meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Moed/Shabbat/English/merged.txt"}
text: Shabbat
  שבת
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -William Davidson Edition - English
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  -Sefaria Community Translation
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  Shabbat
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNA: The acts of carrying out from a public domain into a private domain or vice versa, which are prohibited on Shabbat, are primarily two basic actions that comprise four cases from the perspective of a person inside a private domain, and two basic actions that comprise four cases from the perspective of a person outside, in a public domain.
  The mishna elaborates: How do these eight cases take place? In order to answer that question, the mishna cites cases involving a poor person and a homeowner.
  The poor person stands outside, in the public domain, and the homeowner stands inside, in the private domain. The poor person lifted an object in the public domain, extended his hand into the private domain, and placed the object into the hand of the homeowner. In that case, the poor person performed the prohibited labor of carrying from the public domain into the private domain in its entirety. Or, the poor person reached his hand into the private domain, took an item from the hand of the homeowner, and carried it out into the public domain. In that case, the poor person performed the prohibited labor of carrying out from the private domain into the public domain in its entirety. In both of these cases, because the poor person performed the prohibited labor in its entirety, he is liable and the homeowner is exempt.
  The mishna cites two additional cases. In these, the prohibited labor is performed by the homeowner, who is in the private domain: The homeowner lifted an item in the private domain, extended his hand into the public domain, and placed the object into the hand of the poor person. In that case, the homeowner performed the labor of carrying out from the private domain into the public domain in its entirety. Or, the homeowner reached his hand into the public domain, took an object from the hand of the poor person, and carried it into the private domain. In that case, the homeowner performed the labor of carrying from the public domain into the private domain in its entirety. In both of those cases, because the homeowner performed the prohibited labor in its entirety, he is liable and the poor person is exempt.
  There are four additional cases where neither the homeowner nor the poor person performed the labor in its entirety, and therefore neither is liable: The poor person extended his hand into the private domain and either the homeowner took an object from his hand and placed it in the private domain or the homeowner placed an object into the hand of the poor person, and the poor person carried the object out into the public domain. In those cases and the two that follow, the act of transferring the object from one domain to another was performed jointly by two people, the poor person and the homeowner. Because each performed only part of the prohibited labor, both of them are exempt.
  So too, in a case where the homeowner extended his hand into the public domain and, either the poor person took an object from the homeowner’s hand and placed it in the public domain or the poor person placed an object into the homeowner’s hand and the homeowner carried the object into the private domain. Because each performed only part of the prohibited labor, both of them are exempt.
  GEMARA: We learned in our mishna: The acts of carrying out on Shabbat are two that comprise four. Similarly, we learned in the mishna there, in tractate <i>Shevuot</i>: Oaths on a statement, which, when violated, render one liable to bring a sin-offering are two that comprise four. The first two cases, which are mentioned explicitly in the Torah, are: One who swore that he would perform a specific action in the future and one who swore to refrain from performing said action. Based on an amplification in the language of the Torah, two more cases are added: One who swore that he performed a specific action in the past and one who swore that he did not perform said action.
  
  Daf 2b
  
  Similarly, with regard to awareness of ritual impurity, there are two cases that comprise four. It is prohibited for one who is ritually impure to enter the Temple or to consume a consecrated item. However, one who unwittingly violates this serious prohibition is obligated to bring a sacrifice for his transgression only if he was clearly aware of his ritually impure status both before committing the transgression and thereafter. The two cases of unwitting transgression in this area are: One who was aware and then forgot that he is ritually impure, and then either ate consecrated meat or entered the Temple, and subsequently recalled that he was ritually impure. Two additional cases are: One who was aware of his ritually impure status but was unaware that the food he was about to eat was consecrated and ate it, or he was unaware that he was about to enter the Temple and entered it.
  Signs of affliction by leprosy are two that comprise four. The Torah (Leviticus 13) mentions two types of signs of affliction with regard to leprosy, <i>baheret</i> and <i>se’et</i>. Two additional, secondary signs of affliction were added. They are not as white as those delineated in the Torah. Consequently, there are derivatives of both <i>baheret</i> and <i>se’et</i>.
  The mishna in <i>Shevuot</i> also mentions that the acts of carrying out on Shabbat are two basic actions that comprise four.
  The Gemara asks: What is different here that our mishna teaches: Two that comprise four inside and two that comprise four outside, and what is different there, in tractate <i>Shevuot</i>, that the mishna teaches with regard to transfers on Shabbat: Two that comprise four, and nothing more?
  The Gemara answers: Here, in tractate <i>Shabbat</i>, which contains the primary discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, the mishna teaches the primary categories of labor that are prohibited on Shabbat, including carrying out from the private to the public domain, and it teaches the subcategories of labor that are prohibited on Shabbat, including carrying from the public into the private domain. But there, in tractate <i>Shevuot</i>, which does not contain the primary discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, the mishna teaches the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat but does not teach the subcategories of labor.
  The Gemara asks: What are the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. However, the Gemara objects: The acts of carrying out are only two in number: There is the case of the homeowner who takes an object out of the private domain and places it in the hand of the poor person in the public domain and the case of a poor person who takes an object from the homeowner’s hand in the private domain and takes it out into the public domain. What are the two additional cases referred to by the phrase: Two that comprise four, in tractate <i>Shevuot</i>?
  And if you say that the mishna in tractate <i>Shevuot</i> enumerates all four cases of carrying out, among them those for which there is liability and among them those for which there is exemption, including those mentioned in the second half of our mishna in which each individual performs only half of the prohibited labor, that is not feasible. The mishna in <i>Shevuot</i> teaches the prohibition of carrying out on Shabbat parallel to the signs of affliction by leprosy. Just as there, with regard to leprosy, all four of them are cases for which there is liability, so too, here, with regard to Shabbat, all four of them are cases for which there is liability.
  Rather, Rav Pappa said that the difference between the manner in which the <i>halakha</i> is cited in tractates <i>Shevuot</i> and <i>Shabbat</i> must be understood as follows: Here, where it contains the primary discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, the mishna teaches both cases of liability and cases of exemption, meaning cases of carrying out for which one is liable by Torah law as well as those for which one is exempt by Torah law. However, there, where it does not contain the primary discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, the mishna teaches cases of liability but does not teach cases of exemption.
  The Gemara asks: What are the cases of liability? They are acts of carrying out from the private domain to the public domain. The Gemara objects on the grounds that there are only two acts of carrying out: Carrying out while standing inside and carrying out while standing outside. What is the meaning of the phrase in <i>Shevuot</i>: Which comprise four? The Gemara answers: It is possible to arrive at a total of four. Cases of carrying in from the public domain to the private domain are also enumerated in tractate <i>Shevuot</i>. Consequently, there are two cases of carrying out and two cases of carrying in.
  The Gemara objects: In <i>Shevuot</i>, the phrase: Acts of carrying out, is taught in the mishna, not acts of carrying in. Rav Ashi said: The <i>tanna</i> in <i>Shevuot</i> also refers to carrying in as carrying out.
  From where do I know this? From that which we learned in a mishna: One who carries out an object from one domain to another is liable. Are we not also dealing with a case where he is carrying it in from the public domain to the private domain, and nevertheless the mishna characterizes it as carrying out?
  And what is the reason that the term carrying out is used to refer to an act of carrying in? The <i>tanna</i> characterizes any act that involves lifting of an object from its place and transferring it to another domain as carrying out. Carrying out does not refer only to carrying an object out from one’s house. Rather, it is a general depiction of moving an object from the domain in which it is located into another domain.
  Ravina said: Our mishna is also precise, and its language leads us to the same conclusion, as the expression: Acts of carrying out on Shabbat, was taught in our mishna, yet immediately a case of carrying in is articulated. The first case listed in our mishna involves the poor person placing an object into the hand of the homeowner, which is a case of carrying in from the public to the private domain. The Gemara notes: Indeed, conclude from this that the term carrying out also refers to carrying in.
  Rava said: The language of the <i>mishnayot</i> poses no difficulty. The <i>tanna</i> in both of these <i>mishnayot</i> did not teach: Acts of carrying out on Shabbat. Rather, he taught: Domains of Shabbat. The correct version of the mishna is: The domains of Shabbat are two that comprise four, and, according to this <i>tanna</i>, there are four instances of prohibited labor in these two domains, inside and outside.
  Rav Mattana said to Abaye: The mishna speaks of two that comprise four inside and two that comprise four outside, for a total of eight. Yet there is a difficulty: Are these eight cases? They are twelve. Upon closer inspection, in the four cases in the latter part of the mishna, the homeowner and the poor person each performs an individual action contributing to the overall prohibited labor of carrying in or carrying out. Consequently, there are four actions in the first part of the mishna and eight actions in the second part.
  Abaye responded: According to your reasoning, they are sixteen actions, as even in the first part of our mishna, the one who receives the object and the one who places the object each participates in the performance of a prohibited action. Therefore, there are a total of sixteen actions.
  Rav Mattana said to Abaye: That is not difficult, as granted,
  
  Daf 3a
  
  the first section of the mishna speaks of cases in which the one performing the actions is exempt from punishment by Torah law, and even by rabbinic law he is <i>ab initio</i> permitted to perform those actions. When the poor person or homeowner neither lifted nor placed the object, i.e., the object was placed into or removed from their hands by others, their role is insignificant. Therefore, it was not taught in the mishna, and those cases were not factored into the total number of acts of carrying from domain to domain. However, with regard to the latter section of the mishna, where the person performing those actions is exempt by Torah law, but his actions are prohibited by rabbinic law, it is difficult. Since the Sages prohibited those actions, they should be included in the total in the mishna, which should be twelve, not eight.
  Incidentally, the Gemara wonders: Is there, in all the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, an act for which the mishna deems one exempt and the act is permitted? Didn’t Shmuel say: With regard to all exempt rulings in the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, although one who performs the action is exempt by Torah law, his action is prohibited by rabbinic law. This applies to all cases except for these three cases for which one is exempt and he is permitted to perform the action: Trapping a deer, where he does not actually trap it, rather he sits in the entrance of a house that a deer had previously entered on its own, preventing its exit; and trapping a poisonous snake because of the danger that it poses; and one who drains an abscess, meaning one who lances the boil of pus and drains the liquid from it. If so, the cases in the first section of our mishna, where the ruling is exempt, must be understood as exempt but prohibited.
  The Gemara answers: In these cases, too, the ruling is: Exempt and permitted. When, though, was it necessary for Shmuel to cite specific cases as exempt and permitted? It was necessary in exempt cases where he performs a defined action. However, there are many exempt cases where he does not perform an action, which are completely permitted.
  The Gemara returns to Rav Mattana’s question: In any case, there are twelve actions that should have been enumerated in the mishna. The Gemara answers: The mishna took into consideration cases of exempt acts where the one who performed them could come, through their performance, to incur liability to bring a sin-offering. The mishna did not take into consideration cases of exempt acts where the one who performed them could not come, through their performance, to incur liability to bring a sin-offering. Here, only the instances where one lifts an object from its place are taken into consideration. Having lifted an object, if he continued, he could potentially incur liability to bring a sin-offering. Under no circumstances can one who merely places an object come to violate a more serious prohibition.
  The Gemara asks about the mishna itself: In the latter section of the mishna, instances in which they are both exempt are enumerated. However, wasn’t a prohibited labor performed between the two of them? Since together they performed an act prohibited by a severe Torah prohibition, how is it possible that their partnership will result in both being exempt? The Gemara answers that it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: It is written: “And if one soul sins unwittingly from the people of the land when he does it, one of the laws of God that should not be done and he is responsible” (Leviticus 4:27). The verse’s emphasis on the words “when he does it” means: One who does all of it, i.e., the entire transgression, is liable and not one who does part of it. Therefore, an individual, and he performed an action in its entirety, is liable. However, two people, and they performed an action together, are not liable, as each one performed only part of the action. The Gemara comments: It was also stated in support of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said: Amidst a discussion of these matters, it emanated from the group of Sages and they said: From the verse’s emphasis on “when he does it” it is derived: An individual who performed it is liable. However, two who performed it are not liable.
  Rav raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: One whom another person loaded with food and drink on his back in the private domain on Shabbat, and he carried them out while they were still on his back, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the prohibition of carrying out on Shabbat? Clearly, one who lifts an object with his hand in the private domain, and carries it out into the public domain is liable, as he performed the complete act of carrying out. However, in the case of one who is laden with an object; is moving his body from its place in the private domain considered like lifting the object itself from its place? In that case, he would be liable. Or, perhaps it is not considered like lifting the object from its place, and therefore he would not be liable. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He is liable, and it is not similar to the <i>halakha</i> of one who had an object placed in his hand and carried it out to the public domain, with regard to which we learned in the mishna that he is not liable by Torah law. What is the reason for the distinction between these two apparently similar cases? His body is at rest, in a defined place. However, his hand is not at rest. Since a hand is not generally fixed in one place, moving it and even transferring it to a different domain without a bona fide act of lifting is not considered lifting. However, the body is generally fixed in one place. Moving it from its place is considered lifting in terms of Shabbat, and he is liable for doing so.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav, his sister’s son: Son of great men, didn’t I tell you that when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is involved in this tractate do not ask him questions in another tractate, as perhaps it will not be on his mind and he will be unable to answer? The dilemma that Rav asked was not related to the subject matter of the tractate which they were studying. As, had it not been for the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is a great man, you would have shamed him, as he would have been forced to give you an answer that is not an appropriate answer.
  Now, he was involved in another tractate. Nevertheless, he answered you well, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who was laden with food and drink while it was still day, before Shabbat began, and, consequently, did not perform the act of lifting on Shabbat, and he carried them out into the public domain after dark on Shabbat is liable. Since, as a rule, his body is fixed in one place, moving it is considered like lifting an object, and he is liable. It is not similar to lifting his hand and moving it from place to place. Since his hand is not fixed in one place, moving it is not considered lifting.
  Abaye said: It is obvious to me that the hand of a person in and of itself, when he moves it out of the domain where he is located, is considered to be neither like the public domain nor like the private domain, even if it is the hand of someone standing in one of those domains. Proof that the hand is not considered like the public domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the poor person. As we learned with regard to the poor person who brought his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the public domain into the private domain and the homeowner took the object from his hand; the homeowner is not liable. Apparently, the hand of the poor person is not considered part of the public domain, even though he himself is located in the public domain. Proof that it is not considered like the private domain can be derived from the ruling of the mishna with regard to the hand of the homeowner. As we learned with regard to the homeowner who moved his hand carrying an object that he lifted from the private domain into the public domain and the poor person took the object from his hand; the poor person is not liable for carrying out from a private domain.
  However, Abaye raised a dilemma: What is the ruling with regard to the hand of a person with an object in it, when that person reached his hand into a different domain? Does it assume <i>karmelit</i> status? A <i>karmelit</i> is an intermediate domain established by the Sages that is neither a private nor a public domain. This dilemma is based on the fact that his hand left one domain and did not yet enter a second domain. In terms of practical <i>halakha</i>, the two sides of this dilemma are: Did the Sages penalize him and issue a rabbinic decree prohibiting him from bringing his hand with the object back to the domain where he is standing or not?
  The Gemara says: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which we learned elsewhere, with regard to the question: What must one in the private domain do in a case where his hand was filled with fruits and he extended it outside, into the public domain? It was taught in one <i>baraita</i> that it is prohibited for him to bring it back into his house, and it was taught in another <i>baraita</i> that it is permitted for him to bring it back. Is it not with regard to this that they disagree; that the Sage in one <i>baraita</i> holds that his hand is like a <i>karmelit</i>, and the Sage in the other <i>baraita</i> holds that it is not like a <i>karmelit</i>?
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, everyone agrees that it is like a <i>karmelit,</i> and yet, this is not difficult, as the difference between the <i>baraitot</i> can be explained in the following manner: Here, the <i>baraita</i> prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height below ten handbreadths off the ground, within the airspace of the public domain. And there, the <i>baraita</i> permitting him to bring his hand back, is referring to a case where he took it out at a height above ten handbreadths off the ground, outside the airspace of the public domain. Consequently, the object is considered to be neither in the public domain nor in a <i>karmelit</i>.
  And if you wish, say instead that this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are both referring to a case where he took his hand out to the public domain at a height below ten handbreadths, and his hand is not considered a <i>karmelit</i>. And yet, this is not difficult. As here, the <i>baraita</i> permitting him to bring it back, is referring to a case where he took it out while it was still day on Shabbat eve. Since he extended his hand before Shabbat and, in doing so, did nothing wrong, the Sages did not penalize him and permitted him to bring his hand back on Shabbat itself. However, there, the <i>baraita</i> prohibiting him from bringing it back, is referring to a case where he took it out after dark, and Shabbat had already begun. Since there is an element of prohibition involved, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.
  The Gemara comments that this explanation is difficult. On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. In the case where he extended his hand while it was still day, when even were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would not incur liability to bring a sin-offering because the object was lifted from its place on a weekday, let the Sages penalize him. However, in the case where he extended his hand after dark, where were he to throw the object from his hand into the public domain, he would thereby incur liability to bring a sin-offering, let the Sages not penalize him. Were the Sages to penalize him by prohibiting him from bringing his hand back, he is liable to drop the object in the public domain, and by doing so he would violate a Torah prohibition.
  And from the fact that we did not explain it that way, but preferred the contrary distinction, resolve the dilemma raised by Rav Beivai bar Abaye, whose dilemma is predicated on the same fundamental issue. As Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised the dilemma: One who unwittingly stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, as bread was baked by sticking the dough to the sides of a heated oven, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it from the oven before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so? Removing the bread is also prohibited on Shabbat. However, its prohibition is only by rabbinic law. The fundamental dilemma is: May one violate a rabbinical prohibition in order to avoid violating a Torah prohibition or not?
  Based on the above, resolve that the Sages did not permit one to do so. In resolving Abaye’s dilemma, the concern that one would likely throw the object from his hand, and thereby violate a Torah prohibition, was not taken into consideration. The one who extended his hand into the public domain was penalized by the Sages and prohibited to bring his hand back. Here too, resolve the dilemma and say that he may not remove the bread, even though he will thereby violate a Torah prohibition. The dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, which was thought to be unresolved, is thereby resolved. As a result, there is room for uncertainty whether or not the resolution of the previous dilemma, through which Rav Beivai’s dilemma would also be resolved, is valid. The Gemara rejects this difficulty: That is not difficult. It is possible that even though a resolution had not been previously found for the dilemma of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, that does not mean that it cannot be resolved And, indeed, as proof can be brought from the resolution of the other dilemma, resolve this dilemma as well.
  And if you wish, say instead: Actually, do not resolve the dilemma, but, nevertheless, resolve the contradiction between the <i>baraitot</i> in the following manner. Here, the <i>baraita</i> that taught that it is permitted to bring one’s hand back is referring to a case where he extended it unwittingly. There, the <i>baraita</i> that taught that it is prohibited for one to bring it back is referring to a case where he took it out intentionally. When he took it out unwittingly, the Sages did not penalize him. When he took it out intentionally, the Sages penalized him and prohibited him from bringing it back.
  And if you wish, say instead, in order to resolve the contradiction that this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are both referring to a case where he took his hand out unwittingly. And here they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? The Sage who prohibits him from bringing his hand back holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, even though he took his hand out unwittingly, they penalized him and prohibited him from bringing the object back so that he would not come to do so intentionally. The Sage who permits him to bring it back holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. Therefore, they did not prohibit him from bringing it back.
  And if you wish, say instead that, actually, they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender, and still, this is not difficult, and there is no contradiction. Here, the <i>baraita</i> that permits bringing it back, is referring to bringing it back to the same courtyard where he is standing.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  There, the <i>baraita</i> that prohibits returning the object, is referring to bringing it to a different courtyard, as Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: One who was standing in a courtyard on Shabbat, and his hand was filled with fruits, and he extended it outside into the public domain, what is the ruling with regard to whether or not he is allowed to bring it back into the same courtyard where he is standing? Rav Naḥman said to him: It is permitted. And he asked him further: What is the ruling with regard to bringing it from the public domain to a different courtyard? He said to him: It is prohibited.
  Rava asked about this: And in what way is one case different from the other? By definition, both courtyards are private domains, and there is no apparent halakhic difference between them in terms of Shabbat. Rav Naḥman answered jokingly: When you eat a <i>kor</i> of salt while thinking it over, you will know the answer. Actually, the answer is simple: There, the <i>baraita</i> that taught that it is permitted to bring it back to the same courtyard, said so because his planned objective was not realized. Since he sought to take an object out of his courtyard, requiring him to bring the object back to its original place is a penalty of sorts. However, here, the <i>baraita</i> that taught that it is prohibited to bring it back to a different courtyard, said so because his planned objective was realized. Therefore, it is prohibited to bring it back there.
  Since Rav Beivai bar Abaye’s dilemma was mentioned in passing, the Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself. Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised a dilemma: One who erred and stuck bread in the oven on Shabbat, did they permit him to override a rabbinic prohibition and remove it before it bakes, i.e., before he incurs liability to bring a sin-offering for baking bread on Shabbat, or did they not permit him to do so?
  Rav Aḥa bar Abaye said to Ravina: What are the circumstances? If you say that he stuck the bread to the oven unwittingly and did not remember either that today was Shabbat or that it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat, to whom did they permit to remove it? If he remains unaware that a prohibition is involved, it will not occur to him to ask whether or not he is permitted to remove the bread before it bakes.
  But rather, is it not a case where he then, before it baked, remembered that it is prohibited? In that case, is he liable to bring a sin-offering? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: All those who sin unwittingly and are therefore liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action was unwitting and the end of their action was unwitting. This means that throughout the entire action until its completion, the person remains unaware that his action is prohibited. Consequently, in our case, since he became aware that his action is prohibited while the bread was still baking, his very awareness exempts him from a sin-offering and removing the bread is no longer necessary to prevent him from incurring liability to bring a sin-offering.
  Rather, say that that person stuck the bread in the oven intentionally, but afterward regrets having done so and does not want to violate the prohibition. However, if that is the case, the formulation of the dilemma is inaccurate. It should have said: Before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning. One who desecrates Shabbat intentionally is liable to be stoned, he is not merely liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Sheila said: Actually, it is referring to a case where he did so unwittingly, and the dilemma whether or not they permitted removing the bread is not with regard to the person who stuck it in the oven, as he remains unaware of his transgression. Rather, with regard to whom is Rav Beivai raising a dilemma whether or not the Sages permitted him to remove the bread? It is with regard to others who wish to spare the unwitting sinner from violating a Torah prohibition.
  Rav Sheshet strongly objected to this. And does one tell another person: Sin so that another will benefit? Permitting one to violate a prohibition, even one prohibited by rabbinic law, in order to help another perform a mitzva is inconceivable. The same is true with regard to preventing another from violating a more severe prohibition.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: Actually, it is referring to a case where he stuck the bread in the oven intentionally. And say, emend the text as follows: Before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning. Indeed, Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, would teach it explicitly in that manner; not as a dilemma, but rather, as a halakhic ruling. According to his version, Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: With regard to one who stuck bread in an oven on Shabbat eve, the Sages permitted him to remove it from the oven on Shabbat before he comes to violate a prohibition punishable by stoning.
  We learned in the mishna several examples where the poor person extended his hand: One, when he placed an object into the hand of the homeowner and one, when he took an object from the hand of the homeowner. In those cases, we learned that he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? Don’t we require that halakhic lifting and placing be performed from and onto the surface of an area that is four by four handbreadths? A smaller area is not considered a defined place, and it is as if the object were not there at all; and a person’s hand is not that size. Why, then, is he liable?
  Rabba said: Whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva who said that we do not require a place of four by four handbreadths. According to his opinion, even a smaller area is considered a significant place in terms of carrying out on Shabbat. As we learned in a mishna: One who throws an object from the private domain to the other private domain and there is the public domain in the middle, Rabbi Akiva deems him liable for carrying out into the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt because the object merely passed through the public domain and did not come to rest in it.
  This dispute can be explained as follows: Rabbi Akiva holds that we say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. In his opinion, an object that passed, even briefly, through the airspace of the public domain is considered as if it came to rest in that domain. Therefore, one who threw the object has, for all intents and purposes, lifted the object from the private domain and placed it in the public domain, and he is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. In their opinion, although he lifted the object from the private domain, it never came to rest in the public domain. Since he never placed it in the public domain, he is not liable. Regardless, according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, placing does not require a defined area. The mere presence of an object in the public domain accords it the legal status of having been placed there. Apparently, there is no requirement that an object be placed on a surface with an area of four by four handbreadths.
  Initially, the Gemara wonders about the substance of Rabba’s opinion: Is that to say that it is obvious to Rabba that, with regard to whether or not an object in airspace is considered at rest,
  
  Daf 4b
  
  and it is in a case where the object passed within ten handbreadths of the ground that they disagree? And wasn’t it raised as a dilemma by Rabba, as it was unclear to him whether or not that is the correct explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis? As Rabba raised a dilemma: Do those who dispute the matter of one who throws from a private domain to a private domain with a public domain in the middle disagree with regard to a case where the object was thrown below ten handbreadths off the ground, and this is the point over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that an object in airspace is considered at rest, and the Rabbis hold that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest? However, if the object passed more than ten handbreadths above the public domain, everyone agrees that he is exempt and everyone agrees that we do not derive the <i>halakha</i> of throwing from the <i>halakha</i> of passing. There is a special <i>halakha</i> with regard to passing objects: One standing in a private domain who passes an object through a public domain to another private domain, even though the object did not come to rest in the public domain, his action is considered to have carried out. However, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to throwing is different.
  Or, perhaps they disagree with regard to a case where the object passed ten handbreadths above the ground, and this is the point over which they disagree: Rabbi Akiva holds that we derive the <i>halakha</i> of throwing from the <i>halakha</i> of passing and considers them details of one <i>halakha</i>. And the Rabbis hold that we do not derive throwing from passing, and, although one who passes the object in that case is liable, one who throws it is not. The <i>halakha</i> with regard to passing is a unique <i>halakha</i>, a Torah decree, and other cases cannot be derived from it. However, with regard to one who throws from one private domain to another via a public domain, if the object passed below ten handbreadths off the ground, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason for this? Everyone agrees that an object in airspace is considered at rest. Since Rabba himself is uncertain as to the point of the dispute in that mishna with regard to one who throws an object, how can he determine Rabbi Akiva’s opinion in the matter of our mishna?
  The Gemara answers: That is not difficult. It can be explained that, after he raised the dilemma, it was later resolved for him that the correct understanding is that Rabbi Akiva alone holds that an object in airspace is considered at rest.
  However, there is room to question the parallel between Rabbi Akiva’s opinion and the case in our mishna. Perhaps placing alone does not require an area of four by four in order to be considered halakhic placing, but lifting does require a minimum of four by four handbreadths to be considered halakhic lifting. Perhaps placing, which is merely the conclusion of the prohibited labor, does not require the same conditions as lifting, which is the beginning and the essence of the labor of carrying out (Rashba). From Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, a conclusion may be drawn that an object in airspace is considered placed even without the surface area of four by four handbreadths. But, a conclusion may not be drawn that an object lifted from a surface lacking that area is considered lifted.
  Rather, Rav Yosef said: Whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara asks: To which of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s <i>halakhot</i> is Rav Yosef referring? If you say that he is referring to this <i>halakha</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who threw an object on Shabbat in the public domain from the beginning to the end of four cubits, and it, the object, came to rest atop a projection of any size, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Apparently, this proves that, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there is no minimum area required for lifting and placing. This is the <i>halakha</i> to which Rav Yosef referred.
  The Gemara rejects this: There, the explanation is according to what we will need to say later in accordance with the statement of Abaye, as Abaye said: Here, the <i>baraita</i> is not dealing with just any situation. Rather, it is dealing with a special case where there is a tree standing in the private domain and its boughs lean into the public domain, and one threw an object from the public domain and it rested upon the boughs of the tree.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. The tree’s branches are considered an extension of its trunk. Therefore, the entire tree is considered as a private domain, and one who throws onto it is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. Therefore, the boughs themselves are not considered to be a private domain, and one who throws atop them from the public domain is not liable. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi considers the boughs of the tree like part of the trunk, something thrown atop the tree is considered as if it were placed on the trunk, which is four by four handbreadths. If so, one cannot conclude from here that there is no need for a significant area according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rather, it is possible that Rav Yosef referred to this <i>halakha</i> of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who threw an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the public domain and the private domain was in the middle, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying out from domain to domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In that case, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the one who threw the object is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as he violated two prohibitions: One, due to carrying from the public domain into the private domain, when the object passed through the airspace of the private domain; and one, due to carrying from the private domain out to the public domain. Apparently, he requires neither lifting from nor placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths, as not only is he liable for carrying the object into a private domain and placing it by means of passing through its airspace, but he is also liable for lifting the object from that private domain and bringing it to the public domain. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, neither lifting nor placing requires a significant area.
  The Gemara rejects this proof. Wasn’t it stated with regard to this dispute that Rav and Shmuel both said:
  
  Daf 5a
  
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only deemed him liable in the covered private domain, with a roof, as we say: The house is considered as one that is full? The entire house with all its space is considered one unit, and each part of it is considered as if it is filled with actual objects. Therefore, an object passing through the house is considered as if it landed on an actual surface of at least four by four handbreadths. However, in a private domain that is not covered, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not deem him liable.
  And if you say: Here too our mishna is speaking about a covered domain, and therefore the lifting from and the placing on the hand are considered as if they were performed in a place that is four handbreadths; granted, in a covered private domain lifting from and placing in a hand are considered as if it were lifted from and placed onto an area of four by four handbreadths, but in a covered public domain is he liable at all? Didn’t Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda say that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who carries an object four cubits from place to place in a covered public domain, even though transferring an object four cubits in the public domain is like carrying out from one domain to another and prohibited by Torah law, in this case, he is not liable? The reason is that since the covered public domain is not similar to the banners in the desert, i.e., the area in which the banners of the tribes of Israel passed in the desert. The labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the labors that were performed in the building of the Tabernacle during the encampment of Israel in the desert, and the desert was most definitely not covered. Consequently, even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, it is impossible to explain that our mishna is referring to the case of a covered public domain.
  Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: There must be a different source for our mishna. Whose opinion is it in our mishna? It is the opinion of <i>Aḥerim</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say: One who stood in his place on Shabbat and received an object thrown to him from another domain, the one who threw the object is liable for the prohibited labor of carrying out, as he both lifted and placed the object. However, if the one who received the object moved from his place, ran toward the object, and then received it in his hand, he, the one who threw it, is exempt. That is because, even though he performed an act of lifting, the placing of the object was facilitated by the action of the one who received it, and therefore the one who threw it did not perform the act of placing. In any case, according to the opinion of <i>Aḥerim</i>, if he stood in his place and received the object, the one who threw it is liable. Don’t we require placing upon an area of four by four handbreadths and there is none in this case? Rather, certainly conclude from this that according to <i>Aḥerim</i> we do not require an area of four by four.
  The Gemara rejects this: This is not a proof, and one could say: Perhaps it is specifically for placing that we do not require an area of four by four; however, for lifting we require an area of four by four in order to consider it significant. And with regard to placing as well, one could say: Perhaps it was performed in a manner in which he extended the corners of his coat and received it, so in that case there is also placing upon an area of four by four. Therefore, there is no proof from here.
  Rabbi Abba said: Our mishna is speaking about a special case where he received, i.e., lifted, the object that was in a basket [<i>teraskal</i>] and he placed it atop a basket. In that case, there is also placing performed upon an area of four by four handbreadths. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in the mishna: His hand? So how can you say that he received it in a basket? The Gemara answers: Emend the text of the mishna and teach: The basket in his hand.
  The Gemara asks about this matter: Granted, when the basket was in the private domain, but if it was a basket that was placed in the public domain, doesn’t it immediately become the private domain? Presumably, the basket is ten handbreadths above the ground, and its surface is the requisite size for creating a private domain.
  Since that is not the explanation given, let us say that this is a proof that our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who stuck a stick into the ground in the public domain, and hung a basket atop it, and threw an object from the public domain, and it landed upon it, he is liable, because he threw it from the public domain into the private domain. Since the surface of the basket is four by four handbreadths and it is ten handbreadths above the ground, it is considered a private domain. Even though the stick, which is serving as the base for this basket, is not four handbreadths wide, since the basket is that wide, we consider it as if the sides of the basket descend in a straight line. Consequently, a type of pillar of a private domain is formed in the public domain.
  Our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where the owner of the house extended his hand outside and placed an object in the basket in the hand of the poor person in the public domain, why is he liable? According to his opinion, the basket is considered a private domain and he, the owner of the house, is merely carrying out from private domain to private domain. This proves that the opinion of our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara answers: Even if you say that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, there, where we learned that a basket is considered like a private domain, was in a case in which the basket was above ten handbreadths off the ground. Here, in our mishna, the basket was below ten handbreadths off the ground. Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, in a case where it is below ten handbreadths it is not considered a private domain, rather it is part of the public domain. Therefore, it is considered carrying out and he is liable.
  The Gemara comments: Nevertheless, this explanation is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu: Was the language taught in the mishna: A basket in his hand? His hand, was taught. There is no reason to emend the mishna in that way. Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: The mishna here is referring to a case where the poor person lowered his hand below three handbreadths off the ground and received that object in his hand. Below three handbreadths is considered, in all respects, to be appended to the ground and, therefore, a place of four by four handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t the mishna teach: The poor person stands outside? If he is standing, how is it possible that his hand is within three handbreadths of the ground? Rabbi Abbahu answered: It is describing a case where he is bending down. In that case, his hand could be adjacent to the ground even though he is standing. And if you wish, say instead that it is possible in a case where the poor person is standing in a hole and his hand is adjacent to the ground. And if you wish, say instead a different depiction of the situation: The mishna is speaking about a case involving a midget [<i>nanas</i>], whose hands, even when standing, are within three handbreadths of the ground.
  About all of these Rava said: Did the <i>tanna</i> go to all that trouble in an effort to teach us all of these cases? It is difficult to accept that the <i>tanna</i> could not find a more conventional manner to explain the <i>halakha</i>. Rather, Rava said: The problem must be resolved by establishing the principle: A person’s hand is considered like four by four handbreadths for him. It is true that lifting and placing upon a significant place are required. However, even though a significant place is normally no less than four handbreadths, the hand of a person is significant enough for it to be considered a significant place as far as the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat are concerned. And, so too, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A person’s hand is considered four by four handbreadths for him.
  Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who threw an object and it landed in the hand of another who is in a different domain is liable. The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us? What halakhic principle is conveyed through this statement? Is it that a person’s hand is considered four by four for him? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan already say that one time? Why was it necessary to repeat it, albeit in a different context? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> cited by Rabbi Elai as well, lest you say that this, the principle that a person’s hand is significant, applies only where he himself deemed his hand significant by lifting or receiving an object with his hand. However, where he did not deem his hand significant, rather the object fell into another’s hand without his intention, perhaps the hand is not considered a significant place and he would not be liable. Therefore, he teaches us that the hand’s significance is absolute and not dependent upon the intention of the one initiating the action.
  Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said additionally: One who stood in his place and received an object that was thrown to him from another domain, the one who threw it is liable. However, if he moved from his place and then received the object, the one who threw it is exempt. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. <i>Aḥerim</i> say: If he stood in his place and received in his hand the object that was thrown from another domain, the one who threw it is liable. And if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a related dilemma: One who threw an object from one domain and moved from his place and ran to another domain and then received the same object in his hand in the second domain, what is his legal status?
  To clarify the matter, the Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Didn’t one person perform a complete act of lifting and placing? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: His dilemma was with regard to two forces in one person. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma with regard to one who performs two separate actions rather than one continuous action. Are two forces in one person considered like one person, and he is liable? Or, perhaps they are considered like two people, and he is exempt? This dilemma remains unresolved and therefore, let it stand.
  Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he brought his hand into the courtyard of another and received rainwater that fell at that time into his hand and carried it out to another domain, he is liable. Rabbi Zeira objects to this: What is the difference to me if his friend loaded him with an object, i.e., his friend placed an object in his hand, and what is the difference to me if Heaven loaded him with rainwater? In neither case did he perform an act of lifting. Why then should he be liable for carrying out from domain to domain? The Gemara answers: Do not say: He received rainwater, indicating that he passively received the rainwater in his hand. Rather, read: He actively gathered rainwater in his hand from the air, which is tantamount to lifting. The Gemara asks: In order to become liable, don’t we require lifting from atop an area of four handbreadths, and in this case there is none? How, therefore, would he be liable?
  Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, said: It is a case where he gathered the rainwater from atop and on the side of the wall, so he lifted it from a significant place. Therefore, it is considered an act of lifting, and he is liable. The Gemara questions: Atop a wall, too, the rain did not come to rest. Rather, it immediately and continuously flowed. If so, the lifting was not from the wall at all. The Gemara answers: As Rava said in another context that the case involves an inclined wall, here too the case involves an inclined wall. The Gemara asks: And where was this statement of Rava stated? It was stated with regard to that which we learned in a mishna:
  
  Daf 5b
  
  One who was reading a sacred book in scroll form on Shabbat on an elevated, wide threshold and the book rolled from his hand outside and into the public domain, he may roll it back to himself, since one of its ends is still in his hand. However, if he was reading on top the roof, which is a full-fledged private domain, and the book rolled from his hand, as long as the edge of the book did not reach ten handbreadths above the public domain, the book is still in its own area, and he may roll it back to himself. However, once the book has reached within ten handbreadths above the public domain, he is prohibited to roll it back to himself. In that case, he may only turn it over onto the side with writing, so that the writing of the book should face down and should not be exposed and degraded. And we discussed this <i>halakha</i>: Why must he turn it over onto the side with writing, and he is prohibited to bring the book back to himself? Didn’t the book not yet come to rest upon a defined area in the public domain? Even if he brought it back it would not constitute lifting.
  And Rava said: It is referring to the case of an inclined wall. Because it is inclined, the scroll is resting upon it to some degree. However, that answer is not effective in explaining the case of gathering water. Say that Rava said that the legal status of the slanted wall is different, specifically with regard to a book, as it is wont to come to rest upon an inclined wall. In contrast, is water wont to come to rest upon an inclined wall? It continues flowing. Consequently, the question with regard to water remains.
  Rather, Rava said: Here, it is referring to a case where he gathered the rainwater from on top of a hole filled with water. The Gemara asks: If he gathered it from on top of a hole, it is obvious that it is considered like lifting from a significant place. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since the water that comes down from the roof into the hole it is water on top of water and, perhaps, it is not considered placing. Therefore, he taught us that collecting water from on top of a hole filled with water is considered an act of lifting an object from its placement.
  The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his standard line of reasoning, as Rava already said: It is obvious to me that water on top of water, that is its placement, and lifting the water from there is an act of lifting in every sense. It is also obvious that if a nut is floating on top of water, that is not considered its placement, and therefore lifting it from there is not considered an act of lifting. However, Rava raised a dilemma: In a case where a nut is in a vessel, and that vessel is floating on top of water, and one lifted the nut from the vessel, is that considered an act of lifting? The sides of the dilemma are: Do we go according to the nut and the <i>halakha</i> is decided exclusively based on its status, and it is at rest in the vessel? Or perhaps, we go according to the vessel and it is not at rest, as it is moving from place to place on the surface of the water. This dilemma remained unresolved, and therefore let it stand.
  A similar dilemma was raised with regard to oil that was floating on top of wine. Oil does not mix with wine. Rather, it floats on top of it in a separate layer. Resolution of this dilemma is dependent on a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. Is oil considered a discrete entity placed on the wine? Or, perhaps it is considered to be connected to the wine? As we learned in a mishna: Oil that was floating on top of wine and one who immersed himself during the day touched the oil, he disqualified only the oil alone and not the wine, as he only touched the oil and the oil does not render the wine impure. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: They both are considered connected to each other, and therefore they are both rendered impure through the same contact. The consideration of whether the oil and the wine are considered connected is the determining factor with regard to the laws of Shabbat as well.
  Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Elai said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who was standing in the private domain or the public domain laden with food and drinks on Shabbat, and his intention was to carry them to another corner of the same domain, if once he began walking he changed his mind and exited that domain, and he enters and exits from domain to domain, even if he does so all day long, he is exempt by Torah law for carrying out on Shabbat until he stands still. Moving the object is not considered carrying out, since he did not intend from the outset to move himself in order to carry out. Therefore, only after he stands still can it be considered a bona fide placement, and only when he subsequently moves and walks would he incur liability.
  Abaye added and said: And that is specifically if he stopped to rest; then it is considered placement. However, if he stopped to adjust his burden, it is not considered placement. The Gemara comments: From where did Abaye arrive at this conclusion? From that which the Master said with regard to the laws of carrying in the public domain: Although, by Torah law, one who transfers an object four cubits in the public domain is liable, if while transferring the object he stopped to rest within four cubits, he is exempt. By stopping to rest, he performed an act of placement in the middle of the transfer. As a result, he did not carry the object four complete cubits. However, if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulders, he is liable, as stopping in order to adjust his burden is not considered an act of placement. It is considered an action required to facilitate the continued carrying of that burden. On the other hand, after he walked beyond four cubits, if he stopped to rest, he thereby performed an act of placement and completed the prohibited labor, and he is liable; if he stopped to adjust the burden on his shoulders, he is exempt. From this <i>halakha</i>, Abaye learned that only when one stops to rest is it considered an act of placement in terms of the prohibited labor of carrying on Shabbat.
  With regard to the essence of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s <i>halakha</i> about entering and exiting all day long, the Gemara asks: What principle is he teaching us with this <i>halakha</i>? Is it to teach that one is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for performing the prohibited labor of carrying out on Shabbat when the lifting of the object from its place from the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out, but for another purpose? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan already say it once? As Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who transfers objects from corner to corner in a private domain, and, while carrying them, he changed his mind about them and took them out to the public domain, he is exempt because the lifting at the first moment was not for that purpose of carrying out to another domain. Why, then, was it necessary to repeat the same <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: They are different <i>amora’im</i> who transmitted this matter. One Sage said it in this language and one Sage said it in that language. They chose different <i>halakhot</i> to relate the principle that Rabbi Yoḥanan stated a single time.
  Since the issue of interruptions in the performance of the prohibited labor of carrying out was mentioned above, the Gemara proceeds to discuss a more complex related issue. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries an object out from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza [<i>pelatia</i>], which is a public domain, by way of a colonnade [<i>setav</i>], which is situated between the store and the public domain and whose legal status is that of a <i>karmelit</i>, is liable, as he carried out from the private domain to the public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt.
  The Gemara clarifies the opinions. Granted, the opinion of ben Azzai makes sense, as he holds that walking is considered like standing. In other words, with each step, he is considered as if he came to a complete stop. Therefore, as he walked through the colonnade, which is neither a public domain nor a private domain, he came to rest there. Consequently, he did not carry from a private domain to a public domain; he carried into and out of a <i>karmelit</i>. However, the Rabbis, although they hold that walking is not considered like standing, their opinion is difficult. Where do we find a comparable case where one is liable? There is no direct transfer from domain to domain. The transfer is via a domain where there is no Torah prohibition. Where do we find that the Torah deemed one who carried out in that manner liable?
  Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is not an exceptional case,
  
  Daf 6a
  
  as the <i>halakha</i> there is just as it is in the case of one who transfers an object in the public domain. There, even though as long as he takes it and walks and does not place the object he is exempt, is it not the case that when he places it he is liable? Obviously, between the place where he lifted the object and the place where he placed the object, where there is liability, there lies an undefined area where, as long as he continues walking, he is exempt. Here too, it is no different, as in both cases an identical situation exists: If he places the object at the end of his path he is liable, despite the fact that the area in the middle is an exempt place.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: Is this comparable? There, anywhere that he places the object is a place of potential liability. That cannot be described as two places of liability with an exempt domain between them, as the area between them is also a place of potential liability if he were to place the object there. On the other hand, here, if he places it in the colonnade, it is an absolute exempt domain.
  Again the question arises: Where is there a precedent of liability for transferring an object through an exempt domain? The Gemara answers: Rather, it is possible to cite a different precedent: The <i>halakha</i> here is just as it is in the case of one who transfers an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits exactly. There, is it not the case that, even though were he to place it within four cubits of where he stands, he is not liable because within four cubits, the complete prohibited labor of carrying in the public domain was not performed; and nevertheless, when he places it at the end of four cubits he is liable? Here too, it is no different. It can be said that there is a strip of exempt domain between the lifting and the placement.
  Again the Gemara rejects the analogy: Is that similar? There, in the public domain, for this man it is an exempt domain, as it is within four cubits of the place that he lifted the object. However, for the entire world, it is a place of potential liability, as the space itself is a public domain and it could be beyond four cubits for someone else who placed it there, and he would be liable. Here, on the other hand, the colonnade is an exempt domain for the entire world. There is no comparison between an absence of liability that stems from the fact that the prohibited labor was not completed and an unconditional exemption dependent solely on the nature of the domain in question.
  Rather, it is possible to cite a different precedent: The <i>halakha</i> here is just as it is in the case of one who carries out an object from the private domain to the public domain through the sides of the public domain. The sides of a public domain are narrow strips located adjacent to the houses where the multitudes do not congregate. There, is it not the case that, even though if one were to place an object on the sides of the public domain, he is exempt and, nevertheless, when he places it in the public domain he is liable? If so, here too, it is no different.
  Rav Pappa strongly objects to this explanation: Granted, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the sides of the public domain are a type of independent domain and not considered the public domain, that precedent is similar to our case. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who said that the sides of the public domain are considered a full-fledged public domain, what is there to say?
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said to him: Say that you heard that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that the sides of the public domain are considered a public domain in a place where there are no stakes [<i>ḥipufei</i>] separating the houses and the courtyards from the actual public domain to prevent the public from damaging the walls of the houses. However, in a place where there are stakes, did you hear him say that the legal status of the sides is that of the public domain itself? Therefore, it is similar to that case of the colonnade, and consequently it serves as a precedent for liability when carrying through an exempt domain.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Azzai disagreed with regard to carrying out the object while walking through the colonnade. In his opinion one who carries it out is exempt. Yet, he agrees with the Rabbis that in a case where one throws an object from the private domain to the public domain through a colonnade he is liable, as it is tantamount to carrying out directly from domain to domain. That opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out an object on Shabbat from a store to a plaza via a colonnade is liable. The <i>halakha</i> is identical with regard to all means of transferring an object from domain to domain via a colonnade. The same is true for one who carries out, and one who carries in, and one who throws, and one who extends his hand from domain to domain. Ben Azzai says: One who walks and carries out and one who walks and carries in are exempt, as he is considered to have come to rest in the colonnade. On the other hand, one who extends his hand with the object and one who throws the object, whose actions are uninterrupted, are liable.
  In order to explain the essence of the laws of domains on Shabbat, the Gemara cites what the Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>, that there are four domains for the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat: The private domain, and the public domain, and two additional domains: The <i>karmelit</i>, which is like neither the public domain nor the private domain, and an exempt domain, which does not fall into the category of domains.
  The Gemara elaborates: And what is the private domain? A ditch which is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, as well as a fence which is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide; that is a full-fledged private domain. The criteria for a private domain are that it must be an area of four by four handbreadths, with a ten-handbreadth difference in elevation from the surrounding environment.
  And what is the public domain? A main street [<i>seratia</i>] and a large plaza as well as alleyways [<i>mevo’ot</i>], which are open on both ends to the public domain, connecting between main streets; that is a full-fledged public domain. With regard to those domains: One may not carry out from the private domain of this kind to the public domain of this kind, and one may not carry in from the public domain of this kind to the private domain of this kind. If he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he did so intentionally, and there were no witnesses to his act, and he was not forewarned, he is liable to receive the punishment of excision [<i>karet</i>]. If he was forewarned and there were witnesses to his transgression, he is punished with the court-imposed capital punishment and stoned.
  However, a sea and a valley and a colonnade and the <i>karmelit</i> all enter into the general category of <i>karmelit</i>, which is neither like the public domain, because the multitudes are not congregated there, nor like the private domain, as it has no partitions. Rather, the Sages instituted that cases like these should be considered an independent domain. One may not carry and place an object in it beyond four cubits, just as it is prohibited to do so in the public domain. And if he nevertheless carried and placed an object in it, he is exempt, as it involves no Torah prohibition. And one may neither carry from it into the public domain nor from the public domain into it, as it is not the public domain. And one may neither carry from the private domain into it nor from it into the private domain, as it is not the private domain. And if he carried out from the private domain or carried in from the public domain, he is exempt, as it involves is no Torah prohibition.
  Similarly, there is a type of private domain which, by rabbinic law, has the legal status of a <i>karmelit</i> or a public domain. Courtyards shared by many and alleyways that are not open on both sides are private domains that are somewhat similar to the public domain because many people congregate there. For this reason, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting carrying within them. However, if they placed an <i>eiruv</i>, i.e., a joining of courtyards, to transform a common courtyard into a single domain, or a merging of alleyways to merge a common alleyway shared by several courtyards into a single domain, they are all permitted to carry objects from their houses into the courtyard or from the courtyard into the alleyway, respectively. However, if they did not place an <i>eiruv</i>, they are prohibited to do so.
  An example of the fourth domain listed in the <i>baraita,</i> the exempt domain is: A person standing on the threshold may take an object from the homeowner standing in the private domain and may give an object to him. Similarly, while standing there, he may take an object from a poor person standing in the public domain and may give an object to him because there is no element of prohibition or liability in carrying and carrying out in an exempt domain on Shabbat. There is no prohibition as long as he does not take the object from the homeowner in the private domain and give it to a poor person in the public domain, or from a poor person and give to the homeowner, as by doing so he facilitated transfer from domain to domain. And, however, if he took an object from one and gave it to the other, certainly no labor prohibited by Torah law was performed, and all three of them are exempt.
  <i>Aḥerim</i> say: Not every threshold is an exempt domain. Some are not sufficiently isolated from the surrounding domains. Sometimes, a threshold serves as two domains; at times the public domain and at times the private domain, as in different circumstances it is subsumed within the adjacent domain. Therefore, when the doorway is open, the threshold is an extension of the house and considered to be a private domain. If the doorway was locked, it is considered like the outside, like part of the public domain. This applies when the threshold is not an independent domain. And if the threshold was ten handbreadths high above the public domain and four handbreadths wide, it is a domain unto itself, i.e., a full-fledged private domain discrete from the house.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> with regard to the definition of a private domain that the Master said, with added emphasis: This is the private domain. The Gemara asks: What was this emphasis added to exclude? The Gemara answers: To exclude this <i>halakha</i> of Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One who has two houses opposite each other on two sides of the public domain, if he chooses, he may create a private domain for himself in the public domain. He may place
  
  Daf 6b
  
  a ten-handbreadth high post from here, perpendicular to the public domain. This creates a symbolic wall which, in the <i>halakhot</i> of alleyways, has the legal status of a wall. And, he may place an additional post from here, on the other side, and that has the same legal status as if he closed the public domain on all of its sides. Or, he can implement a different solution appropriate for alleyways by placing a beam extending from here, from one end of one house, to the end of the house opposite it. This creates a symbolic partition across the width of the street. And, he may place a beam extending from here, from the other side of the house. According to Rabbi Yehuda, in that way, one is permitted to carry objects and place them in the area between the symbolic partitions, as he would in a private domain. The Rabbis said to him: One may not place an <i>eiruv</i> in the public domain in that way. One who seeks to transform a public domain into a private domain must erect actual partitions.
  The Gemara questions the language of the <i>Tosefta</i>: This is a full-fledged private domain. And why did they call it full-fledged? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: When do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and say that it is not the private domain? This applies only with regard to the prohibition to carry there on Shabbat. By means of these partitions, it was not rendered a full-fledged private domain to the point that one is permitted to carry there. However, conceivably, with regard to the prohibition of throwing from the public domain to this place, the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda that the area between the partitions would be considered a private domain by Torah law and it would be prohibited. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> taught us that according to the Rabbis it is not a private domain at all.
  It was also taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> with regard to the definition of a public domain that the Master said, with added emphasis: This is the public domain. The Gemara asks: What was this emphasis added to exclude? The Gemara answers: Here, the <i>Tosefta</i> came to exclude another <i>halakha</i> of Rabbi Yehuda. As we learned in a mishna: The Sages permitted those ascending to Jerusalem on the Festival pilgrimage to place posts serving as symbolic boundaries around the wells, in order to render the wells and their surroundings a private domain. That way, the pilgrims could draw water from the wells even on Shabbat, as they became private domains. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the path of the public domain passes through the area of the wells and the posts and obstructs them, he must divert it to the sides, so that the passersby will not pass through there. In his opinion, many people passing through that area negates the private domain formed merely by means of symbolic boundaries. And the Rabbis say: He need not divert the path of the public domain. The emphasis in the <i>Tosefta</i>: This is the public domain, teaches that only the specific areas listed there fall into the category of a public domain; however, a well around which partitions were established is no longer in the realm of public domain, even if the multitudes continue to walk through that area.
  The Gemara asks: And why do they call it full-fledged? The Gemara answers: This emphasis was unnecessary. But, since he taught the first clause of the <i>Tosefta</i> employing the term full-fledged, he also taught the latter section employing the term full-fledged in the interest of uniformity.
  With regard to the places characterized as the public domain, the Gemara asks: And include the desert among the places considered a public domain? Wasn’t it taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: What is the public domain? A main street, and a large plaza, and open alleyways, and the desert? Abaye said: This is not difficult, as here, where it enumerated the desert among the public domains, it refers to the time when Israel was dwelling in the desert, and it was an area frequented by the multitudes. And here, where the desert was not enumerated among the public domains, refers to this time, when multitudes do not congregate there.
  It was also taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that the Master said: If he carried out an object on Shabbat from the private domain to the public domain or vice versa, if he carried in, if he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he did so intentionally and there were no witnesses to his act and he was not forewarned, he is punishable from the hand of Heaven with the punishment of <i>karet</i>. If he was forewarned and there were witnesses to his transgression, he is punished by the court and stoned. The Gemara asks: Unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering; it is obvious that one who violates the serious transgression of desecrating the Shabbat unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to teach that if he did so intentionally he is punishable with <i>karet</i> and stoned. Since he needed to cite those cases because they involve a novel element, he also cited the case where he performed the transgression unwittingly, in order to complete the picture.
  The Gemara asks: That is also obvious, as the Torah states explicitly that one who desecrates Shabbat intentionally without witnesses and forewarning is punishable by <i>karet</i>, and that when there are witnesses and forewarning he is executed by stoning. The Gemara answers: This came to teach us in accordance with the statement of Rav, as Rav said: I found a hidden scroll in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya in which matters of Oral Torah were briefly summarized, and in it was written: Isi ben Yehuda says: The primary categories of prohibited labor on Shabbat are forty-less-one, and he is liable only for one. This expression is unclear, and it would seem that it means that one who performs all of the prohibited labors is only liable to bring one sin-offering.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t we learn in the mishna: The primary categories of prohibited labor are forty-less-one? The mishna proceeded to enumerate those labors. And we discussed it: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? It would have been sufficient for the mishna to merely list the prohibited labors. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The number is also significant, in order to teach us that if he performed all of the prohibited labors within one lapse of awareness, during which he remained unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one of the prohibited labors separately. Consequently, the statement of Isi ben Yehuda cannot be understood as suggested above.
  Rather, say as follows: There are forty prohibited labors less one, and he is not liable for one of them. Among those labors, there is one unspecified exception for which one is not liable to be executed by stoning and merely violates a negative prohibition. That which the <i>Tosefta</i> mentioned with regard to one carrying out on Shabbat being liable for <i>karet</i> and stoning, teaches us: This labor of carrying out from domain to domain, is among those prohibited labors with regard to which there is no uncertainty and it is clear that one is liable for <i>karet</i> and stoning for its violation.
  It was also taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that the Master said: However, a sea, and a valley, and the colonnade, and the <i>karmelit</i> all enter into the general category of <i>karmelit</i>, which is neither like the public domain nor like the private domain. The Gemara asks: And is a valley neither like the private domain nor like the public domain? Didn’t we learn in a mishna in tractate <i>Teharot</i>: The valley, in the days of summer, which is a time when the multitudes frequent it, nevertheless, it is considered the private domain with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, as according to the parameters of domains of Shabbat it remains in the realm of a private domain. And, still, it is considered like the public domain with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity, where there is a distinction between a place frequented by the multitudes and a place that the multitudes do not frequent. While in the rainy season, the winter, when multitudes do not frequent the fields, the valley is considered like the private domain for this, Shabbat, and for that, ritual purity. A valley is a private domain and not a <i>karmelit</i>.
  Ulla said: Actually, the valley is a <i>karmelit</i>; and why does the mishna call it the private domain? In order to emphasize that it is not the public domain, as the mishna in tractate <i>Teharot</i> did not enter into the details of the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. It merely underscored the distinction between the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat and the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity.
  Rav Ashi said:
  
  Daf 7a
  
  The valley discussed in the mishna in <i>Teharot</i> is unusual, as it refers to a case where it has partitions that are ten handbreadths high surrounding it. And in accordance with that which Ulla said that Rav Yoḥanan said: An enclosure [<i>karpef</i>], a large courtyard that is not contiguous with the house and does not serve a direct purpose for the house, that is greater than a field that produces a crop of two <i>se’a</i>, that was not originally surrounded by a fence for the purpose of residence, but with a partition to protect his belongings, and even if it is as large as a field that produces a crop of one <i>kor</i>, thirty times the size of a <i>se’a</i>, and even two <i>kor</i>, it is still considered a private domain. And, consequently, one who throws an object into it from the public domain on Shabbat is liable. What is the reason for this? It is a partition that surrounds the enclosure and its legal status is like that of a partition in every sense, except that it is lacking residents. Even though the Rabbis were stringent with regard to this enclosure because of the lack of residents and prohibited carrying in it as if it were a <i>karmelit</i>, that does not negate its primary legal status; by Torah law it is a full-fledged private domain. The same is true with regard to the aforementioned valley. The valley is a large area surrounded by partitions erected for the purpose of protection and thereby assumes private domain status.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, in explanation of the mishna, Rav Ashi did not say in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as he provided a reason for it. However, what is the reason that Ulla did not say in accordance with his own <i>halakha</i> that he cited in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: Ulla could have said to you: If the mishna is referring to a case where it has partitions, would it call that place a valley? It is an enclosure. The implication of the word valley is that there are no partitions at all. And Rav Ashi defends his opinion by saying: The language taught in the mishna is: The private domain and not a <i>karmelit</i>. Therefore, his explanation more closely approximates the language of the mishna.
  In the <i>Tosefta,</i> the list of places whose legal status is that of a <i>karmelit</i> also includes <i>karmelit.</i> The Gemara asks: Aren’t they, all the other places listed there, i.e., a sea, a valley, and a colonnade, a <i>karmelit</i> too? If so, what is this <i>karmelit</i> that is prominently mentioned here? The Gemara answers: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This addition of <i>karmelit</i> was only necessary in order to teach the case of a corner adjacent to the public domain, where, although at times the multitudes push their way in and enter it, since its use is inconvenient it is considered a <i>karmelit</i>.
  Similarly, when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Between the pillars alongside the public domain is judged like a <i>karmelit</i>. What is the reason for this? Although the multitudes stride there, since they cannot walk in it in a direct manner, uninterrupted, it is considered like a <i>karmelit</i>. Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Yehuda said: The same is true for the bench that is before the pillars upon which the merchants place their wares; it is judged to be like a <i>karmelit</i>.
  The Gemara comments: According to the one who said that between the pillars is considered like a <i>karmelit</i>, all the more so a bench is considered a <i>karmelit</i>. However, according to the one who said that a bench is a <i>karmelit</i>, one could say that that is so specifically with regard to a bench because its use is inconvenient. However, the space between the pillars, whose use is convenient, would not be considered a <i>karmelit</i>. Another version of that statement: However, between the pillars where, at times, the multitudes stride there is considered like the public domain.
  With regard to the question to what degree does the use of the multitudes determine whether a specific place is considered a public domain, the Gemara cites the <i>halakha</i> that Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said: If an upright brick was placed in the public domain and one threw an object from a distance of four cubits and he stuck the object to its side, he is liable for throwing in the public domain. But if the object landed atop the brick, he is not liable. Because the multitudes do not step on the brick, it is not a full-fledged public domain.
  It was Abaye and Rava, who both said: And that is specifically when that brick is at least three handbreadths high, as then the multitudes do not step on it, and, therefore, even though the brick is standing in the public domain, it is considered an independent domain. However, thorns and shrubs, even though they are not three handbreadths high, are not considered part of the public domain. Since people do not walk on thorns, those areas cannot be considered part of the public domain. And Ḥiyya bar Rav said: Even the place where there are thorns and shrubs in the public domain, if they were low, the place is considered part of the public domain. However, a place in the public domain where there are feces is not considered part of the public domain, as people do not walk there. And Rav Ashi said: Even a place in the public domain where there are feces is considered part of the public domain, since ultimately people who are rushing to work do not take care to avoid it and will step on it.
  Rabba from the school of Rav Sheila said: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no <i>karmelit</i> less than four handbreadths. And Rav Sheshet added and said: And the <i>karmelit</i> extends up to ten handbreadths. With regard to the formulation of Rav Sheshet, the Gemara wondered: What is the meaning of the phrase: And extends up to ten? If you say that it means if there is a partition ten handbreadths high surrounding it then it is considered a <i>karmelit</i>, and if not, it is not considered a <i>karmelit</i>. And is it not a <i>karmelit</i>? Didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: A house that does not have walls inside it that are ten handbreadths high, and with its roofing it reaches a height of ten handbreadths above the ground; on its roof, one may carry on all of it, as its roof is a private domain in every sense, and inside it, one may only carry four cubits, as inside, the height is insufficient to render it a private domain, and it retains <i>karmelit</i> status? Apparently, even an area less than ten handbreadths high has the legal status of a <i>karmelit</i>.
  Rather, what is the meaning of Rav Sheshet’s formulation: And extends up to ten? Apparently, up to ten handbreadths is that which is within the parameters of a <i>karmelit</i>, and above ten handbreadths is not a <i>karmelit</i>. And as Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Keen scholar [<i>shinnana</i>], do not be involved with questions in the matters of Shabbat above ten handbreadths. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> and in the context of what issue did Shmuel make this statement? If you say his intention was that there is no private domain above ten handbreadths, didn’t Rav Ḥisda say: One who stuck a stick in the ground of the private domain and threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop it, even if the stick was a hundred cubits high, he is liable, since the private domain extends up to the sky? Apparently, there is a private domain even above ten handbreadths.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  Rather, suggest that Shmuel meant that there is no public domain above ten handbreadths. It is a mishna, and why would he repeat an explicit mishna? As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, and the object came to rest on a wall standing in the public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object in the air and it never landed. If it came to rest below ten handbreadths off the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object to the ground. That is an explicit mishna stating that the area of the public domain does not go beyond ten handbreadths off the ground.
  Rather, it must be that Shmuel’s statement was referring to a <i>karmelit</i>; there is no <i>karmelit</i> above ten handbreadths. And, if so, the Sages were lenient with regard to a <i>karmelit</i> and applied some leniencies of the private domain and some leniencies of the public domain. The Gemara elaborates: Some leniencies of the private domain: That if there is an area of four handbreadths, then it is a <i>karmelit</i>, and if there is not an area of four handbreadths, it is merely an exempt domain. Some leniencies of the public domain: That until a height of ten handbreadths, it is a <i>karmelit,</i> above ten handbreadths is not a <i>karmelit</i>.
  To the matter itself: It was mentioned above that Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: A house that does not have inside it walls that are ten handbreadths high, and with its roofing it reaches a height of ten handbreadths above the ground; on its roof, one may carry on all of it, as its roof is a private domain in every sense, and inside it, one may only carry four cubits, as inside the height is insufficient to render it a private domain and it retains <i>karmelit</i> status.
  With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, Abaye said: And if he dug out an area of four by four handbreadths in the floor of the house and in the place where the digging took place, its height to the ceiling reaches ten handbreadths, the house becomes a private domain, and it is permitted to carry in the entire house. What is the reason for this? Since the dug out area is a private domain, the rest of the house is ancillary to it, and it assumes the legal status of the holes of the private domain, and the holes of the private domain, although they lack the measure of a private domain, are considered like the private domain itself. As it was stated: Everyone agrees that the holes of the private domain are considered like the private domain; since they are subsumed within the private domain, they are judged to be like it. However, they disagreed with regard to the holes of the public domain. Abaye says: They are considered to be like the public domain. And Rava says: They are not considered to be like the public domain; they are either a <i>karmelit</i> or an exempt domain.
  Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who said that the holes of the public domain are considered like the public domain, in what way is it different from this <i>halakha</i>? As when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This addition of <i>karmelit</i> to the <i>Tosefta</i> was only necessary to teach the case of a corner adjacent to the public domain. And, according to your opinion, let this corner be like the holes of the public domain, and its legal status should be that of a public domain itself and not that of a <i>karmelit</i>. Abaye answered: There is a distinction between the cases. There, the corner, its use is not convenient; here, the holes of the public domain, their use is convenient. Since it is convenient to utilize the holes of the public domain, and they are in fact utilized, they are a public domain in every sense.
  The Gemara raised an additional difficulty for Abaye’s opinion: We learned in a mishna with regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, and the object came to rest on a wall standing in the public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object in the air and it never landed. If it came to rest below ten handbreadths off the ground, it is as if he were throwing an object to the ground, and he is liable. And we discussed this <i>halakha</i>: What is the reason that when the wall is not ten handbreadths high it is as if he threw it to the ground? The object did not come to rest on the wall, as presumably the object hit the wall and then fell to the ground. Since there was no act of placement, he did not perform the prohibited labor of carrying in the public domain.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that they learned this mishna as referring to a case when he threw a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall and remains there. And should it enter your mind to say that the holes of the public domain are considered like the public domain, why do I need to establish the mishna as referring to the case of a juicy cake of figs? Let us establish it simply as referring to the case of a run-of-the-mill stone or object, and that it came to rest in a hole.
  Sometimes Abaye would answer the question by saying that a stone or object is different from a juicy fig in that they come back when they are thrown and do not come to rest in the hole. Therefore, it was simpler to establish the mishna in the case of a fig. And sometimes he would answer it by saying that the mishna is referring to a wall that has no hole. And from where does he find support for this explanation? From that which we learned in the first clause of the mishna: One who throws above ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he is throwing in the air and it never landed. And if it should enter your mind to say that we are speaking here about a wall that has a hole in it, why should it be as if he threw it in the air and it never landed? It rested in a hole, and that hole is a private domain, as it is above ten handbreadths, and in that way the prohibited labor of carrying in was performed.
  And if you say that the mishna is referring to a case where holes do not have an area of at least four by four handbreadths, which is common for holes in the wall, and therefore the holes have exempt domain status, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One who threw an object above ten handbreadths and the object went and came to rest in a hole of any size, we have arrived in this matter at the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis? The decision whether or not there is a prohibition here depends on an analysis of that dispute. Rabbi Meir holds that in all cases where a certain minimum area is required for a specific <i>halakha</i> to take effect and the existing area is smaller, if, theoretically, circumstances would allow to carve out and create an area of the requisite size, one considers it as if he carves out the space to complete it, i.e., the space has the legal status as if it was actually enlarged. And the Rabbis hold that one does not carve out the space to complete it. Rather, the legal status of the area corresponds to its actual size. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir, if an object landed in a small hole, one considers the area as if it were carved out to complete the hole to four by four handbreadths, and its legal status is like that of a private domain in every sense. Rather, can we not conclude from the mishna that maintains that one who throws an object onto a wall above ten handbreadths it is as if he threw it in the air, that it is referring to a wall that has no hole in it, and the possibility of carving out the space was never raised? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it.
  The Gemara again returns to the matter that was mentioned above in passing itself [<i>gufa</i>]. Rav Ḥisda said: One who stuck a stick in the ground of the private domain, and an object that he himself threw from the public domain rested atop it, even if that stick was a hundred cubits high, he is liable. The reason for this is because the private domain rises up to the sky. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that when Rav Ḥisda said his statement, it was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagreed with regard to a similar issue, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who threw an object on Shabbat in the public domain, and the object rested on a projection of any size, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Consequently, only according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is there no need for the object to come to rest on an area of a specific size, and therefore the statement of Rav Ḥisda with regard to the stick can only be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion.
  
  Daf 8a
  
  Regarding this assertion, Abaye said: In the private domain, everyone agrees that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, i.e., that the private domain is considered one entity filled from the ground to the sky. However, here this <i>baraita</i> is referring to a special case involving a tree standing in the private domain and its boughs lean into the public domain, and one threw an object from the public domain and it rested upon the boughs of the tree. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we say: Cast its boughs after its trunk. The tree’s branches are considered an extension of its trunk, therefore the entire tree is considered a private domain, and one who throws onto it is liable. And the Rabbis hold that we do not say: Cast its boughs after its trunk, and therefore the boughs themselves are not considered to be a private domain, but rather an exempt domain, and one who throws atop them from the public domain is not liable.
  Abaye said: One who threw a round reed barrel into the public domain, and the barrel is ten handbreadths high and its diameter is not six handbreadths wide, is liable. Since its diameter is less than six handbreadths, its area is less than the area of four handbreadths squared. Therefore, this barrel is considered an object, and if he threw it from the private domain to the public domain he is liable. However, if the diameter of the barrel was six handbreadths wide, he is exempt. Since the area of the barrel is greater than the area of four handbreadths squared, it is considered an independent private domain, and he did not perform an act of throwing an object from one domain to another domain.
  Rava said: Even if it was not six handbreadths wide he is exempt. What is the reason for this? He is exempt because it is impossible that the ends of the reeds protruding from the weave of the barrel will not extend above ten handbreadths. Consequently, the entire barrel never entered the public domain, as part of it remains in a non-liable place, i.e., ten handbreadths off the ground of the public domain.
  If he turned the barrel that is less than six handbreadths wide over on its mouth, i.e., if he threw it with its mouth facing down, even if the barrel was only seven handbreadths and a bit high, he is still liable, as the legal status of this barrel is equivalent to that of any other object that lands there. However, if the height of this barrel was seven and a half handbreadths, he is exempt. Within three handbreadths of the ground, the principle of <i>lavud</i> takes effect: An object within three handbreadths of the ground has the legal status of being connected to the ground. The sides of the barrel extend to the ground and then it is considered as if the barrel already touched the ground of the public domain, even though it is actually still three handbreadths away, while its upper part remains an exempt domain. It is as if this was a barrel higher than ten handbreadths.
  Rav Ashi said: Even if the height of the barrel was seven and a half handbreadths, he is liable, as the sides of the barrel are not considered to be higher than they are in reality. What is the reason for this? The reason is because partitions are made exclusively for the inside of the barrel. The sides of the barrel play no role beyond the barrel itself, and therefore there is no room to extend the sides by means of the principle of <i>lavud</i>. Therefore, if the barrel itself is not higher than ten handbreadths, it is merely an object.
  Ulla said: A pillar that is nine handbreadths high, standing in the public domain, and many people adjust the burden on their shoulders upon it, and one threw an object from the private domain and it rested atop the pillar, he is liable. What is the reason for this? It is based on this principle: Anything protruding from the public domain: If it is less than three handbreadths off the ground, and the multitudes step on it, it is considered to be part of the ground. If it is from three to nine handbreadths, they, the multitudes, neither step on it nor adjust the burden on their shoulders on it, and it is not considered part of the public domain. However, a protrusion nine handbreadths high, certainly the multitudes adjust the burden on their shoulders on it. Since the multitudes utilize it, it is considered a public domain, despite its height.
  Based on Ulla’s statement, Abaye said to Rav Yosef: A hole in the ground of the public domain, which is several handbreadths deep, what is its legal status? Is it also considered, in accordance with Ulla’s principle, part of the public domain? In general, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, there is no distinction between an area elevated above its surroundings and an area depressed below its surroundings. Rav Yosef said to him: And the same is true in a hole; these <i>halakhot</i> apply. Rava said: In a hole, these <i>halakhot</i> do not apply. What is the reason for this? Since use under duress is not considered use, and the use of a pit even if it is nine handbreadths deep is inconvenient, and it is not comparable to a pillar of the same height.
  Rav Adda bar Mattana raised an objection to Rava’s opinion from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One whose basket was placed in the public domain and it was ten handbreadths high and four wide, one may neither move an object from it to the public domain nor from the public domain to it, since its legal status is that of a private domain. If it were less than that height, one may carry from it to the public domain and vice versa. The <i>baraita</i> adds: And the same is true for a hole. Is this statement not referring to the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: One may carry from a pit which is less than ten handbreadths deep to the public domain? This supports the opinion of Rav Yosef, that a hole is subsumed within the public domain. Rava rejected this: This statement is not referring to the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>, but rather to the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>: It is like a basket in that one may not carry from a hole ten handbreadths deep to the public domain because it is a full-fledged private domain. However, no conclusion may be drawn with regard to a hole less than ten handbreadths deep.
  Rav Adda bar Mattana raised another objection to Rava’s opinion from what was taught in a different <i>baraita</i>, which deals with the laws of joining of borders:
  
  Daf 8b
  
  One who intended to establish his Shabbat abode in the public domain at a specific site must place food sufficient for two meals for that site to be considered his legal residence. And if he placed the food used for his <i>eiruv</i> in a pit above ten handbreadths, i.e., less than ten handbreadths below ground level, his <i>eiruv</i> is an <i>eiruv</i>. If he placed the <i>eiruv</i> below ten handbreadths from ground level, his <i>eiruv</i> is not an <i>eiruv</i>. Because the pit is a private domain and he may not carry the <i>eiruv</i> from that private domain to a public domain, where he has established his residence, the <i>eiruv</i> is invalid.
  The Gemara seeks to clarify the details of this case. What are the exact circumstances? If you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a pit that has ten handbreadths in depth and the phrase: And he placed it above ten handbreadths, means that he raised the <i>eiruv</i> and placed it within ten handbreadths of ground level, and the phrase: Below ten handbreadths, means that he lowered the <i>eiruv</i> and placed it ten handbreadths or more below ground level, what difference does it make to me if the <i>eiruv</i> is above ten handbreadths and what difference does it make to me if it is below ten handbreadths? In any case, the pit is a private domain, and the principle states that the private domain extends from its lowest point to the sky. There is no difference whether the <i>eiruv</i> was placed higher or lower. In any case, he is in one place, in the public domain, and his <i>eiruv</i> is in another place, in the private domain. Since he cannot take the <i>eiruv</i> out of the pit, his <i>eiruv</i> is not an <i>eiruv</i>.
  Rather, is the <i>baraita</i> not referring to a pit that does not have in it a depth of ten handbreadths? And the <i>baraita</i> should be understood as follows: If he placed his <i>eiruv</i> below ten handbreadths, refers to a pit whose lowest point is ten handbreadths or more below ground level. If he placed his <i>eiruv</i> above ten handbreadths, refers to a pit that is less than ten handbreadths deep and is not a private domain. And, with regard to that case, it was taught that his <i>eiruv</i> is an <i>eiruv</i>. Consequently, usage under duress in a pit that is less than ten handbreadths deep is considered usage, and a pit of that kind is a full-fledged part of the public domain.
  Rava suggested various responses to this objection. At times he would answer him that it is referring to a case where both he and his <i>eiruv</i> are in a <i>karmelit</i>, i.e., that he intended to establish residence in a <i>karmelit</i> and placed his <i>eiruv</i> there. The pit is less than ten handbreadths deep, and consequently, both he and his <i>eiruv</i> are in the same domain. And why does the <i>baraita</i> call his place of residence the public domain? Because it is not the private domain.
  And at times he would answer him that it is referring to a case where he was, indeed, in the public domain and his <i>eiruv</i> was in a <i>karmelit</i>, as a pit that is not ten handbreadths deep is not part of the public domain, rather it is a <i>karmelit</i>. With regard to the question, how can this be considered a legitimate <i>eiruv</i> as it is forbidden to carry from a <i>karmelit</i> to a public domain as well, this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: Anything that is prohibited on Shabbat and its prohibition is not by Torah law, rather it is due to a rabbinic decree [<i>shevut</i>], the Sages did not issue the decree to apply during twilight, which is neither definitive day nor definitive night. Consequently, at the time that the <i>eiruv</i> was placed in the <i>karmelit</i> it was permissible for him to carry it to the public domain. Since an <i>eiruv</i> takes effect even if it is fit for use just one moment during twilight on Shabbat eve, his <i>eiruv</i> is effective.
  And Rava said to Rav Adda bar Mattana: Do not say that I am just putting you off with these answers. Rather, what I am saying to you is accurate. The opinion that usage under duress is not considered usage is a bona fide opinion and the suggested answers are appropriate explanations of that <i>baraita</i>. As we learned in a mishna: If there was a swamp and the public domain passes through it, one who throws an object into it at a distance of four cubits is liable just like anyone who carried four cubits in the public domain. And how deep is this swamp? It is less than ten handbreadths. The mishna adds: And with regard to a swamp that the public domain passes through it, one who throws four cubits into the swamp is liable.
  The difficulty concerning the repetition of the same topic with virtually identical words is clear, and therefore: Granted, it is possible to explain, that swamp swamp was repeated twice; one case is referring to the summer, and one case is referring to the rainy season. And it is necessary to emphasize that this ruling is in effect both in the summer and in the winter. As, had the mishna told us this <i>halakha</i> only in the summer, we would have said that since people commonly pass through the swamp to cool themselves, it is considered part of the public domain. However, in the rainy season I would have said it is not part of the public domain. And conversely, had the mishna told us this <i>halakha</i> only in the rainy season, I would have said that since he is filthy anyway, it happens that he is not cautious and enters into the swamp. However, in the summer, when he is not dirty with mud, I would have said that it is not part of the public domain. Therefore, it was necessary for the mishna to repeat swamp twice, to teach us that this <i>halakha</i> applies at all times.
  However, why do I need the mishna to state twice that the public domain passes through that swamp? Rather, shouldn’t one conclude from this that passage, even when it is under duress, and not free and easy, is considered passage, but usage under duress is not considered usage? It was necessary to emphasize that the public domain actually passes through it. If the multitudes do not pass through it and it was only used under duress, it would not have been considered a public domain. The Gemara concludes: Indeed conclude from this.
  Somewhat related to the case of the barrel discussed earlier which was a case of moving an object without liability, the Gemara cites that Rav Yehuda said: That bundle of reeds that he stood upright and threw down, stood upright and threw down repeatedly, he is not liable for carrying it four cubits in the public domain until he lifts it off the ground. As long as he did not lift it from the ground, even though he moved it a long way, he did not perform the acts of lifting and placing which are prohibited by Torah law, as at least one part of the bundle always remained on the ground.
  The Master said: A person standing on the threshold may take an object from the homeowner standing in the private domain and may give an object to him. Similarly, while standing there, he may take an object from a poor person standing in the public domain and may give an object to him because there is no element of prohibition or liability in carrying in and carrying out in an exempt domain on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This threshold, what is it; to what type of threshold is it referring? Different thresholds have different halakhic status.
  If you say that it is referring to a threshold that is the public domain, i.e., the threshold of an alleyway that is fewer than three handbreadths off the ground and is not covered, and the post that demarcates the parameters of the alleyway is situated between the public domain and the alleyway, how can the <i>Tosefta</i> say that he may take an object from the homeowner? Isn’t he carrying out from the private domain to the public domain?
  Rather, say that the <i>Tosefta</i> is referring to a threshold that is the private domain, in a case where it is covered, or it is situated between the post that demarcates the parameters of the alleyway and the private domain, or it is ten handbreadths high and its area is at least four by four handbreadths. How then can the <i>Tosefta</i> say that he may take an object from a poor person? Isn’t he carrying in from the public domain to the private domain?
  Rather, say that the <i>Tosefta</i> is referring to a threshold that is a <i>karmelit</i>, i.e., it is not ten handbreadths high and it is four by four handbreadths; how can the <i>Tosefta</i> say that he may take and give even <i>ab initio</i>? Ultimately, in this case, there is nevertheless a prohibition. Even though a <i>karmelit</i> does not engender liability by Torah law, carrying from it is prohibited by rabbinic law and is certainly not permitted <i>ab initio</i>.
  Rather, say that the <i>Tosefta</i> is referring to a threshold that is merely an exempt domain, and therefore there is no prohibition at all. In what circumstances is it an exempt domain? In a case where it does not have an area of four by four handbreadths, and it is therefore not considered a domain with regard to liability on Shabbat. And that <i>halakha</i> is similar to that statement made when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia and he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A place that does not have an area of four by four handbreadths and is set apart, it is permissible for both the people of the private domain and for the people of the public domain to adjust the burden on their shoulders upon it on Shabbat, as long as they do not exchange objects between them from one domain to the other domain.
  The Master also said in the <i>Tosefta:</i> A person standing on the threshold may take an object from the homeowner and give an object to him, and he may take an object from the poor person or give an object to him, as long as he does not take the object from the homeowner and give it to a poor person or from a poor person and give it to the homeowner. And, however, if he took an object from one and gave it to the other, certainly no labor prohibited by Torah law was performed in that case, and all three of them are exempt. The Gemara asks: Say that this will be a conclusive refutation of Rava’s opinion, as Rava said: One who transfers an object from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits in the public domain, even though he transferred it above the upper boundary of the public domain
  
  Daf 9a
  
  via the airspace above it, i.e., he raised the object more than ten handbreadths above the ground of the public domain, which is an exempt domain, still he is liable for carrying in the public domain. On the other hand, in the <i>Tosefta</i> it says that if the object passed through an exempt domain, he is exempt by Torah law from punishment for passing it from domain to domain. The Gemara rejects that refutation as there is room to distinguish between the cases: There, in the <i>halakha</i> stated by Rava, the object did not come to rest in an exempt domain; it merely passed through its airspace. However, here, when transferred via the threshold, the object came to rest in an exempt domain, and as a result, the act of carrying out was divided into two separate actions, neither of which involves a Torah prohibition.
  Later in the <i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Aḥerim</i> say: Depending on the circumstances, a threshold serves two domains: When the entrance is open, the threshold is subsumed within the house and it is considered to be a private domain like the inside of the house. And when the entrance is locked, the threshold is not subsumed within the house, and it is considered to be a public domain like the outside.
  The Gemara wonders: When the entrance is open the threshold is considered to be like a private domain, and is this so even though it does not have a post on its side? Didn’t Rav Ḥama bar Gurya say that Rav said: The opening in the wall, i.e., the doorway, requires another post in order to permit carrying there? A symbolic partition must be established at the side of the opening for that doorway to be considered closed and render carrying within it permissible like a full-fledged private domain. In the <i>Tosefta</i>, no mention was made of the need for a post of that kind.
  And if you say that the <i>Tosefta</i> is referring to a threshold that does not have an area of four by four handbreadths, which is not considered an independent area and therefore does not require a post, didn’t Rav Ḥama bar Gurya say that Rav said explicitly: The opening, even though it does not have an area of four by four handbreadths, requires another post in order to permit carrying there?
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Here we are dealing with the threshold of an alleyway open to the public domain on only one side. Although, by Torah law, it is considered a private domain, the Sages required him to establish a fourth symbolic partition on the side open to the public domain. This alleyway was covered, and this covering extended to part of the threshold in a manner that half of it is covered and half of it is not covered, and the covering is over the part of the threshold toward the inside. In that case, if the entrance is open, its legal status is like that of the inside, as it is considered as if there were a partition extending from the edge of the roofing above to below, based on the halakhic principle: Lower the partition. The opening of the alleyway is thereby sealed, rendering it a private domain. However, when the entrance is locked, it is no longer possible to consider the covering as a partition, and therefore the part of the threshold that is beyond the locked door of the alleyway is considered like the outside, i.e., like a public domain.
  Rav Ashi said: Actually, we can say that we are dealing with the threshold of a house, and in a special circumstance, a case where he covered the threshold with two beams. Furthermore, neither this beam is four handbreadths wide, nor is that beam four handbreadths wide, and there is not a gap of three handbreadths between this one and that one, and there is a door between the two beams. In this case, when the entrance is open, since there is a space of less than three handbreadths between the beams and, based on the principle of <i>lavud</i>, any space less than three handbreadths is considered non-existent, the two beams are considered to be one wide beam. It is considered as if there were a partition extending from the edge of the roofing above to below, based on the halakhic principle: Lower the partition. The threshold is thereby sealed and considered a full-fledged private domain like the inside. However, when the entrance is locked, the two beams do not join together to become one anymore. Since the door creates a separation between them and the outer beam is less than four handbreadths wide, it is not considered a roof from which a partition extends to the ground, and the area under this beam is considered to be a public domain like the outside.
  The Sage also said in the <i>Tosefta</i> that if the threshold was ten handbreadths high and four by four handbreadths wide, it is an independent domain, even if it was inside a private domain. The Gemara comments: This supports the opinion of Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi, as Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said that Rabbi Meir used to say: Any place that you find two domains, i.e., two places, each of which is sufficiently distinct to be an independent domain, and even though they are halakhically one domain, i.e., in a case where a pillar that is ten handbreadths high and four by four wide is standing in the private domain, even though the pillar is a private domain based on its measurements, it is prohibited by rabbinic law to adjust a burden on one’s shoulders upon it and to lift an object from the ground of the private domain and place it atop the pillar, as the pillar is deemed by its measurements to be an independent domain. It is prohibited by a decree issued by the Sages due to a similar situation, the case of a mound of that size in the public domain. In the public domain, lifting an object from the ground and placing it on the mound constitutes a violation of the Torah prohibition of carrying out from the public domain to the private domain. Therefore, the Sages prohibited placing an object on a pillar even in the private domain.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  MISHNA: After having dealt with the limited and defined topic of the <i>halakhot</i> of carrying out on Shabbat, the mishna begins to deal with the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat chronologically, beginning with activities that one may not perform prior to the onset of Shabbat. With regard to one’s daily conduct, the mishna says: A person may not sit before the barber adjacent to the time of <i>minḥa</i> until he recites the afternoon prayer. And a person may not enter the bathhouse and may not enter to work in a tannery [<i>burseki</i>]. And he may neither begin to eat a meal nor to sit in judgment until he prays. And however, if they already began engaging in those activities, they need not stop and recite the <i>Amida</i> prayer. The <i>tanna</i> articulated a principle: One stops engaging in all of these activities to recite <i>Shema</i> and one does not stop to recite the <i>Amida</i> prayer.
  GEMARA: First, the Gemara seeks to clarify: Which “adjacent to <i>minḥa</i>,” in other words, adjacent to which <i>minḥa</i> is the mishna referring? There is a difference between the time of greater <i>minḥa</i> [<i>minḥa gedola</i>], which begins approximately a half hour after noon, and the time of lesser <i>minḥa</i> [<i>minḥa ketana</i>], which begins approximately two and a half hours before sunset. The Gemara elaborates: If you say that it is prohibited to perform all of these activities adjacent to <i>minḥa gedola</i>, why not? Isn’t there still much time remaining in the day? Rather, the mishna means adjacent to <i>minḥa ketana</i>.
  The Gemara asks: In that case, if they started, they need not stop. Let us say that this will be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Once the time of the afternoon prayer has arrived, it is prohibited for a person to taste anything before he recites the afternoon prayer. The implication is that even if one began to eat he must stop.
  Rather, that explanation is rejected and the Gemara says: Actually the mishna is referring to adjacent to <i>minḥa gedola</i>, and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is dealing with adjacent to <i>minḥa ketana</i>. In response to the question: If the mishna means adjacent to <i>minḥa gedola</i> isn’t there significant time remaining in the day? The Gemara explains that each of the activities enumerated in the mishna is performed in an especially time-consuming manner. When the mishna said: A person may not sit before the barber, it was referring to a haircut of ben Elasa, whose haircut was very complicated and required several hours to complete. When the mishna said: A person may not go into the bathhouse adjacent to <i>minḥa</i>, it was referring to all matters involved in a visit to the bathhouse; not only washing, but also washing one’s hair, rinsing, and sweating. And he may not enter the tannery adjacent to <i>minḥa</i>, the reference is to a large tannery where there are many hides that require tanning and he must initiate the tanning process from the beginning. And he may not enter to eat, the reference is to a big meal, which lasts a long time. And he may not enter to sit in judgment, refers to a judge who enters at the beginning of the trial, and, generally, it will take a long time until a verdict is reached.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Indeed the mishna can be explained as referring to <i>minḥa gedola</i> and actually, even our ordinary haircut is prohibited. <i>Ab initio</i>, why may he not sit before the barber adjacent to the time of <i>minḥa</i>? Due to a decree lest the scissors break, and considerable time pass until they repair the scissors or obtain others. When the mishna said: A person may not enter the bathhouse adjacent to <i>minḥa</i>, it is prohibited even if he is entering just to sweat. <i>Ab initio</i>, why may he not enter? Due to a decree issued by the Sages lest he faint in the bathhouse and considerable time elapse until he recovers. And he may not enter the tannery adjacent to <i>minḥa</i>, even if he intends just to examine the skins. <i>Ab initio</i>, why may he not enter? Due to the concern that perhaps he will notice damage to his merchandise and become anxious and come to restore what was ruined. And he may not enter to eat a meal adjacent to the time of <i>minḥa</i> is referring even to a small meal. <i>Ab initio</i>, why may he not enter? There is concern that perhaps he will come to extend his meal for a long time. And he may not enter to sit in judgment adjacent to the time of <i>minḥa</i>, the mishna is referring even at the conclusion of the trial. <i>Ab initio</i>, why may he not enter? Due to concern that perhaps he will find a reason, contrary to what he originally thought, and will overturn the verdict completely, necessitating the restart of the trial from the beginning.
  We learned in the mishna that if he began one of the aforementioned activities, haircut, bath, tannery, meal, and judgment, he is not required to stop. The Gemara asked: From when is it considered the beginning of the haircut? Rav Avin said: From when he places the barber’s wrap over his knees. And from when is it considered the beginning of the bath? Rav Avin said: From when the one entering the bathhouse to bathe removes his outer wrap, his cloak. And from when is it considered the beginning of his visit to the tannery? From when he ties the leather apron between his shoulders (<i>Me’iri</i>). And from when is it considered the beginning of eating? Rav said: From when he ritually washes his hands for the meal. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: From when he loosens his belt.
  The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree. Rather this, the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that the beginning of the meal is considered from when he loosens his belt, is for us, for the people of Babylonia, who are accustomed to close their belts tightly, and therefore the beginning of the meal is when one loosens his belt. And that, the statement of Rav, who said that the beginning of the meal is considered from when he ritually washes his hands, is for them, the people of Eretz Yisrael who did not close their belts tightly, and therefore only when one washes his hands does the meal begin.
  Similarly, Abaye said: Those Babylonian Torah scholars, according to the opinion of the one who said: The evening prayer is voluntary, once one of them loosens his belt, we do not impose upon him to stop his meal and pray. And the Gemara wonders: And according to the opinion of the one who said that the evening prayer is obligatory, we do impose upon him? Doesn’t everyone agree that the afternoon prayer is obligatory? And we learned in our mishna that if they started eating, they need not stop. And with regard to that <i>halakha</i>, Rabbi Ḥanina said: The beginning of the meal is from when he loosens his belt.
  
  Daf 10a
  
  The Gemara responds that there is a difference between the cases. There, at the time of the afternoon prayer, drunkenness is uncommon, as it is unusual to drink excessively during the day. However, here, in the case of the evening prayer, drunkenness is common, and therefore there was room to issue a decree requiring one to interrupt his meal to recite the evening prayer. Alternatively, it is possible to explain that with regard to the afternoon prayer, since its time is fixed, he is anxious, and he won’t come to be negligent and forget to pray. However, with regard to the evening prayer, since all night is the time for the evening prayer, he is not anxious, and he will come to be negligent. Rav Sheshet strongly objects to this: Is it a burden to tie his belt? In addition, if it is a burden, let him stand that way, without a belt, and pray. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to wear a belt while praying, since it is stated: “Prepare to greet your God, Israel” (Amos 4:12). One must prepare and adorn himself when standing before God.
  Since the verse: “Prepare to greet your God, Israel,” was cited with regard to the obligation to prepare and adorn oneself before prayer, the Gemara cites that indeed Rava bar Rav Huna would don expensive socks and pray and he said he would do this as it is written: “Prepare to greet your God, Israel.” On the other hand, Rava would not do so; rather, in his prayer he would remove his cloak and clasp his hands and pray. He said that he would do so as a slave before his master, who appears before him with extreme submission. Rav Ashi said: I saw that Rav Kahana, when there is suffering in the world, would remove his cloak and clasp his hands and pray. And he said that he did so as a slave before his master. When there is peace in the world, he would dress, and cover himself, and wrap himself in a significant garment, and pray, and he said that he did so in fulfillment of the verse: “Prepare to greet your God, Israel.”
  Speaking of prayer, the Gemara relates that Rava saw Rav Hamnuna, who was prolonging his prayer. He said about him: They abandon eternal life, the study of Torah, and engage in temporal life, prayer, which includes requests for mundane needs. The Gemara explains: And Rav Hamnuna held that the time for prayer is distinct and the time for Torah is distinct. The time that one devotes to prayer is not at the expense of the time devoted to Torah study. Similarly, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira and they were engaged in the study of <i>halakha</i>. The time for prayer was approaching and it was getting late and Rabbi Yirmeya was hurrying to conclude the subject that they were studying in order to pray. Rabbi Zeira read this verse as applying to Rabbi Yirmeya: “One who turns his ear from hearing Torah, his prayer is also an abomination” (Proverbs 28:9).
  We learned that if one enters to sit in judgment adjacent to <i>minḥa</i>, he need not interrupt the trial and pray. The Gemara clarifies: From when is it considered the beginning of a trial? Rabbi Yirmeya and Rabbi Yona disagreed. One said that it begins from when the judges wrap themselves in their prayer shawls, as judges were accustomed to do before sitting in judgment. And one of them said that the beginning of judgment is from when the litigants begin articulating their claims. The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree. Rather, this <i>amora</i>, who says that it is from when the litigants begin, refers to a case where they were already engaged in a previous trial, and the judges were already wrapped in their prayer shawls. And that <i>amora</i>, who says that it is from when the judges wrap themselves in their prayer shawls, refers to a case where they were not engaged in a previous trial, and, as a result, the trial begins when they wrap themselves in the prayer shawls.
  Speaking of judgment, the Gemara relates that Rav Ami and Rav Asi would sit and study between the pillars beneath the study hall. And each and every hour they would knock on the bolt of the door and say: If there is someone who has a case that requires judgment, let him enter and come before us. The Gemara also relates that Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna would sit in judgment all day and their hearts would grow weak from hunger. Therefore, Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav from Difti taught them a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And it was the next day and Moses sat to judge the people and the people stood over Moses from the morning until the evening” (Exodus 18:13). Does it enter your mind that Moses would sit and judge all day long? If so, when was his Torah study accomplished? Rather, surely the verse is coming to tell you: Any judge who judges a true judgment truthfully, even if he sits in judgment only one hour, the verse ascribes to him as if he became a partner to the Holy One, Blessed be He, in the act of Creation, as by means of a true judgment he upholds the world (<i>Me’iri</i>). This conclusion is derived by means of a verbal analogy [<i>gezera shava</i>]: It is written here: “And the people stood over Moses from the morning until the evening.” And it is written there, in the act of Creation: “And it was evening and it was morning, one day” (Genesis 1:5). The evening and part of the morning are considered a whole day. With regard to this issue as well, it is sufficient for the judges to sit in judgment for only part of the day and there is no need for them to starve themselves by sitting in judgment all day.
  The Gemara questions further: Until when do they sit in judgment? What is the usual time that court adjourns? Rav Sheshet said: Until mealtime, noon. Rav Ḥama said: What is the verse that alludes to this? As it is written: “Woe to you, land that your king is a lad and your ministers eat in the morning. Happy are you, land that your king is free and your ministers eat on time in strength and not in drunkenness” (Ecclesiastes 10:16–17). He interprets the verse: The ministers in a proper country sit to eat only after they engaged in the strength of Torah and in judgment and not in the drunkenness of wine.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Eating in the first hour of the morning is the time of eating for <i>Ludim</i>, who are members of a nation of cannibals, and they are ravenous and hurry to eat. The second hour is the time of the eating of robbers. Since they spend the night stealing, they eat early in the morning. The third hour is the time of eating for heirs, i.e., people who inherited a lot of money and do not work for their sustenance. Their only preoccupation in the early hours of the morning is eating. The fourth hour is the time of eating for workers. The fifth hour is the time of eating for all people.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Pappa say that the fourth hour is mealtime for all people? Rather, emend the statement and say: The fourth hour is the time of eating for all people. The fifth hour is the time of eating for workers who do not have time to eat beforehand. The sixth hour is the time of eating for Torah scholars as, until then, court is in session. The Gemara adds: One who eats from then on is as if he is throwing a stone into a barrel, meaning that by then it does not contribute to the body’s health. Abaye said: We only said that eating from the sixth hour on is not beneficial, when he did not taste anything in the morning; however, if he tasted something in the morning, we have no problem with it.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: A person may, <i>ab initio</i>, recite his prayer in the bathhouse. The Gemara raises an objection from what was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who enters the bathhouse, in the first room, a place where all people stand dressed, it is like any other place and reading the Torah and prayer are permitted there, and, needless to say, in that room greeting [<i>shalom</i>] others is permitted. And he may don phylacteries there, and, needless to say, if he was already donning phylacteries that he need not remove them.
  In the next room, a place where people dress and undress and they stand both naked and dressed, greeting others is permitted there. However, reading the Torah and prayer are not permitted there. And if one was already donning phylacteries there, he need not remove the phylacteries. However, he may not don phylacteries there <i>ab initio</i>.
  In the innermost room, which is a place where people stand naked, greeting others is not permitted there, and, needless to say, reading the Torah and prayer are prohibited there. And if he is donning phylacteries there, he must remove the phylacteries, and, needless to say, he may not don them there <i>ab initio</i>. Apparently, the <i>Tosefta</i> contradicts the statement of Rav Adda bar Ahava as he was, no doubt, referring to the innermost room in the bathhouse, which alone is referred to simply as a bathhouse, and, according to him, one may pray there <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara answers: When Rav Adda bar Ahava said his <i>halakha</i>, he was referring to an empty bathhouse in which there are no people. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina say: With regard to the bathhouse in which they said that it is prohibited to pray, the prohibition exists even though there are no people in it? With regard to the bathroom in which they said that it is prohibited to pray, the prohibition exists even though there are no feces in it. Certainly, since the place serves a repugnant purpose, it is inappropriate to pray there at any time.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, when Rav Adda made his statement, he was referring to a new bathhouse that had not yet been used for bathing. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Ravina raise a dilemma before Rav Adda with regard to this matter: A place that one designated as a bathroom, what is its legal status as far as praying there is concerned? Is there designation as a significant and determining factor in this case? Or, is designation not a halakhically significant matter? And the dilemma was not resolved for him. Is the same not true with regard to the bathhouse? Doesn’t the same dilemma exist there? The Gemara answers: No, perhaps
  
  Daf 10b
  
  the bathroom is different, as it is disgusting. Once a place is called a bathroom it is disgusting and no longer fit for prayer. However, until he actually bathes in a bathhouse it remains fit for prayer.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: There is no greeting [<i>shalom</i>] others permitted in the bathhouse. The Gemara comments that this statement supports the opinion of Rav Hamnuna in the name of Ulla, who said: It is forbidden for a person to greet [<i>shalom</i>] his friend in the bathhouse because Shalom is one of the names of God, as it is stated: “And Gideon built there an altar for God and he called Him Lord Shalom” (Judges 6:24). Therefore, it is prohibited to utter the word <i>shalom</i> in a dishonorable place.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, words connoting faithfulness are also forbidden to say in the bathroom, as it is written “The faithful God who keeps the covenant and the kindness” (Deuteronomy 7:9). And if you say that it is indeed so, that it is forbidden to use the language of faithfulness in the bathroom, didn’t Rava bar Meḥasseya say that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: It is permitted to say faithfulness in the bathroom? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between the terms: There, the name of God itself is not called in that way, as we translate it as “the faithful God.” However, here, the name of God Himself is called Shalom, as it is written: “And he called Him Lord Shalom.” It is not an adjective, but a holy name in and of itself.
  Incidental to the halakhic statement in his name, the Gemara also cites another statement that Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: One who gives a gift to another must inform him that he is giving it to him. As it is stated: “Only keep My <i>Shabbatot</i> for it is a sign between Me and you for your generations to know that I am God Who sanctifies you” (Exodus 31:13). When the Holy One, Blessed be He, gave Shabbat to Israel, He told Moses to inform them about it. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “For I am God Who sanctifies you,” meaning that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: I have a good gift in My treasure house and Shabbat is its name, and I seek to give it to Israel. Go inform them about it. From here Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: One who gives a gift of bread to a child needs to inform his mother that he gave it to him. The Gemara asks: What does he do to the child, so that his mother will know that he gave him a gift? Abaye said: He should smear him with oil or place blue shadow around his eye in an obvious manner. When the mother of the child notices and asks him about it, he will tell her that so-and-so gave him a piece of bread. The Gemara asks: And now that we are concerned about witchcraft involving oil or eye shadow, what should one who gives a gift do? Rav Pappa said: He should smear him with food of the same type that he gave him to eat.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> itself, the Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Ḥama bar Ḥanina say: One who gives a gift to his friend need not inform him, as God made Moses’ face glow, and nevertheless it is stated with regard to Moses: “And Moses did not know that the skin of his face shone when He spoke with him” (Exodus 34:29)? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. When Rav Ḥama bar Ḥanina said that he need not inform him, he was referring to a matter that is likely to be revealed. When Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that he needs to inform him, he was referring to a matter that is not likely to be revealed. The Gemara asked: If so, isn’t Shabbat likely to be revealed, as it will be necessary to inform them of Shabbat together with the other mitzvot? Why was Moses asked to inform them about Shabbat separately? The Gemara answers: The giving of its reward is not likely to be revealed, and it was necessary to inform them about so extraordinary a gift.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda would take in his hand two gifts of the priesthood separated from an ox. He said: Anyone who comes and tells me a new <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav, I will give these gifts to him. Rava bar Meḥasseya said to him, Rav said as follows: One who gives a gift to his friend needs to inform him, as it stated: “To know that I am God Who sanctifies you.” He gave the gift to Rava bar Meḥasseya. Rava bar Meḥasseya said to Rav Ḥisda: Are the <i>halakhot</i> of Rav so beloved to you? Rav Ḥisda said to him: Yes. Rava bar Meḥasseya said to him, this is what Rav said: Fine wool is precious to those who wear it (Rav Ya’akov Emden), meaning only a person who is used to delicate items can appreciate their quality. Rav Ḥisda said to him excitedly: Did Rav say that? The latter statement is preferable to me more than the first. And if I were holding another gift I would give it to you.
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: A person should never distinguish one of his sons from among the other sons by giving him preferential treatment. As, due to the weight of two <i>sela</i> of fine wool [<i>meilat</i>] that Jacob gave to Joseph, beyond what he gave the rest of his sons, in making him the striped coat, his brothers became jealous of him and the matter unfolded and our forefathers descended to Egypt.
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said Rav said: A person should always seek and dwell in a city whose settling took place in the recent past, meaning that it was recently established, as due to the fact that its settling is recent its sins are few, as its residents have not yet had the opportunity to commit many sins there. As it is stated that Lot said to the angel: “Behold, here is this city that is close to run away to and it is small” (Genesis 19:20). What is the meaning of the word close? If you say: That it is close in distance and truly small, why did he need to say that to the angel? Didn’t they see it? Rather, the meaning of the word close must be because its settling was close, that it had been recently settled, and therefore its sins were few. Rabbi Avin said: What is the verse that teaches us that Zoar was newer than the other cities? As it is written: “I will escape there please [<i>na</i>]” (Genesis 19:20); the numerological value of <i>nun alef</i>, the letters of the word <i>na</i>, is fifty-one, while Sodom was fifty-two years old. And Sodom’s tranquil period
  
  Daf 11a
  
  during which they committed their sins was altogether twenty-six years, as it is written: “Twelve years they served Chedorlaomer and thirteen years they rebelled, and in the fourteenth year Chedorlaomer came” (Genesis 14:4–5). The twelve years plus the fourteen years during which they were enslaved were not years of tranquility, leaving only twenty-six tranquil years when they were sinful.
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: Any city whose roofs are higher than the synagogue will ultimately be destroyed because of the contempt shown the synagogue. Allusion to this is from that which is stated: “To uplift the house of our God and restore its ruins” (Ezra 9:9). The house that is devoted to God needs to be elevated above the other houses of the city. The Gemara adds: And this applies only to the height of the houses themselves. However, if the poles [<i>kashkushei</i>] and the towers [<i>abrurei</i>] that extend from the house are higher than the synagogue, we have no problem with it. Rav Ashi said: I caused the city of Mata Meḥasseya to not be destroyed by building the synagogue higher than the other houses. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t Mata Meḥasseya ultimately destroyed? The Gemara answers: It was not destroyed because of that sin; other sins caused its destruction.
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: It is preferable to be under the yoke of Ishmael and not under the yoke of a stranger, the Romans; under a stranger and not under a <i>Ḥabar</i>, a Persian Zoroastrian fire priest; under a <i>Ḥabar</i> and not under a Torah scholar, as if one offends a Torah scholar who is greater than he, the scholar will be exacting with him and he will be punished at the hand of Heaven; under a Torah scholar and not under an orphan or a widow, as they are easily insulted and God promised to hear their cries and punish those who offend them.
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: It is preferable to suffer from any extended illness and not from an intestinal illness. Similarly, it is preferable to suffer any pain, even if it is sharp and excruciating, and not heart pain; any slight ache and not a headache; any evil and not an evil wife.
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: Even if all the seas would be ink, and the reeds that grow near swamps would be quills, and the heavens would be parchment upon which the words would be written, and all the people would be scribes; all of these are insufficient to write the unquantifiable space of governmental authority, i.e., all the considerations with which a government must concern itself and deal. Rav Mesharshiya said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “The Heavens on High and the land to the depth and the heart of kings are unsearchable” (Proverbs 25:3).
  And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: A fast is effective to neutralize a bad dream like fire burns chaff. Rav Ḥisda said: And a fast is effective specifically on that day that he dreamed. And Rav Yosef said: One suffering from a bad dream that he dreamed is permitted to fast even on Shabbat.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi, happened to come to the house of Rav Ashi. They prepared a third-born calf, whose meat is high quality, for him. They said to him: Let the Master taste something. He said to them: I am sitting in the midst of a fast. They said to him: And does the Master not hold in accordance with this <i>halakha</i> of Rav Yehuda, as Rav Yehuda said: A person can borrow his fast and not fast on the day that he originally designated, and repay it by fasting on another day? You can postpone your fast to another day. He said to them: It is a fast for a dream. And Rava bar Meḥasseya said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: A fast is effective to neutralize a bad dream like fire burns chaff. And Rav Ḥisda said that the fast is effective specifically on that day that he dreamed. And Rav Yosef said that a person suffering due to a bad dream is permitted to fast even on Shabbat.
  We learned in the mishna that if they already began any one of the activities mentioned in the mishna they need not stop to recite the <i>Amida</i> prayer; however, they stop to recite <i>Shema</i>. The Gemara asks: Didn’t the first clause of the mishna already teach that they need not stop? Why does the mishna repeat it? The Gemara answers: In the latter clause of the mishna, we came to discuss matters of Torah. With regard to those engaged in Torah study, they need not stop for prayer, but they are required to stop to recite <i>Shema</i>. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Torah scholars, who were engaged in the study of Torah, stop their Torah study for <i>Shema</i>, and they do not stop for prayer. Rabbi Yoḥanan said a caveat to this statement: They only taught that they need not stop for prayer with regard to the likes of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai and his colleagues, whose Torah is their vocation and they never interrupt their Torah study. However, for the likes of us, who also engage in other activities, we stop both for <i>Shema</i> and for prayer.
  With regard to the essence of the statement the Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in a different <i>baraita</i>: Just as they do not stop for prayer, they do not stop for <i>Shema</i>? The Gemara answers: When that <i>baraita</i> was taught, it was taught with regard to those engaged in the intercalation of the year. Since their activity is crucial and all the Festivals of the year are determined through that activity, the Sages allowed them to continue and not stop to recite <i>Shema</i>. As Rav Adda bar Ahava said, and the Elders of the city of Hagronya also taught that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, said: When we were engaged in the intercalation of the year in Yavne, we would stop neither for <i>Shema</i> nor for prayer.
  MISHNA: This mishna deals with various decrees, especially with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, which were issued in order to distance a person from transgressions that he is liable to commit through habit and routine. The mishna said: The tailor may not go out with his needle adjacent to nightfall on Shabbat eve, lest he forget that he is carrying the needle and go out with it to the public domain even after Shabbat begins. And, similarly, the scribe [<i>lavlar</i>] may not go out with his quill[<i>kulmos</i>] for the same reason. And one may not shake his clothes on Shabbat to rid them of lice; and one may not read a book by candlelight, so that he will not come to adjust the wick of the lamp. However, in truth they said an established <i>halakha</i>: The attendant sees where in the book the children under his supervision are reading in the Torah, even by candlelight on Shabbat. However, he himself may not read. Similarly, the Sages issued a similar decree with regard to other <i>halakhot</i>, as they said: The <i>zav</i> may not eat even with his wife the <i>zava,</i> despite the fact that they are both ritually impure, because, by eating together, they will come to excessive intimacy and become accustomed to sin.
  GEMARA: Among the <i>halakhot</i> concerning decrees that were issued lest one come to commit a transgression, we learned in a mishna there: A person may not stand in the private domain and drink water located in the public domain, or vice versa, stand in the public domain and drink water located in the private domain, lest he transfer the vessel from which he is drinking the water to the place where he is standing and become liable to bring a sin-offering. However, if he introduced his head and most of his body into the place where the water that he is drinking is located, there is no longer room for concern, and it is permitted,
  
  Daf 11b
  
  and the same is true in the wine press.
  In light of the <i>halakha</i> that was taught in this mishna a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the legal status of a <i>karmelit</i> in this matter? Is it permissible to stand in one domain and drink from a <i>karmelit</i> or not? Abaye said: That case is equal to that case, i.e., the same way that the Sages prohibited drinking from the private domain to the public domain and vice versa, so too, they prohibited drinking from the <i>karmelit</i> to another domain. Rava said: It is not prohibited. It, the prohibition to carry between a <i>karmelit</i> and another domain, itself is merely a rabbinic decree. And will we arise and issue one decree to prevent violation of another decree? Although the Sages prohibited doing so in one of the domains by Torah law, i.e., the public and the private domains, a similar decree was not issued in a <i>karmelit,</i> which is a domain by rabbinic law.
  Abaye said: From where do I say that <i>halakha,</i> i.e., that the decree applies to a <i>karmelit</i>? From that which we learned at the end of the mishna in tractate <i>Eiruvin</i>: And the same is true in the wine press. The question arises: What is the status of the wine press in terms of the domains of Shabbat? If you say that it is the private domain, we already learned that in the mishna. If it is the public domain, we already learned that as well. Rather, isn’t this press a <i>karmelit</i>? Apparently, a <i>karmelit</i> was also prohibited in the mishna.
  Rava said: That which we learned in the mishna: And the same is true in the wine press, is not relevant to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. It refers to the matter of the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes. And Rav Sheshet also said: That which we learned in the mishna: And the same is true in the wine press, refers to the matter of tithes, as we learned in a mishna: One may <i>ab initio</i> drink grape juice directly on the press without tithing, whether the juice was diluted with hot water, even though he will then be unable to return the leftover wine to the press, as it would ruin all the wine in the press, or whether the juice was diluted with cold water, in which case he could return the leftover wine without ruining the rest, and he is exempt. Drinking that way is considered incidental drinking, and anything that is not a fixed meal is exempt from tithing. That is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, obligates one to separate the tithe in both cases. And the Rabbis say: There is a distinction between these two cases; when the wine was diluted with hot water, since he cannot return what is left of the wine to the press, he is obligated to tithe, as it is like fixed drinking for which one is obligated to tithe. However, when the wine was diluted with cold water, he is exempt, because he returns the leftover wine to the press, and it is incidental drinking, which is exempt from tithing. Our mishna, which says: And the same is true in the press, means that only if his head and most of his body was in the press is he permitted to drink without separating the tithe, and that <i>halakha</i> is not at all related to matters of Shabbat (Rabbeinu Ḥananel).
  As proof for Abaye’s opinion, the Gemara states that which we learned in our mishna: The tailor may not go out with his needle adjacent to nightfall on Shabbat eve, lest he forget that he is carrying the needle and go out with it to the public domain even after Shabbat begins. Is it not speaking here in a case where the needle was stuck in his clothing? In that case, even if he was to go out into the public domain with the needle, he would not be liable by Torah law, since that is not the typical manner of carrying out; carrying out an object in that manner is prohibited only by rabbinic decree [<i>shevut</i>]. Nevertheless, not only did the Rabbis issue a decree to prohibit going out with the needle on Shabbat, they issued a decree to prevent violation of another decree and prohibited the tailor from going out with his needle adjacent to nightfall. Apparently, the Sages institute a decree to prevent violation of another decree with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of carrying out on Shabbat (<i>Tosafot</i>). Consequently, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>karmelit</i>, the Sages issued a decree as well, and this is proof for Abaye’s opinion. The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to a case where he is holding the needle in his hand, which constitutes performance of the full-fledged prohibited labor of carrying out.
  Come and hear another proof from that which was taught explicitly in the <i>baraita</i>: The tailor may not go out with his needle stuck in his clothing. Is it not speaking of a case where he goes out on Shabbat eve, and the Sages issued a decree to prevent violation of another decree, just as Abaye said? The Gemara rejects this: No, when that was taught in the <i>baraita</i>, it was only with regard to carrying out on Shabbat itself. The Gemara asks further: Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: The tailor may not go out with his needle stuck in his clothing on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and the Sages issued a decree to prevent violation of another decree, just as Abaye said? The Gemara rejects this: Whose opinion is cited in this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: A craftsman who carries out an object in the manner common to his craft, even if others do not generally carry it out in that manner, the craftsman is liable, because he carried the object out in a manner standard for him.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The tailor may not go out with his needle that is stuck in his clothing, and a carpenter may not go out with the wood chip that is behind his ear for use as a measuring stick, and a comber of wool may not go out with a cord with which he ties bundles of wool and which is usually placed that is on his ear, and a weaver [<i>gardi</i>] may not go out with a bit of wool [<i>ira</i>] that is on his ear which he uses for the purpose of his work, and the painter may not go out with the sample of dyed wool that is on his neck, and a money changer may not go out with the dinar that is in his ear. In all of these cases the <i>halakha</i> is that if he went out, he is exempt by Torah law, but it is prohibited for him to do so by rabbinic decree. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: A craftsman who carries out an object in the manner common to his craft on Shabbat is liable by Torah law; any other person who carries it out in that manner is exempt, but it is prohibited for him to do so.
  Since the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the legal status of one who carries out an object in an atypical manner was mentioned, the Gemara discusses a contradiction between two related <i>baraitot</i>. It was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: The <i>zav</i> may not go out on Shabbat with his pouch that he ties to his organ in order to absorb his emission. And if he went out, he is exempt by Torah law but it is prohibited for him to do so by rabbinic law. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The <i>zav</i> may not go out on Shabbat with his pouch. And if he went out unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult. There is no contradiction between the <i>baraitot</i>, as this <i>baraita</i>, which deems him exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir; that, the other <i>baraita</i>, which deems him liable, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Say that you heard that Rabbi Meir deems him exempt with regard to an object that is not carried out in its typical manner. However, with regard to a matter that is carried out in its typical manner, did you hear that he deems him exempt? In general, one carries out a needle in his hand. Rabbi Meir exempts one who carries it out in his clothing, even if he is a craftsman. However, this pouch of a <i>zav</i>, even though it is not held in his hand, is always carried out in that manner, and, even according to Rabbi Meir, that constitutes a bona fide act of carrying out. As, if you do not say so, that the specifics of various prohibited labors can be performed in different manners, in the case of a layman [<i>hedyot</i>], who carved out a vessel the size of a <i>kav</i> in a piece of wood on Shabbat, would you say that Rabbi Meir also does not deem him liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat because he is not a craftsman and he did not craft the vessel according to the standards of a craftsman? Certainly, the layman performed a full-fledged labor to the best of his ability and he is liable.
  Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: This is not difficult, as the two <i>baraitot</i> are referring to two different cases. Here, in the <i>baraita</i> that deemed him liable by Torah law, it is referring to a <i>zav</i> who experienced two sightings of an emission. Liability to bring an offering as part of the purification process is only after he sees three emissions. Therefore, the <i>zav</i> requires the pouch in order to ascertain whether or not he experienced a third emission. However, there, in the <i>baraita</i> that deems him exempt, it is referring to a <i>zav</i> who already experienced three sightings. For him there is no significance whether or not he experiences an additional emission. Therefore, the pouch is insignificant and he has no interest in carrying it out.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about a <i>zav</i> who had two sightings, who is liable, as he requires the pouch for the purpose of examination to ascertain whether or not he experienced a third sighting, and a <i>zav</i> who already experienced three sightings and requires the pouch for the purpose of counting clean days? In order to become ritually pure, he must count seven clean days without experiencing an emission. If so, even a <i>zav</i> who had three sightings requires the pouch, in order to ascertain whether or not he experienced another emission. The Gemara answers: That <i>baraita</i> was only needed for that day when he already saw his third emission. In any case, that day will not be a clean day.
  The Gemara asks: Doesn’t even that <i>zav</i> need the pouch so that his clothes will not get soiled by the emission? Although he does not need the pouch for a halakhic determination, he needs it for practical considerations. Rabbi Zeira said: This <i>tanna</i> is the one who said that any usage intended to prevent filth is not considered a special purpose that will render a certain object an actual vessel. As we learned in a mishna: One who places a bowl on the wall while it is raining, if he did that so that the bowl would be rinsed with the rainwater, that is under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” The water has the legal status of a liquid that he poured of his own volition on fruit and seeds. It renders them liable to become ritually impure, as it is written: “If water be placed upon seed and any of their carcass fell on it, it is impure to you” (Leviticus 11:38). However, if he placed the bowl so
  
  Daf 12a
  
  that the wall will not be damaged, it is not under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” The water does not have the legal status of water poured for that purpose. This <i>tanna</i> does not consider protecting the wall from dirt as a significant usage. Similarly, protecting the <i>zav</i> from being soiled by the emission would not be considered a significant usage and the pouch used for that purpose would not be considered a significant vessel. The Gemara rejects this: Are these cases comparable? There, he does not need those liquids at all, and therefore the vessel is not considered to have been placed to receive them. However, here he needs this pouch to absorb the emission, to ascertain whether or not he experienced an emission. Although on that particular day he does not require the pouch, the <i>zav</i> typically requires his pouch for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is another emission.
  Rather, this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>zav</i> is comparable only to the latter clause of the mishna dealing with rainwater, in which we learned: A bowl that the drip of rain from the roof dropped into it, the water that splashes or overflows from the bowl does not have the legal status of water collected for a purpose, and is not under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” And the water that is in the bowl has the legal status of water collected for a purpose and is under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” Although, fundamentally, one has no interest in the drip of water, once the water already dripped, he wants it to remain in the bowl and not dirty the house. That desire is sufficient to accord the water in the bowl the legal status of water placed there willfully. The same is true with regard to the pouch of the <i>zav</i>. In the current situation of the <i>zav</i>, he is interested in keeping the emission in its place, and therefore the original difficulty posed by the contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i> remains intact.
  Rather, it is Abaye and Rava, who both said that this is not difficult. There is no contradiction between the <i>baraitot</i>. This <i>baraita</i>, which deems a <i>zav</i> liable by Torah law for going out with his pouch, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. His opinion is that one who performs a prohibited labor that is not needed for its own sake, but rather for a different consequence of that prohibited labor, is liable. And that <i>baraita</i>, which deems him exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. He holds that one who performs a prohibited labor that is not needed for its own sake is exempt. Since the <i>zav</i> is not at all interested in the flow and the pouch, he is exempt by Torah law for carrying the pouch.
  The Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may go out <i>ab initio</i> donning phylacteries on Shabbat eve at nightfall. Although one does not don phylacteries on Shabbat and going out donning them involves an element of carrying, there is no concern lest he forget and remove them on Shabbat. What is the reason for this? Because Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A person is obligated to touch his phylacteries at all times that he is donning them. This is derived from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference [<i>kal vaḥomer</i>] from the frontplate [<i>tzitz</i>] of the High Priest. Just as with regard to the frontplate, which has only one mention of God’s name, the Torah said: “And it should be always upon his forehead” (Exodus 28:38), which means that the High Priest must always be aware that the <i>tzitz</i> is placed on his head and that he should not be distracted from it; phylacteries that have numerous mentions of God’s name, all the more so one should always be aware of them. Therefore, he remembers that the phylacteries are on his head and is not likely to come to carry them on Shabbat. On a related note, the Gemara mentions that it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Ḥananya says: A person is required to feel his clothing on Shabbat eve at nightfall to ascertain whether he forgot an object in his pockets that he might come to carry on Shabbat. And Rav Yosef commented and said: That is a significant <i>halakha</i> for Shabbat, and it is fitting to do so in order to refrain from violating a prohibition.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not shake his clothes on Shabbat to rid them of lice; and one may not read a book by candlelight, so that he will not come to adjust the wick of the lamp. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean that one may not shake his clothes even during the day due to the concern lest he kill the louse that he finds in his clothing, and our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said: One who kills a louse on Shabbat, even though it is a very small creature, it is as if he killed a camel, and there is no difference in the severity of the prohibition. And what was said in the mishna: And he may not read by candlelight, is due to concern lest he adjust the wick, a totally independent matter. Or, perhaps both of these <i>halakhot</i> are due to the concern lest he adjust the wick, and both <i>halakhot</i> apply exclusively at night. During the day he is permitted to shake his clothes, and there is no concern lest he kill a louse.
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not shake clothing and one may not read a book by candlelight on Shabbat. The style of the <i>baraita</i> indicates that both actions are prohibited for the same reason. The Gemara rejects this: Is this proof from the <i>baraita</i> a stronger proof than our mishna? In our mishna, both <i>halakhot</i> are also cited together, and that was insufficient proof that they share a common rationale.
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may not shake clothing by the light of the lamp and one may not read by the light of the lamp. These two decrees are among the <i>halakhot</i> that the Sages said in the upper story of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon. Learn from this that both of the decrees are due to the concern lest he adjust the wick. In both decrees, the prohibition of doing so by the light of the lamp, lest he come to adjust the wick, was mentioned. Indeed, learn from this.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is prohibited to use candlelight even to distinguish between his garments and the garments of his wife. Because that requires a certain degree of scrutiny, there is concern lest he adjust the wick in order to see better. To qualify this statement, Rava said: We only said this with regard to the garments of the people of the city of Meḥoza, as there the men’s garments are wide and ornamented similar to the women’s garments; however, with regard to farmers and village residents, they know the difference between men’s and women’s garments. There is no concern lest they adjust the wick to distinguish between the garments, as the differences between men’s garments and women’s garments are obvious. Even with regard to the clothing of the people of Meḥoza, we only said that it is prohibited to distinguish between men’s and women’s garments with regard to the garments of old women; however, with regard to the garments of young women, they know the difference and there is no concern lest one adjust the wick to distinguish between them.
  The Sages taught: One may not shake clothing to rid them of lice in the public domain in deference to human dignity, as passersby would be offended by this. Similarly, Rabbi Yehuda said, and some say that Rabbi Neḥemya said it: One may not make an <i>appiktoizin</i>, a drug to induce vomiting, in the public domain in deference to human dignity. With regard to the matter of shaking clothing to rid them of lice on Shabbat, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who shakes his clothing may squeeze the louse and throw it, as long as he does not kill it. Abba Shaul says: He may take the louse and throw it, as long as he does not squeeze it. In his opinion, killing a louse is prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, even squeezing it is prohibited, lest he come to kill it. Rav Huna said: The <i>halakha</i> is that he may squeeze and throw the louse, and that is the dignified way to get rid of a louse, and even during the days of the week, when it is not Shabbat and there is no concern lest he violate the prohibition of killing a louse. Even then, it is preferable not to kill it because it is disgusting and it is sufficient to simply throw it (<i>Me’iri</i>). The Gemara relates that Rabba would kill the lice. And Rav Sheshet would also kill them. Rava would throw them into a cup [<i>lekna</i>] of water and he would not kill them directly with his hands. The Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman would say to his daughters: Kill them, and let me hear the sound of the combs, meaning, you may kill the lice in the usual manner on the comb.
  As far as the basic <i>halakha</i> is concerned, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to killing a louse on Shabbat: One may not kill a louse on Shabbat, this is the statement of Beit Shammai; and Beit Hillel permit doing so. In their opinion, a louse is unlike the other creatures for which one is liable for killing them on Shabbat.
  And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would also say in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: One may not make matches [<i>meshaddekhin</i>] for the children, to betroth them on Shabbat, and one may not enter into an agreement to take the child and teach him to read a sacred book or to teach him a trade, and one may not comfort mourners on Shabbat, and one may not visit the sick on Shabbat, this is the statement of Beit Shammai, as in their opinion, those are weekday activities and not appropriate on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel permit performing all of these activities on Shabbat, as they each include an aspect of mitzva.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who enters to visit a sick person on Shabbat does not address him in the manner customary during the week; rather, he says: It is on Shabbat that it is prohibited to cry out and ask for compassion, and healing is soon to come. And Rabbi Meir says that it is appropriate to add: The merit of Shabbat is capable of engendering compassion.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  Rabbi Yehuda says that it is appropriate to say: May the Omnipresent have compassion upon you and upon all the sick people of Israel. Rabbi Yosei says that it is appropriate to say: May the Omnipresent have compassion upon you among the sick people of Israel, thereby including this sick person within the community of Israel. When Shevna of Jerusalem would visit a sick person on Shabbat, upon entering, he would say <i>shalom</i>. And when he exited he would say: It is Shabbat when one is prohibited to cry out, and healing is soon to come, and His compassion is abundant, and rest on Shabbat in peace. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is the <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Ḥanina said: One who has a sick person in his house must include him among the sick people of Israel in his prayer? In accordance with whose opinion? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  And Rabbi Ḥanina said: It was only with great difficulty that the Sages permitted to comfort the mourners and visit the sick on Shabbat, as both the visitor and the comforter experience suffering on Shabbat. They permitted it only due to the mitzva involved in these activities. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: When we would follow Rabbi Elazar to inquire about the health of a sick person; sometimes he would say in Hebrew: May the Omnipresent remember you for peace, and sometimes he would say to him in Aramaic: May the all-Merciful remember you for peace. He would say it in Aramaic when the sick person did not understand Hebrew (Rav Elazar Moshe Horovitz). The Gemara asks: How did he do this, pray in Aramaic? Didn’t Rav Yehuda say: A person should never request that his needs be met in the Aramaic language? And, similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Anyone who requests that his needs be met in the Aramaic language, the ministering angels do not attend to him to bring his prayer before God, as the ministering angels are not familiar with the Aramaic language, but only with the sacred tongue, Hebrew, exclusively. The Gemara responds: A sick person is different. He does not need the angels to bring his prayer before God because the Divine Presence is with him.
  As Rav Anan said that Rav said: From where is it derived that the Divine Presence cares for and aids the sick person? As it is stated: “God will support him on the bed of illness” (Psalms 41:4). The Gemara comments: That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who enters to visit the sick person should sit neither on the bed nor on a chair; rather, he should wrap himself in his prayer shawl with trepidation and awe, and sit before the sick person below him, as the Divine Presence is above the head of the sick person, as it is stated: “God will support him on the bed of illness,” and he must treat the Divine Presence with deference. On a similar note, Rava said that Ravin said: From where is it derived that the Holy One, Blessed be He, feeds the sick person during his illness? As it is stated: “God will support him on the bed of illness.”
  We learned in the mishna that one may not read a book by candlelight on Shabbat. Rabba said: Since a decree was issued, there is no distinction whether or not the lamp was near enough to him to enable him to adjust the wick. The prohibition applies even if the lamp was two statures of a person high, and even as high as two plow handles, and even if it was as high as ten houses one atop the other. We learned in the mishna that one may not read, and the Gemara infers: One may not read, but for two, apparently, he may well do so. They will not violate any prohibition, as two people together will certainly not forget the Shabbat prohibition. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that neither one nor two are permitted to read by the light of the lamp? Rabbi Elazar said: This is not difficult, as there is room to distinguish between them and say that here, where two were permitted to read by candlelight, it is referring to a case where they are both engaged in one matter and will remind each other to refrain from adjusting the wick. There, where two were prohibited to read by candlelight it is referring to a case where they are engaged in two different matters. Since each is preoccupied with a different text, they will not pay attention and remind each other. Rav Huna said: And with regard to a bonfire, where everyone is sitting around it and not adjacent to it, even if they were ten people, it is prohibited to read by its light. When sitting around a bonfire, everyone sits at a distance from the others, and therefore they do not notice each other, and each is liable to adjust the firebrands to provide himself with more light.
  Rava said: Even though they prohibited reading by candlelight due to a decree lest they adjust the wick, if he is an important person, it is permitted, as even on weekdays he is not accustomed to adjust a lamp that is dirty with oil. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may not read a book on Shabbat by the light of the lamp, lest he adjust it. The <i>Tosefta</i> relates that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: I will read and will not adjust, as I will certainly not forget that it is Shabbat. However, once he read a book by candlelight and he sought to adjust the wick. He said: How great are the words of the Sages, who would say that one may not read by candlelight, as even a person like me sought to adjust the wick. Rabbi Natan says: That was not the way it happened. Rather, he read and actually adjusted the wick, and he wrote afterward in his notebook [<i>pinkas</i>]: I, Yishmael ben Elisha, read and adjusted a lamp on Shabbat. When the Temple will be rebuilt I will bring a fat sin-offering as atonement for this sin. This proves that even an important person like Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha is liable to adjust the wick. Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha is different, since with regard to the study of Torah, he comports himself like a simple man with no air of importance, but generally, an important person would not dirty his hands and adjust the wick.
  On this subject, the Gemara cites two apparently contradictory <i>baraitot</i>. It was taught in one <i>baraita</i> that a servant may examine cups and bowls by candlelight to check if they are clean. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i> that he may not examine them. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. Rather, here, the <i>baraita</i> that prohibited examining the cups, is referring to a regularly employed servant who fears his master and examines the dishes meticulously. Therefore, there is concern lest he come to adjust the wick. While there, the <i>baraita</i> that permitted examining the cups, is referring to a servant who is not regularly employed, does not fear his master, and therefore will not check meticulously. There is no concern lest he come to adjust the wick. And if you wish, say instead that this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are both referring to a regularly employed servant. And this is not difficult, as they are not referring to the same kind of lamp. This <i>baraita</i>, which prohibited examining the dishes, is referring to an oil lamp, where there is room for concern lest he adjust it. And that <i>baraita</i>, which permitted examining the dishes, is referring to a naphtha [<i>nafta</i>] lamp. Since the naphtha lamp is dirty, the servant certainly will not touch it while checking the cups and dishes.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to a servant who is not regularly employed in terms of examining cups and dishes by the light of an oil lamp? Is he permitted to examine the cups by candlelight, or not? From the perspective of his being a servant not regularly employed, it should be permitted. On the other hand, because it is an oil lamp it should be prohibited. Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is that it is permitted, and, however, <i>ab initio</i> a public ruling is not issued to that effect so that they will not come to sin. However, one who knows the <i>halakha</i> that it is permitted may practice accordingly. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: That <i>halakha</i> is that it is permitted and a public ruling is issued to that effect. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba happened to come to the house of Rav Asi on Shabbat. Rabbi Yirmeya’s servant stood and examined the cups by the light of a lamp [<i>sheraga</i>], as he was not a regularly employed servant in the house of Rav Asi. Rav Asi’s wife said to Rav Asi: But the Master, you, does not do so. You prohibit doing so. Why is the servant of Rabbi Yirmeya examining the cups? He said to her: Leave him, he holds in accordance with the opinion of his master.
  We learned in the mishna that in truth they said that the attendant sees where in the book the children under his supervision are reading, but he himself should not read. The Gemara asked: Didn’t you say in the first clause of the mishna that the attendant sees? Doesn’t that mean that he sees in order to read? How can that part of the mishna conclude by saying that he may not read? The Gemara answers: No, it does not mean that the attendant is permitted to actually read; rather, he is only permitted to look and arrange the beginning of his sections of the Torah that he must read the next day. And so too, Rabba bar Shmuel said: However, he may arrange the beginning of his sections that he must read the next day. The Gemara asks: And may he not read the entire section?
  
  Daf 13a
  
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The schoolchildren would organize the sections and read the book by candlelight. Apparently, it is permitted to read by candlelight on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the <i>Tosefta</i> is only referring to the beginning of the sections. And if you wish, say instead that children are different in this regard. Since the fear of their teacher is upon them, they will not come to adjust the wick. Even on a weekday, fear of their teacher will prevent them from tending to the lamp during their study.
  We learned in the mishna: Similar to this decree of Shabbat, the Sages issued a decree that the <i>zav</i> may not eat with his wife, the <i>zava,</i> even though they are both ritually impure, because by eating together they will come to excessive intimacy and become accustomed to sin. It was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Come and see to what extent ritual purity was widespread in Israel, as we did not learn: The ritually pure may not eat with the ritually impure woman; but rather, the <i>zav</i> may not eat with the <i>zava</i>, although they are both ritually impure, lest he become accustomed to sin. Needless to say, a pure and an impure person certainly would not eat together, as everyone was careful with regard to ritual purity. On a similar note, the Sages said: A <i>zav</i> who generally distances himself from ritual impurity, eats ritually pure food, and is careful about separating tithes, may not eat with a <i>zav</i> who is an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, who does not distance himself from ritual impurity and is not careful about separating tithes, due to the concern lest the <i>am ha’aretz</i> accustom him to frequently spend time with him, by means of a shared meal.
  The Gemara wonders: And if he accustoms him to be with him, what of it, what is the problem? Rather, say: Lest he feed him impure items. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the <i>zav</i> who generally distances himself from ritual impurity does not eat impure things? In his impure state, everything he touches automatically becomes impure, so why would he be concerned with regard to impure items? Abaye said: This prohibition is due to a decree issued by the Sages lest the <i>am ha’aretz</i> feed him food items that are not tithed. Rava said: He needn’t worry about items that are not tithed. Even if his friend was an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, there is a general principle in effect that most <i>amei ha’aretz</i> tithe their fruits. Rather, the Sages were concerned lest he become accustomed to spending time with the <i>am ha’aretz</i> even after the period of his impurity and he feed him impure items even during the days of his purity.
  An additional dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the requirement to distance oneself from prohibition and impurity: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a menstruating woman? May she sleep with her husband in one bed while she is in her clothes and he is in his clothes? Rav Yosef said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from what we learned in a mishna: The fowl is permitted to be placed together with the cheese on the table, although it may not be eaten with cheese. This is the statement of Beit Shammai. Beit Hillel say: The fowl is neither permitted to be placed together with the cheese on the table, nor may it be eaten with it. According to the opinion of Beit Hillel, which is the <i>halakha</i>, not only must one distance himself from the sin itself, but one must also make certain that items that are prohibited together are not placed together. The Gemara rejects this: There it is different as there are not several consciousnesses. When the fowl and the cheese are on one person’s table, he is liable to err and eat them both, as there is only one consciousness there, his. That is not the case when there are two people in one bed. In that case, there are two consciousnesses and there is no concern that they will both forget the prohibition.
  The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to say that where there are two or more consciousnesses it is different, as it was taught in the latter clause of that mishna, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two guests in one house may eat on one table this one eating meat and this one eating cheese, and they need not be concerned. The Gemara rejects this: That is not a proof. Was it not said with regard to this <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Ḥanin bar Ami said that Shmuel said: They only taught that the two of them may eat on one table when they are not familiar with each other; however, if they are familiar with each other it is prohibited for them to eat on one table, as there is room for concern that due to their familiarity they will share their food and come to sin. And, if so, these too, the husband and his wife, are familiar with each other. There is room for concern that they will not keep appropriate distance, and therefore they may not sleep together in one bed even if he is wearing his clothes and she is wearing her clothes. The Gemara rejects this: How can you compare these two cases? There, in the case of meat and milk, there are two consciousnesses; however, there is no noticeable change from the norm, as the meat and the cheese are on the table without any obvious indication to remind them not to mix the food items. While, here, in the case of the menstruating woman, there are two consciousnesses and there is also a noticeable change from the norm, as it is unusual for people to sleep in their clothes. The fact that they are both dressed constitutes a change.
  Others cite the previous passage as proof for Rav Yosef’s opinion and then reject it and say: Come and hear, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Two guests may eat on one table, this one eating meat and this one eating cheese. And it was stated with regard to this <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Ḥanin bar Ami said that Shmuel said: They only taught that the two of them may eat on one table when they are not familiar with each other; however, if they are familiar with each other it is prohibited for them to eat on one table, as there is room for concern that due to their familiarity they will share their food and come to sin. And, if so, these too, the husband and his wife are familiar with each other. There is room for concern that they will not act with the appropriate separation, and therefore they cannot sleep together in one bed, even if he is wearing his clothes and she is wearing her clothes. The Gemara distinguishes between the cases: There, in the case of meat and cheese, although there are two consciousnesses, there is no noticeable change. The meat and the cheese are on the table with no obvious indication to remind them not to mix the food items. While here, in the case of the menstruating woman, there are two consciousnesses and there is also a noticeable change.
  Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from what we learned in our mishna: The <i>zav</i> may not eat with the <i>zava</i> due to concern that excessive intimacy will lead them to become accustomed to sin. Even eating together is prohibited. The Gemara answers: Here, too, although there are two consciousnesses, there is no noticeable change.
  Come and hear a different resolution from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is stated: “And he has not eaten upon the mountains, neither has he lifted up his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel, neither has he defiled his neighbor’s wife, neither has he come near to a woman in her impurity” (Ezekiel 18:6). This verse juxtaposes a menstruating woman to his neighbor’s wife. Just as lying together with his neighbor’s wife, even when he is in his clothes and she is in her clothes, is prohibited, so too, lying with his wife when she is menstruating, even when he is in his clothes and she is in her clothes, is prohibited.
  The Gemara comments: And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Pedat, as Rabbi Pedat said: The Torah only prohibited intimacy that involves engaging in prohibited sexual relations, as it is stated: “None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6). The prohibition of intimacy in the Torah applies exclusively to relations, and all other kinds of intimacy that do not include actual relations are not included in the prohibition. When there is separation, they did not issue a decree.
  The Gemara relates that Ulla, when he would come from the house of his teacher, would kiss his sisters on their chests. And some say: On their hands. Ulla was not concerned about violating the prohibition of displaying affection toward a relative forbidden to him, as his intention was not to have relations with them. The Gemara adds that his action was in contradiction to a saying of his, as Ulla said: Even any intimacy is prohibited with a woman with whom he is forbidden to engage in sexual relations due to the reason formulated as an adage: Go around, go around, and do not approach the vineyard, they say to the nazirite. They advise the nazirite, who is forbidden to consume any product of a vine, that he should not even approach the vineyard. The same is true with regard to the prohibition of forbidden relations. According to Ulla, one must distance himself from them to whatever degree possible.
  The Sage in the school of Eliyahu taught a <i>baraita</i> that deals with this <i>halakha</i>: There was an incident involving one student who studied much Mishna and read much Bible, and served Torah scholars extensively, studying Torah from them, and, nevertheless, died at half his days, half his life expectancy. His wife in her bitterness would take his phylacteries and go around with them to synagogues and study halls, and she said to the Sages: It is written in the Torah: “For it is your life and the length of your days” (Deuteronomy 30:20). If so, my husband who studied much Mishna, and read much Bible,
  
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  and served Torah scholars extensively, why did he die at half his days? Where is the length of days promised him in the verse? No one would respond to her astonishment at all. Eliyahu said: One time I was a guest in her house, and she was relating that entire event with regard to the death of her husband. And I said to her: My daughter, during the period of your menstruation, how did he act toward you? She said to me: Heaven forbid, he did not touch me even with his little finger. And I asked her: In the days of your white garments, after the menstrual flow ended, and you were just counting clean days, how did he act toward you then? She said to me: He ate with me, and drank with me, and slept with me with bodily contact and, however, it did not enter his mind about something else, i.e., conjugal relations. And I said to her: Blessed is the Omnipresent who killed him for this sin, as your husband did not show respect to the Torah. The Torah said: “And to a woman in the separation of her impurity you should not approach” (Leviticus 18:19), even mere affectionate contact is prohibited. The Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: That student did not actually sleep with her with bodily contact; rather, it was in one bed that they slept without contact. In the West, in Eretz Yisrael, they say that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said: When they would sleep together in one bed, she wore a belt [<i>sinar</i>] from the waist down that would separate between him and her. Nevertheless, since the matter is prohibited, that student was punished.
  MISHNA: And these are among the <i>halakhot</i> that the Sages, who went up to visit him, said in the upper story of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon. The precise nature of these <i>halakhot</i> will be explained in the Gemara. These <i>halakhot</i> are considered one unit because they share a distinctive element. Since many Sages were there, among them most of the generation’s Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, they engaged in discussion of various <i>halakhot</i> of the Torah. It turned out that when the people expressing opinions were counted, the students of Beit Shammai outnumbered the students of Beit Hillel, and they issued decrees with regard to eighteen matters on that day in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.
  GEMARA: With regard to the language that introduces our mishna, Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Did we learn in our mishna: These are among the <i>halakhot</i>, or did we learn in our mishna: And these are among the <i>halakhot</i>? The difference is significant. Did we learn: And these, and if so, the reference would be to those that we said earlier, i.e., that those <i>halakhot</i> are included in the decrees? Or did we learn: These, and if so the reference would be to those that we seek to mention below? Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the fact that these matters were taught together in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not shake garments to rid them of lice by the light of the lamp and one may not read by the light of the lamp; and these are among the <i>halakhot</i> that the Sages said in the attic of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon. Conclude from this that we learned: And these in the mishna, and the reference is to the decrees mentioned earlier.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>, which is a list of days of redemption that were established as celebrations for generations: Who wrote <i>Megillat Ta’anit</i>? This scroll was written by Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon and his faction, who held dear the memory of the troubles that befell Israel and their salvation from them.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: We also hold dear the memory of the troubles from which Israel was saved, but what can we do? If we came to write all the days of that kind, we would not manage to do so, as the troubles that Israel experienced in every generation and era are numerous, and on each day there is an event worthy of commemoration.
  Alternatively: Why do we not record the days of salvation from troubles? Just as a crazy person is not hurt, as he is not aware of the troubles that befall him, so too, we cannot appreciate the magnitude of the calamities that befall us.
  Alternatively: The flesh of a dead person does not feel the scalpel [<i>izemel</i>] cutting into him, and we, too, are in such a difficult situation that we no longer feel the pains and troubles. With regard to the last analogy, the Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Yitzḥak say: The gnawing of maggots is as excruciating to the dead as the stab of a needle is to the flesh of the living, as it is stated with regard to the dead: “But his flesh shall hurt him, and his soul mourns over him” (Job 14:22)? Rather, say and explain the matter: The dead flesh in parts of the body of the living person that are insensitive to pain does not feel the scalpel that cuts him.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Truly, that man is remembered for the good, and his name is Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya, as if not for him, the book of Ezekiel would have been suppressed because its contents, in many details, contradict matters of Torah. The Sages sought to suppress the book and exclude it from the canon. What did he, Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya, do? They brought him three hundred jugs of oil, for light and food, up to his upper story, and he sat isolated in the upper story and did not move from there until he homiletically interpreted all of those verses in the book of Ezekiel that seemed contradictory, and resolved the contradictions.
  We learned in the mishna that when the Sages went up to the upper story of the house of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon, they were counted and issued eighteen decrees in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. The Gemara asks: What are those eighteen matters? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a mishna, a list of the decrees that the Sages issued with regard to items whose level of impurity is such that if they come into contact with <i>teruma</i> they disqualify it. By means of that contact, the <i>teruma</i> itself becomes impure, but it does not transmit impurity to other items. These disqualify <i>teruma</i>: One who eats food with first degree ritual impurity status acquired as a result of contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, e.g., a creeping animal; and one who eats food with second degree ritual impurity status acquired as a result of contact with an item with first degree ritual impurity status; and one who drinks impure liquids of any degree of impurity; and one whose head and most of his body come into drawn water after he immersed himself in a ritual bath to purify himself; and a ritually pure person that three <i>log</i> of drawn water fell on his head and most of his body; and a Torah scroll; and the hands of any person who did not purify himself for the purpose of handling <i>teruma</i>; and one who immersed himself during the day, i.e., one who was impure and immersed himself, and until evening he is not considered completely pure; and foods and vessels that became impure by coming into contact with impure liquids. Contact with any of these disqualifies the <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara seeks to clarify these matters.
  The Gemara asks first: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that one who eats food with first degree ritual impurity status, and one who eats food with second degree ritual impurity status, disqualify the <i>teruma,</i> but
  
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  do not render it impure; in other words, they do not render the <i>teruma</i> capable of transmitting impurity to other items? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who eats food with first degree ritual impurity status assumes first degree ritual impurity status, and anything with first degree ritual impurity status renders <i>teruma</i> impure. And one who eats food with second degree ritual impurity status assumes second degree ritual impurity status. One who eats food with third degree ritual impurity status assumes third degree ritual impurity status. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who eats food with first degree ritual impurity status and one who eats food with second degree ritual impurity status assume second degree ritual impurity status. One with second degree ritual impurity status who comes into contact with <i>teruma</i> disqualifies it and does not render it impure. One who eats food with third degree ritual impurity status assumes second degree ritual impurity status vis-à-vis consecrated items, and he does not assume second degree ritual impurity status vis-à-vis <i>teruma</i>. Eating an item with third degree ritual impurity status is only feasible in the case of non-sacred items, as eating impure <i>teruma</i> is prohibited. It is only possible in the case of non-sacred food items that were prepared as if their level of purity were on the level of the purity of <i>teruma</i>.
  With regard to the decree itself, the Gemara asks: One who eats food with first degree ritual impurity status and one who eats food with second degree ritual impurity status; what is the reason the Sages decreed impurity upon him, rendering him impure? The Gemara answers: Because at times one eats impure food, and takes liquids of <i>teruma,</i> and casts them into his mouth and disqualifies the liquids, as the impure food comes into contact with the liquid in his mouth and disqualifies it. To prevent this, the Sages decreed that one who eats impure food becomes impure and must refrain from touching <i>teruma</i> at all.
  Similarly, the Gemara asks: One who drinks impure liquids; what is the reason the Sages decreed impurity upon him? The Gemara answers: Because at times one drinks impure liquids, and takes <i>teruma</i> foods, and casts them in his mouth, and disqualifies them. The Gemara asks: This decree is the same as that decree as they were issued for one reason. Why did the mishna list them separately and consider them two different decrees? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that this, people who eat impure food, is common; as it is common for one eating to drink. Consequently, one who eats impure food is likely to drink <i>teruma</i> liquid. And, however, that, one drinking impure liquids who would put food in his mouth while drinking is uncommon. As a result, it is conceivable to say that the Sages did not issue a decree in an uncommon case. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that even in that instance the Sages decreed impurity.
  Among the eighteen decrees that the Sages issued on that day, we also learned: And one whose head and most of his body come into drawn water is impure by rabbinic decree. The Gemara asks: What is the reason the Sages decreed impurity upon him? Rav Beivai said that Rav Asi said: The reason for this is that originally they would immerse to become purified in cave water that was collected, still, and foul. Although this water purified them, due to its stench, the people immersing themselves would pour on themselves drawn water in order to clean themselves. Once they began this custom and transformed it into an established part of the ritual, the Sages issued a decree on the drawn water, rendering it impure, to prevent them from washing with it after immersion.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of this, that they transformed it into an established part of the ritual? Abaye said that they would say: The cave water is not what purifies; rather this, the cave water, and that, the drawn water, together purify. Rava said to him: What difference does it make if they say that? Ultimately, aren’t they immersing in the cave water? As long as they immersed themselves properly, it matters not if they misunderstand the reason. Rather, Rava said: The problem is that eventually they would say: This, the cave water, is not what purifies; rather, that, the drawn water, purifies. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting the use of drawn water after purification.
  And the Sages decreed impurity upon a ritually pure person that three <i>log</i> of drawn water fell on his head and most of his body. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages decreed impurity upon him? The reason for the decree is that if it were not for this decree that a ritually pure person, who does not require immersion, becomes impure when drawn water falls on him, then that, the first decree, would not stand. People would not distinguish between a person who was pure from the start and one who was just purified upon emerging from immersion.
  The Gemara explains the next case in the mishna: And a Torah scroll; what is the reason the Sages decreed impurity upon it? Rav Mesharshiya said: Since at first, ignorant priests would conceal <i>teruma</i> foods alongside the Torah scroll, and they said in explaining that method of storage: This is sacred and that is sacred, and it is appropriate that they be stored together. Since the Sages saw that they were coming to ruin, as the mice who were attracted to the <i>teruma</i> foods would also gnaw at the Torah scrolls, the Sages decreed impurity upon it. Once they issued the decree of impurity on the Torah scroll, the priests no longer placed <i>teruma</i> near it.
  The Gemara explains the next case in the mishna: And the hands; the reason that the Sages decreed impurity upon them is because hands are busy. A person’s hands tend to touch dirty or impure objects. Since one does not always pay attention to what his hands touch, and it is inappropriate for holy food to be touched by dirty hands, the Sages decreed impurity. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Even hands that come to be impure due to contact with a Torah scroll disqualify the <i>teruma</i>. The reason for this decree is because of the statement of Rabbi Parnakh, as Rabbi Parnakh said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who holds a Torah scroll in a manner that the scroll is exposed without a covering; his punishment is that he is buried naked. The Gemara wonders: Does it enter your mind to say that he will actually be buried naked? Why should he suffer such ignominy for this sin? Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: He is buried naked, i.e., without mitzvot. And the Gemara wonders further: Does it enter your mind to say that he should be buried naked in the sense of without mitzvot? Will he be stripped of all his merit due to that sin? Rather, say he is buried naked, i.e., without that mitzva. If he touches an uncovered Torah scroll, even for the purpose of performing a mitzva, he is not credited with that mitzva because he performed it inappropriately.
  The Gemara asks: Which of these decrees did the Sages issue first? If you say that they issued this decree, impurity of hands in general, first,
  
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  once they decreed that first, why do I need that decree of impurity on hands that touch a sacred scroll as well? Once the Sages decreed impurity on hands in general, there is no longer a necessity to decree impurity on hands that touched a Torah scroll, as hands are impure in any case. Rather, certainly the Sages decreed impurity on this, hands that touched a Torah scroll, first. And then they decreed impurity on all hands.
  Among the decrees listed in the mishna, there is the decree that contact with one who immersed himself during the day disqualifies <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: One who immersed himself during the day transmits impurity by Torah law, as it is written: “One who touches it remains impure until evening. He should not eat of the consecrated items and he must wash his flesh with water. And the sun sets and it is purified. Afterward, he may eat from the teruma, for it is his bread” (Leviticus 22:6–7). Consequently, until sunset he is prohibited by Torah law from touching consecrated items, and the same is true for <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara answers: Delete from here, from the list of decrees in the mishna, one who immersed himself during the day.
  And among the decrees that were listed, there is also the decree concerning the impurity of the foods that became impure through contact with liquids. The Gemara asks: With liquids that became impure due to contact with what source of impurity? If you say that the mishna is referring to liquids that come to be impure due to contact with a creeping animal, they are impure by Torah law, as it is written with regard to the impurity of creeping animals: “And every liquid that is drunk in any vessel, will be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). Rather, the mishna is referring to liquids that come to be impure due to contact with impure hands. The Sages issued this decree due to liquids that come to be impure through contact with a creeping animal.
  And among the decrees that were listed, there is also the decree concerning the vessels that became impure through contact with liquids. The Gemara asks: Vessels that became impure due to contact with liquids that became impure due to contact with what source of impurity? If you say that they become impure due to contact with liquids secreted by a <i>zav</i>, e.g., spittle, urine, etc., they are impure by Torah law, as it is written: “And if a <i>zav</i> spits on a pure person and he should wash his clothes and wash in water and he is impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:8). The Sages interpreted homiletically: Whatever is in the hand of the pure person I made impure for you. Not only did the person who came into contact with the liquids of the <i>zav</i> become impure, but the objects in his hand did as well. Rather, here it is referring to liquids that come to be impure due to contact with a creeping animal, which by Torah law do not transmit impurity to vessels. And the Sages issued a decree with regard to those liquids due to their similarity to the liquids of a <i>zav</i>.
  Among the list of items in the mishna with regard to which the disciples of Shammai and Hillel instituted decrees, were the hands of any person who did not purify himself for the sake of purity of <i>teruma</i>. If he came into contact with <i>teruma</i>, the Sages decreed it impure. The Gemara asks: And with regard to hands, was it the disciples of Shammai and Hillel who issued the decree of impurity? Shammai and Hillel themselves issued the decree. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida and Yosei ben Yoḥanan of Jerusalem decreed impurity on the land of the nations, that the land outside Eretz Yisrael transmits impurity; and they decreed impurity on glass vessels, even though glass is not listed in the Torah among the vessels that can become impure. Shimon ben Shataḥ instituted the formula of a woman’s marriage contract and also decreed special impurity on metal vessels. Shammai and Hillel decreed impurity on the hands.
  And if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to Shammai and his faction and Hillel and his faction, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: With regard to eighteen matters they issued decrees that day, and with regard to those eighteen matters they disagreed prior to that? The eighteen disputes were only between the disciples of Shammai and Hillel, whereas Hillel and Shammai themselves argued only in three places. Clearly, they were neither party to the disputes nor the decrees. As Rav Huna said: Shammai and Hillel disagreed in only three places and no more. And if you say that Hillel and Shammai came and decreed that <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with hands would be in abeyance, and their students came and decreed to burn <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with hands, then the following difficulty arises. Didn’t Ilfa, one of the Sages, say: With regard to hands, from the beginning their decree was that <i>teruma</i> that comes into contact with them is to be burned? According to Ilfa, there is no uncertainty. <i>Teruma</i> that came into contact with definite impurity is burned. <i>Teruma</i> that is in abeyance may not be destroyed. One must wait until it becomes definitely impure or decomposes on its own. Rather, the explanation is that they came and issued a decree and the people did not accept the decree from them, and their disciples came and issued a decree and they accepted it from them.
  The Gemara asks further: Still, the matter is not clear, as the decree of hands was issued by King Solomon. As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: At the time that Solomon instituted the ordinances of <i>eiruv</i> and of washing hands to purify them from their impurity, a Divine Voice emerged and said in his praise: “My son, if your heart is wise my heart will be glad, even mine” (Proverbs 23:15), and so too: “My son, be wise and make my heart glad, that I may respond to those who taunt me” (Proverbs 27: 11). The Gemara responds: Came
  
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  Solomon and decreed impurity on hands to prohibit contact with consecrated items, and Shammai, Hillel, and their disciples came and decreed impurity on hands even to prohibit contact with <i>teruma</i>.
  As to the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to eighteen matters they issued decrees that day, and with regard to those eighteen matters they disagreed prior to that. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that they reached a consensus in their opinions with regard to the eighteen decrees? They answer: On that day they disagreed, and the following day, after the matter was decided in a vote, they reached a consensus in their opinions.
  As to the matter itself that was mentioned above in passing, Rav Huna said: Shammai and Hillel disagreed in three places. The Gemara cites the disputes. One, Shammai says: From a <i>kav</i> of dough, one is required to separate <i>ḥalla</i>, the portion of the dough given to a priest. From any less than that measure there is no obligation to separate <i>ḥalla,</i> as that is not the measure alluded to in the verse: “The first of your dough” (Numbers 15:20), written with regard to the mitzva of separating <i>ḥalla</i>. And Hillel says: One must separate <i>ḥalla</i> only from two <i>kav</i>. And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is neither in accordance with the statement of this one, who is stringent, nor in accordance with the statement of that one, who is lenient. Rather, one and a half <i>kav</i> is the measure from which one is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. Once the measures increased and the Sages recalculated the volume of a <i>kav</i> to be greater, they said that based on the measure of the new <i>kav</i>, five quarters of a <i>kav</i> of flour is the measure from which one is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. Rabbi Yosei says: Five quarters are exempt; only from dough the size of five quarters and a bit more is one obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i>.
  And another dispute between Hillel and Shammai is that Hillel says: A full <i>hin</i>, twelve <i>log</i>, of drawn water poured into a ritual bath in which there was not yet a full measure of forty <i>se’a</i> disqualifies the water of the ritual bath and accords even the water that had been there previously the status of drawn water. Even if water fit for a ritual bath is subsequently added to complete the measure of forty <i>se’a</i>, the ritual bath remains unfit for immersion. Hillel used the biblical measure, <i>hin</i>, because, when quoting one’s teacher, a person must speak employing the language of his teacher. Shammai says: Nine <i>kav</i> of water is enough to disqualify the ritual bath. And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is neither in accordance with the statement of this one nor in accordance with the statement of that one. The Sages did not determine a measure for the water disqualifying a ritual bath until two weavers came from the Dung Gate in Jerusalem and testified in the name of Shemaya and Avtalyon that three <i>log</i> of drawn water disqualify the ritual bath, and the Rabbis upheld their statement against the opinions of the great Sages of Israel, Hillel and Shammai. The Gemara emphasized their occupation and the place that they lived to underscore that, despite the fact that their occupation was despised and their place was contemptible, there is no preferential treatment when it comes to Torah.
  And another dispute between Hillel and Shammai is that Shammai says: All women, their time is sufficient, i.e., a woman who notices that she saw blood of menstruation but did not feel the flow beforehand, need not worry that perhaps the flow of blood began before she saw it, and it is sufficient if she assumes ritual impurity status beginning at that moment. Hillel says: From examination to examination, i.e., a woman who saw blood, if she does not know when the menstrual flow began, she is considered impure retroactive to the last time she examined herself and found herself to be ritually pure, and even if the examination took place several days earlier. Anything that she touched in the interim becomes ritually impure. And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is neither in accordance with the statement of this one nor in accordance with the statement of that one; rather, the principle is: A full day, twenty-four hours, reduces the time from examination to examination, i.e., if her final self-examination took place a long time before, she need only concern herself with ritual impurity for the twenty-four hour period prior to noticing the blood. And from examination to examination reduces the time from a full day, i.e., if she examined herself in the course of the previous day and discovered no blood, she was certainly ritually pure prior to the examination.
  The Gemara asks: And are there no more disputes between them? Isn’t there what we learned that Hillel says that it is permitted to lay hands on the heads of offerings sacrificed on a Festival, and one performs no prohibited labor and does not desecrate the Festival by doing so; and Shammai says not to lay hands? The Gemara answers: When Rav Huna said his statement, he was referring to disputes where there is no dispute between the great Sages who predated them concomitant with theirs. The dispute with regard to laying hands on the Festival is ancient, and their predecessors, Sages dating back to the beginning of the era of the pairs, already disputed it.
  The Gemara asks further: Isn’t there also the dispute with regard to one who harvests grapes in order to take them to the press and stomp them as to whether or not the liquid that seeps out of the grapes is considered as having seeped out willfully and renders the grapes susceptible to impurity? Shammai says: It has become susceptible, and Hillel says: It has not become susceptible. The Gemara rejects this: Except for that one, as there, although they originally disagreed, ultimately Hillel was silent and did not respond to Shammai and ultimately accepted his opinion.
  Earlier it was mentioned that Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida and Yosei ben Yoḥanan of Jerusalem decreed impurity upon the land of the nations and upon glass vessels. The Gemara asks: Was it these two Sages, who were among the first Sages in the era of the pairs, who issued these decrees? Wasn’t it the Sages who lived in the final eighty years of the Second Temple period who issued these decrees? As Rav Kahana said: When Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, fell ill, the Sages sent to him: Rabbi, tell us two or three statements that you once told us in the name of your father.
  He sent to them: This is what my father said: One hundred and eighty years before the Temple was destroyed, the evil kingdom of Rome invaded Israel. Eighty years before the Temple was destroyed, they decreed impurity on the land of the nations and on glass vessels. Forty years before the Temple was destroyed, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stones and sat in the stores on the Temple Mount. With regard to the last statement, the Gemara asks: What are the halakhic ramifications of this statement? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: To say that they no longer judged cases of fines. The Gemara wonders: Does it enter your mind that they no longer judged cases of fines? Even several generations after the Temple was destroyed they continued to judge cases of fines in Eretz Yisrael. Rather, emend and say: That they no longer judged capital cases. The authority to impose the death penalty was stripped from the Sanhedrin, and therefore they willingly left the Chamber of Hewn Stone. Since the Sanhedrin no longer convenes in its designated place, the <i>halakha</i> is that it no longer has the authority to judge capital cases (<i>Tosafot</i>).
  In any case, we learned that the Sages of the last eighty years before the destruction are the ones who decreed impurity on the land of the nations. And if you say that Yosei ben Yo’ezer and Yosei ben Yoḥanan were also there during those eighty years, wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Hillel, and his son Shimon, and his grandson Gamliel, and his great-grandson Shimon filled their position of <i>Nasi</i> before the House, while the Temple was standing, for a hundred years, while Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida and Yosei ben Yoḥanan were much earlier than Hillel?
  
  Daf 15b
  
  Rather, this decree was issued in stages. First, Yosei ben Yo’ezer and Yosei ben Yoḥanan came and issued a decree that <i>teruma</i> that comes into contact with a clump of earth of the land of the nations is to be burned, and they decreed nothing with regard to <i>teruma</i> that enters into the air space of the land of the nations. The Sages of the final eighty years prior to the destruction of the Temple came and issued a decree with regard to <i>teruma</i> that enters into the air space of the land of the nations that its legal status is in abeyance, and it is not burned.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that there was one decree issued immediately to subject <i>teruma</i> to burning? Didn’t Ilfa say: With regard to hands, from the beginning their decree was that <i>teruma</i> that comes into contact with them is to be burned? The Gemara infers from this that, with regard to hands alone, the beginning of their decree was to render <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with them impure to the point of burning; however, with regard to other matters, they did not immediately issue so severe a decree.
  Rather, the stages of the decree were as follows: Yosei ben Yo’ezer and Yosei ben Yoḥanan came and decreed that any item that came into contact with a clump of earth is to be in abeyance, and they decreed nothing with regard to <i>teruma</i> that enters into the air space of the land of the nations. The Sages of the last eighty years came and were stringent by one more level; they decreed that <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with a clump of earth of the land of the nations is to be burned, and, with regard to <i>teruma</i> that enters into the air space of the land of the nations, its legal status is in abeyance.
  The Gemara asked further: And still is the matter clear? Didn’t the Sages issue this decree in Usha, many years after the destruction of the Temple? As we learned in a mishna: For six cases of uncertain impurity one burns the <i>teruma</i> which came into contact with them:For the uncertain case of <i>beit haperas</i>, meaning <i>teruma</i> that entered a field where a grave was plowed and the location of the bones of the corpse is unknown, and it is uncertain whether or not the <i>teruma</i> became impure;And for the uncertain case of earth that comes from the land of the nations, whose impurity itself has the status of uncertain impurity. Therefore, <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with it also has the status of uncertain impurity;And for the uncertain case of the clothes of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. Since an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is not careful with regard to purity, we are concerned lest a menstruating woman touch his clothes. Due to that uncertainty, his clothes are considered impure with a severe degree of impurity. If <i>teruma</i> came into contact with them there is uncertainty with regard to whether or not they became impure; And for the uncertain case of vessels that are not his that are found. Since he does not know whether or not those vessels are impure, if <i>teruma</i> came into contact with them, there is uncertainty whether or not they are impure;And for the uncertain case of spittle, as perhaps it is the spittle of a <i>zav</i> and transmits impurity by Torah law. If <i>teruma</i> came into contact with it there is uncertainty whether or not it is impure;And for the uncertain case of a person’s urine, even though it was adjacent to the urine of an animal, there is room for concern that perhaps it is the urine of a <i>zav</i>, and impure by Torah law. If <i>teruma</i> came into contact with it, there is uncertainty whether or not it is impure.In all of these cases, the Sages established that for their definite contact, when it is clear that these came into contact with <i>teruma</i>, and although there is uncertainty with regard to their essential impurity, i.e., it is uncertain whether or not these items are impure, one burns the <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with them.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case of uncertain contact; if it was in the private domain one burns <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with it, as with regard to impurity by Torah law an uncertainty that developed in a private domain is also ruled impure. According to Rabbi Yosei, these decrees, even though they are fundamentally cases of uncertainty, are sufficiently stringent that the Sages applied Torah law to them. And the Rabbis say: Since these cases are only impure by rabbinic decree, in a case of uncertain contact in the private domain, one does not burn the <i>teruma</i> but rather places it in abeyance. While in the public domain, they are ritually pure.
  And Ulla said with regard to these six uncertain cases: In Usha they instituted how one must act in terms of practical <i>halakha</i>. If so, a clump of earth from the land of the nations transmits impurity from the time of the Usha ordinances and not from eighty years prior to the destruction of the Temple. Rather, Yosei ben Yo’ezer and Yosei ben Yoḥanan came and decreed that if <i>teruma</i> came into contact with a clump of earth from the land of the nations, its legal status is in abeyance and one does not burn it, and upon <i>teruma</i> that entered the air space of the land of the nations they decreed nothing. And the Sages of the last eighty years of the Temple came along and issued a decree upon this, earth, and upon that, air, that in both cases the <i>teruma</i> is in abeyance. And the Sages of the city of Usha came along and decreed that <i>teruma</i> that came into contact with a clump of earth from the land of the nations is burned. And <i>teruma</i> that entered the air space of the land of the nations, as it stood, it continues to stand in abeyance. They did not impose any greater stringency in this matter.
  One of the matters mentioned above was the decree of impurity on glass vessels. With regard to glass vessels, what is the reason that the Sages decreed impurity upon them? Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Reish Lakish said: Since the beginning of the manufacture of glass vessels is from sand, the Sages equated them to earthenware vessels. The Gemara asks: But if what you say is so, if the Sages truly equated the impurity of glass vessels to the impurity of earthenware vessels, there should not be purification in the ritual bath for glass vessels, just as there is no purification for earthenware vessels. Why, then, did we learn in a mishna with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of immersing vessels: And these materials interpose in vessels, i.e., if they were stuck to the vessel when it was immersed the vessel is not purified: The pitch and the myrrh that were stuck on glass vessels obstruct their immersion. Apparently, glass vessels are purified in a ritual bath.
  The Gemara answers that glass cannot usually be purified in a ritual bath. However, with what are we dealing here? With a special case where the glass vessels were perforated and he dripped molten lead into them to seal the hole. This <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Everything follows the nature of the facilitator, i.e., if an object that is not fit for use on its own is reinforced with a different material that facilitates its use, the entire object assumes the legal status of that material. Therefore, since the substance that sealed the holes in these glass vessels is lead, which can be purified through immersion like other metals, these glass vessels can also be purified in a ritual bath. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Glass vessels that were perforated and one dripped lead into them; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that Rabbi Meir deems them ritually impure and the Rabbis deem them ritually pure.
  The Gemara asks further: But if that is so, and glass vessels are equated with earthenware vessels,
  
  Daf 16a
  
  they should not become impure from their outer side. Why, then, did we learn this in a mishna? With regard to earthenware vessels and vessels made from natron [<i>neter</i>], the <i>halakhot</i> of their impurity are equal in that they become impure if a primary source of impurity enters their airspace, and, once impure, they render food that enters their airspace impure from their air space. And they become impure from behind, i.e., if a primary source of impurity enters into the bottom of the vessel, where there is an empty space and a receptacle, the vessel becomes impure. However, earthenware vessels do not become impure from their outer side, i.e., if a primary source of impurity came into contact with the outer side of the vessel, the inside of the vessel does not become impure. And the breaking of earthenware vessels renders them pure. By inference, specifically natron vessels and earthenware vessels are those whose <i>halakhot</i> of impurity are equal, as is their status. However, with regard to other matters that is not the case. Why, then, were glass vessels not listed together with those vessels? The Gemara answers: Since if the glass vessels broke they have the capacity to be repaired, as the glass can be liquefied and recast into a new vessel, the Sages equated them to metal vessels that can also be liquefied and recast.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, if glass vessels were truly equated with metal vessels, then broken glass vessels that were liquefied and recast should reassume their previous impurity, like metal vessels. As we learned in a mishna: Metal vessels, both their flat vessels, which have no airspace, and their receptacles, which have airspace, are all impure if they came into contact with a primary source of ritual impurity. If they broke, they thereby became purified. However, if one remade the broken vessels into new vessels, they reassume their previous impurity. While, with regard to glass vessels, we learned in a mishna: Wooden vessels and leather vessels and bone vessels and glass vessels, their flat vessels are pure when they come into contact with impurity, and only their receptacles are impure. If they broke, they thereby became purified. However, if he remade the broken vessels into new vessels, they can become impure from that point, when they were recast, forward. By inference: From that point forward, yes, they become impure; retroactively, no, they do not reassume their previous impurity. Apparently, there is no <i>halakha</i> of previous impurity as far as glass vessels are concerned.
  The Gemara answers: The entire impurity of glass vessels is by rabbinic decree, and previous impurity, which takes effect on recast metal vessels, is by rabbinic decree. With regard to impurity by Torah law, the Sages imposed a decree of previous impurity. With regard to impurity by rabbinic law, the Sages did not impose a decree of previous impurity. The Sages did not impose the decree of previous impurity, which is by rabbinic decree, on glass vessels whose fundamental impurity is itself only by rabbinic decree.
  The Gemara asks further: Their flat vessels should in any case become impure. Since the impurity of flat metal vessels is by Torah law, isn’t it appropriate, therefore, to decree this impurity on flat glass vessels by rabbinic decree? The Gemara answers: The Sages made a distinction with regard to glass vessels, in order to prevent burning <i>teruma</i> and consecrated items for coming into contact with them. Through this distinction between glass vessels and metal vessels, everyone will understand that the impurity of glass vessels is not by Torah law. They will not come to burn <i>teruma</i> and consecrated items that came into contact with impure glass vessels; rather, their legal status will remain in abeyance.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  Rav Ashi said: There was never a need to equate glass vessels and metal vessels. Actually, glass vessels are likened to earthenware vessels in every sense. And that which was difficult for you, that if so, glass vessels, like other earthenware vessels, should not become impure from contact of their outer side with a source of ritual impurity; since in glass vessels its inner side looks like its outer side, the legal status of the outer side was equated with that of the inner side, as there is no visible separation between them.
  We learned that Shimon ben Shataḥ instituted the formula of the marriage contract for a woman and decreed impurity upon metal vessels. The Gemara asks: Aren’t metal vessels impure by Torah law, as it is written: “But the gold, and silver, and the bronze, and the iron, and the tin, and the lead. Anything that came in fire, make it pass through fire and it will be pure, but with the water of sprinkling it will be purified and anything that did not come in fire make it pass through water” (Numbers 31:22–23)? The Gemara answers: This ordinance of Shimon ben Shataḥ with regard to the impurity of metal vessels in general was only needed with regard to previous impurity reassumed by metal vessels after they are recast. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: There was an incident involving Shimon ben Shataḥ’s sister, Shel Tziyyon the queen, who made a wedding feast for her son. All of her vessels became impure, and she broke them and gave them to the smith, and he welded the broken vessels together and made new vessels. And the Sages said: What she did was ineffective, as all the vessels will reassume their previous impurity.
  With regard to the essence of the matter, the Gemara asks: What is the reason that they imposed a decree of previous impurity on metal vessels? The Gemara answers: Due to a fence constructed to maintain the integrity of the water of a purification offering, the Sages touched upon it. In order to purify a vessel that came into contact with a corpse, one is required to have the water of a purification offering sprinkled on the vessel on the third day and the seventh day after it became impure, as it is written: “He should be purified with it on the third day and on the seventh day he will become pure, and if he is not purified with it on the third day and on the seventh day he will not become pure” (Numbers 19:20). This involves a significant inconvenience. If people will prefer to break or damage impure metal vessels in order to purify them more easily, the use of water of a purification offering will become obsolete. As a result, the Sages decreed that metal vessels will remain impure until they undergo the purification process.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that they did not say the decree of previous impurity on metal vessels with regard to all forms of impurity; rather, they only said the decree with regard to the impurity caused by contact with a corpse, it works out well. In the case of impurity caused by contact with a corpse, the Sages issued this decree because its purification process is demanding. It requires immersion and sprinkling of the water of a purification offering on the third and the seventh days. However, with regard to other forms of impurity, whose purification is accomplished by means of immersion alone, a person will not break a vessel in order to avoid immersion. Consequently, there is no need to institute a decree in those cases.
  However, according to the one who said that they said the decree of previous impurity in metal vessels with regard to all forms of impurity, which includes those forms of impurity that do not require sprinkling of the water of a purification offering for their purification, what is there to say as a rationale for the decree? Abaye said: Shimon ben Shataḥ instituted a decree due to the concern that perhaps he would not perforate that vessel with a hole large enough to render it ritually pure. To purify a vessel by breaking it, one must make a hole large enough to ensure that the vessel will no longer be able to hold the contents that it was designed to hold. Abaye explained that Shimon ben Shataḥ’s concern was that one who values the vessel will not break it sufficiently to render it ritually pure.
  Rava said: It is a decree lest they say that immersion on the same day is sufficient for this vessel to be purified. People will be unaware of the manner in which the metal vessel became pure, and they will assume that its purity was achieved by means of immersion and not by means of breaking. That will lead them to the conclusion that any vessel becomes pure immediately upon immersion, and there is no need to wait for sunset, contrary to Torah law. Therefore, the Sages decreed that repaired vessels retain previous impurity. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the reasons of Abaye and Rava? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is found in a case where he broke the vessel completely. If there was concern that perhaps he will not perforate it sufficiently, there is no longer room for concern. However, if there was concern lest people say that immersion is effective on that day, there remains room for concern.
  To this point, several, but not all, of the eighteen decrees were enumerated. The Gemara asks: And what is the other decree? The Gemara answers: As we learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Mikvaot</i>: One who places vessels under the drain pipe in order to collect rainwater, the water collected in the vessels is considered drawn water. This is true both in the case of large vessels which, due to their size, do not become impure, and in the case of small vessels. And even if they were stone vessels and earth vessels and dung vessels, made from dry cattle dung, which are not considered vessels in terms of ritual impurity and do not become impure at all, this ruling applies. The water in the vessels is considered drawn water in all respects. If it leaked from those vessels and flowed into a ritual bath that had not yet reached its full measure, forty <i>se’a</i>, and filled it, the water invalidates the ritual bath. The Gemara adds that this <i>halakha</i> applies both in a case where one places the vessels beneath the drainpipe with premeditated intent to collect the water flowing through it as well as in a case where one forgets the vessels there and they are filled unintentionally; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel deem the ritual bath pure, i.e., fit to complete the full measure of the ritual bath, in a case where one forgets the vessels. Rabbi Meir said: They were counted in the attic of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya and Beit Shammai outnumbered Beit Hillel. And Rabbi Meir said that Beit Shammai agree with Beit Hillel that in a case where one forgets vessels in the courtyard and they fill with rainwater, the water is pure. Rabbi Yosei said: The dispute still remains in place, and Beit Shammai did not agree with Beit Hillel at all.
  Rav Mesharshiya said: The Sages of the school of Rav say: Everyone agrees that if he placed the vessels in the courtyard at the time of the massing of the clouds, a sign that it is about to rain, just before it began to rain, then the water in the vessels is impure, unfit, as he certainly intended that the water fill the vessels. If one placed the vessels at the time of the dispersal of the clouds, and then the clouds massed together, and then rain fell and the vessels filled with the rainwater, everyone agrees that the water is pure. It is fit to fill the ritual bath to its capacity because at the time that he placed the vessels under the drainpipe his intention was not that they fill with rainwater. They only disagreed in a case where he placed them at the time of the massing of the clouds, and the clouds dispersed, and rain did not fall then, and only later the clouds massed again, and rain fell and filled the vessels. In that case, this Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that because the clouds dispersed after he placed the vessels, his thought to fill the vessels with water was negated. The vessels remained in the courtyard due to his forgetfulness, and when they filled afterward it was not his intention that they fill. And this Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that his thought was not negated, as his original intention was ultimately fulfilled despite the delay in its fulfillment.
  The Gemara wonders: Indeed, according to Rabbi Meir, another decree was added to the total. However, according to Rabbi Yosei, who said that in this case the dispute still remains in place, the tally of eighteen decrees is lacking. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The decree that the daughters of the Samaritans [<i>kutim</i>] are considered to already have the status of menstruating women from their cradle, their birth, they issued on that day. The <i>halakha</i> is that any female who sees blood of menstruation is impure, regardless of her age, even if she is a day old. The Samaritans did not accept that <i>halakha</i>. Consequently, it is possible that there were girls among them who saw blood of menstruation before their coming-of-age, and the Samaritans ignored their impurity. Therefore, due to this uncertainty, the Sages decreed impurity on all daughters of the Samaritans from birth.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the other decree? The Gemara answers that another decree is as we learned a halakhic tradition in a mishna that all movable objects with the width of an ox goad, a long stick for prodding and directing a plowing animal, transmit impurity. If one side of the object was over a corpse and the other side of the object was over vessels, the vessels become impure due to the impurity of a tent over a corpse. Rabbi Tarfon said:
  
  Daf 17a
  
  I will bury my sons if this is not a truncated <i>halakha</i>, i.e., that the one who heard it, heard a halakhic ruling concerning a different situation and erred. He thought this <i>halakha</i> was established with regard to the following: Movable objects with the thickness of an ox goad transmit impurity to another vessel when the movable object is over both the source of impurity and the vessel at the same time. However, the original <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If the farmer was passing and his ox goad was on his shoulder and one side of the ox goad covered the grave, the Sages deemed the ox goad itself impure due to the impurity of vessels that cover a corpse. Any object located over a grave becomes impure. However, just because the ox goad itself became impure, this does not necessarily mean that it transmits impurity to other objects.
  Rabbi Akiva said: I will correct and explain the <i>halakha</i> so that the statements of the Sages will be upheld as they were originally said, and this <i>halakha</i> will be explained as follows: All movable objects transmit impurity to the person carrying them if the objects are at least as thick as an ox goad. As will be explained below, there is room to decree that a round object with the circumference of an ox goad should have the legal status of a tent over a corpse. Something that serves as a covering over a corpse not only becomes impure itself, but also transmits impurity, as it is written: “Anything that is in the tent will become impure for seven days” (Numbers 19:14). Therefore, even the person carrying the ox goad becomes impure due to the ox goad. And, however, movable objects that covered the corpse bring impurity upon themselves by means of this makeshift tent at any size, and there is no minimum measure. And, however, those objects that cover the corpse do not transmit impurity to other people who are not carrying them. And the same is true with regard to vessels, unless the width of these vessels is at least one handbreadth.
  And Rabbi Yannai said: And the ox goad that they mentioned is specifically one in which its width is not a handbreadth and, however, its circumference is a handbreadth, and they, the Sages, issued a decree on its circumference due to its width. If its width was a handbreadth it would transmit impurity as a tent by Torah law. Therefore, they issued a rabbinic decree with regard to an object whose circumference is a handbreadth. This is another of the eighteen decrees.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Tarfon, who said: I will bury my son if this is not a truncated <i>halakha</i>, the tally of the decrees is lacking, and there are not eighteen. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The decree that the daughters of the Samaritans are considered to already have the status of menstruating women from their cradle, they issued on that day. And in the other matter of drawn water, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and thereby the tally of the decrees is complete.
  And another of those decrees is the matter of one who harvests grapes in order to take them to the press. Shammai says: It has become susceptible, and Hillel says: It has not become susceptible. Hillel said to Shammai: If so, for what purpose do they harvest grapes in purity, i.e., utilizing pure vessels, as in your opinion, since the grapes are susceptible to impurity by means of the juice that seeps from them, care must be taken to avoid impurity while gathering; and, however, they do not harvest olives in purity? According to your opinion that liquid that seeps out renders the fruit susceptible to impurity, why is there not a similar concern with regard to the liquid that seeps out of olives?
  Shammai said to him: If you provoke me and insist that there is no difference between gathering olives and grapes, then, in order not to contradict this, I will decree impurity on the gathering of olives as well. They related that since the dispute was so intense, they stuck a sword in the study hall, and they said: One who seeks to enter the study hall, let him enter, and one who seeks to leave may not leave, so that all of the Sages will be assembled to determine the <i>halakha</i>. That day Hillel was bowed and was sitting before Shammai like one of the students. The Gemara said: And that day was as difficult for Israel as the day the Golden Calf was made, as Hillel, who was the <i>Nasi</i>, was forced to sit in submission before Shammai, and the opinion of Beit Shammai prevailed in the vote conducted that day. And Shammai and Hillel issued the decree, and the people did not accept it from them. And their students came and issued the decree, and the people accepted it from them.
  As to the essence of the matter, the Gemara asks: What is the reason they decreed that liquids that seeped from the grapes unintentionally render the grapes susceptible to impurity? Rabbi Ze’iri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The Sages issued a decree due to concern lest he gather the grapes in impure baskets. The impurity of the vessel would accord the liquid in it the status of a liquid that renders food items susceptible to impurity.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well, according to the one who said that an impure vessel accords liquids in it the halakhic status as if they were placed there willfully, and they render foods susceptible to impurity even if he did not want the liquids in the vessel. However, according to the one who said that an impure vessel does not accord liquids that status, what can be said in explanation of the decree? Rather, Rabbi Ze’iri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said the following: The reason is not as we suggested; rather, this is a decree instituted by the Sages lest he gather them in pitched baskets, which are sealed. Since liquids that seep out of the grapes do not spill out of the baskets, it is opportune for him to have the liquids seep out of the grapes as he thereby accelerates the production of wine in the press. Because the seeping of the liquid is opportune, it renders the grapes susceptible to impurity.
  Rava said: The reason for the decree is due to the case of liquid that squirted out when one separated clusters of grapes that were stuck together. Since he did so by his own hand, consciously and willfully, the liquid that seeps out renders the grapes susceptible to impurity. Just as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Sometimes a person goes to his vineyard in order to ascertain whether or not the grapes have reached the time for gathering, and he takes a cluster of grapes to squeeze it, and he sprays the juice onto the grapes. Based on the quality of the juice, he determines whether or not the grapes are sufficiently ripe. If so, this grape juice was squeezed by his own hand willfully and it renders the grapes susceptible to impurity, as even at the time of gathering it is conceivable that the liquid is still moist upon the grapes.
  Since all eighteen decrees decreed that day have not yet been enumerated, the Gemara asks: And what is the other? Said
  
  Daf 17b
  
  Tavi the bird hunter [<i>rishba</i>] that Shmuel said: The decree that growths of <i>teruma</i>, i.e., produce that grows from <i>teruma</i> that was planted in the ground, are considered <i>teruma</i>, the Sages also issued on that day. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this decree? Rabbi Ḥanina said: A decree due to pure <i>teruma</i> in the hand of a non-priest Israelite. One who seeks to avoid giving <i>teruma</i> to a priest would plant it in the ground and thereby negate its <i>teruma</i> status. To prevent him from doing so, the Sages decreed that that which grows from the <i>teruma</i> is also considered <i>teruma</i>. Consequently, one would gain nothing by replanting the <i>teruma</i>.
  Rava said: If they are suspected of that, let them refrain from separating <i>teruma</i> altogether. Rather, Rava said: We know that with regard to an Israelite, as opposed to a Levite, fundamentally it is possible to perform the mitzva of <i>teruma</i> by separating merely one grain of wheat, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said that by Torah law there is no fixed measure for <i>teruma</i>. By separating one grain of wheat as <i>teruma</i> for all the wheat on the threshing floor, one fulfills his obligation. Since he nevertheless did not take advantage of that possibility to exempt himself from the obligation of separating <i>teruma</i>, he is trustworthy, and there is no reason to suspect that he will seek to avoid giving <i>teruma</i> to the priest by planting it. Rather, the reason for the decree is due to impure <i>teruma</i> in the hand of a priest. A priest is forbidden to eat impure <i>teruma</i> and he is required to burn it. However, the priest is permitted to derive benefit from its burning. The Sages were concerned lest he keep the impure <i>teruma</i> with him until the season of sowing and sow his field with it, and, as a result, he encounter a stumbling-block because over time he is liable to forget that the <i>teruma</i> is impure and eat it.
  With regard to the total of eighteen decrees, the Gemara asks: And what is the other decree? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: In a case of one who was carrying a purse with money in it on Shabbat eve, and it got dark for him on the way, the Torah law permitted him to carry the purse in increments, each of which is less than four cubits. However, the Sages issued the following decree: It is prohibited to carry in increments; he should give his purse to a gentile accompanying him. This decree was also issued on that day.
  And the other decree: The Sage Bali said that Avimi of Sanvata said: The decrees with regard to gentiles that prohibit their bread, and their oil, and their wine, and their daughters are all one decree of the eighteen matters. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to Rabbi Meir, as according to his opinion the Gemara already enumerated eighteen decrees. However, according to Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the dispute remains with regard to the matter of vessels in the courtyard, they are only seventeen. The Gemara answers: There is also that statement of Rav Aḥa bar Adda, as Rav Aḥa bar Adda said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The Sages issued a decree prohibiting eating their bread due to their oil. And they issued a decree prohibiting their oil due to their wine. Consequently, there are two separate decrees.
  The Gemara wonders: They issued a decree on their bread because of their oil. In what way is the prohibition on oil stronger than the prohibition on bread? Rather, say that they issued a decree prohibiting their bread and their oil due to their wine. And they issued a decree prohibiting their wine due to the fact that it leads to familiarity, and people will come to marry their daughters. And they issued a decree prohibiting their daughters due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else, idolatry, due to something else. The Gemara asks: What is the something else alluded to here? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They issued a decree on a gentile baby, according him the legal status that he transmits impurity as one with the legal status of a great <i>zav</i>, who experienced three emissions, even though he did not experience an emission. This was in order to distance Jewish children from gentile children so that a Jewish boy should not be accustomed to be with a gentile in homosexual relations. The Gemara asks: If so, according to Rabbi Meir it is difficult as well, as they are now nineteen decrees. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir counts the decrees of food items and vessels that became impure through contact with liquids as one. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir, too, there are only eighteen decrees.
  MISHNA: In this mishna there is a fundamental dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai: Must one begin refraining from actions prohibited on Shabbat on Shabbat eve? Or, may one initiate an action prior to Shabbat, even if he knows that it will continue on its own on Shabbat itself? These are the details of that dispute: Beit Shammai say: One may only soak dry ink in water and dry plants, which produce dyes, in water and vetch for animal food to soften them in water on Shabbat eve, adjacent to Shabbat, if there is clearly sufficient time for them to soak for their designated purpose while it is still day, before Shabbat begins, and their continued soaking on Shabbat will have no effect. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may only place bundles of combed flax inside the oven on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time so that they will be heated while it is still day. And one may only place wool into the dyer’s kettle if there is sufficient time for the wool to absorb the dye while it is still day. And Beit Hillel permit doing so.
  Beit Shammai say: One may spread traps for an animal and birds and fish only if there is sufficient time remaining in the day for them to be trapped in them while it is still day, and Beit Hillel permit doing so even if there is not sufficient time remaining in the day. Beit Shammai say: One may only sell an item to a gentile on Shabbat eve, and one may only load a burden on his donkey with him, and one may only lift a burden on him if there remains sufficient time for the gentile to arrive to a near place prior to Shabbat, and the Jew will play no role in the performance of a prohibited labor by the gentile on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may not give skins to a gentile tanner, nor clothes to a gentile launderer, unless there is sufficient time for work on them to be completed while it is still day, before Shabbat begins. And in all of them Beit Hillel permit doing so with
  
  Daf 18a
  
  the sun, i.e., as long as the sun is shining on Friday. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: The ancestral house of my father, the dynasty of <i>Nesi’im</i> from the house of Hillel, was accustomed to give its white clothes to a gentile launderer no fewer than three days before Shabbat. And, however, these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that, <i>ab initio</i>, one may load the beam of the olive press on the olives on Shabbat eve while it is still day, so that the oil will continue to be squeezed out of the olives on Shabbat. So too, one may load the circular wine press to accelerate the process of producing wine from the grapes.
  GEMARA: Before clarifying the matters themselves, the Gemara seeks to determine: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that merely adding water to ink without any additional action constitutes its soaking, and one is liable for doing so on Shabbat, as he performed an act of kneading, one of the primary categories of labor? Rav Yosef said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where one person adds the flour and another one adds the water into one vessel, the latter one is liable for kneading the dough, which is a prohibited labor on Shabbat, even though he did not actually knead the dough; that is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei says: He is not liable for the prohibited labor of kneading until he actually kneads the dough. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, merely soaking the dough in water is considered a prohibited labor.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And perhaps Rabbi Yosei only stated that actual kneading is required to be liable for performing the prohibited labor of kneading in the case of flour, which can be kneaded; however, ink, which cannot be kneaded, say that its soaking is considered a full-fledged prohibited labor, and he will therefore be liable, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara rejects this: It should not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where one places the ashes and one adds the water, the latter one is liable, although he did not knead them. That is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He is not liable until he actually kneads them. Apparently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, he is only liable for committing the prohibited labor of kneading on Shabbat if he actually kneads the mixture, as he stated his <i>halakha</i> even with regard to ashes, which cannot be kneaded.
  The Gemara asks: And perhaps, what is the meaning of ashes [<i>efer</i>] mentioned here? Perhaps it is soil [<i>afar</i>], which can be kneaded. In that case he is not liable until he actually kneads the mixture. However, with regard to ashes, which cannot be kneaded, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, also holds that even if he did not actually knead the mixture he is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Wasn’t the dispute taught in one <i>baraita</i> with regard to ashes, and wasn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i> with regard to soil? In both cases, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagreed. The Gemara rejects this proof: Were they taught next to each other? Had both of these <i>baraitot</i> been taught together, it would have been truly possible to arrive at the conclusion that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagrees both in the case of ashes and in the case of soil. However, since the <i>baraita</i> that speaks about ashes was taught elsewhere by a different <i>amora</i> who cited it in the name of Rabbi Yosei, the difference in language does not prove that Rabbi Yosei disagrees in both cases.
  The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may open a canal that passes adjacent to a garden on Shabbat eve at nightfall, so that water will flow into a garden and the garden continuously fills with water all day long on Shabbat. Similarly, one may place incense, perfumed herbs placed on coals to produce a fragrance, on coals beneath the clothes on Shabbat eve and the clothes may be continuously perfumed all day long. And, similarly, one may place sulfur beneath the silver vessels on Shabbat eve at nightfall for the purpose of coloring the vessels, and they may be continuously exposed to sulfur all day long. And one may place an eye salve [<i>kilor</i>] on the eye and a bandage [<i>ispelanit</i>] smeared with cream on a wound on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and the wound may continuously heal all day long on Shabbat. However, one may not place wheat kernels into the water mill unless he does so in a way so that they will be ground while it is still day on Friday and not on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the <i>baraita</i> prohibited a mill and permitted other prohibited labor? Rabba said: Because it makes noise and the public will hear the mill grinding on Shabbat. Although no prohibited labor is being performed, doing so displays contempt for Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages prohibited it. Rav Yosef said to Rabba: And let the Master say a better reason, due to the obligation to ensure the resting of utensils. Even the utensils of a Jewish person may not be used for prohibited labor on Shabbat. As it was taught in halakhic midrash, the <i>Mekhilta</i>: That which is stated: “And in all that I said to you, take heed” (Exodus 23:13), is an allusion to matters mentioned in the Oral Torah. It comes to include the resting of utensils on Shabbat. Rather, Rav Yosef said: The reason for the prohibition of the mill on Shabbat is due to the resting of utensils.
  Since the obligation of resting utensils on Shabbat was mentioned, the Gemara says: Now that you said that Beit Hillel also hold that resting utensils on Shabbat is required by Torah law, with regard to sulfur and incense on coals that are placed under silver vessels and clothes, respectively, what is the reason that the Sages permitted this on Shabbat? Isn’t that performed on Shabbat in utensils? The Gemara answers: Because the utensil itself does not perform an action when the incense or sulfur is burning. With regard to the bundles of flax, what is the reason that they permitted placing them in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall to dry, even though the oven is performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat? Because it does not perform an action; rather, on the contrary, it sits idle in its place and the prohibited labor occurs on its own. However, with regard to traps of an animal, and a bird, and a fish, which perform a bona fide action of trapping, what is the reason that they permitted spreading them on Shabbat eve at nightfall? The Gemara explains: There too, it is referring to a fish hook and nets [<i>kokrei</i>], which perform no action. They stand in place, and the fish comes to them and is trapped. Indeed, a trap that performs an action is prohibited.
  And now that Rav Oshaya said that Rav Asi said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who states that the obligation of resting utensils on Shabbat is by Torah law? The <i>tanna</i> is Beit Shammai and not Beit Hillel. Consequently, according to Beit Shammai, whether the utensil performs an action or whether it does not perform an action, it is prohibited. And according to Beit Hillel, even though it performs an action, it is nevertheless permitted. The Gemara asks: And now that you said that according to Beit Shammai even though the utensil does not perform an action it is prohibited, if so,
  
  Daf 18b
  
  with regard to placing incense and sulfur beneath clothes and silver vessels, respectively, what is the reason Beit Shammai permitted this? The Gemara answers: The case under discussion was not one where the incense was placed in a vessel; rather, there, the incense was placed on the ground, and therefore there was no utensil that was obligated to rest. The Gemara asks further: A tub in which fruit or grains are placed to ferment into beer, and where they stay for an extended period; and a Shabbat lamp; and a pot in which food is being cooked, which they place on the fire while it is still day; and a spit [<i>shapud</i>] on which they placed food to roast while it is still day; what is the reason Beit Shammai permitted placing them on Shabbat eve while it is still day even though the prohibited labor continues over time, including on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: These are cases where he declares the utensils ownerless. According to Beit Shammai, the utensils must be declared ownerless while it is still day. Once the utensils are declared ownerless, they no longer belong to a Jew and, consequently, there is no obligation to let them rest.
  The Gemara asks: Based on these conclusions, who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this <i>Tosefta</i> that the Sages taught: A woman may not fill up a pot with pounded wheat and lupines, a type of legume, and place them in the oven to cook on Shabbat eve at nightfall. And if she placed them in the oven, not only may they not be eaten on Shabbat itself, but even at the conclusion of Shabbat they are forbidden for a period of time that would be sufficient for them to be prepared, i.e., the time it takes to cook the dish from the beginning, so that he will derive no benefit from a prohibited labor performed on Shabbat. Similarly, the <i>Tosefta</i> said: A baker may not fill a barrel of water and place it in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall to boil the water that is in the barrel, and if he did so, even at the conclusion of Shabbat it is forbidden for the period of time that would be sufficient for it to be prepared from the beginning. Let us say that this <i>Tosefta</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai and not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara answers: Even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, in those cases the Sages issued a decree due to concern lest the one cooking stoke the coals on Shabbat in order to accelerate the cooking.
  The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to incense and sulfur, the Sages should also issue a decree that prohibits placing them beneath clothes and silver vessels, respectively, on Shabbat eve at nightfall. The Gemara answers: There, in that case, he will not stoke them, as if he stokes them smoke will rise into the garments and the silver, and that is damaging for them. The smoke from the wood will ruin the fragrance and the coating of sulfur. The Gemara asks further: With regard to bundles of flax, the Sages should also issue a decree. The Gemara answers: There, since wind is damaging for them, he does not expose them, and he will not come to stoke the coals. The Gemara asks further: With regard to wool placed in the dyer’s kettle, the Sages should also issue a decree. Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a pot that is removed from the fire, where there is no concern lest he stoke the coals. The Gemara still asks: Let us be concerned lest he stir that same pot, thereby accelerating the cooking, which is prohibited by Torah law. Rather, the mishna is referring to a pot that is removed from the fire and sealed with clay spread around its cover to prevent it from opening.
  The Gemara comments: And now that the Master said that in these cases the prohibition of placing the pot on the fire is due to a decree issued by the Sages lest he stoke the coals; with regard to this pot of raw meat, it is permitted to place it in an oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall. What is the reason for this? Since it is not fit for consumption during the night, as it will not be cooked by then, he diverts his thoughts from it and will not come to stoke the coals. And the same is true of cooked meat; it is permitted to place it on the fire on Shabbat eve at nightfall. Since it is reasonably cooked, one will not come to stoke the coals to cook it more. Meat that is cooked and not sufficiently cooked is prohibited, as there is concern lest he come to stoke the coals. And if he threw a raw bone into this pot, he may well do so, as due to the bone he will not remove the meat to eat it in the evening.
  And now that the Master said that anything for which wind is damaging one does not expose, one could say that with regard to meat of a kid and an oven whose opening is sealed with clay, he may well place it there on Shabbat eve at nightfall. Since the meat of the kid cooks quickly and the opening of the oven is sealed, there is no concern lest he come to stoke the coals. If it is the meat of a ram [<i>barḥa</i>] and the opening of the oven is not sealed with clay, it is prohibited to place it there on Shabbat eve at nightfall. The above are cases where the ruling is clear. However, with regard to the case of the meat of a kid and the opening of the oven is not sealed with clay, or the case of a ram and the opening of the oven is sealed, there is a dispute. Rav Ashi permitted placing it in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and Rav Yirmeya from Difti prohibited doing so. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, who permitted placing it there on Shabbat eve at nightfall, wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one may not roast meat, an onion, and an egg on Shabbat eve unless there is sufficient time for them to be roasted while it is still day? Apparently, one may not place meat that is not sufficiently roasted in an oven on Shabbat eve. The Gemara answers: There, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the meat of a ram and the opening of the oven is not sealed with clay. However, in other cases it is permitted.
  Others say that with regard to the meat of a kid, whether it is in an oven that is sealed or whether it is in one that is not sealed, everyone agrees that he may well do so. With regard to the meat of a ram, when the opening of the oven is sealed, one may well do so too. Where they disagreed was in the case of the meat of a ram and the opening of the oven was not sealed. Rav Ashi permitted placing it in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and Rav Yirmeya from Difti prohibited doing so. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Ashi, who permitted this, wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one may only roast meat, an onion, and an egg on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time for them to be roasted while it is still day? Apparently, one may not place meat that is not sufficiently roasted in an oven on Shabbat eve. The Gemara answers: There, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the case of meat roasted directly on the coals. In that case, there is greater concern that he will come to stoke the coals. Ravina said: With regard to that raw gourd, one may well place it in a pot on the fire on Shabbat eve at nightfall. The reason for this is that since the wind is damaging for it, it is considered like the meat of a kid.
  The full text of the <i>baraita</i> is: Beit Shammai say: One may only sell an item to a gentile on Shabbat eve, and one may only load a burden onto his donkey with him, and one may only lift a burden onto him if the destination of the gentile is near enough that there remains sufficient time for the gentile to arrive at a place near there prior to Shabbat. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that elaborated upon this dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to selling to a gentile on Shabbat eve: Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell his object to a gentile, and lend it to him, and loan him money, and give him an object as a gift on Shabbat eve, unless there is sufficient time for him, the gentile, to reach his house while it is still day. And Beit Hillel say: He is permitted to do this if there is sufficient time for him to reach a house adjacent to the wall of the place where he is going. Rabbi Akiva says: It is permitted to give an object to a gentile on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time for him to exit the entrance of the Jewish person’s house. What the gentile does afterward is irrelevant. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: That is the statement of Rabbi Akiva; that is the statement of Beit Hillel. Rabbi Akiva came only to explain the statement of Beit Hillel. The <i>tanna</i> whose version of Beit Hillel’s statement was: Until he reaches the house adjacent to the wall, held that Beit Hillel’s opinion was similar to Beit Shammai’s opinion. Rabbi Akiva came to elucidate the actual opinion of Beit Hillel.
  The Sages taught a similar principle in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to another tannaitic dispute. Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell his leaven to a gentile on Passover eve unless he knows that the leaven will be finished before Passover. And Beit Hillel say: As long as it is permitted for the Jew to eat leaven, it is also permitted for him to sell it to a gentile. The Jew ceases to be responsible for the leaven sold to a gentile from the moment it is sold. And Rabbi Yehuda says:
  
  Daf 19a
  
  With regard to Babylonian <i>kutaḥ</i>, a spice that contains leavened bread crumbs, and all kinds of <i>kutaḥ</i>, it is prohibited to sell it to a gentile thirty days before Passover. Because <i>kutaḥ</i> is used exclusively as a spice, it lasts longer than other foods.
  The Sages taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: One may, <i>ab initio</i>, put food before the dog in the courtyard on Shabbat, and we are not concerned that the dog may lift it and carry it out to the public domain. If the dog lifted it and exited the courtyard, one need not attend to him, as he is not required to ensure that the dog will eat it specifically in that courtyard.
  On a similar note, the <i>baraita</i> continued: One may place food before the gentile in the courtyard on Shabbat. If the gentile lifted it and exited, one need not attend to him. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this as well? This case is the same as that case. The <i>halakhot</i> with regard to the dog and the gentile are identical, as Shabbat prohibitions do not apply to either of them. The Gemara answers: There is a distinction. Lest you say that in this case, the case of the dog, responsibility for its food is incumbent upon the owner of the courtyard who owns the dog. And in this case, the case of the gentile, responsibility for his food is not incumbent upon the owner of the courtyard. Therefore, in a situation where there is concern that Shabbat will be desecrated, there is room to say that one may not give the gentile his food. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that in that case, it is also permitted.
  The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: A person may not rent his utensils to a gentile on Shabbat eve, as it appears that the Jew is receiving payment for work performed on Shabbat. However, on the fourth and on the fifth days of the week it is permitted. On a similar note, one may not send letters in the hand of a gentile on Shabbat eve. However, on the fourth and on the fifth days of the week it is permitted. Nevertheless, they said about Rabbi Yosei the priest, and some say that they said this about Rabbi Yosei the Ḥasid, that a document in his handwriting was never found in the hand of a gentile, so that a gentile would not carry his letter on Shabbat.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not send a letter in the hand of a gentile on Shabbat eve unless he stipulates a set sum of money for him. In that case, anything the gentile does with this letter is not in service of the Jew, but rather on his own, since his payment is stipulated in advance. Beit Shammai say: One may only give a letter to a gentile on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time for the gentile to reach his house before dark. And Beit Hillel say: If there is sufficient time for him to reach the house adjacent to the wall of the city to which he was sent.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t he stipulate a set price? What difference does it make whether he reaches the city on Shabbat eve or on Shabbat? Rav Sheshet said, the <i>baraita</i> is saying as follows: And if he did not stipulate a set price for the task, Beit Shammai say: One may only give a letter to a gentile on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time for the gentile to reach his house before dark. And Beit Hillel say: If there is sufficient time for him to reach the house adjacent to the wall of the city to which he was sent.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t you say in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>, that one may not send a letter unless he stipulated a set price? Without stipulating a set price, one may not send a letter at all. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is possible to explain that this, where we learned that one is permitted to give a letter to a gentile on Shabbat eve even if he did not stipulate a set price, is in a case where the house of the mail carrier [<i>bei doar</i>] is permanently located in the city. And this, where it is permitted to give a letter to a gentile only if he stipulated a set price, is in a case where the house of the mail carrier is not permanently located in the city.
  The Sages taught: One may not set sail on a ship fewer than three days before Shabbat, to avoid appearances that the Jew is performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. In what case is this statement said? In a case where he set sail for a voluntary matter; however, if he sailed for a matter involving a mitzva, he may well do so. And, even then, he must stipulate with the gentile ship captain that this is on the condition that he rests, i.e., stops the ship, and even if the gentile does not rest. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He need not stipulate. And sailing on a ship that is traveling from Tyre to Sidon, a short journey by sea, is permitted even on Shabbat eve.
  The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may not lay siege to cities of gentiles fewer than three days before Shabbat, to avoid the need to desecrate Shabbat in establishing the siege. And if they already began establishing the siege fewer than three days before Shabbat, they need not stop all war-related actions even on Shabbat. And so Shammai would say: From that which is written: “And you should build a siege against the city that is waging war with you until it falls” (Deuteronomy 20:20), it is derived that the siege should be sustained “until it falls.” Consequently, the siege must continue even on Shabbat.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: The ancestral house of my father, the dynasty of <i>Nesi’im</i> from the house of Hillel, was accustomed to give its white clothes to a gentile launderer no fewer than three days before Shabbat. It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that Rabbi Tzadok said: This was the custom of the house of Rabban Gamliel: They would give white clothes to the gentile launderer three days before Shabbat, and they would give him colored clothes even on Shabbat eve. The Gemara comments: And from their statement we learned that white garments are more difficult to launder than colored ones, as in white garments every stain is more conspicuous.
  On a related note, the Gemara relates that Abaye gave this dyed garment to the launderer. Abaye said to the launderer: How much do you want as payment to wash it? The launderer said to Abaye: Same as for a white garment. Abaye said to him: You cannot deceive me in this matter, as the Sages already preceded you, as it was taught in the <i>baraita</i> which garment is more difficult to wash. On this topic, Abaye said: One who gives clothing to the launderer, he should give it to him by measure and he should take it back from him by measure. In that way, if it is longer, it is an indication that the launderer caused him a loss because he stretched the garment. And if it is shorter, he certainly caused him a loss because he shrunk it.
  We learned in the mishna that these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that one may load the beam of the olive press and the circular wine press. The Gemara asks: What is different about all of the cases in the mishna, where Beit Shammai issued a decree prohibiting them, and what is different about the beams of the olive press and the circular wine press that Beit Shammai did not issue a decree prohibiting them? The Gemara answers: Those cases, where if he performed them on Shabbat he is rendered liable to bring a sin-offering, Beit Shammai issued a decree prohibiting them on Shabbat eve at nightfall. However, in the cases of the beams of the olive press and the circular wine press, where even if he performed them on Shabbat he is not rendered liable to bring a sin-offering, Beit Shammai did not issue a decree.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that anything that comes on its own, and not as the result of an action, it may well be done on Shabbat? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to the garlic and the unripe grapes, and the stalks of wheat that he crushed while it was still day, Rabbi Yishmael says: He may continue tending to them and finish after it gets dark, as after the crushing is completed these items are placed beneath a weight, so that the liquids will continue to seep out. And Rabbi Akiva says:
  
  Daf 19b
  
  He may not finish. And the <i>amora</i> Rabbi Elazar said: Our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar the <i>tanna</i>. As we learned in a mishna: With regard to honeycombs that he crushed on Shabbat eve and the honey came out on its own on Shabbat day, it is prohibited to eat the honey, like anything that was prepared on Shabbat. And Rabbi Elazar permits eating it on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, what is the reason he did not say in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Elazar? Apparently, Rabbi Elazar’s explanation in the mishna is more accurate. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei could have said to you that there, in the case of the honeycombs, it is food from the beginning and it is food at the end, as honey is considered food. Therefore, there was no squeezing of liquid from food at all. However, here, in all of the cases in the mishna, from the beginning they were food and now they became liquid, and that is the definition of squeezing. And Rabbi Elazar could have said to you in response to this assertion: We heard that Rabbi Elazar permitted olives and grapes as well. As when Rav Hoshaya from Neharde’a came, he came and brought a <i>baraita</i> with him, in which it was taught: Olives and grapes that he crushed from Shabbat eve and the liquids seeped out on their own, the liquids are prohibited. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon permit those liquids. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina did not know this <i>baraita</i>.
  On the other hand, the Gemara asks: And Rabbi Elazar, what is the reason he did not say in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Elazar could have said to you: Wasn’t it stated that Rava bar Ḥanina said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Here it is referring to items that lack grinding, i.e., when the garlic and the unripe grapes were not ground in a pestle at all, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to place them in a manner that causes their liquids to come out on their own on Shabbat. The case where they disagreed was where they were already completely ground, but they were still lacking additional pounding; and these cases in our mishna are also considered as if they were lacking grinding. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina issued a practical ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and permitted a person to finish tending to them even after dark.
  Since the Gemara raised issues related to the olive press, it cites other connected matters: Oil of olive pressers and mats of olive pressers, which they use in their work, Rav prohibited moving them on Shabbat since they are set aside for a specific purpose, and it is prohibited to move an item set aside and designated for a defined purpose on Shabbat. And Shmuel permitted doing so, as according to Shmuel, the legal status of set-aside [<i>muktze</i>] does not apply in most cases. Along the same lines, they disagreed with regard to those mats used to cover merchandise transported on a ship. Rav prohibited using them because they are set aside and Shmuel permitted using them. Similarly, Rav Naḥman said: A goat raised for its milk, and a ewe that is raised for shearing its wool, and a chicken raised for its egg, and oxen used for plowing, all of which are designated for purposes other than eating, as well as dates used for commerce; in all of these Rav prohibited using them for food, or slaughtering them even on a Festival due to the prohibition of set-aside. The reason for this is that during the day, before Shabbat, he had no intention of eating them, as he set them aside for a different purpose. And Shmuel said: They are permitted, as in his opinion there is no prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara comments that they disagree in the dispute of the <i>tanna’im</i> Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon with regard to the issue of <i>muktze</i>.
  The Gemara relates: There was this student who issued a ruling in the city of Ḥarta De’argiz that items that are set aside are permitted, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and Rav Hamnuna excommunicated him. The Gemara asks: Don’t we hold that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Why, then, did Rav Hamnuna excommunicate him? The Gemara answers: This incident was in the place of Rav and the student should not have done this; even if the accepted ruling is lenient, the city was under Rav’s jurisdiction, and the student’s public ruling, contrary to Rav’s opinion, was a blatant display of disrespect. Incidentally, the Gemara relates a story involving these two students: One would rescue from a fire with one vessel and one would rescue with four and five vessels, as it is permitted to rescue one’s belongings from a fire on Shabbat. They disagreed with regard to whether it is preferable to carry just one vessel and go back and forth several times, or to carry several vessels and go back and forth fewer times. And they disagree with regard to the same issue that was the subject of the dispute of Rabba bar Zavda and Rav Huna elsewhere.
  MISHNA: This mishna enumerates actions that may only be performed on Shabbat eve if the prohibited labor will be totally or mostly completed while it is still day. One may only roast meat, an onion, or an egg if there remains sufficient time so that they could be roasted while it is still day. One may only place dough to bake into bread in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and may only place a cake on the coals, if there is time enough that the surface of this cake or bread will form a crust while it is still day. Rabbi Eliezer says: Enough time so that its bottom crust should harden, which takes less time. However, in a case that is an exception, one may, <i>ab initio</i>, lower the Paschal lamb into the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall, so that its roasting is completed on Shabbat if Passover eve coincides with Shabbat eve. And one may, <i>ab initio</i>, kindle the fire in the bonfire of the Chamber of the Hearth in the Temple on Shabbat eve, adjacent to the start of Shabbat, and allow the fire to spread afterward throughout all the wood in the bonfire.
  
  Daf 20a
  
  And, however, in the outlying areas, meaning in all of Eretz Yisrael outside the Temple, it is prohibited to light a bonfire on Shabbat eve, unless there is sufficient time for the fire to take hold in most of the bonfire, while it is still day. Rabbi Yehuda says: With a bonfire of coals, even in the outlying areas one is permitted to light the fire on Shabbat eve at nightfall, even if the fire only spread to any amount of the bonfire. The coals, once they are kindled, will not be extinguished again, and there is no concern lest he come to tend to them on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that one may only roast meat and other food items if there remains sufficient time so that they could be roasted while it is still day. The Gemara asks: And how much do they need to be roasted in order to be considered sufficient, so that it will be permitted to complete their cooking afterward? Rabbi Elazar said that Rav said: So that they will be roasted while it is still day like the food of ben Drosai, which was partially roasted. Ben Drosai was a robber and pursued by all. He could not wait for his food to roast completely, so he sufficed with a partial roasting. It was also stated by another of the Sages, as Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Anything that is already cooked like the food of ben Drosai by a Jew, no longer has a problem of the cooking of gentiles. If a gentile completed cooking this food, it is, nevertheless, permitted to eat, even though, as a rule, it is prohibited to eat food cooked by gentiles. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Ḥananya says: With regard to anything that is already cooked like the food of ben Drosai, it is permitted to keep it on the stove on Shabbat and even though this stove is not swept of coals and the burning coals are not covered with ashes. Since the food was already cooked to that extent, there is no concern that he will come to stoke the coals.
  We learned in the mishna that one may only place bread in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall if there remains sufficient time for its surface to form a crust while it is still day. According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is permitted to place bread in the oven on Shabbat eve while it is still day if there remains enough time for a crust to form on its bottom side. A dilemma was raised before them: With regard to the bottom mentioned in the mishna, is it that side close to the oven, or perhaps is it the bottom that is close to the fire? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from what was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says explicitly: So that its surface that is stuck to the oven will form a crust.
  We learned in the mishna that one may lower the Paschal lamb into the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that this was permitted? Because the people of the group who registered to be counted together for the offering and eating of the Paschal lamb are vigilant in the performance of mitzvot and they will not transgress the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And if that was not so, there would not be permission to do so? Didn’t the Master say: The meat of a kid, whether it is in an oven that is sealed or whether it is in one that is not sealed, everyone agrees that he may well place it in the oven at nightfall because taking it out of the oven harms it, and there is no room for concern that he will do so? If so, there is no room for concern with regard to the meat of the Paschal lamb, which must be either a goat or a lamb (Exodus 12:5). The Gemara answers: In any case, it is necessary to emphasize the vigilance of the members of the group, as there, where it was permitted, it was specifically in a case that the goat was cut into pieces. However, here, with regard to the Paschal lamb, the goat is not cut into pieces. It is roasted whole, in accordance with the <i>halakhot</i> of the Paschal lamb. Consequently, it does not roast quickly, and there is room for concern lest he stoke the coals in order to accelerate the roasting. However, since the members of the group are vigilant, the Sages permitted it.
  We learned the following in the mishna: And one may light the fire in the bonfire of the Chamber of the Hearth in the Temple on Shabbat eve adjacent to nightfall and allow the fire to spread afterward throughout the entire bonfire. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters that doing so is permitted, derived? Rav Huna said, as it is stated: “You shall kindle no fire in all of your habitations on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). The Gemara infers: “In all of your habitations,” the dwelling places of the Jewish people, you may not kindle fire, but you may kindle fire on Shabbat in the bonfire of the Chamber of the Hearth, which is in the Temple. Rav Ḥisda objects: If so, if that is the source for the fact that kindling the fire is permitted on Shabbat eve at nightfall, it should also be permitted to kindle it even on Shabbat itself. Why kindle the fire while it is still day? Rather, Rav Ḥisda said, it should be understood as follows: When the verse came, it came to permit burning the limbs and fats of the sacrifices on the altar, even on Shabbat. Lighting the bonfire of the Chamber of the Hearth was not permitted on Shabbat itself, since it is not part of the Temple service. It was kindled merely for the benefit of the priests. The fact that there was no concern about lighting the bonfire on Shabbat eve at nightfall is because the priests are vigilant with regard to mitzvot, and they will certainly not come to stoke the coals.
  We also learned in the mishna that in the outlying areas one may not light a bonfire on Shabbat eve at nightfall unless there is sufficient time for the fire to take hold in most of the bonfire. The Gemara asks about this: What is meant by the measure of most of it? Rav said: Most of each and every one of the branches. And Shmuel said: It is sufficient if the branches are sufficiently lit so that they will not say to each other: Bring thinner branches, which are easier to kindle, and we will place them beneath the existing branches to accelerate their burning. Rav Ḥiyya taught a <i>baraita</i> to support Shmuel, from a <i>halakha</i> that was stated with regard to the Temple candelabrum. The <i>baraita</i> said that it must be lit to the point that the flame will ascend on its own and not that the flame will ascend due to something else. In a place where kindling is required, it is sufficient to ensure that the fire burns on its own (<i>Tosafot</i>).
  To this point, the Gemara was discussing a bonfire. However, the Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a single branch that one kindles on Shabbat eve? Rav said: Most of the thickness of the wood must ignite while it is still day, before Shabbat. Others say the same <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav: Most of the circumference of the wood must ignite while it is still day, before Shabbat. Rav Pappa said: Since there is disagreement with regard to Rav’s <i>halakha</i>, and it is not clear exactly what he said, therefore, we require most of its thickness to ignite and we require most of its circumference to ignite; thereby, we avoid entering into a situation of uncertainty. The Gemara comments: This dispute is parallel to the dispute of the <i>tanna’im</i>, who disagreed with regard to a different matter. Rabbi Ḥiyya said: A fire is considered to be kindled when the wood will be ruined to the extent that it can no longer be used for the work of a craftsman. And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: So that the fire will take hold from both sides of the wood. And he added: And even though there is no proof for the matter, i.e., what constitutes burning as far as Shabbat is concerned, nevertheless there is an allusion to the matter that wood in this condition is considered burnt, as it is stated: “Behold, it is cast into the fire for fuel; the fire consumed both of its ends and the midst of it is burned. Is it fit for any work?” (Ezekiel 15:4).
  Along the same lines, the Gemara cites a different verse that discusses burning fire, as it relates to King Jehoiakim: “And the hearth [<i>aḥ</i>] was burning before him” (Jeremiah 36:22). <i>Amora’im</i> disputed the question: What is the <i>aḥ</i> mentioned in the verse? Rav said that it means willow branch [<i>aḥvana</i>]. And Shmuel said: It is referring to wood that was lit with <i>aḥvana</i>, meaning with fraternity [<i>aḥva</i>], i.e., that each piece of wood is lit from another, even small ones from large ones. The meaning of the word <i>aḥvana</i> was forgotten; the Gemara relates that this man, who said to people in the marketplace: Who wants <i>aḥvana</i>? And he was found to be selling willow, and therefore, the meaning of the word was understood.
  Rav Huna said: Reeds with which he lights a bonfire on Shabbat eve do not require that most of the reeds ignite prior to Shabbat, because they burn easily. However, if he tied them together into a bundle, the reeds assume the legal status of a wooden beam and most of the reeds need to catch fire before Shabbat. The same is true with regard to date seeds that he kindles. They do not require that most of them catch fire before Shabbat, because they burn easily. However, if he placed them in woven baskets [<i>ḥotalot</i>], most of the seeds need to ignite before Shabbat. Rav Ḥisda strongly objects to this: On the contrary, the opposite makes sense, as reeds are scattered and difficult to burn. When they are bundled, they are not scattered, and therefore burn more easily. Similarly, seeds are scattered. And if he placed them in woven baskets, they are not scattered. It was also stated
  
  Daf 20b
  
  on a similar note, Rav Kahana said: Reeds that one tied them into a bundle, require that most of them ignite. If one did not tie them into a bundle, they do not require that most of them ignite, in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna. However, seeds require that most of them ignite. And if he placed them in woven baskets, they do not require that most of them catch fire.
  Rav Yosef taught a <i>baraita</i>: Four bonfires do not require that most of the flammable materials catch fire, as their materials burn easily once the fire takes hold of them. And they are: A bonfire of pitch, and of sulfur, and of dry cheese, and of fatty materials. And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A bonfire of straw and one of rakings of wood gathered from the field also do not require that most of it catch fire.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Babylonian wood does not require that most of it catch fire. Rav Yosef the Babylonian objects: What is that wood that they use in Babylonia that burns so well? If you say that it refers to wood slivers used for burning and light, now that with regard to a wick, Ulla said that one who lights it for a Shabbat lamp must light most of what emerges from the vessel; is it necessary to mention with regard to wood slivers that most of them must be lit? Rather, Rav Yosef said: Certainly the reference is to the branch of a cedar tree. And Rami bar Abba said: The reference here is to a hyssop [<i>zaza</i>].
   We shall return to you, Yiziot HaShabbat 
  This mishna cites a list of fuels and wicks that one may not use in kindling the Shabbat lights, either because their use might induce one to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat or because they are not in keeping with the deference due Shabbat. The mishna begins by listing the materials that one may not use as wicks. That is followed by a list of the substances that one may not use as fuel.MISHNA: With what may one light the Shabbat lamp, and with what may one not light it? With regard to types of prohibited wicks, one may light neither with cedar bast [<i>lekhesh</i>], nor with uncombed flax [<i>ḥosen</i>], nor with raw silk [<i>kalakh</i>], nor with willow bast [<i>petilat ha</i>’<i>idan</i>], nor with desert weed [<i>petilat hamidbar</i>], nor with green moss that is on the surface of the water. With regard to types of prohibited oils, one may light neither with pitch [<i>zefet</i>], nor with wax [<i>sha</i>’<i>ava</i>], nor with castor oil [<i>shemen kik</i>], nor with burnt oil [<i>shemen sereifa</i>], nor with fat from a sheep’s tail [<i>alya</i>], nor with tallow [<i>ḥelev</i>]. Naḥum the Mede says: One may light with boiled tallow. And the Rabbis say: Both tallow that was boiled and tallow that was not boiled, one may not light with them.
  GEMARA: Most of the terms used in the mishna were not understood in Babylonia. Therefore, the Gemara translated and clarified them. We learned in the mishna that one may not light with <i>lekhesh</i>. The Gemara explains that <i>lekhesh</i> is the branch of the cedar tree. The Gemara asks: Isn’t the cedar mere wood? How would one fashion a wick out of wood? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to the woolly substance that is beneath its bark.
  The mishna taught further that one may not light with <i>ḥosen</i>. Rav Yosef said: <i>Ḥosen</i> is tow, thin chaff that falls off the stalk of combed flax. Abaye said to him: Isn’t it written: “And the <i>ḥason</i> shall be as tow” (Isaiah 1:31)? By inference, <i>ḥosen</i> is not tow. Rather, Abaye said: <i>Ḥosen</i> is flax whose stalk was crushed but not yet combed. The threads in the stalk are still covered by a shell and therefore do not burn well.
  And we also learned in the mishna that one may not light with <i>kalakh</i>. Shmuel said: I asked all seafarers, and they said to me that the present-day name of <i>kalakh</i> mentioned in the mishna is <i>kulka</i>. Rav Yitzḥak bar Ze’ira said: <i>Kalakh</i> is the cocoon of the silkworm [<i>gushkera</i>].
  The Gemara relates that Ravin and Abaye were sitting before Rabbana Neḥemya, brother of the Exilarch. Ravin saw that Rabbana Neḥemya was wearing <i>metaksa</i>, a type of silk. Ravin said to Abaye: This is the <i>kalakh</i> that we learned in our mishna. Abaye said to him: We call it <i>shira peranda</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned: The <i>shira</i>’<i>im</i>, the <i>kalakh,</i> and the <i>sirikin</i>, different types of silk, all require ritual fringes. Apparently, <i>shira</i>’<i>im</i> and <i>kalakh</i> are different types of silk. This is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Ravin who identified <i>kalakh</i> with <i>shira peranda</i>. The Gemara responds: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation. If you wish, say instead that <i>shira</i> is a distinct entity, and <i>shira peranda</i> is a distinct entity. <i>Shira peranda</i> is <i>kalakh</i>.
  And we learned in the mishna that one may not light with <i>petilat ha</i>’<i>idan</i>. The Gemara explains that <i>petilat ha</i>’<i>idan</i> is willow, which does not burn well. The Gemara relates that Ravin and Abaye were walking in the valley of Tamrurita. They saw these willow trees. Ravin said to Abaye: This is the <i>idan</i> that we learned in the mishna. Abaye said to him: But this is mere wood. How would one fashion a wick from it? Ravin peeled the bark and showed him the wool-like substance between the bark and the tree. We also learned in the mishna: Nor with desert silk [<i>petilat hamidbar</i>]. That is the mullein plant, which does not burn well.
  And we learned in the mishna that one may not use the green moss that is on the surface of the water to fashion a wick for lighting the Shabbat lamp. The Gemara asks: What is this green moss? If you say that it is the moss found on standing water, isn’t that moss brittle and therefore unfit material from which to fashion a wick? Rather, Rav Pappa said: It is referring to the moss that accumulates on ships, which is more pliable and when dried can be fashioned into a wick.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Sages added to the list of prohibited wicks in the mishna those made of wool and hair as well. The Gemara remarks: And our <i>tanna</i> did not consider it necessary to enumerate these because it is virtually impossible to fashion wicks from these materials, as, when they burn, wool shrinks and hair is scorched. Consequently, they are unsuitable for use as wicks.
  And we learned in the mishna that one may not use <i>zefet</i> or <i>sha</i>’<i>ava</i> as fuel in lighting the Shabbat lamp. The Gemara explains that <i>zefet</i> is pitch, and <i>sha</i>’<i>ava</i> is wax. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Until this point, the word <i>zefet</i>, the mishna is dealing with disqualification of materials unfit for use as wicks, and from this point on it is dealing with disqualification of substances unfit for use as oils. The Gemara asks: Obviously, a wick cannot be made from pitch and similar materials. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to mention wax, lest you say that it is also unfit for use as a coating for wicks, in the manner that wicks are usually made. Therefore, it teaches us that even though wax is unfit for use as oil, it is fit for use as coating for wicks.
  Rami bar Avin said: Tar [<i>itran</i>] is the by-product of pitch. When wood is burned to extract pitch, a clearer liquid oozes out after the pitch, and that is tar. Similarly, wax is the by-product of honey.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference that emerges from that which Rami bar Avin taught? The Gemara explains: Its significance is with regard to buying and selling. One who buys tar can insist upon receiving the by-product of pitch and no other material. The same is true with regard to wax and honey.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to all of those materials about which they said that one may not light the lamp with them on Shabbat; however, one may use them <i>ab initio</i> to make a bonfire. One may do so both to warm himself opposite it and to utilize its light, and he may ignite it both on the ground and on a stove. They prohibited using them only to make a wick for an oil lamp.
  And we learned in the mishna that one may not light the Shabbat lamp with <i>kik</i> oil. The Gemara asks: What is <i>kik</i> oil? Shmuel said: I asked all the seafarers, and they said to me that there is a bird in the cities on the sea coast, and <i>kik</i> is its name. <i>Kik</i> oil is produced from that bird. Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: This is referring to cotton oil. Reish Lakish said: It is the oil made from the seed of a plant like the castor plant [<i>kikayon</i>] of Jonah. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: I have seen the species of the castor plant of Jonah, and it is similar to the ricinus tree and it grows in swamps, and they place it at the entrance of shops for shade, and they produce oil from its seeds, and all the sick people of the West, Eretz Yisrael, rest beneath its branches.
  Rabba said: Those wicks about which the Sages said one may not light with them on Shabbat, the reason is: Because the fire flickers on them. It sputters on the wick and does not burn well. Those oils with which the Sages said that one may not light on Shabbat, the reason is: Because they are not drawn effectively by the wick.
  Abaye raised a dilemma before Rabba: Those oils with which the Sages said one may not light on Shabbat, what is the ruling? May one, <i>ab initio</i>, add to them any amount of oil with which it is permissible to light and light with that mixture? The sides of the dilemma are: Do we issue a decree lest one come to light these oils in their natural form, without mixing them with permissible oils? Or no, that possibility is not a source of concern? Rabba said to him: One may not light that mixture. What is the reason for this? The reason is because the <i>halakha</i> is that one may not light (<i>Arukh</i>).
  Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s opinion from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who wrapped a material with which one may light around a material with which one may not light, may not light with the bound wick. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In the ancestral house of my father, they would wrap a wick with which one is permitted to light around a nut, and that was how they would light. In any case, it is teaching that, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, one may light. Apparently, one is permitted to light with a combination of permitted and prohibited wicks.
  Rabba said to him: Before you raise an objection to my opinion from the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, support it from the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>, who said that it is prohibited to light in that case. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as it is preferable to challenge from the statement of Rabban Gamliel with regard to the custom in his father’s house. There is a principle that proof cited from an action is great, i.e., a practical precedent is more substantial than a theoretical <i>halakha</i>. Nevertheless, the difficulty from the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel remains: Is he not speaking of a case where he combined the wick and the nut to light them together? If so, one is permitted to combine the prohibited and the permitted. The Gemara answers: No, it is speaking in a case where he combined them to float the wick on the oil with the help of the nut. The Gemara asks: If it is speaking only with regard to a case of floating the wick, what is the reason that the first <i>tanna</i> prohibits doing so? The Gemara answers: The entire <i>baraita</i> is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and it is incomplete, and it teaches the following: One who wrapped a material with which one may light around a material with which one may not light, may not light with it. In what case is this statement said? When he combines the materials to light them together. However, if he utilizes that with which one may not light merely in order to float the wick, it is permitted, as we learned that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the ancestral house of my father, they would wrap a wick with which one is permitted to light around a nut. That was how they would light.
  In any case, to this point the conclusion is that one may not light with a mixture of permitted and prohibited oils. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Beruna say that Rav said: With regard to molten fat or fish innards that dissolved and became like oil, a person may place any amount of oil fit for lighting into it and light. Apparently, one may light with a mixture of permitted and prohibited oils. Rabba answers: These, the fat and the fish innards, are drawn by the wick even in their natural state, and those, the prohibited oils, are not drawn in their natural state. Originally, the Sages issued a decree to prohibit molten fat due to unmolten fat and to prohibit dissolved fish innards due to undissolved fish innards; however, the Sages did not issue a decree in a case where one added to them any amount of oil suitable for lighting, and permitted lighting with it. The Gemara asks: Let them also issue a decree to prohibit molten fat and dissolved fish innards to which he added oil due to molten fat and dissolved fish innards to which he did not add permitted oil. The Gemara rejects this: That prohibition with regard to molten fat and dissolved fish innards itself is based on a decree. And will we arise and issue one decree to prevent violation of another decree? The Sages do not issue decrees under those circumstances. Therefore, there is no reason to prohibit their use.
  Rami bar Ḥama taught a <i>baraita</i>: Those wicks and oils, which the Sages said one may not light with them on Shabbat, one may not light with them in the Temple either because it is stated with regard to the Temple candelabrum: “And you shall command the children of Israel, that they bring unto you pure olive oil beaten for the light, to cause a lamp to burn continually” (Exodus 27:20). Rami bar Ḥama taught that <i>baraita</i> and he also said its explanation: What is the proof from the verse? One may interpret the verse homiletically: The requirement is to light the candelabrum so that the flame ascends of itself when it is kindled, and not that it ascends by means of something else, i.e., adjusting the wick after it was lit.
  We learned in a mishna: They would unravel the threads of the tattered trousers of the priests and their belts in order to make wicks from them, and from those same wicks they would light at the Celebration of Drawing Water. There was wool in the belts of the priests. It is said that their belts were made from, among other things, <i>tekhelet</i>, which in the Bible refers to dyed wool. Apparently, one may light with a mixture that includes a wick unsuitable for lighting. The Gemara answers: The Celebration of Drawing Water is different, as in that celebration, they did not light the Temple candelabrum. They lit special lanterns made specifically for that purpose and were not stringent with regard to the wicks placed in them.
  Come and hear a related question from that which Rabba bar Mattana taught: Priestly garments that were tattered, they would unravel them into threads from which they would make wicks for the Temple. Is this not also referring to garments made of diverse kinds, like the sashes of the priests that were made of a mixture of wool and linen? The Gemara answers: No, these wicks were made from linen garments alone.
  Rav Huna said: Those wicks and oils with which the Sages said that one may not light the lamp on Shabbat, one may not light the lamp with them on Hanukkah either; both when it falls on Shabbat and when it falls during the week. Rava said: What is the reason for Rav Huna’s statement? He holds that if the Hanukkah light becomes extinguished, even though one lit it properly, one is bound to attend to it and relight it so that it will burn properly. Therefore, one must ensure that the wick burns properly from the outset. And utilizing the light of the Hanukkah lamp is permitted during the week. Consequently, in order to prevent him from inadvertently sinning on Shabbat, he must ensure from the outset that the wick burns well, lest he come to adjust the flame on Shabbat. Those wicks and oils do not burn well at all. And Rav Ḥisda said: Those same oils and wicks with which the Sages prohibited to light on Shabbat, one may light with them on Hanukkah during the week, but not on Shabbat. He holds that if the Hanukkah light is extinguished
  
  Daf 21b
  
  one is not bound to attend to it. Therefore, there is no reason to make certain from the outset to light it with materials that burn well, as even if it is extinguished, he is not required to relight it. However, he also holds that it is permitted to use its light. As a result, he must ensure that the wick burns well on Shabbat; if not, he is liable to come to adjust the flame in order to use its light. The third opinion is that which Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Mattana said, and others say that Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said: The wicks and oils with which the Sages said one may not light on Shabbat, one may, nevertheless, light with them on Hanukkah, both during the week and on Shabbat. Rabbi Yirmeya said: What is Rav’s reason? He holds that if it is extinguished, one is not bound to attend to it and relight it, and it is prohibited to use its light. Therefore, even on Shabbat, there is no concern lest he come to adjust the wick, as it is prohibited to utilize its light.
  The Gemara relates that the Sages said this <i>halakha</i> before Abaye in the name of Rabbi Yirmeya and he did not accept it, as he did not hold Rabbi Yirmeya in high regard. However, subsequently, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, the Sages said this <i>halakha</i> before Abaye in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he accepted it. Then Abaye said regretfully: Had I merited, I would have learned this <i>halakha</i> from the outset. The Gemara wonders: Didn’t he ultimately learn it and accept it? What difference does it make from whom and at what point he learned it? The Gemara answers: The practical difference is with regard to knowledge acquired in one’s youth, which is better remembered.
  With regard to the opinion that one need not rekindle the Hanukkah light if it is extinguished, the Gemara asks: And is it true that if the Hanukkah light is extinguished one is not bound to attend to it? The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah lights is from sunset until traffic in the marketplace ceases. Does that not mean that if the light is extinguished, he must rekindle it so that it will remain lit for the duration of that period? The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> can be understood otherwise: That if one did not yet light at sunset, he may still light the Hanukkah lights until traffic ceases. Alternatively, one could say that this is referring to the matter of its measure. One must prepare a wick and oil sufficient to burn for the period lasting from sunset until traffic ceases. If he did so, even if the light is extinguished beforehand, he need not relight it.
  The expression until traffic in the marketplace ceases is mentioned here, and the Gemara asks: Until when exactly is this time? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Until the traffic of the people of Tadmor [<i>tarmoda</i>’<i>ei</i>] ceases. They sold kindling wood and remained in the marketplace later than everyone else. People who discovered at sunset that they had exhausted their wood supply could purchase wood from them.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The basic mitzva of Hanukkah is each day to have a light kindled by a person, the head of the household, for himself and his household. And the <i>mehadrin</i>, i.e., those who are meticulous in the performance of mitzvot, kindle a light for each and every one in the household. And the <i>mehadrin min hamehadrin</i>, who are even more meticulous, adjust the number of lights daily. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree as to the nature of that adjustment. Beit Shammai say: On the first day one kindles eight lights and, from there on, gradually decreases the number of lights until, on the last day of Hanukkah, he kindles one light. And Beit Hillel say: On the first day one kindles one light, and from there on, gradually increases the number of lights until, on the last day, he kindles eight lights.
  Ulla said: There were two <i>amora</i>’<i>im</i> in the West, Eretz Yisrael, who disagreed with regard to this dispute, Rabbi Yosei bar Avin and Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida. One said that the reason for Beit Shammai’s opinion is that the number of lights corresponds to the incoming days, i.e., the future. On the first day, eight days remain in Hanukkah, one kindles eight lights, and on the second day seven days remain, one kindles seven, etc. The reason for Beit Hillel’s opinion is that the number of lights corresponds to the outgoing days. Each day, the number of lights corresponds to the number of the days of Hanukkah that were already observed. And one said that the reason for Beit Shammai’s opinion is that the number of lights corresponds to the bulls of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>: Thirteen were sacrificed on the first day and each succeeding day one fewer was sacrificed (Numbers 29:12–31). The reason for Beit Hillel’s opinion is that the number of lights is based on the principle: One elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. Therefore, if the objective is to have the number of lights correspond to the number of days, there is no alternative to increasing their number with the passing of each day.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There were two Elders in Sidon, and one of them acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, and one of them acted in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Each provided a reason for his actions: One gave a reason for his actions: The number of lights corresponds to the bulls of the Festival. And one gave a reason for his actions: The number of lights is based on the principle: One elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp at the entrance to one’s house on the outside, so that all can see it. If he lived upstairs, he places it at the window adjacent to the public domain. And in a time of danger, when the gentiles issued decrees to prohibit kindling lights, he places it on the table and that is sufficient to fulfill his obligation.
  Rava said: One must kindle another light in addition to the Hanukkah lights in order to use its light, as it is prohibited to use the light of the Hanukkah lights. And if there is a bonfire, he need not light an additional light, as he can use the light of the bonfire. However, if he is an important person, who is unaccustomed to using the light of a bonfire, even though there is a bonfire, he must kindle another light.
  The Gemara asks: What is Hanukkah, and why are lights kindled on Hanukkah? The Gemara answers: The Sages taught in <i>Megillat Ta</i>’<i>anit</i>: On the twenty-fifth of Kislev, the days of Hanukkah are eight. One may not eulogize on them and one may not fast on them. What is the reason? When the Greeks entered the Sanctuary they defiled all the oils that were in the Sanctuary by touching them. And when the Hasmonean monarchy overcame them and emerged victorious over them, they searched and found only one cruse of oil that was placed with the seal of the High Priest, undisturbed by the Greeks. And there was sufficient oil there to light the candelabrum for only one day. A miracle occurred and they lit the candelabrum from it eight days. The next year the Sages instituted those days and made them holidays with recitation of <i>hallel</i> and special thanksgiving in prayer and blessings.
  We learned there in a mishna with regard to damages: In the case of a spark that emerges from under a hammer, and went out of the artisan’s workshop, and caused damage, the one who struck the hammer is liable. Similarly, in the case of a camel that is laden with flax and it passed through the public domain, and its flax entered into a store, and caught fire from the storekeeper’s lamp, and set fire to the building, the camel owner is liable. Since his flax entered into another’s domain, which he had no permission to enter, all the damages were caused due to his negligence. However, if the storekeeper placed his lamp outside the store and it set fire to the flax, the storekeeper is liable, as he placed the lamp outside his domain where he had no right to place it.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: If the flax was set on fire by the storekeeper’s Hanukkah lamp that he placed outside the entrance to his store, he is not liable, as in that case, it is permitted for the storekeeper to place his lamp outside. Ravina said in the name of Rabba: That is to say that it is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp within ten handbreadths of the ground. As if it should enter your mind to say that he may place it above ten handbreadths, why is the storekeeper exempt? Let the camel owner say to the storekeeper: You should have placed the lamp above the height of a camel and its rider, and then no damage would have been caused. By failing to do so, the storekeeper caused the damage, and the camel owner should not be liable. The Gemara rejects this: And perhaps one is also permitted to place the Hanukkah lamp above ten handbreadths, and the reason Rabbi Yehuda exempted the storekeeper was due to concern for the observance of the mitzva of kindling Hanukkah lights. He held that if you burden one excessively, he will come to refrain from performing the mitzva of kindling Hanukkah lights. Since the storekeeper placed the Hanukkah lamp outside at the behest of the Sages, the storekeeper should not be required to take extra precautions.
  With regard to the essence of the matter Rav Kahana said that Rav Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rabbi Tanḥum:
  
  Daf 22a
  
  A Hanukkah lamp that one placed above twenty cubits is invalid, just as a <i>sukka</i> whose roofing is more than twenty cubits high, and just as an alleyway whose beam, its symbolic fourth partition in order to place an <i>eiruv</i>, is more than twenty cubits high, are invalid. The reason is the same in all three cases: People do not usually raise their heads and see objects at a height above twenty cubits. As there is a requirement to see all of these, they are deemed invalid when placed above that height. And the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Kahana said that Rav Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rav Tanḥum: What is the meaning of the verse that is written with regard to Joseph: “And they took him, and cast him into the pit; and the pit was empty, there was no water in it” (Genesis 37:24)? By inference from that which is stated: And the pit was empty, don’t I know that there was no water in it? Rather, why does the verse say: There was no water in it? The verse comes to emphasize and teach that there was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it.
  Rabba said: It is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp within the handbreadth adjacent to the entrance. The Gemara asks: And where, on which side, does he place it? There is a difference of opinion: Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: On the right side of the entrance. Rav Shmuel from Difti said: On the left. And the <i>halakha</i> is to place it on the left so that the Hanukkah lamp will be on the left and the <i>mezuza</i> on the right. One who enters the house will be surrounded by mitzvot (<i>ge’onim</i>).
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav Asi said that Rav said: It is prohibited to count money opposite a Hanukkah light. Rav Yehuda relates: When I said this <i>halakha</i> before Shmuel, he said to me: Does the Hanukkah light have sanctity that would prohibit one from using its light? Rav Yosef strongly objected to this question: What kind of question is that; does the blood of a slaughtered undomesticated animal or fowl have sanctity? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Sages interpreted the verse: “He shall spill its blood and cover it with dust” (Leviticus 17:13): With that which he spilled, he shall cover. Just as a person spills the blood of a slaughtered animal with his hand, so too, he is obligated to cover the blood with this hand and not cover it with his foot. The reason is so that mitzvot will not be contemptible to him. Here too, one should treat the Hanukkah lights as if they were sacred and refrain from utilizing them for other purposes, so that mitzvot will not be contemptible to him.
  The Gemara relates that they raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to using decorations of a <i>sukka</i> all seven days of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? He said to them: They already said in a similar vein that it is prohibited to count money opposite the Hanukkah light, which proves that one may not use the object of a mitzva for another purpose. Rav Yosef replied in surprise: Master of Abraham! He makes that which was taught dependent upon that which was not taught. As, with regard to <i>sukka</i>, the prohibition to enjoy use of its decorations was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, and the prohibition to enjoy use of the Hanukkah lights was not taught in a <i>baraita</i> at all. As it was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i> in tractate <i>Sukka</i>: With regard to one who roofed the <i>sukka</i> in accordance with its halakhic requirements, and decorated it with colorful curtains and sheets, and hung in it ornamental nuts, peaches, almonds, and pomegranates, and grape branches [<i>parkilei</i>], and wreaths of stalks of grain, wines, oils, and vessels full of flour, it is prohibited to use them until the conclusion of the last day of the Festival. And, if before he hung the decorations he stipulated with regard to them that he will be permitted to use them even during the Festival, everything is according to his stipulation, and he is permitted to use them. In any case, since the prohibition to benefit from the Hanukkah light is not explicitly taught, a proof should not be cited from there to resolve the dilemma with regard to <i>sukka</i> decorations. Rather, Rav Yosef said: There is no need to bring a proof for the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i> from the Hanukkah light. Rather, the paradigm of them all is blood. The verse with regard to the covering of the blood of slaughter is the original source from which the prohibition to treat mitzvot with contempt is derived.
  It was stated in a dispute between <i>amora</i>’<i>im</i> that Rav said: One may not light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp. And Shmuel said: One may light in that manner. The Gemara cites additional disputes between Rav and Shmuel. Rav said: One may not untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment. And Shmuel said: One may untie them from one garment and affix them to another garment. And Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging, as Rabbi Shimon permitted dragging objects on Shabbat, even if, as a result, a furrow would be dug in the ground, as it was not the person’s intent to dig that hole. Shmuel said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging.
  Abaye said: In all halakhic matters of the Master, Rabba, he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Rav, except these three where he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. He ruled: One may light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp, and one may untie ritual fringes from garment to garment, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, and bench on the ground, as long as he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one need not be concerned.
  One of the Sages sat before Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he sat and said: The reason for the opinion of Rav, who prohibited lighting from one Hanukkah lamp to another, is due to contempt for the mitzva. Using the light for a purpose other than illumination demeans the mitzva of Hanukkah lights. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to his students: Do not listen to him, as the reason for Rav’s opinion is due to the fact that he thereby weakens the mitzva. By lighting from lamp to lamp he slightly diminishes the oil and wick designated for the purpose of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case where he lights directly from lamp to lamp, without using a wood chip or another lamp to light the second lamp. According to the one who said that Rav’s reason is due to contempt for the mitzva, directly from lamp to lamp he may even light <i>ab initio</i>, as, by lighting another Hanukkah lamp, he does not thereby demean the sanctity of the mitzva because the second lamp is also a mitzva. According to the one who said that Rav’s reason is because he weakens the mitzva, lighting directly from lamp to lamp is also prohibited, as ultimately, he utilizes the mitzva lamp for a task that he could have accomplished with a non-sacred lamp.
  Rav Avya raised an objection from that which was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: A <i>sela</i> of
  
  Daf 22b
  
  the second tithe, one may not weigh gold dinars with it in order to determine their precise weight. And doing so is prohibited even if he is weighing the coin in order to redeem other second-tithe produce with it, as one may not derive benefit from tithe money. The Gemara discusses this matter: Granted, if you say that when Rav and Shmuel disagree it is with regard to a case when one lights from lamp to lamp, but with a wood chip, Shmuel prohibits lighting, this will not be a conclusive refutation of Shmuel’s opinion. But if you say that he permits lighting from lamp to lamp with a wood chip as well, this would be a conclusive refutation of his opinion, as the Sages did not permit use of and benefit from a sacred object even for the purpose of a similar sacred need. Rabba said: This is not difficult, as in the case of weighing tithe money the Sages prohibited doing so as a decree lest the weights not be precisely equal. One will discover that the weight of the gold dinars is not equal to the weight of the <i>sela</i> that he used to weigh them, and he will reconsider and render them unsanctified, i.e., they will maintain their original, non-sacred status. In that case, he will have used the tithe money for an unsanctified purpose. However, when one lights even a wood chip for the purpose of Hanukkah lights, it is clear that it is for the purpose of performing a mitzva, and there is no reason to issue a decree.
  Rav Sheshet raised an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>. With regard to the Temple candelabrum, it is stated: “Outside the veil of the testimony, in the Tent of Meeting, shall Aaron order it from evening to morning before the Lord continually; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations” (Leviticus 24:3). It must be understood: And does God require its light for illumination at night? Didn’t the children of Israel, all forty years that they walked in the wilderness, walk exclusively by His light, the pillar of fire? Rather, the lighting of the candelabrum is testimony to mankind that the Divine Presence rests among Israel. The Gemara asks: What is this testimony? Rav said: That is the westernmost lamp in the candelabrum in which the measure of oil placed was the same measure of oil as was placed in the other lamps, and nevertheless he would light the others from it each day and with it he would conclude, i.e., the westernmost lamp would continue burning throughout the day after all the others were extinguished. The rest of the lamps burned only at night, and each night he would relight the rest of the lamps from the westernmost lamp. But isn’t it true that here, in the Temple, since the lamps were fixed in the candelabrum, it was impossible to light directly from lamp to lamp? There was no alternative to taking a wood chip and lighting the rest of the lamps from the westernmost lamp. Consequently, it is difficult both according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to contempt for the mitzva and according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to weakening the mitzva.
  Rav Pappa explained that it need not necessarily be understood that way. Rather, there were long wicks in the candelabrum, which made it possible to reach and light directly from one lamp to another. However, ultimately, according to the one who said that one may not light from lamp to lamp due to weakening the mitzva, it is difficult. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the question remains difficult.
  In summary, the Gemara asks: What is the halakhic conclusion reached about this matter in terms of lighting from lamp to lamp? Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Yehoshua, said: We see; if the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that kindling the Hanukkah light accomplishes the mitzva and the rest is secondary, one may light from lamp to lamp. The lighting itself is the essence of the mitzva of Hanukkah lights. And if the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that placing the lit lamp in a suitable place accomplishes the mitzva, then one may not light from lamp to lamp. According to that opinion, lighting is simply an auxiliary action that facilitates the fulfillment of the essence of the mitzva, which is placing the lamp in a place where its light can be seen by the public. Since lighting is merely a preparatory action, one may not demean the mitzva by lighting from lamp to lamp.
  After the issue of whether lighting accomplishes the mitzva or placing accomplishes the mitzva was raised in the context of the previous discussion, the Gemara cites the discussion in its entirety. As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of the Hanukkah light, does lighting accomplish the mitzva, and placing the lit lamp is simply a continuation of that action, or does placing the kindled lamp accomplish the mitzva, and lighting is simply a practical necessity that facilitates placing the lamp?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from that which Rava said: One who was holding a burning Hanukkah lamp in his hand and standing, he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. Conclude from this that placing accomplishes the mitzva. Until he sets the lamp down in its appropriate place, he did not fulfill the mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: There, they said that he did not fulfill his obligation for a different reason. One who sees it will say that he is not holding the lamp in order to fulfill the mitzva, but he is holding it for his own needs. Since holding the lamp can mislead onlookers, he does not fulfill the mitzva in that manner.
  Come and hear another resolution for this dilemma from that which Rava said: One who lights the Hanukkah lamp inside the house and then takes it out and places it at the entrance to his house did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. Granted, if you say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva it is understandable, as lighting in its place is required. That is why Rava ruled that he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva. However, if you say that placing accomplishes the mitzva, why did Rava rule that he did nothing? Didn’t he set it down in its appropriate place? The Gemara answers: There too, even though he subsequently brought it outside, one who sees him lighting inside will say to himself that he is lighting the lamp for his own needs and not in fulfillment of the mitzva.
  Come and hear another resolution from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:
  
  Daf 23a
  
  A lantern that continued to burn the entire day of Shabbat, at the conclusion of Shabbat one extinguishes it and lights it again as a Hanukkah light. Granted, if you say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva, the requirement to extinguish the lantern and relight it in order to fulfill the mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah light works out well. However, if you say that placing accomplishes the mitzva, this statement, which stated that one extinguishes it and lights it, is imprecise. According to this opinion, it needed to say: One extinguishes it and lifts it from its place and sets it down and lights it, as only by placing the lamp in an appropriate place could one fulfill the mitzva of the Hanukkah light. Furthermore, there is additional proof that lighting accomplishes the mitzva. From the fact that we recite the following blessing over the mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah light: Who has made us holy through His commandments and has commanded us to light the Hanukkah light, the Gemara suggests: Conclude from this that lighting accomplishes the mitzva, as it is over lighting that one recites the blessing. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from this.
  And, the Gemara remarks, now that we say that lighting accomplishes the mitzva, there are practical ramifications. If a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, all of whom are of limited intellectual capacity and not obligated in mitzvot, kindled the Hanukkah light, he did nothing in terms of fulfilling the mitzva, even if an adult obligated in mitzvot subsequently set it down in its appropriate place. That is because placing a lit lamp does not constitute fulfillment of the mitzva. The lighting must be performed by a person with full intellectual capacity, obligated in mitzvot. However, a woman certainly may light, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Women are obligated in lighting the Hanukkah light, as they too were included in that miracle of being saved from the decree of persecution.
  Rav Sheshet said: A guest is obligated in lighting the Hanukkah light in the place where he is being hosted. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira said: At first, when I was studying in the yeshiva, I would participate with <i>perutot</i>, copper coins, together with the host [<i>ushpiza</i>], so that I would be a partner in the light that he kindled. After I married my wife, I said: Now I certainly need not do so because they light on my behalf in my house.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All the oils are suitable for the Hanukkah lamp, and olive oil is the most select of the oils. Abaye said: At first, my Master, Rabba, would seek sesame oil, as he said: The light of sesame oil lasts longer and does not burn as quickly as olive oil. Once he heard that statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, he sought olive oil because he said: Its light is clearer.
  On a similar note, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All the oils are suitable for making ink, and olive oil is the most select. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s intention: Did he mean that olive oil is the most select in terms of being the best for use to mix and knead with the soot produced from a fire in manufacturing ink; or did he mean for use to smoke, i.e., burning olive oil to produce smoke is the most select method of producing the soot used in manufacturing ink? Come and hear a resolution to this from that which Rav Shmuel bar Zutrei taught: All oils are suitable for ink, and olive oil is the most select, both to knead and to smoke. Rav Shmuel bar Zutra taught it this way: All types of smoke are good for ink, and olive oil is the most select. Similarly, Rav Huna said: All saps are good for strengthening the ink compound, and balsam sap is the best of all.
  Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: One who lights a Hanukkah light must recite a blessing. And Rabbi Yirmeya said: One who sees a burning Hanukkah light must recite a blessing because the mitzva is not only to kindle the light but to see the light as well. Therefore, there is room to recite a blessing even when seeing them. Rav Yehuda said: On the first day of Hanukkah, the one who sees burning lights recites two blessings, and the one who lights recites three blessings. From there on, from the second day of Hanukkah, the one who lights recites two blessings, and the one who sees recites one blessing. The Gemara asks: What blessing does he omit on the other days? The Gemara answers: He omits the blessing of time: Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. The Gemara asks: And let us omit the blessing of the miracle: Who has performed miracles. The Gemara answers: The miracle is relevant on all of the days, whereas the blessing: Who has given us life, is only pertinent to the first time he performs the mitzva each year.
  And what blessing does one recite? He recites: Who has made us holy through His commandments and has commanded us to light the Hanukkah light. The Gemara asks: And where did He command us? The mitzva of Hanukkah is not mentioned in the Torah, so how is it possible to say that it was commanded to us by God? The Gemara answers that Rav Avya said: The obligation to recite this blessing is derived from the verse: “You shall not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto you, to the right, nor to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11). From this verse, the mitzva incumbent upon all of Israel to heed the statements and decrees of the Sages is derived. Therefore, one who fulfills their directives fulfills a divine commandment. Rav Neḥemya said that the mitzva to heed the voice of the Elders of Israel is derived from the verse: “Ask your father, and he will declare unto you, your Elders, and they will tell you” (Deuteronomy 32:7).
  Rav Amram raised an objection from that which we learned in a mishna: With regard to doubtfully tithed produce [<i>demai</i>], i.e., grain that was acquired from an <i>am ha</i>’<i>aretz</i> about which there is uncertainty whether or not he tithed it; one may use it to establish an <i>eiruv</i>, i.e., joining of courtyards and joining of borders, and to establish the merging of alleys, and one recites a blessing before and after eating it, and one invites a quorum for recitation of Grace after Meals after eating it. Although the Sages said that one is required to separate tithes from <i>demai</i>, they allowed it to be used for specific purposes and in exigent circumstances. And they said that one may separate the tithe from <i>demai</i> when he is naked and at dusk Shabbat eve, a time when separating tithes from actual untithed produce [<i>tevel</i>] is prohibited. And if you say that every action instituted by rabbinic ordinance requires a blessing, as fulfillment of rabbinic ordinances is based on the mitzva: You shall not turn aside, here, when he stands naked, how can he recite a blessing? Don’t we require fulfillment of the mitzva: “Therefore shall your camp be holy; that He see no unseemly thing in you, and turn away from you” (Deuteronomy 23:15)? And the camp is not holy when one recites a blessing in a state of nakedness. Abaye said: There is room to distinguish between the cases: In a case where there is a definite mitzva by rabbinic law, a blessing is required. In a case where there is a rabbinic ordinance instituted due to uncertainty with regard to the circumstances, as in the case of <i>demai</i>, which may or may not have been tithed already, a blessing is not required.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t the second day of a Festival in the Diaspora a rabbinic ordinance instituted due to uncertainty whether the first day or the second is the actual Festival, and nevertheless a blessing is required? On the second day of the Festival one recites the same blessings as he does on the first. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the second day of the Festival, the reason that blessings are required is so that people will not treat it with contempt. If Festival blessings were not required on the second day of the Festival, people would take its sanctity lightly. Rava said another reason: <i>Demai</i> is not considered to be an ordinance instituted by the Sages due to uncertainty. In fact, in most cases, an <i>am ha</i>’<i>aretz</i> tithes. The concern lest they do not tithe is not a full-fledged case of uncertainty. It is merely a case of suspicion for which the Sages did not institute a blessing. That is not the case with regard to the second day of a Festival. Even though it was instituted due to uncertainty, one must recite the Festival blessings. Since it was instituted by the Sages, one is obligated to recite a blessing just as he recites blessings for other rabbinic ordinances.
  Rav Huna said: A courtyard that has two entrances requires two lamps, one lamp at each entrance, so that it will be obvious that the residents of this courtyard light properly. And Rava said: We only said this in a case where the two entrances face two different directions. However, if they both face in the same direction one need not light at more than one entrance. The Gemara clarifies Rava’s statement: What is the reason for this? If you say that it is because those who see the entrance without a lamp burning will harbor suspicion lest he does not kindle the Hanukkah light, whose suspicion concerns us? If you say that the concern is with regard to the suspicion of people who do not live in the city and are unfamiliar with the courtyard’s tenants, even when both entrances face the same direction let them be required to light at both entrances because visitors are unaware that there are two entrances to that courtyard. And if the concern is with regard to the suspicion of the residents of that city, even when the two entrances face two different directions let them not be required to light at both entrances. The local residents know that only one person lives in the courtyard and will assume that if he did not light at one entrance he surely lit at the other. The Gemara answers: Actually, say that it is because of the suspicion of the residents of that city, and sometimes they pass this entrance and do not pass that one, and they say: Just as he did not light in this entrance, in that second entrance he also did not light. In order to avoid suspicion, it is preferable to light at both entrances.
  And from where do you say that we are concerned about suspicion? As it was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i> that Rabbi Shimon said: On account of four things the Torah said that one should leave <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i>, crops for the poor in the corner of his field, specifically at the end of his field. Only after one has cut virtually the entire field should he leave an uncut corner for the poor. He should not designate an area for <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> in the middle of the field in the course of cutting the field. The reasons for this ruling are: Due to robbing the poor, and due to causing the poor to be idle, and due to suspicion, and due to the verse: “You shall not wholly reap the corner of your field” (Leviticus 23:22). The Gemara explains: Due to robbing the poor; so that the owner of the house will not see a time when the field is unoccupied and there are no poor people in the area. If he could designate <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> as he wished, there is room to suspect that he might say to his poor relative: This is <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i>, in the place and at the time that he chooses. He would thereby conceal the fact that there is <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> in his field from other poor people. The result would be that, for all intents and purposes, he robbed <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> from those with whom he did not share the information.
  
  Daf 23b
  
  And due to causing the poor to be idle; so that the poor, who have no way of knowing when he is going to cut the grain and where in the field he is going to leave the <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i>, will not be sitting and observing until he designates the <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> and constantly saying to themselves: Now the owner of the field is placing <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i>. Now that he leaves the <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> in a defined area at the end of his field, and the poor people know exactly where they can receive their portion, they need not waste their time in anticipation. And due to suspicion; if one leaves the <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> in the middle of the field, the poor will come and take their portion immediately when he designates the area of <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i>. When the owner then continues to cut and harvest the rest of the grain in the field, the <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> will not be noticeable. Insisting that he leave <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> at the end of the field ensures that passersby will not say: A person who did not leave <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> in his field should be cursed. We learned that the fourth reason is due to the verse: You shall not wholly reap. The Gemara wonders: Aren’t all of these reasons due to: You shall not wholly reap? All of the reasons explain that one may not reap his entire field and must leave <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> at the end of his field. Rava said: The meaning of the last reason is that <i>pe’a</i> is separated that way due to cheaters. There is concern that a person would not leave <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i> at all. He would claim that he already separated it in the middle of his field and that the poor already came and took it. In order to bolster the mitzva of <i>pe</i>’<i>a</i>, the Sages instituted that it must be separated specifically at the end of one’s field. In terms of the discussion in the Gemara, apparently, the desire to avoid arousing suspicion is a factor taken into consideration in determining <i>halakha</i>.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Redifa said that Rav Huna said: Lighting an oil lamp that has two spouts, with one wick placed in each of the spouts, is considered to have fulfilled the obligation of kindling the Hanukkah light for two people. Similarly, Rava said: One who filled a bowl with oil and placed wicks all around it, if he overturned a vessel on top of it, it is considered to have fulfilled the obligation of lighting the Hanukkah light for several people, corresponding to the number of wicks. By overturning a vessel atop the bowl, each wick appears to be burning independently. If one did not overturn a vessel on top of it, he thereby made it appear like a type of bonfire. From afar, the light from all of the flames appear to be a single flame. And it is not even considered to have fulfilled the obligation of lighting the Hanukkah light for one person because the mitzva is specifically to light a flame and not a bonfire.
  Rava said: It is obvious to me that there is a fixed list of priorities. When a person is poor and must choose between purchasing oil to light a Shabbat lamp for his home or purchasing oil to light a Hanukkah lamp, the Shabbat lamp for his home takes precedence. That is due to peace in his home; without the light of that lamp, his family would be sitting and eating their meal in the dark. Similarly, if there is a conflict between acquiring oil to light a lamp for his home and wine for the sanctification [<i>kiddush</i>] of Shabbat day, the lamp for his home takes precedence due to peace in his home. However, Rava raised a dilemma: When the conflict is between oil for a Hanukkah lamp or wine for <i>kiddush</i> of Shabbat day, what is the ruling in that case? Does <i>kiddush</i> of Shabbat day take priority because it is frequent, i.e., it is performed every week, and there is a principle: When there is a conflict between a frequent practice and an infrequent practice, the frequent practice takes precedence? Or, perhaps the Hanukkah lamp takes precedence due to publicity of the miracle? After he raised the dilemma, he then resolved it on his own and he ruled that, in that case, the Hanukkah lamp takes precedence due to publicity of the miracle.
  Rav Huna said: One who is accustomed to kindle lights on Shabbat and Hanukkah will be rewarded and have children who are Torah scholars, who will disseminate the light of Torah. One who is meticulous in performing the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i> merits a beautiful house on which to affix his <i>mezuza</i>. One who is meticulous in performing the mitzva of ritual fringes merits a beautiful garment. One who is meticulous in performing the mitzva <i>of kiddush</i> of the day merits and fills jugs of wine. The Gemara relates: Rav Huna was accustomed to pass by and teach at the entrance of the house of Rabbi Avin the carpenter. He saw that Rabbi Avin was accustomed to kindle many lights in honor of Shabbat. Rav Huna said: Two great men will emerge from here. Indeed, Rav Idi bar Avin and Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, his two oldest sons, emerged from their family. On a similar note, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥisda was accustomed to pass by and teach at the entrance of Rav Sheizvi’s father’s family home. He saw that Rav Sheizvi’s father was accustomed to kindle many lights in honor of Shabbat. Rav Ḥisda said: A great person will emerge from here. Indeed, Rav Sheizvi emerged from them.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Yosef’s wife would kindle the Shabbat lights late. Rav Yosef said to her: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “The pillar of cloud by day, and the pillar of fire by night, departed not from before the people” (Exodus 13:22), this teaches that the pillar of cloud would overlap with the pillar of fire? The pillar of fire would appear slightly before nightfall. And the pillar of fire would overlap with the pillar of cloud, as well. The pillar of cloud would appear slightly before daybreak. Therefore, in lighting the Shabbat lights it is also appropriate to light earlier, beginning Shabbat slightly before dark on Shabbat eve. She thought to kindle the lights much earlier, on Shabbat eve, long before nightfall. An Elder said to her, we learned: As long as he neither lights too early nor too late.
  Similar to the reward due one who kindles the Shabbat lights, Rava said: One who loves Sages will have children who are Sages. One who honors Sages will have sons-in-law who are Sages. One who stands in awe of the Sages will himself become a Torah scholar. And if he is not capable and lacks the talent to become a Torah scholar, his statements will be received like the statements of a Torah scholar.
  We learned in the mishna that one may not light with burnt oil on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is burnt oil? Rabba said: It is oil of <i>teruma</i> that became ritually impure. And why did they call it burnt oil? Because its burning is imminent, as it is prohibited to eat this oil and one is obligated to burn it. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that one may not light with it on Shabbat? The Gemara explains: Because it is a mitzva to burn it, the Sages issued a decree lest, in doing so, he come to adjust the wick in order to hasten its burning. Abaye said to him: But if what you say is so, that the reason for the prohibition is a concern lest he adjust it, then, on a Festival, when adjusting a wick is permitted, it should be permitted to light with burnt oil. Why then did we learn in the mishna: One may not light with burnt oil even on a Festival? The Gemara answers: It is a decree issued by the Sages prohibiting burning it even on a Festival, due to the prohibition to burn it on Shabbat.
  Rav Ḥisda said: The reason for the prohibition against lighting a Shabbat lamp with burnt oil is different, as we are not concerned lest one come to adjust the wick. Rather, here, in our mishna, we are dealing with a Festival that fell on Shabbat eve, in which case he must kindle Shabbat lights on the Festival. One may not light a Shabbat lamp with burnt oil on a Festival because one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival, a prohibition that applies to <i>teruma</i> as well. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that we learned in the latter clause, i.e., the next mishna, that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival, by inference, in the first clause of the mishna we are not dealing with a Festival but rather with a standard Shabbat. Rabbi Ḥanina from Sura said: This mishna must be understood in the following manner: These are not two distinct <i>halakhot</i>; rather, this mishna was stated employing the didactic style of what is the reason. What is the reason that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival or on a Festival that falls on Shabbat eve? It is because one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival at all.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda. All of these oils with which the Sages said that one may not light on Shabbat, one may light with them on a Festival, with the exception of burnt oil, because one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to the obligation to mention Hanukkah in Grace after Meals? The dilemma is: Since it is merely an obligation by rabbinic law, do we not mention it? Or, perhaps due to publicity of the miracle, we mention it. Rava said that Rav Seḥora said that Rav Huna said: One does not mention it. And if, nevertheless, he comes to mention it, he mentions it in the blessing of thanksgiving. The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Yehuda happened by Rava’s house on Hanukkah. When, after eating, he came to recite Grace after Meals, he thought to mention Hanukkah in the blessing: Who builds Jerusalem. Rav Sheshet said to the yeshiva students: One mentions Hanukkah in Grace after Meals just as he does in the <i>Amida</i> prayer. Just as in the <i>Amida</i> prayer one mentions Hanukkah in the blessing of thanksgiving, so too, in Grace after Meals one mentions Hanukkah in the blessing of thanksgiving.
  Based on the previous dilemma, an additional dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to the obligation to mention the New Moon in Grace after Meals? The dilemma is: If you say that on Hanukkah, since it is only by rabbinic law, one need not mention it in Grace after Meals; perhaps the New Moon, which is by Torah law, one is required to mention it. Or, perhaps since it is not a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor, one need not mention it. The Sages disputed this matter: Rav said: One mentions the New Moon in Grace after Meals. Rabbi Ḥanina said: One does not mention it. Rav Zerika said: Take the <i>halakha</i> of Rav in your hand as authoritative, since Rabbi Oshaya holds in accordance with his opinion. As Rabbi Oshaya taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: Days on which there is an additional offering sacrificed in the Temple, i.e., the New Moon and the intermediate days of a Festival; in the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers, one recites the eighteen blessings of the <i>Amida</i> prayer and says a passage pertaining to the event of the day during the blessing of Temple service. And if he did not recite it, we require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it. And on those days, there is no <i>kiddush</i> recited over the cup of wine at the start of the day, but there is mention of the day recited in Grace after Meals, in accordance with Rav’s opinion. Days on which there is no additional offering, i.e., Monday, and Thursday, and fast days, and non-priestly watches [<i>ma’amadot</i>], have a different legal status as detailed below.
  Before drawing a conclusion, the Gemara seeks to clarify: Monday and Thursday, what is their purpose in this discussion, i.e., why are Monday and Thursday mentioned here if no special prayers are recited on those days? The Gemara explains: Rather, certainly the reference is to Monday and Thursday and Monday that are fast days for rain and of <i>ma</i>’<i>amadot</i>. On those days, in the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers, one recites eighteen blessings and recites a passage pertaining to the event of the day, i.e., the fast, in the blessing: Who listens to prayer. However, if one did not mention it, we do not require him to return to the beginning of the prayer and repeat it. And, on those days, there is no <i>kiddush</i> recited over a cup of wine, and there is no mention of the day recited in Grace after Meals.
  An additional dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the ruling with regard to the obligation to mention Hanukkah in the additional prayer on Shabbat during Hanukkah or on the New Moon of Tevet, which falls during Hanukkah? The sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that since Hanukkah has no additional prayer of its own, and the additional prayer has no connection to Hanukkah, we do not mention it? Or, perhaps it is the essence of the day that is obligated in the mention of Hanukkah, in which case there is no distinction between the various prayers, and it should be mentioned in all four prayers, including the additional prayer on Shabbat and the New Moon. There is a dispute: Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda both said: One does not mention it. Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan both said: One mentions it.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This opinion of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda is Rav’s opinion, as Rav Giddel said that Rav said: In the case of the New Moon that occurs on Shabbat, the one who recites the portion from the Prophets [<i>haftara</i>] on Shabbat need not mention the New Moon in the blessing, as, if it were not Shabbat, there would be no reading from the Prophets on the New Moon. The <i>haftara</i> is unrelated to the New Moon, and therefore the New Moon is not mentioned in the blessing. The same should be true with regard to mention of Hanukkah in the additional service on the New Moon, as, if it were not the New Moon, he would not be reciting the additional service on Hanukkah. Therefore, when he recites the additional prayer, he need not mention Hanukkah.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison. Is this comparable? There, reading from the Prophets is not at all part of the service on the New Moon. Here, there is mention of Hanukkah in the evening, morning, and afternoon prayers. Rather, it is comparable to this: As Rav Aḥadvoi said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said: On a Festival that occurs on Shabbat, one who recites the portion from the Prophets during the afternoon service on Shabbat need not mention the Festival, as, if it were not Shabbat, there would be no reading from the Prophets during the afternoon service on a Festival. If so, even though there is a <i>haftara</i> during the morning service on a Festival, since they do not read from the Prophets in the afternoon, the reading is considered totally unrelated to the Festival and one does not mention the Festival. The same is true with regard to Hanukkah. One does not mention Hanukkah in the additional prayer.
  
  Daf 24b
  
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with any of these <i>halakhot</i>; rather, it is in accordance with that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: On Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat, one who recites the day’s closing prayer [<i>ne</i>’<i>ila</i>] must mention Shabbat even in that prayer, although <i>ne</i>’<i>ila</i> is not recited every Shabbat. The reason for this is that on Yom Kippur, the day itself is obligated in four prayers, i.e., morning, additional, afternoon, and closing. When it occurs on Shabbat, one must mention Shabbat in each of the prayers. Apparently, on a day that has a unique character, that character is manifest in all sacred aspects of the day; those engendered by the day itself as well as those engendered by other factors.
  The Gemara challenges this: It is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one <i>halakha</i> and another <i>halakha</i>. On the one hand, you said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. And, on the other hand, we hold that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rava, which contradicts the first <i>halakha</i>, as Rava said: On a Festival that occurs on Shabbat, the prayer leader who descends before the ark to recite the prayer abridged from the seven blessings of the Shabbat evening <i>Amida</i> prayer need not mention the Festival, as, if it were not also Shabbat, the prayer leader would not descend before the ark to recite this prayer during the evening prayer on a Festival. The Gemara reverts to the previous assumption that an element that does not arise from the essential <i>halakhot</i> of the day is considered foreign to it and is not mentioned.
  This challenge is rejected: How can you compare? There, actually, even on Shabbat, the prayer leader need not repeat the prayer, just as the prayer is not repeated any other evening. It was the Sages who instituted repetition of the prayer due to concern for potential danger. The Sages sought to slightly delay those leaving the synagogue to enable people who came late to leave together with the rest of the worshippers. This was necessary because synagogues were often located beyond the city limits, and it was dangerous to walk alone at night. This repetition of the prayer does not stem from the obligation of the day but was instituted for another purpose. However, here, on Yom Kippur, it is the day that is obligated in four prayers, and therefore on each day that there are added prayers, one must mention the events that occurred on that day in those prayers just as he does in all the standard prayers.
  And we learned in the mishna that one may not light with the sheep’s tail or with fat. Naḥum the Mede says that one may light using cooked fat. And the Rabbis say that one may not light with it whether or not it is cooked. The Gemara asks: Isn’t the opinion of the Rabbis identical to the unattributed opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to what Rav Beruna said that Rav said that one may light with cooked fat to which oil was added. One of the <i>tanna</i>’<i>im</i> accepts this opinion as <i>halakha</i> and permits lighting with it, and the other prohibits it, and the opinions are not defined. Although it seems from the formulation of the mishna that they differ on this point, it is unclear what the opinion of each <i>tanna</i> is.
  MISHNA: In continuation of the previous mishna, this mishna adds that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival, as the Gemara will explain below. With regard to lighting Shabbat lamps, there were Sages who prohibited the use of specific oils. Rabbi Yishmael says that one may not light with tar [<i>itran</i>] in deference to Shabbat because tar smells bad and disturbs those in the house. And the Rabbis permit lighting with all oils for lamps as long as they burn properly; with sesame oil, with nut oil, with turnip oil, with fish oil, with gourd oil, with tar, and even with naphtha [<i>neft</i>]. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may light only with olive oil in deference to Shabbat, as it is the choicest and most pleasant of the oils.
  GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that one may not light with burnt oil on a Festival, the Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers: Because, in general, one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival. With regard to the fundamental principle that one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Ḥizkiya said, and one of the Sages from the school of Ḥizkiya taught the same, that which the verse said: “And you shall let nothing of it remain until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), requires explanation. As the Torah did not need to state until morning the second time. It would have been sufficient to state: But that which remains of it you shall burn with fire. Rather, why does the Torah state until morning? The verse comes to provide him with the second morning for burning. Leftover meat of the Paschal lamb is not burned on the following morning, which is a Festival, but rather on the following day, the first of the intermediate days of the Festival. From there it is derived that burning consecrated items on a Festival is prohibited.
  Abaye said: This is derived from another verse, as the verse said: “This is the burnt-offering of each Shabbat on its Shabbat” (Numbers 28:10). Only the burnt-offering of Shabbat is sacrificed on Shabbat, and not a weekday burnt-offering on Shabbat, and not a weekday burnt-offering on a Festival. Apparently, performing this mitzva is prohibited even on a Festival, since it was not explicitly enumerated among the actions permitted on a Festival.
  Rava said: This is derived from a different verse, as the verse said with regard to the laws of a Festival: “No manner of work shall be done in them, save that which every man must eat, that alone may be done by you” (Exodus 12:16). From the word that, it is derived that for sustenance, one is permitted to perform prohibited labor on a Festival, but not for facilitators of sustenance. Although cooking is permitted, actions that involve prohibited labors for the purpose of facilitating cooking are prohibited. From the word alone, it is derived: And not circumcision performed not at its appointed time, i.e., a circumcision may be performed on a Festival only if it is on the eighth day. A circumcision that was postponed may not be performed on a Festival. It is possible that license to perform the postponed circumcision on a Festival could have been derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. Therefore, the verse explicitly prohibited doing so. The same is true with regard to burning consecrated items. Although the Torah commands burning consecrated items, it was not permitted on a Festival since there is no obligation to do so specifically on that day.
  Rav Ashi said: It is derived from a different source. In the verses that speak of the Festivals, as opposed to the term Shabbat, the term <i>shabbaton</i> (Leviticus 23:24) appears.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  The latter term is a positive mitzva to rest. And, if so, observance of a Festival is a mitzva that was commanded with both a positive mitzva to rest and a prohibition: “You shall do no manner of servile work” (Leviticus 23:8). And there is a principle that a positive mitzva, e.g., burning consecrated items whose time has expired, does not override a mitzva that was commanded with both a prohibition and a positive mitzva, e.g., observance of the Festival.
  By inference, the conclusion is that, specifically on a Festival, lighting with burnt oil is prohibited. During the week one may well do so. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this distinction? It would be reasonable to say that it is prohibited to derive any benefit from <i>teruma</i> that became ritually impure. Rav said: Just as there is a mitzva to burn consecrated items that became ritually impure, so too, there is a mitzva to burn <i>teruma</i> that became ritually impure, and the Torah said: While it is being destroyed, derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: Where did the Torah say this? Where is there an allusion to this in the Bible? The Gemara answers: It can be derived from the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The verse said: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My <i>terumot</i>” (Numbers 18:8). From the amplification of the plural: My <i>terumot</i>, it is derived that the verse is speaking of two <i>terumot</i>, one <i>teruma</i> that is ritually pure and one <i>teruma</i> that is ritually impure. And God said: “I have given you,” i.e., it shall be yours, and you may derive benefit from it. Since there is a stringent prohibition against eating it, the benefit permitted is to burn it beneath your cooked dish. Similar forms of benefit may also be derived from burning <i>teruma</i>.
  And if you wish, say instead an alternative manner to derive this <i>halakha</i>, from the statement of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is written in the confession of the tithes: “I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, neither have I destroyed from it while impure” (Deuteronomy 26:14). By inference: From it you may not destroy, but you may destroy the oil of <i>teruma</i> that has become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: And say differently: From it you may not destroy, but you may destroy and derive benefit from burning consecrated oil that became ritually impure.
  The Gemara responds: That possibility is unacceptable. Is it not an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? If with regard to the tithe which is lenient, the Torah said: Neither have I destroyed from it, while impure, items consecrated to the Temple, which are more stringent, all the more so that it is prohibited to burn it while ritually impure.
  The Gemara rejects this: If so, that this matter is derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, then, with regard to <i>teruma</i> as well, let us say that it is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as <i>teruma</i> is more stringent than tithes. If it is prohibited to benefit from tithes while they are burning, all the more so would one be prohibited to benefit from the <i>teruma</i> while it is burning. The Gemara answers: Doesn’t it say: From it? From there it is derived that there is an item excluded from the prohibition of burning in ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to conclude that “from it” comes to exclude <i>teruma</i>? Perhaps “from it” comes to exclude consecrated items. The Gemara replies: It is reasonable that I do not exclude consecrated items from the prohibition against benefiting from its burning, as with regard to consecrated items there are many stringent elements. Their Hebrew acronym is <i>peh</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>ayin</i>, <i>kaf</i>, <i>samekh</i>, which is a mnemonic for the following terms. <i>Piggul</i>: With regard to an offering, if, during one of the services involved in its sacrifice, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, bringing it to the altar, sprinkling it on the altar, the priest or the one bringing the offering entertains the thought of eating the sacrifice at a time that is unfit for eating, it is thereby invalidated. <i>Notar</i>: Meat of a sacrifice that remained beyond its allotted time may not be eaten and must be burned. <i>Korban me</i>’<i>ila</i>: One who unwittingly derives benefit from consecrated items is required to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated items. <i>Karet</i>: The punishment of one who eats consecrated items while ritually impure is <i>karet</i>. <i>Asur le</i>’<i>onen</i>: An acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative died that same day and has not yet been buried, is prohibited to eat consecrated items. None of these <i>halakhot</i> applies to <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, consecrated items are more stringent than <i>teruma,</i> and therefore it is consecrated items that are not excluded from the prohibition against deriving benefit while ritually impure.
  The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, it is <i>teruma</i> that I would not exclude from the prohibition, as, with regard to <i>teruma</i>, there are many stringent elements represented by the acronym <i>mem</i>, <i>ḥet</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>zayin</i>, which is a mnemonic for the following: <i>Mita</i>: One for whom <i>teruma</i> is prohibited who ate it intentionally is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven. <i>Ḥomesh</i>: A non-priest, for whom <i>teruma</i> is prohibited, who unwittingly ate <i>teruma</i> is obligated to pay its value to the priest plus one-fifth of the sum.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  And, <i>teruma</i> does not have the possibility of <i>pidyon</i>: redemption, as, once it is sanctified, it may not be redeemed and rendered non-sacred. And it is prohibited to <i>zarim</i>: non-priests may not eat it. These stringencies do not apply to consecrated items. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, those stringencies that apply to consecrated items are more numerous than those that apply to <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, it is appropriate to be more stringent with consecrated items and exclude impure <i>teruma</i> from the prohibition against deriving benefit when burning it.
  And if you wish, say instead a different reason, without counting the number of stringencies: Consecrated items are more stringent because one who eats them while ritually impure is punishable by <i>karet</i>, while in the case of <i>teruma</i> the punishment is death at the hand of Heaven. In this regard, the Torah is more stringent vis-à-vis consecrated items than it is vis-à-vis <i>teruma</i>. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is a different proof that one is permitted to benefit from <i>teruma</i> while it is burning. As the verse said: “The first fruits of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the first of the fleece of your sheep shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4). The Sages derived from this verse: Give the priest <i>teruma</i> that is ritually pure, that is fit for him to consume, and do not give the priest <i>teruma</i> that is suitable only for his fire, to be burned. By inference, ritually impure <i>teruma</i> is suitable for his fire, i.e., a priest may derive benefit from it.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yishmael says that kindling a lamp on Shabbat with tar is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rava said: Because its odor is bad the Sages issued a decree prohibiting the use of tar, lest one forsake the light and leave. Abaye said to him: And let him leave. What obligation is there to sit next to the light? Rava said to him: Because I say that kindling Shabbat lights is an obligation, and one is required to eat specifically by that light in deference to Shabbat. As Rav Naḥman bar Rav Zavda said, and others say that it was Rav Naḥman bar Rava who said that Rav said: Kindling the Shabbat lamps is an obligation, whereas washing one’s hands and feet with hot water in the evening prior to Shabbat is merely optional. And I say: Washing is not merely optional; it is a mitzva even though it is not an obligation.
  The Gemara asks: What mitzva is there? The Gemara explains that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This was the custom of Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai: On Shabbat eve, they would bring him a bowl full of hot water and he would use it to wash his face, hands, and feet, and he would wrap himself, and sit in linen cloaks with ritual fringes, and he was like an angel of the Lord of hosts. He did all this in deference to Shabbat. And the Gemara relates that his students, who also sat wrapped in linen cloaks, would conceal the corners of their garments from him so that he would not see that they did not have ritual fringes on their garments. He said to them: My sons, did I not teach you with regard to the obligation to attach ritual fringes to a linen cloak: Beit Shammai exempt the linen sheet because at least part of the ritual fringes is always made from wool, and there is a Torah prohibition against a mixture of wool and linen that applies even to ritual fringes? And Beit Hillel obligate linen sheets in the mitzva of ritual fringes, as they hold that the positive mitzva of ritual fringes overrides the prohibition of mixing wool and linen. The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and therefore the sheets require ritual fringes. And the students held: Although it is permitted by Torah law to attach ritual fringes to a linen garment, the Sages issued a decree that one may not do so due to garments worn at night. The Sages were concerned lest a person wear this cloak at night. Since one is not obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes at night, he would be wearing the prohibited mixture of wool and linen at a time when he is not fulfilling the mitzva of ritual fringes. Therefore, attaching ritual fringes made of wool to a linen garment is prohibited, even to a garment worn during the day.
  Since bathing as preparation for enjoyment of Shabbat was discussed, the Gemara cites the homiletic interpretation of the verse describing those heading into exile: “And my soul is removed far off from peace, I forgot prosperity” (Lamentations 3:17). What is: And my soul is removed far off from peace? Rabbi Abbahu said: That is the lack of opportunity to engage in kindling the Shabbat lights, which a refugee is unable to do. I forgot prosperity, Rabbi Yirmeya said: That is the lack of opportunity to bathe in the bathhouse. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is the lack of opportunity to engage in washing one’s hands and feet in hot water. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: Prosperity is a pleasant bed and the pleasant bedclothes that are on it, which are not available in exile. Rabbi Abba said: That is a made bed, and a wife adorned, i.e., worthy of and suitable (Rashba) for Torah scholars.
  Incidental to the discussion of prosperity, the Gemara mentions that on a similar topic, the Sages taught: Who is wealthy? Anyone who gets pleasure from his wealth, that is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The letters <i>mem</i> (Meir), <i>tet</i> (Tarfon), <i>kuf</i> (Akiva), <i>samekh</i> (Yosei) are a mnemonic for the <i>tannaim</i> who expressed opinions on this matter. Rabbi Tarfon says: A wealthy person is anyone who has one hundred vineyards, and one hundred fields, and one hundred slaves working in them. Rabbi Akiva says: Anyone who has a wife whose actions are pleasant. Rabbi Yosei says: Anyone who has a bathroom close to his table.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may not light on Shabbat with sap from balsam trees [<i>tzori</i>]. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rabba said: Since its pleasant smell diffuses, the Sages were concerned lest one forget and come to take some sap from it on Shabbat. That is tantamount to extinguishing the lamp, as removing oil from a burning lamp curtails the amount of time that it will burn. Abaye said to him:
  
  Daf 26a
  
  Let the Master say a different reason: Because tar is volatile, i.e., it is liable to evaporate quickly and cause a fire. The Gemara answers: He stated one reason and another: One, because it is volatile and potentially dangerous; and, furthermore, due to a decree lest one take sap from it.
  The Gemara relates: A mother-in-law who hated her daughter-in-law said to her: Go adorn yourself with balsam oil. She went and adorned herself. When she came, her mother-in-law said to her: Go light the lamp. She went and lit the lamp. She caught fire and was burned.
  Since balsam oil was discussed, the Gemara cites the verse: “But Nebuzaradan the captain of the guard left of the poorest of the land to be vinedressers and husbandmen” (Jeremiah 52:16). The Gemara explains the verse: With regard to vinedressers, Rav Yosef taught: These poorest of the land were the balsam collectors in the south of Eretz Yisrael, in the expanse from Ein Gedi to Ramata. And the husbandmen; these are the trappers of the snail [<i>ḥilazon</i>], from which the sky blue dye is produced in the north of the country, in the area between the Promontory of Tyre and Ḥaifa. Only a small number of poor people could barely eke out a living from these tasks, which involved mere gathering.
  The Sages taught: One may not light with ritually impure untithed produce [<i>tevel</i>] during the week, and needless to say one may not light with it on Shabbat. On a similar note, one may not light with white naphtha during the week, and needless to say one may not light with it on Shabbat. Granted, with regard to white naphtha, its prohibition is understandable because it is volatile and potentially dangerous. However, with regard to ritually impure <i>tevel</i>, what is the reason that the Sages prohibited lighting with it?
  The Gemara answers that the verse said: “And I, behold, I have given you the charge of My <i>terumot</i>” (Numbers 18:8). From the fact that <i>terumot</i> is plural, the Sages derived that the verse is speaking of two <i>terumot</i>: Both <i>teruma</i> that is ritually pure and <i>teruma</i> that is ritually impure. Just as with regard to <i>teruma</i> that is ritually pure, you, the priest, have permission to benefit from it only from the time <i>teruma</i> was separated and onward, so too, with regard to <i>teruma</i> that is ritually impure, you have permission to benefit from it only from the time <i>teruma</i> was separated and onward. Since a portion of the untithed produce is <i>teruma</i> that has not yet been separated, it is prohibited even for a priest to use it.
  The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter of the <i>Tosefta</i> itself, the case of lighting with sap from balsam trees on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may not light with <i>tzori</i> on Shabbat. And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would also say: <i>Tzori</i>, which is one of the component spices of the incense in the Temple, is merely the sap that emerges from balsam trees, and is not part of the balsam tree itself. Rabbi Yishmael says: Anything that originates from the tree, one may not light with it; only materials that do not come from trees may be used. Rabbi Yishmael ben Beroka says: One may only light with a substance that emerges from the fruit. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may only light with olive oil alone.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri stood on his feet and, contrary to this statement, said: And what shall the people of Babylonia, who have only sesame oil, do? And what shall the people of Medea, who have only nut oil, do? And what shall the people of Alexandria, who have only radish oil, do? And what shall the people of Cappadocia, who have neither this nor that but only naphtha, do? Rather, you have a prohibition only with regard to those substances with regard to which the Sages said: One may not light with them. All other oils are permitted.
  And one may light with fish oil and tar. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: One may light with gourd oil and naphtha. Sumakhos says: Among the substances that emerge from the flesh of living beings, one may light only with fish oil. The Gemara asks: The opinion of Sumakhos is identical to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, who also permits lighting with fish oil. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to what Rav Beruna said that Rav said: One is permitted to use molten fat to which oil was added for lighting. They disagree with regard to this <i>halakha</i>; however, their opinions are not defined and it is unclear which of them permits using it and which prohibits using it.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Anything that emerges from the tree does not have the legal status of an area of three by three fingerbreadths. Even if it is three by three fingerbreadths, it is not considered sufficiently large to become ritually impure. And, therefore, one may roof his <i>sukka</i> with it, as the roofing of his <i>sukka</i> may not be made from any material that can become ritually impure. This is the case for everything that originates from a tree with the exception of linen, which has a unique legal status. Abaye said:
  
  Daf 26b
  
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael essentially said the same thing, even though they said it in different ways. The Gemara elaborates: The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is that which we said: The only fabrics woven from plant materials that are considered bona fide fabrics are those made of linen. What is the statement of the <i>tanna</i> from the school of Rabbi Yishmael? As it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Since the word garments is stated in the Torah unmodified, without stating from what materials those garments were made, and the verse specified in one of its references to garments, in the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity of leprosy, wool and linen: “And the garment in which there will be the plague of leprosy, whether it be a woolen garment, or a linen garment” (Leviticus 13:47), the conclusion can be drawn: Just as below, when it mentions a garment in the case of leprosy, the Torah is referring to one made of wool or linen, so too, all garments mentioned in the Torah are those made from wool or linen. Other fabrics are not classified as garments.
  In contrast to Abaye, who viewed the opinions expressed by Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael as expressing the same idea, Rava said that the two opinions are not identical. There is a difference between them when the cloth is three by three handbreadths, with regard to other garments that are neither wool nor linen. As Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says explicitly: If it is less than three by three fingerbreadths, indicating that he is of the opinion that a cloth that is three by three handbreadths that is suitable for use even by wealthy people can become ritually impure. In his opinion, the uniqueness of linen fabric is not that it can become ritually impure, but rather that a linen rag, even if it is very small, can become ritually impure. The <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael is not of the opinion that other garments can become ritually impure.
  In any case, based on the above, everyone agrees that, clearly, three by three fingerbreadths in a wool or linen garment can become ritually impure with the impurity of leprosy. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? The Gemara responds that it is derived as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this matter. When the Torah states: Garment, unmodified, I have derived that nothing other than a whole garment can become ritually impure. However, with regard to a cloth that is three by three fingerbreadths, from where do I derive that it is also included in this <i>halakha</i>? The verse states: “And the garment in which there will be the plague of leprosy” (Leviticus 13:47). From the addition of the word: And the garment [<i>vehabeged</i>], it is derived that all woven swatches are subsumed within the category of garment in this matter. The Gemara asks: And perhaps say that it comes to include a woven garment that is three by three handbreadths? The Gemara answers: That is inconceivable. Is that not derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? As, now, even the threads of the warp or the threads of the woof can become ritually impure, is it necessary to mention that a cloth three by three handbreadths can become ritually impure as well? A garment that is three by three handbreadths is comprised of several warp and woof threads that can themselves become ritually impure.
  The Gemara rejects this: If so, then let us also derive a cloth that is three by three fingerbreadths through the same <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the warp and woof threads. Rather, it must be that this <i>a fortiori</i> inference is flawed. Threads woven into fabric do not maintain their previous status as they are no longer suitable to be used as warp and woof threads. Rather, cloths that are three by three handbreadths, which are suitable for use by both the wealthy and the poor as they are multipurpose cloths, can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as they are certainly more significant than the warp and woof threads and they become ritually impure. However, cloths that are three by three fingerbreadths, which are suitable for use by the poor but are unsuitable for use by the wealthy, are not derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. Therefore, the reason that they can become ritually impure is specifically because it was written in the Torah. Had it not been written in the Torah, we would not derive it through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  The Gemara also asks: Indeed, there is amplification in the Torah, derived from the term: And the garment, which is a generalization that comes to expand upon the details that follow. And say that it comes to include the ruling that cloth that is three by three handbreadths in garments made of materials other than wool or linen can become ritually impure. The Gemara answers: That is inconceivable. The verse said: A garment of wool or linen, indicating that a garment made of wool or linen, yes, it becomes ritually impure; a garment made of other materials, no, it does not become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: And say that when the verse excluded, it excluded specifically a garment that is three by three fingerbreadths; however, a garment that is three by three handbreadths can become ritually impure. The Gemara replies: Two exclusions are written; once it is stated: “A garment of wool or linen” (Leviticus 13:59), and it is also stated: “Whether it be a woolen garment, or a linen garment” (Leviticus 13:47). One verse comes to exclude cloth of three by three fingerbreadths, and one verse comes to exclude cloth of three by three handbreadths, to emphasize that a garment made of a material that is neither wool nor linen cannot become ritually impure at all. This corresponds to Abaye’s opinion that garments not made of wool or linen cannot become ritually impure.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rava, who said that the practical difference between the two opinions is with regard to cloth three by three handbreadths in other garments, that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is of the opinion that they can become ritually impure, whereas the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael is not of the opinion that they can become ritually impure, in the case of a cloth that is three by three handbreadths in other garments,
  
  Daf 27a
  
  from where does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar derive that it can become ritually impure? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, it is derived from the verse that speaks of the ritual impurity of creeping animals: “Or a garment, or skin, or sack” (Leviticus 11:32). The additional “or” comes to include items that are not generally included in the definition of garment. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From the fact that it says garment, I have derived nothing other than a whole garment; however, a swatch that is three by three handbreadths in other garments, from where is it derived that it can become ritually impure? The verse states: Or a garment.
  The Gemara asks: And Abaye, who says that everyone agrees that other garments do not become ritually impure at all, this phrase: Or a garment, what does he do with it and what does it come to add? The Gemara answers: He needs it to include a small swatch of fabric that is three by three fingerbreadths made of wool or linen. Despite its size, it can become ritually impure from contact with creeping animals.
  And Rava holds that there is no need for the verse to discuss that matter explicitly, as the Torah revealed in the case of leprosy that it is considered to be a garment, and the same is true with regard to the ritual impurity of creeping animals.
  And Abaye holds that one cannot derive the <i>halakhot</i> of creeping animals from the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy, as there is room to refute that comparison in the following manner: What comparison is there to leprosy, which has more stringent <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity, as even the warp and woof threads alone can become ritually impure from it, which is not the case with regard to ritual impurity from creeping animals? Therefore, even small scraps can become ritually impure from leprosy.
  The other <i>amora</i>, Rava, says: If it should enter your mind to say that leprosy is more stringent, then the Torah should have written the <i>halakha</i> with regard to creeping animals, and let leprosy be derived from them. Ultimately, the two <i>halakhot</i> are paralleled to one another in the Torah. It would have been simpler to explicitly write the laws of creeping animals and to derive leprosy from them. Since that is not the case, it is proof that the <i>halakhot</i> of creeping animals can be derived from leprosy.
  The other <i>amora</i>, Abaye, said that this contention is fundamentally unsound, as leprosy could not be derived from creeping animals because there is room to refute this idea and challenge: What is the comparison to the ritual impurity of creeping animals, which is more stringent than the ritual impurity of leprosy, as the creeping animal makes one ritually impure even in a case where it is a lentil-bulk, which is not true of other types of ritual impurity? Therefore, verses were necessary to teach about the ritual impurity of both creeping animals and leprosy.
  Abaye said: This statement of the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael diverges from another statement of the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: From the fact that the verse says garment, I have derived nothing other than the <i>halakha</i> that a garment of wool or linen can become ritually impure. However, from where is it derived to include garments made of camels’ hair and rabbits’ wool, goats’ hair or the types of silk, the <i>shirayin</i>, the <i>kalakh</i>, and the <i>serikin</i> among the fabrics that can become ritually impure? The verse states: Or a garment. The word “or” serves as an amplification to include all types of fabric.
  Whereas Rava said: There is no need to say that there is a dispute in this case between two <i>tanna</i>’<i>im</i> from a single school. Rather, when this <i>tanna</i> from the school of Rabbi Yishmael, quoted above, is not of the opinion that there is ritual impurity in other garments, it is only with regard to a swatch that is three by three fingerbreadths; however, with regard to a cloth that is three by three handbreadths he is of the opinion that it becomes ritually impure. His previous statement came to exclude a small garment from becoming ritually impure. This statement is referring to a larger garment that is three by three handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t Rava the one who said above that, in the case of three by three handbreadths in other garments, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is of the opinion that they can become ritually impure, whereas the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael is not of the opinion that they become ritually impure? The Gemara answers: Rava retracted that opinion in order to reconcile the opinions of the <i>tanna</i>’<i>im</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael. And if you wish, say instead a different answer: Rav Pappa said this statement and not Rava. Since Rav Pappa was the primary disciple of Rava, the Gemara attributed his statement to Rava.
  Rav Pappa himself understood the first statement of the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael and stated it in a completely different manner. In his opinion, the derivation from the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy, which concluded that even all nonspecific mentions of garments in the Torah refer to wool or linen, came to include the <i>halakhot</i> of diverse kinds, the Torah prohibition to wear clothing made from a mixture of wool and linen threads. He sought to prove that the <i>halakhot</i> of prohibited mixtures of threads apply only to wool and linen. The Gemara asks: Why does he require this derivation with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds? The fact that the prohibition is limited to wool and linen is explicitly written, as it is stated: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together” (Deuteronomy 22:11). The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, an additional derivation was necessary, as it would have entered your mind to say that this, the restriction of the prohibition of diverse kinds to wool and linen, applies specifically to a case when one uses them together in the manner of wearing them; however, in merely placing the garments upon oneself, any two kinds are prohibited. Therefore, it was necessary to derive that the garment mentioned is restricted to wool and linen.
  This claim is rejected: And is it not an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? Just as in the case of wearing the garment, where one’s entire body derives benefit from the diverse kinds, you said that wool and linen, yes, are included in the prohibition, other materials, no, are not included; in the case of merely placing the garment upon himself, all the more so that the <i>halakha</i> should not be more stringent. Rather, certainly the <i>halakha</i> that was attributed to Rav Pappa is a mistake, and he did not say it.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak also said that those statements of the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael do not refer to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity. They refer to another topic. In his opinion, the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael came to say that just as the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy are limited to garments made from wool or linen, so too, all
  
  Daf 27b
  
  garments mentioned in the Torah are made from wool and linen. This comes to include the law of ritual fringes; the obligation of ritual fringes applies only to those materials. The Gemara asks: Why is that derivation necessary? With regard to ritual fringes it is written explicitly: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together” (Deuteronomy 22:11); and juxtaposed to it, it is written: “You shall make for you twisted fringes upon the four corners of your covering, with which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12). From the juxtaposition of these two verses it is derived that the mitzva of ritual fringes applies only to garments to which the laws of diverse kinds apply. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak responded that the matter is not so clear, as it could have entered your mind to say in accordance with the statement of Rava. As Rava raised a contradiction: On the one hand, it is written: “And that they put with the fringe of each corner a thread of sky blue” (Numbers 15:39); apparently, the threads of the ritual fringes must be of the same type of fabric as the corner of the garment. However, in Deuteronomy, in the laws of ritual fringes, it is written in juxtaposition to the laws of diverse kinds: Wool and linen together. The ritual fringes may only be made of those materials. How can that contradiction be resolved? Rather, Rava says: Ritual fringes made of wool and linen exempt the garment and fulfill the obligation of ritual fringes whether the garment is of their own type, wool or linen, whether it is not of their own type. Whereas with regard to other types, a garment of their own type, they exempt; a garment not of their own type, they do not exempt. It would have entered your mind to explain this in accordance with the approach of Rava. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> taught us that the obligation of ritual fringes applies only to wool and linen and not to other materials.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: According to the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, what is different about ritual impurity that he includes other garments not made of wool and linen because it is written: Or a garment, which is a term of amplification? Here too, in the matter of ritual fringes, say that it comes to include other garments from the phrase: Of your covering, with which you cover yourself. Rav Ashi answered: That amplification is necessary to include the garment of a blind person in the obligation of ritual fringes. As it was taught in a <i>baraita,</i> with regard to ritual fringes it is stated: “And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that you may look upon it and remember all the mitzvot of the Lord” (Numbers 15:39). The phrase: That you may look, comes to exclude a night garment, which cannot be seen and is therefore exempt from the mitzva of ritual fringes. The <i>tanna</i> continues: Do you say that the verse comes to exclude a night garment? Or is it only to exclude the garment of a blind person who is also unable to fulfill the verse: That you may look upon it? The <i>tanna</i> explains: When it says in Deuteronomy: Of your covering, with which you cover yourself, the garment of a blind person is mentioned, as he too covers himself with a covering. If so, then how do I fulfill the exclusion: That you may look upon it? It comes to exclude a night garment.
  The Gemara asks: Since there is one verse that includes and another verse that excludes, what did you see that led you to include a blind person and to exclude a night garment in the obligation of ritual fringes? The Gemara answers: I include the garment of a blind person because it is, at least, visible to others, and I exclude a night garment because it is not even visible to others.
  The Gemara asks: And say that this amplification does not come to include a blind person’s garments, but rather, as Rava said, to include other garments not made from wool or linen in the obligation of ritual fringes. The Gemara answers: It is logical to say that since the Torah is standing and discussing a garment made of wool or linen, it is certainly including another garment made of wool or linen. Therefore, an amplification with regard to the garment of a blind person made of wool or linen is derived. However, when the Torah is standing and discussing a garment made from wool or linen, is it reasonable to say that it is including other garments with them? Rather, other garments are certainly not derived from there.
  The Gemara returns to discuss the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who disqualified even small cloths from being used as roofing in the <i>sukka</i> because they can become ritually impure. Abaye said: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar and Sumakhos said the same thing. The Gemara specifies: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar; that which we stated above. Sumakhos; as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Sumakhos says: A <i>sukka</i> that he roofed with roofing made from spun thread is disqualified because spun thread can become ritually impure from leprosy.
  In accordance with whose opinion is Sumakhos’ statement? It is in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as we learned in a mishna: Warp and woof can become ritually impure from leprosy immediately after they are spun; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The warp can become ritually impure only after it is removed from the cauldron in which it is boiled, and it is only the woof that can become ritually impure immediately. However, the bundles of unprocessed flax can become ritually impure after they are bleached in the oven and their processing is at least half-completed. Sumakhos, the student of Rabbi Meir, adheres to his position.
  MISHNA: Of all substances that emerge from the tree, one may light only with flax on Shabbat (<i>Tosafot</i>) because the other substances do not burn well. And of all substances that emerge from the tree, the only substance that becomes ritually impure with impurity transmitted by tents over a corpse is flax. If there is a dead body inside a house or a tent that is made from any materials that originate from a tree, everything in the house becomes ritually impure. However, only in the case of flax does the tent itself become impure.
  GEMARA: The mishna mentioned flax as a material that comes from a tree. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that flax is called a tree? Based on appearance, it does not resemble a tree at all. Mar Zutra said: It is derived from that which the verse said: “And she had taken them up to the roof and hidden them under the trees of flax” (Joshua 2:6).
  And we also learned in the mishna that with regard to any substance that emerges from the tree, the only substance that becomes ritually impure with impurity transmitted by tents over a corpse is flax. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Elazar said: The <i>tanna</i> learned a verbal analogy [<i>gezera shava</i>] between the word tent, written in the context of ritual impurity, and the word tent,
  
  Daf 28a
  
  written in the context of the Tabernacle. It is written here, in the discussion of the laws of ritual impurity: “This is the law: When a man dies in a tent, every one that comes into the tent, and everything that is in the tent, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:14), and it is written there: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle, and put the covering of the tent above upon it; as the Lord commanded Moses” (Exodus 40:19). Just as below, with regard to the Tabernacle, the tent was made of linen and is considered a tent, so too, here, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, only a tent made of linen is considered a tent. The Gemara asks: If so, derive the following from that same verbal analogy: Just as below the linen threads in the Tabernacle were specifically threads that were twisted and the threads were folded six times, so too, here, in all of the <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to a tent over a corpse, the threads must be twisted and their threads folded six times. The verse states the word tent, tent several times to amplify and include even a tent made of linen not identical to the Tabernacle. The Gemara asks: If the repetition of the word tent, tent several times amplifies, even all things should be included among those items that can receive ritual impurity as a tent. The Gemara answers: This amplification cannot be that far-reaching, as, if so, the verbal analogy of tent, tent, that teaches us to derive the tent over a corpse from the Tabernacle, what purpose does it serve if everything is included? Rather, certainly the amplification is not absolute. Through the combination of the verbal analogy and the amplification, it is derived that this <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to linen.
  And perhaps say: Just as below, in the Tabernacle, there were beams supporting the tent, so too, here, in the laws of ritual impurity, a tent made of beams should also be considered a tent. The Gemara responds that the verse said: “And you shall make the beams for the Tabernacle of acacia wood, standing up” (Exodus 26:15). From the language of the verse, it is derived that the Tabernacle, i.e., the curtains alone, is called Tabernacle, and the beams are not called Tabernacle, because they merely facilitate the Tabernacle. The Gemara rejects this: But if that is so, based on an analysis of the language of the verse, it says there: “And you shall make a covering for the tent of rams’ skins dyed red and a covering of <i>teḥashim</i> above” (Exodus 26:14), then in that case, too, say that the covering is not considered a tent. If so, however, what of the dilemma raised by Rabbi Elazar: With regard to the hide of a non-kosher animal over a corpse, what is the ruling? Can it become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse? If the covering of the Tabernacle is not considered a tent, now, the hide of a kosher animal that covered the Tabernacle cannot become ritually impure. If that is so, is it necessary to mention that the hide of a non-kosher animal cannot become ritually impure? The Gemara answers: The cases are not comparable because it is different there, in the case of the covering of animal hides, because the verse subsequently restored its status as a tent by uniting the tent and its covering, as it is written: “They shall bear the curtains of the Tabernacle, and the Tent of Meeting, its covering, and the covering of <i>taḥash</i> that is upon it” (Numbers 4:25). The verse juxtaposes the upper to the lower covering; just as the lower covering is considered a tent, so too, the upper covering is considered a tent.
  Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma was mentioned above, and now the Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: With regard to the hide of a non-kosher animal over a corpse, what is the ruling? Can it become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse? The Gemara clarifies: What is the essence of his dilemma? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The <i>taḥash</i> that existed in the time of Moses is at the crux of Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma. Was it non-kosher or was it kosher? Rav Yosef said: What is his dilemma? Didn’t we learn explicitly: Only the hide of a kosher animal was deemed suitable for heavenly service? Certainly, the <i>taḥash</i> was a kosher species.
  Rabbi Abba raised an objection. Rabbi Yehuda says: There were two coverings for the Tabernacle, one made of the reddened hides of rams and one of the hides of <i>teḥashim</i>. Rabbi Neḥemya says: There was only one covering for the Tabernacle, half of which was made of rams’ hides and half from the hides of <i>teḥashim</i>. And <i>teḥashim</i> were similar to the species of undomesticated animals called <i>tela ilan</i>. The Gemara asks: But isn’t a <i>tela ilan</i> a non-kosher creature? The Gemara emends this statement: This is what Rabbi Neḥemya intended to say: It was like a <i>tela ilan</i> in that it was multicolored; however, it was not an actual <i>tela ilan</i>. There, the <i>tela ilan</i> is non-kosher, and here, the covering of the tent was made from kosher animals. Rav Yosef said: If so, that is the reason that we translate the word <i>taḥash</i> as <i>sasgona</i>, which means that it rejoices [<i>sas</i>] in many colors [<i>gevanim</i>].
  Rava said that the proof that the hide of a non-kosher animal becomes ritually impure in a tent over a corpse is derived from here, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is stated in the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity of leprosy that the leprosy could be: “Either in the warp, or in the woof, whether they be of linen, or of wool; or in a hide, or in any thing made of hide” (Leviticus 13:48). The verse could have simply stated: Or hide, and it said instead: Or in a hide. The Sages said: These words, or in a hide, amplify to include the hide of a non-kosher animal as well as hide that was afflicted in the hands of a priest, i.e., before the owner showed it to the priest there was no leprosy but it became leprous while in the hands of the priest, that they too become ritually impure. If one cut pieces from each of these types and made of them a single cloth, from where is it derived that it can become ritually impure? The verse states from the broader amplification: Or in anything made of hide. The Gemara remarks: There is room to refute this parallel, rendering it impossible to derive the laws of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse from the laws of leprosy. What is the comparison to leprosy with regard to which the Torah is stringent, as even the warp and woof that have not been woven into a garment can become ritually impure from it, which is not the case in impurity imparted by a corpse?
  Rather, one could say that he derived it from the laws of the ritual impurity of creeping animals, as it is stated with regard to them: “And upon whatsoever any of them, when they are dead, does fall, it shall be impure; whether it be any vessel of wood, or garment, or hide, or sack, whatsoever vessel it be, with which any work is done” (Leviticus 11:32). As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From the use of the word hide, I have derived nothing other than the fact that the hide of a kosher animal becomes ritually impure from contact with a creeping animal; however, from where is it derived that the hide of a non-kosher animal can become ritually impure? This is derived from the amplification, as the verse states: Or hide. Since, with regard to the ritual impurity of creeping animals the laws of the hides of kosher and non-kosher animals are identical, it is derived that this is also true with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Once again, the Gemara says: There is room to refute this derivation and say: What is the comparison to creeping animals, as their legal status is stringent because they become ritually impure even if they are as small as a lentil-bulk, which is not true in the case of a corpse? In order for a corpse to transmit ritual impurity, it must be larger, an olive-bulk. Therefore, the Gemara says: If so, the case of leprosy can prove that the fact that creeping animals that are a lentil-bulk transmit impurity is not a factor in whether or not a non-kosher animal hide can become ritually impure. Leprosy that is a lentil-bulk does not transmit impurity and, nevertheless, the hide of a non-kosher animal becomes ritually impure from it. And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique stringencies. However, their common denominator is that hide, in general, is ritually impure in both cases, and the Torah rendered the hide of a non-kosher animal equal to the hide of a kosher animal in that it becomes ritually impure. I will also bring the additional <i>halakha</i> of a tent over a corpse made of the hide of a non-kosher animal, and in that case as well, the hide of a non-kosher animal will be rendered equal to the hide of a kosher animal.
  Rava from Barnish said to Rav Ashi: There is still room to refute this statement and say: What is the comparison to leprosy and creeping animals? Their common denominator is that they both transmit ritual impurity when smaller than an olive-bulk. Can you say the same in the case of a corpse, which only transmits ritual impurity when it is at least an olive-bulk? Therefore, despite the differences between them, these two <i>halakhot</i> are both more stringent than the laws of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and the status of a non-kosher animal hide cannot be derived from them.
  Rather, Rava from Barnish said it can be derived in the following manner:
  
  Daf 28b
  
  It is derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from goats’ hair. Although goats’ hair does not become ritually impure from leprosy, it does become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse; with regard to the hide of a non-kosher animal that becomes ritually impure from leprosy, is it not the case that it becomes ritually impure as a tent over a corpse?
  Since the conclusion was that the hide of even a non-kosher animal can become ritually impure as a tent over a corpse, it is not necessary to assume that the covering of the Tabernacle was made specifically from the hide of a kosher animal. And, if so, that which Rav Yosef taught: Only the hide of a kosher animal was suitable for heavenly service, for what <i>halakha</i> is that relevant, as it is clearly not relevant to the Tabernacle? The Gemara replies: This <i>halakha</i> was stated with regard to phylacteries, which may be prepared only from the hide of a kosher animal. The Gemara asks: Phylacteries? Why did Rav Yosef need to state that <i>halakha</i>? It is written explicitly with regard to them: “And it shall be for a sign unto you upon your hand, and for a memorial between your eyes, that the law of the Lord may be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). The Sages derived from there that the phylacteries must be prepared from that which is permitted to be eaten in your mouth.
  Rather, the Gemara explains that this <i>halakha</i> of Rav Yosef was said only with regard to the leather of the boxes that house the phylacteries, which must be crafted from the hide of a kosher animal. It was not referring to the parchment on which the portions of the Torah inserted into the phylacteries are written. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Abaye say: The obligation to make a letter <i>shin</i> protruding on the phylacteries of one’s head is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? Since Torah law addresses the boxes of the phylacteries, presumably their legal status is parallel to that of the parchment and the prohibition against preparing them from the hide of a non-kosher animal is by Torah law as well.
  Rather, the Gemara explains that Rav Yosef’s <i>halakha</i> comes to teach that one must tie the parchments upon which the portions of the Torah are written in the phylacteries with a kosher animal’s hair, as well as sew the phylacteries with a kosher animal’s sinews. The Gemara asks: The source of these <i>halakhot</i> is also a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The requirement that phylacteries must be square is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as is the requirement that they must be tied with their hair and sewn with their sinews.
  Rather, the Gemara says that Rav Yosef came to teach with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of the straps of the phylacteries. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say: The straps of the phylacteries must be black is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? The Gemara responds: Although we learned this <i>halakha</i>, which states that the straps must be black, did we also learn that they must be from kosher animals? Rav Yosef was certainly referring to straps when he said that all heavenly service must be performed with the hides of kosher animals.
  The Gemara asks: What is the halakhic conclusion reached about this matter of the <i>taḥash</i> that existed in the days of Moses? Rabbi Ela said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that Rabbi Meir used to say: The <i>taḥash</i> that existed in the days of Moses was a creature unto itself, and the Sages did not determine whether it was a type of undomesticated animal or a type of domesticated animal. And it had a single horn on its forehead, and this <i>taḥash</i> happened to come to Moses for the moment while the Tabernacle was being built, and he made the covering for the Tabernacle from it. And from then on, the <i>taḥash</i> was suppressed and is no longer found.
  The Gemara comments: From the fact that it is said that the <i>taḥash</i> had a single horn on its forehead, conclude from this that it was kosher, as Rav Yehuda said in a similar vein: The ox that Adam, the first man, sacrificed as a thanks-offering for his life being spared, had a single horn on its forehead, as it is stated: “And it shall please the Lord better than a horned [<i>makrin</i>] and hooved ox” (Psalms 69:32). The word <i>makrin</i> means one with a horn. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, <i>makrin</i> indicates that it has two horns. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Despite the fact that it is vocalized in the plural, it is written <i>mikeren</i> without the letter <i>yod</i> to indicate that it had only a single horn. The Gemara asks: If so, let us resolve from the same <i>baraita</i> that just as it was derived from the ox of Adam, the first man, that an animal with one horn is kosher, derive that an animal with one horn is a type of domesticated animal. The Gemara answers: Since there is the <i>keresh</i> which is a type of undomesticated animal, and it has only a single horn, it is also possible to say that the <i>taḥash</i> is a type of undomesticated animal. This dilemma was not resolved.
  MISHNA: The wick of a garment, i.e., cloth made into a wick for a lamp, that one folded it into a size and shape suitable for a wick, but did not yet singe it slightly in order to facilitate its lighting, Rabbi Eliezer says: This wick is ritually impure. With regard to the laws of ritual impurity, it can, like other garments, still become ritually impure and one may not light with it on Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva says: It is ritually pure and one may even light with it on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to ritual impurity, the reasons for their disagreement are clear and this is their dispute: Rabbi Eliezer holds that folding alone is ineffective in altering the identity of the garment and it retains its original status. It can become ritually impure like any other garment. Rabbi Akiva holds that folding is effective, and it negates its garment status, and therefore, it can no longer become ritually impure.
  However, with regard to lighting on Shabbat what is at the crux of their dispute? Rabbi Elazar said that Rav Oshaya said, and Rav Adda bar Ahava said likewise: Here we are dealing with a cloth that is precisely three by three fingerbreadths and we are dealing with a Festival that occurred on Shabbat eve. And everyone is of the opinion that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that on a Festival one may only kindle a fire with whole vessels, as it is permitted to carry them and they do not have set-aside [<i>muktze</i>] status; however, one may not kindle a fire using broken vessels, i.e., vessels that broke on the Festival. Since they broke on the Festival itself, they are classified as an entity that came into being [<i>nolad</i>] on the Festival, and the <i>halakha</i> prohibits moving them. And, similarly, everyone is of the opinion that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: One who lights a lamp must light most of the wick that protrudes from the lamp. Based on these assumptions, the dispute in the mishna can be understood as follows: Rabbi Eliezer holds that folding alone is ineffective in negating the wick’s vessel status, and once one lights only a small part of it, it thereby becomes a broken vessel, as part of it burns and the remainder is less than three by three fingerbreadths. A smaller cloth is no longer considered significant. Since he is required to light most of the protruding wick and, as mentioned above, it is prohibited to light broken vessels, he may not light the folded garment. And Rabbi Akiva held that folding is effective and, immediately when he folded it, the garment no longer has the status of a vessel. It was not considered a vessel even before he lit it, and when he lights it, it is as if he were lighting plain wood, not a vessel that broke on the Festival.
  Rav Yosef said, that is what I learned: Three by three exactly. And I did not know to what <i>halakha</i> this was relevant. Rav Yosef received from his teachers that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case of three by three exactly, and he did not know why it was significant to establish the <i>baraita</i> in a case of exactly three by three and no more.
  The Gemara adds incidentally: And from the fact that Rav Adda bar Ahava interpreted this mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, conclude from this that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Did Rav Adda bar Ahava actually say this? Didn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava himself say:
  
  Daf 29a
  
  When a gentile carved out a vessel the size of a <i>kav</i> from a piece of wood on a Festival and thereby rendered it a new vessel, a Jew may burn the vessel on a Festival <i>ab initio</i>. And why may he do so? This new vessel that was made from the wood is an object that came into being [<i>nolad</i>] on a Festival, and is set-aside [<i>muktze</i>]. Since Rav Adda bar Ahava permitted doing so, apparently he holds that the laws of set-aside do not apply on a Festival, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: Rav Adda bar Ahava said this statement in explanation of the statements of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the mishna; however, he himself does not hold that way. Although he explained the opinions in the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he himself does not hold that that is the <i>halakha</i>.
  Rava said, this is the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion with regard to lighting the wick: Because he holds that one may neither light on Shabbat using a wick that is not slightly singed and prepared for lighting nor light with rags that were not singed before Shabbat. If a person singes the wick slightly before lighting it, it will burn well. A wick that has not been singed does not burn well and will not show the appropriate deference to Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If so, that which Rav Yosef taught: Three by three exactly, to what <i>halakha</i> is it relevant? According to Rava’s explanation, the precise size of the garment used in making the wick is irrelevant. The Gemara responds: Rav Yosef’s statement was with regard to another matter, the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity. As we learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Kelim</i>: Three by three fingerbreadths that they stated as the smallest sized garment that can become ritually impure, excludes the portion used for the hem, i.e., those threads that emerge at the edge of the garment and are sewn into a hem; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And the Rabbis say: Three by three exactly, even including the hem. That is the context of Rav Yosef’s statement: Three by three exactly.
  With regard to the statement cited above, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that there is a dispute between the <i>tanna</i>’<i>im</i> on this issue: One may only kindle a fire with whole vessels and one may not kindle a fire with broken vessels; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits kindling a fire even with broken vessels. An additional <i>halakha</i>: One may kindle a fire with whole dates on a Festival, and if he ate them, he may not kindle a fire with their pits as they are set-aside; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits kindling a fire with the pits. Furthermore, one may kindle a fire with whole nuts on a Festival, and if he ate them, he may not kindle a fire with their shells; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon permits doing so.
  The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to cite all three of these cases because each teaches a novel idea. As, had Rav taught us only the first <i>halakha</i>, we would have thought that it is specifically in that case, with regard to burning broken vessels, that Rabbi Yehuda said that it is prohibited, as initially it was a vessel and now it is a broken vessel, and therefore it is considered an object that came into being [<i>nolad</i>] and prohibited; however, dates, initially there were pits in the dates and now they remain pits, say that one may well do so. And had Rav taught us only with regard to date pits I would have said that they are prohibited because initially they were concealed within the fruit and now they are exposed, it is a case of an object that came into being and prohibited. However, nutshells, which initially were exposed and now are exposed, as they were before, say that one may well do so. Therefore, it was necessary to teach all of these cases.
  And the Gemara adds: This <i>halakha</i> of Rav was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference based on conclusions drawn from Rav’s actions and not from his explicit statements. There was an instance where Rav ate dates on a weekday and threw the pits into the oven. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: Son of noblemen, the corresponding action, throwing pits into an oven, is prohibited on a Festival. The Gemara asks: Did Rav accept this <i>halakha</i> from him or did he not accept it from him?
  Come and hear: When Rav came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he ate dates on a Festival and threw their pits to the animals so that they may eat them. Wasn’t it a case involving Persian dates, which are quality dates whose fruit comes completely off the pits, leaving the pits with no trace of fruit? Ostensibly, they are completely set-aside as they are of no use at all to people. And the fact that Rav threw the pits to the animals indicates that he did not accept this <i>halakha</i> from Rabbi Ḥiyya, and he holds that there is no prohibition in that case. The Gemara replies: No, this is a case involving Aramean dates whose fruit does not come off completely, and remnants of the date remain attached to the pit. These pits, since they are still fit for use due to their mother, i.e., the fruit itself, one is permitted to carry them.
  Rav Shmuel bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one may kindle a fire with whole vessels, and one may not kindle a fire with broken vessels, how it is possible to use whole vessels? Once they are ignited a bit, they become broken vessels, and when one turns the wood over to accelerate their ignition, he turns them over in a prohibited manner, as it is prohibited to light with broken vessels. The Gemara answers: This is a case where he acted in accordance with the statement of Rav Mattana. As Rav Mattana said that Rav said: Branches that fell from a palm tree into an oven on a Festival, since these branches were attached to the tree at the onset of the Festival, they are set-aside and it is prohibited to move them. Nevertheless, he can remedy the situation if he adds wood that was prepared for burning prior to the Festival, until the majority of the wood in the oven is not set-aside, and then kindles them. Since the majority of the wood is permitted, he need not concern himself with the minority. One may do the same when burning vessels by adding wood that is not set-aside.
  Rav Hamnuna said a different explanation of the dispute in the mishna. In his opinion, here we are dealing with a garment that is smaller than three by three handbreadths, and they taught here <i>halakhot</i> established by the Sages with regard to insignificant small cloths.
  And Rabbi Eliezer followed his line of reasoning expressed elsewhere, and Rabbi Akiva followed his line of reasoning expressed elsewhere. As we learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Kelim</i>: A cloth smaller than three by three handbreadths that was utilized to plug the bath, and to pour from a boiling pot, and to wipe the millstone, whether this cloth was expressly prepared for that purpose or whether it was not prepared, it can become ritually impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: Whether it was prepared or whether it was not prepared, it is ritually pure, i.e., it cannot become ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva distinguishes between the cases and says: If it was prepared it is ritually impure, and if it was not prepared it is ritually pure. And Ulla said, and some say that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone agrees that a cloth this size, if one threw it into the garbage dump, it is ritually pure. His discarding of the cloth indicates that he no longer considers this cloth a garment and no longer considers it significant.
  
  Daf 29b
  
  If one placed it in a box, everyone agrees that it can become ritually impure because his placing the cloth in a box indicates that he considers the cloth significant and is keeping it in order to use it. They only disagreed in a case where one hung the garment on a dryer, i.e., a stake in the wall, or where he placed it behind a door. Rabbi Eliezer held: From the fact that he did not throw it in the garbage dump, it is certainly on his mind and he is planning to use it. And what is the reason that he called it not prepared? It is because, relative to a cloth placed in a box, it is not considered prepared for use. And Rabbi Yehoshua held that since he did not place it in a box, certainly he has negated its garment status. And what is the reason that he called it prepared? Because relative to one thrown in the garbage, this garment is prepared for use, although, in fact, the cloth has already been negated. And Rabbi Akiva, in the case where he hung it on a dryer, held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one has not yet negated it from use and it can therefore become ritually impure. In the case where he placed it behind a door, Rabbi Akiva held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua that, in doing so, he negated its garment status, and it can no longer become ritually impure.
  The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Akiva retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua and held in accordance with his opinion. And from where do we know this? Rava said: From the term that we learned in our mishna: The wick of a garment [<i>petilat habeged</i>]. Why did it specifically teach: The wick of a garment? Teach that <i>halakha</i> using the phrase: A wick made from a garment. What is the reason that the mishna taught: A wick of a garment? It is because it remains a garment. Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva deemed it ritually pure, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
  MISHNA: The fundamental dispute in this mishna is with regard to the determination whether or not indirect acts of kindling and extinguishing fall within the parameters of the prohibition on Shabbat. The Rabbis said: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell and fill it with oil, and place it over the mouth of a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby extend the time that it burns. And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an earthenware vessel. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. However, if the craftsman, who crafts ceramic vessels, attached the egg to the lamp from the outset, one is permitted to fill it with oil because it constitutes a single, large vessel. The Rabbis decreed that a person may not fill a bowl with oil, and place it beside the lamp, and place the unlit head of the wick into the bowl so that it draws additional oil from the bowl and thereby extend the time that the lamp burns. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so.
  GEMARA: The Gemara comments on the fact that the mishna cited three cases that all share the same rationale: And it was necessary to cite all of the aforementioned cases because it is impossible to derive one from the other. As, had the Gemara only taught us the prohibition of an eggshell, I would have said that, specifically in that case, the Rabbis said that it is prohibited to do so. Since the egg is not dirty and disgusting, there is room for concern that one might come to take oil from it, which would be tantamount to taking oil from a burning lamp on Shabbat, because it causes the flame to be extinguished faster. However, an earthenware tube that is disgusting, say that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda that there is no room for concern, and even according to their opinion it would be permitted. And, conversely, had the Gemara only taught us the prohibition of an earthenware tube, I would have said that, specifically in that case, Rabbi Yehuda says that one is permitted to do so because it is disgusting, as explained above; however, in that case of the eggshell that is not disgusting, say that he agrees with the Rabbis that it is prohibited. And had the Gemara taught us only those two cases of the eggshell and the earthenware tube, I would have said that, specifically in those cases, Rabbi Yehuda said that it is permitted because there is no separation between the lamp and the second receptacle. However, in the case of a bowl, which is separate, say that he agrees with the Rabbis that it is prohibited. And, conversely, had the Gemara only taught us in that case of the added bowl, I would have said that only in that case did the Rabbis say it is prohibited because it is separate. However, in these two cases of the eggshell and the ceramic tube, I would say that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda and permit doing so. Therefore, it was necessary for the mishna to specifically state the <i>halakha</i> in each of the cases cited.
  And we also learned in our mishna that if the craftsman attached the tube to the lamp from the outset, it is permitted to fill it with oil and use it. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that even if a homeowner attached it to the vessel before Shabbat by means of plaster or with dry potter’s clay, it is permitted. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we specifically learn in the mishna: If the craftsman attached it from the outset, not a layman? The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of craftsman in the mishna? It refers to any attachment similar to the attachment of the craftsman.
  With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: One time we spent our Shabbat in the upper story of the house of Nit’za in the city of Lod. And they brought us an eggshell, and we filled it with oil, and pierced it, and left it over the lamp in order to extend its burning. And Rabbi Tarfon and other Elders were there and they did not say anything to us. Apparently, there is no prohibition. The Rabbis said to him: Do you bring proof from there? The legal status of the Elders who were sitting in the house of Nit’za is different. They are vigilant. There is no room for concern lest they use the oil in the eggshell and accelerate the extinguishing of the lamp. However, in every other circumstance, doing so is prohibited.
  The Gemara relates: Avin from the city of Tzippori dragged a bench in an upper story, whose floor was made of marble, before Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar. Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar said to him: If I remain silent and say nothing to you, as Rabbi Tarfon and the members of the group of Elders were silent and said nothing to Rabbi Yehuda, damage will result, as it will lead to unfounded leniency in the future. Had they told Rabbi Yehuda at that time that it is prohibited to puncture the eggshell, he would not have disagreed with the Rabbis. He would not have mistakenly derived a general leniency. So too, here the Sages issued a decree on a marble-floored upper story due to a standard upper story with an earth floor. One who drags a bench on an earth floor will create a furrow.
  On the topic of dragging, the Gemara relates that the Head of the <i>Kenesset</i> of Batzra dragged a bench before Rabbi Yirmeya the Great on Shabbat. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: In accordance with whose opinion do you permit yourself to drag a bench on Shabbat? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Say that Rabbi Shimon said his statement specifically with regard to large benches that are impossible to move from place to place in any other way, but in the case of small benches did he say that one is permitted to drag them? And this disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: The dispute with regard to dragging is in the case of small benches; however, in the case of large benches, everyone agrees that one is permitted to drag them, as there is no other way to move them.
  Rav Yosef raised an objection from what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Shimon says: One may drag a bed, a chair, and a bench across the floor on Shabbat even though it creates a furrow, as long as he does not intend to create a furrow. This <i>baraita</i> teaches about large objects, like a bed, and teaches about small objects, like a chair. If so, this is difficult for both Rabbi Yirmeya the Great and for Ulla. Rabbi Yirmeya holds that Rabbi Shimon prohibits dragging even small furniture. Ulla holds that even Rabbi Yehuda permits dragging large pieces of furniture. According to his opinion, there is no need for Rabbi Shimon to state that it is permitted.
  The Gemara answers that Ulla reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning and Rabbi Yirmeya the Great reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara explains: Ulla reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning: A bed, similar to a chair; the <i>baraita</i> is referring here to a small bed that can be carried like a chair, with regard to which there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning: A chair, similar to a bed; the <i>baraita</i> is referring to dragging a heavy chair that cannot be moved in any other way.
  Rabba raised an objection to Rabbi Yirmeya’s statement from that which we learned in a mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles, and they may place the garments that they are selling on their shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, as long as the merchant does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are particularly fastidious in performing mitzvot, would suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, in the case of dragging benches, where it is possible to act like the modest people, as the clothes are similar to small benches, and nevertheless, when one does not intend to perform the prohibited action, Rabbi Shimon permits dragging even <i>ab initio</i>. Rabbi Shimon holds that one who does not intend to violate a prohibition need not take an alternative course of action due to concern that resulting from his action, the prohibited act might come to be performed. Based on that principle, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon would permit dragging small benches since one does not intend to create a furrow in dragging them. This is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya the Great, who held that dragging small objects is prohibited according to Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  MISHNA: One who extinguishes the lamp on Shabbat because he is afraid due to gentiles, from whom he is hiding in his home, and due to thieves, or if one is afraid due to an evil spirit, i.e., he is depressed and prefers sitting in the dark, or if he extinguished the flame due to the sick person so that he will sleep, he is exempt. However, in a case where he extinguishes the flame in order to spare the lamp, spare the oil, or spare the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei exempts him in all of those cases, as in his opinion no labor prohibited by Torah law is being performed by extinguishing the flame, except for the case where he seeks to spare the wick. Only in that case is extinguishing a creative action because he makes the wick into charcoal by extinguishing the flame.
  
  Daf 30a
  
  GEMARA: From the fact that it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna that one who extinguishes a flame on Shabbat is liable, conclude from it that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering even if it is a labor that is not necessary for its own sake [<i>melakha she</i>’<i>eina tzerikha legufa</i>]. In the mishna, one does not extinguish the flame to achieve the product produced by extinguishing it. He does so to prevent the light from shining. If so, with what is the first clause of the mishna dealing? If it is referring to one who extinguished the flame due to a critically ill person, the term exempt is imprecise. It should have said permitted, as it is permitted even <i>ab initio</i> to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat in a case of danger. And if it is speaking about a non-critically ill person, why is one who extinguished the flame exempt? It should have said that one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  The Gemara replies: Actually, the first clause was referring to a critically ill person, and it should have taught that it is permitted. And since the latter clause of the mishna had to teach that one is liable, in the first clause too, it taught employing the opposite term, exempt, so that the mishna would maintain stylistic uniformity. The <i>halakha</i> is, indeed, that not only is one exempt if he extinguished a light for a critically ill person, it is even permitted to do so <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara asks: What of that which Rabbi Oshaya taught: If one wants to extinguish a flame on Shabbat for a sick person so he can sleep, he may not extinguish it, and if he extinguished it, he is not liable after the fact, but <i>ab initio</i> he is prohibited to do so? The Gemara answers: This is not similar, as that <i>baraita</i> is referring to a non-critically ill person and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one who performs a prohibited labor not necessary for its own sake is exempt. Our mishna is referring to a critically ill person.
  The Gemara relates: This question was asked before Rabbi Tanḥum from the village of Nevi: What is the ruling with regard to extinguishing a burning lamp before a sick person on Shabbat? The Gemara relates that Rabbi Tanḥum delivered an entire homily touching upon both aggadic and halakhic materials surrounding this question. He began and said: You, King Solomon, where is your wisdom, where is your understanding? Not only do your statements contradict the statements of your father David, but your statements even contradict each other. Your father David said: “The dead praise not the Lord, neither any that go down into silence” (Psalms 115:17); and you said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead more than the living that are yet alive” (Ecclesiastes 4:2). And then again you said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion” (Ecclesiastes 9:4). These are different assessments of life and death.
  He resolved the contradictions in the following manner: This is not difficult. That which David said: “The dead praise not the Lord,” this is what he is saying: A person should always engage in Torah and mitzvot before he dies, as once he is dead he is idle from Torah and mitzvot and there is no praise for the Holy One, Blessed be He, from him. And that is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Set free among the dead, like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6)? When a person dies he then becomes free of Torah and mitzvot.
  And that which Solomon said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead”; he was not speaking of all dead people, but rather in praise of certain dead people. As when Israel sinned in the desert, Moses stood before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and he said several prayers and supplications before Him, and his prayers were not answered. And when he said: “Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, Your servants” (Exodus 32:13), his prayers were answered immediately. Consequently, did Solomon not speak appropriately when he said: “Wherefore I praised the dead that are already dead”? Certainly the merit of the deceased forefathers is greater than that of the righteous people who are alive. Alternatively, the way of the world is such that when a flesh-and-blood prince issues a decree on the public it is uncertain whether they fulfill it and uncertain whether they do not fulfill it. And even if you want to say that they fulfill it, it is only during his lifetime that they fulfill it; after he dies they do not fulfill it. But Moses our teacher issued several decrees and instituted several ordinances, and they are in effect forever and ever. And, if so, is it not appropriate that which Solomon said: “Wherefore I praised the dead that are already dead”?
  Alternatively, another explanation is given for the verse: “And I praised the dead that are already dead,” is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the meaning of the verse that was written: “Work on my behalf a sign for good; that they that hate me may see it, and be put to shame” (Psalms 86:17)? David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, forgive me for that sin in the matter of Bathsheba. He said to him: It is forgiven you. David said to Him: Show me a sign in my lifetime so that all will know that You have forgiven me. God said to him: In your lifetime I will not make it known that you were forgiven; however, in the lifetime of your son Solomon I will make it known.
  When Solomon built the Temple and sought to bring the Ark into the Holy of Holies, the gates clung together and could not be opened. Solomon uttered twenty-four songs of praise, as in his prayer there are twenty-four expressions of prayer, song, etc. (I Kings 8), and his prayer was not answered. He began and said: “Lift up your heads, O you gates, and be you lifted up, you everlasting doors; that the King of glory may come in” (Psalms 24:7). Immediately, the gates ran after him to swallow him, as they thought that in the words: “King of glory” he was referring to himself, and they said to him: “Who is the King of glory?” (Psalms 24:8). He said to them: “The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord mighty in battle” (Psalms 24:8). And he said again: “Lift up your heads, O you gates, yea, lift them up, you everlasting doors; that the King of glory may come in. Who then is the King of glory? The Lord of hosts; He is the King of glory. Selah” (Psalms 24:9–10), and he was not answered. When he said: “O Lord God, turn not away the face of Your anointed; remember the good deeds of David Your servant” (II Chronicles 6:42), he was immediately answered, and a fire descended from Heaven (II Chronicles 7:1). At that moment, the faces of all of David’s enemies turned dark like the charred bottom of a pot. And all of Israel knew that the Holy One, Blessed be He, forgave him for that sin. And if so, is it not appropriate what Solomon said: “And I praised the dead that are already dead,” David, more than the living, Solomon, to whose request to open the gates of the Temple God did not respond?
  And that is what is written: “On the eighth day he sent the people away, and they blessed the king, and went unto their tents joyful and glad of heart for all the goodness that the Lord had shown unto David His servant and to Israel His people” (I Kings 8:66). The Gemara explains: And went unto their tents, in accordance with the common expression: One’s house is his wife. It is explained that when they returned home they found their wives ritually pure from the ritual impurity of menstruation. Joyful means that they enjoyed the aura of the Divine Presence at the dedication of the Temple. And glad of heart means that the wife of each and every one of them was impregnated and gave birth to a male. The verse continues: For all the goodness that the Lord had shown unto David His servant and to Israel His people. Unto David His servant means that at that opportunity they all saw that God forgave him for that sin. And to Israel His people means that He forgave them for the sin of Yom Kippur, as they did not fast that year (see I Kings 8:65).
  The Gemara continues: And that which Solomon said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion” (Ecclesiastes 9:4), is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the meaning of that verse which David said: “Lord, make me to know my end, and the measure of my days, what it is; let me know how short-lived I am” (Psalms 39:5)? It means that David said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, Lord, make me to know my end; in how long will I die? God said to him: It is decreed before Me that I do not reveal the end of the life of flesh and blood. He asked further: And the measure of my days; on what day of the year will I die? He said to him: It is decreed before Me not to reveal the measure of a person’s days. Again he requested: Let me know how short-lived I am; on what day of the week will I die? He said to him: You will die on Shabbat. David requested of God: Let me die on the first day of the week so that the honor of Shabbat will not be tarnished by the pain of death. He said to him: On that day the time of the kingdom of your son Solomon has already arrived, and one kingdom does not overlap with another and subtract from the time allotted to another even a hairbreadth. He said to him: I will cede a day of my life and die on Shabbat eve. God said to him: “For a day in your courts is better than a thousand” (Psalms 84:11); a single day in which you sit and engage in Torah is preferable to Me than the thousand burnt-offerings that your son Solomon will offer before Me on the altar (see I Kings 3:4).
  
  Daf 30b
  
  What did David do? Every Shabbat he would sit and learn all day long to protect himself from the Angel of Death. On that day on which the Angel of Death was supposed to put his soul to rest, the day on which David was supposed to die, the Angel of Death stood before him and was unable to overcome him because his mouth did not pause from study. The Angel of Death said: What shall I do to him? David had a garden [<i>bustana</i>] behind his house; the Angel of Death came, climbed, and shook the trees. David went out to see. As he climbed the stair, the stair broke beneath him. He was startled and was silent, interrupted his studies for a moment, and died.
  Since David died in the garden, Solomon sent the following question to the study hall: Father died and is lying in the sun, and the dogs of father’s house are hungry. There is room for concern lest the dogs come and harm his body. What shall I do? They sent an answer to him: Cut up an animal carcass and place it before the dogs. Since the dogs are hungry, handling the animal carcass to feed them is permitted. And with regard to your father, it is prohibited to move his body directly. Place a loaf of bread or an infant on top of him, and you can move him into the shade due to the bread or the infant. And is it not appropriate what Solomon said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion.” The ultimate conclusion of this discussion is that life is preferable to death. And now, with regard to the question that I asked before you; Rav Tanḥum spoke modestly, as, actually, they had asked him the question. A lamp is called <i>ner</i> and a person’s soul is also called <i>ner</i>, as it is written: “The spirit of man is the lamp [<i>ner</i>] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27). It is preferable that the lamp of a being of flesh and blood, an actual lamp, will be extinguished in favor of the lamp of the Holy One, Blessed be He, a person’s soul. Therefore, one is permitted to extinguish a flame for the sake of a sick person.
  Since contradictions in Ecclesiastes were mentioned, the Gemara cites additional relevant sources. Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: The Sages sought to suppress the book of Ecclesiastes and declare it apocryphal because its statements contradict each other and it is liable to confuse its readers. And why did they not suppress it? Because its beginning consists of matters of Torah and its end consists of matters of Torah. The ostensibly contradictory details are secondary to the essence of the book, which is Torah. The Gemara elaborates: Its beginning consists of matters of Torah, as it is written: “What profit has man of all his labor which he labors under the sun?” (Ecclesiastes 1:3), and the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: By inference: Under the sun is where man has no profit from his labor; however, before the sun, i.e., when engaged in the study of Torah, which preceded the sun, he does have profit. Its ending consists of matters of Torah, as it is written: “The end of the matter, all having been heard: Fear God, and keep His mitzvot; for this is the whole man” (Ecclesiastes 12:13). With regard to this verse, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: For this is the whole man? Rabbi Eliezer said: The entire world was only created for this person. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: This person is equivalent to the entire world. Shimon ben Azzai says and some say that Shimon ben Zoma says: The entire world was only created as companion to this man, so that he will not be alone.
  And to the essence of the matter, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Its statements that contradict each other? It is written: “Vexation is better than laughter” (Ecclesiastes 7:3), and it is written: “I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy” (Ecclesiastes 2:2), which is understood to mean that laughter is commendable. Likewise in one verse it is written: “So I commended mirth” (Ecclesiastes 8:15), and in another verse it is written: “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” (Ecclesiastes 2:2). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as the contradiction can be resolved. Vexation is better than laughter means: The vexation of the Holy One, Blessed be He, toward the righteous in this world is preferable to the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the wicked in this world by showering them with goodness. I said of laughter: It is praiseworthy, that is the laughter which the Holy One, Blessed be He, laughs with the righteous in the World-to-Come.
  Similarly, “So I commended mirth,” that is the joy of a mitzva. “And of mirth: What does it accomplish?” that is joy that is not the joy of a mitzva. The praise of joy mentioned here is to teach you that the Divine Presence rests upon an individual neither from an atmosphere of sadness, nor from an atmosphere of laziness, nor from an atmosphere of laughter, nor from an atmosphere of frivolity, nor from an atmosphere of idle conversation, nor from an atmosphere of idle chatter, but rather from an atmosphere imbued with the joy of a mitzva. As it was stated with regard to Elisha that after he became angry at the king of Israel, his prophetic spirit left him until he requested: “But now bring me a minstrel; and it came to pass, when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon him” (II Kings 3:15). Rav Yehuda said: And, so too, one should be joyful before stating a matter of <i>halakha</i>. Rava said: And, so too, one should be joyful before going to sleep in order to have a good dream.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so, that one should introduce matters of <i>halakha</i> joyfully? Didn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav said: Any Torah scholar who sits before his teacher and his lips are not dripping with myrrh due to fear of his teacher, those lips shall be burnt, as it is stated: “His lips are as lilies, dripping with flowing myrrh [<i>shoshanim notefot mor over</i>]” (Song of Songs 5:13)? He interpreted homiletically: Do not read <i>mor over</i>, flowing myrrh; rather, read <i>mar over</i>, flowing bitterness. Likewise, do not read <i>shoshanim</i>, lilies; rather, read <i>sheshonim</i>, that are studying, meaning that lips that are studying Torah must be full of bitterness. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, there is no contradiction here, as this, where it was taught that one should introduce matters of <i>halakha</i> joyfully, is referring to a rabbi, and that, where it was taught that one must be filled with bitterness, is referring to a student, who must listen to his teacher with trepidation. And if you wish, say instead that this and that are referring to a rabbi, and it is not difficult. This, where it was taught that he must be joyful, is before he begins teaching, whereas that, where it was taught that he must be filled with bitterness and trepidation, is after he already began teaching <i>halakha</i>. That explanation is like that which Rabba did. Before he began teaching <i>halakha</i> to the Sages, he would say something humorous and the Sages would be cheered. Ultimately, he sat in trepidation and began teaching the <i>halakha</i>.
  And, the Gemara continues, the Sages sought to suppress the book of Proverbs as well because its statements contradict each other. And why did they not suppress it? They said: In the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, didn’t we analyze it and find an explanation that its statements were not contradictory? Here too, let us analyze it. And what is the meaning of: Its statements contradict each other? On the one hand, it is written: “Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest you also be like him” (Proverbs 26:4), and on the other hand, it is written: “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes” (Proverbs 26:5). The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction: This is not difficult, as this, where one should answer a fool, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims about Torah matters; whereas that, where one should not answer him, is referring to a case where the fool is making claims about mundane matters.
  The Gemara relates how Sages conducted themselves in both of those circumstances. As in the case of that man who came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and said to him: Your wife is my wife and your children are my children, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Would you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst and died. Similarly, the Gemara relates: There was that man who came before Rabbi Ḥiyya and said to him: Your mother is my wife, and you are my son. He said to him: Would you like to drink a cup of wine? He drank and burst and died. Rabbi Ḥiyya said with regard to the incident involving Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s prayer that his children will not be rendered <i>mamzerim</i>, children of illicit relations, was effective for him. As when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would pray, he said after his prayer: May it be Your will, O Lord, my God, that You will deliver me today from impudent people and from insolence. Insolence, in this case, refers to <i>mamzerut</i>. It was due to his prayer that that man burst and was unsuccessful in disparaging Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s children.
  In matters of Torah, what is the case with regard to which the verse said that one should respond to a fool’s folly? As in the case where Rabban Gamliel was sitting and he interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, in the World-to-Come, a woman will give birth every day, as it says: “The woman with child and her that gives birth together” (Jeremiah 31:7), explaining that birth will occur on the same day as conception. A certain student scoffed at him and said: That cannot be, as it has already been stated: “There is nothing new under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9). Rabban Gamliel said to him: Come and I will show you an example of this in this world. He took him outside and showed him a chicken that lays eggs every day.
  And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, in the World-to-Come, trees will produce fruits every day, as it is stated: “And it shall bring forth branches and bear fruit” (Ezekiel 17:23); just as a branch grows every day, so too, fruit will be produced every day. A certain student scoffed at him and said: Isn’t it written: There is nothing new under the sun? He said to him: Come and I will show you an example of this in this world. He went outside and showed him a caper bush, part of which is edible during each season of the year.
  And furthermore: Rabban Gamliel sat and interpreted a verse homiletically: In the future, the World-to-Come, Eretz Yisrael will produce cakes and fine wool garments that will grow in the ground, as it is stated: “Let abundant grain be in the land.” A certain student scoffed at him and said: There is nothing new under the sun. He said to him: Come and I will show you an example in this world. He went outside and showed him truffles and mushrooms, which emerge from the earth over the course of a single night and are shaped like a loaf of bread. And with regard to wool garments, he showed him the covering of a heart of palm, a young palm branch, which is wrapped in a thin net-like covering.
  Since the Gemara discussed the forbearance of Sages, who remain silent in the face of nonsensical comments, it cites additional relevant examples. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person should always be patient like Hillel and not impatient like Shammai. The Gemara related: There was an incident involving two people
  
  Daf 31a
  
  who wagered with each other and said: Anyone who will go and aggravate Hillel to the point that he reprimands him, will take four-hundred <i>zuz</i>. One of them said: I will aggravate him. That day that he chose to bother Hillel was Shabbat eve, and Hillel was washing the hair on his head. He went and passed the entrance to Hillel’s house and in a demeaning manner said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Hillel wrapped himself in a dignified garment and went out to greet him. He said to him: My son, what do you seek? He said to him: I have a question to ask. Hillel said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked him: Why are the heads of Babylonians oval? He was alluding to and attempting to insult Hillel, who was Babylonian. He said to him: My son, you have asked a significant question. The reason is because they do not have clever midwives. They do not know how to shape the child’s head at birth.
  That man went and waited one hour, a short while, returned to look for Hillel, and said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Again, Hillel wrapped himself and went out to greet him. Hillel said to him: My son, what do you seek? The man said to him: I have a question to ask. He said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked: Why are the eyes of the residents of Tadmor bleary [<i>terutot</i>]? Hillel said to him: My son, you have asked a significant question. The reason is because they live among the sands and the sand gets into their eyes.
  Once again the man went, waited one hour, returned, and said: Who here is Hillel, who here is Hillel? Again, he, Hillel, wrapped himself and went out to greet him. He said to him: My son, what do you seek? He said to him: I have a question to ask. He said to him: Ask, my son, ask. The man asked: Why do Africans have wide feet? Hillel said to him: You have asked a significant question. The reason is because they live in marshlands and their feet widened to enable them to walk through those swampy areas.
  That man said to him: I have many more questions to ask, but I am afraid lest you get angry. Hillel wrapped himself and sat before him, and he said to him: All of the questions that you have to ask, ask them. The man got angry and said to him: Are you Hillel whom they call the <i>Nasi</i> of Israel? He said to him: Yes. He said to him: If it is you, then may there not be many like you in Israel. Hillel said to him: My son, for what reason do you say this? The man said to him: Because I lost four hundred <i>zuz</i> because of you. Hillel said to him: Be vigilant of your spirit and avoid situations of this sort. Hillel is worthy of having you lose four hundred <i>zuz</i> and another four hundred <i>zuz</i> on his account, and Hillel will not get upset.
  The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai. The gentile said to Shammai: How many Torahs do you have? He said to him: Two, the Written Torah and the Oral Torah. The gentile said to him: With regard to the Written Torah, I believe you, but with regard to the Oral Torah, I do not believe you. Convert me on condition that you will teach me only the Written Torah. Shammai scolded him and cast him out with reprimand. The same gentile came before Hillel, who converted him and began teaching him Torah. On the first day, he showed him the letters of the alphabet and said to him: <i>Alef</i>, <i>bet</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>dalet</i>. The next day he reversed the order of the letters and told him that an <i>alef</i> is a <i>tav</i> and so on. The convert said to him: But yesterday you did not tell me that. Hillel said to him: You see that it is impossible to learn what is written without relying on an oral tradition. Didn’t you rely on me? Therefore, you should also rely on me with regard to the matter of the Oral Torah, and accept the interpretations that it contains.
  There was another incident involving one gentile who came before Shammai and said to Shammai: Convert me on condition that you teach me the entire Torah while I am standing on one foot. Shammai pushed him away with the builder’s cubit in his hand. This was a common measuring stick and Shammai was a builder by trade. The same gentile came before Hillel. He converted him and said to him: That which is hateful to you do not do to another; that is the entire Torah, and the rest is its interpretation. Go study.
  There was another incident involving one gentile who was passing behind the study hall and heard the voice of a teacher who was teaching Torah to his students and saying the verse: “And these are the garments which they shall make: A breastplate, and an <i>efod,</i> and a robe, and a tunic of checkered work, a mitre, and a girdle” (Exodus 28:4). The gentile said: These garments, for whom are they designated? The students said to him: For the High Priest. The gentile said to himself: I will go and convert so that they will install me as High Priest. He came before Shammai and said to him: Convert me on condition that you install me as High Priest. Shammai pushed him with the builder’s cubit in his hand. He came before Hillel; he converted him.
  Hillel said to him, to the convert: Is it not the way of the world that only one who knows the protocols [<i>takhsisei</i>] of royalty is appointed king? Go and learn the royal protocols by engaging in Torah study. He went and read the Bible. When he reached the verse which says: “And the common man that draws near shall be put to death” (Numbers 1:51), the convert said to Hillel: With regard to whom is the verse speaking? Hillel said to him: Even with regard to David, king of Israel. The convert reasoned an <i>a fortiori</i> inference himself: If the Jewish people are called God’s children, and due to the love that God loved them he called them: “Israel is My son, My firstborn” (Exodus 4:22), and nevertheless it is written about them: And the common man that draws near shall be put to death; a mere convert who came without merit, with nothing more than his staff and traveling bag, all the more so that this applies to him, as well.
  The convert came before Shammai and told him that he retracts his demand to appoint him High Priest, saying: Am I at all worthy to be High Priest? Is it not written in the Torah: And the common man that draws near shall be put to death? He came before Hillel and said to him: Hillel the patient, may blessings rest upon your head as you brought me under the wings of the Divine Presence. The Gemara relates: Eventually, the three converts gathered together in one place, and they said: Shammai’s impatience sought to drive us from the world; Hillel’s patience brought us beneath the wings of the Divine Presence.
  The Gemara continues discussing the conduct of the Sages, citing that Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the faith of your times shall be a strength of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge, the fear of the Lord is his treasure” (Isaiah 33:6)? Faith; that is the order of <i>Zera</i>’<i>im</i>, Seeds, in the Mishna, because a person has faith in God and plants his seeds (Jerusalem Talmud). Your times; that is the order of <i>Moed</i>, Festival, which deals with the various occasions and Festivals that occur throughout the year. Strength; that is the order of <i>Nashim</i>, Women. Salvations; that is the order of <i>Nezikin</i>, Damages, as one who is being pursued is rescued from the hands of his pursuer. Wisdom; that is the order of <i>Kodashim</i>, Consecrated Items. And knowledge; that is the order of <i>Teharot</i>, Purity, which is particularly difficult to master. And even if a person studies and masters all of these, “the fear of the Lord is his treasure,” it is preeminent.
  With regard to the same verse, Rava said: After departing from this world, when a person is brought to judgment for the life he lived in this world, they say to him in the order of that verse: Did you conduct business faithfully? Did you designate times for Torah study? Did you engage in procreation? Did you await salvation? Did you engage in the dialectics of wisdom or understand one matter from another? And, nevertheless, beyond all these, if the fear of the Lord is his treasure, yes, he is worthy, and if not, no, none of these accomplishments have any value. There is a parable that illustrates this. A person who said to his emissary: Bring a <i>kor</i> of wheat up to the attic for me to store there. The messenger went and brought it up for him. He said to the emissary: Did you mix a <i>kav</i> of <i>ḥomton</i>, a preservative to keep away worms, into it for me? He said to him: No. He said to him: If so, it would have been preferable had you not brought it up. Of what use is worm-infested wheat? Likewise, Torah and mitzvot without the fear of God are of no value.
  On a related note, the Gemara cites a <i>halakha</i> that was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: A person who sells wheat may, <i>ab initio</i>, mix a <i>kav</i> of <i>ḥomton</i> into a <i>kor</i> of grain and need not be concerned that by selling it all at the price of grain he will be guilty of theft, as the <i>kav</i> of <i>ḥomton</i> is essential for the preservation of the wheat.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Any person who has Torah in him but does not have
  
  Daf 31b
  
  fear of Heaven is like a treasurer [<i>gizbar</i>] to whom they gave keys to the inner doors of the treasury but they did not give keys to the outer door. With what key will he enter? Although the Torah is the inner key, without fear of Heaven one cannot gain access to the genuine Torah. Similarly, Rabbi Yannai would proclaim: Woe unto one who does not have a courtyard, and who makes a fence for the courtyard, i.e., a person who lacks fear of Heaven and is nevertheless involved in Torah study. Rav Yehuda said: The Holy One, Blessed be He, only created His world so that people would fear before Him, as it is stated: “And God has so made it that men should fear before Him” (Ecclesiastes 3:14).
  The Gemara also related that Rabbi Simon and Rabbi Elazar were sitting. Rabbi Ya’akov bar Aḥa passed and went adjacent to them. One said to the other: Let us stand before him as he is a man who fears sin. The other said to him in response: Let us stand before him, as he is a man of Torah study. He said to him: I said to you that he is a man who fears sin, and you said me that he is a man of Torah study? The former is much greater praise than the latter.
  The Gemara remarks: Conclude that Rabbi Elazar is the one who said that he is praiseworthy because he is a man who fears sin, as elsewhere he also spoke in praise of fear. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: The Holy One, Blessed be He, has in His world only fear of Heaven alone, as it is stated: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you, but to fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 10:12). And it is written: “And unto man He said: Behold [<i>hen</i>], the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding” (Job 28:28), as in the Greek language they call one <i>hen</i>. Apparently, fear of God is of primary importance. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude that Rabbi Elazar is the one who said so.
  Rav Ulla taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Be not overmuch wicked” (Ecclesiastes 7:17)? This appears difficult, as, is that to say that only overmuch one should not be wicked; a little, one should be wicked? Rather, this can be understood based on the following adage: One who ate a clove of garlic and its odor spreads, should he again eat another clove of garlic so that its odor will spread further? If you were somewhat wicked, do not think that it is legitimate to continue and be very wicked.
  Rava bar Rav Ulla taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For there are no pangs [<i>ḥartzubot</i>] at their death and their body is sound” (Psalms 73:4)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Is it not enough for wicked people that they are not anxious [<i>ḥared</i>] or sad [<i>atzuv</i>], <i>ḥartzubot</i> is an acronym of <i>ḥared</i> and <i>atzuv</i>, in anticipation of the day of their death, but also, their heart is as unyielding for them as the entrance to a hall is wide, and they devote no thought to it. And that is what Rabba said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “This is the way of them that are foolish and of those who after them speak approvingly, Selah” (Psalms 49:14)? It means that the wicked know that their path leads to eternal death, but they have fat on their kidneys that prevents that realization from entering their hearts. Lest you say that it is simply forgotten from them; therefore, the verse states: “And of those who after them speak approvingly, Selah” (Psalms 49:14). They are aware of their fate and speak of it, but it does not affect them.
  We learned in the mishna that if one extinguished a flame on Shabbat because he sought to spare the lamp, the oil, or the wick, he is liable, but Rabbi Yosei exempts in all cases except in a case in which he extinguished the flame to spare the wick. The Gemara asks with regard to Rabbi Yosei: In accordance with whose opinion does he hold with regard to prohibited labor performed on Shabbat not for its own sake? If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is liable for a prohibited labor performed on Shabbat not for its own sake, then even in all those cases he should also deem him liable. And if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is exempt for a prohibited labor performed on Shabbat not for its own sake, then even in the case of a wick he should also deem him exempt. Ulla said: Actually, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. However, Rabbi Yosei holds that with regard to every destructive action, if he dismantles in order to rebuild in the same place, then it is considered to be dismantling, and he is liable for having performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat. However, one who demolishes in order to build elsewhere it is not considered performance of the prohibited labor of dismantling. He merely performed a destructive act and is not liable. When one extinguishes the flame to spare the lamp or the oil, he does not do so in order to relight them. When he does so to spare the wick, he indicates that he intends to relight the wick.
  Rabba said to him: That reasoning is implausible. After all, all labors prohibited on Shabbat, we derive them from the labors performed in the Tabernacle, and there it was a case of dismantling in order to build elsewhere. They would dismantle the Tabernacle and reconstruct it at the next encampment. Ulla said to Rabba: That is not a proof, as there, in the case of the Tabernacle, it is different. Since it is written: “At the commandment of the Lord they encamped” (Numbers 9:23). The time and place of their travels and their encampments were not determined by them but rather by the word of God. Consequently, when they took down the Tabernacle it was tantamount to demolishing in order to build in the same place. Since the demolition and the construction were both accomplished at the command of God, there was never a case of destruction without a constructive purpose.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Actually, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And as far as the question, what is different about a wick, that can be answered as Rav Hamnuna said, and some say, Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Here, we are dealing with a wick that one must singe before lighting it in order to facilitate its burning, as, in that case, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that extinguishing the flame is prohibited, as, by doing so, he prepares a vessel for use. Rava said: That interpretation is also precise in the language of the mishna, as it was taught in the mishna that one who extinguished a wick is liable because he makes the wick into charcoal intentionally, and it was not taught because charcoal was made on its own. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that the mishna is to be understood in that manner.
  MISHNA: This mishna concludes the aggadic treatment of the topic of kindling the Shabbat lights. For three transgressions women are punished and die during childbirth: For the fact that they are not careful in observing the laws of a menstruating woman, and in separating <i>ḥalla</i> from the dough, and in lighting the Shabbat lamp.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: A woman who was not careful in observing the laws of menstruation, what is the reason that she is punished during childbirth? Rabbi Yitzḥak said: She sinned with regard to the chambers of her womb; therefore, she is afflicted in the chambers of her womb. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to menstruation; but with regard to a woman who was not careful in separating <i>ḥalla</i> and in kindling the Shabbat lights, what is there to say? Rather, it must be explained in accordance with that which that Galilean taught before Rav Ḥisda. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I placed a quarter [<i>revi</i>’<i>it</i>] of a <i>log</i> of blood in you when you were formed, and about matters of the blood of menstruation I warned you.
  
  Daf 32a
  
  I called you first, as it is stated: “Israel is the Lord’s hallowed portion, His first fruits of the increase” (Jeremiah 2:3) and I warned you about matters of the first: “Of the first of your dough you shall set apart <i>ḥalla</i> for a gift” (Numbers 15:20). The soul that I have placed in you is called <i>ner</i>: “The spirit of man is the lamp [<i>ner</i>] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27), and I warned you about matters of the Shabbat lamp. If you fulfill these mitzvot, fine, and if not, then I will take your soul.
  And, if so, what is different during childbirth? Why does the divine attribute of judgment punish them for dereliction in fulfillment of these mitzvot specifically then? The Gemara cites several folk sayings expressing the concept that when a person is in danger, he is punished for his sins. Rava said: If the ox fell, sharpen the knife to slaughter it. Abaye said: If the maidservant’s insolence abounds, she will be struck by a single blow as punishment for all her sins. So too, when a woman is giving birth and her suffering is great due to Eve’s sin of eating from the Tree of Knowledge, all the punishments for her own sins are added to that suffering. Rav Ḥisda said: Leave the drunk, as he falls on his own. Similarly, the time of birth is a time of danger, and if the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not come to her assistance at that time, that is sufficient to cause her death. Mar Ukva said: The shepherd is crippled, and the goats are running, and he cannot catch them. However, next to the gate, he speaks harsh words, and inside the pen he settles the account. Similarly, as long as a woman is in a healthy state, her sins are in abeyance, and she is not held accountable for them. However, when she is giving birth, which is a time of danger, she is held accountable for her sins and a calculation is made whether or not she is worthy of a miracle. Rav Pappa said: At the entrance to the stores, during a time of prosperity, brothers and loved ones abound. When a person is prospering financially, everyone acts like his brother or friend. However, at the gate of disgrace, during a time of loss and poverty, he has no brothers and no loved ones; everyone abandons him.
  And the Gemara asks: And where are men examined? When are men vulnerable to judgment and held accountable for their actions? Reish Lakish said: When they are crossing a bridge. The Gemara wonders: Only when they are crossing a bridge and at no other time? Rather, say: Anything like a bridge, any place where danger is commonplace. On a similar note, the Gemara relates: Rav would not cross a river in a ferry in which a gentile sat. He said to himself: Perhaps a judgment will be reckoned with him, and I will be caught together with him when he is punished. Whereas, Shmuel would only cross in a ferry if there was a gentile in it. He said: Satan does not have dominion over two nations. He settles his accounts with people from each nationality separately.
  Rabbi Yannai would examine the ferry and cross. The Gemara comments that Rabbi Yannai acted in accordance with his reasoning stated elsewhere, as he said: A person should never stand in a place of danger saying that they on High will perform a miracle for him, lest in the end they do not perform a miracle for him. And, moreover, even if they do perform a miracle for him, they will deduct it from his merits. Rabbi Ḥanin said: What is the verse that alludes to this? When Jacob said: “I am not worthy of all the mercies, and of all the truth, which You have shown unto Your servant” (Genesis 32:11), and he explains: Since You have bestowed upon me so much kindness and truth, my merits have been diminished. Similarly, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira would not go out and walk among the palm trees on a day when there was a southern wind blowing due to the fear that the trees might fall on him.
  In a similar vein, Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: A person should always pray that he will not become ill, as if he becomes ill they say to him: Bring proof of your virtue and exempt yourself. It is preferable for a person not to be forced to prove that he merits staying alive, as he might not be able to prove it. Mar Ukva said: What is the verse that alludes to this? As it says: “When you build a new house, then you shall make a parapet for your roof, that you bring not blood upon your house, if the fallen falls <i>mimenu</i>” (Deuteronomy 22:8). He explains: <i>Mimenu</i>, from him proof must be brought. When one falls from his previous situation, it is his own responsibility to prove his innocence and emerge unharmed. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: What is the meaning of the phrase: If the fallen falls from it? This person was destined to fall from that roof from the six days of Creation, it was ingrained into nature. As, although he did not yet fall, the verse calls him fallen. Nevertheless, the owner of the house is indicted for this, as merit is engendered by means of the innocent and guilt by means of the guilty.
  The Sages taught: One who became ill and tended toward death, they say to him: Confess, as all those executed by the courts confess. Even if he is dying of natural causes, it is worthwhile for him to consider his death atonement for his sins. The Sages said: When a person goes out to the marketplace where there are fights and disputes, he should consider himself as someone who has been handed over to a soldier [<i>seradiyot</i>]. If his head hurt, he should consider it as if they placed him in a chain [<i>kolar</i>] around his neck. If he climbed into bed and fell ill, he should consider himself as if they took him up to the gallows to be judged, as with regard to anyone who goes up to the gallows to be judged, if he has great advocates [<i>peraklitin</i>], he is spared, and if not, he is not spared.
  And with regard to divine judgment, these are a person’s advocates: Repentance and good deeds. The Gemara comments: And even if there are nine hundred ninety-nine asserting his guilt and only one asserting his innocence, he is spared, as it is stated: “If there be for him an angel, an advocate, one among a thousand, to vouch for a man’s uprightness; then He is gracious unto him, and says: Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom” (Job 33:23–24). Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, says: Even if there are nine hundred ninety-nine portions within that same angel accusing him, and one portion asserting his innocence, he is spared, as it stated: “An advocate, one among a thousand.” Even when the advocate who asserts his innocence finds only one-tenth of one percent of innocence in this man, even then, he is gracious unto him, and says: Deliver him from going down to the pit, I have found a ransom.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For three transgressions women die in childbirth [<i>yoledot</i>]. Rabbi Elazar has a different version and says that women die when they are young [<i>yeladot</i>]. These transgressions are those enumerated in the mishna: The <i>halakhot</i> of a menstruating woman, <i>ḥalla</i>, and Shabbat lights. Rabbi Aḥa says they are punished for the sin of laundering their children’s feces from clothing on Shabbat. And some say: Because they call the Holy Ark simply ark.
  Similarly, we learned in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elazar says: On account of two sins, ignoramuses [<i>amei ha</i>’<i>aretz</i>] die young (Rav Ya’akov Emden): Because they call the Holy Ark simply ark, and because they call the synagogue the house of the people. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: Three crucibles potentially leading to death were created in the woman, and some say: Three accelerants of death. They are: Menstruation, <i>ḥalla</i>, and lighting the Shabbat lights. The Gemara explains that one version, accelerants of death, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who said that women die young. And the other one, crucibles of death, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that women die in childbirth.
  Similarly, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: The <i>halakhot</i> of consecrated items, <i>terumot</i>, and tithes are themselves the essence of Torah and are extremely severe,
  
  Daf 32b
  
  and they were given, among others, to ignoramuses to fulfill. When they are negligent in the performance of these mitzvot, they are punished for it.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says: Due to the sin of vows unfulfilled a person’s wife dies. The allusion is as it is stated: “If you have not the wherewithal to pay, why should He take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Due to the sin of vows unfulfilled, children die when they are young, as it is stated: “Better is it that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay. Suffer not your mouth to bring your flesh into guilt, neither say you before the messenger that it was an error; wherefore should God be angry at your voice and destroy the work of your hands?” (Ecclesiastes 5:4–5). What is the work of a person’s hands? You must say that it is a person’s sons and daughters.
  In order to clarify which sins cause one’s young children to die, the Gemara cites what the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For the sin of vows, one’s children die, this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of the one who said that one’s children die due to the sin of vows, as we stated above. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that one’s children die due to sin of dereliction in the study of Torah, what is the verse that supports this? The Gemara replies: As it is written: “In vain have I smitten your children; they received no morality” (Jeremiah 2:30). Children die because their fathers did not accept the morality, the Torah. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: According to the one who said that one’s children die because of the sin of vows, it can also be derived from here: In vain have I smitten your children; on matters of vanity, i.e., when one vows in vain and does not fulfill it. The Gemara asks: After all, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is Rabbi, and it was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i> that Rabbi said that one’s children die because of the sin of vows. How then could it be that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said that it is due to the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah? The Gemara answers: After he heard it from Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, he reconsidered and taught in accordance with Rabbi Elazar’s opinion.
  On the same topic, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Yosei disagree. One said that children die due to the sin of not affixing a <i>mezuza</i> to one’s doorpost. And one said children die due to the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah. According to the one who said that children die because of the sin of not affixing a <i>mezuza</i>, his opinion there is based on an exegetical principle, which states that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it and not on juxtaposition to the verse before the one preceding it. In this case, it says: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children” (Deuteronomy 11:21), and the preceding verse says: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates” (Deuteronomy 11:20). And according to the one who said that children die due to the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah, that is because in his opinion the exegetical principle is that a verse is interpreted homiletically based on juxtaposition to the verse immediately preceding it, as well as to the verse before the one preceding it. In his opinion, the blessing of long life also relates to the verse before the one immediately preceding it: “And you shall teach them your children, talking of them” (Deuteronomy 11:19).
  The <i>tanna</i>’<i>im</i> Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda also disagreed about this. One said: Children die due to the sin of <i>mezuza</i>, and one said children die due to the sin of not affixing ritual fringes. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of the one who said that children die due to the sin of <i>mezuza</i>, it is based on the juxtaposition of the verses, as it is written: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates,” and it says thereafter: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children.” However, according to the one who said that children die because of the sin of ritual fringes, what is the reason? What is the connection between these matters? Rav Kahana said, and some say that it was Sheila Mari: It is homiletically interpreted as is written: “Also in your corners is found the blood of the souls of the innocent poor” (Jeremiah 2:34). Due to one’s failure to affix ritual fringes to the corners of his garments, the innocent poor, young children, who have not had opportunity to sin, die. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: According to the one who said that children die because of the sin of <i>mezuza</i>, it is also derived from here, as it is written in the continuation of that verse: “You did not find them breaking in; yet for all these things.” We see that this punishment comes because they made entrances like a thief’s breach in the wall. They did not place <i>mezuzot</i> in their entrances.
  Since the Gemara discussed the importance of the mitzva of ritual fringes, it cites that which Reish Lakish said: Anyone who is vigilant in performing the mitzva of ritual fringes merits that two thousand eight hundred servants will serve him in the World-to-Come. As it is stated: “Thus says the Lord of hosts: In those days it shall come to pass, that ten men shall take hold, out of all the languages of the nations, shall even take hold of the corner of the garment of him that is a Jew, saying: We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you” (Zechariah 8:23). On each corner of a Jewish person’s garment with ritual fringes, ten people from each of the seventy nations will take hold. That totals seven hundred people on each corner; 2,800 people altogether.
  Together with these statements, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for additional rabbinic adages with regard to punishments for various sins: Hate, <i>ḥalla</i>, <i>teruma</i>, stolen, judgment, oath, pouring, uncovering, and vulgarity. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Neḥemya says: Due to the sin of gratuitous hatred that one has for another, the punishment is great discord within a person’s home, and his wife miscarries, and his sons and daughters die when they are young. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Due to the sin of failure to separate <i>ḥalla</i> from the dough, no blessing takes effect on the grain gathered in the storehouse and a curse spreads to the prices of crops, which increase, and they plant seeds and others eat their yield, as it is stated: “I also will do this unto you: I will appoint terror [<i>behala</i>] over you, even consumption and fever, that shall make the eyes to fail and the soul to languish; and you shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it” (Leviticus 26:16). Do not read it <i>behala</i>; rather, read it as <i>beḥalla</i>. Due to negligence in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i> from the dough, these punishments come. And if they give <i>ḥalla</i>, they are blessed, as it is stated: “And the first of your dough you shall give unto the priest to cause a blessing to rest on your house” (Ezekiel 44:30).
  They also said: Due to the sin of abrogation of <i>terumot</i> and tithes, the heavens are prevented from pouring down dew and rain, and expense prevails, and profit is lost, and people pursue their livelihood but do not attain it, as it is stated: “Drought and heat consume the snow waters; so does the netherworld those that have sinned” (Job 24:19). The Gemara asks: What is the inference? How is that concept derived from this verse? The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that it should be explained as follows: Due to the things that I commanded you during the summer, separating <i>terumot</i> and tithes from the summer crops, and you did not do them, the snow waters will be robbed from you during the rainy season. And if people give <i>terumot</i> and tithes, they are blessed, as it is stated: “Bring you the whole tithe into the storehouse, that there may be food in My house, and try Me now with this, says the Lord of Hosts, if I will not open you the windows of heaven, and pour you out a blessing, that there shall be more than sufficiency [<i>ad bli dai</i>]” (Malachi 3:10). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: More than sufficiency [<i>ad bli dai</i>]? Rami bar Rav said that Rav said: It means that the abundance will be so great that your lips will be worn out [<i>yivlu</i>], similar to the word <i>beli</i>, from saying enough [<i>dai</i>].
  Due to the sin of robbery, locusts emerge, and famine prevails, and people eat the flesh of their sons and daughters, as it is stated: “Hear this word, you cows of Bashan, that are in the mountain of Samaria, that oppress the poor, that crush the needy, that say unto their lords: Bring, that we may feast” (Amos 4:1). Afterward it says: “And I also have given you cleanness of teeth in all your cities, and want of bread in all your places” (Amos 4:6), which refers to famine. Rava said: The cows of Bashan; like those women of the city of Meḥoza,
  
  Daf 33a
  
  who eat and do nothing to support themselves, and cause their husbands to commit the sin of theft. And it is written: “I have smitten you with blight and mildew; the multitude of your gardens and your vineyards and your fig trees and your olive trees has the palmerworm devoured” (Amos 4:9). And it is written: “That which the palmerworm has left the locust has eaten; and that which the locust has left the cankerworm has eaten; and that which the cankerworm has left the caterpillar has eaten” (Joel 1:4). And it is written: “And one snatches on the right hand, and is hungry; and he eats on the left hand, and is not satisfied; they eat every man the flesh of his own arm [<i>besar zero</i>’<i>o</i>]” (Isaiah 9:19). Do not read it: The flesh of his own arm [<i>besar zero</i>’<i>o</i>]; rather, the flesh of his own offspring [<i>besar zaro</i>]. All the punishments for theft listed above were explicitly mentioned in the verses.
  Furthermore, the Sages said that due to the sin of delay of justice, i.e., judges delay issuing their rulings due to personal considerations, and for distortion of justice, i.e., judges intentionally distort their verdicts, and for miscarriage of justice that results from negligence, and for dereliction in the study of Torah, violence and looting abound in the world, and pestilence and famine come, and people eat and are not sated, and they eat their bread measured by weight. As it is written: “And I will bring a sword upon you, that shall execute the vengeance of the covenant; and you shall be gathered together within your cities; and I will send the pestilence among you; and you shall be delivered into the hand of the enemy” (Leviticus 26:25). And covenant means nothing other than Torah, as it is stated: “If My covenant be not with day and night, if I have not appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25). The study of Torah is the mitzva practiced both day and night. And it is written with regard to this punishment: “When I break your staff of bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, and they shall deliver your bread again by weight; and ye shall eat, and not be satisfied” (Leviticus 26:26). And it is written: “Even because they rejected My ordinances, and their soul abhorred My statutes” (Leviticus 26:43). All of these punishments result from breaching the covenant of the Torah and the perversion of justice.
  Due to the sin of an oath taken in vain and a false oath, and desecration of God’s name, and desecration of Shabbat, wild beasts abound in the world, and domesticated animals cease to exist, and human beings decrease in number, and the roads become desolate, as it is stated: “And if in spite of these [<i>be</i>’<i>eleh</i>] things you will not be corrected unto Me, but will walk contrary unto Me casually” (Leviticus 26:23). Do not read of these [<i>be</i>’<i>eleh</i>]; rather, due to a vain oath [<i>be</i>’<i>ala</i>]. And it is written that the punishment for this is: “And I will send the beast of the field among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, and make you few in number; and your ways shall become desolate” (Leviticus 26:22). And it is written with regard to a false oath: “And you shall not swear by My name falsely, so that you desecrate [<i>veḥillalta</i>] the name of your God: I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:12). And it is written with regard to desecrating the name of God: “And you shall not desecrate [<i>teḥallelu</i>] My Holy Name” (Leviticus 22:32). And it is written with regard to desecrating Shabbat: “Every one that desecrates it [<i>meḥaleleha</i>] shall surely be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). And derive by means of a verbal analogy [<i>gezera shava</i>] desecration [<i>ḥillul</i>] of Shabbat from desecration [<i>ḥillul</i>] of a false oath. Just as punishment for a false oath is desolation and wild beasts, one receives the same punishment for desecrating Shabbat and the name of God.
  Due to the sin of bloodshed, the Holy Temple is destroyed, and the Divine Presence leaves Israel, as it says: “So you shall not pollute the land wherein you are; for blood, it pollutes the land; and no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. And you shall not defile the land which you inhabit, in the midst of which I dwell; for I the Lord dwell in the midst of the children of Israel” (Numbers 35:33–34). However, if you defile the land, you will not inhabit it, and I will not dwell in it.
  Due to the sin of prohibited sexual relations, and idol worship, and failure to let the land lie fallow during the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years, exile comes to the world and they exile the Jewish people from their land, and others come and settle in their place. As it is stated with regard to illicit sexual relations: “For all these abominations have the men of the land done, that were before you, and the land is defiled; that the land expel not you also, when you defile it, as it expelled the nation that was before you” (Leviticus 18:27–28). And it is written: “And the land was defiled, therefore I did visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land expelled her inhabitants” (Leviticus 18:25). And it is written: “That the land expel not you also, when you defile it, as it expelled the nation that was before you.”
  And with regard to idol worship it is written: “And I will cast your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols” (Leviticus 26:30). And it is written: “And I will bring your sanctuaries unto desolation, and I will not smell the savor of your sweet odors” (Leviticus 26:31). “And you will I scatter among the nations, and I will draw out the sword after you; and your land shall be a desolation, and your cities shall be a waste” (Leviticus 26:33).
  With regard to the sin of failure to observe the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years it is written: “Then shall the land be paid her Sabbaths, as long as it lies desolate, and you are in your enemies’ land; even then shall the land rest, and repay her Sabbaths” (Leviticus 26:34). And it is written: “As long as it lies desolate it shall have rest; even the rest which it had not in your Sabbaths, when you dwelt upon it” (Leviticus 26: 35).
  Due to the sin of vulgar speech, troubles abound, and harsh decrees are renewed, and the youth among the enemies of Israel, a euphemistic reference to Israel, die, and orphans and widows cry out for help and are not answered, as it is stated: “Therefore the Lord shall have no joy in their young men, neither shall He have compassion on their fatherless and widows; for everyone is ungodly and an evildoer, and every mouth speaks wantonness. For all this His anger is not turned away, but His hand is stretched out still” (Isaiah 9:16).
  The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the phrase: But His hand is stretched out still? Rabbi Ḥanan bar Rava said: Everybody knows why the bride enters the wedding canopy. There is no secret revealed. Nevertheless, anyone who speaks vulgarly about it, even if they, on High, sealed for him a decree of seventy years of good fortune, they will reverse it to bad fortune because of this sin. And Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Ḥisda said: Anyone who speaks vulgarly, they deepen Gehenna for him, as it is stated: “The mouth that speaks perversity is a deep pit: he that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein” (Proverbs 22:14), i.e., Gehenna is deepened for one who speaks vulgarly. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Even one who hears vulgar speech and is silent is punished, as it is stated: “He that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein,” even if he himself does not speak at all.
  And in a similar vein, Rav Oshaya said: Anyone who prepares himself to commit a sin, wounds and bruises emerge on him, as it is stated: “Sharp wounds for one devoted to evil; so do stripes that reach the inward parts” (Proverbs 20:30). And not only that, but he is sentenced to suffer from the disease of edema [<i>hidrokan</i>], as it is stated: So do stripes that reach the inward parts. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: A sign indicating one who committed a sin is the disease <i>hidrokan</i>, which afflicts the inner parts.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There are three types of <i>hidrokan</i>: The one that comes as punishment for sin is thick; and that which is the result of hunger is swollen, but not as thick; and the one caused by witchcraft is thin, and the flesh of the sick person becomes thin in other places.
  The Gemara relates: Shmuel HaKatan fell ill with <i>hidrokan</i>. He said: Master of the Universe, who will draw lots, meaning, who will be able to determine that this <i>hidrokan</i> is not the consequence of sin? He was cured. Abaye also fell ill with <i>hidrokan</i>. Rava testified and said about him: I know about Naḥmani, Abaye, that he starves himself and that his <i>hidrokan</i> is the result of hunger. The Gemara relates that Rava fell ill with <i>hidrokan</i>, and they asked: But Rava did not starve himself, and there is no reason to suspect him of sin, and we cannot say that he contracted <i>hidrokan</i> because he did not relieve himself on time. Rava knew to relieve himself, as it is he who said: More have been killed due to the chamber pot, because they were not careful about relieving themselves in a timely manner, than those swollen due to starvation. The Gemara answers: Rava is different because the Sages compel him to remain in place against his will while he lectures. Since he could not relieve himself, he became sick with <i>hidrokan</i>.
  On a related note, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that there are four signs: A sign of sin is <i>hidrokan</i>, a sign of gratuitous hatred is jaundice, a sign of arrogance is poverty, and a sign of slander is <i>askara</i>.
  The Sages taught: <i>Askara</i> comes to the world as punishment
  
  Daf 33b
  
  for neglecting to separate tithes. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: <i>Askara</i> comes as punishment for slander. Rava said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said it: What is the verse that alludes to this? “But the king shall rejoice in God; every one that swears by Him shall glory; for the mouth of them that speak lies shall be stopped” (Psalms 63:12). The punishment for lying is that the mouth will be stopped. <i>Askara</i> affects the mouth along with other parts of the body.
  A dilemma was raised before those who were sitting in the study hall: Did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, say that <i>askara</i> comes as punishment only for slander, or perhaps he said it was also for slander? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When our Sages entered the vineyard in Yavne, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon were there, and a question was asked before them with regard to this plague of <i>askara</i>: Why does it begin in the intestines and end in the mouth? Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ila’i, who was the head of the speakers in every place, responded and said: Even though the kidneys advise, and the heart understands, and the tongue shapes the voice that emerges from the mouth, still, the mouth completes the formation of the voice. Therefore, the disease begins in the same place that slander begins and it ends in the mouth. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, responded and said: This disease ends in the mouth because one eats with it non-kosher things. They immediately wondered about this: Does it enter your mind to say that <i>askara</i> is caused by eating non-kosher food? Are those who eat non-kosher food so numerous? Rather, it comes as a punishment for eating foods that were not ritually prepared, i.e., were not tithed. Rabbi Shimon responded and said: This disease comes as a punishment for the sin of dereliction in the study of Torah.
  They said to him: Women will prove that dereliction in the study of Torah is not the cause, as they are not obligated to study Torah and, nevertheless, they contract <i>askara</i>. He answered them: They are punished because they cause their husbands to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: Gentiles will prove that this is not the cause, as they also contract <i>askara</i> even though they are not obligated to study Torah. He answered them: They are also punished because they cause Israel to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: Children will prove that this is not the cause, for they are not at all obligated to study Torah and they also suffer from <i>askara</i>. He answered them: They are punished because they cause their fathers to be idle from the study of Torah. They said to him: School children will prove that this is not the cause, as they study Torah and, nevertheless, they suffer from <i>askara</i>.
  The Gemara answers: There, it must be understood in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Guryon, as Rabbi Guryon said, and some say that it was Rav Yosef, son of Rabbi Shemaya, who said it: At a time when there are righteous people in the generation, the righteous are seized, i.e., they die or suffer, for the sins of the generation. If there are no righteous people in the generation, school children, who are also without sin, are seized for the sins of the generation. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ze’iri said, and some say that Rabbi Shimon ben Nezira said: What is the verse that alludes to this? “If you know not, you fairest among women, go your way forth by the footsteps of the flock and feed your kids, beside the shepherds’ tents [<i>mishkenot</i>]” (Song of Songs 1:8). And we say in explanation of this verse: They are the lambs that are taken as collateral [<i>hamemushkanin</i>], which is etymologically similar to the word <i>mishkenot</i>, in place of the shepherds. If the shepherds and leaders of the generation corrupt the multitudes, young children die because of their sins. With regard to the dilemma, conclude from it that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said that the illness of <i>askara</i> also results from slander, as the <i>baraita</i> provides an additional cause of the illness. The Gemara comments: Indeed, conclude from it.
  In this <i>baraita</i> Rabbi Yehuda is described as head of the speakers in every place. The Gemara asks: And why did they call him head of the speakers in every place? The Gemara relates that this resulted due to an incident that took place when Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon were sitting, and Yehuda, son of converts, sat beside them. Rabbi Yehuda opened and said: How pleasant are the actions of this nation, the Romans, as they established marketplaces, established bridges, and established bathhouses. Rabbi Yosei was silent. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai responded and said: Everything that they established, they established only for their own purposes. They established marketplaces, to place prostitutes in them; bathhouses, to pamper themselves; and bridges, to collect taxes from all who pass over them. Yehuda, son of converts, went and related their statements to his household, and those statements continued to spread until they were heard by the monarchy. They ruled and said: Yehuda, who elevated the Roman regime, shall be elevated and appointed as head of the Sages, the head of the speakers in every place. Yosei, who remained silent, shall be exiled from his home in Judea as punishment, and sent to the city of Tzippori in the Galilee. And Shimon, who denounced the government, shall be killed.
  Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai and his son, Rabbi Elazar, went and hid in the study hall. Every day Rabbi Shimon’s wife would bring them bread and a jug of water and they would eat. When the decree intensified, Rabbi Shimon said to his son: Women are easily impressionable and, therefore, there is room for concern lest the authorities torture her and she reveal our whereabouts. They went and they hid in a cave. A miracle occurred and a carob tree was created for them as well as a spring of water. They would remove their clothes and sit covered in sand up to their necks. They would study Torah all day in that manner. At the time of prayer, they would dress, cover themselves, and pray, and they would again remove their clothes afterward so that they would not become tattered. They sat in the cave for twelve years. Elijah the Prophet came and stood at the entrance to the cave and said: Who will inform bar Yoḥai that the emperor died and his decree has been abrogated?
  They emerged from the cave, and saw people who were plowing and sowing. Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai said: These people abandon eternal life of Torah study and engage in temporal life for their own sustenance. The Gemara relates that every place that Rabbi Shimon and his son Rabbi Elazar directed their eyes was immediately burned. A Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Did you emerge from the cave in order to destroy My world? Return to your cave. They again went and sat there for twelve months. They said: The judgment of the wicked in Gehenna lasts for twelve months. Surely their sin was atoned in that time. A Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Emerge from your cave. They emerged. Everywhere that Rabbi Elazar would strike, Rabbi Shimon would heal. Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Elazar: My son, you and I suffice for the entire world, as the two of us are engaged in the proper study of Torah.
  As the sun was setting on Shabbat eve, they saw an elderly man who was holding two bundles of myrtle branches and running at twilight. They said to him: Why do you have these? He said to them: In honor of Shabbat. They said to him: And let one suffice. He answered them: One is corresponding to: “Remember the Shabbat day, to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and one is corresponding to: “Observe the Shabbat day, to keep it holy” (Deuteronomy 5:12). Rabbi Shimon said to his son: See how beloved the mitzvot are to Israel. Their minds were put at ease and they were no longer as upset that people were not engaged in Torah study.
  Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir, Rabbi Shimon’s son-in-law, heard and went out to greet him. He brought him into the bathhouse and began tending to his flesh. He saw that Rabbi Shimon had cracks in the skin on his body. He was crying, and the tears fell from his eyes and caused Rabbi Shimon pain. Rabbi Pineḥas said to Rabbi Shimon, his father-in-law: Woe is me, that I have seen you like this. Rabbi Shimon said to him: Happy are you that you have seen me like this, as had you not seen me like this, you would not have found in me this prominence in Torah, as the Gemara relates: At first, when Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would raise a difficulty, Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would respond to his question with twelve answers. Ultimately, when Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would raise a difficulty, Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai would respond with twenty-four answers.
  Rabbi Shimon said: Since a miracle transpired for me, I will go and repair something for the sake of others in gratitude for God’s kindness, as it is written: “And Jacob came whole to the city of Shechem, which is in the land of Canaan, when he came from Paddan-aram; and he graced the countenance of the city” (Genesis 33:18). Rav said, the meaning of: And Jacob came whole, is: Whole in his body, whole in his money, whole in his Torah. And what did he do? And he graced the countenance of the city; he performed gracious acts to benefit the city. Rav said: Jacob established a currency for them. And Shmuel said: He established marketplaces for them. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He established bathhouses for them. In any event, clearly one for whom a miracle transpires should perform an act of kindness for his neighbors as a sign of gratitude. He said: Is there something that needs repair? They said to him: There is a place where there is uncertainty with regard to ritual impurity
  
  Daf 34a
  
  and the priests are troubled by being forced to circumvent it, as it is prohibited for them to become ritually impure from contact with a corpse. There was suspicion, but no certainty, that a corpse was buried there. Therefore, they were unable to definitively determine its status. Rabbi Shimon said: Is there a person who knows that there was a presumption of ritual purity here? Is there anyone who remembers a time when this place was not considered ritually impure, or that at least part of it was considered to be ritually pure? An Elder said to him: Here ben Zakkai planted and cut the <i>teruma</i> of lupines. In this marketplace Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who himself was a priest, once planted lupines that were given to him as <i>teruma</i>. On that basis, the conclusion can be drawn that it was definitely ritually pure. Rabbi Shimon, like Jacob, also did so and took steps to improve the city and examined the ground (<i>Tosafot</i>). Everywhere that the ground was hard, he pronounced it ritually pure as there was certainly no corpse there, and every place that the ground was soft, he marked it indicating that perhaps a corpse was buried there. In that way, he purified the marketplace so that even priests could walk through it.
  A certain Elder said in ridicule and surprise: Ben Yoḥai purified the cemetery. Rabbi Shimon got angry and said to him: Had you not been with us, and even had you been with us and were not counted with us in rendering this ruling, what you say is fine. You could have said that you were unaware of my intention or that you did not agree or participate in this decision. Now that you were with us and were counted with us in rendering this ruling, you will cause people to say that Sages are unwilling to cooperate with one another. They will say: If competing prostitutes still apply makeup to each other to help one another look beautiful, all the more so that Torah scholars should cooperate with each other. He directed his eyes toward him and the Elder died. Rabbi Shimon went out to the marketplace and he saw Yehuda, son of converts, who was the cause of this entire incident. Rabbi Shimon, said: This one still has a place in the world? He directed his eyes toward him and turned him into a pile of bones.
  MISHNA: There are three things a person must say in his home on Shabbat eve at nightfall and not before. The mishna elaborates: He should ask the members of his household, have you tithed the crop that required tithing? Have you placed the <i>eiruv</i> for joining the courtyards and joining the Shabbat borders? If you have done so, light the lamp in honor of Shabbat. The Sages stated a principle: If the time arrives on Friday when there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, one may not tithe the crop that has definitely not been tithed, and one may not immerse ritually impure vessels in a ritual bath to render them ritually pure, and one may not light the Shabbat lights. However, one may tithe <i>demai</i>, doubtfully tithed produce, which must be tithed due to mere suspicion. And one may place an <i>eiruv</i> and insulate the hot water to be used on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify: From where are these matters, that one must ask these questions in his home at nightfall of Shabbat, derived? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: As the verse said: “And you shall know that your tent is in peace; and you shall visit your habitation, and shall not sin” (Job 5:24). From here it is derived that one should visit his habitation, i.e., ask in his home, so that he will not come to sin. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Although the Sages said that there are three things a person should, indeed he is required to, say in his home on Shabbat eve at nightfall, one must say them calmly so that the members of his household will accept them from him. If he says them harshly, his family members may mislead him and cause him to sin. Rav Ashi said: I did not hear this <i>halakha</i> of Rabba bar Rav Huna, but I fulfilled it based on my own reasoning.
  The Gemara asks: This mishna itself is difficult, as it contains an internal contradiction. On the one hand, you stated initially that there are three things a person must say in his home before Shabbat at nightfall, and this means: At nightfall, i.e., before nightfall, yes, he should say those things; when there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, no, he should not say them. Even if one were to ask then, it is no longer permitted to correct these matters. And then it taught: When there is uncertainty whether it is nightfall and uncertainty whether it is not yet nightfall, one may place an <i>eiruv</i>. One may correct the situation even then. Why did the mishna restrict asking these questions to an earlier time?
  Incidentally, prior to answering this question, the Gemara lists all of the other <i>halakhot</i> in tractate <i>Shabbat</i> stated by the Sage who answers the question, with the mnemonic: Self, pruning, bird, cord, silk.
  Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: This is not difficult and there is no contradiction here. Here, at the beginning of the mishna, where it indicates that the <i>eiruv</i> can only be placed while it is still day, it is referring to the joining of Shabbat boundaries, which is based on a Torah law. Therefore, one must place this <i>eiruv</i> while it is definitely day. And here, where the mishna said that it is permitted even when it is uncertain whether or not it is already nighttime, it is referring to the joining of courtyards, which is more lenient and based merely on a stringency.
  In connection to this, the Gemara cites the <i>halakha</i> that Rava said in order to emphasize the rabbinic aspect of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>eiruv</i>: One to whom two people said: Go and place an <i>eiruv</i>, a joining of courtyards (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), for us. For one of them he placed an <i>eiruv</i> while it was still day, and for one he placed an <i>eiruv</i> at twilight, when it is uncertain whether it is day or night. The one for whom he placed an <i>eiruv</i> while it was still day had his <i>eiruv</i> eaten during twilight, and the one for whom he placed an <i>eiruv</i> during twilight had his <i>eiruv</i> eaten after nightfall. The principle is as follows: Whether or not an <i>eiruv</i> takes effect is determined at the moment that Shabbat begins. If one placed the <i>eiruv</i> beforehand, and it remains intact at the moment Shabbat begins, the <i>eiruv</i> is in effect. However, if the <i>eiruv</i> that was placed at the appropriate time was eaten during twilight, it is problematic. Twilight is a period of uncertainty. There is uncertainty whether it is day, and consequently the <i>eiruv</i> was not in place at the moment that Shabbat began, or whether it is night, and it was in place. In the latter case, there is still uncertainty as to whether or not the <i>eiruv</i> was in place prior to Shabbat, so that it could take effect at all. In that case, Rava ruled that both of them acquired the <i>eiruv</i>.
  The Gemara is surprised by this: Whichever way you look at it, this ruling is difficult. If the twilight period is considered day, let the latter one acquire his <i>eiruv</i>, but let the first one not acquire his because his <i>eiruv</i> was eaten while it was still day. And if the twilight period is night, let the first one acquire his <i>eiruv</i>, but let the latter one not acquire his <i>eiruv</i> because his was not placed before Shabbat. In any event, it is impossible for the <i>eiruv</i> in both of these cases to be valid. The Gemara answers this according to Rava’s position: The status of twilight is uncertain, as it is unknown whether it is day, or night, or both, and uncertainty in the case of a rabbinic ordinance is ruled leniently. Therefore, in both cases the <i>eiruv</i> is acquired.
  And Rava said: Why did they say that one may not insulate hot water even in something that does not add heat, but only retains the pre-existing heat, from nightfall on Friday? It is a decree lest one come to boil the pot on Shabbat. Abaye said to him: If so, if it is due to concern that one may boil it, then during twilight we should also issue a decree and prohibit insulating in something that does not add heat. Rava said to him: During twilight, there is no reason to be concerned because at that time most pots are boiling, as they have just been taken off of the fire. Later at night the pots cool down and it is conceivable that one may come to boil them in order to restore the heat.
  And Rava said:
  
  Daf 34b
  
  Why did the Sages say that one may not insulate hot water for Shabbat in something that adds heat, even while it is still day? It is a decree lest one come to cover it in hot ashes that contain a glowing ember. People may not differentiate between addition of heat by means of hot ashes and other additions of heat. Abaye said to him: Let him insulate it with hot ashes, what is the problem? Rava answered him: It is a decree lest one come to stoke the coals in order to make them burn on Shabbat and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
  The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> which discusses the range of problems that arise with regard to the twilight period. Twilight is a period of uncertainty. It is uncertain whether it consists of both day and night, it is uncertain whether it is completely day, and it is uncertain whether it is completely night. Therefore, the Sages impose the stringencies of both days upon it. If there is a stringency that applies on either of the days, one is obligated to adhere to it during the twilight period.
  Nevertheless, the definition of twilight is uncertain. And what is twilight? From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun. If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color, and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is the twilight period. If the upper segment has lost its color, and its color equals that of the lower one, it is night; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya says: The duration of the twilight period is the time it takes for a person to walk half a <i>mil</i> after the sun sets. Rabbi Yosei says: Twilight does not last for a quantifiable period of time; rather, it is like the blink of an eye: This, night, enters and that, day, leaves, and it is impossible to calculate it due to its brevity.
  It was taught in the <i>baraita</i> that the Master said: The Sages impose the stringencies of both days upon twilight. The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> was this stated? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: With regard to the matter of ritual impurity, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a <i>zav</i> who saw an emission for two consecutive days during twilight, it is unclear whether it should be considered as if he only saw the emission for a single day, as perhaps twilight of the first day was part of the following day, and twilight of the second day was part of the previous day; or, whether it should be considered as two days, attributing each twilight to either the previous or the following day; or, whether it should be considered three days, as it is possible to view the twilight period as two days. By Torah law, a <i>zav</i> who saw two emissions is ritually impure, and all of the stringencies of a <i>zav</i> apply to him. If he sees a third emission, he is liable to bring an offering as part of his purification ritual. Therefore, this <i>zav</i>, with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether he saw emissions for one day, two days, or three days, has uncertain status with regard to both ritual impurity and to sacrifice. If he saw an emission one day during twilight, he has uncertain status with regard to ritual impurity because it may be considered two days.
  The Gemara comments on the <i>baraita</i> cited by the Gemara. This <i>baraita</i> is itself difficult, self-contradictory. Initially you said, what is twilight? From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun. By inference, if the bottom segment lost its color, and the upper one has not lost its color, it is night. And then the <i>baraita</i> taught: If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color, and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is the twilight period. There is an apparent internal contradiction in the <i>baraita</i>. Rabba said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In order to resolve the contradiction, unify the two statements and teach it as follows: What is twilight? From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun. If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is also the twilight period. Only if the upper segment lost its color, and it equals that of the lower one, is it night. And Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said otherwise: From when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun, it is day. If the lower segment of the sky has lost its color, and the upper segment has not yet lost its color, that is the twilight period. If the upper segment lost its color and it equals that of the lower one, it is night.
  And the Gemara remarks: In this dispute over the precise definition of twilight both Rabba and Rav Yosef follow their line of reasoning stated elsewhere. As it was stated: What is the measure of the duration of twilight? Rabba said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The time it takes to walk three parts of a <i>mil</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of three parts of a <i>mil</i>? If you say that it refers to three halves of a <i>mil</i>, let him say a <i>mil</i> and a half. Rather, if you say that it means three-thirds of a <i>mil</i>, let him simply say one <i>mil</i>. Rather, it means three-quarters of a <i>mil</i>. And Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The duration of twilight is two parts of a <i>mil</i>. Again the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of two parts of a <i>mil</i>? If you say that it means two halves of a <i>mil</i>, let him simply say one <i>mil</i>. Rather, if you say that it means two-quarters of a <i>mil</i>, let him say instead: Half of a <i>mil</i>. Rather,
  
  Daf 35a
  
  it means two-thirds of a <i>mil</i>. The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference between them? The practical difference between them is half of one-sixth [<i>danka</i>], i.e., one-twelfth of a <i>mil</i>. Their disputes are consistent, as the duration of twilight according to Rav Yosef is shorter than its duration according to Rabba.
  The Gemara comments: And with regard to the legal status of a wicker vessel their dispute is the opposite. In that case, the size of the vessel permitted by Rav Yosef is larger than the size of the vessel permitted by Rabba. As Rabba said with regard to a wicker vessel with a capacity of two <i>kor</i>, one is permitted to move it on Shabbat. And one with a capacity of three <i>kor</i>, one is prohibited to move it on Shabbat. It is much larger than the dimensions of a vessel and one is only permitted to move vessels on Shabbat. And Rav Yosef said: A vessel with a capacity of three <i>kor</i>, one is also permitted to move it, and only one with a capacity of four <i>kor</i>, it is prohibited to move.
  Abaye said: I raised the dilemma before my Master, Rabba, when it was practical, when I actually needed to know what to do, and he did not permit me to move even a vessel with a capacity of two <i>kor</i>. The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabba issue his practical halakhic ruling? In accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i> that we learned in the mishna discussing the laws of ritual purity: A round straw barrel, and a round barrel made of reeds, and the cistern of an Alexandrian ship, which is a large vessel placed on a boat and filled with potable water, although these vessels have bottoms, i.e., they are receptacles, since they have a capacity of forty <i>se’a</i> of liquid, which is the equivalent of two <i>kor</i> of dry goods, they are ritually pure. Even if they come into contact with a source of ritual impurity, they do not become impure. Beyond a certain size, containers are no longer considered vessels and, consequently, cannot become ritually impure. Rabba held: Since with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity a vessel of two <i>kor</i> is not considered a vessel, it may not be moved on Shabbat. With regard to this mishna, Abaye said: Learn from it that the surplus of dry goods in a vessel relative to liquids is one-third of the contents of the vessel. It says in the mishna that a vessel that can hold forty <i>se’a</i> of liquid holds two <i>kor</i> of dry produce, which is the equivalent of sixty <i>se’a</i>.
  The Gemara relates: Abaye saw that Rava was gazing westward on Shabbat eve to determine whether or not the sky was red and whether or not it was twilight. Abaye said to Rava: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that twilight is from when the sun sets, as long as the eastern face of the sky is reddened by the light of the sun? Why, then, are you looking westward? Rava said to him: Do you hold that the reference is actually to the eastern face of the sky? No, it is referring to the face of the sky that causes the east to redden, i.e., the west. Some say a different version of that incident. Rava saw that Abaye was gazing eastward. He said to him, do you hold that the reference is to the actual eastern face of the sky? The reference is to the face of the sky that causes the east to redden, i.e., the west. And your mnemonic is a window, as it is on the wall opposite the window that one can see how much sunlight is shining through.
  With regard to that which was taught in the <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Neḥemya says: The duration of twilight is the time it takes for a person to walk half a <i>mil</i> after the sun sets. Rabbi Ḥanina said: One who wants to know the precise measure of Rabbi Neḥemya’s twilight should do the following: Leave the sun at the top of Mount Carmel, as when one is standing on the seashore he can still see the top of Mount Carmel in sunlight, and descend and immerse himself in the sea, and emerge, and that is Rabbi Neḥemya’s measure of the duration of twilight.
  Because of its similarity to Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One who wants to see Miriam’s well, which accompanied the Jewish people throughout their sojourn in the desert, should do the following: He should climb to the top of Mount Carmel and look out, and he will see a rock that looks like a sieve in the sea, and that is Miriam’s well. Rav said: A spring that is portable, i.e., that moves from place to place, is ritually pure and is regarded as an actual spring and not as drawn water. And what is a movable spring? It is Miriam’s well.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: During Rabbi Yehuda’s twilight, ritually impure priests who want to immerse themselves during the day to become ritually pure, so that sunset will follow immersion and they will be permitted to eat <i>teruma</i>, can still immerse themselves during that period. According to this opinion, twilight is still considered to be day. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that true? If you say that it is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s own opinion, his opinion cited above is that twilight is a period of uncertainty. Therefore, one who immerses at that time may not eat <i>teruma</i> until after the sunset of the following day. Rather, the reference is to twilight of Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Priests can immerse then, as Rabbi Yosei considers that time to still be day, and sunset will follow.
  The Gemara asks: It is obvious that according to Rabbi Yosei they are immersing themselves during the day. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the twilight of Rabbi Yosei is subsumed within and takes place at the end of the twilight of Rabbi Yehuda. When the twilight of Rabbi Yehuda ends, Rabbi Yosei’s twilight is also over. It is already night, sunset of that day has already passed, and there is no sunset to enable them to eat <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, he teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda’s twilight ends, and only thereafter does Rabbi Yosei’s twilight begin.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the matter of Shabbat, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the matter of <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: Granted, concerning the statement that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the matter of Shabbat, as like all other cases of uncertainty, the ruling is stringent with regard to Torah prohibitions. However, with regard to <i>teruma</i>, what is the case under discussion? If you say that it is referring to the matter of immersion, immersion is also a case of uncertainty with regard to a Torah law. Why would the ruling be more lenient in that case than in the case of Shabbat?
  
  Daf 35b
  
  Rather, it must be that the reference is with regard to eating <i>teruma</i>. Priests may not eat <i>teruma</i> until twilight is completed, which according to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is slightly later than it is according to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.
  With regard to the period of twilight, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: When one can see one star in the evening sky, it is still day; two stars, twilight; three stars, night. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When one can see one star in the evening sky, it is still day; two stars, twilight; three stars, night. Rabbi Yosei said: This is neither referring to large stars that are visible even during the day, nor to small stars that are visible only late at night. Rather, it is referring to medium-sized stars.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Zevida, said: One who performs a prohibited labor during two twilights, one between Friday and Shabbat and one between Shabbat and the conclusion of Shabbat on Saturday night, is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat whichever way you look at it. Whether we say that twilight is day or night, certainly one of those labors was performed on Shabbat. Rava said to his servant: You, who are not expert in the measures of the Sages, when the sun is at the top of the palm trees, light the Shabbat lights. His servant asked him: What should we do on a cloudy day, when the sun is not visible at the top of the trees? Rava said to him: In the city, watch the roosters because as evening approaches they sit on their beams. In a field, watch the ravens because they return to their nests as evening approaches. Alternatively, you can watch the plants [<i>adanei</i>] that turn westward in the evening. When they begin to turn westward evening is approaching.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They sound six blasts on Shabbat eve to announce that Shabbat is approaching. The Gemara details what each blast signifies. The first blast is in order to stop the people from work in the fields. The second blast is to stop those who are working in the city, and to inform the proprietors to close the stores. The third is to inform them to light the Shabbat light; that is the statement of Rabbi Natan. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The third blast is to inform those who don phylacteries throughout the day to remove their phylacteries, as one does not don phylacteries on Shabbat. And he pauses after the third blast for the length of time it takes to fry a small fish or to stick bread to the sides of the oven. One who forgot to do so and needs those foods for Shabbat may do so then. And he sounds a <i>tekia</i>, and sounds a <i>terua</i>, and sounds a <i>tekia</i>, and he accepts Shabbat. It is then that Shabbat begins in every sense.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What shall we do to the Babylonian Jews? They stray from the custom, as they sound a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i>, and they accept Shabbat during the <i>terua</i>, i.e., upon hearing the blast of the <i>terua</i>. The Gemara asks about this: Do the Babylonians really sound only a <i>tekia</i> and a <i>terua</i> and no more blasts? If so, there are only five blasts and not six, as it was taught in the <i>baraita</i>. Rather, the correct version is: They sound a <i>tekia</i>, and they again sound a <i>tekia</i>, and then they sound a <i>terua</i>, and they accept Shabbat during the <i>terua</i>. They do so because they continue the custom of their fathers that was handed down to them.
  Rav Yehuda taught to Rav Yitzḥak, his son: The second blast that is sounded before Shabbat is to inform people to light the light. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did he say this? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rather, certainly he told him that the third blast is in order to inform people to light the light, and in accordance with whose opinion did he say this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan.
  On a similar note, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in greater detail: Six blasts are sounded on Shabbat eve. When one begins sounding the first <i>tekia</i>, the people standing and working in the fields refrained from hoeing, and from plowing and from performing all labor in the fields. And those workers who work close to the city are not permitted to enter the city until those who work farther away come, so that they will all enter together. Otherwise, people would suspect that the workers who came later continued to work after the blast. And still, at this time, the stores in the city are open and the shutters of the stores, upon which the storekeepers would arrange their merchandise in front of the stores, remain in place. When he began sounding the second blast, the shutters were removed from where they were placed and the stores were locked and in the homes, however, hot water was still cooking on the stove and pots remained in place on the stove. When he began sounding the third blast, the one charged with removing food from the stove removed it, and the one charged with insulating hot water for Shabbat so that it would not cool off insulated it, and the one charged with kindling the Shabbat lights lit. And the one sounding the <i>shofar</i> pauses for the amount of time it takes to fry a small fish or to stick bread to the sides of the oven, and he sounds a <i>tekia</i>, and sounds a <i>terua</i>, and sounds a <i>tekia</i>, and accepts Shabbat.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, said: I heard that a person who was pressed for time and comes to light Shabbat lights after six blasts may light without concern, as even the moment of the sixth blast is not yet Shabbat. Proof for this is that the Sages provided the sexton of the synagogue a period of time to take his <i>shofar</i>, which he used to sound the blasts on a tall roof in the middle of the city, to his house. Clearly, during that interval it is not yet Shabbat. He said to him: If so, then you have rendered your statement subject to circumstances, and it would not apply uniformly to all. Shabbat would start at a different time in each place based on the distance between the site where the <i>shofar</i> is sounded and the home of the sexton. Rather, Shabbat began immediately after the final blast with no pause in between. The sexton had a concealed place on top of his roof, where he would sound the <i>shofar</i>, in which he would place his <i>shofar</i> because the consensus is that one may move neither the <i>shofar</i> nor the trumpets on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks with regard to this last <i>halakha</i>: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the <i>shofar</i> may be moved on Shabbat, and the trumpets may not be moved? Rav Yosei said: This is not difficult, as one could say that here, where moving a <i>shofar</i> was permitted, it is referring to a <i>shofar</i> belonging to an individual. Because it has a use even on Shabbat, it may be moved. There, where moving a <i>shofar</i> was prohibited, it is referring to a <i>shofar</i> that belongs to a community. Because it has no use on Shabbat, it is, therefore, considered set-aside [<i>muktze</i>]. Abaye said to him: And in the case of an individual, for what permitted action is a <i>shofar</i> fit to be used on Shabbat? It is fit for use since it is suitable to give water with it
  
  Daf 36a
  
  to a child. Because the mouth of a <i>shofar</i> is bent, one can pour a little water at a time. If so, a <i>shofar</i> belonging to the community is also suitable to feed water to a poor infant whose sustenance is provided by the community. And furthermore, that <i>halakha</i> which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Just as one may move the <i>shofar</i>, so too one may move the trumpets, is contrary to that which was taught previously that there is a difference between moving the <i>shofar</i> and moving the trumpet. In accordance with whose opinion is that <i>baraita</i>? Rather, this is not difficult, as it can be explained that these three <i>baraitot</i> correspond to the three opinions with regard to these <i>halakhot</i>. This <i>baraita</i>, which permits moving the <i>shofar</i> but not the trumpet, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the laws of set-aside apply to these items on Shabbat and one may not move a utensil whose only function is prohibited. Since a trumpet has no permitted use on Shabbat, it may not be moved. On the other hand, one is permitted to move a <i>shofar</i>, which can be used to feed a child. And that <i>baraita</i>, which permits moving both a <i>shofar</i> and a trumpet, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the <i>halakhot</i> of set-aside do not apply to utensils of this kind on Shabbat. Whereas this other <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits moving both a <i>shofar</i> and a trumpet, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that one may not use a utensil whose primary function is prohibited on Shabbat, even for a permissible purpose.
  However, this explanation raises a slight difficulty with regard to the statement that one may move neither a <i>shofar</i> nor a trumpet. There was no need to mention the trumpet. If one may not move a <i>shofar</i>, certainly he may not move a trumpet. However, it can be explained as follows: What is the <i>shofar</i> mentioned in this <i>baraita</i>? It refers to trumpets, in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: These three objects, their names changed since the Holy Temple was destroyed. That which was called trumpet was called <i>shofar</i> in later generations, and that which was called <i>shofar</i> was called trumpet in later generations. The <i>baraita</i> that was cited employed the style that switches trumpet and <i>shofar</i>, and they were mentioned in that order. Incidentally, the Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference whether a <i>shofar</i> is called <i>shofar</i> or trumpet? The Gemara answers: It is significant with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana. On Rosh HaShana one fulfills his obligation only by sounding a <i>shofar</i>. If one comes today and asks what instrument he should use to sound the requisite blasts, he should be told to use a trumpet.
  The second object whose name was changed: That which was called willow [<i>arava</i>] was called in later generations <i>tzaftzafa</i>, and that which was called <i>tzaftzafa</i> was called willow. Here too the Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from the name change? The Gemara answers: With regard to the mitzva of the four species, referred to by the name of one of the species, as taking the palm branch, as one of the four species is a willow branch, not a <i>tzaftzafa</i>.
  The third item whose name was changed: A large table that was originally called <i>petora</i> was called in later generations by the name previously used for a small table, <i>petorata</i>. And a <i>petorata</i> was called <i>petora</i>. And the Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from the change of name? The Gemara answers: With regard to the laws of buying and selling. A person who orders a <i>petora</i> should know that he ordered a small table and not a large one.
  Abaye said: We too shall speak and comment on changes in the meaning of terms in our generation. What was called <i>huvlila</i>, the first stomach of animals that chew their cud, is, in recent generations, called <i>bei kasei</i>, the name of the animal’s second stomach. Similarly, what was once called in the past <i>bei kasei</i> is called <i>huvlila</i> in recent generations. What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from this change of names? With regard to a needle that is found in the thick wall of the second stomach. In the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>tereifot</i>, one is prohibited to eat animals with a life expectancy of less than a year. It was established that if a needle punctured the wall of the second stomach from only one side, the animal is kosher. If the needle penetrated through the wall in a manner visible from both sides, the animal assumes the halakhic status of a <i>tereifa</i>. In the first stomach, even if the needle penetrated only one side of the wall, the animal assumes the halakhic status of a <i>tereifa</i>. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the first and the second stomachs.
  Rav Ashi said: We too shall speak of matters whose name changed over the generations. The city that, in biblical times, was called Babylon was called Bursif in later generations, and Bursif was called Babylon in later generations.
  
  Daf 36b
  
  What is the practical halakhic difference that emerges from this change of names? It is in the area of women’s bills of divorce. With regard to bills of divorce, special care is devoted to ensuring that the name of the place where the bill is written is not altered. Therefore, it is important to be aware that Babylon underwent a name change in later generations.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to a stove that was lit on Shabbat eve with straw or with rakings, scraps collected from the field, one may place a pot of cooked food atop it on Shabbat. The fire in this stove was certainly extinguished while it was still day, as both straw and rakings are materials that burn quickly. However, if the stove was lit with pomace, pulp that remains from sesame seeds, olives, and the like after the oil is squeezed from them, and if it was lit with wood, one may not place a pot atop it on Shabbat until he sweeps the coals from the stove while it is still day or until he places ashes on the coals, so that the fire will not ignite on Shabbat. Beit Shammai say: Even after one has swept away the coals, it is only permitted to place hot water on it, as it is sufficiently hot and does not require additional cooking, but not cooked food. Since, in general, one prefers that food will cook more, there is concern lest he come to ignite the fire by stoking the coals. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food may be placed. Beit Shammai say: One may remove a pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.
  GEMARA: The students raised a dilemma with regard to the explanation of the mishna. That which we learned in the mishna: One may not place, does it mean that one may not return a pot that he took off the fire and wishes to return on Shabbat; however, to leave the pot from Shabbat eve into Shabbat, one may leave it even though this stove is not swept of its coals and its coals are not covered with ashes? And, according to this, whose opinion is it in this mishna? It is the opinion of Ḥananya. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Ḥananya says: Any food that has already been cooked to the extent of the food of ben Drosai, who would only cook his food the minimum amount necessary, one is permitted to leave it atop a stove on Shabbat even though the stove is not swept and not covered with ashes. Or perhaps, that which we learned in the mishna: One may not place, means one may not leave it on the fire from Shabbat eve. And if the coals in the stove were swept or covered with ashes, yes, one may leave the pot on the stove. And if not, no, one may not leave it, and all the more so one may not return it to the stove on Shabbat under any circumstances.
  In order to resolve this dilemma, the Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this from the fact that two sections were taught in our mishna. In the first, Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food. And in the second, Beit Shammai say: One may remove it but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it. Granted, if you say that when we learned in the mishna that one may not place it means that it is prohibited to leave it; in that case, the mishna is teaching as follows: With regard to a stove that was lit with straw or with rakings, one may leave cooked food on it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not leave the cooked food on it until he sweeps the coals out while it is still day or until he places ashes on it. And what may they leave? Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: One may leave both hot water and cooked food on it. And just as they disagree with regard to leaving a pot on the stove, so too, they disagree with regard to whether or not it is permitted to return it to the stove. As Beit Shammai say: One may take the pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it to the stove at all. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.
  However, if you say that when we learned in the mishna that one may not place, it means that it is prohibited to return it, then the mishna is teaching as follows: A stove that was lit with straw or with rakings, one may return cooked food onto it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not return cooked food to it until one sweeps the coals out while it is still day or until one places ashes on them. And what may they return? Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food. Beit Shammai say: One may remove but may not return. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return. If in the first section the question of what may be returned was already addressed, why do I need this additional dispute in the second section? The gist of Beit Shammai’s statement that cooked food may not be returned to the stove is that one may remove but may not return. Apparently, the mishna can only be understood in accordance with the first explanation. The first clause discusses leaving and the latter clause discusses returning.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  The Gemara rejects this proof. Actually, you can say that in the first clause of the mishna we learned to return and the mishna is incomplete. A clause must be added to the mishna, and it teaches the following: With regard to a stove that was lit with straw or rakings, one may return a pot of cooked food to it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not return a pot to it until one sweeps the coals out while it is still day or until one covers the coals with ashes. However, to leave the pot on the flame on Shabbat, one may leave it, even though it is not swept and not covered with ashes. Through this addition, the continuation of the dispute can be understood as follows: And what may they leave? Beit Shammai say: Hot water but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot water and cooked food. Furthermore: And that return that I said to you at the start of the mishna is not according to everyone. Rather, it too is subject to a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, as Beit Shammai say: One may remove but not return. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return. The dilemma with regard to the interpretation of the mishna has not been resolved.
  Come and hear another resolution to this dilemma from that which Rabbi Ḥelbo said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: They only taught that placing is permitted with regard to a stove as far as placing a pot atop it is concerned. However, placing a pot inside it is prohibited. Granted, if you say that we learned returning in the mishna, that is why there is a halakhic difference between placing a pot inside it and placing a pot atop it. If one returns it on Shabbat, placing it inside a stove that might have burning coals, there is concern that Shabbat would be desecrated. Therefore, it was only permitted to place cooked food atop the stove. However, if you say that we learned leaving in the mishna, what is the difference to me whether it is inside the stove and what is the difference to me whether it is atop it? Ultimately, he does nothing on Shabbat with the hot ashes in the stove. The Gemara rejects this proof: Do you think that Rabbi Ḥelbo is referring to the first clause of the mishna? No, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, which states: And Beit Hillel say that one may even return. And with regard to this Rabbi Ḥelbo said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: They only taught that one may return the cooked food atop the stove; however, inside it is prohibited. If so, there is still no resolution to the dilemma.
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: In the case of two adjoining stoves that share a common wall, in one of them, the coals were swept or covered with ashes, and in one the coals were not swept and not covered with ashes; the ruling with regard to leaving a pot atop them on Shabbat is as follows: One may leave food atop the one that was swept or covered with ashes, and one may not leave food atop the one that was not swept and not covered with ashes. And to the crux of the matter, what may one leave? Beit Shammai say: Nothing at all. They dispute the <i>halakha</i> cited above. And Beit Hillel say: One may leave hot water but not cooked food. However, if one removed the cooked dish from atop the stove, everyone, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, agrees that one may not return it atop the stove; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to the tradition that he received, that is the issue disputed between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Rabbi Yehuda says that the dispute is different. Beit Shammai say: One may leave hot water on it but not cooked food. And Beit Hillel say: One may leave both hot water and cooked food. Furthermore, Beit Shammai say: One may remove a pot from the stove on Shabbat but may not return it. And Beit Hillel say: One may even return it.
  Granted, if you say that the case we learned in our mishna was with regard to leaving the pot on the stove, in accordance with whose opinion is our mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. However, if you say that the case we learned in our mishna was with regard to returning the pot to the stove, in accordance with whose opinion is our mishna? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. If you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is difficult for Beit Shammai in one respect. In our mishna, Beit Shammai permit some use of a stove on Shabbat; while according to Rabbi Meir in the <i>baraita</i>, Beit Shammai prohibit any use. And for Beit Hillel it is difficult in two respects. According to our understanding of the mishna, Beit Hillel permit both hot water and cooked food, contrary to Rabbi Meir’s version of their opinion as stated in the <i>baraita</i>. Similarly, in our mishna, Beit Hillel permit returning the pot to the stove, contrary to Rabbi Meir’s version of their opinion. If you explain that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the <i>baraita</i>, it is difficult with regard to the issue of sweeping the coals and covering them with ashes. In the mishna, both Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai allow leaving it on a stove whose coals were not swept or covered with ashes. According to Rabbi Yehuda in the <i>baraita</i>, apparently a stove whose coals are neither swept nor covered with ashes may not be used at all. Since this interpretation leads to contradictions, it is preferable to explain the mishna in accordance with the other approach, so that the mishna will at least correspond to one opinion.
  This claim is rejected: Actually, you can say that the case we learned in our mishna was with regard to returning the pot to the stove, and our <i>tanna</i> in the mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda in one matter, and disagrees with him in one matter. He holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda in one matter, with regard to the matter of hot water and cooked food, and what may be taken from the stove and what may even be returned. And he disagrees with him in one matter: While our <i>tanna</i> in the mishna held that to leave a pot on a stove is permitted even though it is not swept or covered with ashes, Rabbi Yehuda held: With regard to permitting one to leave a pot on the stove as well, if the stove was swept or covered with ashes, yes, it is permitted; if it was not swept or covered with ashes, no, it is prohibited.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a stove that was neither swept nor covered with ashes, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to permitting one to lean a cooked dish against it, so that it may be heated from the sides of the stove? The dilemma is: Was it only placing a pot inside it and atop it that is prohibited, but to lean the pot against it he may well do so? Or, perhaps, leaning is no different and it is prohibited in every case.
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If there are two adjoining stoves, one that was swept or covered with ashes and one that was not swept and covered with ashes, one may leave cooked food atop the stove that is swept and covered with ashes on Shabbat. Apparently, it is permitted to lean a pot on a stove that was not swept, even though heat rises to it from the other stove. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps that case of two adjoining stoves is different. Since the pot is elevated, the air affects it and cools it. Therefore, it is not comparable to actually leaning it against the stove.
  Come and hear another resolution to this dilemma from that which Rav Safra said that Rav Ḥiyya said: If there is a stove whose coals one covered with ashes on Shabbat eve and it subsequently reignited on Shabbat, one may lean a pot against it, and leave cooked food on it, and remove food from it, and even return food to it. Conclude from this the following with regard to leaning, as well: If he covered them with ashes, yes, if he did not cover them with ashes, no, as the Gemara is speaking about a stove whose ashes were covered properly during the day. The Gemara rejects this proof too. And according to your opinion, that which was taught: One may remove the food from it, would you say there too that if he covered them, yes, and if he did not cover them, no? Everyone agrees that it is permitted to take the pot off of the stove even if it is not swept or covered with ashes. Rather, it must be understood that he taught permission to remove the pot due to the fact that it taught permission to return it. Here too, it taught permission to lean the pot due to the fact that it taught permission to leave the pot on the stove. Consequently, a conclusion cannot be drawn that leaning a pot on an unswept stove is prohibited.
  The Gemara is astonished by this comparison. How can you compare them? There, one removes the pot from and returns it to one and the same place. Therefore, it taught removing due to returning, as one cannot return a pot before he removes it. However, here, where one leans the pot is in one place and where one leaves the pot is in one, another, place, there is no connection between the two. If the <i>tanna</i> did not intend to teach that leaning is permitted only on a swept stove, there would be no reason to mention permission to lean in conjunction with permission to leave. In any event, this is not an absolute proof, and the dilemma has not been resolved.
  The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached with regard to this dilemma? Come and hear a resolution to this from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to a stove that was lit with pomace or with wood, one may lean a pot of cooked food against it; however, one may not leave a pot inside it unless the stove is swept out or covered with ashes. Coals that dimmed or on which a strip of thinly beaten flax was placed and the fire did not ignite, it is as if it were covered with ashes, and one need not add more ashes to it. In any case, the conclusion is drawn from here that one is permitted to lean a dish of cooked food against a stove, even though it is not covered with ashes or swept out.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Naḥmani said that Rav Oshaya said: With regard to a stove that he covered with ashes and that reignited on Shabbat, one may leave hot water that was already completely heated and cooked food that was already completely cooked upon it. In that case, there is no need for additional cooking, and therefore there is no concern that one might come to stoke the coals and ignite the fire.
  
  Daf 37b
  
  Conclude from this <i>halakha</i> that even when it is food that shrivels and improves by remaining on the fire, it is nevertheless permitted to leave it. The food is already completely cooked and there is no concern lest one come to stoke the coals and ignite the fire. Rabbi Oshaya did not distinguish between different types of foods in permitting this. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Here, it is different because he covered the coals in the stove with ashes, and that is the reason that he is permitted to leave food on the stove. The Gemara asks: If so, what purpose was there to say this <i>halakha</i>? Is it to teach that if the coals are covered with ashes, there is no room for concern? That is obvious. The Gemara answers: The case where he covered it with ashes and it reignited on Shabbat was necessary and required additional articulation. Lest you say that since it reignited, it returns to its original status and is prohibited, therefore it taught us that this is not the case.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a stove that he swept out or covered with ashes before Shabbat and subsequently reignited on Shabbat, one may leave hot water that was already completely heated and cooked food that was already completely cooked upon it, even if the coals were from the wood of a broom tree, which are very hot and long-burning. If so, conclude from this that even if food shrivels and improves while on the stove, it is permitted. The Gemara rejects this: Here, in this case, it is different because he covered it with ashes. Therefore, it is permitted to leave it on the stove. The Gemara asks: If so, what was the purpose of saying this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: Mention of the case where he covered it with ashes and it reignited on Shabbat was necessary. The Gemara challenges that explanation: This case is identical to the previous one. Why did Rabbi Yoḥanan find it necessary to repeat what was already said? The Gemara responds that there is a novel element in his statement. It was necessary to teach the case of coals from the wood of a broom tree. Even in a case of especially hot coals it is permitted.
  Rav Sheshet said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a stove that was lit with pomace or with wood, one may leave hot water on it even if the water has not yet been completely heated, and the same is true for cooked food even if it was not yet completely cooked. However, if one removed the food from the stove, one may only return it if he sweeps the coals out of the stove while it is still day, or if he places ashes on the coals. The reason for mentioning this <i>halakha</i> is because he holds that in our mishna we learned with regard to returning the cooked food to the stove; however, with regard to leaving a pot on top of the stove, if it was placed there while it was still day, one may leave it on the stove even if it is not swept and not covered with ashes.
  Rava said: We already learned both aspects of Rav Sheshet’s <i>halakha</i> and there is no need to teach us something that was already stated explicitly in the mishna. We already learned that it is permitted to leave a pot on the stove. One may not put bread into the oven at nightfall and may not place cake on top of coals unless there is enough time before Shabbat that its surface will form a crust. However, if its surface already formed a crust before Shabbat, it is permitted to leave it even in an oven that was not swept and not covered with coals. Likewise, we also already learned in our mishna the second aspect of Rav Sheshet’s <i>halakha</i> that it is permitted to return the pot to the fire, as Beit Hillel say: One may even return. And it is clear that Beit Hillel only went so far as permitting the return of the pot in a stove that is swept or covered with ashes; however, in one that is not swept or covered with ashes, they did not permit doing so. If so, Rav Sheshet’s statement is superfluous. The Gemara answers: Rav Sheshet also only came to teach us the inference from the mishna and not to introduce new <i>halakhot</i>.
  Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a stove that was lit with pomace or with wood, on Shabbat eve one may leave a cooked dish that was already completely cooked, as well as hot water that was already completely heated, upon it and even if it is the type of food that when left for a prolonged period of time on the fire it shrivels and improves. There is no concern lest one come to stoke the coals. The Gemara relates that one of the Sages said to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda: Isn’t it Rav and Shmuel who both say, contrary to your opinion, that if food shrivels and improves when placed on the stove, leaving it on there on Shabbat is prohibited?
  Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to him: Is that to say that I do not know that Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If food shrivels and improves when left on the fire for an extended period, it is prohibited to leave it there? When I said to you that it is permitted to leave it, I said it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rav Ukva from Meishan said to Rav Ashi: You, who are close to the place where Rav and Shmuel lived, act in accordance with the ruling of Rav and Shmuel; we will act in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the ruling with regard to leaving food on the stove from Shabbat eve? Rav Yosef said to him: Didn’t they leave food for Rav Yehuda and he ate it? Apparently, it is permitted to do so. Abaye said to him: No proof can be brought from Rav Yehuda. Since he is in danger, as he is sick and needs hot food, even on Shabbat as well, it is permitted to heat up food for him. However, for me and you as well as for all other people what is the ruling? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: In Sura, they leave food on the stove from Shabbat eve, as Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak from Sura was a master of good deeds who was meticulous in his performance of mitzvot, and they would leave food for him and he would eat it. Rav Ashi said: I stood before Rav Huna and saw that they left fish fried in oil [<i>kasa deharsena</i>] for him atop the stove on Shabbat, and he ate the fish on Shabbat. And I do not know if his reason for doing so is because he holds that it is permitted to leave food that shrivels and improves when left on the stove for a long time. Or, if it is because this dish has flour in it, and therefore it shrivels and deteriorates. Everyone agrees that it is permitted to leave food atop the stove that shrivels and deteriorates.
  Rav Naḥman said: Food that shrivels and improves when left on the stove, it is prohibited to leave it on the stove; if it shrivels and deteriorates, it is permitted. The principle in this matter is as follows: Any food that has flour in it shrivels and deteriorates, except for a cooked turnip dish, which, even though it has flour, shrivels and improves. And this applies only when there is meat in it, but when there is no meat in it, it shrivels and deteriorates. And when there is meat in it, too, we only said that it shrivels and improves when one does not need it for guests, but when one needs it for guests, it shrivels and deteriorates because it is not polite to serve guests overcooked food, which is not aesthetic. Furthermore: Leaving dishes made of figs [<i>lafda</i>], porridge, or dates on the stove causes them to shrivel and deteriorate.
  They raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba:
  
  Daf 38a
  
  If one forgot a pot on Shabbat eve atop a stove and it cooked on Shabbat, what is the ruling in that case? Is one permitted to eat that food, or not? He was silent and did not say a thing to him. The next day, he emerged and publicly taught them the following <i>halakha</i>: With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat it, and if he cooked intentionally, he may not eat it; and the <i>halakha</i> is no different.
  The last part of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s statement is unclear. The Gemara asks: What is the practical halakhic meaning of the phrase: And it is no different? Rabba and Rav Yosef both said to interpret the phrase permissively in the following manner: One who cooks is one who performs an action. If he did so intentionally, he may not eat what he cooked. However, this one who forgot the pot on the stove, who does not perform an action, even if he intentionally left the pot on Shabbat eve, he may also eat the food. However, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the phrase: And it is no different, should be interpreted restrictively in the following manner: It is one who cooks who will not come to deceive, as there is no room for suspicion that a person will intentionally cook on Shabbat. Therefore, if one cooks unwittingly, he may eat it. However, one who would come to deceive, intentionally leaving the pot on the stove and saying: I forgot it, the Sages penalize him and decree that if he did so unwittingly as well, he may not eat it.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this statement from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who forgot a pot atop a stove and it cooked on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat it; if he did so intentionally, he may not eat it. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the pot contains hot water that was not yet completely heated, and the same applies to cooked food that was not yet completely cooked. However, if it contains hot water that was already completely heated and cooked food that was already completely cooked, whether the pot was left there unwittingly, or whether the pot was left there intentionally, one may eat it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Yehuda says that there is a distinction: Hot water that was already completely heated is permitted because, in that case, the longer it remains on the fire, the more it shrivels, i.e., evaporates, and deteriorates. In that case, one would certainly not come to increase the heat because he would not want to lose more water through evaporation. However, cooked food that was completely cooked, it is prohibited to leave it on the fire because it shrivels and improves. There is room for concern that he will stoke the coals to increase the heat under the food. And there is a general principle: Anything that shrivels and improves, e.g., cabbage, and beans, and meat cut into small pieces is prohibited; and anything that shrivels and deteriorates is permitted.
  In any event, it was taught in that <i>baraita</i> that in the case of cooked food that was not completely cooked, if it was cooked unwittingly, it is permitted. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, this is not difficult. Although there is an apparent contradiction, as he prohibits eating from a pot that was unwittingly forgotten on the stove, and the <i>baraita</i> prohibits it only when it was left intentionally, he could explain the following: Here, the <i>baraita</i>, which permits eating it, was taught prior to the decree that was issued lest a person act deceitfully, whereas there, the <i>halakha</i> of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, was taught after the decree, which prohibited eating food even if it was forgotten unwittingly. However, according to the opinion of Rabba and Rav Yosef, who said to interpret the phrase permissively, whether he left it on the stove unwittingly or he did so intentionally, it is difficult. If this <i>baraita</i> was taught prior to the decree, the ruling with regard to when he did so intentionally is difficult, as Rabba and Rav Yosef permit eating the food even in that case. If this <i>baraita</i> was taught after the decree, the ruling with regard to when he did so unwittingly is also difficult, as Rabba and Rav Yosef permit eating the food in every case. No answer was found to this objection and the Gemara concludes: It is indeed difficult.
  With regard to the matter itself, the Gemara asks: What is the decree that was discussed above in terms of the distinction between before the decree and after the decree? The Gemara says: This is the decree that Rav Yehuda bar Shmuel said that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Kahana said that Rav said: Initially, they would say: With regard to one who cooks on Shabbat, if it was unwitting, one may eat it; if it was intentional, one may not eat it. And the same is true with regard to one who forgets the pot atop the stove before Shabbat and it cooks on Shabbat. When the number of those who leave their pots intentionally and say we forgot to justify their actions, increased, the Sages then penalized those who forgot. Even one who forgets unwittingly may not eat it.
  In the <i>Tosefta</i> cited earlier, which deals with one who forgot a pot atop the stove and the food cooked on Shabbat, Rabbi Meir ruled leniently and permitted both hot water that was completely heated and cooked food that was completely cooked, even when it was left on the stove intentionally. Rabbi Yehuda ruled stringently and distinguished between different cases. However, in the <i>Tosefta</i> cited at the beginning of the chapter, it was taught that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree with regard to the opinions of Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai as far as leaving food on the stove on Shabbat is concerned. Rabbi Meir says that it is completely prohibited to leave cooked food on the stove <i>ab initio</i>, even according to Beit Hillel who rule leniently. Rabbi Yehuda said that Beit Hillel ruled leniently and permitted doing so. There is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir, and there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara responds: Between one statement of Rabbi Meir and the other statement of Rabbi Meir there is no contradiction. That which we learned: Rabbi Meir prohibits leaving cooked food under any circumstances, is speaking <i>ab initio</i>; whereas this, where he permits eating the food even if it was left on the stove intentionally, is speaking after the fact. Between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda there is also no contradiction. There, where he permitted leaving the food on the stove, it is referring to the case of a stove that was swept and covered with ashes, whereas here, where he prohibited doing so, is referring to the case of a stove that is not swept and covered with ashes.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: One who transgressed and left his pot on the fire on Shabbat, what is his legal status? Did the Sages penalize him and prohibit him from eating the food, or did they not penalize him? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which Shmuel bar Natan said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: When Rabbi Yosei went to the city of Tzippori, he found hot water that was left on the stove, and he did not prohibit them from drinking it. He found eggs shriveled from overcooking that were left on the stove on Shabbat and he prohibited them from eating them. Is this not referring to permitting and prohibiting their consumption for that same Shabbat? If so, apparently he prohibits eating cooked food that was intentionally left on the stove on Shabbat. The Gemara immediately rejects this assumption: No. Rather, he prohibited them from doing so <i>ab initio</i> the following Shabbat, but he did not prohibit them from eating the eggs on that same Shabbat.
  The Gemara is surprised: From this statement it can be inferred that eggs shriveled from overcooking shrivel and improve when left on the fire for a long time, and that is the reason that Rabbi Yosei made a distinction between hot water, which he permitted leaving on the stove, and eggs, which he prohibited leaving on the stove. The Gemara replies: Yes, overcooking improves the eggs. As Rav Ḥama bar Ḥanina said: One time Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and I were guests in the same place, and they brought before us overcooked eggs that shriveled to the size of crab apples [<i>uzradin</i>] and we ate many of them. Apparently, extended cooking improves eggs. Therefore, when they are left on the fire on Shabbat there is room for concern lest one stoke the coals in order to shrivel them more.
  We learned in the mishna: Beit Hillel say that one may even return a pot taken off the stove to the stove on Shabbat. Rav Sheshet said: According to the one who says
  
  Daf 38b
  
  that one may even return it, doing so is permitted even on Shabbat and not only on Shabbat eve. And Rav Oshaya also holds: One may even return it even on Shabbat. As Rav Oshaya said: Once we were standing on Shabbat before Rabbi Ḥiyya the Great and we passed up to him a kettle [<i>kumkemos</i>] of hot water from the bottom floor [<i>deyota</i>] to the top floor, and we poured him a cup and returned the kettle to its place on top of the stove, and he did not say anything to us. Apparently, he is of the opinion that even on Shabbat it is permitted to return a pot to the stove.
  Rabbi Zerika said that Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Tadai said: They only taught that it is permitted to return vessels with the food inside them when they are still in his hand; however, if he already placed them on the ground, he obviously regretted placing them on the fire and it is prohibited to replace them on the stove. Rabbi Ami said: That which Rabbi Tadai did and said, he did on his own, and not in accordance with the accepted <i>halakha</i>. Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said as follows: Even if one placed the pot on the ground, it is permitted to return it to the stove.
  The Gemara remarks that Rav Dimi and Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda disagreed about this matter, and both stated their opinion in the name of Rabbi Elazar. One said that when they are still in his hand, it is permitted to return them to the stove; when they were already placed on the ground, it is prohibited to do so. And one said that even if one placed them on the ground, it is also permitted to return it to the stove. Ḥizkiya said in the name of Abaye: That which you said, that when it is still in his hand, it is permitted to return it to the stove; we only said that <i>halakha</i> when his original intention was to return it to the stove. However, when it was not his original intention to return it, and he reconsidered and decided to return it, it is prohibited to return it. This proves by inference that if one placed it on the ground, even if his intention was to return it, it is prohibited.
  Some say a different version of what Ḥizkiya said in the name of Abaye: That which you said, if one placed it on the ground it is prohibited; we only said that <i>halakha</i> when it was not his original intention to return it. However, if his original intention was to return it, it is permitted. With regard to this matter, Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: In a case where he neither placed them on the floor nor held them in his hand, but he hung them on a stick, what is the ruling? In a case where he placed it on top of a bed, what is the ruling? Similarly, Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: If one transferred them from one urn to another urn what is the ruling? The Gemara said: These dilemmas stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: The <i>halakhot</i> that were stated with regard to a stove were specific to a stove’s unique structure and the manner in which it retains heat. However, with regard to other baking apparatuses, i.e., an oven or a <i>kupaḥ,</i> there are different rules. The mishna delineates: An oven that they lit even with straw or rakings, one may neither place a pot inside it nor atop it on Shabbat. Whereas a <i>kupaḥ</i> that was lit with straw or rakings, its legal status is like that of a stove, and one is permitted to place a pot atop it on Shabbat. If it were lit with pomace or with wood, its legal status is like that of an oven and it is prohibited to place a pot atop it on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: With regard to that which we learned in the mishna that an oven that they lit even with straw or rakings, one may neither place a pot atop it nor inside it, Rav Yosef thought to say that when the mishna says inside it, it means actually inside it; and when it says atop it, it means actually atop it. However, to lean a pot against an oven, it may well be done. Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef from that which we learned in our mishna: A <i>kupaḥ</i> that was lit with straw or rakings, its legal status is like that of a stove. If it were lit with pomace or with wood, its legal status is like that of an oven, and it is prohibited. By inference: If it were like a stove, it would be permitted. With what circumstances are we dealing? If you say that he placed the pot atop the <i>kupaḥ</i>, and in what case? If you say it is referring to a case where it is not swept and covered with ashes; a stove that is not swept and covered with ashes, is it permitted even to place a pot atop it on Shabbat? Rather, isn’t it referring to a case where one seeks to lean a pot against a <i>kupaḥ</i>, and it taught: It is like an oven, and prohibited?
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Here we are dealing with the cases of a <i>kupaḥ</i> that is swept and covered with ashes and an oven that is swept and covered with ashes, and the mishna is to be understood as follows: It is like an oven in the sense that, although it is swept and covered with ashes, it is prohibited to place a pot atop it; as, if its legal status were like that of a stove, when it is swept and covered it may well be done. The Gemara comments that there is a <i>baraita</i> that taught in accordance with the opinion of Abaye: An oven that one lit with straw and with rakings, one may not lean a pot against it, and needless to say one may not place a pot atop it, and needless to say one may not place a pot inside it, and, needless to say if it was lit with pomace or with wood it is prohibited. While with regard to a <i>kupaḥ</i> that was lit with straw or with rakings, one may lean a pot against it, but he may not place a pot atop it. If it was lit with pomace or with wood, one may not lean a pot against it.
  Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This <i>kupaḥ</i>, what are its circumstances? If it is considered like a stove, even if it was lit with pomace or with wood, it should also be permitted. And if it is considered like an oven, even with straw or with rakings, it should also not be permitted. Rav Ashi said to him: From a halakhic perspective, a <i>kupaḥ</i> has intermediate status. Its heat is greater than that of a stove; however, its heat is less than that of an oven.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a <i>kupaḥ</i>? What are the circumstances of a stove in terms of the configuration of the vessels? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: A <i>kupaḥ</i> is a small vessel that is similar to a stove; however, it only has one hole with enough space to place a single pot. A stove is like a double <i>kupaḥ</i> with enough space to place two pots. Abaye said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya said: We also learned this matter in a mishna dealing with the laws of ritual purity and impurity: An impure stove that was divided lengthwise is pure because it can no longer be considered a vessel. It is a broken vessel, and a broken vessel cannot become ritually impure. However, if the stove was divided widthwise, between the spaces for the pots, then it remains impure because it became two small stoves. However, a <i>kupaḥ</i>, whether it was divided lengthwise or whether it was divided widthwise, is pure because it can no longer be used as there is no way to put even a single pot on it. That is the difference between a <i>kupaḥ</i> and a stove.
  MISHNA: In addition to the <i>halakhot</i> that deal with cooking on the fire on Shabbat, several related <i>halakhot</i> are discussed. The mishna says: One may not place a raw egg next to an urn full of hot water so that it will roast slightly. And one may not even wrap it in cloths, i.e., one may not heat the egg inside cloths that were heated in the sun. And Rabbi Yosei permits doing so in that case. And, similarly, one may not insulate it in sand or in road dust that was heated in the sun so that it will roast. Although there is no actual cooking with fire here, it is similar to cooking and the Sages issued a decree to prohibit doing so.
  The mishna relates a story about the people of the city of Tiberias, and they ran a cold-water pipe [<i>silon</i>] through a canal of hot water from the Tiberias hot springs. They thought that by doing so, they could heat the cold potable water on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to them: If the water passed through on Shabbat, its legal status is like that of hot water that was heated on Shabbat, and the water is prohibited both for bathing and for drinking. And if the water passed through on a Festival, then it is prohibited for bathing but permitted for drinking. On Festivals, one is even permitted to boil water on actual fire for the purposes of eating and drinking.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: One who violated the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna and slightly roasted an egg next to an urn, what is the ruling? Rav Yosef said: One who slightly cooked an egg is liable to bring a sin-offering, as he performed the act of cooking on Shabbat, which is prohibited by Torah law. Mar, son of Ravina, said: We also learned something similar in the mishna:
  
  Daf 39a
  
  Any salted food item that was already placed in hot water, i.e., cooked, before Shabbat, one may soak it in hot water even on Shabbat. And anything that was not placed in hot water before Shabbat, one may rinse it in hot water on Shabbat, but may not soak it, with the exception of old salted fish or the colias of the Spaniards [<i>kolyas ha’ispanin</i>] fish, for which rinsing with hot water itself is completion of the prohibited labor of cooking. Once it is rinsed in hot water, it does not require any additional cooking. The same is true with regard to an egg that was slightly cooked. Since it thereby becomes edible, one who brought it to that state has violated the prohibition of cooking. The Gemara sums up: Indeed, conclude from it that this is its meaning.
  We also learned in the mishna according to the first <i>tanna</i>: And one may not wrap an egg in cloths that were heated by the sun in order to heat up the egg, and Rabbi Yosei permits doing so. And with regard to that which we learned in a mishna that one may place cooked food into a pit on Shabbat to protect it from the heat; and one may place good, potable water into bad, non-potable water so that it will cool; and one may put cold water out in the sun to heat it, the Gemara asks: Let us say that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in our mishna and not the opinion of the Rabbis as represented by the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna. The Rabbis prohibited heating food with the heat of the sun.
  Rav Naḥman said: With regard to heating food in the sun itself, everyone agrees that one is permitted to place food in the sun to heat it, as it is certainly neither fire nor a typical form of cooking. Likewise, with derivatives of fire, i.e., objects that were heated by fire, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to heat food with them, as heating with them is tantamount to heating with fire itself. Where they argue is with regard to heating with derivatives of the sun, i.e., objects heated with the heat of the sun. This Sage, who represents the opinion of the Rabbis, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting a person to heat with derivatives of the sun due to derivatives of fire, which are prohibited. People have no way of knowing how the cooking vessel was heated. If the Sages permit the use of objects heated in the sun, people will come to permit use of objects heated by fire as well. And this Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that we do not issue a decree. Even though it is prohibited to heat with derivatives of fire, heating with derivatives of the sun is permitted.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may not insulate it in sand or in road dust that was heated in the sun. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Yosei disagree with this <i>halakha</i> as well. If he holds that one is permitted to cook on Shabbat using objects heated by the sun, the same should apply with regard to sand. The Gemara cites two answers. Rabba said: Rabbi Yosei agrees with the opinion of the Rabbis in this case. The Sages issued a decree in this case due to concern lest one come to insulate it in hot ashes, which is certainly prohibited, if he is permitted to insulate food in sand or road dust. Insulating in sand and insulating in hot ashes appear to be very similar. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yosei prohibits it in this case because when insulating it in the sand, he displaces dirt. It is as if he dug a hole in the sand, which is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the answers proposed by Rabba and Rav Yosef? Apparently, the two answers lead to the same practical conclusion. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in the case of loose earth. Loose earth does not require digging a hole. According to Rav Yosef’s explanation, there is no reason to prohibit insulating food in loose earth, as displacing loose earth involves no prohibition. However, if the decree was issued lest one insulate an egg in hot ashes, then it applies even in the case of loose earth.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may slightly roast an egg on a hot rooftop heated by the sun; however, one may not slightly roast an egg on top of boiling limestone. Granted, this works out well according to the opinion of the one who said that insulating an egg in sand is prohibited due to a decree lest he come insulate it in hot ashes. There is no reason to issue a decree on a hot rooftop, as it is not at all similar to hot ashes. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that the reason is because he is displacing dirt, let him issue a decree and prohibit warming an egg on the rooftop as well because there is sometimes dirt on the roof. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult because, in general, a rooftop does not have dirt, and there is no reason to issue a decree in uncommon cases.
  Come and hear a different objection to the opinion of the <i>amora</i> from our mishna: The Sages prohibited the people of the city of Tiberias, who ran a cold-water pipe through a canal of hot water from the Tiberias hot springs, from using the water. Granted, according to the opinion of the one who said that the prohibition is due to a decree lest one insulate food in hot ashes, that is the reason that this was prohibited, as it is similar to insulating. The cold-water pipe was placed inside the hot water and was surrounded by it. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that the reason is because one displaces dirt, what is there to say to explain the prohibition?
  The Gemara answers: Do you think that the story about Tiberias refers to the latter clause of the mishna? No, it refers to the first clause of the mishna, and it should be understood as follows: The Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to wrapping an egg in cloths. The Rabbis say: One may not wrap it in cloths and Rabbi Yosei permits doing so. And the Rabbis said the following to Rabbi Yosei: Wasn’t the incident involving the people of Tiberias with derivatives of the sun, as the hot springs of Tiberias are not heated by fire, and nevertheless the Sages prohibited them from using the water? Rabbi Yosei said to them: That is not so. That incident involved derivatives of fire, as the hot springs of Tiberias are hot because they pass over the entrance to Gehenna. They are heated by hellfire, which is a bona fide underground fire. That is not the case with derivatives of the sun, which are not heated by fire at all.
  On the same topic, Rav Hisda said:
  
  Daf 39b
  
  From this action performed by the people of Tiberias and the fact that the Sages prohibited them from using the water, the conclusion is that the practice of insulating a pot in something that increases the heat over the course of Shabbat was abolished on Shabbat. And not only is it prohibited to do so on Shabbat itself, but it is also prohibited while it is still day before Shabbat. Running pipes of cold water through hot water is similar to insulating water in something that adds heat. Ulla said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the people of Tiberias. Rav Naḥman said to him: The people of Tiberias have already broken their pipes. Even they reconsidered their position.
  We learned in the mishna with regard to the incident, which related what the people of Tiberias did, that the legal status of water that was heated in the Tiberias hot springs is like that of water heated on Shabbat, and it is prohibited for use in bathing. The Gemara clarifies this matter: What type of bathing is this? If you say that it is referring to bathing one’s entire body, that is difficult. That would indicate that only water heated on Shabbat is prohibited for use in bathing one’s entire body; however, bathing one’s entire body in hot water heated before Shabbat is permitted. That cannot be. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, one may use it the next day to wash his face, his hands, and his feet incrementally; however, not to wash his entire body? Rather, it must be that the bathing prohibited in the mishna with water heated on Shabbat is, in fact, washing his face, his hands, and his feet.
  However, if so, say the latter clause of the mishna: On a Festival, the legal status of the water is like that of water that was heated by fire on a Festival, and it is prohibited for bathing and permitted for drinking. Even on a Festival, washing one’s face, hands, and feet is prohibited with this hot water. If so, let us say that we learned the unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. As we learned in a mishna, Beit Shammai say: A person may not heat water for his feet on a Festival unless it is also fit for drinking, and Beit Hillel permit doing so. According to Beit Hillel, it is permitted to heat water on a Festival for the purpose of washing one’s feet. According to the proposed interpretation of the term bathing in the mishna, as referring to washing one’s face, hands, and feet, our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. This is problematic, as the halakhic opinion of Beit Shammai is rejected and only rarely cited in an unattributed mishna.
  Rav Ika bar Ḥananya said: In our mishna, we are dealing with water that was heated in order to rinse one’s entire body with it. Rinsing does not have the same legal status as bathing. And that which we learned in the mishna: Water that was heated on Shabbat is prohibited for bathing, from which it can be inferred that water heated before Shabbat is permitted for bathing on Shabbat, is in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the <i>Tosefta</i>. As it was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may neither rinse his entire body with hot water, even if it was heated before Shabbat, nor with cold water; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon permits doing so even with hot water because it was heated before Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: With hot water, it is prohibited; with cold water, it is permitted. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is completely prohibited to rinse with water that was heated on Shabbat itself. Consequently, our mishna, which does not differentiate between hot and cold water, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  Rav Ḥisda said: This dispute over washing with water heated before Shabbat is specifically with regard to water in a vessel, as one might mistakenly think that it was heated on Shabbat, and there is then concern lest one permit the use of water heated with fire on Shabbat. However, when the water was collected in the ground, everyone agrees that it is permitted. The Gemara challenges this: Wasn’t the incident involving the people of Tiberias with regard to water in the ground, and nevertheless the Sages prohibited it? Rather, if this was stated, this is what was stated, i.e., this is the correct version of Rav Ḥisda’s statement: This dispute is specifically when the water is collected in the ground. However, when it is in a vessel, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> in this dispute is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Yosef said to him: Did you learn this from Rabbi Yoḥanan explicitly, or did you learn it by inference from something else that he said? The Gemara remarks: What was the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from which this conclusion could be inferred? As Rav Tanḥum said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Rabbi Yannai said that Rav said: Every place that you find two who disagree and each one of them establishes his opinion in a series of cases, and one of the Sages, a third one, adopts a compromise opinion and says that in some cases the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with one, and in some cases the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the other, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the compromiser. This principle holds true except for the case of the ritual impurity of insignificant strips of material. In that case, even though Rabbi Eliezer is stringent, and Rabbi Yehoshua is lenient, and Rabbi Akiva compromises, the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the statement of the compromiser: First, because Rabbi Akiva is a student of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua and lacks the authority to decide between the opinions of his rabbis. And furthermore, didn’t
  
  Daf 40a
  
  Rabbi Akiva reconsider and adopt Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion? In the dispute over the laws of bathing as well, the ruling should have been in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda because his is the compromise opinion. Therefore, Rav Yosef asked whether the ruling was based on that principle alone. The Gemara asks: And if the <i>halakha</i> was derived by inference, what of it? It is legitimate to draw conclusions by inference. The Gemara responds: Perhaps this principle, that the <i>halakha</i> is established in accordance with the compromise opinion, applies only in a mishna; but in a <i>baraita</i>, no, it does not apply. Perhaps the <i>baraita</i> is not a sufficiently reliable source to establish the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the compromise opinion based on its formulation. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef: I heard it explicitly.
  An amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve before Shabbat, Rav said: The next day, on Shabbat, one may wash his entire body with it; however, not all at once. Rather, he washes one limb at a time, in a departure from the standard practice, to remind him that it is Shabbat. And Shmuel said: They only permitted washing one’s face, his hands, and his feet with hot water, even if it was heated on Shabbat eve; however, they did not permit washing his entire body, even in increments. The Gemara raises an objection from what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, the next day one may wash his face, his hands, and his feet with it but not his entire body. This is a conclusive refutation of Rav’s opinion. Rav could have said to you: When the <i>baraita</i> says: Not one’s entire body, it means not his entire body at once, but one limb and then another limb until he washes his entire body is permitted. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t it say one’s face, his hands, and his feet, and no more? Rav answers: It means that one washes his body in a manner similar to the manner that one washes his face, his hands, and his feet, i.e., each limb separately, and they were cited as examples of washing one limb at a time.
  The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear from what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They only permitted to wash one’s face, his hands, and his feet with hot water that was heated before Shabbat. This poses a difficulty to Rav. Rav answers: Here too, this refers to washing one limb at a time, in a manner similar to the way one washes his face, his hands, and his feet.
  The Gemara remarks: A <i>baraita</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: Hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, the next day one may wash his face, his hands, and his feet with it but not his entire body, even one limb at a time. And, needless to say, this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to hot water that was heated on a Festival. Rabba would teach this <i>halakha</i> of Rav in this language: Hot water that was heated on Shabbat eve, the next day, Rav said: One may bathe his entire body in it and exclude one limb to remind himself that today is Shabbat. They raised all of these conclusive refutations, with which they objected to the previous version of Rav’s statement, against him and the Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Does Rabba act in accordance with this <i>halakha</i> of Rav? He said to him: I do not know. The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? It is obvious that Rabba did not act in accordance with Rav’s statement, as Rav’s statement was conclusively refuted. The Gemara answers: Perhaps he did not hear, i.e., he did not know of the challenges or he did not consider them substantial. Perhaps, in his opinion, it is still reasonable to act in accordance with Rav’s statement.
  The Gemara says: If so, there is still no room for the dilemma. And if Rabba did not hear this refutation, certainly he acted in accordance with Rav’s opinion, as Abaye said: In all halakhic matters of the Master, Rabba, he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Rav, except these three where he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. He ruled: One may untie ritual fringes from garment to garment, and one may light from one Hanukkah lamp to another lamp, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the case of dragging. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted to drag heavy objects, and there is no concern that, as a result, a ditch might be dug in the ground. In any case, it is certainly reasonable to say that he acted in accordance with the opinion of Rav in the case of bathing on Shabbat as well. The Gemara answers: His is not an absolute proof. Perhaps Rabba’s custom was that he acted in accordance with the stringencies of Rav and he did not act in accordance with the leniencies of Rav. Washing with hot water on Shabbat is one of Rav’s leniencies. Therefore, it is not clear how Rabba acted in practice.
  The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: A bathhouse whose openings were sealed on Shabbat eve so that the heat would not diminish, after Shabbat one may bathe in it immediately. If its openings were sealed on the eve of a Festival, the next day, on the Festival itself, one may enter and sweat in the heat produced by the hot water and emerge and rinse with cold water in the outer room of the bathhouse.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident in the bathhouse of Benei Berak, whose openings were sealed on the eve of a Festival. The next day, on the Festival itself, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya and Rabbi Akiva entered and sweated there, and emerged and rinsed themselves in the outer room. However, this bathhouse was unique because the hot water was covered by wooden boards and there was no concern lest a person bathe in the hot water. When this matter came before the Sages, they said: Even if its hot water is not covered by boards, it is permitted to sweat from the heat in the bathhouse. When the number of transgressors increased, the Sages began to prohibit this. However, the large bathhouses [<i>ambatyaot</i>] in cities, one may stroll through them as usual and need not be concerned about the prohibitions of Shabbat, even if he sweats while doing so.
  And the Gemara asks: What are these transgressors? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Initially, people would bathe even on Shabbat in hot water that was heated before Shabbat. The bathhouse attendants began to heat water on Shabbat and say that it was heated before Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages prohibited bathing in hot water and permitted sweating. And they would still bathe in hot water and say: We are sweating, and that is why we entered the bathhouse. Therefore, the Sages prohibited sweating and permitted bathing in the hot springs of Tiberias. And people would still bathe in hot water heated by fire and say: We bathed in the hot springs of Tiberias. Therefore, they prohibited even the hot springs of Tiberias and permitted them to bathe in cold water. When the Sages saw that their decrees were not upheld by the people because of their stringency, they permitted them to bathe in the hot springs of Tiberias, and the decree prohibiting sweating remained in place.
  In this context, Rava said: One who violates a decree of the Sages, it is permitted to call him a transgressor. Transgressor is not a term limited to one who violates a severe Torah prohibition. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabba make this statement?
  
  Daf 40b
  
  Rabba’s statement is according to this <i>tanna</i> in the <i>baraita</i>, who referred to those who violated a rabbinic decree as transgressors.
  It was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: In bathhouses in cities, one may stroll through them and, even if he sweats while doing so, need not be concerned. Rava said: This applies specifically to bathhouses in cities; but in villages, no, it does not apply. What is the reason for this distinction? Since the bathhouses in the villages are small, their heat is great, and even merely walking through them will certainly cause one to sweat.
  The Sages taught: One may warm himself opposite a bonfire on Shabbat and emerge and rinse in cold water as long as he does not first rinse in cold water and then warm himself opposite the bonfire. This is prohibited because he thereby warms the water on his body and renders it lukewarm. The Sages also taught: A person whose intestines are painful may heat up a towel [<i>aluntit</i>] and place it on his intestines even on Shabbat. This is permitted as long as one does not bring a kettle of water and place it on his intestines on Shabbat, lest the water spill and he come to wring it out (<i>Tosafot</i>), which is a prohibited labor on Shabbat. And placing a kettle directly on his intestines is prohibited even on a weekday due to the danger involved. If the water is extremely hot it could spill and scald him.
  Similarly, the Sages taught: One may bring a jug [<i>kiton</i>] full of cold water and place it opposite the bonfire on Shabbat; not so that the water will heat up, as it is prohibited to cook on Shabbat, rather to temper the cold, as one is permitted to render water less cold on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: A woman may take a cruse of oil and place it opposite the bonfire; not so the oil will cook, rather, so it will warm until it is lukewarm. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A woman may smear her hand with oil, and heat it opposite the fire, and afterward smear her young son with the heated oil, and she need not be concerned about cooking on Shabbat.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to heating oil in this manner on Shabbat, what is its legal status according to the first <i>tanna,</i> who permits doing so with water? Does he permit oil as well? Rabba and Rav Yosef both said that the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> is to permit doing so in the case of oil. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> is to prohibit doing so. Rabba and Rav Yosef both said that the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> is to permit doing so. The Gemara explains the dispute in the mishna: Oil, even though it is heated to the point at which the hand spontaneously recoils [<i>soledet</i>] from its heat, is permitted to be heated in this manner. The reason is because the first <i>tanna</i> holds that oil is not subject to the prohibition of cooking. Cooking oil to its boiling point requires a very high temperature; merely heating it is not considered cooking. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking; however, warming it to a lukewarm temperature is not tantamount to cooking it. Therefore, it is permitted to place a jar of oil near the fire in order to raise its temperature, though it is prohibited to heat it to the point of cooking. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came to say that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking, and warming it is tantamount to cooking it. He permitted it only in the specific case of a woman who smeared her hand with oil, heated it, and smeared her son with it.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> is to prohibit doing so. He explains the dispute in the following manner: According to the first <i>tanna</i>, with regard to oil, even if the heat is not so great that the hand spontaneously recoils from it, it is prohibited to heat it. He holds that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking, and warming it is tantamount to cooking it. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say, leniently, that warming it is not tantamount to cooking it. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel came to disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and to say that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking, and warming it is tantamount to cooking it. The Gemara questions: According to this explanation, the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is identical to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>. What is the difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where this is done in a backhanded manner, i.e., not as it is typically done. According to the first <i>tanna,</i> it is totally prohibited to heat the oil, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is permitted to heat the oil in a backhanded manner.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said that the <i>halakha</i> is: With regard to both oil and water, heating either one to the point where the hand spontaneously recoils from it is prohibited. Heating either one to the point where the hand does not spontaneously recoil from it is permitted. The Gemara asks: And what are the circumstances in which a hand spontaneously recoils from it? Not all hands are equal in their sensitivity to heat. The Sage, Raḥava, said: Any water that could cause a baby’s stomach to be scalded is considered water from which the hand spontaneously recoils.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: One time I followed Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi into the bathhouse on Shabbat to assist him, and I sought to place a jar of oil in the bathtub for him, to heat the oil somewhat before rubbing it on him. And he said to me: Take water from the bath in a secondary vessel and place the oil into it. The Gemara remarks: Learn from this comment of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi three <i>halakhot</i>: Learn from it that oil is subject to the prohibition of cooking. This explains why he prohibited placing it in the bathtub. And learn from it that a secondary vessel is not hot and does not cook. And learn from it with regard to oil that warming it is tantamount to cooking it.
  The Gemara is astonished by this story: How did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi do this? How did he teach his student <i>halakha</i> in the bathhouse? Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In all places, it is permitted to contemplate Torah matters except for the bathhouse and the bathroom? And if you say that he spoke to him in a secular language, didn’t Abaye say: Secular matters are permitted to be spoken in the sacred language, Hebrew, even in the bathhouse, and sacred matters may not be spoken in the bathhouse even in a secular language? The Gemara answers: It was permitted for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to conduct himself in that manner because he was preventing an individual from violating a prohibition, which is different.
  Know that this is so, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There was an incident where a student of Rabbi Meir followed him into the bathhouse on Shabbat and sought to rinse the floor in order to clean it. And Rabbi Meir said to him: One may not rinse the floor on Shabbat. The student asked if it was permitted to smear the floor with oil. He said to him: One may not smear the floor with oil. Apparently, preventing one from violating a prohibition is different. Here too, in the incident involving Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, preventing one from violating a prohibition is different and permitted.
  Ravina said: Learn from it that one who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias on Shabbat is liable, as the incident with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was after the decree, and he said to his student: Take hot water in a secondary vessel and place the oil into it. Had he cooked the oil in the hot water itself, he would have violated a Torah prohibition. Since the incident with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi took place after the Sages issued a decree to prohibit bathing in hot water on Shabbat, it must have taken place in a bath in the hot springs of Tiberias. The Gemara challenges this: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Ḥisda say that one who cooks in the Tiberias hot springs on Shabbat is not liable? The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction. What, too, is the meaning of the term liable that Ravina said? It does not mean that one who cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias is liable to be stoned or to bring a sin-offering like one who violates a Torah prohibition. Rather, it means liable to receive lashes for rebelliousness, which one receives for intentionally violating rabbinic decrees.
  Rabbi Zeira said: I saw Rabbi Abbahu floating in a bath on Shabbat, and I do not know if he lifted his feet and was actually swimming in the water, or if he did not lift his feet. The Gemara questions Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty. It is obvious that he did not lift his feet, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not float in a pool full of water on Shabbat, and even if the pool was in a courtyard, where there is no room for concern lest he violate a prohibition. This is not difficult; this <i>baraita</i> is referring to a place
  
  Daf 41a
  
  that does not have embankments surrounding it. Since there are no partitions, it appears like an ocean or a river. That incident involving Rabbi Abbahu occurred in a place that has embankments and looks like a vessel. Therefore, the Sages did not prohibit it.
  After citing what Rabbi Zeira related with regard to Rabbi Abbahu, the Gemara cites that Rabbi Zeira said: I saw that Rabbi Abbahu, while he was bathing, placed his hands over his genitals for the sake of modesty, and I do not know whether he touched them or did not touch them. The Gemara questions Rabbi Zeira’s uncertainty. It is obvious that he did not touch his genitals, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who holds his penis and urinates it is as if he were bringing a flood to the world. He is liable to become aroused by that contact and that is an extremely severe transgression, comparable to the transgressions violated in the generation of the flood.
  Abaye said: Nevertheless, no proof can be cited from that <i>baraita</i>. Perhaps the Sages rendered the legal status of this situation like that of a military unit, as we learned in a mishna: A military unit that entered a city, if it entered during peacetime, after the soldiers leave, the open barrels of wine are prohibited and the wine in them may not be drunk due to suspicion that the gentile soldiers may have poured this wine as a libation for idolatry. The sealed barrels are permitted. However, if the unit entered in wartime, both are permitted because in wartime there is no respite to pour wine for idolatry, and one can be certain that the soldiers did not do so. Apparently, since they are afraid, they do not pour libations. Here too, in the case of bathing, since he is afraid, he will not come to have impure thoughts. The Gemara asks: And what fear is there here that would prevent one bathing from having impure thoughts? The Gemara answers: Fear of the river. Since he needs to be careful that the water does not wash him away, he is too distracted to think of other matters.
  The Gemara questions the story itself: And is that so? Is it permitted under any circumstances to cover one’s genitals while bathing? Didn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rav Huna said that Rav said: Anyone who places his hands over his genitals is as if he denies the covenant of our father Abraham? It appears as if he is covering himself to obscure the fact that he is circumcised. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is room to distinguish and say that this, the case where it is prohibited to cover oneself, is when he is descending into the river and there are no people facing him and he need not be concerned with modesty. In that case covering oneself is prohibited as he appears to be renouncing the covenant of Abraham. That, the case where, in certain circumstances, this prohibition does not apply, is when he is emerging from the river. When he emerges, he is facing the people on the riverbank and it is then permitted to cover himself in the interest of modesty, as that which Rava would do. He would bend over when he was naked. Rabbi Zeira would stand upright, in accordance with Rav’s statement that it is prohibited to appear to be renouncing the covenant of Abraham. When the Sages of the school of Rav Ashi descended into the river they stood upright. When they emerged from the river they bent over.
  Speaking of bathing and its <i>halakhot</i>, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Zeira was avoiding being seen by his teacher, Rav Yehuda, as Rabbi Zeira sought to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and his teacher disapproved. As Rav Yehuda said: Anyone who ascends from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael transgresses a positive commandment, as it is stated: “They shall be taken to Babylonia and there they shall remain until the day that I recall them, said the Lord” (Jeremiah 27:22). Based on that verse, Rav Yehuda held that since the Babylonian exile was by divine decree, permission to leave Babylonia for Eretz Yisrael could only be granted by God. Rabbi Zeira did not want to discuss his desire to emigrate with Rav Yehuda, so that he would not be forced to explicitly disobey him. Nevertheless, he said: I will go and hear something from him and then I will leave. He went and found Rav Yehuda standing in the bathhouse and telling his servant: Bring me natron [<i>neter</i>] with which to wash, bring me a comb, open your mouths and let out air, and drink from the water of the bathhouse. Rabbi Zeira said: If I had come only to hear this matter from Rav Yehuda, it would suffice for me.
  The Gemara analyzes the lessons learned from this story. Granted, when Rav Yehuda said: Bring me natron, bring me a comb, he was teaching us that mundane matters are permitted to be spoken in the bathhouse, even in the sacred language. When he said: Open your mouths and let out air, that too is in accordance with that which Shmuel said, as Shmuel said: Heat produces heat. The hot air that one inhales causes him to sweat more quickly. However, drink the water of the bathhouse, what benefit is there in doing that? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who ate and did not drink at all, what he ate becomes blood and that causes the onset of intestinal disease. One who ate and did not walk four cubits after eating, what he ate rots and that causes the onset of bad breath. One who needs to defecate and ate is similar to an oven that was lit on top of its ashes. When ashes from a previous fire are not swept out, and new logs are placed on top of the old ones, it inhibits the burning and dirties the oven, and that causes the onset of odor of the filth of perspiration in a person. As far as our matter is concerned, the <i>baraita</i> teaches: One who bathed in hot water and did not drink from it is like an oven that was lit from the outside and not lit from the inside. The lighting is ineffective and the oven does not heat properly. Rav Yehuda told his servants to drink the hot water while bathing so that they would be heated from the inside and the outside. The <i>baraita</i> continues: One who bathed in hot water and did not rinse afterward with cold water is like iron that was placed in the fire and not placed afterward in cold water, which leaves the iron soft. And one who bathed and did not smear himself with oil afterward is like water that was poured on top of a barrel, and not into it. The water spills outside the barrel.
  MISHNA: In this mishna, the Sages discuss two vessels used for heating water. With regard to a <i>mulyar</i>, a bronze vessel into which coals are placed in an outer compartment and water is placed into an adjacent inner compartment, whose coals were swept, one may drink from it on Shabbat. With regard to an <i>antikhi</i>, which is a vessel with a different configuration, even if its coals were swept, one may not drink from it on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a swept <i>mulyar</i>? The Gemara answers: A <i>mulyar</i> is the vessel, explained in the <i>Tosefta</i> on our mishna, that has water on the inside and coals on the outside. With regard to the identity of an <i>antikhi</i> there are different opinions. Rabba said that it refers to a stove. A space is created in the wall of a stove and filled with water. Since the stove is very hot, it is prohibited to use this water. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak said: An <i>antikhi</i> is a cauldron, i.e., a vessel made from two cauldrons stacked one on top of the other with coals in the bottom one and water in the upper one. These two different opinions have halakhic implications. The one who says that it is prohibited to use a vessel composed of two cauldrons, all the more so it is prohibited to use the space inside of a stove. And the one who says that it is prohibited to use the space inside a stove, a vessel composed of two cauldrons, no, it is not prohibited. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: An <i>antikhi</i>, even if it was swept and covered with ashes, one may not drink from it on Shabbat because its copper heats it. The heating in an <i>antikhi</i> is by means of the coals beneath the water.
  MISHNA: The Sages added to the laws of leaving food on a source of heat and cooking food on Shabbat: An urn that was emptied of its hot water on Shabbat, one may not place cold water into it so that the cold water will be heated. However, one may place cold water into an urn or into a cup that were emptied of their hot water in order to warm it but not in order to heat it.
  GEMARA: The mishna seems to contradict itself. The first statement completely prohibits placing water into an urn, and later it was partially permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? Rav Adda bar Mattana said that it said the following: An urn that was emptied of its hot water, one may not put a small amount of water into it so that it will become very hot. However, one may put a large quantity of water into it in order to warm it. A large quantity of cold water will not be heated in those circumstances.
  
  Daf 41b
  
  The Gemara questions this leniency: By putting cold water into the urn, doesn’t it harden the vessel? Cold water poured into a heated metal vessel reinforces the vessel. It is one of the stages in the labor of a blacksmith. How is it permitted to do something similar on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who stated a principle with regard to the laws of Shabbat: An unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited labor inadvertently ensues, is permitted. Here too, his intention was to warm the water, not to reinforce the vessel. Abaye strongly objects to this explanation: Does it say in the mishna: An urn from which water was emptied? That would indicate that he sought to fill the vessel with other water and warm up that water. Rather, an urn that was removed was taught in the mishna, meaning that the urn was removed from the fire, not that the water was emptied from it.
  Rather, Abaye said this is what the mishna is saying: An urn that was removed from the fire and contains hot water, one may not place a small quantity of water in it so that the water will become hot; rather, one may place a large quantity of water in it so that the water will become warm. And with regard to an urn from which water was removed; one may not place any water into it because he hardens the vessel by placing cold water into a hot vessel. And, according to this explanation, our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor inadvertently ensues is prohibited on Shabbat.
  With regard to the matter itself, Rav said: They taught that one is permitted to place cold water into an urn with hot water after it was removed from the fire, when his intention is only to warm the cold water. However, if he did this in order to harden the vessel, it is prohibited. And Shmuel said: Even if he does so in order to harden the vessel, it is also permitted. The Gemara wonders: Is hardening permitted <i>ab initio</i>? Isn’t it a full-fledged prohibited labor on Shabbat? Rather, if the dispute between Rav and Shmuel was stated, it was stated as follows. Rav said: They taught that it is permitted to add water only in a measure that is sufficient to warm the water, i.e., to only partially fill the vessel. However, filling it completely with a measure sufficient to harden the vessel is prohibited. And Shmuel said: Even a measure sufficient to harden the vessel
  
  Daf 42a
  
  is permitted, since one did not intend to perform that prohibited labor.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Shmuel, who permits adding water even in an amount sufficient to harden a vessel, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that one may perform an action that inadvertently results in a prohibited labor? Didn’t Shmuel say: One may extinguish a piece of white-hot metal in a public area on Shabbat so that the masses will not be injured? That is because the piece of white-hot metal is not actual fire and extinguishing it is prohibited by rabbinic decree, not Torah law. The Sages did not issue decrees in situations where there is concern for public safety. However, one may not extinguish a red-hot wood coal because extinguishing it is prohibited by Torah law. And if it would enter your mind that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it should even be permitted to extinguish wood as well. When one extinguishes the coal, he intends neither to perform a prohibited labor nor to derive any benefit. He merely intends to prevent the coal from causing injury. Extinguishing the coal is a labor not necessary for its own sake. Rabbi Shimon says that one who performs a labor not necessary for its own sake is exempt.
  The Gemara responds: In the case of an unintentional act, Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. In the case of labor not necessary for its own sake, he holds that he is liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Ravina said: Therefore, a thorn in the public domain that is liable to cause injury, one may move it from there in increments, each less than four cubits, on Shabbat. Although the Torah prohibits carrying an object four cubits in the public domain on Shabbat, carrying less than four cubits is prohibited only by rabbinic law. From Shmuel’s statement, it is clear that the Sages did not issue a decree in any case where there is a threat to the masses. And, therefore, if the thorn was in a <i>karmelit</i>, where the prohibition to carry is by rabbinic law, one is permitted to carry it even more than four cubits.
  We learned in the mishna: However, one may place water into an urn in order to warm it. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may place hot water into cold water, but not cold into hot; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. In their opinion the cold water becomes heated by the hot water beneath it. And Beit Hillel say: Both hot into cold and cold into hot are permitted. However, Beit Hillel did not permit this in all cases. In what case is this said? It is in the case of a cup. However, in a bath with a lot of water, it is permitted to pour hot into cold but not cold into hot. And Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya prohibits even putting hot into cold. Rav Naḥman said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya in this matter.
  Rav Yosef thought to say that the legal status of a basin [<i>sefel</i>], which is a vessel used for washing, is like that of a bath, and it is prohibited to pour water into it. Abaye said to him that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a <i>baraita</i>: A basin is not like a bath in terms of pouring water into it. The Gemara asks: And according to what entered Rav Yosef’s mind initially, that a basin is like a bath with regard to this <i>halakha</i>, and Rav Naḥman said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya in this matter, does that mean that on Shabbat there is no possibility of washing with hot water? No all-encompassing prohibition of washing with hot water on Shabbat was ever taught.
  The Gemara replies: Do you think that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya is referring to the latter clause of the mishna? No, he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, where we learned that Beit Hillel permit both hot water into cold and cold water into hot, and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya prohibits placing cold water into hot. The Gemara asks: If so, say that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. Isn’t the <i>halakha</i> generally established according to Beit Hillel? The Gemara explains: He said the following: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not dispute this matter. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya had a different tradition with regard to the opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: I saw that Rava was not strict in the case of a vessel and made no distinction between cold and hot. From where did he derive this leniency? From a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: A person may place a jug of water into a basin of water, both hot into cold and cold into hot. Rav Huna said to Rav Ashi: There is a weakness in this proof, as perhaps there it is different because the vessel forms a partition between the hot and cold water. He is not pouring cold water into the basin itself but is placing a jug whose sides form a partition into the basin. He said to him: The term pour was stated in that <i>baraita</i>. This is the correct version: A person may pour a jug of water into a basin of water, both hot into cold or cold into hot. Therefore, there is no room to distinguish between the two cases.
  MISHNA: In continuation of the discussion of vessels where the prohibition of cooking applies even though the vessels are not actually on the fire itself, the mishna establishes: A stew pot [<i>ilpas</i>] and a pot that were removed from the fire while they were still boiling, even if they were removed before Shabbat, one may not place spices into them on Shabbat itself. Even though the pot is not actually standing on the fire, the spices are still cooked in it because the pot is a primary vessel, i.e., a vessel whose contents were cooked on the fire.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  However, one may place the spices into a bowl or into a tureen [<i>tamḥui</i>], which is a large bowl into which people pour the contents a stew pot or a pot. Bowls and tureens are both secondary vessels and food placed into them does not get cooked. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may place spices into anything on Shabbat except for a vessel that has in it something containing vinegar or brine of salted fish.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rabbi Yehuda referring to the first clause of the mishna and being lenient? According to that possibility, the mishna prohibits placing spices into any boiling pot and Rabbi Yehuda holds that this only applies if there is fish brine or vinegar inside the pot. Or perhaps he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna and is being stringent? The Rabbis said that one is permitted to place spices into a bowl or a tureen, and Rabbi Yehuda came to add a stringency and say that if the bowl or tureen contains vinegar or brine, it is prohibited to place spices into it.
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: Into all stew pots one may place spices on Shabbat; into all pots, even those that are boiling, one may place spices, except for one that contains vinegar or brine. The <i>baraita</i> clearly indicates that Rabbi Yehuda disputes the first clause of the mishna and is being lenient.
  Rav Yosef thought to say that salt is like a spice whose legal status is: In a primary vessel that was on the fire, salt gets cooked and therefore it is prohibited to place salt into it on Shabbat. And in a secondary vessel, into which the contents of a primary vessel were poured, salt does not get cooked. Abaye said to him: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya already teach that salt is not like a spice? Certainly he meant that in a secondary vessel it also gets cooked. And the Gemara remarks that this conclusion disputes the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said: Salt requires cooking for as long as the meat of an ox does, i.e., it requires extensive cooking.
  And some say a very different version of this: Rav Yosef thought to say that salt is like a spice, i.e., in a primary vessel it gets cooked, whereas in a secondary vessel it does not get cooked. Abaye said to him: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya already teach that salt is not like a spice, meaning that in a primary vessel, it also does not get cooked? And that is precisely what Rav Naḥman said: Salt requires cooking for as long as the meat of an ox does.
  MISHNA: From a discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of insulation and preparation for Shabbat followed by a brief tangent dealing with the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat, the mishna proceeds to briefly discuss prohibitions relating to set-aside [<i>muktze</i>] items in terms of Shabbat lamps. One may not place a vessel beneath the oil lamp, the vessel containing the oil and the wick, on Shabbat in order to receive the oil that drips from the wick. And if one placed the vessel on Friday while it was still day, it is permitted. However, in any case, one may not make use of the oil on Shabbat because it is not from the oil prepared from Shabbat eve for use on Shabbat. The oil in the lamp was already set aside and designated solely for the purpose of lighting the lamp.
  GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda said: Although the Sages said that one may not place a vessel beneath a hen preparing to lay an egg on Shabbat on an inclined surface, in order to receive its egg and prevent it from breaking when it falls; however, they permitted overturning a vessel onto an egg on Shabbat so that it will not be trampled and break. Rabba said: What is Rav Ḥisda’s reason? He holds that a hen is likely to lay its egg in a garbage dump and people or animals will oftentimes step on it, but it is not likely to lay its egg on an inclined surface where the egg could roll down and break. And in a common case of preservation, the Sages permitted overturning a vessel onto the egg that is located in the garbage dump to protect it from being broken. And in an uncommon case of preservation, i.e., placing a vessel beneath a hen to receive its egg so that it would not roll down an inclined surface, they did not permit doing so.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>: And is it so that in an uncommon case of preservation they did not permit taking steps to protect the object on Shabbat? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One whose barrel of untithed produce [<i>tevel</i>], which may not be eaten until it is tithed, broke on top of his roof on Shabbat, may bring a vessel and place it beneath the barrel so that the untithed produce is not lost. Even though eating untithed produce is prohibited on Shabbat, they permitted carrying a vessel to preserve it even in the uncommon case of a barrel that breaks. Apparently, even in an uncommon case of preservation the Sages permit taking the necessary steps. Rabba answered: This too, is a common case of preservation because it is an instance of new barrels [<i>gulfei</i>], which commonly break.
  Abaye raised another objection to Rabba’s opinion from the last mishna in this chapter: One may place a vessel beneath the oil lamp in order to receive burning sparks of oil that drip from the burning wick even though this is not common. Rabba answered: Sparks are also common and therefore, it is a common case of preservation.
  
  Daf 43a
  
  Abaye raised another objection to Rabba’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>: One may overturn a bowl on the oil lamp so that the flame will not set fire to the beam. Apparently, the Sages permitted moving a vessel, even though this is not a common case of preservation. Rabba answered him: This is a case of low-ceilinged houses in which fires are common.
  And it is likewise difficult from a mishna: The beam of a roof that broke, one may support it with a bench and with the lengths of a bed frame so that it will not fall. Even though this is an uncommon case of preservation, it is permitted. Rabba answered: This is a case of new beams, which commonly break. This too is a common case of preservation.
  And Abaye raised another objection from a mishna: One may place a vessel beneath a leak in the ceiling on Shabbat. Apparently, even an uncommon case of preservation is permitted. Rabba answered: This is a case of new houses, which frequently leak.
  Rav Yosef said: This is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda, who allowed covering a hen’s egg, but not placing a vessel underneath the hen, in order to receive the egg when it is laid: Because by receiving the egg in the vessel, he negates a vessel’s preparedness. Initially, the vessel was available for any use. Since it now contains an egg that may neither be used nor moved, the vessel too may no longer be carried. It is tantamount to breaking the vessel.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s opinion, just as he had to Rabba’s opinion, from the <i>Tosefta</i>: One whose barrel of untithed produce, which may not be eaten until it is tithed, broke on Shabbat, may bring another vessel and place it beneath the barrel so that the untithed produce is not lost. Even though eating untithed produce is prohibited on Shabbat, they permitted carrying a vessel to preserve it even in the uncommon case of a barrel that breaks. Apparently, one is permitted to negate the vessel’s preparedness. Rav Yosef said to him: This is not difficult. Fundamentally, untithed produce is available for use on Shabbat. As, if one sins and prepares it for use by tithing it on Shabbat, it is prepared and may be eaten and carried.
  Abaye raised another objection from a mishna: One may place a vessel underneath the oil lamp in order to receive the burning sparks of oil that drip from the wick. Once the vessel is filled with the drops of oil, it will no longer be available. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Sparks have no substance. They burn and dissolve as they fall into the bowl and do not accumulate. Therefore, the vessel may still be used.
  And he also raised another objection from a mishna: A beam that broke, one may support it with a bench and with the lengths of a bed frame so that it will not fall. By doing so, he negates the preparedness of the bench or bed frame. He answered: This is a case in which the bench is loosely supporting the beam and not supporting its entire weight. If one wants to do so, he can take the bench. Therefore, the preparedness of the bench is not negated.
  And he also raised another objection from a mishna: One may place a vessel beneath a leak that is dripping from the ceiling on Shabbat. The dripping water has no use and is set-aside; therefore, the water negates the vessel’s preparedness. He answered him: This is a case of a leak that is suitable for drinking. Since it has a use, one is permitted to carry the water that is in the vessel. Consequently, he does not negate the vessel’s preparedness by placing it beneath the leak.
  And he also raised another objection from a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may overturn a basket in front of chicks so that they can climb on and climb off of it. By doing so, he negates the vessel’s preparedness due to the chicks, as moving them is prohibited on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Rav Yosef holds that it is permitted to move the basket on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is prohibited to move the basket? The Gemara replies: This prohibition was stated when they are still on it; however, once the chicks climbed off the basket, it may be carried immediately. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that even though they are no longer on it, it is prohibited to move the basket? Consequently, the vessel’s preparedness is negated. Rabbi Abbahu said: That <i>baraita</i> is referring to the unique case where the chicks remained on top of the basket for the entire twilight period on Shabbat eve. This is in accordance with the principle: Since it was set aside from use during twilight of Shabbat eve, it was set aside for the entire day of Shabbat. The status of every vessel, i.e., whether or not it may be used on Shabbat, is determined at twilight.
  With regard to the basic <i>halakha</i> of a hen that lays an egg on Shabbat, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Just as one may not place a vessel beneath a hen on Shabbat in order to receive its egg, so too, one may not overturn a vessel onto the egg so that it will not break. The Gemara explains that he holds: A vessel may only be carried on Shabbat for the sake of an object that may be carried on Shabbat. Since the egg may not be carried on Shabbat, it is prohibited to carry a vessel for its sake. The Gemara raises all of these objections that were raised to Rav Hisda’s opinion, which permitted doing so. And he answered: All of those <i>halakhot</i> are referring to cases where one needs to move the vessel that he is using for the set-aside item, because he requires its location. This is in accordance with the principle that once it is permitted, for whatever reason, to move any vessel, one may place it anywhere he chooses.
  To clarify whether or not the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak is valid, come and hear what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to both an egg that was laid on Shabbat and an egg that was laid on a Festival, one may neither move it to cover a vessel with it, nor to support the legs of a bed with it. However, one may cover it with a vessel so that it does not break. This is contrary to Rabbi Yitzḥak’s opinion. Here too, it is referring to a vessel that one seeks to move because he requires its location. Since he was permitted to move it from its place, he is also permitted to cover an egg with it.
  Come and hear an additional proof from that which we learned: One may spread mats on top of stones on Shabbat. Apparently, it is permissible to move a vessel for the sake of something that may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara responds: This is a case of rounded rocks that are suitable to be used in the bathroom. Therefore, it is permitted to carry them on Shabbat.
  Come and hear another proof from that which we learned: One may spread mats on top of bricks on Shabbat. Bricks may not be used on Shabbat. Nevertheless, one is permitted to carry mats for the sake of bricks that are prohibited for use on Shabbat. The Gemara replies: This is referring to a case of bricks that are not set aside for construction, but are left over from a completed building and are suitable for people to lean on them. Consequently, they are like other household vessels, and moving them and moving mats to protect them is permitted.
  Come and hear another proof for this from that which we learned: One may spread a mat over a beehive on Shabbat in the sun due to the need to protect it from the sun, and in the rain due to the need to protect it from the rain, as long as he does not intend to trap the bees by covering them. In any event, apparently it is permitted to move a mat for the sake of the beehive even though the beehive itself may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? With a case where there is honey in the beehive. He is permitted to cover it for the sake of the honey. Rav Ukva from Meishan said to Rav Ashi: Granted, you could say this in the summer,
  
  Daf 43b
  
  as there is honey in the beehive during the summer. However, during the rainy season in which there is not honey in the beehive, what can be said according to Rabbi Yitzḥak to explain why it is permitted to cover the beehive at that time? The Gemara answers: This <i>halakha</i> is only applicable in order to permit covering the beehive for those two honeycombs that remain in the hive even during the rainy season so that the bees can feed off of them. The Gemara asks: Aren’t these honeycombs set aside for the bees alone? The Gemara responds: This is a case where one thought of them before Shabbat and, in his mind, prepared them to be eaten. The Gemara asks: By inference, if one did not think about them, what would be the ruling? It would be prohibited to cover the beehive.
  If so, this <i>tanna</i> who taught in that same <i>baraita</i>: As long as he does not intend to trap the bees, let him distinguish and teach with regard to that same <i>halakha</i> itself: In what case are these matters stated, that one is permitted to cover the hive? It is in a case where he thought of them before Shabbat. However, if he did not think of them, it is prohibited. The Gemara answers: This teaches us a novel understanding. Even though he thought of them before Shabbat, it is only permitted as long as he did not intend to trap them.
  With regard to the matter itself, the Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, he does not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside. Consequently, there is no distinction between the different beehives. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, when he does not have intention to trap the bees, what of it? Doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda hold that even an unintentional act is prohibited? The Gemara replies: Actually, this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. What does: And as long as one does not intend to trap the bees, mean? It means that one should not make the mat like a trap. He must leave space so that the bees will not get trapped on their own.
  Rav Ashi said that it can be resolved differently: Did the <i>baraita</i> teach: In the summer and in the rainy season? Actually, it taught: In the sun due to the sun and in the rain due to the rain. That can be interpreted as follows: In the days of Nisan and in the days of Tishrei, as then there is sun shining and there is also cold weather; and there is rain and there is honey in the beehives.
  Rav Sheshet said to the Sages: Go out and tell Rabbi Yitzḥak in Eretz Yisrael: Rav Huna already explained your <i>halakha</i> in Babylonia. There is nothing novel in the principle that you established that a vessel may only be moved for the sake of something that may be moved, as Rav Huna said: One may make a partition for the dead for the benefit of a living person, and one may not make a partition for the dead for the benefit of the dead person. It is prohibited to move objects for the sake of a corpse because it is prohibited to move the corpse itself on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical application of this <i>halakha</i>? As Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said, and likewise the Sage, Sheila Mari taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A corpse that is laid out in the sun and there is concern that it will putrefy and smell, what can be done? Two people come and sit beside it. After a while, when they feel hot from beneath them, this one brings a bed and sits on it and that one brings a bed and sits on it on either side of the corpse, as they are permitted to carry the beds for their own use. When they feel hot from above them, they bring a mat and spread it over their heads. Then, this one stands his bed up so the mat will remain resting atop it and slips away and leaves, and that one stands his bed up and slips away and leaves, and a partition is then created over the corpse as if on its own without erecting it directly for the sake of the corpse. Apparently, the Sages did not permit carrying a mat to cover a corpse for the sake of the corpse. They only permitted doing so in an indirect manner for the benefit of the living.
  Incidental to the mention of <i>halakhot</i> related to a corpse on Shabbat, the Gemara cites an amoraic dispute in which it was stated: A corpse that was laid out in the sun, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One turns it over from bed to bed until it reaches the shade. Rav Hanina bar Shelamiyya said in the name of Rav: One places a loaf of bread or an infant on the corpse and moves it. The corpse becomes a base for an object that one is permitted to move on Shabbat and, consequently, one may move the corpse due to the permitted object. The Gemara adds: In a case where there is a loaf or an infant, everyone agrees that it is permitted to use that method to move the corpse. Where they argue is in a case where he does not have a loaf or an infant. One Sage, Rav, holds: Moving an object in an atypical manner is considered a bona fide act of moving. Therefore, one may not move the corpse by passing it from bed to bed. And the other Sage, Shmuel, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered moving. Therefore, it is permitted to move a corpse by passing it from bed to bed.
  With regard to this dispute between Rav and Shmuel, the Gemara remarks: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> in the <i>Tosefta</i>. The Rabbis said: One may not rescue a corpse from a fire on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish said: I heard that one may rescue a corpse from a fire. The Gemara seeks to clarify the matter: What are the circumstances? If there is a loaf or an infant available, what is the rationale for the opinion of the first <i>tanna,</i> who prohibited rescuing the corpse from the fire? If there is not a loaf or an infant, what is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish who permits rescuing the corpse from the fire? Rather, is it not that they disagree over moving an object in an atypical manner? As this Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is considered moving. Therefore, it is prohibited to rescue the corpse in that manner. And this Sage, Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish, holds that moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered moving. Therefore, it is permitted to rescue the corpse in this manner. The amoraic dispute deals with an issue already disputed by the <i>tanna’im</i>. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone, both <i>tanna’im</i>, agrees that moving an object in an atypical manner is considered moving. Rather, this is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish: Since a person is agitated about his deceased relative and is concerned about maintaining the dignity of the dead,
  
  Daf 44a
  
  if you do not permit him to move the corpse in an atypical manner, he will come to extinguish the fire. The Sages permitted performing an act prohibited by rabbinic law so that one will not come to transgress a Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda ben Sheila said that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish with regard to the issue of rescuing a corpse from a fire.
  We learned in the mishna that one may not make use of the oil that drips from the candle on Shabbat because it is not among the oil prepared from Shabbat eve for use on Shabbat. With regard to this same issue, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The remaining oil that is in the lamp or in a bowl in which a wick was burning is prohibited for use on Shabbat. However, Rabbi Shimon permits using the remaining oil as, according to his opinion, there is virtually nothing prohibited due to the prohibition of set-aside.
  MISHNA: The dispute in this mishna seems to be a local one; however, it is the key to several <i>halakhot</i> in the area of the prohibition of set-aside [<i>muktze</i>]. One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one that was already used. A lamp that was used is covered with soot and unsuitable for use. It is therefore considered set aside from use due to its disgusting nature. Rabbi Shimon says: All oil lamps may be moved on Shabbat except for an oil lamp that is burning on Shabbat, due to the concern that it might be extinguished.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught the dispute in the mishna in greater detail in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: All oil lamps may be moved on Shabbat except for an oil lamp that they kindled on that Shabbat. Rabbi Meir does not hold that one must distance himself from objects that are disgusting. However, since the lamp was burning on Shabbat, it may not be moved, as it is an object set aside due to prohibition for the entire Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon says: All lamps may be moved except for an oil lamp that is burning on Shabbat. If the flame was extinguished, one is permitted to move it. However, a cup and a bowl and a lantern that are full of oil with a wick lit in them, one may not move them from their place even after the flame is extinguished. And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: One may supply himself with oil from an extinguished candle and from the oil that drips from the lamp, and even while the lamp is burning.
  Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in one matter and disagrees with him in one matter. He holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in one matter, as he is not of the opinion that moving set-aside objects is prohibited. And he disagrees with him in one matter; as his father holds that if the flame was extinguished, yes, he may move it, if it was not extinguished, no, he may not move it. And Rabbi Eliezer holds: Even though the flame was not extinguished, it is permitted to carry the lamp and to use the oil that drips from it. In his opinion, doing so in no way extinguishes the flame and it is in no way comparable to extinguishing the flame.
  Following Rabbi Shimon’s statement, it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: However, a cup, and a bowl, and a lantern, one may not move them from their place. The Gemara asks: What is different about these, that even Rabbi Shimon prohibits moving them? Ulla said: In the latter clause of this <i>Tosefta</i>, we came back to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits moving items that are set-aside.
  Mar Zutra strongly objects to Ulla’s explanation: If so, what is the meaning of the word however in the phrase: However, a cup and a bowl, etc.? Rabbi Yehuda prohibited moving an oil lamp as well. In what way could the legal status of a bowl be any different? Rather, Mar Zutra said: Actually, this must be explained differently. That phrase was stated by Rabbi Shimon. And when Rabbi Shimon permitted moving a lamp, that was in the case of a small lamp, which he has in mind, i.e., he is certain that the flame will be extinguished on Shabbat and that he will have the opportunity to use the remaining oil that day. However, these, the bowl and the lantern, which have much oil, no, he does not expect them to be extinguished and he sets them aside from use for the entire Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Using the remaining oil that is in an oil lamp or in a bowl is prohibited on Shabbat, and Rabbi Shimon permits using it. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not distinguish between a candle and a bowl. The Gemara answers: There, where Rabbi Shimon permitted a bowl, was specifically in a case where it is similar to a lamp, i.e., a small bowl in which the flame will quickly extinguish. Here, where Rabbi Shimon prohibited using the oil remaining in a bowl, it is referring to a bowl that is similar to a cup, which is large.
  Rabbi Zeira said: A metal candlestick [<i>pamot</i>] that was kindled on Shabbat, according to Rabbi Shimon, who permits moving a lamp, it is prohibited because it is large. Whereas, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits moving a lamp, a metal candlestick is permitted because it does not become disgusting (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that an object that is set-aside [<i>muktze</i>] due to repugnance may not be moved, and he is not of the opinion that an object that is set-aside due to prohibition may not be moved, and therefore permits moving the candlestick? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: All metal candlesticks may be moved on Shabbat with the exception of a candlestick that was kindled on Shabbat itself? Apparently, he prohibits moving the metal candlestick, not because it is disgusting but because it is set-aside due to prohibition. Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows, Rabbi Zeira said: A metal candlestick that was kindled on Shabbat, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. One that was not kindled on Shabbat, everyone agrees that it is permitted because it is neither set aside due to prohibition nor set aside due to repugnance.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A bed which one designated to place money upon it may not be moved on Shabbat because it is set-aside. It is prohibited even though it no longer has money upon it. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection to Rav Yehuda from our mishna: One may move a new oil lamp on Shabbat but not an old one.
  
  Daf 44b
  
  He explains his objection: And just as a lamp, which is made for this purpose, for lighting, when he did not light it, he is permitted to move it, a bed, which is not made for that purpose, for placing money on it, all the more so moving it would be permitted. Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A bed that one designated for money to be placed upon it, if one left money upon it one day, it becomes designated for that purpose and it is prohibited to move it on Shabbat. If one did not leave money upon it, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. A bed, which one did not designate for money to be placed upon it, if there is money upon it on Shabbat itself, it is prohibited to move it on Shabbat. If there is not money on it, it is permitted to move it. And that is only when there was not money on it during the twilight period between Shabbat eve and Shabbat. If there was money on it at that time, the bed itself becomes set aside due to prohibition for the entire Shabbat, even if the money fell off the bed in the course of the day.
  Ulla said: Rabbi Eliezer raised an objection to Rav’s statement from that which we learned in a mishna. This mishna deals primarily with the laws of ritual impurity and discusses the relationship between a wagon and its undercarriage [<i>mukheni</i>], the system of wheels and the frame at the base of the wagon. And the Sages said: The wagon’s undercarriage, when it is detachable from the wagon, it is not considered connected to it and they are considered independent units as far as the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity are concerned. And it is not measured with it. This refers to calculating the volume of forty <i>se’a</i>, as a vessel with a volume larger than forty <i>se’a</i> does not have the legal status of a vessel and cannot become ritually impure. And the undercarriage likewise does not protect together with the wagon in a tent over the corpse. A large wagon is considered a tent in and of itself and the vessels inside the wagon do not become impure if the wagon is over a corpse. However, the undercarriage is not included with the wagon in this regard. If a hole in the wagon is sealed by the undercarriage, it is not considered sealed with regard to preventing ritual impurity. And, likewise, one may not pull the wagon on Shabbat when there is money upon it.
  By inference: If there is not money on it, one is permitted to move the wagon even though there was money on it at twilight. In this mishna, the prohibition is contingent exclusively on whether or not there is money on the wagon at that time. The Gemara answers: That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Since according to Rabbi Yehuda there is a prohibition of set-aside, the wagon became set aside from use during the twilight period and remains prohibited for the entire Shabbat.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as Rav said: One may place a lamp atop a palm tree on Shabbat eve to burn on Shabbat, and one may not place a lamp atop a palm tree on a Festival. Granted, if you say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this matter; that is why there is a distinction between Shabbat and a Festival. Since the lamp is set-aside [<i>muktze</i>] on Shabbat one will not come to carry it. Since one is permitted to carry a lamp on a Festival, there is concern that one might climb the palm tree or make use of the tree on the Festival and thereby transgress the rabbinic prohibition against making use of something connected to the ground on a Festival. However, if you say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the lamp is not set-aside even on Shabbat, what difference is there to me between Shabbat and a Festival? Ostensibly, there should be no distinction between the two.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rav really hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that it is prohibited to move an object that is set-aside? Didn’t they raise a dilemma before Rav: What is the ruling with regard to moving a Hanukkah candle from before the <i>ḥabarei</i>, Persian Zoroastrian fire priests, on Shabbat? Those priests prohibited lighting fires on certain days. In order to prevent them from discovering that he lit Hanukkah candles it was necessary to quickly move them. And he said to them: One may well do so. Apparently, Rav does not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara answers: This is not a proof, as exigent circumstances are different and Rav permitted this due to the danger involved. As Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi said to Rav on this matter: Is that the <i>halakha</i>? He said to them: Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances like this one.
  On this same matter Reish Lakish raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: Wheat kernels that he sowed in the ground that have not yet taken root and he could still gather them, and eggs that were placed beneath the hen and the incubation process has begun, what is the <i>halakha</i> in these cases? Would Rabbi Shimon agree that in these cases it is prohibited for use on Shabbat? One side of the dilemma is: When is Rabbi Shimon not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside? In a case where one did not reject the object with his own hands, i.e., he did not perform an action setting the object aside. However, in a case where he rejected it with his own hands, he is of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. When he sowed the wheat, he rejected it with his own hands. The same is true with regard to the egg; by placing it under the hen to hatch, he actively rejected it. The other side of the dilemma is: Or, perhaps there is no difference between the cases and Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside in either case. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: There is only a prohibition of set-aside, according to Rabbi Shimon, in the case of oil that is in the lamp while it is burning. Since it was set aside for its mitzva, the lighting of Shabbat candles, and it was also set aside for its prohibition, it is prohibited due to the concern that one might inadvertently extinguish the flame if he moves it while it is burning.
  The Gemara asks: And does he not hold that the prohibition of set-aside applies to an object set aside only for its mitzva without any prohibition? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who roofed the <i>sukka</i> in accordance with its halakhic requirements and decorated it for aesthetic purposes with colored hangings and tapestries, and hung as decorations nuts, peaches, almonds and pomegranates, and grape branches, and wreaths made of stalks, wine, oils, and fine flour, it is prohibited to supply himself from them until the conclusion of the last day of the Festival. Since they were all set aside for the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, all other uses are prohibited. And if one stipulated at the time that he hung them in the <i>sukka</i> that he is not designating them exclusively for this purpose, but he intends to use them for other purposes as well, their use is entirely in accordance with his stipulation. He is permitted to use them as he chooses.
  And from where do we know that this unattributed <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? We ascertained this from a comparison to a <i>baraita</i> that was taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may not take wood from the <i>sukka</i> that was constructed for shade on any Festival, even if the wood fell from the <i>sukka</i> on the Festival. Because it is prohibited to destroy the <i>sukka</i> on the Festival, it was set aside before the Festival for the entire duration of the Festival. Rather, one may take wood only from what is beside the <i>sukka</i>, i.e., bundles of wood that are not being used for the <i>sukka</i>. When he placed them there, his intention was to use them during the Festival. And Rabbi Shimon permits taking wood even from the <i>sukka</i> itself, since he holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon agree that taking wood from the <i>sukka</i> constructed for the <i>Sukkot</i> festival is prohibited during the Festival. And if one stipulated about the wood that he will be able to use it during the Festival, everything is in accordance with his stipulation. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon prohibits using an object that was set aside due only to a mitzva, even though it was not set aside due to a prohibition. Therefore, the Gemara emends Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: There is no <i>halakha</i> of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon except in a case similar to oil in the candle. It is not necessary that there be both a prohibited labor and a prohibition due to the mitzva. Rather, since it was set aside for the mitzva alone, it is thereby set aside for the prohibition. It was also stated: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is only a prohibition of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon in a case similar to oil in the candle while it is burning; since it was set aside for its mitzva, it was set aside for its prohibition.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There is only a prohibition of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon in the cases of dried figs and raisins alone. The case of one who takes figs and raisins up to his roof in order to dry them in the sun is the only situation in which Rabbi Shimon holds that they are prohibited on Shabbat due to the prohibition of set-aside. Since in the initial stages of the process they emit a bad odor and are unfit for consumption, one consciously sets them aside. The Gemara challenges: And other items are not included in the prohibition of set-aside? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who was eating figs and left some over and took them up to the roof to make them into dried figs, and likewise one who was eating grapes and left some over and took them up to the roof to make them into raisins, one may not eat them on Shabbat unless he designates them to be eaten before Shabbat. Otherwise, they are prohibited as set-aside. And you would say the same with regard to peaches, and quinces, and all other types of fruit that one left out to dry. It is prohibited to eat them all on Shabbat due to set-aside.
  The Gemara seeks to clarify: Whose opinion is it in the <i>baraita</i>? If you say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this <i>baraita</i> is superfluous. If in a case where one did not reject it with his own hands, he holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside, in a case where he rejected it by his own hand, all the more so that it is prohibited. There is no need to articulate the <i>halakha</i> in this unique case.
  Rather, isn’t this <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Apparently, he expands the <i>halakhot</i> of set-aside beyond dried figs and raisins. The Gemara rejects this: Actually, this <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda who holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And the case cited here, where he was eating figs, is necessary in order to teach us a novel <i>halakha</i>. It may enter your mind to say that since one was in the course of eating, he does not require prior designation; and if he changed his mind he may immediately retrieve the dried figs that he placed on the roof. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that since he brought them up to the roof, he diverted his attention from them and they are completely set-aside.
  On the same topic: Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, raised a dilemma before his father, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi:
  
  Daf 45b
  
  Unripe dates that are placed in baskets to ripen and until they are ripe can only be eaten with difficulty, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is their legal status as far as moving them on Shabbat is concerned? Are they considered set-aside? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: There is only a prohibition of set-aside according to Rabbi Shimon in the cases of dried figs and raisins alone.
  The Gemara challenges this: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that on a Festival, before they are slaughtered, one may neither give water to, in order to ease removal of their hides, nor slaughter non-domesticated, desert animals, animals that are always grazing in the fields? Since people do not generally tend to them, they are considered set-aside and may not be used. However, one may give water to and slaughter domesticated animals. And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that these are non-domesticated, desert animals: Any animals that leave their sheds on Passover and only enter their sheds with the advent of the rainy season. Domesticated animals are any animals that go out to graze beyond the city limits, and come and sleep within the city limits. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: These and those are both domesticated. And these are the non-domesticated, desert animals that are prohibited due to the prohibition of set-aside: Any animals that graze in the grazing area and neither enter the town during the summer nor during the rainy season. It is these animals that it is prohibited to give water to or slaughter on a Festival. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside even in the case of animals.
  Several resolutions are proposed to this contradiction: If you wish, say that these non-domesticated animals that graze in the grazing areas throughout the year are also considered like dried figs and raisins. Even Rabbi Shimon would agree to this <i>halakha</i>. And if you wish, say instead: When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi told his son that answer, he was saying it to him in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and he himself does not hold that way.
  And if you wish, say instead: In that <i>baraita</i>, he spoke to them in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, and this is how his statement must be understood: In my opinion I do not hold that there is a prohibition of set-aside at all. However, according to your opinion, at least agree with me that animals that leave their sheds on Passover and only enter their sheds with the advent of the rainy season are domesticated. And the Rabbis said to him: No, those are non-domesticated animals.
  As to the essential dispute with regard to the laws of set-aside, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t an Elder from Keruya, and some say that he was from Seruya, raise a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to a hen’s roost, what is its legal status as far as moving it on Shabbat is concerned? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Isn’t the roost made exclusively for hens to be inside it? Since it is not designated for use by people, moving it is prohibited. Apparently, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to set-aside. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a special case, when there is a dead chick in the roost. Moving the roost is prohibited due to the dead chick, which is set-aside.
  The Gemara continues to ask: This works out well according to the opinion of Mar bar Ameimar in the name of Rav, who said: Rabbi Shimon agreed in the case of animals that died on Shabbat, that they are prohibited on Shabbat due to set-aside. However, according to the opinion of Mar, son of Rav Yosef, in the name of Rava, who said: Rabbi Shimon was in disagreement even in the case of animals that died, and said that they are permitted and are not prohibited as set-aside, what can be said? The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here? With a case where there is an egg that was laid on Shabbat in the roost. Because it was laid on Shabbat it is considered set-aside, and using the egg is prohibited. The thought of using it never entered anyone’s mind before Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rav Naḥman say: One who is of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside, is also of the opinion that there is a prohibition of an object that came into being on Shabbat or on a Festival; and one who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside, is also not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of an object that came into being. This case is no different than other cases of set-aside. The Gemara responds: This is referring to a case where the roost has an egg with a chick in it. Even Rabbi Shimon would agree that moving an egg of that sort is prohibited since it is fit for neither human nor animal consumption.
  This explanation was cited to explain that Rabbi Yoḥanan could hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, when Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Yosef, came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that there is no prohibition of set-aside. Rav Yosef said: That is what Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The inference is: They said; however, he himself does not hold that this is the <i>halakha</i>.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And you yourself did not hold that Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even before Rav Yitzḥak came and cited this statement in his name? Didn’t Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Asi happen to come to the house of Rabbi Abba who was from the city Haifa, and a candelabrum fell onto Rabbi Asi’s cloak and he did not move it? What is the reason that he did not lift it? Is it not because Rabbi Asi was a student of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside? Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Candelabrum you say; are you citing a proof from the case of a candelabrum? A candelabrum is different because there is a unique <i>halakha</i> in that case. As Rabbi Aḥa bar Rabbi Ḥanina said that Rabbi Asi said that Reish Lakish issued a ruling in the city of Sidon: A candelabrum that can be moved in one of his hands, one is permitted to move it on Shabbat. However, if it is so heavy that one must move it with his two hands, it is prohibited to move it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We have permission to carry only in the case of an oil lamp, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, with regard to a candelabrum, both one that is carried in one hand and one that is carried in two hands, it is prohibited to move it.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that there is a unique prohibition in the case of a candelabrum? Rabba and Rav Yosef both said: Since a person usually designates a fixed place for it due to its size and its use, it is considered a built-in part of the house, and moving the candelabrum is like dismantling the house. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: A groom’s canopy is an object for which a person designates a set place, and, nevertheless, Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: With regard to a groom’s canopy,
  
  Daf 46a
  
  it is permitted to assemble it and it is permitted to dismantle it on Shabbat. If a permanent object like that one may be assembled on Shabbat and there is no concern for the prohibition of building, all the more so it should not be considered building and dismantling in the case of a candelabrum. Rather, Abaye said: Here it is referring to a special candelabrum made of joints, removable parts, and there is concern lest it fall and break into its component parts when it is moved, and one may come to reassemble it, which would be tantamount to crafting a vessel on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If so, if it is referring to that type of candelabrum, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who permits moving the candelabrum?
  The Gemara replies: It is not referring to a candelabrum that can actually be dismantled. Rather, what is the meaning of joints? Similar to joints, i.e., there are grooves in it and it appears as if it is made of different components. Therefore, in summary: With regard to a candelabrum made of actual joints, both one that is large and one that is small, it is prohibited to move it. In addition, a large candelabrum that has grooves, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to move it by rabbinic decree, which was issued due to a large candelabrum made of joints. Because it is common for a large candelabrum to be made of joints, if one saw someone carrying a large, grooved candelabrum, he would mistakenly assume that it had joints due to the similarity between them, and would mistakenly permit carrying a large candelabrum actually composed of joints. Where Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree is in the case of a small candelabrum that has grooves. This Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting moving even a small, grooved candelabrum due to a large one. And this Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that we do not issue a decree. Because a small candelabrum is not typically made of joints, everyone realizes that the grooves are strictly decorative.
  The Gemara questions: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state the following principle: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in the mishna that discusses ritual impurity of a wagon with a detachable undercarriage: The wagon’s undercarriage, when it is detachable from the wagon, it is not considered connected to it and they are considered independent units as far as the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity are concerned. And it is not measured with it. This refers to calculating the volume of forty <i>se’a</i>, as a vessel with a volume larger than forty <i>se’a</i> does not have the legal status of a vessel and cannot become ritually impure. And the undercarriage likewise does not protect together with the wagon in a tent over the corpse. A large wagon is considered a tent in and of itself, and the vessels inside the wagon do not become impure if the wagon is over a dead body. However, the undercarriage is not included with the wagon in this regard. If a hole in the wagon is sealed by the undercarriage, it is not considered to be sealed with regard to preventing ritual impurity. And, likewise, one may not pull the wagon on Shabbat when there is money upon it.
  By inference: If there is not money on it, one is permitted to move the wagon even though there was money on it at twilight. An object that was set aside at twilight is set aside for the entire Shabbat. In this mishna, moving the wagon is permitted. Clearly, the unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside. Why, then, did Rabbi Yoḥanan, who always rules in accordance with an unattributed mishna, not rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Zeira said: Let our mishna apply only to a case in which there was no money on the wagon throughout the entire duration of twilight. This strained interpretation is accepted so as not to contradict and reject Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One time, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went to the town of Deyosfera, and issued a ruling with regard to a candelabrum in accordance with the ruling that Rabbi Shimon made with regard to an oil lamp. This description is insufficiently clear, therefore a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean that he issued a ruling in the case of a candelabrum, like the ruling that Rabbi Shimon made in the case of an oil lamp, to permit moving it? Or, perhaps, he issued a ruling in the case of a candelabrum to prohibit moving it, and in another case he ruled in accordance with the ruling that Rabbi Shimon made in the case of an oil lamp, to permit moving it. There was no resolution found to this dilemma and therefore it stands unresolved.
  It is told that Rav Malkiya happened to come to the house of Rabbi Simlai and moved an extinguished oil lamp, and Rabbi Simlai became angry, as in his opinion it is prohibited to move an oil lamp because it is set-aside. Likewise, Rabbi Yosei the Galilean happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, and moved an oil lamp, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, became angry. The Gemara also relates that Rabbi Abbahu, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, he would move an oil lamp. However, when he happened to come to the place of Rabbi Yoḥanan, he would not move an oil lamp. The Gemara wondered: Whichever way you look at it there is a difficulty. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, let him act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda everywhere and refrain from moving the lamp. And if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let him act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon everywhere and move the oil lamp. The Gemara answers: Actually, it can be explained that Rabbi Abbahu holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; however, in deference to Rabbi Yoḥanan he did not act accordingly, so as not to act contrary to his ruling in the place where he was the authority.
  With regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of moving lamps on Shabbat, Rav Yehuda said: With regard to an extinguished oil lamp, it is permitted to move it, whereas a naphtha lamp, it is prohibited to move it. Since the smell of naphtha is unpleasant, the lamp is used exclusively for lighting. Therefore, moving it is prohibited. Rabba and Rav Yosef both said: With regard to a naphtha lamp, too, it is permitted to move it.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Avya happened to come to Rava’s house. His feet were dirty with clay and he put them on the bed before Rava. Rava became angry at him for dirtying the bed and, therefore, sought to torment him with questions that he could not answer. Rava said to him: What is the reason that Rabba and Rav Yosef both said that with regard to a naphtha lamp, too, that it is permitted to move it? Rav Avya said to him: Since it is suitable to cover a vessel with it. Rava said to him: But if that is so, all pebbles in the yard may also be carried <i>ab initio</i> on Shabbat, since it is suitable to cover a vessel with them. Rav Avya said to him: There is a distinction between these cases. This, the lamp, the status of a vessel applies to it and there are leniencies that apply to vessels with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of set-aside. These, the pebbles, the status of a vessel does not apply to it, as they are a raw material. Carrying them is prohibited unless designated for a specific purpose before Shabbat. Was it not taught in a <i>baraita</i> that
  
  Daf 46b
  
  bracelets, nose-rings and rings, although it is prohibited to go out into the public domain wearing them on Shabbat, they are like all the vessels that may be moved in the courtyard; in the private domain, one may move them and they are not set-aside. And Ulla said: What is the reason that it is permitted to move nose-rings in the yard? It is because the status of a vessel applies to it. Apparently, vessel status is sufficient to permit moving it on Shabbat. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Thank God that Rava did not embarrass Rav Avya and Rav Avya managed to successfully answer Rava’s questions.
  Abaye raised a contradiction before Rabba citing two sources with regard to set-aside on Shabbat. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the remaining oil that is in an oil lamp and in a bowl in which a wick was lit, it is prohibited to use it on Shabbat and Rabbi Shimon permits using it. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside. And a contradiction is raised from a parallel source, in which the Sages discussed the <i>halakha</i> of the firstborn of a kosher animal that developed a blemish on a Festival. The firstborn must be examined to determine whether or not that type of blemish disqualifies the animal from being sacrificed as an offering. If it is disqualified, it may be redeemed, slaughtered, and eaten as non-sacred meat on the Festival. Rabbi Shimon says: Any firstborn animal whose blemish is not perceptible before the Festival is not among the animals prepared prior to the Festival for use on the Festival, and it is prohibited to slaughter it. Apparently, an item not prepared in advance has set-aside status according to Rabbi Shimon.
  Rabba said to him: How can you compare these cases? There, in the case of the lamp, a person sits and anticipates when his candle will be extinguished. It is clear to him that it will be extinguished, and he can safely assume that a certain amount of oil will remain in the lamp or the bowl. Here, does a person sit and anticipate when a blemish will befall his animal? The owner of the animal says: Who says that a blemish will befall his animal? And even if you say that a blemish will befall it, who says that a permanent blemish that would enable it to be slaughtered will befall it? And even if you say that a permanent blemish will befall it, who says that a Sage will agree to engage in examining the blemish? Since there are so many uncertainties involved, if the blemish is not perceptible before the Festival, the possibility of the firstborn animal becoming available does not enter a person’s mind at all.
  Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection to this last point from that which we learned in a mishna: One may nullify vows on Shabbat. A woman who vowed that certain food is prohibited to her, her husband can nullify her vow on Shabbat. And likewise one may request that a Sage find an opening to dissolve his vows, i.e., a factor that the one taking the vow failed to take into account or an element of regret, if that nullification or dissolution is for the purpose of Shabbat. The question arises: And why, after a man has nullified his wife’s vow, should she be permitted to eat that food? When the woman vowed not to eat that food, she consciously set it aside. Even if some way to dissolve the vow is found, the food should remain set-aside. On the basis of the same uncertainty that was raised above, say: Who says that her husband will agree to engage in nullifying her oath? Perhaps he will refuse to nullify it.
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of vows, it can be explained in accordance with that which Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava, who came to explain some of the fundamentals of the <i>halakhot</i> of vows, as Rav Pineḥas said in the name of Rava: Every woman who takes a vow, it is from the outset contingent on her husband’s consent that she takes the vow. Since she knows that her husband has the ability to nullify it, her vows are not absolute and their final validation comes only through her husband’s agreement. When a woman vows, she does not set aside the food absolutely from potential use.
  Moreover, the Gemara cites proof for this from that which was taught: Come and hear: One may request that a Sage dissolve his vows for the purpose of Shabbat on Shabbat, i.e., one who vowed on Shabbat that eating on that day is prohibited for him. And why is he permitted to eat something that was prohibited to him by his vow? Say again: Who says that the Sage will agree to engage in dissolution of his vow? Consequently, one has certainly diverted his attention from the food, set it aside, and it should be prohibited to eat it. The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a difference, as there, in the <i>halakhot</i> of vows, even if the Sage does not agree to engage in dissolution of his vow, he can suffice with renouncing the vow before three common people. Even though it is preferable to have a Sage dissolve his vow, in exigent circumstances one may turn to a court of three common people to dissolve it. He will certainly find a way to dissolve his vow. However, here, in the case of the firstborn animal, who says that the Sage will agree to engage in examination of the blemish? In the <i>halakhot</i> of firstborn animals only an ordained Sage, who received special license to do so, is authorized to verify that it is a permanent blemish and permit redemption and slaughter of the animal as a non-sacred animal.
  Abaye raised a contradiction before Rav Yosef: Did Rabbi Shimon actually say that when a lamp is extinguished, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat? By inference: After it is extinguished, yes, moving it is permitted; so long as it is not extinguished, no, moving it is prohibited. What is the reason that it is prohibited to move a burning candle? It is due to concern that perhaps, as he moves the lamp, the flame will be extinguished. However, is Rabbi Shimon really concerned that a flame will be extinguished under those circumstances? Didn’t we learn that Rabbi Shimon stated a principle: An unintentional act, a permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues on Shabbat, since he did not intend to perform the prohibited action, is permitted? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, and bench on the ground, as long as he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one need not be concerned. Since that was not his intention, there is no prohibition according to Rabbi Shimon. Consequently, according to Rabbi Shimon there should be no prohibition in moving a burning candle, even though it may be extinguished. Since that is not the intention of the one moving it, no prohibition would be violated.
  The Gemara answers that there is a distinction between the cases: In every case where if he intends to perform the action, there is a prohibition by Torah law, e.g., extinguishing a candle; even when he does not intend to do so, Rabbi Shimon issued a decree prohibiting it by rabbinic law. However, in every case where even if he intends to perform the action, there is merely a prohibition by rabbinic law, e.g., digging a furrow which is not a full-fledged act of plowing that is prohibited by Torah law, but is prohibited only by rabbinic law, when he does not intend to perform the action, Rabbi Shimon even permits performing this action <i>ab initio</i>.
  Rava raised an objection to this distinction from that which we learned in a mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles. A merchant may place the garments he is selling on his shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, as long as the merchant does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are particularly meticulous in their performance of mitzvot, would suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, isn’t it a case where if one intends to wear the clothing, there is a prohibition by Torah law, and even so when he does not intend to wear it, Rabbi Shimon permits it <i>ab initio</i>. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon does not distinguish between cases on that basis.
  Rather, Rava said a different explanation for Rabbi Shimon’s prohibition in the case of an oil lamp:
  
  Daf 47a
  
  Leave the candle, oil, and wick, since they became a base for a prohibited object. Even Rabbi Shimon agrees that a flame burning on Shabbat is set-aside. Since it is prohibited to move the flame, moving the lamp, oil, and wick is also prohibited.
  Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that Rabbi Ḥanina said that Rabbi Romanus said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted me to carry a coal pan with its ashes. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person may carry his son in his hands and even if the son has a stone, which is prohibited to carry, in his hands; or, one may carry a basket with a stone inside it? And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We are dealing with a basket that is full of fruit. Due to the fruit, carrying the stone is also permitted. The reason for the leniency is because there is fruit inside the basket; however, if there is no fruit inside it, no, one may not move it. With regard to the coal pan that is filled with ashes, how can moving it be permitted according to Rabbi Yoḥanan?
  “He was astonished for a while” (Daniel 4:16) and could not find an answer. And, ultimately, Rabbi Asi said: Here, too, it is referring to a case where the coal pan has bits of frankincense that were not yet burned. Due to those bits, moving the pan is permitted. Abaye said: Are small bits in the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi significant? Since they are not significant, they are nullified by the ashes and the mixture is entirely unsuitable for use.
  And if you say: The bits are suitable for the poor. We will explain that the value of an object is determined not by its context, but by its intrinsic value. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that there is a difference with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity between garments belonging to poor people, which can become ritually impure even if they are very small, and garments belonging to the wealthy, which are not considered significant unless they contain a larger amount of fabric? Garments the size of poor people’s clothing are for the poor, and garments the size of rich people’s clothing are for the rich; however, clothes of the poor for the rich are not significant. Apparently, the significance of an object is determined by its context and its owner. Rather, Abaye said an alternative explanation: The <i>halakha</i> here is just as it is in the case of a chamber pot of feces. Since it is disgusting, removing it from the house is permitted, even though clearly there is no use for it.
  Rava said: There are two answers to reject this analogy: One, a chamber pot with feces is disgusting, and the coal pan is not disgusting. And furthermore: A chamber pot with feces is uncovered and smells, and the coal pan is covered. Rather, Rava said an alternative explanation: When we were at the house of Rav Naḥman we would move a coal pan [<i>kanuna</i>] on account of the ashes, and we did this even though there were broken pieces of wood on it. Since the ashes can be used to cover filth, it is not set-aside and the coal pan may be moved due to the ashes. Even if there were also broken sticks on the pan that are useless, nevertheless they are nullified by the ashes. The Gemara raises an objection to this last remark from that which was cited previously: And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon agree that if there were fragments of a wick in the lamp, that it is prohibited to move it. Apparently, these fragments are not null and render the entire lamp set-aside. Abaye said: No proof can be cited from that <i>baraita</i> because they taught it in the Galilee, where oil is abundant and inexpensive. That is why broken wicks are not nullified relative to the oil (Rav Nissim Gaon).
  The Gemara relates that Levi bar Shmuel found Rabbi Abba and Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya, who were standing at the entrance of Rav Huna’s house. Levi bar Shmuel said to them: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to reassembling a weaver’s loom, which was typically a collapsible frame, on Shabbat? He said to him: It may well be done. He came before Rav Yehuda, asking him the same question, and Rav Yehuda said to him that Rav and Shmuel both said: One who reassembles a weaver’s loom on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering, as he performed a labor prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Levi bar Shmuel from the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who reassembles the branch of a disassembled candelabrum on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. With regard to the plasterer’s pole, which has several component parts, one may not reassemble it <i>ab initio</i>, and if he reassembled it, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, although it is prohibited. Rabbi Simai says: With regard to a rounded horn, which is a trumpet that can be dismantled and whose assembly is complicated, one who reassembled it is liable. However, a straight horn, which is easy to assemble, one who assembled it is exempt. Apparently, assembling an object that consists of several components on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law, and one is liable to bring a sin-offering for doing so. The Gemara answers: They said that it is permitted in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A bed frame, which is a wooden frame through which the ropes of the bed were interlaced, and the legs of the bed, and the archer’s tablets [<i>skibas</i>], which refers to the part of a bow upon which one pulls the arrow back, if they were detached from the bed or from the bow, one may not reassemble them, and if he reassembled them he is exempt.
  
  Daf 47b
  
  However, doing so is prohibited. And one may not fasten the pieces together forcefully, and if he fastens them, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing a labor prohibited by Torah law. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If it was loose and could be assembled with ease, it is permitted. Rabbi Abba and Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya relied on this opinion.
  The Gemara relates: In the house of Rav Ḥama, Rava’s grandfather, there was a collapsible bed, similar to a weaver’s loom, and they would reassemble it on a Festival. One of the Sages said to Rava: What is your opinion? Do you hold that this is allowed because it is building in an atypical manner? In other words, one is not performing the prohibited labor of building since it is was not performed in the standard manner? Although there is no Torah prohibition, there is, in any case, a rabbinic prohibition. Rava said to him: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who said that if it were loose, it is permitted even <i>ab initio</i>.
  MISHNA: One may place a vessel beneath the oil lamp in order to receive burning sparks of oil that fall from the lamp so that they will not cause a fire. And he may not place water into the vessel because he thereby extinguishes the sparks.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: How is it permitted to position this vessel to receive the sparks, doesn’t he thereby negate the vessel’s preparedness? It is no longer prepared for any use on Shabbat as the sparks accord it set-aside status. The opinion that negating the preparedness of a vessel is prohibited has already been stated. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Sparks have no substance. They burn immediately and do not leave behind any trace of oil in the vessel. Therefore, the vessel remains suitable to be moved.
  And we also learned in the mishna that one may not place water into the vessel situated beneath the candle because he thereby extinguishes the sparks. The Gemara remarks: Is that to say that we learned an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that even an action that causes extinguishing indirectly is prohibited? The extinguishing in this case, where water was placed into a vessel, was not accomplished by means of a direct action. His action only caused it to extinguish indirectly.
  The Gemara rejects this question in astonishment: And how can you understand it in that manner? Say that Rabbi Yosei said that indirectly causing extinguishing is prohibited on Shabbat; on Shabbat eve did he say this? And if you say that here, too, it is referring to a case where he placed water in the vessel on Shabbat, wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may place a vessel underneath an oil lamp to receive sparks that fall from the lamp on Shabbat, and, needless to say, placing it there is permitted on Shabbat eve? And one may not put water into the vessel because he will thereby extinguish the spark, even if he placed it there on Shabbat eve, and, needless to say, doing so is prohibited on Shabbat itself. Apparently, the prohibition in the mishna is not at all connected to Rabbi Yosei’s approach. Rather, Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, it is different here because, in this case, he is not only causing the spark to extinguish. He is hastening its extinguishing, as the sparks are extinguished immediately when they fall into the water (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). In this matter even the Rabbis would prohibit doing so.
  
  When a pot is removed from the fire on Shabbat eve it may be insulated in materials that preserve its heat, but not in materials that increase its heat. Raising the temperature of a pot is tantamount to cooking. The <i>mishnayot</i> that follow list those materials in which such a pot may be insulated on Shabbat eve and those materials in which it may not be insulated.MISHNA: In what may one insulate a pot of cooked food on Shabbat eve, and in what may one not insulate it? One may neither insulate it in the solid residue of produce that has been pressed free of its oil, nor in manure, nor in salt, nor in lime, nor in sand, whether those materials are moist or whether they are dry. All of these materials spontaneously generate heat when piled for an extended period. Therefore, they add heat to a pot insulated in them.
  And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that have been pressed for their juice, nor in soft material, e.g., from tattered clothing, nor in grass, when these materials are moist. However, one may insulate a pot in them when they are dry.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did we learn with regard to the residue of olives in the mishna, but the residue of sesame seeds that were pressed for their oil, which produces less heat, may well be used for insulating food on Shabbat eve? Or, perhaps, we learned with regard to the residue of sesame in the mishna, and all the more so insulating food in the residue of olives is prohibited?
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from what Rabbi Zeira said in the name of one of the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai: With regard to a basket in which one insulated food in a permissible manner, e.g., in dry soft material or the like, it is prohibited to place it upon the residue of olives. Conclude from this that we learned with regard to the residue of olives in our mishna; however, insulating food in the residue of sesame is permitted.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I can say to you that with regard to actual insulation, the residue of sesame is also prohibited. However, with regard to
  
  Daf 48a
  
  causing heat to rise, i.e., heating food that is not actually insulated in it, but merely resting upon it, the residue of olives causes heat to rise. Therefore, it is prohibited even to place cooked food upon it. However, the residue of sesame does not cause heat to rise to that extent. Therefore, it is permitted to place food upon it.
  The Gemara relates an anecdote somewhat relevant to the previous discussion: Rabba and Rabbi Zeira happened to come to the house of the Exilarch on Shabbat, and saw this servant who placed a jug [<i>kuza</i>] of cold water on the mouth of a kettle filled with hot water. Rabba rebuked him for having acted contrary to the <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabba: How is this case different from placing an urn on top of another urn, which is permitted on Shabbat? Rabba said to him: There, when he places one urn on top of another urn, he merely preserves the heat in the upper urn; therefore, it is permitted. Here, in the case where he places the jug of cold water on the mouth of a kettle, he is generating heat in the water in the upper vessel; therefore, it is prohibited.
  The Gemara continues: Rabba then saw that same servant spread a kerchief [<i>dastodar</i>] over a vat of water and place a cup used to draw water from the vat, on the kerchief. Once again, Rabba rebuked him for having acted improperly. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Why did you rebuke him? Rabba said to him: Now, see what will happen. Ultimately, he saw that the servant was squeezing out the water that was absorbed by the kerchief, thereby violating a Torah prohibition. Nevertheless, Rabbi Zeira said to him: How is this case different from that of a cloth [<i>parvanka</i>], which one is permitted to spread over a vat even on Shabbat? Rabba said to him: There is a distinction between the two cases: There, in the case of the cloth, he is not particular about it; even if it gets wet, he will not come to squeeze it dry. Here, with regard to the kerchief, he is particular about it, and he will wring it so that it will not remain wet.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that were pressed for their juice, nor in soft material. Rav Adda bar Mattana raised a dilemma before Abaye: With regard to swatches of soft material in which he insulated a pot, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to moving that material on Shabbat? Ordinarily, swatches of materials of that kind are set-aside because they have no use. Therefore, moving them on Shabbat is prohibited. Do we say that since they are now being used to insulate a pot, they assume the legal status of a utensil, which may be moved on Shabbat?
  Abaye said to him: Just because he does not now have a basket of straw in which to insulate his food, does he stand up and renounce his basket of soft material? Obviously, he would have preferred to insulate his food in straw, as it is less expensive. The only reason that he used that material was because there was no straw available at the time. However, he does not want the swatches of material to be used for any other purpose, lest it be ruined. Therefore, it remains set-aside.
  The Gemara asks: Let us say that the following <i>baraita</i> supports him: One may insulate a pot of food on Friday afternoon in woolen fleece, in combed wool, in tabs of wool dyed purple, and in swatches of soft material; however, he may not move them. Apparently, this is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: If that is the reason, there is no conclusive argument, as it is saying in the <i>baraita</i> as follows: If, however, he did not insulate a pot in them, he may not move them on Shabbat. In that case, they remain earmarked for their own purpose and are therefore set-aside [<i>muktze</i>].
  The Gemara questions this last assertion: If so, what is the reason to say that? Obviously, those materials are set-aside. The Gemara explains: Lest you say that all these materials are suitable for one to sit on them, and, consequently, their legal status is that of utensils, which may be moved. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not so, and they may not be moved due to the prohibition of set-aside.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥisda permitted returning stuffing to the pillow from which it had fallen on Shabbat. Rav Ḥanan bar Ḥisda raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda from a <i>baraita</i>: One may untie the neck opening of a shirt on Shabbat if it had been tied by the launderer; however, one may not open a new neck opening for the first time on Shabbat. And one may not place soft material into a pillow or into a cushion on a Festival, and, needless to say, one may not do so on Shabbat. This <i>baraita</i> contradicts the ruling issued by Rav Ḥisda.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to new pillows, whereas that, the statement of Rav Ḥisda is referring to old pillows. Stuffing a pillow for the first time on Shabbat is prohibited because by so doing one fashions a new utensil. However, if the stuffing fell out of the pillow, refilling the pillow is permitted even on Shabbat.
  The Gemara notes: That opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not place soft material as stuffing into a pillow or into a cushion on a Festival, and needless to say one may not do so on Shabbat. However, if the stuffing fell out, it may be replaced even on Shabbat, and needless to say that doing so is permitted on a Festival.
  Having raised the issue of opening a collar, the Gemara cites that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who opens a new neck opening in a shirt on Shabbat, by cutting through the fabric and threads that kept it closed, is liable to bring a sin-offering. By creating the opening, he renders the shirt fit to wear, thereby fashioning a utensil on Shabbat.
  Rav Kahana strongly objects to this:
  
  Daf 48b
  
  What is the difference between this and the stopper of a wine barrel, which the Sages permitted piercing on Shabbat in order to serve wine to guests? There, too, by piercing the stopper, he fashions a utensil. Rava said to him: The cases are not comparable: In this case, the neck opening of a shirt, it is considered a connection, i.e., it is an organic part of the weave of the fabric; whereas in that case, the stopper of the barrel, it is not considered a connection. Even though the stopper is sealed in place in the barrel, it is a separate entity. When the stopper is pierced, no new vessel is fashioned.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raised a contradiction before Rabbi Zeira. We learned in a mishna: The basting of launderers, garments that a launderer sewed together with loose, temporary stitches to avoid losing them; and a ring of keys; and a garment that was sewn with a thread of diverse kinds, e.g., a woolen garment that was stitched with linen thread, which must be pulled out; even though they are attached only temporarily, as they will all eventually be separated, it is considered a connection with regard to issues of ritual impurity. If a source of ritual impurity comes into contact with one of the garments, they all become ritually impure, until one actually begins to untie them, thereby indicating that he does not want them attached. Apparently, even when these items are not in use, e.g., after the launderer finished laundering the clothes, it is also considered a connection.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different mishna: With regard to a stick that one made into an axe handle, it is considered a connection between the stick and the axe with regard to issues of ritual impurity when in use. If the axe comes into contact with a source of ritual impurity, the stick also becomes ritually impure, and vice versa. By inference: Only when the axe is actually in use, yes, it is considered a connection; when the axe is not in use, no, it is not considered a connection.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: There, in the case of the axe, when not in use, a person is likely to throw the stick into the wood pile, as he is not particular about keeping them together. Therefore, it is not considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity. Here, with regard to the items listed in the first mishna, even when not in use, he prefers that they remain attached. In that way, if they get dirty, he can launder them again, as it is easier to wash one connected unit than several smaller swatches of fabric. Therefore, it is considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity.
  In Sura, they taught this following <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav Ḥisda; in Pumbedita, they taught it in the name of Rav Kahana, and some say, it was taught in the name of Rava: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this matter stated by the Sages: The status of anything connected to an object is like that of the object with regard to ritual impurity?
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The <i>tanna</i> in question is Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna: The receptacle for the cruse of oil, and the receptacle for the spices, and the receptacle for the lamp that are in the stove become ritually impure through contact, i.e., if the wall of the stove becomes ritually impure through contact with a creeping animal, the receptacles also become ritually impure. However, these receptacles do not become ritually impure through air space, i.e., if the creeping animal were inside the stove but did not come into contact with its walls, the stove itself becomes ritually impure, but the receptacles do not; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon deems the receptacles ritually pure, even if the creeping animal came into actual contact with the stove.
  The Gemara analyzes this dispute: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; he holds that these receptacles are not considered like the stove itself, and therefore they do not become ritually impure when the stove becomes ritually impure. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is difficult. If he holds that they are considered like the stove itself, then even if the creeping animal was in the stove’s air space, the receptacles should also become ritually impure. If he holds that they are not considered like the stove itself, then even if the creeping animal came into contact with the stove, the receptacles should also not become ritually impure.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, by Torah law, the receptacles are not considered like the stove itself, and the Sages are the ones who issued a decree that they become ritually impure due to their proximity to the stove. The Gemara asks: If the Sages issued a decree that they become ritually impure, then even in the case where the creeping animal does not come into contact with the walls of the oven, but is merely in its air space, the receptacles should also become ritually impure.
  The Gemara answers: The Sages made a conspicuous distinction, so that one will not come to burn his <i>teruma</i> and other consecrated items because of it. There is a severe prohibition to destroy <i>teruma</i> or consecrated items. If <i>teruma</i> becomes ritually impure, there is an obligation by Torah law to burn it; however, <i>teruma</i> that is ritually impure only by rabbinic decree is still fit by Torah law and may not be destroyed. Since there is concern that people will come to burn <i>teruma</i> even when doing so is prohibited, the Sages made a distinction, imposing ritual impurity on the receptacles only if the source of impurity came into physical contact with the walls of the stove, and not if it merely entered the stove’s airspace. In that way, it is clear that the ritual impurity is by rabbinic decree, and one will not come to burn <i>teruma</i> and consecrated objects due to that impurity.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to scissors made of component parts that are made to come apart and the blade of a carpenter’s plane, which can be removed from its handle, it is considered a connection between the components with regard to contracting ritual impurity. If one part becomes ritually impure, the other part becomes ritually impure as well. However, it is not considered a connection with regard to the sprinkling of the water of a purification offering. When water of purification is sprinkled on these implements in order to purify them from ritual impurity contracted through contact with a corpse (see Numbers 19:17–19), the water must be sprinkled on each part individually.
  The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, there is a difficulty: If it is considered a connection, it should be so considered even with regard to sprinkling; and if it is not considered a connection, it should not be so considered even with regard to ritual impurity. Rava said: By Torah law, when in use, it is considered a connection, both with regard to ritual impurity and with regard to sprinkling. And when not in use, even if the parts are now together, since they are made to eventually come apart and are typically dismantled, it is neither considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to sprinkling.
  
  Daf 49a
  
  And the Sages issued a decree that it should be considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity even when not in use, due to ritual impurity when in use. If one component becomes ritually impure, the other component becomes ritually impure as well. And, as a further stringency, they issued a decree that it is not considered a connection with regard to sprinkling even when in use, due to sprinkling when not in use. The water of purification must be sprinkled on each part individually.
  The mishna listed several materials in which food may not be insulated on Shabbat eve when those materials are moist. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the mishna referring specifically to materials that are moist due to their own natural state, or is it referring perhaps even to materials that are now moist due to something else, e.g., because they were soaked by liquid?
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the materials listed in the mishna: And one may neither insulate a pot in straw, nor in the residue of grapes that have been pressed for their juice, nor in soft materials, nor in grass, when these materials are moist. Granted, if you say that the mishna is referring to materials that are moist due to something else, this can be well understood, as all of these materials can get wet. However, if you say that it is referring to materials that are moist due to their own natural state, where do you find soft materials that are moist due to their own natural state? Wool is dry in its natural state. The Gemara rejects this argument: The mishna is referring to a case where the material is made from wool plucked from between the thighs of the animal, as that wool is usually damp from sweat.
  The Gemara continues with a similar question: And that which Rabbi Oshaya taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may insulate a pot of hot food on Shabbat eve in a dry garment and in dry produce, but not in a moist garment or in moist produce. Where do you find a ruling pertaining to a cloth that is moist due to its own natural state? The Gemara answers: Here too, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the cloth was made from wool plucked from between the thighs of the animal. The wool was spun and the cloth was woven while the wool was still moist. Consequently, there is no conclusive proof whether the materials listed in the mishna are prohibited only when naturally moist or even if they are moist due to another source.
  MISHNA: One may insulate a pot of hot food on Shabbat eve in clothing, in produce, in doves’ wings, in a carpenter’s wood-shavings, and in the chaff of fine flax. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits doing so when it is fine, and permits doing so when it is coarse.
  GEMARA: Since doves’ wings were mentioned in the mishna, the Gemara cites a related story: Rabbi Yannai said: Donning phylacteries requires a clean body, like that of Elisha, Man of Wings. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement that donning phylacteries requires a clean body? Abaye said: It means that one may not break wind while donning them. Rava said: It means that one may not sleep in them.
  The Gemara asks: And why did they call Elisha Man of Wings? Because on one occasion the evil kingdom of Rome issued a decree against Israel that, as punishment, they would pierce the brain of anyone who dons phylacteries. Nevertheless, Elisha would don them and defiantly go out to the marketplace. One day, an official [<i>kasdor</i>] who was appointed to enforce the decree saw him; Elisha ran away from him, and the official ran after him. When the official reached him, Elisha removed the phylacteries from his head and held them in his hand. The officer asked him: What is that in your hand? Elisha said to him: It is merely a dove’s wings. A miracle was performed: He opened his hand, and, indeed, it was found to be a dove’s wings. Therefore, in commemoration of this miracle, they would call him Elisha, Man of Wings.
  The Gemara asks: And what is different about doves’ wings from those of other birds that led Elisha to say that he had doves’ wings in his hand? The Gemara answers: Because the congregation of Israel is likened to a dove, as it is stated: “You shall shine as the wings of a dove covered with silver and her pinions with yellow gold” (Psalms 68:14). Just as this dove, only its wings protect it and it has no other means of protection, so too the Jewish people, only mitzvot protect them.
  We learned in the mishna: One may insulate food on Shabbat eve in a carpenter’s wood-shavings, and in the chaff of fine flax. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits doing so when it is fine, and permits doing so when it is coarse. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda referring to the carpenter’s wood-shavings, or is it referring to the chaff of flax?
  The Gemara answers: Come and hear proof as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: The legal status of the chaff of fine flax is like that of manure, i.e., it adds heat. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to the chaff of flax. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it.
  MISHNA: One may insulate cooked food on Shabbat eve in animal hides and may move those hides on Shabbat. So too, one may insulate food in wool fleece and, in contrast to hides, one may not move the fleece. How, then, does one act if he insulated food in fleece, and now wishes to remove the pot? He lifts the cover, which he is permitted to move, and the fleece falls by itself. He need not even touch it.
  Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If he placed the pot in a basket filled with fleece, he leans the basket on its side so that the fleece will fall to the side and takes the pot. Otherwise, there is concern lest the wool collapse when he lifts the pot from the basket. And then, he will be unable to replace the pot, as it is prohibited to move the wool to make room for the pot, since the wool is set-aside. And the Rabbis disagree and say: He may take the pot and afterward replace it.
  GEMARA: The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yonatan ben Akhinai and Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar sat, and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama sat with them, and they raised the following dilemma: Did we learn the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that only the hides of a common homeowner may be moved; however, the hides of a craftsman, whose profession is processing hides, since he is particular that they not be ruined because they are essential to his work, one may not move them on Shabbat? Or, perhaps, we learned the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that even the hides of a craftsman may be moved, and all the more so that hides of a common homeowner may be moved.
  Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar said to them: It stands to reason that we learned the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna with regard to the hides of a common homeowner; however, hides of a craftsman may not be moved, since he is particular about them. Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said as follows:
  
  Daf 49b
  
  My father was a tanner, and one Shabbat he said: Bring me hides and we will sit on them (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). In other words, even the hides of a craftsman may be moved on Shabbat.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to wooden boards belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat; however, those belonging to a craftsman, one may not move them. And if, however, he thought to place bread upon them for guests, both these, the boards of the homeowner, and those, the boards of the craftsman, may be moved. Apparently, the raw materials of a craftsman may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Wooden boards are different in that one is particular about them that they not be damaged. Hides, on the other hand, are not damaged when one sits on them.
  The Gemara cites another proof. Come and hear that which was taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: With regard to hides, whether they are tanned or whether they are not tanned, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat. The Sages said that tanned hides have a unique legal status, distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity. Only tanned hides become ritually impure. What, is it not saying that there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a homeowner and there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a craftsman; in both cases they may be moved on Shabbat? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring exclusively to hides belonging to a homeowner.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it true that they may not be moved on Shabbat? If so, that which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: The Sages said that the legal status of tanned hides is distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity; let the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> distinguish and teach within the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat itself, and say: In what case is this statement, that there is no distinction between whether or not the hides were tanned, said? It was stated specifically with regard to hides belonging to a homeowner. However, with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, no, if they were tanned they may not be moved. The Gemara answers: Since the entire <i>baraita</i> is speaking with regard to hides of a homeowner, it would have been forced to elaborate at greater length to introduce the distinction with regard to the hides of a craftsman than it did to introduce the distinction with regard to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara notes that this issue is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to hides belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat, and those of a craftsman, one may not move them. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to both these, the hides of a homeowner, and those, the hides of a craftsman, one may move them.
  The Gemara relates that those same Sages who sat and discussed the issue of hides, sat again and they raised a dilemma: That which we learned in the mishna: The primary categories of labor, which are prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, are forty-less-one; to what does this number correspond? That is to say, what is the source of this number?
  Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: They correspond to the labors in the Tabernacle. All types of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle are enumerated as primary categories of labor with respect to Shabbat. However, other labors, even if they are significant, are not enumerated among the primary categories of labor since they were not performed in the Tabernacle. Rabbi Yonatan, son of Rabbi Elazar, said to them that so said Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonya: They correspond to the instances of the words labor, his labor, and the labor of, that appear in the Torah a total of forty-less-one times.
  Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: The term his labor is written with regard to Joseph: “And it came to pass about this time, that he came into the house to do his labor; and there was none of the men of the house there within” (Genesis 39:11). Is it included in the count of the thirty-nine instances or not? Abaye said to him: And let us bring a Torah scroll and count the instances of the word labor and thereby determine whether or not there are thirty-nine instances without that one. Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in a case of similar uncertainty: They did not move from there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted them?
  Rav Yosef said to Abaye: I cannot reach a conclusion relying solely on a count because there is another instance of the term labor, whose meaning is not clear to me. The reason I am uncertain is because it is written with regard to the Tabernacle: “For the labor they had was sufficient for all the work to do it, and too much” (Exodus 36:7). The question arises whether or not this mention of labor is included in the count of thirty-nine instances, i.e., whether or not it refers to actual labor. And if it does, that verse with regard to Joseph should be understood in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the expression, to do his labor, is a euphemism. It means that it was to attend to his needs and engage in relations with Potiphar’s wife that he entered.
  Or, perhaps, the verse relating to Joseph: “He came into the house to do his labor,” is included in the count, and it refers to actual labor. And this verse: “The labor they had was sufficient,” is saying the following: That they completed the preparatory labor, i.e., they brought all the materials, not that they engaged in the actual labor. Let the uncertainty stand unresolved.
  With regard to the matter itself, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the thirty-nine labors of Shabbat correspond to the labors performed in the Tabernacle. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One is only liable for performing a labor to which there was a corresponding labor in the Tabernacle. They sowed in order to grow dyes for the Tabernacle, and therefore you may not sow on Shabbat. They reaped, and therefore you may not reap on Shabbat.
  They lifted the boards from the ground in the wilderness, which is a public domain, and placed them into the wagon, which is a private domain, and therefore you shall not carry objects in from the public domain to the private domain on Shabbat. They lowered the boards from the wagon to the ground, and therefore you shall not carry objects out from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbat. They took boards and other objects out and passed them from wagon to wagon, i.e., from one private domain to another private domain, and therefore you shall not take objects out from one private domain to another private domain on Shabbat.
  The Gemara expresses astonishment with regard to the last clause of the <i>baraita</i>: One who takes an object out from one private domain to another private domain, what prohibited labor is he thereby performing? The Gemara answers: It was Abaye and Rava who both said, and some say that it was Rav Adda bar Ahava who said: This is referring to taking an object out from one private domain to another private domain via the public domain, as the space between the two wagons in the wilderness was a public domain.
  We learned in the mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and he may not move it. Rava said: This <i>halakha</i> that fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only to a case where one did not insulate food in it. Only in that case is it set-aside. However, if one insulated cooked food in it, he may move it. By insulating food in the fleece, he indicated that he intends to use it on Shabbat.
  A certain Sage for whom it was his first day in that study hall raised an objection to Rava from our mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and one may not move it. How, then, does he act if he insulated food in wool fleece and now wishes to remove the pot?
  
  Daf 50a
  
  He lifts the cover, which he is permitted to move, and the wool fleece falls by itself. Contrary to Rava’s statement, even wool fleece in which a person insulated food may not be moved on Shabbat.
  Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rava said: This <i>halakha</i> that wool fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only in a case where one did not designate it for insulating food. However, if he designated it for insulating food, one may move it, as in that case, it is no longer set-aside.
  It was also stated that when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Asi ben Shaul said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This <i>halakha</i> that wool fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only in a case where one did not designate it for insulating food. However, if one designated it for insulating food, he may move it.
  Ravina said: In fact, Rava’s statement can be understood as it was originally understood, i.e., one who insulated food in wool fleece may move it because it is considered designated for insulating food. In the mishna that indicates otherwise they taught about wool fleece taken from a merchant’s shelves [<i>heftek</i>]. That wool was certainly not designated for insulating food. It will be returned to those shelves to be sold. Therefore, it is set-aside for that purpose and may not be moved on Shabbat, even if it is used to insulate food. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to wool fleece taken from a merchant’s shelves, one may not move it on Shabbat. And if a homeowner prepared the fleece to use it, one may move it.
  With regard to the question of what can be done to permit use of items ordinarily set-aside on Shabbat, Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught the following <i>baraita</i> before Rav: With regard to hard branches of a palm tree that one cut for fire wood or for construction, and then he reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for sitting, he must tie the branches together on Shabbat eve. This allows him to move them on Shabbat like any other household utensil. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He need not tie them together and, nevertheless, he is permitted to move them. Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught the <i>baraita</i>, and he said about it that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  On that same topic, it was stated that Rav said: He ties the branches together on Shabbat eve. And Shmuel said: If he merely has in mind on Shabbat eve that he wishes to sit on them on Shabbat, he need not tie them together. And Rav Asi said: If he even briefly sits on them on Shabbat eve, sitting on the branches is permitted the next day, even though he did not tie them together and even though he did not have that in mind.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, Rav, he stated his opinion in accordance with the unattributed opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, and Shmuel, too, he stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. However, in accordance with whose opinion did Rav Asi state his opinion? Apparently, he disagrees with both <i>tanna’im</i> who expressed an opinion on the issue.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Asi stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may go out into a public domain on Shabbat with combed flax [<i>pakorin</i>] or combed wool covering a wound, when he previously dipped them in oil and tied them to the wound with twine. If he did not dip them in oil or tie them with twine, he may not go out into the public domain with them. And if he went out with them for a brief period on Shabbat eve while it was still day, even if he did not dip them in oil or tie them with twine, he is permitted to go out with them on Shabbat. Apparently, there is a <i>tanna</i> who maintains that using an item before Shabbat enables one to use it on Shabbat as well. No additional steps are necessary.
  Rav Ashi said: We too have also learned in a mishna: Straw that is piled on a bed to be used for fuel or mixed with clay is set aside for that purpose and may not be moved. Therefore, one who seeks to lie on the bed may not move the straw with his hand, but he may move it with his body, as this is not the typical way of moving straw. However, if that straw had been designated as animal feed, or if there was a pillow or sheet spread over it on Shabbat eve while it was still day and he lay on it before Shabbat, he may move it with his hand. Apparently, even brief use before Shabbat suffices to permit use on Shabbat as well. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that there is a tannaitic opinion in accordance with which Rav Asi stated his opinion.
  The Gemara asks: And who is the unnamed <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the <i>baraita</i> cited above? He holds that in order to use palm branches for sitting, one must perform an action, e.g., tie them together, before Shabbat? The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Ze’iri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva once went to a certain place on Shabbat eve and found there hard branches of a palm tree that they had cut for fire wood. And he said to his disciples: Go out and have in mind that you will use them so that we will be permitted to sit on them tomorrow, on Shabbat. And, Ze’iri added, I do not know if the house where Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva went was the house of a wedding feast or if it was the house of mourning.
  The Gemara explains: From the fact that Ze’iri said: I do not know whether it was the house of a wedding feast or the house of mourning, it may be inferred that this <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to the house of mourning or the house of a feast because they are preoccupied with other matters and do not have time to tie the wood. However, here, in ordinary circumstances, if he tied the branches together, yes, it is permitted to sit on them on Shabbat; if he did not tie them together, no, it is not permitted.
  Rav Yehuda said: A person may bring a basket full of earth into his house on Shabbat eve, pour it on the floor, and use it for all his needs on Shabbat, e.g., to cover excrement. Mar Zutra taught in the name of Mar Zutra Rabba: That applies only if he designated a specific corner in his house for the earth.
  The Sages said before Rav Pappa: In accordance with whose opinion was this last ruling taught, that designating a place for the earth is sufficient to permit its use on Shabbat? It must have been taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with respect to palm branches, as if it was taught in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, didn’t they say that in order to permit use of an object that is set-aside on Shabbat, we require an action, e.g., tying the palm branches together? Thought alone is insufficient.
  Rav Pappa said to them: Even if you say that the <i>halakha</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the Rabbis stated their opinion that we require an action, only with regard to something with which it is possible to perform a preparatory action. However, with regard to something with which it is not possible to perform a preparatory action, no, they did not require an action. Since it is not possible to perform a preparatory action with the earth, one is permitted to use the earth by means of thought alone.
  The Gemara asks: Let us say that this issue, whether or not an action is required in that case, is parallel to a dispute among the <i>tanna’im</i>. As it was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: One may clean utensils on Shabbat with any type of cleaning agent, except for silver utensils with cream of tartar [<i>gartekon</i>], as that not only polishes the silver, but also smooths it. By inference: Cleaning with natron and sand is permitted.
  Wasn’t it taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Cleaning with natron and sand is prohibited on Shabbat? What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this following point? That one Sage, who prohibits use of sand on Shabbat, holds that an action is required in order to permit the use of items that would otherwise be set-aside on Shabbat. Since it is impossible to perform an action with sand, its use is prohibited. And the other Sage, who permits use of sand, holds that an action is not required.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: No, everyone agrees that an action is not required; and, nevertheless, it is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits use of sand and natron, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; that <i>baraita</i>, which permits their use, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara elaborates: This <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits use of sand and natron, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said with regard to the laws of Shabbat in general that an unintentional act is prohibited. It is prohibited to perform an otherwise permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues. Therefore, cleaning a silver utensil with sand or natron is prohibited because he thereby unintentionally smooths the utensil, which is prohibited on Shabbat. That <i>baraita</i>, which permits the use of sand and natron, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional act is permitted.
  The Gemara raises an objection: In what manner did you establish that <i>baraita</i>, which permits the use of sand and natron? You established it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. If so, say the latter clause of that same <i>baraita</i>: However, one may not wash his hair with them on Shabbat. And, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, he permits doing so. As we learned in a mishna:
  
  Daf 50b
  
  A nazirite, for whom it is prohibited to cut his hair, may wash his hair with sand and natron and separate it with his fingers; however, he may not comb it, as combing will certainly cause hair to fall out. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon permits washing hair even in a case where it is prohibited to cause hair to fall out; in his opinion, the fact that washing one’s hair might inadvertently cause that to happen is not a source of concern.
  Rather, both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita,</i> which disagree with regard to cleaning silver utensils with sand and natron, are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an unintentional act is prohibited. And there are two <i>tanna’im</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. They disagree with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. This <i>tanna</i>, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that sand and natron scrape and smooth the utensils. Therefore, their use on Shabbat is prohibited. And that <i>tanna</i>, also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that sand and natron do not scrape and smooth the utensils. Therefore, their use on Shabbat is permitted.
  The Gemara raises an objection: How did you establish that <i>baraita</i>? It was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. If so, say the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: But his face, his hands, and his feet, it is permitted to wash with sand and natron. Doesn’t he thereby cause hair to fall out? It should be prohibited according to Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the permission to wash one’s face with sand and natron refers to a child; and if you wish, say instead that it refers to a woman; and if you wish, say instead that it refers to a eunuch. All of them have no facial hair, and that is why there is no concern that use of sand and natron to clean their faces will cause hair to fall out.
  The Gemara continues: Rav Yehuda said: Washing one’s face with powdered frankincense (Rav Hai Gaon) is permitted on Shabbat, even if he has a beard, as it does not cause hair to fall out. Rav Yosef said: Washing with the solid residue of jasmine from which its fragrant oil was squeezed is permitted. Rava said: Washing with ground pepper is permitted. Rav Sheshet said: Washing with <i>berada</i> is permitted on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: What is <i>berada</i>? Rav Yosef said: It is a mixture of one-third aloe, one-third myrtle, and one-third violets. Rav Neḥemya bar Yosef said: Everywhere that there is a mixture with no majority of aloe, it may well be used. Even if the mixture contains more than a third aloe, as long as it constitutes less than a majority, it does not cause hair to fall out.
  The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to splitting olives on a rock on Shabbat in order to wash with the oil that oozes from them (<i>ge’onim</i>)? He said to them: And did they permit doing so on a weekday? Rav Sheshet holds that crushing olives in that manner is prohibited even during the week because it involves ruining food. After the olives are split in that manner, they are no longer fit for consumption.
  The Gemara comments: Let us say that Rav Sheshet disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel. As Shmuel said: A person may perform all his needs with bread, and he need not be concerned that it might be ruined. The Sages said in response: Rav Sheshet does not necessarily disagree with Shmuel. Using bread does not render it disgusting and inedible; splitting these olives renders them disgusting and inedible.
  The Gemara relates that Ameimar, Mar Zutra, and Rav Ashi were sitting on Shabbat, and they brought <i>berada</i> before them for washing. Ameimar and Rav Ashi washed with it; Mar Zutra did not wash. They said to him: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with that which Rav Sheshet said: Washing with <i>berada</i> is permitted on Shabbat? Rav Mordekhai, who was also there, said to them: Except for him, the Master; i.e., do not draw conclusions from Mar Zutra, as he does not hold that one is permitted to use <i>berada</i>, even on a weekday.
  Mar Zutra holds in accordance with that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may scrape off dried excrement crusts and scabs of a wound that are on his flesh because of the pain that they are causing him. However, if he does so in order to clean and beautify himself, it is prohibited. According to the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i>, it is prohibited to adorn or beautify oneself, as the verse: “Neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5) prohibits dressing or conducting oneself in the manner of women.
  The Gemara asks: And Ameimar and Rav Ashi, who permit use of <i>berada</i>, in accordance with whose opinion do they hold? They hold in accordance with that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person must wash his face, his hands, and his feet every day for the sake of his Maker, as it is stated: “The Lord has made everything for His own purpose” (Proverbs 16:4). Every beautiful thing that exists in the world sings the praise of God Who created beautiful things. Therefore, it is appropriate for one to beautify himself in praise of God.
  We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: If he placed the pot in a basket filled with fleece, he leans the basket on its side so that the fleece will fall to the side of the pot, and takes the pot. Otherwise, there is room for concern lest the wool collapse when he lifts the pot from the basket. Then he will be unable to replace the pot. It is prohibited to move the fleece to make room for the pot, since the fleece is set-aside. However, the Rabbis disagree and say: He may lift the pot and afterward replace it. Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: Everyone agrees, even the Rabbis, that if the cavity in which the pot had been placed was destroyed, its walls having collapsed inward, it is prohibited to return the pot to the basket.
  The Gemara asks, based on what we learned in the mishna. And the Rabbis say: He may lift the pot and afterward replace it. The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances? If the cavity in which the pot had been placed was not destroyed, the Rabbis say fittingly that it is permitted to replace the pot; why would Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya prohibit the practice? Rather, is it not that the Rabbis permit returning the pot even though the cavity was destroyed? Apparently, that is the subject of the dispute in the mishna.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, everyone agrees that if the cavity was destroyed, it is prohibited to return the pot to the basket. The mishna is dealing with a case where the cavity was not destroyed, and here the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to whether or not one need be concerned lest, if one is allowed to remove the pot from the basket without tilting it to the side, the cavity be destroyed and he will come to return the pot to the basket anyway. One Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, holds that one need be concerned lest the cavity be destroyed and he return the pot anyway; and the other Sage, a reference to the Rabbis, holds that one need not be concerned about that.
  The Gemara records several rulings with regard to placing an object into another object that is set-aside. Rav Huna said: With regard to this fragrant daffodil branch that was kept in a pot of moist earth in the house; if on Shabbat eve one inserted it into the earth, then pulled it out, and then inserted it again into the earth, it is permitted to pull it out again on Shabbat. By inserting it and then pulling it out, he has already widened the cavity in which the branch was placed. There is no room for concern that when he pulls it out again on Shabbat he will cause earth to shift from its place. And if he did not do so on Shabbat eve, it is prohibited to pull it out on Shabbat.
  Shmuel said: This knife that is stored between bricks; if one stuck it between the bricks on Shabbat eve, pulled it out, and then stuck it between the bricks, it is permitted to pull it out on Shabbat. And if he did not do so on Shabbat eve, it is prohibited to pull it out on Shabbat.
  Mar Zutra, and some say Rav Ashi, said: Placing a knife between the branches of a hedge of reeds (<i>ge’onim</i>) may well be done and there is no concern lest one come to cut the reeds when he removes it.
  Rav Mordekhai said to Rava: Rav Ketina raised a conclusive refutation of the opinions of Rav Huna and Shmuel from that which we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who conceals a turnip or radish in the ground beneath a vine for safekeeping, if some of its leaves were showing, allowing access to pull the turnip or the radish from the ground, he need neither be concerned;
  
  Daf 51a
  
  due to diverse kinds, i.e., that he violated the prohibition of planting food crops in a vineyard, as he did not commit an act of planting; nor due to concern that he violated the prohibition against working the land during the Sabbatical Year; nor due to tithes, i.e., that it would be considered as if he picked it from the ground and would be obligated to tithe it; and they may be taken from the ground on Shabbat. Even if most of the turnip or radish is underground, it is permitted to pull it from the ground on Shabbat. One need not be concerned about causing the earth to move. Apparently, this contradicts the opinions of Rav Huna and Shmuel, who were concerned about causing earth to move on Shabbat. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation of the opinions of Rav Huna and Shmuel.
  MISHNA: If one did not cover a pot of cooked food on Shabbat eve while it was still day, he may not cover it after dark. However, if one covered it while it was still day and it was uncovered on Shabbat, he is permitted to cover it even on Shabbat. One may fill a jug with cold water on Shabbat and place it beneath a pillow or a cushion to prevent it from getting warm.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted to insulate the cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold. There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rav Yosef said: What is Shmuel teaching us with this statement? We already learned in our mishna: One may fill a jug with cold water on Shabbat and place it beneath a pillow or a mattress to prevent it from getting warm.
  Abaye said to him: He teaches us a great deal. As, if it had been learned from the mishna alone, I would have said that the ruling that one is permitted to insulate cold food applies only to something that is not ordinarily insulated when it is hot. However, something that is commonly insulated when it is hot, no, it may not be insulated even when it is cold. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that this is allowed even in the case of something which is commonly insulated when it is hot.
  Rav Huna said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold. The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted cold food to be insulated on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement was made before he heard the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei; that statement in the <i>baraita</i> was made after he heard it. As in that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: Father permitted insulating cold food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: I retract my previous statement, as the Elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.
  Rav Pappa said: Come and see how much they loved each other. Had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, who took his father’s place and was as great a Torah scholar as his father, was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The Elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling.
  Rav Naḥman said to Daru, his slave: Insulate cold food for me on Shabbat, so that it will not become warm, and bring me water that a gentile cook [<i>kappeila</i>] heated on a weekday, as the prohibition to eat food cooked by a gentile does not apply to water. When Rabbi Ami heard this, he became angry. Rav Yosef said: What is the reason that Rabbi Ami become angry? Rav Naḥman acted in accordance with the rulings of his teachers; in one matter in accordance with the ruling of Rav, and in one matter in accordance with the ruling of Shmuel.
  The Gemara explains: In one matter in accordance with the ruling of Shmuel, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold. In one matter in accordance with the ruling of Rav, as Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said that Rav said: Anything that is eaten as it is, raw, and cooking it is unnecessary, even if it was cooked it is not subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles. Since water is commonly drunk uncooked, one may drink it even if it was boiled by a gentile.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ami became angry because he held that an important person is different. A distinguished person like Rav Naḥman should be stringent and distance himself from conduct that could be perceived, even mistakenly, as a prohibited act.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Although the Sages said that one may not insulate hot food, even in something that does not add heat after nightfall on Shabbat, if he comes to add to the material in which he insulated the food on Shabbat eve, he may add to it even on Shabbat. How should he do it? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: He takes the sheets with which he insulated a pot and places the heavy blankets, which provide better insulation, in their place. Or, if he is concerned about excessive heat, he takes the heavy blankets in which the pot had been insulated and places the lighter sheets in their place.
  And likewise, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, in teaching an additional leniency, said: They prohibited insulating a pot on Shabbat to keep its contents warm when the food remains only in the same urn in which the water was boiled. However, if one emptied the water from that urn into another urn, it is permitted to insulate the second urn to keep the water warm. The reason for the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is: It is prohibited to insulate a pot on Shabbat, due to concern lest one heat the food beforehand. Now that he has already taken steps to cool the water by pouring it from one urn to another, is there concern that he will boil it again on Shabbat?
  And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he insulated the pot and covered it with something that may be moved on Shabbat, or if he insulated it with something that may not be moved on Shabbat because it is set-aside and covered it with something that may be moved on Shabbat, he may take the pot to remove food and return it to its place and not be concerned.
  However, if he both insulated it and covered it with something that may not be moved on Shabbat, or if he insulated it in something that may be moved on Shabbat and covered it with something that may not be moved on Shabbat, if the pot was partially exposed, he may remove the pot and the cover will fall on its own and then return it to its place. And if the pot was not partially exposed,
  
  Daf 51b
  
  he may not remove the pot and then return it to its place.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: The chaff of fine flax is like manure. Therefore, one may not insulate food in it even on Shabbat eve.
  One may place a copper urn upon a copper urn, and one may place an earthenware pot upon an earthenware pot because the lower utensil will not heat the upper one. However, one may not place an earthenware pot upon a copper urn, or a copper urn upon an earthenware pot, as in that case there is concern that the upper utensil will be heated by the lower one. And one may seal the mouth of a pot with dough. All of the above may not be undertaken in order to heat the water, but only so that its heat will be maintained and it will not cool down.
  And just as one may not insulate hot food to keep it warm, so too, one may not insulate cold food to keep it cold. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted insulating cold food on Shabbat.
  And one may neither crush snow nor hail on Shabbat so that its water will flow and he will be able to drink it. That act involves creation of a new entity, water from ice, on Shabbat, which is prohibited. However, he may place the snow or the hail into a cup or a dish and allow it to melt on its own, and he need not be concerned.
  
  Due to the mitzva to rest one’s animals on Shabbat, one’s animal may not go out into the public domain bearing a burden. However, an object designated to protect the animal or to prevent it from fleeing is not considered a burden; therefore, an animal bearing objects that serve that purpose may go out into the public domain.MISHNA: The mishna asks: With what may an animal go out into the public domain on Shabbat and with what may it not go out? A camel may go out on Shabbat with an <i>afsar</i>, and a <i>naka</i> may go out with a <i>ḥatam</i>, and a <i>luvdekim</i> may go out with a <i>perumbiya</i>. All these terms will be defined in the Gemara. And a horse may go out with a chain around its neck.
  And, in general, all animals that typically have a chain around their necks when they go out to the public domain may go out with a chain on Shabbat and may be pulled by the chain.
  If these chains contracted ritual impurity, one may sprinkle waters of purification on them and immerse them in their place on the animal, and they need not first be removed.
  GEMARA: Several terms in the mishna were not clear to the Sages, and the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>naka</i> with a <i>ḥatam</i>? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: A white female camel (<i>ge’onim</i>) with an iron nose ring. And what is the meaning of <i>luvdekim</i> with a <i>perumbiya</i>? Rav Huna said: A Libyan donkey with an iron halter.
  Having mentioned a Libyan donkey, the Gemara relates that Levi once sent money to Bei Ḥozai to procure for himself a Libyan donkey, which is reputed to be of superior quality. They bound his money, returned it, and sent him barley, to say that the strides of a donkey depend on the barley that it eats. If one provides his donkey with better feed, its performance will be as good as that of a Libyan donkey.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The students switched the details in the mishna before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and asked: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this animal going out into the public domain with that which is permitted for that animal? For example, may a white female camel go out with a bit or a camel with an iron nose ring?
  The Gemara explains: The case of a white female camel going out with a bit should not be a dilemma for you; since it is not sufficiently secured by a bit, it is regarded as a burden with which the animal may not go out. The case where there should be a dilemma for you is that of a camel going out to the public domain with a nose ring. What is the <i>halakha</i> in that case? The Gemara explains the dilemma: Is the <i>halakha</i> that since a bit alone suffices to secure a camel, an iron nose ring is considered a burden? Or, is the <i>halakha</i> perhaps that with regard to a device that provides excessive security we do not say that it is a burden?
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that so said father, Rabbi Yosei: Four animals may go out with a bit: The horse, and the mule, and the camel, and the donkey. What does this list come to exclude? Is it not coming to exclude a camel going out with a nose ring? Apparently, the dilemma is resolved. The camel may go out only with a bit. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the list comes to exclude a white female camel going out with a bit.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A Libyan donkey and a camel may go out with a bit. The Gemara notes that the question whether or not an animal may go out into the public domain with excessive security is parallel to a dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A non-domesticated animal may not go out with a collar. Ḥananya says: It may go out with a collar and with anything that secures it.
  The Gemara clarifies the case: With what are we dealing here? If you say that we are dealing with a large non-domesticated animal, does a collar suffice for it? Since it does not sufficiently secure the animal, it is considered a burden, and it is prohibited for the animal to go out with it on Shabbat. Rather, it must be dealing with a small non-domesticated animal. In that case, doesn’t a collar suffice for it? Why then does the anonymous first <i>tanna</i> hold that the animal may not go out with it?
  Rather, is it not that the practical difference between their opinions is with regard to a cat? The anonymous first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds that since a small rope suffices for the cat, a collar is considered a burden with which the cat may not go out into the public domain. And Ḥananya holds that with regard to a device that provides excessive security, we do not say that it is a burden. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree whether or not a device that provides excessive security is considered a burden. The Gemara concludes: Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya. A device that provides excessive security is not considered a burden.
  The Gemara relates that Levi, son of Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya, and Rabba bar Rav Huna were once going together on a road. Levi’s donkey on its own initiative went ahead of the donkey of Rabba bar Rav Huna. Rabba bar Rav Huna was offended because he was the greater Torah scholar, and he thought that Levi went first to assert that he considered himself the greater scholar. Levi said to himself: I will say something to him, so that
  
  Daf 52a
  
  he will be placated and will understand that it was not my intention to disrespect him. He said to him: An undisciplined donkey whose conduct is wicked like this one that I am riding, what is the ruling with regard to having it go out with a halter on Shabbat? Typically, in order to secure a donkey, a bit suffices and it does not require a halter. A halter constitutes excessive security. However, the question is whether or not a halter that provides excessive security for a wild donkey like this one is considered a burden with which it is prohibited to go out to the public domain on Shabbat. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: Even if the security is considered extraneous, your father said the following in the name of Shmuel: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya, who said that a device that provides excessive security is not considered a burden.
  A Sage of the school of Menashiya taught a <i>baraita</i>: A goat in which one carved out a hole between its horns may go out with a bit on Shabbat. Because the bit is inserted through the hole, it will not become detached. Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: What is the ruling in a case where one inserted the bit through the goat’s beard? The Gemara explains the dilemma: Is the <i>halakha</i> that since, if the goat attempts to sever itself from the bit, it would cause it pain because the bit is attached to its beard, and therefore it will not come to sever it and the bit will remain in place? Or perhaps is the <i>halakha</i> that sometimes the knot will loosen and the bit will fall, and the goat’s owner will come to bring the bit and carry it four cubits in the public domain? No resolution was found to this dilemma. Let it stand unresolved.
  We learned there in a mishna: And neither may a cow go out with a strap between its horns. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Rav and Shmuel disagreed about this: One said: Whether it was placed for beauty, as an ornament, or whether it was placed to secure the cow, it is prohibited for the cow to go out with the strap between its horns. And the other one said: For beauty, it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow, it is permitted.
  Rav Yosef said: Conclude that Shmuel is the one who said that if the strap was placed for beauty it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow it is permitted. As Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya: A device that provides excessive security is not considered a burden. Therefore, an animal may go out on Shabbat with straps that provide excessive security.
  Abaye said to him: On the contrary, conclude that Shmuel is the one who said that whether it was placed for beauty, as an ornament, or whether it was placed to secure the cow, it is prohibited. As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The students exchanged the details in the mishna before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and asked: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this animal going out into the public domain with that which is permitted for that animal? And Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: So said father, Rabbi Yosei: Four animals may go out with a bit: The horse, the mule, and the camel, and the donkey. Does this list not come to exclude a camel going out with a nose ring, as a nose ring provides excessive security beyond that required for a camel? Apparently, according to Shmuel, an animal may not go out on Shabbat with a device that provides excessive security, as it is considered a burden. Rav Yosef said to him: Delete this latter statement of Shmuel due to that first one.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to delete this latter statement due that first one? Delete that first statement due to this latter one. The Gemara explains: The first statement is supported as we find that Shmuel is the one who said : For beauty, it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow, it is permitted, as it was stated that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: Whether the strap was placed for beauty, or whether it was placed to secure the cow, it is prohibited. And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: For beauty, it is prohibited; however, if it was placed to secure the cow, it is permitted.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If its owner tied a red heifer with its reins that are attached to the bit, it remains fit for use in the purification ritual. And if it should enter your mind to say that a bit is considered a burden, why does a red heifer remain fit for use? The Torah explicitly stated: “Speak to the children of Israel, that they bring you a red heifer without defect, in which there is no blemish, and upon which never came a yoke” (Numbers 19:2). A red heifer is disqualified by a burden.
  Abaye said: There, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the case of a red heifer whose owner is leading it from city to city. When the animal is removed from its habitat, it requires additional security. In that case, tying the heifer with its reins is conventional rather than excessive security. Therefore, the bit is not considered a burden. Rava said: A red heifer, whose monetary value is high, is different and therefore secured more carefully than other cows. Ravina said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a red heifer that is rebellious and headstrong. Therefore, it requires added security.
  We learned in the mishna: A horse may go out with a chain around its neck, and so too, all animals that typically have chains around their necks when they go out to the public domain may go out with chains on Shabbat and may be pulled by the chains. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: May go out, and what is the meaning of: May be pulled? Rav Huna said: These animals may go out either with the chain wrapped around their necks as an ornament, or they may be pulled by the chain. And Shmuel said: These animals may go out pulled by the chain; however, they may not go out with the chain wrapped around their necks as an ornament.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They may go out with the chains loosely wrapped around their necks, so that if the need arises, the animals will be able to be pulled by their chains. Rav Yosef said: I saw the calves of the house of Rav Huna go out into the public domain on Shabbat with their bits and with the reins wrapped around their necks.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The mules of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi go out into the public domain with their bits on Shabbat. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean that the mules went out with their bits and reins wrapped around their necks; or, does it mean that they were pulled by the reins?
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the following incident: When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The mules [<i>molaot</i>] of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out on Shabbat with their bits with the reins wrapped around their necks.
  The Sages said before Rav Asi: That statement of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda is not necessary. It may be derived from the statement of Rav Dimi. As, if it would enter your mind to say that Rav Dimi said that the mules of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out on Shabbat pulled by their bits, it is difficult. There is nothing novel in that statement, as it may be derived from the statement that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said.
  As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The students switched the details in the mishna before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and asked: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this animal going out into the public domain with that which is permitted for that animal? And Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: So said father, four animals may go out with a bit: The horse, and the mule, and the camel, and the donkey. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, a mule may go out on Shabbat pulled by its bit.
  Rav Asi said to them: This statement of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda is necessary, as if it were derived from the statement of Rav Yehuda, who related that which Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, I would have said that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said that before him, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not accept it from him. Therefore, that statement of Rav Dimi teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi indeed accepted it from Rabbi Yishmael and his mules went out with their bits on Shabbat.
  And if it had been derived only from the statement of Rav Dimi, I would have said that this applies only when the mule is pulled by its bit; however, if the reins are merely wrapped around the animal’s neck, no, the animal may not go out with it. Therefore, that statement of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda teaches us that the mules of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out on Shabbat with their reins wrapped around their necks.
  It was further taught in our mishna: If these chains contracted ritual impurity, one may sprinkle water of purification on them and immerse them in their place on the animal. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that these chains are fit to contract ritual impurity? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A ring worn by a person is ritually impure. However, the ring of an animal, and rings of utensils, and all other rings not worn by people
  
  Daf 52b
  
  are ritually pure.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: Our mishna is referring to ornaments that were transformed from their original designation for a person’s adornment to an ornament designated for an animal’s adornment. They had once belonged to a person who later affixed them in order to attach a strap to an animal. Their original ritual impurity does not cease when they are attached to the animal.
  And Rav Yosef said: Animals’ rings can become ritually impure since a person pulls his animal with them. Consequently, they are considered utensils used by people. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The metal animal prod becomes ritually impure? What is the reason that it becomes ritually impure even though it is an animal’s utensil? Since a person subjugates his animal with it, it is regarded as a utensil for use by a person; therefore, it can become ritually impure. Here too, with regard to chains, since a person pulls his animal with them, they are regarded as utensils for use by a person.
  And we learned in our mishna: If the animals’ chains became ritually impure, one may immerse them while they are in their place on the animal, and they need not first be removed. The Gemara raises a question: Isn’t this an obstruction that renders the immersion invalid? The rings of the chain are firmly attached to the chain, and there is no room for the water of the ritual bath to completely surround the chain.
  Rabbi Ami said: The mishna is referring to a case where he struck the rings of the chain with a hammer, widening them and thereby creating sufficient space to allow the water to surround the chain on all sides.
  The Gemara asks: Let us say that Rabbi Ami holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef. As, if he held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who said that our mishna is referring to ornaments that were transformed from their original designation for a person’s adornment to an ornament designated for an animal’s adornment, and therefore they can be ritually impure with impurity contracted while it was still a person’s ornament, it is difficult. Since he struck the chain, he performed an action which altered its identity, and the impurity would have ceased even without immersion.
  As we learned in a mishna: All vessels descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought. Even though an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to complete it, it immediately assumes the legal status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. However, they only ascend from their state of ritual impurity by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure. Hammering the rings is an action that effects physical change. Therefore, the chain should be ritually pure without immersion.
  The Gemara rejects this argument: Actually, Rabbi Ami could interpret the mishna just as Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa did, as he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an action performed to enhance a utensil is not an action capable of ridding that utensil of its ritual impurity, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda said: He did not say that an action that effects a physical change purifies a utensil of its ritual impurity with regard to an action performed to enhance a utensil; rather, he made his statement with regard to an action performed to ruin the utensil.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mishna is referring to a case where the rings attached to the chain are well spaced so that the water completely surrounds the rings of the chain with no obstruction.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: A certain disciple from the Upper Galilee asked Rabbi Eliezer: I heard that one distinguishes between one type of ring and another type of ring. However, I do not know with regard to what <i>halakha</i> this distinction is made. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Perhaps you only heard that distinction with regard to the matter of Shabbat; a ring for adornment may be moved on Shabbat and other rings may not. As, with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, this ring and that ring are one and the same, and there is no distinction between them.
  The Gemara raises an objection: And with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, are this and that one and the same? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A ring worn by a person is ritually impure; however, the ring of an animal, and that of utensils, and all other rings not worn by people are ritually pure? Apparently, a distinction is made between different types of rings with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity as well. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he too was saying to him that with regard to ritual impurity there is no distinction between different types of rings worn by a person.
  The Gemara raises another objection: And with regard to rings worn by a person, are this and that one and the same? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A ring that one fashioned into a buckle at the end of a belt to wear it around his waist, or into a clasp to tie garments between his shoulders, is ritually pure? The Sages only said that a ring is ritually impure with regard to a ring worn on a person’s finger. Apparently, there is in fact a distinction between different rings worn by a person. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he too was saying to him that there is no distinction between different types of rings worn on a person’s finger.
  The Gemara raises yet another objection: And with regard to rings worn on a person’s finger, are this and that one and the same? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A ring made of metal and its seal is made of coral, is ritually impure? The primary component of the ring, metal, is the determining factor, and a metal utensil can become ritually impure. However, a ring that is made of coral and its seal is made of metal is ritually pure. Apparently, there is a distinction between different types of finger rings with regard to ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he too was saying to him that there is no distinction between different types of rings that are made entirely of metal.
  And furthermore, that same disciple asked: I heard that one distinguishes between one type of needle and another type of needle. Still, I do not know with regard to what <i>halakha</i> this distinction is made. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Perhaps you only heard that distinction with regard to Shabbat. With regard to the prohibition of carrying from a private to a public domain, or vice versa, there is a distinction between a needle with an eye, for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and one without an eye, for which one is not. As, if you were to suggest that the distinction is with regard to ritual impurity, this, a needle with an eye, and that, a needle without an eye, are one and the same, and there is no distinction between them.
  The Gemara raises an objection: And with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, are this and that one and the same? Are all needles alike? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A needle whose eye or whose point was removed is ritually pure, as it is no longer fit for use? Apparently, there is a distinction between an intact needle and a broken one with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he was referring to a whole needle. Indeed, there is no distinction between different types of whole needles with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara raises another objection: And with regard to whole needles, are this and that one and the same? Is there no distinction between them? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to a needle that became rusty; if the rust inhibits the sewing, the needle is ritually pure; and if it does not inhibit the sewing, it is ritually impure. And the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: And that is the <i>halakha</i> that the needle cannot become ritually impure not only when it is impossible to push the needle through the fabric, but even when the mark of rusty needle is conspicuous in the stitching. Apparently, there is a distinction between different types of whole needles. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Eliezer was saying that statement to the disciple, he was saying to him that there is no distinction between different types of needles that were smoothed and filed. He was not referring to rusty needles.
  The Gemara raises yet another objection: And with regard to smoothed needles, are this and that one and the same? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A needle, whether it has an eye and whether it does not have an eye, may be moved on Shabbat? And we only said that a needle with an eye is different with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity. Apparently, there is a distinction between different types of smoothed needles with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara answers: Didn’t Abaye already interpret that <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rava as referring to unfinished needles? If a needle is unfinished, and it has not been perforated to create an eye, it cannot become ritually impure because it is not yet a utensil. However, if the needle is finished, whether it has an eye and is used for sewing, or it does not have an eye and is used as a pin, it is regarded as a utensil and therefore can become ritually impure.
  MISHNA: A donkey may go out on Shabbat with a saddlecloth that protects it from the cold when it is tied to the animal, and there is no room for concern lest it fall. Rams may go out <i>levuvin</i>. Ewes may go out <i>sheḥuzot, kevulot,</i> and <i>kevunot</i>. All of these terms are discussed and explained in the Gemara. She-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei prohibits the animals from going out with all of these items, as he considers them burdens, except for the ewes that are <i>kevunot</i>.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: Goats may go out on Shabbat with their udders bound to dry their milk supply and discontinue their lactation, in order to facilitate conception. In that case, they are tied with a tight, permanent knot, and there is no concern lest it fall in the public domain. However, they may not go out with their udders bound to conserve their milk, as in that case they are bound loosely.
  
  Daf 53a
  
  GEMARA: Shmuel said: And with regard to the <i>halakha</i> taught in our mishna that a donkey may go out on Shabbat with its saddlecloth, that only applies to a case where it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve. Rav Naḥman said: The wording of our mishna is also precise in support of Shmuel’s statement, as it teaches later in the chapter: A donkey may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat with its saddlecloth when it is not tied to its back.
  The Gemara clarifies the meaning of that mishna: What are the circumstances? If you say that the later mishna is referring to a case where the saddlecloth is not tied to the animal at all, that is obvious. There is concern lest the saddlecloth fall from the animal and its owner will come to bring it and carry it four cubits in the public domain. Rather, is it not referring to a case where the saddlecloth is presently tied to the animal, but it was not tied from Shabbat eve? By inference, conclude that the first clause, i.e., our mishna, which permits the animal to go out with its saddlecloth, is referring to a case where the saddlecloth was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the correct understanding.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A donkey may go out on Shabbat with its saddlecloth when it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve, and it may not go out with the saddle, even though it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The donkey may even go out with its saddle when it was tied to the animal from Shabbat eve, provided that he does not tie the strap with which the saddle is fastened around the donkey’s belly, and provided that he does not pass a strap under the animal’s tail, which is standard procedure when placing a burden on the animal.
  Rav Asi bar Natan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav Ashi: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to placing a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat in a private domain in order to warm the donkey with no intention to take it into the public domain? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said to him: It is permitted. Rav Asi bar Natan said to him: What is the difference between this and a saddle, which may not be moved on Shabbat? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi remained silent and did not answer.
  Rav Asi bar Natan thought that Rabbi Ḥiyya was of the opinion that even a saddle may be placed on a donkey on Shabbat. He, therefore, raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: A saddle that is on a donkey on Shabbat, and its owner wishes to remove it, he may not move it with his hand to remove it; rather, he walks the animal back and forth in the courtyard, and the saddle falls on its own. Now even with regard to removing a saddle that is already on the animal’s back, you said no, one may not move it; is prohibiting one from placing the saddle on the animal necessary?
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: Leave Rabbi Ḥiyya, and do not raise an objection to his statement, as he agrees with his teacher. As Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: One may hang a basket with fodder around the neck of an animal on Shabbat, and by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, derive that one may place a saddlecloth on an animal’s back on Shabbat. What is the <i>a fortiori</i> inference? Just as there, placing the basket of fodder so that the animal can eat without bending down, which is done for the animal’s pleasure, is permitted; here, placing the saddlecloth, which is done to prevent the animal from suffering from the cold, all the more so should be permitted.
  Shmuel said: A saddlecloth is permitted; however, a basket with fodder is prohibited. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef went and said the <i>halakha</i> of Rav before Shmuel. Shmuel said to him: If Abba, Rav, actually said that, he knows nothing at all about matters of Shabbat.
  When Rabbi Zeira ascended to Eretz Yisrael he found Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet who sat and said to him in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One may place a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat. Rabbi Zeira said to him: You have spoken well, and Aryokh explained the matter likewise in Babylonia.
  The Gemara asks: Who is Aryokh? It is Shmuel. Didn’t Rav also say that one may place a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat? With regard to a saddlecloth they agree. Why then did Rabbi Zeira attribute the ruling specifically to Shmuel? Rather, he heard Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet conclude: However, one may not hang a basket with fodder around the neck of an animal on Shabbat. It was that part of the statement that led him to say: You have spoken well, and Aryokh explained the matter likewise in Babylonia.
  The Gemara continues: In any case, everyone agrees that a saddlecloth is permitted. The question arises: How is a saddlecloth different from a saddle, which may not even be removed from the donkey? If the concern is for the animal’s suffering, why is it not permitted to remove the saddle? The Gemara answers: It is different there, as it is possible for the saddle to fall on its own. Therefore, there is no reason to permit its removal by hand.
  Rav Pappa said: There is a distinction between the two cases: Here, where the Sages permitted placing a saddlecloth on a donkey on Shabbat, it is to warm the animal. There, where the Sages prohibited removing a saddle, it is to cool the animal. Placing the saddlecloth to warm the animal is permitted because otherwise it experiences discomfort from the cold. However, removing the saddle to cool the animal is prohibited because the animal does not experience discomfort from excessive heat. And that is the folk saying that people say: A donkey, even in the summer season of Tammuz, is cold. Therefore, seeing to the animal’s warmth is more important.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the <i>Tosefta</i> to those who prohibit placing a basket with fodder around an animal’s neck on Shabbat: A horse may neither go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a fox’s tail that is placed as a talisman to ward off the evil eye nor with a string of red wool that is hung between its eyes as an ornament. Neither may a <i>zav</i> go out with his pouch that prevents his clothes from becoming sullied from his emissions, nor goats with a pouch that is on their udders so that they will not be scratched by stones, nor a cow with the muzzle that is on its mouth, nor foals with baskets of fodder that are around their mouths into the public domain. And an animal may neither go out with metal shoes that are on its feet, nor with an amulet that is placed on the animal to promote its good health, even if the amulet has proven effective. And this is a stricture that applies to animals beyond the strictures that apply to people, as a person is permitted to go out into the public domain with an amulet that has proved effective.
  However, an animal may go out with a bandage that is on a wound, and with splints that are on a broken bone so that it will heal properly, and with the afterbirth hanging from its womb. And one may plug the bell hanging from an animal’s neck to prevent it from ringing, and then the animal may walk with it in the courtyard, which is a private domain, but not in a public domain.
  In any case, it is taught here: Nor foals with baskets of fodder that are around their mouths into the public domain. By inference: It is specifically into the public domain that they may not go with fodder baskets in their mouths; however, in a courtyard, they may well walk with a basket of fodder. What? Is it not referring to large foals around whose necks fodder baskets are hung for their pleasure?
  The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to small foals, and the baskets are hung to prevent their discomfort. The legs of a young foal are long and its neck is short. Consequently, eating from the ground is difficult. Hanging the fodder basket around its neck enables it to eat without bending down. The Gemara adds: This is also precise in the language of the <i>Tosefta</i>, as it teaches the case of the foals
  
  Daf 53b
  
  similar to the case of an amulet worn for healing purposes. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the correct understanding.
  The Gemara further examines the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier. The Master said: Nor may an animal go out with an amulet on Shabbat, even if the amulet proved effective. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One may not go out on Shabbat with an amulet that has not proved effective? By inference: If the amulet proved effective, he may well do so. The Gemara answers: Here too, it is referring to an amulet that has not proved effective.
  The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> teach: Even if the amulet proved effective? The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to an amulet that proved effective for a person, and did not prove effective for an animal. The Gemara wonders: Is there an amulet that proved effective for a person and is not effective for an animal? Healing an animal should be easier than healing a person. The Gemara answers: Yes, an amulet aids a person, who is under the protection of an advocate angel [<i>mazal</i>]; however, it does not aid an animal, which is not under the protection of an advocate angel.
  The Gemara poses a question: If so, that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to an amulet that did not prove effective for an animal, but if the amulet proved effective, the animal may indeed go out into the public domain with it; what is the meaning of the phrase in the <i>Tosefta</i>: And this is a stricture that applies to animals beyond the strictures that apply to people? The <i>halakha</i> is the same with regard to both people and animals. If the amulet has proven effective, even an animal may go out with it on Shabbat. If it has not proven effective, even a person may not go out with it. The Gemara responds: Do you hold that this statement is referring to an amulet? It is referring to a shoe; an animal may not go out with a shoe on Shabbat, but a person may.
  With regard to whether and to what extent the discomfort of animals is a factor taken into consideration on Shabbat, the Gemara says: Come and hear that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may smear on oil and scrape off a scab on Shabbat for a person, and one may not smear on oil and scrape off a scab for an animal. Is it not referring here to a case where there is a wound, and he smears on oil and scrapes the scab due to the discomfort caused by the wound, and nevertheless it was permitted exclusively for a person and not for an animal? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, it is referring to a case where the wound has already ceased and healed, and he smears oil and scrapes due to the pleasure caused by the treatment.
  The Gemara cites an additional proof: Come and hear that which was taught in the following <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an animal suffering from heart congestion that restricts its blood supply and whose temperature has risen, one may not stand it in water so that it will cool off. However, with regard to a person suffering from heart congestion that restricts his blood supply, one may stand him in water so that he will cool off. Apparently, the suffering of an animal is of no concern. Ulla said: Here, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting all healing on Shabbat due to the crushing of herbs for medicinal purposes, which is prohibited by Torah law. The Sages prohibited cooling the animal in water lest one come to grind the ingredients used in the preparation of medicine.
  If so, the same decree should also apply in the case of a person. It should be prohibited to stand a sick person in water to cool him off due to the rabbinic prohibition against engaging in healing on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: In the case of a person, it appears as if he entered the water merely to cool off, not necessarily to cure an illness.
  The Gemara asks: If so, say in the case of an animal as well that it appears as if it entered the water merely to cool off, not necessarily to cure an illness. The Gemara answers: An animal does not typically enter the water on its own to cool off. Neither does one typically stand an animal in water to cool it off unless it serves some healing purpose. Apparently, due to a decree, the Sages were stringent and prohibited standing the animal in water even if it will die as a result.
  The Gemara now asks: Do we really issue a decree for an animal? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If an animal were standing beyond the Shabbat limit, a situation in which it is prohibited to go fetch it, he may call the animal and it will come to him on its own? And we do not issue a decree to prohibit calling the animal, lest he come to bring it himself. Apparently, the Sages did not issue a decree in a case where one could incur a loss and there is no actual transgression committed. Here too, it should not be prohibited to stand his animal in water due to a decree lest he come to grind herbs and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
  And Ravina said: No proof can be cited from this case, as here it is a situation where the animal’s Shabbat limit was subsumed within the limit of its owner. The animal strayed beyond its own Shabbat limit, which is determined by the Shabbat limit of the shepherd entrusted with its herding. However, the animal remained within the Shabbat limit of its owner, which extended beyond that of the shepherd. Consequently, the owner is permitted to call the animal so that it will return on its own. Even if he forgets and goes out to fetch the animal, he will not have gone beyond his Shabbat limit. The fact that the animal itself went beyond its Shabbat limit is of no concern.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The matter of the decree due to crushing herbs is itself subject to a dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of an animal that ate vetch, which caused a life-threatening case of constipation, one may not run it around in the courtyard to loosen its bowels due to the decree prohibiting healing. Rabbi Oshaya deems it permitted. Apparently, the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree whether or not healing is prohibited with regard to animals. The Gemara adds that Rava taught: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya.
  The Master said: Neither may a <i>zav</i> go out with his pouch, which prevents his clothes from becoming sullied by his emissions, nor goats with the pouch that is on their udders. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: Goats may go out with the pouch that is on their udders?
  Rav Yehuda said: This is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i> is referring to a pouch that is tied tightly to the udder. It is permitted because there is no concern that the pouch will fall. That <i>baraita</i> is referring to a pouch that is not tightly tied. It is prohibited because of the concern that the pouch will fall and a person will come to retrieve it.
  Rav Yosef said: Have you removed the <i>tanna’im</i> from the world? This is subject to a disagreement between the <i>tanna’im</i>, as we learned in our mishna: She-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei Rabbi Yosei prohibits the animals from going out with all of these items, as he considers them burdens, except for the ewes that are <i>kevunot</i>. Rabbi Yehuda says: Goats may go out on Shabbat with their udders bound to dry their milk supply and discontinue their lactation in order to facilitate conception, as in that case, they are tied with a tight, permanent knot. However, they may not go out with their udders bound to conserve the milk, as in that case they are bound loosely. Apparently, there are <i>tanna’im</i> who rule leniently with regard to attaching pouches to the udders of goats and permit the practice, and others prohibit doing so.
  And if you wish, say instead: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> were taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and nevertheless it is not difficult. Here, where the goats are permitted to go out with a pouch on their udders, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where it was done to dry their milk supply. There, where goats are prohibited to do so, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where it was done to conserve the milk.
  The Gemara adds: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the goats belonging to the residents of a house in Antioch whose udders were especially large and they would drag along the ground. And they made pouches for them so that their udders would not get scratched.
  The Gemara cites a related <i>baraita</i> in which the Sages taught: There was an incident where one man’s wife died, and she left him a son to nurse, and he did not have money to pay the wages of a wet-nurse. And a miracle was performed on his behalf, and he developed breasts like the two breasts of a woman, and he nursed his son.
  Rav Yosef said: Come and see how great this person is that a miracle of that magnitude was performed on his behalf. Abaye said to him: On the contrary, how dishonorable is this person that the order of creation was altered on his behalf. A miracle was indeed performed on his behalf; however, it was performed in a demeaning and unpleasant manner.
  Rav Yehuda added and said: Come and see how difficult it is to provide for a person’s sustenance. It is so difficult that the order of creation had to be altered on his behalf, which was apparently easier than providing him a source of financial support. Rav Naḥman said: Know that it is so, as miracles are often performed on a person’s behalf; however, it has not yet happened that food was miraculously created in a person’s home.
  The Gemara relates another unusual story. The Sages taught: There was an incident involving one man who married a one-armed woman, and he did not realize that she was one-armed until the day that she died. Rav said: Come and see how modest this woman was that her husband did not realize this about her. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: That is typical conduct for her, as a woman typically covers herself. All the more so a one-armed woman makes sure to cover her defect. Rather, say: How modest was this man that he did not recognize this in his wife.
  We learned in our mishna: Rams may go out <i>levuvin</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>levuvin</i>? Rav Huna said: Tied [<i>tutri</i>] in pairs. The Gemara explains: From where may it be inferred that this word <i>levuvin</i> is a term of closeness? As it is written: “You have drawn me near [<i>libavtini</i>], my sister my bride” (Song of Songs 4:9).
  Ulla said: <i>Levuvin</i> refers to animal hide that one ties over the hearts [<i>lev</i>] of rams so that wolves will not attack them. The Gemara asks: Do wolves attack rams but do not attack ewes? Why is this protection provided only to males? The Gemara answers: Because the males walk at the head of the flock. The Gemara asks: Do wolves attack the head of the flock but not the rear of the flock? Rather, the wolves prey specifically on the rams because they are plump. The Gemara asks: Are there no plump ones among the ewes? And furthermore, do the wolves know how to distinguish between these, the plump ones, and those, the thin ones? Rather, the wolves prey specifically on the rams because they raise their noses and walk while looking to both sides. The wolves think that they are preparing to attack them.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: <i>Levuvin</i> refers to animal hide that one ties under their male organ so that they will not mount the females. And from where do we derive that meaning? Because the latter clause states: Ewes may go out <i>sheḥuzot</i>. What is the meaning of <i>sheḥuzot</i>? It means that they fasten [<i>she’oḥazin</i>] their tails with animal hide so that the males may mount them more easily. It is reasonable to explain that the first clause refers to an action undertaken so that the males will not mount the females, and the latter clause to an action undertaken so that the males will mount them.
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this word <i>sheḥuzot</i> is a term of exposure? The Gemara answers: As it is written in the description of a wicked woman: “And behold there met him a woman
  
  Daf 54a
  
  with the attire of a harlot [<i>shit zona</i>] and wily of heart” (Proverbs 7:10). <i>Sheḥuzot</i> can be interpreted as an acronym of the words <i>shit zona</i>, attire of a harlot, with the letters <i>tav</i> and <i>ḥet</i>, which are similar in form, interchanged.
  We learned in the mishna: Ewes may go out <i>kevulot</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>kevulot</i>? It means that they bind their tails down with animal hide so that the males will not mount them. The Gemara explains: From where may it be inferred that this word <i>kavul</i> is a term meaning does not produce fruit? As it is written, when Solomon gave a portion of land to Hiram, he complained: “What cities are these which you have given me, my brother? And he called them the land of Kavul to this day” (I Kings 9:13).
  What is the meaning of the land of Kavul? Rav Huna said: That the people living there were bound [<i>mekhubalin</i>] and surrounded by silver and gold. Rava said to him: If so, is that what is written: “And Hiram came out of Tyre to see the cities which Solomon had given him, and they pleased him not” (I Kings 9:12)? Because the people there were bound in silver and gold, the cities were not pleasing in his eyes? Rav Huna said to him: Yes, indeed, it was precisely the abundant wealth that displeased Hiram. Since the people were wealthy and delicate, they did not perform labor. Hiram was seeking people whom he could enlist in the service of the king.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It was a sandy [<i>ḥomton</i>] expanse of land. And why was it called Kavul? It is because the leg sinks into it up to the ankle [<i>kavla</i>]. And people say in describing poor quality land: Land that is bound [<i>mekhabela</i>] shut, i.e., that does not produce fruit.
  We learned in the mishna: Ewes may go out <i>kevunot</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>kevunot</i>? It is that they covered [<i>mekhabnin</i>] the animal to produce fine wool. Sheep were wrapped in cloth from the day they were born so that their wool would remain perfectly clean and it could be used in fashioning especially fine wool garments. As we learned in a mishna: The color of a leprous sore [<i>se’et</i>] is like that of white wool. The Gemara asked: What is white wool? Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: Like the clean wool of a newborn lamb, which they cover from birth to produce fine wool.
  Our mishna continues: And the she-goats may go out with their udders bound. Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between a case where the udders were bound to dry the milk supply and a case where they were bound to conserve the milk. It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to the ruling in this dispute: Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  And there are those who teach this <i>halakha</i> independent of the mishna. Rav said: If the udders were bound to dry the milk supply it is permitted, and not if they were bound to conserve the milk. And Shmuel said: Both this and that are prohibited.
  And there are those who taught this dispute with regard to this <i>baraita</i>: Goats may go out with their udders bound to dry the milk supply but not to conserve the milk. In the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira they said: That is the <i>halakha</i>, based on the letter of the law, but who can cast lots to determine by sight alone which udder is bound to dry the milk supply and which was bound to conserve the milk? And since one cannot distinguish between them, the Sages said: Both this and that are prohibited. Shmuel said, and some say Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. In terms of practical <i>halakha</i>, according to all versions of the disagreement, Shmuel holds that it is prohibited in both cases. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the anonymous first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna. He permits goats to go out with their udders bound in all cases.
  MISHNA: And with what may an animal not go out into the public domain on Shabbat? A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth, nor may it go out <i>akud</i> or <i>ragul</i>, which are different ways of tying its legs together, as will be explained in the Gemara. And likewise, tying all other animals in those manners is prohibited.
  And likewise, one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes.
  GEMARA: It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: A camel may not go out with a saddlecloth tied to its tail alone. However, it may go out with a saddlecloth tied to both its tail and its hump, as in that case one can assume that the saddlecloth will not fall off. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A female camel may go out with a saddlecloth tied to its afterbirth. Because any movement of the saddlecloth will cause pain, the animal will not attempt to detach it. Therefore, there is no room for concern lest it fall.
  We learned in the mishna: A camel may not go out <i>akud</i> or <i>ragul</i>. Rav Yehuda said: <i>Akud</i> means that the animal’s foreleg and hind leg are bound together, similar to the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham, with regard to whom the term <i>vaya’akod</i> is employed. <i>Ragul</i> means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. That was done so that the camel would have the use of only three legs and would be unable to run away.
  The Gemara raises an objection from the following <i>baraita</i>: <i>Akud</i> means that the animal’s two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together. <i>Ragul</i> means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda holds in accordance with this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Akud</i> means that either the animal’s foreleg and hind leg or its two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together. <i>Ragul</i> means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it.
  The Gemara asks: And this <i>baraita</i> and Rav Yehuda’s statement are still not the same. Granted, the first clause, the first case of <i>akud</i>, and the last clause, the case of <i>ragul</i>, work out well. The <i>baraita</i> and the opinion of Rav Yehuda correspond. However, the middle clause is difficult. According to the <i>baraita</i>, when the animal’s two forelegs and two hind legs are bound together, that is also considered <i>akud</i>, contrary to Rav Yehuda’s opinion.
  Rather, Rav Yehuda stated his opinion in accordance with this <i>tanna</i>, who said in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Akud</i> means that the animal’s foreleg and hind leg are bound together, similar to the binding of Isaac, son of Abraham. <i>Ragul</i> means that one may not bend the lower part of the foreleg onto the upper foreleg and tie it.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may not tie camels one to the other and pull the lead camel, thereby pulling the others after it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Ashi said: Because he appears like one going to the market [<i>ḥinga</i>] to sell merchandise or to deliver a caravan of camels. In deference to Shabbat, one may not create that impression.
  The mishna continues: However, he may place the ropes tied to each of the camels in his hand and pull them all, provided that he does not intertwine the ropes. Rav Ashi said: This prohibition was taught not with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat but only with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of prohibited mixtures of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: Diverse kinds of what? If you say that it is referring to the prohibited mixture of the diverse kinds of man and animal, i.e., a person may not be tied to an animal, just as plowing with the diverse kinds of an ox and a donkey is prohibited, that is difficult. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person is permitted to plow and to pull a wagon together with all animals, as the prohibition is limited to diverse kinds of animals?
  Rather, the problem here is one of diverse kinds of ropes. If one rope is made of wool and another of linen, it is prohibited to intertwine them because that would create a forbidden mixture of the diverse kinds of wool and linen. However, this too is difficult, as, wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who attaches a swatch of wool and a swatch of linen with a single stitch or knot, it is not considered a connection with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds? All the more so in this case, where the ropes are not tied together at all but are merely intertwined, it should not be considered a connection.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, the problem here is one of diverse kinds of ropes, and the mishna is saying as follows: Provided that he does not intertwine the ropes and tie them together. Ropes that are intertwined and tied together constitute a double knot, which is considered a connection with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds of wool and linen.
  Shmuel said that there is another restriction that applies to pulling camels with ropes on Shabbat. It is only permitted provided that a handbreadth of the rope does not hang below his hand to avoid the appearance that he is carrying a rope in his hand on Shabbat. The Gemara raises an objection: Didn’t a Sage of the school of Shmuel teach a <i>baraita</i>: Provided that two handbreadths of the rope do not hang below his hand?
  Abaye said: Now that Shmuel said one handbreadth, and a Sage of the school of Shmuel taught two handbreadths, it is reasonable to conclude that Shmuel came to teach us the practical <i>halakha</i>. Even though the <i>tanna’im</i> permitted pulling the camel as long as there is less than two handbreadths of rope hanging below his hand, in practice, one should be stringent and not leave even one handbreadth hanging.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This is only permitted provided that he raises the rope one handbreadth from the ground? Apparently, there is no restriction with regard to the length of rope that may hang below the person’s hand. The Gemara answers: When this <i>baraita</i> was taught, it was taught with regard to the length of rope between the camel and the person holding it. That part of the rope may not sag to the ground; rather, it must be raised at least one handbreadth so that it is clear that the rope is attached to the camel.
  MISHNA: This mishna lists additional objects with which an animal may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat: A donkey may neither go out with the saddlecloth when it is not tied to its back, nor with a bell even if it is plugged to prevent it from ringing, nor with a ladder that is around its neck, nor with a strap that is around its leg.
  And the roosters may not go out with strings and not with a strap on their feet, which are tied there as a sign of ownership. And the rams may not go out with a small wagon under their tails, as it was common practice to put a small wagon under the tails of grown sheep so that the tail would not be injured by dragging on the ground.
  And ewes may not go out <i>ḥanunot</i>, nor may a calf go out with a <i>gimon</i>, nor may a cow go out with the skin of a hedgehog [<i>kupar</i>], nor with a strap between its horns. The mishna relates that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s cow would go out on Shabbat with a strap between its horns, contrary to the will of the Sages.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that a donkey may not go out on Shabbat with a saddlecloth if it was not tied to its back. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? As we stated above, there is room for concern that when not secured, the saddlecloth is liable to fall off the animal’s back, and its owner may come to retrieve the saddlecloth in the public domain.
  We also learned in the mishna: A donkey may not go out with a bell even if it is plugged to prevent it from ringing. The reason is that the animal’s owner appears like one going to the market, who adorns his donkey with bells in honor of market day.
  It was also taught in the mishna: Nor with a ladder that is around its neck. Rav Huna said: This refers to a device tied to the jaw. For what purpose does the owner do so to the animal? For a circumstance in which the animal has a wound, so that it does not chafe it again and exacerbate the wound.
  The mishna continues: Nor with a strap that is around its leg. The Gemara explains: What purpose does this strap serve? The owner does so to the animal to protect its strides. If its legs are slightly bent so that they knock against each other when the animal walks, a strap is tied there to prevent injury.
  We learned further in the mishna: And the roosters may not go out with strings. For what purpose does the owner place the strings? He does so to the roosters as a sign indicating to whom they belong, so that they will not be confused with other roosters.
  The mishna continues: Nor with a strap on their feet. The Gemara explains that the owner does so to the roosters so that they will not break vessels. When their legs are tied, they jump around less and cause less damage. The mishna teaches: Rams may not go out with a small wagon under their tails. The Gemara explains that these wagons were placed there in order that their tails will not be injured.
  The mishna teaches: And ewes may not go out <i>ḥanunot</i>. The Gemara relates that Rav Aḥa bar Ulla sat before Rav Ḥisda and he sat and he said: From when they shear the wool off the animal, they soak a soft swatch of wool or some other material in oil and place it on the animal’s forehead so that it will not catch cold until its wool grows back. <i>Ḥanunot</i> refers to animals with those swatches. Rav Ḥisda said to him: If so, you turned the animal into the Exilarch, Mar Ukva. That is treatment fit for him, not for a shorn sheep.
  Rather, Rav Pappa bar Shmuel sat before Rav Ḥisda, and he sat and he said: At the time that the animal crouches to give birth, those tending to the animal soak two swatches of wool in oil, and place one on the animal’s forehead and the other on its womb so that it will be warmed. <i>Ḥanunot</i> refers to animals with those swatches. Rav Naḥman said to him: If so, you turned the animal into Yalta, my wife, who descended from the house of the Exilarch. That is treatment fit for her, not for an animal.
  Rather, Rav Huna said: There is a certain tree in the cities on the sea shore, and <i>ḥanun</i> is its name. Those tending to the animal bring a wood chip from the tree and place it in the animal’s nose so that it will sneeze and the worms on its head will fall. The Gemara asks: If so, not only ewes but also rams should be given this treatment. The Gemara answers: Since the rams butt heads with each other, the worms fall in any event. Shimon the Nazirite said: <i>Ḥanunot</i> is referring to animals into whose nose the chip of a broom tree would be placed.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the explanation of Rav Huna that it is the chip taken from the <i>ḥanun</i> tree, that is why the mishna teaches the <i>halakha</i> employing the term <i>ḥanunot</i>. However, according to the explanations proposed by the other Sages, what is the reason that the mishna employed the term <i>ḥanunot</i>? The Gemara explains: Because we do something to the animals that indicates that we have mercy on them; <i>hanunot</i> in the sense of merciful.
  We learned in the mishna: And a calf may not go out on Shabbat with a <i>gimon</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: A calf with a <i>gimon</i>? Rav Huna said: A small yoke is placed on the calf in order to train it from an early age to bear a yoke. Rabbi Elazar said: From where is it inferred that this term <i>gimon</i> is a term of bending? As it is written: “Is it to bow down his head like a bulrush [<i>agmon</i>]” (Isaiah 58:5). There is an etymological similarity between the words <i>gimon</i> and <i>agmon</i>.
  The mishna continues: And a cow may not go out on Shabbat with the skin of a hedgehog placed over its udder. The Gemara explains that the owner does this to the cow so that creeping animals will not suckle from it.
  It was also taught in the mishna: And not with a strap that is between its horns. The Gemara notes: If this is explained according to the opinion of Rav, whether the strap was intended as an ornament or whether it was intended to secure the animal, it is prohibited for the cow to go out into the public domain with it. If this is explained according to the opinion of Shmuel, if the strap was intended as an ornament, it is prohibited; if it was intended to secure the animal, it is permitted.
  The mishna relates that the cow of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya would go out on Shabbat with a strap between its horns, contrary to the will of the Sages. The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya have only one cow? Didn’t Rav say, and some say that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya would tithe from his herds 12,000 calves each and every year? There were 120, 000 calves born in his herds annually. There is no way, then, to speak of the cow of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.
  The Gemara answers: It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: The cow was not his; rather, it was his neighbor’s. And because he did not protest her conduct and tell her that doing so is prohibited the cow was called by his name to his discredit, as if it were his.
  It was related that Rav, and Rabbi Ḥanina, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Ḥaviva taught the statement cited below. The Gemara comments: Throughout the order of <i>Moed</i>, wherever this pair of Sages is mentioned, exchange Rabbi Yoḥanan and insert Rabbi Yonatan in his place. In any event, they said: Anyone who had the capability to effectively protest the sinful conduct of the members of his household and did not protest, he himself is apprehended for the sins of the members of his household and punished. If he is in a position to protest the sinful conduct of the people of his town, and he fails to do so, he is apprehended for the sins of the people of his town. If he is in a position to protest the sinful conduct of the whole world, and he fails to do so, he is apprehended for the sins of the whole world.
  Rav Pappa said: And the members of the household of the Exilarch were apprehended and punished for the sins of the whole world. Because their authority extends across the entire Jewish world, it is in their hands to ensure that nobody commit a transgression. As indicated by that which Rabbi Ḥanina said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The Lord will enter into judgment with the Elders of His people and its princes, saying: It is you who have eaten up the vineyard; the robbery of the poor is in your houses” (Isaiah 3:14)? The question arises: If the princes sinned by committing robbery,
  
  Daf 55a
  
  what did the Elders, i.e., the Sages of that generation, do that was considered a sin? Rather, say: God will enter into judgment with the Elders because they did not protest the sinful conduct of the princes.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda was sitting before Shmuel when this woman came and cried before Shmuel about an injustice that had been committed against her, and Shmuel paid no attention to her. Rav Yehuda said to Shmuel: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with the verse: “Whoever stops his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard” (Proverbs 21:13)? He said to him: Big-toothed one, your superior, i.e., I, your teacher, will be punished in cold water. The superior of your superior will be punished in hot water. Mar Ukva, who sits as president of the court, is responsible for those matters.
  And from where is it derived that this responsibility is incumbent upon the house of the Exilarch? As it is written: “House of David, so says the Lord: Execute judgment in the morning, and deliver him that is robbed out of the hand of the oppressor, lest My fury go forth like fire, and burn so that none can quench it because of the evil of your doings” (Jeremiah 21:12). The Exilarch is a direct descendant of the house of David.
  With regard to the issue of reprimand, it was related that Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Simon: Let the Master reprimand the members of the house of the Exilarch, as Rabbi Simon had some influence over them. Rabbi Simon said to him: They will not accept reprimand from me. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Let my master reprimand them even if they do not accept it.
  As Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Never did a promise manifesting a good attribute emerge from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, and He later retracted it and rendered it evil, except with regard to this matter, as it is written: “And the Lord said to him: Go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a mark [<i>tav</i>] upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and that cry on account of all the abominations that are done in her midst” (Ezekiel 9:4).
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the angel Gabriel: Go and inscribe a <i>tav</i> of ink on the foreheads of the righteous as a sign so that the angels of destruction will not have dominion over them. And inscribe a <i>tav</i> of blood on the foreheads of the wicked as a sign so that the angels of destruction will have dominion over them.
  The attribute of justice said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, how are these different from those? He said to that attribute: These are full-fledged righteous people and those are full-fledged wicked people. The attribute of justice said to Him: Master of the Universe, it was in the hands of the righteous to protest the conduct of the wicked, and they did not protest.
  He said to that attribute: It is revealed and known before Me that even had they protested the conduct of the wicked, they would not have accepted the reprimand from them. They would have continued in their wicked ways. The attribute of justice said before Him: Master of the Universe, if it is revealed before You that their reprimand would have been ineffective, is it revealed to them? The Holy One, Blessed be He, retracted His promise to protect the righteous and decided that those who failed to protest would also be punished.
  And that is the meaning of that which is written: “Slay utterly old and young, both maid, and little children, and women; but come not near any man upon whom is the mark; and begin at My Sanctuary” (Ezekiel 9:6). And it is written in that same verse: “Then they began with the elderly men who were before the house.” Rav Yosef taught: Read not: My Sanctuary [<i>mikdashi</i>], rather: Those sanctified to Me [<i>mekudashai</i>]. These are people who observed the whole Torah in its entirety from <i>alef</i> through <i>tav</i>. And immediately: “And, behold, six men came from the way of the higher gate, which lies toward the north, and every man with his weapon of destruction in his hand; and one man among them was clothed in linen, with a writer’s inkwell by his side; and they went in and stood beside the bronze altar” (Ezekiel 9:2).
  The Gemara asks: Was there a bronze altar in the Temple in the time of Ezekiel? Already in the days of Solomon there was only a stone altar. Rather, this should be understood as a figure of speech. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Begin from the place where they recite songs of praise before Me. This is a reference to the Levites in the Temple whose musical instruments are made of bronze. And who are the six men mentioned here? Rav Ḥisda said: Fury, Wrath, and Rage, and Destroyer, and Breaker, and Annihilator, six angels of destruction.
  The Gemara asks further: And what is different about the letter <i>tav</i>, that it was inscribed on the foreheads of the righteous? Rav said: <i>Tav</i> is the first letter of the word <i>tiḥye</i>, you shall live, indicating that the righteous shall live. <i>Tav</i> is also the first letter of the word <i>tamut</i>, you shall die, indicating that the wicked shall die. And Shmuel said: The letter <i>tav</i> is the first letter of the word <i>tama</i>, ceased, indicating that the merit of the Patriarchs has ceased and will not help the wicked. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The letter <i>tav</i> is the first letter of the word <i>taḥon</i>, will have mercy, indicating that due to the merit of the Patriarchs God will have mercy on the righteous.
  And Reish Lakish said: The letter <i>tav</i> is the last letter of the seal of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as Rabbi Ḥanina said: The seal of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is truth [<i>emet</i>], which ends with the letter <i>tav</i>. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: The letter <i>tav</i> teaches that these are people who observed the entire Torah from <i>alef</i> through <i>tav.</i>
  With regard to the statement that the merit of the Patriarchs has ceased, the Gemara asks: From when did the merit of the Patriarchs cease? Rav said: From the days of the prophet Hosea, son of Beeri, as it is stated: “And now I will uncover her lewdness in the sight of her lovers, and none shall deliver her out of My hand” (Hosea 2:12). Israel will no longer be saved by the merit of the Patriarchs.
  And Shmuel said: The merit of the Patriarchs ceased since the days of Hazael, as it is stated: “And Hazael, king of Aram, oppressed Israel all the days of Jehoahaz” (II Kings 13:22). And it is written there: “And the Lord was gracious to them, and had compassion on them, and turned toward them because of His covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and would not destroy them; neither has He till now cast them away from His presence” (II Kings 13:23). That was the last time that the merit of the Patriarchs was mentioned.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The merit of the Patriarchs ceased since the days of Elijah the Prophet, as it is stated: “And it came to pass at the time of the evening sacrifice, that Elijah the Prophet came near and said, Lord, God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, let it be known this day that you are God in Israel, and that I am Your servant, and that I have done all these things at Your word” (I Kings 18:36). By inference: Let it be known this day and not afterward because the merit of the Patriarchs will cease today.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The merit of the Patriarchs ceased since the days of Hezekiah, as it is stated: “For the increase of the realm and for peace without end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice; from now and forever the zeal of the Lord of hosts performs this” (Isaiah 9:6). That is to say, from this point on, the merit of the Patriarchs will not protect Israel, leaving only the zeal of the Lord.
  The Gemara continues its discussion of punishment in general and the relationship between a person’s actions and the punishments meted out against him in particular: Rav Ami said: There is no death without sin; were a person not to sin, he would not die. And there is no suffering without iniquity.
  The Gemara adduces proof to these assertions: There is no death without sin, as it is written: “The soul that sins, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:20). A person dies only because of his own sins and not because of some preexistent sin. And there is no suffering without iniquity, as it is written: “Then I will punish their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with strokes” (Psalms 89:33).
  
  Daf 55b
  
  The Gemara raises an objection from the following <i>baraita</i>: The ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, why did You penalize Adam, the first man, with the death penalty? He said to them: I gave him a simple mitzva, and he violated it. They said to Him: Didn’t Moses and Aaron, who observed the whole Torah in its entirety, nevertheless die? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them, citing the verse: “All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him who sacrifices, and to him who does not sacrifice; as is the good, so is the sinner; and he who swears, as he who fears an oath” (Ecclesiastes 9:2). Apparently, death is not dependent upon one’s actions. Everyone dies.
  The Gemara answers: Rav Ami stated his position in accordance with this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Even Moses and Aaron died due to their sin, as it is stated: “And the Lord spoke to Moses and Aaron: Because you did not believe in Me, to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore you shall not bring this congregation in to the land which I have given them” (Numbers 20:12). Had you believed in Me and spoken to the rock as commanded, your time would not yet have come to leave the world. Apparently, even Moses and Aaron died due to their sins.
  The Gemara raises an objection from what was taught in the following <i>baraita</i>: Four people died due to Adam’s sin with the serpent, in the wake of which death was decreed upon all of mankind, although they themselves were free of sin. And they are: Benjamin, son of Jacob; Amram, father of Moses; Yishai, father of David; and Kilab, son of David. And all of them were learned through tradition, except for Yishai, father of David, with regard to whom there is an explicit verse interpreted homiletically, as it is written: “And Absalom placed Amasa in charge of the army in place of Joab, and Amasa was the son of a man named Ithra the Israelite, who had taken to himself Abigail the daughter of Nahash, sister of Zeruiah, the mother of Joab” (II Samuel 17:25).
  The Gemara asks: And was Abigal the daughter of Nahash? Wasn’t she the daughter of Yishai, as it is written: “And Yishai begot his firstborn Eliab, and Abinadab the second, and Shimea the third, Nethanel the fourth, Raddai the fifth, Ozem the sixth, David the seventh: and their sisters were Zeruiah and Abigail. And the sons of Zeruiah: Abishai, and Joab, and Asahel, three. And Abigail bore Amasa; and the father of Amasa was Jether the Ishmaelite” (I Chronicles 2:13–17)? Apparently, Abigail was the daughter of Yishai. Rather, the verse states that Abigail was the daughter of Nahash in order to teach us that she was the daughter of one who died on account of Adam’s sin with the serpent [<i>naḥash</i>], though he himself was free of sin.
  The Gemara now clarifies the matter: Who is the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> that states that four people did not die due to their own sins? If you say that it is the <i>tanna</i> who taught the conversation between the ministering angels and God, it is difficult, as weren’t there also Moses and Aaron who did not die due to their own sins? Rather, it must be Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that even Moses and Aaron died because of their own sins. Learn from it then that, in principle, he agrees that there is death without sin and there is suffering without iniquity, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Ami. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  Having mentioned the sins of some of the significant ancestors of the Jewish people, the Gemara now addresses several additional ancestors. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that Reuben sinned with Bilhah is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And it came to pass, when Israel dwelt in that land, that Reuben went and lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine; and Israel heard of it. Now the sons of Jacob were twelve” (Genesis 35:22). The fact that the Torah stated the number of Jacob’s sons at that point in the narrative teaches that, even after the incident involving Bilhah, all of the brothers were equal in righteousness. Apparently, Reuben did not sin. How then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And he lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine”? The plain understanding of the verse indicates sin. This verse teaches that Reuben rearranged his father’s bed in protest of Jacob’s placement of his bed in the tent of Bilhah and not in the tent of his mother Leah after the death of Rachel. And the verse ascribes to him liability for his action as if he had actually lain with Bilhah.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: This righteous person, Reuben, was saved from that sin of adultery, and that action did not come to be performed by him? Is it possible that his descendants are destined to stand on Mount Eival and say: “Cursed be he that lies with his father’s wife; because he uncovers his father’s skirt. And all the people shall say, amen” (Deuteronomy 27:20), and this sin will come to be performed by him? Is it conceivable that the members of a tribe would curse their ancestor? How then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And he lay with Bilhah his father’s concubine”? It is understood as follows: He protested the affront to his mother. He said: If my mother’s sister Rachel was a rival to my mother, will my mother’s sister’s concubine be a rival to my mother? He immediately stood and rearranged her bed so that Jacob would enter Leah’s tent.
  <i>Aḥerim</i> say: He rearranged two beds, one of the Divine Presence and one of his father. And that is the meaning of that which is written: “Unstable as water, you shall not excel; because you went up to your father’s bed; then you did defile it; he went up to my bed [<i>yetzu</i>’<i>i</i>]” (Genesis 49:4). Do not read it as <i>yetzu’i</i>, in the singular; rather, read it as <i>yetzu</i>’<i>ai</i>, my beds, in the plural, referring to both the bed of his father and to the bed of the Divine Presence, which rests in the tents of the righteous.
  The Gemara notes that the matter of Reuben’s innocence is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Unstable [<i>paḥaz</i>] as water, you shall not excel.” The Sages understood <i>paḥaz</i> as an acronym. Rabbi Eliezer says that it means: You were impulsive [<i>pazta</i>], you were liable [<i>ḥavta</i>], and you acted contemptuously [<i>zalta</i>]. Rabbi Yehoshua says that it means: You trampled the law [<i>pasata al dat</i>], you sinned [<i>ḥatata</i>], and you were promiscuous [<i>zanita</i>]. Rabban Gamliel says: The acronym does not refer to Reuben’s sin. It refers to his repentance: You prayed [<i>pilalta</i>], you trembled in fear [<i>ḥalta</i>], and your prayer shone forth [<i>zarḥa</i>].
  Rabban Gamliel said: We still need the explanation of the Modaite, as Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i said: Reverse the order of the letters in the word <i>paḥaz</i> and then interpret it homiletically: You shook [<i>zizata</i>], you recoiled [<i>hirtata</i>]; the <i>ḥet</i> in <i>paḥaz</i> is interchanged with the letter <i>heh</i>, so that you would not sin, and the sin flew [<i>parḥa</i>] from you. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i are of the opinion that Reuben did not sin. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua held that he did. Rava said, and some say that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Reverse the letters in <i>paḥaz</i> and interpret: You remembered [<i>zakharta</i>] the punishment for that offense, you made yourself gravely ill [<i>ḥalita</i>] in order to refrain from sinning, and you successfully withdrew [<i>peirashta</i>] from sinning.
  The Gemara prefaces the following statements of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani with a mnemonic: Reuben, the sons of Eli, the sons of Samuel, David, Solomon, and Josiah.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that the sons of Eli sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is written: “And the two sons of Eli, Hophni and Pinehas, were there priests of the Lord” (I Samuel 1:3).
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yonatan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav, as Rav said: Pinehas did not sin. And the verse juxtaposes Hophni to Pinehas; just as Pinehas did not sin, so too Hophni did not sin. The Gemara asks: How, then, do I establish the meaning of the verse: “Now Eli was very old, and heard all that his sons did to all Israel; and how they lay with the women that assembled at the door of the Tent of Meeting” (I Samuel 2:22), which indicates otherwise? The Gemara answers: Since the sons of Eli delayed sacrificing the bird-offerings of women who had given birth, a pair of doves brought as part of the purification process, and this delay caused the women not to go to their husbands in timely fashion, the verse ascribes to Hophni and Pinehas liability as if they had lain with them. They were guilty of nothing more than negligence and carelessness.
  The Gemara now examines the matter itself of Rav’s statement cited in the course of the previous discussion. Rav said: Pinehas did not sin, as it is stated: “And Ahijah, the son of Ahitub, Ichabod’s brother, the son of Pinehas, the son of Eli, was the Lord’s priest in Shiloh, wearing an ephod” (I Samuel 14:3). Is it possible that sin came to Pinehas’ hand and, nevertheless, the verse traces the lineage of his grandson, Ahijah, back to him?
  Wasn’t it was already stated with regard to those who engage in promiscuous relations: “The Lord will cut off from the man that does this, him that is awake and him that answers from the tents of Jacob, or any to present an offering to the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:12). The Sages interpreted the verse homiletically: If the sinner is an Israelite, he will not have among his descendants one who is sharp and awake among the Sages, or even one among their disciples who can answer questions. And if he is a priest, he will not have a son who will present a meal-offering. If Pinehas had sons and grandsons serving as priests, conclude from it that Pinehas did not sin.
  The Gemara asks: However, isn’t it written: “And how they lay [<i>yishkevun</i>] with the women.” The verb <i>yishkevun</i> is in the plural, indicating that both sons were guilty. The Gemara answers: It is written without a <i>vav</i> so that it can be read as <i>yishkeven</i> in the singular, i.e., how he lay, indicating that only one of them sinned.
  The Gemara asks further: Isn’t it written that Eli said: “No, my sons [<i>banai</i>]; for it is not a good report that I hear; you make the Lord’s people to transgress” (I Samuel 2:24). The fact that Eli referred to his sons in the plural indicates that they both sinned. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is written in a manner that can be read as my son [<i>beni</i>] in the singular.
  The Gemara raises another question: Isn’t it written: “You make the Lord’s people to transgress [<i>ma’avirim</i>] in the plural, indicating that both sons were guilty. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Here too, the word is written without a <i>yod</i> so that it can be read as: You cause the Lord’s people to transgress [<i>ma’aviram</i>] in the singular, indicating that only one of them sinned.
  The Gemara raises one last challenge: Isn’t it written: “Now the sons of Eli were scoundrels; they knew not the Lord” (I Samuel 2:12), indicating that they were both sinners. The Gemara answers: Since Pinehas should have protested Hophni’s conduct, but he did not protest, the verse ascribes to him liability as if he too had sinned.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says
  
  Daf 56a
  
  that the sons of Samuel sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And it came to pass, when Samuel was old that he made his sons judges over Israel…And his sons walked not in his ways but sought after unjust gain, and took bribes, and perverted justice” (I Samuel 8:1–3). By inference: In his ways they did not walk, however, they did not sin either. They were not the equals of their father, but they were not sinners.
  However, how then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And they sought after unjust gain,” indicating that they were sinners? It means that they did not conduct themselves in accordance with the actions of their father. As Samuel the righteous would travel to all places where the people of Israel were located and sit in judgment in their towns, as it is stated: “And he went from year to year in circuit from Beth-El, and Gilgal, and Mitzpa, and judged Israel in all those places” (I Samuel 7:16). And, however, they did not do so and travel from place to place. Rather, they sat in their own cities in order to enhance the fees collected by their attendants and scribes. Therefore, the verse ascribes to them liability as if they sinned by seeking ill-gotten gains and bribes.
  The Gemara notes that this matter is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse states: “And they sought after unjust gain.” Rabbi Meir says: This means that they vocally demanded their portions of the tithe due them as Levites, abusing their position to the detriment of other Levites. Rabbi Yehuda says: They imposed upon local homeowners to sell their merchandise and support them. Rabbi Akiva says: They took an extra basket of tithes, beyond that which was their due, by force. Rabbi Yosei says: They took only the gifts due them; however, they took them by force. They acted improperly, as a Levite is required to wait until he is given his gifts and may not take them.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that David sinned with Bathsheba is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And David succeeded in all his ways; and the Lord was with him” (I Samuel 18:14). Is it possible that sin came to his hand and nevertheless the Divine Presence was with him?
  However, how then do I establish the meaning of the rebuke of the prophet Nathan: “Why have you despised the word of the Lord, to do that which is evil in My sight? Uriah the Hittite you have smitten with the sword, and his wife you have taken to be your wife, and him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon” (II Samuel 12:9), indicating that David sinned? The Gemara answers: David sought to do evil and have relations with Bathsheba while she was still married to Uriah but did not do so.
  Rav said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who descends from the house of David, seeks to teach the verse in favor of David. With regard to that which is written: “Why have you despised the commandment of the Lord to do evil,” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This evil mentioned with regard to David is different from all other evils in the Torah; as with regard to all other evils in the Torah, it is written: And he did evil, and here it is written: To do evil. This unique phrase indicates that David sought to do evil but did not actually do so. His intentions were improper; however, his actions were proper.
  That which is written: “Uriah the Hittite you have smitten with the sword,” means that you could have judged him before the Sanhedrin as one guilty of treason against the throne, and you did not judge him in that manner. Instead, you had him executed in a manner that deviated from the generally accepted principles of judgment. With regard to that which is written: “And his wife you have taken to be your wife”; it means that you have rights of marriage with her, as by law Bathsheba was already divorced from Uriah.
  As Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who goes to a war waged by the royal house of David writes a conditional bill of divorce to his wife. That was done to prevent a situation in which the soldier’s wife would be unable to remarry because the soldier did not return from battle and there were no witnesses to his fate. The conditional bill of divorce accorded her the status of a divorcee and freed her to remarry. As it is stated: “And carry these ten cheeses to the captain of their thousand, and to your brothers bring greetings and take their pledge [<i>arubatam</i>]” (I Samuel 17:18).
  What is the meaning of <i>arubatam</i>? Rav Yosef taught: It refers to matters that are shared [<i>hame’oravim</i>] between him, the husband, and her, the wife, i.e., marriage. The verse should be read: Take the bill of divorce that determines the status of the relationship between husband and wife. As, apparently, it was customary for men at war to send their wives a conditional divorce, since Uriah later died, Bathsheba retroactively assumed divorced status from the time that he set out to war. She was not forbidden to David.
  With regard to that which is written: “And him you have slain with the sword of the children of Ammon,” it means: Just as you are not punished for soldiers killed by the sword of the children of Ammon in the course of the war, so too you are not punished for the death of Uriah the Hittite.
  What is the reason that David was not liable for the death of Uriah? Because Uriah was a traitor against the throne. As he said to David: “And my lord Joab and the servants of my lord are encamped in the open fields” (II Samuel 11:11). In the presence of the king, one may not refer to another as his lord. Doing so is treason.
  Rav said: When you analyze the matter of David, no sin that he committed is found in his lifetime, except for that involving Uriah. As it is written: “Because David did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, and turned not aside from any thing that He commanded him all the days of his life, save only in the matter of Uriah the Hittite” (I Kings 15:5).
  Abaye the Elder raised a contradiction between one statement of Rav and another statement of Rav: Did Rav actually say this? Didn’t Rav say: David accepted a slanderous report? Just as it is prohibited to relate a slanderous report, it is similarly prohibited to accept it. This contradiction remains unresolved, and it is difficult.
  The Gemara now examines the matter itself with regard to Rav’s statement cited in the course of the previous discussion. Rav said: David accepted a slanderous report, as it is written with regard to David’s search for a surviving son of Jonathan: “And the king said to him, to Ziba, Saul’s slave: Where is he? And Ziba said to the king: Behold, he is in the house of Machir, the son of Ammiel, in Lo-Devar [<i>belo devar</i>]” (II Samuel 9:4). Ziba indicated to David that Jonathan’s son was inconsequential, lacking any matter [<i>lo devar</i>] of Torah. And it is written: “Then King David sent, and fetched him out of the house of Machir, the son of Ammiel, from Lo-Devar [<i>milo devar</i>]” (II Samuel 9:5). That verse can be read that after sending for him, David found him filled with matters [<i>melo devar</i>] of Torah.
  Now, after David saw that Ziba was a liar, when Ziba once again slandered Jonathan’s son, Mephibosheth, why did David accept his report? As it is written that when David fled from Absalom, he met Ziba: “And the king said: And where is your master’s son? And Ziba said to the king: Behold, he is staying in Jerusalem, as he said: Today shall the house of Israel restore to me the kingdom of my father” (II Samuel 16:3). And from where do we derive that David accepted Ziba’s slanderous report? As it is written: “Then said the king to Ziba: Behold, all that belongs to Mephibosheth is yours. And Ziba said: I humbly beseech you that I may find favor in your sight, my lord, O king” (II Samuel 16:4).
  And Shmuel said: David did not accept Ziba’s slanderous report without substantiation. Rather, he himself saw conspicuous matters in Mephibosheth that indicated that Ziba was right. As it is written: “And Mephibosheth, the son of Saul, came down to meet the king, and he had neither dressed his feet, nor trimmed his beard, nor washed his clothes from the day the king departed until the day he came back in peace” (II Samuel 19:25). David thought that he was mourning the fact that he had returned in peace. And it is written: “And it came to pass, when he came to Jerusalem to meet the king, and the king said to him: Why did you not go with me, Mephibosheth? And he answered: My lord, O king, my servant deceived me; for your servant said: I will saddle me a donkey, and I will ride on it, and go to the king; because lame is
  
  Daf 56b
  
  your servant. And he slandered your servant to my lord the king; but my lord the king is like an angel of God: Do therefore what is good in your eyes” (II Samuel 19:26–28). “And the king said to him: Why do you speak any more of your matters? I have said: You and Ziba shall divide the estate. And Mephibosheth said to the king: Let him even take all, seeing that my lord the king is come back in peace to his own house” (II Samuel 19:30–31). Mephibosheth said to David as follows: I had hoped for your return, saying: When will he come in peace, and yet you do this to me, giving Ziba half of my estate? It is not against you that I have grievances, but against He who brought you back in peace. Mephibosheth’s own statement substantiates Ziba’s report about him.
  This is what is written: “And the son of Jonathan was Meriv-Baal” (I Chronicles 8:34). The Gemara asks: And was Meriv-Baal his name? Wasn’t his name Mephibosheth? However, since he entered into a quarrel [<i>meriva</i>] with his Master [<i>ba’al</i>], i.e., God, and complained about God having saved David, a Divine Voice emerged and said to him: Quarrelsome one, the son of a quarrelsome one; you are just like your father, Saul. The Gemara explains: Quarrelsome one; that which we just said that Mephibosheth complained to God about His salvation of David. The son of a quarrelsome one; as it is written: “And Saul came to a city of Amalek and quarreled in the valley” (I Samuel 15:5). And Rabbi Mani said: Saul quarreled with God with regard to matters of the valley, saying: For the murder of even a single person, there is a commandment to break the neck of a heifer in a valley to atone for the crime (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9); why then must all these Amalekites be killed?
  To the matter at hand: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: When David said to Mephibosheth: You and Ziba shall divide the estate, a Divine Voice emerged and said to him: Rehoboam and Jeroboam shall divide the kingdom.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Had David not accepted Ziba’s slanderous report about Mephibosheth, the kingdom of the house of David would not have been divided, Israel would not have worshipped idols because of Jeroboam, and we would not have been exiled from our land.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that King Solomon sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And his heart was not perfect with the Lord his God, as was the heart of David, his father” (I Kings 11:4). By inference: Solomon’s heart was not equal to the heart of David, his father; however, he also did not sin.
  However, how then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart after other gods” (I Kings 11:4)? That verse is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Natan; as Rabbi Natan raised a contradiction between the two parts of the verse. On the one hand, it is written: “For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart after other gods.” On the other hand, isn’t it written: “And his heart was not perfect with the Lord his God, as was the heart of David his father,” indicating that Solomon’s heart was not equal to the heart of David his father; however, he also did not sin? Rather, the verse says as follows: For it came to pass, when Solomon was old, that his wives turned away his heart, in an attempt to spur him to go after other gods; however, he did not go after them.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: “Then did Solomon build [<i>yivne</i>] an altar for Kemosh, the abomination of Moab, in the hill that is before Jerusalem, and for Molech, the abomination of the children of Ammon” (I Kings 11:7), indicating that Solomon did in fact stray after idols? The Gemara answers: This can be understood to mean that Solomon sought to build an altar for idols but did not build it.
  The Gemara objects: But now if that is the way to understand the future tense verb form <i>yivne</i>, what of another instance where the same form is employed: “Then did Joshua build [<i>yivne</i>] an altar to the Lord God of Israel in Mount Eival” (Joshua 8:30)? There too, would you say that Joshua sought to build an altar but did not build one? Rather, there, in the case of Joshua, it means that he actually built it. Here too, with regard to Solomon, it means that he actually built the altar.
  Rather, this verse should be understood as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: The verse states: “And the altars that were before Jerusalem, which were on the right hand of the Mount of Olives, which Solomon the king of Israel had built for Ashtoret the abomination of the Zidonim, and for Kemosh the abomination of Moab, and for Milkom the abomination of the children of Ammon, did the king defile” (II Kings 23:13). All these were destroyed by Josiah.
  The Gemara asks: Is it possible that the righteous king Asa came and did not destroy them, and the righteous king Jehosaphat came and did not destroy them until Josiah came and destroyed them? Didn’t Asa and Jehosaphat destroy all the idolatry in Eretz Yisrael? Rather, the verse juxtaposes the earlier ones, i.e., Solomon, to the later ones, i.e., Josiah. Just as the later ones, Josiah, did not effect the destruction of the altars, as it was done by his predecessors, and nevertheless the verse attributes it to him to praise him as if he had destroyed all those altars, so too, the earlier ones, Solomon, did not effect the construction, and nevertheless the verse attributes it to him to disgrace him as he did not prevent their construction.
  The Gemara raises another question. Isn’t it written: “And Solomon did evil in the sight of the Lord” (I Kings 11:6), clearly indicating that Solomon sinned? Rather, since he should have protested against the conduct of his wives, i.e., their involvement in idolatry, but he did not protest, the verse ascribes to him liability as if he had sinned.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It would have been preferable for that righteous man, Solomon, to be a servant tasked with drawing water and hewing wood for another matter, i.e., idolatry, and not have the verse write about him: “And he did evil in the sight of the Lord,” even though he did not.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: When Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter, she brought to him a thousand musical instruments and said to him: This is the way we do it for this idolatry, and this is the way we do it for that idolatry, and he did not protest that talk.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: When Solomon married Pharaoh’s daughter, the angel Gabriel descended from heaven and implanted a reed into the sea, and a sandbar grew around it, growing larger each year, and upon it the great city of Rome was built, which became God’s instrument to punish Israel.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On that very day that Jeroboam introduced two golden calves, one in Beth-El and the other in Dan, a single small hut was constructed, which was the first house constructed there. And that was the inauguration of Italy of Greece.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: Anyone who says that Josiah sinned is nothing other than mistaken, as it is stated: “And he did that which was right in the sight of the Lord, and walked in all the way of David his father, and turned not aside to the right hand nor to the left” (II Kings 22:2). However, how then do I establish the meaning of the verse: “And like him was there no king before him that returned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his might, according to all the Torah of Moses; neither after him arose there any like him” (II Kings 23:25)? The verse states: Josiah returned to the Lord. Apparently, in his early days he was a sinner, and later he returned to God.
  The Gemara answers: The reference here is not to repentance for actual sins that Josiah committed. Rather, in every judgment that he issued from the age of eight, when he was crowned, until the age of eighteen, he returned the money to the parties whom he judged liable, due to concern that in his youth he may not have judged the cases correctly. And lest you say that he took from this one, whom he exonerated, and gave to that one, whom he found culpable, therefore the verse states: Returned to the Lord with all his might [<i>me’odo</i>], i.e., with all his money. It means that he gave those he judged liable in his youth from his own money.
  The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yonatan disagrees with Rav, as Rav said: There is no greater penitent than Josiah in his generation, and there is one in our generation. The Gemara asks: And who is the great penitent in Rav’s generation? The Gemara answers: He is Abba, father of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, and some say it is Aḥa, brother of Abba, father of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, as the Master said: Rabbi Abba and Aḥa were brothers.
  Rav Yosef said: And there is another great penitent in our generation. And who is he? He is Okvan, son of Neḥemya the Exilarch. And that is the one also known as Natan <i>detzutzita</i>, i.e., from whose head sparks emerged. Rav Yosef said: I was once sitting at the lecture delivered on the Festival [<i>pirka</i>] and I was dozing. And I saw in a dream how an angel stretched out his hands and received Natan <i>detzutzita</i>, demonstrating that his repentance was accepted.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  The mishna lists items that a woman may or may not carry into, or wear in the public domain on Shabbat. This depends on whether the particular object is considered an ornament, which she may wear, or merely a burden for the woman, which she may not. Even if it is considered an ornament, there is still concern that she might remove it and carry it in her hand in the public domain, which is prohibited by Torah law.MISHNA: With what items may a woman go out into the public domain on Shabbat and with what items may she not go out?
  A woman may neither go out with strings of wool, nor with strings of flax, nor with strips of any other materials that a woman braids in the hair of her head. And a woman may not immerse in a ritual bath with them in her hair until she loosens them. When the strings or strips are tight, the water cannot reach her hair unobstructed, invalidating her immersion.
  And, likewise, a woman may neither go out with the ornament called <i>totefet</i>, nor with <i>sarvitin</i> that are not sewn into her head covering, nor with a <i>kavul</i> into the public domain.
  And, likewise, a woman may neither go out with a city of gold ornament, nor with a <i>katla</i> ornament, nor with nose rings, nor with a ring that has no seal on it, nor with a needle that is not perforated, which are merely for decorative purposes.
  And if she unwittingly went out wearing any of these, she is not liable to bring a sin-offering. According to Torah law, a woman is permitted to go out into the public domain wearing ornaments. However, the Sages decreed that a woman may not go out wearing certain ornaments, lest she remove them to show them to another and inadvertently carry them four cubits in the public domain.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Immersion, who mentioned anything about that? The mishna is dealing with the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, so why did it mention the <i>halakhot</i> of immersion?
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rabba bar Avuh said: When the mishna states the <i>halakha</i>, it employs the style known as: What is the reason. The mention of immersion is an explanation, not a superfluous addition. The mishna should be understood as follows: What is the reason that a woman may neither go out with strings of wool nor with strings of flax? It is because the Sages said that on weekdays she may not immerse with them until she loosens them. And since on weekdays she may not immerse with them until she loosens them, on Shabbat she may not go out with them, lest a situation requiring immersion for the purpose of a mitzva come about, and she untie them, and come to carry them four cubits in the public domain.
  Rav Kahana raised a dilemma before Rav: With regard to strings made into hollow chains, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it permissible for women to go out into the public domain with them on Shabbat or not? It depends on whether they are considered an interposition to immersion. Rav said to him: Woven, you say? With regard to anything woven, the Sages did not issue a decree. Because water reaches the hair unobstructed, there is no need to loosen the hollow chain and there is no concern lest she carry it in the public domain. It was also stated that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: With regard to anything woven, the Sages did not issue a decree.
  And some say that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: I saw that my sisters are not particular about removing them, and they bathe even with woven chains tied in their hair. Apparently, water reaches the hair. Therefore, the chain is not an interposition with regard to immersion.
  The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between this version and that version of the resolution of the dilemma?
  The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the chains are dirty. According to this version, in which you said: With regard to anything woven, the Sages did not issue a decree, these too are woven. And according to that version, in which you said that it is due to the fact that his sisters were not particular; in this case, since they are dirty, she is particular about them and will certainly remove them when she washes. Therefore, she is required to do so when immersing in a ritual bath as well.
  We learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Mikvaot</i>: And these are the objects that interpose for a person: Strings of wool, and strings of flax, and the straps that are on the girls’ heads. Rabbi Yehuda says: Strings of wool and strands of hair do not interpose because the water reaches the hair through them. Rav Huna said: And we learned all these, strings of wool and flax, in a case where they are used to tie the hair on the girls’ heads.
  Rav Yosef strongly objects to this <i>halakha</i> of Rav Huna: To exclude what other places in the body did Rav Huna say this? If you say that it comes to exclude strings tied to the neck, and then, strings made of what material does it exclude? If you say that it comes to exclude strings of wool, now, the mishna stated that soft strings of wool on top of hair, which is relatively hard, interpose and invalidates the immersion. With regard to soft strings on top of the soft flesh of the neck, is it necessary to say that they interpose?
  Rather, say that Rav Huna’s statement came to exclude strings of flax. A similar difficulty arises: Now the mishna stated that hard strings of wool on top of hair, which is hard, interposes and invalidates the immersion. If so, with regard to hard strings on top of the soft flesh of the neck, is it necessary to say that they interpose?
  Rather, Rav Yosef said, this is the reason that Rav Huna restricts the concern for interposition to strings tied in her hair and not around her neck: Because a woman does not strangle herself when adorning herself with a string or straps around her neck. Therefore, she never tightens the strings or straps to the extent that water cannot reach the skin.
  Abaye raised an objection to the explanation of Rav Yosef from a <i>baraita</i>: The girls may go out into the public domain on Shabbat with strings in their ears. Young girls would have their ears pierced, but earrings were not placed in their ears until they were older. Instead, they inserted strings so that the holes would not close. However, they may not go out with straps around their necks. And if you say that the principle: A woman does not strangle herself, is halakhically valid, why may they not go out into the public domain with straps around their necks? They are not tied tight and do not constitute an interposition that invalidates immersion.
  Ravina said:
  
  Daf 57b
  
  Here we are dealing with a broad, ornamented strap [<i>katla</i>] hanging around the neck, to which a small bib is attached. A woman does strangle herself with a <i>katla</i> because the strap is broad and tightening it does not cause pain. She tightens it because it pleases her that she will appear fleshy. It was considered beautiful to have flesh protrude from the <i>katla</i>.
  In the same mishna in tractate <i>Mikvaot</i>, Rabbi Yehuda says: Strings of wool and strands of hair do not interpose and invalidate the immersion because the water reaches through them.
  Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to strands of hair. However, the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with his opinion with regard to wool strings.
  Abaye said to him: By saying that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rav Yehuda, by inference the Rabbis disagree with regard to strands of hair. However, no opinion stating that strands of hair constitute an interposition is cited in the mishna.
  And if you say that had we not heard from the first <i>tanna</i> that he is speaking of strands of hair, Rabbi Yehuda would also not have spoken about them. Apparently, the first <i>tanna</i> prohibited strands of hair, and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed with him. Nevertheless, it could be explained otherwise. And, perhaps he prefaced what he was saying to the Rabbis with the phrase: Just as. Just as you agree with me that strands of hair do not interpose, agree with me that strings of wool also do not interpose. The fact that he mentioned strands of hair does not indicate a dispute; on the contrary, it is an attempt to establish a consensus with regard to the <i>halakha</i>.
  Indeed, it was stated that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to strands of hair.
  This opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Strings of wool interpose. Strands of hair do not interpose. Rabbi Yehuda says: Both strings of wool and strands of hair do not interpose.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as we learned in a mishna in our chapter: A woman may go out with strands of hair whether they are from her own hair or whether they are from the hair of another. Whose opinion is expressed in this mishna? If you say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even strings of wool should also have been permitted. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis; and conclude from it that with regard to strands of hair, they do not disagree? The Gemara determines: Indeed, conclude from it.
  The mishna said that a woman may not go out with the ornament called a <i>totefet</i>. The Gemara asks: What is a <i>totefet</i>? Rav Yosef said: A packet of spices to ward off the evil eye.
  Abaye said to him: And let the legal status of this packet be like that of an effective amulet, whose effectiveness is proven, and it should be permitted, as an effective amulet may be moved on Shabbat.
  Rather, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Abaye: A <i>totefet</i> is an <i>appuzainu</i>, an ornament worn on the forehead. This opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman may go out with a gilded hairnet worn to hold the hair in place, and with the <i>totefet,</i> and with the <i>sarvitin</i> that are fastened to the hairnet, since a woman would not remove her head covering to show her friend those ornaments.
  And they said: Which is a <i>totefet</i> and which is <i>sarvitin</i>? Rabbi Abbahu said: <i>Totefet</i> is that which goes around her forehead from ear to ear. <i>Sarvitin</i> are those attached to the net that reach down to her cheeks.
  Rav Huna said: Poor women make these ornaments from different types of colored materials. Wealthy women make them of silver and of gold.
  We learned in the mishna that a woman may not go out with a <i>kavul</i>. Rabbi Yannai said: This <i>kavul</i>, I do not know what it is. Is it the seal of a slave, who would have a seal on his clothing identifying him as a slave, about which we learned in our mishna that it is prohibited, but a cap of wool that a woman places on her hair, she may well go out wearing it? Or, perhaps we learned in our mishna that going out with a cap of wool is prohibited and all the more so that going out with the seal of a slave is prohibited.
  Rabbi Abbahu said: It is reasonable to say in accordance with the one who said that we learned about a cap of wool in the mishna. And this opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman may go out with a <i>kavul</i> and with an <i>istema</i> to the courtyard on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: She may even go out with the <i>kavul</i> into the public domain. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is worn beneath the hairnet, a woman may go out into the public domain with it, since a woman will not uncover her hair even to show off an ornament while in the public domain. Anything that is worn over the hairnet, like an ornamental hat, a woman may not go out with it. From the context and proximity of the <i>halakha</i> dealing with <i>kavul</i> to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, apparently a <i>kavul</i> is a wool cap worn under the net.
  Since <i>istema</i> was mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara asks: What is an <i>istema</i>? Rabbi Abbahu said: <i>Istema</i> is a <i>beizyunei</i>. However, Rabbi Abbahu’s explanation employed a term from the Aramaic dialect spoken in Eretz Yisrael, which was not understood in Babylonia. Therefore, they asked there: What is a <i>beizyunei</i>? Abaye said that Rav said: It is a small hat or ribbon used to gather hairs that protrude [<i>kalya paruḥei</i>] from the headdress.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that three things were said with regard to an <i>istema</i>: There is no prohibition of a mixture of diverse kinds, wool and linen, in it. Since it is made of hard felt and not woven together, the prohibition of diverse kinds does not apply to material of that kind. And it does not become impure with the ritual impurity of leprosy. Only woven garments can become impure with leprosy. And women may not go out with it to the public domain on Shabbat.
  In the name of Rabbi Shimon they said: Also,
  
  Daf 58a
  
  the rabbinic decree prohibiting adorning brides with bridal crowns to commemorate the destruction of the Temple does not apply to an <i>istema</i>.
  Earlier, the Gemara cited Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion that the <i>kavul</i> mentioned in the mishna, which one may not wear into the public domain on Shabbat, is a woolen cap. And Shmuel said: It is the seal of a slave that we learned about in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? Didn’t Shmuel say: A slave may go out on Shabbat with a seal that is around his neck but not with a seal that is on his clothes? Apparently, Shmuel holds that one may go out into the public domain with a slave’s seal. How, then, could he say that <i>kavul</i> in the mishna, with which one may not go out into the public domain, is referring to the seal of a slave?
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, where Shmuel said that one may go out with a slave’s seal on Shabbat, is referring to a case where his master made it for him. The slave will not remove it because he fears his master. Therefore, there is no concern lest he carry it. However, that, where the mishna said that it is prohibited to go out with a <i>kavul</i>, which according to Shmuel is the seal of a slave, is referring to a case where he made it for himself to indicate to all who his master is so that he may enjoy his master’s protection. In that case, since it is dependent solely upon his discretion, there is concern lest he remove the seal and carry it. Therefore, the Sages prohibited going out with it into the public domain.
  The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish this statement of Shmuel? It is in the case of a seal that his master made for him. If so, why may he not go out with a seal on his clothes? There too, since his master made it for him he will not remove it.
  The Gemara answers: There the concern is that perhaps the seal will be severed, and the slave will fear his master and fold his cloak and place it on his shoulders so that his master will not see that he has no seal on his clothing. That concern is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef; as Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who goes out into the public domain with a cloak folded and resting on his shoulders on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. That is not the manner in which one wears a garment; it is the manner in which one carries a burden.
  And this is like that which Shmuel said to Rav Ḥinnana bar Sheila: All of the Sages affiliated with the house of the Exilarch may not go out on Shabbat with sealed cloaks [<i>sarbal</i>], i.e., garments with seals on them, except for you, since the people of the Exilarch’s house are not particular with regard to you. The Sages affiliated with the Exilarch were officially considered servants of the house and would wear the seal of the house of the Exilarch. Therefore, it was prohibited for them to go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a cloak bearing the Exilarch’s seal, lest the seal break and, in fear of the Exilarch, they remove the cloak, fold it, place it on their shoulders, and carry it on Shabbat. Only Rav Ḥinnana bar Sheila was permitted to go out with this seal on Shabbat since the people of the Exilarch’s house were not exacting with him. Even if he wore clothing with no seal, they would not consider it an act of insubordination against the Exilarch.
  The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Shmuel said that a slave may go out with a seal that is around his neck but not with a seal that is on his clothes. That opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A slave may go out with a seal that is around his neck but not with a seal that is on his clothes.
  The Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: The slave may neither go out with a seal that is around his neck nor with a seal that is on his clothes on Shabbat, and both this and that cannot become ritually impure. And he may not go out with a bell that is hung around his neck; however, he may go out with a bell that is on his clothes, and both this and that can become ritually impure.
  And an animal may neither go out with a seal that is around its neck, nor with a seal that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is around its neck since with regard to an animal these are considered burdens not ornaments. Both this, the seal, and that, the bell, cannot become ritually impure because animal ornaments and utensils do not fall into the category of objects that can become ritually impure. Apparently, it is even prohibited for a slave to go out with a seal around his neck, contrary to Shmuel’s opinion.
  The Gemara answers: Say that this <i>baraita</i>, which permits going out, is referring to a case where his master made him the seal. Since he fears removing it, there is no concern that he will come to carry it. That <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits going out, is referring to a case where he made it for himself and there is concern lest he come to remove it and carry it.
  The Gemara rejects this resolution: No, both this and that are referring to a case where his master made it for him. The difference can be explained differently. And here, where it was prohibited, it is referring to a seal of metal, and here, where it was permitted, it is a seal of clay. And as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: With an object about which his master is particular, one may not go out on Shabbat, lest it become detached from the garment, and fear of his master lead the slave to carry it in his hand. With an object about which his master is not particular, one may go out with it.
  The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to understand the <i>baraita</i> from the fact that it teaches there: This seal and that seal cannot become ritually impure. Granted, if you say it is referring to a metal seal, it is possible to understand the novel aspect of the <i>baraita</i> as follows: These are the objects that cannot become ritually impure; however, their vessels made of the same material can become ritually impure.
  However, if you say that we learned with regard to seals of clay, can it be similarly inferred that these seals are the objects that cannot become ritually impure; however, their vessels made of the same material can become ritually impure?
  Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Vessels of stone, vessels of dung, and vessels of earth that are not made into earthenware can neither become ritually impure by Torah law nor by rabbinic law? Apparently, even an actual vessel made of clay cannot become ritually impure. Rather, learn from it that this <i>baraita</i> is referring to utensils made of metal. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it.
  In that same <i>baraita</i> the Master said that the slave may not go out with a bell that is around his neck, but he may go out with a bell that is on his clothes.
  The Gemara asks: With a bell that is around his neck, why may he not go out? It is due to concern lest it be severed and he come to carry it. If so, with a bell on his clothes too, let us be concerned lest it be severed and he come to carry it.
  The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where the bell is woven into the garment, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Anything that is woven into a garment, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting going out with it on Shabbat.
  In the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier, it was taught that the Master said: An animal may neither go out with a seal that is around its neck, nor with a seal that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is on its clothes, nor with a bell that is around its neck. Both this and that cannot become ritually impure.
  The Gemara asks: And does a bell of an animal not become ritually impure? The Gemara proceeds to raise a contradiction from that which was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The bell of an animal can become ritually impure,
  
  Daf 58b
  
  and the bell of a door is ritually pure. The door itself is not considered a vessel. It is considered part of the house, and therefore its status is like that of the house. The house is attached to the ground, and therefore it cannot become ritually impure. Everything connected to it, including the bell, assumes that status.
  If one took the bell of a door and converted it into a bell for an animal, it can become ritually impure; however, if one took the bell of an animal and converted it into a bell for a door, even though he attached it to the door and even fastened it with nails, it can still become ritually impure because all utensils descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought alone, i.e., as a result of a decision to designate them for a specific purpose through which they will become susceptible to ritual impurity, they receive that status immediately. However, they only ascend from their state of ritual impurity by means of an action that effects physical change to the vessel itself. A change in designation alone is ineffective. This <i>baraita</i> states that an animal bell can become ritually impure, contrary to that which was taught in the previous <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, where it was taught that the bell can become ritually impure, is referring to a case where it has a clapper [<i>inbal</i>]. That <i>baraita</i>, where it was taught that the bell cannot become ritually impure, is referring to a case where it does not have a clapper.
  The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, this is difficult. If the bell is a vessel, then even though it has no clapper it should be susceptible to ritual impurity. If it is not a vessel, does a clapper render it a vessel?
  The Gemara answers: Yes, the clapper can determine the bell’s status with regard to ritual impurity, in accordance with that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said. As Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: From where is it derived that a metal vessel that produces sound is considered a vessel and can become ritually impure? As it is stated: “Every thing that passes through the fire, you shall make it pass through the fire, and it shall be clean; nevertheless, it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling; and all that does not pass through the fire you shall make to go through water” (Numbers 31:23). And the Sages interpret the verse homiletically: Every thing [<i>davar</i>], even speech [<i>dibbur</i>]; in other words, even an object that makes a sound you shall pass through fire to purify it because it is a vessel.
  However, the matter can be clarified further. In what case did you establish the <i>baraita</i>; in the case of a bell that does not have a clapper? If so, say the middle clause of that <i>baraita</i>: And he may not go out with a bell that is hung around his neck; however, he may go out with a bell that is on his clothes, and both this and that can become ritually impure. If it is referring to a bell that does not have a clapper, can it become ritually impure?
  The Gemara raises a contradiction from the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who makes bells for the mortar used to crush spices, and for the cradle, and for mantles of Torah scrolls, and for coverings of small children, if they have a clapper they can become ritually impure, and if they do not have a clapper they are ritually pure and cannot become impure. If after they became ritually impure their clappers were removed, their ritual impurity still remains upon them. Apparently, even with regard to bells used by people, the original existence of a clapper determines whether or not the bell is considered a vessel.
  The Gemara answers: This applies only to the bells of a small child, since they are placed on him to produce sound. If the bell does not make a sound, it serves no purpose and, consequently, cannot become ritually impure. However, with regard to an adult, the bell is an ornament for him even though it does not have a clapper.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that the Master said: If their clappers were removed after they became ritually impure, their ritual impurity still remains upon them. The Gemara wonders: For what use are they suited after their clappers are removed? They are essentially broken and should therefore become ritually pure. Abaye said: The reason that their impurity remains is because a common person is able to replace the clapper into the bell. According to Abaye, with regard to any vessel that comes apart, if a common person is capable of reassembling it and it does not require the expertise of a craftsman, it is not considered broken and its ritual impurity is not nullified.
  Rava raised an objection to this explanation from that which was taught: The connection between the bell and the clapper, this is a connection. Therefore, if they are detached from each other, the bell should be considered broken.
  And he adds: And if you say that when employing the term connection, it is saying as follows: Even though it is not connected, it has the legal status as if it were connected. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The connection between the different parts of scissors made of different parts that are made to come apart and the connection between the blade of a carpenter’s plane, which can be removed from its handle, and its handle are considered a connection with regard to contracting ritual impurity? If one part becomes ritually impure, the other parts become ritually impure as well. The <i>baraita</i> continues: However, they are not considered a connection with regard to the sprinkling of the waters of a purification offering. When waters of purification are sprinkled on these implements in order to purify them from ritual impurity imparted by a corpse (see Numbers 19:17–19), the water must be sprinkled on each part individually.
  The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at it, there is a difficulty: If it is considered a connection, they should be considered connected even with regard to sprinkling; and if they are not considered a connection, they should not be so considered even with regard to ritual impurity.
  And Rabba said: By Torah law, when in use, they are considered a connection, both with regard to ritual impurity and with regard to sprinkling. And when not in use, even if the parts are connected, since they are made to come apart and they are commonly dismantled, they are neither considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to sprinkling. And the Sages issued a decree that they should be considered a connection with regard to ritual impurity even when not in use, due to ritual impurity when in use. If one component becomes ritually impure, the other component becomes ritually impure as well. And, as a further stringency, they issued a decree that they should not be considered a connection with regard to sprinkling even when in use, due to sprinkling when not in use. The waters of purification must be sprinkled on each part individually. Nevertheless, this type of connection with regard to ritual impurity is only relevant when the two parts are actually connected. When the parts are separate, even if they can be reattached easily, the vessel is considered broken. This contradicts Abaye’s explanation.
  Rather, Rava said: It should be explained differently:
  
  Daf 59a
  
  It is considered a vessel since a bell without a clapper is suited to strike on earthenware and produce a sound of similar quality to that produced by a clapper. If so, even when the clapper is removed, the bell may still be used for its original purpose.
  It was also stated that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It is considered a vessel, since a bell without a clapper is suited to strike on earthenware. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is considered a vessel, since it is suited for use to give water to a child to drink.
  And with regard to the essence of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, the Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yoḥanan not require that the vessel’s new usage must be of the same type as the original labor in order for it to retain its ritual impurity after it has undergone change? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “Every bed on which a <i>zav</i> is lying is ritually impure and every vessel on which he is sitting shall be ritually impure” (Leviticus 15:4). I might have thought, based on this verse, that if one overturned a vessel the size of a <i>se’a</i> and sat on it, or overturned a vessel the size of a half-<i>se’a</i> [<i>tarkav</i>] and sat on it, the vessel would become ritually impure. Therefore, the verse states: On which the <i>zav</i> is sitting, i.e., that which is designated for sitting, excluding that vessel with regard to which one says to the <i>zav</i>: Stand and we will perform our labor with the vessel. In that case, because the vessel is primarily used for purposes other than sitting, it does not become ritually impure even when the <i>zav</i> sits on it.
  There is a dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> on this matter: Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to ritual impurity imparted by treading [<i>midras</i>], i.e., the <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to a <i>zav</i> or to a menstruating woman who sits or lies down on an object, one states the principle: Stand and we will perform our labor to maintain the purity of the vessel. However, one does not state with regard to one who is ritually impure due to a corpse: Stand and we will perform our labor to maintain the purity of the vessel. In other words, an object that became ritually impure through contact with a corpse and was subsequently broken, since it is possible to use it for some other purpose, it remains a vessel and susceptible to ritual impurity. However, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even with regard to one who is ritually impure due to a corpse, one states the principle: Stand and we will perform our labor to maintain the purity of the vessel. According to his opinion, a vessel that is no longer suited for its initial use, even though it serves another purpose, is considered broken. Therefore, the bell, since it is no longer suited for ringing, remains ritually pure according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, even though it remains suited for drinking water.
  The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions in the first dispute: It was not Rabbi Yoḥanan who gave that reason; it was Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to reverse the first? Reverse the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar in the latter dispute, and avoid a contradiction in the statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan in that way.
  The Gemara answers: That is because we learned elsewhere that Rabbi Yoḥanan requires that the vessel’s new use will be of the same type as the original labor. His opinion here is consistent with his opinion there. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The shoe of an animal, if it is made of metal, can become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: For what use by people is it suited? Vessels designated for animal use do not become ritually impure unless they have some use for people. Rav said: It is suited for use as a vessel from which one could drink water in war when there are no other available vessels. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: It is suited for use as a vessel from which one could smear oil on his body during a war. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When he flees from the battlefield he places it on his foot and runs over thorns and the thistles. Apparently, the only use for the shoe of an animal that would render it capable of becoming ritually impure when used by a person is use of the same type as the original labor.
  The Gemara asks parenthetically: What is the practical difference between the explanation of Rav and that of Rabbi Ḥanina? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the sandal is repulsive and dirty. In Rav’s opinion, since one would not drink water from it, it cannot become ritually impure. According to Rabbi Ḥanina, since one could still use it to spread oil on his body, it can become ritually impure.
  What is the practical difference between the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan and that of Rabbi Ḥanina? There is a practical difference between them in a case where the shoe is heavy. It is suited for spreading oil; it is not suited for one to place on his foot. Therefore, it cannot become ritually impure according to Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  We learned in the mishna: And neither may a woman go out on Shabbat to the public domain with a city of gold. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: With a city of gold? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem of Gold, a gold tiara engraved with a depiction of the city of Jerusalem,
  
  Daf 59b
  
  like the one that Rabbi Akiva made for his wife.
  And on this subject, the Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: A woman may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a city of gold ornament. And if she went out with it into the public domain she is liable to bring a sin-offering; that is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She may not go out with it <i>ab initio</i>, and if she went out she is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman may go out with a city of gold ornament <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara explains: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds that it is considered a burden and not an ornament, and one who carries a burden into the public domain is liable to bring a sin-offering. And the Rabbis hold that it is an ornament. Why, then, did they prohibit going out into the public domain wearing it? They are concerned lest she remove it, and show it to another, and come to carry it in the public domain. And Rabbi Eliezer holds: Whose manner is it to go out with a city of gold ornament? Only an important woman, and in that case there is no concern, as an important woman does not remove ornaments and show them to others.
  After discussing going out into the public domain on Shabbat with a city of gold ornament, the Gemara discusses other ornaments. There is a dispute among <i>amora’im</i> with regard to a <i>kelila</i>, which is a tiara-like ornament. Rav prohibited going out with it, and Shmuel permitted doing so.
  The Gemara sets the parameters of the disagreement: With a <i>kelila</i> made of metal, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to go out into the public domain. Where they disagree is in the case of a woven fabric inlaid with metal. One Sage, Rav, holds that in that type of ornament the metal is the primary element, and it is prohibited. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that the woven fabric is the primary element, and it is consequently permitted.
  Rav Ashi taught this disagreement with a lenient interpretation, as he said: With a <i>kelila</i> of woven fabric, everyone agrees that it is permitted to go out into the public domain. Where they disagree is in the case of a metal ornament. One Sage, Rav, holds that it is prohibited because there is concern lest she remove it, and show it to another, and come to carry it in the public domain. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that it is permitted. Whose manner is to go out with a <i>kelila</i> ornament? Only an important woman; and an important woman does not remove ornaments and show them to others.
  On the same topic, Rav Shmuel bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef who, due to illness, forgot his learning: You explicitly said to us in the name of Rav: With regard to a <i>kelila</i>, it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat.
  The Gemara relates that one day they said to Rav: A great, tall man came to Neharde’a and he was limping. And he taught: With a <i>kelila</i>, it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat. Rav said: Who is a great, tall man who limps? Levi. Conclude from this that Rabbi Afes passed away and Rabbi Ḥanina is sitting at the head of the yeshiva in Eretz Yisrael in his place. And, consequently, Levi had no one before whom to sit and study and he came here. As long as Rabbi Afes headed the yeshiva, Rabbi Ḥanina would sit outside the study hall. Entering the study hall would indicate that he accepted the authority of Rabbi Afes. Rabbi Ḥanina, who was a great man, refused to do so. In deference to Rabbi Ḥanina, Levi would sit with him as a colleague outside the study hall. When Levi arrived from Eretz Yisrael, it was clear that Rabbi Afes must have died. Levi, who considered himself Rabbi Ḥanina’s equal in terms of both scholarship and age, did not want to defer to Rabbi Ḥanina’s authority and decided to go to elsewhere, to Babylonia.
  The Gemara asks: How did Rav arrive at that particular conclusion? And perhaps Rabbi Ḥanina died and Rabbi Afes remained standing in his position at the head of the yeshiva as he stood previously; and Levi had no one with whom to sit outside the study hall, and that is why he came here? The Gemara answers that that could not be the case for two reasons. First, if it were so, that Rabbi Ḥanina died, Levi would have been subject to the authority of Rabbi Afes. It was only in deference to Rabbi Ḥanina that Levi did not enter the study hall. And furthermore, it could not be that Rabbi Ḥanina died and did not reign as head of the yeshiva, as when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi died, he said in his dying testament: Ḥanina, son of Rabbi Ḥama, shall sit at the head of the yeshiva. And of the righteous it is written: “You will decree a saying and it will be established for you, and the light will shine on your ways” (Job 22:28). Since the statement that Rabbi Ḥanina will serve at the head of the yeshiva crossed the lips of a righteous person, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it is inconceivable that it would not have been realized.
  The Gemara returns to the subject of <i>kelila</i>. When Levi taught in Neharde’a that with the <i>kelila</i> ornament, one is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat, twenty-four women wearing the <i>kelila</i> ornament went out into the public domain from all of Neharde’a. When Rabba bar Avuh taught in Meḥoza that the <i>kelila</i> ornament is permitted, eighteen women wearing the <i>kelila</i> ornament went out from one alleyway. Meḥoza was a wealthy mercantile city, and many women there owned precious jewelry.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav Shmuel said: With a precious gilded belt [<i>kamra</i>], a woman is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat. Some say that he was referring to a belt made of woven fabric and inlaid with gold. And Rav Safra said: It is permitted just as it is permitted in the case of a gilded cloak.
  And some say that it is referring to a belt made entirely of metal. And Rav Safra said: It is permitted just as it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat with the belt of kings made entirely of gold.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: With regard to going out with a gilded belt over another belt [<i>hemyana</i>], what is the <i>halakha</i>? He said to him: Two belts you said; it is certainly uncommon to wear two belts. Therefore, one of them is a burden.
  Rav Ashi said: This short cloak; if it has short straps with which to tie it, it is permitted to go out with it, and if not, it is prohibited.
  We learned in the mishna: And a woman may not go out on Shabbat with a <i>katla</i>. The Gemara explains: What is a <i>katla</i>? A type of small bib hung from the neck. The <i>nezamim</i> mentioned in the mishna with which a woman may not go out on Shabbat refer to nose rings, not earrings.
  We learned in the mishna: Nor with a ring that has no seal on it. By inference: If it does have a seal on it, she is liable to bring a sin-offering. She is only exempt from bringing a sacrifice when she goes out with a ring that does not have a seal on it, which is an ornament; however, a ring with a seal on it, typically used by men for sealing documents, is considered a burden for a woman on Shabbat. Apparently, that ring is not an ornament.
  The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna in tractate <i>Kelim</i>: Women’s ornaments can become ritually impure. And these are women’s ornaments: Bibs; earrings; and rings; and a ring whether it has a seal on it or whether it does not have a seal on it; and nose rings. Apparently, even a ring that has a seal on it is considered a woman’s ornament.
  And Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult. Rather, this ruling in our mishna, which distinguishes between a ring with a seal and a ring without a seal, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya; that ruling in the mishna in tractate <i>Kelim</i>, which does not distinguish between rings, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the ring were made of metal and its seal was made of coral, it can become ritually impure because the primary component of the ring is metal, a material that can become ritually impure. If the ring were made of coral and its seal of metal, it is ritually pure and cannot become ritually impure. Rabbi Neḥemya deems it ritually impure, as Rabbi Neḥemya would say: With regard to a ring, follow its seal; if the seal were made of material that can become ritually impure, the entire ring can become ritually impure, and if it were made of material that cannot become ritually impure, the entire ring remains pure. The same is true with regard to a yoke of an animal: Follow its rods. Rods are placed in the yoke to fasten it to the animal; the component material of the rods determines whether or not the entire yoke can become ritually impure.
  
  Daf 60a
  
  With a hanging board, follow its nails, upon which the objects hang. With a ladder, follow its rungs. With a large scale, follow its chains and not its baseplates. And the Rabbis say, with regard to all of these vessels, everything follows the support. The legal status of the object is not determined by the component of the vessel most significant in terms of function. It is determined by the component most significant in terms of structure. Therefore, according to Rabbi Neḥemya there is a distinction, even in the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, between a ring with a seal and a ring without a seal, as in his opinion the seal constitutes the primary function of the ring. However, the Rabbis hold with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity that the essential part of the ring is the ring itself, not the seal. Therefore, they permit going out into the public domain on Shabbat even with a ring that has a seal.
  Rava said: This contradiction can be resolved in another manner. The <i>mishna</i> dealing with the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity taught with regard to the two types of rings disjunctively, i.e., referring to different circumstances: A ring that has a seal on it can become ritually impure because it is a man’s ornament; a ring that does not have a seal on it can become ritually impure because it is a woman’s ornament.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said an additional resolution to the contradiction between the <i>mishnayot</i>: Are you raising a contradiction from the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat? The underlying principles of these areas of <i>halakha</i> are totally different. With regard to ritual impurity, the Torah stated: “All vessels with which labor is done” (Numbers 31:51), and a ring with a seal is a vessel and can therefore become ritually impure. However, with regard to Shabbat, the Torah stated that the prohibition is due to the fact that the object is a burden. Therefore, in a case where there is not a seal on it, it is an ornament and may be worn in the public domain. In a case where there is a seal on it, it is a burden and may not be worn.
  We also learned in the mishna: Nor with a needle that is not perforated. The Gemara asks: For what use is that type of needle suited? Rav Yosef said: Since a woman gathers her hair and pins it to her hairnet with the unperforated needle.
  Abaye said to him: And if so, let the needle be like a ritually pure garter and consequently be permitted. There is a type of garter, a strap that ensures that a woman’s stockings will not fall, that cannot become ritually impure. A woman is permitted to go out into the public domain wearing it on Shabbat even if it is ornamented. For reasons of modesty, a woman will certainly not remove her garter or display it in the public domain. Similarly, with regard to the needle, the assumption is that a woman will not loosen her hair in the street.
  Rather, Rav Adda from the city of Naresh explained before Rav Yosef: Since a woman parts her hair with it. The Gemara asks: On Shabbat, when it is prohibited to comb one’s hair, for what use is this needle suited? Rava said: There is a gold plate on the other end of the needle. On a weekday, she uses it to part her hair. On Shabbat, she inserts the needle into her head covering and lays the gold plate against her forehead for ornamental purposes.
  MISHNA: A man may not go out on Shabbat with a spiked sandal, as will be explained in the Gemara. And he may not go out with a single sandal when there is no wound on his foot. And he may neither go out with phylacteries, nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert, but rather it was written by someone who has not established a reputation as an expert in writing amulets that are effective for those who carry them. And he may neither go out with <i>shiryon</i>, nor with a <i>kasda</i>, nor with <i>maggafayim</i>. These terms will be explained in the Gemara. And if he went out into the public domain with any of these, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Sages prohibited going out with a spiked sandal on Shabbat?
  Shmuel said: They were those who eluded the decrees of religious persecution, and after one of the wars they were hiding in a cave. And those hiding said: One who seeks to enter the cave may enter, but one who seeks to leave the cave may not leave. One leaving has no way to determine whether or not the enemy is lying in wait outside the cave. Therefore, leaving could reveal the presence of those hiding in the cave.
  It happened that the sandal of one of them was reversed, the front of the sandal was in the back, and his footprints appeared like the steps of one leaving the cave. They thought that one of them left and feared that their enemies saw him and were now coming upon them to attack. In their panic, they pushed one another and killed one another in greater numbers than their enemies had killed among them. To commemorate this disaster that resulted from a spiked sandal, they prohibited going out into the public domain with it.
  Rabbi Elai ben Elazar says that the reason for the decree was different. Once they were sitting in a cave and heard the sound of a spiked sandal atop the cave. They thought that their enemies had come upon them. They pushed one another and killed one another in greater numbers than their enemies had killed among them.
  Rami bar Yeḥezkel said that the reason for the decree was different. They were sitting in a synagogue and they heard the sound of a spiked sandal from behind the synagogue. They thought that their enemies had come upon them. They pushed one another, and killed one another in greater numbers than their enemies had killed among them.
  To commemorate that disaster which occurred due to a spiked sandal, at that time they said: A person may not go out with a spiked sandal. The Gemara asks: If so, on a weekday it should also be prohibited. The Gemara answers: When this incident occurred, it was on Shabbat. Therefore, they issued the decree prohibiting the spiked sandal specifically in parallel circumstances. The Gemara challenges: If so, on a Festival wearing a spiked sandal should be permitted. Why, then, did we learn in the same mishna:
  
  Daf 60b
  
  One may send garments as a gift on a Festival, whether they are sewn or whether they are not sewn, because any object fit for any use on a Festival may be sent as a gift. However, one may neither send a spiked sandal nor an unsewn shoe on a Festival, since using them is prohibited. Apparently, one may not wear a spiked sandal on a Festival.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the Sages prohibited wearing a spiked sandal on Shabbat? It is because there is an assemblage of people. On a Festival too, there is an assemblage of people. The Gemara asks: On a communal fast day, there is an assemblage of people; wearing a spiked sandal should be prohibited then, as well. The Gemara answers: When this incident occurred, it was on a day when there was an assemblage of prohibition, i.e., a day on which performing labor is prohibited. Here, a fast day, is a day when there is an assemblage of permission, a day on which performing labor is permitted, and the two are not comparable. However, extending the scope of commemorative decrees to apply to comparable situations, e.g., from Shabbat to the Festivals, is acceptable.
  And this is true even according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva, who said in the following case that a decree issued due to a specific set of circumstances is applied only to those specific circumstances. The ashes of the red heifer were once transported across the Jordan River in a boat. A source of ritual impurity was discovered at the bottom of the boat. The Sages sought to issue a decree prohibiting transport of the ashes of the red heifer over any body of water, sea or river, over a bridge, or in a boat. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akiva said that decrees that are issued due to a specific event apply only to precisely those circumstances. Therefore, he said: They only prohibited transporting the ashes of a red heifer in the Jordan River and in a boat, and like the incident that occurred. However, even according to this approach, which limits restriction, that applies only to the Jordan River and not to other rivers. This is because it is different from other rivers in several respects, e.g., width and depth. However, a Festival and Shabbat are similar to one another, as it was taught in the mishna: The halakhic difference between a Festival and Shabbat is only with regard to preparation of food.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The Sages taught that a spiked sandal is prohibited only when the nails were placed in the sandal to strengthen its form; however, if they were placed in the sandal for beauty, it is permitted. The Gemara asks: And with how many nails is it considered to be for beauty? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Five on this sandal and five on that one. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: Seven on this one and seven on that one.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen bar Abba: I will explain it to you: According to my opinion, when inserting nails for beauty, two are inserted from here, its outer side, one near the toes and one near the heel, and two are inserted from there, its inner side, one near the toes and one near the heel, and one is inserted on its straps; and for Rabbi Ḥanina, three from here, and three from there, and one on its straps.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: For an uneven sandal, whose soles are not straight, one makes seven nails on the bottom to straighten it, and it is then permitted for use on Shabbat; that is the statement of Rabbi Natan. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits straightening the sandal with thirteen nails.
  The Gemara notes: Granted, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, there is no problem, as he stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. However, Rabbi Yoḥanan, in accordance with whose opinion did he state his opinion? Neither of the <i>tanna’im</i> agrees with his opinion. The Gemara answers: He stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Nehorai, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Nehorai says: With five nails inserted into the sole, it is permitted to go out into the public domain on Shabbat; and with seven nails, it is prohibited to go out into the public domain on Shabbat.
  The Sage, Ifa, said to Rabba bar bar Ḥana: You, who are students of Rabbi Yoḥanan, act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. We will act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina.
  Rav Huna raised a dilemma before Rav Ashi: With a sandal that has five nails inserted into the sole, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to going out into the public domain? He said to him: Even with seven nails it is permitted. He asked further: With nine, what is the <i>halakha</i>? He said to him: Even with eight it is prohibited.
  That shoemaker raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: If one sewed the sole and attached it to the sandal from within, what is the <i>halakha</i>? May he go out into the public domain after inserting nails into it? Rabbi Ami said to him: It is permitted, and I do not know the reason.
  Rav Ashi said: And does the Master not know the reason? It is obvious. Since he sewed it from within, it is no longer a sandal, it is a shoe. With regard to a sandal, the Sages issued a decree; with regard to a shoe, the Sages did not issue a decree.
  Rabbi Abba bar Zavda raised a dilemma before Rabbi Abba bar Avina: If he shaped the nail like tongs [<i>kelavus</i>] by bending a nail with two sharp ends and sticking both ends into the sandal, what is the <i>halakha</i>? May he go out into the public domain with it on Shabbat? He said to him: It is permitted. It was also stated that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: If he shaped it like tongs it is permitted.
  Rav Sheshet said: If he covered the entire sole in nails, so that contact with the ground will not wear it away, it is permitted to go out with that sandal on Shabbat, since it is no longer the spiked sandal with regard to which they issued a decree.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet: A man may not go out with a spiked sandal, and may not walk with it even from house to house within his courtyard, and may not even walk from bed to bed within his house. However, since the decree was issued with regard to circumstances identical to a specific incident, it only applies to wearing the sandal. Therefore, one may carry the sandal to cover a vessel with it and to support the legs of the bed with it. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, prohibits using it for other purposes as well. If most of its nails fell out, and four or five remain in it, it is permitted to go out with it. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out into the public domain with the sandal, even if up to seven nails remain in it. If he covered it with leather from beneath the wood frame of the sandal and inserted nails into it from above, it is permitted. If he made the nail like a tong, or made one end flat like a platter [<i>tas</i>], or sharpened it like a peg, or covered it entirely with nails so that contact with the ground will not wear it away, it is permitted to go out with it.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>Tosefta</i> cited in support of Rav Sheshet’s opinion. This <i>Tosefta</i> itself is difficult, as it is self-contradictory. On the one hand you said: If most of its nails fell out it is permitted; apparently, that is the <i>halakha</i> even though many nails remain in the sole. And, however, subsequently it was taught in the <i>Tosefta,</i> without specifying the number of nails that were there from the outset: With four or five nails, yes, going out is permitted; however, with more nails, no, it is prohibited.
  Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult, and it can be resolved as follows: Here, where it was permitted to go out wearing the sandal if the majority of nails fell out, it is referring to a case where they were broken, i.e., the heads of the nails were broken off while most of the nail remained embedded in the sole. In that case, it is clearly evident that most of the nails fell out. Here, where it was permitted only if four or five nails remain, it is referring to a case where they were totally removed and only the nails that remain in the shoe are visible.
  The Gemara continues its detailed analysis of the <i>Tosefta</i>: It was taught that if most of the nails in the sandal came out and only four or five nails remain, it is permitted to go out wearing it. The Gemara asks: Now, if it was mentioned that when five nails remain, going out is permitted, is it necessary to mention four? Rav Ḥisda said that the <i>Tosefta</i> means: If four nails remain from the nails in a small sandal, and if five nails remain from the nails in a large sandal, going out is permitted.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits up to seven. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that for a sandal with an uneven sole, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits up to thirteen? The Gemara answers: An uneven sole is different. Since the nails are inserted for the purpose of straightening the sole, it does not have the legal status of a spiked sandal.
  The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this new explanation that a sandal with an uneven sole has a different legal status, for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who stated, contrary to the opinions of the <i>tanna’im</i> in this <i>baraita</i>, that the number of nails permitted in each sandal is five, this <i>baraita</i> is also not difficult. He could explain that a sandal with an uneven sole is different and requires additional nails. However, in the case of a sandal with an even sole, even the other <i>tanna’im</i> would not permit that many.
  Rav Mattana said, and some say Rav Aḥadvoi bar Mattana said that Rav Mattana said: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who completely prohibited moving a spiked sandal. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. Isn’t there a halakhic principle that in a dispute between an individual and the many, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the many? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is more reasonable in this case, and therefore the <i>halakha</i> should be ruled in accordance with his opinion. Rav Mattana teaches us that that is not the <i>halakha</i>.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya said: If not for the fact that they would call me: Babylonian who permits prohibitions, I would permit the insertion of many nails into a spiked sandal. The Gemara asks: And how many nails would he have permitted? In Pumbedita they said: Twenty-four nails. In Sura they said: Twenty-two. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And this is your mnemonic to remember which opinion was stated in Sura and which opinion was stated in Pumbedita: Until Rabbi Ḥiyya came from Pumbedita to Sura he lost two nails from his shoe. Since the route that Rabbi Ḥiyya took from Pumbedita to Eretz Yisrael passed through Sura, one could say: Due to the rigors of the journey, two nails fell from the sandal of Rabbi Ḥiyya between Pumbedita and Sura.
  It was taught in the mishna: And he may not go out with a single sandal when there is no wound on his foot.
  
  Daf 61a
  
  By inference: If there is a wound on his foot, he may go out with one sandal. In that case, with a sandal on which of his feet does he go out? Rav Huna said: With a sandal on the foot that has a wound on it. Apparently, he holds: A sandal is made for the purpose of avoiding pain. Typically, a person wears sandals only in order to avoid the pain of walking on stones and the like. When he is seen with only one sandal, it is clear that he is oblivious to that pain and the only reason that he is wearing the sandal is due to the wound on his foot. Consequently, no one will suspect that he went out wearing two sandals and that if he is wearing one, he must be carrying the other one.
  And Ḥiyya bar Rav said: He goes out with a sandal on the foot that does not have a wound on it. Apparently, he holds that the sandal is made for the purpose of providing comfort, and he wears it on his healthy foot. And it does not arouse suspicion because, with regard to that foot on which there is a wound, its wound indicates that he is unable to wear a sandal on that foot, and it is clear that he left the other sandal at home.
  The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds that the opinion of Rav Huna, which maintains that one only wears sandals to avoid pain, is correct. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen bar Abba, his attendant: Give me my sandal. He gave him the right sandal. He said to him: You have rendered this foot as one with a wound. In Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, one must always put on his left shoe first. One who puts on the right shoe first is no longer permitted to put on the left shoe. By handing him his right sandal, he is forcing Rabbi Yoḥanan to go out with one sandal, leading onlookers to conclude that he has a wound on that foot. That incident corresponds to Rav Huna’s opinion that one wears the sandal on the wounded foot.
  The Gemara rejects this: And perhaps, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav, which maintains that one wears the sandal on the healthy foot, and he is saying as follows: By handing me my right shoe, you have rendered my left foot, on which I have no shoe, as one with a wound. No proof can be cited from that incident, as Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion cannot be ascertained from the exchange with his attendant.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his regular line of reasoning. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Just as one dons phylacteries, so too, one puts on shoes. Just as phylacteries are placed on the left arm, so too, when putting on shoes one begins with the left foot.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>: When one puts on his shoes, he puts on the right shoe first and afterward puts on the left shoe.
  Rav Yosef said: Now that it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in this manner, and Rabbi Yoḥanan stated the <i>halakha</i> in that manner, one who acted this way acted properly, and one who acted that way acted properly, as each custom has a basis.
  Abaye said to him: Why is the Gemara certain that Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the <i>baraita</i>? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan had not heard this <i>baraita</i>, and had he heard it, he would have retracted his opinion. And even if he heard it, perhaps he heard it and held that the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with that mishna. In any case, it is necessary to rule in accordance with one of the opinions.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And one who fears Heaven fulfills both opinions. And who is this God-fearing person? Mar, son of Rabbana. How does he conduct himself? He puts on his right shoe and does not tie the laces. And then he puts on his left shoe and ties it, and then afterward ties the laces of his right shoe. Rav Ashi said: I saw that Rav Kahana was not particular with regard to the order in which he put on his shoes.
  After citing this excerpt from <i>Hilkhot Derekh Eretz</i> with regard to putting on shoes, the Gemara cites the entire matter. The Sages taught: When one puts on his shoes, he puts on the right shoe first and afterward puts on the left shoe because the right always takes precedence. When he removes them, he removes the left and afterward he removes the right, so that the right shoe will remain on the foot longer.
  When one washes his feet, he washes the right first and afterward he washes the left. And one who wishes to spread oil on his feet spreads oil on the right first and afterward spreads oil on the left. And one who wishes to spread oil on his entire body, spreads oil on his head first because it is the king of all his other limbs.
  We learned in the mishna: And he may neither go out with phylacteries. Rav Safra said: Do not say that this <i>halakha</i> is only in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that Shabbat is not an appropriate time to don phylacteries, i.e., it is prohibited to don phylacteries on Shabbat, and that is the reason that one may not go out into the public domain with them. Rather, even according to the one who said that Shabbat is an appropriate time to don phylacteries, he may not go out with them due to the concern lest he come to carry them in his hand in the public domain, which is prohibited by Torah law.
  And some teach the statement of Rav Safra as referring to the latter clause of the mishna: And if he went out into the public domain with phylacteries he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Safra said: Do not say that this <i>halakha</i> is only according to the opinion of the one who said that Shabbat is an appropriate time to don phylacteries, and therefore he does not violate a Torah prohibition by going out into the public domain with phylacteries and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. Rather, even according to the opinion of one who said that Shabbat is not an appropriate time to don phylacteries, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. What is the reason that he is exempt? Donning phylacteries is performed in the manner of wearing a garment or an ornament. Although one may not use phylacteries on Shabbat, there is no Torah prohibition against moving them.
  We learned in the mishna: Nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert. Rav Pappa said: Do not say that the meaning of the mishna is that one may only go out with an amulet if the person who wrote it is an expert and the amulet has proven effective. Rather, if the person who wrote it is an expert, even though the amulet has not proven effective, he may go out with it.
  The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Nor with an amulet when it is not from an expert, and it does not teach: When the amulet is not effective. Apparently, it is sufficient if the writer of the amulet is an expert, even if the effectiveness of the amulet has not been proven. The Gemara comments: Indeed, learn from it.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: What is an effective amulet? It is any amulet that healed one person once, and healed him again, and healed him a third time. That is the criterion for an effective amulet, and it applies to both a written amulet and an amulet of herbal roots; both if it has proven effective in healing a sick person who is dangerously ill, and if it has proven effective in healing a sick person who is not dangerously ill. It is permitted to go out with these types of amulets on Shabbat.
  And an amulet was not only permitted in a case where one has already fallen due to epilepsy and wears the amulet in order to prevent an additional fall. Rather, even if one has never fallen, and he wears the amulet so that he will not contract the illness and fall, he is permitted to go out with it on Shabbat is permitted.
  And he may tie and untie it even in the public domain, as long as he does not tie it
  
  Daf 61b
  
  to a bracelet or a ring and go out with it into the public domain. The reason for the prohibition is due to the appearance of transgression, as, in that case, it appears that he is wearing the amulet strictly for ornamental purposes, which is prohibited.
  With regard to the definition of an effective amulet as one which healed one person three times, the Gemara raises an objection. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Which is an effective amulet; any amulet that healed three people as one?
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, where it was taught in the <i>baraita</i> that the amulet must have healed three different people, is referring to proving the expertise of the man who wrote it. Once his amulets have proven themselves by healing three different people stricken with different illnesses, clearly the one who wrote them is an expert. That, where it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> that even if the amulet healed one person three times, is referring to proving that the amulet is effective in fulfilling its designated purpose.
  Rav Pappa said: It is obvious to me in a case where three amulets were written for three people and effectively healed each three times that both the man who wrote them is proven an expert and the amulet is proven effective. Likewise, it is obvious to me that in the case of one who writes three amulets for three people and healed each one time, the man is proven to be an expert; however, the amulet is not proven effective. Similarly, if one wrote one amulet for three people and it healed them, the amulet is proven effective, while the man who wrote it is not thereby proven an expert.
  Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: Three amulets for one person, what is the status of the amulet and the one who wrote it in that case? The amulet is certainly not proven effective; however, with regard to the man who wrote it, is he proven an expert or is he not proven an expert? This is the dilemma: Do we say that the person is an expert since the amulet that he wrote healed the person who was ill? Or, perhaps we say that it was the fortune of that sick man who received the influence of the writing of the amulet, but a different person would not be healed? The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do amulets have an element of sanctity, or perhaps they have no element of sanctity? The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this dilemma relevant? If you say it is relevant with regard to rescuing them from fire on Shabbat, there is a clear resolution to the dilemma. Come and hear what was taught: The blessings and the amulets, even though there are letters of holy names and many matters that are in the Torah written in them, one may not rescue them from the fire, and they burn in their place.
  Rather, the dilemma is relevant with regard to the matter of interment of sacred documents. Must an amulet no longer in use be buried, or may it be discarded? However, with regard to the matter of interment as well, come and hear a resolution from what was taught: If one of the names of God was written even on the handles of the vessels and even on legs of the bed, he must cut off the name and bury it, as one must be exacting with regard to the name of God, wherever it is written.
  Rather, the dilemma was raised with regard to whether or not it is permitted to enter the bathroom with them. What is the <i>halakha</i>? Do they have sanctity, and it is therefore prohibited? Or, perhaps they have no sanctity, and it is permitted? Come and hear a resolution from that which we learned in our mishna: Nor with an amulet, when it is not from an expert. By inference: If it is from an expert, he may go out with it.
  And, if you say that amulets have an element of sanctity, at times he will need to go to the bathroom, will be required to remove the amulets, forget that he removed them, and come to carry them four cubits in the public domain. Since the mishna did not address these complications, apparently amulets do not have an element of sanctity in that regard and one may enter the bathroom with them. The Gemara rejects this: With what we are dealing here? With an amulet made of herbal roots that certainly has no sanctity.
  The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This is the case with regard to both a written amulet and an amulet of herbal roots, indicating that their <i>halakhot</i> are equal? Rather, with what we are dealing here? With a person who is dangerously ill. Because of the life-threatening situation, he is permitted to enter the bathroom with his amulet, despite the resulting degradation of the Holy Name. Wasn’t it taught in the same <i>baraita</i> that the <i>halakha</i> applies to both a sick person who is dangerously ill and a sick person who is not dangerously ill, indicating that they share the same status in this regard?
  Rather, since the amulet heals, even though he holds it in his hand, he may well go out with it too. In terms of healing, there is no difference whether the amulet is hanging around his neck or whether it is in his hand; just as they permitted him to wear it around his neck on Shabbat, so too they permitted him to carry it in his hand.
  
  Daf 62a
  
  But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Oshaya says with regard to an amulet: As long as he does not hold it in his hand and carry it four cubits in the public domain? Apparently, even with regard to an amulet, there is a distinction between wearing it and carrying it.
  Rather, with what are we dealing here? With an amulet that is covered in leather. Since the writing itself is covered, the name of God is not degraded when the amulet is brought into the bathroom with him.
  The Gemara objects. There is writing on the scrolls of phylacteries, which is covered in the leather of boxes housing the scrolls, and nevertheless it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who enters a bathroom while wearing phylacteries must remove the phylacteries at a distance of four cubits and only then enter. There is no halakhic difference whether or not the writing is covered.
  The Gemara rejects this: There, with regard to phylacteries, the prohibition to enter the bathroom is not due to the sacred writing on the scrolls inside the phylacteries. Rather, it is due to the letter <i>shin</i> that protrudes from the leather of the boxes housing the scroll in the phylacteries of the head, as Abaye said: The source of the requirement of the <i>shin</i> of the phylacteries is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. It is required by Torah law. And, Abaye said: The knot in the shape of the letter <i>dalet</i> in the straps of the phylacteries of the head is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. And, Abaye said: The letter <i>yod</i> of the phylacteries is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. It is due to those letters that one must safeguard the sanctity of the phylacteries and refrain from taking them into the bathroom.
  We learned in the mishna: And he may neither go out with <i>shiryon</i>, nor with a <i>kasda</i>, nor with <i>maggafayim</i>. These terms were not understood, and therefore the Gemara explains them:
  <i>Shiryon</i> is a coat of mail [<i>zerada</i>], armor made of scales. <i>Kasda</i>: Rav said that it is a leather hat [<i>sanvarta</i>] worn under a metal helmet. <i>Maggafayim</i>: Rav said they are leg armor worn beneath the knee.
  MISHNA: A woman may neither go out to the public domain with a perforated needle, i.e., a standard needle with an eye, nor with a ring that has a seal on it, nor with a <i>kulyar</i>, nor with a <i>kovelet</i>, the identity of which will be discussed in the Gemara, nor with a flask of balsam oil.
  And if she did go out into the public domain, she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who holds that in doing so she violated the Torah prohibition of carrying a burden in the public domain on Shabbat. And the Rabbis exempt one who goes out on Shabbat with a <i>kovelet</i> and with a flask of balsam oil. In their opinion, these are ornaments, and therefore they do not fundamentally violate the Torah prohibition of carrying in the public domain on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: With regard to that which we learned in the mishna that a woman may not go out on Shabbat with a ring that has a seal, and by inference that she may go out with a ring without a seal, Ulla said: And the reverse of these <i>halakhot</i> is true with regard to a man. A man who wears a ring with a seal in the public domain is exempt. However, if he wears a ring without a seal, he is liable to bring a sin-offering as it is not considered an ornament for a man. Based on that statement, the Gemara concludes: Apparently, Ulla holds that every object that is suitable for a man is not suitable for a woman, and an object that is suitable for a woman is not suitable for a man.
  Rav Yosef raised an objection from the <i>Tosefta</i>: Shepherds may go out on Shabbat in garments made of sacks. And not with regard to the shepherds alone did the Sages say that they are permitted to go out in sacks on Shabbat; rather, any person may do so. However, the Sages taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to shepherds because it is the standard practice of shepherds to go out in sacks. Apparently, although a sack is not a typical garment for most people, it is permitted even for one who is not a shepherd and would not generally wear it. Based on the same principle, although men do not generally wear women’s ornaments and women do not generally wear men’s ornaments, since occasionally a man might wear an ornament belonging to a woman or vice versa, each should be permitted to go out into the public domain with the ornament of the other.
  Rather, Rav Yosef said: Ulla holds that women are a people unto themselves. The difference between the standard practice of men and women is greater than the difference between the standard practice of practitioners of different professions.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef’s statement from the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who finds phylacteries outside of the city on Shabbat should don them and bring them into the city one pair at a time. This applies to both a man and a woman. And if you say that women are a people unto themselves, isn’t the mitzva to don phylacteries a time-bound, positive mitzva, as there are times when the mitzva to don phylacteries is not in effect? And the following is a halakhic principle: Women are exempt from every time-bound, positive mitzva. If, in fact, the clothing and ornaments of a man are not suitable for a woman under any circumstances, why is a woman permitted to don the phylacteries and bring them into the city on Shabbat? Shouldn’t that be considered a prohibited act of carrying?
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to phylacteries, Rabbi Meir holds that night is an appropriate time to don phylacteries, and Shabbat and Festivals are similarly an appropriate time to don phylacteries. Consequently, the mitzva of phylacteries is a positive mitzva that is not time bound; and in every positive mitzva that is not time bound, women are obligated. Therefore, women are permitted to don the phylacteries and bring them into the city.
  With regard to Rabbi Meir’s ruling in the mishna that a woman is liable by Torah law if she goes out into the public domain wearing a ring with a seal, the Gemara asks: Isn’t it considered carrying out in a backhanded manner? A ring with a seal is not an ornament for a woman; it is an object like any other. One typically carries objects holding them in his hand. Wearing an object around one’s finger is atypical. There is no Torah prohibition violated when a labor is performed in an atypical manner.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said that we are dealing in the mishna with a woman who is a treasurer for charity. A woman with that occupation typically wears a ring with a seal on her finger in order to perform her job. She does not, though, wear it as an ornament. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You answered and explained why, in the case of a woman, she would be liable to bring a sin-offering. However, in the case of a man who wore a ring without a seal, what is there to say? Why should he be liable?
  Rather, Rava said that there is a different reason: Sometimes a person gives his wife a ring that has a seal on it to take it to his house and place it in a box for safekeeping, and, in order to ensure that she does not lose the ring, the woman places it in on her hand, i.e., on her finger, until she reaches the box. And, likewise, sometimes a woman gives her husband a ring that does not have a seal on it to take it to a craftsman to repair it, and the husband places it on his hand, i.e., on his finger, until he reaches the craftsman. The purpose of wearing these rings is not for ornamentation. Nevertheless, it is considered a typical manner of carrying them.
  We learned in the mishna: Nor with a <i>kulyar</i>, nor with a <i>kovelet</i>. The Gemara asks: What is a <i>kulyar</i>? Rav said: A brooch with which a woman fastens the collar of her garment. <i>Kovelet</i>: Rav said that it is a bundle of fragrant herbs [<i>pilon</i>]. And, similarly, Rav Asi said: A bundle of fragrant herbs.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman may not go out on Shabbat with a bundle of fragrant herbs, and if she did go out she is liable to bring a sin-offering, as she violated a Torah prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She may not go out <i>ab initio</i>; however, if she went out, she is exempt. Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman may go out with a bundle of fragrant herbs even <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds that it is a burden. Therefore, one who takes it out into the public domain on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. And the Rabbis hold that it is an ornament. Nevertheless, they prohibited going out with it <i>ab initio</i> due to concern lest she remove the bundle of herbs from its place, and show it to others, and come to carry it in the public domain. And Rabbi Eliezer holds: Whose practice is it to place fragrant herbs on herself? A woman whose odor is foul. But a woman whose odor is foul does not remove and show the bundle to others because, by doing so, her odor will be detected, a situation that she would prefer to avoid. And, therefore she will not come to carry it four cubits in the public domain.
  This <i>baraita</i> cites the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who permits, even <i>ab initio</i>, going out into the public domain with a bundle of herbs. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer exempts a woman who goes out on Shabbat with a bundle of herbs and with a flask of balsam oil? With regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, exempt means that although it is not prohibited by Torah law, it is prohibited <i>ab initio</i> by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. When Rabbi Eliezer made this statement, it was when he was addressing the statement of Rabbi Meir. When Rabbi Eliezer made that statement, it was when he was addressing the statement of the Rabbis. To clarify: When he was addressing the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that she is liable to bring a sin-offering, he said to him that she is exempt from bringing the sacrifice. When he was addressing the statement of the Rabbis, who said that she is exempt but it is prohibited <i>ab initio</i>, he said that it is permitted even <i>ab initio</i>.
  
  Daf 62b
  
  And to what statement of Rabbi Meir is the Gemara referring? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman may not go out on Shabbat with a key that is in her hand, and if she went out she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer exempts a woman who goes out with a bundle of fragrant herbs and with a flask of balsam oil [<i>palyaton</i>].
  The Gemara finds the statement of Rabbi Eliezer difficult: A bundle of fragrant herbs; who mentioned anything about that? Rabbi Meir did not mention a bundle of herbs; why did Rabbi Eliezer mention it in his response?
  The Gemara answers that the <i>baraita</i> is incomplete and it teaches the following: And likewise, with a bundle of fragrant herbs, and likewise with a flask of balsam oil she may not go out, and if she went out she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer exempts in the cases of a bundle of fragrant herbs and a flask of balsam oil. In what case is this statement said? In a case where the vessels have perfume in them; however, in a case where they do not have perfume in them, she is liable for carrying the flask out into the public domain on Shabbat.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: That is to say that one who carries out a measure of food that is less than the measure that determines liability on Shabbat, but he does so in a vessel, he is liable. Although he is not liable for carrying the food out into the public domain, he is liable for carrying out the vessel. In that case, the vessel is not subordinate to the food, and therefore it is significant. Since the case of the flask in which there is no perfume is comparable to the case in which there is less than the required measurement of food in a vessel, and it was taught in the case of the flask that she is liable even though the fragrance of the perfume remains in the vessel, it stands to reason that one who carries a vessel containing less than a measure of food is also liable.
  Rav Ashi said: That is no proof because, in general, I would say to you that he is exempt in a case where there is less than the measure that determines liability for food. However, it is different here, in the case of the empty flask of perfume as, in that case, there is no substance at all. Because the vessel is completely empty, he is liable for carrying the flask.
  Related to the mention of perfume, the Gemara cites several statements. It is stated: “That drink wine in <i>mizrekei</i>, and anoint themselves with the chief ointments; but they are not grieved for the hurt of Joseph” (Amos 6:6). Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: “The chief ointments” is balsam oil.
  Rav Yosef raised an objection from the <i>Tosefta</i>: Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava issued a decree on balsam oil as well, prohibiting its use due to mourning over the destruction of the Temple, and the Sages did not agree with him. And if you say that balsam oil is the chief ointment cited in the verse, and the decree was issued due to the pleasure it provides, why didn’t the Sages agree with his decree? Doesn’t the verse criticize those who do not feel the pain of the people?
  Abaye said to him: And according to your reasoning, that which is written in the same verse: “That drink wine in <i>mizrekei</i>”; Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree over the meaning of the term <i>mizrekei</i>. One said: They are multi-spouted vessels [<i>kenishkanin</i>], wine vessels with spouts from which several people can drink at one time, and one said that they throw [<i>mezarkin</i>] their cups to one another in joy and jest. Is that also prohibited? Didn’t Rabba bar Rav Huna visit the house of the Exilarch and see the Exilarch drink from a multi-spouted vessel, and Rabba bar Rav Huna did not say anything to him?
  Rather, the principle is as follows: With regard to any matter in which there is an element of pleasure and in which there is an element of joy, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting it due to mourning over the destruction of the Temple. However, with regard to a matter in which there is an element of pleasure and in which there is no element of joy, the Sages did not issue a decree. Since there is no element of joy in balsam oil, even though it is precious and pleasurable, they did not issue a decree prohibiting it.
  The Gemara interprets additional verses related to the critique of the leadership of Samaria. It is stated: “That lie upon beds of ivory and stretch [<i>seruḥim</i>] upon their couches and eat the lambs out of the flock and the calves out of the midst of the stall” (Amos 6:4). Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: This term, <i>seruḥim</i>, interpreted homiletically, teaches that their sin was that they would urinate before their beds while naked.
  Rabbi Abbahu ridiculed that interpretation: If so, that this is the meaning of the term <i>seruḥim</i>, is this the meaning of that which is written: “Therefore now they shall go into exile at the head of the exiles and the revelry of those <i>seruḥim</i> shall pass away” (Amos 6:7), because they urinate before their beds while naked they will be exiled at the head of exiles? Although doing so is revolting, a punishment so severe is certainly excessive.
  Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: This verse is referring to a grave sin. These are people who would eat and drink with each other, and join their beds to each other, and swap wives with each other, and defile their beds with semen that was not theirs. That is the meaning of <i>seruḥim</i> upon their couches. For those severe transgressions they deserved to be exiled at the head of exiles.
  On a related note, Rabbi Abbahu said, and some say it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Three matters bring a person to a state of poverty as a divine punishment from Heaven: One who urinates before his bed while naked, and one who demeans the ritual washing of the hands, and one whose wife curses him in his presence.
  The Gemara explains: With regard to one who urinates before his bed while naked, Rava said: We only said this prohibition in a case where he turns his face toward his bed and urinates toward it; however, if he turns his face and urinates toward the outer portion of the room, we have no problem with it.
  And where one turns his face toward his bed, too, we only said this prohibition in a case where he urinates on the ground; however, if he urinates into a vessel, we have no problem with it since that is not considered disgusting.
  With regard to one who demeans the ritual washing of the hands, Rava said: We only said this statement in a case where he does not wash his hands at all; however, if he washes his hands and does not wash them with a significant amount of water, we have no problem with it.
  The Gemara notes: And that is not so, as Rav Ḥisda said: I wash my hands with handfuls of water and they gave me in reward handfuls of prosperity. Apparently, in order to garner the benefits of ritual washing of his hands, one should use a significant amount of water.
  With regard to one whose wife curses him in his presence, Rava said: This is referring to a case where she curses him over matters relating to her ornaments, i.e., she complains that he does not provide her with jewelry. The Gemara comments: And that applies only when he has the resources to buy her jewelry but does not do so; however, if he does not have sufficient resources he need not be concerned.
  Since the Gemara spoke of sins in the First Temple era, it continues to explain other verses with similar content. Rava, son of Rav Ilai, interpreted the following verse homiletically. What is the meaning of that which is written: “The Lord says because the daughters of Zion are haughty and walk with outstretched necks and wanton eyes, walking and mincing as they go and making a tinkling with their feet” (Isaiah 3:16)?“Because the daughters of Zion are haughty,” indicates that they would walk with upright stature and carry themselves in an immodest way.“And walk with outstretched necks,” indicates that they would walk in small steps, heel to toe, so onlookers would notice them.“Wanton eyes,” indicates that they would fill their eyes with blue eye shadow and beckon.“Walking and mincing [<i>tafof</i>] as they go,” indicates that the wealthy women would walk a tall woman alongside a short one so that the tall woman would stand out. This is derived from the interchangeability of the letters <i>tet</i> and <i>tzadi</i>; <i>tzafo</i>, meaning, in this case, to be seen.“Making a tinkling [<i>te’akasna</i>] with their feet,” Rabbi Yitzḥak from the school of Rabbi Ami said: This teaches that they would place myrrh and balsam in their shoes and would walk in the marketplaces of Jerusalem. And once they approached a place where the young men of Israel were congregated, they would stamp their feet on the ground and splash the perfume toward them and instill the evil inclination into them like venom of a viper [<i>ke’eres bakhos</i>].
  What was their punishment for these sins? As Rabba bar Ulla taught: “And it shall come to pass that instead of a sweet smell, there shall be a stench; and instead of a belt, a rope; and instead of well-set hair, baldness; and instead of a fine dress, a girding of sackcloth; instead of beauty, a brand” (Isaiah 3:24). He explains: “And it shall come to pass that instead of a sweet smell there shall be a stench,” indicates that the place that they would perfume became decaying sores.“And instead of a sash, a rope [<i>nikpe</i>],” indicates that the place where they were girded with a sash became covered with many bruises [<i>nekafim</i>].“And instead of well-set hair, baldness,” indicates that the place where they would style their hair became bald spots.“And instead of a fine dress [<i>petigil</i>], a girding of sackcloth,” indicates that the orifices [<i>petaḥim</i>] that lead to pleasure [<i>gil</i>] will become a place for a girding of sackcloth.“Instead of beauty, a brand [<i>ki</i>],” Rava said: That is the popular expression that people say: Instead of beauty, a sore [<i>kiva</i>].
  With regard to a different verse: “The Lord will smite with a scab the crown of the head of the daughters of Zion and the Lord will lay bare their secret parts” (Isaiah 3:17). And the Lord will smite with a scab the crown of the heads of the daughters of Zion; Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: This teaches that there was an outbreak of leprosy among them. It is written here, scab [<i>sippaḥ</i>], and it is written there, among the types of leprosy: “For a sore, and for a scab [<i>sappaḥat</i>], and for a bright spot” (Leviticus 14:56).
  With regard to the verse: And the Lord will lay bare their secret parts [<i>pot’hen ye’areh</i>], Rav and Shmuel disagree. One says: It means that they, i.e., their innards, were poured out [<i>ye’areh</i>] like a jug. And one says: That their orifices [<i>pitḥeihen</i>] were covered with hair as thick as a forest [<i>ya’ar</i>].
  On the topic of the sins of Jerusalem and the abundance that existed before its destruction, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The people of Jerusalem were people of arrogance. They would couch their crude behavior in euphemisms. A person would say to another: On what did you dine today? Well-kneaded bread or bread that is not well-kneaded? On white wine or
  
  Daf 63a
  
  on black wine? Sitting on a wide divan or on a narrow divan? With a good friend or a bad friend? And Rav Ḥisda said: And all these allude to promiscuity. These are all euphemisms for different types of women. Well-kneaded bread refers to a woman who is not a virgin; white wine refers to a fair-complexioned woman; a wide divan refers to a fat woman; a good friend refers to a good-looking woman.
  On the topic of Jerusalem, Raḥava said that Rabbi Yehuda said: The logs of Jerusalem used for fuel were from the cinnamon tree, and when they would ignite them, their fragrance would waft through all of Eretz Yisrael. And since Jerusalem was destroyed, these fragrant logs were buried, and only a sliver the size of a grain of barley remains, and it is located in the treasury of [<i>gazzai</i>] Tzimtzemai the queen.
  MISHNA: Just as it is prohibited for a woman to carry out certain items unique to a woman into the public domain, the Sages said that a man may neither go out on Shabbat with a sword, nor with a bow, nor with a shield [<i>teris</i>], nor with an <i>alla</i>, nor with a spear. And if he unwittingly went out with one of these weapons to the public domain he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him; just as a man is permitted to go out into the public domain with other ornaments, he is permitted to go out with weapons.
  And the Rabbis say: They are nothing other than reprehensible and in the future they will be eliminated, as it is written: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation will not raise sword against nation, neither will they learn war anymore” (Isaiah 2:4).
  With regard to women’s ornaments, they added that a garter placed on her leg to hold up stockings is pure and cannot become ritually impure as a utensil, and she may even go out with it on Shabbat.
  However, ankle chains, which were also women’s ornaments, can become ritually impure, and she may not go out with them on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term <i>alla</i>? It means club [<i>kulpa</i>].
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: These weapons are ornaments for him. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that elaborates on this subject: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: And since, in your opinion, they are ornaments for him, why are they to be eliminated in the messianic era? He said to them: They will not be needed anymore, as it is stated: “Nation will not raise sword against nation” (Isaiah 2:4). The Gemara asks: And let the weapons be merely for ornamental purposes, even though they will not be needed for war. Abaye said: It is just as in the case of a candle in the afternoon. Since its light is not needed, it serves no ornamental purpose. Weapons, too; when not needed for war, they serve no ornamental purpose either.
  And this <i>baraita</i> disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The only difference between this world and the messianic era is subjugation of the exiles to other kingdoms, from which the Jewish people will be released. However, in other respects, the world will remain as it is, as it is written: “Because the poor will not cease from within the land” (Deuteronomy 15:11). Society will not change, and wars will continue to be waged.
  However, this <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba who disagrees with Shmuel. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: All of the prophets only prophesied with regard to the messianic era; however, with regard to the World-to-Come it was stated: “No eye sees, God, except You, that which He will do for he that waits for Him” (Isaiah 64:3). What will be in the World-to-Come cannot be depicted even by means of prophecy.
  And some say the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis was different. They said to Rabbi Eliezer: Since in your opinion they are ornaments for him, why will they be eliminated in the messianic era? He said to them: Even in the messianic era they will not be eliminated. And that is in accordance with that which Shmuel stated that the world will remain fundamentally the same, and he disagrees with Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba.
  Abaye said to Rav Dimi, and some say it was to Rav Avya, and some say Rav Yosef said to Rav Dimi, and some say it was to Rav Avya, and some say Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer who said: These weapons are ornaments for him? As it is written: “Gird your sword upon your thigh, mighty one, your glory and your splendor” (Psalms 45:4), indicating that a sword is considered an ornament.
  The Gemara relates that some time later Rav Kahana said to Mar, son of Rav Huna: Is that really a proof? This verse is written in reference to matters of Torah and should be interpreted as a metaphor. He said to him: Nevertheless, a verse does not depart from its literal meaning, although there may be additional homiletical interpretations.
  Rav Kahana said about this: When I was eighteen years old and had already learned the entire Talmud, and yet I did not know that a verse does not depart from its literal meaning until now. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Kahana teaching us with that statement? The Gemara answers: He comes to teach that a person should first learn and then understand the rationale.
  <i>Zarot</i> is a mnemonic acronym for Elazar [<i>zayin</i>], Reish Lakish [<i>reish</i>], and their students [<i>vav</i>, <i>tav</i>], the <i>amoraim</i> who interpreted the verse in Psalms cited above
  Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Elazar said: Two Torah scholars who sharpen one another in <i>halakha</i>; the Holy One, Blessed be He, ensures success for them, as it is written: “And in your majesty [<i>vahadarkha</i>] prosper, ride on, in behalf of truth and meekness and righteousness; and let your right hand teach you tremendous things” (Psalms 45:5). The Sages said: Do not read “and your majesty [<i>vahadarkha</i>],” rather, by changing some of the vocalization and the letters, read it as and He will sharpen you [<i>veḥidedkha</i>], and ultimately you will be successful. Moreover, they who act in that manner will rise to prominence, as it is written: “Prosper, ride on.” I might have thought even if one engages in the study of Torah not for its own sake; therefore, the verse states: “On behalf of truth.” I might have thought that one would be rewarded with prosperity even if he became arrogant; therefore, the verse states: “Meekness and righteousness.” And if they do so in the proper manner they merit the Torah that was given with the right hand of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is written: “And let your right hand teach you tremendous things” (Psalms 45:5).
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They are rewarded with the matters stated with regard to the right hand of the Torah. As Rava bar Rav Sheila said and some say Rav Yosef bar Ḥama said that Rav Sheshet said: What is the meaning of that which is written, “Length of days is in her right hand and in her left hand are riches and honor” (Proverbs 3:16)? Is that to say, however, that in her right there is length of days, but there are not riches and honor? Rather, it means: Those who relate to it with the skilled right hand, i.e., who study Torah for its own sake and with proper intentions, there is length of days and all the more so riches and honor for them. Whereas, those who relate to it with the unskilled left hand, there are riches and honor; there is not length of days.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Two Torah scholars who are agreeable to each other when engaging in discussions of <i>halakha</i>, the Holy One, Blessed be He, listens to them, as it is stated: “Then they that feared the Lord spoke [<i>nidberu</i>] one with another; and the Lord hearkened, and heard, and a book of remembrance was written before Him, for them that feared the Lord, and that thought upon His name” (Malachi 3:16). And the term speech [<i>dibbur</i>] means nothing other than calm, as it is stated: “He subdues [<i>yadber</i>] people under us” (Psalms 47:4). He will cause the nations to submit to the Jewish people leading to a period of calm. Here too the term <i>dibbur</i> indicates calm and agreeability.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase in that verse: “And those who thought of His name”? Rabbi Ami said: Even if one merely planned to perform a mitzva, and ultimately due to circumstances beyond his control did not perform that mitzva, the verse ascribes him credit as if he performed it.
  The Gemara continues in praise of those who perform mitzvot: Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi said: Anyone who performs a mitzva as it was commanded, others do not apprise him of bad tidings, as it is stated: “He who keeps the commandment shall know no evil thing” (Ecclesiastes 8:5).
  Rav Asi, and some say Rabbi Ḥanina said: Even if the Holy One, Blessed be He, issued a decree, He may abrogate it, as it is stated: “For the word of the King has authority and who may say to Him: What do You do?” (Ecclesiastes 8:4). And, although this indicates that even though the King, God, issued a decree, juxtaposed to it is the verse: “He who guards the commandment shall know no evil thing” (Ecclesiastes 8:5). For one who observes mitzvot properly, the decree is abrogated and he will know no evil.
  Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Two Torah scholars who listen to each other in the discussion of <i>halakha</i>, the Holy One, Blessed be He, hears their voice, as it is stated: “You who dwell in gardens, the companions heed your voice, cause me to hear it” (Song of Songs 8:13).
  And if they do not do so, i.e., they do not listen to each other, they cause the Divine Presence to depart from among Israel, as it is stated in the following verse: “Run away, my beloved, and be like a gazelle or a young hart upon the mountains of spices” (Song of Songs 8:14).
  Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Two individual Torah scholars who, while studying together, cause one another to err [<i>madgilim</i>] in <i>halakha</i> [<i>Tosafot</i>], nevertheless, the Holy One, Blessed be He, loves them, as it is stated: “And his banner [<i>vediglo</i>] over me is love” (Song of Songs 2:4). Rava said: And that is only true in a case where they know the foundation of the law, and their error resulted from the lack of more sophisticated knowledge. And that is only true in a case where they do not have a prominent person in the city from whom they could learn without error.
  Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who loans another money is greater than one who gives him charity. And the one who places money into a common purse, i.e., one who enters into a partnership with a needy person, is the greatest of them all, since in that case the needy person is not embarrassed when receiving the assistance.
  Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Even if a Torah scholar is as vengeful and begrudging as a snake, wrap him tightly around your waist, i.e., keep him close, because you will benefit from his Torah. On the other hand, even if an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is righteous, do not dwell in his neighborhood, as his righteousness does not compensate for the fact that he is ignorant.
  Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, and some say Rav Asi said that Reish Lakish said, and some say Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Anyone who raises an evil dog within his home prevents kindness from entering into his home, since poor people will hesitate to enter his house. As it is alluded to in the verse: “To him that is afflicted [<i>lamas</i>],
  
  Daf 63b
  
  kindness from his friend and awe of the Almighty will leave” (Job 6:14), since in the Greek language they call a dog <i>lamas</i>. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: One who keeps an evil dog in his home even divests himself of fear of Heaven, as it is stated at the end of that verse: “And awe of the Almighty will leave.”
  The Gemara relates: A certain pregnant woman who entered to use the oven in a certain house to bake, the dog in that house barked at her, and her fetus was displaced. The owner of the house said to her: Do not be afraid because his teeth have been removed and his claws have been removed. She said to him: Take your goodness and throw it on the thorns. Your encouragement is useless as the fetus has already been displaced and will certainly die.
  On a related note, Rav Huna said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Rejoice young man in your youth, and let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth, and walk in the ways of your heart and in the sight of your eyes; but know that for all these things God will bring you to judgment” (Ecclesiastes 11:9)? Until here, “the sight of your eyes,” these are the words of the evil inclination; from here on, “but know that, etc.,” these are the words of the good inclination.
  Reish Lakish said: Until here, the verse refers to matters of Torah. One is provided the opportunity to study and involve himself in the Torah and rejoice in its innovations; from here on, “but know that, etc.,” it refers to good deeds. One will ultimately stand trial for that which he studied and did not implement.
  We learned in the mishna that a garter is pure. Rav Yehuda said: Garter; that is a bracelet worn on the arm.
  Rav Yosef raised an objection: It is stated here that a garter is pure and a woman may go out with it on Shabbat, while a bracelet is ritually impure. It is mentioned explicitly in the verse enumerating the spoils of the war with the Midianites: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). Earlier in that chapter it is written with regard to the spoils: “Purify yourselves on the third day and on the seventh day both you and your captives” (Numbers 31:19). Apparently, a bracelet can become ritually impure.
  Rather, this is what Rav Yehuda is saying: A garter on the leg is in place of a bracelet on the arm. It goes around the leg to hold a stocking in place just as a bracelet goes around the arm. However, unlike a bracelet, a garter cannot become ritually impure because it is not an ornament. It simply holds up the stocking.
  The Gemara relates: Ravin and Rav Huna were sitting before Rav Yirmeya. And Rav Yirmeya was sitting and dozing as the two students conversed. And Ravin sat and said: The difference between a garter and ankle chains is that a garter is worn on one leg, and ankle chains are worn on two legs.
  Rav Huna said to him: These garters and those ankle chains are both worn on two legs. And when she wears garters on both legs they place a chain between them, and they become vessels with the legal status equal to that of ankle chains.
  And Ravin asked: And does the chain that is connected to it render it a vessel? If a garter without a chain is not considered a vessel, why would the addition of a chain render it a vessel that can become ritually impure?
  And if you say the reason for this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that a metal vessel that makes a sound is considered a vessel and can become ritually impure? As it is stated: “Every thing that passes through the fire, you shall make it pass through the fire, and it shall be clean; nevertheless it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling; and all that does not pass through the fire you shall make to go through water” (Numbers 31:23). And the Sages interpret the verse homiletically: Every thing [<i>davar</i>], even speech [<i>dibbur</i>]; in other words, even an object that makes a sound shall pass through fire to become purified because it is a vessel.
  However, this case is not similar. Granted, there, they require the vessel for the purpose of its sound and it performs an action. However, here, what action does the chain perform? Although it creates a sound, the chain serves no purpose.
  He said to him: Here, too, the chain is performing a purposeful action, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There was one family in Jerusalem whose daughters’ strides were lengthy, and as a result their hymen membranes would fall away. In order to solve this problem they made them ankle chains and they hung a chain between them so that their strides would not be so large and, indeed, their hymen membranes would no longer fall away. Meanwhile, Rabbi Yirmeya awoke from their voices and said to them: Correct, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said likewise.
  On the topic of ritual impurity, the Gemara relates: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that a woven fabric of any size can become ritually impure? It is derived from the frontplate [<i>tzitz</i>] of the High Priest, which is considered a vessel despite its small size.
  Abaye said to him: And is the frontplate a woven fabric? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The frontplate is made like a kind of smooth plate of gold, and its width is two fingerbreadths, and it encircles the forehead from ear to ear. And on it is written in two lines: <i>Yod heh</i>, i.e., the Tetragrammaton, above, and <i>kodesh lamed</i>, i.e., sacred to, below. Thus, the words: Sacred to God, were written on the frontplate. In deference to the name of God, it would be written on the top line, and the words: Sacred to, on the line below.
  And Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I saw it in the Caesar’s treasury in the city of Rome and Sacred to God was written on one line. In any case, since the frontplate is a gold plate, how can it serve as a source for ritual impurity in fabrics?
  When Rav Dimi ascended to Neharde’a, he sent to the yeshiva students: The statements I said to you with regard to woven fabrics of any size becoming ritually impure regardless of their size, they are my mistake. However, this is what they said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: From where is it derived that an ornament of any size can become ritually impure? It is derived from the frontplate. And from where is it derived that a woven fabric of any size can become ritually impure? It is derived from the verse: “Or a garment or leather or sack; any vessel with which any work is done must be put into water and it shall be unclean until evening, then it shall be clean” (Leviticus 11:32). From the extraneous phrase, “or a garment,” it is derived that any garment, regardless how small, falls into this category.
  Similarly, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woven fabric of any size can become ritually impure, and an ornament of any size can become ritually impure. An object that is half woven fabric and half ornament of any size can become ritually impure. And a sack is added to the category of garment; it too is ritually impure due to woven fabric.
  Rava said in explanation of the <i>baraita</i>: A woven fabric of any size is ritually impure as derived from the phrase “or a garment.” An ornament of any size is ritually impure, as derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of the frontplate. A woven fabric and an ornament of any size is ritually impure, as derived from that which is stated: “And Moses and Elazar the priest took the gold from them, all vessels with which labor is done” (Numbers 31:51). Any object that can be utilized for any action falls into the category of: All vessels with which labor is done.
  One of the Sages said to Rava: That verse is written with regard to Midian. There it is referring specifically to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and how is it possible to derive from that <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity in general?
  Rava said to him: He derived by means of a verbal analogy
  
  Daf 64a
  
  from the word vessel written there, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and the word vessel written with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of other impurities.
  It was taught in the <i>baraita</i> that a sack is added to the category of “garment”; it too is ritually impure due to woven fabric. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a garment is not a woven fabric? Rather, the statement should be emended and say as follows: A sack made from goat hair is added to the category of garment; even though it is not woven it can nevertheless become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: For what is a garment made of unwoven goat hair suitable? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Since a poor person occasionally braids three goat hairs and hangs it on his daughter’s neck as an ornament.
  The Sages taught a detailed halakhic exposition of that verse in a different <i>baraita</i>. From the fact that the verse mentioned sack, I have only derived that a whole sack can become ritually impure. From where is it derived to include even reins [<i>kilkeli</i>] and a saddle band fastened under the horse’s belly in the category of those objects that can become ritually impure? The verse states: “Or sack”; “or” teaches that the verse is referring to items similar to a sack as well. I might have thought, on that basis, that I should include even the ropes and measuring cords. The verse states: “Sack,” just as a sack is spun and woven, so too, everything that is spun and woven can become ritually impure. Ropes and measuring cords are not made from spun threads, and they are certainly not woven.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Now, it says with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity imparted by a corpse: “And every garment and all that is made of skins and all work of goats’ hair and all things made of wood you shall purify” (Numbers 31:20). This verse comes to include reins and the band under the horse’s belly within the category of: All work of goats’ hair. They too can become ritually impure.
  I might have thought that I would include even the ropes and thin cords in this category. The Gemara begins with a logical analysis. And it may be inferred logically to the contrary, that a rope cannot become impure. The verse deemed impure an object that came in contact with a creeping animal, and it deemed impure an object that came in contact with a corpse. Just as when it rendered an object impure from contact with a creeping animal it only rendered impure objects spun and woven, as stated above; so too, when it rendered impure an object from contact with a corpse, it only rendered impure objects spun and woven.
  There is room to distinguish: Are these indeed comparable? If the Torah was lenient with regard to the ritual impurity of an object that came in contact with a creeping animal, which is a less severe form of impurity, saying that ropes do not become impure from contact with that form of ritual impurity, will we be lenient with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, which is more severe? Perhaps, since impurity imparted by a corpse is more severe, even objects not woven and spun, e.g., ropes, become ritually impure from contact with it. Therefore, the verse states garment and leather, garment and leather to establish a verbal analogy.
  The term garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal: “And whatever any of them falls upon when they are dead will be impure whether it be any vessel of wood, or a garment, or leather, or sack, whatever vessel it be with which any work is done it must be put into water and it will be impure until evening, then it will be clean” (Leviticus 11:32). And garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Just as garment and leather stated with regard to a creeping animal only rendered impure objects that are spun and woven, so too, garment and leather stated with regard to a corpse only rendered impure objects that are spun and woven.
  Utilizing the same verbal analogy, one could say: And just as garment and leather stated with regard to a corpse rendered impure any object that is the work of goats’ hair, so too, garment and leather stated with regard to a creeping animal rendered impure any object that is the work of goats’ hair.
  I have only derived from this verbal analogy that an object that comes from goats can become ritually impure; from where do I derive to include an item that comes from a horse’s tail or from a cow’s tail? The verse states: Or a sack, and anything like a sack, i.e., these other items as well.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t you already derive ritual impurity with regard to reins and a saddle band from this verse? How can ritual impurity for items that come from a horse’s tail and a cow’s tail be derived from the same verse?
  The Gemara answers: That applies only before the verbal analogy was cited; now that the verbal analogy was cited, the verse is rendered extraneous. The fact that any item that falls in the category of: “And all work of goats’ hair,” can become ritually impure is derived from the verbal analogy. Reins and a saddle bands are included in the category of work of goats’ hair. Therefore, they need not be derived from that phrase. Consequently, a different <i>halakha</i> can be derived from that extraneous phrase: Objects that come from a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail can become ritually impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And I have derived that an object made from a horse’s tail can become impure only with regard to a creeping animal; however, with regard to a corpse, from where is this derived?
  The Gemara begins with a logical analysis. And it may be inferred logically that this is so. The Torah rendered impure a sack that came into contact with a corpse and rendered impure a sack that came into contact with a creeping animal. Just as when the Torah rendered items that came into contact with a creeping animal impure it made the legal status of that which comes from a horse’s tail and a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair, i.e., that it contracts ritual impurity, so too when the Torah rendered impure items that came into contact with a corpse, it made the legal status of that which comes from a horse’s tail and a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair.
  The Gemara rejects this: Are these indeed comparable? If the verse added additional objects to the category of ritual impurity that lasts until nightfall, e.g., the impurity imparted by a creeping animal, which is extensive, will we add additional objects to the category of ritual impurity that lasts for seven days, which is limited to the case of impurity from a corpse? The fact that items made of a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail are added to the already broad category of ritual impurity that lasts until nightfall is not necessarily an indication that they are to be added to the category of ritual impurity that lasts seven days.
  The verse states: Garment and leather, garment and leather to establish a verbal analogy. Garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal, and garment and leather is stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Just as with regard to the garment and leather stated in the <i>halakhot</i> of a creeping animal the Torah rendered the legal status of an item made from a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair, so too, with regard to the garment and leather stated in the <i>halakhot</i> of a corpse, the Torah rendered the legal status of an item made from a horse’s tail or a cow’s tail equal to the legal status of that which is made from goats’ hair.
  The Gemara notes: And it must be that the words garment and leather are free. Those terms must be superfluous in their context. The Torah included those terms for the express purpose of establishing the verbal analogy. A verbal analogy that is based on otherwise extraneous terms cannot be logically refuted. Because if these terms are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted: What is unique to a creeping animal? Its ritual impurity is stringent in that it renders objects ritually impure even by means of contact with a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal. That is not the case with regard to a corpse, which is less severe in that it renders objects ritually impure only by means of contact with an olive-bulk of a corpse. Unless the terms are free, the analogy can be refuted.
  Indeed [<i>la’ei</i>], they are free. The Gemara proves that the terms garment and leather are extraneous in their context. Now, since ritual impurity from contact with a creeping animal is juxtaposed to ritual impurity from contact with semen, as it is written: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead or a man from whom semen is emitted” (Leviticus 22:4), and juxtaposed to that is the verse: “Or whoever touches any creeping animal which makes him impure, or a person who may make him impure with any impurity that he has” (Leviticus 22:5). And it is written in the <i>halakhot</i> of the ritual impurity of semen: “And every garment and every hide on which the semen is must be washed with water and will be impure until evening” (Leviticus 15:17). Since the verses appear next to each other, the <i>halakhot</i> of each can be derived from the other. Consequently, the words garment and leather, which the Torah wrote with regard to a creeping animal, why do I need them? The relevant <i>halakha</i> could be derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of seminal impurity. Learn from it that garment and leather were mentioned to render them free.
  The Gemara comments: And still, it is free only from one side of the verbal analogy. Although the terms garment and leather stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a creeping animal are extraneous in their context, and the relevant <i>halakha</i> could have been derived in another manner, those terms stated with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse are not extraneous in their context. This verbal analogy is only free from one side. It works out well according to the opinion of the one who said, with regard to a verbal analogy that is free from only one side, one can derive from it and cannot refute it logically. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that one can derive from a verbal analogy of this kind and one can refute it logically, what can be said?
  The Gemara answers: Garment and leather stated with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse are also free. Now, since a corpse is juxtaposed with semen, as it is written: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead or a man whose semen is emitted from him” (Leviticus 22:4); and it is stated with regard to semen: “And every garment and every hide” (Leviticus 15:17); the terms garment and leather, which the Torah wrote with regard to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, why do I need them? Learn from it that they are mentioned in order to render them free. These terms are extraneous in their context, and were written for the purpose of the verbal analogy with the <i>halakhot</i> of creeping animals.
  The Gemara interprets verses written with regard to the Midianite war discussed above: “And we have brought an offering before the Lord what every man has gotten of jewels of gold, chains, and bracelets, rings, <i>agil</i>, and <i>kumaz</i>, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). Rabbi Elazar said: <i>Agil</i> is a mold in the shape of a woman’s breasts worn over them as an ornament. <i>Kumaz</i> is a mold in the shape of the womb.
  Rav Yosef said: If so, that is the reason that we translate <i>kumaz</i> into Aramaic as <i>maḥokh</i>, meaning an item that leads to foolishness. Rabba said to him: This meaning is learned from the verse itself; <i>kumaz</i> is an acronym for: Here [<i>kan</i>] is the place of [<i>mekom</i>] lewdness [<i>zimma</i>].
  Later in that chapter, it is written: “And Moses was angry with the officers of the host, the captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, who came from the battle” (Numbers 31:14); Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Moses said to Israel: Perhaps you have returned to your original sinful behavior, when you sinned with the daughters of Moab and Midian at Shittim? They said to him: “Not one man of us is missing” (Numbers 31:49), we remain as wholesome in deed as we were. He said to them: If so, why do you need atonement? The princes brought these ornaments to atone for their souls. They said to him: If we have emerged from the grasps of actual transgression, we have not emerged from the grasps of thoughts of transgression. Immediately, they decided: “And we have brought an offering before the Lord.”
  The Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason did Israel in that generation require atonement? Because
  
  Daf 64b
  
  they nourished their eyes from nakedness.
  With regard to the verse that lists the ornaments, Rav Sheshet said: For what reason did the verse list outer ornaments, i.e., a bracelet, with inner ornaments, i.e., a <i>kumaz</i>? To tell you that anyone who gazes upon a woman’s little finger is considered as if he gazed upon her naked genitals. The atonement was for the sin of looking.
  MISHNA: The mishna continues to discuss those items with which it is permitted to go out and those items with which it is prohibited to go out on Shabbat. A woman may go out with strands of hair that she put on her head, whether they are from her own hair that she made into a wig, or whether they are from the hair of another, or whether they are from the hair of an animal.
  And a woman may go out with an ornament called <i>totefet</i>, and with <i>sarvitin</i> when they are sewn and will not fall.
  She may go out on Shabbat with a woolen cap or with a wig to the courtyard, although not to the public domain. And likewise she may go out with a cloth that is in her ear, and with a cloth in her sandal, and with a cloth that she placed due to her menstrual status.
  She may go out on Shabbat with pepper, or with a grain of salt, or anything placed in her mouth for healing or for preventing bad odor, as long as she does not put these objects in her mouth for the first time on Shabbat. And if it fell out she may not replace it.
  A false tooth as well as (Ramban) a gold tooth, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out with it, and the Rabbis prohibit doing so.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that a woman may go out with different strands of hair. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to cite all of the cases. If the mishna taught us only with regard to her own hair, I would have said that she may go out with it because it is not repulsive, as it is her own hair; therefore, there is no concern lest she come to remove the strands and carry them in the public domain. However, the hair of another, which is repulsive and a different color from hers, say no, she may not go out with it, due to concern lest she be embarrassed, remove it, and come to carry it in the public domain.
  And if the mishna taught us that she is permitted to go out with the hair of another, I would have said that she may go out with it because it is hair of her own kind. Therefore, it is not repulsive in her eyes and she will not come to remove it. However, the hair of an animal, since it is not of her own kind, say no, she may not go out with it due to concern lest she remove it. Therefore, it is necessary to cite all three cases.
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: It is permitted as long as a girl does not go out with the hair of an elderly woman, and an elderly woman does not go out with the hair of a girl.
  The Gemara challenges: Granted, the Gemara cited the case of an elderly woman who goes out with the hair of a girl, as it is a reasonable scenario because it is flattering for her to look young. However, why would a girl go out with the hair of an elderly woman? Since it is demeaning for her to appear elderly, it is an unlikely scenario. The Gemara answers: Since the mishna taught the case of an elderly woman with the hair of a girl, it also taught the improbable case of a girl with the hair of an elderly woman.
  It was taught in the mishna that a woman may go out with a woolen cap or with a wig to the courtyard. Rav said: With regard to all ornaments and garments with which the Sages prohibited going out into the public domain on Shabbat, it is also prohibited to go out with them into the courtyard due to the concern lest she forget and go out to the street, with the exception of a woolen cap and a wig.
  Rabbi Anani bar Sason said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: All ornaments have the same legal status as a woolen cap and may be worn into the courtyard.
  We learned in the mishna that it is permitted to go out with a woolen cap or a wig into the courtyard. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav the matter works out well, as the mishna allows one to go out into a courtyard only with a woolen cap and a wig. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Anani bar Sason, it is difficult. The Gemara answers: In whose name did Rabbi Anani bar Sason say his <i>halakha</i>? In the name of Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei, and Rabbi Yishmael bar Yosei is a <i>tanna</i> and, as such, has the authority to dispute the determination in the mishna.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rav, what is different about these, the woolen cap and the wig, that the mishna permitted going out into the courtyard with them? Ulla said: So that she will not become unappealing to her husband. That would be the result if all ornamentation was prohibited. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And of her that is sick in her menstrual status [<i>niddata</i>]” (Leviticus 15:33), the Elders of the early generations said that this verse comes to teach us that the menstruating woman should be distanced from her husband in all senses, like a person ostracized [<i>menudeh</i>] by the Sages. This includes that she may not paint her eyes blue, and she may not rouge [<i>pokeset</i>] her face, and she may not adorn herself with colorful clothing. Until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: If you do so, you are making her unappealing to her husband, and her husband will consequently divorce her. Therefore, extreme strictures should not be instituted. Rather, what is the meaning of that which the verse states: “And of her that is sick in her menstrual status”? She shall remain prohibited in her menstrual status even after the flow of blood has stopped until she immerses in the water of a ritual bath.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in the innermost chambers, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. When prohibiting an action, the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances. They prohibited performing the action in all cases.
  The Gemara raises an objection. We learned in the mishna that an animal belonging to a Jew may not go out on Shabbat with a bell around its neck, even though it is plugged and makes no sound, due to the appearance of prohibition, as it appears as if he were taking the animal to the marketplace. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: He may plug the bell on the animal’s neck and walk with it in the courtyard. Apparently, although the Sages prohibited this action due to the appearance of prohibition, they permitted it in the courtyard.
  The Gemara answers: It is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> in this matter, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 65a
  
  One whose clothes fell into water on a Festival may not dry them in the conventional manner; however, he may spread them out in the sun, but not before the people, who may suspect that he laundered his clothes on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon prohibit doing so even in a place concealed from view. Apparently, the Sages disagree whether or not an action prohibited due to the appearance of prohibition is prohibited everywhere.
  We learned in the mishna that a woman may go out on Shabbat with a cloth that is in her ear. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: And that is specifically in a case where the cloth is tied to her ear and she will not come to carry it.
  The mishna continues: A woman may go out with a cloth that is in her sandal. Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: And that is specifically in a case where the cloth is tied to her sandal.
  We learned in the mishna: A woman may go out with a cloth that she placed due to her menstrual flow. Rami bar Ḥama considered saying that it is permitted specifically in a case where it is tied between her thighs. Rava said: It is permitted even though it is not tied to her; since it is repulsive, she will not come to carry it even if it falls.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Abba: If she made herself a handgrip in which she could hold the cloth, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Since she does not have to touch the cloth with her bare hand, is there concern that she will come to carry it or not? He said to him: It is permitted. It was also stated that Rav Naḥman bar Oshaya said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If she made herself a handgrip it is permitted.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan went out with a cloth in his ear to the study hall on Shabbat, and his colleagues are in disagreement with him and rule that it is prohibited to do so because it was not tied to his ear. Rabbi Yannai went out with it, a cloth in his ear, to a <i>karmelit</i>, an intermediate domain, neither public nor private. And all the Sages of his generation are in disagreement with him. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rami bar Yeḥezkel teach: And that is specifically in a case where the cloth is tied to her ear? How could these Sages ignore this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this, where it was taught that certain Sages went out with a cloth, is in a case where it was stuck tightly in their ears. Therefore, it was permitted even though it was not tied. That, where Rami bar Yeḥezkel said that going out with a cloth is permitted only when it is tied, is in a case where it was not stuck tightly in his ear.
  We learned in the mishna: A woman may go out with pepper and with a grain of salt in her mouth. The Gemara explains: She places pepper in her mouth to prevent mouth odor and a grain of salt to treat a toothache. With regard to that which we learned in the mishna: A woman may go out on Shabbat with any thing that she places in her mouth: This refers to ginger or, alternatively, to cinnamon [<i>dartzona</i>].
  We learned in the mishna that the Sages disagree whether or not a woman may go out on Shabbat with a false tooth and a gold tooth; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits doing so and the Rabbis prohibit doing so. Rabbi Zeira said: They only taught the dispute with regard to a gold tooth. Since it is precious, she might remove it from her mouth to show her friends and come to carry it. However, with regard to a silver tooth, which is less precious, there is no concern that she will remove it from her mouth. Everyone agrees that it is permitted. That opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a tooth made of silver, everyone agrees that it is permitted. With regard to a tooth of gold, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits going out with it and the Rabbis prohibit going out with it.
  Abaye said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold that anything that makes her unappealing when removed, she will not come to remove it and show it to others. Therefore, it is permitted for her to go out with it.
  The Gemara elaborates: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is that which we just stated. The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer exempts a woman who went out with a bundle of fragrant herbs and with a flask of balsam oil, since a woman whose odor is foul does not remove and show the bundle to others.
  The opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is worn beneath the net, a woman may go out into the public domain with it, since a woman will not uncover her hair while in the public domain even to show off an ornament. Anything that is worn over the net, e.g., an ornamental hat, a woman may not go out with it, since there is concern that she will remove it and carry it.
  MISHNA: A woman may go out with a <i>sela</i> coin that she ties on a wound on her foot. The young girls may go out with strings, and even with wood chips that are in the holes in their ears so that the holes will not seal. Young girls would have their ears pierced, but earrings were not placed in their ears until they were older. Jewish women in Arab countries may go out veiled, with a scarf covering their face, and Jewish women in Media may go out with cloaks fastened with stones. And, any person in any place is permitted to go out on Shabbat clothed in that way; however, the Sages spoke in the present, addressing prevalent situations. A woman may fasten her cloak on a stone by inserting a small stone and wrapping her cloak around it, as she would with a button. And likewise, she may do so on a nut or on a coin, as long as she does not fasten her cloak with them on Shabbat <i>ab initio</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the <i>tzinit</i> with regard to which the mishna taught that a woman may go out with a coin tied to it on Shabbat? The Gemara explains: It is a wound on the sole of her foot.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about a <i>sela</i>? Why specifically is a coin placed on the wound? If you say that any object that is hard is beneficial for her, make an earthenware shard for her instead. Rather, it is beneficial due to the rust on the coin. If so, make a small silver plate for her. Why specifically a coin? Rather it is beneficial due to the image engraved on the coin. If so, make her an unminted coin and engrave an image on it. Abaye said: Learn from it that all these factors together are beneficial for her.
  The mishna taught that the young girls may go out with strings. The Gemara relates that Shmuel’s father did not allow his daughters to go out with strings, and did not allow them to lie next to each other, and he made ritual baths for them in the days of Nisan and mats in the Euphrates River in the days of Tishrei. Since the water was shallow and the riverbed muddy, he placed mats on the riverbed so that they could immerse without getting dirty.
  The Gemara analyzes the conduct of Shmuel’s father: He did not allow them to go out with strings. Didn’t we learn in the mishna that the girls may go out with strings? The Gemara answers: The strings with which the daughters of Shmuel’s father went out were colorful ones, and he was concerned that because the strings were beautiful they would come to remove them to show them to others and carry them.
  He did not allow them to lie next to one another. Let us say that this supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: Women who rub against one another motivated by sexual desire
  
  Daf 65b
  
  are disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. The act renders a woman a <i>zona.</i> It is prohibited for a priest to marry her (<i>Tosafot</i>).
  The Gemara rejects this: No, that is not necessarily so. Perhaps the reason for Shmuel’s father’s insistence was because he thought to prevent them from lying next to one another so that they would not become accustomed to sleeping with a foreign body, which could stimulate sexual desire.
  And he made a ritual bath for them in the days of Nisan. This supports the opinion of Rav, as Rav said: When rain falls in the West, Eretz Yisrael, the great witness attesting to that fact is the Euphrates, as the water flow in the Euphrates increases after the rainy season. The rainfall in northern Babylonia, where the source of the Euphrates is located, is essentially parallel to the rainfall in Eretz Yisrael. The increased water flow of the Euphrates in the spring is the result of the rainfall in the winter. Shmuel’s father held that immersion in the Euphrates would not purify them. A river maintains its status as a river in terms of purification through immersion only if it is established that the rain water that fell would not exceed the naturally flowing spring water. In the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual baths, there are two manners of purification. The first is the immersion in a place where water is gathered, e.g., collected rainwater that does not flow and remains in place. The second is immersion in flowing waters in their natural state, e.g., a spring or a river. However, rainwater purifies only when it is collected; it does not purify when it is flowing.
  And he disagrees with his son Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The river is blessed from its riverbed (<i>ge’onim</i>); the additional water in the river is not from rainfall but rather from subterranean sources. And this statement of Shmuel disagrees with another ruling that he himself issued, as Shmuel said: The water purifies when flowing only in the Euphrates during the days of Tishrei alone. Since rain does not fall in the summer, only then is it clear that the water is in fact river water.
  We learned in the mishna: A woman may fasten her cloak on a stone, and on a nut, and on a coin, as long as she does not fasten her cloak with them <i>ab initio</i> on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you say in the first clause of this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that a woman may fasten, indicating that she is permitted to do so even <i>ab initio</i>? How do you explain the contradiction? Abaye said: In the latter clause of the mishna we have arrived at the case of a coin, one of the examples cited in the mishna. The <i>halakha</i> with regard to a coin is the exception. Because a coin is set-aside from use on Shabbat, one might conclude that it may not be used at all; nevertheless, it is only prohibited to fasten the cloak on the coin <i>ab initio</i> on Shabbat itself.
  Abaye raised a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where a woman employs artifice to circumvent the <i>halakha</i> and fastens her garment on a nut in order to take the nut out in a permissible fashion to her young child in the public domain on Shabbat?
  The Gemara notes: This is a dilemma according to the one who said that one may employ artifice when there is a fire on Shabbat. One is permitted to wear several layers of garments to take them out of a burning house on Shabbat. And this is a dilemma according to the one who said that one may not employ artifice when there is a fire on Shabbat.
  The Gemara elaborates: This is a dilemma according to the one who said that one may employ artifice when there is a fire on Shabbat, as the cases are distinct. Perhaps there, artifice is permitted because if you do not permit him to take the garments out of the burning house in that manner, he will come to extinguish the fire. However, here, if you do not permit the woman to employ artifice and take the nut out to her child in the public domain, she will not come to take it out.
  Or perhaps, even according to one who said that one may not employ artifice in the case of a fire, there is a distinction between the cases. There, in the case of a fire, wearing garments is the typical manner in which one takes clothing out to the public domain. However, here, utilizing a nut as a button is not the typical manner in which one takes a nut out to the public domain. Since no Torah prohibition is violated by doing so, say that she may well employ artifice to take the nut out to her son. The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: One with an amputated leg may go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg, as it has the legal status of a shoe; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  
  Daf 66a
  
  And Rabbi Yosei prohibits going out into the public domain with the wooden leg, since he does not consider it to have the legal status of a shoe.
  And if the wooden leg has a receptacle for pads, a concave space at the top of the leg into which pads are placed to cushion the amputated leg, it assumes the status of a wooden vessel and can become ritually impure.
  And his supports, which are shoes that one who had both of his feet amputated places on his knees in order to walk on his knees, if a <i>zav</i> wears them, they are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. A <i>zav</i> is a primary source of ritual impurity. If he touches a vessel it assumes first-degree ritual impurity status. However, vessels on which he treads, sits, lies, or leans become primary sources of ritual impurity, provided they are designated for that purpose. These supports are vessels designated for treading. And one may go out with them into the public domain on Shabbat since they have the legal status of shoes. And one may enter the Temple courtyard with them. Although, generally, wearing shoes in the Temple courtyard is prohibited, in this regard, the supports do not have the legal status of shoes.
  However, if one who is crippled to the extent that he cannot walk at all sits on a chair that is attached to him, places supports on his hands, and propels himself along with his hands, his chair and supports are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. And one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter the Temple courtyard with them.
  <i>Loketamin</i>, which will be explained in the Gemara, are ritually pure in the sense that they cannot become ritually impure because they are not vessels, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: Rava said to Rav Naḥman: How did we learn the dispute in our mishna? Does Rabbi Meir rule that the amputee may go out with a wooden leg and foot and Rabbi Yosei prohibits him from doing so? Or is it Rabbi Meir who prohibited him from doing so, and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is the lenient one? Rav Naḥman said to him: I don’t know. And Rava asked: What is the <i>halakha</i> in this matter? Rav Naḥman said to him: I don’t know.
  It was stated: Shmuel said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not go out, and Rabbi Yosei permits him to do so. And, likewise, Rav Huna said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not. Rav Yosef said: Since Shmuel said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not, and Rav Huna said: An amputee may not, we will also learn the mishna: An amputee may not.
  Rava bar Shira strongly objects to this: And did they not hear that Rav Ḥanan bar Rava taught the mishna to Ḥiyya bar Rav before Rav in a small room [<i>kituna</i>] in the school of Rav: An amputee may not go out on Shabbat with his wooden leg; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yosei permits going out with it. And Rav signaled him with a hand gesture to reverse the opinions, Rabbi Meir permits going out and Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And the mnemonic to remember which <i>tanna</i> permits and which <i>tanna</i> prohibits is <i>samekh samekh</i>. The letter <i>samekh</i> appears both in the name Yosei and in the Hebrew word for prohibits [<i>oser</i>]. In that way, one remembers that Rabbi Yosei is the one who prohibits it.
  The Gemara comments: And even Shmuel, who said that the correct reading of the mishna is: An amputee may not, and Rabbi Yosei permits it, reversed his opinion. As we learned in a mishna: The <i>ḥalitza</i> ceremony, which frees a childless widow from the obligation to enter into levirate marriage with her brother-in-law, involves the widow removing her brother-in-law’s sandal from his foot. If she removed a sandal that is not his, or a wooden sandal, or the sandal of the left foot that was on his right foot, the <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid.
  And we said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that a wooden sandal is considered a shoe for this purpose? Shmuel said: It is Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna: An amputee may go out with his wooden leg, this is the statement of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yosei prohibits doing so. Ultimately, Shmuel accepted Rav’s reading of the mishna.
  And Rav Huna also reversed his opinion, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a plasterers’ sandal worn by those who work with lime and would cover their leather shoes with a shoe woven from straw or reeds so that the leather shoes would not get ruined by the lime. If the plasterer is a <i>zav</i> and walks with his shoes covered, the shoe covering is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading, as the legal status of that sandal is that of a shoe. A woman may perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with it, and one may go out with it on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis did not agree with him.
  The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that they agreed with him? Rav Huna said in resolution of this apparent contradiction: Who is the Sage whose opinion is referred to in the phrase: They agreed with him? It is Rabbi Meir. And who is the Sage whose opinion is referred to in the phrase: They did not agree with him? It is Rabbi Yosei. Even Rav Huna accepted Rav’s reading of the mishna that Rabbi Yosei prohibits going out with a wooden leg.
  Rav Yosef said: Who is the Sage whose opinion is referred to in the phrase: They did not agree with Rabbi Akiva? It is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. As we learned in a mishna: A receptacle made of straw and a tube made of reeds, Rabbi Akiva deems these vessels capable of becoming ritually impure, and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri deems them pure, i.e., incapable of becoming ritually impure because they are not vessels. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, straw objects are not considered vessels fit for use.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Master said: A plasterers’ sandal is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. The Gemara asks: How could that be? These sandals are not made for walking. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Ulla said: They are used for walking, as, at times, the plasterer walks in them until he reaches his house.
  We learned in the mishna: And if the wooden leg has a receptacle for pads, it is capable of becoming ritually impure. Abaye said: It is subject to ritual impurity due to contact with ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and it is not subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading. If a <i>zav</i> uses a wooden leg it merely assumes first-degree ritual impurity status, since he cannot lean all his weight on it. Rava said: The artificial foot is even subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading.
  Rava said: From where do I derive to say this <i>halakha</i>? As we learned in a mishna: The wagon of a small child utilized to teach him to walk (<i>Tosafot</i>) is subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading, since its purpose is to lean on it. And Abaye said: The two cases are not comparable. There, in the case of the wagon, he leans all his weight on it; here, in the case of the wooden leg, he does not lean all his weight on it.
  Abaye said: From where do I derive to say this <i>halakha</i>? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A walking stick, typically used by the elderly, is pure, i.e., incapable of becoming ritually impure from any form of ritual impurity. Apparently, an object upon which one does not lean all his weight is not subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading.
  And how does Rava respond to this proof? He says that there is a distinction between the cases: There, in the case of a walking stick used by the elderly,
  
  Daf 66b
  
  it is made merely to align his steps and straighten his posture. He does not completely lean all his weight on it. Here, in the case of a wooden leg, it is made to lean on, and in fact he leans all his weight on it.
  It was taught in the mishna that the supports of a <i>zav</i> and his chair are subject to ritual impurity imparted by treading, and one may not go out with them on Shabbat, and one may not enter into the Temple courtyard with them.
  The <i>tanna</i>, who recited <i>mishnayot</i> before Rabbi Yoḥanan, taught the opposite <i>halakha</i> in the mishna: One may enter into the Temple courtyard with them.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I teach that a woman may perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with this support, as it has the legal status of a shoe in every sense, and you say that one may enter the Temple courtyard? Teach the mishna in the following manner: One may not enter into the Temple courtyard with them.
  We learned in the mishna that <i>loketamin</i> are pure. The Gemara asks: What are <i>loketamin</i>? Rabbi Abbahu said: They are wooden toys in the shape of a donkey one carried on the shoulders, creating the impression that the donkey is riding him. Rava bar Pappa said: They are stilts used to avoid getting dirty when walking in mud or for amusement. Rava bar Rav Huna said: They are masks [<i>peramei</i>].
  MISHNA: Young boys may go out on Shabbat with knots as a folk remedy and princes with bells. And any person is permitted to go out on Shabbat with those objects; however, the Sages spoke in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that young boys may go out on Shabbat with knots. The Gemara asks: What are these knots? Adda Mari said that Rav Naḥman bar Barukh said that Rav Ashi bar Avin said that Rav Yehuda said: They are garlands of the madder plant that are tied for their medicinal qualities.
  Abaye said: Mother, actually his foster mother, said to me about the healing properties of madder: Three garlands maintain the illness at its present state and prevent it from worsening, five garlands heal the illness, and seven are effective even against sorcery.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: And that benefit provided by the madder plant is specifically in a case where one on whom the knots were tied does not look at the sun and the moon, and does not see rain, and hears neither the sound of clanging iron, nor the sound of the hen, nor the sound of footsteps. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: If that is the case, the remedial powers of the madder fell in a pit, i.e., if so many conditions exist, for all intents and purposes it provides no benefit at all.
  The Gemara asks: If these knots in the madder plant have remedial qualities, why specifically were boys mentioned in the mishna? Even girls can benefit from the cure as well. By the same token, why specifically were young boys mentioned in the mishna? Even adults can benefit from the cure as well.
  Rather, what are these knots? Like that which Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: A son who has longings for his father and has a difficult time leaving him, the father takes a strap from the right shoe and ties it on the boy’s left arm as a talisman to help the child overcome his longings. These feelings are more common in small children and especially in boys for their fathers, as fathers were more involved in raising their sons than they were in raising their daughters. Therefore, the Sages allowed specifically young boys to go out with these knots. With regard to this practice, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And your mnemonic for where to tie the strap is phylacteries, which are tied by the right hand on the left arm. And the opposite, tying the strap from the left shoe onto his right arm, is dangerous because it will exacerbate his longings.
  On the topic of the use of various forms of healing and medicinal practices and their permissibility on Shabbat, the Gemara cites additional statements by that Sage on these topics. Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: With regard to overturning an empty cup in which there had been hot water and placing it on one’s navel for healing purposes on Shabbat, he may well do so.
  And Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: It is permissible to smear oil and salt on oneself on Shabbat.
  As in this case of Rav Huna, who departed from the house of Rav, and Rav, who departed from the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya, who departed from the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, when they were drunk, the rabbi would bring oil and salt and rub them on the palms of their hands and the soles of their feet and say: Just as this oil is clear, so let the wine of so-and-so, son of so-and-so, his mother, become clear. In other words, let them become sober. And if he could not bring oil and salt, or if they did not work, he would bring the sealing clay of a barrel and soak it in water and say: Just as this sealing clay is clear, so let the wine of so-and-so, son of so-and-so, become clear.
  And Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: It is permitted to strangle, i.e., tightly bandage the neck of one whose vertebra was dislocated in order to reset it, on Shabbat.
  And Avin bar Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: With regard to tightly swaddling a baby born on Shabbat in order to align any limbs that may have been dislocated in birth, one may well do so.
  There were different versions with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Avin bar Huna. Rav Pappa taught two <i>halakhot</i> with regard to children in his name and Rav Zevid taught one <i>halakha</i> with regard to a child in his name. The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa taught two <i>halakhot</i> with regard to children, and he taught both of them in the name of Avin bar Huna, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> with regard to knots and the <i>halakha</i> with regard to swaddling. Rav Zevid taught one <i>halakha</i> with regard to a child. The first, with regard to knots, he taught in the name of Avin bar Huna. And this, with regard to swaddling, he taught in the name of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: With regard to tightly swaddling a baby on Shabbat, one may well do so.
  The Gemara cites additional statements said by Abaye in the name of the woman who raised him with regard to remedies. Abaye said, Mother said to me: All incantations that are repeated are intoned using the name of the mother of the one requiring the incantation, and all knots tied for the purpose of healing are tied on the left.
  And Abaye said, Mother said to me: All incantations for which the number of times they must be intoned is specified, one recites them as they are specified; and those for which the number of times they must be intoned is not specified, one recites them forty-one times.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may go out with a preservation stone, which prevent miscarriages, on Shabbat. They said in the name of Rabbi Meir that one may go out even with the counterweight of a preservation stone; i.e., a stone or another object that was weighed against and found equivalent to the weight of the preservation stone, which is also effective. And this leniency applies not only to a woman who miscarried in the past and is concerned that she may miscarry again; rather, it applies even to a woman who never miscarried and is concerned lest she miscarry for the first time. And it applies not only to a woman who is aware that she is pregnant; rather, it applies even if a woman suspects that she may become pregnant and miscarry. Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya said in the name of Abaye: And this applies only when he happened upon an object that was found equal to the preservation stone when he weighed it against that stone, not when one alters the object to equal the weight of the preservation stone. Abaye raised a dilemma: With regard to a counterweight to the counterweight, i.e., one who finds an object and determines its weight by weighing it against the counterweight of the preservation stone, what is its legal status? May a woman go out into the public domain with it? The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.
  And Abaye said, Mother said to me: To heal a fever of one day, let one take a pale, i.e., newly minted, dinar and go to the salt pools, and weigh its weight in salt against it, and let him bind the salt to the opening of the neckline of his garment with a thread made of hair.
  And if this remedy is not effective, let him sit at a crossroads, and when he sees a large ant carrying something, he should take the ant and place it in a copper tube, and close it with lead, and seal it with sixty seals, and shake it, and lift it, and say to it: Your burden is upon me and my burden, my fever, is upon you. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Huna, said to Rav Ashi: And perhaps a different person already found this ant and used this remedy to end his illness. In that case, by accepting the burden of the ant, he is bringing another’s illness upon himself. Rather, let him say to the ant: My burden and your burden are upon you.
  And if that remedy is not effective, let him take a new jug, and go to the river, and say to it: River, river, lend me a jug of water for a guest who happened to come to me. And let him turn it around his head seven times, and pour out the water behind him, and say to it: River, river, take back the water that you gave me because the guest who happened to come to me came on its day and left on its day.
  Rav Huna said:
  
  Daf 67a
  
  For tertian fever, which afflicts one every three days, let one bring seven thorns from seven palm trees, and seven slivers from seven beams, and seven pegs from seven bridges, and seven types of ashes from seven ovens, and seven types of dust from seven door sockets, the hole in which the hinge of the door revolves, and seven types of tar from seven boats, and seven cumin seeds, and seven hairs from the beard of an old dog, and let him bind it to the opening of the neckline of his garment with a thread made of hair.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For healing a burning fever, let one take a knife that is made entirely of iron, including the handle, and let him go to a place where there is a bush and tie a string of hair to it.
  On the first day, let him carve the bush a little, and recite: “And an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire from within the bush and he looked and behold the bush was aflame in fire and the bush was not consumed” (Exodus 3:2). On the following day, let him carve the bush a little more and recite: “And Moses said: I will turn aside now, and see this great sight, why the bush is not burned” (Exodus 3:3). On the following day, let him carve the bush a little more and recite: “And the Lord saw that he turned aside to see and God called to him within the bush and said: Moses, Moses, and he said: Here I am” (Exodus 3:4).
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: And let him say: “And the Lord said: Do not come close, take off your shoes from your feet, for the place on which you stand is holy ground” (Exodus 3:5). This verse is more suited to be recited as an incantation to cure a fever. Rather, on the first day, let him recite the first two verses: “And an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire from within the bush and he looked and behold the bush was aflame in fire and the bush was not consumed,” as well as, “And Moses said: I will turn aside now and see.” And on the following day, let him recite: “And the Lord saw that he turned aside to see.” And on the following day, let him recite: “And the Lord said: Do not come close, take off your shoes from your feet, for the place on which you stand is holy ground” (Exodus 3:5).
  And when he carves the bush, let him lower himself and cut it close to the ground, and recite as follows: The bush, the bush; not because you are higher than all trees did the Holy One, Blessed be He, rest His Divine Presence upon you. Rather, it is because you are lower than all trees did the Holy One, Blessed be He, rested His Divine Presence upon you. And just as the fire saw Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah and fled from before them, so too, let the fire of the fever see so-and-so, son of so-and-so, his mother, flee from before him.
  For healing boils, let him recite as follows: Baz, Bazya, Mas, Masya, Kas, Kasya, Sharlai, and Amarlai, these are the angels who were sent from the land of Sodom and this was all in order to heal painful boils. Bazakh, Bazikh, Bazbazikh, Masmasikh, Kamon, Kamikh, may your appearance remain with you, may your appearance remain with you, i.e., the boils should not grow redder. May your place remain with you, i.e., they should not spread, may your, the boils’, seed be like one who is barren and like a mule that is not fruitful and does not multiply, so too, do not increase and do not multiply in the body of so-and-so, son of so-and-so.
  For healing a wound, let him recite as follows: A drawn sword and a readied sling, its name shall not be ache, sickness, and pains.
  To be saved from a demon, let him recite as follows: You were stopped up, stopped up you were. Cursed, broken, and excommunicated be the demon called bar Tit bar Tamei bar Tina as Shamgaz, Merigaz, and Istemai.
  To be saved from the demon of the bathroom, let him recite as follows: On the head of a lion and on the nose of a lioness we found the demon named bar Shirika Panda. With a bed of leeks I felled him, and with the jaw of the donkey I struck him.
  We learned in the mishna that princes may go out with bells, and the same is true for anyone else. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that all people of Israel are permitted to conduct themselves like princes with regard to going out with precious ornaments? Rabbi Oshaya said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: All of Israel are princes. Therefore, precious ornaments are suitable for every person of Israel. They will neither remove them to show to others nor will they remove them due to concern that people will think them pretentious. Rava said: The mishna is referring to a case where the bell is woven into his garment, obviating the concern lest he remove it, and the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna is in accordance with the statements of all <i>tanna’im</i>, not merely the statement of Rabbi Shimon.
  MISHNA: One may go out on Shabbat with a locust egg, and with a fox tooth, and with a nail from the crucified, for the purpose of healing; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis prohibit using these remedies even during the week, due to the prohibition of following the ways of the Amorite. These are superstitious beliefs and the customs of gentiles from which one must distance oneself.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that in Rabbi Meir’s opinion one may go out on Shabbat with a locust egg, and a fox tooth, and with a nail from the crucified as a talisman or a cure. The Gemara explains the nature of each: One may go out with a locust egg, as they use it as a talisman to cure an earache; and with a fox tooth, as they use it as a talisman for sleep; the tooth of a live fox for one who sleeps too much to wake him up, and the tooth of a dead fox for one who does not sleep. And one may go out with a nail from the crucified, as they use it as a talisman for curing infection.
  We learned in the mishna that going out with those objects is permitted on Shabbat for the purpose of healing; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna, the Gemara cites Abaye and Rava, who both said: Anything that contains an element of healing and seems to be effective does not contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite. There is no cause for suspicion of one who engages in their practice, gentile or Jew.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that if it is does not contain an element of healing, it does contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A tree that sheds its fruit prematurely, one paints it and colors it with red paint and loads it with stones? Granted, he is permitted to load it with stones because that action produces an actual benefit, i.e., he does that so that its strength will weaken. Sometimes a tree sheds its fruits prematurely due to excessive blossoming. Sustaining those blossoms taxes the tree, rendering it incapable of sustaining the fruits that grow from the blossoms. The stones were used to slightly weaken the tree when blossoming, thereby reducing the number of blossoms that the tree must nourish. However, painting it with red paint, what healing is he performing with that action?
  The Gemara explains: He does so so that people will see the tree and pray for mercy for it. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And the leper in whom the plague is, his clothes shall be ripped and the hair of his head shall grow long and he will put a covering upon his upper lip and will cry: Impure, impure” (Leviticus 13:45). The leper publicizes the fact that he is ritually impure because he must announce his pain to the masses, and the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf. Ravina said: In accordance with whose opinion do we hang bunches of unripe dates on a palm tree that casts off its dates? According to that <i>tanna</i> who taught that one must publicize his pain to the masses.
  The <i>tanna</i> recited the chapter of the <i>Tosefta</i> discussing the actions of the Amorites before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: All those enumerated there contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite, except for these: One who has a bone in his throat brings a bone from the same species as the bone that is stuck in his throat, and places it on his skull, and says as follows: One by one descend and be swallowed, swallow and descend one by one. That does not contain an element of the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorite.
  For a fish bone stuck in the throat, let him say as follows: You are stuck like a needle, locked as a shutter, go down, go down.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  After some discussion of the ways of the Amorite, the Gemara cites additional statements from the Amorite chapter in the <i>Tosefta</i> and from other sources on this topic. One who says: My fortune be fortunate [<i>gad gaddi</i>] and be not weary by day or by night; that statement contains an element of the ways of the Amorite. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is more severe than the ways of the Amorite, as <i>gad</i> is nothing other than a term of idolatry, as it is stated: “And you that forsake the Lord, that forget My holy mountain, that prepare a table for <i>Gad</i>, and that offer mingled wine in full measure unto <i>Meni</i>” (Isaiah 65:11). <i>Gad gaddi</i> is a form of prayer to an idol.
  One who requests that he be called by his wife’s name and she be called by his name for good fortune, his request contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  One who says: Let my barrels be strengthened [<i>donu danei</i>], that contains an element of the ways of the Amorite. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is more severe than the ways of the Amorite, as <i>Dan</i> is nothing other than a term of idol worship, as it is stated: “They that swear by the sin of Samaria and say: As your god <i>Dan</i> lives” (Amos 8:14).
  One who hears a raven calling and is concerned about a bad omen and says to the raven: Scream, and says to the female raven: Whistle and turn your tail to me for the best; those statements contain an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  One who says: Slaughter this rooster that calls out in the evening and says: Slaughter this chicken that calls out like a male rooster; those statements contain an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  One who says: I will drink and leave over, I will drink and leave over, so that his wine will increase; that statement contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  One who cracks eggs on a wall and smears them in front of the chicks; that series of actions contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  And one who stirs the pot in front of chicks as an auspicious practice so they do not die; that action contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  A woman who dances and counts the chicks until she reaches the number of seventy-one chicks, so they won’t die; her action contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  A woman who dances to ensure that the <i>kutaḥ</i>, a spice made from whey salt and bread, that she is preparing will be successful, and a woman who silences bystanders to ensure that the lentils will cook properly, and a woman who screams to ensure that the pearl barley will cook properly; all these contain an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  A woman who urinates in front of her pot so it will cook quickly; that action contains an element of the ways of the Amorite.
  But one may put a chip of mulberry wood and shards of glass in the pot so it will cook quickly, as doing so is effective and not merely superstition. And the Rabbis prohibit shards of glass not due to superstition; rather, due to the danger involved if the glass is not strained out completely.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may place a lump of salt into a candle so it will burn brightly; that is effective and not merely for good fortune, so there is no element of the ways of the Amorites involved. And similarly, one may put mud or clay under a candle so it will burn longer.
  Rav Zutra said: He who covers an oil lamp or who uncovers a kerosene lamp for no purpose violates the prohibition: Do not destroy, since by doing so the fuel burns more quickly.
  One who says while drinking: Wine and life to the mouth of the Sages, this does not fall into the category of the ways of the Amorite. There was an incident with Rabbi Akiva who made a banquet for his son, and over each and every cup he brought he said: Wine and life to the mouth of the Sages, wine and life to the mouth of the Sages and to the mouth of their students.
  
  MISHNA: The Sages stated a significant principle with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who is entirely ignorant of the mitzva of Shabbat according to Torah law, and performed numerous prohibited labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot</i>, is liable to bring only one sin-offering for all those labors when he becomes aware that those actions were prohibited. One who knows the essence of Shabbat but forgets which day is Shabbat, i.e., one who lost track of the days of the week, and performs numerous prohibited labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot</i> is liable to bring a sin-offering for each Shabbat when he becomes aware that he performed those actions on Shabbat. One who is aware that the day is Shabbat but temporarily forgot that certain labors were prohibited and performed numerous prohibited labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot</i> is liable to bring a sin-offering for each
  
  Daf 68a
  
  and every primary category of labor that he performed. One who performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single category of labor is liable to bring only one sin-offering.
  GEMARA: The Gemara attempts to clarify the language of the mishna and asks: Why did the mishna teach the phrase: A significant principle? If you say it is because of the following reason, it is problematic.Here, because the <i>tanna</i> wants to teach in a mishna later in the chapter with regard to a matter that includes two <i>halakhot</i> employing the term: Furthermore, they stated another principle; therefore, in this mishna, which relates to a greater number of <i>halakhot</i>, he taught employing the term: A significant principle. And with regard to the Sabbatical Year as well, because in a later mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 7:2) the <i>tanna</i> wants to teach: Furthermore, another principle, at the beginning of the chapter he taught employing the phrase: A significant principle. There too, the choice of language is understood. However, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes, where the mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 1:1) states two principles one after the other, the <i>tanna</i> taught later in the same mishna: And furthermore, they stated another principle, and even so, at the beginning of the mishna the <i>tanna</i> did not teach: A significant principle, opting instead to say simply: They stated a principle.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said that the term: A significant principle, is not dependent on the existence of another principle; rather, it is dependent on the significance of the principle. Therefore, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year, which include primary categories and subcategories, the <i>tanna</i> taught in the mishna: A significant principle. With regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes, which do not include primary categories and subcategories and all its <i>halakhot</i> are on equal footing, he did not teach employing the term: A significant principle. The Gemara asks: And according to the variant reading of the mishna taught by bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes, what primary categories and subcategories are there with regard to tithes?
  Rather, isn’t this the reason the Mishna employs the term: A significant principle; because it is significant relative to other principles? The scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating Shabbat is greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecrating the Sabbatical Year. As the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat are in effect both with regard to plants that are detached from the ground and with regard to those that are attached, while the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year with regard to detached plants, they are not in effect, but with regard to attached plants they are in effect. And the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for desecration of the Sabbatical Year are greater than the scope of the materials whose use warrants punishment for violating the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes. As, by Torah law, the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year are in effect both with regard to human food and with regard to animal food, while the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes are in effect with regard to human food, but with regard to animal food they are not in effect.
  And according to the opinion of bar Kappara, who taught the phrase: A significant principle, with regard to tithes as well: The scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the <i>halakhot</i> of tithes is greater than the scope of the materials for which one warrants punishment for violating the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>pe’a</i>. As, by rabbinic law, the obligation of tithes is in effect with regard to both figs and vegetables, while the obligation of <i>pe’a</i> is not in effect with regard to figs and vegetables. As we learned in a mishna in tractate <i>Pe’a</i>: They stated a principle with regard to <i>pe’a</i>: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to storage to preserve is obligated in <i>pe’a</i>.
  The Gemara explains that which is excluded by each criterion in the mishna. Food, to exclude the aftergrowths of woad [<i>satis</i>] and madder. As these plants are used for dyeing and not for food, the obligation of <i>pe’a</i> does not apply to them. And protected, to exclude ownerless crops, which by definition are not protected. And grows from the ground, to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one, to exclude the fig tree whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not all ripen together. And one brings it in to storage to preserve; to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods.
  While, with regard to tithes, we learned in a mishna: They stated a principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes; we did not learn with regard to tithes, the following criteria: Gathered as one, and which one brings in to storage to preserve. Apparently, figs and vegetables are obligated in tithes, making the scope of the materials obligated in tithes greater than the scope of those obligated in <i>pe’a</i>.
  The mishna discusses an individual who forgets the very essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to understand how a Jew could forget the very existence of Shabbat. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Our mishna is referring to both a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never educated and a convert who converted among the gentiles and never learned the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. However, one who once knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot is liable for each and every Shabbat, as we learned in the mishna with regard to one who knows the essence of Shabbat. The Gemara seeks to clarify this approach. We learned in our mishna: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat. Doesn’t this phrase indicate by inference that he was aware of Shabbat originally? In order to forget one must have previously been aware. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara refutes this: No, what is the meaning of: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat? That the essence of Shabbat was always forgotten from him, i.e., he never knew it.
  The Gemara further asks: However, based on that understanding, in the case of one who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is he liable for each and every Shabbat? If so, instead of the mishna teaching the next <i>halakha</i>: One who knows the essence of Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot</i> is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, let it teach: One who knew the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot and, all the more so, one who knows the essence of Shabbat would be liable for each Shabbat. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, what is the meaning of the phrase: One who knows the essence of Shabbat? One who once knew the essence of Shabbat and has now forgotten it.
  
  Daf 68b
  
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But if he did not forget the essence of Shabbat, and he knows that today is Shabbat, what would the <i>halakha</i> be? Certainly he would be liable for each and every prohibited labor. If so, instead of teaching the <i>halakha</i>: One who knows that it is Shabbat and performs many labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot</i> is liable for each and every labor, let the mishna teach the <i>halakha</i>: One who knows the essence of Shabbat is liable for each and every labor that he performs and all the more so that one who is aware that today is Shabbat would be liable for each labor. Rather, when our mishna refers to forgetting, it is referring to a case where he knew and ultimately forgot. And the case described by Rav and Shmuel also has the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot. And it was stated as follows: It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Even a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles have the same legal status as one who knew and ultimately forgot, and they are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression, even though they never learned about Shabbat.
  And it was Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both said: He is liable to bring a sin-offering specifically if he knew of the essence of Shabbat and ultimately forgot. However, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. They have the legal status of one who performed the prohibited labor due to circumstances beyond his control. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They stated a significant principle with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat: One who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who does not know that there is a mitzva of Shabbat in the Torah, and performs many prohibited labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot</i> is liable to bring only one sin-offering. How so? With regard to a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and a convert who converted among the gentiles and does not know the essence of Shabbat; and if he performed many prohibited labors on multiple <i>Shabbatot,</i> he is only liable to bring one sin-offering for all his unwitting transgressions. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for all the blood he unwittingly ate before he learned of the prohibition; and one sin-offering for all the forbidden fat that he ate; and one for all the idolatry that he worshipped. And Munbaz, one of the Sages, deems him exempt from bringing any sacrifice.
  And Munbaz deliberated before Rabbi Akiva as follows: Since one who commits a transgression intentionally is called a sinner in the Torah and one who commits a transgression unwittingly is called a sinner, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had prior knowledge that it was prohibited, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is liable to bring a sin-offering only in a case where he had prior knowledge. However, the action of one who had no prior knowledge at all is not considered unwitting; rather, it has the same legal status as an action performed due to circumstances beyond one’s control, and he is completely exempt. Rabbi Akiva said to him: I will elaborate upon your statement and follow your reasoning to its logical conclusion and thereby test the validity of your reasoning. If so, just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is liable for punishment only in a case where he had the awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action, so too, with regard to one who commits the transgression unwittingly, say that he is only liable to bring a sin-offering in a case where he had awareness that he was sinning at the time that he performed the action. If that is the case, it is no longer an unwitting transgression.
  Munbaz said to him: Yes, there is nothing unusual about that. In my opinion it is correct and all the more so now that you have elaborated upon my statement. Awareness at the time that one is performing the action is one of the criteria of my definition of an unwitting transgression, as will be explained below. Rabbi Akiva said to him: According to your statement, since while performing the action one is aware that it is prohibited, his action is not called unwitting; rather, it is a full-fledged intentional transgression.
  Returning to our issue: In any case, as an example of one who forgot the essence of Shabbat, it was taught: How so? A child who was taken captive. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav and Shmuel it works out well, as they consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who unwittingly forgot the essence of Shabbat. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who consider the legal status of a child taken captive equal to that of one who committed the action due to circumstances beyond his control and is therefore exempt, it is difficult because he is liable to bring a sin-offering according to the opinion of the Rabbis in the <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: Isn’t there the opinion of Munbaz who deemed him exempt in that case? We stated our opinion in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Munbaz? Is it based entirely upon the fact that the Torah refers to sinners, both intentional and unwitting, as sinners? The Gemara explains that the source for the opinion of Munbaz is as it is written: “The native of the children of Israel, and the stranger who lives among them, there shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly” (Numbers 15:29), and adjacent to it is the verse: “And the person who acts with a high hand, whether a native or a stranger, he blasphemes God, and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30). The Torah juxtaposes unwitting transgression to intentional transgression. Just as one who commits the transgression intentionally is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge, so too, one who commits the transgression unwittingly is only liable in a case where he had prior knowledge.
  The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis do with the juxtaposition derived from that verse: One law? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi taught his son. It is written: “There shall be one law for you, for one who acts unwittingly.” And it is written:
  
  Daf 69a
  
  “And if you err, and do not perform all these commandments that God spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). The Sages understood this verse as referring specifically to the laws of idolatry. And it is written: “And the person who acts with a high hand, he blasphemes God and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30), from which we learn that all the mitzvot are derived from this juxtaposition to idolatry. Just as there, with regard to idolatry, the reference is to a matter which, for its intentional violation, one is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>, as it is stated: “And that soul shall be cut off,” and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; so too, any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>, for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  The Gemara asks: However, according to Munbaz, who holds that included in the category of an unwitting sinner is one who at the time of action was aware that it was prohibited; if he were fully aware, in what sense was his action unwitting? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he was unwitting with regard to the sacrifice. He was aware that he was committing a transgression for which one is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i> when performed intentionally; however, he was unaware that he would be liable to bring a sin-offering if he performed the transgression unwittingly. Since he was not aware of all punishments and forms of atonement associated with that transgression, he is considered an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis who disagree with Munbaz hold? They hold: Unwitting with regard to a sacrifice is not considered unwitting.
  The Gemara asks: And in the opinion of the Rabbis, lack of awareness with regard to what aspects of the prohibition renders the action unwitting? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is an unwitting transgression since he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is <i>karet</i>, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally. And Reish Lakish said that according to the Rabbis it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and <i>karet</i>, i.e., he was unaware that his action was prohibited by Torah law. Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The verse said: “And if one soul shall sin by mistake from the common people, by performing one of God’s commandments that may not be done, and he becomes guilty” (Leviticus 4:27), indicating that it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to the prohibition and its concomitant <i>karet</i>. The verse indicates that the individual was unaware that he violated “one of the commandments that may not be done,” i.e., that there is a Torah prohibition with regard to that action.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan do with that verse cited as proof by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The Gemara answers: He needs it for that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase: “From the common people” (Leviticus 4:27) teaches that only some sinners, not all, bring sacrifices for their unwitting sins. It comes to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is under no obligation to bring a sin-offering even after he repents. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: This <i>halakha</i> is derived from the phrase in that verse: “That may not be done, and he becomes guilty.” One who repents due to his awareness, i.e., one who repents as soon as he becomes aware that he performed a transgression, brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression. However, one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate who continues to sin even after he becomes aware that he committed a transgression, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action. Rabbi Yoḥanan understood the verse in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
  The Gemara cites proof from what we learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn’t merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Therefore, the mishna indicated that one could conceivably be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings. Under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where with regard to Shabbat his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat; and with regard to the prohibited labors his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat.
  Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is <i>karet</i>, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly, you find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is <i>karet</i>. However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and <i>karet</i>, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. If so, when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the case where one would be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings is one where with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional as he was aware that it was Shabbat, the question arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the <i>halakhot</i> of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the prohibition to go beyond a certain distance outside the city limits on Shabbat is by Torah law and not merely a rabbinic decree.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this <i>baraita</i>? As the Sages taught: If one acted unwittingly with regard to both this, the fact that it is Shabbat, and that, the specific prohibited labors, that is the case of unwitting transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted intentionally with regard to both this and that, that is the case of intentional transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to the labors, i.e., he forgot that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that those labors are prohibited when it is Shabbat; or if one acted unwittingly with regard to the labors and intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he was unaware that these labors are prohibited, but he was aware that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, or, even if he said: I know that this labor is prohibited on Shabbat; however, I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring a sacrifice for its performance, he is liable to bring a sin-offering like anyone who sins unwittingly. In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who holds that one is considered an unwitting sinner even in a case where he was unwitting only with regard to the sacrifice.
  Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to an oath on a statement, a case where one swore to prohibit or to obligate himself to perform an action, that the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If he violates his oath he is only liable to bring an offering if he was unwitting with regard to its prohibition, i.e., he was unaware that it is prohibited by Torah law to violate an oath. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis in their dispute with Munbaz. Even though Rabbi Yoḥanan generally holds that the fact that one is unwitting with regard to <i>karet</i> is sufficient to render his action unwitting, the case of an oath is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of an oath, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by <i>karet</i>; however, here, where there is no punishment of <i>karet</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. Obviously, he agrees that one must be unwitting with regard to the prohibition. There appears to be nothing new in Abaye’s statement.
  The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say the following: Since the obligation to bring an offering in the case of the oath is a novel <i>halakha</i>, as throughout the whole Torah in its entirety we do not find a prohibition for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring an offering and for whose intentional violation is not punishable by <i>karet</i>; and here, one is liable to bring an offering for its unwitting violation, I might have said that if he was unwitting, i.e., unaware that he would be obligated, with regard to the offering, let him be liable also according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Munbaz.
  
  Daf 69b
  
  Therefore, Abaye teaches us that this is not so. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: What is an unwitting violation of an oath on a statement relating to the past? What is an example of one who unwittingly swore falsely with regard to an incident that occurred in the past? It cannot be a case where he forgot the incident, as in that case he is exempt from bringing an offering. It is a case where if he said: I know that taking this false oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for swearing falsely, he is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting transgression. Apparently, with regard to an oath on a statement, unwitting with regard to the sacrifice renders the action unwitting. The Gemara rejects this: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is the opinion of Munbaz. In his opinion, one who commits a transgression while unaware whether or not one is liable to bring an offering if he performs that transgression unwittingly is considered to have performed the transgression unwittingly.
  There is another version of the discussion of Abaye’s statement where, after quoting the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an oath on a statement, the question was raised: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, that is obvious: Now, if throughout the entire Torah where there is no novelty in the obligation to bring an offering, he said that unwitting with regard to an offering is considered unwitting; here, where there is a novelty and the offering in the case of an oath on a statement is more significant than other sin-offerings, certainly unwitting with regard to the offering should be considered unwitting. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.
  And Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to <i>teruma</i> that one is only liable to add a payment of one-fifth the value of the <i>teruma</i> for eating it unwittingly if he is unwitting with regard to its prohibition. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Even though, in general, he holds that unwitting with regard to <i>karet</i> is sufficient to render the action unwitting, the case of <i>teruma</i> is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of <i>teruma</i>, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by <i>karet</i>; however, here, where there is no punishment of <i>karet</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. The Gemara answers that nonetheless Abaye introduced a novel element: Lest you say that since one who intentionally eats <i>teruma</i> is subject to death at the hand of Heaven, perhaps death stands in place of <i>karet</i>. And where he was unwitting with regard to the punishment of death for this sin, he should also be liable to pay the added fifth as one who performed the transgression unwittingly because his case is analogous to one who is considered unwitting due to lack of awareness of <i>karet</i>. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that it is not so. Rava said: Indeed, death stands in place of <i>karet</i> and the added one-fifth stands in place of a sacrifice. One who is unwitting with regard to death at the hand of Heaven and the added fifth has the same legal status as one who is unwitting with regard to <i>karet</i> and an offering.
  Rav Huna said: One who was walking along the way or in the desert, and he does not know when Shabbat occurs, he counts six days from the day that he realized that he lost track of Shabbat and then observes one day as Shabbat. Ḥiyya bar Rav says: He first observes one day as Shabbat and then he counts six weekdays. The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Rav Huna, held: It is like the creation of the world, weekdays followed by Shabbat. And one Sage, Ḥiyya bar Rav, held: It is like Adam, the first man, who was created on the sixth day. He observed Shabbat followed by the six days of the week. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav from a <i>baraita</i>: If a person was walking along the way and does not know when Shabbat occurs, he observes one day for every six. What, does this not mean that he counts six and then observes one day in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna? The Gemara rejects this: No, it could also mean that he observes one day and then counts six.
  The Gemara asks: If so, if that is what the <i>baraita</i> meant, why employ the phrase: He observes one day for six? It should have stated: He observes one day and counts six. And furthermore, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one was walking along the way or was in the desert, and he does not know when Shabbat occurs, he counts six days and observes one day. That is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav.
  Rava said: The person who lost track of Shabbat and treats one day a week as Shabbat, each day he makes enough food to sustain himself, except for that day which he designated as Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And on that day let him die? Rather, it means that the day before he makes twice the amount of food that he prepared on the other days to sustain him for that day and the following day. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the day before was actually Shabbat? In that case, not only did he perform labor on Shabbat, but he also performed labor on Shabbat in preparation for a weekday. Rather, on each and every day he makes enough food to sustain himself for that day, including on that day that he designated as Shabbat. And if you ask: And how is that day which he designated as Shabbat distinguishable from the rest? It is distinguishable by means of the <i>kiddush</i> and the <i>havdala</i> that he recites on that day.
  Rava said: If he had partial knowledge of the day on which he left, i.e., he does not recall what day of the week it was but he does recall the number of days that passed since he left, every week he can perform labor throughout the day of his departure, since he certainly did not leave his house on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, and what novel element was introduced here? The Gemara answers: Lest you say, since he did not leave on Shabbat, he also did not leave on Friday, and this person, even if he left on Thursday, should be permitted to perform labor for two days, the eighth day and the ninth day from his departure, the same day of the week that he left and the following day. Therefore, Rava teaches us that at times one finds a convoy and happens to leave on a journey even on Friday. Therefore, he is not permitted to perform labor on the day of the week following the day of his departure.
  We learned in the mishna that there is a difference in <i>halakha</i> between one who knows the essence of Shabbat and one who does not know it. The Gemara asks: From where in the Torah are these matters derived? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Two verses are written. One states: “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat, to perform the Shabbat through their generations, an everlasting covenant” (Exodus 31:16). And it is written: “And you shall observe My <i>Shabbatot</i> and you shall revere My Sanctuary, I am God” (Leviticus 26:2). How is it that Shabbat is in the singular in one verse, while in the other it is in the plural [<i>Shabbatot</i>]? It should be understood as follows: “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat”: One observance for multiple <i>Shabbatot</i>. If one commits several transgressions, in certain cases he is only liable to bring one sacrifice. “And you shall observe My <i>Shabbatot</i>”: One observance for each and every Shabbat. In certain cases, one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each time that he unwittingly desecrated Shabbat.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak strongly objects: On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat”: One observance for each and every Shabbat. “And you shall observe My <i>Shabbatot</i>”: One observance for multiple <i>Shabbatot</i>. In any case, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak also holds that the <i>halakha</i> of our mishna is derived from comparing and contrasting these two verses.
  We learned in the mishna that there is a difference between one who is aware that the day is Shabbat and performs labor and one who forgets the essence of Shabbat and performs prohibited labors.
  
  Daf 70a
  
  The Gemara asks: What is different about the former clause, which states that he in only liable to bring one sin-offering for each Shabbat, and the latter clause, which states that he is liable for each and every primary category of labor that he performed? Rav Safra said: Here, where he is unaware that the day was Shabbat, when he realizes that he sinned, it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists. When he is told that it was Shabbat, he stops immediately. And here, where he is unaware that the labors are prohibited, it is due to awareness of the labors that he desists. When he is told that this labor is prohibited, he stops immediately. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Safra: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? If he did not know that the labor is prohibited, telling him that it is Shabbat would not cause him to desist. And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? If he did not know that it was Shabbat, there would be no reason for him to desist from labor. Ostensibly, attributing the distinction between the two parts of the mishna to what eventually became known to him in the different cases is incorrect. Rather, Rav Naḥman said: The offering that the Torah obligated him to bring; for what is he so obligated? It is for performing an unwitting transgression. There, where he was unaware that the day was Shabbat, he was unwitting with regard to one matter; here, where he was unaware of the prohibited labors, he was unwitting with regard to multiple matters, and he is liable to bring sin-offerings in accordance with the number of matters of which he was unaware.
  We learned in the mishna that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each prohibited labor that he performs on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the division of labors? What is the source of the <i>halakha</i> that if one performs numerous prohibited labors on Shabbat in the course of one lapse of awareness, each prohibited labor is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment? Shmuel said that the verse says: “And you shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; he who desecrates it shall surely die [<i>mot yumat</i>]” (Exodus 31:14). We learn from the double language, <i>mot yumat</i>, that the Torah amplified multiple deaths for a single desecration. Although several violations were committed in the course of a single lapse of awareness, each is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment. The Gemara asks: That verse was written with regard to intentional transgression. The Gemara is seeking a source for multiple sacrifices brought for unwitting transgression. The Gemara answers: If it does not refer to the matter of intentional transgression, as the verse does not teach a <i>halakha</i> applicable to intentional acts, as it was already written: “Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God; all who desecrate it shall die” (Exodus 35:2), refer it to the matter of unwitting transgression. The verse teaches that that which was written with regard to the death penalty for desecration of Shabbat in general applies to all <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, including cases of unwitting transgression. And what, then, is the meaning of the term: Shall die, in the verse? Does it mean that one who commits an unwitting transgression is punishable by death? It means that he shall die by payment of money. Death is used in the sense of punishment; he will be forced to pay for numerous sacrifices to atone for his sins.
  The Gemara asks: And let him derive division of labors from where it was derived according to Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says that it is written: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). Why does the verse state this <i>halakha</i>? The prohibition against kindling is included in the general prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Rather, it should be understood as follows. Since it is already stated: “And Moses gathered the entire assembly of the children of Israel and said to them: These are the things [<i>eleh hadevarim</i>] that God has commanded to perform them. Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God” (Exodus 35:1–2), and Rabbi Natan derives as follows: “These are the things,” which refers to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, there are emphases in this phrase that are superfluous in the context of the verse. The Torah could have simply stated: This is a thing [<i>davar</i>]. When it states: Things [<i>devarim</i>] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article: The things [<i>hadevarim</i>], adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word <i>eleh</i>: <i>Alef</i>, one; <i>lamed</i>, thirty; and <i>heh</i>, five, is thirty-six. The total numerical value, three plus thirty-six, derived from the phrase: “These are the things.” This alludes to the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai.
  I might have thought that if one performed them all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that they are prohibited, he would be liable to bring only one sin-offering? Therefore, the verse states: “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh you shall rest; in plowing time and in harvest time you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), indicating that there are prohibitions specific to both plowing and harvesting. And still I can say: For plowing and for the harvesting he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as they were stated explicitly. However, for performing all the other prohibited labors, he is liable for only one. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). This is derived in the following manner: Kindling was included in the general prohibition prohibiting all labors, and why was it singled out and prohibited explicitly? It was singled out in order to equate the other labors to it and to tell you: Just as kindling is a primary category of prohibited labor, and one is liable for performing it on its own, so too, with regard to every primary category of prohibited labor, one is liable for performing it on its own.
  Rabbi Natan cited a source proving that there is liability for performance of each prohibited labor of Shabbat on its own. Why doesn’t Shmuel derive that <i>halakha</i> from the same source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who disagreed with Rabbi Natan’s interpretation of the verse, as Rabbi Yosei said: The prohibition against kindling on Shabbat was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat merely violates a prohibition. Performing other primary categories of prohibited labor is punishable by stoning or <i>karet</i>. In contrast, one who lights a fire on Shabbat has merely violated a prohibition, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The prohibition of kindling was singled out as a prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Natan says: Kindling is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat. It was singled out to divide the various labors and to establish liability for performance of each of them.
  The Gemara raises an additional challenge to Shmuel’s opinion. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the explicit prohibition of kindling, let him derive the division of labors from where Rabbi Yosei derives it. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says, it is stated: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [<i>me’aḥat me’hena</i>]” (Leviticus 4:2). Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions, and at times one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? He interprets the unique phrase employed in that verse: From one of these. The Torah could have merely stated: One [<i>aḥat</i>]. Instead, it stated: From one [<i>me’aḥat</i>]. It could have merely stated: Them [<i>hena</i>]. Instead, it stated: Of them [<i>me’hena</i>]. Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, are them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.
  Furthermore: The term one refers to a full-fledged transgression of Shabbat, e.g., one who intended to and wrote a complete name, Shimon. The term from one refers to a case where he performed only part of the transgression, e.g., one who wrote
  
  Daf 70b
  
  only <i>shem</i>, part of the word, the letters <i>shin</i> and <i>mem</i>, from Shimon. Them refers to one who performed the primary categories of labor. Of them refers to one who performed subcategories of prohibited labors. One that is them refers to one transgression with multiple punishments, as in a case where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat in that he was aware that it was Shabbat, and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable for each primary category of labor. Them that are one refers to several transgressions with one punishment, as in a case where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat in that he was unaware that it was Shabbat, and his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors in that he was aware that the labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei has a source for the division of Shabbat labors. Why doesn’t Shmuel derive the <i>halakha</i> from that source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel did not derive one that is them and them that are one from the verse.
  Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: What is the <i>halakha</i> if a person had a lapse of awareness of both this, Shabbat, and that, a particular labor? He said to him: He had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat and is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Rava said to him: On the contrary, he had a lapse of awareness with regard to prohibited labors, and he should be liable for each and every labor that he performed. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We see, if it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists from performing the labor when he is told what day it is, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable for only one. And if it is due to awareness of the prohibited labor that he desists, then, apparently, it was a lapse of awareness with regard to the labors and he is liable for each and every one. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? When one desists from labor when he is told that it is Shabbat, it is because he understands that the labor he is performing is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, when one desists from his labor when he is told that the labor is prohibited, it is because he understands that the day is Shabbat. Rather, there is no difference between the cases, and in both he is considered unwitting with regard to Shabbat.
  The Gemara further discusses the matter from a different perspective. We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn’t merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, if you say that one who had a lapse of awareness of both this and that is liable for each and every one, it works out well. However, if you say that since one who had a lapse of awareness of this and that had a lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat, and he is liable to bring only one sin-offering, under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors were prohibited on Shabbat.
  It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is <i>karet</i>, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. You find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is <i>karet</i>. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and <i>karet</i>, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the <i>halakhot</i> of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that that prohibition is by Torah law.
  Rava said: One who reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, the measure that determines liability for the labors of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, while in performing those actions he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He was unaware that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that the labors were prohibited. And he did not realize that he had sinned until he again reaped and ground grain in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, while in performing those actions he was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. He was aware that it was Shabbat, but he was unaware that the labors were prohibited. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He set aside a sin-offering to atone for his sin, based on the principle that he need set aside only one sin-offering even though he performed two primary categories of labor in the same lapse of awareness. And afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding while intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors. For performing two categories of prohibited labor unwittingly, reaping and grinding, one should be liable to bring two sin-offerings.
  
  Daf 71a
  
  Nevertheless, in that case, the sin-offering that atoned for the unwitting act of reaping, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, draws with it atonement for the second unwitting act of reaping, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labor, and for which he also was liable to bring a sin-offering. And similarly, the sin-offering that atoned for the unwitting act of grinding, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, draws with it atonement for the unwitting act of grinding, which he performed when his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labor. Since the offering was sacrificed after he had committed both transgressions, he attains atonement with one sacrifice, even though he performed several forms of the transgression in a single lapse of awareness. However, if the order of events in that case was different in that he became aware of reaping performed when his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, and he set aside an offering to atone for his unwitting transgression, and only afterward he became aware that he had performed the labors of reaping and grinding when his actions were unwitting with regard to Shabbat, the sin-offering that he brings for the reaping draws with it atonement for the previous reaping and the concomitant grinding. As far as the lapse of awareness with regard to Shabbat is concerned, reaping and grinding are considered like one sin, and atonement for one atones for the other. And the parallel grinding that he performed together with the latter reaping remains in its place, i.e., he does not attain atonement for that transgression. When he becomes aware of it, he brings a separate offering for atonement.
  Abaye said: Grinding also draws the latter grinding with it, as the designation of grinding is one. Since he attained atonement for one act of grinding, atonement is attained for the second act of grinding as well, as they were performed in one lapse of awareness, and he became aware only after the acts were completed. The Gemara asks: And is Rava of the opinion that atonement can be attained by means of drawing? Wasn’t it stated that there is a dispute with regard to that matter in a case where one unwittingly ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he ate two pieces of forbidden fat from different parts of an animal in the belief that they were permitted fat? One is liable to bring a sin-offering for that transgression. And in a case where he became aware that one of the olive-bulks was forbidden fat, and then ate a third olive-bulk while still in the midst of the lapse of awareness of the second piece of forbidden fat, i.e., he had not yet become aware that the second of the original olive-bulks was indeed prohibited and after eating the third olive-bulk, he became aware of both the second and the third pieces of fat. Rava said: If he brought a sacrifice for the first, atonement is attained for the transgressions of the first and second olive-bulks, since he ate both in one lapse of awareness. However, atonement is not attained for the third because awareness of the first olive-bulk interposes.
  If he brought a sacrifice for the third after he became aware that he had sinned, atonement is attained for the transgressions of the third and second, since both were performed in one lapse of awareness. However, atonement is not attained for the transgression of the first, which occurred in a separate lapse of awareness. If he brought a sacrifice for the middle one, atonement is attained for all, since both the first and third olive-bulks have a lapse of awareness common with the second. Abaye said: Even if he brought a sacrifice for any one of them, atonement is attained for all of them by means of drawing. Since he attained atonement for one of the olive-bulks, that atonement draws with it atonement for the other olive-bulks with which it shared a lapse of awareness. In any case, apparently Rava is not of the opinion that atonement draws with it atonement. How, then, does he say that atonement for reaping draws with it atonement for other acts of reaping? The Gemara answers: After he heard this <i>halakha</i> from Abaye, he adopted it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if Rava accepts the principle of drawing, by that same principle grinding should also draw with it grinding. The Gemara answers: There is a difference. Although he is of the opinion that atonement can be attained by means of drawing, he is not of the opinion that atonement that was attained through drawing can draw additional atonement through drawing. Atonement for the initial transgression of grinding was only attained by means of being drawn by the atonement for reaping. Rava holds that it cannot then proceed to draw atonement for the latter act of grinding.
  The Gemara comments: A matter that was obvious to Abaye and Rava was a dilemma for Rabbi Zeira. In a case where one’s action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the labors, and in a case where one’s action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the labors, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering for the unwitting violation of Shabbat. This was not obvious to Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi, and others say that Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If one reaped and ground grain in the measure of half a dried fig-bulk, and his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to the prohibited labors. He is certainly not liable by Torah law because he reaped and ground less than the minimum measure for liability. And then he reaped or ground grain in the amount of half a dried fig-bulk and his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat and unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, do they join together to constitute the minimum measure that determines liability to bring a sin-offering when he becomes aware that he sinned? He said to him: They are separate with regard to sin-offerings, i.e., if one reaped and ground the minimum measure that determines liability, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, and therefore they do not join together to constitute the minimum measure.
  The Gemara asks: And wherever they are separate with regard to sin-offerings, do they not join together? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If one ate one piece of forbidden fat and then ate another piece of forbidden fat, each larger than the measure for liability, in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? In the next case in the mishna, four items are listed. If one eats them unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he ate forbidden fat, and blood, and <i>notar</i>, sacrifices that remained after the time when they may be eaten has expired, and <i>piggul</i>, sacrifices that were invalidated due to inappropriate intent while being offered, in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one. That is the stricture that applies to many types of prohibitions relative to one, the same, type. And this is the stricture of one type relative to many types: That if one ate half an olive-bulk, and then ate another half an olive-bulk from one type, he is liable because the two half measures join to constitute a single measure. And if he ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two types, he is exempt.
  And we discussed this mishna: When we learned of one who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. And Reish Lakish said in the name of the Sage, bar Tutni: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two dishes, where each half was prepared separately, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that dishes separate. One who eats two olive-bulks of prohibited food that was prepared in two different dishes in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring a sin-offering for each one. Lest you say that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that dishes separate both as a leniency and as a stricture, and therefore one who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two dishes would be exempt, the mishna teaches us that Rabbi Yehoshua did not state his opinion as a leniency. He stated his opinion as a stricture.
  But here, where they are separate with regard to the number of sin-offerings, i.e., according to Rabbi Yehoshua one who eats an olive-bulk from each of the two dishes is liable to bring two sin-offerings, and, nevertheless, the two halves of an olive-bulk from the two dishes join together and constitute a full measure and render him liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The Master taught Reish Lakish’s response with regard to the first clause of the mishna, and it is difficult for him. We taught Reish Lakish’s response with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, and it is not difficult for us. When we learned in the latter clause of the mishna: One who ate two halves of an olive-bulk from two types, was it necessary to say that he is exempt? That is obvious. Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutni: Actually, it is referring even to a case where the prohibition was from one type of food. And why then does the mishna call it two types? Because he eats it in the two separate dishes in which it was prepared. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that dishes separate. And this teaches us that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his opinion that dishes separate both as a leniency and as a stricture.
  The Gemara asks: From the fact that the latter clause is referring to one type of food and a case where the two halves of an olive-bulk were prepared in two dishes, as explained above,
  
  Daf 71b
  
  by inference, the first clause in the mishna is referring to one type of food and one dish. The problem is then more difficult. In a case where one ate two halves of an olive-bulk from one type of food and in one dish, was it necessary to say that he is liable? That is obvious. Rav Huna said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he had a period of awareness between eating the two half olive-bulks. After eating the first half of an olive-bulk, he became aware that he had eaten food that was prohibited. Then he became unaware again and ate the second half of an olive-bulk. Although, with regard to sacrifices, awareness usually serves as a line of demarcation between unwitting transgressions performed prior to the period of awareness and unwitting transgressions performed thereafter, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel who said: There is no awareness for half a measure. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for half a measure, the fact that one became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance and does not demarcate between the two half-measures with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering.
  A dispute between <i>amora’im</i> was stated: With regard to one who ate two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in one lapse of awareness, and became aware of the transgression of eating the first olive-bulk, and then became aware of the transgression of eating the second, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings, one offering for each transgression. And Reish Lakish said: He is liable to bring only one. Both Sages cite proofs for their opinions. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that he is liable as it is stated: “And he shall offer for his sin that he sinned…and he shall bring the ox” (Leviticus 4:3-4), indicating that he is liable to bring a separate sacrifice for each sin. And Reish Lakish said he is exempt, as it is stated: “And the priest shall atone for him from his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that even if he atoned from his sin, i.e., for part of his sin and not all of his sin, the entire transgression is forgiven.
  The Gemara asks: And how can Reish Lakish say that one sin-offering is sufficient? Isn’t it written: “For his sin…and he shall bring”? The Gemara answers: That verse refers to a case where he only became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement for the first. However, if he became aware prior to atonement, he is required to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, too, how can he say that one is liable to bring two sin-offerings? Isn’t it written: “From his sin, and it shall be forgiven for him? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, with what are we dealing here? It is a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half, and he became aware of his transgression of eating a single olive-bulk, and then he ate another half of an olive-bulk in the course of the lapse of awareness of the second half of an olive-bulk that he ate together with the whole olive-bulk. Lest you say that the two halves of an olive-bulk should join together, and he is liable to bring an additional sin-offering, the verse teaches us that in that case he is exempt because he has already atoned for part of his transgression.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, they disagree in a case where one became aware of the second transgression prior to designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that periods of awareness separate. Since one became aware of his sins at two different stages, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only designations of animals for sacrifices separate. However, if one became aware of the second transgression after designation of the animal for the first sin-offering, Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Or, perhaps they are disagreeing in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designating an animal for the first sin-offering, and this is the point over which they disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that designations separate; and one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that only atonements separate. Only after the sin-offering has been sacrificed on the altar and the sinner has obtained atonement can it be said that the sacrifice’s capacity to atone is spent and cannot atone for a sin of which he became aware afterward. However, if he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of the sacrifice, Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Or, perhaps, the dispute between them is both in this case, before designation, and in that case, after designation.
  Rav Ashi said to him: It is reasonable to say that the dispute is both in this case and in that case. As, should it enter your mind that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation of an animal for the first sin-offering, and in a case where he became aware after designation Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Reish Lakish’s opinion in a case where one became aware of the second sin after atonement for the first, let him establish it in a case where one became aware of the transgression after designation of an animal for the first sin-offering. And similarly, if you say that they disagree only in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, and in a case where he became aware prior to designation Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees with Reish Lakish that he is only liable to bring one sin-offering, then rather than establishing the verse that posed a difficulty to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion in a case where he ate an olive-bulk and a half, let him establish it in a case where he became aware of the transgression prior to designation.
  Ravina does not accept this proof, as, in his opinion, it is flawed: And perhaps there is uncertainty with regard to this matter, and he spoke employing the style of: If you wish to say. If you wish to say that they disagree in a case where he became aware of the second sin prior to designation, then how does Rabbi Yoḥanan establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one ate an olive-bulk and a half. And if you wish to say they disagree in a case where he became aware of the second sin after designation, then how does Reish Lakish establish the verse? He establishes the verse in a case where one became aware of the second sin after attaining atonement.
  Ulla said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, a sacrifice brought by one who committed a robbery, misused sacred objects, or had relations with a designated maidservant, one does not require prior knowledge that he definitely sinned,
  
  Daf 72a
  
  one who had relations with a designated maidservant five times is only liable to bring one guilt-offering, even if he became aware of his transgression between each instance of relations with her. Because awareness is insignificant with regard to this sacrifice, it does not demarcate in terms of the number of guilt-offerings that he is liable to bring. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this <i>halakha</i>: But if what you say is so, one who had relations with a designated maidservant, and again had relations, and designated an animal for the offering, and said: Wait for me before sacrificing the offering until I have relations again, so that the guilt-offering will atone for this transgression as well, would you say that the same applies in that case too, that he is only liable to bring one guilt-offering? Ulla said to him: You referred to an action performed after designation of an animal for the guilt-offering. I did not say that <i>halakha</i> with regard to an action that was performed after designation.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: According to the one who said that in order to designate a definite guilt-offering one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned, one who had relations five times with a designated maidservant is liable to bring a guilt-offering for each and every one. Because awareness is significant with regard to guilt-offerings, the awareness between the acts of cohabitation renders each a separate transgression. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: That is not so, as with regard to a sin-offering for which we require prior knowledge, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagree whether or not awareness following an unwitting sin demarcates one transgression from another. Rav Dimi was silent and had no response. In an attempt to resolve the problem, Abaye said to him: Perhaps you said your statement with regard to an act that the sinner seeks to commit after designating an animal as a guilt-offering but wants to attain atonement for by means of that same designated sacrifice. That statement is in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. Rav Dimi remembered and said to Abaye: Yes, that was what was originally stated.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he cited several disputes concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of guilt-offerings and said: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant, and there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant. The Gemara elaborates: Everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable to bring only one guilt-offering, even for many acts of cohabitation, in accordance with the opinion of Ulla. Ulla said that since prior knowledge is not required for liability to bring a guilt-offering, even if one became aware of his transgression between each time he had relations, he brings only one sacrifice. And everyone agrees with regard to a designated maidservant; one is liable for each and every act of cohabitation, if it occurred after designation of an animal for a guilt-offering for the previous transgression, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna. And there is a dispute with regard to a designated maidservant; this refers to the one who said that, in order to designate a definite guilt-offering, one requires prior knowledge that he definitely sinned. In that case, the legal status of the guilt-offering is equal to that of the sin-offering and is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who disagree whether awareness between two unwitting transgressions demarcates and requires two offerings.
  It was stated that <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the following case:
  
  Daf 72b
  
  One who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground on Shabbat and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, which under other circumstances constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of reaping, is exempt from bringing a sin-offering for his mistaken act, since he did not intend to perform an act of cutting. One who performs an action unawares [<i>mitasek</i>], i.e., he had no intention to perform the act at all, incurs no liability whatsoever. One who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground, Rava said: He too is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said that he is exempt because he did not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He intended to perform an action completely permitted on Shabbat. He had no misconception with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. It was merely a mistaken act. And Abaye said that he is liable because he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Since he intended to perform that act, and he carried out his intent, the Torah characterizes it as unwitting and not as unawares.
  Rava said: From where do I derive to say this opinion? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There is a stricture with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot, and a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat. The Gemara elaborates: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even if he did so in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case in other mitzvot. In other mitzvot, if an individual commits a transgression several times in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. And a stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. Apparently, the phrase unwittingly without intent refers to the case disputed by Abaye and Rava. Therefore, this is proof for Rava’s opinion that, with regard to Shabbat, one who acts unawares, i.e., whose action resulted from involvement in another matter and who had no intention to perform an action that is prohibited, is not considered to have performed an unwitting act.
  Before the Gemara discusses the <i>baraita</i> in the context of the dispute between Abaye and Rava, the Gemara analyzes its text. The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: A stricture with regard to Shabbat that is greater than the stricture with regard to other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, one who performed two transgressions on Shabbat, even in the course of one lapse of awareness, is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every one, which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If you say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where he ate forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings and here one is liable to bring two sin-offerings. Rather, what are the circumstances in other mitzvot where he is liable to bring only one sin-offering? It is in a case where he ate forbidden fat and again ate forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. However, in that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot. Here one is liable to bring one sin-offering, and here one is liable to bring one sin-offering.
  The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding. And what is the meaning of the phrase: Which is not the case with regard to other mitzvot? It is not referring to all mitzvot in general. It is referring to the prohibition of idolatry, which is comprised of separate component prohibitions, each of which incurs independent liability. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: One who sacrificed to idolatry, and burned incense before it, and poured wine as a libation before it in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring only one sin-offering. That is the ruling, even though, had he performed those rites separately, he would be liable to bring a sin-offering for each. That, then, is the stricture of other mitzvot relative to Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: In what case did you establish the <i>baraita</i>, in the case of idolatry? If so, state the latter clause and determine whether that explanation applies there as well. The latter clause states: A stricture with regard to other mitzvot that is greater than the stricture with regard to Shabbat is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who performs an act unwittingly without intent is liable, which is not the case with regard to Shabbat. One who acts unawares with no intent to perform a prohibited act is not considered to have performed an unwitting act. That case of performing an act unwittingly without intent with regard to idolatry, what are the circumstances? If you say that it is referring to a case where he thought that it was a synagogue and bowed to it, and it turned out that he bowed to idolatry, he committed no transgression. Since his heart was directed toward Heaven, it is not even an unwitting transgression. Rather, it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [<i>andarta</i>] in the image of the king and bowed to it. What are the circumstances? If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case in which he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he worshipped idolatry intentionally and is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is meaningless and is not an act of idolatry.
  Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed due to love of someone who requested that he bow before the statue and due to fear of someone coercing him to do so. He is under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol, there is no prohibition involved. This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is liable to bring a sin-offering. However, according to the opinion of Rava, who said: One who bows due to love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, what can be said? According to Rava’s opinion, the problem remains. There is no case in which there is a difference between the ruling in the case of idolatry and the ruling in the case of Shabbat. Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idolatry is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. The statement in the <i>baraita</i>: Which is not the case with regard to Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labors on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labors under those circumstances is completely exempt.
  That conclusion contradicts another statement of Rava. With regard to one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the individual prohibited labors, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman only whether to deem him liable to bring one or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings. However, the possibility to exempt him completely did not enter Rava’s mind. That explanation of the <i>baraita</i> is incompatible with Rava’s opinion.
  
  Daf 73a
  
  Rather, is it not that the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this <i>baraita</i>.
  A similar dispute between Abaye and Rava was stated. In the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain, for which he would not be liable by Torah law, and it turned out that he threw it four cubits, in violation of the prohibition by Torah law against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits, and, consequently, does not intend to perform a prohibited act. Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw, and ultimately a throw that traveled a prohibited distance was executed. Another dispute between them was stated. In the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain and threw an object more than four cubits, and, ultimately, it was found to be the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. And Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a prohibited throw. In a private domain, he may throw an object as far as he chooses. And Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw.
  The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention these three disputes, despite their similarities, because each one teaches a unique element. As, had the Gemara taught us only the first, the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, we would have said that it was only in that case that Rava said he is exempt, as he does not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He had no intention to perform an action that entails desecration of Shabbat. However, the ruling in the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain and he threw it four cubits would be more stringent, as an object cannot be thrown four cubits without being thrown two cubits. A throw of two cubits is a component part of the four-cubit throw. Consequently, say that in that case Rava agrees with Abaye, as he performed an act that has a prohibited dimension to it. And, had the Gemara taught us the dispute in this case of throwing two cubits as well, we would have said that it is only in that case that Rava says that he is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits. A throw of fewer than four cubits does not constitute a transgression. However, in the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain, and ultimately it was found to be the public domain where the individual intends to execute a throw of four cubits, which is a prohibited distance, say that Rava agrees with Abaye that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary to mention all three cases in which they disagree.
  We learned in a mishna: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, and we discussed it and asked: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, according to Abaye, who said that in a case like that one mentioned above, where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits he is liable, you find that circumstance in a case where he was aware that the prohibition of Shabbat applies to certain labors, and he was aware that particular labors were prohibited, and was mistaken with regard to measures. He intended to perform an act involving less than the prohibited measure, and it turned out that the action he performed involved an amount equal to or greater than the prohibited measure. That is an unwitting act that renders him liable to bring a sin-offering, according to Abaye. However, according to Rava, who said that he is exempt in a case where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits, in what circumstances do you find that he would be liable for each and every one? Is it in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting?
  It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is <i>karet</i>, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. If he holds in accordance with that opinion, you find a case where one could be liable for each and every prohibited labor when he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is <i>karet</i>. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and <i>karet</i>, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the <i>halakhot</i> of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that this prohibition is by Torah law.
  MISHNA: This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes.
  Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches.
  One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts.
  One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.
  
  Daf 73b
  
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the <i>tanna</i> teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds.
  A <i>baraita</i> is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>baraita</i> teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the <i>baraita</i>, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting.
  Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing.
  We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing.
  Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt.
  And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i> with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt.
  And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground.
  And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor.
  And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,
  
  Daf 74a
  
  even though there is a different labor that is similar to it, the mishna enumerated it. Every labor that was performed in the Tabernacle is significant. The Gemara asks: And let him enumerate the labor of pounding as well, as wheat was pounded to remove its outer kernel in the Tabernacle. Abaye said: The labor of pounding is not one of the essential stages in the baking of bread, as paupers eat their bread without pounding the wheat to remove the bran. Therefore, since the <i>tanna</i> enumerated threshing, there was no need to include pounding among the labors enumerated in the breadmaking process. Rava said a different explanation: Who is the <i>tanna</i> of this mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, a number derived from a textual allusion. Therefore, the list cannot be expanded. And had the <i>tanna</i> enumerated pounding, there would be forty labors rather than thirty-nine. The Gemara asks: And let him take out one of these, selecting or winnowing, and insert pounding, thereby leaving the number intact. Rather, the reason that the <i>tanna</i> did not include pounding is clear, according to the explanation of Abaye.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the laws of selecting: If there were several types of food before him, and he wants to remove one or more from the mixture, one selects and eats, selects and puts aside. And one may not select, and if one did select, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>baraita</i> saying? The end of this <i>baraita</i> contradicts the beginning. Ulla said: It is saying as follows: One selects and eats if he is doing so for the purpose of that day, Shabbat. And he selects and puts aside food for the purpose of that day. And one may not select for the purpose of the next day. And if one did select for the next day, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Ḥisda strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake for that day, and is it permitted to cook for that day? No other labor prohibited on Shabbat may be performed for the purpose of Shabbat, and the same should hold true for selecting.
  Rather, Rav Ḥisda said it is to be understood as follows: One selects and eats less than the measure of a dried fig-bulk, which is the smallest amount for which one is liable by Torah law. One selects and puts aside less than that measure. And one may not select the measure of a dried fig-bulk, and if one did select that measure, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake less than the measure for liability <i>ab initio</i>? Although performing a prohibited labor on a minute measure does not engender liability, it is prohibited. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> cannot be interpreted as saying that one may <i>ab initio</i> select an amount that is less than the measure for liability. Rather, Rav Yosef said: One selects and eats by hand, selects and put aside by hand. However, with a basket [<i>kanon</i>] or with a plate, both of which are large, flat vessels used for sorting sizeable quantities, one may not select <i>ab initio</i>. And if he did select, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly. If he did so intentionally he is exempt from stoning. However, it is prohibited. And one may not select with a sieve or with a sifter. And if he did select with those utensils, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about a basket or a plate? Rav Yosef’s explanation is based on the addition of details that do not appear in the <i>baraita</i> either. Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: One selects and eats if he is removing food from the waste, and similarly, selects and puts aside if he is removing food from the waste. However, one may not select waste from food, and if he did select in that manner, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The typical method of selecting is the removal of waste from the food. An individual who alters the procedure is not liable. Abaye strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about food from waste? That detail is not mentioned in the <i>baraita</i> either. Rather, Abaye said: One selects and eats if he is removing food for immediate use, and similarly one selects and puts aside for immediate use. However, one may not select for use later that same day. And if he did select, he is considered like one who selects for storage, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This explanation requires no emendation of the mishna. It is merely an interpretation of the phrase: One selects and eats, as referring to selecting for immediate use. The Gemara relates that the Sages stated Abaye’s explanation of the <i>baraita</i> before Rava. He said to them: Naḥmani, Abaye, spoke well.
  Until this point, the Gemara discussed selecting food from waste. The Gemara proceeds to discuss a different case. If there were two types of foods before him, and he selected and ate one type, and selected and put aside one type, Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. Rav Yirmeya from Difti taught: He is liable. Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that in that case he is liable? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where Rav Ashi said that he is exempt, is referring to a case where he selects by means of a basket or a plate, as that method of selecting is not considered expert work; and that, where the <i>baraita</i> said he is liable, is in a case where he selects by means of a sieve or a sifter, as that method of selecting is considered expert work.
  The Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: It was the Shabbat of Rav Beivai to serve food to the students, and Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi happened to come to his house. He placed before them a basket of fruits without removing the leaves and the stems. And I do not know whether he did so because he holds that it is prohibited to select food from waste when it is not for immediate consumption, or whether he did so because he intended to show generosity to his guests by creating the impression that the basket was full. A fruit-filled basket conveys to the guests that there is plenty and that they may take as much as they wish. Therefore, there is no clear proof from this incident.
  Ḥizkiya said: One who selects lupines from their waste after boiling them is liable for performing the prohibited labor of selecting. The Gemara asks: Let us say, based on this statement, that Ḥizkiya holds that even selecting food from waste is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this proof: Lupines are different,
  
  Daf 74b
  
  as they are boiled seven times. And, if one does not remove them from the shells, they rot. Therefore, it is considered like removing waste from food. The rotting edible portion of the lupine causes the shell to reek. Removing the edible portion, therefore, has the legal status of removing waste.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who grinds. Rav Pappa said: One who chops beets into small pieces on Shabbat is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding, as the actions are similar. Rav Menashe said: One who chops wood chips for sawdust (Rambam) is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding. Rav Ashi said: If he is particular in his chopping with regard to the measurement, i.e., he is careful to cut all the chips to a particular size, he is also liable due to the labor of cutting.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who kneads and one who bakes. Rav Pappa said: Our <i>tanna</i> left out the labor of cooking the spices for dye, which was performed in the Tabernacle, and included the labor of baking, which was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. If, as stated above, all the primary categories of labor were derived from the labors in the Tabernacle, why did the <i>tanna</i> omit cooking? The Gemara answers: Our <i>tanna</i> cited the sequence of preparing bread, which was the underlying principle behind his organization of the primary categories of labor. He opened with plowing and concluded with the preparation of bread.
  Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avira said: One who places a peg into an oven to dry is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he intends to strengthen the utensil, as ultimately, the peg is hardened in the oven, in contrast to cooking in which the fire softens the item being cooked. Therefore, he teaches us that initially the wood is softened in the oven, and only afterward it is hardened. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who boils pitch is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it proceeds to harden afterward, say that it is not considered cooking. One might think that since the pitch was hard before it was cooked and will ultimately be hard after it is cooked, boiling pitch is not considered cooking. Therefore, he teaches us that even a temporary change is considered cooking.
  Rava said: One who unwittingly crafted an earthenware barrel on Shabbat is liable to bring seven sin-offerings: He crumbles the lumps of dirt; which is (1) grinding; (2) selects the stones from the dirt; (3) kneads the mortar; (4) cuts the mortar into pieces of a suitable size; (5) builds the mold; (6) kindles the fire, and then fires the earthenware vessel, which is (7) baking (<i>ge’onim</i>). One who crafts an oven is liable for eight sin-offerings, since in addition to those seven labors, he spreads another layer of mortar to finish the job, performing the prohibited labor of (8) smoothing. Abaye said: One who unwittingly crafts a receptacle from reeds on Shabbat is liable to bring eleven sin-offerings. In pruning the reeds, he performed both (1) reaping and (2) planting, as he stimulates growth of the remaining reeds. He (3) gathers the reeds; (4) selects them; (5) smooths and levels them; cuts them into small pieces, which is (6) grinding; and (7) cuts them to a particular measurement. When he begins weaving the reeds, he performs the labors of (8) stretching the warp; (9) constructing two meshes; and (10) weaving. Crafting the object as a whole constitutes (11) building (<i>ge’onim</i>). And if he sews the mouth of the receptacle, he is liable to bring thirteen sin-offerings with the added labors of (12) sewing and (13) tying.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, which are labors in the process of shearing and spinning wool. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who unwittingly spins wool still attached on the back of an animal on Shabbat is liable to bring three sin-offerings: One due to shearing, since, in the process, some of the wool is detached from the sheep; and one due to combing the wool; and one due to spinning. Rav Kahana said: This is not a typical manner of shearing, and this is not a typical manner of combing, and this is not a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara asks: And is that not a typical manner of spinning? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya that the verse in the context of the work of the Tabernacle: “And all the women whose hearts lifted them with wisdom spun the goats” (Exodus 35:26) means that they washed the hair on the goats, and they spun it into threads on the goats themselves without first shearing the hair? Apparently, spinning on the back of an animal is considered a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara answers: Extraordinary wisdom is different. Although certain individuals are capable of spinning wool that way, the typical person is not capable of performing that feat.
  The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One who unwittingly plucks a large feather from the wing of a bird on Shabbat, and who snips the tip of the feather, and who pulls out the thin threads that comprise the feather is liable to bring three sin-offerings. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in explanation: One who plucks the wing is liable due to the labor of shearing. One who snips the tip of the feather is liable due to cutting. And one who pulls out the threads is liable due to smoothing.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who ties and one who unties. The Gemara asks: Where was there tying in the Tabernacle? Rava said: They tied the tents of the Tabernacle to the pegs. The Gemara rejects this: And is that considered performance of the labor of tying? That was tying a knot in order to untie it. When the children of Israel departed from an encampment, they dismantled the Tabernacle, which involved untying all of the knots. One is not liable for tying a temporary knot on Shabbat. Rather, Abaye said: As the weavers of curtains for the Tabernacle, when a thread would rip, they would tie it. Rava said to him: You have resolved the problem with regard to the labor of tying; however, with regard to the labor of untying, what can be said? Where, in the construction of the Tabernacle, was the labor of untying performed? And if you say that it was performed if one found two threads with knots tied next to each other, he untied one and left one tied; now, before a king of flesh and blood one would not do so, as the curtain would look flawed, in the Tabernacle, before the King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, would one do so? Rather, Rava said, and some say that Rav Elai said: The trappers of <i>ḥilazon</i>, whose blood was used in the Tabernacle as a dye, tie and untie their nets.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who sews two stitches. The Gemara asks: That does not endure; two stitches will unravel immediately. A prohibited labor whose result is temporary is not considered a prohibited labor. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That has the legal status of a prohibited labor only in a case where, after sewing the stitches, he tied them. He tied a knot at each of the two ends of the thread so that the stitches would not unravel.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who tears in order to sew two stitches. The Gemara asks: Was there tearing in the construction of the Tabernacle? The Gemara answers that it was Rabba and Rabbi Zeira who both said the following explanation:
  
  Daf 75a
  
  As, when a curtain had a worm which made a tear in it, they would tear the curtain further to lengthen the tear, and that enabled them to then sew it in a manner that obscured the tear.
  Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who tightens the thread of a stitch on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. If two parts of a garment that were sewn together begin to separate, and one pulls the thread to reattach them, it is tantamount to having sewn them. The Gemara cites additional <i>halakhot</i> cited by Rav Zutra in the name of Rav. And one who learns even one matter from a <i>magosh</i>, a Persian priest, is liable to receive the death penalty. And one who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, and does not do so, one may not speak with him because his actions are improper.
  The Gemara proceeds to discuss the additional <i>halakhot</i> cited by Rav Zutra bar Toviya. With regard to the <i>magosh</i>, Rav and Shmuel disagreed. One said that they are sorcerers, while the other said they are heretics. The Gemara adds: Conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics, as Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who learns one matter from the <i>magosh</i> is liable to receive the death penalty. As, if it should enter your mind that they are sorcerers, wasn’t it written: “When you come into the land which the Lord your God gives you, you shall not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that makes his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, one that uses divination, a soothsayer, or an enchanter, or a sorcerer” (Deuteronomy 18:9–10)? And the Sages inferred: You shall not learn to do, but you may learn to understand and to teach the topic of sorcery. Apparently, merely learning about sorcery does not violate a prohibition. Only acting upon that learning is prohibited. Rav, who prohibited learning even a single matter from a <i>magosh</i>, must hold that they are heretics, not merely sorcerers. The Gemara states: Indeed, conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Anyone who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations and does not do so, the verse says about him: “They do not take notice of the work of God, and they do not see His handiwork” (Isaiah 5:12). And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that there is a mitzva incumbent upon a person to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations? As it was stated: “And you shall guard and perform, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations” (Deuteronomy 4:6). What wisdom and understanding is there in the Torah that is in the eyes of the nations, i.e., appreciated and recognized by all? You must say: This is the calculation of astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, as the calculation of experts is witnessed by all.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who traps a deer or any other living creature. The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One who traps a <i>ḥilazon</i> and breaks its shell to remove its blood for the dye is liable to bring only one sin-offering. He is not liable for breaking the shell. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable to bring two, for performing the prohibited labors of trapping and for threshing, as Rabbi Yehuda would say: The breaking of a <i>ḥilazon</i> is included in the primary category of threshing, as its objective is to extract the matter that he desires from the shell that he does not. The Rabbis said to him: Breaking the shell is not included in the primary category of threshing. Rava said: What is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis? They hold: Threshing applies only to produce that grows from the ground. One who extracts other materials from their covering is exempt. The Gemara asks: Even if extracting blood is not considered threshing, let him be liable for taking a life as well. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is referring to a case where he broke its shell after it was dead.
  Rava said: Even if you say that he broke it when it was alive, he is exempt. Since he had no intention of killing the <i>ḥilazon</i>, he is considered as one who is acting unawares with regard to taking a life. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon, who rules that an unintentional act is permitted, agrees that in a case of: Cut off its head and will it not die, one is liable? One who performs an action that will inevitably result in a prohibited labor cannot claim that he did not intend for his action to lead to that result. Lack of intention is only a valid claim when the result is merely possible, not inevitable. Since one who extracts blood from a <i>ḥilazon</i> inevitably takes its life, how can Rava claim that his action is unintentional? The Gemara answers: Here it is different, as the longer the <i>ḥilazon</i> lives, the better it is for the trapper, so that its dye will become clear. Dye extracted from a live <i>ḥilazon</i> is a higher quality than that which is extracted from a dead one. Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who performs an action with inevitable consequences is liable only in a case where the consequences are not contrary to his interests. Since he prefers that the <i>ḥilazon</i> remain alive as long as possible, he is not liable for the inevitable consequences.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: As there was no slaughter necessary for construction of the Tabernacle, one who slaughters an animal, due to what prohibited labor is he liable? Rav said: He is liable due to dyeing, as in the course of the slaughter the hide is dyed with blood. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to taking a life.
  
  Daf 75b
  
  The Gemara wonders: Is that to say according to Rav, that due to dyeing, yes, he is liable; due to taking a life, no, he is exempt? Rather, emend Rav’s statement and say: He is liable due to dyeing as well. And Rav said: I will say something as an explanation with regard to the statement I said, so that later generations will not come and laugh at me: In what sense is dyeing a desired consequence for him? It is desired that the area of the slaughter will be inundated with blood, so that people will see it freshly dyed and come to purchase fresh meat from him. Therefore, the one slaughtering the animal also wants its neck dyed.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who salts it and one who tans it. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of salting is the same as the prohibited labor of tanning, i.e., salting is a stage in the tanning process. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both said: Remove one of them and replace it with drafting. In their opinion, the labor of drafting, drawing lines on the hide to indicate where it should be cut, should replace salting in the list of thirty-nine labors. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who salts meat on Shabbat to preserve it is liable due to the labor of tanning. Rava said: There is no tanning with regard to food. No action taken with food falls into this category. Rav Ashi said: And even Rabba bar Rav Huna said it falls into the category of tanning only when he needs to pack the meat for a trip and salts it thoroughly. However, to eat in the house, a person does not render his food inedible, tantamount to a piece of wood. In that case, he certainly would not salt the meat to a degree that would approximate tanning.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who smooths it and one who cuts it. Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: One who rubs the hide between the pillars on Shabbat, i.e., places the skin between pillars made for that purpose (Rav Hai Gaon) and rubs it between them, is liable due to the labor of smoothing. Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said: Rav Ashi told me three statements in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: One who planes the tops of posts on Shabbat to make them even is liable due to the labor of cutting, due to his insistence that they all be equal. One who spreads a bandage onto a wound on Shabbat is liable due to the labor of smoothing. And one who chisels a stone on Shabbat is liable due to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer, as he thereby completes work on the stone. Rabbi Shimon ben Kisma said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One who engraves a figure onto an earthenware vessel and one who blows in order to craft a glass vessel is liable due to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer. Rav Yehuda said: One who removes protruding, irregular threads from a cloak is liable due to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer. And that applies only if he is particular about them and would not wear the garment until all protruding threads are removed. In that case, work on the garment is not complete until the threads are removed.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who writes two letters. The Sages taught: One who wrote one large letter, and in its space there is room to write two, is exempt, as he wrote only one letter. However, one who erased one large letter, and in its space there is room to write two, is liable. Rav Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: And that is a greater stricture with regard to erasing than with regard to writing. Although greater stringency is usually accorded to creative acts, here the destructive act of erasing is more stringent. Although he erased only one letter, he made room for two, which is the essence of the prohibited labor.
  We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who builds and one who dismantles; one who extinguishes and one who kindles; and one who strikes a blow with a hammer. With regard to the labor of striking a blow with a hammer, it is Rabba and Rabbi Zeira who both stated a principle: One who performs any action on Shabbat that contains an element of completion of work is liable for the labor of striking a blow with a hammer.
  The mishna concludes: These are the primary categories of labor. The Gemara explains that the emphasis on the word these, indicating these and no others, comes to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who renders one liable for the performance of a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed together with a primary category under which it is subsumed. Rabbi Eliezer deems one who performs two prohibited labors, a primary category and its subcategory, liable to bring two sin-offerings. In his opinion, one who unwittingly performed all the labors in one lapse of awareness would be liable to bring more than thirty-nine sin-offerings. Therefore, the mishna emphasizes that there are only thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor, and one could not possibly be liable to bring a greater number of sacrifices. When the mishna repeats that the labors number forty-less-one, that is to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda added lining up the threads of the warp and beating the threads of the woof to the list of primary categories of labor. They said to him: Lining up is a subcategory subsumed under the primary category of stretching the threads of the warp within the loom, since both involve arranging the threads of the warp. Beating is subsumed under the primary category of weaving. The mishna teaches that there are no more than thirty-nine primary categories of labor.
  MISHNA: And they stated an additional principle with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. Anything fit to store, in the sense that it is large enough to make it worthwhile to store for future use, and people typically store items like it, and one carried it out into a prohibited domain on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for that action. And anything not fit to store and people typically do not store items like it, since it is too insignificant to warrant storage, and one carried it out on Shabbat, only the one who stores it is liable. By storing the item, one indicates that the item is significant to him, even though it is not significant for the typical person. Therefore, he alone is liable for carrying it out into a prohibited domain.
  GEMARA: With regard to the principle in the mishna: Anything fit to store, the Gemara asks: What does it come to exclude? In the opinion of the <i>tanna</i>, what is not fit for storage? Rav Pappa said: It comes to exclude the blood of a menstruating woman. Mar Ukva said: It comes to exclude the wood of a tree designated for idolatry [<i>ashera</i>]. Since one may derive no benefit from a tree designated for idolatry, it has no monetary value. The Gemara explains these opinions: The one who said that blood of a menstruating woman is not fit for storage, all the more so that the wood of an <i>ashera</i> is unfit, as, by Torah law, one is required to destroy it. However, according to the one who said that the wood of an <i>ashera</i> is unfit for storage, the blood of a menstruating woman is fit, as one stores it to feed to the cat. Although it is not typically stored, it does have some use. And the other, who holds that the blood of a menstruating woman is not fit for any use, isn’t it fit for use as cat food? In his opinion, since feeding a person’s blood to an animal weakens that person, one does not store it.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: All of these objective criteria mentioned in our mishna are not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as, if one would attempt to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, didn’t he say: The Sages in the mishna only stated all these fixed measures for items carried out with regard to those who store them? Only one who stores those items is liable for carrying them. However, one who does not store the item, and for whom it is insignificant, is not liable even if that item met the measure for liability delineated in the mishna.
  We learned in the mishna: And anything not fit to store, that is too insignificant to warrant storage, only one who stores it is liable for carrying it out.
  
  Daf 76a
  
  Rabbi Elazar said: This is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored and people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit to be stored by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this person who stored it. Once one person deemed it significant by means of thought and action, it is considered significant for all people. According to our mishna, however, only the person who stored the object is liable for carrying it out.
  MISHNA: The mishna lists the measures in which various substances are significant and generally stored. One who carries out straw in a measure equivalent to a cow’s mouthful is liable. The measure that determines liability for <i>etza</i> is equivalent to a camel’s mouthful. Because it is a coarser food, he must carry out a greater amount in order to be liable. The measure that determines liability for ears of grain is equivalent to a lamb’s mouthful. The measure that determines liability for grass is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful, which is smaller than that of a lamb. The measure that determines liability for garlic leaves and onion leaves, if they are moist and fit for human consumption, is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk. A dried fig-bulk is the standard measure for human food. If the garlic leaves and onion leaves are dry, the measure for liability is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. And none of these substances join together with one another to constitute a measure for liability because they are not equal in their measures.
  GEMARA: The Gemara first asks: What is <i>etza</i> mentioned in the mishna? Rav Yehuda said: It is straw of types of legumes. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: In the case of one who carries out a measure of straw equivalent to a cow’s mouthful for a camel, for which it is an insignificant measure, is his liability determined based on the measure that he carried out or based on the objective for which he carried it out? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: He is exempt. In the evening, Rabbi Yoḥanan said that; however, in the morning, he reversed his opinion and agreed with Reish Lakish. Rav Yosef said: He did well to reverse his opinion, since that amount is not suitable for a camel. There is no liability for carrying out less than a camel’s mouthful for a camel. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: On the contrary, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s original statement that he is liable is reasonable, as it is suitable for a cow. He carried out a significant measure that is fit for use, and he is liable for carrying it out even though it is insignificant for a camel.
  Rather, when Ravin later came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he transmitted a revised version of the dispute and said: With regard to one who carries out a measure equivalent to a cow’s mouthful of straw for a camel, everyone agrees that he is liable. Where they disagree is in a case of one who carries out a measure of <i>etza</i>, which cows do not typically eat, equivalent to a cow’s mouthful for the purpose of feeding a cow. Here the question is more difficult. Clearly, if one were to carry out that measure for a camel, or for no particular purpose, he would be exempt. However, since he designated the food for a cow, for which it is a significant amount, perhaps he should be liable for carrying out.
  And the opposite was stated in the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is exempt. Reish Lakish said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is exempt because he holds that eating under duress, i.e., food that is not typically eaten but could be eaten if necessary, such as a cow eating <i>etza</i>, is not considered eating. Reish Lakish said: He is liable because he holds that eating under duress is considered eating.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for an ear of grain is equivalent to a lamb’s mouthful. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Its measure for liability is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk? The Gemara explains: This, a lamb’s mouthful, and that, a dried fig-bulk, are one, the same, measure.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for one who carries out garlic leaves and onion leaves, if they are moist, is equivalent to a dried fig-bulk. If the garlic leaves and onion leaves are dry, the measure for liability is equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. And none of these substances join together with one another to constitute an amount for which one would be liable because they are not equal in their measures. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Substances that have a more lenient legal status and have a greater measure for liability do not join together with the substances among them whose legal status is more stringent and whose measure for liability is smaller. For example, one who carries out a goat’s mouthful of a mixture of straw, which is more lenient, and grass, which is more stringent, is exempt. However, substances whose status is more stringent, like grass, join together with the substances among them whose status is more lenient, like an ear of grain. One who carries out a lamb’s mouthful of a mixture of grass, which is more stringent, and an ear of grain, which is more lenient, is liable.
  The Gemara questions this principle: And do any items that are not equal in their measures join together? Don’t their fundamental differences preclude any combination? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that the opposite is true? The garment must be at least three by three handbreadths in order to become a primary source of ritual impurity by means of ritual impurity imparted by treading of a <i>zav</i>. And the sack made from goats’ hair must be at least four by four handbreadths. And the animal hide must be five by five, and a mat must be six by six. And a <i>baraita</i> was taught about the mishna: The garment and the sack, the sack and the hide, and the hide and the mat join together with one another. And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason that they join together? Because all the component materials are fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat upon which a <i>zav</i> sits, as they can each be used to patch a saddle or saddlecloth. Since they are all suitable for the same use, they join together with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity. By inference: The reason they can combine is because they are fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat. However, in a case where the combination is of several items not fit to become ritually impure through the ritual impurity imparted to a seat, no, they do not join together even to the more lenient, larger measure. Apparently, in general, items with different measures do not join together.
  Rava said:
  
  Daf 76b
  
  Here too, since these substances are suited to be piled together in the sample of a merchant seeking to sell them, they join together with regard to carrying out on Shabbat as well.
  MISHNA: One who carries out a measure of foods fit for human consumption equivalent to a dried fig-bulk into a domain where carrying is prohibited on Shabbat is liable. And all those foods join together with one another to constitute that amount because they are equal in their measures. This amount is calculated without their shells, and their seeds, and their stems, and their bran, the husk that comes off of the wheat kernel when pounded, and their coarse bran that remains in the flour. Rabbi Yehuda says: None of the shells are calculated, except for the shells of lentils, which join together with the lentils to comprise the measure for liability because they are cooked and eaten with them.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And do the bran and coarse bran of cereals not join together? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: Dough made from five-quarters of a <i>log</i> of flour and a bit more obligates one to separate <i>ḥalla</i>? That amount includes them, the flour, and their bran, and their coarse bran. Apparently, bran and coarse bran join together with the flour to constitute the requisite measure. Abaye said: Bran joins together with the flour with regard to <i>ḥalla</i> and the making of bread, since a pauper eats his loaf made from dough mixed with bran. However, with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, the food items in question must be suitable for all people, since the measures are small and are calculated by their significance.
  We learned in the mishna that shells do not join together to constitute the measure of food. Rabbi Yehuda says: Except for the shells of lentils because they are cooked and eaten with them. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with lentils, yes, the shells do join together; but with beans, no, they do not? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: Except for the shells of beans and lentils? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, shells of beans join together with the beans, is referring to new, fresh beans. That mishna, which teaches that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, shells of beans do not join together with the beans, is referring to old beans. The Gemara asks: Why do the shells of old beans not join together? Rabbi Abbahu said: Because their shell fragments look like flies in the dish; people are repulsed by those shell fragments, they do not eat them and discard them.
  
  MISHNA: One who carries out undiluted wine from a private domain to a public domain or vice versa is liable only for a measure equivalent to the wine typically diluted in a cup. Pure wine was diluted with water. The measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is a measure suitable to be diluted for a significant cup of wine. The measure that determines liability for carrying out milk is equivalent to that which is swallowed in one gulp. The measure that determines liability for carrying out honey is equivalent to that which is used to place on a sore caused by chafing. The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. The measure that determines liability for carrying out water is equivalent to that which is used to rub and spread on an eye bandage. And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all other liquids is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all waste water is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. Rabbi Shimon says: The measure that determines liability for all liquids is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. He further stated: And all these measures were only stated with regard to those who store them. One indicates that he considers these liquids significant by storing them. One is only liable for carrying out an object that is significant to him. Others, for whom these measures are insignificant, are not liable for carrying them out.
  GEMARA: It was taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is equivalent to the wine diluted for a significant cup of wine. The Gemara explains: And what is the significant cup of wine to which the <i>Tosefta</i> referred? It is a cup of blessing. And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: A cup of blessing must have a quarter of a quarter of a <i>log</i> of undiluted wine in it, so that one will dilute it with water, and the cup will contain a quarter of a <i>log</i>. The ratio of dilution is typically three parts water to one part wine.
  Rava said: We too
  
  Daf 77a
  
  learned that in the mishna: One who carries out undiluted wine is only liable if he carries out a measure equivalent to the wine typically diluted for a cup. And it was taught with regard to the mishna: A measure equivalent to the wine diluted for a significant cup of wine. And it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna: And the measure that determines liability for carrying out all other liquids is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. Since a quarter of a <i>log</i> is the significant measure for liquids, that is also the significant measure for diluted wine. And Rava is consistent with his line of reasoning, as Rava said: Any wine that does not hold one part wine diluted by three parts water is not wine. Wine must be sufficiently potent to be capable of being diluted with water three times its measure.
  Abaye said: There are two possible responses with regard to this matter. One, as we learned in a mishna: Diluted wine, which is used to determine the exact color of red, is two parts water and one part wine from the wine of the Sharon. Apparently, wine constitutes one-third and not one-quarter of the diluted cup. And furthermore: Rava’s opinion is that the measure that determines liability for carrying out wine is a measure that, when diluted, would equal a quarter of a <i>log</i>, i.e., a quarter of a quarter of a <i>log</i> of undiluted wine. Is it possible that the water is in the jug and yet joins together with the wine? The wine that he is carrying out is less than the required measure and is not fit for drinking.
  Rava said to him: That which you said that the dilution ratio that determines the color red is two parts water and one part wine, from the wine of the Sharon, is no proof. Wine of the Sharon is unique in that it is weak, and therefore two parts of water are sufficient to dilute it. Alternatively, there the dilution ratio mentioned is for determining the appearance of the color red; however, for the purpose of taste, more water is necessary. And that which you said: Is it possible that the water is in the jug and yet joins together with the wine? With regard to the liability of carrying out on Shabbat, we require an object that is significant, and this quarter of a quarter of a <i>log</i> of wine is also significant.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out congealed wine on Shabbat is an olive-bulk; this is the statement of Rabbi Natan. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said the same thing. Rabbi Natan’s statement is that which we just stated. And the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: Six matters are among the leniencies of Beit Shammai and among the stringencies of Beit Hillel. They include the blood of a carcass. Beit Shammai deem it ritually pure, as, in their opinion, only the flesh of a carcass imparts impurity; and Beit Hillel deem it ritually impure. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Even when Beit Hillel deemed it impure, they deemed impure only a measure of blood that contains a quarter of a <i>log</i>, since it can congeal and constitute an olive-bulk. Rav Yosef draws a parallel between the two opinions. Both <i>tanna’im</i> agree that a quarter of a <i>log</i> of liquid congeals to the size of an olive-bulk.
  Abaye said: Perhaps that is not the case, as Rabbi Natan said that a quarter of a <i>log</i> is required only here, with regard to wine, which is liquid; however, with regard to blood, which is viscous, in order to produce an olive-bulk when congealed, a quarter of a <i>log</i> is not required. Less than a quarter of a <i>log</i> of blood congeals into an olive-bulk. Alternatively, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said that in order to create a congealed olive-bulk, a quarter of a <i>log</i> is sufficient only there, with regard to blood, which is viscous; however, wine, which is liquid, in order to create a congealed olive-bulk, more than a quarter of a <i>log</i> of wine is required. And, therefore, even when he carries out less than an olive-bulk on Shabbat, let him be liable. There is no proof that the two tannaitic opinions are parallel.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out milk is equivalent to that which is swallowed [<i>kedei gemia</i>] in one gulp. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the correct version of the mishna: <i>Kedei gemia</i> with an <i>alef</i> or <i>kedei gemia</i> with an <i>ayin</i>? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It should be written with an <i>alef</i> as we find in the Torah: “And he said: Give me to swallow [<i>hagmi’ini</i> with an <i>alef</i> ] please, a little water from your jug” (Genesis 24:17).
  A similar dilemma with regard to spelling was raised before the Sages.
  
  Daf 77b
  
  In the mishna at the end of the previous chapter we learned that the measure that determines liability for carrying out foods is calculated without their seeds [<i>garinin</i>]. Is the correct version <i>garinin</i> with an <i>alef</i> or <i>garinin</i> with an <i>ayin</i>? Rava bar Ulla said: It is with an <i>ayin</i>, since it stems from the same root as: “And it shall be subtracted [<i>venigra</i> with an <i>ayin</i>] from your valuation” (Leviticus 27:18).
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do we describe dimming coals as <i>omemot</i> with an <i>alef</i> or <i>omemot</i> with an <i>ayin</i>? Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: It is written with an <i>ayin</i>, as it is stated: “The cedars in the garden of God could not hide it [<i>amamuhu</i> with an <i>ayin</i>]” (Ezekiel 31:8).
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to closing the eyes of the dead, did we learn in the mishna <i>me’amtzin</i> with an <i>alef</i>, or <i>me’amtzin</i> with an <i>ayin</i>? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is written with an <i>ayin</i> as it is stated: “And closes [<i>ve’otzem</i> with an <i>ayin</i>] his eyes from seeing evil” (Isaiah 33:15).
  With regard to carrying out milk, the Sages taught: One who carries out the milk of an animal on Shabbat is liable only for a measure equivalent to that which is swallowed in one gulp. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a woman’s milk and the white of an egg is equivalent to that which is used to place on the part of an eye bandage upon which the ointment is placed directly on the wound. And the aforementioned eye bandage must be sufficiently large to use it to rub both his eyes with water. Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: Is the measure that determines liability for the bandage equivalent to that with which water can be rubbed on both eyes, or is it equivalent to that which can be held and rubbed? Is the part of the bandage held in his hand when applying the bandage to his eyes also taken into account? No resolution was found for this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out honey is equivalent to that which is used to place on a sore caused by chafing. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: The precise measure is equivalent to that which is placed on the opening of a sore, i.e., on the wound itself. Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: Does the term on a sore mean the measure of honey spread on the opening of the entire sore; or, perhaps it means the measure spread on the primary protuberance of the sore, to the exclusion of the surrounding area upon which he does not spread honey? No resolution was found for this dilemma either. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.
  On the subject of sores, the Gemara cites a statement referring to one of the methods for healing a sore. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Everything that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created in His world, He did not create anything for naught. He created a snail as a remedy for a sore; He created a fly to be crushed and spread as a remedy on a wasp sting; He created a mosquito as a remedy for a snake bite; and He created the snake itself as a remedy for a skin rash; and He created a gecko as a remedy for a scorpion bite. The Gemara explains: How does one implement the remedy? He brings two geckos, one black and one white, cooks them, and spreads the resulting ointment on the affected area.
  With regard to these creatures, the Gemara cites that which our Sages taught: There are five dreads, i.e., dread that the weak cast over the mighty: The dread of the <i>mafgia</i>, a small creature, over the lion; the dread of the mosquito over the elephant; the dread of the gecko over the scorpion; the dread of the swallow over the eagle; the dread of the <i>kilbit</i>, a small fish, over a whale. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the verse that alludes to these matters? As it is written: “He that causes destruction [<i>shod</i>] to flash upon the mighty, so that destruction comes upon the fortress” (Amos 5:9), which is interpreted as: He who lifts the downtrodden [<i>shadud</i>] over the mighty.
  On the topic of the nature of the world, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Zeira found Rav Yehuda, who was standing at the entrance of his father-in-law’s house, and observed that he was in an especially cheerful mood. And Rabbi Zeira understood that were he to ask Rabbi Yehuda about anything in the entire world, he would tell him the answer. He therefore posed questions to him on a variety of topics unrelated to <i>halakha</i>. He asked: Why do goats walk in front of the flock and then ewes follow? He said to him: It is just as it was in the creation of the world, which at first was dark and then light followed. Goats, which are typically black, precede the ewes, which are typically white. And he asked: Why are the genitals of these ewes covered with a tail, whereas these goats are exposed? He answered: These ewes, whose wool we use to cover ourselves, are rewarded in that they are covered; and those goats, whose hair we do not use to cover ourselves, are exposed. And he asked: Why is the camel’s tail short? He answered: Because a camel eats thorns, and a long tail would become entangled in the thorns. And he asked: Why is the ox’s tail long? He answered: Because the ox lives in a swamp and must fend off mosquitoes.
  He continued to ask: Why is the grasshopper’s antenna soft? He answered: Because it lives in the plains among the grass, and if the antenna were hard it would break and the grasshopper would go blind. When the grasshopper loses its antenna it is unable to move, as Shmuel said: One who seeks to blind a grasshopper should remove its antenna. And he asked: Why does the chicken’s lower eyelid cover the upper one? He answered: Because a chicken lives on rafters in houses, and if the smoke from the houses were to enter its eyes without the protection of the eyelid, it would go blind. He asked further: Why is a door called <i>dasha</i> in Aramaic? He said to him: It is an acronym for <i>derekh sham</i>, which means through there. Why is a stair called <i>darga</i>? He said to him: It is an acronym for <i>derekh gag</i>, which means the way to the roof. Why are spices called <i>mitkolita</i>? He said to him: It is an acronym for <i>matai tikhleh da</i>, which means when will this be finished. Since spices are used sparingly, they last a long time. Why is a house called <i>beita</i>? He said to him: It is an acronym for <i>bo ve’eitiv ba</i>, which means come and I will sit in it. Why is a small house called <i>bikta</i>? He said to him: It is an acronym for <i>bei akta</i>, which means a narrow house.
  A barrel is called <i>kufta</i>, which is an acronym for <i>kuf vetiv</i>, which means turn it over and sit. Bricks are called <i>livnei</i>, which is an allusion to <i>livnei benei</i>, which means for the children of children. A fence made of thorns is called <i>hutza</i> and Rav Yehuda said that it is merely a <i>ḥatzitza</i>, which means partition, as opposed to a true fence. A jug used for drawing water is called a <i>ḥatzba</i> because it hews [<i>ḥotzev</i>] water from the river. A small jug is called <i>kuza</i>, alluding to <i>kazeh</i>, which means: Give me one like that. Myrtle branches with which people dance at a wedding are called <i>shutita</i>, an allusion to <i>shetuta</i>, which means madness, as the frenzied dancing appears to be madness. The large vessel used for washing is called <i>meshikhla</i>, which is an acronym for <i>mashei kula</i>, which means: It washes all. A small vessel used for washing is called <i>mashkhilta</i>, and Rav Yehuda explained that it is an acronym for <i>mashya kalta</i>, which means: It washes the bride. A mortar is called <i>asita</i>, alluding to <i>ḥasirta</i>, which means lacking, since it has a large cavity. The pestle that is inserted into the mortar for pounding its contents is called <i>bukhna</i>, which is an acronym for <i>bo ve’akkena</i>, which means: Come and I will strike it.
  An outer garment is called <i>levusha</i>, which is an acronym for <i>lo busha</i>, which means no shame, as one who is clothed is no longer ashamed. A broad outer garment is called <i>gelima</i>, an allusion to the fact that, by wearing it, one is transformed into an amorphous golem-like figure, as his limbs are indistinguishable. A beautiful coat is termed <i>golta</i>, which is an acronym for <i>geli ve’eitiv</i>, which means reveal, remove the coat, and only then I will sit, so that the coat will not get dirty. A bed is called <i>purya</i>, an allusion to the fact that people <i>parin veravin</i>, which means procreate, upon it. An empty pit is called <i>bor zinka</i>, which is an acronym for <i>bor ze naki</i>, which means that this pit is empty of water. The head covering of Torah scholars is called <i>sudara</i>, an acronym for <i>sod yareh</i>, which is a reference to the verse: “The counsel of the Lord is with them who fear Him [<i>sod Hashem lire’av</i>]” (Psalms 25:14). A palace is called <i>apadna</i>, which is an acronym for <i>apitḥa dein</i>, meaning: To this entrance all come. The Gemara cites an additional <i>baraita</i> related to the nature of the creatures. There are three creatures that grow mightier with age, and they are the fish, and the snake, and the pig.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. The school of Rabbi Yannai said it should be explained as follows: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb and a day-old child. Does this not mean: A small limb of an adult and a large limb of a day-old child? The Gemara rejects this: The school of Rabbi Yannai could have said to you: No, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb, and the small limb in question is that of a day-old child.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb and a day-old child; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. Rabbi Natan says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb. Is it not that they disagree about the following? Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds: It refers to a small limb of a small child, and Rabbi Natan holds: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of an adult or a large limb of a child, but for a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child, no, one is exempt. The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that for carrying out oil in a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child, no, one is exempt,
  
  Daf 78a
  
  and the opinion of the school of Rabbi Yannai is not accepted. And here, in this <i>baraita</i>, they disagree about this: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds: A small limb of an adult and a large limb of a day-old child are equal to one another, and Rabbi Natan holds: For carrying out oil in a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of an adult, yes, one is liable; however, a large limb of a day-old child, no, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached in this matter? Come and hear a proof, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says explicitly: The measure that determines liability for carrying out oil is equivalent to that which is used to spread on a small limb of a day-old child.
  We learned in the <i>mishna</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out water is equivalent to that which is used to rub and spread on an eye bandage. Abaye said: Now, since, with regard to any substance that is utilized for both common and uncommon uses, the Sages, in their ruling, followed the common usage even as a leniency, i.e., one is liable only for carrying out the larger measure. However, when a substance has different uses and one is common and the other is common as well, the Sages, in their ruling, followed the common use that leads to a stringency, i.e., one is liable for carrying out even the smaller amount.
  Proof for this principle can be seen in the following examples. Wine, its use for drinking is common and its use for healing is uncommon. The Sages, in establishing the measure that determines liability for carrying out wine, followed its use for drinking, which is common, which led to a leniency. The amount of wine that one typically drinks is greater than the amount of wine used for healing. Milk, its consumption is common and its use for healing is uncommon. The Sages, in establishing the measure that determines liability for carrying out milk, followed its consumption, which is common, as a leniency. Honey, its consumption is common and its use for healing is also common. The Sages, in establishing the measure that determines liability for carrying out honey, followed its use for healing, the smaller amount, as a stringency.
  However, water, since its drinking is common and its use for healing is uncommon, what is the reason that the Sages followed its use for healing as a stringency? Based on the above principle, the Sages should have determined the measure based on its use for drinking. Abaye said: They taught this <i>halakha</i> in the Galilee where they typically drink wine. There, water is used as commonly for healing as it is for drinking (<i>Tosafot</i>). Rava said: Even if you say that this <i>halakha</i> applies in the rest of the places as well as in the Galilee, the use of water in treating the eye is common, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: All liquids placed on the eye effect a cure and cloud the vision, except for water which cures and does not cloud the vision.
  We learned in the <i>mishna</i>: And the measure that determines liability for all other liquids is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out blood and all types of liquids on Shabbat is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: The measure that determines liability for blood is less than that. The measure that determines liability for carrying out blood is equivalent to that which is used to apply to one eye, as one applies blood to heal a wart on the eye. The Gemara asks: And what type of blood effects this cure? The blood of a wild chicken. Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out blood is equivalent to that which is used to apply to one eye, as one applies blood to heal a cataract. And what type of blood effects this cure? The blood of a bat. And a mnemonic to ensure that you do not confuse these cures: Inside for inside, outside for outside. The blood of a bat, which lives in inhabited areas, for the cataract, which is inside the eye; the blood of a wild chicken, which lives outside inhabited areas, for the wart, which is external to the eye.
  The Gemara cites a <i>Tosefta</i>: In what case are these matters, the measures for the substances in the mishna, stated? They were stated with regard to one who carries them out from one domain to another without ascribing special significance to them. However, with regard to one who stores them, thereby ascribing significance to them, the ruling is that he is liable for carrying out any measure. Rabbi Shimon says: In what case are these matters stated? They were stated with regard to one who stores those amounts. However, if one merely carries them out, he is liable only if he carries out a quarter of a <i>log</i>. And the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who carries out waste water to the public domain that even when one merely carries it out, the measure that determines liability is a quarter of a <i>log</i>.
  The Master said in the <i>Tosefta</i>: In what case are these matters, the measures for the substances in the mishna, stated? They were stated with regard to one who carries them out from one domain to another without ascribing special significance to them. However, with regard to one who stores them, he is liable for any amount. The Gemara is surprised at this: Isn’t the one who stores also the one who carries out? One is not liable for merely storing. He is liable only for carrying out the stored item. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? With the case of a student whose teacher said to him: Go and clear for me space for a meal, and he went and cleared space for him and removed the items to another domain. If he cleared an item that is significant to all, he is liable for carrying it out. If he cleared an item that is not significant to all, then, if his teacher had stored it, he is liable for carrying it out, and if his teacher had not stored it, he is not liable for carrying it out, since the student is fulfilling his teacher’s wishes.
  The Master said in the <i>Tosefta</i>: And the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who carries out waste water to the public domain, that the measure that determines liability is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. The Gemara asks: For what use is waste water fit? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is used to knead clay. The Gemara asks: If that is its purpose, why is such a large amount required? Was it not taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out clay on Shabbat is equivalent to that which is used to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible, which is a much smaller measure? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, where the measure for clay is equivalent to that which is used to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible, is referring to a case where it was already kneaded; that, where the measure for waste water is a quarter of a <i>log</i> to knead clay, is referring to a case where it is not yet kneaded, as a person does not go to the trouble of kneading clay just to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible. When carrying out water to knead clay, a large amount is required; however, clay that was already prepared is fit for use for smaller objects as well.
  MISHNA: One who carries out a rope is liable in a measure equivalent to that which is used to form an ear-shaped handle for a basket. The measure that determines liability for carrying out reed grass is equivalent to that which is used to make a loop for hanging a sifter or a sieve. Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to take the measure of a shoe for a child, as the reed is used to measure the size of the foot. The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper is equivalent to that which is used to write a tax receipt. And one who carries out a tax receipt itself on Shabbat is liable.
  
  Daf 78b
  
  The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper from which the writing has been erased and which can no longer be used for writing, is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small jar of perfume. The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. The measure that determines liability for carrying out <i>dokhsostos</i>, a layer of the animal hide, is equivalent to that which is used to write a <i>mezuza</i>. The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of <i>Shema Yisrael</i>. The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters.
  The measure that determines liability for carrying out blue eye shadow is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue. The measure that determines liability for carrying out glue is equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board to catch birds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out tar and sulfur is equivalent to that which is used to seal a hole in a vessel and to make a small hole in that seal. The measure that determines liability for carrying out wax is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small hole to seal it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out crushed earthenware is equivalent to that which is used to knead and make from it an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible. Rabbi Yehuda says: Equivalent to that which is used to make a small tripod [<i>pitput</i>] for the crucible. The measure that determines liability for carrying out bran is equivalent to that which is used to place on the hole of a gold refiners’ crucible. The measure that determines liability for carrying out lime is equivalent to that which is used to spread as a depilatory on the smallest of girls. Rabbi Yehuda says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on the hair that grows over the temple so that it will lie flat. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Equivalent to that which is used to spread on the temple to remove fine hairs.
  GEMARA: We learned in the <i>mishna</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a rope is equivalent to that which is used to form an ear-shaped handle for a basket. The Gemara asks: In the case of rope, too, let one be liable for carrying out a measure equivalent to that which is used to make a loop for hanging a sifter or a sieve, as he is with a reed. The Gemara answers: Since rope is tough and would cut grooves in the vessel, people do not make loops from it. The Sages taught: The measure that determines liability for carrying out hard palm leaves is equivalent to that which is used to make an ear-shaped handle for an Egyptian wicker basket, which is made from woven palm branches. <i>Aḥerim</i> say: The measure that determines liability for carrying out bast is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small funnel to filter the wine. The measure that determines liability for carrying out fat is equivalent to that which is used to smear beneath a small cake. And how much is its measure? Equivalent to the size of a <i>sela</i>. The Gemara asks: Was it not taught in a <i>baraita</i> that its measure is equivalent to a dried fig? The Gemara answers: This, the width of a <i>sela</i>, and that, the volume of a dried fig, are one measure. The measure that determines liability for carrying out soft material is equivalent to that which is used to make a small ball. And how much is its measure? It is like the size of a nut.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out paper is equivalent to that which is used to write a tax receipt. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: How much is the measure of a tax receipt? Enough to write two letters characteristic of a tax receipt, which are larger than regular letters. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: One who carries out blank paper; if it has space equivalent to that which is used to write two letters, he is liable, and if not, he is exempt. That paper is smaller than a tax receipt. Rav Sheshet said: What are the two letters taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>? Two letters of a tax receipt. Rava said: The <i>Tosefta</i> can even be explained as referring to two standard-size letters of ours and blank space with which to hold the paper on which the text is written, which is the size of a tax receipt.
  The Gemara raises an objection: One who carries out paper from which the writing has been erased or a promissory note whose debt has been repaid, if there is in its white section, the space with no text, equivalent to that which is used to write two letters, or if the entire paper is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small jar of perfume, he is liable; and if not, if it is smaller, he is exempt. The Gemara elaborates: Granted, according to Rav Sheshet, who said: What are the two letters taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>, two letters of a tax receipt, it works out well. However, according to Rava, who said: Two standard-size letters of ours and blank space with which to hold the paper on which the text is written, which is the size of a tax receipt, here, on this paper or document, blank space with which to hold the paper is not necessary, as one can hold it on the erased part or on the text of the voided promissory note. Nevertheless, the measure for liability in the <i>Tosefta</i> for carrying out paper from which the writing was erased is no smaller. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is difficult.
  The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One who carries out a tax receipt on Shabbat before he has shown it to the tax collector, and he still needs it, is liable for carrying out on Shabbat. Once he has shown it to the tax collector he is exempt, as it has no significance. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once he has shown it to the tax collector he is liable because there will be a time when he needs it. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between their opinions? Abaye said: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to tax runners. Occasionally, the tax collectors send inspectors after those who already passed the tax audit in order to verify that they indeed paid. In that case, even though one already showed it to the original tax collector, he will be required to produce it again. Rava said: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a senior tax collector and a junior tax collector. Sometimes, when the first tax collector that one encounters is a minor official, he will need to keep the receipt with him and produce it if he encounters a more senior official. Rav Ashi said: There is a difference between them even in a case where there is just one tax collector. Nevertheless, it is to his advantage to keep it in his possession because he needs it to show it to a second tax collector whom he may encounter in the future, as he says to him: Look, I am a man trusted by the tax collector. The document in his possession proves that he is on good terms with the tax authorities.
  The Sages taught: One who carries out a promissory note on Shabbat before he repaid the debt is liable; however, once he repaid it, he is exempt. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once he repaid the debt, he is liable for carrying out the document because he needs it. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between their opinions? Rav Yosef said: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to the <i>halakha</i> whether or not it is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession. The Rabbis hold: It is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession, so that the creditor will not use it to collect the debt a second time. Since it is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note, the document has no value. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: It is permitted to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession and use it as paper.
  Abaye said: Everyone agrees that it is prohibited to keep a repaid promissory note in one’s possession, and here they disagree with regard to the question whether or not, in a case where a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court. The first <i>tanna</i> holds: When a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court to confirm that it is not a forgery. If it cannot be ratified, the debtor can claim that he already repaid the debt. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: When a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor need not ratify it in court and can collect his debt without ratification. The document is considered more reliable than the debtor’s claims. And what is the meaning of: Before he repaid the debt and once he repaid it?
  
  Daf 79a
  
  It means: Until the debtor says: I repaid the debt, or, I did not repay the debt. If the debtor says: I repaid the debt in the promissory note and there are no witnesses to ratify the document in court, the document has no value. That is the opinion of the Rabbis who hold that an unratified document cannot force a debtor to pay. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a document need not be ratified, the debtor’s claim that he repaid the debt is not accepted and the creditor can collect his debt with the unratified promissory note.
  Rava said: Everyone agrees that when a debtor admits that he wrote a promissory note, the creditor must ratify it in court. And here, it is with regard to the question whether or not one writes a receipt that they disagree. The first <i>tanna</i> holds: One writes a receipt for a promissory note that was repaid. Since the debtor has the receipt in his possession, the creditor may keep the note and use it as paper. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: One does not write a receipt. Therefore, the creditor is required to return the note to the debtor immediately upon repayment of the debt. It is in the interest of the debtor to destroy the document, and he has no reason to keep it. Rav Ashi said: The dispute is with regard to a case where the debtor carried out the promissory note into the public domain. Rabbi Yehuda said he is liable because he needs the repaid document to show it to a second creditor, as he says to him: Look, I am a man who repays his debts.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to one who carries out animal hide, how much must he carry out on Shabbat in order to be liable? He said to him, it is as we learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. He raised another dilemma: With regard to one who tans that hide, how much must he tan in order to be liable? He said to him: It is no different, the same measure. He raised another dilemma: With regard to one who carries out animal hide to tan it, how much must he carry out on Shabbat in order to be liable? He said to him: It is no different.
  And from where do you derive and say that there is no difference whether or not the hide one carries out is tanned? As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who whitens, and one who combs, and one who dyes, and one who spins, the measure of wool for which one is liable in performing those prohibited labors is double the full width of the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And the measure that determines liability for one who weaves two threads is double the full width of the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. Apparently, since the wool is designated for spinning, the measure for which one is liable for whitening, combing, and dyeing is equal to the measure for which one is liable for weaving that spun thread. Here too, since it is designated for tanning, its measure that determines liability for carrying it out into the public domain is equal to the measure that determines liability for carrying out tanned hides. Rava raised another dilemma: With regard to one who carries out animal hide and has no intention to tan it, how much must he carry out on Shabbat in order to be liable? He said to him: It is no different.
  Rava asked: And is there no halakhic difference between carrying out tanned hides and carrying out hides that are not tanned? He raised an objection to him based on a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out herbs that were soaked in water and ready for use as a dye is liable if he carried out a measure equivalent to that which is used to dye a sample the size of a stopper for the shuttle of a loom. While with regard to herbs that were not soaked, we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out nutshells, and pomegranate peels, and for carrying out safflower, and madder, which are herbs used as dyes, is equivalent to that which is used to dye a small cloth to cover the opening of a woman’s hair net. Apparently, the measure for which one is liable for carrying out raw materials is greater than the measure for which one is liable for carrying out prepared dyes. The Gemara answers: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Because a person does not go to the trouble to soak herbs just to dye a sample for the shuttle of a loom? As a rule, there is no distinction between finished and unfinished products. The case of dye is different, as people do not typically prepare dyes in amounts that small. Therefore, even though that size is significant in and of itself, he is exempt for carrying them out.
  He asked further: And with regard to seeds of garden plants before one sowed them, we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out seeds of garden plants is less than a dried fig-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: He is liable if he carries out five seeds. While with regard to carrying out seeds after he sowed them, we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out manure or fine sand is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize one stalk of cabbage with it; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a leek. Apparently, after the seed was sown, the measure for liability is one plant. Before it is sown, the measure is at least five. The Gemara answers: As a rule, there is no distinction between an object that was processed and one that was not. However, this case is different. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that <i>halakha</i> that there is a distinction between this, where one is liable for carrying out one plant, and the mishna is referring to a case where it is already sown; and that, where one is only liable for carrying out at least five, and the mishna is referring to a case where it is not yet sown, because a person does not go to the trouble to carry out just one seed for sowing?
  He asked further: And with regard to clay before one kneads it, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Shimon with regard to one who carries out waste water to the public domain, that the measure that determines liability is a quarter of a <i>log</i>. And we discussed this question: For what use is waste water fit? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is used to knead clay. Apparently, the measure that determines liability for the raw material is the amount kneaded with a quarter of a <i>log</i> of waste water to form clay. While with regard to clay after one kneads it, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to clay, the measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible, which is a small amount. The Gemara answers: There too, it is as we stated: Because a person does not go to the trouble of kneading clay just to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a crucible.
  In order to resolve the dilemma with regard to the measure that determines liability for carrying out an animal hide on Shabbat, the Gemara states: Come and hear a <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: There are three hides, i.e., three stages in the process of tanning hides, and at each stage it is known by a different name: <i>Matza</i>, and <i>ḥifa</i>, and <i>diftera</i>. <i>Matza</i>, as per its plain meaning, with no additives. It is not salted, and not treated with flour, and not treated with gallnuts. And how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying out that hide on Shabbat? Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda taught: It is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small weight. And how big is this small weight? Abaye said: A quarter of a quarter of a <i>litra</i> in the system of weights in use in Pumbedita.
  <i>Ḥifa</i> is hide that is salted, and not treated with flour, and not treated with gallnuts. And how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying out that hide on Shabbat? As we learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out animal hide is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. <i>Diftera</i> is hide that is salted, and treated with flour, and not treated with gallnuts. And how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying out that hide on Shabbat? The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to the amount which is used to write a bill of divorce on it. In any case, it was taught that before it is tanned the measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to wrap around a small weight. And Abaye said: A quarter of a quarter of a <i>litra</i> in the system of weights in use in Pumbedita. That is not the same as the measure that determines liability for a tanned hide, which is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet. The Gemara answers: There, it is referring to wet hide just flayed that was left out to dry in the sun and is suitable only for wrapping around a weight (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). However, for carrying out hide that is tanned, his measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to make an amulet.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: And didn’t we learn in a mishna: The garment must be at least three by three handbreadths to become impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading? And the sack made from goat hair must be at least four by four handbreadths. And the animal hide must be five by five, and a mat must be six by six. Those are the minimum measures for becoming a primary source of ritual impurity by means of both ritual impurity imparted by treading and ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. And it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> with regard to that mishna: With regard to the garment and the sack and the hide; like the measure for ritual impurity, so too is the measure for carrying out on Shabbat. That is significantly larger than the measure for liability cited in the mishna for carrying out hide. The Gemara answers: That <i>Tosefta</i> is referring to <i>kortovela</i>, which is hide that was tanned in a manner that rendered it unfit for writing or wrapping. It is used for covering vessels and other similar uses (Rambam).
  
  Daf 79b
  
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from that which was taught: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment and <i>dokhsostos</i> is equivalent to that which is used to write a <i>mezuza</i> on it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>mezuza</i> in this context? It means those Torah portions of the <i>mezuza</i> that also appear in the phylacteries. The Gemara asks: And are the phylacteries called <i>mezuza</i>? The Gemara answers: Yes, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The straps of the phylacteries, when they are with the phylacteries, render the hands ritually impure as is the case with regard to contact with any sacred texts. When they are on their own, they do not render the hands ritually impure. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: One who touches the strap of the phylacteries remains ritually pure even if it is attached to the phylacteries, unless he touches the actual box of the phylacteries. Rabbi Zakkai says in Rabbi Shimon’s name: One remains ritually pure until he touches the <i>mezuza</i> itself. Apparently the Torah portions in phylacteries are called <i>mezuza</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of <i>Shema Yisrael</i>, by inference, in the first clause of the mishna we are dealing with a <i>mezuza</i> itself. Rather, this is what it teaches: With regard to parchment and <i>dokhsostos</i>, how much is the measure that determines liability for carrying them out? The measure that determines liability for carrying out <i>dokhsostos</i> is equivalent to that which one uses to write a <i>mezuza</i> on it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which one uses to write on it the shortest passage that is in the phylacteries, which is <i>Shema Yisrael</i>.
  Rav said: <i>Dokhsostos</i> has the same legal status as parchment: Just as one may write the portions of the phylacteries on parchment, so too, one may write the portions of the phylacteries on <i>dokhsostos</i>. The Gemara asks, we learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out parchment is equivalent to that which is used to write the shortest portion in the phylacteries, which is the portion of <i>Shema Yisrael</i>. By inference: Parchment, yes, the portions of the phylacteries may be written on it. <i>Dokhsostos</i>, no, the portions of the phylacteries may not be written on it. The Gemara answers: That is no proof, as the mishna is referring to the optimal manner in which to fulfill the mitzva, i.e., writing the portions of the phylacteries on parchment. However, one fulfills the mitzva by writing on <i>dokhsostos</i> as well. Come and hear that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the portions of the phylacteries are written on parchment, and a <i>mezuza</i> is written on <i>dokhsostos</i>. When writing on parchment, one writes on the side of the hide that faced the flesh; on <i>dokhsostos</i>, one writes on the side of the hide on which there was hair. This contradicts the opinion of Rav, who said that phylacteries may be written on <i>dokhsostos</i>. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is also referring to the optimal manner in which to fulfill the mitzva.
  The Gemara asks: And wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if one deviated and wrote on something else it is invalid, indicating that the portions of the phylacteries may not be written on anything other than parchment? The Gemara rejects this: This <i>baraita</i> is referring to a <i>mezuza</i>, which is invalid if written on parchment. The Gemara asks: But was it not taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: If one deviated in this, phylacteries, and that, <i>mezuza</i>, it is invalid? The Gemara rejects this: Both this and that are referring to a <i>mezuza</i>, and this additional invalidation is in a case where one deviated and wrote it on parchment, on the side that faced the hair; or, alternatively, where he deviated and wrote it on <i>dokhsostos</i>, on the side that faced the flesh. And, if you wish, say instead: Actually, this and that are referring to phylacteries and a <i>mezuza</i>. However, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where one deviated in this and that is subject to a tannaitic dispute, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one deviated in this and that it is invalid. Rabbi Aḥa deems it valid in the name of Rabbi Aḥai bar Ḥanina, and some say in the name of Rabbi Ya’akov, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. Rav Pappa said: Rav said his statement in accordance with the opinion of the <i>tanna</i> from the school of Menashe. As it was taught in the school of Menashe: If one wrote it on paper or on a cloth it is invalid. However, if one wrote it on parchment or on a hide that was treated with gallnuts [<i>gevil</i>] or on <i>dokhsostos</i> it is valid.
  The Gemara elaborates: If he wrote it; wrote what? If you say that it is referring to a <i>mezuza</i>, do we write a <i>mezuza</i> on parchment? Rather, isn’t it referring to phylacteries? Apparently, as Rav said, there are Sages who hold that the portions of the phylacteries may be written on <i>dokhsostos</i>. The Gemara rejects this: And according to your reasoning, do we write phylacteries on <i>gevil</i>? Rather, that <i>baraita</i> was taught with regard to a Torah scroll. The Gemara comments: Let us say that the following supports the opinion of Rav: Similarly, phylacteries that became tattered and a Torah scroll that became tattered, one may not make them into a <i>mezuza</i>, despite the fact that identical Torah portions appear in all three. This is prohibited because one does not downgrade from a level of greater sanctity, i.e., a Torah scroll or phylacteries, to a level of lesser sanctity, i.e., a <i>mezuza</i>.
  The Gemara infers: The reason that one may not do so is because one does not downgrade. However, if the <i>halakha</i> were that one does downgrade, one would make a <i>mezuza</i> from phylacteries. The Gemara elaborates: On what is the portion of the phylacteries written? Isn’t it written on <i>dokhsostos</i>? This supports the opinion of Rav. The Gemara answers: No, the portion of the phylacteries is written on parchment. The Gemara asks: If so, how could a <i>mezuza</i> be made from it? Do we write a <i>mezuza</i> on parchment? The Gemara answers: Yes, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one wrote a <i>mezuza</i> on parchment, or on paper, or on a cloth, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would write it on parchment, as it is thereby better preserved. Apparently, even a <i>mezuza</i> may be written on parchment, and there is no proof from the previous <i>baraita</i>. In reaction to the previous <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this opinion that a <i>mezuza</i> may be written on both <i>dokhsostos</i> and parchment, according to Rav, as well, do not say: <i>Dokhsostos</i> has the same legal status as parchment with regard to phylacteries; rather, say: Parchment has the same legal status as <i>dokhsostos</i>. Just as on <i>dokhsostos</i>, one may write a <i>mezuza</i>, so too, on parchment, one may write a <i>mezuza</i>, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters.
  
  Daf 80a
  
  A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: The measure that determines liability for carrying out ink is equivalent to that which is used to write two letters when he carries out dried ink, and two letters when the ink is in the quill, and two letters in the inkwell [<i>kalmarin</i>]. Rava raised a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> if one carried out sufficient ink to write one letter in the form of dried ink, and sufficient ink to write one letter in the quill, and sufficient ink to write one letter in the inkwell? Do they join together to constitute the measure for liability, or is each considered separately? No resolution was found for this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.
  Rava said: One who carried out a measure of ink equivalent to that which is used to write two letters on Shabbat, and he wrote two letters as he walked, even though he did not place the written material in the public domain, he is liable for carrying out the ink. Their writing is their placement. He is liable even without placing the ink on the ground. And Rava said: One who carried out sufficient ink to write one letter and he wrote it, and then proceeded to carry out sufficient ink to write one more letter and he wrote it, is exempt. What is the reason that he is exempt? At the time that he carried out the last drop of ink, he was lacking the first measure of ink. The ink that he carried out first dried slightly in the interim and not enough remained to write one letter.
  And Rava said with regard to a similar issue: One who carried out half of a dried fig on Shabbat and placed it in a different domain, and proceeded to carry out another half of a dried fig and placed it, the first becomes as one that was snatched by a dog or burned and he is exempt, as he did not carry out the measure of a dried fig for which he would be liable. The Gemara wonders: And why is he exempt; isn’t an entire dried fig placed together? Why isn’t he liable for carrying it out? The Gemara explains: This is what Rava is saying: And if he lifted the first half-fig first before placement of the second, i.e., the two half-figs were never placed together, the first becomes as one that was snatched by a dog or burned and he is exempt. And Rava said: One who carried out half of a dried fig on Shabbat and placed it in a different domain, and proceeded to carry out another half of a dried fig and passed the second half-fig over the already placed first half-fig, is liable even though they were never placed together. The Gemara asks: And why is he liable? The second half-fig did not come to rest. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he passed the second half-fig within three handbreadths of the first half-fig. The <i>halakha</i> is that objects less than three handbreadths apart are considered attached.
  The Gemara asks: And didn’t Rava himself say: An object that passes within three handbreadths of the ground, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, must come to rest atop some defined place and if it does not it is not considered placed? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where Rava said that it must actually come to rest, it is referring to one who throws the object; here, where proximity alone is sufficient to render him liable, it is referring to one who passes an object in his hand, since he can place the object down at any point.
  The Sages taught: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and proceeded to carry out another half of a dried fig, within one lapse of awareness, is liable; within two lapses of awareness, he is exempt because in neither lapse did he carry out a measure that would render him liable. Rabbi Yosei says: If he carried out the half-figs within one lapse of awareness to one domain he is liable; to two domains he is exempt. If he carried the two half-figs to two separate sections of the public domain, he is exempt because there is no permitted manner to unite the two halves. Rabba said with regard to Rabbi Yosei’s statement: That is only in a case where there is an area in which there is liability to bring a sin-offering between them. It only applies in a case where there is a private domain between the two sections of the public domain and carrying between them is prohibited by Torah law. However, if the two sections of the public domain were separated by a <i>karmelit</i>, no, he would not be exempt. In that case, there is no Torah prohibition against carrying between the two sections of the public domain through the <i>karmelit</i>, and by Torah law they are not considered separate.
  Abaye said: Even if they were separated by a <i>karmelit</i> it is not considered one domain, and he is exempt. However, if the two sections were separated by a large beam, no, they are not considered separate. And Rava said: Even if the two sections were separated by a large beam, according to Rabbi Yosei, they are considered separate and he is exempt. The Gemara comments: And Rava follows his line of reasoning stated elsewhere as Rava said: The definition of domain for Shabbat is like the definition of domain for bills of divorce. Just as with regard to bills of divorce, two areas separated by a beam are not considered one domain, so too, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, they are not considered one domain.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out blue eye shadow is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue. The Gemara asks: How could the mishna say one eye? Women do not paint only one eye blue. Rav Huna said: Because modest women, who cover their faces with a veil, paint only the one eye that shows blue. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: For carrying out blue eye shadow, if it is used for healing, the measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to paint one eye blue; if it is used to adorn the eye, the measure that determines liability for carrying out is equivalent to that which is used for two eyes. Hillel, son of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, explained it: When this <i>baraita</i> was taught it was in reference to village women. Because immodest behavior is less common there, women do not customarily cover their faces.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out wax is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a small hole to seal it. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: Enough to place on the opening of a small hole in a receptacle holding wine. The size of a hole that enables pouring wine is smaller than the size of the hole required when pouring more viscous liquids.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out glue is equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board [<i>shafshaf</i>]. The Sages taught: This means an amount equivalent to that which is used to place on the top of a board that is attached to the top of a hunter’s rod. Hunters would spread glue to trap the birds that land on the board.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out tar and sulfur is equivalent to that which is used to seal a hole in a vessel and to make a small hole in that seal. Tar and sulfur were used to seal large cavities in jars. Holes were sometimes made in those seals. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One is liable for carrying out a measure equivalent to that which can be used to make a large hole into a small hole.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out crushed earthenware is equivalent to that which is used to knead and make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible. Rabbi Yehuda says: An amount equivalent to that which is used to make a small tripod for the crucible. The Gemara wonders: Is that to say that the measure of Rabbi Yehuda is greater? Don’t we maintain that the measure of the Rabbis is greater, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says with regard to reeds: The measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to take the measure of a shoe for a child? That is smaller than the measure determined by the Rabbis. The Gemara answers: Here too, say it does not mean sufficient material to make the entire tripod, but to plaster the cracks in the small tripod of a small stove, which requires a minimal amount of plaster.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out bran is equivalent to that which is used to place on the opening of a gold refiners’ crucible.
  
  Daf 80b
  
  The Sages taught: One who carries out hair is liable in a measure equivalent to that which is used to knead clay with it, as hair would be mixed with clay to reinforce it. The measure that determines liability for carrying out clay is if it is sufficient to make an opening for the bellows to be placed in a gold refiners’ crucible.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out lime is equivalent to that which is used to spread as a depilatory on the smallest of girls. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to spread on the finger of the smallest of girls, who would use lime to soften and pamper the skin. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that initially, lime was used for a different purpose. It was used for daughters of Israel who reached physical maturity, but had not yet reached the age of maturity, and women who sought to remove hair for cosmetic purposes. They would smear daughters of the poor with lime; they would smear daughters of the wealthy with fine flour; they would smear daughters of kings with <i>shemen hamor</i>, as it was stated: “For so were the days of their anointing filled, six months with <i>shemen hamor</i>” (Esther 2:12). The Gemara asks: What is <i>shemen hamor</i>? Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said: <i>Setaket</i>. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is olive oil extracted from an olive that has not yet reached a third of its growth; the acidic oil is effective as a depilatory. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that <i>anfiknon</i> is olive oil from an olive that has not reached a third of its growth. And why is it spread on the body? Because it removes the hair and pampers the skin.
  With regard to lime, the Gemara relates: Rav Beivai had a daughter. He smeared her with lime limb by limb and, as a result, she became so beautiful that when marrying her off, he received four hundred <i>zuz</i> in gifts for her beyond her dowry. There was a certain gentile in Rav Beivai’s neighborhood. He had a daughter and wanted to do the same. He smeared her entire body with lime at one time and she died. He said: Rav Beivai killed my daughter. Rav Naḥman said: Rav Beivai, who drinks beer, his daughters require that they be smeared with lime, as beer causes hair growth; we, who do not drink beer, our daughters do not require that they be smeared with lime.
  We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: An amount equivalent to that which is used to spread on the hair that grows over the temple [<i>kilkul</i>] so that it will lie flat. Rabbi Neḥemya says: An amount equivalent to that which is used to spread on the temple [<i>andifi</i>] to remove fine hairs. The Gemara asks: What is <i>kilkul</i> and what is <i>andifi</i>? Rav said: The temple and the area beneath the temple. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the measure of Rabbi Yehuda is greater? Don’t we maintain that the measure of the Rabbis is greater? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda’s measure is smaller than that of the Rabbis and greater than the measure of Rabbi Neḥemya. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The statement of Rabbi Yehuda and his measure appear to be correct with regard to dissolved lime, and the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya appears to be correct with regard to blocks of lime. And if it should enter your mind that these terms refer to the temple and the area beneath the temple, both that which is spread on this, <i>kilkul</i>, and that which is spread on that, <i>andifi</i>, are referring to dissolved lime. Rather, Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the school of Rabbi Ami said: When Rav Neḥemya said <i>andifi</i> he meant <i>a’andifa</i>, meaning the lime which was spread on the inside of earthenware vessels containing wine.
  Rav Kahana strongly objected to this: And does a person turn his money into a loss [<i>anparot</i>]? In doing so, he ruins both the lime and the wine. Rather, Rav Kahana said: This lime is not placed inside the vessel, but it is used to make markings on the outside of the vessel to measure the contents of the vessel, as we learned in a mishna: In the Temple, there were markings on the <i>hin</i> vessel to measure wine. These would indicate that when it is filled to here, that is the measure of wine required for the libation of the sacrifice of an ox, half a <i>hin</i>; when it is filled to here, the measure of wine required for the libation of the sacrifice of a ram, a third of a <i>hin</i>; when it is filled to here, the measure of wine required for the libation of the sacrifice of a sheep, a quarter of a <i>hin</i>. And if you wish, say instead: What is <i>andifa</i>? It is the forehead upon which lime is smeared, not to remove hairs, but to pamper and soften the skin. Thick lime can be used for this purpose. And proof for that is cited from a certain Galilean who happened to come to Babylonia, to whom they said: Stand and teach us the esoteric Act of the Divine Chariot [<i>Ma’aseh Merkava</i>]. He said to them: I will teach it to you as Rabbi Neḥemya taught it to his colleague. And a hornet emerged from the wall and stung him on his forehead [<i>andifi</i>] and he died. Apparently, <i>andifi</i> means forehead. And with regard to the incident itself, they said about him, in a play on words: From his own, that came to him [<i>min dilei da lei</i>]. He was punished for his arrogance in seeking to teach <i>Ma’aseh Merkava</i> publicly.
  MISHNA: The measure that determines liability for carrying out earth on Shabbat is equivalent to the seal of large sacks; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Earth was used to seal the openings of sacks so that any tampering would be evident. And the Rabbis say: The measure for liability is much smaller, equivalent to the seal of letters. The measure that determines liability for carrying out manure and fine sand is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize one stalk of cabbage; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The measure that determines liability for carrying it out is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a leek, which is less than that used for cabbage. The measure that determines liability for carrying out coarse sand is equivalent to that which is used to place on a full spoon of plaster. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, or if it was fragmented, its measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an egg most easily cooked, one that is already beaten and placed in a stew pot.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out coarse sand is equivalent to that which is used to place on a full spoon of plaster. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: An amount equivalent to that which is placed on the opening of a plasterer’s trowel, and not on a spoon used for eating. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that sand is beneficial for plaster and is, therefore, mixed with it? Rav Ḥisda said: It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In mourning the destruction of the Temple, one may not plaster his house with plaster, which is white, unless he mixed straw or sand in it, which will make the color off-white and less attractive. Rabbi Yehuda says: Straw is permitted, but sand is prohibited because when mixed with plaster it forms white cement [<i>teraksid</i>]. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that sand is typically mixed with plaster. Rava said: Even if you say that our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, we can say that its ruination is its improvement. Even though the Rabbis hold that mixing sand with plaster is not beneficial, since following the destruction of the Temple only partially ruined plaster may be used, adding sand to plaster enables its use.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. The size of the quill was not specified. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: This refers to a quill that reaches to the joints of one’s fingers. Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: Is this referring to the upper joint of the fingers, or the lower joint? No resolution was found to this dilemma, and therefore let it stand unresolved.
  We learned in the mishna: And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, it is considered as fuel, and its measure for liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook a beaten egg. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: Beaten means beaten in oil and placed in a stew pot. Mar, son of Ravina, said to his son: Have you heard what an egg cooked easily is? He said to him: The egg of a turtledove. He asked his father: What is the reason? Is it because it is small? If so, say the egg of a sparrow. He was silent and had no explanation. He subsequently asked his father: Have you heard anything about this? He said to him that Rav Sheshet said as follows: This refers to the egg of a chicken. And what is the reason that they call it an egg cooked easily? Because the Sages estimated that there is no egg easier to cook than the egg of a chicken. He asked his father: And what is different about this measure? All measures of prohibited labors on Shabbat involving food are a dried fig-bulk, and here the measure is like an egg cooked easily? He said to him that Rav Naḥman said as follows: He is liable for carrying out a dried fig-bulk from an egg cooked easily, not the entire egg.
  
  Daf 81a
  
  MISHNA: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a bone is equivalent to that which is used to make a spoon. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to make from it a key. The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to scrape and smooth the top of a bobbin, a sharpened stick used by weavers. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a pebble or a stone is equivalent to that which is used to throw at a bird to chase it away. Rabbi Elazar bar Ya’akov says: Equivalent to that which is used to throw at an animal, which is larger.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the measure of Rabbi Yehuda is greater? Don’t we maintain that the measure of the Rabbis is greater? Ulla said: Rabbi Yehuda did not refer to the entire key, but to the teeth of a key. With regard to the above, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The teeth of a key are ritually pure, and they cannot become impure when separate from the key, as they have no function on their own. However, if one affixed them to a key, they can become ritually impure as part of a utensil. And teeth of a lock, even though one attached them to the door and affixed them with nails, are ritually pure, as anything attached to the ground has the same legal status as the ground itself, which cannot become ritually impure.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to scrape and smooth the top of a bobbin. A <i>tanna</i> taught that <i>halakha</i> in a <i>Tosefta</i> in a different manner: The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to cut two threads at once, as a glass shard can be used in place of a knife.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a pebble or a stone is equivalent to that which is used to throw at a bird to chase it away. Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: Equivalent to that which is used to throw at an animal. Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that is only if the stone is large enough that the animal feels it. And how much is the measure of that stone? It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Elazar ben Ya’akov says: A weight of ten <i>zuz</i>.
  The Gemara relates: Zunin entered the study hall and said to the Sages: My teachers, with regard to stones that may be moved on Shabbat for wiping in the bathroom, how much is their measure? They said to him: Stones of only three sizes may be moved for that purpose: An olive-bulk, a nut-bulk, and an egg-bulk. He said to them: And will he take scales [<i>turtani</i>] into the bathroom to weigh each stone? They were counted and the Sages concluded that one need not measure the stones. He simply takes a handful of stones. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says the measure of bathroom stones is an olive-bulk, a nut-bulk, and an egg-bulk. Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of his father: One need not measure the stones. He simply takes a handful of stones.
  Our Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to Shabbat: Three sharpened stones may be taken into the bathroom. And what is their measure? Rabbi Meir says: A nut-bulk; Rabbi Yehuda says: An egg-bulk. Rafram bar Pappa said that Rav Ḥisda said: Like the dispute here, so too, there is a dispute between these Sages with regard to the minimum size of a citron. The Gemara is surprised at the comparison. Why does the Gemara cite this <i>baraita</i> as a mnemonic to recall the dispute about the size of a citron? There, with regard to a citron, it is a mishna that is known by all; here it is a <i>baraita</i>, which is more obscure and more likely to require a mnemonic and a comparison to a more popular source. Rather, the phrasing is reversed: Like the dispute with regard to a citron, so too, there is a dispute here.
  Rav Yehuda said: However, one may not move the <i>payis</i> for use in a bathroom. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of <i>payis</i>? Rabbi Zeira said: It refers to clods of Babylonian earth, which is soft and flaky. Rava said: It is prohibited to manipulate the anus with a stone on Shabbat to help discharge bodily functions in the manner that one manipulates it on weekdays. Mar Zutra strongly objected to this: According to Rava, should one endanger himself by refraining from relieving himself? The Gemara explains: He meant he should do so in an unusual manner and not in the manner it is typically done. With regard to the size of stones, Rabbi Yannai said: If he has a fixed place for a bathroom, he may take a handful of stones; if he does not need them on Shabbat, he can use them on another occasion. If he does not have a fixed place he may bring in an average size stone, which is the size of a small mortar used for crushing spices. Rav Sheshet said: If the stone has an indication on it that it has already been used in the bathroom, one is permitted to move it for that purpose on Shabbat, regardless of its size.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Is it permitted to wipe with a stone that was already used? Didn’t the Sages say: Ten things bring a person to suffer from hemorrhoids and they are: One who eats the leaves of bulrushes, grape leaves, tendrils of grapevines, the palate and tongue of an animal, as well as any other part of the animal which is not smooth and which has protrusions, without salt, the spine of a fish, a salty fish that is not fully cooked, and one who drinks wine dregs, and one who cleans himself with lime and clay, the materials from which earthenware is made, and one who cleans himself with a stone with which another person has cleaned himself. And some say: One who suspends himself in the bathroom as well. Apparently, using a previously used stone is dangerous to one’s health. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where it is prohibited, is referring to a case where the stone is still moist. Here, where it is permitted, is referring to a case where the stone is dry. And if you wish, say instead that here, where it is prohibited, is referring to one side, using the side that was already used; here, where it is permitted, is referring to both sides, using the other side of the same stone. And if you wish, say instead that this, where it is permitted, is referring to one’s own stone, which he used to clean himself; this, where it is prohibited, is referring to another person’s stone, which poses a danger.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the ruling if rain fell on the stone and the indications that it had been used previously in the bathroom were obscured? The dilemma is: Is moving it permitted like a stone that is designated for use in the bathroom on Shabbat, or, is moving it prohibited since its indications were obscured and it might have the legal status of set-aside? Rav Yosef said to him: If indication on them is apparent, even though it is partially obscured, it is permitted, since the stone remains clear that it is designated for use in the bathroom.
  Rabba bar Rav Sheila raised a dilemma before Rav
  
  Daf 81b
  
  Ḥisda: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to taking those stones up with him to the roof if his bathroom is there? Is it permitted or is it prohibited due to the exertion involved? He said to him: It is permitted; great is human dignity as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah. The Gemara relates: Mareimar sat and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Ravina raised an objection to the statement of Mareimar from a <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may take a wood chip from the ground before him to clean his teeth on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say one may take a wood chip only from the animal’s trough, which is already designated for the animal’s use, but not from wood on the ground, which is set-aside. Apparently, despite the fact that using the wood chip enhances human dignity, it is nevertheless prohibited due to the prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara rejects this: How can you compare? There, a person determines the place for his meal. Since he knows where he will eat he should have prepared toothpicks beforehand. Here, does a person determine the place for a bathroom? He relieves himself wherever he finds a discreet place to do so.
  Rav Huna said: It is prohibited to defecate in a plowed field on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for that prohibition? If you say it is due to the fact that in doing so he treads on the furrows and destroys them, it should be prohibited even on weekdays. Rather, it is due to the concern that he will clean himself with a clod of earth on which grasses have grown. Didn’t Reish Lakish say that it is permitted to wipe with a stone upon which grasses have grown even though the grasses will be detached as a result? And that is the <i>halakha</i> even though one who unwittingly detaches grasses from it on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rather, the concern is lest he take a clod of earth from a high place, a pile of dirt, and throw it to a low place, into a hole in the ground. And in that case, he would be liable due to that which Rabba said, as Rabba said: If one had a hole and filled it, in the house, he is liable due to the prohibited labor of building; in the field, he is liable due to plowing.
  With regard to the matter itself, Reish Lakish said: It is permitted to wipe with a stone upon which grasses have grown. And one who detaches grasses from it unwittingly on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Pappi said: Learn from that which Reish Lakish said that it is permitted to carry this perforated flowerpot on Shabbat. Rav Kahana strongly objects to this: If they said that it is permitted to carry a stone with weeds on it for a purpose, will they say it is permitted to carry a flowerpot for no purpose? Abaye said: Since the topic of a perforated pot has come to our hands, let us say something with regard to it: If it had been placed on the ground and one lifted it and placed it on top of pegs on Shabbat, he is liable for the labor of detaching. The roots of the plant could have protruded through the holes to draw sustenance from the ground, and when one lifts it he detaches it from that sustenance. Similarly, if it had been placed on pegs and one placed it on the ground, he is liable for the labor of planting.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited to wipe with an earthenware shard on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for that prohibition? If you say that it is due to the danger that he might injure himself with the sharp edges of the shard, it should be prohibited also on weekdays. Rather, it is due to the fact that it invites witchcraft. If so, he should also not do so on weekdays. Rather, the concern is lest he remove hairs with the earthenware shard. However, that is an unintentional act, which is permitted. Rav Natan bar Oshaya said to those who raised the question: A great man said something, let us say a reason for it, and explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement as follows: It is not necessary to say that it is prohibited on a weekday for the aforementioned reasons because he has the option of using a stone. However, with regard to Shabbat we would have said that since this shard has the status of a utensil and is not set-aside, he may well use it, as it is preferable to a stone, which is set-aside. Therefore, he teaches us that it is prohibited.
  Rava taught that Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled that it is prohibited due to the removal of hairs, and he raised a difficulty between that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said here and that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said elsewhere. Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say it is forbidden to wipe with an earthenware shard on Shabbat? Apparently, he holds that an unintentional act is prohibited. Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state a principle: The <i>halakha</i> is ruled in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in a mishna: A nazirite, for whom it is prohibited to cut his hair, may wash his hair on a weekday with sand and natron and separate it with his fingers; however, he may not comb it, which would certainly pull out some hair. Apparently, the unintentional act of removing hair while shampooing is permitted. Rather, it is clearly in accordance with the explanation of Rav Natan bar Oshaya.
  The Gemara asks: What is the witchcraft involved with wiping with an earthenware shard? The Gemara explains: It is as that which transpired when Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna were going on a boat. A certain matron [<i>matronita</i>] said to them: Let me sit with you, and they did not let her sit. She said something, an incantation of witchcraft, and stopped the boat. They said something, the Holy Name, and freed it. She said to them: What will I do to you, to enable me to harm you with witchcraft,
  
  Daf 82a
  
  as you do not clean yourselves with an earthenware shard, and you do not kill lice on your garments, and you do not pull out a vegetable and eat it before you untie the bundle that was tied by the gardener? This implies that all these actions carry with them the danger of witchcraft.
  Rav Huna said to his son Rabba: What is the reason that you are not to be found among those who study before Rav Ḥisda, whose <i>halakhot</i> are incisive? Rabba said to him: For what purpose should I go to him? When I go to him, he sits me down and occupies me in mundane matters not related to Torah. For example, he said to me: One who enters a bathroom should not sit down immediately and should not exert himself excessively because the rectum rests upon three teeth, the muscles that hold it in place, and there is concern lest the teeth of the rectum dislocate through exertion and he come to danger. Rav Huna said to his son Rabba: He is dealing with matters crucial to human life, and you say that he is dealing with mundane matters? Now that I know what you meant, all the more so go before him.
  The Gemara continues to discuss these <i>halakhot</i>. Rav Huna said: One who relieves himself and needs to wipe and has before him a stone and an earthenware shard, wipes with the stone and does not wipe with the earthenware shard, since he might injure himself. And Rav Ḥisda said: He wipes with the earthenware shard and does not wipe with the stone, which is set-aside. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If one had before him a stone and an earthenware shard, he wipes with the earthenware shard and does not wipe with the stone. That is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna. Rafram bar Pappa explained it before Rav Ḥisda in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna: It is not referring to earthenware shards, but to the smooth rims of vessels, which pose no danger.
  There were before him a stone and grasses. With regard to the preferred method to wipe on Shabbat, what is the ruling? There is a dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna. One said: He wipes with the stone and does not wipe with the grasses; and one said: He wipes with the grasses and does not wipe with the stone. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One who wipes with something flammable, his lower teeth, which hold the intestines in place, fall out. How then, may one clean himself with grasses? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where it is permitted, is referring to moist grass; that, where it is prohibited, is referring to dry grass.
  The Gemara continues to discuss this topic. With regard to one who needs to defecate and does not do so, there is a dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Ravina. One said: An evil spirit dominates him; and one said: An odor of filth dominates him. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the one who said that an odor of filth dominates him, as it was taught: One who needs to defecate and eats is comparable to an oven that was heated on top of its ashes; and that is the onset of an odor of filth.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the issue: One who needed to defecate and is unable to do so, Rav Ḥisda said: He should stand and sit, stand and sit. Rav Ḥanan from Neharde’a said: He should move to the sides and attempt to relieve himself in a different spot. Rav Hamnuna said: He should manipulate with a stone in that place. And the Rabbis said: He should divert his thoughts to other matters. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: All the more so that when he diverts his thoughts he will not be able to defecate. Rav Ashi said to him: He should divert his thoughts from other matters, and focus exclusively on his effort to relieve himself. Rav Yirmeya from Difti said: I saw a certain Arab who stood and sat, stood and sat, until it poured out of him like a pot. Apparently, that advice is effective.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who wishes to enter and partake of a regular meal that will last for some time, should pace a distance of four cubits ten times, and some say, ten cubits four times, in order to expedite the movement of the bowels, and defecate, and enter, and sit in his place.
  MISHNA: One who carries out a shard of earthenware on Shabbat is liable if it is in a measure equivalent to that which is used to place between one pillar and another when piled on the ground to separate them; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to stoke a fire with it. Rabbi Yosei says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to hold a quarter of a <i>log</i> in it. Rabbi Meir said: Although there is no proof for the matter, there is a biblical allusion to my opinion, as it is stated: “And He shall break it as a potter’s vessel is broken, smashing it without sparing; and there shall not be found among its pieces a shard to rake fire on the hearth” (Isaiah 30:14). Rabbi Yosei said to him: Is there proof from there? The verse concludes: “And to extract water from the cistern,” indicating that earthenware is significant if it is large enough to hold water.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the measure stated by Rabbi Meir greater, or is the measure stated by Rabbi Yosei greater? The Gemara responds: It is reasonable to say that the measure of Rabbi Yosei is greater; however, based on the verse it appears that the measure of Rabbi Meir is greater. As, if it enters your mind to say that the measure of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the shard of earthenware is greater, would the prophet first curse him by saying that a small vessel will not be found, and then curse him by saying that a larger vessel will not be found? Abaye said: The mishna is also referring to a large shard of earthenware required to stoke the fire of a large conflagration. Even in the mishna, Rabbi Meir’s measure is larger.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yosei said to him: Is there proof from there? He cites proof for his opinion from the conclusion of that same verse. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yosei spoke well to Rabbi Meir. And how does Rabbi Meir address that proof? He explains that the verse is stated employing the style of: There is no need. It should be understood as follows: There is no need to say that an item that is significant to people, e.g., a large shard of earthenware to stoke a fire, shall not be found, but even an item that is insignificant to people, i.e., a shard to extract water, shall not be found. Therefore, the conclusion of the verse does not contradict Rabbi Meir’s opinion.
  
  MISHNA: Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that idolatry, e.g., a statue of a deity, transmits impurity imparted by carrying even when the person who carries it does not come into contact with it, just as a menstruating woman does? As it is stated: “And you will defile the silver overlays of your statues, and the golden plating of your idols, you will cast them away as you would a menstruating woman [<i>dava</i>], you will tell it, get out” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity imparted by carrying, so too, idolatry transmits impurity imparted by carrying.
  GEMARA: Since the <i>halakhot</i> of idolatry and the impurity it causes are beyond the scope of tractate <i>Shabbat</i>, the fundamentals of this <i>halakha</i> are cited from tractate <i>Avoda Zara</i>. We learned in a mishna there: One whose house was adjacent to a house of idolatry, sharing a common wall, and the dividing wall fell, it is prohibited to rebuild it as he would thereby have built a wall for idol worship. What should one do? He moves four cubits into his own land and builds the wall there.
  
  Daf 82b
  
  If the wall stood upon ground that belonged to him and to the house of idolatry, the area is calculated as half and half as far as moving into his property before rebuilding the wall, and one may build the wall four cubits from the middle of the wall. Its stones and its wood and its dust from the house of idolatry transmit impurity like creeping animals, and by rabbinic decree, one who touches them becomes impure like one who touches a creeping animal, as it is stated: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house and become banned like it, you shall utterly detest it [<i>shaketz teshaketzenu</i>] and you shall utterly abhor it, for it is a banned object” (Deuteronomy 7:26). <i>Shaketz</i> is a term used with regard to creeping animals. Rabbi Akiva says: Idolatry transmits impurity like a menstruating woman, as it is stated: “You will cast them away as you would a menstruating woman [<i>dava</i>]” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity imparted by carrying, as one who moves a menstruating woman without touching her becomes impure, so too, idolatry transmits impurity imparted by carrying. Rabba said in explanation of that which the verse said: “You will cast them away”: Make them foreign to you like a stranger. The end of the same verse: “You will tell it, get out” means that under no circumstances can you say to it, come in.
  And to the essence of the dispute, Rabba said: With regard to impurity imparted by carrying, everyone agrees that idol worship transmits impurity, as it is juxtaposed to a menstruating woman in the verse. Where they argue, it is with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of a very heavy stone. There is a special law with regard to the ritual impurity of a <i>zav</i> and a menstruating woman. If they sit on an object, even if it is an object that cannot become ritually impure, and beneath that object is a vessel, even though the weight of the <i>zav</i> and the menstruating woman has no effect on the vessel, it becomes ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva holds that the impurity of idolatry is like the impurity of a menstruating woman in all respects; just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity via a very heavy stone, so too, idolatry transmits impurity via a very heavy stone. And the Rabbis hold that in this regard, the impurity of idolatry is like the impurity of a creeping animal; just as a creeping animal does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone, so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the impurity of idolatry is similar to that of a menstruating woman in all respects, for what <i>halakha</i> was it juxtaposed to a creeping animal? The Gemara explains: In his opinion, it was not stated in reference to idolatry itself, but rather to its accessories, objects used for the purposes of idolatry. The Gemara asks further: And according to the Rabbis, for what <i>halakha</i> was it juxtaposed to a menstruating woman? To teach that it transmits impurity through carrying. And instead of juxtaposing idolatry to both a menstruating woman and to creeping animals, let the Torah juxtapose it to an animal carcass, which transmits impurity through carrying and does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone, since according to the Rabbis the law is the same for idolatry. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. In that sense, juxtaposition to an animal carcass would suffice. However, the juxtaposition to a menstruating woman teaches: Just as a menstruating woman does not transmit impurity through limbs, as if the limb of a menstruating woman is supported by a vessel, the vessel does not become ritually impure (Ra’avad), so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity through limbs, as a severed part of an idol does not transmit impurity. The Gemara is puzzled by this: But that which Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised as a dilemma: Does idolatry have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs or does it not have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs? Resolve the dilemma from this, as according to the opinion of the Rabbis, it does not transmit impurity through limbs. And the Gemara replies: Although that is so, Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the dilemma is unresolved.
  And in another approach to this dispute, Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to a very heavy stone, everyone agrees that idolatry does not transmit impurity in that manner. Where they disagree is with regard to impurity imparted by carrying. Rabbi Akiva holds that the legal status of idolatry is like that of a menstruating woman: Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity through carrying, so too, idolatry transmits impurity through carrying. And the Rabbis hold that the legal status of idolatry is like that of a creeping animal: Just as a creeping animal does not transmit impurity through carrying, so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity through carrying. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> was idolatry juxtaposed to a creeping animal? The Gemara answers: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that its accessories do not transmit impurity through carrying. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> was idolatry juxtaposed to a menstruating woman? The Gemara answers: Just as a menstruating woman does not transmit impurity through her limbs, so too, idolatry does not transmit impurity through its limbs.
  
  Daf 83a
  
  And according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> was idolatry juxtaposed to a menstruating woman? If it was to teach the <i>halakha</i> of impurity imparted by carrying, let it be juxtaposed to an animal carcass and not to a menstruating woman and creeping animals. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. However, the juxtaposition to a menstruating woman teaches: Just as a menstruating woman does not transmit impurity through her limbs, as a menstruating woman who leans on an object by a single limb does not transmit impurity imparted by carrying (Ra’avad), so too, an idol does not transmit impurity through its limbs, and a section of an idol does not transmit impurity. The Gemara asks: But that which Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised as a dilemma: Does idolatry have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs or does it not have the capacity to transmit impurity through its limbs; resolve the dilemma from this, as according to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva, it does not transmit impurity through limbs. According to this explanation, Rabbi Akiva agrees with the Rabbis. The Gemara rejects this: Rav Ḥama bar Guria taught in accordance with the explanation of Rabba and raised the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
  The Gemara now clarifies the explanations of Rabba and Rabbi Elazar in light of other sources. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The ritual impurity of idolatry is like that of a creeping animal, and the ritual impurity of its accessories is like that of a creeping animal. Rabbi Akiva says: The ritual impurity of idolatry is like that of a menstruating woman, and the ritual impurity of its accessories is like that of a creeping animal. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, it works out well. However, according to the opinion of Rabba, it is difficult. The dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in this <i>baraita</i> is whether idolatry is likened to a creeping animal and does not transmit impurity imparted by carrying or whether it is likened to a menstruating woman and it does transmit impurity imparted by carrying. According to Rabba, the Rabbis agree that it does transmit impurity imparted by carrying. Rabba could have said to you: Is the proof from this <i>baraita</i> stronger than the mishna in tractate <i>Avoda Zara</i>, which taught: Its wood and stones and dirt transmit impurity like a creeping animal? With regard to that mishna we established: What is the meaning of like a creeping animal? It means that it is like a creeping animal in the sense that it does not transmit impurity by means of a very heavy stone. Here too, the analogy to a creeping animal in the <i>baraita</i> is in the sense that it does not transmit impurity via a very heavy stone.
  The Gemara raises an objection from what we learned: A gentile man and a gentile woman, with regard to whom the Rabbis issued a decree that they transmit impurity like a <i>zav</i>, idolatry and its accessories, all transmit impurity. They transmit impurity, and not their movement, i.e., they do not transmit impurity to one who moves them. Rabbi Akiva says: Both they and their movement transmit impurity. Granted, according to the explanation of Rabbi Elazar, this works out well; however, according to the explanation of Rabba, it is difficult. Rabba could have said to you: And according to your reasoning, with regard to a gentile man and a gentile woman as well, do they transmit impurity and their movement does not transmit impurity? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them, when any man has an emission from his body, his emission is impure” (Leviticus 15:2), by Torah law, only the children of Israel become impure through the emission of a <i>zav</i>, and gentiles do not become impure through the emission of a <i>zav</i>? But the Sages decreed that they should be considered like a <i>zav</i> for all their halakhic matters. Since gentiles have the legal status of a <i>zav</i>, they should transmit impurity through carrying. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> that states that gentiles do not transmit impurity through carrying is corrupted and must be emended.
  Rather, Rabba explains and adds to the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with his reasoning: A gentile man and a gentile woman transmit impurity, they and their movement and their very heavy stone. And idolatry transmits impurity, it and its movement but not its very heavy stone. Rabbi Akiva says: Idolatry transmits impurity, it and its movement and its very heavy stone. And Rabbi Elazar explains and adds to the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with his reasoning as follows: A gentile man and a gentile woman transmit impurity, they and their movement and their very heavy stone. Idolatry transmits impurity, it and not its movement. And Rabbi Akiva says: Idolatry transmits impurity, it and its movement.
  Rav Ashi strongly objects to this explanation: According to this explanation, what is the meaning of the word they in the context of this <i>baraita</i>? It would have been sufficient to say that their movement transmits impurity. The fact that the gentiles themselves are ritually impure is obvious. Apparently, the word they is emphasized in order to teach an additional <i>halakha</i>. Rather, Rav Ashi said, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: With regard to a gentile man and a gentile woman, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others are ritually impure. The impurity of a gentile is like that of a <i>zav</i>, which is unique in that anything that a <i>zav</i> moves becomes impure even if he did not touch it directly. Idolatry that moved others, the others remain ritually pure; however, others who moved it are ritually impure. With regard to its accessories, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others remain ritually pure. Rabbi Akiva says: A gentile man and a gentile woman and idolatry, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others are ritually impure. Its accessories, whether they moved others or others moved them, the others remain ritually pure. According to this explanation, both the word they and the word movement, both of which appear in the <i>baraita</i>, are significant.
  Rav Ashi’s explanation explains the <i>baraita</i>, but the Gemara questions the matter itself. With regard to idolatry, granted, a case where others moved it can be easily found. However, a case where the idolatry moved others, under what circumstances can it be found? How can an idol move another object? Rami, son of Rav Yeiva, said, a case like that is possible, as we learned in a mishna: In a case where the <i>zav</i> sat on one pan of a balance scale, and food and drinks were on the second pan, if the <i>zav</i> tipped the scales, the food and drinks on the other pan are ritually impure because the <i>zav</i> moved them.
  
  Daf 83b
  
  Even an inanimate object can move a source of impurity in that way. And if the food and drink tipped the scales, they remain ritually pure. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All impure items that move other objects remain pure, meaning that an object does not become impure if moved by a source of impurity, except for movement by a <i>zav</i>, which has no counterpart in the whole Torah in its entirety? Let us say that this is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, there is also the case of idolatry. In his opinion, idolatry also transmits impurity to an object by moving it. The Gemara answers: Even if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, teach: <i>Zav</i> and everything similar to it. According to Rabbi Akiva, just as a menstruating woman falls into that category, so too does an idol.
  The dilemma that was cited incidental to an earlier discussion is examined here in depth. Rav Ḥama bar Guria raised a dilemma: Does idolatry have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs or does it not have the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs? The Gemara narrows the parameters of the dilemma. In a situation where a common unskilled person can restore it to its original form, do not raise the dilemma, as in that case it is certainly considered to be attached and is not considered broken. The case where you could raise the dilemma is where a common unskilled person cannot restore it to its original form. What is the ruling in that case? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that since a common unskilled person cannot restore it, it is considered broken? Or perhaps we say that it is not lacking anything? Idolatry can only be nullified by breaking it in a case where, as a result, it is incomplete. And some raise this dilemma in another direction based on a different assumption: In a situation where a common unskilled person cannot restore it to its original form, do not raise the dilemma, as in that case it is certainly considered to be broken. When you could raise the dilemma is in a situation where a common unskilled person can restore it to its original form. What is the ruling in that case? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that since a common unskilled person can restore it, it is considered attached? Or perhaps we say that at present, it is in pieces and permitted? No resolution was found for either version of this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved.
  Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to idolatry that is less than an olive-bulk? Rav Yosef strongly objected to this: With regard to what use was this dilemma raised? If you say it was raised with regard to the matter of the prohibition of idolatry, let it only be like Zevuv, the Baal of Ekron, which was the size and form of a fly, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And they made Baal Berit into their god” (Judges 8:33). The Sages said that this is referring to Zevuv, the Baal of Ekron. It teaches that each and every person made an image of his god and placed it in his pocket. When he remembered it, he removed it from his pocket and embraced and kissed it. Apparently, even idolatry the size of a fly falls under the rubric of the prohibition of idolatry. Rather, the dilemma is: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the matter of impurity? The two sides of the dilemma are as follows: Since an idol is juxtaposed to a creeping animal, just as a creeping animal transmits impurity when it is a lentil-bulk, so too, idolatry transmits impurity when it is a lentil-bulk. Or perhaps idolatry is juxtaposed to a corpse, and just as a corpse transmits impurity only when it is at least an olive-bulk, so too, idolatry transmits impurity only when it is at least an olive-bulk.
  Rav Avya said, and some say it was Rabba bar Ulla who said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Idolatry that is less than an olive-bulk has no impurity at all, as it is stated: “And he brought out the <i>ashera</i> from the house of the Lord, outside Jerusalem, to the brook of Kidron, and burned it at the brook of Kidron, and stamped it into powder, and cast its powder upon the graves of the common people” (II Kings 23:6). Just as a corpse transmits impurity when it is an olive-bulk, so too, idolatry transmits impurity when it is an olive-bulk.
  The Gemara now asks a general question: And according to the Rabbis, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> was idolatry juxtaposed to a creeping animal? The juxtaposition establishes that like a creeping animal, it does not transmit impurity through carrying. The juxtaposition to a menstruating woman establishes that like a menstruating woman, it has the capacity to transmit impurity through limbs. The juxtaposition to a corpse establishes that it does not transmit impurity when it is a lentil-bulk. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that all of these juxtapositions come to teach a stringency. With regard to what <i>halakha</i> did the Torah juxtapose idolatry to a creeping animal? It is to establish that it transmits impurity when it is a lentil-bulk. The juxtaposition of idolatry to a menstruating woman is to establish that it transmits impurity via a very heavy stone; and the Torah juxtaposed it to a corpse to establish that it transmits impurity imparted by a tent, all of which are stringencies that exist with regard to those types of impurity. The Gemara answers: The impurity of idolatry is by rabbinic law. And whenever there are two possibilities with regard to a rabbinic decree, a leniency and a stringency, we juxtapose to establish the lenient possibility, and we do not juxtapose to establish the stringent possibility.
  MISHNA: This is another mishna that digresses from the central topic of this tractate. It, too, is based on an allusion from the Bible. From where is it derived that the ship is ritually pure, in the sense that it cannot become impure? As it is stated: “The way of a ship in the midst of the sea” (Proverbs 30:19).
  GEMARA: The allusion in the mishna requires clarification. The verse appears to state the obvious. Of course a ship is in the midst of the sea. Rather, this verse teaches us an allusion that the legal status of a boat is like that of the sea. Just as the sea is ritually pure and cannot become impure, so too, a boat is ritually pure and cannot become impure. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Ḥananya says: This <i>halakha</i> is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a sack, as the impurity of wooden vessels is likened to the impurity of a sack. Just as a sack, which can become ritually impure, is carried both full and empty, so too, any object that is carried both full and empty can become ritually impure. This is to exclude a ship, which is not carried on land full and empty, as due to its weight it cannot be carried full.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two reasons? The halakhic ruling according to both is that a ship cannot become impure. The Gemara explains: There is a difference between them with regard to a ship made from earthenware or from any material other than wood. According to the one who said that it is derived from the verse: “A ship in the midst of the sea,” this boat is also in the midst of the sea. However, according to the one who said that it is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a sack, this <i>halakha</i> applies only to those materials that are written in the same verse together with sack and are likened to it. If it is carried both full and empty, yes, it can become impure; and if it can not be carried both full and empty, no, it cannot become impure. However, an earthenware ship can become impure even though it is not carried both full and empty.
  Alternatively, there is a difference between them regarding a Jordan ship, which is a small boat used on the Jordan River. According to the one who said that it is derived from the verse: “A ship in the midst of the sea,” this is also a ship in the midst of the sea. A river is pure like the sea and the boat will remain pure. According to the one who said that it is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a sack, and in order to become impure it must be carried full and empty, this is also carried both full and empty, and can become ritually impure. As Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya said: For what reason did they say that a Jordan ship can become impure? Because they load it on dry land and carry it on land and then lower it into the water. It is carried on land when full. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One should never prevent himself from attending the study hall for even one moment, as this mishna which states that a Jordan ship can become ritually impure was taught for several years in the study hall, but its reason was not revealed until Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya came and explained it.
  Following Rav’s statement, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Yonatan said: One should never prevent himself from attending the study hall or from engaging in matters of Torah, even at the moment of death, as it is stated: “This is the Torah: A person who dies in a tent” (Numbers 19:14). That is an allusion to the fact that even at the moment of death, one should engage in the study of Torah. Reish Lakish said: Matters of Torah only endure in a person who kills himself over the Torah, one who is ready to devote all his efforts to it, as it is stated: “This is the Torah: A person who dies in a tent,” meaning that the Torah is only attained by one who kills himself in its tent. Rava said:
  
  Daf 84a
  
  And according to Ḥananya, who holds that a boat carried both full and empty can become ritually impure, is carrying by oxen considered carrying? He answered his own question. Yes, as we learned in a mishna: In terms of the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity and impurity, there are three distinct types of wagons: A wagon built like a chair, meaning closed on the sides, can become ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading. Since it is designated for sitting, it becomes impure if a <i>zav</i> sits on it, even if he does not touch it. A wagon built like a bed can become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. It contracts all types of impurity, except for impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>. A wagon made of stone, whose bottom is netting, remains ritually pure and does not become impure from any type of impurity. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And if in the stone wagon there is a receptacle for pomegranates, i.e., the holes are not large enough for a pomegranate to fall through, it is considered a utensil and it can become impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. Even though a stone wagon is not carried full, but is pulled by oxen, it can become ritually impure. Apparently, carrying by oxen is considered carrying.
  By association, the Gemara now cites the second part of the mishna: With regard to laws of impurity, there are three types of chests: A chest that opens from the side, on which one can sit or lie, because it can be used for sitting, it can become ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading if a <i>zav</i> sits on it. Even if one needs to open the chest, a person can keep sitting on it. A chest that opens from the top does not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading because it cannot be opened with somebody on it. However, it can become impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. And a chest that comes in a very large size, and can hold more than forty <i>se’a</i>, remains ritually pure and does not become impure from any type of impurity.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to impurity imparted by treading, an earthenware vessel is ritually pure. If a <i>zav</i> sits on an earthenware vessel and does not touch the inside of it, it does not become impure. Rabbi Yosei says: That is even the status of a ship. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>baraita</i> saying? Rav Zevid said that the <i>baraita</i> is saying the following: According to the first <i>tanna</i>, with regard to impurity imparted by treading, an earthenware vessel is ritually pure; however, if the <i>zav</i> touches the vessel it becomes impure. And an earthenware ship can become impure with impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>, in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya. Rabbi Yosei says: Even a boat is ritually pure, in accordance with the opinion of the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna. Rav Pappa strongly objects to this explanation: If so, what is the meaning of the word even employed by Rabbi Yosei, indicating that he is adding to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>? According to the above explanation, the first <i>tanna</i> says that a boat can become ritually impure and Rabbi Yosei says that it is pure. Rabbi Yosei is not adding to the previous opinion but disagreeing with it. Rather, Rav Pappa said that the <i>baraita</i> is saying the following: With regard to impurity imparted by treading, an earthenware vessel is ritually pure, and with regard to its contact with a source of ritual impurity, it is impure. And as far as a wooden vessel is concerned, with regard to both its impurity imparted by treading and its contact with a source of ritual impurity, it is impure. And a Jordan ship is ritually pure in accordance with the opinion of the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna. Rabbi Yosei says: Even the boat is impure like other wooden vessels, in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya.
  The Gemara questions what was stated: And from where do we derive that with regard to impurity imparted by treading, an earthenware vessel is ritually pure? Ḥizkiya said: It is as the verse states: “And whoever touches his bed shall wash his clothes, and bathe himself in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:5). The verse juxtaposes his bed to himself. Just as he has the possibility of purification through immersion in a ritual bath, so too, his bed is referring to a vessel that has the possibility of purification in a ritual bath. Since an impure earthenware vessel cannot be purified in a ritual bath, unlike other vessels, it does not become ritually impure when a <i>zav</i> lies on it.
  Similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that the verse states: “Every bed on which she lies all the days of her <i>zava</i> emission shall be for her like the bed of her menstrual period” (Leviticus 15:26). The verse juxtaposes her bed to herself: Just as she has the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, so too, her bed is referring to a vessel that has the possibility of purification in a ritual bath. This is to the exclusion of an earthenware vessel, which does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath. Rabbi Ila strongly objects to this from what we learned: From where is it derived that a reed mat becomes ritually impure from contact with a corpse?
  
  Daf 84b
  
  And it is derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: We know that small vessels do not become ritually impure through the impurity of a <i>zav</i> because they are not designated for sitting, and are too small for the <i>zav</i> to insert his finger into their airspace. If small earthenware pitchers remain pure and are not susceptible to the impurity of a <i>zav</i>, but they do become ritually impure from contact with a corpse; is it not logical that a reed mat, which contracts impurity from a <i>zav</i>, will become ritually impure from contact with a corpse? And why should the reed mat become impure? Isn’t it true that it does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath? Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: There, in the case of the mat, it is different because there is purification in other vessels of its kind, i.e., other wooden vessels that are made from materials that grow from the earth can be purified in a ritual bath.
  Rabbi Ila said to Rabbi Ḥanina: May the all-Merciful save us from this opinion. Rabbi Ḥanina responded: On the contrary, may the all-Merciful save us from your opinion. And what is the reason that this is relevant? What is the significance of the fact that other vessels of its kind can be purified in a ritual bath if the vessel itself cannot be purified in a ritual bath? It is because two verses are written. In one verse it is written: “And whoever touches his bed shall wash his clothes, and bathe himself in water, and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:5). The verse juxtaposes his bed to himself. Just as he has the possibility of purification through immersion in a ritual bath, so too, his bed has the possibility of purification in a ritual bath. This teaches that his bed has the same legal status as he does; in order for a bed on which a <i>zav</i> lies to be subject to the impurity imparted by lying, it must be immersible in a ritual bath. And in another verse it is written: “Every bed on which the <i>zav</i> lies shall be impure; and every vessel on which he sits shall be impure” (Leviticus 15:4). This verse includes all beds on which a <i>zav</i> might lie, even one that cannot be purified in a ritual bath. How can these two verses be reconciled? If there is purification in other vessels of its kind, even though it itself does not have purification in a ritual bath, it is subject to the impurity imparted by lying. However, if there is no purification in other vessels of its kind, the verse juxtaposes his bed to himself. Any vessel that is not like him in the sense that it cannot be purified in a ritual bath, is not subject to impurity imparted by lying.
  Rava said: The fact that with regard to impurity imparted by treading, an earthenware vessel is ritually pure is derived from here, as it is stated: “And any open vessel that does not have a sealed cover on it becomes impure” (Numbers 19:15). By inference, if there is a sealed cover on it, it is pure. Are we not dealing even with a case where one designated the vessel for use by his wife, when she has the status of a menstruating woman? And even so, the Torah states that it is ritually pure? Apparently, an earthenware vessel with a sealed cover is not subject to impurity from any source.
  MISHNA: The Gemara continues to discuss an additional <i>halakha</i> based on a biblical allusion. From where is it derived that in a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths, that one may plant five different types of seeds in it? He may do so without violating the prohibition of sowing a mixture of diverse kinds of seeds in the following manner. One sows four types of plants on each of the four sides of the garden bed and one in the middle. There is an allusion to this in the text, as it is stated: “For as the earth brings forth its growth, and as a garden causes its seeds to grow, so will the Lord God cause justice and praise to spring forth before all the nations” (Isaiah 61:11). Its seed, in the singular, is not stated; rather, its seeds, written in the plural. Apparently, it is possible that several seeds may be planted in a small garden.
  GEMARA: The Gemara questions this allusion: From where is it inferred that the verse refers to five types of seeds? Rav Yehuda said that it is derived as follows: “For as the earth brings forth its growth” indicates five types of seeds because “brings forth” represents one and “its vegetation” represents one, and that totals two. “Its seeds,” written in the plural, represents at least two, and that totals four. “Cause to grow” is one more. This verse includes terms connoting planting and seeds in a single garden bed that total five species of seeds.
  
  Daf 85a
  
  And the Sages have an accepted tradition that five seeds in a six-handbreadth space do not draw sustenance from one another.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that when the Sages have an accepted tradition it is a substantial matter, meaning that the tradition is reliable? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You shall not cross your neighbor’s border, which they of the old times have set in your inheritance that you shall inherit” (Deuteronomy 19:14)? It means that you shall not cross the border that the early generations set, establishing the parameters necessary for each plant. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: The early generations set? Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: What is the meaning of that which was written: “These are the sons of Seir the Horite who inhabit the land, Lotan and Shoval and Zibeon and Ana” (Genesis 36:20)? And is everyone else inhabitants of the heavens, that it was necessary for the verse to emphasize that these inhabit the land? Rather, it means that they were experts in the settlement of the land, as they would say: This tract of land that is the full length of a rod is fit for olive trees; this full length of a rod is fit for grapes, this full length of a rod is fit for figs. And the members of this tribe were called Horites [<i>ḥori</i>] since they smelled [<i>heriḥu</i>] the earth to determine what is fit to be grown there. The allusion is based on a transposition of the letters <i>ḥet</i> and <i>reish</i>. And in explanation of why the early inhabitants of Seir were called Hivites [<i>ḥivi</i>] (see Genesis 36:2), Rav Pappa said: Because they would taste the earth like a snake [<i>ḥivya</i>] and determine what should be grown there according to the taste. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said that they were called Horites [<i>ḥori</i>] because they became free [<i>benei ḥorin</i>] of their possessions when the children of Esau drove them from their lands. Their primary name was actually Hivites.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> itself, Rav Asi said: The garden bed in the mishna whose area is six by six handbreadths is one whose internal area is six by six handbreadths excluding the area of its boundaries, which must be added to the total area. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The internal area of a garden bed is six by six handbreadths. The Gemara asks: How much is the size of its boundaries? The Gemara answers, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: The width of the border is like the width of a foot. And Rabbi Zeira said, and some say it was Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa who said: What is the reason for the statement of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is written: “And you water it with your foot like a garden of herbs” (Deuteronomy 11:10), meaning that just as one’s foot is a handbreadth wide, so too, the boundary between garden beds where one walks to water plants is also a handbreadth wide.
  Rav said: When we learned in the mishna that one may plant five kinds of seeds within a garden bed without violating the prohibition of diverse kinds, we learned this with regard to a garden bed in a desolate area not surrounded by other plants. However, if the garden bed is among other garden beds, it is prohibited to plant that many species there because seeds from the different beds will intermingle. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is dealing with a solitary garden bed, isn’t there space in the corners, where more species of seeds could be planted without encountering the prohibition of diverse seeds? The school of Rav taught in the name of Rav: Rav’s statement is referring to a case where one fills the corners of the flowerbed with the five species of seeds, leaving no room in the corners for other varieties. The Gemara asks: And let him plant on the outside and not fill up the inside, to increase the different seed types instead of filling up the corners.
  
  Daf 85b
  
  Rather, Rav’s reasoning must be: It is a decree lest one will fill the corners after having first planted the garden bed, and thereby violate the prohibition of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: And why should that matter, the legal status of the garden bed should merely be like a triangular [<i>rosh tor</i>] plot of vegetables. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If a triangular plot of vegetables was protruding into another field, it is permitted; there, it is not considered a prohibited mixture of diverse kinds, because the end of the field is distinguishable. Based on the shapes of the two fields where they intersect, the demarcation between them is clear. And the Gemara answers: There is no leniency with regard to a triangular plot in a garden bed. This allowance with regard to a triangular section of one field jutting into another field applies only to a large field where the triangular shape can clearly be attributed to a different field, but in a small garden bed where the seeds are adjacent to one another, it is impossible to distinguish between the seeds.
  And Shmuel said: When we learned in the mishna that one may plant five kinds of seeds within a garden bed without violating the prohibition of diverse kinds, we learned this even with regard to a garden bed among garden beds, not only in a solitary bed. The Gemara asks: Don’t the seeds become intermingled with one another? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where one inclines one row to here, in one direction, and one row to here, in a different direction (<i>Me’iri</i>). In that way they do not appear intermingled.
  Ulla said: They raise a dilemma in the West, Eretz Yisrael: What is the <i>halakha</i> if one opened a single furrow across its entirety? Is it considered demarcation between the garden beds if one dug a furrow between two garden beds (<i>ge’onim</i>, <i>Tosafot</i>)? Rav Sheshet said: The intermingling of these garden beds comes and nullifies the row. The furrow is not considered to be a demarcation between the beds. Rav Asi said: Its intermingling does not disqualify the row. Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi from a mishna: One who plants two rows of cucumbers and two rows of gourds and two rows of Egyptian beans, it is permitted because each of the species is distinct. However, if he plants one row of cucumbers and one row of gourds and one row of Egyptian beans, it is prohibited because in single rows there is no clear demarcation between the species. This indicates that a furrow between different species of seeds does not prevent intermingling between them. Rav Ashi replied: The case in that mishna is an exception. Here, it is different because there are branches that grow out from these species which become entangled with each other, nullifying the furrow between them. Other vegetables, whose branches do not become entangled, may be planted with a single furrow between them.
  Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who wishes to fill his entire garden with vegetables and does not want to distance the rows of seeds from one another may make a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths and make five circles inside it (<i>ge’onim</i>, Rambam). He plants different species in the different circles and fills its corners with whatever additional species that he wants.
  The Gemara asks: Aren’t there seeds between the circles, which intermingle with the species that are in the circles? The school of Rabbi Yannai say in response to this: This is referring to a case where one leaves the space in between them barren and does not plant there. Rav Ashi said: He may fill the entire bed with seeds, and demarcate between the different types of seeds in the following manner. If the circles were planted lengthwise, he plants the seeds in between widthwise; and if the circles were planted widthwise, he plants the seeds in between lengthwise. Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Ashi: We learned that the work space of a vegetable of one species, when planted with a vegetable of a different species, is six handbreadths. And one views them
  
  Daf 86a
  
  as a square board. All of the <i>halakhot</i> of planting various species were stated with regard to a square-shaped garden bed. By inference: When it is like a square board, it is permitted; and when that is not the case, it is prohibited. Planting different species in horizontal and vertical rows without a space between the species is ineffective, even with circles. Rav Ashi replied: When the <i>baraita</i> says a square board, it does not mean that the only way to demarcate between different species is when the rows are in that configuration. Rather, it is to introduce a different leniency. The <i>baraita</i> came to permit a triangular plot that protrudes from it into another field. This means that a triangular protrusion into another field is considered a conspicuous demarcation only if the bed was square; in that case, no additional measures are necessary.
  MISHNA: The mishna continues to cite a series of unrelated <i>halakhot</i> based upon biblical allusions. From where is it derived that a woman who discharges semen even on the third day after relations is ritually impure, just like one who touches semen (see Leviticus 15:17)? Because the semen remains fit for insemination, it can transmit impurity, as it is stated prior to the revelation at Sinai: “And he said to the people, prepare yourselves for three days, do not approach a woman” (Exodus 19:15). This three-day separation period ensured that even a woman who discharged semen would be pure. The mishna cites another <i>halakha</i> based on a biblical allusion: From where is it derived that one may wash the circumcision on the third day, meaning the third day after the circumcision, even if it occurs on Shabbat? As it is stated: “And it came to pass on the third day when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). The pain of circumcision lasts at least three days, and as long as the child is in pain he is considered to be in danger. The mishna cites another <i>halakha</i> with an allusion in the Bible: From where is it derived that one ties a scarlet strip of wool to the head of the scapegoat that is dispatched to Azazel? As it is stated: “If your sins be like scarlet, they will become white like snow” (Isaiah 1:18). Since the goat is offered to atone for sins, red wool is tied to its horns. The mishna cites another allusion. From where is it derived that smearing oil on one’s body is like drinking and is similarly prohibited on Yom Kippur? Although there is no proof for this, there is an allusion to it, as it is stated: “And it comes into his inward parts like water and like oil into his bones” (Psalms 109:18). The verse appears to equate smearing oil on one’s body with drinking water.
  GEMARA: The Gemara comments on the <i>halakhot</i> cited in the mishna: The first clause in the mishna with regard to discharged semen is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. The latter clause in the mishna with regard to circumcision is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. As, if one was to assert that the first clause is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, we heard him say that in that case the woman is ritually pure. The Gemara explains: He who does not establish the mishna as reflecting the opinions of two <i>tanna’im</i>, has a variant reading of the mishna; he teaches the <i>halakha</i> in the first clause: The woman is ritually pure, and establishes the entire mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. And he who establishes the mishna as reflecting the opinions of two <i>tanna’im</i>, holds that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.
  The Gemara elaborates on the matter of a woman who discharges semen, citing that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman who discharges semen at any point on the third day is ritually pure; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rabbi Yishmael says: Even on the third day she is ritually impure. In addition, the only relevant tally is the number of days. The number of twelve-hour periods of night and day that passed is not relevant. Sometimes there are four twelve-hour periods that elapsed between cohabitation and discharge. If she had relations just before nightfall on Wednesday and discharged on Friday night at the beginning of Shabbat, it is considered as if three days passed, meaning Wednesday, Thursday and Friday; and four twelve-hour periods, meaning Wednesday night, Thursday day, Thursday night and Friday day. Sometimes there are five twelve-hour periods that elapsed, in a case where she discharged semen at the end of Friday night. Sometimes there are six twelve-hour periods that elapsed, if she had relations at the beginning of Tuesday night and discharged at the end of the third day. Rabbi Akiva says: The <i>halakha</i> is that it is always five twelve-hour periods. And if she had relations after part of the first period passed, she is given part of the sixth period to complete the requisite five twelve-hour periods, so that sixty hours will have elapsed between cohabitation and discharge.
  The Rabbis said this before Rav Pappa, and some say that Rav Pappa said this to Rava: Granted, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say with regard to the revelation at Sinai that Moses instituted separation between husbands and wives on the fifth day of the week. Since everyone agrees that the Torah was given on Shabbat, husbands and wives were separated for two days. And Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that Moses instituted separation on the fourth day of the week, meaning that husbands and wives were separated for three days. However, in accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Akiva state his opinion? Ritual impurity, in this case, is not based on the passage of days but on the passage of twelve-hour periods, which do not correspond to either opinion mentioned with regard to the revelation at Sinai. The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. However, his understanding is based on that which Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Moses ascended Mount Sinai early in the morning, and he descended early in the morning and related to them the mitzva of separation.
  The Gemara explains the source of this opinion: He ascended Mount Sinai early in the morning, as it is written: “And Moses rose up early in the morning, and went up to Mount Sinai, as the Lord had commanded him” (Exodus 34:4). And he descended the mountain early in the morning, as it is written: “Go descend and you shall ascend together with Aaron” (Exodus 19:24). The Torah juxtaposes descent to ascent to establish that just as Moses’ ascent was early in the morning, so too, his descent was early in the morning. Moses told the people to separate in the early morning so that there would be five complete periods of separation over the course of the three days.
  The Gemara asks: Why did he need to tell them to separate during the morning hours? Didn’t Rav Huna say: The Jewish people are holy and do not have relations during the day? It was not necessary to command them until night. The Gemara replies: It was necessary to tell them in the morning, as Rava said: If it was a dark house, it is permitted to have relations during the day. And similarly, Rava said, and some say that Rav Pappa said: A Torah scholar obscures the light in the room with his cloak and is thereby permitted to have relations during the day. Therefore, it was necessary to command the people to separate even during the daytime hours.
  
  Daf 86b
  
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t some of the people have status of those who immersed themselves during the day when they received the Torah? Some of the women immersed themselves on Shabbat evening to purify themselves from the discharge of semen. Even after immersion, the purification process is not complete until sunset. It was Abaye bar Ravin and Rav Ḥanina bar Avin who both said in response: The Torah was given to those who immersed themselves during the day, and that in no way diminishes the magnitude of the revelation. The Gemara relates that Mareimar sat and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Ravina said to Mareimar: Did you say that the Torah was actually given to those who immersed themselves during the day, or did you say that it was fit to be given to those who immersed themselves during the day, but, in reality, it was not? He said to him: I said that the Torah was fit to be given, but in actuality the nation was ritually pure, and the women did not discharge semen on the third day.
  The Gemara asks: And let them immerse during twilight on Shabbat eve and receive the Torah just after that during twilight. Why was it necessary to delay revelation until Shabbat morning? Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the verse said in that regard: “From the first, I did not speak in concealment” (Isaiah 48:16). God did not give the Torah under the cloak of night, but rather in the light of day. The Gemara asks: And let them immerse themselves on Shabbat morning and receive the Torah on Shabbat morning. In that case, according to all opinions, the period of separation could have begun one twelve-hour period later. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: This was not done so that there would not be a situation where these, one segment of the people, would be going to receive the Torah while those, another segment of the people, would be going to immerse themselves. Optimally, the entire nation should go to receive the Torah together.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Abba, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: These are the statements of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. However, the Rabbis say: We require that six complete twelve-hour periods elapse between cohabitation and discharge. If a woman discharged semen less than seventy-two hours after having relations, the semen renders her ritually impure. Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute over how long semen renders one ritually impure is only with regard to semen that is discharged from a woman; however, if it is discharged from a man, e.g., it was on a garment, it is impure as long as it is moist, regardless of how much time passed since its discharge. Rav Sheshet raises an objection based on what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states: “And every garment, and every hide on which there is semen shall be immersed in water, and be impure until evening” (Leviticus 15:17). And the Sages taught: This excludes semen which is foul. What, is it not referring to semen discharged from a man, indicating that even moist semen becomes foul after a certain period of time and no longer transmits impurity? The Gemara rejects this: No, this <i>halakha</i> is referring to semen that was discharged from a woman.
  Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to semen of a Jew in the womb of a gentile woman? Do we say that since Jews are concerned about fulfilling mitzvot, due to that concern, their body temperature is hot and semen that is not absorbed becomes foul faster, in contrast to gentiles who are not concerned about fulfilling mitzvot for whom that is not the case? Or, perhaps, since gentiles eat detestable creatures and creeping animals their body temperature is also hot? And if you say that since they eat detestable creatures and creeping animals, their body temperature is hot, another dilemma can be raised: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to semen of a Jew in the womb of an animal? Do we say that in a woman, who has a long corridor [<i>perozdor</i>] to her womb, the semen becomes foul; but in an animal, which does not have as long a corridor, it does not? Or perhaps it is not different, and the period of time that the semen renders one ritually impure is the same in both cases? No resolution was found for these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.
  The Sages taught: On the sixth day of the month of Sivan, the Ten Commandments were given to the Jewish people. Rabbi Yosei says: On the seventh day of the month. Rava said: Everyone agrees that the Jews came to the Sinai desert on the New Moon, as it is written here: “In the third month after the children of Israel were gone forth out of the land of Egypt, the same day came they into the wilderness of Sinai” (Exodus 19:1), without elaborating what day it was. And it is written there: “This month shall be to you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year to you” (Exodus 12:2). Just as there, the term “this” is referring to the New Moon, so too, here the term is referring to the New Moon. And similarly, everyone agrees that the Torah was given to the Jewish people on Shabbat, as it is written here in the Ten Commandments: “Remember the Shabbat day to keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8), and it is written there: “And Moses said to the people: Remember this day, in which you came out from Egypt, out of the house of bondage, for by strength of hand the Lord brought you out from this place; there shall be no leaven eaten” (Exodus 13:3). Just as there, the mitzva of remembrance was commanded on the very day of the Exodus, so too, here the mitzva of remembrance was commanded on the very day of Shabbat. Where Rabbi Yosei and the Sages disagree is with regard to the determination of the month, meaning which day of the week was established as the New Moon. Rabbi Yosei held: The New Moon was established on the first day of the week, and on the first day of the week He did not say anything to them due to the weariness caused by the journey. On the second day of the week, He said to them: “And you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation; these are the words that you shall speak to the children of Israel” (Exodus 19:6).
  
  Daf 87a
  
  On the third day of the week, God said to them the mitzva of setting boundaries around Mount Sinai. On the fourth day of the week, the husbands and wives separated from one another. And the Rabbis hold: On the second day of the week the New Moon was established, and on the second day of the week God did not say anything to them due to the weariness caused by their journey. On the third day of the week, God said to them: “And you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation; these are the words that you shall speak to the children of Israel” (Exodus 19:6). On the fourth day of the week, God said to them the mitzva of setting boundaries around Mount Sinai. On the fifth day of the week, the husbands and wives separated from one another. The Gemara raises an objection: Doesn’t the verse state: “And the Lord said to Moses: Go to the people and sanctify them today and tomorrow and let them wash their garments” (Exodus 19:10), indicating that the husbands and wives were separated for only two days? This is difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said earlier that the separation was for three days.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: Moses added one day to the number of days that God commanded based on his own perception, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Moses did three things based on his own perception, and the Holy One, Blessed be He, agreed with him. He added one day to the days of separation before the revelation at Sinai based on his own perception. And he totally separated from his wife after the revelation at Sinai. And he broke the tablets following the sin of the Golden Calf.
  The Gemara discusses these cases: He added one day based on his own perception. What source did he interpret that led him to do so? He reasoned that since the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “Sanctify them today and tomorrow,” the juxtaposition of the two days teaches that today is like tomorrow; just as tomorrow the men and women will separate for that day and the night preceding it, so too, today requires separation for the day and the night preceding it. Since God spoke to him in the morning, and the night of that day already passed, Moses concluded: Derive from it that separation must be in effect for two days besides that day. Therefore, he extended the mitzva of separation by one day. And from where do we derive that the Holy One, Blessed be He, agreed with his interpretation? It is derived from the fact that the Divine Presence did not rest upon Mount Sinai until Shabbat morning, as Moses had determined.
  And he totally separated from his wife after the revelation at Sinai. What source did he interpret that led him to do so? He reasoned an <i>a fortiori</i> inference by himself and said: If Israel, with whom the Divine Presence spoke only one time and God set a specific time for them when the Divine Presence would be revealed, and yet the Torah stated: “Prepare yourselves for three days, do not approach a woman” (Exodus 19:15); I, with whom the Divine Presence speaks all the time and God does not set a specific time for me, all the more so that I must separate from my wife. And from where do we derive that the Holy One, Blessed be He, agreed with him? As it is written after the revelation at Sinai: “Go say to them: Return to your tents” (Deuteronomy 5:26), meaning to your homes and wives. And afterward it is written that God told Moses: “And you, stand here with Me” (Deuteronomy 5:27), indicating that Moses was not allowed to return home, as he must constantly be prepared to receive the word of God. And some say a different source indicating that God agreed with his reasoning. When Aaron and Miriam criticized Moses’ separation from his wife, God said: “With him do I speak mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord does he behold; why then were you not afraid to speak against My servant, against Moses?” (Numbers 12:8). This indicates that God agreed with his reasoning.
  And he broke the tablets following the sin of the Golden Calf. What source did he interpret that led him to do so? Moses said: With regard to the Paschal lamb, which is only one of six hundred and thirteen mitzvot, the Torah stated: “And the Lord said unto Moses and Aaron: This is the ordinance of the Paschal offering; no alien shall eat of it” (Exodus 12:43), referring not only to gentiles, but to apostate Jews as well. Regarding the tablets, which represented the entire Torah, and Israel at that moment were apostates, as they were worshipping the calf, all the more so are they not worthy of receiving the Torah. And from where do we derive that the Holy One, Blessed be He, agreed with his reasoning? As it is stated: “The first tablets which you broke [<i>asher shibarta</i>]” (Exodus 34:1), and Reish Lakish said: The word <i>asher</i> is an allusion to the phrase: May your strength be true [<i>yishar koḥakha</i>] due to the fact that you broke the tablets.
  Come and hear an additional difficulty from the verse: “And be prepared for the third day, for on the third day God will descend onto Mount Sinai before the eyes of the entire nation” (Exodus 19:11). This indicates that God said that the Torah would be given on the third day after two days of separation. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara answers: Didn’t we say that Moses added one day based on his own perception? Come and hear a proof against this from what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>. That which is stated in the Torah: “For on the third day,” means the third day of the month and the third day of the week. Apparently, the New Moon was on Sunday. This is difficult according to the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara answers: The Rabbis could have said to you: Whose is the opinion in this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Therefore, this <i>baraita</i> poses no difficulty to the opinion of the Rabbis.
  According to the opinion of the Rabbis, that day was the third day of what reckoning? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is written: “And Moses reported the words of the people to the Lord” (Exodus 19:8). And it is written immediately thereafter: “And God said to Moses: Behold I will come to you in a thick cloud so that the people will hear when I speak with you, and they will also believe in you forever. And Moses told the words of the people to the Lord” (Exodus 19:9).
  The Gemara asks: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, say to Moses, and what did Moses say to Israel, and what did Israel say to Moses, and what did Moses report to the Almighty? The verses do not elaborate on the content of God’s command to Moses, which Moses then told the people and which they accepted. It must be that this refers to the mitzva of setting boundaries, which Moses told the people and which they accepted. He then went back and reported to God that the people accepted the mitzva; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: At first, he explained the punishment and the hardship involved in receiving the Torah, as it is written: “And Moses reported [<i>vayashev</i>],” which is interpreted homiletically as: Matters that shatter [<i>meshabbevin</i>] (Rav Hai Gaon) a person’s mind; and, ultimately, he explained its reward, as it is written: “And Moses told [<i>vayagged</i>],” which is interpreted homiletically as: Matters that draw a person’s heart like <i>aggada</i>. And some say that at first, he explained its reward, as it is written: “And Moses reported,” which is interpreted homiletically as: Matters that restore [<i>meshivin</i>] and calm a person’s mind; and ultimately, he explained its punishment, as it is written: “And Moses told,” matters that are as difficult for a person as wormwood [<i>gidin</i>].
  Come and hear a proof from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The sixth was the sixth day of the month and the sixth day of the week. This is also difficult according to the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara answers: This <i>baraita</i> is also according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. But if so, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, that day was the sixth day of what reckoning? Rava said:
  
  Daf 87b
  
  the sixth day from their encampment. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The sixth day from the start of their journey. They left Refidim and arrived and camped in the desert on the same Sunday. And Rava and Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov disagree with regard to the mitzva of Shabbat commanded to the Jewish people at Mara, as it is written in the fourth commandment: “Observe the Shabbat day to keep it holy as the Lord your God commanded you” (Deuteronomy 5:11). And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: As He commanded you in Mara, as it is stated: “There He made for him a statute and an ordinance, and there He proved him” (Exodus 15:25). Their dispute was: One Master held: They were commanded about Shabbat, but they were not commanded about Shabbat boundaries. Therefore, it was permitted to travel from Refidim on Shabbat, because the restriction of Shabbat boundaries was not yet in effect. And one Master held: They were also commanded about the boundaries, and therefore, it was prohibited to leave Refidim on Shabbat.
  Come and hear an additional proof with regard to the day of the revelation at Sinai from what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the month of Nisan during which the Jewish people left Egypt, on the fourteenth, they slaughtered their Paschal lambs; on the fifteenth, they left Egypt; and in the evening, the firstborn were stricken. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that they were stricken in the evening? Was the Plague of the Firstborn after the Jews left Egypt? Rather, say that the evening before, the firstborn were stricken. And that day was the fifth day of the week. From the fact that the fifteenth of Nisan was a Thursday, the New Moon of Iyyar was Shabbat, as Nisan is typically thirty days long. And the New Moon of Sivan was on the first day of the week, as Iyyar is typically twenty-nine days long. This is difficult according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the New Moon of Sivan that year was on Monday.
  The Gemara answers: The Rabbis could have said to you that a day was added to Iyyar that year and it was thirty days long. The New Moon was determined by testimony of witnesses who saw the new moon, together with astronomical calculations that the testimony was feasible. Therefore, Iyyar could be thirty days long. If that was the case, the New Moon of Sivan was on Monday. Come and hear an objection from what was taught in a different <i>baraita</i> that they did not add a day to Iyyar that year, as the Sages taught: In the month of Nisan during which the Jewish people left Egypt, on the fourteenth, they slaughtered their Paschal lambs; on the fifteenth, they left Egypt; and in the evening, the firstborn were stricken. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind to say that they were stricken in the evening? Was the Plague of the Firstborn after the Jews left Egypt? Rather, say that the evening before, the firstborn were stricken. And that day was the fifth day of the week. Nisan was complete, i.e., it was thirty days long, and the New Moon of Iyyar occurred on a Shabbat.
  Iyyar was lacking, i.e., it was twenty-nine days long, and the New Moon of Sivan occurred on the first day of the week. This is difficult according to the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara answers: Whose is the opinion in this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Therefore, this <i>baraita</i> poses no difficulty to the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Rav Pappa said: Come and hear a different proof from another verse, as it is stated: “And they took their journey from Elim, and all the congregation of the children of Israel came unto the wilderness of Sin, which is between Elim and Sinai, on the fifteenth day of the second month after their departing out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 16:1). And that day was Shabbat, as it is written: “And in the morning, then you shall see the glory of the Lord; for He has heard your murmurings against the Lord; and what are we, that you murmur against us?” (Exodus 16:7). The next day the glory of God was revealed, and He told them that in the afternoon the manna and quail would begin to fall, and it is written: “Six days you shall gather it; but on the seventh day is Sabbath, there shall be none in it” (Exodus 16:26). Apparently, the first six days after this command were weekdays on which the manna fell, and the fifteenth of Iyyar was Shabbat. And from the fact that the fifteenth of Iyyar was Shabbat, the New Moon of Sivan was on the first day of the week. This is difficult according to the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, a day was added to Iyyar that year and it was thirty days long. Therefore, the New Moon of Sivan was on Monday.
  Rav Ḥavivi from Ḥozena’a said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a different proof from the following verse: “And it came to pass in the first month in the second year, on the first day of the month, that the tabernacle was erected” (Exodus 40:17). It was taught: That day took ten crowns. It was the first day of Creation, meaning Sunday, the first day of the offerings brought by the princes, the first day of the priesthood, the first day of service in the Temple, the first time for the descent of fire onto the altar, the first time that consecrated foods were eaten, the first day of the resting of the Divine Presence upon the Jewish people, the first day that the Jewish people were blessed by the priests, and the first day of the prohibition to bring offerings on improvised altars. Once the Tabernacle was erected, it was prohibited to offer sacrifices elsewhere. And it was the first of the months. And from the fact that the New Moon of Nisan of that year was on the first day of the week, in the previous year, it was on the fourth day of the week.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, <i>Aḥerim</i> say: Between the festival of Assembly, i.e., <i>Shavuot</i>, of one year and the festival of Assembly of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, there is only a difference of four days of the week. And if it was a leap year, there is a difference of five days between them. There are three hundred and fifty four days in a year, which are divided into twelve months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. If the New Moon of Nisan was on Wednesday, the New Moon of Iyyar was on Shabbat eve, and the New Moon of Sivan was on Shabbat. This is difficult both according to Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the New Moon of Sivan was on Sunday, and according to the Rabbis, who hold it was on Monday. The Gemara answers: Both Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis disagree with <i>Aḥerim</i>. According to Rabbi Yosei, they established seven months that were lacking in the first year, i.e., seven months that were twenty-nine days long,
  
  Daf 88a
  
  and according to the Rabbis, they established eight months that were lacking.
  The Gemara cites another objection. Come and hear that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the anthology called <i>Seder Olam</i>: In the month of Nisan during which the Jewish people left Egypt, on the fourteenth they slaughtered their Paschal lambs, on the fifteenth they left Egypt, and that day was Shabbat eve. From the fact that the New Moon of Nisan was on Shabbat eve, we can infer that the New Moon of Iyyar was on the first day of the week, and the New Moon of Sivan was on the second day of the week. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the New Moon of Sivan was on Sunday. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: Whose is the opinion in this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of the Rabbis. Therefore, this <i>baraita</i> poses no difficulty to the opinion of the Rabbi Yosei.
  The Gemara cites another objection: Come and hear from that which was taught, that Rabbi Yosei says: On the second day of Sivan, Moses ascended Mount Sinai and descended. On the third day, he ascended and descended. On the fourth day, he descended and did not ascend Mount Sinai again until he was commanded along with all of the Jewish people. And the Gemara asks: How is it possible that he descended on the fourth day? Since he did not ascend, from where did he descend? Rather, this must be emended: On the fourth day, he ascended and descended. On the fifth day, he built an altar and sacrificed an offering. On the sixth day, he had no time. The Gemara asks: Is that not because he received the Torah on the sixth day of the month? Apparently, this <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of the Rabbis.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, he had no time due to the burden of preparing for Shabbat. The Gemara adds: A Galilean taught, while standing above Rav Ḥisda: Blessed is the all-Merciful One, Who gave the three-fold Torah: Torah, Prophets, and Writings, to the three-fold nation: Priests, Levites, and Israelites, by means of a third-born: Moses, who followed Aaron and Miriam in birth order, on the third day of the separation of men and women, in the third month: Sivan. On whose opinion is this homily based? It is based on the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the Torah was given on the third day of separation and not on the fourth day.
  The Gemara cites additional homiletic interpretations on the topic of the revelation at Sinai. The Torah says, “And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet God; and they stood at the lowermost part of the mount” (Exodus 19:17). Rabbi Avdimi bar Ḥama bar Ḥasa said: the Jewish people actually stood beneath the mountain, and the verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, overturned the mountain above the Jews like a tub, and said to them: If you accept the Torah, excellent, and if not, there will be your burial. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: From here there is a substantial caveat to the obligation to fulfill the Torah. The Jewish people can claim that they were coerced into accepting the Torah, and it is therefore not binding. Rava said: Even so, they again accepted it willingly in the time of Ahasuerus, as it is written: “The Jews ordained, and took upon them, and upon their seed, and upon all such as joined themselves unto them” (Esther 9:27), and he taught: The Jews ordained what they had already taken upon themselves through coercion at Sinai.
  Ḥizkiya said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You caused sentence to be heard from heaven; the earth feared, and was silent” (Psalms 76:9)? If it was afraid, why was it silent; and if it was silent, why was it afraid? Rather, the meaning is: At first, it was afraid, and in the end, it was silent. “You caused sentence to be heard from heaven” refers to the revelation at Sinai. And why was the earth afraid? It is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day” (Genesis 1:31)? Why do I require the superfluous letter <i>heh</i>, the definite article, which does not appear on any of the other days? It teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, established a condition with the act of Creation, and said to them: If Israel accepts the Torah on the sixth day of Sivan, you will exist; and if they do not accept it, I will return you to the primordial state of chaos and disorder. Therefore, the earth was afraid until the Torah was given to Israel, lest it be returned to a state of chaos. Once the Jewish people accepted the Torah, the earth was calmed.
  Rabbi Simai taught: When Israel accorded precedence to the declaration “We will do” over the declaration “We will hear,” 600,000 ministering angels came and tied two crowns to each and every member of the Jewish people, one corresponding to “We will do” and one corresponding to “We will hear.” And when the people sinned with the Golden Calf, 1,200,000 angels of destruction descended and removed them from the people, as it is stated in the wake of the sin of the Golden Calf: “And the children of Israel stripped themselves of their ornaments from Mount Horeb onward” (Exodus 33:6). Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: At Horeb they put on their ornaments, and at Horeb they removed them. The source for this is: At Horeb they put them on, as we have said; at Horeb they removed them, as it is written: “And the children of Israel stripped themselves of their ornaments from Mount Horeb.” Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And Moses merited all of these crowns and took them. What is the source for this? Because juxtaposed to this verse, it is stated: “And Moses would take the tent [<i>ohel</i>]” (Exodus 33:7). The word <i>ohel</i> is interpreted homiletically as an allusion to an aura or illumination [<i>hila</i>]. Reish Lakish said: In the future, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will return them to us, as it is stated: “And the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come with singing unto Zion, and everlasting joy shall be upon their heads” (Isaiah 35:10). The joy that they once had will once again be upon their heads.
  Rabbi Elazar said: When the Jewish people accorded precedence to the declaration “We will do” over “We will hear,” a Divine Voice emerged and said to them: Who revealed to my children this secret that the ministering angels use? As it is written: “Bless the Lord, you angels of His, you mighty in strength, that fulfill His word, hearkening unto the voice of His word” (Psalms 103:20). At first, the angels fulfill His word, and then afterward they hearken. Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “As an apple tree among the trees of the wood, so is my beloved among the sons. Under its shadow I delighted to sit and its fruit was sweet to my taste” (Song of Songs 2:3)? Why were the Jewish people likened to an apple tree? It is to tell you that just as this apple tree, its fruit grows before its leaves, so too, the Jewish people accorded precedence to “We will do” over “We will hear.”
  The Gemara relates that a heretic saw that Rava was immersed in studying <i>halakha</i>, and his fingers were beneath his leg and he was squeezing them, and his fingers were spurting blood. Rava did not notice that he was bleeding because he was engrossed in study. The heretic said to Rava: You impulsive nation, who accorded precedence to your mouths over your ears. You still bear your impulsiveness, as you act without thinking. You should listen first. Then, if you are capable of fulfilling the commands, accept them. And if not, do not accept them. He said to him: About us,
  
  Daf 88b
  
  who proceed wholeheartedly and with integrity, it is written: “The integrity of the upright will guide them” (Proverbs 11:3), whereas about those people who walk in deceit, it is written at the end of the same verse: “And the perverseness of the faithless will destroy them.”
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥamani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You have ravished my heart, my sister, my bride; you have ravished my heart with one of your eyes, with one bead of your necklace” (Song of Songs 4:9)? At first when you, the Jewish people, merely accepted the Torah upon yourselves it was with one of your eyes; however, when you actually perform the mitzvot it will be with both of your eyes. Ulla said with regard to the sin of the Golden Calf: Insolent is the bride who is promiscuous under her wedding canopy. Rav Mari, son of the daughter of Shmuel, said: What verse alludes to this? “While the king was still at his table my spikenard gave off its fragrance” (Song of Songs 1:12). Its pleasant odor dissipated, leaving only an offensive odor. Rav said: Nevertheless, it is apparent from the verse that the affection of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is still upon us, as it is written euphemistically as “gave off its fragrance,” and the verse did not write, it reeked. And the Sages taught: About those who are insulted and do not insult, who hear their shame and do not respond, who act out of love and are joyful in suffering, the verse says: “And they that love Him are as the sun going forth in its might” (Judges 5:31).
  With regard to the revelation at Sinai, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The Lord gives the word; the women that proclaim the tidings are a great host” (Psalms 68:12)? It means that each and every utterance that emerged from the mouth of the Almighty divided into seventy languages, a great host. And, similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught with regard to the verse: “Behold, is My word not like fire, declares the Lord, and like a hammer that shatters a rock?” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as this hammer breaks a stone into several fragments, so too, each and every utterance that emerged from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, divided into seventy languages. The Gemara continues in praise of the Torah. Rav Ḥananel bar Pappa said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Listen, for I will speak royal things, and my lips will open with upright statements” (Proverbs 8:6)? Why are matters of Torah likened to a king? To teach you that just as this king has the power to kill and to grant life, so too, matters of Torah have the power to kill and to grant life.
  And that is what Rava said: To those who are right-handed in their approach to Torah, and engage in its study with strength, good will, and sanctity, Torah is a drug of life, and to those who are left-handed in their approach to Torah, it is a drug of death. Alternatively, why are matters of Torah referred to as royal? Because to each and every utterance that emerged from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, two crowns are tied. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “My beloved is to me like a bundle of myrrh that lies between my breasts” (Song of Songs 1:13)? The Congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, even though my beloved, God, causes me suffering and bitterness, He still lies between my breasts. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi interpreted the verse: “My beloved is to me like a cluster [<i>eshkol</i>] of henna [<i>hakofer</i>] in the vineyards of [<i>karmei</i>] Ein Gedi” (Song of Songs 1:14). He, Whom everything [<i>shehakol</i>] is His, forgives [<i>mekhapper</i>] me for the sin of the kid [<i>gedi</i>], i.e., the calf, that I collected [<i>shekaramti</i>] for myself. The Gemara explains: From where is it inferred that the word in this verse, <i>karmei</i>, is a term of gathering? Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said that it is as we learned in a mishna: A launderer’s chair upon which one gathers [<i>koremim</i>] the garments.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “His cheeks are as a bed of spices, as banks of sweet herbs, his lips are lilies dripping with flowing myrrh” (Song of Songs 5:13)? It is interpreted homiletically: From each and every utterance that emerged from His cheeks, i.e., the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, the entire world was filled with fragrant spices. And since the world was already filled by the first utterance, where was there room for the spices of the second utterance to go? The Holy One, Blessed be He, brought forth wind from His treasuries and made the spices pass one at a time, leaving room for the consequences of the next utterance. As it is stated: “His lips are lilies [<i>shoshanim</i>] dripping with flowing myrrh.” Each and every utterance resulted in flowing myrrh. Do not read the word in the verse as <i>shoshanim</i>; rather, read it as <i>sheshonim</i>, meaning repeat. Each repeat utterance produced its own fragrance.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: From each and every utterance that emerged from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, the souls of the Jewish people left their bodies, as it is stated: “My soul departed when he spoke” (Song of Songs 5:6). And since their souls left their bodies from the first utterance, how did they receive the second utterance? Rather, God rained the dew upon them that, in the future, will revive the dead, and He revived them, as it is stated: “You, God, poured down a bountiful rain; when Your inheritance was weary You sustained it” (Psalms 68:10). And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: With each and every utterance that emerged from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, the Jewish people retreated in fear twelve <i>mil</i>, and the ministering angels walked them back toward the mountain, as it is stated: “The hosts of angels will scatter [<i>yidodun</i>]” (Psalms 68:13). Do not read the word as <i>yidodun</i>, meaning scattered; rather, read it as <i>yedadun</i>, they walked them.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: When Moses ascended on High to receive the Torah, the ministering angels said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, what is one born of a woman doing here among us? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: He came to receive the Torah. The angels said before Him: The Torah is a hidden treasure that was concealed by you 974 generations before the creation of the world, and you seek to give it to flesh and blood? As it is stated: “The word which He commanded to a thousand generations” (Psalms 105:8). Since the Torah, the word of God, was given to the twenty-sixth generation after Adam, the first man, the remaining 974 generations must have preceded the creation of the world. “What is man that You are mindful of him and the son of man that You think of him?” (Psalms 8:5). Rather, “God our Lord, how glorious is Your name in all the earth that Your majesty is placed above the heavens” (Psalms 8:2). The rightful place of God’s majesty, the Torah, is in the heavens.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Provide them with an answer as to why the Torah should be given to the people. Moses said before Him: Master of the Universe, I am afraid lest they burn me with the breath of their mouths. God said to him: Grasp My throne of glory for strength and protection, and provide them with an answer. And from where is this derived? As it is stated: “He causes him to grasp the front of the throne, and spreads His cloud over it” (Job 26:9), and Rabbi Naḥum said: This verse teaches that God spread the radiance of His presence and His cloud over Moses. Moses said before Him: Master of the Universe, the Torah that You are giving me, what is written in it? God said to him: “I am the Lord your God Who brought you out of Egypt from the house of bondage” (Exodus 20:2). Moses said to the angels: Did you descend to Egypt? Were you enslaved to Pharaoh? Why should the Torah be yours? Again Moses asked: What else is written in it? God said to him: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exodus 20:3). Moses said to the angels: Do you dwell among the nations who worship
  
  Daf 89a
  
  idols that you require this special warning? Again Moses asked: What else is written in it? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: “Remember the Shabbat day to sanctify it” (Exodus 20:8). Moses asked the angels: Do you perform labor that you require rest from it? Again Moses asked: What else is written in it? “Do not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exodus 20:7), meaning that it is prohibited to swear falsely. Moses asked the angels: Do you conduct business with one another that may lead you to swear falsely? Again Moses asked: What else is written in it? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:12). Moses asked the angels: Do you have a father or a mother that would render the commandment to honor them relevant to you? Again Moses asked: What else is written in it? God said to him: “You shall not murder, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal” (Exodus 20:13) Moses asked the angels: Is there jealousy among you, or is there an evil inclination within you that would render these commandments relevant? Immediately they agreed with the Holy One, Blessed be He, that He made the right decision to give the Torah to the people, and as it is stated: “God our Lord, how glorious is Your name in all the earth” (Psalms 8:10), while “that Your majesty is placed above the heavens” is not written because the angels agreed with God that it is appropriate to give the Torah to the people on earth.
  Immediately, each and every one of the angels became an admirer of Moses and passed something to him, as it is stated: “You ascended on high, you took a captive, you took gifts on account of man, and even among the rebellious also that the Lord God might dwell there” (Psalms 68:19). The meaning of the verse is: In reward for the fact that they called you man, you are not an angel and the Torah is applicable to you, you took gifts from the angels. And even the Angel of Death gave him something, as Moses told Aaron how to stop the plague, as it is stated: “And he placed the incense, and he atoned for the people” (Numbers 17:12). And the verse says: “And he stood between the dead and the living, and the plague was stopped” (Numbers 17:13). If it were not that the Angel of Death told him this remedy, would he have known it?
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: When Moses descended from standing before the Holy One, Blessed be He, with the Torah, Satan came and said before Him: Master of the Universe, where is the Torah?He said to him: I have given it to the earth. He went to the earth, and said to it: Where is the Torah? It said to him: I do not know, as only: “God understands its way, and He knows its place” (Job 28:23).He went to the sea and asked: Where is the Torah? And the sea said to him: “It is not with me.”He went to the depths and asked: Where is the Torah? And the depths said to him: “It is not within me.” And from where is it derived that the sea and the depths answered him this way? As it is stated: “The depth said: It is not within me, and the sea said: It is not with me” (Job 28:14). “Destruction and death said: We heard a rumor of it with our ears” (Job 28:22).Satan returned and said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, I searched for the Torah throughout all the earth and did not find it. He said to him: Go to Moses, son of Amram.
  He went to Moses and said to him: The Torah that the Holy One, Blessed be He, gave you, where is it? Moses evaded the question and said to him: And what am I that the Holy One, Blessed be He, would have given me the Torah? I am unworthy. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Moses, are you a fabricator? Moses said before Him: Master of the Universe, You have a hidden treasure in which You delight every day, as it is stated: “And I was His delight every day, playing before Him at every moment” (Proverbs 8:30). Should I take credit for myself and say that You gave it to me? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Since you belittled yourself, the Torah will be called by your name, as it is stated: “Remember the Torah of Moses My servant to whom I commanded at Horeb laws and statutes for all of Israel” (Malachi 3:22).
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: When Moses ascended on High, he found the Holy One, Blessed be He, tying crowns to letters. On the tops of certain letters there are ornamental crownlets. Moses said nothing, and God said to him: Moses, is there no greeting in your city? Do people not greet each other in your city? He said before Him: Does a servant greet his master? That would be disrespectful. He said to him: At least you should have assisted Me and wished Me success in My work. Immediately he said to Him: “And now, may the power of the Lord be great as you have spoken” (Numbers 14:17).
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And the people saw that Moses delayed [<i>boshesh</i>] to come down from the mount” (Exodus 32:1)? Do not read the word in the verse as <i>boshesh</i>; rather, read it as <i>ba’u shesh</i>, six hours have arrived. When Moses ascended on High, he told the Jewish people: In forty days, at the beginning of six hours, I will come. After forty days, Satan came and brought confusion to the world by means of a storm, and it was impossible to ascertain the time. Satan said to the Jews: Where is your teacher Moses? They said to him: He ascended on High. He said to them: Six hours have arrived and he has not yet come. Surely he won’t. And they paid him no attention. Satan said to them: Moses died. And they paid him no attention. Ultimately, he showed them an image of his death-bed and an image of Moses’ corpse in a cloud. And that is what the Jewish people said to Aaron: “For this Moses, the man who brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we know not what has become of him” (Exodus 32:1).
  One of the Sages said to Rav Kahana: Did you hear what is the reason that the mountain was called Mount Sinai? Rav Kahana said to him: It is because it is a mountain upon which miracles [<i>nissim</i>] were performed for the Jewish people. The Sage said to him: If so, it should have been called Mount Nisai, the mountain of miracles. Rather, Rav Kahana said to him: It is a mountain that was a good omen [<i>siman</i>] for the Jewish people. The Sage said to him: If so, it should have been called Har Simanai, the mountain of omens. Rav Kahana said to him: What is the reason that you do not frequent the school where you can study before Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who study <i>aggada</i>? As Rav Ḥisda and Rabba, son of Rav Huna, both said: What is the reason it is called Mount Sinai? It is because it is a mountain upon which hatred [<i>sina</i>] for the nations of the world descended because they did not accept the Torah. And that is what Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The desert in which Israel remained for forty years has five names. Each name has a source and a rationale: The Zin Desert, because the Jewish people were commanded [<i>nitztavu</i>] in it; the Kadesh Desert, because the Jewish people were sanctified [<i>nitkadshu</i>] in it. The Kedemot Desert, because the ancient [<i>keduma</i>] Torah, which preceded the world, was given in it. The Paran Desert,
  
  Daf 89b
  
  because the Jewish people were fruitful [<i>paru</i>] and multiplied in it; the Sinai Desert, because hatred descended upon the nations of the world on it, on the mountain on which the Jewish people received the Torah. And what is the mountain’s true name? Horeb is its name. And that disputes the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said: Mount Sinai is its name. And why is it called Mount Horeb? It is because destruction [<i>ḥurba</i>] of the nations of the world descended upon it.
  We learned in the mishna: From where is it derived that one ties a scarlet strip of wool to the scapegoat? As it says: “If your sins be like scarlet [<i>kashanim</i>], they will become white like snow” (Isaiah 1:18). The Gemara wonders at this: Why does the verse use the plural form: <i>Kashanim</i>? It should have used the singular form: <i>Kashani</i>. Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: Even if your sins are as numerous as those years [<i>kashanim</i>] that have proceeded continuously from the six days of Creation until now, they will become white like snow. Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Go please and let us reason together, the Lord will say” (Isaiah 1:18)? Why does the verse say: Go please? It should have said: Come please. And why does the verse say: The Lord will say? The prophet’s message is based on something that God already said. Therefore, the verse should have said: God said. Rather, the explanation of this verse is that in the future that will surely come, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will say to the Jewish people: Go please to your Patriarchs, and they will rebuke you.
  And the Jewish people will say before Him: Master of the Universe, to whom shall we go? Shall we go to Abraham, to whom You said: “Know certainly that your seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years” (Genesis 15:13), and he did not ask for mercy on our behalf? Or perhaps we should go to Isaac, who blessed Esau and said: “And it shall come to pass when you shall break loose, that you shall shake his yoke from off your neck” (Genesis 27:40), and he did not ask for mercy on our behalf. Or perhaps we should go to Jacob, to whom You said: “I will go down to Egypt with you” (Genesis 46:4), and he did not ask for mercy on our behalf. And if so, to whom shall we go? Shall we go to our Patriarchs, who do not have mercy on us? Rather, now God Himself says what punishment we deserve. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Since you made yourselves dependent on Me, “If your sins be like scarlet, they will become white like snow.”
  Apropos the Jewish people assessing their forefathers, the Gemara cites a related teaching. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For You are our Father; for Abraham knows us not, and Israel does not acknowledge us; You, Lord, are our Father, our Redeemer, everlasting is Your name” (Isaiah 63:16). In the future that will surely come, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will say to Abraham: Your children have sinned against Me. Abraham will say before Him: Master of the Universe, if so, let them be eradicated to sanctify Your name. God said: I will say it to Jacob. Since he experienced the pain of raising children, perhaps he will ask for mercy on their behalf. He said to Jacob: Your children have sinned. Jacob said before Him: Master of the Universe, if so, let them be eradicated to sanctify Your name. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: There is no reason in elders and no wisdom in youth. Neither Abraham nor Jacob knew how to respond properly. He said to Isaac: Your children have sinned against Me. Isaac said before Him: Master of the Universe, are they my children and not Your children? At Sinai, when they accorded precedence to “We will do” over “We will listen” before You, didn’t You call them, “My son, My firstborn son Israel” (Exodus 4:22)? Now that they have sinned, are they my children and not Your children?
  And furthermore, how much did they actually sin? How long is a person’s life? Seventy years. Subtract the first twenty years of his life. One is not punished for sins committed then, as in heavenly matters, a person is only punished from age twenty. Fifty years remain for them. Subtract twenty-five years of nights, and twenty-five years remain for them. Subtract twelve and a half years during which one prays and eats and uses the bathroom, and twelve and a half years remain for them. If You can endure them all and forgive the sins committed during those years, excellent. And if not, half of the sins are upon me to bear and half upon You. And if You say that all of them, the sins of all twelve and a half years that remain, are upon me, I sacrificed my soul before You and You should forgive them due to my merit. The Jewish people began to say to Isaac: You are our father. Only Isaac defended the Jewish people as a father would and displayed compassion toward his children. Isaac said to them: Before you praise me, praise the Holy One, Blessed be He. And Isaac points to the Holy One, Blessed be He, before their eyes. Immediately they lifted their eyes to the heavens and say: “You, Lord, are our Father, our Redeemer, everlasting is Your name.”
  And since the Gemara mentioned Jacob’s descent to Egypt, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Our father Jacob should have gone down to Egypt in iron chains as would an exile against his will, as decreed by God and related to Abraham. However, his merit caused him to descend without suffering, as it is written: “I drew them with cords of man, with bands of love, and I was to them as they that take off the yoke on their jaws, and I fed them gently” (Hosea 11:4).
  MISHNA: After an extended digression for a discussion of matters unrelated to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, this mishna resumes treatment of the <i>halakhot</i> of carrying from domain to domain on Shabbat. One who carries out wood on Shabbat is liable for a measure equivalent to the amount of wood necessary to cook an easily cooked egg. The measure that determines liability for carrying out spices is equivalent to that which is used to season an easily cooked egg. And all types of spices join together with one another to constitute the measure for liability. The measure that determines liability for carrying out nutshells, pomegranate peels, safflower, and madder, which are used to produce dyes, is equivalent to the amount that is used to dye a small garment placed atop a woman’s hairnet. The measure that determines liability for carrying out urine, natron, and <i>borit</i>, cimolian earth [<i>Kimoleya</i>], and potash, all of which are abrasive materials used for laundry, is equivalent to the amount that is used to launder a small garment placed atop a woman’s hairnet. And Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure that determines liability for these materials is equivalent to that which is used to remove a stain.
  GEMARA: With regard to the measure of wood, the Gemara asks: Didn’t we already learn it once? As we learned in a mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out a reed is equivalent to that which is used to make a quill. And if the reed was thick and unfit for writing, or if it was fragmented, the measure that determines its liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an egg most easily cooked, one that is already beaten and placed in a stew pot. The measure of firewood is clearly delineated. The Gemara answers: Still, this mishna is necessary. You might have said: There, the measure of the crushed reed reflects the fact that it is not suitable for anything other than kindling. However, regarding wood that is suitable to be used as a tooth of a key [<i>aklida</i>], the measure that determines its liability should be even any small amount. Therefore, it teaches us that wood is typically designated for burning, and that determines the measure for liability for carrying out wood on Shabbat.
  We learned in the mishna that all types of spices join together with one another to constitute the measure equivalent to that which is used to season an easily cooked egg. The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which we learned elsewhere: Spices, which are prohibited due to two or three different prohibitions, e.g., one is prohibited due to <i>orla</i>, and one due to the prohibition of untithed produce, and they were all of a single species (<i>Tosafot</i>), or if they were of three different species, are prohibited, and they join together with each other to constitute a complete measure. And Ḥizkiya said:
  
  Daf 90a
  
  They taught this <i>halakha</i> in the case of sweet types, because they are fit to be mixed together to sweeten the food in a pot. The Gemara infers: The reason that they join together with one another is that they are suitable to sweeten the food in a pot together. However, if that is not so, then they do not join together with one another. Apparently, spices, in general, do not join together to constitute a complete measure. The Gemara answers: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a case where they are suitable to sweeten the food in a pot.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out nutshells, pomegranate peels, safflower and madder, which are used to produce dyes, is equivalent to that which is used to dye a small garment that is placed atop a woman’s hairnet. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from what we learned elsewhere in a mishna: One who carries out herbs that were soaked in water is liable if he carried out a measure equivalent to the amount used to dye a sample the size of a stopper, for the shuttle of a loom. This refers to a small swath of wool that a weaver places on the loom, as a color sample. The herbs were soaked in water because this was how they were prepared for use as dyes. Apparently, according to this Gemara, the measure for liability is not the amount used to dye a small garment. The Gemara replies: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: In the case of soaked dyes, the measure for liability is smaller because a person does not go to the trouble to soak herbs just to dye a sample for the shuttle of a loom. He will only begin soaking herbs to dye a more significant garment. However, for herbs that are soaking and are ready for use as a dye, the measure for liability is smaller, i.e., sufficient to dye a sample.
  The mishna mentioned abrasive materials used for laundry, among them urine. The Gemara clarifies the nature of the listed materials. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The urine mentioned in the mishna is urine that is up to forty days old. After that, its acidity weakens, rendering it unsuitable for that purpose. With regard to the natron, the Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This refers to Alexandrian natron from the city in Egypt, and not to natron from Anpantrin, which is of a different quality. With regard to the <i>borit</i> mentioned in the mishna, Rav Yehuda said: That is sand. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Borit</i> and sand? Since both terms are listed, <i>borit</i> cannot be sand. Rather, what is <i>borit</i>? It is sulphur.
  The Gemara raises an objection based on plants whose use is prohibited during the Sabbatical year. They added bulbs of ornithogalum and wormwood, and <i>borit</i>, and aloe. And if it would enter your mind to say that <i>borit</i> is sulphur, is there sulphur that is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical year? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that this is the principle: Anything that has a root and grows is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical year, and anything that does not have a root is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical year. Rather, what is the <i>borit</i>? It is aloe. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And <i>borit</i> and aloe? Since both terms are listed, <i>borit</i> cannot be aloe. Rather, there are two types of aloe. One of them is called <i>borit</i>.
  With regard to the cimolian earth mentioned in the mishna, Rav Yehuda said: This is the earth referred to as pull out stick in [<i>shelof dotz</i>]. With regard to the <i>eshlag</i> mentioned in the mishna, Shmuel said: I asked all of the seafarers with regard to the identity of <i>eshlag</i>, and they told me that it is called <i>shonana</i>, and can be found in the shell of the pearl, and is removed using an iron skewer.
  MISHNA: The measure that determines liability for carrying out pepper on Shabbat is any amount. Similarly, the measure that determines liability for carrying out tar is any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out various kinds of perfumes and various kinds of metals is any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out stones of the altar or earth of the altar, sacred scrolls or their coverings that became tattered due to an insect called <i>mekek</i> that destroys scrolls, and <i>mekek</i> that destroys their coverings, is any amount. That is because people store them in order to bury them, due to their sanctity, and accord significance to even a small measure of those items. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who carries out accessories of idolatry on Shabbat is liable for carrying out any amount, as it is stated: “And there shall cleave nothing of the proscribed items to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). Since even the smallest amount is prohibited and must be burned, any amount is significant.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: For what use is any amount of pepper suited? The Gemara answers: For dispelling mouth odor. For what use is any amount of tar suited? It is suited for curing a headache. We learned in the mishna that one is liable for carrying out any amount of various kinds of perfumes on Shabbat. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Even one who carries out an object with a foul odor on Shabbat for medicinal or similar purposes, is liable for carrying out any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out fine perfumed oil is any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out purple dye is any amount. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a virgin rosebud on Shabbat is one bud.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out various kinds of metals is any amount. The Gemara asks: For what use is any amount of metal suited, that it renders one liable for carrying it out? It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Because a small amount of iron is fit to make a small nail.
  Since the Gemara is discussing the measure that determines liability for carrying out metal on Shabbat, it discusses the related <i>halakhot</i> of objects consecrated to the Temple. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who vows without specifying an amount, and says: It is incumbent upon me to donate iron to the Temple, <i>Aḥerim</i> say: He must donate no less than a cubit by a cubit of iron. The Gemara asks: For what use is metal that size suited? Rav Yosef said: For a raven impediment. The roof of the Temple was covered with iron surfaces with protruding nails to prevent ravens from perching there. And some say a slightly different version. <i>Aḥerim</i> say: He must donate no less than the iron necessary for a raven impediment. And how much iron is that? Rav Yosef said: A cubit by a cubit. One who vows to donate copper must donate no less than the value of a <i>ma’a</i> of silver. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: One must donate no less than the amount needed to forge a small copper hook. The Gemara asks: For what Temple use is that suited? Abaye said: They use it to scrape the wicks from the candelabrum, and clean the lamps with it.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for carrying out sacred scrolls or their coverings that became tattered due to an insect called <i>mekek</i> that destroys scrolls, and another type of <i>mekek</i> that destroys their coverings, is any amount. Rabbi Yehuda said: These insects, the <i>mekek</i> that destroys scrolls, the <i>tekhakh</i> that attacks silk, and the <i>ila</i> that eats grapes, and the <i>pe</i> that eats figs, and the <i>ha</i> that eats pomegranates, all pose danger to one who swallows them. The Gemara relates: A certain student was sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan and was eating figs. The student said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: My teacher, are there thorns in figs? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: The <i>pe</i> killed that fellow. The insect in the fig had punctured the student’s throat.
  MISHNA: One who carries out a merchant’s basket, even if there are many types of spices and jewelry in it, is obligated to bring only one sin-offering, because he performed only one act of carrying out. The measure that determines liability for carrying out garden seeds on Shabbat is less than a fig-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: The measure for liability is five seeds.
  
  Daf 90b
  
  The measure that determines liability for carrying out cucumber seeds is two seeds because they are large and conspicuous. The measure that determines liability for carrying out squash seeds is two seeds. The measure that determines liability for carrying out seeds of Egyptian beans is two. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a live kosher locust is any amount. For carrying out a dead kosher locust, which is edible, it is the same as any other food, a fig-bulk. The measure that determines liability for carrying out the locust called <i>tzipporet keramim</i>, whether dead or alive, is any amount; this is because one stores them for medicinal purposes or as a talisman, which renders even a small quantity significant. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who carries out a live non-kosher locust is liable for carrying out any amount, because people store locusts for a child who wants to play with it.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna the measure that determines liability for carrying out garden seeds on Shabbat. And the Gemara raised a contradiction from what we learned: The measure that determines liability for carrying out compost and fine sand on Shabbat is equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a cabbage stalk; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: Equivalent to that which is used to fertilize a single leek. Even a single plant is a significant amount. Rav Pappa said: This smaller measure applies to a case where the seed was already planted and growing. In that case, one carries out manure to fertilize one plant. That larger measure applies to a case where the seed was not yet planted, because a person does not go to the trouble to carry out a single seed for planting.
  With regard to what the mishna said about the measure for carrying out cucumber and squash seeds, the Sages taught: One who carries out date pits on Shabbat, if he did so in order to plant, he is liable for carrying out two pits. If he did so in order for the animals to eat, he is liable for carrying out enough to fill a pig’s mouth. And how much is enough to fill a pig’s mouth? One date pit. If he did so in order to burn the pits, the measure that determines liability is equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. If he carried them out in order to use them to count, the measure for liability is two pits. <i>Aḥerim</i> say the measure for liability is five pits. A person is capable of keeping track of up to five items without help. The Sages taught: One who carries out two hairs from a horse’s tail or from a cow’s tail on Shabbat is liable, since people store them to use in traps. The measure that determines liability for carrying out stiff hair of a pig is one hair. It is significant because it is used to sew shoes. The measure that determines liability for carrying out palm fronds is two fronds, but the measure for palm vines, which are peeled off the frond and are thinner, is one vine.
  We learned in the mishna: With regard to carrying out the locust called <i>tzipporet keramim</i>, whether dead or alive, the measure for liability is any amount. This is because one stores them for medicinal purposes or as a talisman, which renders even one locust significant. The Gemara asks: What is <i>tzipporet keramim</i>? Rav said: It is the locust called <i>palya biari</i>. Abaye said: And it can be found in a palm tree that has only one vine, and it is used as a talisman for wisdom. One eats its right half, and casts its left half into a copper tube, and seals it with sixty seals, and hangs it on his left arm. And the mnemonic reminding you which half to eat and which half to hang on the arm is the verse: “A wise heart to his right and a foolish heart to his left” (Ecclesiastes 10:2). And one then grows wise as much as he wants, and studies as much as he wants, and then eats the other half, as if he does not do so, his learning will be forgotten.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who carries out a live non-kosher locust is liable for carrying out any amount, because people store locusts for play. The Gemara explains: And the first <i>tanna</i> holds that people do not give children non-kosher locusts for play. What is the reason for this? Due to the concern that perhaps the child will eat it. And the Gemara asks: If so, it should also be prohibited to give a child a kosher locust, lest the child will eat it, as the Gemara related that Rav Kahana stood before Rav and passed a live kosher locust near his mouth. Rav said to Rav Kahana: Put it down, so that people will not mistakenly say: He is eating it and violating the prohibition of “You shall not make yourselves detestable” (Leviticus 11:43). Apparently, eating a kosher locust is prohibited while it is alive. Rather, even according to the unattributed mishna, there is no room for concern that a young child will eat a locust with which he is playing. The reason that the first <i>tanna</i> prohibits giving a non-kosher locust to a child for play is the concern that perhaps it will die and he will eat it. And Rabbi Yehuda, who permits giving a non-kosher locust to a child for play, does not share that concern. If the locust dies, the child will eulogize it and mourn its death, and certainly would not eat it.
  
  MISHNA: One who stores a seed for sowing, or as a sample, or for medicinal purposes and carried it out on Shabbat is liable for carrying out any amount. By storing that measure, he indicates that it is significant to him. Therefore, he is liable for carrying it, despite the fact that what he carried out is less than the halakhic measure that determines liability for that item. And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, with no intention to utilize it for the specific purpose for which he stored it, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability (Rav Shmuel Strashun).
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: One who stores a seed for a specific purpose and carried it out? Let the mishna simply teach: One who carries out a seed for planting, or as a sample, or for medicinal purposes is liable for carrying out any amount. One is not liable for storing the seed. He is liable for carrying out less than the measure that determines liability because he attributed significance to that measure. Abaye said: With what we are dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one stored it for a specific purpose and forgot why he stored it, and now he carries it out for no specific purpose.
  
  Daf 91a
  
  Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original intention in mind.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitzḥak the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only liable when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people, as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.
  We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.
  Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Naḥman’s statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Naḥman teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.
  On the basis of this <i>halakha</i>, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist and expanded to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.
  And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveled until there was less than that measure, and he reconsidered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the <i>halakha</i>? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expanded to a fig-bulk, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is there disqualification with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat. The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.
  Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one threw an olive-bulk of <i>teruma</i> into an impure house, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the measure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the <i>halakha</i> in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Naḥman said to him: We already learned the resolution to that dilemma in a <i>baraita</i>: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their measure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of
  
  Daf 91b
  
  disqualification of consecrated items due to leaving the Temple courtyard, the significant measure is an olive-bulk, as one who eats that measure of disqualified consecrated items is liable; with regard to Shabbat, its measure for liability should also be an olive-bulk. The Gemara rejects this: How can you make that comparison? There, in the case of the consecrated items, from the moment that he took it beyond the courtyard wall it was disqualified due to the prohibition of leaving. However, with regard to Shabbat, he is only liable when he takes it into the public domain, which is far beyond the courtyard walls. Here, in the case where one threw <i>teruma</i> into the house on Shabbat, the prohibition of Shabbat and the impurity of the <i>teruma</i> come simultaneously. Since the olive-bulk is significant in terms of impurity, it is similarly significant with regard to Shabbat.
  We learned in the mishna: If one stored the seed, carried it out, and then brought it back in, he is only liable if he brought in its measure for liability. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. By bringing it back into the house he indicates that he no longer considers it significant, and the object then assumes the legal status of an object belonging to anyone else. Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he threw it into the storehouse and its place is clearly discernible to the one who threw it, in that he knows where it landed. Lest you say that because its location is discernible it maintains its original status, the mishna teaches us that from the fact that he threw it into the storehouse, he indicated that he nullified the object’s previous significance.
  MISHNA: One who carries out food from his house on Shabbat and placed it on the threshold of the door, whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt because he did not perform his prohibited labor of carrying from domain to domain all at once. Similarly, if one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, which is in the public domain, and part of the basket remained inside, even though most of the fruit is outside in the public domain, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.
  GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: What is the nature of this threshold in terms of Shabbat? If you say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the public domain, in that it does not extend above nine handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths, and it is suitable for use by the multitudes, why is he exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain? Rather, say that it is a threshold that has the legal status of the private domain, in that it extends above ten handbreadths, and its area is four by four handbreadths. In that case, why does the mishna say: Whether he then carried it out from the threshold into the public domain or another person carried it out, he is exempt? Why should he be exempt? Didn’t he carry out food from the private domain to the public domain?
  Rather, the mishna is referring to a threshold that is a <i>karmelit</i>. And it teaches us the following: The reason that he is exempt is due to the fact that the object came to rest in a <i>karmelit</i>. However, if the object did not come to rest in a <i>karmelit</i>, he is liable even if it passed through a <i>karmelit</i>. This comes to teach that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Azzai, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out an object from a store, which is a private domain, to a plaza, which is a public domain, via a colonnade, which is a <i>karmelit</i>, is liable because he lifted the object in a private domain and placed it in a public domain. And ben Azzai deems him exempt because, in his opinion, an exempt domain separates between the private and public domains.
  We learned in the mishna: If one placed a basket that is full of fruit on the outer threshold, he is only liable if he carries out the entire basket. Ḥizkiya said: They only taught this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and gourds, both of which are long. Part of each fruit remains inside even when most of the basket is in the public domain. However, if the basket was full of mustard seeds, he is liable for carrying out a measure of individual mustard seeds to the public domain. The Gemara concludes: Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Even though several objects are in a single basket, they do not have the legal status of a single unit. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the basket were full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, he holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion.
  Rabbi Zeira said: The language of the mishna does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, and it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara explains: It does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, as the mishna taught: Until he carries out the entire basket. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is liable is because he carried out the entire basket. However, if part of the basket remained inside, even if he carried out all the fruit, he is exempt. Apparently, the mishna holds that fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. Since the vessel fuses the fruit into one entity, when part of the basket remains inside, by extension its fruit is also considered to have remained inside. And it does not precisely correspond with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as the mishna taught: Even though most of the fruit is outside. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is because only most of the fruit is outside. However, if all the fruit were outside, then even though part of the basket remains bound inside, he is liable. Apparently, the mishna holds that the fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion.
  The Gemara asks: However, that is difficult. The inferences of the mishna are contradictory. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara elaborates: According to both of the Sages, the mishna is referring to two distinct cases. Ḥizkiya resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning. The phrase: Until he carries out the entire basket; in what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, in the case of a basket full of mustard seeds, he becomes as one who carried out the entire basket, and he is liable for carrying out the mustard seeds. And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the contradiction according to his reasoning: When we learned: Even though most of the fruit is outside, he is exempt; and that ruling is true not only if he carried out most of the fruit, but even if he carried out all the fruit he is also exempt, until he carries out the entire basket.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out the merchant’s basket on Shabbat that contains different items, primarily spices, and placed it on the outer threshold of the house, even though most of the types of items in the basket are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket. It might enter your mind to say that this is referring to a basket full of bundles of different spices. That is difficult according to the opinion of Ḥizkiya, as even though most of the bundles entered the public domain, he is exempt. The Gemara answers: Ḥizkiya could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? With stalks [<i>urnasei</i>]. The spices are in the form of stalks that fill the entire length of the basket. As long as part of the basket remains inside, part of each stalk remains inside as well.
  And Rav Beivai bar Abaye also raised an objection from that which we learned: One who steals a purse on Shabbat is liable for the theft. Based on the principle that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives the greater of the two, in this case one should be exempt from payment for the theft, since performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat is punishable by stoning. However, this case is different because he was already liable for theft as soon as he lifted the purse. This took place before he came to violate the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat by carrying it into the public domain. However, if he did not lift the purse, but was dragging it on the ground and exiting the private domain, he is exempt from paying for the theft, as in that case, he is only liable for the theft when he drags the purse out of the owner’s property into the public domain. The prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat are violated all at once. For the purposes of this discussion: And if it enters your mind to say that fusion of several objects within a single vessel is considered fusion, in this case the prohibition of theft precedes the prohibition of Shabbat. At the moment that the mouth of the purse enters the public domain, he is liable for theft because it is as if the money inside had been carried out. With regard to Shabbat, he would not be liable until the entire purse entered the public domain.
  The Gemara explains: If this is referring to a case where he carried it out by way of its mouth, indeed that is so, he would be liable for theft. However, with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he carried it out by the underside of the purse. Since none of the money is accessible until the entire purse is in the public domain, he violated the prohibitions simultaneously. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the area of the seam? He could gain access to the money even if he dragged out the purse by way of its underside,
  
  Daf 92a
  
  for if he wishes, he can tear the seam and take the money. The Gemara answers: Here, it is referring to long metal strips. As long as the entire purse is not in the public domain, he did not acquire any of the long strips, and he is not liable for theft. The Gemara asks: And since the purse has laces to close its opening, to be liable for theft it is sufficient that he carry it out so that its mouth is in the public domain, as he can untie the straps and remove the contents of the purse. And since the laces remain bound inside the private domain, he is not yet liable for violating the prohibition of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the purse does not have laces. And if you wish, say instead that it is referring to a case where it has laces, and the laces are wound around the purse.
  There is a dispute between Abaye and Rava that parallels the dispute between Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Yoḥanan. And, so too, Rava said: They only taught in the mishna that one is exempt with regard to carrying out a basket full of cucumbers and gourds. However, for carrying out a basket full of mustard seeds, he is liable. Apparently, Rava holds: fusion of several objects in a single vessel is not considered fusion. Abaye said: Even if the basket is full of mustard seeds, he is exempt. Apparently, Abaye holds: Fusion of several objects in a single vessel is considered fusion. The Gemara comments: Abaye later assumed the opinion of Rava, and Rava assumed the opinion of Abaye. And a contradiction is raised between one statement of Abaye and another statement of Abaye; and a contradiction is raised between one statement of Rava and another statement of Rava.
  As it was stated that they disputed the matter of one who carries out fruit into the public domain. Abaye said: If he carried them out in his hand, he is liable even if the rest of his body remained in the private domain because fusion of several objects in his hand is not considered fusion. However, if he carried them out in a vessel, and part of the vessel remained in the private domain, he is exempt. And Rava said: If he carried them out in his hand, he is exempt because the legal status of his hand is determined by the status of the rest of the body. However, if he carried them out in a vessel, he is liable.
  These are contrary to their opinions stated above. The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions, and say that Rava was the one who said: If he carried it out in his hand, he is liable. The Gemara raises an objection. Didn’t we learn in the mishna: In a case where the homeowner extended his hand into the public domain, and either the poor person took an object from the homeowner’s hand and placed it in the public domain, or the poor person placed an object into the homeowner’s hand and the homeowner carried the object into the private domain, both are exempt. Apparently, one is not liable if he merely moved an object in his hand into the public domain. The Gemara answers: There, in the mishna, it is referring to a case where his hand was above three handbreadths from the ground. The object in his hand, therefore, does not have the legal status of having been placed on the ground, and he is exempt. Here, it is referring to a case where his hand was below three handbreadths off the ground. Anything that is within three handbreadths off the ground has the legal status of having been placed on the ground.
  MISHNA: One who carries out an object into the public domain on Shabbat, whether he carried it out in his right hand or in his left hand, whether he carried it in his lap or on his shoulders, he is liable. All of these are typical methods of carrying out an object, as this was the method of carrying the sacred vessels of the Tabernacle employed by the sons of Kehat in the desert. All labors prohibited on Shabbat are derived from the Tabernacle, including the prohibited labor of carrying out from domain to domain. But one who carries an object out in an unusual, backhanded manner, or with his foot, or with his mouth, or with his elbow, with his ear, or with his hair, or with his belt [<i>punda</i>] whose opening faced downward, or between his belt and his cloak, or with the hem of his cloak, or with his shoe, or with his sandal, he is exempt because he did not carry it out in a manner typical of those who carry.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar said: One who carries out a load from the private domain to the public domain, even if he does so at a height above ten handbreadths, which is beyond the parameters of the public domain, he is liable, as this was the method of carrying utilized by the sons of Kehat. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the method of carrying utilized by the sons of Kehat was above ten handbreadths? The Gemara answers: For it is written about the Levites’ carrying: “And the hangings of the courtyard, and the screen for the courtyard entrance which surrounds the Tabernacle, and the altar, and its cords for all of its service” (Numbers 3:26). This verse juxtaposes the altar to the Tabernacle. It is derived that just as the Tabernacle was ten cubits high, so too, the altar was ten cubits high. The verse that indicates otherwise: “And you shall make the altar…and its height should be three cubits” (Exodus 27:1), must be understood differently.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the Tabernacle itself was carried above ten handbreadths? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And you shall make the boards for the Tabernacle out of acacia wood standing upright, the length of a board shall be ten cubits” (Exodus 26:15–16). And it is written with regard to the construction of the Tabernacle: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle, and he placed the cover for the tent on top of it as God commanded Moses” (Exodus 40:19). And Rav said: Moses, our teacher, spread it himself. From here you can derive that the height of the Levites was ten cubits. If Moses was capable of standing and spreading the cover over the tent by himself, he must have been at least ten cubits tall. Presumably, that was the height of the rest of the Levites as well. And they learned through tradition that every burden that is carried with poles, one-third of the burden is above the porter’s height, and two-thirds are below his height. It is found, then, that the altar was very high, as if they carried the altar on poles, the bottom of the altar was at least one-third of ten cubits, twenty handbreadths, off the ground.
  And if you wish, say instead that the Levites were not extraordinarily tall, and this can be derived from the Ark of the Covenant, as the Master said: The Ark itself was nine handbreadths tall as stated in the Torah, and the Ark-cover was one handbreadth, for a total of ten. And they learned through tradition that every burden that is carried with poles, one-third of the burden is above the porter’s height and two-thirds are below his height. It is found, then, that the bottom of the Ark stood ten handbreadths above the ground. The Gemara asks: And let us derive it from Moses, and why was the first proof insufficient? The Gemara answers: Perhaps Moses was different from the other Levites and taller than they were, as the Master said: The Divine Presence only rests upon a person who is wise, mighty, wealthy, and tall. Since the Divine Presence rested on Moses, he had to be tall.
  Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One who carries out a burden on his head on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering, as the people of Hotzal do so. They would typically carry burdens on their heads. The Gemara asks: And do the people of Hotzal constitute the majority of the world? Even if in one place it is a typical method of carrying a burden, it remains an atypical method of carrying in the rest of the world. Rather, if this ruling was stated, it was stated as follows. Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: If a resident of Hotzal carried out a burden on his head on Shabbat he is liable, as the people of his city do so. The Gemara asks again: Even if the inhabitants of his city do this, let his intention be rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. If an individual or small group of people conduct themselves in an atypical manner, their conduct is not rendered typical. Typical conduct is determined by the majority of people. Rather, if this was stated, it was stated as follows. One who carries out a burden on his head is exempt.
  
  Daf 92b
  
  And if you say that the people of Hotzal do so and therefore they should be liable, their intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people.
  MISHNA: One who intends to carry out an object with the object before him, and as he was walking the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. However, if he intended to carry it out behind him and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like <i>sinar</i> worn beneath the outer garments, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable, as it is common for the <i>sinar</i> to be reversed. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even those royal couriers, who receive notes [<i>pittakin</i>], carry those notes in their belts, and are not particular where on their belt they carry the notes (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out the notes whether they carried them before them or behind them.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the case of one who intended to carry an object before him and it came to be carried behind him that he is exempt? The reason is that his intention was not realized. Since he did not perform the act that he intended to perform, he is exempt. If so, then even in the case of one who intended to carry an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, he should also be exempt because his intention was not realized. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, in the sense that it cites the opinions of two different Sages. He who taught this <i>halakha</i> did not teach that <i>halakha</i>. Rava said: And what difficulty is there here? Perhaps it can be explained as follows. With regard to one who intended to carry an object before him, and it came to be carried behind him, this is the reason that he is exempt: He intended to provide the object with outstanding protection, seeing it at all times, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with reduced protection. Since that was not his intention, it is not considered a prohibited labor and he is exempt. Whereas one who intended to carry an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, this is the reason he is liable: He intended to provide the object with reduced protection, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with outstanding protection.
  Rather, what is the difficulty here? It is the inference inferred from the mishna that is difficult. One who intends to carry out an object before him, and the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. By inference: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and indeed, the object came to be carried behind him, is liable. Say the latter clause of the mishna: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, is the case where he is liable. By inference: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and indeed, the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. The inference from the first clause contradicts the inference from the latter clause. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed. He who taught this <i>halakha</i> did not teach that <i>halakha</i>.
  Rav Ashi said: What difficulty is there here? Perhaps the mishna is stating the <i>halakha</i> utilizing the following didactic style: It was not necessary, and it should be understood as follows. It was not necessary to teach that a person who intended to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, is liable. That is obvious because his intention was realized. However, it was necessary for the mishna to teach that even in a case where he intended to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. It would have entered your mind to say: Since his intention was not realized, he should not be liable. Therefore, the mishna teaches us: Since he intended to provide the object with reduced protection, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with outstanding protection, he is liable.
  And the case where one intended to carry out the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, is the subject of a dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carried out coins in his money belt, and its opening was facing up, is liable because this is the typical method of carrying coins. However, if one carried it out with its opening facing down, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not agree that in a case where one intends to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, that he is liable? Apparently, one who intended to provide his object with reduced protection and realized that intention is liable. And they said to him: And do you not agree that one who carries out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot is exempt? Apparently, carrying out an object in an atypical manner is not considered carrying.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: I said one thing to the Rabbis in support of my opinion, and they said one thing to me. I did not find a response to their statement, and they did not find a response to my statement. From the fact that he said to them: Do you not agree that in a case where one intends to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, he is liable? Can it not be inferred that the Sages deem one exempt in that case? Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis dispute this matter. The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, from the fact that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: Do you not agree that one who carries out an object in a backhanded manner is exempt, can it not be inferred that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable, even for carrying out in a backhanded manner? Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who carries an object out in a backhanded manner or with his foot, everyone agrees that he is exempt?
  Rather, the <i>baraita</i> should be understood as follows. With regard to one who intended to carry an object behind him, and the object came to be carried out behind him, everyone agrees that he is liable. With regard to one who carried out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot, everyone agrees that he is exempt. Where they disagree is in a case where one carried coins in his money belt with its opening facing down. This Master, Rabbi Yehuda, likens it to the case of one who intended to carry an object behind him and the object came to be carried out behind him, and deems him liable; and this Master, the Rabbis, liken it to the case of one who carried out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot, and deems him exempt.
  We learned in the mishna: In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like <i>sinar</i>, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable. It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: In every instance that the mishna employs the phrase: In truth, that is the undisputed <i>halakha</i>. And we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says that even those who receive notes, i.e., royal couriers who transmit messages, place notes in their belts, and are not particular about which side the note is on (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out notes, whether they carry the notes out in front of them or behind them. We learned a different explanation: Because the royal scribes do this, they place their notes on all sides of their belts.
  MISHNA: One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, they are exempt because neither performed a complete prohibited labor. However, if one person is unable to carry it out alone, and therefore two people carried it out, they are liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even in that case.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say that Abaye said this, and some say that it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an action performed by two people, when this person is capable of performing it alone, and that person is capable of performing it alone, Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon deem them exempt. If both this person is incapable and that person is incapable of performing the action alone, and therefore they performed it together, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir deem them liable, and Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt. If this person is capable, and that person is incapable, and they performed it together, everyone agrees that he is liable.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and Rabbi Yehuda says: If one is incapable of carrying it out, and two carried it out, they are liable. And if not, if each person is capable of carrying it out himself, and nevertheless they carried it out together, they are exempt. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even if neither was capable of performing the action alone. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? What is the biblical source of these <i>halakhot</i>? The Gemara answers that the source is as our Sages taught in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus. It is written: “And if one person among the common people sins unwittingly by performing it, any one of God’s commandments not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). The Gemara interpreted: “By performing it,” means that one who performs a transgression in its entirety is liable, and not one who performs part of it. How so? If two people were holding a pitchfork and gathering the stalks, or holding a shuttle and weaving the threads of the warp, or holding a quill and writing, or holding a reed and carrying it out to the public domain, I might have thought they are liable, therefore the verse states: “By performing it.” One who performs a transgression in its entirety is liable, and not one who performs only part of it.
  
  Daf 93a
  
  In contrast, if two people held a round cake of figs, which is too heavy for one person to carry, and they carried it out to the public domain, or if they held a beam and carried it out to the public domain, Rabbi Yehuda says: If one person is incapable of carrying it out alone, and two people carried it out, they are liable. And if not, if one person is capable of carrying it out alone, they are exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if one person is incapable of carrying it out alone, and two people carried it out, they are exempt. It is with regard to that case that it is stated: “By performing it” (Leviticus 4:27), to establish a principle: An individual who performs a transgression is liable, two people who perform a transgression are exempt.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree over the interpretation of this verse: “And if one person among the common people sins unwittingly by performing it, any one of God’s commandments not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). Rabbi Shimon holds: Three exclusionary statements are written in this verse. It is as if it were written: A person who sins, one who sins, and by performing it he sins. The Torah could have conveyed the same meaning by saying simply: And if one of the common people. Apparently, the superfluous words in the verse are exclusionary and the verse should be understood as follows: A person, and not many people; one, and not two; by performing it, and not by two performing it. One of the terms comes to exclude from liability a case where each of the two people performs a part of the transgression, i.e., this person lifts an object from one domain, and that person places it in another domain. And one of the terms comes to exclude a case where this person is capable of performing the action alone, and that person is also capable, and the two of them perform the action together. And one of the terms comes to exclude even a case where this person is incapable of performing the action alone, and that person is incapable of performing the action alone. Since the two of them violated this prohibition together, they are both exempt.
  And Rabbi Yehuda holds: One of the terms comes to exclude a case where this person lifts an object, and that person places it, as he agrees that they are exempt in this case. And one of the terms comes to exclude a case where this person is capable of performing the action alone, and that person is also capable. And one of the terms comes to exclude the case of an individual who performed a transgression in accordance with the ruling of a court. If a court issued a mistaken ruling that a prohibited action is permitted, and an individual performed that action based on that ruling, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering and is considered to have sinned due to circumstances beyond his control. And Rabbi Shimon holds that an individual who performed a transgression in accordance with the ruling of a court is liable to bring a sin-offering for his mistake. His action is not considered intentional, but falls into the category of an unwitting act.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir, who deems them liable in a case where each was capable of performing the act alone, interpret the third exclusionary term? The Gemara answers: Is it written in the verse: A person who sins, one who sins, and by performing it he sins? There are not three exclusionary terms in the verse. Only two exclusionary terms are written, as the words: “One person who sins,” constitutes a single phrase. Therefore, one term comes to exclude from liability a case where this person lifts an object, and that one places it; and one term comes to exclude an individual who performed a transgression in accordance with the ruling of a court.
  We learned earlier that the Master said: In a case where this person is capable, and this person is incapable, and they performed it together, everyone agrees that he is liable. The Gemara seeks to clarify: Which of them is liable? Rav Ḥisda said: The one who is capable of performing the act alone is liable, as if it was the one who is incapable of performing the act alone that was liable, what is he doing that would render him liable? His efforts are inadequate to perform the task. Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: He is doing quite a bit, as he is assisting him. He said to him: The assistance provided by one who assists another to perform a task that the other could have performed himself is insubstantial.
  Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned that <i>halakha</i> in a mishna, with regard to vessels upon which a <i>zav</i> lies or rides. By Torah law, any vessel designated for lying and riding, upon which a <i>zav</i> lies or rides, becomes impure even if the <i>zav</i> did not come into direct contact with it. If a <i>zav</i> was sitting on a bed, and there were four garments beneath the four legs of the bed, they are all ritually impure. The weight of the <i>zav</i> is considered to have rested on each of the garments because the bed is incapable of standing on three legs. And Rabbi Shimon deems the garments ritually pure, since only a portion of his weight rested on each garment. However, if he was riding on an animal, and there were four garments beneath the legs of the animal, they are all ritually pure because the animal is capable of standing on three legs. And why are the garments ritually pure? Aren’t the animal’s legs assisting each other in supporting the weight of the <i>zav</i>? Is it not because we say: An object that assists is insubstantial?
  Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: Actually, I will say to you that a person or an object that assists is substantial. However, it is different here, in this case, as the animal lifted its foot completely. The mishna is not discussing the case of an animal that could theoretically stand on three legs, but an actual situation where it completely lifted one of its feet and the fourth foot did not even assist in supporting the animal’s weight. The Gemara rejects the suggestion of Rav Yehuda of Diskarta. And since it sometimes lifts this foot and sometimes lifts that foot, it should have the legal status of a <i>zav</i> who turns over. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to a <i>zav</i> who was lying on five benches or on five money belts, if he was lying along their length, they are impure. At different times, his entire body was lying on each of the benches or on each of the money belts. If he was lying across their width, they are ritually pure because at no point was his entire weight supported by one of the benches or the money belts. However, if he slept across their width, there is uncertainty whether or not, while sleeping, he turned over on them. This raises the possibility that, at some point, he lay along their length, and his entire weight was supported by one of the benches. Therefore, all of the benches are impure. A <i>zav</i> who moves his weight from one place to another renders all of those places ritually impure. Similarly, the fact that the animal lifts different legs is not sufficient for each to be considered as not assisting to support the weight of the <i>zav</i>.
  Rather, is it not that the garments beneath the legs of the animal remain ritually pure because we say: An object that assists is insubstantial? Each foot merely assists in supporting the weight of the <i>zav</i>. Similarly, Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned support for this <i>halakha</i>,
  
  Daf 93b
  
  as we learned in a mishna, Rabbi Yosei says: If a <i>zav</i> was riding on an animal, and there was a garment beneath it, if he was riding the horse, he renders the garment impure by means of the horse’s front legs. Only then is it impure; if it was beneath the horse’s hind legs it is not. And if he was riding the donkey, he renders the garment impure by means of the donkey’s hind legs. Only then is it impure; if it was beneath the donkey’s front legs it is not. The reason for this distinction is that a horse rests primarily on its front legs, and a donkey rests primarily on its hind legs. But why should a garment beneath the hind legs of a horse or the front legs of a donkey remain ritually pure? Don’t the legs assist each other? Is the reason not because we say that one who assists is insubstantial? Rav Ashi said: We, too, also learned support for this <i>halakha</i> in a different mishna. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a priest that stood in the Temple, and one of his feet was on a vessel, and one of his feet was on the floor, or one of his feet was on a stone, and one of his feet was on the floor, while performing priestly Temple rites; we see, if the vessel was removed or the stone was removed, whether he would still be capable of standing on one foot on the ground. If so, his service is valid. And if he could not stand on one foot, his service is invalid. Is he considered to be standing on the floor, in which case the service is valid, or is he not considered to be standing on the floor, in which case the service is invalid?
  The Gemara asks: And why, if he would still be capable of standing on one foot, should it be valid? Don’t his legs assist each other? Isn’t the reason because we say: One who assists is insubstantial? Ravina said: We, too, also learned support for this in a different mishna. All service performed in the Temple must be performed with the right hand. If he received the blood in his right hand, and his left hand assisted his right hand, his service is valid. And why is his service valid? Aren’t his hands assisting each other? Isn’t the reason because we say: One who assists is insubstantial? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so.
  The Master said in a <i>baraita</i> cited above: With regard to an action performed by two people, when this person is capable of performing it alone and that person is capable of performing it alone, Rabbi Meir deems them liable. A dilemma was raised before the students: Do we require a measure that determines liability for this person and a measure that determines liability for that one; or perhaps one measure that determines liability is sufficient for them all? Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna disagreed. One said: There must be a measure that determines liability for this person and a measure that determines liability for that one. And one said: One measure of liability is sufficient for them all. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned a mishna in support of the opinion that one measure is sufficient. It states in the mishna in tractate <i>Zavim</i>: If a <i>zav</i> was sitting on a bed, and there were four garments beneath the four legs of the bed, they are all ritually impure because the bed is incapable of standing on three legs. And why should they be ritually impure? Let them require a measure of the weight of a <i>zav</i> for this garment and a measure of the weight of a <i>zav</i> for that garment. All the garments should only become impure if there was one <i>zav</i> on the bed for each garment. Is it not because we say that in order to make the garments impure one measure of impurity is sufficient for them all? Therefore, both parties are liable for one measure that determines liability.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a different source. With regard to a deer that entered the house, and one person locked the door before it on Shabbat and prevented it from exiting, one is liable for performing the prohibited labor of trapping on Shabbat. If two people locked the door, they are exempt. If one is incapable of locking the door alone, and two people locked it, they are liable. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of trapping for this person and a measure of trapping for that person. Is it not because we say that one measure of trapping is sufficient for them all? Ravina said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a different source. With regard to partners who stole an animal and slaughtered it, they are obligated to pay four or five times its value, as stated in the Torah. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of slaughtering for this one and a measure of slaughtering for that one. Is it not because we say that one measure of slaughtering is sufficient for them all?
  And Rav Ashi said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a similar source. Two people who carried out a weaver’s reed on Shabbat are liable. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of carrying for this one and a measure of carrying for that one. Is it not because we say that one measure of carrying is sufficient for them all? Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This cannot serve as a proof, for perhaps the rod has a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily-cooked egg for this one and an easily-cooked egg for that one. That is the measure that determines liability for carrying out wood on Shabbat. He answered him: If so, let the <i>baraita</i> teach us the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an ordinary reed. What is different here that led the <i>baraita</i> to teach the <i>halakha</i> specifically about a weaver’s reed? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is certainly referring to a reed that is a single unit. Again Rav Aḥa rejects the proof: And perhaps it has a measure equivalent to that which is used to weave a cloth for this one and to weave a cloth for that one. That is the measure that determines liability. Rather, proof cannot be learned from this <i>baraita</i>.
  The <i>tanna</i> who recited <i>mishnayot</i> in the study hall taught before Rav Naḥman: Two people who carried out a weaver’s reed on Shabbat are exempt, and Rabbi Shimon deems them liable. Rav Naḥman was surprised at this. He asked: Toward where are you facing? This is the diametric opposite of their opinions. Rather, say an emended <i>baraita</i>: They are liable, and Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt.
  MISHNA: One who carries out foods less than the measure that determines liability for carrying out food in a vessel on Shabbat is exempt, even for carrying out the vessel, because the vessel is secondary to the food inside it. Since one is not liable for carrying out the food, he is not liable for carrying out the vessel either. Similarly, one who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt, even for carrying out the bed, because the bed is secondary to the person. One who carries out a corpse on a bed is liable. And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal, which are the minimal measures of these items that transmit ritual impurity, is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. He holds that one is only liable for performing a prohibited labor for its own sake. One who carries out an object in order to bring it to its destination is liable. However, people carry out a corpse or an animal carcass only to be rid of them.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out the measure that determines liability for carrying out foods in a vessel on Shabbat is liable for carrying out the food and exempt for carrying out the vessel. And if that vessel was needed by him for another purpose, he is liable even for carrying out the vessel. The Gemara wonders with regard to the second <i>halakha</i>: Can we conclude from it that one who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin-offerings? In that case, one who carries out a vessel with food inside it has performed two actions that fall under the rubric of one prohibited labor. Why should he be liable to bring two sin-offerings? Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where
  
  Daf 94a
  
  one acted unwittingly with regard to the food and intentionally with regard to the vessel. He is liable to bring a sin-offering for the food and to receive <i>karet</i> for the vessel. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this. Didn’t the <i>baraita</i> teach: He is liable even for the vessel? Apparently, the liability for the food and the liability for the vessel are identical. Rather, Rav Ashi said: This is referring to a case where one acted unwittingly both with regard to this, the food, and with regard to that, the vessel. And he became aware of one transgression, and then he became aware of the other transgression. And the ruling is dependent upon the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish cited above, with regard to the question whether or not one who unwittingly performed a single transgression twice and became aware of each separately is liable to bring two sin-offerings.
  We learned in the mishna: One who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt even for carrying out the bed. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and fowl into the public domain on Shabbat is liable whether they are alive or whether they are slaughtered. Rabbi Natan says: For carrying out slaughtered animals, he is liable, and for carrying out live animals, he is exempt, because a living being carries itself. A living being attempts to lighten the load of the person carrying it and thereby participates in the act of carrying. Rava said: The mishna can be understood even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Natan only as far as the case of a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and fowl is concerned because they deaden their weight in an attempt to free themselves from the one carrying them. However, with regard to the fact that a live person carries himself, even the Rabbis agree. Therefore, one who carries a live person out is exempt.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: And with regard to that which we learned in a mishna that it is prohibited to sell work animals to gentiles, to prevent a situation where animals still belonging to a Jew would be lent to a gentile who would perform labor with them on Shabbat, but ben Beteira permits selling a horse to a gentile. And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Ben Beteira permits selling a horse for riding because the horse is performing an act for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as riding a horse is not actually a prohibited labor. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan said one, the same, thing. They both hold that an animal with a rider on its back is not considered to be bearing a burden. And if you say that the Rabbis only argue with Rabbi Natan with regard to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and fowl because they deaden their weight in an attempt to free themselves, why did Rabbi Yoḥanan say specifically that ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan agree? Didn’t you say that in the case of a person riding a horse even the Rabbis agree? The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yoḥanan said that ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan said the same thing, he was referring to a horse designated specifically for carrying fowl. The Gemara asks: And is there a horse designated for carrying fowl? The Gemara answers: Yes, there is the horse for carrying a hunter’s falcons [<i>devei vayadan</i>].
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And Rabbi Natan agrees in the case of a person who is bound because he is unable to lighten the load of the person carrying him. Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Abaye: And what of those Persians who are considered as if they were bound because they don heavy armor and always ride horses, and nevertheless Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Beteira and Rabbi Natan said one thing and permitted selling horses even to Persians? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the Persians, it is not that they are unable to dismount their horses. It is arrogance that keeps them from dismounting their horses. As proof, the Gemara relates: There was that Persian officer [<i>pardashka</i>] at whom the king was angry, and he ran three parasangs on foot. Apparently, even Persian horsemen are not considered bound and are capable of walking without their horses.
  We learned in the mishna that according to the first <i>tanna</i>: One who carries out a corpse on a bed is liable. And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal is liable. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said, and Rav Yosef said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon would deem exempt
  
  Daf 94b
  
  even one who carries out a corpse to bury it. Rava said: And Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who carries out a hoe on Shabbat with which to dig or a Torah scroll from which to read is liable. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as if those acts of carrying out are also in the category of a prohibited labor not necessary for its own sake because the carrier’s intention is to dig or to read, if so, according to Rabbi Shimon, how can you find an act of carrying that would be considered a prohibited labor necessary for its own sake? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a novel element in Rava’s statement. Lest you say that Rabbi Shimon deems one liable only in a case where one carries out an object for the sake of the one carrying it, as well as for its own sake, for example, in a case where one carried out a hoe for its own sake, in order to sharpen its blade, and for the sake of the one carrying it, in order to dig with it, or one carried out a Torah scroll for its own sake, in order to emend it, and for the sake of the one carrying it, in order to read from it; therefore, Rava teaches us that Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for carrying out an object even when it is carried only for his own sake and not for the sake of the object.
  The Gemara relates: There was a corpse in the city of Derokera and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak permitted carrying it out into a <i>karmelit</i> on Shabbat because, for some reason, it could not remain where it was. Rabbi Yoḥanan, brother of Mar, son of Rabbana, said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In accordance with whose opinion did you permit moving the corpse to the <i>karmelit</i>? If it was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, say that in that case Rabbi Shimon exempted one from the obligation to bring a sin-offering. However, there remains a rabbinic prohibition. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: By God, have you entered into an understanding of the matter? Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda it is permitted to carry out the corpse, as did I say they may carry it out to the public domain? I said that it may be carried out into a <i>karmelit</i>, which is only prohibited by rabbinic law. With regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, the principle states: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah: “You shall not deviate from that which they tell you to the right or to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11).
  We learned there in a mishna discussing the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy: One who plucks white hairs that are signs of impurity, and similarly one who burned the unaffected skin in the midst of a leprous sore in an attempt to purify himself, violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “Take heed [<i>hishamer</i>] in the plague of leprosy” (Deuteronomy 24:8). This ruling is based on the principle that the term <i>hishamer</i> indicates a prohibition. On this topic, it was stated: With regard to one who plucks one of two white hairs, everyone agrees that he is liable because a single hair remains, which is less than the measure that determines impurity, i.e., two hairs. It is with regard to one who plucks one of three white hairs that there is a dispute between the <i>amora’im</i>. Rav Naḥman said: He is liable. Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt. The Gemara elaborates. Rav Naḥman said: He is liable because his actions were effective, as if another hair is removed, the impurity would cease. He thereby hastened his purification and is in violation of the prohibition. Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt because his actions were ineffective, as now, in any case, the impurity is intact even after he removed one hair. His act is ineffective, and therefore he does not violate the prohibition.
  Rav Sheshet said: From where do I derive and state my opinion? I derive it as we learned in the mishna: And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse and an olive-bulk of an animal carcass is liable. The Gemara elaborates: By inference, one who carries out half an olive-bulk is exempt. What, is it not taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who carries out half an olive-bulk of a corpse is liable? Is it not that the contradiction is resolved as follows? That which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: He is liable, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk. Because less than an olive-bulk of the corpse remained, it is no longer a source of ritual impurity. And that which we learned in the mishna: He is exempt, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half. Since an entire olive-bulk remains, the source of impurity remains intact. And Rav Naḥman explains it differently. Both this, the one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk, and that, the one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half, are liable. And that which we learned in the mishna: He is exempt, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from a large corpse. In that case, even Rav Naḥman agrees that his action was ineffective. Since he did not carry out a measure that determines liability, he is exempt.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who removes his fingernails with one another on Shabbat without scissors, or with his teeth, and the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands, and the same is true with regard to his mustache, and the same is true with regard to his beard, and the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blue eye shadow, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blush, Rabbi Eliezer deems them all liable, as they each performed a labor prohibited by Torah law. And the Rabbis prohibited performing all of these actions due to rabbinic decree. None of the actions constitute prohibited labors.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute is specifically with regard to a case where one removes his fingernails by hand; however, everyone agrees that one is liable if he removes them with a utensil. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We explicitly learned the phrase: With one another, in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the Rabbis also exempt one who removes his fingernail with a utensil, i.e., because one is not interested in the removed nail, he did not perform the prohibited labor of shearing, and that which was taught in the mishna: With one another, is intended to convey the far-reaching nature of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that one is liable even in a case where he removed his fingernails with one another; therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that this is not so.
  And Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute is specifically with regard to one who removes fingernails for himself; however, with regard to one removing fingernails for another, everyone agrees that he is exempt. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. We explicitly learned the phrase: His fingernails, in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable for cutting another’s fingernails as well, and that which was taught in the mishna: His fingernails, is intended to convey the far-reaching nature of the statement of the Rabbis that one is exempt even in a case where he removes his own nails, and all the more so in a case where he removes another’s; therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that everyone agrees that he is exempt when removing another’s nails.
  We learned in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands; Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. One of the Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One who removes enough of his hair to fill the opening of the scissors on Shabbat is liable. And how much is enough to fill the opening of the scissors? Rav Yehuda said: Two hairs. The Gemara asks: But was it not taught later in that <i>baraita</i>: And with regard to the Torah prohibition against removing one’s hair and causing baldness as an expression of mourning the dead: “Nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead” (Deuteronomy 14:1), one who removes two hairs is liable? Apparently, enough to fill the opening of a scissors is a different amount of hairs. The Gemara answers: Say that these are not two different measures. The <i>baraita</i> is saying: And the same is true for baldness, two is the measure.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who removes enough of his hair to fill the opening of the scissors on Shabbat is liable. And how much is enough to fill the opening of the scissors? It is two hairs. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable for removing even one hair. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that one who collects and plucks white hairs from among black ones is liable even if he removed a single hair. His actions indicate that one hair is significant for him. And this matter of plucking white hairs is prohibited for men even on weekdays, as it is stated: “A woman shall not don a man’s clothes, and a man shall not wear a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5). The Sages derive that any action typically performed by women for beautification is prohibited for men.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to a fingernail, the majority of which has been severed, and it is only connected to the finger by a small piece; and with regard to shreds of skin, the majority of which have been severed from the body; by hand, one is permitted to completely remove them on Shabbat. If he removes them with a utensil, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara wonders: Is there any matter where one who performs an action with a utensil is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he performs that action by hand, it is permitted <i>ab initio</i>, and it is not even prohibited by rabbinic decree? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar meant to say: If the majority has been severed, removing the rest by hand is permitted. If he removes the rest with a utensil he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>. And if the majority has not yet been severed, if he removes the rest by hand he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>. If he did so with a utensil, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yehuda said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar in this matter. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that is if the partially severed portions of the fingernail were severed facing upward near the nail and cause him pain; in that case one may remove them <i>ab initio</i>.
  We learned in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and one who applies blue eye shadow, and one who applies blush; Rabbi Eliezer deems them liable by Torah law. The Gemara asks: For performance of what prohibited labor is a woman who braids her hair, or who applies blue eye shadow, or who applies blush on Shabbat liable? Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: A woman who braids her hair is liable due to weaving, as braiding and weaving are similar actions. A woman who applies blue eye shadow is liable due to writing. A woman who applies blush is liable due to spinning. Women would make a string from a doughy substance and pass it over their faces to redden their complexion. The Rabbis said before Rabbi Abbahu: And is that the typical manner of weaving, and is that the typical manner of writing, and is that the typical manner of spinning? Rabbi Eliezer would certainly agree that one who performs a prohibited labor in an atypical manner is exempt. Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: This matter was explained to me by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, himself.
  
  Daf 95a
  
  A woman who applies eye shadow is liable due to dyeing; one who braids her hair and applies blush is liable due to the prohibition against building. The Gemara asks about this: And is that the typical manner of building? The Gemara answers: Yes, braiding one’s hair is considered building, as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya taught that the verse states: “And the Lord God built the side that He took from Adam into a woman” (Genesis 2:22), which teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, braided Eve’s hair and brought her to Adam. From where is it derived that this is the meaning of built? It is because in the islands of the sea they call braiding building. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to a woman who braids her hair and who applies eye shadow or blush on Shabbat, if she did it for herself, she is exempt; if she did it for another, she is liable. This is because a woman cannot perform these actions for herself in as complete a fashion as she can for someone else. And, so too, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would say in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: A woman may not apply rouge to her face on Shabbat because by doing so she is dyeing, which is one of the prohibited labors on Shabbat.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who milks an animal, and one who sets milk to curdle, and one who makes cheese, in the measure of a dried fig-bulk, and one who sweeps the house, and one who sprinkles water on the floor, and one who removes honeycombs, if he did so unwittingly on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he did so intentionally on a Festival, he receives forty lashes; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: Both this, on Shabbat and that, on a Festival, these actions are only prohibited due to a rabbinic decree, not by Torah law. Therefore, one is neither liable to bring a sin-offering nor to receive lashes for performing those actions.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Naḥman bar Gurya happened to come to Neharde’a. The students asked him: For what prohibited labor is one who milks liable? He said to them: For milking. For what prohibited labor is one who sets milk to curdle liable? He said to them: For setting milk to curdle. For what is a person who makes cheese liable? He said to them: For making cheese. They said to him: Your teacher was a reed cutter in a swamp who did not know how to explain the mishna to his students. He came and asked those questions in the study hall. They said to him: One who milks is liable for performing the prohibited labor of extracting, which is a subcategory of threshing, on Shabbat. This is because when one extracts milk from a cow it is similar to the act of threshing, where one removes the desired content from its covering. One who sets milk is liable for the prohibited labor of selecting because part of the milk is separated and made into congealed milk. And one who makes cheese is liable for building because the cheese within the milk assumes a solid form, which is similar to the process of building.
  The <i>baraita</i> cited above taught: With regard to one who sweeps the house, and one who sprinkles water on the floor, and one who removes honeycombs, if he did so unwittingly on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he did so intentionally on a Festival, he receives forty lashes; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Elazar said: What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Eliezer? His rationale is as it is written: “And he put forth the end of the rod that was in his hand and dipped it in the honeycomb [<i>yarat hadevash</i>]” (i Samuel 14:27). The Gemara wonders: What does a forest [<i>ya’ar</i>] have to do with honey [<i>devash</i>]? Rather, it comes to tell you: Just as with regard to a forest, one who picks from a tree on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too, with regard to a honeycomb, one who removes honey from it on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  The Gemara relates: Ameimar permitted sprinkling water in the city of Meḥoza. He said: What is the reason that the Rabbis said it is prohibited to sprinkle water? It was due to concern lest one come to smooth out holes in an unpaved floor. Here, in Meḥoza, there are no holes in the floor because all the houses have stone floors. The Gemara also relates: Rava Tosfa’a, an expert on the <i>Tosefta</i>, found that Ravina was suffering on Shabbat from the dusty hot air in the house. And some say that Mar Kashisha, son of Rava, found that Rav Ashi was suffering from the dusty hot air. Mar Kashisha said to Rav Ashi: And does my Master not hold in accordance with this <i>halakha</i> that was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who wishes to sprinkle water on the floor of his house on Shabbat, where it is otherwise prohibited, brings a large basin full of water, and washes his face in this corner, then moves the basin and washes his hands in this corner, his feet in this corner, and it will eventuate that the floor of the entire house is sprinkled by itself from the water that splashed in a backhanded manner? Rav Ashi said to him: It did not enter my mind to employ that method.
  One of the Sages taught: A wise woman sprinkles water on the floor of her house on Shabbat by washing different vessels in different parts of the house. And now that we hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that it is permitted to perform an unintentional act on Shabbat, it is permitted to sweep and sprinkle water on the floor of a house on Shabbat even <i>ab initio</i>, because one’s intention is not to smooth the holes in the floor.
  MISHNA: One who severs a leaf or a fruit from a plant growing in a perforated flowerpot on Shabbat is liable, as a plant in a flowerpot with holes in it has the legal status of a plant connected to the ground. Picking from it is prohibited due to reaping. And one who picks from an imperforated pot is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>. And Rabbi Shimon deems one who does so exempt in both this, the case of the perforated flowerpot, and that, the case of the imperforated flowerpot.
  GEMARA: Abaye raised a contradiction before Rava, and some say it was Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav who raised the contradiction before Rav: On the one hand, we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt in both this case and that case. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon equates a perforated pot with an imperforated pot. And they raised a contradiction: Rabbi Shimon says: The only difference between a perforated pot and an imperforated pot
  
  Daf 95b
  
  is with regard to rendering seeds capable of becoming ritually impure. Seeds that are in a perforated pot have the legal status of seeds planted in the ground and, as such, cannot become ritually impure. Seeds that are in an imperforated pot are considered detached from the ground and can become ritually impure. Apparently, in other areas of <i>halakha</i>, Rabbi Shimon holds that a plant in a perforated pot has the legal status of a plant in the ground (<i>Me’iri</i>). He said to him: With regard to all matters of <i>halakha</i>, Rabbi Shimon equates the status of a perforated pot with that of being detached. However, the matter of impurity is different, as the Torah amplified purity with regard to seeds, as it is stated: “And if anything falls from their carcasses upon any sowing seed that is sown, it is pure” (Leviticus 11:37). The repetitive language: “Any sowing seed that is sown” teaches that any seed that can be characterized as sowing, including one growing in a perforated pot, remains pure. However, in other areas of <i>halakha</i>, the status of a perforated pot is equal to that of an imperforated pot.
  A certain Elder raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In a case where the root of a plant in a perforated pot is opposite the hole, what would Rabbi Shimon say in terms of whether or not it is considered attached to the ground? He was silent and did not say anything to him. The Gemara relates that once the same Elder found Rabbi Zeira, who was sitting and saying: And Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the hole in the flowerpot is large enough to render it ritually pure, i.e., unable to hold olives, it is considered attached to the earth with regard to Shabbat. He said to him: Now, I raised a dilemma before you as to Rabbi Shimon’s ruling in a case where the root is opposite the hole, and you did not say anything to me. With regard to a case where the root is not actually opposite the hole, but its hole is large enough to render it pure, do you need to tell me that the dilemma whether or not it is considered detached is unresolved? Rather, this must certainly be understood differently.
  Abaye said: And if the statement of Rabbi Zeira that Rabbi Shimon holds that a perforated pot is considered attached to the ground, was stated, it was stated as follows: And Rabbi Shimon agrees that if the pot was perforated below the level where it could hold a quarter of a <i>log</i>, it is no longer considered a vessel, and the plants are considered attached to the ground.
  Apropos the purification of an earthenware vessel, the Gemara cites that Rava said: Five measures were stated with regard to holes in an earthenware vessel: If it was perforated with a small hole from which liquid seeps, it is no longer a vessel and is ritually pure in terms of the impurity of a shard. Certain shards of impure earthenware vessels remain impure if they can still be used. If it has a hole, even a small one that liquids can flow through, it can no longer transmit ritual impurity. However, it remains a complete vessel in which to sanctify the purification waters of the red heifer, which require a whole vessel. And if it was perforated with a hole large enough to enable liquid to enter the vessel, it is ritually pure in terms of sanctifying the purification waters in it, but it remains a vessel in terms of rendering seeds in it capable of becoming ritually impure. And if it was perforated with a hole the size of a small root, it is ritually pure in terms of rendering seeds in it capable of becoming ritually impure, but it remains a vessel that can become ritually impure in terms of holding olives. And if it was perforated with a hole large enough to enable olives to go out, it is pure in terms of the impurity of all other vessels that can hold olives, but it remains a vessel in terms of holding pomegranates. If the vessel is designated for use in holding pomegranates, it can become ritually impure because it is suitable for that use. If it was perforated with a hole large enough to enable pomegranates to go out, it is ritually pure from any type of impurity. And if the mouth of an earthenware vessel that is in a room with a corpse is surrounded by a sealed cover, it does not become ritually pure, even if its hole was large enough to enable a pomegranate to go out. It protects whatever is inside the vessel from contracting impurity, unless the majority of the vessel is broken.
  Rav Asi said: I heard that with regard to an earthenware vessel, the measure of the hole that renders it unable to become ritually impure is large enough to enable a pomegranate to go out. Rava said to him: Perhaps you only heard this when its mouth is surrounded by a sealed cover, but an ordinary earthenware vessel becomes ritually pure with a hole big enough to enable an olive to go out. The Gemara asks: Isn’t Rava himself the one who said that an earthenware vessel that is surrounded by a sealed cover protects whatever is inside the vessel from contracting impurity unless the majority of the vessel is broken? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.
  
  Daf 96a
  
  This statement, that a hole must be large enough to enable a pomegranate to go out in order to purify the vessel, is referring to large vessels. And this statement, that teaches that a vessel is purified only when the majority of the vessel is broken, is referring to small vessels. Rav Asi said that they teach this <i>halakha</i>: With regard to an earthenware vessel, the measure of the hole that renders it unable to become ritually impure is large enough to enable liquid to enter it. And they only said: The measure of a small hole from which liquid seeps, with regard to the impurity of a shard [<i>gistera</i>]. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers that Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: A shard is used as a plate beneath a perforated earthenware vessel. If the shard is also perforated and leaks, it is no longer of any use. Because one does not say: Bring another shard to seal the leak of a shard, but throws it out immediately.
  Ulla said: Two <i>amora’im</i> in the West, Eretz Yisrael, disagree about this topic: They are Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, and Rabbi Yosei bar Zavda. One said: The measure of a hole that purifies an earthenware vessel is large enough to enable a pomegranate to go out. And one said: The size of a small root. And your mnemonic to remember that neither holds that the measure is size of an olive is the expression: Both one who increases and one who decreases. They hold extreme positions in this dispute and eschew the intermediate position. Rav Ḥinnana bar Kahana said an intermediate position in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: An earthenware vessel becomes ritually pure with a hole large enough to enable olives to go out. And Mar Kashisha, son of Rabba, concluded this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: And vessels that have been perforated are like dung vessels, and so too, stone vessels and earth vessels that were not baked in a kiln, which neither become impure by Torah law nor by rabbinic law. And, as far as the matter of an earthenware vessel with a sealed cover in a room with a corpse, it maintains its impurity until the majority of it is broken.
  
  MISHNA: One who throws an object on Shabbat from the private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to the private domain is liable. However, one who throws an object from the private domain to the other private domain, and the object passes through the public domain between the two, Rabbi Akiva deems him liable for carrying into the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  How so? If there are two balconies [<i>gezuztra’ot</i>] that are private domains opposite each other on either side of the public domain, one who passes or throws an object from the one on this side to the one on that side is exempt. However, if the balconies were on the same level on the same side of the public thoroughfare, and the public domain separated the two, one who passes from one to the other is liable, and one who throws is exempt, as that method, passing, was the service of the Levites who carried the beams of the Tabernacle.
  In the Tabernacle, two wagons along the same level stood behind one another in the public domain, and the Levites passed the beams from one wagon to the other through the public domain on the same side of a thoroughfare. But they did not throw from one wagon to another because the beams were heavy. Passing, which was performed in the Tabernacle, is prohibited. Throwing, which was not performed in the Tabernacle, is not prohibited.
  
  Daf 96b
  
  GEMARA: With regard to the main issue, the Gemara asks: After all, throwing is a subcategory of carrying out. Where is the primary category of prohibited labor of carrying out itself written in the Torah? Isn’t it necessary to clarify the primary category before discussing the subcategory? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As the verse said: “And Moses commanded, and they passed a proclamation throughout the camp saying: Neither man nor woman should perform any more work to contribute to the Sanctuary; and the people stopped bringing” (Exodus 36:6). According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Moses commanded the people to cease bringing contributions in order to prevent them from bringing their contributions on Shabbat. He then explains: Where was Moses sitting? He was in the camp of the Levites, and the Levites’ camp was the public domain. And he said to Israel: Do not carry out and bring objects from the private domain, your camp, to the public domain, the camp of the Levites.
  The Gemara asks: And how do you know that he was standing and commanding the people on Shabbat? Perhaps he was standing during the week, and Moses commanded the cessation of contributions because the labor of the Tabernacle was completed, since all the necessary material was already donated, as it is written: “And the work was sufficient for them for all of the work to perform it, and there was extra” (Exodus 36:7). Rather, derive this by means of a verbal analogy between passing mentioned in this context and passing mentioned with regard to Yom Kippur.
  It is written here, with regard to the Tabernacle: “And they passed a proclamation throughout the camp,” and it is written there, with regard to Yom Kippur: “And you shall pass a blast of a <i>shofar</i> on the tenth day of the seventh month, on Yom Kippur you shall sound a shofar throughout your land” (Leviticus 25:9). Just as there, with regard to the <i>shofar</i> of the Jubilee Year, passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor, so too, here passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source prohibiting carrying out from a private domain into the camp of the Levites. From where do we derive that carrying in is also considered a prohibited labor? The Gemara answers: It is a logical inference. After all, carrying is from one domain to another, so what difference is there to me whether it is carrying out or carrying in? Carrying from one domain to another is prohibited; the direction in which the object is carried makes no difference. However, carrying out is a primary category, while carrying in is a subcategory, as it is not stated explicitly in the biblical text.
  The Gemara now questions the distinction between primary categories and subcategories of labor. After all, one is liable for this, carrying out, and one is liable for that, carrying in. Why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? What is the point of the distinction?
  The Gemara answers: The practical ramification is that if one performs two different primary categories together, or alternatively, if one performs two subcategories of two different primary categories together, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And if one performs a primary category of labor together with its own subcategory, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering.
  The Gemara further asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who renders one liable for the performance of a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed together with a primary category, why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? The Gemara answers: According to him, that which was a significant labor in the Tabernacle is called a primary category; that which was not a significant labor in the Tabernacle is not called a primary category. Alternatively, perhaps that which is written explicitly in the Torah is called a primary category, and that which is not written explicitly in the Torah is called a subcategory.
  And as for the <i>halakha</i> that we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat a distance of four cubits in the public domain and it lands on a wall, if the wall was higher than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it into the air, and he is exempt. If the wall was lower than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it onto the ground, and one who throws an object a distance of four cubits onto the ground in the public domain is liable.
  The Gemara asks: If one threw an object four cubits in the public domain, and it did not go from one domain to another, from where do we derive that he is liable? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya said: Because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle throw their needles to each other when they need to borrow the other’s needle. Throwing was a labor performed in the Tabernacle; therefore, one is liable for performing it. The Gemara wonders: Why do weavers need needles? Rather, emend the statement to say: Because those who sewed the tapestries throw their needles to each other.
  The Gemara asks: Is it clear that they had to throw needles to each other? Perhaps they sat next to each other. The Gemara answers: It is clear that they kept their distance from each other. If they sat too close, they would reach each other and hurt one another with their needles. The Gemara asks: Perhaps, even though they kept their distance, they sat within four cubits of each other, and they would not throw the needles farther than that. In the absence of proof of their sitting arrangement, this <i>halakha</i> cannot be derived from those who sewed the tapestries.
  Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: Throwing an object four cubits in the public domain is prohibited because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle threw the shuttle, to which the thread of the warp was tied on the tapestry. Weaving entails throwing the thread of the warp through the threads of the woof. The Gemara asks: That is not actually throwing, as didn’t the weaver hold the end of the thread in his hand? One is not liable for throwing an object when part of it remains in his hand. Rather, this must be referring to the final throw, when the weaving was finished and the weaver released the thread from his hand.
  The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the shuttle go in an exempt domain? The tapestry was less than four handbreadths wide, rendering it an exempt domain even though it is four cubits long. One who throws in an exempt domain is exempt. Rather, it is because the weavers of tapestries throw the shuttle to those who seek to borrow it from them. The Gemara asks: But perhaps they sat next to each other? The Gemara answers: That is impossible because they would reach one another and disturb one another when tightening the thread at the end of the tapestry.
  The Gemara asks: And perhaps they were not in a straight line but staggered. That would enable the weavers to sit adjacent to each other without disturbing each other’s work. And furthermore, did they borrow from each another? Wasn’t the following taught in a <i>baraita</i> of the Sage Luda? The verse states: “And all the wise men who performed all of the work of the Sanctuary came, each one from the work he was doing” (Exodus 36:4). From that verse it is derived: Each performed the labor from his own work, and they would not perform the labor from their friends’ work. Each person had his own tools and did not need to borrow from others.
  And furthermore, the Gemara asks: Even if the <i>halakha</i> of throwing was derived from here, from where do we derive that one who carries an object four cubits in the public domain is liable? Rather, apparently, this <i>halakha</i> is not derived from the labor performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. Rather, all the <i>halakhot</i> related to carrying four cubits in the public domain are learned through tradition and not derived from the text.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The wood gatherer who was sentenced to death for desecrating Shabbat (see Numbers 15:33–36) was one who carried four cubits in the public domain. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of carrying. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: He was one who detached still-growing branches. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of detaching. Rav Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ya’akov, said: He was one who gathered sticks together into a pile.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical ramification of determining precisely which prohibited labor the wood gatherer performed? The Gemara answers: The ramification is with regard to the statement of Rav, as Rav said: I found a hidden scroll in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya. And in it, it is written that Isi ben Yehuda says: The number of primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat is forty-less-one. And if one performed all of them in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: One and no more? We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one.
  This citation from the hidden scroll cannot be accurate. Rather, emend this statement in the hidden scroll and say that one is not liable for one of them. There is a primary category of labor among the thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor whose violation does not incur the death penalty. The identity of this category that is not punishable by death was not specified.
  It is obvious to Rav Yehuda that one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to the <i>baraita</i> that one who detaches is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov that one who gathers is liable to receive the death penalty. In other words, this Master maintains: With regard to this labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. And this Master maintains: With regard to that labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. Each Sage maintains that the prohibited labor that he attributed to the wood gatherer incurs the death penalty and is certainly not the labor referred to in the hidden scroll.
  On the topic of the wood gatherer, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The wood gatherer mentioned in the Torah was Zelophehad, and it says: “And the children of Israel were in the desert and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat” (Numbers 15:32), and below, in the appeal of the daughters of Zelophehad, it is stated: “Our father died in the desert and he was not among the company of them that gathered themselves together against the Lord in the company of Korah, but he died in his own sin, and he had no sons” (Numbers 27:3). Just as below the man in the desert is Zelophehad, so too, here, in the case of the wood gatherer, the unnamed man in the desert is Zelophehad; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement that the wood gatherer was Zelophehad, the Torah concealed his identity, and you reveal it. And if it the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man.
  
  Daf 97a
  
  The Gemara asks: However, didn’t Rabbi Akiva derive this by means of a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira did not learn a verbal analogy. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira had no tradition of this verbal analogy from his teachers, and therefore he disagreed with Rabbi Akiva’s conclusion. The Gemara asks: However, according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, from where was Zelophehad’s liability derived? Why was he executed? The Gemara answers: Zelophehad was among those who “presumed to ascend to the top of the mountain” (Numbers 14:44) in the wake of the sin of the spies.
  On a similar note, Rabbi Akiva revealed an additional matter not explicitly articulated in the Torah. You say that when Aaron and Miriam spoke against Moses, both Aaron and Miriam were struck with leprosy, as it written: “And God became angry at them and He left, and the cloud departed from above the tent, and behold, Miriam was leprous like snow. And Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was leprous” (Numbers 12:9–10). The verse’s statement that God became angry at both of them teaches that Aaron, too, became leprous; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement, the Torah concealed Aaron’s punishment and you reveal it. And if the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man.
  The Gemara asks: However, didn’t Rabbi Akiva derive this from the plural pronoun them, meaning that God was angry with both of them? The Gemara answers: God’s anger in that verse was manifest in a mere rebuke, not in leprosy. A <i>baraita</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that Aaron also became leprous, as it is written: “And Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was leprous” (Numbers 12:10), and it was taught: This teaches that he turned, i.e., he was healed, from his leprosy, as he too had been afflicted.
  On the topic of Miriam’s leprosy, the Gemara cites that which Reish Lakish said: One who suspects the innocent of indiscretion is afflicted in his body, as it is written: “And Moses answered and said: But they will not believe me and will not hearken to my voice, for they will say, God did not appear to you” (Exodus 4:1), and it is revealed before the Holy One, Blessed be He, that the Jewish people would believe. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: They are believers, the children of believers; and ultimately, you will not believe.
  They are believers, as it is written: “And the people believed once they heard that God had remembered the children of Israel, and that He saw their affliction, and they bowed and they prostrated” (Exodus 4:31). The children of believers, as it says with regard to Abraham our Patriarch: “And he believed in God, and He counted it for him as righteousness” (Genesis 15:6). Ultimately, you will not believe, as it is stated: “And God said to Moses and to Aaron: Because you did not believe in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel” (Numbers 20:12). From where do we know that Moses was afflicted in his body? As it is written: “And God said to him further: Bring your hand to your bosom, and he brought his hand to his bosom and he took it out and behold, his hand was leprous like snow” (Exodus 4:6).
  On this topic, Rava said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said: The divine attribute of beneficence takes effect more quickly than the divine attribute of punishment. From where is this derived? While, with regard to the divine attribute of punishment, it is written, “And he took it out and behold, his hand was leprous like snow” (Exodus 4:6), with regard to the divine attribute of beneficence it is written: “And He said: Return your hand to your bosom, and he returned his hand to his bosom and he took it out from his bosom and behold, it had returned to be like his original flesh” (Exodus 4:7). The Gemara analyzes this as follows: It was already from his bosom that it returned to be like his original flesh. Moses’ hand was healed even before he took his hand out.
  The Gemara proceeds to discuss another miracle that transpired at that time. With regard to the verse, “And each man threw down his staff and they became serpents, and Aaron’s staff swallowed their staffs” (Exodus 7:12), Rabbi Elazar said: This was a miracle within a miracle. It was Aaron’s staff, not his serpent, that swallowed the other staffs.
  We learned in the mishna that there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in a case where one threw an object from the private domain to the other private domain through the public domain between the two. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable, as one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  Rabba raised a dilemma with regard to their dispute: Are they disagreeing with regard to a case where the object traveled below ten handbreadths from the ground? And, if so, it is with regard to this point that they disagree: As this Master, Rabbi Akiva holds: We say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. The object is considered as if it was actually placed in the public domain after being lifted from the private domain. And this Master, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. However, with regard to a case where the object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt, and we do not derive the legal status of throwing from the legal status of passing. Although everyone agrees that one who passes an object from a private domain to another private domain via a public domain is liable, even if it was passed above ten handbreadths, as that was the service of the Levites, one who throws an object in that manner is exempt.
  Or perhaps, they are disagreeing with regard to a case where the object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, and it is with regard to this that they disagree: As this Master, Rabbi Akiva, holds: We derive the legal status of throwing from the legal status of passing. Therefore, one who throws an object that passes through the airspace of a public domain higher than ten handbreadths from the ground is liable. And this Master, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not derive throwing from passing. However, with regard to a case where the object traveled beneath the ten handbreadth airspace of the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason for that? An object in airspace is considered at rest.
  Rav Yosef said: Rav Ḥisda had a dilemma with regard to this matter, and Rav Hamnuna resolved it for him from this <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an object that travels from the private domain to the other private domain, and it passes through the public domain itself, Rabbi Akiva deems one liable and the Rabbis deem one exempt. From the fact that it says in the <i>baraita</i>: Through the public domain itself, it is obvious that it is with regard to a case where the object traveled below ten handbreadths from the ground that they disagree.
  And with regard to what form of transfer is the <i>baraita</i> dealing? If you say it refers to passing an object in his hand, is it only when he passes it below ten handbreadths that he is liable? When he passes it above ten handbreadths is he not liable? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: One who carries out a load from a private domain to a public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground is liable, as that was the manner in which the descendants of Kehat, from whom we derived the laws of carrying, carried their burden in the Tabernacle? Rather, isn’t this <i>baraita</i> referring to a case of throwing, and it is in a case where the object travels below ten handbreadths from the ground that one is liable, and above ten handbreadths from the ground one is not liable? Learn from it that it is with regard to whether or not an object in airspace is considered at rest that they disagree. The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the crux of their dispute.
  And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva deems one liable even if the object travels above ten handbreadths. And that term that was taught in the <i>baraita</i>, the public domain itself, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem one exempt even if the object traveled in the public domain itself, and all the more so if it traveled above ten handbreadths, which is no longer within the bounds of the public domain.
  This opinion of Rabbi Elazar disagrees with the opinion of Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi, as Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi said: If the thrown object traveled within three handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is liable because the Sages established the principle of <i>lavud</i>. <i>Lavud</i> means that any object within three handbreadths of another object is considered to be attached to it. Therefore, an object that traveled within three handbreadths of the ground is considered to have come to a complete rest. If the thrown object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt. If the thrown object traveled between three handbreadths and ten handbreadths from the ground, we have come to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Within three handbreadths of the ground, everyone agrees that one is liable; above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt by Torah law, and it is only prohibited due to rabbinic decree. The Sages prohibited throwing or passing an object from the private domain of one person set to the private domain of another person unless a joining of the courtyards is set. And if both of the private domains were his it is permitted. If the thrown object traveled between three handbreadths and ten handbreadths from the ground, Rabbi Akiva deems one liable and the Sages deem him exempt.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> cited above: And if both of the private domains were his, i.e., they belonged to the same person, it is permitted. Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rav’s opinion, as an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to the following case: Concerning two houses on two opposite sides of the public domain, even if they belong to the same person, Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: It is prohibited to throw an object from this private domain to that private domain. And Shmuel said: It is permitted to throw from this private domain to that private domain. The Gemara rejects this and states: Didn’t we already establish that Rav’s statement is referring to a case where one of the houses was elevated and one was low? Due to the disparity in height, the concern is that at times the object will fall into the public domain, and one will come to bring it in from there and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.
  Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Hamnuna, and some say that Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: From where is this matter that the Sages stated: Any objects less than three handbreadths apart are considered to be <i>lavud</i>, attached? He said to him: Because it is impossible for the public domain to be made level with planes. Since the space cannot be completely smooth, even the minor differences in the ground level throughout the public domain must be taken into consideration.
  He asked him: If so, if that is the reason, objects within three handbreadths should also be considered <i>lavud</i>. Why is it that only objects within less than three handbreadths are considered attached? And furthermore, an inference can be made from that which we learned in the mishna with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>sukka</i>: If one lowers the walls of a <i>sukka</i> from the top to the bottom, if the bottom of the wall is above three handbreadths from the ground, the <i>sukka</i> is invalid because it is considered to be lacking walls. By inference, if one lowers the walls so that the bottom of the wall is below three handbreadths from the ground, it is valid. In this case, the rationale that it is impossible for the public domain to be made level does not apply.
  He rejects this: There, the reason that a space larger than three handbreadths is not considered to be part of the wall is because it, i.e., the wall, is a partition that goats pass through. Therefore, it is a partition incapable of serving its function. Once a partition is below three handbreadths, it will obstruct the passage of the goats. Furthermore, according to this explanation, it works out well when the measure of three handbreadths is below, adjacent to the ground. If any more than three handbreadths of space are between the ground and the wall, it is not considered a wall. However, there are several <i>halakhot</i> in which <i>lavud</i> applies above and not near the ground, e.g., when the roofing of the <i>sukka</i> is not connected to the walls. What, then, can be said to explain that <i>halakha</i>? Rather, the conclusion is that the <i>halakha</i> which states that anything that is less than three is considered to be <i>lavud</i> is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, learned through tradition.
  The Sages taught a case in a <i>baraita</i> similar to the one discussed in the mishna: One who throws an object from the public domain to the other public domain and the object passes through the private domain between the two, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying into the private domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. With regard to this, Rav and Shmuel both said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds him liable only if the private domain between the two public areas is covered with a roof. In that case, we say that the house is considered full and an object that passes through it is considered as if it landed upon an actual object. However, if the private domain is not covered, he is not liable even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. On this topic, Rav Ḥana said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the second public domain, and one for carrying in, when the object initially entered the private domain.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥana was sitting, and the following point was difficult for him:
  
  Daf 97b
  
  Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems one liable for a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed with a primary category of prohibited labor? After all, carrying out and carrying in constitute a primary category of prohibited labor and its subcategory.
  Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that Shabbat is mentioned in the verse: “These are the things [<i>eleh hadevarim</i>] that God has commanded to perform them” (Exodus 35:1)? Several points are derived from the superfluous emphases in this verse. The Torah could simply have stated: This is a thing [<i>davar</i>]. When it states things [<i>devarim</i>] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article the in the term the things [<i>hadevarim</i>] adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word <i>eleh</i>, which are <i>alef</i>, one; <i>lamed</i>, thirty; and <i>heh</i>, five, is thirty-six. The phrase: These are the things, alludes to three plus thirty-six derivation, i.e., the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that there are a fixed number of primary categories of labor, he would certainly hold a person liable for the primary categories but not for the subcategories. 
  Rav Yosef said to him: The Master taught Rav Yehuda’s statement with regard to this, and consequently, he encounters a difficulty. One statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. We learn the statement of Rav Yehuda with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore there is no difficulty for us.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and it traveled four cubits in the public domain, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the public domain and one for carrying the object four cubits through the public domain. The Rabbis deem him exempt for carrying four cubits in the public domain. And it must be interpreted that way because if it would enter your mind to say that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring only one sin-offering, by inference, the Rabbis deem him completely exempt. How is that possible? Didn’t he carry an object out from the private domain into the public domain? This proof is rejected: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps I could actually say to you that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring one sin-offering and the Rabbis deem him completely exempt, and how do you find that circumstance? In a case where he said: My intention is that as soon it, the object, goes out into the public domain it will immediately come to rest.
  And they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that we say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was fulfilled. As soon as the object enters the airspace of the public domain it is considered to have come to rest. And the Rabbis maintain that we do not say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was not fulfilled and he is exempt. However, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: It could not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda adds even lining up the threads of the warp and beating the threads of the woof to the list of primary categories of labor. The Rabbis said to him: Lining up is a subcategory subsumed under the primary category of stretching the threads of the warp within the loom, and beating is subsumed under the primary category of weaving. Is this not referring to a case where one performed both lining up and beating together, and learn from it that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for both a subcategory and a primary category of labor when they are performed together?
  The Gemara rejects this proof: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps it is actually referring to a case where one performed this action alone and this action alone, and Rabbi Yehuda does not deem one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor. And Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this. Rabbi Yehuda maintains as follows: These actions of lining up and beating are additional primary categories of labor, and the Rabbis maintain as follows: These are subcategories.
  Know that this is so, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Rabbi Yehuda adds. The Gemara explains this quote from the <i>baraita</i>: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda meant that these are primary categories of labor, what is the meaning of: He adds? It means he adds primary categories of labor. However, if you say that he meant that these are subcategories, what is the meaning of: He adds? It was also stated that it was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said: Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring only one sin-offering.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And according to what originally entered our mind that Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring two sin-offerings, how could he be liable for both carrying out from the private domain and for carrying four cubits in the public domain? If one only wanted the object to land here at the beginning of the public domain, he did not want it to land here, four cubits into the public domain. Conversely, if one only wanted the object to land here, four cubits into the public domain, he did not want it to land here, at the beginning of the public domain. Rav Ashi said to Ravina: It is possible in a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. One indicated that his intention would be fulfilled wherever the thrown object lands.
  Concerning throwing an object on Shabbat from one domain to another and within a single domain, the Gemara raises several issues with regard to intention when throwing. It is obvious that one who intended to throw an object eight cubits in a public domain and actually threw it only four cubits is liable because that case is similar to a case where one wrote the word <i>shem</i>, the first two letters of the name Shimon. In the case of writing <i>shem</i>, the individual performed the prohibited labor of writing a two-letter word, even though he did not complete the word that he originally intended to write. The question is as follows: What is the <i>halakha</i> if one intended to throw an object four cubits and threw it eight? Do we say he did indeed carry the object, or perhaps we say that ultimately the object did not land where he wanted it to land? But is that not precisely what Ravina said to Rav Ashi, as mentioned above? And Rav Ashi said in response that it is referring to a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. In such a scenario one is liable, because he expressed the fact that he is contented with any labor that will be performed with the object.
  Furthermore, the first case, which seems obvious, also requires clarification. And that which you said, that this is similar to a case where one wrote the word <i>shem</i>, the first two letters of the name Shimon, is it in fact similar? There, as long as the letters of <i>shem</i>, <i>shin</i> and <i>mem</i>, are not written, the name Shimon cannot be written. Here, where one intended to throw the object eight cubits and he threw it only four, is it true that as long as it was not thrown four cubits it cannot be thrown eight? An object can be thrown eight cubits without first landing after four cubits. The question remains unresolved.
  The Sages taught: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the other public domain through the private domain, he is liable if he throws an object a total of four cubits in both parts of the public domain.
  
  Daf 98a
  
  If he throws it less than four cubits, he is exempt, as he is neither liable for carrying from domain to domain nor for carrying in the public domain. The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us with this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: He is teaching us the following two things. First, that domains join together; even though one public domain is separated from the other by a private domain, they are treated as one domain. And second, that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. The object is not considered to have landed in a private domain, and therefore the one who threw it is exempt.
  Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said that Rav Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who carries an object four cubits in the covered public domain is exempt because it is not similar to the flags of the camp of Israel in the desert, which were not covered. The Gemara wonders: Is that so? Weren’t the wagons on which they transported the beams of the Tabernacle covered? The beams formed a covering over the wagons. And even so, Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: The areas that were beneath the wagons, and between them, and on their sides are all considered to have been the public domain. Apparently, even a covered public domain, like the space beneath the wagons, has the legal status of a public domain. The Gemara answers: When Rav said that the space beneath the wagons had the legal status of a public domain, he was referring to when the beams were arranged in stacks. The beams did not cover the entire area of the wagon. There was space between the stacks.
  The Gemara asks: After all, how much was the length of a wagon? It was five cubits. How much was the width of a beam? It was a cubit and a half. How many beams could one place on a wagon? One could place three stacks of beams, totaling four and a half cubits. If so, half a cubit of open space remained. When the Master distributes half a cubit between the stacks of beams it is considered <i>lavud</i>, attached, as the space between each stack was less than three handbreadths. The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that they would place the beams on their width? They would place them on their depth, which was one cubit wide, and therefore there was a greater distance between the rows.
  The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how much was the depth of a beam? It was one cubit. How many stacks would they place? They would place four stacks. One cubit of open space remained. When the Master distributes one cubit between the four stacks of beams it is considered <i>lavud</i>, as two handbreadths separated each stack. The Gemara adds: This statement of Rav works out well according to the opinion of the one who said that the beams in the Tabernacle were one cubit thick at the bottom, and they narrowed to a fingerbreadth as they reached the top. According to that opinion, there was a space larger than three handbreadths at least between the tops of the beams, and therefore the area beneath that part of the wagon was not covered. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that just as they were one cubit thick at the bottom, so too, the beams were one cubit thick on top, what can be said? In that case, the space between the stacks was less than three handbreadths, and area beneath the wagon had the legal status of a covered public domain.
  Rav Kahana said: When we said that the underside of the wagon was considered to be a public domain, the statement was not referring to when the beams were stacked on them. When the wagon was empty and consisted of the frames that held the beams in place, beneath the wagon was an uncovered public domain. The Gemara asks: But where would they place the frames? On top of the wagon when the beams were already stacked on it and the wagon itself was already covered by the beams, as stated above (<i>ge’onim</i>).
  
  Daf 98b
  
  Shmuel said: It is referring to the stakes of the Tabernacle. Before the Levites would place the beams on the wagon, they would position the stakes, which were particularly narrow. Therefore, the space between them was greater than three handbreadths, and the area beneath the wagons was therefore considered an uncovered public domain (<i>ge’onim</i>).
  The Sages taught: The Tabernacle beams were one cubit thick at the bottom, and they narrowed to a fingerbreadth as they reached the top, as it is stated: “And they shall match at the bottom, and together they will be ended [<i>tamim</i>] at the top toward a single ring; so shall it be for them both, they shall form the two corners” (Exodus 26:24). And below, when the children of Israel crossed the Jordan River, it says: “And those who went down toward the Sea of Arava at the Dead Sea came to an end [<i>tamu</i>]” (Joshua 3:16). <i>Tam</i> means finished or terminated. Here, too, the beams narrowed as they reached the top until they were virtually terminated; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Just as they were one cubit thick at the bottom, so too, they were one cubit thick at the top, as it is stated: Together.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: <i>Tamim</i>? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Neḥemya explains that this word teaches that they should bring whole beams and they should not bring planks and attach them. The Gemara asks: And according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, isn’t it written: Together? The Gemara answers: That comes to teach that they should not be positioned askew from each other; rather, they should be perfectly aligned.
  The Gemara asks further: Granted, according to the one who said: Just as they were one cubit thick at the bottom, so too, they were one cubit thick at the top, it is understandable why it is written: “And for the back of the Tabernacle westward you shall make six beams. And you shall make two beams for the corners of the Tabernacle in the back” (Exodus 26:22–23). This means that the width of these beams comes and covers the remaining thickness of those. However, according to the one who said that they were one cubit thick at the bottom and they narrowed to a fingerbreadth as they reached the top, they would not be perfectly aligned, as at the corners this beam goes in and this beam goes out. Part of the beam would protrude out of the Tabernacle. The Gemara answers that it was not only the thickness of the beam that narrowed. One pared the width of the beams as well so they were sloped like mountains and did not protrude.
  Following the dispute over the Tabernacle beams, the Gemara interprets other verses according to the two positions. It is written: “And the middle bar in the midst of the beams shall pass through from end to end” (Exodus 26:28). One of the Sages taught: It stood by means of a miracle, as this verse indicates that the middle bar was a single rod that ran along the length and width of the Tabernacle. The middle bar was miraculously bent through the beams on three sides.
  The Gemara cites a verse with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya: “And you shall make the Tabernacle with ten curtains…the length of each curtain shall be twenty-eight cubits and the width of each curtain four cubits; all the curtains shall have the same measurement” (Exodus 26:1–2). Place their length, i.e., the curtains’ length, across the width of the Tabernacle. How much was their length? It was twenty-eight cubits. Subtract ten cubits for the width of the roof of the Tabernacle, and nine cubits remain on this side, and nine on that side. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the beams narrowed to a fingerbreadth, the cubit of the sockets was exposed, as the beams were ten cubits high and the bottom cubit of the beams was placed in the sockets. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, the cubit at the top of the beams must be added to the overall width of the Tabernacle. In addition to the cubit of the sockets, a cubit of the beams themselves was exposed.
  Place their width, i.e., the curtains’ width, across the length of the Tabernacle. How much was their width? It was forty cubits. Subtract thirty cubits for the length of the Tabernacle’s roof and ten cubits remain. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the beams narrowed to a fingerbreadth, the curtain hung down the western side of the Tabernacle and the cubit of the sockets was covered. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, the cubit of the sockets was exposed.
  It is also written: “And you shall make curtains from goat hair for a tent over the Tabernacle; eleven curtains you shall make them. The length of each curtain shall be thirty cubits and the width of each curtain four cubits; each of the eleven curtains should have the same measurement” (Exodus 26:7–8). Place their length across the width of the Tabernacle. How much was their length? It was thirty cubits. Subtract ten for the width of the roof and there will remain ten on this side and ten on that side. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the cubit of the sockets was covered. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, the cubit of the sockets was exposed.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. The verse states, “And the cubit on the one side, and the cubit on the other side of what remains of the length of the curtains of the tent shall hang over the sides of the Tabernacle, on this side and on that side to cover it” (Exodus 26:13). What remains of the length of the curtains is to cover the cubit of the sockets; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya says: It is to cover the cubit of the beams. Place their width across the length of the Tabernacle. How much was their width? It was forty-four cubits. Subtract thirty for the roof, and fourteen remain. Subtract two for the doubling of the sixth curtain, as it is written: “And you shall double the sixth curtain over the front of the tent” (Exodus 26:9), and twelve remain.
  Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the beams narrowed to a fingerbreadth, and therefore the top of the beams did not take up any of the width of the curtains, which enabled the curtain to cover the entire wall of the Tabernacle with part of the curtain on the ground, it is understandable why it is written: “And as for the overhanging part that remained from the curtains of the tent, the half curtain that remained shall hang over the back of the Tabernacle” (Exodus 26:12). However, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, who maintains that it is necessary for the width of the curtains to cover the thickness at the top of the beams, what is the meaning of the phrase shall hang? The Gemara answers: It means that it will hang more than the others. In his opinion, this curtain is two cubits longer than the other curtains covering the Tabernacle. With regard to this, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: To what is the Tabernacle similar? It is similar to a woman walking in the marketplace with her skirts following after her.
  The Sages taught with regard to the construction of the Tabernacle: The bottoms of the beams were grooved and the sockets were hollow, and the grooves were inserted into the sockets to support the beams.
  
  Daf 99a
  
  Additionally, the clasps in the loops, which connected the curtains to one another, looked like stars in the sky.
  Our Sages taught: The bottom curtains in the Tabernacle were made of sky blue wool, and of purple wool, and of scarlet wool, and of fine linen; and the top curtains were made of goat hair, even though that material is considered to be inferior and common. However, the wisdom that was stated with regard to the top curtains was greater than that which was stated with regard to the bottom ones. This is because, with regard to the bottom curtains, it is written: “And every wise-hearted woman spun with her hands, and they brought that which they had spun, the blue, and the purple, the scarlet, and the linen” (Exodus 35:25); while with regard to the top curtains, it is written: “And all of the women whose hearts inspired them with wisdom spun the goats” (Exodus 35:26). The phrase “whose hearts inspired them” suggests a greater degree of wisdom. Apparently, spinning the goat’s hair curtains required greater skill than spinning the various kinds of wool. And on a similar note, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya: The hair was rinsed on the goats, and it was even spun from the goats, which required a great deal of skill.
  We learned in the mishna with regard to two balconies. Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: With regard to the wagons on which the beams of the Tabernacle were transported, the areas beneath them, and between them, and to their sides are considered to be the public domain. Abaye said: The space between one wagon and the wagon alongside it equaled the full length of a wagon. And how much was the length of a wagon? It was five cubits. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the wagon to be five cubits long? Four and a half cubits would suffice whether the beams were arranged in three stacks, each a cubit and a half wide, or four stacks, each one cubit wide. The Gemara answers: You need the wagon to be five cubits long so that space remains between the beams and they will not be pressed against each other.
  Rava said: The area on the sides of the wagon between the wagon and the wheel and the thickness of the wheel together equaled the full width of the wagon (<i>Tosafot</i>). And how much was the width of the wagon? It was two and a half cubits. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the wagon to be two and a half cubits wide? A cubit and a half would suffice. The Gemara answers: So that the beams would not teeter. Ten-cubit beams on a one-and-a-half-cubit wide surface would be unstable.
  The Gemara comments: However, with regard to the principle that we maintain that a thoroughfare in the public domain is sixteen cubits wide; we who derive it from the Tabernacle encounter a difficulty: The thoroughfare associated with the Tabernacle was fifteen cubits wide. When two wagons stood side by side, the width of the wagons plus the space between them and the space on their sides totaled fifteen cubits. The Gemara explains: There was an extra cubit where a member of the tribe of Levi stood, to ensure that if the beams fell, he would take hold of them and restore them to their stack. Therefore, the total width was no less than sixteen cubits.
  MISHNA: With regard to the bank surrounding a pit and the boulder that are ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one who takes an object from them to the public domain and similarly one who places an object from the public domain atop them is liable for carrying from one domain to another. If the height or width of the pit or the boulder is less than that height, ten handbreadths, one is exempt because the legal status of those protrusions is not distinct from that of the surrounding public domain.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach in the mishna about the cases of the bank of a pit and a boulder? Let the mishna simply teach about a pit and a boulder. One could derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an object that is ten handbreadths high from the case of the boulder, and the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an object that is ten handbreadths deep from the pit. The fact that the mishna taught the case of the bank of a pit supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A pit and its bank join together to constitute the total ten handbreadths. If the distance from the bottom of the pit to the top of its bank is ten handbreadths, it is considered a private domain, even though some of the ten handbreadths are above ground and some are below. That <i>halakha</i> was also taught in the following <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, one may not fill water from it on Shabbat because the pit itself is a private domain, and carrying water from the pit to the public domain is prohibited
  
  Daf 99b
  
  unless they constructed a partition around it that is ten handbreadths high. Everything within the partition is then considered a private domain, and one standing within the partition may draw water from the pit. And similarly, one may only drink water from the pit on Shabbat if he inserts his head and most of his body into the well. And a pit and its bank join together to constitute the total of ten handbreadths, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  Rav Mordekhai raised a dilemma before Rava: In a case where there is a column in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and one threw an object and it landed atop the column, what is the ruling? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that the lifting from the public domain was performed in a prohibited manner and the placing in the private domain was performed in a prohibited manner, and therefore one is liable? Or perhaps, we say that since the object comes from an exempt domain, the one who threw the object would not be liable. Prior to landing on the column, the object traveled through the airspace above the public domain. The airspace of a public domain extends ten handbreadths from the ground. Beyond that point the airspace is an exempt domain.
  Rava said to Rav Mordekhai: It is our mishna that states that one who places an object atop a boulder that is more than ten handbreadths high is liable. Rav Mordekhai came and asked Rav Yosef about the same dilemma: Rav Yosef said to him: It is our mishna. Rav Mordekhai came and asked Abaye. He said to him: It is our mishna. Rav Mordekhai said to them: You are all spewing the same spittle. None of you taught anything new. You repeat the same unsatisfactory answer.
  They said to Rav Mordekhai: And do you not hold this to be correct? Didn’t we learn explicitly in the mishna: One who takes an object from them, and one who places an object atop them is liable? He said to them: Perhaps the mishna is referring to a needle that can be placed atop the column without passing through the exempt area above ten handbreadths, since it is so small and hardly takes up any space.
  They said to him: With regard to a needle, too, it is still impossible that it will not be raised somewhat above the public domain. He answered them: It is possible that the boulder has a protrusion below ten handbreadths from the ground. Since the protrusion is not significant in and of itself, it has the legal status of a hole in the wall of a private domain. One who throws an object into it is liable, just like one who throws into the private domain itself. Alternatively, it is possible that the needle is placed in a groove that is below ten handbreadths from the ground. The needle did not enter the groove from above ten handbreadths. It passed directly into the groove, which is a private domain. Therefore, Rav Mordekhai’s dilemma is not resolved from the mishna.
  Rav Meyasha said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: There is a wall in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and is not quite four handbreadths wide, and it surrounds a <i>karmelit</i> and renders the area that it encloses the private domain. The wall serves as a partition of this private domain. And if one threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop the wall, what is the ruling? Do we say: Since it is not four handbreadths wide it is an exempt domain, and the one who threw the object is exempt? Or perhaps we say that since it rendered the <i>karmelit</i> the private domain, the wall together with the private domain is considered to be filled. Therefore, the object is considered to have landed on an area that is four handbreadths wide, and the one who threw the object is liable.
  Ulla said: The fact that it is considered a private domain is derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If this wall creates a partition that renders other areas surrounded by the wall a private domain, all the more so does it render itself a private domain. It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said, and so too, Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a wall in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and is not quite four handbreadths wide, and it surrounds a <i>karmelit</i> and renders the area that it surrounds the private domain, if one threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop the wall, he is liable. If this wall creates a partition that renders other areas a private domain, all the more so does it render itself a private domain.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: In a case where there is a pit that is nine handbreadths deep, and one dug out a segment of earth from the bottom of the pit and thereby completed the depth of the pit to ten handbreadths, and then he proceeded to throw the earth into the public domain, what is the ruling? The two sides to the dilemma are: Is it that the lifting of the object and establishment of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps he is not liable. And if you say: Since the partition was not ten handbreadths deep initially, he is not liable, then in a case where there is a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and one placed a segment of earth into the pit and thereby minimized its depth to less than ten handbreadths, nullifying its status as a private domain, what is the ruling? The two sides of the question are: Is it that placement of the object and the elimination of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps, he is not liable because the partition was not intact throughout the performance of the action.
  The Gemara suggests: Resolve Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dilemma from his own statement, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain and it hits the wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, which is an exempt domain, it is as if he threw it in the air, and he is exempt. If it was below ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he threw it and it landed on the ground, and one who throws an object four cubits and it lands on the ground is liable. And we discussed it: How could he be liable for carrying in that case? The object did not come to rest on the wall and there was no placement.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is with regard to the case of a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall when thrown against it that we learned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And why is one liable in that case? When the cake of figs sticks to the wall, it reduces the distance the figs traveled from the measure of four cubits that determines liability. If one threw the cake of figs at a distance of exactly four cubits from the wall, and, based on Rabbi Yoḥanan, the object becomes part of the wall, the distance that the cake of figs traveled is slightly less than four cubits, and therefore he should be exempt. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan did not take this into account, apparently, in his opinion, when the placement of the object and the elimination of the partition are simultaneous, one is liable.
  The Gemara rejects this and says: The cases are not similar because there, in the case of the cake of figs, the one who threw it does not nullify its independent existence vis-à-vis the wall, as the food will eventually be removed from the wall. Here, in the case of the dirt in the pit, one nullifies its independent existence vis-à-vis the pit, and it eliminates the ten-handbreadth partition.
  Rava raised a similar dilemma: In a case where one threw a board and it landed on top of stakes that are ten handbreadths high but not four handbreadths wide, what is the ruling? Once the board lands, the surface is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Does his dilemma pertain to the ruling in a case where the placement of the object and the establishment of the partition came about simultaneously? That is precisely the dilemma raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara answers: The case where Rava raised a dilemma is more complex. His dilemma is with regard to a case where one threw a board and there was an object resting atop the board. In that case, what is the ruling? The two sides of the dilemma are: Since the board and the object come simultaneously, the legal status is similar to a case where the placement of the object and the establishment of the partition came about simultaneously. The object and the board are a single unit that creates a partition when it lands, and therefore one is exempt. Or perhaps we say that since it is impossible, when they land, for the object not to rise slightly and then land because the object and the board are not connected, it is like the case where the establishment of the partition was completed and the placement of the object followed, and therefore one is liable. These dilemmas remain, and therefore let it stand unresolved.
  Rava raised an issue related to the previous dilemmas, and before doing so he sought to clarify certain points. Rava said: It is obvious to me that if one poured water onto water that is its placement, and if one did so from one domain to another he is liable. If one placed a nut onto water,
  
  Daf 100a
  
  it is not considered its placement. However, Rava raised a dilemma: In a case where there is a nut in a vessel and the vessel is floating on water, what is the ruling? Is it permitted to lift the nut on Shabbat if one is in another domain? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that we go according to the status of the nut, and it is at rest in the vessel? Or perhaps we go according to the status of the vessel, and it is not at rest. No resolution was found to this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved as well.
  However, with regard to oil floating on wine, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna: In the case of oil floating on wine, and one who immersed himself during the day, i.e., one who was impure, immersed himself in a ritual bath, but will not become completely pure until sunset, touched the oil, he invalidated only the oil and not the wine. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: With regard to the two, i.e., the oil and the wine, they are considered to have a connection to each other. Since he made the oil impure, the wine is also impure. Their dispute is whether or not the oil is considered to be placed atop the wine.
  Abaye said: In the case of a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and precisely eight handbreadths wide, and one threw a mat into it, he is liable. However, if he divided the pit with a mat that split it in two, each one slightly less than four handbreadths wide, he is exempt because neither part is considered a private domain. The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Abaye, for whom it is obvious that the mat eliminates the partition of the pit, all the more so that a segment of dirt thrown into a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, rendering it less than ten handbreadths, eliminates the partition, and he has no dilemma with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s case. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who raised a dilemma with regard to a segment of dirt, it is obvious that a mat does not eliminate the partition.
  Abaye said: With regard to a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide and filled with water, and one threw an object into it on Shabbat, one is liable because the pit is considered a private domain. And if the pit was filled with fruit and one threw an object into it, he is exempt. What is the reason for the different rulings? Water is not significant enough to eliminate the partition; fruit eliminates the partition. This was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who throws an object from the sea to the street or from the street to the sea is exempt because the sea is considered a <i>karmelit</i>, and one is not liable according to Torah law in that case. Rabbi Shimon says: If the area in the sea where he threw it is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, he is liable, as he is considered as one who threw an object into a private domain. Apparently, the water in the sea does not eliminate the status of a private domain.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, if the object hits the wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, which is an exempt domain, it is as if one threw it in the air, and he is exempt. If it hits the wall below ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he threw it and it landed on the ground, and one who throws an object four cubits and it lands on the ground is liable.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one throws an object in the public domain a distance of four cubits and it hits a wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, he is liable if he threw it. The Gemara asks: And we discussed it: How could he be liable for carrying in that case? Since the object did not come to rest on the wall, there was no placement. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is with regard to the case of a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall when thrown against it that we learned in the mishna.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that Rabbi Ḥiyya said: If one threw a stone at a wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, and it went and came to rest in a hole in the wall of any size less than four handbreadths, we have come to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: One carves out the space to complete it, he is liable. We complete the hole by conceptually carving it to four handbreadths because doing so is theoretically possible. Since the hole is considered ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one is liable for transferring an object from a public domain to a private one. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One does not carve out the space to complete it, the thrower is not liable because the hole is actually less than four handbreadths wide at present. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one threw an object above ten handbreadths, and it went and came to rest in a small hole, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, while the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: In the case of a mound that is an inclined plane that gradually attains a height of ten handbreadths over a horizontal space of four cubits, and one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop that mound, he is liable because it is considered a partition. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: An alleyway that is level inside and becomes an inclined or declined plane as it enters the public domain, which is higher or lower than the alleyway, or if the entrance to the alleyway is level when entering the public domain and inside it is inclined, that alleyway requires neither a post alongside its entrance or a beam across its entrance in order to distinguish it from the public domain because the incline itself is considered a partition. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: In the case of a mound that gradually attains a height of ten handbreadths over a horizontal space of four cubits, and one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop that mound, he is liable.
  MISHNA: If one threw an object in the public domain, intending for it to land within four cubits, meaning that he had no intention of violating the Torah prohibition of carrying, and the object rolled and went beyond four cubits, he is exempt. However, if one threw an object with the intention of it landing beyond four cubits, and the object rolled back within four cubits, he is liable from when he originally threw the object.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one threw an object beyond four cubits and it rolled back within four cubits, he is liable. The Gemara asks: The object did not come to rest beyond four cubits, so how can the one who threw it be liable? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that liability was established when the object came to rest atop something. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one threw an object beyond four cubits and the wind blew it while still in the air and brought it within four cubits, he is exempt even though it, i.e., the wind, then brought it back out because the object did not come to rest in the place where it was thrown. However, if the wind seized it briefly and it stayed on the ground for a brief period of time (<i>Tosafot</i>), even though the wind then brought it in, the individual is liable.
  Rava said: Despite the principle of <i>lavud</i>, which states that within three handbreadths of the ground an object is considered to be attached to it, according to the Rabbis, who maintain that an object in airspace is not considered at rest, the object must come to rest atop something to establish liability. The Gemara relates that Mareimar sat and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Ravina said to Mareimar:
  
  Daf 100b
  
  Isn’t that what we learned in the mishna, with regard to which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That liability is when it came to rest atop something, which means that the object must actually land in order for the one who threw it to be liable. Mareimar said to Ravina: Are you saying it is a case of rolling? One cannot cite proof from a rolling object because a rolling object will not ultimately come to rest. However, with regard to this object, which passed within three handbreadths of the ground, I would say: Since it will ultimately come to rest, even though it has not yet come to rest, it is considered as an object that came to rest. Therefore, Rava teaches us that even in that case one is not liable until it actually comes to rest upon something.
  MISHNA: One who throws an object four cubits into the sea is exempt. If there was a swamp and the public domain passes through it, one who throws an object four cubits into it is liable like one who carried four cubits in the public domain. And how deep is this swamp? It is less than ten handbreadths deep. In the case of a swamp that the public domain passes through, one who throws an object four cubits into the swamp is liable.
  GEMARA: One of the Sages said to Rava: Granted, passing passing is mentioned twice in the mishna; this teaches us that passage under duress is considered passage, but usage under duress is not considered usage. But why do I need it to mention swamp swamp twice? Rava answered him: One case is referring to the summer, and one case is referring to the winter. And both cases are necessary, as had the mishna taught only one mention of swamp, I would have said that these matters, i.e., cases indicating that passage under duress is considered passage, apply only in the summer because people commonly pass through the swamp to cool themselves; however, in the winter I would have thought that it would not be so. And had the mishna taught us only the case of winter, I would have said that since they are filthy from mud anyway, they do not mind walking through the swamp, but in the summer it would not be so.
  Abaye said: It is possible to explain this other way. It was necessary for the mishna to state swamp twice because it would have entered your mind to say that these matters apply specifically where the swamp is not four cubits wide because then people walk through the swamp and do not circumvent it, but where the swamp is four cubits wide, people circumvent it. Therefore, it was necessary to teach that people walk through swamps that are both narrow and wide.
  Rav Ashi said another explanation: It was necessary for the mishna to state swamp twice because it would have entered your mind to say that these matters apply specifically where the swamp is at least four handbreadths wide, but where the swamp is not four handbreadths wide, people step over it and do not walk through it. The Gemara comments: And Rav Ashi follows his own reasoning, as Rav Ashi said: One who threw an object and it came to rest on one of the beams of a bridge is liable. Even though the width of each beam is less than four handbreadths, it joins together with the other beams to form a single surface of the public domain because even though many people step over the beams, still many people step on it.
  MISHNA: One who throws an object from the sea to dry land, or from dry land to the sea, or from the sea onto a boat, or from a boat into the sea, or from one boat to another is exempt because the sea has the legal status of a <i>karmelit</i>. If boats are tied together, one may carry an object from one to the other on Shabbat. However, if they are not tied, even though they are adjacent, one may not carry from one to the other.
  GEMARA: It was stated that the Sages disagreed with regard to the manner in which one may draw seawater onto a boat on Shabbat. Rav Huna said: One extends a projection of any size from the side of the boat as a distinctive sign, and fills a receptacle with water from the sea. Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna say: One creates an area, a frame of four by four handbreadths, and fills the water from inside it.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Huna, who said that one extends a projection of any size and fills a receptacle with water, maintains that we measure the <i>karmelit</i> from the sea floor. Since the sea itself is deeper than ten handbreadths, the boat is considered to be floating in the air, and the air is an exempt domain, as it is above ten handbreadths from the ground of the <i>karmelit</i>. And by law one should not require a projection because he is drawing water from an exempt domain into a private domain, which is permitted <i>ab initio</i>. Rather, the reason a projection is required is so that he will have a distinctive sign and not come to draw water from a <i>karmelit</i> into a private domain.
  Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna say: One creates an area, a frame of four by four handbreadths, and fills a receptacle with water. They maintain that we measure the <i>karmelit</i> from the surface of the water, and the water in the sea has a legal status like that of solid land. Therefore, if one does not create an area of four by four, he will carry from a <i>karmelit</i> to the private domain.
  Rav Naḥman said to Rabba bar Avuh: And according to Rav Huna, who said that one extends a projection of any size from the side of the boat and fills a receptacle with water, isn’t there room for concern that at times when the water is not ten handbreadths deep, he will carry from a <i>karmelit</i> into the private domain? He said to him: We learned through tradition that a boat does not travel in water that is less than ten handbreadths deep. He asks: Although a boat has a protrusion at its bow is more than ten handbreadths above the sea floor, the entire length of the boat is not necessarily that far above the bottom. Rav Safra said: Those people who measure the depth of the water with long poles proceed before the ship and ensure that that the water is at least ten handbreadths deep.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin: According to Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna, who say that in order to draw water onto a boat on Shabbat one creates an area of four by four handbreadths and fills a receptacle, how does he throw out his waste water? And if you say he pours it out in the same area from which he draws water, the water that he subsequently draws from there will be disgusting to him. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin answered him: He pours it onto the side of the boat from which it runs into the sea, and he does not pour it directly into the sea. The Gemara asks: Even so, it is accomplished by means of his power. Although he did not pour it directly, he caused the waste water to enter the sea. The Gemara answers: The Sages did not issue a decree to prohibit an action performed by one’s power in a <i>karmelit</i>. They only prohibited throwing an object directly. And from where do you say that this is so? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a ship, one may neither carry from it into the sea, nor from the sea into it.
  
  Daf 101a
  
  Rabbi Yehuda says: If the interior of the boat is ten handbreadths deep and it is not ten handbreadths above the surface of the water, one may carry from it into the sea, but not from the sea into it. The Gemara asks: What is different about carrying from the sea into the ship that one may not do so? Is it because in doing so one is carrying from a <i>karmelit</i> into the private domain? In carrying from the ship into the sea, one is also carrying from the private domain into a <i>karmelit</i>. Rather, is it not that from the ship to the sea is permitted because one throws the object onto the edge of the boat and it falls into the sea on its own, and learn from it that the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting an action caused indirectly by one’s power in a <i>karmelit</i>? The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, learn from it that this is so.
  Rav Huna said: With regard to those small boats of Meishan, which are wide on top and narrow at the bottom, one may carry in them only within four cubits. Because they are less than four handbreadths wide at the bottom, they are not a private domain. And we only said this <i>halakha</i> in a case where the width of the boat does not reach four handbreadths less than three handbreadths from the bottom of the boat. However, if the width of the boat reaches four handbreadths less than three handbreadths from the bottom, we do not have this <i>halakha</i>, as those are considered full-fledged partitions which create a private domain. And, similarly, if one fills the bottom of the boat with reeds and thin willow branches up to the point where the boat reaches four handbreadths, we do not have this <i>halakha</i>. If there are ten handbreadths above the point where the boat reaches four handbreadths, it is a private domain.
  Rav Naḥman strongly objects to this: And let us say: Lower the partition. The upper part of the raft is sufficiently wide and its partitions are sufficiently high; why not consider it as if the partitions of the boat descend from the top of the raft in a straight line to the bottom? Was it not taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who stuck a stick into the ground in the public domain, and hung a basket atop it that is four by four handbreadths wide, and threw an object from the public domain and it landed upon it, he is liable, like one who carried an object into a private domain? Apparently, we say: Lower the partition of the basket and treat it as if it reaches the ground, creating a column that is considered a private domain. Here, too, let us say: Lower the partition.
  Rav Yosef strongly objects to this statement of Rav Naḥman: And did they not hear that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and there are those who determined that this <i>halakha</i> was stated in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And the Rabbis deem one exempt in the case of a reed stuck in the ground of a public domain? Apparently, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is an individual opinion and was not accepted as <i>halakha</i>. Abaye said to him: And do you not hold the principle of extending partitions? Was it not taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a column in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and its base is not four handbreadths wide, and its narrowest point is more than three handbreadths high; and if one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop the column, he is liable? Apparently, we say: Lower the partition. Since the column’s uppermost section is sufficiently wide, its partitions are considered as if they extend to the ground. Here, too, say: Lower the partition.
  The Gemara asks: Are the case of the basket and the case of the boat comparable? There, in the case of the basket, it is a partition that goats pass through. A partition that does not serve as a barrier is not considered a partition. Here, it is a partition that goats do not pass through. It is considered a partition. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Aḥa, said to Rav Ashi: In the case of a boat, too, there is the passage of fish, as they can swim through the lowered partitions of the boat. He said to him: Passage of fish is not considered passage because it is not visible. And from where do you say that this is so? As Rabbi Tavla raised a dilemma before Ravin: With regard to a hanging partition, what is the ruling in terms of it permitting one to carry in a ruin when part of the building’s walls are still intact, and they are still considered partitions? Ravin said to him: A hanging partition only permits one to carry
  
  Daf 101b
  
  in water. It is a leniency the Sages instituted in water but not in other circumstances. And why were they lenient with regard to a hanging partition in water? Isn’t there the passage of fish? Rather, learn from this that the passage of fish is not considered passage.
  We learned in the mishna: If boats are tied together, one may carry an object from one to the other on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, since these boats are like a single domain. Rava said: This mishna was necessary only to permit carrying from one boat to another via a small boat that is between them.
  Rav Safra said to him: You, who are as great in this generation as Moses, did you speak well? We learned in the mishna that one may carry only from one to the other, not via a small boat. Rather, Rav Safra said: The mishna was only necessary to obligate one to place an <i>eiruv</i>, a joining of courtyards, between the two boats. Since the boats belong to different people, they must be joined to form a single domain in order to permit carrying from one to the other, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to boats tied to one another, one places an <i>eiruv</i> and carries from one to the other. If the ties between them were severed, the people on the boats are prohibited to carry from one to the other. If they were then retied, whether unwittingly, i.e., the one who retied them forgot that it was Shabbat, whether intentionally, whether due to circumstances beyond one’s control, whether mistakenly, the boats are restored to their original permitted status.
  And similarly, in the case of mats that are unfurled to create a partition between two people and the public domain, one places an <i>eiruv</i> and carries from one to the other. If the mats were furled, the people on the boats are prohibited to carry from one to the other. If the mats were then unfurled again, whether unwittingly, whether intentionally, whether due to circumstances beyond one’s control, whether mistakenly, they are restored to their original permitted status. That is because any partition that is established on Shabbat, whether unwittingly, whether intentionally, is considered a partition.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say: They only taught the principle that a partition established on Shabbat is considered a partition with regard to throwing. In that case, a partition creates a domain unto itself, and one who throws an object into it from another domain is liable. However, with regard to carrying within that domain, it is certainly prohibited. The Gemara answers: When that statement of Rav Naḥman was stated, it was stated with regard to an act performed intentionally. One who intentionally establishes a partition is penalized and is not permitted to benefit from it. In principle, though, that partition is considered a full-fledged partition.
  Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> that one may carry from one ship to another if they are tied together applies even if they were tied with a string used to close the neckline of a cloak. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the string is capable of holding the ships together, it is obvious that carrying between the ships is permitted as they are tied together. However, if the string is incapable of holding them, why is it permitted?
  The Gemara explains: Actually, it refers to a string that can hold them, and Shmuel said this to exclude this case from his own statement. As we learned in a mishna: If one tied a ship with an item capable of holding it and the end of that item was in a tent with a corpse, it transmits impurity to the ship. And if one tied it with something that is incapable of holding it, it does not transmit impurity to the ship. And Shmuel said: When the mishna refers to an item capable of holding it, it is referring to a case where it is tied with an iron chain. It was necessary for Shmuel to establish that although with regard to ritual impurity the <i>halakha</i> applies only to an iron chain, with regard to Shabbat the <i>halakha</i> applies to any item capable of holding the ships together. 
  The reason that the <i>halakha</i> is different with regard to impurity is as it is written: “And whoever touches in the open field one slain by sword, or one who dies by himself, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be unclean seven days” (Numbers 19:16). The Sages derived from the phrase: One slain by sword that a sword is like one slain, i.e., a corpse. A metal instrument that comes into contact with a corpse assumes the same level of ritual impurity as the corpse itself, the ultimate primary source of ritual impurity. Therefore, it is only an iron chain in a tent with a corpse in it that can render a boat tied to the other end a primary source of ritual impurity. A string made of other materials cannot. However, with regard to Shabbat, since it is capable of holding it and it is a mere distinctive sign that is necessary, even the string of a cloak is sufficient.
  
  Daf 102a
  
  MISHNA: One who unwittingly throws an object from one domain to another or one who throws an object four cubits within the public domain, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he is in violation of a prohibition, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. Similarly, if one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. This is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. However, if the beginning of one’s action was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, as he became aware that he was in violation of a prohibition, or if the beginning of one’s action was intentional and the conclusion was unwitting, the individuals in both of these cases are exempt until both the beginning and the conclusion are unwitting.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one throws an object unwittingly and then remembers that he was in violation of a prohibition, he is exempt if the object did not come to rest on the ground. The Gemara infers: If the object comes to rest, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? Didn’t he remember the prohibition before it landed, and we learned in the mishna: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action will be unwitting? If one remembered before the act was complete, he should be exempt. Rav Kahana said: With regard to the latter clause of the mishna, we have come to a special case of a bolt and a cord. The bolt is connected to a cord that one holds in his hand, which renders him capable of retrieving the bolt before it lands. Therefore, in a case where the beginning was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, one is exempt because he is still capable of changing the outcome of the action. However, in the first clause of the mishna, once the object left his hand the action is irreversible, and therefore it is an action whose beginning and conclusion are unwitting.
  The Gemara asks: The case of the bolt and the cord is one where one holds it in his hand. Therefore, no act of throwing actually took place, and there is no liability to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara answers: The case of the bolt and the cord was not stated with regard to Shabbat. Rather, it was stated with regard to one who intended to inflict a wound by throwing an object tied to a rope. The Gemara asks: This was also taught explicitly in the mishna: If one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, and he remembered before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. Rather, Rava said: This principle was stated with regard to a case of carrying, not throwing an object. Since one is holding the object the entire time while violating the prohibition, and is capable of letting it go at any time, this is a case whose beginning and conclusion are intentional.
  The Gemara asks: Wasn’t this principle that was taught, taught with regard to throwing because that is the topic of the mishna? Rather, Rava said: Two separate matters were taught in the mishna. The first case is: One who unwittingly throws an object, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition. Alternatively, another case where one is exempt is: A case where one did not remember and another caught it, or a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt.
  Rav Ashi said: The mishna is incomplete, and it teaches the following: One who throws a rock and remembers the violation after it left his hand, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. By inference, if the object comes to rest, he is liable. Rav Ashi adds: In what case are these matters stated? In a case where one then forgot again before the object came to rest. However, if one did not then forget again, he is exempt because all who are liable to bring sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting.
  We learned in the mishna that this is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. It was stated that <i>amora’im</i> disputed this point. With regard to a case where one carried an object in the public domain two cubits unwittingly, and then became aware and carried it two more cubits intentionally, and then carried it two additional cubits unwittingly, and then placed the object, can this be characterized as a case in which the beginning of the action and the conclusion of the action are unwitting? Rabba said: One is exempt. Rava said: One is liable. 
  The Gemara clarifies the two positions. Rabba said: One is exempt. This is the <i>halakha</i> even according to Rabban Gamliel, who said: There is no awareness for half a measure, and therefore he is liable. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for a half-measure, the fact that he became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance. One’s awareness does not demarcate between the two half-measures of two cubits with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering. He only said so there, when the measure that determines liability was completed, it was completed unwittingly. However, here, when the measure is completed, it is completed intentionally. In that case, he would say no, he is not liable. The measure that determines liability for carrying in the public domain on Shabbat is four cubits. When the object reached four cubits, he was carrying the object intentionally.
  The Gemara explains: And in what case was this stated? If it was stated with regard to a case of throwing, the entire act was unwitting because when he became aware, there was nothing he could do to prevent the object from landing. Rather, it must have been with regard to a case of carrying.
  Rava said: One is liable. Even according to the Rabbis, who said: There is awareness for half a measure, and therefore he is exempt, they only said so there, where it is still in his control to complete or terminate the action. But here, where it is not in his control to affect the outcome, they would not say so and would deem him liable. And in what case was this stated? If it was stated with regard to a case of carrying, the outcome is still in his control. Rather, it must have been with regard to a case of throwing. Apparently, Rabba and Rava do not disagree. They are discussing separate cases.
  Rabba said: If one unwittingly threw an object from one domain to another or unwittingly threw an object four cubits in a public domain on Shabbat, and it came to rest in the mouth of a dog or in a furnace, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: If another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt? The Gemara answers: There, the case of the mishna where one is exempt, one did not intend to throw it into the dog’s mouth. A dog came and snatched the object, preventing it from landing at its intended destination. Since the intention of the thrower was not realized, he is exempt. However, here, where Rabba said that the thrower is liable, he intended to throw the object into the dog’s mouth. He is liable because his intention was realized.
  Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: We also learned support for that distinction in a mishna: There is a person who performs a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food, and he is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. How so? This <i>halakha</i> applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat that was <i>notar</i> from a consecrated offering, i.e., it remained after the time when it may have been eaten expired, and this happened on Yom Kippur. The person who did this is liable to bring one sin-offering for eating consecrated food while impure, one for eating forbidden fat, one for eating <i>notar</i>, and one for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated items.
  Rabbi Meir says: There is one more sin-offering for which he may be liable. In addition, if it was Shabbat and he carried this olive-bulk of food from one domain to another in his mouth, he is liable for carrying out on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: Liability for the sin-offering that you added is not incurred from violation of the same type of prohibition. He is liable for carrying out the food, not for eating it. However, fundamentally, the Rabbis agree that one would be liable for carrying out in that case. The Gemara asks: And why would one be liable? That carrying, which was done in one’s mouth, is not the typical manner of carrying out. Rather, it must be that since he intended to carry out the object in that manner, his thought renders his mouth a suitable place for placement of an object. Here, too, since he intends to throw the object into the dog’s mouth, his thought renders the dog’s mouth a suitable place for placement of an object, and he is liable for throwing it there.
  
  Daf 102b
  
  MISHNA: With regard to one who builds on Shabbat, thereby violating a prohibition in a primary category of prohibited labor, how much must he build to be liable to bring a sin-offering? The Sages said: One who builds is liable for building any amount. And one who chisels, or strikes with a hammer or with an adze, or one who drills a hole of any size on Shabbat, is liable. This is the principle: Anyone who performs a prohibited labor and his labor endures on Shabbat is liable. And so too, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer during his labor has performed a constructive act and is liable, because he is as one who improves the labor that he is performing.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to any small amount of building, for what use is it suited? Rabbi Yirmeya said: As a poor person digs a hole in the floor of his house in which to hide his coins. Digging a hole in the floor of a house is an act of building. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was as those who sewed curtains in the Tabernacle dug holes in which to hide their needles. Abaye said: Since needles rust in the ground, they did not do so. The Gemara seeks a different example of small-scale building that is significant. Rather, an example is that a poor person makes legs for a small stove to place a small pot on it. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was with regard to those who cooked herbs used to dye curtains, whose dyeing process was lacking a small amount for completion. At that point, it was not worth the effort to cook a large quantity of dye, and so they would make legs for a small stove upon which to place a small cauldron to cook a small bit of dye to finish the job.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: There is no poverty in a place of wealth. In the Tabernacle, as in any public project, actions are not performed on a small scale or in parsimonious quantities; they were performed generously. Those who cooked dyes in the Tabernacle had no use for small crucibles. Rather, an example of significant small-scale building is a homeowner who has a small hole in his house and seals it. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was with regard to a beam that was set upon by a worm that bore a hole into it; one pours lead into the hole and seals it.
  Shmuel said: If one sets a stone in place on Shabbat, i.e., he takes a building stone and fixes it in place on the ground on Shabbat, he is liable for performing the prohibited labor of building. The Gemara raises an objection to this from that which the Sages taught with regard to building on Shabbat. In a case where one puts down a stone and another one places the mortar, the one who places the mortar is liable for building. Apparently, the prohibition of building is only violated when mortar is added. Merely setting a stone in place is not enough to establish liability.
  The Gemara answers: And according to your line of reasoning, say the latter clause of that mishna where we learn that Rabbi Yosei says: And even if one lifted the stone and placed it on a top row of stones [<i>dimos</i>], he is liable even without securing it with mortar. Rather, apparently, there are three different kinds of building: Bottom row, middle row, and upper row. The bottom row requires setting the stones in place and dirt to hold it in place. The middle row requires mortar as well. The upper row suffices with mere placement.
  We learned in the mishna: One who chisels any amount is liable. The Gemara asks: With regard to one who chisels, for which primary category of prohibited labor is he liable? Rav said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of building. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel. They similarly disagreed with regard to one who makes a hole in a chicken coop. Rav said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of building. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer. And similarly, with regard to one who inserts a pin into the handle of a hoe in order to secure the handle, Rav said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of building. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer.
  The Gemara comments: It is necessary for the Gemara to teach us that Rav and Shmuel disagreed in each of these cases because one could not be inferred from the other. As, had the Gemara told us only the first case of chiseling, I would have said that it is specifically in that case that Rav said one is liable for building because it is a typical manner of building; however, with regard to one who makes a hole in a chicken coop, which is not a typical manner of building, say that Rav agrees with Shmuel that this is not subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building. And had the Gemara told us only about this case of making a hole in a chicken coop, I would have said that it is specifically in that case that Rav said one is liable for building, because it is similar to building, as people do so for ventilation in a chicken coop, just as they place windows in buildings.
  However, inserting a pin into the handle of a hoe, which is not a typical manner of building, say that Rav agrees with Shmuel that it is not subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building. Conversely, had the Gemara told us only about this case of inserting a pin into the handle of a hoe, I would have said that it is only in that case that Shmuel said that the action is not subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building; however, with regard to these other two cases of chiseling and making a hole in the coop, say that Shmuel agrees with Rav that they are subsumed under the rubric of the prohibited labor of building. Therefore, it was necessary to cite all three disputes.
  Rav Natan bar Oshaya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who chisels, for which primary category of prohibited labor is he liable? He indicated with his hand that he is liable for striking a blow with a hammer. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: One who chisels and one who strikes a blow with a hammer, indicating that they are two different prohibitions? The Gemara answers: Emend this and say: One who chisels is liable due to the prohibition of striking a blow with a hammer.
  Come and hear a proof that will resolve this dilemma from that which we learned:
  
  Daf 103a
  
  One who drills a hole of any size is liable. Granted, according to Rav, who said that one who makes a hole is liable due to the prohibited labor of building, here too, he should be liable because he appears as one who is making a hole for the purpose of building. However, according to Shmuel, drilling a hole is not a completion of the labor. The labor will be complete only when a stake or pin is inserted into the hole. Until he does so, he cannot be liable for completing the labor. The Gemara answers: With what we are dealing here? With a case where one drilled a hole with an iron nail and left it inside the surface in which he drilled the hole. That is considered a completion of labor because there is no intention to remove the nail from its hole.
  We learned in the mishna that this is the principle: Anyone who performs a prohibited labor and his labor endures on Shabbat is liable. The Gemara asks: What does the phrase: This is the principle, come to include? The Gemara explains: It comes to include a case where one carved out a vessel with a capacity of half a <i>kav</i> [<i>kefiza</i>] into a piece of wood in which it was possible to chisel a vessel with a capacity of a whole <i>kav</i>. Since this labor endures on Shabbat and it can be used, it is considered a complete labor and he is liable.
  We also learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer is liable. The Gemara wonders: What has he done by striking the anvil that would render him liable? It was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said in explanation: He is liable because he trains his hand for his work by striking the anvil. The sons of a man named Raḥava found this answer difficult: If so, one who observed a craft being performed on Shabbat and learned to perform that craft through observation, would he also be liable? Only one who performs an actual labor on Shabbat is liable. Rather, it was Abaye and Rava who both said in explanation: He is liable, as those who flatten plates of metal for the Tabernacle do so. They would strike the anvil with the sledgehammer in order to straighten the sledgehammer’s handle, which became crooked. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer during his labor is liable, as those who flatten plates of metal for the Tabernacle do so.
  MISHNA: One who plows is liable for plowing any amount of land on Shabbat. One who weeds and removes grass on Shabbat, and one who removes dry branches and who prunes any amount is liable. With regard to one who gathers wood, if he did so to enhance the tree or the land, he is liable for any amount; if he did so for fuel, he is liable for collecting a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. With regard to one who gathers grass, if he did so to enhance the plants or the land, he is liable for any amount; if he did so to feed an animal, he is liable for collecting a measure equivalent to a goat’s mouthful.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: For what use is plowing any amount of land suited? The Gemara answers: It is suited for a single pumpkin seed. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was as it is suitable for planting a single stalk of herbs to make dyes.
  We also learned in the mishna: One who weeds, and one who removes dry branches, and who prunes any amount is liable. The Sages taught that in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who severs endives that grow like weeds, or who prunes reeds [<i>zeradim</i>]; if he did so for human consumption, he is liable in the measure of a fig-bulk; if he did so for animal consumption, he is liable in a measure equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. If he did so for fuel, he is liable for severing a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. If he did so to enhance the land, he is liable for any amount.
  The Gemara asks: Aren’t all these done to enhance the land? Each stalk that a person uproots enhances the land. It was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said in explanation: They taught this <i>baraita</i> with regard to swampland, where grass is not uprooted to enhance the land. Abaye said: Even if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a field that is not a swampland, it can be referring to a case where one did not intend to enhance the land. The Gemara asks: However, is it not Abaye and Rava who both say that Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is liable only for performing an intentional action, concedes that one is liable in a case of cut off its head, will it not die? In any case where the outcome is inevitable, as in this case where the land will be enhanced, one’s lack of intention does not exempt him. The Gemara answers: Abaye’s statement was only necessary in a case where one did so on another’s land. Since he did not intend for that outcome to eventuate and he derives no benefit from enhancing the land, he is not liable in that case.
  MISHNA: One who writes two letters on Shabbat, whether he did so with his right hand or his left, whether they were the same letter or two different letters, whether he did so using two different types of ink, in any language, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei said: One is deemed liable for writing two letters only due to marking, as they would write symbols on adjacent beams of the Tabernacle to know which beam was another beam’s counterpart. Rabbi Yehuda said: We found that one is liable for writing even if he did not complete what he was writing, so that he wrote a small name that constituted part of a longer name, e.g., Shem [<i>shin mem</i>] from the name Shimon or from Shmuel; Noaḥ [<i>nun ḥet</i>] from Naḥor; Dan [<i>dalet nun</i>] from Daniel; Gad [<i>gimmel dalet</i>] from Gaddiel. In all of these cases, the first two letters of the longer name constitute the shorter name.
  GEMARA: The Gemara questions the beginning of the mishna: Granted, for writing with the right hand let one be liable, as that is the typical manner of writing. However, for writing with the left hand, why is one liable? That is not the typical manner of writing. Rabbi Yirmeya said: When the mishna taught that one who writes with his left hand is liable, they taught it with regard to one who is left-handed. The Gemara asks: And if so, let his left hand have the same legal status as everyone’s right hand; for writing with his left hand, let him be liable, for writing with his right hand, let him not be liable. Rather, Abaye said: This mishna refers to an ambidextrous person, who is liable for writing with either hand.
  Rav Ya’akov, son of the daughter of Ya’akov, said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: One is deemed liable for writing two letters only due to marking. As such, one is liable for writing a letter even if he writes it imprecisely with his left hand. The Gemara asks: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, the first clause of the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara answers: That is not necessarily the case. The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and the attribution of his second statement was for emphasis alone.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: We found that one is liable for writing even if he did not complete what he was writing, so that he wrote a small name that constituted part of a longer name. The Gemara asks: Rather, is that to say that according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is one who writes two letters that are two different types of letters who is liable; however, one who writes two letters that are one type of letter is not liable?
  Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “When a leader sinned, and he unwittingly performed one of any of the commandments which the Lord his God commanded not to do, and is guilty” (Leviticus 4:22)? The Sages taught: I might have thought that one is not guilty until he performs a complete labor, e.g., until he writes the entire name that he intended to write, or until he weaves the entire garment, or until he crafts the entire sieve made from the reeds of the warp and the woof; therefore, the verse states: “A soul who sins unintentionally in any of the Lord’s commandments which one shall not perform, and did an action from one of these” (Leviticus 4:2).
  The emphasis on the phrase “from one” teaches that in order for one to be liable, it is sufficient that he perform only part of the prohibited labor. However, if that is derived from the use of the phrase “from one,” I might have thought that one is liable even if he wrote only a single letter, or even if he wove only a single thread, or even if he crafted only a single eye of the sieve, i.e., arranging the reeds to create a warp, and then interweaving a single reed as a woof;
  
  Daf 103b
  
  therefore, the verse states “one,” which means one complete labor. How can the two phrases be reconciled? Rather it must be explained that one is liable only if he writes a small name that constitutes part of a longer name, e.g., Shem from the name Shimon or from Shmuel, Noaḥ from Naḥor, Dan from Daniel, Gad from Gaddiel. Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable even if he wrote only two letters that are one type of letter, e.g., <i>shesh</i> [<i>shin shin</i>], <i>tet</i> [<i>tav tav</i>], <i>rar</i> [<i>reish reish</i>], <i>gag</i> [<i>gimmel gimmel</i>], <i>ḥaḥ</i> [<i>ḥet ḥet</i>].
  Rabbi Yosei said: And is one liable due to the labor of writing? Isn’t one liable only due to the prohibition of marking, as they would write symbols on adjacent beams of the Tabernacle to know which beam was another beam’s counterpart? Therefore, one who made a single scratch on two boards, or two scratches on a single board, is liable.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The verse states, “When a leader sinned, and he unwittingly performed one of any of the commandments which the Lord his God commanded not to do, and is guilty” (Leviticus 4:22), and from the word one, I might have thought that one is not guilty until he performs a complete labor, e.g., until he writes the entire name that he intended to write, or until he weaves the entire garment, or until he crafts the entire sieve made from the reeds of the warp and the woof; therefore, the verse states “from one.” However, if that is derived from the use of the phrase “from one,” I might have thought that one is liable even if he wrote only a single letter, or even if he wove only a single thread, or even if he crafted only a single eye of the sieve. Therefore, the verse states “one.” But how can we reconcile the two phrases? One is only liable for performing a labor that is of the type that endures. In that case it is considered a complete labor.
  Rabbi Yosei says that the verse states: “And did an action from one of these” (Leviticus 4:2). This unusual expression indicates repetition: And he performed one, and he performed these. From here it is derived that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for them all, and at times one is liable to bring several offerings, one for each and every one.
  The Gemara returns to the matter of the <i>baraita</i>: In any event, it was taught that Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable even if he only wrote two letters that are one type of letter; he does not insist that one is liable only if he writes two different letters. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This opinion is his own, and that other opinion is that of his teacher, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabban Gamliel: Even if one only wrote two identical letters, forming words such as <i>shesh</i>, <i>tet</i>, <i>rar</i>, <i>gag</i>, or <i>ḥaḥ</i>, he is liable. That is Rabban Gamliel’s opinion, but Rabbi Yehuda himself holds that one is only liable for writing two different letters.
  The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the <i>baraita</i> is identical to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>. And if you say that there is a practical difference between their opinions in the case of the letters <i>alef alef</i> in a word such as <i>a’azerkha</i> (Isaiah 45:5), in that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that if one wrote the letters <i>alef alef</i> of the word <i>a’azerkha</i> he is not liable because the two letters do not spell a complete word, and Rabbi Shimon holds that since that combination of letters appears in standard amulets [<i>gelatorei</i>] he is liable because this writing is considered to be enduring; is that to say that the opinion of Rabbi Shimon tends to stringency in this matter?
  Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who drills a hole of any size on Shabbat is liable, one who scrapes and smooths posts or parchments in any amount is liable, one who tans any amount of an animal hide is liable, one who draws any size form on a vessel is liable? Rabbi Shimon says: One is liable only if he drills the entire hole that he intended to drill, or if he scrapes the entire post or parchment that he intended to scrape, or if he tans the entire hide that he intended to tan, or if he draws the entire form that he intended to draw. Clearly, Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is the lenient one.
  Rather, Rabbi Shimon comes to teach us this: It is considered writing that endures only if he writes the entire name. The Gemara asks: And how can you say this? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: From the phrase “and he performed one” I might have thought that one is liable only if he writes the entire name; therefore, the verse states “from one.” Apparently, he does not require that the entire word be written in order to be liable. The Gemara answers: Resolve the contradiction between these statements and say this: I might have thought that one is liable only if he writes the entire verse that he intended to write; therefore, the verse states “from one.” One is liable for writing less than that. However, one is certainly not liable for writing less than a complete word.
  The <i>baraita</i> cites that Rabbi Yosei says that the verse states: “And did an action from one of these.” This unusual expression indicates repetition and it is as if it says: And he did one, and he did these. From here it is derived that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for them all, and at times one is liable to bring several offerings, one for each and every one.
  And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s opinion? Since the verse says “from one” and “of these,” Rabbi Yosei detects both a restriction, i.e., “from” and “of,” an amplification based on superfluous expressions, as it would have been sufficient for the verse to say “one” and not “from one,” and it would have been sufficient to say “these” instead of “of these.” The repetitive language teaches that there are cases of one that is these and cases of these that are one.
  Similarly, Rabbi Yosei explained that had the verse said “one,” the conclusion would have been that one is only liable for performing a complete transgression, e.g., writing the name Shimon on Shabbat. “From one” teaches that one is liable even if he does not complete the intended action, e.g., writing Shem from Shimon. “These” refers to the transgressions themselves, e.g., the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat. The words “from these” teach that even subcategories are included. The Gemara illustrates the case of one that is these. One was aware that he was in violation of the prohibition of Shabbat but not aware that the individual labors were prohibited. In that case, if he performed several prohibited labors during this lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each violation. These that are one refers to a case where one was unaware that he was in violation of the prohibition of Shabbat but he was aware that the individual labors were prohibited. In that case, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering for all of the prohibited labors.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: We found that one is liable for writing even if he did not complete what he was writing and wrote a small name that constituted part of a longer name, e.g., Shem from Shimon. The Gemara asks: Is it similar? The <i>mem</i> in Shem is closed and the <i>mem</i> in Shimon is open. Rav Ḥisda said: That is to say that a closed letter that one rendered open is valid even in writing a Torah scroll, and it is not considered an irregularity in the writing. Therefore, one is liable for writing an open letter instead of a closed one.
  The Gemara raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i> that interprets the verse: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates” (Deuteronomy 6:9). “And you shall write them [<i>ukhtavtam</i>]” means that it should be perfect writing [<i>ketiva tamma</i>] with no mistakes, and clear writing. This means that one should not write an <i>alef</i> as an <i>ayin</i>, an <i>ayin</i> as an <i>alef</i>, a <i>beit</i> as a <i>kaf</i>, a <i>kaf</i> as a <i>beit</i>, a <i>gimmel</i> as a <i>tzadi</i>, a <i>tzadi</i> as a <i>gimmel</i>, a <i>dalet</i> as a <i>reish</i>, a <i>reish</i> as a <i>dalet</i>, a <i>heh</i> as a <i>ḥet</i>, a <i>ḥet</i> as a <i>heh</i>, a <i>vav</i> as a <i>yod</i>, a <i>yod</i> as a <i>vav</i>, a <i>zayin</i> as a <i>nun</i>, a <i>nun</i> as a <i>zayin</i>, a <i>tet</i> as a <i>peh</i>, a <i>peh</i> as a <i>tet</i>.
  Similarly, one should not write bent letters like <i>kaf</i> and <i>nun</i> found in the middle of a word as straight letters like <i>kaf</i> and <i>nun</i> found at the end of a word, nor should one write straight letters as bent letters. A final <i>mem</i> should not be written like a <i>samekh</i>, and a <i>samekh</i> should not be written like a <i>mem</i>. A closed <i>mem</i> should not be written open, and an open one should not be written closed. Similarly, if there is an open paragraph in the Torah one may not render it closed, and one may not render a closed paragraph open. If one wrote a <i>mezuza</i> or a Torah scroll following the Torah’s format for poetry or if one wrote poetry like regular text, as a <i>mezuza</i> is typically written, or if one wrote without ink but with another material, or if one wrote the mentions of God’s names in gold, all of these must be suppressed. Apparently, one may not write closed letters as open letters, contrary to the statement of Rav Ḥisda.
  The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: While on the rest of the days of Sukkot the verse employs the phrase: “And its libation [<i>veniska</i>],” on the second day it is stated: “And their libations [<i>veniskeihem</i>]” (Numbers 29:19) with an extra letter <i>mem</i>; on the sixth day, it is stated: “And its libations [<i>unsakhe’ah</i>]” (Numbers 29:31) with an extra letter <i>yod</i>. On the seventh day, instead of “according to the law [<i>kamishpat</i>]” employed on the other days, it is stated: “According to their laws [<i>kemishpatam</i>]” (Numbers 29:33) with an extra letter <i>mem</i>. Together these additional letters, <i>mem</i>, <i>yod</i>, and <i>mem</i>, form the word <i>mayim</i>, which means water. This is an allusion to the water libation from the Torah. On <i>Sukkot</i>, a water libation was poured onto the altar in addition to the wine libation that accompanied sacrifices throughout the year. However, here, the closed <i>mem</i> at the end of the word <i>veniskeihem</i> is interpreted as if it were an open <i>mem</i> and used as the first <i>mem</i> in <i>mayim</i>.
  And from the fact that an open letter that one rendered closed is valid, in the case of a closed letter, too, a closed letter that one rendered open is valid. This homiletic interpretation supports Rav Ḥisda’s opinion.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: Is it similar? If one rendered an open letter closed,
  
  Daf 104a
  
  he elevates its status, as Rav Ḥisda said: The letters <i>mem</i> and <i>samekh</i> that were in the tablets were standing miraculously. Each letter was chiseled all the way through the tablets. In that case, the segment of the tablets at the center of the <i>samekh</i> and final <i>mem</i>, letters that are completely closed, should have fallen. Miraculously, they remained in place. Consequently, rendering an open <i>mem</i> closed elevates its status. However, if one rendered a closed letter open, he diminishes its status, as Rabbi Yirmeya said, and some say that it was Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba who said: The prophets instituted the difference between the open and closed forms of the letters <i>mem</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>tzadi</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>kaf</i>. Since the closed letters date back to the Ten Commandments, apparently the prophets introduced the open versions of the letters, which are therefore less significant.
  The Gemara rejects this: And is that reasonable? Isn’t it written: “These are the commandments that the Lord commanded Moses to tell the children of Israel at Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34). The word “these” underscores that a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element related to the Torah and its mitzvot from here on. Rather, the prophets did not innovate these forms. Both the open and closed versions existed before then. However, people did not know which form appeared in the middle of a word and which form at the end of a word. And the prophets came and instituted their set positions. The Gemara asks: And still the question remains: Didn’t the Sages derive from the verse: “These are the commandments,” that a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element from here on? How could they institute the position of the letters? Rather, over the course of time, the people forgot their positions in the words and the prophets then reestablished their positions. Apparently, closed letters are no more significant than the open ones.
  The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. Rav Ḥisda said: The letters <i>mem</i> and <i>samekh</i> that were in the tablets were standing miraculously. And furthermore, Rav Ḥisda said: The writing on the tablets was read from the inside, from one side of the tablets, and read from the outside, the other side of the tablets, in reverse order. The Gemara cites words that appear elsewhere in the Bible: <i>Nevuv</i> was read as <i>bet</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>bet</i>, <i>nun</i>; <i>rahav</i> as <i>beit</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>reish</i>; and <i>saru</i> as <i>vav</i>, <i>reish</i>, <i>samekh</i>.
  The Sages said to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: Young students came today to the study hall and said things the likes of which were not said even in the days of Joshua bin Nun. These children who only knew the Hebrew alphabet interpreted the letters homiletically.<i>Alef beit</i> means learn [<i>elaf</i>] the wisdom [<i>bina</i>] of the Torah.<i>Gimmel dalet</i> means give to the poor [<i>gemol dalim</i>]. Why is the leg of the <i>gimmel</i> extended toward the <i>dalet</i>? Because it is the manner of one who bestows loving-kindness to pursue the poor. And why is the leg of the <i>dalet</i> extended toward the <i>gimmel</i>? It is so that a poor person will make himself available to him who wants to give him charity. And why does the <i>dalet</i> face away from the <i>gimmel</i>? It is to teach that one should give charity discreetly so that the poor person will not be embarrassed by him.
  The children continued to interpret the letters.<i>Heh vav</i>: That is the principal name of the Holy One, Blessed be He.<i>Zayin ḥet</i>, <i>tet yod</i>, <i>kaf lamed</i>: And if you do so, the Holy One, Blessed be He, feeds [<i>zan</i>] you, and shows you favor [<i>ḥan</i>], and bestows goodness [<i>meitiv</i>] upon you, and gives you an inheritance [<i>yerusha</i>], and ties a crown [<i>keter</i>] for you in the World to Come [<i>la’olam haba</i>].The open <i>mem</i> and closed <i>mem</i> indicate that the Torah contains an open statement, understood by all, and an esoteric statement.The bent <i>nun</i> and the straight <i>nun</i> at the end of a word refer to a faithful person who is bent [<i>ne’eman kafuf</i>] and is modest now, who will ultimately become a well-known faithful person [<i>ne’eman pashut</i>].
  <i>Samekh ayin</i>: Support the poor [<i>semokh aniyyim</i>] to prevent them from falling further. Another version: Make mnemonic signs [<i>simanim aseh</i>] to remember the Torah and acquire it.The bent <i>peh</i> and the straight <i>peh</i>: Sometimes one needs to have an open mouth [<i>peh patuaḥ</i>] and speak, and sometimes one needs to have a closed mouth [<i>peh satum</i>].The bent <i>tzadi</i> and the straight <i>tzadi</i> indicate that a righteous person who is bent and humble [<i>tzaddik kafuf</i>] now will ultimately become a well-known righteous person [<i>tzaddik pashut</i>] whose righteousness is apparent to all. The Gemara asks: That is identical to the interpretation of the bent and straight <i>nun</i>: <i>Ne’eman kafuf</i>, <i>ne’eman pashut</i>. The Gemara explains: The verse added the bending of the righteous person to the bending of the faithful person. From here it is derived that the Torah was given in an atmosphere of gravity. One must receive the Torah with a sense of awe and extreme humility.
  The children continued:<i>Kuf</i>: Holy [<i>kadosh</i>], referring to God.<i>Reish</i>: A wicked person [<i>rasha</i>]. Why is the <i>kuf</i> facing away from the <i>reish</i>? This question was phrased euphemistically, as it is the <i>reish</i> that is facing away from the <i>kuf</i>. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I am unable look at a wicked person, i.e., the wicked person does not want to look toward God. And why is the crown of the letter <i>kuf</i> turned toward the <i>reish</i>? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: If the wicked person repents his evil ways I will tie a crown for him like My own. And why is the leg of the <i>kuf</i> suspended and not connected to the roof of the letter? Because if the wicked person repents he can enter through this opening if he so desires.
  The Gemara asks: Let him enter through that opening, as the <i>kuf</i> is open on both sides at the bottom. The Gemara answers: This supports the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “If it concerns the scorners, He scorns them, and unto the humble He gives grace” (Proverbs 3:34)? One who comes in order to become impure, i.e., to sin, they, in Heaven, provide him with an opening to do so, and he is not prevented from sinning. However, if he comes in order to become purified, not only is he allowed to do so, but they, in Heaven, assist him.
  They further taught:<i>Shin</i>: Falsehood [<i>sheker</i>]. <i>Tav</i>: Truth [<i>emet</i>].Why are the letters of the word <i>sheker</i> adjacent to one another in the alphabet, while the letters of <i>emet</i> are distant from one another? That is because while falsehood is easily found, truth is found only with great difficulty. And why do the letters that comprise the word <i>sheker</i> all stand on one foot, and the letters that comprise the word <i>emet</i> stand on bases that are wide like bricks? Because the truth stands eternal and falsehood does not stand eternal.
  The Gemara cites another midrash that also deals with the letters of the alphabet. This one uses a code in which the first letter is paired with the last letter, the second letter with the penultimate one, and so on [<i>alef tav</i>, <i>beit shin</i>]. <i>Alef tav</i>, God said: If he despised Me [<i>oti ti’ev</i>] would I desire [<i>etaveh</i>] him? <i>Beit shin</i>: If he does not desire to worship Me [<i>bi</i>], shall My name [<i>shemi</i>] rest upon him? <i>Gimmel reish</i>: He defiled his body [<i>gufo</i>]; shall I have mercy [<i>araḥem</i>] on him? The word comprised of the letters <i>gimmel</i> and <i>reish</i> in Aramaic means licentiousness. <i>Dalet kuf</i>: He locked My doors [<i>daltotai</i>], shall I not cut off his horns [<i>karnav</i>]? To this point, the Gemara interpreted the letters as referring to the attribute of the wicked.
  However, with regard to the attribute of the righteous it is taught differently. <i>Alef tav</i>, <i>beit shin</i>: If you have shame [<i>ata bosh</i>], <i>gimmel reish</i>, <i>dalet kuf</i>: If you do so, you will reside [<i>gur</i>] in the heavens [<i>bedok</i>], as the verse says: “Who stretches out the Heavens like a curtain [<i>dok</i>]” (Isaiah 40:22). <i>Heh tzadi</i>, <i>vav peh</i>: There is a partition [<i>ḥatzitza havei</i>] between you and anger [<i>af</i>]. <i>Zayin ayin</i>, <i>ḥet samekh</i>, <i>tet nun</i>: And you will not be shaken [<i>mizdaze’a</i>] by the Satan. <i>Yod mem</i>, <i>kaf lamed</i>: The minister of Gehenna said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, send the righteous as well into the sea to which all go [<i>yam kol</i>], Gehenna.
  The interpretation of the alphabet continues with other combinations of letters. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: <i>Alef ḥet samekh</i>, <i>bet tet ayin</i>, <i>gimmel yod peh</i>: I have mercy on them [<i>Ani ḥas aleihem</i>] because they spurned [<i>ba’atu</i>] adultery [<i>gif</i>]. The Gemara continues with this combination of the letters: <i>Dalet kaf tzadi</i>: They are pure [<i>dakkim</i>], they are honest [<i>kenim</i>], they are righteous [<i>tzaddikim</i>]. <i>Heh lamed kuf</i>: You have no portion [<i>ḥelek</i>] with them, based on the interchange of the letters <i>ḥet</i> and <i>heh</i>. <i>Vav mem reish zayin nun</i>, <i>shin tav</i>: The minister of Gehenna said [<i>amar</i>], based on <i>vav mem reish</i>, before Him: Master of the Universe, my Master [<i>Mari</i>], sustain me [<i>zaneini</i>] with the seed of Seth [<i>Shet</i>], which refers to all humankind, including the Jewish people.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him using another configuration of the alphabet: <i>Alef lamed</i>, <i>beit mem</i>: Not with them [<i>al bam</i>], i.e., you will have no portion of them. <i>Gimmel nun</i>, <i>dalet samekh</i>: To where will I lead them? I will lead them to the garden of myrtle [<i>gan hadas</i>], i.e., the Garden of Eden. <i>Heh ayin</i>, <i>vav peh</i>: The minister of Gehenna said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, I am tired [<i>ayef anokhi</i>] and thirsty and need people to care for me. The Holy One, Blessed be He, responded: <i>Zayin tzadi</i>, <i>ḥet kuf</i>: These are the descendants [<i>zaro</i>] of Isaac [<i>Yitzḥak</i>]. <i>Tet reish</i>, <i>yod shin</i>, <i>kaf tav</i>: Wait [<i>tar</i>], I have groups upon groups [<i>yesh li kittot kittot</i>] of other nations that I will give you instead.
  
  Daf 104b
  
  MISHNA: One who writes two letters on Shabbat during one lapse of awareness is liable. The following substances used as ink are explained in the Gemara. One is liable if he wrote with <i>deyo</i>, with <i>sam</i>, with <i>sikra</i>, with gum [<i>komos</i>], or with copper sulfate [<i>kankantom</i>] or with any substance that makes a mark. If one wrote on two walls of a house that form a corner, or on two parts of a writing tablet, and the two items are read together, he is liable. One who writes on his flesh on Shabbat is liable. If one unwittingly scratches letters on his flesh on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering and the Sages deem him exempt.
  If one wrote with liquids or with fruit juice, or if one drew letters with road dust, with scribes’ dust that they use to dry the ink, or with any substance with which the writing does not endure, he is exempt. Similarly, if one wrote by holding the pen on the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow; if one wrote only a single letter, even if it was adjacent to other preexisting writing; or if one wrote over other writing; if one meant to write the letter <i>ḥet</i> and instead wrote the two halves of the <i>ḥet</i> as two instances of the letter <i>zayin</i>; if one wrote one letter on the ground and one on a rafter; if one wrote one letter on two walls of a house, or on two parts of a writing tablet that are not read together, he is exempt. If one wrote one letter as an abbreviation representing an entire word, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  GEMARA: The Gemara defines the terms used in the mishna. <i>Deyo</i> is <i>deyota</i> made from soot. <i>Sam</i> is <i>samma</i>, which is yellow-tinged arsenic. <i>Sikra</i>, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: It is called <i>sikreta</i> in Aramaic and is a lead-based red paint. <i>Komos</i> is <i>koma</i> in Aramaic, and it is an ink made with gum Arabic from the sap of a tree. <i>Kankantom</i>, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Shmuel said: This is the black substance used by cobblers, copper sulfate.
  And we learned in the mishna that one who writes with any substance that makes a mark is liable. The Gemara asks: What does this statement come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include that which Rabbi Ḥananya taught with regard to writing a bill of divorce: If one wrote it with the juice of the fruit called <i>teriya</i>, or with gallnut juice instead of ink, it is valid. Similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: If one wrote a bill of divorce with lead, with soot (<i>ge’onim</i>), or with shoeblack, it is valid. Since those substances leave a permanent mark, one who writes with them on Shabbat is liable.
  We learned in the mishna: If one unwittingly scratches letters on his flesh on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering and the Sages deem him exempt. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: Didn’t the infamous ben Stada take magic spells out of Egypt in a scratch on his flesh? They said to him: He was a fool, and you cannot cite proof from a fool. That is not the way that most people write. Incidentally, the Gemara asks: Why did they call him ben Stada, when he was the son of Pandeira? Rav Ḥisda said: His mother’s husband, who acted as his father, was named Stada, but the one who had relations with his mother and fathered him was named Pandeira. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t his mother’s husband Pappos ben Yehuda? Rather, his mother was named Stada and he was named ben Stada after her. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t his mother Miriam, who braided women’s hair? The Gemara explains: That is not a contradiction. Rather, Stada was merely a nickname, as they say in Pumbedita: This one strayed [<i>setat da</i>] from her husband.
  We learned in the mishna: If one wrote only a single letter, even if it was adjacent to other preexisting writing, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> whose opinion is cited in the mishna? Rava bar Rav Huna said: This <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, didn’t he say: One who adds a single thread to a previously woven fabric is liable for weaving? In his opinion, although a single thread or letter is insignificant in and of itself, one is liable because adding even a small measure to existing material is significant.
  We learned in the mishna: If one wrote over other writing he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> whose opinion is cited in the mishna? Rav Ḥisda said: This <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one needed to write the Tetragrammaton, the name of God, in a Torah scroll, and became confused and intended instead to write the name Yehuda, and while intending to write Yehuda he erred and omitted the letter <i>dalet</i>, thereby writing the name of God, he should do the following. He passes a quill with more ink over the name and sanctifies it, i.e., he writes it with the intention required when writing a holy name. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Even if he adds ink over what he wrote, this writing of God’s name is not ideal. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, writing over other writing is considered writing anew.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one wrote a single letter and thereby completed a book, or if one wove a single thread and thereby completed an entire garment, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> whose opinion is cited in the <i>baraita</i>? Rava bar Rav Huna said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: One who adds a single thread to a previously woven fabric is liable for weaving. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, one who does so to complete a garment is different. Even if he is not liable for weaving, he is liable at least for striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel.
  Rabbi Ami said: If one wrote one letter on paper in Tiberias and one letter on paper in Tzippori, he is liable because he performed a full-fledged act of writing that is lacking only in proximity. When the two pieces of paper are brought together he will have written two associated letters. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: If one wrote one letter on two walls of a house, or on two parts of a writing tablet that are not read together, he is exempt? All the more so that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who wrote in two different cities. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the parts of a tablet, there is the lack of an additional act of cutting or tearing to facilitate bringing the letters together. However, here, in the case of two cities, even though they are distant from one another, there is no lack of an additional act to facilitate bringing them together.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: If one emended a single letter on Shabbat, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: Now, if one wrote a single letter on Shabbat he is exempt; is it possible that if one emends a single letter he is liable? Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one removed the roof of a <i>ḥet</i> and transformed it into two instances of the letter <i>zayin</i>, effectively writing two letters with a single correction. Rava said: It is not necessarily referring to that specific case. It could even be referring to a case where one removed the protrusion from the back of a <i>dalet</i> and transformed it into a <i>reish</i>, thereby emending the written text. One who did so is liable for performing the prohibited labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught: If one intended to write one letter on Shabbat
  
  Daf 105a
  
  and managed to write two letters, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that one is exempt in that case? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: That case where we learned that he is exempt is referring to a case where the letters require crowns. This is referring to a case where they do not require crowns, and he is liable. If the letters already had their requisite ornamentation and an individual separated them, it is as if he wrote two letters.
  We learned in the mishna If one wrote one letter as an abbreviation [<i>notarikon</i>] representing an entire word, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Zimra: From where is it derived that the language of abbreviation is employed in the Torah? As it is stated: “Neither shall your name any more be called Abram, but your name shall be Abraham; for the father of a multitude of nations [<i>av hamon goyim</i>] have I made you” (Genesis 17:5). The verse itself contracts <i>av hamon</i> into Abraham [<i>Avraham</i>]. The words <i>av hamon</i> themselves are interpreted as an abbreviation: I have made you a father [<i>av</i>] for the nations, I have made you chosen [<i>baḥur</i>] among the nations, I have made you beloved [<i>ḥaviv</i>] among the nations, I have made you king [<i>melekh</i>] for the nations, I have made you distinguished [<i>vatik</i>] for the nations, I have made you trusted [<i>ne’eman</i>] for the nations.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan himself said that the word <i>anokhi</i> that begins the Ten Commandments is an abbreviation for: I myself wrote and gave [<i>ana nafshi ketivat yehavit</i>]. The Rabbis said it is an abbreviation for: A pleasant statement was written and given [<i>amira ne’ima ketiva yehiva</i>]. Some say the word <i>anokhi</i> can be interpreted backwards: It was written, it was given, its statements are faithful [<i>yehiva ketiva ne’emanim amareha</i>].
  The school of Rabbi Natan said that there is another abbreviation in the Torah. In the verse: “And the angel of the Lord said to him: Why did you hit your donkey these three times? Behold I have come out as an adversary because your way is contrary [<i>yarat</i>] against me” (Numbers 22:32). <i>Yarat</i> is an abbreviation for: The donkey feared [<i>yare’a</i>], it saw [<i>ra’ata</i>], and it turned aside [<i>nateta</i>]. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The word <i>karmel</i> in the verse: “And bread, and toasted grain flour, and toasted grain [<i>karmel</i>]” (Leviticus 23:14) means: A full kernel [<i>kar maleh</i>], i.e., the seed fills the stalk. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said in King David’s words: “And behold, with you is Shimi ben Gera from Benjamin, of Bahurim, who cursed me with a grievous [<i>nimretzet</i>] curse on the day that I went to Mahanaim” (I Kings 2:8). The word <i>nimretzet</i> is an abbreviation for: He is an adulterer [<i>noef</i>], he is a Moabite [<i>Moavi</i>], he is a murderer [<i>rotze’aḥ</i>], he is an oppressor [<i>tzorer</i>], he is an abomination [<i>to’eva</i>].
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is another abbreviation in the Bible: “And Judah said: What can we say to my master, what can we speak, and how can we justify [<i>nitztadak</i>]” (Genesis 44:16), which stands for: We are honest [<i>nekhonim</i>], we are righteous [<i>tzaddikim</i>], we are pure [<i>tehorim</i>], we are innocent [<i>dakkim</i>], we are holy [<i>kedoshim</i>].
  MISHNA: With regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat in two separate lapses of awareness separated by a period of awareness that the day was Shabbat, writing one letter in the morning and one letter in the afternoon, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin-offering like someone who has unintentionally performed a full-fledged prohibited labor, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabban Gamliel holds: There is no awareness for half a measure. One is not liable to bring a sacrifice for half a measure; therefore, the fact that he became aware between performance of the two halves of the prohibited labor is of no significance. His awareness does not demarcate between one act of writing a letter and the second act of writing a letter with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering. And the Rabbis hold: There is awareness for half a measure. If an individual became aware of his transgression between the two parts of the prohibited labor, each individual part is independent of the other, and the two halves of the prohibited labor do not join together to create liability.
  
  MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering if he wove three threads at the beginning of something new, or if he adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. And the Rabbis say: Both at the beginning and at the end, its measure for liability is two threads. One who makes two meshes, i.e., ties the threads of the warp, attaching them to either the <i>nirin</i> or the <i>keiros</i>, which will be explained in the Gemara, in a winnow, sieve, or basket, is liable for making meshes. And one who sews is liable if he sews two stitches. And one who tears is liable if he tears enough fabric in order to sew two stitches to repair it.
  GEMARA: When Rabbi Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he taught that Rabbi Eliezer said: Two threads is the measure that determines liability for beginning a weave. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn three in the mishna? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, because this source is referring to thick threads and that source is referring to thin threads. Some say it this way, that one is liable when weaving two thick threads, and some say it that way, that one is liable when weaving two thin threads. The Gemara elaborates: Some say it this way: One who weaves thick threads, three threads will not unravel, but two will unravel. With regard to thin threads, two will also not unravel. And some say it this way: One who weaves thin threads, three threads are conspicuous, two are not conspicuous. With regard to thick threads, two are also conspicuous.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who weaves three threads at the beginning or one thread onto a preexisting woven fabric is liable. And the Rabbis say: Both at the beginning and at the end, its measure for liability is two threads. And if one weaves a hem with a thread or color different from the original garment, he is liable for weaving two threads across a width of three meshes, i.e., three threads of the warp. Why is one liable in that case? To what is this similar? It is similar to weaving a small belt in which one weaves two threads across a width of three meshes, the width of the belt. And when it is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: One who weaves three threads at the beginning or one thread onto a preexisting woven fabric is liable, that unattributed <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  It was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One who weaves two threads onto a large fabric or onto the border of a fabric alongside the woof on Shabbat is liable. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable even if he weaves one thread. And along the edge of the warp, one who weaves two threads across a width of three meshes is liable. To what is this similar? It is similar to weaving a small belt in which one weaves two threads across a width of three meshes. The Gemara comments: When it was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: One who weaves two threads onto a large fabric or onto the border is liable, that unattributed <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  We learned in the mishna that one who makes two meshes, attaching them to either the <i>nirin</i> or the keiros, is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of to the <i>nirin</i>? Abaye said: One ties two to the meshes, the thread of the warp, and ties one to the crosspiece, the thread that extends from the weaving rod. We learned in the mishna that one is liable for attaching the meshes to the <i>keiros</i>, and the Gemara asks: What is a <i>keiros</i>? Rav said: It refers to the slips, the parts that go up and down on a stationary loom and are parallel to the pole.
  And we also learned in the mishna that one who sews on Shabbat is liable if he sews two stitches. The Gemara asks: We already learned that on the list of primary categories of prohibited labor: And one who sews two stitches is liable. The Gemara answers: Since the mishna wanted to teach in the latter clause: And one who tears in order to sew two stitches, it also taught the <i>halakha</i> of one who sews. And one who tears, did we not also learn this in the mishna enumerating the list of primary categories of prohibited labor? Since the mishna wanted to teach a new <i>halakha</i> in the latter clause, namely: One who tears in his anger or for his dead relative, therefore, it also taught the <i>halakha</i> of one who sews two stitches.
  With regard to what we learned in the mishna: And one who tears in order to sew two stitches, the Gemara asks: Where do you find that case where it is necessary to tear a garment in order to sew it?
  
  Daf 105b
  
  The Gemara explains: It is found in a case where a pocketlike protrusion impedes sewing. Therefore, one tears the garment and tucks the protruding portion under the seam.
  MISHNA: One who rends his garment in his anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. And anyone else who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. And one who performs a labor destructively in order to repair is liable, and his measure for liability is equivalent to the measure for one who performs that labor constructively. The measure that determines liability for one who whitens, or one who combs, or one who dyes, or one who spins wool is the full width of a double <i>sit</i>, which is the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And for one who weaves two threads, the measure that determines liability is one <i>sit</i>.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: One who rends his garment in anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. The Gemara raises a contradiction to this based on a <i>baraita</i>: One who rends his garment in his anger or in his mourning or in his anguish over his dead relative is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. And even though he desecrates Shabbat by tearing his garment, he nevertheless fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment in mourning. Apparently, one is liable for rending his garment in anguish over the dead. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this mishna, which states one is liable for rending his garment, is referring to his own dead relative for whom he is obligated to tear his garment. And that mishna, which states one is exempt for rending his garment, is referring to any unrelated dead person.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Over his dead relative? The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna, which says that he is exempt, is referring to his own dead; however, it is referring to those relatives who are not subject to the obligation of mourning by Torah law. The Gemara asks: And even so, if the dead person is a Torah scholar, one is obligated to rend one’s garment in anguish over his death, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When a Torah scholar dies, everyone is his relative. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that everyone is his relative? Rather, say: Everyone is considered to be like his relative, in the sense that everyone rends his garment in anguish over him, and everyone bares his shoulder over him in mourning, and everyone eats the mourner’s meal over him in the public square as mourners do. The death of a Torah scholar is a personal loss for every Jew. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> in a case where the dead person is not a Torah scholar.
  The Gemara asks: And if he was an upright person, aren’t all those present at his death obligated to rend their garments over his death? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Why do a person’s sons and daughters die when they are young? They die so that he will cry and mourn over the death of an upright worthy person. The Gemara asks: They die so that he will cry? Is security taken from him in advance to ensure that he fulfills his obligation? Rather, emend the statement and say: It is because he did not cry or mourn over an upright person who died, as anyone who cries over an upright person who died, they forgive him for all his transgressions because of the honor he accorded to the deceased. Nevertheless, it is difficult, as one is required to rend his clothing over the death of an upright person. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> in a case where the deceased was not an upright person.
  The Gemara asks: And if one is standing close to the deceased when the soul leaves the body, he is obligated to rend his garment, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One who is standing over the deceased at the time of the departure of the soul is obligated to rend his garment. To what is this similar? It is similar to a Torah scroll that was burned. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> in a case where he is not standing there at the time of the departure of the soul.
  The Gemara asks further: This works out well in terms of resolving the contradiction with regard to his dead relative. However, the contradiction between the ruling in the mishna that one who rends his garment in his anger is not liable, and the ruling in the <i>baraita</i> that one who rends his garment in his anger is liable, is still difficult. The mishna exempts one who rends garments in anger, while the <i>baraita</i> deems him liable. The Gemara answers: The contradiction between his anger in the mishna and his anger in the <i>baraita</i> is also not difficult, as this ruling in the <i>baraita</i> that deems him liable is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and that ruling in the mishna that exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara elaborates: This ruling in the <i>baraita</i> follows Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat that is not needed for its own sake is liable for performing it. Therefore, one who rends his garment in anger is liable. That ruling in the mishna which exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one who performs a labor that is not needed for its own sake is exempt for performing it.
  The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda rules that one is liable for performing a labor not needed for its own sake in the case of a constructive act; did you hear him deem one liable in the case of a destructive act? Rabbi Avin said: This case, where one rends his garment in anger, is also constructive, because in doing so he assuages his anger. Rending his garment calms him; therefore, it can be said that he derives benefit from the act of rending, and it is consequently a constructive act. The Gemara asks: And is it at all permitted to tear in that manner? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Ḥilfa bar Agra, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: One who rends his garments in his anger, or who breaks his vessels in his anger, or who scatters his money in his anger, should be like an idol worshipper in your eyes, as that is the craft of the evil inclination. Today it tells him do this, and tomorrow it tells him do that, until eventually, when he no longer controls himself, it tells him worship idols and he goes and worships idols. Rabbi Avin said: What verse alludes to this? “There shall not be a strange god within you, and you shall not bow to a foreign god” (Psalms 81:10). What is the strange god that is within a person’s body? Say that it is the evil inclination. One may not rend his garments in anger, because in doing so he is deriving pleasure from satisfying the evil inclination.
  The Gemara answers: It is only necessary to discuss this in a case where one does so to instill fear in the members of his household. In order to show them that he is very angry, he tears and breaks objects even though he is not that angry. In that case he maintains control of himself and is not in danger of succumbing to the evil inclination. It is like the incident where Rav Yehuda sought to display his anger and he pulled threads off his garment. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov smashed broken vessels, Rav Sheshet threw small fish on his maidservant’s head, and Rabbi Abba broke the lid of a jug. All of these Sages caused minimal damage in creating the impression that they were angry.
  Apropos the laws of mourning for an upright person and a Torah scholar, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Anyone who sheds tears over an upright person, the Holy One, Blessed be He, counts his tears and places them in His treasury, as it is stated: “You have counted my wanderings, put my tears into your bottle, are they not in your book?” (Psalms 56:9). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Anyone who is lazy in eulogizing a Torah scholar, it is fitting to bury him alive, as it is stated: “And they buried him in the border of his inheritance in Timnat-seraḥ, which is in the hill-country of Ephraim, on the north of the mountain of Ga’ash” (Joshua 24:30). This teaches that the mountain raged against them to kill them because they did not eulogize him appropriately. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whoever is lazy in eulogizing a Sage does not live a long life, and his punishment is measure for measure. Since he was unconcerned with the death of the Sage, in the heavens they will be unconcerned with his death. The Holy One, Blessed be He, conducts Himself in this manner, as it is stated: “In full measure [<i>besase’a</i>], when You send her away You contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8), and the Sages derived that God punishes from the words: “You contend with her,” and He does so measure for measure, <i>se’a</i> for <i>se’a</i>, from the word <i>sase’a</i> in the verse above.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is stated: “And the nation worshipped the Lord all the days of Joshua and all the days of the Elders, who lived many days after Joshua” (Judges 2:7), indicating that the Elders lived long lives even though they did not eulogize Joshua properly. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Babylonian, you should be more precise in your reading. They indeed lived many days; however, they did not live many years. In fact, they did not live to the end of that year. Again he asked: But then with regard to the verse “So that your days and the days of your children will multiply on the land which the Lord your God swore to give to your fathers, as the days of the heavens over the earth” (Deuteronomy 11:21), would you also say that here the reward is to live many days but not years? He answered him: A blessing is different and should be interpreted in its most expansive sense.
  And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one of the brothers dies,
  
  Daf 106a
  
  all of the brothers should be concerned, lest their death be approaching. Similarly, if one member of a group dies, the entire group should be concerned. Some say the concern is greatest if the eldest dies. If he, despite his virtues, could not avoid punishment, others will certainly not be saved. And some say the concern is greatest if the youngest dies, because the least significant people are punished first, and perhaps this is the start of a punishment for the entire group.
  We learned in the mishna: And anyone who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. Rabbi Abbahu taught this <i>baraita</i> before Rabbi Yoḥanan: Anyone who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt, except for one who inflicts a wound or kindles a fire. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go teach that outside. This <i>baraita</i> is not fit for discussion in the study hall. The opinion that deems one liable for inflicting a wound or kindling a fire on Shabbat is not an accepted teaching and should be ignored. And if you want to say that it is a legitimate teaching, one who inflicts a wound would only be liable in a case where he needed the blood to give to his dog, and one who kindles a fire would only be liable in a case where he needs its ashes.
  The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Abbahu teach this <i>baraita</i>? Didn’t we learn explicitly in the mishna: Anyone who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt, including one who inflicts a wound or who kindles a fire? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for performing labor which is not needed for its own sake, whereas the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who exempts in that case. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that Rabbi Shimon deems one who inflicts a wound or kindles a fire on Shabbat liable even though these are destructive acts? From the fact that a verse was necessary to permit circumcision on Shabbat, by inference, in general, one who inflicts a wound is liable. If inflicting a wound was not prohibited on Shabbat, there would be no need to permit circumcision.
  Similarly, from the fact that the Torah prohibited kindling a fire on Shabbat even with regard to the execution by burning of a priest’s daughter who committed adultery, conclude from it that in general, one who ignites a fire on Shabbat is liable.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda address this proof? The Gemara answers: There, that is a case of a constructive labor in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ashi. For Rav Ashi said: What difference is there to me between repairing the child through circumcision and repairing a vessel? They are both constructive acts. And what difference is there to me between cooking a lead wick, as a melted lead wick was poured down the throat of the criminal sentenced to execution by burning, and cooking herbs used to produce dyes in the Tabernacle? The Torah addressed these cases specifically because they are constructive, and nothing can be derived from them with regard to liability for performance of destructive labors.
  We learned in the mishna: The measure that determines liability for one who whitens and for similar prohibited labors is the full width of a double <i>sit</i>. Rav Yosef would demonstrate the width of a double <i>sit</i> by indicating the distance between the index and middle fingers and instructing the onlookers to double the measure. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami would demonstrate in a simple manner, as he calculated that the distance between the thumb and the forefinger is equal to a double <i>sit</i>.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yehuda says: One who traps a bird into a closet or cage, and one who traps a deer into a house is liable. The Rabbis say: One is liable for trapping a bird into a closet
  
  Daf 106b
  
  and for trapping a deer into a garden, or into a courtyard, or into an enclosure [<i>bivar</i>], he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. This is the principle: If the trapping of the animal is inadequate and it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend it, one is not liable. However, if one trapped a deer into an enclosure in which the trapping is not inadequate, he is liable.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna there in tractate <i>Beitza</i>: One may not trap fish from the enclosures on a Festival, nor may one place food before them, because it is prohibited to feed an animal that may not be eaten on the Festival. However, one may trap an animal or a bird from its enclosures and slaughter them, and one may also place food before them. The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: From enclosures of animals, of birds, and of fish, one may not trap on a Festival, nor may one place food before them. This is difficult due to a contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling with regard to an animal in the <i>Tosefta</i>. This is similarly difficult due to the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the <i>Tosefta</i>.
  The Gemara says: Granted, with regard to the contradiction between the ruling concerning an animal in the mishna and the ruling concerning an animal in the <i>Tosefta</i>, it is not difficult, because this, the <i>Tosefta</i> that prohibits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda cited in the mishna that an animal trapped into an enclosure whose trapping is inadequate, i.e., it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend the animal, is not considered trapped. That, i.e., the mishna in <i>Beitza</i>, which permits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that animals in an enclosure are considered trapped.
  However, concerning the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the <i>Tosefta</i>, it is difficult. And if you say that the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the <i>Tosefta</i> is also not difficult because this, the mishna, which permits trapping, is referring to a roofed enclosure, in which a bird is considered trapped, and therefore there is no prohibition against apprehending it on Shabbat; and that the <i>Tosefta</i>, which prohibits trapping, is referring to an unroofed enclosure in which a bird is not considered trapped and apprehending it is prohibited, that does not resolve the contradiction. As with regard to a house, which is roofed, there is no dispute, and according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, trapping a bird into a closet, yes, it is considered trapped, while trapping it into a house, no, it is not considered trapped.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Here, in the mishna, according to which a bird in a house is not considered trapped, we are dealing with a free bird, a sparrow, because it does not accept authority. That bird is not intimidated and evades capture even in a house, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Why is it called a free bird [<i>tzippor dror</i>]? Because it dwells [<i>dara</i>] in a house as it does in a field. Therefore, the distinction between a roofed and unroofed enclosure resolves the apparent contradiction between the mishna and the <i>Tosefta</i>. The Gemara says: Now that you have arrived at this understanding, that the difference between the rulings in the two sources is predicated on different circumstances and not on a tannaitic dispute, the apparent contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling with regard to an animal in the <i>Tosefta</i> is also not difficult. This, the ruling in the <i>Tosefta</i> which prohibits apprehending the animal, is referring to a large enclosure from which the animal cannot escape, but it can still avoid being apprehended. Therefore, the trapping is considered inadequate, and apprehending the animal constitutes trapping. That, the ruling in the mishna that permits apprehending the animal, is referring to a small enclosure in which the animal cannot evade its pursuers and requires no further trapping.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a large enclosure and what are the circumstances of a small enclosure? Rav Ashi said: Any enclosure where one can run after an animal and reach it in one lunge is a small enclosure. And any other is a large enclosure. Or perhaps: Any enclosure where the shadows from the different walls fall upon each other is a small enclosure, as all enclosures had a uniform height. And any other is a large enclosure. Or perhaps: Any enclosure that does not have a series of corners in which the animal could evade capture is a small enclosure, and any other is a large enclosure.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. It depends whether the trapping of the animal is inadequate, in which case one is liable for trapping, or whether the trapping is not inadequate, in which case one is exempt. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in this matter. Abaye said to him: If you rule the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with his opinion, does that mean by inference that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps there is no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. He answered him using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who traps a deer on Shabbat that is blind or sleeping is liable. One who traps a lame, old, or sick deer is exempt. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is different about these cases and what is different about those cases? Rav Yosef answered: These, the blind or sleeping deer, are likely to run away when they feel that they are being touched; therefore, they require trapping. However, these, the crippled, old, and sick deer, are not likely to run away and are therefore considered to be already trapped. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one who traps a sick deer is liable? Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, in which a sick deer is not considered trapped and one who traps it is liable is referring to a deer that is sick due to a fever, which can still flee; that <i>baraita</i>, in which the deer is considered trapped and one who traps it is exempt is referring to a deer that is sick with fatigue and is incapable of fleeing.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who traps locusts, cicadas, hornets, or mosquitoes on Shabbat is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Not every insect is the same in this matter. If one traps any insect whose species is typically trapped for personal use, he is liable, and if one traps any insect whose species is typically not trapped for personal use, he is exempt. It was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One who traps locusts when there is dew is exempt. Since it is cold at that time, the locusts are paralyzed. If one traps them when it is hot, he is liable. Elazar ben Mehavai says: If the locusts were swarming, one is exempt for trapping them, because no effort is necessary to apprehend them. A dilemma was raised before them: Does the statement of Elazar ben Mehavai apply to the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>, ruling stringently that one is liable for trapping locusts even when there is dew unless they are swarming; or does it apply to the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>, ruling leniently that one is exempt when trapping locusts, even in the heat when they are swarming? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma based on a source that addresses the point explicitly: One who traps locusts when there is dew is exempt; one who traps locusts when it is hot is liable. Elazar ben Mehavai says: Even when it is hot, if they were swarming, one is exempt.
  MISHNA: If a deer entered a house on its own and one locked the door before it, he is liable for trapping. If two people locked the door, they are exempt, because neither performed a complete labor. If one person is incapable of locking the door and two people locked it, they are liable because that is the typical manner of performing that labor. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt as he holds that two people who perform a single labor are never liable by Torah law.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Shmuel said: One who traps a lion on Shabbat is not liable for trapping unless he traps it in its cage, and until that point it is not considered trapped.
  MISHNA: If one person sat in the entrance of a courtyard in which there is a deer, but did not fill the entire doorway, and a second person sat and filled it, the second person is liable because he completed the labor of trapping. However, if the first person sat in the doorway and filled it, and a second person came and sat next to him, the first person is liable and the second is exempt even if the first person stood and went away, leaving the second one to secure the deer. The mishna explains: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it, and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside it. In that case, he is exempt even though he enhances security on the deer, because he did not trap the animal.
  
  Daf 107a
  
  GEMARA: Rabbi Abba said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: If a bird flew under the flaps of one’s clothing on Shabbat and cannot get out, he may sit and secure it until dark and then take it. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised an objection based on that which we learned in the mishna: If the first person sat in the doorway and filled it, and a second person came and sat next to him, the first person is liable and the second is exempt, even if the first person stood and went. What, does this not mean here, as it does throughout tractate <i>Shabbat</i>, that he is exempt after the fact, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>? How then could Rav say one may sit and secure the bird <i>ab initio</i>? The Gemara rejects this: No, the statement in the mishna means that he is exempt and it is permitted <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to explain the mishna that way from the fact that it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it, and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside it. By inference, he is exempt and it is permitted, just like one who locks the door to his house. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that it is so.
  Some say a slightly different version. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too learned support for Rav’s statement in the mishna: Even if the first person stood and went, the first person is liable and the second is exempt. What, does this not mean that he is exempt, and it is permitted? The Gemara rejects this: No, he is exempt and it is prohibited. Rav Naḥman said: That is impossible, from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside it. By inference, he is exempt and it is permitted, just like one who locks the door to his house. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that it is so.
  With regard to this issue Shmuel said: With regard to all exempt rulings in the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, although one who performs the action is exempt by Torah law, his action is prohibited by rabbinic law, with the exception of these three for which he is exempt and it is permitted to perform the action.One is this case of the deer. And from what source do we conclude that one is exempt and it is permitted? From the fact that it was taught in the latter clause of the mishna: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside. And another example where he is exempt and it is permitted is: One who drains an abscess containing pus on Shabbat, if he did so to create a permanent opening in it, he is liable. However, if he did so to drain fluid from it, he is exempt. And from what source do we conclude that one is exempt and it is permitted? As we learned in a mishna: A hand needle used for sewing clothes may be moved on Shabbat to remove a thorn. Apparently, removing a thorn on Shabbat is permitted <i>ab initio</i> to the extent that one is even permitted to move a needle for that purpose. And another case is: One who traps a snake on Shabbat, if he deals with it so that it will not bite him and in doing so traps it, he is exempt. However, if he traps it for medicinal purposes, he is liable. And from what source do we conclude that one is exempt and it is permitted? As we learned in a mishna: One may overturn a bowl on top of a lamp <i>ab initio</i> on Shabbat so that the fire will not take hold in the ceiling beam; and similarly, one may overturn a bowl on top of a child’s feces so that he will not touch it and dirty himself, and on top of a scorpion so it will not bite, and the ruling is the same with regard to a snake.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to any of the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah, one who traps them or wounds them on Shabbat is liable. The Torah states: “The following shall be impure for you among the creeping animals that swarm upon the earth: The weasel, and the mouse, and the dab lizard of every variety; and the gecko, and the land-crocodile, and the lizard, and the skink, and the chameleon” (Leviticus 11:29–30). With regard to other abominations and crawling things, one who wounds them is exempt. One who traps them for a specific need is liable; one who traps them for no specific need is exempt. With regard to animals or birds that are in his possession, i.e., an animal that is domesticated and under someone’s control, one who traps them is exempt; and, however, one who wounds them is liable.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From the fact that it is taught in the mishna: One who wounds them is liable, by inference they have skins. One is liable for inflicting a wound only when there is skin covering the flesh and the blood pools beneath it. Who is the <i>tanna</i> who teaches this? Shmuel said: It is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping animals that are listed in the Torah have skins. Their flesh transmits impurity, but their skin does not transmit impurity. The Rabbis say that both the skin and the flesh of some creeping animals transmit impurity. Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri only with regard to the matter of impurity, as it is written after the Torah lists the creeping animals: “Those are for you the impure among the creeping animals, whoever touches them when they are dead shall become impure until evening” (Leviticus 11:31). The Rabbis derive from the extraneous term: “Those are for you the impure,” to include the fact that the skins of the creatures in the second verse transmit impurity just as their flesh does. However, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, even the Rabbis concede that their skin is distinct from their flesh.
  The Gemara asks: And, with regard to Shabbat, they do not disagree? Wasn’t the following taught in a <i>baraita</i>? One who traps one of the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah or one who wounds them is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. And the Rabbis say: The term skin is utilized only
  
  Daf 107b
  
  with regard to those animals enumerated by the Sages as having skin, since their skin is considered by the Sages to be similar to their flesh. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, those that the Sages enumerated, whose skin and flesh are equated, do not have skins. And Abaye said: This is what the <i>tanna</i> in the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Only those that the Sages did not enumerate have skin discrete from their flesh. Rava said to him: Doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> say the opposite: That those enumerated by the Sages have skin discrete from their flesh? Rather, Rava said: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Only the skin of those animals enumerated by the Sages transmits impurity like flesh. The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri holds that even the creeping animals not enumerated by the Sages also transmit impurity? Isn’t the opposite taught, that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping animals have skin that does not transmit impurity? Rav Adda bar Mattana said to resolve it this way: And the Rabbis say: With regard to impurity, those animals enumerated by the Sages do not have skin. According to this explanation, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to the laws of impurity.
  But still, is it clear that they do not disagree with regard to the matter of Shabbat? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who traps one of the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah on Shabbat is liable, as is one who wounds them, if they are creeping animals that have skins? And what is considered to be an irreversible wound? It is a wound where the blood collects in a single spot beneath the skin, even if it does not emerge. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping animals have skins. Apparently, there is disagreement with regard to Shabbat as well.
  Rav Ashi said: Who is the first <i>tanna</i>? It is Rabbi Yehuda, who follows the texture of the skin. He does not distinguish between those creeping animals whose skin is considered like flesh and those whose skin is discrete from the flesh as the verses may imply; rather, creeping animals are distinguished based on the texture of their skin, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even though the lizard is mentioned in the verse, it has the same ruling as the weasel because the weasel has skin discrete from its flesh. However, the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to impurity, concede with regard to Shabbat and hold that all creeping animals have skins. The Gemara asks: If so, the phrase in the <i>baraita</i>: This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, is difficult. It should have said: This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and those who disagree with him, as the Rabbis who disagree with him with regard to impurity concede to him with regard to the laws of Shabbat. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Emend the <i>baraita</i> and teach: The statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and those who disagree with him.
  Levi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From where is it derived that a wound is defined as something irreversible? He answered him that it is derived as it is written: “Can a Cushite change his skin, or a leopard its spots [<i>ḥavarburotav</i>]?” (Jeremiah 13:23). The Gemara explains: What does <i>ḥavarburotav</i> mean? If you say that they are spotted marks on the leopard’s skin, that phrase: Or a leopard its spots, should have been: Or a leopard its colors. Rather, <i>ḥavarburotav</i> means wounds, and they are similar to the skin of a Cushite: Just like the skin of a Cushite will not change its color to white, so too a wound is something that does not reverse.
  We learned in the mishna: And one who traps other abominations is exempt. The Gemara infers: If one kills them he is liable. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds this opinion? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who kills lice on Shabbat is akin to one who kills a camel on Shabbat. Apparently, he is the Sage who holds that one is liable for killing any living creature. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this: Perhaps this is not so, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to lice, which do not procreate. However, with regard to other abominations and crawling things that procreate, they do not disagree with him.
  And fundamentally they both derived this <i>halakha</i> from the reddened ram skins used to cover the Tabernacle. Rabbi Eliezer holds that liability for killing an animal on Shabbat exists only with regard to animals like rams. Just as rams have their lives taken and die, so too, one is liable for killing any animal whose life is taken, including lice. And the Rabbis also hold that liability for killing an animal on Shabbat exists only with regard to animals like rams. Just as rams procreate, so too, one is liable for killing any creature that procreates. One is not liable for killing lice, which do not procreate. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And lice do not procreate? Didn’t the Master say: The Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and sustains everything from the horns of wild oxen to the eggs of lice? Apparently, lice reproduce by laying eggs. Rav Yosef answered him: There is a species of insect that is called lice eggs, but lice themselves do not actually lay eggs.
  Again he asked: And wasn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i> that lists types of creeping animals: <i>Tefuyei</i>, a type of insect, and lice eggs? He answered him: There is a species of insect called lice eggs. Again he asked: And still, there is the issue of a flea, which procreates according to all opinions, and nevertheless, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who traps a flea on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rav Ashi said: Are you raising a contradiction between trapping with killing? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree only in that one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that one is liable for trapping even a species that is not typically trapped; and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, holds that one is exempt in that case. However, with regard to killing, even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that one is liable.
  We learned in the mishna that one who traps creeping animals for a specific need is liable, but one who traps them for no specific need is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds this way? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said that for a prohibited labor performed not for its own sake, one is exempt.
  Some taught the statement of Rav in reference to this: With regard to one who drains an abscess in a boil containing pus on Shabbat, if his intention is to create an opening for it he is liable; if his intention is to remove pus from it he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds this way? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said that for a prohibited labor performed not for its own sake, one is exempt.
  Some teach the statement of Rav as referring to this: With regard to one who traps a snake on Shabbat, if he engages in its trapping so it does not bite him, he is exempt; if he does so for medicinal purposes he is liable. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds this way? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said that for a prohibited labor performed not for its own sake, one is exempt.
  Shmuel said: With regard to one who removes a fish from the sea, when an area on the skin of the fish has dried up the size of a <i>sela</i>, he is liable. A fish in that condition cannot survive, and therefore the individual who removed it from the water is liable for killing it. Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: That is so as long as the skin that dried is between its fins. Rav Ashi said: Do not say that this <i>halakha</i> applies only in a case where it actually dried. Rather, it applies even if the fish has dried to the extent that mucus has formed, and if one were to touch that area it would stick to his fingers.
  Mar bar Hamdurei said that Shmuel said: One who reached his hand into the innards of an animal on Shabbat and detached a fetus that was in its womb is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? It does not make sense to consider the fetus as a full-fledged living creature. Rava said: Bar Hamdurei explained this to me. Didn’t Rav Sheshet say: One who detaches hops on Shabbat from the shrubs and thorns on which they are growing is liable for uprooting an object from its place of growth? Here, too, in the case of the fetus, one is liable for uprooting an object from its place of growth. Abaye said: One who detached
  
  Daf 108a
  
  a mushroom from the handle of a pitcher on Shabbat is liable for uprooting an object from its place of growth. Rav Oshaya raised an objection from that which we learned: One who detaches a plant on Shabbat from a perforated flowerpot is liable, and one who detaches a plant from an imperforate pot is exempt. A plant that grows in an imperforate pot is not considered connected to the ground. One who detaches it is not uprooting it from its place of growth. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of an imperforate pot, that is not the way a plant grows. Plants are generally planted in the ground; a plant in an imperforate pot is disconnected from the ground. Whereas here, in the case of a mushroom growing from the handle of a pitcher, that is the way it grows. The plant is considered connected to the ground.
  We learned in the mishna: One who wounds an animal or a bird on Shabbat is liable. Rav Huna said: One may write phylacteries on the skin of a kosher bird. Rav Yosef said: What is he teaching us with this statement? If he is teaching us that a bird has skin, we already learned that: One who wounds an animal or a bird is liable. Since there is liability only if a wound forms beneath the skin, apparently a bird has skin. Abaye said to him: He is teaching us many things, for if I had only learned from the mishna, I would have said the following: Since the skin of a bird has many holes from which the feathers grow, one should not be allowed to write sacred matters on it. Therefore, he teaches us as they say in the West, i.e., in Eretz Yisrael: Any hole over which ink passes and does not penetrate it, is not considered a hole that invalidates the writing.
  Rabbi Zeira raised an objection to the conclusion that the skin of a bird is considered skin. Didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “And he shall rend it by its wings without creating a division, and the priest shall burn it upon the altar on the wood that is on the fire” (Leviticus 1:17), teaches that the priest must prepare even the skin to make it acceptable for the altar? That is not the case when animals are offered, as their skin is flayed before they are sacrificed. And if it should enter your mind that the skin of a bird is skin, how does the verse include it among that which the priest prepares for the altar? Abaye said: This is not difficult. Indeed, it is skin, and nevertheless, the Torah includes it as a biblical decree, specifying that the skin of a bird is sacrificed.
  Some say that Rabbi Zeira said: We, too, have also learned support for this <i>halakha</i>: The verse: “By its wings,” comes to include the skin. Granted, if you say that the skin of a bird is skin, that is the reason that the verse needs to explicitly include it. The verse is teaching us that even though the bird’s skin is skin, it must still be sacrificed. However, if you say that the skin of a bird is not skin, why is a verse necessary to include it? Clearly, it is sacrificed. Abaye said to him: That is not proof. Actually, I can say to you that it is not skin and, nevertheless, it must be included in the verse. Had the skin of the bird not been specifically included, it might have entered your mind to say that since there are many holes in it, it is repulsive and unfit for the altar. Therefore, the verse teaches us that it is sacrificed. There is no proof that the skin of a bird is considered skin.
  Mar, son of Ravina, raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to writing phylacteries on the skin of a kosher fish? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak said to him: If Elijah comes and says. The Gemara asks: What does the phrase: If Elijah comes and says, mean? What requires clarification? If you say that whether a fish has skin or whether it does not have skin requires clarification, we see that it has skin. And furthermore, we learned in a mishna: Fish bones and skin protect the objects covered with them from becoming impure under a tent with a corpse. Since fish bones and skin do not contract impurity, they constitute a barrier to impurity. Apparently, fish have skin. Rather, if Elijah comes and says whether its foul smell has ceased from it or whether its foul smell has not ceased from it.
  It was reported: Shmuel and Karna were sitting on the bank of the Malka River. They saw that the water was rising and was murky. Shmuel said to Karna: A great man is coming from the West, Eretz Yisrael, and his intestines are aching, and the water is rising to greet him. Go sniff out his container, i.e., see if he is a Torah scholar. Karna went and found Rav, who was the Sage that came from Eretz Yisrael, and he asked him several questions to test him. He said to him: From where is it derived that one may write phylacteries only on the hide of a kosher animal? Rav said to him that this <i>halakha</i> is as it is written: “And it shall be a sign for you on your arm, and a reminder between your eyes, so that God’s Torah will be in your mouth” (Exodus 13:9). Only hide from those animals that are permitted to be placed in your mouth, i.e., may be eaten, may be used for phylacteries. Karna then asked him: From where is it derived that prohibited blood is red? Karna asked Rav this to determine which shades of menstrual blood are impure. Rav said to him that it is as it is stated: “And the Moabites saw the water from afar, red like blood” (II Kings 3:22).
  Karna also asked: From where is derived that circumcision is performed in that place? Rav answered him: It is stated here, with regard to circumcision: “And on the eighth day he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin [<i>orlato</i>]” (Leviticus 12:3), and it is stated there, with regard to recently planted trees: “And when you come to the land and plant all types of fruit trees, and you shall count the fruit thereof as forbidden [<i>orlato</i>]; three years shall it be as forbidden unto you, it shall not be eaten.” (Leviticus 19:23). Just as there the Torah is referring to a tree, which is an item that bears fruit, here, too, in the case of circumcision, <i>orla</i> is referring to an item that bears fruit. He asked him: Say that circumcision should be performed on one’s heart, as it is written: “And you shall circumcise the foreskin of [<i>orlat</i>] your heart” (Deuteronomy 10:16)? Say that circumcision should be performed on one’s ear, as it is written: “Behold, their ear is dull [<i>areila</i>] and they cannot listen” (Jeremiah 6:10)? Rav said to him: One derives the meaning of the complete form <i>orlato</i> from another instance of the complete form <i>orlato</i>; and one does not derive the complete form <i>orlato</i> from the incomplete form <i>orlat,</i> which modifies another word, as is also the case with the word <i>areila</i>.
  Since Rav understood that Karna came to test him, he said to him: What is your name? He told him: Karna. He said to him: May it be the will of God that a horn [<i>karna</i>] will emerge in his eyes.
  Ultimately, Shmuel brought him into his house. He fed him barley bread and small fried fish, and gave him beer to drink, and he did not show him the lavatory so he would suffer from diarrhea. Shmuel was a doctor and he wanted to relieve Rav’s intestinal suffering by feeding him food that would relieve him. Since Rav was unaware of Shmuel’s intention, he became angry at him. Rav cursed Shmuel and said: Whoever causes me suffering, let his children not survive. Although Rav eventually discovered Shmuel’s good intentions, his curse was fulfilled, and so it was that Shmuel’s children did not survive long.
  The Gemara comments: The issue mentioned above is in fact a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. It was asked in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that <i>circumcision</i> is performed in that place? It is stated here, in the case of circumcision, <i>orlato</i>. And it is stated there, with regard to trees, <i>orlato</i>. Just as there the Torah is referring to a tree, which is an item that bears fruit, here too, <i>orla</i> is referring to an item that bears fruit; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Natan says: This verbal analogy <i>is not necessary</i>, as it says: “And an uncircumcised man who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin [<i>orlato</i>], his soul will be cut off from his nation, he has broken My covenant” (Genesis 17:14). From the fact that it says: An uncircumcised man, it is derived that circumcision is in the place that distinguishes between a male and a female.
  The Gemara cites similar proofs. The Sages taught: One may write phylacteries on the hide of a kosher domesticated animal, and on the hide of a kosher non-domesticated animal, and on the hides of their unslaughtered carcasses [<i>neveilot</i>], and on the hides of animals with a condition that will cause them to die within twelve months [<i>tereifot</i>]. And one may wrap the parchment with the hair of these animals and sew them with their sinews; and it is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the parchment of phylacteries may be wrapped with the hair of these animals and sewn with their sinews. But one may not write on the hide of a non-kosher animal, or on the hide of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, and it goes without saying that one may not write on their skins when they are <i>neveilot</i> or <i>tereifot</i>. And one may not wrap the parchment with the hair of non-kosher animals, nor may one sew them with their sinews.
  And this question was asked by a Boethusian to Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi: From where is it derived that one may not write phylacteries on the hide of a non-kosher animal? He said to him, it is as it is written: “So that God’s Torah will be in your mouth.” The Rabbis derived that one may write the passages only on an item that is permitted to be placed in one’s mouth, i.e., eaten. He said to him: If that is so, on the skin of <i>neveilot</i> and <i>tereifot</i> coming from kosher animals, one should not write phylacteries, as they may not be eaten. He said to him: I will tell you a parable. To what is this similar? To two people who were sentenced to death by the king. One was killed by the king himself, and one was killed by an executioner [<i>ispaklitor</i>]. Which one is more praiseworthy? You must say: The one that the king himself killed. Therefore, an animal that died at the hands of Heaven and not by a human action is superior. He said to him: If so, then the <i>neveilot</i> and <i>tereifot</i> should be eaten, as they were killed by the king. He said to him: The Torah said: “Do not eat any <i>neveila</i>” (Deuteronomy 14:20) and you say they should be eaten? A Torah decree determines that they may not be eaten, but that does not mean they are inferior. The Boethusian said to him: Well put [<i>kalos</i>].
  MISHNA: One may not make brine [<i>hilmei</i>] on Shabbat,
  
  Daf 108b
  
  but one may make salt water and dip one’s bread in it, and place it in cooked food. Rabbi Yosei said: But isn’t it still brine, whether it is a large quantity or whether it is a small quantity? And this is the type of salt water that is permitted: Salt water in which one places oil initially into the water or into the salt. This is salt water prepared not in the usual manner.
  GEMARA: With regard to that which was stated in the mishna, the Gemara asks: What is the <i>tanna</i> saying with regard to the distinction between brine and salt water? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is what he is saying: One may not prepare a large quantity of salt water, brine, on Shabbat, but one may prepare a small quantity of salt water.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yosei said: But isn’t it still brine whether it is a large quantity or a small quantity? A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Yosei said that there is no difference between a large and small quantity of salt water, was his intention to prohibit preparing any salt water on Shabbat or to permit doing so? Rav Yehuda said: His intention is to permit doing so, which is understood from the fact that the mishna is not teaching: Rabbi Yosei prohibits. Rabba said to him: From the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: And this is the type of salt water that is permitted, by inference, Rabbi Yosei intended to prohibit preparing salt water. Rather, Rabba said: Rabbi Yosei intended to prohibit preparing any salt water on Shabbat. And similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yosei’s intention was to prohibit.
  That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not prepare a large quantity of salt water to add to the pickled vegetables that are inside a flat earthenware shard used for pickling [<i>gistera</i>]. However, one may prepare a small quantity of salt water and eat his bread with it and add it to cooked food. Rabbi Yosei said: Is it because this is a large quantity and this is a small quantity that this is prohibited and this is permitted? People will learn from this and say: A large amount of labor is prohibited on Shabbat, but a small amount of labor is permitted. Rather, certainly they are both prohibited. And this is the type of salt water that is permitted: One may place oil and salt together or oil and water and then add salt to the mixture, and this <i>halakha</i> applies provided one does not place water and salt together <i>ab initio</i>.
  Strong, radish, and citron are a mnemonic for the following <i>halakhot</i>.
  Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥaviva taught: One may not prepare strong salt water on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is strong salt water? Rabba and Rav Yosef bar Abba both said: Any water in which an egg can float. The Gemara asks: And how much salt is in this salt water? Abaye said: Two-thirds salt and one-third water.
  The Gemara asks: For what purpose is this salt water prepared? Rabbi Abbahu said: It is prepared for fish brine [<i>muraisa</i>]<i>.</i> And Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥaviva taught with regard to salting: One may not salt a radish or an egg on Shabbat because by salting them he performs a labor that improves them. Rav Ḥizkiya said in the name of Abaye: Preparing a radish is prohibited, and preparing an egg is permitted. Rav Naḥman said: Initially, I would salt radishes on Shabbat, as I said: I am ruining it by doing so, as Shmuel said: Sharpness is good for radishes; since salt reduces their sharpness, one who adds salt ruins the radish. However, once I heard this, that when Ulla came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, they salt many piles of radishes throughout the week, I do not salt them on Shabbat anymore, but I certainly dip them in salt because that is not considered to be an improvement.
  The Gemara cites that which Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥaviva taught with regard to radishes and eggs: With regard to a citron, a radish, and an egg, if it were not for their outer peel, or egg white, they would never emerge from the intestines, because they are extremely hard to digest.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: No person has ever drowned in the Sea of Sodom, the Dead Sea. Since there is so much salt, people easily float in it. Rav Yosef said: Sodom is overturned and Rav Dimi’s statement is backward. Is his statement saying that it is a man who does not drown in the Dead Sea, but a plank sinks? Abaye said to him: He is saying his statement utilizing the style of: It is not necessary: It is not necessary to mention a plank because it does not sink in any body of water in the world. But even a man, who drowns in other bodies of water in the world, does not drown in the Sea of Sodom. The Gemara asks: What are the practical consequences of this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains: This <i>halakha</i> is relevant in a case of this kind: Ravin was walking after Rabbi Yirmeya on the shore of the Sea of Sodom. Ravin said to Rabbi Yirmeya: What is the ruling? Is it permitted to wash oneself with this water on Shabbat, or perhaps it is prohibited because it has healing properties? Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: One may well do so.
  Ravin asked another question: When one washes himself on Shabbat in water from the Dead Sea, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it permitted for him to close and open his eyes in the water so that the water gets inside? Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: That case I did not hear; however, with regard to a similar case, placing wine in one’s eye on Shabbat, I did hear. As Rabbi Zeira said, sometimes he said it in the name of Rav Mattana and sometimes he said it in the name of Mar Ukva, and they both said it in the name of Shmuel’s father and in the name of Levi: One of them said: With regard to placing wine inside the eye on Shabbat, it is prohibited because it heals; on the eye, it is permitted. And one of them said: Bland saliva, saliva from one who has not eaten since waking, even placing it on the eye on Shabbat is prohibited because it is commonly used as medicine.
  The Gemara comments: Conclude that Shmuel’s father is the one who said that placing wine inside the eye is prohibited but on the eye is permitted, from the fact that Shmuel said: A person may soak his bread in wine and place it on his eye on Shabbat. He said this after he heard this <i>halakha</i> from whom? Is it not that he heard it from his father? The Gemara rejects this: And according to your reasoning, that <i>halakha</i> which Shmuel said: It is prohibited to place bland saliva even on the eye on Shabbat, he said this after he heard this <i>halakha</i> from whom? If we say that he heard it from his father, then Levi, who was cited together with Shmuel’s father in the list of those who stated the <i>halakhot</i>, did he himself not say even one <i>halakha</i>? Rather, one <i>halakha</i> Shmuel heard from his father, and one <i>halakha</i> he heard one from Levi, and we do not know which he heard from his father and which he heard from Levi.
  Mar Ukva said that Shmuel said: One may soak eye salves from Shabbat eve and place them on his eyes on Shabbat, and he need not be concerned that he is violating the prohibition against healing on Shabbat. The Gemara relates: Bar Liva’ei was standing before Mar Ukva on Shabbat. He saw Mar Ukva, who was opening and closing his eyes while applying a salve to them. Bar Liva’ei said to him: Master Shmuel certainly did not permit doing all of this. Rabbi Yannai sent a message to Mar Ukva: Can the master send us some of Master Shmuel’s eye salves? Mar Ukva sent him in response: I will send it to you so that you do not say I am miserly, but be aware that this is what Shmuel said: For healing the eyes, better a drop of cold water in the morning and washing the hands and feet with hot water in the evening than all the eye salves in the world. Follow these instructions and you will need nor other cures. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Mona said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: Better a drop of cold water in the morning and washing the hands and feet in the evening than all the eye salves in the world.
  Apropos Rabbi Mona’s statement with regard to healing, the text cites what he would say about other matters that require special attention: A hand that touches the eye should be severed because it harms the eye. A hand that touches the nose should be severed. A hand that touches the mouth should be severed. A hand that touches the ear should be severed. A hand that touches one’s wound should be severed. A hand that touches one’s member should be severed, lest one arouse himself. A hand that touches one’s anus should be severed, lest one make himself ill. A hand
  
  Daf 109a
  
  that is placed into a barrel of beer should be severed because the beer will not ferment. A hand that frequently touches the eye causes blindness. A hand that frequently touches the ear causes deafness. A hand that touches the nose or mouth causes polyps [<i>polypus</i>]. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says: She is a liberated entity, this evil spirit that rests on one’s hands before they are washed in the morning, and she refuses to leave until one washes his hands three times. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When eye shadow is placed on the eyes it causes the evil spirit called the Daughter of the King to pass, and it stops tears and causes eyelashes to grow. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: Eye shadow causes the Daughter of the King to pass, and stops tears and causes eyelashes to grow.
  And Mar Ukva said that Shmuel said: Leaves that are placed on the eye (Rabbeinu Ḥananel) contain no element of healing, and therefore one may place them on his eyes on Shabbat.Rav Yosef said: Coriander contains no element of healing.Rav Sheshet said: Hops contain no element of healing.Rav Yosef said: Even for me, who is blind, coriander is harmful. He overstated coriander’s inefficacy, asserting that it is in fact harmful.Rav Sheshet said: Arugula even for me, despite my blindness, is beneficial.And Mar Ukva also said that Shmuel said: All types of hops may be eaten on Shabbat except for <i>teruza</i>, which is used exclusively for medicinal purposes.
  Rav Ḥisda said: Melon juice, which is beneficial for the intestines, may be strained and drunk on Shabbat (<i>ge’onim</i>). The juice of <i>pipuim</i>, which are a type of vegetable (Rashba), may not be drunk on Shabbat. The Gemara relates: Ze’iri’s wife made melon juice for Ḥiyya bar Ashi and he did not consume it. She said to him: I made it for your Rabbi, Ze’iri, and he ate it, and you do not eat it? The Gemara explains: Ze’iri followed his own reasoning in permitting this drink, as Ze’iri said: One may place clear wine and clear water into a strainer used to strain dregs from wine on Shabbat without concern. Apparently, since the wine and water are drunk even with what little dregs may remain, one is doing nothing to improve them. Here, too, since melon juice is consumed this way, without being strained and for non-medical purposes, one is doing nothing and it is permitted.
  And Mar Ukva also said: One whose hand or foot was wounded may immerse it in wine on Shabbat to stop the flow of blood, and he need not be concerned that he is violating the prohibition against healing on Shabbat. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to vinegar, what is the ruling? May one immerse a wound in it? Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: When we were in Rav Kahana’s house they said that vinegar is not permitted, as it is considered actual medicine. Rava said: And these people from Meḥoza, since they are delicate, even wine heals them. Therefore, they may not immerse their wounds in wine.
  The Gemara relates: Ravina happened to come to the house of Rav Ashi. He saw that a donkey stepped on the back of Rav Ashi’s foot, and Rav Ashi sat and immersed his foot in vinegar on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does the Master not hold according to that which Rav Hillel stated, that vinegar is not permitted? He said to him: The back of the hand and the back of the foot are different because their wounds are dangerous.
  Some say that Ravina saw that Rav Ashi immersed his foot in wine. Ravina said to him: Does the Master not hold according to that which Rava said: These people from Meḥoza, since they are delicate, even wine heals them? And the Master is also delicate. Rav Ashi said to him: The back of the hand and the back of the foot are different, as Rav Adda bar Mattana said that Rav said: A wound on the back of the hand or the back of the foot is like a fatal wound, and one may desecrate Shabbat for it.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On Shabbat, one may bathe in the therapeutic hot springs of the waters of Gerar, in the waters of Ḥamatan, in the waters of Asya, and in the waters of Tiberias; however, one may not bathe in the Great Sea, namely, the Mediterranean sea, nor in water in which flax was soaked, nor in the Sea of Sodom, because people bathe in those bodies of water only for medicinal purposes.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on that which was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may bathe in the waters of Tiberias on Shabbat and in the Great Sea; but one may not bathe in water in which flax was soaked, nor in the Sea of Sodom. This is difficult because in the first <i>baraita</i> the Sages prohibit bathing in the Great Sea, and in this <i>baraita</i> they permit bathing in the Great Sea.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult, because this <i>baraita,</i> which permits bathing in the Great Sea, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who deems all seas equal. That <i>baraita,</i> which prohibits bathing there, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the Great Sea is unlike other seas. As we learned in a mishna: All seas purify like a ritual bath [<i>mikve</i>], as it is stated: “And God called the dry land earth, and the gathering together of the waters [<i>mikve</i>] He called seas” (Genesis 1:10); this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: Only the Great Sea purifies like a ritual bath, and the verse states seas only because there are many seas in the Great Sea, not because all seas purify.
  Rabbi Yosei says: All seas purify like a ritual bath. They actually purify even more than a ritual bath, as they purify even when they are flowing. Immersion in a sea is purifying not only when its waters are still, but even when they are flowing. That is not the case with a ritual bath, whose waters only purify when still. And sea water is invalid for purifying <i>zavim</i> and lepers and for sanctifying purification water to mix the ashes of the red heifer with it. Those cases require spring water. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak strongly objects to this explanation:
  
  Daf 109b
  
  Say that they disagree over the status of the Mediterranean Sea with regard to impurity and purity, but with regard to Shabbat did you hear that they disagree? Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i> is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits bathing in the Mediterranean, is referring to a case where one remained in the water and thereby indicated that he bathed in the Mediterranean for its curative effects. That <i>baraita</i>, which permits bathing, is referring to a case where one did not remain in the water, and thereby indicated that he bathed in the Mediterranean for non-medical purposes.
  The Gemara asks: And how did you establish this last <i>baraita</i>? Do you say that it is referring to a case where one did not remain in the water? If it is referring to a case where one did not remain in the water, it would be permitted to bathe even in water in which flax was soaked, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may bathe on Shabbat in the waters of Tiberias, and in water in which flax was soaked, and in the Sodom Sea, and this is even though one has wounds on his head that are healed by bathing in these waters. In what case is this statement said? In a case where one did not remain in the water, since it appears that he entered the water to cool himself. However, if one remained in the water it is prohibited.
  Rather, the contradiction between the <i>baraita</i> that permits bathing in the Great Sea on Shabbat and the <i>baraita</i> that prohibits bathing in the Great Sea on Shabbat is not difficult. There is a distinction between the two. This <i>baraita</i>, which permits doing so, is referring to the pure water in it, i.e., the area in the Great Sea in which one bathes for pleasure during the week. That <i>baraita,</i> which prohibits bathing, is referring to the polluted water in it, which people enter only for medicinal purposes. And with regard to the contradiction between one statement with regard to the water in which flax was soaked and the other statement about water in which flax was soaked, it is also not difficult. There is a distinction between the two statements. This <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits bathing on Shabbat in water in which flax was soaked, is referring to a case where one remained in the water and thereby indicated that he was bathing for medicinal purposes. That <i>baraita</i>, which permits bathing on Shabbat in water in which flax was soaked, is referring to a case where one did not remain there. It is permitted to bathe in that water for non-medical purposes.
  MISHNA: One may not eat <i>eizoveyon</i> on Shabbat because healthy people do not eat it, and therefore it is clear that anyone eating it is doing so for its medicinal value. However, one may eat a plant called <i>yo’ezer</i> and may drink <i>abuvro’e</i>. Furthermore, all types of food that healthy people eat may be eaten by a person even for medicinal purposes. And one may drink all drinks except for water from palm trees and a <i>kos ikarin</i> because they are known as a remedy for jaundice. Therefore, it is prohibited to drink them on Shabbat for curative purposes. However, one may drink palm tree water on Shabbat in order to quench his thirst, and one may smear <i>ikarin</i> oil on himself for non-medical purposes.
  GEMARA: Rav Yosef said: Unspecified hyssop mentioned in the Torah is called <i>abarta bar hamag</i> in Babylonia, and <i>eizoveyon</i> is called <i>abarta bar hing</i>. Ulla said: The hyssop mentioned in the Torah is white sage. The Gemara relates: Ulla happened to come to the house of Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda. They brought white sage before him. He said: This is the hyssop that is written in the Torah. Rav Pappi said: Hyssop is the root called <i>shumeshuk</i>. Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: In accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappi it is reasonable, as we learned in a mishna: The mitzva of hyssop is that one take three branches each with three stems, and <i>shumeshuk</i> is the species that is found with that configuration of three stems on each of its branches. The Gemara says: For what purpose do people eat it? It is eaten for curing intestinal worms. And with what is it eaten? It is eaten with seven black dates. From what do worms come into being in the intestines? They come into being from eating barley flour from a vessel that held the flour for forty days since it was ground.
  We learned in the mishna: However, one may eat the <i>yo’ezer</i> plant. The Gemara asks: What is <i>yo’ezer</i>? The Gemara answers: It is the vegetable known as <i>potnak</i>. For what is it eaten? It is eaten to cure liver worms. With what is it eaten? It is eaten with seven white dates. From what do worms come into being in the liver? From eating raw meat with water on an empty stomach, and from eating fatty meat on an empty stomach, and from eating ox meat on an empty stomach, and from eating nuts on an empty stomach, and from eating fenugreek shoots on an empty stomach and drinking water thereafter.
  And if one has liver worms but does not have any <i>potnak</i> handy, or if one has taken <i>potnak</i> and it did not help, he should swallow white cress. And if he does not have that or if it did not help him, he should sit in fast, and take fatty meat and place it on coals and suck the bone and swallow vinegar. And some say: One should not drink vinegar because it is harmful to the liver. And if none of those options are available, let one take the sawdust that was scraped from the shell of a thorn bush from top to bottom, and not from bottom to top, as perhaps then the worms will come out through his mouth. And let one then boil the scrapings in beer at twilight and the next day close his nostrils and drink it. And when he defecates, he should defecate on the trunk of a palm tree.
  We learned the mishna: And one may drink <i>abuvro’e</i> on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is <i>abuvro’e</i>? The Gemara answers: It is the plant known as <i>ḥumtareya.</i> The Gemara asks: What is <i>ḥumtareya</i>? It is that which is called the lonely staff. The Gemara asks: For what purpose is it used? It is used for one who drank exposed water from which we suspect a snake drank and left behind its venom. And if one does not have the lonely staff, or if it was ineffective, let him take five roses and five cups of beer and cook them together until there is a quarter of a <i>log</i> of liquid and then drink it.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami’s mother made this remedy for a certain man who had drunk exposed water suspected of having venom in it. She took one rose and one cup of beer and she boiled them. She gave it to him to drink, and lit the oven, and swept out the coals, and placed a brick inside it on which he could sit and not get burned. And something that appeared like a green leaf emerged, i.e., he vomited the venom.
  Rav Avya said: The remedy for one who has swallowed venom is to drink a quarter of a <i>log</i> of milk from a white goat. Rav Huna bar Yehuda said: Let one bring a sweet citron and make a hole in it, and fill it with honey, and place it among burning coals, and eat it. Rabbi Ḥanina said: Urine that is forty days old is an effective remedy for several maladies: A very small cupful is beneficial in treating a hornet sting. A quarter of a <i>log</i> is beneficial in treating a scorpion bite. Half a <i>log</i> is effective in treating one who drank exposed water. A <i>log</i> is even effective in counteracting witchcraft. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Water in which spinach was boiled [<i>anigron</i>], and water in which <i>banagri</i> grass was boiled [<i>avangar</i>], and balsam are effective for both one who drank exposed water and as an antidote for witchcraft.
  One who swallowed a snake should be fed hops in salt, and then he should be made to run a distance of three <i>mil</i>. The Gemara relates: Rav Shimi bar Ashi saw a person who swallowed a snake, and Rav Ashi appeared to that person as a horseman. Rav Shimi fed him hops with salt and made him run in front of him for three <i>mil</i>, and the snake came out of him in pieces. Some say that Rav Shimi bar Ashi was the one who swallowed a snake, and Elijah came and appeared to Rav Ashi as a horseman. He fed him hops with salt and made him run in front of him for three <i>mil</i>, and the snake came out of him in pieces. One who was bitten by a snake should have the fetus of a white donkey brought to him, and it should be torn open and placed on the snakebite. The Gemara says: And this applies only when the mother does not have a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>]. The Gemara relates: There was a certain
  
  Daf 110a
  
  Jewish official in Pumbedita that was bitten by a snake. There were thirteen white donkeys in Pumbedita and they tore them all open and they were found to be <i>tereifot</i>. There was one donkey on the other side of Pumbedita, and until they went to bring it, a lion ate it. Abaye said to them: Since all of these things have happened, perhaps a snake of the Rabbis bit him, for which there is no cure, as it is written: “One that digs a pit will fall into it, and one who breaches a fence will be bitten by a snake” (Ecclesiastes 10:8). Perhaps this person violated a rabbinic decree, also known as a fence, and was bitten by a snake as punishment. That bite has no cure. They said to him: Yes, my teacher, it is so, as when Rav died Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna ruled that one may not bring myrtle and palm branches to a wedding hall to accompany bells, and he went and brought myrtle and palm branches to the wedding hall with bells. Therefore, a snake bit him. And it is reported that ultimately the official died.
  The Gemara cites additional information about the dangers posed by snakes and how to deal with them. One whom a snake encircled should descend into water and place a basket on his head and remove the snake slowly from him into the basket. And once the snake goes into the basket, let him throw it into the water and climb and emerge. One at whom a snake is angry and is being pursued by a snake, if he has another with him, let him ride him four cubits. And if not, let him jump over a ditch. And if not, let him cross a river. And at night let him place his bed on four barrels and sleep outside beneath the stars. And let one bring four cats and let one tie them to the four legs of the bed. And let one bring twigs and branches and throw them there so that when the cats hear the sound of the snake crawling they will eat it. One who is being pursued by a snake, let him run in sand because a snake cannot move as quickly in sand as a person can.
  A woman who is seen by a snake and does not know whether it has directed his attention toward her or whether it has not directed his attention toward her, she should remove her garment and throw it before the snake. If the snake wraps itself in the garments, it is an indication that it has directed his attention toward her; and if not, it is an indication that it has not directed his attention toward her.
  What is her remedy so the snake will leave her alone? She should have relations with her husband before the snake. Some say: If she has relations in front of the snake, all the more so that its desire will become stronger. Rather, she should take from her hair and her nails and throw them at the snake, and say the following to it as an incantation: I am a menstruating woman [<i>dishtana</i>]. A woman whom a snake has entered, let them spread her legs and place her on two barrels, and let them bring fatty meat and throw it onto coals. And let them bring her a bowl of cress and fragrant wine and place them there and mix them together. And she should take tongs in her hand, as when the snake smells the fragrance it emerges. And then one should take the snake and burn it in the fire, as if it is not burned, it will come back onto her.
  We learned in the mishna: All types of food that healthy people eat may be eaten by one eating them for medicinal purposes on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: The phrase: All foods, what does it come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include spleen for healing teeth and vetch for healing intestines, although they are not common foods. We also learned in the mishna: And one may drink all drinks on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: The phrase: All drinks, what does it come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include mixing water in which capers have soaked, with vinegar. Ravina said to Rava: What is the ruling with regard to drinking urine on Shabbat? Rava said to him: We already learned in the mishna: One may drink all drinks, and people do not drink urine and is not considered a drink. It is only consumed for medical purposes and is therefore prohibited.
  We learned in the mishna: One may drink anything on Shabbat except for palm tree water [<i>mei dekalim</i>]. It was taught slightly differently in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Water that stabs [<i>mei dekarim</i>]. The Gemara explains: The one who taught water that stabs means that the waters pierce the gall bladder; and the one who said palm tree water means that they come from two palm trees. In order to explain what palm tree water is, Rabba bar Beruna said: There are two palm trees in Eretz Yisrael, and a spring of water emerges from between them. The first cup one drinks of this water loosens the intestines, another cup causes diarrhea, and another, a third cup, just as it entered as water, so too it emerges. Ulla said: For me, I drink Babylonian beer, and it is more effective than palm tree water in causing diarrhea. The Gemara comments: And this is true. It is effective for the stomach when the person who drinks it has not become accustomed to beer for forty days.
  Rav Yosef said: Water that stabs is Egyptian <i>zitom</i>, which is made from one-third barley, and one-third saffron, and one-third salt. Rav Pappa said: It is one-third wheat, and one-third saffron, and one-third salt and cumin. And this is your mnemonic to remember which said <i>zitom</i> is made from barley: A basket which is called <i>sisanei</i>, a word with two <i>samekhs.</i> This word alludes to the fact that Rav Yosef, who has a <i>samekh</i> in his name, is the one who says that Egyptian <i>zitom</i> is made from barley [<i>se’orim</i>], which has the letter <i>sin. Sin</i> is interchangeable with <i>samekh</i>. And one should drink it between Passover and <i>Shavuot</i>. For one whose intestines are blocked, it will loosen his intestines and cure him; and for one whose bowels are loose, it will block him and cure him as well.
  And we also learned about a <i>kos ikarin</i> in the mishna. The Gemara asks: What is a <i>kos ikarin</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Let one bring the weight of a <i>zuz</i> of Alexandrian gum, and a weight of a <i>zuz</i> of alum, and a weight of a <i>zuz</i> of garden saffron, and let one grind them together. The procedure for treating a <i>zava</i> is that she should drink these three ingredients with wine, and she will be cured of her emission and will not become barren. For treating jaundice one should drink two of these ingredients with beer; however, one will become sterile from it. It was said that for treating a <i>zava</i>, she should drink these three ingredients with wine and she will be healed from her emission and will not become barren. And if it is not effective, let one bring three
  
  Daf 110b
  
  vessels full of Persian onions, and boil them in wine, and give it to her to drink. And we say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if that is not effective, seat her at a crossroads, and she should take a cup of wine in her hand, and let a person come from behind her and frighten her and say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if this is also not effective, bring her a fistful [<i>buna</i>] of cumin, and a fistful of saffron, and a fistful of fenugreek, and cook them in wine, and give it to her to drink, and say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if this is not effective, let one bring sixty barrel seals, soak them, and then spread it on her and say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if this is also does not effective, let one bring <i>pashtina</i>, a type of grass, boil it in wine, and then spread it on her and say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if this is not effective, let one bring a thistle that grows on Roman thorns and burn it, and place its ashes in rags from linen clothing in the summer and in rags from cotton clothing in the winter.
  And if this is not effective, let one dig seven pits and burn young grape shoots in them from vines that are <i>orla</i>, and place a cup of wine in her hand and raise her up from that pit and sit her in another pit, and raise her from that pit and sit her in this pit, and raise her from that pit and sit her in this other pit. And each and every time say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if this is not effective, let one bring fine flour and place it on the bottom half of her body and say to her: Stop emitting your discharge. And if this is not effective, let one bring an ostrich egg and burn it, and place its ashes in linen rags during the summer, and in cotton rags during the winter. And if this is also not effective, let one open a barrel of wine for her, and let her drink it. And if this is not effective, let one hold a barley grain that is found in the dung of a white donkey. If she holds it for one day her discharge will cease for two days; and if she holds it for two days it will cease for three days, and if she holds it for three days it will cease forever.
  The Gemara states: For jaundice, one should drink two of the three ingredients mentioned together with beer, and one becomes sterile from it. The Gemara continues to discuss this remedy: And if one does not have these ingredients, i.e., Alexandrian gum, saffron, and alum, or if the remedy did not work, let one bring the head of a salted <i>shibuta</i> fish and boil it in beer and drink it. And if this is not effective, let one bring grasshopper brine and drink it. And if one does not have grasshopper brine, let one bring brine of small birds, and enter the bathhouse, and smear himself with it. And if there is no bathhouse, have him stand between the oven and the wall and sweat out his disease. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who seeks to warm this patient up should wrap him tightly in his sheet. Rav Aḥa bar Yosef was sick with this disease, and Rav Kahana performed this remedy for him and he was healed.
  The Gemara continues: And if this remedy is not effective, let one bring three vessels of Persian dates, and three vessels of dripping wax [<i>kira</i>], and three vessels of red aloe, and boil them in beer and drink it. And if this remedy is not effective, let one bring a donkey foal, and shave the middle of its head, and let blood from the donkey’s forehead, and place it on his own head. And he should take care not to let the blood enter his eyes lest it blind him. And if this is not effective, let one bring a pickled ram’s head and boil it in beer and drink it. And if this is not effective, let him bring a striped something else, i.e., a pig, and tear it open and place it on his heart. And if this is not effective, let him bring leeks from the middle of the row, which are very sharp.
  It is reported that a certain Arab was sick with jaundice. He said to the gardener: Take my cloak and give me a row of leeks in exchange. The gardener gave him the row and he ate it. The Arab said to the gardener: Lend me your cloak and I will sleep in it for a short while. The gardener gave it to him and he wrapped himself in it and slept. When he got hot and stood up pieces fell from the cloak bit by bit because the cloak had become very hot from the Arab’s sweat. The Arab tricked the gardener, who ultimately received nothing.
  The Gemara discussed the remedy for jaundice, saying that one should drink two of the ingredients mentioned together with beer, and one becomes sterile from it. The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to cause sterility? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that castration of a man is prohibited? The verse states: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or torn, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24), meaning that you shall not do it to yourselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina. Apparently, it is prohibited to castrate a man. The Gemara answers: This prohibition applies only in a case where one intends to castrate. Here, in the cure for jaundice, the sterility happens on its own, incidental to the treatment. Proof is cited from that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who seeks to castrate a rooster should remove its comb and it will become castrated on its own. Incidental castration is permitted. The Gemara rejects the proof. Didn’t Rav Ashi say: It is arrogance that it assumes when it has its comb, and when the comb is removed it becomes depressed and no longer procreates. However, it is not actually castrated. Rather, apparently this remedy for jaundice is permitted only for one who is castrated and for whom causing sterility is not a concern.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:
  
  Daf 111a
  
  Everyone agrees that one who leavens a meal-offering after one who already leavened it is liable for the additional leavening, as it is stated: “It shall not be baked leavened” (Leviticus 6:10), and it is also stated: “No offering that you sacrifice to God shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11). The Sages interpreted this to mean that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a Temple offering. Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates after one who castrates is liable, as it is stated: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or torn, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24). Presumably, if one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, when the testicles are detached altogether all the more so one is liable. Rather, this comes to include that one who detaches after one who cuts is liable. Apparently, one is liable for sterilizing one who is already castrated. Rather, we must say that it is permitted to use a remedy that causes sterility in an old man who is no longer capable of procreating.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say with regard to remedies that restore procreative ability: These have restored me to my youth? Apparently, even an elderly man can procreate with the proper remedy. Rather, the remedy for jaundice was discussed with regard to a woman, who is not commanded to reproduce. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who said: The mitzva is incumbent on both of them, the man and the woman, as it states: “And God blessed them and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28), what is there to say? How could a woman use this remedy? In his opinion a woman is also commanded to procreate. The Gemara answers: In his opinion, this remedy may be used for an elderly woman or, alternatively, for a barren woman. He would agree that there is no prohibition to cause infertility in a woman who cannot conceive.
  MISHNA: One who is concerned about pain in his teeth may not sip vinegar through them on Shabbat for medicinal purposes: however, he may dip his food in vinegar in his usual manner and eat it, and if he is healed by the vinegar, he is healed. One who is concerned about pain in his loins may not smear wine and vinegar on them on Shabbat because that is a medical treatment. However, one may smear oil on them. However, one may not use rose oil, which is very expensive and used exclusively as a cure. However, princes may smear with rose oil on their wounds on Shabbat because it is their usual manner to smear rose oil on themselves during the week for pleasure. Rabbi Shimon says: All of the Jewish people are princes, and it is permitted for them to smear rose oil on themselves on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: Rav Aḥa Arikha, so named for his height as the word <i>arikha</i> literally means long in Aramaic, who is also known as Rav Aha bar Pappa, raised a contradiction before Rabbi Abbahu: We learned in the mishna that one who is concerned about pain in his teeth may not sip vinegar through them on Shabbat. Is that to say that vinegar is beneficial for teeth? Isn’t it written: “Like vinegar to the teeth, and like smoke to the eyes, so is the lazy one to those who send him” (Proverbs 10:26)? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is a distinction. This verse, which indicates that vinegar is harmful for teeth, is referring to fruit vinegar. The mishna, which indicates that vinegar is beneficial for teeth, is referring to wine vinegar. And if you wish, say instead that both this and that are referring to wine vinegar. In that case, the distinction is as follows: The mishna, which states that vinegar is beneficial for teeth, is referring to a situation in which there is a wound in the teeth. That verse, which indicates that it is harmful for teeth, is referring to a situation in which there is not a wound in the teeth. The Gemara explains: Where there is a wound, vinegar heals; where there is not a wound, it weakens the teeth.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not sip vinegar through his teeth on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the prohibition to sip vinegar on Shabbat means that one may not sip and spit it out; however, one may sip and swallow it? Abaye said: When we learned this ruling in the mishna, we learned it with regard to the case of one who sips and spits it out. Rava said: Even if you say that the mishna prohibits sipping vinegar even in a case where one sips and swallows it, there is still a distinction. Here, the <i>baraita</i> permits sipping vinegar before dipping one’s food in it, as he appears to be doing so for pleasure. Here, the mishna prohibits sipping vinegar after dipping, when it is clear that one is doing so for medicinal purposes.
  The Gemara asks: And let us say that since before dipping it, sipping it is permitted, after dipping it sipping it is also permitted. As we heard that Rava accepts the principle of since. The principle of since is illustrated in the following example: The Sages discussed whether one may immerse himself in a ritual bath on Shabbat, even though immersion is similar to repairing oneself through purification and is therefore prohibited. The conclusion of that discussion was that immersion is permitted because it appears as if the individual is bathing for pleasure. On the other hand, immersion is prohibited on Yom Kippur, as bathing for pleasure is prohibited then.
  Rava said: There is nothing that is permitted on Shabbat and prohibited on Yom Kippur. The principle is: Since it is permitted on Shabbat, it is also permitted on Yom Kippur. Although the reason to permit bathing on Shabbat does not apply on Yom Kippur, Rava nonetheless permits it due to the principle of since. The decrees of the Sages should be applied equally to whatever degree possible, without making distinctions for particular cases. Here, too, in the case of sipping vinegar, since it is permitted to sip vinegar before dipping food, it should also be permitted to sip vinegar after dipping food.
  The Gemara answers: Rava retracted that statement and prohibited sipping vinegar. The Gemara asks: From where can it be determined that he retracted that statement? Perhaps he retracted this statement with regard to immersion in a ritual bath on Yom Kippur. The Gemara answers: It does not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All obligated in immersions immerse in their usual manner, both on the Ninth of Av and on Yom Kippur. Rava certainly does not dispute this <i>baraita</i>.
  We learned in the mishna: One who is concerned about pain in his loins may not smear rose oil on them on Shabbat, and Rabbi Shimon permits doing so. Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Didn’t Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya say the following in the name of Rav? With regard to this cloth stopper inserted into the spout of a barrel,
  
  Daf 111b
  
  it is prohibited to insert it tightly on a Festival due to the prohibited labor of wringing. Doesn’t Rabbi Shimon permit performing an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor may ensue? The Gemara answers: In that case, even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited, as it was Abaye and Rava who both said: Rabbi Shimon concedes in instances categorized as: Cut off its head and it shall not die. This category refers to situations where the ensuing prohibited labor is inevitable. In those kinds of cases, one is liable even according to Rabbi Shimon. Since stuffing a cloth into a barrel will inevitably lead to wringing wine from it, Rabbi Shimon concedes that doing so is forbidden.
  The Gemara asks again: Didn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi say that Rav said explicitly: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin taught the same tradition without mentioning the names of the men who cited the statements, but cited it directly: Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rather, Rava said: I and the lion of the group explained this. And the Gemara asks: And who is the lion of the group? It is Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin. He and Rava explained: The <i>halakha</i> is indeed in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, but not for his reason.
  The Gemara explains: What exactly is the meaning of the statement: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, but not for his reason? If we say the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits smearing rose oil, but not for his reason, because Rabbi Shimon holds that rose oil heals, and Rav holds that it does not heal, which is why he permits smearing it on Shabbat, then does Rav hold that rose oil does not heal? From the fact that it is taught: Princes smear rose [<i>vered</i>] oil on their wounds; by inference, it heals. Rather, it means: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits rose oil, but not for his reason. As Rabbi Shimon holds that although rose oil is uncommon and expensive, and anyone who sees one smearing it realizes that it is for medicinal purposes, nevertheless, it is permitted. And Rav holds that if rose oil is common in a given place, yes, one may smear it on himself; however, if it is not common there, it is not permitted. And in Rav’s place, roses were common, and that is why he permitted smearing with rose oil on Shabbat. However, in a place where rose oil is uncommon, he concedes to the Rabbis, who prohibited doing so.
  
  MISHNA: And these are knots for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering if one tied them on Shabbat: A camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot, both of which are meant to be permanent. And just as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for tying these knots, so too, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for untying them. Rabbi Meir says a principle: For tying any knot that one can untie with one of his hands, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, because a loose knot of that sort is not considered permanent even if that was his intention.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot? If you say that these are a knot that one uses to tie a strap to the camel’s nose ring in order to pull it and a knot that one uses to tie a rope to the ring [<i>isterida</i>] fixed to the bow of a ship when the ship is docked, then these knots are not meant to be permanent, as they are periodically untied. Rather, a camel driver’s knot is the knot that fixes the nose ring itself in the camel’s nose, and the sailor’s knot is the knot that fixes the ring itself to the ship. These knots are never untied and are permanent.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Meir says a principle: For tying any knot that one can untie with one of his hands, one is not liable for tying it. Rav Aḥadvoy, brother of Mar Aḥa, raised a dilemma: With regard to tying a bow, what is the ruling according to Rabbi Meir? Is it permitted to tie it tightly on Shabbat or not? The dilemma is: Is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir merely that because one can untie the knot with one of his hands it is not considered a permanent knot, and this bow too, he can untie it with one of his hands and therefore he would not be liable for tying on Shabbat? Or perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir is because typically a knot that can be untied with one hand is not particularly tight, and this bow is tight and therefore it is prohibited to tie it on Shabbat. This dilemma is not resolved, and the Gemara concludes: Let it stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: You have knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering as one is liable for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot; however, it is nevertheless prohibited to tie them. A woman may tie closed the opening of her robe with straps, as well as the strings of her hairnet and the laces of her girdle, i.e., a wide belt tied with laces. One may also tie the straps of a shoe or a sandal, as well as the spouts of wine or oil jugs. One may also tie a garment over a pot of meat. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult, as there is an internal contradiction in the mishna. On the one hand, you said that there are knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering as he is for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot, which would seem to indicate that although there is no Torah liability, there is a rabbinic prohibition. And then it was taught that a woman may tie the opening of her robe, indicating that doing so is permitted even <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: There are knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for tying them on Shabbat as he is for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot. And which are these?
  
  Daf 112a
  
  A knot with which one ties a strap to the camel’s nose ring and a knot with which one ties a rope to the ring fixed to the bow of a ship, with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering, there is none; however, there is a rabbinic prohibition. And there are knots that are permitted to be tied on Shabbat <i>ab initio</i>. And which are these? The knot that a woman uses to tie the opening of her robe.
  We learned in the mishna: A woman may tie the opening of her robe on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious, as the knot is meant to be untied and is therefore not permanent. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> in a case where the robe has two laces with which to tie the opening. Lest you say that one of them may become void because the woman can remove the garment even with one string, leaving the one not untied a permanent knot, it therefore teaches us that neither knot is considered permanent.
  We learned in the mishna: And a woman may tie the strings of her hairnet on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious. The Gemara clarifies the matter: It was only necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> in a case where the hairnet is tied loosely on her head. Lest you say that she sometimes removes it without untying it and the knots remain, the mishna teaches us that a woman is protective of her hair and avoids pulling it out, and therefore she unties the hairnet to avoid damaging her hair.
  We learned in the mishna: And it is permitted to tie the straps of a shoe or a sandal on Shabbat. It was stated with regard to one who untied the straps of a shoe or a sandal: One <i>baraita</i> taught that one who did so on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering; and it was taught in another <i>baraita</i> that one is exempt by Torah law, and it is prohibited to untie those straps <i>ab initio</i>; and it was taught in another <i>baraita</i> that it is permitted to untie these knots <i>ab initio</i>. This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement with regard to a shoe and another statement with regard to the straps of a shoe; and this is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement with regard to the straps of a sandal and another statement with regard to the straps of a sandal.
  The Gemara explains: The apparent contradiction between one statement with regard to a shoe and the other statement with regard to a shoe is not difficult, as that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that one is liable to bring a sin-offering, is referring to a shoemaker’s knot, which is permanent as it holds the shoe together. The <i>baraita</i> that states that he is exempt by Torah law and it is prohibited by rabbinic decree is referring to the shoe worn by Sages, as they often tie their shoes loosely so they can easily put on and remove their shoes. The <i>baraita</i> that teaches that it is permitted to tie shoes <i>ab initio</i> is referring to such knots used by the residents of the city of Meḥoza, who are meticulous in their dress and who tie and untie their shoes every day.
  Similarly, the contradiction between one statement with regard to the straps of a sandal and the other statement with regard to the straps of a sandal is not difficult, as that <i>baraita,</i> which teaches that one is liable to bring a sin-offering, is referring to Arab sandals, for which shoemakers tie permanent knots. And the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that he is exempt by Torah law and it is prohibited by rabbinic decree is referring to straps that they, i.e., ordinary people, tie. The <i>baraita</i> that teaches that it is permitted to tie and untie the straps of a sandal <i>ab initio</i> is referring to a sandal shared by two people who alternate going out at different times. They untie and retie the straps each time to ensure that the sandals will fit properly, like the sandals of Rav Yehuda; as Rav Yehuda, brother of Rav Sala Ḥasida, had a pair of sandals, and sometimes he would go out wearing them and sometimes his child would go out wearing them. Rav Yehuda came before Abaye and said to him: What is the ruling in a case of this kind? May I tie the straps on Shabbat? Abaye said to him: Doing so renders you liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Yehuda said to him: Now, even if your ruling in that case had been that one is exempt by Torah law but it is still prohibited by rabbinic law, it would be difficult for me, and you say to me that the ruling is that one is liable to bring a sin-offering. Abaye asked him: What is the reason for that difficulty? Rav Yehuda said to him: Because on weekdays too I sometimes go out wearing them and sometimes my child goes out wearing them. Abaye said to him: If so, it is permitted to untie the straps <i>ab initio</i>.
  Rabbi Yirmeya was walking after Rabbi Abbahu in a <i>karmelit</i> on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: What should I do to it? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Take a moist reed fit for animal consumption and wrap it around the sandal to fasten it. And the Gemara relates: Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What should I do with it? He said to him: Leave it and do not move it. Abaye said to him: How is this case different from that of Rabbi Yirmeya? He answered him: There the sandal would not have been protected; here it will be protected. Abaye said to him: But it remains a utensil and may therefore be moved on Shabbat, as if I so desire, I can switch it from the right foot to the left foot and wear it. Rav Yosef said to him: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the matter in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as will be explained, conclude from it that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Therefore, a torn sandal is not considered to be a utensil even if it were switched, i.e., turned around.
  The Gemara asks: What is that opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A sandal that was ritually impure, whose two ears that hold the straps or whose two straps (<i>ge’onim</i>) broke, or whose entire sole was removed, becomes ritually pure because it is no longer a utensil. However, if only one of its ears or one of its straps broke, or if only most but not all of its sole was removed, it remains impure. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the inner strap broke it remains impure, because the outer strap can still be used. If the outer strap broke it is rendered pure. And Ulla, and some say Rabba bar bar Ḥana, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Like there is a dispute with regard to ritual impurity, so too, there is a dispute with regard to Shabbat, i.e., whether or not it is permitted to wear such a sandal on Shabbat. However, there is no dispute with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>.
  And we discussed this issue: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the <i>baraita</i> is explained as follows: From the fact that it is a utensil with regard to ritual impurity, it is also a utensil with regard to Shabbat, but it is not considered a utensil with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>. However, didn’t we learn in a mishna: If she removed the left shoe, which was on the right foot of her brother-in-law, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid? Apparently, a woman can perform <i>ḥalitza</i> even when the shoe is on the wrong foot, and it is not deemed unfit for <i>ḥalitza</i>. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is saying the following: From the fact that with regard to impurity it is not a utensil, with regard to Shabbat it is also not a utensil. However, that is not the case with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>, for which it is a utensil.
  The Gemara asks: Say that we said that if she removed the left shoe which was on the right foot, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid, that applies only in a case where it is fit as a utensil for its usual purpose, i.e., it can be used as footwear. However, here it is not fit as a utensil for its usual purpose, as Rabbi Yehuda said: If the outer strap of the sandal tore, the sandal is rendered ritually pure. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is not a utensil. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is difficult according to both opinions. The Gemara answers: Actually, his opinion is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; however, emend his statement and say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i> as well. And this teaches us that when we say that if she removed the left shoe that was on the right foot her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid, that is only in a case where
  
  Daf 112b
  
  it is fit as a utensil for its usual purpose, i.e., it can be used as footwear. However, here it is not fit as a utensil for its usual purpose.
  The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan in fact say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the outer strap broke the sandal becomes pure? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in a mishna: A sandal that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>, and one of its ears broke and he repaired it, this sandal is still impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading, since a broken ear does not render the sandal useless and it remains a utensil. If the second ear broke and he repaired it, it is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure in the same way a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading does, since when both ears tear it is no longer a utensil. However, it is itself ritually impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading due to contact with a vessel that is impure, i.e., contact with itself. Since the sandal now has only one torn ear, it is still considered a utensil which is capable of contracting impurity, and it is as if it contracted impurity from itself in its previous state. Is this statement not an indication that there is no difference whether it was the inner strap or the outer strap that broke, as no single ear that breaks terminates the sandal’s use? This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, this mishna is referring specifically to the inner strap. When the inner strap breaks, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the sandal remains ritually impure. The Gemara asks: However, if the outer strap breaks, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it that the sandal is pure? If so, instead of teaching: If the second ear broke and he repaired it, it is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure as a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading; however, it is itself ritually impure due to contact with a vessel that is impure due to contact with an object that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, let him make a distinction within the case itself: In what case was this statement said? In a case where the inner strap breaks. However, if the outer strap breaks, the sandal becomes ritually pure. Rav Yitzḥak ben Yosef said: Let our mishna be interpreted as referring to a sandal that has four ears and four straps, and it can be explained that when it says that the second one broke, it was referring to the second outer one. It is worthwhile to interpret it this way so as not to break, i.e., contradict, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he related that Rav Ḥanan bar Abba said that Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan provided an explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, conclude from it that he holds that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: They are different <i>amora’im</i> who made their statements in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara cites another discussion related to the previous <i>halakha</i>. We learned there in a mishna in tractate <i>Kelim</i>: All ritually impure wooden utensils belonging to ordinary homeowners become pure through breaking the utensil if they have holes the size of pomegranates. Ḥizkiya asked: What is the <i>halakha</i> when a utensil was perforated with a hole large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and then it was perforated again with a hole large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and this went on until the total area of all the holes completed a space large enough for a pomegranate to emerge? In other words, do we say that because the sum of the areas of all the holes adds up to the size of a pomegranate, the utensil is pure, or do we say that since the previous hole was filled before the next hole was formed, the utensil remains ritually impure?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan, his student, said to him: Master, you taught us that with regard to a sandal that became ritually impure by impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>, and one of its ears broke and he repaired it, this sandal remains ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading. If the second ear broke and he repaired it, the sandal is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure in the same way a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading does. However, it is itself ritually impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading due to contact with a vessel that is impure, i.e., contact with itself. And we said to you: What is different when the first ear breaks that the sandal remains impure? It is because the second one is intact. So too, when the second ear breaks, the first one is repaired, and there is only one torn ear.
  And you said to us in this regard that the reason the sandal is pure is because a new face has arrived here. The legal status of the sandal with the two repaired ears is not that of the original sandal; it is a new sandal. Here too, with regard to a utensil that was perforated several times and sealed each time, let us say with regard to the sandal as well that a new face has arrived here, and it is ritually pure because the repaired sandal is a new entity and not the original sandal.
  Ḥizkiya was so impressed by Rabbi Yoḥanan’s comment that he exclaimed about him: This is not a human being, but an angel. Some say that he said: This is an ideal human being. On a similar note, Rabbi Zeira said that Rava bar Zimuna said: If the early generations are characterized as sons of angels, we are the sons of men. And if the early generations are characterized as the sons of men, we are akin to donkeys. And I do not mean that we are akin to either the donkey of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa or the donkey of Rabbi Pinḥas ben Yair, who were both extraordinarily intelligent donkeys; rather, we are akin to other typical donkeys.
  And we learned in the mishna: It is permitted to tie the spouts of wine or oil jugs. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> in a case where it, the jug, has two ears, i.e., two spouts. Lest you say: One of them, he voids it consequently defining the knot on that opening permanent and therefore prohibited, it teaches us that this is not the case.
  We also learned in the mishna that it is even permitted to tie a garment to cover a pot of meat. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> a case where it has a string with which one could open a flap and empty the food. Lest you say that since a single opening usually suffices he voids the knot with which he ties the garment, it teaches us that this is not the case.
  We also learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> in a case where the entrance has two ropes. Lest you say
  
  Daf 113a
  
  that one of the knots one voids, because he can enable the animal to go out, albeit with difficulty, after untying one knot, therefore, it teaches us that both are considered temporary knots, and it is permitted to tie them. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If you rule the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with his opinion, does that mean, by inference, that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps is there no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye answered Rav Yosef using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it, even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.
  MISHNA: One may tie a bucket with a belt on Shabbat, as he will certainly not leave it tied to the bucket, and therefore it is not a permanent knot. But one may not tie a bucket with a rope. Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. Rabbi Yehuda stated a principle: With regard to any knot that is not permanent, one is not liable for tying it.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that according to the first <i>tanna</i>, it is prohibited to tie a rope to a bucket on Shabbat, and Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. The Gemara asks: A rope of what kind? If you say it is referring to a standard rope, does Rabbi Yehuda permit doing so? It is a permanent knot. Rather, it is referring to a weaver’s rope; since the weaver needs it for his work, he will untie it after Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the Rabbis hold that we issue a decree prohibiting a weaver’s rope due to a standard rope, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that we do not issue a decree?
  The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the rope of a bucket that was severed on Shabbat, one may not tie it with a regular knot; rather, he may tie a bow. And Rabbi Yehuda says: One may wrap a hollow belt around it or a sash as long as he does not tie it into a bow.
  This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda, as in the <i>baraita</i> he issued a decree prohibiting tying a bow due to tying a knot, and in the mishna he issued no decree. And this is also difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and another statement of the Rabbis, as in the <i>baraita</i> they do not issue a decree and in the mishna they do issue a decree.
  The Gemara responds: The contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as they are of the opinion that a rope may be confused with another rope. Therefore, the Rabbis issued a decree prohibiting a weaver’s rope, because if it were permitted one might mistakenly come to tie a standard rope. However, a bow is not confused with a knot, and therefore they did not issue a decree prohibiting a bow. The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as there, where he prohibited tying a bow, it is not because a bow may be confused with a knot, but because, in his opinion, a bow itself is a full-fledged knot and is not prohibited due to a decree.
  Rabbi Abba said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: A person may bring a rope from inside his house on Shabbat and tie one end of it to a cow and the other end to a trough. That is not considered a permanent knot, because he will certainly untie the rope. Rabbi Aḥa Arikha, who was nicknamed Rabbi Aḥa the Long, due to his height, who is also called Rabbi Aḥa bar Pappa, raised an objection to Rabbi Abba from the <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a rope that is tied to the trough, one may tie it to a cow, and a rope that is tied to the cow one may tie it to a trough, provided that one does not bring a rope from inside his house and tie it to the cow and to the trough. The Gemara answers: There, where they permitted it, it is referring to a weaver’s rope, which will certainly be untied.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A weaver’s tools may be moved on Shabbat. They raised a dilemma before Rav Yehuda: What is the ruling with regard to the upper beam and the lower beam of the weaver’s loom? Does this leniency apply to them? Rav Yehuda did not provide a clear answer. He said: Yes and no, and the matter was uncertain to him. It was stated: Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: A weaver’s tools may be moved on Shabbat, even the upper beam and the lower beam, but not the posts.
  Rava said to Rav Naḥman: What is different about the posts that one may not carry them? If we say it is because one makes holes when removing the post from the ground, holes come into being on their own and that is not prohibited, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who stores a turnip or radish in the ground beneath a vine for safekeeping, if some of its leaves were exposed, making it possible to grab the turnip or the radish and pull it out of the ground, he need not be concerned, neither due to diverse kinds, i.e., that he violated the prohibition of planting food crops in a vineyard, as there was no intent to plant them, nor due to concern that he violated the prohibition against working the land during the Sabbatical Year, nor due to tithes, i.e., that it would be considered as if he picked it from the ground and would be obligated to tithe it, and they may be taken from the ground on Shabbat. Apparently, the Rabbis do not prohibit doing so due to concern that one will thereby create a hole.
  Rav Naḥman answered him: The cases are not comparable. In a field one will not come to fill holes; however, here, where the holes are created in the house, the concern is that one may come to smooth out the holes. Therefore, the Rabbis prohibited it. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda bar Liva’ei: With regard to weaver’s tools, such as the upper beam and the lower beam of the loom, what is the ruling in terms of carrying them on Shabbat? Rabbi Yehuda said to him: One may not carry them. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked him: What is the reason for this? Rabbi Yehuda bar Liva’ei answered: Because they are not usually carried even during the week, as they are extremely heavy and are considered fixed in place. Therefore, the Sages prohibited carrying them on Shabbat.
  MISHNA: One may fold the garments after removing them even four or five times, and one may make the beds from Shabbat evening in preparation for Shabbat day, but not from Shabbat in preparation for the conclusion of Shabbat, since one may not perform an action on Shabbat that is preparation for a weekday. Rabbi Yishmael says: One may fold the garments and make the beds from Yom Kippur in preparation for Shabbat if Yom Kippur occurs on Friday. And the fats of the offerings that were sacrificed on Shabbat are offered on Yom Kippur, but not those of Yom Kippur on Shabbat, because the sanctity of Shabbat is greater than the sanctity of Yom Kippur. Rabbi Akiva says: Neither are the fats of the offerings sacrificed on Shabbat offered on Yom Kippur, nor are those of Yom Kippur offered on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Sages in the school of Rabbi Yanai said: They only taught that it is permitted when one person is folding the garments alone on Shabbat; however, when two people are folding the garments together, no, they may not do so, because when two people fold garments it is tantamount to repairing the garment. And with regard to when a single person is folding the garments, we only said it is permitted when he is folding a new garment, which is suitable to be worn even if it were not folded; however, with regard to old garments, no, he may not do so. And with regard to new garments, we only said that one may fold the garments when they are white; however, when they are colored, no, one may not do so. And with regard to white garments, we only said it is permitted to fold them on Shabbat when one does not have garments into which one could change; however, if one has other garments into which he could change, he may not fold them.
  And it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: The members of Rabban Gamliel’s household did not even fold their white garments because they had others into which they could change. Rav Huna said: If one has new garments into which he could change on Shabbat, he will change into those garments; and if one does not have garments into which he could change, he lets his garments hang down before Shabbat to beautify himself in deference to Shabbat as it used to be the custom of wealthy people to wear their clothes loosely. Rav Safra strongly objects to this: Doesn’t this appear as haughtiness? The Gemara answers: Since every day he does not do so, and now in honor of Shabbat he is doing so, it does not appear as haughtiness. Rather it is apparent that he is acting in deference to Shabbat.
  On a related note, the Gemara cites what we learned with regard to the following passage: “If you keep your feet from breaking, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day, and you call Shabbat a delight, the Lord’s holy day honorable, and you honor it by not going your own way, from attending to your affairs and speaking idle words” (Isaiah 58:13). The Rabbis derived from the words “and you honor it” that your dress on Shabbat should not be like your dress during the week, as Rabbi Yoḥanan would refer to his clothing as my honor, indicating that appropriate clothing is a form of deference. The words “going your own way” mean that your walking on Shabbat should not be like your walking during the week. “From attending to your affairs” means it is prohibited to deal with your weekday affairs and to speak about them on Shabbat. However, affairs of Heaven, i.e., those pertaining to mitzvot, are permitted. “And speaking idle words”
  
  Daf 113b
  
  means that your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech during the week, i.e., one should not discuss his weekday affairs on Shabbat. However, it is only speech that they said is prohibited, whereas merely contemplating weekday affairs is permitted. The Gemara asks: Granted, all of these directives, fine, they are understood. However, what is the meaning of the following phrase: That your walking on Shabbat should not be like your walking during the week? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with that which Rav Huna said that Rav said, and some say that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said: If one were walking on Shabbat and came upon a stream of water and had to cross it, if the stream is narrow and one could place his first foot down on the other side before raising the second one, it is permitted to cross it; and if it is not possible and one must jump to cross it, it is prohibited. That is the type of walking that is not permitted on Shabbat.
  Rava strongly objects to this: Since we have said that one’s walking on Shabbat should not be like his walking during the week, and jumping constitutes prohibited walking, if one encounters a stream on Shabbat, what should he do to cross to the other side? If he circumvents the stream, he is increasing the distance that he is walking and exerting extra effort on Shabbat. If he walks through the water, sometimes his clothes will absorb water and he will come to wring them out. What then should he do? Rather, in this case, since it is not possible to cross any other way, he may well cross it, i.e., it is permitted for him to jump over the stream. Therefore, rather say that walking that is defined as characteristic of weekday walking involves taking large steps. As Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: What is the ruling with regard to taking large steps on Shabbat? That is what the Gemara meant when it used the phrase: Your walking during the week. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And during the week are large steps permitted? As I say: A large step takes away one five-hundredth of a person’s eyesight. The Gemara comments: And his eyesight is restored to him during <i>kiddush</i> on Shabbat evening.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: What is the ruling with regard to eating earth for medicinal purposes on Shabbat? Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And during the week is it permitted to eat soil? As I say: Even during the week it is prohibited because it is harmful. Rabbi Ami said: Anyone who eats the dust of Babylonia, it is as if he is eating the flesh of his ancestors buried there. And some say: It is as if he eats abominations and creeping creatures, as it is written: “And He wiped out all that existed on the face of the earth, from humans to animals, to creeping creatures to the birds in the sky, and they were wiped off the land” (Genesis 7:23).
  Apropos dead residue in the ground, Reish Lakish said: Why is Babylonia called Shinar? It is because all those who died in the Flood were deposited there [<i>ninaru lesham</i>]. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Why is Babylonia called Metzula? It is because all those who died in the Flood sank there [<i>nitztalelu lesham</i>]. The Gemara asks: We said that some say that if one eats dirt from Babylonia, it is as if he eats abominations and creeping creatures. However, certainly their bodies have putrefied and decomposed, and therefore they are no longer prohibited. Rather, since soil is harmful, the Sages issued a decree not to eat it. The decree was not issued due to the prohibition of eating creeping creatures; rather, it was issued because a certain person ate soil for medicinal purposes and also ate cress. The cress took root in the soil that was inside him and began to grow. And the cress punctured his heart and he died.
  The Gemara continues to discuss Shabbat. Naomi advised Ruth: “And you shall bathe, and anoint yourself, and put on your robes, and go down to the threshing floor. Do not make yourself known to the man until he has finished eating and drinking” (Ruth 3:3). Rabbi Elazar said: These robes are Shabbat garments that Naomi told her to wear in honor of the occasion. Apropos the book of Ruth, the Gemara cites additional statements of Rabbi Elazar with regard to Ruth: “Give to the wise one and he will become wiser; let the righteous one know and he will learn more” (Proverbs 9:9). Rabbi Elazar said: This refers to Ruth the Moabite and Samuel of Rama, who received advice and added to it with their wisdom.
  The Gemara elaborates. Whereas Naomi said to Ruth: “And you shall bathe, and anoint yourself, and put on your robes, and go down to the threshing floor,” but with regard to Ruth herself it is written, “And she went down to the threshing floor” (Ruth 3:6), and only afterward does it say, “And she did according to all that her mother-in-law commanded her.” Ruth decided to anoint herself at the threshing floor and not on the road so that people would not meet her on the way there and suspect her of immorality. Whereas Eli said to Samuel: “Go and lie down and if He calls you, you say: Speak, Lord, for Your servant is listening” (I Samuel 3:9), but with regard to Samuel himself it is written: “And the Lord came and stood, and He called like He did the other times: Samuel, Samuel. And Samuel said: Speak, for Your servant is listening” (I Samuel 3:10), and he did not say: Speak, Lord, since he would not assume it was God speaking to him until he was sure of it.
  And the verse in Ruth states: “And she went, and she came, and she collected in the field after the harvesters” (Ruth 2:3). Rabbi Elazar said: This verse teaches that she went and came, went and came, until she found suitable people with whom to walk. It also says: “And Boaz said to his youth who was standing over the harvesters: To whom does this young woman belong?” (Ruth 2:5). This is surprising: And was it Boaz’s habit to inquire about a young woman? Rabbi Elazar said: He saw in her a matter of wisdom and Torah, and that is why he asked about her. What he saw was that she collected two stalks, but she did not collect three stalks. She thereby acted in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> that three stalks lying together are not considered to be gleanings left for the poor; rather, they remain in the possession of the owner of the field.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: He saw a matter of modesty in her when she was collecting stalks. She picked stalks that were upright while she was standing, and stalks that had fallen she picked while sitting; due to her modesty she did not bend over to take them. It also says: “And Boaz said to Ruth: Do you hear, my daughter? Do not go to glean in another field and do not leave from here, but cling to my maidens” (Ruth 2:8). This is also surprising. And was it Boaz’s habit to cling to women? Rabbi Elazar said: Since he saw “And Orpah kissed her mother-in-law and Ruth clung to her” (Ruth 1:14), he said: It is permitted to cling to a woman like this.
  It also says: “And Boaz said to her at mealtime: Come here [<i>halom</i>] and eat from the bread and dip your bread in vinegar. And she sat beside the harvesters and he gave her roasted grain and she ate, and she was satiated, and she left some over” (Ruth 2:14). Rabbi Elazar interpreted this and said that he hinted to her prophetically: In the future the kingdom of David will come from you, as it is written with regard to it, i.e., the kingdom of David: “Here,” as it is stated: “And King David came and sat before God and said: Who am I, Lord, God, and who is my family that You have brought me to here [<i>halom</i>]?” (II Samuel 7:18). With regard to his saying: “And dip your bread in vinegar” (Ruth 2:14), Rabbi Elazar said: From here we see that vinegar is good to have in hot weather.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that he hinted to her: A son will come from you in the future whose actions will be as sharp as vinegar, and who is he? King Manasseh. “And she sat beside the harvesters.” Rabbi Elazar said with regard to this: Beside the harvesters, and not among the harvesters. He hinted to her that the kingdom of David will be divided in the future and her children will not always be in the center of Israel.
  It also says in the verse: “And he gave her roasted grain and she ate, and she was satiated, and she left some over.” The Gemara explains: “And he gave her roasted grain and she ate”; this is also interpreted as a prophetic message. Rabbi Elazar said: “And she ate” was fulfilled by her children’s children in the days of David; “And she was satiated” was fulfilled in the days of Solomon; “And she left some over” was fulfilled in the days of Hezekiah. And some say that there is a different interpretation: “And she ate,” was fulfilled in the days of David and Solomon; “And she was satiated,” was fulfilled in the days of Hezekiah; “And she left some over” was fulfilled in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As the Master said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s horsekeeper [<i>ahuriyarei</i>] was richer than the king of Persia. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And she ate,” in this world; “and she was satiated,” in the days of the Messiah; “and she left some over,” in the future, at the end of days.
  It was mentioned earlier that Rabbi Yoḥanan called his clothing his honor. The Gemara cites the interpretation of the verse that speaks about the downfall of the king of Assyria: “Therefore, the Lord, the Lord of hosts, will send leanness to his fat ones and under his honor He will burn a burning like a burning fire” (Isaiah 10:16).Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “And under his honor,” but not his actual honor. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own reasoning, for he called his clothing my honor, which means that the bodies of the king of Assyria’s soldiers were burned. However, their garments were miraculously not burned.
  Rabbi Elazar said: “And under his honor” means in place of his actual honor. That is to say, their bodies were burned. Since, in Rabbi Elazar’s opinion, the word under means in the place of, the verse accordingly means that in the place of his honor, i.e., the body, there remain ashes.Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: Under his honor means beneath his flesh, similar to the burning of the sons of Aaron. Just as there, i.e., the burning of Aaron’s sons, the soul burned while the body remained intact, so too here, i.e., the burning of Assyrian soldiers, the soul burned while the body remained intact.
  Rabbi Aḥa bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:
  
  Daf 114a
  
  From where is it derived that changing clothes is a display of honor? As it is stated: “And he will remove his garments and will don other garments, and he will bring the ashes outside of the camp to a pure location” (Leviticus 6:4). The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The Torah taught you etiquette. The clothes in which one prepared food for his master, one does not wear to pour his master wine. Since cooking makes one’s clothes dirty, he should wear fresh clothes when serving his master.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is disgraceful for a Torah scholar to go out to the marketplace in patched shoes. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina go out in patched shoes? Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rav Naḥman, said: They only prohibited patched shoes if there is a patch upon a patch.
  And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A Torah scholar on whose clothes a fat stain is found is liable to receive the death penalty, as it is stated: “All those who hate me love death” (Proverbs 8:36), and the Sages said: Do not read: Those who hate me [<i>mesanai</i>]. Rather, read: Those who cause me to be hated [<i>masniai</i>]. Those who cause people to hate the Torah by creating the impression that those who study Torah are unclean deserve the death penalty. Ravina said: A fat stain [<i>revav</i>] was not stated, but rather a bloodstain [<i>revad</i>] was stated (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), which is a greater disgrace. The Gemara adds: They did not disagree over the <i>halakha</i>. Rather, the dispute is whether that which we learned concerning stains on a Torah scholar’s clothes refers to an overgarment that people wear over the rest of their clothes, while that which we learned with regard to a bloodstain refers to an undergarment, where a bloodstain is disgraceful but other types of spots are not.
  And similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That which is written: “As My servant Isaiah went naked and barefoot for three years” (Isaiah 20:3), is not to be understood literally. Rather, naked means that he wore tattered clothing, and barefoot means that he walked with patched shoes.
  We learned in a mishna there: A fat stain on a donkey’s saddle interposes, i.e., if the saddle becomes impure, its immersion in a ritual bath is invalid unless the stain is removed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A stain interposes only when it is as large as an Italian <i>issar</i> but not smaller. And if there were a fat stain on clothing on one side, it does not interpose, but if the stain is on both sides it interposes. Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: It interposes even on one side.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥanina: Is a stain on a saddle an interposition even if it is on just one side, or only if it is on both sides? Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: That, I did not hear explicitly. However, I heard something similar to it. As we learned in that same mishna that Rabbi Yosei says: A garment belonging to builders [<i>banna’in</i>] is considered to have an interposition if it has a stain on one side, and that of an ignoramus, who is not meticulous, is considered to have an interposition when the stain is on both sides. And certainly a donkey’s saddle cannot be more important than the garment of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Who are the builders mentioned here? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: These are Torah scholars, who are engaged in building the world all of their days. And with regard to this, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is a Torah scholar of whom the Sages said that one must return a lost object to him based on visual identification, even if he does not provide an identifying sign for it? That is one who makes sure his upper undergarment is turned inward so that the uneven stitching is not visible. This means that he conducts himself like a Torah scholar in all his ways, even in matters of cleanliness and order (Maharsha). On a related note, the Gemara adds that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is a Torah scholar who may be appointed as a leader of the community? This is one who is asked about matters of <i>halakha</i> on any topic and he is able to answer, and even if he were asked about tractate <i>Kalla</i>, a tractate that few have mastered.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is the Torah scholar for whom the inhabitants of his city are commanded to perform his labor for him? This is one who sets his own matters aside and engages in matters of Heaven. It is therefore fitting for the community to support him. And that applies only to exerting themselves to provide him with his bread, as it is appropriate that they sustain him. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Who is included in the category of a Torah scholar? Anyone who is asked about the <i>halakha</i> with regard to any topic and is able to state it. And they say: What are the practical consequences of this question? It is to appoint him a leader of the community. If he is an expert in a single tractate, they appoint him as a leader in his place; if he is an expert in all of his learning, they appoint him as the head of the yeshiva.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: These garments of the <i>banna’in</i> mentioned in the mishna are the clothes of the bath attendants [<i>ulairin</i>] that come from a country overseas, on which stains are apparent, and these men are meticulous about their cleanliness. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that these are white garments? Didn’t Rabbi Yannai say to his sons: My sons, do not bury me in white garments nor in black garments. Not in white, lest I not be acquitted in judgment, and I will be among the wicked like a groom among mourners. And not in black, lest I be acquitted in judgment, and I will be among the righteous like a mourner among grooms. Rather, bury me in the clothes of the bath attendants who come from a country overseas, which are neither black nor white. Apparently, these clothes of the bath attendants are red. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as a distinction can be made. When Rabbi Yannai indicates that they are red, that is referring to overgarments; the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that indicated that they are white, that is referring to undergarments.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yishmael says: One may fold clothes and make beds on Yom Kippur for Shabbat if Yom Kippur occurs on Friday, and the fats of the sacrifices that were brought on Shabbat were offered on Yom Kippur that occurs on Sunday. The verse “The burnt-offering of Shabbat on its Shabbat, besides the daily offering and its libation” (Numbers 28:10) taught, with regard to the fats of Shabbat, that they are offered on Yom Kippur, because Yom Kippur is also called Shabbat, and the verse indicates that the Shabbat offering is offered on another Shabbat. I might have thought even the fats from Yom Kippur offerings could be sacrificed on Shabbat; therefore, the verse states “on its Shabbat” to specify that it is not so; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rabbi Akiva says that when the verse says: “The burnt-offering of Shabbat on its Shabbat,” it teaches that the fats of Shabbat are offered on a Festival that occurs on the following day. I might have thought that they could even be offered on Yom Kippur that occurred on the day after Shabbat. Therefore, the verse states “on its Shabbat” and not on another one.
  When you analyze the matter you will find that you can say that, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, vows and free-will offerings are offered on a Festival. If sacrifices that fulfill vows can be postponed to a weekday but are nevertheless brought on a Festival, certainly fats from Shabbat can be offered on a Festival that follows it. And the verse is needed to permit offering Shabbat fats on Yom Kippur that follows it. However, according to Rabbi Akiva vows and free-will offerings are not brought on a Festival, and therefore the verse is needed to permit sacrificing the fats from Shabbat on a Festival that follows it, but on Yom Kippur it is prohibited. Rabbi Zeira said:
  
  Daf 114b
  
  When I was in Babylonia, I said with regard to that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If Yom Kippur occurred on Shabbat eve, they would not sound the <i>shofar</i> as they did every Friday to herald the start of Shabbat; and if Yom Kippur occurred at the conclusion of Shabbat, they would not recite <i>havdala</i> to mark the end of the sanctity of Shabbat and the start of the sanctity of Yom Kippur, is a statement accepted by all. When I went to Eretz Yisrael, I found Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, who sat and said: This <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it equates the sanctity of Yom Kippur with that of Shabbat. As, if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, then, since Rabbi Yishmael said that fats from Shabbat are offered on Yom Kippur, let them sound the <i>shofar</i> so that the priests will know that the fats from Shabbat are offered on Yom Kippur and they may begin offering them (Rav Hai Gaon). And I said to him: You cannot prove this from here, because priests are vigilant and can be trusted to know this on their own, and there is no need to sound the <i>shofar</i>.
  Mar Kashisha, the son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Do we say that priests are vigilant in that regard? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that three blasts were sounded in the Temple on Friday to stop the people from work, and three more were sounded to demarcate between sacred and profane? Apparently, even priests required the blasts to alert them to the beginning and end of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: As Abaye said in a different context, that certain matters were undertaken for the rest of the people in Jerusalem, so too here, these blasts were sounded for the rest of the people in Jerusalem and not for the priests.
  The Gemara asks: In any event, Let them sound the <i>shofar</i> so that they will know that trimming the vegetables, i.e., removing the leaf heads from vegetables in preparation for cutting them, is permitted from the late afternoon and onward. On Yom Kippur, it is permitted, starting at a certain point of the day, to prepare vegetables for the meal following the fast. However, this is not permitted on Shabbat, when it is prohibited to perform any action in preparation for the weekdays after Shabbat. Rav Yosef said: This is because a rabbinic prohibition [<i>shevut</i>] is not overridden in order to permit another action. Although sounding the <i>shofar</i> is not prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, it is prohibited by rabbinic law on Shabbat and Yom Kippur, and this prohibition is not overridden to permit another action.
  And Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The Sages permitted doing so for an immediate rabbinic prohibition, e.g., sounding the <i>shofar</i> to permit prohibited actions immediately. They did not permit doing so for a more remote rabbinic prohibition, such as trimming vegetables, which is allowed only beginning late in the afternoon, several hours after the start of Yom Kippur (Rabbeinu Ḥananel).
  The Gemara asks: And did they permit doing so for an immediate rabbinic prohibition? Didn’t we learn in a mishna that if a Festival occurs on Shabbat eve, one sounds the <i>shofar</i> to announce that Shabbat has begun, but one does not recite <i>havdala</i> over wine to mark the conclusion of the Festival, because the sanctity of Shabbat is greater than the sanctity of the Festival? And if a Festival occurs at the conclusion of Shabbat, one recites <i>havdala</i> to demarcate between the sanctity of Shabbat and the sanctity of the Festival, but one does not sound the <i>shofar</i>. And why does one not sound the <i>shofar</i>? Let them sound the <i>shofar</i> at the beginning of the Festival, so that people will know that slaughtering is permitted immediately on the Festival, although it was prohibited on Shabbat. Rather, it is clear that this must be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, who says that a rabbinic prohibition is not overridden to permit the performance of actions that were prohibited.
  With regard to trimming vegetables on Yom Kippur, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Huna said, and some say Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said: If Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat, trimming vegetables is prohibited. Rav Mana said: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that on Yom Kippur that occurs on Shabbat trimming vegetables is prohibited? The verse states: “A solemn rest [<i>shabbaton</i>], a holy Shabbat unto the Lord” (Exodus 16:23), which means that there is an obligation to issue a rabbinic prohibition on this day. Issue a rabbinic prohibition for what activity? If you say this refers to prohibiting actual labor, isn’t it written explicitly: “But the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God; you shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9)? Rather, does it not refer to trimming vegetables, which is prohibited on Shabbat even though it is not a full-fledged prohibited labor? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that trimming vegetables is prohibited.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat, trimming vegetables is permitted. The Gemara raised an objection from what we learned in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier: From where is it derived that on Yom Kippur that occurs on Shabbat trimming vegetables is prohibited? The verse states: “A solemn rest [<i>shabbaton</i>], a holy Shabbat unto the Lord” (Exodus 16:23), which means that there is an obligation to issue a rabbinic prohibition on this day. Issue a rabbinic prohibition for what activity? If you say this refers to prohibiting actual labor, isn’t it written explicitly: “But the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God; you shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9)? Rather, is it not referring to trimming vegetables, which is prohibited on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: No, that is not; rather, solemn rest actually refers to labor. It is a positive commandment to rest on Shabbat. Although the verse says explicitly: “But the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God; you shall not perform any labor,” this adds that one who performs a prohibited labor violates both a positive mitzva and a prohibition.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat,
  
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  trimming vegetables is permitted. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If Yom Kippur occurs on a weekday, one may crack nuts and remove pomegranate seeds from the late afternoon and onward, because doing so involves no actual labor and due to anxiety, i.e., if a person does not know that there is food prepared for when the fast ends, he suffers more during the final hours of the day (Rabbi Zeraḥia HaLevi). The Gemara relates: The members of Rav Yehuda’s house would trim cabbage. The members of Rabba’s house would scrub gourds. Once Rabba saw that they were doing this early, before the late afternoon, he said to them: A letter came from the West, i.e., from Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, saying that doing so is prohibited.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to all sacred writings, one may rescue them from the fire on Shabbat, whether they are read in public, e.g., Torah or Prophets scrolls, or whether they are not read in public, e.g., Writings scrolls. This ruling applies even though they were written in any foreign language. According to the Rabbis, those scrolls are not read in public, but they are still sacred and require burial. And why does one not read the Writings on Shabbat? Due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall. People came to the study hall at specific times on Shabbat to hear words of <i>halakha,</i> and other texts were not allowed at those times.
  GEMARA: It was stated that <i>amora’im</i> debated the status of sacred writings written in Aramaic translation or in any other language. Rav Huna said: One may not rescue them from the fire on Shabbat. And Rav Ḥisda said: One may rescue them from the fire on Shabbat. The Gemara adds: According to the one who said that sacred writings written in other languages may be read, everybody agrees that one may rescue them. Where they argue is according to the one who said that they may not be read. Rav Huna said: One may not rescue them, as they may not be read. Whereas Rav Ḥisda said: One may rescue them due to disgrace to sacred writings that will result. We learned in the mishna: With regard to all sacred writings, one may rescue them from the fire on Shabbat whether they are read in public or whether they are not read in public, even if they are written in any foreign language. What, is it not that the phrase: “That they are read” is referring to the books of the Prophets, and the phrase: “That they are not read” is referring to the Writings? Even though these are books written in any foreign language, which may not be read, it is taught that one may save them. This then is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.
  Rav Huna could have said to you: And do you understand the mishna that way? Say the latter clause of the mishna, which states: They require burial. This is unnecessary, as now, that it was mentioned that we rescue them from the fire, is it necessary to say that they require burial? Rather, the mishna must be emended. Rav Huna reconciles the mishna in accordance with his reasoning, and Rav Ḥisda reconciles the mishna in accordance with his reasoning. Rav Huna reconciles this in accordance with his reasoning: Whether they are read is referring to the Prophets, and whether they are not read is referring to the Writings. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where they are written in the holy tongue, but if they are not written in Hebrew but in any other language, they are not rescued from the fire on Shabbat, and even so, they require burial. Rav Ḥisda reconciles the mishna in accordance with his reasoning: Whether they are read is referring to the Prophets, and whether they are not read is referring to the Writings, even if they are written in any language other than Hebrew, they are also rescued. And this is what the mishna is saying: And even the decayed sections of parchment require burial.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If they were written in Aramaic translation or in any language other than Hebrew, they are rescued from the fire on Shabbat. And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who states that these are not rescued. Rav Huna could have said to you: This <i>tanna</i> holds that sacred writings not written in Hebrew may be read, whereas Rav Huna stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the <i>tanna</i> who holds that they may not be read, and therefore may not be rescued. Come and hear another proof from that which was taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: Sacred writings that were written in Coptic, Egyptian; Median; <i>Ivrit</i>, i.e., ancient Hebrew script; Eilamitic; or Greek are rescued from the fire on Shabbat, even though they may not be read. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who holds that they are not rescued. Rav Huna could have said to you: This is a dispute between <i>tanna’im,</i> as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If they were written in Aramaic translation or in any language other than Hebrew, one may rescue them from the fire on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei says: One may not rescue them from the fire.
  Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident involving my father, Ḥalafta, who went to the esteemed Rabban Gamliel of Yavne in Tiberias, where he found him sitting at the table of Yoḥanan HaNazuf and in his hand there was a translation of the book of Job, and he was reading from it. Yoḥanan said to Rabban Gamliel of Yavne: I remember Rabban Gamliel, your father’s father, who was standing on top of a step on the Temple Mount. And they brought before him a translation of the book of Job, and he said to the builder: Bury this book under the course of bricks. When he heard of that incident, Rabban Gamliel of Yavne ordered that it be buried and he buried it. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that on the Temple Mount they overturned a large bowl of mortar on it. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: There are two responses to this that prove that it did not happen: One, from where would they get mortar on the Temple Mount? Construction on the Temple Mount was performed with other materials, not with mortar. And furthermore, is it permitted to actively destroy even sacred writings that are not read, with one’s hands? Rather, at the very least they leave them in a neglected place, where they are likely to decompose quickly, and they decay on their own. The Gemara seeks to clarify: Who are the <i>tanna’im</i> who dispute this <i>halakha</i> according to Rav Huna?
  
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  If we say it is the first <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei, that is not necessarily so, and perhaps they are disagreeing about this: This Master, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that books written in other languages may be read; and this Master, Rabbi Yosei, holds that they may not be read, and their dispute is unrelated to the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda. Rather, it is the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the first <i>tanna</i>, who spoke about books written in Coptic. According to that <i>tanna</i>, even books that may not be read are rescued, whereas Rabbi Yosei holds that they are not rescued.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The blessings that are written and the amulets, even though there are the letters of the Name of God in them and matters that appear in the Torah are mentioned in them, they are not rescued from the fire; rather, they burn in their place, they and the names of God contained therein. From here the Sages said: Writers of blessings are like burners of Torah scrolls, as it is prohibited to rescue these texts from the fire on Shabbat even though it is likely that they will be destroyed. There was an incident involving one who was writing pages with blessings in Sidon. They came and informed Rabbi Yishmael of his actions, and Rabbi Yishmael went to examine him to determine if the report was true. When Rabbi Yishmael was ascending the ladder to confront him, the scribe sensed his presence, took a bundle [<i>tomos</i>] of blessings, and submerged it in a basin of water to conceal it from Rabbi Yishmael. And in these words Rabbi Yishmael said to him: The punishment for the latter action is greater than the punishment for the former. Although it is prohibited to write blessings, destroying them is a greater violation.
  The Exilarch raised a dilemma before Rabba bar Rav Huna: If the sacred scrolls were written in yellow-tinged arsenic, or red paint, in gum, or in iron sulfate, types of ink which may not be used to write Torah scrolls; however, the scrolls were written properly in the holy tongue, does one rescue them from the fire on Shabbat or does one not rescue them? The Gemara adds: This dilemma is raised according to the one who said that one rescues sacred writings written in other languages; and this dilemma is raised according to the one who said that one does not rescue them. The Gemara elaborates. This dilemma is raised according to the one who said that one does not rescue them: Perhaps that applies specifically in a case where they are written in Aramaic translation and in any foreign language; however, here, where they are written in the holy tongue, one rescues them. Or perhaps even according to the one who said that one rescues them, that applies specifically in a case where they are written in ink that endures; however, here, since the script does not endure, they are not rescued. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: One does not rescue them. The Exilarch said to him: Didn’t Rav Hamnuna teach in a <i>baraita</i> that one saves them. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: If it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, it was taught, and I retract my statement. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>baraita</i> that was taught on this matter? Rav Ashi said, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The only difference between the books of the Bible and the Megilla of Esther is that the books are written in any language and are valid, and the Megilla is only valid if it is written in Assyrian script, the familiar square Hebrew script, on a parchment scroll, and in ink. Apparently, other sacred books need not be written in ink.
  Rav Huna bar Ḥaluv raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to a Torah scroll in which there is not enough to compile from it eighty-five complete letters written properly and in order, which is the minimum measure determined by the Sages for a Torah to maintain the sanctity of a Torah scroll, as in the portion of: “And when the Ark traveled” (Numbers 10:35–36), does one rescue it from the fire on Shabbat or does one not rescue it? Rav Naḥman said to him: And raise a dilemma with regard to the portion of: “And when the Ark traveled,” itself, i.e., does one rescue it on Shabbat if it is missing a single letter? Rav Huna bar Ḥaluv answered: In a case where the portion of: “And when the Ark traveled,” is incomplete, it is not a dilemma for me, as since it contains names of God, even though there are not eighty-five letters in it, it is rescued. However, the case where it is a dilemma for me is with regard to a Torah scroll in which there is not enough to compile from it eighty-five complete letters; what is the ruling? Is it rescued on Shabbat or not? Rav Naḥman said to him: It is not rescued.
  Rav Huna bar Ḥaluv raised an objection to his opinion from that which we learned: A verse that is originally written in Aramaic translation that was written in the language of the Bible, and a verse that is originally written in the language of the Bible that was written in Aramaic translation, and a Torah that was written in ancient Hebrew script, one rescues them from the fire on Shabbat. And, needless to say, one saves the verses written in Aramaic translation that are in the book of Ezra, and that are in the book of Daniel, and that are in the Torah. What are the verses originally written in Aramaic translation in the Torah? It is the verse: “And Laban called it Yegar Sahaduta, and Jacob called it Gal Ed” (Genesis 31:47), and apparently, it is rescued, even though there are not eighty-five letters in it. Rav Naḥman answered him: That is no proof, as when that <i>baraita</i> was taught, it was in a case where the Aramaic verse is counted to complete the total of eighty-five letters, but it is not independently significant.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to these eighty-five letters that allow one to rescue a Torah scroll, is that specifically when they are juxtaposed, or even when they are scattered? Rav Huna said: Only when they are juxtaposed. Rav Ḥisda said: Even when they are scattered. The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned: With regard to a Torah scroll that is worn, if there is enough to compile from it eighty-five complete letters as in the portion of: “And when the Ark traveled,” one rescues it from the fire, and if not one does not rescue it. The term: To compile, indicates that the letters are not juxtaposed, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna. Rav Ḥisda interpreted it according to the opinion of Rav Huna: Indeed, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the letters are scattered, but they are juxtaposed in the form of words. In that case, even Rav Huna agrees that it is a sacred book. Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda only disagree in a case where isolated letters are scattered.
  Apropos the portion: “And when the Ark traveled,” the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>. It is stated: “And when the Ark traveled and Moses proclaimed: Rise up, God, and Your enemies will scatter and those who hate You will flee from before You.” And The Holy One, Blessed be He, made signs in the Torah for this portion, above and below, i.e., before and after it, in order to say
  
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  that this is not its place, as the previous portion does not discuss the nation’s travels. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is not for that reason that signs were inserted. Rather, the signs are there because this portion is considered a book unto itself.
  The Gemara asks: According to whose opinion is that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥman said that Rabbi Yonatan said, that with regard to the verse: “With wisdom she built her house, she carved its seven pillars” (Proverbs 9:1), these are the seven books of the Torah? According to whose opinion? It is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as by his count there are seven books of the Torah: Genesis; Exodus; Leviticus; Numbers until: “And when the Ark traveled”; the portion: “And when the Ark traveled,” which is considered its own book; the remainder of Numbers; and Deuteronomy.
  Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In the future, this portion will be uprooted from here, where it appears, and will be written in its proper place. And why was it written here, even though it discusses the travels of the children of Israel, and the portion before it does not? It is in order to demarcate between the first punishment and the second punishment. What is the second punishment that appears immediately afterward? It is the verse: “And the people complained wickedly in God’s ears, and God heard and became angry, and the fire of God burned in them and it consumed the edge of the camp” (Numbers 11:1). What is the first punishment? It is the verse: “And they traveled from the mountain of God [<i>mehar Hashem</i>] for three days” (Numbers 10:33), and Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: That they turned from after God [<i>me’aḥarei Hashem</i>] and hurriedly fled Mount Sinai. The Gemara asks: And if so, where is the proper place for this paragraph? Rav Ashi said: In the portion of the flags, where there is a description of the manner in which the Jewish people traveled through the desert.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the blank folios of parchment of a Torah scroll, does one rescue them from the fire on Shabbat, or does one not rescue them from the fire? Come and hear a resolution to this from that which we learned: With regard to a Torah scroll that is worn, if there is enough in it to compile eighty-five complete letters as in the portion of: “And when the Ark traveled,” one rescues it from the fire, and if not one does not rescue it. If even the blank folios are rescued, why would one not rescue a Torah scroll with fewer than the requisite number of letters? Derive that this scroll may be rescued due to its blank folios. The Gemara answers: A Torah scroll that is worn is different, because at that point its sanctity is negated, and its blank folios are not sacred. Therefore, one may rescue the scroll only if it contains eighty-five letters.
  Come and hear a different resolution from that which was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a Torah scroll that was erased, if there is enough in it to compile eighty-five complete letters as in the portion of: “And when the Ark traveled,” one rescues it from the fire, and if not, one does not rescue it. And why is that so? Derive that this scroll may be rescued due to its blank folios, as the erased section is surely no less significant than the blank folios of the scroll. The Gemara answers: That is not so. In a case where the place of the writing is erased it is not a dilemma for me, as it is sacred due to the writing. If the writing is gone, its sanctity is gone. When it is a dilemma for me is with regard to the blank portions that are above and below, that are between one section and another section, that are between one page and another page, that are at the beginning of the scroll, and that are at the end of the scroll. The Gemara asks again: Derive that this scroll may be rescued due to that area that is blank, whose sanctity remains. The Gemara replies: There, it is referring to a case where the blank area was cut and thrown out, and all that remains is the place of the writing.
  Come and hear a different resolution from what we learned in a mishna: The Sages decreed that the blank folios that are above and below, that are between one section and another section, that are between one page and another page, that are at the beginning of the scroll, and that are at the end of the scroll render the hands that touch them ritually impure. Apparently, the blank folios have the sanctity of a Torah scroll. The Gemara replies: That is not a proof, as perhaps when it is part of the Torah scroll, it is different, and in those circumstances the sanctity of the Torah extends to the blank portions. When they stand alone they have no sanctity.
  Therefore, come and hear a different resolution from that which was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the blank folios and the Torah scrolls of heretics, one does not rescue them from the fire; rather, they burn in their place, they and the names of God contained therein. What, is this not referring to the blank folios of a Torah scroll? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to the blank folios of the scrolls of heretics. The Gemara is surprised at this: Now, with regard to the scrolls of heretics themselves, one does not rescue them; is it necessary to say that one does not rescue their blank folios? Rather, this is what it is saying: And the scrolls of heretics are like blank folios.
  Apropos the scrolls of heretics, the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. With regard to the blank folios and the Torah scrolls of the heretics, one does not rescue them from the fire. Rabbi Yosei says: During the week, one cuts the names of God contained therein and buries them, and burns the rest. Rabbi Tarfon said in the form of an oath: I will bury my sons if I fail to do the following, that if these books come into my possession I will burn them and the names contained therein. As even if a person is pursuing him with the intent to kill him, and a snake is hurrying to bite him, one enters a house of idolatry and does not enter the houses of these heretics. The reason is that these heretics are aware of the greatness of the Creator manifest in the Torah and its mitzvot, and nevertheless, they deny the existence of God; whereas these idolators are not aware, and that is the reason that they deny the existence of God. And with regard to the heretics, the verse says: “And behind the door and the doorpost you place your memory” (Isaiah 57:8). Although they remember the word of God, they treat it contemptuously, as if casting it behind the door.
  Rabbi Yishmael said: The fact that the names of God in the scrolls of heretics may be burned can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as to make peace between a husband and his wife, the Torah says: My name that was written in sanctity shall be erased in the water in the framework of the ordeal of the <i>sota</i>; these, the heretics, who impose jealousy, and hatred, and conflict between the Jewish people and their Father in Heaven, all the more so it is proper to erase God’s names because of them. And with regard to heretics, David said: “For I hate those who hate You, God, and I fight those who rise against You. I hate them with the utmost hatred, they have become enemies to me” (Psalms 139:21–22). And just as they, the scrolls of heretics, are not rescued from the fire, neither are they rescued from a rockslide, nor from water, nor from any other matter that destroys them.
  Yosef bar Ḥanin raised a dilemma before Rabbi Abbahu: With regard to these books of the house of Abidan, does one rescue them from the fire or does one not rescue them? There were sacred Jewish texts in that house, which were used in debates and discussions on matters of faith. Rabbi Abbahu did not give him a clear answer but said yes and no, and the matter was uncertain to him. Rav would not go to the house of Abidan for conversation, and all the more so he would not go to the house of Nitzrefei, the Persian fire-temple. Shmuel, to the house of Nitzrefei he did not go, but to the house of Abidan he did go. The gentile scholars said to Rava: Why did you not come to the house of Abidan? He evaded their question with an excuse and said to them: There is a certain palm tree on the road, and that makes the path difficult for me. They said to him: We will uproot it. He said to them: Nevertheless, the resulting pit in its place will be difficult for me. Mar bar Yosef said: I am one of them, we are friends, and I do not fear them. Still, one time he went and argued with them and they sought to endanger his life. Rabbi Meir would call the Christian writing, the Evangelion, the wicked folio [<i>aven gilyon</i>]; Rabbi Yoḥanan called it the sinful folio [<i>avon gilyon</i>].
  The Gemara relates: Imma Shalom, the wife of Rabbi Eliezer, was Rabban Gamliel’s sister. There was a Christian philosopher [<i>pilosofa</i>] in their neighborhood
  
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  who disseminated about himself the reputation that he does not accept bribes. They wanted to mock him and reveal his true nature. She privately gave him a golden lamp, and she and her brother came before him, approaching him as if they were seeking judgment. She said to the philosopher: I want to share in the inheritance of my father’s estate. He said to them: Divide it. Rabban Gamliel said to him: It is written in our Torah: In a situation where there is a son, the daughter does not inherit. The philosopher said to him: Since the day you were exiled from your land, the Torah of Moses was taken away and the <i>avon gilyon</i> was given in its place. It is written in the <i>avon gilyon</i>: A son and a daughter shall inherit alike.
  The next day Rabban Gamliel brought the philosopher a Libyan donkey. Afterward, Rabban Gamliel and his sister came before the philosopher for a judgment. He said to them: I proceeded to the end of the <i>avon gilayon</i>, and it is written: I, <i>avon gilayon</i>, did not come to subtract from the Torah of Moses, and I did not come to add to the Torah of Moses. And it is written there: In a situation where there is a son, the daughter does not inherit. She said to him: May your light shine like a lamp, alluding to the lamp she had given him. Rabban Gamliel said to him: The donkey came and kicked the lamp, thereby revealing the entire episode.
  We learned in the mishna: And why does one not read the Writings on Shabbat? Due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall. Rav said: They only taught that it is prohibited to read from the Writings on Shabbat during the hours of study in the study hall; but when it is not during the hours of study in the study hall, one may read them. And Shmuel said: Even when it is not the hours of study in the study hall one may not read from the Writings on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Wasn’t Neharde’a Shmuel’s place where he was the rabbi of the town, and in Neharde’a they concluded their regular weekly discourse with Writings on Shabbat afternoon. Rather, if a dispute was stated in this matter, it was stated as follows: Rav said: It was only taught that there is a prohibition in a place where there is a study hall nearby that people can attend; but not in a place where there is a study hall, one may read Writings.
  And Shmuel said: Whether it is in the place of the study hall or it is not the place of the study hall, one may not read anywhere when it is during the hours of study in the study hall; but when it is not during the hours of study in the study hall, one may read. And Shmuel follows his line of reasoning stated elsewhere, as in Neharde’a they would conclude their studies with Writings on Shabbat afternoon.
  Rav Ashi said: Actually, the dispute is as we stated initially, and Shmuel said what he said in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Although the Sages said with regard to sacred writings that they may not be read on Shabbat, one may study the midrash on them and teach them before the congregation; if one requires a verse that is written in the Writings, he brings a book and looks in it. Rabbi Neḥemya said: Why did they say that sacred writings are not read on Shabbat? So that people will say: Sacred writings may not be read, all the more so that is the case with ordinary documents, i.e., contracts and letters. If so, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, reading any sacred writings on Shabbat is prohibited so that people will refrain from reading non-sacred documents on Shabbat. It was not prohibited to encourage attendance the study hall. Shmuel himself does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.
  MISHNA: One may rescue the casing of a Torah scroll from a fire on Shabbat together with the Torah scroll, and the casing of phylacteries along with the phylacteries, even if they have money inside them. And to where may one rescue them? Into an alley that is closed, which, if it is surrounded on three sides, is considered to be a private domain by Torah law. Ben Beteira says: Even into an open alley.
  GEMARA: Apropos the mishna, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the fourteenth of Nissan occurs on Shabbat, and the Paschal lamb is offered but not roasted until Shabbat ends, one flays the Paschal lamb up to the breast to enable removal of the parts of the animal that are offered on the altar on Shabbat. One flays the rest of the animal after Shabbat. Further skinning is only to facilitate eating the animal, therefore, it does not override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And the Rabbis say: One flays it in its entirety. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who said one may flay only part of the animal, the <i>halakha</i> is understandable. Since it has already been used for its divine purpose of having its blood sprinkled on the altar, the animal no longer should be flayed. But according to the Rabbis, what is the reason for their opinion? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse states, “All that the Lord has made is for His sake” (Proverbs 16:4), meaning that a prohibited action is only permitted if its performance honors God. The Gemara asks: And here, what manifestation of for His sake is there in flaying the remaining hide from the Paschal lamb? Rav Yosef said: The Rabbis permitted removing the entire hide so that the sacrifice will not putrefy. Rava said: The Rabbis permitted removing the entire hide so that the sacred sacrifices will not be left in disgrace like a half-stripped animal carcass left unattended.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them when the Paschal lamb is laid on a golden table. In this case, there is indeed a concern that the carcass will putrefy, although there is no element of disgrace. Alternatively, there is a practical difference on a day with a cold northern wind. In this case, there is no concern that it will putrefy but there is a concern of disgracing the sacrifice. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yishamel, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, do with the verse, “All that the Lord has made is for His sake”? The Gemara answers: He uses it to permit removing part of the hide, as if it was not for this verse, it would have been possible to remove the sacrificial parts offered on the altar before removing the hide by puncturing the hide of the animal and removing the fats through the opening. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Torah prohibited doing so? Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said: Because of the hairs, so that they do not become entangled in the sacrificial parts and distort them.
  Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: How did the members of the group respond to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? This is what they said to him: If one may save the casing of a Torah scroll along with the Torah scroll, why may one not strip the Paschal lamb of its skin? Here too, in the case of skinning the Paschal lamb, once part of the action is permitted one should be able to perform the entire act. The Gemara is surprised at this: Are they comparable? There, in rescuing the casing of the scroll, only moving is involved, which is prohibited by rabbinic law; whereas here, in the case of the Paschal lamb, the act of flaying is a prohibited labor by Torah law. Rav Ashi said: They are disagreeing with regard to two issues: They disagree with regard to moving the hide along with the flesh, and they disagree with regard to the labor of flaying the animal. And this is what they said to him: If one may rescue the casing of the Torah scroll along with the Torah scroll, will we not move the hide of the Paschal lamb together with the flesh of the sacrifice? The sacrifice should be moved with its skin so it does not putrefy.
  
  Daf 117a
  
  The Gemara asks: Are they comparable? There, with regard to the Torah scroll, the casing is a base for a permitted object, i.e., the scroll itself, which may be moved on Shabbat; whereas here, with regard to the hide of the Paschal lamb, the skin is a base for a prohibited object, i.e., the flesh of the sacrifice, which may not be moved until nightfall because it may not be eaten until night. Rather, this is what they said to him: If one may save the casing of the Torah scroll along with the scroll, even if there is money inside it, why then may one not move the hide together with the flesh? The Gemara asks: Are they comparable? There, with regard to the Torah scroll, the casing becomes a base for a prohibited object and a permitted object; whereas here, with regard to the hide, it is entirely a base for a prohibited object. Rather, this is what they said to him: If one may bring a casing that has money inside it from outside in order to save a Torah scroll in it, why may one not move the hide together with the flesh?
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this <i>halakha</i> itself? As it is not stated in the mishna, from where do we derive that it is permitted on Shabbat to bring a casing containing money from the outside in order to save a Torah scroll? If you say that from the fact that in a situation where the casing has money in it one does not throw it away but brings it out with the casing, when the casing is outside and has money in it, one may also bring the money along with it; is it comparable? There, with regard to the Torah scroll’s casing with money inside, if one tarries in order to empty the money from the case, in the meantime the fire might catch the Torah scroll and burn it; whereas here, with regard to bringing in the casing, in the meantime he could have thrown it away. Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Actually, it is as we said initially. The Sages equated carrying the Torah casing with flaying the hide of the Paschal lamb. And as for what was difficult for you, that here, with regard to the Torah casing, moving alone is involved, whereas here, with regard to a Paschal lamb, a prohibited labor is involved, it can be explained as referring to a case where one does not need the hide of the Paschal lamb. Therefore, he is exempt.
  The Gemara asks: But Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon concedes in cases categorized as cut off its head and will it not die, i.e., an action with an inevitable consequence. When an action has an inevitable consequence, even Rabbi Shimon, who normally exempts a person for performing an action with an unintended consequence, maintains the one is liable. Rather, we must say that one flays it strip by strip, and thereby he does not benefit from the hide. It therefore does not constitute the prohibited labor of stripping the hide.
  We learned in the mishna: And to where may one rescue them? Into an alley that is closed, which, if it is surrounded on three sides, is considered to be a private domain by Torah law. Ben Beteira says: Even into an open alley. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an alley that is open, and what are the circumstances of an alley that is not open? Rav Ḥisda said: An alley that has three walls and two posts at its entrance is an alley that is not open; one that has three walls and one post is an alley that is open. And they both, the first <i>tanna</i> and ben Beteira, disagree in the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in a mishna: For preparation of an alley to permit carrying within it on Shabbat, Beit Shammai say the alley must have a post on the side of the entrance and a beam over the entrance. And Beit Hillel say: Either a post or a beam is sufficient. Rabbi Eliezer says: In order to permit carrying, two posts are required.
  Rabba said to him: Did you call an alley that has three walls and one post open? Even if Rabbi Eliezer does not permit carrying there, it is still not considered to be open but closed. And furthermore, according to the Rabbis, if this is so, let us rescue food and drinks by carrying them there as well. Since the Sages only permitted carrying in an alley that is not open, and because, according to all opinions, it is permitted to carry in a closed alley, one should also be allowed to save food and water, and not only a Torah scroll, by carrying them there. Rather, Rabba said: An alley that has two walls and two posts at both entrances to the alley is an alley that is not open. If it has two walls and one post, it is an alley that is open.
  And both of them hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One who has two houses opposite each other on two sides of the public domain, if he chooses, he may create a private domain for himself in the area of the public domain. He may place a ten-handbreadth high post from here, perpendicular to the public domain. This creates a symbolic wall which, in the <i>halakhot</i> of alleyways, has the legal status of a wall. And he may place an additional post from here, on the other side, and that has the same legal status as if he closed the public domain on all of its sides. Or, he can implement a different solution appropriate for alleyways by placing a beam extending from here, from one end of one house, to the end of the house opposite it. This creates a symbolic partition across the width of the street. And he may place a beam extending from here, from the other side of the house. According to Rabbi Yehuda, in that way, one is permitted to carry objects and place them in the area between the symbolic partitions, as he would in a private domain. The Rabbis said to him: One may not establish an <i>eiruv</i> in the public domain in that way.
  Abaye said to Rabba: According to your opinion too, according to the opinion of the Rabbis cited in the mishna who agree with Rabbi Yehuda and permit carrying in an alley that is closed, let us also save food and drinks by carrying them there.
  
  Daf 117b
  
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: The Sages in the mishna disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: Three walls and one post is an alley that is closed; three walls without a post at all is an open alley. And even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who said we need two posts, one post being insufficient, those words were stated to permit one to move food and drinks, but for the purpose of moving a Torah scroll, one post is sufficient.
  MISHNA: One may rescue food for three meals from a fire on Shabbat. One may rescue food that is suitable for a person for a person; and one may rescue food that is suitable for an animal for an animal. How so? If a fire ignited on Friday night before the Shabbat evening meal, one may rescue food for three meals. If a fire ignited in the morning, after the Shabbat evening meal has been eaten and before the meal of Shabbat day, one may only rescue food for two meals. If a fire ignited in the afternoon, one may rescue food for one meal. Rabbi Yosei says: One may always rescue food for three meals, which is the measure that the Sages permitted without distinguishing between the times of day.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Now, since one is exerting himself to move permitted objects, let us rescue more. Why was he allowed to rescue food for only three meals? Rava said: Since a person is agitated about his property, if you permit him to move more, he will come to extinguish the fire. Abaye said to him: Rather, that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one’s barrel broke atop one’s roof on Shabbat, he may bring a vessel and place it under the barrel to salvage its contents, and this is permitted provided that he does not bring another vessel and place it on the ground to catch the liquid that flows out of the barrel. Similarly, one may not bring another vessel and attach the vessel next to the roof so that the liquid from the barrel will pour into it. There, what decree applies to prohibit saving it in any other way? Rava said to him: Here, too, it is a decree issued due to the concern lest one bring the additional vessel through the public domain, which is prohibited.
  Apropos this <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: If one’s barrel broke atop one’s roof on Shabbat, he may bring a vessel and place it under the barrel to salvage its contents, and this is permitted provided that he does not bring another vessel and place it on the ground to catch the liquid, another vessel and attach the vessel next to the roof. If guests happen to come to him and he needs more to drink, he may bring another vessel and catch the liquid, and he may bring another vessel and attach it. And one may not catch the liquid and then invite guests; rather, one must first invite guests, and afterward catch the liquid. Until he invites guests, there is no need for the beverage, and he will be catching the liquid in a prohibited manner. And one may not employ artifice in this by inviting guests expressly for the purpose of rescuing his wine. In the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, they said: One may even employ artifice.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to it and its offspring that fell into a pit on a Festival, Rabbi Eliezer says: One may raise the first in order to slaughter it, and then slaughter it; and with regard to the second one, one may provide it sustenance in its place in the pit so that it will not die. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may raise the first in order to slaughter it, and then reconsider and not slaughter it, and one may employ artifice and say that he reconsidered and wants to slaughter the other, and raise the second. If he so desires, he slaughters this one; if he so desires, he slaughters that one.
  The Gemara rejects this: From what does that conclusion ensue? Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer only stated that he may not raise the second animal there, in a case where it is possible to save the animal by feeding it in the pit; however, here, in the case of the barrel, where it is impossible to save it by feeding it in the pit, no, he would permit doing so. Perhaps even he agrees that it is permitted to employ artifice in this case. And similarly, perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua only said there that one may employ artifice because there is an issue of the suffering of living beings, but here, where there is no issue of the suffering of living beings, perhaps he did not permit employing artifice.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: If one rescued sufficient fine bread for his needs, he may not then rescue coarse bread [<i>hadra’a</i>], bread made from flour and bran. However, if one rescued coarse bread, he may then rescue fine bread. And one may rescue bread on Yom Kippur for the purpose of Shabbat; however, one may not rescue bread on Shabbat for the purpose of Yom Kippur. And, needless to say, one may not rescue bread on Shabbat for the purpose of a Festival, and one may not rescue bread on Shabbat for the purpose of the next Shabbat.
  And the Sages taught: If one forgot bread in the oven and did not remove it until the day of Shabbat was sanctified, he may rescue enough food for three meals from the oven. And, one may say to others: Come and rescue bread for yourselves. And when one removes the bread from the oven, he may not remove it in the usual manner with a baker’s paddle, but he removes it in an unusual manner, e.g., with a knife. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach that it is stated: “And the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord, your God, you shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:10), and the emphasis on the word labor excludes blowing the shofar and removing bread, which is a skill and not a labor, and which therefore is not prohibited on Shabbat. If by Torah law removing bread on Shabbat is permitted, why may one not remove it in the usual manner? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, as much as it is possible to alter the manner in which one removes bread from the oven one alters, to emphasize that the day is Shabbat.
  Rav Ḥisda said: A person should always rise early on Friday in order to prepare all of the expenditures for Shabbat, as it is written with regard to the collection of the manna: “And it shall be on the sixth day, and they will prepare that which they have brought” (Exodus 16:5), indicating that the children of Israel would begin preparing the food for Shabbat immediately upon collecting the manna in the morning. Apropos manna, the Gemara mentions other matters derived from it. Rabbi Abba said: On Shabbat a person is obligated to break bread in his meal over two loaves of bread, as it is written: “And it happened on the sixth day, they collected double the bread, two <i>omer</i> for each one” (Exodus 16:22).
  Rav Ashi said: I saw that Rav Kahana took two loaves in his hand and broke one, not both at once. He said in explanation that it is written: “They collected double the bread,” meaning that one collects and holds two loaves together, but need not break both. Rabbi Zeira would break off a piece that would suffice for his entire meal. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Doesn’t that appear like gluttony? Rav Ashi said to him: Since on every other day he does not do this and now he is doing so, it does not appear like gluttony. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, when the bread from the <i>eiruv</i> would happen to become available to them, they would begin and recite the blessing over it. They said in explanation: Since one mitzva was performed with it, let an additional mitzva be performed with it.
  We learned in the mishna that one may rescue food for three meals on Shabbat. How so? If a fire ignited before the meal on Shabbat evening, one rescues food for three meals; if a fire ignited Shabbat morning, he rescues food for two meals; if a fire ignited in the afternoon, he rescues food for one meal. With regard to meals on Shabbat, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How many meals is a person obligated to eat on Shabbat? Three. Rabbi Ḥidka says: Four. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And both of them derived their opinions from one verse: “And Moses said: Eat it today, for today is Shabbat for God, today you will not find it in the field” (Exodus 16:25). Rabbi Ḥidka holds: These three mentions of the word today allude to the number of meals on Shabbat besides the evening meal, as Moses spoke on Shabbat morning. And the Rabbis hold that these three mentions include the evening meal. We learned in the mishna: If a fire ignited on Shabbat evening,
  
  Daf 118a
  
  one rescues food for three meals. What, is this not referring to a situation where he has not yet eaten any meals? Apparently, one is obligated to eat only three meals on Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a situation where one already ate one meal. Three meals still remain, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka, who requires four meals. The Gemara challenges this from the continuation of the mishna: If a fire ignited in the morning, one may only rescue food for two meals. What, is it not referring to a situation where one has not yet eaten one’s morning meal and the obligation is to eat only three meals, one at night and two during the day? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a situation where one has already eaten the morning meal. The Gemara challenges this from the continuation of the mishna: If a fire ignited in the afternoon, one may rescue food for one meal. What, is it not referring to a situation where one has not yet eaten the afternoon meal and the obligation is to eat only three meals? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a situation where one has already eaten.
  The Gemara challenges this: From the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: One may always rescue food for three meals, by inference, even the first <i>tanna</i> holds that the obligation is to eat three meals, as there is no dispute with regard to the number of meals on Shabbat. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka. According to the <i>tanna’im</i> in the mishna, one is obligated to eat three meals on Shabbat.
  And that which we learned in another mishna: One who has sufficient food for two meals in his possession may not take food from the charity plate that is distributed to the poor. He is not considered needy and would be taking food at the expense of people who are worse off than he. And one who has food for fourteen meals, enough meals for an entire week, may not take money from the charity fund. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? Apparently, it is neither in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka. If it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, they maintain that they are fifteen meals that are eaten in a week, two each day, evening and morning, and three on Shabbat. If it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka, they are sixteen meals that are eaten in a week, twelve during the six days of the week and four on Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, but we say to him: That which you want to eat at the conclusion of Shabbat, Saturday night, eat it as the third meal on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: Let us say that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka. The Gemara rejects that approach: Even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka, the mishna can be understood, as we can say to him: That which you want to eat on Shabbat eve, Friday afternoon, eat at night on Shabbat instead. The Gemara asks: And do we have a person sit and fast all day on Shabbat eve? According to this suggestion, he would not eat at all on Friday. Rather, we must say: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said: Make your Shabbat like a weekday and do not be beholden to other beings. It is preferable to eat two meals on Shabbat as he does during the week if he can thereby avoid taking charity.
  And that which we learned in another mishna: One gives no less charity to a poor person who is traveling from place to place than a loaf worth a pundeyon, one forty-eighth of a <i>sela</i>, when the standard price of grain is four se’a for a sela. If he sleeps there, one gives him money for sleeping; and if he spends Shabbat in that city, one gives him food for three meals. Let us say that is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka. The Gemara rejects this: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥidka. When it says that if the poor traveler spends Shabbat there one gives him food for three meals, it is referring to a case where there is one meal that he brought with him, for we say to him: This meal that you have with you, eat it. The Gemara is surprised at this: And when he goes, does he go empty-handed, with no food. The Gemara answers: We provide him a meal to accompany him when he leaves. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of money for sleeping? Rav Pappa said: It means that one provides his sleeping needs, i.e., a bed and cushions.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to bowls from which one ate in the evening on Shabbat, he may rinse them in order to eat from them in the morning. Bowls from which one ate in the morning, he may rinse them to eat from them in the afternoon. Bowls from which one ate in the afternoon, he may rinse them to eat from them in the afternoon. However, from the afternoon onward, one may no longer rinse them because there is no further need for these bowls on Shabbat, and it is prohibited to make preparations on Shabbat for a weekday. However, with regard to cups, and ladles, and flasks, which are vessels used for drinking, one rinses them all day long because there is no fixed time for drinking, and one does not know when he will drink again.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Anyone who fulfills the obligation to eat three meals on Shabbat is rescued from three punishments: From the pangs of the Messiah, i.e., the suffering that precedes the advent of Messiah, and from the judgment of Gehenna, and from the war of Gog and Magog. The Gemara derives that one is rescued from the pangs of Messiah by means of a verbal analogy. It is written here, with regard to Shabbat, day: “Eat it today” (Exodus 16:25). And it is written there, with regard to Messiah, day: “Behold, I am sending you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and awesome day of God” (Malachi 3:23). The Gemara derives that one is rescued from the judgment of Gehenna by means of a verbal analogy. It is written here, with regard to Shabbat, day, as cited above. And it is written there, day: “That day will be a day of wrath, a day of trouble and distress, a day of destruction and desolation, a day of darkness and blackness, a day of cloud and thick fog” (Zephaniah 1:15), which is interpreted as referring to the punishment of Gehenna. The Gemara derives that one is rescued from the war of Gog and Magog by means of a verbal analogy. It is written here, with regard to Shabbat, day. And it is written there, with regard to the War of Gog and Magog, day: “And it shall be on that day, on the day that Gog arrives on the land of Israel” (Ezekiel 38:18).
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei: With regard to anyone who delights in the Shabbat, God gives him a boundless portion, i.e., a very large reward, as it is stated: “If you keep your feet from violating Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day, and you call Shabbat a delight, the Lord’s holy day honored, and you honor it by not going your own way, or attending to your own matters or speaking idle words. Then you shall delight in the Lord and I will cause you to ride on the heights of the world, and to feast
  
  Daf 118b
  
  on the inheritance of Jacob your father, as the mouth of God has spoken” (Isaiah 58:13–14). The reward for delighting in Shabbat is specifically the portion of Jacob. Not that of Abraham, about whom it is written, “Rise, walk through the land through its length and its width because I have given it to you” (Genesis 13:17), i.e., only this land alone in its borders. And not that of Isaac, about whom it is written, “Dwell in this land and I will be with you and I will bless you because I will give all of these lands to you and your offspring” (Genesis 26:3), meaning these lands and no others. Rather, that of Jacob, about whom it is written, “And your offspring will be like the dust of the earth, and you will spread out to the west and to the east and to the north and to the south, and all of the families of the land will be blessed through you and your offspring” (Genesis 28:14). There are no boundaries for Jacob’s portion.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: One who delights in Shabbat is rescued from the oppression of exile. He derives it by means of a verbal analogy. It is written here, with regard to Shabbat: “And I will cause you to ride on the heights [<i>bamotei</i>] of the world” (Isaiah 58:14), and it is written there: “You are fortunate Israel, who is like you? A nation redeemed by God, the shield that aids you and the sword of your triumph. Your enemies will try to defeat you and you will trample their high places [<i>bamoteimo</i>]” (Deuteronomy 33:29). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With regard to anyone who delights in the Shabbat, God grants him his heart’s desires, as it is stated: “And you shall delight in God and He will grant you your heart’s desires” (Psalms 37:4). This delight in God, which is mentioned in the verse, I do not know what it is. When it says: “And you shall call the Shabbat delight,” one must say: It is the delight of Shabbat. The Gemara asks: With what does one delight in the day of Shabbat? Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: With a dish of beets, and large fish, and heads of garlic. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: Even with regard to a small item and one prepared it in deference to Shabbat, it is a delight. The Gemara asks: What is the small item mentioned? Rav Pappa said: Small fried fish.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to anyone who observes Shabbat in accordance with its <i>halakhot</i>, even if he worships idolatry as in the generation of Enosh, God forgives him his sins, as it is stated: “Fortunate is the man [enosh] who does this and the person who holds strong to it, one who guards the Shabbat from desecrating it [<i>meḥallelo</i>], and guards his hand from doing any evil” (Isaiah 56:2). Do not read it as: From desecrating it [<i>meḥallelo</i>], but rather: He is forgiven [<i>maḥul lo</i>]. With regard to the generation of Enosh it is written: “And to Seth, to him also there was born a son; and he called his name Enosh. Then they began [<i>huḥal</i>] to call upon the Name of God” (Genesis 4:26), meaning to desecrate [<i>leḥallel</i>] His name.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Had the Jewish people properly observed the first Shabbat that was commanded them, no nation or tongue would have ever ruled them, as it is stated: “And it happened on the seventh day, some people went out from the nation to collect and they did not find” (Exodus 16:27). And it is written after they went out to collect manna: “And Amalek came and fought with Israel in Refidim” (Exodus 17:8). Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: If only the Jewish people would keep two <i>Shabbatot</i> in accordance with their <i>halakhot</i>, they would be immediately redeemed, as it is stated: “So said God to the eunuchs who will keep My Shabbatot” (Isaiah 56:4), and it is written after that: “And I will bring them to My holy mountain and will let them rejoice in My house of prayer” (Isaiah 56:7).
  Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who eat three meals on Shabbat. Apropos this statement of Rabbi Yosei, the Gemara cites additional declarations. Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who complete hallel every day. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that so? Didn’t the Master say: One who reads <i>hallel</i> every day is tantamount to one who curses and blasphemes God. He displays contempt for <i>hallel</i> by not reserving it for days on which miracles occurred. The Gemara answers: When we say this statement of Rabbi Yosei, we are referring to the verses of praise [<i>pesukei dezimra</i>], recited during the morning service, not to <i>hallel</i> (Psalms 113–118) recited on special days.
  And furthermore, Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who pray the morning and afternoon prayers with the reddening of the sun, i.e., the morning prayer at sunrise and the afternoon prayer adjacent to nightfall. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is a mitzva to pray with the reddening of the sun. Rabbi Zeira said: What verse alludes to this? “They will fear You with the sun and before the moon, generation upon generation” (Psalms 72:5). Fear of God, prayer, should be with the sun and before the moon.
  And Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who die from intestinal disease, as the Master said: Most righteous people die of intestinal disease. It is a very harsh disease through which the sins of righteous people are cleansed before their death and also, as a result, they die with a clean body. And Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who die on the path to perform a mitzva. And Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who accept Shabbat in Tiberias, which is in a valley where day turns to evening earlier, and among those who see Shabbat out in Tzippori, which is located on a mountain top where the sun is visible for longer, and Shabbat ends later. And Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among those who seat others in the study hall, i.e., who cause others to come sit and study, and not among those who cause others to stand in the study hall, i.e., who announce that it is time to leave the study hall and go to eat.
  And Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be among the collectors of charity and not the distributors of charity. One who collects charity collects fixed amounts, whereas distributors may inadvertently fail to give the poor person enough to cover his needs. And Rabbi Yosei said: May my portion be with one whom others suspect of sin and there is no basis for suspecting him. Rav Pappa said: They suspected me, and there was no basis for suspecting me.
  Furthermore, Rabbi Yosei said: I engaged in relations five times, and I planted five cedars in Eretz Yisrael. And who are these cedars? The sons of Rabbi Yosei, who were great Sages of Israel: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Ḥalafta, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Avtilas, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there Vardimas, who was also Rabbi Yosei’s son? The Gemara answers: Vardimas is the same as Menaḥem. And why did they call him Vardimas? Because his face was as beautiful as a rose [<i>vered</i>]. The Gemara asks: Is that to say based on this statement that Rabbi Yosei did not fulfill the mitzva of his wife’s conjugal rights, but only had relations with her five times? Rather, say it this way: I engaged in relations five times and I did so again, and the Sages said that one who seeks to father male offspring should engage in relations and do so again.
  Furthermore, Rabbi Yosei said that he always spoke euphemistically: In all my days, I did not call my wife, my wife, nor my ox, my ox. Rather, I called my wife, my home, because she is the essence of the home, and my ox, my field, because it is the primary force in the fields.
  Rabbi Yosei said: In all my days, due to modesty, I never looked at my circumcision. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t they say to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why did they call you our holy Rabbi? He said to them: It is because in all my days I never looked at my circumcision. If so, why wasn’t Rabbi Yosei also called our holy Rabbi? The Gemara replies: In the case of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, another matter of modesty was present in him, as he did not insert his hand below his belt due to his great modesty. And Rabbi Yosei said: In all my days, the walls of my house never saw the seams of my robe due to modesty, as he would only undress under his bed sheets.
  And Rabbi Yosei said: In all my days I never violated the words of my friends. I know about myself that I am not a priest, and nevertheless, if my friends say to me: Go up to the platform with the priests, I go up. And Rabbi Yosei said: In all my days I never said something and then retreated from it. Rabbi Yosei never said something positive or negative about a specific person and then denied it.
  Rav Naḥman said: May I receive my reward because I fulfilled the obligation to eat three meals on Shabbat magnificently. Rav Yehuda said: May I receive my reward because I fulfilled the obligation of consideration during prayer. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: May I receive my reward because I never walked four cubits with my head uncovered. Rav Sheshet said: May I receive my reward because I fulfilled the mitzva of phylacteries magnificently. And Rav Naḥman said: May I receive my reward because I fulfilled the mitzva of ritual fringes magnificently.
  Rav Yosef said to Rav Yosef, son of Rabba: In what area was your father, Rabba, especially vigilant? He said to him: It was in the mitzva of ritual fringes. The Gemara relates: One day he was climbing the stairs when a string from his ritual fringes was severed, and he would not descend until he placed a new string on the garment. And Abaye said: May I receive my reward because when I see a young Torah scholar who has completed a tractate that he studied
  
  Daf 119a
  
  I make a feast for the Sages. Rava said: May I receive my reward because when a young Torah scholar comes before me for judgment, I do not put my head on the pillow until I seek as many of his merits as possible, based on conditions and his claims. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: I am disqualified to sit in judgment of a young Torah scholar. What is the reason that I am disqualified? It is because the Torah scholar is as beloved to me as my own self, and a person does not find fault in himself.
  The Gemara now returns to the issue of delight in and deference to Shabbat. Rabbi Ḥanina would wrap himself in his garment and stand at nightfall on Shabbat eve, and say: Come and we will go out to greet Shabbat the queen. Rabbi Yannai put on his garment on Shabbat eve and said: Enter, O bride. Enter, O bride. The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Rav Huna happened to come to the house of Rabba bar Rav Naḥman. They brought before him three se’a of oiled biscuits. He said to them: Did you know I was coming and prepared all of this in my honor? They said to him: Are you more important to us than Shabbat? The biscuits were prepared in deference to Shabbat.
  Rabbi Abba bought thirteen plain staters [<i>astirei peshitei</i>] worth half a <i>zuz</i> of meat from thirteen butchers in deference to Shabbat, so that he would have various types of fine meat. And he would place the meats at the door hinge at the entrance to his house to hurry to bring another type of meat. And he said to the cooks, in order to rush them: Hurry and prepare it, hurry and prepare it. The Gemara also relates: Rabbi Abbahu would sit on an ivory chair [<i>takhteka</i>] and fan the fire cooking the food for Shabbat, in order to play a role in preparations for Shabbat. Rav Anan would don a simple black garment for the Shabbat preparations, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: While wearing the garments in which he cooked a pot of food for his master, one should not dilute a cup of wine for his Master. One should wear a garment appropriate for the task at hand.
  Rav Safra would roast the head of an animal to prepare it for Shabbat. Rava salted a <i>shibuta</i> fish in deference to Shabbat. Rav Huna kindled lamps in deference to Shabbat. Rav Pappa spun the wicks for the Shabbat lamp. Rav Ḥisda cut the beets in preparation for Shabbat. Rabba and Rav Yosef cut wood. Rabbi Zeira prepared thin sticks for kindling. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak would load objects on his shoulder and enter, load objects on his shoulder and exit. He said: If Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi happened to visit me, would I not load objects on my shoulder before them? So too, it is fitting to do so in deference to Shabbat. And some say that Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi would load objects on their shoulders and enter, load objects on their shoulders and exit. They said: If Rabbi Yoḥanan happened to come to visit us, would we not load objects on our shoulders before him?
  The Gemara relates with regard to Yosef who cherishes Shabbat: There was a gentile in his neighborhood whose property was extremely plentiful. The astrologers said to the gentile with regard to all his property: Yosef who cherishes Shabbat will consume it. The gentile went and sold all of his property, and with the money he received he bought a pearl, and he placed it in his hat. When he was crossing a river in a ferry, the wind blew his hat and cast it into the water, and a fish swallowed it. The fish was caught and removed from the water and it was brought to shore adjacent to nightfall on Shabbat eve. The fishermen said: Who buys fish at a time like this? The townspeople said to the fishermen: Go bring it to Yosef who cherishes Shabbat, as he regularly purchases delicacies in deference to Shabbat. They brought it to him and he purchased it. He ripped the fish open and found a pearl inside it. He sold it for thirteen vessels filled with golden dinars (<i>Tosafot</i>). This elderly man who encountered him and said: One who lends to Shabbat, Shabbat repays him.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: With regard to the wealthy of Eretz Yisrael, by what virtue do they merit their wealth? He said to him: Because they tithe, as it is stated: “A tithe you shall tithe [<i>asser te’asser</i>] from all the crops of your seed that come out of the field each year” (Deuteronomy 14:22). The Sages interpreted this homiletically: Take a tithe [<i>asser</i>] so that you will become wealthy [<i>titasher</i>]. He asked: With regard to the wealthy of Babylonia, who are not obligated to tithe, by what virtue do they merit their wealth? He said to him: Because they honor the Torah and the Sages in Babylonia.
  With regard to the wealthy of other countries, where there are no Sages, by what virtue do they merit their wealth? He said to him: Because they honor Shabbat, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: One time I was hosted at the home of a homeowner in Laodicea and they brought before him a table of gold that was so heavy it required sixteen people to carry it, and there were sixteen chains of silver attached to it, and there were bowls and cups and pitchers and flasks attached to it, and there were all sorts of food, and delicacies, and fragrant spices on it. And when they placed it there they would say: “The earth and all that fills it is God’s, the world and all that inhabit it” (Psalms 24:1). And when they removed it they would say: “The heavens are God’s heavens, but the earth He gave to mankind” (Psalms 115:16). I said to him: My son, what did you do to merit this? He said to me: I was a slaughterer, and when I would come across parts from every animal that I slaughtered that was fine, I would say: This will be for Shabbat. I said to him: Happy are you that you merited this, and blessed is God, Who has afforded you this merit.
  The Roman emperor said to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: Why does the fragrance of a cooked Shabbat dish diffuse? He said to him: We have a certain spice called dill [<i>shevet</i>], which we place in the cooked dishes and its fragrance diffuses. The emperor said to him: Give us some of it. He said to him: For anyone who observes Shabbat, the spice is effective, and for one who does not observe Shabbat, it is not effective.
  The Exilarch said to Rav Hamnuna: What is the meaning of that which is written, “The holy one of God is honored” (Isaiah 58:13)? Rav Hamnuna said to him: That is Yom Kippur, when there is no eating or drinking, and so the Torah said: Honor it with a clean garment. And with regard to that which is stated about Shabbat, “And you shall honor it,” Rav said: To honor Shabbat, make the Shabbat feast earlier than on other days, in order to show that one delights in eating it. And Shmuel said: To honor Shabbat, make the Shabbat feast later, so that one’s appetite will be greater. The sons of Rav Pappa bar Abba said to Rav Pappa: People like us, for whom meat and wine is found on our table every day, in what manner can we change it on Shabbat? He said to them: If you are accustomed to eating your meal early, make it later on Shabbat; if you are accustomed to making it late, make it earlier on Shabbat. This difference will underscore the uniqueness of Shabbat. The Gemara relates: In the summer, Rav Sheshet would seat the Sages who attended his lecture in a place where the sun would reach; in the winter, he would seat the Sages in a place where the shade would reach. He did this so that they would stand quickly after the lecture ended and not engage in discussion, which would detract from the time devoted to delighting in Shabbat. Rabbi Zeira
  
  Daf 119b
  
  would seek pairs of Sages engaged in conversation on Shabbat and said to them: Please do not desecrate Shabbat by failing to delight in Shabbat.
  Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said: Even an individual who prays on Shabbat evening must recite the passage: “And the heavens and the earth were finished [<i>vaykhullu</i>]” (Genesis 2:1–3), as Rav Hamnuna said: Anyone who prays on Shabbat evening and recites the passage of vaykhullu, the verse ascribed him credit as if he became a partner with the Holy One, Blessed be He, in the act of Creation. As it is stated: “And the heavens and the earth were finished [<i>vaykhullu</i>].” Do not read it as: Were finished [<i>vaykhullu</i>]; rather, as: They finished [<i>vaykhallu</i>]. It is considered as though the Holy One, Blessed be He, and the individual who says this become partners and completed the work together. Rabbi Elazar said: From where is it derived that speech is like action? As it is stated: “By the word of God the heavens were made, and all of their hosts by the breath of His mouth” (Psalms 33:6).
  Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: One who prays on Shabbat evening and recites <i>vaykhullu</i>, the two ministering angels who accompany the person at all times place their hands on his head and say to him: “And your iniquity has passed, and your sin has been atoned” (Isaiah 6:7). It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Two ministering angels accompany a person on Shabbat evening from the synagogue to his home, one good angel and one evil angel. And when he reaches his home and finds a lamp burning and a table set and his bed made, the good angel says: May it be Your will that it shall be like this for another Shabbat. And the evil angel answers against his will: Amen. And if the person’s home is not prepared for Shabbat in that manner, the evil angel says: May it be Your will that it shall be so for another Shabbat, and the good angel answers against his will: Amen.
  Rabbi Elazar said: A person should always set his table on Shabbat eve with all the preparations for an important feast, even if he only needs the table set for an olive-bulk of food. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: A person should always set his table at the conclusion of Shabbat, Saturday night, for a feast in deference to the Shabbat that passed, even if he only needs the table set for an olive-bulk of food. And with regard to the meal at the conclusion of Shabbat, they said: Hot water after Shabbat is a remedy [<i>melugma</i>], warm bread at the conclusion of Shabbat is a remedy. The Gemara relates: They would prepare for Rabbi Abbahu at the conclusion of Shabbat a third-born calf, and he would eat one kidney from it. When his son Avimi grew up, he said to his father: Why do you waste so much? Let us leave a kidney over from Shabbat eve, and you will not need to slaughter an entire calf for that purpose. Indeed, they left the calf and did not slaughter it, and a lion came and ate it. This teaches that one should not be miserly when it comes to honoring Shabbat.
  Apropos the reward for honoring Shabbat, the Gemara cites statements about the reward for answering amen. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that anyone who answers: Amen, may His great name be blessed, wholeheartedly, with all his might, they rip his sentence, as it is stated: “When punishments are annulled in Israel, when the people offer themselves, bless the Lord” (Judges 5:2). What is the reason for when punishments are annulled? Because the Jewish people blessed God. When one recites: Amen, may His great name be blessed, and blesses God, his punishment is annulled. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if one has within him a trace of idolatry, when he answers amen he is forgiven. It is written here, in the verse above: “When punishments [<i>pera’ot</i>] are annulled.” And it is written there, with regard to the sin of the Golden Calf: “And Moses saw that the nation was wild [<i>paru’a</i>], for Aaron had let them loose for anyone who might rise against them” (Exodus 32:25). Even one with the wildness of idolatry is forgiven. Reish Lakish said: One who answers amen with all his strength, they open the gates of the Garden of Eden before him, as it is stated: “Open the gates, and a righteous nation shall come who keeps the faith” (Isaiah 26:2). Do not read: Who keeps [<i>shomer</i>] the faith [<i>emunim</i>], but rather: Who say [<i>she’omerim</i>] amen. What is the allusion of the word <i>amen</i>? Rabbi Ḥanina said: It is an acronym of the words: God, faithful King [<i>El Melekh ne’eman</i>].
  Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel, said in the name of Rav: Fire is only found in a place where there is desecration of Shabbat, as it is stated: “And if you do not heed Me to sanctify the day of Shabbat, and to refrain from carrying burdens and come to the gates of Jerusalem on the day of Shabbat, and I will light a fire in its gates and it will consume the palaces of Jerusalem and it will not be extinguished” (Jeremiah 17:27). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And it will not be extinguished? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Fire will break out at a time when people are not found to extinguish it. Abaye said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because people desecrated the Shabbat in it, as it is stated: “And from My <i>Shabbatot</i> they averted their eyes, and I was profaned among them” (Ezekiel 22:26). Several punishments were decreed to befall Jerusalem as punishment for this transgression.
  The Gemara suggests additional reasons for the destruction of Jerusalem. Rabbi Abbahu said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because its citizens intentionally omitted recitation of <i>Shema</i> morning and evening, as it is stated: “Woe to those who rise early in the morning and pursue the drink and are aflame from wine until late in the evening” (Isaiah 5:11). And it is written in the continuation of that passage: “And their drinking parties have lyre and lute, drum and flute and wine, and they do not look upon the actions of God, and they do not see His hands’ creations” (Isaiah 5:12). This means that in the morning and evening, when the Jews should have been reciting <i>Shema</i>, they were drinking wine and liquor. And it is written in that passage: “Therefore My nation is being exiled for its ignorance; its honor will die of hunger and its multitudes will be parched with thirst” (Isaiah 5:13).
  Rav Hamnuna said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because schoolchildren there were interrupted from studying Torah, as it is stated: “And I am filled with the wrath of God, I cannot contain it, pour it onto the infants in the street and onto the gathering of youths together, for men and women alike will be captured, the elderly along with those of advanced years” (Jeremiah 6:11). Rav Hamnuna explains: What is the reason that the wrath is poured? It is because infants are outside in the streets and are not studying Torah. Ulla said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because people had no shame before each other, as it is stated: “They acted shamefully; they have performed abominations, yet they neither were ashamed nor did they know humiliation. Therefore, they will fall among the fallen, they will fail at the time that I punish them, said God” (Jeremiah 6:15). Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because its small and the great citizens were equated. They did not properly value the prominent leaders of their generation, as it is stated: “And the common people were like the priest, the slave like his master, the maidservant like her mistress, the buyer like the seller, the lender like the borrower, the creditor like the one indebted to him” (Isaiah 24:2). And it is written afterward: “The land shall be utterly desolate and completely plundered, for God has said this” (Isaiah 24:3).
  Rav Amram, son of Rabbi Shimon bar Abba, said that Rabbi Shimon bar Abba said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because the people did not rebuke one another, as it is stated: “Her ministers were like stags that found no pasture, and they walked without strength before their pursuer” (Lamentations 1:6). Just as this stag turns its head toward the other’s tail when it grazes, and each one feeds on its own, so too, the Jewish people in that generation lowered their faces to the ground and did not rebuke one another. Rabbi Yehuda said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because they disparaged the Torah scholars in it, as it is stated: “And they mocked the messengers of God and disdained His words and taunted His prophets, until the wrath of God arose against His people, until it could not be healed” (II Chronicles 36:16). What is the meaning of: Until it could not be healed? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It means that anyone who disparages Torah scholars cannot be healed from his wound.
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Do not touch My anointed ones and do My prophets no harm” (I Chronicles 16:22)? “Do not touch My anointed ones,” these are the schoolchildren, who are as precious and important as kings and priests (Maharsha); “and do not harm My prophets,” these are Torah scholars. Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: The world only exists because of the breath, i.e., reciting Torah, of schoolchildren. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: My Torah study and yours, what is its status? Why is the Torah study of adults worth less? He said to him: The breath of adults, which is tainted by sin, is not similar to the breath of children, which is not tainted by sin. And Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: One may not interrupt schoolchildren from studying Torah, even in order to build the Temple. And Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yehuda Nesia: I have received from my ancestors, and some say that he said to him: I have received from your ancestors as follows: Any city in which there are no schoolchildren studying Torah, they destroy it. Ravina said: They leave it desolate.
  And Rava said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because there were no more trustworthy people there, as it is stated: “Roam about the streets of Jerusalem and see, and search its plazas, if you can find a person, who acts justly, who seeks integrity, that I should forgive it” (Jeremiah 5:1). The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Ketina say: Even at the time of Jerusalem’s failure, trustworthy people did not cease there, as it is stated: “For a man will grab his brother of his father’s house and say: You have a garment. Come be a chief over us and let this ruin be under your care” (Isaiah 3:6)? Things that people use to cover up like a garment, secrets, are in your hands and you know about them. Therefore, you should be a leader of the community. And that which is stated: “And let this ruin be under your care,” meaning:
  
  Daf 120a
  
  Matters of Torah that people do not ascertain unless they misunderstand them are in your hands; therefore, be a chief over us. It is stated later on in that passage: “He will rise [<i>yissa</i>] on that day, saying, I will not be a ruler while in my house there is no bread and no garment, you shall not appoint me as chief of the people” (Isaiah 3:7). The term rise [<i>yissa</i>] means nothing other than an oath, as it says: “Do not raise [<i>tissa</i>] the name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exodus 20:17). I will not be a ruler, means: I will not be one of those who close themselves up in the study hall, as I do not regularly do so, while in my house there is no bread and no garment, for I have neither Bible nor Mishna nor Gemara in my hands. According to this explanation, there were people of faith who truthfully admitted that they did not study Torah, even during the time of the destruction of Jerusalem. The Gemara rejects this: And from what do you conclude that this admission was due to their faithfulness? Perhaps it is different in that case, as had he told them: I studied Torah, they would have said to him: Tell us what you studied. As he would not know to respond, he would have no choice other than to admit that he did not study. The Gemara rejects this: That is not difficult, as he could have at least said he learned and forgot. The Gemara asks: Therefore, what is: I will not be a ruler? It means that he is telling the truth and although he could have lied, he admits that he did not study Torah at all. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where it was taught that they were faithful, that was with regard to matters of Torah; whereas here, where it was taught that there were no more people of faith in Jerusalem, that was with regard to matters of business.
  MISHNA: One may rescue a basket full of loaves and the like from a fire on Shabbat, even if there is food for one hundred meals in it. And one may rescue a round cake of dried figs, even though it is very large, and one may rescue a barrel full of wine. And one may even say to others: Come and rescue for yourselves. And if the people who rescue with him were clever, they make a calculation with him after Shabbat in order to receive payment for the items that they rescued.
  To where may one rescue items moved from the fire? One may do so to a courtyard where an <i>eiruv</i> was established, and it is permitted to carry. Ben Beteira says: One may do so even to a courtyard where an eiruv was not established. And one may carry there all the utensils, and put on all the garments that he can wear, and one may wrap all the cloths that he can wrap around himself in order to rescue his property. Rabbi Yosei says: One may put on only eighteen garments at once, as people sometimes wear that number of garments, but not more. However, one may again put on that number of garments and carry it out. And he may say to others: Come and rescue with me.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in the first clause, i.e., the preceding mishna, that one may rescue three meals and no more? Rav Huna said: This is not difficult. This current mishna permitted rescuing a greater amount when one comes to rescue a basket or round cake of figs; that previous mishna permitted rescuing food for only three meals in a case where one comes to collect the food. When one comes to rescue, he may rescue everything; when one comes to collect, he may collect food for only three meals. However, Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: Both this and that are referring to a case where one comes to collect, and this is not difficult. This current mishna permitted rescuing a greater amount when one moves the objects to the same courtyard; that, the previous mishna, permitted saving food for only three meals when one transfers it to a different courtyard. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised a dilemma: If one spread his cloak on the ground and collected and placed objects in the cloak, and collected and placed objects inside it, what is the ruling? Is he considered as one who comes to rescue or is he like one who comes to collect?
  The Gemara attempts to resolve the dilemma from that which Rava said: Rav Sheizvi misled Rav Ḥisda, and Rav Ḥisda taught (Rabbeinu Ḥananel) a <i>halakha</i> with regard to a barrel that breaks on a roof, and added: And it is permitted provided that one does not bring a vessel that holds more than three meals. Conclude from the fact that Rava said that Rav Ḥisda’s restriction of the amount that can be rescued to food sufficient for three meals is mistaken, that one who takes a large amount all at once is like one who comes to rescue, and he may well do so. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: What is the error in Rav Ḥisda’s statement? Perhaps it is actually prohibited. He said to him, as it is taught: Provided that he does not bring another vessel and place it on the ground to catch the liquid, another vessel and attach the vessel next to the roof. Apparently it is another vessel that one may not bring, but in that same vessel, one may rescue as much as he wants, and the Sages did not establish a maximum size for the vessel.
  And we learned in the mishna that one is permitted to rescue a round cake of dried figs from a fire, and one may even say to others: Come and rescue for yourselves. And if the people who rescue with him are clever, they make a calculation with him after Shabbat. The Gemara is surprised at this: What is the mention of a calculation doing here? Aren’t they acquiring food from ownerless property? What calculation is necessary here? Whatever they rescue is theirs, and they do not need to return it to the original owner. Rav Ḥisda said: They taught an attribute of piety here. These are pious people. They want to return the objects to their owner even though they are not legally obligated to do so, and they were permitted to receive payment for their efforts. Rava said: And do pious people take payment for work they do on Shabbat? Rather, Rava said: Here, we are dealing with one who is Heaven-fearing but not completely pious. And it is uncomfortable for him to benefit from the property of others, and it is also uncomfortable for him to exert himself for free. And this is what the mishna is saying: And if they are clever and know that in a situation of this kind it is not technically payment for Shabbat labor, and it is permitted because they are only receiving a small portion of the value of the objects that they rescued, they may make a calculation with him after Shabbat.
  We learned in the mishna that one may say to others: Come and rescue for yourselves. We also learned: And to where may one rescue the food? According to the first <i>tanna</i>, one may rescue to a courtyard in which an <i>eiruv</i> was established. According to ben Beteira, one may rescue even to a courtyard in which an <i>eiruv</i> was not established. The Gemara asks: What is different here, with regard to rescuing food, that it is taught that one may say to others: Come and rescue for yourselves, and what is different here, with regard to rescuing clothing, that it is taught that one may say to others: Come and rescue with me? The Gemara answers: With regard to food, it taught: For yourselves, because only food for three meals is suited for him, and only others can benefit from the rest. However, with regard to the garments, it is taught: With me, because it is suited for him to continue rescuing garments all day, since he is permitted to wear other clothes.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one wants to rescue objects from a fire and there are many garments there, he may wear them, and take them out to a safe place, and remove them there, and return to the fire, and wear other clothes, and take them out and remove them. And he may even do so all day long; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: One may wear only eighteen garments, and these are the eighteen garments: A cloak [<i>miktoren</i>], a cape [<i>unkali</i>], a broad garment worn on one’s shoulders, and a large hollow belt worn over the clothes, a wide linen garment [<i>kalbus</i>], and a robe worn against the skin, a robe wrapped above, and a kerchief on one’s head, and two straps, i.e., belts, and two shoes, and two socks [<i>anpilaot</i>], and two tall boots [<i>pargod</i>], and a belt around one’s loins over the robe, and a hat on one’s head, and a scarf around one’s neck.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas says: One may spread out a moist goat’s hide over a box, a chest, or a closet that caught fire, because the fire singes and does not burn it. The fire does not burn the wet goat’s hide but merely singes it, and by doing so the wooden vessels are preserved. And one may establish a barrier against the fire with all vessels, both full and empty, so that the fire will not pass. Rabbi Yosei prohibits using new earthenware vessels full of water, because they cannot withstand the heat of the fire and they will burst and extinguish the fire, and it is prohibited to cause the fire to be extinguished on Shabbat even indirectly.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: If a garment caught fire on one side, one may place water on its other side, and if as a result the fire is extinguished, it is extinguished. The Gemara raises an objection based on the following <i>Tosefta</i>: If a garment caught fire on one side, one may stretch it out and cover himself with it, and if the fire is extinguished, it is extinguished. And so too, if a Torah scroll caught fire, one may open it and read it, and if the fire is extinguished, it is extinguished. Apparently, it is prohibited to actually pour water, but one may perform a permitted act that will incidentally extinguish.
  
  Daf 120b
  
  The Gemara answers: It was Rav who said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas in the mishna.
  The Gemara asks: Say that Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas said it is permitted to place the goat’s hide on the burning item because it singes and does not burn; did he say it is permitted to indirectly cause the fire to extinguish? The Gemara answers: Yes, Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas permitted that as well, and we learn this from that which is taught in the latter clause in the mishna: Rabbi Yosei prohibits using new earthenware vessels that are full of water, because they cannot withstand the fire and will burst and extinguish the fire. This proves by inference that the first <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas, permits it.
  The Sages taught: With regard to a candle that is atop a board, one shakes the board and the candle falls, and if it is extinguished, it is extinguished. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: They only taught that this is permitted in a case where one forgets the candle atop the board when Shabbat began. However, in a case where one places it there, the board becomes a base for a prohibited object and may not be moved.
  It was taught: With regard to a candle behind a door, one may open and shut the door in his usual manner, and if it is extinguished, it is extinguished. Rav would curse one who did so. Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What is the reason that Rav cursed and reprimanded one who did so? If you say it is because Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that it is prohibited to perform an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor could ensue, and the <i>tanna</i> taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that it is permitted to perform an unintentional act in those circumstances; because Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he curses anyone who teaches the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? They rely on the ruling of a <i>tanna</i>, whose opinion is legitimate.
  He said to him: In this case, even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited, as it was Abaye and Rava who both said that Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of: Cut off its head, will it not die? In an instance where the unintentional act leads to an inevitable prohibited consequence, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that the person who performs the unintentional act is liable.
  Rav Yehuda said: A person opens a door opposite a fire on Shabbat. The Gemara relates that Abaye would curse anyone who did so. The Gemara clarifies: With what are we dealing? If you say this is referring to a case where a typical wind is blowing outside, what is the reason of the one who prohibits opening the door? A typical wind will neither fan nor extinguish the fire. And if it is referring to a case where an atypical wind is blowing outside, what is the reason of the one who permits opening the door? The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to the case of a typical wind. However, one Sage, Abaye, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting to open the door in the case of a typical wind due to a case of an atypical wind, and the other Sage, Rav Yehuda, holds that we do not issue that decree.
  We learned in the mishna that one may establish a barrier with all earthenware vessels, and Rabbi Yosei prohibits using new earthenware vessels. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the Rabbis hold that indirect extinguishing is permitted on Shabbat, and Rabbi Yosei holds that indirect extinguishing is prohibited? Didn’t we hear them state the opposite, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may establish a barrier with empty vessels, and with full ones that do not typically break. And these are full vessels that do not typically break; metal vessels. Rabbi Yosei says: Even earthenware vessels from the village of Shiḥin and vessels from the village of Ḥananya do not typically break. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is more lenient than the opinions of the Rabbis. And if you say: Reverse the attribution of opinions in the mishna and attribute Rabbi Yosei’s opinion to the Rabbis, and say that Rabbi Yosei is saying his statement in the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, although he himself disagrees and permits using all vessels. But can you reverse the mishna? Didn’t Rabba bar Taḥalifa say in the name of Rav: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who teaches that indirect extinguishing is prohibited? It is Rabbi Yosei.
  Rather, actually, do not reverse the attribution of the opinions in the mishna, and the entire <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is incomplete and is teaching the following: One may establish a barrier with empty vessels and full ones that do not typically break. And these are vessels that do not typically break: Metal vessels; and vessels from the village of Shiḥin and vessels from the village of Ḥananya also do not typically break, as Rabbi Yosei says: Even vessels from the village of Shiḥin and vessels from the village of Ḥananya do not typically break.
  The conclusion is that Rabbi Yosei prohibits indirect extinguishing, and the Rabbis permit it. The Gemara raises a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and a second statement of the Rabbis; and it raises a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yosei and a second statement of Rabbi Yosei. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one had a sacred name of God written on his skin he may neither wash it in water lest it be erased, nor may he smear it with oil, nor may he stand in a place of filth because it is disrespectful of God’s name. If an immersion of mitzva happened to present itself, he wraps a reed over God’s name and then descends and immerses. Rabbi Yosei says: Actually, he descends and immerses in his usual manner, even if it is not an immersion of mitzva, provided that he does not rub the spot and erase the name. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is more lenient than that of the Sages with regard to indirectly causing a prohibited outcome.
  The Gemara answers: It is different there because the verse says: “And you shall break down their altars, and you shall smash their pillars, and their sacred trees, and burn with fire, and the graven images of their gods you shall hew down and you shall destroy their name from that place. You shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). From the prohibition: “You shall not do so,” Rabbi Yosei derives that actually doing so is that which is prohibited; indirectly causing that result is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to Shabbat, it is written: “And the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God, you shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9). And here, too, one could derive: Performance is that which is prohibited; indirectly causing a prohibited action is permitted. The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yosei maintains there is no prohibition in indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished; however, since a person is agitated about his property, if you permit him to indirectly extinguish the fire, he will come to extinguish it directly.
  The Gemara asks: If so, there is a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and another statement of the Rabbis: If in the case of a fire, where a person is agitated about his property, nevertheless, the Rabbis hold that indirect extinguishing is permitted; here, in the case of erasing God’s name, all the more so it should be permitted to indirectly cause erasure of God’s name. Why did the Rabbis in the <i>baraita</i> issue a stringent ruling in this matter?
  The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand it that way? What are the circumstances of this reed with which God’s name is covered while immersing according to the Rabbis? If it is firmly attached, it is an interposition; if it is not firmly attached, the water enters and erases the name. The Gemara questions this: If the concern is with regard to an interposition, derive that it is an interposition in any case due to the ink on his skin. The Gemara answers: This is referring to moist ink that does not interpose, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood, and ink, and honey, and milk on a person’s skin, when they are dry, they interpose during immersion; when they are moist, they do not interpose. The Gemara continues: Nevertheless, it is difficult: Why do the Rabbis require wrapping a reed around God’s name?
  Rather, Rava bar Rav Sheila said that this is the reasoning of the Rabbis: They hold that it is prohibited for a person to stand before the name of God while naked, and therefore there must be a barrier between one’s naked body and the name. The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that Rabbi Yosei holds that it is permitted to stand before the name while naked? The Gemara answers: No, he does not allow doing so; however, he does not require that the name be covered with a reed. It is sufficient for one to place his hand over the name.
  The Gemara asks: If so, according to the Rabbis it should also be sufficient for one to place his hand over it. The Gemara explains: The Rabbis are concerned because sometimes one will forget and remove his hand. The Gemara asks: Shouldn’t Rabbi Yosei also be concerned because sometimes one will forget and remove his hand? Rather, if there is a reed available, Rabbi Yosei indeed concedes that one covers God’s name with it. However, with what situation are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case in which one would have to seek a reed. In that case, the Rabbis hold
  
  Daf 121a
  
  that performing immersion at its designated time is not a mitzva, and we seek a reed to wrap around God’s name even if it means postponing immersion to the next day, and Rabbi Yosei holds that immersion at its designated time is a mitzva, and therefore we do not seek a reed, since immersion cannot be postponed.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that immersion at its designated time is a mitzva? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a <i>zav</i> and a <i>zava</i>, a male and female leper, one who has relations with a menstruating woman, and a person impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, their immersion is during the day. They immerse at the designated time even on Yom Kippur, when bathing is prohibited. A menstruating woman and a woman after childbirth immerse at night. A man who has had a seminal emission immerses at any point during the entire day after the emission. Rabbi Yosei says: From the time that he recited the afternoon prayer and on he does not immerse. Since he already recited the afternoon prayer, he waits until after Yom Kippur to immerse, and then recites the evening prayer in a state of purity. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei holds that immersion at the designated time is not a mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: In that <i>baraita</i> the reference is not to the Rabbi Yosei most commonly cited in tannaitic literature without a patronymic, Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta, but it is to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Her latest immersion is sufficient. A woman who is uncertain with regard to the correct time for her immersion need not immerse multiple times. She may postpone her immersion until a time when she will be certain to fulfill her obligation, even though it might not be immersion at the designated time.
  MISHNA: If a gentile comes to extinguish a Jew’s fire on Shabbat, one may not say to him: Extinguish, and: Do not extinguish, because responsibility for his rest is not incumbent upon the Jew. However, if a Jewish child comes to extinguish a fire on Shabbat, they do not listen to him and allow him to extinguish it, even though he is not yet obligated in mitzva observance, because responsibility for his rest is incumbent upon the Jew.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Ami said: During a fire, the Sages permitted to say in the presence of gentiles: Anyone who extinguishes the fire will not lose, so that the gentiles will come and extinguish the fire; it is only prohibited to tell gentiles to do so explicitly. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna supports his statement: If a gentile comes to extinguish a Jew’s fire on Shabbat, one may not say to him: Extinguish, and: Do not extinguish, because responsibility for his rest is not incumbent upon the Jew. It can be inferred from the language of the mishna: It is a direct command, e.g., extinguish, that we may not say to him; however, anyone who extinguishes will not lose, we may tell him, which supports Rabbi Ami’s statement. The Gemara rejects this. Say the latter clause of the mishna: Do not extinguish, we do not tell him. It can be inferred that neither do we say to him: Anyone who extinguishes will not lose. Rather, nothing can be inferred from this mishna.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident that a fire ignited on Shabbat in the courtyard of Yosef ben Simai in a place called Shiḥin. And men came from the fortress [<i>gistera</i>] of Tzippori to extinguish the fire, because he was a steward [<i>apotropos</i>] of the king and they wanted to help him. However, Yosef ben Simai would not allow them to extinguish the fire in deference to Shabbat; and a miracle transpired for him and rain fell and extinguished the fire. That evening after Shabbat he sent two <i>sela</i> to each one of the soldiers who came to his aid, and fifty to their commander [<i>iparkhos</i>]. And when the Sages heard about this, they said: He need not have prevented them from extinguishing the fire, as we learned in the mishna: If a gentile comes to extinguish a Jew’s fire on Shabbat, one may not say to him: Extinguish, and: Do not extinguish, because responsibility for his rest is not incumbent upon the Jew; rather, the gentile may do as he pleases.
  We learned in the mishna: However, if a Jewish child comes to extinguish a fire on Shabbat, they do not listen to him and allow him to extinguish it, even though he is not yet obligated in mitzva observance, because responsibility for his rest is incumbent upon the Jew. The Gemara seeks to conclude: Learn from this that a child who eats meat from unslaughtered animals or violates other prohibitions, the court is commanded to prevent him from eating it. This mishna would resolve a dilemma that arose regarding that issue. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This mishna is referring to a child who is acting with the intention of fulfilling his father’s will, and therefore one is obligated to prevent him from doing so. However, if a child sins of his own volition, one is not obligated to prevent him from doing so. The Gemara asks: If so, the case with regard to a gentile in the mishna must be interpreted in a similar manner as referring to a case where he is acting with the intention to fulfill the will of a Jew. Is that permitted? It is prohibited to derive benefit from an action performed by a gentile for a Jew on Shabbat. The Gemara responds: This is not the case; the gentile is acting of his own volition. Because he is paid for extinguishing the fire he is not doing so in order to help the Jew.
  MISHNA: One may overturn a bowl on top of a lamp so that fire will not take hold in the ceiling beam on Shabbat. And similarly, one may overturn a bowl on top of a child’s feces inside the house so he will not touch it and dirty himself, and on top of a scorpion so that it will not bite. Rabbi Yehuda said: An incident came before Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in his village of Arav, where a person covered a scorpion on Shabbat, and Rabban Yoḥanan said: I am concerned that he is liable to bring a sin-offering because he might have violated a Torah prohibition.
  GEMARA: The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmeya bar Abba and Rav Ḥanan bar Rava happened to come to the house of Avin from a place called Nashikiya. For Rav Yehuda and Rav Yirmeya bar Abba,
  
  Daf 121b
  
  they brought beds for them to sit on, whereas for Rav Ḥanan bar Rava, they did not bring one for him. Rav Ḥanan was insulted and got angry at his host. He found Rabbi Avin teaching his son the mishna and saying: And one may place a bowl on top of the feces of a child due to the child so that he will not touch it and dirty himself. Rav Ḥanan said to him: Avin the fool is teaching his son folly; aren’t the feces themselves prepared as food for dogs? An object that is fit for consumption by a dog may be carried, so why need one cover the feces if he can remove them? And if you say these feces were not prepared for that use from yesterday, that would not prohibit moving them. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to rivers that flow and springs that gush, they do not have specific Shabbat boundaries, but they may be used anywhere and their boundaries are like the feet of all people who draw from them. Even though the water was not within the boundaries when Shabbat began, since the nature of flowing water is to move from place to place, it is as if they were prepared for this purpose. So too, here, since a child will relieve himself in any place, it is as if it was prepared from before Shabbat.
  Rabbi Avin asked: And how, then, should I teach it to him? Rav Ḥanan answered: Say, one may place a bowl on top of chicken feces due to a child.
  The Gemara asks: And derive that it is permitted to remove the feces because it is like a chamber pot of feces, which may be moved out of the room because it is disgusting. And if you say that a chamber pot of feces together with the vessel, yes, it may be moved; but feces itself, no, it may not be moved. What about that mouse that was found among the spices [<i>isperamaki</i>] of Rav Ashi, and he said to his servants: Take it by its tail and remove it? Apparently, a disgusting object may be moved even without a vessel. Rather, we must say that the feces were in the garbage dump, and since the feces were not before the household members it was only permitted to conceal them, not to move them. The Gemara asks: And what is a child doing in the garbage dump in the public domain? It is not adjacent to the house; how would the child get there? The Gemara answers that the feces were not in the garbage dump but were in the courtyard. The Gemara rejects this: In the courtyard, it is also considered a chamber pot of feces and may be moved. Rather, it is referring to a garbage dump that is in the courtyard, to which the child sometimes has access. Feces in a place designated for garbage are no more disgusting than their surroundings, and therefore it is prohibited to move the feces.
  And we also learned in the mishna that one may cover a scorpion with a bowl on Shabbat so that it will not bite. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: All harmful creatures are killed on Shabbat. Rav Yosef raised an objection to this from the following <i>baraita</i>: Five creatures may be killed even on Shabbat, and they are: The poisonous fly that is in the land of Egypt, and the hornet that is in Ninveh, and the scorpion that is in Ḥadyab, and the snake that is in Eretz Yisrael, and a mad dog in any place. The Gemara clarifies this: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? If you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say that one is liable for a prohibited labor that is not needed for its own sake, and it is therefore prohibited to kill even these creatures? Rather, is it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and these are those creatures that it is permitted to kill; others, no, it is not permitted to kill?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: And who will say to us that this <i>baraita</i> is accurate? Perhaps it is corrupted, and an objection cannot be raised from it. Rav Yosef said: I taught the <i>baraita</i> and raised an objection from it, and I will answer it as follows: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi permitted killing all harmful creatures on Shabbat when they are running after him; as in that case the danger is real, and therefore it is permitted to kill them according to all opinions.
  The <i>tanna</i> who recited tannaitic literature before Rava bar Rav Huna taught a <i>baraita</i>: One who kills snakes and scorpions on Shabbat, the spirit of the pious is not pleased with him. Rava bar Rav Huna said to him: And with regard to those pious, the spirit of the Sages is not pleased with them, as snakes and scorpions harm people. The Gemara comments: And this statement disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, for Rav Huna saw a person killing a hornet on Shabbat and said to him: Have you finished killing all the hornets? This indicates that he was not pleased with him.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who snakes and scorpions happened before him, if he killed them, it is clear that they happened before him in order for him to kill them. If he did not kill them it is clear that they happened before him in order for them to kill him, but a miracle from heaven transpired for him and he was saved. Ulla said, and some say it was Rabba bar bar Ḥana who said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is referring to when they were touching and brushing up against him (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), as in that case if they cause him no harm, it is surely a miracle that saved him.
  Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: One time, a snake fell into the study hall on Shabbat, and a Nabatean [<i>Nivati</i>] stood and killed it. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: One of its type killed it.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: One of its type killed it, did he mean that he acted properly or not? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was related about Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and Rabbi Zeira, who were sitting in the courtyard of Rabbi Yannai’s house. A matter emerged from among them, and they raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: What is the ruling with regard to killing snakes and scorpions on Shabbat? He said to them: I would kill a hornet, all the more so would I kill a snake or a scorpion, as they are more dangerous and it is permitted to kill them. The Gemara rejects this: There is no conclusive proof from this, as perhaps it is only permitted when one steps on it innocently as he is walking, so that it does not appear to others that he intended to step on it. As Rav Yehuda said: With regard to spittle on Shabbat, one may trample it innocently and need not be concerned about the prohibitions of smoothing or leveling holes. And Rav Sheshet said: With regard to a snake, one may trample it innocently. And Rav Ketina said: With regard to a scorpion, one may trample it innocently.
  The Gemara relates: Abba bar Marta, who is Abba bar Manyomi, owed money to members of the Exilarch’s household. They brought him to the house of the Exilarch on Shabbat and they tormented him to force him to pay. There was spittle there. The Exilarch said to the members of his household: Bring me a vessel and place it over the spittle so that people will not step on it. Abba bar Manyomi said to them: You need not do so, as Rav Yehuda said as follows: With regard to spittle, one may trample it innocently. The Exilarch said to the members of his household: He is a Torah scholar, leave him alone.
  Apropos Rabbi Abba bar Kahana, the Gemara cites additional statements of his. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: With regard to the candlesticks of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat. It was not clear what the nature of these candlesticks was, and Rabbi Zeira said to him: Is this referring to candlesticks that are small, which are moved with one hand, or even to those that are moved with two hands?
  
  Daf 122a
  
  Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said to him: They are like those from your father’s house, which are large (<i>Tosafot</i>).
  And Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The sedan chairs of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi may be moved on Shabbat. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abba bar Kahana: Are you referring to sedan chairs that can be moved by one person or those that can be only moved by two people? He said to him: They are like those from your father’s house.
  And Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: Rabbi Ḥanina permitted the members of the household of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to drink wine transported in a gentile’s wagons even though the wine was sealed only with one seal. He was not concerned that perhaps the gentile may have opened the barrel and poured wine libations to idolatry from it or touched it, which would prohibit drinking it. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana adds: And I do not know if that is because Rabbi Ḥanina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who permits drinking wine from a gentile that was protected by a single seal, or if it was because the gentile would not dare to open these specific casks due fear of the household of the <i>Nasi</i>, but in general Rabbi Ḥanina prohibited drinking wine protected by a single seal.
  MISHNA: If a gentile kindled a lamp on Shabbat for his own purposes, a Jew also uses its light; and if the gentile kindled it for a Jew, the Sages prohibited to utilize its light. Similarly, if a gentile drew water from a well in the public domain to give his animal to drink, a Jew gives his own animal to drink after him from the same water; and if he drew the water initially for the benefit of a Jew, it is prohibited for a Jew to give his animal to drink from that water. Similarly, if a gentile made a ramp on Shabbat to disembark from a ship, a Jew disembarks after him; and if he made the ramp for a Jew, it is prohibited. There was an incident in which Rabban Gamliel and the Elders were traveling on a ship and a gentile made a ramp on Shabbat in order to disembark from the ship on it; and Rabban Gamliel and the Elders disembarked on it as well.
  GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> in all these cases. As, had it taught us only the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a lamp, I would have said that this is the <i>halakha</i> because the light of a lamp for one is the light of a lamp for one hundred people. There is no need to kindle multiple lamps for multiple people; the light of one candle suffices for many. Therefore, it is permitted to use the light of a lamp kindled by a gentile. However, with regard to water, there is room to issue a decree against benefitting from the gentile’s efforts, lest one come to increase the amount of water he draws for a Jew, even without stating that intention. The Gemara asks: And why do I need the mishna to mention that it is permitted to use the ramp? The Gemara answers: It taught us the case of the ramp to cite the incident involving Rabban Gamliel and the Elders to indicate that they followed this ruling in practice.
  The Sages taught: If a gentile collected grass on Shabbat for himself, in order to feed his animal, a Jew may feed his own animal after him, and if he collected it for the benefit of a Jew, it is prohibited. If he drew water to give his animal to drink, a Jew may give water to his own animal to drink after him, and if he drew it for the benefit of a Jew it is prohibited. In what case is this statement, that if the gentile acted for himself it is permitted for a Jew to benefit, said? When the gentile does not know him; however, if the gentile knows him, it is prohibited, as in that case, he certainly intended to benefit his Jewish acquaintance as well.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Huna say that Rabbi Ḥanina said: One may position his animal over grass on Shabbat, even grass that is growing in the ground, and there is no concern lest he detach the grass and feed the animal; however, he may not position the animal over an item that is set aside on Shabbat, since there is concern lest one lift the item with his hand. The grass that the gentile collects for himself is certainly set aside, so why may the Jew feed it to his animal? The Gemara answers: Indeed, a Jew may not position his animal over the grass that a gentile picked; he may only position it in before the grass at a distance, and the animal goes on its own and eats.
  We learned above that the Master said: In what case is this statement, that if the gentile acted for himself it is permitted for a Jew to benefit, said? When the gentile does not know him; however, if the gentile knows him, it is prohibited. The Gemara asks: However, in the incident involving Rabban Gamliel and the ship, it is a case where the gentile knows him as they traveled together on the ship. Abaye said: The action was not performed in Rabban Gamliel’s presence, and since the gentile had not seen him he intended to make it only for himself. Rava said: Even if you say that the gentile made the ramp in his presence, that is irrelevant because a lamp for one is a lamp for one hundred; similarly, with regard to a ramp, once the gentile constructs it for his own use it can be used by others with no further adjustments.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s statement based on the <i>Tosefta</i>: Rabban Gamliel said to them: Since he made it not in our presence, we will disembark on it. Rabban Gamliel made use of the ramp only for this reason, contrary to Rava’s explanation. The Gemara rejects this: Say the <i>Tosefta</i> in an emended form: Rabban Gamliel said to them: Since he made it, we will disembark on it.
  Come and hear proof from another <i>baraita</i> with regard to the dispute between Abaye and Rava: With regard to a city where both Jews and gentiles live and there was a bathhouse in it in which there is bathing on Shabbat, if the majority of the city’s residents are gentiles, it is permitted to bathe in the bathhouse immediately after Shabbat because the bathhouse was heated on Shabbat to serve the gentiles. However, if there is a majority of Jews in the city, one waits after Shabbat for a period of time sufficient for them to heat the hot water so as not to benefit from prohibited labor performed on Shabbat. Apparently, even when an action is not performed in the presence of a Jew, there is concern that it may have been performed for the benefit of Jews. The Gemara rejects this proof: There, in the case of the <i>baraita</i>, when they heat the water, they heat it with the majority of the city’s inhabitants in mind, and the owner of the bathhouse sets the heating schedule to service the majority.
  Come and hear a proof from the following <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a lamp kindled at a banquet in which several people are participating, if the majority of those present are gentiles it is permitted for a Jew to utilize its light, and if the majority of those present are Jews it is prohibited, as in that case, the lamp was certainly lit for the Jews’ benefit. If those present are half Jews and half gentiles, it is prohibited. Since they are participating in the same banquet, the gentile certainly knows the Jew. Why, then, is it permitted for a Jew to utilize the light of the lamp even when the majority of those present are gentiles? The Gemara rejects this proof: There, too, when they kindle the lamp,
  
  Daf 122b
  
  they kindle it with the majority of the those present at the banquet in mind. When the majority of those present are gentiles, it is permitted.
  The Gemara relates that Shmuel happened to come to the house of Avin Toran. A certain gentile came and kindled a lamp. Shmuel turned his face back away from the lamp in order to avoid benefitting from the light. When Shmuel saw that the gentile brought a document and was reading it, he said: He kindled it with his own benefit in mind. He turned his face back toward the lamp.
  
  MISHNA: All vessels may be moved on Shabbat, and their doors, which are part of these vessels, along with them, even if they were dismantled on Shabbat, as the doors of these vessels are unlike the doors of the house. It is prohibited to make use of the doors of a house on Shabbat, even if they were removed from the entrance, because they are not prepared from before Shabbat.
  Likewise a person may move a mallet, which is generally used for labor prohibited on Shabbat, to crack nuts with it. Likewise, one may move an axe, a tool generally used to chop wood, to cut a cake of figs with it. So too, one may move a saw to cut cheese with it. Similarly, one may move a spade to scoop dried figs with it.
  One may also move a winnowing shovel and a pitchfork, both of which are designated for use with crops in a barn, to place food on it for a child. One is likewise permitted to take a reed or a shuttle from a spindle, ordinarily used for weaving, in order to insert it into food like a fork. One is permitted to move an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it, and one may move a sack maker’s needle to open the door with it.
  GEMARA: The mishna states: All vessels may be moved, and even if they were dismantled on Shabbat. Should we learn from here that there is only a question with regard to vessels which were dismantled on Shabbat, and that there is no need to mention vessels detached during the week, as it is certainly permitted to carry them on Shabbat?
  On the contrary, if they were dismantled on Shabbat it can be said that the parts of the vessel were prepared for use at the onset of Shabbat, due to their being attached to their original vessels from which they were removed. However, if they were detached during the week, at the onset of Shabbat they would not have been prepared for use, due to their being detached from their original vessels from which they were removed.
  Abaye said that this is what the mishna is saying: All vessels may be moved on Shabbat along with their doors. And even if they came apart during the week, they may be moved on Shabbat.
  The Sages taught: With regard to the door of a chest, or of a box, or of a closet, one may remove them from their hinges on Shabbat, but he may not restore them to their original places. And with regard to the door of a chicken coop, one may neither move it nor restore it to its place.
  Granted, in the case of a chicken coop the <i>tanna</i> holds: Since the coop is attached to the ground, there is a prohibition against building on the ground and there is a prohibition against dismantling on the ground. Consequently, when one dismantles or restores the door he has performed the prohibited labor of building. However, in the case of the door of a chest, or a box, or a closet, what does he hold?
  If the tanna holds that there is a prohibition against building with regard to vessels, then there is also a prohibition against dismantling with regard to vessels and it should be prohibited to remove the door. And if there is no prohibition against dismantling with regard to vessels and it is permitted to remove the door, then there should also be no prohibition against building with regard to vessels. Why, then, is it prohibited to restore a door to its original place?
  Abaye said: Actually, he holds that there is a prohibition against building with regard to vessels and there is also a prohibition against dismantling with regard to vessels. To resolve the difficulty, emend the text. Rather than saying: One may remove them, it is saying: The doors of a chest, or a box, or a closet that were already removed may not be restored.
  Rava said to him: There are two possible responses with which your statement can be rejected. One is that it is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: One may remove them, <i>ab initio</i>. And furthermore, what is the meaning of: But one may not restore them? According to your emendation, what is the meaning of the word, but, in this context? Rather, Rava said: The <i>tanna</i> holds that there is no prohibition against building with regard to vessels and there is no prohibition against dismantling with regard to vessels, and so why did the <i>tanna</i> rule one may not restore the door? It is due to a decree lest one fix it firmly in place in the manner of a full-fledged prohibited labor, completing the production process of a vessel.
  The mishna states: A person may take a mallet on Shabbat in order to crack nuts with it. Rav Yehuda said: The type of hammer in this case is a hammer designated for nuts to crack nuts with it, but blacksmiths’ hammers, no, they may not be used.
  That <i>tanna</i> holds that using an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, even for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action, is prohibited.
  Rabba said to him: But if what you say is so, how do you reconcile this with the latter clause of the mishna in which it is taught: And a winnowing shovel or a pitchfork in order to place food for a child on it; are a winnowing shovel and a pitchfork designated for use by a child? Rather, Rabba said: The mishna should be interpreted as follows: One may use a blacksmiths’ hammer on Shabbat to crack nuts with it.
  The <i>tanna</i> holds:
  
  Daf 123a
  
  Using an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action, is permitted.
  Abaye raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from the <i>Tosefta</i>: A mortar, if it still has garlic in it, one may move it on Shabbat, and if not, one may not move it. Apparently, under no circumstances may a mortar be used, even for an action that is generally permitted on Shabbat, because the mortar’s primary function is prohibited.
  Rabba said to him: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who says: A vessel may not be moved on Shabbat except for the purpose of its designated use.
  Abaye raised another objection to Rabba’s opinion. We learned in a mishna that Beit Shammai say: One may not take a large pestle from a mortar, which is typically used for a prohibited action, in order to cut meat on it for the purpose of a Festival. And Beit Hillel permit doing so due to the mitzva of rejoicing on the Festival. And everyone agrees that if one cut meat on it for the purpose of the Festival, that it is then prohibited to move it because there is no further need for it on the Festival. Apparently, it is prohibited to use an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, even to perform a permitted action.
  Initially, Rabba thought to respond to Abaye’s objection by saying that this mishna, too, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, that a vessel may only be moved on Shabbat for the purpose of its designated use. However, he changed his mind once he heard that which Rav Ḥinana bar Shelemya said in the name of Rav: Everyone agrees in the case of launderers’ pins, presses, and clothing rods (<i>Arukh</i>), that since one is particular about them to ensure that they remain intact, he designates a place for them and does not move them for other purposes. Therefore, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to move them. Here, too, the mortar and pestle are specifically designated for a particular use and one designates a place for them; therefore, it is prohibited to move them.
  It was stated that there was another amoraic dispute on this topic. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It was with regard to the hammer of goldsmiths that we learned it may be used to crack nuts. Although the goldsmith is particular about ensuring that the hammer remains smooth and avoids using it for any purpose other than its particular use, nevertheless, it was allowed to be used for other permitted actions. Rav Shemen bar Abba said: It was with regard to the hammer of spice merchants that we learned it may be used to crack nuts.
  The Gemara explains: The one who said it is permitted to crack nuts on Shabbat using the hammer of spice merchants, all the more so that it is permitted to use a hammer typically used by goldsmiths. However, the one who said that it is only permitted to use a hammer used by goldsmiths, but with regard to the hammer of spice merchants, the merchant is particular about it and would not allow it to be used for cracking nuts. Use for other purposes would cause the hammer to absorb foreign smells, which would ruin the spices.
  And we learned in the mishna: one may move a reed or a shuttle [<i>karkar</i>] in order to stick it into food. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an unripe fig that one buried in straw to accelerate its ripening, and likewise with regard to a cake that one buried in coals in order to heat it, if part of it is exposed, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. And if not, and it was completely covered, it is prohibited to move it lest one come to carry straw or coals, which are set-aside, along with it. It is prohibited for one to move set-aside objects or to cause them to be moved.
  Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai says: One may insert a reed or a shuttle into an unripe fig or a cake that is buried in coals to remove it from its place, and the straw and the coals are shaken off on their own. Rav Naḥman says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Tadai.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rav Naḥman holds: Moving an object in an atypical manner is not considered to be a bona fide act of moving and is permitted on Shabbat? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say: This radish that was buried in the dirt to protect it, if it was inserted from the top to bottom, i.e., the wider part of the radish is closer to the surface and the narrower part is farther, it is permitted to remove it from the dirt. If it was inserted from bottom to top, and the wider part was farther from the surface, it is prohibited because he thereby moves the dirt. Apparently, Rav Naḥman prohibits moving set-aside items even if one does so in an atypical manner. The Gemara answers: Rav Naḥman reversed his opinion with regard to that <i>halakha</i> of the radish.
  We learned in the mishna: One is permitted to take an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it. Rava, son of Rabba, sent the following question to Rav Yosef: Let our teacher teach us: With regard to a needle whose eye or point was removed, what is its legal status, i.e., is moving it on Shabbat permitted?
  Rav Yosef said to him: You already learned the answer to that question in the mishna: One is permitted to take an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it. And what does the thorn that is stuck in his flesh care whether the needle has an eye or whether it does not have an eye? Since the needle is suited for that purpose, it is permitted to move it.
  Rava, son of Rabba, raised an objection to Rav Yosef from that which we learned in a mishna: A ritually impure needle whose eye or point was removed becomes ritually pure, because its status as a vessel is negated. Since it is no longer considered a vessel, why would it be permitted to move it?
  Abaye said: Are you raising a contradiction from the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat? With regard to ritual impurity, we require a functional utensil for it to become ritually impure or to retain impurity, and anything which is not functional is ritually pure. However, with regard to Shabbat we require something that is fit for use, and this too is fit to extract a thorn with it, and therefore, its legal status is that of a utensil and moving it is permitted.
  Rava said: The one who raises the objection, raises the objection well. From the fact that with regard to ritual impurity it is not considered a utensil, with regard to Shabbat, it is also not considered a utensil, and if it is not a utensil it may not be moved on Shabbat.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rava based on what was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A needle, whether it is perforated or whether it is not perforated, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. And they said that the status of a perforated needle is different only with regard to ritual impurity alone.
  Abaye interpreted it according to the opinion of Rava: In this mishna, we are dealing with unfinished needles. Sometimes one decides to render them a utensil for other purposes without perforating them. However, in a case where its eye or its point was removed from the finished needle, its status as a vessel was negated, since a person throws it among the junk [<i>gerutaot</i>].
  With regard to the matter of aligning the limbs of an infant on Shabbat when it is necessary to do so, Rav Naḥman prohibits doing so on Shabbat, due to concern that it is similar to the prohibited labor of completing the production process of a vessel, and Rav Sheshet permits doing so. Rav Naḥman says: From where do I say that this is the <i>halakha</i>? As we learned in a mishna: One may not make
  
  Daf 123b
  
  <i>afiktoizin</i>, a drug to induce vomiting, on Shabbat. Apparently, actions associated with treating the body on Shabbat are prohibited. And Rav Sheshet explains: There, with regard to a drug to induce vomiting, drinking it for any reason other than medicinal purposes is atypical. Here, aligning the limbs of an infant is typical conduct not undertaken solely for medicinal purposes.
  Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say that this is the <i>halakha</i>? As we learned in the mishna: One is permitted to take an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it. Apparently, some curative actions are permitted and there is no concern that they are similar to completing the production process of a vessel. And Rav Naḥman objects: That is no proof, as there, the thorn is merely deposited in the skin and it is not an organic part of the body. Removing a foreign object from the body effects no fundamental change in the body. Here, in the case of aligning the limbs, it is not merely tending to a foreign object deposited in the body; rather it involves effecting a fundamental change in the body itself, which is both a curative act and one similar to completing the production process.
  MISHNA: A reed that is used for turning olives in a bundle, if there is a cork-like knot at the top of it, it can become ritually impure as a vessel, and if not, it cannot become ritually impure, because it is not a vessel. In either case, it may be moved on Shabbat for use in a permitted action.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why would this reed become impure? It is in the category of flat wooden vessels without a receptacle, and the governing principle in that case is: Flat wooden vessels do not become ritually impure. What is the reason for this? We require an object similar to a sack. The <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity are derived from the sack mentioned in the Torah as an example of an item that can become ritually impure. If it lacks a receptacle, it is unlike that sack and it cannot become ritually impure. To explain this <i>halakha</i>, the Gemara cites that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya: At the time that one turns over the olives with the reed, he turns over the reed and sees inside it. There is a small cavity at the end of the reed near the knot. He looks there to ascertain whether it has filled with oil, which would indicate that the olives are ready to be placed in the olive press. That cavity is a type of small receptacle, which renders the reed fit to become ritually impure.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yosei says: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the blade of a plow. Since they must be sharp and ready for use and there is concern that they might be damaged, one sets them aside from his consciousness and they may not be used for any other purpose.
  GEMARA: Rav Naḥman says: A launderer’s sprinkler is considered to be like the blade of a plow. Moving it is prohibited on Shabbat because one sets it aside from use out of concern that it might be damaged.
  Abaye says: A shoemaker’s knife, and a butcher’s knife, and a carpenter’s drawknife are considered to be like the blade of a plow, because their owners set them aside from use out of concern that they might be damaged.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Initially, they would say that only three utensils may be moved on Shabbat: A knife for cutting a cake of dried figs, and a combined spoon and fork (<i>ge’onim</i>) to clean the filth [<i>zuhama listeran</i>] of a pot, and a small knife that is on the table. Each of these items is required for eating and may be used, and it had been prohibited to move any other utensil. However, over the generations, when the Rabbis saw that Jewish people were vigilant in observing the prohibitions of Shabbat, they permitted, and then they permitted again, and then they permitted again, until they said in the last mishna: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the blade of a plow.
  The Gemara asks: What are the stages described in the <i>Tosefta</i>: They permitted, and then they permitted, and then they permitted?
  Abaye says: Initially, they permitted moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action. And then they permitted moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, for the purpose of sitting in or utilizing its place. And then they permitted moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action, yes; however, for the purpose of utilizing its place, no. And still, utensils that can be held in one of his hands, yes, they may be moved; however, utensils that can only be held in his two hands, no, they may not be moved, in order to signify that there is a prohibition to move certain items. This prohibition remained intact until they said: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat, and even those that can only be held in both hands.
  Rava said to him: After all, it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: They permitted, what difference is there to me if it is for the purpose of utilizing the object itself, and what difference is there to me if it is for the purpose of utilizing its place; why introduce distinctions that are not explicitly stated in the <i>Tosefta</i>? Rather, Rava said that it should be explained as follows: Initially, they permitted moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, both for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of sitting in or utilizing its place. And then they permitted moving that object from the sun into the shade. And then they permitted moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, both for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of sitting in or utilizing its place, yes; however, moving that object from the sun into the shade, no, they did not permit it. And still, utensils that can be carried by one person, yes, they may be moved; however, utensils that can only be carried by two people, no, they may not be moved. This prohibition remained intact until they said: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat, and even those that can only be carried by two people.
  Abaye raised a challenge to Rava’s opinion from that which was taught: With regard to a mortar, if it has garlic in it, one may move it on Shabbat, and if not, one may not move it on Shabbat. According to Rava’s opinion that all utensils may be moved, why is it prohibited to move the mortar? Rava responded: With what we are dealing here? We are dealing with a case of moving the mortar from the sun to the shade. Abaye raised a challenge to Rava’s opinion from that which was taught: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that if one cut meat on it for the purpose of a Festival that it is then prohibited to move it because there is no further need for it on the Festival. According to Rava’s opinion, all utensils may be moved. He answered him: Here, too, we are dealing with a case of moving the mortar from the sun to the shade.
  Rabbi Ḥanina said: This mishna was taught in the days of Nehemiah, son of Hacaliah, a period when many stringent decrees were issued with regard to Shabbat prohibitions, as it is written: “In those days I saw in Judea some treading winepresses on Shabbat and bringing in heaps of grain and lading donkeys with them; as also wine, grapes, figs, and all manner of burdens which are brought into Jerusalem on the Shabbat day. I forewarned them on that day when they sold food” (Nehemiah 13:15). Since the people treated the sanctity of Shabbat with disdain, Nehemiah instituted many stringencies with regard to all the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat in order to educate the people to observe Shabbat.
  Rabbi Elazar said: The <i>mishnayot</i> that deal with the topics of rods, poles, the thick end [<i>gelostera</i>] of the bolt in a door lock, and a mortar were all taught before permission to move utensils on Shabbat was adopted. At that time, moving most utensils was still prohibited and only a small number of utensils whose primary function was for a permitted use were permitted to be moved. The Gemara cites the relevant <i>mishnayot</i>.
  Rods: Golden rods were placed between the loaves of showbread in the Temple to support the loaves and to aerate them. At that time, moving the rods was prohibited because they were considered to be set-aside, as we learned in a mishna: Neither arranging the rods nor moving them overrides the prohibition of set-aside on Shabbat.
  And the source for the matter of poles is as we learned in a mishna: There were thin, smooth poles in the Temple, and every Passover eve one places the pole on his shoulder and on the shoulder of another, and suspends the Paschal lamb on it and flays its hide. And Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to the fourteenth of Nisan, the day that the Paschal lamb is sacrificed, that occurred on Shabbat, they would not use the poles, as a conspicuous reminder that it was Shabbat. Instead, one places
  
  Daf 124a
  
  his hand on the shoulder of another, and the other’s hand on his shoulder, and suspends the lamb and flays its hide.
  The source for the thick end of a bolt is as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a bolt used in a door lock which has a thick end at the head of the bolt, Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may drag it from this doorway and hang it in another doorway on Shabbat, but he may not move it with his hands, because it was considered to be set-aside. Rabbi Tarfon says: It is like all the other utensils and may be moved in a courtyard.
  The case of a mortar is that which we said above. Rabba said: From what does that conclusion ensue? Perhaps, actually I could say to you that these <i>mishnayot</i> were taught after permission to move utensils on Shabbat was adopted, and nevertheless, the prohibitions can be understood. With regard to the rods for the showbread, what is the reason that they are used? They are used due to concern that the bread will decay. In that brief period until the conclusion of Shabbat it will not decay. With regard to poles, why may they not be used on Passover eve? It is prohibited because it is possible to flay the lamb in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. Use of the pole is superfluous, and therefore it is set-aside.
  In the case of the thick end of the bolt in the door, why was it prohibited to move it by hand? It was prohibited in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yanai, as Rabbi Yanai says: We are dealing with a courtyard for which a joining of courtyards [<i>eiruv</i>] was not established. Rabbi Yehoshua holds that inside the doorway is considered to be like inside the house, and therefore, he is moving utensils of the houses in the courtyard. Since there is no joining of the courtyards, one may not move a vessel from the house to the courtyard. And Rabbi Tarfon holds that inside the doorway is considered to be like outside the house, and therefore, he is moving utensils of the courtyard in the courtyard, which is permitted.
  With regard to a mortar, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that a vessel may only be moved on Shabbat for the purpose of its designated use.
  MISHNA: All vessels may be moved for a specific purpose and not for a specific purpose. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Vessels may only be moved for a specific purpose.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: For a specific purpose, and what is the meaning of: Not for a specific purpose?
  Rabba said: For a specific purpose means: Moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use for the purpose of utilizing the object itself. Not for a specific purpose means: Moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use for the purpose of utilizing its place. And an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, for the purpose of utilizing the object itself, yes, it is permitted; for the purpose of utilizing its place, no, it is prohibited. And Rabbi Neḥemya came to say: And even an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, moving it for the purpose of utilizing the object itself, yes; for the purpose of utilizing its place, no. Rava said to him: Do you call for the purpose of utilizing its place, not for a specific purpose? It is for a purpose.
  Rather, Rava said: For a specific purpose means: Moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use both for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place. Not for a specific purpose means: Moving it even from the sun to the shade. And an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, both for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place, yes, it is permitted; moving it from the sun to the shade, no, it is prohibited. And Rabbi Neḥemya came to say: Even an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, moving it for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place, yes, it is permitted; moving it from the sun to the shade, no, it is prohibited.
  It is told that Rav Safra and Rav Aḥa bar Huna and Rav Huna bar Ḥanina sat together and they sat and they said: According to Rabba’s explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya that it is prohibited to move an object whose primary function is for a permitted use for the purpose of utilizing its place, these empty bowls, how do we carry them? Rav Safra said to them: You may move them, just as is the case of a chamber pot containing waste that may be moved because it is disgusting.
  Abaye said this same matter to Rabba: According to the Master’s explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, these empty bowls, how do we carry them? He said to him: Our colleague Rav Safra interpreted it: Just as is the case of a chamber pot.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s opinion from that which was taught: With regard to a mortar, if it has garlic in it, one may move it on Shabbat, and if not, one may not move it on Shabbat. According to Rava’s opinion that all utensils may be moved, why is it prohibited to move the mortar? Rava responded: With what we are dealing here? We are dealing with a case of moving the mortar from the sun to the shade, which Rava prohibited. Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s opinion from that which was taught: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that if one cut meat on it for the purpose of the Festival that it is then prohibited to move it because there is no further need for it on the Festival. According to Rava’s opinion, all utensils may be moved. He answered him: Here, too, we are dealing with a case of moving the mortar from the sun to the shade.
  And Abaye raised another objection with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: One may not prop a pot with a piece of wood, and so too, one may not prop a door on a piece of wood. Isn’t a piece of wood on a Festival an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, since it is permitted to move it to light an oven? Apparently, there is an opinion that moving an object whose primary function is for a permitted use, both for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place is prohibited, and according to Rabba, even Rabbi Neḥemya does not hold that this is so. Rava answers: There, what is the reason for the prohibition? It is because on Shabbat it is an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use. Since the wood is set aside from use on Shabbat, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting moving it on a Festival, due to Shabbat.
  And if you say: Moving the wood should be permitted on Shabbat itself because an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use is permitted both for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place, that assertion is rejected. This ruling, which permits moving an object whose primary use is prohibited, applies only in a case where the status of a vessel applies to it; in a case where the status of a vessel does not apply to it, no, it is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: And do we issue decrees prohibiting actions on Festivals due to the fact that they are prohibited on Shabbat? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One may drop fruits from the roof through a skylight on a Festival, but not on Shabbat. Apparently, the Sages do not prohibit on a Festival all of the actions that are prohibited on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks on the contrary: And do we not issue decrees on a Festival due to Shabbat? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: The only difference between a Festival and Shabbat is with regard to the preparation of food alone. In all other matters the Sages established that the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat and Festivals are the same.
  Rav Yosef says: This is not difficult. This mishna, which rules that it is prohibited, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer; that mishna, which rules that it is permitted, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is prohibited to slaughter a mother animal and its offspring on the same day, as it is stated: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28). With regard to it and its offspring that fell into a pit on a Festival, Rabbi Eliezer says: One may raise the first in order to slaughter it, and then slaughter it; and with regard to the second one, one may provide it sustenance in its place in the pit so that it will not die. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may raise the first in order to slaughter it, and then reconsider and not slaughter it, and then employ artifice and say that he reconsidered and wants to slaughter the other, and raise the second. If he so desires, he slaughters this one; if he so desires, he slaughters that one. Apparently, Rabbi Yehoshua permits certain actions on a Festival due to financial considerations, and does not issue decrees in those cases.
  The Gemara rejects this: From what does that conclusion ensue? Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer only stated that he may not raise the second animal there, in a case where it is possible to save the animal by feeding it in the pit; however, in a case where it is impossible to save it by feeding it in the pit, no, he would permit raising the animal.
  Alternatively, Rabbi Yehoshua only said that he may raise the second animal in a case where it is possible to employ artifice; however, in a case where it is not possible to employ artifice, no, he would not permit doing so.
  Rather Rav Pappa said: This is not difficult. This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, and that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. As we learned in a mishna that Beit Shammai say:
  
  Daf 124b
  
  One may neither carry a child nor a <i>lulav</i> nor a Torah scroll out to the public domain on a Festival, and Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Hillel permit carrying objects from one domain to another on a Festival for purposes other than preparing food.
  The Gemara rejects this: Say that you heard Beit Shammai prohibit carrying out an object from one domain to another; did you hear that they prohibited moving an object? The Gemara rejects that distinction: And isn’t the prohibition of moving itself a decree issued due to the prohibition of carrying out? One who prohibits carrying out certainly prohibits moving an object as well.
  The Gemara adds: And even Rav holds in accordance with this <i>halakha</i> of Rava, as Rav said: Moving a hoe so that it will not be stolen; that is an example of moving an object not for a specific purpose, and it is prohibited. The Gemara infers: The reason that it is prohibited is that it is moved so it will not be stolen; however, for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place, it is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Kahana happen to come to the house of Rav, and he said: Bring a net for Kahana so that he may sit on it? Is that not to say that with regard to an object whose primary function is prohibited, for the purpose of utilizing the object itself, yes, it is permitted to move it; and for the purpose of utilizing its place, no, it is prohibited?
  The Gemara answers that this is what he said to them: Remove the net from before Kahana. That is a case of moving for the purpose of utilizing its place. And if you wish, say instead: There, it was a case of moving the object from the sun to the shade, as it was in a place where it could have been damaged. One might have mistakenly concluded that this was the reason that they were moving the net. Rav specified that the net was being moved for the purpose of utilizing the object itself, not to indicate that moving it for the purpose of utilizing its place is prohibited, but to indicate that moving from the sun to the shade is prohibited.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Mari bar Raḥel, had felt cushions in the sun on Shabbat. Rav Mari came before Rava and said to him: What is the ruling with regard to carrying them? Rava said to him: It is permitted. Rav Mari said to Rava: I have others, and I do not need these cushions specifically. Rava said to him: Even so, these cushions are suitable for guests. Rav Mari said to him: I also have others for guests and therefore would be moving the cushions so that they would not be ruined in the sun. Rava said to him: You have revealed your opinion that you hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabba. For everyone else, it is permitted to move the cushions in this situation; however, for you, it is prohibited, as it is inappropriate to permit one to perform an action that he considers prohibited.
  Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: With regard to brooms made of fine wool garments, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat because it is permitted to use them. However, brooms made of date-palm fronds, no, they may not be moved. It is prohibited to fill holes in the ground.
  Rabbi Elazar says: It is permitted to move even those made of date-palm fronds. The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing? If you say that this is referring to moving it for the purpose of utilizing the object itself and for the purpose of utilizing its place, would Rav say a broom made of date-palm fronds, no, it may not be moved? Doesn’t Rav hold in accordance with the opinion of Rava? Rather, this is referring to moving the broom from the sun to the shade, and that these brooms are in a place where they can be damaged. However, it is still puzzling: In this case, would Rabbi Elazar say that even brooms made from date-palm fronds may be moved? The Gemara answers: Actually, this is referring to moving them from the sun, where they will be damaged, to the shade. Emend this and say: And so too, Rabbi Elazar said, like Rav, that it is prohibited.
  MISHNA: All vessels that may be moved on Shabbat, their shards may be moved along with them, as long as they are suited for some purpose.
  Shards of a large bowl may be used to cover the mouth of a barrel. Shards of a glass vessel may be used to cover the mouth of a cruse.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: As long as they are suited for a purpose similar to their original use. Shards of a large bowl must be suited to pour soup into them, and shards of a glass vessel must be suited to pour oil into them.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This dispute in the mishna is only with regard to a case where the vessels broke on Shabbat eve, as this Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that if they are suited for a purpose similar to their original use, yes, it is permitted, and for some other use, no, it is prohibited. And this Sage, the Rabbis, hold: Even if they are suited for some other use, it is also permitted.
  But if the vessels broke on Shabbat, everyone agrees they are permitted. The reason for this is since they were designated for Shabbat use and consequently considered prepared at the onset of Shabbat due to their original vessels, it is permitted to move the shards as well.
  Rav Zutrai raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One may kindle a fire on a Festival with whole vessels, but one may not kindle a fire with shards of vessels.
  The Gemara seeks to clarify: Vessels that were broken when? If you say that they were broken before the Festival, why is it prohibited to light a fire with them? They are pieces of ordinary wood. Isn’t this referring to a case where they broke on the Festival, and it is taught: One may kindle a fire on a Festival with whole vessels, but one may not kindle a fire with shards of vessels. The legal status of a vessel broken on a Festival, and all the more so one broken on Shabbat, is more stringent, not less.
  Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This dispute in the mishna is only with regard to a case where the vessels broke on Shabbat, as this Sage, the Rabbis, holds it was prepared before Shabbat as part of the original vessel, and this Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that it is an item that came into being on Shabbat. Since they were not shards before Shabbat, they are a new entity and are set-aside. However, if they were broken from before the onset of Shabbat everyone agrees that it is permitted to move them, since they were prepared to serve some function while it was still day, before the onset of Shabbat.
  With regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Festivals, it was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: One may kindle a fire with whole vessels, but one may not kindle a fire with shards of vessels. And it was taught in the other <i>baraita</i>: Just as one may kindle a fire with vessels, so too, one may kindle a fire with shards of vessels. And it was taught in yet another <i>baraita</i>: One may neither kindle a fire with vessels nor with shards of vessels.
  The Gemara resolves the apparent contradiction between the <i>baraitot</i>: This <i>baraita</i>, which distinguishes between vessels and broken vessels, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside on a Festival. That <i>baraita</i>, which permits kindling with both vessels and shards, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that there is no prohibition of set-aside on a Festival. This third <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits kindling with both vessels and shards, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who prohibits moving a vessel for any purpose other than its designated function.
  Rav Naḥman said: With regard to these bricks that remained from the building after construction was completed, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat, because they are suited for one to sit on them. And if one arranged them in a pile, he certainly thereby set them aside from his consciousness, and it is prohibited to move them.
  Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: With regard to a small earthenware shard, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat in the courtyard, because there are vessels there that need to be covered; but in a <i>karmelit</i>, no, one may not move it, because typically there are no vessels there and there would be no use for the shard. And Rav Naḥman himself said: Even in a <i>karmelit</i> it is permitted, but in the public domain, no, it is prohibited. And Rava said: Even in the public domain, it is permitted.
  And Rava follows his regular line of reasoning, as Rava was walking in the street of Meḥoza and his shoes became dirty with clay. His servant came, took a shard of earthenware from the street, and wiped the clay off. The Sages raised their voice at him to reprimand him. Rava said: Is it not enough for them that they did not learn, but they are also teaching others? If the shard was in a courtyard, wouldn’t it be suited to cover a vessel with it? Here too, the shard is also suited to me, and moving it should not be prohibited.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to the clay seal of a jug that was broken, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. That was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the clay seal that was broken, it is permitted to move it, and its shards are permitted to be carried on Shabbat. And one may not break a shard from it to cover a vessel with it or to support the legs of a bed with it. And if one threw it into the garbage dump, it is prohibited to move it because he set it aside from his consciousness.
  Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: If that is so, if one throws his cloak into the garbage dump, would you also say that it is prohibited to move it because it is set-aside? Isn’t the cloak still fit for use, and its status is not dependent on his intention? Rather, Rav Pappa said:Rav Mari bar Raḥel, had felt 
  
  Daf 125a
  
  If one threw the clay seal of a jug into the garbage dump while it is still day, before Shabbat, it is prohibited to move it on Shabbat because he indicated that he set it aside from use.
  Bar Hamduri said that Shmuel said: With regard to shreds of reeds that separated from a mat, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rava said: Bar Hamduri explained it to me: The mat itself, for what use is it suited? It is suited to cover dirt with it. These shreds, too, are suited to cover filth with them.
  Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said: With regard to the remains of cloaks [<i>perozemiyyot</i>], it is prohibited to move them on Shabbat. Abaye said: This is referring to small rags that do not have an area of three by three fingerbreadths, that are neither suited for use by the poor nor by the wealthy.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: The shards of an old oven may be moved in a courtyard on Shabbat like all of the vessels that may be moved in a courtyard on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: They may not be moved. Rabbi Yosei testified in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov about shards of an old oven that may be moved on Shabbat, and about its cover, which does not require a handle.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what do they disagree? Abaye said: It is with regard to shards when they serve some function but do not serve a function similar to their own original function that they disagree. And Rabbi Yehuda follows his own line of reasoning, and Rabbi Meir follows his own line of reasoning, as they differed in the mishna.
  Rava strongly objects to this: If so, instead of disagreeing with regard to shards of an oven, let them disagree with regard to ordinary shards. Why is the dispute specifically with regard to an oven?
  Rather, Rava said: It is with regard to shards of this particular oven that they disagree, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a clay oven that is not attached to the ground with mortar in the standard manner, but rather, one placed it over the mouth of a pit or over the mouth of a cistern, and he placed a stone there between the wall of the pit and the oven to secure the oven in place, Rabbi Yehuda says: If one heats the oven from beneath the oven, inside the pit, and the oven is thereby heated at the top, the oven serves its standard function; it is a full-fledged utensil and it can become ritually impure. And if it is not attached so tightly that it is heated at the top, it is ritually pure, because it is not a full-fledged vessel. And the Rabbis say: Since it can be heated in some manner, it can become ritually impure, because it serves its standard purpose.
  And with regard to what do they disagree? It is with regard to this verse: “And everything upon which any part of their carcass falls shall be impure; whether oven, or stove, it shall be broken in pieces; they are impure, and they shall be impure to you” (Leviticus 11:35). Rabbi Yehuda holds: An oven that lacks smashing, i.e., it is whole and can be broken, can become impure. One that does not lack smashing, but it is situated in a place where it is not completely effective, is considered broken and is pure, i.e., it cannot become ritually impure. And the Rabbis hold that the verse comes to add: “They shall be impure to you,” in any case, under any circumstances.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, too, isn’t it written: “They shall be broken into pieces,” and why don’t they interpret the verse in the same way that Rabbi Yehuda does? The Gemara explains: The Rabbis understand this verse from another direction, as it could have entered your mind to say: Since he attached it to the ground, its legal status is like that of the ground itself, and anything attached to the ground cannot become impure. Therefore, it teaches us that since it is possible to detach it from the ground, it is indeed impure.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehuda, too, isn’t it written: “They shall be impure to you”? The Gemara answers: He understood that verse in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis is specifically with regard to the first lighting. The first lighting transforms an earthenware oven that did not yet completely dry into a vessel. However, with regard to the second lighting they do not disagree, even if it was hanging around a camel’s neck; since it had already been fired up once, it is impure.
  Ulla says: And with regard to the first lighting according to the Rabbis, even if it was hanging around a camel’s neck, since it had already been fired up once it is a full-fledged oven and is impure.
  Rav Ashi strongly objects to this line of reasoning: If so, instead of disagreeing with regard to the shards of an oven, let them disagree with regard to the oven itself. Now the oven itself, according to Rabbi Yehuda, is not considered a vessel; therefore, to say that its broken pieces are not vessels, is it necessary?
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: Actually, it is as we said initially, that it is referring to shards of any oven, and with which he crafts a ceramic board [<i>tapka</i>], and Rabbi Meir is speaking in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda: According to my opinion, it is permitted to move even shards that serve any purpose. However, according to your opinion, agree with me at least that in a case of this sort, it is a function similar to their own original function. The shards can be used for baking.
  And Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not similar. There, in the case of an intact oven, its firing is from within. Here, with regard to the shard, its firing is from without. There, in the case of an intact oven, it bakes standing; here, it does not bake standing. Therefore, its function is not similar to its original function.
  In that same <i>Tosefta</i> where Rabbi Yosei testified in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov about shards of an old oven that may be moved on Shabbat, and about its cover, which does not require a handle, and which is considered a vessel and may be moved as is, Ravina says: In accordance with whose opinion do we now move the oven covers in the city of Meḥasya that do not have handles? In accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.
  MISHNA: A stone that is in a gourd used to draw water [<i>kiruya</i>], if they fill it with water and the stone does not fall, one may fill with it on Shabbat, and if not, and the stone does fall, one may not fill with it.
  
  Daf 125b
  
  With regard to a vine branch that is tied to a pitcher, one may fill water with it on Shabbat because the branch became part of the vessel.
  With regard to a window shutter, Rabbi Eliezer says: When it is tied to and hanging from the window, i.e., it is not touching the ground, one may shutter the window with it, because it is not considered building; and if not, i.e., it is touching the ground, one may not shutter the window with it. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case one may shutter with it.
  GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there: In the case of a stone that is atop a barrel and one wants to open the barrel, he tilts the barrel on its side and the stone falls. Rabba said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They only taught this in a case where one forgets the stone atop the barrel; however, in a case where one places the stone atop the barrel intentionally, the barrel becomes a base for a prohibited object, and it is therefore prohibited to move the barrel. And Rav Yosef said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They only taught this in a case where one forgets it; however, in a case where one places it there, the stone becomes a cover for the barrel and it is permitted to use it like other barrel covers.
  Rabba said: We raise an objection to our <i>halakha</i> from the mishna: With regard to a stone that is in a gourd used to draw water, if they fill it with water and the stone does not fall, one may fill with it on Shabbat. Apparently, if the stone is designated for a purpose, it is no longer set-aside. He rejects the proof: And that is not so, as these cases are not comparable. There, in the case of the stone in the gourd, since one attached it to the gourd, he rendered the stone a wall of the gourd and part of the vessel, unlike in the case of the stone atop the barrel.
  Rav Yosef said: And we raise an objection to our <i>halakha</i> from the mishna: And if not, and the stone does fall, one may not fill with it. A stone that is not attached is not considered to be part of the vessel and is therefore set-aside. He rejects the proof. And that is not so, as these cases are not comparable. There, since he did not attach the stone to the gourd, he negates its status as a part of the vessel and it remains set-aside.
  The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Rabba, holds that we require an action to change the status of a stone or another set-aside object into a vessel, and one Sage, Rav Yosef, holds that we do not require an action.
  And they, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, follow their regular line of reasoning, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Ḥanina said, and some say that it was Rabbi Zeira who said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went to one place and found a course of building stones, and he said to his students: Go out and think that you are designating these stones for Shabbat so that we may sit on them tomorrow on Shabbat, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not require them to perform an action with those stones. Thought alone was sufficient.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is not what happened. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi required them to perform an action to designate the stones. The Gemara asks: What action did he say to them to perform? Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: Go out and arrange the stones. Rabbi Asi said that he said to them: Go out and rub the mortar off of them. Rabbi Ami requires a more significant action to render the stones a vessel.
  It was stated that there was a dispute with regard to this matter. Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul said: It was a new stack of beams, not stones. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Shaul said: It was the sounding pole of a ship used to determine the depth of the water. The one who said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted sitting on a ship’s sounding pole, all the more so he permitted doing so in the case of beams. And with regard to the one who said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted sitting on a stack of beams, but in the case of the sounding pole he would prohibit doing so because it is set-aside due to monetary loss, as he is particular about it that it will not become warped and damaged.
  We learned in the mishna: With regard to a vine branch that is tied to a pitcher, one may fill water with it on Shabbat. The Gemara infers: If it is tied, yes, it is permitted; if it is not tied, no, it is prohibited. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to hard branches of a palm tree that one cut for firewood or for construction, and then he reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for sitting, he must tie the branches together on Shabbat eve so that they will not be set-aside. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He need not tie them together, and nevertheless, it is permitted to move them. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, cut wood need not be specially prepared to be used on Shabbat.
  Rav Sheshet says: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, with what are we dealing here? With a case where the shoot is still connected to its origin, the vine. The Gemara asks: If so, he is making use of an item that is attached to the ground, and the Sages issued a decree prohibiting the use of any plant attached to the ground. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a branch attached to the vine below three handbreadths off the ground. A vine attached to the ground below three handbreadths off the ground was not prohibited in that decree, just as it is permitted to make use of tree roots adjacent to the ground. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that it is referring to a branch that is detached, nevertheless, its use is prohibited due to the decree lest one cut and straighten the branch to prepare it for use with the bucket. Therefore, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teaches that there is no need for concern.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis dispute the case of a window shutter and in what manner one is permitted to shutter a window on Shabbat. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone agrees that one may not construct a temporary tent on a Festival for the first time, and needless to say, one may not do so on Shabbat. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree only with regard to adding to an existing tent, as Rabbi Eliezer says: One may not add to an existing structure on a Festival, and needless to say, one may not do so on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: One may add to a temporary structure on Shabbat, and needless to say, one may do so on a Festival.
  We learned in the mishna that the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case one may shutter with it. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Both in this case and in that case, in this context? Rabbi Abba said that Rav Kahana said:
  
  Daf 126a
  
  Both if it is tied and if it is not tied it is permitted, and that is only if it is prepared for this purpose beforehand.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abba: And let the Master say it in this way: Both if it is hanging and if it is not hanging, and that is only if it is tied, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Like the dispute here with regard to the window shutter, so too is the dispute with regard to a bolt that was dragged, which refers to a pole that was stuck through a hole in the door and into the ground in order to hold the door in place. As we learned in a mishna: With regard to a bolt that is dragged, which is not a part of the door itself but is attached to it and is dragged on the ground, one locks with it in the Temple on Shabbat, because the rabbinic decrees are not in effect in the Temple, but not in the rest of the country outside the Temple. And a bolt that is placed alongside the door and not attached, here, in the Temple, and there, outside the Temple, it is prohibited to lock with it on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: One that was placed is permitted in the Temple and one that is dragged is permitted even in the rest of the country.
  And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is a bolt that is dragged that one locks with it in the Temple but not in the rest of the country? Any bolt that is tied and hangs from the door and one of its edges reaches the ground. Rabbi Yehuda says: That is permitted even in the rest of the country. Rather, what is prohibited in the rest of the country? Any bolt that is neither tied nor hung, and one removes it from the door and places it in a corner.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba said in the name of Ulla: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught the <i>halakha</i> of a bolt that is dragged? The <i>tanna</i> is Rabbi Eliezer, whose opinion in this case is identical to his opinion in the mishna with regard to the window shutter. It is certainly referring to a shutter that is attached. If it is not attached, Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is prohibited for use even in the Temple.
  Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Yirmeya: It is I who say that this case is in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to a reed that the homeowner installed to open and lock the door with it like a bolt, when it is tied and hanging in the entrance, one may open and lock the door with it on Shabbat, and when it is not tied and hanging, one may not open and lock the door with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If it was prepared for that use, it is permitted to use it even if it is not tied. There is an opinion that holds that a bolt need not be attached, and preparation is sufficient to permit its use.
  Rav Yehuda bar Sheilat said that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> in this case is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this? Didn’t we learn in the mishna: All covers of vessels
  
  Daf 126b
  
  that have a handle may be moved on Shabbat. And Rav Yehuda bar Sheila said that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that is specifically when the status of a vessel applies to them, i.e., when the cover itself is suited for use as a vessel. This is contrary to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that preparation alone is sufficient.
  And if you say: Here, too, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is referring to a case where the status of a vessel applies to the reed, does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel require that the status of a vessel apply to it? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to hard branches of a palm tree that one cut for firewood or for construction and then he reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for sitting, he must tie the branches together on Shabbat eve so that they will not be set-aside. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He need not tie them together, and nevertheless, it is permitted to move them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel does not require that one render it a vessel. Thought is sufficient.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in one matter and disagrees with him in one matter.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak taught at the entrance of the house of the Exilarch: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the matter of a window shutter. Rav Amram raised an objection from that we learned explicitly in a mishna: And from their statements and their actions, we derived that one may seal a window, and measure, and tie a knot on Shabbat. Apparently, one may shutter the window under any circumstances, not only when the shutter was prepared for use, as Rabbi Eliezer said.
  Abaye said to Rav Amram: What is your opinion, that the proof is decisive because it was taught in the mishna unattributed and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? The mishna with regard to a bolt that is dragged is also an unattributed mishna. The <i>halakha</i> should be in accordance with that mishna as well. The Gemara concludes: And even so, an action is greater. Even though the two <i>mishnayot</i> are of equal weight, since one of them not only cites an unattributed opinion but also relates an incident where the Sages shuttered a window, that source is decisive.
  MISHNA: All covers of vessels that have a handle may be moved on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said? In the case of a cover for the ground, i.e., the cover of a pit; however, with regard to covers of vessels, both in this case and in that case, even if they do not have handles, they may be moved on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda bar Sheila said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And this applies specifically when the status of a vessel applies to them and they are suited for some use. The Gemara adds: Everyone holds that with regard to a cover for the ground, if it has a handle, yes, it is permitted to move it, and if not, no, it is prohibited to move it; with regard to a cover of a vessel, even if it does not have a handle, it is permitted to move it.
  When they disagree in the mishna, it is with regard to vessels that one attached to the ground. This Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that we issue a decree according to which it is prohibited to move the cover of a vessel attached to the ground due to the concern that one will move a cover for the ground itself, and that Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that we do not issue a decree.
  Another version of this statement: When they disagree in the mishna, it is with regard to the cover of an oven; this Sage likens it to a cover for the ground, and this Sage likens it to a cover of a vessel.
  
  MISHNA: On Shabbat, one may move even four or five baskets of straw and baskets of produce, due to the guests, who require that place to sit, and due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall, where space is required to seat the students. However, one may not move these items to create space in the storeroom.
  One may move ritually pure <i>teruma</i>, although it may only be eaten by a priest; and doubtfully tithed produce [<i>demai</i>], which may not be eaten until tithes are separated from it due to concern that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> did not separate its tithes; and first tithe whose <i>teruma</i> of the tithe has already been taken and given to priests; and second tithe and consecrated items that were redeemed; and even dry lupine, which is not fit for consumption by a person, because it is goat food.
  However, one may neither move untithed produce, nor first tithe whose <i>teruma</i> has not been taken, nor second tithe and consecrated items that were not redeemed, nor raw arum and raw mustard, as all of these items are not fit for consumption and are therefore set aside. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving in the case of arum because it is food for ravens.
  With regard to bundles of straw, and bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs, if one prepared them on Shabbat eve for animal food, one may move them. And if not, one may not move them.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Now that the mishna stated that one may move five baskets, is mentioning four baskets necessary?
  Rav Ḥisda said: The mishna means that one may move four out of five baskets, but not all of them. Some say: It is permitted to move four baskets from a small storeroom and five baskets from a large storeroom.
  The Gemara asks: And what then is the meaning of: However, one may not move these items to create space in the storeroom? It means that one may not use the storeroom for the first time. If he has never taken supplies from this storeroom, he may not begin moving baskets from it. And whose opinion is cited in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who is of the opinion that this constitutes a prohibition of set-aside. The contents of a storeroom that was never used are set-aside.
  And Shmuel says: The difficulty in the mishna should be explained as a figure of speech: Four and five,
  
  Daf 127a
  
  as people who are not so precise in their formulation say: Four or five. And if one so desires, he may clear even more. And what then is the meaning of: However, one may not move these items to create space in the storeroom? It means that one may not finish moving the baskets out of the entire storeroom, lest he come to level the floor by filling the holes. However, one may begin removing baskets from the storeroom. And whose opinion is cited in this mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not use the storeroom for the first time. If one has never taken supplies from this storeroom, he may not begin moving baskets from it. However, he makes a path in it, so that he will be able to enter and exit. The Gemara asks: He makes a path in it? Did you not say: One may not use the storeroom for the first time? The Gemara answers that the <i>baraita</i> is saying as follows: He makes a path in it by moving baskets with his feet, as he enters the storehouse and as he exits. He may not move the basket with his hand.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to piled grain, if one had started to take grain from the pile on Shabbat eve, it is permitted to satisfy his needs from it on Shabbat, and if not, it is prohibited to satisfy his needs from it on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Aḥa permits doing so in any case. The Gemara raises a difficulty: On the contrary; it is Rabbi Shimon who is lenient with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of set-aside. Rather, emend the <i>baraita</i> and say: This is the statement of Rabbi Aḥa. Rabbi Shimon permits doing so in any case.
  It was taught: How much is the measure of piled grain needed to confer the legal status of a storeroom? A half-kor. Rav Naḥumi bar Zekharya raised a dilemma before Abaye: The measure of piled grain, how much is it? Abaye said to him that they said: The measure of piled grain is a half-<i>kor</i>.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: These four or five baskets, which the <i>tanna</i> stated in the mishna, is he saying the following: Four or five baskets, yes, one may move them, more baskets, no, one may not move them? This would indicate that it is preferable to minimize the walking distance because fewer baskets results in less walking in and out of the storeroom. Or perhaps it is preferable to minimize the size of the burden by carrying smaller baskets, as long as the total measure of all that one carries does not exceed the capacity of five large baskets?
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma, as one <i>baraita</i> taught: One may move even four or five baskets containing jugs of oil and jugs of wine. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may move them even in ten and in fifteen baskets. What, is it not that the two <i>baraitot</i> disagree concerning the following matter, as this Sage in the first <i>baraita</i> holds that it is preferable to minimize the walking distance by moving fewer, heavier baskets, and this Sage in the second <i>baraita</i> holds that it is preferable to minimize the size of the burden by moving lighter baskets over the course of several trips.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, everyone agrees that it is preferable to minimize the walking distance. And do you hold that: In ten and in fifteen, is referring to baskets? It is referring to jugs, and there is no dispute between the <i>baraitot</i>. And this is not difficult: This <i>baraita</i>, which spoke of moving five, is referring to a case in which the jugs are taken one by one in each basket. And that <i>baraita</i>, which speaks of moving ten, is referring to a case in which the jugs are taken two by two in each basket. And that <i>baraita</i>, which speaks of moving fifteen, is referring to a case in which the jugs are taken three by three, e.g., in the case of the small jugs of Harpanya.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: These four or five baskets, which the <i>tanna</i> stated in the mishna, is he saying that one may move only four or five baskets even though he has many guests? Or perhaps, it is all according to the number of guests, and if there are more guests one may move more baskets. And if you say it is all according to the number of guests, does one man move the baskets to make room for all of them, or perhaps each and every man moves a basket to make room for himself?
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which Rabba said that Rav Ḥiyya said: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went to a certain place and saw that the place was too crowded for the students. And he went to the field and found a field full of bundles of grain, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi cleared the bundles from the whole field in its entirety. Conclude from it that the quantity that can be moved is all according to the number of guests.
  And Rav Yosef said that Rav Hoshaya said: Once Rabbi Ḥiyya went to a certain place and saw that the place was too crowded for the students. And he went to the field and found a field full of bundles of grain, and Rabbi Ḥiyya cleared the bundles from the whole field in its entirety. Conclude from it that the quantity that can be moved is all according to the number of guests.
  The Gemara continues: And still you have a dilemma. Does one man move the baskets to make room for all of them, or perhaps each and every man moves baskets to make room for himself?
  Come and hear a resolution to this question. We learned: And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi cleared the bundles. Apparently, one person moved the bundles to make room for the others. The Gemara rejects the proof: And according to your reasoning, your opinion, do you think Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the spiritual leader of his generation, cleared the bundles himself? Rather, he ordered others to do so, and he thereby cleared the bundles. And actually, each and every one moves a bundle to make room for himself.
  We learned in the mishna: One may move baskets of produce due to the guests and in order to prevent the suspension of Torah study in the study hall. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Hospitality toward guests is as great as rising early to go to the study hall, as the mishna equates them and teaches: Due to the guests and due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall. And Rav Dimi from Neharde’a says: Hospitality toward guests is greater than rising early to the study hall, as it teaches: Due to the guests, and only afterward: And due to suspension of Torah study in the study hall. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said on a related note: Hospitality toward guests is greater than receiving the Divine Presence, as when Abraham invited his guests it is written: “And he said: Lord, if now I have found favor in Your sight, please pass not from Your servant” (Genesis 18:3). Abraham requested that God, the Divine Presence, wait for him while he tended to his guests appropriately. Rabbi Elazar said: Come and see that the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He, is not like that of flesh and blood. The attribute of flesh and blood people is such that a less significant person is unable to say to a more significant person: Wait until I come to you, while with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, it is written: “And he said: Lord, if now I have found favor in Your sight, please pass not from Your servant.” Abraham requested that God wait for him due to his guests.
  Rav Yehuda bar Sheila said that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There are six matters a person enjoys the profits of in this world, and nevertheless the principal exists for him for the World-to-Come, and they are: Hospitality toward guests, and visiting the sick, and consideration during prayer, and rising early to the study hall, and one who raises his sons to engage in Torah study, and one who judges another favorably, giving him the benefit of the doubt.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? And did we not learn in a mishna: These are the matters that a person does them and enjoys their profits in this world, and nevertheless the principal exists for him for the World-to-Come, and they are: Honoring one’s father and mother, and acts of loving kindness, and bringing peace between a person and another, and Torah study is equal to all of them. By inference: These matters, yes, one enjoys their profits in this world and the principal exists for him in the World-to-Come; other matters, no.
  
  Daf 127b
  
  The Gemara answers: These too, hospitality toward guests and visiting the sick, are in the category of acts of loving-kindness. A different version of that answer: These matters on the longer list are attributable to those, the matters on the shorter list.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who judges another favorably is himself judged favorably. And there was an incident involving a certain person who descended from the Upper Galilee and was hired to work for a certain homeowner in the South for three years. On the eve of the Day of Atonement, he said to the homeowner: Give me my wages, and I will go and feed my wife and children. The homeowner said to him: I have no money. He said to him: In that case, give me my wages in the form of produce. He said to him: I have none. The worker said to him: Give me my wages in the form of land. The homeowner said to him: I have none. The worker said to him: Give me my wages in the form of animals. He said to him: I have none. The worker said to him: Give me cushions and blankets. He said to him: I have none. The worker slung his tools over his shoulder behind him and went to his home in anguish.
  After the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, the homeowner took the worker’s wages in his hand, along with a burden that required three donkeys, one laden with food, one laden with drink, and one laden with types of sweets, and went to the worker’s home. After they ate and drank, the homeowner gave him his wages.
  The homeowner said to him: When you said to me: Give me my wages, and I said: I have no money, of what did you suspect me? Why did you not suspect me of trying to avoid paying you? The worker answered, I said: Perhaps the opportunity to purchase merchandise [<i>perakmatya</i>] inexpensively presented itself, and you purchased it with the money that you owed me, and therefore you had no money available. The homeowner asked: And when you said to me: Give me animals, and I said: I have no animals, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps the animals are hired to others. The homeowner asked: When you said to me: Give me land, and I said: I have no land, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps the land is leased to others, and you cannot take the land from the lessees. The homeowner asked: And when you said to me: Give me produce, and I said: I have no produce, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps they are not tithed, and that was why you could not give them to me. The homeowner asked: And when I said: I have no cushions or blankets, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps he consecrated all his property to Heaven and therefore has nothing available at present.
  The homeowner said to him: I swear by the Temple service that it was so. I had no money available at the time because I vowed and consecrated all my property on account of Hyrcanus, my son, who did not engage in Torah study. The homeowner sought to avoid leaving an inheritance for his son. And when I came to my colleagues in the South, the Sages of that generation, they dissolved all my vows. At that point, the homeowner had immediately gone to pay his worker. Now the homeowner said: And you, just as you judged favorably, so may God judge you favorably.
  On a similar note, the Gemara relates that the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving a certain pious man who redeemed a young Jewish woman from captivity. When they arrived at the inn he had her lie beneath his feet. The next day, he descended, and immersed in a ritual bath to purify himself before Torah study and prayer, and taught his students. This conduct could arouse suspicion that the pious man kept the maiden for himself, as immersion in the morning is customary for men who have experienced a seminal emission by engaging in sexual relations.
  And the pious man said to his students: When I had her lie beneath my feet, of what did you suspect me? They said to him: We said: Perhaps there is a student among us whose conduct is not established before the rabbi, and he wanted to make certain that this student would not inappropriately accost the young woman. Therefore, the rabbi kept the woman close by.
  He said to them: When I descended and immersed, of what did you suspect me? They answered: Perhaps due to the exertion of travel, a seminal emission befell the rabbi. He said to them: I swear by the Temple service that it was so. And you, just as you judged me favorably, so may God judge you favorably.
  The Sages taught a similar <i>baraita</i>: Once there was a certain matter needed by Torah scholars. They wanted to discuss an issue with a certain matron whose company was kept by all the prominent people of Rome. The Torah scholars wanted to address the government on behalf of the Jewish people, and they sought the matron’s advice. They said: Who will go? Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I shall go.
  Rabbi Yehoshua and his students went to her. When he arrived with his students at the entrance of her house, he removed his phylacteries at a distance of four cubits from the door, and entered, and locked the door before them. After he emerged, he descended and immersed in a ritual bath, and taught his students. Here too, this was conduct that could arouse suspicion that something improper transpired.
  And he said to his students: When I removed the phylacteries, of what did you suspect me? They said to him, we said: The rabbi must hold that sacred items may not enter a place of impurity. Therefore, it would have been inappropriate to enter the house with phylacteries.
  He asked: When I locked the door, of what did you suspect me? They said to him: We said: Perhaps there is a discreet royal matter that must be discussed between him and her and should not be revealed.
  Rabbi Yehoshua asked: When I descended and immersed, of what did you suspect me? They said to him, we said: Perhaps a bit of spittle sprayed from her mouth onto the rabbi’s clothes. The Sages decreed that the legal status of a gentile is like that of a <i>zav</i>; their bodily fluids transmit ritual impurity. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: I swear by the Temple service that it was so. And you, just as you judged favorably, so may God judge you favorably.
  We learned in the mishna: One may move ritually pure <i>teruma</i> on Shabbat. The Gemara objects: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach this only in a case in which it is placed in Israelite hands. Lest you say: Since it is not suitable for the Israelite to eat, he is prohibited to move it on Shabbat; therefore, it teaches us that since it is suitable for a priest to eat, one may well move it on Shabbat.
  And we also learned in the mishna: One may move doubtfully tithed produce. The Gemara asks: With regard to doubtfully tithed produce, why may one move it? It is not suitable for him to eat. The Gemara answers: Since if he so desires, he may renounce all his property, declaring it ownerless, and he would then be poor, and the doubtfully tithed produce would be suitable for him, now too it is suitable for him. A pauper may eat doubtfully tithed produce, as we learned in a mishna: One may feed the poor doubtfully tithed produce and soldiers [<i>akhsanya</i>] doubtfully tithed produce. And Rav Huna said that it was taught: Beit Shammai say: One may neither feed the poor doubtfully tithed produce nor feed soldiers doubtfully tithed produce. And Beit Hillel say: One may feed the poor doubtfully tithed produce and feed soldiers doubtfully tithed produce. The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may move first tithe whose teruma of the tithe has already been taken. The Gemara poses a question: It is obvious that if the <i>teruma</i> was already tithed it is non-sacred produce in every sense. The Gemara explains: It was necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> only in the following case: A Levite preceded the priest while the grain was still on the stalks and brought it to the threshing floor, and before the grain was threshed, the <i>teruma</i> of the tithes was taken and the <i>teruma gedola</i> was not taken.
  And the above mentioned <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that Reish Lakish said: With regard to first tithe, in a case in which the Levite preceded the priest while the grain was still on the stalks, one is exempt from separating <i>teruma gedola from it</i>, as it is stated: “And you shall set apart from it a gift for the Lord, even a tenth part of the tithe” (Numbers 18:26). By inference: A tenth part of the tithe, i.e., the <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, I, God, said to you that you must take, and not both <i>teruma gedola</i> and the <i>teruma</i> of the tithe.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so, even if the Levite preceded the priest after the kernels of grain were removed from the stalks and placed in a pile, the Levite should also be exempt from taking <i>teruma gedola.</i> Abaye said to him: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “From all that is given to you, you shall set apart that which is the Lord’s <i>teruma</i>” (Numbers 18:29). God’s <i>teruma,</i> i.e., <i>teruma gedola,</i> must be taken from all the Levites’ gifts.
  The Gemara asks: What did you see that led you to require <i>teruma gedola</i> from first tithe that was taken from grain in piles, and not from first tithe that was taken from grain on stalks? Abaye answers: This, stalks that were threshed and placed into piles, are completely processed and have become grain, and that, grains that have remained on the stalk, have not yet become grain. The verse states the following with regard to <i>teruma gedola</i>: “The first of your grain” (Deuteronomy 18:4) is given to the priest. Once it is considered grain, the rights of the priest take effect and the Levite is required to separate <i>teruma gedola.</i>
  We learned in the mishna: One may move second tithe that was redeemed. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where the consecrated property was not completely redeemed, i.e., where one gave payment for the principal, the value of the tithe, but he did not give payment for the fifth that he must add when redeeming items that he consecrated. And the mishna teaches us that failure to add the fifth does not invalidate the redemption, and the second tithe assumes non-sacred status from the moment that one pays the principal.
  And we learned in the mishna: One may move even dry lupine, which is not fit for consumption by a person, because it is goat food. The Gemara comments: This applies only when lupine is dry. However, when it is moist, no it is prohibited to move it. What is the reason for this prohibition? Since lupine is extremely bitter when wet, an animal will not eat it.
  
  Daf 128a
  
  We learned in the mishna: However, one may not move untithed produce on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case in which the produce is permitted by Torah law, but is considered untithed produce only by rabbinic law. What are the circumstances? It is referring to a case where the produce grew in an unperforated flowerpot. The legal status of produce that grows in an unperforated flowerpot is not like that of produce that grows in the ground.
  We learned in the mishna: Nor may one move first tithe from which <i>teruma</i> has not been taken. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> for a case in which the Levite preceded the priest after the kernels of grain were placed in a pile, where first tithe was taken and <i>teruma gedola</i> was not taken. Lest you say concerning this case, as Rav Pappa said to Abaye, here too, the produce should be exempt from the obligation to separate <i>teruma gedola,</i> the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches us as Abaye responded to Rav Pappa: There is a difference between the case in which the grain was on the stalks and the case in which the grain was in a pile.
  We learned in the mishna: Nor may one move second tithe and consecrated items that were not redeemed. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where they were redeemed but not redeemed properly. When the mishna lists the second tithe, it is referring to that which was redeemed with an unminted coin [<i>asimon</i>], i.e., a silver bullion that had not been engraved. And God, in the Torah, states in the case of second tithe: “And bind up [<i>vetzarta</i>] the money in your hand” (Deuteronomy 14:25). The Sages interpreted this as follows: <i>Vetzarta</i> is money that has a form [<i>tzura</i>] engraved upon it. When the mishna lists consecrated property, it is referring to that which was redeemed by exchanging it for land instead of money. And God, in the Torah, states with regard to this: He will give the money “and it will be assured to him” (Leviticus 27:19). Money and not land may be used in redeeming consecrated property.
  We learned in the mishna: Nor may one move arum on Shabbat. The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: One may move squill on Shabbat because it is food for deer and mustard because it is food for doves. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may even move glass shards because they are food for ostriches.
  Rabbi Natan said to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If that is so, even bundles of grapevines one should be permitted to move because they are food for elephants. The Gemara answers that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel responded: Ostriches are common, whereas elephants are not common.
  Ameimar said: And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving glass shards only in a case where one has ostriches. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: However, with regard to that which Rabbi Natan said to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: If that is so, even bundles of grapevines one should be permitted to move because they are food for elephants. If one has elephants, why would he not feed them? The relevant criterion to permit moving the animal food is not whether or not one owns an elephant, but rather whether or not the food is suitable as food for elephants. Here too, in the case of glass shards, the criterion is whether or not they are suitable as food for ostriches, not whether or not one owns an ostrich.
  Abaye said: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Akiva all hold that all Jewish people are princes. There is nothing that is unsuitable for them due to its extravagance. How do we know that all of them hold this position?
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: From that which we said in the mishna, that it is permitted to move arum, this is because arum is food for ravens, and it is as if every Jew owns ravens.
  Rabbi Shimon: As we learned in a mishna: Princes may smear rose oil on their wounds on Shabbat, as it is the way of princes to smear it on during the week, even without the purpose of healing a wound. Rabbi Shimon says: All the Jewish people are princes, and it is permitted for them to smear themselves with rose oil on Shabbat.
  Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva: From that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One from whom his creditors were demanding repayment of a debt of a thousand times one hundred dinar [<i>maneh</i>] and he was wearing a cloak [<i>itztela</i>] worth one hundred times one hundred dinar, they strip him of that cloak and sell it, and dress him with a cloak worthy of him based on his wealth. It was taught in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and it was taught in the name of Rabbi Akiva: All the Jewish people are worthy of that more expensive cloak, and it cannot be said that one is unworthy of it. Rather, the coat is treated like any other vital garment. The principle that one need not sell his vital garments to pay off a debt applies to it.
  We learned in the mishna: With regard to bundles of straw, and bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs, if one prepared them on Shabbat eve for animal food, one may move them. If not, one may not move them. The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to bundles of straw, and bundles of wood, and bundles of twigs, if one prepared them on Shabbat eve for animal food, one may move them. And if not, one may not move them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Bundles that are taken in one hand, it is permitted to move them, as no exertion is involved. However, if they can only be taken in two hands, it is prohibited to move them.
  With regard to bundles of savory, hyssop, and thyme, fragrant plants suitable as food for people, if one brought them in for use as firewood, he may not supply himself from them on Shabbat for food. If he brought them in for use as food for animals, he too may supply himself from them on Shabbat.
  And one may pick them with his hand and eat, as long as he does not pick them with a vessel. And one may crush and remove the seeds with his hand and eat them, as long as he does not crush a lot with a vessel; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One may crush them only with the ends of his fingers, in an atypical manner, as long as he does not crush a lot with his hand in the manner that he does during the week.
  And that too is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>amita</i>, and with regard to rue [<i>peigam</i>], and with regard to all the other types of spices. The Sages asked: What is <i>amita</i>? They answered: It is mint [<i>ninya</i>]. What is <i>sia</i>? Rav Yehuda says: <i>Sia</i> is savory. <i>Ezov</i> is hyssop. <i>Koranit</i> is called <i>koranita</i>, i.e., it is not known to us by any other name.
  The Gemara asks: The one who came to sell and said to them: Who wants <i>koranita</i>? And he was found to be selling thyme. Therefore, we see that <i>koranita</i> is in fact a plant that is known to us. Rather, it should be explained: <i>Sia</i> is savory, <i>ezov</i> is hyssop, and <i>koranita</i> is thyme.
  It was stated: It is permitted to move salted meat on Shabbat, as it is fit for consumption. With regard to unsalted meat, Rav Huna said: It is permitted to move it. Rav Ḥisda said: It is prohibited to move it.
  The Gemara asks: Did Rav Huna say that it is permitted to move it? Wasn’t Rav Huna a student of Rav, and Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who is of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside for salted meat? How could Rav Huna disagree with the opinion of his teacher?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to a food item set aside from eating, Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that it may not be eaten. With regard to an item set aside from moving, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside, and moving it is permitted.
  Rav Ḥisda said: It is prohibited to move unsalted meat on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Rav Yitzḥak bar Ami happen to come to Rav Ḥisda’s house, and he saw the meat of that duck? He saw that they were moving it from the sun to the shade so that it would not spoil. And Rav Ḥisda said to the members of his household: We see a case of monetary loss here. One must make certain that the meat does not stay in the sun and spoil. Apparently, Rav Ḥisda holds that it is permitted to move inedible meat. The Gemara answers: The meat of a duck is different, as it is fit to be eaten as raw meat.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to salted fish, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. With regard to unsalted fish, it is prohibited to move it. Meat, both unsalted meat and salted meat, it is permitted to carry it. And this unattributed <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Sages taught: One may move bones on Shabbat, because they are food for dogs.
  
  Daf 128b
  
  With regard to swollen meat that began to putrefy, it is permitted to move it because it is food for non-domesticated animals. With regard to exposed water, from which a snake might have drunk and into which it injected its venom, it is permitted to move it because it is suitable for a cat, which is somewhat immune to snake venom. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Exposed water itself may not be kept due to the danger that one may inadvertently drink it.
  MISHNA: One may overturn a basket in front of the chicks so that they can climb on and climb off of it. Likewise, with regard to a hen that fled that one seeks to retrieve, one may push it even with his hands until it reenters the house.
  One may help calves and foals to walk, and likewise a woman may help her son to walk. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is it permitted? When her son picks one foot up and puts one foot down by himself. However, if her son were dragging both his feet, it would be prohibited because it would be like carrying him in the public domain.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With regard to an animal that fell into an aqueduct, one brings cushions and blankets, and throws them into the water ditch, and places them beneath the animal in the aqueduct. And if the animal thereby emerges, it emerges.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to an animal that fell into an aqueduct on Shabbat, one provides it with sustenance in its place so that it will not die. This implies that providing it with sustenance, yes, that is permitted, providing it with cushions and blankets, no, that it is prohibited.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is room to distinguish between the cases. This, the <i>Tosefta</i> in which it was taught that one provides the animal with sustenance, is referring to a case where it is possible to provide it with sustenance. That, the mishna in which Rav said that one brings cushions and blankets, is referring to a case where it is impossible to provide it with sustenance. Where it is possible to provide it with sustenance, yes, he does so. And if it is not possible to provide it with sustenance, he brings cushions and blankets and places them beneath the animal.
  The Gemara asks: Does he not, by placing the cushions and blankets, negate a vessel’s preparedness? The cushions and blankets are no longer fit for their designated use on Shabbat, and this negation of their designated use is similar to the prohibited labor of dismantling. The Gemara answers: Rav holds that negating a vessel’s preparedness is prohibited by rabbinic law. Causing a living creature to suffer is a Torah prohibition. And a matter prohibited by Torah law comes and overrides a matter prohibited by rabbinic law.
  We learned in the mishna: With regard to a hen that fled that one seeks to retrieve, he may push it back to its place. By inference: Push the hen, yes, it is permitted, help it to walk, no, it is prohibited. The Gemara comments: We already learned this, as the Sages taught: One may help domesticated animals, non-domesticated animals, and fowl walk in the courtyard on Shabbat, but not hens.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to a hen, what is the reason that one may not help it walk? Abaye says: It is prohibited because the hen lifts itself off the ground. As a result, one actually carries it.
  It was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: One may help domesticated animals, non-domesticated animals, and fowl walk in the courtyard, but not in the public domain. And a woman may help her son walk in the public domain, and, needless to say, it is permitted in the courtyard. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may not lift domesticated animals, non-domesticated animals, and fowl off the ground in the courtyard, but one may push them so that they will enter.
  The Gemara first seeks to clarify the second <i>baraita</i>. This <i>baraita</i> itself is difficult. On the one hand, you said that one may not lift, from which it may be inferred, however, that one may help it walk. Then you said: Push, yes, it is permitted, help walk, no, it is prohibited. Abaye said: The latter clause, which states that one may not help it walk, we came to the <i>halakha</i> of a hen, which, as mentioned above, one may not help it walk.
  Having mentioned moving the hen, the Gemara cites that which Abaye said: One who slaughters a hen should force its legs into the ground, or alternatively lift it entirely into the air. Failure to do so leads to the concern lest the hen place its claws into the ground and convulse during the slaughter and dislocate the signs, the trachea and gullet. This would invalidate the slaughter and render the hen an unslaughtered animal carcass.
  MISHNA: One may not birth an animal on a Festival, and all the more one may not birth it on Shabbat. However, one may assist it to give birth. And one may birth a woman even on Shabbat, and call a midwife for her to travel from place to place, even when the midwife’s travel involves the desecration of Shabbat. And one may desecrate Shabbat for a woman giving birth. And one may tie the umbilical cord of a child born on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei says: One may even cut the umbilical cord. And all the requirements of circumcision may be performed for a baby whose eighth day of life occurs on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: How may one assist in the birth of an animal? Rav Yehuda said: One holds the newborn so that it will not fall to the ground. Rav Naḥman says: One presses the flesh around the womb so that the newborn will emerge.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda: How may one assist in the birth of an animal? One holds the newborn so that it will not fall to the ground, and he blows into its nostrils to remove mucus obstructing the air passages, enabling the offspring to breathe, and he places the mother’s teat into its mouth so that it will suckle.
  Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: We would have mercy on kosher animals on a Festival, to help the offspring. The Gemara asks: How does one have mercy? Abaye said: If the mother does not draw her offspring near and tend to it, one may bring a lump of salt and place it in the animal’s womb, so that it will suffer, remember its suffering while giving birth, and have mercy on the offspring. And one may pour fluids of the afterbirth on the offspring so that the mother will smell it and have mercy on it, her offspring. And this may be done specifically for a kosher animal, but for a non-kosher animal, no, it may not be done.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason one may not do so for a non-kosher animal? The Gemara answers: A non-kosher animal does not distance its offspring, and if it does distance its offspring, it will not draw it near again. No purpose is served by taking these steps with a non-kosher animal.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may birth a woman even when that involves the desecration of Shabbat The Gemara asks: After all, it was taught explicitly in the mishna: And one may birth a woman even on Shabbat, and call a midwife for her to travel from place to place. The phrase: And one may desecrate Shabbat for a woman giving birth, what does it come to include? All the possible acts of desecrating Shabbat for the birthing woman were already listed.
  The Gemara answers: It comes to include that which the Sages taught with regard to this issue: If a woman giving birth were to need a lamp, her friend lights the lamp for her on Shabbat. And if she were to need oil, her friend brings her oil via the public domain in an atypical manner, carrying it in the palm of her hand but not in a vessel. And if the oil that her friend brings in her hand is not enough, she brings oil in her hair. And if oil that she brings in her hair is not enough, she brings oil for her in the typical manner, in a vessel.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: If a woman giving birth were to need a lamp, her friend would light the lamp for her on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> only in the case of a blind woman giving birth. Lest you say: Since she cannot see even with the light it is prohibited to bring a lamp for her, it teaches us that lighting the lamp is permitted to settle her mind. The blind woman thinks: If there is something that needs to be done in the course of childbirth, the lamp will enable my friend to see and she will do it for me.
  We learned in the mishna: And if she needed oil, her friend brings her oil in her hair. The Gemara asks: What good is this advice? Derive that it is prohibited due to the prohibited labor of wringing. The friend will need to wring her hair in order to extract the oil for the birthing woman.
  It was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said: There is no prohibition of wringing with regard to hair, since hair does not absorb liquids like other materials. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that there is a prohibition of wringing with regard to hair, here the friend does not actually bring the oil in her hair. Rather, she brings it in a vessel tied through her hair. She does this because as much as it is possible to change the manner in which one performs a labor that is being done to save a life, we change it.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to a woman in childbirth, as long as the womb is open, whether she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, or whether she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one desecrates Shabbat for her. Generally, a woman in childbirth is in danger, and prohibited labors may be performed in life-threatening circumstances.
  Once the womb closed after birth, whether the woman who gave birth said:
  
  Daf 129a
  
  I need Shabbat to be desecrated, or whether she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one does not desecrate Shabbat for her.
  That is how Rav Ashi taught it. This is how Mar Zutra taught it: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to a woman in childbirth, as long as the womb is open, whether she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, or whether she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one desecrates Shabbat for her. Once the womb closed after birth, if she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one desecrates Shabbat for her. If she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, and all the more so if she said: I do not need Shabbat to be desecrated, one does not desecrate Shabbat for her.
  Ravina said to Mareimar: Since Mar Zutra teaches leniently, and Rav Ashi teaches stringently, in accordance with whose opinion is the <i>halakha</i>? Mareimar said to him: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Mar Zutra, based on the following principle: In cases of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the <i>halakha</i> is lenient.
  With regard to the matter of the open womb, the Gemara asks: From when is it considered that the opening of the womb has begun? Abaye says: It begins from when the woman sits on the travailing chair. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: It begins from when the blood flows and descends; and others say when her friends need to carry her by her arms, as she can no longer walk on her own.
  The Gemara asks: Until when does the opening of the womb continue? Abaye said: It lasts three days. Rava said in the name of Rav Yehuda: It lasts seven days. And others say: It lasts thirty days.
  The Sages of Neharde’a say: For a woman in childbirth, there are halakhic distinctions between three, seven, and thirty days after she gives birth. The Gemara elaborates: During the first three days after birth, whether she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, or whether she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one desecrates Shabbat for her. Between three and seven days after birth, if she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one desecrates Shabbat for her. If she did not say: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one does not desecrate Shabbat for her. Between seven and thirty days after birth, even if she said: I need Shabbat to be desecrated, one does not desecrate Shabbat for her; however, we perform all necessary prohibited labors by means of a gentile.
  This ruling is in accordance with the statement of Rav Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, who said: All needs of a sick person whose life is not in danger are performed by means of a gentile on Shabbat. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: With regard to a matter in which there is no danger, but only potential illness, one says to the gentile to perform the act, and the gentile performs the act.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: For a woman in childbirth, there is a <i>halakha</i> of thirty days. The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> was this stated? The Sages of Neharde’a say: It was stated with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of immersion. A woman does not purify herself through ritual immersion within thirty days of giving birth because she is in a weakened state and susceptible to catching cold.
  Rava said: We say that the ruling that she does not immerse during that period applies only when her husband is not with her. However, if her husband is with her, her husband warms her by engaging in relations with her, and she is not susceptible to catching cold, as is illustrated in this incident involving the daughter of Rav Ḥisda, Rava’s wife. She immersed within thirty days of giving birth, not in the presence of her husband, and caught cold, and afterward they brought her funeral bier after Rava to Pumbedita.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One builds a fire for a woman in childbirth on Shabbat during the rainy season. The Sages thought to infer from here the following: For a woman in childbirth, yes, one builds a fire; for sick people, no, he does not build a fire. In the rainy season, yes, one builds a fire; in the summer, no, he does not build a fire. And the Gemara concludes: That is not the case. There is no difference between a woman in childbirth and a sick person, and there is no difference between the rainy season and the summer. In all of these cases one may build a fire on Shabbat. This conclusion emerges from that which was stated: Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: With regard to one who let blood and caught cold, one makes a fire for him even during the season of Tammuz, i.e., the summer. Failure to do so could result in serious illness.
  The Gemara relates that after Shmuel underwent bloodletting, they broke for him a wooden armchair made of teak [<i>shaga</i>] to build a fire. Similarly, for the sake of Rav Yehuda they broke a wooden table made of ebony [<i>yavna</i>], and for Rabba they broke a bench. They needed to build a fire due to the potential danger to Rabba. Since they could not find firewood, they kindled the fire with the furniture.
  And Abaye said to Rabba: In breaking the bench, didn’t the Master violate the prohibition, “Do not destroy” (Deuteronomy 20:19)? It is prohibited to destroy objects of value. Rabba said to him: Do not destroy also with regard to destruction of my body. Preventing illness and danger is preferable to me.
  With regard to the danger of bloodletting, the Gemara cites that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One should always sell the beams of his house and purchase shoes for his feet with the proceeds, as shoes protect him from stepping on obstacles and from catching cold. If he let blood and has nothing to eat after the bloodletting, he should even sell the shoes on his feet, and from the proceeds provide the needs of a meal. After bloodletting, a meal is more crucial to one’s well-being than shoes are.
  The Gemara asks: What are these special needs of a meal? Rav said: It is referring to meat. And Shmuel said: It is referring to wine. The Gemara explains: Rav says: It is referring to meat because the soul replaces the soul, i.e., the meat replenishes the person’s strength. And Shmuel said: It is referring to wine because the red replaces the red, i.e., red wine substitutes for red blood.
  A mnemonic for the names of the Sages cited in the following discussion is the word <i>shenimsar</i>; <i>shin</i> for Shmuel, <i>nun</i> for Rabbi Yoḥanan, <i>mem</i> for Rav Naḥman, <i>samekh</i> for Rav Yosef, <i>reish</i> for Rava.
  The Gemara relates the following about bloodletting and drinking wine. Shmuel, on the day on which he would perform the practice of bloodletting, they would prepare for him a dish of cooked spleen. Rabbi Yoḥanan would drink wine after bloodletting until the odor emerged from his ears. And Rav Naḥman would drink until his spleen floated in wine. Rav Yosef would drink until the wine would emerge from the bloodletting incision. Rava would search for wine that was sufficiently aged such that three leaves had already grown over three years on the vine from which the grapes were picked (Rashash).
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak said to the Sages: I beg of you, on the day that you undergo bloodletting, tell your households, your wives: Naḥman bar Yitzhak happened to come to visit us. Due to the visit of the important guest, the women will prepare a large meal. The husbands will eat well, recover from the lost blood, and avoid endangering themselves.
  And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak said: All types of artifice that come at the expense of others are prohibited except for this artifice, which is permitted. One who performed the practice of bloodletting and it is not possible for him to purchase food due to lack of means, let him take a worn <i>zuz</i> coin and go to seven stores. In each store, he tastes the wine as one who seeks to buy wine would. After tasting, he hands the <i>zuz</i> to the storekeeper, who will not accept it because it is worn. He then proceeds to do the same in all the stores until he has tasted the measure of a quarter of a <i>log</i> of wine. And if doing so is not possible, let him eat seven black dates and smear oil on his temple and lie in the sun.
  The Gemara relates: The gentile scholar, Ablat, found Shmuel lying in the sun. Ablat said to Shmuel: Wise man of the Jews, a matter that is evil, can it become good? Are there any circumstances in which the heat of the sun, which is harmful, can be beneficial? Shmuel said to him: It happens on a day of bloodletting, for which the heat of the sun is beneficial.
  The Gemara comments: And actually, that is not what occurred. Rather, there is a day on which the sun is beneficial more than the entire year, and that is the day on which the Tammuz solstice, the longest day of the year, occurs. And Shmuel thought: I will not reveal this remedy to him.
  Indifferent, in wind, taste, waited are a mnemonic for the following matters. It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: Anyone who is indifferent and not vigilant with regard to the meal eaten after bloodletting, they are indifferent with regard to providing his food from the Heavens. And they say in the name of Heaven: He took no pity on his life, will I take pity on him?
  Similarly, it was Rav and Shmuel who both said: One who performs the practice of bloodletting should not sit where the wind is blowing, due to the concern that perhaps the blood letter let too much blood from him and established the amount of remaining blood at a quarter of a <i>log</i>. And there is concern the wind will come and draw out a little more blood from him, and he will be endangered.
  The Gemara relates: Shmuel would customarily perform the practice of bloodletting in a house whose walls were seven and a half bricks thick. One day he performed bloodletting and felt himself weakened. He examined and discovered that one half-brick was lacking from the thickness of the walls. The resultant chill caused his weakness.
  It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: One who performs the practice of bloodletting should taste something and then go outside, since if he does not taste anything, if he encounters a corpse, his face will turn green. If he encounters one who killed a person, he will die. If he encounters
  
  Daf 129b
  
  something else, a euphemism for a pig, it is harmful with regard to something else, a euphemism for leprosy.
  It was Rav and Shmuel who both said: With regard to one who performs the practice of bloodletting, let him wait a bit and then let him rise, as the Master said: There are five matters that render one closer to death than life, and they are these: If one ate and immediately rose, if one drank and rose, if one slept and immediately rose, if one let blood and rose, if one engaged in conjugal relations and rose.
  Shmuel said: The interval for bloodletting is every thirty days. And during the middle periods of one’s life, he should decrease the frequency of bloodletting; and during the later periods, he should decrease its frequency again.
  And Shmuel said: The times for bloodletting are the first day of the week, the fourth day of the week and Shabbat eve. However, on the second and the fifth days of the week, no, one should not let blood, as the Master said: Only one who has the merit of his ancestors and relies on it should let blood on the second and on the fifth days of the week, as the court on High, in the heavens, and the court below are equal. The courts in the cities convene on Mondays and Thursdays, as does the heavenly court. Letting blood on a day of judgment is dangerous. If one is judged unfavorably all his blood could flow out.
  The Gemara explains: On the third day of the week, what is the reason that one does not let blood? It is because the planet Mars is dominant during the even hours. Since it is a planet of blood, and the even hours are a bad omen, that combination gives cause for concern. The Gemara asks: On Shabbat eve, Mars also dominates during the even hours. The Gemara answers: Since the multitudes have already become accustomed to letting blood on Shabbat eve, the verse: “The Lord protects the simple-hearted” (Psalms 116:6) applies in this case.
  Similarly, Shmuel says: On the fourth day of the week that is the fourth day of the month; on the fourth day of the week that is the fourteenth of the month; on the fourth day of the week that is the twenty-fourth of the month; and on the fourth day of the week after which there are not four days remaining in the month it is dangerous to let blood.
  Bloodletting on the New Moon and on the second day of the month causes weakness; bloodletting on the third day of the month leads to danger. Bloodletting on the eve of a Festival causes weakness; bloodletting on the eve of the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> leads to danger. And the Sages issued a decree prohibiting bloodletting on the eve of every Festival due to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>. On <i>Shavuot</i>, an evil spirit named <i>Tibbuaḥ</i>, from the Hebrew word meaning slaughter, emerges, as had the Jewish people not accepted the Torah on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, <i>Tibbuaḥ</i> would have slaughtered their flesh and their blood. Consequently, it remains a dangerous day.
  Shmuel said: If one ate wheat and afterward let blood, he only let that wheat. The bloodletting was ineffective as the wheat replaced any blood that was let. And this ineffectiveness applies only if he let blood to cure an illness; however, to relieve discomfort, bloodletting after eating wheat relieves one’s discomfort.
  One who lets blood should engage in drinking immediately; he should not engage in eating until the time that it takes to walk half a <i>mil</i> has elapsed.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When they said that one should engage in drinking immediately, does that mean that drinking immediately is beneficial; however, thereafter, it is injurious? Or perhaps, thereafter it is neither injurious nor beneficial. No resolution is found for this dilemma, therefore it stands unresolved.
  Similarly, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: When they said one should not engage in eating until the time that it takes to walk half a <i>mil</i> has elapsed, does that mean that only at that time it is beneficial, however, after that time or before that time it is injurious? Or perhaps, before and after that time it is neither injurious nor beneficial. No resolution is found for this dilemma, therefore it too stands unresolved.
  Rav would announce: One hundred bloodlettings for a <i>zuz</i>; cutting the hair on one hundred heads for a <i>zuz</i>; grooming one hundred moustaches does not cost anything (<i>ge’onim</i>). Blood letters typically served as barbers as well and did not charge for grooming a moustache. If one hundred men happened to arrive one day to have their moustaches groomed, the barber would work all day without receiving any pay. Rav Yosef said: When we were students in Rav Huna’s school, on a day when the Sages were sluggish in their studies, they would say: Today is the day of the moustaches, and I did not know what they were saying. Now that I heard Rav’s statement, I understand that they meant that it was a day without purpose.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may tie the umbilical cord of a child born on Shabbat. The Sages taught similarly in the <i>Tosefta</i> and even added to it: One may tie the umbilical cord of a child born on Shabbat. Rabbi Yosei said: One may even cut the umbilical cord. And one may insulate the placenta as a healing remedy so as to warm the newborn. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Princesses insulate the placenta in mugs of oil; the daughters of the wealthy do so in combed wool; the daughters of the poor in soft rags.
  Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei that it is even permitted to cut the umbilical cord on Shabbat.
  And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yosei with regard to the umbilical cord attached to twin babies that one may cut it on Shabbat. What is the reason for this? In that case, leaving the cord attached is dangerous. Since the attached twins will try to disengage from each other, they could potentially rip each other’s cords.
  And Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: Everything stated in the passage of rebuke (Ezekiel 16) one may perform for a woman in childbirth on Shabbat. Since that chapter speaks of the dangerous birth of an abandoned child, for all other children, these issues should be addressed. As it is stated there: “And as for your birth, on the day you were born, your navel was not cut, and you were not washed in water for cleansing, and you were not salted, nor were you swaddled” (Ezekiel 16:4).
  The Gemara explains: “And as for your birth, on the day you were born”; from here it is derived that one delivers the newborn on Shabbat. “Your navel was not cut”; from here it is derived that one cuts the umbilical cord on Shabbat. “And you were not washed in water for cleansing”; from here it is derived that one washes the newborn on Shabbat. “And you were not salted”; from here it is derived that one salts the newborn on Shabbat. “Nor were you swaddled”; from here it is derived that one swaddles the newborn on Shabbat.
  
  Daf 130a
  
  MISHNA: As a continuation to the discussion at the end of the previous chapter, which mentioned circumcision in the context of a discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of childbirth on Shabbat, the mishna continues to address the <i>halakhot</i> of circumcision. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he did not bring an implement for circumcising the child on Shabbat eve, he brings it on Shabbat itself uncovered so that it will be clear to all that he is bringing a circumcision scalpel. And in times of danger, when decrees of persecution prohibit Jews from circumcising their children, one covers it in the presence of witnesses who can testify that he transported the scalpel to perform a mitzva.
  And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said with regard to this issue: One may even cut down trees to prepare charcoal in order to fashion iron tools for the purpose of circumcision.
  Rabbi Eliezer’s approach was not universally accepted, and a principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat, including transporting the circumcision scalpel. However, any prohibited labor involved in the mitzva of circumcision itself that cannot be performed on Shabbat eve overrides Shabbat.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that the scalpel must be uncovered due to affection for the mitzva and the desire to publicize it, or perhaps it is due to avoiding suspicion? The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between the two reasons suggested for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion? The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to the question of whether or not it is permitted to bring the scalpel covered in the presence of witnesses who are aware that one is bringing the scalpel for the purpose of circumcision. If you say the reason is due to affection for the mitzva, then if it is uncovered, yes, there is a display of affection for the mitzva. If it is covered, no, there is no display of affection. However, if you say the reason for this ruling is due to avoiding suspicion, even if it is covered he may well do so, because the witnesses are aware that a circumcision will be performed. What is the resolution of this dilemma?
  It was stated that Rabbi Levi said: Rabbi Eliezer only stated this ruling to express affection for the mitzva. That opinion was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a child is to be circumcised on Shabbat and they failed to bring the scalpel on Shabbat eve, one brings it on Shabbat uncovered, but he does not bring it covered; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rav Ashi said: The language of the mishna is also precise in support of this opinion, as it teaches: And in a time of danger he covers it in the presence of witnesses. By inference, in a time of danger, yes, he covers it; when it is not a time of danger, no, he does not cover it. Conclude from this that the scalpel is uncovered due to affection for the mitzva. The Gemara states: Indeed, conclude from this.
  It was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: He brings the scalpel uncovered, and he does not bring it covered; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: In a time of danger they would customarily bring the scalpel covered in the presence of witnesses.
  With regard to these witnesses, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: The necessary witnesses that he is saying, do they include he who is bringing the scalpel and one other witness? Or perhaps they include he who brought the scalpel and two other witnesses to testify on his behalf.
  Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the language of the mishna, which stated: And in times of danger he covers it in the presence of witnesses. Granted, if you say it is referring to him and two other witnesses, it works out well; the wording is appropriate. However, if you say it is referring to him and one other witness, what is to be made of the use of the term witnesses in the plural when there is only one other witness? The Gemara refutes this proof: They may still be called witnesses, in the plural, because they, i.e., he and the other witness, are fit to testify elsewhere.
  We learned in our mishna: And furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer said: One may even cut down trees to prepare charcoal for the purpose of circumcision on Shabbat. With regard to this issue, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the locale of Rabbi Eliezer, where they would follow his ruling, they would even cut down trees on Shabbat to prepare charcoal from it in order to fashion iron tools with which to circumcise a child on Shabbat. On a related note, the <i>baraita</i> relates: In the locale of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili they would eat poultry meat in milk, as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili held that the prohibition of meat in milk does not include poultry.
  The Gemara relates: Levi happened to come to the house of Yosef the hunter. They served him the head of a peacock [<i>tavsa</i>] in milk and he did not eat. When Levi came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the latter said to him: Why did you not excommunicate these people who eat poultry in milk, contrary to the decree of the Sages? Levi said to him: It was in the locale of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, and I said: Perhaps he taught them that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who permits the eating of poultry meat in milk. Given the possibility that their rabbi rules that it is permitted, I cannot come and prohibit it, and I certainly cannot excommunicate them for it.
  As we learned in a mishna, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is stated in the verse: “You shall not eat anything that dies of itself; to the stranger at your gates you may give it, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a holy people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:21), and it is stated later in the same verse: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” From the juxtaposition of the two issues it is derived: That which is prohibited due to the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered animal, it is prohibited to cook it in milk. The prohibition against cooking a creature in milk is not limited to only a kid. If so, with regard to poultry, which is prohibited due to the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered animal, I might have thought it should be prohibited to cook it in milk; therefore, the verse states: “In its mother’s milk.” This excludes poultry, which does not have mother’s milk and is therefore not included in the prohibition.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak said: There was one city in Eretz Yisrael where they would act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to circumcision, and they would die at their appointed time and not earlier, as a reward for their affection for this mitzva. And not only that, but on one occasion the wicked empire, Rome, issued a decree against the Jewish people prohibiting circumcision; but against that city it did not issue the decree.
  Apropos affection for the mitzva of circumcision, the Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> in which it was taught that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Every mitzva that the Jews initially accepted upon themselves with joy, such as circumcision, as it is written: “I rejoice at Your word as one who finds great spoil” (Psalms 119:162), and as the Sages explained, this “word” refers to the mitzva of circumcision, over which they rejoiced, they still perform it with joy. And every mitzva that the Jews initially accepted upon themselves with contentiousness and regret, such as the prohibition against incestuous relations, as it is written: “And Moses heard the people weeping, family by family” (Numbers 11:10), and as the Sages interpreted homiletically: They wept over matters pertaining to their families, as they were prohibited at that time from marrying family members, they still perform with contentiousness. The fact is that there is no marriage contract and wedding in which contentiousness does not arise, as there is inevitably some conflict between the parties. The <i>baraita</i> asserts that this is because, initially, the Jews did not accept the laws governing marriage and family relationships willingly.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in praise of the observance of the mitzva of circumcision: Any mitzva for which the Jews sacrificed their lives at the time of the decrees of the wicked empire, such as the prohibition of idolatry and the mitzva of circumcision, is still steadfastly observed. And any mitzva for which the Jews did not sacrifice their lives at the time of the decrees of the wicked empire, such as phylacteries, is still casually observed, meaning that they are not as careful in its fulfillment as they should be.
  The Gemara cites proof that the mitzva of phylacteries was not fulfilled properly at the time of the decrees, based upon an incident related to the following <i>halakha</i>. As Rabbi Yannai said: Donning phylacteries requires a clean body like that of Elisha, Man of Wings. What is included in the requirement to have a clean body? Abaye said: That one may not pass wind in them. Rava said: That one may not sleep in them.
  The Gemara asks: And why did they call him Elisha, Man of Wings? Because on one occasion the wicked empire of Rome issued a decree against the Jewish people that, as punishment, they would pierce the brain of anyone who dons phylacteries on his head. Nevertheless, Elisha would don them and defiantly go out to the marketplace. One day, an official who was appointed to enforce the decree saw him. Elisha ran away from him, and the official ran after him. When the official reached him, Elisha removed the phylacteries from his head and held them in his hand. The officer asked him: What is in your hand? Elisha said to him: It is merely a dove’s wings. A miracle took place: He opened his hand, and, indeed, it was found to be a dove’s wings. Therefore, in commemoration of this miracle, they would call him Elisha, Man of Wings.
  The Gemara asks: And what is different about a dove’s wings, that Elisha specifically told him that he was holding the wings of a dove and he did not tell him he was holding the wings of other birds? The Gemara answers: Because the congregation of Israel is likened to a dove, as it is stated: “You shall shine as the wings of a dove covered with silver and her pinions with yellow gold” (Psalms 68:14). Just as a dove has only its wings to protect it, so too, the Jewish people have only mitzvot to protect them. Apparently, Elisha Man of Wings was vigilant in fulfilling the mitzva of phylacteries in the face of the decree, whereas the rest of the people were not.
  Rabbi Abba bar Rav Adda said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said as follows: On one occasion they were supposed to circumcise a baby on Shabbat, and they forgot and did not bring a scalpel with which to circumcise him on Shabbat eve, and they brought it on Shabbat via roofs and via courtyards,
  
  Daf 130b
  
  contrary to the wishes of Rabbi Eliezer. Even though the roofs and courtyards were not halakhically joined in a manner where it would be permitted to carry from one to the other, the Rabbis permitted carrying the scalpel in this manner.
  Rav Yosef strongly objects to this: Contrary to the wishes of Rabbi Eliezer? On the contrary, it is Rabbi Eliezer who permits this, as he permits carrying the scalpel even through the public domain. And if you say that it means contrary to the wishes of Rabbi Eliezer, who permits carrying even in the public domain, but in accordance with the wishes of the Rabbis, who prohibited carrying via the public domain and only permitted carrying via roofs, via courtyards and enclosures, that is also difficult. And is it permitted according to the opinion of the Rabbis? Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Just as one may not bring the circumcision knife via the public domain, so too, one may not bring it via roofs, via enclosures, or via courtyards?
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: It means contrary to the wishes of Rabbi Eliezer and his disputants, but in accordance with the wishes of Rabbi Shimon. As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Shimon says: Roofs, enclosures, and courtyards are all considered as one domain with regard to vessels that rested inside them at the beginning of Shabbat. Therefore, it is permitted to carry vessels that rested inside one to another. However, they are not considered the same domain with regard to vessels that rested inside the house at the beginning of Shabbat. If the homeowners did not join the courtyard by means of an <i>eiruv</i>, it is prohibited to carry vessels from their houses to the courtyard. Even if the houses in a courtyard were joined, it is prohibited to carry from the courtyard to an enclosure unless they were joined by means of an <i>eiruv</i>. In any case, there are circumstances in which Rabbi Shimon allows carrying via roofs, courtyards, and enclosures.
  Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi: An alleyway whose residents did not merge together, what is its legal status with regard to carrying items in all of it according to Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Zeira explains the dilemma: Do we say that it is like a courtyard, and just as with regard to a courtyard, even though they did not join the houses in it together and despite the fact that it is prohibited to carry out items from the houses to the courtyard, it is nonetheless permitted to carry in all of it? Therefore, in this alleyway too, even though they did not merge together, it is permitted to carry in all of it despite the fact that it is prohibited to carry items into the alleyway. Or, perhaps an alleyway is not similar in this regard to a courtyard, as a courtyard has four partitions, whereas this, the alleyway, does not have four partitions, but only three. Alternatively, there may be a different reason for the inferior status of an alleyway in this regard: A courtyard has residents and can therefore be considered like a house, which would allow carrying within it, whereas this alleyway does not have residents. Rabbi Asi was silent and did not say anything to him, as he was unable to provide a satisfactory response.
  On another occasion Rabbi Zeira found Rabbi Asi sitting and saying: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: One time they forgot and did not bring a scalpel on Shabbat eve for the purpose of circumcising a child on Shabbat, and they brought it on Shabbat, and the matter was difficult in the eyes of the Rabbis: How can they abandon the words of the Rabbis, who prohibit doing so, and act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? Why did they find this difficult? One reason was that Rabbi Eliezer was a <i>Shammuti</i>, i.e., a follower of the views of Beit Shammai (Jerusalem Talmud), and the <i>halakha</i> is generally in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel in their disputes with Beit Shammai. And furthermore, there is a general rule that in a dispute between an individual and the many, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the many. Here too, the <i>halakha</i> should certainly be in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer.
  And Rabbi Oshaya said: I asked Rabbi Yehuda the Cutter, i.e., the circumcisor, and he told me that this incident occurred in an alleyway whose residents did not merge together, and they brought the scalpel from this end of the alleyway to that end, where the baby was. That concludes Rabbi Asi’s account of the event. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Since you related that story without expressing any reservations, it appears that the Master must hold that with regard to an alleyway whose residents did not merge together, it is permitted to carry in all of it. And Rabbi Asi said to him: Yes, that is the <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Zeira said to him: But on a different occasion I raised a dilemma on this matter before you and you did not say so to me. Perhaps in the course of your studies your knowledge was restored to you? He said to him: Yes, in the course of my studies my knowledge was restored to me, and I remembered this <i>halakha</i>.
  With regard to the very same <i>halakha</i>, it was stated as a principle that Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said: An alleyway that was not merged by the residents of the courtyards that open into it, it is only permitted to carry in it within four cubits.
  Abaye said: This halakhic matter was stated by Rabbi Zeira, and he did not explain it. It remained enigmatic until Rabba bar Avuh came and explained it. As Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that Rav said: With regard to an alleyway that was not merged by the residents of the courtyards that open into it, if they joined the courtyards with the houses, i.e., the homeowners within each courtyard joined together and are therefore permitted to carry within the courtyards themselves, it is only permitted to carry in it within four cubits, as in an intermediate domain [<i>karmelit</i>]. However, if they did not join the courtyards with the houses and it is prohibited to carry within the courtyards, it is permitted to carry in the entire alleyway.
  Rav Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said to Rabba: What is different about a case where they joined the courtyards with the houses? Is it because the courtyards were detached and became like houses? And Rav follows his regular line of reasoning, for Rav said: An alleyway can only be made into a permitted area for carrying by means of a sidepole and a crossbeam, which is the standard <i>halakha</i> in a closed alleyway, if there are
  
  Daf 131a
  
  houses and courtyards open to it, and each courtyard contains at least two houses, and there are at least two courtyards. And here, there are houses but there are no courtyards, and therefore the standard <i>halakhot</i> of a closed alleyway do not apply. However, if that is the case, when they did not join the courtyards with the houses too, let us consider these houses as though they were sealed, because their residents may not carry from their houses into the courtyards, and the houses should be considered irrelevant. Therefore, in that case too, there are courtyards but there are no houses.
  The Gemara answers: In that case it is possible for them to renounce all of their property rights and transfer them to one person. Just as the residents of a courtyard can join together, thereby rendering it permitted to carry in the courtyard, they can also relinquish their property rights to a single resident. In that way, it is considered as though there is only one inhabited house in the courtyard, and it is therefore permitted to carry within the courtyard as well as between that particular house and the courtyard. The Gemara rejects this answer: Ultimately, even in that case, there is one house, yet there are not multiple houses, as it is possible to relinquish one’s privileges to only one homeowner and not to two. This would fail to meet the minimum requirement of two houses for the area to be considered a courtyard.
  The Gemara answers: It is possible to resolve this: From morning until midday they can relinquish their rights to one, and from midday until evening they can relinquish their rights to another, and as a result there will be two houses. The Gemara rejects this answer: Ultimately, at the time when this house has the ownership rights, that house does not have them, as at any point in time there is only one house from which it is permitted to carry into the courtyard. Rather, Rav Ashi said: The explanation that there are no houses and courtyards here is rejected, and the explanation is: What caused the courtyards to be prohibited? It is the presence of the houses. Had there been no houses, it would have been permitted to carry from the courtyards into the alleyway, since they are one domain according to Rabbi Shimon. And here, it is considered as though there are no houses. Therefore, it is permitted to carry in the alleyway.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Eliezer did not say with regard to all mitzvot that actions that facilitate performance of a mitzva override Shabbat. This is not a fixed principle with regard to preparations for all mitzvot. Rather, each case must be considered on its own merits, and proof must be cited that this principle applies to a specific mitzva. As the two loaves offered on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> are an obligation of that day, and Rabbi Eliezer only learned that the activities that facilitate their sacrifice override Shabbat from a special verbal analogy. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that the actions that facilitate the offering of the two loaves override Shabbat? The term bringing is stated in the verse with regard to the <i>omer</i> offering, and the term bringing is stated with regard to the two loaves. Just as in the case of the bringing stated with regard to the <i>omer</i>, all the actions that facilitate its offering override Shabbat, as the reaping of the <i>omer</i>, which facilitates its offering, overrides Shabbat, so too, in the case of the bringing stated with regard to the two loaves, actions that facilitate its offering override Shabbat.
  With regard to this verbal analogy the Gemara comments: It must be that those terms are free, i.e., they are superfluous in their context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. As, if they are not free, the verbal analogy can be logically refuted, as it is possible to say: What is unique to the <i>omer</i>? That if one found reaped barley one must nevertheless reap more barley for the sake of the mitzva. Can you say the same with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the two loaves, where it is taught that if one found reaped grain one need not reap additional grain for the sacrifice? Apparently, the <i>halakhot</i> of the offering of the two loaves are not parallel to those of the <i>omer</i>. The same might be true with regard to actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva. In truth, the verse is free for establishing the verbal analogy. The Gemara explains: Since the verse already states: “When you come to the land that I am giving to you, and you reap its harvest, then you shall bring the sheaf [<i>omer</i>], the first of your harvest to the priest” (Leviticus 23:10), when the verse restates, “And you shall count for yourselves from the morrow after the day of rest, from the day you have brought the sheaf of the waving, seven whole weeks they shall be” (Leviticus 23:15), why do I need this repetition? Conclude from this that the additional statement is there to render the term “bringing” free for establishing a verbal analogy.
  And yet there is still a difficulty: The verbal analogy is free only from one side, as only the verse that mentions bringing in the context of the <i>omer</i> offering is superfluous in its context, and we heard Rabbi Eliezer, who said with regard to a verbal analogy that it is only free from one side, that one can derive from it, and one can also refute it logically. The Gemara answers: There is a superfluous usage of the term with regard to the two loaves as well, as in the verse: “From your dwelling places you shall bring the loaves of waving of two tenth parts of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour, they shall be baked with leaven for first-fruits unto the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17) the phrase: “You shall bring” is an amplification. Since it was mentioned in the previous verse it is superfluous in its context. Consequently, the verbal analogy is available from both sides.
  The Gemara poses a question with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: Rabbi Eliezer did not say with regard to all mitzvot that actions that facilitate performance of a mitzva override Shabbat; to exclude actions that facilitate the performance of what mitzva was he referring?If you say that it was to exclude actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva of taking the palm branch [<i>lulav</i>] and the other three species on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>lulav</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?Rather, say that it comes to exclude the mitzva to dwell in a <i>sukka</i> on <i>Sukkot</i>. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>sukka</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?Rather, say that it comes to exclude the mitzva to eat <i>matza</i> on Passover. Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>matza</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?Rather, say that it comes to exclude the mitzva to sound the <i>shofar</i> on Rosh HaShana. But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>shofar</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer?
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan comes to exclude attaching ritual fringes to his garment and affixing a <i>mezuza</i> to the doorway, which do not override Shabbat. The Gemara notes that that was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: And they, Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, agree that if one attached ritual fringes to his garment on Shabbat, and similarly, if one affixed a <i>mezuza</i> to his doorway on Shabbat, that he is liable.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer concedes that actions that facilitate the performance of these mitzvot do not override Shabbat? Rav Yosef said: Because they have no fixed time and these mitzvot need not be performed on Shabbat. Abaye said to him: On the contrary, from the fact that they have no fixed time,
  
  Daf 131b
  
  it can be said that each and every moment is its proper time. The obligation to fulfill the mitzva is perpetual and one may not neglect it. Why should it be prohibited for him to perform actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva on Shabbat? Rather, Rav Naḥman said that Rav Yitzḥak said, and some say that he said that Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The actions that facilitate the performance of these mitzvot do not override Shabbat, since one can render the relevant objects ownerless. One is only required to perform these mitzvot if the objects, i.e., the garment and the house, belong to him. If he renders them ownerless, he is no longer obligated to perform these mitzvot.
  It was taught that the Master said in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>lulav</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara poses a question: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this <i>halakha</i>? If you say he derives it from the mitzvot of the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves, whose facilitators override Shabbat, this can be refuted by saying that the performance of facilitating actions is permitted on Shabbat in these cases because they are for the necessities of Temple service to God on High, as they are connected to the sacrificial service, which proceeds even on Shabbat. Rather, we can say that he derives it from the fact that the verse states: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day, the fruit of goodly trees, branches of palm trees, boughs of thick-leaved trees, and willows of the river, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days” (Leviticus 23:40), from which he infers: “On the first day,” meaning that one is obligated to take it on the first day even if it occurs on Shabbat.
  The Gemara clarifies: And with regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this emphasis stated? In what way would the laws of Shabbat have prohibited fulfilling the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>? If you say that it comes to permit moving the <i>lulav</i> despite the prohibition against moving set-aside items, is a verse required in order to permit moving the <i>lulav</i>? The prohibition to move items that are set-aside is not a Torah prohibition. The Torah would not come to permit an action prohibited by the Sages. Rather, it must be that the verse is coming to permit violation of Shabbat prohibitions for the facilitators of the <i>lulav</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer understand the verse’s emphasis that the mitzva must be performed on that day? The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, that expression in the verse is necessary to teach that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night? The Gemara answers: He derives this <i>halakha</i> from the phrase: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God seven days,” as this indicates that the mitzva applies during the days and not the nights.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis respond to this? The Gemara answers: The previous derivation was necessary because it might have entered your mind to say that we should derive the seven days stated here from the seven days stated with regard to <i>sukka</i>, and say: Just as there, the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> applies not only during the days but even the nights, so too here, the mitzva of <i>lulav</i> applies not only during the days but even the nights. Therefore, the derivation teaches us that the mitzva only applies during the day based upon the original expression: “On the first day.”
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer’s approach, let the Torah write this principle only with regard to <i>lulav</i>, and let these, the mitzva of the <i>omer</i> and similar cases, be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Because the analogy can be refuted. What is unique about <i>lulav</i>? That it requires four species, as the Torah demands that three other species be taken along with the <i>lulav</i>. Therefore, <i>lulav</i> cannot serve as a paradigm for other mitzvot that do not share this characteristic.
  Earlier, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>sukka</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this matter? If you say he derives it from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves, this can be refuted by saying that the performance of facilitators is permitted on Shabbat in these cases as these are the necessities of Temple service to God on High. If you say he derives it from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>lulav</i>, this too can be refuted, as <i>lulav</i> requires four species and therefore has special significance.
  Rather, he derived it through the following verbal analogy based upon the expression “seven days,” which is stated with regard to both the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> and the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>. Just as below, with regard to the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>, its facilitators override Shabbat, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, its facilitators override Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: And let the Torah write only that actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva override the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, and let us bring these other mitzvot and derive their <i>halakhot</i> from <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara answers: Because this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>? That it applies during the nights just as it applies during the days, whereas the others apply only during the day.
  Earlier it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>matza</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this matter? If you say he derives it from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves, this can be refuted, as these are the necessities of Temple service to God on High. If you say he derives it from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>lulav</i>, this too can be refuted, as it requires four species. If you say he derives it from the precedent of <i>sukka</i>, this too can be refuted, as it applies during the nights just as it applies during the days.
  Rather, Rabbi Eliezer derived it by means of a verbal analogy based upon the word fifteenth stated with regard to the mitzva of <i>matza</i>, and the word fifteenth stated with regard to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>: Just as below, with regard to the mitzva to dwell in a <i>sukka</i> on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, which is on the fifteenth of the month, its facilitators override Shabbat, so too here, with regard to the mitzva to eat <i>matza</i> on the fifteenth of the month, its facilitators override Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: And let the Torah write this principle with regard to <i>matza</i>, and let us bring these other mitzvot and derive their <i>halakhot</i> from <i>matza</i>. The Gemara answers: Because this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the mitzva of <i>matza</i>? That it applies to women as it does to men. It is therefore different from the other mitzvot under discussion, which only apply to men.
  It was also taught in the <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of <i>shofar</i> and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this matter? If you say he derives it from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves, this can be refuted, as these are the necessities of Temple service to God on High. If you say he derives it from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>lulav</i>, this too can be refuted, as it requires four species. If you say he derives it from the precedent of <i>sukka</i>, this too can be refuted, as it applies during the nights just as it applies during the days. If you say he derives it from <i>matza</i>, this too can be refuted, as it applies to women just as it applies to men. Rather, Rabbi Eliezer derives it from the fact that the verse stated: “And in the seventh month, on the first of the month, a holy calling it shall be to you; any prohibited labor of work you shall not perform; a day of sounding the <i>shofar</i> it shall be for you” (Numbers 29:1). The verse’s emphasis that the <i>shofar</i> must be sounded on that day teaches us that it applies even on Shabbat.
  And for what purpose was this emphasized? If you say it is in order to permit sounding the <i>shofar</i>, this has already been taught by one of the Sages of the school of Shmuel with regard to the verse that prohibits performing prohibited labor on Festivals: “Any prohibited labor of work you shall not perform” (Numbers 29:1), which comes to exclude from the category of prohibited labors the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> and the removal of bread from the oven, which are skills and not labors. Rather, it is necessary to teach with regard to actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis understand the verse’s emphasis that the mitzva must be performed on that day? The Gemara answers: That expression in the verse is necessary according to the Rabbis in order to teach that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive that this mitzva must be performed by day and not by night? The Gemara answers: He derives this <i>halakha</i> from the verse with regard to the laws of the Jubilee Year: “And you shall pass a <i>shofar</i> of sounding in the seventh month, on the tenth of the month, on the Day of Atonement you shall pass a <i>shofar</i> throughout your land” (Leviticus 25:9), and the laws of all instances of sounding the <i>shofar</i> during the seventh month are derived from each other. Therefore, just as on Yom Kippur the <i>shofar</i> is sounded during the day, as emphasized by the fact that the verse uses the phrase Day of Atonement, the same applies on Rosh HaShana.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer’s approach, let the Torah write this principle only with regard to <i>shofar</i>, and let us bring these other mitzvot and derive their <i>halakhot</i> from <i>shofar</i>. The Gemara answers: From the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> of Rosh HaShana, the principle that actions that facilitate the performance of a mitzva override Shabbat cannot be derived, because it has special significance in that it introduces the remembrances of the Jewish people before their Father in heaven. From the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> of Yom Kippur, the principle that actions that facilitate the performance of a mitzva override Shabbat cannot be derived, as this <i>shofar</i> sounding also has special significance, as the Master said: Once the court sounds the <i>shofar</i> on Yom Kippur in the Jubilee Year, the declaration of freedom applies at once. Slaves may take leave of their masters and go to their homes, and fields that had been sold return to their ancestral owners. Therefore, other mitzvot cannot be derived from the sounding of the <i>shofar</i> of Yom Kippur.
  Earlier it was taught that the Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: The mitzva of circumcision and all its facilitators override Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this <i>halakha</i>? If he derives it from all of the other mitzvot cited above, we can refute it, as we have already said that each one of them includes a unique aspect of severity or significance. And furthermore, there is another difficulty: What is unique about these mitzvot
  
  Daf 132a
  
  in each, as if its time passed, it is void, unlike the mitzva of circumcision, which can be fulfilled at a later date if the child is not circumcised on the eighth day. Rather, this is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as the verse says: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), indicating that he is circumcised on the eighth day even if it falls on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: And let the Torah write this principle only with regard to the mitzva of circumcision, and let these other mitzvot come and derive their <i>halakhot</i> from it. The Gemara answers: Because this suggestion can be refuted: What is unique about the mitzva of circumcision? That thirteen covenants were established over it, as the word covenant is mentioned thirteen times in the passage dealing with the circumcision of Abraham (Genesis 17). Owing to its great significance, other mitzvot cannot be derived from it.
  The Gemara departs from the facilitators of circumcision to the <i>halakha</i> of circumcision itself and asks: The Rabbis only disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to actions that facilitate circumcision, which, in their view, do not override Shabbat; however, with regard to circumcision itself, everyone agrees that it overrides Shabbat. From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? Ulla said: This is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, but there is no biblical basis for it. And so too, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: It is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: From where is it derived that saving a life overrides Shabbat? Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says it is derived from the mitzva of circumcision: Just as circumcision, which pertains to only one of a person’s limbs, overrides Shabbat, all the more so it is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that saving a life, which is a mitzva that pertains to the entire person, overrides Shabbat.
  And if it should enter your mind to say that circumcision may be performed on Shabbat based on a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference derived from a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> that an <i>a fortiori</i> inference cannot be derived from a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai? Rabbi Akiva sought to derive that a nazirite who comes into contact with a quarter <i>log</i> of blood from a corpse becomes ritually impure and is required to shave his hair. He sought to do this based on an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of the bone from a dead person the size of a grain of barley, as he had a received tradition that a nazirite is required to shave his hair due to that contact. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him: Akiva, the <i>halakha</i> that a bone the size of a grain of barley transmits ritual impurity is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and you would derive from it that a quarter of a <i>log</i> of blood transmits ritual impurity based upon an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, and one does not derive an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The <i>Tosefta</i> explicitly states that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya himself derived an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of circumcision on Shabbat. Clearly, then, it is derived from the Torah itself and not from a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: This <i>halakha</i> is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word sign that appears with regard to circumcision: “And you shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a sign of the covenant between Me and you” (Genesis 17:11), and sign that appears with regard to Shabbat: “However, you shall keep My <i>Shabbatot</i>, for it is a sign between Me and you throughout your generations” (Exodus 31:13). From this verbal analogy, it is derived that circumcision, which is a sign, may be performed even on Shabbat, which is itself a sign.
  The Gemara asks: But if what you say is so, phylacteries, with regard to which the term sign is also written: “And it shall be for a sign on your hand and for frontlets between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), should also override Shabbat, and they should be donned on that day.
  Rather, this principle is derived by means of a different verbal analogy from the word covenant that appears with regard to circumcision: “And you shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a sign of the covenant between Me and you” (Genesis 17:11), and the word covenant that appears with regard to Shabbat: “The children of Israel shall keep the Shabbat, to observe the Shabbat throughout their generations for a perpetual covenant” (Exodus 31:16).
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If this is so, then the circumcision of an adult should also be permitted on Shabbat and it should not be limited to a child on the eighth day, as the term covenant is written with regard to him as well, as it applies to any Jewish male not yet circumcised. Therefore, let his circumcision override Shabbat. The <i>halakha</i>, however, is that only circumcision at its proper time on the eighth day overrides Shabbat.
  Rather, this <i>halakha</i> is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the word generations that appears with regard to Shabbat: “Throughout their generations for a perpetual covenant” (Exodus 31:16), and the word generations that appears with regard to circumcision: “And I shall establish My covenant between Me and you, and between your seed after you throughout their generations, for an everlasting covenant” (Genesis 17:7).
  The Gemara asks: If so, let ritual fringes too, with regard to which the term generations is also written, override Shabbat, and it should be permitted to affix ritual fringes to a garment on Shabbat.
  Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This <i>halakha</i> is derived not from one common word alone, but one derives it based upon the three words sign, covenant, and generations that appear with regard to circumcision, from sign, covenant, and generations that appear with regard to Shabbat, to the exclusion of these, i.e., ritual fringes and phylacteries, that with regard to each of them, one of these is written but not all three words together.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse says: “And on the eighth day…shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), which means that the child is circumcised on the eighth day whenever it occurs, even on Shabbat.
  Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But if what you say is so, then, with regard to those lacking atonement, such as a <i>zav</i> or a healed leper, who must after their immersion still bring an atonement offering in order to complete their purification process, with regard to whom the term on the day is also written, as in the verse: “And on the eighth day he shall take two he-lambs without blemish, and one ewe-lamb of the first year without blemish” (Leviticus 14:10), sacrificing their atonement offerings should also override Shabbat. Rabbi Yoḥanan responded: That verse is necessary to teach that the sacrifice must be brought during the day and not at night.
  Reish Lakish asked: This verse with regard to the mitzva of circumcision is also necessary to teach that circumcision must be performed during the day and not at night. Rabbi Yoḥanan replied: That is derived from a different verse, which states: “And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you throughout your generations” (Genesis 17:12). That circumcision must take place during the day is derived from that verse.
  Reish Lakish says: That matter, that the atonement offering must be sacrificed during the day, can also be derived from a different verse, as it is stated: “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the consecration-offering, and of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings; which the Lord commanded Moses at Mount Sinai on the day He commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings to the Lord in the wilderness of Sinai” (Leviticus 7:37–38), and from here it is derived that all offerings are sacrificed by day and not at night.
  The Gemara answers: Although this <i>halakha</i> is derived from: “On the day He commanded,” an additional source is necessary for those lacking atonement. It might have entered your mind to say that since the Torah shows him mercy by allowing him to bring an offering of poverty, as if one cannot afford to sacrifice the regular atonement offering, the Torah enables him to sacrifice a less costly one, let him also bring it at night, as perhaps the Torah shows him mercy and allows him to hasten his atonement. Therefore, it teaches us that he too must bring his offering only by day and not at night.
  Ravina strongly objects to this reasoning: But if what you say is so, that the Torah has compassion on a person lacking atonement and is lenient with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the atonement offering, a non-priest should be fit to sacrifice them, and similarly, a priest who is an acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative died that same day and has not yet been buried, should be fit to sacrifice them. The Gemara answers: The verse has restored this. The additional verse that teaches that even one lacking atonement must sacrifice during the day, also teaches that the Torah was lenient with regard to this offering only in the ways explicitly stated in the Torah.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: There is a different proof from the Torah that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat, for the verse said: “On the eighth day,” underscoring that circumcision is performed specifically on the eighth day and indicating that it is performed even on Shabbat.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: This usage of the term eighth is necessary to exclude the seventh day, i.e., a child may not be circumcised before the eighth day. The Gemara answers: The fact that one may not circumcise on the seventh day is derived from a different verse, as it is stated: “And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you throughout your generations” (Genesis 17:12).
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Both verses are still necessary, one to exclude the seventh day and one to exclude the ninth day. As if it were derived from one verse alone, I would have said: It is on the seventh day that one may not circumcise, since the time to circumcise this child has not yet arrived and the obligation of circumcision is not yet in effect; however, from the eighth day and onward is its time, and therefore it is permissible to postpone a circumcision until the ninth day. No answer was found to this question, and the Gemara concludes: Rather, the derivation is clear according to Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, as the <i>tanna</i> interprets the phrase: “On the eighth day he shall be circumcised” to mean that the circumcision must be performed even on Shabbat. And how do I fulfill the prohibition against performing prohibited labor explicit in the Torah in the verse: “And you shall guard the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; he who desecrates it shall surely die” (Exodus 31:14)? That is referring to other prohibited labors besides circumcision. The <i>tanna</i> questions his previous statement: Or perhaps that is not the case, and the prohibition of performing prohibited labor on Shabbat includes even circumcision, and, on the contrary, how do I fulfill the verse: “On the eighth day he shall be circumcised”? It applies when the eighth day is any day other than Shabbat. The verse states: “On the day,” meaning on that very day when he turns eight days old, even on Shabbat. The <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> rejects Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s proof and accepts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s assertion that the phrase “On the day” conclusively establishes that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat.
  With regard to this <i>baraita</i>, Rava said: Initially, what did this <i>tanna</i> find acceptable, and ultimately, what did he find difficult? Initially he suggested that: “On the eighth day he shall be circumcised” is a valid source for the fact that circumcision overrides Shabbat, but ultimately, he deemed that difficult and turned to an alternative source, yet provided no reason, neither for his initial statement nor for his second statement.
  Rather, we can explain that this is what he is saying: “On the eighth day he shall be circumcised” applies even on Shabbat. And how do I fulfill: “He who desecrates it shall surely die”? That is referring to the other prohibited labors besides circumcision; however, circumcision overrides Shabbat.
  What is the reason for this? It is derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as leprosy, which overrides the Temple service, as a priest who is a leper may not serve in the Temple and it is prohibited to cut off the symptoms of leprosy,
  
  Daf 132b
  
  and the Temple service overrides Shabbat, as Shabbat offerings are sacrificed at their appointed time, and nevertheless circumcision overrides leprosy, i.e., if there were symptoms of leprosy on the foreskin of the baby, one circumcises the child even though he thereby violates the prohibition to cut off symptoms of leprosy; therefore, with regard to Shabbat, which is overridden by the Temple service, is it not logical that circumcision, which is so stringent that it overrides leprosy, overrides Shabbat as well? This was the <i>tanna’s</i> reasoning at the outset.
  And what was the reason the <i>tanna</i> said: Or perhaps, and questioned his previous statement? He reconsidered and said: And from where do we know that leprosy is more stringent than Shabbat? Perhaps Shabbat is more stringent, as it includes the severe punishments of <i>karet</i> and execution by stoning, and numerous warnings pertaining to it throughout the Torah. Alternatively, and from where do we know that the reason the Temple service does not override the prohibition of leprosy is specifically because leprosy is more stringent than the Temple service? Perhaps the Temple service does not override the prohibition of leprosy because a man afflicted with leprosy is unfit to perform the Temple service and not due to the stringency of the prohibition to remove symptoms of leprosy from one’s body. And if so, how do I establish the verse: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3)? That it applies to days other than Shabbat. Consequently, the <i>tanna</i> cited additional proof from that which the Torah states: “On the day,” indicating that circumcision is performed even on Shabbat.
  The Sages taught: Circumcision overrides leprosy. The foreskin is cut even if it has symptoms of leprosy on it, despite the fact that there is a Torah prohibition to cut off symptoms of leprosy. This is the <i>halakha</i> both when the circumcision takes place at its appointed time, on the eighth day, or when it is not performed at its appointed time but after the eighth day. However, circumcision overrides a Festival only when performed at its appointed time.
  The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), since this verse is stated in general terms, it teaches that even though there is a bright white leprous spot there, he should cut it. And how do I establish the verse: “Take care with regard to the plague of leprosy to take great care and to perform in accordance with all that the priests, the Levites, instruct you; as I commanded them you shall take care to perform” (Deuteronomy 24:8)? Does usage of the term “take care” indicate that there is a negative mitzva that prohibits cutting off symptoms of leprosy? We establish this prohibition as applying in other places, other than the place of a circumcision.
  The <i>tanna</i> asks: Or perhaps that is not the case; rather, this prohibition applies even in the place of circumcision, and how do I validate the verse: “The flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised”? It applies when there is no bright white leprous spot on the foreskin. So that we will not interpret the verse that way, the verse states the superfluous word flesh. It would have been sufficient to state: His foreskin shall be circumcised, but instead the verse stated: “The flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised,” indicating that the foreskin must be removed even though there is a bright white spot there.
  Rava said: Initially, what did this <i>tanna</i> find acceptable, and ultimately, what did he find difficult? At first he assumed that the mitzva of circumcision is more stringent, but he ultimately rejected this assumption with no explanation.
  Rather, this is what he is saying: Initially he held that the phrase: The flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised teaches that it is permitted to remove the foreskin even though there is a bright white spot there. And how do I validate the following verse: Take care with regard to the plague of leprosy? It applies in other places, aside from the place of circumcision, but circumcision overrides leprosy. What is the reason for this? It is derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as Shabbat is stringent and nevertheless circumcision overrides it, all the more so that circumcision overrides leprosy, which is less stringent than Shabbat.
  And what was the reason for the term or perhaps that the <i>tanna</i> is saying to question his previous statement? He reconsidered and said: From where do we know that Shabbat is more stringent? Perhaps leprosy is more stringent, as leprosy overrides the Temple service, as stated earlier, and the Temple service overrides Shabbat. Therefore, the verse states the additional word flesh, to teach that the foreskin is removed even though there is a bright white leprous spot there.
  The Gemara cites another version of Rava’s comments. Initially the <i>tanna</i> thought that circumcision overrides leprosy. What is the reason for this? He relied on the principle that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a negative mitzva. And what was the reason the <i>tanna</i> is saying: Or perhaps to question his previous statement? He reconsidered and said: Say that we say that a positive mitzva comes and overrides a negative mitzva when there is a negative mitzva alone. However, this cutting off leprosy is prohibited by both a positive mitzva and a negative mitzva. And how do I establish the verse: The flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised? It applies only when there is no bright white spot on the foreskin. Therefore, the verse states the additional word flesh in order to emphasize that the foreskin is removed, even though there is a bright white spot there.
  The Gemara questions the derivation from the word flesh: This works out well with regard to the circumcision of an adult who has not yet been circumcised, as the word flesh is written with regard to adults in the verse: “And an uncircumcised male who will not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from its people; My covenant he has broken” (Genesis 17:14). Similarly, it works out well with regard to a minor who is circumcised on the eighth day, as the superfluous word flesh is also written with regard to him. However, with regard to a person at an intermediate stage of life, i.e., a child who was not circumcised on the eighth day but has not yet reached majority, from where do we derive that his circumcision overrides leprosy? The Torah explicitly mandates his circumcision: “Circumcise for yourselves every male” (Genesis 17:10). However, that verse does not employ the term flesh.
  Abaye said: It is derived from a combination of the two sources about the status of a child at the intermediate stage, from the common denominator between an eight-day-old and one who reached majority. From an adult alone, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an intermediate child cannot be derived, as an adult is punishable by <i>karet</i> if he fails to circumcise himself, but an intermediate child is not punishable by <i>karet</i>. Likewise, from the case of an eight-day-old child, the case of an intermediate child cannot be derived; since the circumcision at its time overrides Shabbat it may also override leprosy. However, the common denominator between an eight-day-old and an adult is that they are circumcised and their circumcision overrides leprosy. So too, all who are circumcised, including those in the intermediate stage, override leprosy.
  Rava said: No verse is required to teach that circumcision at its appointed time overrides leprosy, as it is derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as circumcision overrides Shabbat, which is more stringent than leprosy, all the more so that circumcision overrides leprosy.
  Rav Safra said to Rava: From where do we know that Shabbat is more stringent? Perhaps leprosy is more stringent, as leprosy overrides the Temple service, and the Temple service overrides Shabbat. Rava answered: There, when leprosy overrides the Temple service, it is not because leprosy is more stringent; rather, it is because the man afflicted with leprosy is unfit for the Temple service. Rav Safra asked: Why is he unfit? Let him cut off his bright white leprous spot and serve. Rava answered: He would remain unfit to serve, as he is lacking immersion. In order to purify himself for service in the Temple, he must immerse himself and wait until the following day. In the meantime he is unfit.
  Rav Safra raised a difficulty: It works out well if we are referring to impure symptoms of leprosy, as even one who removes them must immerse afterward. However, with regard to pure symptoms of leprosy, there is a prohibition to cut off the symptoms even though there is no impurity. They have the legal status of blemishes that invalidate a priest from serving until it is cured. Once the bright white spot is removed, he may immediately serve in the Temple without immersion. What is there to say in that case?
  Rather, Rav Ashi said that this is the reason that leprosy overrides the Temple service: Where do we say that a positive mitzva overrides a negative mitzva? It is in cases like circumcision in a case of leprosy, or alternatively, ritual fringes and diverse kinds of wool and linen, as at the time the negative mitzva is uprooted, the positive mitzva is fulfilled in the very same action, e.g., when the ritual fringes are woolen and will be attached to a linen garment, a prohibited mixture is created. However, here, in the case of a person afflicted with pure symptoms of leprosy cutting off his symptoms to enable his involvement in the Temple service, it is different, at the time the negative mitzva is uprooted, the positive mitzva is not yet fulfilled, as cutting off the symptoms is only a preliminary action that enables him to serve. In that case, the positive mitzva does not override the negative one.
  The Gemara points out that this disagreement between Rava and Rav Safra
  
  Daf 133a
  
  is a dispute of <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The term flesh comes to teach that even though there is a bright white spot there, one should circumcise; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation from the word flesh in the verse. Rather, the same law can be derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If circumcision overrides Shabbat, which is stringent, all the more so that it overrides leprosy.
  We earlier learned that the Master said: When the verse states the term flesh, it comes to teach that even though there is a bright white spot there, one should circumcise; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan agrees with this <i>halakha</i>, albeit for a different reason. The Gemara addresses the fundamental question: Why do I need a verse to derive this? The removal of leprous skin is an unintentional act. One does not intend to cut the symptom of leprosy; he intended to circumcise the baby. And the general rule is that an unintentional act is permitted. Consequently, there is no need for a special derivation in this case.
  Abaye said: This derivation is only necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional act is prohibited. Rava said: Even if you say that it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of: Cut off its head and will it not die, i.e., an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor ensued as an inevitable consequence. In that case, the one who performs the action cannot claim that the outcome was unintended. In the case of circumcising a leprous foreskin, the removal of leprosy is an inevitable consequence of the circumcision. The Gemara asks: And does Abaye not accept this reasoning? Wasn’t it Abaye and Rava who both say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that in the case of: If you cut off its head will it not die? The Gemara answers: After Abaye heard this principle from Rava, he accepted it.
  Some teach that which Abaye and Rava said as referring to this <i>baraita</i>. The verse states: “Take heed with regard to the plague of leprosy that you observe diligently and do in accordance with all that the priests, the Levites, instruct you; as I commanded them you shall take care to do” (Deuteronomy 24:8). The Sages derived from here that to do something in order to remove leprosy directly, you may not do; but you may do something that will indirectly remove one’s symptom, such as tying a thick rope on his foot, and placing a rod on his shoulder. This is permitted even though there is a bright white spot present, and if the bright white spot is thereby removed, it is removed.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to address this? It is an unintentional act, and an unintentional act is permitted. Abaye said: This derivation is only necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional act is prohibited. Rava said: Even if you say that it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an unintentional act is permitted, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda in the case of: If you cut off its head will it not die? The Gemara asks: And does Abaye not accept this reasoning? Wasn’t it Abaye and Rava who both say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that in the case of: Cut off its head and will it not die? The Gemara answers: After Abaye heard this principle from Rava, he accepted it.
  The Gemara clarifies: According to Abaye’s initial understanding of the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, i.e., even the inevitable consequence of an unintended act is permitted, what does he do with this term flesh, which appears in the verse with regard to circumcision? Rav Amram said: This term teaches that even in a case where the person who is circumcising himself says explicitly that his intention is also to cut off the bright white spot, the circumcision nonetheless overrides the prohibition to remove symptoms of leprosy.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well in the case of an adult who intends to perform the prohibited act. With regard to the circumcision of a minor, who has no intention at all, what is there to say, i.e., how does this teaching apply? Rav Mesharshiya said: The teaching applies in a case where the father of the circumcised child says that his intention is to cut off his son’s bright white leprous spot.
  The Gemara asks: In that case, if there is another person present who can circumcise the child, let the other person perform the circumcision. Presumably the other person will not intend to excise the bright white spot but rather will intend to fulfill the mitzva of circumcision, and no transgression will be committed, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Any place that you find positive and negative mitzvot that clash with one another, if you can find some way to fulfill both, that is preferable; and if that is not possible, the positive mitzva will come and override the negative mitzva. Here it is possible to fulfill both the positive and negative mitzvot by having another person perform the circumcision. The Gemara answers: This is a case where there is no other person to perform circumcision; only the boy’s father can circumcise him. Therefore, a particular verse is needed to teach us that the mitzva of circumcision overrides the prohibition to cut off symptoms of leprosy.
  We learned earlier that the Master said that circumcision only overrides a Festival when the circumcision takes place at its proper time, on the eighth day after birth. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived?
  Ḥizkiya said, and likewise one of the Sages of the school of Ḥizkiya taught: The verse states with regard to the Paschal lamb: “And you shall not leave any of it until morning; but that which remains of it until morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10). This verse contains a superfluous phrase, as the Torah did not need to state until morning the second time; it would have been sufficient to state: But that which remains of it you shall burn with fire. Rather, why does the Torah state until morning? The verse comes to provide him with the second morning for burning. Leftover meat of the Paschal lamb is not burned on the following morning, which is a Festival, but rather on the following day, the first of the intermediate days of the Festival. Even though the labor of kindling a fire is not entirely prohibited on a Festival, as one may cook and bake, it is derived from here that kindling a fire is permitted only for the purpose of preparing food for the immediate needs of the day and not for purposes that can be postponed until the intermediate days. Similarly, since circumcision involves a prohibited labor, it is permitted on the eighth day only when there is no option of postponing it. Otherwise, doing so is prohibited.
  Abaye said there is a different source for the fact that only circumcision on the eighth day overrides the Festival, as the verse stated: “The burnt-offering of each Shabbat on its Shabbat in addition to the continual burnt-offering and its libation” (Numbers 28:10). This verse teaches that one may not sacrifice the burnt-offering of a weekday on Shabbat, and one may not sacrifice the burnt-offering of a weekday on a Festival. Although slaughtering is permitted on a Festival for sustenance, it is nevertheless prohibited to slaughter animals for sacrifices other than those specifically mandated on the Festival. Temple service only overrides prohibited labor in the case of Temple service that is an essential obligation of that day. Similarly, circumcision only overrides the prohibition of labor when it is an essential obligation of that day, which is the case only on the eighth day; it is not the case after the eighth day.
  Rava said there is a different proof, as the verse states with regard to Festivals: “And in the first day there shall be to you a holy convocation, and in the seventh day a holy convocation; no manner of work shall be done in them, save that which every man must eat; that alone may be done for you” (Exodus 12:16). The superfluous term “that” in the verse teaches the following: That which is necessary for food preparation itself is permitted and not actions that facilitate food preparation or which prepare utensils necessary for eating. Similarly, “that alone may be done” teaches: Only food preparation may be performed and not circumcision that is not at its appointed time, which could have been derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. Therefore, the verse emphasizes that “that alone” may be performed, to teach that prohibited labors are permitted for sustenance on a Festival, and are not permitted for other mitzvot.
  Rav Ashi said: The mitzvot of a Festival include not only a negative mitzva but also a positive one. There is a prohibition of labor as well as <i>Shabbaton</i>, an obligation to engage in solemn rest, which is a positive mitzva, and therefore the observance of a Festival constitutes both a positive mitzva and a negative mitzva. And there is a principle that a positive mitzva does not override both a negative mitzva and a positive mitzva.
  We learned in the mishna: A principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat; however, any prohibited labor that cannot be performed on Shabbat eve overrides Shabbat. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in this matter.
  And we also learned in a mishna pertaining to the Paschal lamb, in a similar vein: A principle was stated by Rabbi Akiva: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat. By contrast, the slaughtering of the Paschal lamb, which cannot be performed on Shabbat eve, as it has a fixed time from the Torah, overrides Shabbat. And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.
  The Gemara comments: And both statements that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva were necessary. As had Rav taught us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva only with regard to circumcision, the conclusion would have been: It is specifically there that facilitators that can be performed the day before do not override Shabbat, as there is no punishment of <i>karet</i> if the circumcision is delayed, as liability for <i>karet</i> only applies when the child becomes obligated in mitzvot and chooses not to circumcise himself. However, with regard to the Paschal lamb, where there is <i>karet</i> for one who fails to offer the sacrifice at its proper time, one would say that those facilitators should override Shabbat. Therefore, it was necessary for Rav to state that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to the Paschal lamb.
  And if Rav had taught us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva only with regard to the Paschal lamb, the conclusion would have been that the reason that facilitators that can be performed on the eve of the Festival do not override the Festival is because thirteen covenants were not established upon the Paschal lamb, and it is therefore not so significant. However, with regard to circumcision, upon which thirteen covenants were established, the conclusion would have been that even actions that facilitate the mitzva that could have been performed on Shabbat eve should override Shabbat. It was therefore necessary to teach that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva in both cases.
  MISHNA: When the eighth day of a baby’s life occurs on Shabbat, he must be circumcised on that day. Therefore, one performs all the necessities of the circumcision, even on Shabbat: One circumcises the foreskin, and uncovers the skin by removing the thin membrane beneath the foreskin, and sucks the blood from the wound, and places on it both a bandage [<i>ispelanit</i>] and cumin as a salve.
  If one did not grind the cumin from Shabbat eve, he chews it with his teeth and places it on the place of circumcision as a salve. If he did not mix wine and oil on Shabbat eve, a mixture designed to heal and strengthen the child, this, the wine, is placed on the wound by itself and that, the oil, is placed by itself.
  And on Shabbat one may not make a pouch to place over the circumcision as a bandage <i>ab initio</i>, but he may wrap a rag over it as a dressing. If he did not prepare the bandage on Shabbat eve by bringing it to the place where the circumcision was performed, he wraps the bandage on his finger and brings it on Shabbat, even from a different courtyard. While the Sages permitted it to be brought, they required that it be performed in an unusual fashion, by wearing it in the manner of a garment.
  
  Daf 133b
  
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Since the mishna is teaching all of them, i.e., enumerated all the requirements of circumcision, when the mishna added: One performs all the requirements of circumcision even on Shabbat, what did it come to include?
  The Gemara answers: It comes to include that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who circumcises on Shabbat, as long as he is engaged in the circumcision, he may return and remove shreds of skin that were not cut properly. This is the ruling both for shreds of skin and flesh that invalidate the circumcision if they are not cut, i.e., the child is not considered circumcised if they remain, and for shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision if they are not cut. But if the circumcisor has withdrawn from engaging in the mitzva of circumcision, he may return for shreds that invalidate the circumcision if they were not cut, as the mitzva has not yet been properly performed, but he may not return for shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision if they are not cut. Consequently, when the mishna refers to all the requirements of circumcision, it means that as long as one is still involved in the act of circumcision, one may go back and remove even pieces of skin that do not invalidate the circumcision.
  With regard to this law, the Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that if one has already withdrawn from a mitzva he may not return to engage in its performance? Which <i>tanna</i> asserts that as long as a person is involved in a mitzva whose performance overrides Shabbat, he may complete it; however, if he is no longer involved in the mitzva, he may not exceed the minimum requirements if doing so would desecrate Shabbat? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case of the fourteenth of Nisan, the day the Paschal lamb is sacrificed, that occurs on Shabbat, one flays the Paschal lamb until he exposes the breast, in order to remove the portions that are offered on the altar, but one does not flay anymore, as it is not necessary for the mitzva of the day; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And the Rabbis say: One may even flay the entire hide.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: From where do you draw this comparison? Perhaps Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, only stated his opinion that one may do no more than the minimum requirement there, with regard to the Paschal lamb, because we do not need to fulfill the mitzva of: “This is my God and I will glorify Him” (Exodus 15:2). The manner in which the animal is flayed does not impact the mitzva of the sacrifice. However, here, with regard to circumcision, where we need to fulfill the mitzva of: “This is my God and I will glorify Him,” which requires performing the circumcision in a beautiful manner, indeed, Rabbi Yishmael would agree that the mitzva must be performed as aesthetically as possible.
  What is the source for the requirement of: “This is my God and I will glorify Him”? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “This is my God and I will glorify Him [<i>anveihu</i>], the Lord of my father and I will raise Him up.” The Sages interpreted <i>anveihu</i> homiletically as linguistically related to <i>noi</i>, beauty, and interpreted the verse: Beautify yourself before Him in mitzvot. Even if one fulfills the mitzva by performing it simply, it is nonetheless proper to perform the mitzva as beautifully as possible. Make before Him a beautiful <i>sukka</i>, a beautiful <i>lulav</i>, a beautiful <i>shofar</i>, beautiful ritual fringes, beautiful parchment for a Torah scroll, and write in it in His name in beautiful ink, with a beautiful quill by an expert scribe, and wrap the scroll in beautiful silk fabric.
  Abba Shaul says: <i>Ve’anveihu</i> should be interpreted as if it were written in two words: <i>Ani vaHu</i>, me and Him [God]. Be similar, as it were, to Him, the Almighty: Just as He is compassionate and merciful, so too should you be compassionate and merciful. In any case, there is no proof from Rabbi Yishmael’s statement with regard to the Paschal lamb that he would say the same with regard to circumcision, as in that case, he might agree that fulfilling the mitzva beautifully justifies overriding Shabbat.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: This should be understood differently. In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i> with regard to circumcision? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As we learned in a mishna: Whether the new moon was clearly seen by everyone or whether it was not clearly seen, one may desecrate Shabbat in order to sanctify the New Moon. Eyewitnesses who saw the appearance of the moon may desecrate Shabbat in order to go to court and testify. Rabbi Yosei says: If the moon was clearly seen, they may not desecrate Shabbat for it, since other witnesses, located nearer to the court, will certainly testify. If these distant witnesses go to court to testify, they will desecrate Shabbat unnecessarily. Apparently, Rabbi Yosei holds that if the basic requirements of a mitzva have already been fulfilled, one may no longer desecrate Shabbat in its performance.
  The Gemara rejects this: From where do you draw this comparison? Perhaps Rabbi Yosei only stated his opinion there, in the case of sanctification of the New Moon, because there no allowance was made for Shabbat to be overridden. Given that the moon was clearly seen and testimony to that effect could have been delivered easily, there was no need for additional witnesses to come and desecrate Shabbat, and the prohibition to desecrate Shabbat remained in place. However, here, in the case of circumcision, where allowance was made for Shabbat desecration, as it is permitted and required to perform circumcision on Shabbat at its appointed time, indeed, it would be permitted to complete the circumcision even according to Rabbi Yosei.
  Rather, the Sages of Neharde’a say: This ruling is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei. As we learned in a mishna: Four priests would enter the Sanctuary every Shabbat to arrange the showbread, two of whom had two orders of six loaves each in their hands, and two had two bowls of frankincense in their hands. And four priests would precede them; two came to take the two orders of bread left on the table from the previous week, and two came to take the two bowls of frankincense. Next, those bringing the loaves and bowls into the Sanctuary would stand in the north of the Sanctuary, facing south, while those carrying the loaves and bowls out would stand in the south of the Sanctuary, facing north. These slide the old bread along the table, and these place the new bread on the table, and as a result, the handbreadth of this one would be alongside the handbreadth of that one, so that the requisite amount of bread would always be present on the table, as it is stated: “And you shall place on the table showbread before Me continuously” (Exodus 25:30).
  Rabbi Yosei said: Even if these priests were first to take the old bread off the table entirely, and only afterward were these priests to place the new ones on the table, this too would fulfill the requirement that the showbread be on the table continuously. It is unnecessary to ensure the uninterrupted presence of the showbread on the table. Apparently, the Rabbis hold that even a moment’s break in the performance of a mitzva is deemed an interruption. The same principle applies to circumcision. Once one withdrew and is no longer engaged in its performance, it is as though he completed the mitzva and he may no longer return to it.
  The Sages taught: We complete the cutting of the foreskin, and if he did not complete the cutting he is punishable by <i>karet</i>. The Gemara asks: Who is punishable by <i>karet</i>? Rav Kahana said: The craftsman, i.e., the circumcisor. If he failed to complete the circumcision properly on Shabbat he is punishable by <i>karet</i>, as he wounded the baby on Shabbat without fulfilling the mitzva circumcision.
  Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: Why should the craftsman be liable? Let him say to those present: I performed half the mitzva; now you perform the other half of the mitzva. I am not liable, as I was engaged in performance of a mitzva, even though I did not complete it. Rather, Rav Pappa said: The reference here is not to circumcision on Shabbat, but rather to the mitzva of circumcision in general. The one liable for <i>karet</i> is an adult whose circumcision was not completed. He is not considered to have been circumcised according to <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, he is punishable by <i>karet</i>, like one who was not circumcised at all.
  Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: This cannot be, as if so what is the <i>baraita</i> teaching? The fact that an adult is liable for <i>karet</i> is explicitly written in the verse: “And an uncircumcised male who will not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that soul shall be cut off from its people; My covenant he has broken” (Genesis 17:14). Rather, Rav Ashi said: Actually, it refers to the craftsman who performed the partial circumcision on Shabbat, and it is a case where he came to perform the circumcision at twilight on Shabbat day, just before the conclusion of Shabbat, and those present said to him: You will not manage to complete the circumcision before the conclusion of Shabbat, and he said to them: I will manage. And he performed the circumcision and did not manage to complete the mitzva before Shabbat ended. It turns out that he made a wound in the child but did not fulfill the mitzva. And since he was forewarned not to do so, he is therefore punishable by <i>karet</i> like anyone who violates Shabbat not for the purpose of performing a mitzva.
  We learned in the mishna that one sucks blood from the wound after the circumcision was performed on Shabbat. Rav Pappa said: A craftsman who does not suck the blood after every circumcision is a danger to the child undergoing circumcision, and we remove him from his position as circumcisor.
  The Gemara comments: This is obvious. Given that one desecrates Shabbat to suck the blood, which involves performance of a prohibited labor, obviously, failure to do so poses a danger. Desecration of Shabbat would not be permitted if it was not a life-threatening situation. The Gemara answers: This is not an absolute proof. Lest you say that this blood is collected and contained in place, and one who removes that which is pooled in its place does not perform the subcategory of the prohibited labor of threshing on Shabbat, i.e., drawing blood; that is the reason sucking the blood is permitted, not due to any danger involved in failing to do so. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this blood is attached and flowing and not merely pooled. One who draws it out performs an act that is generally prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, and it is nonetheless permitted due to danger to the child.
  And it is similar to the <i>halakhot</i> of a bandage and cumin stated in the mishna. Just as in the case of a bandage and cumin, failure to do what is necessary with these items poses a danger to the child, here too, if he does not perform the sucking after circumcision, it poses a danger to the child; Shabbat is overridden in cases of danger.
  We learned in the mishna: And on Shabbat one places on the wound from the circumcision a bandage. Abaye said: My nurse said to me: A bandage for all wounds should be made from seven parts fat and one part wax. Rava said: A bandage should be made from wax and sap of a tree.
  When Rava taught this cure in Meḥoza, the sons of Manyomei the doctor tore their clothes in misery, as he taught everyone how to make a bandage, and their services would no longer be required. Rava said to them: I left you one cure that I did not reveal, with which you can make a profit, for Shmuel said: One who washes his face and does not wipe it a lot will develop
  
  Daf 134a
  
  sores on his flesh. What is his remedy? Let him wash extensively in beet water, in which beets have been boiled.
  We learned in the mishna: If one did not grind the cumin from Shabbat eve, he chews it with his teeth and places it on the place of circumcision as a salve. The Sages taught: There are actions that may not be performed in preparation for a circumcision on Shabbat but may be performed in preparation for it on a Festival. For example: One grinds cumin for it, and one mixes wine and oil for it.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is different about cumin that makes it permissible to grind it on a Festival? The fact that it is suitable for use to spice a pot, in cooking. Based on that explanation, mixed wine and oil are also suitable for use on Shabbat for a sick person, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not mix wine and oil for a sick person on Shabbat. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Meir: One may even mix wine and oil on Shabbat.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: It happened on one occasion that Rabbi Meir had intestinal pain on Shabbat, and we sought to mix wine and oil for him as treatment and he did not let us do so. We said to him: Will your statement be negated in your lifetime? You permit mixing these ingredients for a sick person. He said to us: Even though I say this and my colleagues say that, and I do not retract my statement, still, in all my days I have never been so presumptuous as to violate the statements of my colleagues and act in accordance with my opinion. Apparently, it was he who was stringent with regard to himself, but for everyone it is permitted.
  The Gemara answers that there is a distinction between the cases: There, for medicinal purposes, it need not be beaten, whereas here, for circumcision, it must be beaten. The Gemara asks: Here too, let us prepare the mixture but not beat it. The Gemara answers: That is in fact the custom, and that is what the mishna teaches: He places this by itself and that by itself, meaning that he may mix the wine and oil, but he may not beat them.
  The Sages taught with regard to labor on a Festival: One may not strain mustard in its strainer, and one may not sweeten it with coal. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: In what way is this different from that which we learned in a mishna: One may place an egg in a mustard strainer on Shabbat?
  Rav Yosef said to him: There is a distinction between the cases, that there, in the case of the egg, the act does not appear like selecting, whereas here, in the case of the mustard, the act appears like selecting. Straining an egg does not actually separate it into its component parts. Straining mustard does.
  We learned that one may not sweeten the mustard with coal. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may sweeten it with coal. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is a distinction: There, where it is permitted, it is referring to the case of a metal coal, as extinguishing metal coals is not prohibited by Torah law, whereas here, where it is prohibited, it is referring to the case of a wooden coal.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: In what way is mustard placed on coals, which is prohibited, different from meat placed on coals, which is permitted even if the coals are extinguished by the blood dripping from the meat? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: The two cases are not similar, as there, with regard to meat, it is not possible to accomplish this in any other way, but here, with regard to mustard, it is possible to accomplish this in another way.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether it is permissible to curdle cheese on a Festival? He said to him: It is prohibited. Abaye asked: In what way is this different from kneading dough, which is permitted on a Festival? Rav Yosef said to him: There, with regard to dough, it is not possible to bake bread before a Festival, as day-old bread is inferior to fresh bread. Therefore, kneading dough to bake bread on a Festival is permitted. Here, with regard to cheese, it is possible to curdle cheese before a Festival and it will not deteriorate in any way.
  Abaye challenged this distinction: Didn’t the Sages of Neharde’a say that one-day-old cheese is excellent? Curdling cheese on a Festival should be permitted? Rav Yosef responded: This is what they are saying: Even one-day-old cheese is excellent; however, cheese that aged longer is better. Therefore, they did not permit curdling cheese on a Festival, as it is not necessary for the Festival.
  We learned in the mishna: And on Shabbat one may not make a pouch to place over the circumcision as a bandage <i>ab initio</i>. Abaye said: My mother, actually his foster mother who was the nursemaid who raised him, told me: With regard to that pouch, placed as a bandage over the circumcision of a baby, let one place it on the upper side with the threads below, lest a thread from it stick to the place of circumcision and cause the baby to become one with a severed urethra. The Gemara relates that Abaye’s mother would make a pouch that covered half the place of circumcision so that it would not be damaged through contact with the threads emerging from the edge of the pouch. Abaye said: If this baby does not have a pouch to put on the place of the circumcision, let one bring a worn-out garment with a hem, and wrap the hem under, and fold the garment over, so that the threads from the worn-out garment will not adhere to the wound.
  And Abaye also said: My mother told me: In the case of a baby the location of whose exit, i.e., anus, is unknown, as it is obscured by skin, let one rub it with oil and stand it before the light of the day. And where it appears transparent, let one tear it with a barley grain widthwise and lengthwise. However, one may not tear it with a metal implement because it causes infection and swelling. And Abaye said that my mother told me: If a baby refuses to nurse, that is because its mouth is cold and it is unable to nurse. What is his remedy? They should bring a cup of coals and place it near his mouth, so that his mouth will warm and he will nurse. And Abaye said that my mother told me: A baby that does not urinate, let one place him in a sieve and shake him, and he will urinate.
  And Abaye said: My nurse told me: If a baby is not breathing, let them bring his mother’s placenta and place the placenta on him, and the baby will breathe. And Abaye said that my mother told me: If a baby is too small, let them bring his mother’s placenta and rub the baby with it from the narrow end to the wide end of the placenta. And if the baby is strong, i.e., too large, let them rub the baby from the wide end of the placenta to the narrow end. And Abaye said that my mother told me: If a baby is red, that is because the blood has not yet been absorbed in him. In that case, let them wait until his blood is absorbed and then circumcise him. Likewise, if a baby is pale and his blood has not yet entered him, let them wait until his blood enters him and then circumcise him.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Natan said: On one occasion, I went to the coastal cities, and one woman came before me who circumcised her first son and he died, and she circumcised her second son and he died, and since she feared circumcising the third due to concern that he might die as well, she brought him before me. I saw that he was red. I said to her: Wait until his blood is absorbed into him. She waited until his blood was absorbed into him and then circumcised him, and he lived. And they would call him Natan the Babylonian after my name.
  Rabbi Natan further related: On another occasion I went to the state of Cappadocia, and a woman came before me who circumcised her first son and he died, and she circumcised her second son and he died. Since she feared circumcising the third due to concern that he might die as well, she brought him before me. I saw that he was pale. I looked at him and I could not see in him the blood of the covenant, i.e., he had a blood deficiency. I said to her: Wait until blood enters him. And she waited and then circumcised him, and he lived. And they would call his name Natan the Babylonian after my name.
  
  Daf 134b
  
  MISHNA: One may wash the baby on Shabbat, both before the circumcision and after the circumcision. And one may sprinkle hot water on him by hand but not with a vessel, in order to depart from the usual manner in which this is done. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may wash the baby on the third day following his circumcision, even if that third day occurs on Shabbat. On the third day following circumcision, the baby is considered to be in danger, as it is stated with regard to the men of Shekhem, who were circumcised: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain” (Genesis 34:25). This teaches us that on the third day the pain of circumcision poses a danger.
  If there is uncertainty whether or not to circumcise a baby, and likewise in the case of a hermaphrodite [<i>androginos</i>] baby, who possesses both male and female genitals, one does not desecrate Shabbat to perform the circumcision, since it is not certain that the circumcision is required. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so for a hermaphrodite baby.
  GEMARA: The Gemara questions the mishna’s statement that one may sprinkle hot water on the baby only by hand: Didn’t you say in the first clause of the mishna that one may wash him? If it is permissible to wash the baby, it is certainly permitted to sprinkle water on him with a vessel.
  It was Rav Yehuda and Rabba bar Avuh who both said that this mishna is taught employing the style known as: How. In this style, the latter clause clarifies the former. It should be understood as follows: One may wash the baby both before circumcision and after circumcision. How may one wash him? One sprinkles water on him by hand, but not with a vessel.
  Rava said: Doesn’t it teach the phrase one may wash, and washing is not sprinkling. Rather, Rava said that this is what the mishna is teaching: One may wash the baby, both before circumcision and after circumcision. On the first day, one may wash him in his usual manner. However, on the third day following his circumcision, if that third day occurs on Shabbat, one may sprinkle water on him only by hand, but not with a vessel, and one may certainly not wash him. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may even wash the baby on the third day following his circumcision, if that third day occurs on Shabbat, because the baby is considered to be in a state of danger, as it is stated: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain.”
  A <i>baraita</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rava: One may wash the baby, both before circumcision and after circumcision. On the first day, the baby is washed in its usual manner; and on the third day that occurs on Shabbat, one sprinkles water on him by hand but not with a vessel, and one may not wash him. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may even wash the baby on the third day that occurs on Shabbat. And although there is no absolute proof for this matter, there is an allusion to this matter, as it is stated: “And it came to pass on the third day, when they were in pain.”
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And when one sprinkles water, he may not sprinkle it with a cup or with a bowl or with any other vessel; rather, he does so by hand. The Gemara comments: We have arrived at the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, as this clarification of how the sprinkling was performed is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. Rather, it is an elaboration of the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>.
  The Gemara comments: What is the meaning of the <i>baraita’s</i> statement: And although there is no absolute proof for this matter, there is an allusion to this matter? Why does the <i>baraita</i> refer to it as a mere allusion when it appears to offer absolute proof that the pain of circumcision is significant on the third day? The Gemara answers: Indeed, it is not a complete proof, because an adult’s flesh does not heal immediately, but a child’s flesh heals immediately. Perhaps a baby is not considered to be in danger on the third day.
  The Gemara relates: A certain person came before Rava to ask a question with regard to washing a baby after circumcision. Rava ruled in accordance with its halakhic ruling, that everyone agrees that it is permitted to wash the baby on the first day. Afterward, Rava became ill. He said: Why did I involve myself in the opinions of the Elders? The Sages of the previous generation, Rav Yehuda and Rabba bar Avuh, articulated the <i>halakha</i> in a different, more stringent manner. Rava felt that his illness was divine punishment for taking their opinions lightly.
  The Sages said to Rava: Wasn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of the Master, so why are you concerned with regard to your ruling, which is correct? Rava said to them: The language of the mishna is precise according to their opinion.
  From where can this be concluded? From the fact that it is stated: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: One may wash the baby on the third day that occurs on Shabbat. Granted, if you say that the first <i>tanna</i> is saying only that one may sprinkle, but prohibited washing the baby even on the first day, that explains what Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him in response: One may wash. However, if you say that the first <i>tanna</i> is saying one may wash on the first day and one may sprinkle on the third day, this statement: Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says that one may wash, is imprecise. Rather, he should have said that one may even wash on the third day. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya is not disputing whether it is ever permitted to wash the baby, as the first <i>tanna</i> also agrees that it is permitted on the first day; the dispute is whether or not that leniency extends to the third day as well. Since a precise reading of the mishna supports the opinion of Rav Yehuda and Rabba bar Avuh, the <i>baraita</i> supporting Rava’s opinion is not sufficiently authoritative to supplant that understanding.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya.
  They discussed the following question in the West, in Eretz Yisrael: Is this referring to washing the entire body of the baby, or to washing the place of the circumcision?
  One of the Sages, named Rabbi Ya’akov, said to them: It stands to reason that it is referring to washing his entire body, as if it should enter your mind that the dispute is with regard to washing the place of the circumcision, is this washing any worse than placing hot water on a wound? Rav said: One does not prevent placing hot water and oil on a wound on Shabbat. Therefore, it should certainly be permissible to wash the place of the circumcision.
  Rav Yosef strongly objects to this proof: And is there no difference for you between hot water heated on Shabbat and hot water heated on Shabbat eve? Placing hot water heated on Shabbat eve on a wound violates only the rabbinic decree prohibiting healing; whereas heating hot water on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition.
  Rav Dimi strongly objects to Rav Yosef’s point: And from where do you know that here it is with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat that they disagree? Perhaps it is with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat eve that they disagree. Abaye said: I wanted to answer him, but Rav Yosef answered him first: The dispute is certainly with regard to heating water on Shabbat, because failure to do so poses a danger for the baby.
  It was also stated that when Ravin came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said, and others say that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, both with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat and with regard to hot water heated on Shabbat eve; both with regard to washing the entire body and with regard to washing the place of the circumcision alone, because failure to do so poses a danger for the baby.
  Rav’s statement with regard to the treatment of a wound on Shabbat was mentioned in passing. The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself. Rav said: One does not prevent placing hot water and oil on a wound on Shabbat. And Shmuel said: It is prohibited to place hot water or oil directly onto the wound, because it appears to be medical treatment. Rather, one places the hot water or the oil outside the wound, above it, and it flows and descends to the wound itself.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not place oil or hot water on soft material to place it on a wound on Shabbat. This supports the opinion of Shmuel, who prohibits performing actions that appear to be medical treatment. However, that ruling contradicts the opinion of Rav. The Gemara answers: There, the <i>baraita</i> prohibited placing oil or hot water on a rag, not because it appears to be medical treatment; rather, it is prohibited due to concern that one might perform the prohibited labor of squeezing.
  The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear that which was taught in a similar <i>baraita</i>: One may not place oil or hot water on soft material that is on a wound on Shabbat. This <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara answers: There too, it is prohibited due to concern for squeezing.
  A <i>baraita</i> was taught explicitly in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: One may not place oil or hot water on a wound on Shabbat; however, one may place it outside the wound so it flows and descends to the wound.
  The Sages taught another <i>baraita</i>: One may place a dry compress and a dry sponge on a wound, but not a dry reed and not dry rags. The Gemara comments: This is difficult, as the first statement with regard to rags, i.e., a dry compress which is a type of rag, contradicts the second statement with regard to rags, as the <i>baraita</i> first permitted placing rags on a wound and then prohibited doing so. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement, which prohibits placing rags on a wound, is referring to new rags, which heal the wound; that statement, which permits placing rags on a wound, is referring to old rags, which are not effective in healing. Abaye said: Conclude from this that these rags heal, which is useful information with regard to the treatment of wounds.
  We learned in the mishna: If there is uncertainty whether or not to circumcise a baby, and likewise in the case of a hermaphrodite baby, one does not desecrate Shabbat to perform the circumcision of a hermaphrodite, even on the eighth day following the birth. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), and they interpreted the verse: “His foreskin” indicates that only the circumcision of his halakhically certain foreskin overrides Shabbat,
  
  Daf 135a
  
  and the circumcision of a halakhically uncertain foreskin does not override Shabbat. And by means of the same inference from the term his foreskin, derive that circumcision of his definite foreskin overrides Shabbat, and circumcising the foreskin of a hermaphrodite baby, with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether or not circumcision is required, does not override Shabbat.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: The circumcision of a hermaphrodite overrides Shabbat, and if he is not circumcised, when he reaches majority he is punishable by <i>karet</i>. Rabbi Yehuda interprets the verse in the following manner: His definite foreskin overrides Shabbat; however, the circumcision of one born at twilight does not override Shabbat. And likewise, his definite foreskin overrides Shabbat; however, the circumcision of one who was born circumcised, i.e., without a foreskin, does not override Shabbat. With regard to a child in that condition, there is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, as Beit Shammai say: It is necessary to drip covenantal blood from him, in lieu of circumcision of the foreskin, and Beit Hillel say: It is not necessary, as he is already circumcised.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: That was not the subject of their dispute, as Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree over the fact that from one who was born circumcised, it is necessary to drip covenantal blood, because they agree that it is a case of a concealed foreskin. The child is not actually circumcised; it is just that his foreskin is not visible. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to a convert who for some reason was circumcised when he was a gentile and converted when he was already circumcised, as Beit Shammai say: Dripping covenantal blood from him is necessary, and Beit Hillel say: Dripping covenantal blood from him is not necessary, and he needs only a ritual immersion to complete his conversion.
  The Gemara cited above that the Master said: The circumcision of a halakhically uncertain foreskin does not override Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What case of uncertainty does this statement come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include that which the Sages taught: To circumcise a child born after seven months of pregnancy, one desecrates Shabbat, as it will likely live. However, to circumcise a child born after eight months of pregnancy, with regard to whom the presumption was that he would not survive, one may not desecrate Shabbat. And even for the circumcision of a child with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether the child was born after seven months and uncertainty whether the child was born after eight months, one may not desecrate Shabbat.
  And the Sages taught: A child born after eight months is like a stone with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of set-aside [<i>muktze</i>], and it is prohibited to move him. However, his mother may bend over the child and nurse him due to the danger that failure to nurse will cause her to fall ill.
  With regard to the halakhic ruling in the case of a child born circumcised, it is stated that the Sages disagree. Rav said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the explanation of the first <i>tanna</i>, i.e., in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s explanation of the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, that they disagree with regard to one born circumcised. Since we rule in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, it is not necessary to drip covenantal blood from a child born circumcised. And Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree with regard to one born circumcised, and that everyone agrees that it is necessary to drip covenantal blood from him.
  The Gemara relates that to Rav Adda bar Ahava there was this child that was born circumcised, and the time for his circumcision was on Shabbat. He inquired after thirteen ritual circumcisors, but they refused to circumcise him, until ultimately, he circumcised his son himself and rendered him one with a severed urethra. He did not know how to perform a circumcision and made too deep an incision. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: I have it coming to me, i.e., I deserve to be punished, as I violated the ruling of Rav, who ruled that one born circumcised does not even need covenantal blood drawn.
  Rav Naḥman said to him: And did he not violate the ruling of Shmuel? Say that Shmuel said that one is required to drip covenantal blood during the week, on Shabbat, did he say so? Certainly one does not desecrate Shabbat in that case. The Gemara explains that Rav Adda bar Ahava held differently, that in that case there is not merely a concern that perhaps there is a concealed foreskin. In that case, that there is definitely a concealed foreskin. Therefore, a form of circumcision must be performed on the child, and it overrides Shabbat. As it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute as to whether or not it is permitted to drip covenantal blood on Shabbat from a child born circumcised. Rabba said: We are concerned lest there is a concealed foreskin, and therefore there is uncertainty whether or not he is considered uncircumcised, and therefore it is prohibited to circumcise him on Shabbat. Rav Yosef said: In that case, there is certainly a concealed foreskin and therefore, it is permitted to circumcise him even on Shabbat.
  Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this line of reasoning? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar says: There is a tradition that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to a child who was born circumcised, that one is required to drip covenantal blood from him. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to whether or not to desecrate Shabbat on his behalf. Beit Shammai say: One desecrates Shabbat in order to circumcise him, and Beit Hillel say: One does not desecrate Shabbat in order to circumcise him. Rav Yosef concludes: Does this not prove by inference that the first <i>tanna</i>, whose opinion Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar disputes, holds that everyone agrees that one desecrates Shabbat on his behalf, and Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar disagrees and states that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute that very matter?
  The Gemara refutes this: And perhaps the first <i>tanna</i> is saying that everyone agrees that one may not desecrate Shabbat in that case, and Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar disagrees and holds that there is a dispute in this regard. The Gemara immediately rejects this assertion: If that is so, that Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar is coming to introduce an opinion that allows desecrating Shabbat to perform circumcision in this case, that is the opinion of Beit Shammai; did Rabbi Eliezer HaKappar come to teach us the reasoning of Beit Shammai? Their opinion is rejected as <i>halakha</i>, and there would be no purpose in making a statement simply to explain the opinion of Beit Shammai. The Gemara answers that proof is not absolute; perhaps this is what he is saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree with regard to this matter of circumcision of a baby born circumcised on Shabbat. They disagree with regard to the requirement to drip covenantal blood on a weekday.
  Rabbi Asi stated a principle: Any child whose birth renders his mother ritually impure due to childbirth is circumcised at eight days; and any child whose birth does not render his mother ritually impure due to childbirth, e.g., the birth was not natural, but by caesarean section, is not necessarily circumcised at eight days. As it is stated: “If a woman bears seed and gives birth to a male, she shall be impure seven days…and on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:2–3). This verse draws a parallel between the two issues, indicating that only a child whose birth renders his mother impure is circumcised on the eighth day.
  Abaye said to him: The early generations, from Abraham through the revelation at Sinai, will prove that the principle is not valid, as the birth of a male during that era did not render his mother ritually impure due to childbirth, as the <i>halakhot</i> of the impurity of childbirth were commanded at Sinai, and nevertheless, the child was circumcised at eight days, as stated in the Torah, in the book of Genesis.
  Rabbi Asi said to him: There is no proof from here, as when the Torah was later given,
  
  Daf 135b
  
  <i>halakha</i> was introduced. No proof can be cited from the observance of mitzvot prior to the revelation at Sinai.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Wasn’t it stated that there is a dispute with regard to this <i>halakha</i>? As it was taught with regard to a child born by caesarean section and one who has two foreskins, Rav Huna and Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav disputed their status. One said: One desecrates Shabbat on his behalf and performs the circumcision; and one said: One does not desecrate Shabbat on his behalf. They only disagree with regard to whether or not it is permissible to desecrate Shabbat on his behalf; however, with regard to circumcising him at eight days, in principle, we certainly circumcise him, even though the birth of a child by caesarean section does not render his mother ritually impure due to childbirth. The Gemara answers: The two disputes are interdependent. The one who holds that one desecrates Shabbat for this child’s circumcision also holds that one must circumcise him on the eighth day. The one who holds that one may not desecrate Shabbat for this child’s circumcision holds that one need not circumcise him on the eighth day.
  The Gemara comments: The issue of Rabbi Asi’s statement that the obligation to circumcise after eight days depends upon whether or not his birth renders his mother ritually impure due to childbirth is parallel to a tannaitic dispute, as we learned: There is a home-born child of a Canaanite maidservant born in a Jewish home, who has the legal status of a Canaanite slave and his Jewish owner is obligated to circumcise him, who is circumcised at the age of one day, i.e., immediately after birth; and there is a home-born child circumcised at eight days. And there is a slave purchased in a money transaction who is circumcised at one day, and there is a slave purchased in a money transaction who is circumcised at eight days.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: There is a home-born child who is circumcised at one; and there is a home-born child circumcised at eight. How so? If a Jew purchased a pregnant maidservant and she then gave birth to a child while in his possession; that is a slave purchased in a money transaction who is circumcised at eight days, as the fetus was purchased along with the maidservant. If he purchased a maidservant who had already given birth and purchased her child along with her, he is obligated to circumcise the child as soon as the child enters his possession; this is a slave purchased in a money transaction, who is circumcised at one day.
  And likewise, there is a home-born child circumcised at eight days. How so? If he bought a maidservant and she became pregnant in his possession and gave birth; that is a home-born child circumcised at eight days. Rav Ḥama says there is a distinction: If the maidservant gave birth and he subsequently had her immerse for the purpose of becoming a maidservant, that is a home-born child circumcised at one day. But if he had her immerse and she then gave birth; that is a home-born child circumcised at eight days.
  And the first <i>tanna</i> does not distinguish between whether he had her immerse and she then gave birth, or whether she gave birth and he then had her immerse. Apparently, even though the child’s birth does not render his mother ritually impure due to childbirth, as she is not obligated in mitzvot before immersing and she is not susceptible to ritual impurity of childbirth, he is circumcised at eight days. The dispute between Rabbi Ḥama and the first <i>tanna</i> revolves around the <i>halakha</i> stated by Rabbi Asi.
  With regard to the dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>, Rava said: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥama, cases can be found of a home-born child circumcised at one day, a home-born child circumcised at eight days, a slave purchased in a money transaction circumcised at one day, and a slave purchased in a money transaction circumcised at eight days, in the following manner: If a maidservant gave birth and he subsequently had her immerse, that is the case of a home-born child circumcised at one day. If he had her immerse and she then gave birth, that is the case of a home-born child circumcised at eight days.
  A slave purchased in a money transaction is circumcised at eight days in a case where a Jew purchased a pregnant maidservant and thereby paid for and purchased the fetus as well, and then had her immerse, and she then gave birth. A slave purchased in a money transaction is circumcised at one day in a case where that person purchased a maidservant, and that person, i.e., someone else, bought her fetus; since the owner of the fetus has no share in its mother, the child may be circumcised immediately after birth.
  However, according to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, granted that all the cases can be found; however, how can the case of a home-born child circumcised at one day be found?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: It can be found in the case of one who purchases a maidservant for the purpose of purchasing rights to her fetus without purchasing the maidservant herself.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of the one who said that a transaction to purchase an item for its product is not a transaction to purchase the item itself, i.e., one who purchased a field for its fruit did not purchase the field itself. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that a transaction to purchase an item for its product is a transaction to purchase the item itself, what can be said, as he does not distinguish between the purchase of the maidservant herself and the purchase of the children that she bears?
  Rav Mesharshiya said: According to this opinion, it must be explained as referring to one who purchases a maidservant on condition that he will not have her immerse. They can stipulate that he will not have her immerse as a maidservant and that she will remain a gentile. In that case, the child is a slave born to a Jew, and the mitzva of circumcision is in effect immediately upon birth.
  The Gemara cites a related <i>baraita</i> where it was taught that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to people, any child that remains alive thirty days after birth is no longer suspected of being a stillborn, and is assumed to be a regular child who will go on living. Proof is cited from that which is stated with regard to the laws of redemption and valuations: “And their redemption, from a month old you shall redeem according to your valuation, five shekels of silver, according to the shekel of the Sanctuary; it is twenty <i>gera</i>” (Numbers 18:16), indicating that no value is ascribed to an infant less than a month old, as its viability is uncertain. Likewise, a newborn animal that survives for eight days is no longer suspected of being a stillborn, as it is stated: “When a bullock or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27).
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference: If the child did not yet remain alive for thirty days, it is considered an uncertainty whether or not it is a stillborn with regard to several <i>halakhot</i>?
  
  Daf 136a
  
  If so, with regard to circumcision, how can we circumcise him? Perhaps he is a stillborn and one may not desecrate Shabbat for his circumcision.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: One may circumcise him whichever way you look at it, based on the following calculation: If he is a child who will live, the circumcisor may well circumcise the child, and if not, if the child is a stillborn and the circumcisor is merely cutting flesh, one who cuts the flesh of a corpse or the flesh of one with the legal status of a corpse is not considered to have made a wound, and therefore has not performed a prohibited labor.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: And however, with regard to that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If there is uncertainty whether he was born after seven months of pregnancy, and uncertainty whether he was born after eight months, one does not desecrate Shabbat on his behalf and circumcise him. The Gemara asks: Why? Let us circumcise him on Shabbat, as whichever way you look at it, that is appropriate. If he is a child that will live, the circumcisor may well circumcise the child, and if not, he is merely cutting the flesh of a corpse, which does not violate any Shabbat prohibitions.
  Mar, son of Ravina, said: Rav Naḥumei bar Zekharya and I interpreted this as follows: Indeed, as for circumcision itself, we do indeed circumcise that child even on Shabbat. It was only necessary to say that one does not desecrate Shabbat on his behalf with regard to the issue of preparing facilitators of circumcision on Shabbat, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that actions that facilitate circumcision at its appointed time override Shabbat.
  Abaye said: The issue of whether a child who has not yet survived thirty days from his birth is considered viable is parallel to a dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to the interpretation of the verse: “And if any animal of which you may eat shall die, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The verse is interpreted as coming to include offspring of eight months. Large domesticated animals typically give birth after a gestation period of nine months. If an animal of that sort gives birth after eight months, its offspring is deemed to be not viable and its slaughter does not purify it. Rather, it assumes the status of an unslaughtered animal, which is not only prohibited to be eaten, but also transmits ritual impurity to those who touch or move it. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, say: Its slaughter purifies it, and it does not assume unslaughtered animal status.
  What, is it not that this is the matter with regard to which they disagree? That this Master holds that the animal is considered alive and therefore its slaughter is effective, as is the case with regard to all pure animals, while this Master, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that it is considered dead.
  Rava said: If so, instead of disagreeing over the issue of impurity and purity, let them disagree over the issue of eating, i.e., whether it is permitted to eat this offspring after it is slaughtered. Since they did not dispute this point, their disagreement must revolve around a different factor.
  Rather, it must be that everyone agrees that it is considered dead, yet Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, hold that it has the legal status like that of a <i>tereifa</i>, an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months. With regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, is it not that even though it is considered dead from the perspective of <i>halakha</i> because there is no possibility of long-term survival, nevertheless, if it is slaughtered, its slaughter purifies it? It does not cause ritual impurity like an unslaughtered animal, even though it may not be eaten. Here too, it is no different. And the Rabbis, who do not accept this claim, say: It is not similar to a <i>tereifa</i>, since a <i>tereifa</i> had a period of fitness before it became a <i>tereifa</i>. However, this animal that was born after eight months of pregnancy did not ever have a period of fitness.
  And if you say: With regard to an animal that was a <i>tereifa</i> from the womb and was born in that condition, what is there to say? It too never had a period of fitness. There is a distinction between the cases. There, with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, there is slaughter in its type; here, with regard to a stillborn, there is no slaughter in its type, as there is no circumstance where slaughter of a stillborn animal is appropriate.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that any animal that survived for eight days after birth is presumed viable, or not? If you say that they disagree, the dilemma is: Is the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with his opinion, or is the <i>halakha</i> not in accordance with his opinion?
  Come and hear proof from that which we learned: With regard to a calf that was born on a Festival, one may slaughter it on the Festival. Apparently, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion is not accepted, and one need not wait eight days after the animal is born. The Gemara refutes this: With what are we dealing here? It is a case in which one is certain that its months of gestation were completed, and therefore, it is certainly not stillborn.
  Come and hear another proof from that which we learned: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, who disagreed with regard to whether or not it is permitted to inspect firstborn animals for blemishes on a Festival, agree that if a firstborn animal was born with its blemish, it is considered prepared for use on the Festival. It is not deemed set-aside and an expert may examine it to determine whether or not it is a permanent blemish. Apparently, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered on the day of its birth. The Gemara refutes this proof as well: It is a case in which one is certain that its months of gestation were completed, and it is certainly not stillborn.
  Come and hear a solution to the dilemma, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> in this matter is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Nonetheless, from the fact that the <i>halakha</i> was ruled in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, by inference, the Sages disagree with his ruling. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from this the resolution to both dilemmas raised above.
  Abaye said: With regard to a baby less than thirty days old that fell off a roof or was eaten by a lion, everyone agrees that he is considered to have been alive; it was a viable baby that died in the accident. Where they disagree is in a case where the baby yawned, i.e., breathed momentarily after birth, and then immediately died. This Master, the Rabbis, hold: The baby is considered to have been living, since it was born alive; and this Master holds: It is considered to have been born dead until it lives a month after its birth.
  What practical difference is there whether or not the baby is considered to have been alive? The difference is to exempt the child’s mother from levirate marriage. If a man died with no children, and his wife was pregnant and a viable child was born, the woman is exempt from levirate marriage; however, if the child was born dead, the man is considered to have died childless, and his widow is obligated in levirate marriage.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that to say that if the child fell off a roof or was eaten by a lion, everyone agrees that it is considered to have been alive? Didn’t Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, happen to come to the house of the son of Rav Idi bar Avin, and he prepared for them a third-born calf on the seventh day after its birth. And they said to him: Had you waited to slaughter it until the evening, we would have eaten from it. Now that you did not wait, we shall not eat from it. Apparently, if a calf is slaughtered before it was alive for eight days and definitely viable, suspicion that it is stillborn remains; the same is true of a child who dies from an accident within thirty days of birth.
  Rather, Abaye’s statement must be reformulated: When the baby yawned and died, everyone agrees that it is considered to have been dead from the outset. Where they disagree is in a case when it fell off a roof or was eaten by a lion: This Master, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds: It is considered to have been dead; and this Master holds that since it did not die on its own, it is considered to have been alive.
  The Gemara relates: A baby was born to the son of Rav Dimi bar Yosef. Within thirty days the baby died. He sat and mourned over him. His father, Rav Dimi bar Yosef, said to him: Are you mourning because you wish to partake of the delicacies fed to mourners? The <i>halakha</i> deems a child that dies before thirty days stillborn, and one does not mourn over it. He said to him: I am certain that its months of gestation were completed.
  The Gemara similarly relates that Rav Ashi happened to come to Rav Kahana’s house. A matter befell him, i.e., his child died within thirty days of its birth. Rav Ashi saw him and observed that he was sitting and mourning over him. He said to him: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that only a child who lived for thirty days is not considered stillborn? He said to him: I am certain that its months of gestation were completed and he is not to be considered a stillborn.
  It was stated that the Sages discussed the following question: What is the ruling in a case where a baby died within thirty days after birth, leaving its mother a childless widow, and before they decided whether or not she was obligated in levirate marriage, she stood and was betrothed to another? Ravina said in the name of Rava:
  
  Daf 136b
  
  If she is the wife of an Israelite, meaning she became betrothed to an Israelite, who may marry a woman who has undergone <i>ḥalitza</i>, she performs <i>ḥalitza</i> due to uncertainty. Given that the child may have been stillborn and therefore never considered alive, in which case she would be obligated to undergo levirate marriage or perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, by performing <i>ḥalitza</i>, she removes any doubt and can remain with her new husband. However, if she is the wife of a priest, she does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, as if she were to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> she would be prohibited to her husband the priest. Since there are those who hold that that the baby is considered alive from the moment of its birth, based on that opinion, she is exempt from performing <i>ḥalitza</i>, after the fact.
  Rav Sherevya said in the name of Rava: Both this, the woman married to an Israelite, and that, the woman married to a priest, perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, as the prohibition against marrying a woman not released from her bond of levirate marriage is a stringent one, and the fact that her husband is a priest is not taken into consideration.
  Ravina said to Rav Sherevya: In the evening Rava indeed said so, as you said; however, in the morning he retracted his statement, and that is what I cited. Rav Sherevya, however, did not accept this explanation, and said: Did you permit the wife of a priest without <i>ḥalitza</i>, despite the fact that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel deems the baby stillborn unless he survives to the age of thirty days? Since you have violated his ruling, may it be God’s will that you continue along this path and permit the eating of forbidden fat.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda permits circumcising a hermaphrodite on Shabbat. Rav Sheizvi said that Rav Ḥisda said: Not with regard to all matters did Rabbi Yehuda say that a hermaphrodite is considered a male; it was only with regard to circumcision, as if you say so, that the legal status of a hermaphrodite is that of a male in every sense, then even with regard to vows of valuation, he should be valuated.
  And from where do we derive that he is not valuated? As it was taught in the <i>Sifra</i>, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus, with regard to the verse: “Then your valuation shall be for the male from the age of twenty years until the age of sixty years, your valuation shall be fifty shekel of silver, after the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:3). The Sages inferred: “The male” means the definite male but not a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite. I might have thought that these shall not be valuated according to the valuation of a man, but shall be valuated according to the valuation of a woman. Therefore, the verse states: “The male,” and in the following verse: “And if she is a female, then your valuation shall be thirty shekels” (Leviticus 27:4), indicating: Only a definite male or a definite female, but not a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite, which are categorized as neither male nor female.
  
  Daf 137a
  
  And an unattributed <i>halakha</i> cited in the <i>Sifra</i> generally reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too also learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda does not consider a hermaphrodite to be a male in every sense. The Sages disagreed over sanctification of the waters of a purification offering, i.e., the placing of the ashes of the red heifer in potable, running spring water: Everyone is fit to sanctify the waters of a purification offering, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor. Rabbi Yehuda deems a minor fit, but deems a woman and a hermaphrodite unfit. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not consider the legal status of a hermaphrodite to be like that of a male. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from this.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about the <i>halakhot</i> of circumcision, with regard to which Rabbi Yehuda categorizes a hermaphrodite as a male in regard to its laws? The Gemara answers that it is due to the fact that it is written: “This is My covenant which you shall keep, between Me and you and your seed after you: Circumcise for yourselves every male” (Genesis 17:10), and he interprets the phrase “every male” as an amplification including anyone who could possibly be included in the category of a male.
  MISHNA: One who had two babies to circumcise, one of whom he needed to circumcise on the day after Shabbat, and one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, because he performed the prohibited labor of causing a wound not in the framework of performing a mitzva, as no obligation yet exists to circumcise the child.
  If there were two babies, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve, and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that he should have circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, as circumcision after its appointed time does not override Shabbat. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him; since he intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error in fact performed a mitzva, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering.
  GEMARA: There is a dispute among the <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the correct version of our mishna, based on an early dispute of the <i>tanna’im</i>: Rav Huna teaches the first clause of the mishna as stating: Liable, whereas Rav Yehuda teaches the first clause as stating: Exempt.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Huna taught the first clause as stating: Liable, based on that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to one who had two babies, one to circumcise on Shabbat and one to circumcise after Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat; in that case, everyone agrees that he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who had two babies, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, as Rabbi Eliezer renders him liable to bring a sin-offering for this unwitting transgression, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.
  And both of them only derived it from idolatry, where the Torah details the <i>halakhot</i> of bringing a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression. Rabbi Eliezer holds: The law of every unwitting transgression is like that of idolatry. Just as with regard to idolatry the Torah stated: Do not perform certain activities, and when one performs them unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, here too it is no different, and since he transgressed the prohibition, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: There, where the unwitting transgression was not performed in order to fulfill a mitzva, one is liable to bring a sin-offering. Here, his intention was to perform a mitzva, and one who unwittingly violates a prohibition in the course of attempting to fulfill a mitzva is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. This is according to the opinion of Rav Huna, based on the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
  Rav Yehuda taught the first clause as stating: Exempt, based on that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree over one who had two babies to circumcise, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat; in that case, everyone agrees that he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, as that circumcision fulfilled a mitzva.
  With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who had two babies, one to circumcise after Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, as Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.
  And the Gemara notes here too that both of them only derived it from idolatry. Rabbi Eliezer holds: The <i>halakha</i> of every unwitting transgression sin is like that of idolatry: Just as with regard to idolatry the Torah stated: Do not perform certain activities, and when one performs them unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin-offering, here too it is no different, and since he violated the prohibition, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: There, with regard to idolatry, one is liable to bring a sin-offering when he performs the transgression, because he is not preoccupied with the performance of a mitzva. Here, he is preoccupied with the performance of a mitzva, and anyone who unwittingly transgresses a prohibition while preoccupied with a mitzva is exempt from bringing a sin-offering.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya taught another version of the same dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>: Rabbi Meir would say that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree over one who had two babies, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat; in that case, everyone agrees that he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who had two babies to circumcise, one to circumcise after Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him.
  The Gemara expresses surprise at this last version: Now, after all, in the latter clause, where he did not perform a mitzva, Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him; in the first clause, where he performed a mitzva, does Rabbi Yehoshua deem him liable?
  In the school of Rabbi Yannai they say: The first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a unique situation, where the circumcisor first unwittingly circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat on Shabbat eve. In that case, Shabbat is not given to be overridden at all, since the baby who was supposed to be circumcised on Shabbat was already circumcised. In the latter clause, however, the circumcision was performed in a situation where Shabbat is given to be overridden.
  Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana that this explanation is difficult: In the first clause too, Shabbat is given to be overridden with regard to babies in general, as it is permitted to circumcise a baby whose eighth day occurs on Shabbat. He replied: That is indeed so; however, with regard to this person, Shabbat is not given to be overridden, as there is no longer any child who is supposed to be circumcised on Shabbat. Therefore, if he unwittingly performed a circumcision on Shabbat, he is not considered to have unwittingly performed a transgression while preoccupied with the performance of a mitzva.
  MISHNA: Although a child is generally circumcised at eight days, as the verse states: “And on the eighth day, the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised” (Leviticus 12:3), nevertheless, at times he is circumcised at nine days, at times at ten days, at eleven days, and at twelve days, no earlier and no later.
  How so? In his usual manner, a child is circumcised at eight days. If he was born at twilight and it is therefore uncertain on which day he was born, he is circumcised at nine days, as his circumcision is postponed due to that uncertainty, as perhaps the eighth day from his birth has not yet arrived. If he was born at twilight on Shabbat eve, he is not circumcised on the following Shabbat, due to the uncertainty whether it is the eighth or ninth day since his birth, and only a circumcision definitely performed at the appointed time overrides Shabbat. Rather, he is circumcised on Sunday, and the result is that he is circumcised at ten days.
  If there was a Festival after that Shabbat, he is not circumcised on the Festival either, and he is circumcised at eleven days. And if that Shabbat was followed by two days of Rosh HaShana, the result is that he is circumcised at twelve days.
  The mishna states another <i>halakha</i>: With regard to a sick child, one does not circumcise him until he becomes healthy.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that one does not circumcise a sick baby until he becomes healthy. Shmuel said: A baby that was sick and had a high fever, and subsequently the fever left him, one gives him a full seven days to heal before circumcising him.
  With regard to this issue, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do we require, during the recovery period, to wait from the time the seven days begin to the exact same time seven days later, i.e., seven complete, twenty-four-hour periods, or is it enough to wait seven days without taking into account the time of day?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this from that which the Sage Luda taught: The day of his healing is like the day of his birth. What, is it not that just as from the day of his birth we need not wait from the time he is born to the same time on the eighth day to circumcise him, so too, with regard to the day of his healing, we need not wait from the time he heals to the same time seven days later?
  The Gemara refutes this: No, the day of his healing is superior to the day of his birth. While from the day of his birth until circumcision we need not wait from time to time, from the day of his healing we need to wait seven complete days from time to time.
  MISHNA: These are the shreds of flesh that invalidate the circumcision if they are not cut. The essential element of circumcision is the removal of the flesh that covers most of the corona, and a child that was not circumcised in this manner is considered uncircumcised, and he does not eat <i>teruma</i>.
  And if he was properly circumcised but he was fleshy, and it appears as though he has not been properly circumcised, the circumcisor should correct it by circumcising more than necessary, to avoid the appearance of transgression, so he will not appear uncircumcised.
  
  Daf 137b
  
  If one circumcised but did not uncover the flesh at the area of the circumcision by folding back the thin membrane beneath the foreskin, it is as if he had not circumcised.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Avina said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rav said: When the mishna said most of the corona, they meant the flesh that covers most of the height of the corona, as well as most of its circumference.
  We learned in the mishna: If the baby was fleshy, the circumcisor corrects the circumcision so that it will not appear uncircumcised. Shmuel said: A child who is encumbered with flesh, one examines him, and as long as when his limb hardens he looks circumcised, one need not circumcise him again. And if not, meaning he does not appear circumcised even then, one must circumcise him again.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A child who is encumbered with flesh, one examines him, and as long as when it hardens it does not appear circumcised, one needs to circumcise him again, and if not, one need not circumcise him again.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two formulations? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case where he appears circumcised but does not appear fully circumcised. According to Shmuel, in order to avoid an additional circumcision, one must appear fully circumcised, and this state is insufficient. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, only one who appears uncircumcised requires further circumcision; this partial circumcision is adequate.
  We learned in the mishna: If he circumcised a child but did not uncover the area of the circumcision, it is as if he did not circumcise him. The Sages taught in a <i>Tosefta</i> that one who circumcises a child recites: Who has made us holy through His commandments, and commanded us concerning circumcision. The father of the circumcised child recites: Who has made us holy through His commandments, and commanded us to bring him into the covenant of Abraham, our father. Those standing there recite: Just as he has entered into the covenant, so may he enter into Torah, marriage, and good deeds.
  And the one who recites the additional blessing says: Who made the beloved one holy from the womb, marked the decree in his flesh, and gave his descendants the seal and the sign of the holy covenant. Therefore, as a reward for this, the living God, our Portion, commanded to deliver the beloved of our flesh from destruction, for the sake of His covenant that He set in our flesh. Blessed are You, Lord, Who establishes the covenant.
  One who circumcises converts says: Blessed are You, Lord, our God, King of the universe, Who made us holy with His commandments, and commanded us concerning circumcision. And the one who recites the additional blessing recites: Who has made us holy with His commandments, and commanded us to circumcise converts, and to drip from them covenantal blood, as were it not for the blood of the covenant, the heaven and earth would not be sustained, as it is stated: “If My covenant would not be with day and night, the ordinances of heaven and earth I would not have placed” (Jeremiah 33:25), which is interpreted to mean that were it not for the covenant of circumcision that is manifest both day and night, the world would cease to exist. He concludes the blessing with the phrase: Blessed are You, Lord, Who establishes the covenant.
  When a Jew buys a Canaanite slave, he is obligated to circumcise the slave, as the slave is partially entering the covenant of the Jewish people. One who circumcises slaves recites a blessing: Who made us holy with His commandments, and commanded us concerning circumcision. And the one who recites the additional blessings says a blessing similar to those mentioned above: Who made us holy with His commandments, and commanded us to circumcise slaves, and to drip from them covenantal blood, as were it not for the blood of the covenant the heaven and earth would not be sustained, as it is stated: “If My covenant would not be with day and night, the ordinances of heaven and earth I would not have placed” (Jeremiah 33:25). Blessed are You, Lord, Who establishes the covenant.
  
  MISHNA: Rabbi Eliezer says: One may suspend and stretch over a base the strainer through which sediment is filtered from wine, on a Festival. And one may place wine through a strainer that was already suspended the day before; however, one may not suspend the strainer on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: One may not suspend the strainer on a Festival, and one may not place wine for filtering through a suspended strainer on Shabbat; however, one may place wine through a suspended strainer on a Festival.
  GEMARA: The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to Rabbi Eliezer’s position: Now, Rabbi Eliezer holds that we may not even add to a temporary tent on Shabbat; could it be that to make a tent is permitted <i>ab initio</i>? Stretching a strainer over a base, which Rabbi Eliezer permits, is comparable to making a tent.
  The Gemara explains the question: What is this opinion of Rabbi Eliezer’s? As we learned in a mishna: With regard to a window shutter used to cover a skylight, Rabbi Eliezer says: When it is tied to and hanging from the window, i.e., it is not touching the ground, one may shutter the window with it, and if not, one may not shutter the window with it. And the Rabbis say: Both in this case and in that case one may shutter with it.
  And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Everyone agrees that one may not construct a temporary tent on a Festival for the first time, and needless to say, one may not do so on Shabbat. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree only with regard to adding to an existing tent, as Rabbi Eliezer says: One may not add to an existing structure on a Festival, and needless to say, one may not do so on Shabbat. And the Rabbis say: One may add to the temporary structure on Shabbat, and needless to say, one may do so on a Festival.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer indeed holds that the suspension of a strainer constitutes a prohibited labor. However, Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to actions that facilitate preparation of food on a Festival, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The only difference between a Festival and Shabbat is with regard to the preparation of food alone. It is permitted to perform labors for the purpose of food preparation on a Festival, but not on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda permits even actions that facilitate food preparation on a Festival, e.g., fixing utensils with which food is prepared on the Festival. Similarly, Rabbi Eliezer permits the suspension of a strainer, which would otherwise constitute a prohibited labor, in order to prepare wine for use on the Festival.
  The Gemara asks: Say that we heard that Rabbi Yehuda permits labors that are otherwise prohibited if they pertain to actions that facilitate food preparation that cannot be performed on the eve of the Festival; however, with regard to actions that facilitate food preparation that can be performed on the eve of the Festival, did you hear that he permits doing so?
  The Gemara answers: The leniency of Rabbi Eliezer exceeds that of Rabbi Yehuda. Unlike Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Eliezer does not distinguish between actions that facilitate food preparation that can and those that cannot be performed on the eve of the Festival.
  We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: One may not suspend the strainer on a Festival. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If he suspended a strainer unwittingly, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Yosef said: If he suspended it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, like anyone who unwittingly performs a labor prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat.
  Abaye said to him: But if that is so, that an action of that sort constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of building by Torah law, then if one suspended a jug on a peg, is he also liable for building a tent?
  
  Daf 138a
  
  Rather, Abaye said: It is a rabbinic decree issued so that one will not conduct himself on Shabbat in the manner that he conducts himself during the week.
  Abaye would consolidate the principles of the <i>baraitot</i> pertaining to the construction of a tent on Shabbat and teach: With regard to a large wineskin, a wine strainer, a canopy hung over a bed, and a folding chair whose cover is detached from its legs, one may not assemble them due to the prohibition against making a temporary tent. If one did so unwittingly, he is exempt by Torah law from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited by rabbinic decree. With regard to permanent tents, one may not make them, and if he did so, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing the prohibited labor of building. However, with regard to a bed, and a folding chair [<i>teraskal</i>] whose cover is attached to its legs, and a collapsible toilet, it is permissible to open them <i>ab initio</i>, since they are prepared for use from before Shabbat.
  We also learned in the mishna: One may not place wine for filtering even into a suspended strainer on Shabbat. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one strained wine, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Kahana said: If one strained wine, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Sheshet strongly objects to this: Is there something for which the Rabbis render one liable to bring a sin-offering and Rabbi Eliezer permits its performance <i>ab initio</i>? Extreme differences of opinion of that kind are rarely found in one mishna.
  Rav Yosef strongly objects to this question: Why not? Isn’t there an analogous dispute with regard to a woman who wears a city of gold ornament from one domain to another on Shabbat, as Rabbi Meir renders her liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Eliezer permits it even <i>ab initio</i>?
  What is that dispute? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman may not go out into the public domain on Shabbat with a city of gold ornament. And if she did go out with it into the public domain, she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: She may not go out with it <i>ab initio</i>, and if she went out, she is exempt. And Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman may go out with a city of gold ornament <i>ab initio</i>. Apparently, there is precedent for a dispute in which one opinion maintains that an action incurs liability to bring a sin-offering, while another opinion rules that it is permitted <i>ab initio</i>.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Do you hold that Rabbi Eliezer is relating to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who said that she is liable to bring a sin-offering? He is relating to the statement of the Rabbis, who said one is exempt but it is prohibited, and he said to them that he holds that it is permitted <i>ab initio</i>. Had there not been the intermediate opinion of the Rabbis, an argument with such extreme opinions would not have been possible.
  The Gemara asks: One is liable to bring a sin-offering for straining. Due to performance of what category of prohibited labor do we forewarn him? Rabba said: It is for the category of selecting, as one is selecting the wine from the sediment. Rabbi Zeira said: It is for the category of sifting, as straining is similar to sifting flour in a sifter, which is a form of selecting.
  Rabba said: According to my opinion, it is reasonable. What is the manner of one who selects? He takes the food and leaves the refuse; here too, when straining wine, one takes the food and leaves the refuse.
  Rabbi Zeira said: According to my opinion, that this is not typical selection but rather a specific type of selection, it is reasonable, as what is the manner of sifting? The refuse remains atop the sifter and the food is below. Here too, when straining wine, the refuse remains atop the strainer and the food is below.
  Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: With regard to a doubled cloak, one may not make a covering on Shabbat by taking the cloak and placing it over a rope and extending the two sides in order to form something similar to a canopy beneath which one could lie (<i>ge’onim</i>; Rif). And if one made it, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering by Torah law, but it is prohibited by rabbinic decree. If there was a string or a cord wrapped around it before Shabbat, and the cloak was attached to the string while folded, it is permitted to spread it and stretch it <i>ab initio</i>.
  On a related issue, Rav Kahana raised a dilemma before Rav: In the case of a canopy, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it permitted to spread it on Shabbat? He said to him: Even a bed is prohibited. Rav Kahana asked: With regard to a bed, what is the <i>halakha</i>? He said to him: Even a canopy is permitted. Rav Kahana again asked: In the case of a bed and a canopy, what is the <i>halakha</i>? He said to him: A canopy is prohibited, and a bed is permitted.
  The Gemara comments: And this is not difficult, as the responses do not in fact contradict one another. Rather, when he said: Even a bed is prohibited, this is referring to folding beds like those of the Carmanians. Unfolding them is considered like making a tent. When he said: Even a canopy is permitted, this is referring to spreading the canopy in the manner explained by Rami bar Yeḥezkel. The canopy was bound by a string from before Shabbat. When he said: A canopy is prohibited, and a bed is permitted, this is referring to beds and canopies like ours, which do not fold. A bed of that kind involves no building. However, spreading canopies is performed in a manner similar to constructing a tent.
  Rav Yosef said: I saw the canopies of the house of Rav Huna that were spread out in the evening, and in the morning they were cast off and lying on the ground. This indicates that it is permitted to dismantle and spread them on Shabbat.
  Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: With regard to a curtain, it is permitted to spread it, and it is permitted to dismantle it. Since a curtain has no roof, neither action constitutes establishing a tent.
  And Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya:
  
  Daf 138b
  
  With regard to a bridegroom’s canopy, which has no roof but is entirely sloped, it is permitted to spread it and it is permitted to dismantle it on Shabbat.
  Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: We only said that it is permitted in a case where its roof is not a handbreadth wide; however, if its roof is a handbreadth wide, it is prohibited. Furthermore, even when its roof is not a handbreadth wide, we only said that it is permitted where there is not the width of a handbreadth within three handbreadths of its roof; however, if it expands to the width of a handbreadth within three handbreadths of its roof, it is prohibited. And we only stated that it is permitted where there is not in its incline the width of a handbreadth; however, if there is in its incline the width of a handbreadth, it is prohibited. This <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the principle that the inclines of tents, even though they are not actual roofs, are considered like tents. And we only said that this canopy is permitted where no part of the canopy descends to a handbreadth below the bed; however, if part of the canopy descends to a handbreadth below the bed, it is prohibited, as the bed itself becomes a roof, and the curtain is considered a wall.
  And Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, also said: Wearing this felt hat is permitted on Shabbat, even though it has a wide brim and is similar to a tent. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Wasn’t it stated elsewhere that it is prohibited to wear a felt hat on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This latter statement, which prohibited wearing the hat, is referring to a case where its brim has the width of a handbreadth wide and is similar to a tent. That statement by Rav Sheshet, which permits wearing the hat, is referring to a case where its brim does not have the width of a handbreadth.
  The Gemara asks: But if that is so, if one extended his cloak a handbreadth beyond his head, would you also say that he is liable for making a tent? Rather, this is not difficult. The reason the hat is prohibited is not due to making a tent, but due to concern that the wind might blow the cap off one’s head and he will come to carry it by hand. The conflicting statements can be resolved as follows: This statement of Rav Sheshet, which permits wearing the hat, is referring to a case where it is fitted firmly on his head. That statement, which prohibits wearing the hat, is referring to a case where it is not fitted firmly.
  Rami bar Yeḥezkel sent to Rav Huna: Say to us, please, those excellent statements that you said to us in the name of Rav, two with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, and one with regard to the Torah.
  Rav Huna sent to him in response: With regard to that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is permitted to spread a large wineskin and suspend it by its straps on Shabbat, Rav said: They only taught that it is permitted if it is performed by two people together. They do not stretch the wineskin like a tent; rather, they place it without stretching it. However, it is prohibited for one person to do so by himself, due to the concern that he may establish a tent of sorts.
  Abaye said: And it is prohibited to spread a canopy on Shabbat even with ten people. The reason for this is that it is impossible that it will not be stretched a bit for a certain period of time, which would establish a temporary tent.
  And the other <i>halakha</i> with regard to Shabbat, what is it? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a stove, one of whose legs fell, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. Since it remains a vessel, it may be moved if it is taking up a space that is needed. However, if two of its legs fell, it is prohibited, since it is then a broken vessel. Rav said: Even if only one leg fell, it is also prohibited to handle it, due to a decree lest one fasten the leg in place forcefully and be liable for preparing a vessel for use.
  With regard to Torah, Rav Huna related that Rav said: The Torah is destined to be forgotten from the Jewish people. It is stated at the conclusion of the curses in the Torah’s reproof: “And the Lord will make your plagues astonishing, and the plagues of your seed, great plagues of long continuance, and evil diseases of long continuance” (Deuteronomy 28:59). This term of astonishment, mentioned in the verse in addition to the explicit punishments, I do not know what it is. But when the verse states elsewhere: “Therefore, behold, I will continue to astonish this people with wondrous astonishment, and the wisdom of its wise will be lost, and the understanding of its men of understanding shall be hidden” (Isaiah 29:14), you must say: This astonishment is referring to forgetting the Torah.
  The Sages taught a similar idea in the <i>Tosefta</i>: When our Sages entered the vineyard in Yavne, they said: The Torah is destined to be forgotten from the Jewish people, as it is stated: “Behold, days are approaching, says the Lord God, and I will send forth a hunger in the land, not a hunger for bread and not a thirst for water, but for hearing the words of the Lord” (Amos 8:11). And it states: “And they will drift from sea to sea, and from north to east they will roam to find the word of the Lord, but they will not find it” (Amos 8:12).
  “The word of the Lord” in this context bears many meanings. “The word of the Lord”; that is <i>halakha</i>. “The word of the Lord”; that is the end of days. “The word of the Lord”; that is prophecy. All these will be lost from the Jewish people.
  And what is the meaning of: “They will roam to find the word of the Lord, but they will not find it”? They said: It is destined that a woman will take a loaf of <i>teruma</i> bread and circulate among the synagogues and study halls to ascertain whether it is ritually impure or whether it is ritually pure, and there will be none who understands.
  The Gemara asks: How is it possible that they will be unable to understand whether the loaf is ritually pure or whether it is ritually impure? It is explicitly written in the Torah with regard to this: “All food that is eaten upon which water falls shall contract impurity, and all liquid drunk in any vessel shall contract impurity” (Leviticus 11:34). There can be no doubt as to the question of whether or not the loaf can become impure. Rather, the Gemara explains: The woman seeks to ascertain whether it assumes first-degree ritual impurity status or whether it assumes second-degree ritual impurity status; and there will be none who understands.
  The Gemara asks: That too is an explicit mishna, and how is it that none will know an explicit mishna? As we learned in a mishna: If the carcass of a creeping animal was found in the airspace of an oven, the bread inside it assumes second-degree ritual impurity status, as the creeping animal, which is a primary source of impurity, renders the oven impure with first-degree ritual impurity. The oven then renders the bread impure with second-degree ritual impurity.
  The Gemara responds: They are uncertain with regard to that which Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: Let us view this oven as one filled with impurity, and the bread will then assume first-degree ritual impurity status. In other words, the legal status of food in the airspace of an earthenware vessel that also has the carcass of a creeping animal in its airspace is that of food that came into contact with the creeping animal, even if the food does not come into contact with the carcass of a creeping animal.
  He said to him that we do not say: Let us view the oven as one filled with ritual impurity, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might think that all vessels should become ritually impure in the airspace of an earthenware vessel that has the carcass of a creeping animal in its airspace; therefore, the verse states: “And any earthenware vessel in which any of them falls, all that is in it shall be impure, and you shall break it. All food that is eaten, upon which water comes, shall be impure; and all drink that may be drunk, in any vessel, shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33–34). The <i>baraita</i> learns from the juxtaposition of these verses that foods become ritually impure in the airspace of earthenware vessels, but vessels do not become ritually impure in the airspace of earthenware vessels. Apparently, the airspace of an oven is not considered filled with the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal. If that were the case, even vessels would become ritually impure.
  An opposing view was taught in another <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Heaven forfend that the Torah should be forgotten from the Jewish people, as it is stated: “And this song shall answer to him as a witness, for it shall not be forgotten from his seed” (Deuteronomy 31:21). Rather, how do I explain: “They will roam to find the word of God, but they will not find it”? It means that they will not find
  
  Daf 139a
  
  clear <i>halakha</i> and clear teaching together, but rather there will be disputes among the Sages.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei ben Elisha says: If you see a generation that many troubles are befalling it, go and examine the judges of Israel. Perhaps their sins are the cause, as any calamity that comes to the world comes due to the judges of Israel acting corruptly, as it is stated: “Please hear this, heads of the house of Jacob, and officers of the house of Israel, who abhor justice and pervert all equity, who build up Zion with blood, and Jerusalem with iniquity. Their heads they judge for bribes, and their priests teach for hire, and their prophets divine for money; yet they lean upon the Lord, saying: Is not the Lord in our midst? No evil shall befall us” (Micah 3:9–11).
  The Gemara comments: They are wicked, but they placed their trust in the One Who spoke and the world came into being, the Almighty. Therefore, the Holy One, Blessed be He, brings upon them three calamities corresponding to the three transgressions for which they are responsible, as it is stated in the following verse: “Therefore, because of you, Zion shall be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem shall become heaps, and the Temple Mount as the high places of a forest” (Micah 3:12).
  And the Holy One, Blessed be He, will not rest His Divine Presence on the Jewish people until evil judges and officers shall be eliminated from the Jewish people, as it is stated: “And I will turn My hand upon you, and I will purge away your dross as with lye, and I will remove all your alloy. And I will restore your judges as at first, and your counselors as at the beginning; afterward you shall be called the city of righteousness, a faithful city” (Isaiah 1:25–26).
  Ulla said: Jerusalem will be redeemed only through righteousness, as it is stated: “Zion will be redeemed with justice and those who return to her with righteousness” (Isaiah 1:27).
  Rav Pappa said: If the arrogant will cease to exist, the Persian fire priests will cease to exist as well. If the deceitful judges will cease to exist, the royal officers [<i>gazirpatei</i>] and taskmasters will cease to exist.
  He explains: If the arrogant will cease, the Persian fire priests will cease, as it is written: “And I will purge away your dross [<i>sigayikh</i>] as with lye, and I will remove all your alloy [<i>bedilayikh</i>].” This teaches that when the conceited and haughty [<i>sigim</i>] are purged, the priests of fire, who are separated [<i>muvdalim</i>] from the fear of God, will also cease.
  He said: If the deceitful judges cease, the royal officers and taskmasters will cease, as it is written: “The Lord has removed your judgment, cast out your enemy” (Zephaniah 3:15).
  Rabbi Mallai said in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The Lord has broken the staff of the wicked, the rod of the rulers” (Isaiah 14:5)? He explains: “The Lord has broken the staff of the wicked”; these are the judges who have become staffs for their attendants. The attendants abuse people, and the judges provide the attendants with legal backing and moral support. “The rod of the rulers”; these are the Torah scholars who are members of the families of the judges. These Torah scholars assist their relatives, the judges, conceal their faults. Mar Zutra said: These are the Torah scholars who teach communal <i>halakhot</i> to ignorant judges. They teach ignorant judges just enough Torah and modes of conduct to prevent the people from realizing how ignorant they are, enabling them to maintain their positions.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Mallai said in the name of Reish Lakish: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For your hands are defiled with blood, and your fingers with iniquity; your lips have spoken lies, your tongue utters wickedness” (Isaiah 59:3)?
  He explains: “For your hands are defiled with blood”; these are the judges who take bribes in their hands. “And your fingers with iniquity”; these are the scribes of the judges, who write falsehood with their fingers. “Your lips have spoken lies”; these are the legal advisors. “Your tongue utters wickedness”; these are the litigants themselves.
  And Rabbi Mallai said in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak from Migdal: From the day that Joseph took leave from his brothers, he did not sample a taste of wine, as it is written: “They shall be on the head of Joseph, and on the crown of the head of he who was separated [<i>nezir</i>] from his brothers” (Genesis 49:26). The language of the verse alludes to the fact that Joseph conducted himself like a nazirite and abstained from wine.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Joseph’s brothers too did not sample the taste of wine during the intervening period, due to their remorse, as it is written: “And they drank and became drunk with him” (Genesis 43:34). By inference: Until now there was no drunkenness, as they abstained from drinking. And the other Sage, Rabbi Mallai, holds: It was drunkenness of which there was none; however, there was drinking on the part of the brothers during the intervening years.
  And Rabbi Mallai said: It is stated in the verse: “And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Moses, and He said: Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite, I know that he can surely speak, and also behold, he is coming out to greet you, and he will see you and be glad in his heart” (Exodus 4:14). Rabbi Mallai taught that as reward for Aaron’s lack of jealousy at seeing his brother Moses rise to greatness, as it is stated: “And he will see you and be glad in his heart,” he merited to become the High Priest, and for the breastplate of judgment to rest on his heart.
  The Gemara returns to the laws of a canopy. The inhabitants of the town of Bashkar sent to Levi: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to spreading a canopy on Shabbat? Additionally, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to hops in a vineyard? Do they constitute a prohibited mixture of diverse kinds? Finally, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who died on a Festival? How can the people attend to his burial?
  As the messenger was going with the question, Levi died. Shmuel said to Rav Menashya: If you are wise and able to respond, send them answers to their questions. He sent them: With regard to a canopy, we reviewed all aspects of the matter of the canopy, and we did not find any permissible aspect.
  The Gemara asks: And let him send them that it can be permitted in accordance with the opinion of Rami bar Yeḥezkel. The Gemara answers: He did not want to reveal that leniency to them, because they are not well versed in Torah, and they would not distinguish between permitted and prohibited methods of spreading the canopy.
  He also told them: Hops in a vineyard are a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds. The Gemara asks: And let him send them the message that it is permitted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: With regard to hops, Rabbi Tarfon says: They do not constitute a prohibited mixture of food crops in a vineyard, and the Rabbis say: They constitute a forbidden mixture of food crops in a vineyard. And we maintain that anyone who is lenient with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of diverse kinds in Eretz Yisrael, even if the <i>halakha</i> is not ruled in accordance with his opinion, the <i>halakha</i> is ruled in accordance with his opinion outside of Eretz Yisrael, where the <i>halakhot</i> of diverse kinds apply only by rabbinic law. The Gemara explains: He did not reveal this leniency to them, because they were not well versed in Torah.
  With regard to the matter of hops in a vineyard, the Gemara relates that Rav would announce: One who seeks to sow hops in a vineyard, let him sow. In contrast, Rav Amram Ḥasida would administer lashes for sowing hops in a vineyard.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Mesharshiya would give a <i>peruta</i> to a gentile child, and the child would sow hops for him. The Gemara asks: And let him give the <i>peruta</i> to a Jewish child, who is also not obligated in mitzva observance. The Gemara answers: He may come to continue this habit and violate the prohibition as an adult. The Gemara asks: And let him give the <i>peruta</i> to an adult gentile. The Gemara answers: He may come to confuse him with a Jew.
  With regard to a person who died on a Festival, he sent them in response: If a person died on a Festival, neither Jews nor Arameans, i.e., gentiles, should attend to his burial, neither on the first day of a Festival, nor on the second day of a Festival observed in the Diaspora.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Yehuda bar Sheilat say that Rabbi Asi said: There was an incident in the synagogue of the settlement of Maon on a Festival adjacent to Shabbat. A person died,
  
  Daf 139b
  
  and I do not know whether the Festival occurred before Shabbat or after Shabbat. And they came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he said to them: Let gentiles attend to his burial.
  And likewise, Rava said: If a person died on the first day of a Festival, gentiles may attend to his burial; on the second day of a Festival observed in the Diaspora, Jews may attend to his burial. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even on the second day of the festival of Rosh HaShana, which is not so with regard to an egg. With regard to an egg laid on the Festival, the two days of Rosh HaShana are considered one long day that cannot be disconnected. Therefore, in contrast to other two-day Festivals in the Diaspora, use of an egg laid on the first day of Rosh HaShana is prohibited on the second day. However, in deference to the dead, the Sages were lenient with regard to burial on the second day of Rosh HaShana. Why then did Rav Menashya prohibit the inhabitants of Bashkar from attending to the burial on a Festival? The Gemara answers: Because they were not well versed in Torah.
  Rabbi Avin bar Rav Huna said that Rav Ḥama bar Gureya said: A person may wrap himself in a canopy and in its straps and go out to the public domain on Shabbat, and he need not be concerned about violating the prohibited act of carrying out a burden.
  The Gemara asks: In what way is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the straps different from that which Rav Huna said? As Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who goes out unwittingly to the public domain on Shabbat with a four-cornered garment that does not have the requisite ritual fringes attached is liable to bring a sin-offering, because the remaining fringes are not an integral part of the garment. Since they do not fulfill the mitzva, they are considered a burden that may not be carried into the public domain on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: There is a distinction between the cases. Ritual fringes are significant relative to a garment and are not negated. They are considered an independent entity that may not be carried out into the public domain. These straps of a canopy are not significant and are negated.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna said: According to the Rabbis, who prohibit suspending a strainer on a Festival, a person may nevertheless employ artifice and circumvent the prohibition against suspending a strainer by taking it on a Festival and suspending it for the purpose of pomegranates in it, which is permitted. Once the strainer is suspended, he may suspend it in order to filter sediment from the wine, as even the Rabbis hold that on a Festival it is permitted to do this straining through a strainer that is already suspended. Rav Ashi said: And this is only permitted provided that he actually suspended pomegranates in it before using it to strain wine. It must be obvious to all that he used the strainer in a permitted manner.
  The Gemara asks: In what way is that <i>halakha</i> different from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may begin brewing beer during the intermediate days of a Festival for the purpose of using it on the Festival. If it is not for the purpose of the Festival, it is prohibited. This is the <i>halakha</i> both with regard to date beer and with regard to barley beer. And even though they have old beer, one may employ artifice and say that he wishes to drink from the new, and that he is making beer on the intermediate days of the Festival for that purpose. Apparently, it is permitted to employ artifice even without actively demonstrating that one is performing the action for a permitted purpose. This contradicts the opinion of Rav Ashi.
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to beer, the matter is not evident. When people see someone starting to brew beer, they have no way of knowing whether or not he has beer at home, and consequently, whether or not the action itself is prohibited in that case. However, here, with regard to a strainer, the matter is evident, as people see him suspending a strainer for wine, which is prohibited.
  On the topic of artifice, the Gemara relates that the Rabbis said to Rav Ashi: Master, observe this Torah scholar, and Rav Huna ben Rabbi Ḥayon is his name, and some say that his name is Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Ḥalvan, who took a slice of garlic and placed it in the spout of a barrel, and said: I intend to store it. He thereby stopped the spout on Shabbat. And similarly, he went and slept in a ferry on the river, and the ferryman sailed the ferry across the river, and he thereby crossed to the other side and inspected the fruit of his vineyard. He said: I intend to sleep. In this way, he crosses the river by boat on Shabbat, which is a prohibited activity.
  Rav Ashi said to them: Are you speaking of artifice? This is artifice employed to circumvent a rabbinic prohibition, and a Torah scholar will not come to perform the action <i>ab initio</i> without artifice. Therefore, there is no reason to prohibit him from doing so.
  MISHNA: One may pour water over sediment that is in a strainer on Shabbat so that it will become clear and clean. And similarly, one may filter wine through cloths and through an Egyptian basket made from palm leaves. Since these liquids are drinkable even without filtering, doing so does not violate the prohibition of selecting.
  And likewise, one may place an egg in a mustard strainer in order to separate the yolk from the egg-white, and one may prepare <i>anumlin</i>, a wine-based drink, on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: On Shabbat one may only make <i>anumlin</i> in a small cup; on a Festival, in a larger vessel; and on the intermediate days of a Festival, one may even prepare it in a barrel. Rabbi Tzadok says: There is no objective principle; rather, it is all according to the number of guests; if they are numerous, one may prepare a larger quantity of <i>anumlin</i>.
  GEMARA: Ze’iri said: A person may place clear wine and clear water into a strainer on Shabbat, and he need not be concerned over the prohibition of selecting, as the wine is drinkable even without this filtering. However, doing so with murky liquids, no, one may not strain them.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A person may stir a barrel of wine, mixing its wine and its sediment, and place it in a strainer on Shabbat, and he need not be concerned. Apparently, it is permitted to place even murky wine in a strainer. Ze’iri explained that <i>baraita</i> and resolved the difficulty: That was taught with regard to wine between the presses, when the wine has yet to ferment and will remain murky even after filtering.
  We learned in the mishna: One may filter wine through cloths on Shabbat. Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said: This is permitted provided one does not make an indentation in the cloth, making it into a receptacle, as one must diverge from the usual, weekday manner of performing this activity.
  We also learned in the mishna: And it is permitted to filter wine on Shabbat through an Egyptian basket. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said the following caveat to that statement: It is permitted provided one does not lift the basket a handbreadth from the bottom of the lower vessel. This ensures that one performs the activity in an atypical manner (Rabbeinu Yona).
  Rav said: It is permitted to place this cover that has holes for filtering over half a barrel, but it is prohibited to spread it over the entire barrel, in order that it not appear as though one is using it as a filter (Rabbeinu Ḥananel).
  Rav Pappa said: A person may not attach a bundle of straw to the mouth of a barrel’s spigot, because it appears like a strainer.
  The Gemara relates: The members of Rav Pappa’s household would carefully pour beer from one vessel to another so that the dregs from one vessel would not pass to the other. Rav Aḥa from Difti said to Ravina: But there are the final drops, which remain when one pours the beer into another vessel. When pouring the final drops from the dregs left in the vessel, one is in violation of the prohibition of selecting. He replied: In Rav Pappa’s house they would leave the final drops in the first vessel together with the dregs. They would not attempt to separate them, as the last drops were not significant to the household of Rav Pappa, because beer was always readily available in his house.
  And we further learned in the mishna: One may place an egg in a mustard strainer on Shabbat in order to separate the yolk from the egg-white. The Sage, Ya’akov Korḥa, taught a reason for this:
  
  Daf 140a
  
  Because it is only made to enhance the color of the food. That does not negate the egg-white as significant food in the sense that it would be considered waste, and therefore, no actual selection is performed.
  It is stated: With regard to mustard that one kneaded on Shabbat eve, on the following day, Shabbat, Rav said: One may dissolve it in wine or water with a vessel, but not with his hand, as using a vessel diverges from the normal method of preparation.
  Shmuel said to him: Why may he not dissolve it with his hand? Is that to say that he dissolves it with his hand every day? If it is prepared in that manner, it is donkey food. Certainly dissolving by hand is not the manner in which mustard is prepared during the week. Therefore, dissolving mustard with a vessel should not be permitted on Shabbat. Rather, Shmuel said the opposite: He may dissolve it with his hand as a divergence from the typical method of preparation, but he may not dissolve it in the usual manner, with a vessel.
  It is stated that <i>amora’im</i> from Eretz Yisrael also disputed this issue, as Rabbi Elazar said: Both this and that, dissolving by hand and with a vessel, are prohibited; while Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Both this and that are permitted. Abaye and Rava both said: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the lenient opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  Subsequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan stood and adopted the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and prohibited both methods of dissolving. Rabbi Elazar stood and adopted the opinion of Shmuel, who prohibited using a vessel but permitted it by hand. Given these stances, Abaye and Rava both said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who prohibited both methods.
  The Gemara relates: Abaye’s mother, actually his foster mother, prepared mustard for him, and he did not eat it. Ze’eira’s wife prepared mustard for Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, her husband’s student, and he did not eat it. She said to him: I made this for your rabbi and he ate it, and you do not eat it? Rava bar Shabba said: I was standing before Ravina, and they stirred mustard for him with the inner part of the garlic, and he ate it.
  Mar Zutra said: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with any of these statements. Rather, it is in accordance with this one, as it was stated: Mustard that one kneaded on Shabbat eve, on the following day he may dissolve it either by hand or with a vessel, and he may place honey in it. And when he dissolves it he may not beat it forcefully as would a craftsman, but he may mix it gently.
  Cress that one ground on Shabbat eve, on the following day he may place oil and vinegar in it, and add <i>amita</i> into the mixture, and he may not beat it, but he may mix it. Similarly, garlic that one crushed on Shabbat eve, on the following day, he may place beans and grits in it, and he may not pound, but mix, and he may add <i>amita</i> into the mixture. The Gemara asks: What is <i>amita</i>? The Gemara answers: It is mint. Abaye said: Learn from this that adding mint is beneficial for cress.
  We also learned in the mishna: One may prepare <i>anumlin</i> on Shabbat. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may prepare <i>anumlin</i> on Shabbat. However, one may not prepare <i>aluntit</i>. The <i>baraita</i> explains: And what is <i>anumlin</i> and what is <i>aluntit</i>? <i>Anumlin</i> is a drink, which is a mixture of wine, honey, and pepper. <i>Aluntit</i> is a mixture of aged wine and clear water and balsam, which they prepare for use after bathing in a bathhouse to cool down from the heat of the bathhouse. It is prohibited to prepare it on Shabbat because it is a form of remedy.
  Rav Yosef said: On one occasion, I followed Mar Ukva into a bathhouse. When I exited, he came and gave me one cup of this wine to drink, and I felt its chill from the hairs on my head down to the toenails on my feet. And if he had given me another cup to drink, and if I would have survived it, I would have feared a reduction of my merit in the World-to-Come. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Mar Ukva drink this wine every day? How was he not harmed? The Gemara answers: Mar Ukva was different, as he grew accustomed to it.
  MISHNA: One may not soak asafoetida in lukewarm water to prepare a medicinal drink from it; however, one may place it into vinegar like a standard spice. And one may not soak vetches in water in order to separate them from their chaff, nor rub them by hand so as to remove their chaff. However, one may place them into a sieve or into a basket, and if the chaff gets removed, so be it.
  One may not sift straw in a sieve, and similarly, one may not place it on a high place so that that the chaff blows away in the wind; however, one may take the straw in a sieve and place it into the trough of an animal, and one need not be concerned if the chaff is removed in the process.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one unwittingly soaked asafoetida on Shabbat, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Adda from the city of Naresh interpreted it before Rav Yosef: If one soaked it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Abaye said to him: But if that is so, if one soaked a piece of meat in water, would you also say that he is liable? No cooking was performed at all. Rather, Abaye said: It is prohibited by rabbinic decree, so that one will not conduct himself on Shabbat in the manner in which he conducts himself during the week.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to soaking asafoetida in cold water on Shabbat? Rabbi Yannai said to him: It is prohibited. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: One may not soak asafoetida in lukewarm water, indicating that it is permitted to soak it in cold water?
  Rabbi Yannai said to him: If so, that is the difference between my knowledge and yours, as I am able to analyze the <i>halakha</i> more profoundly. In this case, the mishna is not a reliable source, as the mishna expresses an individual opinion. As it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may neither soak asafoetida in hot water nor in cold water. Rabbi Yosei says: In hot water it is prohibited; in cold water it is permitted. The mishna that does not prohibit cold water is in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Yosei, but the <i>halakha</i> is not ruled based on that opinion.
  The Gemara asks: For what purpose is soaked asafoetida prepared? The Gemara answers: As a cure for heaviness of the heart. One who feels a pain in his heart drinks asafoetida. The Gemara relates: Rav Aḥa bar Yosef felt heaviness in his heart. He came before Mar Ukva to ask his advice. Mar Ukva said to him: Go drink the weight of three shekels of asafoetida in three days. He went and drank on Thursday and Shabbat eve. In the morning, he went and asked in the study hall if he could drink it on Shabbat. They said to him: The Sage from the school of Rav Adda taught, and others say, that the Sage from the school of Mar bar Rav Adda taught: A person may drink asafoetida on Shabbat, even a <i>kav</i> or two <i>kav</i>, and he need not be concerned about the decree prohibiting medicine, because asafoetida is drunk by healthy people as well.
  Rav Aḥa bar Yosef said to them: With regard to drinking, I have no dilemma. When I raised a dilemma, it is with regard to soaking asafoetida; what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to them: There was an incident that happened with me, and I came and asked that question to Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he did not have an answer for it. I came and asked Rav Huna, and he said that this is what Rav is saying: One may soak asafoetida in cold water and place it in the sun to warm it so it will be fit to drink.
  The Gemara asks: Was Rav’s ruling according to the opinion of the one who permitted soaking asafoetida in cold water? The Gemara answers: His ruling could be even according to the opinion of the one who prohibited doing so; this prohibition applies only when he had not drunk asafoetida at all; however, here, since he drank it on Thursday and on Shabbat eve, if he does not drink on Shabbat he would thereby be endangered. Therefore, he is permitted even to soak the asafoetida.
  The Gemara relates another incident involving Rav Aḥa bar Yosef: Rav Aḥa bar Yosef was walking and leaning on the shoulder of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, his sister’s son. Rav Aḥa said to him: When we arrive at Rav Safra’s house, bring me in. When they arrived, Rav Naḥman brought him in. Rav Aḥa then raised a dilemma before Rav Safra: What is the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to rubbing and thereby softening a linen shirt that is hard after being laundered on Shabbat? Does one intend to soften the shirt, and one may well do so? Or perhaps he intends to generate whiteness in the shirt, and it is prohibited? Rav Safra said to him: He intends to soften, and one may well do so.
  When Rav Aḥa emerged and came from Rav Safra’s house, Rav Naḥman said to him: What dilemma did the Master raise before Rav Safra? Rav Aḥa said to him: I raised the following dilemma before him: What is the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to rubbing and thereby softening a linen shirt on Shabbat, and he said to me: One may well do so.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak asked: And let the Master raise the same dilemma with regard to rubbing a scarf. He replied: I did not raise the dilemma with regard to a scarf, as I raised it before Rav Huna. And he resolved it for me and said that it is permitted (Rif).
  Rav Naḥman asked him: And let the Master resolve the dilemma with regard to a shirt from Rav Huna’s ruling with regard to a scarf. Rav Aḥa said to him: There is a difference between the cases: There, in the case of a shirt, it appears that one is generating whiteness, whereas here, in the case of a scarf, it does not appear that one is generating whiteness, as people are not so particular with the whiteness of a scarf, and one’s intention is undoubtedly to soften it.
  Rav Ḥisda said: With regard to this linen shirt,
  
  Daf 140b
  
  to remove it from the reed upon which it is hanging is permitted; however, to remove the reed from it is prohibited. Since the reed is not a vessel, it is set-aside. Rava said: And if it is hung on a weaver’s vessel, it is permitted to remove the vessel as well. Although its primary function is for a prohibited labor, since it is a vessel, it may be moved.
  Rav Ḥisda said: This bundle of vegetables, if it is suitable for animal food, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat, but if not, it is prohibited to move it.
  Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said as follows: In the case of this hook, if it is used for hanging meat, it is permitted to move it, as it is also suitable for other uses. However, if it is a hook for hanging fish, it is prohibited to move it, because it smells bad (Rabbeinu Ḥananel) and is used exclusively for fish.
  Rav Ketina said: One who stands on a board in the middle of a bed, it is as though he were standing on the stomach of a woman. Just as he would certainly injure the woman, he will certainly break the bed (<i>ge’onim</i>). The Gemara comments: And it is not a correct matter, and it is not accepted as <i>halakha</i>.
  On the topic of the bundle of vegetables, the Gemara cites additional advice on similar issues that Rav Ḥisda said to poor scholars experiencing difficulty earning a livelihood: A student of a Torah academy who buys vegetables should buy long ones. A bundle is a bundle, and they have a standard thickness at a standard price. However, the addition of length comes on its own for free.
  And Rav Ḥisda also said: A student of a Torah academy who buys reeds should buy long ones, since a bundle is a bundle. Bundles of reeds have a standard thickness, but the length comes on its own for free.
  And Rav Ḥisda further said: A student of a Torah academy who does not have much bread should not eat a vegetable, because it whets the appetite. And Rav Ḥisda said: I neither ate a vegetable in my state of poverty, nor did I eat a vegetable in my state of wealth. In my poverty, I did not eat a vegetable because it whets the appetite. In my wealth, I did not eat a vegetable because I said: Where a vegetable enters, let meat and fish enter instead.
  And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy who does not have much bread should not cut it into thin slices; rather, he should eat what he has in one helping. And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy who does not have much bread should not break it for guests. What is the reason? As he will not do so in a generous manner. And Rav Ḥisda said: Originally, I would not break bread until I placed my hand in the entire dish to assure that I found that there was enough bread to meet my needs.
  And Rav Ḥisda also said: One who is able to eat barley bread and nevertheless eats wheat bread violates the prohibition against wanton destruction. One who wastes resources is comparable to one who destroys items of value. And Rav Pappa said: One who is able to drink beer and nevertheless drinks wine violates the prohibition against wanton destruction. The Gemara comments: And this is not a correct matter, as the prohibition against destruction of one’s body takes precedence. It is preferable for one to care for his body by eating higher quality food than to conserve his money.
  And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy who has no oil should wash, i.e., smear himself, with ditch water, as the scum that accumulates in it is as useful as oil.
  And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy who buys meat should buy from the neck [<i>unka</i>], as there are three types of meat there.
  And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy who buys a linen shirt [<i>kitonita</i>] should buy it from those who work by the river Abba, and should wash it every thirty days, so that it will last him for the twelve months of the year. And I guarantee that the shirt will remain in good shape. The Gemara comments: What is the meaning of <i>kitonita</i>? A fine class [<i>kita</i>], as fine clothing provide one entry into a well-dressed class of people.
  And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy should not sit on a new mat, as its dampness ruins his garments.
  And Rav Ḥisda said: A student of a Torah academy should not give his clothes to his host to wash for him, as that is not proper behavior, for the host might see something on it, such as signs of a seminal emission, and he will be demeaned in the eyes of his host.
  After citing Rav Ḥisda’s recommendations to students, the Gemara cites his advice to his daughters. Rav Ḥisda said to his daughters: Be modest before your husbands; do not eat bread before your husbands, lest you eat too much and be demeaned in their eyes.
  Similarly, he advised: Do not eat vegetables at night, as vegetables cause bad breath. Do not eat dates at night and do not drink beer at night, as these loosen the bowels. And do not relieve yourself in the place where your husbands relieve themselves, so that they will not be revolted by you.
  And when a person calls at the door seeking to enter, do not say: Who is it, in the masculine form, but rather: Who is it, in the feminine form. Avoid creating the impression that you have dealings with other men.
  In order to demonstrate the value of modesty to his daughters, Rav Ḥisda held a pearl in one hand and a clod of earth in the other. The pearl he showed them immediately, and the clod of earth, he did not show them until they were upset due to their curiosity, and then he showed it to them. This taught them that a concealed object is more attractive than one on display, even if it is less valuable.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not soak vetches in water in order to separate them from their chaff. However, one may take the straw in a sieve and place it into the trough of an animal. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may not look at a sieve at all on Shabbat, lest one come to violate the prohibited labor of selecting.
  MISHNA: One may sweep hay from before an animal that is being fattened, and one may move hay to the sides for an animal that grazes on its own in the field (Rabbeinu Ḥananel); this is the statement of Rabbi Dosa. And the Rabbis prohibit doing so. One may take hay from before this animal and place it before that animal on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Do the Rabbis, who are stringent, disagree with the first clause of Rabbi Dosa’s statement, or do they disagree with the latter clause of the mishna, or do they disagree with both clauses?
  Come and hear a resolution from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>. And the Rabbis say: With regard to both this, hay placed before an animal set aside for fattening, and that, hay placed before an animal that grazes on its own, one may not move it to the sides. Apparently, the Rabbis rule stringently in both cases.
  Rav Ḥisda said: This dispute is with regard to a trough formed in the ground; however, with regard to a trough which is a vessel, everyone agrees that it is permitted. The Gemara expresses surprise: Is there anyone who permits doing so in a trough formed in the ground? Isn’t one leveling holes and thereby performing the prohibited labors of building or plowing? Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Ḥisda said: This dispute applies only to a trough that is a vessel; however, with regard to a trough formed in the ground, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, due to the concern lest one level holes.
  We also learned in the mishna: One may take hay from before this animal and place it before that animal. It was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: One may take hay from before an animal whose mouth is fine and place it before an animal whose mouth is foul. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may take hay from before an animal whose mouth is foul and place it in front of an animal whose mouth is fine. There is an apparent contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i>.
  Abaye said: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> hold that one may take hay from before a donkey and place it before an ox. However, one may not take hay from before an ox and place it before a donkey. The formulation of the <i>baraitot</i> can be explained as follows: That which was taught: One may take hay from before an animal whose mouth is fine, is referring to a donkey, and the reason the <i>baraita</i> says its mouth is fine is because it has no spittle. Therefore, the donkey does not dampen the remaining hay with its saliva. And the statement: And one may place it before an animal whose mouth is foul, is referring to a cow,
  
  Daf 141a
  
  which has spittle.
  And that which was taught in the other <i>baraita</i>: One may take hay from before an animal whose mouth is foul, is referring to a donkey. Its mouth is foul because it does not discern between different foods and it eats everything. And the statement: One may place it before an animal whose mouth is fine, is referring to a cow, which discerns between different foods and only then it eats.
  MISHNA: With regard to straw that is on top of a bed, if a person wishes to lie on it, he may not move it with his hand to smooth it, as the straw is set aside for kindling; rather, he may move it with his body. Since moving straw with one’s body is not the usual manner, it is permitted. And if the straw was designated as animal food, or a pillow or sheet was on it, which would clearly indicate that the straw was placed on the bed so one could sleep on it, the straw is not considered set-aside, and one may move it even with his hand.
  A press which belongs to a homeowner, one may loosen it on Shabbat. This press is used to dry and press clothing after laundering. One loosens it to remove clothing from it. However, one may not press clothing with it on Shabbat. And in the case of a press that belongs to a launderer, which is made specifically for pressing and requires professional expertise for its operation, one may not touch it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the launderer’s press was loosened somewhat on Shabbat eve, he may loosen it completely on Shabbat and remove the garment.
  GEMARA: With regard to moving items that are set aside, the Gemara cites that which Rav Naḥman said: This radish, which was buried in the earth, if it was buried from top to bottom, with its wide end at the top and its narrow end at the bottom, it is permitted to remove it on Shabbat. When the radish is buried in that manner, one does not move the earth when he removes the radish. However, if the radish was buried in the earth from bottom to top, with the wide end at the bottom, it is prohibited.
  Rav Adda bar Abba said: They say in the school of Rav: We already learned in the mishna that the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: With regard to straw on top of a bed, one may not move it with his hand, but he may move it with his body. And if it is animal food, or a pillow or sheet is on it, he may move it even with his hand. Conclude from here that moving an item in an atypical manner is not considered moving. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from here that this is indeed the case.
  The Gemara cites a somewhat similar case. Rav Yehuda said: In the case of these peppers, crushing them one by one with the handle of a knife is permitted. However, crushing two at a time is prohibited, because it appears to be a prohibited labor. Rava said: Since he alters the manner in which he performs this activity, even crushing many at a time is also permitted.
  Rav Yehuda also said: One who bathes in water should first dry himself immediately upon exiting, and then ascend to the coast, lest he come to carry the remaining drops of water on his body four cubits in a <i>karmelit</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, if there is a concern about carrying water, there should be concern when one descends into the water as well. In that case, his force propels water four cubits into the river, and it should be prohibited. The Gemara answers: With regard to movement that results from his force in a <i>karmelit</i>, the Sages did not issue a decree. Since one does not directly propel the water, but the water moves only as an extension of his motion, and since the river is a <i>karmelit</i>, and the prohibition to carry there is only a rabbinic law, the Sages did not issue a decree for one who descends into the water.
  In a similar decree, Abaye said, and some say that it was stated by Rav Yehuda: If one has mud on his foot, he may wipe it on the ground on Shabbat, but he may not wipe it on a wall.
  Rava said: What is the reason that he may not wipe it off on a wall? Is it because it appears like building, as he is adding plaster to the wall? That is the building of a field laborer, which is not an actual building. There is no concern in that case because in adding plaster to that building, one does not perform the prohibited labor of building.
  Rather, Rava said: On the contrary, He may wipe it on a wall, but he may not wipe it on the ground. This is due to the concern lest one come to level holes in the ground while wiping his foot.
  It is stated that other <i>amora’im</i> disputed this issue. Mar, son of Ravina, said: Both this, wiping the mud on a wall, and that, wiping the mud on the ground, are prohibited. Rav Pappa said: Both this and that are permitted.
  The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Mar, son of Ravina, with what may he wipe his foot? The Gemara answers: Even according to his opinion, there is a permitted manner to clean his foot; he wipes it on a beam on the ground.
  Rava said: A person should not sit on Shabbat right at the entrance to a closed alleyway where a side post is placed as a symbolic partition enabling one to carry inside the alleyway. The reason for this is that perhaps an object will roll into the public domain and one will come to get it, as there is no conspicuous demarcation between inside and outside the alleyway.
  And Rava also said a similar decree: A person may not position a barrel on a dirt floor, lest he come to level holes in the ground while smoothing the surface upon which he is positioning the barrel.
  And furthermore, Rava said: A person may not stuff a rag into the mouth of a jug [<i>shisha</i>] on Shabbat, lest he come to violate the prohibition of squeezing liquid from the cloth.
  Rav Kahana said: With regard to mortar that is on one’s garment on Shabbat, one may rub it off from the inside, but one may not rub it off from the outside, because that is comparable to the prohibited labor of laundering.
  The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned: With regard to mortar that is on one’s shoe, he may scrape it off with the back of a knife as a departure from the typical manner of scraping. And mortar which is on one’s clothes, he may scrape off with his fingernail, as long as he does not rub it. The Gemara asks: What, is it not saying that he may not rub it at all? The Gemara rejects that premise: No, it is saying that he may not rub it from the outside, rather from the inside.
  Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Yannai said: One may scrape mud off of a new shoe on Shabbat, but not off of an old shoe, because a layer of the shoe will be removed, which constitutes the prohibited labor of smoothing.
  
  Daf 141b
  
  With what does one scrape it off? Rabbi Abahu said: With the back of a knife, which is a departure from the typical manner of doing so.
  A certain Elder said to Rabbi Abbahu: Delete your teaching before this statement taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya: One may not scrape at all; neither a new shoe nor an old shoe, and one may not smear oil on one’s foot while it is inside the shoe or inside the sandal, as the oil is absorbed by the leather of the shoe and strengthens it, which constitutes performance of the prohibited labor of tanning. However, one may smear oil on his foot in the typical manner and place it afterward in a shoe or in a sandal, and he need not be concerned that this oil will enhance the shoe leather. And he may likewise smear oil on his entire body with oil and roll on a leather carpet, and he need not be concerned.
  Rav Ḥisda said: They only taught this in a case where he does so in order to polish the carpet. But if he does so to tan the carpet, it is prohibited.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If he does so to tan the leather, it is obvious that it is prohibited, as tanning is a labor prohibited by Torah law. And furthermore: If he does so in order to polish it, is there an opinion that permits one to perform this act intentionally on Shabbat <i>ab initio</i>?
  Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Ḥisda said: They only taught that it is permitted to do so on Shabbat in a case where one smears a measure sufficient only to polish it; however, if one smears a measure sufficient to tan it, it is prohibited, even if he did not intend to tan the leather.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A small person may not go out in a too large shoe, due to concern lest the shoe fall off and he will come to carry it in the public domain; but he may go out in a too large cloak. Even if it does not fit him properly, it will certainly not fall off.
  And a woman may not go out on Shabbat in a shoe that is torn on top, lest she be mocked, remove it, and carry it on Shabbat. And a shoe of that kind may not be used to perform <i>ḥalitza</i>, as it is not a suitable shoe. <i>Ḥalitza</i> is performed by a widow bound in a levirate bond with her brother-in-law. However, if she performed <i>ḥalitza</i> with it, her <i>ḥalitza</i> is valid, since ultimately it is a shoe.
  And one may not go out on Shabbat wearing a new shoe, due to the concern that it will not fit properly, and then one will remove it and carry it. The Gemara comments: In what case did they say that one may not wear a new shoe? They said this with regard to a woman’s shoe, as women are very particular about having their shoes fit properly.
  Bar Kappara taught: They only taught that she may not go out wearing a new shoe on Shabbat if she did not yet go out wearing it for any length of time while it was still day. However, if she went out wearing it on Shabbat eve, at which point she would have ascertained if it fits her, she is permitted to go out wearing it on Shabbat.
  One <i>baraita</i> taught: One may remove a shoe from the shoemaker’s last, the frame on which a shoe is shaped, on Shabbat. And another <i>baraita</i> taught the opposite: One may not remove it. The Gemara explains that this is not difficult: This <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits doing so, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that <i>baraita</i>, which permits doing so, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis dispute the applicability of the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity and impurity in a similar case.
  As we learned in a mishna: A shoe that remains on a last, Rabbi Eliezer deems it pure, i.e., unable to become impure, as in his opinion the shoe is not yet complete, and therefore it is not yet a vessel and cannot become impure. And the Rabbis deem it capable of becoming impure, as in their opinion, the shoe is completed, and any vessel whose work is complete can become ritually impure. Correspondingly, the Rabbis, who hold that a shoe on a last is a completed vessel, hold that it may be moved on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that it is an incomplete vessel, holds that it may not be moved.
  The Gemara poses a question: It works out well according to the opinion of Rava, who said: Moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, whether for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action or for the purpose of utilizing its place, is permitted. It is well understood that one may move the last slightly while removing the shoe, since removing the shoe is considered utilizing the last’s place.
  However, according to Abaye, who said that for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action, it is permitted; however, for the purpose of utilizing its place, it is prohibited, what can be said? It is prohibited to move the last, which is clearly a utensil whose primary function is for a prohibited use. How is it possible to remove the shoe without moving the last?
  The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is with a shoe placed loosely on the last, so the shoe can be removed without moving the last. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was loose, it is permitted.
  The Gemara infers: The reason it is permitted is only because it is loose; however, if it is not loose, no, it is prohibited. It works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said that moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action it is permitted; however, for the purpose of utilizing its place, it is prohibited to move it. It is well understood that it is prohibited to move the last if the shoe is tightly attached to it.
  However, according to Rava, who said that moving an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use, whether for the purpose of utilizing the object itself to perform a permitted action or for the purpose of utilizing its place, is permitted, why discuss specifically a case where it is loose? Even if it were not loose, it should also be permitted to move it.
  The Gemara answers: That <i>baraita</i> is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, and it is not a clarification of the opinion of the Rabbis. Although Rabbi Eliezer holds that the shoe is not yet completed, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer that it is permitted to carry it. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: If it was already loose and no longer requires a last, it is permitted to move it, since it is a completed vessel and no longer needs the last to shape it.
  
  MISHNA: A person may take his son in his hands on Shabbat, and even though there is a stone, which is a set-aside item, in the child’s hand, it is not prohibited to pick up the child. And it is permissible to take a basket with a stone inside it on Shabbat. And one may move ritually impure <i>teruma</i>, which may not be eaten and is set-aside, with ritually pure <i>teruma,</i> as well as with non-sacred produce.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: One may even lift a measure of <i>teruma</i> that was nullified from a mixture of one hundred measures of non-sacred produce and one measure of <i>teruma.</i> When a measure of <i>teruma</i> is mixed with non-sacred produce, if the non-sacred produce is one hundred times the measure of <i>teruma,</i> the <i>teruma</i> is nullified. However, the Sages instituted that one must remove an amount equivalent to that measure of <i>teruma</i> and give it to a priest. The remainder is considered non-sacred produce. Rabbi Yehuda permits removing that measure on Shabbat to render the mixture permitted to eat.
  GEMARA: Rava said: If one carried out a living baby to the public domain on Shabbat, and the baby had a purse that was hanging around his neck, he is liable for carrying out the purse. However, one who carried out a dead baby, with a purse hanging around his neck, is exempt.
  Rava said: If one carried out a living baby to the public domain on Shabbat, and a purse was hanging around the baby’s neck, he is liable for carrying out the purse. The Gemara asks: And let him be liable for carrying out the baby as well.
  The Gemara responds: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who said: A living being carries itself. Therefore, one who carries a living being from one domain to another is not liable.
  The Gemara asks: And let the purse be negated relative to the baby; and he should be exempt for carrying out the purse as well. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt even for carrying out the bed, because the bed is secondary to the person? The same should be said with regard to the purse, relative to the baby.
  The Gemara answers: In a case where a bed is relative to a living being, the living being negates it, as the bed is needed to carry the person and is secondary to him. However, in a case where a purse is relative to a baby, the baby does not negate it, since it is independently significant.
  And Rava said: One who carried out a dead baby with a purse hanging around the baby’s neck is exempt. The Gemara asks: And let him be liable for carrying out the baby. The Gemara answers: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: With regard to any labor that is not needed for its own sake, one is exempt for performing it on Shabbat. One who carries out a corpse does not do so because he needs it; rather, he does so for the sake of the corpse, i.e., to bury it or to move it from a degrading place. Therefore, he has not performed a labor prohibited by Torah law. Similarly, he is also exempt for carrying out the purse because due to his distress and mourning he negates the purse, as it is insignificant relative to the baby.
  We learned in the mishna: A person may take his son in his hands on Shabbat; and this is permitted even though there is a stone in the child’s hand. As it can be inferred from this mishna that the stone is negated relative to the child, why, then, is he liable in the case of a purse hanging around a live baby’s neck? Let the purse be negated relative to the baby. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: You cannot infer from this mishna that the stone is negated and therefore it is permitted to move it. Rather, the mishna is referring to a baby who has longings for his father. It is permitted for the father to move the stone because if the father does not lift him, the baby might take ill.
  The Gemara asks: If so,
  
  Daf 142a
  
  why does the mishna refer specifically to moving a stone? The same should hold true even for a dinar, as well. Why, then, did Rava say: They only taught this in a case where the child has a stone in his hand; however, if the child has a dinar in his hand, it is prohibited to lift the child? The Gemara answers: Actually, lifting the child with a dinar should also be permitted. However, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting lifting the child with a dinar because with regard to a stone, if it falls, his father will not come to bring it. However, with regard to a dinar, if it falls, his father will come to bring it.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rava: On Shabbat, one who carries out his clothes to the public domain while they are folded and placed on his shoulder, and his sandals on his feet and his rings in his hand, not on his fingers, is liable. And if he was wearing them, he is exempt for all of them, as they are negated relative to him.
  One who carries out a person with his garments on him, and his sandals on his feet, and his rings on the fingers of his hands, i.e., wearing all of his clothes and jewelry in the typical manner, is exempt, whereas if he carried them out as they are, i.e., the person was holding his clothes in his hands, he is liable for carrying out the clothes, just as Rava said.
  We learned in the mishna: And it is permissible to take a basket with a stone inside it on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And why may he do so? The basket should be a base for a prohibited object, and a base for a prohibited object is set-aside and may not be moved on Shabbat. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Here, we are dealing with a basket full of fruit. The basket is a base for permitted items as well, not only a base for the stone. The Gemara asks: Why may he move the basket and the stone? There is an alternative. And let him throw the fruit and throw the stone out of the basket, and take the fruit in his hands, and there will be no need to move the stone. The Gemara answers: As Rabbi Elai said that Rav said in a different context: It is referring to fruits that become soiled and ruined. Here, too, it is referring to fruits that become soiled and ruined if he throws them down.
  The Gemara asks a question: And let him shake them until the stone is on one side of the basket, enabling him to throw the stone out of the basket. Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said that Rava said: Here, we are dealing with a broken basket with a hole, in which the stone serves as a side of the basket by sealing the hole. Therefore, he cannot throw it out of the basket.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may move ritually impure <i>teruma</i> with ritually pure <i>teruma</i>. Rav Ḥisda said: They only taught this in a case where the pure <i>teruma</i> is on the bottom and the impure <i>teruma</i> is on the top. In that case, if one wants to reach the pure <i>teruma,</i> there is no alternative to taking the impure <i>teruma</i> as well. However, if the pure <i>teruma</i> is on the top and the impure <i>teruma is</i> on the bottom, he takes the pure <i>teruma</i> and leaves the impure <i>teruma.</i>
  The Gemara asks a question: And when the pure <i>teruma</i> is on the bottom too, let him throw the impure fruit, and take the pure fruit. Rabbi Elai said that Rav said: It is referring to fruits that become soiled and ruined, which cannot be thrown from the basket.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rav Ḥisda: One may move impure <i>teruma</i> with the pure <i>teruma</i> and with the non-sacred produce, whether the pure is on the top and the impure is on the bottom, or whether the impure is on the top and the pure is on the bottom. This is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Hisda.
  The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥisda could have said to you: The mishna, which, according to Rav Ḥisda, permits moving the impure <i>teruma</i> with the pure <i>teruma</i> only when the pure <i>teruma</i> is on top, is referring to a case where he needs the basket for the purpose of utilizing the object itself, i.e., he wants to eat the fruit. The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he needs the basket for the purpose of utilizing its place, i.e., he wants to move the basket in order to vacate its place, in which case he may move it even if it contains impure <i>teruma</i> exclusively.
  The Gemara asks: What impelled Rav Ḥisda to establish the mishna as referring specifically to a case where he needs the basket for the purpose of utilizing the object itself? Why can’t he explain the mishna as referring to any case?
  Rava said: The mishna is precise in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as it is taught in the latter clause, the next mishna: With regard to coins that are on a cushion, he shakes the cushion and the coins fall. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They only taught that he may shake the cushion in a case where it is for the purpose of utilizing the cushion itself. However, if he needs it for the purpose of utilizing its place, he may move it, even though the coins are still on it. And from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case where he needs the cushion for the purpose of utilizing the cushion itself, the first clause, too, is referring to a case where he needs the basket for the purpose of utilizing the basket itself.
  We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may even lift a measure of <i>teruma</i> that was nullified from a mixture of one hundred measures of non-sacred produce and one measure of <i>teruma.</i> The Gemara asks: And why is it permitted? Isn’t he rendering the produce fit for consumption? The Sages issued a decree prohibiting the performance of any action that renders an item fit for use on Shabbat.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: <i>Teruma</i> is considered as if it is placed in its pure unadulterated state. By lifting the measure of <i>teruma,</i> one does not render the rest of the mixture fit for consumption. It is considered as if the measure of <i>teruma</i> never intermingled with the rest of the produce and the measure that he lifted from the produce is the measure that fell into the produce.
  As we learned in a mishna: A <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> that fell into less than one hundred <i>se’a</i> of non-sacred produce causes it to become a prohibited mixture. The <i>teruma</i> is not nullified by the non-sacred produce. And then, if a <i>se’a</i> from the mixture fell into a different place with non-sacred produce, Rabbi Eliezer says: The <i>se’a</i> from the original mixture renders it a prohibited mixture in the same way that definite <i>teruma</i> would. This is due to the concern that the same <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> that fell into the first mixture never intermingled with the produce and subsequently fell into the second mixture. Therefore, it requires nullification like unadulterated <i>teruma.</i>
  And the Rabbis say: The <i>se’a</i> from the original prohibited mixture only renders the second one a prohibited mixture according to the proportion of <i>teruma</i> in the entire mixture. In other words, the percentage of <i>teruma</i> in each <i>se’a</i> of the original mixture is representative of the percentage of <i>teruma</i> in the entire mixture. Only that measure of <i>teruma</i> need be nullified. Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that the <i>teruma</i> in the mixture is not considered mixed, and it is considered as if it was placed in its pure unadulterated state, corresponds to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that by lifting the measure of <i>teruma,</i> one does not render the rest of the mixture fit for consumption.
  The Gemara rejects this: Say that you heard that Rabbi Eliezer expresses his opinion in this matter to rule stringently. Did you hear him express his opinion to rule leniently? He expressed concern lest the fallen <i>teruma</i> might not have intermingled with the non-sacred produce in the first mixture, and therefore, the second mixture is prohibited. However, he does not consider this a certainty.
  Rather, Rabbi Yehuda stated his <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna: If a <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> fell into one hundred <i>se’a</i> of non-sacred produce, and he did not manage to lift that <i>se’a</i> from the mixture until another <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> fell into the mixture, this entire mixture is prohibited. This is because two <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> are mixed with one hundred <i>se’a</i> of non-sacred produce. And Rabbi Shimon permits the mixture. Rabbi Shimon holds that the first <i>se’a</i> that fell into the produce is not mixed with it; it is placed in its unadulterated state. When the second <i>se’a</i> falls, it is also placed in its unadulterated state, and the two <i>se’a</i> do not join together.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: And from what does that conclusion ensue? Perhaps there, they are disagreeing with regard to this: That the first <i>tanna</i> holds: Even though two <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> fell one after another, it is as though they fell at once, and this <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> fell into fifty <i>se’a</i> of non-sacred produce, and this <i>se’a</i> of <i>teruma</i> fell into fifty <i>se’a</i> of non-sacred produce, which are insufficient to nullify <i>teruma.</i> And Rabbi Shimon holds: The first <i>se’a</i> was nullified immediately when it fell into one hundred <i>se’a,</i> and this <i>se’a</i> will be nullified in one hundred and one <i>se’a.</i> There is no connection between this dispute and the opinion that by lifting the measure of <i>teruma,</i> one does not render the rest of the mixture fit for consumption.
  Rather, Rabbi Yehuda stated his <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One need not lift a <i>se’a</i> from the mixture in order to render it permitted to eat. It is sufficient if he casts his eyes on this side of the mixture and decides to separate a <i>se’a</i> from the produce on that side, and he eats from a different side of the mixture and physically separates the <i>se’a</i> later. Lifting a <i>se’a</i> from the mixture does not render the mixture fit for consumption, as it is permitted to partake from the mixture even without removing a <i>se’a</i>. That is the rationale for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar?
  
  Daf 142b
  
  Doesn’t he disagree with him? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may lift a measure of <i>teruma</i> that was nullified from a mixture of one hundred measures of non-sacred produce and one measure of <i>teruma.</i> Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One casts his eyes on this side of the mixture and decides to separate a <i>se’a</i> from the produce on that side, and he eats from a different side of the mixture.
  The Gemara rejects this: Fundamentally, the two <i>tanna’im</i> agree, but the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is more far-reaching than the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. Rabbi Yehuda says that since thought is sufficient, lifting the <i>se’a</i> does not render the produce fit for consumption, and it is preferable if he lifts the <i>se’a</i> even on Shabbat.
  MISHNA: With regard to a stone, which is set-aside on Shabbat and may not be moved, that was placed on the mouth of a barrel, one tilts the barrel on its side, and the stone falls. If the barrel was among other barrels, and the other barrels might break if the stone falls on them, he lifts the barrel to distance it from the other barrels, and then tilts it on its side, and the stone falls.
  With regard to coins that are on a cushion, he shakes the cushion and the coins fall. If there was bird dung (<i>Arukh</i>) on the cushion, he wipes it with a rag, but he may not wash it with water because of the prohibition against laundering. If the cushion was made of leather, and laundering is not a concern, he places water on it until the bird dung ceases.
  GEMARA: Rav Huna said that Rav said: They only taught this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a stone in a case where one forgets the stone on the barrel. However, if he places the stone on the barrel, the barrel becomes a base for a prohibited object, which itself may not be moved throughout Shabbat.
  We learned in the mishna: If the barrel was among other barrels, he lifts the barrel and then tilts it on its side, and the stone falls. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that any place that there is a prohibited item and a permitted item, we may exert ourselves for the permitted item, but we may not exert ourselves for the prohibited item? One must exert himself to lift the barrel, and he may not remove the stone, although doing so would minimize his exertion.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who selects legumes on a Festival, separating edible and inedible, Beit Shammai say: He selects food and eats it immediately and leaves the waste. And Beit Hillel say: He selects in his usual manner, and may even remove the waste and leave the food, in his lap or in a large vessel.
  And it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: In what case are these matters, the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, stated: In a case where the quantity of the food is greater than the quantity of the waste. However, if the quantity of the waste is greater than the quantity of the food, everyone agrees that one selects the food to avoid the exertion involved in removing the waste, which itself may not be moved. The same is true here. He moves the barrel and not the stone, which is like waste.
  The Gemara asks: And here, in the case of the barrel, isn’t it comparable to a case where the food is greater than the waste, as the barrel, which is food, is bigger and heavier than the stone. In addition, it is easier to move the stone. Nevertheless, he is not permitted to do so, in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
  The Gemara answers: Here, too, since if he wants to take the wine, the wine cannot be taken until he removes the stone, the legal status of the stone is like that of waste which is greater in quantity than the food, and it cannot be likened to the case of selecting. In this case, he is unable to move the barrel without moving the stone.
  We learned in the mishna: If the barrel was among other barrels, he lifts the barrel. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: If the barrel was placed in a storeroom amongst other barrels, or if glass vessels were placed beneath it, preventing him from tilting the barrel and letting the stone fall, he lifts the barrel and moves it to a different place, and he tilts it on its side, and the stone falls. And then he takes from the barrel what he needs, and restores the barrel to its place.
  We learned in the mishna: With regard to coins that are on a cushion, he shakes the cushion and the coins fall. Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: They only taught this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where one forgets the coins on the cushion; however, if he places the coins on the cushion, the cushion becomes a base for a prohibited object and may not be moved at all.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They only taught the <i>halakha</i> that one shakes the cushion and the coins fall, when he needs the cushion for the purpose of utilizing the cushion itself; but if he needs it for the purpose of utilizing its place, he moves the cushion with the coins still on it. And likewise, Hiyya bar Rav from Difti taught in a <i>baraita:</i> They only taught the <i>halakha</i> that one shakes the cushion and the coins fall, when he needs the cushion for the purpose of utilizing the cushion itself, but if he needs it for the purpose of utilizing its place, he moves the cushion with the coins still on it.
  We learned in the mishna: With regard to coins that are on a cushion, he shakes the cushion and the coins fall. Rabbi Oshaya said: If one forgot a purse of money in the courtyard on Shabbat eve, and he remembers it on Shabbat and wants to bring it into the house, he places a loaf of bread or a baby on it and moves it. The purse becomes a base for a permitted object and may be moved. Rav Yitzhak said: If one forgot a brick in the courtyard, he places a loaf of bread or a baby on it and moves it. Rabbi Yehuda bar Sheila said that Rabbi Asi said: Once, they forgot a saddlebag [<i>diskaya</i>] full of coins in a main street, and they came and asked Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he said to them: Place a loaf or a baby on it, and move it.
  Mar Zutra said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with all these statements in the case of one who forgets. However, if one intentionally left an object, even a valuable object, on Shabbat eve, he may not employ artifice and move it the following day. Rav Ashi said: If one forgot, he may also not employ artifice, and they only stated that movement by means of a loaf or a baby for the purposes of moving a corpse alone.
  The Gemara relates: Abaye would place a spoon on bundles of produce, so that he would be able to move the bundles because of the spoon. Rava would place a knife on a slaughtered young dove and move it. Rav Yosef said mockingly: How sharp is the <i>halakha</i> of children? Say that the Sages stated this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where one forgets, but did they say that one may do so <i>ab initio</i>?
  Abaye explained his actions and said: If not for the fact that I am an important person, why would I need to place a spoon on the bundles? Aren’t the bundles themselves suited to lean upon? I could have carried the bundles without the spoon.
  Similarly, Rava said: If not for the fact that I am an important person, why would I need to place a knife on a young dove? Isn’t the young dove itself suited to be eaten as raw meat?
  The Gemara asks: The reason that it is permitted to move the slaughtered dove is because it is suited to be eaten by a person as raw meat; but if it is not suited to be eaten by a person as raw meat, no, it may not be moved. Is that to say that Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that on Shabbat it is prohibited to move food that was originally designated for human consumption and is now only suited for animal consumption?
  Didn’t Rava say to his attendant on a Festival: Roast a duck for me, and throw its intestines to the cat. Moving the duck’s intestines was permitted in order to feed the cat. Similarly, moving the dove should have been permitted not because it is raw meat fit for consumption by a person, but because it is suited for consumption by a dog.
  
  Daf 143a
  
  The Gemara answers: There, since the intestines will putrefy as time passes, they are on his mind from yesterday. Since Shabbat eve, he has had in mind to feed them to the cat.
  The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to say that Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as Rava taught: A woman may not enter the wood storehouse to take a wooden poker to stoke a fire on a Festival. And with regard to a poker that broke, it is prohibited to kindle a fire with it on a Festival, as one may kindle a fire on a Festival with vessels that may be moved, but one may not kindle a fire with broken vessels that broke during the Festival. They are set-aside and prohibited. Conclude from it that Rava ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of set-aside.
  MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: One may clear bones and shells left from the Shabbat meal from the table with his hand. And Beit Hillel say: One may remove the entire board [<i>tavla</i>] that is the table surface and shake the bones and shells off of it, but he may not lift them with his hand because they are set-aside and may not be moved.
  One may clear bread crumbs from the table, even if they are less than an olive-bulk, and pea and lentil pods. Even though it is not fit for human consumption, it may be moved because it is animal fodder.
  With regard to a sponge, if it has leather as a handle, one may wipe the table with it, and if not, one may not wipe the table with it lest he come to squeeze liquid from it. And the Rabbis say: Both this, a dry sponge with a handle, and that, one without a handle, may be moved on Shabbat and it does not become ritually impure. A sponge is not among the substances that can become ritually impure, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic decree.
  GEMARA: Rav Naḥman said: Reverse the two opinions, as we have only Beit Shammai in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits moving set-aside items, and Beit Hillel in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who permits doing so.
  We learned in the mishna: One may clear bread crumbs from the table. The Gemara comments: This supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to crumbs that are less than an olive-bulk, it is prohibited to destroy them by hand in deference to the food.
  We learned in the mishna: One may clear pea and lentil pods from the table on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is it in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who is not of the opinion that there is a prohibition of set-aside.
  Say the latter clause of the mishna: With regard to a sponge, if it has leather as a handle, one may wipe the table with it, and if not, one may not wipe the table with it. We have arrived at the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: An unintentional act is prohibited, as he certainly does not intend to squeeze liquid from the sponge.
  The Gemara answers: In that case, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is prohibited, as it is Abaye and Rava who both say: Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of: Cut off its head will it not die, i.e., inevitable consequences. When the prohibited outcome that ensues from the unintentional action is inevitable, Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is prohibited. Squeezing liquid from a sponge is an inevitable consequence.
  With regard to those pits of Aramean dates, which are low quality and occasionally fed to animals, it is permitted to move the pits since they are fit for use due to their origin, i.e., the dates that were prepared as animal feed beforehand. And moving pits of Persian dates is prohibited. Since those dates are high quality and are not prepared for animals, their pits, too, are not prepared for that use.
  The Gemara relates that Shmuel would carry them along with bread. The letters <i>shin</i>, <i>resh</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>zayin</i> are a mnemonic of the Sages whose opinions are cited below: Shmuel, Rabba, Huna, Ameimar, Sheshet, Pappa, Zekharya. The Gemara comments: Shmuel’s statement is consistent with his reasoning, as Shmuel said: A man may perform all his needs with bread. As long as the bread remains edible, he need not be concerned that he is treating the bread contemptuously.
  Rabba would move them along with a pitcher of water. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, would render them a chamber pot with excrement. The Sages permitted moving repulsive vessels. Here, too, he would collect all the date pits and then move them out because they were disgusting. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: And may one create a chamber pot with excrement <i>ab initio</i>? Although the Sages permitted moving a container of excrement, they did not permit creating one <i>ab initio</i> so that it would be permitted to move it.
  Rav Sheshet would dispose of the pits with his tongue. Rav Pappa would dispose of them behind the divan on which he sat while eating because he did not want to move them in another manner. They said about Rabbi Zekharya ben Avkolas that he would turn his face toward the back of the divan and dispose of them.
  
  Daf 143b
  
  MISHNA: From a barrel of wine or oil that broke on Shabbat, one may rescue from it food sufficient for three meals, and one may also say to others: Come and rescue food for yourselves. This applies provided that one does not soak up the wine or oil with a sponge or rag, due to the prohibition of squeezing. One may not squeeze fruits on Shabbat in order to extract liquids from them. And if liquids seeped out on their own, it is prohibited to use them on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the fruits were designated for eating, the liquid that seeps from them on Shabbat is permitted. There is no concern lest one purposely squeeze liquids from fruit that is designated for eating. And if the fruits were originally designated for liquids, the liquids that seep from them on Shabbat are prohibited. In the case of honeycombs that one crushed on Shabbat eve, and honey and wax seeped from them on their own on Shabbat, they are prohibited, and Rabbi Eliezer permits using them.
  GEMARA: It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may not soak up wine and one may not collect oil in his hand, so that one will not conduct himself on Shabbat in the manner that he conducts himself during the week. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one’s fruit was scattered in a courtyard on Shabbat, one may collect them from hand to hand, a little at a time, and eat them immediately. However, one may not collect them into a basket or into a box, so that one will not conduct himself on Shabbat in the manner that he conducts himself during the week.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not squeeze fruit on Shabbat, and the liquid that seeps from fruit on its own is prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda, however, distinguishes between fruit that is designated for eating, in which case the liquid that seeps out on its own is permitted, and fruit that is designated for juicing, in which case the liquid that seeps out on its own on Shabbat is prohibited. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Rabbis with regard to olives and grapes. Even if they were designated for eating, the liquid that seeps from them on its own on Shabbat is prohibited. What is the reason for this? Since they are generally used for squeezing, one had in mind from the outset that these would serve that purpose as well, even if he designated them for eating. And Ulla said that Rav said: Rabbi Yehuda was in disagreement even with regard to olives and grapes. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to other fruits, and the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to olives and grapes.
  Rabba said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said as follows: Rabbi Yehuda would concede to the Rabbis with regard to olives and grapes, and the Rabbis would concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to other fruit.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abba: If it is true that they agree with each other, with regard to what do they disagree? He said to him: When you find it, i.e., examine this matter and you will find areas in which they disagree. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It stands to reason that they disagree with regard to mulberries and pomegranates, which have intermediate status, between olives and grapes, which are always considered designated for juicing, and other fruits, which are not.
  As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to olives from which one squeezed oil and grapes from which one squeezed wine before Shabbat (<i>Tosafot</i>), and he subsequently brought them into his house, whether he brought them in for use as food or whether he brought them in for use of their liquids, that which seeps from them on its own on Shabbat is prohibited. However, with regard to mulberries from which one squeezed water, i.e., juice, and pomegranates from which one squeezed wine, i.e., pomegranate juice, and he brought them into the house, if he originally brought them in for use as food, what seeps from them is permitted. And if he brought them in for use of their liquids, and similarly, if he brought them in without specifying his intention, what seeps from them is prohibited. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: Whether he brought them into the house for use as food or whether he brought them in for use of their liquids, what seeps from them is prohibited.
  The Gemara questions this <i>baraita</i>: And does Rabbi Yehuda maintain that in the case of undesignated fruit that was not designated for a specific purpose, the liquid that seeps on its own is prohibited? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: A woman’s milk is considered a liquid and therefore renders food susceptible to ritual impurity, whether the milk was expressed volitionally and whether it was expressed unvolitionally? On the other hand, milk of an animal only renders food susceptible to ritual impurity if it was milked volitionally but not if it drips out on its own.
  Rabbi Akiva said: It is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that this is incorrect: Just as a woman’s milk, which is intended only for young children, is considered a liquid and renders food susceptible to ritual impurity both if the milk is expressed volitionally and if it is expressed unvolitionally, the milk of an animal, which is intended for both young and old, is it not logical that it should render food susceptible to ritual impurity, both if it was expressed volitionally and if it was expressed unvolitionally? They said to him that this <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be refuted in the following way: If a woman’s milk renders food susceptible to ritual impurity even when the milk was expressed unvolitionally, as the status of the blood of her wound is also that of a liquid that renders food susceptible to ritual impurity, that does not mean that the milk of an animal renders food susceptible to ritual impurity
  
  Daf 144a
  
  if it was expressed unintentionally, as the blood of its wound is ritually pure, meaning that it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Akiva said to them: I am more stringent with regard to milk than with regard to blood, as if one milks an animal for medicinal purposes, the milk renders food susceptible to ritual impurity, and if one lets blood for medicinal purposes, the status of the blood is not that of a liquid and is ritually pure, in the sense that it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. They said to him: The case of baskets of olives and grapes will prove that there is a difference between liquids that emerge of his own volition and those that do not, as liquid that seeps from them volitionally renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. However, liquid that seeps from them unvolitionally is ritually pure, i.e., it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. Apparently, liquid renders food susceptible to ritual impurity only if it emerged of its own volition.
  The Gemara analyzes the terms of that mishna: What, is it not true that the term volitionally is referring to a situation where one is pleased with the emergence of liquids, and the term unvolitionally is referring to an indeterminate situation, where he expressed no preference? This leads to a conclusion with regard to our original topic of discussion. Just as in the case of olives and grapes, which are primarily designated for squeezing in order to extract oil and wine respectively, if liquid leaked from them unvolitionally, in the sense that one did not intend for the liquid to emerge, it has no significance and does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity; in the case of mulberries and pomegranates, which are not typically designated for squeezing, is it not all the more so that liquid that seeps from them unvolitionally does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity?
  The Gemara refutes this argument: No, the term volitionally is referring even to a situation where one’s preference is indeterminate, and the term unvolitionally is referring to a situation where one revealed his mind-set explicitly and said: I am not pleased if liquid emerges. And if you wish, say instead that baskets of olives and grapes are different; since the liquid that leaks from them stands to be lost, one renounces it from the outset. No proof can be cited from this mishna. Generally speaking, however, the legal status of liquids that are not designated to be lost from the outset is that of liquids, even if one did not express pleasure with their emergence.
  We have found in the <i>baraita</i> cited above that Rabbi Yehuda conceded to the Rabbis with regard to olives and grapes, that liquid that seeps from them on its own on Shabbat, both volitionally and unvolitionally, is prohibited during Shabbat. From where do we conclude that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to other fruits and distinguish between fruits designated for eating and those designated for juicing? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may squeeze
  
  Daf 144b
  
  plums and quinces and crab apples. However, one may not squeeze pomegranates, because they are typically squeezed for their juice, as people from the house of Menashya bar Menaḥem would squeeze pomegranates during the week. Apparently, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda with regard to fruits other than pomegranates and mulberries.
  The Gemara objects: And from where is it ascertained that this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? Perhaps it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: And let this <i>baraita</i> also be the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: Say that you heard that according to Rabbi Yehuda, juice that seeped out on its own is permitted; did you hear that squeezing it is permitted <i>ab initio</i>? Rather, what have you to say? Since they are not fruits that are generally designated for squeezing, it is permitted to squeeze them even <i>ab initio</i>. That being the case, even if you say the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, the same reasoning applies: Since they are not generally designated for squeezing, it is permitted to squeeze them even <i>ab initio</i>. Even the Rabbis would permit squeezing fruits such as plums, quinces, and crab apples. Since the <i>baraita</i> does not permit squeezing pomegranates, learn from it that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it.
  It was taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited above that people from the house of Menashya bar Menaḥem would squeeze pomegranates on weekdays. This indicates that it is typical for people to squeeze pomegranates, and therefore it is prohibited to do so on Shabbat. Rav Naḥman said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the practice of the people from the house of Menashya bar Menaḥem. In other words, squeezing pomegranates is considered typical, and therefore it is prohibited on Shabbat.
  Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Is Menashya ben Menaḥem a <i>tanna</i> that you say the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion? And if you say that Rav Naḥman meant that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with this <i>tanna</i>, who held in accordance with the practice of the people from the house of Menashya ben Menaḥem, there is still room to ask: Does it make sense that because he held in accordance with the practice of the people from the house of Menashya ben Menaḥem, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion? Does Menashya ben Menaḥem constitute the majority of the world? Since most people do not squeeze pomegranates, the practice of the people from the house of Menashya ben Menaḥem should be irrelevant relative to the typical practice of others.
  Rav Naḥman answered: Yes, in cases of this kind, halakhic rulings are based even on practices that are not universal, as we learned in a mishna that addresses the prohibition of diverse kinds, particularly forbidden food crops in a vineyard. With regard to one who maintains thorns in a vineyard, Rabbi Eliezer says: He rendered the crops a forbidden mixture of food crops in a vineyard. And the Rabbis say: Only a crop that people typically maintain renders a vineyard forbidden. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? Because in Arabia they maintain the thorns of the fields to feed them to their camels. There, thorns are treated as a bona fide crop. According to this opinion, since thorns are maintained in one place, they are considered to be significant everywhere. The same reasoning applies to the issue of juicing pomegranates.
  The Gemara rejects this answer: Is this comparable? Arabia is a place, and a custom practiced in an entire country is significant. Here, with regard to the practice of the house of Menashya bar Menaḥem, who was an individual, his opinion is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other men.
  Rather, this is the reason for Rav Naḥman’s statement: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said: In the case of beets that one squeezed and then placed their juice in a ritual bath, the juice invalidates the ritual bath if it causes a change of appearance. Any liquid that causes the water of a ritual bath to change color invalidates the ritual bath. Rav Ḥisda elaborated: Aren’t beets typically not designated for squeezing? Rather, what have you to say? Since he ascribed it significance, it is considered a liquid. Here, too, with regard to pomegranates, since he ascribed it significance, it is considered a liquid. Even if one person ascribes significance to a liquid, it assumes for him the status of a liquid and is prohibited on Shabbat.
  Rav Pappa said that the reason Rav Ḥisda ruled that beet juice invalidates the ritual bath is because it is something with which one may not make a ritual bath <i>ab initio</i>, and there is a principle: Anything with which one may not make a ritual bath <i>ab initio</i>, i.e., anything other than water, snow, or ice, invalidates the ritual bath if it causes a change of appearance, even if it does not have the legal status of a liquid.
  We learned in a mishna there, in tractate <i>Mikvaot</i>: If wine or vinegar or olive discharge, i.e., the liquid that comes from olives but is not oil, fell into a ritual bath and changed its appearance, the ritual bath is invalid. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who holds that olive discharge is considered liquid? Abaye said: It is Rabbi Ya’akov, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ya’akov says: The legal status of olive discharge is like that of a liquid. And what is the reason the Sages said that olive discharge that emerges at the outset, before one begins to press the olives for their oil, is ritually pure, meaning that it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity? It is not because the olive discharge is not considered a liquid but because he does not want its existence; the owner would prefer that the olive discharge not yet emerge and instead emerge together with and mix with the oil.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The legal status of olive discharge is not like that of a liquid. And what is the reason the Sages said that the olive sap that emerges from the bale of the olive press after the olives were pressed is capable of rendering foods susceptible to become ritually impure? Because it is impossible that it will not contain drops of oil that come with it from the olives.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? They both agree that olive discharge that emerges at the outset is incapable of rendering food susceptible to ritual impurity and that olive discharge that emerges from the bale of the olive press is capable of rendering food susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to olive discharge that comes after extensive pressing; according to Rabbi Ya’akov, it is considered a liquid and renders food susceptible to ritual impurity, and according to Rabbi Shimon, it is not a liquid and does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. Rava said: The reason that olive discharge invalidates a ritual bath is not because it is a liquid, but rather, because it is something with which one may not make a ritual bath <i>ab initio</i>, and it therefore invalidates a ritual bath if it causes a change of appearance.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A person may squeeze a cluster of grapes on Shabbat into a pot with food in it, and it is not considered squeezing a liquid but rather adding one food to another; however, he may not squeeze the liquid into an empty bowl. Rav Ḥisda said: From the statement of our Rabbi, Shmuel, we learn that one may milk a goat into a pot of food on Shabbat, because it is not considered to be the manner of squeezing that is prohibited as a subcategory of the labor of threshing; however, one may not do so into an empty bowl. The Gemara deduces: Apparently, he holds that liquid that comes into food is not considered liquid, but rather, it is food.
  Rami bar Ḥama raised an objection from the following mishna: In the case of a <i>zav</i> who milks a goat, the milk is ritually impure whether or not the <i>zav</i> actually touched it, as a <i>zav</i> renders items ritually impure simply by moving them, or being moved by them, even without direct contact. And if you say that liquid that comes directly into food is food and not liquid, in the case of one who milked directly into a pot of food, the milk should be considered food. The <i>halakha</i> is that food cannot become ritually impure unless it is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through contact with a liquid. With what liquid was this milk rendered susceptible to ritual impurity?
  The Gemara answers: As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in a different context, that a particular statement is referring to the first drop, which is smeared on the top of the teat in order to moisten it and facilitate nursing or milking, here too, it is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by means of the drop which is smeared on the top of the teat. This drop was not intended to fall into the pot of food and is therefore considered a liquid and renders the food susceptible to ritual impurity.
  Ravina raised an objection based on what we learned in another mishna: In the case of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse who squeezed olives or grapes
  
  Daf 145a
  
  in the exact amount of an egg-bulk, the liquid is ritually pure. Even though the ritually impure individual touched the food, less than an egg-bulk of food cannot become ritually impure. Once the first drop of liquid is squeezed out, less than an egg-bulk of food remains, and it cannot render the liquid impure. By inference, if he squeezed more than an egg-bulk, the liquid is ritually impure. And if you say that liquid that comes into food is considered food, in what manner was this liquid rendered susceptible to ritual impurity? He raised the objection and he resolved it: It is referring to a case where one squeezes into an empty bowl, in which case the juice is considered a liquid.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: The question of whether liquid squeezed directly from one food into another is considered liquid or food is parallel to the following dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. We learned in a mishna: In the case of one who smooths bread before baking it by squeezing grapes onto it, the bread was not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Yehuda says: It was rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. What, do they not disagree about this? One Sage held that liquid that comes into food is food, and therefore it cannot render bread susceptible to ritual impurity, and one Sage held that it is not food but rather a liquid, and therefore it renders the bread susceptible to ritual impurity.
  Rav Pappa said that the disputes are not necessarily parallel; it can be explained that everyone agrees that liquid that comes into food is not food, and here they disagree with regard to liquid that goes to waste, as the liquid that dripped onto the bread eventually evaporates due to the heat of the oven. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, held that it is nonetheless a liquid and therefore can render the bread susceptible to ritual impurity, and one Sage held that it is not a liquid. And they disagree in the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who cuts olives with soiled, i.e., ritually impure, hands, the olives are rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through the liquid that comes from them, and his hands render the olives ritually impure. If he cut them in order to dip them in salt, the olives are not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, because if that liquid emerged from the olives against the owner’s will, the liquid cannot render food susceptible to ritual impurity.
  If he was cutting in order to ascertain whether his olives have reached the stage of ripeness at which they are fit to be harvested or not, they are not rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. Rabbi Yehuda said: They are rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. What, do they not disagree with regard to this? One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, held that liquid that emerges when one tests the olives but which stands to go to waste, is liquid and renders food susceptible to ritual impurity; and one Sage held that it is not liquid and does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The last two disputes are not necessarily parallel. These <i>tanna’im</i>, who disagreed with regard to olives, disagreed with regard to liquid that stands to go to waste, and those <i>tanna’im</i>, who disagreed with regard to the liquid on the bread, disagreed with regard to liquid that stands to be used to shine it.
  Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: A person may squeeze a cluster of grapes into a pot with food in it on Shabbat, because liquid that is squeezed directly into food is considered food rather than liquid; however, one may not do so into a bowl that is empty or that contains liquid. And squeezing a fish for its brine is permitted even into a bowl.
  Rav Dimi sat and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: You teach this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav and it is not difficult for you; we teach it in the name of Shmuel and it is difficult for us for the following reason: Did Shmuel say that it is permitted to squeeze a fish for its brine even into a bowl? Wasn’t it stated that there was a dispute with regard to pickled vegetables that one squeezed? Rav said: If he wants to squeeze them because he needs the vegetables themselves without the liquid, it is permitted to do so even <i>ab initio</i> on Shabbat. And if he squeezes them because he needs their liquid, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>.
  And with regard to boiled vegetables, whether he needs the vegetables themselves without their liquid or whether he wants to squeeze the vegetables for their liquids, it is permitted to squeeze them on Shabbat. And Shmuel said: With regard to both pickled vegetables and boiled vegetables, if he squeezes them for the vegetables themselves, it is permitted, and if he squeezes them for their liquids, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>. Apparently, squeezing fish for its brine falls into the category of squeezing boiled items for their liquid, which according to Shmuel is prohibited. As such, Shmuel’s two statements appear contradictory.
  He said to him: You can certainly rely on my version of this statement. To underscore his point, he uttered the oath-like expression: By God! and applied the verse: “Whom I shall see for myself; my eyes have seen it, and not another’s” (Job 19:27). I heard this tradition from the mouth of Rabbi Yirmeya, and Rabbi Yirmeya heard it from Rabbi Zeira, and Rabbi Zeira heard it from Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi heard it from Rav, and each transmitter of this tradition is a reliable source.
  Apropos the topic of squeezing pickled vegetables, the Gemara addresses the matter itself. We learned that with regard to pickled vegetables that one squeezed, Rav said that if he squeezes them for themselves, it is permitted, and if he squeezes them for their liquids he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>; and with regard to boiled vegetables, if he squeezes them both for themselves and for their liquids it is permitted. And Shmuel said: With regard to both this, pickled vegetables, and that, boiled vegetables, squeezing for the vegetables themselves without liquid is permitted; squeezing them for their liquids, one is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so <i>ab initio</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to both pickled vegetables and boiled vegetables, if one squeezes them for the vegetables themselves it is permitted; if one squeezes them for their liquids, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having performed a labor prohibited by Torah law.
  The Gemara raises an objection based on that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may squeeze pickled vegetables on Shabbat for the purpose of using them on Shabbat but not for the conclusion of Shabbat. And one may not squeeze olives and grapes at all on Shabbat, and if one squeezed them unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Apparently, it is permitted to squeeze pickled vegetables <i>ab initio</i> on Shabbat for any purpose, even for their juice, and if so, it is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, it is difficult according to the opinion of Shmuel, and it is difficult according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, which all assert that squeezing pickled vegetables for their juice is prohibited on some level. The Gemara responds that Rav interprets the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning, Shmuel interprets the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan interprets the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning. The Gemara proceeds to elucidate how the <i>baraita</i> is explained according to each opinion.
  Rav interprets the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning by emending the <i>baraita</i> and adding to it: One may squeeze pickled vegetables on Shabbat for the purpose of Shabbat, but not for the conclusion of Shabbat. In what case is this statement said? When one squeezes the vegetables for themselves; however, if one squeezes them for their liquid, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, but it is prohibited to do so. And with regard to boiled vegetables, whether one squeezes them for themselves or whether he does so for their liquid, it is permitted. And with regard to olives and grapes, one may not squeeze them at all, and if one squeezed them unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Shmuel interprets the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning by emending the <i>baraita</i> and adding to it: One may squeeze pickled vegetables on Shabbat for the purpose of Shabbat, and the same is true for boiled vegetables. In what case is this statement said? When one squeezes them for themselves; however, if he squeezes them for their liquids, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, but it is prohibited to do so. And with regard to olives and grapes, one may not squeeze them at all, and if one squeezed them unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan also interprets the <i>baraita</i> according to his line of reasoning by emending the <i>baraita</i> and adding to it: One may squeeze pickled vegetables for the purpose of Shabbat but not for the conclusion of Shabbat, and that ruling applies both to pickled vegetables and to boiled vegetables. In what case is this statement said? When one squeezes them for themselves, but if he does so for their liquids, one may not squeeze them, and if one squeezed them unwittingly, he becomes like one who squeezed olives or grapes, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: By Torah law, one is only liable for stomping on olives and grapes, and all other prohibitions related to squeezing or juicing are rabbinic decrees and protective measures. And similarly, it was taught in the school of Menashe: By Torah law, one is only liable for stomping on olives and grapes. And it was taught in the school of Menashe: And testimony of one witness based solely on what he learned from the mouth of another witness, i.e., hearsay testimony, is valid
  
  Daf 145b
  
  only for testimony that a woman’s husband died, enabling her to remarry. Only in that case can a ruling rely on hearsay testimony, and that is specifically so the woman will be allowed to remarry.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages about a related matter: With regard to hearsay testimony in testimony permitting a priest to eat a firstborn animal, what is the <i>halakha</i>? After the destruction of the Temple, the Sages decreed that if a priest has the firstborn offspring of a kosher animal and it becomes blemished, he must bring witnesses to testify that he did not cause the blemish. Priests were suspected of violating the prohibition against inflicting a wound on firstborn animals to enable them to eat the animals. The question here pertains to a case in which there is no one available who can testify that he saw firsthand how the animal was blemished, but there is someone who heard from an eyewitness how the blemish was caused. Rav Ami prohibited accepting hearsay testimony in this case, and Rav Asi permitted doing so.
  Rav Ami said to Rav Asi: Didn’t the school of Menashya teach that hearsay testimony is only valid in testimony enabling a woman to remarry, indicating that it is not accepted in the case of a firstborn animal? Rav Asi answered: Emend the previously cited ruling and say: Hearsay testimony is only valid in testimony for which the testimony of a woman is valid. A woman’s testimony is accepted with regard to the death of a man, enabling his wife to remarry, and it is also accepted with regard to a firstborn animal. Rav Yeimar deemed hearsay testimony valid in permitting the slaughter of a firstborn animal that developed a blemish. Mareimar called him: Yeimar who permits the firstborn; Mareimar was of the opinion that testimony of that kind is invalid and cannot provide the basis to allow the animal to be slaughtered. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that hearsay testimony is valid with regard to a firstborn animal.
  We learned in the mishna that according to Rabbi Eliezer, honey that flows on its own from honeycombs is permitted on Shabbat. When Rav Hoshaya came from Neharde’a, he came and brought a <i>baraita</i> with him: With regard to olives and grapes that one crushed before Shabbat and their juices seeped out on their own on Shabbat, the juices are prohibited for use on Shabbat; and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon permit using them.
  Rav Yosef said rhetorically: Did he merely come to teach us an additional person? This opinion already appears in the mishna in the name of Rabbi Elazar. Did Rav Hoshaya cite the <i>baraita</i> merely to add the name of Rabbi Shimon? Abaye said to him: He is teaching us a great deal, as if we learned this matter from the mishna alone, I would have said: It is there that it is permitted, because initially it was food and ultimately it remained food, since it is possible to assert that the honey that seeped is a food rather than a liquid. However, here, with regard to olives and grapes, which initially were food and ultimately became liquid, say that it is not permitted even according to Rabbi Elazar. Therefore, he is teaching us that Rabbi Elazar rules leniently even in the case of olives and grapes.
  MISHNA: Any salted food item that was already placed in hot water, i.e., cooked, before Shabbat, one may soak it in hot water even on Shabbat. And anything that was not placed in hot water before Shabbat, one may rinse it in hot water on Shabbat but may not soak it, with the exception of old salted fish and small salted fish and the <i>kolyas ha’ispanin</i> fish, for which rinsing with hot water itself is completion of the prohibited labor of cooking.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that an item that was cooked before Shabbat may be soaked in hot water on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: In what case would soaking in hot water be required after the item was already cooked? Rav Safra said: In the case of the chicken of Rabbi Abba, which for medical reasons was cooked so thoroughly that it completely dissolved. And Rav Safra said: One time I happened to come there and he fed me chicken prepared that way, and if not for the fact that Rabbi Abba gave me three-leaf-, i.e., year, old wine to drink, I would have been forced to vomit.
  The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yoḥanan would spit from the thought of Babylonian <i>kutaḥ</i>, because he found it so disgusting. Rav Yosef said: Then we should spit from the thought of Rabbi Abba’s chicken, which is even more disgusting to people from Babylonia. And furthermore, Rav Gaza said: On one occasion I happened to come there, to Eretz Yisrael, and I prepared Babylonian <i>kutaḥ</i>, and all of the sick people of the West, Eretz Yisrael, asked me for it. Apparently, not everyone in Eretz Yisrael found it disgusting.
  We learned in the mishna: Anything that was not cooked in hot water before Shabbat, one may rinse it in hot water on Shabbat except for salted fish and <i>kolyas ha’ispanin</i>. The Gemara asks: If one unwittingly rinsed it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Yosef said: If one rinsed these foods, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having performed the prohibited labor of cooking. Mar, son of Ravina, said: We, too, have also learned this ruling in the mishna, which states: Except for old salted fish and <i>kolyas ha’ispanin</i>, rinsing itself is completion of their prohibited labor of cooking. One who rinses these items is considered to have performed a prohibited labor. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that this is the ruling.
  Apropos relations between the Jews of Eretz Yisrael and Babylonia, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Asi were sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rabbi Yoḥanan was sitting and dozing. In the meantime the two of them conversed. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Asi: For what reason are the fowl in Babylonia fatter than those in Eretz Yisrael? He said to him: This is not at all the case; go to the desert of Gaza in Eretz Yisrael, and I will show you fowl that are fatter than them. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba then asked: For what reason are Festivals in Babylonia more joyous than those in Eretz Yisrael? Rabbi Asi answered him: Because in Babylonia they are poor, and it is only on Festivals that they have a lot to eat, which causes them to rejoice. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: For what reason are Torah scholars in Babylonia distinguished by their special rabbinic garb? Rabbi Asi answered: Because they are not well-versed in Torah. If they would not distinguish themselves by dressing differently, they would not be respected for their Torah knowledge. He then asked: For what reason are gentiles ethically contaminated? He answered: Because they eat abominable creatures and crawling things, and that causes bad character traits.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan woke up due to their discussion and said to them: You children, did I not tell you this, that the verse “Say to wisdom: You are my sister, and call understanding your kin” (Proverbs 7:4) means that if the matter is as clear to you as the fact that your sister is forbidden to you, say it, and if not, do not say it; and these explanations that you offered are unfounded. They said to him: Then will the Master tell us the answers to some of them? He said to them: Why are the fowl in Babylonia fatter than those in Eretz Yisrael? Because they were not exiled, as it says: “Moab has been at ease since his youth and he has settled on his lees, and he was not emptied from vessel to vessel and did not go into captivity; therefore his taste remained in him and his scent did not change” (Jeremiah 48:11). Apparently, one who is not exiled retains his strength.
  And here in Eretz Yisrael, from where do we derive that even the animals and birds were exiled? As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that no person passed through the land of Judea for fifty-two years, as it is stated: “I will raise crying and wailing for the mountains and a lamentation for the pastures of the wilderness, for they have been burned, with no person passing through, and they do not hear the voice of the cattle, from the bird of the heavens to the beast [<i>behema</i>, spelled <i>beit</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>heh</i>], all have fled and gone” (Jeremiah 9:9). <i>Behema</i> has a numerical value of fifty-two, alluding to the fact that no one passed through for fifty-two years. From the verse cited in this <i>baraita</i>, it is clear that even the animals and birds were exiled, as it states: “All have fled and gone.”
  Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They all returned except for the <i>kolyas ha’ispanin</i>, as Rav said: Those inclines of Babylonia return the water through underground watercourses to the spring of Eitam in Eretz Yisrael, and the fish also returned through these watercourses. And this fish, the <i>kolyas</i>, because its spine is not strong, it could not ascend these watercourses and did not return to Eretz Yisrael.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan continued to answer the questions of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rabbi Asi: For what reason are the Festivals in Babylonia more joyous than those in Eretz Yisrael? Because they were not included in that curse with which Eretz Yisrael was cursed, as it is written: “And I will cause all of her happiness to cease, her Festival, her New Moon, and her Shabbat and all her Festivals” (Hosea 2:13). And it is also written: “My soul hates your New Moons and your Festivals; they are a burden to Me; I am weary to bear them” (Isaiah 1:14). What is the meaning of the phrase: “They are a burden to me”? Rabbi Elazar said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Is it not enough for the Jewish people that they sin before Me, that they also burden Me to know which harsh decree I will bring upon them? Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Because of this curse, there is not a single Festival on which troops did not come to Tzippori to conduct searches or to collect taxes. And Rabbi Ḥanina said: There is not a single Festival on which an <i>egmon</i> and a <i>kamton</i> and a branch bearer, Roman officials, did not come to Tiberias to collect taxes, thereby disrupting the festive celebrations.
  For what reason are the Torah scholars in Babylonia distinguished by special garb? Because they are not native to that place and therefore require special dress to distinguish themselves, as people say in the folk expression: In my own city, I am honored for my name; in a place that is not my own city, I am honored for my clothing. The Gemara then praised the Sages of Babylonia by interpreting the verse “In days to come Jacob will take root, Israel will bud and blossom” (Isaiah 27:6). Rav Yosef taught: These are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who add buds and blossoms to the Torah.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan then explained to them: Why are gentiles ethically contaminated? It is because they did not stand on Mount Sinai. As when
  
  Daf 146a
  
  the snake came upon Eve, i.e., when it seduced her to eat from the Tree of Knowledge, it infected her with moral contamination, and this contamination remained in all human beings. When the Jewish people stood at Mount Sinai, their contamination ceased, whereas gentiles did not stand at Mount Sinai, and their contamination never ceased. Rav Aḥa, the son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What about converts? How do you explain the cessation of their moral contamination? Rav Ashi said to him: Even though they themselves were not at Mount Sinai, their guardian angels were present, as it is written: “It is not with you alone that I make this covenant and this oath, but with he that stands here with us today before the Lord our God, and with he that is not here with us today” (Deuteronomy 29:13–14), and this includes converts.
  The Gemara points out that this opinion disagrees with Rabbi Abba bar Kahana, as Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: Until three generations passed, the moral contamination did not cease from our forefathers: Abraham fathered Ishmael, who was of lowly moral stature; Isaac fathered Esau; finally, Jacob fathered twelve tribes in whom there was no flaw. Rabbi Abba bar Kahana holds that the moral contamination ceased in the Patriarchs long before the Revelation at Sinai.
  MISHNA: A person may break a barrel on Shabbat in order to eat dried figs from it, provided he does not intend to make a vessel. And one may not perforate the plug of a barrel to extract wine from it; rather, one must remove the plug entirely to avoid creating a new opening for the barrel. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis permit puncturing the plug, but they too restrict this leniency and say that one may not perforate the plug of the barrel on its side. And if it was already perforated, one may not apply wax to it to seal the hole, because in doing so he spreads the wax evenly on the barrel and thereby violates the prohibited labor of smoothing. Rabbi Yehuda said: An incident of that kind came before Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai in the city of Arav, and he said: I am concerned for him, because he may be liable to bring a sin-offering as a result of this.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Oshaya said: They only taught that it is permitted to break open a barrel when the figs were pressed together. This is because in that case it is permissible to use a utensil to separate the figs, that utensil may also be utilized to break open the barrel. However, if the figs were already separated, it is not permitted to handle a utensil for the sole purpose of breaking the barrel. The Gemara asks: And is it not permitted to break the barrel for separated figs?
  The Gemara raises an objection based on a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A person may bring a barrel of wine and cut off the top of the barrel with a sword and place it before the guests on Shabbat without concern that it is prohibited to move the sword or that doing so constitutes the creation of a new vessel, which is prohibited. Apparently, it is permitted to move a sword in order to open a barrel on Shabbat even if it is not needed to cut the contents of the barrel. The Gemara answers for Rabbi Oshaya: That <i>baraita</i>, which cites the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, whereas our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who said that it is prohibited to move any utensil on Shabbat for any purpose other than that for which the utensil is designated.
  The Gemara asks: And what forced Rabbi Oshaya to establish the mishna in accordance with the minority opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya and to say that it is referring only to the case of a pressed dried figs? Let him establish that the mishna is referring even to separated figs and is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rava said: The mishna posed a difficulty for him; why did the <i>tanna</i> teach particularly about dried figs? Let him teach a more general <i>halakha</i> with regard to fruit. Rather, learn from here that the mishna is referring specifically to pressed dried figs, and it is because one requires a utensil to separate them that he may use it to open the barrel as well.
  It was taught in one <i>baraita</i>: If one has sealed, wicker baskets of dried figs or of dates, one may untie the basket’s knot on Shabbat, and unbraid the basket and cut it open. And it was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may untie the knot, but one may not unbraid or cut the basket. There is a contradiction between these two <i>baraitot</i>. The Gemara resolves this contradiction: This is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which permits all of these actions, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. That <i>baraita</i>, which prohibits unbraiding and cutting, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Neḥemya says: Even a large spoon and even a cloak and even a knife may only be taken on Shabbat for their designated use, and it is therefore prohibited to take a knife to cut open baskets of fruit.
  The students raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether or not it is permitted to perforate a barrel with a spear [<i>burtiya</i>] on Shabbat? Is the assumption that one intends to make an opening in the barrel and it is therefore prohibited, or perhaps is the assumption that one merely intends to display generosity and it is permitted? Rav Sheshet said to them: He intends to make an opening in the barrel and it is prohibited.
  The Gemara raises an objection based on that which was taught in the <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may bring a barrel of wine on Shabbat and cut off its top with a sword. This contradicts Rav Sheshet’s opinion that opening a barrel with a spear is prohibited? He answered them: There, in the case of the sword, since one essentially destroys the barrel by cutting off its top, he certainly intends to display generosity by breaking the barrel open in his guests’ honor. However, here, in the case of spearing a hole in the barrel, if it were true that he intends to display generosity, let him open the top of the barrel by removing its plug. By perforating the barrel, he indicates that he specifically wants there to be a small hole.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may not perforate the plug of a barrel; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, and the Rabbis permit it. Rav Huna said: This dispute is only with regard to a case where one seeks to make a perforation on top of the plug; however, if he seeks to perforate it from the side, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because people sometimes puncture a barrel beneath the plug in this way. And that is what the mishna is teaching: One may not perforate it on its side. Whereas Rav Ḥisda said: This dispute is with regard to a case where one seeks to perforate it from the side; however, if one seeks to perforate it on top, everyone agrees that it is permitted, and with regard to that which the mishna is teaching: One may not perforate it on its side, there it is referring to perforating the barrel itself, not the plug.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not create a new hole in a vessel on Shabbat. And if one seeks to add to and widen an already existing hole, one may add to it; and some say that one may not even add to an already existing hole. And all opinions, even those who generally prohibit creating new holes, agree that one may perforate the seal over an old hole, even <i>ab initio</i>. And with regard to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, the Gemara asks: What is different about perforating the seal over an old hole that makes it permitted, whereas creating a new hole is not permitted? Is it because in creating the new hole he is creating an opening? If so, by adding to an already existing hole he is also creating an opening.
  Rabba said: Actually, even creating a new hole is not prohibited, because by Torah law, any opening that is not made to both insert and to remove is not considered an opening, and a hole that one perforates in a barrel is intended exclusively to remove the contents of the barrel. And it was the Sages who issued a decree that one may not perforate a vessel because it is similar to perforating a chicken coop, which is designated for use in both directions, e.g., to let in air and to let out heat, and it is therefore prohibited by Torah law. And therefore we learned that if one seeks to add to an existing hole one may add to it. There is no reason to prohibit this due to concern that one may do so in a chicken coop, because one will certainly not come to add to an already existing hole in a chicken coop,
  
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  because one does not want vermin to enter the coop. And when we learned that some say that one may not add to a preexisting hole, that ruling is also due to a decree lest one come to do so in a chicken coop, as sometimes one does not properly create the opening initially, and comes to expand it so that it will be fit for use. In that case, widening the opening is considered its completion. Rav Naḥman taught in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement cited as: Some say.
  We learned in the <i>baraita</i>: And everyone agrees that one may perforate an old hole that was sealed <i>ab initio</i>. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They only taught this in a place where the hole is made to strain the wine from the sediment; however, if it was made to reinforce the barrel, it is prohibited (<i>ge’onim</i>). The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which a hole is considered to have been made to strain and what are the circumstances in which a hole is meant to reinforce the barrel? Rav Ḥisda said: If one perforates the barrel above the level of the wine, that is a hole designated to strain the wine, and if one perforates the barrel below the level of the wine, that is a hole designated to reinforce the barrel. Rava said: A hole made below the level of the wine is also designated to strain the wine, and what are the circumstances in which a hole is meant to reinforce the barrel? It is in a case where one perforated it below the sediment.
  Abaye said to Rava: A <i>baraita</i> was taught that supports your opinion that any opening retains its status unless it is absolutely clear that it is no longer used for that purpose. When dividing a courtyard between the owners of the houses in it, in addition to an equal share of the courtyard, each receives the four cubits adjoining each entrance leading from his house to the courtyard. A house with a sealed entrance still has the four cubits adjoining that entrance, because the entrance can be reopened. It is only if one broke its doorposts and sealed the entrance that the entrance has been completely negated and it does not have the four cubits adjoining it. This applies similarly to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity: A house in which there is a corpse transmits ritual impurity only through its doorways. A house with sealed entrances does not render all of its surroundings ritually impure; the ritual impurity only extends opposite the entrances. However, if one broke its doorposts, it is no longer considered an entrance, and it renders all of its surroundings ritually impure.
  With regard to inserting a reed through a hole in a barrel in order to draw wine through it, Rav prohibited doing so on Shabbat, and Shmuel permitted doing so. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to cutting and inserting the reed <i>ab initio</i>, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because this is considered fashioning a utensil. With regard to restoring a prepared reed to its place, everyone agrees that it is permitted. When they disagree is in a case where the reed has been cut but not yet inserted into the barrel. The one who prohibits doing so, Rav, holds that we issue a decree that prohibits inserting the reed due to the concern that perhaps one will come to cut the reed <i>ab initio</i> for this purpose; and the one who permits doing so, Shmuel, holds that we do not issue a decree in that situation.
  The Gemara notes that Rav and Shmuel’s dispute is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: One may not cut a reed tube on a Festival, and needless to say, it is prohibited on Shabbat. And if it was already cut but fell, one may restore it to its place on Shabbat, and needless to say, it is permitted to do so on a Festival. And Rabbi Yoshiya is lenient in this matter.
  The Gemara asks with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya: On which section of the <i>baraita</i> is he commenting? If you say that he is referring to the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>, which discusses cutting a tube, isn’t he creating a vessel, which is a prohibited labor? How could Rabbi Yoshiya permit doing so? Rather, say that he is referring to the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>, which discusses restoring a fallen tube to its place; the first <i>tanna</i> also permits doing so, leaving no room for further leniency by Rabbi Yoshiya. Rather, it is with regard to a case in which it was cut but not inserted into the barrel that there is a practical difference between them: One Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, held that we issue a decree that prohibits doing so, and one Sage held that we do not issue a decree. The Gemara concludes: Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, taught publicly in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya.
  And we also learned in the mishna: And if the barrel was already perforated, one may not seal the hole with wax. There is a dispute among the <i>amora’im</i> whether or not it is permitted to seal that hole with oil: Rav prohibited doing so, and Shmuel permitted doing so. The Gemara explains: The one who prohibits doing so, Rav, holds that we issue a decree prohibiting oil due to concern lest one come to seal the hole with wax. And the one who permits doing so, Shmuel, holds that we do not issue a decree prohibiting oil due to concern lest one come to use wax to seal the hole. Rav Shmuel bar bar Ḥana said to Rav Yosef: How is Rav cited as prohibiting the sealing of the hole in a barrel with oil on Shabbat? You told us explicitly in Rav’s name: Oil is permitted for use in sealing a hole.
  The Gemara cites a statement that Tavut the hunter said that Shmuel said: With regard to this myrtle leaf, it is prohibited to insert it into a hole in a barrel to be used as a spout. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yeimar of Difti said: It is a decree issued due to the concern lest one come to make an actual spout on Shabbat. Rav Ashi said: It is a decree issued lest one cut a myrtle leaf from its branch on Shabbat for this purpose. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them in a case in which the leaves were already cut and placed, as in that case, Rav Ashi’s concern would not apply, but Rav Yeimar would still rule stringently.
  The Gemara cites another dispute between Rav and Shmuel: With regard to felt cloths upon which people typically sit but that may also be worn as cloaks, the Sages disagreed whether or not one may wrap himself in them on Shabbat and transfer them from one place to another through a public domain. Rav prohibited doing so, and Shmuel permitted doing so. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to articles made of soft felt, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as their legal status is that of other garments. With regard to articles made of hard felt, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. When they disagree, it is with regard to felt articles that have an intermediate level of softness. The one who prohibits wearing them, Rav, holds that one who wears these as a garment appears as one carrying a burden, and the one who permits wearing them, Shmuel, holds that it does not appear as one carrying a burden, because the material appears to be a garment.
  The Gemara points out that this opinion attributed to Rav was not stated explicitly by him; rather, it was stated by inference, i.e., based on Rav’s conduct, it was concluded that this is his opinion. As Rav happened to come to a certain place where there was not enough room for him and his students inside the house, and therefore, he went out and sat in a <i>karmelit</i>. They brought him felt cloths by wearing them outside, and he did not sit on them. One who saw this incident assumed that he refused to sit on them because it is prohibited to move cloths in this manner; however, that is not so, as Rav used to proclaim that it is permitted to move articles made of felt in this manner. And it was in deference to our Rabbis who were there that he did not sit on it, as he did not want to sit on a higher and more distinguished surface than they did. The Gemara adds: And who were these Rabbis? Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who were Rav’s disciples and colleagues.
  MISHNA: One may place a cooked dish into an empty pit on Shabbat so that it will be protected from the heat, and similarly, one may place good potable water into a vessel and place the vessel into bad, non-potable water so that the potable water will cool off. And one may also place cold water out in the sun so that it will be heated. They also taught: Someone whose garments fell into water while walking on the road may replace them and continue to walk wearing them and need not be concerned about violating the prohibitions against wringing or laundering. When he reaches the outer courtyard of a place where he can leave his clothes, he spreads them in the sun to dry, but not opposite the masses, as they will suspect him of laundering on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara is puzzled by the <i>halakha</i> that was taught about placing food in a pit: It is obvious that it is permitted. The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Let us issue a decree prohibiting this due to concern lest one perform the prohibited labor of leveling holes in the pit when he places the pot in it, it teaches us that no decree was issued due to this concern.
  We also learned in the mishna: One may place good water into bad water on Shabbat in order to cool it off. The Gemara says: It is obvious that it is permitted. The Gemara explains: It is necessary to mention the latter clause of the mishna, which states that it is permitted to place cold water out in the sun. The Gemara expresses surprise: This, too, is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that we should issue a decree prohibiting this action, because perhaps one will come to insulate it in hot ashes to warm it up, which also heats the water without actually placing it on the fire, it teaches us that we do issue a decree in that case.
  We learned in the mishna that one whose garments fell into water need not be concerned about wringing or laundering the clothing and may replace them and continue walking, and then place them to dry in the sun, but not before the masses. This is so that they will not suspect him of laundering on Shabbat. In this regard, the Gemara cites that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in the innermost chambers where no one will see it, it is prohibited, as the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances. The Gemara says: We learned in the mishna that one may spread them in the sun but not opposite the masses, which contradicts that principle. The Gemara explains: It is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may spread them out in the sun but not opposite the masses. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon prohibit doing so, which is a precedent for the opinion that Rav Yehuda stated in the name of Rav.
  Rav Huna said:
  
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  One who shakes his cloak on Shabbat to remove dust that collected on it is liable to bring a sin-offering for violating the prohibition of laundering. The Gemara qualifies this ruling: We only stated this <i>halakha</i> with regard to new garments, but with regard to old garments, we have no problem with this behavior. And we only stated this with regard to black garments, but with regard to white or red garments, we have no problem, as shaking off the dust would not be prohibited. And this prohibition applies only when one is particular about keeping them clean, but if one does not insist on wearing clean garments, we have no problem with it, i.e., it is not prohibited to shake off the dust.
  The Gemara relates that Ulla happened to come to Pumbedita, and while there he saw rabbis shaking their cloaks to remove dust. He said: The Rabbis are desecrating Shabbat. Rav Yehuda said to the Rabbis whom Ulla criticized: You may continue to shake your cloaks in his presence. We are not at all particular about this, and it is therefore permitted for us to shake the dust from our cloaks.
  The Gemara also relates that Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said to him: Give me my hat. Abaye saw that there was dew on it, and he hesitated to give it to him, because he feared violating a prohibition by shaking off the dew. Rav Yosef said to him: Shake off the dew and throw me the hat; we are not at all particular about the cleanliness of the hat, and it is therefore permitted to shake off the dew.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who goes out with a cloak folded and resting on his shoulder on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering for carrying in the public domain. This ruling was also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Clothing merchants who go outside with cloaks folded and resting on their shoulders on Shabbat are liable to bring a sin-offering. And they did not say this only with regard to clothing merchants; rather, any person is liable for this transgression, and they only stated the <i>halakha</i> in these terms because it is the usual manner for merchants to go out this way.
  And likewise, a shopkeeper who goes out with coins bound in his cloak is liable to bring a sin-offering. And they did not say this only with regard to a shopkeeper; rather, any person is liable for this, and they only stated the <i>halakha</i> in these terms because it is the usual manner of a shopkeeper to go out this way. And runners, i.e., foot messengers, may go out on Shabbat with scarves on their shoulders, because this is how they typically wear them. And they did not say this only with regard to runners; rather, any person is permitted to do this, but it is simply the usual manner of runners to go out this way.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Hyrcanus, son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, who went outside with a scarf on his shoulder on Shabbat. However, a thread from the garment was tied around his finger so that the garment would not fall. When this matter came before the Sages, they said: It is permitted to go out in that manner even if a thread is not tied around one’s finger. And likewise, Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught in the name of Rav Ḥisda: The <i>halakha</i> is that one may go outside with a garment around one’s shoulders even if a thread from the garment is not tied around one’s finger.
  Ulla happened to come to the house of Asi bar Hini. The members of the household asked him: What is the <i>halakha</i>: Is it permitted to make a spout of one’s garment on Shabbat? Ulla said to them that this is what Rabbi Elai said: It is prohibited to make a spout on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the spout referred to here? Rabbi Zeira said: It is referring to Babylonian pockets, which were formed by lifting up the bottom of the cloaks and tying them to their shoulders to make pocket-like folds in their garments.
  The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira and showed him a certain fold and said to him: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this kind of fold on Shabbat? He said to him: It is prohibited to make it on Shabbat. He then showed him another fold and asked: And what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this? He said to him: It is prohibited. Rav Pappa said: Grasp this principle: Any fold made to gather one’s clothing from the ground is prohibited, and any fold that is merely to beautify oneself is permitted, as the precedent of Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, who was beautifying himself with his garment by folding it on his shoulders.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: On one occasion, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out into a field, and the two sides of his cloak were resting on his shoulders. Yehoshua ben Zeiruz, son of the father-in-law of Rabbi Meir, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: In a case like this, didn’t Rabbi Meir hold one liable to bring a sin-offering? Rabbi said to him: Was Rabbi Meir exacting to that extent, i.e., he considered wearing a garment in this fashion to be carrying on Shabbat? If so, it is preferable to avoid questionable practices; immediately Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi lowered his cloak from his shoulders.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: It was not Yehoshua ben Zeiruz; rather, it was Yehoshua ben Kefusai, Rabbi Akiva’s son-in-law, and he said: In a case like this, didn’t Rabbi Akiva hold one liable to bring a sin-offering? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Was Rabbi Akiva exacting to that extent? If so, it is preferable to avoid questionable practices. Immediately, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi lowered his cloak from his shoulders. When Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda came, he said: This is not what happened, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself did not wear his cloak folded up on his shoulders on Shabbat. Rather it was stated that Rabbi was asked, meaning that this question came before him, and he wanted to rule leniently, until he was informed that some of the greatest Sages of the generation ruled stringently.
  MISHNA: One who bathes on Shabbat in a ritual bath formed by cave water or in the water of Tiberias and dried himself even with ten towels may not carry them in his hand, lest he forget that it is Shabbat and wring the water from them. However, ten people may use one towel to dry their faces, hands, and feet, and may carry them in their hands. Even though in this case the towel would be quite wet, it is permitted to handle the towel because there are several people present, and they will remind each other that it is prohibited to wring a towel on Shabbat.
  Apropos the waters of Tiberias, the mishna discusses the <i>halakhot</i> of bathing and medicine on Shabbat. One may smear oil on his body and gently rub his body with his hand; however, one may not exert himself with vigorous massage or by means of exercise in order to benefit from the therapeutic effects of sweating; and one may not scrape the oil off with a scraper. Additionally, one may not go into a swampy river [<i>kurdima</i>], on Shabbat. And one may not make a drug to induce vomiting, nor may one align a young infant’s bones to straighten them, nor may one reset a break in a bone. One whose hand or foot was dislocated may not move them about vigorously in cold water, which is the standard method of treatment; however, one may wash the limb in the typical manner, and if one is cured through this washing, he is cured.
  GEMARA: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches the case of cave water that is similar to the case of water of Tiberias; just as the water of Tiberias is hot, so too the cave water is hot. The Gemara also infers from the formulation of the mishna: With regard to one who bathes, after the fact, yes, one may dry himself; however, one may not bathe <i>ab initio</i>, as had the mishna intended to permit bathing <i>ab initio</i> it would have said: One may bathe in cave water. This proves by inference
  
  Daf 147b
  
  that rinsing one’s entire body by pouring water on it rather than bathing in the standard fashion may well be done even <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara asks: According to whose opinion is our mishna? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not rinse himself on Shabbat, neither with hot water nor with cold water; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon permits rinsing one’s body even with hot water. Rabbi Yehuda says that there is a distinction: With hot water it is prohibited and with cold water it is permitted.
  The mishna addressed the permissibility of drying oneself with a towel after bathing on Shabbat, and added the phrase: And dried himself off even with ten towels. The Gemara comments on the formulation of the mishna: The first clause teaches us a novel concept, and the latter clause teaches us a novel concept. The Gemara explains: The first clause: One who…dried himself even with ten towels may not carry them, teaches us a novel concept, that the prohibition applies even to these towels, which do not have much water absorbed in them. The reason for this is that since he is one person, he may come to squeeze them. And the latter clause teaches us a novel concept, that even these ten people may carry the towel that they have all used, despite the fact that they have absorbed much water and the towel is very wet. The reason for this is that since they are many people, they remind each other not to wring the towel.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may dry himself with a towel on Shabbat and leave it in the window of the bathhouse; and one may not give it to the bath attendants, because they are suspect in this matter of wringing out towels. Rabbi Shimon says: One may dry himself with a single towel and carry it in his hand into his home, and there is no concern lest he wring out the water.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to carrying a towel home after using it to dry himself? Rav Yosef said to him: There is Rabbi Shimon, there is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, there is Shmuel, and there is Rabbi Yoḥanan, all of whom permit it.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Shimon rules leniently, as we have already stated that he permits bathing and drying oneself with a towel and then bringing it home. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: When we would study Torah with Rabbi Shimon in Tekoa, we would carry oil and towels from the courtyard to the roof and from the roof into an enclosure similar to a courtyard until we reached the spring in which we would bathe, without passing through a public domain. In Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, it is permitted to carry a towel both before and after using it to dry oneself. Shmuel is also lenient, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said explicitly: One may dry himself with a towel and carry it in his hand into his home. Rabbi Yoḥanan is also lenient, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is that one may dry himself with a towel and carry it in his hand into his house.
  The Gemara challenges this last point: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say that? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state a principle that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with an unattributed mishna, in which the name of the <i>tanna</i> who issued the rulings does not appear? And we learned explicitly in our mishna, which is unattributed, that if one bathed and dried himself even with ten towels, he may not carry them in his hand. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s version of the mishna does not teach this <i>halakha</i> unattributed; rather, it teaches it in accordance with the opinion of ben Ḥakhinai, which is the opinion of an individual Sage that is not the accepted <i>halakha</i>.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Bath attendants may bring women’s bathing garments [<i>balarei</i>] to the bathhouse on Shabbat as long as they cover their heads and the majority of their bodies with them, so that they are being worn rather than carried. With regard to the large scarf that is worn draped over one’s shoulders, one must tie its two ends together below so that it will not fall. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This means that one must tie it below the shoulders. In a similar vein, Rava said to the inhabitants of his city, Meḥoza: When you transport clothing for the soldiers who are staying in the city, extend them beneath your shoulders so that you will wear them like a garment and not simply carry them.
  We learned in the mishna: One may smear oil and rub a person’s body by hand on Shabbat. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may smear oil on and rub his intestinal area on Shabbat, and it is not a prohibited form of healing, provided he does not do so in the manner in which he does during the week. The Gemara asks: How then does one do this on Shabbat? Rabbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina said: One first smears oil and afterward rubs the body. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One smears oil and rubs simultaneously.
  The mishna taught: However, one may not exert himself on Shabbat. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited to stand on the floor of the therapeutic bathhouse of Deyomset on Shabbat, because it warms and heals even if one is not bathing or exerting himself. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The entire period that bathing in Deyomset is therapeutic is twenty-one days; and <i>Shavuot</i> is included. The Gemara raises a dilemma: Is <i>Shavuot</i> on this side, at the beginning, of the twenty-one-day period, or on this side, at the end, of the twenty-one days? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which Shmuel said: All medicinal drinks are effective from Passover to <i>Shavuot</i>; apparently, the waters of the Deyomset are therapeutic in the time period leading up to <i>Shavuot</i>. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps there, with regard to medicinal drinks, it is so, because the cooler the world, the better these drinks heal; however, here, with regard to bathing, the therapeutic effect is due to the heat, and therefore the warmer the world, the better. The time period during which bathing is effective would only begin with <i>Shavuot</i>.
  Apropos Deyomset, the Gemara cites that Rabbi Ḥelbo said: The wine of Phrygia [<i>Perugaita</i>] and the water of the Deyomset deprived Israel of the ten lost tribes. Because the members of these tribes were attracted to the pleasures of wine and bathing and did not occupy themselves with Torah, they were lost to the Jewish people.
  The Gemara relates that once Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh happened to come there, to Phrygia and Deyomset, and he was drawn after them, and his Torah learning was forgotten. When he returned, he stood to read from a Torah scroll and was supposed to read the verse: “This month shall be for you [<i>haḥodesh hazeh lakhem</i>]” (Exodus 12:2), but he had forgotten so much that he could barely remember how to read the Hebrew letters, and instead he read: Have their hearts become deaf [<i>haḥeresh haya libbam</i>], interchanging the similar letters <i>reish</i> for <i>dalet</i>, <i>yod</i> for <i>zayin</i>, and <i>beit</i> for <i>khaf</i>. The Sages prayed and asked for God to have mercy on him, and his learning was restored.
  And that is what we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Nehorai says: Exile yourself to a place of Torah and do not say that it will follow you, as if you are in a place of Torah, your colleagues will establish it in your hands, and do not rely on your understanding alone. It was taught: Rabbi Nehorai was not his name, but rather Rabbi Neḥemya was his name; and some say that Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh was his name and his statement was based on the personal experience of forgetting his Torah due to his failure to exile himself to a place of Torah. And why was he called Rabbi Nehorai? It was because he would illuminate [<i>manhir</i>] the eyes of the Sages in <i>halakha</i>.
  The mishna taught: However, one may not scrape off the oil on Shabbat. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not scrape his body with a scraper on Shabbat. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If one’s feet were dirty with mortar and excrement he may scrape them in the usual manner with a scraper and need not be concerned about violating a prohibition. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda’s mother made him a silver scraper to use on Shabbat to distinguish it from a weekday.
  The mishna also taught that one may not enter a swampy river full of mud on Shabbat. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? Due to the mud, as it is likely that one will slip and fall and come to violate the prohibitions of bathing and wringing out his clothes.
  We also learned in the mishna that one may not make a drug to induce vomiting on Shabbat. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They only taught that this is prohibited with a drug, which is considered a medicine; however, inducing vomiting by hand is permitted. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Neḥemya says: Even during the week, if one need not vomit for medical reasons, it is prohibited to induce vomiting because it causes loss of food.
  And we learned in the mishna that one may not align a young infant’s bones in order to straighten them on Shabbat. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to swaddling an infant on Shabbat, one may well do so. The Gemara challenges this statement: Didn’t we learn in the mishna that one may not align an infant’s bones? The Gemara answers: There, the mishna is referring to the bones, vertebrae, of the spine, because straightening them appears like the prohibited labor of building.
  We also learned in the mishna that one may not reset a break in a bone on Shabbat. Rav Ḥana of Baghdad said that Shmuel said:
  
  Daf 148a
  
  The <i>halakha</i> is that one may reset a break on Shabbat, which was the ruling in Shmuel’s version of the mishna. The Gemara relates that Rabba bar bar Ḥana happened to come to Pumbedita and he did not enter Rav Yehuda’s lecture. Rav Yehuda sent for Adda, his attendant, and said to him: Go drag him to the lecture. He went and dragged him forcibly to the lecture (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). Rabba bar bar Ḥana came and found Rav Yehuda teaching that one may not reset a break on Shabbat. He said to him: This is what Rav Ḥana of Baghdad said that Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is that one may reset a break on Shabbat. Rav Yehuda said to him: Ḥana is ours, a Babylonian scholar, and Shmuel is ours, and nevertheless, I did not yet hear this <i>halakha</i>; did I not rightfully drag you to the lecture?
  We learned in the mishna that one whose hand was dislocated may not treat it by vigorously moving it about in water. The Gemara relates that Rav Avya was once sitting before Rav Yosef and his hand became dislocated. Rav Avya then displayed a variety of hand positions and he said to him: What is the ruling with regard to this? Am I permitted to place my hand in this way, or is it a violation of the prohibition against healing on Shabbat? Rav Yosef said to him: It is prohibited. Rav Avya again asked: And what is the ruling if I position my hand in this way? Rav Yosef said to him: It is prohibited. In the meantime, his hand was restored to its proper location and was healed.
  Rav Yosef said to him: What is your dilemma? We learned in our mishna that one whose hand or foot was dislocated on Shabbat may not vigorously move it about in cold water; however, he may rinse it in the usual manner, and if it is healed, it is healed. Rav Avya said to him: That is no proof, as didn’t we learn in our mishna that one may not reset a break, and Rav Ḥana of Baghdad said that Shmuel said that the <i>halakha</i> is that one may indeed reset a broken bone. Therefore, perhaps a dislocated limb may also be treated on Shabbat. Rav Yosef said to him: Were all these woven together in a single weave? Where it was stated that an alternative version of the mishna exists, it was stated; where it was not stated, it was not stated. Therefore, the ruling of the mishna with regard to a dislocated limb must be observed.
  
  MISHNA: One may borrow jugs of wine and jugs of oil from another on Shabbat, as long as one does not say the following to him: Loan me. And similarly, a woman may borrow from another loaves of bread on Shabbat. And if the lender does not trust him that he will return them, the borrower may leave his cloak with him as collateral and make the proper calculation with him after Shabbat. And similarly, on the eve of Passover in Jerusalem, when it occurs on Shabbat, one who is procuring a Paschal lamb may leave his cloak with him, i.e., the person from whom he is purchasing it, and take the lamb to bring as his Paschal lamb, and then make the proper calculation with him after the Festival.
  GEMARA: It was taught in the mishna that one is permitted to borrow jugs from another on Shabbat, but one may not use the phrase loan me. Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: What is different about the expression let me borrow, that makes it permitted? And what is different about the expression loan me that makes it prohibited? He said to him: If someone says let me borrow, the lender will not come to write down the loan because the expression indicates that the borrower intends to return the object in its current state within a short amount of time. On the other hand, the expression loan me indicates a more extended loan in which the object is not necessarily returned in exactly the same manner in which it was taken. Therefore, the lender will come to write down the terms of the loan.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan challenged Abaye’s answer: But since on weekdays there are times one intends to say loan me and instead says let me borrow, and the lender is not particular about his imprecise terminology and he comes to write down the terms of the loan, on Shabbat he will also come to write. Abaye said to him: On a weekday, when there is no difference if one says loan me or let me borrow, lenders are not particular about his terminology, and the lender will therefore come to write down the terms of the loan. On Shabbat, since only the expression let me borrow was allowed by the Sages, while the expression loan me was not permitted, the matter is recognizable. Both of the parties must bear in mind which terminology is acceptable, and the lender will not come to write.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Now, since the Sages said that with regard to all matters of a Festival, as much as we can change the way we do things from the manner in which we do them on weekdays, we change, these women who fill their pitchers with water, what is the reason they do not change the way they draw water from their normal weekday procedure? Abaye answers: Because it is not possible to change the procedure. How would they do it differently? If you say that those who normally fill a large pitcher should fill a small pitcher on a Festival, they would thereby add to their walking and expend extra effort. Conversely, if those who normally fill a small pitcher would fill a large pitcher on a Festival, they would thereby add to the weight of their load. Even though these methods are different from the norm, they would cause added exertion. Therefore, the Sages did not require that one draw water in an unusual fashion.
  
  Daf 148b
  
  If you say that, in order to draw water in an unusual manner, we should require a woman to spread a cloth over the vessel, she may come to violate the prohibition of squeezing water from the cloth. And if we would cover it with a lid, sometimes it is severed from the pitcher, and one will then come to tie it. Therefore, since it is impossible to require women to draw water any other way, women draw water on a Festival in the usual manner.
  And Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Did we not learn in a mishna that one may not clap hands, or clap one’s hand against one’s body, or dance on a Festival? And we see, however, that people do these things, and we do not say anything to stop them. Abaye responded: And according to your reasoning, what about this <i>halakha</i> that Rava said: One may not sit on Shabbat at the entrance of a private alleyway next to the post, which delineates its boundaries, lest an object roll away into the public domain and he come to bring it back? And yet we see that women put down their jugs and sit at the entrance of the alleyway, and we do not say anything to stop them. Rather, in these matters we rely on a different principle: Leave the Jewish people alone, and do not rebuke them. It is better that they be unwitting in their halakhic violations and that they not be intentional sinners, for if they are told about these prohibitions they may not listen anyway.
  There were those who understood from this statement that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to rabbinic prohibitions but not to Torah prohibitions, with regard to which we must certainly reprimand transgressors. However, that is not so. There is no difference between rabbinic prohibitions and Torah prohibitions. In both cases one does not reprimand those who violate unwittingly and would not listen to the reprimand. For the requirement of adding to Yom Kippur by beginning the fast while it is still day is from the Torah, and we see women who eat and drink on the eve of Yom Kippur up until nightfall, and we do not say anything to them. Thus, this rule, which applies to rabbinic prohibitions, applies to Torah prohibitions as well.
  We learned in the mishna: And similarly, a woman may borrow loaves of bread from another on Shabbat. However, as in the previous <i>halakha</i>, she may not ask for them using the word loan. The Gemara asks: Is it only on Shabbat that it is prohibited, but on a weekday it seems well. Is it permitted to borrow bread as a loan on a weekday? If so, let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, for we learned in a mishna: And thus Hillel would say: A woman may not loan a loaf of bread to another until she calculates its monetary value, lest wheat become more valuable and they come to violate the prohibition against lending with interest. If the price of wheat rises and the borrower returns the same sized loaf of bread, she will have returned something of greater value than what she borrowed, and therefore she will have paid interest on her loan. From here we see that even on weekdays it is prohibited to borrow a loaf of bread from another person.
  The Gemara answers: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, we may distinguish between the cases such that there is no contradiction: This case, in which the mishna permits borrowing a loaf of bread as a loan, is applicable in a place where the price of the loaf is set, while this statement, which was said by Hillel, is applicable in a place where its price is not set.
  The mishna taught further that if the lender does not trust the one who borrows from him on Shabbat or a Festival, the borrower may leave his cloak as collateral. On this topic, the Gemara cites that which was said in an amoraic dispute with regard to loans on a Festival: Rav Yosef said that such a loan cannot be claimed in court. Although the borrower is obligated to return the object or reimburse the lender, the lender cannot force him to do so by taking legal action. And Rabba said that such a loan is like any other type of loan and can be claimed in court. The Gemara explains these two positions: Rav Yosef said that a loan made on a Festival cannot be claimed in court, for if you say that it can be claimed, there is a concern that the lender may come to write the details of the loan on the Festival so that he can claim it later. Rabba said that it can be claimed, for if you say that it cannot be claimed, the lender will not give him anything to borrow, and the potential borrower will refrain from rejoicing on the Festival.
  We learned in the mishna that if he does not trust him, he may leave his cloak with him as collateral. The Gemara attempts to show that this <i>halakha</i> supports Rav Yosef’s position: Granted, this <i>halakha</i> makes sense if you say that loans given on a Festival cannot be claimed, in accordance with Rav Yosef’s position. Due to this, he leaves his cloak with him and makes a calculation with him after Shabbat. However, if you say that loans given on a Festival can indeed be claimed in court, why then would he leave his cloak with him? Let him give him the item on loan and bring him to court if he does not return it. The Gemara rejects this argument because the lender can say: I do not want to stand in judgment before judges; he may prefer taking collateral so that he will not need to go to court at a later time.
  Rav Idi bar Avin raised an objection to the view of Rav Yosef, based on a mishna pertaining to one who slaughters a cow and divides it among purchasers on Rosh HaShana of a year that follows the Sabbatical Year [<i>shemitta</i>]. Even during the times of the Temple, they were already celebrating two days of Rosh HaShana. The first day was possibly the last day of the month of Elul and possibly the first day of the month of Tishrei, which is the actual date of Rosh Hashana. The question therefore arises as to whether those who bought the meat of the cow initiated their debt on the final day of the Sabbatical Year, in which case the debts would be canceled, or whether the transactions took place on the first day of the following year, in which case the debts may still be collected. The mishna said that if it becomes clear that Elul of the previous year was a full thirty-day month, the Sabbatical Year cancels the debts because the very end of the Sabbatical Year cancels the ability to collect all previous debts. And if this was not the case, and the first day of Rosh HaShana was actually the first day of the new year, the Sabbatical Year does not cancel the loan.
  Based on that mishna, Rav Idi bar Avin makes the following argument: If a loan given on a Festival cannot be claimed in court, what is the meaning of the word cancels? In any event, the lender could not have presented his claim against the borrower in court. The Gemara rejects this argument: It is different there, in an instance in which the month of Elul has thirty days, for it has become clear that the first day of Rosh HaShana was a regular weekday. The loan could therefore be claimed in court, if not for the fact that it was canceled by the Sabbatical Year.
  The Gemara attempts to bring a different proof: Come and hear a proof for this from what we learned in the latter clause of that mishna: If the month of Elul did not turn out to be a full month, such that the first day of Rosh HaShana was actually the first day of the new year, the Sabbatical Year does not cancel the loan. Granted, if you say that a loan given on a Festival can be claimed, that which was taught that it does not cancel the loan is understandable. But if you say that it cannot be claimed, why does it teach that it does not cancel the loan? In any event, the lender cannot make a claim on it in court. The Gemara explains: A loan given on a Festival cannot be claimed in court, but since it has not been canceled, if the borrower gives him the money he may take it.
  The Gemara is surprised at this statement: Does this prove by inference that, in the first clause of the mishna, if the borrower gives him the money, he may not take it? One does not have to refuse repayment of a loan that the Sabbatical Year has canceled. One is simply not allowed to demand repayment from the borrower. The Gemara explains the difference between the two clauses of the mishna: In the first clause of the mishna, in which the first day of Rosh HaShana turned out to be the last day of Elul, the lender must say to him: I relinquish my claim against you. However, in the latter clause of the mishna, in which the first day of Rosh HaShana is the first day of the new year, he does not need to say to him: I relinquish my claim. This is as we learned in a mishna: When one repays a debt during the Sabbatical Year, the lender should say to him: I relinquish my claim.
  And if the borrower says to him: Nonetheless, I want to repay you, he may accept it due to that which is stated: “And this is the manner of the release [<i>devar hashemitta</i>], every creditor shall release that which he has lent to his neighbor; he shall not exact it of his neighbor or brother because the Lord’s Sabbatical Year has been proclaimed” (Deuteronomy 15:2). The manner of the release, <i>devar hashemitta</i>, can be rendered: The statement of release. The Sages derived that, although the creditor must verbally release the debtor from obligation, if the debtor persists in his desire to repay the debt, the creditor may accept payment. If, however, the loan was made after the Sabbatical Year, as is the case in the latter clause of the mishna, the creditor need not verbally release the debtor from obligation.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Avya would take collateral for loans that he gave on a Festivals. Rabba bar Ulla would circumvent the issue by taking something from the borrower after the conclusion of the Festival and holding onto it until the repayment of the loan.
  We learned in the mishna: And similarly, on the eve of Passover in Jerusalem, when it occurs on Shabbat, one who needs to obtain an animal for the Paschal lamb may leave his cloak with the owner of the lamb as collateral and then make the appropriate calculations with him after the Festival. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A person may consecrate his Paschal lamb on Shabbat and his Festival peace-offering on the Festival. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that the mishna supports him? It states: And similarly, on the eve of Passover in Jerusalem which occurred on Shabbat, one may leave one’s cloak with him and take his Paschal lamb and make the appropriate calculation with him after the Festival. Here, we see that the lamb itself is consecrated on Shabbat, which follows the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is not necessarily the case, for with what are we dealing here? With a case in which one registers others to participate with him in bringing his Paschal lamb. In other words, the case is not one in which a person consecrates a previously unconsecrated animal but rather a case in which one allows others to join with him in registering for an animal that was already consecrated from the outset.
  The Gemara challenges this: But we learned in a mishna: One may not initially register for an animal on the Festival. Therefore, even if the animal has been consecrated in advance, it is prohibited to register for it on the Festival, and it should certainly be prohibited to do so on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: The case here is different. Since each person who joins regularly registers together with him, the legal status of that person is like that of one who registered for it from the outset.
  The Gemara raises another proof to the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan: But Rabbi Hoshaya taught: One who wants to bring a Paschal lamb and does not have his own lamb may go to a shepherd to whom he normally goes, and the shepherd may give him a lamb to be used for his Paschal lamb, and he may consecrate it and fulfill his obligation with it. This indicates that one may consecrate an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: There, too, it is referring to a special case. Since he normally goes to him every year, the shepherd has already consecrated it beforehand, prior to Shabbat. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But it taught that one may consecrate it, indicating that the animal is only now being consecrated. The Gemara answers: This is not an actual sanctification in the normal sense, but rather consecration by valuation. By consecrating their animals on their own, the owners add further sanctity to the offering. This process is merely rabbinic, and it may be performed on Shabbat according to all opinions.
  The Gemara questions the very basis of this discussion: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this? But Rabbi Yoḥanan stated as a general principle that the <i>halakha</i> is always in accordance with an unattributed mishna, i.e., a mishna that does not mention the name of the Sage whose ruling is quoted in the mishna. And we learned in an unattributed mishna: One may not consecrate, or take a valuation vow, or consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple, or separate <i>terumot</i> or tithes; they said all of these prohibitions with regard to a Festival, and it is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that these activities are prohibited on Shabbat as well. How, then, would Rabbi Yoḥanan have permitted sanctifying an animal on Shabbat or on a Festival? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the case in which Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it permitted, it is referring to obligations that have a set time, such that if the person does not consecrate the animal right now he will no longer be able to fulfill the mitzva. There, in the mishna that prohibits these activities, the prohibition is referring to obligations that do not have a set time, and one can therefore consecrate the animal after Shabbat.
  MISHNA: One may count his guests who are coming to his meal and his appetizers, as long as he does so from memory; but one may not read them from a written list, the reason for which will be explained in the Gemara. A person may draw lots with his children and family members at the table on Shabbat, in order to determine who will receive which portion, as long as he does not intend to set a large portion against a small portion in such a lottery. Rather, the portions must be of equal size. And one may cast lots among the priests for sanctified foods on a Festival, but not for the specific portions.
  
  Daf 149a
  
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that one may not read the names of his guests or the appetizers served in his meal from a written list. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this prohibition? Rav Beivai said: It is a decree lest one erase something that is written on the list if he regrets inviting a particular guest or changes his mind about a particular dish. Abaye said: It is a decree lest one read regular business documents.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case in which the writing is on a wall and it is raised higher than a person can reach. According to the one who says that the decree was made lest one erase something from the list, in a case such as this we are not concerned about erasure because one cannot even reach the writing. But according to the one who says that the decree was made lest one read business documents, we are still concerned in this case.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that the decree was made lest one erase, we should also be concerned lest one read business documents. And furthermore, are we really not concerned lest one erase when the writing is high up? But wasn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one may not read by the light of a lamp on Shabbat lest one adjust the lamp toward oneself; and Rabba said: Even if the lamp was two statures of a person high, and even as high as two plow handles, and even if it was as high as ten houses one atop the other, one may not read by its light. This clearly demonstrates that when we are concerned that one may violate <i>halakha</i>, we do not distinguish between situations in which such a violation is more or less likely.
  Rather, there is a difference between them in a case in which the writing is on a wall and it is low down. According to the one who says that the reason for the decree is lest one erase, in a case such as this we are concerned because one can easily reach the writing and erase it. However, according to the one who says that the decree was made lest one read business documents, we are not concerned because a wall will not be confused with a document, and reading from the wall will not cause one to then read business documents.
  The Gemara asks further: And according to the one who says that the concern is lest one read, we should also be concerned lest one erase. Rather, there is a practical difference between them in a case where the writing is engraved on a tablet or on a board. According to the one who says that the concern is lest one erase, in a case such as this we are not concerned. Since the writing is not in ink, there is no concern that he will erase it. According to the one who says that the concern is lest one read business documents, we are concerned. The style of writing is irrelevant in terms of the likelihood that one will end up reading business documents.
  The Gemara asks further: According to the one who says that the concern is lest one erase, we should also be concerned lest one read business documents. And if you say: A tablet or a board will not be confused with a document, but wasn’t it taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: One may count how many guests will sit inside, and how many guests will sit outside, and how many portions he will place before them from writing that is on the wall, but not from writing that is on a tablet or a board?
  The Gemara attempts to clarify this: What are the circumstances of the case described in this statement? If you say that it was written in ink, what is the difference here, when the writing is on a wall, and what is the difference here, when the writing is on a tablet? Rather, is it not a case of a list that has been engraved, and nonetheless it teaches that one may read from writing that is on the wall but not from writing that is on a tablet or a board?
  Rather, we should actually explain that the writing was on a wall and was raised. And with regard to what was difficult for you, based on Rabba’s statement that prohibited reading by candlelight on Shabbat regardless of the height of the candle, which presumably means that in our case, too, we should be stringent regardless of the height of the writing, that statement of Rabba is the subject of dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may count one’s guests and one’s appetizers from memory, but not from a written list. Rabbi Aḥa permits reading from a written list that is on a wall.
  The Gemara attempts to clarify this: What are the circumstances in which Rabbi Aḥa permits this? If you say that it is written below, low down on the wall, we should be concerned that perhaps one will erase it. Rather, is it not referring to a case in which it is written and the location of the writing is raised such that it is high up on the wall, and conclude from this that the statement of Rabba is the subject of dispute among the <i>tanna’im</i>? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from this that it is so.
  The Gemara comments that in this matter, these <i>tanna’im</i> are like those <i>tanna’im</i>, who also argued over the same principle, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not look in a mirror on Shabbat lest one see a hair hanging and pluck it. Rabbi Meir permits looking in a mirror that is fixed on a wall.
  The Gemara questions Rabbi Meir’s leniency: What is different about a mirror that is fixed on a wall? In that situation we say that, in the meantime, while one goes to bring scissors or another appliance to cut one’s hair, one will remember that it is Shabbat and that it is prohibited to cut hair. If so, with regard to a mirror that is not fixed on a wall, we can also say that in the meantime one will remember.
  Rather, here we are dealing with a metal mirror, and it is as Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said, for Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: For what reason did the Sages say that a metal mirror is prohibited for use on Shabbat? Because a person may remove hanging hairs with it, meaning that one may use the sharp edge of the mirror itself to cut the hairs. If the mirror is permanently set on the wall, we are not concerned that one will do this. This is similar to the view that one may read writing that is high up on a wall because it is impractical to erase the writing.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to writing that is under a picture or under graven images [<i>deyokenaot</i>], it is prohibited to read it on Shabbat lest one end up reading business documents. And with regard to an idolatrous image itself, even on a weekday it is prohibited to look at it, because it says: “Do not turn toward idols [<i>al tifnu el ha’elilim</i>] or make yourselves molten gods, I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 19:4). The Gemara asks for clarification: What is the biblical derivation? How does this verse indicate that one may not look at an idolatrous image? Rabbi Ḥanin said: Do not push God [<i>al tefannu El</i>] out of your mind by looking at these images (<i>Arukh</i>).
  We learned in the mishna that a person may draw lots with one’s children and family members at the table on Shabbat to see who will receive which meal portion. The Gemara infers: With one’s children and family members, yes, it is permitted, but with another person it is not. What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains that it is as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said, for Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Members of a group who are eating together on Shabbat or on a Festival and who are particular with each other that no one receive a larger portion than anyone else are in violation of the prohibitions of measuring, and weighing, and counting merchandise on Shabbat or a Festival, and they are also in violation of the prohibition against lending and repaying on a Festival.
  
  Daf 149b
  
  And according to Beit Hillel, they even violate the prohibition of interest. In Beit Hillel’s view, it is prohibited to loan or return objects without determining their monetary value, lest the object rise in value and the borrower end up returning an item that is more expensive than the one he borrowed.
  The Gemara asks: If this is so, and one violates so many prohibitions when drawing lots, it should be prohibited to do so with one’s children and family members also. The Gemara answers: With regard to one’s children and family members, this is the reason that it is permitted: It is like the ruling that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, for Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is permitted to loan to one’s children and family members with interest, in order to let them experience a taste of how difficult it is to repay a loan taken with interest. Also, in the case of family members, all the money, including the money used to repay the loan, belongs to the same person. Therefore, there is no real prohibition of interest.
  The Gemara asks: If this is so, and everything in this case actually belongs to the father, and he uses a lottery system in order to educate his family, it should be permitted to cast lots for a big portion against a small portion also.
  The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, and the mishna is incomplete and it teaches the following: A person may draw lots with his children and his family members at the table, and he may even do so with a large portion against a small portion. What is the reason for this? It is in accordance with the ruling that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. Although with one’s children and family members, yes, this is permitted, with others it is not. What is the reason for this? It is in accordance with the ruling that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Raffling a large portion against a small portion is prohibited to do for other people, even on a weekday. What is the reason? Due to the prohibition against gambling with dice, which is prohibited by rabbinic law as a form of theft.
  The mishna taught that one may draw lots for the sacrifices but not for the specific portions. This statement is not entirely clear, and the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: But not for the specific portions? Rabbi Ya’akov, son of the daughter of Ya’akov, said that it means: But one may not draw lots for the weekday [<i>ḥol</i>] portions on a Festival. The Gemara challenges: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since the priests are naturally quarrelsome, which the Sages derive from that which is written: “Yet let no man strive, neither let any man reprove, for your people are like those that strive with the priest” (Hosea 4:4), and in order to maintain peace between them even lotteries for weekday portions were also permitted, therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not the case.
  Having quoted Rabbi Ya’akov, son of the daughter of Ya’akov, the Gemara brings another teaching of this <i>amora</i>. And Rabbi Ya’akov, son of the daughter of Ya’akov, said: Anyone who causes another to be punished on his account, they do not bring him within the partition of the Holy One, Blessed be He, even if he is right. The Gemara asks: From where do we know this? If you say it is because of what is written in the prophecy of Micaiah, that proof can be disputed. It is written: “And the Lord said: Who will entice Ahab to go up and fall at Ramot Gilad? And one said: In this manner, and another said: In that manner. And the spirit came out and stood before the Lord and said: I will entice him. And the Lord said to it: With what? And it said: I will go out and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all of his prophets. And He said: You shall entice him and will prevail. Go out and do this” (I Kings 22:20–22).
  And we said: What is this spirit? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the spirit of Naboth the Jezreelite, who asked to avenge his death at the hands of Ahab. And what is the meaning of the words: Go out, which God commanded him? Rav said: It means that he was given permission to entice Ahab, but God said: Leave from within My partition. Therefore, it seems that the spirit of Naboth was told to leave God’s area because it caused Ahab to be punished. The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps there, the reason is as it is written: “One who speaks lies shall not dwell before My eyes” (Psalms 101:7), and this is the only reason that the spirit of Naboth was removed from within God’s partition.
  Rather, it is derived from here: “You are filled with shame instead of honor. Drink, you, and be like one who is uncircumcised, the cup of the Lord’s right hand will turn to you and filthiness shall be upon your glory” (Habakkuk 2:16). The verse is expounded: “You are filled with shame instead of honor”; this is referring to Nebuchadnezzar. “Drink, you, and be like one who is uncircumcised”; this is referring to Zedekiah, who was also punished for being the cause of Nebuchadnezzar’s punishment, as will be explained. The Gemara rejects this proof: One objection to this is that the entire verse is written about Nebuchadnezzar. And furthermore, with regard to Zedekiah, the righteous one, what could he have done to him? For Rav Yehuda said that Rav said about this matter: When that wicked man wanted to do this to that righteous man, his foreskin was stretched, as will be explained.
  Rather, the basis for this idea is from here: “Punishment is also not good for the righteous” (Proverbs 17:26), meaning that it is not good for a righteous person to issue punishment. There is no meaning of not good other than evil. And it says: “For You are not a God that desires wickedness, evil will not dwell with You” (Psalms 5:5), meaning that You, God, are righteous and evil shall not dwell with You in Your place of dwelling. Even a righteous person who punishes someone and is called evil and cannot dwell within God’s partition.
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this term used in the mishna, <i>ḥalashim</i>, is a word for lots? As it is written: “How have you fallen from heaven, O day-star, son of the morning! How have you been cut down to the ground, casting lots [<i>ḥolesh</i>] over the nations!” (Isaiah 14:12), and Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This verse teaches us that he, Nebuchadnezzar, would cast lots [<i>ḥolesh</i>] for the royal leaders of the nations he had captured, in order to know whose day it was to service him with homosexual relations. And it is written: “All the kings of the nations, all of them sleep in glory, every one in his own house” (Isaiah 14:18). And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The meaning of this verse is that they rested from homosexual relations.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: All of the days of the life of that wicked man, laughter could not be found in the mouth of any creature, as it is stated: “The whole earth is at rest and is quiet; they break forth into singing” (Isaiah 14:7). This proves by inference that until now there was not any song.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited even nowadays to stand in the ruins of the house of that wicked man, Nebuchadnezzar, in Babylonia, for it is stated about that place: “And demons shall dance there” (Isaiah 13:21). There is concern that one may be injured by the harmful forces there (Maharsha).
  And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: At the time when that wicked man, Nebuchadnezzar, wanted to do to that righteous man, Zedekiah, this act of sodomy, his foreskin was stretched three hundred cubits, and it surrounded the entire company at Nebuchadnezzar’s feast, as it is stated: “Woe to one who gives his neighbor drink, who puts your venom in and also makes him drunk so that you may look upon their nakedness. You are filled with shame instead of honor. Drink, you, and be like one who is uncircumcised [<i>vehe’arel</i>]” (Habakkuk 2:15–16). The word <i>arel</i>, which refers here to one who is uncircumcised and also connotes the foreskin, has a numerical value of three hundred.
  And Rav Yehuda also said that Rav said: When that wicked man descended into Gehenna, everyone who had already descended to Gehenna trembled, and they said, referring to themselves in third person: Perhaps he is coming to rule over them; or is he coming to be weakened like them? As it is stated: “They all answer and say to you: Have you also become weak like us? Have you become like us [<i>eleinu nimshalta</i>]?” (Isaiah 14:10). The Hebrew phrase: <i>Eleinu nimshalta</i>, can mean: Have you become like us, or alternatively: Have you come to rule over us. A Divine Voice emerged and said: “Whom do you pass in beauty? Go down and be laid with the uncircumcised” (Ezekiel 32:19). This confirmed that Nebuchadnezzar has the same status in Gehenna as everyone else.
  On a related note, the verse states: “And you shall take up this parable against the king of Babylonia and you shall say: How has the oppressor ceased. The exactor of gold has ceased” (Isaiah 14:4). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The meaning of this verse is that this nation that said:
  
  Daf 150a
  
  Measure and bring a lot of money, has ceased. And some say that the meaning of the statement is that this nation said: Bring very, very much, without measure.
  The Gemara cites another verse pertaining to Nebuchadnezzar: “And surpassing greatness was added unto me” (Daniel 4:33), about which Rav Yehuda said that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: This teaches that Nebuchadnezzar rode atop a male lion and tied a serpent to its head, fulfilling what was said of him: “And the beasts of the field I have also given him to serve him” (Jeremiah 27:6).
  MISHNA: A person may not hire workers on Shabbat to work for him after Shabbat because even speaking about weekday matters is prohibited on Shabbat. Similarly, a person may not tell another on Shabbat to hire workers for him. One may not even wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to leave the boundary immediately after Shabbat to hire workers for himself or to bring produce from his field. But he may wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to guard his produce that is outside the Shabbat boundary, and he may then bring produce back in his hand, since he did not initially intend to wait at the edge of the boundary for this purpose. Abba Shaul stated a general principle: With regard to anything that I am permitted to discuss on Shabbat, I am permitted to wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary for its sake.
  GEMARA: The beginning of the mishna taught that one may not hire workers on Shabbat, and one may not tell another to hire workers for him. The Gemara finds this puzzling and states: This is obvious. What is the difference between him and another? Just as he is prohibited from hiring workers on Shabbat, others are also prohibited from doing so. Rav Pappa said: Another is referring to a gentile. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: This is itself a prohibition, for telling a gentile to do something that is prohibited for a Jew on Shabbat violates a rabbinic prohibition.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that it is referring to another Jew, it can be said that the novel element of this ruling is not the statement itself but what can be derived from it. This is what it is teaching us: One may not say to another explicitly on Shabbat: Hire workers for me, but one may say to another: Does it seem that you will join me this evening? This is permitted even though both of them understand that the questioner intends to hire the other person to work for him. And in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa; as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not say to another on Shabbat: Does it seem that you will join me this evening? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: A person may say to another on Shabbat: Does it seem that you will join me this evening?
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa’s ruling? As it is written in the verse from which we derive the prohibition to speak on Shabbat about activities that one may not perform on that day: “And you shall honor it by not doing your ways, nor pursuing your business, nor speaking of it” (Isaiah 58:13). We derive from this verse that speaking is prohibited, but merely contemplating these matters is permitted.
  Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raised a contradiction to Rava: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan really state as a general principle that speaking is prohibited, but contemplating is permitted? Consequently, we can derive from here that contemplation is not tantamount to speech. But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is permitted to think about Torah in any place except for a bathhouse and a bathroom. This statement indicates that contemplation is tantamount to speech, as even thought is prohibited in these locations. The Gemara answers: It is different there, for with regard to Torah we need to fulfill the verse: “For the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp to deliver you and to give your enemies before you; therefore, your camp shall be sacred so that He see no unseemly thing in you and turn away from you” (Deuteronomy 23:15); and the requirement to be sacred is not fulfilled if one thinks about Torah while in the bathhouse or bathroom.
  The Gemara challenges this: But here, too, with regard to a bathhouse and a bathroom, it is written: “So that He see no unseemly thing [<i>davar</i>] in you” (Deuteronomy 23:15). We can infer that this prohibits speech [<i>dibbur</i>] but not contemplation. The Gemara answers: That verse is not referring to speech. It is needed for the ruling of Rav Yehuda, for Rav Yehuda said: Opposite a naked gentile, it is prohibited to recite <i>Shema</i>, as this is included in the prohibition of unseemly things mentioned above.
  The Gemara asks: Why did Rav Yehuda teach this prohibition particularly with regard to a gentile? Even in the presence of a naked Jew, reciting <i>Shema</i> is also prohibited. The Gemara answers: That ruling is stated employing the style of: There is no need. The Gemara explains: There is no need to state this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a Jew, as it is certainly prohibited to recite <i>Shema</i> in the presence of a naked Jew. However, with regard to a gentile, since it is written about him: “Whose flesh is as the flesh of donkeys” (Ezekiel 23:20), perhaps his flesh is not considered nakedness, and one may say that it seems well and permitted. Therefore, Rav Yehuda teaches us that it is also prohibited to recite <i>Shema</i> before a naked gentile.
  The Gemara asks: Why not say that it is indeed so, that gentile flesh is not considered nakedness? The Gemara rejects this idea: The verse already said with regard to the sons of Noah: “And they walked backward and covered their father’s nakedness, and their faces were turned backward, and they did not see their father’s nakedness” (Genesis 9:23). The verse uses the term nakedness with regard to Noah, who was a gentile.
  The Gemara addresses the basis of the <i>halakha</i> mentioned above: And is it speaking about proscribed activities prohibited on Shabbat? But Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna both said: It is permitted to make calculations pertaining to a mitzva on Shabbat, and Rabbi Elazar said that this means that one may apportion charity for the poor on Shabbat. And Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may attend to activities necessary for saving a life or for communal needs on Shabbat, and one may go to a synagogue to attend to communal affairs on Shabbat.
  And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may go to theaters [<i>tarteiot</i>], and circus performances [<i>kirkesaot</i>], and courthouses [<i>basilkaot</i>] to attend to communal affairs on Shabbat. And one of the Sages in the school of Menashe taught: One may make the necessary arrangements to pair off children so that they will be betrothed on Shabbat, and one may likewise make arrangements for a child by finding someone to teach him how to read books and to teach him a craft. If speaking about monetary matters is prohibited on Shabbat, how is it possible to participate in all these activities? The Gemara answers that although speaking about similar things is generally prohibited on Shabbat, it is permitted in these cases because the verse said: “Nor pursuing your business, nor speaking of it” (Isaiah 58:13), which indicates that your business matters are prohibited to speak of on Shabbat, but the business of Heaven, matters which have religious significance, is permitted to speak of.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to calculations of: What is it to you, [<i>mallakh</i>], calculations that are in no way relevant to the person making them, and of: What significance does it have [<i>ma bekhakh</i>], calculations that do not have any practical significance, it is permitted to make them on Shabbat. This was also taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: Calculations with regard to matters that have passed or that will be in the future may not be calculated on Shabbat. However, with regard to calculations of: What is it to you,
  
  Daf 150b
  
  and of: What significance does it have, it is permitted to calculate them.
  The Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One may make calculations that are unnecessary, but one may not make calculations that are necessary on Shabbat. How so? One may say to another: I sent out such and such number of workers to this field, and I spent such and such number of <i>dinar</i> for this home. But he may not say to him: I spent such and such amount of money, and I am going to spend such and such amount in the future. Apparently, one is permitted to calculate one’s previous expenditures on Shabbat.
  The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, it itself, the <i>Tosefta</i> quoted previously, is difficult for you, for it prohibits calculating past expenditures while allowing one to make calculations that do not have practical significance. Rather, it must be explained in the following manner: This <i>Tosefta</i>, which taught that it is prohibited to calculate past expenses, is referring to a case in which he has payment with him that he still owes his workers. Therefore, although his calculation pertains to projects that have already been completed, it is still relevant in a practical manner. And this <i>baraita</i>, which taught that it is permitted to calculate past expenses, is referring to a case in which he does not have payment with him that he must still pay his workers, and therefore his calculation does not have practical significance.
  We learned in the mishna that one may not wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to hire workers or bring produce from outside of the boundary immediately after Shabbat. The Sages taught: There was an incident with a pious man in which a breach was made in the fence around his field, and when he saw it he decided to fence it in. And then he remembered that it was Shabbat. And that pious man refrained from fixing the fence forever because he had thought about fixing it on Shabbat. And a miracle was done for him, and a caper bush grew in the breach, thereby closing it up. And from it and its produce he then received his livelihood and the livelihood of the members of his household.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A person is permitted to say to another on Shabbat: I am going to such and such city tomorrow, for if there were small guardhouses [<i>burganin</i>] one would be permitted to walk. If small guardhouses, from which the surrounding area and fields could be watched, were located along the way one needs to travel, the entire area would attain the status of a single city, and walking from one part to the other on Shabbat would be permitted <i>ab initio</i>. Since it would be permitted to traverse this area on Shabbat with <i>burganin</i> present, it is permitted to talk about such a journey on Shabbat, even when these guardhouses are not present. This is because it is permitted to speak about or prepare for something that can be done in a permitted fashion on Shabbat, even in the absence of the conditions that make it permitted.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to hire workers or bring produce after Shabbat from the other side of the boundary. Granted, it makes sense that it is prohibited to wait at the Shabbat boundary in order to hire workers, as one may not hire workers under any circumstances on Shabbat. But if one waits there in order to bring produce, why is it prohibited? Let us say that since one would be permitted to bring produce at the edge of the boundary on Shabbat <i>ab initio</i> if there were partitions there, one may wait for nightfall at the border to bring produce even when there are not partitions present, in accordance with Rav Yehuda’s ruling mentioned above. The Gemara answers: You find a case where bringing produce is not permitted under any circumstances; that is when the produce is still attached to the ground, as there is no permitted way to pick produce on Shabbat.
  The Gemara again questions Rav Yehuda’s ruling: But Rabbi Oshaya taught: One may not wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to bring in hay and straw after Shabbat. Granted, Rabbi Oshaya taught that it is prohibited in the case of straw; you find the case of straw that is still attached to the ground, which it is clearly prohibited to pick under any circumstances. But hay, which has already been detached from the ground, how do you find a case in which it would be prohibited to carry it on Shabbat, even with partitions present? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Oshaya’s ruling referred to rotten straw, which may not be carried on Shabbat because it is considered set-aside [<i>muktze</i>].
  Come and hear a proof with regard to this matter based on what was taught elsewhere: One may wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to attend to the needs of a bride or the needs of a corpse. The Gemara infers from this that for the needs of a bride or a corpse, yes, one is permitted to wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary, but for the needs of another person, no, it is not permitted.
  Granted, with regard to attending to the needs of another in a manner similar to attending to the needs of a bride, you find a case where it is prohibited to cut him a myrtle branch as was customarily done for brides because this is absolutely prohibited on Shabbat. But with regard to a corpse, what is it that one might do which would be prohibited to do for others? To bring for it a coffin and shrouds. And it teaches that for a corpse, yes, it is permitted, but for another it is not.
  And why is it prohibited to do so for others? Let us say that since one would be permitted to bring these items on Shabbat if there were partitions there, one may wait for nightfall at the edge of the border to bring these items after Shabbat, in accordance with the ruling of Rav Yehuda. The Gemara answers: In the case of a corpse, you also find a case where bringing an item is prohibited under any circumstance, e.g., if one is waiting to cut a garment for the corpse to use as shrouds. There is no permissible way to do that on Shabbat. In that case, it would be prohibited to wait at the edge of the Shabbat boundary for this purpose if not for the fact that it is for the sake of a corpse, as it is a mitzva to attend to the needs of a corpse.
  We learned in the mishna: But one may wait for nightfall at the Shabbat boundary in order to guard one’s produce. The Gemara asks: And is this the case even if he has not recited the blessing of distinction [<i>havdala</i>] marking the end of Shabbat? But didn’t Rabbi Elazar ben Antigonos say in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov that it is prohibited for a person to tend to his weekday affairs after Shabbat before he recites <i>havdala</i>? And if you say that this is referring to a case in which one already recited <i>havdala</i> during prayer, as formulated by the Sages in the blessing of: Who graciously grants knowledge, didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said that one who recites <i>havdala</i> in prayer must still recite <i>havdala</i> over a cup of wine? And if you say that this is an instance in which one already recited <i>havdala</i> over a cup of wine, does one have a cup of wine in the field? Rabbi Natan bar Ami explained this before Rava: They taught this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a unique case in which the edge of the Shabbat boundary was situated among wine presses, and one took wine from the wine press and recited <i>havdala</i> over it.
  Rabbi Abba said another explanation to Rav Ashi: In the West, in Eretz Yisrael, we say this at the end of Shabbat: The One who distinguishes between the sacred and the mundane, and then we attend to our needs, as reciting <i>havdala</i> over a cup is unnecessary in order to begin doing labor after Shabbat. It is therefore possible that the mishna addressed a similar case. Similarly, Rav Ashi said: When I was in the house of Rav Kahana, he would say: The One who distinguishes between the sacred and the mundane, at the end of Shabbat, and we would cut wood to burn for light and heat.
  We learned in the mishna: Abba Shaul stated a general principle: With regard to anything that I am permitted to discuss on Shabbat, I am permitted to wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary for its sake. The Gemara raises a dilemma: To which part of the mishna did Abba Shaul’s statement refer? If you say that it relates to the first clause of the mishna, which taught: One may not wait for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to hire workers or to bring produce,
  
  Daf 151a
  
  this phrase: Anything that I am permitted to discuss on Shabbat I am permitted to wait for nightfall for its sake, is not appropriate. Rather, the mishna should have formulated the principle in the negative: With regard to anything that I am not permitted to discuss on Shabbat, I am not permitted to wait for nightfall for its sake, similar to the phraseology at the beginning of the mishna. Rather, it is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, which taught: But he may wait for nightfall in order to guard his produce, and he may bring produce in his hand. But even if this is correct, the phraseology does not fit. It should have said the opposite: Anything for which I am permitted to wait for nightfall I am permitted to discuss.
  The Gemara explains: Actually, it is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, and Abba Shaul relates to this statement that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted for a person to say to another on Shabbat: Guard my produce that is in your boundary for me, and I will guard your produce in my boundary for you. And this is what Abba Shaul said to the first <i>tanna</i>: Do you not agree that it is permitted for a person to say to another: Guard my produce that is in your boundary for me, and I will guard your produce that is in my boundary for you? It is in such a case that Abba Shaul permitted waiting for nightfall at the edge of the Shabbat boundary in order to guard produce.
  The Gemara still finds this difficult: And say simply: With regard to anything that I am permitted to discuss, I am permitted to wait for nightfall for its sake. When Abba Shaul stated that his ruling was a general principle, what did that come to include? The Gemara answers: It comes to include that which the Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may not wait for nightfall at the Shabbat boundary in order to bring an animal immediately after Shabbat. If the animal is standing right outside of the boundary, one may call it so that it will come to him. Abba Shaul said a general principle: With regard to anything that I am permitted to discuss on Shabbat, I am permitted to wait for nightfall for its sake. Here, since it is permitted to call to the animal, it is also permitted to wait for nightfall in order to retrieve it.
  The Sages also said: And all agree that one may wait for nightfall to attend to the needs of a bride and the needs of a corpse, such as to bring it a coffin and shrouds. And one may say to him, to one’s messenger, on Shabbat: Go to such and such place to buy them, and if you do not find them in that place, bring them from such and such a place. Similarly, one may instruct one’s messenger: If you do not find them for one hundred dinar, buy them for two hundred. However, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One is permitted to give instructions to a messenger on Shabbat, provided one does not mention to him a specific monetary amount to spend on the transaction.
  MISHNA: One may wait for nightfall at the Shabbat boundary to attend to the needs of a bride and the needs of a corpse, such as to bring him a coffin and shrouds. If a gentile brought flutes on Shabbat in order to play music during the eulogy and funeral procession, a Jew may not eulogize with them as accompaniment, unless they were brought from a nearby location within the Shabbat boundary and transporting them did not include any violation of <i>halakha</i>. If gentiles made someone a coffin and dug him a grave on Shabbat, and they then changed their minds and decided to give it to someone else, a Jew may be buried in it. However, if it was initially intended for a Jew, a Jew may never be buried in it.
  GEMARA: The mishna taught that if a gentile brought something from a nearby location on Shabbat, a Jew is permitted to make use of it. The Gemara asks: What exactly is considered to be from a nearby location? Rav said: Something that is from a location that is actually nearby, meaning that we know with certainty where the object was brought from. And Shmuel said: Even if we do not know exactly where it was brought from, we are concerned that it may have stayed overnight just outside the city wall, which is still within the Shabbat boundary, and no prohibition was violated for the sake of the object. Therefore, it would only be prohibited to use such an object if it was known with certainty that it had been brought from outside the Shabbat boundary. Thus, Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to a situation in which we do not know where the object was brought from on Shabbat.
  The language of the mishna is precise according to Shmuel’s opinion, as it teaches: If a gentile made someone a coffin and dug him a grave on Shabbat and then changed his mind and decided to give it to someone else, a Jew may be buried in it. Consequently, we can derive that if it is uncertain whether the coffin and grave were made for a Jew, it is permitted. Here, too, in a case in which a gentile brings flutes, if it is uncertain whether their transportation was in violation of <i>halakha</i>, it is permitted.
  And a <i>baraita</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav: In the case of a city in which both Jews and gentiles live and in which there is a bathhouse that functions on Shabbat, if there is a majority of gentiles in the city, the <i>halakha</i> is that in the evening, after Shabbat, a Jew may bathe in it immediately. If there is a majority of Jews in the city, a Jew must wait until the amount of time necessary to heat up water after Shabbat has passed, so that one will not benefit from the fact that the water was heated on Shabbat. If the population of the city is half Jewish and half gentile, it is prohibited to bathe there immediately after Shabbat, and one must wait until the amount of time necessary to heat up water after Shabbat has passed. Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of a small bath, if there is a ruling power in the city, a Jew may bathe in it immediately after Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning the phrase: A ruling power? Rav Yehuda said that Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, said: It means that if there is an important person in the city who has ten slaves who heat ten water jugs [<i>kumkumin</i>] for him at once in a small bath, it is permitted for a Jew to bathe in it immediately after Shabbat. This is because this bath may have been heated immediately after Shabbat for the use of this important person, rather than on Shabbat itself.
  The mishna taught that if gentiles made someone a coffin and dug him a grave and then changed their minds and decided to make it available to someone else, it is permitted for a Jew to be buried in it. The Gemara asks: Why? Here, too, one should at the very least have to wait after Shabbat the amount of time necessary for them to do the work after Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Ulla said: The mishna is addressing a case in which the grave is located in a public street. This indicates that it was intended for a gentile because Jews are not usually buried there. The Gemara asks further: Granted, in the case of a grave, the <i>halakha</i> is understandable. However, in the case of a coffin, what is there to say? Why isn’t a Jew required to wait after Shabbat for the amount of time it would take to make the coffin? Rabbi Abbahu said: The mishna addresses a case in which the coffin was already placed over the grave of a gentile, which proves that it was intended for him.
  MISHNA: One may perform all of the needs of the dead on Shabbat. One may smear oil on the body and rinse it with water, and all of this is permitted provided that one does not move any of its limbs, which would constitute a violation of the laws of set-aside objects. When necessary, one may also remove a pillow from beneath it and thereby place it on cold sand in order
  
  Daf 151b
  
  to delay its decomposition. Similarly, one may tie the jaw of a corpse that is in the process of opening. One may not move it directly so that it will rise back to its original position, but so that it will not continue to open. And similarly, if one has a roof beam that has broken on Shabbat, one may support it with a bench or with long poles from a bed. One may not move it so that the beam will rise back to its original place, but so that it will not continue to fall.
  GEMARA: The Gemara questions the mishna’s lenient ruling with regard to smearing oil on a corpse: But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel said: There was an incident with a student of Rabbi Meir who followed him into the bathhouse on Shabbat. The student wanted to rinse the ground. Rabbi Meir said to him: One may not rinse on Shabbat. The student wanted to smear the ground with oil. Rabbi Meir said to him: One may not smear on Shabbat. This indicates that it is prohibited to rinse or smear anything that may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara responds: The ground in one place can be confused with the ground in another place, and the Sages therefore prohibited these activities even on a tiled floor, such as that of a bathhouse, due to a concern that one may come to do so on a dirt floor and smooth it out. However, a corpse cannot be confused with the ground, and it is therefore permitted to rinse a corpse and smear it with oil.
  We learned in the mishna that one may attend to all the needs of the dead on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What does the word all include in the mishna’s ruling that one may have thought is not included? The Gemara answers: It is meant to include that which the Sages taught: One may bring cold vessels and metal vessels and place them on the corpse’s stomach so that it does not swell. And one may seal up its orifices so that air will not enter them and cause swelling.
  And King Solomon also said in his wisdom with regard to old age and death: “Before the silver cord is snapped asunder, and the golden bowl is shattered, and the pitcher is broken at the fountain, and the wheel falls, shattered, into the pit” (Ecclesiastes 12:6), which the Gemara explains as follows: “Before the silver cord is snapped asunder”; this is a reference to the spinal cord. “And the golden bowl [<i>gullat</i>] is shattered”; this is a reference to the member, which is like a spring of water [<i>gulla</i>]. “And the pitcher is broken at the fountain”; this is a reference to the stomach, which looks like a pitcher that swells and ruptures. “And the wheel [<i>galgal</i>] falls, shattered, into the pit”; this is a reference to excrement [<i>gelalim</i>].
  And similarly, it says in the verse: “And I will spread dung upon your faces, even the dung of your Festival offerings” (Malachi 2:3). Rav Huna said, and some say that it was Rav Ḥagga who said: This verse is referring to those people who neglect the words of the Torah and turn all of their days into Festivals. Rabbi Levi said that Rav Pappi said that Rabbi Yehoshua said: Three days after death, the stomach of the dead bursts and falls onto his face and says to him: Take what you have put inside me.
  MISHNA: One may not shut the eyes of the dead on Shabbat because the body is set-aside. And one may not shut the eyes even on a weekday while the soul departs. One must wait until the person has died. And one who shuts the eyes while the soul departs is a murderer because he has hastened the person’s death.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: One who shuts a person’s eyes while the soul departs is a murderer. This is analogous to a lamp that is gradually becoming extinguished but could continue to burn a little longer. If a person places his finger on it, it is immediately extinguished. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who wants the eyes of a corpse to close should blow wine up its nose, and place oil between its eyelids, and grab hold of its two big toes, and its eyes will shut by themselves.
  Incidental to the Gemara’s discussion of corpses, it cites that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a living day-old baby, one desecrates Shabbat to save his life. Yet for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat. For a day-old baby we desecrate Shabbat because the Torah says: Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he can observe many <i>Shabbatot</i>. But for the deceased David, king of Israel, one does not desecrate Shabbat, as once a person dies he is idle from mitzvot. And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to the verse: “Set apart among the dead [<i>bametim ḥofshi</i>], like the slain that lie in the grave, whom You remember no more” (Psalms 88:6). Once a person dies, he becomes free [<i>ḥofshi</i>] from the mitzvot.
  And it was also taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: It is not necessary to protect a live day-old baby from a weasel or from mice, for they run away from the baby. But if Og, the king of Bashan, is dead, it is necessary to protect even him from a weasel or from mice, as it is stated: “And the fear of you and the dread of you [<i>ḥittekhem</i>] shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every bird of the heavens” (Genesis 9:2). The Gemara explains: As long as a person is alive [<i>ḥai</i>], he is feared by the animals. Once he dies, he is no longer feared.
  Rav Pappa said: We hold that a lion does not pounce upon two people. The Gemara challenges this: But how can that be? We see that it does pounce upon two people. The Gemara answers: That statement of Rav Pappa must be in accordance with that which Rami bar Abba said: An animal does not overpower a person until he appears to it as an animal, as it is stated: “But man does not abide in honor, he is like the beasts that perish” (Psalms 49:13). However, animals do not attack people who are human in their spiritual character. In a similar vein, Rabbi Ḥanina said: It is prohibited to sleep alone in a house, and anyone who sleeps alone in a house will be seized by the evil spirit Lilith.
  It was also taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the appreciation of life: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Perform mitzvot while you still find opportunities, and you have the financial means, and you are still under your own control. And King Solomon also said, in his wisdom: “And remember your Creator in the days of your youth, before the evil days come and the years arrive when you will say: I have no desire for them” (Ecclesiastes 12:1). Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar explains: “The evil days”; these are the days of old age. “And the years arrive when you will say: I have no desire for them”; these are the days of Messiah, in which there is neither merit nor liability.
  The Gemara comments that this explanation disagrees with the view of Shmuel, for Shmuel said: There is no difference between this world and the days of Messiah except for subjugation to foreign kingdoms alone, from which we will be released in the Messianic era, as it is stated: “For the poor will never cease from the land, therefore I command you, saying: You shall surely open your hand to your brother, to your poor and your needy in your land.” (Deuteronomy 15:11). This indicates that the ways of the world, including the existence of wealthy and poor socioeconomic strata, will continue forever.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar HaKappar says: A person should always request divine mercy with regard to this condition of poverty, for if he does not come to a state of poverty, his son will, and if his son does not come to such a state his grandson will, as it is stated: “You shall surely give him and your heart shall not be grieved when you give to him, for due to this thing [<i>biglal hadavar hazeh</i>] the Lord your God will bless you in all your work and in all that you put your hand toward” (Deuteronomy 15:10). With regard to this verse, the <i>tanna</i> from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Due to [<i>biglal</i>] this thing means that it is a wheel [<i>galgal</i>] that turns in the world, upon which people continuously rise and fall. Rav Yosef said: We hold that a Torah scholar will not become poor. The Gemara challenges this statement: But we see that they do become poor. The Gemara answers: Even so, if there is a Torah scholar who becomes poor, he will still never have to go around asking for charity at people’s doors.
  In a similar vein, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Ḥiyya said to his wife: When a poor person comes to the house, be quick to give him bread so that they will be quick to give bread to your children. She said to him: Are you cursing them, your children? He said to her: It is a verse that is written, as it says: “Due to this thing,” and the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that it is a wheel that continuously turns in the world. Similarly, it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Gamliel, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, says: The verse that states: “And He will show you mercy and have compassion on you and multiply you” (Deuteronomy 13:18) teaches us that anyone who has compassion for God’s creatures will receive compassion from Heaven, and anyone who does not have compassion for God’s creatures will not receive compassion from Heaven.
  The Gemara returns to verses from Ecclesiastes that relate to death and old age. It is written: “Before the sun and the light and the moon and the stars are darkened, and the clouds return after the rain” (Ecclesiastes 12:2). The Sages taught: “The sun and the light”; this is referring to the forehead and the nose which stick out from a person’s face. “And the moon”; this is referring to the soul, which shines within a person. “And the stars”; these are the cheeks. “And the clouds return after the rain”; this is the light of a person’s eyes, which goes and dwindles after one cries as if it were covered by clouds. Shmuel said: With regard to the tear that a person cries, until one reaches the age of forty years, one’s vision returns and is not harmed. From here on, once a person reaches the age of forty, it does not return, and every time a person cries his vision is weakened.
  And similarly, Rav Naḥman said: With regard to medicinal eye shadow, until one reaches the age of forty years, it enhances his eyesight. From here and on, even if one fills it as thick as a weaver’s pin [<i>avisana degirda’ei</i>], it will maintain his eyesight but it will not enhance it. The Gemara asks about this: What is he teaching us with the example of a weaver’s pin? The Gemara answers: Generally speaking, the more eye shadow one applies, the more beneficial it is.
  The Gemara relates a story: When Rabbi Ḥanina’s daughter died, he did not cry over her. His wife said to him: Have you merely let a chicken out of your house, that you do not show any signs of sorrow? He said to her: If I cry, I will suffer twice, from bereavement and from blindness. The Gemara explains: He held in accordance with the statement that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosei ben Ketzarta: There are six types of tears, three of which are good for the eyes and three of which are bad. Tears that come from smoke, and from crying out of sorrow,
  
  Daf 152a
  
  and from pain in the bathroom are bad for the eyes. Tears that come from medicinal drugs, and from laughter, and from sharp produce are good for the eyes.
  The Gemara continues to interpret verses from the Book of Ecclesiastes. The verse states: “On the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble, and the strong men shall bow themselves, and the grinders cease because they are few, and those that look out the windows shall be dimmed” (Ecclesiastes 12:3). “On the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble”; this is referring to the flanks and ribs that surround and protect a person’s internal organs. “And the strong men shall bow themselves”; these are the thighs, which support a person’s strength. “And the grinders cease”; these are the teeth, which decay and fall out. “And those that look out the windows shall be dimmed”; these are the eyes, which become dimmer.
  The Gemara relates: The Roman emperor said to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: What is the reason you did not come to the House of Avidan? This was a place in which dialogues and debates were conducted. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya said to him enigmatically: The snowy mountain is surrounded with ice, meaning that his hair had turned white; his dogs do not bark, meaning that his voice could no longer be heard; his grinders have ceased grinding, meaning that his teeth had fallen out. In the school of Rav they say that he added: I am searching for that which I have not lost, because an old man walks bent over and appears to be searching for something.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei bar Kisma says: The two feet of one’s youth are better than the three of old age, when one walks with a cane. Woe to the one who goes and does not come back. What is this referring to? Rav Ḥisda said: Youth. Similarly, when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: Youth is a crown of roses; old age is a crown of thorns. The Sage taught in the name of Rabbi Meir: Grind food with your teeth and you will find in your feet the strength to carry your body, as it is stated: “For we were sated with our bread and were well, and saw no evil” (Jeremiah 44:17). Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Large-toothed one; untie your sack, that is, your mouth, and insert your food. Until the age of forty years, food is beneficial; from here and on, drinking is beneficial.
  Having quoted some aphorisms of the Sages, the Gemara relates the following conversation: A certain eunuch who was an apostate said the following to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa as a provocation: How far is it from here to Karḥina? The provocateur’s intention was to hint to the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa was bald [<i>kere’aḥ</i>]. He said to him: It is the same as the distance from here to the mountains of Gozen, hinting at the eunuch’s castration, which in Aramaic is <i>goza</i> (Rav Ya’akov Emden). The apostate said to him: A bald buck is sold for four <i>dinar</i>. He said to him: A castrated goat [<i>ikkara shelifa</i>] is sold for eight.
  The apostate saw that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa was not wearing shoes. He said to him: One who rides on a horse is a king. One who rides on a donkey is a free man. And one who wears shoes is at least a human being. One who does neither this nor that, someone who is buried in the earth is better than him. He said to him: Eunuch, eunuch, you said to me three things, and now hear three things: The glory of a face is the beard, the joy of the heart is a wife, and “the portion of the Lord is children” (Psalms 127:3); blessed is the Omnipresent who has denied you all of them, for a eunuch does not have a beard, a wife or children. He said to him: Does a bald man quarrel? He said to him: Does a castrated male goat speak words of rebuke?
  The Gemara again addresses old age: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Shimon ben Ḥalafta: For what reason did we not greet you during the Festival the way that my fathers greeted your fathers? This was a polite way of asking Rabbi Shimon ben Ḥalafta why he had not come to visit Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. He said to him: Because I have grown old, and the rocks on the road have become tall, and destinations that are near have become far away, and my two feet have been made into three with the addition of a cane, and that which brings peace to the house, namely, the sexual drive which motivates a couple to make peace, is no more.
  The Gemara continues to expound the verses of the final chapter of Ecclesiastes. The verse states: “And the doors shall be shut in the marketplace when the sound of the grinding is low, and one shall start up at the voice of a bird, and all the daughters of music shall be brought low” (Ecclesiastes 12:4). The Sages expounded: “And the doors shall be shut in the marketplace”; these are a person’s orifices, which cease to function normally. The interpretation continues: “When the sound of the grinding is low”; because the stomach is not grinding and digesting one’s food. “And one shall start up at the voice of a bird”; because one is unable to sleep deeply such that even a bird will wake him from his sleep. “And all the daughters of music shall be brought low”; this means that even the voices of male and female singers will seem to him like mere conversation, and he will no longer derive pleasure from song.
  And even Barzilai the Gileadite said to David: “Today I am eighty years old, can I discern between good and bad? Can your servant taste what I eat or what I drink? Can I hear any more the voice of singing men and singing women?” (II Samuel 19:36). The Gemara explains: “Can I discern between good and bad”; from here we derive that the minds of the elderly change and they no longer discern properly. “Can your servant taste what I eat or what I drink”; from here we derive that the lips of the elderly crack and wither. “Can I hear any more the voice of singing men and singing women”; from here we derive that the ears of the elderly become heavy.
  Rav said: Barzilai the Gileadite was a liar and he merely wanted to avoid joining David upon his return to Jerusalem, for an eighty-year old man is not usually this debilitated. For there was a particular maidservant in the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who was ninety-two years old, and she would taste the food that was cooking in the pots. Rava said: Barzilai was speaking the truth, but Barzilai the Gileadite was steeped in promiscuity, and anyone who is steeped in promiscuity is overtaken by old age before his time. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: As Torah scholars grow older, wisdom is increased in them, as it is stated: “With aged men is wisdom; and length of days brings understanding” (Job 12:12). And as ignoramuses grow older, foolishness is increased in them, as it is stated: “He removes the speech of men of trust and takes away the understanding of the aged” (Job 12:20).
  The Gemara continues interpreting verses from Ecclesiastes. The verse states: “Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high and terrors shall be on the road, and the almond tree shall blossom, and the grasshopper shall drag itself along, and the caper berry shall fail, for a person goes to his eternal home, and the mourners circle the marketplace” (Ecclesiastes 12:5). The Gemara explains: “Also when they shall be afraid of that which is high”; this means that even a small knoll on the road seems to him, the elderly, like the highest of mountains. “And terrors shall be on the road”; this means that while he is walking on the road he will have terrors, i.e., he will fear falling or otherwise suffering injury. “And the almond tree shall blossom”; this is the hip bone that protrudes from the skin of an elderly person. “And the grasshopper [<i>ḥagav</i>] shall drag itself along [<i>yistabbel</i>]”; by replacing the letter <i>ḥet</i> of <i>ḥagav</i> with an <i>ayin</i>, this can be understood as referring to the buttocks [<i>agavot</i>] which become heavy [<i>sevel</i>]. “And the caper berry shall fail”; this is sexual desire that ceases.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Kahana was reading biblical verses before Rav. When he got to this verse, Rav sighed. Rav Kahana said: We can derive from this that Rav’s desire has ceased. Rav Kahana also said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For He spoke and it was, He commanded and it stood” (Psalms 33:9)? He understands this to mean that God created man with desires that push him to do things he would not do if he acted purely on the judgment of his intellect, and Rav Kahana therefore interprets the verse in the following manner: “For He spoke and it was”; this is a woman that a man marries. “He commanded and it stood”; these are the children who one works hard to raise. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A woman is essentially a flask full of feces, a reference to the digestive system, and her mouth is full of blood, a euphemistic reference to menstruation, yet men are not deterred and they all run after her with desire.
  The Gemara interprets the continuation of the verse cited above: “For a person goes to his eternal home” (Ecclesiastes 12:5). Rabbi Yitzḥak said: This teaches that each and every righteous person is given a dwelling place in the World-to-Come in accordance with his honor. The Gemara offers a parable in which a king enters a city along with his servants. When they enter, they all enter through a single gate; however, when they sleep, each one is given a dwelling place in accordance with his honor. So too, although everyone dies, not everyone receives the same reward in the World-to-Come.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For childhood and youth [<i>shaḥarut</i>] are vanity” (Ecclesiastes 11:10)? Sinful things that a person does in his youth darken [<i>mashḥirim</i>] his face with shame as he grows old (Rabbi Yoshiya Pinto).
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The maggots that eat the flesh of the deceased are as painful to the dead as a needle in the flesh of the living, as it says with regard to the dead: “But his flesh is in pain for him, and his soul mourns over him” (Job 14:22). Rav Ḥisda said: A person’s soul mourns for him during all seven days of mourning following his death, as it is stated: And his soul mourns over him,” and it is also written: “And he mourned his father seven days” (Genesis 50:10).
  Rav Yehuda said: In the case of a deceased person who has no comforters, i.e., he has nobody to mourn for him, ten people should go and sit in his place and accept condolences. The Gemara relates the story of a certain person who died in Rav Yehuda’s neighborhood and who did not have any comforters, i.e., mourners;
  
  Daf 152b
  
  every day of the seven-day mourning period, Rav Yehuda would take ten people and they would sit in his place, in the house of the deceased. After seven days had passed the deceased appeared to Rav Yehuda in his dream and said to him: Put your mind to rest, for you have put my mind to rest.
  Rabbi Abbahu said: Everything people say before the deceased, he knows, until the tomb is sealed with the top-stone. Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, disagreed with regard to the meaning of this statement. One of them said that the deceased is aware until the tomb is sealed with the top-stone, which is referring to the covering of the grave (<i>Tosafot</i>). And one of them said that it is until the flesh decomposes.
  The one who said that it is until the flesh decomposes can support his position based on that which is written in the following verse: “But his flesh grieves for him, and his soul mourns over him” (Job 14:22). This indicates that the deceased is aware of the pain of his flesh in the grave. The one who said that the deceased is aware only until the tomb is sealed with the top-stone can support his view based on that which is written in a different verse: “And the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it” (Ecclesiastes 12:7). This indicates that when the body returns to the earth, the spirit also returns to its place and is no longer aware of what is happening to the body.
  The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And the spirit returns to God who gave it” (Ecclesiastes 12:7) that the words: Who gave it, mean: As it was given. In other words, give it to Him as He gave it to you; just as He gave it to you in purity, you too should return it to God in purity. The Gemara cites a parable of a king of flesh and blood who distributed royal garments to his servants. The wise ones folded them and placed them in a box [<i>kufsa</i>] to protect them, whereas the foolish ones went and worked in them. After a period of time the king requested that his garments be returned to him. The wise ones returned them to him pressed, as they were when the servants received them, and the foolish ones returned them dirty. The king was happy to greet the wise ones and angry to greet the foolish ones.
  With regard to the wise ones he said: My garments shall be given back to the storehouse, and let them go to their homes in peace. And with regard to the foolish ones he said: My garments shall be given to the launderer, and they, the fools, will be locked up in prison as a punishment for degrading the king’s garments for their own purposes.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, also acts in this way. With regard to the bodies of the righteous, which are likened to the royal garments that are well kept, it states: “He enters into peace, they rest on their beds each one that walks in his uprightness” (Isaiah 57:2). And with regard to their souls, it states: “And the soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord your God” (I Samuel 25:29). And conversely, with regard to the bodies of the wicked, it states: “There is no peace, says the Lord, for the wicked” (Isaiah 57:21), and with regard to their souls, it states: “And the souls of your enemies He shall sling out in the hollow of a sling” (I Samuel 25:29).
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: The souls of the righteous are stored beneath the Throne of Glory, as it is stated: “And the soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life” (I Samuel 25:29). And the souls of the wicked are continuously tied up, and one angel stands at one end of the world and another angel stands at the other end of the world and they sling the souls of the wicked back and forth to one another, as it is stated: “And the souls of your enemies He shall sling out in the hollow of a sling” (I Samuel 25:29).
  Rabba said to Rav Naḥman: What happens to the souls of middling people, who are neither righteous nor wicked? Rav Naḥman said to him: It is good that you asked me this question, for even if I were dead I would not have been able to tell you that. As Shmuel said as follows: These and those, the souls of the wicked and of the middling people, are handed over to Duma, the angel in charge of spirits. But these, the souls of the middling people, have rest, and these, the souls of the wicked, do not have rest. Rav Mari said: Even the bodies of the righteous will not be preserved and will become dust, as it is written: “And the dust returns to the earth as it was” (Ecclesiastes 12:7).
  The Gemara cites a related story: The diggers who were digging in Rav Naḥman’s land came upon a grave, and Rav Aḥai bar Yoshiya, who was buried there, rebuked them. They came and said to Rav Naḥman: A deceased person just rebuked us. Rav Naḥman came and said to the person buried there: Who is the Master, i.e., who are you? He said to him: I am Aḥai bar Yoshiya. Rav Naḥman said to him: How has your body been preserved? Didn’t Rav Mari say that the righteous will turn to dust? Rav Aḥai said to him: And who is Mari, whom I do not know? Why should I be concerned about what he says? Rav Naḥman said to him: Even without Rav Mari’s statement, there is an explicit verse which is written: “And the dust will return to the earth as it was” (Ecclesiastes 12:7).
  Rav Aḥai said to him: Whoever taught you the book of Ecclesiastes did not teach you the book of Proverbs, for it is written in Proverbs: “A tranquil heart is the life of the flesh, but envy is the rotting of the bones” (Proverbs 14:30). This means that anyone who has envy in his heart during his lifetime, his bones rot in the grave, and anyone who does not have envy in his heart, his bones do not rot.
  Rav Naḥman touched him and saw that he had substance. Rav Naḥman said to him: Let the Master arise and come into my house. Rav Aḥai said to him: You have revealed that you have not even studied Prophets, and it is not just the Writings of which you are ignorant, for it is written: “And you shall know that I am the Lord when I open up your graves and lift you up from your graves, My nation” (Ezekiel 37:13). As long as the dead have not been instructed to leave their graves, leaving of their own accord is prohibited.
  Rav Naḥman once again asked Rav Aḥai about the preservation of the flesh, and he said: But it is written: “For you are dust and you shall return to dust” (Genesis 3:19), so why has your body not turned into dust? He said to him: That verse applies to the righteous only one hour before the resurrection of the dead, so that they, too, may be created anew (Maharsha).
  A certain apostate once said to Rabbi Abbahu: You say that the souls of the righteous are stored beneath the Throne of Glory, but if so, how did the oracle woman raise up Samuel using necromancy if his soul was no longer in this world? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: There, it was within twelve months of his death, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For a full twelve months a deceased person’s body remains and his soul ascends and descends, such that it is sometimes in this world with its body. After twelve months, the body ceases to exist
  
  Daf 153a
  
  and his soul ascends to its place beneath the Throne of Glory, and does not descend anymore.
  Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said in the name of Rav: From a person’s eulogy it is apparent whether or not he has a share in the World-to-Come. If the listeners are pained and brought to tears during the eulogy, it is clear that the person was righteous. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav say to Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat: Stir the hearts of those gathered during my eulogy, for I will be standing there and listening to your words? Even a person as great as Rav needed to give instructions about his eulogy. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, for this statement, which maintains that those who merit a share in the World-to-Come can be identified by their eulogies, is referring to a situation in which they attempt to stir the listener and he is stirred; while that statement is referring to a situation in which they attempt to stir the listener and he is not stirred. That is an indication that the deceased person was not righteous.
  Abaye said to Rabba: In the case of the Master, i.e., Rabba, whom all of the inhabitants of his city, Pumbedita, hate, who will be stirred during his eulogy? He said to him: It is sufficient for me if you and Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan are stirred.
  Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: Which type of person has a share in the World-to-Come? He said to him: We can derive this from the verse: “And your ears shall hear a word behind you, saying: This is the path, walk on it, when you turn to the right or to the left” (Isaiah 30:21). In other words, if people eulogize one by saying that others should follow in his path, he must have a share in the World-to-Come. Rabbi Ḥanina said: Anyone with whom our Rabbis are pleased has a share in the World-to-Come. In interpreting the verse: “And the eulogizers walk about the marketplace” (Ecclesiastes 12:5), the people of the Galilee say: Do things that you will want people to say at your eulogy in front of your bier. The people of Judea say: Do things that you want people to say at your eulogy behind your bier. The Gemara remarks: And they do not disagree; this Sage expressed it according to the norm in his place, and this Sage expressed it differently according to the norm in his place. The custom in the Galilee was that the eulogizers would stand before the bier and the custom in Judea was that eulogizers would stand behind the bier.
  We learned there in a mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: Repent one day before your death. Rabbi Eliezer’s students asked him: But does a person know the day on which he will die? He said to them: All the more so this is a good piece of advice, and one should repent today lest he die tomorrow; and by following this advice one will spend his entire life in a state of repentance. And King Solomon also said in his wisdom: “At all times your clothes should be white, and oil shall not be absent from upon your head” (Ecclesiastes 9:8), meaning that a person always needs to be prepared.
  Similarly, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said the following story as a parable to this lesson: The situation is comparable to a king who invited his servants to a feast and did not set a time for them to come. The wise among them adorned themselves and sat at the entrance to the king’s house. They said: Is the king’s house missing anything necessary for the feast? Certainly the king could invite them at any moment. The fools among them went to attend to their work and said: Is there such thing as a feast without the toil of preparing for it? While the feast is being prepared, we will attend to other matters.
  Suddenly, the king requested that his servants come to the feast. The wise among them entered before him adorned in their finest clothes, and the fools entered before him dirty. The king was happy to greet the wise ones and angry to greet the fools. The king said: These wise servants who adorned themselves for the feast shall sit and eat and drink, but these fools who did not adorn themselves for the feast shall stand and watch. There is a similar outcome for people who think that their day of death and judgment is far away and do not prepare themselves for it.
  Rabbi Meir’s son-in-law said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If the punishment for those who did not prepare themselves in advance was merely to stand and watch, it would not be severe enough because they also look like servants at the feast, which is not such a disgraceful punishment. Rather, these and these, both groups of people, sit at the feast. These wise and righteous people eat, and these wicked fools are hungry; these righteous people drink, and these wicked people are thirsty, as it is stated: “Therefore, thus said the Lord, God: Behold, My servants shall eat and you shall be hungry; behold, My servants shall drink and you shall be thirsty; behold, My servants shall rejoice and you shall be ashamed. Behold, My servants shall sing from a joyous heart and you shall scream from a pained heart” (Isaiah 65:13–14).
  Alternatively, the verse quoted above can be interpreted in the following way: “At all times let your clothes be white”; this is clothing that contains ritual fringes [<i>tzitzit</i>], which are white. “And oil shall not be absent from upon your head”; these words hint to phylacteries, which are worn on the head.
  
  MISHNA: One who was traveling on Shabbat eve and night fell, and Shabbat began while he was still en route, gives his money pouch to a gentile traveling with him. And if there is no gentile with him he places it on the donkey. Once he reached the outer courtyard of the city, where belongings can be securely placed, he takes the vessels that may be moved on Shabbat off the donkey. With regard to the vessels that may not be moved on Shabbat, he unties the ropes that attach his bags to the donkey, and the bags of vessels fall on their own.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: One who was traveling on Shabbat eve and night fell, and Shabbat began while he was still en route, gives his money pouch to a gentile. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Sages permitted him to give his pouch to a gentile? Is it not prohibited for a Jew to ask a gentile to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: The Sages maintain that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money. If you do not permit him to give his pouch to a gentile, he will come to carry four cubits in a public domain, thereby violating a Torah prohibition.
  Rava said: This allowance to give the pouch to a gentile is specifically with regard to his own pouch, but in the case of a lost object that he found, no, it was not permitted. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, as we learned in the mishna: His pouch, and nothing else. The Gemara answers: Rava specified this lest you say that the same is true even with regard to a lost object, that one may give it to a gentile on Shabbat, and the mishna taught the case of his pouch merely because it is the manner in which the matter typically occurs. Therefore, Rava teaches us that the mishna is in fact establishing a <i>halakha</i> restricted to his pouch. The Gemara comments: And we only said that this allowance does not apply to a lost object when it did not come into his possession before Shabbat. However, if the object already came into his possession before Shabbat, its legal status is like that of his pouch.
  Some state this dilemma in a different manner. Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to a lost object that came into his possession before Shabbat, what is the ruling? Is the <i>halakha</i> that since it already came into his possession, its legal status is like that of his pouch? Or perhaps, since he did not exert himself to acquire it, its legal status is not like that of his pouch. Since he expended no effort, he would be capable of restraining himself even when faced with losing it. Therefore, there is no need for the Sages to permit him to give it to a gentile. The Gemara concludes: Let this dilemma stand unresolved.
  We learned in the mishna: And if there is no gentile with him he places it on the donkey. The Gemara infers: The reason is specifically because there is no gentile with him; if there is a gentile with him, he gives it to the gentile and does not place it on a donkey. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: With regard to a donkey belonging to a Jew, you are commanded with regard to its rest on Shabbat. With regard to a gentile, you are not commanded with regard to his rest and no Torah prohibition is being violated.
  The Gemara teaches an additional <i>halakha</i>: If there was no gentile with him but there was a donkey, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, meaning someone under thirteen years old, one places it on the donkey, but one neither gives it to the deaf-mute, nor the imbecile, nor the minor. What is the reason for this? Although they are not obligated to fulfill mitzvot, these are people, but this donkey is not a person. It is preferable to place it on the donkey rather than give it to a person. And if a deaf-mute and an imbecile were with him, he gives it to the imbecile. If an imbecile and a minor were with him, he gives it to the imbecile.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a deaf-mute and a minor were with him, what is the ruling? To whom does he give his pouch? The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer you have no dilemma. Rabbi Eliezer holds that a deaf-mute has a greater degree of halakhic intelligence than does a minor, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yitzḥak says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The <i>teruma</i> of a deaf-mute that he separated from his produce
  
  Daf 153b
  
  does not vacate its sanctified status and assume non-sacred status because his status with regard to halakhic intelligence is uncertain. According to Rabbi Eliezer, a deaf-mute apparently has a degree of halakhic intelligence, and therefore has a greater obligation in mitzvot than a minor.
  When you raise this dilemma, the issue is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna: There are five categories of people who may not separate <i>teruma</i> <i>ab initio</i>, and if they separated <i>teruma</i>, their <i>teruma</i> is not considered <i>teruma</i>. They are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, and one who separates <i>teruma</i> from produce that is not his; and a gentile who separated <i>teruma</i> from the produce of a Jew, even with his permission, his <i>teruma</i> is not considered <i>teruma</i> because a gentile cannot be appointed as an agent to separate <i>teruma</i>, and all the more so he cannot separate <i>teruma</i> on his own. The deaf-mute and the minor have the same legal status according to the Rabbis; therefore, a dilemma arises as to which of them should receive the pouch on Shabbat.
  What should one do? Should he give it to the deaf-mute because the minor will eventually reach the stage of halakhic intelligence, when he will be obligated to observe the mitzvot, and it is preferable that he not become accustomed to desecrating Shabbat? Or perhaps he should give it to the minor, because if he is allowed to give it to the deaf-mute, onlookers will mistake him for an adult with halakhic intelligence and conclude that it is permitted to give his pouch to an adult? In that case it would be preferable to give the pouch to a minor, as it is clear that he is not obligated in mitzvot. Regarding this <i>halakha</i>, some say that he gives it to the deaf-mute and some say that he gives it to the minor, and no definitive conclusion was reached.
  The Gemara asks: If there is neither a gentile nor a donkey nor a deaf-mute nor an imbecile nor a minor there, what should one do? Rabbi Yitzḥak said: There was another manner of dealing with this situation, and the Sages did not want to reveal it. The Gemara asks: To what was Rabbi Yitzḥak referring when he said: There was another manner? The Gemara answers: The alternative is to move the pouch in increments, each less than four cubits, and thereby carry the object in the public domain without violating a Torah prohibition. The Gemara asks: Why didn’t the Sages want to reveal this alternative? The Gemara answers that it is due to the verse: “It is the glory of God to conceal a thing; but the glory of kings is to search out a matter” (Proverbs 25:2). And here, what glory of God is there in concealing this option? The Gemara answers: If one were to move the pouch in this manner, there is concern lest he come to carry the object four cubits in the public domain.
  The ruling that one should give his pouch to a gentile rather than carry in increments each less than four cubits was among the eighteen decrees issued in accordance with the position of Beit Shammai, enumerated in the first chapter of tractate <i>Shabbat</i>. Sages of later generations disagreed with regard to these eighteen decrees: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: On that day they measured with a large <i>se’a</i> measurement, i.e., they did well to issue these decrees, which construct a fence around the Torah to prevent its violation. Rabbi Yehoshua said: On that very day they measured with a minimal <i>se’a</i>, i.e., because these decrees are difficult to observe, they not only will lead people to violate the decrees, but to violate Torah prohibitions as well.
  It was taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The Sages articulated a parable to illustrate the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. To what is this matter similar? It is similar to a basket full of squash and gourds into which a person places mustard seeds. Just as the basket also holds the mustard, the decree will also endure. They also articulated a parable to illustrate the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua: To what is this matter similar? It is similar to a large bowl full of honey into which one places pomegranates and walnuts. Just as the bowl expels the honey from inside it, so too, the decree will cause Torah prohibitions to be violated.
  We learned in the mishna that the Master said: When there is no gentile with him, one places the pouch on the donkey. The Gemara asks: Isn’t he thereby driving a laden animal? And the Torah stated: “And the seventh day is Shabbat for the Lord your God, you shall not perform any manner of labor, neither you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your slave, nor your maidservant, nor your animal, nor your stranger that is within your gates” (Exodus 20:10). He is causing the prohibited labors of carrying from domain to domain and of carrying in the public domain by placing the pouch on his donkey on Shabbat.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: One places the pouch on the donkey as it is walking, because in doing so he does not commit a full-fledged violation of the Torah prohibition against carrying out from domain to domain on Shabbat. A full-fledged violation consists of lifting and placing the object. Because the animal was already walking when the pouch was placed on it, the animal performed no lifting. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it impossible that the animal will not stand in its place at some point after it begins walking, either in order to urinate or to defecate, and when it begins walking again there is both an act of lifting and an act of placing performed by the donkey. The Gemara answers: There is a solution to that problem. When the donkey is walking, one places the pouch on it, and when it stands, he removes it. The Gemara asks: If so, one could even place the pouch on another Jew as well, as there would be neither lifting nor placing.
  Rav Pappa said: Any action that if one performs it by himself, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it, if he performed it by means of another, he is exempt but it is still prohibited for him to do so. And any action that if performed by means of another, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering but it is still prohibited for him to do so, performing the action by means of his donkey is permitted <i>ab initio</i>.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: One who was traveling on Shabbat eve and his package was resting on his shoulder as night fell, he runs beneath it, i.e., with his package on his shoulder, until he reaches his home. The Gemara infers: Specifically, one runs until he reaches home; however, walking a little bit at a time, no, he may not do so.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Since, when walking in the usual manner, he has no conspicuous reminder that it is Shabbat, there is concern lest he come to perform the acts of lifting and placing by stopping to rest on his way home. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, when he reaches his home, it is impossible that he will not stop and stand a bit, and at that point, he will have performed the prohibited labor of carrying the package from the public domain into the private domain of his house. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case in which he does not place the package in the typical manner when he reaches his home. Rather, he throws it down in an unusual manner. Since he did not perform the action in the typical manner, it is not prohibited by Torah law.
  With regard to the topic of driving a donkey on Shabbat, the Gemara cites that which Rami bar Ḥama said: With regard to one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat, if he does so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he does so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ruling? Rava said that the verse states: “You shall not perform any manner of labor, neither you…nor your animal” (Exodus 20:10). From this he derived: His animal is similar to himself; just as he, if he performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he did so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning, so too, if he performed a prohibited labor by means of his animal, if he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he did so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning.
  Rava said: There are two possible responses with which this statement can be rejected. One is, as it is written: “You shall have one law [<i>Torah</i>] for him that does unwittingly…and for the proselyte who resides among them. But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30). This verse is referring to one who worships idolatry unwittingly. The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idolatry, and from that juxtaposition it is derived: Just as in the case of idolatry one is liable only when he performs an action with his body, i.e., himself, here too, in the case of Shabbat, he is liable only if he performs an action with his body, i.e., himself. He is not liable for an action performed by his animal.
  And furthermore, with regard to the statement that if he drove the laden donkey he is liable to be executed by stoning, we learned in a mishna that enumerates those who are executed by stoning: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. By inference, there is another matter, another prohibition, that for which its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, and for which its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning.
  And what is that Torah prohibition? Is it not the prohibition of driving a laden animal? Apparently, driving a laden animal and other labors performed by means of animals on Shabbat are not punishable by stoning, even though they are prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this second proof. No, this is not necessarily so. It is possible that the mishna is referring to the prohibition of Shabbat limits, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that it is a Torah prohibition but that one is neither liable to bring a sin-offering for violating it unwittingly, nor is he liable to be executed by stoning for violating it intentionally. And likewise, it may refer to the prohibition of kindling a fire on Shabbat in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that it is not punishable by stoning but by lashes, like other prohibitions.
  
  Daf 154a
  
  Rav Zevid taught this as follows. Rami bar Ḥama said: With regard to one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat, if he does so unwittingly, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he does so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning.
  Rava raised an objection based on that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, then for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. The Gemara explains: By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning. This contradicts Rami bar Ḥama’s statement.
  The Gemara answers: Was it taught in the <i>baraita</i>: By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning? The <i>baraita</i> can be understood differently, and this is what it is saying: With regard to a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is always liable to be executed by stoning. However, there is also a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, and nevertheless, for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. And what is that case? It is the case of driving a laden animal.
  Rava, the brother of Rav Mari bar Raḥel, cites a different opinion with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of driving a laden animal on Shabbat, and some say that he was the father of Rav Mari bar Raḥel and stated this <i>halakha</i>. As an aside, the Gemara comments: According to the latter version above, that Rava was the father of Rav Mari bar Raḥel, the fact that Rav needed to validate the status of Rav Mari bar Raḥel and only then appoint him as an official [<i>pursei</i>] of Babylonia is difficult. This incident teaches that Rav Mari bar Raḥel’s father was not Jewish, and before he could be appointed his status required validation through the fact that his mother was Jewish. If Rav Mari bar Raḥel’s father was a sage named Rava, why was it necessary to validate his status by means of his mother’s lineage? The Gemara answers: Perhaps there were two people named Mari bar Raḥel. One was the son of a convert and a Jewish mother, and the other was the son of a Sage named Rava.
  In any event, that Sage taught his <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan to exempt one who drives a laden animal, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who drives a laden animal on Shabbat is exempt from any punishment.
  The Gemara explains: For driving the animal unwittingly, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering because all of the prohibitions in the Torah were juxtaposed to the prohibition of idolatry, from which the principle is derived that one is liable only for actions that he himself performed. And for driving the animal intentionally, he is also not liable to be executed by stoning, as we learned in the mishna: One who desecrates Shabbat by performing a matter that for its unwitting performance one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and for its intentional performance one is liable to be executed by stoning. By inference, for a matter that for its unwitting performance one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, for its intentional performance one is not liable to be executed by stoning.
  And similarly, he is not even liable to be flogged for violating a Torah prohibition for which the punishment is lashes. Even though the Torah explicitly warns against performing labor on Shabbat, it is a prohibition that was fundamentally given, not as a standard prohibition punishable by lashes, but rather as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, and for any prohibition that was given as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, if the death penalty is not imposed for any reason, one is not flogged for its violation.
  
  Daf 154b
  
  And even according to the one who said that one is flogged for violating a prohibition that was given as a warning of court-imposed capital punishment, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to driving a laden animal can be derived by means of an inference from the language of the verse. Let the Torah write: “You shall not perform any manner of labor…and neither shall your animal.” Why do I need the superfluous word you in the phrase: You and your animal? Rather it is to teach that it is he himself who is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat; however, for a prohibited labor performed by his animal, he is not liable.
  We learned in the mishna: Once he reached the outer courtyard, he may untie the ropes that attach his bags to the donkey, and the bags of vessels that may not be moved on Shabbat fall on their own. Rav Huna said: If one’s animal was laden with glass vessels, which would break if he let them fall to the ground, he may bring cushions and blankets and place them beneath the animal and untie the ropes and let the bags fall onto the cushions.
  The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to unload glass vessels in so complicated a manner? Didn’t we learn in the mishna: He takes the vessels that may be moved on Shabbat off the donkey? As glass vessels fall into that category, why not simply remove the glass vessels and then untie the bags?
  The Gemara answers: When Rav Huna stated this <i>halakha</i>, he was referring to the horns of a blood letter, which are not suitable for any other purpose and are therefore set-aside on Shabbat due to prohibition and repulsiveness. The Gemara asks: Isn’t he thereby negating a vessel’s preparedness? Initially, the cushion was available for any use. Since it now has the set-aside vessels on it, the cushion, too, may no longer be moved. The Sages ruled that one may not place a vessel in a circumstance that will render it prohibited to move. The Gemara answers: This mishna is referring to small bundles of glass vessels that will not break if the cushions are subsequently removed from beneath them.
  The Gemara raises an objection based on that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one’s animal was laden with untithed produce and chunks of glass [<i>ashashiot</i>], one unties the ropes and the bags fall on their own, even though they break. Apparently, placing cushions beneath the animal is prohibited. The Gemara answers: There, the <i>baraita</i> is not referring to vessels but rather to chunks [<i>kulsa</i>] of glass that are designated to be broken so that they can be melted and crafted into vessels. The Gemara adds: The language of the <i>baraita</i> is also precise, as it teaches that chunks are similar to untithed produce: Just as untithed produce is not fit for his use, here too, the chunks are also not fit for his use.
  The Gemara explains: And what is the meaning of the phrase: Even though they break? If the mishna is indeed referring to chunks of glass, they are designated to be broken. Rather, lest you say that the Sages were also concerned about a minimal loss, as certainly some small slivers of glass will be lost when the chunks fall and break, the <i>tanna</i> in the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that the Sages did not consider minimal loss a reason significant enough to permit carrying the prohibited glass.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: If one’s animal was loaded with a burden of untithed grain, he may place his head beneath the pile and move it to a different side of the animal, and it falls by itself. The Sages prohibited moving set-aside objects in the typical manner, but there is no concern about doing so in an unusual manner.
  The Gemara relates: Rabban Gamliel’s donkey was laden with honey and he did not want to unload the donkey until the conclusion of Shabbat. At the conclusion of Shabbat, the donkey died of fatigue. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: He takes the vessels that may be moved on Shabbat off the donkey? Why, then, did Rabban Gamliel not unload the honey? The Gemara answers: This is a case where the honey had spoiled. The Gemara asks: For what use is spoiled honey suited? Why did Rabban Gamliel bring it? The Gemara answers: It can be used to rub on the wounds of camels.
  The Gemara asks: And let Rabban Gamliel untie the ropes and the bags will fall on their own. The Gemara answers: It was due to the concern that the jugs containing the honey would crack. The Gemara asks: And let him bring cushions and blankets and place them beneath the jugs. The Gemara answers: He was concerned lest they become soiled and he would thereby negate the vessel’s preparedness, i.e., the cushions and blankets would be rendered unusable. The Gemara asks: Isn’t there the matter of the suffering of a living creature? He should suffer monetary loss rather than cause the animal to suffer. The Gemara answers: Rabban Gamliel holds that causing a living creature to suffer is prohibited not by Torah law but rather by rabbinic law. Therefore, he need not suffer monetary loss due to the rabbinic prohibition (Ramban).
  The Gemara relates: Abaye found Rabba sliding his son on the back of a donkey on Shabbat to entertain him. He said to him: The Master is making use of living creatures on Shabbat, and the Sages prohibited doing so. Rabba said to him: I placed my son on the side of the donkey, and as they are sides, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting making use of them. From where do you say that this is so? As we learned in the mishna: One may untie the ropes and the bags fall on their own. What, is it not referring to a case where one attached the bags by means of <i>guvalaki</i>, where the bags are strapped to the animal and the only way to loosen them involves leaning against the sides of animal in order to unstrap them? That is because it is a case of making use of the sides, and the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting making use of an animal’s sides.
  Abaye answered: No, this is a case where one attached the bags by means of <i>agalavki</i>, i.e., where the bags were not tightly strapped to the animal, but rather attached by means of a hook. In such a case, there is no need to make use of the sides of the animal in order to unhook the strap. Alternatively, the bags were tied to the sides of the animal with a rope, which could likewise be untied with ease and without leaning against the animal.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s opinion based on that which was taught in a mishna: A <i>sukka</i> that had two of its walls on the ground, built by a person, and one wall on a tree is valid and can be used to fulfill the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>. However, one may not enter it on the festival day of <i>Sukkot</i> because it is prohibited to use trees rooted in the ground on Shabbat or a Festival. What, is this not referring to a case where one carved a hole in the tree and inserted a beam into the hole for support, in which case these are sides of the tree that are being used, and apparently, using the sides of the tree is prohibited?
  Rabba rejected this: No, it is referring to a case where one bent the tree over and placed the roofing atop it, as in that case, he is making use of the tree itself and not its sides. Abaye asked: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If there are three walls built by a person and one on a tree, it is a valid <i>sukka</i> and one may enter it on a Festival. And if one bent a tree and placed the roofing atop it, why may one enter it on a Festival?
  Rabba rejected this question: Rather, what would you say? Making use of sides is prohibited. If so, the same problem still exists, why is the <i>sukka</i> fit for use in the latter case? Ultimately, why may one enter it on a Festival? Rather, there it is referring to a case where the branches [<i>gavaza</i>] are spread out and where one made the tree itself into a wall, not where he leaned a wall against it. The language of the mishna is also precise. The wall may not be used if it is an integral part of the <i>sukka</i>, meaning that it is one of the three required walls. However, if it serves as a fourth wall, one may use the <i>sukka</i> on a Festival as it is taught that this is the principle: In any case where if the tree was taken the <i>sukka</i> would still be able to stand, one may enter it on a Festival. Then it is clear that the walls are not leaning against the tree; rather, the tree itself serves as a wall. The Gemara says in summary: Learn from here that this is so.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that these <i>amora’im</i> disagree in a dispute parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to making use of the sides of a tree, as it was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may not enter a <i>sukka</i> whose walls are leaning against a tree on a Festival. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: One may enter it on a Festival. What, is it not that they are disagreeing about this issue, as this Master, meaning the Rabbis, holds that making use of the sides is prohibited, and this Master, Rabbi Meir, holds that they are permitted?
  Abaye said: No. Everyone agrees that the sides are prohibited, and it is with regard to the sides of the sides, i.e., not a wall leaning against the tree itself, but a wall that is supported by a beam that is placed in the hole carved in the tree, that they disagree. This Master, meaning the Rabbis, holds that the sides of the sides are prohibited, and this Master, Rabbi Meir, holds that the sides of the sides are permitted.
  Rava said: The one who prohibited making use of the sides also prohibited making use of the sides of the sides, and the one who permitted making use of the sides also permitted making use of the sides of the sides. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to the opinion of Rava: If one drove
  
  Daf 155a
  
  a stake in a tree and hung a four-by-four handbreadth basket from it into which he placed the food for his joining of the Shabbat boundaries, if the basket was above ten handbreadths from the ground, his <i>eiruv</i> is not a valid <i>eiruv</i>. It is prohibited for him to take the bread from the basket on Shabbat, because the basket’s area and height render it a private domain, and he is standing in a different domain. If the basket was below ten handbreadths from the ground, his <i>eiruv</i> is a valid <i>eiruv</i>.
  The Gemara examines this statement: The reason for this distinction between above and below ten handbreadths is specifically because he drove a stake into a tree and hung the basket from it. However, if he did not drive a stake into a tree, but tied the basket to the tree itself, even if it was below ten handbreadths from the ground his <i>eiruv</i> is not a valid <i>eiruv</i>. If he were to take the bread from the basket he would be making use of the sides of the tree, which is prohibited on Shabbat. And isn’t it the case that this is the <i>tanna</i> who prohibits using the sides of the tree, and nevertheless, he permits using the sides of the sides, contrary to Rava’s opinion?
  Rav Pappa said: Here, we are dealing with a narrow-mouthed basket that is tightly tied to the tree. Since it is difficult to remove anything from it, when he takes the bread for the <i>eiruv</i> he moves the tree, and he is thereby using the sides of the tree itself and not the sides of the sides of the tree. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that use of the sides of a tree or an animal is prohibited on Shabbat, but use of the sides of the sides is permitted.
  Rav Ashi said: Now that you said that the <i>halakha</i> is that use of the sides is prohibited, with regard to this ladder that one climbs to an elevated area, a person may not lean it against the palm tree itself because it is considered use of the sides of the tree on Shabbat. Rather, he should lean it on stakes that are external to the trunk of the palm tree. And when one climbs the ladder, he should not place his foot on the stakes. Rather, he should place it on the rungs of the ladder because it is prohibited to use the sides of the tree.
  MISHNA: One may untie <i>peki’in</i> of grain before an animal on Shabbat, and one may spread the <i>kifin</i> but not the <i>zirin</i>. These terms will be explained in the Gemara. One may not crush hay or carobs before an animal on Shabbat in order to facilitate its eating. He may do so neither for a small animal [<i>daka</i>] nor for a large one. Rabbi Yehuda permits to do so with carobs for a small animal, because it can swallow the hard carobs only with difficulty.
  GEMARA: Rav Huna said: They are called <i>peki’in</i> and they are also called <i>kifin</i>. The difference between them is that <i>peki’in</i> are tied with two knots, whereas <i>kifin</i> are tied with three. <i>Zirin</i>, which may not be moved on Shabbat, are bundles of cedar branches eaten by animals when the branches are small and moist. And this is what the mishna is saying: One may untie <i>peki’in</i> of grain before an animal and spread them, and the same is true for <i>kifin</i>, but not for <i>zirin</i>, which one may neither spread nor untie. Rav Ḥisda said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav Huna? He holds that with regard to exerting oneself with food on Shabbat, one may exert himself; however, with regard to rendering food edible, one may not render it so. Bundles of crops which are fit for animal consumption in their present state may be further prepared on Shabbat. Cedar branches cannot be eaten when bound together; therefore, one may not exert himself to untie them and render them edible on Shabbat.
  Rav Yehuda understood the mishna differently and said: They are called <i>peki’in</i> and they are also called <i>zirin</i>. The difference between them is that <i>peki’in</i> are tied with two knots, whereas <i>zirin</i> are tied with three. <i>Kifin</i> are bundles of cedar branches. And this is what the mishna is saying: One may untie <i>peki’in</i> of grain before an animal; however, with regard to spreading them, no, he may not spread them. And with regard to <i>kifin</i>, one may also spread them. However, that is not the case with regard to <i>zirin</i>, as it is prohibited to spread them, and it is only permitted to untie them. Rava said: What is the reason for Rav Yehuda’s opinion? He holds the opposite of Rav Huna’s opinion. He holds that with regard to rendering food edible, one may render it so; however, with regard to exerting oneself on Shabbat with food that is already in an edible state, one may not exert himself.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not crush hay or carobs before an animal on Shabbat in order to facilitate its eating. He may do so neither for a small animal nor for a large one. Is this not referring to carobs that are similar to hay? Just as it is referring to hay that is soft, so too, it is referring to carobs that are soft. Apparently, we do not exert ourselves with food. Since the carobs are suitable for animal consumption without being crushed, it is prohibited to exert oneself and crush them. And this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna.
  The Gemara answers that Rav Huna could have said to you: No, the mishna is referring to hay that is similar to carobs. Just as it is referring to carobs that are hard, so too, it is referring to hay that is hard and crushing it renders it edible. The Gemara asks: How is it possible to find hay that is so hard that an animal cannot eat it? The Gemara answers: It is referring to young donkeys, that can only eat hay that is crushed well.
  Come and hear a proof from that which we learned in the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda permits crushing carobs for a small animal. The Gemara infers: For a small animal, yes, it is permitted; for a large one, no, it is not permitted. Granted, if you say that the first <i>tanna</i> holds: One may not exert himself with food on Shabbat, but with regard to rendering food edible, one may render food edible, that explains that which Rabbi Yehuda said in response: Feeding carobs to a small animal is also a case of rendering food edible because the animal cannot eat hard carobs. However, if you say that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that with regard to rendering food edible, one may not render food edible on Shabbat, but with regard to exerting oneself with food, one may exert himself, then Rabbi Yehuda, who permits crushing carobs for a small animal, all the more so he should permit crushing carobs for a large one. If carobs are suitable for consumption by a small animal, all the more so are they suitable for consumption by a large animal.
  The Gemara rejects this: Do you hold that the small animal [<i>daka</i>] mentioned here is referring to an actual small animal? No; rather, what is the meaning of <i>daka</i> here? It is referring to a large animal. And what is the reason that the mishna calls it <i>daka</i>? Because it is particular [<i>dayka</i>] about its food. Since this animal can eat uncrushed carobs when there is no alternative, one may exert himself and crush them for it.
  The Gemara asks: From the fact that it is taught in the first clause of the mishna: Neither for a small animal nor for a large animal, it can be inferred that when Rabbi Yehuda said <i>daka</i>, he meant an actual small animal. The Gemara was unable to answer to find an answer to this question and it remains difficult. Nonetheless, Rav Huna’s opinion was not refuted.
  Therefore, come and hear a proof from that which we learned in another mishna: One may chop
  
  Daf 155b
  
  pumpkins before an animal and an animal carcass before dogs. Is this not referring to pumpkins that are similar to an animal carcass? Just as an animal carcass is soft, so too, the pumpkins referred to here are soft. Apparently, one may exert himself with food, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Yehuda. The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda could have said to you: No, the mishna is referring to an animal carcass that is similar to pumpkins. Just as the reference is to pumpkins that are hard, so too, the reference is to an animal carcass that is hard, and chopping it renders it edible. The Gemara asks: And how is it possible to find an animal carcass that is so hard that another animal cannot eat it? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to elephant flesh. Alternatively, it can be explained that the mishna is referring to more common animal meat placed before puppies that can eat only chopped meat.
  Come and hear a proof from that which Rav Ḥanan of Neharde’a taught: One may crumble straw and alfalfa on Shabbat and mix the two together, and the animal then eats the straw because it is mixed with the alfalfa. Apparently, one may exert himself with food on Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the straw mentioned here is rotten straw that requires special preparation to render it suitable for animal consumption, and alfalfa is taught with regard to young donkeys who can only eat it in small pieces.
  MISHNA: One may not forcibly overfeed a camel on Shabbat and one may not force-feed it, even if in doing so he does not overfeed the camel. However, one may place food into its mouth. And the mishna makes a distinction, which will be explained in the Gemara, between two manners of placing food in the mouths of cattle. One may not place food in the mouths of calves on Shabbat in the manner of <i>hamra’a</i>, but one may do so in the manner of <i>halata</i>. And one may force-feed chickens. And one may add water to bran used as animal feed, but one may not knead the mixture. And one may not place water before bees or before doves in a dove-cote, because they are capable of finding their own food; however, one may place water before geese and chickens and before hardisian [<i>hardeisiyyot</i>] doves.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that one may not forcibly overfeed a camel on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is meaning of: One may not forcibly overfeed? Rav Yehuda said: One may not feed a camel to the point that it creates a trough inside of its stomach. The Gemara asks: Is there the possibility of feeding a camel in that manner? The Gemara answers: Yes; and as Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: I saw an Arab who fed his camel a <i>kor</i> of food and loaded it with another <i>kor</i> on its back.
  We learned in the mishna: One may not place food in the mouths of calves on Shabbat in the manner of <i>hamra’a</i>, but one may do so in the manner of <i>halata</i>. The Gemara asks: Which is <i>hamra’a</i> and which is <i>halata</i>? Rav Yehuda said: <i>Hamra’a</i> is positioning food into a place in the animal’s throat from which it cannot return and expel the food. <i>Halata</i> is positioning food into a place in the animal’s mouth from which it can return and expel the food. Rav Ḥisda said: Both this and that refer to positioning food into a place from which the animal cannot return and expel the food; however, the difference between them is that in <i>hamra’a</i> the food is placed with a vessel, whereas in <i>halata</i> the food is placed by hand.
  Rav Yosef raised an objection from that which was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: One may force-feed [<i>mehalketin</i>] chickens, and needless to say, one may <i>malkitin</i>. And one may not <i>malkitin</i> doves in a dove-cote or doves in an attic, and needless to say, one may not force-feed. The Gemara asks: What is <i>mehalketin</i> and what is <i>malkitin</i>? If you say that <i>mehalketin</i> means that one feeds the bird by hand and <i>malkitin</i> means that one throws the food before them, by inference, throwing food before doves in a dove-cote or before doves in an attic is also not permitted. But why would that be prohibited?
  Rather, is it not that <i>mehalketin</i> means positioning food into a place from which the bird cannot return and expel the food, and <i>malkitin</i> means positioning food into a place from which it can return and expel the food? Therefore, <i>mehalketin</i> in the case of birds is similar to <i>halata</i> into a camel’s mouth, which the mishna permitted. By inference, the <i>hamra’a</i> prohibited in the mishna is performed with a vessel, and this poses a conclusive refutation to the opinion of Rav Yehuda.
  Rav Yehuda could have said to you: Actually, <i>mehalketin</i> means that one feeds the bird by hand, and <i>malkitin</i> mean that one throws the food before them. And that which was difficult for you: Is throwing food before doves in a dove-cote or doves in an attic also not permitted on Shabbat? This is not difficult because with regard to these chickens and geese that were mentioned, sole responsibility for their sustenance is incumbent upon you as they are incapable of providing for themselves. However, in the case of these doves, responsibility for their sustenance is not incumbent upon you, and therefore, it is prohibited to place food before them, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may place sustenance before a dog on Shabbat, but one may not place sustenance before a pig. And what is the difference between this and that? In this case of the dog, responsibility for its sustenance is incumbent upon you, and in that case of the pig, responsibility for its sustenance is not incumbent upon you, as no Jew raises pigs.
  Rav Ashi said: The language of the mishna is also precise in support of this explanation, as we learn: And one may not place water before bees or before doves in a dove-cote because they are capable of finding their own food; however, one may place water before geese and chickens and before hardisian doves. What is the reason for this distinction? Is it not because for these, geese and chickens, responsibility for their sustenance is incumbent upon you, and for those, bees and doves, responsibility for their sustenance is not incumbent upon you?
  The Gemara rejects this proof: And according to your reasoning, why did the mishna cite a case specifically involving water? Even wheat and barley should also not be permitted. Rather, the reason for the distinction between the <i>halakhot</i> is that water is different because it is found in a lake or in other reservoirs, and therefore one need not exert himself to provide water for bees and doves. That is not the case with the rest of their food.
  Returning to the discussion of feeding dogs, the Gemara cites additional statements on the topic. Rabbi Yona taught at the entrance to the house of the <i>Nasi</i>: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The righteous man takes knowledge of the cause of the poor” (Proverbs 29:7)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, knows that for a dog, its sustenance is scarce and they are not fed sufficiently. Therefore, its food remains in its intestines for three days so that the dog will be sustained by that food, as we learned in a mishna dealing with the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity: After an animal eats flesh from a corpse, how long does its food remain in its intestines undigested and therefore ritually impure? In the case of a dog it is for three twenty-four hour periods, and for fowl and fish, who digest their food quickly, it is the equivalent of the time it takes for the flesh to fall into the fire and be consumed by the fire.
  Rav Hamnuna said: Learn from it: It is the way of the world, i.e., proper conduct, to throw a piece of meat before a dog, as even the Holy One, Blessed be He, concerns Himself with the dog’s sustenance. The Gemara asks: And how much food should one give to a dog? Rav Mari said: Give it the equivalent of the measure of its ear and strike it immediately thereafter with a staff so that the dog will not grow attached to the one who fed it. This applies specifically when one is in the field, but in the city, one should not give anything to a dog because the dog will be drawn to follow him and remain with him. Rav Pappa said: There is no creature poorer than a dog, and no creature richer than a pig, as pigs will eat anything, and people provide them with plentiful amounts of food.
  With regard to the halakhic ruling, a <i>baraita</i> was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda: What is <i>hamra’a</i> and what is <i>halata</i>? <i>Hamra’a</i> is when a person forcibly lays the animal on the ground and forces its mouth open and feeds it vetch and water simultaneously so that the animal will be unable to expel it. <i>Halata</i> is when one feeds the animal while it is standing and gives it to drink while it is standing, i.e., gives it food and drink in the usual manner, and one gives it vetch separately and water separately, to augment what the animal eats on its own.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may force-feed chickens, and one may add water to bran, but one may not knead the mixture. Abaye said: I said this before my Master, Rabba: Whose opinion is it in the mishna? And he said to me: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one person places flour and another one places water into it, the latter is liable to bring a sin-offering for performing the prohibited labor of kneading. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: One is only liable when he actually kneads the flour and water together. He is not liable for merely adding water to the flour. This is similar to the ruling of the mishna that one may pour water into the bran but may not knead the mixture.
  The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda only stated that actual kneading is required to be liable for performing the prohibited labor of kneading in the case of flour, which can be kneaded; however, in the case of bran, which cannot be kneaded into a dough, even Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda would concede that it is prohibited, even if one does not actually knead the mixture. The Gemara rejects this statement: It should not enter your mind to explain it that way, as it was taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not place water into bran on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: One may place water into bran.
  The Sages taught: On Shabbat, one may not knead sweet flour made from unripe grain that was dried in an oven, and some say: One may knead it. The Gemara asks: Whose is the opinion introduced as: And some say? Rav Ḥisda said:
  
  Daf 156a
  
  It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. And this leniency applies only in a case where one alters the way that he kneads. The Gemara asks: How does one alter the manner in which he kneads? Rav Ḥisda said: One does not knead the dough all at once but rather a little bit at a time.
  It was also taught: And they agree that one may mix the <i>shatit</i>, roasted barley to which honey is added, on Shabbat, and drink Egyptian beer, as it is not considered to be for medicinal purposes. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you say: One may not knead? That contradicts the statement that they agree that it is permitted to stir the <i>shatit</i>. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is a distinction between the cases. This dispute with regard to <i>shatit</i> is referring to mixing a thick mixture, which is similar to kneading. However, that statement where they agree that mixing is permitted is referring to a soft, thin mixture that cannot be kneaded. And all of these statements are referring to a case where one alters the way he kneads or stirs.
  The Gemara asks: How does one alter the manner in which he performs these actions? Rav Yosef said: On a weekday one first places the vinegar in a vessel and then places the <i>shatit</i>. On Shabbat one first places the <i>shatit</i> and then places the vinegar. The Gemara relates that Levi, son of Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya, found the one who kneads in his parents’ home kneading bran on Shabbat and feeding it to his ox. He kicked him so that he would stop. When his father came and found him, he said to him: This is what your mother’s father said in the name of Rav. The Gemara interjects: And who is his mother’s father? It is Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba, who said: One may knead but not feed animals, and a calf that does not take the food with its tongue may be fed on Shabbat. And this applies only when one alters the manner in which he does so.
  The Gemara asks: How does one alter the manner in which he does so? Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya said in the name of Abaye: One moves the ladle or stirring utensil in the directions of warp and woof. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it the case that it will not mix well, so what is the point of stirring it that way? Rav Yehuda said: It means that one pours it into another vessel and in the process it is mixed.
  It was written in Ze’eiri’s notebook: I said before my rabbi, and the Gemara asks: And who is his rabbi? It is Rabbi Ḥiyya. And Ze’eiri said before him: What is the ruling? Is it permitted to knead on Shabbat? He said: It is prohibited. What is the ruling with regard to emptying food from a vessel before one animal to place it before another animal? He said: It is permitted. Rav Menashya said: Placing one trough before one animal or two troughs before two animals, one may well do so. Placing three troughs before two animals is prohibited, because it is considered to be superfluous labor as he is bringing the animals more food than they need. Rav Yosef said: It is permitted to add a <i>kav</i> of additional food or even two <i>kav</i>. Ulla said: One may add a <i>kor</i> or even two <i>kor</i> and there is no need for concern.
  It was written in Levi’s notebook: I said before my rabbi, and the Gemara asks: And who is his rabbi? It is our holy Rabbi, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Levi spoke about the fact that people would knead <i>shatit</i> in Babylonia, and my rabbi, and who is it, our holy Rabbi, cried in protest over the fact that people would knead <i>shatit</i>. And there was no one who listened to him, and he did not have the power to prohibit it due to the people’s reliance on the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who permitted doing so.
  After citing relevant <i>halakhot</i> written in the notebooks of various Sages, the Gemara relates that it was written in Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s notebook: One who was born on the first day of the week, Sunday, will be a person and there will not be one in him.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: There will not be one in him? If you say that there is not one quality for the best, that cannot be, as Rav Ashi said: I was born on the first day of the week, and one cannot say that there was nothing good about him. Rather, it must mean that there is not one quality for the worst. Didn’t Rav Ashi say: I and Dimi bar Kakuzta were both born on the first day of the week. I became a king, the head of a yeshiva, and he became the head of a gang of thieves, clearly a negative quality. Rather, one born on a Sunday is either completely for the best or completely for the worst. What is the reason for this? It is because both light and darkness were created on the first day of Creation.
  One who was born on the second day of the week, Monday, will be a short-tempered person. What is the reason for this? It is because on that day, the second day of Creation, the upper and lower waters were divided. Therefore, it is a day of contentiousness.  One who was born on the third day of the week will be a rich man and a promiscuous person. What is the reason for this? It is because on that day, the third day, vegetation was created. It grows abundantly but is also mixed together without boundaries between the grass and the plants. One who was born on the fourth day of the week will be a wise and enlightened person. What is the reason for this? It is because the heavenly lights were hung in the heavens on that day, and wisdom is likened to light.
  One who was born on the fifth day of the week will be a person who performs acts of kindness. What is the reason for this? It is because on that day the fish and fowl were created, and they do not receive their sustenance by performing work for people. They are sustained by the kindness of God alone. One who was born on the sixth day of the week will be a seeker. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this means that he will be one who seeks out mitzvot, as most of the activity on Friday involves preparation for Shabbat. One who was born on Shabbat will die on Shabbat, because they desecrated the great day of Shabbat on his behalf. Rava bar Rav Sheila said: And he will be called a person of great sanctity because he was born on the sacred day of Shabbat.
  Rabbi Ḥanina said to his students who heard all this: Go and tell the son of Leiva’i, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: It is not the constellation of the day of the week that determines a person’s nature; rather, it is the constellation of the hour that determines his nature. One who was born under the influence of the sun will be a radiant person; he will eat from his own resources and drink from his own resources, and his secrets will be exposed. If he steals he will not succeed, because he will be like the sun that shines and is revealed to all. One who was born under the influence of Venus will be a rich and promiscuous person. What is the reason for this? Because fire was born during the hour of Venus, he will be subject the fire of the evil inclination, which burns perpetually. One who was born under the influence of Mercury will be an enlightened and expert man, because Mercury is the sun’s scribe, as it is closest to the sun. One who was born under the influence of the moon will be a man who suffers pains, who builds and destroys, and destroys and builds. He will be a man who eats not from his own resources and drinks not from his own resources, and whose secrets are hidden. If he steals he will succeed, as he is like the moon that constantly changes form, whose light is not its own, and who is at times exposed and at times hidden. One who was born under the influence of Saturn will be a man whose thoughts are for naught. And some say that everything that others think about him and plan to do to him is for naught.  One who was born under the influence of Jupiter [<i>tzedek</i>] will be a just person [<i>tzadkan</i>]. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And just in this context means just in the performance of mitzvot. One who was born under the influence of Mars will be one who spills blood. Rav Ashi said: He will be either a blood letter, or a thief, or a slaughterer of animals, or a circumciser. Rabba said: I was born under the influence of Mars and I do not perform any of those activities. Abaye said: My Master also punishes and kills as a judge.
  It was stated that Rabbi Ḥanina says: A constellation makes one wise and a constellation makes one wealthy, and there is a constellation for the Jewish people that influences them. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no constellation for the Jewish people that influences them. The Jewish people are not subject to the influence of astrology. And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own reasoning, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that there is no constellation for the Jewish people? As it is stated: “Thus said the Lord: Learn not the way of the nations, and be not dismayed at the signs of heaven; for the nations are dismayed at them” (Jeremiah 10:2). The nations will be dismayed by them, but not the Jewish people.
  And Rav also holds that there is no constellation for the Jewish people, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: From where is it derived that there is no constellation for the Jewish people? As it is stated with regard to Abraham: “And He brought him outside, and said: Look now toward heaven, and count the stars, if you are able to count them; and He said unto him: So shall your offspring be” (Genesis 15:5). The Sages derived from this that Abraham said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, “Behold, You have given me no offspring, and one born in my house is to be my heir” (Genesis 15:3). The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: No. “And, behold, the word of the Lord came to him, saying: This man shall not be your heir; rather, one that will come forth from your own innards shall be your heir” (Genesis 15:4).
  Abraham said before Him: Master of the Universe, I looked at my astrological map, and according to the configuration of my constellations I am not fit to have a son. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: Emerge from your astrology, as the verse states: “And He brought him outside,” as there is no constellation for Israel. What is your thinking?
  
  Daf 156b
  
  Is it because Jupiter is situated in the west that you cannot have children? I will restore it and establish it in the east. And that is the meaning of that which is written with regard to Abraham: “Who has raised up one from the east, he will call justice [<i>tzedek</i>] to his steps [<i>leraglo</i>]. He gives nations before him, and makes him rule over kings; his sword makes them as the dust, his bow as the driven stubble” (Isaiah 41:2). God established Jupiter [<i>tzedek</i>] in the east on behalf of [<i>leraglo</i>] Abraham.
  And from that which transpired to Shmuel, one can also conclude that there is no constellation for the Jewish people. The Gemara relates that Shmuel and the gentile sage Ablet were sitting, and they saw these people were going to the lake. Ablet said to Shmuel: This person will go and he will not return, because a snake will bite him and he will die. Shmuel said to him: If he is a Jew, he will go and come back. As they were sitting for a while, the person they discussed went away and then returned.
  Ablet stood up, threw down the person’s burden, and inside he found a snake cut and cast in two pieces. Shmuel said to him: What did you do to merit being saved from death? The person said to him: Every day we all take bread together and eat from the bread. Today, there was one of us who did not have bread, and when it came time to gather the bread, he was embarrassed because he did not have any to give. I said to the others: I will go and take the bread. When I came to the person who did not have bread, I rendered myself as one who was taking from him so that he would not be embarrassed. Shmuel said to him: You performed a mitzva. Shmuel went out and taught based on this incident that even though it is written: “And charity will save from death” (Proverbs 10:2), it does not only mean that it will save a person from an unusual death but even from death itself.
  And from that which transpired to Rabbi Akiva as well it can be derived that there is no constellation for the Jewish people, as Rabbi Akiva had a daughter, and Chaldean astrologers told him that on the same day that she enters the wedding canopy, a snake will bite her and she will die. She was very worried about this. On that day, her wedding day, she took the ornamental pin from her hair and stuck it into a hole in the wall for safekeeping, and it happened that it entered directly into the eye of the snake. In the morning, when she took the pin, the snake was pulled and came out with it.
  Her father Rabbi Akiva said to her: What did you do to merit being saved from the snake? She told him: In the evening a poor person came and knocked on the door, and everyone was preoccupied with the feast and nobody heard him. I stood and took the portion that you had given me and gave it to him. Rabbi Akiva said to her: You performed a mitzva, and you were saved in its merit. Rabbi Akiva went out and taught based on this incident that even though it is written: “And charity will save from death” (Proverbs 10:2), it does not mean that it will save a person only from an unusual death, but even from death itself.
  And from that which transpired to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak as well it can be derived that there is no constellation for the Jewish people, As Chaldean astrologers told Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s mother: Your son will be a thief. She did not allow him to uncover his head. She said to her son: Cover your head so that the fear of Heaven will be upon you, and pray for Divine mercy. He did not know why she said this to him. One day he was sitting and studying beneath a palm tree that did not belong to him, and the cloak fell off of his head. He lifted his eyes and saw the palm tree. He was overcome by impulse and he climbed up and detached a bunch of dates with his teeth. Apparently, he had an inborn inclination to steal, but was able to overcome that inclination with proper education and prayer.
  MISHNA: One may cut the pumpkins before an animal on Shabbat, as long as they were picked prior to Shabbat. And likewise one may cut an animal carcass before the dogs on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was not already a carcass, i.e., it was not dead, prior to Shabbat, it is prohibited to cut it or even move it on Shabbat because it is not prepared for use on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: A dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the prohibition of set-aside on Shabbat was stated. <i>Ayin</i>, <i>reish</i>, <i>lamed</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>ḥet</i>, <i>zayin</i> is a mnemonic for the names of the <i>amora’im</i> who stated the following <i>halakhot</i>. Ulla said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that there is a prohibition of set-aside on Shabbat. And Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  And Rav also holds that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. From where is it ascertained that this is Rav’s opinion? From that which was taught with regard to the mats that are on ships; Rav prohibited moving them on Shabbat due to the prohibition of set-aside, and Shmuel permitted moving them. And Levi also holds that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as can be seen from his practice when they would bring a slaughtered animal with regard to which there was concern that it was an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], before Levi on a Festival. He would examine it only when he was sitting near a garbage dump, as he said: Perhaps it would not be determined to be kosher and it would not be suited even for dogs, and then it would be prohibited to move the carcass. Apparently, he holds that it is prohibited to move a carcass that was not prepared for use before Shabbat.
  And Shmuel said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the prohibition of set-aside does not apply on Shabbat. And Ze’eiri also holds that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to an animal that died on Shabbat, one may not move it from its place on Shabbat. And Ze’eiri explained: This prohibition only applies to a consecrated animal, as consecrated items may not be fed to dogs in deference to their sanctity; therefore, it is set-aside and may not be moved on Shabbat. However, in the case of a non-sacred animal, one may well move it and use it because it does not have set-aside status. And Rabbi Yoḥanan also said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say that? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with an unattributed mishna, and we learned in a mishna:
  
  Daf 157a
  
  One may chop wood neither from beams set aside for building nor from a beam that broke on a Festival. Apparently, this unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan answered: That mishna is actually in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, which is an individual opinion. Come and hear: One may start a fire on a Festival with a pile of straw but not with wood that is from the wood storage behind one’s house, because that wood is set aside for other uses. Apparently, this is an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the prohibition of set-aside. The Gemara answers: There, the mishna is referring to wood from cedar and fir trees that are set aside due to monetary loss. Even Rabbi Shimon concedes that the prohibition of set-aside is in effect in that case.
  Come and hear a proof from another mishna: One may neither give water to nor slaughter non-domesticated desert animals, animals that are always grazing in the fields. Since people do not generally tend to them, they are considered set-aside and may not be used. Giving them water would ease removal of their hides. However, one may give water to and slaughter domesticated animals. This is apparently an unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan found a different unattributed mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Beit Shammai say: One may lift bones and peels and shells, which are set-aside, from the table on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel say: One must remove the entire board from atop the table and shake it; however, he may not lift the set-aside objects. And Rav Naḥman said to reverse the two opinions, and we have only Beit Shammai in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Beit Hillel in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As the <i>halakha</i> is always ruled in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, this mishna has the authority of an unattributed mishna.
  Rav Aḥa and Ravina disputed this matter. One said: In all of the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat in which there is a tannaitic dispute involving Rabbi Shimon, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, except for the case of an item set aside due to repulsiveness. And what is that case? It is the case of an old oil lamp, which may not be moved on Shabbat, contrary to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. And one said: In the case of an item set aside due to repulsiveness, the <i>halakha</i> is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon except for the case of set aside due to prohibition. And what is that case? It is the case of moving an oil lamp that one kindled for that very Shabbat. However, with regard to an item set aside due to monetary loss, even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited to move that item, as we learned in a mishna according to his position: All vessels may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the blade of a plow, both of which are prohibited. Due to their significance, their owners make certain that they will not be damaged.
  MISHNA: A father or husband may nullify his daughter’s or his wife’s vows on Shabbat, and one may request from a Sage to dissolve vows that are for the purpose of Shabbat. Failure to dissolve the vow will compromise one’s fulfillment of the mitzva to delight in Shabbat. And one may seal a window on Shabbat to prevent light from entering, and one may measure a rag to determine whether or not it is large enough to contract ritual impurity, and one may measure a ritual bath to determine if it contains enough water for immersion. The mishna relates that there was an incident in the time of Rabbi Tzadok’s father and the time of Abba Shaul ben Botnit, in which they sealed a window using an earthenware vessel and tied an earthenware shard with a long reed-grass with a temporary knot, in order to ascertain whether or not the roofing had an opening the size of a handbreadth. And from their statements and their actions, we derived that one may seal a window, and measure, and tie a knot on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that it is permitted to nullify vows and to request that Sages dissolve vows for the purpose of Shabbat. In an attempt to understand the mishna, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is nullification of vows on Shabbat permitted both for the purpose of Shabbat and when it is not for the purpose of Shabbat? And the request to dissolve vows, when it is for the purpose of Shabbat, yes, it is permitted, but when it is not for the purpose of Shabbat, no, it is prohibited? And is it due to that distinction that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna separated the cases from each other and listed them separately?
  Or perhaps with regard to nullification of vows on Shabbat as well, when it is for the purpose of Shabbat, yes, it is permitted, but when they are not for the purpose of Shabbat, no, it is prohibited; and the fact that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna separated the cases from each other and listed them separately is due to the fact that for nullification one does not require a court, and a husband or father can nullify a woman’s vows on his own, but for the request to dissolve vows one requires a court.
  Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from that which the Sage, Zutei, of the school of Rav Pappa taught: One may nullify vows on Shabbat for the purpose of Shabbat. Apparently, when the nullification is for the purpose of Shabbat, yes, it is permitted to nullify vows, but when it is not for the purpose of Shabbat, no, it is prohibited.
  The Gemara cites another version of the dilemma that was raised before the Sages. Was the phrase: When they are for the purpose of Shabbat, taught about both of them, and nullification is only permitted for the purpose of Shabbat, but when it is not for the purpose of Shabbat, no, it is prohibited? If so, apparently, nullification of vows may be performed for an entire twenty-four hour period after hearing the vow, and the father or husband can wait until after Shabbat to nullify the vow if he does not need to do so for the purpose of Shabbat. Or perhaps when the mishna taught that it is permitted when the nullification is for the purpose of Shabbat, that was taught only with regard to the request to dissolve that which was prohibited by the vow, but nullification of vows may be performed on Shabbat even when it is not for the purpose of Shabbat. If so, apparently nullification of vows may be performed only for the entire day that the husband or father heard the vow. Once Shabbat concludes, the vow may no longer be nullified. Therefore, even vows whose nullification is not for the purpose of Shabbat may be nullified on Shabbat.
  Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from that which the Sage, Zutei, of the school of Rav Pappa taught: One may nullify vows on Shabbat for the purpose of Shabbat. Apparently, when the nullification is for the purpose of Shabbat, yes, it is permitted to nullify vows, but when it is not for the purpose of Shabbat, no, it is prohibited. If so, apparently nullification of vows may be performed for the entire twenty-four hour period after hearing the vow.
  Rav Ashi said: Didn’t we learn in a mishna that one may nullify vows for the entire day, and there is both a leniency and a stricture in this matter to extend or curtail the period during which the vow may be nullified. How so? If the woman vowed on Shabbat evening, her father or husband may nullify the vow on Shabbat evening and on Shabbat day until dark. However, if she vowed before Shabbat at nightfall, her father or husband may only nullify the vow until nightfall, as if he did not nullify the vow before nightfall, he can no longer nullify it because the day ended. The Gemara answers that this issue is subject to a tannaitic dispute, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may nullify vows for the entire day. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: For a twenty-four hour period.
  We learned in the mishna: And one may request from a Sage to dissolve vows on Shabbat. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is this only permitted when one did not have time to request to have the vow dissolved before Shabbat, or perhaps it is permitted even if one had time before Shabbat to request to have his vow dissolved? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the fact that the Sages attended to Rav Zutra, the son of Rav Zeira, and dissolved his vow even though he had time to request its dissolution before Shabbat.
  The mishna related: They sealed a window using an earthenware vessel and tied an earthenware shard with a long reed-grass. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said in explanation: There was a small alleyway [<i>heilketei</i>] between two houses, and there was ritual impurity imparted by a corpse there in the alleyway,
  
  Daf 157b
  
  and there was a cracked roofing placed atop the two houses. If the roofing was intact it would have the legal status of a tent over a corpse, rendering everything in the alleyway, and, through the windows, everything in the houses, ritually impure. However, since the roofing was cracked and the corpse was directly beneath the opening, if the opening was the size of a handbreadth or more, the entire alleyway and the houses would not become impure. Only the area directly over the corpse extending through the opening is impure. And that is the reason that they sealed the window of the house with an earthenware vessel, so that the ritual impurity would not enter the houses, and they tied an earthenware shard with a long reed-grass inserted into the opening in the roofing in order to ascertain whether or not there is an opening there in the roofing the size of a handbreadth.
  The mishna concludes: And from their statements and their actions, we derived that one may seal a window, and measure, and tie a knot on Shabbat. The Gemara relates: Ulla happened to come to the house of the Exilarch. He saw Rabba bar Rav Huna sitting in a tub [<i>avna</i>] of water and measuring it. He said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: Say that the Sages said that it is permitted to measure on Shabbat only a measurement for a mitzva. However, with regard to a measurement like this one, which is not for a mitzva, did they say that it is permitted? Rabba bar Rav Huna said to him: I am merely acting unawares and am not at all interested in the measurements. Therefore, it is not prohibited.