>zava</i> and is required to count seven clean days before immersion. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: No configuration of stains leads to concern due to the flow of a <i>zava</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Who are the Rabbis in this mishna? It is Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: Stains do not lead to concern due to the flow of a <i>zava</i>, but stains can sometimes lead to <i>ziva</i>.
  How so, i.e., how can stains lead to <i>ziva</i> according to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus? If a woman wore three different robes that had been examined by her for blood stains, and she then found a stain on each of them; or if she saw blood flowing from her body on two consecutive days and on the third day she saw a stain on one of the robes that she wore that day, those are the stains that lead to <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the above statement: According to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, now that in a case where she sees stains on three robes we are concerned for <i>ziva</i>, despite the fact that she does not see the blood flowing from her body, is it necessary to state that we are concerned if she experiences bleeding from her body on two days and sees a stain on one of the robes?
  The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state that, lest you say that in any case like this, where she experiences bleeding from her body on two days and on the third day she sees a stain on one of the robes, she brings an offering and it is consumed, like one who is definitely a <i>zava</i>. Therefore, Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus teaches us that her status as a <i>zava</i> is uncertain, and consequently she brings a bird for a sin offering that is due to uncertainty, which is not eaten.
  Rava said: With this claim Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus bested the other Rabbis, who agree with the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the mishna: What is different about a stain that is less than three split beans in one place, that we are not concerned she might be a <i>zava</i>? The reason is that we say she saw blood on only two days. But in a case where she discovered a stain on her robe with the area of at least three split beans in one place, one can also say: The area of two and a half split beans should be attributed to blood seen from her body, but the other is the blood of a louse that was there due to the dirt associated with her bleeding.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: They maintain that since it is possible to divide the stain into at least one split bean for each of the three days, we do not attribute the stain to the blood of a louse.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the statement of Rava: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus, one can infer that it is specifically in the case of a stain with the area of at least three split beans in one place that we are not concerned she might be a <i>zava</i>. It can be inferred from here that if it is in three places, we are concerned. But didn’t you say that if she discovered stains in three robes, yes, we are concerned, which indicates that if it is in three places on a single robe we are not concerned.
  The Gemara answers that it was in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus stated his opinion to them, as follows: According to my opinion, if she discovered stains in three robes, yes we are concerned, whereas if it is in three places we are not concerned. But according to your opinion, at least concede to me that where she saw a stain on her robe with the area of at least three split beans in one place, that we say that the area of two and a half split beans can be attributed to blood seen from her body, and the other is the blood of a louse that was there due to the dirt associated with her bleeding.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: They maintain that since it is possible to divide the stain into at least one split bean for each of the three days, we do not attribute the stain to the blood of a louse.
  § With regard to a woman who finds a stain on her robe, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who sees a red stain on her garment that she wore for a number of days and she does not know when and where it is from, what is her status? If the area is large enough to be divided into three parts, where the total area is the size of three split beans, each of which is the minimum measure to render her a <i>zava</i>, i.e., an area the size of at least a split bean, she must be concerned that she is a <i>zava</i>, as this stain might be the result of seeing a sufficient measure of blood on each of three occasions. But if the stain is not that size, she does not need to be concerned.
  Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Both in this case, where she saw a stain large enough to be divided into three parts, where the total area is the size of three split beans, and that case, where the stain was not that large, she must be concerned that she might be a <i>zava</i>. This is due to the fact that she possibly saw stains of sufficient size on only two occasions, but one was during twilight, which counts as two days, amounting to a total of three days.
  
  Daf 53a
  
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra and the Rabbis should be decided as follows: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra, who maintains that there is a concern for the possibility that the woman might have seen blood at twilight, appears to be correct in a case where she did not examine. And the statement of the Rabbis, who are not concerned about that possibility, appears to be correct in a case where she did examine.
  The Gemara asks: What did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi mean by: Where she did examine, and what did he mean by: Where she did not examine? Rava says: I found the Sages in the study hall of Rav sitting and saying the following explanation of the <i>baraita</i>: Here we are dealing with a case where the woman examined herself but did not examine her robe. And even with regard to herself, she examined herself only during twilight [<i>bein hashemashot</i>] as defined by Rabbi Yehuda, i.e., the time it takes to walk a half <i>mil</i> before the emergence of the stars. But during twilight as defined by Rabbi Yosei, i.e., the blink of an eye before the emergence of the stars, she did not examine herself.
  As the Rabbis hold that during the period of twilight as defined by Rabbi Yosei it is already night, and therefore it does not matter that she did not examine herself then. And as she did examine herself during the period of twilight as defined by Rabbi Yehuda, and she found no blood, there is no concern that she saw during twilight, which would count as two sightings. And Rabbi Yosei conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rabbi Yosei, in whose name Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra said his ruling, stated that the time that he defines as twilight is considered uncertain, i.e., it is not definitely night or day, and therefore there is a concern that she might have seen blood at that time, which would count as seeing twice.
  Rava continues: And I said to those Sages: Had the woman’s hands been in her eyes, a euphemism for her private parts, for the entire twilight period, what you say would be fine. But now that this is not the case, perhaps when she removed her hands from examining herself she saw blood. And those Sages said to me: The case about which we said that opinion was where she placed her hands in her eyes for the entire twilight period.
  The Gemara further clarifies the <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra in the name of Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that one needs to be concerned for the possibility that the woman saw blood at twilight, which would count as though she saw blood twice, appears to be correct in a case where she did not examine. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: Where she did not examine?
  If we say that she examined herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yehuda as twilight, but she did not examine herself during the time period that is defined by Rabbi Yosei as twilight, this is difficult: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi accepted the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra only in such a case, this indicates, by inference, that Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra himself, whose ruling is more strict than that of the Rabbis, holds that even though she examined herself during the twilight period as defined by both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, she must be concerned. This conclusion is untenable, as she examined herself throughout twilight and there was no blood.
  Rather, it is obvious that when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi referred to a case where she did not examine herself, he meant that she examined herself neither during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight, nor during the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight. But if she examined herself during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight, but she did not examine herself during the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight, then she does not need to be concerned.
  Evidently, the time period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight is considered nighttime according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. But if so, say the latter clause: And the statement of the Rabbis appears to be correct in a case where she did examine. What is meant by: Where she did examine?
  If we say that she examined herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yehuda as twilight, but she did not examine herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yosei as twilight, this is difficult: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi accepted the opinion of the Rabbis only in such a case, this indicates by inference that the Rabbis themselves hold that even though she did not examine herself during the twilight period as defined by both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, nevertheless, we are not concerned. But in such a case, she did not examine herself at twilight at all.
  Rather, it is obvious that she examined herself both during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight, and during the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight. But if she examined herself during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight, and she did not examine herself during the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight, then we are concerned.
  Evidently, the time period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight is considered to be of uncertain status regarding whether it is day or night according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara asks: If so, one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi poses a difficulty for another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as the inferences from the two parts of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s observation contradict one another.
  The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra appears correct to the Rabbis in a case where she did not examine herself at all, neither during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight, nor during the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight. As, even the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra only in a case where she examined herself during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight but she did not examine herself during the time period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight. But in a case where she did not examine herself at all, they concede to him that we are concerned that she might have emitted blood at twilight.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who sees a red stain, if she saw a large stain, covering an area the size of at least three split beans, she must be concerned that she might be a <i>zava</i>. But if she saw a small stain, covering an area of less than the size of three split beans, she does not need to be concerned that she is a <i>zava</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra, who said it in the name of Rabbi Yosei.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: I heard from Rabbi Yosei that with regard to both this one and that one, i.e., whether it is a large or small stain, she must be concerned that she is a <i>zava</i>. And Rabbi Yosei said this <i>halakha</i> to me based on this reasoning: And what would be the case if a menstruating woman did not perform the examination marking the first step in her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on the seventh day from <i>minḥa</i> time onward? Would she not have a presumptive status of ritual impurity? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi added: And Rabbi Yosei’s statement appears to be correct with regard to the case where she examined.
  Once again, the Gemara asks: What is meant by the term: Where she examined? If we say that she examined herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yehuda as twilight, but she did not examine herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yosei as twilight, this indicates by inference that Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra, who disagrees in the second <i>baraita</i> with this version of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion and rules more leniently, holds that even though she did not examine herself during the twilight period as defined by both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, nevertheless, she does not need to be concerned that she is a <i>zava</i>. But this conclusion is untenable, as she did not examine herself at twilight at all.
  Rather, it is obvious that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is referring to a case where she examined herself both during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight and during the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight. This indicates, by inference, that Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra holds that if she examined herself during the period that Rabbi Yehuda defines as twilight, but she did not examine herself during the time period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight, then she does not need to be concerned, as a sighting at that time would not count as two.
  Evidently, the period that Rabbi Yosei defines as twilight is considered to be nighttime according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra. If so, one statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra poses a difficulty with regard to another statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra, as earlier it was stated that according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra twilight is not definitely night.
  Granted, without the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the apparent contradiction between these statements of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra in the two <i>baraitot</i> is not difficult, as one could explain as follows: There, with regard to the first <i>baraita</i>, it is referring to a case where she examined herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yehuda as twilight, but she did not examine herself during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yosei as twilight. By contrast, here it is referring to a case where she examined herself both during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yehuda as twilight and during the period that is defined by Rabbi Yosei as twilight. But in light of the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, one cannot explain in this manner, and therefore the contradiction poses a difficulty.
  The Gemara answers: This is not a contradiction, as there are two <i>tanna’im</i> and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra. This <i>tanna</i> holds that Rabbi Yehuda’s twilight ends,
  
  Daf 53b
  
  and only thereafter the twilight of Rabbi Yosei begins, when there is uncertainty, and there is a concern that perhaps she saw blood at that time. And that <i>tanna</i> of the second <i>baraita</i> holds that the twilight of Rabbi Yosei is subsumed within and occurs at the end of the twilight of Rabbi Yehuda. According to the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, since she examined herself throughout the twilight of Rabbi Yehuda, she also necessarily examined herself throughout the twilight of Rabbi Yosei and therefore there is no need to be concerned about her status.
  § On the topic of a woman seeing a stain, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman who sees a red stain on her garment renders herself and consecrated items that she touched impure retroactively, from the time when that garment was last laundered. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: She does render consecrated items that she touched impure retroactively, but she does not render herself impure with regard to rendering impure objects that she touched since the time the garment was last laundered. The reason is that her stain should not be more stringent than her actual seeing of blood. If she experiences bleeding, she renders impure only objects that she touched during the previous twenty-four-hour period.
  The Gemara asks: But don’t we find that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar himself holds that her stain is more stringent than her actual seeing of blood with regard to consecrated items? Her stain renders such items impure retroactively from the time that the garment was laundered, whereas her actually seeing blood renders impure only those items that she touched during the past twenty-four-hour period.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, teach the <i>baraita</i> like this: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that she does not even render consecrated items that she touched impure retroactively from the time that the garment was laundered, but only those items that she touched during the past twenty-four-hour period. The reason is that her stain should not be more stringent than her actual seeing of blood with regard to any matter.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who saw a red stain on her garment, and afterward saw blood, what is the <i>halakha</i>? She attributes her stain to her seeing blood, i.e., the stain is treated as part of the seeing of blood, which means that she is impure only from when she found the stain, as it assumed that it appeared no earlier. This is the <i>halakha</i> provided that she saw the blood within a twenty-four-hour period of her discovery of the stain. But if more than twenty-four hours passed, she cannot attribute the stain to her sighting. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: She may attribute the stain to the sighting only if she experienced bleeding on the day of discovering the stain. If she experienced bleeding after that day, even if it was within twenty-four hours, she may not attribute the stain to the sighting, which means that she is impure retroactively from when she found the stain, in case it appeared earlier. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar appears to be more correct than mine, as he fixes her situation, i.e., he is lenient, and I ruin her situation, as my ruling is stringent. Since the impurity of a stain applies by rabbinic law, one should follow the more lenient opinion.
  The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar actually fix her situation? Does he not ruin her situation? If she experiences bleeding the day after she found the stain, but within twenty-four hours of finding the stain, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar she renders items impure retroactively. By contrast, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi she renders objects impure only from when she discovered the stain. Ravina says: Reverse Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement, so that it states: My statement appears to be more correct than that of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as I fix her situation and he ruins her situation.
  Rav Naḥman says: Actually, do not reverse Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi meant the following: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s opinion appears to be more correct, as he fixes her <i>halakhot</i> with regard to <i>ziva</i>. If she experiences bleeding on the day after discovering the stain, the count of her seven days of menstrual flow begins on that day of her actual sighting, not from when she saw the stain. This is due to the fact that the stain is not attributable to the seeing of the blood. Therefore, if she experiences bleeding on the seventh day after first experiencing bleeding, which is the eighth day after discovering the stain, she is not considered a lesser <i>zava</i>, and she can be purified from her status as a menstruating woman.
  But I, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, ruin her <i>halakhot</i> with regard to <i>ziva</i>. Since the stain is attributable to the seeing of the blood within twenty-four hours, her counting starts from when she found the stain, and therefore the blood that she sees on the eighth day after discovering the stain is considered <i>ziva</i>. Consequently, she is considered a lesser <i>zava</i> and must observe a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge.
  § Rabbi Zeira asked Rabbi Asi: Are stains like the actual sight of blood, in that they require an examination in which she is clean of blood, marking the first step in her transition from impurity to purity before immersion on the night following the seventh day, or not? Rabbi Asi was silent and said nothing to Rabbi Zeira.
  The Gemara relates that on another occasion Rabbi Zeira found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying that a woman who sees a stain and afterward experiences bleeding attributes her stain to her seeing blood, if she saw the blood within a twenty-four-hour period of when she discovered the stain. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Asi added that there is a dispute with regard to the details of this <i>halakha</i>. Reish Lakish says: This applies only in a case where she examined herself at the end of the seventh day from the discovery of the stain. This examination indicates that the stain is related to her experiencing bleeding, and therefore the standard <i>halakha</i> of a woman who becomes pure at the end of her seven menstrual days applies to her. By contrast, if she examined herself only at the end of the eighth day, the stain is not attributable to her bleeding. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The stain is attributable to her bleeding under all circumstances, even if she did not examine herself until the eighth day.
  Upon hearing this, Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Does that mean, by inference, that stains require an examination marking the first step in her transition from impurity to purity? Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: Yes, that is the <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Zeira further said to Rabbi Asi: But on many occasions I asked you about this matter and you did not say anything to me. Perhaps in the course of your studies this <i>halakha</i> came back to you? Rabbi Asi said to him: Yes, in the course of my studies this <i>halakha</i> came back to me.
  MISHNA: In the case of a woman who sees an emission of blood during twilight on the eleventh day of the days in which she can assume the status of a <i>zava</i>, as there is uncertainty whether the emission was during the day and it is the flow of a <i>zava</i> or whether it was at night and it is menstrual flow, she observes seven days of impurity like the beginning of the seven days of menstruation and the end of menstruation. If she experienced an emission on the two previous days as well, she observes seven clean days before immersion like the beginning of the flow of <i>ziva</i> and the end of the flow of <i>ziva</i>.
  Similarly, in the case of a woman who experiences an emission of blood during twilight on the fortieth day after the birth of a male or the eightieth day after the birth of a female, there is uncertainty whether it is considered daytime and therefore part of the final day of the blood of purity, or night that is part of the following day when the blood is impure. With regard to experiencing bleeding during twilight in all those cases, these women are mistaken in their calculation of the days of menstrual flow and the flow of a <i>zava</i>. Consequently, if they experience bleeding for three consecutive days at the beginning or at the end of the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>, they bring the offering of a <i>zava</i> but it is not eaten, as it was brought based on uncertainty.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said: Instead of making provisions to remedy the uncertainties of the misguided, come and remedy the uncertainties of the competent women who know what day they saw the blood but require guidance, due to the multitude of emissions that they experienced.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a woman experiences bleeding during twilight on the eleventh day of the days on which she can assume the status of a <i>zava</i>, the flow is considered to be the beginning of the seven days of menstruation and the end of menstruation. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the concern is only that this flow might be either the beginning of the seven days of menstruation, if twilight is treated as night, or the end of <i>ziva</i>, if twilight is treated as day.
  Rav Ḥisda says that this is what the mishna is saying: A woman who sees an emission of blood during twilight on the eleventh day of the days on which she can assume the status of a <i>zava</i> must be concerned both for the possibility that it is the beginning of the seven days of menstruation and for the possibility that it is the end of the flow of <i>ziva</i>. If she had also seen an emission on the two previous days, she observes seven clean days before immersion, due to uncertainty.
  With regard to the continuation of the mishna, which states: The beginning of the flow of <i>ziva</i> and the end of the flow of <i>ziva</i>, this should be understood as follows: And in the case of a woman who experiences an emission of blood during twilight on the seventh day of the seven days of the flow of her menstruation, she must be concerned both for the possibility that it is the end of the seven days of menstruation and for the possibility that it is the beginning of the flow of <i>ziva</i>.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehoshua said to the Rabbis: Instead of making provisions to remedy the uncertainties of the misguided, come and remedy the uncertainties of the competent women. The Gemara asks: Are these women who experience bleeding during twilight
  
  Daf 54a
  
  actually misguided? Since they are in doubt as to their status, would it not be more accurate to say that they are mistaken? The Gemara answers: Rather, this is how one should teach the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua in the mishna: Instead of making provisions to remedy the uncertainties of the mistaken, come and remedy the uncertainties of the competent women.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to these competent women: What is the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a woman who consistently has the following pattern for each pair of days: One day she is impure, i.e., she experiences bleeding, and one day she is pure, she does not experience bleeding? In what manner is it permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband? She may engage in intercourse with her husband on the eighth day from the first time that she experienced bleeding and its accompanying night. At that time she is pure from her menstruation, as she immersed and purified herself on the night of the seventh day. It is permitted for her to engage in intercourse during the eighth day and the following night, as she will not experience bleeding until the ninth day.
  In addition, she may engage in intercourse four nights out of the cycle of eighteen days, which consist of the seven menstrual days and the eleven days of the flow of the <i>zava</i>. This woman will never become a greater <i>zava</i>, as she does not emit blood on consecutive days. Since she must observe a day of purity during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> each time she experiences bleeding, she may engage in intercourse with her husband on the night following the tenth, twelfth, fourteen, and sixteenth days. The night after the eighteenth day is considered part of the next cycle of menstruation and <i>ziva</i>. But if she sees blood in the evening, she may engage in intercourse with her husband only on the eighth night and its day. During the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> she either experiences bleeding at night or is observing a day of purity for the blood she had emitted earlier.
  If in every set of four days, two days she is impure, i.e., experiences bleeding, and two days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband on the eighth day, in the day or at night, and also on the twelfth day, after observing the eleventh as a day of purity for the sightings of the ninth and tenth days, and by a similar calculation on the sixteenth day and on the twentieth day, as she has not yet seen the blood of menstruation in this new cycle.
  The Gemara objects: And let her also engage in intercourse with her husband on the nineteenth day, as the eleven days of the flow of the <i>zava</i> have already passed at the end of the eighteenth day, and she is no longer required to observe a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge. Rav Sheshet says: That is to say that when we learned in a mishna (72a) that a husband who could not wait for the conclusion of the day after the last day of <i>ziva</i> before engaging in intercourse is a glutton, it means that it is actually prohibited for them to engage in intercourse.
  Rav Ashi says: In fact, it is not prohibited for a woman to engage in intercourse with her husband on the day after the end of the days of the flow of the <i>zava</i> even by rabbinic decree, as it is already the beginning of her menstrual days, and she is no longer required to observe a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge. But although there is no requirement to observe a clean day for the eleventh day of <i>ziva</i>, which is the eighteenth day of the full cycle, in any event there is a requirement to observe a clean day for the tenth day, i.e., the seventeenth of the entire cycle. Since she did not observe a clean day on the eighteenth day, as she saw blood on that day as well, she must observe the nineteenth day in purity.
  If out of every set of six days, three days she is impure, and three days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband during two of the days, and thereafter she may never again engage in intercourse with him. The eighth and ninth days, which are the first days of the flow of <i>ziva</i>, are the second and third of the three days on which she experiences bleeding. Therefore, she can immerse and purify herself on the night of the eleventh, and engage in intercourse with her husband on the eleventh and twelfth days. These are the only two days on which she is permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband, as afterward she will experience bleeding for three days during the days of the flow of the <i>zava</i>, and is thereby rendered a greater <i>zava</i>. Accordingly, she requires seven clean days to become pure again, which she will never attain, as she never has more than three clean days.
  If out of every set of eight days, four days she is impure, and four days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband during one of the days, the eighth, after her purification for menstruation, as it is the last of her first set of four days without blood, and thereafter she may never again engage in intercourse with him, as she will be rendered a greater <i>zava</i> by experiencing bleeding on the next three days.
  If out of every set of ten days, five days she is impure, and five days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband during three of the days, i.e., the eighth, ninth, and tenth, as she has completed her menstruation period and has not yet emitted the blood of <i>ziva</i>, and thereafter she may never again engage in intercourse with him. Similarly, if out of every set of twelve days, six days she is impure, and six days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband during five of the days, i.e., the eighth to the twelfth, and thereafter she may never again engage in intercourse with him.
  If out of every set of fourteen days, seven days she is impure, and seven days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband during a quarter of the days of her life, i.e., seven out of every twenty-eight days. In the first seven days she is a menstruating woman, but during the next seven days she is pure. In the third set of seven days, when she again experiences bleeding, she becomes a <i>zava</i>, which means that in her last seven days, which are without blood, she counts the clean days for her <i>ziva</i>, after which this cycle of twenty-eight days begins afresh.
  If out of every set of sixteen days, eight days she is impure, and eight days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband fifteen days out of every forty-eight days. The first eight days during which she experiences bleeding are the seven days of menstruation and one day of <i>ziva</i>, which renders her a lesser <i>zava</i>. Therefore, she must observe one clean day, after which she is pure for seven days. The first two days of the third set of eight are her last days of <i>ziva</i>, and the bleeding she experiences renders her again a lesser <i>zava</i>, while the next six are during her days of menstruation. Then she starts her fourth set of eight days, which are without blood. The first of these completes her days of menstruation, after which she may engage in intercourse for the subsequent seven days. During the fifth set of eight days she experiences bleeding, rendering her a greater <i>zava</i>. She counts her clean days in the sixth set, leaving her one day of purity, after which the cycle of forty-eight days starts again.
  The Gemara objects: But the days during which she is permitted are actually only fourteen, not fifteen. This objection is based on the assumption that a woman cannot count her clean days for <i>ziva</i> during days that are fit for menstruation. Consequently, the last four days of the fifth cycle are actually part of her days of menstruation, as her eleven days of <i>ziva</i> ended after the fourth day of that cycle. If so, the sixth set of eight days consists of three menstrual days followed by five days of <i>ziva</i>. Although she is not a menstruating woman in those three days, as she did not previously count seven clean days, they still do not count for her seven clean days of <i>ziva</i>, since they are fit to be menstrual days. She can start counting her seven clean days only on day forty-four, but on day forty-nine, before the seven clean days are finished, she will again experience bleeding. Therefore, it should not be permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband on the forty-eighth night.
  Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak says that this premise should be rejected: That is to say that her menstrual days on which she does not actually see blood do count toward her counting of her seven clean days of <i>ziva</i>. In other words, she begins counting the seven clean days during these menstrual days. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to this issue:
  
  Daf 54b
  
  What is the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a woman who gave birth when she was a <i>zava</i>? There are seven days of impurity following the birth of a son and fourteen days of impurity following the birth of a daughter, during which the mother is impure even if she did not experience bleeding. With regard to those days during this period on which she does not see blood, are they reckoned in the counting of her seven clean days required to become purified from the status of <i>ziva</i>?
  Rav Kahana says: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: A woman saw blood on two consecutive days during the period of <i>ziva</i>, and on the third day she miscarried, but she does not know what she miscarried, i.e., whether it was a stillborn human fetus for which a woman contracts the impurity of childbirth, or whether she discharged an amorphous piece of tissue. In addition, she does not know whether she emitted blood during the miscarriage.
  In such a case, it is uncertain whether she has the status of one who experienced <i>ziva</i> or whether she has the status of a woman who gave birth. If she gave birth to a fetus and did not emit blood, she is a woman after childbirth but not a <i>zava</i>. If the discharge was an amorphous piece of tissue and she saw blood, she is a <i>zava</i>. If it was a human fetus and she saw blood, she is one who gives birth as a <i>zava</i>. Finally, if she did not emit blood and it was a discharge of an amorphous piece of tissue, she is not obligated to bring an offering at all.
  Consequently, she brings an offering but it is not eaten by the priests, as it is uncertain whether it is an offering of <i>ziva</i> or an offering for her childbirth, or whether it is non-sacred. And the days of impurity following this uncertain birth, on which she does not see blood, are reckoned in the counting of her seven clean days required to become purified from the status of <i>ziva</i>. This resolves the dilemma raised by the Sages.
  Rav Pappa says that this does not resolve the dilemma, as it is different there, since it can be said that she is a woman who gave birth to a male, and it is only for that reason that all of these additional seven days that we give her due to the concern that she might have given birth to a female, which would render her impure for fourteen days, are reckoned in the counting of her seven clean days of <i>ziva</i>. But if it was certain that she gave birth to a female, those days after the birth would not count toward her period of <i>ziva</i>.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: Is there uncertainty that perhaps she is a woman who gave birth to a male, but there is no uncertainty that she might be a woman who gave birth to a female? In fact, both possibilities must be taken into account. And yet, despite the fact that she might have given birth to a female, these seven days are included in the counting of her seven clean days. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that such days are reckoned in the counting? The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that these days do count.
  The Gemara concludes its citation of the <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman whose set pattern is that nine days she is impure, i.e., experiences bleeding, and nine days she is pure, she may engage in intercourse with her husband during eight days out of eighteen. The last two days of the nine with blood are part of her <i>ziva</i> period, after which she must observe one clean day, leaving her with eight days when she may engage in intercourse before the cycle begins again.
  In the case of a woman whose set pattern is that ten days she is impure and ten days she is pure, the number of days of her being permitted to engage in intercourse with her husband is equivalent to the number of days of her experiencing the flow of <i>ziva</i>. In the first seven days she is a menstruating woman, followed by three days of blood that render her a <i>zava</i>. She must count seven of the ten days without blood to be purified from her <i>ziva</i>, which leaves her three days in which she may engage in intercourse, exactly the same as the three days of <i>ziva</i> on which she saw blood. And so too, the same applies in the case of one hundred days, as she experiences bleeding of <i>ziva</i> for ninety-three days, and is subsequently permitted to her husband for ninety-three days, and so too in the case of one thousand days.
  
  MISHNA: The blood of a menstruating woman and the flesh of a corpse transmit impurity by contact and by carrying when they are moist, and likewise transmit impurity when they are dry. But with regard to the gonorrhea-like discharge of a <i>zav</i> [<i>ziva</i>], and the mucus and the saliva of a <i>zav</i>, and the carcass of a creeping animal, and an animal carcass, and semen, all transmit impurity when they are moist but do not transmit impurity when they are dry. And if one could soak those dry substances in water and thereby restore them to their previous state, they transmit impurity when moist and transmit impurity when dry.
  The mishna asks: And how long is the process of soaking these substances that determines whether they can be restored to their previous state? This is referring to soaking them in lukewarm water for a twenty-four-hour period. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to the flesh of a corpse that is dry and cannot be soaked to restore it to its previous state, it is ritually pure, in the sense that an olive-bulk of the flesh does not transmit impurity imparted by a corpse. But a ladleful of the flesh transmits the impurity of the decayed flesh of a corpse.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the blood of a menstruating woman transmits impurity by contact and by carrying both when moist and when dry. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Ḥizkiyya says: They are derived from a verse, as the verse states with regard to a menstruating woman: “This is the law of him that has an issue…And of her who experiences the flow of her menstrual impurity” (Leviticus 15:32–33). The verse compares the status of the menstrual flow to that of the menstruating woman. This teaches that the status of the menstrual flow is like the status of the woman herself: Just as she transmits impurity by contact and by carrying, so too, the menstrual flow transmits impurity by contact and by carrying.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the impurity of the menstrual blood when it is moist, since it is called the menstrual flow; from where do we derive that dry menstrual blood also transmits impurity? Rabbi Yitzḥak says that the verse states with regard to menstrual impurity: “And if a woman should have an issue, and her issue in her flesh shall be blood, she shall be in her impurity seven days, and whoever touches her shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:19). The term “shall be” indicates that the blood shall remain in its impure status even once it is dry.
  The Gemara objects: But one may say that this statement applies only to blood that was initially moist and subsequently became dry, as it retains its initial status. With regard to blood that was dry at the outset, from where do we derive that it too transmits impurity? And furthermore, this inference does not provide a source for that which we learned in a mishna (21a): In the case of a woman who discharges an item whose shape is similar to a type of shell, similar to a type of soil, similar to a type of hair, or similar to a type of mosquito, if such items are red, she should cast them into water to ascertain their nature. If they dissolved, it is blood, and the woman is impure. From where do we derive that even this type of blood is impure? The Gemara explains: The term “shall be” is an amplification, indicating that menstrual blood in all these forms is impure.
  The Gemara objects: If so, one can likewise infer the following: Just as she, a menstruating woman, renders an item designated for lying or sitting impure to the extent that it transmits impurity to a person and to the extent that that person transmits impurity to his garments, despite the fact that the garments did not come into contact with the couch, so too, her blood also renders items designated for lying or sitting impure to the extent that they transmit impurity to a person and to the extent that he transmits impurity to his garments, in the manner of a primary source of ritual impurity. The Gemara replies: Is that to say that the concepts of lying and sitting apply to her menstrual blood? These categories of impurity are limited to people.
  The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning that this category of impurity is limited to people, do the concepts of lying and sitting apply to a stone afflicted with leprosy, so that a verse was necessary to exclude it? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that a stone afflicted with leprosy should render an item designated for lying or sitting impure to the extent that it transmits impurity to a person and to the extent that he transmits impurity to his garments.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: And this ruling might be derived by logical inference: If one enters a house where there is a stone afflicted with leprosy he becomes impure, but one who enters a house together with a man who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] does not become impure. One may therefore infer as follows: If a <i>zav</i>, who does not transmit impurity by entering a house, nevertheless renders an item designated for lying or sitting impure to the extent that it transmits impurity to a person and to the extent that that person transmits impurity to his garments, then with regard to a stone afflicted with leprosy, which does transmit impurity by entering a house, is it not logical that it renders an item designated for lying or sitting impure to the extent that it transmits impurity to a person and to the extent that he transmits impurity to the garments he is wearing?
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Therefore, the verse states: “Every bed upon which the <i>zav</i> lies shall be impure, and every item upon which he sits shall be impure” (Leviticus 15:4). The term “the <i>zav</i>” indicates that only the <i>zav</i>, and not a stone afflicted with leprosy, renders items designated for lying or sitting impure. The Gemara infers from the <i>baraita</i>: The reason a stone afflicted with leprosy does not transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting is that the verse excluded it, but were it not so, the stone would transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting, despite the fact that the concepts of lying and sitting do not apply to a stone.
  The Gemara replies that from this same derivation one can infer that menstrual blood does not render items designated for lying or sitting impure: Didn’t you say that the term “the <i>zav</i>” teaches that only the <i>zav</i>, and not a stone afflicted with leprosy, renders items designated for lying or sitting impure? So too, a verse excludes menstrual blood from this category of impurity, as the verse states: “And he if is on the bed, or on any item upon which she sits, when he touches it, he shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:23). The term “she” indicates that she, the menstruating woman, but not her blood, transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting.
  
  Daf 55a
  
  The Gemara raises an objection: There is a unique <i>halakha</i> with regard to the impurity of a <i>zav</i> and a menstruating woman: In a case where one of them sits on an item, including one that cannot become ritually impure, e.g., a stone, and beneath that item is a vessel, that vessel becomes impure, even if their weight has no effect on the vessel, as in the case of a very heavy stone. If the verse compares the status of the menstrual blood to the status of the menstruating woman, as derived above, one can infer as follows: Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity to items that lie beneath a very heavy stone, so too, her menstrual flow also transmits impurity to items that lie beneath a very heavy stone.
  Rav Ashi said in response: Items designated for lying or sitting also transmit impurity to items that lie beneath a very heavy stone. The verse states with regard to an item of this kind, which was rendered impure by a <i>zav</i>: “And whoever touches anything that was under him shall be impure until the evening, and he that carries them shall wash his clothes, and bathe himself in water, and he shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:10). The term “them” is an exclusion, indicating that items designated for lying or sitting transmit impurity to items that lie beneath a very heavy stone, but menstrual blood does not.
  § The mishna teaches: And the flesh of a corpse transmits impurity both when moist and when dry. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? Reish Lakish said that this is as the verse states: “Or whoever touches any creeping thing by which he may be made impure, or a man from whom he may be made impure, from any impurity that he has” (Leviticus 22:5). The term “from any” is an amplification, indicating that one may become impure from any impurities that come from a dead person, whether they are moist or dry.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said that this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “And whoever touches in the open field one who is slain with a sword, or one who died, or the bone of a man, or a grave, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:16). The verse indicates that the impurity of a dead man is similar to the impurity of a bone: Just as a bone is dry, so too here, with regard to the impurity of a corpse, it transmits impurity even when it is dry.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the inferences of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers that the practical difference between them is the case of a corpse which is so dry that it crumbles. Reish Lakish maintains it is impure, as the term “from any” indicates that a corpse transmits impurity in any form, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains it is ritually pure, as it is unlike a bone, which does not crumble.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: The flesh of a corpse that crumbled is ritually pure. The Gemara answers that this is not difficult, as the <i>baraita</i> there is referring to where the flesh is so dry that it has become like flour and is therefore classified as dust.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinions of both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 3:3): Everything that is in a corpse transmits impurity, except for the teeth, and the hair, and the nails. This is the <i>halakha</i> only when these items are separated from the body, but when they are attached to the corpse they are all impure. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan teeth should transmit impurity because they are similar to bones, while according to Reish Lakish they should be included in the term “from any.”
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Only items that are similar to a bone transmit impurity: Just as a bone is an item that was created with him at the time of birth, so too, all items that transmit impurity are those that were created with him, whereas teeth are not present at the time of birth. The Gemara asks: But are there not the cases of hair and nails, which were created with him, and yet the mishna states that they are ritually pure?
  Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said a different explanation: Only those items that are similar to a bone transmit impurity: Just as a bone is an item that was created with him and its root does not renew itself, i.e., if a bone is removed a new bone does not grow in its place, so too, any item that was created with him and whose root does not renew itself transmits impurity. The teeth were excluded from this category, as they were not created with him. The hair and nails were excluded, as even though they were created with him their roots renew themselves, since they grow again after they are cut off.
  The Gemara objects: But isn’t there the case of skin, whose root renews itself, and this is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 54a): In the case of an animal whose hide was removed [<i>hageluda</i>], Rabbi Meir deems it kosher, as the skin renews itself, and the Rabbis deem it an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>] and unfit for consumption. The Gemara explains: And even the Rabbis deem it unfit only due to the fact that in the meantime, between the removal of the old hide and the growth of the new one, the air affects it and as a result it will die, but they concede that actually the skin’s root renews itself. And nevertheless we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 122a): These are the entities whose skin has the same halakhic status as their flesh: The skin of a dead person, and the skin of a domesticated pig…and the skin of the hump of a young camel, etc.
  The Gemara explains that it was stated with regard to that mishna that Ulla said: By Torah law, the skin of a dead person is ritually pure. And what is the reason the Sages said that it is impure? It is a rabbinic decree lest a person should fashion rugs for a donkey out of the skins of his deceased father and mother.
  And some say a different version of the above discussion: Isn’t there the case of skin, whose root does not renew itself, and this is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 54a): In the case of an animal whose hide was removed, Rabbi Meir deems it kosher, and the Rabbis deem it a <i>tereifa</i> and unfit for consumption, as its skin does not regrow? The Gemara explains: And even Rabbi Meir deems it fit only because the flesh cools and the animal heals, but he concedes that actually the skin’s root does not renew itself. Accordingly, the skin of a corpse should be impure. But Ulla said: By Torah law, the skin of a dead person is ritually pure.
  The Gemara answers that when the opinion of Ulla was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of that mishna: And for all of these skins, in a case where one tanned them or where one spread them on the ground and trod on them for the same amount of time it takes for tanning, they are no longer classified as flesh and are ritually pure, except for the skin of a dead person, which maintains the status of flesh. And with regard to this Ulla said that by Torah law the skin of a dead person, when one tanned it, is ritually pure. And what is the reason the Sages said it is impure? It is a rabbinic decree lest a person should fashion rugs out of the skin of his deceased father and mother.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the case of flesh, whose root renews itself, as when one’s flesh is cut it regrows and heals, and yet it is impure? Mar bar Rav Ashi says: Flesh does not renew itself, as although when someone is cut his flesh regrows and heals, a scar is formed in its place.
  § The mishna teaches: But <i>ziva</i> transmits impurity when moist, although not when dry. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that <i>ziva</i> transmits impurity? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that discusses the verse: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue, it is impure” (Leviticus 15:2). This taught with regard to <i>ziva</i> that it is impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: Why is this derivation necessary? Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? Since <i>ziva</i> causes impurity to others, i.e., to the one who emitted the discharge, is it not all the more so that <i>ziva</i> itself is impure? The <i>baraita</i> replies that the case of the scapegoat brought on Yom Kippur may prove that this inference is not valid, as it causes impurity to others, i.e., the dispatcher of the scapegoat is rendered impure, and yet the goat itself is pure. So too, you should not be surprised about this, the discharge of <i>ziva</i>, that even though it causes impurity to others, <i>ziva</i> itself is pure. Therefore, the verse states: “His issue, it is impure.” This taught with regard to <i>ziva</i> that it is impure.
  The Gemara objects: But one may say that this statement, that the discharge of <i>ziva</i> transmits impurity, applies only to transmitting impurity by contact. But with regard to transmitting impurity by carrying it does not transmit impurity, just as it is with regard to the carcass of a creeping animal, which transmits impurity by contact but not by carrying. Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: A verse was not necessary to teach that <i>ziva</i> transmits ritual impurity by contact, as the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>ziva</i> is no less stringent than with regard to semen, which transmits impurity by contact.
  
  Daf 55b
  
  When the verse was necessary, it was to teach that <i>ziva</i> transmits impurity by carrying. The Gemara asks: And yet one may say that <i>ziva</i> transmits impurity to a person and to his garments only by carrying, but as for impurity by contact, although <i>ziva</i> transmits impurity to the person who touches it, it does not transmit impurity to his garments, just as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to contact with an unslaughtered animal carcass. If one touches a carcass he is rendered impure but his garments remain pure, despite the fact that if one carries a carcass his garments are also rendered impure.
  The Gemara answers: This could not enter your mind, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that <i>Aḥerim</i> say, with regard to the verse: “This is the law of him that has an issue…And of her who experiences the flow of her menstrual impurity, and of one who emits his issue [<i>zovo</i>], in the case of a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:32–33). The verse juxtaposes the impurity of the issue of the <i>zav</i> to the impurity of the <i>zav</i> himself: Just as with regard to him you did not distinguish between impurity transmitted by contact with him and impurity transmitted by carrying him, as in both cases the <i>zav</i> transmits impurity to a person and transmits impurity to his garments, so too, with regard to the issue of the <i>zav</i> the <i>halakha</i> is the same.
  The Gemara asks: And now that we have derived the impurity of the discharge of a <i>zav</i> from the verse: “And of one who emits his issue” (Leviticus 15:33), why do I need the verse: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue, it is impure” (Leviticus 15:2)?
  Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: This verse was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that the case of the scapegoat may prove that the discharge of a <i>zav</i> is not impure, as the scapegoat causes impurity to others and yet the goat itself is pure. Likewise, one might conclude that although the discharge of a <i>zav</i> causes impurity to others, <i>ziva</i> itself is pure. And if one were to dismiss this possibility, due to the verse: “And of one who emits his issue [<i>zovo</i>], in the case of a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33), one could reply that it does not indicate the impurity of <i>ziva</i>. Rather, it comes to teach the number of emissions by which one becomes impure with the impurity of a <i>zav</i>.
  Rav Yehuda of Diskarta clarifies this interpretation of the verse. The term: An issue [<i>zov</i>], would indicate one emission of <i>ziva</i>. Since the verse uses the term “his issue [<i>zovo</i>],” the superfluous addition indicates two emissions of <i>ziva</i>. With regard to these two emissions, the verse states: “In the case of a male,” indicating that the status of a male <i>zav</i> differs from the status of a female <i>zava</i> in that he is not rendered impure if the emission occurred due to an accident, which would render a female impure. But in the case of the third emission of <i>ziva</i> the Merciful One juxtaposed the status of a male <i>zav</i> to that of a female, as the verse states: “Or a female,” indicating that even if the third emission was due to an accident he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering.
  Since one would not have derived the impurity of <i>ziva</i> from this verse, the Merciful One wrote: “His issue, it is impure” (Leviticus 15:2). And now that the Merciful One states: “His issue, it is impure,” one may derive from the verse “and of one who emits his issue” not only the number of emissions, but also this interpretation, that there is no difference between the impurity imparted by <i>ziva</i> by contact and by carrying.
  § The mishna teaches: And the mucus and the saliva of a <i>zav</i> transmit impurity when moist but not when dry. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the ritual impurity of the saliva of a <i>zav</i>? The Gemara answers that this is derived as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And if one who has an issue spits on the pure person, then he shall wash his clothes, and bathe himself in water, and he is impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:8). One might have thought that the saliva transmits impurity even if the <i>zav</i> merely spat in the direction of a pure person, despite the fact that it did not come into contact with him. Therefore, the verse states: “And if one who has an issue spits on the pure person,” which teaches that unless the saliva comes into contact with the pure person he is not rendered impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: I have derived only that his saliva is impure. From where is it derived that his phlegm, his mucus, and his nasal fluids are also impure? The verse states: “And if one who has an issue spits.” The superfluous “and” is an amplification, indicating that these substances also transmit impurity.
  The Master said above: One might have thought that the saliva transmits impurity even if the <i>zav</i> merely spat in the direction of a pure person, despite the fact that it did not come into contact with him. The Gemara asks: From where would this be derived? Why would one think that a person becomes impure from saliva that did not come into contact with him, making it necessary for a verse to exclude this possibility?
  The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that we should derive a verbal analogy from the term saliva in the verse “and if one who has an issue spits,” and the term saliva stated in connection with a <i>yevama</i>, a widow whose husband died childless and who participates in <i>ḥalitza</i>, as the verse states: “His <i>yevama</i> shall approach him, before the Elders, and remove his shoe from on his foot and spit before him” (Deuteronomy 25:9). Just as there, with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>, the ritual is valid even though the saliva did not touch her brother-in-law, so too here, with regard to the saliva of a <i>zav</i>, it transmits impurity despite the fact that it did not come into contact with the pure person. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the saliva of a <i>zav</i> transmits impurity only if it comes into contact with the pure person.
  The Gemara objects: And yet one may say that this statement, that the saliva of a <i>zav</i> transmits impurity, applies only to transmitting impurity by contact. But with regard to transmitting impurity by carrying it does not transmit impurity, just as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the carcass of a creeping animal, which transmits impurity by contact but not by carrying. Reish Lakish said that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And if one who has an issue spits on the pure person.” The term “on the pure person” is interpreted to mean that in any case where something of the saliva is in the hand of the pure person I deemed him impure for you, even if he did not come into direct contact with the saliva but merely carried it.
  The Gemara objects: But one may say that although the saliva of a <i>zav</i> transmits impurity both by carrying and by contact, nevertheless there is the following difference between them: By carrying the saliva of a <i>zav</i>, it transmits impurity to a person and to his garments, but by contact, although it transmits impurity to the person who touches it, it does not transmit impurity to his garments, just as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to contact with an unslaughtered animal carcass.
  Reish Lakish said, and so too the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that the verse states: “And if one who has an issue spits on the pure person.” The term “on the pure person” teaches that a case of purity, i.e., that which I deemed pure for you in a different case, I have deemed impure for you here. And which case is this? This is referring to contact with an animal carcass, which renders only the one touching it impure, but not his garments, whereas the saliva of a <i>zav</i> renders them both impure.
  The Gemara objects: But one can say that the case deemed pure elsewhere but deemed impure here is that of carrying the carcass of a creeping animal. Perhaps the verse is teaching that whereas a creeping animal does not transmit impurity by carrying, the saliva of a <i>zav</i> does transmit impurity by carrying. By contrast, contact with the saliva of a <i>zav</i> renders only the one touching it impure, but not his garments, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an animal carcass. The Gemara responds: If that is so, let the verse write: If one who has an issue spits on the person. What is the reason the verse states specifically: “On the pure person”? Conclude two conclusions from it, both that the saliva of a <i>zav</i> transmits impurity by carrying and that contact with the saliva renders impure both the person and his garments.
  § The aforementioned <i>baraita</i> teaches: And the nasal fluids of a <i>zav</i> also transmit impurity. The Gemara asks: What are these nasal fluids? Rav says: This is referring to fluids that are emitted via the mouth of a person. They are impure because it is impossible for the nasal fluids to flow through the mouth without containing traces of saliva, which are impure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>baraita</i> is referring even to fluids that are emitted via the nose. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that nasal fluids are categorized as a flow of bodily fluids, and the Merciful One included it among the impure bodily fluids of a <i>zav</i>, by the amplification: “And if one who has an issue spits.”
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rav, who maintains that nasal fluids are impure because they contain traces of saliva, this is difficult: Let the mishna also count among the impure bodily fluids of the <i>zav</i> the tears of his eye, as Rav said: He who desires to blind his eye should have a gentile paint [<i>likhḥol</i>] his eye, as the gentile is apt to add a substance that causes blindness. And Levi said: He who desires to die should have a gentile paint his eye, as the gentile is apt to add poison to the paint.
  The Gemara continues: And Rav Ḥiyya bar Gurya said: What is the reasoning of Rav, that he did not say like Levi: He who desires to die should have a gentile paint his eye? Rav did not say this because he maintains one can prevent the poisonous substances from killing him, since he can suck the poisonous substances into his mouth by inhaling and emit them via the mouth. This indicates that the fluids of the eye can also be emitted through the mouth, and if so, the tears of a <i>zav</i> should likewise transmit impurity. The Gemara answers: And Rav would say that although the poison [<i>dezihara</i>] placed in one’s eye can exit the body via the mouth, the tears themselves do not exit the body through the mouth.
  The Gemara states: With regard to the above dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan, come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: There are nine types of fluids of the <i>zav</i>. The sweat, the foul secretion from an infected wound, and the excrement are pure from any form of impurity. The tears that emerge from his eye, the blood from his wound, and the milk of a woman who is a <i>zava</i> all transmit the ritual impurity of liquids, i.e., they render food and liquids impure, as other impure liquids do, in a situation where there is at least a quarter-<i>log</i> of the fluid. But his <i>ziva</i>, his saliva, and his urine all transmit a severe form of ritual impurity. The Gemara comments: The <i>baraita</i> lists many substances, and yet it does not teach that nasal fluids are impure.
  Granted, according to the opinion of Rav, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> does not teach that nasal fluids are impure, as he could not teach it categorically, since sometimes the nasal fluid comes via the mouth, and is impure, and sometimes it comes via the nose, and is not impure. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, let the <i>tanna</i> teach that nasal fluids are impure.
  The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, does this <i>tanna</i> teach that his phlegm and his mucus are impure? Rather, he taught that saliva is impure, and this includes the impurity of all substances that are derived from its amplification, e.g., his phlegm and his mucus. Here too, with regard to nasal fluids, the <i>tanna</i> taught the <i>halakha</i> of his saliva, and this includes all substances that are derived from its amplification, including nasal fluids.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that in the case of a <i>zav</i> or <i>zava</i>, the tears of their eyes and the blood from their wounds, as well as the milk of a <i>zava</i>, all transmit the ritual impurity of liquids. The Gemara cites the source for these cases of impurity: The tears of his eye are classified as a liquid, as it is written: “You have fed them with the bread of tears, and given them tears to drink in great measure” (Psalms 80:6). And the blood from his wound is classified as a liquid, as it is written: “And he shall drink the blood of the slain” (Numbers 23:24). Although the verse is referring to the blood of a dead person, and not to the blood of a wound, what difference does it make to me if one killed all of him, and what difference does it make to me if one killed part of him, i.e., wounded him? With regard to the milk of a woman, it too is classified as a liquid, as it is written: “And she opened the bottle of milk, and gave him to drink” (Judges 4:19).
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that the urine of a <i>zav</i> transmits a severe form of ritual impurity, as do his <i>ziva</i> and his saliva. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the urine of a <i>zav</i> is impure? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue, it is impure. And this shall be his impurity” (Leviticus 15:2–3). The term “and this” comes to include his urine with regard to a severe form of ritual impurity. The <i>baraita</i> asks: And could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? If saliva, which comes from a place of purity, i.e., one’s mouth, whose secretions are not usually impure, is nevertheless impure, then with regard to his urine, which comes
  
  Daf 56a
  
  from a place of impurity, the same place that emits <i>ziva</i>, is it not logical that it should be impure? The <i>baraita</i> answers: The case of blood that issues from the opening of the penis may prove that this inference is invalid, as the blood comes from a place of impurity and yet it is pure. Likewise, you should not be surprised about this, the urine of a <i>zav</i>, that even though it comes from a place of impurity it should be pure. Therefore, the verse states: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue, it is impure. And this shall be his impurity” (Leviticus 15:2–3). The term “and this” comes to include his urine with regard to the severe form of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that blood that issues from the opening of the penis is pure? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning a <i>zav</i>: One might have thought that blood that issues from his mouth or from the opening of the penis is impure, like his saliva and urine. Therefore, the verse states: “His issue, it is impure” (Leviticus 15:2). The term “it” is an exclusion, indicating that it, <i>ziva</i>, is impure, but blood that issues from his mouth or from the opening of the penis is not impure; rather, it is pure.
  The Gemara suggests: But perhaps I should reverse the <i>halakhot</i>. One could derive from the amplification “and this” that blood issuing from the penis of the <i>zav</i> is impure, and from the exclusion “it” that his urine is pure. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: Urine, rather than blood, should be included among the impure fluids of the <i>zav</i>, as it is similar to saliva: Just as saliva is a fluid that first gathers together and then comes out of the mouth, so too, all impure fluids are those that gather together and then come out of the body. Blood is therefore excluded, as it does not first gather together and then come out of the body.
  The Gemara objects: But there is the case of the milk that is emitted from a woman, which first gathers together and then comes out of the body, and it should therefore transmit a severe form of ritual impurity, like saliva and <i>ziva</i>. And yet the Master said in the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>: The milk of a woman transmits the ritual impurity of liquids. One may infer that with regard to the ritual impurity of liquids, yes, it transmits impurity, but it does not transmit a severe form of ritual impurity.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: In order to transmit a severe form of impurity the fluid must be similar to saliva: Just as saliva first gathers together and then comes out of the mouth, and if it is not expectorated it is reabsorbed, so too, all impure fluids first gather together and then come out of the body, and are reabsorbed by the body if they are not emitted. Blood is therefore excluded, as it does not first gather together and then come out of the body. The milk that is emitted from a woman is also excluded, as even though it gathers together and then comes out of the body it cannot be reabsorbed.
  The Gemara further objects: But let us derive from the case of <i>ziva</i> that both blood and breast milk transmit impurity: Just as his <i>ziva</i> does not first gather together and then come out of the body, and yet it transmits impurity, so too, all the fluids of a <i>zav</i> should transmit impurity, even if they do not gather together before they are emitted from the body. Rava said in explanation: One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood and breast milk of a <i>zav</i> or <i>zava</i> from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to his <i>ziva</i>, as the case of <i>ziva</i> is unique in that it causes impurity to others, i.e., to the one who emitted <i>ziva</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: And the carcass of a creeping animal transmits impurity when moist but not when dry. Reish Lakish says: With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal that dried up but its skeleton is intact, i.e., its bone structure remains in place, it is ritually impure. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that the items it lists, including the creeping animal, all transmit impurity when they are moist, but they do not transmit impurity when they are dry? Rabbi Zeira said: It is not difficult. This statement of Reish Lakish, that creeping animals transmit impurity even when dry, is referring to a case where all of the bones are intact. By contrast, that ruling of the mishna, that they do not transmit impurity when dry, is referring to a situation where only part of the bones are intact.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Bisna, says that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: The verse states with regard to creeping animals: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:31). One might have thought that the carcasses of creeping animals transmit impurity only if one comes into contact with all of them, i.e., with creeping animals that are completely intact. Therefore, the verse states: “And upon whatever any of them falls when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). The term “any of them” indicates that this <i>halakha</i> applies even if one comes into contact with only part of a creeping animal.
  If the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the term “of them,” one might have thought that even if one comes into contact with a part of them he is rendered impure. Therefore, the verse states: “Whoever touches them,” which indicates completely intact creeping animals. The <i>baraita</i> concludes: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, where the verse indicates that even part of them transmits impurity, it is referring to a moist creeping animal. There, where the verse teaches that only a complete creeping animal transmits impurity, it is speaking of a dry creature.
  Rava said: With regard to these lizards of the city of Meḥoza, when their skeleton is intact they are impure. The dab lizard is one of the creeping animals listed in the Torah. And Reish Lakish says: With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal that was burned but its skeleton is intact, it is ritually impure.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna that indicates a burnt carcass of a creeping animal is pure (<i>Teharot</i> 9:9): In a case where a burnt creeping animal was found on top of a pile of olives, and likewise, if the tattered rag of a <i>zav</i> was found on a pile of olives, the olives and the rag are pure. One is not concerned that the carcass of the creeping animal touched the olives or rag before it was burned, because with regard to all matters of impurity, it is assumed that when the item in question came into contact with the potential sources of impurity, the potential sources of impurity were in the same state as they were at the time they were found, and a burnt carcass does not transmit impurity. Rabbi Zeira said: It is not difficult; this statement of Reish Lakish refers to a case where all of the bones are intact, whereas that ruling of the mishna is referring to a situation where only part of the bones are intact.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Bisna, says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: When the verse states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31), one might have thought that creeping animals transmit impurity only if one comes into contact with all of them, i.e., with creeping animals that are completely intact. Therefore, the verse states: “And upon whatever any of them falls when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32), indicating that even a part of them transmits impurity.
  If the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the term “of them,” one might have thought that even contact with a part of them transmits impurity. Therefore, the verse states: “Whoever touches them.” How can these texts be reconciled? Here, where the verse teaches that only the complete carcass of a creeping animal transmits impurity, it is referring to a burnt creeping animal. There, where the verse indicates that even a part of them transmits impurity, it is referring to the carcass of a creeping animal that is not burnt.
  § The mishna teaches that the <i>ziva</i> of a <i>zav</i>, the mucus and saliva of a <i>zav</i>, the carcass of a creeping animal, an animal carcass, and semen all transmit impurity when they are moist, but they do not transmit impurity when they are dry. The Gemara cites the sources for these <i>halakhot</i>: The <i>ziva</i> of a <i>zav</i> transmits impurity only when moist, as it is written: “His flesh runs with his issue” (Leviticus 15:3), which is referring to a moist discharge. His phlegm and his mucus and his saliva likewise transmit impurity only when moist, as it is written: “And if one who has an issue spits” (Leviticus 15:8), which is referring to a substance that is like saliva, which is moist.
  The carcass of a creeping animal transmits impurity only when moist, as the Merciful One states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31). This indicates that they transmit impurity when they are in a state similar to their state at the time of death, when creatures are still moist. Semen transmits impurity only when moist, as it must be fit to inseminate. An animal carcass transmits impurity only when moist, as it is written: “And if any animal of which you may eat dies, he who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39), which teaches that the carcass transmits impurity when it is in a state similar to its state at the time of death.
  § The mishna teaches that if one could soak those dry substances in water and restore them to their previous state they would transmit impurity both when moist and when dry. The mishna further teaches that this is referring to soaking them in lukewarm water for a twenty-four-hour period. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: Does the mishna mean that the soaking must be performed in lukewarm water from the beginning of the soaking until its end, or perhaps it is sufficient if the water is lukewarm at the beginning of the soaking, even if at the end of the soaking the water is not lukewarm?
  The Gemara explains: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How much time is their soaking in lukewarm water? Yehuda ben Nekosa says: This is referring to a twenty-four-hour period, and it is sufficient if the water is lukewarm at its beginning, even if it is not lukewarm at its end. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The water must be lukewarm for the entire twenty-four-hour period.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to the flesh of a corpse that is dry and cannot be soaked to restore it to its previous state, it is ritually pure. Shmuel says: It is pure from transmitting impurity by the amount of an olive-bulk, but if there is a ladleful of the flesh it transmits the impurity of the decayed flesh of a corpse. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to the flesh of a corpse that dried up and cannot be soaked and restored to its previous state, it is ritually pure from transmitting impurity by the amount of an olive-bulk, but it is impure with the impurity of the decayed flesh of a corpse.
  MISHNA: The carcass of a creeping animal that was found in an alleyway renders pure items impure retroactively. All items that passed through that alleyway from the time about which one may state: I examined this alleyway and there was no carcass of a creeping animal in it, or from the time of the sweeping of the alleyway, are impure.
  And likewise, a blood stain that was discovered on the robe of a woman renders her impure retroactively. Any pure items that she handled from the time about which one may state: I examined this robe and there was no blood stain on it, or from the time of the laundering of the robe, are impure.
  And the carcass of a creeping animal or a blood stain renders items impure retroactively whether they are still moist or are already dried out. Rabbi Shimon says: The dry one renders items impure retroactively, but the moist one does not render items impure from the aforementioned times, but only from such a time that it could still be moist from then up to the moment it was discovered.
  GEMARA: With regard to the case of the carcass of a creeping animal that was found in an alleyway, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: The mishna teaches that any pure items that passed through that alleyway from the time of the sweeping of the alleyway are impure. Does this mean that once the alleyway is swept its presumptive status is that it has been examined, as it is examined during the sweeping and any impure item would have been discovered, and therefore any pure items that passed through the alleyway beforehand remain pure? Or perhaps the mishna means that once the alleyway is swept its presumptive status is that it has been entirely swept, and therefore any creeping animal would have been removed by the sweeping.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the practical difference that arises from this dilemma? The Gemara answers: There is a difference in a case where the one who swept the alleyway said he swept it but did not examine it. If you say that items that were present in the alleyway before it was swept remain pure because the presumptive status of a swept alleyway is that it has been examined, in this case the man explicitly said that he did not examine it, so it does not have this presumptive status. By contrast, if you say that the items remain pure because the presumptive status of the alleyway is that it has been completely swept, in this case too it has been swept, and therefore the items that were present earlier remain pure.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  Alternatively, there is a difference between these explanations in a case where the creeping animal was found in a hole in the ground. If you say the presumptive status of a swept alleyway is that it has been examined, it is clear that one who examines the alleyway also examines any holes, and any items that were in the alleyway beforehand should remain pure. By contrast, if you say its presumptive status is that it has been completely swept, this applies only to items that are on the ground, whereas a hole is not considered to have been swept. Consequently, even items that passed through the alleyway before it was swept should be deemed impure.
  The mishna teaches: And likewise, a blood stain that was discovered on the robe of a woman renders her impure retroactively. With regard to this <i>halakha</i> as well a dilemma was raised before the Sages: The mishna states that any pure items the woman handled from the time of laundering are impure. Does this mean that once the robe has been laundered its presumptive status is that it has been examined, as when it is laundered it is examined thoroughly, and any blood stain would have been discovered? Or perhaps the mishna means that its presumptive status is that it is thoroughly laundered, and any blood stain would have been removed by the laundering.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference that arises from this dilemma? The Gemara replies: There is a difference in a case where the person who laundered the robe said he laundered it but did not examine it. If you say its presumptive status is that it has been examined, in this case the man explicitly said that he did not examine the robe, so it does not have this presumptive status. By contrast, if you say its presumptive status is that it is thoroughly laundered, in this case too it has been laundered.
  Alternatively, there is a difference between these explanations in a case where the blood stain was found on the side of the robe, in an area where there are folds and stitches. If you say its presumptive status is that it has been examined, it is clear that one who examines the robe also examines the side of the robe, and therefore any items that the woman handled before the robe was laundered should remain pure. By contrast, if you say its presumptive status is that it is thoroughly laundered, this applies only to the main part of the robe, but on its side it is not laundered thoroughly enough to remove a blood stain.
  What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to these two dilemmas? Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir says: For what reason did the Sages say that the carcass of a creeping animal that was found in an alleyway renders pure items impure retroactively from the time about which one may state: I examined this alleyway and there was no creeping animal in it, or from the time of the sweeping of the alleyway? It is due to the fact that there is a presumption with regard to Jewish people that they examine their alleyways at the time of their sweeping. And therefore, if they did not examine the alleyway they retroactively lose the purity of any items that were there from the last time it was examined.
  And similarly, for what reason did the Sages say that a blood stain that was found on the robe of a woman renders her impure retroactively from the time about which one may state: I examined the robe and there was no blood stain on it, or from the time of the laundering of the robe? It is due to the fact that there is a presumption with regard to the Jewish women that they examine their robes at the time of their laundering. And therefore, if they did not examine the robe they retroactively lose the purity of any items they handled since it was last examined.
  Rabbi Aḥa says: Even in a case where the robe was not examined when it was laundered and a blood stain was subsequently found on it, and it is unknown whether the stain was present before the laundering, there is a remedy to the dilemma: Let her launder it again. If the appearance of the blood stain changes as a result of this laundering it is known that the robe became stained after the previous laundering, which is why the present laundering affected its appearance. Consequently, those pure items that the woman handled before the earlier laundering remain pure. And if the blood stain’s appearance does not change due to the second laundering it is known that the robe became stained before the previous laundering, and therefore the items that she handled before the laundering are impure.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One can differentiate between a blood stain that was on the robe before it was laundered and one that stained the robe afterward by inspecting the stain itself. This is because the appearance of a blood stain after the laundering is not similar to the appearance of a blood stain before the laundering, as this stain, from after the laundering, penetrates [<i>makdir</i>] the garment, and that stain, from before the laundering, forms a crust [<i>maglid</i>] that can be scraped off the robe. With regard to the Gemara’s dilemma, one may conclude from Rabbi Meir’s statement that the presumptive status of a swept alleyway or a laundered robe is that it has been examined. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
  § The mishna teaches: And the carcass of a creeping animal or a blood stain renders items impure retroactively whether they are still moist or are already dried out. Rabbi Shimon says: The dry one renders items impure retroactively, whereas the moist one does not render items impure since the aforementioned times, but only from such a time that it could still be moist from then up to the moment it was discovered. With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Elazar says: The mishna taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to the carcass of a creeping animal, but Rabbi Shimon concedes that a moist blood stain also renders the woman impure retroactively from the time that the robe was examined. This is because one can say the blood stain was dry beforehand and water fell upon it, causing it to become moist.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the moist carcass of a creeping animal as well, one can say it was dried out beforehand and water fell on it. It should therefore render items impure retroactively from the time that the alleyway was swept. The Gemara answers: If it is so, that this is what occurred, the dead creeping animal would be sundered apart and would not have its current appearance.
  MISHNA: Any blood stains on garments that come from the town of Rekem are ritually pure, as most of the residents there are gentiles, and the blood stains of gentile women are not ritually impure. Rabbi Yehuda deems those stains impure because in his opinion the residents of Rekem are not gentiles; rather, they are converts whose halakhic status is that of Jews, but they are misguided and do not put away their bloodstained garments. The blood stains on garments that come from among the gentiles are ritually pure. With regard to blood stains on garments that come from among the Jews and from among the Samaritans, Rabbi Meir deems them impure, as they may have come from the Jews. And the Rabbis deem them ritually pure due to the fact that Jews are not suspected of failing to put away their garments on which there are blood stains.
  GEMARA: The mishna categorically teaches that any blood stains on garments that come from among the gentiles are ritually pure, thereby indicating that this applies even to garments that come from among the gentile population of Tarmod. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: That is to say, one may accept converts from Tarmod, i.e., there is no concern with regard to whether they are actually Jews of flawed lineage, who may not marry Jews of fit lineage.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But aren’t there Rabbi Yoḥanan and the Elders who both say that one may not accept converts from Tarmod? This is due to a concern that the daughters of the ten tribes exiled during the First Temple period might have intermingled with them, and according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the offspring of a Jewish woman and a gentile is a <i>mamzer</i>, who may not marry a Jew of fit lineage.
  And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan merely infers that this is the opinion of the mishna, as indicated by the term: That is to say, but he himself does not hold accordingly, that is not so. Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say a principle that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, as is the case here?
  The Gemara answers: They are <i>amora’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. According to one <i>amora</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that converts from Tarmod are not accepted, and he did not state that it is a principle that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna. According to another <i>amora</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the unattributed mishna, and therefore one may accept converts from Tarmod.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to blood stains on garments that come from among the Jews and from among the Samaritans that Rabbi Meir deems them impure, and the Rabbis deem them ritually pure. The Gemara asks: But with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis, if they deem stains that come from a Jewish woman pure, whose stains do they deem impure?
  The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: Everyone agrees that blood stains on garments that come from among the Jews are impure. With regard to blood stains that come from among the Samaritans, Rabbi Meir deems them impure, as he maintains the Samaritans are true converts and have the halakhic status of Jews, whose blood stains are impure. And the Rabbis deem them ritually pure, as they maintain the Samaritans are converts who converted under duress due to the threat posed by lions, and therefore their conversion is void, and their halakhic status is that of gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why does the mishna state that according to the Rabbis the blood stains of the Samaritans are ritually pure due to the fact that they are not suspected of failing to put away their garments on which there are blood stains? The mishna should state that their blood stains are pure, as they are converts who converted due to the threat of lions.
  Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: Blood stains on garments that come from among the Jews and from among the Samaritans are ritually impure, as everyone agrees the Samaritans are true converts. With regard to blood stains that are found in the towns of Jews, they are pure, as they are not suspected of failing to put away their garments on which there are blood stains, and they certainly put them away. Therefore, the stains necessarily come from gentiles.
  The Gemara continues paraphrasing the mishna: With regard to blood stains that are found in the towns of Samaritans, Rabbi Meir deems them impure, as the inhabitants are suspected of failing to put away their garments on which there are blood stains. And the Rabbis deem them pure, as they maintain that even Samaritans are not suspected of failing to put away their garments on which there are blood stains, and the stains are necessarily from gentiles.
  MISHNA: All blood stains on garments that are found anywhere where Jews and gentiles reside are ritually pure, since they must not belong to Jews, who put away their stained garments. This is the <i>halakha</i> except for the stained garments that are found in the inner rooms of the house, as these might be garments that the Jews put away there; and except for the stained garments found in proximity to the house of impurity, i.e., the room that women used when they were impure due to menstruation.
  The house of impurity of Samaritans imparts the impurity that is imparted by a corpse by means of a tent, due to the fact that they bury the stillborn children there. Rabbi Yehuda says: The house of impurity of Samaritans does not impart that impurity, as they would not bury a stillborn child there. Rather, they would cast it outside and an animal would drag it away.
  Samaritans are deemed credible to state: We buried the stillborn children there, in a certain place, and it transmits ritual impurity; or to state: We did not bury the stillborn children there, and it does not transmit ritual impurity. They are likewise deemed credible to state about an animal whether it previously gave birth or whether it did not previously give birth; and their testimony is accepted with regard to determining whether the animal’s offspring has the status of a firstborn animal, which is sacred. They are also deemed credible to testify about the marking of graves, i.e., that where they marked is deemed a grave and where they did not mark is deemed a place where there is no grave.
  But with regard to the following cases, in which the exact location of a grave is unknown, the Samaritans are not deemed credible to testify: They are not deemed credible to testify about the overhanging boughs, nor about the protrusions that jut out of stone fences and cover the ground. If it is unknown which bough or protrusion hangs over a grave, forming a tent that transmits the impurity of a corpse, and if a Samaritan testifies that the grave is not beneath a particular bough or protrusion his testimony is not accepted. And likewise they are not deemed credible to testify about a <i>beit haperas</i>. The Sages issued a decree that in such a case, the area that was plowed is impure as far as one hundred cubits from the original grave, due to the concern that the bones were dispersed by the plow.
  This is the principle governing the credibility of Samaritans: In the case of any matter of <i>halakha</i> that they are suspected of not fulfilling, they are not deemed credible to testify about it.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the Samaritans do not observe burial customs for stillborn children. The Gemara asks: What verse did they interpret as a source for this practice? The Gemara replies that they interpreted the verse: “You shall not remove your fellow’s boundary marker, which was bounded by the first ones, in your inheritance that you shall inherit, in the land that the Lord your God gives you to possess it” (Deuteronomy 19:14).
  The Gemara explains: The Sages derived from this verse that it is prohibited to sell one’s ancestral burial ground. In accordance with this interpretation of the verse, the Samaritans derived that any individual who has an inheritance, i.e., who stands to inherit land, has a boundary, i.e., a burial place, whereas any individual who does not have an inheritance in the land, e.g., a stillborn child, does not have a boundary, i.e., a burial place. The Samaritans therefore concluded that the mitzva of burial does not apply to stillborn children.
  The mishna teaches that Samaritans are deemed credible to state: We buried the stillborn children in a certain place, or to state that they did not bury the stillborn children there, and that place does not transmit ritual impurity. The Gemara objects: But the Samaritans do not accept the Sages’ interpretation of the verse: “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), that one may not cause another to sin. Since they are not concerned about misleading others, why is their testimony accepted? Rabbi Abbahu says: The mishna is referring to a case where a Samaritan priest is standing there, on that spot, which indicates that he genuinely maintains it is not impure with the impurity of a corpse.
  The Gemara objects: But perhaps he is an impure priest and therefore he does not refrain from standing in an impure place. The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a situation where the priest is holding <i>teruma</i> in his hand, which indicates he is ritually pure. The Gemara further objects: But perhaps it is impure <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a case where the priest is partaking of the <i>teruma</i>, which indicates that it is not impure, as it is prohibited to consume impure <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if this is the circumstance, it is obvious that the Samaritan priest’s testimony can be accepted. Then what is the purpose of stating this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the mishna is necessary, lest you say that the Samaritans are not knowledgeable with regard to the stages of the formation of an embryo, and they might bury a fetus believing that it is an unformed fetus that does not transmit impurity, when it is actually a forty-day-old fetus, which is impure. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that they are sufficiently knowledgeable, and their testimony is accepted.
  The mishna teaches that the Samaritans are deemed credible to state with regard to an animal that it previously gave birth, and its subsequent offspring does not have the sacred status of a firstborn animal. The Gemara objects: But the Samaritans do not accept the Sages’ interpretation of the verse: “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind,” that one may not cause another to sin. Why, then, is their testimony accepted? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna is referring to a case where the Samaritan is shearing and working the offspring of the animal. Since the Samaritans are meticulous with regard to Torah law, it is evident that it is not a firstborn.
  The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if this is the circumstance, what is the purpose of stating this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the mishna is necessary, lest you say that the Samaritans are not knowledgeable with regard to a murky discharge emitted from the uterus, which is indicative of a fetus and exempts subsequent births from the mitzva of the firstborn (see <i>Bekhorot</i> 21a). It is possible that the Samaritan mistakenly believes the animal previously emitted a murky discharge and therefore its offspring is not a firstborn. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that they are sufficiently knowledgeable, and their testimony is accepted.
  The mishna further teaches that the Samaritans are deemed credible to testify with regard to the marking of graves, as the Samaritans mark their graves, and we rely on their marking as an indication that a corpse is buried there. Therefore, any place where there is no marking is considered ritually pure. The Gemara explains: Even though the marking of graves is required only by rabbinic law, and Samaritans generally do not observe rabbinic law, since it is written in the Bible, the Samaritans are meticulous with regard to it, as it is written: “And those that pass through shall pass through the land, and when one sees a human bone he shall set up a marking by it, until the buriers have buried it in the valley of Hamon-gog” (Ezekiel 39:15).
  The mishna teaches: But with regard to the following cases in which the exact location of a grave is unknown, the Samaritans are not deemed credible to testify: They are not deemed credible to testify about overhanging boughs, nor about the protrusions that jut out of stone fences. The Gemara explains these terms: The term overhanging boughs should be understood as we learned in a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 8:2): These are overhanging boughs: A tree that hangs over the ground. The term protrusions should be understood as we learned in the <i>Tosefta</i> (<i>Oholot</i> 9:4): Protruding stones that jut out of a fence.
  § The mishna teaches that the Samaritans are not deemed credible to testify about a <i>beit haperas</i>. With regard to a <i>beit haperas</i>, Rav Yehuda says that Rav Shmuel says: The reason the Sages deemed a <i>beit haperas</i> impure is due to the concern that the bones, but not the flesh of the corpse, were dispersed by the plow throughout the field. The <i>halakha</i> is that a bone transmits impurity by carrying or by contact, if it is at least the size of a barley grain, but it does not transmit impurity by means of a tent. Therefore, if a person is carrying ritually pure items, or if he wishes to remain ritually pure so that he may consume consecrated items, and yet he must pass through a <i>beit haperas</i>, he may blow on the earth of the <i>beit haperas</i> before each step, so that if there is a bone beneath the dust he will expose it and avoid it. And in this manner he may walk across the area while remaining ritually pure, even though he might step over a bone.
  Rav Yehuda bar Ami says in the name of Rav Yehuda: A <i>beit haperas</i> that has been trodden underfoot by many people is pure, as it may be assumed that any bone fragments at least as large as a barley grain that were on the surface were either broken or removed. And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who plows a graveyard, this individual thereby renders it a <i>beit haperas</i>. And to what extent does he render it a <i>beit haperas</i>, i.e., how far does the concern apply that bones might have been dispersed? The field is rendered a <i>beit haperas</i> to the extent of a full furrow [<i>ma’ana</i>], one hundred cubits by one hundred cubits, which is the area required for sowing four <i>se’a</i> of seed. Rabbi Yosei says: The area rendered a <i>beit haperas</i> is the area required for sowing five <i>se’a</i> of seed.
  With regard to the ruling of the mishna that the Samaritans are not deemed credible to testify about a <i>beit haperas</i>, the Gemara asks: And aren’t they deemed credible? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a field in which a grave was lost, which has the status of a <i>beit haperas</i>, a Samaritan is deemed credible to say: There is no grave there?
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: This is due to the fact that he is not considered to be testifying about a case of uncertain impurity; rather, he is testifying about the location of the grave itself, which is a matter of Torah law, and the Samaritans are deemed credible with regard to a matter of Torah law. Likewise, in the case of a tree that is hanging over the ground, a Samaritan is deemed credible to say: There is no grave beneath it, as he is testifying only about the location of the grave itself. This indicates that the Samaritans are deemed credible with regard to overhanging boughs and protrusions.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says in explanation: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the Samaritan is walking to and fro over the entire area, and therefore if there was a grave there he would certainly have become impure. Consequently, one may rely on his statement with regard to the purity of the place. By contrast, the mishna is speaking of a case where the Samaritan did not traverse the entire area, and therefore his testimony is not accepted, as they are not meticulous with regard to cases of uncertainty.
  The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that his testimony is credible, and what is the purpose of stating this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: The ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is necessary, lest you say that perhaps a narrow strip of land, which is called by the same name as this field, extends into a nearby field, and the Samaritan presumes the grave is located in that strip of land. If so, even if the Samaritan traversed the entire field his testimony cannot be accepted, as he traversed the field because he considered it merely a case of uncertain impurity. The <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches us that if the Samaritan traverses the entire field his testimony is accepted, as this concern is not an issue.
  The mishna teaches: This is the principle governing the credibility of Samaritans: In the case of any matter of <i>halakha</i> that they are suspected of not fulfilling, they are not deemed credible to testify about it. The Gemara asks: What is added by the term: This is the principle? The Gemara answers: It serves to add that Samaritans are not deemed credible with regard to Shabbat boundaries, i.e., to say that a Shabbat boundary extends until a certain point, as the <i>halakha</i> of Shabbat boundaries applies by rabbinic law. And likewise, the Samaritans are not deemed credible with regard to the status of wine used for a libation in idol worship, as the Samaritans do not refrain from drinking wine touched by a gentile.
  
  
  Daf 57b
  
  MISHNA: A woman who sees a blood stain on her flesh adjacent to her vagina [<i>beit haturpa</i>], i.e., a place where blood that originated in her vagina could be found, becomes ritually impure, as there is a concern that it originated in the uterus and is menstrual blood. And if it was discovered on her flesh in an area not adjacent to her vagina she remains ritually pure, as it certainly did not originate in the uterus. If the stain was discovered on her heel or on the tip of her large toe, although it is not adjacent to her vagina she is ritually impure, as blood from the uterus could have reached there.
  In a case where the stain was discovered on her leg or on her feet, if it was on the inner side she is ritually impure, as blood from the uterus could have reached there. If it was on the outer side she is ritually pure, and if it was on the sides, either from here, i.e., on the front of her leg or foot, or from there, i.e., on the back of her leg or foot, she is also ritually pure, as blood from the uterus could not have reached there.
  In a case where the woman saw a blood stain on her robe, if it was from the belt and below she is ritually impure, as blood from the uterus could have reached there; if it was from the belt and above she is ritually pure. In a case where she saw the stain on the end of the sleeve of the robe, if the sleeve can reach adjacent to her vagina she is ritually impure; and if not, i.e., if the stain is in a place on the sleeve that does not reach adjacent to the vagina, she is ritually pure.
  If it was a robe which she would remove and with which she would cover herself at night, wherever on the robe that the stain is found, the stain renders her ritually impure, due to the fact that the robe moves while the woman is asleep and therefore the blood could have originated in the uterus. And likewise with regard to a kerchief [<i>bapoleyos</i>], no matter where the blood is found on the kerchief, the woman is impure.
  GEMARA: With regard to the cases discussed in the mishna concerning a blood stain found on a woman, Shmuel says: If a woman examined the ground beneath her to see if it was clean from blood and other substances, and she found nothing, and subsequently she sat upon it and then found blood on it, although it might be assumed that this blood came from her, she is ritually pure. The reason is as it is stated: “And her issue in her flesh shall be blood, she shall be in her menstrual state seven days” (Leviticus 15:19). This verse teaches that a woman does not become impure unless she senses, i.e., experiences some type of sensation, in her flesh that she emitted blood from her uterus. Since this woman did not sense an emission of blood, she is pure.
  The Gemara asks: How can Shmuel interpret the verse in this manner? After all, he requires this term: “In her flesh,” to teach a different <i>halakha</i>, that a woman becomes impure by finding blood inside her body just as by seeing blood outside her body, i.e., provided that the blood is uterine blood, even if it is currently situated inside her vaginal canal, she is impure. The Gemara answers: If so, if it serves to teach only that blood inside is like blood outside, let the verse say: In the flesh. What is the reason that the verse states: “In her flesh”? Conclude from this term that a woman does not become impure unless she senses in her flesh.
  The Gemara asks: And still, Shmuel requires the term “in her flesh” to teach that she is impure only if the blood touches her flesh, and not through blood found in a gestational sac, nor through blood found in an amorphous piece of tissue that she emitted. The Gemara answers: Conclude two conclusions from this verse, as the plain meaning of the term teaches all these <i>halakhot</i>.
  With regard to the opinion of Shmuel, the Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna at the beginning of the next chapter (59b): In the case of a woman who is urinating and sees blood intermingled with the urine, Rabbi Meir says: If she urinates while she is standing she is ritually impure, as the blood could have originated in the uterus. And if she is sitting she is ritually pure, as it is clear that the blood is from a wound.
  The Gemara analyzes this mishna: What are the circumstances? If she sensed while urinating, then in the case where she is sitting, why is she ritually pure, according to Shmuel? Rather, is it not referring to a case where she did not sense while urinating? And yet the mishna teaches that if she urinates while she is standing she is ritually impure. This indicates that her status does not depend on her sensing, which contradicts the statement of Shmuel.
  The Gemara answers: This affords no proof, as the mishna is actually referring to a case where she sensed while urinating, and yet since this feeling accompanied urination, one might say it was the sensation of urine. Consequently, if she urinated while standing, the urine would return to her uterus and bring blood with it. But if she urinated while sitting the urine cannot return to the uterus and therefore she is pure, as the sensation is attributed to her urine.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear the mishna below (58b): With regard to an examination cloth that was placed beneath the pillow and blood was later found on the cloth, and it is unclear whether it is the blood of an examination or the blood of a louse that was crushed beneath it, if the stain is round it is ritually pure. There is no concern that this blood might have come from her examination, as a woman examines through an act of wiping and a stain produced in this manner would not be round. And if the stain is elongated it is ritually impure, as this shape can be formed by an examination.
  The Gemara analyzes the mishna: What are the circumstances? If she sensed, then in the case where the stain is round why is it pure? Rather, is it not referring to a case where she did not sense? And yet the mishna teaches that an elongated stain is impure. This contradicts the opinion of Shmuel that a woman is rendered impure only if she sensed.
  The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is actually referring to a case where she sensed, but since she also performed an examination one might say this was the sensation of the examination cloth. Consequently, if the stain was elongated, as appropriate for a stain produced by an examination, the blood certainly came from her body, whereas if the stain was round it is pure, as this is not the usual appearance of a stain from an examination.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another mishna (14a): If blood was found on his, i.e., the husband’s, examination cloth following intercourse, the woman and her husband are both ritually impure for seven days, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of a menstruating woman and one who engages in intercourse with her, and they are each liable to bring a sin offering for unwittingly performing an action punishable with excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>]. If blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, the woman and her husband are likewise ritually impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. If blood was found on her swatch after time passed, they are both ritually impure due to uncertainty, as it is possible that the blood appeared only after intercourse, and they are exempt from bringing the sin offering.
  The Gemara analyzes this mishna: What are the circumstances? If it is referring to a situation where she sensed, then in the case where blood was found on her cloth after time passed, why are they exempt from bringing the sin offering? Rather, is it not referring to a case where she did not sense? And yet the mishna teaches that if blood was found on her cloth immediately after intercourse, they are ritually impure for seven days and are each liable to bring a sin offering. Once again, this contradicts the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is actually referring to a case where she sensed, but since she was engaging in intercourse at the time, one might say this was the sensation of the male organ.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear from a <i>baraita</i>: You are found to say that there are three uncertainties involving cases where blood is found on a woman or her garments. If a stain is discovered on her flesh and there is uncertainty whether it is impure or pure, the <i>halakha</i> is that it is impure. If it is found on her robe and there is uncertainty whether it is impure or pure, the <i>halakha</i> is that it is pure. And in the case of a woman whose status as a menstruating woman is uncertain, with regard to her touching items and with regard to her moving items, one should follow the majority.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: What is the meaning of the phrase: Follow the majority, with regard to this woman of uncertain status? Does this not mean that if for the majority of her days she is in a state of ritual impurity, as she emits impure blood on many days, then she is considered impure even when her status is uncertain? And since this <i>baraita</i> does not differentiate between cases where she did and did not sense, the ruling that one follows the majority, and that she is impure, evidently applies even though she did not sense, which contradicts the opinion of Shmuel.
  The Gemara answers: No proof may be brought from here, as this is what the <i>baraita</i> means: If on the majority of her days this woman sees blood accompanied by a sensation, she is impure, despite the fact that she is uncertain whether she had a sensation, as one can say she sensed on this occasion as well, but it was not on her mind, i.e., she did not pay attention to it at the time.
  Before returning to the opinion of Shmuel, the Gemara analyzes the other clauses of this <i>baraita</i>. The Master said above: If a stain is discovered on her flesh and there is uncertainty whether it is impure or pure, it is impure; if it is found on her robe and there is uncertainty whether it is impure or pure, it is pure. The juxtaposition of these two cases indicates that the blood is found in the same area in both instances.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the blood was discovered from the belt and below, then when it was found on her robe why is she pure? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: In a case where the woman saw a blood stain on her robe, if it was from the belt and below she is ritually impure? And if the blood was from the belt and above, then if it was discovered on her flesh why is she impure? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that if she saw blood on her flesh in an area not adjacent to her vagina she remains ritually pure?
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the blood was discovered from the belt and below, and if you wish, say instead that it was found from the belt and above. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say that the blood was found from the belt and below, as the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where the blood can be attributed to an external factor, e.g., a case where she passed through a marketplace of butchers [<i>tabbaḥim</i>]. Consequently, if the blood is found on her flesh it is assumed that it came from her body, as, if it came from the outside world, it should have been found on her robe as well. If it is discovered on her robe it is assumed that it came from the outside world, as, if it came from her body, it should have been found on her flesh as well.
  And if you wish, say instead that the blood was found from the belt and above, and the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where it is possible the blood came from her body, e.g., a case where she jumped backward. Therefore, if the blood is found on her flesh it certainly came from her body, as, if it came from the outside world, it should have been found on her robe as well. And if it is discovered on her robe the assumption is that it came from the outside world, as, if it came from her body, it should have been found on her flesh as well.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the <i>baraita</i> to the opinion of Shmuel: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that if a stain is discovered on her flesh and there is uncertainty whether it is impure or pure, it is impure, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even though she did not sense, which contradicts the opinion of Shmuel. And furthermore, we learned in the mishna that a woman who sees a blood stain on her flesh adjacent to her vagina becomes ritually impure, and this is apparently the <i>halakha</i> even though she did not sense. Rav Yirmeya of Difti says: The ruling of Shmuel that a woman must sense in order to be rendered impure applies only by Torah law. But Shmuel concedes that in all the cases cited above, where it is indicated that a woman is impure despite the fact that she did not sense, she is impure
  
  Daf 58a
  
  by rabbinic law. Accordingly, Shmuel agrees that if she examined the ground, found it clean, sat upon it, and later found blood, even if she did not sense that she emitted blood she is impure by rabbinic law.
  Rav Ashi said: Shmuel said this woman is pure even by rabbinic law, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as we learned in a mishna (59b) that Rabbi Neḥemya says: Any item that is not susceptible to ritual impurity, e.g., the ground, is not susceptible to ritual impurity due to blood stains. This is because the decree of impurity of blood stains was limited to items susceptible to ritual impurity. According to Rav Ashi, all the sources cited above that indicate she is impure even if she did not sense an emission are referring to cases where the stain was found on an item that is susceptible to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Ashi with regard to Shmuel’s opinion, that is why Shmuel says the woman examined the ground beneath her, as the ground is not susceptible to ritual impurity. But according to the opinion of Rav Yirmeya, why does Shmuel refer specifically to the ground? The same <i>halakha</i> should apply even if she sat on a cloak and did not sense an emission of blood. The Gemara answers that Shmuel is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary.
  The Gemara elaborates: It is not necessary to state that if a woman examined a cloak, found it pure, sat upon it, and then saw a blood stain on it, she is pure. The reason is that it is not easy to examine a cloak well, due to its creases, and therefore there is room to say the stain on the cloak came from the outside world, i.e., from some external factor. Rather, even in the case of the ground, which one can examine well and therefore there is room to say the stain on the ground must have come from her body when she sat upon it, Shmuel teaches that the blood is nevertheless ritually pure.
  § The mishna teaches: If a stain was discovered on her heel or on the tip of her large toe, although it is not adjacent to her vagina she is ritually impure, as blood from the uterus could have reached there. The Gemara comments: Granted, when blood is found on her heel she is impure, as it is wont to touch that place, her vagina, when she kneels. But if the blood is discovered on the tip of her large toe, what is the reason she is thereby rendered impure? And if you would say the reason is that sometimes the tip of one large toe might touch her heel, i.e., the heel of the other foot, do we presume that ritual impurity travels from place to place? Since that is not presumed, the stain on the large toe of one foot cannot be presumed to come from the heel of the other foot.
  The Gemara cites the source of this principle. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman had a wound on her neck in an area where she can attribute the blood she found adjacent to her vagina to that wound, she may attribute the blood to the wound and she is pure. But if the wound was on her shoulder, which is a place where she cannot attribute the blood she found adjacent to her vagina to that wound, she may not attribute it to the wound, and she is ritually impure.
  The Gemara explains the proof from the <i>baraita</i>: And it is clear from this <i>baraita</i> that we do not say that perhaps she took blood from her wounded shoulder in her hand and brought it there, near her vagina. Rather, this is the reason for the ruling of the mishna: The tip of her large toe is different, as when she walks it might happen that the tip of this toe is positioned under her vagina and blood drips onto it from there. For this reason she is rendered impure by a stain on that toe.
  The Gemara asks: And do we not presume that ritual impurity travels from place to place? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If blood was found on the joints of her fingers on the back of her hand she is impure, despite the fact that blood from her source is not usually found on that part of her hand because hands are active?
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? Is it not due to the fact that we say she examined with one hand and then touched the back of the other hand? If so, this indicates that ritual impurity is presumed to travel from place to place. The Gemara answers: No, the reason she is impure when blood is found on the back of her hand is that her hand is different, as with regard to the entire hand, including the back, it might happen that it touched the vagina,as one’s hands are active.
  § The mishna teaches: In a case where the stain was discovered on her leg or on her feet, if it was on the inner side she is ritually impure, as blood from the uterus could have reached there. If it was on the outer side of the leg or foot she is ritually pure. The Gemara asks: With regard to the term: On the inner side, until where does it extend? The students of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: Until the place of the joint [<i>mekom ḥavak</i>] of the thigh and shin, the ligaments on the inside of the kneecap.
  In this regard, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the place of the joint itself considered as part of the inner side or as part of the outer side? Come and hear, as Rav Ketina explicitly teaches: The inner side extends until the place of the joint, and the joint itself is considered as part of the inner side. The Gemara adds that Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Avya, teaches it explicitly that the students of the school of Rabbi Yannai themselves said: The inner side extends until the place of the joint, and the joint itself is considered as part of the inner side.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If the stain on a woman’s body was in the shape of a bracelet, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Likewise, if it was in the shape of a straight line, what is the <i>halakha</i>? If it was not in a single defined shape but was a series of drops, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Furthermore, if the stain extended along the width of her thigh, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is there a concern in these cases that the blood might have come from her uterus?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: If a stain is discovered on her flesh and there is uncertainty whether it is impure or pure, it is impure. What, is it not that the case of blood found on her flesh is referring to a case like this, i.e., those cases mentioned by Rabbi Yirmeya, and therefore she is impure? The Gemara answers: There is no proof from here, as perhaps the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a stain shaped like a strip along the length of her thigh, as this is the usual form of a stain from the vagina.
  The Gemara relates that there was a certain woman who discovered blood in the warp on the loom where she was weaving. She was concerned that while she was weaving, the threads of the warp might have come between her legs and been stained. She came before Rabbi Yannai to inquire about the status of this blood. Rabbi Yannai said to her: Let her go and come, i.e., she should go and weave in her usual manner. Since this involves a repetitive action, it will soon become clear whether the threads stretch between her legs.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one does not rely on repeated actions with regard to ritually pure items? Since the second action might not precisely mimic the first it cannot be relied upon to determine ritual-purity status. The Gemara answers that when we say one does not rely on repeated actions it is only in cases where it would lead to a leniency. But if it leads to a stringency, as in this case where the woman is currently pure, since the blood was not found on her body or her garments one does rely on repeated actions. If the repeated action indicates that the threads of the warp come between her legs while weaving, she is impure.
  § The mishna teaches: If it was a robe that she would remove and cover herself with at night, no matter where on the robe the stain is found, she is ritually impure because the robe moves while the woman is asleep, and therefore the blood could have originated in the uterus. The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: With regard to this matter of blood found on a robe worn at night, I issued a prohibitive ruling in the city of Rome. And when I came to the Sages in the south of Eretz Yisrael they said to me: You issued a proper ruling.
  With regard to blood discovered on a robe, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a tall woman who wore the robe of a short woman without first examining it to see if it was clean of stains, and likewise a short woman who wore the robe of a tall woman, if a stain was subsequently found on the robe and it is unknown from which woman it came, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If the location of the stain reaches adjacent to the vagina of the tall woman they are both ritually impure. The reason is that in this case it certainly reached that area of the short woman. And if it does not reach adjacent to the vagina of the tall woman, the tall woman is pure, as the stain is definitely not from her, and the short woman is impure.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: If a woman examined her robe and did not find a stain, and then lent it to another woman, after which a stain was discovered on the robe, what is the <i>halakha</i>? She, the woman who lent the robe, is pure, and the other woman, the one who borrowed the robe, may attribute the stain to the woman who lent the robe to her, i.e., she may say that she does not rely on the lender’s examination. Rav Sheshet said in explanation of this <i>baraita</i>: And we learn this ruling that the borrower can say she does not rely on the lender only with regard to the matter of a monetary judgment as to which of the women must pay for the laundering of the robe. But with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, she, the lender, is pure, and the other woman, the borrower, is impure.
  
  Daf 58b
  
  The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to two women who were occupied with one slaughtered bird, and the bird contained only an amount of blood capable of producing a stain as big as a <i>sela</i> coin, and blood the size of a <i>sela</i> was found on this woman and blood the size of a <i>sela</i> was found on that woman, they are both impure, despite the fact that the blood of one of them can be attributed to the bird. Likewise, in the case of Rav Sheshet the lender should be impure as well, as she might not have examined the robe properly. The Gemara answers: There it is different, as there is an additional <i>sela</i>.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a woman who wore three robes, one on top of the other, that had been examined by her for blood stains, and she subsequently found a stain on one of the robes, if she can attribute the blood on the robe to an external source, she may attribute it to that source, and she is pure. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even if the stain was on the lower robe, closest to her skin. But if she cannot reasonably attribute the blood to an external factor she may not attribute it to an external factor, and she is impure, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even if the stain was on the upper robe.
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: How so? If she passed through a marketplace of butchers, where blood could have sprayed on her clothes, she may attribute a stain on her garment to the butchers and she is pure, even if the stain was on the lower robe. If she did not pass through a marketplace of butchers or anywhere else with a lot of blood, then even if the stain was on the upper robe she may not attribute the blood to an external source and she is impure.
  MISHNA: And a woman who discovers a blood stain on her body or her garment may attribute its existence to any matter to which she can attribute it: If she slaughtered a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird; or if she was occupied with the removal of blood stains from the garments of other women or from her own garment, from any source, such as blood that originated from a wound elsewhere on her body or even her own menstrual blood from a prior menstrual cycle; or if she sat alongside others who were occupied with removing blood stains; or if she killed a louse; in all of these cases, that woman may attribute the blood stain to it.
  How large a stain may a woman attribute to a louse? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: It can be up to the area of a split bean. And she may attribute the stain to a louse even if she does not remember that she killed it. And she may attribute the blood stain to her son or to her husband in a case where one of them is near her and has a wound. Furthermore, if the woman herself has a wound, even if the wound scabbed over and is no longer bleeding, but it can reopen and bleed, that woman may attribute the blood stain to that wound.
  There was an incident involving one woman who came before Rabbi Akiva. She said to him: I saw a blood stain. Rabbi Akiva said to her: Perhaps there was a wound on your body? She said to him: Yes, there was a wound and it healed. He said to her: Was it perhaps a wound that could reopen and bleed? She said to him: Yes it was. And Rabbi Akiva deemed her ritually pure.
  Rabbi Akiva saw his students looking at each other, wondering why he ruled leniently in this case. Rabbi Akiva said to them: What in this matter is difficult in your eyes? The reason I ruled this way is that the Sages did not state the matter of the impurity of blood stains in order to be stringent; rather, they instituted this impurity in order to be lenient, as it is stated: “And if a woman has an issue, and her issue in her flesh shall be blood” (Leviticus 15:19), from which it is derived that by Torah law, “blood” deems her impure, but not a stain. Impurity from a blood stain was instituted by the Sages, and they rule leniently in any case where the stain can be attributed to another source.
  With regard to an examination cloth that was placed beneath the pillow and blood was found on the cloth, and it is unclear whether it is the blood of an examination or the blood of a louse that was crushed beneath it, if the stain is round the woman is ritually pure, as an examination to determine whether a woman is menstruating would not leave a round stain. If the stain is elongated the woman is ritually impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a woman who discovers a blood stain on her body or her garment may attribute its existence to any matter to which she can attribute it. The Gemara notes: We learn in the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: An incident occurred involving a blood stain found on a woman’s garment, and Rabbi Meir attributed it to an eye salve [<i>bekilor</i>] that the woman had previously handled, and likewise, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi attributed a stain to the sap of a sycamore tree the woman had touched.
  § The mishna teaches: Or if she was occupied with the removal of blood stains from the garments of other women or from her own garment, from any source, such as blood that originated from a wound elsewhere on her body or even her own menstrual blood from a prior menstrual cycle; or if she sat alongside others who were occupied with removing blood stains. The Gemara infers: If she knows for certain that she sat alongside those occupied with removing blood stains, yes, she may attribute blood to this source. But if she does not know for certain that she sat alongside those who were removing blood stains, but knows only that she was in the same area as they were, she may not attribute blood to this source.
  Again the Gemara comments: We learn in the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman passed through a marketplace of butchers and it is uncertain whether blood from the marketplace sprayed on her or whether it did not spray on her, she may attribute a stain to the butchers. But if she is uncertain whether she passed by the marketplace or whether she did not pass by, she is deemed impure and may not attribute it to that source. In this case as well, only if she is certain that she was in a circumstance to which she can attribute the blood may she attribute it to that cause.
  § The mishna teaches that if she killed a louse she may attribute the blood stain to it. The Gemara infers: If she killed a louse, yes, she may attribute blood to it, but if she did not kill a louse she may not attribute blood to it. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers that it is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman killed a louse before finding blood, she may attribute blood to it. If she did not kill a louse she may not attribute blood to it; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case she may attribute blood to a louse.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said there is a difficulty with regard to both his opinion and that of the Rabbis: According to my statement, that a woman may attribute a stain only to a creature she actually killed, there is no limit; and according to the statement of my colleagues, who rule that she may attribute a stain to a louse even if she had not killed one, there is no end.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel explains: According to my statement, there is no limit to the size of the stain she found, as she is impure even if it is as small as a mustard seed. Consequently, you have no woman who is pure to her husband, as you have no bed of any sort on which there are not several drops of blood of a louse. Since I rule that a woman may attribute blood to a louse only if she previously killed one, all women will be in a state of impurity to their husbands.
  By contrast, according to the statement of my colleagues there is no end to the advantage their ruling provides to women, because if their ruling is accepted you have no woman who is not pure to her husband, as you have no sheet of any sort on which there are not several blood drops, and every woman can attribute all these drops to a louse, even if she had not killed one.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel continues: But the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus appears to be more correct than my statement and their statement, as Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus would say: How large a stain may a woman attribute to a louse? It can be up to the area of a split bean. And therefore we concede to his opinion and accept his statement. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that a woman may attribute blood to a louse whether or not she killed one, how large can the stain be? After all, some stains are far bigger than those produced by a louse. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: She may attribute a stain to a bedbug, which has more blood than a louse, and this applies to any stain whose size is up to the width of a lupine seed.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the matter of the bedbug. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This bedbug, its length is equal to its width, and its taste is like its foul smell. A covenant is made with it, i.e., it is a law of nature, that anyone who squeezes it will smell its foul odor. The Gemara explains with regard to which <i>halakhot</i> these characteristics of the bedbug were mentioned. The fact that its length is equal to its width was stated with regard to the matter of stains, i.e., if a stain is found whose length is the same as its width, one may attribute it to the blood of a bedbug even if the stain is larger than the area of a split bean.
  The statement that its taste is like its foul smell is applicable with regard to the matter of the partaking of <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 8:2): Or if he tasted the taste of a bedbug in his mouth, which is prohibited for consumption, this person must spit out the contents of his mouth, despite the fact that it is generally prohibited to waste <i>teruma</i>. How does he know that there is a bedbug in his mouth? He knows because its taste is like its foul smell. And still, how does he know the smell of a bedbug? In answer to this question the <i>baraita</i> explains that one does not err with regard to the smell of the bedbug, as a covenant is made with it that anyone who squeezes it will smell its foul odor, and therefore it is a well-known smell.
  The mishna teaches that a woman may attribute a blood stain as having come from another entity and remain pure. In this regard Rav Ashi says: In the case of a town in which there are pigs, one need not be concerned for stains found on the body or clothes of a woman living there. Since pigs wander the streets and often have stains of blood on them, and their living areas attract bugs of all kinds, any blood stain found on a woman can be attributed to the pigs. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And this town of Dukeret, where there are many slaughterhouses, garbage heaps, and bugs, is considered like a town in which there are pigs.
  § The mishna teaches: How large a stain may a woman attribute to a louse? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: It can be up to the area of a split bean. The Gemara notes that the meaning of the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus is a matter of dispute among the Sages. Rav Huna says: If the stain was the size of a split bean she may not attribute it to the blood of a louse; if it was less than the size of a split bean she may attribute it to the blood of a louse. And Rav Ḥisda says: Even if it was the size of a split bean she may still attribute it to the blood of a louse; but if the stain was more than the size of a split bean she may not attribute it to the blood of a louse.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that these Sages disagree with regard to the matter of: Up to and including. As Rav Huna maintains that the term: Up to, means: Up to the measure but not including the measure, and since Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus said that a stain can be up to the area of a split bean, this does not include the size of a bean itself. And Rav Ḥisda maintains that the term means: Up to and including the measure.
  The Gemara responds: Rav Huna could say to you that there are instances where the term means up to and including the measure, and there are instances where it means up to and not including the measure. And both here, where it means up to and not including the measure, it is intended as a stringency, as in the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus; and there, where it means up to and including the measure, it is likewise intended as a stringency.
  And Rav Ḥisda could say to you that in general I will say to you that when it leads to a stringency, we say that the term: Up to, means up to and including the measure, whereas if it leads to a leniency we do not say so. And here, with regard to stains, I interpret the term in this manner despite the fact that it entails a leniency, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu. As Rabbi Abbahu says: All measures of the Sages must be interpreted stringently, except for the measure of a split bean as a standard for stains of blood found on a woman’s clothing, which is interpreted leniently. Therefore, even if the stain is exactly the size of a bean the woman remains pure.
  Some say this <i>halakha</i> as a distinct matter, not specifically as an explanation of the mishna: Rav Huna says the area of a split bean is considered the same as the area of greater than a split bean. And Rav Ḥisda says the area of a split bean is considered the same as the area of less than a split bean. And these two <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to the matter of up to, whether it means including or not including the measure itself, as discussed in this case here, with regard to stains. The Gemara raises an objection:
  
  Daf 59a
  
  If there were on a woman’s body small drops of blood and large drops of blood, she may attribute these drops to an external source, even with regard to the largest drop, provided that it is up to the size of a split bean. What, is it not that a drop the size of a split bean itself is considered small, like a drop that is less than the size of a bean, which contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna? The Gemara responds: No, it means that a drop exactly the size of a split bean is like a large drop, i.e., a drop greater than a bean.
  It was stated: If a stain was found on a woman and it was the size of a split bean and slightly more, which is too large to be attributed to a louse, and in that area that was slightly more than a bean there was a squashed louse, what is the status of that woman? Rabbi Ḥanina says she is ritually impure, as the stain is not attributed to a louse; Rabbi Yannai says she is pure. The Gemara explains their opinions: Rabbi Ḥanina says she is impure, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> that a woman may attribute a stain to a louse only with regard to a stain whose area is up to the area of a split bean, whereas with regard to a stain the size of a split bean and slightly more, she may not attribute it to a louse.
  By contrast, Rabbi Yannai says she is pure, as he maintains that this statement that one may not attribute a stain larger than a bean to a louse applies only where there is no louse squashed on the stain. But in a case where there is a louse squashed on the stain it is apparent that this blood that causes the stain to be slightly more than the size of a bean is the blood of a louse. Since it is visibly squashed there, there is no uncertainty in this regard. When that area is subtracted one is left with a stain that is the size of a split bean, and one may say that since in general a woman attributes a stain the size of a bean to a louse, here too, she may attribute the stain to another, second louse.
  With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Yannai, Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a woman was occupied with an item the size of a split bean, e.g., the blood of a slaughtered bird, or eye salve, and then a stain was found on her the size of a split bean and slightly more, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yirmeya elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, who maintained in the previous case that she is impure, and the dilemma can be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, who ruled that she is pure.
  The dilemma can be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, as perhaps Rabbi Ḥanina states there that she is impure only where she was not occupied with a louse, and there is no reason to attribute the stain to that cause. But here, where she was occupied with an item that can stain her, it can be claimed that she may attribute the stain to that source. Or perhaps, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, who said in the previous case that she is pure, that statement applies only where a louse was found squashed on the stain; but in a case where there is no louse squashed on the stain and there is no certainty that part of the stain came from another source, she may not attribute part of the stain to the item she was occupied with and part of the stain to a louse. In this situation everyone agrees she is impure.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman was occupied with a red item she may not attribute a black stain to it. Likewise, if she was dealing with a small item she may not attribute a large stain to it. What are the circumstances of the second clause of this <i>baraita</i>? Is it not referring to a case like this dilemma raised by Rabbi Yirmeya where she was occupied with an item the size of a bean and a stain was found on her that was the size of a bean and slightly more? If so, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that in such a situation she may not attribute the stain to the item.
  The Gemara responds: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where she was occupied with an item the size of a split bean, and subsequently a stain was found on her the size of two split beans and slightly more. In this situation she may not attribute the stain to the item she was occupied with. The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating this case? Even if as much of the stain as possible is attributed to the item, a stain larger than a bean remains, and that part cannot be attributed to that source.
  The Gemara answers that the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is necessary lest you say that one should take the blood stain the size of a split bean that came from the blood of the bird she was previously occupied with and cast it into the middle of the stain. In other words, assume the blood from the bird is in the middle of the large stain, joining together two smaller stains. Consequently, one could say: Go here and measure the stain on this side, and there is no measure that transmits impurity, as it is less than the size of a bean, and likewise, go there, to the other side, and there is no measure that transmits impurity. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not so, and in such a case she is impure.
  Rava says: If one type of a stain was found on a woman, e.g., a stain from the sap of a sycamore tree or an eye salve, she may attribute other stains to that source, even if the stains are of several types, i.e., if they differ in color from the first stain. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rava from the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>: If a woman was occupied with a red item she may not attribute a black stain to it. The Gemara answers: A situation where she was occupied is different from Rava’s case. Since she was occupied with a red item, there is no reason to attribute a black stain to that source. In Rava’s case, by contrast, she was not occupied with any item, and therefore one can say that just as a stain of one type was sprayed upon her without her knowledge, the same occurred with regard to the other types of stains.
  Some say a different version of the above discussion. Rava says: If a woman was occupied with an item of one type, she may attribute stains of several types to it. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rava: If a woman was occupied with a red item she may not attribute a black stain to it. The Gemara answers: When Rava said his ruling he was referring to a situation where she was occupied with a slaughtered chicken, which has several types of blood, and therefore she may attribute stains of different types to that cause.
  § The mishna teaches that there was an incident involving one woman who came before Rabbi Akiva and he deemed her pure, to the surprise of his students. He explained to them that the Sages did not state the matter of the impurity of blood stains in order to be stringent; rather, they instituted this impurity in order to be lenient. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Sages did not state the matter of the impurity of blood stains to be lenient, but rather to be stringent?
  Ravina says that there is no contradiction between these two statements: The very institution of the impurity of blood stains was enacted so as not to be more lenient than Torah law, but rather to be stringent beyond Torah law. But since the impurity of blood stains themselves is by rabbinic law, the Sages were lenient in specific cases.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to an examination cloth that was placed beneath the pillow and blood was later found on the cloth, that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, maintains that if the stain is round it is ritually pure and if it is elongated it is ritually impure. Concerning this a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, or not?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a <i>baraita</i>: An elongated stain combines with other elongated stains, so that if together they form the area of slightly more than a bean the woman is impure. But a series of drops do not combine to constitute a stain that renders her impure. Whose opinion is stated in this <i>baraita</i>? If it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, why do I need a combination in the case of an elongated stain? Didn’t he say that an elongated stain of any size renders her impure?
  Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis, and should one not conclude from it that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok? The Gemara responds: No, actually the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, and when Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said an elongated stain is ritually impure he was referring to a stain found on an examination cloth; but with regard to a regular stain of an elongated shape, he does not hold it is impure regardless of its size.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok. Since Shmuel rules that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion, it may be derived by inference that the Rabbis disagree with his opinion, as otherwise there would be no need for a ruling of <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is correct.
  
  
  Daf 59b
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a woman who is urinating and saw blood intermingled with the urine, Rabbi Meir says: If she urinated while standing she is ritually impure, as the blood could have originated in the uterus. And if she is sitting, she is ritually pure, as it is clear that the blood is from a wound. Rabbi Yosei says: Whether she urinates in this manner, i.e., standing, or whether she urinates in that manner, i.e., sitting, she is ritually pure.
  In the case of a man and a woman who urinated into a basin [<i>hasefel</i>], and blood is found on the water in the basin, Rabbi Yosei deems her ritually pure. Even when it is clear that it is the blood of a woman who urinated, and there is only one uncertainty, Rabbi Yosei deems her ritually pure. In this case, there is a compound uncertainty: Did the blood originate with the man or with the woman, and did the blood come from the uterus or from a wound? And Rabbi Shimon deems her ritually impure, because there is only one uncertainty, as it is not the typical manner of the man to discharge blood with his urine; rather, the presumptive status of the blood is that it was discharged from the woman.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in a case where a woman finds blood in her urine Rabbi Meir distinguishes between a case where she is standing and a case where she is sitting. The Gemara asks: What is different about a situation where she is standing? The difference is that we say that while she was urinating the urine returned to the uterus and brought blood from there, which renders her impure. But if so, when she is sitting as well, let us say that the urine returns to the uterus and brings blood. Why does Rabbi Meir deem her ritually pure in that case?
  Shmuel says, in answer to this question: This mishna is referring specifically to a case where the urine flows in a steady stream, without the woman straining. In such a situation, when she is sitting and the urine flows in a steady stream, the stream of urine does not return to the uterus and bring blood. By contrast, if she is standing the urine does not flow in a steady stream, and she must strain to urinate. When she strains to urinate, the urine can bring blood from the uterus with it, whether she is standing or sitting. The Gemara objects: But in a case where she is sitting as well, when the urine flows in a steady stream, perhaps after the urine has finished, blood will come naturally from the uterus, and the flow of blood will mix with the urine?
  Rabbi Abba says: This is no concern, as the mishna is referring to a case where she is sitting on the edge of the basin and urinates in a steady flow into the basin, and the blood is found only inside the basin. As, if it is so that after the stream of urine finished the blood came naturally from her uterus, the blood should have been found on the edge of the basin. Since the blood is found only inside the basin it is clear that it came with the urine, not separately.
  Shmuel said, and some say that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. And similarly, Rabbi Abba ruled for a Sage called Kala, who inquired into this matter, that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  § The mishna teaches: In the case of a man and a woman who urinated into a basin, and blood is found on the water in the basin, Rabbi Yosei deems her ritually pure. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case where a man and a woman were standing and they urinated into the same basin, and blood was found in the basin, what would Rabbi Meir, who distinguishes between a woman who was sitting and a woman who was standing, say the <i>halakha</i> is?
  The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: When Rabbi Meir said that a woman who sees blood in her urine while standing is impure, does this apply when there is only one uncertainty, i.e., whether the blood came from a wound or from the uterus? Whereas in a case of a compound uncertainty, i.e., whether the blood came from the man or from the woman, and even if it came from the woman, whether it came from a wound or from her uterus, perhaps Rabbi Meir does not deem her impure? Or perhaps there is no difference between the two cases according to Rabbi Meir.
  Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Meir would rule in this case of a compound uncertainty exactly as he rules in that case of a single uncertainty, i.e., there is no difference between the two cases. Reish Lakish clarifies: From where do I know that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion? From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna does not teach: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei deem her pure. Instead, the mishna states merely that Rabbi Yosei deems her pure. This indicates that Rabbi Meir deems her impure even if a man and a woman both urinated into the same basin where the blood was found.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Reish Lakish’s opinion: If so, i.e., if according to Rabbi Meir a woman is impure even when a man also urinates into the same basin, now that Rabbi Meir deems her impure in a case of compound uncertainty, is it necessary for the mishna to teach his opinion in a case of one uncertainty? The Gemara answers: The mishna formulated the <i>halakha</i> in that manner to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, i.e., that he deems her pure even in a case of one uncertainty.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, rather than stating the dispute in a case of one uncertainty, which serves to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, let the <i>tanna</i> teach the dispute in a case of compound uncertainty, in order to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara answers: It is preferable for the <i>tanna</i> to teach the strength of a lenient ruling. If a <i>tanna</i> can formulate a dispute in a manner that emphasizes the extent of the more lenient opinion, he will do so.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed with Reish Lakish, and said: When Rabbi Meir says that the woman is impure, that applies only to a case of one uncertainty, but in a case of compound uncertainty Rabbi Meir did not say that she is impure. The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: If so, i.e., if Rabbi Meir deems her pure when both a man and a woman urinate into the same basin, let the mishna teach: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei deem her pure. Why does the <i>tanna</i> mention only Rabbi Yosei? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, that Rabbi Meir agrees with this ruling, but since the mishna left off with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei at the end of the first clause of the mishna, the <i>tanna</i> opened the latter clause with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei as well.
  The Gemara asks: But as Rabbi Yosei deems her pure in a case of one uncertainty, is it necessary for the mishna to teach his opinion a case of a compound uncertainty? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to state that Rabbi Yosei deems her pure in a case of compound uncertainty, lest you say that this statement, that Rabbi Yosei deems her pure, applies only after the fact, if the woman has already touched pure items, but he does not deem her pure <i>ab initio</i>. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that Rabbi Yosei deems her pure even <i>ab initio</i>.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of a man and a woman who urinated into a basin, and blood is found on the water in the basin, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei deem her ritually pure, and Rabbi Shimon deems her ritually impure, as there is only one uncertainty.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems her ritually impure because there is only one uncertainty, as it is not the typical manner of the man to discharge blood with his urine. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case where a woman was sitting and she urinated into a basin, and blood was found in the basin, what would Rabbi Shimon say? The Gemara explains the dilemma: When Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion, was he referring specifically to a woman who is standing, who in general must strain to urinate in such a position, and perhaps as a result the blood came from the uterus? Whereas if she is sitting without straining, in which case Rabbi Meir deems her pure, perhaps Rabbi Shimon agrees that she is not impure. Or perhaps there is no difference between the two cases according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman urinates while sitting and blood is found in the basin, she can attribute the blood to a wound and she is pure, but if she is standing she cannot attribute the blood to a wound, and therefore she is impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei said: Both in this case and in that case she can attribute the blood to a wound and she is pure. Rabbi Shimon said: Both in this case and in that case she cannot attribute the blood to a wound, and she is impure.
  Another dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: In a case where a man and a woman were sitting and urinated into the same basin, and blood was found in the basin, what would Rabbi Shimon say? The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: When Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion, was he referring to a woman who is standing, who in general must strain to urinate in such a position and perhaps as a result the blood came from the uterus, or to a case where she alone is sitting, which are cases of only one uncertainty? Whereas in a case of compound uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty whether the blood came from the man or from the woman, and even if it did come from the woman, whether it was from a wound or from her uterus, perhaps he does not say that she is impure. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases, as it is entirely atypical for a man to discharge blood.
  The Gemara answers: Come and hear the mishna: Since Rabbi Shimon said that the presumptive status of the blood is that it was discharged from the woman, evidently there is no difference in his opinion whether she was standing or whether she was sitting.
  MISHNA: In a case where a woman lent her garment to a gentile woman or to a menstruating Jewish woman, and after the borrower returned the garment the owner wore it and then discovered a blood stain, she attributes the blood stain to the gentile or the menstruating woman.
  In a case of three women who wore one garment or who sat on one bench [<i>safsal</i>], one after the other, and the garment, or bench, was examined before the first of them donned it, or sat on it, and it was clean, and after the third one removed the garment, or stood up, a blood stain was discovered on the garment or on the bench, all the women are ritually impure.
  If they sat on a stone bench or on the bench [<i>ha’itzteva</i>] of a bathhouse, neither of which can become ritually impure, the first because it is stone and the second because it is attached to the floor of the bathhouse, and a blood stain was found on one of those benches, Rabbi Neḥemya deems all three women ritually pure, as Rabbi Neḥemya would say: Any item that is not susceptible to ritual impurity is not susceptible to ritual impurity due to blood stains. The decree of impurity due to blood stains was limited to items susceptible to ritual impurity.
  GEMARA: Rav says: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a gentile woman
  
  Daf 60a
  
  who is of age and already seeing a flow of menstrual blood, i.e., she has had a flow of menstrual blood.
  The Gemara explains: From where does Rav know that this is referring to a gentile woman who once experienced a flow of blood? He infers from the mishna that the gentile woman it mentions is similar to a menstruating woman: Just as a menstruating woman is one who sees, i.e., who has already experienced bleeding, so too, the mishna is referring to an adult gentile woman who already sees menstrual blood.
  Rav Sheshet says: I say that when Rav was dozing or sleeping he said that <i>halakha</i>, i.e., it is an error. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman loaned her garment to a gentile and subsequently found a blood stain on it, she attributes the stain to the gentile woman. This <i>tanna</i> deems it permitted for her to attribute the blood to any gentile woman, regardless of her age or her likelihood of bleeding. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says: This applies specifically to a gentile woman who is fit to see menstrual blood. And the Gemara adds that even Rabbi Meir says only that the gentile woman must be fit to see menstrual blood, but he too agrees that it is not necessary for her to be seeing blood at that time. She does not have to have actually experienced bleeding at some point.
  Rava said in response to Rav Sheshet’s challenge: And how can you understand that Rabbi Meir is coming to be stringent? Rav Sheshet maintains that according to the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> she can attribute the blood stain to any gentile, whereas Rabbi Meir rules stringently that she may attribute it only to a gentile who is fit to experience bleeding. This is incorrect, as Rabbi Meir is actually coming to be lenient. In other words, the first <i>tanna</i> is more stringent, as he deems it permitted for her to attribute the blood stain only to a gentile woman who had experienced a menstrual flow at least once. By contrast, Rabbi Meir rules that she may attribute the stain to a gentile woman who is old enough to experience bleeding, even if she has never experienced a menstrual flow.
  The Gemara provides the reason for Rava’s opinion. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman who loaned her garment to a gentile woman and subsequently finds a blood stain on it may not attribute the stain to the gentile woman. Rabbi Meir says that she may attribute the blood stain to the gentile woman. But if so, the first <i>baraita</i>, which states that according to the first <i>tanna</i> she may attribute the blood stain to any gentile woman, is difficult. You must answer like this: According to the first <i>tanna</i> she may attribute the blood to any gentile woman provided that she sees, i.e., that she once experienced bleeding. By contrast, Rabbi Meir says a more lenient opinion, that she may attribute it to the gentile woman provided that she is fit to see menstrual blood, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even though she has not actually seen menstrual blood yet.
  § The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a woman who loaned her garment to another woman who was a lesser <i>zava</i>: The lender may attribute the blood stain on the loaned garment to a woman who observes a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge, if the blood is found on her second day, i.e., the day after she had a discharge, despite the fact that she does not have a presumptive status of seeing blood. It is nevertheless considered that her uterus is open and the likelihood is that she will experience bleeding.
  And likewise, she may also attribute the blood stain if she loaned her garment to a woman counting seven clean days who did not immerse in a ritual bath, and who will now have to count another seven clean days. Therefore, the status of the one who loaned the garment is fixed, and the status of the other woman is ruined and she must begin her counting again; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: She may not attribute the blood flow to either of these women. Therefore, the statuses of both the woman who loaned the garment and the one who borrowed it are ruined, in that both women are deemed impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And both Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agree that a woman who lends her garment may attribute any blood stain found on it to a woman who observes a day for a day if it is on her first day of the discharge. In this case the status of the woman who borrowed the garment is no more ruined than it was already, as either way she can become pure on the following day.
  And they also agree in a case where the woman who borrowed the garment was a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity. During these days, attributing the blood to her does not ruin her status, as any blood she emits is pure and does not affect her status. And similarly, the lender may attribute the blood stain to a virgin who engages in intercourse for the first time, as her blood is pure, as there is an assumption that it is hymenal bleeding rather than menstrual blood.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need the clause starting with: Therefore, mentioned by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? It is obvious that the status of only one woman is ruined, so what information does this observation add? The Gemara answers that this clause does not add any new information; rather, the <i>baraita</i> taught it because of the use of the similar clause beginning with: Therefore, stated by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the latter part of the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara persists: But why do I need the clause starting with: Therefore, in the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? That too is apparently superfluous. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that the status of the woman who has the blood stain found with her when she is wearing the garment, should be ruined, whereas the status of the other woman should not be ruined, as the garment was not with her when the blood stain was discovered. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us the clause beginning with: Therefore, to stress that both women are impure.
  § With regard to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rav Ḥisda says: In a case of two individuals, one of whom was ritually impure and the other of whom was pure, who walked on two paths, one of which was pure and the other one impure due to a corpse buried there, and neither remembers which path he took, and afterward they handled items of ritual purity, e.g., the portion of produce designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>] or consecrated items, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, if one of the two individuals was already impure it can be assumed that he was the one who walked along the ritually impure path, and the other individual remains pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi claims that there is no assumption that the one who was pure retains that state, as it is equally possible that he walked along the ritually impure path.
  Rav Adda objects to this suggestion of Rav Ḥisda, claiming that one cannot compare the two cases. It is possible that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states his <i>halakha</i> only there, with regard to a woman who observes a day for a day, as she can immerse in a ritual bath at any time, and therefore both women are like each other, i.e., both have a presumption of ritual purity. But here, in the case of the two individuals walking on two paths, what practical difference does it make to the one who was previously impure if he remains ritually impure? Since there is no change of status, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would agree in that case that it can be assumed that the individual who was previously impure was the one who walked on the impure path.
  And the Gemara asks: How would Rav Ḥisda respond to this claim? Rav Ḥisda would answer that a woman who observes a day for a day is also not fully pure, as ultimately she requires immersion in a ritual bath to complete her purification, and yet Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi still rejects the attribution of the blood flow to her. Accordingly, the two cases are comparable and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not assume that the individual who was already impure was the one who walked along the path that was impure.
  It was stated that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: In a case of two individuals, one of whom was ritually impure and the other of whom was pure, or even where one was pure and the other was impure due to uncertainty, who walked on two different paths, one of which was impure and the other one pure, and neither remembers which path he took, one may attribute by assuming that the impure path was the one traversed by the individual who was impure due to uncertainty, and the pure path was traversed by the one who was ritually pure. And everyone agrees with this ruling, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in this case. This statement is in accordance with Rav Adda’s objection, not in accordance with the suggestion of Rav Ḥisda.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to attributing a blood stain to a woman who is already impure due to having seen a blood stain? Rabbi Yoḥanan clarifies his question: I am not raising this dilemma to you according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan explains why his dilemma does not apply according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Now, and if there, where one loaned her garment to a woman who observes a clean day for a day, which is a case where she sees a discharge from her body, and yet you said that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the other woman may not attribute the blood stain to her, then here, in the case of a woman who is impure merely due to having seen a blood stain, where her impurity came from a source external to her, is it not all the more so that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not permit one to attribute the blood stain to her?
  Rather, when I raise this dilemma to you, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yoḥanan clarifies the dilemma: Perhaps it is only there, in the case where she loaned her garment to a woman who observes a day for a day, where she sees the discharge from her body, that the lender may attribute the blood stain to her, whereas here, where it is possible that the stain came from a source external to her, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would not permit the lender to attribute this new blood stain to her. Or perhaps it is no different, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would rule leniently in both cases.
  Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: She may not attribute this blood stain to a woman who was already impure due to having seen a blood stain, and both women are ritually impure. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai: What is the reason that she may not attribute the blood stain to her? Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai answered: It is because in this case one may not attribute the new blood stain to that other woman, as her previous stain might have come from an external cause.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai from the following <i>baraita</i>: A woman who loans her garment to another and subsequently finds a blood stain on it may not attribute the blood stain to a woman who was impure due to having previously seen a blood stain. But if she loaned her garment to a gentile woman or to a woman who was observing days of impurity due to having seen a blood stain, she may attribute the blood stain found on the garment to that other woman.
  Before explaining the objection, the Gemara first analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. This <i>baraita</i> itself is difficult. In the first clause you said that a woman who loans her garment to another and subsequently finds a blood stain on it may not attribute the blood stain to a woman who was impure due to having previously seen a blood stain, whereas in the latter clause you said that she may attribute the blood stain to such a woman. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains this contradiction: This is not difficult. This first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and that latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  There are those who say an alternative resolution of the contradiction: Both this clause and that clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The difference is that this latter clause, where she may attribute the blood stain to the other woman, is referring to a case where the blood stain was found on that woman’s first day, when she had just found the blood stain and is impure for that day. Since she is in any case impure for that day, she is not adversely affected by having the new stain attributed to her. The case where the blood stain may not be attributed to the other woman is a case where the blood stain in question was found on her second day, i.e., the day after she found the blood stain, when she is not impure but merely requires immersion. The lender may not attribute the new blood stain to her, as that would render her ritually impure for an extra day.
  Rav Ashi said yet another resolution of the <i>baraita</i>: Both this first clause and that latter clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and it is not difficult.
  
  Daf 60b
  
  Here, in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>, when she may attribute the stain to a woman who had seen a blood stain, it is referring to rendering that woman impure retroactively with regard to the status of pure items that she had already touched before the stain was found on the garment she borrowed. This attribution of the blood stain to the woman who was already impure due to seeing a blood stain does not harm her impure status in any way, as items she had previously touched were already considered impure. There, in the beginning of the <i>baraita</i>, where the ruling is that the lender may not attribute the blood stain to a woman who was already impure, it is referring to her own status with regard to the future. With regard to the future, one may not attribute the stain to woman who had already seen a blood stain, as this attribution would ruin that woman’s counting of pure days.
  The Gemara returns to the objection: The <i>baraita</i> has been resolved, but in any case everyone agrees that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel she may attribute the stain to a woman who had previously seen a blood stain. This presents a difficulty to the answer of Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai, i.e., that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel one may not attribute the blood stain in such a case. Ravina said: It is not difficult, as this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying in its latter clause: If she loaned her garment to a gentile woman, then with regard to defining the lender as one who had seen a blood stain, the lender may attribute the stain to the gentile woman. If so, it cannot be inferred from the <i>baraita</i> that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel one may attribute a blood stain to another woman who was already impure due to a blood stain.
  The Gemara raises an objection: But the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Or to a woman who was observing days of impurity due to having seen a blood stain, i.e., it mentions another woman who was already impure due to having seen a blood stain. Ravina explains that this is what the <i>tanna</i> is saying: If she loaned the garment to a gentile woman or to a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity, then with regard to defining the lender as a woman who saw a blood stain, she may attribute the stain to the gentile or to the woman observing the days of ritually pure blood, and the lender remains pure.
  § The mishna teaches: In a case of three women who wore one garment, etc. If they sat on a stone bench or on the bench of a bathhouse, Rabbi Neḥemya deems all three women ritually pure, as Rabbi Neḥemya would say: Any item that is not susceptible to ritual impurity is not susceptible to ritual impurity due to blood stains. The Gemara clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. Rav Mattana says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya? As it is written: “And her gates shall lament and mourn; and clean she shall sit upon the ground” (Isaiah 3:26). This teaches that once she sits on the ground, which is not susceptible to ritual impurity, she shall be clean, i.e., pure.
  Rav Huna says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: Rabbi Neḥemya would deem her ritually pure even if she sat on the exterior of an inverted earthenware vessel. Since an earthenware vessel becomes impure only if an impure item enters its airspace, its exterior is not susceptible to ritual impurity and therefore it does not render a woman who sees a blood stain on it ritually impure. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Rabbi Neḥemya himself said that she does not become impure if a blood stain is found on an item that is not susceptible to ritual impurity. What does Rabbi Ḥanina add to that statement?
  The Gemara answers: This observation is necessary, lest you say: Let the Sages decree that she becomes impure from a blood stain found on the exterior of an earthenware vessel, due to its similarity to a blood stain found on the interior, which would render her impure. Therefore, Rabbi Ḥanina teaches us that there is no such decree.
  Abaye says: Rabbi Neḥemya would deem her ritually pure if she saw blood stains on small rags that do not have an area of three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, as these rags are suitable for use neither for the poor nor for the wealthy.
  Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav Mattana taught in the name of Rav: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav Mattana: Father teaches the following <i>baraita</i>: An incident of this kind came before the Sages, involving two women who found a blood stain on an item that was not susceptible to ritual impurity, and the Sages deemed both women ritually impure, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Neḥemya. And yet you say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya?
  The Gemara inquires: What is that incident in question? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to two women who were grinding with a hand mill and were standing next to each other, and blood was found beneath the woman on the inside, i.e., the woman standing closest to the mill, they are both ritually impure. The reason is that the woman standing further away pushes in to get closer to the mill, and therefore the blood stain could be from either of them. But if blood was found beneath the woman on the outside, i.e., the woman standing further from the mill, the woman on the outside is impure and the woman on the inside is pure. If the blood was found between them, they are both impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: There was an incident and blood was found on the edge of a bathtub, and in another case a blood stain was found on an olive leaf at the time that the women were kindling the oven. And the incident came before the Sages and they deemed both women ritually impure. Since an olive leaf is not susceptible to ritual impurity, this <i>baraita</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav Mattana answered: It is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> whether or not the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a blood stain is found on an item that is not susceptible to ritual impurity, Rabbi Ya’akov deems her impure, but Rabbi Neḥemya deems her pure. And the Sages ruled that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.
  MISHNA: In a case of three women who were sleeping in one bed and blood was discovered beneath one of them, all of them are ritually impure. If when the blood was discovered one of them examined herself and discovered that she was impure due to menstruation, she is impure and the other two are pure. And if none of them examined themselves, or if all of them examined themselves and were pure, they attribute the blood to each other, i.e., if one of them is unfit to menstruate, e.g., she is pregnant, she may attribute the blood to the other women who are fit to menstruate. And if all three women were not fit to see the flow of blood, e.g., they each belonged to one of the categories listed in the mishna on 7a, one considers them as though they were fit, and all three are impure, because the blood must have originated from one of them.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one of the women examined herself when the blood was discovered and found that she was impure due to menstruation, she is impure and the other two are pure. In this regard, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The other two women may attribute the blood to the one who examined herself only when she examined herself within the brief period of time needed for the onset of menstruation. But if she checked herself after this time, although she is impure, the other women are also impure, due to uncertainty.
  The Gemara explains: Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of bar Padda, who said: There are three time periods with regard to defining a woman’s ritual-purity status if she sees blood after engaging in intercourse. The shortest is the period of time required for the onset of menstruation, i.e., for menstrual bleeding to begin. The next shortest is the time it would take the woman to get out of bed after intercourse and wash her private parts. The longest period is any time longer than that. If a woman finds blood after intercourse within the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation, she must have been impure during intercourse. With regard to any woman whose husband would be liable to bring a sin offering if he had engaged in intercourse with her, because she found the blood within that short period, if she had not been engaging in intercourse, but rather had been preparing food in a state of ritual purity, and then she found blood within that short period, all the pure items that she touched are ritually impure.
  By contrast, with regard to any woman whose husband would be liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he had engaged in intercourse with her, as it is uncertain whether he violated a transgression for which he would be liable to bring a sin offering, if she had not been engaging in intercourse, but rather had been preparing food in a state of ritual purity and then found blood within that same time period, the status of all the pure items she touched is suspended, as their status is uncertain. They are not burned but they may not be eaten either. Finally, with regard to any woman whose husband would be exempt from bringing any offering, i.e., where she finds blood after a longer time period, if she had not been engaging in intercourse, but rather had been preparing food in a state of ritual purity, and then found the blood after a longer time period, all the pure items she touched remain pure.
  And Rabbi Oshaya says: There is no connection between her husband’s obligation to bring an offering and the ritual-purity status of the items she handled. Even if her husband is liable to bring a sin offering, i.e., when she discovered the blood within the period of time needed for the onset of menstruation, the status of all the pure items she touched before she discovered the blood is suspended, as their status is uncertain.
  Rabbi Oshaya explains his reasoning. Granted, there, in the case of intercourse, where the husband must bring an offering, one can say that the male organ prevented the blood from emerging from her body, and therefore it is clear that she was impure beforehand. But here, in the case of preparing food in a state of ritual purity, if it is so that there was blood coming out of her while she was preparing the food, what prevented the blood from emerging from her body?
  Rabbi Yirmeya says a parable in explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya: To what is this matter comparable? To a child and an old man who are walking along the road. As long as they are on the road, the child delays his arrival, i.e., he walks at the pace of the old man. But once they enter the city, the child hastens his arrival, and runs on ahead. Similarly, as soon as the couple has finished engaging in intercourse, the blood comes quickly, but the blood is hindered from coming out during intercourse. And Abaye also says a parable in explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya: To what is this matter comparable? To a man who puts his finger in his eye. As long as his finger is in his eye, the tears delay their arrival and remain in the eye. But as soon as he has removed his finger the tears hasten their arrival.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to three women who were sleeping in one bed and blood was discovered beneath one of them, that if one of them is unfit to menstruate they attribute the blood to each other, i.e., to the women who are fit to menstruate. In this regard, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How do they attribute the blood to one another? If one of the women is pregnant and one is not pregnant, the pregnant woman may attribute the blood to the woman who is not pregnant.
  If one of the women is nursing and the other is not nursing, the nursing woman may attribute the blood to the woman who is not nursing. If one of the women is old and no longer experiences bleeding regularly, and the other one is not old, the old woman may attribute the blood to the woman who is not old. Likewise, if one of the women is a virgin, in this context, one who has not yet experienced bleeding due to her youth, and the other woman is not a virgin, in this context, one who has experienced bleeding, the virgin may attribute the blood to the woman who is not a virgin.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If both women are pregnant, or both women are nursing, or both women are old, or both women are virgins, in this case the <i>halakha</i> is as we learned in the mishna: If both women were not fit to see menstrual blood, and yet blood is found beneath them on the bed, one considers them
  
  Daf 61a
  
  as though they were fit, and all three are impure, because the blood must have originated from one of them.
  MISHNA: In a case of three women who were sleeping in one bed that was located adjacent to a wall, and blood was discovered beneath the middle woman, all of them are ritually impure. If the blood was discovered beneath the woman on the inside, closest to the wall, the two innermost women are ritually impure and the woman on the outside is ritually pure. If the blood was discovered beneath the woman on the outside, farthest from the wall, the two outermost women are ritually impure and the woman on the inside is ritually pure.
  When is that the ruling? It is when they passed into their positions on the bed via the foot of the bed; but if they passed into their positions on the bed via the side of the bed, over the place where the blood was discovered, all of them are ritually impure. If immediately after the blood was discovered, one of them examined herself and she was found to be ritually pure, she is pure and the other two are impure. If two of them examined themselves and found that they were ritually pure, they are pure and the third is impure. If all three of them examined themselves and found that they were ritually pure, all of them are ritually impure, as the blood must have originated from one of them.
  To what case is this matter comparable? It is similar to the case of a ritually impure pile of stones with an olive-bulk of a corpse beneath it, where this pile was intermingled with two ritually pure piles, and they examined one of them and found it pure. That pile is pure and the other two are impure. If they examined two of them and found them ritually pure, they are ritually pure and the third is impure.
  If they examined all three of them and found them ritually pure, all of them are impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, as Rabbi Meir would say: With regard to any item that has the presumptive status of ritual impurity, it forever remains in its state of ritual impurity, even if one examined the relevant area or item and the source of impurity was not found, until it becomes known to you where the ritual impurity is. The assumption is that the impurity was not found because the examination was not conducted properly.
  And the Rabbis say: One continues searching the relevant area until he reaches bedrock or virgin soil, beneath which there is certainly no ritual impurity. If no ritual impurity is found at that stage, presumably an animal dragged the olive-bulk of the corpse from beneath the pile, and the pile of rocks is pure.
  GEMARA: The previous mishna taught that if blood is found beneath one of three women lying together on a bed, they are all ritually impure. By contrast, the mishna here distinguishes based on the precise location where the blood was found. The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause, i.e., the previous mishna, which did not distinguish on the basis of where the blood was found, and what is different in the latter clause, i.e., this mishna, which does distinguish in that manner? Rabbi Ami said that the previous mishna is referring to a case where the women were lying intertwined, and therefore it is impossible to distinguish between the woman on the inside and the woman on the outside.
  § The mishna teaches: If immediately after the blood was discovered, one of them examined herself and she was found to be ritually pure, she is pure and the other two are impure. If two of them examined themselves and found that they were ritually pure, they are pure and the third is impure. If all three of them examined themselves and found that they were ritually pure, all of them are ritually impure. The mishna proceeds to compare this case to that of a pile of stones beneath which there is an olive-bulk of a corpse. The Gemara asks: Why does the <i>tanna</i> need to teach: To what case is this matter comparable? The ruling of the mishna is clear enough without this analogy.
  The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Meir is saying to the Rabbis: What is different with regard to the case of blood, where you do not disagree with me, as you concede that all three women are impure, and what is different with regard to the case of the pile of stones, where you disagree with me and maintain that all three piles of stones can be ritually pure if they are examined?
  And the Rabbis would counter that the two cases are different. Granted, there, with regard to the piles of stones, one could say that a raven or some other animal took away the olive-bulk of the corpse, so there is a reason to deem all the piles pure. But here, in the case of the three women and the blood, from where did this blood come? It must have come from one of them. Therefore, at least one of the women must be ritually impure, and one cannot say that all three are pure.
  The Gemara discusses other cases involving possible mistakes in examinations. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Meir said that there was an incident involving a sycamore tree in Kefar Sava, with regard to which they had a presumption of ritual impurity, i.e., a presumption that there was a corpse buried beneath it. And they examined by digging in that place and did not find any corpse. Some days later, the wind blew at it and uprooted the sycamore tree, and they found a skull from a corpse stuck in its roots. This apparently indicates that in general one cannot rely upon an examination. The Sages said to Rabbi Meir: Do you seek to bring a proof from there? One can say that they did not examine as much as was necessary.
  The Gemara cites another case. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei said that there was an incident involving a cave in Shiḥin with regard to which they had a presumption of ritual impurity of a corpse. And they examined by digging inside the cave until they reached ground that was as smooth as a fingernail, and they did not find any corpse. Some days later workers entered the cave because they sought shelter from the rain. And they dug with their shovels and found a mortar full of bones. Once again, this indicates that one cannot rely upon an examination. The Sages said to Rabbi Yosei: Do you bring a proof from there? One can say they did not examine as much as was necessary.
  The Gemara cites yet another relevant case. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Abba Shaul says that there was an incident involving bedrock in Beit Ḥoron, with regard to which they had a presumption of ritual impurity of a corpse. And the Sages were unable to examine it because the area of the bedrock was too large. And there was one old man there, and his name was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya. He said to them: Bring me sheets. They brought him sheets and he soaked them in water and spread them over the bedrock. In every place of ritual purity the ground remained dry, and in every place of ritual impurity the ground became moist. They understood that it was not entirely bedrock, as the area where the ground was wet was actually soft earth. And they examined there by digging and found a large pit filled with bones.
  It is taught: That pit that they found is the pit that Ishmael, son of Nethaniah, filled with corpses, as it is written: “Now the pit where Ishmael cast all the dead bodies of the men whom he had slain by the side of Gedaliah was that which Asa the king had made for fear of Baasa king of Israel; the same Ishmael, son of Nethaniah, filled with them that were slain” (Jeremiah 41:9).
  The Gemara analyzes that verse: And did Gedaliah kill them? But didn’t Ishmael kill them? Gedaliah was one of those killed by Ishmael and his men (see Jeremiah 41:2). The Gemara answers: Rather, since Gedaliah should have been concerned and cautious based on the advice of Johanan, son of Kareah, who warned him that Ishmael was conspiring to kill him and even offered to go and kill Ishmael in a preemptive strike (see Jeremiah 40:13–16), but Gedaliah was not concerned and he refused to listen to Johanan’s advice, saying that he did not want to listen to malicious speech, the verse ascribes him blame as though he himself killed them.
  § In relation to the above comment that Gedaliah was killed after not heeding the warning of Johanan, the Gemara clarifies what is permitted when receiving such a warning. Rava said: With regard to this prohibition against listening to malicious speech, even though one should not accept the malicious speech as true, one is nevertheless required to be concerned about the harm that might result from ignoring it.
  The Gemara cites examples of people who were concerned about malicious speech. There were these people of the Galilee about whom a rumor emerged that they had killed someone. They came before Rabbi Tarfon and said to him: Will the Master hide us? Rabbi Tarfon said to them: What should we do? If I do not hide you, your pursuers will see you and kill you. If I do hide you, this too is problematic, as didn’t the Rabbis say: With regard to this prohibition against listening to malicious speech, even though one should not accept the malicious speech as true, one is required to be concerned about the harm that might result from ignoring it? Therefore, you must go and hide yourselves.
  The Gemara cites another case of a report that caused concern. Before the battle against Og, king of Bashan, it is stated: “And the Lord said to Moses: Do not fear him; for I have delivered him into your hand, and all his people, and his land; and you shall do to him as you did to Sihon king of the Amorites, who dwelt at Heshbon” (Numbers 21:34). The Gemara asks: Now, Sihon and Og were brothers, as the Master said: Sihon and Og were sons of Ahijah, son of Shamhazai. In what way is Sihon different from Og, that God found it necessary to warn Moses not to be afraid of Og, and in what way is Og different from Sihon, that there was no need for a warning not to be afraid of Sihon?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: From the answer that God gave to that righteous one, Moses, you know what was in his heart, i.e., what gave Moses cause to fear. Moses said to himself: Perhaps the merit of our forefather Abraham will stand for Og and save him. Og was the one who told Abraham that Lot had been taken captive by the four kings, enabling Abraham to rescue Lot.
  The Gemara cites the source of this claim. As it is stated: “And there came one that was saved, and told Abram the Hebrew, now he dwelt by the terebinths of Mamre the Amorite, brother of Eshkol, and brother of Aner; and these were confederate with Abram. And when Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, he led forth his trained men, born in his house, three hundred and eighteen, and pursued as far as Dan” (Genesis 14:13–14). And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the term “one that was saved” is referring to Og, who was saved from the punishment of the generation of the flood. For this reason, Moses was more afraid of Og.
  § The Gemara cites another instance in which an impure item was lost, similar to the case discussed above involving the pile of stones. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Menstrual blood is itself a source of impurity. With regard to a garment in which a blood stain was lost, i.e., it is difficult to determine if the blood is still on the garment, one applies to it, i.e., scrubs it with, seven abrasive substances that are known to remove blood stains, and thereby nullifies the blood stain, so that the garment is pure. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says:
  
  Daf 61b
  
  He examines it section by section, as by examining each part of the garment separately he will discover any remaining blood stain.
  In the case of a garment in which a seminal emission, which is also ritually impure, was lost, i.e., it is not known where on the garment the semen is, if the garment is new, one examines it by sticking a needle into every part of it. In this manner he will feel if the semen is in the garment. If the garment is worn out, one examines it by holding it up to the sun, as the sun’s rays will not pass through the stained part of the garment. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The section mentioned need not be less than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths in area.
  The Gemara cites another case of a garment in which something was lost. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a garment in which diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, was lost, i.e., it is a wool garment into which a linen thread was sewn or vice versa and it is not known where on the garment the thread is located, one may not sell it to a gentile and one may not even fashion it into a saddlecloth for a donkey. This is prohibited lest one remove a piece of the garment and sew it onto his own clothing. But one may fashion it into a shroud for a corpse, as there is no concern that one might remove it from the dead. Rav Yosef said: That is to say that the mitzvot will be nullified in the future. If this were not the case, then when the dead are resurrected they will be deriving benefit from the garment of diverse kinds in which they were buried.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef, and some say that Rav Dimi said to Rav Yosef: But didn’t Rabbi Mani say that Rabbi Yannai said: They taught that it is permitted to place a corpse in a shroud of diverse kinds only in order to eulogize him, but it is prohibited to bury him in a shroud of diverse kinds? Rav Yosef said to him: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that matter that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is even permitted to bury him in a shroud of diverse kinds?
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Set apart [<i>ḥofshi</i>] among the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6)? Once a person dies, he becomes free [<i>ḥofshi</i>] from the mitzvot.
  § Rafram bar Pappa says that Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to a garment in which diverse kinds was lost, one may dye it, and it is permitted to wear the garment, as wool and linen absorb dye differently, and therefore it will be easy to notice the location of the other kind of thread and remove it. Rava said to Rafram bar Pappa: From where does the Elder, i.e., Rav Ḥisda, derive this <i>halakha</i>?
  Rafram bar Pappa said to him: It is derived from the mishna, as we learned: With regard to a pile of stones that was known to have an item of ritual impurity buried beneath it, one continues searching beneath each of these piles until he reaches bedrock. And if the impure item is not there, i.e., if he found nothing, one can say that a raven or some other animal took it. So too here, wool and flax, i.e., linen, do not absorb the dye in the same manner. And since he dyed the garment and he does not know of any mixture of linen and wool within it, as the entire garment absorbed the dye in the same way, one must say that that thread has fallen out, and therefore it is permitted to wear the garment.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yeiva, said in the name of Mar Zutra: In a case of one who put a thread of flax in a cloak of wool and it fell out, but he does not know whether it all fell out or whether it did not all fall out, it is permitted to wear the cloak.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the <i>halakha</i> is lenient in this case of uncertainty? By Torah law, it is written: “Diverse kinds [<i>sha’atnez</i>]” (Deuteronomy 22:11), and this is interpreted as an acronym indicating that the <i>halakha</i> of diverse kinds does not apply unless the item is combed smooth [<i>shua</i>], spun [<i>tavui</i>] as a thread, and woven [<i>nuz</i>]. Without these characteristics, the combination is not considered diverse kinds by Torah law. And it is the Sages who decreed that diverse kinds that are merely attached to each other are prohibited, despite the fact that they are not combed and spun together. And in this case, since he does not know if it all fell out it is permitted, as the <i>halakha</i> is lenient with regard to uncertainties involving prohibitions that are by rabbinic law.
  Rav Ashi objects to this leniency. One can say that by Torah law it is prohibited if the linen and wool are either combed, or spun, or woven. Perhaps the word <i>sha’atnez</i> does not limit the prohibition to a combination of all three activities, but to any one of them. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Mar Zutra, from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the prohibition in the Torah in one word, <i>sha’atnez</i>. Therefore, the term means all three characteristics together.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A colored garment renders a woman impure due to blood stains if she sees a blood stain on it. Rabbi Natan bar Yosef says: If she sees a blood stain on the colored garment she is not impure due to a blood stain, as the Sages enacted that women wear colored garments, and this decree was made only in order to be lenient with regard to their blood stains, i.e., so that they do not become impure.
  The Gemara questions Rabbi Natan bar Yosef’s use of the word: Enacted. The Sages enacted? What was their enactment? Rather, Rabbi Natan bar Yosef said the reason that the Sages permitted colored garments to women was only in order to be lenient with regard to her blood stains. The Gemara raises an objection: From the statement that the Sages permitted colored garments one can conclude by inference they were previously prohibited. But was there a time when it was not permitted for women to wear colored garments?
  The Gemara answers: Yes, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Sota</i> 49a): In the war [<i>bapulmus</i>] of Vespasian they decreed upon the crowns of bridegrooms, i.e., that bridegrooms may no longer wear crowns, and upon the drum [<i>ha’irus</i>], i.e., they also banned the playing of drums. They also sought to decree with regard to colored garments, i.e., that women may not wear such garments, but they said: This is preferable, that women should wear colored garments, in order to be lenient with regard to their blood stains, as a blood stain found on a colored garment does not render a woman ritually impure.
  MISHNA: There are seven substances that one applies to the stain on a garment to ascertain whether it is a blood stain or a dye, as these seven substances remove the blood. They are: Tasteless saliva, and liquid from split beans, and urine, and natron, and <i>borit</i>,
  
  Daf 62a
  
  Cimolian earth [<i>kamonya</i>], and potash [<i>eshlag</i>].
  If one immersed the garment with the stain whose nature is unknown and then handled ritually pure items with the garment, and then applied these seven substances to the stain and it did not disappear, that stain is presumably from a dye, and therefore the ritually pure items are pure, and he need not immerse the garment again, as there is no impurity. If the stain disappeared or if it faded, that is a blood stain, and the ritually pure items that he handled are impure, and he must immerse the garment again.
  What is tasteless saliva? It is saliva that emerges from the mouth of any person who tasted nothing all night, when he first awakens in the morning. Liquid from split beans is created through the chewing of split beans that divided naturally, not by human hand, which is then applied to the stain. The urine that is an effective detergent is specifically urine that fermented for three days.
  And one must rub each and every one of the substances three times over the stain, and one must apply them separately, and one must apply them in the order they are listed in the mishna. If one applied them in a manner that is not in their prescribed order, or if one applied all seven substances simultaneously, he has done nothing. One cannot determine by means of that examination whether it is blood or a dye.
  GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies the identities of the seven substances that remove blood stains. With regard to natron, a Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This is referring to Alexandrian natron, i.e., from the city in Egypt, and not natron from Anpantrin, which is of a different quality.
  The mishna lists <i>borit</i> as one of the seven substances. Rav Yehuda says: This is referring to ice plant. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Borit</i> and ice plant, which indicates that they are two different substances? Rather, what is <i>borit</i>? Sulfur.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the <i>baraita</i> discussing the <i>halakha</i> of plants whose use is prohibited during the Sabbatical Year: They added to the list of such plants: Bulbs of ornithogalum, and wormwood, and <i>borit</i>, and ice plant. And if it would enter your mind to say that <i>borit</i> is sulfur, is there sulfur that is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year? But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i> that this is the principle: Anything that has a root and grows is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year, and anything that does not have a root is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year? Rather, what is <i>borit</i>? It is ice plant. But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i>: And <i>borit</i> and ice plant? The Gemara explains that there are two types of ice plant, one of which is called <i>borit</i>.
  With regard to the Cimolian earth mentioned in the mishna, Rav Yehuda said: This is the earth referred to as: Pull out, stick in. And with regard to the <i>eshlag</i> mentioned in the mishna, Shmuel said: I asked all of the seafarers about the identity of <i>eshlag</i>, and they told me it is called <i>ashlega</i>, in Aramaic, and can be found in the shell of the pearl, and is removed with an iron skewer.
  § The mishna teaches: If one immersed the garment with the stain whose nature is unknown and then handled ritually pure items with the garment, and then applied these seven substances to the stain and it did not disappear, that stain is a dye, and therefore the ritually pure items are pure, and he need not immerse the garment again, as there is no impurity. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one applied these seven substances to the stain and it did not disappear, but he then applied soap [<i>tzafon</i>] and it disappeared, any ritually pure items that he handled with the garment are impure.
  The Gemara raises an objection with regard to this ruling: But soap causes dye to disappear as well; why then should one assume that the stain was blood? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means that if one applied only six of the seven substances to it and the stain did not disappear, and he then applied soap to the stain and it disappeared, any ritually pure items that he handled with the garment are impure. The reason is that if he had applied all seven substances initially, perhaps the stain would have disappeared, proving that it was blood. Consequently, the garment is rendered impure due to uncertainty.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: If one applied the seven substances to the stain and it did not disappear, indicating that it is a dye, and he then repeated and applied the seven substances a second time and the stain disappeared, any ritually pure items that he handled with the garment remain ritually pure.
  In explanation of this <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Zeira says: They taught that the pure items remain pure only with regard to the ritually pure items that were handled between the first washing with the seven substances and the second washing. But with regard to any pure items that were handled with the garment after the second washing, these pure items become impure, as he was particular about it, i.e., by repeating the washing procedure he showed he was concerned that it might be blood, and the stain disappeared, demonstrating that it was in fact blood.
  
  Daf 62b
  
  Rabbi Abba said to Rav Ashi, with regard to his statement: Does the matter of purity or impurity depend on whether or not one is particular about the blood stain? If the items he handled on the garment between the first and second washings are ritually pure, then any items he handled after the second washing should likewise be pure.
  Rav Ashi said to him: Yes, the status of purity depends upon whether or not the owner of the garment is particular about the stain. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥiyya says: If one finds blood on a garment that is certainly from a menstruating woman and therefore renders the garment impure, one may apply the seven substances listed in the mishna to it and thereby nullify it from being considered a blood stain at all, even if the stain is not completely removed. And he may then immerse the garment in a ritual bath and it is ritually pure.
  Rav Ashi analyzes this ruling: But why is the garment pure? After all, it has blood from a menstruating woman on it. Evidently, the matter of whether or not it is ritually pure depends upon whether or not the owner of the garment is particular about the blood stain. So too here, the matter of whether or not it is ritually pure depends upon whether or not the owner of the garment is particular about the blood stain.
  § We learned in a mishna there (see <i>Kelim</i> 9:5): In a case of pottery, i.e., a chamber pot, that a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] has used and that has absorbed impure liquids from the <i>zav</i>, and it then fell into the air of an oven, and the oven was subsequently heated, the oven is impure, as the impure liquid will eventually emerge from the chamber pot due to the heat of the oven.
  The <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to the correct interpretation of this mishna. Reish Lakish says: They taught that the oven is impure once it is heated only with regard to liquids of lesser ritual impurity, i.e., that are not primary sources of impurity, such as the tears or urine of one who was rendered impure by contact with a corpse. But with regard to liquids of greater ritual impurity, e.g., urine of a <i>zav</i> or <i>zava</i>, the oven is impure even though the oven was not heated. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to both liquids of lesser ritual impurity and liquids of greater ritual impurity that fell into an oven, if the oven was heated, then yes, the oven is impure, but if the oven was not heated, it is not impure.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from the mishna: If one immersed the garment with the stain whose nature is unknown, and then handled ritually pure items with the garment, and then applied these seven substances to the stain and it did not disappear, that stain is presumably from a dye, and therefore the ritually pure items are ritually pure, and he need not immerse the garment again, as there is no impurity. Rabbi Yoḥanan understands that the stain is not definitely from a dye; even if it is from blood, such blood that is absorbed into the garment to the degree that it does not come out after this process is performed, does not impart ritual impurity. The same should apply in the case of the oven, i.e., the liquids should impart impurity only when the oven is heated and they actually emerge.
  Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan in response: Leave aside blood stains, i.e., one cannot cite a proof from them, as they impart impurity by rabbinic law, and for this reason the Sages were lenient and ruled that they do not impart impurity until they actually emerge. But with regard to liquids that are impure by Torah law, the <i>halakha</i> is different.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raises another objection to Reish Lakish: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach: If one finds blood on a garment that is certainly from a menstruating woman and therefore renders the garment impure, one may apply the seven substances listed in the mishna to it and nullify the stain from being considered a blood stain at all, even if the stain is not entirely removed; and he may then immerse the garment in a ritual bath and it is ritually pure?
  Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan in response: You cannot raise an objection to me from the <i>baraita</i> of Rabbi Ḥiyya, since if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not teach this <i>halakha</i> in the Mishna, from where did Rabbi Ḥiyya learn it? Rabbi Ḥiyya was a student of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and therefore he could not have included a <i>halakha</i> that contradicts the Mishna. Consequently, this statement in his name must be erroneous.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 3:2): With regard to a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood from a corpse that was absorbed in the floor of a house, every vessel in the house is ritually impure by virtue of being under the same roof as the blood. The Gemara parenthetically notes: And some say that the mishna states that every vessel in the house is ritually pure. And these two statements do not disagree, as this first statement was issued in reference to vessels that were in the house at the outset, before the blood became absorbed; and this second statement was issued in reference to vessels that came into the house at the end, after the blood had already been absorbed.
  The mishna continues: In a case where the blood was absorbed in a garment, it is examined. If the garment is washed and a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood emerges from it, it is ritually impure and it imparts impurity to the vessels in the house as well. But if not, then it is pure, and it does not impart impurity. Apparently, only blood that can be removed from a garment is considered blood, whereas blood absorbed in the garment is insignificant. This is in accordance with the opinion that an absorbed substance does not impart ritual impurity, even if it can be removed in some manner.
  Rav Kahana said in response: They taught here a <i>halakha</i> from among the leniencies that apply to the measurement of a quarter-<i>log</i>. That is, this case is different, as the mishna is referring to the blood of submission discharged from a body at the time of death, and such blood is ritually impure by rabbinic law. But in general, a ritually impure liquid that is absorbed into an item does impart impurity.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mishna (<i>Oholot</i> 3:2): Any liquid that is absorbed but that is unable to emerge is pure. Reish Lakish infers from this mishna that if it is able to emerge it is impure, and that this is the <i>halakha</i> even though it has not yet emerged.
  Rav Pappa said in defense of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Anywhere that the liquid is unable to emerge and the owner of the garment is not particular about it, i.e., he is not bothered that this liquid is absorbed within the garment, everyone, i.e., both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, agrees that the garment is pure. If the liquid is able to emerge and the owner of the garment is particular about it and does not want it in his garment, everyone agrees that the garment is impure.
  They disagree when the liquid is able to emerge and the owner is not particular about it. One Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that since the liquid is able to emerge, even though the owner is not particular about it, the garment is impure. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that even though the liquid is able to emerge,
  
  Daf 63a
  
  if he is particular that he does not want the liquid there, then yes, it renders the garment impure, but if not, then the liquid does not render the garment impure.
  § The mishna teaches: What is tasteless saliva? A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the definition of tasteless saliva? Any saliva where the person had not tasted anything since the evening. Rav Pappa, who was sitting before Rava, thought to say: This is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that he did not eat anything all night long. Rava said to him: Is it taught: One who had not tasted anything in the evening, which would indicate that it is referring only to one who did not eat since nightfall? No, the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Where the person had not tasted anything since the evening, which means even if he ate after nightfall, but did not eat for the rest of the night. This serves to exclude a case where he arose early in the morning and ate, as in such a case it is no longer tasteless saliva.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is tasteless saliva? Any saliva where the person did not eat any food and he passed the middle of the night and he was in a state of sleep. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the matter depends on whether or not he had sleep? But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i>: Even if he slept the entire day, that is not tasteless saliva; but if he was awake the entire night, that is tasteless saliva? This indicates that sleep is not a critical factor in producing tasteless saliva. The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction by explaining that there, in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>, it is referring to a case where he was awake all night and did not sleep properly, but was dozing off and on.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of dozing? Rav Ashi said: It is referring to a situation in which one is asleep and yet not fully asleep, and awake and yet not fully awake. If someone calls him he answers, and he is in a mental state in which he does not know how to provide an answer that requires logical reasoning, but when people remind him about something when he is in that state that has happened previously he remembers it.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one rose early in the morning and learned aloud his chapter of the Torah, that saliva in his mouth is not tasteless saliva, as speech weakens the strength of the saliva. And how much learning and talk removes the strength of the saliva? Rav Yehuda bar Sheila says that Rav Ashi says that Rabbi Elazar says: Any case where he uttered most of his normal amount of speech that he usually says in three hours.
  § The mishna teaches: Liquid from split beans is created through the chewing of split beans that divided naturally, not by human hand, which are then applied to the stain. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this ruling supports the opinion of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: Tasteless saliva must be mixed with each and every one of the other six substances in order to remove the blood stain. The Gemara answers that this is no proof, as perhaps it is not due to the saliva, but rather the heat of his mouth is what helps the split beans remove the stain.
  The Gemara notes that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: The liquid from split beans is effective in removing blood stains only when it is boiling, and before [<i>over</i>] one puts salt into the pot.
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the word <i>over</i> is a formulation of priority? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the verse states: “And Ahimaaz ran by the way of the plain, and overran [<i>vayya’avor</i>] the Cushite” (II Samuel 18:23), i.e., Ahimaaz overtook the Cushite. Abaye said: It is derived from here: “And he passed [<i>avar</i>] before them” (Genesis 33:3). And if you wish, say instead that the proof is from here: “And their king passed [<i>vayya’avor</i>] before them and the Lord at their head” (Micah 2:13).
  § The mishna teaches: The urine that is an effective detergent is specifically urine that fermented. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For how long must it be fermented? For three days.
  On the topic of the urine used to remove a blood stain, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All the measures of the Sages with regard to blood stains require a measure for their measure. There are many types of urine, each of which has different properties, and it is unclear which is to be used. Is it urine of a young person or of an old person? Is it urine of a man or of a woman? Is it urine that has been kept covered or uncovered? Is it urine from the summer or from the rainy season?
  § The mishna teaches: And one must rub each and every one of the substances three times. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma with regard to this rubbing: Is the going and coming of the hand over the surface of the rubbed item considered one rubbing, or perhaps the going and coming are considered two actions and two distinct rubbings? What is the correct count? The Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna further teaches: If one applied them in a manner that is not in their prescribed order, or if one applied all seven substances simultaneously, he has done nothing. The Sages taught two <i>baraitot</i> with regard to this matter. If one applied the substances from the second half of the list, i.e., natron, <i>borit</i>, Cimolian earth, and potash, before the substances from the first half of the list, i.e., tasteless saliva, liquid from split beans, and urine, it is taught in one <i>baraita</i>: The second set count for him, but the first do not count for him. And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The first count for him, but the second do not count for him.
  Abaye said that there is no dispute between these two <i>baraitot</i>: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> agree that the substances that he applied second count for him, and not the substances that he applied first. And what does the second <i>baraita</i> mean when it uses the term: First? It means the first according to the order of the mishna, which were the second in their application.
  MISHNA: For any woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle that is not time dependent, but is dependent on a physical sensation, her time is sufficient, i.e., she does not transmit ritual impurity retroactively, for twenty-four hours or until the last time she examined herself (see 2a). And these are the fixed menstrual cycles based on sensation: When a woman menstruates after she yawns [<i>mefaheket</i>], or after she sneezes, or after she senses pain near her stomach or in her lower abdomen, or after she secretes a discharge, or after a type of feverish shuddering [<i>tzemarmorot</i>] overtakes her. And likewise the same applies with regard to any sensation of the like. And in the case of any woman who establishes a pattern for herself by experiencing such a sensation three times before the onset of menstruation, that is a fixed menstrual cycle.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that for any woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, her time is sufficient. The Gemara objects: We already learned that her time is sufficient on another occasion (2a): For any woman who has a fixed menstrual cycle, and she examined herself at that time and discovered blood, her time is sufficient, and it is only from that moment that she transmits ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to a fixed menstrual cycle of a certain number of days; here, it is referring to a fixed menstrual cycle based on a physical sensation.
  As it teaches in the continuation of the mishna: These are the fixed menstrual cycles based on sensation: When a woman menstruates after she yawns, or after she sneezes, or after she senses pain near her stomach or in her lower abdomen, or after she secretes a discharge. All of these are physical sensations.
  The mishna includes the case where she secretes a discharge as one of the physical sensations. The Gemara understands this as referring to a continuous discharge of blood, and therefore asks: But during menstruation she is continuously discharging blood; how can this be a signal of the onset of menstruation? Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, said:
  
  Daf 63b
  
  The mishna is referring to a case where she discharges ritually impure blood in the midst of discharging ritually pure blood. For example, if she normally first discharges blood that is not red, and it therefore does not render her impure, and then she experiences a discharge of red blood.
  The mishna teaches: Or a type of feverish shuddering overtakes her, and likewise the same applies with regard to any sensation of the like. The Gemara asks: What is added by this last phrase? Rabba bar Ulla said: It serves to include a woman whose head is heavy upon her or her limbs are heavy upon her, or she trembles or belches constantly.
  Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya says that Shmuel says: The Sages said, with regard to establishing a set period of days, that two days are sufficient, i.e., if a woman experiences bleeding twice on the same date of the month or after the same interval, she has a fixed menstrual cycle. By contrast, with regard to a fixed menstrual cycle based on a physical sensation, it is sufficient if she experiences bleeding even once. But for those sensations which the Sages did not include in the mishna, she has a fixed cycle only if she experiences bleeding three times accompanied by one of those symptoms.
  The Gemara asks: When Shmuel said: For those which the Sages did not include, what did he intend to add? Rav Yosef says: This serves to add the case mentioned above, i.e., her head is heavy upon her, or her limbs are heavy upon her, or she trembles or belches constantly. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is that addition teaching us? In effect, it is already taught in the mishna, as Rabba bar Ulla explained above that the additional phrase: The same applies with regard to any sensation of the like, serves to include those sensations. Rather, Abaye said: Shmuel’s phrase serves to add a case where she ate garlic and saw menstrual blood, or ate onions and saw menstrual blood, or chewed pepper and saw menstrual blood, i.e., these triggers can give rise to a fixed cycle, but only after three occurrences.
  Rav Yosef said: I did not hear this tradition concerning the opinion of Shmuel, that with regard to days a cycle is fixed if she experiences bleeding twice, whereas for physical sensations a cycle is fixed after one occurrence. Rav Yosef had fallen ill and forgotten his studies and was therefore unable to remember that such a ruling had been issued.
  His student, Abaye, said to him: You yourself told us this <i>halakha</i>, and it was with regard to this following matter that you told this <i>halakha</i> to us, taught in the mishna below: If a woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood on the fifteenth day and she deviated from the norm to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day, then on both this day, the fifteenth, and that day, the twentieth, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. If she deviated from the norm to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day three times, it becomes permitted for her to engage in intercourse on the fifteenth day, and she has established the twentieth day for herself as the day of her fixed menstrual cycle, as a woman establishes a fixed menstrual cycle only after she establishes it three times.
  Abaye continues: And you, Rav Yosef, said to us with regard to this mishna that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is the statement of Rabban Gamliel bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said it in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. But the Rabbis say: If she saw a discharge of blood even once, she has a fixed cycle and does not need to repeat and experience bleeding a second time or to repeat a third time.
  And we said to you: Since you said to us that she does not need to repeat a second time, is it necessary for you to mention that she does not need to repeat a third time? And you said to us that when you said that she does not need to repeat a second time, this is referring to a fixed menstrual cycle based on a physical sensation, whereas when you said she does not need to repeat a third time, that is referring to a fixed cycle of days.
  The Gemara asks: But why did Shmuel have to explain that the mishna is the statement of Rabban Gamliel bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Let him say simply that this mishna is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who always requires repetition three times to establish a presumptive status. The Gemara answers that this is what Shmuel teaches us: That Rabban Gamliel, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  MISHNA: If a woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood at the beginning of the sensation that accompanies her fixed cycle, even if on one occasion she happened to experience bleeding only at the end of the sensation, all the ritually pure items that she handled within the duration of that sensation that accompanies her fixed cycle are ritually impure. If the woman was accustomed to experience bleeding at the end of the sensation that accompanies her fixed cycle, all the ritually pure items that she handled within the duration of that sensation that accompanies her fixed cycle are pure.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Even specific days and specific hours determine a fixed menstrual cycle: If a woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood on a certain day of the month at sunrise, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse with her husband only at sunrise; but during the night before and the following day, it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse. Rabbi Yehuda says: Once sunrise passed and she did not menstruate, the entire day is hers and she may engage in intercourse, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; but contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, intercourse the night before is prohibited.
  GEMARA: A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In what case did Rabbi Yosei say that specific days and hours determine a fixed menstrual cycle? For example, if a woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day and again on the twentieth day, and in the sixth hour of the day and again in the sixth hour of the day the next time; if the twentieth day arrives a third time and she does not see a flow of blood, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse for the entirety of the first six hours of the day; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted for her to engage in intercourse until the sixth hour of the day, and says that she must be concerned only during the sixth hour.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the sixth hour passed and she did not see a flow of blood, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse for the entirety of the day; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted for her to engage in intercourse from <i>minḥa</i> time onward, i.e., from the beginning of the seventh hour.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to a woman who was accustomed to see the flow of blood on a certain day of the month at sunrise, that Rabbi Yehuda says: Once sunrise passed and she did not menstruate, the entire day is hers and she may engage in intercourse, but intercourse is prohibited the night before. The Gemara objects: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: The entire night is hers? This indicates that she may engage in intercourse during the night.
  The Gemara explains that it is not difficult. Here, when it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse the entire night, it is referring to a case where she is accustomed to see a flow of blood at the beginning of the day, i.e., immediately after sunrise. And there, in the mishna, which deems it prohibited for her to engage in intercourse all night, it is referring to a case where she is accustomed to see a flow of blood at the end of the night, i.e., just before sunrise.
  The Gemara cites further <i>baraitot</i> that deal with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. It is taught in one <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda deems it prohibited for her to engage in intercourse before the time of her fixed cycle, but deems it permitted for her to do so after the time of her fixed cycle if she did not experience bleeding then. And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda deems it prohibited for her to engage in intercourse after the time of her fixed cycle but deems it permitted for her to do so before the time of her fixed cycle.
  The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction: And this is not difficult; here, the <i>baraita</i> that rules that it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse before the time of her fixed cycle is referring to a case where she is accustomed to see a flow of blood at the end of the night. By contrast, there, the <i>baraita</i> that states that it is prohibited for her to do so after the time of her fixed cycle is referring to a case where she is accustomed to see a flow of blood at the beginning of the day.
  Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: And did Rava actually say this? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a menstruating woman: “You shall separate the children of Israel from their impurity” (Leviticus 15:31). From here, Rabbi Yirmeya said that there is a warning to the children of Israel that they should separate from their wives close to the time of their menstrual cycles.
  And how close? Rava says: One twelve-hour period, i.e., either from sunrise to sunset, or from sunset to sunrise. The Gemara explains the difficulty: What, is it not referring to an additional twelve-hour period, i.e., the prohibition applies to the time of her expected period itself, either day or night, as well as the previous twelve hours? This is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems it prohibited for her to engage in intercourse only for the twelve hours of the expected time of her period. The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to that same twelve-hour period.
  The Gemara asks: And why do I need two statements of Rava, i.e., both that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and that a woman must separate for only one twelve-hour period? The Gemara answers that both are necessary, because if Rava had taught us only this, that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, I would say that this statement applies only to the handling of pure items, but with regard to engaging in intercourse with her husband, it does not apply, and with regard to intercourse, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Therefore, Rava teaches us that even with regard to intercourse, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  And by contrast, if Rava had taught us only that statement, that she must wait a twelve-hour period, I would say that she must separate close to the fixed time of her cycle for an additional twelve-hour period, as suggested above. Therefore, Rava teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, which indicates that she separates for only that single twelve-hour period.
  MISHNA: If the woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood on the fifteenth day and she deviated from the norm to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day, then on both this day, the fifteenth, and that day, the twentieth, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. If she deviated from the norm twice, then on both this day, the fifteenth, and that day, the twentieth, it is likewise prohibited for her to engage in intercourse.
  If she deviated from the norm to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day three times, it becomes permitted for her to engage in intercourse on the fifteenth, and she has established the twentieth day for herself as the day of her fixed menstrual cycle, as a woman establishes a fixed menstrual cycle only after she establishes it three times. And a woman is purified from the existing fixed menstrual cycle, in the sense that intercourse is permitted on that day, only when she has been displaced from that day three times.
  
  Daf 64a
  
  GEMARA: It was stated: If a woman saw menstrual blood on the fifteenth of this month, and on the sixteenth of the month after that, and on the seventeenth of the month after that, Rav says: She has thereby determined her menstrual cycle by skipping, i.e., as a month and a day. And Shmuel says: Her menstrual cycle is not determined until she skips a day three times. According to Shmuel, as the cycle is established in this case not by the date itself but by the pattern of one additional day every month, the pattern is established only when this occurs three consecutive times, i.e., when she menstruates on the fourth occasion.
  The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman was married to her first husband and he died, and was then married to a second one and he too died, she may not marry a third husband; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She may marry a third husband, but if he also dies she may not marry a fourth husband. The suggestion is that Rav and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold that after two instances she has established a presumption and a pattern, whereas Shmuel and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintain that the presumption is established only after three occurrences.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone agrees that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that a presumption is established only after three times, and here they disagree with regard to this matter: Rav holds that when she experienced bleeding on the fifteenth of the month, that occasion is also one of the number, i.e., it counts as the first of the pattern, which therefore has three elements. And Shmuel holds that since she did not see the first time after skipping, i.e., after having experienced bleeding on the fourteenth of the previous month, it is not part of the number, which means that she has experienced bleeding only twice in accordance with that pattern.
  Shmuel raised an objection to the opinion of Rav from a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman was accustomed to see a flow of blood on the fifteenth day of the month, and deviated and instead experienced bleeding on the sixteenth day of the month, on both this day, the fifteenth, and that day, the sixteenth, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse with her husband. If she then deviated and experienced bleeding on the seventeenth day of the following month, the sixteenth day becomes permitted, and the fifteenth and seventeenth days of the following month are prohibited.
  If she subsequently deviated and experienced bleeding on the eighteenth day of the following month, all the days are permitted. The fifteenth is permitted because she has now experienced bleeding three times on a different day, while the other days are permitted because she experienced bleeding only once on each day. And it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse in the following month only from the eighteenth day and onward, i.e., on the nineteenth day, since she has now established a pattern of bleeding after one month and one day. This is difficult for Rav, as he maintains that twice is sufficient to establish a pattern, whereas this <i>baraita</i> requires three instances. Rav could have said to you in response: Since she was accustomed to experience bleeding on the fifteenth it is different. In that particular case the fifteenth does not count as the beginning of a new pattern because it was already her regular established time.
  The Gemara expresses surprise at Shmuel’s question: And he who asked [<i>udeka’arei</i>] it, why did he ask it? The <i>baraita</i> clearly stresses the fact that the woman began with an established fixed menstrual cycle that was not part of the pattern. Shmuel could answer: It was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach the case where she was accustomed to experience bleeding on a specific day, lest you say that since she was accustomed to experience bleeding on a specific day and displaced that pattern by bleeding on a different day, it should be sufficient that with two times she displaces it. For this reason, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that an established pattern is displaced only after three occasions where she experiences bleeding on a different day. If it is not established, one displacement is enough.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman saw a flow of blood on the twenty-first day of this month, the twenty-second day of that month, i.e., of the next month, and the twenty-third day of that month, i.e., of the third month, she established a fixed pattern of bleeding after one month and one day. If in the third month she instead varied and experienced bleeding on the twenty-fourth day of the month, she has not established a fixed pattern, as this last interval was one month and two days long. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel, as according to the <i>baraita</i> the pattern is established after only two equidistant intervals, whereas Shmuel requires three.
  The Gemara answers that Shmuel could have said to you: Here, we are dealing with a case where the woman was accustomed to see a flow of blood on the twentieth day of the month, and she deviated and experienced bleeding on the twenty-first day of the month. Consequently, there were in fact a total of three equidistant intervals of one month and one day. The Gemara adds that the language of the <i>baraita</i> is also precise, as for what other reason would the <i>baraita</i> leave aside the twentieth day of the month and not use that date as the example, and instead take for its example the twenty-first day of the month? Learn from this that she had an established pattern of bleeding on the twentieth of every month before the events described in the <i>baraita</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: As a woman establishes a fixed menstrual cycle only after she establishes it three times. Rav Pappa says, in explanation: We said that she must experience bleeding three times only with regard to establishing a fixed menstrual cycle, but with regard to being concerned for a pattern, even after one time she must be concerned that this might be the beginning of a fixed pattern.
  The Gemara asks: What is Rav Pappa teaching us? We learn this in the mishna: If the woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood on the fifteenth day and she deviated from the norm to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day, on both this day, the fifteenth, and that day, the twentieth, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. This clearly demonstrates that even after bleeding only once on a certain day she must be concerned that this could be the start of a new fixed menstrual cycle.
  The Gemara answers: If this <i>halakha</i> was derived only from there, I would say that this statement applies in a case where she experiences bleeding on the twentieth day while she is standing in her days suitable for menstruation, i.e., the days following the eleven days after her last period, when she is most likely to menstruate. But in a case where she is not standing in her days suitable for menstruation, but rather during the eleven days when uterine bleeding would render her a <i>zava</i>, I would say that she does not need to be concerned that she might experience bleeding again at that time. Therefore, Rav Pappa teaches us that even during these eleven days she must be concerned.
  § The mishna teaches: And a woman is purified from the existing fixed menstrual cycle, in the sense that intercourse is permitted on that day, only when she has been displaced from that day three times. Rav Pappa says, in explanation: We said this only in the case of a set cycle that she established by three times. With regard to such a cycle, we said that a different three times are necessary to displace that cycle. But with regard to a cycle that is established with only two times, it is displaced by one time of bleeding on a different day.
  The Gemara asks: What is Rav Pappa teaching us? We learn this in the mishna: A woman establishes a fixed menstrual cycle only after she establishes it three times. The Gemara answers that it was necessary for Rav Pappa to teach his <i>halakha</i>, lest you say that a cycle is displaced by bleeding one time on a different day for a cycle that was set one time, but by bleeding on two different days for a cycle that was established with two times, and likewise by bleeding on three different days for a cycle that was established with three times. Therefore, Rav Pappa teaches us that whether she experiences bleeding once or twice, she displaces it by bleeding once on a different day.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa: If a woman was accustomed to see the flow of blood on the twentieth day after her previous flow, and she deviated from the norm to experience bleeding on the thirtieth day, on both this day, the twentieth, and that day, the thirtieth, it is prohibited for her to engage in intercourse. If the twentieth day arrived, counting from the previous flow, which had occurred on day thirty, and she did not see a flow of blood, it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse until the thirtieth day after the previous flow, and she must be concerned on the thirtieth day.
  If the thirtieth day arrived and she saw a flow of blood, and then the twentieth day after that arrived and she did not see a flow of blood, and the thirtieth day from her previous flow arrived and she did not see blood on that day but saw on a later day, and then the twentieth day after her previous flow arrived and she saw a flow of blood, the thirtieth day becomes permitted, as she experienced bleeding after an interval of thirty days only twice. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa that a cycle of bleeding that has occurred twice is displaced by a single time of not bleeding on that day.
  
  Daf 64b
  
  And she is prohibited on the twentieth day, because it is the manner of women that their blood flow comes at its usual time.
  MISHNA: Women, with regard to the blood that flows when their hymens are ruptured, are like grapevines: There is a vine that produces wine that is red, and there is a vine that produces wine that is black; and there is a vine that produces wine in abundance, and there is a vine that produces only a meager amount of wine. Rabbi Yehuda says: In every vine, there are grapes fit to produce wine, but any vine in which there are no grapes fit to produce wine, this is a dry vine [<i>durkati</i>]. Likewise, any woman who experiences bleeding is capable of giving birth, whereas one who does not experience bleeding is like a dry vine, unable to give birth.
  GEMARA: With regard to the term <i>durkati</i>, the Gemara explains that this means truncated generation [<i>dor katua</i>]. As Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: Just as leaven is good for dough, so too, blood is good for a woman. It was likewise taught in the name of Rabbi Meir: Any woman whose blood is plentiful, her children are plentiful.
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a young girl whose time to see a menstrual flow, i.e., the age of puberty, has not yet arrived, and she married and engaged in intercourse and her hymen was torn, Beit Shammai say: The Sages give her four nights after intercourse during which the blood is attributed to the torn hymen and she remains ritually pure. Thereafter, any blood is assumed to be menstrual blood and renders her impure. And Beit Hillel say: The blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the wound heals.
  In the case of a young woman whose time to see a menstrual flow has arrived but she has not yet begun to menstruate, and she married and engaged in intercourse and her hymen was torn, Beit Shammai say: The Sages give her the first night during which the blood is attributed to the torn hymen. Thereafter, any blood is assumed to be menstrual blood. And Beit Hillel say: The blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the conclusion of Shabbat, and she may engage in intercourse with her husband for four nights, as it was customary for a virgin to marry on Wednesday.
  In the case of a young woman who saw menstrual blood before marriage while she was still in her father’s house, Beit Shammai say: The Sages give her permission to engage only in relations that consummate a marriage, which are a mitzva, after which she is ritually impure due to the blood. And Beit Hillel say: The husband and wife may engage even in several acts of intercourse, as any blood seen throughout the entire night is attributed to the torn hymen.
  GEMARA: The mishna first addresses the case of a young girl who has not yet reached puberty. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: And this <i>halakha</i> applies to her even if she has seen menstrual blood. He explains his reasoning: From where do I derive this? I derive it from the fact that the <i>tanna</i> distinguishes in the latter clause of the mishna between a young girl who has seen menstrual blood and a young girl who has not seen menstrual blood. By inference, in the first clause of the mishna the <i>halakha</i> is no different in this case, where the young girl has experienced menstrual bleeding, and it is no different in that case, where she has not yet experienced menstrual bleeding.
  This explanation of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Beit Hillel say: With regard to a young girl who has not yet reached puberty, the blood she emits is attributed to the torn hymen until the wound heals, regardless of whether she has seen menstrual blood beforehand or whether she has not yet seen menstrual blood.
  § The mishna teaches that Beit Hillel say: The blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the wound heals. The Gemara clarifies: Until when can the blood be attributed to the torn hymen? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: All the time that she is <i>noḥeret</i>. Rav Yehuda continues: When I subsequently said this <i>halakha</i> before Shmuel, he said to me: This <i>noḥeret</i>, I do not know what it is, nor do I know what Rav means by it. Rather, all the time that the saliva is in her mouth due to sexual intercourse, she may attribute the blood to the torn hymen. Shmuel is using a euphemism, i.e., as long as there is blood in her vagina resulting from sexual intercourse.
  The Gemara clarifies: This <i>noḥeret</i> that Rav says; what is it like? What did he mean? Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: It was explained to me by Rav as follows: If the young girl stands up and sees blood, but she sits and does not see blood, it is known that the wound has not yet healed, and the blood is still attributed to the torn hymen. Similarly, if she sits on the ground and sees blood, but she sits on cushions and blankets and does not see blood, it is known that the wound has not yet healed and she may attribute the blood to the torn hymen, as the blood flows due to the strain of sitting on the ground. But if she sometimes sits on all of them, i.e., the ground, cushions, and blankets, and sees blood, and on other occasions she sits on all of them and does not see blood, it is known that the wound has healed, and this blood must now be menstrual blood.
  § The mishna teaches: In the case of a young woman whose time to see a menstrual flow has arrived, Beit Hillel say: The blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the conclusion of Shabbat and she may engage in intercourse with her husband for four nights. It was stated that there is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the following case: If she engaged in intercourse with her husband during the daytime, in addition to engaging in intercourse at night, Rav says: She has not lost her nights, and the blood is still attributed to the torn hymen for four nights. Levi says: She has lost her nights, since she has engaged in intercourse twice during the daytime and twice at night, and therefore she has already used up the equivalent of four nights.
  The Gemara explains: Rav says that she has not lost her nights, as we learned in the mishna that the blood is attributed to the torn hymen until the conclusion of Shabbat, and it does not limit the number of times she may engage in intercourse during that time. And Levi says: She has lost her nights, as what is the meaning of the term: Four nights, that is taught in the mishna? It means four twelve-hour periods, either days or nights.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav, why do I need the mishna to teach: Four nights? The mishna should have stated four days, which would include both days and nights. Rav would respond that the mishna teaches us proper conduct, as it is proper that intercourse should be performed only at night. The Gemara suggests: And according to the opinion of Levi, let the mishna teach only: Four nights. Why do I need the mishna to specify: Until the conclusion of Shabbat? Levi would answer that this teaches us that it is permitted to engage in intercourse for the first time on Shabbat. Since the custom was for a virgin to marry on Wednesday, which means that one of the four first nights is Shabbat, it is permitted to engage in intercourse on that night, despite the fact that it may cause her to bleed.
  The Gemara notes that Levi’s ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: It is permitted to enter into a narrow opening in a wall on Shabbat, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even though doing so causes pebbles to fall from the wall. Similarly, although engaging in intercourse might cause a wound and bleeding, it is permitted on Shabbat.
  It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> engaged in a dispute: If a husband engaged in intercourse with a virgin and did not find blood, and he went back within the first four nights and again engaged in intercourse with her and this time he found blood, Rabbi Ḥanina says: The wife is ritually impure, as this is menstruation blood. And Rabbi Asi says: She is ritually pure, as it is blood from the wound resulting from the act of intercourse.
  Rabbi Ḥanina says: She is ritually impure, as if it is so that it is blood from her hymen, i.e., the blood of her virginity, it would have come at the outset, after the first time they engaged in intercourse. And Rabbi Asi said: She is ritually pure, as perhaps it happened for him that he engaged in intercourse like Shmuel described. As Shmuel said: I can engage in intercourse several times without the appearance of blood. In other words, I can engage in intercourse with a virgin while leaving her hymen intact. And the other Sage, Rabbi Ḥanina, does not allow for that possibility, since he maintains that Shmuel is different, as his strength was great. Shmuel was particularly skilled at this, while others cannot accomplish this.
  § The mishna teaches the <i>halakha</i> of a young girl. The Gemara discusses the case of a girl who is older than twelve and a half. Rav says: The Sages give a grown woman, who engaged in intercourse on her wedding night, the entire first night, during which she may engage in intercourse with her husband several times. And this statement applies only if she did not see any blood. But if she saw blood, she has only the relations that consummate a marriage, which are a mitzva, and nothing more.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving a virgin who married, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave her four nights in which to engage in intercourse within twelve months of her wedding when the blood is considered to be like blood resulting from the torn hymen. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave her all of those nights of purity in her days as a minor,
  
  Daf 65a
  
  in accordance with the ruling of the mishna: The Sages give her four nights, then he should have given her longer, as we learned in the mishna that according to Beit Hillel the blood may be attributed to the torn hymen until the wound heals.
  Rather, you will say that he gave her these four nights all during her days as a young woman. Are there twelve months when one has the status of a young woman? But didn’t Shmuel say: The difference in time between becoming a young woman and becoming a grown woman is only six months? And if you would say that Shmuel is saying that it is in less than six months that there is no transition from young woman to grown woman status, but there is such a transition in more than six months, as women develop differently, that is not so, as Shmuel said: Only, which indicates that the period is neither less nor more than six months.
  Rather, you will suggest that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave her two days during her days as a minor, and he gave her two days during her days as a young woman. This too is difficult, as Rav Ḥinnana bar Shelamya asked Rav: With regard to a young girl who married before she reached puberty, and then her time to see menstrual blood arrived while she was under the authority of her husband, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does she have the four nights when the blood is considered to be from her torn hymen?
  And Rav said to him: All the acts of intercourse that you engage in while she is still too young are considered as only one act of intercourse, and the remainder, i.e., three more acts of intercourse, complete the total number of four nights. If so, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi could not have given her two nights as a minor, since at most those acts of intercourse count as one.
  Rather, you will suggest that he gave her one night during her days as a minor, and two nights during her days as a young woman, and one night during her days as a grown woman. But this is also difficult: Granted, if you say that we generally give a grown woman more than one night, then one can understand why Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave her one night in this case: Just as all the acts of intercourse she engaged in as a minor have the effect to deduct one night for her days as a young woman, similarly all the acts of intercourse she engaged in while a young woman have the effect to deduct one night for her days as a grown woman, leaving her with one.
  But if you say that we generally do not give a grown woman more than one night, then in this case Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi should have given her as a grown woman only the one act of relations that consummate a marriage, which are a mitzva, i.e., merely a single act of intercourse, and nothing more, as otherwise the acts of intercourse before she became a grown woman would not have affected her status.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, the correct explanation is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave her one night during her days as a minor and three nights during her days as a young woman. And as for the fact that she has the status of a young woman for only exactly six months, do you maintain that every three months was counted as one period of the husband’s absence, such that she had only two nights in six months? This is not the case. Rather, every two months was counted as one period, and therefore she had three nights during these six months when she could attribute the blood to her torn hymen.
  The Gemara relates that the Sage Minyamin Saksana was coming and walking to the place of Shmuel. He thought that he would perform an action in accordance with the opinion of Rav, in that he would permit a grown woman to attribute blood to her torn hymen for the entire first night, even though she had already seen menstrual blood before she was married. Minyamin mistakenly said to himself: Rav does not distinguish between a woman who has seen menstrual blood and a woman who has not seen menstrual blood.
  Before Minyamin reached Shmuel’s place, he passed away on the road, and he never completed the journey. Upon hearing this, Shmuel recited this verse about Rav: “No mishap shall befall the righteous” (Proverbs 12:21), i.e., God does not allow prohibited acts to come from the statements of the righteous. In this case, Minyamin ruled incorrectly, based on a misunderstanding of Rav’s statement.
  Since the Gemara cited Rav Ḥinnana bar Shelamya, it cites another of his statements: Rav Ḥinnana bar Shelamya said in the name of Rav: Once a person’s teeth fall out and he has difficulty eating, his food diminshes accordingly, as it is stated: “And I also have given you cleanness of teeth in all your cities, and lack of bread in all your places” (Amos 4:6). The term “cleanness of teeth” is here a euphemism for having no teeth at all, which leads to a lack of bread.
  § The mishna teaches: In the case of a young woman who saw menstrual blood before marriage, while she was still in her father’s house, Beit Hillel say: They may engage in several acts of intercourse, as any bleeding throughout the entire night is attributed to the torn hymen. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a young woman who saw menstrual blood while she was still in her father’s house, Beit Hillel say: All the night is hers, and the Sages give her one complete period of time during which she may attribute all bleeding to her torn hymen. And how long is a complete period of time in this context? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel explained that it is one night and half of the next day.
  The Gemara asks: But do we require all this time of one night and half of a day for a complete period? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one whose winepresses or olive presses were impure and he wished to prepare his grapes and olives in a state of ritual purity, how does he act? He should rinse the planks used to press the grapes in the winepress, and the palm branches used as brooms, and the troughs,
  
  Daf 65b
  
  and he should clean the pressing baskets with ashes and water if they were made of palm leaves or of hemp [<i>bitzbutz</i>], or leave them dormant if they were made of bast [<i>shifa</i>] or of reeds, because these absorb more of the wine. And how long must one leave them dormant? He must leave them for twelve months. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He can lay them aside from one wine-pressing season to the next wine-pressing season, or from one olive-pressing season to the next olive-pressing season.
  The Gemara interrupts its citation to analyze the <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s statement is the same as that of the first <i>tanna</i>, as there are twelve months between one wine-pressing season and the next. The Gemara responds: The difference between them is the matter of the early and late ripening season for grapes. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel does not require a precise measure of twelve months, as the difference in time between ripening seasons can be slightly more or less than that.
  The Gemara continues its citation of the <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yosei says: One who wishes to purify the baskets immediately, without waiting a year, purges them in boiling water or scalds them in olive water. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: One sets them under a pipe whose water flows constantly or in a spring with rapid waters. And how much time should he leave them there? He should leave them for a period of time. In the same way that the Sages stated this time frame with regard to wine used for a libation in idol worship, so too the Sages stated this time frame with regard to matters of ritual purity.
  The Gemara expresses surprise at this last clause: Isn’t it the opposite [<i>kelapei layya</i>]? We are dealing with matters of purity in this <i>baraita</i>. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means: In the same way that the Sages stated this time frame with regard to matters of ritual purity, so too the Sages stated this time frame in the case of wine used for a libation in idol worship.
  The Gemara asks: And how long is the period of time referred to in the <i>baraita</i>? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Either the day or the night. Rabbi Ḥana She’ona, and some say Rabbi Ḥana bar She’ona, say that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Half a day and half a night.
  And Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: And the Sages do not disagree. The ruling of this one, who says either a day or a night, is stated with regard to the equinox of the season of Nisan or Tishrei, when the days and night are equal; whereas the ruling of that one, who says half a day and half a night, is stated with regard to the solstice of the season of Tammuz, i.e., summer, or Tevet, i.e., winter, which have the longest day or night respectively, so that half the day and half the night together amount to twelve hours. This <i>baraita</i> apparently contradicts the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that the woman may attribute the blood to her hymen for a night and half the day.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, one can say with regard to a menstruating woman that he meant half a day and half a night. The Gemara raises a difficulty. But Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said a night and half a day. The Gemara clarifies: Rather, this is what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel meant: Either a night during Nisan or Tishrei, which is twelve hours, or half a day and half a night during Tevet or Tammuz, which also equals twelve hours.
  And if you wish, say instead: With regard to the purity of wine, a period is twelve hours. But in the case of marriage the time frame is different, due to the marriage contract, which is signed before the marriage is consummated, as there are those who delay for a lengthy period until they complete and sign it. Consequently, the Sages extended the period in this case to a night and half a day.
  § Although the mishna provides a certain period of time for both a minor and a young woman during which they may attribute any blood to the torn hymen, nevertheless Rav and Shmuel both say that the <i>halakha</i> is that the groom engages in relations that consummate a marriage, which are a mitzva, and then he separates from his wife.
  Rav Ḥisda raises an objection from the <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving a virgin who married, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave her four nights to engage in intercourse within twelve months of her wedding. This indicates that the husband does not have to separate from his wife immediately after the first act of intercourse is completed.
  Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: Why do I need to search for a refutation from a <i>baraita</i>, which is not necessarily known by all? One can raise a difficulty from an explicit statement of the mishna, which states that the first blood a woman sees on her wedding night is attributed to her torn hymen. The Gemara explains that Rav Ḥisda raises his objection from the <i>baraita</i>, as he holds that a practical incident ruled upon by a Sage is a preferable source.
  The Gemara returns to the objection: In any case, this <i>baraita</i> is difficult for Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara answers that they acted in accordance with the opinion attributed to our Sages, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Our Sages returned and were counted again, i.e., they voted and decided, that the groom engages in relations that consummate a marriage, which are a mitzva, and subsequently he separates from his wife.
  The Gemara proves that this ruling of Rav and Shmuel, based on the <i>baraita</i>, is also the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. Ulla said: When we were learning the topic of a young girl who saw blood on her wedding night with Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, they brought up from it only the amount of earth that the fox brings up from a plowed field, i.e., they did not establish the <i>halakha</i> as stated in the mishna. And they concluded the discussion in this manner: The groom engages in relations that consummate a marriage, which are a mitzva, and then he separates from his wife.
  Rabbi Abba said to Rav Ashi, in light of this ruling that the groom must separate from his bride after completing the act of intercourse: If that is so, a pious person should not complete his act of intercourse, lest he unintentionally continue longer than is permitted. Rav Ashi said to him in reply: The Sages did not issue such a decree, because if so, his heart will strike him with fear that perhaps his wife will begin to bleed while he is engaged in the act of intercourse, and he will separate from his wife completely and will not consummate the marriage.
  § The mishna teaches that a young girl is given four nights during which any bleeding is attributed to her torn hymen. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And with regard to all of them, i.e., all the women who are given four nights, if they were discharging blood continually, from four nights until after those four nights, or in the case of those women who are given only one night, if they discharge blood from that one night until after that night, they may not attribute the blood to the torn hymen. Rather, all of them must examine themselves, in the manner that will be explained.
  And with regard to all of these women, Rabbi Meir is stringent in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai, and therefore a minor girl who bleeds for more than four nights must examine herself, despite the fact that Beit Hillel say she remains ritually pure until the wound has healed. Similarly, Rabbi Meir holds that with regard to a young girl who has reached puberty, if she continues to bleed after the first night she must examine herself.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: But with regard to the other cases of seeing blood, when she does not discharge blood continuously but bleeds again the following day, concerning which there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, Rabbi Meir holds that one follows the appearance of the blood. In other words, he does not maintain entirely in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel rule that the woman is ritually pure even if the color of the blood has changed, whereas Beit Shammai hold that she is ritually impure even if the color of the blood has not changed.
  As Rabbi Meir would say: The appearances of impure and pure blood differ from one another. How so? The blood of a menstruating woman is red, whereas blood that comes from a torn hymen, indicating that she was a virgin, is not red. The blood of a menstruating woman is cloudy; blood that indicates that she was a virgin is not cloudy. Finally, the blood of a menstruating woman comes from the uterus; blood that indicates that she was a virgin comes from the sides of the vaginal wall.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Rabbi Yosei says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, it is possible to examine the color of blood to determine whether it is menstrual blood or hymenal blood. But the Rabbis say that all appearances of blood are one, i.e., there is no distinction between the appearance of menstrual blood and blood indicating one’s loss of virginity.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman who sees blood due to sexual intercourse may engage in intercourse before the first time this occurs, before the second time this occurs, and before the third time this occurs. From this point forward, i.e., after three consecutive occurrences of bleeding due to intercourse, she may not engage in intercourse until she is divorced from her husband
  
  Daf 66a
  
  and is married to another man. She is permitted to engage in intercourse with her second husband because it is possible that the bleeding was caused by engaging in intercourse with her first husband, and the issue will not reoccur when she engages in intercourse with a different man.
  If she married another man and again saw blood due to sexual intercourse, she may engage in intercourse before the first time this occurs, before the second time this occurs, and before the third time this occurs. From this point forward she may not engage in intercourse until she is divorced from her second husband and is married to yet another man. If she married another man and again saw blood due to sexual intercourse, she may engage in intercourse the first time this occurs, the second time this occurs, and the third time this occurs. From this point forward there is a presumption that she always bleeds due to engaging in intercourse, and therefore she may not engage in intercourse or marry someone else until she examines herself.
  How does she examine herself? She brings a tube, inside of which she places a cosmetic brush so that it is long enough to reach deeply into her vagina, and an absorbent cloth is placed on the tip of the brush. She inserts the tube with the brush and cloth within herself and then removes it. If blood is found on the top of the absorbent cloth, it is known that the blood comes from the uterus and she is ritually impure. If blood is not found on the top of the cloth, it is known that the blood comes from the sides of the vaginal walls and she is ritually pure, and she may resume engaging in intercourse with her husband.
  And if she has a wound in that place, i.e., her vagina, she attributes the blood to her wound, and she is ritually pure, as it is assumed to not be uterine blood. And if she has a fixed menstrual cycle, i.e., she does not bleed every time she engages in intercourse with her husband, but only at fixed times, she attributes the blood to her fixed menstrual cycle, and she is permitted to engage in intercourse at other times.
  And if the blood of her wound differed from the blood that she sees due to sexual intercourse, she may not attribute the blood to her wound. And a woman is deemed credible to say: I have a wound in my uterus, from where the blood is emerging. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Blood of a wound that comes from the uterus is ritually impure as a primary category of impurity. Although this blood does not render it prohibited for her to engage in intercourse with her husband, it does render her impure with regard to eating ritually pure food. But our Sages testified that they had a tradition with regard to the blood of a wound that comes from the uterus, that it is ritually pure.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of those Sages and the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? Ulla said: The difference between them is whether the place of a woman’s uterus is impure, which means that any blood that passes through there is impure, even if it is blood from a wound. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, even the blood of a wound becomes impure if it passes through the uterus, whereas those Sages hold that only blood that originates in the uterus is impure.
  With regard to the <i>baraita</i> that states that the test for a woman who experiences bleeding due to sexual intercourse is to insert a tube, the Gemara asks: But won’t a tube scratch her and cause her to bleed regardless? Shmuel said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a tube of lead, and the mouth, i.e., the end that is inserted, is folded inward so that it will not scratch her.
  The <i>baraita</i> says that if a woman experiences bleeding on three occasions due to intercourse with her husband he must divorce her. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But let her examine herself after the third act of intercourse with her first husband, so that he need not divorce her. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: It is preferable for her not to test herself and risk becoming forbidden to all men and instead to be divorced and remarry another, because not all fingers, i.e., penises, are equal. Since it is possible that sexual intercourse with her second husband might not cause her to bleed, she should not risk becoming forbidden to all men by performing the examination.
  Reish Lakish further said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Why does she examine herself only after the third time she experiences bleeding due to sexual intercourse with her third husband? But let her examine herself after the first act of intercourse with her third husband. After the first occurrence this woman already has a presumptive status that all acts of intercourse cause her to bleed. Rabbi Yoḥanan answered: She does not perform the examination then, because not all forces are equal. It is possible that the manner in which the couple has intercourse causes her to bleed, and therefore it is only after three times that she has a presumptive status of bleeding after every act of intercourse.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who experienced bleeding due to sexual intercourse who came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and asked him what she should do. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to the Sage Abdon, who was present at the time: Go and suddenly frighten this woman. Abdon went and frightened her, and a mass of congealed blood fell from her vagina. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This woman is now cured. She will no longer experience bleeding due to sexual intercourse, as this mass of blood was the source of the blood.
  The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain woman who experienced bleeding due to sexual intercourse who came before Shmuel. Shmuel said to Rav Dimi bar Yosef: Go and frighten this woman. Rav Dimi went and frightened her, but nothing fell from her at all. Shmuel said: This woman is filled with blood, which falls out of her during intercourse. And any woman who is filled with blood that falls out during intercourse has no cure.
  The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain woman who came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and told him that every time she emerged from immersion in a ritual bath, after completing the mitzva of purifying herself for her husband, she would see blood before she engaged in intercourse with him. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to her: Perhaps the gossip of the women in your city, who are jealous of the love between you and your husband, has reached you, and this evil eye causes you to bleed before you engage in intercourse. Go and immerse in the river and engage in intercourse with your husband on the bank of the river, so that the other women will not see you leaving the ritual bath and gossip about you.
  Some say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to her: Reveal this fact to your friends, so that those women who were against you on this side, and gossiped about you, will be with you on that side, and be kind to you. And some say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to her: Reveal this fact to your friends, in order that they will pray for mercy for you, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> discussing the verse: “And the leper in whom the mark is, his clothes shall be ripped and the hair of his head shall grow long and he will put a covering upon his upper lip and will cry: Impure, impure” (Leviticus 13:45). The leper publicizes the fact that he is ritually impure, as he must announce his pain to the masses, and then the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf.
  Rav Yosef said: There was a similar incident in Pumbedita of a woman who experienced bleeding immediately after immersing in a ritual bath, and she followed the advice given by Rabbi Yoḥanan and she was cured.
  § Rav Yosef says that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi decreed that in the fields, i.e., in those distant places where there were no Torah scholars and whose residents were not well versed in the <i>halakhot</i> of menstruating women and did not know how to distinguish between the days of menstruation and the days of <i>ziva</i>, if she saw blood on one day, she must sit and count six days and that first day. She must observe six clean days without a discharge despite the possibility that she might have experienced bleeding only in her period of <i>ziva</i>, in which case she would be impure for only one day.
  If she experiences bleeding for two days, she must sit and count six days and both of those first two days, for a total of eight days, in case the first day on which she bled was the last day of <i>ziva</i>, while the next day was the first day of her menstruation period. If she experiences bleeding for three days she must sit and count seven clean days, as she might be a greater <i>zava</i>, who must count seven clean days.
  The Gemara cites a related statement. Rabbi Zeira says: Jewish women were stringent with themselves to the extent that even if they see a drop of blood the size of a mustard seed, they sit seven clean days for it. By Torah law, a woman who experiences menstrual bleeding waits seven days in total before immersing, regardless of whether she experienced bleeding on those days. If she experiences bleeding during the eleven days when she is not expected to experience menstrual bleeding, she is a lesser <i>zava</i> and waits one day without bleeding and then immerses. The Jewish women accepted upon themselves the stringency that if they experience any bleeding whatsoever, they treat it as the blood of a greater <i>zava</i>, which obligates one to count seven clean days before immersing (see Leviticus 15:25).
  Rava authorized Rav Shmuel, and he taught: If a pregnant woman experienced labor pains for two days, and on the third day she miscarried, she must sit and count seven clean days. The Gemara explains that Rava holds that the principle that blood that emerges while the woman experiences labor pains is not ritually impure does not apply to miscarriages. And Rava further maintains that it is impossible for the womb to open without blood emerging. Therefore, when she miscarried she must have experienced a flow of blood, even if she did not notice it.
  Rav Pappa said to Rava: For what reason did you teach this <i>halakha</i> specifically with regard to a woman who experiences labor pains for two days? Even if she merely discharges any amount of blood she should be impure, as Rabbi Zeira says: The Jewish women were stringent with themselves to the extent that even if they see a drop of blood of the size of a mustard seed, that woman sits seven clean days for it. Since it is impossible for the womb to open without the emergence of blood, when this woman miscarried there must have been blood, and therefore she must count seven clean days.
  Rava said to Rav Pappa: I speak to you of a prohibition, i.e., that by Torah law a woman who experiences difficulty in childbirth for two days and on the third miscarries must count seven clean days as a greater <i>zava</i>, and you speak to me of a custom, a mere stringency. The stringency you mention does not apply in this case. Where the Jewish women were stringent, they were stringent, i.e., if they saw a drop of blood the size of a mustard seed. Where they were not stringent, i.e., in a case of blood due to labor, they were not stringent. By contrast, in the case I described the woman is obligated to count seven clean days by Torah law.
  The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the following discussions: One who proposed to her; natron; with hot water; to immerse; folds; on top of; a port. Rava says: With regard to one who proposed marriage to a woman and she accepted it, the emotional excitement might have caused her to have a flow of menstrual blood, which would render her ritually impure and prohibit her from engaging in intercourse. Even if she was unaware of any flow, she must consider the possibility that it occurred. Therefore, to purify herself she must wait seven consecutive days that are clean from any flow of menstrual blood and then immerse in a ritual bath. Only after that process may she marry.
  The Gemara cites a related incident: Ravina arranged for his son to marry into the family of Rav Ḥanina, i.e., to marry Rav Ḥanina’s daughter. Rav Ḥanina said to Ravina: Does the Master hold that it is appropriate to write the marriage contract as stating that the wedding will take place in four days, i.e., on Wednesday? Ravina said: Yes. When the fourth day, i.e., Wednesday arrived, he waited until another fourth day before marrying her, until the following Wednesday, i.e., he delayed seven days after that day when he had planned to marry her.
  Rav Ḥanina said to Ravina: What is this? Why did you delay the wedding by an extra week? Ravina said to Rav Ḥanina: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with this statement of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to one who proposed marriage to a woman and she accepted it, she must wait seven consecutive days that are clean from any flow of menstrual blood and then immerse in a ritual bath? Rav Ḥanina said to Ravina: One can say that Rava said this statement with regard to an adult woman, who has seen menstrual blood. But did Rava actually say this with regard to a minor girl, who has not yet seen menstrual blood?
  Ravina said to Rav Ḥanina: Rava said explicitly that there is no difference whether she is an adult woman and no difference whether she is a minor girl. What is the reason that an adult woman must wait for seven days? She must wait because she desires to marry her husband, and this might cause her to have a flow of blood. A minor girl also desires to marry her husband, which could cause a flow of blood.
  § Rava says: A woman who is about to immerse herself in a ritual bath for purification
  
  Daf 66b
  
  may not wash her hair with natron or with sand. The reason she may not wash her hair with natron is because natron pulls out hair, and that hair may remain sitting on her head and serve as an interposition between her and the water of the ritual bath. And similarly, she may not wash her hair with sand, because it sticks to her hair and it also serves as an interposition.
  And Ameimar said in the name of Rava: A woman washes her hair only with hot water, but not with cold water. But she may wash her hair even with hot water that was heated in the sun. What is the reason that she may not wash her hair with cold water? Because it is cold and causes the hair to harden, and the dirt will remain in the hair.
  And Rava says: A man should always teach in his house that a woman should rinse any place with creases, e.g., her armpits, in water before she immerses in a ritual bath, to ensure that they are clean. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Places with creases and any concealed part of the body do not require immersion in water. In other words, the immersion is valid even if the water does not touch those parts of the body. If so, why must she rinse them before immersing?
  The Gemara answers: Granted that they do not require immersion in water, but we require that they must be a place that is suitable for immersion in water. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira says: For any amount of flour suitable for mingling with oil in a meal offering, mingling is not indispensable for it, i.e., it is valid even if it is not mixed. But for any amount of flour not suitable for mingling, e.g., if the quantity of flour is so great that the ingredients cannot be properly mixed, mingling is indispensable for it, and such a meal offering is invalid. This teaches a halakhic principle: There are certain actions that prevent the fulfillment of a mitzva if they are impossible, even if the actual performance of those actions are not indispensable to the mitzva.
  Ravin bar Rav Adda says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: There was an incident involving a maidservant of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who immersed herself, and she ascended from her immersion and a bone was found interposed between her teeth, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi required her to perform another immersion. This demonstrates that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi one may not have a foreign object even inside one’s mouth.
  And Rava says: If a woman immersed in a ritual bath and ascended from the water, and she then found on her hair an item that interposes between her and the water, what is the <i>halakha</i>? If she immersed soon after washing her hair, she does not need to wash her hair and immerse in the ritual bath a second time, as it can be assumed that this item was not there when she immersed, since her hair had been cleaned. But if she did not wash her hair immediately before immersing, she must wash her hair and immerse in the ritual bath a second time.
  There are those who state a slightly different version of Rava’s statement: If she immersed on the same day that she washed her hair, she does not need to wash her hair and to immerse in a ritual bath a second time. But if she did not wash her hair on the same day that she immersed, she must wash her hair and immerse in the ritual bath a second time.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two versions of Rava’s statement? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to washing her hair close to immersion. According to the first version of Rava’s statement, she must wash her hair immediately before immersing, whereas according to the second version she has more time. Another difference between the two versions is with regard to washing her hair during the day and immersing at night immediately afterward. According to the first version of Rava’s statement, provided that she washed her hair immediately before immersing, it makes no difference whether or not she washed and immersed on the same day. Conversely, according to the second version she must wash her hair on the same day or night as her immersion.
  § Rava says: A woman may not stand on top of earthenware utensils that are submerged in the ritual bath and immerse. Rav Kahana thought to say: What is the reason for this? It is because the Sages issued a decree against immersing in this manner, as it appears like immersing in bathhouses, i.e., the purpose of the decree is to prevent women from thinking that it is permitted to immerse in a bathhouse, which contains drawn water and is not valid as a ritual bath. It can be inferred from this reasoning that it is permitted for a woman to stand on top of a plank of wood that is in the ritual bath.
  Rav Ḥanan from Neharde’a said to Rav Kahana that this is not the reason for Rava’s statement. Rather, there, in the case of submerged earthenware utensils, what is the reason that she may not immerse? She may not immerse because she will be afraid that she might fall off, and consequently she will not immerse herself properly. By the same logic, she will also be afraid when she is standing on top of a plank of wood, and therefore this is also prohibited.
  Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: A woman may not immerse herself
  
  Daf 67a
  
  in a port [<i>banamal</i>], where the boats are drawn up onto shore, as there is a lot of mud there, which can stick to her and interpose between her and the water. Even though now, after the immersion, there is no mud stuck to her feet or body, one can say that perhaps while she walked back after immersing the mud fell off. Since one cannot be certain that there was no mud stuck to her body while she immersed, she may not immerse in a port.
  The Gemara relates that Shmuel’s father prepared ritual baths for his daughters in the days of Nisan, by digging holes and letting them fill with natural rainwater, and he placed mats in the Euphrates River in the days of Tishrei. Since the water was shallow and the riverbed was muddy, he placed mats on the riverbed so that they could immerse without getting dirty.
  The Gemara cites a similar <i>halakha</i> involving the interposition of an item during immersion. Rav Giddel says that Rav says: If a woman gave a cooked dish to her son, and afterward she immersed in a ritual bath and ascended from the ritual bath, the immersion is ineffective for her. The reason is that even though now, after the immersion, there is no food stuck to her body, one can say that perhaps as she walked back after immersing the food fell off. Since one cannot be certain that there was no food stuck to her body while she immersed, she should not handle food immediately before immersing.
  Rami bar Abba said: With regard to these bloodletting incisions [<i>ravdei dekhusilta</i>], until three days have passed since the bloodletting, when they have not yet formed a hard scab, they do not interpose and invalidate an immersion. From this point forward they interpose, as the scab is too hard for the water to penetrate.
  Mar Ukva said: With regard to mucus that is in the eye, if it is moist, it does not interpose and invalidate an immersion. But if the mucus is dry and hard it interposes. When is it called dry? It is called dry from the time that it begins to turn yellow.
  Shmuel says: Eye shadow that is in the eye does not interpose and invalidate an immersion. But eye shadow that is on or around the eye interposes. And if the woman’s eyes were constantly blinking, then even eye shadow that is on or around the eye does not interpose, as the constant blinking removes the eye shadow.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If a woman opened her eyes very wide or closed her eyes very tightly while immersing, this immersion is ineffective for her. Such open or closed eyelids prevent the water from reaching the creases around the eyes.
  Reish Lakish says: A woman may immerse herself in a ritual bath only in the manner that she grows, i.e., she may not force her arms to her sides or close her legs tightly. She is not obligated to spread her limbs widely, but simply stand in her normal manner. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 2:4): When a man has a leprous mark between his legs and stands before a priest for inspection, he should appear like one who is hoeing, i.e., with his legs slightly apart, and if it is under his arm, he should appear like one who is harvesting olives, with his arms slightly raised. If the mark is not visible when he is standing in that manner, it is not impure. By contrast, a woman with a leprous mark between her legs should appear like one who is weaving, and if the mark is beneath her breast she should appear like a woman who is nursing her son.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna says: A single hair tied in a knot interposes and invalidates an immersion.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  Three hairs tied together in a knot do not interpose, as three hairs cannot be tied so tightly that water cannot penetrate them. With regard to two hairs tied together in a knot, I do not know the <i>halakha</i>. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: We have a tradition that only one hair interposes, but two or more do not prevent the water from reaching the body.
  § Rabbi Yitzḥak says: By Torah law, if there is an interposition between a person and the water, and it covers the majority of his body, and he is particular and wants the interposing substance removed, it interposes and invalidates an immersion in a ritual bath. But if it covers the majority of his body but he is not particular about that substance, it does not interpose. But the Sages issued a decree prohibiting substances covering the majority of his body with regard to which he is not particular, due to substances covering the majority of his body about which he is particular. And likewise, they issued a decree against substances covering the minority of his body with regard to which he is particular, due to substances covering the majority of his body about which he is particular.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But let them also issue a decree prohibiting substances covering the minority of his body with regard to which he is not particular, due to substances covering the minority of his body about which he is particular. The Gemara answers: The Sages did not issue such a decree, as that prohibition is itself a rabbinic decree, and will we arise and issue a decree to prevent the violation of another decree?
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the issue of the correct time for immersion. Rav says: A menstruating woman who wishes to immerse to complete her purification process at her time, i.e., at the end of seven days, may immerse only at night, i.e., on the night after the seventh day, the night of the eighth day. But a woman who wishes to immerse not at her time, i.e., on the eighth day or afterward, may immerse either during the day or at night. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whether she is immersing at her time or not at her time, she may immerse only at night. This is because her daughter might follow her example when she is old enough, and also immerse in the daytime, but she may do so on the seventh day, when immersion is not valid.
  And even Rav retracted his opinion and ruled that a woman who is immersing after menstruation may never do so during the day. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: A menstruating woman who wishes to immerse to complete her purification process, whether at her time or whether not at her time, may immerse only at night, because her daughter might follow her example and immerse during the daytime of the seventh day.
  The Gemara cites examples of Sages who permitted immersion on the eighth day due to exceptional circumstances. Rav Idi decreed in Neresh that the women may immerse during the daytime on the eighth day due to the lions that roamed the area at night and posed a threat to women who immersed at that time. Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov decreed in Pappunya that the women should immerse during the daytime on the eighth day due to thieves who posed a threat to women who immersed at that night.
  Similarly, Rav Yehuda decreed in Pumbedita that the women should immerse in the daytime on the eighth day due to the cold of the night. Rava decreed in Meḥoza that the women should immerse in the daytime on the eighth day due to the gatekeepers [<i>abula’ei</i>], who were untrustworthy and might hurt the women on their way to and from immersion.
  § Rav Pappa said to Rava and to Abaye: Since nowadays the Sages have given all women who menstruate the status of an uncertain greater <i>zava</i>, may they immerse on the seventh day during the daytime? A greater <i>zava</i>, after counting seven clean days, may immerse on the seventh day. Since all women who menstruate now count seven clean days after the bleeding ceases, more than seven days from the onset of her menstruating have passed by the seventh clean day.
  Rava and Abaye replied that they may nevertheless not immerse on the seventh day, due to the statement of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “But if she be purified of her <i>ziva</i>, then she shall count to herself seven days, and after that she shall be pure” (Leviticus 15:28). The purification of a <i>zava</i> must be after the seven days, i.e., after all of the days, which must be consecutive so that there are no days of impurity separating between the seven clean days. Rabbi Shimon says that the phrase “And after that she shall be pure” teaches that after the action of counting seven clean days she shall be pure. In other words, once she has examined herself at the beginning of the seventh day she may immerse on that day.
  Rabbi Shimon continues: But the Sages said: It is prohibited to do so, i.e., to immerse on the seventh day, lest she come to a case of uncertainty. If she were to engage in intercourse with her husband on that seventh day after immersion, and afterward on the same day she experiences bleeding, it would retroactively nullify her entire seven clean days, which would mean that she engaged in intercourse with her husband while she was impure, rendering them both liable to receive the punishment of <i>karet</i>.
  § Rav Huna says: A woman may wash her hair on the first day of the week, Sunday, and immerse on the third day of the week, i.e., Monday night. The proof of this is that sometimes a woman washes her hair on the eve of Shabbat, but she does not immerse until the conclusion of Shabbat, which is the same interval as from Sunday to Monday night.
  Similarly, a woman may wash her hair on the first day of the week, Sunday, and immerse on the fourth day of the week, Tuesday night. The proof of this is that sometimes a woman washes her hair on the eve of Shabbat, but she does not immerse until the conclusion of the Festival that occurs after Shabbat, which is the same interval as from Sunday to Tuesday night.
  Furthermore, a woman may wash her hair on the first day of the week, Sunday, and immerse on the fifth day of the week, Wednesday night. The proof of this is that sometimes a woman washes her hair on the eve of Shabbat, but she does not immerse until the conclusion of two days of Rosh HaShana that occurs after Shabbat, which is the same interval as from Sunday to Wednesday night.
  But Rav Ḥisda said: We say that all of these long gaps between a woman washing her hair and immersing are permitted. But we do not say as proof that since a woman washes her hair before Shabbat and immerses only several days later, she may do so during a regular week as well. One cannot learn this <i>halakha</i> from those situations involving Shabbat, as one cannot derive cases where alternatives are possible from those cases where alternatives are not possible. Where it is possible for a woman to wash her hair and immerse immediately, it is possible, and she is not allowed to do so any earlier. But where it is not possible for a woman to wash her hair immediately before immersion, e.g., when she must immerse after the conclusion of Shabbat or a festival, it is impossible, and for this reason she is permitted to wash her hair in advance.
  And Rav Yeimar said: We even say the proof that since a woman washes her hair before Shabbat and immerses only several days later, she may do so during a regular week as well. Rav Yeimar agrees with Rav Huna in all cases apart from that of a woman who washes her hair on the first day of the week, Sunday, and immerses on the fifth day of the week, Wednesday night. He maintains that Rav Huna’s proof from the conclusion of two days of Rosh HaShana that is after Shabbat is not a sufficient proof, as even in such a case a woman may not wait so long. Rather, it is possible for her to wash her hair at night after the conclusion of Rosh HaShana and immerse on that same night, so that she should not have such a long gap between washing her hair and immersing.
  Mareimar taught: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, that a woman should not wash her hair many days before immersing except when there is no other possibility. And the <i>halakha</i> is also in accordance with the manner in which Rav Yeimar explains that if Rosh HaShana occurs after Shabbat a woman should wash her hair on the night of her immersion.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether a woman may wash her hair at night and immerse on that same night? Mar Zutra deems it prohibited for her to do so. Since she will be in a hurry to immerse and return to her husband, there is a concern that she will not wash and examine her hair thoroughly. And Rav Ḥinnana from Sura deems it permitted for a woman to wash her hair on the night of her immersion.
  Rav Adda said to Rav Ḥinnana from Sura: Was there not an incident like this involving the wife of Abba Mari, the Exilarch, who quarreled with her husband, and as a result she did not want to immerse in a ritual bath to become permitted to him; and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak went to appease her and to persuade her to immerse, and she said to him: What is there that can be done now? There is no reason for me to hurry and immerse now.
  
  Daf 68a
  
  Rather, it is sufficient if you come back again tomorrow and speak with me then about this matter. And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak knew what she was saying to him. She was alluding to the fact that she had not washed her hair while it was still daylight, and therefore she could not immerse that evening. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to her: Are you lacking kettles [<i>dudei</i>] to heat water to wash your hair? Are you lacking buckets [<i>tashtekei</i>] to bring the water to wash your hair? Are you lacking servants, who can help you prepare to wash your hair? It can be inferred from this story that Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak holds that it is permitted for a woman to wash her hair and immerse on the same night.
  § Rava taught: A woman may wash her hair on the eve of Shabbat and immerse at the conclusion of Shabbat. Rav Pappa said to Rava: But didn’t Ravin send the following <i>halakha</i> in his letter: A woman may not wash her hair on the eve of Shabbat and immerse at the conclusion of Shabbat? Instead, she should wash her hair after the conclusion of Shabbat immediately before she immerses.
  And furthermore, you should be astounded with yourself: How did the Sages deem it permitted for a woman on a weekday to wash her hair during the day and immerse at night? Don’t we require that her immersion must be immediately after washing her hair? And if she washes her hair during the day, this requirement will not be fulfilled. The Sages reluctantly permitted a woman to wash her hair during the day, and they permitted this only due to the concern that she might not wash her hair properly if she would wait until night. Consequently, with regard to an immersion on the conclusion of Shabbat, she should avoid washing her hair a day or more in advance.
  As a result of Rav Pappa’s comments, Rava then appointed an interpreter before him to publicize his retraction, and he taught: The statement I said to you was a mistake of mine. But in fact this is what the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: A woman may not wash her hair on the eve of Shabbat and immerse after the conclusion of Shabbat. And furthermore you should be astounded with yourself. How can a woman wash her hair during the day and immerse at night? Don’t we require: Her immersion must be immediately after washing her hair? And if she washes her hair on the eve of Shabbat, this principle will not be fulfilled.
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that a woman may wash her hair during the day and immerse at night. And the <i>halakha</i> is that a woman may wash her hair only at night. The Gemara comments: This is difficult, as one <i>halakha</i> contradicts the other <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This ruling that she may wash her hair during the day is referring to a case where it is possible, e.g., when she immerses on a weeknight and can wash her hair shortly beforehand during the daytime. That ruling that she is permitted to wash her hair only at night is referring to a case where it is not possible, e.g., when her time for immersion is after the conclusion of Shabbat. Since she may not wash her hair on the eve of Shabbat for an immersion after the conclusion of Shabbat, she must wash her hair at night, after Shabbat has ended, immediately before she immerses.
  MISHNA: In the case of a menstruating woman who examined herself on the seventh day of menstruation in the morning and found that she is ritually pure and eligible to immerse in a ritual bath that evening, but during twilight of the seventh day she did not perform an examination that marks the transition between the days when she has a flow of blood and the days when she no longer has a flow of blood but immersed despite not having performed the examination, and after several days she examined herself and found that she is ritually impure, the presumptive status of that woman is one of ritual purity from the time of her immersion until her examination, and all ritually pure items that she handled in the interim remain pure.
  If she examined herself on the seventh day of menstruation in the morning and found that she is ritually impure, i.e., her menstrual flow continued, and during twilight of the seventh day she did not perform an examination to confirm the transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity but immersed nonetheless, and after several days she examined herself and found that she is ritually pure, the presumptive status of that woman is one of ritual impurity from the time of her immersion until her examination, and all ritually pure items that she handled in the interim are impure. Since she found blood during her last examination in her days of menstruation, the concern is that the flow of blood continued during the days that followed, and therefore her immersion on the eve of the eighth day was ineffective.
  In a case where there was no blood found during the examination on the seventh morning and she did not examine herself during twilight, and several days later she discovered blood, where the mishna says that a woman’s presumptive status is one of ritual purity, that is the <i>halakha</i> only for the days following immersion. But she transmits ritual impurity to the ritually pure items that she handled before the examination in which she found blood for a twenty-four-hour period and from examination to examination, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of a woman who experiences bleeding (see 2a). And if she has a fixed menstrual cycle, on the day that she examined herself and found blood, her time is sufficient, i.e., it is assumed that the bleeding began then, and she does not transmit impurity retroactively.
  And Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to any woman who did not perform the examination marking her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on the seventh day from <i>minḥa</i> time onward, even if she performed an examination and found no blood that morning, the presumptive status of that woman is one of ritual impurity. And the Rabbis say: Even if on the second day of her menstruation she performed the examination and found that she is ritually pure, and she did not perform the examination marking her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on the seventh day during twilight, and after several days she examined herself and found that she is ritually impure, the presumptive status of that woman is one of ritual purity from the time of her immersion until her examination.
  GEMARA: The Gemara cites a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to a case where a woman did not perform an examination indicating her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity, and three days passed in which it is possible that she received the status of a <i>zava</i>, and then she found that she was ritually impure. It was stated that Rav says: This woman is a definite greater <i>zava</i>. And Levi says: She is an uncertain greater <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara asks: To which clause of the mishna does this dispute apply? If we say that Rav and Levi are referring to the first clause, i.e., a woman who examined herself on the morning of the seventh day and found herself to be ritually pure, but she did not examine herself at twilight, and several days later she examined herself and found herself to be impure, this cannot be correct, as the mishna teaches: The presumptive status of that woman is one of ritual purity. She is not a <i>zava</i> at all.
  Rather, say that they are referring to the latter clause of the mishna, when she examined herself on the morning of the seventh day and found herself to be ritually impure. If so, granted Levi’s opinion is reasonable, as we say that this woman is an uncertain greater <i>zava</i>. But how can one explain Rav’s opinion that she is even a definite greater <i>zava</i>? After all, she examined herself and found that she is ritually pure. If so, how can she be a definite <i>zava</i>?
  Rather, when the dispute of Rav and Levi was stated, it was stated as a distinct <i>halakha</i> unrelated to the mishna, as follows: With regard to a menstruating woman who examined herself on the seventh day in the morning and found that she was ritually impure, and at twilight of the seventh day she did not perform an examination to confirm her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity, and after several days she examined herself and found that she is ritually impure, Rav says: This woman is a definite greater <i>zava</i>. And Levi says: She is an uncertain greater <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara explains their opinions. Rav says: This woman is a definite greater <i>zava</i>, since from the outset she found herself to be ritually impure, and now she found herself to also be ritually impure. Consequently, she is definitely impure. And Levi says: This woman is an uncertain greater <i>zava</i>, as one can say that perhaps she stopped experiencing bleeding in between the morning of her seventh day of menstruation when she first found herself to be impure and several days later, on the second occasion that she found herself to be impure.
  
  Daf 68b
  
  And Levi taught similarly in a <i>baraita</i>: If a woman examined herself on the seventh day of menstruation and found herself to be impure, and she did not perform the examination to confirm her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity, and after several days she examined herself, whether she examined herself and found herself to be ritually pure or whether she examined herself and found herself to be ritually impure, she is an uncertain greater <i>zava</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: But she transmits ritual impurity to the ritually pure items that she handled before the examination in which she found blood for a twenty-four-hour period. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava, as Rava said, with regard to the statement in the mishna on 38b that a woman has a presumptive status of ritual purity during the eleven days of potential <i>ziva</i>: This serves to say that a woman does not transmit ritual impurity for a twenty-four-hour period before experiencing bleeding during her days of <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Gemara already cite a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava one time, on 39a? The Gemara explains that this is what we are saying: Let us say that there is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava from this mishna as well.
  The Gemara responds that Rava could have said to you that when the mishna teaches: She transmits ritual impurity for a twenty-four-hour period, it is referring to the beginning of our chapter. Specifically, it is speaking of the mishna on 64b, which discusses the case of a young woman who saw menstrual blood before marriage while she was still in her father’s house. According to Beit Hillel she may engage in intercourse only the first night, during which the blood is considered the blood from the torn hymen rather than the blood of menstruation. This mishna is teaching that from that point onward, when she experiences bleeding she renders items impure retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period, like other women.
  The Gemara explains that this ruling is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since her cycle of menstruation and <i>ziva</i> is interrupted by days when any blood she discharges is considered to be ritually pure, she now reverts back as though it is considered like the beginning of her days of menstruation, and she does not transmit ritual impurity retroactively for a twenty-four-hour period. Therefore, this mishna teaches us that she does transmit impurity retroactively.
  § The mishna teaches: And if she has a fixed menstrual cycle on the day that she examined herself and found blood, her time is sufficient and she does not transmit impurity retroactively. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya, with regard to the ruling he says that Shmuel says? As Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya says that Shmuel says, with regard to the mishna on 38b that teaches that a woman has a presumptive status of ritual purity during the eleven days of potential <i>ziva</i>: This serves to say that a woman does not establish a fixed menstrual cycle during her days of <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara answers that Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya could have said to you: When we say that a woman does not establish a fixed menstrual cycle during her days of <i>ziva</i>, we meant this only as a leniency, that she does not require three times to uproot any such cycle. Rather, she uproots it after one time when she does not experience bleeding in accordance with that cycle. As we say that her menstrual blood is removed during her days of <i>ziva</i>, and she is unlikely to discharge menstrual blood during that time. And since her blood is removed, if she established a fixed menstrual cycle it is sufficient for her to be deemed impure from the hour that she saw the menstrual flow. There is no decree of retroactive impurity on items that she previously touched due to the concern that the blood flow might have started earlier.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to any woman who did not perform the examination indicating her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on the seventh day from <i>minḥa</i> time onward, even if she performed an examination and found no blood that morning, the presumptive status of that woman is one of ritual impurity. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: If the <i>halakha</i> had been that a woman who will immerse must keep her hands placed in her eyes, a euphemism for her vagina, for the entire twilight period, what you say is fine. It would be reasonable to assume that since she did not examine herself at the end of the day she has a presumptive status of ritual impurity.
  But now that you say that it is insufficient to examine herself in the morning, what is your reasoning? Evidently, you say that when she removed her hand from examining herself perhaps she saw blood and is impure. If so, what difference is it to me if she performed the examination indicating her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on the seventh day from <i>minḥa</i> time onward, and what difference is it to me if she performed the examination indicating her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on the first day of her counting?
  The Gemara asks: Why do the Rabbis mention an examination on the first day of her counting? Is there one who said that if a woman examines herself only on the first day that is sufficient?
  The Gemara answers: Yes, there is such an opinion, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I asked Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon the following question when they were walking on the road: With regard to a menstruating woman who examined herself on the seventh day in the morning and found herself to be ritually pure, but at twilight she did not perform the examination indicating her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity, and after several days she examined herself and found herself to be ritually impure, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon said to him: She has a presumptive status of ritual purity up until the moment that she discovered that she was impure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi asked them additional questions: If she examined herself on the sixth day, or the fifth day, or the fourth day, or the third day, or even the second day, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon said to him: The <i>halakha</i> is no different. In all of these cases she has a presumptive status of ritual purity until she discovers that she is impure.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi comments: I did not ask about a woman who examined herself on the first day, and I erred in that I did not ask them. If I would have asked them they would have told me that even if she examined herself only on the first day, she still has a presumptive status of ritual purity. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains his reasoning: Is that to say that on all of these other days she was not standing with a presumptive status of ritual impurity? And nevertheless, once she performed the examination and her blood is found to have stopped, it is considered to have stopped, and she now has the presumptive status of a woman whose bleeding has stopped. If so, on the first day too, once she performed the examination and her blood is found to have stopped, it is considered to have stopped, and she now has a presumptive status of a woman whose bleeding has stopped.
  The Gemara asks: And initially, what did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold? Why didn’t he ask them about a woman who examined herself only on the first day? The Gemara answers that he held that since she has a presumptive status that her spring, i.e., her uterus, is open, as she had just begun experiencing bleeding, an examination conducted on that day is ineffective. In any event, this <i>baraita</i> teaches that there is an opinion that even if a woman examined herself only on the first day, she has a presumptive status of ritual purity.
  MISHNA: With regard to a <i>zav</i> and a <i>zava</i>, who are required to count and examine themselves on each of seven clean days before purification in a ritual bath, who examined themselves on the first day and found themselves ritually pure, i.e., with no blood, and they examined themselves on the seventh day and found themselves ritually pure, and on the rest of the intervening days they did not examine themselves, Rabbi Eliezer says: The presumptive status of the <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i> is one of ritual purity. Rabbi Yehoshua says: In that case, the <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i> have counted only the first day and the seventh day, two of the seven clean days, and they must count another five days to complete the tally. Rabbi Akiva says: The <i>zav</i> and the <i>zava</i> have counted only the seventh day, and they must count another six days to complete the tally.
  GEMARA: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: According to your statement, that the first day is included in her count of seven, you are counting at intervals, i.e., with days in-between that do not count, and the Torah states: “But if she be purified of her <i>ziva</i>, then she shall count to herself seven days, and after that she shall be pure” (Leviticus 15:28). This teaches that the purification of a <i>zava</i> must be after the seven days, i.e., after all of the days, which must be consecutive so that there are no days of impurity separating between the seven clean days.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: And you too, do you not concede with regard to a <i>zav</i> who experienced a seminal emission during his count of seven clean days, and with regard to a nazirite who walked under overhanging boughs and protrusions that have items whose status of impurity is uncertain beneath them, that they count at intervals, as both are impure for one day before resuming their counting? And yet the Torah states with regard to a nazirite who definitely contracted ritual impurity from a corpse: “But the former days shall be void, because his consecration was defiled” (Numbers 6:12). This indicates that even in cases where the Torah says that one must count consecutively, it is permitted to count with intervals in between countings.
  And how would Rabbi Eliezer respond to Rabbi Yehoshua’s claim? He would say: Granted, there in the cases of the <i>zav</i> and the nazirite, the Merciful One states: “This is the law of him that has an issue, and of him from whom an emission of semen goes out, so that he is thereby impure” (Leviticus 15:32). This teaches that when a <i>zav</i> experiences a seminal emission it overturns the counting of only that one day. And if one would claim that the Sages should issue a decree due to the concern that one might confuse the <i>halakha</i> of one who had an emission of <i>ziva</i> during the seven clean days with a <i>zav</i> who had a seminal emission during the seven clean days, that is not a concern. The reason is that an emission of a <i>ziva</i> will not be confused with the case of one who experienced a seminal emission.
  Similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would say that in the case of a nazirite who walked under overhanging boughs and protrusions that have items whose status of impurity is uncertain beneath them, there is also no need to overturn all the previous days of counting, as by Torah law we require a full-fledged tent over a corpse, and it was the Sages who decreed that one who walks under overhanging boughs and protrusions is ritually impure. And a <i>halakha</i> that applies by rabbinic law will not be confused with a <i>halakha</i> that is mandated by Torah law.
  But here, in the case of a <i>zava</i> who counts only the first and seventh day, if we are concerned that as she did not count the five intermediate days perhaps she saw blood during those days, and since what occurred on those days is uncertain, only the first day counts for her, then one might come to confuse this situation with a case where she is certain that she saw blood during the intermediate days. One might mistakenly think that even if she definitely experiences bleeding during the intermediate days she can still count the first day as one of her seven clean days before immersing.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: The statement of Rabbi Eliezer appears more correct than the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, and the statement of Rabbi Akiva appears more correct than the statement of all of them. But nevertheless, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a <i>zav</i> and a <i>zava</i> who examined themselves on the first day of their seven clean days and found themselves to be pure, and they examined themselves again on the eighth day and found themselves to be pure, but they did not examine themselves on the remainder of the days,
  
  Daf 69a
  
  according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that if they examined themselves on the first and seventh days they are considered to be pure during the intermediate days as well, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we require the first and last days of the seven, and if so, here there is an examination on the first day, and yet there is no examination on the last day, but only on the eighth day? Or perhaps Rabbi Eliezer requires an examination only on the first of the days, and this is sufficient even though there is no examination on the last of the seven days.
  Rav said: This case of examining on the first and eighth days is the same as that of examining on the first and seventh days, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer requires an examination only on the first of the days, and this examination is sufficient even though there is no examination on the last of the days. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: We require an examination on the first and last days of the seven, and here there is an examination on the first day but there is no examination on the last day. Consequently, Rabbi Eliezer would not permit a <i>zav</i> or a <i>zava</i> to count any of the days in this case.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from a <i>baraita</i>: And the Sages agree with regard to a <i>zav</i> and a <i>zava</i> who examined themselves on the first day and on the eighth day and found themselves to be ritually pure, that they have only the eighth day as part of their count. The Gemara asks: Who are the Sages who agree to this? Are they not Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua? These two Sages, who disagree in a case where the <i>zav</i> and <i>zava</i> examined themselves on the first and seventh days, are evidently the ones who agree in the case of a woman who performed an examination on the first and the eighth days. This seems to contradict Rav’s opinion.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, the Sages referred to here are Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Akiva. Both of them agree that in this case the first day is not included in the count. Conversely, Rabbi Eliezer would say that the first seven days are included in the count and the eighth day is unnecessary, as there is a presumptive status of ritual purity from her examination on the first day.
  § The Gemara cites another discussion with regard to which days are included in the count of seven clean days. Rav Sheshet says that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: A menstruating woman who performed the examination marking the first step in her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on her third day counts that day as part of the number of seven clean days.
  The Gemara asks: Why does a menstruating woman require any kind of counting? If this is during her days when she is expected to menstruate she may immerse after the conclusion of seven days, whether or not those days were clean. Rather, say that Rav meant as follows: A <i>zava</i> who performed the examination marking the first step in her transition from ritual impurity to ritual purity on her third day counts that day as part of the number of seven clean days.
  Rav Sheshet said to Rav Yirmeya bar Abba: Did Rav say his <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of the Samaritans, who say that the day on which a <i>zava</i> ceases to experience the emission of <i>ziva</i> counts toward the number of seven clean days, and she does not need to count seven complete days?
  Rav Yirmeya bar Abba replied: When Rav says his <i>halakha</i>, he meant apart from the third day. Rav Sheshet challenged: If Rav meant apart from the third day, that is obvious; there is no need for him to issue such a statement at all. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba replied: No, the statement that she begins counting immediately after the third day is necessary for a case where once she saw that she was clean after the third day of her <i>ziva</i> emissions she did not examine herself again until the seventh day.
  And Rav is teaching us two <i>halakhot</i>. There, in the previous discussion with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, Rav stated that an examination at the beginning is sufficient, even though there is no examination at the end of the seven days. And here he teaches us that an examination at the end of the seven days is sufficient, even though there is no examination at the beginning of the seven days, but only on the day when she ceased experiencing bleeding.
  Rav Yirmeya adds that it is necessary to teach both <i>halakhot</i>, lest you say that we say that an examination at the beginning is sufficient even though there is no examination at the end of the seven days, as we establish the clean days in accordance with their presumptive status. But one might have thought that Rav would not permit her to consider all the days to have been clean in a case of an examination at the end of the seven days even though there is no examination at the beginning of the seven days, where no presumptive status was established. Therefore, this second statement of Rav teaches us that even if she only examined herself at the end of the seven clean days it is sufficient.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rav Yirmeya’s explanation. Is that so? But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, that a woman who is uncertain whether or not she miscarried an actual fetus must bring an offering (see 29a). The reason is that the majority of pregnant women carry actual fetuses. Rabbi Yosef objected to this from the case of a woman who was forgetful, i.e., a woman who left town when she was pregnant, and later returned no longer pregnant. It is unknown whether she miscarried an actual fetus, and if it was a fetus, whether it was male or female. The conclusion there was that she does not have any days when blood she discharges is considered ritually pure, which is the <i>halakha</i> following a birth, as her miscarriage might not have been a fetus at all. Apparently, here one does not follow the principle that the majority of pregnant women carry actual fetuses.
  Ravin continues: And I do not know what his objection is, as the reason that she does not have any days when blood she discharges is considered ritually pure is not only due to the uncertainty as to whether or not she miscarried a fetus, but because it is also unknown when that miscarriage occurred, i.e., even if she miscarried a fetus, perhaps the days when blood she discharges is considered ritually pure had already been completed. As we maintain that the first week that she comes before us, when the court is uncertain with regard to her impurity, we tell her to immerse every night of that week, in the manner of a woman purifying herself after menstruation or childbirth, but we do not tell her to immerse during the daytime, as she has not counted seven clean days (see 29b).
  The Gemara explains how this discussion apparently contradicts Rav Yirmeya’s explanation. And if it enters your mind that we do not require all seven clean days to be counted before us, i.e., if an examination on the seventh day is sufficient, let us tell her to immerse also during the daytime, as perhaps she gave birth to a male baby during her days of <i>ziva</i>, and already performed her seven days of counting before she came before the court. The Gemara concludes: Rather, must one not conclude from this statement of Ravin that we require that her seven clean days be counted before us, which is why the court does not instruct her to immerse during the daytime.
  The Gemara rejects this contention. But didn’t we interpret that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that we require her seven clean days to be counted before us? By contrast, Rav’s statement was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the days do not need to be counted before us.
  § The Gemara stated earlier that according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the seven clean days do not need to be counted before us. The Gemara analyzes their opinion: And from where do you say that according to the opinion of the Rabbis we do not require that the seven days be counted before us? This is as we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a woman who was forgetful and does not know whether she is now in her days of menstruation or days of <i>ziva</i>, who said: I saw blood on one day of impurity, the court instructs her to immerse nine immersions.
  The <i>baraita</i> clarifies: Since there is no way of knowing whether she is a woman purifying herself after menstruation or after <i>ziva</i>, she must immerse seven immersions on the following seven nights, for purification from menstruation, as each of these days might be the last of the seven days of menstruation. And she must also immerse during two days as purification from <i>ziva</i>, i.e., on the day that she arrives, in case she experienced bleeding the day before, and on the following day, as perhaps she experienced bleeding on the day of her arrival. But if this woman says: I saw blood at twilight that renders me impure, the court instructs her to immerse eleven immersions.
  The Gemara asks: These eleven days, what is their purpose? If she would normally require nine immersions, why does she require an extra two immersions if she experienced bleeding at twilight? Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring specifically to a case where she came before us at twilight and says that she also experienced bleeding at twilight, but it is not clear whether she experienced bleeding on a previous day at twilight, or today at twilight.
  Rav Yirmeya explains: Therefore, she requires eight immersions to purify herself from menstruation, seven in case each of the following nights is the night after the seventh day of menstruation, and the eighth in case she experienced bleeding during twilight of the day she arrived, and this occurred in a time which was actually part of the next day, such that she needs to immerse also on the eighth night from her arrival, and three additional immersions during the day to purify herself from <i>ziva</i>. She must immerse during the day three times: She must immerse immediately, because if she experienced bleeding on the previous day during twilight it may have still been day, and right now, at twilight, it might still be day; she must immerse on the next day, because if she experienced bleeding on the previous day during twilight it may have already been night; and she must immerse during the day following the next day, because perhaps she experienced bleeding this twilight after it was night.
  If this woman who is forgetful with regard to her cycle of menstruation and <i>ziva</i> says: I have not seen any blood at all, the court instructs her to immerse fifteen immersions. Rava said, in reference to this final <i>halakha</i> in the <i>baraita</i>: This <i>halakha</i> is not a logical <i>halakha</i>. Rather, it is like the <i>halakha</i> that they judge in a place named Galaḥi. In that place they follow the behavior of Sodom, and say that with regard to one who has one ox, he must shepherd the local flocks one day, and one who does not have an ox must shepherd the local flocks for two days. It is not logical that a woman who has not experienced a flow of blood must immerse more times than one who has experienced a flow of blood.
  Apropos the mention of Galaḥi, the Gemara relates an incident that occurred in that place. There was an orphan in that town, the son of a widow [<i>armelata</i>], who had no oxen of his own. The people of that town gave him their oxen to shepherd. This orphan went and slaughtered all of the oxen. He said to the townspeople: Whoever has an ox should take one skin, while one who does not have an ox should take two skins. The people of Galaḥi said to the orphan: What is this that you are saying, i.e., what is the reason? He said to them: The end of the law is like the beginning of the law: Isn’t the beginning of the law that one who has no ox is preferred, and must shepherd the oxen for two days? So too, with regard to the end of the law, one who has no ox is preferred and should receive two hides.
  The Gemara returns to discuss Rava’s comment with regard to the ruling of the <i>baraita</i>: Here too one can claim: And if in a case where she says: I saw blood, it is sufficient for her to immerse either nine immersions or eleven immersions, so too, in a case where she says: I did not see any flow of blood at all, is it logical that she requires fifteen immersions?
  Rather, say that this is what the <i>baraita</i> means: If a woman says: I saw a flow of blood but I do not know how many days I saw blood, and likewise I do not know whether I saw the flow during the days of menstruation or if I saw the flow during the days of <i>ziva</i>, in such a case, the court instructs her to immerse fifteen immersions. The reason for these immersions is as follows: If she comes before us during the daytime, we give her seven immersions, beginning from that night, to remove the impurity of menstruation. Any of those seven nights might be the night after the last of her days of menstruation.
  
  Daf 69b
  
  And she requires eight immersions during the day to purify her from her <i>ziva</i>, as it is possible that she experienced bleeding for three consecutive days, rendering her a greater <i>zava</i>, and one of those was on this day that she came before the court, and it is also possible that the day she arrived she did not experience bleeding, and she was a <i>zava</i> during her last clean day and had to immerse that day. If she comes before us at night, we give her eight immersions to purify herself from her menstruation, including one on the night that she comes before the court, and seven immersions during the day to purify herself from her <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: With regard to her <i>ziva</i>, she still requires eight immersions. Since it is possible that she experienced bleeding for the third day on the day before coming to the court, she might be a greater <i>zava</i>, who starts her clean days only the day after she arrived. In addition, any of the first seven days may be the last clean day, on which she has to immerse herself. The Gemara answers: Rather, in both this case and that case she requires seven immersions to purify herself from the impurity of menstruation, and eight immersions to purify herself from the impurity of <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: If the woman comes at night to the court, she requires eight immersions to purify herself from her impurity of menstruation. Why does the <i>baraita</i> require her to immerse a total of only fifteen times when there are cases where she must immerse sixteen times?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to purifying herself from the impurity of <i>ziva</i>, which can be taught in a distinct manner, as there is no difference whether she comes before us during the day and there is no difference whether she comes before us at night, the <i>baraita</i> counts the fixed amount of eight immersions. By contrast, with regard to purifying herself from menstruation, which the <i>tanna</i> cannot teach in a distinct manner, as when she comes before us at night she requires eight immersions but if she comes before us during the day she does not require eight immersions, the <i>tanna</i> did not count both options, but mentioned only seven immersions, which is the minimum number required.
  The Gemara returns to the initial purpose of this discussion, which was to indicate that the Rabbis do not require all seven days of counting before the court. And if it enters your mind that we require seven days of counting before us, why do I need all of these immersions? She should count seven clean days and only afterward immerse. Rather, must one not conclude from this that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva and who say that we do not require seven days of counting before us?
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi, in rejection of this proof: But didn’t you resolve a difficulty in the <i>baraita</i>? Since you admit that the <i>baraita</i> in any event requires revision, resolve this difficulty too, and say this: If a woman comes and says: I counted clean days but I do not know how many days I counted, and I do not know whether I counted during the days of menstruation or whether I counted during the days of <i>ziva</i>, the court instructs her to immerse fifteen immersions. If so, there is no proof that the Rabbis hold that the counting does not need to be before the court.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>: If it is referring to a case where the woman said: I counted clean days but I do not know how many days I counted, it is impossible that she did not count at least one clean day. If so, she should not be required to immerse on the eighth day, in which case she is lacking one immersion, as the <i>baraita</i> rules that she must immerse fifteen times.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, say that she claims: I do not know if I counted any clean days or I did not count any clean days. Likewise, she does not know whether she saw the blood during her days of menstruation or during her days of <i>ziva</i>. Therefore, she must immerse fifteen times, as it is possible that she has not yet counted at all.
  MISHNA: The corpses of a <i>zav</i>, and a <i>zava</i>, and a menstruating woman, and a woman after childbirth, and a leper, who died, transmit ritual impurity by carrying their corpses, until the flesh decays. With regard to the corpse of a gentile who died, although when alive he transmits impurity like a <i>zav</i>, once he dies he is ritually pure and is prevented from transmitting impurity.
  Beit Shammai say: The status of all women when they die is as though they were menstruating women at the time of death. Therefore, the garments that they were wearing before they died are impure and require immersion. And Beit Hillel say: Only a woman who died with the impurity of a menstruating woman has the status of a menstruating woman after death.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the corpse of one of these impure people transmits ritual impurity by carrying. The Gemara asks: What does the mishna mean by the term: By carrying? If we say that it literally means by carrying, that is difficult: Is that to say that every other corpse does not impart ritual impurity by carrying? Since every corpse imparts impurity through carrying, why does the mishna need to specify this <i>halakha</i> in these specific cases?
  Rather, what does the mishna mean when it states: By carrying [<i>bemassa</i>]? It means imparting impurity through a very heavy stone [<i>even mesama</i>]. There is a unique <i>halakha</i> with regard to the ritual impurity of a <i>zav</i> and a menstruating woman. If they sit on an item, even one that cannot become ritually impure, and beneath that item there is a vessel, although the weight of the <i>zav</i> or the menstruating woman has no physical effect on the vessel, it becomes ritually impure.
  The Gemara notes that the word <i>mesama</i> is based on a verse, as it is written: “And a stone was brought and placed [<i>vesumat</i>] upon the mouth of the den; and the king sealed it with his own signet and with the signet of his lords, that nothing might be changed concerning Daniel” (Daniel 6:18). Accordingly, the mishna is teaching that although a corpse does not normally impart ritual impurity to vessels under a heavy stone, these specific types of corpses do transmit impurity in this manner.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Sages decreed that these specific types of corpses impart ritual impurity through a heavy stone? Rav said: It is a decree due to the possibility that perhaps one of these people might faint while sitting on the heavy stone, and it might be mistakenly thought they are dead and do not impart impurity to the vessels beneath.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Sages said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: All of these types of corpses listed in the mishna impart ritual impurity through a heavy stone until the belly of the corpse bursts. The Sages imposed their decree only in cases where the corpse resembles a person who has fainted. Once the corpse is clearly no longer alive, it no longer imparts ritual impurity through a heavy stone.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the corpse of a gentile who died, although when alive he transmits impurity like a <i>zav</i>, once he dies he is ritually pure and is prevented from transmitting impurity. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: For what reason did the Sages say that the corpse of a gentile who died is ritually pure and is prevented from transmitting impurity by carrying? Because his impurity that he transmits even when alive is not by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. The Sages decreed that every living gentile imparts ritual impurity in the manner of a <i>zav</i>; they did not extend their decree to include the corpse of a gentile in the manner of the corpse of a <i>zav</i>.
  § The Sages taught: The wise people of Alexandria asked twelve matters of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥinnana. Three of them were matters of wisdom, three were matters of <i>aggada</i>, three were matters of ignorance, and three were matters of behavior.
  The Gemara lists the questions. Three were matters of wisdom: The first question was with regard to a <i>zav</i> and a <i>zava</i> and a menstruating woman and a woman after childbirth and the leper, who died: Until when do they transmit ritual impurity by carrying? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: Until the flesh decays. This is the <i>halakha</i> taught in the mishna.
  The second question referred to the daughter of a wife who had been sent away by her husband, i.e., divorced, who then married another, but after her divorce from her second husband or his death she returned and remarried her first husband, to whom she is forbidden (see Deuteronomy 24:1–4), and a daughter was born from this marriage. What is her, i.e., the daughter’s, status with regard to marrying a priest?
  Do we say an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if in the case of a widow married to a High Priest, whose prohibition does not apply to all, i.e., it is prohibited for her only to marry a High Priest (see Leviticus 21:13–15), and yet the lineage of her son is flawed, as he is disqualified from the priesthood, then in the case of this daughter of a remarried divorcée, whose prohibition applies equally to all men, is it not right that her son should be of flawed lineage? Or perhaps this comparison can be refuted: What is notable about a widow married to a High Priest? It is notable in that she herself is disqualified from the priesthood, i.e., if a High Priest engages in intercourse with her she is disqualified from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, whereas a remarried divorcée is not disqualified from partaking of <i>teruma</i>.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to them:
  
  Daf 70a
  
  With regard to one who remarries his divorced wife, the Torah states: “Her former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after she is defiled, for that is an abomination before the Lord; and you shall not cause the land to sin, which the Lord your God gives you for an inheritance” (Deuteronomy 24:4). By inference, she, the divorced wife, is an abomination, but her children are not abominations. In other words, if he transgressed the prohibition and remarried this woman, the daughters from that marriage are not disqualified from marrying priests.
  The third question was as follows: Two wealthy people who were lepers came to purify themselves and each brought a sin offering, a guilt offering, and a burnt offering. Their offerings became intermingled with each other, and the offering of one of them was sacrificed, and subsequently one of them died. What shall be with the second individual, i.e., how can he complete his purification process? If the other one had not died, they could both bring the remaining offering with the stipulation that it should be sacrificed on behalf of whoever is the owner. But now that one is dead, the other person may not bring the remaining animal, as one may not sacrifice a sin offering for one who is dead. He may also not bring another animal instead, as the animal that was already sacrificed might have been his, and one may not bring a second sin offering.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: The solution is for him to write a contract giving all his possessions to others, whom he trusts to return them as a gift later, and he is then considered to be destitute. And as a poor leper, he brings a bird sin offering, which can be brought even in a case of uncertainty.
  The Gemara challenges: But there is the guilt offering that a leper must bring, and this must be an animal not a bird, and may not be brought in a case of uncertainty. How can this leper bring his guilt offering? Shmuel says: Rabbi Yehoshua was referring specifically to a case where his guilt offering had already been sacrificed, before the animals became intermingled.
  Rav Sheshet said: Is it possible that a great man like Shmuel would say a statement like this? In accordance with whose opinion does this solution apply? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the leper was wealthy when he sacrificed his guilt offering he has thereby fixed his manner of atonement, and must bring animals as his other two offerings, it is difficult: And once he fixed his guilt offering as an animal while he was wealthy, he may not bring a bird sin offering when he is destitute.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 14:11): With regard to a leper who brought an offering of a destitute person and thereafter he became wealthy, or if he brought an offering of a wealthy person and thereafter he became destitute, everything follows after the sin offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. If he was wealthy when he brought the sin offering, he brings the burnt offering of the wealthy; if he was destitute at that time, he brings the burnt offering of the destitute.
  And Rabbi Yehuda says: Everything, i.e., the sin offering and the burnt offering, follows after his status at the time that his guilt offering was brought. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Everything follows after the offering of the birds, brought seven days earlier, at the start of his purification process.
  Rav Sheshet continues: And if Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that the sin offering fixed the status of the remaining offerings, it is difficult: Why did Shmuel state that the case is where his guilt offering had already been sacrificed? Even if the guilt offering had not been sacrificed before the animals became intermingled, let him bring another animal as his guilt offering, and stipulate that if the guilt offering that was already slaughtered was his, this animal should be a peace offering. As we have heard that Rabbi Shimon said: Let him bring another animal and stipulate with regard to it.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says, with regard to a leper of uncertain status who must bring a guilt offering and a <i>log</i> of oil for his purification: The following day, on the eighth day of his purification, he brings his guilt offering and his <i>log</i> of oil with it, and the priest stands him at the Gate of Nicanor, and the leper stipulates with regard to the offering and says: If this person, i.e., I, was a leper, this is his guilt offering and this is his <i>log</i> of oil with it. And if not, this animal that I brought for a guilt offering shall be a voluntary peace offering, as the two offerings are sacrificed in the same manner.
  And that guilt offering of uncertain status requires
  
  Daf 70b
  
  that its slaughter must be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard, as in the case of a guilt offering, and it requires placement of the blood on the right thumb and right big toe and right earlobe of the leper, as described in Leviticus 14:14, and it requires placing hands on the head of the animal, and the accompanying wine libations and waving of the breast and thigh, like a peace offering. And it is eaten by males of the priesthood for one day and the following night, like a guilt offering, rather than for two days, like a peace offering.
  But the Rabbis did not concede to Rabbi Shimon, because they hold that he thereby brings sacrificial animals to a situation where the time that they may be eaten is restricted, thereby increasing the likelihood of disqualification, as it might be a peace offering, which may be eaten for two days and one night.
  The Gemara answers that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to one <i>halakha</i>, i.e., that it is not the guilt offering that fixes whether the leper must bring the offerings of a wealthy person or a destitute person, but he disagrees with him with regard to one other <i>halakha</i>, as he does not permit such a stipulation in the case of a guilt offering.
  The Gemara details the three matters of <i>aggada</i> that the sages of Alexandria asked Rabbi Yehoshua. One verse states: “For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dies, says the Lord God; but turn yourselves, and live” (Ezekiel 18:32). And one verse states, with regard to the sons of Eli the High Priest, who did not pay attention to the reproof of their father: “If one man sins against another, God shall judge him; but if a man sins against the Lord, who shall pray for him? But they did not listen to the voice of their father, because the Lord desired to kill them” (I Samuel 2:25). Rabbi Yehoshua replied to them: Here, the verse in Ezekiel is referring to a case where the sinners repent, whereas there, the verse in Samuel is speaking of a case where the sinners do not repent.
  The sages of Alexandria also asked the following: One verse states: “For the Lord your God, He is God of gods, and Lord of lords, the great God, the mighty, and the awful, Who shows no favor nor takes graft” (Deuteronomy 10:17), and one verse states: “The Lord shall show favor to you and give you peace” (Numbers 6:26). How can this contradiction be resolved? Rabbi Yehoshua replied to them: Here, the verse in Numbers is dealing with the time before one’s sentence is issued, when God shows favor and forgives; there, the verse in Deuteronomy is referring to after the sentence has been issued, when He no longer forgives.
  The sages of Alexandria further asked: One verse states: “For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His dwelling place” (Psalms 132:13), and one verse states: “For this city has been to Me a provocation of My anger and of My fury from the day that they built it until this day, so that I should remove it from before My face” (Jeremiah 32:31). Rabbi Yehoshua replied to them: Here, the verse in Psalms is referring to the time before Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter (see I Kings 3:1), whereas there, the verse in Jeremiah is speaking of the time after Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter.
  The Gemara lists the three matters of ignorance that the sages of Alexandria asked Rabbi Yehoshua. What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the wife of Lot, who was turned into a pillar of salt as she fled from the city of Sodom (Genesis 19:26), in terms of whether she transmits ritual impurity as a corpse? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: A corpse transmits ritual impurity, but a pillar of salt, even if it was formerly a person, does not impart ritual impurity.
  The sages of Alexandria also asked Rabbi Yehoshua: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the son of the Shunammite woman, who died and was brought to life by Elisha (II Kings 4:33–36), in terms of whether he transmits ritual impurity as a corpse? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: A corpse transmits ritual impurity, but a living person does not transmit ritual impurity, even if he had been dead temporarily.
  The sages of Alexandria also asked Rabbi Yehoshua: With regard to the dead who will be resurrected in the future, will they require sprinkling with ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh days, like one who is purified after coming into contact with a corpse, or will they not require that sprinkling? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: When they come to life, we will be clever for them and clarify the <i>halakha</i>. There are those who say that Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: When Moses our teacher comes with them, he will tell us the correct <i>halakha</i>.
  The sages of Alexandria also asked Rabbi Yehoshua three matters of behavior: What should a person do to become wise? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: He should increase his time spent sitting in the study house and minimize his dealings in merchandise. The sages of Alexandria said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Many people have done so, and it did not help them to acquire wisdom. Rabbi Yehoshua responded: Rather, they should pray for mercy to receive wisdom from the One to Whom wisdom belongs, as it is stated: “For the Lord gives wisdom; out of His mouth comes knowledge and discernment” (Proverbs 2:6).
  With regard to the subject of wisdom, Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who prepared a feast for his servants. The servants eat the food placed before them, but in addition he sends some of the food that is before him to those he loves. Similarly, God sends some of His wisdom to those He loves, as the verse states: “For the Lord gives wisdom.”
  The Gemara asks: Since the path to wisdom is through prayer, what is Rabbi Yehoshua teaching us when he says that one should increase his time spent sitting and studying? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehoshua is teaching that this, prayer, without that, sitting and learning, does not suffice.
  The sages of Alexandria asked: What should a person do to become wealthy? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: He should increase his time involved in merchandise and conduct his business faithfully. The sages of Alexandria said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Many people have done so, and it did not help them become rich. Rabbi Yehoshua replied: Rather, they should pray for mercy to receive wisdom from the One to Whom wealth belongs, as it is stated: “Mine is the silver, and Mine the gold, says the Lord of hosts” (Haggai 2:8).
  The Gemara asks: Since the path to wealth is through prayer, what is Rabbi Yehoshua teaching us when he says that one should increase his time spent involved in merchandise and conduct his business faithfully? Once again, the Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua is teaching that this, prayer, without that, being involved in honest business, does not suffice.
  The sages of Alexandria further asked: What should a person do to have male children? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: He should marry a woman who is fit for him
  
  Daf 71a
  
  and sanctify himself by acting modestly at the time of sexual intercourse.
  The sages of Alexandria said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Many people have done so, and it did not help them. Rabbi Yehoshua said: Rather, they should pray to receive sons from the One to Whom sons belong, as it is stated: “Behold, children are a heritage of the Lord; the fruit of the womb is a reward” (Psalms 127:3).
  The Gemara again asks: Since the path to sons is through prayer, what is Rabbi Yehoshua teaching us when he said that one should marry an appropriate woman and conduct himself with modesty during intercourse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua is teaching that this, prayer, without that, marrying an appropriate woman and being modest, does not suffice.
  With regard to the verse from Psalms, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: “The fruit of the womb is a reward” (Psalms 127:3)? What act is rewarded here? Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: In reward for men withholding their semen in their belly in order to allow their wives to emit seed first, the Holy One, Blessed be He, gives him the reward of the fruit of the womb, i.e., sons.
  § The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai say: The status of all women when they die is as though they were menstruating women. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Beit Shammai? If we say that their opinion is due to that which is written: “Then the queen was exceedingly distressed [<i>vatitḥalḥal</i>]” (Esther 4:4), this is difficult. The Gemara first explains the derivation. And Rav said: This teaches that she began to menstruate out of fear, as the cavities [<i>ḥalalim</i>] of her body opened. Here too, when a woman is about to die, due to the fear of the Angel of Death she sees blood. This is difficult, as didn’t we learn in a mishna (39a) that trepidation eliminates the flow of menstrual blood? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Anxiety generated by extended worry contracts the muscles and prevents the blood from flowing, but sudden fear relaxes the muscles and causes the blood to flow.
  But if the reason Beit Shammai hold that all women who die have the status of menstruating women is due to fear, then what about that which we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: Beit Shammai say: The status of all men when they die is as though they were <i>zavim</i>; and Beit Hillel say: Only a man who died with the impurity of a <i>zav</i> has the status of a <i>zav</i>. If the reason that Beit Shammai maintain that all women who die have the status of menstruating women is due to fear of the Angel of Death, presumably they also should consider all men who die to have the status of a <i>zav</i> for the same reason.
  But this is difficult, as I will apply here the principle stated with regard to a <i>zav</i>: “An issue out of his flesh” (Leviticus 15:2) renders a man impure, but not an issue due to circumstances beyond his control. If a man has a discharge of <i>ziva</i> due to an illness or some accident, he does not become impure. Consequently, if he has a discharge due to fear after seeing the Angel of Death, he would not become ritually impure.
  Rather, the reason for the opinion of Beit Shammai is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At first they would ritually immerse all the utensils that had been used by women who died while menstruating, which had thereby contracted ritual impurity even if the utensils did not touch the women after their death. And as a result, the living menstruating women were embarrassed, as they saw that the status of a menstruating woman is so severe that it remains even after death. The Sages therefore instituted that one must immerse the utensils which had been used by all dying women, due to the honor of living menstruating women.
  Similarly, at first they would immerse all the utensils that had been used by <i>zavin</i>, men suffering from gonorrhea, who died, as the utensils had thereby contracted ritual impurity even if the utensils did not touch the men after their death. And as a result, the living <i>zavin</i> were embarrassed. Therefore, the Sages instituted that one must immerse the utensils that had been used by all dying men, due to the honor of the living <i>zavin</i>.
  MISHNA: With regard to a woman who died, and after her death a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood emerged from her body, although the blood emerged after death, it transmits ritual impurity by touching and carrying, due to the impurity of the spot of blood of a menstruating woman. This impurity as blood of menstruation applies to any amount of blood she emits, despite the <i>halakha</i> that generally, the blood of a corpse transmits impurity only if it is at least a quarter-<i>log</i> in volume. And as it is a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood, it transmits impurity in a tent, as it is the blood of a corpse.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: That quarter-<i>log</i> of blood does not transmit impurity due to the impurity of the spot of blood of a menstruating woman, because that blood was displaced after she died. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of a woman who is sitting in childbirth on the travailing chair [<i>mashber</i>] and she died, and a quarter<i>-log</i> of blood emerged from her body, that this blood transmits ritual impurity due to the impurity of the spot of blood of a menstruating woman. In that case, the blood was displaced while she was still alive. Rabbi Yosei said: For that reason, that quarter-<i>log</i> of blood does not transmit impurity in a tent, as it did not come from a corpse.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yehuda a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood that emerges from a woman after death does not transmit impurity due to the impurity of a spot of blood of a menstruating woman, despite the fact that it came from the uterus. The Gemara raises a difficulty: By inference one might think that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that even though the blood was displaced after she died, it renders one ritually impure due to the impurity of a blood spot. This is not reasonable, as a dead woman cannot attain the status of a menstruating woman.
  Rabbi Ze’eiri said: Even the first <i>tanna</i> agrees that blood from the uterus which leaves the body after death does not impart impurity as a spot. Rather, the difference between the opinions of the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Yehuda is whether the place of a woman’s source, i.e., her uterus, is impure, and therefore any blood that passes through there is impure, even if it left her body after death. The first <i>tanna</i> maintains that even blood that appears after her death transmits impurity like the blood of menstruation, as it passed through the uterus when she was still alive, whereas Rabbi Yehuda holds that this blood does not transmit impurity as blood of menstruation, despite the fact that it passed through her uterus.
  § The mishna teaches: And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of a woman who was sitting in childbirth when she died, that the quarter-<i>log</i> of blood which emerged from her body transmits the ritual impurity of the spot of the blood of a menstruating woman. And Rabbi Yosei said: For that reason, that quarter-<i>log</i> of blood does not transmit impurity in a tent.
  The Gemara asks: By inference, one might conclude that the first <i>tanna</i>, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the blood which emerges from a woman who died during childbirth also transmits impurity in a tent. This cannot be correct, as the blood left her while she was still alive. Rav Yehuda said: The difference between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei is with regard to blood of submission discharged from a body at the time of death, which contains a mixture of blood that leaves a person when he is still alive and blood that emerges after his death. Rabbi Yehuda holds that the blood which emerges from a woman who dies during childbirth is blood of submission, which transmits impurity in a tent by rabbinic law. Rabbi Yosei maintains that it is clear that this blood emerged from her body before she died, and therefore it is not blood of submission.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is blood of submission, which imparts ritual impurity (see 62b)? Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yehuda, explained: The case is one of a person who was killed, from whom a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood emerged, a flow which began while he was alive and continued after his death, and it is uncertain whether a full quarter-<i>log</i> emerged while he was alive and therefore does not transmit ritual impurity, and it is uncertain whether it emerged out after his death, in which case it imparts ritual impurity by Torah law, and it is uncertain whether the quarter-<i>log</i> emerged partly while he was alive and partly after his death. That is blood of submission.
  And the Rabbis say that this is not blood of submission, but a case of uncertain ritual impurity by Torah law, as it might all have emerged after death. Therefore, one applies the principle that in a private domain a case of uncertainty is considered to be ritually impure, whereas in a public domain a case of uncertainty is considered to be ritually pure.
  Rather, what is blood of submission? The case is one of a person who has been killed from whom a quarter-<i>log</i> of blood emerged while he was alive and continued emerging after his death and has still not stopped coming out. It is clear that a full quarter-<i>log</i> did not emerge after his death, but it is uncertain whether the majority emerged while he was alive and the minority after his death, and equally uncertain whether the minority emerged while he was alive and the majority after his death. That is blood of submission.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of one who has been killed from whom a quarter<i>-log</i> of blood emerged, and he was lying in a bed and his blood was dripping into a hole in the ground, the blood in the ground is ritually impure, because the drop of death is mixed with it. And the Rabbis deem it ritually pure, because
  
  Daf 71b
  
  each first drop and every other first drop is separated from the other drops of blood, i.e., it did not flow in a steady stream. Since the blood initially emerged while he was alive and is pure, every drop of blood which emerged after his death is nullified when it falls into that blood, and therefore the entire puddle of blood is ritually pure. The Gemara asks: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yehuda; how does he respond to their claim? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he said: Blood does not nullify blood.
  Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who is crucified on wood, whose blood does not drip but runs down the wood to the earth, and a quarter<i>-log</i> of blood is found underneath him, the blood is ritually impure. Rabbi Yehuda deems the blood ritually pure. He explains his reasoning: As I say that the quarter-<i>log</i> of blood found underneath the body came out while he was still alive, and the drop of blood that came out after his death remains on the wood.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yehuda, let him say to himself with regard to one who was killed on a bed and his blood is dripping into a hole in the ground: As I say that all the blood found underneath the body emerged while he was still alive and the drop of blood that came out after his death remains on the bed. Why does Rabbi Yehuda deem the blood ritually impure in such a case? The Gemara answers: The case of the bed is different, as the blood seeps through the bed onto the floor, whereas in the case of one who is crucified some of the blood may remain on the tree.
  MISHNA: Initially the Sages would say, with regard to a woman who gave birth and observed the seven or fourteen days of impurity for a male or female child, respectively, and then immersed in a ritual bath and who is observing the period of the blood of purity, that she would pour water from a vessel in her hands to rinse the Paschal offering. Although it is permitted for such a woman to engage in intercourse with her husband, her halakhic status is like that of one who immersed that day and the sun has not yet set. She therefore assumes second-degree ritual impurity and confers third-degree ritual impurity upon <i>teruma</i> with which she comes into contact. Consequently, she may touch the vessel, as second-degree ritual impurity does not render a vessel impure. She may not touch the water, as it is designated for rinsing the Paschal offering and therefore it is treated with the sanctity of sacrificial food, which is rendered impure by second-degree ritual impurity.
  The Sages then said: Her status is like that of one who came into contact with one impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, i.e., one with first-degree ritual impurity, who renders consecrated items impure. But with regard to all non-sacred items, even non-sacred items treated with the sanctity of sacrificial food, such as the water used to rinse the Paschal offering, she has second-degree ritual impurity. Consequently, it is permitted for her to touch not only the vessel, but the water inside it as well, in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: The status of the woman is even like that of one who is impure due to contact with a corpse, who is a primary source of ritual impurity and renders even a non-sacred vessel impure.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: A woman who gave birth, observed the days of impurity, immersed in a ritual bath, and who is now observing the period of the blood of purity would pour water from a vessel in her hands to rinse the Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: Pouring from a vessel, yes, this is permitted, but she may not touch the water itself. Apparently, non-sacred produce, e.g., even liquid such as the water for rinsing the Paschal offering, that was prepared according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food, i.e., with the same stringencies as required for sacrificial food, is considered like sacrificial food.
  But now say the latter clause of the mishna: The Sages then said: Her status is like that of one who came into contact with one impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, i.e., one with first-degree ritual impurity, who renders consecrated items impure. This indicates that with regard to consecrated items, yes, she renders them impure, but with regard to non-sacred items, e.g., the water used to rinse the Paschal offering, she does not render them impure. Apparently, non-sacred produce that was prepared according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food is not considered like sacrificial food.
  The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the latter clause of the mishna? It is the opinion of Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Abba Shaul says: With regard to one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, he has the status of one who is impure with first-degree impurity with regard to sacrificial food, in that he renders two items of sacrificial food impure, and disqualifies one additional item. In other words, the first item of sacrificial food that he touches assumes the status of second-degree impurity. A second item that comes into contact with the first item assumes third-degree impurity. A third item that comes into contact with the second assumes fourth-degree impurity and is therefore disqualified from being eaten, but it does not impart impurity to other items.
  MISHNA: And Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel that a woman observing the days of purity partakes of second-tithe produce, as it is permitted for one who immersed that day to eat second-tithe produce. And she separates part of her dough as <i>ḥalla</i>, and she draws the vessel with the part of the dough that she separated near the rest of the dough, and she designates it with the name of <i>ḥalla</i>.
  And Beit Shammai further concede to Beit Hillel that if a drop from her saliva or from the blood of purity fell onto a loaf of <i>teruma</i>, the loaf is ritually pure, as any liquid discharged from the body of one who immersed that day is ritually pure.
  There is another dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to a woman who completed her days of purity. Beit Shammai say: Her immersion at the end of the days of impurity does not render it permitted for her to enter the Temple or to partake of <i>teruma</i>; rather, she requires immersion even at the conclusion of the days of purity. And Beit Hillel say: She does not require immersion at the conclusion of the days of purity to render it permitted for her to partake of <i>teruma</i>, as the immersion at the end of the days of impurity is sufficient.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel that the woman observing the days of purity partakes of second-tithe produce. The Gemara explains that the reason is as the Master said: When the period of ritual impurity of a <i>zav</i> or leper has been completed, and he immersed during the day and ascended from the ritual bath, he may partake of second tithe immediately.
  The mishna teaches: And she separates part of her dough as <i>ḥalla</i>. The Gemara explains that non-consecrated food that is untithed produce with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>, as it has not had <i>ḥalla</i> separated from it, e.g., this dough from which a piece has been set aside for the future separation of <i>ḥalla</i>, is not considered like <i>ḥalla</i>, and therefore is not rendered impure by the contact of a woman observing the days of purity.
  The mishna also teaches that she draws the vessel with the part of the dough that she separated near the rest of the dough. The Gemara explains that this is as the Master said: It is a mitzva to separate <i>teruma</i> from produce that is situated nearby the produce it comes to exempt, <i>ab initio</i>.
  The mishna states: And she designates it with the name of <i>ḥalla</i>. The Gemara explains that it is necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to teach this <i>halakha</i>, as it might enter your mind to say: Let us decree lest she comes to touch the <i>ḥalla</i> from the outside. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that there is no such decree.
  The mishna teaches: And Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel that if a drop from her saliva or from the blood of purity fell onto a loaf of <i>teruma</i>, that the loaf is ritually pure, as any liquid discharged from the body of one who immersed that day is ritually pure. The Gemara explains that the reason is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Tevul Yom</i> 2:1): The <i>halakha</i> with regard to liquids that emerge from one who immersed himself that day from his state of ritual impurity is like that of liquids that he touches. And both these and those, the liquids that emanated from him and the liquids that he touched, do not transmit ritual impurity. This is the <i>halakha</i> except for liquids that come from a <i>zav</i>, who is a primary source of ritual impurity.
  The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai say: Her immersion at the end of the days of impurity does not render her permitted; rather, she requires immersion even at the end of the days of purity. And Beit Hillel say: The immersion at the end of the days of impurity is sufficient. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between them, i.e., what is the basis of their dispute? Rav Ketina said: The difference between them is with regard to the status of one who immersed that day, i.e., at the end of his time of impurity, and a long time has passed since the immersion. Beit Shammai hold that as a long time has passed, i.e., thirty-three days after the birth of a boy or sixty-six days after the birth of a girl, she may not rely on that immersion. Beit Hillel maintain that she may still rely on that initial immersion.
  MISHNA: There is a dispute with regard to a woman who sees blood on the eleventh day, which is the final day of the period fit for the flow of a <i>zava</i>. It is permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband after observing one clean day corresponding to the one day that she saw blood, but in this case, she failed to observe one clean day. Rather, she immersed in a ritual bath that evening, the eve of the twelfth day, and then engaged in intercourse with her husband.
  Beit Shammai say: Since she did not observe that corresponding clean day, she retains the status of a <i>zava</i>. Therefore both she, the <i>zava</i>, and her husband, who engaged in intercourse with a <i>zava</i>, transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting, to the extent that these transmit impurity to food and drink that came in contact with them, and in her case, to people as well. And each of them is liable to bring a sin offering for participating in intercourse involving a <i>zava</i>.
  
  Daf 72a
  
  And Beit Hillel say: Although they transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting, they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. Since the twelfth day is unfit for the flow of a <i>zava</i>, and even if she were to experience bleeding on the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth days she would not become a greater <i>zava</i>, one who experiences bleeding on the eleventh does not need to observe a corresponding clean day.
  If the woman immersed on the day following the eleventh day and she engaged in intercourse with the man of her house, i.e., her husband, on that twelfth day and then saw blood, Beit Shammai say: They transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting by rabbinic law, as the Sages issued a decree of impurity in the case when the second day is the twelfth day, due to a case when the second day is within the eleven days fit for the flow of a <i>zava</i>. And they are exempt from bringing the sin offering, as she observed part of the twelfth day, and the bleeding she experienced after engaging in intercourse, which occurred during her period of menstruation, is not fit to be appended to the discharge of the <i>zava</i> on the eleventh day.
  And Beit Hillel say: That husband is a glutton, as he could not wait for the conclusion of the twelfth day before engaging in intercourse. Nevertheless, the Sages did not issue a decree of impurity. And Beit Hillel concede to Beit Shammai in a case where the woman sees blood in the midst of the eleven-day period, and she immersed in the evening and engaged in intercourse with her husband without observing a corresponding clean day, that they transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting. And each of them is liable to bring a sin offering for participating in intercourse involving a <i>zava</i>.
  If she saw blood in the midst of the eleven days and observed part of a corresponding clean day and immersed on the day following the day that she saw blood and engaged in intercourse with her husband, that is wayward conduct, as the possibility exists that she will experience bleeding after intercourse that will be appended to the bleeding of the previous day, rendering her a <i>zava</i> and disqualifying the immersion. And the status of ritually impure items with which they came into contact and the status of their intercourse is contingent upon whether she experiences bleeding on the day of her immersion, in which case the ritually pure items become impure and they are liable to bring a sin offering, or whether she does not experience bleeding that day, in which case the ritually pure items remain pure and the woman and man are exempt from bringing a sin offering.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree with regard to a woman who immersed at night to purify herself after having been a lesser <i>zava</i>, that it is not a valid immersion. And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel also agree with regard to a woman who sees blood in the midst of her eleven days of <i>ziva</i>, rendering her a lesser <i>zava</i> who must wait one clean day and immerse the day after, but she immersed in the first evening without waiting one clean day and engaged in intercourse with her husband, that she transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting that came in contact with the couple, and she and her husband are liable to bring a sin offering.
  They disagree only in the case of a woman who sees blood on the eleventh day of her days of <i>ziva</i>, and immersed that evening, and engaged in intercourse with her husband. As Beit Shammai say: They transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting and are liable to bring a sin offering, and Beit Hillel deem them exempt from bringing a sin offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: What the difference between the eleventh day itself and another day in the midst of the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>? If you equate the eleventh day to the other days with regard to ritual impurity, will you not equate it with regard to liability to bring an offering?
  Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: No, if you say that she is liable to bring an offering if she experiences bleeding in the midst of the eleven days, that is because the following day combines with it as a day of <i>ziva</i>. Will you say the same with regard to the eleventh day, when the following day does not combine with it as a day of <i>ziva</i>?
  Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: Apply your method equally. If you equate the two cases, bleeding on the eleventh day and bleeding on one of the other days of <i>ziva</i>, with regard to ritual impurity, equate them also with regard to liability to bring an offering. And if you do not equate them with regard to liability to bring an offering, do not equate them with regard to ritual impurity either.
  Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Even if we have brought a woman who experiences bleeding on the eleventh day and the man who engages in intercourse with her to ritual impurity, due to a decree to be stringent, so that people should not confuse one who experiences bleeding on the eleventh day with one who experiences bleeding during the other days with regard to ritual impurity, we will not bring them to the liability of bringing an offering, to be lenient. It would be a leniency to permit them to bring an unnecessary and therefore a non-sacred animal into the Temple courtyard.
  And furthermore, from your own statement you are refuted, as you say that if she immersed on the following day and engaged in intercourse, and afterward she saw blood, she transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting, but she is exempt from bringing the offering. You too should apply your method equally. If you equate a <i>zava</i> who immersed on the twelfth day with one who immersed on the night after the eleventh day with regard to ritual impurity, equate these cases also with regard to liability to bring an offering.
  And if you do not equate them with regard to liability to bring an offering, do not equate them with regard to ritual impurity either. Beit Hillel continued: Rather, you agree with us that the two are equated to be stringent, but not to be lenient. We say that here too, the two should be equated to be stringent but not to be lenient.
  § Rav Huna says, in further clarification of Beit Shammai’s opinion: If a woman experiences bleeding during the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> and must observe one clean day, but did not wait until the conclusion of that second day before immersing, with regard to her items designated for lying or sitting, on the second day, Beit Shammai render them impure by rabbinic law. This is the <i>halakha</i> even though she has immersed in a ritual bath and even though she did not see any blood after her immersion. What is the reason? Since if she would see blood she would render these surfaces ritually impure by Torah law, now too she renders them ritually impure by rabbinic law.
  Rav Yosef said: What is Rav Huna teaching us? We already learn in the mishna: If the woman immersed on the day following the eleventh day and she engaged in intercourse with the man of her house on that twelfth day and then saw blood, Beit Shammai say: They transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting by rabbinic law. And they are exempt from bringing the sin offering. Her impurity applies by rabbinic law, lest this case be confused with one where she experiences bleeding during the eleven days when she would be impure by Torah law. By inference, if she experienced bleeding on one of her eleven days and immersed on the following day, she would likewise render items designated for lying or sitting ritually impure by rabbinic law.
  Rav Kahana said: Rav Huna is teaching that Beit Shammai render her ritually impure even if she does not experience bleeding. Based on the mishna alone, one might have thought that the case where she saw blood is different, and it is only in this situation that Beit Shammai render her impure by rabbinic law.
  Rav Yosef said, in refutation of Rav Kahana’s claim: And if she saw blood on the twelfth day, what of it? A discharge of blood on the twelfth day is a sighting of a menstruating woman, which does not render her a <i>zava</i> by Torah law. Therefore, it is comparable to a case where she experienced bleeding on one day during her eleven days of <i>ziva</i> and immersed on the following day, and she does not experience bleeding on that following day at all.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This is what is difficult for Rav Kahana: Granted, in a case where she saw blood on the twelfth day, it stands to reason that we decree impurity with regard to a sighting of a menstruating woman due to a sighting of a <i>zava</i>. But in a case where she did not see any blood at all, for what reason should the Sages decree impurity upon her?
  Abaye continues: And furthermore, we learned in a mishna (<i>Zavim</i> 1:1): If a man sees one sighting of <i>ziva</i> (see 35b), Beit Shammai say: His status on the following day is like that of a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge. In other words, he must immerse and observe that day in purity, and if he touches tithes their status is suspended, since if he sees another discharge on that day, they are retroactively impure. And Beit Hillel say: His status is like that of a man who experiences a seminal emission, who is purified by his immersion, and therefore any tithes this man touches on the second day remain pure even if he later experiences a second discharge.
  
  Daf 72b
  
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one moves the discharge seen by a <i>zav</i> on the first day, Beit Shammai say: Due to the uncertainty, his status of ritual purity is contingent upon whether he sees another emission. If the <i>zav</i> sees a discharge a second time he will retroactively have been a full-fledged <i>zav</i> and his discharge renders one who moves it impure. But if he does not see another discharge he will remain like one who experienced a seminal emission, which means that his discharge does not render one who moves it impure. And Beit Hillel deem him pure. The discharge has the status of a seminal emission and does not transmit impurity to one who moves it.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to items designated for lying or sitting and their status between the first sighting and the second sighting, Beit Shammai say: Due to the uncertainty their status of ritual purity is contingent upon whether he sees another emission, and Beit Hillel deem them pure.
  Abaye explains Rav Kahana’s difficulty with Rav Huna’s opinion: It is taught in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> that if a man sees one sighting of <i>ziva</i>, Beit Shammai say: His status is like that of a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge. Apparently, according to the opinion of Beit Shammai the ritual purity status of a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge is contingent upon whether she experiences an emission of blood. This is difficult for Rav Huna, who explains that Beit Shammai hold that a woman who observes a clean day for each day of discharge is definitely impure, by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara answers that Rav Huna would explain: Do not say that his status is like that of a woman who observes a clean day for a day. Rather, say that he is like one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day after she has immersed. Rav Huna agrees that items designated for lying or sitting that this man sits or lies on is ritually impure only if she experiences bleeding before the end of the day.
  The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to him, a man who engages in intercourse with a woman who is observing a clean day for a day, that he does not transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting, and what is different with regard to her, that woman herself, that she does transmit impurity to items designated for lying or sitting?
  The Gemara explains: With regard to him, as he does not frequently see blood, the Sages did not issue a decree rendering him impure to such an extent, if the woman has not seen blood on the second day. Whereas with regard to her, as she does frequently see blood, the Sages did issue a decree rendering her definitely impure to this degree.
  The Gemara further inquires: And since a decree was applied to her, as she commonly sees blood, what is different with regard to items designated for lying or sitting, that she transmits impurity to them, and what is different with regard to the one who engages in intercourse with her, that she does not render him impure?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to items designated for lying or sitting, she renders them ritually impure because she frequently sits or lies on them, whereas with regard to one who engages in intercourse with her, which is not nearly as frequent, she does not render him ritually impure.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty with regard to Rav Huna’s opinion. We learned in the mishna: If she saw blood on the eleventh day and observed part of a corresponding clean day and immersed on the day following the day that she saw blood and engaged in intercourse with her husband, that is wayward conduct, as the possibility exists that she will experience bleeding after intercourse that will be appended to the bleeding of the previous day, rendering her a <i>zava</i> and disqualifying the immersion.
  The mishna adds: And the status of ritually impure items with which they came into contact and the status of their intercourse is contingent upon whether she experiences bleeding on the day of her immersion. The Gemara explains the difficulty. What, is it not correct to say that all, i.e., Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agree with this clause of the mishna? If so, Beit Shammai concur that this woman renders items impure only due to uncertainty. This is not in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna.
  The Gemara answers: No, this clause of the mishna is only in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda said to Beit Hillel: Do you call this type of behavior wayward conduct? But he intended only to engage in intercourse with a menstruating woman. The Gemara questions the meaning of Rabbi Yehuda’s statement. Can it enter your mind that he intended to engage in intercourse with a menstruating woman? The mishna and <i>baraita</i> are not referring to a man who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman.
  Rather, say that Rabbi Yehuda meant that this man intended only to engage in intercourse with a <i>zava</i>. The Gemara rejects this formulation as well: Can it enter your mind that Rabbi Yehuda said he intended to engage in intercourse with a <i>zava</i>? The mishna and <i>baraita</i> are not referring to a man who engages in intercourse with a <i>zava</i> either. Rather, say that Rabbi Yehuda meant that this man intended to engage in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge. This <i>baraita</i> indicates that the latter clause of the mishna is only according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, as Rabbi Yehuda directed his comments specifically to them.
  § The Gemara cites another discussion concerning a woman who experiences bleeding toward the end of her eleven days of <i>ziva</i>. It was stated with regard to a woman who experiences bleeding on the tenth day of her eleven days of <i>ziva</i>, that Rav Yoḥanan says: The tenth day is considered like the ninth, i.e., just as the ninth day requires the observance of a day clean from discharges on the following day, so too does the tenth day require observance of a day in case she experiences bleeding on the eleventh day.
  Reish Lakish says: The tenth day is considered like the eleventh day, as in such a case it is impossible for her to experience bleeding for the three consecutive days within the eleven days of <i>ziva</i>. Just as the eleventh day does not require the observance of a day clean from discharges, so too the tenth day does not require the observance of a day clean from discharges, since even if she experiences bleeding on both the eleventh and the twelfth days, the last of the three consecutive days was already the start of her days of menstruation, and therefore she does not become a greater <i>zava</i>.
  There are those who teach the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to this case: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to Rabbi Akiva: Even if you were to amplify and derive <i>halakhot</i> from the repeated terms “in oil,” “in oil,” stated with regard to the thanks offering (see Leviticus 7:12) for the entire day, I would not listen to you and accept your claim. Rather, the <i>halakha</i> that one-half of a <i>log</i> is the requisite amount of oil for the thanks offering, and the <i>halakha</i> that one-quarter of a <i>log</i> is the amount of wine for a nazirite, and the <i>halakha</i> that a woman who experiences an emission of blood during the eleven days that are between one period of menstruation and the next period of menstruation is a <i>zava</i>, each of these is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. None of the <i>halakhot</i> are derived from verses.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> mentioned here with regard to the eleven days between one period of menstruation and the next? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is referring to the <i>halakha</i> that distinguishes the first ten days from the eleventh day. Reish Lakish says: It is referring to two <i>halakhot</i> that distinguish the first ten days from the eleventh.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this is referring to the <i>halakha</i> which distinguishes the first ten days from the eleventh. It is the eleventh that does not require the observance of a day clean from discharges, but for the other ten days she must perform observance. And Reish Lakish says: It is referring to two <i>halakhot</i> that distinguish the first ten days from the eleventh. The eleventh day does not require observance, and it does not serve as a day of observance for the tenth day, i.e., the tenth day also does not require observance. The tenth day does not require observing since day eleven is excluded from being a day of observation for the previous day.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s claim that the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Are these <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? Not so; rather, these are derived from verses. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that one who sees blood for three consecutive days at the beginning of the days of menstruation will be a <i>zava</i> and is required to count seven clean days and to bring an offering afterward (see Leviticus 15:28–30).
  And if so, how do I realize the meaning of the verse: “And if a woman has a flow, and her flow on her flesh be blood, she shall be in her impurity seven days; and whoever touches her shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:19)? This is referring to one who sees blood on only one day. But perhaps one who sees blood for three days at the beginning of her days of menstruation should become a <i>zava</i>? The verse states:
  
  Daf 73a
  
  “And if a woman has a discharge of her <i>ziva</i> blood for many days not in the time of her menstruation, or if she has a discharge beyond the time of her menstruation, all the days of the issue of her <i>ziva</i> she shall be as in the days of her menstruation: She is impure” (Leviticus 15:25). This verse teaches that a woman becomes a <i>zava</i> only if she experiences bleeding close to her days of menstruation, i.e., on the day following her days of menstruation, but not during her days of menstruation.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And I have derived only that she is a <i>zava</i> in a case where she experiences bleeding close to her time of menstruation. From where do I derive that if she experiences bleeding one day separated from her days of menstruation she is also a <i>zava</i>? The verse states: “Or if she has a discharge beyond the time of her menstruation” (Leviticus 15:25).
  The <i>baraita</i> further states: I have derived only that she is a <i>zava</i> in a case where she experiences bleeding one day away from her time of menstruation. From where is it derived to include a case when she experiences bleeding two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten days separated from her days of menstruation that she is also a <i>zava</i>? From where is this derived?
  You say as follows: Just as we find with regard to a woman who experiences bleeding on the fourth day of her days of <i>ziva</i>, that it is fit for counting, i.e., if she experiences bleeding for the first time on that day she must count one clean day for the one day that she experienced bleeding, and it is fit for <i>ziva</i>, i.e., if it is the last of three consecutive days of sightings that she becomes a greater <i>zava</i>, so too I will bring and include the tenth day, as it is fit for counting if she experiences bleeding for the first time on that day, and fit for <i>ziva</i> if she experiences bleeding for the third consecutive day on the tenth day.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And from where is it derived to include a case where she experiences bleeding on the eleventh day after her days of menstruation? The verse states: “Not in the time of her menstruation” (Leviticus 15:25). One might have thought that I include even the twelfth day after her period of menstruation. You must say: No, as that is no longer within her days of <i>ziva</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> further states: And what did you see to include the eleventh day and to exclude the twelfth day? I include the eleventh day as it is fit for counting the seven clean days that follow sightings on three consecutive days which ended on the fourth day, as derived from the verse: “Or if she has a discharge beyond the time of her menstruation” (Leviticus 15:25), as explained; and I exclude the twelfth day as it is not fit for counting the seven clean days after the fourth day, a requirement derived from the same verse: “Or if she has a discharge beyond the time of her menstruation.”
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And I have derived only that a woman is impure as a <i>zava</i> if she experiences bleeding for three consecutive days. From where do I derive that she is impure if she experiences bleeding for two consecutive days? The continuation of the verse states: “All the days of the issue of her <i>ziva</i> she shall be as in the days of her menstruation: She is impure” (Leviticus 15:25). The plural “days” indicates two days. From where is it derived that she is impure if she experiences bleeding on only one day? The verse states: “All the days of the issue of her <i>ziva</i> she shall be as in the days of her menstruation: She is impure.”
  The <i>baraita</i> further explains that the word “impure” in that verse teaches that a <i>zava</i> renders one who engages in intercourse with her impure, just like a menstruating woman does. The term: “She is impure,” indicates that she, a <i>zava</i>, renders a man who engages in intercourse with her impure, but a <i>zav</i> does not render a woman whom he engages in intercourse with ritually impure.
  One might have thought that one who engages in intercourse with a <i>zav</i> has the same status as one who engages in intercourse with a <i>zava</i>. Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? And if a <i>zava</i>, who does not become impure through three sightings like she becomes impure if she experiences bleeding for three consecutive days, and yet she renders a man who engages in intercourse with her impure, then with regard to a <i>zav</i>, who becomes impure through three sightings even on a single day like he becomes impure by seeing a discharge for three consecutive days, isn’t it logical that he should render a women whom he engages in intercourse with ritually impure? Therefore, the verse states: “She shall be impure.” This teaches that a <i>zava</i> renders a man who engages in intercourse with her impure, but a <i>zav</i> does not render a woman whom he engages in intercourse with ritually impure.
  And from where is it derived that a <i>zava</i> transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting? The verse states: “Every bed which she lies on all the days of her discharge shall be for her like the bed of her menstruation; and everything that she sits on shall be impure, as the impurity of her menstruation” (Leviticus 15:26).
  And I have derived only that she transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting if she experiences bleeding for three consecutive days and is a greater <i>zava</i>. From where do I derive that she transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting if she experiences bleeding for two consecutive days and is only a lesser <i>zava</i>? The verse states “days.” And from where do I derive that she transmits impurity to items designated for lying or sitting even if she experiences bleeding on only one day? The verse states: “All the days of her discharge.”
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And from where is it derived that she counts one clean day for experiencing bleeding on one day? The verse states: “All the days of her discharge shall be for her.” One might have thought that she must count seven clean days for experiencing bleeding on two consecutive days. And this is a logical inference: Just as a <i>zav</i>, who does not count one clean day if he sees a discharge on one day, nevertheless must count seven clean days if he sees a discharge on two days, then with regard to a <i>zava</i>, who counts one clean day if she experiences bleeding on one day, isn’t it logical that she should count seven clean days if she experiences bleeding on two consecutive days? The verse states: “All the days of her discharge shall be for her,” which teaches that she counts only her one day even if she experiences bleeding for two consecutive days.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty from this <i>baraita</i>: Evidently, the <i>halakhot</i> of the eleven days of <i>ziva</i> are derived from verses and are not a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva these <i>halakhot</i> are derived from verses. According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya they are a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  With regard to the verse discussing the days of <i>ziva</i>, Rav Shemaya said to Rabbi Abba: But one can say that if she experiences bleeding during the daytime she shall be a <i>zava</i>, but if she experiences bleeding at night she shall be a menstruating woman, as the verse specifies “days.” Rabbi Abba said to him: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “Beyond the time of her menstruation” (Leviticus 15:25), which teaches that she becomes a <i>zava</i> if she experiences bleeding close to her days of menstruation. When is the time close to her days of menstruation? At night. And with regard to an emission during this time the verse calls her a <i>zava</i>.
  The Gemara concludes the tractate with a general statement with regard to Torah study. The school of Elijah taught: Anyone who studies <i>halakhot</i> every day is guaranteed that he is destined for the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “His ways [<i>halikhot</i>] are eternal” (Habakkuk 3:6). Do not read the verse as <i>halikhot</i>; rather, read it as <i>halakhot</i>. The verse indicates that the study of <i>halakhot</i> brings one to eternal life in the future world.
  