meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Kodashim/Zevachim/English/William Davidson Edition - English.txt"}
text: Zevachim
  זבחים
  William Davidson Edition - English
  
  
  Zevachim
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNA: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake, i.e., during the slaughtering the slaughterer’s intent was to sacrifice a different offering, are fit, and one may continue their sacrificial rites and partake of their meat where that applies. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who is therefore required to bring another offering. This is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. In those cases, if the owner sacrificed them not for their own sake, they are unfit. But there is a difference between the two exceptions. The Paschal offering is unfit only when sacrificed not for its sake at its appointed time, on the fourteenth day of Nisan after noon, while the sin offering is unfit any time that it is sacrificed not for its sake.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. According to his opinion, the correct reading of the mishna is: The Paschal offering is unfit only at its appointed time, while the sin offering and the guilt offering are unfit at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said in explanation: The sin offering is brought for performance of a transgression and the guilt offering is brought for performance of a transgression. Just as a sin offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
  Yosei ben Ḥoni says: Not only are the Paschal offering and the sin offering unfit when slaughtered not for their sake, but also other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a sin offering are unfit.
  Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose level of sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.
  How so? Offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., sin offerings and burnt offerings, that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., peace offerings, are unfit. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit. Likewise, there is a distinction between different offerings of lesser sanctity. The firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe are unfit.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> using the language: But they did not [<i>ella shelo</i>] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [<i>velo</i>] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word: But [<i>ella</i>], add?
  The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency with regard to these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, but they retain their sanctity, and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of their sacrificial process, i.e., the remaining rites must be performed with proper intent.
  And this <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its sake.
  The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement, and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, i.e., in its slaughter, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.
  And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [<i>nadarta</i>] freely [<i>nedava</i>] to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words <i>nadarta</i> and <i>nedava</i> exegetically: Can this verse be referring to a gift offering [<i>nedava</i>]?
  
  Daf 2b
  
  It is already referred to as a vow offering [<i>neder</i>]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you vowed to do, i.e., you sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; and if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering unrelated to the vow, and shall not satisfy the obligation of your vow.
  The Gemara concludes: And is it permitted to deviate from protocol in the sacrifice of a gift offering <i>ab initio</i>? Clearly it is not. Evidently, even if one of the sacrificial rites was performed for the sake of sacrificing a different offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of the other sacrificial rites in the incorrect manner.
  § Ravina said to Rav Pappa: Since you were not with us last night within the Shabbat limit of Bei Ḥarmakh, you did not hear that Rava raises a contradiction between two superior mishnaic statements and teaches their resolution.
  What are these superior statements? We learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rava infers: The reason they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner is specifically that they were slaughtered not for their sake. But if offerings were slaughtered without specification of intent, they, as well, satisfied the obligation of the owner. Apparently, if one performs any action without specification of intent, it is also considered as if he performed it expressly for its sake.
  And Rava raises a contradiction from another mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman in question is not valid. And it is derived from the continuation of that mishna that if a bill of divorce was written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is also not valid.
  And Rava resolves the contradiction: Ordinary slaughtered offerings stand designated for their own sake. From the time that the offering is consecrated, its presumed end is that it will be slaughtered for the type of offering for which is was consecrated. Therefore, even if the one slaughtering it has no particular intention, it is in effect considered slaughtered for its own sake. By contrast, an ordinary wife does not stand designated for divorce. Therefore, a bill of divorce is never presumed to be referring to a given woman unless it is specified explicitly.
  § The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that slaughtered offerings are fit and even satisfy the obligation of the owner if slaughtered without specification? If we say it is from that which we learned in the mishna: All slaughtered offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and it does not teach this using the language: All slaughtered offerings that were not slaughtered for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, this cannot be. One cannot infer from this language that slaughter without specification is valid, since the Mishna also teaches with regard to a bill of divorce: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it does not teach: That was not written for the sake of the woman is not valid, and it is a given that a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid.
  Rather, perhaps it is derived from that which we learned in a mishna (13a): How are offerings slaughtered for their sake and then not for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and then for the sake of a peace offering. The Gemara infers: The reason such an offering is unfit is that he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering and then he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering. But if he says that he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering, and then slaughters it without specification, it is fit. Apparently, slaughtering an offering without specification is considered as if one slaughtered it for its sake.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that anyone who performs an action performs it with his original intent in mind. Therefore, since he specified initially that he was slaughtering the offering for the sake of a Paschal offering, there are no grounds to assume that he then changed his mind. Here, by contrast, he pronounced no initial statement of proper intent.
  Rather, perhaps this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the latter clause of that mishna: How are offerings slaughtered not for their sake and then for their sake? For example, one might slaughter the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and then for the sake of a Paschal offering. The Gemara infers: The reason it is unfit is that he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a peace offering and then he says he is slaughtering it for the sake of a Paschal offering. But if he started slaughtering it without specification and then slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering, it is fit. Apparently, if one slaughters an offering without specification it still satisfies the obligation of the owner.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the mishna is saying that his ultimate intent proves the nature of his original intent. Since his ultimate intent was to sacrifice a Paschal offering, that was presumably his original intent as well. Here, by contrast, there is no ultimate expression of proper intent.
  Alternatively, it can be explained that even if one’s ultimate intent is not considered proof of his original intent, the mishna still uses the same term in both clauses to preserve symmetry. Since in the former clause the <i>tanna</i> taught using the language: For their sake and then not for their sake, teaching that original intent is considered proof of ultimate intent, the <i>tanna</i> also taught the second clause using the language: Not for their sake and then for their sake. In any event, there is no proof from that mishna that an offering slaughtered without specification satisfies its owner’s obligation.
  Rather, perhaps this <i>halakha</i> is derived from that mishna (46b), which states: The offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular offering; for the sake of the one sacrificing the offering, i.e., the owner; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of sacrificing it in a manner that gives an aroma; and for the sake of pleasing God. And the sin offering and a guilt offering are slaughtered for the sake of atonement for the sin.
  The mishna on 46b continues: Rabbi Yosei said: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, since this is a stipulation of the court. The Gemara explains Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: The court stipulated that one should not say that he is slaughtering the offering for its sake, lest he come to say that he is slaughtering it not for its sake. Therefore one should not specify his intent at all.
  The Gemara infers: And if it enters your mind that if one slaughters an offering without specification it is unfit, would the court arise and stipulate a matter that disqualifies the offering? Clearly, an offering slaughtered without specification is fit and satisfies the obligation of the owner.
  § The Gemara asks: And with regard to a bill of divorce, from where do we derive that if it is written without specification as to which woman it is referring, it is not valid?
  If we say it is inferred from that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 24a): In the case of a man who was passing through the marketplace, and he heard scribes who write bills of divorce dictating to their students: The man so-and-so divorces so-and-so from the place of such and such, and the man said: This is my name and that is the name of my wife, and he desires to use this bill for his divorce, this bill is unfit to divorce his wife with it, that is not a proof.
  It can be explained: Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rav Pappa. As Rav Pappa says: Here we are dealing with scribes who are wont to practice writing bills of divorce; and this bill of divorce is a draft and was not written for the sake of severance, i.e., divorce, at all. But if a bill of divorce is written to be used for divorce, perhaps it is fit even if written without specifying the woman in question.
  Rather, derive this <i>halakha</i> from the subsequent clause in that mishna:
  
  Daf 3a
  
  Moreover, if a husband wrote a bill of divorce with which to divorce his wife but later reconsidered, and a resident of his town found him and said to him: My name is the same as your name, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s name, and we reside in the same town; give me the bill of divorce and I will use it, the bill of divorce is unfit for the second man to divorce his wife with it. Evidently, even if the bill of divorce was written to be used for divorce, if it was not written specifically for the given woman it is not valid.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated For the sake of that man’s divorce, and therefore it is not valid for the second man’s divorce. But a bill of divorce that was written without specification might be valid if written for the sake of divorce.
  Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he has two wives whose names are identical, and he wrote a bill of divorce to divorce the older one, and then reconsidered, he may not divorce the younger one with it. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written specifically to divorce a specific wife.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as the bill of divorce was specifically designated for the sake of the divorce of that other wife.
  Rather, derive it from the subsequent clause in that mishna: Moreover, if he said to the scribe [<i>lalavlar</i>]: Write a bill of divorce for one of my two wives who have identical names, and I will use it to divorce whichever one of them that I want, this bill of divorce is unfit to divorce either wife with it. Evidently, it must be written for the divorce of a specific woman.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps there it is different, as there is no retroactive designation. The designation of the bill of divorce cannot be determined retroactively. It cannot be used for either wife because it was possibly written for the sake of the other wife. But a bill of divorce written without specification may be valid.
  Rather, derive it from that mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 26a): With regard to a scribe who writes the standard part of [<i>tofesei</i>] bills of divorce in advance, so that when one requests a bill of divorce, he will have to add only the details unique to the case, he must leave empty the place of the name of the man, and the place of the name of the woman, and the place of the names of the witnesses, and the place of the date. And in addition, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A scribe must also leave the place of the essential phrase: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, since it must be written for the sake of that specific woman. Evidently, a bill of divorce must be written for a specific husband and wife, and if not it is not valid, even if it was written for the sake of divorce.
  § Ravina continued to inform Rav Pappa of Rava’s statements: Rava further raises another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered the animal for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, it is fit? Apparently, only improper intent that is of its type, i.e., for the sake of another offering, ruins the offering and renders it unfit, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type, i.e., for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, is disregarded and does not ruin it.
  And Rava raises a contradiction from the aforementioned mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 24a): Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman who is being divorced with it is not valid; and by inference, even if it was written for the sake of a gentile woman, it is not valid. With regard to the matter of divorce, a gentile woman is not of the same type as a Jewish woman, as the <i>halakhot</i> of bills of divorce are irrelevant to her.
  And Rava resolves the contradiction: If a bill of divorce is written for the sake of a gentile woman it is not valid, because if you remove the intent for the sake of a gentile woman from it, it is considered to be without specification of the woman who is divorced with it, and a bill of divorce written without specification is not valid. But if sacrificial animals are slaughtered for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, they remain fit, since if you remove the non-sacred intent from them, they are considered to be without specification, and offerings slaughtered without specification are fit.
  § And Rava raised another contradiction: Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat it is fit? Apparently, he holds that only improper intent that is of its type ruins it, whereas wrong intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to ritually impure carcasses of creeping animals: “And every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls, anything that is in its interior shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33). From the word “interior” it is derived that only food in its interior is rendered impure, but not any food that is in the interior of its interior, i.e., in another vessel within the earthenware vessel. And this is the <i>halakha</i> not only if the inner vessel is an earthenware vessel; even if it is a metal or wooden vessel, which is purified though rinsing in a ritual bath and is therefore susceptible to impurity from its exterior, it nevertheless protects food that is inside it from being rendered impure. Evidently, even a vessel that is not of the same type serves to nullify the status of the interior of an earthenware vessel.
  And Rava resolves the contradiction as follows: A vessel purified through rinsing is actually considered of the same type as an earthenware vessel, since they are both vessels. Concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of impurity, the equivalent of intent with regard to the consumption of non-sacred meat is an item that is not a vessel at all; the Sages rendered non-sacred meat with regard to sacrificial animals like a partition with regard to an earthenware oven: Just as a partition in an oven is not effective at all in preventing the transmission of impurity from one side to the other since it is not a vessel, so too, slaughtering an offering for the consumption of non-sacred meat is not effective at all with regard to rendering sacrificial animals unfit.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 8:1): In the case of an oven that one divided with boards or with curtains, and the carcass of a creeping animal was found in one place, all of the food in the oven, including that on the other side of the partition, is rendered impure.
  The mishna continues: In the case of a round barrel that is broken and plugged up with straw and lowered into the airspace of the oven, if the carcass of a creeping animal is inside the barrel, the oven is rendered impure. And if the carcass of a creeping animal is in the oven, the food that is inside the barrel is rendered impure. The broken barrel is not considered a vessel despite its being plugged up with straw, and therefore it does not prevent the transmission of impurity between the creeping animal and the oven. And Rabbi Eliezer deems the food in the barrel pure.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Eliezer said: My opinion can be inferred <i>a fortiori</i>: If a barrel or any other partition between some item and a corpse under the same roof protects the item from becoming impure, even though impurity imparted by a corpse is severe in that it lasts seven days, shouldn’t a partition protect food in the airspace of an earthenware vessel from impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal, which is mild by comparison?
  The mishna continues: The Rabbis said to him: Your inference is not correct.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  If a partition protects an item from impurity imparted by a corpse, which is severe, this is only because such impurity is unique in that it is imparted to that which is in the same tent, i.e., under the same roof, and tents are divided by partitions. If so, should a partition protect food from impurity imparted in an earthenware vessel, which, although mild, is not divided by partitions, like tents are?
  The Gemara notes: The comparison between non-sacred meat vis-à-vis offerings and a partition in an earthenware vessel works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a partition does not prevent transmission of impurity inside an earthenware vessel. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that a partition is effective in an earthenware oven, what can be said? How is this compatible with the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type?
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer agrees with this principle. Yet he says that a partition in an earthenware vessel is effective due to his <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which overrides the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type.
  The Gemara challenges: If that is so, that an <i>a fortiori</i> inference overrides this principle, let us say an <i>a fortiori</i> inference there as well, with regard to a sin offering that was slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat: If slaughtering sacrificial animals for the sake of other sacrificial animals desecrates those sacrificial animals, all the more so is it not clear that slaughtering them for the consumption of non-sacred meat desecrates them?
  The Gemara responds: Rather, the reasoning behind the statement of Rav that a sin offering slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat is fit is not in accordance with this principle at all, but it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reasoning behind the statement of Rav? The verse: “And they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:15), teaches that only improper intentions for the sake of sacred items, i.e., offerings, desecrate sacred items, but non-sacred intent does not desecrate sacred items.
  The Gemara notes: Apparently, an inference from a verse can come to rule out a conflicting <i>a fortiori</i> inference. If so, here too, with regard to a partition in an oven, let the verse “and every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls” come to rule out Rabbi Eliezer’s <i>a fortiori</i> inference that a partition prevents food in an oven from becoming impure.
  The Gemara responds: This expression: “Whose interior,” does not indicate that a partition is ineffective, as it is necessary to teach another <i>halakha</i>, namely, that food that one kneaded with clay, covering it from all sides, and put in the airspace of an oven that had the carcass of a creeping animal in it is impure. Because it might enter your mind to say that since the food cannot become impure by touching an impure item, as the clay serves as an interposition, it also cannot become impure by being put in the airspace of an impure oven. The phrase “in whose interior any of them falls” teaches us that the food does contract impurity.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, who apparently do interpret the verse as teaching that a partition is ineffective in preventing the contracting of impurity in an earthenware vessel, how do they derive that food covered with clay and placed in an impure oven is impure? The Gemara answers: These matters do not need a verse to teach them. Such food has the same status as any other food in an impure oven, and the <i>halakha</i> therefore is self-evident.
  § Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction between Rav’s statement with regard to deviation with regard to the type of offering, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of a different type of offering, and Rav’s statement with regard to deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of someone other than the offering’s owner, and he then resolves the contradiction.
  The contradiction is as follows: Did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering, i.e., one that the owner is obligated to bring for a different transgression, is fit, but that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit? Apparently, slaughtering an offering with an improper intention not of its type ruins it; whereas intent that is of its type does not ruin it.
  But doesn’t Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not its owner but who nevertheless is obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins the offering, whereas intent not of its type does not ruin it.
  And he resolves the contradiction as follows: There, with regard to deviation from the type of offering, the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). And here a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit.
  Here, concerning deviation with regard to the owner, it is written in the Torah concerning a sin offering: “And he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that specifically he, the owner, but not another person, shall be forgiven. Therefore, if a sin offering is slaughtered for the sake of another person, it is unfit. The other person to whom this is referring is presumably similar to him, the owner of the sin offering, in that he is obligated to make atonement similar to that of the owner. Therefore, if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.
  § Rav Ḥaviva raises a contradiction between Rav’s statement concerning deviation with regard to the owner and the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> concerning the interior of its interior, i.e., a vessel placed in an earthenware vessel, and resolves the contradiction.
  The contradiction is as follows: But did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who is also obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins it, whereas intent that is not of its type does not ruin it.
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if the carcass of a creeping animal is found inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel’s interior is rendered impure but not the interior of its interior, and even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from contracting impurity? Evidently, impurity in the airspace of an earthenware vessel can be contained by something not of its type.
  And Rav Ḥaviva resolves the contradiction as follows: The expression: Whose interior [<i>tokho</i>], is written four times. In other words, in the verse: “And every earthen vessel into whose interior [<i>tokho</i>] any of them falls, anything that is in its interior [<i>tokho</i>] shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33), the word <i>tokho</i> is mentioned twice, and each time, the verse could have written: The interior. Since the possessive: Its, is added to each instance, the verse is interpreted exegetically as though the word interior [<i>tokh</i>] were mentioned four times: Interior [<i>tokh</i>], whose interior [<i>tokho</i>], interior [<i>tokh</i>], and its interior [<i>tokho</i>].
  One of these is necessary to teach the matter itself, that an im-pure earthenware vessel imparts impurity to food in its airspace; and one instance is used for a verbal analogy between the two instances of the word interior, from which it is derived that an earthenware vessel itself contracts impurity from impure items in its airspace.
  One indicates that the interior airspace of this, i.e., an earthenware vessel, renders food impure, but not the interior of another type of vessel, which imparts impurity only through contact; and the other instance indicates that its interior, but not the interior of its interior, imparts impurity, and that even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from becoming impure. Consequently, it is derived from a verse that inside an earthenware vessel, other vessels not of its type can block the transmission of impurity. Since this halakha is derived from a verse written in that context, there is no reason to assume that a similar <i>halakha</i> would apply to slaughter.
  
  Daf 4a
  
  § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that we require that an offering’s slaughter be performed for its own sake? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if his offering is a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings” (Leviticus 3:1), teaching that slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps when the verse states: “A sacrifice of peace offerings,” “a sacrifice of peace offerings” is simply the name of this type of offering, and is not referring to intent of the one slaughtering it.
  The Gemara answers: From the fact that it is written in other verses: “Who offers the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:33), and: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14), and the term: A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>], is not written, whereas here, in this verse, the term: “A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings,” is written, learn from it that the slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the offering being sacrificed. From where do we derive that the other sacrificial rites, i.e., collecting the blood, conveying it to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar, must also be performed for the sake of the offering?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from the fact that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the offering that the other sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of the offering as well, this derivation can be refuted, as slaughter has a unique element of stringency: What is unique about slaughter? It is unique in that with regard to a Paschal offering, the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered not for the sake of those who eat it. If the Paschal offering is slaughtered for the sake of people who are incapable of eating it, such as one who is too ill to eat, it is disqualified. By contrast, performing other rites with this intent does not disqualify the offering. Therefore, one cannot assume that a <i>halakha</i> that applies to slaughter applies to other rites as well.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “Who sacrifices [<i>hamakriv</i>] the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:33), referring to the one who collects the blood of the offering, as the Gemara will explain. This phrase indicates that the collection of the blood must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.
  The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write this <i>halakha</i> in the Torah only with regard to the collection of the blood, and we would derive from it that slaughter must also be performed for the sake of the offering.
  The Gemara answers: Because such a derivation can be refuted as follows: What is unique about collection of the blood? It is unique in that it is not valid if performed by a non-priest or a woman, whereas slaughter can be performed by any competent Jew. Therefore, one cannot assume that a <i>halakha</i> that applies to collection applies to slaughter as well.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that slaughter and collection of the blood must be performed for the sake of the offering. From where do we derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the sprinkling of the blood as well?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from these rites, i.e., slaughter and collection, that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the sprinkling of the blood as well, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about these rites? They are unique in that for offerings of the most sacred order, it is required that they be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, these rites are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as standard sin offerings. The sprinkling of the blood on the external altar, by contrast, is performed in all portions of the Temple courtyard, and it is not performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, whose blood is sprinkled only in the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14), indicating that the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.
  The Gemara challenges: And let the Merciful One write this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to sprinkling, and we would derive from it that it applies to slaughter and collection as well.
  The Gemara answers: That would not be sufficient, because such a derivation can be refuted, as sprinkling has a unique element of stringency. What is unique about sprinkling? It is unique in that a non-priest is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to all four rites save conveying the blood to the altar. From where do we derive that this latter rite must also be performed for the sake of the offering?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from all the other rites that conveying the blood must also be performed for the sake of the offering, this derivation can also be refuted: What is unique about all of the other rites? They are unique in that each of them is an indispensable rite. Would you say that any requirement that applies to those rites necessarily applies also with regard to conveying the blood, which is dispensable? If an offering is slaughtered by the side of the altar, it is unnecessary to convey its blood to the altar.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “And the priest shall sacrifice [<i>vehikriv</i>] the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13), and the Master said that this is referring to conveying the limbs of the offering to the ramp of the altar. And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present [<i>vehikrivu</i>] the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), that this is referring to the collection of the blood. And one can infer that the Merciful One expresses collection of the blood in the same language used for conveying, to say that you should not exclude conveying from the category of collection of the blood. Therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of collection apply to conveying.
  The Gemara asks further: And we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning deviation with regard to the type of offering, i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different type of offering. From where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., that an offering may not be slaughtered for the sake of one who is not the owner?
  Rav Pinḥas, son of Rav Ami, says: The verse states with regard to a thanks offering: “And the meat of the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of his thanksgiving peace offering shall be eaten on the day of his offering” (Leviticus 7:15), apparently indicating that its slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be performed for the sake of a thanks offering. And if this language is not needed for the matter of deviation with regard to the type of offering, and in fact it is not, as we already derived this <i>halakha</i> from there, i.e., the verse cited concerning peace offerings, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner. It is thereby derived that an offering must be slaughtered for the sake of its owner.
  The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the phrase “and the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering,” Abba Ḥanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit; whereas a peace offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. What is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in that verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.
  The Gemara answers: We are saying that it is derived from the superfluous term: “Sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],” that the slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be performed for the sake of the owner. The term “peace offering” teaches Abba Ḥanin’s ruling.
  The Gemara disputes this: But the term “sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>]” is still necessary to serve as the source for another halakhic midrash: From where is it derived that the meat of a sin offering and a guilt offering may be eaten only on the day the animal is sacrificed and the following night, like a thanks offering? The verse states: “And the meat of the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of his thanksgiving peace offering shall be eaten on the day of his offering.” The phrase teaches that not only thanks offerings, but any slaughtered offering [<i>zevaḥ</i>] is subject to this time limit unless the Torah specifies otherwise.
  The Gemara answers: If that were so, i.e., if the term “sacrifice” indicated only that a sin offering and a guilt offering may be eaten only for the period of time for which a thanks offering may be eaten, let the verse write: And the meat of his thanksgiving peace offering sacrifice. What is indicated by the mention of the word sacrifice before the phrase “his thanksgiving peace offering”? Rather, conclude two conclusions from it.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the owner. From where do we derive that the other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter that the other rites must be performed for the sake of the owner as well, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about slaughter? It is unique in that with regard to a Paschal offering, slaughter not for the sake of those who eat it disqualifies the offering, whereas performing the other rites not for the sake of the owner does not.
  The Gemara answers: A term of slaughter is stated with regard to deviation from the type of offering, and a term of slaughter is stated with regard to deviation with regard to the owner. Just as concerning the term slaughter stated with regard to deviation from the type of offering, you did not differentiate between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites, and all four rites must be performed for the sake of the offering, so too, concerning the term slaughter stated with regard to deviation in the context of the owner, you should not differentiate between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites.
  The Gemara counters: This derivation can be refuted: What is unique about deviation from the type of offering, as opposed to deviation with regard to the owner? It is unique with regard to four matters: First, it is unique in that its disqualification concerns the essence of the offering itself. And second, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering applies to the four sacrificial rites, whereas performing a rite for the sake of the owner is relevant only to the sprinkling of the blood, which atones for the owner.
  And third, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering applies even after the death of the owner, when the owner’s heir brings the offering, whereas intent for the sake of the owner is irrelevant after the owner has died. And fourth, it is unique in that deviation from the type of offering applies with regard to communal offerings as well as with regard to individual offerings, whereas employing the term owner is irrelevant with regard to communal offerings, which are owned by the public.
  
  Daf 4b
  
  And although two of these distinctions are not precise, the other two are in any event precise distinctions, based upon which a distinction can be drawn.
  The Gemara explains why two of the distinctions are not precise: What is different about deviation with regard to the owner, such that its disqualification does not concern the offering itself? It is that this merely constitutes a change of thought. Deviation from the type of offering is also merely a change of thought; the offering is not physically affected. Rather, this distinction between deviation with regard to the owner and deviation from the type of offering is false; one should claim that if deviation from the type of offering disqualifies it once the one who slaughtered it had that intent, here too, once the one who slaughtered it had intent to deviate from its owner, he disqualified it.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty with the second distinction, the case where the owner died: And according to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Mari, who says that disqualification by deviation with regard to the owner applies even after the owner’s death, there is no distinction in this regard between deviation from the type of offering and deviation with regard to the owner. In any event, there are two remaining distinctions based on which the comparison between a deviation from the type of offering and a deviation with regard to the owner can be refuted.
  Rather, Rav Ashi says that the <i>halakha</i> that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from a verse. The verse states: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4), teaching that the sacrificial rite that atones for the owner, namely, the sprinkling of the blood, must be performed specifically for him, and not for another.
  The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? Isn’t it necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the verse: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him [<i>alav</i>],” Rabbi Shimon says: This indicates that in a case where one consecrated an animal as an offering and it died or was lost, if it was initially incumbent upon him [<i>alav</i>] to bring an offering, i.e., if he had accepted upon himself a personal obligation to bring an offering, he bears responsibility for it, i.e., he is obligated to bring another offering in its stead. But if it was not incumbent upon him [<i>alav</i>] to bring an offering, i.e., if he consecrated a specific animal without accepting upon himself any personal obligation, he does not bear responsibility for it if it dies or is lost.
  And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: What is the reasoning behind this distinction? Once a person said: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering, it is considered as though the offering is loaded upon his shoulders. He does not discharge his obligation until he brings some offering.
  The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi says that the <i>halakha</i> that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from the phrase “And it shall be accepted for him,” not from the term “for him,” on which the <i>baraita</i> is based.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that slaughter and the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for the sake of the owner. From where do we derive that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from slaughter and sprinkling that collection must also be performed for the sake of the owner, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about slaughter and sprinkling? They are unique in that each is a rite for which one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven if he performs it outside the Temple.
  Rather, Rav Ashi says that the <i>halakha</i> that the collection of the blood must also be performed for the sake of the owner is derived from the case of a nazirite’s ram. As it is written: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings unto the Lord” (Numbers 6:17), indicating that its offering should be performed for the sake of a peace offering. And if the verse is not necessary for the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as we derived that from there, i.e., the verses cited earlier (4a), apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner. It is thereby derived that its sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of its owner.
  Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rava, in objection to this derivation: Say that the term: “Shall offer,” is a generalization and: “A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],” is a detail. According to the principles of biblical hermeneutics, where there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only that which is specified in the detail. Accordingly, slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>], yes, must be performed for the sake of its owner; but no other rite must be performed for the sake of its owner in order for the offering to be fit.
  The Gemara answers: If it had been written: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings as a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>], it would be as you say. The clause: Shall offer the ram for peace offerings, would be considered a generalization, and: Sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>], would be a detail. Now that it is written: “Shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings,” the term “shall offer” is an incomplete generalization, as the term “for a sacrifice” interrupts between “shall offer” and “peace offerings.” And one cannot derive a <i>halakha</i> from any incomplete generalization by employing the principle of a generalization and a detail.
  Ravina says there is a different answer: Actually, one can derive a <i>halakha</i> from verses with incomplete generalizations using the principle of a generalization and a detail. And the reason this <i>halakha</i> applies to other rites besides slaughter is that by adding the term “unto the Lord,” it then makes a generalization.
  Before Ravina concluded his interpretation, Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But the former generalization is dissimilar to the latter generalization. The former generalization includes only the essential sacrificial actions and nothing more, whereas the latter generalization includes any sacrificial duty unto the Lord, and even pouring the remains of the blood on the base of the altar and burning the sacrificial portions of the offering on the altar. Ravina responded: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught generalizations and details in cases like this.
  Ravina concludes his explanation: Since the term: “Unto the Lord,” is another generalization, the verse is formulated as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the mentioned detail, slaughter, is defined as an essential rite and we require that it be performed for the sake of the owner, so too, we require that every essential rite be performed for the sake of the owner.
  The Gemara asks: If the verse is referring only to actions similar to the detail, not all of the essential rites are necessarily included. Perhaps it should be derived that just as the mentioned detail, slaughter, is defined as an essential rite, and one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it outside the Temple, so too, any essential rite for which one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for performing it outside the Temple is included in the verse. Accordingly, slaughter and sprinkling the blood are included, but collection of the blood and conveying it are not.
  Alternatively, it could be derived that just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an action that requires performance in the north of the Temple courtyard and is performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings, so too, any rite that requires performance in the north and is performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings is included in the <i>halakha</i>. Accordingly, slaughter and collection are included; sprinkling the blood is not.
  The Gemara answers: Both possibilities are equally valid; this derivation can be said and that derivation can be said. Either collection or sprinkling might be included in the <i>halakha</i>. Consequently, they are equal, and therefore both are included. Or according to another version of the Gemara’s answer, they are equal, and therefore each one, i.e., both collection and sprinkling, shall stand in its status.
  The Gemara provides an alternative answer: If you wish, say instead that sprinkling is derived from the verse that Rav Ashi cited: “And it shall be accepted for him to atone for him.” Therefore, when the verse states: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord,” indicating the inclusion of rites similar to slaughter, it is apparently referring not to sprinkling but to collection.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a nazirite’s ram must be sacrificed for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies with regard to other peace offerings as well?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from a nazirite’s ram that all peace offerings must be sacrificed for the sake of their owners, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about a nazirite’s ram? It is unique in that there is other blood, i.e., there are other offerings, a sin offering and a burnt offering, that must be brought by a nazirite together with his ram.
  The Gemara answers: If that is so, if this <i>halakha</i> is unique to a nazirite’s ram, let the verse write: His peace offerings [<i>shelamav</i>]. What is indicated by writing “peace offerings [<i>shelamim</i>]”? It is written to include all types of peace offerings.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a peace offering must be sacrificed for its own sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies with regard to all other offerings?
  And if you would say: Let us derive from a peace offering that all offerings must be sacrificed with these intentions, this derivation can be refuted: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires placing hands on the head of the offering, and it is accompanied by libations, and it requires the waving of the breast and the right hind leg by the priest and owner together. No other offering possesses all three of these requirements.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). The verse juxtaposes all types of offerings with peace offerings, indicating that just as we require the sacrifice of a peace offering to be performed for its sake, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, so too, we require the sacrifice of every type of offering to be performed for its sake, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner.
  § Having established the source for the requirement to sacrifice offerings with the rightful owner and the specific type of offering in mind, the Gemara inquires: Why not say that in a case where one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are disqualified? Why, according to the mishna, do they remain fit?
  The Gemara answers: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed [<i>nadarta</i>] freely [<i>nedava</i>] to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara interprets the words <i>nadarta</i> and <i>nedava</i> exegetically: How can the offering mentioned in this verse be a gift offering [<i>nedava</i>]? It is already referred to as a vow offering [<i>neder</i>]. Rather, the verse indicates that if you did what you had vowed to do, i.e., sacrificed your vow offering properly, it shall be a satisfactory vow offering; but if you did not sacrifice it properly, it shall be rendered a voluntary gift offering. Although it does not satisfy the obligation of your vow, it remains a valid offering.
  And it was necessary for the Torah to include the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” and it was necessary to include the verse: “This is the law.” As, had the Merciful One written in the Torah only the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” I would say
  
  Daf 5a
  
  that we do not know what requirement does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: This is the law, juxtaposing all offerings with a peace offering, which must be performed for its own sake. And if the Merciful One had written only the verse: This is the law, I would say that offerings sacrificed not for their sake should be disqualified. Therefore, the Merciful One writes the verse: That which is gone out of your lips, teaching that they are accepted, though they do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
  § Reish Lakish raised a difficulty while lying on his stomach in the study hall: If offerings that were sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or someone other than the owner are fit, let them propitiate God, i.e., let them satisfy the obligation of their owners; and if they do not propitiate God, why are they brought as offerings at all?
  Rabbi Elazar said to him: We have found a precedent for this in the case of offerings brought after the death of their owners, as they are fit, but they do not propitiate God, as they do not have owners requiring atonement. This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Kinnim</i> 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering and then died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering. If she brought her burnt offering and then died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering. Evidently, a burnt offering is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
  Reish Lakish said to him: I concede to you with regard to a burnt offering that it is sacrificed even if it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation, since it is brought even after its owner’s death in the case of the woman who died after bringing her sin offering. But from where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is brought for atonement and therefore not brought after its owner’s death, is brought even in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore will not satisfy its owner’s obligation?
  Rabbi Elazar said to him: Your side of the dispute is written in the mishna next to the opinion that you find difficult. Following the opinion in the mishna (2a) that only a sin offering and a Paschal offering are disqualified if they are slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering too is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake.
  Reish Lakish said in reference to Rabbi Elazar: Is he the one of whom people say that he is a great man? I am referring to the entire mishna, specifically to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, which is the accepted <i>halakha</i>. And you say to me that the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer resolves my difficulty?
  Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will introduce a solution to my own difficulty. He then recited the exegesis stated above: The verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, etc.” How can this be referring to a gift offering? It is already referred to as a vow offering; and so on, as stated above. In other words, it is derived from a verse that although the offering does not satisfy the obligation of its owner, it is fit to be sacrificed as a gift offering.
  Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: The case of a guilt offering was difficult for Reish Lakish, as a guilt offering is not brought after the owner’s death, and he adduced the derivation from the verse: “That which has gone out of your lips,” as a solution to it. This resolution is difficult: Why not say that only an offering that is brought for a vow or a gift is brought even in a case where it does not propitiate, since the verse mentions a vow and a gift; but a guilt offering, which is not brought voluntarily, should not be brought at all if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong type of offering. How does the verse resolve Reish Lakish’s difficulty?
  Abaye said to them: Although Reish Lakish cited that verse, he actually introduced the solution to his difficulty from here: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). It is derived from the word “it” in this verse that if a sin offering is slaughtered for its sake, it is fit; if it is slaughtered not for its sake, it is unfit. Consequently, other offerings slaughtered not for their sake, including a guilt offering, are fit. And since one might have thought that once they are fit, they also propitiate God, the verse states: “That which has gone out of your lips,” from which it is derived that such an offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
  Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba asked him: But since the phrase in the verse “that which has gone out of your lips” is referring to offerings brought for a vow or a gift, why not say that only these offerings do not propitiate God even though one must bring them if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, but a guilt offering slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God as well?
  Abaye said in response: You cannot say that a guilt offering that was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering propitiates God, due to an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from a burnt offering: Just as a burnt offering, which does not atone for a sin as it is brought as a vow or gift offering, still does not propitiate God if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering, so too, with regard to a guilt offering, which atones for a sin and is therefore treated more stringently, is it not logical that it does not propitiate God?
  The Gemara challenges the inference: What is unique about a burnt offering? It is unique in that it is totally consumed on the altar. By contrast, the meat of a guilt offering is eaten by priests. Since in some ways a burnt offering is treated more stringently than a guilt offering, no <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be derived from one to the other.
  The Gemara answers: A peace offering can prove that this aspect is not relevant, since it is not totally consumed on the altar, and still if slaughtered for the sake of the wrong offering it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The inference can therefore be drawn from a peace offering rather than a burnt offering.
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a peace offering? It is unique in that it requires libations, and the waving of the breast and the right hind leg.
  The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since these stringencies do not apply to it. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. At this stage the <i>halakha</i> is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering, is not like the aspect of that case, the peace offering. And the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but they do not propitiate. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this <i>halakha</i>, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but it does not propitiate.
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about their common element, i.e., the common element of a burnt offering and a peace offering? These offerings are unique in that they are brought by the public. There are communal burnt offerings and peace offerings, but there are no communal guilt offerings.
  The Gemara responds: A thanks offering can prove the point, since there are no communal thanks offerings, and still a thanks offering slaughtered not for its sake does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
  
  Daf 5b
  
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about a thanks offering? It is unique in that it requires a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
  The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering and a peace offering can prove the point, as loaves are not brought with them. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The <i>halakha</i> is derived from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, a burnt offering and a peace offering, is not like the aspect of that case, a thanks offering, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate God. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this <i>halakha</i>, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is fit but does not propitiate God.
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is unique about the common element of a thanks offering, a burnt offering, and a peace offering? It is unique in that these offerings are brought either as a vow offering or as a gift offering, whereas a guilt offering is brought only to fulfill an obligation.
  Rather, Rava says: The verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), juxtaposes a guilt offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as peace offerings are offerings and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are fit but do not propitiate, so too, I shall include a guilt offering, as it is an offering, and therefore if it is slaughtered not for its sake, although it is fit, it does not satisfy the obligation of its owner.
  The Gemara asks: What did you see, i.e., why do you think it is reasonable, that you compared a guilt offering to a peace offering? Why not compare it to a sin offering, which is disqualified in such a case?
  The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded all other offerings from the <i>halakha</i> concerning a sin offering in this matter, as derived from the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33).
  The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the <i>amora’im</i> who participated in the two following discussions: <i>Heh</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>shin</i>; <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>reish</i>.
  Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: Reish Lakish raised his difficulty with regard to a guilt offering, since it is not brought after its owner’s death. Let Rabbi Elazar say to him that a guilt offering is also essentially brought after its owner’s death, since it is sold once it develops a blemish, and the proceeds are used to buy a burnt offering.
  Rav Sheshet said to them: This claim can be refuted: What element of a guilt offering is sacrificed after its owner’s death? Only its remainder, i.e., the money from its sale that is used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And if so, it is no different from a sin offering, the remainder of which is also sacrificed, and a sin offering itself is entirely disqualified if slaughtered not for its sake.
  Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman explained: A sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified even though its remainder is sacrificed, because the Merciful One specifically excludes a sin offering from being a fit offering if sacrificed not for its own sake, as derived from the verse: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The redundant phrase “it is a sin offering” teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if sacrificed not for its own sake.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written with regard to a guilt offering: “And the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar for an offering made by fire unto the Lord; it is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Why is a guilt offering not disqualified when it is slaughtered not for its sake?
  The Gemara answers: That verse is written not with regard to the main sacrificial rites, but with regard to the stage after the burning of the offering’s sacrificial portions on the altar, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: But with regard to a guilt offering, the term “It is a guilt offering” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the guilt offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the term “It is a guilt offering” to be stated at all? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.
  The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to fulfill another purpose.
  § Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them. And they were sitting and saying: In response to that which Rabbi Elazar said to Reish Lakish: We have found a precedent for this situation in the case of offerings that are brought after their owners’ death, as they are fit but they do not propitiate God, let Reish Lakish say to him: These offerings should also be brought and propitiate God with regard to the heirs. Why did Reish Lakish not challenge Rabbi Elazar’s assumption?
  Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How can the offering of a woman after childbirth propitiate God after her death? If she gave birth, did her children give birth?
  Rav Asi objects to this reasoning: And who shall say to us that if a woman has several violations of positive mitzvot for which to atone, she does not atone by means of the burnt offering she brings after childbirth for her purification? Clearly, such offerings can atone for transgressions other than those for which they are brought. And since, when she has several violations of positive mitzvot she atones by means of the offering, so too, if she dies, her heirs atone by this offering for their own violations of positive mitzvot.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the offering is acquired by the heirs, and this is why it atones for their transgressions? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that if one left his two sons a meal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and it does not have the status of a meal offering brought in partnership? And if it enters your mind that the offering is acquired by the heirs, it should be considered a meal offering brought in partnership, which is unfit, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when one brings a meal offering unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1). The word “one” teaches that two people cannot bring a meal offering together. Clearly, the heirs do not inherit the offering, and if so, it should not atone for their transgressions.
  The Gemara asks: And is the offering not acquired by them? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say that if one left his two sons an animal offering and then died, the offering must be sacrificed, and they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it? Even if they declare another animal to be a substitute for it, that animal is not consecrated. Granted, if you say that the offering is acquired by them, this is the reason that they cannot effect substitution of another animal for it: It is because they are like partners,
  
  Daf 6a
  
  and partners cannot effect substitution of other animals for their offering. But if you say that it is not acquired by them, and the animal is the property solely of the deceased father, let them also effect substitution on his behalf, as heirs are able to affect substitution for their deceased parents’ offerings.
  The Gemara answers: There it is different, as although the verse states: “If he shall at all change [<i>hamer yamir</i>] animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), the superfluous word <i>hamer</i> serving to include the heir as one who is able to effect substitution, nevertheless the subject’s singular form teaches that only one heir can effect substitution, but two heirs cannot effect substitution.
  Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this derivation: If that is so, one should say the same with regard to the redemption of the second tithe, as it is written: “And if a man will redeem [<i>gaol yigal</i>] any of his tithe, he shall add to it the fifth part thereof” (Leviticus 27:31), with the superfluous word <i>gaol</i> serving to include the heir as one who must add the one-fifth. So too, it should be derived from the verb’s singular form that if one heir redeems the tithe, he must add one-fifth of its value, but if two heirs redeem it, they do not need to add one-fifth. In fact, the <i>halakha</i> is that partners must also add one-fifth.
  The Gemara answers: Redemption of the tithe is different, as the father had the ability to redeem the tithe even in partnership with another when alive. Therefore, the heirs can do so as well. By contrast, substitution of an offering cannot be effected by partners.
  Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: But from this <i>halakha</i> itself, that two heirs cannot effect substitution of an offering, it can be proven that they acquire the offering of the deceased. Granted, if you say it is acquired by them, this is the reason that one heir, in any event, can effect substitution of another animal for the offering. But if you say it is not acquired by them, how can even one heir effect substitution?
  But doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one consecrates his own animal to atone for someone else and he then redeems it, he adds one-fifth of its value, as he would for any other offering he owned, but if the one for whom it atones redeems it, he need not add one-fifth, since he is not the owner. Nevertheless, only the one for whom the offering atones can render another animal a substitute for it, as in this respect only he is considered its owner. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement concludes: And if one separates <i>teruma</i> from his own produce to exempt the produce of another from the obligation to have teruma separated from it, the benefit of discretion is his. Only the one who separated the <i>teruma</i> is entitled to determine which priest receives it. Since an heir is able to effect substitution, apparently the offering atones for his transgression. This supports the claim that the heir acquires the offering.
  Rav Ashi responds: The offering does not atone for the transgressions of the heirs by its essence, as it was not consecrated for their atonement, and they do not acquire it. Therefore, two heirs of a meal offering can bring it, as explained above. Yet, it does atone for them incidentally [<i>mikkufeya</i>]. Therefore, an heir can effect substitution of another animal for it.
  § With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that offerings slaughtered not for their sake are fit to be sacrificed but do not satisfy the obligations of their owners, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: After these offerings are sacrificed, did they atone for the sins for which they came, or did they not atone for them?
  Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, said: It stands to reason that they did not atone, as, if it enters your mind that they did atone, for what purpose is the second offering brought? Why is the owner required to bring another offering if the first atoned for his sin?
  The Gemara challenges this reasoning: Rather, what is the alternative? That they did not atone? If so, for what purpose is the first offering sacrificed?
  Rav Ashi said: This is what is difficult for Rav Sheisha, i.e., Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi: Granted, if you say that such an offering did not atone, it is brought even when slaughtered not for its sake on the strength of its prior consecration for its sake. And in that case, for what purpose is the second offering brought? It is brought to atone for the sin. But if you say that offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake atoned for the sin, for what purpose is the second offering brought?
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When one brings a burnt offering, which atones for violations of positive mitzvot, does it atone even for a violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after designating the animal as an offering, or does it not atone for such a violation?
  The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that the <i>halakha</i> in this case is just as it is with regard to a sin offering, in that just as a sin offering does atone for a sin that one committed before designation of the animal but does not atone for a sin that one committed after designation, here too, a burnt offering does atone for violations that one committed before designation but does not atone for those committed after designation?
  Or, perhaps a burnt offering is not similar to a sin offering, as with regard to a sin offering one must bring one sin offering for each and every sin he commits. But here, since a burnt offering atones even for one who has committed several violations of positive mitzvot, one may claim that it also atones even for the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after designation of the animal.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand on the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4). And does placing hands atone for one’s sins? But isn’t atonement achieved only by the sprinkling of the blood, as it is stated: “For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the life” (Leviticus 17:11)? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And he shall place…and it shall be accepted for him to atone”? This teaches that if one deemed the ritual of placing hands to be a non-essential mitzva and consequently failed to perform it, the verse ascribes to him blame as though the offering did not atone for his sins; and nevertheless, the offering atoned for his sins.
  What, does the final clause of the <i>baraita</i> not mean that the offer-ing atoned for the violation of any positive mitzva that the owner committed before designation of the animal, but it did not atone for violation of the positive mitzva of placing hands on the head of the offering, as that constitutes a violation of a positive mitzva after designation of the animal? Apparently, a burnt offering does not atone for the violations committed after the animal’s designation.
  Rava said in response: You say that the positive mitzva of placing hands is proof? There it is different, since as long as he does not slaughter the offering, he remains obligated to stand and place his hands on its head. He has not yet violated the mitzva. When does the violation of this positive mitzva occur? It occurs after the slaughter, at which point fulfillment of the mitzva is no longer possible. And with regard to a violation committed after the slaughter, we do not raise the dilemma; clearly a burnt offering does not atone for such a violation.
  Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Say the <i>baraita</i> means that the offering atoned for the transgression of the person,
  
  Daf 6b
  
  but it did not atone for him before Heaven, i.e., it is not accepted by God as a perfect offering.
  Didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to the purification process of a leper (<i>Nega’im</i> 14:10): The verse states: “And the rest of the oil that is in the priest’s hand he shall put upon the head of the one that is to be purified, to make atonement for him before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:18). This teaches that if the priest placed the oil on the leper’s head, it atoned for him, and he is purified, but if he did not place the oil on his head, it did not atone for him; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Placement of the oil on the leper’s head is a non-essential mitzva. Therefore, whether the oil was placed on his head or whether it was not placed on his head, it atoned for him, but the verse ascribes the leper blame as though it did not atone for him.
  The Gemara comments: What is the meaning of the phrase: As though it did not atone for him? If we say that it is necessary for the leper to bring another offering of oil, didn’t you say that whether the oil was placed on his head or whether it was not placed on his head, it atoned for him? Rather, the meaning of the statement is as follows: It atoned for the person, but did not atone for him before Heaven. Here too, with regard to one who sacrificed an offering without placing hands on its head, the <i>baraita</i> apparently means that the offering atoned for the owner’s transgression, even if it did not atone for him before Heaven.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There too, with regard to the purification process of a leper, one can explain that the oil atoned for one matter and did not atone for another: It atoned; in other words, the placement of oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe, which was performed, effected its atonement. But it did not atone, i.e., there still needs to be an atonement effected by placement of oil on the leper’s head, and another <i>log</i> of oil must be brought for the performance of that act.
  The Gemara returns to the matter of atonement for transgressions committed after the offering’s designation. Come and hear another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to the communal peace offering of two lambs that accompanies the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>, for what sin are they brought?
  The Gemara interrupts the citation of the <i>baraita</i>: The two lambs sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> are not brought for a sin; they are peace offerings brought with the annual public offering of two loaves of new wheat. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> should be emended as follows: For what sin are the goats sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> as a sin offering brought?
  Rabbi Shimon answers: They are brought for the defiling of the Temple, by entering it while ritually impure, or for defiling its sacrificial foods, by partaking of them while ritually impure.
  Rabbi Shimon continues: Once the blood of the first goat is sprinkled on the altar, thereby atoning for this defilement, for what sin is the second one sacrificed? It is sacrificed for any incident involving impurity that may have occurred between the sacrifice of that first goat and the sacrifice of this second goat. Based on this, say that the Jewish people should have had to sacrifice their offerings at all times and at every moment, as perhaps they sinned in the interim; but the verse spared them of this obligation.
  The Gemara infers: And here, where an incident involving impurity occurred between the sacrifice of the two goats, is a case where the positive mitzva of distancing ritually impure people from the Temple was violated after the designation of the offering, as both goats were designated in advance. And nevertheless, the second goat atones for the violation. Evidently, an offering can atone for transgressions committed after its designation.
  The Gemara rejects this inference: If both goats were designated simultaneously, this would indeed be evidence to that effect. But here we are dealing with a case where they were designated sequentially, and an incident involving impurity may have occurred between their respective designations.
  The Gemara challenges this assertion: But shall we stand and say about the verse mandating these two sin offerings that when it is written, it is written specifically with regard to a case where they are designated sequentially?
  Rav Pappa said the inference can be rejected for a different reason: Do you say that evidence can be adduced from communal offerings? Communal offerings are different, as the court makes a non-verbal stipulation about them, in accordance with what Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says. As Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: With regard to communal offerings, the slaughtering knife, i.e., the act of slaughter, designates them for what they are. The court stipulates that the second goat be consecrated as it is sacrificed, and it therefore atones for incidents of impurity that occur beforehand. Individual offerings, by contrast, are all designated in advance.
  Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, said to Rav Pappa: But does Rabbi Shimon accept the opinion that the court can make a non-verbal stipulation about communal offerings? Doesn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav Amram says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to animals designated as daily offerings but which in the end were not necessary for use by the public,
  
  Daf 7a
  
  according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the <i>baraita</i> can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.
  And furthermore, continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the goats sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> were slaughtered simultaneously and their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of the first goat was sprinkled, for what sin is the second goat brought? There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones for any incident involving impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the blood of that first goat and the sprinkling of the blood of this second goat.
  One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma only about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of a positive mitzva committed after its slaughter and before the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after the designation of the offering, before its slaughter, he did not raise the dilemma. Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because he was saying: Even if you say that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.
  § It was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering: Rabba says that it is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation, and Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit in this regard.
  Rabba says it is fit because the thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit because it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.
  Rabba said: From where do I say that it is fit? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering…on the day that he presents his offering it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:15–16). Abba Ḥanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit, whereas a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. And what is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in the verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.
  Rabba explains: The <i>baraita</i> indicates that a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, but a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of some other thanks offering is fit. What, is it not referring to the thanks offering of another, teaching that it satisfies its owner’s obligation?
  The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to another thanks offering of his own, which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.
  The Gemara asks: But if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of another’s thanks offering, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it unfit, i.e., it does it not satisfy the owner’s obligation? If so, rather than teaching that a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, let the <i>baraita</i> teach that a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering is unfit, and one could infer that all the more so a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit.
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to specify a case where a peace offering was slaughtered for the sake of his own thanks offering. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and therefore when one slaughters a peace offering for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit. Therefore the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not the case.
  § Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering he was obligated to bring is fit; but if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.
  What is the reason for this distinction? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), and therefore, as long as the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.
  And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner, but who nevertheless was obligated to bring a sin offering, is unfit. But if one slaughtered it for one who was obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit.
  What is the reason for this distinction? The Torah states: “And he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically he, the owner, who shall be forgiven, and not another person. The other person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably similar to the owner in that he is also obligated to achieve atonement similar to the owner’s by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.
  And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not obligated to bring anything is unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated to bring an offering for violating a positive mitzva. Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.
  And Rava says that a sin offering atones for those obligated to bring a burnt offering for violating a positive mitzva, due to an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If a sin offering atones for those who are liable for transgressions for which one receives excision from the World-to-Come if he performs them intentionally, all the more so is it not clear that it atones for those liable for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva?
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the violation of a positive mitzva is of the same type as the sins atoned for by a sin offering? But doesn’t Rava say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who was obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, but if it was slaughtered for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit, as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  The Gemara answers: A sin offering does not atone for violating a positive mitzva by its essence, since prohibitions and positive mitzvot are not of the same type, but it atones for it incidentally.
  And Rava says: As for a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.
  Why is this so? If you wish, cite a verse; and if you wish, propose a logical argument. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The derivation from this verse was explained in 2a. If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its slaughter, shall he continue to deviate from protocol in the rest of the sacrificial process? This is as it was stated at the beginning of the chapter (2a).
  And Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that is brought by its owner’s heirs after his death, if one slaughtered it with a deviation from the type of offering, i.e., for the sake of another type of offering, it is unfit, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, and the heirs must therefore bring another offering. But if it was slaughtered with a deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., for the sake of another person, it is fit, as the offering has no legal owner after the owner’s death.
  And Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, says that an offering has an owner after its owner’s death, specifically, the heir. Rav Ashi said to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami: Is the Master saying that an offering actually has an owner after its owner’s death, and that if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir must bring another burnt offering, contrary to the opinion of Rava? Or perhaps the Master is merely saying that if the heir has several violations of positive mitzvot, the offering atones for them, but still if it was slaughtered for the sake of the wrong owner, the heir is not required to bring another offering.
  Rav Pineḥas said to him: I am saying that the heir is actually the owner, and if the offering was slaughtered for someone else, he must bring another offering.
  And Rava says: A burnt offering is a gift [<i>doron</i>] to God; its essential purpose is not atonement. Rava supports his assertion: What are the circumstances under which a burnt offering atones for violating a positive mitzva? If one brings a burnt offering without repentance for his transgression, he may not sacrifice it at all, as “the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination” (Proverbs 21:27). And if there is repentance, isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if one violates a positive mitzva and repents, God forgives him before he even moves from his place? If so, why is he required to bring an offering? Rather, conclude from it that a burnt offering is a gift that one brings in order to appease God even after he is forgiven.
  The Gemara states a mnemonic for this series of statements by Rava: A sin offering atones for who, a burnt offering after a gift.
  This last statement of Rava is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon said: For what purpose is a sin offering brought? The Gemara interrupts: For what purpose is it brought? Is it not brought to atone for a transgression? Rather, Rabbi Shimon clearly meant: For what reason is it brought before a burnt offering in all circumstances where both are brought? Rabbi Shimon answered: It is comparable to an advocate [<i>lifraklit</i>] who enters before the king to convince him to pardon the defendant. Once the advocate has appeased the king, the gift is brought in after him.
  § The mishna teaches that all offerings are fit even if slaughtered not for their sake, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a Paschal offering is required to be slaughtered for its sake?
  The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “Observe the month of the spring and offer [<i>ve’asita</i>] the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaching that all of the actions [<i>asiyyotav</i>] of the Paschal offering, all of its sacrificial rites, must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that deviation from the type of offering is prohibited. From where do we derive that deviation with regard to the owner is also prohibited?
  The Gemara answers that this is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that the slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>] must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering. If the verse is not necessary in order to derive the matter of deviation from the type of offering, as that <i>halakha</i> is derived from Deuteronomy 16:1, apply it to the matter of deviation with regard to the owner.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner. From where do we derive that these intentions are indispensable and, if lacking, disqualify the offering?
  The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall sacrifice [<i>vezavaḥta</i>] the Paschal offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). By repeating the mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering for its sake and for the sake of its owner, the Torah indicates that these two intentions are both indispensable to the sacrificial process.
  Rav Safra objects to this: Does this verse: “And you shall sacrifice,” come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? It is necessary for the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.” The verse is difficult: But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? From here it is derived that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.
  Rather, Rav Safra says that the verses should be expounded as follows: The verse “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” teaches the statement of Rav Naḥman, that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. The verse: “Observe the month of the spring and offer the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:1), teaches that there is a mitzva to sacrifice the Paschal offering without deviation from the type of offering. The verse: “And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), teaches that there is a mitzva to slaughter it without deviation with regard to the owner. The term “it is” in the latter verse teaches that both here and there, i.e., with regard to both the offering and the owner, proper intent is indispensable.
  Rav Safra continues: And we found a source for slaughter. From where do we derive that other sacrificial rites must also be performed for the sake of the owner or the offering is disqualified? Since the Torah revealed that this intention is indispensable to the proper slaughter of the Paschal offering, it thereby revealed that it is critical to proper performance of the other rites as well.
  Rav Ashi says: We do not say that since the Torah revealed that this <i>halakha</i> is indispensable to slaughter, it thereby revealed that it is indispensable to the other rites as well. Rather, from where do we derive that it is indispensable to the other sacrificial rites? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “This is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37), indicating that all offerings must, like a peace offering, be sacrificed for their own sake.
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the verse: “In the day that he commanded the children of Israel to present their offerings” (Leviticus 7:38), this word, i.e., “offerings,” is referring to the firstborn animal, the animal tithe, and the Paschal offering, which are not mentioned in the previous verse.
  The text juxtaposes all types of offerings mentioned in both verses with a peace offering, indicating that just as one who sacrifices a peace offering is required to do so with the proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, and in addition, the <i>halakha</i> of proper intent is only as a mitzva, not as an indispensable requirement, so too, in the case of any type of offering that must have proper intent, both concerning deviation from the offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, the <i>halakha</i> of proper intent is only as a mitzva. Therefore, the mitzva <i>ab initio</i> is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier repeat the <i>halakha</i> to teach that it is indispensable with regard to slaughter.
  And the juxtaposition of the peace offering with the Paschal offering indicates that a Paschal offering is similar to a peace offering in another respect: Just as with regard to a peace offering, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other rites with regard to the mitzva <i>ab initio</i> of proper intent, so too, with regard to the Paschal offering, do not distinguish between slaughter and the other sacrificial rites with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that proper intent is indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, since the indispensability of proper intent with regard to the Paschal offering is derived from its juxtaposition with the peace offering, why do I need the term “it is” to be written in Exodus 12:27? What is derived from there?
  The Gemara answers: This is written to teach that this requirement is indispensable only in the case of a Paschal offering, and not in the case of a guilt offering. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the Paschal offering, the term “it is” is stated with regard to slaughter in Exodus 12:27 to teach that intent for the owner is indispensable. But concerning a guilt offering, the term “it is” is stated only after the verse mentions the burning of the sacrificial portions, and since a guilt offering itself is fit even when its portions were not burned on the altar at all, intent for the sake of the owner at this point is certainly not indispensable.
  § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that if a sin offering is sacrificed for the sake of the wrong type of offering or one other than its owner, it is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaching that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source with regard to slaughter. From where do we derive this with regard to collection of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from this verse, as it is written:
  
  Daf 8a
  
  “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering” (Leviticus 4:25), teaching that the collection of the blood must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: And we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that the slaughter and collection must be performed for the sake of a sin offering. From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the sprinkling of the blood? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his sin” (Leviticus 4:26), teaching that the atonement must be effected for the sake of a sin offering, as atonement is effected by the sprinkling of the blood.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the prohibition against deviation from the type of offering. From where do we derive the prohibition against deviation with regard to the owner? The Gemara answers: The aforementioned verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement for him,” indicating that the intent must be for him, and not for another.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva to sprinkle the blood for the sake of the owner <i>ab initio</i>. From where do we derive that this is indispensable and disqualifies the offering if not fulfilled? The Gemara answers: It is as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says with regard to the sin offering of a nazirite: Since the verse could have simply stated: Sin offering, but instead stated: “His sin offering” (Numbers 6:16), it is inferred that the offering must be sacrificed for his, the owner’s, sake. Here too, since the verse could have simply stated “sin,” but states “his sin,” one infers that if the blood of the sin offering is not sprinkled for the sake of its owner, it is disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the mitzva of sacrificing a sin offering without deviation from the type of offering <i>ab initio</i>, and with regard to sprinkling its blood without deviation with regard to the owner concerning both its mitzva <i>ab initio</i> and its indispensability. From where do we derive that performing all sacrificial rites without deviation from the type of offering is an indispensable requirement, and that performing all other rites, besides sprinkling the blood, without deviation with regard to the owner is both a mitzva <i>ab initio</i> and indispensable?
  Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from the <i>halakha</i> concerning the sin offering of a nazirite; as it is written concerning a nazirite: “And the priest shall bring them before the Lord, and shall offer [<i>ve’asa</i>] his sin offering, and his burnt offering” (Numbers 6:16). The verse teaches that all of its sacrificial actions [<i>asiyyotav</i>] must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a sin offering must be sacrificed without deviation from the type of offering, and that this requirement is indispensable. From where do we derive that sacrificing it without deviation with regard to the owner is also indispensable, even in rites other than the sprinkling of the blood?
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: Since the verse concerning a nazirite could have simply stated: Sin offering, but instead states: “His sin offering,” one infers that the offering must be sacrificed for the owner’s sake.
  Ravina objects to this: If that is so, what do you interpret from the fact that the same verse could have stated: Burnt offering, but instead states: “His burnt offering”?
  The Gemara asks: And according to Ravina, what do you interpret from the subsequent verse: “The priest shall offer also his meal offering and his libation” (Numbers 6:17)? Why does Ravina not mention that this verse could have stated: Meal offering, but instead states: “His meal offering,” and that it could have stated: Libation, but instead states: “His libation”?
  The Gemara answers: That language is necessary; it is just like the phrase: “Their meal offering and their libations,” which is mentioned many times in the portion of the Festival offerings (e.g., Numbers 29:37). It teaches that the meal offerings and libations that are brought with the additional animal offerings of the Festivals can be sacrificed even at night after the offering is brought. The phrase: “Their meal offering and their libations,” also teaches that they may be brought even on the following day. Likewise here, when stated with regard to a nazirite, the phrase teaches that they may be brought at night or the day after the offering is sacrificed. But there remains a difficulty: What do you interpret from the fact that the verse could have stated: Burnt offering, but instead states: “His burnt offering”?
  The Gemara raises an additional objection to the derivation from a nazirite’s sin offering: And furthermore, can the <i>halakhot</i> of a standard sin offering and of a nazirite’s sin offering be derived from one another? The <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering brought for a transgression, e.g., eating forbidden fat, cannot be derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a nazirite’s sin offering, due to the unique element of stringency of the latter, since there is other blood, i.e., other offerings are brought, with it. Likewise, the <i>halakhot</i> of a nazirite’s sin offering cannot be derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offer-ing brought for eating forbidden fat, due to the unique element of stringency of the latter, since it atones for a transgression punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>].
  Rather, Rava says: These <i>halakhot</i> are derived from the <i>halakha</i> of the sin offering of a leper; as it is written: “And the priest shall offer [<i>ve’asa</i>] the sin offering” (Leviticus 14:19), teaching that all sacrificial actions of [<i>asiyyotav</i>] a sin offering must be performed for the sake of a sin offering.
  And we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a sin offering must be sacrificed without deviation from the type of offering, and that this is indispensable. From where do we derive that sacrificing a sin offering without deviation with regard to the owner is also indispensable? The verse states: “And make atonement for the one that is to be purified of his impurity” (Leviticus 14:19), indicating that the sin offering must be sacrificed for the sake of this person who is being purified, and not for another person who is to be purified.
  The Gemara asks: But still, can the <i>halakhot</i> of a standard sin offering and a leper’s sin offering be derived from one another? This comparison is also problematic. The <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering brought for eating forbidden fat cannot be derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a leper’s sin offering, since there is other blood that is brought with the latter, i.e., a burnt offering and a guilt offering; and the <i>halakhot</i> of a leper’s sin offering cannot be derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering brought for eating forbidden fat, since the latter atones for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Indeed, the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering cannot be derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of one other type of sin offering alone. But one can derive the <i>halakhot</i> of one type of sin offering from the <i>halakhot</i> of the other two. The verses concerning a standard sin offering, that of a leper, and that of a nazirite all contain elements that indicate that the offering must be sacrificed for its own sake. Two of them together are sufficient to teach that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the third case. The third case is therefore apparently extraneous, and it is understood to teach that proper intent in this regard is indispensable for all the offering’s rites.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to which type of sin offering should the Torah not have written this <i>halakha</i>, i.e., which of the three cases should be regarded as the extraneous case? If you say: Let the Merciful One not write it with regard to a sin offering brought for eating forbidden fat, and one can derive it from these other sin offerings, i.e., those of a nazirite and a leper, this can be refuted: What is notable about these other sin offerings? They are notable in that there is other blood brought with them. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> should apply only to similar sin offerings.
  If you say: Let the Merciful One not write it with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering, and one can derive it from these other sin offerings, those of a leper and a sinner, this can also be refuted: What is notable about these other sin offerings? They are notable in that one does not have the option of obtaining an exemption through a request to a halakhic authority. A nazirite, by contrast, can request of a halakhic authority to dissolve his vow of naziriteship, thereby nullifying his obligation.
  If you say: Let the Merciful One not write it with regard to a leper’s sin offering, and one can derive it from these other sin offerings, those of a nazirite and a sinner, this can also be refuted: What is notable about these other sin offerings? They are notable in that they cannot be brought from doves instead of sheep if the owner is poor, unlike a leper’s sin offering (see Leviticus 14:21). Therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of these different sin offerings cannot be derived from one another.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> is derived from that which the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, and of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). The verse juxtaposes a sin offering with a peace offering, indicating that just as for a peace offering we require intent for its sake, as a mitzva <i>ab initio</i>, both concerning the deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner, so too, for a sin offering we require intent for its sake as a mitzva, both concerning deviation from the type of offering and concerning deviation with regard to the owner.
  Therefore, the mitzva <i>ab initio</i> is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a peace offering; and those verses mentioned earlier, from which this requirement is derived with regard to each type of sin offering separately, repeat the <i>halakha</i> to teach that it is indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: And we found a source for these <i>halakhot</i> with regard to a sin offering brought for eating forbidden fat, as it is written with regard to it: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), indicating that it must be slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering. Likewise, sources for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper have also been cited.
  
  Daf 8b
  
  From where do we derive these <i>halakhot</i> with regard to a sin offering brought for idol worship, which has unique <i>halakhot</i>, as detailed in Numbers 15:27–31, and with regard to which the term: For a sin offering, is not written? Likewise, from where do we derive them with regard to the sin offerings that are brought for the hearing of the voice, and for an utterance of the lips, and for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, which also have unique <i>halakhot</i> (Leviticus 5:1–13), and with regard to which the term: For a sin offering, is not written either?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to a sin offering brought for idol worship, these <i>halakhot</i> are derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering brought for eating forbidden fat, as idol worship is also punishable by <i>karet</i>, similar to consumption of forbidden fat. And with regard to all these other sin offerings, which are brought for transgressions not punishable by <i>karet</i>, these <i>halakhot</i> are derived by analogy from the common element of the aforementioned three sources, namely, a standard sin offering, the sin offering of a nazirite, and the sin offering of a leper.
  § The Sages taught: When a Paschal offering is sacrificed at its appointed time, on Passover eve after noon, if it is sacrificed for its sake, it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake, it is unfit, as stated in the mishna. And when an offering consecrated as a Paschal offering is sacrificed during the rest of the days of the year, if it is sacrificed for its sake, it is unfit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake, it is fit.
  The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the names of the <i>amora’im</i> mentioned in this discussion: <i>Shin</i>, <i>lamed</i>, <i>vav</i>; <i>kuf</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>alef</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>tzadi</i>, <i>nun</i>; <i>mem</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>reish</i>; <i>beit</i>, <i>tzadi</i>, <i>alef</i>; <i>beit</i>, <i>alef</i>.
  The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, i.e., that if a Paschal offering is sacrificed during the rest of the year it is fit if sacrificed not for its sake? Shmuel’s father says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), indicating that an offering that is brought only from the flock will be a sacrifice of peace offerings. The Paschal offering fulfills this criterion.
  The Gemara challenges: Say that if it is sacrificed for the sake of a peace offering, yes, it is fit, but if it is sacrificed for the sake of some other offering, it is not fit. Rabbi Ila says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The redundant expression “for a sacrifice” in Leviticus 3:6 is stated to include any type of sacrifice.
  The Gemara asks: If so, say that a Paschal offering should be rendered as any offering for which one slaughters it; for example, if it is slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering, it should be rendered a burnt offering.
  The Gemara answers: If the phrase: For peace offerings and a sacrifice, was written in the verse, it would be as you say. Now that it is written: “For a sacrifice of peace offerings,” it indicates that for whatever type of offering one slaughters it, it will be a peace offering.
  The Gemara challenges: Say that: “For a sacrifice,” is a generalization and: “Of peace offerings,” is a detail, and according to the principles of biblical hermeneutics, wherever there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only that which is specified in the detail. Accordingly, if the offering is sacrificed for the sake of a peace offering, yes, it is fit; but if it is sacrificed for the sake of another offering, it is not fit.
  The Gemara answers: With the term: “Unto the Lord,” the verse then generalized again. Therefore, the verse is formulated as a generalization, a detail, and a generalization, as the Gemara will explain.
  Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this suggestion: But the latter generalization is dissimilar to the former generalization. The former generalization: “For a sacrifice,” includes only slaughtered offerings and nothing more, whereas the latter generalization: “Unto the Lord,” includes any offering unto the Lord. And accordingly, even if the Paschal offering was sacrificed for the sake of bird offerings, or even for the sake of meal offerings, it should be fit, as these are brought “unto the Lord.”
  The Gemara responds to this objection: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught generalizations and details even in examples like this case.
  The Gemara explains: Since “unto the Lord” is a second generalization, the verse is formulated as a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as a case where a Paschal offering was sacrificed not for its own sake, and nevertheless it is fit, so too, in any case where it was sacrificed not for its sake but for the sake of another offering, it is fit.
  The Gemara asks: If the verse is referring only to actions similar to the detail, then just as the items mentioned in the detail are clearly defined as a peace offering, which is a matter that is brought as a vow offering or as a gift offering, so too, a Paschal offering should be fit only if it was sacrificed for the sake of any offering that is brought as a vow offering or as a gift offering. Accordingly, if it was sacrificed for the sake of a burnt offering or a peace offering, yes, it is fit, as these are brought as a vow offering or as a gift offering; but if it was sacrificed for the sake of a sin offering or a guilt offering, it is not fit, as these are not brought as a vow offering or as a gift offering.
  The Gemara therefore rejects the exegetical method of generalizations and details in favor of that of amplifications and restrictions: Rather, the term: “For a sacrifice,” is not a generalization, but an amplification, which includes any type of offering. Therefore, if a Paschal offering is sacrificed for the sake of any type of offering during the rest of the year, it is fit.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, say that it adds that a Paschal offering should be rendered as any offering for which one slaughters it. Why does Shmuel’s father interpret that it is rendered a peace offering specifically?
  Rabbi Avin says:
  
  Daf 9a
  
  Offerings that are eaten, in this case the Paschal offering, are diverted when slaughtered not for their sake to serve as other types of offerings that are eaten, such as peace offerings. But offerings that are eaten are not diverted to serve as offerings that are not eaten, such as burnt offerings.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a sin offering and a guilt offering are not eaten? Why does a Paschal offering receive the status of a peace offering and not that of a sin offering or a guilt offering, which are eaten by the priests?
  Rather, the answer should be emended: Offerings that are eaten by every Jewish person are diverted to serve as offerings eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings eaten by every Jewish person are not diverted to serve as offerings not eaten by every Jewish person, i.e., sin offerings and guilt offerings, which are eaten only by priests.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, says that there is a different answer: Offerings of lesser sanctity are diverted to serve as offerings of lesser sanctity, i.e., peace offerings. But offerings of lesser sanctity are not diverted to serve as offerings of the most sacred order, i.e., burnt offerings, sin offerings, or guilt offerings.
  Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rabbi Savriyu, objects to this answer: If so, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of the animal tithe, let it be rendered animal tithe, which, like a Paschal offering, is an offering of lesser sanctity. The Gemara adds: For what <i>halakha</i> does it matter, practically speaking, that a Paschal offering has been rendered an animal tithe rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered an animal tithe, it should not require libations. And furthermore, if one sells it, he should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), which applies to the animal tithe even after its slaughter.
  The Gemara responds: The verse states with regard to the animal tithe: “The tenth shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:32). The definite article indicates that this, the tenth animal, is the tithe, but another animal slaughtered for its sake is not a tithe.
  The Gemara challenges: Still, say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a firstborn animal, let it be rendered like a firstborn. The Gemara adds: For what <i>halakha</i> does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a firstborn rather than a peace offering? It matters because if it is rendered a firstborn, it should not require libations. Also, this means that one should give it to the priests.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to a firstborn too, the verse states: “That you shall set apart [<i>veha’avarta</i>] unto the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12). Since with regard to the animal tithe it is stated: “Whatever passes [<i>ya’avor</i>] under the rod, the tenth shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:32), it is derived by verbal analogy between the passing [<i>avara</i>] stated with regard to a firstborn and the passing [<i>avara</i>] stated with regard to the animal tithe that a Paschal offering cannot become a firstborn either.
  The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a substitute, let it be rendered a substitute. The Gemara adds: For what <i>halakha</i> does it matter, practically speaking, that it has been rendered a substitute rather than a peace offering? The one who slaughtered it should be flogged for transgressing the prohibition of effecting substitution. Also, its sale should be determined to violate the prohibition: “It shall not be sold or redeemed” (Leviticus 27:28).
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says: It is derived from that which the verse states with regard to substitution: “Then both it and that for which it is changed shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:33). The verse teaches that only it, the animal substituted, is a substitute, but another animal is not a substitute.
  The Gemara challenges: But say that if one slaughtered a Paschal offering for the sake of a thanks offering, let it be rendered like a thanks offering. The Gemara adds: For what <i>halakha</i> does it practically matter that it has been rendered a thanks offering rather than a peace offering? If so, it should require a meal offering of forty loaves of bread.
  The Gemara answers: Is there anything, i.e., any situation, comparable to this suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require bread, but its leftover, an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, requires bread when slaughtered not for its sake? Such a suggestion is implausible.
  The Gemara asks: If so, now that a leftover Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering becomes a peace offering, this objection can also be raised: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that a Paschal offering itself does not require libations, but its leftover requires libations as a peace offering?
  The Gemara explains its answer: This is what we are saying: Is there anything comparable to the suggestion that the leftover of a thanks offering itself does not require bread, but the leftover of an offering from some other category requires bread?
  § It was taught that the verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that a Paschal offering sacrificed not on Passover eve is rendered a peace offering if sacrificed not for its sake. Rav Yeimar, son of Rav Hillel, objects to this: But from where is it derived that this verse is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? Perhaps it is written with regard to a leftover guilt offering; a guilt offering is also brought only from the flock.
  Rava says: The verse states: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of [<i>min</i>] the flock,” where the term “<i>min</i>” indicates that is brought equally from all species of the flock, i.e., from both sheep and goats. A guilt offering, by contrast, is brought only from rams, i.e., male sheep.
  Rabbi Avin bar Ḥiyya, and some say Rabbi Avin bar Kahana, objects to this: You say everywhere that the word “<i>min</i>” is stated to exclude items, but here you claim that the word “<i>min</i>” is stated to include all species of the flock? You should say the opposite: The verse indicates an offering that is brought only from some species of the flock, i.e., a guilt offering.
  Rabbi Mani says: Here too, the word “<i>min</i>” is stated to exclude certain categories of the flock, as a Paschal offering is not brought from an animal that is in its second year, and is not brought from the female animals of the flock.
  The Gemara cites another objection. Rav Ḥana of Baghdad objects to this: How can you say that when this verse is written, it is written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering? But from that which is written in the subsequent verses: “If he brings a lamb” (Leviticus 3:7), and “if his offering is a goat” (Leviticus 3:12), one learns by inference that the passage is not written with regard to a leftover Paschal offering; the Torah states elsewhere, in Exodus 12:5, that a Paschal offering is brought from both lambs and goats, and it is unnecessary to teach this again in Leviticus.
  The Gemara answers: Those verses are necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The word “lamb” is written to include the Paschal offering in the requirement that the tail be offered on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this <i>halakha</i> is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: When the verse states: “If he brings a lamb,” it is to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose first year has passed and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering. Specifically, this indicates that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh. And when the verse states: “And if his offering is a goat,” it interrupted the previous matter and taught that the sacrificing of a goat does not require that the tail be burned on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here that a Paschal offering that is too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? It is derived from the verse that Shmuel’s father cites, as Shmuel’s father says: The verse: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6), teaches that an offering that is brought only from the flock, i.e., the Paschal offering, will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.
  The Gemara responds: But even without the <i>baraita</i>, Shmuel’s father’s statement is still superfluous, as that <i>halakha</i> is derived from that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says. As Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? As it is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). Why is the herd mentioned? But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Rather, it is derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd. And what is that? It is a peace offering.
  Rather, none of these derivations are superfluous, as three verses are written that teach the <i>halakha</i> that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  One verse teaches this <i>halakha</i> in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the <i>halakha</i> in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.
  And all these verses are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only one of the verses, I would say that it is referring to a case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed. Only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering. But in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.
  And had the Merciful One written only these two verses, one might assume that only these Paschal offerings are sacrificed as peace offerings, as they were both rejected from their status as Paschal offerings. But in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.
  § Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon, i.e., a sin offering similar to those brought by the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7), not to atone for a sin but as a gift, is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation; as the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), indicating that there is one law for all the sin offerings.
  Rava sat and stated this <i>halakha</i> of Mavog. Rav Mesharshiyya raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another type of meal offering are fit, and satisfied the obligation of the owner, in contrast to animal offerings, which if slaughtered not for their sake do not satisfy their owners’ obligations.
  This is because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. As, if one removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan. Likewise, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is demonstrably incorrect, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering. The demonstrably incorrect nature of the intention prevents it from affecting the status of the meal offering in any way.
  But with regard to slaughtered offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Therefore, improper intention affects the status of the offering; if a rite is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
  Rav Mesharshiyya inferred from the <i>baraita</i>: The reason a meal offering satisfies its owner’s obligation even when one removed a handful for the sake of another type of meal offering is that its mode of preparation proves its true nature. But if its mode of preparation does not prove its nature, it does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. Why not? If Mavog’s derivation is correct, let us say likewise that the verse: “This is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicates that there is one law for all of the meal offerings, regardless of their mode of preparation.
  Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered on the condition that Nahshon, the prince of Judah, be atoned for by it is fit; this is not considered a change of owner, as there is no atonement for the dead.
  The Gemara challenges: But if this was Mavog’s statement, why did he mention Nahshon? Let him state this <i>halakha</i> in reference to a dead person in general.
  The Gemara answers: This statement of Mavog teaches us that the reason for the fitness of a sin offering slaughtered for the atonement of Nahshon is that he is dead. Consequently, if it was slaughtered for the sake of a living person obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon, it is unfit. And what is that? It is a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, which are brought not to atone for a sin but to become ritually pure. Consequently, if one sacrifices a standard sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring the sin offering of a nazirite or a leper, it is considered a change of owner, and the offering is unfit.
  The Gemara counters: Why is the offering disqualified? These sin offerings of a nazirite and a leper are equivalent to burnt offerings, since they are not brought for atonement. Sacrificing a sin offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt offering is not considered deviation with regard to the owner and does not disqualify it (see 3b).
  The Gemara answers: Rather, if Mavog’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin offering similar to that of Nahshon is fit; Nahshon’s sin offering is equivalent to a burnt offering.
  There is one who says that Rav says in the name of Mavog: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering of Nahshon is unfit. This is because a sin offering of Nahshon is equivalent to a burnt offering, and he is therefore considered to have deviated from the type of offering.
  The Gemara challenges: But why did Mavog mention a sin offering of Nahshon, which one cannot bring at all? Let him say this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a nazirite’s sin offering and a leper’s sin offering, which are also equivalent to burnt offerings. The Gemara explains: Mavog cited the primary sin offering, the first case of an individual sin offering recorded in the Bible.
  § Rav says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood, or for the sake of a sin offering brought for engaging in idol worship, is fit; it is not considered deviation from the type of offering.
  But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a nazirite’s sin offering, or for the sake of a leper’s sin offering, it is unfit; these sin offer-ings are equivalent to burnt offerings, as they are not brought for atonement.
  Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that the offering is fit, as the latter type of sin offering atones for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i> when committed intentionally, similar to the transgression of consuming forbidden fat?
  Or perhaps is it unfit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is a sliding-scale sin offering, the contents of which vary with the financial situation of the transgressor (see Leviticus 5:3–13), and not a set sin offering, which is always an animal, like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches a version of Rav’s statement according to which in all of the cases he mentioned, including one where the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering brought for consuming blood or for engaging in idol worship, the offering is unfit. What is the reason? It is derived from the verse: “And slaughter it [<i>otah</i>] for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), that a sin offering must be slaughtered for the sake of that [<i>otah</i>] sin offering, and no other.
  Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: How do you teach Rava’s dilemma? Rava appears to assume that if one slaughters a sin offering for the sake of some other types of sin offering it remains fit. How is this compatible with your version of Rav’s statement, according to which slaughter for the sake of any other type of sin offering disqualifies it?
  Rav Aḥa said to him: We teach Rava’s dilemma with regard to deviation with regard to the owner rather than from the type of offering. And this is how we teach it: First, Rava says: A sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for consuming blood, or for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for engaging in idol worship, is unfit. Since the other person is also obligated to bring a sin offering, this is considered deviation with regard to the owner. But if it was slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a nazirite’s sin offering or a leper’s sin offering, it is fit, as these sin offerings are not brought for atonement. Deviation with regard to the owner disqualifies an offering only if the other owner is obligated to bring a similar offering.
  And then we pose the dilemma like this: Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of one who is obligated to bring a sin offering for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that the offering is unfit, as the one who defiled the Temple or its sacrificial foods is obligated to bring a sin offering for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i>, similar to the transgression of the owner? Or perhaps it remains fit, as a sin offering brought for defiling the Temple is not a set sin offering like a sin offering brought for consuming forbidden fat?
  The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § It was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Reish Lakish says it is fit.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is unfit, as in his opinion one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite, i.e., one can disqualify an offering by performing one rite with improper intent about a subsequent rite that he has not yet performed. And we derive this <i>halakha</i> from intent of <i>piggul</i>, i.e., intent while performing one of the main rites to consume the offering after the appointed time, which disqualifies the offering.
  And Reish Lakish says that it is fit, as in his opinion one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive <i>halakhot</i> with regard to deviation from the type of offering from intent of <i>piggul</i>.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish each follow [<i>ve’azdu</i>] their general line of reasoning in this matter; as it was stated:
  
  Daf 10a
  
  With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or in order to burn its forbidden fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as it is considered an offering to idol worship, even if ultimately its blood was not sprinkled or its fat burned to that effect. This is because one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite; idolatrous intent while slaughtering the animal renders it forbidden, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the forbidden fat. And this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i>, as we derive <i>halakhot</i> of idol worship, which are applicable even outside the Temple, from <i>halakhot</i> concerning intent that apply inside the Temple.
  Reish Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. One cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite, and we do not derive <i>halakhot</i> applicable outside the Temple from <i>halakhot</i> that apply inside the Temple.
  Although both disputes are essentially the same, each is necessary. And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to that issue, namely, an animal slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would have reasoned that Reish Lakish says his opinion only with regard to that issue, as he maintains that <i>halakhot</i> applicable outside the Temple are not derived from <i>halakhot</i> applicable only inside the Temple. But with regard to an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that it is disqualified, as <i>halakhot</i> applicable inside the Temple can be derived from other <i>halakhot</i> applicable inside the Temple.
  And if the Sages had taught us the dispute only with regard to this issue, namely, an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, one might claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan says his opinion only with regard to this issue, which concerns <i>halakhot</i> applicable inside the Temple. But with regard to that issue, an animal that was slaughtered with idolatrous intent, one would say that he concedes to the opinion of Reish Lakish that <i>halakhot</i> applicable outside the Temple are not derived from <i>halakhot</i> applicable only inside the Temple. Therefore, both statements are necessary.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Rav Yirmeya responds to this dispute by eliciting evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish.
  Rav Dimi elaborated: Rav Yirmeya elicits evidence to support the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s time, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it beyond its designated time, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?
  Rava bar Ahilai objects to this inference: One cannot claim that deviation from the type of offering is a more severe transgression than intent to consume it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, since the latter has its own element of stringency. What is notable about intent beyond its designated time? It is notable in that one who eats the meat of such an offering is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>, whereas one who eats the meat of an offering disqualified due to deviation from the type of offering is not.
  Rather, Rava bar Ahilai says: Rav Yirmeya was actually referring to improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, since consumption of an offering thereby disqualified is not punishable by <i>karet</i>. And this is what he is saying: Just as in the case of improper intent with regard to the offering’s designated area, where if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it outside its designated area, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood outside its designated area, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit?
  Rav Ashi objects to this inference: What is notable about intent to sprinkle the blood outside its designated area? It is notable in that the disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. Can you say that the same <i>halakhot</i> govern the disqualification of an offering sacrificed not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?
  Rather, Rav Ashi says: This is what Rav Yirmeya is saying: Just as in the case of deviation with regard to the owner, where, if the one slaughtering the offering said: I am hereby slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so, it is fit, and nevertheless, if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so, it is unfit, so too, in the case of deviation from the type of offering, where even if he said: I am hereby slaughtering it not for its sake, it is unfit, isn’t it logical that if he slaughtered it in order to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, it should be unfit? The opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is supported by this logical line of reasoning.
  Rabbi Ila elicits evidence to support the opinion of Reish Lakish, that performance of one rite with improper intent with regard to another rite is of no consequence: The Torah should not have stated the requirement of sacrificing an offering for its own sake with regard to sprinkling of the blood, and rather should have let one derive it by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the common element of two other rites, from slaughter and collection of the blood. If so, for what <i>halakha</i> does the Merciful One write this redundant requirement? It is in order to say that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.
  Rav Pappa objects to this derivation: But perhaps the requirement is written to teach the opposite, that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite. A redundant requirement should expand, not reduce, the scope of actions that can disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse remain silent with regard to sprinkling the blood for the sake of the offering, and one could derive that one can have intention from one rite to affect another rite from Rav Ashi’s aforementioned <i>a fortiori</i> inference. The verse must be meant to counteract that inference and teach that one cannot have intention from one rite to affect another rite.
  And the other <i>amora</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan, would refute Rabbi Ila’s proof like this: It is necessary for the Torah to state the requirement with regard to sprinkling. It cannot be derived from the cases of slaughter and collection of the blood, since these two share an element of stringency that sprinkling lacks. What is notable about these? They are notable in that in offerings of the most sacred order they must be performed in the north of the Temple courtyard. And furthermore, they are performed in the sacrifice of inner sin offerings as well as external sin offerings, unlike the sprinkling of the blood on the external altar.
  And the other <i>amora</i>, Reish Lakish, would respond that now, in any event, we stand in a discussion with regard to peace offerings, since the requirement of sacrifice for the offering’s sake is derived from the verses concerning peace offerings. Peace offerings are neither offerings of the most sacred order nor inner sin offerings, and therefore the elements of stringency mentioned above are irrelevant.
  A parallel dispute was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its sake but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its sake, Rav Naḥman says that the offering is unfit, and Rabba says that it is fit. And Rabba retracted his opinion, and conceded to Rav Naḥman, due to Rav Ashi’s <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt offering, too, is unfit when sacrificed not for its sake. With regard to this it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering is brought for committing a transgression and a guilt offering is brought for committing a transgression. Just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The inference is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line that encircles the altar, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line, like most animal offerings?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as its blood is sprinkled below the red line, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is unfit.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: A Paschal offering cannot serve as the source either, since it possesses a unique element of stringency. What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its designated time is fixed. A guilt offering does not have a fixed time.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering can prove the point, as it does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless, it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:
  
  Daf 10b
  
  I return to my previous claim that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around [<i>ḥalila</i>] in circles.
  Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, in the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they kill the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. And similarly, with regard to a Paschal offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter [<i>zeviḥa</i>], in the verse: “It is the sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27). Here, the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.
  And the word “it” is stated with regard to a guilt offering as well, in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Here too, say that the word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit; if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: With regard to a sin offering, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. With regard to a Paschal offering too, the word “it” is stated concerning slaughter, likewise teaching that if it is sacrificed for its sake it is fit, but if it is sacrificed not for its sake it is unfit. But with regard to a guilt offering, the word “it” is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions. And since the offering itself is fit even if the sacrificial portions were not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A sin offering and a guilt offering are juxtaposed in the verse that states: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7). The verse teaches that just as a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit, so too, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is unfit.
  § The Gemara discusses the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: I return to my previous claim, that a sin offering is unique since its blood is sprinkled above the red line. The discussion is going around in circles. The Gemara asks: And let the derivation revert to its starting point, and let Rabbi Eliezer derive the point by analogy from the common element of the two sources, a sin offering and a Paschal offering. Together they can prove that a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is also unfit, since they share no element of stringency that the latter lacks.
  The Gemara answers: Even such a derivation is not valid, as it can be refuted: What is notable about their common element? A sin offering and a Paschal offering are notable in that they both have an element of <i>karet</i>. A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i> when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>. A guilt offering, by contrast, has no element of <i>karet</i>.
  § The <i>baraita</i> states: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering is not valid. If you say a <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: And let Rabbi Yehoshua say to him another refutation: Your comparison is not valid, as if you say the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering, whose blood enters the innermost sanctum, i.e., the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, must the same be said for a guilt offering, whose blood never enters the innermost sanctum?
  The Gemara answers: We are stating a comparison of a guilt offering to a sin offering specifically with regard to the external sin offerings, whose blood does not enter the innermost sanctum.
  The Gemara counters: If so, Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the comparison by pointing out another difference between a sin offering and a guilt offering, as, if the blood of an external sin offering enters the innermost sanctum, it is disqualified. This is not so in the case of the blood of a guilt offering.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a guilt offering whose blood enters the innermost sanctum is also disqualified.
  The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, as a sin offering atones for transgressions for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> if he committed them intentionally.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer derives the <i>halakha</i> specifically from a sin offering brought for hearing the voice, i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that the blood of a sin offering requires four placements on the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering requires only two.
  The Gemara answers: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that the blood of almost all offerings requires four placements.
  The Gemara counters: Rabbi Yehoshua could have pointed out another distinction, that a sin offering’s blood requires placement on all four corners of the altar, whereas the blood of a guilt offering, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, is sprinkled on only two corners.
  The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, why didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua mention other distinctions between a sin offering and a guilt offering? Isn’t there the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his finger? Isn’t there the requirement to place a sin offering’s blood on the corner of the altar? And even according to the opinion that it is not placed on the corner itself, isn’t there the requirement to place it on the edge of the corner? None of these requirements pertain to any offering other than a sin offering. Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned one of two or three valid claims at his disposal.
  § The Master says: Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Your comparison is not valid. If you say this with regard to a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled above the red line, should you necessarily say the same with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled below that line? The Gemara challenges: Let Rabbi Eliezer say to him: The blood of a guilt offering is also sprinkled above the red line, since Rabbi Eliezer holds that the <i>halakhot</i> of a guilt offering and a sin offering are parallel.
  Abaye said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering is presented above the red line, due to an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, which is treated stringently in that it is totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line, all the more so is it not clear that in the case of a guilt offering, which is not totally consumed on the altar, its blood is presented below the red line?
  The Gemara rejects the inference: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it does not atone for a sin, unlike a guilt offering. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.
  The Gemara answers: A bird sin offering can prove the point, as it atones for a sin, and still its blood is presented below the red line.
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about a bird sin offering? It is notable in that it is not a type of offering that is slaughtered; it is killed by pinching the nape of its neck. Perhaps this is why its blood is presented below the red line.
  The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since it is slaughtered, and its blood is still presented below the red line. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> is derived from a combination of the <i>halakhot</i> of a burnt offering and a bird sin offering: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and their blood is presented below the red line. So too, I shall include a guilt offering in this <i>halakha</i>, as it is an offering of the most sacred order, and therefore its blood is presented below the red line.
  Rava of Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Let Rabbi Eliezer refute this inference: What is notable about the common element of the two cases? It is notable in that neither a burnt offering nor a bird sin offering has a fixed value. Need you say that the same <i>halakhot</i> apply to a guilt offering, which has a fixed value of two silver shekels (see Leviticus 5:15)?
  Rather, this is Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for not claiming that the blood of a guilt offering is presented below the red line: As the verse states with regard to the presenting of the blood of a sin offering: “The priest who offers it” (Leviticus 6:19). The word “it” indicates that its blood is presented above the red line, but the blood of another slaughtered offering is not presented above the red line.
  The Gemara asks: If so, if Rabbi Eliezer accepts that the word “it” indicates exclusivity, let him also say that the verse: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), teaches that only a sin offering is fit if slaughtered for its sake, and unfit if slaughtered not for its sake. Consequently, other slaughtered offerings, whether slaughtered for their sake or not for their sake, are fit. Why then does Rabbi Eliezer deem a guilt offering unfit if slaughtered not for its sake?
  The Gemara answers: That instance of the word “it” does not indicate that the <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to a sin offering and to no other offerings, as the Torah excludes the Paschal offering from such a generalization. A Paschal offering is certainly disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
  The Gemara counters: If so, here too, with regard to the presenting of the blood above the red line, one must say the word “it” does not indicate that this <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to a sin offering and no other offerings, as the Torah excludes a bird burnt offering from such a generalization. The blood of a bird burnt offering is presented above the red line.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to offerings that require slaughter, in any event, the Torah excluded nothing from the generalization. Bird offerings are irrelevant, as they are killed by the pinching of the nape.
  And if you wish, say instead that even the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented in a manner different from that of a sin offering. In accordance with whose opinion is this suggestion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: This place where the blood of a sin offering is presented is discrete, and that place where the blood of a bird burnt offering is presented is discrete.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The blood that must be placed on the lower half of the altar is placed anywhere from the red [<i>hasikra</i>] line and below, and the blood that must be placed on the upper half is placed anywhere from the red line and above. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a bird burnt offering. But the placement of the blood of an animal sin offering is itself performed only on the actual corner of the altar.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (81b): As Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that should have been sprinkled on the external altar but instead entered to atone in the Sanctuary is unfit. And the Rabbis say: That is the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to the blood of a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhic status of a guilt offering is also like that of a sin offering, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7).
  The Gemara asks: Granted, the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is understandable, as he states the reason for his opinion. But what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis?
  Rava said: You cannot say that the blood of a guilt offering that entered into the Sanctuary is disqualified, due to an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a burnt offering: Just as
  
  Daf 11a
  
  with regard to a burnt offering, which is totally consumed by the fire on the altar, nevertheless, even if its blood enters into the Sanctuary it is fit, with regard to a guilt offering, which is not entirely consumed on the altar, all the more so is it not clear that even if its blood enters the Sanctuary it remains fit?
  The Gemara refutes this inference: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it does not atone for a sin. Perhaps this is why its blood is not disqualified if it enters the sanctuary.
  The Gemara responds: The meal offering of a sinner can prove the point, as it is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary, even though it atones for a sin.
  The Gemara interjects: But let us say that a bird sin offering can prove the point, as it too atones for a sin but is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary. This case is more similar to that of a guilt offering, as a bird has blood, unlike a meal offering. The Gemara answers: It is not certain that a bird sin offering is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary; this is a dilemma raised by Rabbi Avin.
  The Gemara asks: But let us refute the above response as follows: What is notable about a sinner’s meal offering? It is notable in that it is not a type of slaughtered offering.
  The Gemara answers: If so, a burnt offering can prove the point, since it is a slaughtered offering, and still if its blood enters the Sanctuary, it is not disqualified. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The <i>halakha</i> is derived from the <i>halakhot</i> of a burnt offering and a sinner’s meal offering: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings of the most sacred order, and if they enter into the Sanctuary they are still fit. So too, I shall include a guilt offering and infer that since it is also an offering of the most sacred order, if its blood enters into the Sanctuary it is still fit.
  Rava of Barnish said to Rav Ashi: But let us refute this inference: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that neither a burnt offering nor a sinner’s meal offering has a fixed value. Should you say the same <i>halakhot</i> apply to a guilt offering, which has a fixed value?
  Rather, this is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis: As the verse states: “And any sin offering, any of whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). The term “whose blood” teaches that the blood of this offering, i.e., a sin offering, and not the blood of another offering, is disqualified in this manner.
  And how does the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, interpret this term? He derives from it that only its blood is disqualified by entering the Sanctuary, but not its flesh.
  And from where do the other Rabbis derive that the flesh of a sin offering is not disqualified by entering the Sanctuary? They maintain that both <i>halakhot</i> are derived from this term, as the verse could have simply stated: Blood, but stated: “Whose blood.” The redundancy excludes not only the flesh, but also other offerings.
  And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Eliezer, does not interpret the redundancy indicated by the change from: Blood, to: “Whose blood,” to be significant. Once the word blood is mentioned, it is grammatically necessary for the verse to state “whose blood.”
  § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute in the mishna between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that a guilt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake is fit, that is why a meal offering is juxtaposed with a sin offering, and a meal offering is also juxtaposed with a guilt offering.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says: The verse states with regard to a meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), teaching that a meal offering of a sinner is like a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed its handful not for its sake, it is disqualified. And the verse also teaches that a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed its handful not for its sake, it is still fit. This accords with the opinion of the Rabbis, that a guilt offering slaughtered not for its sake is fit.
  But according to Rabbi Eliezer, for what <i>halakha</i> is a meal offering juxtaposed with a sin offering, and a meal offering juxtaposed with a guilt offering?
  The Gemara answers: They are juxtaposed to teach the other <i>halakha</i> derived by Rabbi Shimon from this verse; as we learned in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 26a): If the handful of a meal offering is conveyed to the altar not in a service vessel, the offering is unfit. And Rabbi Shimon deems it fit.
  And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states with regard to a meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering,” teaching that if a priest comes to perform its sacrificial rites by hand, he must perform them with his right hand, like one performs the rites of a sin offering. And if he performs them with a vessel, he may perform them with his left hand, like one performs the rites of a guilt offering, since Rabbi Shimon maintains this is permitted in the case of a guilt offering.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Shimon himself, does he expound this verse for this purpose, concerning one who if one removes its handful not for its sake, and expound it for that purpose, concerning conveying the handful with one’s hand?
  The Gemara answers: The verse comes mainly to teach that which Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, explained. And the <i>halakha</i> that a meal offering of a sinner whose handful was removed not for its sake is unfit is due to another reason: What is the reason a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified? The reason is that the word “it” is written with regard to it in the verse: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Since the word “it” is also written with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, in the verse: “For it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11), the same applies in that case.
  In the mishna, Rabbi Eliezer cites the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7), as a source for his opinion. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, for what <i>halakha</i> is a guilt offering juxtaposed with a sin offering? The Gemara answers: They are juxtaposed to tell you that just as a sin offering requires placing hands on the head of the offering, so too, a guilt offering requires placing hands on the head of the offering.
  § The mishna teaches: Yosef ben Ḥoni says: Other offerings that are slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering or a sin offering are unfit. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Yosef ben Ḥoni and Rabbi Eliezer said the same thing, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Yosef ben Ḥoni.
  Rabba says: Although they agree that other offerings slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering are unfit, they disagree with regard to other offerings slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering. Whereas Yosef ben Ḥoni holds that they are unfit, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that they are fit.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a Paschal offering whose first year has passed, and it must therefore be sacrificed as a peace offering, and one slaughtered it at its designated time on Passover eve for its own sake as a Paschal offering, and likewise, if one slaughtered other offerings for the sake of a Paschal offering at its designated time, the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree as to the status of the offering. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said: If, during the rest of the days of the year, when a Paschal offering is not fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, nevertheless, other offerings that are slaughtered for its sake are fit, then at its designated time, when a Paschal offering is fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, isn’t it logical that other offerings slaughtered for its sake should be fit?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Or conversely, just as during the rest of the days of the year, when a Paschal offering is not fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, it is fit if slaughtered for the sake of other offerings, so too, at its designated time, when it is fit if slaughtered for its own sake, isn’t it logical that it should be fit if slaughtered for the sake of other offerings? And accordingly, a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its own sake on the fourteenth of Nisan should be deemed fit, which contradicts the <i>halakha</i>. Clearly, this line of reasoning leads to incorrect conclusions.
  Furthermore, Rabbi Eliezer refuted Rabbi Yehoshua’s logic as follows: And do you say this derivation? What does it matter to me that other offerings slaughtered during the rest of the days of the year for the sake of a Paschal offering are deemed fit? After all, a Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of other offerings is also fit. But must you say that other offerings slaughtered at its designated time for its sake should be deemed fit? After all, at its designated time, a Paschal offering slaughtered for the sake of other offerings is unfit.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: If, as you maintain, other offerings slaughtered on Passover eve for the sake of a Paschal offering are disqualified, you have diminished the force of the requirement that a Paschal offering be sacrificed for its own sake, and you have given more force to the requirement that a peace offering be sacrificed for its own sake. A Paschal offering sacrificed at the proper time, i.e., during the rest of the year, for the sake of a peace offering, is fit, whereas a peace offering sacrificed on Passover eve for the sake of a Paschal offering is unfit.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Eliezer then presented a different logical inference: We find that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated as a Paschal offering but ultimately not sacrificed on Passover eve, is brought as a peace offering; but a leftover peace offering, one bought with money left over from funds dedicated toward the acquisition of a peace offering, is not brought as a Paschal offering. A Paschal offering is a potential peace offering, but a peace offering is not a potential Paschal offering.
  And if so, one may infer <i>a fortiori</i>: Just as with regard to a Paschal offering, whose leftover offering is brought as a peace offering, and nevertheless, if one slaughtered it at its designated time for the sake of a peace offering it is unfit, so too, with regard to a peace offering, whose leftover offering is not brought as a Paschal offering, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a Paschal offering at its designated time, isn’t it logical that it should be unfit?
  
  Daf 11b
  
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: This inference is not valid, as we find that a leftover sin offering, e.g., one bought with money left over from funds dedicated to the acquisition of a sin offering, is brought as a burnt offering, whereas a leftover burnt offering is not brought as a sin offering.
  And according to Rabbi Eliezer’s logic, one should derive <i>a fortiori</i>: Just as with regard to a sin offering, whose leftover is brought as a burnt offering, nevertheless, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit, so too, with regard to a burnt offering, whose leftover is not brought as a sin offering, if one slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering, isn’t it logical that it should be unfit? Yet, the <i>halakha</i> is that a burnt offering slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering is fit.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No, if you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering, that another offering sacrificed for its sake is fit, this is only because a sin offering is fit when sacrificed for its sake all year long. Shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a Paschal offering, which is fit when sacrificed for its sake only at its designated time? Since a Paschal offering is unfit when sacrificed for its sake during the rest of the year, it is logical that other offerings should be disqualified when sacrificed for its sake at its designated time.
  § The mishna teaches: Shimon, brother of Azarya, says that this is the distinction: With regard to all offerings, if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose sanctity is greater than theirs, they are fit; if one slaughtered them for the sake of an offering whose sanctity is less than theirs, they are unfit.
  Rav Ashi teaches in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches the same statement in the name of Rabbi Yannai: What is the reason for the opinion of Shimon, brother of Azarya? It is derived from that which the verse states: “And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they will set apart [<i>yarimu</i>] unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:15). The verse is interpreted not as a prohibition but as a halakhic axiom, teaching that offerings are not profaned, i.e., disqualified, by sacrifice for the sake of offerings whose sanctity is more elevated [<i>muram</i>] than theirs; they are profaned only by sacrifice for the sake of offerings whose sanctity is less than theirs.
  The Gemara asks: And does that verse come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? But isn’t it necessary for Shmuel’s derivation? As Shmuel says: From where is it derived that one who eats untithed produce is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven? As it is stated: “And they shall not profane the holy things of the children of Israel, which they will set apart unto the Lord.” The term: “Will set apart,” indicates that the verse is speaking of holy items that are to be set apart in the future, i.e., untithed produce, which includes the portion designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>].
  The Gemara answers: If so, if the verse taught only one <i>halakha</i>, the <i>halakha</i> of Shimon, brother of Azarya, it should have written: Which they have set apart. What is the reason the verse states: “Which they will set apart,” in the future tense? Conclude from it that the verse teaches two <i>halakhot</i>: An offering sacrificed for the sake of an offering of greater sanctity is fit, and consumption of untithed produce is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.
  Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: According to Shimon, brother of Azaria, who says that less sacred offerings sacrificed for the sake of more sacred offerings are fit, perhaps they are fit but do not propitiate God, i.e., they do not fulfill the owner’s obligation, as the Rabbis hold. If so, when Shimon, brother of Azaria, disagrees with the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna, he disagrees only with regard to one matter, i.e., that more sacred offerings sacrificed for the sake of less sacred ones are disqualified altogether. Alternatively, perhaps Shimon, brother of Azaria, holds that if less sacred offerings are sacrificed for the sake of more sacred offerings they are both fit and propitiate God, and they disagree with the Rabbis about two matters.
  Abaye, and some say Rabbi Zerika, said: Come and hear proof that they do not satisfy the owners’ obligation: Shimon, brother of Azarya, elaborated on his opinion in the mishna: A firstborn animal and the animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings are fit, as the sanctity of peace offerings is greater. Peace offerings that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of the animal tithe are unfit.
  And if it enters your mind that offerings sacrificed for the sake of offerings of greater sanctity are both fit and propitiate God, is a firstborn an offering that propitiates? Sacrificing a firstborn does not serve to propitiate God; rather, conclude that such offerings are fit but do not propitiate. And one can infer that since in the latter clause they are fit but do not propitiate, in the former clause as well, concerning all offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, they are fit but do not propitiate.
  The Gemara responds: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. Perhaps Shimon, brother of Azarya, holds that offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order propitiate God, but a firstborn animal and animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings do not propitiate God.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the latter clause concerning a firstborn and animal tithe teaching us, if not that no offerings of lesser sanctity propitiate God when sacrificed for the sake of offerings of greater sanctity? How is the clause not redundant? Does it teach us an example of offerings of higher sanctity and offerings of lower sanctity? We already learn such an example in the former clause, which teaches: How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity are unfit; offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are fit.
  The Gemara answers: It is stated lest you say that the <i>halakha</i> of offerings of higher sanctity and offerings of lower sanctity applies only when the difference is between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, but with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity and other offerings of lesser sanctity this <i>halakha</i> does not apply, as they are all considered to possess the same level of sanctity. Therefore the mishna adds the example of a firstborn animal and animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of peace offerings, to clarify that one can distinguish between different offerings of lesser sanctity as well.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this answer: We already learn this as well, in another mishna (89a): The peace offering precedes sacrifice of the firstborn because the peace offering requires placement of its blood twice so as to be visible on four sides of the altar, placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and waving of the breast and thigh by the priest and the owner, none of which is required for the firstborn.
  The Gemara answers: The primary mention of the distinction is in this mishna; that mishna cites it incidentally, in discussing the order of precedence of offerings.
  MISHNA: With regard to the Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan, the day when the Paschal offering should be slaughtered in the afternoon, if he did so not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua deems it fit as though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth of Nisan. An animal consecrated as a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not at its designated time for the sake of a different offering is fit for sacrifice as a peace offering. Ben Beteira deems it unfit as though it were slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth.
  Shimon ben Azzai said: I received a tradition from seventy-two elders, as the Sanhedrin deliberated and decided on the day that they installed Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya at the head of the yeshiva and ruled that all the slaughtered offerings that are eaten that were slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering. Based on that version, ben Azzai added to the <i>halakha</i> cited in the first mishna only the burnt offering, which is not eaten, and the Rabbis disagreed and did not concede to him.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: With regard to a Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan for its sake, ben Beteira would deem it fit, as he held that the entire day, not only the afternoon, is its designated time.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason the mishna states that according to ben Beteira, a Paschal offering slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth is considered as though it were slaughtered in the afternoon? This language seems to indicate that it does not have the same status as a Paschal offering actually slaughtered in the afternoon.
  The Gemara responds: Since Rabbi Yehoshua says the term: As though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth, ben Beteira also says the term: As though it were slaughtered in the afternoon. But in fact he maintains that there is no difference between a Paschal offering slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth and one slaughtered in the afternoon.
  The Gemara asks: If so, rather than disagreeing in the mishna with regard to a Paschal offering that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth not for its sake, let them disagree with regard to one slaughtered for its sake; ben Beteira holds that it is fit, and Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it is unfit.
  The Gemara answers: If the mishna were to write only that they disagree with regard to a Paschal offering slaughtered for its sake, I would say: But in a case where it was slaughtered not for its sake, Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to ben Beteira that it is disqualified, even though it was slaughtered in the morning, since at least part of the day, the afternoon, is fit for its sacrifice as a Paschal offering. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that they disagree with regard to this case as well.
  The Gemara asks: How can ben Beteira claim that a Paschal offering may be slaughtered in the morning? But isn’t it written: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon [<i>bein ha’arbayim</i>]” (Exodus 12:6)?
  Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, says: Ben Beteira interprets the phrase <i>bein ha’arbayim</i> literally: Between two evenings, i.e., between the eve of the fourteenth and the night after the fourteenth. Accordingly, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed all day long.
  The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the daily offering, concerning which it is written: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning, and the other lamb you shall offer <i>bein ha’arbayim</i>” (Numbers 28:4), is the entire day fit for sacrifice also?
  The Gemara answers: There, since it is written: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning,” by inference, the term <i>bein ha’arbayim</i> is referring to the actual afternoon.
  The Gemara counters: Say that one of the lambs should be sacrificed in the morning, and the other one can be sacrificed all day. Why is it evident from the requirement that one be sacrificed in the morning that the other must sacrificed in the afternoon?
  The Gemara answers: The clause “One lamb you shall offer in the morning” indicates that two lambs are not sacrificed in the morning; the other must perforce be sacrificed in the afternoon.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the lamps of the Candelabrum, one should say the same, as it is written: “And when Aaron lights the lamps <i>bein ha’arbayim</i>” (Exodus 30:8). Is the entire day fit for lighting also, according to the opinion of ben Beteira?
  The Gemara answers: There it is different, as it is written: “To burn from evening to morning” (Exodus 27:21). And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “from evening to morning” indicates that you must allocate the Candelabrum its measure of oil so that it will burn from evening until morning. Alternatively, the same verse can be interpreted as follows: Only this rite is valid from evening until morning, since all other rites must be performed during the day. Therefore, the Candelabrum is lit only at the end of the day.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the incense, one should say likewise, as it is written with regard to it: “<i>Bein ha’arbayim</i> he shall burn it” (Exodus 30:8). Is the entire day also fit for burning the incense according to the opinion of ben Beteira?
  The Gemara answers: The incense is different,
  
  Daf 12a
  
  as it is juxtaposed with the lighting of the lamps (see Exodus 30:8). Evidently, it is burned in the afternoon as well.
  The Gemara asks: Just as it is written explicitly that the Candelabrum must be lit in the evening, there too, with regard to a Paschal offering, it is written: “There you shall sacrifice the Passover offering at evening” (Deuteronomy 16:6). How can ben Beteira claim that it may be sacrificed all day long?
  The Gemara answers: That verse comes to teach a different <i>halakha</i>, that a certain item should be sacrificed after another item. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the order of precedence between the Paschal offering and the daily afternoon offering: An item, i.e., the Paschal offering, with regard to which both the expressions: “In the evening,” and: “<i>Bein ha’arbayim</i>,” are stated, should be sacrificed after an item, the daily afternoon offering, with regard to which only “<i>bein ha’arbayim</i>” is stated.
  The Gemara asks: But is there anything comparable to ben Beteira’s suggestion, that if one slaughters it in the morning, you say that it is its designated time and it is fit; but when afternoon comes, you say that the item should be sacrificed only after the daily afternoon offering?
  The Gemara answers: Yes, there is a precedent; as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one did not recite the additional prayers of Shabbat, the New Moon, or a Festival, which should be recited in the morning, until it is time for the afternoon prayer, the <i>halakha</i> is that he should first recite the afternoon prayer, and recite the additional prayers thereafter.
  The Gemara asks: But if the term “<i>bein ha’arbayim</i>” is referring to the entire day, as ben Beteira maintains, why do I need those instances of the expression that are written with regard to burning incense and lighting the lamps, which are not performed all day?
  Furthermore, this interpretation of the opinion of ben Beteira is difficult, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded on behalf of ben Beteira to the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua that a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its sake on the morning of the fourteenth of Nisan is fit, as though it were slaughtered on the thirteenth: No, if you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the thirteenth, as no part of the day is fit for sacrificing the Paschal offering, shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the fourteenth, part of which is fit for sacrificing the Paschal offering? Since it can be sacrificed in the afternoon of the fourteenth, if it is slaughtered in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified.
  The Gemara concludes: And if it is so that a Paschal offering can be sacrificed throughout the day of the fourteenth, all of it is fit, not only part of it.
  Rather, Rabbi Oshaya’s interpretation of ben Beteira’s opinion is rejected. Instead, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a Paschal offering that one slaughtered on the fourteenth in the morning, ben Beteira would deem it unfit, whether it was slaughtered for its sake or not for its sake. It is unfit even if it was slaughtered not for its sake, since part of the day is fit for its sacrifice as a Paschal offering.
  Rabbi Abbahu ridiculed [<i>megaddef</i> ] this interpretation: If so, how can you find a fit Paschal offering according to ben Beteira? If its owner designated an animal now, on the morning of the fourteenth, as a Paschal offering, it is disqualified from the outset, as it cannot be sacrificed at all, either for its sake or not for its sake. And even if its owner designated it the previous day, when it was fit to be sacrificed not for its sake, it was fit and then disqualified the next morning, when it was no longer fit to be sacrificed until the afternoon. Once an offering is disqualified, it can no longer become fit.
  Rather, Rabbi Abbahu says: Let the Paschal offering be fit when it is designated on the fourteenth after noon, when it may already be sacrificed as a Paschal offering.
  Abaye says: You may even say that it is fit if designated in the morning, as an offering is not disqualified due to the fact that it is an offering whose time has not yet arrived if its time will arrive on that same day.
  Rav Pappa says: You may even say that it is fit if designated from the previous night, as an offering that was designated at night and may be sacrificed the following day is not considered an offering whose time has not yet arrived, as it is taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Although an animal is unfit for sacrifice until its eighth day, on the night before its eighth day it may already enter the den to be tithed.
  And this is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Appetoriki, as Rabbi Appetoriki raises a contradiction: It is written: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, then it shall be seven days with its mother” (Leviticus 22:27); consequently, on the following night, i.e., the night before the eighth day, it is fit for sacrifice. And it is written subsequently in that verse: “But from the eighth day and on it may be accepted for an offering made by fire unto the Lord”; consequently, on the previous night, i.e., the night before the eighth day, it is not yet fit.
  How can these texts be reconciled? At night it is fit for consecration, and the following day it is fit for effecting acceptance, i.e., for sacrifice. Apparently, an offering that may be sacrificed the following day can be consecrated the previous night, even though it may not be sacrificed at night, and it is not considered an offering whose time has not yet arrived.
  § Rabbi Abbahu presumes that an animal consecrated before it may be sacrificed is disqualified. With regard to this, Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Abbahu: Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that consecrated animals that cannot be sacrificed at any given moment are disqualified from ever being sacrificed?
  Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Yes, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to an animal belonging to two partners, if one of them consecrated the half of it that belongs to him, and then purchased the other half of it from his partner and consecrated it, it is consecrated, despite the fact that it was consecrated piecemeal. But it may not be sacrificed, since when he first consecrated it, the consecration did not extend to his partner’s half. Since the animal was not fit to be sacrificed then, it is disqualified permanently.
  But as it is consecrated now, it can render consecrated as a substitute a non-sacred animal that is exchanged for it. If the owner substitutes a non-sacred animal for this one, the second animal becomes consecrated as well. And yet its substitute is like it; it too is consecrated but cannot be sacrificed.
  And one can conclude three points from this statement: Conclude from it that animals that cannot be sacrificed are permanently disqualified; and conclude from it that disqualification from the outset, i.e., from the time the offering is consecrated, is permanent disqualification; and conclude from it that
  
  Daf 12b
  
  there is permanent disqualification even in a case where the animal possesses sanctity that inheres in its monetary value, rather than inherent sanctity.
  § Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering to atone for the transgression, and then apostatized, thereby disqualifying himself from bringing an offering, and later recanted his apostasy, since the offering was already disqualified, it shall be disqualified permanently.
  It was also stated that Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering to atone for his transgression, and then became an imbecile, who is unfit to bring an offering, and then again became halakhically competent, since the offering was already disqualified, it shall be disqualified permanently.
  The Gemara notes: And both statements are necessary. As, if Rabbi Yoḥanan had taught us only the first statement, concerning an apostate, one might have reasoned that the offering is permanently disqualified because he disqualified himself by his own action, but here, in the case of one who became an imbecile, where he was disqualified through a process that occurs by itself, when he becomes competent again he may bring his sacrifice, as it is considered as though he were asleep. If one designated an offering and fell asleep, this certainly does not disqualify it.
  And if Rabbi Yoḥanan had taught us only the statement here, with regard to one who became an imbecile, one might have reasoned that the offering is permanently disqualified because it is not in his power to return to competence, but here, in the case of an apostate, since it is in his power to recant his apostasy, I would say that the offering is not permanently disqualified. Therefore, both statements are necessary.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering for the transgression, and then the court ruled that the type of fat he ate is permitted, thereby rendering the offering unnecessary, and the court subsequently retracted its ruling, in this case, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the offering permanently disqualified, or is it not permanently disqualified?
  A certain elder [<i>hahu sava</i>] said to Rabbi Yirmeya: When Rabbi Yoḥanan introduced the topic of permanently disqualified offerings, he introduced it with this case. What is the reason? There, in the case of one who apostatized or became an imbecile, although the person was disqualified, the offering itself was not disqualified. Consequently, it is less evident that the offering will be disqualified permanently. But here, in a case where the court ruled that the fat is permitted, the offering itself was also disqualified, as it was rendered unnecessary. Therefore, this is a more obvious example.
  § The mishna teaches: Shimon ben Azzai said: I received a tradition from seventy-two elders [<i>zaken</i>] that all slaughtered offerings that are eaten, if slaughtered not for their sake, are fit. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach the phrase seventy-two elders using the singular form: <i>Zaken</i>, rather than the plural form: <i>Zekenim</i>? The Gemara answers: Because they all maintained one opinion, i.e., they all agreed with this <i>halakha</i>.
  The mishna continues: Ben Azzai added only the burnt offering to the sin offering and the Paschal offering, which are mentioned in the first mishna as disqualified when sacrificed not for their sake.
  Rav Huna said: What is the reason for the opinion of ben Azzai? The verse states: “It is a burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma unto the Lord” (Leviticus 1:13). The word “it” teaches that if it is sacrificed for its sake, it is fit; if sacrificed not for its sake, it is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t the word “it” written with regard to a guilt offering as well, in the verse: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5)? Nevertheless, a guilt offering sacrificed not for its sake is not disqualified.
  The Gemara answers: That verse is written after the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar. Since the offering is fit even if these portions are not burned at all, it is certainly fit if they are burned not for the sake of a guilt offering.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t this mention of the word “it” with regard to a burnt offering also written after the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar?
  The Gemara answers: The word “it” is written with regard to a burnt offering in two places, both in Leviticus 1:13 and in Exodus 29:18. Although both are written after the burning of the portions consumed on the altar, one of them is superfluous, and is therefore interpreted in reference to the main sacrificial rites, performed before the burning of the portions. The verse therefore teaches that the offering is fit only if these rites are performed for its sake.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to a guilt offering as well, isn’t the word “it” written in two places, Leviticus 5:9 and Leviticus 7:5?
  Rather, ben Azzai derives his <i>halakha</i> not from a verse, but by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as with regard to a sin offering, which is not totally consumed on the altar but partially eaten by priests, if one slaughtered it not for its sake it is disqualified, so too, with regard to a burnt offering, which is treated more strictly in that it is totally consumed on the altar, all the more so is it not clear that if it is slaughtered not for its sake it is disqualified?
  The Gemara rejects this inference: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for sin, in contrast to a burnt offering, which is not brought for atonement. Therefore, only a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its sake.
  The Gemara suggests: A Paschal offering can prove the point, as it is not brought for atonement, yet it is disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about a Paschal offering? It is notable in that its time is set at Passover eve, in contrast to a burnt offering, which does not have a designated time.
  The Gemara suggests: If so, a sin offering can prove the point, since it has no set time. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The <i>halakha</i> is derived from the common element of the two sources: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are disqualified. So too, I shall include a burnt offering in this <i>halakha</i>, as it is an offering, and therefore if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is disqualified.
  The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that they both have an element of <i>karet</i>. A sin offering is brought for a transgression punishable by <i>karet</i> when committed intentionally, and one who refrains intentionally from bringing a Paschal offering is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>. A burnt offering does not have an element of <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Ben Azzai
  
  Daf 13a
  
  does not refute the inference by citing a common element of <i>karet</i>, as the elements of <i>karet</i> in a sin offering and in a Paschal offering are not parallel.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let it be derived from this inference that a guilt offering is also disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to a guilt offering, ben Azzai refutes the inference as follows: What is notable about the common element of a sin offering and a Paschal offering? It is notable in that there are communal offerings as well as individual offerings of these types, as well as communal burnt offerings, whereas there is no communal guilt offering.
  And if you wish, say instead that actually, ben Azzai also refutes the entire inference, because a sin offering and a Paschal offering uniquely share an element of <i>karet</i>. And the reason ben Azzai maintains that a burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified is that he learned it as a tradition. And as for the fact that Rav Huna cites an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, he does not believe it to be the true source for ben Azzai’s <i>halakha</i>; he said it only to sharpen the minds of his students with it, challenging them to refute it.
  MISHNA: With regard to the Paschal offering and the sin offering, where one slaughtered them not for their sake, or where he collected their blood in a vessel, conveyed this blood to the altar, or sprinkled this blood on the altar not for their sake, or where he performed one of these sacrificial rites for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, in all these cases the offerings are unfit.
  How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering.
  The offering is unfit because a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent in four matters: In the performance of the sacrificial rites of slaughtering the animal, in collecting the blood, in conveying the blood, and in sprinkling the blood.
  Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood, as he would say: It is impossible to sacrifice an offering without slaughtering the animal, or without collection of the blood, or without sprinkling the blood, but it is possible to sacrifice an offering without conveying the blood to the altar. How so? If one slaughters the animal alongside the altar and sprinkles the blood, the blood does not need to be conveyed. Therefore, the rite of conveying the blood is not significant enough to cause the offering to be disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing it.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. If he conveys the blood in a situation where he is not required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it does not disqualify the offering.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing four rites, including collection of the blood. The Gemara asks: And does collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualify the offering?
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); this is referring to collection of the blood. Do you say it is referring to collection of the blood, or is it referring to only sprinkling the blood? When it states immediately afterward: “And sprinkle the blood roundabout against the altar,” sprinkling the blood is thereby stated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present”? This is referring to collection of the blood. And the phrase “the sons of Aaron, the priests” teaches that collection of the blood must be performed by a fit priest, i.e., one who has no blemish and who was not disqualified due to flawed lineage, and that he must do so while he is wearing priestly service vestments.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that collection of the blood may be performed only by a fit priest and while he is wearing service vestments? The expression “the sons of Aaron” is stated here in the verse in Leviticus, and it is stated there: “These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed, whom he consecrated to minister in the priest’s office” (Numbers 3:3). Just as there, in the verse in Numbers, it mentions the word “priests” with regard to fit priests, i.e., Aaron’s sons, and with regard to priests who were consecrated to serve by being dressed with service vestments (see Exodus 29:30), so too here, the reference is to a fit priest and with regard to one who is wearing service vestments.
  Rabbi Tarfon said: I will bury my sons if I did not hear a <i>halakha</i> from my teachers discerning a distinction between collection of and sprinkling the blood, but I cannot explicate the distinction, as I do not remember what it was.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Akiva said: I will explicate: With regard to collection, the Torah does not render intent like action. Collecting the blood with prohibited intent does not disqualify the offering. But with regard to sprinkling, the Torah does render intent like action. Furthermore, if one collected the blood outside the Temple, he is not liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>. But if one sprinkled the blood outside the Temple, he is punished with <i>karet</i>. Moreover, if those who are unfit for the Temple service collected the blood, they are not liable for that action. But if those who are unfit for the Temple service sprinkled the blood, they are liable to receive the penalty of death at the hand of Heaven for that action.
  Rabbi Tarfon said to him excitedly: I take an oath by the Temple service that you have not deviated left or right from what I heard from my teachers. I myself heard them and I cannot explicate what they taught, whereas you teach this <i>halakha</i> on your own in concurrence with the <i>halakha</i> I heard. He said to Rabbi Akiva, using this language: Akiva, anyone who leaves you is like one who leaves his life. In any event, Rabbi Akiva’s statement in the <i>baraita</i> apparently contradicts the mishna with regard to the matter of whether the collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualifies the offering.
  Rava said: It is not difficult. The <i>baraita</i> here is referring to intent of <i>piggul</i>, i.e., intent to consume or burn the offering after its appointed time. The mishna there is referring to intent not for the sake of the offering.
  The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified in this manner, and it does not teach that an offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> in this manner. Apparently, the mishna is referring to intent that merely disqualifies the offering without rendering it <i>piggul</i>, one who partakes of which is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from the mishna’s language that this interpretation is correct.
  The Gemara asks: And does intent of <i>piggul</i> during the collection of the blood not disqualify the offering?
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that intent to consume an offering after its designated time is effective to render the offering <i>piggul</i> only when one has that intent during sprinkling. From where is it derived to include slaughter and collection of the blood in this <i>halakha</i>? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [<i>piggul</i> ]” (Leviticus 7:18). As derived on 29a, the verse is referring to performance of the sacrificial rites with intent to consume the offering after its designated time. The phrase “is at all eaten” teaches that the verse speaks of matters that lead to consumption, i.e., those sacrificial rites that enable consumption of the offering, including slaughter of the animal and collecting the blood.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that I should include even the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, after its sprinkling, and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar.
  Therefore, the verse states: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it” (Leviticus 7:18). The phrase “the one who offers it” indicates the sprinkling of the blood. Sprinkling was included in the general category of rites that enable consumption. And for what purpose was it singled out? To compare other <i>halakhot</i> to it, i.e., to say to you: Just as sprinkling is unique, as it is a rite and if not performed it prevents atonement, so too, any rite that prevents atonement if not performed is included in the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i>. Pouring the remainder of the blood and burning the sacrificial portions are therefore excluded, as they do not prevent atonement if not performed. Evidently, intent of <i>piggul</i> applies to the collection of the blood, contrary to Rava’s resolution of the contradiction between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i>.
  
  Daf 13b
  
  The Gemara answers: Rather, it is not difficult. This statement of Rava, that intent of <i>piggul</i> does not apply to collection, is referring to a case where the one slaughtering the offering says: I am hereby slaughtering this offering in order to collect its blood tomorrow. Because the collection of the blood is not considered consumption, such intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>. That statement of the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the one collecting the blood says: I am hereby collecting its blood in order to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar tomorrow. Since pouring the remains is considered consumption of the blood on the altar, such intent renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  One of the Sages said to Rava: And does prohibited intent with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions not disqualify the offering, as this explanation of the <i>baraita</i> seems to indicate?
  But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that only prohibited intent with regard to consumption of the meat is effective to render the offering <i>piggul</i>. From where is it derived to include the pouring of the remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten [<i>he’akhol ye’akhel</i> ] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). It is derived from the repeated verb that the verse speaks of two types of consumption: One is consumption of the meat by man, i.e., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is consumption of the blood and the sacrificial portions on the altar.
  The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This case, where intent renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, is where the one sprinkling the blood says: I am hereby sprinkling the blood in order to pour the remainder tomorrow. Since sprinkling the blood is necessary for atonement, if it is performed with the intent that consumption occur beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>. That case, where intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, is where he says: I am hereby pouring the remainder in order to burn the sacrificial portions tomorrow. Although burning the portions is considered consumption, pouring the remainder of the blood is not indispensable for atonement, and therefore the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  § Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: I heard that with regard to an inner sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled on the curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, dipping one’s finger in the blood in order to sprinkle it, if he does so with the intent of burning the offering on the altar the following day, renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  Ilfa heard this statement and said it before Rav Padda. Rav Padda said in response: Did we derive the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> with regard to all offerings from anything but a peace offering? The source for the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> is the verse stated with regard to peace offerings (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood to sprinkle it on the altar does not render it <i>piggul</i>, as there is no requirement to sprinkle the blood of a peace offering with one’s finger rather than the containing vessel, so too, with regard to a sin offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara challenges: But are all of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i> derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a peace offering? If that is so, then just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered <i>piggul</i>, as it is still fit, so too, the <i>halakha</i> should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered <i>piggul</i>. In fact, the <i>halakha</i> is that a sin offering sacrificed not for its sake cannot become <i>piggul</i>.
  Rather, what have you to say to explain this <i>halakha</i>? You must say that it is derived from an amplification of the verse. Here too, the <i>halakha</i> that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it <i>piggul</i> is derived from an amplification of the verse.
  Similarly, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: I heard in this upper story that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering renders it <i>piggul</i>. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish wondered [<i>tahei</i>] at this <i>halakha</i>: Did the Sages derive the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> from anything but a peace offering? Just as with regard to a peace offering, prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it <i>piggul</i>, so too, with regard to a sin offering, the <i>halakha</i> should be that prohibited intent while dipping one’s finger in the blood does not render it <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara responds: But are all of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i> derived from those of a peace offering? If so, just as sacrifice of a peace offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered <i>piggul</i>, so too, the <i>halakha</i> should be that sacrifice of a sin offering not for its sake does not preclude its being rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Indeed, all of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i>, even this one, are derived from a peace offering. Since in the case of a peace offering, intent to consume it outside its designated area disqualifies it, and in the case of a sin offering, sacrifice not for its sake disqualifies it, one can infer that just as intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering, precludes its being rendered <i>piggul</i>, so too, sacrifice not for its sake, which disqualifies a sin offering, precludes its being rendered <i>piggul</i>. By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it after its designated time does not render it <i>piggul</i>, as there is no parallel <i>halakha</i> with regard to a peace offering.
  Rabbi Yirmeya says: This inference is inherently disjointed: What is notable about intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, which disqualifies a peace offering? It is notable in that its disqualification applies to all slaughtered offerings. This is why it precludes the offering from becoming <i>piggul</i>. Need you say the same with regard to disqualification by sacrifice not for its sake, which applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering?
  Rather, what have you to say to explain this derivation? One must say that it is not based on a case-to-case comparison, but on a principle that is derived from a peace offering, namely: Any matter that disqualifies a peace offering, e.g., intent to consume it outside its designated area, precludes its being rendered <i>piggul</i>, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders the offering <i>piggul</i> if performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.
  One infers therefore that here too, with regard to an inner sin offering, any matter that disqualifies it, e.g., sacrifice not for its sake, precludes its being rendered <i>piggul</i>, and any matter that prevents atonement if not performed renders it <i>piggul</i> if it is performed with intent to consume it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time renders it <i>piggul</i>, as this rite is indispensable.
  Rav Mari says: We learn in a mishna as well that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering with intent to consume it beyond its designated time renders the offering <i>piggul</i> (<i>Menaḥot</i> 12a): This is the principle: With regard to anyone who removes a handful from a meal offering, or who places the handful in a vessel, or who conveys the handful to the altar, or who burns it on the altar, if he does so with intent that the offering will be consumed after its designated time the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  Since the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i> are derived from those of a peace offering, one can ask: Granted, the one who removes a handful of a meal offering can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, as he is considered equivalent to the one who slaughters a peace offering. Just as the blood is the essential part of an animal offering, and it is removed by slaughter, so too, the handful of a meal offering is its essential part. Likewise, the one who conveys the handful is equivalent to the one who conveys the blood of a peace offering, and the one who burns the handful is equivalent to the one who sprinkles the blood too. But to what is the one who places the handful in a vessel equivalent? From where is it derived that he, too, can render the offering <i>piggul</i>?
  If we say that placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to collection of the blood, as both rites involve placing the essential part of the offering in a vessel, one may respond: Are these rites actually comparable? There, in the case of a peace offering, the collection of the blood is performed passively. The blood spills into the vessel by itself. Here, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in a vessel. Clearly, placing the handful in a vessel is not equivalent to any specific rite in the sacrifice of a peace offering.
  Rather, since it is not sufficient for the handful to be sacrificed without first placing it in a service vessel, it is, perforce, an important rite. One who performs it can therefore render the offering <i>piggul</i> like those who perform other essential rites. Here too, with regard to dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering, although it has no equivalent in the sacrifice of a peace offering, since it is not sufficient if the priest does not perform it, it is perforce considered part of the conveying of the blood, and the priest can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while performing it.
  The Gemara responds: No, actually, placing the handful in a vessel is comparable to the collection of the blood. And despite the distinction that you say, namely, that here, in the case of a peace offering, the blood spills by itself, while there, in the case of a meal offering, the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel, nevertheless, since both this rite and that rite involve placement of the essential part of the offering in a vessel, they are equivalent. What difference is it to me if the blood spills into the vessel by itself, and what difference is it to me if the priest takes the handful himself and places it in the vessel? By contrast, dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering has no equivalent in a peace offering. Therefore, <i>piggul</i> does not apply to it.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the principle that dipping one’s finger in the blood is considered part of conveying it to the curtain is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught in one <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an inner sin offering, dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time renders it <i>piggul</i>. And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Dipping one’s finger in the blood with intent that it be consumed beyond its designated time does not render it <i>piggul</i>, and neither does slaughtering the animal with the intent to dip his finger in the blood the next day render it <i>piggul</i>. What, is it not that this matter is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>?
  The Gemara responds: No, both <i>tanna’im</i> agree that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an inner sin offering is part of conveying it to the curtain. Rather, this <i>baraita</i>, which states that a priest can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while dipping his finger in its blood, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in the mishna (13a), who hold that one can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while conveying the blood to the altar. That <i>baraita</i>, which states the opposite, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, who holds that one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while conveying the blood.
  The Gemara asks: If the latter <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, why is it referring specifically to dipping one’s finger? Doesn’t he say
  
  Daf 14a
  
  that any offering whose blood is not sprinkled on the external altar like a peace offering is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>piggul</i>? If so, <i>piggul</i> does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.
  Rather, both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis; and the apparent contradiction between them is not difficult. Here, the <i>baraita</i> that maintains that one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while dipping his finger in the blood is referring to the external sin offerings, since dipping one’s finger in order to sprinkle the blood on the external altar is not considered an essential rite. There, the <i>baraita</i> that maintains that one can render the offering <i>piggul</i> while performing this rite is referring to the inner sin offerings.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while dipping his finger in the blood of the external sin offerings? The statement: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), is not written with regard to these offerings. Since it is clearly not an essential rite, why was it necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach that improper intent while performing it cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i>?
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach this, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since it is written with regard to an external sin offering: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:34), and therefore if a monkey comes and places blood on the hand of the priest the priest must take blood from the vessel again to perform the mitzva as stated in the verse, it is considered as though the statement: And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, is written with regard to an external sin offering as well.
  Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that dipping one’s finger in the blood of an external sin offering is an inessential rite and one cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i> while performing it. As it is for this reason that the phrase: And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, is not written with regard to this offering, but rather: And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, which indicates this <i>halakha</i>, that the priest must actively take the blood in his hand, and also indicates that <i>halakha</i>, that dipping one’s finger in the blood is not an essential rite and cannot render the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood to the altar. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that prohibited intent during the conveying of the blood of the inner sin offerings disqualifies them, since with regard to those offerings, it is an indispensable rite. Because the blood must be sprinkled inside the Sanctuary and the offering cannot be slaughtered inside the Sanctuary, conveying the blood into the Sanctuary is always necessary for such offerings.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say that with regard to any offering whose blood is not sprinkled on the external altar like a peace offering, one is not liable to be punished with <i>karet</i> for eating it, due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>? In other words, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> does not apply to inner sin offerings at all.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Rabbi Shimon concedes that although intent to consume an inner sin offering after its designated time does not render it <i>piggul</i>, it disqualifies the offering, due to an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as sacrifice not for its sake, which is valid in the case of a peace offering, is nevertheless not valid in the case of a sin offering, as stated in the mishna (2a), so too, isn’t it logical that sacrifice with intent to consume it beyond its designated time, which disqualifies peace offerings, should disqualify sin offerings?
  The Gemara asks: And we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that intent to consume an inner sin offering beyond its designated time disqualifies it according to Rabbi Shimon. From where do we derive that intent to consume it outside its designated area also disqualifies it?
  If we derive it from the case of intent to consume it beyond its designated time, one may respond: What is notable about intent to consume it beyond its designated time? It is notable in that it can render an offering <i>piggul</i>, for partaking of which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  If we derive it from the case of intent not for its sake, one may respond: What is notable about sacrifice not for its sake? It is notable in that this disqualification applies even to sacrifice on a private altar during the era when such altars were permitted. By contrast, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area is irrelevant to sacrifice on a private altar, which has no designated area.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to what offering does disqualification due to intent not for its sake apply? It applies to a Paschal offering and a sin offering. Since a Paschal offering and a sin offering may not be sacrificed on a private altar, this factor is irrelevant. One may therefore derive from the case of intent not for its sake that intent to consume the offering outside its designated area disqualifies it.
  And if you wish, say that it is derived from the juxtaposition of the <i>halakha</i> of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time with the <i>halakha</i> of intent to consume it outside its designated area. The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [<i>piggul</i>]” (Leviticus 7:18). This statement: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted,” is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time; and this seemingly superfluous statement: “Neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>,” is referring to intent to consume it outside its designated area. Such juxtaposition indicates that there are parallel <i>halakhot</i> in the two cases even if they are dissimilar.
  § Rava says: If you say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of his son Rabbi Elazar, who says that the area between the Entrance Hall and the altar is considered part of the north of the Temple courtyard, the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, he must also hold that prohibited intent while conveying the blood of the inner sin offerings is effective to disqualify them only from the doorway of the Entrance Hall inward. Prohibited intent before the priest reaches the doorway of the Entrance Hall does not disqualify the offering, as conveying the blood to the doorway is not necessary; the offering could have been slaughtered at the doorway in the first place.
  And if you say that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the interior of the Temple courtyard sanctifies offerings, i.e., that offerings can be sacrificed on the courtyard floor as if it were part of the altar, prohibited intent while conveying the removed bowls of frankincense from the table in the Sanctuary to burn them on the external altar is effective to disqualify them only while conveying them from the doorway of the Sanctuary outward to the Entrance Hall. Since the table can be placed anywhere in the Sanctuary, conveying the bowls of frankincense in the Sanctuary itself is unnecessary, and once the priest exits the Entrance Hall to the Temple courtyard, the frankincense could theoretically be burned immediately.
  Rava continues: And if you say that Rabbi Shimon also holds that the sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall are one and the same, and the table can be placed in the Entrance Hall as well, prohibited intent is effective only while conveying the frankincense from the doorway of the Entrance Hall outward, i.e., in the doorway of the Entrance Hall itself.
  And if you say that he also holds that inside the doorway is considered like inside the Entrance Hall, then the table can be placed in the doorway too, and prohibited intent is not effective while conveying the frankincense even one step. Rather, it is effective only during the moment when the frankincense is taken out of the doorway to the courtyard, the time it takes the priest to stretch out his hand to place the bowls on the courtyard floor.
  And if you say that he also holds that conveying an offering not by foot is not considered conveying, prohibited intent is not effective at all while conveying the bowls of frankincense.
  § Abaye said to Rav Ḥisda’s interpreter: Ask Rav Ḥisda for me: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest conveying the blood? Is the offering disqualified, as in a case where a non-priest performs any other sacrificial rite that may performed only by priests?
  Rav Ḥisda said to him: The offering remains fit, and a verse supports my ruling: “And they slaughtered the Paschal offering, and the priests sprinkled the blood, which they received of their hand, and the Levites flayed them” (II Chronicles 35:11). Apparently, priests are required only for the sprinkling of the blood on the altar and later rites. Just as slaughter may be performed by non-priests, so can the collection and conveying of the blood be performed by them.
  Rav Sheshet raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If a non-priest, or an acute mourner,
  
  Daf 14b
  
  a drunk priest, or a blemished priest performs the rites of collection, conveying or sprinkling the blood, the offering is disqualified. And likewise, it is disqualified if a priest performs any of these rites while sitting. And this is likewise the <i>halakha</i> if a priest performs any of these rites with his left hand. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation of Rav Ḥisda’s ruling; if a non-priest conveys the blood, it is disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Ḥisda state a verse as proof that the offering is not disqualified? The verse states that the priests sprinkled the blood after receiving it from non-priests.
  The Gemara answers: The verse described a case where the non-priests served as a bench [<i>itztaba</i>]. The priests would give the blood to the non-priests to hold it for them and would then take it and sprinkle the blood. The non-priests would not convey the blood to the altar.
  Rabba and Rav Yosef both say that the case of a non-priest conveying the blood is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Shimon, who says that a dispensable rite is not classified as a true rite and therefore does not disqualify the offering if performed with prohibited intent, the offering is fit even if the conveying of the blood is performed by a non-priest. According to the Rabbis, who hold that a dispensable rite is classified as a true rite, the conveying of the blood is not valid if performed by a non-priest.
  Abaye said to him: But what about slaughter, which is an indispensable rite, and yet the offering is fit even if it is performed by a non-priest? He said to Abaye: Slaughter, though indispensable, is not classified as a sacrificial rite at all. Therefore it need not be performed by a priest.
  The Gemara asks: And is it not? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say that Rav says: If the slaughter of a red heifer is performed by a non-priest, it is not valid? And Rav said about this <i>halakha</i>: It is derived from the phrases: “Elazar the priest” (Numbers 19:3), and: “Statute” (Numbers 19:2), which are written with regard to the red heifer. The mention of Elazar indicates that slaughter must be performed by a priest, and the term “statute” indicates that one may not deviate from any of the details of the service as delineated in the verses. If one does, the heifer is disqualified.
  The Gemara answers: The red heifer is different, as it is not an offering; it has the sanctity of items consecrated for Temple maintenance. The <i>halakhot</i> that govern its service therefore differ from those of offerings proper.
  The Gemara asks: But does this not prove the point all the more? If slaughtering an animal consecrated for Temple maintenance is tantamount to a sacrificial rite, can slaughtering offerings, which are sacrificed on the altar, not be considered a sacrificial rite?
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The slaughter of a red heifer is considered just as it is in the case of shades of leprous marks, which are deemed ritually pure or impure by a priest. Although this is not a sacrificial rite, it still requires a member of the priesthood to perform it. Therefore, the requirement that the red heifer be slaughtered by a priest does not prove that it is classified as a sacrificial rite.
  The Gemara further challenges the premise of Rabba and Rav Yosef that a dispensable rite can be performed by a non-priest: But what about conveying the limbs of the offering to the ramp, which is a dispensable rite, as the offering can be slaughtered next to the ramp? And nevertheless, if it is performed by a non-priest, the offering is disqualified, as it is written: “And the priest shall sacrifice the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13); and the Master says: This is referring to conveying the limbs to the ramp.
  The Gemara answers: In a case where the verse explicitly revealed that a rite must be performed by a priest, it revealed it; but in a case where the Torah did not reveal it, it did not reveal it. With regard to conveying the blood, the Torah does not state explicitly that a priest is required.
  The Gemara challenges: But is it not all the more so obvious? Just as conveying the limbs to the ramp requires that the conveyor be a member of the priesthood, even though it does not prevent atonement if not performed at all, since atonement was already effected by sprinkling the blood, all the more so is it not clear that concerning conveying the blood and sprinkling it on the altar, where the failure to convey it and sprinkle it on the altar prevents atonement, it must be that the conveyor be a member of the priesthood? This difficulty remains unresolved.
  It was also stated that Ulla says that Rabbi Elazar says: In a case where conveying the blood is performed by a non-priest, the offering is disqualified, even according to Rabbi Shimon.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is conveying the blood not by foot but rather by passing it by hand to another priest considered conveying, or is it not considered conveying? Can the rite be performed in this manner?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear evidence from the <i>baraita</i>: And likewise, if the priest collected, conveyed, or sprinkled the blood while sitting, and likewise, if he performed any of these rites with his left hand, the offering is disqualified. Since only sitting is listed, one consequently infers that if the priest conveyed the blood while standing but in a manner similar to sitting, i.e., by outstretching his hand without walking, the offering is fit. Evidently, conveying the blood does not require walking.
  The Gemara rejects this inference: Perhaps when the <i>baraita</i> states: Sitting, it is referring to one who conveys the blood by moving toward the altar while sitting on the ground in such a manner that he rubs himself against the floor of the courtyard as he pulls himself forward. If so, the parallel case of standing in a manner similar to sitting is a case where the priest moves forward a bit. Perhaps if he does not move at all and merely outstretches his hand, the rite is not valid.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 64a): An Israelite would slaughter the Paschal offering, and a priest would collect the blood. The priests would be lined up from the place where the lamb was slaughtered until the altar. The priest who collected the blood would immediately hand it to another priest standing next to him, and the other priest would pass it to another, and so forth, until it would reach the altar. Evidently, the blood can be passed from hand to hand; it need not be conveyed by foot.
  The Gemara answers: There, too, the priests would move a bit with their feet while passing the blood forward. The Gemara asks: But what is the mishna teaching us in this description, if not that the blood need not be conveyed by foot? The Gemara answers: It teaches that: “In the multitude of people is the king’s glory” (Proverbs 14:28). It honors God when the Temple service is performed by a multitude of priests.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another resolution from a mishna (32a): If a priest who is fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave it to an unfit individual standing next to the altar, that individual should return it to the fit priest, so that he may perform a complete act of conveying the blood to the altar. Evidently, the blood must be conveyed to the altar by foot. If conveying by hand were valid, another priest could simply take the blood from the unfit person and complete the conveying of the blood to the altar.
  The Gemara rejects this inference: Say that the wording of the mishna should be emended; instead of stating that the unfit person should return the vessel to the fit priest, it should state that the fit priest, even another priest, should then receive it from the unfit person. If so, the mishna proves nothing about conveying by hand.
  It was stated: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Conveying the blood not by foot is not considered conveying.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  The Gemara asks: If the blood was conveyed by hand, is it possible to correct it by conveying it again properly, or is it not possible to correct it, and the offering is disqualified permanently?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the aforementioned mishna: If a priest fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave the vessel to an unfit person standing next to the altar, the latter should return it to the fit priest. Apparently, even after the blood is conveyed in an inappropriate manner, it can be corrected.
  And though one can indeed explain that the fit priest should then receive it from him, as posited above, if it enters your mind that if the blood is conveyed incorrectly it is not possible to correct it, the offering was already disqualified when the priest gave the blood to the unfit person. Taking it back is of no consequence.
  The Gemara rejects this inference: Do you maintain that this is referring to a case where the non-priest is standing inside, between the fit priest and the altar? No, it is a case where the non-priest is standing outside, farther away from the altar than the priest. Therefore, when the priest gave him the blood, he was not conveying it toward the altar at all; he was moving it farther away from the altar.
  It was stated: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Conveying the blood not by foot renders the offering unfit. Apparently, it is not possible to correct it, as otherwise Rabbi Yoḥanan would have merely stated that it is not considered conveying, as in his earlier statement (14b).
  Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Ulla from a mishna (32a): If the blood spilled from the vessel onto the floor and one collected it from the floor, it is fit for sacrifice. Apparently, although spilling the blood on the floor constitutes a not valid conveying toward the altar, it can still be corrected after the fact.
  The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a case where the blood that spilled went outward, i.e., away from the altar, so it did not constitute conveying at all.
  The Gemara asks: Can spilled blood go outward and not come inward? Clearly, spilled blood spreads to all sides. The Gemara answers: It is a case where the blood spilled on an inclined plane, and it therefore spilled only outward, away from the altar. And if you wish, say instead that it spilled into a hole in the ground, so it did not spread in any direction. And if you wish, say instead that it is a case where the blood is thick, so it did not spread in all directions.
  The Gemara asks: But did the <i>tanna</i> go to all that trouble [<i>ikhpal</i>] just to teach us all these unlikely cases? And furthermore, rather than teaching in another chapter (see 25a) that if the blood spilled from the animal’s neck onto the floor and one collected it in a vessel from the floor it is unfit, let the mishna teach a distinction within the case where the blood spilled from the vessel itself: In what case is this statement, that the blood is fit, said? In a case where the spilled blood went outward, away from the altar, but if it came inward it is unfit. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation; if the blood is conveyed in a not valid manner, it can be corrected.
  § It was stated: The dispute in the mishna (13a) between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis as to whether improper intent while conveying the blood disqualifies the offering is only with regard to conveying the blood not by foot. With regard to greater conveying, i.e., conveying the blood by moving the feet, everyone agrees that if one performs it with prohibited intent, the offering is unfit. When they disagree, it is with regard to lesser conveying, i.e., conveying the blood by hand without moving the feet, in a case where the offering was slaughtered next to the altar.
  They laughed at this statement in the West, Eretz Yisrael, saying: But if so, one encounters difficulty with regard to a bird sin offering, which is killed through pinching its nape on the altar and whose blood is sprinkled directly from its neck. It is known that if one sprinkled its blood with prohibited intent, the offering is unfit. And according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that prohibited intent while conveying the blood by hand does not disqualify the offering, how can you find these circumstances? If the priest has prohibited intent with regard to the offering before the blood comes out of the bird, this intent is nothing, since his waving it is like conveying by hand. And if he has such intent after the blood came out, its mitzva was already performed, as the blood already reached the altar.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty? Perhaps the offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent from the moment the blood leaves the bird until the moment it reaches the altar.
  This is as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the priest was sprinkling the blood, and the hand of the one sprinkling was severed before the blood reached the airspace of the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the sprinkling not valid since it was performed by a blemished priest, or is it valid because the blood left the bird before he was blemished? And Rabbi Zeira said to him: It is not valid. What is the reason? We require that the verse: “And sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), be fulfilled in the same manner as the verse that follows it: “And the priest shall place of the blood upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:7), namely, that the blood reach the altar. Therefore, the blood can be disqualified anytime until it reaches the altar, whether through the priest becoming blemished or through prohibited intent.
  When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the study hall, they said: This is the reason for the laughter of the scholars of Eretz Yisrael: With regard to greater conveying, i.e., conveying by foot, can one say Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis do not disagree? Clearly, when they disagree in the mishna, they disagree with regard to greater conveying, as Rabbi Shimon reasons that conveying is a dispensable rite. Only conveying by foot is dispensable, since even if the offering is slaughtered next to the altar, the priest will need to move its blood somewhat with his hand.
  Rather, the statement under discussion should be emended to say: With regard to lesser conveying, i.e., conveying the blood by hand, everyone agrees that it does not disqualify the offering due to prohibited intent. When they disagree, it is with regard to greater conveying, i.e., conveying the blood for a distance by foot. Rabbi Shimon holds that improper intent even then does not disqualify the offering, as the rite is dispensable, and the Rabbis maintain that it does disqualify it.
  § If a non-priest conveyed the blood to the altar, and a priest returned it to its original location, and a priest then conveyed it again to the altar, the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yannai disagree with regard to the <i>halakha</i>. One says that the offering is fit, and one says it is unfit. This is because one Sage holds that if the blood is conveyed improperly, it is possible to correct it, and one Sage holds that it is not possible to correct it.
  If a priest conveyed it to the altar, and then returned it, and a non-priest then conveyed it again, Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: According to the statement of the one who deems the offering fit in the previous case, where a non-priest conveyed it the first time and a priest conveyed it the second time, in this case the offering is unfit, as a non-priest conveyed it the second time. According to the statement of the one who deems the offering unfit in the previous case, as a non-priest conveyed it the first time, in this case, where a priest conveyed it the first time, he deems the offering fit.
  Rava says: Even according to the statement of the one who deems the offering unfit in a case where a non-priest conveyed it the first time, it is unfit in this case as well, where a priest conveyed it the first time and a non-priest conveyed it the second time. What is the reason? Because after the blood is returned to its original location, it is necessary
  
  Daf 15b
  
  to bring it again. Therefore, the second conveying must also be performed by a priest.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rav Ashi: This is what Rav Yirmeya of Difti said when he stated that it is necessary to bring the blood to the altar again, and that therefore the second conveying is considered a sacrificial rite and must be performed by a priest: He meant that this principle is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.
  This is as we learned in the mishna (13a): Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. If he conveys the blood in a situation where he is not required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it does not disqualify the offering.
  And Rava says: All of the <i>tanna’im</i> concede that if one collected the blood outside, i.e., at a distance from the altar, and he brought it inside, close to the altar, that is considered necessary conveying. If one collected it inside and took it outside, that is considered unnecessary conveying.
  They disagree only with regard to a case where he brought it in and took it out again. One Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that since it is necessary to bring it back to the altar, it is considered necessary conveying, and prohibited intent while performing it disqualifies the offering. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that since the rite of conveying to the altar was already performed, it is not considered conveying that is necessary for the sacrificial service, and prohibited intent while performing it does not disqualify the offering. Apparently, the same dispute applies to a case where a non-priest conveyed the blood the second time.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s interpretation from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. How so? If one collected the blood outside, at a distance from the altar, and he brought it inside, close to the altar, that is considered necessary conveying. If one collected it inside and took it outside, that is considered unnecessary conveying. And consequently, one infers that if he brought it in again, it is considered necessary conveying even according to Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rava said to him: If this <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught, and I cannot disagree with it.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to all slaughtered offerings, if the one who collected their blood was a non-priest; or a priest who was an acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative has died and has not yet been buried; or one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed; or one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, e.g., a <i>zav</i> or leper after the seventh day of the purification process; or a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments; or one who did not wash his hands and feet from the water in the Basin prior to performing the Temple service; or an uncircumcised priest; or a ritually impure priest; or if the one who collected the blood was sitting; or if he was standing not on the floor of the Temple but upon vessels, or upon an animal, or upon the feet of another, he has disqualified the offering.
  If he collected the blood with his left hand, he disqualified the blood for offering. In this last case, Rabbi Shimon deems it fit.
  GEMARA: From where do we derive that a non-priest who performs sacrificial rites disqualifies an offering? As Levi teaches: The verse states: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel [<i>benei Yisrael</i>]” (Leviticus 22:2). Levi continues: “The children of Israel” serves to exclude what from the prohibition against sacrificing an offering in a state of impurity? If we say that it serves to exclude the offerings of women, and the verse states “<i>benei</i>” in the masculine to indicate sons but not daughters, is it conceivable that an offering of women is sacrificed in a state of impurity?
  Rather, perhaps it serves to exclude offerings of gentiles. Now, if the frontplate of the High Priest, which normally effects acceptance for offerings of Jews sacrificed in a state of impurity, does not effect acceptance for the offerings of gentiles, as the Master said: And with regard to an offering of gentiles, whether it was offered in a state of impurity unintentionally or intentionally, it was not accepted; can it be, then, that such an offering is sacrificed in a state of impurity <i>ab initio</i>?
  Rather, this is what the verse is saying, i.e., it should be read in the following manner: That they separate themselves from the sacred items; the children of Israel, and that they not profane My holy name. That is, the verse states that they, the priests, must separate themselves from the sacred items when they are ritually impure, and that the children of Israel must separate themselves from performing the sacrificial rites, so that they will not profane, i.e., disqualify, the offerings.
  A <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The <i>halakha</i> of a non-priest who performs the sacrificial rites is derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a blemished priest: Just as with regard to a blemished priest, who may partake of the meat of offerings, if he performed sacrificial rites he has nevertheless desecrated the service,
  
  Daf 16a
  
  then with regard to a non-priest, who may not partake of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, is it not right that if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service?
  The Gemara rejects the inference: One cannot draw an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from a blemished priest, as what is notable about the case of a blemished priest? It is notable in that the Torah rendered an animal that is sacrificed like the priest who sacrifices it, i.e., both blemished animals and blemished priests are disqualified. Since there is an added element of stringency with regard to the case of a blemished priest, one cannot draw an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from it.
  The Gemara suggests: The case of an impure priest will prove that this is no reason to reject the <i>a fortiori</i> inference. While an animal and the priest are not equated with regard to ritual impurity, as an animal cannot become impure while alive but a priest can, an impure priest desecrates the service. The Gemara rejects this as well: What is notable about the case of an impure priest? It is notable in that an impure priest imparts impurity to others.
  The Gemara responds: A blemished priest will prove that this is no reason to reject the inference, as he cannot impart his blemish to others. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. Therefore, one may derive the <i>halakha</i> of a non-priest from the combination of the case of a blemished priest and that of an impure priest: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are prohibited from performing sacrificial rites and if they performed these rites they have desecrated the service. Therefore, I will also include a non-priest, who is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, and conclude that if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a non-priest is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites? If it is derived from the verse: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, and that they not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2), then the <i>a fortiori</i> inference is unnecessary, since profanation itself is writ-ten in the verse. Rather, it must be that it is derived from the verse: “Keep the charge of the Tent of Meeting, whatever the service of the Tent may be; but a common man shall not draw close to you” (Numbers 18:4).
  The Gemara asks: Still, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference drawn from the cases of a blemished priest and an impure priest can be refuted: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that a blemished priest and an impure priest were not permitted to perform sacrificial rites on a private altar during times when there was no Temple or permanent Tabernacle. Since it was permitted for non-priests to perform rites on private altars, perhaps non-priests do not desecrate the sacrificial rites performed in the Temple.
  The Gemara responds: Do not say that the case of an impure priest will prove the <i>a fortiori</i> inference with the case of a blemished priest; rather, say that the case of an acute mourner will prove it, as it is prohibited for him to perform the service and, if he were to perform it, he would desecrate it. This, too, is rejected: What is notable about the case of an acute mourner? It is notable in that he is prohibited from partaking of second tithe, whereas a non-priest may partake of second tithe. The Gemara responds: A blemished priest will prove the inference, as he may partake of second tithe.
  And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case. Their common element is that they are prohibited from performing sacrificial rites <i>ab initio</i>, and they desecrate the service if they do so. Therefore, with regard to a non-priest, who is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service.
  The Gemara asks: Here, too, let one refute the inference: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that both an acute mourner and a blemished priest were not permitted to perform sacrificial rites on a private altar, unlike a non-priest. Rav Samma, son of Rava, objects to this: And who shall say to us that an acute mourner was prohibited from performing rites on a private altar? Perhaps it was permitted for him to perform the rites on a private altar.
  Rav Mesharshiyya says: The <i>halakha</i> that a non-priest desecrates the service is derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a priest who performed sacrificial rites while sitting: Just as with regard to a priest who was sitting, who may partake of the meat of offerings, if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service, then with regard to a non-priest, who may not partake of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, is it not right that if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service?
  The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the case of a sitting priest? It is notable in that one who sits is disqualified from bearing witness, as witnesses must stand when testifying. Since there is an added aspect of stringency with regard to the case of a sitting priest, one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest from it. The Gemara responds: Learn instead from the <i>halakha</i> of a sitting Torah scholar, as the court may allow a Torah scholar to sit while testifying.
  The Gemara challenges: Still, one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> from this, as what is notable about the category of a sitting priest? It is notable in that generally speaking, one who sits is disqualified from bearing witness, even though there are exceptions. The Gemara responds: The category of a sitting priest cannot refute the derivation. One can refute a derivation only from concrete cases, not general concepts. And even if you say it can refute the derivation, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest can be derived from the case of a sitting priest and from one of those other cases, i.e., a blemished priest, an impure priest, or an acute mourner, all of whom may testify.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that one who is sitting is fit to perform sacrificial rites on a private altar? If he is not, one can refute the common element in the same manner as above. The Gemara responds: The verse states: “The Lord separated the tribe of Levi to bear the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord, to stand before the Lord to minister to Him” (Deuteronomy 10:8). The verse indicates that the sacrificial rites must be performed while standing only before the Lord, i.e., in the Temple, where the Divine Presence resides, and not before a private altar, which is a mere place of worship.
  § The mishna teaches that rites performed by an acute mourner are disqualified. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written with regard to a High Priest who is an acute mourner: “And he shall not leave the Sanctuary, and he will not profane the Sanctuary of his God” (Leviticus 21:12). One can infer: But any other ordinary priest who did not leave the Sanctuary while he was an acute mourner and continued to perform the service has desecrated the rites he performed.
  Rabbi Elazar says: One can derive it from here instead: When Moses asked Aaron why the sin offering that was sacrificed on the day that Nadav and Avihu died was burned and not eaten, he suspected that Aaron’s other sons, Eleazar and Itamar, had sacrificed the sin offering while acute mourners, which disqualified it and forced them to burn it. Aaron responded to Moses: “This day have they offered their sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:19). Rather, I offered it. As High Priest, I do not desecrate the Temple service even when I am an acute mourner; I burned it only because, as acute mourners, my sons and I are prohibited from partaking of the meat. Rabbi Elazar continues: By inference, one can derive that if they had offered the sin offering they would have disqualified it, and it would have been proper that it was burned.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rabbi Elazar does not say that this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “And he shall not leave the Sanctuary”? The Gemara responds: He could have said to you: Is it written: But any other ordinary priest that did not leave the Sanctuary has desecrated the rites he performed? It is only an inference, and so it is not conclusive.
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who derives it from the verse: “And he shall not leave the Sanctuary,” what is the reason that he did not say to derive it from the verse: “This day have they offered their sin offering?” The Gemara responds: He holds that the sin offering was burned because it became ritually impure, not because Aaron and his sons were acute mourners.
  A <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The <i>halakha</i> is derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a blemished priest: And just as
  
  Daf 16b
  
  with regard to a blemished priest, who may partake of the meat of offerings, if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service, then with regard to an acute mourner, who may not partake of the meat of offerings, is it not right that if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service?
  The Gemara rejects the inference: One cannot derive this <i>halakha</i> from the case of a blemished priest, as what is notable about a blemished priest? It is notable in that the Torah rendered animals that are sacrificed like the priests who sacrifice them. Since this stringency does not exist with regard to acute mourning, perhaps an acute mourner may perform sacrificial rites as well.
  The Gemara responds: The case of a non-priest will prove that this is no reason to reject the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, since there is no equivalence between priest and sacrifice in this regard, yet a non-priest desecrates the service. The Gemara rejects this as well: One cannot cite a proof from the case of a non-priest, as what is notable about the case of a non-priest? It is notable in that he has no remedy, i.e., a non-priest may never perform the sacrificial rites. By contrast, an acute mourner will eventually become permitted to perform the service.
  The Gemara responds: A blemished priest will prove that this is no reason to reject the inference, as even though the priest may perform the service if the blemish is healed, he desecrates the service so long as he remains blemished. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. Therefore, one learns the <i>halakha</i> from the combination of the cases of a blemished priest and a non-priest: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case. Their common element is that they are prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, and if they performed such rites they have desecrated the service. Therefore, I will also include an acute mourner, who is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, and conclude that if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service.
  The Gemara clarifies: Where is an acute mourner prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, as asserted in the inference? If we say that it is derived from the verse: “And he shall not leave the Sanctuary, and he will not profane the Sanctuary of his God” (Leviticus 21:12), then the above <i>a fortiori</i> inference is unnecessary, since profanation itself is written in the verse. Rather, it must be that it is derived from the verse: “This day have they offered their sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:19), and this <i>tanna</i> holds that the sin offering brought by Aaron was burned because Aaron and his sons were in acute mourning.
  The Gemara challenges: The inference from the common element of the cases of a blemished priest and a non-priest can be refuted: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted. There is an exception to the prohibition against an acute mourner performing the Temple service, namely the High Priest, who may perform the sacrificial rites while an acute mourner.
  The Gemara responds: The case of an impure priest will prove that this is no reason to reject the inference, as there is an exception to the prohibition against performing the service while impure, namely that the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of impurity is permitted in cases involving the public, yet an impure priest desecrates the service.
  The Gemara asks: What is notable about the case of an impure priest? It is notable in that he imparts impurity to others. Perhaps it is only for this reason that an impure priest desecrates the service. The Gemara responds: Those other cases, i.e., a blemished priest and a non-priest, will prove that this does not reject the inference, since they do not impart their status to others. And the inference has reverted to its starting point. Therefore, one can derive the <i>halakha</i> from the combination of the cases of an impure priest, a blemished priest, and a non-priest: The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case; their common element is that they are prohibited from performing sacrificial rites and they desecrate the service. Therefore, I will also conclude that since an acute mourner is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites, he desecrates the service.
  The Gemara asks: But let one refute this as well: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that its general prohibition was not permitted, even in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering. By contrast, a High Priest in acute mourning may perform rites even for individual offerings. The Gemara responds: The category of impurity, at least, is permitted in the case of communal offerings. Therefore, one cannot claim that an impure priest, a non-priest, and a blemished priest all share a lack of exemptions.
  Rav Mesharshiyya says: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to an acute mourner is derived by <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a sitting priest: And just as with regard to a sitting priest, who may partake of the meat of offerings, if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service, then with regard to an acute mourner, who may not partake of the meat of offerings, is it not right that if he performed sacrificial rites he has desecrated the service?
  The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the case of a sitting priest? It is notable in that one who sits is disqualified from bear-ing witness, as witnesses must stand when testifying. The Gemara responds: Learn instead from the <i>halakha</i> of a sitting Torah scholar, as the court may allow a Torah scholar to sit while testifying.
  The Gemara challenges: Still, one cannot derive from this, as what is notable about the category of a sitting priest? It is notable in that generally speaking, one who sits is disqualified from bearing witness, even though there are exceptions. The Gemara responds: The category of a sitting priest cannot refute the derivation. One can refute a derivation only from concrete cases, not general concepts. And even if you say it can refute the derivation, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a non-priest can be derived from the case of a sitting priest and from one of those other cases, i.e., a non-priest, an impure priest, or a blemished priest, through their common element.
  § The mishna teaches that if an acute mourner collects the blood of an offering, the offering is disqualified. Rava says: They taught this only with regard to an individual’s offering. But with regard to a communal offering, a rite performed by an acute mourner does effect acceptance. One can derive this by <i>a fortiori</i> inference from ritual impurity.
  Just as the prohibition against performing rites in a state of ritual impurity, whose general prohibition was not permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering, as no individual offering may be sacrificed in a state of impurity, was nevertheless permitted in the case of an ordinary [<i>hedyot</i>] priest performing rites for a communal offering, as communal offerings may be sacrificed by an impure priest when necessary; then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing rites while in a period of acute mourning, whose general prohibition was permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering, as the High Priest may perform all rites while an acute mourner, is it not right that this prohibition was permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering?
  Rava bar Ahilai objects to this: On the contrary, if such an inference can be made, then perhaps one can make the following mistaken inference: The performance of rites in a state of acute mourning should not be permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering, by <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as the prohibition against performing rites in a state of ritual impurity, whose general prohibition was permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering, was not permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering; then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing the rites during a period of acute mourning, whose general prohibition was not permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering, is it not right that this prohibition should not be permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering?
  And similarly, one may claim: The performance of rites in a state of ritual impurity should be permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering, by <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as the prohibition against performing rites in a state of acute mourning, whose general prohibition was not permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering, still was permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering; then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing the rites in a state of ritual impurity, whose general prohibition was permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering, is it not right that this prohibition was permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering?
  And similarly, one may claim: The performance of rites in a state of ritual impurity should not be permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering, by <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as the prohibition against performing rites in a state of acute mourning, whose general prohibition was permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual’s offering, still was not permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering; then so too, with regard to the prohibition against performing the rites in a state of ritual impurity, whose general prohibition was not permitted in the case of a High Priest performing rites for an individual offering, is it not right that this prohibition should not be permitted in the case of an ordinary priest performing rites for a communal offering?
  The Gemara provides a mnemonic for recalling the above rejections of Rava bar Ahilai: And should not be permitted, and should not be permitted, acute mourning, and ritual impurity, ritual impurity, individual, and individual, communal.
  
  Daf 17a
  
  Rather, one can derive this way and one can derive that way. Since these derivations contradict one another, each and every <i>halakha</i> shall stand in its place and not modify the other by <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  § The mishna teaches that sacrificial rites performed by one who immersed that day are disqualified. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: It is derived as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Simai says: From where in the Torah is the allusion with regard to a priest who immersed that day, that if he performed the Temple service he desecrated that service? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “They shall be sacred to their God and they shall not desecrate the name of their God” (Leviticus 21:6).
  If this verse is not written with regard to the matter of an impure priest who performed the Temple service, as that <i>halakha</i> is derived for us from the verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:2), then apply it to the matter of a priest who immersed that day who performed the Temple service. Although he is no longer impure in every sense, the priest remains impure in the sense that he is prohibited from partaking of <i>teruma</i> and sacrificial food, and from entering the Temple.
  The Gemara asks: Why must the verse be applied to the matter of one who immersed that day? Say that one should apply it to the matter of one who creates a bald spot upon his head or to the matter of one who destroys his beard, as these matters are discussed in the preceding verse.
  The Gemara responds: This verse is already used to indicate another <i>halakha</i> relating to one who immersed that day: From where do we derive that if one who immersed that day performed sacrificial rites, he is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven? As it is derived by verbal analogy between profanation mentioned in this context and profanation from <i>teruma</i>, as the verse states in this context: “And not profane the name of their God” (Leviticus 21:6), and the verse states with regard to <i>teruma</i>: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die therein, if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). It can be inferred from this verbal analogy that one who disqualifies <i>teruma</i>, i.e., one who immersed that day, profanes the Temple service, and one who does not disqualify <i>teruma</i>, i.e., one who creates a bald spot or one who destroys his beard, does not profane the service.
  § Rabba said: Why do I need that which the Merciful One wrote, i.e., that an impure priest, and one who immersed that day, and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering all disqualify the rites they perform? Wouldn’t it have been enough to teach the <i>halakha</i> in only one case?
  Rabba explains: All three are necessary, as in each case there is a stringency not present in the others. Therefore, had the Merciful One written only that an impure priest desecrates the service, one might say that this is because he imparts impurity to others, and since the other two cases do not, one cannot derive them from the case of an impure priest. And had the Merciful One written the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to one who immersed that day, then the case of one who has not yet brought an atonement offering could not be derived from it, since the former is unfit to partake of <i>teruma</i> while the latter is not. And had the Merciful One written the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, then the case of one who immersed that day could not be derived from it, since only the former has not yet performed a necessary action, while one who immersed that day must simply wait for nightfall in order to become fully pure.
  The Gemara asks: Still, why are all three necessary? Granted, from one of these cases the other two cannot be derived, but let one be derived from the other two.
  The Gemara asks: Which of the three should the Merciful One not write? If one suggests: Let the Merciful One not write the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who has not yet brought an atonement offering and derive it from these other two, an impure priest and one who immersed that day, one can reply: What is notable about these? They are notable in that they are unfit to partake of <i>teruma</i>. Since one who has not yet brought an atonement offering may partake of <i>teruma</i>, perhaps he does not disqualify rites he performs.
  Rather, say: Let the Merciful One not write the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who immersed that day and derive it from these other two, an impure priest and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering. As, what can you say to refute this? One cannot reply: What is notable about these; they are notable since they have not yet performed a necessary action, because ultimately their impurity, i.e., the impurity of one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, is weak when compared to one who immersed that day, and relatively speaking, one who has not yet brought an atonement offering is not considered to be lacking the performance of an action.
  
  Daf 17b
  
  The Gemara responds: Rabba holds that a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] who has not yet brought an atonement offering is still considered to have the impure status of a <i>zav</i>. The impurity of one who has immersed but has not yet brought an atonement offering is therefore considered stronger than that of one who immersed that day but requires no atonement.
  The Gemara notes: And the matter of whether a <i>zav</i> who has not yet brought an atonement offering is still considered a <i>zav</i> is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If an acute mourner or one who has not yet brought an atonement offering burned the red heifer, it is fit. Yosef the Babylonian says: If an acute mourner burned it, it is fit, but if one who has not yet brought an atonement offering burned it, it is disqualified. What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Yosef the Babylonian, holds that a <i>zav</i> who has not yet brought an atonement offering is considered a full-fledged <i>zav</i> and therefore disqualifies the red heifer, and one Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that a <i>zav</i> who has not yet brought an atonement offering is not considered a <i>zav</i>, but is instead considered like one who immersed that day, who is fit to burn the red heifer?
  The Gemara responds: No, everyone agrees that he is considered a <i>zav</i>, and here the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to this matter, as it is written with regard to the rite of the red heifer: “And the pure person shall sprinkle” the water of purification (Numbers 19:19). The preceding verse already states that the one performing the service must be ritually pure. Therefore, by stating “pure” this verse emphasizes that he needs be pure enough only to perform the rite of the red heifer specifically. By inference, one derives that he may be impure in some way that disqualifies him for other rites. This teaches that one who immersed that day is fit to participate in the rite of the red heifer.
  The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree as to the extent of this <i>halakha</i>: One Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that it is referring to any state of impurity mentioned in the entire Torah, i.e., anyone who immersed that day due to any impurity may participate in the rite of the red heifer. And one Sage, Yosef the Babylonian, holds that it is referring specifically to one who was in the state of impurity mentioned in this passage, i.e., impurity contracted from a corpse, which the red heifer purifies.
  Therefore, according to Yosef the Babylonian, with regard to an acute mourner and one who immersed that day after becoming impure due to contact with the carcass of a creeping animal, since they are treated more leniently, they are derived <i>a fortiori</i> from the case of one who immersed that day to remove impurity contracted from a corpse, and they are fit to participate in the rite of the red heifer. But with regard to a <i>zav</i> who has not yet brought an atonement offering, who is treated more stringently, since his impurity emerges onto him from his body rather than being imparted from without, one does not derive that he is fit to participate in the rite of the red heifer.
  § The mishna teaches that a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments disqualifies the rites he performs. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rabbi Avuh says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some determined it to be stated in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: As the verse states: “And you shall gird them with belts, Aaron and his sons, and bind mitres on them; and they shall have the priesthood by a perpetual statute” (Exodus 29:9). The verse indicates that when their vestments are on them, their priesthood is upon them, but if their vestments are not on them, their priesthood is not upon them and their rites are disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: But is this <i>halakha</i> derived from here? It is derived from there, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that if those who drank wine performed sacrificial rites they have desecrated the service? The verse states with regard to the priests: “Drink no wine or strong drink, you, nor your sons with you, when you go into the Tent of Meeting, so that you not die; it shall be a statute forever throughout your generations. That you may put difference between the holy and the common” (Leviticus 10:9–10). The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to one lacking the requisite vestments and one whose hands and feet are not washed, from where is it derived that their rites are disqualified as well?
  
  Daf 18a
  
  The verse states “statute” with regard to those who drank wine, and it likewise states “statute” with regard to the priestly vestments (Exodus 28:43) and with regard to the washing of the hands and feet (Exodus 30:21). One therefore derives by verbal analogy that the <i>halakha</i> in all three cases is the same. If so, there is already a source for the <i>halakha</i> that one who lacks the requisite priestly vestments disqualifies the service.
  The Gemara responds: If one derived the <i>halakha</i> only from there, I would say: This matter, i.e., that the rites of one who lacks the requisite vestments are disqualified, applies only to a rite for which a non-priest is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven, since that is the topic of the passage discussing those who drank wine. But with regard to a rite for which a non-priest is not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, I will say that they are not subject to this <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, the verse (Exodus 29:9) teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> applies to all rites.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that one lacking the requisite vestments disqualifies all rites, even those for which a non-priest is not liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven; from where do we derive that the <i>halakha</i> is the same for those who drank wine, as the passage in Leviticus (10:9–10) addresses only rites for which a non-priest receives the death penalty? The Gemara responds: It is derived by verbal analogy between the word “statute” used there and the word “statute” from the verses discussing one lacking the requisite vestments.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i> of the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> derive that the rites of those who drank wine are disqualified from the verse: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common” (Leviticus 10:10), and not by verbal analogy to a priest lacking the requisite vestments? The Gemara responds: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common” is the source of this <i>halakha</i> only before the verbal analogy stands. Once the verbal analogy is derived, it is the source of the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those who drank wine as well.
  The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one lacking the requisite vestments itself from the case of those who drank wine? The Gemara responds: Actually, the disqualification of rites performed by one who drank wine is derived from the case of one lacking vestments. And this is what the <i>tanna</i> is saying: From where is it derived that there is no distinction between one lacking the requisite vestments and those who drank wine and one whose hands and feet are not washed, and that all three disqualify all rites? The verses state the word: “Statute,” “statute,” in order to derive a verbal analogy.
  The Gemara asks: But if the <i>halakha</i> that one who drank wine disqualifies the service is derived from the verbal analogy, why do I need the verse: “That you may put difference between the holy and the common”? The Gemara responds: The verse is necessary in accordance with the custom of Rav, as Rav would not place an interpreter before him, i.e., he would not lecture in public, from the time that he drank wine on one Festival day until the other, the second Festival day, due to drunkenness. Rav was concerned that he would not issue a proper ruling, because it was customary to drink wine on the Festivals, and the verse states: “And that you may put difference between the holy and the common, and between the impure and the pure. And that you may teach the children of Israel all the statutes which the Lord has spoken” (Leviticus 10:10–11), indicating that one who drank wine may not issue a halakhic ruling.
  The Gemara asks: Still, is the disqualification of rites performed by one lacking the requisite vestments derived from here, i.e., from the verse: “And you shall gird them with belts, Aaron and his sons” (Exodus 29:9)? It is derived from there: “And the sons of Aaron the priest shall put fire upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:7). The superfluous term “the priest” serves to indicate that he may serve only in his priestly state. The verse therefore teaches that with regard to a High Priest who wore the vestments of an ordinary priest and performed sacrificial rites, his service is disqualified.
  The Gemara responds: If one derived the <i>halakha</i> only from there, I would say: This matter applies only to service that is indispensable for effecting atonement. But service that is not indispensable for effecting atonement, e.g., putting fire upon the altar, is not subject to the <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, the verse (Leviticus 1:7) indicates that the <i>halakha</i> applies even to rites that are not indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: But still, is the <i>halakha</i> derived from here, i.e., from all of the previous sources? It is derived from there: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall lay the pieces, and the head, and the fat, in order upon the wood that is on the fire, which is upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:8). The superfluous term “the priests” serves to indicate that the priests may serve only in their priestly state. From here one derives that with regard to an ordinary priest who wore the vestments of the High Priest and performed sacrificial rites, his service is disqualified.
  The Gemara responds: If one derived the <i>halakha</i> only from there, I would say: This matter applies only to a lack of vestments, e.g., a High Priest who wore fewer than his requisite eight vestments, but an excess of vestments, e.g., an ordinary priest who wore more than his requisite four, is not subject to the <i>halakha</i>. This verse therefore teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> applies even to an excess of vestments.
  § The Sages taught: If the priest’s vestments were dragging on the ground, or raised up [<i>mesulakin</i>] far from the ground, or frayed, and the priest performed sacrificial rites while wearing them, his service is valid. If he wore two pairs of trousers or two belts, or if he was lacking one of his requisite vestments, or if he wore one extra vestment, or in a case where a priest had a bandage on a wound on his body under his vestment such that the bandage acted as an interposition between the vestments and his skin, or if he wore vestments that were
  
  Daf 18b
  
  soiled or ripped, and he performed sacrificial rites, his service is disqualified.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If the vestments are dragging on the ground, they are fit, but if they are raised up above the ground, they are unfit. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the above <i>baraita</i> that even if the vestments were raised up they are fit? Rami bar Ḥama says: This is not difficult. Here, the <i>baraita</i> deems them fit in a case where the priest raised them up by his belt, although they were initially the proper length; there, Shmuel deems them unfit in a case where they do not initially cover the priest’s feet at all.
  Rav says: In both this case and that case, whether they were dragging or raised up, they are unfit.
  The Gemara recounts: Rav Huna happened to come to Argiza. The son of his innkeeper [<i>oshpizekhaneih</i>] raised a contradiction before him: Did Shmuel actually say that if the vestments are dragging on the ground, they are fit, but if they are raised up above the ground, they are unfit? But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i> that even if the vestments were raised up they are fit? Rav Huna said to him: Raise a contradiction from any source apart from this <i>baraita</i>, as Rami bar Ḥama already answered that it does not contradict Shmuel’s statement, as it applies only to vestments that were initially the proper length.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> pose a difficulty for Rav, who deems the vestments unfit even if they were dragging? And if you would say: What is the meaning of the word: Dragging, in the <i>baraita</i>? It means that they would initially drag but were raised up by a belt to the proper length, and they are fit since the belt effectively trims them, but then the term: Raised up, in the <i>baraita</i> poses a difficulty. Why should the <i>baraita</i> deem raised vestments fit? If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to vestments that were initially the proper length and were then raised up by a belt, then shouldn’t they be unfit as the belt trims them?
  Rabbi Zeira says: Rav taught the <i>baraita</i> not as referring separately to both dragging and raised vestments, but as one statement referring to vestments that are simultaneously dragging and raised, i.e., dragging vestments that the priest raised up by his belt to the proper height are fit. But if they were above or below their proper height for any reason, they are unfit.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti says: The case of dragging vestments that the priest did not raise is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “On the four corners of your garment” (Deuteronomy 22:12), from which it can be inferred: Four, but not three, i.e., a three-cornered garment is exempt from the obligation of ritual fringes. One may ask: Or perhaps it is only specifying four, but not five? When it says in the same verse: “With which you cover yourself,” a garment of five corners is mentioned as obligated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of: “Four corners”? It means four, but not three. And what did you see that led you to include a garment of five corners and to exclude a garment of three corners? I include a garment of five corners as four is included in five, and I exclude a garment of three corners as four is not included in three.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the verse states: “On the four corners of your garment,” from which it may be inferred: Four, but not three, and also four, but not five, i.e., only a four-cornered garment is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes. Rabbi Yirmeya continues: What, is it not that these <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to this: That one Sage, who deems a five-cornered garment exempt, holds that an extra item is considered as though it exists and cannot be ignored, and one Sage, who deems it obligated, holds that it is considered as though it does not exist and the garment has only four corners? Accordingly, the first Sage deems a dragging priestly vestment unfit, since one cannot ignore the extra fabric, while the second Sage deems it fit since the extra fabric is treated as immaterial.
  The Gemara responds: No, everyone agrees that an extra piece of a garment is considered as though it exists, and therefore dragging vestments are unfit. And according to the <i>tanna</i> of the second <i>baraita</i>, it is different here, with regard to ritual fringes, as the Merciful One amplifies the <i>halakha</i> to obligate even five-cornered garments with the words “with which you cover yourself.”
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who deems five-cornered garments exempt, what does he do with this verse: “With which you cover yourself”? The Gemara responds: He requires it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that you may look upon it” (Numbers 15:39). The phrase: “That you may look upon it,” serves to exclude a night garment from the obligation of ritual fringes, as the fringes on such a garment cannot be seen. One might ask: Or is it only to exclude the garment of a blind person, who is unable to see the ritual fringes? When it states in the verse: “With which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12), the obligation of ritual fringes for the garment of a blind person is mentioned. If so, how do I realize the meaning of the phrase: “That you may look upon it”? It serves to exclude a night garment.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And what did you see that led you to include the garment of a blind person and to exclude a night garment and not the reverse? I include the garment of a blind person because it is at least visible to others, and I exclude a night garment because it is not visible, even to others.
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who derives that a five-cornered garment requires ritual fringes from the phrase: “With which you cover yourself,” from where does he derive that the garment of a blind person requires ritual fringes? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the word “which” in the phrase, as that term itself connotes an amplification of the <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage do with this word? The Gemara responds: He does not interpret the word “which” as an amplification.
  § The Sages taught with regard to the priestly vestments that the term: “Linen [<i>bad</i> ]” (Leviticus 6:3), used in the verse indicates several properties of the garments: The verse states “linen” to indicate that they must be made of fine linen [<i>butz</i>]; “linen,” that they must be new; “linen,” that their thread must be twisted of several plies; “linen,” that their thread must be folded six times; “linen,” that the priest may not wear non-sacred clothes along with them.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Granted, the statement that they must be of fine linen is understood; this requirement teaches us that if they are of fine linen they are fit, but if they are of something else they are not. But with regard to the statement: Linen, that they must be new, one can infer that if they are new they are fit but if they are frayed they are not. But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i> (18a) that even if they were frayed they are fit?
  Rav Yosef said to him: And according to your reasoning that the <i>baraita</i> intends to derive all of these requirements from the word linen, such that all of these requirements are indispensable, how can one understand the requirement: Linen, that their thread must be folded six times? The word <i>bad</i> itself means each one on its own (see Exodus 30:34). Rather, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Those garments with regard to which it is stated: Linen, must be made of fine linen, and they must be new and twisted, and their thread must be folded six times. Some of these requirements constitute a mitzva <i>ab initio</i>, and some of them are indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: From where is it known that this material <i>bad</i> is produced from the flax plant? Rabbi Yosef, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: The verse is referring to an item that grows from the ground with each stalk growing on its own [<i>bad bevad</i>], i.e., it does not split into multiple stalks. The flax plant fulfills this criterion.
  The Gemara asks: Why not say that it is wool? The Gemara responds: The individual wool fibers split into smaller fibers. The Gemara rejects this: But flax also splits. The Gemara responds: It splits only by being struck. Wool, by contrast, splits naturally.
  Ravina says that the identity of <i>bad</i> is derived from here: The verse states with regard to the priestly vestments: “They shall have linen [<i>pishtim</i>] crowns upon their heads, and shall have linen breeches upon their loins; they shall not gird themselves with <i>yaza</i>” (Ezekiel 44:18). The word <i>pishtim</i> is clearly referring to flax.
  Rav Ashi said to Ravina: But before Ezekiel came, from where did we derive the identity of <i>bad</i>? Ravina responded: And according to your reasoning, one could ask the same of that which Rav Ḥisda said with regard to the prohibition against Temple service by one who is uncircumcised or an apostate: We did not learn this following matter from the Torah of Moses, our teacher; we learned it from the words of Ezekiel, son of Buzi: “No stranger, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My Sanctuary to serve Me” (Ezekiel 44:9). Until Ezekiel came, from where did we derive this? Rather, this <i>halakha</i> is learned as a tradition and therefore was observed for generations, and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse. Here too, it is learned as a tradition, and Ezekiel came and gave it support by writing a verse.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase in the verse: “They shall not gird themselves with <i>yaza</i>”? Abaye said: They shall not gird themselves in a place in which people sweat [<i>mezi’in</i>]. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When they gird themselves with the belt, they may not gird themselves below their loins nor above their elbows, but rather
  
  Daf 19a
  
  at the level of their elbows.
  Rav Ashi says: Huna bar Natan said to me: Once, I was standing before Izgadar, king of Persia, and my belt was raised above its appropriate height, and he lowered it into place and said to me: “A kingdom of priests, and a holy nation” (Exodus 19:6), is written about you; therefore, you should always look dignified. When I came before Ameimar and recounted this incident, he said to me: With regard to you, God’s promise to Israel: “And kings shall be your foster fathers” (Isaiah 49:23), was fulfilled.
  § With regard to the priestly vestments, we learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Eiruvin</i> 103b): A priest who was injured on his finger on Shabbat may temporarily wrap it with a reed so that his wound is not visible while he is serving in the Temple. This leniency applies in the Temple, but not in the rest of the country, as the reed also heals the wound, and medical treatment is prohibited on Shabbat by rabbinic decree. But if his intention is to draw blood from the wound, it is prohibited both here and there.
  Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: They taught only that a reed is permitted. But a small sash [<i>tziltzul</i>] as a bandage is considered an extra garment and is therefore forbidden, since it is prohibited for a priest to add to the priestly vestments prescribed by the Torah. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They said that wearing extra garments is prohibited only if the extra garment is worn in a place on the priest’s body where the requisite vestments are worn. But if the sash is in a place on his body where the vestments are not worn, e.g., on his hand, it is not considered an extra garment.
  The Gemara challenges: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan derive that a sash is prohibited because it acts as an interposition between the priest’s hand and the sacred vessel he grips, which disqualifies the service. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to a case where the wound is on the priest’s left hand. Since the entire service is performed exclusively with his right hand, a bandage on his left hand is not an interposition. Alternatively, the wound is on the priest’s right hand, but not in a place used for the service, such that the bandage does not interpose between his hand and the sacred vessel.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Rava, as Rava says that Rav Ḥisda says: In a place on the priest’s body where the vestments are worn, even one extra thread interposes and is prohibited, whereas in a place on his body where the vestments are not worn, if the fabric is three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths it interposes, but if it is less than that it does not interpose.
  The Gemara notes: Rava certainly disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that fabric of any size that is in a place on his body where the vestments are not worn is not considered an interposition. Shall we say that he also disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who deems any sash an interposition, even one smaller than three by three fingerbreadths?
  The Gemara responds: Even according to Rava, a small sash is different, as it is significant, and it is therefore considered a garment even if it is less than three by three fingerbreadths.
  Some say that there is another version of the dispute: Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says that they taught only that a reed is permitted, but a small sash interposes. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They said that an item acts as an interposition when it is less than three by three fingerbreadths only in a place on the priest’s body where the vestments are worn. But in a place on his body where the vestments are not worn, the following distinction applies: If the fabric is three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, it interposes, but if it is less than this, it does not interpose. And this is the same ruling that Rava says that Rav Ḥisda says.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rava disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who deems any sash an interposition, even one smaller than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths. The Gemara rejects this: This is not necessarily so, as a small sash is different, since it is significant. It is therefore like a vestment, even if it is smaller than three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths.
  The Gemara raises a question: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, why does the mishna teach the <i>halakha</i> specifically with regard to a reed? Let the mishna teach us that a priest may wrap his wounded finger with a small sash, since this would teach the greater novelty that although a sash is significant, it does not constitute an interposition. The Gemara responds: It teaches us a matter in passing, that a reed heals.
  § Rava raises a dilemma: If a gust of wind entered the priest’s vestment, raising it slightly off his body, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we require that the vestment be: “Upon his body” (Leviticus 6:3), in a literal sense, and this is not the case when the wind raises his vestment? Or perhaps the service is valid because this is the normal manner of wearing clothes.
  Furthermore, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a louse found under the priest’s vestments? Does it interpose between the vestments and his body, disqualifying the service?
  The Gemara clarifies: Do not raise a dilemma with regard to a dead louse, as it certainly interposes, like any other item. Rather, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a live louse? Do we say that since it comes and goes, i.e., it moves around on his body, it is like a growth and does not interpose? Or perhaps, since he objects to its presence, it interposes?
  Furthermore, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to dirt found under the priest’s vestments? Does it interpose? The Gemara objects: But dirt certainly interposes. The Gemara clarifies: Rather, the question is: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to dust of dirt, i.e., a minute amount of dust?
  Furthermore, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the gap between the underarm of the vestment and the priest’s armpit? Does it interpose? Do we require that the vestment is “upon his body” in a literal sense, and this is not the case? Or perhaps the service is valid since this is the normal manner of wearing clothes.
  Furthermore, if the priest inserted his hand into his vestments and touched his chest, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does his body interpose or not?
  Furthermore, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a thread [<i>nima</i>]? Does it interpose? The Gemara interjects: But a thread certainly interposes. Rather, the question is: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a thread that hangs off the vestment itself and will soon fall off? Is such a thread considered as though it has already detached from the vestment, in which case it interposes?
  Mar bar Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If his hair emerged from his head and extended into his vestment and separated it from his skin, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is his hair considered like his body, in which case it does not interpose, or is it not considered like his body?
  Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to phylacteries? Do they interpose? The Gemara clarifies: According to the opinion of one who says that night is not an appropriate time to don phylacteries, do not raise the dilemma. Since they interpose at night, they also interpose during the day. Rather, when you raise the dilemma, do so according to the one who says that night is an appropriate time to don phylacteries. According to this opinion, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does a mitzva that one fulfills with his body interpose, or does it not interpose?
  This matter circulated and eventually came before Rabbi Ami, who said to him: It is a settled tradition in our possession that phylacteries interpose.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Priests in their service; and Levites on their platform in the Temple, where they recite songs; and Israelites at their watches, where they observe the sacrifice of the daily offering, are all exempt from prayer and from donning phylacteries. What, is it not that the term: Exempt, indicates that if they donned phylacteries anyway, they do not interpose? Apparently, priests may wear phylacteries while performing the Temple service. The Gemara responds: No, if they donned phylacteries, they interpose.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why does the <i>baraita</i> use the word: Exempt? It should have used the word: Prohibited, since wearing phylacteries disqualifies the priests’ service. The Gemara responds: Since there are also Levites and Israelites mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, concerning whom the <i>baraita</i> could not teach the word: Prohibited, as it is permitted for them to don phylacteries, due to that reason the <i>baraita</i> taught the word: Exempt, which is applicable to all.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest donned phylacteries they do not interpose? The Gemara responds: That is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that phylacteries interpose is referring to the phylacteries of the hand, whereas that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that they do not is referring to the phylacteries of the head.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about the phylacteries of the hand that only they interpose? The verse indicates the difference, as it is written with regard to the vestments covering the body: “Shall he put upon his body” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that nothing may interpose between the vestment and his body. The Gemara challenges: But there is also a verse written with regard to the head: “And you shall set the mitre upon his head” (Exodus 29:6), indicating that there must be no interposition between the mitre and the head. If so, the phylacteries of the head should be considered an interposition as well.
  The Gemara responds: The Sages taught: The hair of the High Priest was visible between the frontplate and the mitre. The frontplate was set on the forehead, below the hairline, while the mitre was set above it;
  
  Daf 19b
  
  it was there that the High Priests would don their phylacteries. Consequently, the phylacteries of the head did not interpose between the mitre and the priest’s head.
  § The mishna teaches that rites performed by one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process are disqualified. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rav Huna says: The verse states with regard to the offering brought by a woman who has given birth: “And the priest shall make atonement for her, and she shall be pure” (Leviticus 12:8). Since the verse states: “And she shall be pure,” one learns by inference that she is ritually impure to some extent until she brings her offering, even though she has already immersed. Anyone who has not yet brought an atonement offering is likewise impure to some extent, and rites performed by one who is impure are disqualified (see 17a).
  § The mishna teaches that rites performed by one whose hands and feet are not washed are disqualified. The Gemara explains: This <i>halakha</i> is derived by verbal analogy between “statute” mentioned in this context and “statute” from the case of one lacking the requisite vestments, whose rites are disqualified (see 17b).
  The Sages taught: With regard to a High Priest who did not immerse or did not sanctify his hands and feet during the Yom Kippur service between donning the golden garments and the white linen garments, or between performance of one rite and another rite, and he performed the service in this state, his service is valid after the fact. But with regard to either a High Priest or an ordinary priest who did not sanctify his hands and feet at all in the morning and performed the service, his service is disqualified.
  Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Now, there are five immersions and ten sanctifications of the hands and feet during the Yom Kippur service by Torah law, and the word: “Statute” (Leviti-cus 16:34), is written with regard to them. Accordingly, they should be indispensable and should disqualify the service if not performed.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: After stipulating that the High Priest must wear the requisite vestments before performing the Yom Kippur service, the verse states: “And put them on” (Leviticus 16:4). This superfluous term serves to indicate that wearing the requisite vestments is indispensable, but nothing else is indispensable.
  Rav Asi’s face lit up with joy after hearing this response. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I have merely written the letter <i>vav</i> on a piece of wood for you, i.e., I have not given you a satisfactory answer. As, if that is so, that only the wearing of the vestments is indispensable, then failure to sanctify the hands and feet in the morning should also not disqualify the service, yet according to the <i>baraita</i> it disqualifies the service.
  Ḥizkiyya says there is an alternative answer: The verse states with regard to sanctification of the hands and feet: “And it shall be a statute forever to them, even to him and to his seed throughout their generations” (Exodus 30:21). From the comparison of Aaron to his children one may derive that anything that is indispensable with regard to his seed, the priests, is indispensable with regard to him, the High Priest during the Yom Kippur service, which only he may perform. But anything that is not indispensable with regard to his seed is not indispensable with regard to him. Therefore, the sanctification of the hands and feet between each rite, which is unnecessary for priests during the daily service, does not disqualify the High Priest’s Yom Kippur service if not done.
  Rabbi Yonatan says: The principle is derived from here: The verse states with regard to the Basin in the Temple: “That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet from it” (Exodus 40:31). One may derive from the verse that anything that is indispensable with regard to his sons is indispensable with regard to him. But anything that is not indispensable with regard to his sons is not indispensable with regard to him.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Yonatan did not say to derive this from the verse cited by Ḥizkiyya? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yonatan could have said to you: That verse cited by Ḥizkiyya is written to teach that the <i>halakha</i> applies even for future generations, not to draw a parallel between the High Priest and ordinary priests.
  The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, Ḥizkiyya, what is the reason that he did not say to derive the <i>halakha</i> from that verse cited by Rabbi Yonatan? The Gemara responds: He requires that verse for the <i>halakha</i> taught by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: With regard to any circumstance in which the Basin does not contain enough water for four priests to sanctify their hands and feet from it, the priests may not sanctify their hands and feet with it, as it is stated: “That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet from it.” Moses, Aaron, and Aaron’s two sons total four.
  § The Sages taught: How is the mitzva of sanctification of the hands and feet performed? The priest lays his right hand on top of his right foot, and his left hand on top of his left foot, and sanctifies them with the water flowing from the Basin. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He lays both his hands one on top of the other, and lays them together on top of both his feet, themselves laid one on top of the other, and sanctifies them. They said to him: You have gone too far; it is impossible to do so.
  The Gemara notes: They speak well to him; it seems impossible to assume such a position without losing one’s balance. Rav Yosef says: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, meant that the priest would assume the position while another priest would help him maintain his balance.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the reasoning of the Sages and that of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? Abaye says: The difference between them is their opinion with regard to standing with support from the side. According to the Sages, this is not considered standing and the priest may not sanctify his hands and feet while in such a position.
  Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina: And let him sit and sanctify his hands and feet while seated, and in this manner he may sanctify them all at once. Ravina said to him: The verse states: “When they go into the Tent of Meeting, they shall wash with water, that they not die; or when they come near to the altar to minister” (Exodus 30:20), and ministration is performed while standing, as the verse states: “To stand to minister” (Deuteronomy 18:5). Therefore, sanctification must also be performed while standing.
  § The Sages taught: If a priest sanctified his hands and feet during the day, he does not need to sanctify them that night, but if he sanctified them at night, he must sanctify them during the following day. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would say: The disqualification of being left overnight is determinative with regard to sanctification of the hands and feet, like any sacrificial item that is sanctified. Accordingly, once night has passed, the priest must sanctify them again. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The disqualification of being left overnight is not determinative with regard to sanctification of the hands and feet. Therefore, as long as the priest continues to serve, he need not sanctify them again.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: If the priest was standing and sacrificing offerings on top of the altar all night, in the morning he requires sanctification of the hands and feet again. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Once he sanctified his hands and feet at the beginning of the service, even if he continues to perform rites for the next ten days, he does not need to sanctify them again.
  The Gemara notes: And both of the above <i>baraitot</i> are necessary, though they seem to present the same dispute. As, if it had taught us only the first <i>baraita</i>, one might have thought that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his opinion only with regard to that case, as there the priest paused between one rite and another rite. But in this case, i.e., the second <i>baraita</i>, where he did not pause between rites, say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that the priest need not sanctify his hands and feet again. And conversely, if it had taught us only with regard to that case, i.e., the second <i>baraita</i>, one might have thought: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, stated his opinion only in that case. But in this case, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Therefore, both <i>baraitot</i> are necessary.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? As it is written: The priests must sanctify their hands and feet: “When they come near to the altar to minister” (Exodus 30:20), i.e., when they begin the service in the morning. And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written in the same verse: “When they go into the Tent of Meeting,” indicating that one sanctification suffices for the duration of a priest’s service in the Tent of Meeting.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the other Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as well, isn’t it written: “When they go into the Tent of Meeting”? How does he interpret this term? The Gemara responds: If only “when they come near” had been written, and “when they go into” had not been written, I would say that the priest must sanctify his hands and feet for each and every approach, i.e., every rite. Therefore the Merciful One wrote: “When they go into,” to indicate that it is necessary only once a day.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the other Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as well, isn’t it written: “When they come near”? How does he interpret this term? The Gemara responds: If only “when they go into” had been written, and “when they come near” had not been written, I would say that even for an entrance with no purpose, i.e., where the priest has no intention of performing rites, he must sanctify his hands and feet. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote: “When they come near.”
  The Gemara rejects this: How could one have thought that the priest must sanctify his hands and feet for an entrance with no purpose? Isn’t is written in the same verse: “To minister”? Rather, according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, “when they come near” is necessary for the <i>halakha</i> taught by Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov. As Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: All concede with regard to the second sanctification performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur after each immersion that he must sanctify his hands and feet while he is dressed in the priestly vestments, as the verse states: “Or when they come near to the altar to minister.” The verse indicates that one who is lacking only to come near to the altar, i.e., one who is in all other ways prepared for the service, may perform this sanctification. Excluded is this one, who is lacking both dressing and coming near.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need the continuation of the verse: “To cause an offering by fire to smoke”?
  
  Daf 20a
  
  The Gemara responds: Lest you say that this matter, sanctification of the hands and feet, applies only to a rite that is indispensable for effecting atonement, e.g., sprinkling the blood on the altar; but a rite that is not indispensable for effecting atonement, e.g., placing the fats and sacrificial portions of the offering on the altar, does not require prior sanctification of the hands and feet, therefore this verse teaches us that even such rites require sanctification of the hands and feet.
  § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Ilfa raises a dilemma: According to the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that the disqualification of being left overnight is not determinative with regard to sanctification of the hands and feet, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the water in the Basin? Is it disqualified by being left overnight? Do we say: For what purpose is this water? It is for the sanctification of the hands and feet, and since sanctification of the hands and feet itself is not disqualified by being left overnight, the <i>halakha</i> should be the same concerning the water. Or perhaps, since the water is sanctified in a service vessel, i.e., the Basin, it is disqualified by being left overnight, like all other items sanctified in service vessels.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Rabbi Yirmeya says that Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Ilfa then resolved the dilemma: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, with regard to that issue, i.e., whether sanctification of the hands and feet is disqualified overnight, so too there is a dispute between the two with regard to this issue, i.e., the water in the Basin. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that the water is not disqualified by being left overnight.
  Ravin continued: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna said before Rabbi Yirmeya: My teacher, do you say so? But this is what Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Ilfa: With regard to a Basin that they did not sink into its pit at night, which would have prevented the water from being disqualified by being left overnight, a priest sanctifies his hands and feet from it for the service of that night, and the next day he does not sanctify his hands and feet from it.
  And we discussed it: When Ilfa said that the next day he does not sanctify his hands and feet from it, did he mean that he does not require sanctification the next day, since sanctification is not disqualified overnight? Or perhaps Ilfa meant that it is prohibited to sanctify one’s hands and feet from the Basin since the water was disqualified by being left overnight? And Rabbi Asi did not resolve the issue for us. But you, Master, are resolving the issue by claiming that Ilfa ruled explicitly with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara attempts to resolve the issue: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 37a): The High Priest ben Katin made twelve spigots for the Basin so that several priests could sanctify their hands and feet at once. He also made a mechanism [<i>mukhani</i>] for sinking the Basin into water during the night so that its water would not be disqualified by being left overnight. What, is it not that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? If so, he holds that water of the Basin is disqualified by being left overnight. The Gemara responds: No, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, one should infer that the latter clause is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara elaborates: As the first clause teaches (<i>Yoma</i> 35b): At one point during the Yom Kippur service, the High Priest would come and stand next to his bull, and his bull was standing between the Entrance Hall and the altar with its head to the south and its face to the west. And the priest stands to the east of the bull, and his face points to the west. This is where he would slaughter the bull. Whom have you heard who says that between the Entrance Hall and the altar is considered part of the north of the courtyard, where it is permitted to slaughter offerings of the most sacred order? It is Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the north? It is the area from the northern wall of the altar until the northern wall of the Temple courtyard. And opposite the entire altar is considered the north; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, adds even the area between the Entrance Hall and the altar to the area that is considered north. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi adds that even the areas to the north in the place where the priests walk, and the areas to the north in the place where the Israelites walk. But all concede that the area from the Chamber of the Knives [<i>haḥalifot</i>] and inward, which is an area to the side, is unfit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, as it is not visible from the altar.
  The Gemara rejects the proof: And must you understand that the first clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Now, does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi add only to the statement of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, but not add to the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? The area deemed north according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is included in the area deemed north by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Accordingly, since the first clause of the mishna can also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, perhaps the mishna offers no proof at all with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara reformulates its suggestion: This is what we are saying: If it enters your mind to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, then let him stand the bull in the place where the priests walk and in the place where the Israelites walk, since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that those areas are also considered north. Why is the bull placed specifically between the Entrance Hall and the altar?
  The Gemara rejects this: Rather, what shall you say? Will you say that the mishna is only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? But if so, let him stand the bull anywhere from the north wall of the altar to the north wall of the Temple courtyard, as everyone agrees that this area is considered north. Rather, what have you to say to explain why the bull is positioned specifically between the Entrance Hall and the altar? It is due to the weakness of the High Priest, so that he need not exert himself and walk long distances on Yom Kippur. Here too, the mishna may be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and due to the weakness of the High Priest the bull is positioned there.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If a priest sanctified his hands and feet in preparation for the removal of the ashes, the first service performed every day in the Temple, which was performed before dawn, then the next day, i.e., after dawn, he does not need to sanctify them again, as he already sanctified them at the beginning of the day’s service.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, doesn’t he say that being left overnight disqualifies sanctification of the hands and feet? If so, one should be required to sanctify them again after dawn. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say that if the priest sanctified his hands and feet at the beginning of the service, he does not need to sanctify them again even if he continues to perform rites for the next ten days? Why, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan state only that one who sanctified his hands and feet before the removal of the ashes is not required to do so after dawn?
  Abaye says: Actually, the statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the disqualification of sanctification of the hands and feet by being left overnight is by rabbinic law. And although the Sages mandate that a priest must sanctify his hands and feet every morning, they concede that during the period from the rooster’s crow before dawn until morning, being left overnight does not disqualify his sanctification. Therefore, one who sanctifies his hands and feet at the rooster’s crow may continue to perform rites after dawn.
  Rava says: Actually, the statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yoḥanan saw the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as correct with regard to the beginning of the service, i.e., that a priest may serve during the day on the strength of sanctification performed before dawn. But he did not agree with regard to the end of the service. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if a priest sanctified his hands and feet before participating in the day’s final rites, he must sanctify them again the next morning. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, one who sanctified his hands and feet before sunrise must do so again afterward.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 28b) that describes the daily service: His priestly brethren, members of the patrilineal family, saw that the priest who removed the ashes descended from the altar with the coal pan in his hands, and they ran and arrived at the Basin. They hurried and sanctified their hands and their feet with water from the Basin.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  Assuming that these priests had all been serving in the Temple through the night, one can ask: Granted, according to Abaye, who interprets the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that during the period from the rooster’s crow before dawn until morning, being left overnight does not disqualify sanctification, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that although they served through the night, the previous day’s sanctification was disqualified and they must sanctify their hands and feet again in the morning, but they may do so before dawn.
  But according to Rava, who interprets the statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, but who holds that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, during the period from the rooster’s crow until morning being left overnight disqualifies sanctification, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, then the priests’ sanctification described therein is useless, since being left overnight disqualifies it at dawn. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say that even if the priest continues to perform rites for the next ten days, he does not need to sanctify his hands and feet again? If so, since the priests were serving throughout the night, they should not require sanctification.
  The Gemara responds: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and here we are dealing with new priests, who did not serve in the Temple that night. Since they are beginning their service now, they must sanctify their hands and feet.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to leaving the Temple? Is it effective to disqualify sanctification of the hands and feet such that the priest must sanctify them again when he reenters the Temple? The Gemara elaborates: If you say that being left overnight does not disqualify it, perhaps that is only because he does not separate from the Temple; but when leaving the Temple, where the priest separates from the Temple, it is possible that the priest becomes distracted from the service. If so, he must sanctify his hands and feet again. Or perhaps, since it is in his power to return to the Temple at any point, he does not become distracted, in which case he does not need to sanctify them again.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest sanctified his hands and feet and his hands then became impure, he may immerse them to purify them, and he does not need to sanctify them again. If he sanctified his hands and they then left the Temple, they retain their sanctity. Apparently, leaving the Temple does not disqualify sanctification.
  The Gemara responds: We do not raise the dilemma with regard to a case where only his hands left the Temple. In such a case, he certainly does not need to sanctify them again. When we raise the dilemma, it is with regard to a case where his entire body left the Temple; what is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: One whose hands and feet are not washed must sanctify them with a service vessel inside the Temple. If he sanctified them with a service vessel outside the Temple, or with a non-sacred vessel inside, or if he immersed in cave water and performed the service, his service is disqualified. The Gemara infers: The reason his service is disqualified is that he sanctified his hands and feet with a service vessel outside, but if he sanctified them inside and then left, his service is valid.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps one can say: What are the circumstances of the case where one sanctified them with a service vessel outside? It is a case where he removed only his hands and placed them outside the Temple and sanctified them there. Consequently, one can infer only that if he sanctified them inside and then left, i.e., specifically where he removed only his hand and placed it outside, his service is valid. But with regard to a case where his entire body left the Temple, you should raise the dilemma.
  Rav Zevid said to Rav Pappa: Come and hear a proof from another <i>baraita</i>: In a case where a priest left the boundary of the wall of the Temple courtyard, if he left long enough to remain there for a time, he requires immersion. If he left only for a moment, he requires sanctification of the hands and feet. Apparently, one who leaves even for a brief time requires sanctification.
  Rav Pappa said to him: Here we are dealing with a case where the priest left the Temple to cover his legs, a euphemism for defecating, or to urinate. It is only for this reason that he must sanctify his hands and feet when reentering the Temple.
  The Gemara challenges: But the mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 28a) already teaches it explicitly: Anyone who covers his legs requires immersion afterward; and anyone who urinates requires sanctification of the hands and feet with water from the Basin afterward. The Gemara responds: The redundancy is not difficult. The <i>tanna</i> teaches the principle and then explains it again.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the following dispute: With regard to the priest who performs the service of the red heifer, which takes place outside the Temple, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: In preparation, he must sanctify his hands and feet with a service vessel inside the Temple, as he must before any other service, and afterward he leaves the Temple to perform the service. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He may sanctify his hands even outside of the Temple, and even with a non-sacred vessel, and even with an earthenware bowl [<i>bimkeida</i>]. Apparently, leaving the Temple does not disqualify sanctification of the hands and feet.
  Rav Pappa said: The rite of the red heifer is different, since all of its acts are performed outside the Temple, unlike other rites. Therefore, leaving the Temple does not disqualify sanctification of the hands and feet with regard to it. The Gemara asks: If so, why do I require that the priest sanctify his hands and feet at all for the service of the red heifer? The Gemara responds: The service of the red heifer must be similar to the service of offerings performed inside the Temple.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest who contracts ritual impurity during the service? Is this effective to disqualify the sanctification of his hands and feet such that he must sanctify them again when he becomes pure? If you say that leaving the Temple does not disqualify sanctification, perhaps this is because the person remains fit to serve; but here, where the person is unfit for service, perhaps he becomes distracted. Or perhaps, since he will become fit again when he becomes pure, he takes care not to become distracted.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest sanctified his hands and feet and they became impure, he may immerse them, and he does not need to sanctify them again.
  The Gemara responds: We do not raise the dilemma with regard to a case where only his hands became impure. When we raise the dilemma it is with regard to a case where his entire body became impure. The Gemara challenges: But if his entire body contracted impurity, let me derive that the sanctification is disqualified since he needs to allow the sun to set in order to become pure after immersing, and he certainly becomes distracted in the interim. The Gemara responds: The dilemma concerns a case where he became impure adjacent to sunset, so that he does not need to wait long after immersing and will not become distracted.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the following dispute: With regard to the priest who performs the rite of the red heifer, Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Yosef, says: He must sanctify his hands and feet with a service vessel inside the Temple, and afterward he leaves the Temple to perform the service. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He may sanctify his hands even outside of the Temple, and even with a non-sacred vessel, and even with an earthenware bowl.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  And in preparation for the rite of the red heifer, we intentionally impart impurity to the priest after he has already sanctified his hands and feet, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:7): They would render the priest who burns the heifer ritually impure and immerse him immediately, to remove a misconception from the hearts of the Sadducees by means of a public display of disregard for their ruling. As the Sadducees would say: Only by those for whom the sun set was the heifer ritual performed. The Sadducees believed that it is prohibited for an impure priest who immersed that day to burn the red heifer until sunset, when the purification process is completed. The Gemara concludes: Since this impurity does not disqualify the sanctification of his hands and feet, learn from it that impurity does not disqualify sanctification of the hands and feet in general.
  The Gemara responds: The service of the heifer is different, as one who immersed that day is not unfit for performing it, unlike any other rite. Likewise, impurity does not disqualify the sanctification of hands and feet preceding the service of the heifer. The Gemara asks: If so, why do I require that the priest sanctify his hands and feet at all for the service of the red heifer? The Gemara responds: We require that the service of the red heifer be similar to the service of offerings performed inside the Temple.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest who wishes to sanctify his hands and feet by dipping them in the Basin rather than letting the water run from it onto them? Must one say that the priest may not do so, since the Merciful One states: “And Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and their feet from it” (Exodus 30:19), and not inside it? Or perhaps the priest may even use water still inside it.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: Or if a priest immersed in cave water and performed the service, his service is disqualified, since this is not adequate sanctification of the hands and feet. From the <i>baraita</i> one infers: But if he used water from the Basin in a manner similar to cave water, i.e., by immersing his hands, and performed the service, his service is valid.
  The Gemara responds: No, it is possible that immersing one’s hands in the Basin is insufficient as well. Nevertheless, it was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to mention cave water so that you shall not say: If one may immerse his entire body in cave water to purify himself, all the more so is it not clear that he may sanctify his hands and feet by immersing them in cave water? The <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches that despite being fit for immersion of the entire body, cave water is unfit for sanctification of the hands and feet.
  § Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: The water in the Basin is disqualified by being left out, at different times of day for different rites. For rites that are permitting factors for an offering, i.e., that must be performed before the meat of the offering may be eaten, the water is disqualified at sunset, like the permitting factors themselves, which may be performed only during the day. For example, if a priest wishes to sprinkle an offering’s blood on the altar, he may not sanctify his hands and feet from the Basin unless it was sunk into its pit at sunset on the previous day, preventing the water from being disqualified. Similarly, for the burning of the offering’s limbs on the altar, which may be performed all night, the water in the Basin is disqualified at dawn, like the limbs themselves.
  Rav Ḥisda says: Even for the performance of permitting factors, the water is disqualified only at dawn, as it is for the burning of the limbs. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Once one has sunk the Basin into its pit at the end of the day’s service, reconnecting the water in the Basin to flowing water to prevent it from being disqualified, he may not raise it up again the entire night.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that if the Basin was not sunk before sunset the water inside is unfit for the night’s service as well? But doesn’t Rabbi Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Ilfa: With regard to a Basin that the priests did not sink into its pit at night, a priest sanctifies his hands and feet from it for the service of that night, and the next day he does not sanctify from it? Apparently, for purposes of the night’s service, the water in the Basin is not disqualified at sunset.
  The Gemara responds: What does it mean when it says: He may not raise it up again? It means that he may not raise it to sanctify his hands and feet in preparation for the day’s service; but the water is fit for sanctification for the night’s service.
  The Gemara asks: If so, this is the same as the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef, i.e., that for purposes of the day’s service the water in the Basin is disqualified at sunset, and for purposes of the night’s service it is disqualified at dawn.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  The Gemara responds: The difference between them is that according to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef, if the water is raised at any point throughout the night, it is disqualified for sanctification prior to the day’s services. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the water is not disqualified unless the Basin is raised at the break of dawn, but the Sages issued a rabbinic decree of sinking the Basin into its pit all night <i>ab initio</i>, so that it would not be raised at dawn accidentally.
  The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yoḥanan really hold that the Basin must be sunk all night? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If a priest sanctified his hands and feet in preparation for the removal of the ashes before dawn, then the next day he does not need to sanctify them again, as he already sanctified them at the beginning of the day’s service? Evidently, the Basin is raised before dawn.
  The Gemara elaborates: Granted, according to Rava, who interprets that statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that sanctification of the hands and feet is not disqualified overnight (see 20a), this statement that the Basin must be sunk all night is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that sanctification of the hands and feet is disqualified at dawn. Accordingly, he holds that the water in the Basin is disqualified as well.
  But according to Abaye, who interprets that statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is difficult to reconcile with this other statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: What is different there that one must sink the Basin all night, and what is different here, with regard to sanctification prior to removal of the ashes, that one does not need to sink it?
  The Gemara responds: There is no contradiction. Prior to removal of the ashes, one raises the Basin and then sinks it again so that it will not remain raised at dawn and render the water disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that the priest does not sanctify his hands and feet again the next day? If the water has not been disqualified, why would the priest need to avoid sanctifying his hands and feet with it? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan means to say that he does not need to sanctify them again for service on the same day, not that he is prohibited from doing so.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, if one raised the Basin at night and sank it again before dawn, it remains fit for sanctification prior to performing the offering’s permitting factors that day? If so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion is the same as that of Rav Ḥisda.
  The Gemara responds: The difference between them is that according to Rav Ḥisda, there is no mitzva of sinking the Basin into its pit throughout the night, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is a mitzva of sinking the Basin into its pit all night <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda from a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 28b): The priests would not see the priest performing the removal of the ashes, nor would they hear his voice. Rather, they were unaware of his actions until they would hear the sound of the wood with which ben Katin made a mechanism for sinking the Basin into water during the night. And when they heard the sound of the mechanism, they would say to each other: The time for sanctifying hands and feet from the Basin has come. The Gemara asks: What, is it not that they heard the mechanism raising the Basin? Apparently, the mechanism would sink it during the night, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that there was no need to sink it overnight.
  The Gemara responds: No, they heard the mechanism sinking the Basin, which had been raised all night. The Gemara asks: If the mechanism were sinking it, would its sound be audible? No mechanism is necessary to lower the Basin; it can simply be lowered with a chain. The Gemara responds: The priest would still sink it by using a wheel, which would make a sound.
  The Gemara presents another version of the answer: The priest would deliberately sink it by its wheel so that its sound would be audible, and the other priests would hear and come to begin the service. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Gevini the crier, who would notify the priests of the beginning of the service? The Gemara responds: They would make two conspicuous markers for the beginning of the service: The sound of the wheel and the crier. Anyone who heard from this marker would come, and anyone who heard from that marker would come.
  § Having mentioned a <i>halakha</i> earlier (19b), the Gemara addresses the matter itself: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: With regard to any Basin that does not contain enough water for four priests to sanctify their hands and feet from it, the priests may not sanctify their hands and feet with it, as it is stated: “That Moses and Aaron and his sons might wash their hands and their feet from it” (Exodus 40:31).
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The priests may sanctify their hands and feet from all vessels, whether they can hold a quarter<i>-log</i> of water
  
  Daf 22a
  
  or they cannot hold a quarter<i>-log</i> of water, provided that they are service vessels. Apparently, the Basin need not hold so much water.
  Rav Adda bar Aḥa says: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where one drills a hole in the Basin and places a much smaller vessel at the hole as a conduit for the water. Even if that vessel is very small, the priest may sanctify his hands and feet from it, provided that there is enough water in the Basin for four priests.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Merciful One state that the priests must wash their hands and feet “from it,” i.e., from the Basin and not from another vessel? The Gemara responds: The following verse repeats the phrase “they should wash,” to include any service vessel.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, then it should be permitted for a priest to use a non-sacred vessel as well. Abaye says: You cannot say that a priest may sanctify his hands and feet from a non-sacred vessel, since the matter may be derived by <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> concerning the base of the Basin: And just as its base, which was anointed along with it (see Exodus 40:11), is still not fit for a priest to sanctify his hands and feet with water from it, then with regard to a non-sacred vessel, which was not anointed along with the Basin, is it not right that it is not fit for a priest to sanctify his hands and feet with water from it?
  The Gemara clarifies: And from where do we derive that water from the base of the Basin is unfit? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that water from its base should be fit for priests to sanctify their hands and feet just as water from the Basin itself is fit to sanctify their hands and feet. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall also make a Basin of copper, and the base thereof of copper” (Exodus 30:18). The verse indicates that I have equated the base and the Basin only with regard to the requirement that they both be made of copper, but not for another matter. Rather, the base, unlike the Basin, is unfit for sanctification.
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: The <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be refuted: What is notable about its base? It is notable in that its inside is not made for use, as it is to be used only as a stand. Will you say that the <i>halakha</i> is the same for a non-sacred vessel, concerning which its inside is made for use? Rather, one must say that the term “from it” serves to exclude a non-sacred vessel.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, “from it” should exclude a service vessel as well. The Gemara responds: But the Merciful One amplifies the <i>halakha</i> with the term “they should wash,” to include a service vessel.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to include a service vessel and exclude a non-sacred vessel, rather than the reverse? The Gemara responds: This, a service vessel, requires anointing like the Basin when the Tabernacle is raised (see Exodus, chapter 40), and that, a non-sacred vessel, does not require anointing like the Basin.
  § Reish Lakish says: Any liquid that may be used to complete the requisite measure of water for a ritual bath may complete the requisite measure of water for the Basin. But it may not complete the quarter<i>-log</i> required for ritual washing of the hands.
  The Gemara asks: This statement means to exclude what as unfit for completing the requisite measure for ritual washing of the hands? If we say that it means to exclude liquefied clay, there is a difficulty, as what is this clay like? If it is such that a cow can kneel and drink from it, it is considered water and should be fit even to complete the measure of a quarter<i>-log</i> for ritual washing of the hands. And if a cow cannot kneel and drink from it, it should not even be fit to complete the requisite measure for a ritual bath.
  Rather, say that it means to exclude red gnats that originate and grow in water. This, too, is difficult, as even by themselves they may constitute the entire measure of the ritual bath, not only to complete a deficient measure of water; as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to anything that originates in the water, one may immerse in it, since it is considered as though it were water. And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: One may immerse even in liquefied fish eye of sufficient volume.
  Rav Pappa says: The statement of Reish Lakish means to exclude a case where one added a <i>se’a</i> and removed a <i>se’a</i>, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 7:2): In the case of a ritual bath that contains the minimum measure of exactly forty <i>se’a</i> of water, and one added a <i>se’a</i> of liquid other than water, and then removed a <i>se’a</i> of the mixture, the ritual bath remains fit. The added liquid is considered nullified in the forty <i>se’a</i> of water, so that when one <i>se’a</i> of the mixture is removed, there still remain the requisite forty <i>se’a</i> of fit water. And Rav Yehuda bar Sheila says that Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this <i>halakha</i> applies up to the greater part of the measure of the ritual bath. Adding and removing such a liquid to the requisite measure for washing of the hands renders the water unfit.
  Rav Pappa says: If one drilled in the wall of a ritual bath, and the sides of the hole can hold a quarter<i>-log</i> of liquid, one may immerse small vessels such as needles and hooks in the hole, even though it constitutes a space separate from the ritual bath, since the fitness of the water in the hole derives from the fitness of the water in the ritual bath. This <i>halakha</i> is parallel to the one discussed with regard to the Basin.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya says that Reish Lakish says: Water of a ritual bath is fit to be used as water of the Basin.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the water in the Basin does not need to be flowing water, i.e., spring water? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse indicates that the innards of an offering must be washed: “With water” (Leviticus 1:9), and not with wine; “with water,” and not with wine mixed with water; “with water,” to include other types of water, even those that are not spring water. And it can be inferred <i>a fortiori</i> that the water used for the Basin may be used to wash the innards. What is the basis of the <i>a fortiori</i> inference that the water used for the Basin may also be used? Is it not that it is from a source of flowing water and therefore obviously fit for washing the innards?
  The Gemara responds: No, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference is based on the fact that the water used for the Basin is sanctified for the service. The Gemara asks: But is sanctified water preferable, given that the Torah stipulates simply “water”? But didn’t Rabbi Shmuel teach: The word “water” used in the verse denotes specifically water whose name has no modifier;
  
  Daf 22b
  
  excluded is water of the Basin, which has a modifier in its name? Rather, since the <i>baraita</i> cannot be referring to the water of the Basin itself, as it is unfit for washing the innards, is it not referring to water that is fit to be water of the Basin? Apparently, the only reason such water could be preferable is because it is flowing water.
  The Gemara responds: The issue is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to the water of the Basin, Rabbi Yishmael says: It must be spring water, i.e., flowing water, and the Rabbis say: It may be another type of water.
  § The mishna teaches that a priest who is uncircumcised disqualifies sacrificial rites he performs. The Gemara elaborates: From where do we derive this? Rav Ḥisda says: We did not learn this matter from the Torah of Moses, our teacher; rather, we learned it from the words of the prophet Ezekiel, son of Buzi: “No stranger, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into My Sanctuary to serve Me” (Ezekiel 44:9).
  And from where do we derive that he desecrates the service after the fact? As it is written: “In that you have brought in strangers, uncircumcised in heart or uncircumcised in flesh, to be in My Sanctuary, to profane My house” (Ezekiel 44:7).
  The Sages taught: The verse states “stranger”; one might have thought that this is referring to an actual stranger, i.e., a gentile. Therefore, the verse states: “Uncircumcised in heart,” to indicate that it is referring to a priest rather than a gentile. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Stranger”? It is referring to one whose actions are considered estranged from his Father in Heaven, i.e., an apostate, who sins regularly. And I have derived only that one uncircumcised in heart is unfit to serve; from where is it derived that one uncircumcised in flesh is unfit as well? The verse states: “Or uncircumcised in flesh.”
  The Gemara notes: And both phrases in the verse are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written only: “Uncircumcised in flesh,” one might think that only he is unfit because he is disgusting in that he possesses a foreskin, but concerning one uncircumcised in heart, who is not disgusting, I will say that he is not unfit. And had the verse taught us only that one uncircumcised in heart is unfit, one might think that only he is unfit, because his heart is not directed toward Heaven, but one uncircumcised in flesh, whose heart is directed toward Heaven, I will say that he is not unfit. Therefore, both phrases are necessary.
  § The mishna teaches that a ritually impure priest is unfit for Temple service and disqualifies rites he performs. The Elders of the South said: They taught this only with regard to one who became impure due to contact with the carcass of a creeping animal. But with regard to a priest who became impure due to contact with a corpse, since he can effect acceptance of his rites for communal offerings <i>ab initio</i> if the majority of the community has contracted impurity from a corpse, he can effect acceptance of his rites for individual offerings as well after the fact.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let it be derived that one impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal can also effect acceptance for communal offerings in cases of communal impurity <i>ab initio</i>, and for individual offerings after the fact, by <i>a fortiori</i> inference from one impure due to a corpse: Just as a priest who is impure due to a corpse, who requires sprinkling of the water containing the ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh day to be purified, still effects acceptance, then with regard to one who is impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal, who does not require sprinkling on the third and seventh day, is it not right that he should also effect acceptance?
  The Gemara responds: The Elders of the South hold that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those who effect atonement is like those who achieve atonement: Just as with regard to those who achieve atonement through communal offerings, i.e., the community, only if a majority is impure due to a corpse may the offering be sacrificed in a state of impurity, but if they are impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal it may not, so too with regard to those who effect atonement, i.e., the priests, if they serve when they are impure due to a corpse, yes, their service achieves atonement, but if they serve when they are impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal, it does not.
  The response of the Gemara assumes that communal offerings may not be brought when the majority of the community is impure due to a creeping animal. The Gemara therefore asks: What do the Elders of the South hold with regard to the Paschal offering? If they hold that one may not slaughter it nor sprinkle its blood on the altar for an owner who is impure due to a creeping animal, even though he can immerse and become pure in time to eat the offering that night, then one may ask: Why can’t the community perform communal offerings in such a state of impurity? Isn’t it a principle that for any impurity for which an individual may not sacrifice the Paschal offering and is deferred to the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, the community may perform its offerings in such a state of impurity?
  Rather, they must hold that one may slaughter the Paschal offering and sprinkle its blood for an owner who is impure due to a creeping animal. Accordingly, the community may not offer the Paschal offering in such a state of impurity.
  Ulla says: Reish Lakish shouted [<i>teka</i>] to the Elders of the South: But which power is greater to overcome impurity with respect to offerings, the power of those who effect atonement, i.e., the priests, or the power of those who achieve atonement, the offerings’ owners? Since the Elders of the South hold that the Paschal offering may be sacrificed for an owner who is impure due to a creeping animal, while a priest who is similarly impure may not sacrifice any offering, you must say that the power of those who achieve atonement is greater.
  If so, your initial statement that a priest who contracted impurity from a corpse can effect acceptance for individual offerings can be refuted <i>a fortiori</i>: And just as in a case where the owner became impure due to a creeping animal, he may send his offerings for sacrifice, and yet a priest who became impure due to a creeping animal cannot effect acceptance, then in a case where the owner became impure due to a corpse, where he may not send his offerings for sacrifice, is it not right that a priest who became impure due to a corpse cannot effect acceptance?
  The Gemara responds: The Elders of the South hold that an owner who is impure due to a corpse may also send his offerings, even though he will not be able to partake of his Paschal offering. Therefore, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference does not stand.
  The Gemara protests: But isn’t it written: “If any man of you or of your generations shall be impure by reason of a dead body, or be in a journey afar off, he shall perform the Paschal offering to the Lord. In the second month on the fourteenth day at dusk they shall perform it” (Numbers 9:10–11)? Apparently, one impure due to a corpse in the first month must defer his Paschal offering to the second month. The Gemara responds: The verse intends this as a mitzva <i>ab initio</i>. But if he sends his offering in the first month, it is accepted, and he is not required to sacrifice a Paschal offering in the second month.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then shall he and his neighbor next to his house take one according to the number of the souls; a man,
  
  Daf 23a
  
  according to his eating, you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4)? This teaches that one may bring the Paschal offering only if he is able to partake of it. The Gemara responds: This requirement is also meant as a mitzva <i>ab initio</i>; it does not disqualify the offering if not fulfilled.
  The Gemara asks: And is this requirement not indispensable even after the fact? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the phrase “according to the number of the souls” teaches that the Paschal offering may be slaughtered only for those who registered for it in advance. If the Paschal offering was slaughtered for individuals who did not register for it, one might have thought that it would only be like transgressing a mitzva, but the offering would not be disqualified. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall make your count”; the verse repeats the issue of counting to stress that the <i>halakha</i> is indispensable, and if one slaughters the offering for one who is not registered, it is disqualified. The Gemara concludes: And those who eat the offering are juxtaposed to those registered for it, as the verse states: “According to the number of the souls; a man, according to his eating.” Accordingly, if one slaughters the Paschal offering for one who cannot partake of it, the offering is disqualified.
  The Gemara responds: The Elders of the South do not juxtapose the phrases, i.e., they do not interpret the verse’s juxtaposition of the two phrases as significant. The Gemara asks: But even if they do not juxtapose the phrases, there is a refutation to their statement from this inference as well: And just as in a case where the owner became impure due to a creeping animal, where he may send his offerings for sacrifice <i>ab initio</i>, a priest who became impure due to a creeping animal nevertheless cannot effect acceptance, then in a case where the owner became impure due to a corpse, where he may not send his offerings <i>ab initio</i>, is it not right that a priest who became impure due to a corpse cannot effect acceptance?
  Furthermore, the Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 80b): As the Sages said that with regard to a nazirite and one who performs the rite of the Paschal offering, the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacrificed in a state of impurity of the blood, but the frontplate does not effect acceptance for offerings sacrificed in a state of impurity of the body of the individual bringing it.
  The Gemara continues: To what impurity is it referring? If we say that it is referring to impurity due to a creeping animal, didn’t you say above that according to the Elders of the South, one may slaughter the Paschal offering and sprinkle its blood for an owner who is in a state of impurity due to a creeping animal? Rather, it must be referring to impurity due to a corpse, and the mishna teaches: The frontplate does not effect acceptance. Evidently, if the owner became impure due to a corpse, he may not send his offerings for sacrifice, contrary to the opinion ascribed to the Elders of the South.
  The Gemara responds: No, if the owner became impure due to a corpse, the frontplate indeed effects acceptance for the offering. The mishna is not referring to the owners of the offerings at all; rather, here we are dealing with a case where the officiating priest became impure due to a creeping animal.
  The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If it became known after the offering was brought that he had contracted ritual impurity imparted in the depths, i.e., a source of impurity that had been unknown at the time, the frontplate effects acceptance for the offering. This clause cannot be reconciled with the suggested interpretation of the mishna, since Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: They stated this <i>halakha</i> of impurity imparted in the depths only with regard to impurity due to a corpse. Now, when he says that it applies only to impurity due to a corpse, he means to exclude what? Does he not mean to exclude impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal in the depths? If so, the mishna cannot be referring to impurity due to a creeping animal.
  The Gemara responds: No, Rabbi Ḥiyya means to exclude impurity imparted by a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>ziva</i>] in the depths. Impurity due to the corpse of a creeping animal, by contrast, is within the scope of the mishna.
  The Gemara asks: But how is one to understand this dilemma that Rami bar Ḥama raises: With regard to a priest who effects acceptance for the offerings of the nazirite and the Paschal offering, was impurity imparted in the depths permitted for him or was impurity imparted in the depths not permitted for him? According to the Elders of the South, why not resolve the dilemma and conclude that impurity imparted in the depths was permitted for him, since they hold that we interpret the mishna here as referring to an impure priest?
  The Gemara responds: The premise of this dilemma of Rami bar Ḥama certainly disagrees with the opinion of the Elders of the South, and Rami bar Ḥama does not interpret the mishna in this manner.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a verse written about the frontplate: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred items, which the children of Israel shall consecrate, even all their sacred gifts; and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before God” (Exodus 28:38). And the Sages expounded: Which sin does Aaron bear?
  
  Daf 23b
  
  If the verse means that he bears the sin of <i>piggul</i>, it is already stated: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it” (Leviticus 7:18). If he bears the sin of <i>notar</i>, it is already stated in the same verse: “It shall not be accepted.”
  Rather, the frontplate bears only the sin of impurity, whose general prohibition was permitted in cases involving the pub-lic. The verse indicates that the frontplate effects acceptance for individual offerings sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the impurity borne by the frontplate? If we say that it effects acceptance for impurity due to a creeping animal, where does one find that the general prohibition was permitted in cases involving the public? Rather, it must be referring to impurity due to a corpse. And is it not referring to a case where the owner of the offerings became impure from a corpse? Evidently, if the owner became impure from a corpse, he may send his offerings for sacrifice, as the frontplate effects acceptance for them.
  And to what offering is this statement referring? If it is referring to the offering of a nazirite, doesn’t the Merciful One state: “And if any man die very suddenly beside him, and he defile his consecrated head” (Numbers 6:9)? The passage indicates that even if a nazirite contracts impurity against his will, he still cannot bring his offerings until he is pure. Rather, it must be referring to one who performs the rite of the Paschal offering. This proves the claim of the Elders of the South that one who is impure due to a corpse may send his Paschal offering for sacrifice.
  The Gemara responds: Actually, the statement is referring to impurity due to a creeping animal, not due to a corpse. And although the general prohibition with regard to impurity due to a creeping animal was not permitted in cases involving the public, nevertheless, one finds that the category of impurity in general was permitted in such cases.
  The Gemara notes: And some infer the opposite and derive like this: The verse states of the frontplate: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred items” (Exodus 28:38). That is, it does bear the iniquity of the sacred items, but it does not bear the iniquity of those who consecrate or sacrifice them, i.e., the owners of the offering or the priests involved in its sacrifice. And to what impurity is this verse referring? If we say that it is referring to impurity due to a creeping animal, is such impurity permitted in cases involving the public? Rather, is it not referring to impurity due to a corpse, and the verse indicates that the frontplate does bear the iniquity of the sacred items but does not bear the iniquity of those who consecrate them? This refutes the opinion of the Elders of the South that owners who are impure due to a corpse may send their offerings.
  The Gemara responds: Actually, the verse is referring to impurity due to a creeping animal, and although the general prohibition with regard to impurity due to a creeping animal was not permitted in cases involving the public, the category of impurity in general was permitted in such cases.
  § The mishna teaches that a priest who is sitting disqualifies the rites that he performs. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The verse states with regard to the priests: “For the Lord your God has chosen him out of all your tribes, to stand to minister” (Deuteronomy 18:5). The verse indicates that I have chosen him for standing and not for sitting.
  The Sages taught: “To stand to minister,” indicates that there is a mitzva to perform the service while standing. When it says: “Then he shall minister in the name of the Lord his God, as all his brethren the Levites do, who stand there before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 18:7), the verse repeats the matter to invalidate rites that are performed while not standing.
  Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Now, one who is sitting is considered like a non-priest and desecrates the service. Therefore, I will say: Just as a non-priest who performs a rite is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, so too one who is sitting should be liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. If so, why is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: But one who is uncircumcised, an acute mourner, and one who is sitting are not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven if they performed rites; rather, they simply transgress a prohibition?
  The Gemara responds: That is taught because the case of a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments and that of one whose hands and feet are not washed are two verses that come as one, as the verse states explicitly for each case that if they perform rites they are liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.
  
  Daf 24a
  
  And any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to similar cases. Therefore, one cannot assume that analogous prohibitions carry penalty of death at the hand of Heaven as well.
  And even according to the one who says that they do teach their common aspect, the prohibition against service by those who drank wine also contains explicit mention of death at the hand of Heaven and constitutes a third verse. And all agree that three verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect.
  § The mishna teaches that one who is standing upon vessels, or upon an animal, or upon the feet of another, is unfit to perform rites. The Gemara elaborates: From where do we derive this? This is derived as the Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Since the floor of the Temple courtyard sanctifies the priest to perform the service, and service vessels, i.e., priestly vestments, also sanctify him, one may draw a comparison between the two: Just as with regard to service vessels, nothing may interpose between the priest and the service vessel, so too with regard to the floor, nothing may interpose between the priest and the floor.
  The Gemara adds: And each of the three cases mentioned in the mishna is necessary. As, had the mishna taught us only that a vessel interposes between the priest’s feet and the floor, one might have thought that this is only because it is not a type of flesh, but with regard to an animal, which is a type of flesh, I will say that it does not constitute an interposition. And had it taught us only that an animal interposes, one might have thought that this is only because it is not of the human species, but another person, who is human, I will say that he does not interpose. Therefore, each is necessary.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: If one of the priest’s feet was on a vessel and one of his feet was on the floor, or if one of his feet was on a stone and one of his feet was on the floor, one sees: Any case where, were the vessel to be removed or the stone removed, he would still be able to stand on one foot and perform rites, his service is valid. But if he would not be able to stand on one foot, his service is disqualified.
  Rabbi Ami raises a dilemma: If one of the stone tiles of the Temple floor came loose and began to wobble, and the priest stood on it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara elaborates: Do not raise the dilemma with regard to a case where he does not intend to attach the stone to the floor again, as it certainly interposes in such a case, since it is considered an item separate from the Temple. Rather, when you raise this dilemma, do so with regard to a case where he intends to attach it again. In such a case, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does one say that since he intends to attach it, it is considered like that which is already attached? Or perhaps now, at least, it is disconnected, and it is considered a separate item.
  Rabba Zuti raises this dilemma like this: Rabbi Ami raises a dilemma: If one of the stone tiles was uprooted and the priest stood in its empty place, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara interjects: What is the dilemma he is raising? Perhaps this is the dilemma: When King David sanctified the site of the Temple, did he sanctify the upper level of the floor but nothing underneath it, or perhaps he sanctified it to the depths of the earth? But if this is the dilemma, let him raise the dilemma with regard to the entire Temple courtyard, i.e., what is the <i>halakha</i> if the entire floor is removed?
  The Gemara responds: Actually, it is obvious to him that King David sanctified the site of the Temple to the depths of the earth, and this is the dilemma that he raised: When a priest stands on an unfinished part of the Temple floor, is this a normal manner of ministration, or is this not a normal manner of ministration? Concerning the dilemma itself, the Gemara responds: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: If the priest collected the blood with his left hand, the service is disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:25). The conjunction of the term “with his finger” and the term “and the priest shall take” teaches that the collection of the blood may be performed only with the right hand, since the word “finger” in the context of priesthood is always referring to the right hand. Likewise, the phrase “with his finger and put it” teaches that the placing of the blood may be performed only with the right hand.
  Rabbi Shimon said: But is the word: Hand, stated with regard to the collection of the blood? Rather, the verse states only: “With his finger and put it,” teaching that the placing of the blood may be performed only with the right hand. Since the word: Hand, is not stated with regard to the collection of the blood, even if one collected the blood with his left hand, the offering is fit.
  The Gemara asks: But as for Rabbi Shimon, whichever way you look at it, his opinion is difficult. If he holds that one derives a verbal analogy from the passage discussing a leper (Leviticus, chapter 14), which indicates that all references to hands and fingers mean specifically the right hand, then even if the word: Hand, is not stated with regard to the collection of the blood, what of it? In any event, the word “finger” is stated. And if he does not hold that one derives this verbal analogy, then even if the word: Hand, were stated with regard to the collection of the blood, what of it? The word would have no significance.
  Rav Yehuda says: Actually, he does not hold that one derives this verbal analogy. And this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: But is the phrase: Right hand, stated with regard to the collection of the blood? Rather, since the phrase: Right hand, is not stated with regard to the collection of the blood, even if one collected the blood with his left hand, the offering is fit.
  Rabba said to him: If so, then even the rite of placing the blood should be valid when performed with the left hand, since the phrase: Right hand, does not appear with regard to it as well. And furthermore, does Rabbi Shimon really not hold that one derives this verbal analogy? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: In every instance in the Torah that the word “hand” is stated, the verse is referring only to the right hand, and whenever the verse mentions “finger,” it is referring only to a finger of the right hand?
  Rather, Rava says: Actually, Rabbi Shimon holds that one derives this verbal analogy, and this is what he is saying: But is the word: Hand, stated with regard to the collection of the blood? Since the word: Hand, is not stated with regard to the collection of the blood, but the word “finger” is stated, and collection cannot be performed with a finger alone, one must conclude that the word “finger” must actually be referring to the placing of the blood. Therefore, while the placing of the blood must be performed with the right hand, if one collected the blood with his left hand, the offering is fit.
  Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina: But it is possible to fashion a small handle for the rim of the bowl, and one could then hold the bowl with his finger and collect the blood in it. If so, it is possible for one to collect the blood with only his finger.
  Rather, Abaye says:
  
  Daf 24b
  
  They disagree with regard to whether a verse is interpreted based on juxtaposition to the language preceding it and to the language following it. According to Rabbi Shimon, a verse is interpreted only based on the language following it. Therefore, when the verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it upon the corners of the altar,” the word “finger” is referring only to the placing of the blood and not its collection. The Rabbis hold that the verse is also interpreted based on the language preceding it. Accordingly, they require that both rites be performed with the right hand.
  Abaye says: This statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, diverges from the opinion of his father, and it diverges from the opinion of the Rabbis: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: In every instance in the Torah that the word “finger” is stated with regard to collection of the blood and not with regard to placing of the blood on the altar, if the priest deviated from the proper method of collection and performed it with the left hand, the offering is disqualified, but if he deviated from the proper method of placing the blood, the offering remains fit. And in every instance that the word “finger” is stated only with regard to placing the blood, if the priest deviated from the proper method of placing, the offering is disqualified, but if he deviated from the proper method of collection, the offering remains fit.
  And where is the word “finger” stated only with regard to placing? As it is written: “And you shall take of the blood of the bullock and put it upon the corners of the altar with your finger” (Exodus 29:12). And he holds that a verse is interpreted based on juxtaposition to the language immediately preceding it and not to the language before that which immediately precedes it, nor to the language following it.
  § Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In every instance in the Torah that it is stated that an action is performed with a finger and by members of the priesthood, it may be performed only with the right hand.
  The Gemara comments: It might enter our mind to say that this means that we require both a finger and the priesthood to be stated together in the verse in order to mandate use of the right hand, e.g., as it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:25). And the fact that this verse is referring to a finger from his right hand is derived from a leper, as it is written: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). This cannot be correct, as there is the verse that addresses the removal of a handful from a meal offering, in which only the priesthood is written, and yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 6a): If one removed the handful with his left hand, the meal offering is disqualified.
  Rather, Rava says: This statement means that if the verse mentions either a finger or the priesthood, only the right hand may be used.
  Abaye said to Rava: But this is contradicted by the verse discussing the conveyance of the limbs of the daily burnt offering to the ramp of the altar, as priesthood is written with regard to it, as it is written: “And the priest shall sacrifice the whole and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13), and the Master said that this verse is referring to the conveyance of the limbs to the ramp. And yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 31b): When the priest conveys the limbs to the ramp, the foot of the right side of the offering is carried in the left hand of the priest, and the place of its skin, i.e., the side of the limb covered in skin, is held facing outward. Clearly, use of the left hand does not disqualify the conveyance of the limbs.
  The Gemara responds: When we say that if the verse states either finger or priesthood then the left hand is disqualified, this is only with regard to a matter that precludes atonement, i.e., a rite whose performance is indispensable to the atonement, similar to the sprinkling of the oil on the leper (see Leviticus 14:16). The conveyance of the limbs, by contrast, is not indispensable to atonement.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the collection of the blood in a service vessel, about which priesthood is written and which is a matter that precludes atonement? And yet we learned in the mishna: If one collected the blood with his left hand, the blood is disqualified for offering, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Shimon requires that both matters appear in the verse, i.e., both finger and priesthood.
  The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Shimon really require both? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: In every instance in the Torah that the word “hand” is stated, the verse is referring only to the right hand, and whenever the verse mentions “finger,” it is referring only to a finger of the right hand?
  The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Shimon, if the verse mentions only “finger,” then it does not require a mention of the priesthood as well for the limitation to apply. But if the verse mentions only the priesthood, it requires a mention of “finger” for the limitation to apply.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, if the mention of the priesthood alone does not suffice to disqualify the right hand, then why do I need the superfluous reference to a priest with regard to the collection of the blood? After all, the verse already states that the collection must be performed by the sons of Aaron. The Gemara responds: The additional mention of the priesthood indicates that the priests must perform the collection of the blood in their priestly state, i.e., while wearing the priestly vestments.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the sprinkling of the blood, concerning which only the priesthood is written in the verse, and we learned: If one sprinkled the blood with his left hand it is disqualified; and Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with this ruling, indicating that Rabbi Shimon holds that a mention of the priesthood does not require a mention of “finger”?
  Abaye says: He disagrees with this ruling in a <i>baraita</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one collected the blood with his left hand, it is disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. Additionally, if one sprinkled the blood with his left hand, it is disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit.
  The Gemara asks: But that which Rava says with regard to the superfluous phrases in the passage discussing a leper: One derives a verbal analogy between “hand” and “hand” mentioned with regard to the removal of a handful from a meal offering, to indicate that the latter must also be performed with the right hand. Additionally, one derives a verbal analogy between “foot” and “foot” mentioned with regard to the <i>ḥalitza</i> ritual. And one derives a verbal analogy between “ear” and “ear” mentioned with regard to the piercing of a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl. One may ask: Why do I need the first analogy? The requirement that the handful be removed with the right hand can be derived from the statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana above, since priesthood is mentioned in the verse describing it.
  The Gemara responds: Both derivations are necessary, one for the removal of the handful from a meal offering, and one for the sanctification of the handful, i.e., placing it into a second service vessel. Both must be performed with the right hand.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not require sanctification of the handful, or according to the one who says that Rabbi Shimon also requires the sanctification of the handful but that he deems the sanctification fit when performed with the left hand, why do I need the verbal analogy of Rava between “hand” and “hand”?
  If one suggests that it is necessary to indicate that the removal of the handful itself must be performed with the right hand, this cannot be, since that is derived from the verse cited by Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya. As Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reason that Rabbi Shimon does not require that the handful be sanctified in a service vessel? As the verse states with regard to the meal offering: “It is most holy, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10).
  The verse compares the meal offering to a sin offering and a guilt offering. Therefore, if the priest comes to perform the burning of the handful with his hand, then he performs it with his right hand, like a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled by hand. And if he comes to perform it with a vessel, i.e., if he first sanctifies the handful in a service vessel, then he may perform it with his left hand, like a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled from a vessel. Since the removal of the handful is performed by hand, the verse indicates that it must be performed with the right hand, and the verbal analogy is unnecessary.
  The Gemara responds: The verbal analogy is necessary only for the handful of a meal offering of a sinner, to teach that it must be removed with the right hand. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that this offering does not require oil and frankincense so that his offering will not be of superior quality, perhaps when he removed the handful with his left hand, which is an inferior manner, it should be fit as well. The verbal analogy therefore teaches us that the handful must always be removed with the right hand, even in the case of the meal offering of a sinner.
  MISHNA: If the blood spilled on the floor before the priest managed to collect it into a vessel, and the priest then collected it from the floor into a vessel, it is disqualified.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: The verse states: “And the anointed priest shall take from the blood of the bull [<i>middam happar</i>]” (Leviticus 4:5). This means that the priest shall take from the blood of the soul, i.e., the blood that flows from the place of slaughter as the animal dies, but not from the blood of the skin, which bleeds out when the skin is cut before the slaughter, nor from the blood of exudate, i.e., that exudes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: When the verse states: “From the blood of the bull,” it should be interpreted as if it is written: He shall collect the blood from the bull, i.e., if the blood spills onto the floor before it is collected in a service vessel, it is disqualified. As, if it enters your mind that “from the blood of the bull” should be interpreted as it is written, i.e., that “from the blood” means that the priest may collect even only a portion of the blood, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rav say: One who slaughters the offering must collect all the blood of the bull, as it is stated: “And all the blood of the bull he shall pour out on the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:7)? The verse emphasizes that the priest must pour all the blood of the bull, which is possible only if he has collected all of it.
  Rather, “from the blood of the bull” means that the priest shall collect the blood from the bull. And this Sage holds that the Sages subtract and add and interpret homiletically, i.e., one may take a letter from one word, insert it into a second word, and explain the phrase in that manner. In this case, the <i>mem</i> of <i>middam</i> is added to <i>happar</i>, so that the verse is interpreted as though it states: <i>Dam mehappar</i>, meaning: Blood from the bull.
  § The Gemara turns to the matter itself: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: One who slaughters the offering must collect all the blood of the bull, as it is stated: “And all the blood of the bull he shall pour out on the base of the altar.” The Gemara asks: But isn’t this verse written with regard to the remainder of the blood that is poured onto the base of the altar after the sprinkling? How, then, can a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the collection of the blood be derived from it?
  The Gemara responds: If this verse is not referring to the matter of the remainder of the blood after sprinkling, as not all of the blood is present for that rite since some of it has already been sprinkled, apply it instead to the matter of collection of the blood from the animal.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who slaughters the offering must hold the knife up after slaughter, so that blood that is on the knife does not fall into the service vessel, as it is stated: “And the anointed priest shall take from the blood of the bull,” i.e., and not from a mixture of the blood of the bull and something else, such as the blood from the knife.
  The Gemara asks: And with what does he wipe the blood from the knife? Abaye says: He wipes it with the rim of the bowl used to collect the blood, as it is written of the bowls used to collect the blood: “Atoning-bowls [<i>keforei</i>] of gold” (Ezra 1:10). The root <i>kaf</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>reish</i> can also mean to wipe.
  Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says: One who slaughters the offering must place
  
  Daf 25b
  
  the veins of the offering into the vessel, so that all the blood will empty into it. It was also stated: Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The veins must see the airspace of the vessel.
  § Rabbi Asi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If the priest was collecting the blood, and the bottom of the bowl broke before the blood reached the bowl’s airspace, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is blood that enters the airspace of a bowl that will not ultimately allow it to settle inside nevertheless considered as though it settled inside the vessel, so that when it spills through the break it is considered to have already been collected in the bowl? If so, it remains fit for sprinkling. Or is it not considered as though it settled, but is instead considered to have spilled directly from the animal’s neck onto the floor, and is therefore disqualified?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: You learned the answer in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a barrel that is placed under a pipe to catch water running from it, both the water that has already flowed inside the barrel and that which is still outside it but about to fall in are unfit to be used as water of purification, which purify one who contracts impurity from a corpse. The water of purification must be flowing water, and all of this water is considered to have been collected in the barrel. But if one joined the mouth of the barrel to the pipe, the water that is inside the barrel is unfit, but water that is still outside it is fit, even though it will ultimately fall in, since it is still in the pipe and is not considered to be above the airspace of the barrel. One can infer from the <i>baraita</i> that all liquid that enters the airspace of a vessel is considered to have been collected in it.
  The Gemara rejects this: What is this comparison? Rabbi Asi raises a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to a case where an item enters the airspace of a vessel that will not ultimately allow it to settle inside, and Rabbi Yoḥanan resolves the dilemma by citing a case where the item enters the airspace of a vessel that will ultimately allow it to settle inside.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Asi raises two dilemmas before Rabbi Yoḥanan: First, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that will not come to rest in the vessel? Second, if you say that an item that enters the airspace of a vessel that will not ultimately allow it to settle inside is not considered as though it settled inside the vessel, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that entered the airspace of a vessel that will ultimately allow it to settle inside?
  The Gemara notes: Rav Yosef teaches the exchange in this manner, i.e., as recounted. Rav Kahana teaches it as follows: Rabbi Asi raised the dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to a barrel, asking whether the water in its airspace is fit to be used for the water of purification, and Rabbi Yoḥanan resolved the dilemma for him by citing the <i>baraita</i> mentioning a barrel, with which he was unfamiliar.
  Rabba teaches the exchange as follows: Rabbi Asi raised the dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to a barrel, and Rabbi Yoḥanan resolved the dilemma for him by citing the <i>halakha</i> concerning a bowl used to collect the blood in the Temple, saying: Do you not concede with regard to the bowl that it is impossible to collect the blood in it without a stream of blood flowing through the air from animal’s neck? If the air above the bowl is not considered part of the bowl, the blood would be considered to have entered the bowl from the air above rather than directly from the animal’s neck, and all collected blood would be unfit. Therefore, the airspace must be considered part of the bowl, and the same holds for the barrel with regard to the water of purification.
  The Gemara adds: We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Para</i> 6:4) with regard to sanctifying the water of purification: If one placed his hand or his foot or vegetable leaves in order to allow flowing water to pass through them to the barrel, the water is disqualified. But if the water passed through leaves of reeds or leaves of nuts, the water remains fit. This is the principle: If the water passes through an item that is susceptible to impurity, it is disqualified; if it passes through an item that is not susceptible to impurity, it is fit.
  The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Abba: The verse states: “Nevertheless a fountain or a cistern wherein is a gathering of water shall be pure” (Leviticus 11:36). The verse indicates that their being must be by way of purity, i.e., the gathering of the water must not be accomplished by way of items susceptible to impurity.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Since this mishna states that water that flows over one’s hand through the air into the barrel is disqualified, that is to say that the airspace above a vessel is considered as though it were part of the vessel itself. If it were not, the water would not be considered to have flowed directly from the hand to the vessel, but rather from the air above the vessel. Since air is not susceptible to impurity, the water would not be disqualified.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: But perhaps the mishna is referring to a case where the water flows weakly straight from the hand into the vessel itself, since the hand is situated directly on the edge of the vessel, with no air separating them? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Imbecile, we learned in the mishna: In order to allow flowing water to pass through them to the barrel. This indicates that the water is traveling in a stream and will pass through the air before reaching the barrel.
  And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This mishna concerning the barrel was taught from the testimony of Rabbi Tzadok, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 7:4): Rabbi Tzadok testified with regard to rivulets that one diverted by way of a pipe made with leaves of nuts that their water is fit to be used as water of purification. This was an incident in the town of Ohalya, and an account of the incident came before the Sages in the Chamber of Hewn Stone in the Temple, and they deemed the water fit.
  § Rabbi Zeira says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In the case of one who slits the ear of the bull with the knife after slaughter, creating a blemish, and thereafter collected its blood from the neck, the offering is disqualified, as it is stated: “And the anointed priest shall take from the blood of the bull” (Leviticus 4:5). By referring to the animal as a bull even after its slaughter, the verse indicates that the bull must be at the time of collection of the blood as it already was before slaughter, without a blemish.
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, since the verse is referring to such an offering; from where do we derive that the same holds for offerings of lesser sanctity?
  Rava says: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the Paschal offering, an offering of lesser sanctity: The verse states: “A lamb without blemish, a male of the first year it shall be for you” (Exodus 12:5), indicating that it shall be unblemished and in its first year at the time of slaughter. From where is it derived that it must also be without blemish at the time of collection of the blood, at the time of conveying the blood to the altar, and at the time of the sprinkling of the blood? The verse states: “It shall be,” emphasizing that all its happenings shall be only when it is unblemished and in its first year.
  Abaye raised an objection to this from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to any of the types of offerings that are mentioned in the Torah from which there remains either an olive-bulk of flesh or an olive-bulk of fat, the <i>halakha</i> is that the priest sprinkles the blood of that offering. Apparently, one may sprinkle the blood even if much of the offering is damaged or missing.
  The Gemara responds: Interpret the verse as referring only to the requirement that the animal be in its first year until after the sprinkling. It may have a blemish at the time of sprinkling.
  The Gemara challenges this: But is there any case where the animal is in its first year at the time of slaughter, but at the time of conveying the blood to the altar and sprinkling the blood it is in its second year?
  Rava says: That is to say that hours disqualify sacrificial animals, i.e., one measures the age of the offering from the exact time of its birth. It is therefore possible that the animal reaches its second year between its slaughter and the conveying of its blood to the altar.
  § Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Elazar says: In a case where the animal is standing inside the Temple courtyard but its legs are planted outside it, if one severed its legs and thereafter slaughtered it, the offering is fit, since all the blood collected in the bowl is from the portion of the animal standing in the courtyard.
  
  Daf 26a
  
  But if he slaughtered the animal and thereafter severed its legs, the offering is disqualified because some of the blood collected is from the legs, which are outside the courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: If he severed its legs and thereafter slaughtered it, is the offering fit? But isn’t he sacrificing a blemished animal? Rather, say: If one slaughtered the animal while it stood wholly in the courtyard, and afterward its legs moved beyond the edge of the courtyard, and then he severed its legs and thereafter collected the blood, the offering is fit. But if he collected the blood and thereafter severed the animal’s legs, the offering is disqualified, since the blood from the legs is mixed with the other blood of the animal.
  The Gemara challenges: If he severed its legs and thereafter collected the blood, is the offering fit? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say: If one slits the ear of a firstborn animal with the knife after slaughter, creating a blemish, and thereafter collected its blood from the neck, the offering is disqualified, as it is stated: “And the anointed priest shall take from the blood of the bull” (Leviticus 4:5)? The verse indicates that the bull must be at the time of collection of the blood as it already was before slaughter, without a blemish.
  Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: Rabbi Ami is not referring to a case where one severs the entire leg. Rather, one cuts the flesh of the limb until he reaches the bone, leaving the bone intact. This is not considered a blemish, and the animal remains fit for sacrifice.
  The Gemara suggests: Given that if he collected the blood and thereafter severed the animal’s legs, the offering is disqualified, perhaps you can conclude from it that blood absorbed in the limbs of an animal is considered blood, such that it disqualifies the offering because this blood left the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps the offering is disqualified because of the animal’s fat that is mixed with the blood in the legs. This is considered to be like meat of the offering that has left the Temple courtyard, which also disqualifies the offering.
  The Gemara suggests: If so, perhaps you can conclude another <i>halakha</i> from it: In the case of meat of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, the offering is disqualified, even though the meat of such offerings may be eaten outside the Temple after the blood has been sprinkled.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps the <i>halakha</i> was stated only with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, whose meat must be eaten inside the Temple courtyard. It proves nothing about offerings of lesser sanctity.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north. If one stood in the south and extended his hand into the north and slaughtered the offering there, his slaughter is valid. If he collected the blood in a similar manner, his collection is not valid. If he inserted his head and most of his body into the north of the courtyard and collected the blood there, it is as if his entire body entered the north. If he slaughtered the animal and it then convulsed and left the north to the south and then returned to the north, it remains fit.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, their slaughter is anywhere inside the Temple courtyard, and collection of their blood in a service vessel is anywhere inside the Temple courtyard. If one stood outside and inserted his hand into the courtyard and slaughtered the offering there, his slaughter is valid. If he collected the blood in a similar manner, his collection is not valid. And if he inserted his head and most of his body into the courtyard and collected the blood, it is as if he had not entered it at all. If he slaughtered the animal and it then convulsed and left to the outside of the courtyard and returned, it is disqualified. The Gemara infers: Conclude from this <i>baraita</i> that in cases of meat of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, the offerings are disqualified.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the tail, the diaphragm, and the two kidneys of offerings of lesser sanctity, which are all burned on the altar. Since these portions are never meant to leave the Temple courtyard, they are disqualified if they leave even momentarily. It may still be that the remaining meat of such offerings is not disqualified.
  § Shmuel’s father raised a dilemma before Shmuel: If the offering was standing inside the Temple courtyard and its legs were outside, what is the <i>halakha</i>? May one slaughter it?
  Shmuel said to him: It is written: “That they may bring them to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:5), indicating that the offering may not be slaughtered unless all of it is inside.
  His father asked him further: If one suspended the animal in the air and slaughtered it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel said to him: It is valid. His father said to him: You are mistaken. We require that the slaughter occur on the side of the altar (see Leviticus 1:11), and this is not considered to fulfill that requirement.
  His father asked him further: If the one slaughtering the animal was suspended in the air and slaughtered the offering while it was on the ground, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel said to him: It is not valid. His father said to him: You are mistaken. We require only that the slaughter occur on the side of the altar, but not that the one who slaughters be on the side of the altar.
  His father asked him further: If the priest was suspended in the air and collected the blood of the offering in that position, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel said to him: It is valid. His father said to him: You are mistaken. This is not a normal manner of ministration.
  His father asked him further: If the priest suspended the offering in the air after slaughter and collected its blood, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Shmuel said to him: It is not valid. His father said to him: You are mistaken. We require only that the slaughter occur on the side of the altar, but not that collection of the blood occur on the side of the altar.
  Abaye said: With regard to offerings of the most sacred order, in all of those cases the offerings are disqualified, except for the case where one was suspended in the air and slaughtered the animal. With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, in all of those cases the offerings are fit, except for the case where the priest was suspended in the air and collected the blood.
  Rava said: What is different about a case where one suspended the animal and collected the blood of an offering of lesser sanctity, such that the offering is fit? Perhaps it is because the air inside the Temple courtyard is considered to be inside the courtyard for purposes of the service. But if so, then with regard to offerings of the most sacred order as well, let one say that air in the north of the Temple courtyard is considered to be in the north for purposes of the service.
  Rather, Rava says: Both with regard to offerings of the most sacred order and with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, they are fit in all of those cases except where one suspended the animal and slaughtered it in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, because the Torah mandates that such offerings be slaughtered on the side of the altar. And the offerings are also disqualified where the priest was suspended in the air and collected the blood, both with regard to offerings of the most sacred order and with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, since this is not a normal manner of ministration.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If the priest was inside and his fringes, i.e., his hair, were outside, and he collected the blood, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Did you not say that the verse: “That they may bring them to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:5), indicates that an offering may not be slaughtered unless all of it comes inside? Here, too, the verse states with regard to the priests: “When they go into the Tent of Meeting” (Exodus 28:43), indicating that the priest may not perform rites unless all of him comes into the Tent of Meeting.
  MISHNA: If the priest placed the blood upon the ramp leading up to the altar, or if he placed it on the wall of the altar in an area that is not opposite the base of the altar, i.e., in those parts of the altar where there is no foundation; or if he placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line that runs along the middle of the altar, e.g., the blood of a burnt offering, above the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line, e.g., the blood of a sin offering, below the red line; or if he placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary, i.e., on the golden altar or in the Holy of Holies, outside the Sanctuary on the external altar, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary, in all these cases the offering is disqualified. Nevertheless, there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of these offerings.
  
  Daf 26b
  
  GEMARA: Shmuel says: When the mishna states that the offering is disqualified, it means that the meat is unfit for consumption. But the owner of the offering has achieved atonement through it. What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states with regard to the blood: “And I have given it to you upon the altar to atone for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11), from which it is derived that once the blood reaches any location on the altar, the owner of the offering has achieved atonement.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, the meat should be fit for consumption as well. The Gemara responds: The verse states “to atone,” emphasizing that I have given it to you for atonement and for nothing else, e.g., consumption of the meat.
  The Gemara notes: Apparently, Shmuel holds that blood sprinkled not in its proper place is considered as though it were sprinkled in its proper place. But we learned in a mishna in another chapter (32a): If an unfit person placed the blood upon the ramp, or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar; or if he placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line; or if he placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary, then if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should collect the blood again and sprinkle it on the altar.
  The Gemara continues: And if it would enter your mind to say that blood sprinkled not in its proper place is considered as though it were sprinkled in its proper place, why do I need the fit priest to collect the blood again and sprinkle it? And if you would say that although the first sprinkling already effected atonement, the second sprinkling is necessary to permit the meat of the offering for consumption, is there such a concept as a sprinkling that does not itself effect atonement and yet permits the meat for consumption? Rather, one must conclude that the first sprinkling did not effect atonement at all, since it was not sprinkled in its proper place.
  The Gemara responds: If a fit priest had initially placed the blood improperly, the sprinkling would indeed have effected atonement after the fact and there would not be another sprinkling. But here we are dealing with a case where an unfit person placed the blood, so that it did not effect atonement at all.
  The Gemara asks: But if the mishna is dealing with a case where an unfit person placed the blood initially, then the offering should be rejected permanently, as we learned in the same mishna: And with regard to all unfit people who collected the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should collect the blood again and sprinkle it on the altar. Since the mishna states this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to collection of the blood, one can infer that specifically if an unfit person collected the blood with improper intent, a fit priest can indeed collect the blood again, but if they sprinkled the blood with improper intent he cannot. What is the reason for this? Is it not because the offering is rejected permanently when an unfit person sprinkles its blood?
  The Gemara responds: No, the offering is rejected because it is disqualified by the improper intent of the person sprinkling the blood, not because that person is unfit.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, then improper intent with regard to collection of the blood should disqualify the offering as well. And furthermore, does intent disqualify offerings in such cases? But doesn’t Rava say: Intent is effective to disqualify an offer-ing only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service? Here, the one collecting the blood is unfit.
  The Gemara responds: Do not say that one infers from the mishna that if an unfit person sprinkled the blood with improper intent a fit priest cannot collect it again. Rather, say that one infers that if an unfit person slaughtered the offering with improper intent the mistake cannot be rectified. Slaughter is valid if performed by one unfit for the Temple service, and therefore an unfit person’s improper intent is effective to disqualify the offering. By contrast, collection and sprinkling of the blood must be performed by a fit priest. Consequently, an unfit person’s intent with regard to those rites does not disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara asks: According to this interpretation, what is the mishna teaching us? Can it mean to teach only that improper intent by an unfit person during slaughter disqualifies the offering? We already learn this in the same mishna (31b), which states: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, and therefore, these unfit people disqualify the offering with improper intent.
  The Gemara responds: This is what the mishna teaches us: That one who is unfit can disqualify the offering only during its slaughter, but from the rite of collection of the blood onward the intent of an unfit person does not disqualify the offering. What is the reason for this? It is like that which Rava says: Intent is effective to disqualify an offering only when expressed by one who is fit for the service in question.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered an offering and had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, and he had intent to do so immediately, i.e., on the same day, the offering remains fit. Therefore, if he subsequently had intent when performing the other rites
  
  Daf 27a
  
  to burn or eat the offering or sprinkle its blood outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. But if he had intent to perform one of those actions beyond its designated time, then it is rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it.
  If he had intent to sprinkle the blood improperly the next day, beyond the permitted time, then the offering is disqualified. Nevertheless, it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, because he also had intent to sprinkle the blood improperly. Therefore, if he subsequently had intent to sacrifice the offering or consume its meat, whether beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, it is disqualified and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it, because an offering can be rendered <i>piggul</i> only if it would have otherwise been fit.
  The Gemara asks: But if blood sprinkled not in its proper place is considered as though it were sprinkled in its proper place, then in this case above, where he had intent to sprinkle the blood improperly the next day, is the offering merely disqualified? Since it is considered as though he had intent to sprinkle the blood properly the next day, shouldn’t the offering be rendered <i>piggul</i>?
  Mar Zutra said: Intent with regard to sprinkling that permits the meat for consumption can cause the offering to become <i>piggul</i>. Intent with regard to sprinkling that does not render the meat permitted for consumption does not cause it to become <i>piggul</i>. Even Shmuel concedes that although the owner achieves atonement, if the blood is sprinkled in an improper place the meat may not be consumed. Accordingly, this offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: From where do you derive this? Mar Zutra replied: I derive it from a verse, as it is written: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it, it shall be <i>piggul</i>” (Leviticus 7:18). The verse indicates that only an offering whose intent of <i>piggul</i> alone caused it to be disqualified is considered <i>piggul</i>. Excluded is this case, whose intent of <i>piggul</i> alone did not cause it to be disqualified; rather, the prohibition of something else, i.e., the intent to sprinkle the blood in an improper location, caused it to be disqualified.
  The Gemara challenges: But if so, i.e., if blood applied not in its proper place is considered as though it were applied in its proper place, and the intent to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, then it should not even be disqualified due to such an intention. Why, then, does the <i>baraita</i> rule that it is disqualified?
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: In general, intent to perform the rites of an offering beyond its designated time disqualifies the offering, even when it does not render it <i>piggul</i>, just as is the case with regard to the intent to leave portions of the offering for the next day, as taught in a mishna in the next chapter (35b), and according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda there, that intent to leave the blood until the next day rather than sprinkling it on the altar disqualifies the offering even though it does not render it <i>piggul</i>.
  § The Gemara cites additional opinions with regard to the statement of the mishna that blood misapplied on the altar disqualifies the offering. Reish Lakish says: Actually, when the mishna states that the offering is disqualified, this is to be taken literally, i.e., that the owner does not even achieve atonement through it. And nevertheless, blood sprinkled not in its proper place is considered as though it were sprinkled in its proper place, and it effects atonement. And the apparent contradiction between these two claims is not difficult: Here, where misapplication of the blood effects atonement, it is a case where he placed it in silence, i.e., without specific intent; there, in the mishna, it is a case where he placed it with a statement, i.e., intent to consume the offering beyond its appointed time.
  Since Reish Lakish agrees with the statement of Shmuel that blood applied not in its proper place is considered as though it were applied in its proper place, the Gemara poses the same difficulties to the statement of Reish Lakish as posed above to Shmuel: We learned in a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered an offering and had intent to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, etc., until the response of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: Just as is the case with regard to the intent to leave portions of the offering for the next day, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, etc.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both here and there, i.e., in the mishna here as well as in the mishna in the next chapter (32a), it is a case where he placed the blood in silence. And the mishna here rules that the offering is completely disqualified because blood applied not in its proper place is not considered as though it were applied in its proper place. And that mishna in the next chapter, which states that the blood may be collected and sprinkled again, is referring to a case where there is blood of the soul left in the animal to sprinkle again, while this mishna is referring to a case where there is no blood of the soul left.
  The Gemara challenges: We learned in the mishna that if the blood was misapplied on the altar, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of the meat. Granted, according to Reish Lakish, who explains that the mishna is referring to one who expresses intent to sacrifice or consume the offering beyond its designated time, this is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> teaches: Disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it, to stress that although one sprinkled the blood with intent of <i>piggul</i>, since the sprinkling was performed improperly, his intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, and one who partakes of it is not liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who explains that the mishna is referring to a case where the blood was sprinkled with no specific intent, of what necessity is the clause: There is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it? Since the offering is disqualified because the blood was placed not in its proper place, and there was no intent of <i>piggul</i>, why would one think that there should be liability for <i>karet</i>? The Gemara responds: Indeed, this clause is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, of what necessity is the clause: There is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it? The Gemara responds: This is what the mishna is saying: If one placed the blood improperly with intent that would otherwise render the offering <i>piggul</i>, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it, because such sprinkling would not have permitted the meat for consumption.
  The Gemara challenges: And according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, if blood sprinkled not in its proper place is not considered as though it were sprinkled in its proper place, it should be as if it spilled from the service vessel onto the floor, and let the priest gather it up and sprinkle it again properly. Why, then, does the mishna rule that it is disqualified?
  The Gemara responds: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says: He may not gather it up. As Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All concede with regard to the blood that is to be placed above the red line that if one placed it above the red line, and likewise with regard to the blood that is to be placed below the red line if one placed it below the red line, not in accordance with the procedure dictated by its mitzva, e.g., with the left hand or with improper intent, he may not gather it up again. They disagree only with regard to the blood that is to be placed above the red line that one placed below the red line, and blood that is to be placed below the red line that one placed above the red line, as Rabbi Yosei says: He may not gather it up, and Rabbi Shimon says: He may gather it up.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  And our mishna is in accordance with the statement of the one who says: He may not gather it up.
  And Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: Everyone concedes with regard to the blood that is to be placed below the red line that if one placed it above the red line he may not gather it up again. And all the more so with regard to the blood that is to be placed above the red line that one placed below the red line, since the blood placed above the red line will eventually run down the side of the altar and reach below the red line. They disagree only with regard to the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary that one placed outside on the external altar, or blood that is to be placed outside that one placed inside, as Rabbi Yosei says: He may gather it up, as though it had spilled on the floor, and Rabbi Shimon says: He may not gather it up, because the blood was nevertheless placed on an altar.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: We learn in a <i>baraita</i> as well that if the blood is misapplied on the altar it may not be gathered, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Yehuda says that the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering: It is that which goes up [<i>ha’ola</i>] on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that a disqualified offering that ascended upon the altar shall not descend from it. These terms, i.e., “this,” “it,” and “that,” are three terms of exclusion, which serve to exclude three cases of disqualified offerings from this <i>halakha</i>: An offering that was slaughtered at night, one whose blood was spilled, and one whose blood emerged outside the curtains, i.e., the Temple courtyard. In these cases, even if the offering ascended upon the altar it shall descend.
  Rabbi Shimon says: From the term “burnt offering [<i>ola</i>]” I have derived only that a fit burnt offering shall not descend. From where is it derived that the <i>halakha</i> includes an offering that was slaughtered at night, or one whose blood was spilled, or one whose blood emerged outside the curtains, or one that was left overnight, or one that left the courtyard, or one that became impure, or one that was slaughtered with intent to consume it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, or an offering for which an unfit person collected and sprinkled its blood, or a case where one placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line below it, or where one placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above it, or where one placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside on the external altar, or where one placed the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside it, or a Paschal offering or a sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake? From where is it derived that if these offerings ascended they shall not descend?
  The verse states: “The law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>],” literally: That which goes up. The verse included under one law all items that ascend upon the altar, teaching that if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend.
  One might have thought that I should include even an animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or an animal that was set aside for idol worship, or an animal that was worshipped as a deity, or an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal that is a <i>tereifa</i>, or an animal born by caesarean section. The verse therefore states: “This,” to exclude these animals from the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see as the reason to include the former cases and to exclude the latter ones? The Gemara responds: I include these former cases, whose disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., in the course of the Temple service, and I exclude these latter cases, whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity and were disqualified as offerings from the outset.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak continues: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that if one placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above it, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line below it, the offering does not descend from the altar. And Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree, even though he holds that if the blood spilled on the ground the offering descends from the altar. What is the reason for this? Is it not because even if the blood was misapplied, the altar has absorbed the blood and it is not considered to have been spilled on the floor? Conclude from it that if blood was misapplied on the altar, the priest may not gather it up again, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  § Pursuant to the discussion of disqualified offerings that do not descend from the external altar, Rabbi Eliezer says: The inner altar, i.e., the golden altar inside the Sanctuary, sanctifies disqualified offerings such that if they ascended onto it, they do not descend.
  The Gemara asks: What is this statement teaching us? We already learn this in the above <i>baraita</i>: If one placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside on the external altar, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside it, on the golden altar, the offering does not descend.
  The Gemara responds: If one were to learn the <i>halakha</i> only from there, I would say: This matter applies only to blood mistakenly placed on the golden altar, as it is fit to be placed on that altar in certain contexts, i.e., the blood of the bull and goat sin offerings on Yom Kippur; but with regard to a handful from a meal offering, which is not fit to be placed on the golden altar in any context, I will say that it is not sanctified when placed on it. Rabbi Eliezer therefore teaches us that even a handful from a meal offering does not descend from it.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If strange incense, i.e., incense that it is prohibited to burn on the golden altar, ascended onto the altar, it shall descend, as only the external altar sanctifies disqualified offerings that are suited for it. One can infer that the external altar does sanctify disqualified offerings, but the inner altar does not.
  The Gemara responds: Answer like this: The <i>baraita</i> means that if strange incense ascended onto the external altar, it shall descend, as the external altar sanctifies only disqualified offerings that are suited for it. But the inner altar sanctifies everything, whether it is suited for it or it is not suited for it. What is the reason for this? This, the external altar, is considered part of the floor, since it is fixed to the floor of the Temple, and that, the inner altar, is considered a service vessel with a higher level of sanctity.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who slaughters the offering with intent to sprinkle its blood outside the Temple or to sprinkle part of its blood outside the Temple, to burn its sacrificial portions outside the Temple or to burn part of its sacrificial portions outside the Temple, to partake of its meat outside the Temple or to partake of an olive-bulk of its meat outside the Temple, or to partake of an olive-bulk of the skin of the tail outside the Temple, in all of these cases the offering is disqualified, and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of it.
  But if one had intent to sprinkle its blood the next day or part of its blood the next day, to burn its sacrificial portions the next day or to burn part of its sacrificial portions the next day, to partake of its meat the next day or to partake of an olive-bulk of its meat the next day, or to partake of an olive-bulk of the skin of the tail the next day, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it.
  GEMARA: The students assumed that the skin of the tail
  
  Daf 28a
  
  is considered as though it were part of the tail itself. The tail of a sheep sacrificed as a peace offering is burned on the altar rather than eaten. But if so, one who slaughters the sheep with intent to consume the skin of its tail the next day has intent to shift its consumption from consumption by the altar, i.e., burning the offering, to consumption by a person. Since intent to consume part of an offering beyond its designated time renders an offering <i>piggul</i> only if that part is intended for human consumption, why does the mishna rule that such an offering is <i>piggul</i>?
  Shmuel says: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent to shift an item’s consumption from consumption by the altar to consumption by a person, or from consumption by a person to consumption by the altar, and the offering will still be rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (35a): In a case of one who slaughters the offering with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit. And Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna here? You interpreted it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. But if so, say the latter clause, i.e., the next mishna (29b): This is the principle: Anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, beyond its designated time, renders it <i>piggul</i>.
  One can infer that intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it does render it <i>piggul</i>, while intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it does not render it <i>piggul</i>. In this clause, we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis. Can it be that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, while the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? Shmuel said to him: Yes. That is how one must understand the mishna.
  Rav Huna says: The skin of the tail is not considered as though it were the tail itself. Unlike the tail itself, its skin is consumed. Consequently, both this mishna and the next can be understood in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rava said: What is the reasoning of Rav Huna? As the verse states: “And he shall present of the sacrifice of peace offerings an offering made by fire unto the Lord: The fat thereof, the fat tail” (Leviticus 3:9), indicating that the priest must offer the fat of the tail on the altar, but not the skin of the tail.
  Rav Ḥisda says: Actually, the skin of the tail is considered as though it were the tail itself, and it is burned on the altar. And here, in the mishna, we are dealing with the tail of a kid, which is not burned on the altar but is consumed. Accordingly, intent to consume it outside its designated time renders it <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara notes: All of them, Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda, do not say as Shmuel says, since they do not wish to interpret that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And Shmuel and Rav Ḥisda do not say as Rav Huna says, since they heard that the skin of the tail is considered as though it were the tail itself.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Shmuel and Rav Huna do not say as Rav Ḥisda says, that the mishna is referring to the tail of a kid? The Gemara responds that they reason: According to Rav Ḥisda, what is the mishna teaching us by referring specifically to the skin of the tail? Does it mean to teach simply that the skin of the tail is considered edible, like the tail itself? We already learn this in another mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 122a): These are the entities whose skin has a halakhic status like that of their meat, since it is soft and edible: The skin beneath the tail.
  The Gemara asks: And Rav Ḥisda, how would he respond? The Gemara answers: The reference here to the skin of the tail was necessary, as given only the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥullin</i>, it might enter your mind to say: This matter, the equation between the skin of the tail and the tail itself, applies only with regard to the matter of ritual impurity, as the skin of the tail is soft and edible, and it is therefore counted as part of the tail. But here, with regard to the matter of the Temple service, I will say that the verse states with regard to the gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled: “As a consecrated portion” (Numbers 18:8), to indicate that they must be eaten in greatness, in the way that the kings eat. And since kings do not generally eat the skin of the tail, I will say that it is not considered an eaten portion of the offering. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is nevertheless considered like the tail itself.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One who slaughters a burnt offering with intent to burn an olive-bulk of the skin beneath the tail outside its designated area renders the offering disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of the offering. If his intent is to burn it beyond its designated time, it is rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating it. This is the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Elazar ben Yehuda of Avelim says in the name of Rabbi Ya’akov, and so Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda of Kefar Ikos would say in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Whether the hide of the hooves of small livestock, or the skin of the head of a young calf, or the skin beneath the tail, or any of the skins that the Sages listed with regard to ritual impurity under the heading: These are the entities whose skin has a halakhic status like that of their meat, which means to include the skin of the womb, if one has intent to burn one of them outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it, and if one’s intent is to burn it beyond its designated time, he renders it <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it.
  One can infer from the <i>baraita</i> that only with regard to a burnt offering, yes, the skin of the tail is burned on the altar like the tail itself. But with regard to another offering, this is not the <i>halakha</i>. Granted, according to Rav Huna, who holds that the skin of the tail of a peace offering is not considered as though it were the tail itself, and it is eaten rather than burned, this is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> teaches about a burnt offering specifically, as all portions of a burnt offering are burned, even those that are eaten in the case of other offerings. But according to Rav Ḥisda, who holds that the skin of the tail is burned together with the tail, why does the <i>tanna</i> specifically teach about a burnt offering? If the skin of the tail is always considered as though it were the tail itself, let the <i>tanna</i> teach about any offering.
  Rav Ḥisda could have said to you: If you wish, say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the tail of a kid, which is never burned on the altar except in the case of a burnt offering. And if you wish, say instead that one should emend the text of the <i>baraita</i> to teach: One who slaughters any offering, etc.
  § The mishna states that if one intends to consume the meat or sprinkle the blood outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of it. If one intends to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Shmuel says: Two verses are written.
  The Gemara asks: What are these verses? Rabba said: Shmuel is referring to two phrases from the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The Sages taught that this verse is referring not to offerings actually eaten on the third day, but to one who performs one of the sacrificial rites with intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time. Now, when the verse states: “And if any of the flesh…be at all eaten on the third day,” this is referring to intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time.
  When the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>,” this is referring to one who has intent to consume it outside its designated area. And when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” i.e., shall be liable to receive <i>karet</i>, “of it” indicates that only one of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of it, but not two of them. And this included case is intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, to the exclusion of intent to consume it outside its designated area, which carries no such penalty.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say the opposite, that when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” this is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, to the exclusion of intent to consume it beyond its designated time? The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time is the preferable candidate to carry the punishment of <i>karet</i>, as the verse opened with it. The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area is preferable, as the clause that teaches liability for <i>karet</i> is adjacent to it.
  Rather, Abaye said: When Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi came, he said that Rav says: Shmuel was actually referring to two separate verses. And he relied on that which the <i>tanna</i> taught: The verse is seemingly redundant when it states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is <i>piggul</i>; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 19:2), as there is no need for the verse to state this, since it is already stated: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day…it shall be <i>piggul</i>” (Leviticus 7:18).
  
  Daf 28b
  
  Therefore, if the verse is not referring to the matter of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, apply it to the matter of intent to consume it outside its designated area. And as for the punishment of <i>karet</i>, the Merciful One restricted it to the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, i.e., actually partaking of the offering beyond its designated time, as the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8). This indicates that one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of <i>notar</i>, to the exclusion of intent to consume the offering outside its designated area.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say instead that when the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, and the verse serves to exclude <i>notar</i> from the penalty of <i>karet</i>?
  The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that <i>notar</i> should be interpreted as carrying the penalty of <i>karet</i>, because this would allow one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” stated with regard to the case of intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time, that the punishment of <i>karet</i> applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would be apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that they share features that form the acronym <i>zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>: Both concern the offering’s designated time [<i>zeman</i>], and both are applicable to an offering sacrificed on a private altar [<i>bama</i>].
  The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, intent to consume the offering outside its designated area should be interpreted as carrying the penalty of <i>karet</i>, because this would allow one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” stated with regard to the case of intent to consume the meat beyond its designated time, that the punishment of <i>karet</i> applies to the latter as well. The verbal analogy would still be apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that both share features that form the acronym <i>mikdash</i>: Both concern intent [<i>maḥashava</i>]; both disqualify the entire offering even if one had intent with regard to only part [<i>ketzat</i>] of it; both occur while collecting or sprinkling the offering’s blood [<i>dam</i>]; and with regard to both the verse contains an extraneous mention of the third [<i>shelishi</i>] day.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Zavdi bar Levi taught: It is derived that the prohibition of <i>notar</i> carries the penalty of <i>karet</i> by way of verbal analogy between “sacred” and “sacred.” It is written here: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 19:8). And it is written there: “And if any of the flesh of the consecration, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder [<i>notar</i>] with fire; it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred” (Exodus 29:34). Just as the verse there is referring to <i>notar</i>, so too, there verse here is referring to <i>notar</i>.
  And consequently, when the Merciful One restricted the penalty of <i>karet</i> to the prohibition of eating <i>notar</i>, as the verse states: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this restriction serves to exclude the case of intent to consume the offering outside its designated area from the penalty of <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara returns to the initial assumption that the statement of Shmuel is referring to two verses: And what did you see that led you to conclude that the long verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, and that the verse that mentions the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy,” is referring to intent to consume it outside its designated area? I might just as well reverse the two.
  The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that the long verse is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as this allows for one to derive by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from <i>notar</i> that an offering sacrificed with such intent carries the penalty of <i>karet</i>. The verbal analogy is apt since one prohibition is similar to the other in that both share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: <i>Zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, it stands to reason that the long verse is referring to intent to consume the offering outside its designated area, and that the verse that mentions the third day in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy,” is referring to intent to consume it beyond its designated time. This is due to the fact that the latter intent is similar to <i>notar</i> in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: <i>Zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>, and it is therefore reasonable that the Torah juxtaposed the two in adjacent verses. And if so, when the verse states with regard to <i>notar</i>: “But whoever eats it shall bear his iniquity,” this excludes intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time from the penalty of <i>karet</i>.
  Rather, Rava says: One must accept the original interpretation of Shmuel’s statement, that all of these <i>halakhot</i> with regard to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area are derived from the long verse. As it is written: “If any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offers it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). When the verse states: “Be at all eaten [<i>he’akhol ye’akhel</i>],” using a doubled verb, the verse speaks of intent with regard to two consumptions, one consumption by a person, and one consumption by the altar, i.e., burning the offering. Improper intent with regard to either of these acts renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The phrase “any of the flesh of his peace offerings” indicates that just as a peace offering possesses that which renders <i>piggul</i> and that which is rendered <i>piggul</i>, i.e., the blood, which renders the offering <i>piggul</i> through one’s intent with regard to its rites, and the meat, which is rendered <i>piggul</i> through such intent, so too the verse is referring to all offerings that possess that which renders an offering <i>piggul</i> and that which is rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  The term “on the third day” indicates that the verse is referring to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as peace offerings may be eaten for only two days.
  The phrase “it shall not be accepted” indicates that an offering is deemed <i>piggul</i> following the stage of the service at which it would have otherwise effected atonement. Therefore, like the acceptance of a fit offering, so is the acceptance of a disqualified offering, and just as the acceptance of a fit offering does not occur until one sacrifices all its permitting factors, i.e., one sprinkles the blood properly, so too the acceptance of a disqualified offering does not occur until one sacrifices all its permitting factors.
  The term “he who offers” indicates that <i>piggul</i> is disqualified at the time of offering, due to improper intent, and it is not disqualified on the third day literally. And when the verse states “it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of a disqualification of the offering only, but it is not speaking of the priest, who is not disqualified from the priesthood through such intent.
  The phrase “neither shall it be credited [<i>yeḥashev</i>]”
  
  Daf 29a
  
  indicates that to render an offering <i>piggul</i>, the priest does not mix other improper intentions [<i>maḥashavot</i>] with intent of <i>piggul</i>. If he has more than one type of improper intent, the offering is disqualified, but it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  When the verse states: “<i>Piggul</i>,” this is referring to an offering that one had intent to consume outside its designated area.
  And since the verse states: “It shall be,” and not: They shall be, this teaches that intent to consume half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time and intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area join together with one another to constitute the minimum measure required to disqualify the offering.
  Finally, when the verse states: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity,” the term “of it” indicates that only one of the above disqualifications carries the penalty of <i>karet</i>, but not two of them. And which is this? It is intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, as one derives by way of verbal analogy between “iniquity” and “iniquity” from <i>notar</i> (Leviticus 19:8), that “bear his iniquity” means that one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The comparison is apt since <i>notar</i> is similar to intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time in that both prohibitions share the features mentioned above that form the acronym: <i>Zayin</i>, <i>beit</i>.
  Rav Pappa said to Rava: According to your opinion, in what way do you interpret the reference to the third day (Leviticus 19:7) in the Torah portion that begins: “You shall be holy”? Rava responded: That verse is necessary to teach that a given location is considered to be outside the offering’s designated area only if it is so in three ways, i.e., outside the permitted limits of the blood, of the meat, and of the sacrificial portions.
  The Gemara asks: Why not let me derive that <i>halakha</i> from the first verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day” (Leviticus 7:18), since the Merciful One expresses that verse as well with the term “third”? Since Rava derives the disqualification of intent to consume an offering outside its designated area from this verse, why not let him derive this <i>halakha</i> from the verse as well?
  Rav Ashi said: I stated this <i>halakha</i> before Rav Mattana, and he said to me: If one were to derive this <i>halakha</i> only from there (Leviticus 7:18), I would say: The term “third” is a detail, and the term “<i>piggul</i>” is a generalization, and whenever a detail is followed by a generalization, the generalization becomes an addition to the detail, and consequently, all other areas are included as well. The additional verse teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> includes only those areas that are outside in three ways.
  § The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18): Rabbi Eliezer said: Bend your ear to hear the true meaning of the verse: The verse is speaking of one who intends to partake of his offering on the third day. Or perhaps it is referring only to one who actually partakes of his offering on the third day, per the straightforward meaning of the verse? But that cannot be; would you say that after the offering is fit for the first two days, it should then be disqualified retroactively by being eaten on the third day?
  Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yes, it could be disqualified retroactively. After all, we find with regard to a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>], or a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], or a woman who observes a clean day for a day when she experiences a discharge, that they all have the presumptive status of purity after immersing. But once they have seen another discharge the same day, they have negated this status retroactively, and everything they had touched after immersing becomes impure. Therefore, you as well should not be surprised about this offering consumed beyond its designated time, that even though it was rendered fit, it may then be disqualified retroactively.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But the same verse says: “He who offers it,” indicating that the offering is disqualified at the time of its offering, and it is not disqualified on the third day. Or perhaps when the verse says: “He who offers it,” this is referring only to the priest who sacrifices the offering, indicating that he is disqualified. But if so, it would have been enough for the verse to state: He who offers shall not be credited. Therefore, when it states instead: “Neither shall it be credited to he who offers it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of the offering, and it is not speaking of the priest.
  Ben Azzai says: Why must the verse state: “It”? It is necessary because elsewhere it is stated: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you, and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22). One might have thought that even one who is late in fulfilling his vow is included in: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). Therefore, the verse states: “It,” to indicate that it, an offering rendered <i>piggul</i>, is included in the <i>halakha</i> of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the <i>halakha</i> of: “It shall not be accepted.”
  <i>Aḥerim</i> say: One can conclude that the verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to improper intention rather than improper consumption from the phrase “neither shall it be credited [<i>yeḥashev</i>],” which indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention [<i>maḥashava</i>], and it is not disqualified by consumption on the third day.
  The Gemara asks: And ben Azzai, who interprets the term “it” as excluding vows that were fulfilled late, from where does he derive that the verse is speaking of the offering and not of the priest? The Gemara responds: If you wish, say that he derives it from the statement of <i>Aḥerim</i> that the verse rules out disqualification on the third day itself. This would be necessary only if the verse is referring to the offering and not the priest. Or, if you wish, say instead: From the fact that it is written: “They shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:25), and: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18), it is evident that the verse is referring to an offering, which may be accepted or may not be accepted.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to the statement of ben Azzai that one derives from the word “it” that it, i.e., <i>piggul</i>, is included in the <i>halakha</i> of: “It shall not be accepted,” but the animal of one who is late in fulfilling his vow is not included in the <i>halakha</i> of: “It shall not be accepted,” is this <i>halakha</i> derived from here? It is derived from the statement of <i>Aḥerim</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say: One might have thought that a firstborn animal whose first year passed, during which time it ought to have been sacrificed, should be
  
  Daf 29b
  
  like disqualified consecrated animals, and it should be disqualified from being sacrificed, as though it had developed a blemish.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain, of your wine, and of your oil, and the firstborns of your herds, and of your flocks” (Deuteronomy 14:23). The verse juxtaposes a firstborn animal to the tithe of grain to indicate that just as the tithe is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next (see Deuteronomy 14:28), so too a firstborn animal is not disqualified by being kept over from one year to the next. If so, one already derives from this verse that an offering is not disqualified even if it is brought late.
  The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, the verse cited by ben Azzai was necessary, as without it, it might enter your mind to say that this matter applies only to a firstborn, which is not for acceptance, i.e., it does not serve to atone for any sin and is merely a gift for the priest, but with regard to other sacrificial animals that are for acceptance, say that they shall not effect acceptance when brought late. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even these others are not disqualified when brought late.
  The Gemara asks further: But still, isn’t this <i>halakha</i> derived from a <i>baraita</i> elsewhere: The verse states: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it; for the Lord your God will require it from you; and it will be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), indicating that there is sin in you, but there is no sin in your offering, and therefore it is not disqualified due to the delay?
  The Gemara responds: Ben Azzai requires that verse to teach a different <i>halakha</i>: The phrase “and it will be sin in you” indicates that there will be sin in you, but there will not be sin in your wife. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Elazar said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: A man’s wife does not die unless his creditors ask him for money that he owes and he does not have it, as it is stated: “If you do not have with what to pay, why should he take away your bed from under you?” (Proverbs 22:27); therefore, one’s wife also dies for this transgression of the prohibition: You shall not delay, since one has failed to fulfill his commitment. Consequently, the verse teaches us that the sin is imputed to him alone.
  § The <i>baraita</i> stated that <i>Aḥerim</i> say: The phrase “neither shall it be credited” indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention, and it is not disqualified by consumption beyond its designated time on the third day. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who derives this <i>halakha</i> from a different source, what does he do with the phrase “neither shall it be credited”?
  The Gemara responds: He requires it for that which Rabbi Yannai says, as Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived with regard to intentions that they displace one another, i.e., that an additional improper intention prevents the offering from being rendered <i>piggul</i>? As it is stated: “Neither shall it be credited [<i>yeḥashev</i>],” indicating that an offering is rendered piggul only if the priest does not mix other improper intentions [<i>maḥashavot</i>] with intent of <i>piggul</i>.
  And Rav Mari teaches that Rabbi Yannai says: From where is it derived that one who has improper intentions with regard to sacrificial animals is flogged like one who transgressed a prohibition? The verse states: “Neither shall it be credited [<i>lo yeḥashev</i>],” i.e., one reads the verse as if it states: One shall not have improper intention [<i>lo y’ḥashev</i>].
  Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, and the principle is that for transgressing any prohibition that does not involve an action one is not flogged. Rav Mari said to him: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: For transgressing a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged.
  MISHNA: This is the principle: With regard to anyone who slaughters the animal, or who collects the blood, or who conveys the blood, or who sprinkles the blood, with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the meat of the offering, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, if his intent was to partake of or to burn the measure of an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered it with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood in silence; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, that is the case where one sacrifices the permitting factor in accordance with its mitzva.
  How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the animal with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area; or if one slaughtered the animal and collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it outside its designated area, these are cases in which the permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with the mitzva.
  Similarly, in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake, and one collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time; or if one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering with intent to burn it or partake of it beyond its designated time, and he collected and conveyed and sprinkled the blood not for their sake; or that one slaughtered the Paschal offering or sin offering and collected and conveyed and sprinkled their blood not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  If one performed one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it.
  Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: In any case where the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. And the Rabbis say: In both this case and that case, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.
  GEMARA: With regard to the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis concerning a case where one has intent with regard to both time and area, Ilfa says: There is a disagreement only with regard to two sacrificial rites, i.e., where each intent was held during a different rite, but if both were held in the course of one rite, all agree that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the intentions were both held in the course of one rite, there is still a disagreement.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, the mishna is understandable according to Ilfa, since the first clause of the mishna: If one slaughtered the animal in silence with no specific intent and collected…beyond its designated time, etc., is referring to different intentions held in the course of two sacrificial rites, one can assume that the latter clause is referring to two rites as well. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, could it be that the first clause is referring to two rites, and the latter clause is referring to only one rite?
  
  Daf 30a
  
  The Gemara responds: Yes, it can be explained that the first clause is referring to two sacrificial rites, while the latter clause, i.e., the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, applies to both one rite and two rites.
  The Gemara suggests a proof: We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the disagreement applies even to one rite, this is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> teaches: This is the principle, indicating that the principle is broad. But according to Ilfa, what is added by the phrase: This is the principle? The Gemara responds: This indeed poses a difficulty to the opinion of Ilfa.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Temura</i> 25b): If one had two animals standing before him, one a burnt offering and one a peace offering, and he said with regard to another non-sacred animal of his: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, the substitute of the peace offering, then that animal is the substitute of the burnt offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Yosei said: If that was his intent from the outset, i.e., his intent was that this animal be the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering, since it is impossible to produce two designations simultaneously and one designation must precede the other, his statement is effective, and the animal is the substitute of both a burnt offering and a peace offering. But if it was only after he said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the burnt offering, that he reconsidered and said: This animal is hereby the substitute of the peace offering, then that animal is the substitute of a burnt offering alone.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one expressed the two intentions simultaneously and said: This is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering and a peace offering, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Additionally, if one specified his intention to split the animal between a burnt offering and a peace offering, but mentioned the burnt offering first, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Abaye said: In this case, Rabbi Meir certainly concedes that both types of sanctity apply to the animal. Rava said: It is still a disagreement; Rabbi Meir still holds in this case that since he mentioned the burnt offering first, only that sanctity applies to the animal.
  Rava said to Abaye: According to your opinion, as you say that in this case Rabbi Meir certainly concedes, one may raise an objection from the mishna, which describes a case where one performs slaughter with intent to eat one olive-bulk of the offering beyond its time and one olive-bulk outside its area, which is comparable to a case where one says: To split, since both intentions are held during the singular act of slaughter. And nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree, and Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one attends only to the first statement, renders the animal <i>piggul</i>.
  Abaye said to him: Do you hold that slaughter is considered to have been performed only at its end, such that it takes effect in a single instant? Actually, slaughter is accomplished progressively, from beginning to end, and our mishna is referring to a case where one says: I slaughter the first <i>siman</i>, the gullet or the windpipe, with intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, and the second <i>siman</i> with intent to consume it outside its designated area.
  The Gemara asks: But what about the removal of a handful from a meal offering with intent to eat one olive-bulk beyond its time and one outside of its area, which is comparable to a case where one says: To split, since both intentions are held during the removal, and nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to it in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i> (12a)?
  The Gemara responds: Since the mishna does not state such a dispute explicitly, one can say that their disagreement is not with regard to the removal of the handful but with regard to the burning of the two permitting factors of the meal offering, the handful and the frankincense. Accordingly, there too, the case is such that the priest burned the handful of the meal offering with intent to eat it beyond its designated time, and he burned the handful of frankincense with intent to eat the meal offering outside its designated area.
  The Gemara persists: But what about the handful from a meal offering of a sinner, which has no frankincense with it, and still Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree?
  The Gemara responds: In that case they do not disagree. Rav Ashi says: Even if you say that they disagree in that case, one may say that they disagree specifically with regard to a case where the priest had different intentions during his steps toward the altar while holding the handful. Consequently, even this rite is divisible into separate parts.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi would teach in accordance with the opinion of Abaye that in a case where one explicitly mentions both intentions at once, Rabbi Meir concedes that both sanctities apply to the animal. Rav Huna bar Natan would teach in accordance with the opinion of Rava that even in such a case, Rabbi Meir considers only the first sanctity mentioned.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: When Rabbi Meir said that if one says: This animal is hereby the substitute of a burnt offering, the substitute of a peace offering, then the animal is the substitute of a burnt offering, he said this according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in general, the <i>halakha</i> is to attend only to the first statement.
  As we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it.
  
  Daf 30b
  
  Abaye said to Rav Dimi: But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When you consider their opinions, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei do not disagree with one another, i.e., neither holds that one attends only to the first statement?
  Rav Dimi objected: And is it so that they do not disagree? But don’t they disagree explicitly in the mishna cited earlier? Abaye said to him: They disagree where they disagree, i.e., that specific case, but they do not disagree where they do not disagree, i.e., the underlying principle. Accordingly, one must understand the basis of their dispute in another manner.
  This is as Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All, i.e., Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, concede that in a case where one says: Let this sanctity of a burnt offering take effect and afterward let that sanctity of a peace offering take effect, everyone agrees that the sanctity of a peace offering does not take effect, because the sanctity of the burnt offering took effect first. Likewise, if one said: This sanctity shall not take effect unless that sanctity applies, everyone agrees that the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect as well.
  They disagree with regard to a case where one says: This animal is hereby a substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering. Rabbi Meir holds: Since if he wanted both sanctities to take effect, he should have said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, but he said instead: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering, learn from his language that he originally intended for it to be a burnt offering, and he then retracted his first intention.
  And Rabbi Yosei holds that if he had said: A substitute for a burnt offering and a peace offering, I would say that he means that half the animal should be a substitute for a burnt offering and half a substitute for a peace offering. He therefore says: A substitute for a burnt offering, a substitute for a peace offering; that is to say that all of it is a burnt offering and all of it is a peace offering. In any event, according to this explanation, Rabbi Meir does not necessarily hold that one attends only to the first statement.
  Rav Dimi said to Abaye: He, Rabba bar bar Ḥana, says that they do not disagree, but I say that they disagree, and Rabbi Meir holds that one attends only to the first statement, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna itself: Ulla said, and some say it was Rav Oshaya who said: Perhaps our colleagues, the Babylonians, know whether we learn the language of the improper intention in the mishna as: I hereby slaughter the animal with intent to consume an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or we learn: An olive-bulk beyond its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated area?
  The Gemara elaborates: Perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and it is only in this case that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis. But if one said: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, everyone agrees that it constitutes a combination of intentions, and the animal is not rendered <i>piggul</i>. Or perhaps we learn: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, where according to Rabbi Yehuda each term constitutes a separate term despite the use of the conjunction: And, and he holds that one attends only to the first statement, and all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that dilemma which Levi raised before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If one had intent to consume an olive-bulk the next day outside its designated area, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This is an excellent question. The answer is that even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this constitutes a combination of intentions and that the animal is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said before him: How is this an excellent question; is it not our mishna? As we learned in the mishna: If one expressed intent to eat an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for burning or partaking of it. Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only with regard to these cases; but in another case, it could easily be inferred that he concedes that it constitutes a combination of intentions.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Levi asked me a matter of wisdom, and you say our mishna. For you, whom I taught two phrasings of the mishna, both: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, and: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, the question is not difficult, since my omission of this other case allows you to infer its <i>halakha</i>.
  For him, whom I taught only one phrasing, and who heard the Rabbis reciting two, the question is excellent, since Levi thought: Perhaps my phrasing is exact, and their additional phrasing constitutes a combination of intentions according to all opinions. Or perhaps their phrasing is exact, and my phrasing omitted this case. And if my phrasing omitted this case, perhaps their phrasing also omitted that other case, even though it is subject to disagreement.
  The Gemara asks: And which phrasing did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi teach Levi? If we say that he taught him: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda still holds the terms to be distinct despite the conjunction, this is not an omission, since one can infer <i>a fortiori</i> that the same applies to: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk. Rather, it must be that he taught him: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk, so that it was unclear to Levi what the <i>halakha</i> would be if one used the conjunction: And.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why did Levi raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: The next day outside? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to the phrasing: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.
  The Gemara responds: Levi thought: I will raise one dilemma before him so as to learn two <i>halakhot</i>. As, if I ask only with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, it will work out well if he says to me that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that they constitute one general term, as this would apply all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk the next day outside, which is even more unified. But if he says to me that each term constitutes a separate term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then I will still need to raise the dilemma with regard to the case of: An olive-bulk the next day outside. I will therefore inquire with regard to the latter case.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, now too, it works out well if he says to him that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the wording: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is constituted of separate terms, as this would apply all the more so if one said: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, which is less unified. But if he says to him that it is one general term according to Rabbi Yehuda, then he will still need to raise the dilemma with regard to the case of: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.
  The Gemara responds: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answered in this manner, i.e., that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that: An olive-bulk the next day outside, is considered one term, he would unwittingly provide the answer to the other question as well. As, if Rabbi Yehuda had also conceded with regard to: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would become angry with Levi for asking the wrong question and say:
  
  Daf 31a
  
  Now that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that even: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, is one general term, is it necessary to inquire with regard to: An olive-bulk the next day outside?
  The Gemara presents another version of this discussion: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi might say that if Rabbi Yehuda maintains that even when one says: An olive-bulk the next day outside, each term is considered separate, is it necessary to inquire with regard to: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk?
  § It was stated: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, and another half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, Rava says: In such a case, the <i>piggul</i>: “Awaked as one asleep” (Psalms 78:65), i.e., since one had intent to consume two halves of an olive-bulk beyond their designated time, these intentions are joined together. The middle thought is disregarded, since it constitutes only half the requisite measure, and the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>. And Rav Hamnuna says: It constitutes a combination of improper intentions. The middle thought, although itself insufficient to disqualify the offering, is sufficient to interfere with the intention to consume it beyond its time, and the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rava said: From where, i.e., based on what, do I state my ruling? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 1:5): An egg-bulk of food with first-degree impurity and an egg-bulk of food with second-degree impurity that one mixed together are collectively considered to have first-degree impurity. If one separated them into two portions, each containing a homogenous mixture, this portion is considered to have second-degree impurity and that portion is considered to have second-degree impurity. Since neither of them contains the requisite amount of food with first-degree impurity, each mixture settles to the lower level of impurity between the two foods. Rava reasoned: But if one mixed them again, they revert to be of first-degree impurity.
  From where do I know this? From the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches: If this portion fell by itself and that portion fell by itself onto a loaf of <i>teruma</i>, it disqualifies it, as would any food with second-degree impurity. But it does not render it impure, since only foods with first-degree impurity impart impurity to other foods. But if they both fell simultaneously onto the loaf, they render it a food with second-degree impurity. Evidently, although the first-degree impurity lay dormant for lack of a requisite measure, it resurfaces when the rest of the measure is added, despite the fact that each portion was previously considered to have second-degree impurity. The <i>halakha</i> would be the same in the case of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, i.e., the intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its area does not interfere with the intent of <i>piggul</i>.
  And Rav Hamnuna says: The cases are different. There, in the case of ritual impurity, there is a requisite measure present at the outset, which is divided and then recombined. Here, in the case of the offering, there is no requisite measure present at the outset to render it <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Hamnuna said: From where do I say my opinion? As we learned in another mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 17b): The food that became ritually impure through contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, thereby assuming first-degree impurity, and the food that became ritually impure through contact with a derivative source of ritual impurity, thereby assuming second-degree impurity, join together to constitute the requisite measure of an egg-bulk to impart impurity in accordance with the more lenient of the two, i.e., as a food of second-degree impurity. What, is it not that they retain second-degree impurity even if one makes up the requisite measure again? If so, it can be inferred that the first-degree impurity is lost, and it does not lie dormant or resurface. Here as well, the latter intent of <i>piggul</i> cannot restore the initial intent of <i>piggul</i>, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its area interfered.
  The Gemara responds: Perhaps the mishna is referring specifically to a case where one does not complete the requisite measure again.
  The Gemara presents similar cases: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, and half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then another half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, bar Kappara teaches that the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>, since the half an olive-bulk with regard to the area is not effective to interfere where the intent with regard to the time concerns a whole olive-bulk.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he stated a different formulation: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then another half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, bar Kappara teaches that the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>, since the half an olive-bulk is not effective to interfere where the intent of <i>piggul</i> concerns a whole olive-bulk.
  Rav Ashi teaches the <i>halakha</i> in this manner: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then intended with regard to a whole olive-bulk to eat half of it outside its designated area and half of it beyond its designated time, bar Kappara teaches that the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>, because the half an olive-bulk is not effective to interfere where the intent of <i>piggul</i> concerns a whole olive-bulk.
  § Rabbi Yannai says: If one had intent that dogs would eat the offering the next day, it is rendered <i>piggul</i>, as it is written: “And the dogs shall eat Jezebel in the portion of Jezreel” (II Kings 9:10). The verse indicates that consumption by dogs is considered eating.
  Rabbi Ami objects to this: If that is so, then if one had intent that non-sacred fire would consume it the next day, as it is written: “A fire not blown shall consume him” (Job 20:26), this too should be <i>piggul</i>. And if you would say that this is indeed so, that is difficult: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together?
  The Gemara responds: If one expressed his intention to burn the offering in terms of consumption, it would indeed join together with intention to eat. But in the mishna here we are dealing with a case where he expressed it in terms of burning. The two intentions do not join together since terms of consumption and terms of burning are discrete entities.
  § Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If one had intent that two people would collectively eat an olive-bulk, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we follow the intent, in which case there is the requisite measure of an olive-bulk? Or do we follow those who eat, and neither eats the requisite measure?
  Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond the designated time or outside the designated area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.
  
  Daf 31b
  
  It can be inferred that if one had intent to eat and to eat in a manner similar to a case of intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk; Abaye interjects: And what are the circumstances of such a case? It is a case with two people, i.e., where each one will consume half an olive-bulk. Abaye continues with the conclusion of his statement: Then the two halves join together. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that this is so.
  Rava raises a dilemma: If one had intent to eat an olive-bulk in more than the period of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we equate the consumption of offerings to the consumption of the Most High, i.e., the burning of offerings on the altar, for which there is no maximum allotted time? Or do we equate it to the consumption of an ordinary person, for whom consumption slower than this rate is not considered eating?
  Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together. One may infer that the reason the offering is fit is that he had intent to eat and to burn the offering. But if he had intent to eat half an olive-bulk at the normal rate and to eat half an olive-bulk in the time it takes to burn half an olive-bulk, the two would join together. But the burning of an olive-bulk of an offering can take more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. It therefore seems that there is no upper limit on the time in which one is considered to have consumed an offering.
  The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps the mishna is referring to intent to burn half an olive-bulk in a large fire, which can consume it in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Accordingly, one may draw the inference only with regard to a case where his intent was to consume the halves of an olive-bulk within this time.
  § The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the animal with intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit. The Gemara infers: The reason that the two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together is because his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk. But if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of the meat and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the halves do join together and disqualify the offering, as both intentions concern eating.
  The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: But the first clause of the mishna teaches: If one’s intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, beyond its designated time, his intent joins together to disqualify the offering. One can infer that only if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, does his intent join together, but if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not to partake of it, then it does not join together.
  Rabbi Yirmeya says: In accordance with whose opinion is this latter clause? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent to shift an item’s consumption from consumption by a person to consumption by the altar, or from consumption by the altar to consumption by a person. As we learned in another mishna (35a): In the case of one who slaughters the offering with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not to partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.
  Abaye says: You may even say that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that one should infer from the mishna that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of an item normally consumed and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the offering is disqualified. Rather, say that one infers that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to eat another half an olive-bulk, both halves from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, then the halves join together to disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara asks: If so, what is this latter clause teaching us? If it teaches us that two half olive-bulks from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, join together, one can already learn this from the first clause of the mishna: If one has intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering is disqualified. One can infer that if his intent was to eat the first half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering would be rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  But if one will say that this term teaches its literal meaning, that intentions to eat and to burn two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together, one can already learn this from the inference drawn above from the first clause of the mishna, namely that intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it does disqualify the offering, but intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it does not. By extension, intent to consume half an olive-bulk of such an item does not join to disqualify the offering.
  Now, consider the following: And just as if when one has intent to partake of an item normally eaten and to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, his intentions do not join together, even though both intentions concern consumption, is it necessary for the mishna to teach that intentions to consume and to burn do not join together? The last clause therefore seems unnecessary.
  The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the mishna to explicitly address the case where one had intent to eat and to burn, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only there, where one’s intentions are referring solely to consumption, that they do not join together, since he has intent to act in a way that is not consistent with its typical manner and consume an item not normally consumed. But here, where his intent is to both eat and burn the offering, such that with regard to this half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, and with regard to that half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, one might say that they should join together. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that intentions to eat and to burn do not join together.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid <i>ab initio</i> when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure. Therefore, these unfit individuals can disqualify the offering with prohibited intent, e.g., if one of them intended to partake of the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area.
  
  Daf 32a
  
  And with regard to all of them, in a case where they collected the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.
  If the priest fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave the vessel to an unfit person, that person should return it to the fit priest. If the priest collected the blood in a vessel in his right hand and moved it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If the priest collected the blood in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return the blood to a sacred vessel. If the blood spilled from the vessel onto the floor and he gathered it from the floor, it is valid.
  If an unfit person placed the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or if he placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary, then if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar.
  GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the use of the past tense in the mishna: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered, that after the fact, yes, the slaughter is valid. But <i>ab initio</i>, no, those who are unfit may not slaughter an offering.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from what was taught in the halakhic midrash <i>Torat Kohanim</i>: The verse states with regard to a burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5). The fact that the verse does not stipulate that a priest must slaughter the offering teaches that slaughter is valid if performed by a non-priest, as stated in the mishna: As the sacrificial rite of slaughter is valid when performed by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals, and even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order. Or perhaps the term “and he shall slaughter” in the verse is referring only to slaughter by priests?
  You can say in response: From where did you come to the idea that the verse is referring only to a priest? It is from the fact that it is stated to Aaron: “And you and your sons with you shall keep your priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar” (Numbers 18:7).
  One might have thought that this is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to slaughter, that only priests are fit to slaughter an offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord, and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present [<i>vehikrivu</i>] the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), from which it is inferred that specifically from the collection of the blood and onward it is a mitzva exclusively of the priesthood. This teaches about the rite of slaughter that it is valid <i>ab initio</i> if performed by any person. This contradicts the inference from the mishna that slaughter of an offering by a non-priest is valid only after the fact.
  The Gemara answers: The same is true that even <i>ab initio</i> as well it is permitted for those unfit for Temple service to slaughter an offering, but because the mishna wants to teach with regard to the ritually impure that they may not slaughter an offering <i>ab initio</i> due to a rabbinic decree lest they touch the flesh and render it ritually impure, therefore the mishna taught this <i>halakha</i> with the expression in the past tense: Who slaughtered, i.e., after the fact.
  The Gemara asks: And in the case of a ritually impure individual who performed the slaughter, is it permitted even after the fact? And one can raise a contradiction from what is taught in the halakhic midrash: The Torah states two consecutive directives: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:4–5). This juxtaposition indicates that both directives are referring to the same individual, which teaches that just as placing hands on the head of an offering may be performed only by ritually pure individuals, so too, the slaughter may be performed only by ritually pure individuals. The Gemara answers: By rabbinic law, an impure person is prohibited from slaughtering an offering lest he touch the flesh of the offering, but by Torah law the slaughter is valid.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about placing hands that it can be performed only by those who are ritually pure even by Torah law? It is that it is written: “Before the Lord,” which is referring to the Temple courtyard, and an impure person may not enter the Temple courtyard. With regard to slaughter as well, isn’t it written: “Before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5)? How can a ritually impure person enter the Temple courtyard to slaughter an offering? The Gemara answers: It is possible, in a case where he fashions a long knife, stands outside the Temple courtyard, and slaughters the offering that is inside the courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to placing hands also, it is possible, in a case where he inserts his hands into the Temple courtyard and places them on the head of the offering. The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> holds that a partial entry, in which only a part of the body enters the Temple courtyard, is called entry. Therefore, an impure individual may not insert even part of his body, such as his hands, into the Temple courtyard.
  Rav Ḥisda taught the <i>baraita</i> in the opposite manner: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…and he shall slaughter the bull” (Leviticus 1:4–5), teaches that just as slaughter may be performed only by ritually pure individuals, so too, placing hands may be performed only by ritually pure individuals. The Gemara asks: What is different about slaughter that it may be performed only by those who are ritually pure? It is that it is written with regard to it: “Before the Lord,” which refers to the Temple courtyard, and a ritually impure person may not enter the Temple courtyard.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  With regard to placing hands on the head of an offering as well, it is written: “Before the Lord.” The Gemara answers that it is possible, in a case where he inserts his hands into the Temple courtyard and places them on the head of the offering while he remains outside. The Gemara asks: But with regard to slaughter also, it is possible, in a case where he fashions a long knife and slaughters the animal while standing outside the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Shimon HaTimni, who holds that the one who slaughters an offering must stand inside the Temple courtyard. This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>, that when the verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5),it teaches that the bull must be inside the Temple courtyard, but the slaughterer need not be “before the Lord.” Therefore, he may stand outside the Temple courtyard and slaughter the offering that is inside. Shimon HaTimni says: From where is it derived that the hands of the slaughterer must be farther inside the Temple courtyard than the animal that is slaughtered? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord,” which teaches that the slaughterer of the bull must be before the Lord.
  § Apropos the question of whether partial entry into the Temple courtyard is considered entry, Ulla says that Reish Lakish says: A ritually impure individual who inserted his hand inside the Temple courtyard is flogged for transgressing the prohibition of entering the Temple while impure, as it is stated with regard to the impurity of a woman who gave birth: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come, until the days of her purification are complete” (Leviticus 12:4). The verse juxtaposes entry into the courtyard to touching a sacred item. Just as touching with even a part of the body is considered touching, so too, entry with part of the body is considered entry.
  Rav Hoshaya raised an objection to Ulla from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There is the case of a leper whose eighth day, on which he becomes ritually pure from his leprosy and performs the final stages of his purification process, occurs on Passover eve, such that it would be possible to bring his offerings and be fit to partake of the Paschal offering that evening. And he experienced a seminal emission on that day before he performed the final stages of his purification process, rendering him ritually impure and prohibited from entering the Temple. And he then immersed himself in a ritual bath. The question is whether he may come to the gate of the Temple courtyard, which is necessary to complete his purification process and terminate his status as a leper.
  The Sages said: Although any other individual who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed may not enter the Temple mount until nightfall, this one may enter. The reason is that it is better for a positive mitzva that has a punishment of <i>karet</i>, i.e., the bringing of the Paschal offering, to come and override a positive mitzva for which there is no liability to be punished with <i>karet</i>, i.e., the mitzva to remove individuals who are ritually impure from the Temple courtyard, than have the positive mitzva that has a punishment of <i>karet</i> not be performed.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law, there is not even a positive mitzva that restricts from entering the Temple courtyard one who has immersed that day and will become pure only upon nightfall, as it is stated: “And Jehoshaphat stood in the congregation of Judea and Jerusalem, in the House of the Lord, before the new courtyard” (II Chronicles 20:5). What is the meaning of “the new courtyard”? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is referring to the place in which they innovated many matters and said that one who immersed that day may not enter the camp of the Levites, which in Jerusalem includes the entire Temple Mount. This indicates that the prohibition is of rabbinic origin, and by Torah law it is permitted for him to enter.
  Rav Hoshaya concludes his objection: And if you say that partial entry into the courtyard is considered entry, how does the leper who immersed himself that day insert his hands into the courtyard so that his right thumb and big toe will become purified? In this situation, both this mitzva to eat of the Paschal offering and that mitzva for an impure person to not enter the courtyard are each a positive mitzva for which there is liability to be punished with <i>karet</i>, as someone who immersed himself that day who enters the Temple courtyard is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>.
  Ulla said to Rabbi Hoshaya: A proof to my opinion can be brought from your own burden, i.e., from the question you asked. A leper is different, as the Torah permitted him to insert his right thumb and big toe into the courtyard in order to become purified despite the fact that he has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, and since he was permitted to partially enter the courtyard for purification from his leprosy, he was also permitted with regard to his impurity due to his seminal emission. Nevertheless, a partial entry into the courtyard is in fact considered an entry.
  Based on Ulla’s previous comment, Rav Yosef said: Ulla holds that if most of the Jewish people were <i>zavim</i> on Passover eve, and were therefore prohibited from sacrificing the Paschal offering while impure, and then they became ritually impure due to a corpse, which allows them to sacrifice the Paschal offering despite their impurity as they are a majority of the Jewish people, since they are permitted to sacrifice the offering with regard to their impurity due to a corpse, they are also permitted with regard to their <i>ziva</i>.
  Abaye said to him: Are the cases comparable? With regard to a leper who experienced a seminal emission, he was already permitted to partially enter the courtyard despite his initial impurity. There-fore, the subsequent impurity does not prohibit him from entering. By contrast, the <i>zavim</i> were originally prevented from sacrificing the Paschal offering. Therefore, even if he would be permitted to enter the courtyard despite becoming impure due to a corpse, he would not be permitted to enter due to the <i>ziva</i> that was previously present.
  Furthermore, Abaye said to him: Perhaps this is what the Master is saying: If most of the Jewish people were initially ritually impure due to a corpse, and they subsequently became <i>zavim</i>, since they are permitted with regard to their impurity due to a corpse, they are permitted with regard to their <i>ziva</i> as well. Rav Yosef said to him: Yes, that was what I meant.
  The Gemara asks: But still, this is not comparable to the case of Ulla, since with regard to a leper, it is with total permission that he is allowed partial entry into the courtyard. And since it was permitted with regard to one impurity, it was permitted with regard to a second impurity. But the ritual impurity with regard to the sacrificing of the Paschal offering is only overridden, and there is not a total permission. Perhaps with regard to this, i.e., ritual impurity due to a corpse, it is overridden, but with regard to that, i.e., the impurity of <i>ziva</i>, it is not overridden.
  Rava said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable. With regard to a leper, it is with specific permission that he was allowed by the Torah to insert his right thumb and big toe into the courtyard in order to become purified despite his ritual impurity, which was not granted for other impurities. Therefore, perhaps only with regard to this impurity it is permitted, but with regard to that impurity, i.e., due to a seminal emission, it is not permitted. But with regard to ritual impurity, since it is overridden in the case of ritual impurity due to a corpse, what difference does it make to me if there is one impurity that is overridden, and what difference does it make to me if there are two impurities that are overridden?
  
  Daf 33a
  
  The Gemara comments: It can be derived by inference that both Abaye and Rava hold that impurity is overridden in cases involving the public and is not entirely permitted.
  The Gemara returns to discussing Ulla’s statement that partial entry of a ritually impure individual is considered entry: Let us say that a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nega’im</i> 8:10) supports Ulla’s opinion: Concerning all the cases of placing hands that were there in the Temple, I say about them that the principle: Immediately following the placing of hands on the head of an offering is its slaughter, is applied, meaning that these acts must take place uninterruptedly and in the same location.
  This is so except for this case of a leper who places hands on his guilt offering, which was done in the threshold of the Nicanor Gate and not in the Temple courtyard where the guilt offering was slaughtered. The reason for this is that a leper cannot enter the courtyard until they sprinkle from the blood of his sin offering and from the blood of his guilt offering on the altar on his behalf. The Gemara explains the proof: And if you say that partial entry is not considered entry, let him insert his hands and place them on the head of the offering, and the offering should then be slaughtered in that location next to the gate.
  Rav Yosef said: There is no proof from here, as in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the northern side of the courtyard in which it is permitted to slaughter offerings of the most sacred order, which includes a guilt offering, includes only the area to the north of the altar and not the entire northern section of the courtyard. This area is far north of the entrance to the courtyard, i.e., more than twenty-two cubits away. Consequently, even if the leper were to insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of his guilt offering, it would not be permitted to slaughter it there.
  The Gemara suggests: But let an opening [<i>pishpash</i>] be made in the northern courtyard wall facing the altar, where the leper can insert his hands. The Gemara explains: Abaye and Rava both say that such structural changes cannot be made to the Temple, since the verse states with regard to the Temple construction: “All in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by His hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern” (I Chronicles 28:19).
  There are those who say that Rabbi Yosef said another explanation as to why the leper cannot insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of the offering: Anyone who places hands on the head of an offering must insert his head and most of his body into the courtyard. What is the reason? We require placing hands with all of his force. Therefore, it is not possible for the leper to perform the placing of his hands properly without entering the courtyard, and the placing of hands on the offering is done instead in the threshold of the Nicanor Gate.
  The Gemara clarifies: What does the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> hold? If he holds that placing hands on the head of a guilt offering of a leper is by Torah law, and the principle that immediately following the placing of hands on the head of an offering must be its slaughter is also by Torah law, let the leper openly insert his hands into the courtyard and place them on the head of the offering, as the Merciful One states in the Torah that he must do so.
  Rav Adda bar Mattana says: In principle that should be done. But the prohibition against the leper entering the courtyard is a rabbinic decree, due to the concern that perhaps he will increase his steps, enter the courtyard more than is necessary, and be liable for entering there in a state of impurity. There are those who say that Rav Adda bar Mattana says that placing hands on the head of a guilt offering of a leper is indeed by Torah law, but the requirement that immediately following the placing of hands is the slaughter is not by Torah law. Therefore, he places hands on the offering outside of the courtyard.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> cited previously (32a): The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering…And he shall slaughter the bull” (Leviticus 1:4–5). Just as placing hands may be performed only by ritually pure individuals, so too, the slaughter may be performed only by ritually pure individuals. And if you say that the requirement that placing hands must immediately precede the slaughter is not by Torah law, then with regard to ritually impure individuals you also find that placing hands may be performed, since they can do so outside the courtyard.
  Rather, reverse it and say that placing hands on the head of the guilt offering of a leper is not by Torah law, and therefore the leper must do so outside the courtyard, but with regard to offerings that require placing of hands by Torah law, the requirement that immediately following the placing of hands must be the slaughter is by Torah law.
  
  Daf 33b
  
  The Gemara returns to Ulla’s statement in the name of Reish Lakish (32b) that an impure individual who inserted his hand into the Temple courtyard is flogged, as partial entry is considered entry. An objection was then raised from the case of the leper, where he is not liable to be punished with <i>karet</i> for partial entry, and Ulla offered one answer. Ravina says that there is another answer: It was stated only with regard to lashes, teaching that one is flogged for partially entering the courtyard while ritually impure. Reish Lakish agrees that there is no punishment of <i>karet</i> for partial entry as there is for a full entry.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Abbahu says that the statement of Reish Lakish with regard to this verse was stated with regard to a ritually impure individual who touched sacrificial food, and not with regard to partial entry into the courtyard, as Ulla had said.
  This is as it was stated: There is an amoraic dispute with regard to an impure person who touched sacrificial food. Reish Lakish says: He is flogged. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. The Gemara elaborates. Reish Lakish says: He is flogged, as it is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch” (Leviticus 12:4). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged, as that verse is written with regard to touching the portion of the produce designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>].
  The Gemara asks: But does Reish Lakish actually hold that this verse comes to teach this <i>halakha</i>? He requires this verse to teach a prohibition for a ritually impure person who eats sacrificial meat. As it was stated: From where is the prohibition for a ritually impure person who eats sacrificial meat derived? Reish Lakish says it is derived from the verse: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch,” which the Gemara will explain is referring to eating.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sage Bardela teaches that this prohibition is derived from a verbal analogy of the term “his impu-rity [<i>tumato</i>]” written with regard to one who eats sacrificial meat while impure (Leviticus 7:20), and the term “his impurity [<i>tumato</i>]” written with regard to one who enters the Temple while impure (Numbers 19:13). Just as there, with regard to entering the Temple while impure, the Torah prescribed the punishment of <i>karet</i> and also explicitly prohibited doing so, so too here, with regard to eating sacrificial meat while impure, the Torah prescribed the punishment of <i>karet</i> and also explicitly prohibited doing so. Clearly, Reish Lakish understood this verse as referring to eating sacrificial meat, not merely touching it.
  The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that both can be derived from Leviticus 12:4. The prohibition with regard to a ritually impure individual who touched sacrificial food is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expressed this prohibition with a term of touching, while the prohibition with regard to one who eats sacrificial food while impure is derived from the fact that the Torah juxtaposed the prohibition of eating sacrificial food while impure to the prohibition of entering the Temple while impure in the verse: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come” (Leviticus 12:4).
  The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish. It is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch”; this is a prohibition for an impure person who eats sacrificial food. Do you say that it is a prohibition for an impure person who eats sacrificial food, or perhaps it is only a prohibition for an impure person who touches sacrificial food?
  The verse states: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch, and to the Temple she shall not come” (Leviticus 12:4). The verse juxtaposes the matter pertaining to sacrificial food to the matter of entering the Temple while ritually impure. Just as entering the Temple is a matter that entails a punishment that involves
  
  Daf 34a
  
  the taking of a life, i.e., <i>karet</i>, so too, the matter pertaining to sacrificial food entails a punishment that involves the taking of a life. The Gemara explains: And if the prohibition is with regard to touching sacrificial food, is there a punishment that entails the taking of a life? Rather, the prohibition is with regard to eating.
  The Gemara asks: But this verse is still necessary for Reish Lakish to teach the <i>halakha</i> of a ritually impure person who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood of the offering on the altar, when the meat is not yet permitted. As it was stated: With regard to an impure individual who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged.
  Reish Lakish says: He is flogged, as it is written: “Every consecrated item she shall not touch,” without limiting the prohibition to a specific time, indicating that it is no different if one eats the sacrificial meat prior to sprinkling the blood, and it is no different if one does so after sprinkling the blood. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged, as the Sage Bardela teaches that the prohibition is derived by means of the verbal analogy cited before, as the verse states “his impurity” with regard to an impure person who eats sacrificial food, and states “his impurity” with regard to an impure person entering the Temple. And when “his impurity” is written, it is with regard to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood (see Leviticus 7:20).
  The Gemara answers for Reish Lakish: If so, that the verse was referring only to partaking of sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood, let the verse say: A consecrated item she shall not touch. What is the reason for using the phrase “every consecrated item”? Conclude two conclusions from it, i.e., it also includes not eating sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: With regard to an impure individual who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. Abaye says: This dispute applies with regard to a case of impurity of the body of the one who eats the meat, but with regard to impurity of the flesh itself, i.e., if the sacrificial meat was ritually impure, all agree that he is flogged.
  This is as the verse states: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire; and the flesh, every one that is pure may eat the flesh” (Leviticus 7:19). The Sages derived that the extra term “and the flesh” serves to include wood and frankincense, which are not fit for consumption, and even so the verse included them as being susceptible to impurity, and one who eats them while he is impure is flogged. Therefore, sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, which is fit for consumption, is certainly included in the prohibition.
  And Rava says: This dispute applies with regard to a case of impurity of the body, but with regard to impurity of the meat all agree that he is not flogged. What is the reason? Since one does not apply to meat before the sprinkling of the blood the verse: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings of the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which is referring to meat after the sprinkling of the blood, so too, one does not apply to it the prohibition: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19).
  The Gemara challenges the statement of Rava: But doesn’t the Master say that the term “and the flesh” serves to include wood and frankincense that became impure as items that are forbidden to be eaten, despite the fact that they are not fit for consumption? Certainly, then, sacrificial flesh before the sprinkling of the blood should also be included in the category of items forbidden to be eaten.
  The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here, that one would be liable for eating wood and frankincense that are impure? It is a case where the wood and frankincense were sanctified in a vessel, and the reason for the liability is that they are then considered like an item for which all of its permitting factors were sacrificed, such as flesh after the sprinkling of the blood, and only then is one liable for eating it while impure.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 10a): With regard to anything that has permitting factors, i.e., rites that must be performed or items that must be sacrificed before the meat of the offering may be eaten, such as the meat of an offering that is permitted to be eaten by the sprinkling of the blood; one is liable for eating it while impure from the time that its permitting factors were sacrificed. With regard to anything that does not have permitting factors, such as the handful removed from a meal offering and the frankincense, which themselves render the rest of the meal offering permitted for consumption, one is liable for eating it while impure from the time it is sanctified in a vessel.
  § It was stated: In the case of one who offers up the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, Reish Lakish says: He is flogged for doing so, while Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is not flogged. The Gemara explains the logic for each opinion: Reish Lakish says that he is flogged, because there is a positive mitzva to sacrifice an offering from the herd and the flock (see Leviticus 1:2), which are kosher animals. Therefore, it can be inferred that a kosher animal, yes, one may sacrifice, but a non-kosher animal one may not sacrifice, and one who transgresses a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva is flogged for it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is not flogged for it, as one who transgresses a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva is not flogged for it.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i> cited in <i>Torat Kohanim</i>: “Whatsoever parts the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews the cud, among the beasts, that may you eat” (Leviticus 11:3). One can infer: But you may not eat a non-kosher animal; and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva.
  Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain it to you: With regard to one who sacrifices the limbs of a non-kosher animal upon the altar, everyone agrees that he is not flogged, as he violates only a positive mitzva. When they disagree, it is with regard to one who sacrifices a kosher undomesticated animal on the altar, and it was stated like this: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything.
  The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He transgresses a positive mitzva, since the Torah commanded that a domesticated animal, yes, should be sacrificed, from which it can be inferred that an undomesticated animal may not be sacrificed, and a prohibition that stems from a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva. Reish Lakish says: He does not transgress anything, since that verse which instructs one to sacrifice offerings from the herd and the flock is referring to the optimal manner of fulfilling the mitzva, but if he sacrificed an undomesticated animal, he has not transgressed the mitzva.
  Rava raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Had the verse (Leviticus 1:2) stated only: When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, animals [<i>behema</i>], I would say that even an undomesticated animal is included in the category of an animal [<i>behema</i>], like that which is stated: “These are the animals [<i>behema</i>] that you may eat: The ox, the sheep, and the goat, the deer, and the gazelle, and the fallow deer, and the wild goat, and the oryx, and the aurochs, and the mountain sheep” (Deuteronomy 14:4–5), and, for example, the deer and gazelle are undomesticated animals. Therefore, the verse states: “From animals, from the cattle and from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that God says: I have told you to bring offerings from the cattle and the flock, but not an undomesticated animal.
  One might have thought that one should not bring an undomesticated animal <i>ab initio</i>, but if one did bring it, it is valid, and to what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher says to him: Bring me wheat, and the student brought him wheat and barley. In this case, it is not as though the student is disobeying the statement of the teacher; rather, he is merely adding to his statement, and that should be valid.
  Therefore, the verse states again: “From the cattle” (Leviticus 1:3), and: “From the flock” (Leviticus 1:10), to reiterate that God says: I have told you to bring offerings from the cattle and the flock, but not an undomesticated animal. To what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher told him: Bring me only wheat, and the student brought him wheat and barley. It is not as though the student is adding to the statement of the teacher; rather, it is as though he is disobeying his statement, since his teacher instructed him to bring only wheat. Consequently, one who sacrifices an undomesticated animal does not merely add to a mitzva of the Torah, but also violates a prohibition,
  
  Daf 34b
  
  and the offering is therefore disqualified. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish is indeed a conclusive refutation.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to all of them, in a case where they collected the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, if there is blood of the soul that remains in the animal, the priest fit for Temple service should again collect the blood and sprinkle it on the altar. Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: If an individual unfit for Temple service presented the blood, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood that remains in the animal? Does the fact that he presented some blood render the rest of it a remainder and no longer fit to be presented, or perhaps the presenting performed by an unfit individual is not considered valid, and therefore a priest fit for Temple service may present the blood again?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: A not valid presenting does not render the rest of the blood a remainder unless it is a case where a priest fit for Temple service presented the blood with the intent to offer it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, since it is only in that case that the presenting of the blood effects acceptance, i.e., it is considered a valid presenting, with regard to rendering the offering <i>piggul</i>, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time.
  Rav Zevid teaches the matter in this way: Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: Concerning a cup of disqualified blood, e.g., one which had been taken out of the Temple courtyard and was then nevertheless presented on the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to it rendering the remaining blood a remainder and unfit to be presented? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: In the case of an unfit individual who himself presented the blood, what do you hold to be the <i>halakha</i>? If an unfit individual who presented the blood renders the remaining blood a remainder, then a cup of disqualified blood should also render the remaining blood a remainder. If an unfit individual does not render the remaining blood a remainder, then a cup of disqualified blood should also not render the remaining blood a remainder.
  Rav Yirmeya of Difti teaches the discussion this way: Abaye asked Rabba: If the blood was collected in more than one cup and the presenting of the blood on the corners of the altar was performed with one cup, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does the cup render the blood of the other cup rejected, and it is therefore poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard, or does it render it a remainder, which is poured on the base of the altar?
  Rabba said to him: This is a dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the remainder of the blood of the external sin offering: In the verse above, discussing the sin offering of a <i>Nasi</i>, it states: “And he shall pour its blood out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). In the verse below, discussing the sin offering of an individual, it states: “And he shall pour all its blood out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30).
  The discrepancy between the first verse and the second verse, which contains the additional term “all,” is explained as follows: From where is it derived with regard to a sin offering which the priest collected its blood in four cups and placed one placement of blood onto the altar from this cup, and one placement of blood from that cup, and likewise for all four corners of the altar, that the remainder of blood from all the cups are poured out onto the base of the altar? The verse states: “And he shall pour all its blood.”
  One might have thought that if he placed four placements of blood of the sin offering from one cup, the blood in all the rest of the cups should be poured onto the base of the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall pour its blood,” and not all of its blood. How so? Only that blood in the cup from which blood was properly presented on the altar is poured onto the base of the altar, and the rest of the cups of blood are rejected and are poured into the Temple courtyard drain.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: From where is it derived with regard to a sin offering which the priest collected its blood in four cups and then placed four placements from one cup, that the blood from all the cups are poured out onto the base of the altar? The verse states: “And he shall pour all its blood.” The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And he shall pour its blood,” which indicates that not all of the blood is poured? Rav Ashi said: That verse serves to exclude the remainder that is in the throat of the animal that was never collected in a vessel to be presented, which is not poured onto the base of the altar but into the Temple courtyard drain.
  § The mishna discussed three similar cases: If the priest fit for Temple service collected the blood in a vessel and gave the vessel to an unfit person, that person should return it to the fit priest. If the priest collected the blood in a vessel in his right hand and moved it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If the priest collected the blood in a sacred vessel and placed it in a non-sacred vessel, he should return the blood to a sacred vessel.
  The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to mention all of these cases, as had the mishna taught us only the case where he gave the blood to an unfit individual, I would say: What does the term: Unfit, mean? It means an impure priest, who is not completely unfit, as he is fit for communal service in the Temple when the priests or the entire community are impure, and that is why the blood is not disqualified; but if the priest moved the blood to his left hand, which under no circumstances may be used to perform the rite of collecting and carrying the blood, it is no longer valid.
  And had the mishna taught us only with regard to moving the blood to his left hand that he should return it to his right hand and present it, one would assume that the reason is that the left hand has validity on Yom Kippur, since the High Priest carries the spoon of incense with his left hand, but if he poured the blood into a non-sacred vessel then it is not valid.
  And had the mishna taught us only with regard to a non-sacred vessel that the blood is not disqualified, one could suggest that perhaps it is because the vessels are suitable to be consecrated, but with regard to these, i.e., an unfit individual and the left hand, which have no possibility of becoming fit for service, say that the blood does not remain valid. Therefore, it is necessary for all of the cases to be mentioned.
  § The Gemara questions the actual <i>halakha</i>: But let the blood be considered rejected when placed in the hand of the unfit individual, the left hand, or the non-sacred vessel. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This is what Rav Yirmeya of Difti says in the name of Rava: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who does not subscribe to the <i>halakha</i> of rejection, but holds that a sacrifice that was rejected temporarily is not rejected entirely.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Ḥanan the Egyptian says: In the event that the scapegoat of Yom Kippur was lost, even if the blood of its partner that is sacrificed to God has already been collected in the cup, the blood is not rejected, but rather he brings another scapegoat as its counterpart, and pairs it with the goat that has already been slaughtered, and the blood is sprinkled.
  Rav Ashi says that there is another explanation to the mishna: Anything that is in his power to rectify is not considered rejected, as in these cases where he can simply return the blood to its proper place.
  Rav Shaya said: It is reasonable to explain the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi, as whom have you heard who accepts the reasoning of rejection? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 62a): And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: If the blood of the goat sacrificed to God spilled from the cup before it was sprinkled, the scapegoat is left to die. Similarly, if the scapegoat died, the blood of the goat sacrificed to God should be spilled, and two other goats are used. Consequently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the scapegoat, or in the opposite case, the blood of the goat to be sacrificed to God, is totally rejected.
  And yet, we have heard that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anything that is in his power to rectify is not rejected. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: A priest would fill one cup with blood of the many Paschal offerings brought that day that was now mixed together on the floor and then sprinkle it with a single sprinkling against the base of the altar. Conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda holds that although the blood originally spilled from the cup, anything that is in his power to rectify is not rejected. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that it is so.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: A priest would fill one cup with the mixed blood, so that if one of the cups with the collected blood of one of the Paschal offerings were to spill, it would be found that this cup of the mixed blood that was sprinkled would render the sacrifice valid. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But the mixed blood was not collected in a vessel. The Gemara asks: From where do the Rabbis know that the blood was not collected in a vessel? Perhaps it was collected and it spilled out. Rather, this is what they are saying: Perhaps it was not collected in a vessel. Rabbi Yehuda said to them:
  
  Daf 35a
  
  I too said that the blood should be sprinkled only when it was collected in a vessel. The Gemara asks: But he, Rabbi Yehuda, himself, from where did he know if the blood was indeed collected? The Gemara answers: He relies on the fact that priests are vigilant, and perform their service properly and collect all of the blood. But they work swiftly, and the blood therefore spills from the cup.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t blood of exudate, which is unfit to be sprinkled upon the altar, mixed with the blood of the soul on the floor? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that blood of exudate is considered blood.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Blood of exudate is subject to a prohibition, and one who consumes it receives lashes. This is not as severe as consuming blood of the soul, the blood that spurts out of an animal as it is being slaughtered, for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who consumes blood of exudate is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, as this blood is treated as proper blood.
  The Gemara challenges this answer: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say that Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement that presenting blood of exudate does not effect atonement, as it is stated: “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).
  This verse indicates that blood with which the soul leaves the animal, i.e., that spurts immediately upon slaughter, is called blood; but blood with which the soul does not leave the animal, i.e., blood of exudate, is not called blood. If so, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, blood of exudate is unfit for presenting upon the altar, and collecting blood from the floor should therefore be ineffective.
  Rather, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the blood in the cup that is fit for sprinkling on the altar is not nullified by the blood of exudate, and the entire mixture may be sprinkled on the altar.
  The Gemara cites the continuation of the <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: According to your statement that the mixed blood on the floor may not be used, why do they plug the drain of the Temple courtyard on Passover eve and not allow the blood to flow out through it? The Rabbis said to him: It is a source of praise for the sons of Aaron that they should walk in blood up to their ankles, thereby demonstrating their love for the Temple service.
  The Gemara challenges: But the blood is an interposition between the feet of the priests and the floor of the Temple, and this should invalidate the service. The Gemara explains: The blood is moist and is therefore not an interposition, as we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood, ink, honey, and milk, when they are dry they interpose, but when they are moist they do not interpose.
  The Gemara asks further: But don’t their garments become soiled? And we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: If a priest’s garments were soiled and he performed a Temple rite while wearing them, his rite is disqualified. And if you would say that they raised their garments so that they would stay clean, but isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment [<i>middo</i> <i>vad</i>]” (Leviticus 6:3). The term <i>middo</i>, literally, his measure, teaches that his garment must be according to his measure [<i>kemiddato</i>], i.e., that it should not be too short and that it should not be too long. If the priest raises his garment, it will no longer be exactly his size. The Gemara answers that the priests would walk in the blood only while carrying the sacrificial limbs to the ramp of the altar, which is not actually a rite, but only preparation for a rite.
  The Gemara asks: And is it not one of the rites? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And the priest shall bring it all and burn it upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13); this is referring to the carrying of the limbs to the ramp? Rather, the priests would walk in the blood only while carrying wood to the arrangement of wood on the altar, which is not a rite. The Gemara asks: But if the floor of the Temple was full of blood; how did they walk to perform the actual rites without soiling their garments? The Gemara answers: They would walk on platforms raised above the floor, so that the blood would not reach their garments.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, e.g., the portions of the offering consumed on the altar, or with the intent to burn, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, e.g., the meat of the offering, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.
  One who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does partake of it, or with the intent to burn, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to partake or burn less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
  In the case of one who slaughters an offering with the intent to eat, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, an olive-bulk from the hide, or from the gravy, or from the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, or from a tendon in the neck, or from the bones, or from the tendons, or from the horns, or from the hooves, the offering is fit and one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for it, neither due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to partake of the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to the prohibition of leftover meat beyond the designated time, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.
  In the case of one who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside the designated area, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. Likewise, in the case of one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside the designated area, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. This is because the fetus, the placenta, and the eggs are not considered part of the body of the animal or the bird.
  For the same reason, one who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for it, neither due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, nor due to the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says: If one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> by slaughtering it with the intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, its fetus is rendered <i>piggul</i> as well, and one who eats it is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. But if he intended to partake of the fetus beyond its designated time, the offering has not been rendered <i>piggul</i>. Likewise, if he rendered a bird offering <i>piggul</i> by having intent to partake of a tendon in the neck, which is edible, beyond its designated time, then the crop of the bird is rendered <i>piggul</i> as well, although it is not considered an item that is usually eaten, since there are people who eat it. But if he intended to partake of the crop beyond its designated time, then a tendon in the neck is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  If he rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>, i.e., had improper intent by intending to burn the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar beyond their designated time, then the rest of the bulls are rendered <i>piggul</i>. Therefore, if one partakes of their meat, he is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. But if he intended to partake of the rest of the bulls beyond their designated time, since <i>piggul</i> does not apply to them, as they are not destined to be consumed on the altar or to be eaten, the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar are not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following <i>baraita</i> sup-ports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar: And even those who hold that <i>piggul</i> applies to the bulls that are burned agree that if he intended to partake of the bulls or to burn them beyond their designated time he did not do anything. This is because these bulls are not eaten or burned on the altar, and intentions can render an offering <i>piggul</i> only in the cases of offerings that are eaten or burned on the altar. The Gemara infers: What, is it not possible to infer that if he intended with regard to the sacrificial portions of the bulls that are consumed on the altar to burn them beyond their designated time, the bulls are rendered <i>piggul</i>, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar? The Gemara rejects this: No,
  
  Daf 35b
  
  derive instead as follows: But if he intended, with regard to the sacrificial portions of the bulls, to burn them beyond their designated time, the sacrificial portions themselves are rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating them. The flesh of the bulls is never rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 9a): In the case of the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the time that they were consecrated. Once they were slaughtered, they are susceptible to being rendered disqualified for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through being left overnight without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled.
  The Gemara derives: What, is it not referring to the flesh being left overnight, which would render it not valid? And conclude from the mishna that since the flesh is rendered disqualified by being left overnight, the flesh is also rendered disqualified by the intention to burn the sacrificial portions the next day, i.e., it is subject to <i>piggul</i>, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar.
  The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to leaving overnight the sacrificial portions of the offering, not the flesh. Likewise, only the sacrificial portions are rendered <i>piggul</i> by intent to eat them after their designated time. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: One who derives benefit from all of them by the place of the ashes where they are burned is liable for misuse of consecrated property until the flesh is completely scorched, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is also referring to the flesh being left overnight. The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The first clause is referring to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar, and the latter clause is referring to the flesh.
  Rabba raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar from a <i>baraita</i>: And these are portions of the offering that do not render an offering <i>piggul</i>, and they do not become <i>piggul</i>: The wool that is on the head of the lambs, the hair that is in the beard of the goats, the hide, the gravy, the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, a tendon in the neck, the crop, the bones, the tendons, the horns, the hooves, the fetus, the placenta, the milk of sacrificial animals, and the eggs of doves.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: All of these do not render other items <i>piggul</i> in the case of intent to consume them after their designated time, and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for them, neither due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, nor the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, nor the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. And one who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, since they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar.
  Rabba explains: What, does the <i>baraita</i> not mean that all of these items do not render the offering <i>piggul</i> if one intends to partake of them beyond the designated time, and they are also not rendered <i>piggul</i> due to the rest of the offering having been rendered <i>piggul</i>? This includes the fetus and placenta, and is therefore not in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar that the rest of the offering does render them <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara responds: No, it means, that they do not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i> due to themselves if one had intent to partake of them beyond the designated time. But such intent with regard to the offering can render them <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara asks: If so, concerning that which is taught in the latter clause: All of these do not render other items <i>piggul</i> and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>, why do I also need this? Doesn’t it teach that they are not rendered <i>piggul</i> due to the rest of the offering?
  The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning that the additional statement is necessary, then with regard to that which it says a third time: One is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for them due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, why do I also need this? Rather, the third statement does not teach an additional <i>halakha</i>, but since the <i>tanna</i> wants to teach that one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to violating the prohibition of <i>notar</i> and the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure, he taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>piggul</i> as well.
  Here too, it can be explained similarly: Since the <i>tanna</i> wants to teach the <i>halakha</i> that one who offers up one of these items outside the Temple is exempt, he also taught: And all of these do not render other items <i>piggul</i> and they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>. It may be that the rest of the offering does in fact render them <i>piggul</i>, as Rabbi Elazar stated.
  Rava says: We learn in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar in the mishna as well: One who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside their designated area has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. And one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside their designated area, has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  And then it is taught: One who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for it due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, nor due to the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. But it can be inferred that one who partakes of the fetus or placenta, which are not mentioned, is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.
  Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that here, they are rendered <i>piggul</i> due to the offering, and there, due to themselves, i.e., if he had improper intent concerning them, then they are not rendered <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that it is so.
  § The <i>baraita</i> cited by Rabba is now discussed in a different context: We learned in a mishna there (84a) that if disqualified offerings are nevertheless brought upon the altar, they are removed, and blemished animals are also included in this <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit, and if they were brought upon the altar they are not removed.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only an animal with a blemish on the cornea of the eye and similar blemishes that are not noticeable, since they are valid in the case of birds. And in addition, this is the <i>halakha</i> provided that its consecration preceded its blemish, i.e., when the animal was consecrated it was still entirely fit.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering that was brought upon the altar that since a burnt offering may be only a male animal, it is comparable to a case where its blemish preceded its consecration, since the disqualifying factor was there from the outset. Therefore, if it was brought upon the altar it must be removed.
  Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to this from the <i>baraita</i> cited by Rabba: One who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, as they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar. But it can be inferred that if he were to sacrifice from the flesh of the mother of one of these outside the Temple, he would be liable. And how can you find these circumstances? It is only in the case of a female burnt offering. This is because with regard to a peace offering, which may also be from a female animal, its flesh is not burned on the altar but is eaten. Therefore, there would be no liability for sacrificing it outside the Temple.
  Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds with regard to a female burnt offering that if it ascended onto the altar it does not descend, in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is that of Rabbi Akiva. This is because one is liable for sacrificing any offering outside the Temple that may be sacrificed on the altar, including one that was brought upon the altar inappropriately but is not removed. But if you say that with regard to a female burnt offering if it ascended the altar it must descend, and it entirely lacks the status of an offering fit to be sacrificed on the altar, in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>?
  The Gemara answers: Say that the inference should be as follows: One who offers up one of those items outside the Temple is exempt, but if he sacrificed from the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these, he is liable. This <i>halakha</i> can apply to both a sin offering and a peace offering, for which a female may be brought and whose sacrificial portions are burned on the altar.
  The Gemara challenges: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches this <i>halakha</i> with the term: Of one of these, indicating that it is referring to one who sacrifices the flesh, and not the sacrificial portions alone. And the case of their mother is similar to that of them, and is therefore referring to sacrificing the flesh of the mother outside the Temple, and not the sacrificial portions. Rather, say as follows: One who offers up part of their sacrificial portions outside the Temple is exempt, but one who offered up some of the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these is liable.
  MISHNA: If one slaughters the animal in order to leave its blood or its sacrificial portions for the next day, or to remove them outside the designated area, but not in order to sacrifice them the next day, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. In the case of one who slaughters the animal in order to place the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or in order to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or the blood that is to be placed
  
  Daf 36a
  
  inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary, or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary; and likewise, if he slaughtered the animal with the intent that ritually impure people will partake of it, or that ritually impure people will sacrifice it, or that uncircumcised people will partake of it, or that uncircumcised people will sacrifice it; and likewise, with regard to the Paschal offering, if he had intent during the slaughter to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or to eat from the meat of the Paschal offering partially roasted, or to mix the blood of an offering with the blood of unfit offerings, in all these cases, although he intended to perform one of these prohibited acts, some of which would render the offering unfit, the offering is fit.
  The reason is that intent does not render the offering unfit except in cases of intent to eat or to burn the offering beyond its designated time and outside its designated area, and in addition, the Paschal offering and the sin offering are disqualified by intent to sacrifice them not for their sake.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems the offering unfit if there was intent to leave it over until the next day or to take it out of its designated area? Rabbi Elazar said: There are two verses that are written with regard to <i>notar</i>. One verse states: “You shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), and one verse states: “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). If the additional verse is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, which is already mentioned by the first verse, apply it to the matter of intent of leaving it overnight, which would therefore be prohibited as well.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does this verse come to teach this idea? This verse is necessary for him to derive that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering; he shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). From the words: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving,” we learned with regard to a thanks offering that it is eaten for a day and a night.
  With regard to animals exchanged for thanks offerings, and the offspring of thanks offerings, and the substitutes of thanks offerings, from where is it derived that they too are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “And the flesh [<i>uvesar</i>],” and the additional “and” includes them. With regard to a sin offering and a guilt offering, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” to include other types of offerings.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And from where is it derived to include the peace offering of a nazirite, i.e., the ram that a nazirite brings at the close of his term of naziriteship, and the peace offering of Passover? The verse therefore states: “His peace offerings,” in the plural. With regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, and the loaves and wafers that are part of the offering brought by a nazirite, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “His offering.” With regard to all of them I will read the phrase “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” as being applicable. Evidently, this verse is necessary to teach numerous <i>halakhot</i> concerning the allotted time to partake of offerings.
  The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, as stated in the other verse. What is indicated by the phrase “He shall not leave any of it”? If it is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, apply it to the matter of intent to leave it overnight.
  The Gemara now questions the source cited by Rabbi Elazar: This works out well to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who had intent to leave the sacrificial portions overnight. But with regard to disqualifying the offering due to one who had intent to remove them from the Temple, what can be said to explain the source of Rabbi Yehuda, as it cannot be derived from these verses?
  And furthermore, the statement of Rabbi Elazar can be questioned, as the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda is based on logical reasoning and is not derived from a verse. This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede that if he left it over until the next day that it is disqualified? So too, if he intended to leave it over until the next day it is disqualified. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda bases his opinion on logical reasoning, as he equates intent with action. The Gemara asks: Rather, is the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda based on logical reasoning and not derived from the verse? But if so, Rabbi Yehuda should also disagree with regard to all of the other cases in the mishna due to the same reasoning.
  The Gemara rejects this: With regard to which case should Rabbi Yehuda disagree? Should he disagree with regard to one who slaughters the offering with intent to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or with intent to partake of the Paschal offering while it is partially roasted? Even had he actually realized such intent, would the offering itself thereby be disqualified? It presumably would not, as the presenting of the blood effects acceptance.
  Likewise, if a rite was performed on the condition that ritually impure individuals will partake of it, or that ritually impure individuals will sacrifice it, i.e., burn the sacrificial portions on the altar, would the offering itself be disqualified if such actions occurred? Likewise, if it was done with the intent that uncircumcised individuals will partake of it, or that uncircumcised individuals will sacrifice it, would the offering itself be disqualified if this occurred? The Gemara presents another version of this question: Is it in his power to execute these actions that are contingent upon the will of others?
  With regard to a case where one had intent to mix their blood with the blood of unfit offerings, where Rabbi Yehuda also does not disagree with the ruling of the mishna that the offering is valid, he conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, even if one would actually mix the two types of blood, it would not be disqualified. Likewise, in cases where one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or those that are to be placed below the red line above the red line, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood that was not placed in its proper place on the altar is also considered to be placed in its proper place, and it effects acceptance of the offering.
  The Gemara suggests: And let him disagree with regard to a case of blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary that was placed outside, and blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary that was placed inside, as the verse explicitly states that an external sin offering whose blood was sprinkled inside is disqualified (see Leviticus 6:23).
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda holds that in order to disqualify an offering with the intent to perform a rite outside its designated area, we require that the intended place have threefold functionality, i.e., for the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar, which is true only of the area outside the Temple courtyard, which was valid for these three activities during an era in which it was permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars. Therefore, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary, which lacks these three elements, does not disqualify the offering, as the meat and sacrificial portions are never eaten or burned there.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda accept this reasoning that it must be a place of threefold functionality? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1). The verse included here a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south and not on the northern side of the Temple courtyard as required, and likewise a sin offering whose blood entered inside, i.e., it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be brought inside the Sanctuary, that they are disqualified. This indicates that an offering slaughtered with improper intent with regard to a place that lacks threefold functionality nevertheless renders the offering not valid.
  The Gemara responds: And does Rabbi Yehuda not accept the requirement of a place of three functions? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (82a) that Rabbi Yehuda said: If he brought the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presenting, from which it may be inferred: But if he brought it in intentionally, it is unfit. And we maintain that Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit only where one actually effected atonement, i.e., he presented the blood on the inner altar.
  Now, it stands to reason that if there, where one actually brought the blood inside, only if he effected atonement, yes, it is unfit, but if he did not effect atonement it is not unfit, then here, where he merely thought to bring it inside, all the more so is it not clear that it should be valid? The Gemara answers: There are two <i>tanna’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning a place with threefold functionality.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south,
  
  Daf 36b
  
  the slaughterer would be liable to receive lashes?
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south, he would be liable for it. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1), to teach that for slaughtering an evil thing, such as a blemished offering, you deem him liable to receive lashes, but you do not deem him liable for a sin offering that he slaughtered in the south. The Gemara answers: Here too, there are two <i>tanna’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  § Rabbi Abba says: Although Rabbi Yehuda says that an offering is rendered not valid if it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be left over until the next day, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that if the priest subsequently collected, conveyed, or presented the blood with the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, he then establishes the offering as <i>piggul</i>. The intent to leave it overnight does not prevent it from being rendered <i>piggul</i>, in contrast to intent to sacrifice or partake of it outside its designated area, or performing a sacrificial rite of the Paschal offering or a sin offering not for its own sake, which do prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered <i>piggul</i> (see 29b).
  Rava says: Know that this is so, as intent to sprinkle the blood the next day, which renders an offering <i>piggul</i> and which inherently includes the intent to leave the blood over until the next day so that he can then sprinkle it, is nothing before the sprinkling of the blood. And his intent during the slaughter to sprinkle the blood the next day does not render the offering <i>piggul</i> until the blood is sprinkled, and then the sprinkling of the blood comes and establishes the offering as <i>piggul</i>. Clearly, the intent to leave the blood over until the next day does not prevent the offering from subsequently being rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so that this is a valid proof, as there, with regard to standard <i>piggul</i> intent, it is one intent that is established with the sprinkling of the blood. By contrast, here, where he initially had intent to leave the blood until the next day and subsequently had intent to sprinkle it beyond its designated time, there are two separate intents. Therefore, since an improper intent already exists, the offering cannot thereafter be rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Huna raised an objection to Rabbi Abba from a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered an offering with the intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, and he had intent to do so immediately, i.e., on the same day, then it is valid, as such intent does not disqualify the offering. If he then had intent to sacrifice the offering outside its designated area, it is disqualified, but there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> for it. If he had intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, then it is rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for it.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line or vice versa the next day, then it is disqualified, due to his intent to leave it overnight, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. In this case, if he then had intent to sacrifice the same offering either beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, it is disqualified, and there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> for it. Evidently, intent to leave it overnight prevents the offering from subsequently being rendered <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Abba is indeed a conclusive refutation.
  § Rav Ḥisda says that Ravina bar Sila says: If one slaughtered an offering with intent that impure individuals would eat the meat of the offering the next day, one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. Although impure individuals are not fit to partake of the meat, this is nevertheless considered intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Rava says: Know that this is so, as meat prior to the sprinkling of the blood is not fit to be eaten, and when one has improper intent with regard to it, it is disqualified. Clearly, intent to partake of a forbidden item beyond its designated time renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, with regard to standard <i>piggul</i> intent, he sprinkles the blood, and the meat is rendered fit to be eaten the next day. By contrast, here, it is not rendered fit to be eaten by impure individuals at all. Therefore, such intent is not considered significant intent to consume the meat after its designated time.
  Rav Ḥisda says that Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana was wont to say the following <i>halakha</i>: With regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, although it is prohibited for them to be eaten, nevertheless one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to violating the prohibition against eating them in a state of impurity.
  Rava said: Know that this is so, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The added words “that pertain to the Lord” serve to include the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity with regard to impurity, teaching that one who partakes of them while impure is liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  Apparently, even though they are not fit for consumption, one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to violating the prohibition against eating them in ritual impurity. Here too, with regard to the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted, and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, even though they are not fit to be eaten, one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to violating the prohibition against eating them in impurity.
  The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But it is not so, as there, the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that are burned on the altar are at least fit for the Most High, i.e., for the consumption of the altar, and therefore one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating them while ritually impure. This is to the exclusion of the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, which are not fit at all, not for the Most High, and not for an ordinary person.
  The Gemara presents another version of the proof and its rejection: But the sacrificial portions are not fit, and yet one is liable if he consumes them while impure. The Gemara responds: But it is not so, since these sacrificial portions are fit for their matters, and these, i.e., the meat of a Paschal offering that was not roasted and the loaves of a thanks offering from which the priests’ portion was not separated, are not fit at all.
  
  MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, even those that require that the blood be sprinkled on two opposite corners of the altar so that it will run down each of its four sides, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with only one placement, he facilitated atonement. And in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, one on each of the four corners of the altar, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement. And Beit Hillel say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact.
  Therefore, since the priest facilitates atonement with one placement in all cases other than a sin offering according to Beit Shammai, and even in the case of a sin offering according to Beit Hillel, if he placed the first placement in its proper manner, and the second with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, he facilitated atonement. Since the second placement is not indispensable with regard to achieving atonement, improper intent while performing that rite does not invalidate the offering.
  And based on the same reasoning, if he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and he placed the second placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area, the second of which does not render an offering <i>piggul</i>, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, an offering disqualified by improper intention, and one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>] for its consumption. This is because the intent that accompanied the second placement does not supersede the <i>piggul</i> status of the offering.
  All this applies to those offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar. But with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one placement in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, as it is lacking one placement; but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of the offering, as the improper intention related to only part of the blood that renders the offering permitted for consumption, and an offering becomes <i>piggul</i> only when the improper intention relates to the entire portion of the offering that renders it permitted for consumption.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to those offerings whose blood is placed on the external altar, that if the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that a single pouring of blood suffices. The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in another <i>baraita</i> discussing a different matter:
  
  Daf 37a
  
  From where is it derived that all the blood that is left over from an offering after the requisite placement requires placement of blood on the base of the altar? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of the first <i>baraita</i> derives this from the verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to a verse discussing a bird sin offering: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). As there is no need for the verse to state “of the blood,” because the entire verse is talking about the blood, what is the meaning when the verse states “of the blood”?
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Since we have learned only about those offerings whose blood is placed on the altar with four placements, i.e., outer sin offerings, that they require placement of the leftover blood on the base of the altar, from where is it derived that the same applies to the leftover blood of all the other offerings? The verse states: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). Since there is no need for the verse to state “of the blood,” because the entire verse is talking about the blood, what is the meaning when the verse states “of the blood”? This teaches that all the leftover blood from all the offerings requires placement of blood on the base of the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But still, does this verse, Deuteronomy 12:27, come to teach this <i>halakha</i>, that if a priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to those offerings whose blood is supposed to be placed by means of sprinkling from a certain distance from the altar, that if the priest placed the blood by pouring it from up close he has fulfilled his obligation? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27).
  The Gemara answers that the ruling in this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, while the <i>tanna</i> of the earlier <i>baraita</i> holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Sprinkling is not included in pouring, and similarly pouring is not included in sprinkling. Rather, these are separate actions performed under different circumstances, and one does not fulfill his obligation to sprinkle the blood by pouring it. Therefore, the verse is available to him to teach that if a priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement.
  The Gemara demonstrates that this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 121a): If one recited the blessing over the Paschal offering, which is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the Paschal offering, he has also exempted himself from reciting a blessing over the Festival peace offering, i.e., the peace offering that is eaten together with the Paschal offering. The blessing for the Festival peace offering of the fourteenth of Nisan is: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to eat the offering.
  If he recited the blessing over the Festival offering, he has not exempted himself from reciting a blessing over the Paschal offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Yishmael’s reasoning is based on the <i>halakha</i> that the blood of the Paschal offering is poured, while the blood of the Festival offering is sprinkled. He maintains that sprinkling is included in the more general category of pouring, and therefore the blessing over the Paschal offering includes the Festival offering. Pouring is not included in the more limited category of sprinkling, and therefore reciting the blessing over the Festival offering does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over the Paschal offering.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Akiva says: This blessing does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over that one, and that blessing does not exempt one from reciting a blessing over this one. Sprinkling is not included in pouring, and pouring is not included in sprinkling. Therefore, there is a separate blessing for each offering.
  The Gemara asks: Still, does this verse, Deuteronomy 12:27, come to teach this <i>halakha</i>, that if a priest placed the blood with one placement he facilitated atonement? That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yishmael says: Since it is stated: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred. You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17), we learned with regard to a firstborn animal, which must be given to a priest to be offered on the altar in the Temple, that it requires placement of its blood and sacrificial portions on the altar. From where is it derived that the same applies to an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering? The verse states: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). This verse teaches that all offerings require placement of their blood on the altar.
  The Gemara answers that the <i>tanna</i> of the earlier <i>baraita</i>, who derives from Deuteronomy 12:27 the <i>halakha</i> that if a priest placed the blood with one placement he facilitated atonement, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that the <i>halakha</i> that the blood and sacrificial parts of an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering must be placed on the altar is derived from the aforementioned verse concerning a firstborn animal: “You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17).
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>, that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: It is not stated in this verse: Its blood, but rather: “Their blood.” Similarly, it is not stated: Its fat, but rather: “Their fat.” The plural form teaches with regard to the firstborn animal, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse, as well as with regard to the animal tithe offering and the Paschal offering, which have a level of sanctity similar to that of a firstborn animal, that each requires placement of the blood and sacrificial portions on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yishmael derive one <i>halakha</i> from this verse and then derive another <i>halakha</i> from this same verse? It was stated earlier that Rabbi Yishmael derives from the verse “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured” that sprinkling is included in pouring, and yet here he derives from that same verse that the blood of an animal tithe offering and that of a Paschal offering must be presented on the altar. The Gemara answers: These are the opinions of two <i>tanna’im</i>, each of whom expressed his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.
  The Gemara raises a question with regard to the disagreement about the interpretation of Numbers 18:17. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets the entire verse as referring to a firstborn animal, and according to whom the plural form in the verse is referring to three such firstborns, that of a bull, that of a sheep, and that of a goat, this explains that which is written immediately afterward: “And their meat shall be yours” (Numbers 18:18), in the plural, i.e., the meat of these firstborn animals shall be eaten by the priests.
  But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who interprets this verse as referring also to an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering, there is a difficulty, as an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering are eaten by their owners, not by the priests. If so, what is the meaning of the phrase “and their meat shall be yours”? The Gemara answers that the plural term “their meat,” is referring not to an animal tithe offering or a Paschal offering, but to different types of firstborns, i.e., both an unblemished animal, whose blood is poured on the altar, and a blemished one, which is not brought as an offering on the altar.
  
  Daf 37b
  
  This verse teaches that a blemished firstborn is given to a priest as a gift, and that he may eat its meat. This is a novel concept, as we have not found in the entire Torah another <i>halakha</i> similar to it, where a blemished offering is given to the priests for consumption.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets this verse differently, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i> that a blemished firstborn is given to a priest? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the phrase: “As the breast of waving and as the right thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:18), which is the latter clause of that same verse. The repetition of the phrase “shall be yours” serves to teach that even the meat of a blemished firstborn shall be eaten by the priests.
  § The Gemara raises another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who interprets the verse as referring also to an animal tithe offering and a Paschal offering, this is as it is written in the same verse: “You shall not redeem; they are sacred” (Numbers 18:17). The word “they” indicates that only they are sacrificed on the altar, but their substitutes are not sacrificed. In general, if one substitutes a non-sacred animal for one designated as an offering, both the original and the substitute are considered to be consecrated, and they are therefore sacrificed. But if one substitutes a non-sacred animal for a firstborn, an animal tithe offering, or a Paschal offering, the substitute is not sacrificed.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 21a): With regard to the substitute of a firstborn and of an animal tithe offering, both they, the substitutes themselves, and their offspring, and the offspring of their offspring, forever, i.e., for all future generations, are as the firstborn and the animal tithe offering, respectively, and therefore they are eaten in their blemished state by the owners; but unlike the firstborn and the animal tithe offering themselves, they are not sacrificed on the altar.
  And likewise with regard to the substitute of a Paschal offering, we learned in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 96b) that Rabbi Yehoshua says: I have heard two rulings from my teachers: One ruling was that the substitute of a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering after Passover, and another ruling was that the substitute of a Paschal offering is not offered as a peace offering after Passover; and I cannot explain these apparently contradictory rulings, as I do not remember the circumstances to which each ruling applies. And as will be explained, if the substitution took place after the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, the animal is sacrificed, as it is considered the substitute of a peace offering, whereas if the substitution occurred before the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, it is not sacrificed, as it is the substitute of a Paschal offering. This indicates that the substitute of a Paschal offering is not sacrificed, just like the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed.
  But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who interprets the entire verse as dealing with a firstborn, from where does he derive the <i>halakha</i> that the substitute of an animal tithe offering and of a Paschal offering are not sacrificed? The Gemara answers: With regard to an animal tithe offering, he derives this by means of a verbal analogy between the terms passing, and passing written with regard to a firstborn. Concerning a firstborn it is stated: “And you shall pass [<i>veha’avarta</i>] to the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12), and concerning an animal tithe it is stated: “Of whatever passes [<i>ya’avor</i>] under the rod” (Leviticus 27:32). From this verbal analogy it may be derived that just as the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed, so too, the substitute of an animal tithe offering is not sacrificed.
  With regard to the Paschal offering, this <i>halakha</i> is not derived through a verbal analogy, but rather this <i>halakha</i> is explicitly written concerning it. The verse referring to peace offerings states: “If he offers a lamb for his offering” (Leviticus 3:7). The Torah could simply have stated: A lamb, and proceed from there to teach the <i>halakhot</i> of a lamb peace offering. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “If he offers a lamb”? This serves to include the substitute of a Paschal offering that was substituted after the sacrifice of the Paschal offering, teaching that it is sacrificed as a peace offering, since the Paschal offering has the status of a peace offering after that time. One might have thought that even before the sacrifice of the Paschal offering the same should apply, i.e., that the substitute of a Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover” (Exodus 12:27), which indicates that it, the Paschal offering itself, is sacrificed, but its substitute is not sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: And as for all those <i>tanna’im</i> who derive a different exposition from this verse: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured” (Deuteronomy 12:27), this <i>halakha</i> that is recorded in the mishna, that with regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar, in a case where the priest placed the blood on the altar with one placement, he facilitated atonement, from where do they derive this? The Gemara answers: Those <i>tanna’im</i> hold in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, who say: Even with regard to a sin offering, in a case where the priest placed the blood with one placement, he facilitated atonement after the fact. And they derive the <i>halakha</i> applying to all the other offerings from that which applies to a sin offering.
  § The mishna teaches that Beit Shammai maintain that in the case of a sin offering, which requires four placements, at least two placements are necessary to facilitate atonement, whereas Beit Hillel hold that even in the case of a sin offering one placement suffices. Rav Huna said: What is the reasoning for the opinion of Beit Shammai?
  He explains: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:25). Subsequently, the verse states: “The priest shall take of its blood with his finger, and put it on the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30), and an additional verse states: “The priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it on the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As the mini-mum amount justifying the use of the plural form, i.e., in the word “corners,” is two, one may conclude that there are six references to the corners of the altar here. Four of them are mentioned for a mitzva, meaning that the priest should place the blood on all four corners of the altar <i>ab initio</i>, and the other two are mentioned to invalidate the offering if he did not present the blood on at least two corners.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reasononing for the opinion of Beit Hillel? The Gemara answers: The matter should be understood according to the written consonantal text, i.e., the way in which the words are actually spelled. The word “corners” is written plene, i.e., with a <i>vav</i>, in one of the verses, which means that it must be read in the plural form. In the other two verses, “corners” and “corners” are written deficient, i.e., without a <i>vav</i>, in a way that can be vocalized in the singular form, i.e., as <i>karnat</i>. Therefore, there are four references to corners here. Three of these references are written to indicate the placements of blood are performed only as a mitzva, i.e., they are performed <i>ab initio</i>, and the remaining one is written to indicate that its absence invalidates the offering, i.e., the offering is not valid if the blood was not placed against at least one corner of the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But according to this explanation of Beit Hillel, why not say that all of them are written for the mitzva and none are to invalidate, i.e., that the blood must be presented on all four corners <i>ab initio</i>, but the offering atones after the fact even if the blood was not presented at all? The Gemara rejects this possibility: We have not found anywhere in the Torah an example of an offering in which atonement can be achieved with no placement of the blood.
  And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason of Beit Hillel: The vocalized text of the Torah, i.e., the way in which the words of the Torah are pronounced based on the tradition of what vowels the words contain, is effective in determining how the verses are to be expounded. And likewise, the consonantal text of the Torah, i.e., the way in which the words are actually written, is also effective in determining how the verses are to be expounded. The Gemara elaborates: The vocalized text is effective in adding one more corner and the consonantal text is effective in subtracting one corner. Consequently, the verse is interpreted as referring to five corners, four of which are necessary for the mitzva <i>ab initio</i>, and one of which is indispensable after the fact.
  The Gemara asks: But if that is so, that this is the proper manner of expounding the verses, consider the case of the phylacteries of the head, about which it is stated: “And for frontlets [<i>totafot</i>] between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), and: “They shall be for frontlets [<i>totafot</i>] between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), and subsequently: “They shall be for frontlets [<i>totafot</i>] between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 11:18). The word <i>totafot</i> is written once in plene form, i.e., with a <i>vav</i>, indicating the plural form, and twice in a deficient form, i.e., without a <i>vav</i>, indicating the singular. Accordingly, there are four frontlets here, and from here the Sages derive that the phylacteries of the head consist of four compartments, which together form a cube. Why not say that the vocalized text, read in the plural, is effective, i.e., that it requires six compartments, and likewise, the consonantal text, read in the singular, is effective, i.e., it requires four compartments, and therefore one should be required to prepare five compartments for the phylacteries of the head?
  The Gemara answers that Beit Hillel hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that the requirement to have four compartments in the phylacteries of the head is not derived from the number of times that the word <i>totafot</i> is mentioned, but rather from an exposition of the word <i>totafot</i> itself: <i>Tot</i> in the Katpi language means two, and <i>pat</i> in the Afriki language means two, for a total of four.
  The Gemara raises another objection to this method of exposition: If that is so, consider the case of a <i>sukka</i>, about which it is stated: “In <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>] shall you reside seven days; all that are homeborn in Israel shall reside in <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>]. So that your future generations will know that I caused the children of Israel to reside in <i>sukkot</i> [<i>basukkot</i>] when I took them out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 23:42–43). Two instances of the word <i>basukkot</i> are written in a deficient manner, i.e., without a <i>vav</i>, indicating the singular, and one instance is written in plene form, i.e., with a <i>vav</i>, indicating the plural form. The Sages derived from here that a <i>sukka</i> must have four walls. Why not say that the vocalized text, read in the plural, is effective, requiring six walls, and likewise, the consonantal text, read in the singular, is effective, requiring four walls, and therefore one should be required to build a <i>sukka</i> with five walls?
  
  Daf 38a
  
  The Gemara answers: There, one of the five indicated by the verse is needed entirely for the mitzva itself, i.e., to teach the basic <i>halakha</i> that one must dwell in a <i>sukka</i>. And another one of the five is needed to teach that a <i>sukka</i>, as is indicated by its name, must have a covering [<i>sekhakha</i>]. Accordingly, there are three left, alluding to the requirement that a <i>sukka</i> must have three walls. The Gemara adds that the <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai comes and reduces the size of the third wall, teaching that it need not be complete, and sets its minimum length at only one handbreadth.
  The Gemara raises yet another objection: If that is so, that both the vocalized and the consonantal texts are taken into account, consider the case of a woman who gives birth to a female child. Concerning this woman the verse states: “But if she bear a female child, then she shall be impure two weeks [<i>shevu’ayim</i>], as in her menstruation” (Leviticus 12:5). The way that the word is written allows it to be read as <i>shivim</i>, seventy. Why not say that the vocalized text of the Torah is effective, teaching us that the woman is ritually impure for fourteen days, and the consonantal text is also effective, teaching us that she is impure for seventy days, and, therefore, she should be required to sit in a state of ritual impurity for forty-two days, which is the halfway point between fourteen and seventy days?
  The Gemara answers: There it is different, and the consonantal text is disregarded entirely, as it is written: “As in her menstruation,” and a menstruating woman is impure for one week. Evidently, the verse is speaking in terms of weeks, and is not alluding to the number seventy at all.
  § The Gemara further analyzes the opinion of Beit Hillel that even in the case of a sin offering, if the priest placed the blood on the altar with one placement, he facilitated atonement. And a <i>tanna</i> cites proof for this from here, as it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering brought by a king: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:26), and with regard to the goat brought as a sin offering by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:31), and with regard to the sheep brought as a sin offering by an ordinary person: “And the priest shall make atonement for him” (Leviticus 4:35). The repetition of this term is due to a logical inference.
  As one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through logical inference as follows: It is stated that blood is placed below the red line, and it is stated that blood is placed above the red line. Just as with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is placed below the red line, when the priest placed it on the altar with one placement he facilitated atonement, so too, with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is placed above the red line, when the priest placed it on the altar with one placement he facilitated atonement.
  Or perhaps, go this way, turning away from the previous explanation and toward this explanation: It is stated that blood is presented on the inner altar, i.e., with regard to a sin offering of the community or of the High Priest; the blood of these offerings is sprinkled on the incense altar that is inside the Sanctuary. And it is stated that blood is presented on the external altar, i.e., with regard to the sin offering of an ordinary person, which is offered on the outer altar that is in the courtyard. Just as with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is presented on the inner altar, if the priest omitted one of the placements he has done nothing, i.e., the offering is not valid, so too, with regard to the blood concerning which it is stated that it is presented on the external altar, if the priest omitted one of the placements he has done nothing.
  The Gemara analyzes the two possibilities: Let us see to which of the two cases the blood of an animal sin offering is more similar. It can be claimed: We derive a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the external altar from a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the external altar, but we do not derive a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the external altar from a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to the inner altar. Or, go this way: We derive a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to a sin offering whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar from a <i>halakha</i> stated with regard to a sin offering whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar. But a sin offering consisting of a bird, which is not a sin offering whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar, cannot serve as proof to the <i>halakha</i> concerning an animal sin offering, whose blood is to be placed on the four corners of the altar.
  Since both of the above inferences are reasonable, neither can serve as the source of the <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” “And the priest shall make atonement,” for a total of three times. The verses are interpreted as follows: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed only three placements. Subsequently: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed only two placements, and then: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed only one placement. This interpretation is the source of Beit Hillel’s opinion.
  The Gemara challenges: But each of these verses is necessary for itself, to teach that atonement is achieved for each of the sins through its respective sin offering. Rava said: Bar Adda Mari explained this matter to me: The verse states with regard to each of these sin offerings: “And the priest shall make atonement…and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26, 31, 35). This is atonement and this is forgiveness; they are one and the same. Since it would have sufficed to say: “And he shall be forgiven,” the superfluous mentions of the phrase: “And the priest shall make atonement,” serve to teach that the priest facilitates atonement even if he has not performed all the placements.
  The Gemara asks: But even if these phrases are superfluous, do they necessarily indicate that a priest who omitted placements has nevertheless facilitated atonement? Why not say that these phrases serve to teach that if the priest placed all the placements he facilitated atonement even if the placements were placed in the wrong place? And expound the verses as follows: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed the blood on the altar with only three placements above, on the corners of the altar, and one below, on the lower portion of the altar; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he placed the blood with only two placements above and two below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even if he did not place the blood above at all, but only below.
  Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak says: If so, that the priest facilitates atonement even if he placed all the placements below, you have abolished the requirement of four corners that is stated with regard to the sin offering (see, e.g., Leviticus 4:34), as the four corners are on the upper portion of the altar. The Gemara is puzzled by Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak’s claim: But if the Merciful One states that this is so, let this requirement be abolished.
  As Rav Adda bar Yitzḥak’s claim was rejected, Rava said there is a different reason why the previous claim cannot be accepted: What is the item that requires three repetitions of “and the priest shall make atonement,” i.e., to what are these verses referring? You must say that these are the corners of the altar. The Torah must teach that the priest facilitates atonement even if he did not place the blood on three of the four corners. But in order for the verses to teach that all four placements can be placed below, the phrase “and the priest shall make atonement” would have to be written four times.
  The Gemara asks further: Even so, it is possible to interpret the three repetitions of the phrase “and the priest shall make atonement” as referring to the location of the placements, without abolishing the requirement of corners, as one can say: “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood on the altar with only three placements above and one below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood with only two placements above and two below; “And the priest shall make atonement,” even though he placed the blood with only one placement above and three below.
  The Gemara answers: This entire line of inquiry can be rejected, as we do not find a case involving blood, half of which is placed above the red line and half of which is placed below it. One either places all the blood on the lower half of the altar, as in the case of most offerings, or all of it on the upper half of the altar, as in the case of sin offerings. The Gemara asks: And is there really no case of that sort? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 53b): The High Priest took the blood of the bull into the Holy of Holies and sprinkled from the blood one time upward and then seven times downward? Apparently, part of the blood of an offering can be sprinkled upward, toward the upper part of the Ark Cover, and part can be placed downward, toward the lower part of the Ark Cover.
  The Gemara rejects this: That is not a case where half the blood is sprinkled upward and half is sprinkled downward. Instead, that sprinkling was like a <i>matzlif</i>. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of like a <i>matzlif</i>? Rav Yehuda demonstrated with his hand; it means like one who whips. One who whips another does not strike repeatedly in one place but directs one lash beneath the other.
  The Gemara further asks: And is there really no case of that sort? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 58b) about the Yom Kippur service: After the High Priest sprinkled blood on the four corners of the incense altar, he sprinkled blood seven times on <i>tohoro</i> of the altar.
  
  Daf 38b
  
  What, is it not referring to the middle of the side of the altar, as people say: Clear noon [<i>tihara</i>], that is the middle of the day? Accordingly, the root <i>tet</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>reish</i> denotes the middle; in the one case, the middle of the day, and in the other case, halfway up the altar. Now, since the blood was sprinkled on the altar seven times, inevitably some of the blood landed above the midpoint and some of it landed below the midpoint. Rava bar Sheila said: No, that is not the meaning of <i>tohoro</i>. Rather, <i>tohoro</i> means on the revealed part, i.e., the top, of the altar, as it is written: “Like the very clear [<i>latohar</i>] sky” (Exodus 24:10). <i>Tohoro</i> is referring to the top of the altar when it has been revealed, after the ashes of the incense are cleared and the pure gold is visible.
  The Gemara asks again: Is there not a case where some of the blood is presented above the red line and some of it is presented below? But there is the remainder of the blood, which is poured on the base of the altar even in the case of a sin offering, the main blood of which is placed on the upper portion of the altar. The Gemara answers: The pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar is not indispensable for atonement. Blood that is indispensable for atonement is in no instance presented half above the red line and half below it.
  The Gemara continues this line of questioning: But there is the remainder of the blood of the inner sin offerings, the main blood of which is sprinkled on the inner altar. The remainder of the blood of these offerings is poured on the base of the external altar, and there is one who says that this pouring of the blood is indispensable for atonement. The Gemara explains: When we said that there is no blood, half of which is presented above and half below, we said this with regard to one place, i.e., the same altar. The blood of inner sin offerings is sprinkled on the inner altar, while the remainder of that blood is poured on the base of the external altar. There is no case of blood, half of which is presented above and half of which is presented below on the same altar.
  § The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, in the case of a sin offering two placements facilitate atonement, while with regard to other offerings a single placement is sufficient. Beit Hillel disagree and say that even in the case of a sin offering one placement suffices after the fact. With regard to this issue, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Beit Shammai say that two placements in the case of a sin offering, and one placement in the case of other offerings, they render the offering permitted for eating since these actions facilitate atonement after the fact, despite the fact that blood was not placed on all four corners of the altar.
  And similarly they render the offering <i>piggul</i>. That is to say, if the priest placed two placements of the blood of a sin offering or one placement of the blood of any another offering, intending to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i>. Beit Hillel say: One placement in the case a sin offering, and likewise one placement in the case of all the other offerings, if done with proper intent, renders the offering permitted for eating and, if done with improper intent, renders the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Oshaya objects to this: If so, let this <i>halakha</i> be taught in the fourth chapter of tractate <i>Eduyyot</i> alongside the other rare cases of Beit Shammai’s leniencies and Beit Hillel’s stringencies. According to Beit Hillel, a sin offering is <i>piggul</i> even if the priest intended to partake of it beyond its designated time even while performing a single placement, whereas Beit Shammai maintain that the offering is <i>piggul</i> only if he had this improper intent during two placements.
  Rava said to Rav Oshaya: When this question was initially asked, and the Sages stated their opinions concerning the matter, it was asked with regard to the permission to partake of the sin offering. In other words, the dispute arose as a result of an inquiry into the other relevant <i>halakha</i>, i.e., whether the priests may partake of a sin offering, the blood of which was placed only one time. In this case it is Beit Shammai who are more stringent, as they permit the meat of a sin offering only after two placements have been placed. For this reason, this case was not listed among the other leniencies of Beit Shammai and stringencies of Beit Hillel.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Despite the fact that, according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, the last three placements in the case of a sin offering are not indispensable to the atonement, they may not be performed at night, because the blood is invalidated at sunset. And these three placements may be performed after the death of the owner. If the owner of the offering died before any of the blood was placed on the altar, the blood may not be placed, and the offering is burned as a disqualified offering. But if he died after one placement, the priest may perform the other three placements, as he has already facilitated atonement by means of the first placement. And as it is a mitzva to perform these three placements on the altar, one who offers this blood up on an altar outside the Temple is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, the punishment received by one who offers a sacrifice outside the Temple.
  Rav Pappa says: There are some respects in which the blood of the last three placements of a sin offering is treated like the blood presented at the outset, i.e., like the blood of the first placement, and there are some respects in which the blood of the last three placements is treated like the blood presented at the end, i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.
  Rav Pappa elaborates: With regard to liability for presenting blood outside the Temple, and concerning the prohibition against presenting blood at night, and with regard to the disqualification of a non-priest from presenting blood and his liability for death at the hand of Heaven if he presents blood in the Temple, and with regard to the requirement that the blood that is to be presented must first be placed in a service vessel, and that the blood must be placed on the corner of the altar, and that the placement must be performed with the priest’s finger, and concerning the obligation to launder a garment onto which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, and finally with regard to the requirement of pouring the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, the last three placements are treated like blood presented at the outset, i.e., like the first placement.
  But these last three placements may be performed after the death of the owner; and they do not render the offering permitted for eating, as that was already achieved by means of the first placement; nor do they render the offering <i>piggul</i> if during these placements the priest intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time; and similarly, they are not governed by the <i>halakha</i> that if the blood enters inside the Sanctuary the sin offering is disqualified. With regard to all these matters the blood of the last three placements is treated like the blood presented at the end, i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.
  With regard to the obligation to launder a garment onto which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, Rav Pappa said: From where do I say that this <i>halakha</i> applies even to the blood of the last three placements? It is as we learned in a mishna (93a): If the blood of a sin offering sprayed directly from the neck of the animal onto a garment, that garment does not require laundering, as the blood had never been received in a vessel. Likewise, if the blood sprayed onto the garment from the corner of the altar after having been placed there, or from the base of the altar after the remainder was poured there, the garment does not require laundering. It may be inferred from here that blood that sprayed from the corner of the altar does not require laundering. But blood that is fit to be placed on the corner, as it has not yet been placed, requires laundering, and the blood of the last three placements is indeed fit to be placed on the corner of the altar.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: But according to your reasoning, one can claim in the same manner that it is only blood that sprayed from the base of the altar that does not require laundering; but blood that is fit for the base of the altar, i.e., what remains of the blood after it has been placed on the corners, requires laundering. This is difficult, as it is written: “And when there will be sprinkled [<i>yizze</i>] of its blood upon any garment” (Leviticus 6:20). The future form of the word <i>yizze</i> serves to exclude this blood sprayed onto the garment from the corner of the altar, as it has already been sprinkled.
  The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as we learned in a mishna (110b) that Rabbi Neḥemya says: With regard to the remainder of the blood of an offering, which was to be poured at the base of the altar, if one presented it outside the Temple, he is liable. Since Rabbi Neḥemya treats the remainder of the blood as blood with regard to liability for a service performed outside the Temple, he also treats the remainder of the blood of a sin offering as blood with regard to laundering. Accordingly, Rav Pappa’s inference from the previously cited mishna is valid only according to Rabbi Neḥemya, but not according to the majority opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.
  The Gemara challenges the proof even according to the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya: Say that you heard that Rabbi Neḥemya ruled in this manner with regard to the offering up of the remainder of the blood outside the Temple, just as is the case with regard to limbs and fats. Even though the offering of the limbs and fats is not indispensable for atonement, one who offers them outside the Temple is liable. But did you also hear him say this with regard to laundering, that one must launder a garment sprayed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering? The Gemara answers: Yes, we also heard Rabbi Neḥemya rule in this manner with regard to laundering.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  And this is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood that requires the base of the altar, presumably a reference to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, which must be poured on the base of the altar, it requires laundering; and improper intent is effective with regard to it, i.e., if the priest poured such blood with the intent to partake of the sacrificial meat beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i>; and one who offers it up outside the Temple is liable.
  And conversely, with regard to blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain that passed through the Temple and emptied into the Kidron River, which is blood that has been become disqualified, it does not require laundering, and improper intent is not effective with regard to it, and one who offers it up outside the Temple is exempt.
  The Gemara inquires: About whom did you learn that he said that one who offers up the remainder of the blood outside the Temple is liable? It is Rabbi Neḥemya who says this, and he states in this <i>baraita</i> that a garment that was sprayed with such blood requires laundering.
  The Gemara asks: And is improper intent effective with regard to blood that must be poured on the base of the altar? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> discussing the intent that renders an offering <i>piggul</i>: The possibility of <i>piggul</i> applies only with regard to a service that is indispensable for atonement. This serves to exclude pouring the remainder of the blood on the altar and burning the sacrificial portions on the altar, actions that are not indispensable for atonement, concerning which the <i>halakha</i> is that improper intent is not effective with regard to them.
  Rather, when that <i>baraita</i> is taught, stating that blood that requires the base requires laundering, it is not referring to the remainder of the blood after the placements have been completed. Instead, it is referring to the blood that is to be used for the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: If so, is it correct to describe this blood as requiring the base of the altar? After all, this blood goes to the corner of the altar, not the base. The Gemara answers: Say that this means: Blood that becomes required for the base, i.e., blood that in the end, after the placements are completed, will be poured on the base of the altar. The Gemara further asks: But is improper intent effective with regard to the blood of the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering? Didn’t you say that this blood does not render the offering permitted for eating, nor does it render the offering <i>piggul</i>, and it is not governed by the <i>halakha</i> that if the blood enters inside the Sanctuary the sin offering is disqualified? With regard to all these matters the blood of the last three placements is treated like the blood presented at the end, i.e., like the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.
  The Gemara explains: Rather, when that <i>baraita</i> is taught, stating that blood requiring the base requires laundering, and improper intent is effective with regard to it, and one who presents of it outside the Temple is liable, it is indeed referring to the remainder of the blood after the placements have been completed. It is stated not with regard to the remainder of the blood of a standard sin offering, but with regard to the remainder of the blood of inner sin offerings, which are brought on the inner altar located inside the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, with regard to the remainder of the blood of external sin offerings that are brought on the external altar, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is one who presents them outside the Temple exempt? If so, rather than teaching the <i>halakha</i> of disqualified blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain, let the <i>baraita</i> distinguish and teach the <i>halakha</i> within the case of the remainder of the blood itself, in the following manner: In what case is this statement said? In a case of the blood of sin offerings brought on the inner altar. But in the case of the blood of sin offerings brought on the external altar, one who offers up such an offering outside the Temple is exempt.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> could not have made such a distinction, for in accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who says: With regard to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering brought on the external altar, in a case where one presented it outside the Temple, he is liable. And therefore, were the <i>tanna</i> to contrast the <i>halakha</i> of the blood of sin offerings brought on the external altar with that of the blood of sin offerings brought on the inner altar, he would not have been able to teach three rulings of exemptions corresponding to three rulings of liabilities, as Rabbi Neḥemya maintains that even with regard to the remainder of the blood of a sin offering brought on the external altar, if one presents it outside the Temple he is liable. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> preferred to compare the <i>halakhot</i> of the remainder of the blood of inner sin offerings to the disqualified blood that is poured into the Temple courtyard drain, so that he could list three lenient rulings alongside three stringent ones.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the statement of Rav Pappa, that a garment sprayed by blood from the last three placements of the blood of a sin offering requires laundering, and to his proof from the mishna that states that if the blood of a sin offering sprayed onto a garment from the corner of the altar or from the base of the altar, the garment does not require laundering. Ravina says, in answer to the objection raised against Rav Pappa above, that according to Rav Pappa the mishna (93a) should be understood as follows: The term: From the corner, means from the corner, literally, after the blood was placed there, and therefore Rav Pappa could infer from this that blood that is fit to be placed on the corner, including the blood to be used for the last three sprinklings, requires laundering. But the term: From the base of the altar, does not mean from the base, literally. Rather, it means: From blood that is fit for the base of the altar, i.e., from the remainder of the blood, which is to be poured on the base.
  Rav Taḥlifa bar Gazza said to Ravina: One can say a different explanation, that both this and that, i.e., the term: From the corner, and the term: From the base, are referring to blood that is fit for the corner or the base, in which case the mishna teaches that a garment sprayed by the blood that was to be used for the last three placements of a sin offering does not require laundering, contrary to the opinion of Rav Pappa. Ravina replied: What is this claim? Now that you say that blood which is fit for the corner does not require laundering, is it necessary to state that the same applies to blood that is merely fit for the base of the altar? That ruling would be unnecessary. Rather, it must be that the term: From the corner, means from the corner, literally, i.e., that the blood has already been placed there, whereas the term: From the base, means from blood that is fit for the base, i.e., from the remainder of the blood, which is to be poured on the base.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to all the offerings whose blood is to be placed on the inner altar, which are the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and the goat for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, if the priest omitted even one of the placements, it is as though he did not facilitate atonement. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah first discusses the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and afterward the bull for an unwitting communal sin, concerning which it states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). It may be asked: This phrase: “And he shall do…as he did,” what does this come to teach? All the details stated with regard to the first bull, i.e., that of the anointed priest, seem to be stated explicitly with regard to the second bull as well.
  Rather, the verse comes to repeat the <i>halakha</i> of the sprinkling of the blood, as though it were written twice with regard to the same bull. This repetition of the <i>halakha</i> indicates that the sprinkling is indispensable, thereby teaching that if the priest omitted one of the placements he has done nothing. I have a derivation only with regard to the seven placements on the Curtain separating between the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, that they are indispensable, as these seven are indispensable in all cases, as the Gemara will explain (40a). From where is it derived that the same applies to the four placements on the inner altar? The verse states: “So shall he do” (Leviticus 4:20).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states: “And he shall do with the bull” (Leviticus 4:20); this alludes to a different bull whose service is similar, namely the bull of Yom Kippur.
  
  Daf 39b
  
  “As he did with the bull” (Leviticus 4:20); this is a reference to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, teaching that all of the sprinklings of the blood of this bull are also indispensable. “A sin offering”; these are the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, teaching that they are offered in the same manner as the bull for an unwitting communal sin, their blood being sprinkled in the Sanctuary and their flesh burned. One might have thought that I should include also the goats of the Festivals and the goats sacrificed on the New Moons, which are communal offerings as well, i.e., that their service should be performed inside the Sanctuary like that of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. Therefore, the verse states: “So shall he do with this” (Leviticus 4:20), which indicates that this service is performed only with this animal and not with the goats of the Festivals or the goats of the New Moons.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see to include these goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship and to exclude those goats sacrificed on the Festivals and the New Moons? The Gemara answers: After noting that the verse included some offerings and excluded others, one can say: I include these goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, as they atone for the known transgression of a mitzva, i.e., idol worship, and therefore they are similar to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought for an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin with regard to a specific mitzva. And I exclude those goats sacrificed on the Festivals and the New Moons, as they do not atone for the known transgression of a mitzva, but rather they atone for the unwitting defilement of the Temple or its sacrificial foods.
  The <i>baraita</i> resumes its interpretation of the verse. “And the priest shall make atonement”; this teaches that atonement is achieved even if the Elders did not place their hands on the head of the bull as they are commanded to do (see Leviticus 4:15). “And they shall be forgiven”; this teaches that atonement is achieved even if the priest did not place the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, as is required (see Leviticus 4:7).
  The Gemara again asks: And as the verse does not specify which aspects of the service are included and which are excluded, what did you see to disqualify the offering in the case of the seven sprinklings; how did you derive that the phrase “And he shall do…as he did” teaches that the seven sprinklings are indispensable? And what did you see to render the offering fit in the absence of placing hands on the head of the offering and pouring out the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, based on the words “And the priest shall make atonement…and they shall be forgiven”?
  The Gemara answers: You should say the following logical argument: I disqualify the offering in the absence of the seven sprinklings, as these seven sprinklings are indispensable in all cases, as will be explained (40a), and I render the offering fit in the absence of placing hands on the head of the offering and in the absence of the pouring of the remainder of the blood onto the base of the altar, as these are not indispensable in all cases, and therefore it is reasonable to conclude that they are not indispensable here either.
  
  Daf 40a
  
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i> in detail. The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: I have a derivation only with regard to the seven placements on the Curtain separating between the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, that they are indispensable, as these seven are indispensable in all cases. The Gemara asks: Where are the seven indispensable? Rav Pappa says: In the case of the red heifer (see Numbers 19:2–4), and in the purification process of one afflicted with leprous marks (see Leviticus 14:16).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From where is it derived that the same applies to the four placements on the inner altar? The verse states: “So shall he do” (Leviticus 4:20). The Gemara asks: What is different about seven placements, that they should be indispensable? If you say that the reason is that the seven placements are written and repeated, by means of the terms “And he shall do…as he did,” which teaches that they are indispensable, I can say that the four placements as well are written and repeated. Why then should their <i>halakha</i> be any different?
  Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that only two placements are written in this chapter, while the other two are derived through a juxtaposition. Consequently, a specific derivation is required for these. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the placements on the inner altar: Above, in the case of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the verse states corner in the plural form of corners (see Leviticus 4:7), i.e., it says “corners [<i>karnot</i>],” in the plural, where it could have written corner, in the singular. These are two corners. And below, with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, it again states corner in the plural form of corners (see Leviticus 4:18). Together these amount to four corners. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: This derivation is not necessary, as it states in these same verses: “And he shall put of the blood upon the corners of the altar which is before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). The superfluous expression “in the Tent of Meeting” teaches that the blood must be placed on all the corners of the altar that are stated with regard to the Tent of Meeting, i.e., on all four corners. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with the phrase “so shall he do,” which Rabbi Shimon interprets as referring to the four placements?
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda requires this verse for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: As we did not learn with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur that placing hands is required, i.e., that the High Priest must place his hands on this animal before it is slaughtered, and likewise it is not stated that the remainder of its blood must be poured on the base of the altar. From where is it derived that these actions must be performed? The verse states: “So shall he do.”
  The Gemara asks: And did we not learn with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur that these requirements apply? But you said earlier in the <i>baraita</i>: “With the bull” (Leviticus 4:20); this alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur, which indicates that all the rites performed in connection with the bull for an unwitting communal sin apply also to the bull of Yom Kippur.
  The Gemara answers: The derivation from the phrase “so shall he do” was necessary, as it could enter your mind to say that this matter, the comparison between the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the bull of Yom Kippur, applies only to a service that is indispensable for atonement, e.g., the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to a service that is not indispensable for atonement, such as placing hands on the head of the animal or pouring out the remainder of the blood, one might say that these actions need not be performed. Therefore, the verse teaches us: “So shall he do,” i.e., these services, too, must be performed with the bull of Yom Kippur.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he do with this phrase: “In the Tent of Meeting,” from which Rabbi Yehuda derives that the blood must be placed on all four corners of the altar? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon requires the phrase “in the Tent of Meeting” to teach that if the roof of the Sanctuary was breached by a hole, the priest would not sprinkle the blood, as it would no longer be called the Tent of Meeting. The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehuda, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the superfluous term “which is in the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7, 18). The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Shimon? He does not interpret the term “which is” as he maintains that this expression is not significant enough to serve as the source of a <i>halakha</i>.
  Abaye said: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, it was necessary to learn from the phrase “so shall he do” that the four placements are indispensable. As it might enter your mind to say that just as it is with regard to placing hands and the remainder of the blood, that even though they are written and repeated they are not indispensable, so too, the four placements of blood should not be indispensable. Therefore, the phrase “so shall he do” teaches us that this is not the case, and the four sprinklings are indeed indispensable.
  § The <i>baraita</i> teaches: “With the bull” (Leviticus 4:20), this alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur. To what <i>halakha</i> does this statement relate? If it serves to teach that all matters stated with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur are indispensable, this is obvious, since the word “statute” is written concerning it: “And this shall be an everlasting statute to you” (Leviticus 16:29), and there is a principle that <i>halakhot</i> described as statutes are indispensable.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This statement is necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: When the term “statute” is written concerning the Yom Kippur service, indicating that no details may be altered, it is written only with regard to actions performed in white garments inside the Holy of Holies, e.g., burning the incense and sprinkling the blood, which are the essential services of the day, and it teaches that if the High Priest performed one of the actions before another, i.e., not in the proper order, he has done nothing.
  But with regard to those actions performed in white garments outside, in the Sanctuary, if he performed one action before another, what he did is done and he is not required to repeat the rite. Consequently, one might say that from the fact that their order is not indispensable, it may be derived that the sprinklings, i.e., placements, themselves are also not indispensable. Therefore, the term “with the bull” teaches us that the placements are indeed indispensable.
  Rav Pappa objects to this: And how can you say this, that Rabbi Yehuda derives from here that the placements are indispensable? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse discussing the Yom Kippur service states: “And when he has finished atoning for the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 16:20). This indicates that if he performed the atonement, i.e., the sprinklings, inside the Sanctuary, he has finished the order of the service, even though he has not poured the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar; and if he did not perform the atonement, he has not finished; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Yehuda said to him: For what reason do we not say: If he finished the entire service, which includes sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary and pouring the remainder of the blood onto the base of the altar, he has facilitated atonement; and if he did not finish, he has not facilitated atonement? This indicates that Rabbi Yehuda derives from this verse the <i>halakha</i> that the sprinklings in the Sanctuary are indispensable.
  Rav Pappa says: This reference to the bull of Yom Kippur in the term “with the bull,” is necessary only to apply to the bull of Yom Kippur three <i>halakhot</i> that are derived from that which is stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest: “And the priest shall immerse his finger [<i>et etzba’o</i>] in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6). These <i>halakhot</i> can be summarized in the shortened form: <i>Et</i>, blood, and with immersion. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the word <i>et</i>, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: This word is necessary only to render fit
  
  Daf 40b
  
  service performed by a priest who has a wart or blister on his finger. These are not considered an interposition between his finger and the blood. With regard to the term “in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), this teaches that the blood in the service vessel must be of a sufficient measure for immersion from the outset. The priest must initially collect in the vessel enough blood for all the sprinklings, rather than adding blood to the vessel for each sprinkling. Finally, the term “and the priest shall immerse his finger in the blood” indicates that there must be enough blood in the vessel such that the priest can immerse his finger in it and not have to wipe the sides of the utensil to collect blood for sprinkling.
  The Gemara explains: And it was necessary for the verse to state both these last two terms. It had to write “in the blood,” as had the Merciful One written only “and the priest shall immerse,” I would say that the sprinklings are valid even if there was not a sufficient measure of blood for immersion from the outset, but only enough for a single sprinkling, provided that the priest then added more blood to the vessel for each sprinkling. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “in the blood” to teach that from the outset there must be enough blood in the vessel for all the sprinklings.
  And conversely, had the Merciful One written only “in the blood,” I would say that even if there was enough blood in the vessel at the outset it is not necessary that there be enough blood for immersion for the last sprinklings, as the priest can wipe the sides of the utensil to collect blood for sprinkling. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “and the priest shall immerse.”
  The Gemara addresses another apparently superfluous phrase in the same chapter: “And the priest shall put some of the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord” (Leviticus 4:7). Why do I need the verse to mention the sweet incense? It would have been enough to identify the altar as being “before the Lord” and one would have understood that the reference is to the inner altar. Rather, this serves to teach that if the altar had not been inaugurated with sweet incense, the priest would not sprinkle blood on it.
  The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa that the superfluous phrase in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin alludes to the bull of Yom Kippur in order to teach the three <i>halakhot</i> of <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, from the case of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which is also alluded to in that verse. The <i>baraita</i> states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). What is the meaning when the verse states “with the bull”? This serves to include the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in this matter, i.e., in the passage concerning the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, specifically the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Yishmael said: This inclusion is unnecessary, as these <i>halakhot</i> can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as in a case in which one offering is not equated with another offering of a different type of animal, the Torah equated the actions of sprinkling the blood in one offering with the actions of the blood in the other offering, as will be explained, in a case in which the Torah equated one offering with another offering, i.e., the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and the bull of Yom Kippur, isn’t it logical that the Torah should equate the actions of sprinkling the blood in the one offering with the actions of the blood in the other offering? Therefore, the derivation by way of a special inclusion is not necessary.
  Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering”? With regard to the first instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And with regard to the second instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. And the verse serves to teach that just as in the first case, if the priest omitted one of the sprinklings, he has done nothing, the same is true in the second case.
  The Gemara clarifies the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said above: Just as in a case in which one offering is not equated with another offering. What is the meaning of the expression: One offering is not equated with another offering? Which offerings are not brought from the same type of animal, but nevertheless the <i>halakhot</i> governing the sprinkling of their blood are the same?
  If we say that Rabbi Yishmael is referring to the bull of Yom Kippur and the goat of Yom Kippur, and from them he derives by way of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that the actions concerning the bull of Yom Kippur are the same as those concerning the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which are the same animal, this can be refuted as follows: What is notable about these offerings, the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur? They are notable in that their blood enters the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies. This is not so of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, the blood of which is sprinkled only in the outer area of the Sanctuary.
  Rather, say that the reference here is to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. But once again this claim can be refuted: What is notable about these offerings? They are notable in that they both atone for the transgressions of a known mitzva, whereas the bull of Yom Kippur atones for unknown transgressions (see <i>Shevuot</i> 2a).
  Rather, the reference here is to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat of Yom Kippur, and this is what Rabbi Yishmael is saying: Just as in a case in which one offering is not equated with another offering, as this is a bull and that is a goat, nevertheless the actions of sprinkling the blood in one offering are equated with the actions of the blood in the other offering with regard to that which is written concerning it, in a case in which one offering is equated with another offering, i.e., the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest and the bull of Yom Kippur, as this is a bull and that is a bull, isn’t it logical
  
  Daf 41a
  
  that the actions of sprinkling the blood in one offering are equated with the actions of the blood in the other offering? The blood of the goat of Yom Kippur is sprinkled even inside the Holy of Holies, which is not so concerning the blood of the bull. Nevertheless, with regard to the sprinkling in the Sanctuary, which is common to both, their actions are performed in the same manner, with the blood being sprinkled with a finger on the Curtain and on the corners of the altar.
  And by means of this <i>a fortiori</i> inference the case of the bull of Yom Kippur is derived from the case of the bull of an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> summarized by the words <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, as they are both bulls. And likewise, the case of the goat of Yom Kippur is derived from the case of the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, via this <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as they are both goats.
  The Gemara asks: How can the <i>halakhot</i> of the goat of Yom Kippur be derived from the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship? But does a matter derived by juxtaposition, i.e., a <i>halakha</i> that is not written explicitly in the Torah but that is learned by means of a comparison, again teach by <i>a fortiori</i> inference? There is a principle that a <i>halakha</i> derived by juxtaposition with regard to consecrated matters cannot subsequently teach another <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. The <i>halakhot</i> alluded to by the words <i>et</i>, in the blood, and immersion, are not explicitly stated with regard to the goats of an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. Rather, they are derived from the comparison found in the verse: “And he shall do…as he did” (Leviticus 4:20), which alludes to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship and the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. Rav Pappa said: The school of Rabbi Yishmael maintains that a matter derived by juxtaposition does again teach by <i>a fortiori</i> inference, even with regard to consecrated matters.
  The Gemara continues to analyze the statement of Rabbi Yishmael in the <i>baraita</i>: “With the bull”; this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin. The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive this case by way of an exposition? This verse itself is written in reference to the bull for an unwitting communal sin. Rav Pappa said: The derivation is necessary because Rabbi Yishmael wants the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin to teach with regard to the burning on the altar of the sacrificial portions, including the diaphragm and the two kidneys, that this obligation applies also to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, despite the fact that this requirement is not stated with regard to them.
  Rav Pappa continues: And as the obligation to burn the diaphragm and the two kidneys on the altar is not written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, but rather it is derived by juxtaposition from the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, in which this requirement is explictly stated (see Leviticus 4:8–9), it was necessary to include the bull for an unwitting communal sin once again with the term “with the bull.”
  The Gemara elaborates: This derivation is required in order that it should be as though this <i>halakha</i> of burning the diaphragm and the two kidneys was written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself. And in this manner the derivation from this case, teaching the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, should not be a matter derived by juxtaposition that again teaches by juxtaposition, as such a derivation is not done with regard to consecrated matters.
  § The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did” (Leviticus 4:20); what is the meaning when the verse states: “With the bull”? It is clear that this verse is referring to the bull.
  The <i>baraita</i> answers: Because it is stated with regard to the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship: “And they have brought their offering, an offering made by fire to the Lord, and their sin offering before the Lord for their error” (Numbers 15:25), and this verse is interpreted as follows: “Their sin offering”; these are the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, alluded to in that passage. “Their error”; this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought for an inadvertent transgression of the community. The juxtaposition of these offerings in the verse: “Their sin offering…for their error,” indicates that the Torah means to say: Their sin offering is for you like their error, i.e., all the portions consumed on the altar in the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin are also burned on the altar in the case of the goats for an unwitting sin of idol worship.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the offering brought for their error, i.e., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, from where did you learn this <i>halakha</i>? Was it not via juxtaposition from the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, as the diaphragm and the two kidneys are not explicitly mentioned with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin? But this is difficult, as does a matter derived via juxtaposition again teach via juxtaposition?
  Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall do with the bull, as he did with the bull for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20). With regard to the first instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And with regard to the second instance of “with the bull,” this is the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest. Due to this juxtaposition, it is as though the burning of the diaphragm and the two kidneys was explicitly written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and therefore the <i>halakha</i> can be taught by juxtaposition with regard to the goats for an unwitting sin of idol worship, as stated by Rav Pappa.
  The Gemara analyzes the previous <i>baraita</i>. The Master said above: “Their sin offering,” these are the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, which are juxtaposed in this verse to the bull for an unwitting communal sin. The Gemara asks: But let the <i>tanna</i> derive this from the earlier verse stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, as the Master said in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier (39b): “A sin offering” (Leviticus 4:20), this serves to include the goats for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship. Rav Pappa said: This derivation was necessary, as if there were only the juxtaposition from Leviticus 4:20, it would enter your mind to say: This matter applies only to the acts of sprinkling, which are written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself.
  
  Daf 41b
  
  But with regard to the burning of the diaphragm and the two kidneys, which are not written with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, you might say that this <i>halakha</i> should not be derived from it. Therefore, this additional derivation of “their sin offering” teaches us that the two offerings are similar with regard to this detail as well.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But the <i>tanna</i> said: “With the bull”; this serves to include the bull of Yom Kippur for all that is stated in this matter. This statement indicates that all the details applying to the bull for an unwitting communal sin are extended to the bull of Yom Kippur by means of a single derivation. Rav Pappa responded: This issue is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rav amplifies the <i>halakha</i> through this juxtaposition, whereas the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael does not amplify the <i>halakha</i> through this juxtaposition, but maintains that an additional derivation is necessary with regard to the diaphragm and the two kidneys.
  § The Gemara cites a statement that is related to the above <i>halakhot</i>. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason are the diaphragm and the two kidneys stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and they are not explicitly stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin? This can be explained by a parable: It can be compared to a flesh-and-blood king who grew angry with his beloved servant for his misdeeds, but spoke little of the servant’s offense due to his great affection for him. Likewise, as the Jewish people are beloved by God, the Torah does not describe their sin offering in detail.
  And the school of Rabbi Yishmael further taught: For what reason is it stated: “Before the Curtain of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 4:6), with regard to the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and this is not stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, where it merely states: “Before the Curtain” (Leviticus 4:17)? This can be explained by a parable: It can be compared to a flesh-and-blood king against whom a province sinned. If a minority of that province sinned, his relationship with his entourage [<i>pamalya</i>] remains, i.e., the king continues to treat his loyal followers in the usual manner. But if the majority of the province sinned, his relationship with his entourage does not remain, and he no longer meets even those who remained devoted to him. Similarly, when the entire people sins, God no longer has the same relationship with them, and it is as though the place where the priest sprinkles the blood is no longer sacred.
  § The mishna teaches that all the placements upon the inner altar are indispensable, and therefore if the High Priest placed all the placements in their proper manner, and one in an improper manner, i.e., with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of the offering. The Gemara states that we learned in a mishna there (<i>Menaḥot</i> 16a), with regard to the burning of the handful of a meal offering and the frankincense, both of which render the meal offering permitted for eating: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, and this occurred during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, i.e., he burned one of them with the intention of eating the remainder of the offering beyond its designated time, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one who eats it is liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  And the Rabbis say: There is no liability for <i>karet</i> in this case unless he renders the offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of the entire permitting factor, i.e., the burning of both the handful and the frankincense.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Do not say that the reason of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the offering is <i>piggul</i>, is that he holds in general that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> even if he intended to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time during the performance of only half a permitting factor. Rather, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he initially placed the handful of the meal offering on the altar, to burn it, with the improper intention to eat the remainder beyond its designated time, and afterward he placed the frankincense on the altar silently, i.e., without any particular intent. Rabbi Meir holds: Anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent. Therefore, his action with the frankincense is considered to have been performed with the same improper intention as his action with the handful.
  The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish learn that this is the case? He learns it from the fact that the mishna teaches: Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner and one in an improper manner, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. Consequently it follows that if he initially placed one placement in an improper manner, with the intent to eat or burn the offering beyond its designated time, and all the other placements in the proper manner, the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, don’t the Rabbis explicitly say that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention in the performance of only half a permitting factor? Here, the priest placed one placement in the proper manner. Rather, it must represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if he had an improper intention with regard to the handful and not the frankincense the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  And if Rabbi Meir’s reason is that he holds in general that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> even during the performance of only half a permitting factor, even if the priest acted as it taught in the mishna, the offering should also be <i>piggul</i>, as he had an improper intention during half the permitting factor. Rather, is Rabbi Meir’s reason not because he holds that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent? Consequently, if he placed the first placement with an improper intention, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, and if his intention during the first placement was proper, the offering is not <i>piggul</i>.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: Actually, it is possible that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention during half a permitting factor. And what is the meaning of the term: In their proper manner, in the context of the mishna? It means in their proper manner with regard to <i>piggul</i>, i.e., he placed the blood with an intention that renders the offering <i>piggul</i>. The mishna is teaching that although he placed the first placements with an improper intention, one does not say that the last placement, which was placed without any specific intention, was performed with his initial intent.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that it teaches: Therefore, if he placed all the placements in their proper manner and one in an improper manner, the offering is disqualified but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>, which indicates that the offering is disqualified due to the one placement performed improperly, one can learn by inference that the term: In their proper manner, comes to indicate an intention that renders the offering fit, and not an intention that renders it <i>piggul</i>.
  Rava says: It can still be explained that the term: In their proper manner, is referring to an intention that renders the offering <i>piggul</i>; and what is the meaning of: In an improper manner? This is referring to the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area. This intention serves to disqualify the offering, which means that it is not <i>piggul</i>, as not all its rites have been performed in the proper manner. Rav Ashi says: The term: In an improper manner, in the mishna, means that he placed one placement not for the sake of  the offering being sacrificed, and in the case of a sin offering an intention of this kind disqualifies the offering; therefore, it is not <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, one can learn by inference that when the priest does not perform the last placement with the intent to eat the offering outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, but silently, he becomes liable, as the offering is <i>piggul</i>. This is certainly not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as they maintain that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention during half a permitting factor.
  The Gemara answers: The wording of the mishna is imprecise, as in fact, even if he placed the last placement silently the offering is not <i>piggul</i>. But since the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna taught in the first clause, with regard to an offering whose blood is placed on the external altar: If he placed the first placement with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time and the second placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, he likewise taught the latter clause, with regard to a sin offering whose blood is placed on the inner altar, in a similar manner, that if he placed the last placement with the intent to eat it outside its designated area or not for the sake of the offering, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for its consumption. One cannot infer from here that if he placed the last placement without intent the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement, that the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> even when he intends to eat it beyond its designated time only in the first placement, said? In the case of blood that is placed on the external altar, where one placement renders the offering permitted.
  
  Daf 42a
  
  But with regard to the blood placed inside, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on the Curtain, and on the inner altar, e.g., the forty-three presentations of the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, and the eleven presentations of the blood of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and the eleven presentations of the blood of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, if in those cases the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, whether during the first set of presentations, whether during the second set, or whether during the third set, i.e., in any of the requisite sets of presentations, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption. And the Rabbis say: There is no liability for <i>karet</i> unless he had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of the entire permitting factor.
  In any event, this <i>baraita</i> teaches: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, whether during the first set of presentations, whether during the second set, or whether during the third set, and yet Rabbi Meir disputes the ruling of the Rabbis and says that the offering is <i>piggul</i>. If the priest’s intent renders the offering <i>piggul</i> whether it was during the first, second, or third set of presentations, evidently Rabbi Meir’s ruling must be based on the consideration that one can render an offering <i>piggul</i> during half a permitting factor. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s claim that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent, the offering shoud be <i>piggul</i> only if the first set of presentations was performed with an improper intention while the rest were performed silently.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Avin says: What are we dealing with here? We are not dealing with a case of a priest who had improper intention in the presentations themselves, where the issue of half a permitting factor is relevent. Rather, we are dealing with a case where he had an improper intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the act of slaughter. In other words, after presenting the blood of the bull inside the Sanctuary, the rest of the blood spilled, and he had to slaughter another bull so that he could continue with the presentations, this time on the Curtain. The reason for Rabbi Meir’s ruling is that the act of slaughter is one permitting factor, and therefore the priest’s improper intent involved an entire service, not half a permitting factor. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis?
  Rava says: Who are these Rabbis? This is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in a mishna (109b): With regard to the handful of a meal offering, and the frankincense, and the incense, and the meal offering of priests, and the meal offering of the anointed priest, and the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, in a case where one sacrificed even an olive-bulk from any one of these, which should be sacrificed on the altar, outside the Temple, he is liable, as the burning of an olive-bulk is considered a proper burning. And Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. This indicates that according to Rabbi Eliezer even when one performs a proper action he is not liable unless he completes the service. The same should apply to the slaughter of different bulls for different sets of presentations; one should be liable only if he rendered each of them <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can you explain Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion with regard to the presentation of the blood in this manner? But doesn’t Rava say: And Rabbi Eliezer concedes with regard to blood that even one who sacrifices part of the blood outside the Temple is liable? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 60a) that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon say: If the blood of the bull or goat of Yom Kippur spilled, even if this occurred in the middle of one of the sets of sprinklings, and the High Priest slaughtered another animal, nevertheless, from the place that he interrupted that particular rite, when the blood spilled, there he resumes performance of that rite. In Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, each individual sprinkling in each of these rites is an act in and of itself, and therefore the offering can be rendered <i>piggul</i> through any one of them. This is certainly not the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir in the <i>baraita</i>.
  Rather, Rava says: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would explain that the <i>baraita</i> does not mean that the priest had an improper intention either during the first set of sprinklings or the second or the third. Instead, this is referring to a case where the High Priest had an improper intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the first set of sprinklings, in the Holy of Holies, and was silent during the second set of sprinklings, on the Curtain, and again had an improper intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the third set of sprinklings, on the inner altar. There is a certain novelty in this case according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent.
  Rava elaborates: Lest you say that if it enters your mind that when the priest performs the second set of sprinklings he does so with his initial intent, i.e., that which he had at the time of the first set of sprinklings, why do I need him once again to have an improper intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the third set of sprinklings? Doesn’t his explicit intent during the third set of sprinklings indicate that he did not have this intent during the second set of sprinklings? Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not so, but rather his silence during the second set is considered a continuation of his initial intent. Rav Ashi objects to this: Is it taught that he was silent during the second set of sprinklings? According to Rava’s interpretation this is the key detail of the case, and yet it is not mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the High Priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the first set of sprinklings, in the Holy of Holies, and during the second set, on the Curtain, and during the third, on the corners of the inner altar. But during the fourth set, the sprinklings on the top of the inner altar, he was silent. Lest you say that if it enters your mind to say that anyone who performs an action performs it with his initial intent, why do I need him once again to have an improper intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during each and every set of sprinklings? Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that even so he is considered to have performed all the sprinklings with his initial intent.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can Rav Ashi explain the <i>baraita</i> as referring to a case where the High Priest had an improper intention during the first, second, and third sets of sprinklings? But doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> teach: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, whether during the first set of presentations, whether during the second set, or whether during the third set? This indicates that he did not have improper intent during all the sprinklings but only in part of them. The Gemara comments: Indeed, this is difficult, as the wording of the <i>baraita</i> does not suit this interpretation.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the <i>baraita</i> that addresses the blood presented inside the Sanctuary. The Master said that if the High Priest had an improper intention in one of the sets of presentations, e.g., inside the Holy of Holies, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the rite silently. The Gemara asks: Now consider, one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> unless all the permitting factors of the offering have been sacrificed, i.e., if the whole service is completed, including the presentation of the blood. As the Master said: As is the acceptance of a valid offering, so is the lack of acceptance of a disqualified offering: Just as there is no acceptance of a valid offerning unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed, so too, there is no lack of acceptance of a disqualified offering, i.e., it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed. That is to say, in the absence of one of its permitting factors it does not become <i>piggul</i>.
  But here, in the case of the bull or goat of Yom Kippur, since he intended to burn the offering beyond its designated time while he was sprinkling the blood inside the Holy of Holies, the sprinkling is not valid, and therefore the High Priest is considered like one who did not sprinkle the blood, as every one of the sprinklings of the blood of an inner sin offering is indispensable. If so, when he sprinkles the blood again later in the Sanctuary, on the Curtain and the inner altar, it is as though he is merely sprinkling water, and not the blood of the offering. Consequently, the permitting factors of the offering have not been sacrificed, and therefore the offering should not be rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rabba says: You find it in a case of four bulls and of four goats. After sprinkling blood inside the Holy of Holies with the intent to burn the offering beyond its designated time, the blood spilled. Since the priest did not use that blood again, the service inside the Holy of Holies was completed, and that permitting factor was performed properly. He then had to slaughter another bull and goat for the other sprinklings inside the Sanctuary, which he again performed with improper intent and again the blood spilled. The same sequence repeated itself in the sprinklings on the inner altar and on the top of the altar. In this manner each permitting factor was performed properly.
  Rava said: You may even say that this is a case where there is only one bull and one goat, as the sprinkling effects acceptance with regard to the offering’s status of <i>piggul</i>. In other words, even though the High Priest sprinkled the blood inside the Holy of Holies with an improper intention, and thereby disqualified the offering, nevertheless, since he completed the service, he is considered as having sacrificed all the permitting factors with regard to <i>piggul</i>.
  § The <i>baraita</i> mentioned that there are forty-three presentations of the blood of the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught otherwise in a different <i>baraita</i>, that there are forty-seven presentations of that blood? The Gemara answers: This statement, that there are forty-three presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the High Priest mixes the blood of the bull and the goat before placing it on the corners of the inner altar, rather than placing the blood of each one separately. And that statement, that there are forty-seven presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the High Priest does not mix the two types of blood before placing them on the corners, but sprinkles four times from the blood of the bull and another four times from the blood of the goat, and only afterward mixes the blood of the two animals for placement on the top of the altar.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But isn’t it taught in yet another <i>baraita</i> that there are forty-eight presentations? The Gemara answers: This statement, that there are forty-eight presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the external altar is indispensable, and therefore this act is added to the total. That statement, that there are only forty-seven presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the pouring of the remainder of the blood is not indispensable.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention during the performance of half a permitting factor, from a <i>baraita</i> discussing <i>piggul</i> of a meal offering, which states: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that if the priest had an improper intention during the performance of one of its services, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the services silently? When he had the improper intention in the removal of the handful, or in the placement of the handful in a service vessel, or in the walking with the handful to the altar.
  But if he came to perform the burning of the handful and the frankincense, and he presented the handful on the altar with an improper intention and the frankincense he presented silently, or he presented the handful silently and the frankincense he presented with an improper intention, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for consuming it. And the Rabbis say: There is no liablility to receive <i>karet</i> unless the priest had an improper intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of the entire permitting factor.
  In any event, this <i>baraita</i> teaches: Or he presented the handful silently and the frankincense he presented with an improper intention, and yet Rabbi Meir disagrees with the ruling of the Rabbis and says that the offering is <i>piggul</i>. This indicates that the decisive factor according to Rabbi Meir is not that the priest continues his initial intent, but that one can render an offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of half a permitting factor. The Gemara answers: Say and explain the <i>baraita</i> as follows: Or he presented the handful silently after he had already presented the frankincense with an improper intention. In this case the offering is <i>piggul</i> because he performed the second action with his initial intent.
  The Gemara refutes this interpretation: One counterclaim is that if this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying, this is exactly the same case as the first clause. And furthermore, isn’t it taught explicitly in another <i>baraita</i>: And afterward he presented the frankincense with an improper intention. The Gemara states: Indeed, this is difficult for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who claims that according to Rabbi Meir one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of half a permitting factor.
  MISHNA: And these are the items for which one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. One is liable to receive <i>karet</i> only if he partakes of an item that was permitted for consumption or for the altar by another item. As for the items listed here, either nothing else renders them permitted for consumption or for the altar, or they themselves render other items permitted. They are as follows: The handful of flour, which permits consumption of the meal offering; the incense, which is burned in its entirety, without another item rendering it permitted for the altar; the frankincense, which is burned together with the handful of the meal offering;
  
  Daf 43a
  
  the meal offering of priests, from which no handful of flour is removed and which is burned in its entirety (see Leviticus 6:16); the meal offering of the anointed priest, which is sacrificed by the High Priest each day, half in the morning and half in the evening; the blood, which permits all the offerings; and the libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The same <i>halakha</i> applies even with regard to libations that are brought with an animal offering.
  With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, Rabbi Shimon says: One is not liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, because it is not permitted by any other item. And Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the guilt offering of the leper permits its use, as only after the blood’s sacrifice is the oil sprinkled and given to the priests. And the principle is: With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.
  The mishna elaborates: The burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh to be burned on the altar and its hide to be used by the priests. The bird burnt offering, its blood permits its flesh and its skin to be burned on the altar. The bird sin offering, its blood permits its meat for consumption by the priests. Bulls that are burned, e.g., the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and goats that are burned, e.g., the goats sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, their blood permits their sacrificial portions to be sacrificed on the altar.
  Rabbi Shimon says: Those bulls and goats are not subject to <i>piggul</i> because their blood is presented in the Sanctuary, and in the case of any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, with regard to which the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> was stated in the Torah, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.
  GEMARA: Ulla says: With regard to a handful of a meal offering that is <i>piggul</i> that was offered up on the altar, its <i>piggul</i> status has left it. His reasoning is as follows: If this handful brings other items to a status of <i>piggul</i>, with regard to itself is it not all the more so? The Gemara asks: What is Ulla saying? This consideration does not explain why the status of <i>piggul</i> should leave the handful. The Gemara answers that this is what he is saying: If the handful is not accepted, i.e., if its sacrifice is disqualified, how can it bring other items to a status of <i>piggul</i>? A meal offering is considered <i>piggul</i> only if its handful is properly sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: What is Ulla teaching us? If he is teaching us that one is not liable for eating the handful due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, we learn this in the mishna: These are the items for which one is not liable due to <i>piggul</i>: The handful, the incense, the frankincense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood. If so, one is not liable for eating the handful even if it was not offered up on the altar.
  Rather, Ulla is teaching that if items with <i>piggul</i> status ascended the altar, they shall not descend. But this too, we learn in a mishna (84a): With regard to sacrificial flesh that is left overnight, or that emerges from the Temple courtyard, or that is ritually impure, or an offering that was slaughtered with the intention of eating the meat beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, thereby acquiring the status of <i>piggul</i>, if any one of these ascended the altar they shall not descend.
  Rather, Ulla is teaching that if items with <i>piggul</i> status descended from the altar after having been brought up there, they ascend once again. But we also learn in that same mishna (84b) that this is not so: Just as if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend, so too, if they descended from the altar they shall not ascend. The Gemara answers: No, Ulla’s ruling is necessary in a case where the fire has already taken hold of it, i.e., the handful began to burn before it came down from the altar. Ulla teaches that in such a case the priests should return the handful to the altar, as its <i>piggul</i> status has already left it.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But this <i>halakha</i> too, Ulla already said it on another occasion. As Ulla says: The mishna taught that items that descended from the altar shall not ascend again only where the fire has not taken hold of them, but where the fire has already taken hold of them, they shall ascend. The Gemara explains: Even so, there is a novelty in Ulla’s ruling: Lest you say that this matter applies only
  
  Daf 43b
  
  to a limb of an offering, which is all connected together so that it forms a single unit, and one can say that if fire took hold of part of it, all of it is considered the food of the altar, and therefore it is returned to the altar if it came down; but with regard to a handful, which consists of separate pieces, perhaps only the part that the fire took hold of is returned to the altar, but as for the rest you might say that it does not ascend again. Therefore, Ulla teaches us that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to the handful as to a limb, i.e., if it descended from the altar after fire already took hold of any part of it, it ascends once again in its entirety to the altar.
  Rav Aḥai says: Since the handful is considered one unit, therefore, in the case of this handful of <i>piggul</i>, half of which lies on the ground and half of which was brought up to the wood arrangement on the altar and the fire took hold of it, one brings all of it up to the altar <i>ab initio</i>.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, i.e., offerings that remain after the time allotted for their consumption, and ritually impure flesh, where one brought them up to the altar, their prohibition has left them. Rav Ḥisda said in astonishment: Teacher of this <i>halakha</i>, is the altar a bath of ritual purification that can render an impure item pure? Rabbi Zeira says: This is referring to a case where the fire took hold of them, and therefore the item belongs to the altar and the prohibition lapses.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>. Others say: The verse states: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). Although this can also be read as: Having its impurity upon it, referring to the meat of the peace offerings, the verse in fact is referring to one whose impurity can depart from him, i.e., a person who is currently impure, but can attain a state of ritual purity by immersing in a ritual bath. This serves to exclude the impure flesh of offerings, as its impurity cannot depart from it, since ritually impure flesh cannot be purified. And if it is so that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is correct, the impurity of flesh can in fact depart from it by means of the fire of the altar.
  Rava says: When the <i>baraita</i> speaks of an item whose impurity cannot depart from it, we say it is referring to purification by means of a ritual bath, not through any other means. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is the term ritual bath written in the <i>baraita</i>? It speaks only in general terms about impurity that can or cannot depart from an item. Rather, Rav Pappa says: In that verse we are dealing with the meat of peace offerings, which are not fit for sacrificing, as the meat of a peace offering is eaten rather than being burned on the altar. Therefore, bringing it up to the altar does not remove its impurity from it.
  Ravina says there is a different answer: Even if the impurity of flesh leaves it when it is brought up to the altar, this verse cannot be referring to the impure meat of peace offerings, as the phrase “having his impurity upon him” is referring to one whose impurity departs from him when he is whole; the term “upon him” indicates that he is in a state of wholeness. This serves to exclude sacrificial flesh, which is an item whose impurity does not depart from it when it is whole, but only when it is deficient, i.e., when fire takes hold of it on the altar.
  § The Gemara proceeds to analyze the matter itself. In the <i>baraita</i> the Rabbis attempt to prove that the verse: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), is referring to a ritually impure person, and not to impure flesh. The <i>baraita</i> states: “Having his impurity upon him”; the verse speaks of impurity of the body of the person, not the impurity of the flesh of the offering.
  The question may be raised: Do you say that it is dealing with impurity of the body? Or is it speaking only of impurity of the flesh, as is suggested by the fact that the term for “meat” [<i>basar</i>] is masculine, matching the masculine pronominal suffix attached to the word “impurity,” whereas the word for “soul” [<i>nefesh</i>] is feminine? The answer is that here it is stated: “Having his impurity upon him,” and there it is stated: “Whoever touches the dead, the body of any man that has died, and does not purify himself, he has defiled the Tabernacle of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from Israel, because the water of sprinkling was not sprinkled upon him, he shall be impure, his impurity is yet upon him” (Numbers 19:13). Just as there, the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, so too here, the verse is speaking of impurity of the body.
  Rabbi Yosei says there is a different proof: Since in this verse (Leviticus 7:20) the sacrificial animals are mentioned in the plural form, i.e., “peace offerings,” but the impurity is mentioned in the singular: “Upon him,” evidently the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, and not impurity of the peace offerings. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says there is yet another proof: Since the next verse states: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item…and eat of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:21), this indicates that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body, as will be explained. Others say that the phrase “having his impurity upon him” proves that the reference here is to one whose impurity can depart from him, i.e., a person. This serves to exclude the impure flesh of offerings, as its impurity cannot depart from it. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the term “and eat” indicates that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body. The Gemara asks: From where is this inferred? How is the meaning of this verse derived from this term, which appears in a different verse? In this connection the Gemara notes that Rava said: Any verse that was not explained by Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi, and any <i>baraita</i> that was not explained by Rav Ze’eiri, was not explained, as these Sages are the most accomplished interpreters of verses and <i>baraitot</i>, respectively.
  Rava cites the relevant explanation of the verse referred to by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: This is what Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: The next verse states: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any impure detestable thing, and eat of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21). The beginning of that verse: “And when anyone shall touch,” and the end of that verse: “That soul shall be cut off,” are in the feminine form, whereas the middle of the verse: “And eat of the meat,” is in the masculine form, and yet it is clear that the verse is speaking of impurity of the body. The same may be said about the previous verse: Since the verse begins in the feminine form and ends in the feminine form, and the masculine form is used in the middle, the verse must be speaking of impurity of the body, despite the change from the feminine to the masculine.
  The Gemara cites the <i>baraita</i>, alluded to by Rava, through which the interpretative prowess of Rav Ze’eiri is demonstrated. This <i>baraita</i> also discusses the topic of eating consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the lenient are stated, why are the stringent stated; and if the stringent are stated, why are the lenient stated? If the lenient were stated and not the stringent, I would say: For the lenient, one is liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition, and for the stringent, one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Therefore, the stringent are stated. And if the stringent were stated and the lenient were not stated, I would say: Only for the stringent should one be liable to receive a punishment; but for the lenient, one should be entirely exempt. Therefore, the lenient are stated. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>, the meaning of which is opaque.
  The Gemara asks: What are the lenient, and what are the stringent? It is known that the <i>baraita</i> is discussing the broad topic of eating consecrated food in a state of impurity, but its precise meaning requires elucidation. If we say that the lenient is referring to the consumption of second tithe while one is impure, and the stringent is referring to the partaking of <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, in a state of impurity, how can the <i>baraita</i> say that had the Torah stated only the prohibition against eating second tithe I would incorrectly have said that one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven? Now too, this is the <i>halakha</i>; one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> when he is in a state of impurity is indeed liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.
  And furthermore, is it correct to say: And if the Torah had not stated the stringent case of <i>teruma</i> but only the lenient case of second tithe, and I would learn the <i>halakha</i> in the stringent case from the <i>halakha</i> in the lenient case by way of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, I would then say that the punishment in the stringent case is that of death at the hand of Heaven? This is impossible, as there is a principle with regard to <i>a fortiori</i> inferences that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source. In other words, a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. In this instance, if an impure person who eats second tithe is flogged for violating a prohibition, then the punishment for partaking of <i>teruma</i> in a state of impurity, were it not stated in the Torah, could be no more severe than that.
  Rather, when the <i>baraita</i> refers to the lenient it is referring to the impurity of the carcass of a creeping animal, while the stringent is referring to the impurity imparted by a corpse, as the Torah discusses both these cases in the context of eating consecrated foods in a state of ritual impurity: “And whoever touches anything that is impure by the dead, or a man whose semen goes from him, or whoever touches any creeping animal” (Leviticus 22:4–5).
  The Gemara asks: But if so, to what food is this referring? If it is referring to the partaking of <i>teruma</i>, both this one who was rendered impure by the dead and that one who was rendered impure by a creeping animal are liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. No matter how he became impure, if he partakes of <i>teruma</i> in a state of ritual impurity he is liable to be punished with death. And furthermore, how can the <i>baraita</i> state: Therefore, the stringent are stated, i.e., to teach that one is liable only to be flogged for violating a prohibition, and not to be punished with death. After all, one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> when impure is in fact liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Consequently, the reference to stringent and lenient cannot be referring to the partaking of <i>teruma</i>.
  And if the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the eating of second tithe, this too is difficult.
  
  Daf 44a
  
  If the stringent case of impurity imparted by a corpse were not stated, but only the lenient case of the impurity of a creeping animal, would I say that the punishment in the stringent case is that of death at the hand of Heaven? Rather, the <i>halakha</i> in the case of impurity imparted by a corpse would be derived from the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the impurity of a creeping animal by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, and it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source, in this case that one is liable to be flogged for the violation of a prohibition, and no more.
  Ze’eiri says: Indeed, the lenient case is referring to the impurity of a creeping animal, and the stringent case is referring to impurity imparted by a corpse. And this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the impurity of a creeping animal was stated, and it was stated that one who eats second tithe while impure with such impurity has violated a prohibition and one who partakes of <i>teruma</i> in that state is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the impurity imparted by a corpse was not stated in this context, I would say as follows: The lenient level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, with regard to food with lenient <i>halakhot</i>, second tithe, involves the violation of a prohibition, and with regard to food with stringent <i>halakhot</i>, <i>teruma</i>, it involves liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.
  Ze’eiri continues his explanation of the <i>baraita</i>: And from the fact that the lenient level of impurity, that of a creeping animal, with regard to food with stringent <i>halakhot</i>, <i>teruma</i>, involves liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven, it may be inferred that also in the analogous case of the stringent level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, with regard to food with lenient <i>halakhot</i>, there is liability to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven. Therefore, the stringent level of impurity, imparted by a corpse, was stated with regard to second tithe, which has lenient <i>halakhot</i>, to teach that even if one contracted impurity from a corpse, he has violated only a prohibition for eating second tithe, and is not liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara cites a verse and a related <i>baraita</i>. The verse states: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to him who sacrifices it; it shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The <i>baraita</i> first demonstrates that the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies not only to a peace offering, with regard to which it is stated in the Torah, but to all offerings.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Or perhaps the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> extends only to an offering that is similar to peace offerings: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they are eaten for two days and one night, so too, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies to any offering that is eaten for two days and one night.
  But as for an offering that is eaten only for one day, i.e., the day the offering is sacrificed, and the following night, e.g., a sin offering, guilt offering, and firstborn offering, from where is it derived that the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies to this offering as well? The verse states: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering,” which teaches that the status of <i>piggul</i> can apply to any offering whose remainder of meat is eaten after its sacrificial portions have been offered on the altar. The <i>baraita</i> asks: With regard to a burnt offering, whose remainder of meat is not eaten, as it is burned in its entirety on the altar, from where is this <i>halakha</i> derived? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” which includes any offering that is slaughtered.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: From where is it derived to include bird offerings, e.g., doves or pigeons, which are not slaughtered but whose napes of their necks are pinched, and meal offerings, until I include even the <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper? The verse states with regard to the consumption of consecrated food in a state of ritual purity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).
  The <i>baraita</i> clarifies this derivation: The <i>halakha</i> that the prohibition of <i>notar</i> applies to all these offerings is derived through a verbal analogy of profanation in the context of <i>notar</i>: “And if anything remains until the third day, it shall be burned in fire…and anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity, because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:6–8), and profanation stated in the verse discussing ritual impurity: “And that they do not profane My holy name.” And the <i>halakha</i> that <i>piggul</i> applies to all these offerings is subsequently derived through a verbal analogy of “iniquity” in the context of <i>piggul</i> and “iniquity” stated in the verse discussing <i>notar</i>. With regard to <i>piggul</i>, the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to <i>notar</i>, it is stated in the aforementioned verse: “And anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity.”
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: And since the verse eventually includes all items, even meal offerings and the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, now one can ask: Why does the verse state <i>piggul</i> specifically with regard to peace offerings? The <i>baraita</i> answers: This serves to tell you that the offering must be similar to peace offerings in the following way: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they have permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, so too, with regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> specifies: With regard to the burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted to be burned on the altar and its hide to be used by the priests. With regard to the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its flesh and its skin permitted to be burned on the altar. With regard to the bird sin offering, its blood renders its flesh permitted for consumption by the priests. With regard to bulls that are burned, e.g., the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal transgression, and goats that are burned, e.g., the goat sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin of idol worship, their blood renders their sacrificial portions permitted to be sacrificed on the altar.
  And I exclude, via the analogy to peace offerings, the handful of a meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood. All these do not have an item that renders them permitted either for a person or for the altar.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Rabbi Shimon says that the fact that the verse specifies peace offerings as the standard case of <i>piggul</i> teaches: Just as peace offerings are notable in that they have a permitting factor that is sacrificed on the external altar, i.e., their blood, and one is liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, so too, with regard to any item that has a permitting factor that is sacrificed on the external altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. This serves to exclude bulls that are burned and goats that are burned: Since their blood is not presented on the external altar like peace offerings, one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: Perhaps the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> extends only to an offering that is similar to peace offerings: What is this offering that is similar to a peace offering but not included in the category of peace offerings? The Gemara answers: The reference is to a firstborn offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, as is a peace offering. The Gemara raises a difficulty: By what hermeneutical principle is the <i>halakha</i> of the firstborn offering derived? If it is by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, a principle of inductive reasoning involving a comparison between cases that include similar details, i.e., since the peace offering and firstborn offering are similar with regard to the time designated for their eating, <i>piggul</i> status should apply to each, this can be refuted.
  The Gemara clarifies the refutation: What is notable about peace offerings? They are notable in that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and waving of the breast and thigh. None of these apply in the case of a firstborn offering.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> that <i>piggul</i> status applies to a firstborn offering is derived through the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, from the following verse: “And if any be at all eaten of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18). The terms: “And if any” and “be at all eaten” are generalizations, while the words: “The flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offering” constitute a detail. According to the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, in such a case one includes any item that is similar to the detail, and therefore one includes the firstborn offering.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: These two phrases are generalizations that are adjacent to one another, which means that this is not an instance of a generalization and a detail and a generalization, as they are not in that order. Rava said: The hermeneutical principle applies even in this case, as they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: In every place that you find two generalizations that are adjacent to one another, cast the detail that is written afterward between them, and interpret them in the manner of a generalization and a detail and a generalization. Consequently, this verse is considered to state a generalization and a detail and a generalization.
  § The <i>baraita</i> teaches: Until I include even the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? The Gemara answers that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil of the leper, one is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became <i>piggul</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say the latter clause: And I exclude the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, and the blood, as they do not have a permitting factor. Here we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute the ruling of Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara elaborates: As it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the libations of an animal offering, one is liable for consuming them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the offering renders them permitted to be offered on the altar; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to him: But a person may bring his offerings today and the accompanying libations from now until even ten days later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does not render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: I too spoke only about libations that come to be sacrificed together with the offering. If so, the <i>baraita</i> under discussion represents two conflicting opinions.
  Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling, that even the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper is included in the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who agrees with the Rabbis that the libations of an animal offering are not permitted by the blood of the offering. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says with regard to the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper that it is not the blood of the guilt offering that renders it permitted; rather, the placements of its oil “before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:16) render the remainder of the oil permitted to be eaten by the priests. And from the fact that the placements of its oil render the oil permitted, by the same token the placements of its oil render it <i>piggul</i>, i.e., if the oil was placed with the intent that the priests should consume its remainder on the following day, one who consumes the oil is liable for consuming <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara cites the source for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing consecrated property if he derives benefit from it at any point after it has been consecrated in a service vessel, until the blood of the leper’s guilt offering is sprinkled. At this stage the oil is permitted to the priests, and therefore the prohibition against misusing property consecrated to the Temple no longer applies to it. Once the blood has been sprinkled, one may not derive benefit from the oil <i>ab initio</i>, by rabbinic law, as it must still be placed on the leper’s right ear, thumb, and big toe. But if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One who derives benefit from the oil is liable for misusing consecrated property until the priest places its own placements, i.e., until the oil is sprinkled seven times toward the Sanctuary, as these sprinklings render the remainder of the oil permitted to the priests. And the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agree that consumption of the <i>log</i> of oil is prohibited until the priest places the seven placements, i.e., sprinklings, of oil toward the Sanctuary, and performs the placing of the oil on the leper’s thumb and big toe.
  They said this statement before Rabbi Yirmeya in Eretz Yisrael, whereupon he said: Would a great man such as Rav Yosef say such a matter, that the sprinkling of the oil renders the rest of the oil <i>piggul</i>?
  
  Daf 44b
  
  But there is the case of the <i>log</i> of oil that is brought by itself, i.e., where the leper brings it after he has sacrificed his offerings. There everyone agrees that its placements render the remainder of the oil permitted to the priests, and yet they do not render the oil <i>piggul</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, one is liable for consuming it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the offering renders it permitted to be placed on the thumb and big toe of the leper. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his guilt offering today and the accompanying <i>log</i> of oil from now until even ten days later. Rabbi Meir said to them: I too spoke only about a <i>log</i> of oil that comes with the guilt offering. This indicates that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it is the blood of the offering that renders the oil <i>piggul</i>.
  Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya says: Actually, the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and omit the case of the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings from the list of items that are not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i>. Abaye says: Actually, do not omit this item from the list, and the <i>baraita</i> can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir as follows: The <i>tanna</i> first taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>log</i> of oil that comes with the leper’s guilt offering, and the same is true of libations that come with an animal offering, as according to Rabbi Meir <i>piggul</i> status applies to both of these. And then the <i>tanna</i> taught that <i>piggul</i> does not apply to libations that come by themselves, and the same is true of a <i>log</i> of oil that comes by itself.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the bird burnt offering, its blood renders its meat and its skin permitted to be eaten by the priests. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that the meat of a bird burnt offering is eaten by the priests, derived? The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> that Levi teaches, with regard to a verse that discusses the gifts that are to be presented to the priests: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they shall render to Me, shall be most sacred for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9).
  The <i>baraita</i> clarifies what is included by the term “every” in each of these clauses. The verse states: “Every offering of theirs,” which serves to include the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper; it too is given to the priests. The Gemara explains why it is necessary to derive from the verse that the oil is a gift to the priesthood: It might enter your mind to say that the oil should not be included, as the Merciful One writes in this same verse: “From the fire,” and this <i>log</i> of oil, notwithstanding its status as an offering, is not reserved from the fire. Only an item concerning which part of it is brought to the altar can be said to be reserved from the fire, and none of the oil is brought to the altar. Therefore, the verse teaches us by the phrase: “Every offering of theirs,” that the oil goes to the priests.
  The phrase: “Every meal offering of theirs,” serves to include the <i>omer</i> meal offering, brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and the meal offering of jealousy, brought by a <i>sota</i>. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that as the verse states with regard to the consumption of sacrificial food by the priests: “And they shall eat those items with which atonement is achieved” (Exodus 29:33), only those foods that facilitate atonement are given to the priests. And this would exclude the <i>omer</i> meal offering and the meal offering of jealousy, as the <i>omer</i> meal offering comes to permit the consumption of the new crop, and the meal offering of jealousy comes to clarify the transgression of the <i>sota</i>, as part of the ordeal undergone by the woman. Therefore, the verse teaches us by the phrase: “Every meal offering of theirs,” that even these meal offerings are eaten by the priests.
  The phrase: “And every sin offering of theirs,” serves to include the bird sin offering; its meat too is given to the priests. The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that this meat should not be eaten at all, as it is an unslaughtered animal carcass, since the bird is killed by pinching its nape (see Leviticus 5:8) rather than by slaughtering, which is the manner of ritual slaughter of non-sacred birds. Therefore, the phrase: “And every sin offering of theirs,” teaches that the bird sin offering is eaten by the priests.
  The phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” serves to include the guilt offering of a nazirite who contracted ritual impurity, and the guilt offering of a leper. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that these should not be given to the priests to eat, as they come to qualify these individuals, rather than to atone. The guilt offering of a nazirite renders him fit to restart his term of naziriteship, and the guilt offering of a leper qualifies him to eat sacrificial food, whereas the verse states: “And they shall eat those items with which atonement is achieved” (Exodus 29:33). Therefore, the verse teaches us by the phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” that these offerings as well are eaten by the priests.
  The Gemara challenges: It is explicitly written with regard to the guilt offering of a leper that it is consumed by the priests: “For as the sin offering is the priest’s, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:13). Why, then, is this derivation necessary? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means to say that the phrase: “Every guilt offering of theirs,” serves to include the guilt offering of a nazirite, teaching that it is like the guilt offering of a leper, in that both are eaten by the priests.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to the phrase “which they shall render to Me,” this is referring to an item stolen from a convert. One who robs a convert who then dies with no heirs must give the stolen item and an additional one-fifth to the priests. Finally, the term “for you” teaches that it shall be yours, even to betroth a woman with it, i.e., these gifts are considered the priest’s property in all regards.
  § According to the first <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, the blood of which is presented on the inner altar, are subject to <i>piggul</i>, whereas Rabbi Shimon rules that they are not subject to <i>piggul</i>. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that there is a third opinion concerning the matter: Rabbi Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If in his service of the bulls that are burned or the goats that are burned the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> with regard to a matter that is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, he has rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. If his intention was with regard to a matter that is performed inside the Sanctuary or the Holy of Holies, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: How so? If he was standing outside when slaughtering the animal, and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention of sprinkling its blood tomorrow inside the Sanctuary, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. The reason is that in the case of an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed inside, one has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. Likewise, if he was standing inside when sprinkling, and said: I hereby sprinkle the blood of the sin offering in order to burn its sacrificial portions on the external altar and to pour out its remainder on the base of the altar tomorrow, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>, as this is an intention inside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.
  But if he was standing outside, and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention of pouring out the remainder of its blood tomorrow, or to burn its sacrificial portions tomorrow, he has rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>, as this is an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: What is the verse from which this is derived? The verse states with regard to the sacrificial portions of a bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, which is one of the bulls that are burned: “As it is taken off from the bull of the peace offering” (Leviticus 4:10). But what, then, do we learn from the bull of a peace offering? Everything that is specified with regard to a peace offering is stated with regard to this bull as well.
  Rather, the verse juxtaposes the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest with the bull of the peace offering: Just as the bull of the peace offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i> unless the priest’s actions and intentions relate to the service performed on the external altar, as that is where it is offered, so too, the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest is not rendered <i>piggul</i> unless the priest’s intentions and actions relate to the service performed on the external altar.
  Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says his ruling in the name of Rabbi Yosei.
  Rava said:
  
  Daf 45a
  
  Does one issue a <i>halakha</i> for the messianic period, when the Temple will be rebuilt? Abaye said to him: If that is so, that such <i>halakhot</i> are not taught, let the <i>tanna</i> not teach all the <i>halakhot</i> of the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate <i>Zevaḥim</i>, as it is entirely a <i>halakha</i> for the messianic period. Rather, one studies these <i>halakhot</i> due to the principle of: Study Torah and receive reward, i.e., one is rewarded for the study of Torah regardless of its practical applicability. Here too, study Torah and receive reward. Rava said to him: This is what I am saying to you: Why do I need a practical ruling of <i>halakha</i>? According to another version, which presents the same answer in different terms, Rava said to him: I spoke in reference to the ruling of <i>halakha</i>, as it is puzzling that a halakhic ruling is given in this case.
  MISHNA: With regard to offerings consecrated by gentiles for sacrifice to God, one is not liable for eating them, neither due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i> if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, nor due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while ritually impure. And one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is exempt; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yosei deems him liable.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to offerings consecrated by gentiles, one may not derive benefit from them <i>ab initio</i>, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable after the fact for misusing consecrated property. And one is not liable for eating them, neither due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i> if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent to eat the offering beyond its designated time, nor due to violation of the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, nor due to violation of the prohibition against eating the meat while ritually impure.
  And gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute, i.e., if a gentile stated with regard to an animal that it should be the substitute of a consecrated animal, the substitution does not take effect. And gentiles cannot bring libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering, but their animal offerings require libations. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.
  Rabbi Yosei says: I see the logic of the opinion that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent about the offerings of gentiles, as it is stated with regard to them: “Any man of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel that will sacrifice his offering…to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:18). This indicates that all offerings, even those of gentiles, are fully consecrated to God; therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and eating the meat while ritually impure should all apply to the offerings of gentiles. In what case is this statement said? In the case of items consecrated for the altar. But with regard to items that are consecrated by gentiles for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misusing them. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara begins to analyze this <i>baraita</i> in detail. The <i>baraita</i> taught that one may not derive benefit from items consecrated by gentiles <i>ab initio</i>, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable after the fact for misusing of consecrated property. The Gemara explains: One may not derive benefit from them by rabbinic law, as the Sages prohibited deriving benefit from any item that was consecrated to God.
  The Gemara’s explanation continues: But if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable after the fact for misusing consecrated property, as the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> derives the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property through a verbal analogy between “sin” stated with regard to misuse of consecrated items and the word “sin” stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>. With regard to misuse of consecrated property, the verse states: “If any one commits a trespass, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). In the case of <i>teruma</i>, the verse states: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die due to it, if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). And with regard to <i>teruma</i>, it is written: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15), which indicates: But not the sacred items of gentiles, i.e., one is not liable for partaking of the <i>teruma</i> of gentiles while he is in a state of ritual impurity.
  The <i>baraita</i> further taught: And one is not liable for eating the offerings of gentiles due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, or <i>notar</i>, or eating the meat while ritually impure. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains that the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> is derived through a verbal analogy between the word “iniquity” stated with regard to <i>piggul</i> and the word “iniquity” stated with regard to <i>notar</i>. With regard to <i>piggul</i>, the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to leftover sacrificial meat the verse states: “Therefore anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8).
  And the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> itself is derived through a verbal analogy between profanation stated with regard to <i>notar</i> and profanation stated with regard to ritual impurity. With regard to <i>notar</i> the verse states: “Because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and with regard to impurity the verse states: “And that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). And with regard to impurity it is written in that same verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel,” which indicates: But not the sacred items of gentiles.
  The <i>baraita</i> also teaches: And gentiles cannot render an animal a substitute. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara explains: It is because substitution is juxtaposed in the Torah with animal tithe, as the verse states: “And concerning the tithe of the herd, or of the flock…the tenth shall be sacred to the Lord…neither shall he make a substitute for it” (Leviticus 27:32–33). And animal tithe is juxtaposed with the tithe of grains, as the verse states: “You shall tithe [<i>asser te’asser</i>] all the increase of your seed that the field brings forth year by year. And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to place His name there, the tithe of your grain” (Deuteronomy 14:22–23). The doubled verb form, <i>asser te’asser</i>, is understood as an allusion to two tithes, grain tithe and animal tithe. And with regard to the tithe of grains it is written: “When you take of the children of Israel the tithes” (Numbers 18:24), which indicates: But not of gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition again teach via a juxtaposition? There is a principle that in consecrated matters, a <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition cannot teach another <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition. The Gemara answers: This derivation is not relevant exclusively to consecrated matters, as the tithe of grains is non-sacred food.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the one who says that when implementing this principle we follow the source that teaches the <i>halakha</i>, i.e., if the matter that teaches the first juxtaposition involves non-sacred items, one can employ two juxtapositions even with regard to deriving the <i>halakha</i> for consecrated matters. But according to the one who says that we follow the matter that is taught the <i>halakha</i>, i.e., the case to which we wish to apply the <i>halakha</i>, and if that case involves offerings one cannot employ two juxtapositions, what can be said?
  Rather, the reason why gentiles cannot bring an animal tithe offering is that animal tithe is an obligation for which there is no fixed time, and with regard to any obligation for which there is no fixed time, a Jew can bring it but gentiles cannot bring it. And as stated, substitution is juxtaposed with the animal tithe, and therefore gentiles can also not render an animal a substitute.
  § The <i>baraita</i> teaches: And gentiles cannot bring libations that are brought by themselves as a separate offering and do not accompany an animal offering, but their animal offerings require libations. The Gemara cites the source of these <i>halakh</i>ot. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to libations: “All who are homeborn shall do these things after this manner” (Numbers 15:13), which teaches that those who are homeborn, i.e., Jews, can bring libations as a separate offering, but a gentile cannot bring such libations. One might consequently have thought that a gentile’s burnt offering should not require the standard accompanying libations. Therefore, the verse states: “So it shall be done for each bull” (Numbers 15:11), which indicates that every offering requires libations.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yosei says: I see that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent. In what case is this statement said? In the case of items consecrated for the altar. But with regard to items that are consecrated by gentiles for Temple maintenance, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misusing them. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei?
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yosei holds that when the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property is derived through a verbal analogy between “sin” stated with regard to misuse of consecrated property and “sin” stated with regard to <i>teruma</i>, this is referring to items that are similar to <i>teruma</i>, which is sacred with inherent sanctity. But with regard to an item consecrated for Temple maintenance, which has no inherent sanctity, but only sanctity that inheres in its value, this exemption of gentiles does not apply.
  The Gemara continues to analyze the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood that became impure and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, if he did so unwittingly, the offering is accepted.
  
  Daf 45b
  
  But if he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the offering of an individual. But with regard to the offering of the community, whether the priest sprinkled the blood unwittingly or he did so intentionally, the offering is accepted. And in the case of the offerings of gentiles, whether he sprinkled the blood unwittingly or he did so intentionally, the offering is not accepted.
  The Sages said before Rav Pappa: In accordance with whose opinion was this <i>baraita</i> taught? Apparently, it was taught not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as if it reflects the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, there is a difficulty: Doesn’t Rabbi Yosei say: I see the logic of the opinion that in all of these cases it is correct to be stringent about the offerings of gentiles? This indicates that Rabbi Yosei equates the <i>halakhot</i> applying to the offerings of gentiles with those governing the offerings of Jews.
  Rav Pappa said to them: You may even say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is different there, as the verse states with regard to the High Priest’s frontplate, which atones for ritual impurity contracted by offerings in the Temple without the knowledge of those offering them: “And it shall be always upon his forehead that it may be accepted for them before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), which indicates that it is accepted for them, i.e., for Jews, but not for gentiles.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: If that is so, with regard to the verse discussing ritually impure priests and consecrated items: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me” (Leviticus 22:2), so too, would Rabbi Yosei say that the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity applies only to offerings which they, the Jews, consecrate, and not to those of gentiles? This cannot be, as Rabbi Yosei explicitly states in the <i>baraita</i> that in this regard the offerings of gentiles are like those of Jews.
  Rather, Rav Ashi says that it is not from the words “for them” that one derives that the offering of a gentile is not accepted when the blood that was sprinkled had become impure. Rather, it is because the atonement achieved by way of the High Priest’s frontplate does not apply to gentiles, as the verse states: “That it may be accepted for them before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), and gentiles are not subject to the acceptance of offerings.
  MISHNA: Even with regard to those items enumerated in the previous mishna (42b) for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, e.g., the handful, the frankincense, and the incense, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it. But with regard to the wood, the frankincense, and the incense, one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating a consecrated item while ritually impure.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It might have been thought that one should be liable due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity only for an item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: And this may be derived via a logical derivation: Just as with regard to <i>piggul</i>, which renders one who unwittingly eats it liable to bring a fixed sin offering, and this liability is incurred with one change in his awareness, i.e., it suffices for the sinner to become aware after the fact that he had sinned unwittingly, and it has no permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, as there are no circumstances in which one is permitted to eat <i>piggul</i>, and yet one is liable due to violation of the prohibition against eating <i>piggul</i> only for an item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, so too, the same should certainly apply to the more lenient case of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara elaborates: Impurity is more lenient than <i>piggul</i>, as it renders the unwitting sinner liable only to bring a sliding-scale offering, which varies according to his financial circumstances: A poor person brings a bird offering or even a meal offering (see Leviticus 5:6–13). And liability is incurred only with two changes in his awareness, i.e., when the sinner was aware of his impurity beforehand, then forgot about it at the time of his sin, and then once again become aware of his impurity. And it has permitted exceptions from its general prohibition with regard to the community, as it is permitted to sacrifice communal offerings in the Temple in a state of impurity. With these leniencies in mind, is it not right that one should be liable due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure only for an item that has permitting factors, either for a person or for the altar.
  Therefore, the verse states, with regard to eating consecrated foods in a state of ritual impurity: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2). This teaches that a ritually impure person is liable for eating any item that has been consecrated.
  One might have thought that one is liable for eating sacred items immediately after they have been consecrated. Therefore, the verse states: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items” (Leviticus 22:3), and Rabbi Elazar said, in explanation of this verse: But is there one who merely touches, i.e., approaches, consecrated items, who is liable? Only one who eats consecrated food while in a state of ritual impurity is liable.
  Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Approaches [<i>yikrav</i>]”? This term alludes to sacrificing [<i>hakrava</i>], as though the verse has stated: Whoever sacrifices sacred items and eats them. This teaches that the verse is speaking of flesh that has been rendered fit to be sacrificed. How so? With regard to an item that has permitting factors, one is liable from when the permitting factors are sacrificed. In the case of an item that does not have permitting factors, one is liable from when it is sanctified in a service vessel for the purpose of its sacrifice.
  The Gemara asks: We have found proof that the prohibition against eating consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor. From where do we derive that <i>notar</i> likewise applies to an item that does not have a permitting factor? The Gemara answers: This is derived through a verbal analogy between profanation stated in the context of <i>notar</i> and profanation stated in the context of ritual impurity. With regard to <i>notar</i> the verse states: “Because he has profaned the sacred item of the Lord” (Leviticus 19:8), and with regard to impurity the verse states: “And that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2).
  The Gemara challenges: But let the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> be derived through a verbal analogy between “iniquity” stated in the context of <i>notar</i> and “iniquity” stated in the context of <i>piggul</i>. With regard to <i>piggul</i>, the verse states: “It shall be <i>piggul</i>, and the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18), and with regard to leftover sacrificial meat the verse states: “Therefore anyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 19:8). If so, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> should be similar to that of <i>piggul</i>, for which one is liable only for an item that has a permitting factor.
  The Gemara answers that it is more reasonable to derive <i>notar</i> from ritual impurity, for several reasons, as indicated by the mnemonic: <i>Gimmel</i>, <i>zayin</i>, <i>lamed</i>. Both <i>notar</i> and impurity are disqualifications that apply to the body [<i>guf</i> ] of the offering itself, whereas <i>piggul</i> is caused by intent; unlike <i>piggul</i>, these two disqualifications are not determined by the sprinkling [<i>zerika</i>] of the blood, and in both cases the Torah uses the term profanation [<i>ḥillul</i> ].
  The Gemara responds: On the contrary, it is more reasonable to derive <i>notar</i> from <i>piggul</i>, as like <i>piggul</i> it does not have permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, it has no atonement through the High Priest’s frontplate, both <i>notar</i> and <i>piggul</i> apply to a ritually pure offering, these disqualifications are dependent on time, and both of them are disqualifications of the item being sacrificed, not the priest performing the service. None of these features are true of ritual impurity. And these reasons for comparing <i>notar</i> to <i>piggul</i> are more numerous.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>notar</i> is derived from that which Levi taught with regard to the verse: “That they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they consecrate to Me, and that they do not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:2), which is referring to the eating of consecrated food in a state of ritual impurity. As Levi taught: From where is it derived that the verse is speaking even of a disqualification caused by time, and not only ritual impurity? The verse states profanation elsewhere: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15).
  
  Daf 46a
  
  The verse is speaking here of two profanations; one is the disqualification of <i>notar</i> and one is the disqualification of ritual impurity. This teaches that like impurity, <i>notar</i> applies even to an item that does not have a permitting factor.
  § The mishna teaches: Even with regard to the items for which one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, one is, nevertheless, liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>notar</i>, and due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated food while ritually impure, except for the blood. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Before answering this question, the Gemara cites another discussion as to why the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood. Ulla says: The verse states with regard to blood: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). “To you” indicates that it shall be yours; it is not the property of the Temple, so it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.
  The school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: “To make atonement,” teaching that God is saying: I gave it for atonement, and not for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: “For it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term “it is” teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been presented on the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.
  The Gemara asks: But if the term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara rejects this: This cannot be the case, as there is a principle: There is no item whose mitzva has been performed that is still subject to the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.
  The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar. Any benefit derived from them between their removal and their required burial constitutes misuse of consecrated property, despite the fact that their mitzva has already been performed.
  The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the matter of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the <i>halakha</i> that misuse of consecrated property applies to them even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique <i>halakha</i> not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. Instead, they are considered exceptional instances that cannot serve as models for other cases.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment.
  But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who says that these priestly vestments are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, provided that a High Priest does not use them on Yom Kippur in a different year, one does not misuse consecrated property by using them after their mitzva has been performed, and therefore what is there to say? In his opinion, the <i>halakha</i> of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva applies only to the removal of ashes from the altar, not to the priestly vestments, which means it is stated in only a single case. Why, then, does this case not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?
  The Gemara responds: It is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the <i>halakha</i> of the heifer whose neck is broken are two verses that come as one, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from either of them even after their mitzva is completed, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.
  The Gemara challenges this from a different angle: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say?
  The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this <i>halakha</i> applies to them alone. Here, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: “Whose neck was broken” (Deuteronomy 21:6), and this superfluous description teaches that this <i>halakha</i>, that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property is in effect even after the performance of a mitzva, applies solely to this case and should not be extended to others. And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: “And he shall put it” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies to “it,” and nothing else.
  The Gemara asks: And why do I need these three verses stated with regard to blood, from which it is derived that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply to blood? The reference is to the three terms specified earlier, in the expositions of Ulla, the school of Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, from the verse: “I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11).
  The Gemara answers: One of those terms serves to exclude the blood from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Another phrase serves to exclude blood from the prohibition of <i>notar</i>. If one consumed leftover blood, he is not liable for consuming <i>notar</i>. Rather, he is liable for violating only the prohibition against consuming blood. And the last phrase serves to exclude it from the prohibition of ritual impurity. If one consumed this blood in a state of ritual impurity, he is liable only for consuming blood, but not on account of consuming consecrated food while ritually impure.
  But no verse is required to exclude this blood from the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i>, because this is already derived from another source, as we learned in the mishna (43a): With regard to any item that has permitting factors, either for consumption by a person or for burning on the altar, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. The permitting factor itself is not subject to <i>piggul</i>. And consequently, <i>piggul</i> does not apply to blood itself, as it renders the offering permitted for human consumption or for the altar.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why do I need three mentions of <i>karet</i> with regard to one who eats peace offerings in a state of ritual impurity? The three verses are: “But the soul that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off [<i>venikhreta</i>] from his people” (Leviticus 7:20); “And when anyone shall touch any impure item, whether it is the impurity of man, or an impure animal, or any unclean detestable thing, and eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that pertain to the Lord, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:21); and: “Whoever he is of all your seed among your generations that approaches the sacred items, which the children of Israel consecrate to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from before Me; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 22:3).
  
  Daf 46b
  
  One mention of <i>karet</i> in the verse: “That approaches the sacred items,” is for a generalization, and one mention in the verse: “Of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings,” is for a detail. This detail serves to include all items consecrated to the altar, in accordance with the hermeneutical principle that any matter that was included in a generalization but was explicitly specified to teach a certain <i>halakha</i> was intended to teach not just about itself but about the entire generalization. And one mention of <i>karet</i> in the verse: “And when anyone shall touch any impure item,” serves to include items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, e.g., wood and frankincense, and teaches that one who eats even these items is liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna with regard to items whose typical manner is such that they are not to be eaten, that one is not liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition against eating consecrated items in a state of ritual impurity, what does this last mention of <i>karet</i> serve to include? The Gemara answers that it serves to include the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara explains why this inclusion is necessary. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that concerning any offering whose blood is not presented on the external altar like that of a peace offering, one is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, one should likewise not be liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of ritual impurity. Therefore, the additional mention of <i>karet</i> teaches us that one who is impure is in fact liable for eating these sin offerings brought inside the Sanctuary.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon stated a ruling in which he deems one liable for eating in a state of ritual impurity an item whose typical manner is such that one eats it, but not for eating the wood, the frankincense, or the incense, whose typical manner is such that one does not eat it. The Rabbis disagree and deem him liable in all these cases. It was stated that two pairs of <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to this issue; one pair is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, and the other pair is Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. The two different opinions that follow were respectively stated by one of this pair and one of that pair.
  One says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the impurity of meat, i.e., the item that is eaten is impure. The Rabbis maintain that one who eats impure wood or frankincense is flogged, as derived from the two mentions of flesh in the verse: “And the meat that touches any impure item shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. And as for the meat, everyone who is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). But if one ate wood or frankincense in a state of impurity of the body, everyone agrees that he is not flogged.
  And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, when the item eaten is impure, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, when the one eating the wood or frankincense is impure. What is the reason for this opinion? Since one reads with regard to these inedible items: “And the flesh that touches any impure item” (Leviticus 7:19), as this phrase serves to include even items such as wood and frankincense in the prohibition against eating them when they are impure, one likewise reads with regard to them the next verse: “But the person that eats of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace offerings…having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20), which discusses one in a state of impurity who eats consecrated items.
  The Gemara notes: Rav Tavyumei teaches the discussion in this preceding manner, whereas Rav Kahana teaches it in this alternative manner: One of this pair of <i>amora’im</i> and one of that pair disagreed with regard to the latter clause in the mishna, i.e., the meaning of Rabbi Shimon’s statement. One says that Rabbi Shimon’s dispute with the Rabbis is with regard to the impurity of the body, as he maintains that an impure individual who eats wood or frankincense is exempt. But with regard to the impurity of flesh, i.e., these items themselves, everyone agrees that one is flogged. And one says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case, i.e., Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt in both cases.
  Rava said: It stands to reason that the correct interpretation is like the one who says: As there is a dispute with regard to this case, so is there a dispute with regard to that case. What is the reason? Since one does not read with regard to these inedible items: “Having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off,” as according to both alternative explanations Rabbi Shimon deems exempt one who eats these items when he is in a state of impurity, similarly one does not read with regard to them the previous verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure item shall not be eaten.”
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the Master say that the term: “And as for the flesh,” in the same verse, serves to include wood and frankincense? This indicates that even these items can become ritually impure, and the prohibition against eating consecrated items that are impure applies to them. The Gemara answers: This is referring merely to disqualification, i.e., this inclusion applies by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited in mere support.
  MISHNA: The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, and one must have all of these matters in mind: For the sake of the particular type of offering being sacrificed; for the sake of the one who sacrifices the offering; for the sake of God; for the sake of consumption by the fires of the altar; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing of God, i.e., in fulfillment of God’s will; and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that he should not state any intent <i>ab initio</i>. This is necessary because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite, and therefore if the one who slaughters the animal is not careful and states the wrong intent, the offering would be disqualified through his improper intent.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says with regard to the verse: “A burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), the term “a burnt offering” means that one must intend that it be for the sake of a burnt offering, to the exclusion of one who sacrifices a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which one may not do. The mention of fires, i.e., the term “an offering made by fire,” teaches that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of complete consumption by the fires of the altar, to the exclusion of one who intends that its portions should only be roasted on the fire, as one may not do so.
  Rav continues to expound the verse. The term “aroma” indicates that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma, to the exclusion of limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, which he may not do. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to limbs that one first roasted and afterward took them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement that the offering must be sacrificed for the sake of the aroma.
  The term “pleasing” means for the sake of pleasing God’s spirit, i.e., that the offering should be accepted by God. Finally, the expression “to the Lord” indicates that it should be for the sake of the One Who spoke and the world came into being.
  Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent that the slaughter be for the sake of a burnt offering, it is disqualified. As explained (2a), a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another offering is entirely disqualified. But if he intended the slaughter to be for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is valid. Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reason of Rav? The verse states: “And they shall not profane the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:15). This teaches that consecrated items, i.e., the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of another type of offering, profane consecrated items, but the intent to slaughter an offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal does not profane consecrated items.
  Rabba raises an objection from the mishna: Rabbi Yosei says: Even in the case of one who did not have in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of any one of these, the offering is fit, as it is a stipulation of the court that one not state any intent <i>ab initio</i>. Rabba infers from this that the reason the offering is valid and it effects acceptance is that he did not have in mind any intent at all. But if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, it is disqualified.
  Abaye said to Rabba: Perhaps Rabbi Yosei means the following: If he did not have in mind any intent at all, the offering is valid and it effects acceptance, but if he had in mind to slaughter the offering for the sake of a non-sacred animal, the offering is valid, but it does not effect acceptance, as it is a flawed offering. Rav’s statement can be understood in a similar fashion.
  Rabbi Elazar says: Indeed, a sin offering that one intentionally slaughtered for the sake of a non-sacred animal is valid, as stated by Rav. But if he slaughtered it as a non-sacred animal, actually thinking that it was non-sacred, it is disqualified, as when he slaughtered it, he did not intend to perform a sacrificial rite. This is like the dilemma that Shmuel raised before Rav Huna:
  
  Daf 47a
  
  From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the case of consecrated items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather like one occupied with other matters, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, i.e., knowing that he is performing an act of slaughter.
  Shmuel said to Rav Huna: We have this as an established <i>halakha</i> already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but from where is it derived that this requirement is indispensable? Rav Huna said to him that the verse states: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., with your full awareness you shall slaughter it, in the form of a purposeful action.
  § The mishna teaches: Because the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that even the owner of an offering can render it <i>piggul</i> through improper intention. Rava says: What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei? As the verse states: “Then he who sacrifices shall sacrifice his offering to the Lord” (Numbers 15:4). The term “he who sacrifices” is a reference to the owner; since the owner is considered one who sacrifices, he too can render his offering <i>piggul</i> with an improper intention.
  Abaye says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all hold that even in a case involving two people, where this one has intention and that one performs the service, it is the intention that is relevant, i.e., it is as though the one performing the service had the intention. The Gemara explains: The statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, is that which we just said, that the owner can render his offering <i>piggul</i> through improper intention despite the fact that it is the priest who performs the service.
  The statement of Rabbi Eliezer is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 38b): With regard to one who slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, his slaughter is valid and a Jew may eat the meat of this animal. But Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, as the intention of the gentile, which is presumably to use the animal for idol worship, invalidates the act of slaughter performed by the Jew.
  The statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is as we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: In the case of any item that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out on Shabbat the item that was stored, that one who carried it out is rendered liable by the thought of this one who stored it.
  The Gemara notes: These two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, although their rulings are stated in the context of entirely different matters, accept as <i>halakha</i> the ruling of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara explains: Now that concerning matters outside the Temple, i.e., non-sacred slaughter and carrying on Shabbat, with regard to which the Torah makes no reference to intention, we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to state that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to matters inside the Temple, i.e., offerings, with regard to which it is explicitly stated that intention is effective, as indicated by the verse: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5)?
  But Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not necessarily accept as <i>halakha</i> the rulings of these two Sages, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara explains: Perhaps it is only concerning inside the Temple that we say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, whereas concerning outside the Temple, we do not say this.
  The Gemara further differentiates between the opinions of those two Sages themselves. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts as <i>halakha</i> the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer: Now that with regard to Shabbat we say that the intention of one person is effective for the action of another, is it necessary to say that the same applies concerning idol worship, where the actions are somewhat similar to those performed in the Temple?
  But Rabbi Eliezer does not necessarily accept as <i>halakha</i> the ruling of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: Perhaps it is only with regard to idol worship that you say that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another, as idol worship is somewhat similar to service performed inside the Temple. Consequently, it is reasonable that one person’s intention is effective for the action of another in the case of idolatry, as it does for offerings. But with regard to Shabbat, the Torah prohibited only planned, constructive labor, i.e., one is liable only for an action that includes the creative intent of the doer, and here the one who took the item out did not intend to perform a labor.
  
  MISHNA: What is the location of the slaughtering and consumption of offerings? The principle is that with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  Specifically, with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the staves of the Ark in the Holy of Holies, and upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and on the golden altar. Concerning all those sprinklings, failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As to the remainder of the blood, which is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering.
  With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires sprinkling upon the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and upon the golden altar,
  
  Daf 47b
  
  and failure to perform even one placement of their blood disqualifies the offering. As for the remainder of the blood that is left after those sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar, but if he did not pour the remainder it does not disqualify the offering. These, the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, and those, the bulls and the goats that are burned, are then burned in the place of the ashes, a place outside of Jerusalem where the priests would bring the ashes from the altar.
  GEMARA: The mishna opens with a principle that the slaughter of offerings of the most sacred order is in the north of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara inquires: And let the mishna also teach as a principle: And the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north of the Temple courtyard. Since collecting the blood is an indispensable part of the service, why is it not listed in this clause of the mishna? The Gemara explains: Since there is among the offerings of the most sacred order the guilt offering of a leper, for which the collection of its blood is in the hand, the mishna could not state this as a principle. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> omitted this from the requirements for offerings of the most sacred order.
  The Gemara challenges: And is the blood of the guilt offering of a leper not collected in a service vessel? But the mishna teaches this <i>halakha</i> later (54b): With regard to the guilt offering of a nazirite brought for his purification and the guilt offering of a leper brought for his purification, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard and collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north. Apparently, the <i>tanna</i> maintains that the blood of the guilt offering of a leper must be collected in a service vessel.
  The Gemara answers: Initially, the <i>tanna</i> held that since collection of the blood of the guilt offering of a leper must also be in the priest’s hand, not exclusively in a service vessel, he omitted it. But since it is the case that it is possible for one to collect some of the blood only in a service vessel, the <i>tanna</i> subsequently taught it.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nega’im</i> 9:2): The Torah states with regard to the guilt offering of a leper: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the guilt offering, and the priest shall put it upon the tip of the right ear of him who is to be purified, and upon the thumb of his right hand, and upon the big toe of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:14). One might have thought that he should take it in a vessel; therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall put.” Just as putting the blood on the ear, thumb, and big toe must be performed with the priest’s own body, so too, taking of the blood is performed with the priest’s own body, not with a service vessel.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that even with regard to the blood of the leper’s guilt offering that he presents on the altar, like the blood of other guilt offerings, it is so, that he collects the blood in his hand rather than with a vessel. To counter this, the verse states: “For as the sin offering is, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:13). This teaches that just as a sin offering requires a vessel for collection of its blood, so too, the blood of a guilt offering requires a vessel for collection of its blood. You consequently say: In the case of a leper’s guilt offering, two priests collect its blood; one collects the blood by hand, and the other one collects the blood in a vessel. This one, who collected the blood in a vessel, comes to the altar and sprinkles some of the blood on it. And that one, who collected the blood by hand, comes to the leper and places some of the blood on his right ear, right thumb, and right big toe.
  
  Daf 48a
  
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, their slaughter is in the north and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna list these sin offerings first? After all, while the <i>halakha</i> that slaughter must be in the north of the Temple courtyard is written in the Torah with regard to a burnt offering (Leviticus 1:11), the Torah does not explicitly state that the other offerings must be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, let the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teach the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering first.
  The Gemara answers: Since the location for slaughtering the sin offering is derived through interpretation, it is dear to the <i>tanna</i>, and he therefore he gives it precedence. The verse states: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18). The Gemara (55a) derives from this verse that the sin offering must be slaughtered in the same place as the burnt offering, i.e., in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara challenges: But let the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teach first the <i>halakha</i> of the external sin offerings, since those are the offerings to which the verse is referring. The Gemara explains: Since the blood of the Yom Kippur sin offerings enters the innermost sanctum, these offerings are dear to the <i>tanna</i>, and he taught them first.
  The Gemara asks: And where is it written that a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers that with regard to a sheep that is brought as a burnt offering the Torah states: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord; and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall dash its blood against the altar round about” (Leviticus 1:11).
  The Gemara clarifies: We have found that this verse provides a source that a young sheep burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north. From where do we derive that a young bull burnt offering must also be slaughtered in the north? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And if his offering be of the flock, whether of the sheep, or of the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it a male without blemish” (Leviticus 1:10). The conjunctive “and” represented by the letter <i>vav</i> adds to the previous matter. The previous passage addresses cattle offerings. And let the upper passage, the place of the slaughter of a bull, be learned from the lower passage, the place of slaughtering a sheep.
  The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that we learn <i>halakhot</i> in this manner. But according to the one who says that we do not learn <i>halakhot</i> in this manner, what is there to say?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Immediately following the passage in the Torah addressing a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, the Torah discusses the <i>halakhot</i> of a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. The verse states: “And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). This serves to render him liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis deem him exempt in such a case. The Gemara suggests: What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that we learn <i>halakhot</i> of the upper passage from the lower passage, and the other Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that we do not learn <i>halakhot</i> in this manner?
  Rav Pappa said: This is not correct, as everyone holds that we learn <i>halakhot</i> of the upper passage from the lower passage. And this is the reason that the Rabbis exempt from bringing an offering one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property: They learn a verbal analogy. It is stated here: “And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done” (Leviticus 5:17). And it is stated with regard to the sin offering for eating forbidden fat: “And if any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27).
  The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, the sin offering is brought only for an act that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>, and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin offering, so too here, one brings a provisional guilt offering only for an act that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with <i>karet</i>, and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin offering, which is not the case concerning misuse of consecrated property.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Akiva derive from this verbal analogy? He learns that just as there the verse obligates one to bring a fixed sin offering, so too here, with regard to the provisional guilt offering, one brings it for a case of uncertain transgression of a prohibition for which one would be liable to bring a fixed sin offering, to exclude a sin offering brought for uncertain transgression of the defiling of the Temple or sacrificial foods, as the sin offering for that transgression is not fixed, but is a sliding-scale offering. If the sinner is poor he brings a meal offering or a bird offering; if he is rich he brings an animal offering. In a case of uncertainty one does not bring a provisional guilt offering.
  And as for the Rabbis, who derived a different <i>halakha</i> from the verbal analogy, they hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter. Once a provisional guilt offering is compared to a sin offering, it must be completely similar, and both matters are derived from the verbal analogy. The Gemara asks: But Rabbi Akiva also must hold that there is no verbal analogy for half of a matter, so why does he not agree with the derivation of the Rabbis?
  The Gemara reconsiders: Yes, this is indeed so. And here they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Akiva holds that it is written with regard to the provisional guilt offering: “And if anyone sin, and does any of the commandments which the Lord has commanded not to be done, though he did not know it, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17). The word “and” represented by the letter <i>vav</i> adds to the previous matter. When a phrase begins with the conjunction <i>vav</i>, it is a continuation of the previous matter, and the <i>halakhot</i> of the previous passage can be learned from the subsequent passage. Therefore one brings a provisional guilt offering for uncertain misuse of consecrated property.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of the Rabbis also, isn’t it written: “And if anyone sin”? Let us say that they disagree about this: As one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that a derivation from a juxtaposition is preferable, and derives from the juxtaposition of the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property to the <i>halakhot</i> of a provisional guilt offering that one is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that a derivation from a verbal analogy is preferable, and therefore derive from a verbal analogy between the passage of misuse of consecrated property and the passage of a sin offering for eating forbidden fat that one is not liable to bring a provisional guilt offering if he is not certain whether he misused consecrated property.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, it may be that everyone agrees that a derivation from a juxtaposition is preferable. And the Rabbis would say to you that the reason one is exempt from bringing a provisional guilt offering in a case of uncertain mis-use of consecrated property is that the juxtaposition should be understood in the opposite manner. It is the lower passage that is derived from the upper passage.
  The juxtaposition teaches that a provisional guilt offering must be a ram worth a minimum of two silver shekels, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the offering brought for misuse of consecrated property. This derivation is needed so that you should not say that a provisional guilt offering, brought for his uncertain transgression, should not be more stringent than the offering one brings in a case of his definite transgression. According to that claim, one would say that just as for his definite transgression one may bring a sin offering worth only one-sixth [<i>danka</i>] of a dinar, so too, for his uncertain transgression one may bring a provisional guilt offering worth only one-sixth of a dinar.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive this conclusion? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse that states: “And this is the law of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:1), which teaches that there is one law for all of the guilt offerings and they must all be worth at least two shekels, provisional guilt offerings included.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to one who holds that there is a derivation from the word “law,” but according to the one who does not hold that there is a derivation from the word “law,” from where does he learn that all guilt offerings must have the same minimum value? The Gemara answers: He learns it from a verbal analogy between the term “according to your valuation” stated with regard to a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:15) and the term “according to your valuation” stated with regard to a provisional guilt offering (Leviticus 5:18) and a guilt offering for robbery (Leviticus 5:25).
  The Gemara asks: This works out well concerning guilt offerings where it is written “according to your valuation,” but with regard to a guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant, concerning which it is not written in the Torah “according to your valuation,” what is there to say? How does one derive that the guilt offering brought for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant must be worth a minimum of two silver shekels?
  The Gemara answers that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the term “with the ram” stated with regard to a guilt offering for mis-use of consecrated property (Leviticus 5:16) and the term “with the ram” stated with regard to the guilt offering for engaging in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant (Leviticus 19:22).
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the mishna. From where do we derive that a sin offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to an individual sin offering: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). Just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, so too, a sin offering must also be slaughtered in the north.
  The Gemara asks: We have found from this verse that the slaughter must be in the north. From where do we derive that collection of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and all its remaining blood he shall pour out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). As this verse immediately follows the verse discussing the slaughter of a sin offering, evidently the taking of the blood is performed in the same place as the slaughter.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one collecting the blood must himself stand in the north of the Temple courtyard? Perhaps he may stand near the north and extend his arm to collect the blood. The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And the priest shall take [<i>velakaḥ</i>]” (Leviticus 4:34), which can be read, as: He will take himself [<i>lo yikkaḥ</i>].
  The Gemara asks: We have found that the offering must be slaughtered in the north and the blood collected in the north to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. From where is it derived that if one slaughters the offering or collects the blood anywhere else the offering is disqualified? The Gemara answers: It is written in another verse which speaks of a goat sin offering brought by a king who sins: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? In the north. This sin offering of a king must also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  
  Daf 48b
  
  The Gemara asks: And do you learn this <i>halakha</i> from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why did the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: To fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if it was not slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified even after the fact.
  The Gemara asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). This established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they require slaughter in the north.
  The Gemara continues its explanation: We have found that the Torah writes with regard to the goat sin offering of a king that it requires slaughter in the north both to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner and to disqualify the offering even after the fact. We have also found with regard to the other sin offerings that the Torah states that to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner they must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard. From where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> to disqualify other sin offerings if they were not slaughtered in the north?
  The Gemara explains: As it is written with regard to a lamb sin offering that it must be slaughtered in the north: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:33) and it is also written with regard to a she-goat sin offering: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter it for a sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). This repetition teaches that a sin offering is disqualified if it is not slaughtered in the north.
  § Having derived from these verses that all sin offerings are disqualified if they are slaughtered not in the north, the Gemara questions its earlier explanation. Rather, why do I need the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king in the verse: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24)?
  The Gemara answers: It is required for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle, but the goat offered by Nahshon and the other princes was not slaughtered in the north. Nahshon was the prince of the tribe of Judah. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (Numbers, chapter 7). Although the offerings were classified as sin offerings because they shared some characteristics of sin offerings, they were not brought to atone for any particular sin. Therefore, the term “it” teaches that the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.
  And the reason that it is necessary for the Torah to exclude Nahshon’s sin offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north is because it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.
  The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement of being slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that for the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon and the other princes there was no requirement of slaughter in the north.
  Ravina objects to this interpretation: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon required him to place his hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Tavi, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does it work out well? Why is it necessary for the Torah to specifically exclude the offerings of the princes from the requirement of slaughter in the north? Why not say that for that for which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included, and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included.
  And if you would say that if the verse had not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was only for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.
  Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters it.
  The Gemara challenges this: The <i>halakha</i> of the one who slaughters the offering has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term “it”?
  He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it,” to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters it is not required to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. Therefore, the question must be addressed: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?
  The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a young bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that a male bird requires pinching of the nape in the north of the Temple courtyard. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as a young sheep brought as a burnt offering is an offering for which the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest but nevertheless fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a young bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its killing must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a male bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.
  The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a bird offering from the <i>halakha</i> of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a young sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. A bird, by contrast, is killed by the priest using his fingernail. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation.
  The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as a burnt offering is an offering for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter but fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, as it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.
  The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a Paschal offering from the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
  The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar but is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins that render one liable for punishment by <i>karet</i>, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
  The Gemara continues: If you would suggest a logical inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, which does not atone for those sins punishable by <i>karet</i>, and which is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it has the status of an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings as well, the <i>halakha</i> of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them, since they all have the status of offerings of the most sacred order.
  The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Actually, the term “it” teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this <i>halakha</i> from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation from the term “it” is not to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that <i>halakha</i> is known already from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya. Rather, the derivation is that it is only one who slaughters the animal who does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.
  The Gemara questions this inference: The <i>halakha</i> that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: “And the priest shall take” [<i>velakaḥ</i>] (Leviticus 4:34), which may be read as: He will take himself [<i>lo yikaḥ</i>], as explained on the previous <i>amud</i>. The Gemara explains: This <i>tanna</i> does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: “And the priest shall take.” He does not agree with this derivation, and therefore he must derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.
  § The Gemara asks: We found a source for the requirement of slaughter in the north with regard to a burnt offering in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. We also found a source for the requirement of collecting the blood while standing in the north in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner. From where do we derive that slaughter and collection of the blood are disqualified if they are not performed in the north?
  Rav Adda bar Ahava says, and some say it was Rabba bar Sheila who says: It is derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as the <i>halakha</i> that the slaughter and blood collection of a sin offering be performed in the north comes by virtue of a comparison to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, as the verse states: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), yet if the animal was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north it disqualifies the offering, with regard to the burnt offering itself, as the <i>halakha</i> that the slaughter and blood collection of a sin offering be in the north comes by virtue of it, is it not logical that if it was not slaughtered or its blood was not collected in the north, this should disqualify the offering?
  The Gemara rejects this logical inference: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins that render one liable for punishment by <i>karet</i>, which is not so with regard to a burnt offering.
  Ravina said: This is what is difficult for Rav Adda bar Ahava. In other words, regardless of the notable characteristic of a sin offering, he still is of the opinion that his logical inference stands. Have we ever found that a secondary prohibition is more stringent than a primary prohibition? Since the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering is derived via a comparison to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, the former cannot have stringencies that the latter lacks.
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But have we not found a secondary prohibition that is more stringent than the primary one?
  
  Daf 49a
  
  But there is the case of the second tithe, which may be redeemed, whereas food that is purchased with second-tithe redemption money may not be redeemed. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 10:10): With regard to food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure, this ritually impure food must be redeemed with money, with which one must purchase other food. Rabbi Yehuda says: The food must be buried. The Gemara infers from the mishna: If the food purchased with the second-tithe money became impure, yes, it may be redeemed, but if it did not become impure, it may not be redeemed. If so, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the <i>halakha</i> that food purchased with second-tithe money must be buried if it becomes impure is more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> for second-tithe produce itself, which may be redeemed if it becomes impure.
  The Gemara answers: There, the reason one may not redeem food that was purchased with second-tithe money and that then became ritually impure is not that the <i>halakha</i> is more stringent. Rather, there is a different reason. Since this food was merely purchased with second-tithe money, its sanctity is not as strong as the tithe itself and is unable to grasp its redemption money. Its status as second tithe is weak, and cannot be transferred to a third item. Consequently, if it becomes impure, according to Rabbi Yehuda it cannot be redeemed for money but must be buried, as an item that one is prohibited to derive benefit from.
  Mar Zutra asks: But there is the case of a substitution, as the status of an offering does not take effect with regard to a permanently blemished animal, while consecration performed via substitution does take effect with regard to an animal with a permanent blemish. Although the animal cannot be sacrificed as an offering and must be redeemed, even after its redemption it may not be used for labor and its wool may not be used.
  The Gemara answers: The sanctity of a substitution comes by virtue of a consecrated animal; therefore it has a stronger sanctity. But the sanctity of a consecrated animal itself comes by virtue of a non-sacred animal, as there was no consecrated animal by which the owner extended the sanctity to this animal.
  Mar Zutra asks: But there is the case of a Paschal offering, as it does not require the placing of hands on its head, or wine libations to accompany the offering, or waving of the breast and thigh. While its remainder, an animal that was designated as a Paschal offering but was not sacrificed at the right time, which is then sacrificed as a peace offering, has more stringent <i>halakhot</i>, because it requires the placing of hands on its head, and wine libations to accompany the offering, and waving of the breast and thigh.
  The Gemara answers: A Paschal offering on the rest of the days of the year is the same as a peace offering, and the animal is no longer considered to be a Paschal offering. Since it is a peace offering, all the <i>halakhot</i> of a peace offering apply to it, and the fact that it was once designated as a Paschal offering is irrelevant. The conclusion of the Gemara is that there are no cases where a secondary status is more stringent than the corresponding primary status. Therefore, the derivation from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, that the latter should be disqualified if it was not slaughtered in the north or if its blood was not collected in the north, remains.
  And if you wish, say there is a different proof that even after the fact a burnt offering that was not slaughtered in the north is disqualified. The verse states: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29). Since the earlier verse (Leviticus 4:24) already stated: “In the place of the burnt offering,” the repetition in this verse stresses that it shall be in its place, meaning that the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered anywhere else.
  § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that a guilt offering, which is an offering of the most sacred order, requires slaughter in the north? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “In the place where they slaughter the burnt offering they shall slaughter the guilt offering, and its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar” (Leviticus 7:2). Since the burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north, the guilt offering must also be slaughtered in the north.
  The Gemara asks: We have found a source that the slaughter must be in the north. From where do we derive that the collection of the blood must also be in the north? The Gemara answers that the second half of the verse states: “And its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar.” Since the blood must be collected immediately after the slaughter and before the sprinkling, just as the slaughter must be in the north, so the collection of its blood must also be in the north.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the one who collects the blood must himself stand in the north? The Gemara answers: It is derived from the fact that the verse does not only state: “Its blood shall be sprinkled,” but states: “And its blood shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 7:2). The conjunction “and [<i>ve’et</i>]” serves to include the one who collects the blood.
  The Gemara asks: We have found a verse teaching that in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal manner, the slaughtering of the guilt offering is in the north. From where do we derive to disqualify after the fact an offering slaughtered elsewhere, not in the north? The Gemara answers: Another verse is written, referring to a guilt offering, which states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). This teaches that all guilt offerings are disqualified if they are not slaughtered in the north.
  The Gemara asks: But does this verse come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? This verse is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a matter that was included in a general category but left to discuss a new matter, i.e., if a novel aspect or special ruling is taught with regard to a specific case within a broader general category, you may not return it to its general category even for other matters, and this case is understood to have been entirely removed from the general category, until the verse explicitly returns it to its general category.
  The Gemara explains: How so? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary; for as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest, it is most holy” (Leviticus 14:13). As there is no need for the verse to state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” since the verse had already equated the guilt offering with the sin offering, why does the verse state: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”? What does it serve to teach?
  Since the guilt offering of a leper left the general category of guilt offerings to teach a new matter, as there is a <i>halakha</i> unique to the guilt offering of a leper in that blood of the offering is placed on the right thumb of the hand and the right big toe of the foot and the right ear of the leper, one might have thought that this guilt offering does not require placement of blood or the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar, as the <i>halakhot</i> of this guilt offering are unique.
  To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “As the sin offering, so is the guilt offering.” Just as the sin offering requires the placement of the blood and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar, so too, the guilt offering of a leper requires placement of the blood and the burning of sacrificial portions on the altar. Similarly, just as the verse had to teach these two <i>halakhot</i>, so too, the verse had to state: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering,” to teach that it requires slaughter in the north. It cannot serve as a source for the general <i>halakha</i> that a guilt offering slaughtered in a place other than in the north is disqualified.
  The Gemara explains: If so, that the optimal manner to perform the mitzva is to slaughter a guilt offering in the north but failure to do so does not disqualify the offering, let the Torah write the requirement to slaughter in the north in this context, i.e., in the context of the guilt offering of a leper, and not write it in that context, i.e., that of the standard guilt offering. The requirement for slaughter in the north for all other guilt offerings could be derived from the guilt offering of the leper. The repetition of the requirement to slaughter in the north serves to disqualify a guilt offering whose slaughter is not in the north.
  The Gemara comments: This works out well if we hold that with regard to a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, the following principle applies: That matter itself does not learn <i>halakhot</i> from its general category until the Torah explicitly returns it to that category,
  
  Daf 49b
  
  but other matters in its general category learn <i>halakhot</i> from it; in this case with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of slaughtering a guilt offering in the north, it is well. Although some of the <i>halakhot</i> of the guilt offering of a leper do not apply to the category of guilt offerings in general, it can still serve as the source for the <i>halakha</i> that any guilt offering is disqualified if slaughtered not in the north. But if we hold that in the case of a matter that left its category to teach a new matter, it, the original matter, does not learn <i>halakhot</i> from its general category and its general category does not learn <i>halakhot</i> from it, then this verse is necessary to teach its own <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Once the verse returned the <i>halakha</i> of the guilt offering of a leper to the general category by stating “as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering,” it returned it completely. Therefore, when the verse states that it requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard, the phrase is not needed to teach the <i>halakha</i> about the guilt offering of a leper, and it can be used to teach the <i>halakha</i> about guilt offerings in general.
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: Say that when the verse returned the guilt offering of a leper to the class of standard guilt offerings, that is only with regard to place-ment of blood on the altar and burning the sacrificial portions, which require priesthood, i.e., only a priest may perform those rites. As the verse states: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; to the priest” (Leviticus 14:13). But say that slaughter, which does not require priesthood, as even a non-priest may slaughter an offering, does not require that it be done in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  Ravina answered him: If so, let the verse state: For as the sin offering, so is it. What is added by the expanded phrase: “For as the sin offering, so is the guilt offering”? It teaches that the guilt offering of a leper will be like the rest of the guilt offerings.
  § The Gemara asks: Why do I need to juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper to a sin offering to teach the <i>halakha</i> that it must be slaughtered in the north, and why do I need to juxtapose it to a burnt offering to teach the same <i>halakha</i>? The verse states: “And he shall slaughter the sheep in the place where they slaughter the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the place of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 14:13).
  Ravina said: It was necessary to juxtapose the guilt offering to both of them, as, if the verse had juxtaposed it only to a sin offering but had not juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, I would say: From where is the requirement to slaughter a sin offering in the north derived? It is from the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, as explained on 48a. I would then assume that a matter derived via a juxtaposition, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering, which was derived via a juxtaposition to the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, then teaches that <i>halakha</i> to another case via a juxtaposition. But there is a principle that with regard to matters of consecration the <i>halakha</i> may not be derived via a juxtaposition from another <i>halakha</i> that was itself derived via a juxtaposition. To prevent this incorrect assumption, the verse had to specifically teach the juxtaposition to a burnt offering.
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: But let the verse juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper only to a burnt offering and not juxtapose it to a sin offering. The juxtaposition to a sin offering appears superfluous.
  Ravina answered: If that had been so, I would still say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition. And if you would say that if that were to be so, let the verse juxtapose the guilt offering of a leper only to a sin offering, one could answer that it is preferable for the Torah that it juxtaposes the guilt offering to the primary offering about which it states that it must be slaughtered in the north, i.e., the burnt offering, and not juxtapose it to the secondary offering, the sin offering. For this reason, i.e., to prevent the incorrect assumption that a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, the verse juxtaposed it to a sin offering and also juxtaposed it to a burnt offering, to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition does not then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.
  Rava says: The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition is derived from here, as it is written with regard to the sin offering brought by the High Priest: “And the two kidneys, and the fat that is upon them, which is by the loins, and the diaphragm with the liver, which he shall take away by the kidneys. As it is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings; and the priest shall make them smoke upon the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:9–10). One can ask: For what <i>halakha</i> is this offering juxtaposed to that of a peace offering? If it is to teach that the priest must sacrifice the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys from the offering, that is written with regard to the offering itself, in the previous verse. This does not need to be derived via a juxtaposition.
  It is written due to the fact that the verse wants to teach the <i>halakha</i> of the diaphragm with the liver and the two kidneys, deriving it from the <i>halakha</i> of the offering of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, then teaching it to apply it to the <i>halakha</i> of the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship. It is not written explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself, and it is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of the bull for an unwitting sin of an anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest. The offering for an unwitting communal sin is juxtaposed to the sin offering brought by the High Priest in the verse: “So shall he do with the bull; as he did with the bull of the sin offering, so shall he do with this” (Leviticus 4:20).
  For this reason it was necessary for the verse to state: “As it is taken off from the ox” (Leviticus 4:10), so that it is as though it wrote explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself. One of the hermeneutical principles applied to understanding verses in the Torah is: If the <i>halakha</i> stated is not required for the matter in which it is written, apply it to another matter. When this principle is employed, the <i>halakha</i> written in one context is viewed as if it were written elsewhere. In this case, as it was not necessary for the verse to write the juxtaposition to a peace offering in the context of the sin offering brought by the High Priest, it is applied to the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin. And therefore it will not be a case of a matter derived via a juxtaposition that then teaches its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.
  Rav Pappa said to Rava: But why not let the Torah write explicitly in the passage discussing the bull for an unwitting communal sin itself that the diaphragm with the liver and two kidneys must be removed from the ox, and not juxtapose it to a peace offering in this convoluted manner?
  Rava answered: If the Torah had written it in that passage itself, and not juxtaposed it, I would say that in general a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches via a juxtaposition, as one would not have this instance to serve as a counterexample to that principle. And if you would say: If so, why not simply juxtapose the case of the bull for an unwitting communal sin to the case of the bull of the anointed priest, I would answer: It is preferable for the verse that it writes it in the passage itself rather than to juxtapose it alone. It is for this reason that it wrote it and juxtaposed it, to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.
  § Before beginning a lengthy discussion concerning derivations via compounded methodologies of the hermeneutical principles, the Gemara presents a mnemonic for its forthcoming discussion: Juxtaposition, verbal analogy, an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  The principle that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition is indicated either from the proof of Rava or from the proof of Ravina, both cited earlier. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Natan ben Avtolemos says: From where is it derived that if leprosy of garments spreads throughout an entire garment that it is pure? It is derived via a verbal analogy: A bareness within [<i>karaḥat</i>] and a bareness without [<i>gabbaḥat</i>] are stated with regard to leprosy of garments: “And the priest shall look, after that the mark is washed; and behold, if the mark has not changed its color, and the mark has not spread, it is impure; you shall burn it in the fire; it is a fret, whether the bareness be within or without” (Leviticus 13:55); and a bald head [<i>karaḥat</i>] and a bald forehead [<i>gabbaḥat</i>] are stated with regard to leprosy of a person: “But if there be in the bald head, or the bald forehead, a reddish-white plague, it is leprosy breaking out in his bald head, or his bald forehead” (Leviticus 13:42).
  Just as there, with regard to a person, if the leprosy spread throughout him entirely he is pure, as the verse states: “Then the priest shall look; and behold, if the leprosy has covered all of his flesh, he shall pronounce the one who has the mark pure; it is all turned white: He is pure” (Leviticus 13:13), so too here with regard to garments, if the leprosy spread throughout the entire garment it is pure.
  The Gemara continues its proof: But there, with regard to the head, which serves as the source for this verbal analogy, from where do we derive that if the leprosy spreads throughout the head he is pure? As it is written: “And if the leprosy breaks out on the skin, and the leprosy covers all the skin of the one who has the mark, from his head to his feet, as far as it appears to the priest” (Leviticus 13:12). And the verse thereby juxtaposes leprosy on his head to leprosy on his foot, teaching the following <i>halakha</i>: Just as there, with regard to leprosy of the body and foot, if its entirety turned white, and it spread all over him, he is pure, so too here, in the case of leprosy of the head, if its entirety turned white and it spread over all his head, he is pure. Evidently, a matter derived via a juxtaposition can then teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This cannot serve as a proof with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of consecrated matters. With regard to the entire Torah, one derives a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy from a <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, apart from with regard to consecrated matters, where one does not derive a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy from a <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: As if it were to be so that one could derive a <i>halakha</i> in this manner even concerning consecrated matters, the verse should not state the requirement for slaughter in the north with regard to a guilt offering, as stated from the explicit juxtaposition of a burnt offering and a sin offering, and instead derive it through a verbal analogy. The verse describes a guilt offering as an offering of the most sacred order (see Leviticus 7:1), and its <i>halakha</i> can be derived via a verbal analogy from that of a sin offering, which is described in the same manner (see Leviticus 6:18).
  Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: Is this not to say, at least with regard to consecrated matters, that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy?
  The Gemara rejects Rabbi Yoḥanan’s proof: But perhaps the requirement to slaughter a guilt offering in the north must be written explicitly because the verbal analogy can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins liable for punishment by <i>karet</i>, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering.
  The Gemara rejects this claim: There are additional descriptions of a guilt offering and a sin offering as offerings of the most sacred order written in the verses: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, reserved from the fire: Every offering of theirs, every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may offer to Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). A verbal analogy derived from extra phrases in the verse cannot be refuted with a logical claim. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s claim stands, and, at least with regard to consecrated matters, a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy.
  The Gemara states: That a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teaches its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference
  
  Daf 50a
  
  is apparent from that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, discussed in the previous chapter (41a).
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via a juxtaposition can teach its <i>halakha</i> in another context via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: It must be that it cannot, as, if it could, let the Torah not write the requirement to slaughter an offering in the north of the Temple courtyard with regard to a guilt offering (see Leviticus 14:13), and one can derive it via a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering, since they are both offerings of the most sacred order. For what <i>halakha</i> did the verse write it with regard to a guilt offering as well? Is this not to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> in another context via a paradigm?
  The Gemara questions this proof: But according to your reasoning, why not derive the <i>halakha</i> that a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north from the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, via a paradigm? What is the reason that this <i>halakha</i> is not derived from there? It must be because it can be refuted with the following claim: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering. The Gemara now states its objection: In that case, the derivation from a sin offering via a paradigm can also be refuted: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins liable for punishment by <i>karet</i>, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering. If so, there is no proof from here.
  The Gemara suggests an alternative paradigm: Although the requirement to slaughter one of these three offerings, i.e., a burnt offering, sin offering, or guilt offering, in the north cannot be derived from any one of the others, one can derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning one of them from the other two.
  The Gemara clarifies: From which two could one derive the third? Let the Merciful One not write the requirement to slaughter the offering in the north with regard to a burnt offering, and derive this <i>halakha</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering and a guilt offering. The Gemara refutes this derivation: What is notable about these two offerings? They are notable in that they atone for transgressions, whereas a burnt offering does not atone for any sin.
  The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write the requirement to slaughter an offering in the north with regard to a sin offering, and derive this <i>halakha</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of these others, the burnt offering and the guilt offering. The Gemara refutes this derivation: What is notable about these two offerings? They are notable in that they are brought only from male animals, whereas an individual’s sin offering is a female animal.
  The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write the requirement to slaughter an offering in the north with regard to a guilt offering, and derive this <i>halakha</i> from the <i>halakhot</i> of these other two. The Gemara refutes this derivation: What is notable about these two offerings? They are notable in that they are brought by a community just as they are brought by an individual, whereas a guilt offering can be brought only by an individual.
  The Gemara returns to its discussion of hermeneutical principles. What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a juxtaposition? Rav Pappa says: The verse states: “And this is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which one may offer to the Lord. If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall offer with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour soaked” (Leviticus 7:11–12). From this juxtaposition we have learned that the money to purchase a thanks offering can come from money used to redeem the second tithe, since we find that the money to purchase a peace offering can come from money used to redeem the second tithe.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the money to purchase peace offerings themselves can come from money used to redeem the second tithe? As it is written with regard to peace offerings: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7). And it is written with regard to second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there” (Deuteronomy 14:23). The usage of the term “there” in both passages serves as a verbal analogy, and demonstrates that a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy, that of a peace offering, can then teach a <i>halakha</i> via its juxtaposition to a thanks offering.
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: This is not a proof, because the tithe of grain, including the second tithe, is merely non-sacred. Therefore, it cannot be used to prove that in the realm of consecrated matters a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy can teach a <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.
  Ravina said to him: Does the one who said that in the realm of consecrated matters a <i>halakha</i> derived via one of the hermeneutical principles cannot teach via another of those principles say this only when the <i>halakha</i> that is derived is in the realm of consecrated matters and the <i>halakha</i> that teaches is in the realm of consecrated matters as well? He holds that even if that which is derived is in the realm of consecrated matters it cannot teach its <i>halakha</i> via one of the hermeneutical principles. Therefore, since peace offerings are in the realm of consecrated matters, the <i>halakha</i> derived from the juxtaposition of thanks offerings to peace offerings serves as a source that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a juxtaposition.
  § The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via another verbal analogy? Rami bar Ḥama says: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the types of bread that accompany a thanks offering: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened loaves mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and loaves mingled with oil, of fine flour cooked with oil” (Leviticus 7:12). We have derived from here that the poached breads accompanying the thanks offering come from fine flour.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From where is it derived that the loaves accompanying a thanks offering are also prepared with fine flour? The verse states: “Loaves mingled with oil, of fine flour cooked with oil” (Leviticus 7:12), and it also states in the same verse: “Unleavened loaves mingled with oil.” From where is it derived that the unleavened wafers accompanying a thanks offering are also prepared with fine flour? The verse states: “Unleavened cakes mingled with oil” (Leviticus 7:12), and the verse also states: “Unleavened wafers spread with oil.” The <i>baraita</i> derives via a verbal analogy that the unleavened loaves mingled with oil are prepared with fine flour, and then teaches the <i>halakha</i> concerning unleavened wafers using a verbal analogy from the <i>halakha</i> of unleavened loaves.
  Ravina said to Rami bar Ḥama: From where do you know that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> learns the verbal analogy of “unleavened” and “unleavened” from loaves of the thanks offering? Perhaps the <i>tanna</i> learns the verbal analogy from the word “unleavened” stated with regard to meal offerings baked in an oven, about which the verse states explicitly that they are prepared with fine flour: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in the oven, it shall be unleavened cakes of fine flour mingled with oil, or unleavened wafers spread with oil” (Leviticus 2:4). If so, there is no source that a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy can teach a <i>halakha</i> via a verbal analogy.
  Rather, Rava says that the source is from a different <i>baraita</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the bull offering of a High Priest: “And the skin of the bull and all its flesh, with its head and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung, the whole bull shall he carry out of the camp to a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it on wood with fire” (Leviticus 4:11–12). This teaches that he brings the offering out whole.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that he should burn it whole as well. It is stated here: “Its head and its legs,” and it is stated there, with regard to a burnt offering: “And he shall cut it into its pieces; and the priest shall lay them, with its head and its fats, in order on the wood that is on the fire which is upon the altar. But the innards and the legs shall he wash with water” (Leviticus 1:12–13). Just as there, the burnt offering is burned by means of cutting the offering into pieces, as explicitly stated in the verse, so too here, it is burned by means of cutting the offering into pieces.
  The Gemara clarifies: If these are compared, one could say that just as there, the burnt offering is prepared for being burned by first flaying it, so too here, the bull offering of a High Priest should also be prepared for being burned by first flaying it. To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “And its innards and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation? How do these words teach that there is no requirement to flay the animal? Rav Pappa says: Just as the dung remains inside the animal when the animal is burned, so the animal’s flesh remains inside its skin. In any event, the <i>halakha</i> that the bull offering of a High Priest is cut into pieces before it is burned is derived via a verbal analogy.
  Rava continues: And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated here, with regard to the bull and goat offered by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, the terms skin, flesh, and dung, in the verse: “And the bull of the sin offering, and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to make atonement in the Sanctuary, shall be carried out of the camp; and they shall burn in the fire their skin, and their flesh, and their dung” (Leviticus 16:27).
  
  Daf 50b
  
  And it is stated below, with regard to the bull sin offerings that are burned, the terms skin, flesh, and dung, in the verse: “But the skin of the bull, and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). Just as below it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying, as derived by the verbal analogy, so too here it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying. Evidently, a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy can then teach another <i>halakha</i> via a verbal analogy.
  § The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? The Gemara answers: That question itself can be answered with an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference?
  The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say?
  Rather, this can be derived through a different <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its <i>halakha</i> via another verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference?
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a paradigm? The question shall stand unresolved.
  § The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a juxtaposition? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which can be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition?
  The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. And just as a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which can be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its <i>halakha</i> via a verbal analogy?
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. And just as a <i>halakha</i> derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as we have said, with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which can be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference?
  The Gemara comments: And this is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that is the son of, i.e., is derived from, another <i>a fortiori</i> inference. The Gemara challenges this last statement: It is not the son of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, but the grandson of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which cannot be used. The very fact that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can then teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is itself derived from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the Gemara stated.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be derived via another <i>a fortiori</i> inference. And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot be derived via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a <i>halakha</i> derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, which can be derived from another <i>halakha</i> derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its <i>halakha</i> via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? The Gemara comments: And this is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that is the son of another <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (69a–b): If a priest pinched the nape of a bird offering properly and it was then found to be a bird with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], which disqualifies it from being used as an offering and renders it prohibited for consumption by the priests, Rabbi Meir says: An olive-bulk of its meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning a bird carcass, as the fact that it underwent pinching means that it is not in the category of a carcass. Rabbi Yehuda says: Its status is like that of any other carcass of a kosher bird, and its meat renders one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir said: My opinion can be proved via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. And just as with regard to the carcass of an animal, which transmits impurity to a person through touching it and carrying it, its slaughter nevertheless purifies its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity, with regard to the carcass of a bird, which possesses less severe impurity, as it does not transmit impurity through touching it and carrying it, but only when it is in the throat, is it not logical that its slaughter purifies its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity? And once it is established that slaughter purifies a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i>, it can be derived: Just as we found with regard to a bird’s slaughter that it permits it for consumption
  
  Daf 51a
  
  and it purifies its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity, so too its pinch-ing, which permits bird offerings with regard to consumption, should purify its <i>tereifa</i> from its impurity.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Although one can derive from the case of an animal that slaughter purifies the <i>tereifa</i> of a bird from its impurity, that derivation cannot be extended to pinching. The same restriction that applies to every <i>a fortiori</i> inference, namely, that a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived, applies here: It is sufficient for the halakhic status of the carcass of a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> to be like that of the carcass of an animal of a kosher species that is a <i>tereifa</i>; i.e., that only its slaughter purifies it, but not its pinching.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: And that is not so. Let it remain there, i.e., one cannot learn from it, as that is a case that comes from the slaughter of non-sacred animals. The <i>halakha</i> of the pinching of a consecrated bird is derived through a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of the slaughter of a non-sacred bird, and the <i>halakha</i> of the slaughter of a non-sacred bird is derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of the slaughter of a non-sacred animal. Outside of the realm of consecrated matters there is no question that a matter derived via one of the hermeneutical principles can then teach its <i>halakha</i> via another principle. The entire question under discussion is only with regard to the realm of consecrated matters.
  § The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether a matter derived via a paradigm can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a juxtaposition or via a verbal analogy or via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference or via a paradigm?
  The Gemara states: Resolve at least one of those questions. The Gemara cites a lengthy <i>baraita</i> before stating the resolution inferred from that <i>baraita</i>. For what reason did the Sages say that in the case of blood left overnight it is fit, i.e., if blood of an offering had been left overnight and was then placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is as it is in the case of sacrificial portions, where if they are left overnight they are fit. From where is it derived that in the case of sacrificial portions which are left overnight, they are fit? This is as it is in the case of meat, where if it is left overnight it is fit, because the meat of a peace offering may be eaten for two days and one night.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that has left the Temple courtyard is then placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, since an offering that leaves its area is fit in the case of an offering brought on a private altar.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that has become ritually impure is placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, since one is permitted to offer an impure offering in the case of communal rites, i.e., communal offerings. In cases of necessity, the communal offerings may be sacrificed even if they are ritually impure.
  From where is it derived that in the case of an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it beyond its designated time [<i>piggul</i>], if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? The <i>halakha</i> applies there since the sprinkling of its blood effects acceptance of the offering notwithstanding its status of <i>piggul</i>. The status of <i>piggul</i> takes effect only if the sacrificial rites involving that offering were otherwise performed properly. This indicates that it still has the status of an offering, so it need not be removed from the altar.
  From where is it derived that in the case of an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it outside its designated area, if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, since it is juxtaposed to an offering that was slaughtered with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.
  From where is it derived that in the case of an offering for which priests who are disqualified collected and sprinkled its blood, if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of these priests who are generally disqualified because they are impure, yet who are fit to perform the communal rites, i.e., to sacrifice communal offerings, when all the priests or the majority of the Jewish people are impure. In any event, the <i>halakha</i> of the sacrificial portions was derived via a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of meat that was left overnight, and then the <i>halakha</i> of blood was derived via a paradigm from the <i>halakha</i> of the sacrificial portions. Evidently, a matter derived via a paradigm can teach its <i>halakha</i> to another matter via a paradigm.
  The Gemara questions the derivations of the <i>baraita</i>: But can one deduce the <i>halakha</i> of a matter that is not fit, i.e., sacrificial portions that are disqualified due to having been left overnight, from the <i>halakha</i> of a matter that is fit, i.e., the peace offering, which is permitted to be eaten for two days and one night? Similarly, how can the <i>baraita</i> derive the <i>halakha</i> of meat that was removed from the Temple courtyard from the <i>halakha</i> of a private altar, which has no sacred area surrounding it?
  The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> relied on the verse: “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: This is the law of the burnt offering: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night until the morning; and the fire of the altar shall thereby be kept burning” (Leviticus 6:2), which amplified it, teaching that many types of disqualified offerings may be left upon the altar. The derivations written in the <i>baraita</i> are mere supports for those <i>halakhot</i>.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary: As to the remainder of the blood which is left after the sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that it must be poured on the western base? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to the bull offering of the High Priest: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting; and all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). This means that he must pour it on that base which he encounters first when he leaves the Tent of Meeting, which is the western base.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There are three verses that contain the same phrase. With regard to pouring the remainder of the blood of a bull offering of the High Priest, the verse states: “All the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:7). This teaches that it must be on the base of the external altar, but not on the base of the inner altar, where he had sprinkled the blood.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin the verse states: “And he shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar which is before the Lord, that is in the Tent of Meeting, and all the remaining blood shall he pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). This teaches that the inner altar itself has no base at all.
  Finally, the verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). This teaches that you must give a base to the altar of the burnt offering, i.e., that the remainder of any blood placed on the altar must be poured on the base.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Or perhaps it is not so, but rather the verse serves to teach that any sprinkling of blood on the corners of the altar of the burnt offering will be done on a part of the altar where there is a base. Rabbi Yishmael said: There is no need for the verse to teach that <i>halakha</i>, because it can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as the remainder of the blood, which does not effect atonement, requires pouring on the base of the altar, with regard to the initial sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, which effects atonement, is it not logical that it requires a part of the altar where there is a base?
  Similarly, Rabbi Akiva said: Just as the remainder of the blood, which does not effect atonement and does not come for atonement, nevertheless requires pouring on the base of the altar, with regard to the initial sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, which effects atonement and comes for atonement, is it not logical that it requires a part of the altar where there is a base?
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: If so, why must the verse state: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25)? It is to teach that you must give a base to the altar of the burnt offering, i.e., that the remainder of the blood of the offering must be poured on the base.
  The Gemara discusses this <i>baraita</i>. The Master says: The verse states: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). This teaches that it must be on the base of the external altar, but not the base of the inner altar. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that necessary for the matter itself, to teach that the remainder of the blood must be poured onto the base of the external altar? The Gemara answers: That <i>halakha</i> is derived from: “Which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18), referring to the external altar. Therefore, the verse mentions the altar of burnt offering to exclude the base of the inner altar.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches with regard to the sin offering of a king: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25).
  
  Daf 51b
  
  This teaches that you must give a base to the altar of the burnt offering, i.e., that the remainder of any blood placed on the altar must be poured on the base.
  The Gemara explains: Because if it enters your mind that the verse states this simply to teach as it is written, concerning this offering alone, why do I need these verses with regard to the sin offering of a king? If you would answer: The verses are needed to teach the <i>halakha</i> that the remainder of the blood must be poured on the external altar rather than on the inner altar, then the question remains: Is there any need for the Torah to teach this about the remainder? But the sprinklings of blood themselves are performed on the external altar, so why would one think that the remainder of the blood should be poured on the inner altar?
  And if you would say that one might mistakenly say that the priest reverses the sprinklings,
  
  Daf 52a
  
  such that with regard to an offering for which he sprinkles the blood on the external altar he should pour the remainder of the blood on the inner altar, and this is analogous to the <i>halakha</i> that he pours the remainder of the blood sprinkled on the inner altar on the base of the external altar, this is not possible. But the inner altar itself does not have a base, and therefore it is not possible to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the inner altar. Therefore, the verse must teach that the remainder of the blood of the burnt offering is poured on the base of the external altar.
  The Gemara analyzes the next clause of the <i>baraita</i>: Or perhaps it is not so, but rather the verse serves to teach that any sprinkling of blood on the corners of the altar of the burnt offering will be done on a part of the altar where there is a base. The Gemara asks: How can the verse mean that? Is it written: At the base of the burnt offering? This would indicate that the blood of the burnt offering must be placed where there is a base. It is written in the verse: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25).
  The Gemara answers: Even if the verse were to be speaking about sprinkling the blood of the burnt offering and is not referring to pouring the remainder of the blood, the term “altar of” is necessary, because if it were written: At the base of the burnt offering, I would say that the priest must sprinkle the blood on the upright wall of the base of the altar, i.e., the side of the base, rather than on the upper surface of the base. Now that it is written: “At the base of the altar of the burnt offering,” it means that the blood must be sprinkled on the upper surface of the base.
  The Gemara explains the next clause of the <i>baraita</i> based on this understanding: Rabbi Yishmael said: Why do I need a verse to teach that the blood must be sprinkled on the upper surface of the base of the altar? It can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, which does not effect atonement, nevertheless requires that it must be poured on the upper surface of the base of the altar, with regard to the initial sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, which effects atonement, is it not logical that it requires the upper surface of the base of the altar?
  Rabbi Akiva explained similarly and said: And just as the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, which does not effect atonement and does not come for atonement, nevertheless requires that it must be poured on the upper surface of the base, with regard to the initial sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, which effects atonement and comes for atonement, is it not logical that it requires the upper surface of the base of the altar? The <i>baraita</i> concludes: If so, why must the verse state: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25)? It is to teach that you must give a base to the altar of the burnt offering, i.e., that the remainder of any blood sprinkled on the altar must be poured on the base.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the explanations of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva? Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The difference between them is whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood disqualifies the offering, so that all the sprinklings must be done again. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds that failure to pour the remainder of the blood does disqualify the offering. And one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, who adds the words: Which does not come for atonement, holds that failure to pour the remainder of the blood does not disqualify the offering.
  Rav Pappa says: Everyone agrees that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base does not disqualify the offering. But here they disagree with regard to the issue of whether failure to squeeze the blood from a bird sin offering after sprinkling the blood disqualifies the offering or not. One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds that it does disqualify the offering, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that it does not disqualify the offering.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa that even Rabbi Yishmael agrees that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base does not disqualify the offering. The verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting; and all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). What is the meaning when the verse states “of the bull”? This seems superfluous, as the entire passage is referring to the bull. This serves to teach the <i>halakha</i> of another bull, i.e., the bull of Yom Kippur, which also requires placement of blood on the base of the external altar. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yishmael said: It is not necessary for the Torah to write that the blood of the bull of Yom Kippur requires placement of blood on the base of the external altar. This is because it can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as if the bull of the anointed priest, i.e., the sin offering of a High Priest, with regard to which it is not obligatory to bring its blood inside the Sanctuary, i.e., it is not an obligatory offering, as he brings it only if he sins, nevertheless requires sprinkling blood on the base of the altar; with regard to the bull of Yom Kippur, with regard to which it is obligatory to bring its blood inside the Sanctuary, i.e., it must be brought every year, is it not logical that it requires sprinkling of its blood on the base of the altar?
  Rabbi Akiva said: Just as the bull of a High Priest, with regard to which its blood does not enter the innermost sanctum, whether as a fixed obligation or as a mitzva, nevertheless requires pouring of blood on the base of the altar, concerning the bull of Yom Kippur, with regard to which its blood enters the innermost sanctum as an obligation, is it not logical that it requires pouring of blood on the base of the altar?
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that the reason the Torah writes the phrase “of the bull” is to teach that failure to place the blood on the base of the external altar disqualifies the offering. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the service of Yom Kippur, after sprinkling the blood in the Sanctuary: “And when he has made an end of atoning for the Sanctuary, and the Tent of Meeting, and the altar, he shall present the live goat” (Leviticus 16:20). This teaches that once he has sprinkled the blood in the innermost sanctum all the atonements are completed. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From now, i.e., based on this, one can state an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to derive the <i>halakha</i> of the bull of the anointed priest from the <i>halakha</i> of the goat of the king. Just as the goat sin offering of a king, with regard to which its blood does not enter inside the Sanctuary, whether as a fixed obligation or as a mitzva, but is sprinkled, like other individual sin offerings, on the external altar, requires that the blood be poured on the base of the altar (see Leviticus 4:25); with regard to the sin offering of a High Priest, the blood of which enters inside the Sanctuary, whether as a fixed obligation or as a mitzva, is it not logical that it should require pouring on the base of the altar?
  If so, the verse that states that there is a requirement that the blood of the sin offering of a High Priest is poured on the base of the altar is apparently superfluous. One might have thought that the reason the Torah writes it is to teach that failure to pour the blood there disqualifies the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle of the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting, and all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7).
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: Since the verse inverted the terms in the clause, writing: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out,” and not: He shall pour out all the remaining blood of the bull, the verse detaches this positive mitzva of pouring the remaining blood from the other mitzvot in the verse. And the verse thereby made this a non-essential mitzva, to tell you that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar does not disqualify the offering. This <i>baraita</i> supports Rav Pappa’s interpretation, that Rabbi Yishmael agrees that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar does not disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yishmael hold that failure to squeeze out the blood of a bird sin offering disqualifies the offering, as Rav Pappa explained? But the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar; and the remainder of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9). This means: And the remainder shall be squeezed out, i.e., it needs to be squeezed out only if some blood remains.
  
  Daf 52b
  
  And that which does not remain, i.e., if there is no blood remaining, he shall not squeeze it out. This indicates that failure to squeeze the blood does not disqualify the offering. The Gemara answers: There are two <i>tanna’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.
  The Gemara continues its discussion of the remainder of the blood. Rami bar Ḥama says: This following <i>tanna</i> holds that failure to pour the remainder of the blood of offerings whose blood is sprinkled inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the offering, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “The priest that sacrifices it for sin shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19). The verse states the word “it” to teach that it, the offering whose blood was sprinkled correctly, above the red line of the altar, is valid, and the priest may eat the meat. But this is not so for an offering whose blood was sprinkled below the red line, which is disqualified.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: You said this, but from where did you come? In other words, why would one think that such an offering is valid, so that the verse needs to teach that it is not? The <i>baraita</i> explains: From the fact that it is stated: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood, upon the altar of the Lord your God; and the blood of your offerings shall be poured out against the altar of the Lord your God, and you shall eat the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:27), we learned that with regard to those offerings whose blood is placed with four placements on the corners of the altar, that if the priest placed them with only one placement, he has effected atonement. Therefore, since it is derived that if the priest does not present the blood on the specified corners of the altar, the offering is nevertheless valid, one might have thought that blood that should have been placed above the red line but that one placed below the red line effects atonement as well, and the offering is valid.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And it would seem there is a logical inference to counter this logic. It is stated that blood is to be sprinkled above the red line, referring to the blood of an animal sin offering, which is to be sprinkled on the corners on the upper half of the altar, and it is stated that blood is to be sprinkled below the red line, referring to the blood of a bird sin offering, which is to be sprinkled on the lower half of the altar. Just as with regard to the blood about which it is stated that it is to be below the red line, if it is a case where one placed it above the red line, it does not effect atonement, as the Sages derived from the verse: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar, and the remainder of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:9), so too, with regard to the blood, about which it is stated that it is to be above the red line, if it is a case where one placed it below the red line, it does not effect atonement.
  This logical inference is rejected: No, if you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood of a bird sin offering, which is to be sprinkled below the red line that was placed with a placement above the red line, that may be because they will not ultimately be sprinkled above. For this reason it does not effect atonement. Shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood that is to be sprinkled above the red line, i.e., the blood of an animal sin offering, but which one placed below the red line, that it will not effect atonement? The blood that is to be sprinkled above the red line is different, as some of it is sacrificed below the red line, when the remainder of the blood is poured on the base of the altar.
  The <i>baraita</i> responds: The blood that is placed inside the Sanctuary will prove it, as some of it is sacrificed outside, but if the priest initially placed the blood on the altar outside the Sanctuary it does not effect atonement.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this proof: No, if you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood that is placed inside the Sanctuary, concerning which the inner altar does not complete the atonement, as they require additional blood placements, shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood offered above the red line, i.e., the blood of an animal sin offering, concerning which the corners of the altar complete the atonement? Accordingly, it is possible to say that if one placed them below the red line they are valid.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: To counter this reasoning, the verse states with regard to an animal sin offering that is sacrificed outside: “The priest that sacrifices it for sin shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19), to emphasize that it, the offering whose blood was placed correctly, above the red line of the altar, is valid, and the priest may eat the meat. But this is not so for an offering whose blood was placed below the red line, which is disqualified.
  Rami bar Ḥama proves his point: What does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it says: If you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood that is placed inside the Sanctuary, concerning which the inner altar does not complete the atonement? What is required to complete the atonement? Is it not referring to this remainder of the blood and is teaching that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar disqualifies the offering?
  Rava said to Rami bar Ḥama: If so, that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds that failure to pour the remainder of the blood of the offerings whose blood is sprinkled inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the offering, you could derive the <i>halakha</i> that if the priest sprinkled the blood below the red line the offering is disqualified via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  Just as it is with regard to the remainder of the blood of the offerings of the inner altar, concerning which their ultimate rite, pouring on the base of the altar, is obligatory on the external altar, but if the priest initially performed the rite of placing the blood on the external altar, it does not effect atonement, with regard to those offerings whose blood is placed above the red line, concerning which their ultimate rite, pouring on the base of the altar, is not obligatory below the red line of the altar, and the priest initially performed the rite of placing the blood below the red line, is it not logical that it does not effect atonement? Since the <i>baraita</i> does not advance this claim, but derived the <i>halakha</i> from a verse, this indicates that pouring the remainder of the blood is not obligatory.
  Rava continues: Rather, when the <i>baraita</i> states that the blood of the offerings offered inside the Sanctuary are those concerning which the inner altar does not complete the atonement it means that the inner altar does not complete the atonement alone, but rather requires that blood also be sprinkled inside the Sanctuary on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states concerning the sacrificial rite performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur: “And when he has finished atoning for the Sanctuary, and the Tent of Meeting, and the altar, he shall present the live goat” (Leviticus 16:20). This verse indicates that if he performed the atonement, he has finished the service, but if he did not perform the atonement, he has not finished. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: For what reason do we not say: If he finished, he has performed atonement, but if he did not finish, he has not performed atonement? This derivation would indicate that if one of any of the blood placements is lacking it is as though he did nothing.
  The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: What is the difference between them? Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi engaged in a dispute concerning this. One says that interpretation of the meaning of the verse is the difference between them, i.e., there is no halakhic difference between them but only a dispute as to how to interpret the verses. And one says that there is a difference between them with regard to whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering. According to Rabbi Akiva, it does not disqualify the offering, whereas Rabbi Yehuda maintains that it does disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara suggests: It may be concluded that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is the one who says that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda disagree as to whether or not failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the altar disqualifies the offering. As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: According to the statement of the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, if the priest finished placing the blood on the inner altar and the blood was spilled before he poured the remainder on the external altar, he must bring one bull and slaughter it, and begin the sprinkling of the blood as he did initially on the inner altar, so that there will be blood remaining from the sprinkling, and then he pours the remainder of the blood on the external altar. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi discusses the opinion that failure to pour the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, apparently in reference to the <i>baraita</i> cited here.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not agree with this reasoning? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say (111a): Rabbi Neḥemya taught a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the statement of the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of blood disqualifies the offering? Rabbi Yoḥanan also discusses the opinion of a <i>tanna</i> who holds that failure to pour the remainder of blood disqualifies the offering, apparently in reference to the <i>baraita</i> cited here.
  Rather, there is no proof that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehuda. He is stating a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the statement of the one who says that it disqualifies the offering, whichever <i>tanna</i> that may be, but he is not referring to the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>. Here too, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is stating a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the statement of the one who says that it disqualifies the offering, whichever <i>tanna</i> that may be, but he is not referring to the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>.
  MISHNA: These are the <i>halakhot</i> of the communal and the individual sin offerings. These are the communal sin offerings: Goats of the New Moon and of the Festivals. Their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard, and the collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires four placements on the four corners of the altar. How did the priest do so?
  
  Daf 53a
  
  He ascended the ramp of the altar and turned right to the surrounding ledge and he continued east, and he came to the southeast corner and sprinkled the blood of the sin offering there and then to the northeast corner and sprinkled the blood there, and then to the northwest corner and sprinkled the blood there, and the southwest corner, where he performed the fourth sprinkling and descended from the altar. He would pour the remainder of the blood on the southern base of the altar. And the meat portions of the offering are eaten within the curtains, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, by the males of the priesthood. And they are eaten prepared in any form of food preparation, on the day the offering is sacrificed and during the night that follows, until midnight.
  GEMARA: How does the priest perform the rite of sprinkling the blood on the corners of the altar? There is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar. One says that the priest places the blood within a cubit on this side or a cubit on that side. He places the blood wherever he wants, provided that it is within one cubit of the corner of the altar. And one says that he sprinkles the blood on the outer edge of the corner of the altar, and it flows down on both sides of the altar.
  The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that the sprinkling of the blood of a sin offering itself is performed only on the actual corner, the one-by-one-cubit projection above each corner of the altar, everyone agrees that the blood may be sprinkled anywhere on the corner, and this will be a fulfillment of the verse: “And put it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). When they disagree is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the blood may be sprinkled anywhere above the red line on the edge of the altar. One Sage holds that the blood may be sprinkled on the cubit on either side of the edge, because a cubit on this side and a cubit on that side is still considered to be on the corner. And one Sage holds that on its edge, yes, it is fit, but any further on either side is not.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion that one cubit on either side of the edge is still considered on the edge, from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to communal sin offerings and individual sin offerings, how is the placement of their blood on the altar performed? The priest would ascend the ramp of the altar and turn right to the surrounding ledge and he continued east, and he would come to the southeast corner. And he would then dip with his right [<i>haymanit</i>] finger, the most dexterous [<i>hamyumenet</i>] of the right hand, i.e., the index finger, of the blood that is in the bowl, and would gather the blood with his thumb above and his smallest finger below, so that it would remain on his finger. And he would sprinkle the blood and move his hand down on the outer edge of the corner, until he would finish sprinkling all the blood that was on his finger. And he would act similarly at each and every corner. This <i>baraita</i> states explicitly that the blood must be sprinkled on the actual edge.
  The Gemara answers: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: The optimal manner to perform the mitzva is to sprinkle the blood on the edge of the corner. But if he did the sprinkling on the cubit on this side, or the cubit on that side, we have no problem with it, and he has still fulfilled the mitzva.
  The Gemara discusses the aforementioned dispute. What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and what is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 6:11): The blood that must be placed on the upper half of the altar, e.g., the blood of a sin offering, is placed anywhere from the red line that circumscribed the middle of the altar and above. The blood that must be placed on the lower half of the altar is placed anywhere from the red line or below it. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon says: In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a bird burnt offering, as its blood may be placed anywhere above the red line. But with regard to an animal sin offering, the placement itself may be performed only on the actual corner of the altar. This is based on the verse that states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and put it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25).
  Rabbi Abbahu says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? As it is written: “And the altar shall be four cubits; and from the altar and above there shall be four corners” (Ezekiel 43:15). The Gemara asks: Was the altar only four cubits wide? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: And the total area of the four corners, which were each one square cubit, was four cubits. The Gemara asks: Was the area of the corners four square cubits? If the four corners would be placed together the area would be only two square cubits. Rather, say that the domain of the corners is four cubits. In other words, the verse means that the blood may be sprinkled up to four cubits beneath the actual corners of the altar.
  We learned in a mishna there (<i>Middot</i> 35b): A red line circumscribed the altar in the middle, to separate between the area for the blood that must be placed on the upper part of the altar and the area for the blood that must be placed on the lower part of the altar. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Aḥa bar Rav Ketina said it is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And you shall put it under the ledge round the altar beneath, and the net will reach halfway up the altar” (Exodus 27:5). The Torah provided for a separation on the altar, to separate between the area for the blood placed on the upper part of the altar and the area for the blood placed on the lower part of the altar.
  § The mishna teaches: He would pour the remainder of the blood on the southern base of the altar. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the phrase: “At the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:30), mentioned with regard to pouring the remainder of the blood of the sin offering of a king, this is referring to the southern base of the altar. The <i>baraita</i> challenges: Do you say that this is referring to the southern base, or is it referring only to the western base?
  The <i>baraita</i> suggests: And one can derive the meaning of this unspecified phrase from the meaning of the explicit phrase, as follows: You said that one can derive the location of the priest’s descent from the ramp of the external altar after sprinkling blood of the sin offering by comparing it to his exit from the Sanctuary with the blood that remained after having sprinkled blood inside the Sanctuary. The verse states with regard to the bull offering of the High Priest: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). Just as upon his exit from the Sanctuary the priest pours the remainder of the blood on the side closest to him, the western side, so too, upon his descent from the ramp of the external altar after sprinkling blood from the sin offering, he pours the blood on the side closest to him, which is the southern side.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yishmael says: This and that, both the remainder of the blood sprinkled inside the Sanctuary and the remainder of the blood sprinkled on the external altar, are poured on the western base of the altar. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: This and that are poured on the southern base of the altar.
  The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to the one who says that the blood is poured on the western base of the altar, it is clear how he derived his <i>halakha</i>. He holds that one can derive the meaning of an unspecified phrase from the meaning of the explicit phrase. Therefore, just as the remainder of the blood sprinkled inside the Sanctuary is poured on the western base of the external altar, the same is done with the remainder of the blood sprinkled on the external altar.
  But according to the one who says that the blood is poured on the southern base of the altar, what is the reason? Rabbi Asi said: This <i>tanna</i> holds that the entire external altar stands in the north of the Temple courtyard. Therefore, the southern base is in the center of the courtyard, opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. This is what the verse is referring to when it states: “At the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). The Gemara presents another formulation of Rabbi Asi’s explanation: The entire entrance of the Sanctuary stands in the south of the altar. Accordingly, when the priest exits the Sanctuary the southern base is the first one he encounters.
  
  Daf 53b
  
  The school of Rabbi Yishmael, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, says: Both this and that, i.e., the blood of an inner sin offering and that of an external sin offering, were poured at the western base of the altar. According to this version, Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. The Gemara comments: And your mnemonic to remember this change in opinion is: The men pulled the man. In this case, the numerous students of Rabbi Yishmael claim that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai agrees with their teacher.
  MISHNA: The burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order. Its slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard and the collection of its blood in a service vessel is in the north, and its blood requires two placements that are four, and it requires flaying of its carcass and the cutting of the sacrificial animal into pieces, and it is consumed in its entirety, with the exception of its hide, by the fire of the altar.
  GEMARA: What is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> taught that a burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order, when the mishna earlier (52b) did not mention that a sin offering is of the most sacred order? The Gemara answers: It is because in the Torah it is not written explicitly with regard to the burnt offering: It is most sacred, as it states concerning the sin offering and the guilt offering in a verse concerning a meal offering: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire; it is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10). Consequently, the <i>tanna</i> explicitly states that a burnt offering is likewise of the most sacred order.
  The mishna teaches: And its blood requires two placements that are four. How does the priest perform the placements? Rav says: He places the blood on one side of the corner of the altar, and places it again on the other side of the corner of the altar. He repeats this on the diagonally opposite corner, so that he places on two corners but on all four sides of the altar. And Shmuel says: He places one placement on each of the two diagonally opposite corners, so that each placement is similar to the shape of the Greek letter gamma, which is bent at a right angle.
  The Gemara comments: This dispute between Rav and Shmuel is like a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: One might have thought that a priest should sprinkle one sprinkling with the blood of a burnt offering. To counter this possibility, the verse states: “And sprinkle the blood around against the altar that is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 1:5). If the blood must be sprinkled around the altar, one might have thought that he should circumscribe the altar as one would do with a thread, and sprinkle the blood all around. To counter this possibility, the verse states: “Shall present the blood, and sprinkle the blood around against the altar” (Leviticus 1:5), and one cannot have the blood circumscribe the altar as a thread would without directly applying it with a finger. How can these verses be reconciled? He applies the blood in a shape that is similar to that of the Greek letter gamma, and its blood requires two sprinklings that are four. This opinion accords with the opinion of Shmuel.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yishmael says: It is stated here: “Shall present the blood, and sprinkle the blood around against the altar” (Leviticus 1:5), and it is stated there, with regard to the sin offering sacrificed at the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “And when it was slain, Moses took the blood, and put it upon the corners of the altar around with his finger” (Leviticus 8:15). Just as there, with regard to the sin offering, the blood was placed discretely and with four placements, one on each corner, so too here, with regard to a burnt offering, it must be placed discretely and with four placements. This opinion accords with the opinion of Rav.
  If these offerings are compared to each other, why not say that just as there, the blood of the sin offering must have four placements on the four corners, so too here, the blood of the burnt offering requires four placements on the four corners? You said that a burnt offering requires that the blood be placed on a part of the altar that has a base, and the southeast corner of the altar had no base beneath it. Therefore, the blood had to be placed on the northeast corner and the southwest corner.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that there was no base on the southeast corner of the altar? Rabbi Elazar says: Because it was not in the portion of land of the one who tears, i.e., the tribe of Benjamin, as he is described in the following manner: “Benjamin is a wolf that tears apart; in the morning he devours the prey, and in the evening he divides the spoil” (Genesis 49:27). As Rav Shmuel, son of Rav Yitzḥak, says: The altar would consume, i.e., occupy, one cubit of the portion of Judah. The part of the altar in Judah’s portion was the southeast corner of the base, and therefore there was no base on that corner.
  Rabbi Levi bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A strip of land emerged from the portion of Judah and entered into the portion of Benjamin, and the southeast corner of the base was on that strip. And the tribe of Benjamin the righteous would agonize over it every day, desiring to take it into its portion, due to its unique sanctity. As it is stated in Moses’ blessing to the tribe of Benjamin:
  
  Daf 54a
  
  “He covers it throughout the day, and He dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12). The term “covers it” is understood to mean that Benjamin is continually focused upon that site. Therefore, Benjamin the righteous was privileged and became the host of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as the Holy of Holies was built in his portion. As it is stated: “And He dwells between his shoulders.”
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: How was the rite of a bird burnt offering performed? The priest ascended the ramp and turned to the surrounding ledge. When he arrived at the southeast corner, the priest would pinch the bird’s head by pinching at its nape with his thumbnail and sever the bird’s head from its body, and would squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar.
  The Gemara states its objection: And if you say that the southeast corner of the altar had no base, is he merely performing the rite in the air, i.e., not within the domain of the altar? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Say that when Eretz Yisrael was apportioned, they made this condition: The airspace of what would become the southeast part of the altar is in the portion of the tribe of Benjamin, so the pinching of the bird offering was performed within the domain of the altar. But the land was in the portion of the tribe of Judah.
  § The Gemara asks: What does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it states that the southeast corner of the altar had no base? Rav says: It is with regard to the fact that it had no base built on those sides. Levi says: It is with regard to the fact that no blood was sprinkled on that side, as the blood was not permitted to be presented there, even though there was a physical base. Based on this dispute, each of them disagreed as to the correct Aramaic translation of the verse: “Benjamin is a wolf that tears apart; in the morning he devours the prey, and in the evening he divides the spoil” (Genesis 49:27). Rav translates this as: In his portion will the altar be built. Levi translates this as: In his portion will the Sanctuary be built, which means: A place sanctified for blood.
  The Gemara brings proof for each opinion: Come and hear a proof for the explanation of Rav from a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 35b): The base of the altar would extend along all of the northern side and along all of the western side. It consumed one cubit on the southern side and one cubit on the eastern side. This indicates that there was no base on most of the southern or eastern sides of the altar. The Gemara comments: Levi would explain: What is the meaning of the term: Consume? The <i>baraita</i>, as well, is stated with regard to consuming blood of the offerings.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the explanation of Levi from that same mishna: The altar was thirty-two cubits by thirty-two cubits. This indicates that there was a base on all four sides, in accordance with the opinion of Levi. Rav could answer: Here we are dealing with the measurement from the side. In other words, only the northern and western sides were thirty-two cubits in length.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the explanation of Levi from a <i>baraita</i>: It turns out the top of the ramp of the altar would overhang one cubit in the air over the base of the altar and one cubit over the surrounding ledge. This indicates that it had a base on all four sides, as the ramp was on the southern side. Rav could answer: Say that the <i>baraita</i> means it would overhang toward the place where the base of a cubit would have been, and one cubit over the surrounding ledge.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Levi teaches in a <i>baraita</i>: How does one build the altar? He brings a square wooden frame, which is thirty-two cubits by thirty-two cubits, and its height is one cubit. And he brings pieces of damp [<i>mefulamot</i>] stone, both large and small, which are the main components of the altar, which is described as: “An altar of stone” (Exodus 20:22). And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts them and pours the mixture into the gaps between the stones. And this is the place of the base of the altar.
  And then he brings a square wooden frame, which is thirty cubits by thirty cubits, and its height is five cubits. And he brings pieces of damp stone, both large and small. And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts them and pours the mixture into the gaps between the stones. And then he brings a square wooden frame, which is twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight cubits, and its height is three cubits. And he brings pieces of damp stone, both large and small. And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts them and pours the mixture into the gaps between the stones. And this is the place of the arrangement of wood on the altar.
  And then he brings a square wooden frame, which is one cubit by one cubit. And he brings pieces of damp stone, both large and small. And he brings plaster and molten lead and tar, and melts them and pours the mixture into the frame. And this is the corner of the altar. And so he does this for each and every corner. This <i>baraita</i> indicates that the altar had a base around all four sides.
  The Gemara comments: And if you would say
  
  Daf 54b
  
  that he cuts the base on the southern and western sides after he has poured the mixture for the altar and it has dried, it is written concerning the altar: “You shall build the altar of the Lord your God of unhewn stones; and you shall offer burnt offerings on it to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 27:6), so it cannot be cut.
  Rav could answer: This means that he places something under the frame, in the place where there is to be no base, and after the poured mixture has dried he removes it, leaving the space empty. As if you do not say so, how will you explain that which Rav Kahana says: The stone interiors of the corners were hollow, i.e., there were gaps between the stones, as it is written: “And they shall be filled like the basins, like the corners of the altar” (Zechariah 9:15)? The verse compares the corners to hollow basins. Here too, doesn’t the Merciful One state that the altar must be made of “unhewn stones”? If so, how could the corners be hollow? Rather, it must be that he places something, e.g., sticks and twigs, under the frame and pours the mixture for the corners over it, and when it has hardened, removes the sticks and twigs, leaving the corners somewhat hollow. Here too, he places something under the frame and later removes it.
  § Apropos the altar and the Temple, the Gemara relates that Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written concerning David: “And he and Samuel went and dwelt in Naioth. And it was told Saul, saying: Behold, David is at Naioth [<i>beNayot</i>] in Ramah” (I Samuel 19:18–19)? But what does Naioth have to do with Ramah? They are in two distinct places. Rather, this means that they were sitting in Ramah and were involved in discussing the beauty [<i>benoyo</i>] of the world, i.e., the Temple.
  David and Samuel said: It is written: “Then you shall arise, and get you up unto the place which the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8). This teaches that the Temple is higher than all places in Eretz Yisrael. And Eretz Yisrael is higher than all countries. They did not know where the highest place in Eretz Yisrael was.
  They brought the book of Joshua. With regard to all of the borders of the tribes it is written: “And went down” (see Joshua 15:10, 16:3, 17:9), and it is written: “And the border went up to Beth Hoglah.” (Joshua 15:6), and: “And the border was drawn from the top of the mountain to the fountain of the waters of Nephtoah” (Joshua 15:9). The verse uses different terms to describe the borders of the portion of each tribe. And with regard to the borders of the tribe of Benjamin it is written only: “And went up” (Joshua 18:11), but it is not written: “And went down.” They said: Conclude from the verses that the Temple’s place is here, in the portion of Benjamin.
  They thought to build it at Ein Eitam, which is higher than any other place in the portion of Benjamin. They said: Let us lower it a bit, as it is written: “He covers it throughout the day, and He dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12). This indicates that the Temple is situated slightly lower, between two peaks.
  And if you wish, say instead that it is learned as a tradition that the Sanhedrin is to be located in the portion of Judah, and the place of the Divine Presence is to be located in the portion of Benjamin. They said: And if we raise it and place it near Ein Eitam it will be too distant from the portion of Judah. They said: It is preferable that we lower it a bit, as it is written: “He covers it throughout the day, and He dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12).
  And with regard to this matter, that David and Samuel discovered the location of the Temple, Doeg the Edomite was jealous of David, as it is written: “Because jealousy for Your House has eaten me up” (Psalms 69:10), and it is written: “Lord, remember for David all his affliction; how he swore to the Lord, and vowed unto the Mighty One of Jacob: I will not come into the tent of my house, nor go up into the bed that is spread for me; if I will give sleep to my eyes, or slumber to my eyelids; until I find a place for the Lord, a dwelling place for the Mighty One of Jacob” (Psalms 132:1–5).
  The verse following those verses states: “We heard of it as being in Ephrath; we found it in the field of the wood” (Psalms 132:6). Rava explains the meaning of these words: “In Ephrath”; this is a reference to Joshua, who came from the tribe of Ephraim. This alludes to the fact that David and Samuel were able to locate the highest place in Eretz Yisrael based on the book of Joshua. “We found it in the field of the wood”; this is a reference to Benjamin, as it is written concerning him: “Benjamin is a wolf that tears apart; in the morning he devours the prey, and in the evening he divides the spoil” (Genesis 49:27). A wolf is a wild animal living in the field, and David and Samuel found the location of the Temple in the portion of Benjamin.
  MISHNA: These are the <i>halakhot</i> of communal peace offerings and guilt offerings. These are guilt offerings: The guilt offering for robbery, brought by one from whom another demanded payment of a debt and he denied it and took a false oath (see Leviticus 5:20–26); the guilt offering for unwitting misuse of consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:14–16); the guilt offering of an espoused maidservant, brought by one who engaged in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave (see Leviticus 19:20–22); the guilt offering of a nazirite who became impure via contact with a corpse (see Numbers 6:12); the guilt offering of a leper, brought for his purification (see Leviticus 14:12); and the provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–18).
  Concerning all of these, their slaughter is in the north of the Temple courtyard and collection of their blood in a service vessel is in the north, and their blood requires two placements that are four. And the meat portions of the offering are eaten within the curtains, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, by male priests. And they are eaten prepared in any manner of food preparation, on the day the offering was sacrificed and during the night that follows, until midnight.
  
  Daf 55a
  
  GEMARA: From where do we derive that the communal peace offerings, i.e., the two sheep brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, require slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: As Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan taught before Rava: The passage in the Torah discussing the offerings of <i>Shavuot</i> states: “And you shall offer one he-goat for a sin offering, and two male sheep in their first year for a sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 23:19). The peace offerings are juxtaposed with the sin offering. Just as the sin offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, so too, communal peace offerings must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  Rava said to him: But from where is the requirement to slaughter a sin offering in the north of the Temple courtyard derived? It is derived from its juxtaposition with a burnt offering, as the verse states: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before the Lord; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18). In the realm of consecrated matters, can a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition? The Gemara (49b) demonstrates that it cannot.
  Rava explains: Rather, the source that communal peace offerings must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard is derived from that which Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, teaches: The verse states: “Also in the day of your gladness, and in your appointed seasons, and in your New Moons, you shall blow with the trumpets over your burnt offerings, and over your peace offerings; and they shall be to you for a memorial before your God: I am the Lord your God” (Numbers 10:10). This verse directly juxtaposes burnt offerings with communal peace offerings. Just as burnt offerings are offerings of the most sacred order, so too, communal peace offerings are offerings of the most sacred order. Furthermore, just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, so too, communal peace offerings must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, what <i>halakha</i> does the first juxtaposition between communal peace offerings and the he-goat sin offering come to teach? The Gemara answers: It teaches that the <i>halakhot</i> of communal peace offerings are like the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering. Just as a sin offering is eaten only by male priests, so too, communal peace offerings are eaten only by male priests.
  Abaye said to Rava: If so, then with regard to a nazirite’s ram, concerning which it is written in the verse: “And he shall present his offering to the Lord, one he-lamb in its first year without blemish for a burnt offering, and one ewe-lamb in its first year without blemish for a sin offering, and one ram without blemish for a peace offering” (Numbers 6:14), so too shall we say that the Torah juxtaposed the nazirite’s ram with a sin offering of a nazirite to teach that just as a sin offering is eaten only by male priests, so too, a nazirite’s ram is eaten only by male priests? As the next mishna states, a nazirite’s ram may be eaten by every ritually pure Jew.
  Rava answers: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the nazirite’s ram, since it is written: “And the priest shall take the foreleg of the ram when it is cooked” (Numbers 6:19), by inference one can deduce that the owner may eat all of the remaining portions of the animal.
  The Gemara asks: If so, in any event, the cooked foreleg of the nazirite’s ram should be eaten only by male priests. The mishna states that the cooked foreleg may be eaten by priests, their wives, and their slaves. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult. Based on its juxtaposition with the sin offering of a nazirite, the <i>halakha</i> should be that only the male priests may eat it, yet that is not the case.
  The Gemara offers another explanation: And if you wish, say that the foreleg of the nazirite’s ram is called sacred, but it is not called an offering of the most sacred order. Therefore, it cannot be juxtaposed with the sin offering of a nazirite in this regard. The Gemara asks: But rather, with regard to what <i>halakha</i> is the nazirite’s ram juxtaposed with the sin offering of a nazirite? Rava says: It is juxtaposed to teach that if the nazirite shaved after the sacrifice of any one of the three offerings, he has fulfilled his obligation after the fact.
  MISHNA: The thanks offering and nazirite’s ram are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the Temple courtyard, and their blood requires two placements that are four, and they are eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem, by every person, i.e., any ritually pure Jew, prepared in any manner of food preparation, on the day the offering was sacrificed and during the night that follows, until midnight. The status of the portion that is separated from them and given to the priests is similar to theirs; but the portion that is separated is eaten by the priests, by their wives, and by their children, and by their slaves.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the priests: “And the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving you shall eat in a pure place; you, and your sons, and your daughters with you; for they are given as your due, and your sons’ due, out of the peace offerings of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 10:14). Rabbi Neḥemya said: But did they eat the first offerings, mentioned in the previous two verses, in a place of impurity? The previous verses make reference to the remainder of the meal offering, which also had to be eaten in a pure place.
  Rather, by inference, the word “pure” in this context is referring to a place that is to some degree ritually impure, but pure in some respects. The priest must eat in a place that is pure due to the impurity of a leper, but it may be a place that is impure due to the impurity of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>]. And which place is this? This is the Israelites’ camp in the wilderness, and, once the Temple was built in Jerusalem, the entire city of Jerusalem. A <i>zav</i> could remain in these places, but not a leper. This is the source for the <i>halakha</i> in the mishna that these offerings may be eaten anywhere in Jerusalem.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say that the word “pure” is referring to a place which is pure from the impurity of a <i>zav</i> and impure due to ritual impurity imparted by a corpse? And which place is this? This is the Levites’ camp in the wilderness, and, once the Temple was built in Jerusalem, the Temple Mount.
  Abaye says that the verse states with regard to the meal offering: “And you shall eat it in a sacred place” (Leviticus 10:13). The word “it” is a restriction, teaching that one must eat “it,” i.e., the meal offering, in a sacred place, i.e., in the camp of the Divine Presence, but one is not required to eat another offering, i.e., the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving, in a sacred place. This removes the portions from the camp of the Divine Presence, to be eaten in the Levites’ camp. Then it is written: “You shall eat in a pure place,” which removes the portions from the Levites’ camp, to be eaten in the Israelites’ camp.
  Rava says a different explanation: “It,” i.e., the meal offering, must be eaten in a sacred place, but one is not required to eat another offering, i.e., the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving, in a sacred place. This verse removes the portions completely from any pure place, and according to this stage of Rava’s interpretation, these portions may be eaten anywhere. Then the Merciful One wrote: “You shall eat in a pure place,” which brings it into the Israelites’ camp, which is a pure place, relative to everywhere outside it.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say that the verse brings it into the Levites’ camp, which is also referred to as pure? The Gemara answers: We bring it into one camp, adjacent to the area outside the encampment of the Jewish people, but we do not bring it into two camps.
  The Gemara asks: If so, also with regard to removing it, why not say that we remove it to one place, but we do not remove it from two places? Accordingly, the initial derivation should be to eat it in the Israelites’ camp. And furthermore, it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows which you vow, nor your gift offerings, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). This verse negates the possibility that an offering may be eaten “in your gates,” i.e., outside of Jerusalem. Rather, it is clear that the source for the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the explanation of Abaye.
  MISHNA: Peace offerings are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the Temple courtyard, and their blood requires two placements that are four, and they are eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem, by every person, i.e., any ritually pure Jew, prepared in any manner of food preparation, for two days and one night, i.e., the day on which they are slaughtered, the following day, and the intervening night. The status of the portion that is separated from them and given to the priests is similar to theirs; but the portion that is separated is eaten by the priests, by their wives, and by their children, and by their slaves.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to cattle peace offerings, the verse states: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of his offering, and slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2). With regard to sheep peace offerings the verse states: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of his offering, and slaughter it before the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:8). With regard to goat peace offerings the verse states: “And he shall lay his hand upon the head of it, and slaughter it before the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:13).
  This repetition serves to render fit all directions of the Temple courtyard for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity. From here one can derive an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to permit slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard: Just as the rites of slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, which are not rendered fit in all directions, are rendered fit in the north, with regard to the rites of slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity, which are rendered fit in all directions, is it not logical that they are rendered fit in the north?
  Rabbi Eliezer says: The repetition of the verse is stated only to render fit slaughter in the north. As one might have thought: And could this not be derived through logical inference? Just as with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, whose slaughter is rendered fit in any direction, nevertheless their place is not rendered fit for the slaughter of offerings of the most sacred order, with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, whose slaughter is rendered fit only in the north, is it not logical that their place should not be rendered fit for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity? Therefore, the verse states: “Tent of Meeting,” to teach that offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered in the north.
  
  Daf 55b
  
  The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? The first <i>tanna</i> holds that three verses are written. One verse serves to teach the <i>halakha</i> itself, that we require that the slaughter take place at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. And one verse serves to render fit slaughter at the sides, i.e., the entire length of the Temple courtyard eastward from the entrance, and not only that part which is directly in front of the entrance. And one verse serves to disqualify the sides of the sides, i.e., those parts of the courtyard that are not in front of the entrance at all. And it was not necessary to have a verse teach the fitness of slaughtering in the north, as it can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  And Rabbi Eliezer holds that one verse is necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> itself, that we require slaughter at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. And one verse serves to render fit slaughter in the north of the courtyard. And one verse serves to render fit slaughter at the sides of the courtyard. But according to him, it was not necessary to have a verse teach that the sides of the sides are not fit for the slaughter of the offering.
  § The Gemara asks: What is different here that it is written: “At the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2), and what is different there that it is written: “Before the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:8, 13)? The Gemara answers: This teaches us a matter in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says. As Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered in the Temple before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened are disqualified, as it is stated with regard to peace offerings: “And he shall slaughter it at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2), which teaches that it must be slaughtered when the entrance is open and serves as an actual entrance, and not when it is locked. As long as the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, or in the Temple the doors to the Sanctuary, remain closed, one may not sacrifice the peace offerings, and if they are sacrificed, they are disqualified.
  It was also stated: Mar Ukva bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened are disqualified, as it is stated in the verse: “He shall slaughter it at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2). This means when the entrance of the Sanctuary is open, and not when it is locked.
  In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they teach this <i>halakha</i> like this: Rav Ya’akov bar Aḥa says that Rav Ashi says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered before the doors of the Sanctuary were opened are disqualified. And in the Tabernacle, which had no doors, peace offerings that were slaughtered before the Levites erected the Tabernacle or after the Levites dismantled the Tabernacle are disqualified.
  The Gemara comments: It is obvious that if the door is closed but not locked it has the same status as if it were locked. The Gemara asks: If there is a curtain covering the entrance, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Zeira says: A curtain itself is made only to be used like an open entrance, and therefore it is not considered as if the entrance is closed.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> if a tall item is blocking the entrance? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that a tall item does not render an entrance as closed, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: There were two wickets, i.e., openings, in the Chamber of Knives, and their height was eight cubits. The function of these openings was in order to render fit the entire Temple courtyard for the eating of offerings of the most sacred order, and to render fit all of the Temple courtyard for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity. Due to the openings, the western area of the courtyard was considered to be “before the Tent of Meeting.”
  The Gemara explains the inference: What, is the reference to eight cubits not referring to the fact that in front of the wickets there was an obstruction eight cubits high? Nevertheless, the area outside of it is considered open to the Chamber of Knives. The Gemara answers: No, their height was eight cubits, i.e., the wickets themselves were eight cubits high.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this explanation from a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 35a), which teaches: All the gates that were there, in the Temple, were twenty cubits high and ten cubits wide. If so, how could these wickets be only eight cubits high? The Gemara answers: The wickets are different, and they are not considered gates.
  The Gemara questions the ruling of the <i>baraita</i>. How did the wickets render fit the entire Temple courtyard? But there are the sides, i.e., to the north and south of the Chamber of Knives, and the wickets faced only to the west. The Gemara answers that they inserted the wickets in the corner of the Chamber, so that one opened to the northwest, and one to the northeast.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the area behind the Hall of the Ark Cover, i.e., behind the Sanctuary, from where one could not see the entrance of the Temple courtyard or the two wickets? The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as Rami bar Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: There was a small niche behind the Hall of the Ark Cover, which was eight cubits high. The function of this niche was in order to render fit the entire Temple courtyard for the eating of offerings of the most sacred order, and to render fit all of the Temple courtyard for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity. And this is as it is written: “For the precinct westward, four at the causeway, and two at the precinct” (I Chronicles 26:18). What is the meaning of the term: “For the precinct [<i>laparbar</i>]”? Rabba bar Rav Sheila said: It is like one who says: Facing outward [<i>kelappei bar</i>].
  § Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One is liable for entering the Temple courtyard in a state of ritual impurity only with regard to
  
  Daf 56a
  
  an area whose length is 187 cubits by 135 cubits in width.
  A <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Naḥman: The entire Temple courtyard was 187 cubits in length by 135 cubits in width. Rav Naḥman said to the <i>tanna</i>: My father said this to me: In an area such as this, the priests enter there and eat offerings of the most sacred order there, and slaughter offerings of lesser sanctity there, and are liable due to entering in a state of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: These specific dimensions serve to exclude what? If we say they are stated to exclude the windows, doors, and thickness of the wall, we learn the opposite in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 85b): The windows in the wall and the thickness of the wall are considered as though they are inside the Temple courtyard.
  But rather, they are stated to exclude the chambers in the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: And if it is referring to chambers that are built in the non-sacred area, which is outside this designated space, and open to the sacred area, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 3:8): The inside of chambers that are built in the sacred area but are open to the non-sacred area is non-sacred, but their roofs are sacred. If they are built in a non-sacred area and open to a sacred area, their interior is sacred and their roofs are non-sacred? The Gemara answers: They have sanctity by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara asks: And do they not have sanctity by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the chambers that are built in the non-sacred area of the Temple Mount and open to the sacred area, from where is it derived that the priests enter there and eat there offerings of the most sacred order and the remainders of meal offerings? The verse states with regard to a meal offering: “It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place; in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it.” (Leviticus 6:9). The verse could have simply stated: “In a holy place,” which indicates the courtyard. By also stating: “In the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting,” the Torah amplified many courtyards with one type of eating, i.e., of the meal offering. If the chambers do not have sanctity by Torah law, the Sages would not have permitted the priests to eat offerings of the most sacred order there.
  Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> concerning eating is different. The Torah specifically includes these chambers in addition to the Temple courtyard itself for eating offerings of the most sacred order. By contrast, with regard to slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity and the punishment for entering the courtyard in a state of ritual impurity, these chambers are not considered sacred by Torah law.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to ritual impurity, is one not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for entering these chambers? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the chambers that are built in the non-sacred area and that open to the sacred area, priests enter there and eat offerings of the most sacred order there, but may not slaughter offerings of lesser sanctity there, and are liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to ritual impurity if they enter there while ritually impure?
  Rava could answer: Did you not say in the <i>baraita</i> that they may not slaughter offerings of lesser sanctity in those chambers? If so, emend the text of the <i>baraita</i> and teach also: They are not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for entering in a state of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara challenges: Granted, the priests may not slaughter there, because slaughtering an offering requires that it be performed before the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and if he slaughters it inside a chamber, it is not. But why would they not be liable for entering there in a state of ritual impurity?
  The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning, when it teaches that they may not slaughter there, are we not dealing even with a case in which there is an act of slaughter performed before the entrance, i.e., the entrance to the chamber directly faced the entrance of the Temple? As if not, for what purpose was it necessary to teach this at all? Rather, even though he slaughters the offering before the entrance, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that a priest may not slaughter offerings in the chambers because that area is not sacred. If so, teach also that they are not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for entering the chambers in a state of ritual impurity, as they are not sacred.
  The Gemara asks: And for eating an offering, do we not require that this take place before the entrance of the Temple courtyard? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: There were two wickets in the Chamber of Knives, and their height was eight cubits; the function of these openings was in order to render fit the entire Temple courtyard for the eating of offerings of the most sacred order, and to render fit all of the Temple courtyard for the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity? Ravina said: Remove from here the clause concerning eating. The eating of offerings does not have to take place before the entrance of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the offerings brought at the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “And Moses said to Aaron and to his sons: Cook the meat at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting; and eat it there” (Leviticus 8:31). This indicates that the eating of offerings had to be at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. The Gemara answers: Offerings that were sacrificed only one time are different. Since they were specifically commanded for just that time, one cannot derive from there any <i>halakhot</i> with regard to offerings in general.
  § Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi says: From where is it derived that the blood of offerings becomes disqualified at sunset and can no longer be presented on the altar? This is as it is stated in the verse: “But if the sacrifice of his offering be a vow, or a gift offering, it shall be eaten on the day that he sacrifices his offering [<i>zivḥo</i>], and on the morrow” (Leviticus 7:16). This means that on the day that you slaughter [<i>zove’aḥ</i>] the offering you sacrifice it on the altar and present its blood. But on the day that you do not slaughter the offering you may not sacrifice it and present its blood.
  The Gemara challenges: But he requires this verse
  
  Daf 56b
  
  for the matter itself, to teach that a peace offering may be eaten for only two days? The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: On the day he slaughters it shall it be eaten, and the following day. Why do I need the verse to add the term “that he sacrifices it”? Conclude from the wording of the verse that on the day that you slaughter the offering you sacrifice the blood on the altar, but on a day that you do not slaughter the offering you do not sacrifice the blood on the altar.
  The Gemara questions this proof: But perhaps this is what the Merciful One is saying: If the blood is sacrificed today, i.e., the day the offering was slaughtered, the meat may be eaten today and tomorrow. If the blood is sacrificed tomorrow, the meat may be eaten tomorrow and the following day. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: On the day it is sacrificed it shall be eaten, and the following day. Why do I need the verse to state: “That he sacrifices his offering”? Conclude from the wording of the verse that on the day that you slaughter the offering you sacrifice the blood on the altar, but on a day that you do not slaughter the offering you do not sacrifice the blood on the altar.
  § It was stated: With regard to one who slaughters a peace offer-ing and intends to eat it on the evening preceding the third day, Ḥizkiyya says: The offering is valid, and it is not disqualified due to his intention to eat it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>]. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is disqualified. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiyya says that the offering is valid because on the evening preceding the third day, the peace offering has not yet been removed from its previous status and designated for burning. A peace offering is not burned until the third morning, as the verse states: “It shall be eaten the same day you offer it, and on the following day; and if anything remain until the third day, it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 19:6). Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is disqualified, because it has been rejected from being eaten.
  These two <i>amora’im</i> have the same dispute concerning a similar matter: With regard to one who eats a peace offering on the evening preceding the third day, Ḥizkiyya says: He is exempt from <i>karet</i>, because the offering has not yet been removed from its previous status and designated for burning. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, because it has been rejected from being eaten.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to sacrificial animals that may be eaten for one day, if one intends to present their blood after sunset, or if one intends to eat their meat or to sacrifice their sacrificial portions after the first rays of dawn, the offering is considered to be <i>piggul</i> and is disqualified. With regard to sacrificial animals that may be eaten for two days and one night, if one intends to present their blood after sunset, or if one intends to sacrifice their sacrificial portions after the first rays of dawn, or if one intends to eat their meat after sunset following the second of the two days, the offering is considered to be <i>piggul</i> and is disqualified.
  The Gemara cites another <i>baraita</i> on this topic. The Sages taught: One might have thought that peace offerings, which may be eaten for two days, may also be eaten on the evening preceding the third day. And this is the conclusion of a logical inference: Other offerings, e.g., thanks offerings, are eaten for one day, and peace offerings are eaten for two days. Just as with regard to offerings that are eaten for one day, the night follows the previous day, i.e., the offering may be eaten during the day and the subsequent night, so too, with regard to peace offerings that are eaten for two days, say that the night follows the day, and rule that they may be eaten on the night after the second day.
  To counter this logic, the verse states: “And when you sacrifice a peace offering to God, you shall sacrifice it of your own will. It shall be eaten the same day you sacrifice it, and on the next day; and if any remains until the third day, it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 19:5–6). This teaches that it may be eaten while it is still daytime, i.e., during the second day, but it may not be eaten on the evening preceding the third day.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If a peace offering may not be eaten beyond the second day, one might have thought that it should be burned immediately after the conclusion of the second day, and this too is the conclusion of a logical inference: Other offerings are eaten for one day, and peace offerings are eaten for two days. Just as with regard to offerings that are eaten for one day, immediately after the conclusion of their permitted time for eating should their burning commence, on the morning of the second day, so too, with regard to peace offerings that are eaten for two days say that immediately after the conclusion of their permitted time for eating should their burning commence, at night after the second day.
  To counter this logic, the verse states: “And if any remains of the flesh of the sacrifice on the third day, it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 7:17), meaning: You must burn it during the day, but you may not burn it during the night.
  MISHNA: The firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering are offerings of lesser sanctity. Their slaughter is anywhere in the Temple courtyard, and their blood requires one placement, provided that the priest places it so that the blood goes on the base of the altar.
  The <i>halakha</i> differs with regard to their consumption. The firstborn offering is eaten by the priests, and the animal tithe offer-ing is eaten by any person, i.e., any ritually pure Jew. And they are eaten throughout the city of Jerusalem, prepared in any manner of food preparation, for two days and one night. The Paschal offering is eaten only at night, and it is eaten only until midnight, and it is eaten only by its registrants, i.e., those who registered in advance to partake of the offering, and it is eaten only roasted, not prepared in any other manner.
  GEMARA: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that the blood of these offerings is placed, not poured, so that it goes on the base of the altar? Rav Ḥisda says that it is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The verse states: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred; you shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and you shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17). It is not stated: Its fat, but rather: “Their fat.” Similarly, it is not stated: Its blood, but rather: “Their blood.” This teaches with regard to a firstborn offering, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse, and an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering, which are similar in their sanctity to a firstborn offering, that they all require placement of their blood and the burning of their sacrificial portions on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that their blood must be placed so that it goes on the base of the altar? Rabbi Eliezer says: This is derived by way of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of the word “sprinkling” stated here derived from the meaning of the word “sprinkling” stated with regard to a burnt offering.
  
  Daf 57a
  
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> that a burnt offering itself has its blood presented on the altar in a place where there is a base? The Gemara answers: We derive it from a verse, as it is written: “And he shall pour all the blood of the bull at the base of the altar of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:7). This teaches that the blood of an obligatory burnt offering requires presentation at the base of the altar, as the verse specifically describes the base of the altar as connected to the burnt offering.
  The Gemara asks: If it is derived from a burnt offering via a ver-bal analogy, one might think that just as there, a burnt offering requires two placements that are four, so too here, a firstborn offering, an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering should also require two placements that are four, and not just a single placement.
  Abaye says: Why do I need the Torah to write: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood, and sprinkle the blood around against the altar” (Leviticus 1:5), with regard to a burnt offering, to teach that the blood must be placed on all four sides of the altar, in addition to writing: “And Moses took the blood, and put it upon the corners of the altar around with his finger” (Leviticus 8:15), with regard to a sin offering? They are two verses that come as one, i.e., they teach the same matter; and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases. Therefore, a firstborn offering, an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering do not require two placements that are four.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect with regard to other cases. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common aspect with regard to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Together with the verse stated with regard to a guilt offering, there are three verses, as it is written: “And its blood shall be sprinkled around the altar” (Leviticus 7:2), and three verses which come as one certainly do not teach their common aspect with regard to other cases.
  § The mishna teaches: The firstborn offering is eaten by the priests, throughout the city of Jerusalem, prepared in any manner of food preparation, for two days and one night. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to a firstborn offering that it is eaten for two days and the intervening night? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated with regard to a firstborn offering: “And their flesh shall be yours, as the breast of waving and as the right thigh” (Numbers 18:18). The verse juxtaposes the firstborn offering with the breast and thigh of peace offerings. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn offering is eaten for two days and one night.
  The <i>baraita</i> relates: And this question was asked before the Sages in the vineyard, i.e., the academy, in Yavne: For how many days and nights is a firstborn offering eaten? Rabbi Tarfon responded and said: For two days and one night.
  There was one student there who came to the study hall before the Sages for the first time, and his name was Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. He said to Rabbi Tarfon: My teacher, from where do you derive this? Rabbi Tarfon said to him: My son, peace offerings are offerings of lesser sanctity, and a firstborn offering is an offering of lesser sanctity. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn offering is eaten for two days and one night.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to him: My teacher, there is a different comparison that can be made: A firstborn offering is given as a gift to the priest, and a sin offering and a guilt offering are each given as a gift to the priest. Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering are eaten for one day and one night, so too, a firstborn offering should be eaten for one day and one night.
  Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Let us judge a matter from a matter to which it is most similar, i.e., a firstborn offering is an offering of lesser sanctity, as are peace offerings, and learn a matter from a matter, i.e., there is another comparison to be made: Just as peace offerings do not come as atonement for a sin, so too, a firstborn offering does not come as atonement for a sin. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn offering is eaten for two days and one night.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to him: My teacher, I can answer you in a similar way. Let us judge a matter from a matter to which it is most similar, i.e., a firstborn offering is more similar to a sin offering and a guilt offering, and learn a matter from a matter, i.e., there is another comparison to be made: A sin offering and a guilt offering are each given as a gift to the priest, and a firstborn offering is given as a gift to the priest. Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering do not come as a vow offering or as a gift offering, i.e., they are brought only by one obligated to bring them, so too, a firstborn offering does not come as a vow offering or as a gift offering. Just as a sin offering and a guilt offering are eaten for one day and one night, so too, a firstborn offering should be eaten for one day and one night.
  Rabbi Akiva jumped into the discussion, and Rabbi Tarfon left. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: But the verse states: “And their flesh shall be yours, as the breast of waving and as the right thigh” (Numbers 18:18). The verse juxtaposes firstborn offerings with a breast and thigh of peace offerings. Just as peace offerings are eaten for two days and one night, so too, a firstborn offering is eaten for two days and one night.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to Rabbi Akiva: You juxtaposed it with a breast and thigh of peace offerings. But since the Torah does not specify with which offering the firstborn is juxtaposed, I juxtapose it with a breast and thigh of a thanks offering, which are also given to a priest. Just as a thanks offering is eaten for one day and one night, so too, a firstborn offering should be eaten for one day and one night.
  Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: I concede that it is possible to juxtapose a firstborn offering with a thanks offering, but the verse states: “And their flesh shall be yours, as the breast of waving and as the right thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:18). Since there is no need for the verse to state a second time: “It shall be yours,” what is the meaning when the verse states a second time: “It shall be yours”? The verse adds another day on which it is permitted for a firstborn offering to be eaten, i.e., a second day.
  The Gemara relates: And when these matters were said before Rabbi Yishmael, he said to his students: Go out and tell Rabbi Akiva: You were mistaken when you conceded to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili that the allotted time for eating a firstborn offering could have been derived from the allotted time for eating a thanks offering. Why? From where is it derived that the breast and thigh of a thanks offering are eaten by priests? It is derived from a juxtaposition with a peace offering. Nowhere is it stated explicitly that the breast and thigh of a thanks offering are eaten only by priests. And in the realm of consecrated matters, can a matter derived via a juxtaposition then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition? The Gemara (49b) demonstrated that it cannot. Consequently, you should not infer from the latter formulation of the verse, from the words “It shall be yours,” but rather, from the first formulation of the verse, as you claimed that the Torah juxtaposes a firstborn offering with the breast and thigh of a peace offering.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yishmael do with this extra phrase: “It shall be yours”? This teaches about a blemished firstborn offering, that it is also given as a gift to the priest, as we have not found it written explicitly anywhere in the entire Torah what should be done with a blemished firstborn.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive that a blemished firstborn offering is also given as a gift to the priest? He derives it from the term “their flesh,” which is written in the plural. This teaches that both an unblemished firstborn offering and a blemished firstborn offering are given as gifts to the priest. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yishmael understand the plural term? The Gemara answers that he understands it to be saying that the priest receives gifts from the flesh of all these firstborn offerings mentioned in the verse, i.e., the firstborn of cattle, sheep, and goats.
  The Gemara asks: Since Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael both agree that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition, with regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds that a <i>halakha</i> derived both from that juxtaposition and from another principle is considered a juxtaposition. In this case, the specific detail that the breast and thigh of a thanks offering are given to a priest is derived from a juxtaposition with peace offerings. The length of time in which it may be eaten, one day and one night, is written explicitly. Since it is nevertheless considered a juxtaposition, it cannot be used to teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a firstborn offering. And one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that such a case is not considered to be a juxtaposition, and therefore it can be used to teach another <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who says that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle is not considered a juxtaposition, this is the reason that it is written with regard to the rites performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur: “And so shall he do for the Tent of Meeting that dwells with them in the midst of their impurity” (Leviticus 16:16).
  The High Priest sprinkles the blood of two offerings, the bull and the goat. He sprinkles their blood between the staves of the Ark and on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies. In each location he sprinkles their blood once above and seven times below. The verse does not write all of the details of these sprinklings with regard to each offering, and the details of each are derived from what is written explicitly in the other, as follows: Just as the High Priest sprinkles in the innermost sanctum, between the staves of the Ark, once above and seven times below, with the blood of the bull, so he sprinkles on the Curtain in the Sanctuary.
  And just as in the innermost sanctum he sprinkles once above and seven times below, with the blood of the goat, so he sprinkles on the Curtain in the Sanctuary. This is an instance of a <i>halakha</i> derived both from a juxtaposition and from another principle, and the stringency that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot also teach its <i>halakha</i> via a juxtaposition is not applied in this case.
  But according to the one who says that this too is considered a juxtaposition, what can be said? How can these <i>halakhot</i> be derived? The Gemara answers: It is the locations where the blood is sprinkled that are derived from one another in the second juxtaposition. The first juxtaposition teaches one <i>halakha</i>, namely, that the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat are to be compared to one another. The second juxtaposition does not teach a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat per se; rather it teaches a comparison between the sprinkling performed in the Holy of Holies and the sprinkling performed in the Sanctuary. These are two unconnected juxtapositions.
  
  Daf 57b
  
  The Gemara suggests: And if you wish, say there is a different resolution: The sprinkling outside is derived from the sprinkling inside, all at once. There are not two comparisons here, one derived from the other, but rather a single, complex juxtaposition, from which all of the relevant <i>halakhot</i> are derived.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who says that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle is not a juxtaposition, this is the reason that it is written with regard to the offering brought on <i>Shavuot</i>: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two wave loaves of two-tenths of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 23:17).
  Since apparently there is no need for the verse to state: “You shall bring,” as it already states: “And you shall present a new meal offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:16), why must the verse state: “You shall bring”? It states this to teach that anything that you bring from another place that is similar to this offering, i.e., the leavened bread that accompanies a thanks offering, shall be prepared like this. Just as there, with regard to the two loaves, they must be prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour for each loaf, so too here, each of the ten loaves of leavened bread that accompany a thanks offering must be prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour for each loaf.
  If they are compared, why not say that just as there, with regard to the two loaves, the total amount of flour is two-tenths of an ephah, so too here, with regard to the ten loaves that accompany a thanks offering, the total amount of flour for all ten should be two-tenths of an ephah? To counter this comparison, the verse states: “They shall be,” to serve as a restriction and teach that only these two loaves amount to a total of two-tenths of an ephah, but the bread accompanying the thanks offering does not amount to two-tenths of an ephah.
  The Gemara continues: The ten loaves accompanying a thanks offering must each be a tenth of an ephah, and this has been derived from two sources: A juxtaposition with the offering of <i>Shavuot</i> and another principle, which is that which the verse states concerning the thanks offering, that there must be ten leavened loaves. And we have learned that ten-tenths of an ephah is required for the ten loaves of leavened bread. From where is it derived that ten-tenths of an ephah are required for the <i>matza</i> which also accompanies a thanks offering? After stating that thirty <i>matzot</i> accompany a thanks offering, the verse states: “With cakes of leavened bread” (Leviticus 7:13), to juxtapose the <i>matza</i> with the leavened bread. This teaches that one must bring <i>matza</i> of an amount corresponding to the leavened bread. In any event, this derivation can be employed according to the one who says that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle is not a juxtaposition.
  But according to the one who says that a matter derived via a juxtaposition and another principle is a juxtaposition, and therefore it cannot then teach its <i>halakha</i> via another juxtaposition, what is there to say? How can the measure of flour for the <i>matza</i> be derived from the measure of flour for the leavened bread? The Gemara answers: The first <i>halakha</i>, connecting the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> to the bread accompanying a thanks offering, is not derived via a juxtaposition, but rather via a superfluous word. The term “You shall bring,” written with regard to the two loaves, is extra, and is therefore considered as if it were written explicitly with regard to the leavened bread accompanying the thanks offering. Therefore, it is possible to derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning matza from the <i>halakha</i> concerning leavened bread via a juxtaposition.
  § The mishna teaches: The Paschal offering is eaten only at night and it is eaten only until midnight. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this mishna? Rav Yosef said that it is Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And they shall eat of the flesh on that night” (Exodus 12:8). Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: It is stated here: “On that night,” without stating when the night ends. And it is stated there, with regard to the plague that afflicted the firstborn Egyptians: “And I will pass through the land of Egypt on that night and I will strike every firstborn in the land of Egypt” (Exodus 12:12). With regard to the death of the firstborns the Torah states: “So said the Lord: At about midnight, I will go out into the midst of Egypt and every firstborn in Egypt shall die” (Exodus 11:4–5).
  Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya continues: Just as in the verse there, the death of the firstborns occurred until midnight, as stated explicitly in the verse, so too, in the verse here, the mitzva to eat the Paschal offering continues until midnight but not beyond.
  Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: But isn’t it already stated: “And so you shall eat it, with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, your staffs in your hands, and you will eat it in haste, for it is the Paschal offering for the Lord” (Exodus 12:11)? This verse indicates that the Paschal offering may be eaten until the time of haste, i.e., until dawn, as the Jewish people left Egypt hastily the next morning.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why must the verse state: “On that night,” with regard to eating the Paschal offering? The Gemara explains: This phrase is necessary, as one might have thought that the Paschal offering is like all the other offerings in that it should be eaten during the day, on the day it is sacrificed. To counter this reasoning, the verse states: “On that night,” to emphasize that this particular offering shall be eaten at night, but it shall not be eaten during the day.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And from where do you know that the mishna represents the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and is stating that the Paschal offering must be eaten by midnight by Torah law? Perhaps the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and is stating that the Paschal offering must be eaten by midnight by rabbinic law, and the reason for the rabbinic decree was to distance one from a sin. Rav Yosef replied: If so, what does the mishna mean when it says: It is eaten only until midnight? With regard to the other offerings the mishna teaches: Until midnight, without specifying: Only. Rather, one must say that it is like there, with regard to the other <i>halakhot</i> of the Paschal offering stated in the mishna. Just as there, the requirements are by Torah law, so too here, with regard to the final time for eating the meat, the requirement is also by Torah law.
  
  
  Daf 58a
  
  MISHNA: It was taught in the previous chapter that offerings of the most sacred order are to be slaughtered in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. With regard to offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered atop the altar, Rabbi Yosei says: Their status is as though they were slaughtered in the north, and the offerings are therefore valid. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The status of the area from the halfway point of the altar and to the south is like that of the south, and offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered in that area are therefore disqualified. The status of the area from the halfway point of the altar and to the north is like that of the north.
  GEMARA: Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei used to say: The entire altar stands in the north section of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: And what is the meaning of Rabbi Yosei’s statement that if one slaughtered offerings of the most sacred order atop the altar it is as though they were slaughtered in the north, which indicates that they were not actually slaughtered in the north? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei said this lest you say that we require that the offering be slaughtered “on the side of the altar northward” (Leviticus 1:11), i.e., on the ground beside the altar, and that requirement is not fulfilled when it is slaughtered on top of the altar. Therefore, Rabbi Yosei teaches us that the offering is still valid.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: Rabbi Yoḥanan apparently understands that the reason Rabbi Yosei holds that an offering of the most sacred order slaughtered on the altar is valid is because the entire altar is in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. If that is so, shall one also say that according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, half of the altar was situated in the north of the Temple courtyard and half of it was situated in the south?
  And if you would say that indeed that is so, wasn’t it you who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, concedes that if one slaughtered offerings of the most sacred order on the ground opposite the northern half of the altar, the offering is disqualified? Accordingly, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, apparently maintains that the altar is not located in the north at all.
  Rav Asi said to Rabbi Zeira: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement with regard to Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is an independent statement rather than an inference from the mishna. And with regard to the dispute in the mishna, this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both of them derived their opinions from one verse: “An altar of earth you shall make for Me, and you shall slaughter upon it your burnt offerings and your peace offerings” (Exodus 20:21).
  Rabbi Yosei maintains that the verse teaches that all of it, i.e., the entire altar, is fit for slaughtering a burnt offering, and all of it is also fit for slaughtering a peace offering. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, maintains that the verse teaches that half of it is fit for slaughtering a burnt offering and half of it is fit for slaughtering a peace offering.
  The Gemara explains the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: As if it enters your mind that all of it is fit for slaughtering a burnt offering, now that all of it is fit for slaughtering a burnt offering, which must be slaughtered in the northern section of the Temple courtyard (see 53b), is it necessary to teach that it is also fit for slaughtering a peace offering, which may be slaughtered anywhere in the Temple courtyard (see 55a)? The verse therefore must be understood as teaching that half the altar is fit for slaughtering burnt offerings and half is fit for slaughtering peace offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, respond to this reasoning? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to mention peace offerings. Otherwise, it could enter your mind to say that the verse allows one to slaughter only a burnt offering atop the altar, as the location where it may be slaughtered on the ground is narrow. But with regard to peace offerings, whose location for slaughter on the ground is not narrow, say that no, one may not slaughter them atop the altar. Therefore, the verse teaches us that peace offerings as well may be slaughtered atop the altar.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, concedes that if one slaughtered offerings of the most sacred order on the ground opposite the northern half of the altar, the offering is disqualified. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: What is the meaning of the phrase: On the ground opposite the northern half of the altar? If we say it means that the offering was sacrificed upon the cubit-wide base of the altar or upon the cubit-wide surrounding ledge of the altar, this itself is part of the altar. And furthermore, what is the meaning of the phrase: On the ground opposite the northern half of the altar? The base and ledge are not on the ground.
  And if you would say that the case is where one dug tunnels in the ground beneath the altar, and slaughtered the offerings in them, in a case like this would the altar itself be fit for use so that according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, one may slaughter the offerings of the most sacred order on the altar but not on the ground? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “An altar of earth you shall make for Me” (Exodus 20:21)? This verse indicates that the altar must be attached to the earth, so that one may not build it on top of tunnels nor on top of arches.
  The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to have the phrase: On the ground opposite the northern half of the altar, in order to teach the <i>halakha</i> in a case where one minimized the dimensions of the altar and slaughtered the offerings on the ground where the northern half of the altar had previously stood.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that according to Rabbi Yosei the entire altar was located in the northern section of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara had mentioned that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is an independent statement, not based on the mishna. Rabbi Zeira said: Is it possible that this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is correct and we did not learn it in any mishna?
  Rabbi Zeira went out, examined the matter, and discovered a mishna that alludes to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 2:5): The priests selected fine wood of a fig tree from the chamber of firewood, with which to lay out a second arrangement of wood on the altar so that coals from this arrangement could be used for burning the incense. This second arrangement was located opposite the southwest corner of the altar, distanced from the corner northward by four cubits. They would arrange enough wood which, when burned, would produce approximately five <i>se’a</i> of coals. And on Shabbat, there was enough wood to produce approximately eight <i>se’a</i> of coals, as they would place there the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the significance of the mishna’s defining the precise location of the arrangement and the fact that this is where the frankincense is burned? The Gemara embarks on a lengthy discussion to answer this question: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that this arrangement of wood and the burning of the frankincense must be in that precise location, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 58b
  
  Rabbi Yosei says: This is the principle of where sacrificial items are placed on the inner and outer altars: Any sacrificial item that is taken from the altar located inside the Sanctuary in order to be placed on the altar outside the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard, may be placed only on the area of that altar that is near the Sanctuary, so that there is no area closer to the inside of the Sanctuary. It must therefore be placed on the part of the external altar closest to the entrance to the Sanctuary.
  And any sacrificial item that is taken from the altar outside the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard, in order to be placed on the altar located inside the Sanctuary, may be taken only from the area of the external altar that is near the Sanctuary, so that there is no area closer to the inside of the Sanctuary, i.e., from the part of the external altar closest to the entrance to the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara clarifies: With regard to the statement concerning any sacrificial item that is taken from the altar located inside the Sanctuary in order to be placed on the altar outside the Sanctuary, what are these items? If we say they are the remaining blood of the sin offerings whose blood is presented on the inner altar, there is no reason for Rabbi Yosei to formulate his principle, as it is explicitly written concerning them: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering, which is at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). This verse describes how the blood of the inner sin offerings that remained after the sprinkling was to be poured out on the base of the west side of the altar, which is the side closest to the entrance to the Sanctuary.
  And furthermore, with regard to the statement about any sacrificial item that is taken from the altar outside the Sanctuary, in the Temple courtyard, in order to be placed on the altar located inside the Sanctuary, what are these items? If we say these are the coals of the Yom Kippur service, which must be taken from the western side of the altar, it is explicitly written concerning them: “And he shall take a coal pan full of coals of fire from off the altar before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:12). The expression “before the Lord” is a reference to the western side of the altar, which is the side closest to the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara continues: Rather, Rabbi Yosei’s statement with regard to any sacrificial item that is taken from the altar located inside the Sanctuary in order to be placed on the altar outside the Sanctuary is referring to the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread. According to Rabbi Yosei, they must be burned on the western side of the altar, as he derives this <i>halakha</i> from the location on the base of the altar where the remaining blood of the inner sin offerings is poured.
  Rabbi Yosei’s next statement, that any sacrificial item that is taken from the altar outside the Sanctuary in order to be placed on the altar located inside the Sanctuary may be taken only from the area of the external altar that is near the Sanctuary, is referring to the coals that are taken from the external altar each and every day and placed on the inner altar in order to burn the incense. According to Rabbi Yosei these coals must be taken from the western side of the altar, as we derive this <i>halakha</i> from the location on the altar from where the coals of the Yom Kippur service must be taken.
  The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that the second arrangement of wood was placed four cubits north of the southwest corner of the altar: And what does Rabbi Yosei hold about the placement of the altar in the Temple courtyard? If he holds that the entire altar stands in the south side of the Temple courtyard, then only the five northernmost cubits of the altar are opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. Accordingly, in order for the arrangement of wood to be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary, one is required to move it twenty-seven cubits north of the southwest corner of the altar.
  The Gemara continues: And even if Rabbi Yosei holds that the level of sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall is the same, so that the arrangement of wood can be opposite the Entrance Hall, which is ten cubits wider than the Sanctuary, his opinion is still difficult. In order for the arrangement of wood to be opposite the Entrance Hall, one is required to move it twenty-two cubits north of the southwest corner of the altar.
  The Gemara continues: And even if Rabbi Yosei holds that half of the altar was located in the north side of the Temple courtyard and half in the south, in order for the arrangement of wood to be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary one is still required to move it eleven cubits to the north of the southwest corner of the altar. And if one suggests that, rather, he holds that the sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall is one matter, i.e., equal, one is still required to move the arrangement of wood six cubits from the southwest corner in order to be opposite the Entrance Hall.
  Rather, is it not that Rabbi Yosei’s opinion that the arrangement of wood was located four cubits from the altar’s southwest corner is due to the fact that he holds that the entire altar stands in the north side of the Temple courtyard? Accordingly, only the five southernmost cubits of the altar were opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary.
  And of these four cubits from which the arrangement of wood was distanced from the southwest corner of the altar, one cubit was the base of the altar; and one cubit was the surrounding ledge of the altar; and one cubit was the place where the corners of the altar were located; and another cubit was the place of the feet of the priests, i.e., space for the priests to walk around the perimeter of the surface of the altar in order to perform the sacrificial rites. The arrangement of wood was located specifically in that location, as if one were to move it farther away from the southwest corner of the altar, it would no longer be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. This proves that according to Rabbi Yosei, the entire altar was located in the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara challenges this proof by suggesting an alternative explanation of the mishna in <i>Tamid</i>: Rav Adda bar Ahava said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: The altar was centered and standing precisely in the middle of the Temple courtyard, and it was thirty-two cubits wide. Ten cubits were opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary, eleven cubits were to this side of the entrance to the Sanctuary, and eleven cubits were to that side of the entrance to the Sanctuary. It turns out that the length of the altar was aligned opposite the width of the Sanctuary, which itself was thirty-two cubits wide.
  The Gemara asks: Ultimately, according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is still required to move the arrangement of wood eleven cubits from the southwest corner in order for it to be opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary. And even if he holds that the sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall is one matter, i.e., equal, one is still required to move the arrangement of wood six cubits in order to be opposite the Entrance Hall. Therefore, the mishna, which states that the arrangement of wood is four cubits north of the southwest corner, cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara responds: Do you hold that these four cubits include the cubit of the base of the altar and the cubit of the surrounding ledge of the altar? Actually, the four cubits are aside from the cubit of the base of the altar and the cubit of the surrounding ledge of the altar. Accordingly, the arrangement of wood was actually a total of six cubits from the southwest corner of the altar, and the mishna can be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara asks why Rav Adda bar Ahava interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: But let him interpret it to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei and explain that the altar is located in the center of the Temple courtyard. The Gemara explains: Rav Adda bar Ahava interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda because we heard that Rabbi Yehuda explicitly said that the altar was positioned in the center of the Temple courtyard, whereas we did not hear that Rabbi Yosei maintains such an opinion.
  And Rav Sherevya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna in <i>Tamid</i>, which holds that the entire altar was located in the northern part of the Temple courtyard? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Since it is stated: “And you shall set the Basin between the Tent of Meeting and the altar” (Exodus 40:7), and another verse states: “And
  
  Daf 59a
  
  the altar of the burnt offering he set at the entrance to the Tabernacle of the Tent of Meeting.” (Exodus 40:29), indicating that no object was allowed to be located between the altar and the Tent of Meeting, whose parallel, in the Temple, was the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives from these verses that only the altar stood at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, but the Basin did not stand at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting. Where would they place the Basin? It was placed between the Entrance Hall and the altar, extended slightly toward the south. Therefore, although the Basin was closer to the Sanctuary than the altar was, it did not actually stand between the altar and the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara seeks to clarify: What does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili hold? If he holds that the entire altar stands in the south section of the Temple courtyard, let him stand the Basin anywhere from where the wall of the Sanctuary begins and southward, so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary but it is between the Entrance Hall and the altar. This would allow for the optimal fulfillment of both verses (Exodus 40:29; Leviticus 4:7), as the Basin would be located between the altar and the Sanctuary without interposing between the altar and the entrance to the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara continues: And even if he holds that the level of sanctity of the Sanctuary and the Entrance Hall is the same, in which case the Basin could not be located opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall as this too would be considered a violation of the second verse, let him stand the Basin anywhere from where the wall of the Entrance Hall begins and southward, so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall but is in between the Entrance Hall and the altar. From the fact that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili did not say that, it is clear he held that the altar was not located in the southern section of the Temple courtyard.
  Alternatively, if Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that half of the altar was located in the north section of the Temple courtyard and half of it was located in the south, let him stand the Basin anywhere from where the wall of the Sanctuary begins and southward, so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary but between the Entrance Hall and the altar. Since the entrance to the Sanctuary was five cubits wide and stood in the middle of the courtyard, and the altar was thirty-two cubits long, there would have been eleven cubits to both the north and the south of the entrance to the Sanctuary where the Basin could be placed in order to be located between the altar and the Sanctuary without interposing between the altar and the entrance to the Sanctuary.
  And even if Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the level of sanctity of the Entrance Hall and that of the Sanctuary is the same, in which case the Basin could not be located opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall because this too would be considered a violation of the second verse, let him stand the Basin anywhere from where the wall of the Entrance Hall begins and southward, so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall but in between the Entrance Hall and the altar. Why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili require that the Basin be placed south of the altar? The Gemara concludes: Rather, is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the entire altar stood in the north section of the Temple courtyard?
  The Gemara asks: Even if this is the case, why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili require that the Basin be located to the south of the altar so that it is not actually in between the altar and the Sanctuary? Even if you stand it anywhere from where the wall of the Sanctuary begins and northward, it would not interpose between the altar and the entrance to the Sanctuary but it would actually be located in between the Entrance Hall and the altar.
  And even if Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the sanctity of the Entrance Hall is equal to that of the Sanctuary, and that the Basin cannot interpose between the altar and the entrance to the Entrance Hall, stand the Basin anywhere from where the wall of the Entrance Hall begins and northward, so that it is not opposite the entrance to the Entrance Hall but it is located in between the Entrance Hall and the altar.
  The Gemara answers: That suggestion is technically not feasible, as the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward [<i>tzafona</i>]” (Leviticus 1:11). This verse indicates that the north section of the Temple courtyard must be vacant of all vessels, including the Basin. This concludes the Gemara’s explanation of Rav Sherevya’s assertion that the mishna in <i>Tamid</i>, which holds that the altar was located in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: The verse states: “Northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This indicates that the north section of the Temple courtyard must be vacant of everything, and even of the altar. Therefore, he maintains that the entire altar stood in the southern section of the Temple courtyard.
  § Rav says: In a case of an altar that was damaged, all sacrificial animals that were slaughtered there are disqualified. Rav continues: We have a verse as the source for this <i>halakha</i> but we have forgotten which one it is. When Rav Kahana, Rav’s disciple, ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he found Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, saying in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei: From where is it derived that in the case of an altar that was damaged, that all sacrificial animals that were slaughtered there are disqualified?
  It is derived from a verse, as it is stated in the verse with regard to the altar: “An altar of earth you shall make for Me, and you shall slaughter upon it your burnt offerings and your peace offerings [<i>shelamekha</i>]” (Exodus 20:21). Is it true that you slaughter sacrificial animals on the altar itself? They are slaughtered on the ground near the altar. No, rather, the verse indicates that one is able to slaughter the sacrificial animals on account of the altar, i.e., when the altar is complete [<i>shalem</i>], but not when it is lacking, i.e., damaged. Rav Kahana said: This is the verse that eluded Rav.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Both this one and that one are disqualified, i.e., all animals that were designated as offerings when the altar was in a damaged state are disqualified, even if they were not yet slaughtered. The Gemara asks: With regard to what issue do Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree? The Gemara answers: Rav holds that living animals are not permanently deferred, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that living animals are permanently deferred. If the altar is damaged and it is therefore impossible to sacrifice offerings, Rav holds that only offerings that were already slaughtered become permanently deferred, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that even those that were not yet slaughtered become permanently deferred.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s opinion, based on a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of all sacrificial animals that were consecrated before the altar was built, and then the altar was subsequently built, the animals are disqualified. The Gemara assumes that this <i>baraita</i> is referring to animals that were consecrated before the building of the altar in the Second Temple. The Gemara responds: In a case where the animals were consecrated before the altar was built, the animals are considered initially deferred, i.e., deferred from the time they were initially consecrated. In this case all agree they are not permanently deferred and they can be sacrificed when the altar is built.
  Rather, explain the <i>baraita</i> as follows: If the animals were consecrated before the altar was destroyed in the First Temple, and then the altar was destroyed and rebuilt, the animals are still disqualified. The Gemara questions this reading: Can the <i>baraita</i> be referring to a case where the altar was destroyed in the First Temple? Didn’t the animals become too old for sacrifice by the time the altar was constructed in the Second Temple?
  The Gemara emends the <i>baraita</i> yet again: Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where one consecrated the animals before the altar was damaged, and subsequently the altar was damaged. The <i>halakha</i> is that the animals are disqualified. It seems from this <i>baraita</i> that even sacrificial animals that were not yet slaughtered when the altar became damaged are nevertheless permanently disqualified, in contrast to the opinion of Rav. The Gemara rejects this proof: But did you not already have to emend the text of the <i>baraita</i>? Emend it differently and say that the case is where the animals were slaughtered before the altar became damaged. Accordingly, there is no proof from this <i>baraita</i> with regard to the deferral of living animals.
  Rav said that sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard when the altar was in a damaged state are disqualified. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav says: In a case where the golden altar became uprooted from its location in the Sanctuary, one may burn the incense in its place? Apparently, it is not essential to have the altar in order to sacrifice offerings.
  The Gemara answers: It is like that which Rava says (60a): Although Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the entire Temple courtyard is fit for burning the sacrificial portions of offerings, Rabbi Yehuda would concede with regard to the presenting of the blood that it must be performed specifically on the altar. Here too, the Gemara says, Rav concedes with regard to the blood that an altar is required. Consequently, if consecrated offerings were slaughtered when the altar was in a damaged state, since the blood may not be presented, the offering is disqualified.
  Having briefly mentioned Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, the Gemara asks: What is the context of the statement of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the inauguration of the Temple in the time of King Solomon: “On that day the king sanctified the middle of the court that was before the House of the Lord; as there he offered the burnt offering, and the meal offering, and the fat of the peace offerings; because the copper altar that was before the Lord was too small to receive the burnt offering, and the meal offering, and the fat of the peace offerings” (I Kings 8:64). The matters in the verse are to be understood as they are written, i.e., that the altar in the Temple was too small to receive all of the offerings that Solomon sacrificed, and Solomon therefore sanctified the Temple courtyard so that it, too, could function as an altar; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Yosei said to him:
  
  Daf 59b
  
  But isn’t it already stated with regard to the altar that Moses built: “A thousand burnt offerings did Solomon offer upon that altar” (I Kings 3:4), while with regard to the Eternal House, i.e., the Temple, it states: “And Solomon offered for the sacrifice of peace offerings, which he offered to the Lord, two and twenty thousand cattle and one hundred and twenty thousand sheep” (I Kings 8:63)?
  And when you arrive at the calculation of burnt offerings and the number of cubits for each altar, this was greater than that, i.e., Solomon sacrificed more offerings per square cubit on Moses’ altar than he did on the altar in the Temple upon its inauguration. Therefore, it is difficult to suggest that the altar in the Temple was not large enough to accommodate the number of offerings that Solomon sacrificed.
  Rabbi Yosei presents an alternative understanding of the verse: Rather, what is the meaning of the phrase “because the copper altar…was too small to receive”? It is not referring to the altar built by Solo-mon, but rather to the copper altar built in the time of Moses, which was disqualified from use from the day of the Temple’s inauguration on. Rather than stating outright that the altar became disqualified, the verse employed a euphemism, like a person who says to his friend: So-and-so is a dwarf [<i>nanas</i>], and what he really means to say is that he is disqualified from performing the Temple service. Similarly, rather than stating outright that the altar built in the time of Moses became disqualified, the verse states that it was too small to accommodate the offerings sacrificed in the Temple.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to this claim? Rabbi Yosei is saying well, i.e., his claim is persuasive. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that the altar that Moses built was large. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states that the altar built in the time of Moses was: “Five cubits long and five cubits wide” (Exodus 27:1). The matters in the verse are to be understood as they are written; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: It is stated here that the altar built in the time of Moses was: “Square” (Exodus 27:1), and it is stated there, in Ezekiel’s prophetic description of the altar, that it is: “Square” (Ezekiel 43:16). Just as there, in Ezekiel’s vision, he was measuring the distance in each direction from its center, so too here, the verse was measuring the altar that Moses built from its center. Accordingly, the altar built by Moses was ten cubits by ten cubits. As a result, Solomon sacrificed more offerings per square cubit of space on the altar in the Temple than he did on the altar built by Moses. It is therefore possible that the altar in the Temple was not sufficient to accommodate the offerings, and Solomon consecrated the Temple courtyard to serve as an altar.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the altar mentioned there, in Ezekiel, was measured from its center? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And the hearth shall be twelve cubits long by twelve wide, square, to its four sides” (Ezekiel 43:16). The Gemara asks: Does the verse mean twelve cubits in each direction from the center of the altar, so that in total it was twenty-four by twenty-four cubits? Or perhaps the altar was only a total of twelve by twelve cubits. The Gemara answers: When the verse states: “To its four sides,” it teaches that Ezekiel was measuring from the center of the altar.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yosei respond to Rabbi Yehuda’s claim? The Gemara answers: When he learns the verbal analogy, he learns it with regard to the altar’s height. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the altar built in the time of Moses: “And its height shall be three cubits” (Exodus 27:1). The matters in the verse are to be understood as they are written, i.e., that the height of the altar was three cubits. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Yosei says: It is stated here that the altar built in the time of Moses was: “Square” (Exodus 27:1), and it is stated there that the incense altar was: “Square” (Exodus 30:2). The verbal analogy indicates that just as there, with regard to the incense altar, its height was twice its length, so too here, the height of the altar built in the time of Moses was twice its length, i.e., ten cubits.
  Rabbi Yehuda said to Rabbi Yosei: But isn’t it already stated: “The length of the court shall be a hundred cubits…and the height five cubits” (Exodus 27:18)? Is it possible that the priest would stand atop the altar and hold the items with which he would perform the sacrificial service in his hand, and the whole nation could see him from outside the courtyard? That would constitute a lack of respect for the service in the Tabernacle.
  Rabbi Yosei said back to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And the curtains of the court, and the screen for the door of the gate of the court which is by the Tabernacle and by the altar” (Numbers 4:26)? This verse juxtaposes the Tabernacle with the altar to teach that just as the Tabernacle was ten cubits high, so too, the altar was ten cubits high. And another verse states: “The curtains were fifteen
  
  Daf 60a
  
  cubits for the one side” (Exodus 38:14), which indicates that the height of the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle was fifteen cubits. And what is the meaning when the verse states: “And the height five cubits” (Exodus 27:18)? It is referring to the height of the curtains from the upper edge of the altar and above; the curtains surrounding the courtyard were five cubits higher than the altar.
  Rabbi Yosei continues: And what is the meaning when the verse states: “And you shall make the altar…and its height shall be three cubits” (Exodus 27:1)? The verse means that the altar measures three cubits from the edge of the surrounding ledge and above.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda, who understands that the copper altar built in the time of Moses was actually three cubits high, interpret the verbal analogy based upon the word “square,” from which Rabbi Yosei derived that the height of the copper altar was ten cubits? The Gemara answers: When he learns the verbal analogy, he learns it with regard to the altar’s width, not its height. This is based on the verse in Ezekiel (see 59b). Accordingly, it teaches that the altar built in the time of Moses was ten cubits by ten cubits.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the altar was three cubits high and the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle were five cubits high, isn’t the priest visible while performing the service atop the altar? The Gemara answers: Granted, the priest is visible, but the items with which he performs the sacrificial service that are in his hand are not visible.
  The Gemara returns to the original dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei with regard to whether or not Solomon consecrated the floor of the Temple courtyard. Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the floor of the Temple courtyard was consecrated so that it could serve as an altar, this is the meaning of that which is written: “The king sanctified the middle of the court” (I Kings 8:64). But according to Rabbi Yosei, what is the meaning of the phrase “the king sanctified”? The Gemara answers: It means that Solomon sanctified the courtyard in order to stand the altar in it.
  The Gemara continues: Granted, according to Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that the surface of the altar built in the time of Moses was five cubits by five cubits, this is the meaning of that which is written in the continuation of that verse: “Because the copper altar that was before the Lord was too small to receive.” But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that its surface area was ten cubits by ten cubits, what is the meaning of the phrase “too small”? The Gemara answers: The verse is referring to the altar built by Solomon, and this is what it is saying: The stone altar that Solomon built in place of the copper altar built in the time of Moses was too small to accommodate the large quantity of offerings.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei disagree that causes them to interpret differently the verbal analogy based on the word “square”? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that we derive the dimensions of the external altar built in the time of Moses from the external altar described in Ezekiel; but we do not derive the dimensions of the external altar from the dimensions of the inner altar, used for burning the incense.
  And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that we derive the dimensions of a portable vessel, i.e., the copper altar built in the time of Moses, from the dimensions of another portable vessel, i.e., the golden incense altar built at that time; but we do not derive the dimensions of a portable vessel from the dimensions of an edifice, i.e., the stone altar in the Temple.
  § Rava says: Although Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the entire Temple courtyard is fit for burning the sacrificial portions of offerings, he concedes with regard to the blood and holds that it must be presented on the altar, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: On Passover eve, a priest would fill one cup with the blood of the many offerings brought that day and that was now mixed together on the floor. And then he would pour it on the altar, so that if all of the blood of one of the offerings had been spilled and was never presented on the altar, this cup would contain a small amount of that blood and pouring it on the altar would render the offering fit.
  Rava explains his proof: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yehuda maintains the entire Temple courtyard was consecrated so that it had the status of the altar, then the mitzva of sacrificing the Paschal offering was performed even if the blood spilled on the ground of the courtyard and was never presented on the altar.
  The Gemara attempts to reject this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda requires pouring a cup of the mixture of blood on the altar due to the fact that he holds we require pouring of the blood of the Paschal offering by human force. Since the blood on the floor of the courtyard was not poured there by a person, the mitzva has not yet been fulfilled despite the fact that the floor has the same status as the altar. The Gemara responds: If so, let the priest take the cup of the mixture of blood and pour it in its place on the floor rather than on the altar.
  The Gemara rejects Rava’s proof: But perhaps Rabbi Yehuda requires the blood to be poured on the altar only due to the fact that we require the mitzva to be performed in the optimal manner. Even if Rabbi Yehuda holds that the floor of the courtyard has the same status as the altar, he would agree that it is preferable for the blood to be poured on the altar itself.
  § Rabbi Elazar says: In the case of an altar that was damaged, one may not eat the remainder of a meal offering on its account, as it is stated: “Take the meal offering…and eat it without leaven beside the altar; for it is most holy” (Leviticus 10:12). The verse is difficult: But did the priests have to eat the meal offering beside the altar? A priest may eat sacrificial items even of the most sacred order anywhere in the Temple courtyard. Rather, the verse means that one may eat the meal offering only at a time when the altar is complete, but not at a time when it is lacking.
  The Gemara continues: We found a source for this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the remainder of a meal offering; from where do we derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies to all offerings of the most sacred order? The Gemara answers: The end of the verse states: “For it is most holy.” Since this term is also used with regard to the other offerings of the most sacred order, it is derived through verbal analogy that these offerings may not be eaten if the altar is damaged.
  The Gemara continues: From where is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> also applies to offerings of lesser sanctity? Abaye said: It is derived from the exposition of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says three halakhic matters in the name of
  
  Daf 60b
  
  three elders, and this is one of them: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that a person would bring second-tithe produce up to Jerusalem in the present, after the destruction of the Temple, and eat it. And ostensibly, it could be derived by means of a logical inference that one may not do so: A firstborn offering requires bringing it to the place, to Jerusalem, and eating it there, and second-tithe produce requires bringing it to the place (see Deuteronomy 12:17–18); just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.
  Rabbi Yishmael notes that this derivation can be challenged: What is notable about a firstborn? Bringing the firstborn to Jerusalem is required only in the presence of the Temple, because it is notable in that it requires placement of its blood and its sacrificial portions upon the altar; will you say the same with regard to second-tithe produce, which requires only that it be consumed in Jerusalem?
  He continues: First fruits will prove that placement of blood upon the altar is not a factor, as they do not require placement of blood upon the altar, and yet they are brought to Jerusalem only in the presence of the Temple. Rabbi Yishmael counters: What is notable about first fruits? They are notable in that they require placement alongside the altar. Perhaps, since second-tithe produce does not require placement at all, even in the present one must bring it to Jerusalem and eat it there.
  Rabbi Yishmael concludes: Therefore, the verse states: “And there you shall bring your burnt offerings, and your sacrifices, and your tithes…and the firstborns of your herd and of your flock” (Deuteronomy 12:6); the Torah juxtaposes second-tithe produce with the firstborn. Just as the firstborn offering may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce may be eaten there only in the presence of the Temple.
  The Gemara questions why a verse was needed to teach that second-tithe produce may not be consumed nowadays: But let the logical derivation return and the <i>halakha</i> will be derived from the common element between the <i>halakhot</i> of firstborn animals and first fruits. Although each has a unique factor, they share a common element: They must be brought to Jerusalem and that they may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple. So too, second-tithe produce, which also must be brought to Jerusalem, should be permitted for consumption only in the presence of the Temple.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael did not present this derivation because it can be refuted in the following manner: What is notable about the two sources that share a common element? Both firstborn animals and first fruits are notable in that they possess an aspect of being offered upon the altar. Since second-tithe produce does not share this characteristic, its <i>halakhot</i> cannot be derived from those pertaining to firstborn animals and first fruits.
  The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yishmael hold? If he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, then it should be permitted to build an altar and sacrifice offerings even nowadays, and therefore even a firstborn animal may be eaten. And if he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple area did not sanctify it forever, let the dilemma be raised with regard to a firstborn as well.
  Ravina said: Actually, Rabbi Yishmael holds that that the initial consecration of the Temple did not sanctify it forever. And al-though one cannot slaughter the firstborn to begin with, here we are dealing with a firstborn that was slaughtered and whose blood was sprinkled on the altar before the destruction of the Temple, and then the Temple was destroyed, and the meat of the firstborn still exists.
  It is prohibited to eat the meat of the firstborn in this case because its meat was juxtaposed with its blood, which is mentioned in the previous verse, as it is stated: “You shall sprinkle their blood…and you shall burn their fats…and their flesh shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). The juxtaposition teaches that just as its blood is sprinkled only on the altar, so too, its meat may be consumed only in a time when there is an altar. And the case of second-tithe produce comes and is derived from the case of a firstborn. Consequently, second-tithe produce may not be consumed unless there is an altar.
  The Gemara asks: But does a matter derived via a juxtaposition with another case then teach that the <i>halakha</i> applies to a third case via a juxtaposition between the second and third cases? There is a principle that this is not a valid method of deriving <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to consecrated matters. Since the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meat of the firstborn offering is derived from the juxtaposition of the meat with the blood of the firstborn, one cannot then prove that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to second-tithe produce simply because it is juxtaposed in a verse with the meat of the firstborn. The Gemara answers: Second-tithe grain is non-sacred, and therefore the acceptable methods for deriving its <i>halakhot</i> are not limited in this manner.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: In determining whether the derivation involves consecrated matters or whether it involves non-sacred matters, we follow the matter that is derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition. Since in this case the matter derived is second-tithe produce, which for these purposes is non-sacred, its legal status may be derived from juxtaposition with the <i>halakhot</i> of sacrificial matters. But according to the one who says: We follow the matter that teaches, i.e., from which the <i>halakha</i> is derived, what is there to say? The status of second-tithe produce may not be derived by means of juxtaposition with the status of the firstborn offering, which itself was derived from the blood of the offering, because the firstborn offering is a sacrificial matter.
  The Gemara answers: This is not a matter derived from a matter derived from a juxtaposition, as the status of the firstborn offering is not derived from the status of blood; blood and meat are one matter. There is only one derivation in this case, which is that the status of second-tithe produce is derived from the status of the blood and the meat of the firstborn. In any event, Abaye has proven, quoting Rabbi Yishmael’s statement cited by Rabbi Yosei, that even sacrificial items of lesser sanctity may not be eaten if the altar is missing or damaged.
  The Gemara relates: When Ravin ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he stated this <i>halakha</i>, that even items of lesser sanctity are disqualified if the altar is damaged or missing, in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Foolish Babylonians! Because they dwell in a dark land, they state <i>halakhot</i> that are dim. Have they not heard that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At the time when the Jewish people would dismantle the Tabernacle in order to depart on their journeys in the wilderness, sacrificial food was disqualified from being consumed, since the altar was not in place. Nevertheless, <i>zavim</i> and lepers were sent out of the relevant partition; a <i>zav</i> was sent out of the Levite camp and a leper was sent out of the Israelite camp.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Sacrificial food could be consumed in two locations, i.e., one could eat it while the Tabernacle was in place and one could continue eating it after the Tabernacle had been disassembled and transported. What, is it not that this first <i>baraita</i> is referring to offerings of the most sacred order, and that second <i>baraita</i> is referring to offerings of lesser sanctity? Accordingly, Abaye’s statement that offerings of lesser sanctity may not be consumed if the altar is damaged is incorrect.
  Ravina said that there is an alternative reconciliation of the two <i>baraitot</i>: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are referring to offerings of lesser sanctity, and it is not difficult:
  
  Daf 61a
  
  This first <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who derives that meat of a firstborn offering, which is an offering of lesser sanctity, cannot be consumed if the altar is damaged or absent, based upon the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to the blood of the firstborn. That second <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Sages, who disagree with Rabbi Yishmael.
  And if you wish, say there is a different resolution of the two <i>baraitot</i>: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are referring to offerings of the most sacred order. And what does the second <i>baraita</i> mean when it says the food may be consumed in two locations? It is referring to when the Israelites arrive at a new camp, before the Levites erect the Tabernacle,
  
  Daf 61b
  
  and, when they are leaving the camp, after the Levites dismantle the Tabernacle but before they remove the altar. Since the altar has not yet been moved, it is still permitted to consume the sacrificial food.
  The Gemara continues: It was necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> lest you say that once the partitions surrounding the courtyard have been taken down, the sacrificial food has been disqualified because it is considered to have left the courtyard of the Tabernacle. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that the food is permitted for consumption as long as the altar remains in place.
  The Gemara challenges: And say it is indeed so, that the sacrificial food should be disqualified because it is no longer within the partitions surrounding the courtyard. The Gemara explains: The verse states: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall travel” (Numbers 2:17). This verse indicates that even though it traveled it is still considered the Tent of Meeting. Therefore, the sacrificial food is not considered to have left its designated area.
  § The Gemara raises another discussion concerning the altar: Rav Huna says that Rav says: The altar in Shiloh was fashioned of stones, unlike the portable altar constructed in the time of Moses, which was fashioned from copper. This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Why must the verses state that the altar must be fashioned from stones (Exodus 20:22), and state again that the altar must be fashioned from stones (Deuteronomy 27:5), and mention yet again the word stones (Deuteronomy 27:6), with regard to the altar, for a total of three times? These allude to three different stone altars: One in Shiloh, and one in Nov and Gibeon, and one in the Eternal House, i.e., the Temple.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ami raises an objection based on a <i>baraita</i>: The fire that descended from Heaven upon the altar in the days of Moses (see Leviticus 9:24) departed from atop the copper altar only in the days of Solomon, when he replaced the copper altar with a stone altar, and the fire that descended upon the altar in the days of Solomon did not depart until Manasseh came and removed it by destroying the altar. And if it is so that the altar in Shiloh was fashioned of stones, it emerges that the fire departed the copper altar earlier, when the stone altar in Shiloh replaced the copper altar of Moses, many years before King Solomon.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Huna stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says: The altar in Shiloh was fashioned of copper; it was hollow and full of stones.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says there is an alternative answer: What is the meaning of the statement in the <i>baraita</i> that the fire did not depart until the days of Solomon? It means that it did not depart in a manner in which it was nullified; it was still somewhat present in Shiloh on the copper altar, which stood together with the stone altar. The Gemara asks: What is it, i.e., what does it mean that the fire did not depart a manner in which it was nullified? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis say: The fire on the copper altar would emit sparks toward the stone altar when the priests would sacrifice offerings on the stone altar. Rav Pappa says: The fire was as a guest; sometimes it was here, on the copper altar, and sometimes it was there, on the stone altar.
  § The Gemara continues discussing the altar: We learned in a mishna there (<i>Middot</i> 35b): The altar in the First Temple was twenty-eight by twenty-eight cubits. When the members of the exile ascended to Jerusalem in the beginning of the Second Temple period, they added four cubits to it on the south and four cubits on the west sides of the altar, like the shape of the Greek letter gamma, i.e., the additions made a right angle. As a result, the altar in the Second Temple was thirty-two by thirty-two cubits. The Gemara asks: What was the reason for this expansion? Rav Yosef said: Because the size of the altar from the First Temple was not sufficient.
  Abaye said to him: Now, if in the First Temple era, about which it is written: “Judah and Israel were many as the sand that is by the sea” (I Kings 4:20), the altar was sufficient, how could it be that in the Second Temple era, about which it is written: “The whole congregation together was forty and two thousand three hundred and sixty” (Ezra 2:64), the altar was not sufficient? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: There, in the First Temple, a heavenly fire would assist them and consume the offerings. Here, in the Second Temple, there was no heavenly fire that would assist them. Therefore, they needed a larger area in which to burn the offerings.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that which Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says in the name of Bar Kappara with regard to the expansion of the altar: They expanded the altar to extend over the underground cavities into which the libations flowed. Initially, in the First Temple era, they held that when the verse states: “An altar of earth you shall make for Me” (Exodus 20:21), it means that it should be completely filled with earth.
  But ultimately, in the Second Temple era, they maintained that the altar’s drinking is like its eating, i.e., just as the offerings are burned upon the altar, so too, the libations must be poured onto the altar itself and not down its side. Consequently, they expanded the altar to cover the underground cavities, and created holes in the altar so that the libations could be poured on top of the altar and flow into the underground cavities. And according to this, what is the meaning of the phrase “an altar of earth”? It teaches that the altar must be attached to the earth, so that one may not build it on top of arches
  
  Daf 62a
  
  and one may not build it on top of tunnels.
  The Gemara relates that after reconsidering the reason for the expansion of the altar, Rav Yosef said: Is this not as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And they set the altar upon its bases” (Ezra 3:3), which teaches that in the Second Temple the size of the altar reached its full measure, i.e., that it was the ideal size, whereas in the First Temple it was not the ideal size? The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the instructions David gave Solomon about how to build the Temple: “All this in writing, as the Lord has made me wise by His hand upon me, even all the works of this pattern” (I Chronicles 28:19), indicating that the design of the First Temple was dictated by God?
  Rather, Rav Yosef said: The size of the altar in the First Temple was ideal, but in the Second Temple era there was a need to expand the altar, and they found a verse and interpreted it as follows. The verse states: “Then David said: This is the House of the Lord God, and this is the altar of burnt offering for Israel” (I Chronicles 22:1). The verse juxtaposes the House, i.e., the Temple, with the altar, which indicates that the altar is like the Temple: Just as the House was sixty cubits (see I Kings 6:2), so too, the altar may be extended up to a length of sixty cubits.
  § The Gemara discusses the construction of the altar in the Second Temple. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the location of the House, its shape was discernable from the vestiges of its foundations; but how did they know the proper location of the altar?
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar says: They saw a vision of the altar already built and Michael the archangel standing and sacrificing offerings upon it. And Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: They saw a vision of the ashes of Isaac that were placed in that location. And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: From the entire House they smelled the scent of incense, yet from there, the location of the altar, they smelled a scent of burned animal limbs.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Three prophets ascended with them from the exile: One who testified to them about the size and shape of the altar, and one who testified to them about the proper location of the altar, and one who testified to them that one sacrifices offerings even if there is no Temple, provided that there is a proper altar.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Three prophets ascended with the Jewish people from the exile: One who testified to them about the size and shape of the altar and about the proper location of the altar, and one who testified to them that one sacrifices offerings even if there is no Temple, and one who testified to them about the Torah and instructed that it be written in Assyrian script [<i>Ashurit</i>] rather than the ancient Hebrew script used in the times of Moses.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The corner built at each point where the edges of the altar meet, the ramp upon which the priests ascended the altar, the base of the altar, and the requirement that the altar must be exactly square, are all indispensable in order for the altar to be fit for use. But the measurement of its length, and the measurement of its width, and the measurement of its height are not indispensable. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Huna says: In reference to each of these characteristics the verse states the term “the altar,” and there is a principle that wherever the term “the altar” is stated, it serves to indicate that the halakhic detail mentioned is indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, then the engraving [<i>kiyyur</i>] that was on the altar according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, or the surrounding ledge of the altar according to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, should also be indispensable, as it is written: “And you shall put it under the <i>karkov</i> of the altar beneath” (Exodus 27:5). And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the <i>karkov</i>? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This is the engraving on the altar. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: This is the surrounding ledge.
  The Gemara answers: Yes, the <i>karkov</i> is also indispensable, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On that day when <i>etrogim</i> were pelted at a Sadducee priest who poured the water libation of <i>Sukkot</i> on his feet rather than on the altar (see <i>Sukka</i> 48b), the corner of the altar was damaged as a result of the pelting and the ensuing chaos. They brought a fistful of salt and sealed the damaged section. They did this not because it rendered the altar fit for the Temple service, but in deference to the altar, so that the altar would not be seen in its damaged state. The reason the altar is disqualified is because any altar that does not have a corner, a ramp, and a base, and any altar that is not square, is disqualified. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Even the surrounding ledge is indispensable.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the <i>karkov</i> of the altar? It is the area between one corner and the next corner, which is the cubit-wide place on top of the altar where the priests would walk. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that the priests would walk between one corner and the next corner? The Gemara answers: Rather, say: The <i>karkov</i> is the cubit-wide area between one corner and the other, and there was an additional cubit that was the place where the priests would walk.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And he made for the altar a grating of network of brass, under the <i>karkov</i> beneath, reaching halfway up” (Exodus 38:4), which indicates that the <i>karkov</i> was on the side of the altar and not on top of it? The Gemara answers: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There were two entities called <i>karkov</i>. One was a slight protrusion above the midway point of the altar for aesthetic purposes, and one was an indentation on top of the altar for the benefit of the priests, to ensure that they would not slip off the top of the altar.
  It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> cited above that the measurement of the altar’s length, and the measurement of its width, and the measurement of its height are not indispensable. Rabbi Mani says: This is the <i>halakha</i> provided that one does not decrease its size so that it is smaller than the altar constructed by Moses. The Gemara asks: And how large was the altar constructed by Moses? Rav Yosef says: One cubit. Those in the study hall mocked Rav Yosef, as it is written explicitly: “Five cubits long and five cubits wide; the altar shall be square” (Exodus 27:1).
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Perhaps the Master is speaking about the area of the arrangement of wood? Since the corners took up one cubit on each side and there was an additional cubit on each side for the priests to walk, only one cubit was left for the arrangement of wood. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: The Master, i.e., Abaye, who is a great man, knows what I mean to say. Rav Yosef read, i.e., applied, the following verse to those who mocked him:
  
  Daf 62b
  
  “The children of Keturah” (Genesis 25:4). Although Keturah’s children were children of Abraham, they were not of the same caliber as Isaac. Similarly, Rav Yosef was saying that his other students were not of the caliber of Abaye. Having mentioned this term, the Gemara relates: The sons of Rabbi Tarfon’s sister were sitting silently before Rabbi Tarfon. In an attempt to encourage them to say something, he began and said: The verse states: And Abraham took another wife, and her name was Yoḥani. They said to Rabbi Tarfon: It is written: “Keturah” (Genesis 25:1), not Yoḥani. Rabbi Tarfon read, i.e., said, about them the phrase “the children of Keturah” as they were able to contribute only this small piece of information.
  § Abaye bar Huna says that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says: With regard to the logs that Moses prepared for the mitzva of burning wood upon the altar, their length was a cubit and their width was a cubit, and their thickness was like that of a leveler, a kind of flat stick used to remove the excess grain heaped on top of a container that holds one <i>se’a</i>.
  Rabbi Yirmeya says: The length and width of the logs men-tioned were measured with a shortened cubit. Rav Yosef said: Is this not as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Upon the wood that is on the fire that is upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:8). The seemingly superfluous phrase “that is upon the altar” teaches that the wood should not extend at all beyond the area of the altar designated for the arrangement of wood. Since this area was one square cubit, the logs were exactly one cubit as well.
  § The Gemara discusses the ramp of the altar: We learned in a mishna there (<i>Middot</i> 36a): There was a ramp that was located on the south side of the altar, whose size was a length of thirty-two cubits by a width of sixteen cubits. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, i.e., from where is it derived that the ramp is on the south side of the altar? Rav Huna said: The verse states: “And he shall slaughter it on the side [<i>yerekh</i>] of the altar northward” (Leviticus 1:11), which teaches that the altar’s thigh [<i>yarekh</i>] should be located in the north, and its face, i.e., the front of the altar where the priests ascend to it, should be in the south. The verse likens the positioning of the altar to a person who is lying down flat, in which case if his legs are to the north, his face is to the south.
  The Gemara asks: Why not say that its thigh should be in the north and its face should also be in the north? Perhaps the verse is referring to a person sitting with both his face and feet in the north. Rava said in response: Place the man on his face, i.e., the analogy is to a man who is lying down. Abaye said to him: On the contrary, sit the man straight up so that his face and his legs are facing the same direction.
  Rava said back to him: It is written in a verse that the altar must be “square [<i>ravua</i>]” (Exodus 27:1), which indicates lying down or crouching, as it is similar to the term <i>ravutz</i>, meaning crouching. Abaye challenges Rava: But this word is necessary to teach that the altar must be square. Rava responds: Is it written in the verse that the altar must be square [<i>merubba</i>]? The verse specifically uses the form <i>ravua</i> in order to allude to the word <i>ravutz</i>, crouching. Abaye counters: According to your reasoning, is it written in the verse that the altar must be <i>ravutz</i>? Rava answers: It is written in the verse that the altar must be <i>ravua</i>, which is a term that indicates this, i.e., that the altar must be square, and indicates that, i.e., that its positioning is comparable to that of a person who is lying down.
  The Gemara adds: And another <i>tanna</i> cites the source for the ramp’s positioning from here, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: The verse states with regard to the future altar: “And its steps shall look [<i>penot</i>] toward the east” (Ezekiel 43:17), which indicates that all the turns [<i>pinot</i>] that you turn should be only to the right and you should turn to the east. Only if the ramp is in the south can one turn to the right and be facing eastward.
  The Gemara challenges: The verse indicates only that after a person turns he is facing eastward. Why not say that the ramp was located in the north and the priest turns left and faces eastward? The Gemara answers: This possibility should not enter your mind, as Rami bar Yeḥizkiya teaches: A verse describes the sea, i.e., the Basin, that Solomon built, in the following terms: “It stood upon twelve oxen, three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the north, and three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the west, and three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the south, and three looking toward [<i>ponim</i>] the east” (II Chronicles 4:4). From the order of the directions in which the verse lists the groups of oxen under the Basin, it can be derived that all the turns that you turn should be only to the right and to the east.
  The Gemara challenges: That verse is necessary to teach its own information describing the Basin. The Gemara explains: If so, why do I need the verse to repeat the term <i>ponim</i>, <i>ponim</i>? It must be in order to teach how one turns while performing the sacrificial rite upon the altar, which, in turn, teaches the location of the ramp.
  § Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Yosei: Is it so that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai used to say that there is airspace, i.e., a gap, between the ramp and the altar? Rabbi Yosei said to him: And you, don’t you say so as well? But isn’t it already stated: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deuteronomy 12:27)? The verse juxtaposes the flesh of the burnt offering with its blood to teach that just as the blood is presented upon the altar via tossing while the priest stands on the ground next to the altar (see Leviticus 1:5), so too, the flesh of the burnt offering is presented via tossing. In order to fulfill this requirement, the priest stands on the ramp and tosses the flesh over the gap between the ramp and the altar, so that it lands on the arrangement of wood.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya said to him: If the verse simply teaches that the flesh must be tossed onto the arrangement of wood, it does not prove that there must be a gap between the ramp and the altar, as I say that the priest should stand next to the arrangement of wood and toss the flesh onto it.
  Rabbi Yosei said to him: When he tosses the flesh, does he toss it onto a part of the arrangement of wood that is burning or does he toss it onto a part of the arrangement of wood that is not burning? You must say that he tosses it onto a part of the arrangement of wood that is burning. And there, according to your suggestion that the priest is standing next to the arrangement of wood, he would have to toss the flesh, because it is impossible to place the flesh directly into the fire without the priest getting burned. It would be unnecessary for the verse to teach that the priest tosses the flesh while standing next to the arrangement. Consequently, when the verse juxtaposed the blood with the flesh, it must be teaching that the flesh must be tossed over a gap between the ramp and the altar.
  Rav Pappa says: The requirement that there be a gap between the ramp and the altar can be derived from this verse, because the juxtaposition teaches that the flesh is like blood in the manner in which it is tossed: Just as with regard to the blood there is space on the ground that interposes between the priest and the altar, so too with regard to the flesh, there is space on the ground that interposes between the priest and the altar, i.e., he stands on the ground next to the altar and tosses the flesh onto the altar.
  § The Gemara continues discussing the ramp: Rav Yehuda says: There were two small ramps protruding from the main ramp that led to the altar, on which the priests could turn to the base of the altar and to the surrounding ledge of the altar. They were separated from the altar by a hairbreadth, because it is stated: “Roundabout” (Leviticus 1:5), with regard to the altar. This indicates that nothing is attached to the entire perimeter of the altar. And Rabbi Abbahu says there is a different source, as it states: “Square” (Exodus 27:1), and if the ramps would be connected to the altar it would no longer be square.
  The Gemara continues: And it was necessary for the verse to write: “Roundabout,” and it was necessary for the verse to write: “Square,” as, had the Merciful One written only: “Roundabout,” I would say that the altar can be circular. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote that the altar must be “square.” And had the Merciful One written only that the altar must be “square [<i>ravua</i>],” I would say that the word <i>ravua</i> simply means rectangular and the altar can be long and narrow. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote the term “roundabout,” which teaches that the altar must not have some sides that are longer than others.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Middot</i> 37b): The ramp and the altar together were sixty-two cubits long. The Gemara challenges: The dimensions of these are sixty-four cubits, as the altar and the ramp were each thirty-two cubits long (<i>Middot</i> 36a). The Gemara explains: The thirty-two-cubit measurement of the ramp is explained by a <i>baraita</i> that states: It is found that the ramp of the altar overhung the base of the altar by one cubit and the surrounding ledge by one cubit, resulting in an aggregate length of thirty-two cubits.
  
  Daf 63a
  
  Rami bar Ḥama says: The slope of each of the minor ramps, was one cubit of rise per three cubits of run; this was true aside from the main ramp of the altar, which rose one cubit in three and a half cubits and one fingerbreadth and one-third of a fingerbreadth, measured by the tip of the thumb. The slope of the main ramp of the altar was slightly less than that of the minor ramps in order to make it easier for the priests to ascend the ramp while holding the sacrificial portions.
  MISHNA: Handfuls were removed from the meal offerings in any place in the Temple courtyard and were consumed within the area enclosed by the curtains by males of the priesthood, prepared in any form of food preparation that he chooses, e.g., roasted or boiled, for one day and night, until midnight.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says: A meal offering that had its handful removed in the Sanctuary is valid, as we found with regard to the removal of the two bowls of frankincense that were placed beside the shewbread on the Table, which was located in the Sanctuary. On Shabbat, these bowls of frankincense were removed and burned on the altar, which allowed the shewbread to be eaten. Removal of the bowls of frankincense paralleled the process of removing a handful from a meal offering; just as the removal of the bowls took place in the Sanctuary, so could the removal of a handful of the meal offering be done in the Sanctuary.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the meal offerings: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons, the priests; and he shall take from there his handful” (Leviticus 2:2). The term “from there” indicates that the handful must be taken from a place where the feet of the non-priest who brought the meal offering may stand, i.e., the Temple courtyard, but not the Sanctuary, in direct contradiction to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Ben Beteira says there is a different explanation of the verse. From where is it derived that if the priest removed a handful with his left hand, that he should return the handful to the vessel and then remove another handful with his right hand? The verse states: “And he shall take from there his handful,” indicating that he may take it from the place where he already removed a handful.
  The Gemara answers: There are those who say that Rabbi Yirmeya raises the objection and he resolves it, and there are those who say that Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain to you the solution. The verse that indicates that the handful is taken from a place where non-priests may stand is necessary only to render the entire Temple courtyard valid for removing the handful, but not to indicate that one may not take the handful in the Sanctuary.
  This was necessary because it might enter your mind to say that since a burnt offering is one of the offerings of the most sacred order, and a meal offering is also one of the offerings of the most sacred order, just as a burnt offering requires slaughter specifically in the north side of the Temple courtyard, so too, a meal offering requires the taking of the handful specifically in the north side of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara responds: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it is completely burned upon the altar. Therefore, one would not have derived that just as a burnt offering must be slaughtered in the north side of the Temple courtyard, the handful must be taken from a meal offering in the north side of the Temple courtyard.
  And if one would attempt to derive that the handful of a meal offering must be taken in the north side of the Temple courtyard from the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to a sin offering, which is an offering of the most sacred order whose slaughtering must take place in the north side, yet is not completely consumed upon the altar, this too can be refuted: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  And if one would attempt to derive that the handful of a meal-offering must be taken in the north side of the Temple courtyard from the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to a guilt offering, which is an offering of the most sacred order that must be slaughtered in the north, and that does not share the unique characteristics of the burnt offering or sin offering, this too can be refuted: What is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is one of the types of offerings whose sacrificial rites are performed with their blood, which is not so with regard to a meal offering.
  The Gemara adds: It also cannot be suggested to draw an analogy from the common element shared by all of the offerings mentioned above. What is notable about all of them? They are notable in that they are all types of offerings whose sacrificial rites are performed with their blood.
  The Gemara presents a different answer: Rather, it was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach that the handful may be taken from the meal offering anywhere in the Temple courtyard because it may enter your mind to say that since it is written: “And he shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8), and then it states: “And he shall take up from there his handful” (Leviticus 6:8), indicating that the handful must be taken from the vessel in which the meal offering was brought near the altar, that the verses also indicate that the handful must be taken in the place where the vessel is brought near the altar.
  Therefore, just as one must bring the meal offering to the southwest corner of the altar, so too, the removal of its handful must take place at the southwest corner of the altar. To counter this, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that the removal of the handful may take place anywhere in the Temple courtyard.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Peace offerings that one slaughtered in the Sanctuary are valid, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2), i.e., in the courtyard; and the courtyard, which is of secondary sanctity, should not be weightier than the place of primary sanctity. Accordingly, as the offering is valid if it was slaughtered in the courtyard, it is certainly valid if it was slaughtered in the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beteira says: From where is it derived that if gentiles surrounded the entire Temple courtyard and were attacking, making it impossible for the priests to remain there, the priests may enter that area, i.e., the Sanctuary, and eat the offerings of the most sacred order there? The verse states: “In a most holy place shall you eat it” (Numbers 18:10).
  The Gemara asks: But why is there a need to derive the <i>halakha</i> from this source? Let us say that it can be derived from the verse: “In the court of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:9), and the place of secondary sanctity should not be weightier than the place of primary sanctity. Therefore, similar to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, if the sacrificial food can be eaten in the courtyard, it can certainly be eaten in the Sanctuary. The fact that the <i>baraita</i> requires another source indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s method of derivation is not valid.
  The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to slaughtering offerings, the act of slaughter is a sacrificial rite, and a person serves in the presence of his master. Therefore, we say that the place of secondary sanctity should not be weightier than the place of primary sanctity, and if one can slaughter an offering in the courtyard, he can certainly do so in the Sanctuary. By contrast, in the case of eating sacrificial food, which is different because a person does not eat in the presence of his master, we do not say the rationale that the place of secondary sanctity should not be weightier than the place of primary sanctity. Therefore, a verse was required to teach that the priest may partake of the offerings in the Sanctuary.
  MISHNA: The sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering would be performed at the southwest corner of the altar. And if its sacrificial rite was performed in any place on the altar, the offering was deemed valid; but that corner was its designated place. And there were three matters for which the portion of that corner below the red line that served as the demarcation between the upper and lower portions of the altar served as the proper location, and there were three matters for which the portion of that corner above the red line served as their proper location. The following rites were performed below the red line: Sacrificing a bird sin offering, and bringing meal offerings near the altar before removal of the handful, and pouring out the remaining blood.
  And the following rites were performed above the red line: The wine libation that is brought together with animal offerings or as an offering by itself, and the water libation on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, and sacrificing a bird burnt offering when they were numerous and it was impossible to perform the rite in the east, i.e., the southeastern corner where the bird burnt offering was sacrificed.
  All those who ascend the ramp to the altar ascend via the right side of the ramp toward the southeast corner
  
  Daf 63b
  
  and circle the altar until reaching the southwest corner and descend via the left side of the ramp, except for one who ascends for one of these three matters, where they would ascend directly to the southwest corner of the altar, and descend by turning on their heels and retracing the path by which they ascended rather than circling the altar.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question about the mishna’s statement that the sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering is performed at the southwest corner of the altar: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Yehoshua says: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a destitute sinner, which is a meal offering brought in lieu of an animal or bird: “He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense on it; for it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11). From this verse it is evident that a sin offering is called a meal offering and a meal offering is called a sin offering, so that their <i>halakhot</i> may be compared.
  Just as a sin offering requires slaughtering in the north section of the Temple courtyard, so too, the handful of a meal offering requires sanctification in a service vessel in the north. And just as a meal offering is brought near to the southwest corner of the altar, so too, the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on the southwest corner of the altar.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to a meal offering itself, from where do we derive that it must be brought near the altar at the southwest corner? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And this is the law of the meal offering…before the Lord, in front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7). From the phrase: “Before the Lord,” one might have thought that the rite of bringing the meal offering near the altar must be performed at the west side of the altar, which faces the Sanctuary. Therefore, the verse states: “In front of the altar,” which is its south side, from where the priests ascend the ramp.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the verse merely stated: “In front of the altar,” one might have thought that the practice of bringing the meal offering near the altar must be performed at the south side of the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “Before the Lord,” which indicates the west side. How can these texts be reconciled? The priest brings it near at the southwest corner of the altar, opposite the edge of the corner of the altar, and that is sufficient.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: One might have thought that the priest may bring it near the altar to the west of the southwest corner or to the south of the southwest corner. You must say: Anywhere you find two verses, and acting in accordance with one of them fulfills itself, i.e., the requirement stated in that verse, and fulfills the requirement stated in the other verse, whereas acting in accordance with the other one of them fulfills itself and negates the requirement stated in the other verse, one leaves the verse that fulfills itself and negates the other, and seizes the verse that fulfills itself and fulfills the other verse as well.
  The Gemara explains: In this context, when you say: “Before the Lord,” which indicates that the meal offering should be brought near the altar at the west side of the altar, how have you fulfilled the other part of the verse: “In front of the altar,” which indicates the south side? But when you say: “In front of the altar,” and bring it near the altar at the south side, you have also fulfilled the phrase: “Before the Lord.” Consequently, the meal offering must be brought near the south side of the altar.
  The Gemara asks: If one brought the meal offering near the altar at the south side, how have you fulfilled the phrase: “Before the Lord”? Rav Ashi says: This <i>tanna</i> holds that the entire altar stood in the north section of the Temple courtyard. The southern side of the altar was directly aligned with the midpoint of the Temple courtyard, directly opposite the entrance of the Sanctuary, and therefore it is considered “before the Lord.”
  § The mishna teaches that if the sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering was performed in any place on the altar, the offering is valid, but the southwest corner was its designated place. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying when it states that the southwest corner was its designated place? The mishna already stated that the sacrificial rite of a bird sin offering should be performed at the southwest corner. Rav Ashi said: This is what the mishna is saying: Any place was valid for its pinching, but the southwest corner was the place for the sprinkling of its blood.
  The Gemara notes: We learn in this mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a bird sin offering: If the priest pinched its nape in any place on the altar, it is valid. If he sprinkled its blood in any place on the altar, it is valid. If he sprinkled the blood, but did not squeeze out the remaining blood upon the lower part of the wall of the altar, in accordance with the verse: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offer-ing upon the side of the altar; and the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 5:9), it is nevertheless valid, provided that he places some of the blood of the soul anywhere on the altar from the red line and below.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>baraita</i> saying? It first states that the offering is valid no matter where on the altar its blood is sprinkled, and it then states that blood must be placed specifically below the red line. The Gemara answers: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If he pinched its nape in any place on the altar, it is valid. If he squeezed out its blood in any place on the altar, it is valid,
  
  Daf 64a
  
  because if he sprinkled the blood but did not squeeze out the rest of it, it is still valid, provided that he places some of the blood of the soul anywhere on the altar from the red line and below. This version of the <i>baraita</i> states that the offering is valid no matter where on the altar its blood was squeezed out; but it is essential that blood is sprinkled on the lower half of the altar.
  § The mishna teaches that there were three matters for which the portion of the southwest corner below the red line served as the proper location: The sacrificing of a bird sin offering, and the bringing of the meal offerings near the altar, and pouring the remaining blood. The Gemara cites sources to prove that each of these three matters was performed at the southwest corner: The source with regard to the bird sin offering is that which we said earlier (63b), that it is derived from a comparison to meal offerings.
  The source for bringing meal offerings near the altar at the southwest corner is derived from that which is written: “And he shall bring it to the front of the altar.” The source for pouring the remaining blood at the southwest corner of the altar is as it is written: “And all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 4:7), which the Gemara derives to be referring to the southwest corner (see 53a).
  § The mishna teaches that there were three matters for which the portion of the southwest corner above the red line served as the proper location: The water and wine libations, and sacrificing a bird burnt offering when they were numerous in the east, i.e., the southeast corner. The Gemara asks: What is the reason the sacrificial rites of a bird burnt offering were ideally supposed to be performed at the southeast corner of the altar? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Because it is the closest of all the corners to the place of the ashes, i.e., the place where the ashes from the altar are placed every morning. The crop and feathers of a bird burnt offering are placed there as well.
  The Gemara cites a comment pertaining to the mishna’s statement that when the southeast corner of the altar is too crowded, the sacrificial rites of a bird burnt offering can be performed at the southwest corner: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Come and see how great was the strength of the priests, as you have no parts of birds lighter than the crop and feathers, and there were times when the priest would toss them more than thirty cubits from the southwest corner of the altar to the place of the ashes.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 28b) describing the procedure of separating the ashes: The priest would take a coal pan of silver and ascend to the top of the altar and clear the upper layer of coals to this side and to that side, and, using the coal pan, scoop up coals from among the inner, consumed coals and descend the ramp. When he reached the floor of the Temple courtyard, he would turn his face to the left, toward the north, and walk about ten cubits along the eastern side of the ramp. There, he would heap the coals upon the floor at a distance of three handbreadths from the ramp. This was the location where one places the crop and feathers, and the ashes removed from the inner altar and the Candelabrum.
  The Gemara challenges: The distance from the southwest corner to the location described in that mishna is more than thirty-one cubits. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan did not consider the space taken up by people, i.e., the priest performing the service, in his calculation.
  § The mishna teaches that everyone who ascends the ramp to the altar ascends via the right side of the ramp, circles the altar until reaching the southwest corner, and descends via the left side of the ramp, with the exception of one ascending in order to perform the wine or water libations, or to sacrifice a bird burnt offering on the southwest corner of the altar. In those cases the priest would ascend directly to the southwest corner. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for these exceptions to the standard practice? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to the libations, the priest would not walk all the way around the altar lest the wine or water absorb the smoke of the altar fire. And with regard to a bird burnt offering he would not walk all the way around lest the bird die from inhaling the smoke.
  The Gemara raises a contradiction from the following mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 33b): If the High Priest was performing the sacrificial rites of the daily offering, after he would place the limbs on the fire on top of the altar and he would come to circle the altar, from where does he start walking? He starts from the southeast corner, continues to the northeast corner, then to the northwest corner, and finally arrives at the southwest corner. And he is given wine to pour on the altar. This indicates that the High Priest circles the altar while holding the wine for the libation, and there is no concern that it will absorb too much smoke.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says:
  
  Daf 64b
  
  The circling around the altar by the High Priest is done on foot, i.e., empty-handed, as he was given the wine to pour only once he arrived at the southwest corner. Rava said: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that he is given wine to pour, and the mishna does not teach that one tells him to pour the wine, which would have indicated that the High Priest was already holding the wine as he circled the altar. The Gemara comments: Conclude from the language of the mishna that the High Priest was given the wine only once he arrived at the southwest corner of the altar.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All those who ascend the ramp to the altar ascend via the right side of the ramp and descend via the left side; they ascend via the east side of the ramp and descend via the west side, except for one who ascends for one of these three matters: The wine libation, the water libation, and the sacrificial rite of a bird burnt offering. In these cases, one ascends via the west side of the ramp and descends via the west side; one ascends via the right side and descends via the right side.
  The Gemara asks: Does one who ascends via the west side of the ramp do so via the right side? Ascending via the west side of the ramp is the same as ascending via the left. Ravina says: Emend the <i>baraita</i> so that it teaches that he ascends via the left side. Rava says: What is the meaning of the right side mentioned in the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>? It is the right side from the standpoint of the altar, facing south, in which case the altar’s west side is synonymous with its right side. And what is the meaning of the left side mentioned in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>? It is the left side from the standpoint of a person facing the altar.
  The Gemara objects: But let the <i>baraita</i> be consistent and teach both this case and that case, i.e., the first clause and latter clause, from the standpoint of the altar, or let it teach both this case and that case from the standpoint of a person facing the altar. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.
  MISHNA: The sacrifice of the bird sin offering, how was it performed? The priest would pinch off the bird’s head by cutting opposite its nape with his thumbnail and would not separate the bird’s head from its body. And he sprinkles from its blood on the wall of the altar below the red line. The remaining blood would be squeezed out from the body of the bird on the base of the altar. The altar has only its blood and the entire bird goes to the priests for consumption.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bird sin offering: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood of the sin offering upon the side of the altar” (Leviticus 5:9). This teaches that the blood is sprinkled directly from the body of the sin offering, not with the priest’s finger or from a vessel. How so? The priest holds the head and the body and sprinkles its blood on the wall of the altar. And he does not sprinkle it on the wall of the ramp, and not on the wall of the Sanctuary, and not on the wall of the Entrance Hall. And which is this wall of the altar that the blood is sprinkled on? This is the lower wall, below the red line.
  The <i>baraita</i> suggests: Or perhaps the verse is referring only to the upper wall, above the red line. And this should be a logical inference: Just as with regard to an animal offering, where the blood of a burnt offering is applied below the red line (see 10b), nevertheless, the blood of the sin offering is applied above the red line (see Leviticus 4:30), with regard to a bird offering, where the blood of the burnt offering is sprinkled above the red line (see 65a), is it not logical that the blood of its sin offering is sprinkled above the red line?
  Therefore, the verse states: “And the rest of the blood shall be squeezed out [<i>yimmatze</i>] at the base of the altar” (Leviticus 5:9), which teaches that the priest sprinkles the blood on the wall where its remaining blood drains to the base of the altar. And which wall is this? This is the lower wall. The surrounding ledge of the altar is located one cubit above the red line, and any blood sprinkled above this ledge will not drip down to the base of the altar. The verse teaches that the blood is sprinkled on the wall of the altar from which it would drip down to the altar’s base unimpeded.
  The Gemara suggests: Let the priest perform the sprinkling of the blood above, as the <i>baraita</i> logically deduced, and then perform the squeezing below in fulfillment of the aforementioned verse. Rava said: Is it written: He shall drain [<i>yematze</i>]? It is written: It shall be drained [<i>yimmatze</i>], which indicates that the blood trickles down to the base of the altar by itself. Accordingly, the blood must be sprinkled on a part of the altar wall from which it can trickle down to the base of the altar.
  § Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says: How does the priest pinch the nape of a bird sin offering? He holds the bird by its back in the palm of his hand and holds its wings with two fingers, i.e., the middle and index fingers, and its two legs with his next two fingers, i.e., the ring finger and pinky, leaving the head resting between his index finger and thumb, and he stretches its neck over the width of his thumb and pinches its nape with his thumbnail.
  The Gemara cites a varying opinion: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The bird is not in the priest’s palm, but rather on the outside of his hand. The priest holds its wings with two fingers and its two legs with two fingers. Using his thumb, the priest bends its head into his palm and stretches its neck over the width of his two fingers, and pinches its nape. And this is the most difficult sacrificial rite in the Temple to perform.
  The Gemara asks: This is the most difficult rite to perform, and no other? But isn’t there also the removal of the handful of the meal offering and the handful of the incense on Yom Kippur? The Gemara answers: Rather, say that the pinching procedure was a difficult sacrificial rite, one of the most difficult sacrificial rites in the Temple to perform.
  MISHNA: The sacrifice of the bird burnt offering, how was it performed? The priest ascended the ramp and turned to the surrounding ledge and came to the southeast corner of the altar. He would then pinch off the bird’s head by cutting at its nape with his thumbnail and separate the bird’s head from its body, and would squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar. He took the head and neared the place of its pinching, i.e., its nape, to the altar in order to squeeze the blood from the head. He would then absorb the remaining blood with salt and throw the head onto the fire on the altar.
  He then arrived at the body and removed the crop and the feather attached to it and the innards that emerge with them and he tossed them to the place of the ashes. He then ripped the bird lengthwise and did not separate the two halves of the bird; but if he separated them, the offering is valid. He would then absorb the remaining blood with salt and throw the body of the bird onto the fire on the altar.
  If he neither removed the crop, nor the feather and the innards that emerge with them, nor absorbed the blood with salt, with regard to any detail that he changed in the sacrificial rites after he squeezed out its blood, the offering is valid. If he separated the head from the body in sacrificing the sin offering, or if he did not separate the head from the body in sacrificing the burnt offering, the offering is disqualified. In a case where he squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body, it is disqualified. If he squeezed out the blood of the body and did not squeeze out the blood of the head, the offering is valid.
  In the case of a bird sin offering that the priest pinched not for its sake, or if he squeezed out its blood not for its sake, or if he did so for its sake and then not for its sake, or not for its sake and then for its sake, it is disqualified, like all other sin offerings that are disqualified when performed not for their sake (see 2a). A bird burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is valid; it is just that it did not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  With regard to both a bird sin offering and a bird burnt offering where the priest pinched its nape or squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified. But there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of the offering. If his intent was to eat it or burn it beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the offering, provided that the permitting factor, the blood, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  How is the permitting factor sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one pinched the nape in silence, i.e., with no disqualifying intent, and squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of the parts typically eaten or to burn the portions that are to be burned on the altar, beyond its designated time; or in the case of one who pinched with the intent to partake of the offering or burn it on the altar beyond its designated time, and squeezed out its blood in silence; or in the case of one who pinched and squeezed out the blood with the intent to partake of the offering or burn it on the altar beyond its designated time, that is the case of a bird offering where the permitting factor is sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If the priest pinched the nape of the bird with the intent to partake of it or burn it outside its designated area and squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of it or burn it beyond its designated time, or he pinched with the intent to partake of it or burn it beyond its designated time and squeezed out its blood with the intent to partake of it or burn it outside its designated area, or if the priest pinched and squeezed out the blood with the intent to partake of it or burn it outside its designated area,
  
  Daf 65a
  
  or in the case of a bird sin offering where one pinched its nape not for its sake and squeezed out its blood with the intent of consuming it or burning it beyond its designated time, or in a case where he pinched its nape with the intent to consume it or burn it beyond its designated time and squeezed out its blood not for its sake, or in a case where he pinched its nape and squeezed out its blood not for its sake, that is a case of a bird offering whose permitting factor is not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  If one pinched the nape of the bird and squeezed out its blood with the intent to eat an olive-bulk of the offering outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified and it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>.
  Rabbi Yehuda disagreed and said that this is the principle: If the improper intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating it. And if the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is disqualified and it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say: In both this case where the intent with regard to time came first and that case where the intent with regard to area came first, the offering is disqualified and it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>.
  If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is valid, because eating and burning do not join together.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse pertaining to a bird burnt offering: “And the priest shall bring it to the altar, and pinch off its head, and make it smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:15). What is the meaning when the verse states: And the priest shall bring it to the altar? Since the previous verse states that “he shall bring his offering,” this verse should have started with the phrase “And he shall pinch off its head.”
  Since it is stated in the preceding verse: “And if his offering to the Lord be a burnt offering of birds, then he shall bring his offering of doves, or of pigeons” (Leviticus 1:14), one might have thought that one who donates a bird as an offering may not donate fewer than two birds. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall bring it,” indicating that one may bring even one bird to be sacrificed on the altar.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues analyzing the verse: What is the meaning when the verse states that “the priest shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 1:15)? It is to establish that only a priest may pinch its nape, as one might have thought that even a non-priest may perform this procedure. Could this not be derived through logical inference: And if with regard to a sheep burnt offering, with regard to which the verse established that it must be slaughtered in the north (see Leviticus 1:11), it did not establish that it must be slaughtered by a priest (see 32a), then in the case of a bird burnt offering, with regard to which the verse did not establish that its nape must be pinched in the north, is it not logical that the verse does not establish that its nape must be pinched by a priest? To counter this, the verse states that “the priest shall bring it to the altar,” in order to establish that its nape must be pinched specifically by a priest.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that the priest should pinch its nape with a knife. And one could derive this through a logical inference: And if with regard to slaughtering, with regard to which the verse did not establish that it must be performed by a priest, it established that it must be performed with an instrument, i.e., a knife (see 97b); then in the case of pinching, which the verse established must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the verse establishes that it must be performed with an instrument?
  To counter this, the verse states: “And the priest shall bring it near the altar and pinch off its head.” In explanation of this verse, Rabbi Akiva said: Could it enter your mind that a non-priest may approach the altar in order to sacrifice an offering? Since this is impossible, the verse does not need to state that the sacrificial rite is performed by a priest. Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “The priest”? It means that the pinching must be performed with the very body of the priest.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues to analyze the verse: One might have thought that the priest may pinch the bird’s nape whether above the red line of the altar or below it. To counter this, the verse states: “And the priest shall bring it unto the altar and pinch off its head, and make it smoke on the altar.” The verse juxtaposes the pinching to the burning of the bird on the altar to teach that just as the burning occurs atop the altar, so too, the pinching occurs on the top part of the wall of the altar.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states that the priest shall “pinch off its head,” which must be performed at the nape. Do you say that the pinching occurs at the nape, or is it only at the throat? It can be derived through a logical inference: It is stated here, with regard to a bird burnt offering: “And pinch off its head” (Leviticus 1:15), and it is stated there, with regard to a bird sin offering: “And pinch off its head opposite its nape, but shall not separate it” (Leviticus 5:8). Just as there, the head is pinched at the nape, so too here, the head is pinched at the nape.
  If the <i>halakha</i> of a bird burnt offering is derived from that of a bird sin offering, perhaps it should also be derived that just as there, the priest pinches off the head but does not separate it completely from the body, so too here, with regard to a bird burnt offering, he pinches off the head but does not separate it from the body. To counter this, the verse states with regard to a bird burnt offering: “And pinch off its head, and make it smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:15). This indicates that just as with regard to the burning of the bird burnt offering, the head is burned by itself and the body is burned by itself, so too with regard to the pinching, the head is by itself and the body is by itself, i.e., the head is completely detached from the body.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And from where is it derived that the burning of the head is by itself and the body is burned by itself? As it is stated: “And he shall rend it by its wings…and the priest shall make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:17). Since the burning of the body is stated in this verse, how do I realize the meaning of the earlier phrase: “And make it smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:15)? One must conclude that the verse is speaking about the burning of the head.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues to expound the verse stated with regard to a bird burnt offering: “And its blood shall be drained out on the wall of the altar” (Leviticus 1:15). When the verse states: “And its blood shall be drained out,” it means that all of it must be drained out. The continuation of the verse indicates that it must be drained out “on the wall of the altar,” and not on the wall of the ramp, nor on the wall of the Sanctuary. And which wall of the altar is this? This is the upper wall, i.e., above the red line.
  Or perhaps the verse is referring only to the lower wall, i.e., below the red line; and this can be supported by a logical inference: And if with regard to an animal offering, where the blood of its sin offering is applied above the red line, the blood of its burnt offering is applied below the red line, then with regard to a bird offering, where the blood of its sin offering is sprinkled below the red line, is it not logical that the blood of its burnt offering is sprinkled below the red line?
  To counter this, the verse states: “And pinch off its head, and make it smoke on the altar; and its blood shall be drained out.” Could it enter your mind that after he has burned the bird, the priest goes back and drains out its blood? Rather, the verse serves to tell you: Just as the burning occurs atop the altar, so too, the draining occurs atop the altar. How so? The priest would ascend the ramp and turn to the surrounding ledge and arrive at the southeast corner. He would pinch off the bird’s head at its nape, and separate it from its body. He would then squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar beside him. Nevertheless, if the priest performed the squeezing below his feet, i.e., below the surrounding ledge, even one cubit beneath the ledge, it is valid.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes by citing a dissenting opinion: Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov say: The entire rite of a bird burnt offering is performed only atop the altar. The Gemara asks: Since the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov agree that the bird must be burned atop the altar and its blood must be squeezed on the top part of the wall of the altar, what is the difference between them?
  Abaye and Rava both say: There is a difference between them with regard to whether one may form an arrangement of wood on the surrounding ledge and burn the bird there. According to the first <i>tanna</i>, this is permitted when needed, and therefore it is valid if the priest squeezes out the blood on the wall up to a cubit below the surrounding ledge. According the Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, one may never burn the bird on the surrounding ledge, and therefore it is not valid if the priest squeezed out the blood below the surrounding ledge.
  § The mishna teaches that after the priest throws the bird’s head onto the fire on the altar, he arrives at the body and removes the crop and the feathers attached to it and the innards that emerge with them, and tosses them to the place of the ashes. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse pertaining to a bird burnt offering: “And he shall take away <i>murato</i> with its feathers” (Leviticus 1:16). This word, <i>murato</i>, is referring to the crop.
  Had the verse written only “its crop,” one might have thought that the priest may cut the skin with a knife and take the crop without any other part of the bird. Therefore, the verse states: “With its feathers [<i>benotzatah</i>],” which teaches that he takes the feathers with it, i.e., he must remove the skin with the feathers still attached. The Gemara presents another opinion: Abba Yosei ben Ḥanan says: He takes the crop and he also takes its gizzard with it.
  A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The word <i>benotzatah</i> is a contraction of the words <i>benotza shelah</i>, meaning its feathers. This teaches that the priest cuts it with a knife, creating an opening like a window opposite the crop. This allows him to remove the crop with only the feathers and skin directly opposite it, and that is what he brings to the place of the ashes.
  
  Daf 65b
  
  § The mishna teaches that after removing the crop and the feathers and innards that emerged with it, the priest ripped the bird lengthwise and did not separate the two halves of the bird. In this regard the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And he shall rend” (Leviticus 1:17). The act of rending is performed only by hand, and so too, the verse states with regard to Samson: “And he rent it as one would have rent a kid, and he had nothing in his hand” (Judges 14:6).
  § The mishna teaches that if the priest did not remove the crop, or he changed any detail of the sacrificial rite after he squeezed out the blood, the offering is valid. If he separated the head from the body of a bird sin offering, it is disqualified. The Gemara says: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: I heard that one may separate the head from the body of a bird sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between them, i.e., what is the basis of the disagreement? Rav Ḥisda says: The difference between them concerns the question of whether squeezing out the blood of a bird sin offering after its blood has been sprinkled is indispensable. The first <i>tanna</i>, whose opinion is cited in the mishna, holds that squeezing out the blood of a bird sin offering is indispensable. And since squeezing out the blood is indispensable, the priest will have to squeeze out the blood after separating the head from the body, and he will have performed the rite of a bird burnt offering on a bird sin offering, which disqualifies the offering (see 66a).
  And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that squeezing out the blood of a bird sin offering is not indispensable. Consequently, if the priest would separate the bird’s head from its body, he would refrain from squeezing out the blood, in which case the rite is dissimilar to that of a bird burnt offering. And the separation of the head is considered as though the priest was merely cutting flesh, and the offering is valid.
  Rava says there is an alternative explanation of the dispute: It is possible that all agree that squeezing the blood of a bird sin offering is indispensable, and there is a difference between them with regard to whether interrupting the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i>, i.e., the gullet or windpipe, one of the organs that must be cut in the ritual slaughter, of a bird burnt offering disqualifies the offering. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that interrupting the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i> of a bird burnt offering does not disqualify the offering, and therefore, if the priest separates the head of a bird sin offering from its body, even though he interrupted the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i>, he has performed the rite of a bird burnt offering on a bird sin offering, which disqualifies it.
  And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that interrupting the pinching of a bird burnt offering disqualifies the offering. Therefore, in the case of a bird sin offering, since the priest interrupted the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i>, even if he separates the head from the body he is merely cutting flesh, i.e., it is an insignificant act because he is not performing the rite of a burnt offering on a sin offering, and the offering is not disqualified.
  Abaye says there is a third explanation of the dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>: It is possible that all agree that interrupting the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i> disqualifies a bird burnt offering, and there is a difference between them with regard to whether cutting the majority of the flesh of the nape of a bird sin offering is indispensable.
  The Gemara points out: And Rava and Abaye disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak. One says that the difference between the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, concerns whether interrupting the pinching before severing the second <i>siman</i> of a bird burnt offering disqualifies the offering. And one says that the difference between them concerns whether cutting the majority of the flesh of the nape of a bird sin offering is indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: Since there is a dispute concerning whether cutting the majority of the flesh of the nape of a bird sin offering is indispensable, can it be deduced by inference that all agree that we require the priest to cut the majority of the flesh <i>ab initio</i>? The Gemara responds: Yes; and similarly it was taught in <i>baraita</i>: How does one pinch the nape of a bird sin offering? Using his thumbnail, the priest cuts the spine and nape, without cutting through the majority of the flesh, until he reaches either the gullet or the windpipe. Upon reaching the gullet or the windpipe, he cuts one <i>siman</i> entirely, or at least the majority of it, and he cuts the majority of the flesh with it. And in the case of a bird burnt offering, he cuts the two <i>simanim</i> or the majority of the two <i>simanim</i>.
  The Gemara relates that the Rabbis said this dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> concerning the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, before Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Have they not heard that which Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakim said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat, in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, used to say: I heard that one may completely separate the head of a bird sin offering from its body. And what is the meaning of the verse that states: “But shall not separate it” (Leviticus 5:8)?
  
  Daf 66a
  
  It means that the priest does not have to separate it, but not that it is prohibited to do so. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, then with regard to a pit in the public domain, where it is written: “And if a man shall open a pit…and does not cover it” (Exodus 21:33), can one claim that this verse also means that he does not have to cover it?
  The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to a pit, since it is written in the following verse: “The owner of the pit shall pay” (Exodus 21:34), it is evident that it is incumbent upon him to cover the pit. But here, since it is written with regard to a bird burnt offering: “And the priest shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 1:15), the term “it” indicates that the verse is referring only to a burnt offering, and the verse has thereby differentiated between a bird sin offering and a bird burnt offering.
  Consequently, it is obvious that whereas the priest must completely separate the head of a bird burnt offering, this is not the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering. Why do I need the verse to state with regard to a bird sin offering: “But shall not separate it” (Leviticus 5:8)? Conclude from this verse that it is not forbidden to separate the head of a bird sin offering from the body, but rather one does not have to separate it.
  § The mishna teaches that if the priest squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body, it is disqualified. If he squeezed out the blood of the body and did not squeeze out the blood of the head, the offering is valid. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In reference to a bird burnt offering, the verse states, seemingly unnecessarily: “It is a burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:17). This teaches that even though the priest squeezed out the blood of the body and did not squeeze out the blood of the head, it is valid. One might have thought that if the priest squeezed out the blood of the head and did not squeeze out the blood of the body the offering is still valid. Therefore, the verse states: “It is.”
  The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation for the opinion that the offering is valid if the priest squeezed out only the blood of the body but not if he squeezed out only the blood of the head? Ravina said: There is no conclusive proof from the language of the verse itself, but it stands to reason that this is the case, as most of the blood is found in the body, not the head.
  
  MISHNA: If the priest sacrificed a bird sin offering in its designated place below the red line, and he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a sin offering with pinching, i.e., cutting from the nape with a fingernail, and sprinkling, and he sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering, the offering is fit. This is the manner in which a priest is to sacrifice a sin offering <i>ab initio</i>.
  If the priest sacrificed the bird sin offering below the red line in the middle of the altar and according to the procedure of a sin offering, but he sacrificed it for the sake of a burnt offering; or if he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a burnt offering, even if he sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering; or if he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a burnt offering for the sake of a burnt offering; in all these cases the sin offering is disqualified. If one sacrificed a bird sin offering above the red line according to the procedure of any of the offerings, it is disqualified, because he did not sacrifice it in its designated place.
  A bird burnt offering that one sacrificed in its designated place above the red line according to the procedure of a burnt offering and for the sake of a burnt offering is fit. This is the manner in which a priest is to sacrifice a burnt offering <i>ab initio</i>. If he sacrificed a bird burnt offering above the red line according to the procedure of the burnt offering but for the sake of a sin offering, the offering is fit, but it did not satisfy the obligation of its owner.
  If the priest sacrificed a bird burnt offering according to the procedure of a sin offering for the sake of a burnt offering, or according to the procedure of a sin offering for the sake of a sin offering, the offering is disqualified. If he sacrificed it below the red line according to the procedure of any of the offerings, it is disqualified, because he did not sacrifice it in its designated place.
  
  Daf 66b
  
  GEMARA: According to the mishna, a bird sin offer-ing that one sacrificed according to the procedure of a burnt offering is disqualified. The Gemara asks: With regard to what rite did the priest change the procedure? If we say that he changed the pinching by severing the head completely, as is proper for a burnt offering, shall we say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: I heard that the priests would sever the head completely even in the sacrifice of a bird sin offering?
  The Gemara responds: And what is wrong with this conclusion? Have we not already explained that the mishna in the previous chapter (65a), with regard to pinching, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?
  The Gemara offers another explanation: No, the mishna is referring to a case where the priest changed the procedure in the rite of sprinkling by squeezing out all the blood at once, as one would do with a burnt offering, rather than first sprinkling the blood on the altar as is proper for a sin offering. Under such circumstances, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, would also agree that the offering is disqualified.
  This, too, stands to reason that the mishna is referring to a change in the sprinkling. This can be inferred from the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: If one sacrificed a bird sin offering above the red line according to the procedure of any of the offerings, it is disqualified, and this applies even if he sacrificed it according to the procedure of a sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering. With regard to what rite did the priest change the location of the procedure? If we say that he changed the pinching, performing it above the red line, didn’t the Master already say with regard to a bird sin offering that pinching is valid anywhere on the altar? Rather, is it not that he changed the location of the sprinkling? And since the ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to sprinkling, by inference, the ruling of the first clause is also stated with regard to sprinkling.
  The Gemara responds to this proof: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. Even if the ruling of the latter clause is stated with regard to a change in the location of the sprinkling, the ruling of the first clause may still be stated with regard to a change in the procedure of the pinching, in which case the mishna would not be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.
  § According to the mishna, a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed according to the procedure of a sin offering is disqualified. The Gemara asks: With regard to what rite did the priest change the procedure?
  If we say that he changed the pinching of the bird’s nape by leaving the head partially attached, as is proper for a sin offering, then from the fact that the latter clause, i.e., the first clause of the next mishna (66b), teaches: All of the offerings enumerated above do not render one who swallows their meat ritually impure when it is in the throat, and one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property, by inference, we must say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. As, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, doesn’t he say later on in that mishna concerning a burnt offering whose nape was pinched according to the procedure of a sin offering: One who derives benefit from it is not liable for misusing consecrated property?
  Rather, the mishna must be referring to a change in the procedure of squeezing out the blood. Instead of squeezing out the blood, the priest sprinkled it on the wall of the altar as if it were a sin offering. In this case, even Rabbi Yehoshua would concede that one is liable for misusing it.
  But say the last clause of the subsequent mishna: In the case of a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of a sin offering, and for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: One who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who benefits from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, as the bird assumes the status of a sin offering. Here, with regard to what rite did the priest change the procedure and perform it as if it were a sin offering?
  If we say that he changed the squeezing, this poses a difficulty, as it is reasonable to say that Rabbi Yehoshua says that one is not liable for misuse specifically when the priest changed the pinching, as pinching a burnt offering for a bird as though it were a sin offering changes its status; but does he say this in a case where it was pinched properly, and the priest changed the squeezing procedure alone? It is unreasonable to suggest that the offering changes its status at this later stage.
  Rather, this final clause must be referring to a change with regard to the pinching. But can it be that the first clause concerning a sin offering sacrificed as a burnt offering and the last clause concerning the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua are both referring to a change with regard to the pinching, but the middle clause concerning a burnt offering sacrificed as a sin offering is referring to a change with regard to the squeezing?
  The Gemara answers: Indeed, the first clause and the last clause are referring to a change with regard to the pinching, and the middle clause is referring to a change with regard to the squeezing.
  MISHNA: And all of the offerings enumerated in the previous mishna, even those that are disqualified and may not be eaten or sacrificed, still differ from carcasses of unslaughtered kosher birds in that they do not render one who swallows their meat ritually impure when the meat is in the throat. This is because the pinching of the napes of bird offerings, like the slaughter of animals, prevents them from assuming the status of a carcass. But nevertheless, since they are forbidden to the priests, one who derives benefit from any of them is liable for misusing consecrated property. This is the <i>halakha</i> in all cases except for the bird sin offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of the sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering. Since it was sacrificed properly and it is permitted for priests to partake of a fit sin offering, there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property.
  In the case of a bird burnt offering that one improperly sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of the sin offering, and one did so for the sake of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: One who derives benefit from it is liable for misusing consecrated property, as it remains a burnt offering, whose meat is never permitted to the priests. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One who derives benefit from it is not liable for misusing consecrated property. Since the entire sacrificial process was conducted according to the procedure of a sin offering, the offering assumes the status of a sin offering in this regard.
  The mishna recounts the dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i>. Rabbi Eliezer said: And if in the case of a sin offering that was sacrificed for its sake, one is not liable for misusing it, and nevertheless, when one changed its designation and sacrificed it not for its sake, one is liable for misusing it, then in the case of a burnt offering, where one is liable for misusing it even when it was sacrificed for its sake, when one changed its designation and sacrificed it not for its sake is it not right that he is liable for misusing it?
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, that <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not correct, as if you said with regard to a sin offering for which one changed its designation and sacrificed it for the sake of a burnt offering that there is liability for misuse, this is reasonable, because he changed its designation to an item for which there is liability for misuse. Would you say in the case of a burnt offering for which one changed its designation and sacrificed it for the sake of a sin offering that there is liability for misuse, as in that case he changed its designation to an item for which there is no liability for its misuse?
  
  Daf 67a
  
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard and slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, will prove that the fact that one changed the offering’s designation to an item that is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse is not a relevant factor. As in this case, one changed their designation to an item that is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse and, nevertheless, one is liable for misusing them. You too should not be puzzled about the burnt offering, concerning which even though one changed its designation to an item that is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse, the <i>halakha</i> is that one would be liable for misusing it.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, that is no proof, as if you said with regard to offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard, and slaughtered them for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, that one is liable for misusing them, that is reasonable. The reason is that one who slaughtered them changed their designation to an item for which there are both prohibited and permitted elements as offerings of lesser sanctity. Although one is not liable for misuse of their flesh, after the blood is sprinkled one is liable for misuse of the portions consumed on the altar. Would you say the <i>halakha</i> is the same in the case of a burnt offering for which one changed its designation to an item that is permitted in its entirety, i.e., a bird sin offering, which is eaten by the priests and none of it is burned on the altar?
  GEMARA: The discussion between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua is taught in a <i>baraita</i>, where it is recounted in greater detail: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: The case of a guilt offering that one slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard for the sake of a peace offering will prove my point, as here the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation to an item for which there is no liability for misuse, and yet one is liable for misusing it. And you too should not be puzzled about the bird burnt offering that was sacrificed as a sin offering, concerning which even though the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation to an item for which there is no liability for misuse, the <i>halakha</i> is that one is liable for misusing it.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say that this this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a guilt offering sacrificed as a peace offering, as although the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation, he still did not change its location but sacrificed it in the north of the Temple courtyard, which is the appropriate location for both guilt offerings and peace offerings, shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a bird burnt offering sacrificed below the red line as a sin offering, where the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation and also changed its location?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A guilt offering that one slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard for the sake of a peace offering will prove my point, as here the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation and also changed its location, and yet one is liable for misusing it. You too should not be puzzled about the bird burnt offering that was sacrificed below the red line as a sin offering, concerning which even though the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation and also changed its location, the <i>halakha</i> is that one is liable for misusing it.
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say that this this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a guilt offering sacrificed as a peace offering, in which case the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation and changed its location, but he did not change its procedure, shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a bird burnt offering sacrificed entirely according to the procedure of a sin offering, in which case the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation and procedure and also changed its location?
  The <i>baraita</i> ends here, and it would appear that Rabbi Eliezer had no response to this claim. Rava said: Why? Let him say to Rabbi Yehoshua that a guilt offering that one slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard for the sake of a peace offering with a deviation with regard to the offering’s owner, i.e., he slaughtered it for the sake of someone other than the offering’s owner, will prove my opinion; as this is tantamount to a case where the one who performed the slaughter changed its designation and changed its location and also changed its procedure, yet one is liable for its misuse.
  Rava concluded: Since he did not say this to him, learn from it that at this stage Rabbi Eliezer grasped Rabbi Yehoshua’s line of reasoning; as Rav Adda bar Ahava says that Rabbi Yehoshua would say the following reasoning: In the case of a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of a sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering, once he pinched one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter [<i>siman</i>], i.e., either the gullet or the windpipe, the offering is removed from its status as a burnt offering and becomes a bird sin offering.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, then in the case of a bird sin offering that one sacrificed above the red line according to the procedure of a burnt offering, too, as soon as he pinches one <i>siman</i> it should be removed from its status as a sin offering and become a bird burnt offering. And if you would say that indeed that is so, this is difficult: But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Bena’a that this is the accurate presentation of the mishna? What, does he not mean that this is the accurate presentation in the sense that Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle applies specifically to the case stated in the mishna, namely, that of a burnt offering sacrificed as a sin offering, and to nothing more?
  The Gemara answers: No, what Rabbi Bena’a means is that this is the accurate presentation of the entire mishna. Just as Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to a bird burnt offering sacrificed entirely as a sin offering, he holds similarly that a bird sin offering sacrificed entirely as a burnt offering assumes the status of a burnt offering.
  Rav Ashi said: The two cases are different. Granted, Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle applies to a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of a sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering. Since the method of preparing this bird sin offering is by pinching one <i>siman</i>, and the method of preparing that bird burnt offering is by pinching two <i>simanim</i>, and since there can be no bird burnt offering below the red line, therefore once he pinched one <i>siman</i> below the red line, the offering is removed from its status as a burnt offering and becomes a bird sin offering.
  But one cannot say this with regard to a bird sin offering that was sacrificed as a burnt offering. Since the Master said with regard to the bird sin offering: Pinching is valid everywhere on the altar, it follows that as soon as one pinched one <i>siman</i> for the sake of a burnt offering it was disqualified, like any other sin offering pinched for the sake of a different type of offering. Consequently, when he then pinched the other <i>siman</i> according to the procedure of a burnt offering, how could it then be removed from its status as a sin offering and become a bird burnt offering?
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself, that Rav Adda bar Ahava says that Rabbi Yehoshua would say: In the case of a bird burnt offering that one sacrificed below the red line according to the procedure of a sin offering and for the sake of a sin offering, once he pinched one <i>siman</i>, the offering is removed from its status as a burnt offering and becomes a bird sin offering.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to this principle from a mishna in tractate <i>Kinnim</i> (24a). A woman after childbirth must bring two bird offerings: A burnt offering and a sin offering. The mishna discusses a case where two women after childbirth, one of whom already brought her burnt offering and one of whom already brought her sin offering, bring their remaining offerings to the Temple, a sin offering for this one and a burnt offering for that one, but confusion has arisen as to which bird is which.
  If the priest sacrificed both of them above the red line, half of the birds, i.e., one of them, is fit, as in any event the burnt offering has been sacrificed properly, and half of the birds, i.e., the other one, is disqualified. Likewise, if he sacrificed both of them below the red line, half are fit, as in any event the sin offering was sacrificed properly, and half are disqualified. If he sacrificed one above the red line and one below, they are both disqualified, as I say that perhaps the sin offering was sacrificed above, and the burnt offering was sacrificed below.
  But according to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle, the sin offering should be deemed fit in any event; even though the burnt offering was indeed sacrificed below the red line, it should be removed from its status as a burnt offering and become a bird sin offering.
  The Gemara rejects this claim: It is reasonable to say that Rabbi Yehoshua stated his principle with regard to one person, whose offering the priest sacrificed below the red line instead of above it; but did he state it with regard to two people, one of whose offering the priest sacrificed for the sake of the other person? In the case of the two women, the priest sacrificed the offering for the sake of a different person altogether, and Rabbi Yehoshua would concede that such an offering does not become a sin offering.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another challenge from a mishna in tractate <i>Kinnim</i> (24a). The mishna discusses a case of two women who jointly brought three pairs of birds, as follows: The birds of one pair were designated as a sin offering and a burnt offering respectively, but it was not specified which woman’s obligation they were to satisfy; and the second pair was unspecified as to which bird was to be which offering; and the third pair was specified as to both the type of offering of each bird and whose obligation each bird was to satisfy.
  If the priest sacrificed all of them above the red line, half of the birds are fit, as in any event the burnt offerings have been sacrificed properly, and half are disqualified. Likewise, if he sacrificed all of them below the red line, half are fit, as in any event the sin offerings were sacrificed properly, and half are disqualified. If he sacrificed half of every pair above the red line and half of it below, but it is unclear which bird he sacrificed above and which he sacrificed below, only the unspecified pair is fit, as by sacrificing one above and one below the priest has in effect designated them. And since the women brought the birds jointly, the fit pair is divided between them, one bird counting toward the obligation of each woman.
  The mishna teaches that only the unspecified pair is fit, while the specified birds are not, as perhaps each bird was sacrificed on the wrong side of the red line and disqualified. But why should that be the <i>halakha</i>? According to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle, even if the burnt offering was indeed sacrificed below the red line, it should be removed from its status as a burnt offering and become a bird sin offering.
  And if you would say that this mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, how can you say that?
  The Gemara explains: Come and hear evidence that the <i>mishnayot</i> in tractate <i>Kinnim</i> are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua from another mishna in the same chapter (24b): The mishna discusses the case of a woman who said: It is incumbent upon me to bring one nest, i.e., one pair of bird offerings, if I give birth to a male child. Since all women who give birth must bring one pair of birds in any event, if she ultimately gave birth to a male, she must bring two nests, one for her vow and one for her obligation.
  If she gave them to the priest without specifying which bird is to be which type of offering, the priest must sacrifice three above the red line and one below. This is because the obligatory pair must consist of a burnt offering and a sin offering, while a pair of birds brought to fulfill a vow must consist of two burnt offerings.
  If the priest did not do so, but rather, thinking that both pairs were obligatory, sacrificed two above and two below, and he did not consult the woman before sacrificing them, she must bring one more bird [<i>perida</i>] and sacrifice it above the red line to satisfy her remaining obligation.
  This is the <i>halakha</i> only if both pairs were of the same species of bird, either doves or pigeons; but if the two pairs were of two different species, and the priest does not remember which pair he sacrificed first, she must bring two more birds, one of each species. Whichever pair was sacrificed first is deemed the obligatory pair, and the woman must bring a bird of the other species to satisfy her remaining obligation of a burnt offering. But since it is not known which species of bird that is, she must bring one of each.
  If the woman initially specified which species of bird she would bring for her vow but subsequently forgot what species she specified, and she then brought two pairs of a single species, and the priest mistakenly sacrificed two birds above the red line and two below, then she must bring three more birds, all as burnt offerings. One must be of the species she brought, to replace the bird mistakenly sacrificed below, and the other two must be of the other species, in case that was the species she specified in the first place.
  This is the <i>halakha</i> only if both pairs that she brought were of the same species. But if they were of two different species, and the priest does not remember which pair he sacrificed first, she must bring four, two of each species. This is because no matter which species she specified, the priest may have sacrificed the pair of that species first, leaving none of that species to satisfy even part of her vow. She therefore may still need to satisfy an entire vow of either species.
  The mishna continues: If, besides forgetting which species of bird she specified to bring for her vow, the woman also committed to sacrificing the birds of her vow together with the burnt offering of the obligatory pair, but the priest mistakenly sacrificed two birds above the red line and two below,
  
  Daf 68a
  
  she must bring another five birds and sacrifice them all above the red line as burnt offerings. Since her commitment was not satisfied, she has not fulfilled even part of her vow. She must therefore bring two burnt offerings of each species to ensure that she fulfills her vow, and she must bring another bird to replace the initial obligatory burnt offering and fulfill her commitment to bring them together.
  This is the <i>halakha</i> only if both pairs that she brought were of the same species. But if they were of two different species, and the priest does not remember which he sacrificed first as the obligatory pair, she must bring six, two of each species to ensure that she fulfills her vow, and one more of each species to ensure that she properly replaces the original burnt offering of the obligatory pair and fulfills her commitment.
  If the woman specified the species of bird for her vow but then forgot which species she specified, and she gave two pairs of birds to the priest but does not know now what species she gave, or even if she gave him one or two species of birds, and the priest went and sacrificed the birds but does not know now what he sacrificed where, in this case, she must bring seven birds, as follows: Four birds, two of each species, for her vow; and two more birds, one of each species, for her obligatory burnt offering, in case the priest sacrificed a sin offering of a certain species and the burnt offering must now match that species; and one sin offering of either species, in case the priest sacrificed them all as burnt offerings.
  Ben Azzai says she must bring two sin offerings, one of each species, as he holds that if the priest sacrificed a bird of a certain species specifically as the obligatory burnt offering, the sin offering must now match that species.
  The mishna concludes: Rabbi Yehoshua said that there is a parable that explains this situation: This is what people say about a sheep: When it is alive it makes one sound, and when it is dead it makes seven sounds. Its two horns become trumpets, its two shinbones become flutes, its skin becomes a drumhead, its large intestines become harp strings, and its small intestines become lyre strings. Here too, because of the uncertainty as to what had occurred, the woman must bring seven extra birds. Since Rabbi Yehoshua summarizes the mishna, the <i>mishnayot</i> in this chapter must be in accordance with his opinion. According to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s principle, burnt offerings of birds sacrificed as sin offerings become valid sin offerings. Why then, according to these <i>mishnayot</i>, are they disqualified?
  The Gemara responds: Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation is not at odds with these <i>mishnayot</i>; while it is reasonable to say, i.e., to explain, that Rabbi Yehoshua said that the offering becomes a sin offering insofar as to exclude one who derives benefit from it from liability for misuse of consecrated property, did he say that it becomes a sin offering so expansively as to indicate that it would satisfy the owner’s obligation? In the cases in the <i>mishnayot</i> in <i>Kinnim</i>, all burnt offerings that were sacrificed as sin offerings are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property, but the women must nevertheless bring replacement offerings.
  MISHNA: With regard to any of those people disqualified from performing the Temple service who pinched the nape of a bird offering, their pinching is not valid, but the offering’s meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as would the meat of a kosher bird that was not ritually slaughtered. If a priest pinched it with the thumbnail of his left hand, or if he pinched it at night, or if he slaughtered a non-sacred bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard, in all these cases, although it is prohibited to consume these birds, they do not render one ritually impure when they are in the throat, as the halakhic status of pinching is like that of slaughtering.
  If he pinched with a knife and not with his thumbnail; or if he pinched a non-sacred bird inside the Temple courtyard or a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard;
  
  Daf 68b
  
  or if he pinched doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not yet arrived, as they are too young to be sacrificed; or if he pinched pigeons whose time of fitness has passed, as they are too old; or if he pinched the nape of a fledgling whose wing was withered, or whose eye was blinded, or whose leg was severed; in all these cases, although the bird’s nape was pinched, it renders one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  This is the principle: The meat of any bird that was initially fit for sacrifice and whose disqualification occurred in the course of the service in the sacred Temple courtyard does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. The meat of any bird whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred area, but rather was disqualified before the service began, renders one ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  GEMARA: Rav says: Pinching with the thumbnail of the left hand and pinching at night do not cause the offering’s meat to render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat as would the carcass of an unslaughtered bird; but pinching by a non-priest and pinching, i.e., cutting from the nape of the neck, with a knife rather than the fingernail do cause the meat to render one ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  The Gemara challenges: What is different about the first two cases that prevents the bird from assuming the status of a carcass? Temple service with the left hand has an instance of validity during the service on Yom Kippur, when the High Priest enters the Holy of Holies holding the spoon of incense in his left hand. And Temple service at night has an instance of validity in the burning of limbs and fats of offerings on the altar, which may be burned throughout the night. But a non-priest also has an instance of validity in the slaughter of animal offerings. Why then does Rav rule that pinching by a non-priest renders the bird a carcass? The Gemara answers: Slaughter is not considered a full-fledged sacrificial rite, and therefore it cannot be compared to pinching.
  The Gemara asks: And is it not a full-fledged rite? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say that the slaughter of a red heifer by a non-priest is not valid, which indicates that it is a full-fledged rite? And Rav showed a source in the Torah for this <i>halakha</i>: The verses concerning the red heifer mention both Elazar the priest as performing the slaughter and the word “statute,” which is mentioned in the verse: “This is the statute of the law” (Numbers 19:2), teaching that Elazar’s involvement was halakhically required.
  The Gemara answers: The red heifer is different, as it has the halakhic status of an item consecrated for Temple maintenance rather than for sacrifice on the altar. Therefore, its slaughter cannot teach the <i>halakha</i> concerning an actual offering.
  The Gemara asks: But can it not be inferred <i>a fortiori</i> that slaughter is a sacrificial rite? If animals that have the status of items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are of lesser sanctity, require slaughter by the priesthood, is it necessary to say that the slaughter of animals consecrated for sacrifice on the altar, which are of greater sanctity, is a sacrificial rite that should require a priest? Apparently, the fact that non-priests may slaughter offerings proves that certain sacrificial rites apply to them.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The slaughter of a red heifer does not constitute Temple service at all, and therefore it cannot be compared to the slaughter of an offering. The <i>halakha</i> is just as it is with regard to the examination of the shades of leprous marks, which does not constitute Temple service but requires a declaration of purity or impurity by the priesthood.
  The Gemara asks: But let us derive from the <i>halakha</i> of a private altar, which was a valid medium for sacrificing offerings before the Temple was built, where non-priests were permitted to pinch the napes of bird offerings, that there is a circumstance in which pinching by non-priests is valid. Why then does the bird assume the status of a carcass when the pinching is performed by a non-priest?
  The Gemara answers: One cannot derive the <i>halakhot</i> of the Temple service from the <i>halakhot</i> of a private altar, which was considered non-sacred by comparison.
  The Gemara asks: And can one not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of the Temple service from the <i>halakhot</i> of a private altar? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to an item, e.g., the limbs of an offering, which emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby rendered unfit for sacrifice upon the altar, that if it nevertheless ascended upon the altar it shall not descend? It is derived from the fact that an item that emerged is valid for sacrifice on a private altar. This indicates that one can learn from the <i>halakhot</i> of a private altar with regard to the Temple service.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of that <i>baraita</i> relies on the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>]” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that any item that ascends [<i>ola</i>] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. In other words, the verse is the actual source for the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling.
  Until this point the Gemara has discussed the opinion of Rav, who holds that the pinching of a non-priest renders the bird a carcass with regard to ritual impurity. But Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If a non-priest pinched the nape of a bird offering, the meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat; but if a priest pinched it, i.e., cut it from the nape of the neck, with a knife, the meat renders one ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  The Gemara brings proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from that which we learned in the mishna: If any of those disqualified for Temple service pinched the nape of a bird offering, their pinching is not valid, but the meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the word: Any, is written to add that even the pinching of a non-priest does not render the bird a carcass. But according to Rav, who holds that it does render the bird a carcass, what is added by the word: Any?
  The Gemara answers: It is written to add pinching with the left hand or pinching at night. The Gemara challenges: The word: Any, is unnecessary with regard to teaching the cases of pinching with the left hand and pinching at night, as they are taught in the mishna explicitly. The Gemara answers: According to Rav, the word: Any, is not meant to add a specific case. Rather the mishna teaches the principle and then explains using specific examples.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the continuation of the mishna: This is the principle: The meat of any bird whose disqualification occurred during the course of the service in the sacred Temple courtyard does not render the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when the meat is in the throat. Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the word: Any, is written to add that even the pinching of a non-priest does not render the bird a carcass. But according to Rav, who holds that it does render the bird a carcass, what is added by the word: Any?
  
  Daf 69a
  
  The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, one could infer the opposite from the following clause: The meat of any bird whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred Temple courtyard transmits ritual impurity to one who swallows it. Here, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, what disqualification is added if not pinching by a non-priest?
  Rather, both clauses add other disqualifications not mentioned in the mishna. The former clause, concerning an offering that was disqualified in the Temple courtyard, is written to add that the slaughter of sacrificial birds inside the Temple courtyard does not render them carcasses. The latter clause, with regard to an offering disqualified outside the Temple courtyard, is written to add that the pinching of non-sacred birds outside the Temple courtyard does render them carcasses.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In a case where a non-priest pinched a bird offering, or a priest disqualified from the Temple service pinched it, or it became <i>piggul</i>, i.e., it was sacrificed with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, or it became <i>notar</i>, i.e., its meat remained uneaten beyond its designated time, or it became ritually impure, in all these cases, even though the meat of these birds may not be consumed, they still do not render one who swallows them ritually impure when they are in the throat.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak says: I heard [<i>shamati</i>] two <i>halakhot</i>, one concerning the removal of a handful from a meal offering by a non-priest for burning on the altar, and one concerning the pinching of a bird offering by a non-priest. Although both offerings are disqualified, I heard that one shall descend from the altar if it ascended, and one shall not descend; but I do not know which <i>halakha</i> applies to which case. Ḥizkiyya said: It stands to reason that in the case of the removal of the handful the offering shall descend and in the case of pinching the offering shall not descend.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about pinching by a non-priest that would allow the bird to be sacrificed if it ascended onto the altar? If the difference is that for a non-priest to do so would be valid on a private altar, where all sacrificial rites were performed by non-priests, this does not constitute a difference, as the removal of the handful by a non-priest would also be valid on a private altar.
  And if you would say that no handfuls were removed on private altars because no meal offering was sacrificed on a private altar, as meal offerings were brought before the construction of the Temple only on the altar in the Tabernacle, you must also say that there was no pinching either, as according to this opinion no birds were sacrificed on a private altar either.
  As Rav Sheshet says: According to the statement of the one who says that a meal offering was sacrificed on a private altar, birds were sacrificed on a private altar. According to the statement of the one who says that no meal offering was sacrificed on a private altar, no birds were sacrificed there either. What is the reason for this? This is because the Torah, in describing the offerings brought at Mount Sinai, before the Tabernacle was built, mentions slaughtered offerings (see Exodus 24:5) but not meal offerings; it mentions slaughtered offerings, i.e., animal offerings, but not birds.
  Rather, say that even though both pinching the nape of a bird offering and removing the handful of a meal offering by a non-priest are valid on a private altar, the <i>halakhot</i> of meal offerings sacrificed on a private altar cannot be compared to those of meal offerings sacrificed in the Temple. This is because in the case of a meal offering sacrificed on a private altar, there is no consecration in a service vessel of the handful removed from it. By contrast, in the Temple, the handful must always be consecrated in a service vessel.
  § The mishna rules that if a priest pinched with his left hand, or if he pinched at night, the offering does not render one ritually impure when in his throat. With regard to this issue the Sages taught: One might have thought that invalid pinching that occurs inside the Temple courtyard, such as pinching with the left hand or pinching at night, would cause the offering to render the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. Therefore the verse states: “Every soul that eats a carcass…shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). Bird offerings whose napes were pinched inside the Temple courtyard are not considered carcasses.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t a bird offering whose nape was pinched inside the Temple courtyard also a carcass? Rather, the <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is derived from that which the verse states: “Every soul that eats a carcass or a <i>tereifa</i>…shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). A <i>tereifa</i> is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months. It is derived from this verse that just as having the status of a <i>tereifa</i> does not render permitted any forbidden bird, so too, any type of death that does not render permitted any forbidden bird renders the animal a carcass with regard to ritual impurity.
  Consequently, invalid pinching that is performed inside the Temple courtyard is excluded, since it renders permitted a forbidden bird, as it is permitted to sacrifice such a disqualified offering if it ascended onto the altar, whereas it was prohibited to sacrifice such a disqualified offering if it was not pinched. The meat of such an offering therefore does not render the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  This principle includes two other cases of invalid pinching, for which the Gemara gives a two-word mnemonic: <i>Ketz</i>, <i>ḥefetz</i>. These words are acronyms for the cases of one who pinches the napes of sacrificial birds outside the Temple courtyard, and one who pinches the napes of non-sacred birds whether inside the Temple courtyard or outside of it. Since these offerings do not render permitted any forbidden bird, as these offerings may not be sacrificed even if brought onto the altar, they render the garments of one who swallows them ritually impure when they are in the throat.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that the slaughter of non-sacred birds inside the Temple courtyard, or the slaughter of sacrificial birds whether inside or outside of it, would cause their meat to render the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. Therefore the verse states: “Every soul that eats a carcass…shall be impure until the evening.” Birds that have been slaughtered in this manner are not considered carcasses, and so they do not impart ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t a bird slaughtered in one of these manners also a carcass? Rather, it is derived from that which the verse states: “Every soul that eats a carcass or a <i>tereifa</i>…shall be impure until the evening,” as follows: Just as the status of a <i>tereifa</i> is the same, if the bird is slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard as it is if the bird is slaughtered outside of it, i.e., forbidden, so too all forbidden birds whose status is the same if slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard as it is if they were slaughtered outside of it constitute carcasses.
  Consequently, the slaughter of non-sacred birds inside the Temple courtyard, or of sacrificial birds whether inside or outside of it, is excluded, since the status of such birds is not the same if they are slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard as if they are slaughtered outside of it. The meat of such an offering therefore does not render the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  The Gemara challenges: Granted, the status of non-sacred birds is not the same if slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard as if they are slaughtered outside of it, as if slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard they are forbidden, while if slaughtered outside of it they are permitted. But with regard to sacrificial birds, in both this case and that case, whether slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard or outside of it, they are disqualified.
  Rava says: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to slaughtered sacrificial birds outside the Temple should not be derived from the verse at all, but rather by logic. If the slaughter of a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard has sufficient effect on it as proper slaughter to render the one who slaughtered it liable to excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>], which is the punishment for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard (see 107a), could it be that it does not have sufficient effect on the bird as proper slaughter to render it ritually pure by preventing it from assuming the status of a carcass?
  The Gemara asks: We found a source for the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the slaughter of sacrificial birds outside the Temple courtyard; from where do we derive this <i>halakha</i> with regard to their slaughter inside the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers that it is derived from the principle articulated above: Since their status is not the same if they are slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard as if they are slaughtered outside of it, as one who slaughters a sacrificial bird outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, the status of a carcass does not apply.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, it follows that if the priest pinched sacrificial birds outside the Temple courtyard, they are also not considered carcasses, as their status is not the same if they are pinched inside the Temple courtyard as if they are pinched outside of it; if they are pinched inside, they are fit offerings, and if they are pinched outside, they are disqualified. This conclusion would contradict the mishna, which rules that sacrificial birds pinched outside the Temple courtyard are considered carcasses, and they render one who eats their meat impure.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: One can derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that is prepared not in its valid manner, i.e., sacrificial birds slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to another item that is prepared not in its valid manner, i.e., sacrificial birds slaughtered inside it. But one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that is prepared not in its valid manner, i.e., sacrificial birds pinched outside the Temple courtyard, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that is prepared in its valid manner, i.e., those pinched inside it. The cases of a bird pinched outside and a bird pinched inside the Temple courtyard are not subject to comparison, so one cannot derive conclusions from the differences between them.
  The Gemara asks: And can one not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to disqualified offerings from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to fit offerings? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to an item that emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, that if it nevertheless ascended upon the altar it shall not descend? It is derived from the fact that an item that emerged is valid for sacrifice on a private altar, i.e., that disqualification was not applicable to an offering sacrificed on a private altar, as there was no Temple. Here, the <i>baraita</i> derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an disqualified offering from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a fit one.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of that <i>baraita</i> relies on the phrase: “This is the law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>]” (Leviticus 6:2), a seemingly superfluous general phrase which is interpreted homiletically to include the <i>halakha</i> that any item that ascends [<i>ola</i>] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. The verse is the actual source for the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling.
  MISHNA: If the priest pinched the nape of the bird’s neck properly and then it was found to be a <i>tereifa</i>, and it was therefore disqualified from being sacrificed and forbidden for consumption by a priest, Rabbi Meir says: An olive-bulk of its meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as the pinching prevents it from assuming the status of a carcass.
  
  Daf 69b
  
  Rabbi Yehuda says: Its status is like any other carcass of an unslaughtered kosher bird, and its meat renders one who swallows it ritually impure.
  Rabbi Meir said: My opinion can be inferred <i>a fortiori</i>. If an animal carcass transmits impurity to a person through touching it and through carrying it, and nevertheless the slaughter of an animal purifies it, even if it is a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity, i.e., its slaughter prevents it from assuming the impurity status of a carcass, then with regard to a bird carcass, which possesses a lesser degree of impurity, as it does not transmit impurity to a person through touching it and through carrying it, but only through swallowing it, is it not logical that its slaughter should purify it, even if it is a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity?
  And once it is established that slaughter renders a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> pure, it can be inferred that just as we found with regard to its slaughter that it renders a bird fit for consumption and purifies a bird, even if it is a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity, so too its pinching, which renders a bird offering fit with regard to consumption, should purify it, even if it is a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Although one can derive from the case of an animal that slaughter renders even a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> pure, that derivation cannot be extended to pinching. The same restriction that applies to every <i>a fortiori</i> inference, namely, that a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived, applies here: It is sufficient for the halakhic status of the carcass of a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> to be like that of the carcass of an animal that is a <i>tereifa</i>; its slaughter renders it pure, but its pinching does not.
  GEMARA: In the mishna, Rabbi Yosei answers Rabbi Meir by invoking the principle that a <i>halakha</i> derived by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Meir not require that <i>a fortiori</i> inferences conform to the principle that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source? But isn’t the principle: It is sufficient, etc., mandated by Torah law?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How is it derived from the Torah that derivation by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference is a valid method of biblical exegesis? The Torah states with regard to Miriam, who was reprimanded by God: “And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had but spit in her face, should she not hide in shame seven days? Let her be shut up outside the camp seven days” (Numbers 12:14). If one who was reprimanded by her father would hide in shame for seven days, one could infer through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that one reprimanded by the Divine Presence should be shut up outside the camp for fourteen days. Rather, one must say: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to be like its source.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, said: Rabbi Meir does require that <i>a fortiori</i> inferences conform to this principle. But he does not actually infer his opinion <i>a fortiori</i>; rather, he found a verse and interpreted it.
  The Torah states, with regard to the impurity of unslaughtered animal carcasses: “This is the law of the beast, and of the fowl” (Leviticus 11:46), indicating that the two are somehow equated. But with regard to what law is a beast equal to a fowl and a fowl equal to a beast? The <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity governing animals and birds are not comparable; an animal transmits impurity by touching and by carrying, whereas a bird does not transmit impurity by touching or by carrying. Furthermore, a bird renders the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat; an animal does not render the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.
  Rather, this verse serves to tell you that just as with regard to an animal, that which renders it fit for consumption, i.e., slaughter, purifies it, even when it is a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity, so too with regard to a bird, that which renders it fit for consumption, i.e., both the slaughter of a non-sacred bird and pinching the nape of a bird offering, purifies a bird, even if it is a <i>tereifa</i>, from its impurity.
  § The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> imparts impurity even when slaughtered? He too found a verse and interpreted it. The Torah states with regard to the ritual impurity of kosher bird carcasses: “And every soul that eats a carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>…he shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 17:15). Rabbi Yehuda said: Why was the case of a <i>tereifa</i> stated? If the verse is referring to a live <i>tereifa</i>, it should not be impure, as the term “a carcass” is stated, indicating that to impart impurity the bird must be dead. If it is referring to a <i>tereifa</i> that is not alive, but rather has died of its wounds, it falls within the category of a carcass. Rather, the word <i>tereifa</i> is written to include a <i>tereifa</i> that one slaughtered before it had the opportunity to die by itself, to teach that it imparts ritual impurity as would a carcass.
  Rav Sheizevi said to the Sage who suggested this source for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: If that is so, one should interpret another verse likewise, as it is written: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), meaning that although the meat of a carcass imparts ritual impurity, those fats that would be forbidden even if the animal had been slaughtered do not impart impurity.
  There too let us say, interpreting the verse according to Rabbi Yehuda’s logic: Why is the case of a <i>tereifa</i> stated? If it is referring to a live <i>tereifa</i>, the case is superfluous, as “a carcass” is stated. Since the forbidden fat of a carcass is pure, obviously that of a live animal is pure. If it is referring to a <i>tereifa</i> that is not alive, but has rather died of its wounds, it is included within the category of “a carcass,” and likewise it need not be mentioned. Rather, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” is written to include a <i>tereifa</i> that one slaughtered, to teach that its forbidden fat is pure. By inference, one should then conclude that its meat does impart impurity.
  But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says, and some say it was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse concerning the impurity of carcasses states: “And if some animal, of which you may eat, dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:39)? The word “some” teaches that some animals impart impurity and some animals do not impart impurity. And what is it that does not impart impurity? That is a <i>tereifa</i> that one slaughtered. And if even its meat does not impart impurity, the word <i>tereifa</i> is not needed to teach that its forbidden fat is pure.
  Rather, the word <i>tereifa</i> in the verse concerning forbidden fat (Leviticus 7:24) is necessary to exclude non-kosher animals from the <i>halakha</i> in the verse and to teach that their forbidden fat is impure. The word indicates that only the forbidden fat of those carcasses to whose species the <i>halakha</i> of <i>tereifa</i> applies, i.e., those of kosher animals, impart impurity. Forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal is excluded, as the <i>halakha</i> of <i>tereifa</i> does not apply to its species. The status of <i>tereifa</i> is immaterial for a non-kosher animal as its consumption is prohibited in any event.
  Here too, the word <i>tereifa</i> in the verse concerning the impurity of kosher bird carcasses (Leviticus 17:15) should be interpreted as excluding a carcass of a non-kosher bird from ritual impurity, as the <i>halakha</i> of <i>tereifa</i> does not apply to its species. Therefore, this verse cannot serve as a source for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the impurity of a slaughtered bird that is a <i>tereifa</i>.
  The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Yehuda, the <i>halakha</i> that carcass of a non-kosher bird does not impart impurity is derived from the phrase “a carcass” as it appears elsewhere.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: One might have thought that the carcass of a non-kosher bird renders the garments of one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat. But the verse states, concerning the impurity of carcasses of birds: “A carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>, he shall not eat” (Leviticus 22:8). This type of impurity applies only to those birds that are forbidden specifically due to the prohibition: You shall not eat of a carcass, i.e., kosher birds that died without ritual slaughter. This carcass of a non-kosher animal is excluded, and is not impure, as it is forbidden not due to the prohibition: You shall not eat of a carcass, but rather due to the prohibition: You shall not eat a non-kosher bird, to render yourself impure with it. Consequently, the word <i>tereifa</i> in the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 17:15) teaches that a slaughtered <i>tereifa</i> imparts ritual impurity, as originally posited.
  
  Daf 70a
  
  The Gemara challenges: According to this logic, one can also derive the <i>halakha</i> that the forbidden fat of the carcass of a non-kosher animal is impure from the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), which teaches that such forbidden fat is ritually pure.
  The continuation of the verse: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” indicates that the verse renders pure only fat that is forbidden specifically due to the prohibition: You shall not eat the forbidden fat of a carcass, i.e., the forbidden fat of kosher animals. This serves to exclude this forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal, which is not forbidden due to the prohibition: You shall not eat the forbidden fat of a carcass, but rather due to the prohibition against eating a non-kosher animal. Since the verse that states that fats are ritually pure is referring only to kosher animals, the forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal must be impure. Rav Sheizevi’s derivation of this <i>halakha</i> from the word <i>tereifa</i> is therefore superfluous.
  Rather, this word “<i>tereifa</i>” is necessary to include the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal, to teach that it is ritually pure; as it might enter your mind to say that only the forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals whose fat is forbidden and whose meat is permitted if slaughtered, i.e., kosher domesticated animals, is ritually pure, and this serves to exclude this forbidden fat of carcasses of those animals whose fat and meat are both permitted if slaughtered, i.e., kosher undomesticated animals, whose fat is impure. To counter this possibility, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” teaches us that the fat of a carcass of any animal that can become a <i>tereifa</i> is ritually pure, including the fat of kosher undomesticated animals.
  He said to him: If it is derived from the verse that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a kosher undomesticated animal is pure, what is different about a non-kosher animal that would cause its forbidden fat to be impure? If the difference is that its fat is not distinct from its meat, as both are forbidden for consumption, the fat of a kosher undomesticated animal is also not distinct from its meat, as both are permitted. And furthermore, isn’t it written later in the verse: “But you shall in no way eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24)? This phrase is interpreted (70b) as excluding the fat of undomesticated animals, teaching that it is impure.
  Rather, Abaye said: The word “<i>tereifa</i>” in this verse was necessary for its own sake, to teach that the forbidden fat of a carcass of a <i>tereifa</i> of a kosher domesticated animal is pure. The inclusion of the word teaches that you should not say that since a non-kosher animal is forbidden while still alive, and a <i>tereifa</i> is forbidden while still alive, therefore just as the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal is impure, so too the forbidden fat of a <i>tereifa</i> is impure. The word “<i>tereifa</i>” therefore teaches that it is pure.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, i.e., if one could have learned the <i>halakha</i> of the forbidden fat of a <i>tereifa</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal, then this word “<i>tereifa</i>” in the verse concerning the impurity of a kosher bird carcass (Leviticus 17:15) is also necessary for its own sake, to teach that the carcass of a kosher bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> is impure. It is necessary for this to be written with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird so that you should not say as follows: Since a non-kosher bird is forbidden for consumption, and a <i>tereifa</i> is forbidden for consumption, therefore just as a non-kosher bird does not impart impurity, so too a <i>tereifa</i> does not impart impurity. According the Rabbi Yehuda, the word is necessary to include the slaughtered kosher bird that is a <i>tereifa</i>, not a carcass.
  And furthermore, is it possible to derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning a <i>tereifa</i> from that concerning a non-kosher animal, as suggested? The two cases are incomparable, as a non-kosher animal never had a kosher period before being forbidden, whereas a <i>tereifa</i> had a kosher period before becoming a <i>tereifa</i>. And if you would say: What can be said with regard to an animal that is a <i>tereifa</i> from the womb, which never had a kosher period? In any event, there are kosher animals among its species, i.e., the <i>tereifa</i> is a member of a kosher species, which cannot be said of a non-kosher animal.
  Rather, Rava said: The word <i>tereifa</i> in the verse concerning forbidden fat (Leviticus 7:24) teaches a different <i>halakha</i>. By stating: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” referring to the forbidden fat of a carcass, the Torah states: Let the prohibition of eating a carcass come and take effect where the prohibition of eating forbidden fat already exists. One who eats the forbidden fat of a carcass is liable both for eating forbidden fat and for eating from a carcass. Likewise, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” in the verse teaches: Let the prohibition of eating a <i>tereifa</i> come and take effect where the prohibition of eating forbidden fat already exists, so that one who eats the forbidden fat of a <i>tereifa</i> is liable for transgressing two prohibitions.
  And both the word “carcass” and the word “<i>tereifa</i>” are necessary, even though they teach similar <i>halakhot</i>. As, had the verse taught us about additional liability only with regard to the forbidden fat of a carcass, one might have thought that it applies to only a carcass, as it imparts ritual impurity, but with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, which does not, one might say that the additional liability does not apply. And had the verse taught us this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, one might have thought that it applies only to a <i>tereifa</i>, as its prohibition takes effect while it is still alive, but with regard to a carcass, which becomes forbidden only when it dies, one might say that it does not apply. Both words are therefore necessary.
  § The Gemara has established that according to Rabbi Yehuda, the word “<i>tereifa</i>” in the verse concerning the impurity of a kosher bird carcass (Leviticus 17:15) teaches that a slaughtered bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> imparts ritual impurity. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Meir, who holds that a slaughtered bird that is a <i>tereifa</i> does not impart ritual impurity, do with this word “<i>tereifa</i>”? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to exclude the slaughter of non-sacred birds that occurs inside the Temple courtyard, teaching that it does not cause them to impart ritual impurity as would a carcass, even though they are forbidden for consumption.
  And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: Another instance of the word <i>tereifa</i> is written concerning the ritual impurity of birds: “A carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>, he shall not eat to become impure with it” (Leviticus 22:8). Rabbi Yehuda derives the <i>halakha</i> from this verse.
  And how does Rabbi Meir interpret the appearance of the word <i>tereifa</i> in both verses? The Gemara answers: One is necessary to ex-clude the slaughter that occurs inside the Temple courtyard as mentioned above, and one is necessary to exclude a non-kosher bird, to teach that the carcass of a non-kosher bird does not impart ritual impurity.
  And how does Rabbi Yehuda derive that the carcass of a non-kosher bird does not impart ritual impurity? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the word “carcass” in the verse: “A carcass, or a <i>tereifa</i>, he shall not eat to become impure with it” (Leviticus 22:8), which indicates that only carcasses of birds that are forbidden for consumption due to their status as a carcass are impure. Non-kosher birds are forbidden due to their non-kosher status, not due to their status as a carcass.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Meir do with this word “carcass”? The Gemara answers: Since the verse mentions eating, Rabbi Meir holds that the word “carcass” is written to teach that the minimum measure of consumption of the meat of a bird carcass that renders one impure is an olive-bulk, which is the standard legal measure of consumption for Torah laws in general.
  The Gemara challenges: But let him derive this measure from the first verse: “And every soul that eats a carcass…shall be impure” (Leviticus 17:15), from the fact that the Merciful One expresses this <i>halakha</i> using the language of consumption.
  The Gemara responds: Both verses are necessary, one to indicate that the measure of consumption that renders one impure is an olive-bulk, and one to indicate that the maximum measure of time for consumption of the olive-bulk is the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. One who takes longer than this standard measure of time will not contract impurity.
  It is necessary for the Torah to indicate this latter <i>halakha</i> as well, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say: Since the impurity of carcasses of birds is a novelty, as one contracts it by eating rather than by touching or carrying, perhaps its <i>halakhot</i> are unusually stringent and even one who eats an olive-bulk in more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread should also contract impurity. Therefore, the verse teaches us otherwise.
  § The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> concerning the impurity of the forbidden fat of a carcass. The Sages taught: When the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>, may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24) teaches that such fat is pure, the verse speaks of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal.
  The <i>baraita</i> challenges: Do you say that the verse speaks of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal, or perhaps does it only speak of the forbidden fat of a non-kosher animal?
  You may say in response: The Torah renders a slaughtered animal pure of the impurity of a carcass due to the fact that it was ritually slaughtered. And likewise the Torah renders the forbidden fat of a carcass pure, due to the fact that it is forbidden fat. Therefore, the two cases are comparable: Just as when the Torah renders a slaughtered animal pure due to the fact that it was slaughtered, it is referring only to a kosher animal and not to a non-kosher animal, which is impure even when ritually slaughtered, so too, when the Torah renders forbidden fat pure due to the fact that it is forbidden fat, it is referring only to a kosher animal and not to a non-kosher animal.
  The <i>baraita</i> challenges: Or perhaps go this way and maintain that since the Torah renders the carcass of a non-kosher animal ritually pure, removing it from the category of a carcass, and likewise the Torah renders the forbidden fat of a carcass pure, due to the fact that it is forbidden fat; therefore, the two cases are comparable: Just as when the Torah renders the carcass of a non-kosher animal pure, removing it from the category of a carcass, it is referring only to a non-kosher animal and not to a kosher animal, the carcass of which imparts impurity, so too, when the Torah renders forbidden fat pure due to the fact that it is forbidden fat, it is referring only to a non-kosher animal and not to a kosher animal.
  You may say in response:
  
  Daf 70b
  
  When one approaches the matter this first way, the <i>halakha</i> that forbidden fat is pure applies specifically to kosher animals, but when one approaches the matter that second way, the <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to non-kosher animals. To decide the matter, the verse states: “The fat of a <i>tereifa</i> may be used for any other service” (Leviticus 7:24), indicating that only the forbidden fat of those animals to whose species the <i>halakha</i> of <i>tereifa</i> applies, i.e., kosher animals, is ritually pure. The status of <i>tereifa</i> is immaterial to a non-kosher animal as its consumption is prohibited in any event.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: One might still assume that I will exclude from this <i>halakha</i> only the forbidden fat of a carcass of a non-kosher animal, as the <i>halakha</i> of <i>tereifa</i> does not apply to its species, but I will not exclude the fat of a carcass of an undomesticated kosher animal, as the <i>halakha</i> of <i>tereifa</i> applies to its species. Therefore, the verse states in conclusion: “But you shall in no way eat of it,” indicating that the reference is only to animals whose fat is forbidden for consumption if slaughtered but whose meat is permitted, i.e., kosher domesticated animals. Excluded are kosher undomesticated animals, whose fat and meat are both permitted for consumption.
  Rav Ya’akov bar Abba said to Rava: If that is so, it appears from the <i>baraita</i> that the carcass of a kosher animal imparts impurity, but the carcass of a non-kosher animal does not impart impurity. Rava said to him: How many elders have you caused to err in the interpretation of this <i>baraita</i>? In the latter clause we come to discuss only the carcass of a non-kosher bird, which does not impart impurity. By contrast, carcasses of non-kosher animals are impure.
  § In the mishna, Rabbi Meir states that a bird offering whose nape was pinched and was found to be a <i>tereifa</i> does not impart impurity as would a carcass. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir deemed pure only unblemished birds whose napes were pinched, as they are fit to be sacrificed, but he did not deem pure blemished birds, which are not fit to be sacrificed. And Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Meir deemed even blemished birds pure and did not distinguish between the two. It was also stated that Rav Beivai says that Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Meir would deem pure blemished birds, and this was his opinion even concerning geese and chickens, species that may not be brought as offerings and as such are never supposed to be pinched.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: According to Rabbi Elazar’s understanding of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who broke the neck of a goat? Does the impurity of animal carcasses apply? The breaking of the neck is considered the proper procedure in certain cases, as the Torah commands that a heifer’s neck be broken if a murdered body is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:4).
  One could claim: What is the reason that geese and chickens are pure if their napes are pinched? It is because they are species of birds and the napes of some birds are pinched; but a goat is not of the same species as a heifer, as goats are considered small livestock whereas cattle are large livestock. Or perhaps one could claim: Since a goat is still a species of domesticated animal, it is similar enough to a heifer that the breaking of its neck prevents it from imparting impurity as a carcass.
  Rav Dimi was sitting and saying this <i>halakha</i>, i.e., this dilemma. Abaye said to him: By inference from this dilemma, it seems that you assume that a heifer whose neck is broken is itself pure and does not impart impurity as would a carcass. Rav Dimi said to him: Indeed, as the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: Since the language of atonement is written with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, in the verse: “Forgive, Lord, Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8), just as atonement is written with regard to sacrificial animals, the breaking of the heifer’s neck is equivalent to the pinching of the nape of a bird offering, and breaking its neck prevents the heifer from imparting ritual impurity.
  Rav Natan, father of Rav Huna bar Natan, raises an objection based on a <i>baraita</i> concerning the purity of the forbidden fat of a kosher animal, mentioned in the verse: “And the fat of a carcass, and the fat of a <i>tereifa</i>, may be used for any other service; but you shall in no way eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24). I have derived from the verse only that forbidden fat that is forbidden for consumption but from which deriving benefit is permitted is pure. From where is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> also applies to the forbidden fat of an ox that is stoned by the court or the forbidden fat of a heifer whose neck is broken, from both of which one is prohibited from deriving benefit?
  The verse states: “You shall eat no fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17). The generalization “no fat” indicates that the same <i>halakhot</i> apply to the forbidden fats of all domesticated kosher animals, including those from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit.
  Rav Natan concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that the meat of a heifer whose neck is broken is pure, why must the verse teach that its forbidden fat is pure? Could one entertain the possibility that its meat is pure but its forbidden fat is impure?
  The Gemara responds: The derivation in the <i>baraita</i> was not necessary for a case where one broke the neck of the heifer. It was necessary for the verse to teach that the forbidden fat is pure even in a case where one slaughtered a heifer whose neck was designated to be broken.
  The Gemara asks: But the slaughter itself should be effective in purifying the forbidden fat, as slaughter prevents an animal from assuming the impure status of a carcass, and the derivation is still superfluous. The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary to teach that the forbidden fat of a heifer that died before its neck could be broken is pure even though the heifer itself assumes that status of a carcass.
  The Gemara asks: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring only to a heifer that died before its neck could be broken, and it describes benefitting from it as being prohibited, by inference, is it prohibited to derive benefit from the heifer while it is still alive? The Gemara responds: Indeed, as Rabbi Yannai says: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which it is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is, and yet the members of the group of scholars were inclined to say that its descent to a hard valley (see Deuteronomy 21:4), where its neck was broken, is the action that renders it forbidden.
  
  MISHNA: All the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden, e.g., sin offerings left to die, or with an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the offerings were intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is forbidden but deriving benefit from them is not, the <i>halakha</i> is different. Examples of this are an ox with which a transgression was performed, which disqualifies it from being sacrificed as an offering, or
  
  Daf 71a
  
  an ox that is known to have killed a person based on the testimony of one witness or based on the admission of the owner. Had two witnesses testified, deriving benefit from the ox would have been prohibited. Additional examples include when an offering is intermingled with an animal that copulated with a person; or an animal that was the object of bestiality; or with an animal that was set aside for idol worship; or one that was worshipped as a deity; or with an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19).
  
  Daf 71b
  
  Additional examples include an offering that was intermingled with an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, e.g., the offspring of a ram and a goat, or with an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], or with an animal born by caesarean section. In all these cases the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them, of the same type of offering that the intermingled offering was.
  The mishna continues: If sacrificial animals were intermingled with unblemished, non-sacred animals, which, if consecrated, are fit for sacrifice, the non-sacred animals shall be sold for the purpose of purchasing offerings of the same type as the offering with which they were intermingled.
  In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, if it was an animal of one type of offering with animals of the same type of offering, one shall sacrifice this animal for the sake of whoever is its owner and one shall sacrifice that animal for the sake of whoever is its owner, and both fulfill their obligation.
  In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, where an animal of one type of offering was intermingled with animals not of the same type of offering, e.g., two rams, where one is designated as a burnt offering and one as a peace offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold. And from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as this type of offering, and another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as that type of offering, and he will lose the additional expense of purchasing two highest-quality animals, when he had sold only one highest-quality animal, from his own assets.
  In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering.
  All offerings can become indistinguishably intermingled with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering, as the Gemara will explain.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches the <i>halakha</i> of all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is forbidden. This indicates that one offering became intermingled with a majority of prohibited animals, as it is usual to describe the smaller unit as being intermingled with the larger unit. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the meaning of the term: Even, in the clause: Even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they all must die. If the permitted animal is rendered prohibited by a simple majority, of course it is prohibited if the ratio is one in ten thousand.
  The Gemara explains: This is what the mishna is saying: All the offerings in which were intermingled sin offerings left to die, or in which an ox that was sentenced to be stoned was intermingled, even if the ratio is one forbidden animal intermingled with ten thousand offerings, they all must die.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why is this mishna necessary? We already learn this <i>halakha</i> on another occasion, in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 28a): With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted they render the entire mixture prohibited in any amount, regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. The mishna adds that these are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that actively copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality. That mishna proceeds to add other categories of animals to this list, including ones mentioned in the mishna here. In any event, the basic <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is also taught in tractate <i>Temura</i>.
  Rav Ashi says: I said this <i>halakha</i> in the presence of Rav Shimi, and he explained to me that both <i>mishnayot</i> are necessary, as each teaches a novelty not included in the other. Rav Ashi clarifies: As, if this <i>halakha</i> was learned only from there, the mishna in <i>Temura</i>, I would say that this statement, that prohibited animals render a mixture prohibited in any ratio, applies only to prohibiting the animals from being sacrificed to the Most High; but with regard to prohibiting the animals even to an ordinary person [<i>hedyot</i>], e.g., that if they became intermingled with an ox that is to be stoned they all must die without the possibility of redemption, one might say that they are not all rendered prohibited in benefit, as the prohibited animal is nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna here teaches that even with regard to deriving benefit, all the animals in the mixture are prohibited.
  Rav Ashi continues: And if this <i>halakha</i> was learned only from here, I would say that it is only these categories that are mentioned in this mishna, i.e., sin offerings that were condemned to die or an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, that render a mixture prohibited in any ratio. The <i>halakha</i> is stringent with regard to them, as they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. But with regard to these categories mentioned in the mishna in <i>Temura</i>, e.g., an animal that copulated with a person, which are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, one might say that they are not disqualified from being sacrificed, and they are nullified in a majority. Therefore, both <i>mishnayot</i> are necessary.
  The Gemara questions this explanation: This justifies the mishna here, but concerning the <i>halakha</i> stated in <i>Temura</i>, why did that mishna teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those animals that are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, such as an animal that copulated with a person; the <i>tanna</i> already taught this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna here. The Gemara answers: Does the mishna here teach by what ratio they render the mixture prohibited? The important measure: In any amount, is taught there, in <i>Temura</i>, not in the mishna here, and that is the novelty of the mishna in <i>Temura</i>.
  The Gemara challenges: But if so, let the <i>tanna</i> teach that mishna in <i>Temura</i>, and then he would not require this mishna here. Why teach the second clause of the mishna here? The Gemara explains: It was necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to mention the remedy, i.e., that the animals that are intermingled shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then they shall be sold; and from the money received in the sale, the owner shall bring another offering of the monetary value of the highest-quality animal among them as the same type of offering that the sacrificial animal was. This <i>halakha</i> is not stated in the mishna in <i>Temura</i>.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty. The <i>halakha</i> of the mishna that items from which deriving benefit is prohibited render a mixture prohibited in any amount even to an ordinary person, as stated with regard to the sin offerings that were condemned to die and an ox that was sentenced to be stoned, is also taught in a mishna (<i>Avoda Zara</i> 74a): And these following items are themselves forbidden, and any amount of them renders other items with which they become mixed forbidden: Wine used for a libation that became mixed with kosher wine, and objects of idol worship that were intermingled with permitted items.
  
  Daf 72a
  
  The Gemara explains that both the mishna here and the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i> are necessary, as, if this <i>halakha</i> had been learned only from there, the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i>, I would say that this applies only if the prohibited animal is intermingled with a non-sacred animal and thereby becomes prohibited to an ordinary person. But if it is intermingled with offerings that are designated to the Most High so a loss to the Temple would ensue, one might say that we should not lose all the valid offerings, and therefore the prohibited animal should be nullified in a simple majority. Accordingly, the ruling of the mishna here was necessary, to teach that the same applies to a mixture involving offerings.
  The Gemara continues: And conversely, if this <i>halakha</i> were learned only from here I would say that this statement, that the entire mixture is prohibited, applies specifically to sacrificial animals, as it is repulsive to sacrifice to God an animal from a mixture that includes a prohibited animal. But with regard to deriving benefit from a non-sacred animal from this mixture, which is not a repulsive act, one might say: Let the items from which deriving benefit is prohibited be nullified in a majority. Therefore, the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i> is also necessary.
  The Gemara questions the ruling of the mishna: But let the prohibited animals be nullified in a majority, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning other matters, in which the minority items assume the status of the majority. And if you would say in response that animals are significant, as they are counted individually and therefore they are not nullified in a majority, this answer is unsatisfactory. The Gemara elaborates: This suggested answer works out well according to the one who says that we learned in the mishna discussing nullification in a majority (see <i>Orla</i> 3:6–7): Any item whose manner is also to be counted, i.e., that are sometimes sold by unit rather than weight or volume, is considered significant. This definition includes animals, as they are sometimes sold as individual animals, and therefore they would be considered significant.
  But according to the one who says that we learned in that mishna: An item whose manner is exclusively to be counted, i.e., one that is always sold by unit, is considered significant, what can be said? Although animals are often sold by unit, they are occasionally sold as part of a herd, and would therefore not be considered significant. The Gemara cites the mishna in which this dispute appears. As we learned (<i>Orla</i> 3:6–7): With regard to one who had bundles of fenugreek, a type of legume, that were diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit,
  
  Daf 72b
  
  those bundles must be burned. If the bundles were intermingled with others, and those others were intermingled with others, they all must be burned. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They can be nullified when the total is 201 items, i.e., one prohibited item intermingled with two hundred permitted ones.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir holds that they all must be burned, as Rabbi Meir would say: Any item whose manner is to be counted renders its mixture prohibited, as it is considered significant and cannot be nullified. And the Rabbis say: Only six items are sufficiently significant to render their mixture prohibited. Rabbi Akiva says: There are seven. And they are: Nuts with brittle shells, and pomegranates from Badan, and sealed barrels of wine, and beet greens, and cabbage stalks, and Greek gourd. Rabbi Akiva adds: Loaves of a homeowner are also in this category.
  The mishna continues: Different prohibitions apply to these items. That which is fit to be forbidden due to the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>], i.e., nuts, pomegranates, and sealed barrels of wine, prohibit their mixture as <i>orla</i>. That which is fit to be forbidden due to diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, i.e., beets, cabbage, and gourd, prohibit their mixture as diverse kinds in a vineyard.
  And it was stated that there is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the wording of Rabbi Meir’s opinion in this mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that we learned: Only an item whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nulli-fied, and it therefore renders its mixture prohibited according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that we learned: Any item whose manner is also to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified.
  The Gemara reiterates its question: This works out well according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, but according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, what can be said? According to his opinion, since animals are not sold exclusively by unit, they are not sufficiently significant. Therefore, a prohibited animal should be nullified in a simple majority. Rav Pappa says: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this <i>tanna</i>, who says that a prohibited animal cannot be nullified, is the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>halakha</i> concerning a <i>litra</i> of dried figs, who says:
  
  Daf 73a
  
  Any item that is counted, even if it is prohibited by rabbinic law, e.g., <i>teruma</i> of fruit, cannot be nullified, and all the more so items prohibited by Torah law, such as animals that are disqualified for the altar, as in the mishna.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 5:11): The <i>baraita</i> discusses three cases, all of which relate to the tithing of figs, which is an obligation by rabbinic law. The first is the case of a <i>litra</i> of untithed dried figs that were pressed in different vessels and shaped into circles, that one placed into a barrel containing tithed figs, and during the process of producing a circle he pressed the figs onto the opening of one of the circular vessels in which the circles are formed, and he does not know into which circular vessel he pressed it. The second is the case in which he recalls that he pressed it on the opening of a barrel containing tithed figs, but he does not know into which barrel he pressed it. The third case is that he recalls that he pressed it on the opening of a straw receptacle containing tithed figs, but he does not know into which receptacle he pressed it. In all of these cases, there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as to the details of a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.
  Rabbi Meir says that Rabbi Eliezer says: One views the upper layers of possibly untithed dried figs as though they are separate pieces, rather than one unit. And the lower ones, which were there beforehand and have certainly been tithed, nullify the upper ones, as there are enough circles of figs to nullify the upper layer. One does not need to tithe the figs at the top of any of the containers.
  Rabbi Meir continues: By contrast, Rabbi Yehoshua says: If there are one hundred openings of containers present there, the untithed <i>litra</i> of figs on the opening of one of the containers is nullified in a ratio of one part of untithed figs to one hundred parts of similar, tithed figs. But if not, all of the layers of figs at the openings of the containers are prohibited, i.e., viewed as untithed, as one of them certainly contains an untithed <i>litra</i> that has not been nullified. And the figs on the insides of the vessels are permitted, as the untithed figs certainly did not reach there. This is Rabbi Meir’s version of the dispute.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yehuda says that Rabbi Eliezer says: If there are one hundred openings of containers with tithed figs present there, in addition to the untithed figs, it is nullified in the one hundred. But if not, all of the layers of figs at the openings of the containers are prohibited, i.e., viewed as untithed, as one of them certainly contains an untithed <i>litra</i> that has not been nullified. And the figs on the insides of the vessels are permitted, as the untithed figs certainly did not reach there.
  Rabbi Yehuda continues his statement: By contrast, Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even if there are three hundred openings present there, the layer at the top of the container is not nullified. This <i>litra</i> cannot be nullified in any manner, as Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that even an item occasionally sold by unit, such as a circle of dried figs, can never be nullified.
  Rabbi Yehuda continues: But if one pressed the <i>litra</i> of dried figs into a circular vessel along with other dried figs, but does not know onto which place, i.e., which side, of the circular vessel he pressed it, whether, e.g., to its northern side or to its southern side, in this case, as the prohibited <i>litra</i> is not located in a defined place and it cannot be distinguished from the others, it is not considered an item of significance, and everyone agrees that it is nullified. Accordingly, the ruling of the mishna that animals that are disqualified from being sacrificed are not nullified is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua as stated by Rabbi Eliezer, that an item occasionally sold by unit is not nullified. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, that only an item whose manner is exclusively to be counted is significant and cannot be nullified, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  Rav Ashi says: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Meir, who maintains that an item that is not always counted is nullified in a majority. The reason is that living creatures are significant, and therefore they are not nullified.
  § The Gemara raises a difficulty with the ruling of the mishna that all of the animals are prohibited. And let us draw out and sacrifice one animal from the mixture, and say, i.e., apply the principle: Any item that separates from a group is assumed to have separated from the majority. Accordingly, the animal that was sacrificed is presumed to be fit. One can continue in this manner until only two animals from the mixture remain. The Gemara questions this suggestion: Should we draw out an animal from the mixture? But this is the removal of an item from its fixed place,
  
  Daf 73b
  
  and there is a principle that anything fixed is considered as though it was half and half, i.e., equally balanced, and it remains a case of uncertainty. The Gemara clarifies its suggestion: Rather, let us push the intermingled animals so that they all move from their places, which negates the fixed status of the prohibited item. And accordingly, let us say with regard to each animal: Any item that separates from a group is assumed to have separated from the majority.
  Rava says: Now that the Sages have said that we do not sacrifice any of them, this is evidently a rabbinic decree, lest ten priests come simultaneously and sacrifice all the animals in the mixture together, not one at a time. Therefore, the fact that there could be a method to permit the animals is immaterial.
  One of the Sages said to Rava: If that is so, do you hold that the large basin [<i>megisa</i>] on which the sacrificial portions of the animal are placed is prohibited? In other words, is it possible that these animals, which were slaughtered when they were initially declared permitted after being separated from their places, could later become prohibited again when their sacrificial portions are ready to be burned on the altar?
  Rava responded that he did not mean there is a concern that ten priests would sacrifice their sacrificial portions simultaneously. Rather, the decree is due to the concern lest when the animals move, ten priests will come simultaneously and take them from the mixture. As all or most of the animals were separated simultaneously in this case, it is assumed that the prohibited animal is among those that were separated. The Gemara asks: Is it possible for ten priests to take these scattered animals simultaneously? Rather, Rava says that one may not allow the animals to be sacrificed by moving them due to a decree that if this is allowed, one may, in another circumstance, allow them to be sacrificed even when they are taken from a fixed location.
  § Rava said: Now that the Sages say in the mishna that we do not sacrifice any of the animals, if we did sacrifice one of them, the offering does not effect acceptance for the owner. Rav Huna bar Yehuda raised an objection to Rava from a mishna (<i>Kinnim</i> 22b): With regard to a bird sin offering that was intermingled with a bird burnt offering, or a bird burnt offering that was intermingled with a bird sin offering, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, they all must die, as there is no remedy for these birds. It is not known which is which, and their sacrificial rites are performed differently.
  The mishna continues: In what case is this statement said? In the case of a priest who consulted the court to ask how he should proceed. But in the case of a priest who did not consult the court, but sacrificed them of his own accord, if there was an equal number of bird sin offerings and burnt offerings, and he performed all their sacrificial rites above the red line that circumscribes the altar at its midpoint, as required for a burnt offering, half of the birds are fit, as in any event the burnt offerings were sacrificed properly, and half are unfit.
  Likewise, if he performed all of their sacrificial rites below the red line, half are fit, as in any event the sin offerings were sacrificed properly, and half are unfit. If he performed the sacrificial rites of one of the birds below the red line and one of the birds above the red line, they are both unfit, as I say that the sin offering was sacrificed above the red line and the burnt offering was sacrificed below. This mishna proves that an offering that is prohibited to be sacrificed as part of a mixture is fit after the fact, which contradicts the statement of Rava.
  Rather, Rava would claim that this matter depends on a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. This statement of Rava is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that living creatures that become disqualified are permanently rejected from being sacrificed on the altar, and this animal was rejected when it was part of the mixture. That ruling of the mishna in <i>Kinnim</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that living creatures are not permanently rejected from the altar. Therefore, if the animal was sacrificed it is fit.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But there is the case of slaughtered offerings that are rejected from the altar, concerning which everyone agrees that these are rejected. Even those who say that living creatures generally are not rejected agree that, in this case, they should be rejected.
  
  Daf 74a
  
  And we learned in a mishna (77b) that in a case where sacrificial portions from unblemished burnt offerings became mixed with sacrificial portions from blemished burnt offerings, which are disqualified, Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them was sacrificed on the altar before they knew of the blemish, all the heads should be sacrificed, as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar. This indicates that even with regard to slaughtered animals, if they were rejected from the altar due to being in a mixture, they are not permanently rejected, but are fit after the fact.
  The Gemara explains that this mishna affords no proof, as Rabbi Eliezer states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who maintains that even slaughtered animals are not permanently rejected. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Ḥanan the Egyptian says, with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the one sacrificed to God and the scapegoat designated to be sent to Azazel: Even if the blood of the sacrificed goat is already in the cup where it was collected and the scapegoat dies, the sacrificed goat is still a fit offering, and the priest brings another goat and joins it to this slaughtered goat to serve as the scapegoat. By contrast, the other <i>tanna’im</i>, who maintain that slaughtered animals are rejected, hold that once they have become rejected due to being in a mixture they are no longer fit for sacrifice, as stated by Rava.
  § Concerning a similar case, Rav Naḥman says that Rava bar Avuh says that Rav says: With regard to a ring used in idol worship, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit and which is not nullified even in a ratio of one in one hundred, that was intermingled with one hundred permitted rings, and subsequently one of them fell into the Great Sea [<i>Yam HaGadol</i>], they are all permitted. The reason is that we say: That ring that fell into the Great Sea is the prohibited ring.
  Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the mishna: With regard to all the offerings that were intermingled with animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, they all must die. According to the opinion of Rav, that we say the one that was lost is the prohibited item, why must they all die? Let us say, with regard to the first animal that died, that the prohibited animal died, and the rest should be permitted.
  Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Rav states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer says: If the head of one of them is sacrificed on the altar before the priests knew of the blemish, all the heads should be sacrificed, as it is assumed that the head of the disqualified animal was the one already sacrificed on the altar.
  Rava asked Rav Naḥman: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the sacrifice of all the heads only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of them is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, in case the priest sacrifices the prohibited head by itself? How, then, can Rav Naḥman permit the rings without qualification? Rav Naḥman said to Rava: I too am saying that Rav permits the rings only if they are sold two at a time, in which case one of them is certainly not from idol worship.
  The Gemara discusses a similar case. Rav says: With regard to a ring used in idol worship that was intermingled with one hundred permitted rings, and then forty of them became separated to one place, and the other sixty became separated to another place, so that they are now two distinct groups of rings, if one ring from the group of forty became separated from them and then became intermingled with other rings, it does not render them prohibited. But if one ring from the other sixty became separated from its group and became mixed with other rings, it renders them prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: What is different concerning the case in which one ring from the group of forty separated, that it does not render the other rings prohibited? The reason is that we say: The prohibited ring is in the group that contains the majority of the rings, i.e., it is in the group of sixty. If so, in the case where one ring from the group of sixty became separated and became intermingled with the other rings, we should also say that the prohibited ring is still in the group that contains the majority of the rings, i.e., it is one of the fifty-nine remaining rings. Rather, Rav’s statement was as follows: If all forty became separated to one place, where they became intermingled with other rings, the forty rings do not render those other rings prohibited, as it is assumed that the prohibited ring is in the group of sixty. Conversely, if all of the sixty rings became separated to one place, where they became intermingled with other rings, the sixty rings render those other rings prohibited.
  Rav Yehuda, who said this statement citing Rav, added: When I said this ruling in the presence of Shmuel, that if the forty rings became intermingled with others they do not render them prohibited, he said to me: Disregard this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the case of idol worship, as this prohibition is so stringent that its uncertainty and its compound uncertainty are prohibited forever, i.e., no matter how many uncertainties are added they are all prohibited.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a <i>baraita</i>: An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited, but its compound uncertainty is permitted. How so? With regard to a cup used in idol worship that fell into a storeroom full of cups, they are all prohibited. If one of these cups separated from the rest and fell into a group of ten thousand other cups, and from that ten thousand cups a single cup fell into ten thousand other cups, they are permitted. This <i>baraita</i> teaches that only one uncertainty is prohibited, not a compound uncertainty.
  The Gemara explains: This is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 5:10) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Prohibited pomegranates from Badan, which are too significant to be nullified, prohibit a mixture in any amount. How so? If one of them fell into a group of ten thousand other pomegranates, and one of that group fell from that ten thousand into another ten thousand, they are all prohibited, despite the fact that this is a compound uncertainty.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If a prohibited pomegranate fell into a group of ten thousand pomegranates, they are all prohibited, as he concedes that these pomegranates are not nullified in a majority. But if one pomegranate from the ten thousand fell into a group of three pomegranates, and one of these three pomegranates fell into a different place, it is permitted, as this is a compound uncertainty.
  The Gemara inquires: In accordance with the opinion of which of these <i>tanna’im</i> does Shmuel state his opinion that an item used in idol worship remains prohibited no matter how many uncertainties are involved? If you say that he stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then even with regard to other prohibitions a compound uncertainty should be prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda stated his ruling with regard to a prohibited pomegranate, not an item of idol worship. And if Shmuel stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then even in the case of idol worship a compound uncertainty should be permitted, as Rabbi Shimon did not differentiate between different types of prohibitions.
  And if you would say that there is a difference according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon between idol worship and other prohibitions, and he prohibits compound uncertainties only in the case of idol worship, then if so, that which is taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited previously: An uncertainty of idol worship is prohibited but its compound uncertainty is permitted, whose opinion does this represent? It is neither the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda nor the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as he permits a compound uncertainty in all cases. And Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one matter, that a compound uncertainty is prohibited in the case of idol worship, and disagrees with him with regard to one matter, as Shmuel does not apply this stringency to other prohibitions.
  § The Gemara continues its analysis. The Master, Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda citing Rabbi Shimon, says above: If one pomegranate from the ten thousand fell into a group of three pomegranates, and one of these three pomegranates fell into a different place, the mixture is permitted.
  
  Daf 74b
  
  The Gemara asks: What is different about a case where the pomegranate fell into a group of three other pomegranates? The essential factor is that there is a majority of permitted pomegranates, which nullify the pomegranate that fell from the ten thousand. Even if it fell into a group of two others, there is a majority of permitted items. Why must it fall into a group of three? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of three that the <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> teaches? It means that there were two permitted pomegranates initially, and the pomegranate of uncertain status fell into them, for a total of three.
  The Gemara returns to the question concerning the opinion of which <i>tanna</i> is followed by Shmuel, who is stringent with regard to a compound uncertainty involving idol worship. And if you wish, say instead that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as he is similarly stringent with regard to mixtures of items of idol worship, as explained in tractate <i>Avoda Zara</i> (49b).
  § The Gemara discusses a related topic. Reish Lakish says: In the case of a barrel of <i>teruma</i> produce, which may be eaten only by a priest and his household, that was intermingled with one hundred barrels of non-sacred produce, they are all considered as <i>teruma</i>, as a sealed barrel is significant and is not nullified. And if one of these barrels fell into the Dead Sea, all the barrels are permitted, as we say: Since there is that barrel that fell, the assumption is that it is the prohibited barrel that fell.
  The Gemara comments: And it was necessary for the Gemara to record the ruling of Rav Naḥman with regard to rings used in idol worship, and it was also necessary for the Gemara to record the ruling of Reish Lakish with regard to barrels of <i>teruma</i>, despite the similarity between the two cases. The Gemara elaborates: As, if the <i>halakha</i> were taught only from the ruling of Rav Naḥman, I would say that this matter applies only with regard to a mixture involving an item of idol worship, which has no permitting factors; such items themselves cannot be permitted in any other manner. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> is to be lenient, i.e., to assume that the prohibited ring fell into the sea. But in the case of <i>teruma</i>, which has permitting factors, as the mixture can be sold in its entirety to priests, perhaps the mixture should not be permitted because one of them fell into the sea.
  And conversely, if the <i>halakha</i> was taught only from the ruling of Reish Lakish, I would say that the <i>halakha</i> is lenient only in the case of a barrel of <i>teruma</i>, as its falling is noticeable, and everyone will know that the other barrels were permitted due to the one that fell. Accordingly, they will not come to permit barrels in a similar case where no barrel became separated from the mixture. But with regard to a ring, whose falling is not noticeable, perhaps the rest of the rings should not be permitted. Therefore, both statements are necessary.
  Rabba says: Reish Lakish deemed the rest of the items permitted only in the case of a barrel, as its falling is noticeable. But in the case of a fig that fell from a group of figs that contained a fig of <i>teruma</i>, Reish Lakish does not deem the rest of the figs permitted, as the one that fell is too small for its fall to be discernible. And Rav Yosef says: Reish Lakish deemed the rest of the items permitted even with regard to a fig. The reason is that just as the initial falling of one fig rendered the entire mixture prohibited, so too, the emerging of one fig from the pile permits the rest.
  Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to a barrel of <i>teruma</i> wine that fell among one hundred barrels of non-sacred wine, it cannot be nullified in its current state, as sealed barrels are significant and are therefore not nullified. How should one proceed? He should open one of them, so that it is no longer an item of significance, and take from it as much as ought to be taken from a normal mixture of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred produce, i.e., one-hundredth. He should give that to a priest, and then he may drink the rest of the wine.
  Rav Dimi sat and said this <i>halakha</i>, and Rav Naḥman said to him: I see a ruling of: Swallow and drink here, i.e., this formulation indicates that one may act in this manner <i>ab initio</i>, which is puzzling. Rather, say: If one of the barrels was opened, after the fact one may take from it as much as ought to be taken from a normal mixture of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred produce. He should give that to a priest, and then he may drink the rest of the wine.
  With regard to the same issue, Rabbi Oshaya says: In the case of a barrel of <i>teruma</i> wine that was intermingled with 150 barrels of non-sacred wine, and one hundred of them opened, one may take from it as much as ought to be taken from a normal mixture of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred produce. He should give that to a priest, and then he may drink the rest of the wine. And as for the rest of the fifty barrels, they remain prohibited, i.e., they have <i>teruma</i> status, until they are opened and the ratio of <i>teruma</i> is separated from them. This is because we do not say that the prohibited barrel is in the group that contains the majority of barrels and the one he opens is likely permitted.
  § The mishna listed various categories of prohibited animals: An animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, an animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped as a deity, an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal that is a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to all of the other examples in this list, the prohibited animal is not known. In other words, it is physically indistinguishable from the other animals. But with regard to this <i>tereifa</i> animal, what are the circumstances? If, due to its physical impairment, it is known to him which animal it is, let him come and take it from there, and all the other animals will be permitted. If it is not known to him, how does he know that a <i>tereifa</i> animal was intermingled with others in the first place?
  They say in the school of Rabbi Yannai: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where an animal that was pierced by a thorn, which does not render it a <i>tereifa</i>, was intermingled with an animal that was clawed by a wolf, which renders it a <i>tereifa</i>. Since the skin of both animals has been pierced, one cannot identify the <i>tereifa</i>.
  Reish Lakish says there is a different answer: The mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal was intermingled with a fallen animal, i.e., one that has fallen from a great height. A fallen animal is prohibited in case it is a <i>tereifa</i>, despite the fact that it bears no external sign of injury. The Gemara raises a difficulty: With regard to a fallen animal as well, let us examine it and see if it can walk by itself, in which case it is not a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Reish Lakish, even after an examination of this kind it is still a possible <i>tereifa</i>, which is prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, as he holds that if an animal fell and stood up again, it requires a twenty-four-hour waiting period to determine if it is in fact injured. Furthermore, even if it both stood up and walked after the fall, it requires inspection after slaughter to determine whether it was injured by the fall and rendered a <i>tereifa</i>.
  Rabbi Yirmeya says there is a third answer: The mishna is referring to a case where a healthy animal was intermingled with the offspring of a <i>tereifa</i>, which of course bears no sign of a <i>tereifa</i>. And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: The offspring of a <i>tereifa</i> may not be sacrificed upon the altar.
  The Gemara explains why each of these Sages suggests a different interpretation of the mishna: All of them, i.e., Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yirmeya, do not say that the explanation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yannai that an animal pierced by a thorn became mixed up with one clawed by a wolf, as they maintain that the difference between an animal pierced by a thorn and one that was clawed by a wolf is known, as this perforation caused by a wolf is elongated, and that perforation caused by a thorn is round.
  The Gemara continues: Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yirmeya do not say that the explanation of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Reish Lakish, that the mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal became intermingled with one that has fallen, as they hold that if a fallen animal stood, it does not require a twenty-four-hour waiting period, and if it walked it does not require any further inspection after slaughter at all. Consequently, one can simply examine the animals to see if they can walk, and if they can, they are fit.
  Finally, Rabbi Yannai and Reish Lakish do not say that the explana-tion of the mishna is in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yirmeya, that the mishna is discussing a case where a healthy animal became intermingled with the offspring of a <i>tereifa</i>, as they do not want to interpret the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer because the <i>halakha</i> does not follow his ruling.
  § The mishna teaches: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with other sacrificial animals, if it was an animal of one type of offering with animals of the same type of offering, one should sacrifice this animal for the sake of whoever is its owner and one should sacrifice that animal for the sake of whoever is its owner, and both owners fulfill their obligations. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But each animal requires placing hands on its head, a rite that must be performed by its owner, and in this case the owner is unknown.
  Rav Yosef says: The <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is stated with regard to an offering of women, who do not perform the placing of hands. The Gemara is puzzled by this suggestion: But this indicates that with regard to an offering of men, the <i>halakha</i> stated in the mishna is not applicable, and therefore there is no way of rectifying a mixture of consecrated animals of the same type of offering.
  
  Daf 75a
  
  Abaye raised an objection to this from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 8:22): With regard to the offering of an individual that was intermingled with another offering of an individual, and likewise a communal offering that was intermingled with another communal offering, or the offering of an individual and a communal offering that were intermingled with each other, the priest places four placements of blood from each and every one of them on the altar, and in this manner fulfills the obligation of the blood rites of all the offerings. But if he placed one placement from each one, he has fulfilled his obligation. And likewise, if he placed four placements from all of them together, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: In what case is this statement, that he places from the blood of each of the offerings <i>ab initio</i>, said? In a case where the offerings were intermingled when they were still alive, before they were sacrificed, and therefore the priest could perform four placements from the blood of each animal separately. But if slaughtered animals were then intermingled, i.e., their blood became mixed together in one container, the priest places four placements from all of them together, only one set of four.
  And in any case, if he placed one placement from all of them, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the blood of all these offerings is placed on the outer altar, and with regard to all of them one fulfills the obligation after the fact with a single placement. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One assesses the blood of the placement given from each animal; if there is enough in that blood for a placement of blood for this offering and enough for that one, it is fit, but if not, the offering is disqualified.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: This <i>baraita</i> indicates that if live offerings became intermingled, each is sacrificed for its owner, despite the fact that these offerings are owned by men and therefore require placing of the hands. It is evident that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to offerings of men, as it teaches the case of the offering of an individual adjacent to, and therefore similar to, the case of a communal offering: Just as a communal offering is sacrificed by men, so too, the offering of an individual that is being discussed here also belongs to men. This presents a difficulty to the explanation of Rav Yosef.
  Rava says: And can you understand the <i>baraita</i> in this manner? Is this <i>baraita</i> accurate as it stands? There is another difficulty with the <i>baraita</i>, as it teaches: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where these offerings were intermingled when they were still alive. But if slaughtered animals were intermingled it is not said. This is problematic, as what difference is it to me whether the animals are alive or whether they are slaughtered? This is not the decisive factor, as even if the animals were slaughtered, if the blood of each is in a separate vessel the priest should perform separate placements from the blood of each.
  Rava continues: Rather, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where these offerings were intermingled after they were slaughtered, but they were similar to living animals, i.e., the blood of each animal was in separate cups. But in a situation where the blood of these animals was mixed together in a single cup, the priest places four placements of blood from all of them. And if he placed one placement from all of them, he has fulfilled his obligation. If so, this <i>baraita</i> has no bearing on the issue of offerings that became intermingled while they were still alive, as it deals exclusively with the blood of animals that have been slaughtered.
  § The <i>baraita</i> cited teaches that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One assesses the blood of the placement given from each animal; if there is enough in that blood for a placement of blood for this offering and enough for that offering, it is fit, but if not, the offerings are disqualified. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold in accordance with this line of reasoning, that there must be a minimum amount of blood placed from each offering? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Para</i> 9:5) with regard to the water of purification into which water that is invalid for sprinkling fell that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer,
  
  Daf 75b
  
  a sprinkling of any amount of the water of purification on someone rendered impure by impurity imparted by a corpse purifies him from his ritual impurity, as sprinkling does not require a minimum measure to purify him. Likewise, a sprinkling of water that is half fit and half unfit for sprinkling serves to purify the individual. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that no minimum amount is required for the sprinkling of the water of purification, and the same should apply to the sprinkling of blood on the altar.
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, but he himself does not agree with this opinion. And if you wish, say instead that sprinkling of water of purification is discrete and placement of blood on the altar is discrete, i.e., these are two separate <i>halakhot</i> that have no bearing on each other.
  § The mishna teaches: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. This means that one may not sell them in the marketplace nor sell their meat by weight, so as not to degrade consecrated animals. Rami bar Ḥama says: With regard to a firstborn offering, according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, who hold (<i>Bekhorot</i> 33a) that even after a firstborn offering develops a blemish the priest may not eat it in a state of ritual impurity, and therefore one may not feed it to menstruating women, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to its substitute? That is, if the owner of a firstborn animal stated with regard to a non-sacred animal in his possession: This animal is a substitute for the firstborn offering, is a menstruating woman permitted to eat that substitute after it develops a blemish?
  Rami bar Ḥama further asks: A firstborn offering itself may not be redeemed, even after it develops a blemish, but what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to redeeming its substitute? He likewise inquired: A firstborn offering itself, even after it develops a blemish, may not be weighed and sold by the <i>litra</i>, in the manner that non-sacred meat is sold. What is the <i>halakha</i> of its substitute in this regard? Rava says that an answer to these questions is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a firstborn offering or an animal tithe offering, from when they develop a blemish they can be used to render another animal a substitute, and their substitute has the same status as them. Their substitutes have the same <i>halakhot</i> as they do.
  Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If the priest who received a firstborn offering dedicated the firstborn offering to the Temple maintenance, i.e., he vowed to give the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the matter that he may weigh its meat by the <i>litra</i>? The Gemara explains the dilemma: In this case, is consideration of the profit of the Temple treasury preferable, or perhaps avoidance of the demeaning of the firstborn offering is preferable. If the profit of the Temple treasury is preferable, the firstborn offering should be weighed in the normal manner so as to increase its price; a buyer will pay more for meat he is able to resell it afterward by exact weight. If avoidance of demeaning the firstborn offering is preferable, it should not be weighed by the <i>litra</i>, even though a loss to the Temple would result.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Zevida says: Come and hear a proof from the ruling of the mishna: In a case where sacrificial animals were intermingled with a firstborn offering or with an animal tithe offering, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and they shall both be eaten as a firstborn offering or as an animal tithe offering. Is this not meaning to say that the sacrificial animal that became intermingled with a firstborn offering is also not weighed by the <i>litra</i>, despite the fact that this causes a slight loss to the Temple?
  Rav Huna and Rabbi Ḥizkiyya, the students of Rabbi Yirmeya, say: Are these cases comparable? There, the mishna is referring to two separate sanctities, the sanctity of a firstborn offering and that of another offering, and two separate bodies, i.e., two different animals, and in such a case one may not degrade the sanctity of the firstborn due to the other animal with which it is intermingled. Conversely, here, with regard to one who vows to give the value of a firstborn to the Temple, there are two sanctities, a firstborn offering and the Temple maintenance, but they are both found in one body. In this case, as the sanctity of the Temple maintenance itself is in the firstborn offering, it may be weighed by the <i>litra</i>, because of the profit the Temple will gain.
  Rav Yosei bar Avin objects to this: What would be the <i>halakha</i> if one says: Redeem for me, i.e., I wish to redeem, a firstborn offering that he had previously dedicated as the object of his vow to the Temple maintenance? Does the court listen to him? His request is certainly not granted, as by Torah law a firstborn offering may not be redeemed. Similarly, the fact that he dedicated the value of the firstborn offering to the Temple should not negate the prohibition of weighing it by the <i>litra</i>. The Gemara questions this comparison: One cannot raise a difficulty from a case where someone says: Redeem the firstborn offering for me, as the Merciful One states with regard to a firstborn offering: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred” (Numbers 18:17). But the weighing of the offering by the <i>litra</i> is not prohibited by Torah law.
  Rather, the Gemara suggests a different resolution of Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma: Rabbi Ami says: Can this priest transfer to the Temple maintenance anything other than that which was transferred to him? In other words, just as the priest who took the vow may not weigh the firstborn by the <i>litra</i> and gain a profit, the same applies to the Temple treasury, the recipient of his vow.
  § The mishna teaches: All offerings can become indistinguishably intermingled with each other, except for a sin offering and a guilt offering. The Gemara asks: What is different about a sin offering and a guilt offering, that they cannot become intermingled? Is the reason that this, a guilt offering, is always a male, and that, a sin offering, is always a female?
  The Gemara questions this explanation: A sin offering and a burnt offering are also like this, as a sin offering is always female while a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara answers that although the standard sin offering is always female, there is the goat of the <i>Nasi</i>, which is a male sin offering, and therefore it can become intermingled with a male goat burnt offering. And as to the statement of the mishna that a sin offering cannot become intermingled with a guilt offering despite the male sin offering of the <i>Nasi</i>, that is because this goat has straight hair and that guilt offering comes only from sheep or rams, which have wool, and the wool is curly.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: A Paschal offering and a guilt offering also cannot become intermingled, as this Paschal offering is in its first year, and that guilt offering is in its second year. The Gemara answers that there is the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, which must be in their first year. And if you wish, say instead that an animal in its first year can become intermingled with an animal in its second year, as there is an animal in its first year that looks like an animal in its second year, and likewise there is an animal in its second year that looks like an animal in its first year.
  MISHNA: In the case of a guilt offering that was intermingled with a peace offering, Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them should be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north while a peace offering may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard. And they both must be eaten in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of the more stringent of them, i.e., the guilt offering, with the following <i>halakhot</i>: They may be eaten only in the courtyard rather than throughout Jerusalem; by male priests and not by any ritually pure Jew; and on the day they were sacrificed and the following night, and not on the day they were sacrificed, the following day, and the intervening night.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: One may not limit the time of the consumption of an offering, as one may not bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness. According to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, the peace offering becomes leftover, <i>notar</i>, the morning after it is sacrificed, and not at the end of that day, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning peace offerings. Rather, the owner shall wait until these animals become blemished, redeem them, and bring an offering of each type that is worth the monetary value of the higher-quality animal among them.
  The mishna adds: Even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if pieces of the meat of one offering were intermingled with pieces of the meat of another offering, e.g., meat from offerings of the most sacred order with meat from offerings of lesser sanctity; or if pieces of meat from offerings eaten for one day and the following night were intermingled with pieces of meat from offerings eaten for two days and one night, since in that case the remedy with regard to offerings that were intermingled cannot be implemented, they both must be eaten in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of the more stringent of them.
  GEMARA: In connection to the principle cited by the Rabbis in the mishna that one may not bring consecrated animals to the status of unfitness, a <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Shevi’it</i> 6:29) before Rav: With regard to produce of the Sabbatical Year, one may not purchase produce of <i>teruma</i> from a previous year with its money, i.e., money received in its sale, because one thereby reduces the time of eating the <i>teruma</i>. The produce of the Sabbatical Year may be eaten only until the time of the removal of that type of produce from the field, whereas <i>teruma</i> may be consumed at any time.
  The Sages said this <i>baraita</i> before Rabba, and they explained that this <i>baraita</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna. Their reasoning was that if you would say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say, as can be inferred from the mishna, that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness? Similarly, one can limit the time allowed for the consumption of the Sabbatical Year produce.
  Rabba said to them: You may even say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. That statement, that one may bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, applies only in a case that is after the fact, as in the mishna, where offerings became intermingled. Rabbi Shimon did not permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon not permit one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness <i>ab initio</i>? Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna that discusses the manner of eating the meat of offerings (Zevachim 90b):
  
  Daf 76a
  
  And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted to eat them roasted, boiled, or cooked, and they are likewise permitted to place non-sacred spices or <i>teruma</i> spices in the cooking pot. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. This indicates that it is permitted to spice offerings with <i>teruma</i> spices <i>ab initio</i>, despite the fact that this reduces the time available to eat the <i>teruma</i>. Rabba said to Abaye: Set aside the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> of spices, as this <i>teruma</i> applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rabba from a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 3:2): One may not purchase <i>teruma</i> with second tithe money, because he thereby limits the circumstances for the eating of the <i>teruma</i>. <i>Teruma</i> may be eaten in any place and even by an acute mourner, i.e., one whose relative died that same day and has not yet been buried, whereas second tithe and food purchased with second tithe money must be eaten in Jerusalem and is prohibited to an acute mourner. And Rabbi Shimon permits one to purchase <i>teruma</i> with second tithe money. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon allows one to bring <i>teruma</i> to the status of unfitness. Rabba was silent in response to his statement, and did not answer Abaye.
  When Abaye came before Rav Yosef and told him of his discussion with Rabba, Rav Yosef said to him: Why didn’t you raise an objection to Rabba from this mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 8:7): One may not cook vegetables of the Sabbatical Year in <i>teruma</i> oil, so that one does not bring consecrated food, <i>teruma</i>, to the status of unfitness, as the <i>teruma</i> oil would have to be eaten before the time of the removal of the Sabbatical Year produce; and Rabbi Shimon permits one to cook in this manner. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon allows one to bring <i>teruma</i> to the status of unfitness <i>ab initio</i>.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And didn’t I raise an objection to Rabba from that mishna discussing the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> spices, and he said to me: Disregard the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> of spices, as this <i>teruma</i> applies by rabbinic law. Here too, with regard to vegetables of the Sabbatical Year, he could likewise say that this <i>teruma</i> oil is not olive oil, but oil that is <i>teruma</i> of vegetables, which applies by rabbinic law. Rav Yosef replied: If so, that this mishna is referring to vegetable oil of <i>teruma</i>, it should teach the opposite case, that one may not cook vegetables of <i>teruma</i> in oil of the Sabbatical Year. Since the <i>tanna</i> specifies <i>teruma</i> oil, he must certainly be speaking of <i>teruma</i> by Torah law, i.e., olive oil.
  Abaye then said to Rav Yosef: And didn’t I raise an objection to Rabba from the mishna, in which Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness, and Rabba said to me that Rabbi Shimon’s ruling applies only after the fact, when the guilt offering and peace offering have become intermingled? Here too, he would say that this ruling is after the fact, that when the <i>teruma</i> oil and the vegetables of the Sabbatical Year have become intermingled one may then cook them together, but he does not permit one to cook them together <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If this <i>halakha</i> is referring to a case where the foods have already become intermingled, what is the reason of the Rabbis for prohibiting one to cook them together? The Gemara answers: This is just as it is in the case of the mishna with regard to a guilt offering and a peace offering that became intermingled, that even after the offerings are intermingled, one may not bring the flesh of the peace offering to the status of unfitness.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Are these two cases comparable? There, with regard to the offerings, the situation has a remedy by having the offerings graze until they develop a blemish, at which point the owner brings each offering of each type with the monetary value of the higher-quality animal. By contrast, in this case of <i>teruma</i> oil mixed with vegetables of the Sabbatical Year, the situation has no remedy similar to that of having the offerings graze, and therefore if the Rabbis prohibited the mixture the <i>teruma</i> would go to waste.
  If one wishes to compare this case of oil and vegetables to an intermingling of sacrificial animals, this is comparable only to the other <i>halakha</i> of the mishna, which addresses a piece of the flesh of an offering of the most sacred order that was intermingled with pieces of the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity. Here the Rabbis concede that since there is no remedy for the intermingled pieces, the <i>halakha</i> is that they both must be eaten in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of the more stringent among them, but they are not prohibited.
  Ravina objects to this comparison: Are these cases comparable? In the case of the piece of sacrificial flesh that is intermingled with the other pieces, it has no remedy at all, whereas this case of <i>teruma</i> oil has a remedy through squeezing the oil from the vegetables. If so, this case of vegetables is in fact comparable to that of an intermingling of a guilt offering and peace offering, which also have a means of remedy, and for this reason the Rabbis prohibited the mixture.
  The Gemara asks: And how would Rav Yosef respond to the claim that the Rabbis prohibit this mixture after the fact because there is a remedy available through squeezing it? The Gemara explains that Rav Yosef would respond that squeezing is not in fact a remedy, as how can one squeeze it? If one squeezes the vegetables a lot, he thereby causes a loss of Sabbatical Year produce; if one squeezes the vegetables a little, ultimately the <i>teruma</i> oil and vegetables of the Sabbatical Year will still be intermingled, as this squeezing will be ineffective. If so, Rav Yosef’s contention that in this case the Rabbis would not have prohibited cooking vegetables of the Sabbatical Year in <i>teruma</i> oil remains valid. Consequently, this must be referring to a case where the vegetables and oil have not yet become mixed, which means that this case does prove that Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness <i>ab initio</i>, not only after the fact, as claimed by Rabba.
  Rav Yosef raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nazir</i> 6:1): How should one whose status as a confirmed leper has not been determined bring his guilt offering and <i>log</i> of oil on the eighth day of his purification? Rabbi Shimon says: On the following day, after his seven days of purification, he brings his guilt offering and his <i>log</i> of oil with it, and says the following stipulation: If this offering is one of a leper, i.e., if I am a confirmed leper, this is his, i.e., my, guilt offering and that is his <i>log</i> of oil.
  
  Daf 76b
  
  And if he is not a leper, this animal that is brought for a guilt offering shall be a voluntary peace offering, because their sacrificial rites are equivalent. And that uncertain guilt offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard as a guilt offering, and placement of the blood on the right thumb and big toe and right ear of the leper, as described in Leviticus 14:14, and it requires placing hands on the head of the animal, and the accompanying wine libations and waving of the breast and thigh like a peace offering.
  And lastly, it is eaten by males of the priesthood on the day it is sacrificed and the following night, in the Temple courtyard, like a guilt offering, not for two days and one night in the manner of a peace offering. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon permits one to bring sacrificial animals to the status of unfitness even <i>ab initio</i>, not only when the animals became intermingled. The Gemara answers that the remedy of a man is different from the case discussed by Rabba. Since this person has no way of purifying himself from his leprosy other than by bringing the offering, the concern of reducing the time available for its consumption is disregarded.
  The Gemara asks a question with regard to the resolution suggested by Rabbi Shimon of bringing the offerings and stating a stipulation. This works out well with regard to the guilt offering, but with regard to the <i>log</i> of oil what can be said? A <i>log</i> of oil does not accompany a peace offering. The Gemara explains that the individual bringing the offering says: If I am not a leper, then this <i>log</i> shall be a gift to the Temple, as one can dedicate oil to the Temple. The Gemara questions this resolution: But perhaps he is not in fact a leper, and if so, it is required that a priest remove a handful of the donated oil and sacrifice a handful of it on the altar before the rest of the oil may be consumed by the priests, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to oil brought as an offering. The Gemara explains that this is referring to a case where the priest already removed a handful.
  The Gemara further questions: But perhaps he is in fact a leper, and he requires the placement of seven sprinklings of oil before the Lord (see Leviticus 14:15–16). The Gemara answers that the priest does place these sprinklings.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the priest sprinkle the oil? But it is lacking, as a handful has been removed from the oil, and one sprinkles only from a whole <i>log</i>. The Gemara explains that after the handful is removed the priest brings a little more oil to the container and fills it up to a <i>log</i>. This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 14:10): In a case where the <i>log</i> lacked a full measure, then if it became lacking before the priest poured from it into his palm in order to place it on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, he shall fill it.
  The Gemara poses yet another question: But if he is not a leper, and that <i>log</i> of oil is a gift, that handful removed from the oil requires burning on the altar for the remainder of the oil to be permitted to the priests. The Gemara explains that the priest does in fact burn the handful.
  The Gemara asks: When does the priest burn the handful? If he does so after the placement of seven sprinklings for the leper’s purification, in such a case the <i>log</i> will be lacking due to the sprinklings. That which remains is akin to the remainder of a meal offering that was lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning, and one may not burn the handful for that remainder. Similar to a gift of oil, in a meal offering a handful is removed from the offering and then sacrificed on the altar. If after the handful is removed but before it is sacrificed some of the remainder of the meal offering is separated, the handful may not be sacrificed. The same should apply if some of the oil was sprinkled after the handful was removed.
  If, alternatively, the priest burns the handful before the placement of seven sprinklings, once he has burned the handful he may no longer perform the sprinklings, in accordance with the principle: Whatever is partly burned in the fire on the altar is subject to the prohibition of: You may not make as an offering (see Leviticus 2:11). This principle states that if part of an item, such as the blood of an animal offering or the handful of a meal offering, has been sacrificed, one who sacrifices any other part of it that is not designated for sacrifice has violated a prohibition. The sprinkling of the oil is equivalent to sacrifice in this regard.
  Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, says that the priest does not sprinkle the oil as a definite rite but stipulates that if the man is not a leper he is sprinkling it in a manner analogous to other items that one burns for the sake of wood, i.e., as fuel for the altar and not as a sacrificial rite. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: The verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke from it as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord; but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar” (Leviticus 2:11–12). This verse indicates that you may not offer up leaven and honey as a pleasing aroma, an offering. But you may offer up leaven and honey and other substances
  
  Daf 77a
  
  for the sake of wood, not as an offering. Here as well, the priest stipulates that if the man is not a confirmed leper, the sprinkling of the oil should not be viewed as a rite.
  The Gemara questions further: But even if the priest removes a handful from the oil and burns it, and also sprinkles from the oil, there is the matter of the remainder of the oil, which must be filled after the removal of the handful so that the priest can perform the sprinkling with a full <i>log</i>, and there is therefore that bit of oil that was added from which the priest did not remove the handful initially. If the one bringing the offering is not a leper, and the <i>log</i> of oil is a gift, it will turn out that there is a small portion of the oil that was not permitted by the removal of the handful. The Gemara explains that the priest redeems it, i.e., after the sprinklings of the oil have been performed, he stipulates that if the person who brought the offering is not a leper then the oil should be desacralized by his giving its value to the Temple treasury.
  The Gemara asks: If you say that he redeems it, where does he redeem it? If he redeems it when the oil is within the walls of the Temple, he would thereby be bringing non-sacred oil into the courtyard. If he redeems the oil outside the courtyard, before he can redeem the oil it would become disqualified due to the prohibition of a consecrated item leaving the courtyard. The Gemara answers: Actually, he redeems the oil when it is within the walls of the Temple. This is permitted because the non-sacred oil is then found in the Temple courtyard by itself, i.e., he did not bring a non-sacred item into the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara asks a question with regard to the suggested resolution, according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that one whose status as a leper is uncertain should bring a <i>log</i> of oil as a gift offering and state a stipulation. But doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say that one may not donate oil as a gift? The Gemara answers, as on 76b: The remedy of a person is different, i.e., Rabbi Shimon concedes that one may donate oil in this instance, as this is the only manner by which this person can undergo ritual purification.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. It was stated above that according to Rabbi Shimon, one whose status as a leper is uncertain may bring a lamb as a gift for a peace offering and state a stipulation with regard to it. The Gemara relates that Rav Reḥumi was sitting before Ravina, and he was sitting and saying the following in the name of Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa: But why can’t he bring a lamb for a guilt offering and say that if he is not a leper then this guilt offering shall be a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering? This guilt offering is eaten for one day and night, like the guilt offering of a leper, and therefore he would not be reducing the time for its consumption, unlike when he stipulates that it should be a peace offering.
  Rav Reḥumi continued: Since this option was not suggested, one can learn from here that who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that one may donate a provisional guilt offering (<i>Keritut</i> 25a)? It is Rabbi Shimon, who says, by inference from his suggestion here, that one may not donate a provisional guilt offering. Ravina said to Rav Reḥumi: Torah, Torah! That is, where is the Torah of such a great man as yourself? You are confusing lambs with rams. The guilt offering of a leper is a lamb in its first year (see Leviticus 14:10), which cannot be brought as a provisional guilt offering because these must be rams (see Leviticus 5:15), i.e., they must be in their second year.
  MISHNA: In the case of the limbs of a sin offering, which are eaten by priests and may not be burned on the altar, that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering, which are burned on the altar, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall place all the limbs above, on the altar, and I view the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering above on the altar as though they are pieces of wood burned on the altar, and not as though they are an offering. And the Rabbis say: One should wait until the form of all the intermingled limbs decays and they will all go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard, where all disqualified offerings of the most sacred order are burned.
  GEMARA: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer for deeming it permitted to burn the limbs of the sin offering on the altar as wood? The Gemara explains: The verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord; but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar” (Leviticus 2:11–12). This indicates that you may not offer up leaven and honey as a pleasing aroma, i.e., as an offering. But you may offer up leaven and honey and other substances that are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, such as the limbs of a sin offering, for the sake of wood.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, how do they respond to this reasoning? They claim that the Merciful One excludes other cases at the beginning of the verse: “As an offering of first fruits you may bring them.” This indicates that it is with regard to them, i.e., leaven and honey alone, that it is stated: You may not offer up as an offering, but you may offer up leaven and honey for the sake of wood. But with regard to any other substances that are prohibited to be brought on the altar, one may not offer them up to the altar at all.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, what does he derive from this term of exclusion “them”? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer expounds this word as follows: It is only with regard to them, leaven and honey, that the verse includes a prohibition against bringing them up to the ramp of the altar like offering them up on the altar itself. But with regard to any other substances that are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, bringing them up to the ramp is not considered like offering them up on the altar itself.
  The Gemara further asks: And the Rabbis, from where do they derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers that the Rabbis learn two <i>halakhot</i> from the word “them.” This term of emphasis teaches that all that is stated in this verse is referring only to leaven and honey, both the <i>halakha</i> that it is permitted to offer them up on the altar as wood, and the ruling that the ramp is considered like the altar with regard to this <i>halakha</i>.
  § The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this following <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 8:15) that Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to the limbs of a sin offering that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering, as all agree that they shall be sacrificed. Likewise, they agree that if limbs that are fit to be burned on the altar became intermingled with the limbs of an animal that actively copulated with a person, or with the limbs of an animal that was the object of bestiality, which are prohibited to be sacrificed upon the altar, that they shall not be sacrificed, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rabbi Yehuda continues: With regard to which case did Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree? They disagreed with regard to the limbs of an unblemished burnt offering that were intermingled with the limbs of a blemished animal, which is disqualified from the altar. As in this case Rabbi Eliezer says: All the limbs shall be sacrificed, and I consider the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering above, on the altar, as though they are pieces of wood burned on the altar. And the Rabbis say: They shall not be sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: And concerning the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, what is different about the limbs of an animal that actively copulated with a person, or the limbs of an animal that was the object of bestiality, that they may not be sacrificed? If one says that the reason is that they are not fit for the altar, that cannot be the reason, as a blemished animal is not fit for the altar as well, and there he holds that the limbs are burned.
  
  Daf 77b
  
  Rav Huna says: When Rabbi Eliezer makes reference to a blemished animal, he is speaking of an unobtrusive blemish, e.g., one that is on the cornea of the eye. And his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that in the case of an offering with such a blemish, if its sacrificial parts ascended the altar, they shall not descend from it, because it is not a disgrace to the altar for the sacrificial parts of such an offering to be burned on it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say that Rabbi Akiva says this is the <i>halakha</i> after the fact, meaning that if the priest already brought up the limbs of these blemished animals, they do not descend from the altar. Does Rabbi Akiva say that one may burn a mixture of these limbs <i>ab initio</i>?
  Rav Pappa says: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where all the limbs in the mixture were brought up upon the ramp. Since they have been brought on the ramp and sanctified as offerings, it is considered after the fact. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, i.e., if we are dealing with a case in which the limbs were already carried to the ramp, then even if they were as is, and not intermingled, the limbs of the blemished animal should be burned, as claimed by Rabbi Akiva.
  Rather, the reason of Rabbi Eliezer is that with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing a blemished animal upon the altar, the Merciful One excludes certain cases. After listing the various disqualifying blemishes, the verse states: “Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall you offer the bread of your God of any of these, because their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them; they shall not be accepted for you” (Leviticus 22:25). This teaches that it is only if there is a blemish clearly in them that they shall not be accepted; but if they were sacrificed by means of a mixture they shall be accepted. This exclusion is stated only with regard to blemished animals, not with regard to animals that copulated with people, and consequently the limbs of these animals are not brought up to the altar even if they became intermingled with the limbs of fit offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, how do they expound this verse? The Gemara explains that they expound it as follows: It is only if the blemish is still in them that they shall not be accepted; but if their blemish has passed, they shall be accepted. And Rabbi Eliezer derives this <i>halakha</i> from the previous clause in that same verse: “Because their corruption is in them [<i>bahem</i>].” Since the verse could have stated the shorter form of <i>bam</i>, and instead stated “<i>bahem</i>,” one derives from here that if the animal no longer is blemished it is accepted as an offering. And as for the Rabbis, they do not interpret anything from the variation between <i>bam</i> and “<i>bahem</i>”; they do not see this as a significant deviation from the standard language of the verse.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, and Rabbi Eliezer permits the limbs of blemished animals to be sacrificed if they are in a mixture, why is it necessary for him to say: I view the flesh of the limbs of the blemished animals as though they are pieces of wood? After all, the Merciful One permits them as an offering. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer is speaking to the Rabbis in accordance with their statement, as follows: According to my opinion, the Merciful One permits these limbs to be sacrificed upon the altar. But even according to your opinion, at least agree with me that the flesh of a blemished animal that was intermingled with the flesh of a qualified offering is considered like wood, just as is the <i>halakha</i> of the flesh of a sin offering that became intermingled with the flesh of a burnt offering, as according to this <i>baraita</i> the Rabbis concede that the flesh of these two offerings should be sacrificed together.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, how do they respond to this claim of Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara explains: According to the Rabbis there is a difference between the cases: Here, with regard to a mixture that includes limbs of blemished animals, these limbs are repulsive, and therefore they may not be brought upon the altar, even as wood. Conversely, there, in the case of a mixture of limbs of a sin offering and limbs of a burnt offering, the limbs of the sin offering are not repulsive in and of themselves, and consequently they may be sacrificed upon the altar as wood.
  MISHNA: In a case where limbs of burnt offerings fit for sacrifice were intermingled with limbs of blemished burnt offerings, Rabbi Eliezer says: Although all the limbs are unfit for sacrifice, if the head of one of them was sacrificed all the heads shall be sacrificed, as the head that was sacrificed is assumed to have been that of the unfit animal in the mixture. Likewise, if one sacrificed the legs of one of them all the legs shall be sacrificed. And the Rabbis say: Even if all the limbs were sacrificed except for one of them, there is a concern that the remaining limb is the unfit limb, which may not be sacrificed. Rather, all of the limbs must go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the sacrificing of all the heads only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of each pair is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, in case the priest may be sacrificing the prohibited head by itself. Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection from the mishna, which states: And the Rabbis say: Even if all the limbs were sacrificed except for one of them, all the limbs must go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard. This indicates that even in this situation, where only one of the limbs remains, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis still applies, which means that Rabbi Eliezer permits it to be sacrificed despite the fact that it is only one limb.
  Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa said to Rabbi Yirmeya in response: I will explain the meaning of this statement to you: What does the mishna mean when it states: Except for one of them? It means except for one pair, i.e., two limbs, as even Rabbi Eliezer did not permit one to sacrifice the limbs individually.
  MISHNA: In the case of blood of an offering fit for sacrifice that was mixed with water, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit for sprinkling on the altar, even though the majority of the mixture is water. If the blood was mixed with red wine, one views the wine as though it is water. If that amount of water would leave the mixture with the appearance of blood it is fit for presentation. And likewise if the blood was mixed with the blood of a non-sacred domesticated animal or the blood of a non-sacred undomesticated animal, one considers the non-sacred blood as though it is water.
  
  Daf 78a
  
  Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the priest presents the blood of the mixture on the altar.
  If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, there is no remedy. Therefore, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard. Likewise, if blood fit for presentation was mixed with blood of exudate, i.e., that exudes from the neck after the initial spurt following its slaughter concludes, which is unfit for presentation, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Rabbi Eliezer deems this mixture fit for presentation. Even according to the first <i>tanna</i>, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood on the altar, the offering is fit.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in a case where water became mixed with the blood of an offering, if the mixture has the appearance of blood it is fit, despite the fact that there is more water than blood. Concerning this Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where the water fell into the blood. But in a case where the blood fell into the water, the first drop of blood, and then the next first drop of blood, is nullified in the water, i.e., each drop is nullified in turn. Consequently, the mixture is unfit for presentation, regardless of whether it has the appearance of blood.
  Rav Pappa says: But with regard to the mitzva of covering the blood of birds or undomesticated animals that are slaughtered, it is not so. In this case, even if the blood fell into water, the mitzva of covering applies to it, provided that the mixture has the appearance of blood. The blood is not nullified by the water because there is no permanent rejection with regard to mitzvot, i.e., its nullification was merely temporary, but once there is enough blood in the water, it reassumes its status of blood.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss various mixtures. Reish Lakish says: With regard to meat of <i>piggul</i>, i.e., an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, and meat of <i>notar</i>, an offering whose designated time for consumption has passed, and ritually impure sacrificial meat, each of which was an olive-bulk, the minimum size for which one is liable to be flogged for its consumption, that one mixed together and ate them as a mixture, he is exempt from being flogged. The reason is that it is impossible that while eating them one type would not be greater than another type and nullify it. Since it is unknown which prohibition will nullify the other, one cannot forewarn the offender as to which prohibition he is about to transgress, and in order to be liable to be flogged one must receive a forewarning concerning a specific prohibition.
  The Gemara comments: Conclude three <i>halakhot</i> from this statement of Reish Lakish. Conclude from it that prohibitions nullify one another in a majority, just as permitted items nullify a prohibited item. And conclude from it that the <i>halakha</i> that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. The proof is that if this principle were applied by Torah law, then one should be flogged for this consumption, as the meats are of different types and therefore one of them must have imparted flavor to the other. And finally, conclude from it that an uncertain forewarning, e.g., one in which the witnesses cannot be sure which prohibition the transgressor is about to violate, is not considered a forewarning.
  Concerning the inference that the <i>halakha</i> that when a prohibited food imparts flavor to a permitted substance it prohibits it even when the permitted substance is the majority does not apply by Torah law, Rava raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Ḥalla</i> 3:7): In a case where one prepared a dough from wheat and from rice, if this mixture has the taste of wheat, it is obligated in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i>, a portion of dough that must be given to a priest (see Numbers 15:17–21). <i>Ḥalla</i> is separated only from one of the five species of grain, not rice. Rava explains his objection: And this <i>halakha</i> applies even though the majority of the mixture is flour from rice. Apparently, the fact that the wheat imparts flavor to the dough renders it obligated in <i>ḥalla</i> even if the wheat is the minority.
  The Gemara answers: The obligation to set aside <i>ḥalla</i> in this case applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law. Rava raises a difficulty: If so, say the latter clause of that same mishna: A person can fulfill his obligation with <i>matza</i> from this type of dough on the first night of Passover. Since by Torah law this mitzva must be fulfilled with <i>matza</i> made from a grain, evidently the principle that one substance that imparts flavor to a greater amount of a different substance affects its status applies by Torah law.
  
  Daf 78b
  
  Rather, one must say that according to Reish Lakish, in a case of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, such as wheat flour and rice flour, whose tastes are different, the status is determined by the flavor. Therefore, if the dough tastes like wheat, it has the <i>halakha</i> of a dough made from wheat. But if it is a type of food mixed with food of its own type, e.g., a mixture of <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i> meat, which is the case addressed by Reish Lakish, the status of the mixture is determined by the majority.
  The Gemara suggests: But let us estimate in a case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type as though it were a mixture of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, and if so, the minority is not nullified if it is substantial enough to impart flavor to the majority. As we learned in the mishna: If the blood of an offering was mixed with wine, one considers it as though it is water. Although blood and wine certainly have different flavors, in the case of the mishna the determinative factor is not the taste of the mixture, but the appearance. Since they share the same appearance, they are considered a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. What, is it not correct to explain the mishna as stating that one views the wine as though it is water, i.e., a substance of a different type, and if the mixture would have the appearance of blood if the wine were water it is fit for presentation, despite the fact that the blood is not the majority?
  The Gemara answers: No, this is not the explanation of the mishna. Rather, it means that one views the blood as though it is water, i.e., it is unfit for presentation, since it is as though one presented water on the altar. The Gemara questions this explanation: If so, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna should have said: The blood is nullified.
  And furthermore, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Mikvaot</i> 7:4): With regard to a ritually impure bucket containing a certain amount of white wine or milk that one immersed in a ritual bath, Rabbi Yehuda says: Although the appearance of the white wine or milk is not discernible in the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket, one views the white wine or milk as though it is red wine, and makes the following determination: If its conjectured red appearance would pale due to the water that enters the bucket, the wine or milk is nullified by the water. Therefore, the act of purification is fit, and the bucket is ritually pure.
  Rabbi Yehuda continues: But if its conjectured red appearance would not pale, the act of purification is unfit, and the bucket remains ritually impure. This is a case in which a substance was mixed with another substance of similar appearance, as white wine and milk have a similar appearance to the water, and yet it is treated as a mixture of a substance with a different type of substance, and it is not nullified in a majority.
  The Gemara explains: One cannot cite a proof from the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as this is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, and the ruling follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in that <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a ritually impure bucket in which there is white wine or milk, and one immersed it in a ritual bath, one follows the majority, i.e., if the majority of the contents of the bucket is now water from the ritual bath, it is pure. Rabbi Yehuda says: One views the white wine or milk as though it is red wine and makes the following determination: If its conjectured red appearance would pale due to the water that enters the bucket, the act of purification is fit, and the bucket is ritually pure. But if its conjectured red appearance would not pale, the act of purification is unfit, and the bucket remains ritually impure.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda from a mishna (see <i>Mikvaot</i> 10:6): If one had an impure bucket that is filled with spittle and one immersed it in a ritual bath, the spittle is considered an interposition between the water of the ritual bath and that of the bucket, and therefore it is as though he did not immerse it.
  If the impure bucket was full of urine and he immersed it, although urine is slightly different in appearance than water, one views the urine as though it is water, and therefore once the urine is in contact with the ritual bath it is considered connected to the water, and it is not an interposition preventing the bucket from becoming ritually pure.
  The mishna continues: If the impure bucket was filled with water of purification, the bucket is not purified until the water of the ritual bath that enters the bucket becomes greater in quantity than the water of purification it contains, thereby nullifying it in a majority.
  The Gemara explains the contradiction: Whom have you heard who accepts this reasoning of: One views, which appears in this mishna with regard to urine? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as stated in the <i>baraita</i> cited above. And yet the mishna teaches that a majority suffices to nullify the water of purification that became mixed with water, and it is not considered as though it is red wine. This conflicts with the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to white wine and milk.
  Abaye says: This is not difficult;
  
  Daf 79a
  
  this statement, that the water of purification is nullified in a majority of water, is his, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda’s, own opinion, whereas that statement, in the <i>baraita</i>, that white wine is not nullified in a majority of water, is his teacher’s ruling, i.e., that of Rabban Gamliel, who is stringent with regard to a mixture of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabban Gamliel: Blood does not nullify blood, spittle does not nullify spittle, and urine does not nullify urine.
  Rava says there is a different resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna that states that water of purification is nullified in a majority of water of a ritual bath and Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the <i>baraita</i> with regard to white wine mixed with water: In the mishna, we are dealing with a bucket whose internal surface is ritually pure, and only its external surface is impure. The significance of this is that by Torah law it suffices for the water of the ritual bath to enter the bucket in any amount to purify its external surface, and therefore the water of purification in the bucket does not prevent the purification of the bucket at all.
  Rava continues: And it is the Sages who decreed with regard to this case that the internal surface must be purified as well, lest the owner wish to spare the water of purification and not to nullify it from its sanctity. In that case he would wish to avoid allowing water from the ritual bath to enter the vessel, and might immerse it in a manner which would not allow even the full external surface to come in contact with the water. Therefore, the Sages required that one immerse the entire vessel. But once there is a majority of water in the bucket from the ritual bath, he does not need to enable any more water to enter the vessel, as by Torah law it is already pure.
  § Rava says, in summary of these <i>halakhot</i>: The Sages said that the status of an item in a mixture is determined by the taste, i.e., if the taste of one substance is noticeable in a mixture with another substance it is not nullified, and the Sages said that a prohibited item is nullified by the majority, and the Sages also said that the status of an item in a mixture is determined by the appearance, i.e., if the appearance of a substance is recognizable in a mixture it is not nullified. Rava elaborates: With regard to a type of food mixed with food not of its own type, the nullification is determined by the taste. In the case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, the nullification is determined by the majority. In a case where there is a possibility to determine the status of an item based on appearance, the nullification is by appearance.
  § The Gemara returns to its discussion of the opinion of Reish Lakish that prohibited items, such as <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and ritually impure meat, nullify one another. The Gemara notes: And Reish Lakish disagrees with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: Just as items used in the performance of mitzvot do not nullify one another, despite the fact that one is of greater volume than the other or imparts flavor to it, so too, items to which prohibitions apply do not nullify one another.
  The Gemara adds: Whom did you hear who says that items used in the performance of mitzvot do not nullify one another? It is Hillel, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They said about Hillel the Elder that when eating the Paschal offering, <i>matza</i>, and bitter herbs on the first night of Passover, he would wrap them all at once and eat them together, because it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “They shall eat it with <i>matzot</i> and bitter herbs” (Numbers 9:11), which indicates that these three foods should be eaten together. Hillel was not concerned that the taste of the bitter herbs would nullify the taste of the <i>matza</i>.
  
  Daf 79b
  
  § The Gemara continues its discussion of cases involving a mixture of one substance in contact with the same type of substance, in which according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna the prohibited substance is not nullified. The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 5:3): In a case where a broken earthenware flask had absorbed the urine of a <i>zav</i> or a <i>zava</i>, whose urine is a primary source of ritual impurity, which imparts impurity to one who carries it, in such a case, if one poured water into this flask to clean it, after the first time and the second time one washed it, it remains ritually impure, but after the third time it is ritually pure, as the impure urine has been expelled from the flask.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: In what case is this statement said? It is said when one placed water into the flask. But if he did not place water into it, but instead placed the urine of a ritually pure person into it, even after the tenth time he places this urine into the flask it remains ritually impure, as one substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: After the third time, even though he did not place water into it, but rather urine, it is ritually pure. The Gemara comments: Whom did you hear who says that a substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified? Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore he is the first <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i>.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 4:11): With regard to flax that was woven by a menstruating woman, although it has absorbed the spittle of a menstruating woman, which imparts impurity by being carried, one who moves it remains ritually pure, as the spittle has dried. But if the flax was still moist, one who moves it is rendered impure due to the liquid of her mouth, i.e., the spittle of the menstruating woman. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who wets the flax with water is rendered impure due to the liquid of her mouth, and this <i>halakha</i> applies even if he wet the flax a great deal, several times, as the water does not nullify and expel the spittle. This apparently contradicts Rabbi Yehuda’s claim with regard to the broken flask that was washed with water three times.
  Rav Pappa says: Spittle is different, as it is thoroughly absorbed and adheres to the flax, and therefore washing the flax with water does not nullify the spittle.
  § The mishna teaches: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and similarly, if blood fit for presentation became mixed with blood of exudate, it shall be poured into the drain, whereas Rabbi Eliezer deems the mixture fit for presentation. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Eliezer disagree?
  Rav Zevid says: They disagree with regard to the question of whether the Sages issue a rabbinic decree of this kind with regard to the Temple. As one Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that the Sages issue a rabbinic decree with regard to the Temple, and therefore one may not present this mixture of blood, lest one present a mixture that contains a majority of blood of unfit offerings or blood of exudate. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the Sages do not issue a rabbinic decree with regard to the Temple, and consequently this mixture of blood is fit for presentation.
  Rav Pappa says that there is a different explanation of the dispute: Everyone agrees that the Sages issue a rabbinic decree with regard to the Temple, and therefore in a case where blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings Rabbi Eliezer agrees that it should be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and he deems the blood permitted only if it was mixed with blood of exudate.
  Rav Pappa continues: And here they disagree with regard to the question of whether it is common for blood of exudate to be greater in quantity than blood of the soul, i.e., the blood that emerges immediately following the slaughter of the animal. One Sage, the first <i>tanna</i>, holds that this is a common occurrence, and therefore the Sages issued a decree concerning all mixtures of blood of exudate and blood of the soul. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that this is not a common occurrence, and therefore the Sages did not issue a decree concerning a mixture of this kind.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Pappa that Rabbi Eliezer’s lenient ruling applies only to a mixture with blood of exudate, but that he concedes to the first <i>tanna</i> that if blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings it is poured down the Temple courtyard drain, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings, it shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain; if blood fit for presentation was mixed with blood of exudate, it shall be poured into the drain. In other words, the fact that the mishna separates these two cases into different clauses makes sense, as Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling applies only to one case.
  But according to the interpretation of Rav Zevid that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with regard to both cases, let the mishna combine them and teach them together, as follows: If blood fit for presentation was mixed with the blood of unfit offerings or with blood of exudate, the entire mixture shall be poured into the drain running through the Temple courtyard, and Rabbi Eliezer deems the mixtures fit for presentation. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the wording of the mishna poses a difficulty to the explanation of Rav Zevid.
  MISHNA: If the blood of unblemished offerings was mixed with the blood of blemished animals unfit for sacrifice, the entire mixture shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. This is the <i>halakha</i> when the fit and unfit blood were mixed in one vessel. By contrast, if a cup of the blood of a blemished offering was intermingled with cups of blood fit for offering and it is unclear which blood is in the cup, Rabbi Eliezer says: Although it is prohibited to present all the blood due to the uncertainty, if it happened that a priest already sacrificed, i.e., presented, one cup, the blood in all the other cups shall be sacrificed, as the blood that was presented is assumed to have come from the unfit cup in the mixture. And the Rabbis say: Even if the blood in all the cups was sacrificed except for one of them, the remaining blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain.
  With regard to blood that is to be placed below the red line circumscribing the altar, e.g., blood of a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or a peace offering, that was mixed with blood that is to be placed above the red line, e.g., blood of a sin offering, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall initially place the blood of the mixture above the red line for the sake of the sin offering, and I view the blood that was to be placed below that was in fact placed above as though it is water, and the priest shall again place blood from the mixture below. And the Rabbis say: It shall all be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Even according to the Rabbis, if the priest did not consult the authorities and placed the blood above the red line, the offering is fit, and he should then place the remaining blood below the red line.
  
  Daf 80a
  
  In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, e.g., the blood of a firstborn offering with the blood of another firstborn offering or the blood of an animal tithe offering, the blood shall be placed with one placement. In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements, e.g., the blood of a sin offering with that of another sin offering, or the blood of a burnt offering with that of a peace offering, the blood shall be placed with four placements.
  If the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements was mixed with the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood shall be placed with four placements. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The blood shall be placed with one placement, as the priest fulfills the requirement with one placement after the fact.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: According to your opinion, the priest violates the prohibition of: Do not diminish, as it is written: “All these matters that I command you, that you shall observe to do; you shall not add thereto, nor diminish from it” (Deuteronomy 13:1). One may not diminish the number of required placements from four to one. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, the priest violates the prohibition of: Do not add, derived from the same verse. One may not add to the one required placement and place four.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: The prohibition of: Do not add, is stated only in a case where the blood is by itself, not when it is part of a mixture. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: Likewise, the prohibition of: Do not diminish, is stated only in a case where the blood is by itself. And Rabbi Yehoshua also said: When you placed four placements, you transgressed the prohibition of: Do not add, and you performed a direct action. When you did not place four placements but only one, although you transgressed the prohibition of: Do not diminish, you did not perform a direct action. An active transgression is more severe than a passive one.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, if a cup containing the blood of blemished animals became intermingled with cups holding the blood of fit offerings, and the blood in one of the cups was sacrificed, all the remaining cups are fit. Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Eliezer permitted the rest of the cups only if they were sacrificed two by two, as at least one of them is certainly permitted; but he did not permit them to be sacrificed one by one, as he may be found to have presented the blood of the prohibited cup by itself.
  Rav Dimi raises an objection from the mishna: And the Rabbis say that even if the blood in all the cups was sacrificed except for the blood in one of them, the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. This indicates that even in this case, where only one cup remains, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and permits the blood in the cup to be presented. Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain it to you: What does the mishna mean when it states: Except for the blood in one of them? It means except for one pair, i.e., two cups, as even Rabbi Eliezer did not permit the presentation of the cups one by one.
  § The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis was also stated above with regard to a mixture of limbs from fit and unfit offerings. The Gemara notes: And it is necessary for the mishna to teach this dispute with regard to both cases, as, if it were stated only with regard to that case of the limbs, one would have said that it is in that case alone that Rabbi Eliezer says that the rest of the limbs are sacrificed, because the offering’s atonement, i.e., the presenting of the blood, has already been performed, as the limbs are sacrificed after the blood has been presented. But in this case of the blood in the cups, say that Rabbi Eliezer concedes to the Rabbis that the rest of the blood is unfit to be presented.
  And conversely, if the dispute were stated only with regard to this case of the cups, one would have said that it is in this case alone that the Rabbis say that the blood in the rest of the cups is unfit, but in that case of the limbs, say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Eliezer that the rest of the limbs are fit to be sacrificed, as the blood has already been presented. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to state that the dispute applies in both cases.
  § The Gemara continues its discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. We learned in a mishna there (<i>Para</i> 9:1): With regard to a flask containing water of purification into which any amount of regular water fell, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest should sprinkle two sprinklings on the ritually impure person, as in this manner he ensures that he will be sprinkled with some of the water of purification; but the Rabbis disqualify the mixture for purification.
  The Gemara clarifies: Granted, one can understand why the Rabbis disqualify the mixture, as they hold three opinions: They hold that there is mixing, i.e., when two substances are mixed together each drop is assumed to contain a bit of each of them. And they hold that an act of sprinkling of the water of purification requires a minimum measure of water of purification, and in this case each sprinkling contained some of the regular water. And they hold that it is of no help to sprinkle the water twice, as one cannot combine sprinklings, i.e., two acts of sprinkling the water of purification do not combine to render one pure. Therefore, the person is not purified.
  But what does Rabbi Eliezer hold? If he holds that there is no mixing, i.e., when two substances are mixed together each drop is not assumed to contain a bit of each of them, then even if one sprinkles two sprinklings, what of it? Perhaps on both occasions he sprinkles regular water. Rather, one must say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is mixing. If he holds that the act of sprinkling does not require a minimum measure, why do I need two sprinklings? One act of sprinkling would be enough. Rather, you must say that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the act of sprinkling requires a minimum measure. And if Rabbi Eliezer holds that one cannot combine sprinklings, then even if one sprinkles two sprinklings, what of it? And alternatively, if he holds that one combines sprinklings, who says that the two sprinklings will amount to the minimum measure? Perhaps most of the water he sprinkled was regular water.
  Reish Lakish says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is mixing, and sprinkling requires a minimum measure. And here we are dealing with a case where the two types of water were mixed together in a ratio of one to one, and therefore by performing two sprinklings the priest ensures that he has sprinkled the minimum measure of one sprinkling of water of purification.
  Rava says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is mixing, and sprinkling does not require a minimum measure. Consequently, it should suffice for the priest to perform one sprinkling. And the requirement to sprinkle twice is a penalty that the Sages imposed, so that one who mixes regular water with the water of purification would not benefit from this act by diluting the valuable water of purification.
  Rav Ashi states a different explanation: Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is no mixing, and therefore if the priest sprinkles only once there is a concern that he might not have sprinkled any water of purification at all, and therefore he sprinkles two sprinklings.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> against Reish Lakish’s opinion that Rabbi Eliezer holds that sprinkling requires a minimum measure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer that if the priest performs two sprinklings the purification ritual is valid, a sprinkling of any amount renders the impure person ritually pure, as sprinkling does not require a minimum measure, and even a sprinkling that contains half fit water and half unfit water renders the individual ritually pure.
  
  Daf 80b
  
  The Gemara adds: And furthermore, one can raise another difficulty against the opinion of Rav Ashi, who maintains that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no mixing, as it is taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood of an offering, e.g., a sin offering, which is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood of an offering, e.g., a burnt offering, which is to be placed below the red line, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall initially place the blood of the mixture above the red line for the sake of the sin offering, and the priest should then place blood from the mixture below the red line for the sake of the burnt offering, and both the blood placed above and the blood placed below count for him toward the fulfillment of the mitzva.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty from this <i>baraita</i>: And if you say that there is no mixing, why do both of the placements count for him? Perhaps he placed the blood of the mixture that belongs above the red line below it, and the blood that belongs below the red line above it.
  The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where there is a majority of blood that is to be placed above the line, and the priest placed blood above by the measure of the blood in the mixture that is to be placed below the line, and slightly more blood. In this manner he ensures that he must have placed above the red line some of the blood that belongs there.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches: The blood placed below counts for him toward the fulfillment of the mitzva. According to this explanation, it is possible that all the blood of the burnt offering was placed above the red line. Why, then, has he fulfilled the mitzva by placing blood below the red line? The Gemara explains: The <i>baraita</i> does not mean that it counts for the mitzva of the placing of the blood of a burnt offering below the red line; rather, it means that it counts for him for the sake of the remainder of the blood of the sin offering, which must be poured onto the base of the altar.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest placed the mixed blood below the red line and did not consult the authorities, what should he do now? Rabbi Eliezer says: He shall again place the blood above the red line, and the blood placed below counts for him. Once again, the difficulty is that if Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is no mixing, why does the placement count for him? Perhaps he placed the blood of the mixture that belongs above the red line below it, and the blood that belongs below the red line above it.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, we are dealing with a case where the majority of blood belongs above the line, and the priest placed blood above from the measure of the blood in the mixture that belongs below the line, and slightly more blood. Again the Gemara asks: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches: The blood placed below counts for him. Since it is possible that all of the blood of the burnt offering was placed above the red line, why does the blood placed below count for him? The Gemara answers that the <i>baraita</i> means it counts for him for the sake of the remainder of the sin offering.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest placed the mixed blood above and did not consult the authorities, both these Sages and those Sages, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, concede that he shall again place the blood below the red line, and these placements and those placements count for him. If Rabbi Eliezer maintains that there is no mixing, he would not concede this point, as perhaps he placed the blood that belongs below the red line above it, and the blood that belongs above, below.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, this is referring to a case where the majority of blood belongs above the line, and the priest placed blood above in the measure of the blood in the mixture that belongs below the line, and slightly more blood. In this manner he fulfills the mitzva of the blood that is to be placed above the red line alone.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches: These and those count for him, not only the blood that is to be placed above. The Gemara explains: Does the <i>baraita</i> teach: These Sages and those Sages concede that these placements and those placements count for him? It teaches only: These and those count for him. In other words, although the <i>baraita</i> states in the first clause that both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer concede that the priest returns and places the blood below the red line, this agreement does not apply to the next clause of the <i>baraita</i>, as in the latter clause we come to the opinion of the Rabbis alone, who say that there is mixing, which is why both placements count.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: In a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, the blood shall be placed with one placement. And if you say that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no mixing, why shall they be placed with one placement? Perhaps he places from this blood and does not place from that blood. The Gemara answers: This is referring to a case where the measure of one placement of this blood was mixed with the measure of one placement of that blood, and no more. Consequently, he certainly placed both types of blood.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: The mishna teaches that in a case of the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements that was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements, the blood shall be placed with four placements. But if there is no mixing, perhaps he placed only the blood of one offering. The Gemara explains: Here too, it is referring to a case where the measure of four placements of this blood was mixed with the measure of four placements of that blood, and therefore he certainly placed blood from both offerings.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: The mishna teaches that if the blood of an offering that is to be placed on the altar with four placements was mixed with the blood of another offering that is to be placed on the altar with one placement, Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood shall be placed with four placements. Here too, if there is no mixing according to Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps he placed the blood of only one of the offerings.
  
  Daf 81a
  
  And if you would say that here too, the mishna is discussing a case where the measure of four placements was mixed with precisely the amount of one placement, and therefore the priest certainly placed some blood of both offerings, if so, how would one explain the clause in the mishna that states: Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your opinion, doesn’t the priest violate the prohibition of: Do not add? From where is the violation of: Do not add, here? After all, the priest places only the measure of one placement from the offering that requires one placement.
  Rather, Rava says: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis do not disagree with regard to a case of actual blood mixed together. When they disagree it is with regard to a case of cups of blood that were intermingled, and it is unknown which blood is in which cup. The explanation according to Rabbi Eliezer is that he is of the opinion that one views the blood that was not placed properly as though it were water, and therefore it is permitted to present the blood; whereas the explanation according to the Rabbis is that they are not of the opinion that one views the blood that was not placed properly as though it were water, and consequently all of it must be poured into the Temple courtyard drain.
  The Gemara asks: And do they not disagree with regard to blood mixed together? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree in a case of blood of a sin offering that was mixed with blood of a burnt offering that the mixture shall be sacrificed, or in a case of blood that was fit for presentation that was mixed with the blood of an animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, that it shall not be sacrificed. The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to blood of an unblemished animal that was mixed with blood of a blemished animal, as Rabbi Eliezer says that it shall be sacrificed, whether in a case of blood mixed together or in a case of cups intermingled, and the Rabbis say it shall not be sacrificed.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, i.e., when Rabbi Yehuda teaches the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, teaches that the dispute applies both in a case of blood mixed together and in a case of intermingled cups, but the Rabbis who taught the mishna maintain that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree only in a case of intermingled cups.
  § The mishna teaches that if the blood of a sin offering, which is to be placed above the red line, was mixed with blood of a burnt offering, which is to be placed below the line, Rabbi Eliezer holds that it shall all be placed above the red line, and one views the blood of the burnt offering placed there as though it is water, and subsequently the priest shall place the blood below the red line. By contrast, the Rabbis rule that all the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. Concerning this, Abaye says: The mishna taught that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the blood shall be poured into the drain only if the first portion of the blood of a sin offering, i.e., that blood which is to be placed above the red line, and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed.
  But if the final portion of the blood of a sin offering, i.e., the remainder of the blood that is poured onto the base of the altar (see Leviticus 4:25), and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed, everyone agrees that since the place of the blood of a burnt offering, below the red line, is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, as the remainder of the blood of a sin offering is poured on the base of the altar, the priest shall place all the blood on the side of the altar below the red line. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: This is what Rav Yehuda says: The places are not the same, as the remainder of blood needs to be placed on the bench, i.e., on the upper horizontal surface of the base itself, and not on the side of the altar as is the case with the blood of a burnt offering.
  The Gemara notes that <i>amora’im</i> of Eretz Yisrael disagreed in the same manner as Abaye and Rav Yosef: And likewise Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The mishna taught that according to the opinion of the Rabbis the blood shall be poured into the drain only if the first portion of the blood of a sin offering and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed. But if the final portion of the blood of a sin offering and the blood of a burnt offering were mixed, everyone agrees that since the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering, the priest shall place all the blood on the side of the altar below the red line. Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say it was Rabbi Elazar who says: This case of the remainder of blood of a sin offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering is still included in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.
  Rav Huna bar Yehuda raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to firstborn animals: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17). The emphasis of the term “they” serves to teach that even if the blood of a firstborn offering was mixed with blood of other sacrificial animals, the blood shall be sacrificed, as the blood of firstborn offerings is not nullified. What, is it not referring even to a case of the final portion of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering that were mixed, indicating that the priest places the mixture below the red line? And if so, one can learn from this <i>baraita</i> that the place of the blood of a burnt offering, which is also the place of the blood of a firstborn offering, is the same as the place of the remainder of blood of a sin offering. The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the first part of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, what is this <i>baraita</i> teaching us? Is it teaching that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another? This <i>halakha</i> is already derived from the verse: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18), from which it is understood that although the blood of the two animals is in the same vessel, they each retain their distinct identity. The Gemara answers: This is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as there is a <i>tanna</i> who derives this <i>halakha</i> from here, and there is a <i>tanna</i> who derives it from there.
  Rava raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> that discusses a verse describing a burnt offering: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The superfluous second mention of the blood teaches that it is still called the blood of a burnt offering even after it was mixed with other blood, and therefore it should be sprinkled in its proper manner. What does it mean when
  
  Daf 81b
  
  the verse states twice: “Blood,” “blood”? The <i>baraita</i> explains: If “blood” were written only once, one might have thought: I have derived only that this <i>halakha</i> was stated with regard to a case where this, i.e., the blood of a burnt offering, was mixed with the blood of its substitute, as even if these offerings were intermingled when the animals were alive, the burnt offering and its substitute shall be sacrificed. From where is it derived to include even a case of the blood of a thanks offering or a peace offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as these offerings are not sacrificed if they became intermingled with a burnt offering while alive?
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And even if one says: I include in this first mention of blood the case of the blood of a thanks offering or a peace offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as they are similar in that they both come as a vow offering and a gift offering, like a burnt offering, from where is it derived to include even a case of the blood of the guilt offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as a guilt offering cannot be brought as a vow offering or a gift offering?
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And even if one says: I include in this first mention of blood even a case of the blood of the guilt offering that was mixed with the blood of a burnt offering, as they are similar in that a guilt offering requires the placement of two placements that are four, like a burnt offering, from where is it derived that the same applies to the blood of a firstborn offering, and the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering, whose blood is placed once on the altar? Therefore, the verse states twice: “Blood,” “blood.” This repetition serves to teach that in any case where the blood of a burnt offering became mixed with the blood of another offering that is placed below the red line, this blood is presented.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: What, is it not referring even to a case of the final portion of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering that were mixed? And if so, one can learn from this <i>baraita</i> that the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a firstborn offering.
  The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the first part of the blood of a burnt offering and the blood of a firstborn offering. But if so, what is this <i>baraita</i> teaching us? Is it teaching that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another? This <i>halakha</i> is already derived from the verse: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18). The Gemara explains: This is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as there is a <i>tanna</i> who derives this <i>halakha</i> from here, and there is a <i>tanna</i> who derives it from there.
  § The Gemara has cited three different verses as the source for the <i>halakha</i> that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17); “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat” (Leviticus 16:18); “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The Gemara notes: And these other <i>tanna’im</i> do not derive this principle from the verse: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat,” as they maintain that the High Priest does not mix the blood of the bull with the blood of the goat in order to place the blood on the corners of the golden altar; rather, each type of blood is placed separately. Additionally, these other <i>tanna’im</i> do not derive this <i>halakha</i> from the repeated mention of: “Blood,” “blood,” as they do not learn anything from this repetition.
  The Gemara asks: But what is the reason that those other <i>tanna’im</i> do not derive this <i>halakha</i> from the verse: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17)? The Gemara explains: They hold that the verse should be understood as follows: “They are holy,” i.e., they, the firstborn offerings themselves, are sacrificed, but their substitutes are not sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, i.e., the <i>tanna</i> who derives the <i>halakha</i> that the blood of offerings that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another from the verse: “They are holy” (Numbers 18:17), from where does he learn that the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed? The Gemara explains: He derives it from the verse: “Whether it be ox or sheep, it is the Lord’s” (Leviticus 27:26). The emphasis of “it is” teaches that it is sacrificed but its substitute is not sacrificed.
  § The Gemara resumes its discussion of whether the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place for the remainder of the blood of offerings. Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to blood that is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood that is to be placed below the line, which according to the Rabbis must be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, if the priest placed the mixed blood above and did not consult the authorities, both these Sages and those Sages, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, concede that he shall again place the blood below the red line, and these placements and those placements count for him.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: What, is it not referring to a case where the blood of a sin offering and a burnt offering were mixed? And once the priest placed blood of the sin offering above the red line, that which is left from the blood of the sin offering is considered the remainder of the blood. And yet the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Both these Sages and those Sages concede that he shall again place the blood below the red line. And if so, one can learn from the <i>baraita</i> that the place of the blood of a burnt offering is the same as the place of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering.
  The Gemara relates: When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing not with a mixture of blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering, but with a case where the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar, which is placed above the red line, was mixed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary. This remainder is poured on the base of the external altar. Consequently, once the priest has placed blood from the mixture above the red line, all that remains is a mixture of remainders, which are placed in the same location.
  Abaye said to Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef: Why is it necessary to cite the case of the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary? But let the Master say that it is referring to a case where the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar was mixed with the remainder of the blood of a sin offering sacrificed on the external altar. Perhaps you chose that case to indicate that this is what the <i>baraita</i> teaches us: Even according to the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood of a sin offering whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the offering, nevertheless, if the remainder was merely lacking, as in this case, as some of the blood had been placed above the red line, this does not disqualify the offering.
  Rava Tosfa’a said to Ravina: How can that <i>baraita</i> be cited as proof for the issue at hand? We already interpreted it (80b) with regard to a mixture of blood that is to be placed above the red line with blood that is to be placed below the red line, which contains a majority of blood that is to be placed above the line, and the priest places above the red line a measure of blood that is to be placed below the line and slightly more. Ravina said to him: That statement applies according to those who said initially that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to a mixture of blood, and that Rabbi Eliezer holds that there is no mixing. But according to the conclusion, Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to cups of blood that were intermingled, and therefore the above interpretation of the <i>baraita</i> was rejected.
  MISHNA: Blood that is to be placed on three locations inside the Sanctuary, i.e., between the staves, on the Curtain, and on the golden altar, that was mixed with blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary on the external altar in the Temple courtyard, has no remedy, as one may not change the location of the placement of the blood of one to fulfill his obligation with the other type of blood. Therefore, all the blood shall be poured into the Temple courtyard drain. If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood outside the Sanctuary and again placed the mixture of blood inside the Sanctuary, the offering is fit.
  If the priest, on his own initiative, placed the mixture of blood inside the Sanctuary and again placed the mixture of blood outside the Sanctuary, Rabbi Akiva deems the blood placed outside disqualified, and the Rabbis deem it fit. As Rabbi Akiva says: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified; but the Rabbis say: That is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the blood of an external sin offering alone, as it is written: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). Rabbi Eliezer says: The status of a guilt offering is like that of a sin offering as well, as it is stated: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:7), i.e., there is one <i>halakha</i> for them. That is not the case with regard to the blood of other offerings.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary was mixed with blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary, all the blood should be poured into the Temple courtyard drain, and there is no opposing opinion recorded in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Eliezer disagree even with regard to this case, just as he disagrees with regard to a mixture of blood that is to be placed above the red line that was mixed with blood that is to be placed below the red line, where he holds that the improperly placed blood is considered as though it were water.
  The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer does not disagree in this case, as how should the priest act? If one says that he should first place blood from the mixture on the altar outside the Sanctuary, and again place blood from the mixture inside the Sanctuary, this is not allowed. Just as it is a mitzva to give precedence to the blood that is to be placed above the red line over the blood that is to be placed below the line, e.g., the presentation of the blood of a sin offering precedes the presentation of the blood of a burnt offering, since a sin offering serves to effect atonement, so too is it a mitzva to give precedence to the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary over blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary.
  
  Daf 82a
  
  And if you suggest that the priest should first place blood from the mixture inside the Sanctuary and again place blood outside, on the altar, although this resolution is applicable to most offerings whose blood is placed outside, nevertheless the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna chose to omit this case. The reason is that since there are a sin offering and a guilt offering, concerning which, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, when their blood enters the Sanctuary they are disqualified from being placed on the external altar, the <i>tanna</i> could not teach this <i>halakha</i> categorically. In other words, as the <i>tanna</i> could not issue a categorical ruling that applies to all types of offerings, he omitted the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer here.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood that is to be presented outside that entered to atone in the Sanctuary is disqualified. The Gemara discusses the source for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling. The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). How does Rabbi Akiva apply this <i>halakha</i> to all offerings whose blood is presented on the external altar? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Hear a parable: To what is this matter comparable? To a student who mixed wine with hot water for his teacher. And the teacher said to him: Mix another drink for me. The student said to him: With what should I mix the wine, hot or cold water? The teacher said to him: Aren’t we dealing with hot water? Now that I requested that you mix me another cup, I mean that you should mix it either in hot water or in cold. Otherwise, the teacher would not have needed to say anything.
  Here too, since we have been dealing with a sin offering in that passage (see Leviticus 6:17–22), why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes in this verse? Even without this term it is clear that the Torah is referring to a sin offering. Rather, as in the parable, the Torah mentions a sin offering to teach: I do not say this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering alone, i.e., that only the blood of a sin offering is disqualified when it is brought inside the Sanctuary, but the blood of all sacrificial animals is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this explanation: Accordingly, one should reach the opposite conclusion: Since all sacrificial animals that are sacrificed on the altar are included in this passage of the Torah with regard to scouring and rinsing, as derived by the Sages, despite the fact that this requirement is stated in connection with a sin offering (see Leviticus 6:21), it is already established that this chapter is speaking of all offerings. Consequently, why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes with regard to the matter of blood that entered the Sanctuary? Learn from the verse that in the case of a sin offering whose blood entered the Sanctuary, yes, it is disqualified, but if the blood of any other offering entered the Sanctuary, no, it is not disqualified.
  Rav Huna addresses Shmuel’s parable: And if you wish to provide a comparison, it is comparable only to a student who initially mixed wine for his teacher with both hot and cold water, and his teacher then said to him: Mix wine for me only with hot water.
  Rav Huna continues: Rather, the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva is from the fact that the verse does not state simply: “Sin offering,” but states: “Any sin offering”; this serves to include all other offerings. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). I have derived that this <i>halakha</i> applies only with regard to a sin offering; from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And from where is it derived that it also applies to offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “And any sin offering.” This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to Rabbi Akiva: Even if you include offerings in this manner from the verse all day long, I will not listen to you. Rather, this verse is referring to a sin offering alone, and it should be expounded as follows: The verse states: “Sin offering”; I have derived only that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the sin offering of an individual. From where is it derived that the same applies to a communal sin offering? The verse states: “Any sin offering.” And one can still say: I have derived only that this <i>halakha</i> applies to a male sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a female sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”
  The Gemara asks: Why is it assumed that the application of this <i>halakha</i> to a male sin offering is more obvious than to a female sin offering? Isn’t it the opposite [<i>kelapei layya</i>], as the standard sin offering of an individual is a female? Rather, this is what Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is saying: One can still ask: I have derived only that this <i>halakha</i> applies to a female sin offering; from where is it derived that the same applies to a male sin offering? The verse states: “And any sin offering.”
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili hold that this verse comes for this purpose, to teach the <i>halakha</i> of sin offerings whose blood was brought inside the Sanctuary? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: As we have found the entire matter that is stated in the verse: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23), is not stated with regard to a standard sin offering improperly brought inside the Sanctuary; rather, it speaks only about bulls that are burned and goats that are burned.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili elaborates: These are unique sin offerings, and the Torah states that their blood should be brought inside the Sanctuary. The verse is stated with regard to these sin offerings both in order to command the Jewish people to burn their disqualified ones in the Temple and in order to establish a prohibition with regard to their consumption.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: If you expound the verse in this fashion, then from where is it derived that a standard sin offering whose blood entered the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies, must be burned? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to them that it is derived from the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the sin offering referred to in the verse been brought inside the Sanctuary, it should have been burned. In any event, with regard to the issue at hand, since Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse from Leviticus 6:23 in this manner, how can he interpret it differently in his dispute with Rabbi Akiva?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili spoke according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, i.e., although Rabbi Yosei HaGelili interprets the verse in a different manner, according to Rabbi Akiva’s explanation it should be understood as referring only to a sin offering, not to other offerings.
  MISHNA: In the case of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar whose blood the priest collected in two cups, if one of them left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, the cup that remained inside the courtyard is fit to be presented. If one of the cups entered inside the Sanctuary and was thereby disqualified, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili deems the blood in the cup that remained outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, fit to be presented, and the Rabbis deem it disqualified from being presented.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said in support of his opinion: The <i>halakha</i> is that if one slaughters an offering with the intent that its blood be presented outside of the Temple courtyard, the offering is disqualified, but if his intention was that the blood be presented inside the Sanctuary, the offering is not disqualified. Just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet when some of the blood is taken there it does not render the status of the remaining blood disqualified like that of blood that leaves the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that we will not deem the status of the remaining blood like that of blood that entered the Sanctuary?
  The mishna continues: If all of the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, despite the fact that the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood to atone, the offering is disqualified; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is disqualified only when he atones and sprinkles the blood in the Sanctuary. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit to be presented.
  With regard to all the blood disqualified for presentation that was placed on the altar, the frontplate effects acceptance only for offerings sacrificed that are ritually impure. Although it is written with regard to the frontplate worn on the forehead of the High Priest: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the iniquity committed in the sacred matters” (Exodus 28:38), this does not apply to all disqualifications of offerings. This is because the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacri-ficed that are ritually impure but does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave the courtyard.
  GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis as to whether the blood of a sin offering in a second cup is disqualified if the blood in the first cup entered the Sanctuary, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said: This is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, and yet that blood that was taken outside does not disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, is it not logical that the blood that was taken inside will not disqualify the blood that is still outside the Sanctuary?
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that even if part of its blood is brought inside the Sanctuary, the sin offering is disqualified.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to the Rabbis: If you expound the verse in that manner, then from now one can derive an <i>a fortiori</i> inference with regard to the blood that leaves the courtyard: And just as in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there does not disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the Sanctuary, the blood that was taken inside disqualifies the blood that is still outside, i.e., in the courtyard, so too, in a case where part of the blood reached a place where the intent to present the blood there disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard, is it not logical that the blood that was taken outside will disqualify the blood that is still inside the courtyard? Why do the Rabbis deem this blood fit?
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili in response: But the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23). This teaches that only blood that enters the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood in the courtyard, but the blood that leaves the courtyard does not disqualify the blood in the courtyard.
  In light of this discussion, the Gemara asks: And let intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary disqualify the offering based on an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood in this place disqualifies the offering, i.e., outside the courtyard, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, in the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood in this place will disqualify the offering, i.e., inside the courtyard?
  The Gemara explains that one does not derive this <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is <i>piggul</i>; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7), and the Sages expounded this verse with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of intent while slaughtering an offering.
  
  Daf 82b
  
  This verse teaches that the place where improper intent disqualifies the offering must be triply functional: For the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions of the offering that are consumed on the altar. In other words, it must be outside its designated place with regard to all three of these issues. Consequently, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary does not disqualify the blood.
  The Gemara suggests the opposite: And if so, let intent to present the blood outside the Sanctuary not disqualify the offering based on an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside in the courtyard, and yet intent to present the blood inside the Sanctuary does not disqualify the offering, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that intent to present the blood outside the courtyard does not disqualify the offering?
  The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And if it be eaten at all on the third day, it is <i>piggul</i>; it shall not be accepted,” and the Sages interpreted this verse as follows: “On the third day” is referring to intent to perform its rites beyond its designated time; “it is <i>piggul</i>” is referring to intent to perform its rites outside its designated area.
  A <i>baraita</i> teaches: The meat of offerings that left its designated area and was taken to a place that is outside its designated area for consumption, which is outside the wall of Jerusalem in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity and outside the wall of the Temple courtyard in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, is disqualified from being eaten. By contrast, meat of offerings that entered inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified and remains fit to be eaten.
  One might have thought that it should be derived based on a logical inference that this meat is disqualified, as follows: And just as in a place where the part of the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the rest of the blood that remained inside the courtyard, yet meat that leaves and is taken outside the courtyard is disqualified, so too, in a place where the part of the blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the rest of the blood that is outside the Sanctuary, is it not right that meat that enters the Sanctuary should be disqualified?
  The <i>baraita</i> explains that one does not derive this inference, as the verse states: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), which indicates that the blood of an offering that is brought inside is disqualified, but not meat that enters the Sanctuary.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From now, as it has been established that the meat of offerings that is brought inside the Sanctuary is not disqualified, one can suggest an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And just as in a place where blood that went inside the Sanctuary disqualifies the blood that remained outside in the courtyard, and yet meat that enters the Sanctuary is fit, therefore, in a place where the blood that went outside the courtyard does not disqualify the blood that is inside the courtyard, is it not logical that meat that left and was taken outside the courtyard should be fit?
  The Gemara explains that one does not derive this <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the verse states: “And you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field” (Exodus 22:30). The apparently superfluous term “in the field” teaches a general <i>halakha</i>: Once meat has left and been removed outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted to consume it, it has become prohibited.
  § The Gemara returns to its discussion of the blood of a sin offer-ing that entered the Sanctuary. The Sages taught: It is stated that when Moses questioned Aaron as to why a sin offering was not consumed, he said: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18). This indicates that had the blood been brought within, Moses would have understood that the offering would have been disqualified and rendered prohibited for consumption. The <i>baraita</i> comments: I have derived only that the offering is disqualified if the blood is brought within, i.e., into the Holy of Holies; from where is it derived that the same applies if it was merely brought into the Sanctuary? The verse states: “Into the sacred place within,” and this sacred place is the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara questions this derivation: And let the verse state only “sacred place,” and it need not state “within.” If blood that entered the Sanctuary is already disqualified, this <i>halakha</i> certainly applies if it was brought farther inside, to the Holy of Holies. Rava says: This verse comes and teaches about that verse. In other words, had the verse stated only “sacred place,” it would have been interpreted as referring to the Holy of Holies. The addition of “within” indicates that this sacred place is the Sanctuary, while the term “within” is referring to the Holy of Holies. The Gemara cites a similar example: This is just as it is with regard to a tenant and a hired worker.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning <i>teruma</i>: The verse states: “A tenant of a priest or a hired worker shall not eat of the consecrated” (Leviticus 22:10). “A tenant”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired as a permanent acquisition, i.e., one who said he wishes to stay with his master. This slave has his ear pierced and he remains with his master until the Jubilee Year. “A hired worker”; this is referring to a Hebrew slave who has been acquired for an acquisition of six years, the standard period of servitude for a Hebrew slave.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: Let the verse say “tenant” and let it not say “hired worker,” and I would say: If one who is acquired as a permanent acquisition does not partake of his master’s, i.e., the priest’s, <i>teruma</i>, as despite his status as a slave he is not considered his master’s property, is it not all the more so logical that one who is acquired for an acquisition of six years should not be permitted to partake of <i>teruma</i>?
  The <i>baraita</i> answers: If so, that the verse were stated in this manner, I would say: “A tenant”; this is one who was acquired for an acquisition of six years, as the term itself is ambiguous, but one who was acquired as a permanent acquisition may partake of <i>teruma</i>. Therefore, the term “hired worker,” which is certainly referring to one who is less permanent than a tenant, comes and teaches about the meaning of the term “tenant,” that this one was acquired as a permanent acquisition and that one was acquired for an acquisition of six years, and both this one and that one may not partake of <i>teruma</i>. Similar reasoning applies in the above case concerning the terms “sacred place” and “within.”
  Abaye said to Rava: Are these cases comparable? Granted, there, the tenant and the hired worker are two bodies. And this is significant, as even though the verse could have written explicitly that a pierced tenant may not partake of <i>teruma</i>, from which the <i>halakha</i> of a Hebrew slave for six years could have been inferred, and the other case, that of a slave for six years, is therefore a matter that can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, it need not be stated explicitly. Nevertheless, there is a principle: At times, with regard to a matter that can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly. But here, the same blood enters the Holy of Holies via the Sanctuary, and once it is disqualified in the Sanctuary, why is it necessary for the verse to teach that this blood is disqualified when it enters the innermost sanctum, the Holy of Holies?
  Rather, Abaye says: This mention of “within” is necessary only for a case where the blood entered the Holy of Holies not via the Sanctuary but in a roundabout manner, e.g., from the roof or the loft of the Holy of Holies, without having entered the Sanctuary. Rava said to Abaye: But an expression of bringing is written in the verse: “Behold, its blood was not brought into the sacred place within,” which indicates a standard manner of bringing it into the Holy of Holies. Rather, Rava says: In any circumstance where the priest intended to bring the blood inside the innermost sanctum, it is not disqualified when it is only in the Sanctuary, and therefore it was necessary for the verse to teach both disqualifications.
  § Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goat for a sin of idol worship, whose blood should be presented in the Sanctuary, if it occurred that the priest brought their blood into the innermost sanctum, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that since the verse states: “Into the sacred place within” (Leviticus 10:18) as a single phrase, and therefore anywhere that we read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” i.e., that the blood is disqualified by being brought into the Sanctuary, we also read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within,” i.e., that it is likewise disqualified when it is brought into the Holy of Holies; but anywhere that we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “into the sacred place,” such as with regard to these offerings, whose blood is supposed to be brought into the Sanctuary, we do not read a prohibition against bringing the blood “within” the Holy of Holies? Or perhaps, since in any event the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings, it is disqualified.
  And if you say that the Holy of Holies is not the proper place for the blood of these offerings and they are therefore disqualified, one can raise another dilemma: In the case of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, where the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the staves of the Ark, as required (see Leviticus 16:14), and he brought their remaining blood out to the Sanctuary and subsequently brought it in again to the Holy of Holies, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the blood disqualified by this improper second entrance into the Holy of Holies?
  Rava explains the sides of the question: Do we say that it is its place, as the High Priest is supposed to bring this blood into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur at some point? Or perhaps one should say that since the High Priest has performed the mitzva and the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, and the Holy of Holies is no longer considered its place.
  And if you say that since the blood has been brought out, it has been brought out, one can raise another dilemma: If the High Priest sprinkled from their blood on the Sanctuary Curtain
  
  Daf 83a
  
  and then brought out the blood to the golden altar in the Sanctuary and sprinkled the blood there, as required (see Leviticus 16:18), but subsequently brought the remainder of the blood in toward the Curtain dividing the Sanctuary from the Holy of Holies, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rava explains the sides of the dilemma: Do we say that here the area of the Curtain and the golden altar is certainly one place, as they are both in the Sanctuary, and therefore the blood should not be disqualified by being brought back toward the Curtain? Or perhaps, since we call the taking of the blood to the golden altar: Going out, in the verse: “And he shall go out unto the altar” (Leviticus 16:18), its return to the Curtain should be considered bringing in, and therefore the blood should be disqualified? No answers were found, and therefore the Gemara states that these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches that the Sages disagree as to the <i>halakha</i> in a case where the priest carrying the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar entered the Sanctuary to atone through sprinkling, but in practice the priest did not actually sprinkle the blood. According to Rabbi Eliezer the blood is disqualified, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that the blood is disqualified only if the priest sprinkles it in the Sanctuary. Concerning this, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the Sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23), and it is stated there, with regard to the service of the High Priest on Yom Kippur: “And there shall be no man in the Tent of Meeting when he goes in to atone in the Sanctuary, until he comes out” (Leviticus 16:17).
  Rabbi Eliezer explains: Just as there, with regard to Yom Kippur, the phrase “when he goes in to atone” is referring to the stage when he has not yet atoned, so too here, with regard to the disqualification of blood brought inside the Sanctuary, the phrase “to atone in the Sanctuary” is referring to a situation where the blood enters the Sanctuary at a time when the priest has not yet atoned.
  Conversely, Rabbi Shimon says: It is stated here: “To atone” (Leviticus 6:23), and it is stated there, with regard to the conclusion of the service on Yom Kippur: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary, shall be taken outside the camp, and they shall burn in the fire” (Leviticus 16:27). Just as there, the phrase “to atone” is referring to the stage when he has already atoned, as the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned after their blood has been sprinkled, so too here, the phrase “to atone” is referring to a situation where he has already atoned, whereas merely bringing the blood into the Sanctuary does not disqualify it.
  The Gemara inquires: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree? The Gemara explains that one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that one derives a case of outside, i.e., the blood of a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar, which may not be brought inside the Sanctuary, from another prohibition of outside, the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary; but one does not derive a case of outside from the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, whose blood is brought inside the Sanctuary.
  And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one derives a <i>halakha</i> involving an animal, i.e., a sin offering whose blood placement is on the external altar, from another <i>halakha</i> involving an animal, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur; but one does not derive a case of an animal from a prohibition involving a person.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the priest took the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presentation. The Gemara infers: But if his taking of the blood into the Sanctuary was intentional, it is disqualified. The Gemara analyzes this <i>halakha</i>: Is the blood disqualified only in a case where he took the blood into the Sanctuary and atoned, by sprinkling it inside the Sanctuary, as claimed by Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna; or even in a case where he took the blood in and did not yet atone, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said that one can cite a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: From the fact that it is stated with regard to the Yom Kippur service: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering, whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary, shall be taken outside the camp, and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung; and he who burns them shall wash his clothes” (Leviticus 16:27–28), one can ask the following question: Why must the verse state: “And he who burns”?
  The Gemara interrupts its citation of the <i>baraita</i> to question its line of inquiry. Why must the verse state: “And he who burns”? One can answer that this term was necessary for itself, to teach that the one who burns the bull and goat of Yom Kippur is thereby rendered ritually impure. Rather, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Why must the verse state twice: “Sin offering,” “sin offering,” with regard to the bull and the goat? It could have stated merely: And the bull and the goat of the sin offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> answers that if the term “sin offering” had appeared only once, we would have learned only with regard to the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur that are burned in the place of the ashes that they render ritually impure the garments of the one who carries them. From where is it derived that the same applies to other sin offerings that are burned? The verse states: “Sin offering,” “sin offering,” twice, to include all sin offerings that are burned. This the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Meir says: This derivation from the repeated mention of sin offering is not necessary. Now consider, the verse states: “And the bull of the sin offering and the goat of the sin offering…shall be taken outside the camp.” As there is no need for the verse to state with regard to these offerings: “Whose blood was brought in to atone in the Sanctuary,” why must the verse nevertheless state: “To atone”? This teaches with regard to all offerings that atone inside the Sanctuary that one who burns them renders his garments impure.
  The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yehuda does not learn anything from the term “to atone.” What is the reason for this? Is it not because he requires this phrase for a verbal analogy, to derive that the blood of an external sin offering that was taken inside the Sanctuary is disqualified only if the priest sprinkled it, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? This answers the Gemara’s question, as Rabbi Yehuda evidently follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  
  MISHNA: Certain unfit items, once they have been placed on the altar, are nevertheless sacrificed. The mishna teaches: The altar sanctifies only items that are suited to it. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree as to the definition of suited for the altar.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, e.g., burnt offerings and the sacrificial portions of other offerings, which are burned on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>, it shall not descend. Since it was sanctified by its ascent upon the altar, it is sacrificed upon it, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt offering, which is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, with regard to any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend.
  Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar,” from which it is derived: Just as with regard to a burnt offering, which is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend, so too, any item that is fit for the altar, if it ascended it shall not descend.
  The mishna comments: The difference between the statement of Rabban Gamliel and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is only with regard to disqualified blood and disqualified libations, which are not consumed by the fire but do ascend upon the altar, as Rabban Gamliel says: They shall not descend, as they are fit to ascend upon the altar, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: They shall descend, as they are not burned on the altar.
  Rabbi Shimon says: Whether the offering was fit and the accompanying libations were unfit, e.g., if they became ritually impure or they were brought outside their designated area, or whether the libations were fit and the offering was unfit, rendering the accompanying libations unfit as well, and even if both this and that were unfit, the offering shall not descend, as it was sanctified by the altar, but the libations shall descend.
  
  Daf 83b
  
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the altar sanctifies items that are suited to it, from which the Gemara infers: Items suited to the altar, yes, they are sanctified by it, but items that are not suited to the altar, no, they are not sanctified by it and descend from it even after ascending. The Gemara asks: This inference serves to exclude what? Rav Pappa said: It serves to exclude handfuls of flour that were removed from meal offerings by a priest in order to be burned on the altar, and that were not sanctified by being placed in a service vessel before they ascended upon the altar. Those handfuls did not yet become suited for the altar and therefore shall descend.
  Ravina objects to Rav Pappa’s assertion: In what way is this case different from that of Ulla? As Ulla says: Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that one offered up on the altar before the sprinkling of the offering’s blood, and are therefore not yet suited for the altar, shall not descend, as they have become the bread of the altar, i.e., they have been sanctified such that they must be burned.
  The Gemara responds that there is a difference between the cases: These sacrificial portions described by Ulla do not lack the performance of an action with regard to themselves that will render them fit for the altar; they lack only the sprinkling of the blood, an independent action. By contrast, these handfuls mentioned by Rav Pappa lack the performance of an action with regard to themselves, as they have yet to be sanctified through placement in a service vessel and never became fit for the altar.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehoshua says: Any item that is suited to be consumed by the fire on the altar, if it ascended upon the altar it shall not descend, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that any item suited for burning on the altar shall not descend. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabban Gamliel also, who holds that any item suited for the altar, whether it is to be burned or not, shall not descend, isn’t it written in the verse: “Burnt offering on the pyre”? The Gemara responds: That verse comes to teach the mitzva to restore to the pyre any parts of the offering that were dislodged from the pyre, and is not discussing unfit items at all.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, from where does he derive the requirement to restore to the fire sacrificial portions that were dislodged from it? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the verse: “That the fire has consumed of the burnt offering on the altar” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that items already partially consumed by the fire are restored to it even if they were dislodged from the pyre.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabban Gamliel, what does he derive from that verse? The Gemara responds: Rabban Gamliel requires that verse to derive that you return partially consumed parts of a burnt offering to the altar, but you do not return partially consumed parts of an incense offering that fell from the golden altar. As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Minyumi, son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, teaches that the verse “that the fire has consumed of the burnt offering on the altar” teaches that you return partially consumed parts of a burnt offering that fell from the pyre, but you do not return partially consumed parts of an incense offering that fell from the pyre.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, from where does he derive this distinction? The Gemara responds: Can it not be learned by itself from the straightforward meaning of the verse that we restore partially consumed parts of a burnt offering to the altar? Therefore, there is no need for an additional verse, as both <i>halakhot</i> can be derived from the same verse.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabban Gamliel says: With regard to any item that is suited to ascend upon the altar, even if it is not typically consumed, if it ascended, it shall not descend, even if it is disqualified from being sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>, as it is stated: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehoshua as well, isn’t it written: “Upon the altar,” and not merely: “On the pyre”? The Gemara responds: That term is required by Rabbi Yehoshua to teach: What is the reason the Merciful One states that any item that is suited for the pyre does not descend from the altar? It is because the altar sanctifies it.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabban Gamliel, from where does he derive that the altar sanctifies the items that ascend upon it? The Gemara responds: It is from the fact that the term “altar” is written another time, in the verse: “Whatever touches the altar shall be sacred” (Exodus 29:37). The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yehoshua, why does he require two verses to teach the same <i>halakha</i>, i.e., that the altar sanctifies items that ascend upon it? The Gemara answers: One verse is necessary for a case where an item had a time of fitness for consumption by the fire and was then disqualified, e.g., it became ritually impure; and one verse is necessary for a case where an item did not have a time of fitness, e.g., an offering that became disqualified at the moment of its slaughter.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabban Gamliel, why does he not require another verse to teach that even items that had no time of fitness shall not descend from the altar? The Gemara responds: Once there are disqualified items that the Merciful One included in the <i>halakha</i> that they shall not descend from the altar, it is no different if the item had a time of fitness and it is no different if the item did not have a time of fitness.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: Whether the offering was fit and the accompanying libations were unfit, or whether the libations were fit and the offering was unfit, and even if both this and that were unfit, the offering shall not descend, but the libations shall descend. The Gemara elaborates: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: The verse that teaches that fit items shall not descend from the altar states: “This is the law of the burnt offering: It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). From there it is derived: Just as a burnt offering, which is an item that comes upon the altar for its own sake, shall not descend, so too, all items that come upon the altar for their own sake shall not descend. Excluded are libations, which come upon the altar for the sake of the offering, not for their own sake; these shall descend.
  § The Gemara cites another <i>baraita</i> relating to the mishna. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From that which is stated: “Whatever touches the altar shall be sacred” (Exodus 29:37), I would derive that the altar sanctifies any item that ascends upon it, whether it is fit for the altar or whether it is unfit. Therefore, the verse states: “Now this is that which you shall offer upon the altar: Two lambs” (Exodus 29:38), to teach: Just as lambs are fit for the altar and are sanctified by it, so too, all items fit for the altar are sanctified by it. Rabbi Akiva says that the verse states: “Burnt offering,” to teach: Just as a burnt offering is fit for the altar and is sanctified by it, so too, all items fit for the altar are sanctified by it.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these opinions? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The case of a disqualified bird burnt offering is the practical difference between them. One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, who cites the <i>halakha</i> from the term “burnt offering,” includes a disqualified bird burnt offering in the <i>halakha</i> that the offering shall not descend, as it is a burnt offering. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who cites the <i>halakha</i> from the term “lambs,” does not include a disqualified bird burnt offering in the <i>halakha</i>, as it is not similar to a lamb.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who cites the <i>halakha</i> from the term “lambs,” isn’t it written: “Burnt offering”? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, if “lambs” had been written and “burnt offering” had not been written, I would say that even an animal that became disqualified and ascended upon the altar while alive shall not descend. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Burnt offering,” indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to animals once they are fit to ascend the altar. Live animals are not fit to ascend the altar.
  The Gemara continues: And according to the one who derives the <i>halakha</i> from “burnt offering,” isn’t it written: “Lambs”? The Gemara explains: According to Rabbi Akiva, if “burnt offering” had been written and “lambs” had not been written, I would say that any item fit to ascend the altar is included in the <i>halakha</i>, even a meal offering. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Lambs,” indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to animal offerings and bird offerings, not to meal offerings.
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the opinions of these <i>tanna’im</i>, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva, and the opinions of these <i>tanna’im</i> of the mishna? Rav Pappa said: The difference between them is with regard to handfuls of flour, removed from meal offerings, that were sanctified in a service vessel and were then disqualified. According to our <i>tanna’im</i>, i.e., those in the mishna here, those handfuls shall not descend, as they are fit for the altar and for consumption by the fire as well. According to the <i>tanna’im</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, those handfuls shall descend, as those <i>tanna’im</i> hold that the <i>halakha</i> applies only to animal offerings and bird offerings.
  Reish Lakish says in summary: With regard to a meal offering that comes by itself and does not accompany another offering, according to the statements of all of the <i>tanna’im</i> in the mishna, it shall not descend once it ascended, either because it is fit to be consumed by the fire, or because it comes by itself. According to the statements of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Akiva,
  
  Daf 84a
  
  even that meal offering shall descend, as it is not similar to lambs. With regard to a meal offering that comes with an animal offering, either a burnt offering or peace offering, according to the statements of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua, it shall not descend, as it is meant for consumpion by the fire. According to the statements of everyone else, i.e., Rabbi Shimon and the <i>tannai’im</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, it shall descend, as it is neither offered by itself nor is it an animal.
  Reish Lakish continues: With regard to libations that come by themselves, according to the statements of everyone, i.e., Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Yehoshua, they shall descend, but according to the statements of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Shimon, they shall not descend. With regard to libations that come with an animal offering, according to the statements of everyone, they shall descend, while according to the statement of Rabban Gamliel alone, they shall not descend.
  The Gemara questions the need for such a summary: Isn’t it obvious? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to state the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a meal offering that comes by itself, and this is in accordance with the statement of Rava. As Rava says: A person can volunteer to bring a meal offering that normally accompanies libations, on any day, even without offering the libations and animal offering that it normally accompanies. Although the summary is itself obvious, it is nevertheless stated to indicate that it is possible to offer such a meal offering.
  The Gemara asks: If the intent of his summary is to express his agreement with the statement of Rava, then let Reish Lakish teach us explicitly that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Rava. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the case of libations that come with an animal offering, as the <i>halakha</i> in such a case is that he may sacrifice the libations the next day and on a later [<i>ḥara</i>] day sometime after sacrificing the animal offering that they accompany.
  Accordingly, it may enter your mind to say that since the Master says that the verse: “And their meal offering and their liba-tions” (Numbers 29:18), indicates that libations may be offered at night, and the phrase “and their meal offering and their libations” indicates that libations may be offered the next day and on a later day, perhaps libations offered on a later date than the animal itself are to be considered as libations which come by themselves, and Rabbi Shimon would concede that they shall not descend. Reish Lakish therefore teaches us the case of libations that accompany an animal offering, to indicate that such libations are still considered as those that accompany an animal offering and that they shall descend from the altar.
  MISHNA: These are the items that even if they were disqualified, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend: Blood, sacrificial portions, or limbs of a burnt offering, any of which were left overnight off the altar, or that emerge from the Temple courtyard, or that become ritually impure, or that came from an animal that was slaughtered with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, or an offering that people unfit to perform the Temple service collected and then sprinkled its blood.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered at night, or one whose blood was spilled on the floor of the Temple without its being collected in a vessel, or one whose blood emerged outside the curtains, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard: Even if it ascended upon the altar it shall descend. Rabbi Shimon says: In all these cases, if it ascended it shall not descend, because its disqualification occurred in sanctity. As Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any unfit offering whose disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., in the course of the Temple service, the sacred area renders the offering acceptable, and if it ascended onto the altar it shall not descend. But with regard to any offering whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity but rather was unfit initially, the sacred area does not render the offering acceptable.
  And these are the offerings whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity: An animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and an animal that was set aside for idol worship, and an animal that was worshipped as a deity, and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, and an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, and an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], and an animal born by caesarean section, and blemished animals. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit in the sense that if they ascended they shall not descend. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: My father would reject blemished animals from upon the altar.
  Concerning those animals that, if they ascended, do not descend, just as if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, so too, if they descended they shall not then ascend. And all of them that if they ascend they do not descend, if they ascended to the top of the altar alive they descend, as an animal is fit for the altar only after it is slaughtered. A burnt offering that ascended to the top of the altar alive shall descend, as one does not slaughter an animal atop the altar <i>ab initio</i>. But if one slaughtered the animal at the top of the altar, he should flay it and cut it into pieces in its place, and it is not removed from the altar.
  GEMARA: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: The verse from which is derived the <i>halakha</i> that items that ascended upon the altar shall not descend, states: “This is the law of the burnt offering: It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:2). These are three terms of exclusion used in the verse: “This,” “it,” and “the,” from which it is derived that three instances are excluded from this <i>halakha</i>: A sacrificial animal that was slaughtered at night, and one whose blood was spilled, and one whose blood emerged outside the curtains, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard. With regard to these cases, the <i>halakha</i> is that if one of them ascended upon the altar it shall descend.
  Rabbi Shimon says: From the usage of the term “burnt offering” I have derived only with regard to a fit burnt offering that it shall not descend. From where is it derived that the verse also includes a sacrificial animal that was disqualified, such as one that was slaughtered at night; or whose blood was spilled; or whose blood emerged outside the curtains, i.e., outside the Temple courtyard; or that was left overnight; or that emerged from the Temple courtyard, or that became ritually impure; or that came from an animal that was slaughtered with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or an offering that people unfit to perform the Temple service collected and then sprinkled its blood?
  In addition, from where is it derived that the following are also included in this <i>halakha</i>: Those offerings whose blood is to be placed below the red line that divided between the upper and lower halves of the external altar, i.e., a burnt offering, a guilt offering, or a peace offering, but it was placed above the red line; and a sin offering, whose blood is to be placed above the red line, that had its blood placed below the red line; and those offerings whose blood is to be placed outside, on the external altar, that had their blood placed inside, in the Sanctuary; and those offerings whose blood is to be placed inside that had their blood placed outside?
  And in addition, with regard to a Paschal offering or sin offering that were slaughtered not for their sake, from where is it derived that if they ascended upon the altar they shall not descend? The verse states: “The law of the burnt offering,” which included in one law all items that ascend upon the altar, establishing the principle that if they ascended the altar they shall not descend.
  One might have thought that I should also include an animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and an animal that was set aside for idol worship, and an animal that was worshipped as a deity, and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, and an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, and an animal that is a <i>tereifa</i>, and an animal born by caesarean section. Therefore, the verse states: “This,” to exclude these types of disqualifications, which descend even after they have ascended the altar.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see as reason to include those and exclude these? The Gemara answers: After noting that the verse included
  
  Daf 84b
  
  and subsequently the verse excluded, I say the following claim with regard to what to include and what to exclude: I will include those whose disqualification was in sanctity, i.e., in the course of Temple service, and rule that if they ascended they shall not descend, and I will exclude these whose disqualification was not in sanctity, and rule that if they ascended they shall descend.
  And as for Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and does not deem it permitted for items whose disqualification occurred in sanctity to remain on the altar, yet agrees that those items listed in the beginning of the mishna, such as sacrificial portions left overnight, shall not descend, he derives it from here, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For what reason did the Sages say to us that in the case of blood left overnight it is fit, i.e., if blood of an offering had been left overnight and was then placed on the altar it is not removed?
  This is as the <i>halakha</i> is in the case of sacrificial portions, which if they are left overnight are fit. From where is it derived that in the case of sacrificial portions that are left overnight, they are fit? This is as the <i>halakha</i> is in the case of meat, which if it is left overnight is fit, because the meat of a peace offering may be eaten for two days and one night.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that emerges from the Temple courtyard is then placed on the altar it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, since an offering that leaves its area is fit in the case of an offering brought on a private altar, as the entire notion of sacrifice on such an altar is that it may be performed anywhere.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that has become ritually impure is placed on the altar it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, since it is permitted to offer an impure offering in the case of communal rites, i.e., communal offerings. In cases of necessity, the communal offerings may be sacrificed even if they are ritually impure.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it beyond its designated time [<i>piggul</i>] was placed on the altar, it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, since the sprinkling of its blood effects acceptance with regard to its status as <i>piggul</i>. The status of <i>piggul</i> takes effect only if the sacrificial rites involving that offering were otherwise performed properly. This indicates that it still has the status of an offering, so it is not removed from the altar.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it outside its designated area was placed on the altar, it is not removed? This is derived by comparison, since it is juxtaposed to an offering that was slaughtered with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.
  From where is it derived that if an offering that people unfit for performing the Temple service collected and then sprinkled its blood was placed on the altar, it is not removed? This is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of these priests who are generally disqualified because they are impure, yet who are fit to perform the communal rites, i.e., to sacrifice communal offerings, in a case when all the priests or the majority of the Jewish people are impure.
  The Gemara questions the derivations of the <i>baraita</i>: But can one deduce the <i>halakha</i> of a matter that is not fit, i.e., sacrificial portions that are disqualified due to having been left overnight, from the <i>halakha</i> of a matter that is fit, i.e., the peace offering, which is permitted for eating for two days and one night? Similarly, how can the <i>baraita</i> derive the <i>halakha</i> of flesh that was removed from the Temple courtyard from the <i>halakha</i> of a private altar, which has no halakhic area surrounding it?
  The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> relied on the verse: “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: This is the law of the burnt offering: It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar all night until the morning; and the fire of the altar shall be kept burning there” (Leviticus 6:2), which amplified the application of the <i>halakha</i> stated in the verse, teaching that many types of disqualified offerings may be left upon the altar. The derivations written in the <i>baraita</i> are mere supports for those two <i>halakhot</i>. The explanations cited in the <i>baraita</i> for including these disqualifications are mentioned only to clarify why Rabbi Yehuda does not exclude them based on the terms “this,” “it,” and “that.”
  § With regard to an offering that was slaughtered at night, which Rabbi Yehuda holds shall descend from the altar even if it ascended, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who slaughters a sacrificial animal at night inside the Temple courtyard, and then offers it up on an altar outside the Temple courtyard, is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, which is the punishment for one who sacrifices an offering outside the Temple courtyard. Although one is normally liable for sacrificing an offering outside the Temple courtyard only if it was fit to be offered on the altar within the Temple, and an animal slaughtered at night is disqualified and shall descend from the altar according to Rabbi Yehuda,
  
  Daf 85a
  
  nevertheless, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters an animal at night should not be less stringent than that of one who slaughters an animal outside the Temple and offers it up outside. With regard to that case, the mishna (106a) states that such a person is liable, even though an animal slaughtered outside the Temple is not fit to be offered on the altar inside the Temple and shall descend from the altar even if it has ascended.
  Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mishna (111a): One who slaughters a bird inside the Temple courtyard and then offers it up on an altar outside the Temple is exempt, as a bird offering is supposed to be pinched at the nape of the neck and not slaughtered with a knife. But if he slaughtered the bird outside the Temple courtyard and offered it up outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, let us say that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters an animal inside the Temple should not be less stringent than that of one who slaughters an animal and offers it up outside the Temple. Why, then, is such a person exempt?
  The Gemara responds: This is indeed a conclusive refutation, and the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is rejected. The Gemara adds a possible explanation: If you wish, say that one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a bird slaughtered inside the Temple from that of a bird slaughtered outside of it, because in the case of the slaughter of a bird inside the Temple, it is considered as if he killed it. By contrast, in the case of an animal slaughtered at night within the Temple, although it is disqualified, it is still considered a slaughtered animal, and its status may therefore be derived from that of an animal that is slaughtered outside the Temple.
  § Concerning items that were inappropriately placed on the altar, Ulla says: Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that one offered up upon the altar before the sprinkling of their blood, which is the act that sanctifies such portions for the altar, shall not descend, as they have become the bread of the altar.
  Rabbi Zeira said in support of Ulla: We learn in the mishna as well: The sacrificial portions of an offering whose blood was spilled, or whose blood emerged outside the curtains, shall not descend if they ascended. From this one can infer: And if there, where the blood was spilled, if he comes to sprinkle it he cannot sprinkle it, as there is no blood with which to do so, and you said that if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, then here, where the blood is intact such that if he comes to sprinkle it he sprinkles it, which renders the sacrificial portions permitted for sacrifice upon the altar, is it not all the more so that if they ascended they shall not descend?
  The Gemara rejects the inference of Rabbi Zeira: Interpret the mishna as referring specifically to offerings of the most sacred order, whose sacrificial portions are sanctified for the sake of the altar before their blood is presented. Therefore, such sacrificial portions are considered fit for the altar and shall not descend if they ascended. It may be that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity are entirely unfit for the altar before the presentation of their blood.
  The Gemara challenges: But there is a Paschal offering, which is an offering of lesser sanctity, and it is mentioned in the same list of items that shall not descend if they ascended. The Gemara explains: Interpret the case of a Paschal offering as referring to where it was slaughtered not for its sake, but not to where its blood was spilled or emerged outside the curtains.
  We learned in the mishna: And all of them that if they ascend they do not descend, if they ascended to the top of the altar alive, they descend. But it may be inferred from here that slaughtered animals shall not descend, even if their blood was not presented. What, is it not that this inference applies to all offerings, and the <i>halakha</i> is not different with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, and it is not different with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity?
  The Gemara responds: No, it is possible to infer as follows: But with regard to slaughtered animals, some of them shall descend and some of them shall not descend. The Gemara challenges: But the mishna teaches that all of them shall descend if they ascended alive, in which case it must be inferred with regard to all of them that if they were slaughtered they shall not descend. The Gemara explains: When the mishna states: All of them shall descend, it is referring only to animals that ascended upon the altar while still alive, in order to emphasize that all fit animals that ascended while still alive shall descend and are not slaughtered atop the altar. The mishna did not intend to teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all slaughtered animals.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that live animals that ascended upon the altar shall descend? The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna intends to teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to living animals but is referring specifically to animals blemished on the cornea of the eye, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that in the case of such a small blemish, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend. The phrase: All of them shall descend, teaches that even Rabbi Akiva agrees that such animals that ascended while still alive shall descend.
  The Gemara asks: To what case did you interpret this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna to be referring? You interpreted it as referring to disqualified offerings. Say the latter clause: And likewise, a burnt offering that ascended to the top of the altar alive shall descend. But if one slaughtered the animal at the top of the altar, he should flay it and cut it into pieces in its place, and it is not removed from the altar. And if the mishna is referring to a disqualified offering one must ask: Is a disqualified offering fit for flaying and cutting? The Merciful One states: “And he shall flay the burnt offering, and cut it into its pieces” (Leviticus 1:6), and the word “it” indicates an exclusion: Only fit offerings are flayed and cut, and not those that are disqualified.
  The Gemara answers: In the latter clause we come to refer to a fit offering. The Gemara asks: And what does this teach us? The Gemara answers: It teaches that there is flaying and cutting at the top of the altar, and it is not considered degrading to the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that there is no flaying and cutting at the top of the altar, what can be said? The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the animal that ascended while still alive had a time of fitness, during which it was slaughtered atop the altar and its blood was presented, and thereafter it became disqualified. And the last clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Since the blood was sprinkled, thereby effecting acceptance of the flesh of the offering for a moment, even if the offering then became disqualified, he shall flay it and its hide is given to the priests, and its flesh is burned.
  The Gemara asks: But if the mishna is referring to an offering that became disqualified, then with regard to that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning the mishna: What shall he do with such an offering? He takes the innards down from the altar, placing them below it, and thereafter rinses them, why do I need to do so? Since the innards of a disqualified offering may not be returned to the altar once they have been removed from it, why should they be removed from the altar?
  The Gemara responds: Rather, what should we do? Should we offer them with their dung? Doesn’t the verse state: “Present it now to your governor; will he be pleased with you? Or will he accept your person?” (Malachi 1:8), and isn’t it derived from this verse that items considered repulsive to people are not fit for use as an offering for the Most High?
  The Gemara clarifies: This is what we are saying: Since one removes the innards of a disqualified offering from atop the altar and they may not be returned, why do I need to rinse them? The Gemara answers: The concern is that if another priest chances upon these innards and does not know that they are disqualified for the altar, he will sacrifice them upon the altar with their dung.
  
  Daf 85b
  
  The Gemara asks: And shall we stand and do something for the priests through which they shall come to encounter a stumbling block? Were these innards to remain unwashed, no priest would mistakenly sacrifice them upon the altar. The Gemara answers: Even so, rinsing disqualified innards is preferable, so that the sanctified offerings of Heaven shall not be lying as a carcass.
  With regard to the matter discussed by Ulla (85a), Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: In the case of sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that one offered up before the sprinkling of their blood, which is the act which sanctifies such portions for the altar, shall they descend or shall they not descend?
  Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Instead of raising the dilemma of whether or not such portions shall descend, you should raise the dilemma of whether their ascension upon the altar sanctifies them with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: With regard to the misuse of consecrated property I do not raise the dilemma, as certainly the rite of sprinkling and not their ascension to the altar determines their status with regard to the misuse of consecrated property. When Rabbi Yoḥanan raised the dilemma it was with regard to their descent from the altar. And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolved his dilemma and ruled: If they ascended they shall not descend, and they are not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches the discussion in this manner: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: In the case of sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that one offered up on the altar before the sprinkling of their blood, are they subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse or not? Rabbi Ami said to him: And you should raise the dilemma with regard to their descent from upon the altar. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: With regard to their descent I do not raise the dilemma, because after these sacrificial portions ascend the altar they become the bread of the altar and shall not descend. When I raise the dilemma it is with regard to the misuse of consecrated property. And Rabbi Yoḥanan resolved his dilemma in this manner: They shall not descend, and they are not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.
  § The mishna teaches: And these are the offerings whose disqualification did not occur in sanctity: An animal that copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality…or blemished animals. Such offerings shall descend from the altar if they ascended. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit in the sense that if they ascended upon the altar they shall not descend.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only those animals with small blemishes, such as on the cornea of the eye, as such blemishes are fit with regard to bird offerings <i>ab initio</i>. And this is the <i>halakha</i> only when their consecration preceded their blemish, since such an animal was fit for the altar at the time of its consecration. But if their blemish preceded their consecration, they shall descend, as they were never fit for the altar. And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering that it shall descend from the altar. Since only a male animal may be used for a burnt offering, it is like a case where the animal’s blemish preceded its consecration.
  The Gemara presents a discussion in which the opinion of Rabbi Akiva is cited: Rabbi Yirmeya raises the dilemma: Is the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality applicable with regard to birds, or is there no disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality with regard to birds? Did the verse say: “When any man of you brings an offering to the Lord, you shall bring your offering of the animals” (Leviticus 1:2), where the term “of” serves to exclude from being brought as offerings both an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality, in order to equate the two?
  If so, then derive from it that anywhere that there is a disqualification of an animal that copulated with a person there is a disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality, and anywhere that there is no disqualification of an animal that copulated with a person there is no disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality. Consequently, since birds cannot be the active party in an act of bestiality, the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality is also inapplicable to birds. Or perhaps the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality does apply with regard to birds, as nevertheless a sin was committed with it?
  Rabba said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit when the blemish is on the cornea, since such blemishes are fit with regard to bird offerings <i>ab initio</i>. And if it is so that a bird that was the object of bestiality is fit as an offering, then let us also deem fit an animal that was the object of bestiality, since such an offering is fit with regard to birds. From the fact that such animals are not deemed fit, conclude from the mishna that the disqualification of an animal that was the object of bestiality applies to birds as well.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We learn in the <i>baraita</i> as well: A bird that was the object of bestiality, or that was set aside for idol worship, or that was worshipped as a deity, or that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or that was a <i>tumtum</i> or a hermaphrodite, in all of those cases, if its nape was pinched, it renders the garments of one who swallows an olive-bulk from the carcass ritually impure when it is in the throat, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all unslaughtered carcasses of birds. Since the <i>baraita</i> lists a bird that was the object of bestiality among those disqualified offerings, conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that such a bird is in fact disqualified.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: My father would reject blemished animals from upon the altar. The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? The first <i>tanna</i> already stated that blemished animals shall descend. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that Rabbi Ḥanina teaches us an incident, to express that this <i>halakha</i> was not only stated theoretically but applied practically as well. And if you wish, say instead: What is the meaning of the term: Would reject? It means that he would remove blemished animals from the altar in a backhanded manner, i.e., privately rather than publicly, so as not to disgrace the honor of the altar.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to those disqualified offerings that shall not descend from the altar if they ascended it: Just as if it ascended it does not descend, so too, if it descended it does not then ascend. Ulla says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where the fire has not yet taken hold of these offerings. But if the fire has taken hold of these offerings, then even if they descended from the altar they shall ascend.
  Rav Mari teaches that the statement of Ulla is referring to the first clause, i.e., to this mishna. Rav Ḥanina of Sura teaches that Ulla is referring to the latter clause, i.e., to the next mishna, which states: The bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves of a burnt offering; when they are attached to the flesh of the offering they shall ascend upon the altar and be sacrificed with the offering. If they separated from the flesh of the offering they shall not ascend. With regard to this Ulla says: The Sages taught that if they separated from the flesh they shall not ascend only in a case where the fire has not yet taken hold of them. But if the fire has taken hold of them, then even if they separated from the flesh of the offering they shall ascend.
  The Gemara elaborates: According to the one who teaches Ulla’s statement, i.e., if the fire has taken hold of them they still ascend the altar, as referring to the latter clause, which discusses items that are not burned on the altar, all the more so will Ulla’s statement apply to the first clause, which discusses items that are burned on the altar but were disqualified. And according to the one who teaches Ulla’s statement as referring to the first clause, it applies only to those items that were to be burned on the altar but were disqualified. But with regard to the latter clause it does not apply, since the bones, tendons, and other items mentioned there are not subject to burning at all.
  MISHNA: And these are the items that if they ascended upon the altar they descend, because they are completely unfit for the altar: The meat of offerings of the most sacred order, i.e., a guilt offering and a sin offering, the meat of which is eaten by priests; and the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, which is eaten by the owners; and the surplus of the <i>omer</i> meal offering brought on the second day of Passover after the handful was removed and burned on the altar; and the two loaves meal offering brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>; and the shewbread; and the remainder of the meal offerings after the handful was removed, which are all eaten by the priests; and the incense that ascended upon the external altar and not the golden altar where it should be burned.
  With regard to the wool that is on the heads of the sheep brought as burnt offerings, and the hair that is in the beard of goats that were sacrificed, and the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves: When they are attached to the flesh of the offering they shall ascend upon the altar and be sacrificed with the offering, as it is stated: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9). If they separated from the flesh of the offering they shall not ascend, as it is stated: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deuteronomy 12:27), and nothing else.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9). The term “the whole” serves to include the bones and the tendons and the horns and the hooves among those items that are sacrificed on the altar. One might have thought that even if they separated from the flesh of the burnt offering they are sacrificed upon the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deuteronomy 12:27), indicating that only those items and anything attached to them are sacrificed upon the altar.
  If one derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to bones and tendons from the phrase “the flesh and the blood,”
  
  Daf 86a
  
  then one might have thought that a priest must first remove the tendons and bones from an offering and then sacrifice the flesh upon the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar,” including the tendons and bones. How can these texts be reconciled? If they were attached to the flesh, they shall ascend. If they separated from the flesh, then even if they are already at the top of the altar, they shall descend.
  The Gemara notes: Who is the <i>tanna</i> that you heard that says if they separated they shall descend? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar” (Leviticus 1:9); the term “the whole” serves to include the bones, and the tendons, and the horns, and the hooves, among those items that are offered on the altar, even if they separated from the flesh of the offering.
  But if so, how do I realize the meaning of the verse: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood” (Deuteronomy 12:27), which indicates that only the flesh and blood of an offering ascend upon the altar? This verse is necessary to tell you an additional <i>halakha</i>, that you return the consumed flesh of a burnt offering to the fire if it is dislodged from it, but you do not return the consumed tendons and bones if they are dislodged from the fire.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that one verse states: “And the priest shall make the whole smoke on the altar,” which included tendons and bones, and one verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood,” which excluded any part other than the flesh and the blood. How can these texts be reconciled? If they were attached to the flesh, they shall ascend. If they separated from the flesh, then even if they are already on top of the altar, they shall descend.
  § The mishna teaches that items that are not meant for consumption on the altar, such as the bones and tendons, are sacrificed along with the flesh if they are attached to it. But if they separated they shall not ascend. Rabbi Zeira said: The Sages taught that if they separated from the flesh they shall not ascend only when they separated from the offering downward, i.e., away from the altar, whereby they became distanced from the pyre when they were separated. But if they separated from the offering upward, i.e., they became closer to the pyre when they were separated from the offering, they have become closer to consumption and shall ascend. The Gemara asks: And even if they separated, shall they be offered? Doesn’t the mishna state that they shall ascend only if they are still attached to the flesh?
  Rabba said: This is what Rabbi Zeira is saying: It was necessary for the Sages to teach the <i>halakha</i>, that bones or tendons that separated from the flesh of an offering shall not ascend the altar, only where they separated after the sprinkling of its blood, since at the time that the flesh itself became permitted for the altar through the sprinkling, the bones and tendons were still attached to the flesh and therefore fit to be offered with it. But if they separated from an offering before the sprinkling of its blood they shall certainly not ascend, as they were already separated from the flesh when it became permitted for the altar. Instead, the sprinkling comes and permits them for any use, just as the hide of a burnt offering is permitted to the priests upon the sprinkling of its blood. In fact, one may even use such tendons or bones to fashion the handles of knives from them.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rabba holds in accordance with that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: It is stated: “He shall have the hide of the burnt offering that he has offered” (Leviticus 7:8), with regard to a burnt offering, and it is stated: “The priest that makes atonement, he shall have it” (Leviticus 7:7), with regard to a guilt offering. The following verbal analogy is derived from here: Just as after the blood of a guilt offering is presented its bones become permitted to the priest for any use, since only the portions intended for consumption on the altar are sacrificed whereas the rest of the animal is given to the priests, so too, with regard to a burnt offering, bones that are not attached to the flesh and therefore are not intended for the altar are permitted.
  The Gemara notes: The phrase “He shall have” is free, i.e., superfluous in its context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy, and there is a principle that such verbal analogies are not refuted. As, if these words were not considered free, the verbal analogy can be refuted by saying: What is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that its meat is permitted and its bones are therefore permitted as well, while the flesh of a burnt offering ascends upon the altar in its entirety. If so, <i>halakhot</i> may not be applied to one based on the other. Consequently, the phrase “He shall have” with regard to a burnt offering is considered as having been written superfluously, as it would have sufficed to state: The hide of the burnt offering that he has offered, to the priest.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection to the explanation of Rabba from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the bones of sacrificial animals, specifically sin offerings or guilt offerings, which are offerings of the most sacred order that are intended for consumption, before the sprinkling of their blood, one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property, similar to the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order before their blood is sprinkled.
  After the sprinkling of their blood, one who benefits from them is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, as they are not intended for sacrificing upon the altar. But concerning the bones of a burnt offering, one who benefits from them is always liable for misuse of consecrated property. This <i>baraita</i> contradicts the opinion of Rabba, who said that if the bones separated from a burnt offering before the sprinkling of its blood, it is permitted to derive benefit from them.
  The Gemara answers: Say that the <i>baraita</i> meant the following: But concerning the bones of a burnt offering, if they separated before the sprinkling of its blood and its blood was then sprinkled, then one who benefits from them is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. If they separated after the sprinkling of its blood, one who benefits from them is always liable for misuse of consecrated property.
  And Rabba disagrees with Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: If the bones of a burnt offering separated from its flesh before sprinkling, one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property. If they separated after sprinkling, the Sages decreed that one may not benefit from them <i>ab initio</i>, but if one benefitted from them after the fact, he is not liable for misuse, since by Torah law they were permitted through the sprinkling of the offering’s blood.
  MISHNA: And all of those disqualified offerings with regard to which it was taught (84a) that if they ascended they do not descend, in a case where they were dislodged from upon the altar, the priest does not restore them to the altar. And likewise, with regard to an ember that was dislodged from upon the altar, the priest does not restore it to the altar. As for limbs of a fit burnt offering that were dislodged from upon the altar, if they were dislodged before midnight, the priest should restore them to the altar and one is liable for misusing them. But if they were dislodged after midnight, the priest does not restore them and one is not liable for misusing them, as one is not liable for misuse of consecrated property after it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was designated.
  With regard to unfit items that if they ascended do not descend, just as the altar sanctifies items that are suited to it, so too, the ramp sanctifies items that are suited to it. Just as the altar and the ramp sanctify items that are suited to them, so too, the service vessels sanctify items that are placed in them.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that limbs of a fit burnt offering that were dislodged from upon the altar before midnight are returned to the altar, but that if they were dislodged after midnight they are not returned. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the limbs have substance, i.e., they were not yet consumed in their entirety by the fire, then even if they were dislodged after midnight the priest must return them to the fire. If they do not have substance and have been reduced to ash, then even if they were dislodged before midnight the priest does not return them to the altar. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary
  
  Daf 86b
  
  with regard to hardened limbs that were dried by the fire but have not yet been reduced to ash. The mishna teaches that before midnight, such limbs should be returned to the altar. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived that midnight determines whether or not they shall be returned?
  Rav says: One verse states: All night and he shall burn the burnt offering, which indicates that there is a mitzva to burn the limbs of a burnt offering all night, as the verse states: “It is the burnt offering on the pyre upon the altar all night until the morning” (Leviticus 6:2). And one verse states: “All night until the morning…and he shall remove the ashes that the fire has consumed of the burnt offering on the altar, and he shall put them beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:2–3), which indicates that one may remove the ashes at any time during the night, including the limbs of a burnt offering that were already hardened by the fire. How can these texts be reconciled?
  Rav explains: Divide the night into two parts: Half of the night, i.e., until midnight, is designated for the mitzva of burning, and during this time, that which is dislodged from the altar shall be returned; and half of the night, i.e., after midnight, is designated for removing.
  With regard to Rav’s assertion that one may begin to remove the ashes only after midnight, Rav Kahana raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 20a): Every day the priests would remove the ashes from the altar and place them on the east side of the ramp at the rooster’s crow or close to the time of its crowing, whether before it or after it, as there was no insistence on a precise time. On Yom Kippur they would remove the ashes at midnight. On the Festivals the ashes were removed even earlier, at the end of the first watch. Rav Kahana concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that the proper time for removing the ashes by Torah law is from midnight, how do we advance the removal of the ashes on the Festivals, and how do we delay their removal the rest of the year?
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The proper time of the removal of the ashes is based on the following: From the fact that it is stated with regard to the burning of the limbs: “All night” (Leviticus 6:2), don’t I know that he may burn a burnt offering until the morning? If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Until the morning”? It means: Add another morning to the morning of the night. Arise before dawn, as that is the time for the removal of the ashes. Nevertheless, there is no specific hour fixed for performing this removal, and one may remove the ashes from the beginning of the night.
  Therefore, every day, performing the removal at the rooster’s crow is sufficient. On Yom Kippur, due to the weakness of the High Priest, who must perform the entire Temple service on that day, they would hasten to remove the ashes from midnight. On the Festivals, during which there are many offerings on account of the masses of Jewish people in Jerusalem on those days, who, in order to offer their sacrifices, would arrive early at the Temple, they would remove the ashes beginning from the end of the first watch, as the mishna teaches in the latter clause (<i>Yoma</i> 20a): The call of the rooster would not arrive on Festivals until the Temple courtyard was filled with Jews.
  § The Gemara previously explained the mishna as saying that limbs that were hardened by the fire but not entirely consumed are not returned to the altar if they were dislodged from it after midnight, since the mitzva of burning has been performed and the limbs are considered to have been entirely consumed. It was stated that <i>amora’im</i> engage in a dispute concerning the following matter: In the case of limbs that separated from upon the altar before midnight and were returned after midnight, whereby the mitzva of burning was not completed by midnight, Rabba says:
  
  Daf 87a
  
  The second midnight, i.e., midnight of the following night, renders them consumed, and if they were dislodged from the altar thereafter they are not returned. Rav Ḥisda says: Dawn following the first evening renders them consumed, and if they were dislodged from the altar thereafter they are not returned.
  They say in the school of Rav: What is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda, who says that dawn renders these limbs consumed? It is the following <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if midnight, which does not cause the disqualification of being left overnight with regard to limbs that were left off the altar until that time, still causes consumption, i.e., limbs burned on the altar until midnight are considered entirely consumed, then certainly with regard to dawn, which causes the disqualification of being left overnight with regard to limbs that were not left off the altar until that time, isn’t it logical that it causes consumption?
  These <i>amora’im</i> also dispute the <i>halakha</i> in a case where the limbs separated from the altar before midnight and were returned to the altar after dawn: Rabba says that the second midnight renders them consumed, and if they separated after this time they are not returned. Rav Ḥisda says: Since these limbs were not returned to the altar by dawn, they are never subject to consumption through the passage of time. Rather, they are returned to the altar and allowed to burn until they are reduced to ash. These two disputes between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda indicate that both agree that limbs not on the altar by midnight are not considered consumed.
  Rav Yosef objects to this: And who shall say to us that midnight, specifically when the limbs are at the top of the altar, effects for them consumption? Perhaps anywhere that the limbs are found, midnight effects for them consumption. The Gemara notes: They sent from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, i.e., the passing of midnight renders all limbs consumed, regardless of their location at that time.
  It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: In the case of limbs that separated from upon the altar before midnight and were returned to the altar after midnight, one may not benefit from them <i>ab initio</i>, but if one benefited from them after the fact he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, since the mitzva of burning is considered fulfilled after midnight has passed. And bar Kappara also taught: If they separated from upon the altar before midnight and were returned to the altar after midnight, the limbs are removed from being subject to liability for misuse of consecrated property.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And since they sent from there that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef that midnight effects consumption even for those items left off the altar, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba says this as well, and bar Kappara also teaches that this is the <i>halakha</i>, then with regard to what do Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree? Abaye said to him: They disagree with regard to fatty limbs, whose consumption is delayed due to their surrounding fat, and consequently midnight may not effect consumption for these limbs.
  § Rava raises a dilemma before Rabba: Is the disqualification of being left overnight effective in disqualifying limbs that are situated at the top of the altar at dawn but were not placed on the pyre, or is it not effective in disqualifying limbs that are at the top of the altar but were not placed on the pyre? The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that the limbs have not descended from the altar, then the <i>halakha</i> should be obvious: Now that with regard to limbs that were left overnight in the Temple courtyard, you said in the mishna (84a) that if they ascended upon the altar they shall not descend, then with regard to limbs left on top of the altar, is it necessary to teach that they shall not descend?
  But rather, the dilemma is in a case where they were left overnight on top of the altar and descended from it after dawn. Do we compare limbs left overnight on top of the altar to the Table of the shewbread, and they are therefore returned, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 100a): Even if loaves of shewbread, which are supposed to be replaced every Shabbat, remained on the Table many days beyond Shabbat, there is nothing wrong with that, and the loaves are not disqualified by being left overnight. Or perhaps we compare the limbs to flesh left on the ground of the Temple courtyard, which is disqualified when left there until dawn, and they are not returned.
  Rabba said to him: There is no disqualification of limbs that are left overnight at the top of the altar. The Gemara asks: Did Rava accept this response from Rabba or not? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which was stated: With regard to limbs that were left overnight in the Temple courtyard, the priest may place them upon the altar to burn them all night long provided that they are placed there before dawn. With regard to a limb that was left overnight at the top of the altar, the priest may burn it forever, i.e., no matter how much time has passed.
  With regard to limbs that were left overnight on top of the altar and then descended from it, Rabba says that they shall ascend, while Rava says that they shall not ascend. Conclude from it that Rava did not accept the response from Rabba, as he holds here that limbs are disqualified when left overnight on top of the altar. The Gemara confirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
  § The mishna teaches: Just as the altar sanctifies items, so too, the ramp and the service vessels sanctify items. With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, the Sages taught: The verse states: “Whatever touches the altar shall be sacred” (Exodus 29:37). From here I have derived only that the altar sanctifies items. From where is it derived that the ramp sanctifies items as well? The verse states: “And you shall anoint…the altar [<i>et hamizbe’aḥ</i>]” (Exodus 40:10), and the addition of the word <i>et</i> serves to include the ramp. With regard to service vessels, from where is it derived that they sanctify items? The verse states with regard to them: “Whatever touches them shall be sacred” (Exodus 30:29).
  Reish Lakish raises a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether service vessels sanctify disqualified items? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: You learned in the mishna that just as the altar and the ramp sanctify items that are suited to them even if those items are disqualified, so too, the service vessels sanctify items placed in them.
  Reish Lakish said to him: The mishna indicates that service vessels sanctify that which is placed in them in the sense that they may no longer be redeemed even if they become disqualified. I raise the dilemma with regard to whether service vessels sanctify disqualified items such that they may be sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: This also we learn in a mishna (84a):
  
  Daf 87b
  
  An offering that people unfit for performing the Temple service collected and then sprinkled its blood shall not descend from the altar if it ascended. What, is it not that the mishna means that people unfit for performing the Temple service collected the blood and people unfit for performing the Temple service sprinkled it as well, which disqualifies it from ascending the altar? But if the collection alone was performed by people unfit for performing the Temple service, although the offering becomes disqualified, those fit to perform the Temple service may sprinkle the blood and sacrifice the offering <i>ab initio</i>. The reason, apparently, is that service vessels sanctify disqualified blood such that it may be sprinkled <i>ab initio</i>.
  Reish Lakish rejects this proof: No, the mishna may be referring to two independent cases, i.e., that people unfit for performing the Temple service collected the blood, or that people unfit for performing the Temple service sprinkled the blood after it was collected by people who were fit for performing the Temple service. Accordingly, the mishna teaches only that if such offerings ascended the altar they shall not descend after the fact, but service vessels do not sanctify disqualified items such that they are offered <i>ab initio</i>.
  § The Gemara raises a dilemma: Is the airspace above the altar considered as the altar itself, whereby items that enter this airspace shall not descend from the altar, or is it not considered like the altar? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the mishna, which states: Just as the altar sanctifies items, so too, the ramp sanctifies items, and if they ascended upon it they shall be sacrificed upon the altar and shall not descend.
  And if you say that the airspace above the altar is not considered as the altar itself, then the airspace above the ramp as well should not be considered as the ramp. If so, how can one elevate the disqualified limbs of an offering from the ramp to the altar? The moment one elevates a limb from upon the ramp, it is considered to have descended from the ramp, and all disqualified items that descended shall not be returned.
  The Gemara responds: The mishna is referring to a case where the priest drags the offering up the ramp, but it never enters its airspace. The Gemara challenges: But even if he drags it up the ramp, he must still lift it, as there is a space between the ramp and the altar. The Gemara responds: Since this gap is small, only a minority of the limb of an offering will be located over the gap as it passes from the ramp to the altar. Therefore, when a majority of the limb is on the ramp, the minority situated above the gap is considered as if it is on the ramp. Once a majority of the limb is on the altar, the minority situated above the gap is considered as if it is on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: If so, resolve from this mishna the dilemma that was raised by Rami bar Ḥama: Is there a connection of limbs that ascend upon the altar, i.e., is an offering considered a unit such that even those parts that do not ascend the altar shall be considered as if they are upon it, or is there not, and each part is considered independent? Based on the previous answer, resolve the dilemma by saying that there is a connection of limbs. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one may indeed resolve Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma from here.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan objects to the assumption that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself: But if you say that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself, then with regard to a bird burnt offering that one disqualified by having the intention to burn it beyond its designated time, i.e., the day after it was pinched, how can you find the circumstances for such a disqualification to take effect?
  One’s intent to burn an offering beyond its designated time disqualifies it only when he intended to burn it during a time that he may not do so. Since a bird burnt offering is pinched in the airspace above the altar, the altar has already accepted it. Therefore, even if one delayed burning it until the next day, it does not descend from the altar, like all other offerings that are disqualified by being left overnight.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the objection raised by Rava bar Rav Ḥanan: Why is it not possible for a bird burnt offering to be disqualified through the intention to burn it beyond its designated time? You find it in a case where he says: I am hereby pinching it in order to take it down from the altar tomorrow and thereafter sacrifice it and burn it. If he takes it down from the altar the next day, he may not subsequently return it there for burning, as all disqualified items that have descended from the altar shall not be returned to it. Accordingly, even if the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself, a bird burnt offering can still be disqualified with such intention.
  The Gemara questions the objection of Rav Shimi bar Ashi: This works out well according to the opinion of Rava, who says that the disqualification of being left overnight is effective even when the offering is at the top of the altar. Accordingly, if he were to take the bird burnt offering down from the altar the next day, he may not restore it to the altar for burning. But this is difficult according to the opinion of Rabba, who says: The disqualification of being left overnight is not effective when the offering is at the top of the altar, and therefore even if the next day he removed the bird burnt offering from the altar, he must return it there to burn it, as it has not been disqualified. If so, his intention is not significant, i.e., he does not disqualify a bird burnt offering with such intention.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi responds: According to the opinion of Rabba as well, you find a case of a bird burnt offering that is disqualified due to one’s intention, such as where he says: I am hereby pinch-ing it in order to take it down from the altar before dawn and to then sacrifice it after dawn. In such a case, where the offering is removed from the altar before dawn, even Rabba would agree that one’s intention renders a bird burnt offering disqualified by being left overnight.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi adds: Irrespective of the validity of the proof of Rava bar Rav Ḥanan, in any event, resolve the issue to this side, i.e., in favor of the claim that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar itself. As if it enters your mind that the airspace above the altar is not considered as the altar,
  
  Daf 88a
  
  then with regard to the case of a disqualified bird sin offering that was pinched at the top of the altar, how does one sprinkle from its blood on the wall of the altar? When the priest raises the bird in his hand in order to sprinkle its blood, the bird is considered to have descended from upon the altar and he cannot sprinkle its blood, as the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all disqualified items is that once they have descended from upon the altar they shall not ascend. Likewise, concerning the blood of other offerings that were disqualified that ascended upon the altar, how does he sprinkle from their blood, since it is sprinkled from the airspace above the altar? Rather, it must be that the airspace above the altar is considered as the altar.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that in such cases one does not sprinkle the blood in its normal fashion, but in such a manner that he presses it against the wall of the altar immediately without the blood passing through the air. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Is this considered sprinkling? It is squeezing, an act that is performed for a bird burnt offering, not for a bird sin offering. Likewise, if one sprinkles the blood of other disqualified offerings in this manner, is this sprinkling? It is pouring.
  And furthermore, with regard to a disqualified bird burnt offering, is the manner of sprinkling in such a fashion? And in the case of other disqualified offerings, is the manner of sprinkling in such a fashion? It is not. Rather, the airspace above the altar must be considered as the altar.
  Rav Ashi said: If the question concerns a case where the priest held the blood or limbs while standing at the top of the altar, they would indeed be considered as having ascended the altar, and shall not descend from it. But when the dilemma was stated with regard to the airspace above the altar, it was with regard to an instance where he suspended them with a pole above the altar, while he himself stood on the floor of the Temple courtyard. What is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case? The Gemara responds that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: The mishna elaborates on the <i>halakha</i> taught in the previous mishna (86a) that service vessels sanctify items placed in them. The service vessels used for liquids sanctify only liquids used in the service, and the service vessels that serve as dry measures sanctify only dry items used in the service. The service vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry items, and the service vessels used for dry items do not sanctify liquids. With regard to sacred vessels that were perforated, if one continues to utilize them for a use similar to the use for which they would utilize them previously when they were whole, they continue to sanctify their contents. And if not, they do not sanctify their contents. And all of these vessels sanctify items only when they are in the sacred area, i.e., the Temple courtyard.
  GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that the vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry items, Shmuel says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to measures used for liquids, i.e., wine or oil. But cups, which are used for collecting the blood of offerings, sanctify dry items as well, as it is stated in the verse: “One silver cup of seventy shekels, after the shekel of the sanctuary; both of them full of fine flour mingled with oil for a meal offering” (Numbers 7:13), indicating that the cups were also fashioned for use with flour, a dry item.
  Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: The meal offering of the verse is also considered a liquid, as it is mixed with oil, and one cannot derive from it the <i>halakha</i> with regard to items that are entirely dry. Ravina said to him: The verse cited by Shmuel was only necessary to derive the <i>halakha</i> of the dry portions of a meal offering, teaching that even flour that remained dry because it did not get thoroughly mixed with the oil is sanctified by the cups as well. If you wish, say instead: A meal offering, even though it is mixed with oil, is, in comparison to blood, considered as a dry item. Accordingly, one can derive from the verse that the cups sanctify all dry items.
  Additionally, Shmuel says: Service vessels sanctify items only when the vessels are whole, i.e., they do not have a hole; they sanctify only full measures, i.e., when they contain a measurement fit for offering; and they sanctify items only from within them and not items that merely touched their exterior. And some say there is another version of the statement of Shmuel: Service vessels sanctify items only when the vessels are whole, and when they contain full measures, and from inside.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions? The Gemara responds: The difference between them is with regard to heaping measures. According to the first version, that service vessels sanctify only items that are within them, nothing that overflows is included. The Gemara notes that it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with both versions: Service vessels sanctify items only when they are whole, and only full measurements, and from within them, and inside.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that service vessels sanctify only full measurements, Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only when the priest’s initial intention was not to add to that which was already placed inside the vessel. But if his initial intention was to add, then each initial amount placed in the vessel becomes sacred, no matter how small.
  This distinction is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that service vessels sanctify full measurements, full measurements are nothing other than whole measurements. Rabbi Yosei said: When are full measurements whole ones? It is at a time that the priest’s intention was not to add. But if his intention was to add, each initial amount is sacred.
  § The mishna teaches that the service vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry items. With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, Rav says, and some say that Rav Asi says: The service vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry items to permit them for sacrifice upon the altar, but they sanctify dry items in order for the items to be disqualified by them, i.e., dry items placed in such vessels may be disqualified by that which disqualifies only sanctified items, e.g., if they are touched by one who immersed that day, or if they emerged from the Temple courtyard.
  There are those who teach this statement with regard to this <i>halakha</i>: One may not bring meal offerings, or libations, or meal offerings accompanying an animal, or first fruits, from a mixture containing <i>teruma</i>, since that which may not be consumed by all Jews may not be used for an offering. And needless to say, one may not bring these items from the fruit of a tree that is <i>orla</i>, i.e., a tree during the first three years after its planting, from which it is prohibited to eat, or from diverse kinds sown in a vineyard, both of which are prohibited for consumption to priests as well. And if he brought an offering from them, it is not sanctified. With regard to this issue, Rav says, and some say that Rav Asi says: It is not sanctified for sacrifice upon the altar, but it is sanctified in order to be disqualified.
  § With regard to perforated vessels, the Sages taught: In the case of sacred vessels that were perforated, one may not melt them in order to seal the perforation, and one may not melt lead into them for such a purpose. If the vessels were damaged, one may not repair them. Concerning a knife that was damaged, one may not sharpen the spot of its damage. If the blade separated from the handle, one may not restore it. Abba Shaul says: There was a certain knife in the Temple whose metal was soft and easily damaged, such that when used it would often render animals prohibited, thereby disqualifying them. Accordingly, the priests voted concerning it, and elected to hide it.
  The Sages taught: Priestly vestments are not fashioned by needlework, i.e., by stitching various parts together, but rather through woven work, whereby the entire garment is initially woven into one entity, as it is stated: “Woven work” (Exodus 28:32). If the garments were soiled one may not launder them, neither with natron nor with soap, two common detergents.
  The Gemara asks: But may it be inferred from this that with water one may launder the priestly vestments? Abaye said: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the dirtied garments have only reached the point where laundering them with water alone would suffice, one may launder them with natron and soap, as they are not considered soiled.
  
  Daf 88b
  
  But if the garments became so dirty that they reached a point that laundering them would require the use of natron or soap, then one may not launder them, even with water. And some say: One may not launder the priestly vestments at all, even if laundering them with water would suffice, because there is no poverty in a place of wealth, i.e., only priestly vestments that were clean as new should be worn, as is befitting the Temple service, and those that were laundered should not be worn.
  § With regard to the priestly vestments, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The robe of the High Priest was sewn entirely of sky-blue wool, as it is stated: “And he made the robe of the ephod of woven work, all of sky-blue wool” (Exodus 39:22). With regard to its skirts, concerning which it states: “And they made upon the skirts of the robe pomegranates of sky blue, and purple, and scarlet, twined” (Exodus 39:24), how were they fashioned? The tailor brings sky-blue wool, and purple wool, and scarlet wool, which are twined together, and fashions them to appear as pomegranates that have not opened their mouths, i.e., they are sewn in the appearance of pomegranates that are not yet ripe enough for the crown on top to open, and as the cones [<i>konaot</i>] of the helmets [<i>kenasot</i>] that are found on the heads of children.
  And in order to fulfill that which is stated: “And they made bells of pure gold, and put the bells between the pomegranates” (Exodus 39:25), he brings seventy-two bells, i.e., the outer part of bells, made from gold, that contain inside them seventy-two bell clappers, and he suspends them on the skirts: Thirty-six of each, i.e., pomegranates and bells, on this side of the robe, and thirty-six of each on that side, as the verse states: “A bell and a pomegranate, a bell and a pomegranate, upon the skirts of the robe around it” (Exodus 39:26). Rabbi Dosa says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: There were thirty-six bells suspended around the skirt, eighteen from this side and eighteen from that side.
  Rabbi Inini bar Sason says: Just as there is a disagreement here between <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to the total number of bells suspended around the skirt of the robe of the High Priest, so is there a disagreement between <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to the total number of shades of leprous marks. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 1:4): With regard to the total number of shades of leprous marks, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says: There are thirty-six, while Akavya ben Mahalalel says: There are seventy-two.
  § The Gemara cites another statement of this sage: And Rabbi Inini bar Sason says: Why was the passage in the Torah that discusses offerings (Leviticus, chapters 1–7) juxtaposed to the passage that discusses the priestly vestments (Leviticus, chapter 8)? It was juxtaposed to tell you that just as offerings effect atonement, so too, priestly vestments effect atonement.
  The tunic atones for bloodshed, as it is stated with regard to the brothers of Joseph after they plotted to kill him: “And they killed a goat, and dipped the tunic in the blood” (Genesis 37:31). The trousers atone for forbidden sexual relations, as it is stated with regard to fashioning the priestly vestments: “And you shall make them linen trousers to cover the flesh of their nakedness” (Exodus 28:42). The mitre atones for the arrogant. From where is this derived? Rabbi Ḥanina says: It is logical that an item that is placed at an elevation, i.e., on the head of a priest, shall come and atone for the sin of an elevated heart.
  Rabbi Inini bar Sason continues: The belt atones for thought of the heart. The Gemara elaborates: The belt atones for the sins occurring where it is situated, i.e., over the heart. The breastplate of the High Priest atones for improper judgments, as it is stated: “And you shall make a breastplate of judgment” (Exodus 28:15). The ephod of the High Priest atones for idol worship, as it is stated: “And without ephod or teraphim” (Hosea 3:4), meaning that when there is no ephod, the sin of teraphim, i.e., idol worship, is found. Therefore, it may be inferred that if there is an ephod, there is no sin of idol worship.
  The robe of the High Priest atones for malicious speech. From where is this known? Rabbi Ḥanina says: It is logical that an item that produces sound, i.e., the robe, which has bells, shall come and atone for an evil sound. And the frontplate of the High Priest atones for brazenness. This is derived from the fact that with regard to the frontplate it is written: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead” (Exodus 28:38), and with regard to brazenness it is written: “And you had a harlot’s forehead” (Jeremiah 3:3).
  The Gemara asks: Is that so, that the priestly vestments atone for these sins? But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: There are two matters that we do not find for them an atonement with offerings, but we find for them an atonement from another place, and they are: Bloodshed and malicious speech.
  With regard to bloodshed, its atonement comes from the heifer whose neck is broken. This is referring to a case where a murdered body is found but the identity of the murderer is not known. In such an instance, the Torah mandates that the neck of a heifer must be broken as an atonement for the murder. And with regard to malicious speech, its atonement comes from incense, as Rav Ḥananya teaches in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that the incense effects atonement? As it is stated after the Israelites spoke slanderously against Moses and Aaron and a plague was sent against them: “And he put on the incense, and made atonement for the people” (Numbers 17:12).
  The Gemara continues: And similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael teaches: For what does incense effect atonement? It effects atonement for malicious speech, in order that an item that is offered in private, i.e., the incense, which is offered by a priest acting alone, shall come and atone for an action generally occurring in private, i.e., malicious speech.
  Accordingly, there is a difficulty between that which is stated with regard to malicious speech and that which is stated with regard to malicious speech, as according to Rabbi Inini bar Sason the robe atones for malicious speech, whereas according to the <i>baraita</i> it is only the incense that effects atonement for that transgression. Likewise, there is a difficulty between that which is stated with regard to bloodshed and that which is stated with regard to bloodshed, as according to Rabbi Inini bar Sason the tunic effects atonement for bloodshed, whereas according to the <i>baraita</i> only the heifer whose neck is broken effects atonement for it.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to bloodshed, it is not difficult, as this, the tunic, effects atonement for bloodshed in an instance where it is known who killed the victim, and this, the heifer, effects atonement in an instance where it is not known who killed the victim. The Gemara challenges: If it is known who killed the victim, that man is deserving of death, and there is no atonement for the community otherwise, as it is stated: “And no atonement can be made for the land for the blood that is shed within it, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numbers 35:33). The Gemara responds: It is referring to a case where he murdered intentionally but witnesses did not forewarn him of the consequences of committing murder. Therefore, the court may not execute him, as no earthly punishment may be administered without forewarning.
  And with regard to the contradiction between that which is stated with regard to malicious speech and that which is stated with regard to malicious speech, it is also not difficult. This, the incense, effects atonement for malicious speech spoken in private, whereas this, the robe, on which the bells that produce noise are placed, effects atonement for malicious speech spoken in public.
  
  
  Daf 89a
  
  MISHNA: Any offering that is more frequent than another precedes the other offering. Therefore, the daily offerings precede the additional offerings, which are sacrificed only on certain days. When Shabbat and the New Moon coincide, the additional Shabbat offerings precede the additional New Moon offerings. Likewise, the additional New Moon offerings precede the additional New Year offerings. The mishna cites the source for the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent: As it is stated with regard to the additional offerings of the first day of Passover: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning, which is for a daily burnt offering, you shall offer these” (Numbers 28:23). The verse indicates that the daily offering is sacrificed first, and then the additional offerings are sacrificed.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent? The Gemara expresses puzzlement at this question: From where do we derive this? One must say that the reason is stated in the mishna, which says that it is derived from the verse: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning.” The Gemara explains: If that verse is the only source, it could be claimed that perhaps it is only the daily offerings that precede the additional offerings, because they are far more frequent, as they are sacrificed daily. With regard to the precedence of a relatively frequent additional offering over a relatively less frequent additional offering, the question arises: From where do we derive this?
  Rabbi Ile’a said that it is derived from the fact that the verse states with regard to the additional offerings of Passover: “Like these you shall offer daily, for seven days” (Numbers 28:24). This verse, which immediately follows the one cited previously, indicates that the principle that governs these additional offerings shall be like the principle governing those daily offerings and additional offerings mentioned previously, i.e., the more frequent precedes the less frequent.
  The Gemara challenges: But that verse is required to teach its own <i>halakha</i>, that the additional offerings of the first day of Passover recur on each day of Passover. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse write: These you shall offer daily. Since the Torah writes: “Like these,” both the <i>halakha</i> that these additional offerings are brought on each day of Passover and the principle concerning precedence can be derived from this verse.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If the verse had written only: These you shall offer daily for the seven days, I would say that these offerings mentioned in the previous verse are sacrificed in total, over the seven days. Therefore, the Torah writes: “Like these,” to teach that they are all sacrificed each day. The Gemara counters: That interpretation is not possible, as the phrase: “You shall offer daily,” is written in the verse, which indicates that these offerings are sacrificed on each of the seven days.
  The Gemara challenges: And still, one can say that these specific offerings are required for the first day; but with regard to the other days, I do not know how many offerings are to be sacrificed. Therefore, the term “like these” is needed to teach this, and cannot be used for the principle that relatively frequent additional offerings precede relatively less frequent additional offerings. The Gemara answers: That interpretation is also not possible, as the verse states: “You shall offer [<i>ta’asu</i>],” indicating that all the sacrificial rites [<i>asiyyot</i>] on all the days of Passover should be equal. Therefore, the term “like these” is in fact superfluous and can be cited as the source of the principle of precedence.
  Abaye said: The application of the principle of precedence to all frequent offerings can be derived from the verse itself, cited in the mishna. The reason is that if so, that only the daily offering precedes less frequent offerings, let the verse say merely: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning,” and remain silent from the rest of the verse. Why do I need the additional phrase: “Which is for a daily burnt offering”? This serves to say that this offering that is more frequent, i.e., any more frequent offering, should precede any less frequent offering.
  MISHNA: Any offering that is more sacred than another precedes the other offering. The mishna elaborates: If there is blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering to be presented, the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering because it effects acceptance, i.e., atonement, for severe transgressions punishable by <i>karet</i>. Likewise, if there are limbs of a burnt offering and portions of a sin offering to be burned on the altar, the burning of the limbs of the burnt offering precedes the portions of the sin offering, because the burnt offering is entirely burned in the flames on the altar, whereas only part of the sin offering is burned.
  Similarly, although both effect atonement, a sin offering precedes a guilt offering due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar and the remnants of its blood are poured on the base of the altar, whereas the blood of the guilt offering is sprinkled on only two corners of the altar. A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order, and the others are offerings of lesser sanctity. A thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram precede a peace offering due to the fact that they are eaten for one day, like offerings of the most sacred order, whereas a peace offering is eaten for two days, and the thanks offering and nazirite’s ram require loaves to be brought with them, four types with the thanks offering and two types with the nazirite’s ram.
  Sacrifice of the peace offering precedes sacrifice of the firstborn offering due to the fact that the peace offering requires placing the blood on the altar, in the form of two placements that are four, and placing hands on the head of the offering, and libations, and the wavings of the breast and the thigh by the priest and the owner; none of which is required for the firstborn offering. The firstborn offering precedes the animal tithe offering because it is sanctified from the womb, i.e., unlike the animal tithe offering it does not require consecration, and it is eaten by the priests, whereas everyone may partake of the animal tithe offering.
  The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; and there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood that is presented on the altar and its portions that are burned on the altar, whereas with regard to bird offerings only the blood is presented on the altar. The bird offerings precede meal offerings due to the fact that they are types whose blood is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering due to the fact that it comes to atone for a sin. For the same reason the sacrifice of the bird sin offering precedes the sacrifice of the bird burnt offering, and likewise with regard to its consecration, the sin offering takes precedence.
  
  Daf 89b
  
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the placement of the blood of a sin offering precedes the sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, whereas the burning of the limbs of a burnt offering precedes the burning of the portions of a sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> discussing a verse about the consecration of the Levites: “Then let them take a young bull, and its meal offering, fine flour mingled with oil; and a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering” (Numbers 8:8).
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: If this verse comes to teach that they are two bulls, this is superfluous, as it is already stated: “And offer the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering” (Numbers 8:12). Why must the verse state: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering”? As one might have thought that the sin offering should precede all the rites of the burnt offering, therefore the verse states: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering,” which indicates that the sin offering actually comes second to the burnt offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the verse had stated only that the sin offering is the second bull, one might have thought that the burnt offering precedes the sin offering with regard to all its rites. Therefore, the verse states: “And offer the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering,” indicating that the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. How can these verses be reconciled? The placement of the blood of the sin offering precedes the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering because it effects acceptance, whereas the burnt offering does not effect atonement. And burning the limbs of the burnt offering on the altar precedes burning the portions of the sin offering, in fulfillment of the phrase: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering.”
  The Gemara asks: But why do all four placements of the blood of the sin offering precede the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering? Let only the first placement of blood, which effects atonement, take precedence, and those other placements should not come before the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering.
  Ravina said: In the verse here, we are dealing with the sin offering brought by the Levites for their consecration. And even though it does not effect atonement and is therefore comparable to a burnt offering, the Merciful One states that the sin offering precedes the burnt offering with regard to the presentation of the blood. This indicates that in general, all four placements of the blood of a sin offering precede the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering, despite the fact that only the first placement effects atonement. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say there is another answer: Once the priest commenced with the placements of the blood of the sin offering, he completes all of them before sprinkling the blood of the burnt offering.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is blood of a sin offering and limbs of a burnt offering to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the other? Does the blood of the sin offering take precedence, due to the fact that it effects acceptance? Or perhaps the limbs of the burnt offering take precedence, due to the fact that they are entirely burned in the flames of the altar.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna teaches that the blood of a sin offering precedes the blood of a burnt offering. One can infer from this that the blood of the sin offering does not precede all elements of the burnt offering; it is only with regard to the blood of the burnt offering that it takes precedence, whereas it does not take precedence with regard to the limbs of the burnt offering.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, the opposite conclusion can be inferred from the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that limbs of a burnt offering precede the portions of the sin offering consumed on the altar. This indicates that it is only with regard to the portions of the sin offering consumed on the altar that the limbs of the burnt offering take precedence, but they do not take precedence with regard to the blood of the sin offering. The Gemara concludes: Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna concerning this matter.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is blood of a burnt offering to be sprinkled and portions of a sin offering to be burned, which of them precedes the other? Does the blood of the burnt offering take precedence, as it comes from an offering that is burned in its entirety on the altar? Or perhaps the portions of the sin offering to be burned take precedence because they come from an offering that effects atonement.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna teaches that the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering. One can infer from this that it is only the blood of the sin offering that precedes the blood of the burnt offering, but the portions of the sin offering to be burned do not take precedence.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, the opposite conclusion can be inferred from the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that the limbs of the burnt offering precede the portions of the sin offering to be consumed on the altar. This indicates that it is only the limbs of the burnt offering that precede the portions of the sin offering to be burned, but the blood of the burnt offering does not. The Gemara again concludes: Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna concerning this dilemma.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is blood of a burnt offering and blood of a guilt offering to be sprinkled on the altar, which of them precedes the other? Does the blood of the burnt offering take precedence, as it comes from an offering that is burned in its entirety on the altar? Or perhaps the blood of a guilt offering takes precedence, as it effects atonement.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna teaches that the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering. One can infer from here: But the blood of a guilt offering does not precede the blood of a burnt offering.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: By right the mishna should have taught this <i>halakha</i> with regard to blood of a guilt offering. One could then have inferred that the blood of a sin offering, which takes precedence over the blood of a guilt offering, also precedes blood of a burnt offering. But since the mishna wants to teach the latter clause: The burning of the limbs of a burnt offering precedes the portions of a sin offering, it also mentions a sin offering in the former clause.
  The Gemara explains why the latter clause had to mention a sin offering rather than a guilt offering: As, had the mishna taught this principle of the latter clause with regard to the portions of a guilt offering, I would say that it is only the portions of a guilt offering over which the limbs of a burnt offering take precedence, but they do not take precedence over the portions of a sin offering, as a sin offering is of greater sanctity than a guilt offering. Due to this reason the mishna in the former clause also taught this principle with regard to a sin offering, and one cannot infer from this that its <i>halakha</i> does not apply to the guilt offering.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna states that a sin offering precedes a guilt offering. One can infer from this that it is only a sin offering that precedes a guilt offering, but a burnt offering does not. What, is the mishna not referring to the sprinkling of the blood, which would indicate that the blood of a burnt offering does not precede the blood of a guilt offering?
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, it is referring to the precedence of the sacrificial portions consumed on the altar. The Gemara adds that the language of the mishna is also precise in this regard, as it teaches that the sin offering takes precedence due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar, rather than simply teaching: It is placed on the four corners of the altar, as it would have taught had it been speaking of the blood. One can therefore conclude from the statement of the mishna that its subject is the sacrificial portions burned on the altar, not the blood.
  § The mishna teaches: A sin offering precedes a guilt offering due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar and the remainder of its blood is poured on the base of the altar. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the guilt offering should precede the sin offering, as it has a fixed minimal value of two shekels, as stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:15), whereas the sin offering has no minimal value. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the sin offering requires more placements of the blood on the altar is of greater importance.
  The mishna further teaches: A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram should precede the guilt offering, as they require loaves to be brought with them. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the guilt offering is an offering of the most sacred order is of greater importance.
  The mishna teaches: A thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram precede a peace offering due to the fact that they are eaten for only one day. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, peace offerings should precede the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram, as they are offered by the community as well as by the individual. A communal peace offering is sacrificed on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, but there is no communal thanks offering or nazirite’s ram. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram are eaten for only one day is of greater importance.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is a thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the other? Does the thanks offering take precedence, as it requires four types of loaves, whereas the nazirite’s ram requires only two? Or perhaps the nazirite’s ram takes precedence, as there are other offerings whose blood is placed on the altar together with the nazirite’s ram. A nazirite is required to sacrifice a burnt offering and a sin offering, as well as a ram. The Gemara answers: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i> that explicitly discusses this case: This offering precedes that offering, as this offering, i.e., the thanks offering, requires four types of loaves, and that offering, the nazirite’s ram, requires only two types of loaves.
  The mishna teaches: And the peace offering precedes the firstborn offering due to the fact that the peace offering requires two placements of the blood on the altar that are four, and the placement of hands on the animal’s head, and libations, and the wavings of the breast and thigh. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the sacrifice of the firstborn offering should precede the peace offering, as it is sanctified from the womb and it is eaten only by the priests, whereas the peace offering may be eaten by non-priests. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that additional mitzvot are performed in the case of the peace offering is of greater importance.
  The mishna further teaches: The firstborn offering precedes the animal tithe offering because it is sanctified from the womb and is eaten only by the priests. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the animal tithe offering should precede the firstborn offering, as if one mistakenly called the ninth or eleventh animal that emerged from the pen the tenth, those animals that came out before or after the tenth are also sanctified. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the firstborn is sanctified from the womb is of greater importance.
  The mishna teaches: The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; and furthermore, there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood, which is presented on the altar, and its portions that are burned on the altar. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, bird offerings should precede the animal tithe offering, as they are offerings of the most sacred order, whether they are burnt offerings or sin offerings. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the animal tithe is a type of offering that requires slaughtering is of greater importance.
  § Ravina bar Sheila says with regard to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar: Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. And the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna also taught: The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, and there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood and its sacrificial portions consumed on the altar.
  The Gemara explains how Ravina bar Sheila interprets the mishna in support of his opinion: Granted, there are no sacrificial portions consumed on the altar from a bird offering, but its blood at least is sprinkled. Why, then, does the mishna mention the blood? Rather, is it not mentioned in order to teach us that the status of the sacrificial portions consumed on the altar from the animal tithe offering and other offerings of lesser sanctity is comparable to the status of its blood?
  The Gemara explains the implications of this comparison. Just as its blood referred to in the mishna is blood before its sprinkling on the altar, as afterward it no longer has any sanctity, so too, the sacrificial portions mentioned in the mishna are from before the sprinkling of the blood, and the mishna calls them at this stage offerings of the most sacred order. And therefore one can infer from this that just as the animal tithe’s blood is disqualified by leaving the Temple courtyard, so too, the sacrificial portions to be burned on the altar are disqualified by leaving the courtyard.
  The Gemara attempts to prove the opinion of Ravina bar Sheila. Let us say that the following dispute between <i>amora’im</i> supports his statement: With regard to flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is fit and Reish Lakish says that it is disqualified.
  The Gemara clarifies this dispute: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is fit, since it will ultimately leave the Temple courtyard, as offerings of lesser sanctity may be eaten anywhere within the walls of Jerusalem. Reish Lakish says that it is unfit, as its time to leave the Temple courtyard has not yet arrived because the flesh cannot be taken out until after the sprinkling of the blood. The Gemara infers that these <i>amora’im</i> disagree only with regard to the flesh of the offering, which will eventually leave the Temple courtyard. But with regard to the sacrificial portions of the offering, which will never leave the courtyard, they do not disagree, as Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes that those portions are disqualified.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: The same is true with regard to the sacrificial portions, i.e., these <i>amora’im</i> also disagree in that case, as Rabbi Yoḥanan holds they are fit. And the reason that they disagree explicitly with regard to the flesh is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Reish Lakish, as even with regard to the flesh, which will ultimately leave the Temple courtyard, he says that it is disqualified, because its time to leave the courtyard has not yet arrived.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between <i>amora’im</i> is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: With regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, Rabbi Eliezer says that one who benefits from them is not liable for misuse of consecrated property,
  
  Daf 90a
  
  and one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for them due to prohibitions against eating <i>piggul</i> or <i>notar</i>, or for partaking of the flesh while he is ritually impure. All these prohibitions apply only if the sacrificial portions are otherwise fit for sacrifice. Rabbi Akiva says that one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating them due to the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or partaking of the flesh while he is ritually impure.
  The Gemara explains: What, is it not correct to say that they disagree with regard to a case where after taking the portions to be burned out of the Temple courtyard one then brought them back into the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood? And, if so, it is with regard to this very point that they disagree: As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the portions are disqualified by leaving the courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that the portions are not disqualified by leaving the courtyard.
  The Gemara rejects this claim: Rav Pappa said that with regard to a case where after taking these portions out of the Temple courtyard one then brought them back into the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, everyone agrees they are fit. And here they disagree with regard to a case where these portions are outside the courtyard when the blood is sprinkled on the altar. And they disagree with regard to this following matter: As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the sprinkling of the blood is not effective with regard to those portions that were taken out of the courtyard, i.e., it does not render them fit, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that the sprinkling of the blood is effective with regard to those portions that were taken out of the courtyard, i.e., it renders them fit.
  The Gemara challenges: But Rav Pappa’s statement here apparently contradicts his claim concerning the two loaves brought with the two sheep on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>. The sprinkling of the blood of the sheep renders those two loaves fit for consumption by the priests, and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva also applies in that case. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Pappa is the one who said that with regard to a situation where the two loaves are outside the Temple courtyard when the blood of the two sheep is sprinkled on the altar, everyone, even Rabbi Akiva, agrees that the sprinkling does not render the two loaves fit, and therefore if one eats them he is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition against eating <i>piggul</i>. Rather, the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree with regard to a case where one returned the loaves to within the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood.
  The Gemara answers: This statement of Rav Pappa applies only to the two loaves, as they are not part of the offering itself. But with regard to the sacrificial portions, which are part of the offering itself, everyone agrees that they are rendered fit if they are within the Temple courtyard at the time the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree only with regard to a case where they are outside the Temple courtyard when the blood is sprinkled on the altar.
  § The mishna teaches: The bird offerings precede meal offerings due to the fact that they are types whose blood is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, meal offerings should precede bird offerings, as they are sacrificed both as communal offerings and as individual offerings, whereas there are no communal bird offerings. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that bird offerings are types whose blood is sprinkled is of greater importance.
  The mishna further teaches: The meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, a voluntary meal offering should precede the meal offering of a sinner, as it requires oil and frankincense. The Gemara explains: Even so, the meal offering of a sinner, which comes due to a sin, is of greater importance, as it effects atonement.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>, a woman suspected by her husband of having committed adultery, and a voluntary meal offering being brought by someone at the same time, which of them precedes the other? Does the voluntary meal offering take precedence, as it requires oil and frankincense? Or perhaps the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> takes precedence, as it comes to clarify the woman’s transgression, as part of the rite performed with a <i>sota</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna states that the meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering. One can infer from this that it is only the meal offering of a sinner that precedes a voluntary meal offering, but the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> does not. The Gemara rejects this proof: Is the mishna teaching that the meal offering of a sinner takes precedence due to the fact that it effects atonement? The mishna teaches: Due to the fact that it comes because of a sin, and the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> also comes because of a sin, as she secluded herself with another man.
  The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear the statement of a <i>baraita</i>: This meal offering precedes that meal offering, as this meal offering comes from wheat, and that meal offering comes from barley. What, does this <i>baraita</i> not refer to the precedence of a voluntary meal offering to the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the precedence of the meal offering of a sinner over the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>.
  The Gemara responds: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the meal offering of a sinner, why is its precedence to the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> derived from the fact that the meal offering of a sinner comes from wheat, whereas the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> is brought from barley? I could derive the precedence of the meal offering of the sinner due to the fact that the meal offering of a sinner effects atonement and the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> does not effect atonement.
  The Gemara counters: Rather, what is the <i>baraita</i> referring to? Is it referring to the precedence of a voluntary meal offering over the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>? If so, I could derive its precedence from the fact that this voluntary meal offering requires oil and frankincense and that meal offering of a <i>sota</i> does not require oil and frankincense. Rather, one cannot prove anything from the omission of an alternative explanation, as whichever way one interprets the <i>baraita</i> it clearly cited one of two reasons.
  § The mishna states: The sacrifice of the bird sin offering precedes the sacrifice of the bird burnt offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the bird sin offering and the bird burnt offering that a poor sinner sacrifices instead of an animal sin offering. The verse states: “And he shall offer that which is for the sin offering first” (Leviticus 5:8). Why must the verse state this? As there is no need for the verse to state this in order to teach that the sin offering is sacrificed first, as it is already stated: “And he shall prepare the second for a burnt offering” (Leviticus 5:10).
  Rather, this verse established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they should precede the burnt offering that comes with them; whether in the case of a bird sin offering taking precedence over a bird burnt offering, whether in the case of an animal sin offering taking precedence over an animal burnt offering, and even with regard to a bird sin offering taking precedence over an animal burnt offering.
  The Gemara summarizes: Therefore, the precedence of a bird sin offering over a bird burnt offering is learned from the verse: “And he shall prepare the second for a burnt offering.” The precedence of an animal sin offering over an animal burnt offering is derived from the fact that the Merciful One extends the <i>halakha</i> derived from the sin offering of the Levites (see 89a). Finally, the precedence of a bird sin offering over an animal burnt offering is derived from the principle stated in this <i>baraita</i>, that this verse established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they should precede the burnt offering that comes with them.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a further proof from a <i>baraita</i>. The Torah states that a woman who has given birth must bring a sheep as a burnt offering and a bird as a sin offering. If she is poor she may bring two birds: “One for a burnt offering and the other for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:8). Rabbi Eliezer says: In every other instance where a bird offering is exchanged for an animal sin offering, the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. For example, in the case of the sliding scale sin offering brought for entering the Temple while ritually impure, where a poor person brings two birds, one as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering, the sin offering comes first. But here, in the case of a woman who gave birth, the burnt offering takes precedence, as it takes the place of an animal burnt offering, mentioned first in the verse: “She shall bring a lamb in its first year for a burnt offering, and a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering (Leviticus 12:6).
  Furthermore, in every instance where the sin offering comes because of a sin, the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. But here, in the case of a poor woman who gave birth, where the sin offering effects ritual purity rather than atonement, the burnt offering precedes the sin offering. And in every instance where two birds come instead of an animal for a sin offering, the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. But here, in the case of a poor woman who gave birth, the bird burnt offering replaces the animal burnt offering of a rich woman, whereas the bird sin offering is sacrificed even by a rich woman who gave birth. Therefore, in this particular case of a woman who gave birth, the burnt offering precedes the sin offering.
  The straightforward reading of this <i>baraita</i> contradicts the statement of the previous <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering. In order to reconcile the two <i>baraitot</i>, Rava said: The fact that the verse mentions the animal burnt offering first is only with regard to reading it, but in practice the sin offering is sacrificed first.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another <i>baraita</i> which apparently contradicts this principle. When there are different animal offerings to be sacrificed, bulls precede rams, and rams precede sheep, and sheep precede male goats.
  
  Daf 90b
  
  What, is it not referring to the additional offerings of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? If so, the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that bulls, rams, and sheep, which are burnt offerings, precede the sin offerings of male goats. The Gemara answers: No, with regard to all these animals the <i>baraita</i> is referring to gift offerings. The Gemara interprets the <i>baraita</i> in accordance with this explanation: Bulls precede rams, as they require a greater quantity of libations; and likewise rams precede sheep for the same reason. Sheep precede male goats, although their libations are identical, as the portions of the sheep consumed on the altar are greater; the sheep’s tail is burned, whereas the goat’s tail is not.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i> which seems to contradict the principle that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering: The bull of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, which he sacrifices if he issues and then acts upon an erroneous halakhic ruling, precedes the bull for an unwitting communal sin, sacrificed if the Sanhedrin issues an erroneous halakhic ruling and the community then acts upon it. Similarly, the bull for an unwitting communal sin precedes the bull sacrificed as a burnt offering to atone for an unwitting communal sin involving idol worship.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The bull sacrificed as atonement for communal idol worship precedes the male goats that atone for idol worship, i.e., the goat sacrificed together with the bull. This is the <i>halakha</i> even though the bull that atones for idol worship is a burnt offering, and the male goats sacrificed as atonement for idol worship are sin offerings. This <i>baraita</i> seems to contradict the statement of the previous <i>baraita</i> that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering.
  The Gemara responds: But you can say that the opposite conclusion is derived from the first clause of that <i>baraita</i>, as at least the first clause supports the principle that sin offerings take precedence: The bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is a sin offering, precedes the bull sacrificed to atone for an unwitting communal sin involving idol worship, which is a burnt offering.
  The Gemara dismisses this answer: In any event, with regard to offerings that are both of one species of animal, we did not say there is any doubt that a sin offering takes precedence. When we say there is a contradiction between the rulings of the <i>baraitot</i>, it is with regard to offerings of two species. According to the earlier <i>baraita</i>, even a bird sin offering precedes an animal burnt offering, whereas here we find a burnt offering that precedes a sin offering.
  The Gemara answers: They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rava bar Mari: The sin offering sacrificed to atone for idol worship is written without an <i>alef</i> (see Numbers 15:24). It is written <i>lamed</i>, <i>ḥet</i>, <i>tet</i>, <i>tav</i>. This indicates that it is different from other sin offerings in that it does not precede the burnt offering. Ravina says that the term “according to the ordinance” is written with regard to the offerings sacrificed to atone for idol-worship, in the verse: “The congregation shall offer one young bull…according to the ordinance, and one goat for a sin offering” (Numbers 15:24). This mention of an ordinance indicates that they must be sacrificed in the precise order stated by the verse.
  The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the previous <i>baraita</i> can be explained in a similar manner: Even if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the bulls and other offerings of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, there is also no difficulty with regard to the burnt offering sheep taking precedence over the sin offering male goats, as the term “according to their ordinance” is written concerning these offerings as well (see Numbers 29:33).
  A dilemma ensuing from the conclusion of the previous discussion was raised before the Sages: If there is a bird sin offering, and an animal burnt offering, and an animal tithe offering to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the others? If you say that the bird sin offering should take precedence, there is the animal tithe offering that generally precedes it, since it requires slaughtering, as stated by the mishna. If you say that the animal tithe offering should take precedence, there is the animal burnt offering that precedes it, as the burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order. If you say that the animal burnt offering should take precedence, there is the bird sin offering that precedes it, as the Gemara previously concluded.
  The Gemara answers: Here, in Babylonia, they explained that the fact that the animal tithe offering is a type of offering that requires slaughtering is of greater importance than the other factors. Therefore, the animal tithe offering is sacrificed first, followed by the bird sin offering, and finally the animal burnt offering. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say: The animal burnt offering has an effect on the bird sin offering sacrificed with it and raises its importance above that of the animal tithe offering. Therefore, the bird sin offering is sacrificed first, followed by the animal burnt offering, and finally the animal tithe offering.
  MISHNA: All the sin offerings mandated by the Torah take precedence over the guilt offerings, as explained in the previous mishna (89a), except for the guilt offering of a leper, because it comes to render one fit. One who has been cured of leprosy must undergo a process through which he is rendered ritually pure before coming into contact with consecrated items. Although he must also bring a sin offering, his guilt offering is more central to that process of purification and therefore it takes precedence over the sin offering.
  All the guilt offerings mandated by the Torah come as rams in their second year, and come worth two silver shekels, except for the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, as they come from sheep in their first year, and do not need to come worth two silver shekels, as they have no fixed value.
  Just as the more sacred offerings precede other offerings with regard to their sacrifice, as taught in the previous mishna (89a), they also precede the others with regard to their consumption. If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a peace offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the peace offering from today. If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The sin offering precedes the peace offering, due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order. Likewise, the guilt offering precedes the peace offering, as it is also of the most sacred order.
  And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted to eat them roasted, or boiled, or cooked, and to place in the cooking pot non-sacred spices or <i>teruma</i> spices. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: One may not place <i>teruma</i> spices in it, so that he will not bring the <i>teruma</i> to a state of disqualification. Consumption of consecrated foods is permitted only for a limited period, after which they are disqualified and burned. Adding <i>teruma</i> spices might cause those spices to be similarly disqualified.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: The <i>mishnayot</i> (89a) taught that a frequent offering precedes other offerings, and also that an offering of greater sanctity precedes others. If there is a frequent offering and an offering of greater sanctity to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the other? Does the frequent offering take precedence, due to the fact that it is frequent, or perhaps the offering of greater sanctity takes precedence, as it is of greater sanctity? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the ruling of the first mishna in this chapter, that the daily offerings precede the additional offerings because they are frequent.
  
  Daf 91a
  
  And even though the additional offerings are of greater sanctity, as they are sacrificed due to the sanctity of Shabbat, the frequent offering precedes the offering of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the additional offerings but does not affect the daily offerings brought on Shabbat? Rather, the sanctity of Shabbat elevates the sanctity of the daily offerings as well, and as both are of equal sanctity, the frequent daily offering precedes the additional offerings.
  The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the continuation of this mishna: The additional Shabbat offerings precede the additional New Moon offerings because they are more frequent, despite the fact that the New Moon elevates the sanctity of its additional offerings. The Gemara rejects this proof in a similar manner: Is that to say that the sanctity of the New Moon affects the sanctity of its additional offerings but does not affect the additional offerings of Shabbat? These additional offerings are also imbued with the sanctity of the New Moon.
  The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the continuation of this mishna: The additional New Moon offerings precede the additional New Year offerings because they are more frequent, even though the New Year is of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Is that to say that the sanctity of the New Year affects the sanctity of its additional offerings but does not affect the additional offerings of the New Moon?
  The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Berakhot</i> 5:25) that discusses the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the order of blessings in <i>kiddush</i>. After stating one reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel that one recites the blessing on the wine before the blessing of the sanctity of the day, the <i>Tosefta</i> adds: Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: The blessing over wine is recited frequently, and the blessing over the day is not recited frequently, and there is a principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. This applies even though the blessing of the day is of greater sanctity, as it is recited due to the sanctity of Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the blessing of the day but does not affect the sanctity of the blessing on the wine?
  The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one did not recite the additional prayer on Shabbat until the time of the afternoon prayer arrived, the <i>halakha</i> is that a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer, as the afternoon prayer is more frequent. This ruling applies despite the fact that the additional prayer is of greater sanctity. Once again the Gemara rejects the proof: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the additional prayer but does not affect the sanctity of the afternoon prayer?
  The Gemara cites yet another proof. Come and hear the mishna: If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. One can infer from this that if both this offering and that offering are from today, the sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even though the peace offering is more frequent, as people sacrifice voluntary peace offerings more often than sin offerings or guilt offerings.
  Rava said in response: Are you speaking of a common offering? Although peace offerings are sacrificed more often than sin offerings, there is no obligation to sacrifice them at any particular frequency. We raise the dilemma only with regard to a clash between a frequent offering and one of greater sanctity, but we do not raise the dilemma with regard to a common offering.
  Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Is that to say that a common obligation is not considered tantamount to a frequent obligation? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to positive mitzvot whose intentional neglect results in the punishment of <i>karet</i> but whose unwitting transgression does not entail the sacrifice of a sin offering: I should exclude the neglect of the Paschal offering from the obligation to sacrifice a sin offering, as it is not frequent, and I should not exclude the neglect of the mitzva of circumcision, as it is frequent? Circumcision is considered a frequent mitzva, as it is performed more often than the Paschal offering, despite the fact that there is no obligation to perform circumcisions at any particular frequency.
  Rava answers: What is the meaning of frequent in that context? It means that circumcision is frequent in terms of the numerous mitzvot commanded with regard to its fulfillment. And if you wish, say instead that circumcision in relation to the Paschal offering is considered like a frequent obligation, as it is occurs far more often, whereas peace offerings are brought only somewhat more often than sin offerings. In sum, one cannot infer from the mishna that an offering of greater sanctity precedes a frequent offering.
  § An additional dilemma with regard to precedence was raised before the Sages: If the priest had two offerings to sacrifice, a frequent offering and an infrequent offering, and although he should have initially sacrificed the frequent offering he slaughtered the infrequent offering first, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that since he already slaughtered the infrequent offering he also proceeds to sacrifice it? Or perhaps he does not yet sacrifice it but gives it to another priest, who stirs its blood to prevent it from congealing, until he sacrifices the frequent offering; and then he sacrifices the infrequent offering.
  Rav Huna from Sura said: Come and hear an answer from the mishna: If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the sin offering from today. It can be assumed that the mishna is not discussing a case where none of the offerings have been slaughtered, as the peace offering would not take precedence in this situation. Rather, it is discussing a peace offering from yesterday that was slaughtered but its blood has not yet been presented. One can infer from this that only a peace offering from yesterday takes precedence in this situation, but in the case of a peace offering from today that is similar in other aspects to a peace offering from yesterday, the peace offering does not take precedence.
  The Gemara explains: And what are the circumstances of this case? This is a situation where one first slaughtered the peace offering from today. In this case the sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, although the peace offering is already slaughtered, as both of them are of greater sanctity. The same should apply to an infrequent offering that was slaughtered before a frequent offering: The frequent offering is slaughtered before the blood of the infrequent offering is presented.
  The Gemara rejects this answer: Perhaps when the mishna makes reference to a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the circumstances should be understood differently. How can you find these other circumstances? The mishna discusses a case where the priest already slaughtered both of them, the peace offering and the sin- or guilt offering, and the blood of both awaits presentation on the altar. But had he not yet slaughtered both of them, but only the peace offering, you can still raise the dilemma of whether the priest should set aside the blood of the peace offering in order to slaughter the sin offering first, due to its greater sanctity.
  The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>: Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: With regard to the order of blessings in <i>kiddush</i>, the blessing on wine is recited frequently and the blessing of the day is not recited frequently, and there is a principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. The obligation to recite the blessing of the day is due to the sanctity of Shabbat and applies at the start of Shabbat, before wine is placed on the table. Nevertheless, the blessing on the wine takes precedence due to its frequency. So too, the slaughtering of the frequent offering should take precedence, even if the priest had already commenced the sacrificial rites of the infrequent offering.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, with regard to <i>kiddush</i>, the circumstances are different, since wine is available when one recites <i>kiddush</i>, and therefore the obligation of both blessings come together. This means that it is comparable to a situation where one already slaughtered both animals.
  The Gemara cites yet another proof: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is that a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer, despite the fact that the obligation of the additional prayer applies first, which is similar to an offering slaughtered first. The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, since the time of the afternoon prayer has now arrived, one is obligated in both prayers, and again this is comparable to a situation where one already slaughtered both animals.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina that an answer to this dilemma can be found in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 61a): If one slaughtered the Paschal offering before midday it is disqualified, because it is stated in its regard: “In the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it before the daily afternoon offering was slaughtered it is valid, even though the daily offering should be sacrificed first, but someone should stir its blood to prevent it from congealing until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood of the daily offering. Although the infrequent Paschal offering is already slaughtered, the priest first slaughters the frequent daily offering and then sprinkles the blood of the Paschal offering.
  The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Here we are dealing with a case where he gave precedence to the daily offering and slaughtered it first, and then slaughtered the Paschal offering before sprinkling the blood of the daily offering. Since the blood of both offerings requires sprinkling on the altar, the blood of the daily offering takes precedence. Rav Aḥa the Elder said to Rav Ashi that the wording of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled, and does not teach: Until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood. This indicates that the daily afternoon offering has already been slaughtered. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from its wording that this is the meaning of the mishna.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: The verse states, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood: “Of all the consecrated items of the children of Israel to you have I given them <i>lemoshḥa</i>” (Numbers 18:8). <i>Targum Onkelos</i> renders this term as: For greatness, indicating that the flesh of the offerings should be eaten in the manner that kings eat their food, i.e., prepared in any way they want.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard for consumption by the priests and you seek to ascertain its nature, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites after they smeared a bit of oil on them, or it is left over from the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper after a small amount of the oil was placed on him.
  If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar in the manner of an offering, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests, or it is the leftover oil from the meal offering of the anointed priest, which requires a great deal of oil and which is burned in its entirety on the altar. The mishna adds: One can-not say that the oil distributed to priests or burned on the altar was brought as a gift offering, as one may not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may contribute oil as a gift offering.
  
  Daf 91b
  
  GEMARA: Shmuel says: According to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that oil may be sacrificed as a gift offering, in the case of one who contributes oil, a priest removes a handful of the oil and sacrifices it on the altar, and its remainder is eaten by the priests. What is the reason for the ruling of Shmuel? The verse states: “And when one brings a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]” (Leviticus 2:1). The superfluous word <i>korban</i> teaches that one may contribute oil, and its status is like that of a meal offering: Just as with regard to a meal offering the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too with regard to oil, the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.
  Rabbi Zeira said that we learn this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna as well: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard, you do not need to ask what it is; rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites, or it is left over from the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, as one does not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Zeira learns by inference from the mishna that according to the one who says that one may contribute oil, it is distributed to the priests for consumption and it is not sacrificed entirely.
  Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Say the last clause of the mishna: If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar, you do not need to ask what it is; rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests or it is left over from the meal offering of the anointed priest, as one does not contribute oil as a gift offering. Abaye learns by inference from the mishna that according to the one who says that one may contribute oil, it is burned in its entirety in the flames on the altar. This contradicts Shmuel’s statement that according to Rabbi Tarfon only a handful of the oil is burned on the altar. The Gemara comments: For Abaye the inference from the first clause of the mishna is difficult, while for Rabbi Zeira the inference from the last clause is difficult.
  The Gemara continues: Granted, according to Rabbi Zeira, the inference from the first clause that the oil is distributed for consumption by the priests can be explained as referring to the remainder of the oil, whereas the inference from the last clause that the oil is burned on the altar is referring to the handful removed from the oil. But according to Abaye, the contradictory inferences pose a difficulty. The Gemara answers: One cannot infer anything from the first clause, as the mishna taught the first clause due to the last clause. That is, as the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna wishes to teach the last clause in a certain manner, he teaches the first clause in a similar style, despite the fact that one might come to an erroneous conclusion from the wording of the first clause.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, a <i>tanna</i> may teach the last clause of a mishna due to the first clause, i.e., a <i>tanna</i> might teach in a similar formulation to one he had already used. But would a <i>tanna</i> teach the first clause of a mishna due to the last clause? The Gemara answers: Yes; they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that a <i>tanna</i> taught the first clause due to the last clause.
  The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: If one contributes wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva that one may contribute wine, it is poured into the basins adjacent to the corner of the altar. If one contributes oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that one may contribute oil, it is burned in the flames of the altar. What, is it not possible to infer from the fact that the wine is poured in its entirety into the basins that the oil is likewise burned in its entirety in the flames of the altar, contrary to Shmuel’s statement? The Gemara rejects this proof: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is and that case is as it is, i.e., the donations of wine and the oil are separate cases, and the two statements of the <i>baraita</i> need not accord with each other.
  Rav Pappa said: Shmuel’s statement is like one side of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who contributes oil should not bring less than a <i>log</i>. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Three <i>log</i>. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree? The Sages said this before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the nature of an inference by means of verbal analogy or juxtaposition: Is the secondary case equated to the primary case in all aspects, in accordance with the exegetical principle: Infer from it and again from it; or does the comparison extend only to one specific issue derived from the primary case, in accordance with the principle: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, i.e., in all other aspects the cases are not equated?
  The Gemara explains that this is the difference between them, as the Rabbis hold by the principle: Infer from it and again from it. The Gemara explains the application of this principle: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed, as inferred from the verse addressing the meal offering. And again one infers from this source: Just as a meal offering requires a <i>log</i> of oil, so too here, an offering of oil alone must be a <i>log</i> of oil. And just as with regard to a meal offering the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too with regard to oil, the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.
  And the other, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds by the principle: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place. The Gemara explains that here too, one infers from the case of a meal offering: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed. But with regard to all other aspects of this <i>halakha</i>, interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, and its status is like that of wine libations, which are similar to oil in that they are also poured onto the altar: Just as one contributes libations of three <i>log</i>, so too, when one contributes oil one contributes three <i>log</i>; and just as libations are poured in their entirety into the basins, so too, the oil is burned in its entirety in the flames of the altar.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi cited the source of the gift offering of oil from the verse addressing the meal offering he would not disagree with the Rabbis, as everyone employs the principle of: Infer from it and again from it. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the gift offering of oil from a verse that deals with libations: “All that are homeborn shall do these things after this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire” (Numbers 15:13). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from here that just as one may contribute wine libations, so too, one may contribute oil. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi compares oil to wine libations: Just as one contributes libations of three <i>log</i>, so too, one contributes three <i>log</i> of oil.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that, i.e., that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the source of the gift offering of oil is not from the meal offering? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And when one brings a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]” (Leviticus 2:1), that the superfluous word <i>korban</i> teaches that one may contribute oil? The <i>baraita</i> continues: And how much must one contribute? Three <i>log</i>. The Gemara explains the question: And whom did you hear who says the gift offering of oil is three <i>log</i>? This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and yet he cites the source of the gift offering of oil from the word <i>korban</i>, which is referring to a meal offering. Rav Pappa said to him: If this <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught; and I cannot take issue with it.
  § Shmuel says: One who contributes wine brings it and sprinkles it on the flames of the altar. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “And you shall present for the libation half a <i>hin</i> of wine, for an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 15:10). The verse indicates that there is a type of wine libation which is an offering made by fire. The Gemara challenges: But he thereby extinguishes the fire on the altar, and the Torah states: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). The Gemara explains: Extinguishing in a partial manner is not called extinguishing; in other words, this act is not included in the prohibition.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Rabba bar Avuh says: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable for violating the prohibition: “It shall not go out”? The Gemara answers: This statement is referring to a situation where there is only this coal on the altar, and therefore the fire is entirely extinguished. If you wish, say instead that even if partial extinguishing is prohibited, extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, as in the case of sprinkling wine on the altar, is different, and is permitted.
  The Gemara challenges: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov teaches: Since the Torah gave a mitzva to remove the ashes of the offerings from the altar, one might have thought that it is permitted to extinguish the coals so that they become ashes and then to remove them. Therefore, you say: He shall not extinguish, in accordance with the verse: “It shall not go out.” Although this is a case of extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, the <i>baraita</i> deems it prohibited. The Gemara explains: It is different there, as it is possible for the priest to sit and wait until some of the coals become ashes, and then remove them. By contrast, with regard to wine, there is no alternative to sprinkling the wine on the fire, and therefore it is permitted.
  The Gemara challenges: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i> that prohibits sprinkling wine on the fire of the altar: If one contributes wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva that one may contribute wine, it is poured into the basins on the altar. If one contributes oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that one may contribute oil, it is poured onto the flames of the altar. And it is furthermore taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The wine libation is poured into the basins. The <i>baraita</i> suggests: Or perhaps it is not so; rather, it is poured onto the flames. Therefore, you say: He shall not extinguish.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that even an unintentional action, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues, is prohibited; and this statement of Shmuel is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues is permitted. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? But doesn’t Shmuel say: One may extinguish a piece of white-hot metal in a public thoroughfare on Shabbat so that the masses will not be injured by it;
  
  Daf 92a
  
  but one may not extinguish a wood coal, because extinguishing it is prohibited by Torah law? And if it enters your mind that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it should be permitted to extinguish even a wood coal. Rabbi Shimon maintains that extinguishing a coal is prohibited by Torah law only when one intends to use the extinguished coal. Otherwise, this constitutes a labor performed on Shabbat which is not necessary for its own sake, which is not prohibited by Torah law.
  The Gemara answers: Shmuel’s statements are not contradictory, as with regard to an unintentional act, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. But with regard to labor not necessary for its own sake, he holds that it is prohibited by Torah law, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  § Rav Huna says: With regard to wine libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement of wood by themselves and burns them there, without removing them from the Temple courtyard. This is due to the fact that it is stated with regard to a disqualified sin offering: “In the sacred place…it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). This requirement of burning in the sacred place applies to all offerings that are meant to be sacrificed on an altar and became disqualified. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the blood, the oil, the meal offerings, and the libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement of wood by themselves and burns them there.
  The Gemara relates: Shmuel said to Rav Ḥana of Baghdad: Bring me an assembly of ten men and I will tell you in their presence this <i>halakha</i> that I wish to disseminate: With regard to libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement of wood by themselves and burns them there.
  
  MISHNA: In the case of the blood of a sin offering designated for presentation that was sprayed on a garment, that garment requires laundering, as is stated with regard to a sin offering: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment, you shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled in a sacred place” (Leviticus 6:20). Although the verse is speaking only of sin offerings that are eaten and whose blood is presented on the outer altar, as it is stated: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten” (Leviticus 6:19), the principle is not exclusive to eaten sin offerings. With regard to the blood of both the sin offerings that are eaten and the sin offerings that are wholly burned and not eaten and whose blood is presented on the inner altar, garments sprayed with blood from each of these offerings require laundering. As it is stated at the start of that passage: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), it is understood: There is one law for all the sin offerings.
  That is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to sin offerings fit for sacrifice. With regard to a disqualified sin offering, its blood does not cause a garment to require laundering whether the offering had a period of fitness when its blood was fit for presentation or whether it did not have a period of fitness. Which offering is the disqualified sin offering that had a period of fitness? It is one that was left overnight and then became disqualified; or it is one that became ritually impure; or it is one that emerged from of the Temple courtyard. Which offering is the disqualified sin offering that did not have a period of fitness? It is one that was slaughtered with the intent to eat it or present its blood beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or it is one whose blood was collected by people disqualified for Temple service and they sprinkled its blood.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: In the case of the blood of a sin offering that was sprayed on a garment, the garment must be laundered, and this is the <i>halakha</i> concerning the blood of sin offerings that are eaten and sin offerings that are wholly burned, as it is stated: “This is the law of the sin offering”; there is one law for all sin offerings. The Gemara asks: And if there is one law for all sin offerings, even the blood of a bird sin offering should also require laundering. If so, why is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that the blood of a bird sin offering requires laundering. To counter this, the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering.” The word “this” teaches that the <i>halakha</i> is to be restricted to the blood of an animal sin offering and it does not apply to the bird sin offering.
  Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara: The verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering…shall the sin offering be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). The verse is speaking specifically of sin offerings that are slaughtered and not of bird offerings, which are killed by pinching the nape of the neck, rather than slaughtering with a knife.
  The Gemara challenges: And I might say that the <i>halakha</i> is to be learned in another manner, and the verse is speaking specifically of sin offerings that are eaten, as it is written: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten” (Leviticus 6:19); but internal sin offerings, which are not eaten, should not be included. The Gemara explains: The Merciful One amplifies the <i>halakha</i> by stating: “This is the law of the sin offering,” which includes all sin offerings, even those that are not eaten.
  The Gemara suggests: If so, then even the blood of the bird sin offering should be included. The Gemara explains: The Merciful One restricts the <i>halakha</i> by stating: “This is the law,” which excludes bird offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see that indicated that the verse is to be understood as including internal sin offerings and excluding bird offerings, and not the opposite? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that internal animal sin offerings should have been included by the inclusive language of the verse, as internal sin offerings resemble eaten animal sin offerings in several ways: Each variety is a large animal and not a bird; each variety is subject to slaughter on the north side of the Temple courtyard; and the blood of each requires collection in a vessel;
  
  Daf 92b
  
  and their blood is placed on the corner of the altar; and the blood is placed with a priest’s finger; and the blood is placed on the edge of the corner of the altar; and parts of each are consumed in flames upon the altar. None of these apply to bird sin offerings.
  The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary, the bird sin offering should have been included and likened to the eaten animal sin offerings, as the blood of bird sin offerings is presented on the outer altar like an animal sin offering that is eaten, and the bird sin offering has portions set aside for eating, like it. The Gemara rejects the reasoning for including bird offerings: Those features that are common to internal sin offerings and eaten animal sin offerings are more numerous than the features common to bird sin offerings and eaten animal sin offerings.
  Rav Yosef said: There is another way to prove that the blood of a bird sin offering is not required to be laundered out if it is sprayed on a garment. With regard to laundering, the verse states: “The priest that offers it for sin shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19); the obligation described applies to it, i.e., the eaten animal sin offering, and not to another similar sin offering. Consequently, the verse is excluding a case within the broad category of eaten sin offerings, and one is not required to launder out the blood of a bird sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: But if the exclusion of bird offerings is derived from this verse, then why do I need the derivation from the verse: “This is the law of the sin offering”? The Gemara answers: If not for the derivation from “this,” I would say that the term “shall eat it” is simply the manner of speech of the verse, so that it does not indicate any exclusion. Therefore, the word “this” teaches us that a sin offering is excluded, and the term “shall eat it,” demonstrates that the excluded sin offering is one that is eaten.
  Rabba said that there is a different explanation. Internal sin offerings cannot be excluded from the requirement of laundering sprayed garments, as the verse speaks specifically of internal sin offerings, as the verse states: “It shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 6:20). The verse is speaking of sin offerings that require sprinklings, and sprinkling is mentioned specifically with regard to internal sin offerings (see Leviticus 4:6), unlike eaten animal sin offerings, with regard to which the Torah uses a term of placing to describe the presenting of its blood (see Leviticus 4:25).
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Can one say that the passage about laundering applies specifically to internal sin offerings? But isn’t it taught in the mishna: Although the verse is speaking only of sin offerings that are eaten, indicating that the passage certainly applies to sin offerings that are eaten? The Gemara answers: The mishna’s statement pertains to the matter of scouring and rinsing copper vessels in which a sin offering was cooked (see Leviticus 6:21), which is relevant only to sin offerings that are eaten. But in the matter of laundering: “You shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 6:20) is written, and the term “it shall be sprinkled” indicates only internal sin offerings. By contrast, eaten sin offerings are included only through the amplification in the verse: “The law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18).
  The Gemara asks: If so, that the verses prescribing laundering are primarily discussing internal sin offerings, and eaten sin offerings are included only through a derivation, then with regard to the statement in the mishna: Both the sin offerings that are eaten and the internal sin offerings, is this statement not misleading? Rather, the <i>tanna</i> should have stated: Both the internal sin offerings and the sin offerings that are eaten, first mentioning the offerings most clearly indicated in the verse. The Gemara answers: Teach it as: Both the internal sin offerings and the sin offerings that are eaten.
  If so, that the requirement of laundering applies to those sin offerings with regard to which the Torah uses the term sprinkling, the blood of a bird sin offering should require laundering as well, as sprinkling is also mentioned with regard to it (see Leviticus 5:9). The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excludes bird offerings by stating: “This is the law of the sin offering.” The Gemara challenges: If so, that the function of this verse is to be understood as a restriction, an external sin offering also should not require laundering. The Gemara responds: The Merciful One amplified the <i>halakha</i> to include external sin offerings by stating: “The law of.”
  The Gemara asks: And what did you see that convinced you to exclude bird offerings and include external sin offerings? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the eaten animal sin offering should have been included, as the eaten animal sin offering resembles the internal sin offering in several respects: Each is a large animal; each is subject to slaughter on the north side of the courtyard; and the blood of each requires collection in a vessel; and their blood is placed on the corner of the altar; and the blood is placed with a priest’s finger; and the blood is placed on the edge of the corner of the altar; and parts of each are consumed in flames upon the altar. None of these apply to bird sin offerings.
  The Gemara raises an objection: On the contrary, the bird sin offering should have been included in the requirement for laundering, as the offering of the blood of the bird sin offering is termed sprinkling, just like it is in the case of the internal sin offering. The Gemara answers: Those features common to internal sin offerings and eaten animal sin offerings are more numerous than the features common to internal sin offerings and bird sin offerings.
  § The Gemara indicated that the blood of the bird sin offering is not received in a vessel, unlike that of animal sin offerings. With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, Rabbi Avin asks: When the blood of an eaten animal sin offering is brought into the Sanctuary in a vessel, this disqualifies it. In the case of a bird sin offering, which is killed by pinching the nape of its neck, whose blood a priest brought inside the Sanctuary in its neck, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is its neck comparable to a service vessel, since it is from its neck that the blood is presented, and therefore it is disqualified if brought into the Sanctuary this way?
  Or perhaps is its neck comparable to the neck of a large animal offering, about which the Merciful One states in the Torah: “Of whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 6:23), which teaches that its blood is disqualified when brought inside in a service vessel, but the blood is not disqualified when the animal’s flesh is brought inside. What is the status of the bird’s neck? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: If, after its nape is pinched, a bird sin offering convulsed and consequently entered inside the Sanctuary and then it returned to the courtyard, it remains valid; its blood may be sprinkled and its meat eaten. It can be inferred that the bird offering remains valid if it has entered on its own, but if a priest has brought it in, it is disqualified because of the blood in its neck.
  The Gemara rejects the proof: But according to your reasoning, one might draw a faulty inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a convulsing offering, as follows. With regard to an animal offering of the most sacred order, about which it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If, after being slaughtered appropriately on the north side of the courtyard, the animal convulsed, and consequently it went out to the south side of the courtyard and then returned to the north side, it remains valid; should it be inferred: But if a priest took it out to the south side it becomes disqualified? The sacrifice is certainly not disqualified by being taken to the south side of the courtyard, and the inference is incorrect.
  Rather, it must be assumed that this <i>halakha</i>, that of the convulsing animal that moved from the northern side to the southern side, is taught for another purpose. It was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to teach this <i>halakha</i> in order to establish a contrast with an animal that went out to the outside beyond the courtyard, which is disqualified even if it goes out by itself. Here, too, with regard to the bird sin offering, the <i>halakha</i> of the convulsing animal that moved into the Sanctuary is taught for another purpose. This <i>halakha</i> was necessary for establishing a contrast with a bird offering that went out to the outside beyond the courtyard, which is disqualified even if it goes out by itself. Accordingly, this may not be used to resolve Rabbi Avin’s dilemma.
  § Rabbi Avin asks another question about the blood of a bird offering, which is sprinkled directly from the body of the bird and not collected in a service vessel. With regard to the blood of a large animal, which spills on the floor before it is received in a service vessel, it becomes disqualified for presentation (see 25a), but if it spills after it is received in a vessel, it may be collected from the floor and presented (see 32a). If the blood of a bird offering spilled onto the floor and the priest collected it from the floor in order to sprinkle it, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Is it simply that the Merciful One did not require a service vessel for the collection of the bird’s blood, and therefore a priest may collect it from the floor and it remains fit for sprinkling on the altar? Or perhaps the Merciful One rendered a service vessel unfit for sprinkling it in any case, and the blood must be sprinkled directly from the bird’s body, and therefore, if it spills on the floor and the priest collects it, it is unfit for sprinkling.
  Rava said: Come and hear a proof, deduced from a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that the blood of a bird sin offering would require laundering if sprayed on a garment. Therefore, the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), which excludes the bird sin offering. But if it enters your mind that the Merciful One rendered a vessel unfit for sprinkling the blood of a bird, this interpretation is unnecessary. I will deduce the <i>halakha</i> that a bird’s blood does not require laundering because the blood becomes disqualified even by merely passing into the airspace of a vessel. Consequently, the blood is disqualified when coming into the airspace of the garment, which is considered a vessel, and, as disqualified blood, it does not subsequently require laundering.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The <i>baraita</i> provides no decisive proof, as even if a bird’s blood is disqualified by passing into the airspace of a vessel, the word “this” must still be interpreted to exclude the blood of a bird sin offering from the requirement of laundering. The interpretation of the verse accounts for cases in which the blood reaches the vessel without first passing into its airspace, as in a case when the priest affixes a vessel to the bird’s neck. Consequently, no resolution can be derived for Rav Avin’s question.
  § The Gemara returns to the primary subject of the mishna, the requirement of laundering garments from the sprayed blood of a sin offering. Levi asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If the blood of an offering sprayed from one garment to another garment, what is the <i>halakha</i>? By contact with the first garment, is the blood thereby dismissed with regard to the requirement of laundering, such that a subsequent garment would not require laundering? Or perhaps not.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This is an excellent question; and the answer is: The garment requires laundering whichever way you look at it. If the <i>halakha</i> is that with regard to blood that sprayed onto a garment the priest may collect it and it is still fit for presentation on the altar, then this blood is also fit. Consequently, even the second garment must be laundered. And if you say that with regard to blood that sprayed onto a garment if he collects it, it is unfit for presentation, I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: If the offering had a period of fitness and then was disqualified, its blood requires laundering. Accordingly, since the blood upon the second garment was initially collected in a service vessel, it too had a period of fitness.
  
  Daf 93a
  
  § In a related matter, Rami bar Ḥama asked of Rav Ḥisda: If the blood of a sin offering sprayed onto a ritually impure garment, so that the blood became impure and unfit for presentation, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does the garment require laundering? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: From the fact that Rami bar Ḥama asked the question in this manner, with regard to ritually pure blood that sprayed onto an impure garment, and not with regard to blood that was already impure that sprayed onto a garment, conclude from it that he holds that even if the sin offering had a period of fitness and then was disqualified, a garment onto which its blood sprayed does not require laundering.
  His question, therefore, is: Does this statement apply only when one event, the spraying of the blood, occurs after the other event, i.e., the disqualification of the blood? But if the spraying and the disqualification occur simultaneously, as in this case, perhaps the principle does not apply, and the garment must be laundered. Or, perhaps there is no difference whether the events occur this way or that way, and even if the offering becomes unfit only as the blood touches the garment, it still does not require laundering? Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: The matter is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the Rabbis, in accordance with the explanation of Rabba, and as Abaye resolves it.
  The Gemara elaborates: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to water of purification, which has been sanctified by the ashes of the red heifer, even if the water is rendered impure it nevertheless performs its function and purifies a person from the ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. This is evident because those performing the rite would sprinkle water of purification even on a menstruating woman who has been rendered impure by a corpse. Although her menstruation impurity renders the water of purification impure when it touches her, it is effective in removing the ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Rabbi Elazar’s opinion is in opposition to that of the Rabbis.
  And concerning this dispute, Rabba says: Although it would seem that the water of purification applied to a menstruating woman does not become impure until it touches her, the case may still provide precedent for all water of purification that has become impure, as follows: Rabbi Elazar stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of his teacher Rabbi Akiva, who says that passing a vessel containing water of purification over the place where a ritually impure item is renders the vessel considered as if resting there, so that the water becomes impure. Consequently, just as the water of purification is effective for the menstruating woman although it has become impure when hovering above her, water of purification always remains effective after having contracted ritual impurity.
  That is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 10:5): There is a dispute with regard to the case of a ritually pure person who was standing beyond an oven, which stood between him and the wall, and a carcass of a creeping animal, which imparts impurity, was in the oven; and the person stretched out his hand to the window and took the jug [<i>halagin</i>] containing water of purification and passed it over the opening of the oven. Rabbi Akiva deems the water of purification impure, although the jug has merely passed over the oven’s opening and has not come to rest on it, and the Rabbis deem the water pure. And according to Rabba, in this manner do they disagree: That Rabbi Akiva holds that the jug is considered as if resting on the opening of the oven, and the Rabbis hold that the jug is not considered as if resting there.
  And Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s interpretation from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Para</i> 10:6): Although he deems the water of purification impure in the previous case, Rabbi Akiva concedes that in the act of sprinkling, in which the person passed the water of purification over an impure earthenware vessel or over an impure item designated for lying or sitting, the water remains pure. This is so because there is nothing that renders impure all that is in the airspace directly above it, like anything below that touches it, other than an olive-bulk from a corpse and all other items which impart ritual impurity to those items which overlie them, including a stone marked with leprosy. Such a stone also imparts overlying impurity, rendering impure anything under the same roof or, if there is no roof, in the airspace directly above it up to the sky.
  Rather, Abaye said: Everyone agrees that a vessel containing water of purification passing over an item that is ritually impure is not considered as if it is resting on it. And here, with regard to the jug being taken over the oven, they disagree about this: Rabbi Akiva holds that we decree that the vessel contracts impurity by rabbinic law, since perhaps a vessel carried above an impure item will come to rest directly on that impure item. And the Rabbis hold: We do not decree that the vessel contracts impurity in such a case. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that in the act of sprinkling, while the water passes over an impure item, once it has set forth into the air, it has set forth. Since the water has left the person’s hand, the person cannot leave it to rest upon an impure item.
  The Gemara asks: If so, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis would agree that the water of purification does not become impure before touching a menstruating woman. And, if so, then Rabbi Elazar and the Rabbis, who disagree as to whether impure water of purification renders one pure, with regard to what case do they disagree? Abaye said: They disagree with regard to whether one may derive the <i>halakha</i> of impurity rendered earlier, before sprinkling the water of purification, from the <i>halakha</i> of impurity rendered at that very moment that the purification occurs, as in the case of the menstruating woman.
  One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds: One derives the <i>halakha</i> in this manner, and, therefore, the water effects purification even if the water has become impure first. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that one does not derive this <i>halakha</i>. Therefore, Rav Ḥisda’s answer to Rami bar Hama is that, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, if the impurity occurs in the moment that the sin offering’s blood touches the impure garment, the <i>halakha</i> is the same as it is when the blood has become impure before reaching the garment. In both cases, the garment is exempt from laundering. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, the <i>halakha</i> is not the same in both cases: If the blood becomes impure at the very moment it reaches the garment, laundering is required.
  Rava said: The case of sprinkling water of purification upon a menstruating woman has no bearing upon the case of the sprayed garment, as everyone holds that one does not derive the <i>halakha</i> of impurity incurred earlier from the <i>halakha</i> of impurity incurred at that very moment.
  Rava continues: But here, with regard to the precedent of the menstruating woman, they disagree about this: Rabbi Elazar holds that sprinkling the water of purification requires a specific measure of the water, but sprinklings of small quantities combine to constitute sprinklings of the required measure. Therefore, if the initial sprinkling on the woman does not contain a sufficient measure of water, the small quantity of water of purification first becomes impure, but it later combines with the subsequent sprinkling to purify her. Consequently, water of purification that has already become impure may effect purification. But the Rabbis hold that sprinkling of the water does not require a measure. Accordingly, the woman is purified by the initial sprinkling, although the purification water becomes impure at the very moment that it reaches her; and this does not have any bearing on a case in which the purification water is impure before it touches the person upon whom it is sprinkled.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to a disqualified sin offering, a garment on which its blood is sprayed does not require laundering, whether the offering had a moment of qualification when its blood was fit for sprinkling or whether it did not have a moment of qualification. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a garment on which the blood of a sin offering sprayed, the verse states: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment” (Leviticus 6:20), teaching that laundering is required when some of the blood of a fit sin offering is sprayed on the garment, but this is not so in the case of the blood of a disqualified sin offering. Rabbi Akiva says: If the sin offering had a period of fitness and then was disqualified, a garment onto which its blood sprayed still requires laundering. If it did not have a period of fitness at all and was then disqualified, a garment onto which its blood sprayed does not require laundering.
  And Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to both this sin offering that had a period of fitness and that sin offering that did not, a garment onto which its blood sprayed does not require laundering. What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara answers: It is written in the Torah with regard to laundering the blood of a sin offering: “Every male among the priests may eat it” (Leviticus 6:22), and only it. And it is written earlier in that same section: “Of its blood” (Leviticus 6:20), but not all its blood. Therefore, there are two exclusionary terms; one excludes laundering for the situation where the unfit offering had a period of fitness, and the other excludes a situation in which the offering did not have a period of fitness.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Akiva interpret these verses? From the term “of its blood” he derives that the offering that has no period of fitness is excluded. The exclusion indicated by the word “it” teaches that the requirement for scouring and rinsing a copper vessel in which sacred food was cooked excludes <i>teruma</i>, i.e., scouring and rinsing is not required for a vessel in which <i>teruma</i> was cooked. And rejecting Rabbi Akiva’s understanding, Rabbi Shimon conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing as explained on 96b, and all the more so does <i>teruma</i> not require this. Consequently, Rabbi Shimon does not need a verse to exclude <i>teruma</i>, and he interprets the verse to exclude both a sin offering that had a period of fitness and a sin offering that did not have a period of fitness.
  MISHNA: If the blood of a sin offering sprayed from the neck of the animal onto a garment, the garment does not require laundering. If the blood was collected in a vessel and sprinkled on the altar and sprayed from the corner or from the base of the altar onto the garment, the garment does not require laundering, as the blood was already sprinkled and its mitzva was fulfilled. If the blood spilled from the neck onto the floor before it was collected in a vessel, and the priest collected the blood and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering. It is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is fit for sprinkling that the garment requires laundering.
  GEMARA: The Gemara cites sources for the <i>halakhot</i> mentioned in the mishna. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that if blood sprayed from the neck of the animal onto a garment, the garment should require laundering. Therefore, the verse states: “On which it shall be sprinkled” (Leviticus 6:20), which teaches: I told you that a garment requires laundering only with regard to blood which is fit for sprinkling, which must be collected in a vessel directly from the neck of the animal. It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that if blood sprayed from the corner or from the base of the altar, the garment should require laundering. Therefore, the verse states: “On which it shall be sprinkled,” excluding that blood that was already sprinkled.
  § The mishna teaches: If the blood spilled from the neck onto the floor before it was collected in a vessel, and the priest collected the blood and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering. It is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is fit for sprinkling that the garment requires laundering.
  
  Daf 93b
  
  With regard to the statement that only blood that was collected in a vessel and is fit for sprinkling requires the laundering of the garment on which it sprayed, the Gemara asks: Why do I also need this? After all, it was already taught that if blood spilled from the neck onto the floor before it was collected in a vessel, and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering. The Gemara answers: This is not an additional <i>halakha</i>, but rather the mishna is saying: What is the reason? What is the reason that if the blood spilled from the neck onto the floor before it was collected in a vessel, and the priest collected it and it sprayed on a garment, the garment does not require laundering? This is because it is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is fit for sprinkling that the garment requires laundering.
  § The mishna teaches: It is only with regard to blood that was received in a sacred vessel and is fit for sprinkling that the garment requires laundering. The Gemara asks: As it was already taught that when disqualified blood is sprayed on a garment, it does not require laundering, this reiteration serves to exclude what? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case where a priest received less blood than is sufficient for sprinkling in this vessel, and less than is sufficient for sprinkling in that vessel, and then he mixed together the blood from the two vessels. In such a case, even though the combined amount is now enough for sprinkling, the blood did not become fit for sprinkling.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the sanctification of water of purification, Rabbi Ḥalafta bar Shaul says: If a priest sanctified less than is sufficient for sprinkling in this vessel and less than is sufficient for sprinkling in that vessel, and he then mixed together the water from the two vessels, he has not sanctified it to become water of purification.
  In a related issue, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a priest did this for the blood of an internal sin offering, collecting less than is sufficient for sprinkling in each vessel and then mixing all the blood together, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is Rabbi Ḥalafta’s statement about the water of purification a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and we do not learn from such a <i>halakha</i> an application to a different matter?
  Or, perhaps: What is the reason there, that the combined water of purification is not fit for sprinkling? It may be because it is written about sprinkling the water: “And dip it in the water” (Numbers 19:18), stressing that it is to be dipped in precisely the same water that was first placed in the vessel. This indicates that from the outset there must be an amount sufficient for sprinkling. If so, then here also there is comparable language employed with regard to the blood of a sin offering. It is written: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6). Does this prove that from the outset there must be sufficient blood for sprinkling?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Elazar says: Even in the case of the blood of a sin offering, if one collected two insufficient amounts and then mixed them together, he did not sanctify the blood to make it fit for sprinkling on the altar, and therefore, if it sprays on a garment, one is not required to launder the garment.
  § Rava says: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the internal sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled in the Sanctuary: The verse states: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6); and there must be enough blood in the vessel for the priest to dip his finger in it so that he does not need to wipe blood from the sides or the bottom of the vessel onto his finger. The verse states: “In the blood,” teaching that the blood is unfit for sprinkling unless there is a measure of the blood fit for dipping in the vessel from the outset, and the blood is disqualified if more blood is added to a vessel that initially contained less than the required measure. The verse states: “Sprinkle of the blood,” which teaches that he must sprinkle of the blood that is mentioned in this matter, which is the blood in the vessel.
  And it was necessary for the Torah to write the term: “In the blood,” as well as the term: “And the priest shall dip.” As, had the Merciful One written only: “And the priest shall dip,” I would say that if there is sufficient blood at the time of dipping, even though there was not a measure of blood fit for dipping in the vessel from the beginning, it is nevertheless fit for dipping. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “In the blood,” to teach that there must be sufficient blood from the beginning.
  And if the Merciful One had written only: “In the blood,” I would say that if at the beginning there was an appropriate measure of blood, it is not necessary for the vessel to retain a measure of enough blood throughout the whole rite, and even if he eventually wipes blood off of the vessel onto his finger, it is sufficient for sprinkling. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And the priest shall dip,” to teach that there must remain enough blood to dip his finger each time.
  The cited <i>baraita</i> states: The verse states: “Sprinkle of the blood,” which teaches that he must sprinkle of the blood that is mentioned in this matter, which is the blood in the vessel. The Gemara asks: In order to exclude what was this mentioned? Rava said: This serves to exclude the remainder of the blood that is on the priest’s finger after sprinkling, which may not be used for further sprinkling, as he must dip his finger in the blood again for each sprinkle. Rava continues: This supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: The remainder of the blood that is on the priest’s finger after sprinkling is unfit for further sprinkling.
  Ravin bar Rav Adda said to Rav, i.e., Rava: Your student says that Rav Amram says: We already learn a <i>baraita</i> opposing Rabbi Elazar’s opinion: If a priest was sprinkling the blood of an internal sin offering, and a sprinkle sprayed from his hand onto a garment, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. If it sprayed before he sprinkled, the garment requires laundering, but if it sprayed once he has sprinkled, it does not require laundering.
  Ravin bar Rav Adda explains: What, is it not this that the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the blood sprayed on a garment before the priest concluded sprinkling, the garment requires laundering, even if it sprayed from the remainder on his finger; but if it sprayed once the priest has concluded sprinkling, it does not require laundering? This indicates that blood sprayed from the remainder on his finger requires laundering, so it must be fit for sprinkling. Rava replied: No, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the blood sprayed on a garment before the sprinkling has left his hand, it requires laundering, but if it sprayed once the sprinkling has left his hand, the remainder on his finger does not require laundering if it then sprays onto a garment.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion from what is taught about sprinkling the blood of the red heifer in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:9): When the priest has concluded sprinkling the blood, he wipes his hand on the body of the red heifer. Evidently, if he concluded sprinkling, yes, he does wipe his hand; but if he did not conclude sprinkling, he does not wipe his hand, even though a remainder is left on his finger. Evidently, this remainder is fit for sprinkling. Rava said to him: The mishna is to be understood otherwise: If he concluded sprinkling, he wipes his entire hand on the body of the red heifer; but if he has not concluded sprinkling, he wipes only his finger after each sprinkling.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, if he concluded sprinkling, he wipes his hand on the body of the red heifer, as it is stated: “And the heifer shall be burned in his sight; its skin, and its flesh, and its blood” (Numbers 19:5), indicating that the remaining blood must be incinerated together with the flesh. But on what does he wipe his finger after each sprinkling, since he must not wipe it on the body of the heifer, which might cause hair to stick to his finger, interfering with the sprinkling? Abaye said: He wipes his finger on the lip of the bowl holding the blood for sprinkling, as it is written: “Atoning bowls [<i>keforei</i>] of gold” (Ezra 1:10). The atoning bowls are so named because the priest wipes his finger on them, and the word <i>keforei</i> indicates cleansing by way of wiping (see <i>Ḥullin</i> 8b).
  MISHNA: Apropos laundering the blood of a sin offering from garments onto which it sprayed, the mishna discusses what is considered a garment. If the blood of a sin offering sprayed onto the hide of an animal before it was flayed from the animal, the hide does not require laundering, because its status is not that of a garment, which is susceptible to ritual impurity. If the blood sprayed onto the hide after it was flayed, it requires laundering; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the blood sprayed onto the hide after it was flayed, it does not require laundering until it is crafted into a vessel or garment that is actually susceptible to ritual impurity. This is the principle with regard to laundering: A garment must be laundered only in the place where the blood was sprayed, and only if it is an item that is fit to become ritually impure, and only if it is an item fit for laundering.
  With regard to the garment mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and the sackcloth, and the hide, all of these require laundering. And the laundering must be performed in a sacred place, the Temple courtyard, and the breaking of an earthenware vessel in which a sin offering was cooked must be performed in a sacred place, and scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked must be performed in a sacred place. With regard to this matter, a stringency applies to a sin offering more than it applies to offerings of the most sacred order.
  GEMARA: With regard to blood sprayed on a flayed hide, from where are these matters, i.e., the divergent opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, derived? The Gemara explains: They are derived as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is stated with regard to laundering: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment” (Leviticus 6:20). I have derived only a garment; from where do I include an animal’s hide after it was flayed? The same verse states: “You shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled,” to include any item on which the blood sprayed.
  One might have thought that I would include a hide even before it was flayed. To counter this, the verse states: “Garment.” Consequently, just as any manner of garment is an item fit to become ritually impure if one intends to use it, e.g., making it a patch for his clothing, so too the requirement of laundering applies to any item that becomes fit to become ritually impure when one intends to use it as is. A hide is fit to become ritually impure after it has been flayed, when one intends to use it for a rug or the like; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Elazar holds that, even after it is flayed, the hide does not require laundering. In interpreting the verse, he says: The verse states: “Garment,” and from this I have derived only a garment; from where do I include sackcloth
  
  Daf 94a
  
  and all types of garments made of other materials in the requirement of laundering? The verse states: “You shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled.” One might have thought that I include an animal’s hide after it was flayed. That verse states: “Garment,” to teach that just as a garment is an item that is susceptible to ritual impurity as is, so too any comparable item that is a ready utensil and therefore susceptible to impurity must be laundered. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar holds that merely flaying a hide is insufficient to render it an item that must be laundered.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar? Is there an item that is fit to become ritually impure, but is not actually susceptible to impurity? Abaye said: A patch of cloth less than three by three fingerbreadths presents a practical difference between the two opinions. According to the one who says that any garment fit to become ritually impure must be laundered, this patch of cloth is also fit to become ritually impure, as if the owner wants, he can intend it for a specific use, as in patching his garment. According to the one who says that only an object already susceptible to impurity must be laundered, this patch, in any event, is not yet susceptible to impurity so it does not require laundering.
  Rava said: A garment upon which an individual initially intended to place an image constitutes a practical difference between the two opinions. Since the garment was initially intended to have an adornment, the garment is considered incomplete and not yet susceptible to impurity until the image is added. According to the one who says that any garment fit to become ritually impure requires laundering, this garment is also fit to become ritually impure, as if the owner wants to, he can void his intention to add the image, and the garment will be automatically susceptible to impurity. According to the one who says that only an item already susceptible to impurity requires laundering, now, at least, this garment is not susceptible to impurity and does not require laundering.
  According to a different version, Rava said: An unfinished hide [<i>utzeva</i>] that one intended to trim in a precise manner constitutes a practical difference between the two opinions. According to the one who says that any garment-like item fit to become ritually impure must be laundered, this hide must be laundered, since it is also fit to be susceptible to impurity if he voids his intention. According to the one who says that only an item already susceptible to impurity must be laundered, this hide does not require laundering since it is not susceptible to impurity until he trims it. This explanation may be corroborated, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: An unfinished hide that one intended to trim is ritually pure until he trims it.
  § The mishna teaches: A garment requires laundering only in the place that the blood was sprayed; but the entire garment does not require laundering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught: The verse states: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment.” One might have thought that even if the blood sprayed only on part of a garment, the entire garment should require laundering. To counter this, the same verse states: “That on which it shall be sprinkled.” This is to be understood: I told you that laundering is required only in the place that the blood was sprayed.
  The mishna also teaches: A garment must be laundered only if it is an item that is fit to become ritually impure, and only if it is an item fit for laundering. The Gemara observes: Evidently, the unattributed portion of the mishna is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. This statement is unlike the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who holds that only an item that is presently susceptible to impurity requires laundering.
  The mishna also teaches: Only an item fit for laundering must be laundered. The Gemara observes: This qualification serves to exclude a vessel from the requirement of laundering, as it is suitable for scraping blood off of it. Laundering is necessary only for material or fabric into which blood is absorbed.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the garment mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and the sackcloth, and the hide, all of these must be laundered. Apparently, that is to say that a hide, i.e., leather, is suitable for laundering. And the Gemara raises a contradiction between that assumption and a mishna that discusses laundering on Shabbat (<i>Shabbat</i> 142b): If there were bird droppings [<i>lishleshet</i>] on the cushion, one wipes it with a dry rag, but one may not rinse it with water because of the prohibition against laundering. If it was on a cushion of leather, he applies water to it until the filthy substance dissolves. Evidently, cleaning leather with water is not considered laundering.
  Abaye said: This contradiction is not difficult. That mishna in tractate <i>Shabbat</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of others. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> about the blood of a sin offering: If blood sprays onto a garment or onto sackcloth, he launders it; but if it sprays onto a vessel or onto leather, he scrapes it off. Others say: If it sprays onto a garment, or onto sackcloth, or onto leather, he launders it; but if it sprays onto a vessel, he scrapes it off. According to this <i>baraita</i>, the Rabbis hold that laundering is not applicable to leather, and the opinion attributed to: Others say, holds that it is applicable.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said: Many times I would stand before Rav on Shabbat and place water on his leather shoes, which he did not consider laundering on Shabbat? In accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis in this <i>baraita</i>.
  § Rava said: And is there anyone who says that leather is not suitable for laundering? But isn’t it written with regard to leprosy: “And the garment, or the warp, or the woof, or any article of leather that you shall wash” (Leviticus 13:58)? Rather, Rava said: The verse that speaks of leprosy and the mishna that speaks of the sin offering are ruling with regard to soft leather, which is considered subject to laundering. In the <i>baraita</i>, when the Rabbis and the others disagree, it is with regard to an item that is made of hard leather; as the Rabbis hold that laundering does not apply to hard leather.
  The Gemara challenges Rava’s explanation: But didn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi say: Many times I would stand before Rav on Shabbat and place water on his leather shoes, which he did not consider laundering on Shabbat? Since shoes are normally made of soft leather, according to Rava’s explanation, this should have constituted laundering on Shabbat. The Gemara resolves the difficulty: It was a case of hard leather shoes, and Rav acted in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that laundering does not apply to hard leather.
  Rava then said: That which I said, that the verse about leprosy relates to soft leather, is not correct. Shall we stand and say of the verse that when leather articles are written, it is only of soft leather articles that the Torah writes? A verse cannot be constrained in such a manner. Are we not also dealing with articles of hard leather [<i>aksilgiyya</i>] that come from overseas, and yet the Merciful One says in the verse that they require laundering?
  Rather, Rava said: Although the verse also relates to hard leather, this does not mean that all opinions must agree that laundering is always applicable to hard leather. The hard leather in the verse is an exception, because in the case of leprosy, since leprosy sprouts from within the garment itself, it loosens it and renders it soft so that its halakhic status is that of soft leather. Rava said: Nevertheless, if something poses a difficulty for me, according to my opinion that everyone agrees that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to laundering applies to soft leather, this is what poses a difficulty for me:
  
  Daf 94b
  
  Cushions and blankets that are of soft leather, and for which the <i>halakha</i> with regard to laundering should be relevant, and yet we learned about them in the mishna (<i>Shabbat</i> 142b): If the filth was on a cushion of leather, he applies water to it until the filth dissolves, which indicates that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to laundering is not applicable even to soft leather. Rather, Rava said: With regard to any laundering that does not include rubbing, it is not considered laundering. Consequently, one may apply water to a soft leather cushion, but soft leather remains subject to laundering, so long as there is rubbing.
  And that statement that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said: Many times I would stand before Rav on Shabbat and place water on his leather shoes, may be explained accordingly. With regard to placing water on leather, yes, that is permitted, but with regard to laundering, which includes rubbing, it is not permitted. This may be explained as follows: If Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi spoke of soft leather shoes, then all agree that only placing water is permitted. And if Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi spoke of hard leather shoes, the distinction between placing and rubbing accords with the opinion of the others, who hold that the requirement of laundering sprayed blood applies even to hard leather.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, that placing water upon something is not considered laundering so long as one does not also rub the item, then with regard to a non-leather garment as well, one should be allowed to place water upon it on Shabbat. Why does the cited mishna state that one may wipe it only with a dry rag? The Gemara answers: With regard to a garment, its soaking is its laundering, and merely placing water on it is forbidden.
  The Gemara comments: Rava conforms to his standard line of reasoning; as Rava says: If one cast a cloth into water on Shabbat, he is liable for laundering on Shabbat, as it is made of fabric like any garment; and if one cast flax seeds into water, he too is liable. The Gemara analyzes this statement: Granted, if he casts a cloth into water, he performs laundering; but with regard to flaxseed, what is the reason that one may not cast it into water on Shabbat?
  And if you would say that it is prohibited because it sprouts in the water and constitutes the prohibited act of planting, if so, with regard to wheat and barley, it should also be forbidden to place them into water. The Gemara explains: Casting the flax into the water is not prohibited because of planting but because these flax seeds have discharges when soaked. If so, with regard to hides, it should also be prohibited to place them into water, because they too produce discharges in water. The Gemara answers: There, with regard to flaxseed, it is prohibited because it effects kneading, as the discharges cause the seeds to combine together, which is not true of hides.
  The Gemara relates: Rava taught in public: It is permitted to launder a shoe on Shabbat. Rav Pappa said to Rava: But didn’t Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi say: Many times I would stand before Rav on Shabbat and place water on his leather shoes? Evidently, placing water upon leather, yes, that is permitted, but laundering, which includes rubbing, is not permitted. Rava went back and placed an interpreter before him so that he could tell the public that he had been wrong, and taught in public: The statements that I said before you earlier are my error. Truly, the Sages said like this: Placing water upon shoes is permitted, but laundering them is prohibited.
  § The mishna teaches: The laundering must be performed in a sacred place, and the breaking of an earthenware vessel must be performed in a sacred place, and the scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel must be performed in a sacred place. From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning a garment on which blood was sprayed, the verse states: “You shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled in a sacred place” (Leviticus 6:20). From where is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the breaking of an earthenware vessel in which a sin offering was cooked derived? The subsequent verse states: “And the earthenware vessel in which it is cooked shall be broken” (Leviticus 6:21). From where is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked derived? The verse states immediately thereafter: “And if it be cooked in a copper vessel, it shall be scoured, and rinsed in water.”
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to this matter, a stringency applies to a sin offering more than it applies to offerings of the most sacred order. The Gemara asks: And are there no more <i>halakhot</i> specific to a sin offering? But there is this <i>halakha</i>: That its blood enters the innermost sanctum to be sprinkled. The Gemara answers: The mishna is dealing with external sin offerings, and this <i>halakha</i> applies only to internal sin offerings.
  The Gemara challenges: But there is the stricture that if its blood enters into the Sanctuary it becomes disqualified. The Gemara explains: This mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: Every offering’s blood, not only that of a sin offering, that enters the Sanctuary to atone becomes disqualified; therefore, this is not a <i>halakha</i> specific to a sin offering.
  The Gemara challenges: But there is the <i>halakha</i> that external sin offerings atone for those who are liable to receive excision, <i>karet</i>, through unintentional sins. The Gemara explains: The mishna includes an offering that does not have that <i>halakha</i>, as its principles also apply to a sin offering brought for hearing the voice, i.e., for falsely taking an oath that one is unable to testify in another’s case. This transgression is not punishable by <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara challenges: But there is the stricture that the blood of a sin offering requires four placements on the altar, unlike other offerings of the most sacred order. The Gemara explains: This mishna is composed in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that all blood of offerings requires four placements, one upon each of the four corners of the altar; accordingly, this is not a <i>halakha</i> limited to the sin offering.
  The Gemara asks: And even according to your reasoning, can it be said that there is only one <i>halakha</i> that applies to a sin offering but does not apply to other offerings? Isn’t there the requirement to place a sin offering’s blood on the corner at the top of the altar? Isn’t there the requirement that a priest place a sin offering’s blood on the altar with his finger? Isn’t there the requirement to place it on the edge of the altar? Therefore, it should not be assumed that this is the only <i>halakha</i> unique to a sin offering, but rather that the mishna simply cited one of two or three stringencies.
  MISHNA: With regard to a garment upon which the blood of a sin offering was sprayed that went outside the curtains, i.e., the Temple courtyard, before being laundered, the garment reenters the courtyard and one launders it in a sacred place. If the garment became ritually impure outside the curtains, one tears the garment in order to render it ritually pure, enters the courtyard with it, and launders it in a sacred place. With regard to an earthenware vessel in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains, the vessel reenters the courtyard and one breaks it in a sacred place. If the vessel became ritually impure outside the curtains, one punctures the vessel to render it ritually pure, and one enters the courtyard with it and breaks it in a sacred place.
  With regard to a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains, the vessel reenters the courtyard, and one scours it and rinses it in a sacred place. If the vessel became ritually impure outside the curtains, one breaks the vessel by boring a large hole in it to render it ritually pure and enters the courtyard with it and scours and rinses it in a sacred place.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If the garment became ritually impure outside the curtains, one tears the garment in order to render it ritually pure, enters the courtyard with it, and launders it in a sacred place. Ravina objects to this: How can the mishna say that one tears it? The Merciful One states in the Torah that one must launder “a garment” (Leviticus 6:20), and once this article is torn, this is no longer a garment, but only a scrap of cloth.
  The Gemara answers: The mishna describes a scenario when he leaves untorn a fragment of the garment that is size enough for a small cloth. Is that so? If he leaves such a portion intact, is he still permitted to bring the garment back into the courtyard? But doesn’t Rav Huna say: The Sages taught that an impure garment, most of which has been torn, loses its impurity only when one did not leave of it enough for a small cloth, but if he left enough of it untorn for a small cloth, it is considered a joining of the pieces, and the garment remains ritually impure. Accordingly, leaving a piece that size would not serve any purpose with regard to ritual impurity.
  
  Daf 95a
  
  The Gemara answers that Rav Huna’s statement means that it is ritually impure by rabbinic law, since the Sages decreed the small cloth impure lest one fail to tear a garment enough to render it truly pure. By Torah law, this small cloth is torn enough to be ritually pure, so that one may bring it back into the Temple courtyard to launder it.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to an earthenware vessel in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains and became ritually impure outside the curtains, one punctures the vessel to render it ritually pure, brings the vessel back into the courtyard, and breaks it there. The Gemara asks: Why is there a need to break the earthenware vessel after puncturing it? The Merciful One states: “The earthenware vessel…shall be broken” (Leviticus 6:21), and, once it is punctured, it is not a vessel. The Gemara explains: When it is punctured with a hole only the size of a small root, the earthenware vessel is purified from the ritual impurity it contracted, but it remains a vessel for other purposes, such as holding fruit.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked that went outside the curtains and became ritually impure outside the curtains, one breaks the vessel by boring a large hole in it to render it ritually pure, brings the vessel back into the courtyard, and scours and rinses it there. The Gemara asks: Why should the copper vessel be scoured and rinsed? After all, once the hole is bored, this is not a vessel anymore. The Gemara explains: When he hammers it and refashions it into a vessel, he must scour and rinse it.
  § Earlier (94b–95a), the Gemara discusses a garment upon which the blood of a sin offering has sprayed; if it has contracted ritual impurity outside of the Temple courtyard, it must be torn before it is brought back into the courtyard to be laundered. Reish Lakish says: If the robe of the High Priest upon which the blood of a sin offering has sprayed has contracted ritual impurity outside of the Temple courtyard, one does not tear it; rather, he brings it in to the courtyard gradually, in portions less than the measure of a garment susceptible to impurity, which is three by three fingerbreadths, and he launders it section by section as the robe crosses the threshold. The ritually impure robe must be brought into the courtyard in this manner because it is stated with regard to the High Priest’s robe: “It shall not be torn” (Exodus 28:32).
  Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection based upon a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 28:8): The particularly thick garments and the soft garments are not subject to the standard measure of three by three fingerbreadths, with regard to determining their susceptibility to becoming ritually impure. Because of their particular qualities, such garments are useful only when they are larger and are not considered significant items when they measure three by three. Since the High Priest’s robe is a thick garment, why must one bring it into the courtyard only in portions of less than three by three?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to the whole robe of the High Priest, which is a garment of particular significance, even the small portions of the robe are significant due to their source garment, and are susceptible to impurity in portions measuring three by three fingerbreadths.
  § The Gemara asks a fundamental question with regard to the procedure for laundering a garment upon which the blood of a sin offering has sprayed: But isn’t it so that laundering requires seven abrasive substances? As Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Blood of a sin offering that has sprayed on a garment, and shades of leprous marks on garments, which are subject to laundering (see Leviticus 13:54), require the seven abrasive substances used as laundering agents; and these substances include urine (<i>Nidda</i> 61b). And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: But urine is not brought into the Temple, because it is inappropriate for the Temple, although urine is theoretically suitable for use in the preparation of the incense spices. Accordingly, how is a garment laundered in the Temple?
  
  Daf 95b
  
  The Gemara rejects a solution: And if you would say that the urine is absorbed together with the rest of the seven abrasive substances used as laundering agents, and one applies all of them at once to the garment, such that the urine is not discernable separately, that is difficult: But didn’t we learn in a mishna that this method is invalid? The mishna states (<i>Nidda</i> 62a): If one applied them not according to their prescribed order, or if one applied all seven substances simultaneously, he has done nothing, and the laundering has not been effective.
  The Gemara rejects another solution: And if you would say that the urine is absorbed together with only one of the cleansing substances, that is difficult: But didn’t we learn in that mishna: One must rub the garment three times with each and every one of those substances independently? The Gemara resolves: Rather, it must be explained that the urine is absorbed in tasteless saliva, which comes from one who has not eaten since waking; as Reish Lakish says: Tasteless saliva must accompany each and every one of the substances applied to the garment.
  MISHNA: Whether with regard to a copper vessel in which one cooked the meat of an offering or whether with regard to one into which one poured the boiling meat of an offering, whether the meat is from offerings of the most sacred order or whether it is from offerings of lesser sanctity, such vessels require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: Vessels in which offerings of lesser sanctity were cooked or poured do not require scouring and rinsing.
  GEMARA: Concerning the statement in the mishna that these <i>halakhot</i> also apply to a vessel into which a boiling cooked dish was poured, the Gemara notes that the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a sin offering, the verse states: “In which it is cooked” (Leviticus 6:21). I have derived only that this applies to a vessel in which one cooked the sin offering. From where do I derive that it applies also to a vessel into which one poured a boiling cooked dish? The verse states more fully: “But the earthenware vessel in which it is cooked shall be broken.” Since the verse employs the phrase: “In which it is…shall be broken,” that teaches that if the hot meat is in the vessel, whether cooked or poured into the vessel, these <i>halakhot</i> apply to it, and if it is an earthenware vessel it must be broken.
  § Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If one suspended the meat of a sin offering in the airspace of an earthenware oven in order to roast it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? When the verse requires the breaking of the earthenware vessel, is it only with regard to both cooking and the resultant absorption of the offering’s flavor into the vessel that the Merciful One is particular? If so, an oven would not need to be broken simply because an offering has been roasted within its airspace. Or perhaps, is the Merciful One particular even about cooking in the vessel without absorption of the flavor, and therefore, if meat is roasted while suspended in this oven, the vessel must still be broken?
  Rava said: Come and hear a proof, deduced from the mishna: Whether with regard to a copper vessel in which one cooked the meat of an offering or whether with regard to one into which one poured the boiling meat of an offering, the earthenware vessel must be broken. Therefore, the vessel must be broken even if the meat was not cooked in it but only absorbed in its walls, indicating that even if cooking and absorption do not occur together, just one of the two should suffice to require the breaking of the vessel.
  The Gemara rejects the proof: The <i>halakha</i> in a case of the absorption of flavor into an earthenware vessel without cooking the meat in that vessel, as in the case of pouring, was not raised as a dilemma to us. If the boiling offering has been poured into a vessel, the vessel certainly must be broken, since earthenware never fully emits all that it absorbed. When a scenario was raised as a dilemma to us, it was with regard to cooking meat in the vessel without absorption of the flavor by that vessel, as in the case of roasting suspended meat. In such a case, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, deduced from that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The oven of the Temple was fashioned of metal. And if it enters your mind that with regard to cooking in a vessel without absorption, the Merciful One is not particular and does not require the breaking of a vessel used in such a fashion, then the oven should be made of earthenware. The Gemara rejects this proof: Since there are the remainders of meal offerings, whose baking is performed in the oven, and there is both cooking and absorption into the oven, as the remains of the meal offerings would be baked directly on the walls of the oven, for this reason alone the oven would have to be broken if it were fashioned of earthenware. Consequently, we fashion it of metal.
  § The Gemara relates: There was a certain oven that was smeared with animal fat all over its walls and floor. Rabba bar Ahilai prohibited eating bread baked in that oven forever, and he prohibited even eating the bread with salt alone, lest one come to eat it with <i>kutaḥ</i>, a dish made from milk, water, salt, and bread crumbs. According to Rabba bar Ahilai, the oven will never fully eliminate the fat.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to baking bread, one may not knead the dough with milk, and if one nevertheless kneaded the dough with milk, all of the bread made from that dough is forbidden, because one might become accustomed to sin. As one habitually eats bread with meat, he might also eat this bread with meat and unwittingly transgress the prohibition against eating meat with milk.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Similarly, one may not smear [<i>tashin</i>] the inside of an oven with the fat of a sheep’s tail, because the fat of the tail has the <i>halakha</i> of meat. And if one nevertheless smeared the oven with the fat of the tail, all of the bread baked in it is forbidden, until one kindles the oven and burns off this fat. Evidently, the bread baked after the oven is kindled again is permitted, because the oven is considered cleansed of the meat fat. Therefore, the refutation of the opinion of Rava bar Ahilai, who says that the oven never fully eliminates the fat, is indeed a conclusive refutation.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Since the statement of Rava bar Ahilai was conclusively refuted, why does Rav say that pots that were used for leavened bread must be broken before Passover? Presumably, the leavened bread could be burned out of them through kindling instead. Rav Ashi said to him: Rav construes that ruling of the <i>baraita</i>, according to which the fat can be burned out of the oven, as referring to an oven fashioned of metal, which cleanses the fat when kindled. In the case of earthenware vessels, additional kindling is insufficient, because the flavor absorbed within it cannot be cleansed by fire.
  Or if you wish, say instead that the <i>baraita</i> is also referring to an earthenware oven, and there is another distinction. This oven is kindled from the inside, and a fire kindled inside the oven suffices to cleanse absorbed flavor. But that pot is kindled from the outside while it rests on the stove, and the heat absorbed in that manner is insufficient to cleanse absorbed flavor.
  The Gemara suggests: And let us also perform the kindling of the pot from the inside, in order to cleanse that which has been absorbed. The Gemara answers: This solution is not feasible; the owners of such pots might be concerned for them, as they are apt to break if the heat becomes too great. Consequently, the owners will not apply sufficient heat to ensure that the absorbed flavor will be completely cleansed. The Gemara concludes: Therefore, with regard to this earthenware tile [<i>kuvya</i>], which is used on the fire as a baking pan and its kindling is from the outside, it becomes prohibited for subsequent use by the flavors absorbed within, which cannot be cleansed.
  
  Daf 96a
  
  The Gemara challenges: But according to the opinion that earthenware vessels can be cleansed of their absorbed substances by the process of kindling, with regard to pots used in the Temple, why does the Merciful One state in the Torah that they should be broken? Let us simply return them to the kilns in which pots are made to be sure that the pots will be cleansed by the extreme heat of the kilns. Rabbi Zeira said: The pots cannot be returned to kilns because, as taught in a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Bava Kamma</i> 82b), kilns are not built in Jerusalem because of the great quantity of smoke they produce.
  The Gemara presents an objection to Rabbi Zeira’s answer. Abaye said: But if, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches, there are no kilns in Jerusalem, are scrap heaps of earthenware assembled in the Temple courtyard? The same <i>baraita</i> also teaches that there are no scrap heaps in Jerusalem. What, then, is done with the shards of earthenware vessels that must be broken in the courtyard? The Gemara dismisses the question: Abaye raised that objection only because that which Shemaya taught in Kalnevo escaped him; Shemaya taught there: In the Temple, shards of earthenware vessels were miraculously absorbed in their place.
  The Gemara returns to the topic of kindling earthenware vessels and asks: But if kindling from within cleanses everything absorbed in an earthenware oven, what is the reason for that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The oven in the Temple was fashioned of metal? Let us fashion it of earthenware, as an oven’s kindling is from the inside, and, accordingly, it would be possible to cleanse it?
  The Gemara answers: The reason the oven must be fashioned of metal is because there are the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on <i>Shavuot</i> of two loaves from the new wheat, and the shewbread, i.e., the bread baked each week in a special form and displayed for the duration of one whole week on the table in the Sanctuary, whose baking is done in the oven, and also whose sanctification occurs in the oven. Because these offerings are not kneaded in a service vessel, they are sanctified only by being placed in the oven, and therefore the oven is a service vessel; and we do not make a service vessel of earthenware.
  
  Daf 96b
  
  And even Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says only that a service vessel may be fashioned of wood, which is a somewhat significant material, but with regard to a service vessel fashioned of earthenware, he holds that this is not valid.
  § The Gemara relates an incident related to the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda was initially accustomed to study Torah before Rami bar Ḥama. After some time, he left him and went to study before Rav Sheshet. One day Rami bar Ḥama met him and said to him colloquially: Did you assume, as many do, that when the chief of taxes [<i>alkafta</i>] grasped me by the hand, the fragrance of his hand came to my hand? Do you think that because you went away from me in order to study before Rav Sheshet, have you become like Rav Sheshet merely by association?
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda said to him: It is not due to that reason that I went to study before Rav Sheshet, but for another reason. As for you, Master, when I ask with regard to any matter, Master resolves the question for me through reasoning. Consequently, when I find a mishna that opposes that reasoning, it refutes Master’s proposed resolution. As for Rav Sheshet, when I ask of him a question concerning any matter, he resolves the question for me by citing a mishna. Consequently, when I also find a mishna, and that mishna refutes the proposed resolution, it is a dispute between one mishna and another mishna, which does not necessarily refute the mishna that he cited.
  Rami bar Ḥama said to him: Ask me about a matter, which I will resolve for you in accordance with a mishna. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda asked him: If one cooked a sin offering in only part of a vessel, does the entire vessel require scouring and rinsing, or does it not require scouring and rinsing? Rami bar Ḥama said to him: The entire vessel does not require scouring and rinsing, just as it is taught concerning sprinkling the blood of a sin offering upon a garment. In the latter case, the mishna teaches (93b) that one must launder only the part of the garment on which the blood sprayed.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda replied: But the <i>tanna</i> does not teach this explicitly. Rami bar Ḥama said to him: Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the scouring and rinsing of a vessel in which sacred meat was cooked should be like the laundering of a garment, as follows: Just as a garment requires laundering only in the place where the blood was sprayed, so too, it must be that a vessel requires scouring and rinsing only in the place where the meat underwent the process of cooking.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Yehuda said to him: Are the situations comparable? Blood does not spread and penetrate all parts of the garment, but in the case of cooking, the flavor of the meat spreads throughout the entire vessel. Additionally, your reasoning opposes that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 10:15): A certain stringency applies to sprinkling more than it applies to scouring and rinsing; and a certain stringency applies to scouring and rinsing more than it applies to sprinkling.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The stringency that applies to sprinkling is that the <i>halakha</i> of the sprinkling of blood on a garment applies to external sin offerings, brought on the altar in the Temple courtyard, and to internal sin offerings, whose blood is sprinkled on the altar in the Sanctuary; and the <i>halakha</i> of blood sprayed onto a garment applies if it sprays before the required sprinkling of the offering’s blood on the altar; which is not so in the case of scouring and rinsing. Scouring and rinsing are required only for external sin offerings, whose meat is eaten and therefore cooked; and it applies only after the sprinkling of blood on the altar, after which the meat may be eaten.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The stringency that applies to scouring and rinsing is that the scouring and rinsing of vessels is practiced both for offerings of the most sacred order and for offerings of lesser sanctity; and even if one cooked in only part of the vessel, the entire vessel requires scouring and rinsing, which is not so in the case of errantly sprinkling blood onto a garment, for which one must launder only the place on which the blood sprayed.
  Rami bar Ḥama said to him: If this <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it. The Gemara then clarifies: And what is the reason that an entire vessel requires scouring and rinsing even if one cooked the meat of an offering in only part of the vessel? The reason is that the verse states: “And if it be cooked in a copper vessel, it shall be scoured and rinsed in water” (Leviticus 6:21). From the phrase “in a copper vessel” it is derived that even if the meat is cooked in only part of a vessel, the entire vessel must be scoured and rinsed.
  § The mishna teaches: Whether the meat is from offerings of the most sacred order or whether it is from offerings of lesser sanctity, the vessels in which it is cooked must be scoured and rinsed. The Gemara cites a related <i>baraita</i>: The Sages taught: The Torah introduces the mitzva of scouring and rinsing with the qualifying statement: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18). From this verse I have derived only that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to scouring and rinsing applies to vessels in which a sin offering was cooked. From where do I derive that this <i>halakha</i> applies to vessels used for all sacrificial meat? The verse states: “Every male among the priests may eat of it; it is most sacred” (Leviticus 6:22), to teach that this <i>halakha</i> applies to vessels used for all of the sacrificial meat that the priests eat.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that I should include vessels used for cooking <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, as well, as it is also sacred and may be eaten only by a priest (see Leviticus 22:14). To counter this, the verse states: “Every male among the priests may eat of it; it is most sacred” (Leviticus 6:22). The emphatic qualifier “of it” excludes <i>teruma</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: Offerings of the most sacred order require scouring and rinsing, but offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing, as it is written: “Most sacred.” Accordingly, with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, yes, scouring and rinsing is required; but for offerings of lesser sanctity, no, it is not required.
  The Gemara asks: The <i>baraita</i> explains Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning; what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: Since the qualifying term “of it” was necessary to exclude <i>teruma</i>, by inference, it must be that vessels used for offerings of lesser sanctity require scouring and rinsing. If even offerings of lesser sanctity are excluded from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, it would be self-evident that the vessel used for <i>teruma</i> is exempt from scouring and rinsing. Accordingly, the direct exclusion of <i>teruma</i> indicates that the vessels used for offerings of lesser sanctity are not excluded. And Rabbi Shimon could have said to you: The term “of it” teaches a different <i>halakha</i> and excludes a disqualified sin offering from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, as we say earlier in this chapter (93a).
  The Gemara asks: And is it correct that with regard to a copper vessel used to cook <i>teruma</i>, it does not require rinsing and scouring? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 8:16): With regard to a pot in which one cooked meat, one may not cook milk in it; and if one cooked milk in it, the meat absorbed in the pot renders the milk forbidden if it imparts flavor to it. Similarly, if one cooked <i>teruma</i> in a pot, one may not cook non-sacred food in it; and if one cooked non-sacred food in it, the absorbed <i>teruma</i> renders the mixture sacred if it imparts flavor to it. Therefore, a pot requires purging with boiling liquid in order to expel the flavor of <i>teruma</i> from it.
  Three <i>amora’im</i> address the apparent inconsistency that while the Torah excludes vessels used for <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that these vessels must be purged. Abaye said: When the verse excludes <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, this is necessary only for that which the Master said: If one cooked in only part of the vessel, the entire vessel requires scouring and rinsing. By contrast, in this case, if <i>teruma</i> was cooked in only part of a vessel, one must perform scouring and rinsing only in the place of the cooking, and not in the whole vessel.
  Rava said: When the verse excludes <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, that is necessary only for that which the Master said: The verse specifies: “It shall be scoured and rinsed in water” (Leviticus 6:21), but the vessel is not to be scoured and rinsed in wine. It must be scoured and rinsed “in water,” but not in diluted wine. By contrast, in this case, i.e., the vessel in which <i>teruma</i> was cooked, it may be scoured and rinsed even in wine, and even in diluted wine.
  Rabba bar Ulla said: When the verse excludes <i>teruma</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of scouring and rinsing, this is necessary only for that which the Master said: One must perform scouring and rinsing with cold water, in addition to purging a vessel of its absorbed flavors with boiling water. By contrast, in this case, i.e., with regard to the vessel in which <i>teruma</i> was cooked, one may cleanse the vessel even by performing only the purging with boiling water, which removes the residue of the forbidden food, and omitting the cold water processes entirely.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that scouring and rinsing are performed with cold water; but according to the one who says that scouring is done by purging with hot water, and rinsing is a different procedure performed with cold water, what can be said? According to this opinion, the verse is also referring to purging; and if the verse excludes vessels used for <i>teruma</i>, how does the <i>baraita</i> teach that such vessels much be purged? The Gemara answers: According to the opinion that differentiates scouring, which is done with boiling water, from rinsing, which is done with cold water, the Torah excludes vessels used for <i>teruma</i> only from the additional rinsing that the Torah requires after the scouring.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Tarfon says: If one cooked a sin offering in a copper vessel from the beginning of the pilgrimage Festival, one may cook in it for the entire pilgrimage Festival; he need not scour and rinse the vessel after every use. And the Rabbis say: One may not continue using it in this manner; rather, one must perform scouring and rinsing before the end of the period during which partaking of the particular cooked offering is permitted. Scouring is like the scouring of the inside of a cup, the cleaning done when wine sticks to the cup, and rinsing is like the rinsing of the outside of a cup. Scouring and rinsing are both performed with cold water.
  
  Daf 97a
  
  With regard to the spit and the metal grill [<i>askela</i>], one purges them in hot water.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that Rabbi Tarfon says: If one cooked a sin offering in a vessel from the beginning of the Festival, one may cook in it for the entire Festival without scouring and rinsing the vessel after every use and without being concerned that he is eating forbidden leftover meat. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Tarfon? The Gemara answers: It is as the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “And you shall roast and eat it in the place that the Lord your God shall choose; and you shall turn in the morning, and go to your tents” (Deuteronomy 16:7). Although one does not leave Jerusalem on the first morning of Passover, the verse has rendered all of those days over which one remains there equal to one morning.
  Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami objects to this: Can it be that all of the days of the Festival are considered a single day? But is there no prohibition against bringing an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [<i>piggul</i>] during a pilgrimage Festival? And is there no prohibition of <i>notar</i>, consuming sacrificial meat beyond its appointed time, during a pilgrimage Festival? Both these prohibitions are based on the premise that each offering may be eaten over a limited time far less than the duration of the entire Festival.
  And if you would say: Indeed, neither <i>piggul</i> nor <i>notar</i> apply during a Festival, that is difficult: But it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says: Rabbi Tarfon said that an entire Festival is considered a single day only with regard to this, the <i>halakhot</i> of scouring and rinsing, alone, and not with regard to other <i>halakhot</i>, including <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i>. Evidently, his opinion is not based on the cited verse.
  The Gemara continues: Rather, one must explain that Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion accords with that which Rav Naḥman says citing Rabba bar Avuh. As Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Scouring and rinsing does not need to be done every day in order to avoid eating the taste of forbidden leftover meat, because while the vessels are used for repeatedly cooking various types of sacrificial meat, the meat of each and every day becomes a purging agent for the other food, that which is already absorbed in the vessel from the prior day. Therefore, only after the Festival, when the vessel is not being used, must the pot be scoured and rinsed.
  § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: One may not continue using it in this manner; rather, one must perform scouring and rinsing before the end of the period during which partaking of the particular cooked offering is permitted. What is the mishna saying? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: One waits for the copper vessel so long as it remains the period of partaking, and then he performs scouring and rinsing on it.
  From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Abba Yosei bar Abba: It is written about a copper vessel in which a sin offering was cooked: “It shall be scoured and rinsed in water” (Leviticus 6:21); and it is written in the following verse: “Every male among the priests may eat it.” How so, i.e., what are the verses teaching through this juxtaposition? One waits with it until the end of the period of partaking and then performs scouring and rinsing on it.
  § The mishna teaches: Scouring is like the scouring of a cup, and rinsing is like the rinsing of a cup; and scouring and rinsing are both performed with cold water. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Scouring and rinsing are both performed with cold water; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: Scouring is performed with hot water, and rinsing is performed with cold water.
  What is the reasoning of the Rabbis? They hold that this <i>halakha</i> is just as it is with regard to purging the used vessels acquired from gentiles, for which purging the forbidden absorptions must be performed with hot water. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi could have said to you: I do not say this statement about purging, which must certainly be performed with hot water. Rather, when I say my opinion, it is with regard to the mitzva of scouring and rinsing, which is performed after purging.
  And the Rabbis could reply: If so, that scouring and rinsing are both performed in the same manner, let the verse write the same verb to describe both processes, namely either: It shall be scoured and scoured in water, or: It shall be rinsed and rinsed in water. What is meant by the formula: “It shall be scoured and rinsed in water”? Conclude from the use of two verbs that scouring is performed with hot water, and rinsing is performed with cold water.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi could reply: If it were written: It shall be scoured and scoured, or: It shall be rinsed and rinsed, I would say that the vessel must be scoured two times, or that it must be rinsed two times. Therefore, it is written: “It shall be scoured and rinsed,” to tell you that even if both are performed with cold water, there are two distinct actions: Scouring is like the scouring of the inside of a cup, and rinsing is like the rinsing of the outside of a cup.
  MISHNA: If one cooked in one vessel sacrificial meat and non-sacred meat, or the meat of offerings of the most sacred order and the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, the status of the food depends upon the taste of the stringent substance. If there is enough of the more sacred meat to impart flavor to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then the lenient components of the mixtures must be eaten in accordance with the restrictions of the stringent components therein, insofar as who may partake of them, as well as the time when and the place where they may be eaten. And the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked do not require scouring and rinsing, and the lenient components do not disqualify pieces of meat through contact. With regard to these principles, the lenient components do not assume the status of the stringent components.
  In the case of a fit wafer that touched an unfit wafer or a piece of sacrificial meat that touched an unfit piece of sacrificial meat, neither all the wafers nor all the pieces of meat are forbidden. No part is forbidden other than that which is in the place where the item absorbed taste from the unfit wafers or pieces.
  GEMARA: According to the mishna, if the more sacred meat imparts flavor to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then the lenient meat is to be treated in the same manner as the more sacred meat. Concurrently, their vessels do not require scouring and rinsing, and the lenient components do not disqualify pieces of meat through contact. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? Is this not inconsistent? The Gemara answers: The mishna must be understood otherwise: If there is enough of the more sacred meat to impart flavor to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then the lenient components of the mixtures must be eaten in accordance with the restrictions of the stringent components. Moreover, the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked do require scouring and rinsing, and the lenient components do disqualify pieces of meat through contact.
  The Gemara continues: If the more sacred meat is not sufficient to impart flavor to the less sacred or non-sacred meat, then the lenient components of the mixtures are not eaten in accordance with the restrictions of the stringent components. Moreover, the copper vessels in which the lenient components were cooked do not require scouring and rinsing, and the lenient components do not disqualify pieces of meat through contact.
  The Gemara asks: If the offerings of the most sacred order do not impart taste to the offerings of lesser sanctity, granted, the vessels do not require scouring and rinsing commensurate with vessels used to cook offerings of the most sacred order. But isn’t it so that the vessels should nevertheless require scouring and rinsing by virtue of having been used for offerings of lesser sanctity?
  Abaye said: What is the meaning of: Do not require, which the mishna states? It means only that the vessels do not require scouring and rinsing commensurate with vessels used to cook offerings of the most sacred order, but they do require scouring and rinsing as vessels used to cook offerings of lesser sanctity. Rava said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Vessels used to cook offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing at all.
  The Gemara analyzes: Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches: If one cooked in one vessel sacrificial meat and non-sacred meat, or the meat of offerings of the most sacred order and the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity. The mishna provides a second scenario in order to teach that vessels used to cook offerings of lesser sanctity do not require scouring and rinsing, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. But according to Abaye, why do I need two cases to teach the single principle that a substance is nullified if its presence is insufficient to impart flavor?
  The Gemara answers: Even according to Abaye, both cases are necessary, in order to teach a <i>halakha</i> with regard to nullification. As, had the mishna taught only the case of sacrificial meat and non-sacred meat, I would say that it is non-sacred meat that can nullify sacrificial meat, as sacrificial meat is not its type. But with regard to offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, I would say: The offerings of lesser sanctity do not nullify those other offerings, because they are of the same type.
  And had the mishna taught only the case of offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, I would say that it is sacrificial meat that is strong enough to nullify other sacrificial meat; but with regard to non-sacred meat, I would say: It is not strong enough to nullify sacrificial meat. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.
  § The mishna teaches: In the case of a fit wafer that reached an unfit wafer or a piece of sacrificial meat that touched an unfit piece of sacrificial meat, neither all the wafers nor all the pieces are forbidden. No part is forbidden other than that which is in the place where the item absorbed taste from the unfit wafers or pieces. In relation to this <i>halakha</i>, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a sin offering, the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:20). One might have thought that this applies to all contact, even if the other piece did not absorb any flavor from the meat of the sin offering. To counter this, the same verse states: “With its flesh [<i>bivsarah</i>]” which can also be translated: In its flesh.
  
  Daf 97b
  
  This teaches that this <i>halakha</i> does not apply unless the other food absorbs something of the sin offering into its meat.
  One might have thought that if the sin offering touched part of a piece of something that absorbed flavor from the sin offering, the entire piece should become disqualified. To counter this, the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:20), to teach that only the section that touches the sin offering is disqualified. How so? What can be done with an item when a section of it is disqualified? One slices off the section of the piece that absorbed the disqualified matter. Additionally, the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh,” but an item is not disqualified if it touches the sin offering’s sinews, nor its bones, nor its horns, nor its hooves.
  § The <i>baraita</i> continues to interpret the same verse. “Whatever shall touch its flesh shall be sacred,” teaches: Whatever touches it becomes like it, with regard to its status. How so? If the sin offering is disqualified, due to any disqualification, whatever touches it becomes disqualified. And if it is fit, whatever touches it must be eaten in accordance with the stringent regulations that apply to the sin offering. Therefore, a piece of meat that touches the meat of a sin offering may be eaten only in accordance with the terms of the consumption of a sin offering, e.g., it may be eaten only by male priests, and only for one day and one night.
  The Gemara asks: If sacrificial meat touched the meat of a disqualified sin offering, why should the sacrificial meat become forbidden? Should not the positive mitzva of eating the sacrificial meat come and override the prohibition against eating the disqualified substance that was absorbed in it? Rava said: A positive mitzva does not override a prohibition that relates to the Temple.
  Rav’s opinion relates to that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: As it is stated in a verse concerning the Paschal offering: “Nor shall you break a bone of it” (Exodus 12:46). Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Both a bone that contains marrow and a bone that does not contain marrow are included in the prohibition. This statement is analyzed: If one means to break a bone in order to eat its marrow, why would that be prohibited? Should not the positive mitzva of eating the edible parts of the offering, including the marrow, come and override the prohibition of not breaking a bone of the Paschal offering? Rather, it must be that a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition that relates to the Temple.
  Rav Ashi said: If sacrificial meat touches a disqualified sin offering, this is not simply a case of a positive mitzva in conflict with a prohibition. Because the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:20), treating the item as consecrated is itself a positive mitzva. Consequently, both a positive mitzva and a prohibition stand in opposition to eating that sacrificial meat, and a positive mitzva does not override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva.
  § With regard to a sin offering, the verse states: “Whatever shall touch its flesh shall be sacred.” The Gemara asks: We found a source teaching that with regard to a sin offering, whatever it touches becomes sanctified through that which is absorbed from the sin offering. From where do we derive that this is also the <i>halakha</i> concerning the rest of the sacred offerings? Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It is stated: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). This verse connects all of the specified offerings, such that individual aspects of each offering are applicable to all of the offerings.
  The Gemara details these aspects. The verse states “of the burnt offering” to teach that all of the offerings are like a burnt offering in that just as a burnt offering requires a utensil in its preparation, so too do all animal offerings require a utensil. What is the utensil? If we say it is a bowl, a utensil used for collecting the blood, as were used in the burnt offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai, that cannot be correct, since the source for a vessel for collecting blood does not need to be derived from the use of one in a burnt offering. With regard to communal peace offerings it is also written of them: “And they offered burnt offerings, and they sacrificed peace offerings…And Moses took half of the blood, and put it in basins” (Exodus 24:5–6).
  Rather, the term: Utensil, must be stated of a knife, as the slaughtering may be performed only with a knife and not with a sharp stone or reed. The Gemara asks: And with regard to a burnt offering itself, from where do we derive that it must be slaughtered with a knife? This is learned from that which is written: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10); and there, Abraham was offering a burnt offering, as it is written: “And offered it up for a burnt offering instead of his son” (Genesis 22:13).
  The Gemara continues to expound the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 7:37). When the verse mentions a meal offering, it teaches that just as a meal offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood (see Leviticus 6:9–11), so too are all of the offerings mentioned in this verse eaten only by males of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: With regard to what offering is it that this <i>halakha</i> must be derived? If one suggests it is with regard to the sin offering and the guilt offering, this <i>halakha</i> is explicitly written of them. With regard to the sin offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat it” (Leviticus 6:22); and with regard to the guilt offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:6).
  And if one suggests that the <i>halakha</i> must be derived with regard to communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs that were sacrificed as communal offerings on <i>Shavuot</i> together with the offering of the two loaves (see Leviticus 23:19), this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the amplification of the verse that is stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings. The verse states: “In a most sacred place shall you eat of it; every male may eat it” (Numbers 18:10), and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse teaches with regard to communal peace offerings that they are eaten only by males of priestly families.
  The Gemara explains: It is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>.
  
  Daf 98a
  
  There is one <i>tanna</i> who derives it, the <i>halakha</i> that only males of priestly families may eat of the communal peace offering, from here, i.e., the precedent mentioned explicitly with regard to the meal offering; and there is one <i>tanna</i> who derives it from there, i.e., the amplification of the verse stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings.
  The Gemara continues expounding the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings.” “Sin offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a sin offering, whatever it touches is sanctified through the substance that becomes absorbed, so too for all offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch is sanctified through the absorbed portions.
  “Guilt offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a guilt offering, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred within it, because a guilt offering is always male and as such never holds a fetal sac or a placenta, so too for any of the offerings mentioned in the verse, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred if found within it. The Gemara notes: Evidently, this <i>tanna</i> holds that with regard to the offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the moments of their births, but not in utero. And he also holds that one derives the possible from the impossible, so that the <i>halakha</i> of a fetal sac and of a placenta concerning female animals may be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a male animal.
  “Inauguration offering” teaches: Just as with regard to the inauguration offering, the rams and the bread of that offering, which were brought during the seven days of inauguration of the Tabernacle and which the priests ate, their leftovers were disposed of by incineration, as is stated: “And if any of the flesh of the inauguration offering, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder with fire” (Exodus 29:34), and no living animals were among their leftovers designated for incineration; so too for all offerings mentioned, their leftovers are disposed of by incineration, and there are no living animals counted among their leftovers to be incinerated. Accordingly, if one sanctifies two animals so that either one may be brought if the other is lost, when one animal is sacrificed, the surviving animal is not killed and incinerated.
  “Peace offering” teaches: Just as with regard to the peace offer-ing, its components can render an animal disqualified as an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [<i>piggul</i>] and can be rendered <i>piggul</i>; so too with regard to all offerings mentioned in this verse, their components render an animal disqualified as <i>piggul</i> and can be rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  § With regard to the verse at the center of the prior exchange (Leviticus 7:37), the Gemara states: It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Akiva: From the term “meal offering,” it is derived: Just as with regard to a meal offering, whatever it touches is sanctified through the substance that becomes absorbed, as it is stated: “Whatever shall touch them shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:11); so too for all offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch is sanctified through the absorbed portions.
  The Gemara notes: And it was necessary to write the <i>halakha</i> of absorption with regard to a meal offering, and it was necessary to write the <i>halakha</i> of absorption with regard to a sin offering. As, had the Torah taught us this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a meal offering, I would say that since it is soft, it is absorbed and, therefore it sanctifies what it touches. But with regard to the meat of a sin offering, I would say that it does not sanctify what it touches. And had it had taught us this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a sin offering, I would say that because, on account of its fattiness, it oozes into whatever it touches, it sanctifies it. But with regard to a meal offering, I would say that it does not sanctify what it touches. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to write both.
  The cited <i>baraita</i> continues: “Sin offering” teaches: Just as a sin offering is brought only from non-sacred animals and is sacrificed specifically in the daytime, and its service must be performed with the priest’s right hand; so too all offerings mentioned are brought only from non-sacred animals, and are sacrificed specifically in the daytime, and each one’s service must be performed with the priest’s right hand. And with regard to a sin offering, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred animals? Rav Ḥisda said: The verse states: “And Aaron shall present the bull of the sin offering, which is his” (Leviticus 16:11). This teaches that the animal must come from his cattle, and not from communal property, and not from money upon which the second tithe has been redeemed.
  The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering that an offering is sacrificed in the daytime? Is this principle not derived from the conspicuous expression: “On the day of His commanding” (Leviticus 7:38), which is understood to be referring to all offerings? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the <i>baraita</i> cited the principle from the model of a sin offering for no reason [<i>kedi</i>], and it was mentioned here on account of the other principles.
  The Gemara asks: Why must the <i>baraita</i> teach that <i>halakha</i> of the sin offering teaches that the rites of an offering must be performed with the priest’s right hand? Is this not derived from the statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana? As Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In any place in the Torah that it is stated that an action is performed with a finger, or that it is performed by priesthood, the <i>halakha</i> is that the rite is performed only with the right hand. This is derived from the Torah’s statement with regard to the leper: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> cited the principle from the model of a sin offering for no reason, since it is actually derived from Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement.
  The Gemara suggest: And if you wish, say that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Where the verse mentions a finger, it is not necessary for the verse to mention priesthood; but where it mentions priesthood, it is necessary for the verse to mention a finger, in order to teach that the rite must be performed with the right hand, which is not self-evident. With regard to the assorted offerings itemized in the verse (Leviticus 7:37), the Torah does not mention a finger; therefore, they must be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering.
  The cited <i>baraita</i> continues: “Guilt offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a guilt offering, its bones have no sanctity and are permitted for any use, so too with regard to any mentioned offering, its bones are permitted.
  § Rava said: It is obvious to me that
  
  Daf 98b
  
  when the blood of a sin offering is below and the blood of a burnt offering is above, in a case in which the blood of a burnt offering is sprayed as a second layer on top of the blood of a sin offering that has already been sprayed and absorbed into a garment, the garment requires laundering.
  Rava asks: When the blood of a burnt offering is below and the blood of a sin offering is above, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is one required to launder a garment to remove the blood of a sin offering because the blood touches his garment, and in this case, this blood is touching the garment? Or perhaps is one required to launder it because of the absorption of the blood into the garment, and, in this case, since the garment has already absorbed the other blood, this garment did not absorb the blood? Rava then resolves his dilemma, ruling that such garments do not require laundering.
  § In a similar manner, with regard to the immersion of a garment that has become impure, Rava said: It is obvious to me that if there is blood on one’s garment, it interposes between the water of immersion and the garment, such that the immersion is ineffective. But if he is a butcher, used to having blood on his garments, a bloodstain does not interpose, and the immersion is effective, since a substance is not considered an interposition if the one immersing is not particular about it. Similarly, if there is a stain of fat [<i>revav</i>] on one’s garment, it interposes. But if he is a fat seller, such a stain does not interpose. Rava asks: If there is both blood and fat on one’s garment when he immerses it, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara challenges the question: If he is a butcher, let me derive that the stain interposes due to the fat that he is not used to having on his garments; and conversely, if he is a fat seller, let me derive that the stain interposes due to the stain of blood that he is not used to having on his garments. The Gemara explains: No, this question is not superfluous; it is necessary with regard to a person who works both as this, a butcher, and as that, a fat seller. In such a case, the question is: Is it that he is not particular with regard to one stain, but he is particular with regard to two stains, so that the immersion is ineffective? Or, perhaps, is it that he is not particular even with regard to two stains, as neither is unusual for him? The Gemara provides no answer, and the question shall stand unresolved.
  
  MISHNA: A priest who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, e.g., a <i>zav</i> and a leper who did not bring their requisite atonement offerings, who are not yet permitted to partake of sacrificial meat, do not receive a share of sacrificial meat along with the other members of the patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, in order to partake of it in the evening after the offerings were sacrificed, even though after nightfall he would be permitted to partake of the offerings.
  A priest who is an acute mourner, i.e., if one of his relatives for whom he is obligated to mourn died that day, is permitted to touch sacrificial meat, as he is not ritually impure. But he may not sacrifice offerings, and he does not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening.
  Blemished priests, whether they are temporarily blemished or whether they are permanently blemished, receive a share and partake of the offerings with their priestly brethren, but do not sacrifice the offerings.
  The principle is: Any priest who is unfit for the service that specific day does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat, and anyone who has no share of the meat has no share in the hides of the animals, to which the priests are entitled as well.
  Even if the priest was ritually impure only at the time of the sprinkling of the blood of the offering and he was pure at the time of the burning of the fats of that offering, he still does not receive a share of the meat, as it is stated: “He that sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat, from among the sons of Aaron, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). One who cannot sprinkle the blood does not receive a share in the meat.
  
  Daf 99a
  
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that a priest who is unfit for the Temple service does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Reish Lakish said: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states about a sin offering: “The priest who effects atonement shall eat it; in a sacred place shall it be eaten, in the court of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 6:19). This teaches that only a priest who effects atonement by performing the rites of the offering shall partake of its meat, but a priest who does not effect atonement does not partake of its meat.
  The Gemara challenges: And is this an established principle? But there are all the priests of the priestly watch of that week in the Temple, who do not effect atonement for that offering, because the blood of a specific sin offering is presented by just one priest, and yet they all partake of its meat. The Gemara explains: We mean to say that any priest who is fit for effecting atonement may partake of it, even one who did not participate in the service.
  The Gemara objects: But there is the case of a minor, who is unfit for effecting atonement, and who nevertheless partakes of sacrificial meat. The Gemara explains: Rather, what is meant by the term: “Shall eat it”? It means that he shall receive a share of it. The <i>halakha</i> is therefore that a priest who is fit for effecting atonement receives a share of the meat, but a priest who is unfit for effecting atonement does not receive a share of the meat. Minors do not receive a share, though they may partake of meat given to them by others.
  The Gemara objects: But there is a blemished priest, who is unfit for effecting atonement, and yet he receives a share of its meat. The Gemara replies: The Merciful One included a blemished priest as an exception, as the verse that states: “Every male among the priests shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:22), serves to include a blemished priest.
  The Gemara suggests: But say that the phrase “every male” serves to include one who immersed that day, teaching that he may also receive a share in the sacrificial meat. Why should it be understood as referring specifically to a blemished priest? The Gemara replies: It stands to reason that the Torah should include a blemished priest for receiving his own share of the meat, because he may partake of sacrificial meat in any event. By contrast, one who immersed that day is impure and may not touch or partake of sacrificial meat.
  The Gemara rejects this: On the contrary, the Torah should include one who immersed that day, because, unlike a blemished priest, in the evening he will be fit to perform the service. The Gemara replies: Now, in any event, the one who immersed himself is not fit.
  Rav Yosef said another explanation: Now what is meant by the term: “Shall eat it”? It means: He shall receive a share of it. But if so, let the Merciful One write: Shall receive a share of it. What is the reason for writing: “Shall eat it”? Learn from it that only a priest who is fit for partaking of sacrificial meat, which includes a blemished priest, receives a share in the meat; but a priest who is not fit for partaking of sacrificial meat, e.g., one who immersed that day, does not receive a share in the meat.
  § Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: If a priest is blemished and he is impure, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Must the other priests give him a share of the meat? Perhaps we say that since he is not fit to perform the rite as a blemished priest and nevertheless the Merciful One included him to receive a share in the meat, there is no difference: What is the difference to me if he is impure, and what is the difference to me if he is only blemished? In any event he is not fit, yet the Torah allows him to receive a share in the meat. Or perhaps he may not receive a share in the meat, because only a priest who is fit for partaking of sacrificial meat receives a share of the meat, but a priest who is not fit for partaking of sacrificial meat does not receive a share of the meat.
  Rabba said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a <i>baraita</i>: If a High Priest is serving in the Temple and one of his immediate relatives dies, he sacrifices offerings even as an acute mourner. But he does not partake of sacrificial meat, and he does not receive a share to partake of it in the evening. Conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that in order for the priest to receive a share in sacrificial meat, we require that he be fit for partaking of it, and accordingly, a blemished priest who is impure does not receive a share. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that this is so.
  § Rav Oshaya raises a dilemma: If a priest is impure, then in a case of communal offerings, which may be offered by an impure priest, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do the other priests give him a share of the meat, so that he may partake of it in the evening when he becomes pure? Do we say that the Merciful One states: “The priest who effects atonement,” and therefore any priest who is fit for effecting atonement receives a share, as derived earlier, and this priest is also one who may effect atonement, since this is a communal offering? Or perhaps he may not, due to the principle that only a priest who is fit for partaking of sacrificial meat receives a share of the meat, but a priest who is unfit for partaking of sacrificial meat does not receive a share.
  Ravina said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a <i>baraita</i>: If a High Priest is serving in the Temple and one of his relatives dies, he sacrifices offerings even as an acute mourner, but he does not partake of sacrificial meat and he does not receive a share of it to partake in the evening. Conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that in order for a priest to receive a share in sacrificial meat, we require that he be fit for partaking of it at the time of the service, without regard to whether he can perform the service. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that this is so.
  § The mishna teaches: A priest who is an acute mourner is permitted to touch sacrificial meat, but he may not sacrifice offerings. The Gemara asks: Is it in fact permitted for an acute mourner to touch sacrificial meat? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another mishna (<i>Ḥagiga</i> 21a): An acute mourner and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, even after their respective disqualifications have expired, require immersion in order to eat sacrificial food. According to that mishna, an acute mourner who did not immerse may not touch sacrificial meat.
  Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult. Here, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a case where the mourner immersed during his day of acute mourning. This is why he is permitted to touch the sacrificial meat. There, the ruling of the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i> is stated with regard to a case where the mourner did not immerse.
  The Gemara asks: And even if he immersed, what of it? But doesn’t his acute mourning return to him? As Rabba, son of Rav Huna, says: In a case of an acute mourner who immersed during his day of his acute mourning, his acute mourning returns to him.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. That case, in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, is one where he was distracted from safeguarding his state of purity, so he may not touch sacrificial meat in the event that he is impure. This case, in the mishna here, is one where he was not distracted.
  The Gemara counters: If the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i> is discussing a case of distraction, then his status is like that of one who contracted ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, who requires sprinkling with water of purification on the third and seventh days of his impurity. As Rabbi Yustai, son of Rabbi Matun, says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One who experienced a distraction requires sprinkling with water of purification on the third and seventh days.
  The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. That statement, that he requires sprinkling, is discussing a case where he was distracted and careless about contracting impurity imparted by a corpse. This mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, stating that he requires immersion but not sprinkling, is discussing a case where he was distracted and careless about contracting impurity imparted by the carcass of a creeping animal.
  The Gemara counters: One who was careless about becoming impure due to the carcass of a creeping animal is fully impure, and so he requires not only immersion to become pure, but he also requires sunset. And furthermore, if the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i> is discussing this case, the mourner should be prohibited from touching even <i>teruma</i>, not just sacrificial meat. Why does the mishna mention only the latter?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: The mishna is discussing a case where he says: I safeguarded myself from anything that would render me impure, so I am certain that I did not contract impurity that requires waiting until sunset; but I did not safeguard my-self from anything that would render me unfit for touching sacrificial meat.
  The Gemara asks: But is there such a concept of partial care, that one can claim to have safeguarded himself from one form of impurity but not another? The Gemara answers: Yes, and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one was carrying a basket, and the basket was still on his head,
  
  Daf 99b
  
  and a shovel was in the basket, and he said: I am minding the basket, that it not become impure, but I am not minding the shovel, then the basket is pure, and the shovel is impure.
  The Gemara challenges the ruling of the <i>baraita</i>: But wouldn’t the shovel render the basket impure? The Gemara answers: There is a principle that a vessel does not render another vessel ritually impure. The Gemara challenges: But wouldn’t the shovel render that which is in the basket, e.g., figs, impure? Rava said: The case is where he says: I safeguarded it, the shovel, from anything that would allow it to render another item impure, but I did not safeguard it from anything that would render it itself unfit, i.e., impure.
  The Gemara returns to discuss the contradiction between the mishna, which permits an acute mourner to touch sacrificial meat, and the mishna in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, which requires him to immerse. The Gemara relates: The matter circulated and came before Rabbi Abba bar Memel. He said to the Sages before him: Have they not heard that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One who partakes of <i>teruma</i> that has third-degree impurity, i.e., <i>teruma</i> disqualified through contact with an item with second-degree impurity, is prohibited from partaking of <i>teruma</i>, but permitted to touch <i>teruma</i>.
  Rabbi Abba bar Memel continued: Apparently, in a case of partaking, the Sages imposed a higher standard, whereas in a case of touching, the Sages did not impose a higher standard. Similarly, in a case of an acute mourner, the Sages require him to immerse before he may partake of sacrificial meat, as taught in tractate <i>Ḥagiga</i>, but they do not impose this standard for touching the meat, as taught in the mishna here.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to an acute mourner: And he does not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening. The Gemara comments: The mishna indicates only that he may not receive a share of the meat, but when other priests invite him to join in their portions, he may partake of them in the evening.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 91b): An acute mourner immerses and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but he may not partake of other sacrificial meat.
  Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: This is not difficult. Here, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to the first night of Passover, whereas there, in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to the rest of the days of the year.
  What is the reason for the distinction between the two? On the first night of Passover, since he partakes of the Paschal offering, he may also partake of other sacrificial meat. But on the rest of the days of the year, when he is unfit to partake of sacrificial meat, he is unfit. And what does the mishna in <i>Pesaḥim</i> mean when it states: But he may not partake of other sacrificial meat? It means: But he may not partake of sacrificial meat of all of the rest of the year, other than the first night of Passover.
  Rav Asi said there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the <i>mishnayot</i>: This is not difficult. Here, in the ruling of the mishna in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, which prohibits an acute mourner from partaking of sacrificial meat, it is referring to a case where his relative died on the fourteenth day of Nisan, and he buried him on the fourteenth itself, in which case he is still considered an acute mourner by rabbinic law that evening. There, in the ruling of the mishna in this chapter, it is referring to a case where his relative died on the thirteenth of Nisan, and he buried him on the fourteenth of Nisan. The reason the mourner may partake is that since the day of burial is not the day of death, it does not take hold of its following night by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara clarifies: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that acute mourning the following night is by rabbinic law, as opposed to by Torah law? This is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Acute mourning at night is by Torah law; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: His status as an acute mourner at night is not by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. Know that this so, as the Sages said: An acute mourner immerses and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but he may still not partake of other sacrificial meat. If acute mourning at night were by Torah law, he would not be permitted to partake of the Paschal offering.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law and that consequently an acute mourner partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says: An acute mourner does not send his offerings to the Temple to be sacrificed? What, is it not referring even to a Paschal offering? The Gemara rejects this: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to all offerings other than a Paschal offering.
  The Gemara counters: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the verse: “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace offerings [<i>shelamim</i>]” (Leviticus 3:1), Rabbi Shimon says: The offering is called <i>shelamim</i> to teach that when a person is whole [<i>shalem</i>], i.e., in a state of contentment, he brings his offering, but he does not bring it when he is an acute mourner. From where is it derived to include that an acute mourner does not bring even a thanks offering? I include the thanks offering because it is consumed in a state of joy, like a peace offering.
  From where is it derived that the verse also serves to include a burnt offering? I include the burnt offering because it comes as a vow offering and as a gift offering, like a peace offering. From where is it derived that the verse also serves to include a firstborn offering, and an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering, which are not brought voluntarily? I include a firstborn offering, and an animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering, because they too, like a peace offering, do not come to atone for a sin. From where is it derived to include a sin offering and a guilt offering, which atone for sins? The verse states: “And if his offering be a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings,” which teaches that an acute mourner may not sacrifice any slaughtered offering [<i>zevaḥ</i>].
  From where is it derived to include even the bird offerings, and the meal offerings, and the wine, and the wood, and the frankincense brought for the Temple service? The verse states: “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace offerings [<i>shelamim korbano</i>],” teaching that for all offerings [<i>korbanot</i>] that a person brings, he brings them when he is whole [<i>shalem</i>], but he does not bring them when he is an acute mourner.
  The Gemara explains: In any event, Rabbi Shimon teaches that it is prohibited for an acute mourner to bring a Paschal offering, even though he will cease to be an acute mourner that night; this contradicts the first <i>baraita</i>.
  Rav Ḥisda said: The latter <i>baraita</i> mentions a Paschal offering for no purpose. In other words, the <i>halakha</i> that an acute mourner does not bring an offering does not actually apply to a Paschal offering, and the <i>baraita</i> mentions it only out of habit, since a firstborn-animal offering, the animal tithe offering, and a Paschal offering are frequently mentioned together.
  Rav Sheshet said: What is meant in this <i>baraita</i> by the term: Paschal offering? It is referring to the peace offerings of Passover, i.e., the peace offering that is sacrificed along with the Paschal offering. The Gemara objects: If so, that is the same as a peace offering, which Rabbi Shimon already mentioned. The Gemara answers: He taught the <i>halakha</i> with regard to peace offerings that come on account of the Paschal offering, and he taught separately the <i>halakha</i> with regard to peace offerings that come on their own account.
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Shimon needed to teach both cases explicitly, because if he did not teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to peace offerings that come on account of the Paschal offering, it would enter your mind to say: Since they come on account of the Paschal offering, they are considered like the Paschal offering itself, and the acute mourner offers them as well. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon teaches us that these peace offerings are also forbidden to an acute mourner.
  Rav Mari said a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon:
  
  Daf 100a
  
  It is not difficult. Here, in the <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Shimon holds an acute mourner may not send a Paschal offering, since acute mourning at night is by Torah law, it is referring to a case where his relative died on the fourteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth itself. There, the ruling in the mishna in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, which teaches that an acute mourner immerses and partakes of the Paschal offering in the evening, since acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law, is referring to a case where his relative died on the thirteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth of Nisan.
  Rav Mari explains: In a case where his relative died on the fourteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth itself, his acute mourning is due to the day of death and is therefore by Torah law. Consequently, it takes hold of its following night by Torah law, and the mitzva of the Paschal offering does not override it. By contrast, in a case where his relative died on the thirteenth day of Nisan and he buried him on the fourteenth of Nisan, the fourteenth is only the day of burial, and his acute mourning is therefore by rabbinic law. Consequently, it takes hold of its following night only by rabbinic law, and the mitzva of the Paschal offering overrides it.
  Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari: But if so, it is difficult to understand that which the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda: Know that this so, as the Sages said: An acute mourner immerses on the fourteenth of Nisan and partakes of his Paschal offering in the evening, but he may not partake of other sacrificial meat. According to your explanation of this statement, let Rabbi Yehuda say to Rabbi Shimon that this is no proof: I am telling you a <i>halakha</i> about the day of death, when acute mourning is by Torah law, and you tell me that you have a proof from a mishna that deals with the day of burial, when acute mourning is by rabbinic law. The Gemara concludes: This indeed poses a difficulty for Rav Mari.
  Abaye said a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon: It is not difficult. Here, in the <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Shimon holds that an acute mourner may not send a Paschal offering, it is referring to a case where his relative died before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan. There, the ruling in the mishna in tractate <i>Pesaḥim</i>, which teaches that an acute mourner immerses and partakes of the Paschal offering in the evening, it is a case where his relative died after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan. When his relative died before midday, in which case he was not ever fit for bringing a Paschal offering since the obligation begins at midday, the status of acute mourning applies to him, and it is prohibited for him to bring a Paschal offering. But if his relative dies after midday, when he is already fit for bringing a Paschal offering, the status of acute mourning does not apply to him with regard to this matter, so he may immerse and partake of the Paschal offering in the evening.
  The Gemara explains: And from where do you say that the <i>halakha</i> is different depending on whether his relative died before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan or whether he died after midday? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to a priest: “And for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that has had no husband, for her may he become impure” (Leviticus 21:3). From here it is derived that it is a mitzva for a priest to become impure in order to bury his deceased relatives, and if he did not want to do so, others must render him impure against his will. And an incident occurred involving Yosef the priest, where his wife died on Passover eve, and he did not want to become impure, as he wanted to offer the Paschal offering; and his brethren the priests voted and rendered him impure against his will.
  And the Sages raise a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: What is the meaning when the verse states with regard to a nazirite: “He shall not become impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister when they die; because his consecration unto God is upon his head” (Numbers 6:7)? If a nazirite went to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son, mitzvot for which failure to fulfill them is punishable by <i>karet</i>, and he heard that a relative of his died, one might have thought that he should become impure in order to bury his relative even if this will result in his not bringing the Paschal offering. You rather say, based on this verse, that “he shall not become impure.”
  One might have thought that just as he may not become impure to bury his sister, so too he may not become impure to bury a corpse with no one to bury it [<i>met mitzva</i>]. The verse states: “Or for his sister,” teaching that it is only to bury his sister that he may not become impure, but he does become impure to bury a <i>met mitzva</i>.
  In the first <i>baraita</i>, contracting impurity from a dead relative is obligatory, and in the second <i>baraita</i> it is forbidden. Do you not learn from this contradiction that there must be a distinction between the cases? Here, in the first <i>baraita</i> concerning a priest, it must be referring to a case where the relative died before midday, so he was obligated to become impure before the obligation for the Paschal offering took effect. There, in the second <i>baraita</i> concerning a nazirite, it must be referring to a case where the relative died after midday. This distinction, between death before and after midday, also applies to acute mourning.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: From where do you infer that this is the resolution to the contradiction? Actually, perhaps I will say to you: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are discussing deaths that occurred after midday. And this <i>baraita</i>, about a nazirite, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and that <i>baraita</i>, about Yosef the priest, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to a priest: “And for his sister a virgin, that is near unto him, that has had no husband, for her may he become impure” (Leviticus 21:3). This is optional, i.e., a priest is not obligated to become impure to bury his sister; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is mandatory.
  The Gemara responds: This should not enter your mind, because it is Rabbi Akiva who teaches the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> about a nazirite. As it is taught in the full version of that <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states: “All the days that he consecrates himself unto the Lord he shall not come near to a dead body. He shall not become impure for his father, or for his mother, for his brother, or for his sister when they die; because his consecration unto God is upon his head” (Numbers 6:7). Rabbi Akiva says: The term “body [<i>nefesh</i>]” is referring to relatives. The term “dead [<i>met</i>]” is referring to non-relatives.
  The verse specifies: “For his father,” even though his father is included among his relatives, to teach that he may not become impure to bury his father, but he does become impure to bury a <i>met mitzva</i>. The verse states: “For his mother,” to teach that even if he was a priest and he was a nazirite, and therefore doubly prohibited from becoming impure, nevertheless, he may not become impure to bury his mother but he does become impure to bury a <i>met mitzva</i>. The verse states: “For his brother,” to teach that even if he was a High Priest, who may not become impure even for his relatives, and he was also a nazirite, nevertheless, he may not become impure to bury his brother but he does become impure to bury a <i>met mitzva</i>.
  What is the meaning when the verse states: “Or for his sister”? If a nazirite went to slaughter his Paschal offering or to circumcise his son, and he heard that a relative of his died, one might have thought that he should become impure. You rather say that he may not become impure. One might have thought that just as he may not become impure to bury his sister, so too he may not become impure to bury a <i>met mitzva</i>. The verse states: “Or for his sister,” to teach that he may not become impure to bury his sister but he does become impure to bury a <i>met mitzva</i>. Consequently, the statement of the <i>baraita</i> concerning a nazirite represents the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
  
  Daf 100b
  
  Rava said there is a different resolution to the contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon. Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are discussing cases where the relative died after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, and still it is not difficult. Here, his relative died before the priests would have slaughtered the Paschal offering and sprinkled its blood on his account, and he may not send the offering. There, the relative died after the priests slaughtered the Paschal offering and sprinkled its blood on his account. Since acute mourning at night is by rabbinic law, it is suspended to allow him to consume an offering that was already sacrificed.
  Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: In a case where one’s relative died after the priests slaughtered the Paschal offering and sprinkled its blood, why should he be permitted to partake of the Paschal offering? What was, was, and although the offering was sacrificed, isn’t he still an acute mourner by rabbinic law? Ravina said to Rav Adda bar Mattana: Partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable for the mitzva, as is seen from that which Rabba bar Rav Huna taught, as the Gemara will explain. Therefore, the Sages did not prohibit the acute mourner from partaking of the Paschal offering as they do for other offerings, for which consumption of the meat is dispensable. Rava said to Rav Adda bar Mattana: Listen to what your master, Ravina, told you, as his explanation is correct.
  What is the statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna that teaches that partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The day that a person receives tidings that his relative died is considered as if it were the day of burial with regard to the mitzva of the seven-day mourning period, when he may not bathe or wear shoes, and with regard to the thirty-day period when he may not wear ironed garments. And with regard to partaking of the Paschal offering, the day he receives the tidings is like the day of the gathering of the bones of the deceased after the flesh decomposed (see <i>Pesaḥim</i> 92a). In both this and that case, he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening.
  The Gemara challenges: This <i>baraita</i> itself is difficult. At first you say: The day of tidings is considered as if it were the day of burial for the mitzva of the seven-day and thirty-day mourning periods; and with regard to partaking of the Paschal offering, it is like the day of the gathering of bones, when one may immerse and partake of sacrificial meat in the evening. By inference, one concludes that on the day of burial, he may not partake of the Paschal offering even in the evening, and all the more so other sacrificial meat. And then it is taught: In both this and that case, i.e., on both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones, he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening.
  Rav Ḥisda said: Whether it is permitted to partake of sacrificial meat the night after the day of burial is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as the Gemara will explain.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna said: This is not difficult. Here, in the latter clause, where the <i>baraita</i> teaches that on both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones he immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening, it is referring to a case where he heard tidings of his dead relative just before sunset, and likewise a case where they gathered the bones for him just before sunset, and likewise a case where his relative died and he buried him just before sunset. But there, in the first clause, from which it is inferred that he may not consume any sacrificial meat the night after the day of burial, the burial occurred after sunset, i.e., on the night of the fifteenth of Nisan itself.
  The Gemara objects: If so, why not say that even if he gathered bones after sunset, then what was, was? Why did the Sages permit him to partake of the Paschal offering, as opposed to other sacrificial meat? Rather, learn from this <i>baraita</i> that partaking of the Paschal offering is indispensable to fulfilling the obligation, and due to the severity of the mitzva, the Sages suspended their decree prohibiting one from partaking of it.
  Rav Ashi said there is another resolution to this question: What is meant by the latter clause in the <i>baraita</i>: In both this and that case? It does not mean both the day of burial and the day of the gathering of bones. Rather, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Both on the day of tidings and on the day of the gathering of bones, the mourner immerses and partakes of sacrificial meat in the evening. But after the day of burial, he may not partake of the Paschal offering, and all the more so of other sacrificial meat, as indicated in the first clause in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara notes: And this resolution of Rav Ashi is a mistake, since the <i>tanna</i> is already discussing those two cases and equating them. According to Rav Ashi’s resolution, it is extraneous to say: In both this and that case; the <i>tanna</i> should have simply said: In this and that case. Rather, learn from the language of the <i>baraita</i> that Rav Ashi’s resolution is a mistake.
  The Gemara returns to discuss Rav Ḥisda’s resolution: And what is the dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to the night following the day of burial? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative, such that he is prohibited to partake of sacrificial meat? The entire day. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: As long as his relative has not been buried.
  The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say we are dealing with the day of death, is there a <i>tanna</i> who does not hold that the day of death takes hold of its following night, at least by rabbinic law? In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>, who says that the acute mourning is only during the day, and not at night?
  And furthermore, if we are dealing with the day of death, then when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: As long as his relative has not been buried, it indicates that consequently, once he has buried him, it becomes permitted for him to partake of sacrificial meat, even on the day of death itself. But is there a <i>tanna</i> who does not hold that acute mourning extends for the entire day of death, even after burial? The verse states: “And I will turn your feasts into mourning, and all your songs into lamentation; and I will bring up sackcloth upon all loins, and baldness upon every head; and I will make it as the mourning for an only son, and the end thereof as a bitter day” (Amos 8:10).
  Rav Sheshet said: The <i>tanna</i> of this <i>baraita</i> is discussing the day of burial when it is not the day of death. The <i>tanna’im</i> disagree whether the acute mourning lasts only until the burial, or until the end of the day of burial.
  Rav Yosef objects to this: But there is that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who hears tidings of his dead relative is considered as one who gathers his relative’s bones, in that he may immerse and partake of sacrificial meat in the evening. By inference, on the day of burial he may not partake even in the evening. In accordance with whose opinion is this? This is the opinion of neither the first <i>tanna</i> nor Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rather, one must answer that the <i>baraita</i> means: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative? That entire day of burial and its following night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He continues into the night only as long as his relative has not been buried; but once he is buried, the acute mourning lasts only for the rest of the day, without its night.
  The Sages said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya said in surprise: Would a great man like Rav Yosef say this? Would he say that the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the more lenient of the two? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative? As long as his relative has not been buried, even if he remains unburied from now until ten days from now. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Sages say: He mourns acutely for his relative only on that same day. The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is more stringent than that of the Sages.
  Rather, answer like this: Until when does a person mourn acutely for his relative? That entire day of burial, without its night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The acute mourning continues as long as his relative has not been buried, even for ten days, and once he is buried, that day takes hold of its night. This is the dispute to which Rav Ḥisda referred.
  The Sages said this statement before Rava. Rava said: Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the day of burial, when acute mourning is by rabbinic law, takes hold of its night by rabbinic law, by inference, he must hold that the day of death, when acute mourning is by Torah law, takes hold of its night by Torah law. The Sages would not be more stringent with their ordinance than the parallel law of the Torah.
  The Gemara objects: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold that acute mourning at night is by Torah law? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On the last day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, after two of Aaron’s sons died, Aaron said to Moses: “Behold, today…there have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). The word “today” teaches that Aaron is saying: I am prohibited from partaking today but permitted to partake at night; but for future generations, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of sacrificial meat whether during the day or at night. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: For future generations, acute mourning at night is not by Torah law, but rather by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that acute mourning on the night after death is by rabbinic law, not Torah law.
  
  Daf 101a
  
  And the same holds for the night after the day of burial, even though the acute mourning of that day itself is by rabbinic law, because the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with greater severity than Torah law.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: On the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, on which two of Aaron’s sons died, Moses spoke to Aaron and his sons using three different forms of the word command: “For so I am commanded [<i>tzuveiti</i>]” (Leviticus 10:13), “as I commanded [<i>tziveiti</i>]” (Leviticus 10:18), and “as the Lord has commanded [<i>tziva</i>]” (Leviticus 10:15). Moses said to Aaron: “And you shall eat it…for so I am commanded,” to teach that Aaron and his remaining sons shall partake of the offerings even in acute mourning. The statement: “You should certainly have eaten it…as I commanded,” Moses said to them at the time of the incident, when Aaron and his sons burned the sin offering for the New Moon. Moses said: “As the Lord has commanded,” to emphasize that it is not of my own initiative that I say this, but it is from the word of God.
  And the Sages raise a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: The sin offering was burned due to the acute mourning of Aaron and his sons, since they felt they could not partake of it. Therefore, it is stated in Aaron’s explanation: “There have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). Moses conceded to Aaron that he was correct (see Leviticus 10:20), indicating that it was not permitted for Aaron to partake of the sin offering in acute mourning.
  Shmuel said: This is not difficult. This first <i>baraita</i>, according to which Moses commanded Aaron and his sons to consume the sacrificial meat in acute mourning, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; and that <i>baraita</i>, according to which they acted properly in refraining from eating it, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Aaron and his sons burned the sin offering due to their acute mourning. Therefore, it is stated: “As these”; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say: The sin offering was burned due to ritual impurity. As, if you say that it was burned due to acute mourning, they should have burned all three of the sin offerings offered that day. Alternatively, if it was burned due to acute mourning, they would have been fit to partake of the sin offerings in the evening, and there would have been no need to burn them. Alternatively, if it was burned due to acute mourning, wasn’t Pinehas, son of Elazar the priest, with them? He was not in mourning, and he could have partaken of the sin offering.
  Rava said: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning. And this is not difficult. Here, the <i>baraita</i> according to which Moses commanded that Aaron and his sons partake of the offering as acute mourners is referring to the offerings of a particular time, i.e., the meal offering, which was unique to the inauguration ceremony. There, the <i>baraita</i> according to which they rightly burned the sin offering, due to acute mourning, is referring to the offerings of all future generations. That sin offering was brought for the New Moon of Nisan, and such an offering would be brought at every New Moon from that day onward. Moses conceded that such offerings should not be consumed by acute mourners.
  The Gemara asks: How would Rabbi Neḥemya reconcile these apparently contradictory verses about the sin offering, and how would the Sages reconcile these verses (see Leviticus 10:17–20)?
  Rabbi Neḥemya would reconcile them like this: When Moses asked: “Why have you not eaten the sin offering?” (Leviticus 10:17), this is what Moses said to Aaron: Perhaps the blood of this sin offering entered the innermost sanctum, thereby disqualifying it (see Leviticus 6:23). Is this why you burned it? Aaron said to him: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18). Moses then asked: Perhaps it went outside its partition, i.e., it exited the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and was thereby disqualified? Aaron said to him: It was inside the sacred area at all times.
  Moses then suggested: But perhaps you sacrificed it in acute mourning, which is prohibited for ordinary priests, and disqualified it. Aaron said to him: Moses, was it they, i.e., my sons, who sacrificed the offering? I sacrificed the offering, and as High Priest, I may serve even as an acute mourner (see Leviticus 21:10–12). And Moses said to him: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within,” and it was inside the sacred area at all times; therefore: “You should certainly have consumed it in the sacred area, as I commanded” (Leviticus 10:18), i.e., just as I commanded that the priests should consume today’s meal offering in acute mourning.
  Aaron said to him: “Behold, today have they sacrificed their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord, and there have befallen me such things as these; and if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?” (Leviticus 10:19). Perhaps you heard the command to consume the offering only with regard to offerings of a particular time, i.e., the meal offering, which was unique to that day.
  As, if you claim that it also applies to the offerings of all generations, then one can prove this is not so via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the second tithe, for which the <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than for sacrificial meat: Just as with regard to the second tithe, for which the <i>halakha</i> is more lenient, the Torah stated: “I have not eaten thereof in my mourning [<i>ve’oni</i>]” (Deuteronomy 26:14), teaching that an acute mourner [<i>onen</i>] is prohibited from partaking of it, all the more so is it not clear that with regard to the offerings of all generations, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of them?
  Moses immediately conceded to Aaron, as the verse states: “And Moses heard, and it was good in his eyes” (Leviticus 10:20). And Moses was not embarrassed and did not attempt to justify himself by saying: I did not hear of this <i>halakha</i> until now. Rather, he said: I heard it, and I forgot it, as the verse indicates by stating: “Moses heard.”
  The Gemara continues: And how would Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that the sin offering was burned due to ritual impurity, reconcile those verses? They would reconcile them like this: When Moses said to Aaron and his sons: “Why have you not eaten the sin offering in the place of the Sanctuary?” (Leviticus 10:17), he meant: Perhaps its blood entered the innermost sanctum, disqualifying the offering. Aaron said to him in response: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within” (Leviticus 10:18).
  Moses then asked: Perhaps it went outside its partition, i.e., the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and was thereby disqualified? Aaron said to him: It was inside the sacred area at all times. Moses then asked: But perhaps you sacrificed it in acute mourning and disqualified it? Aaron said to him: Moses, was it my sons who sacrificed the offering, that their acute mourning would disqualify the offering? I, the High Priest, sacrificed the offering, and I may serve even in acute mourning.
  Moses then asked: Or perhaps, due to your bitterness in mourning, were you neglectful of the offering and it became impure? Aaron said to him: Moses, am I in your eyes such a person, that I would treat an offering consecrated to Heaven with contempt? “There have befallen me such things as these” (Leviticus 10:19), i.e., even if these tragedies and more such as them should befall me, I would not treat an offering consecrated to Heaven with contempt.
  Moses said to him: If so, and if, as you say: “Behold, the blood of it was not brought into the Sanctuary within,” and it was inside the sacred area at all times, then: “You should certainly have eaten it in the sacred area, as I commanded,” i.e., as I commanded that the priests should consume the meal offering even in acute mourning.
  Aaron said to him: Perhaps you heard the command to consume the offering only with regard to the night following the day of acute mourning, but during the day itself the prohibition stands. As, if you claim that it may be consumed during the day itself, I can prove that this is not so via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the second tithe, for which the <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than for sacrificial meat: Just as with regard to the second tithe, for which the <i>halakha</i> is more lenient, the Torah stated: I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, all the more so is it not clear that in the stringent case of sacrificial meat, an acute mourner is prohibited from partaking of it?
  Moses immediately conceded to Aaron, as the verse states: “And Moses heard,
  
  Daf 101b
  
  and it was good in his eyes” (Leviticus 10:20). Moses was not embarrassed and did not attempt to justify himself by saying: I did not hear this <i>halakha</i> until now. Rather, he said: I heard it, and I forgot it.
  The Gemara asks: According to this opinion, why was the sin offering burned? They should have delayed its consumption and consumed it that night. The Gemara answers: Ritual impurity came upon this sin offering due to circumstances beyond the priests’ control, and they were forced to burn it.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, this is as it is written: “And if I had consumed the sin offering today, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord”? The verse indicates that Aaron could have eaten it at night. But according to Rabbi Neḥemya, who holds that Aaron distinguished between the offerings of that particular time and the offerings of all later generations, what did Aaron mean by the word “today”? The Gemara answers: He meant: And if I had eaten the sin offering of the New Moon, which is today’s obligation, would it have been good in the eyes of the Lord?
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, this is as it is written: “Behold, today have they sacrificed their sin offering and their burnt offering before the Lord,” i.e., they offered it as the obligation of the day. But according to the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, what did Aaron mean by the phrase “behold [<i>hen</i>], today”? The Gemara answers: This is what Aaron is saying: Did they [<i>hen</i>], my sons, sacrifice the offering today, which would have been prohibited to them in acute mourning? No, I sacrificed the offering, and as High Priest, I may perform the service in acute mourning.
  § The Gemara continues to analyze the <i>baraita</i>. The Master says: If the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, then the priests should have burned all three of the sin offerings offered that day. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: All three of the sin offerings?
  The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And Moses diligently inquired for the goat of the sin offering, and behold, it was burned” (Leviticus 10:16). When the verse states: “The goat,” this is referring to the goat of Nahshon, son of Amminadav, the prince of the tribe of Judah, who brought the offering on the first day of the Tabernacle’s inauguration (see Numbers 7:12). When the verse states: “The sin offering,” this is referring to the sin offering that the people brought on the eighth day of the inauguration (see Leviticus 9:13). The term “inquired” is referring to the goat sacrificed at every New Moon (see Numbers 28:15). The Tabernacle was erected on the New Moon of Nisan (see Exodus 40:17). These are the three goats that were sacrificed that day.
  One might have thought that all three of them were burned. Therefore, the verse states: “And Moses diligently inquired for the goat of the sin offering, and, behold, it was burned,” to teach that one of the offerings was burned, but not all three of them were burned. The verse states: “And Moses diligently inquired [<i>darosh darash</i>].” Why were there two inquiries? Moses said to them: For what reason is this sin offering burned, and secondly, for what reason are those left unburned? The <i>baraita</i> comments: Still, I do not know which of them was burned. When it states with regard to the burned goat: “And He has given it to you to bear the iniquity of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), you must say: This is the goat of the New Moon, which atones for impurity in the Temple.
  The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say well to Rabbi Neḥemya; if the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, then all three goats should have been burned. How would Rabbi Neḥemya respond? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Neḥemya conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Acute mourning does not disqualify offerings of a particular time. Therefore, they burned only the New Moon sin offering, which applies to future generations as well.
  The Master says in the <i>baraita</i>: If the sin offering was burned due to acute mourning, why was it burned at all? He should have eaten it in the evening. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say well to Rabbi Neḥemya in posing this difficulty. How would he respond? The Gemara explains: He holds that acute mourning in the evening is by Torah law, and therefore the priests were not permitted to eat it even then.
  Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon also stated: Alternatively, wasn’t Pinehas, son of Elazar the priest, with them? He was not an acute mourner. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon say well to Rabbi Neḥemya. The Gemara explains: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: Pinehas did not become a priest until he killed Zimri, who had engaged in intercourse with a Midianite woman (see Numbers 25:6–8). As it is written only after that incident concerning Pinehas: “And it shall be unto him and to his seed after him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood” (Numbers 25:13). Before that incident, at the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, the only priests were Aaron and his sons.
  Rav Ashi said: Pinehas did not become a priest until he made peace among the tribes at the time of the conquest of Eretz Yisrael, when the tribes east of the Jordan River built their own altar and nearly provoked a civil war. Before this, Pinehas was always referred to as: Son of Elazar the priest, but during this incident he is himself referred to as a priest for the first time, as it is stated: “And Pinehas the priest, and the princes of the congregation, and the heads of the thousands of Israel that were with him, heard the words that the children of Reuben and the children of Gad and the children of Manasseh spoke, and it pleased them well” (Joshua 22:30).
  The Gemara asks: And for the other Sage, Rav Ashi, as well, isn’t it written: “And it shall be unto him, and to his seed after him, the covenant of an everlasting priesthood”? Apparently, Pinehas became a priest after he killed Zimri. The Gemara responds: When that verse is written, it is with regard to the blessing that it is written, that his descendants would always be priests. It did not indicate that Pinehas became a priest immediately.
  The Gemara asks: And for the other Sages as well, who hold that Pinehas became a priest immediately after he killed Zimri, isn’t it written: “And Pinehas the priest…heard”? Apparently he became a priest only after the conquest of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara answers: That verse serves to entitle his descendants after him, that they would continue as High Priests through his merit.
  § Rav says: Moses, our teacher, was a High Priest and would receive a share of offerings consecrated to Heaven, as it is stated: “And Moses took the breast, and waved it for a wave offering before the Lord; it was Moses’ portion of the ram of inauguration, as the Lord commanded Moses” (Leviticus 8:29).
  The Gemara raises an objection: In the <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon claim that acute mourning was not the reason the sin offering was burned by asking: Wasn’t Pinehas with them? And if it is so that Moses could partake of sacrificial meat, let them say: Wasn’t Moses, our teacher, with them? The Gemara responds: Perhaps Moses is different, since as a prophet, he was preoccupied with the Divine Presence, and was not available. As the Master says: Moses ascended Mount Sinai early in the morning, and he descended early in the morning.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a blemished priest: “He may eat the bread of his God, both of the most sacred, and of the sacred” (Leviticus 21:22). If offerings of the most sacred order are stated, that a blemished priest may eat them, then why are offerings of lesser sanctity also stated? And if offerings of lesser sanctity are stated, why are offerings of the most sacred order stated?
  The <i>baraita</i> answers: Had offerings of lesser sanctity not been stated, I would have said: It is only offerings of the most sacred order that a blemished priest may eat, as they were permitted both to a non-priest and to the priests, but a blemished priest may not eat offerings of lesser sanctity, which were not permitted to non-priests. And had offerings of the most sacred order not been stated, I would have said: A blemished priest may eat offerings of lesser sanctity, as they are of lesser sanctity, but he may not eat of offerings of the most sacred order, as they are of higher sanctity. Therefore, offerings of the most sacred order are stated, and therefore, offerings of lesser sanctity are stated.
  The Gemara explains the objection: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches: As they were permitted both to a non-priest and to the priests. What non-priest is permitted to eat offerings of the most sacred order? Is this not referring to Moses? This indicates that Moses was not considered a High Priest, contrary to Rav’s statement. Rav Sheshet said: No, this is referring to a non-priest sacrificing on a private altar. Once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael, it was permitted for a time for them to build private altars, on which even non-priests could serve. And although only offerings of lesser sanctity were offered on private altars, this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the statement of the Sage who says: There is a meal offering that may be offered on a private altar. Meal offerings are of the most sacred order.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement: When Miriam became a leper (see Numbers 12:10), who diagnosed and quarantined her? If you say that Moses quarantined her, that is difficult, as Moses was a non-priest,
  
  Daf 102a
  
  and a non-priest may not inspect the shades of leprous marks to diagnose them. And if you say that Aaron quarantined her, that is difficult, as Aaron was a relative, Miriam’s brother, and a relative may not inspect the shades of leprous marks. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, bestowed a great honor on Miriam at that time, and said: I Myself am a priest, and I will quarantine her for seven days to see if the shades of leprous marks persist, and I will declare her a leper if she is impure, and I will exempt her if she is not impure.
  In any event, the midrash teaches: Moses was a non-priest, and a non-priest may not inspect the shades of leprous marks, which contradicts the statement of Rav that Moses was a priest.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The <i>halakhot</i> of the examination of shades of leprous marks are different, because specifically Aaron and his sons, and not Moses, are written in the passage that discusses them: “Then he shall be brought unto Aaron the priest, or unto one of his sons the priests” (Leviticus 13:2). Therefore, there is no proof from this <i>baraita</i> that Moses was not a priest.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a <i>baraita</i>: Elisheva, the daughter of Amminadav and the wife of Aaron, had five more reasons for joy than the other daughters of Israel on the day the Tabernacle was dedicated: Her brother-in-law, Moses, was a king; her husband, Aaron, was the High Priest; her son, Elazar, was the deputy High Priest; her son’s son, Pinehas, was the priest anointed for war, who would lead the army out to battle; and her brother, Nahshon, son of Amminadav, was the prince of the tribe of Judah, who brought his offering on that day, as the first of all the princes. But on that same day of joy she was in mourning for her two sons, Nadav and Avihu, who died on that day.
  In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Her brother-in-law, Moses, was a king. From this one can infer that yes, he was a king, but he was not a High Priest, contrary to Rav’s statement. The Gemara responds: Say that the <i>baraita</i> means: Moses was a king as well, in addition to being a High Priest.
  The Gemara comments: The question of whether Moses was a High Priest is subject to a dispute among <i>tanna’im</i>, as is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When Moses was at the burning bush and expressed hesitation to deliver God’s message to Pharaoh, the verse states: “And the anger of the Lord burned against Moses, and He said: Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite? I know that he can speak well. And also, behold, he comes forth to meet you, and when he sees you, he will be glad in his heart” (Exodus 4:14). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: For every burning anger that is stated in the Torah, its effect is also stated, i.e., the Torah records an action or pronouncement as a consequence of that anger, but in this case no effect of the anger is stated.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Even in this case the anger’s effect is stated, as it is stated there: “Is there not Aaron your brother the Levite? I know that he can speak well.” But isn’t Aaron a priest? Why is he referred to as a Levite? This is what God is saying to Moses: I initially said that you would be the priest and he would be the Levite; now he will be the priest and you will be the Levite.
  And the Rabbis say: Moses became a priest for the seven days of inauguration alone, and after that his priesthood expired. And some say: The priesthood expired only for the descendants of Moses, but Moses himself remained a priest, as it is stated: “But as for Moses the man of God, his sons are named among the tribe of Levi” (I Chronicles 23:14). This verse indicates that it was his sons who were Levites, but he himself remained a priest. And so too the verse states: “Moses and Aaron among His priests, and Samuel among them that call upon His name, did call upon the Lord, and He answered them” (Psalms 99:6).
  The Gemara asks: What is meant by: And so too the verse states? Why did the <i>tanna</i> need to cite a second proof? The Gemara explains: And if you would say the first verse is written only for future generations, to include Moses’ descendants in the tribe of Levi but not to exclude him, then there is a second proof: And so too, the verse states: “Moses and Aaron among His priests.” The statement of Rav that Moses was a High Priest is in accordance with the opinion in this <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara challenges the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: And is it true that for every burning anger that is stated in the Torah, its effect is also stated? But isn’t it written with regard to Moses: “And he went out from Pharaoh in hot anger” (Exodus 11:8)? And Moses did not say anything to Pharaoh. Reish Lakish said: Moses slapped him and left.
  The Gemara challenges: And does Reish Lakish actually say this? But isn’t it written: “Go unto Pharaoh in the morning; lo, he goes out unto the water; and you shall stand by the river’s brink to meet him, and the rod which was turned to a serpent shall you take in your hand” (Exodus 7:15); and Reish Lakish says: God meant: Pharaoh is a king, and so you should be amiable toward him, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: God meant: Pharaoh is wicked, and so you should be insolent toward him. If according to Reish Lakish Moses was commanded to greet Pharaoh with respect, how could he say that Moses slapped Pharaoh? The Gemara answers: Reverse the names of the Sages in this dispute; it is Reish Lakish who says that Moses was commanded to be insolent.
  With regard to the respect accorded to a king, Rabbi Yannai says: Fear of the kingship should always be upon you, even when the king does not deserve respect, as it is written that Moses said to Pharaoh: “And all these your servants shall come down unto me and bow down unto me, saying: Get you out, and all the people that follow you, and after that I will go out” (Exodus 11:8). He mentioned Pharaoh’s servants, but he did not say this of Pharaoh himself, even though this was the eventual outcome. Rather, he spoke to Pharaoh with the respect due to a king.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Derive the principle from here: “And the hand of the Lord was on Elijah, and he girded up his loins and ran before Ahab to the entrance of Jezreel” (I Kings 18:46). Elijah the prophet ran before the evil king Ahab out of respect.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the roles of Moses: Ulla says: Moses requested that he be given the kingship, but it was not given to him, as it is written: “Do not draw hither” (Exodus 3:5); and the word “hither” refers to nothing other than kingship, as it is stated: “Then David the king went in and sat before the Lord, and he said: Who am I, O Lord God, and what is my house, that You have brought me hither”? (II Samuel 7:18).
  Rava raises an objection from the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier: Rabbi Yishmael says: Elisheva’s brother-in-law, Moses, was a king. This teaches that Moses was in fact granted kingship. Rava said: Ulla is saying that Moses did not receive kingship for himself and for his descendants, i.e., it was not bequeathed to his sons.
  The Gemara counters: And is it so that anywhere that it is written “hither” the verse is referring to kingship for future generations as well? But isn’t it written about the kingship of Saul: “They asked of the Lord further: Is there yet a man who comes hither” (I Samuel 10:22), and Saul was indeed a king, but his descendants were not.
  The Gemara responds: If you wish, say: There was Ish-Bosheth, Saul’s son, who was a king (see II Samuel 2:10), indicating that Saul’s kingship did pass to his son. And if you wish, say instead: Saul is different, because the kingship did not stand even for himself, and this is why it did not pass on to his descendants.
  The second response is in accordance with that which Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: When greatness is apportioned to a person in Heaven, it is apportioned to him and to his descendants until the end of all generations, as it is stated: “He withdraws not His eyes from the righteous; but with kings upon the throne He sets them forever, and they are exalted” (Job 36:7). But if he then became arrogant, the Holy One, Blessed be He, humiliates him, as is stated in the next verse: “And if they be bound in fetters, and be held in cords of affliction” (Job 36:8). This was the case with Saul.
  § The mishna teaches: Blemished priests, whether they are temporarily blemished or permanently blemished, receive a share and partake of offerings, but do not sacrifice them. The Gemara explains: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the meal offering: “Every male among the sons of Aaron shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:11). The phrase “every male” serves to include blemished priests.
  The Gemara clarifies: For what matter is this derivation necessary? If one suggests it is for the matter of consumption, it is already stated explicitly: “Any man of the seed of Aaron the priest who has a blemish…He may eat the bread of his God, of the most sacred, and of the sacred” (Leviticus 21:21–22). Rather, Leviticus 6:11 is necessary for the matter of receiving a share, teaching that blemished priests may do so along with the other priests. This is the source for the mishna’s statement.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering: “Every male among the priests may eat thereof” (Leviticus 6:22). The phrase “every male” serves to include blemished priests. The Gemara explains: For what matter is this derivation necessary? If one suggests it is for the matter of consumption, isn’t that already stated in Leviticus, chapter 21? If one suggests it is for the matter of receiving a share, isn’t that already stated in verse 6:11? Rather, the verse is necessary because one might have thought that I have derived only the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest who was at first unblemished and later became blemished. From where is it derived that one blemished from birth also receives a share? The verse states here: “Every male.”
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the guilt offering: “Every male among the priests may eat thereof” (Leviticus 7:6). The phrase “every male” serves to include a blemished priest. The Gemara explains: For what matter is this derivation necessary? If one suggests it is for the matter of eating, isn’t that already stated? And if one suggests it is for the matter of receiving a share, isn’t that already stated? And if one suggests it is for a priest blemished from birth, isn’t that already stated? Rather, the verse is necessary because one might have thought that I have derived only the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a permanently blemished priest. From where is it derived that a temporarily blemished priest also receives a share? The verse states here: “Every male.”
  The Gemara objects: Isn’t it the opposite [<i>kelapei layya</i>]? Wouldn’t I have thought that a priest with a permanent blemish would be treated more stringently than one with a temporary blemish? Rav Sheshet said: Reverse the wording as follows: One might have thought that I have derived only the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a priest with a temporary blemish; from where is it derived that one with a permanent blemish also receives a share?
  Rav Ashi said: Actually, do not reverse the wording, and this is not difficult. It was necessary to teach that even a priest with a temporary blemish receives a share, because it might enter your mind to say
  
  Daf 102b
  
  that the <i>halakha</i> of this priest is like that of a ritually impure priest: Just as an impure priest may not partake as long as he is not pure, so too, this priest with a temporary blemish may not partake as long as he does not become fit. The verse therefore teaches us that he may receive a share even before his blemish heals.
  § The mishna teaches: The principle is: Any priest who is unfit for the service that day does not receive a share of the sacrificial meat. The Gemara objects: But doesn’t he? Isn’t there a blemished priest, who is not fit for the service and who nevertheless receives a share of the meat, as the mishna itself teaches? And furthermore, this principle indicates that only priests unfit for the service do not receive a share, but any priest who is fit for the service does receive a share. But isn’t there an impure priest, who, with regard to offerings of the community, is fit for the service, and who nevertheless does not receive a share?
  The Gemara answers: The mishna is saying that any priest who is not fit for partaking of sacrificial meat does not receive a share. Blemished priests may partake of sacrificial meat, and impure priests may not.
  The Gemara objects: This indicates that any priest who is fit to partake may receive a share. But isn’t there is a minor, who is fit for partaking and who does not receive a share? The Gemara answers: This inverse principle, that any priest who is fit to partake may receive a share, is not taught. The mishna means to teach only that any priest who is unfit does not receive a share.
  The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this conclusion, that the mishna’s statement only teaches what it says explicitly, one can say that the mishna actually means what the Gemara said at the outset, that no priest unfit for the service receives a share. If one raises an objection with regard to an impure priest, who is fit for the service of communal offerings but does not receive a share, answer that the mishna does not teach that every fit priest, even an impure one, receives a share, only the inverse. And if you raise an objection with regard to a blemished priest, who is unfit for the service but nevertheless receives a share, answer that the Merciful One included him as an exception by the phrase: Every male, as derived above (102a).
  § The mishna teaches: Even if the priest was ritually impure only at the time of the sprinkling of the blood of the offering, and he was pure at the time of the burning of the fats, he still does not receive a share of the meat. The Gemara notes: Consequently, one can infer that a priest who was pure at the time of the sprinkling of the blood, even one who was impure at the time of the burning of the fats, does receive a share.
  The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Abba Shaul says: A priest never partakes, i.e., receives a share, of sacrificial meat, unless he is pure from the time of sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats, as the verse states: “He among the sons of Aaron who sacrifices the blood of the peace offerings and the fat shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). The verse requires that the priest be pure even at the time of the burning of the fats.
  Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: According to the opinion of Abba Shaul, in a case where the priest became impure between the sprinkling of the blood and the burning of the fats but became pure again before the latter, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we require only that he be pure both at the time of sprinkling and at the time of the burning of the fats, and there is purity at these times? Or perhaps Abba Shaul meant that the priest may not receive a share in the meat unless he is pure from the time of sprinkling until the time of the burning of the fats, without interruption. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches that an impure priest who immersed that day, such that he will not be pure until sunset, and likewise an acute mourner and one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, do not receive a share of sacrificial meat in order to partake of it in the evening. Rava says: I learned this <i>halakha</i> from Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said in the bathroom: You can contend by way of a story: A priest who immersed that day came and said to a pure priest of the same patrilineal priestly family serving in the Temple that day, who was apportioning the sacrificial food: Give me a share of a meal offering, and I will partake of it in the evening.
  The pure priest said an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to him: Just as with regard to a matter where your right is superior, i.e., in the case of your own sin offering, to which you have a right even when your family is not serving in the Temple, I can nevertheless deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite because you immersed today; is it not logical that with regard to a matter where your right is inferior, i.e., in the case of your own meal offering, as the meal offering of a priest is not eaten at all, that I can deny you a share of the meal offering of an Israelite?
  The priest who immersed that day responded: But even if you can deny me a share of the sin offering of an Israelite on the day I immersed, perhaps this is since just as my right is superior in the case of my own sin offering, so too, your right is superior in the case of your own sin offering. If so, is it necessarily so that you can refuse me a share of the meal offering of an Israelite, where just as my right is inferior, so your right is inferior, as neither of us may eat from our own meal offerings?
  The pure priest responded: The verse states: “And every meal offering that is baked in the oven, and all that is dressed in the stewing pan, and on the griddle, shall be the priest’s that offers it” (Leviticus 7:9). If you wish to receive a share of a meal offering, come sacrifice and partake of one. Since you cannot sacrifice a meal offering, having immersed only today, neither can you receive a share.
  The priest who immersed that day made another demand: Give me a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, and I will partake of it in the evening when I am pure.
  The pure priest said to him: Just as with regard to a matter where my right is inferior, i.e., in the case of my own meal offering, which is not eaten, I can deny you a share of the meal offering of an Israelite, as I explained; so too, is it not logical that with regard to a matter where my right is superior, i.e., in the case of my own sin offering, to which I have a right even when my family is not serving in the Temple, I can deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite?
  The priest who immersed that day said to him: But if you can deny me a share of the meal offering of an Israelite, where just as your right is inferior, so too my right is inferior, is it necessarily so that you can deny me a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, where just as your right is superior in the case of your own sin offering, so too my right is superior in the case of my own sin offering?
  The pure priest responded: The verse states with regard to the sin offering: “The priest who effects atonement shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:19). If you wish to receive a share of a sin offering, come effect atonement and partake of one. Since you cannot perform the service of a sin offering, having immersed only today, you cannot receive a share in its meat either.
  The priest who immersed that day made another demand, and said to him: Give me a share of the breast and thigh, the portions that priests receive of peace offerings, and I will partake of it in the evening when I am pure.
  The pure priest said to him: Just as with regard to a matter where your right is superior, i.e., in the case of your own sin offering, to which you have a right to its meat in its entirety, I can deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, as I explained, so too is it not logical that with regard to a matter where your right is inferior, i.e., in the case of a peace offering, of which you have only the right to a share of the breast and thigh, I can deny you a share?
  The priest who immersed that day responded: But if you can deny me a share of a sin offering, where my right is inferior with regard to my wives and my slaves, as a sin offering can be consumed only by male priests, is it necessarily so that you can deny me a share of the breast and thigh of a peace offering, where my right is superior with regard to my wives and my slaves, who may also partake of them?
  The pure priest responded: The verse states with regard to the peace offering: “It shall be the priest’s that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings against the altar” (Leviticus 7:14). If you wish to partake of a peace offering, come sprinkle its blood and partake of it. Since you cannot perform this service, having immersed only today, you cannot receive a share of its meat either.
  The story concludes: The priest who immersed that day left in disappointment, with his <i>a fortiori</i> inferences upon his head, as they did not help him. And along with him walked an acute mourner on his right and a priest who had not yet brought an atonement offering on his left. They too were denied shares, because they were unfit for the Temple service.
  Rav Aḥai refutes this: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, could have added to the contentions described in the story. Let the priest who immersed that day say to the pure priest: Give me a share of a firstborn offering, and I will partake of it in the evening.
  Perhaps it is because the pure priest could say to him: Just as with regard to a sin offering, where my right is inferior with regard to my wives and my slaves, since it may be eaten only by male priests, I can nevertheless deny you a share of the sin offering of an Israelite, as I explained; so too is it not logical that with regard to a first-born, where my right is superior because all of its meat is mine, as firstborn offerings are given to a specific priest, I can deny you a share of it?
  But the priest who immersed that day could respond: But if you can deny me a share of a sin offering, where just as your right is inferior, so is my right inferior; is it necessarily so that you can deny me a share of a firstborn offering, where just as your right is superior, so my right is superior?
  The pure priest could respond: The verse says with regard to a firstborn offering: “You shall sprinkle their blood on the altar and shall make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire, for a pleasing aroma to the Lord. And the flesh of them shall be yours, as the breast and as the thigh, it shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). If you wish to receive a share in the meat of a firstborn, come sprinkle its blood and partake of it. Why did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, not include this exchange as another stage in his story?
  The Gemara responds: But the other priest, the one who immersed that day, could refute this proof: Is it written: And the flesh of them shall be for the priest who sprinkles, as is written with regard to a meal offering, a sin offering, and a peace offering? Rather, it is written: “And the flesh of them shall be yours,” indicating that it can be given even to a priest other than the one who sacrificed it. This is why Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, did not include this exchange in his story.
  The Gemara returns to Rava’s statement that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, taught this <i>halakha</i> in the bathroom. And how did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, do this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is permitted to contemplate matters of Torah in all places except the bathhouse and the bathroom? The Gemara answers: A case where the matter was involuntary is different. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, was so preoccupied by the issue that he taught it even though he was in the bathroom.
  
  Daf 103a
  
  MISHNA: In the case of any burnt offering for which the altar did not acquire its flesh, e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, the priests did not acquire its hide, as it is stated with regard to the burnt offering: “And the priest that sacrifices a man’s burnt offering, the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8), indicating that the priest acquires only the hide of a burnt offering that satisfied the obligation of a man.
  Nevertheless, in a case of a burnt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake but for the sake of another offering, although it did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, its hide goes to the priests. In addition, although the verse states: “A man’s burnt offering,” in the case of both the burnt offering of a man and the burnt offering of a woman, their hides go to the priests.
  The hides of offerings of lesser sanctity belong to the owners; the hides of offerings of the most sacred order belong to the priests. The right of priests to hides of offerings of the most sacred order is derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If for a burnt offering, for which the priests do not acquire its flesh, as it is burned in its entirety, they acquire its hide, then for other offerings of the most sacred order, for which the priests acquire its flesh, is it not right that they should acquire its hide? And there is no room to contend that the altar will prove that this is not a valid inference, as it acquires the flesh of a burnt offering but not its hide, since it does not have the right to the hide of an offering in any place.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” in the verse mentioned above serves to exclude the burnt offering of consecrated property, meaning that the priests do not acquire the hides of such offerings. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The phrase serves to exclude the burnt offering of converts.
  The Gemara clarifies: What does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he says that the phrase serves to exclude the burnt offering of consecrated property? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: He means it serves to exclude a burnt offering that comes from property that was left over. For example, if an animal consecrated as a guilt offering remains alive after its owner has achieved atonement by sacrificing another animal, the owner must wait until it acquires a blemish and then sell it. The proceeds are used to purchase a communal gift offering, which is sacrificed when there are no other offerings to be burned on the altar (see <i>Temura</i> 20b). Because it is a communal offering, it is not considered a man’s burnt offering, and the priests therefore have no right to the hide.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: Leftover consecrated property goes toward communal gift offerings. But according to the one who says: Leftover consecrated property goes toward an individual’s gift offering, what can be said? As this is a man’s burnt offering, the priests should have a right to the hides.
  The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, the <i>halakha</i> is as Rava says: The verse states: “And the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; and he shall lay the burnt offering in order upon it” (Leviticus 6:5). The verse states: “The burnt offering,” with the definite article, to teach that the daily burnt offering is the first burnt offering sacrificed each day in the Temple. Here too, the verse states: “The priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering which he has offered,” to teach that the priest acquires the hide of a first burnt offering, i.e., an animal that was initially designated as a burnt offering, but not of a burnt offering purchased from proceeds left over from another offering.
  Rabbi Aivu says that Rabbi Yannai says: Rabbi Yehuda’s statement can be interpreted differently. The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves to exclude a case of one who consecrates a burnt offering for Temple maintenance. Since the owner seeks to shift its ownership to the Temple, the priests have no right to its hides.
  The Gemara comments: It is not necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> according to the one who says that consecration for Temple maintenance applies by Torah law to offerings already consecrated to the altar, as the animal in fact ceases to belong to the individual, and the priests clearly have no claim to its hide. Rather, even according to the one who says that it does not apply by Torah law, because the offering is already consecrated for the altar, this matter applies only to the meat; but as for the hide, the consecration for Temple maintenance applies and nullifies the priests’ claim to it.
  The Gemara returns to the explanation of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef and comments: And so says Rav Naḥman that Rabba bar Avuh says: The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves to exclude a burnt offering that comes from property that was left over.
  Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Naḥman: In accordance with whose statement is your opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. But didn’t Rabbi Yehuda retract this statement? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The mishna in tractate <i>Shekalim</i> (6:5) states that the Temple had six collection boxes shaped like horns, for communal gift offerings. These funds would go toward burnt offerings that come from money that was left over. For example, if someone dedicated money to purchasing an offering, and after his purchase some of the sum remained, he would put it in these boxes. The <i>halakha</i> is that the priests have no right to the hide of such an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Neḥemya said to Rabbi Yehuda, and some say that Rabbi Shimon said to him: If so, you have nullified the interpretation of Jehoiada the priest. As it is taught in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 6:6) that Jehoiada the priest taught this interpretation: The verse states: “It is a guilt offering; he is certainly guilty before the Lord” (Leviticus 5:19). The phrase “before the Lord” teaches that if any money comes on account of a sin offering or on account of a guilt offering, i.e., it is left over after their purchase, burnt offerings must be purchased with it, and their flesh must be burned on the altar to the Lord. But its hide shall go to the priests. Rabbi Yehuda did not respond, indicating that he conceded that the hides of such offerings go to the priests.
  Rav Naḥman said to Rav Hamnuna: But how does the Master interpret the phrase: “A man’s burnt offering,” as meaning? Rav Hamnuna said to him: I interpret it as referring to one who consecrates all his property, including animals fit for burnt offerings. If these animals are later sacrificed as burnt offerings, the priests do not acquire the hides, since the offerings are consecrated property.
  And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 4:7): If one consecrates his property without specifying the purpose, generally speaking, it goes toward Temple maintenance. But if among it were animals fit to be sacrificed on the altar, either male or female, then Rabbi Eliezer says: Animals that are fit for offerings must be sacrificed. Therefore, the male animals shall be sold for the purpose of burnt offerings to those who need to bring such offerings, and the female animals, which cannot be brought as burnt offerings, shall be sold for the purpose of peace offerings to those who need to bring such offerings. And because they were consecrated for Temple maintenance, their proceeds shall be allocated with the rest of the person’s property for Temple maintenance.
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: The donor intended that all animals fit for sacrifice be brought as burnt offerings, and the rest of his property be given for Temple maintenance. Therefore, the males shall be sacrificed themselves as burnt offerings; and the females shall be sold for the purpose of being sacrificed as peace offerings, and he shall bring burnt offerings with their proceeds; and the rest of his property shall be allocated for Temple maintenance.
  Rav Hamnuna explains: And even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that a person divides his consecrated property, as he rules that the animals are themselves sacrificed while the other property is given for Temple maintenance, this statement applies specifically to the flesh, which is fit to be burned on the altar; but as for the hide, which is not, the fund for Temple maintenance acquires it from the outset, and the priests therefore have no right to it. This is the <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Yehuda derives from the phrase “a man’s burnt offering.”
  The <i>baraita</i> states: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The phrase “a man’s burnt offering” serves to exclude the burnt offering of converts. The priests do not acquire the hides of such offerings. Rav Simai bar Ḥilkai said to Ravina: Is that to say that a convert is not included in the category of a man? Ravina said to him: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, meant that the verse serves to exclude the burnt offering of a convert who died and has no heirs. The offering has no owner, and therefore the priests do not acquire its hide.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the priest that offers a man’s burnt offering, the priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8). From this verse I have derived the <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a man’s burnt offering, i.e., that of a born-Jewish male. From where is the same derived with regard to the burnt offering of converts, women, or Canaanite slaves? The verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering,” and it thereby included these as well.
  And if so, why must the verse state: “A man’s burnt offering”? It serves to teach that the priests acquire the hide only of a burnt offering that satisfied the obligation of a man, i.e., to exclude a burnt offering that was slaughtered with the intention of consuming it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area and was thereby disqualified. The verse teaches that the priests have no right to the hide of such an offering.
  One might have thought that I include a burnt offering that was not slaughtered for its own sake but for the sake of another offering. Since it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner,
  
  Daf 103b
  
  I might have thought that the priests have no right to its hide. Therefore, the verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering,” to teach that in any case where the offering is not disqualified, the priests acquire its hide, even if it did not satisfy the owner’s obligation.
  And from the phrase “the hide of the burnt offering” I have derived only that the priests acquire the hide of the burnt offering. From where do I derive that they acquire the hides of all offerings of the most sacred order? The verse states: “The hide of the burnt offering which he has offered,” which serves to include any offering that the priests sacrifice. If so, one might have thought that I include even offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, the verse states: “Burnt offering,” and not simply: Offering, to teach that just as a burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order, so too the priests acquire the hides only of all offerings of the most sacred order; they do not acquire the hides of offerings of lesser sanctity.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yishmael says there is a different derivation. From the phrase “the hide of the burnt offering,” I have derived only that the priests acquire the hide of the burnt offering. From where is it derived that they acquire the hides of all offerings of the most sacred order? It is based on a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the priests do not acquire its meat, the priests nevertheless acquire its hide, then in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, for which the priests do acquire its meat, is it not logical that they acquire their hides?
  One may counter: Let the altar prove that this is not a valid <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as it acquires the meat, and still it does not acquire the hide. One may respond: What is notable about the altar? It is notable in that it does not acquire hides in any instance. Will you say the <i>halakha</i> concerning the altar should teach the <i>halakha</i> concerning the priests, who acquire hides of some of the offerings, as the Torah explicitly grants them the hides of burnt offerings? Rather say: Since the priests acquire hides of some of the offerings, they acquire the hides of all offerings of the most sacred order.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: There is no need to derive that hides of offerings of the most sacred order go to the priests. We need the verse itself only to teach that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the hide of the burnt offering. As the Torah does not generally require that an offering be flayed, in all other cases the hide of the offering follows the flesh of the offering.
  For example, bulls that are burned and goats that are burned must be burned themselves, and their hides burned with them, as the Torah states explicitly (see Leviticus 4:11–12). A sin offering, and a guilt offering, and a communal peace offering are given as a gift to the priest (see Leviticus 7:7); if the priests want, they may flay them and use the hides, and if they do not want to use the hides, they may eat the offerings together with their hides. Offerings of lesser sanctity are given to the owners; if they want, they may flay them and use the hides, and if they want, they may eat the offerings together with their hides.
  But with regard to a burnt offering it is stated: “And he shall flay the burnt offering, and cut it into its pieces” (Leviticus 1:6). One might have thought that, because all the flesh of the burnt offering is burned on the altar, the priests have no right to its hide. Therefore, the verse states: “The priest shall have to himself the hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed” (Leviticus 7:8).
  The phrase “the priest shall have to himself” serves to exclude a priest who immersed that day and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and an acute mourner, i.e., meaning that they do not receive a share of the hides, just as they do not receive a share of the meat. As one might have thought that although these priests will not acquire the meat, this is because it is for consumption, and they are not permitted to partake of it; but they will acquire the hide, because it is not for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “Shall have to himself,” to exclude a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and a priest who immersed that day, and an acute mourner.
  The Gemara asks: But let the first <i>tanna</i> also derive the <i>halakha</i> logically, as Rabbi Yishmael did. Why did he cite a verse? The Gemara answers: Often when there is a matter that can be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.
  And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this phrase: “The hide of the burnt offering that he has sacrificed,” from which the first <i>tanna</i> derives the <i>halakha</i>? He holds that it serves to exclude a priest who immersed that day, and a priest who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and an acute mourner, who do not receive a share in the hides.
  The Gemara challenges: But let Rabbi Yishmael derive this <i>halakha</i> from the phrase: “Shall have to himself,” as does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yishmael conforms to his line of reasoning, that the phrase teaches a different <i>halakha</i>. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: It is stated: “Shall have to himself” (Leviticus 7:8), with regard to a burnt offering, and it is stated: “The priest that makes atonement, he shall have to himself” (Leviticus 7:7), with regard to a guilt offering. The following verbal analogy is derived from here: Just as there, after the blood of a guilt offering is presented, its bones become permitted to the priest for any use, since only the portions intended for consumption on the altar are sacrificed whereas the rest of the animal is given to the priests, so too here, with regard to a burnt offering, its bones that are not attached to the flesh and are therefore not intended for the altar are permitted.
  With regard to this verbal analogy the Gemara comments: It must be that those terms are free, i.e., superfluous in their context and therefore available for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. As, if they are not free, the verbal analogy can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that its meat is permitted to the priests, unlike the flesh of a burnt offering, which is burned upon the altar, and perhaps this is why the bones of a guilt offering are also permitted. Since the phrase: “Shall have it to himself,” is a superfluous term in each verse, the analogy stands, because a verbal analogy based on free terms cannot be refuted logically.
  MISHNA: If any offerings of the most sacred order were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not go to the priests; rather, they are burned together with the flesh in the place of burning. If they were disqualified after their flaying, their hides go to the priests. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said: In all my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning.
  Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, we learned that in a case where one flays the firstborn offering, and the animal is later discovered to have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], the <i>halakha</i> is that the priests may derive benefit [<i>sheye’otu</i>] from its hide. And the Rabbis say: The claim: We did not see, is no proof; rather, if after flaying it is discovered that the animal was unfit before it was flayed, the hide goes out to the place of burning.
  GEMARA: The previous mishna (103a) teaches: In the case of any burnt offering for which the altar did not acquire its flesh, e.g., if it was disqualified prior to the sprinkling of its blood, the priests did not acquire its hide. The mishna does not state any qualification, indicating that this is the <i>halakha</i> even if the priest flayed the hide before the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. The Gemara posits: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself; i.e., it effects acceptance of the hide only together with the flesh. Since the flesh is disqualified and the sprinkling does not effect its acceptance, the sprinkling does not effect acceptance for the hide either.
  The Gemara challenges: Say the latter clause, i.e., the mishna here: If any offerings of the most sacred order were disqualified prior to their flaying, their hides do not go to the priests. If they were disqualified after their flaying, their hides go to the priests. This indicates that once the hides are flayed, they go to the priests even if the flesh was disqualified before the sprinkling of the blood. If so, we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: The blood effects acceptance of the hide, i.e., renders the hide permitted to the priests, by itself. Can it be that the former clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi?
  Abaye said: Since the latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it must be that the former clause is also the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And although Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in principle the priests should acquire the hides if they are removed before the flesh is disqualified, in any case Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that the flaying is not done before the sprinkling. Since the offering cannot be disqualified before the hide is removed, practically speaking, the priests will never acquire the hides unless the altar acquires the flesh, as taught in the former clause.
  Rava said: On the contrary, since the former clause is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, it must be that the latter clause is also the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. When the mishna states that the priests acquire the hides if the flesh was disqualified after the flaying, it must mean that the flesh was disqualified after the sprinkling. Therefore, what does the mishna mean by the phrase: Before flaying,
  
  Daf 104a
  
  and what does it mean by the phrase: After flaying? It means before the moment the offerings became fit for flaying, and after the moment they became fit for flaying, i.e., before and after the sprinkling of the blood.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and what is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon? Their opinions are as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The blood effects acceptance of the hide by itself, after it has been flayed, even if the flesh is disqualified. And if, when the hide is still with the flesh, a disqualification appears on the flesh, whether before the sprinkling of the blood or after the sprinkling of the blood, then the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the hide is parallel to the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the flesh: Both are burned.
  Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself. And if, when the hide is still with the flesh, a disqualification appears on the flesh before the sprinkling of the blood, then the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the hide is parallel to the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the flesh: Both are burned. If a disqualification develops on the flesh after the sprinkling of the blood, the flesh was already accepted for a time. Therefore, even though the flesh is disqualified, the priest may flay the animal before it is burned, and its hide goes to the priests.
  The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar disagree about the same principle as do Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood, upon the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27). Rabbi Yehoshua says: The verse teaches that if there is no blood sprinkled on the altar, no flesh may be burned on the altar, and if there is no flesh to be burned on the altar, no blood may be sprinkled on the altar.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: The blood must be sprinkled even if there is no flesh, as it is stated in the continuation of the verse: “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out against the altar of the Lord your God, and you shall eat the flesh.” If so, what is taught when the verse states: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood”? It is stated to tell you: Just as blood is placed on the altar by sprinkling, so too, the flesh is placed on the altar by tossing. Consequently, you learn that there is a space between the ramp and the altar, such that the priest must toss the flesh from the edge of the ramp.
  The Gemara explains: Shall we say that the one who says that the hide is accepted independent of the flesh holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, that the blood is sprinkled independent of the flesh, and the one who says that the hide is not accepted independent of the flesh holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, that if there is no flesh then the blood is not sprinkled?
  The Gemara rejects this: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the blood may be sprinkled even if the flesh is disqualified, everyone agrees that this sprinkling effects acceptance of the hide. When they disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
  The one who says that the hide is not accepted independently, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the straightforward meaning of the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua; once the flesh is disqualified, the blood cannot be sprinkled and does not effect acceptance of the hide. The one who says that the hide is accepted, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, could say to you: Rabbi Yehoshua says only there that the blood may not be sprinkled in a case where nothing but the flesh was at stake, where there is no loss for the priests, who never receive meat from burnt offerings. But in cases where the hide would go to waste, where there is a loss for the priests, perhaps even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that the blood effects acceptance.
  This latter interpretation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion with regard to the hides is just as it is with regard to disqualified flesh after the fact. As we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: If the flesh contracted ritual impurity or was disqualified, or if it emerged beyond the curtains delineating its designated area, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest must nevertheless sprinkle the blood on the altar. Rabbi Yehoshua says: The priest may not sprinkle the blood on the altar. And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if the priest nevertheless sprinkled the blood, the offering is accepted after the fact. Apparently, the sprinkling is sufficiently valid to effect acceptance of the hide.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said: In all my days, I never saw a hide going out to the place of burning. The Gemara challenges: And is it so that he did not see? Aren’t there bulls that are burned and goats that are burned together with their hides as a matter of course?
  The Gemara answers: We are not saying that Rabbi Ḥanina never saw hides go out to be burned in accordance with their mitzva; he certainly did. Rather, he never saw hides being burned because the offering was disqualified.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t there a case where an offering is disqualified before flaying and before the sprinkling of the blood, in which case all agree that the animal is burned with its hide? The Gemara answers: We are saying that Rabbi Ḥanina never saw a hide go out stripped from its flesh.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t there a case where an offering is disqualified after the flaying of the hide and before the sprinkling of the blood, in which case the hide is burned according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The blood does not effect acceptance of the hide by itself?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that the blood does effect acceptance of the hide in such a case, and so it would not be burned. And if you wish, say instead that you can even interpret the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that the flaying is not done before the sprinkling, and so in practice Rabbi Ḥanina never saw a hide that was flayed before the offering was disqualified.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t there the case of an animal that, after the hide was flayed and the blood was sprinkled, was found to have a wound in its intestines rendering it a <i>tereifa</i>, in which case the offering was already disqualified when the blood was sprinkled?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina holds that in the case of an animal that was found to be a <i>tereifa</i> due to a wound in its intestines, the sprinkling of the blood nevertheless effects acceptance, because the wound was unknown at the time of the sprinkling. The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Rabbi Akiva said: From the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, we learned that in a case where one flays the firstborn offering, and the animal is later discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i>, the <i>halakha</i> is that the priests may derive benefit from its hide. This indicates that the sprinkling of the blood effects acceptance if the wound was unknown. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from the mishna that this is so.
  The Gemara challenges: But if this is what Rabbi Ḥanina meant, then what is Rabbi Akiva teaching us? His statement seems unnecessary. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Akiva is teaching us: This <i>halakha</i> applies not just in the Temple but even in the outlying areas, e.g., with regard to a blemished firstborn animal, which is slaughtered outside the Temple. If it is discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i> before its slaughter, it must be buried with its hide, but if it is slaughtered and later discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i>, then its slaughter renders the hide permitted to the priests, just as the sprinkling of the blood renders the hide permitted in the Temple.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara adds: And even Rabbi Akiva said this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where an expert verified the firstborn animal’s blemish and permitted it to be slaughtered. But if an expert did not permit it, then its slaughter does not render the hide permitted to the priest.
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, not Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, the flesh is discarded by burial and the hide by burning.
  MISHNA: With regard to bulls that are burned, i.e., the bull of Yom Kippur, the bull of the anointed priest, and the bull brought for an unwitting communal sin, which are burned after their blood is sprinkled and their sacrificial portions burned on the altar, and goats that are burned, i.e., the goat of Yom Kippur and the goat brought for the unwitting communal transgression of the prohibition against idol worship, when they are burned in accordance with their mitzva, they are burned in the place of the ashes (see Leviticus 4:12) outside of Jerusalem, and they render the garments of the priests who tend to their burning impure (see Leviticus 4:25). And if these offerings are not burned in accordance with their mitzva because they were disqualified, and offerings that are disqualified are also burned, they are burned in the place of burning in the <i>bira</i>, and they do not render the garments of the priests who tend to their burning impure.
  
  Daf 104b
  
  The priests would carry the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended on poles. When the first priests, carrying the front of the pole, emerged outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and the latter priests did not yet emerge, the first priests render their garments impure, and the latter priests do not render their garments impure until they emerge. When both these and those priests emerged, they render their garments impure. Rabbi Shimon says: They do not render their garments impure, as this <i>halakha</i> applies only to those who burn the offerings. And even then their garments do not become ritually impure until the fire is ignited in the majority of the offerings. Once the flesh is completely scorched, with no moisture remaining, one who then burns the remains does not render his garments impure.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if offerings of a type that are burned were disqualified, they are burned in a place of burning called the <i>bira</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>bira</i>? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a place on the Temple Mount, and its name is <i>bira</i>, and this is where they would burn these offerings. And Reish Lakish says: The entire Temple is called the <i>bira</i>, as it is stated in the prayer of David: “And give unto Solomon my son a whole heart, to keep Your commandments, Your testimonies, and Your statutes, and to do all this, and to build the Temple [<i>bira</i>] for which I have made provision” (I Chronicles 29:19).
  § Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: There are three places of the ashes. First was the great place of the ashes that was in the Temple courtyard, where the priests would burn the disqualified offerings of the most sacred order, and the disqualified sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, and bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified prior to the sprinkling of the blood.
  And there was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified after the sprinkling of the blood. And the third place of the ashes was for the bulls and goats that were burned in accordance with their mitzva, outside the three camps, i.e., outside the walls of Jerusalem.
  Levi teaches a different version of this <i>baraita</i>: There are three places of the ashes. First was the great place of the ashes that was in the Temple courtyard, where the priests would burn the disqualified offerings of the most sacred order, and the disqualified sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, and bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified, whether prior to the sprinkling of the blood or after the sprinkling of the blood. And there was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified upon emerging from the Temple courtyard. And the third was for bulls and goats burned in accordance with their mitzva, outside the three camps.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: The flesh of most offerings is disqualified by being left overnight. What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether being left overnight is effective to disqualify bulls that are burned and goats that are burned? Given that their flesh is neither eaten nor burned on the altar, do we say: When being left overnight is effective to disqualify flesh, this is only in a case of flesh that is fit for consumption, either by the altar or by human beings; but in the case of these bulls and goats that are burned, which are not fit for consumption, being left overnight does not disqualify the flesh? Or perhaps this case is no different, and being left overnight disqualifies the flesh.
  Rava said: This matter, Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma, was raised by Abaye, and I resolved it from this <i>baraita</i>: The mishna (43a) records a dispute as to whether the sacrificial portions of bulls that are burned are subject to disqualification by intent to burn them beyond their designated time [<i>piggul</i>]. But the disputants agree that if the priest intended for the consumption of the bulls’ meat and their burning to be beyond their designated time, he did nothing, as <i>piggul</i> applies only to flesh consumed by human beings or the altar. What, is it not the case that since the intention of burning after the designated time does not disqualify bulls that are burned, one can infer that being left overnight also does not disqualify bulls that are burned?
  The Gemara responds: But perhaps it is only improper intention that does not disqualify such offerings, but being left overnight does disqualify them.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 9a): With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the time that they were consecrated. Once they have been slaughtered, they are susceptible to be rendered disqualified for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through being left overnight without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled. What, is it not referring to the flesh of bulls, indicating that the flesh is disqualified if left overnight?
  The Gemara responds: No, the mishna indicates only that the offerings’ sacrificial portions are disqualified if left overnight, since they must be burned on the altar.
  The Gemara responds: But evidence to the contrary can be ad-duced from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches: In all of those cases, one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property if he derives benefit while they are burned in the place of the ashes, until the flesh is completely incinerated. The Gemara explains: From the fact that the latter clause is discussing flesh, infer that the first clause also discusses flesh, and not the sacrificial portions. The Gemara rejects this: Are the cases comparable? The latter clause discusses flesh, and the first clause discusses sacrificial portions.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Levi teaches in the <i>baraita</i>: There was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified upon emerging from the Temple courtyard. What, is it not referring to offerings disqualified by being left overnight? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to disqualification by contracting ritual impurity or disqualification by leaving the courtyard before the blood was sprinkled on the altar. The dilemma of Rabbi Yirmeya stands unresolved.
  § Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma: In general, the flesh of offer-ings is disqualified by leaving the Temple courtyard. What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether leaving is effective to disqualify bulls that are burned and goats that are burned?
  The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? Here it is a mitzva to burn the flesh of these offerings outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: Rabbi Elazar raises his dilemma in accordance with the opinion of the one who says: With regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, even though the flesh may be consumed anywhere in Jerusalem, nevertheless, if it emerges from the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, it is disqualified, because its time to leave from the Temple courtyard has not yet arrived. Perhaps the same <i>halakha</i> applies to bulls and goats that are burned: Even though the flesh must eventually leave the Temple, if it leaves before its designated time, it is disqualified.
  The dilemma is: Do we say that this matter, disqualification by leaving the Temple courtyard prematurely, applies only to flesh that need not eventually leave due to an obligation? One may consume the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity in the Temple courtyard if he wishes. But perhaps these bulls and goats that are burned, which must eventually leave due to an obligation, are not disqualified by emerging prematurely. Or perhaps here too the flesh is disqualified if its time to leave has not yet arrived.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear that which Levi teaches in the <i>baraita</i>: There was another place of the ashes on the Temple Mount, where the priests would burn bulls that are burned and goats that are burned if they were disqualified upon emerging from the Temple courtyard. What, is it not referring to disqualification by leaving the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to disqualification by contracting ritual impurity or disqualification by being left overnight. The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar stands unresolved.
  § Rabbi Elazar raises another dilemma: With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, if the majority of the animal’s body emerged from the Temple courtyard, but it consists of a majority only by inclusion of the minority of a limb, the majority of which remains inside the courtyard, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we determine the status of this minority of a limb by casting it after the majority of that limb, and the majority of that limb did not leave? Or perhaps we determine its status by casting it after the majority of the animal, and therefore a majority of the animal has left?
  The Gemara clarifies: Isn’t it obvious that we do not disregard the majority of the animal and instead follow the majority of the limbs? Rather, Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma must be as follows: In a case where half of the animal emerged from the courtyard such that the majority of a certain limb emerged, but a minority of the limb remained inside, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we determine the status of this minority of a limb
  
  Daf 105a
  
  by casting it after the majority of that limb, and the majority of that limb did leave? Or perhaps we determine its status by casting it after the half of the animal, which did not leave the courtyard. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar shall stand unresolved.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches this dilemma with regard to people: In a case where five people are handling an offering and carrying it out to be burned, and three of them emerged and two of them remained in the Temple courtyard, such that the animal is partly inside and partly outside, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we follow the majority of the people handling the offering, who have left the courtyard, or do we follow the animal, the majority of which did not yet leave? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rabbi Elazar raises another dilemma: If bulls and goats that are burned left the Temple courtyard and returned, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the garments of those who carry them inside the courtyard? Do we say: Once they left, they became impure? Or perhaps once they return, they return and do not render garments impure?
  Rabbi Abba bar Memel says: Come and hear the mishna: They would carry the bulls and the goats that are burned suspended on poles. When the first priests, carrying the front of the pole, emerged beyond the wall of the Temple courtyard and the latter ones did not yet emerge, the first ones, who emerged beyond the wall of the Temple courtyard, render their garments impure, but the latter ones do not render their garments impure until they emerge. Rabbi Abba bar Memel explains: And if it enters your mind to say that once they leave, they become impure, these latter ones mentioned in the mishna who are still inside should be rendered impure, since the offering itself has emerged. It follows that if the offering returns, their garments are not rendered impure.
  Ravina said: And can you understand this as a proof? The reason that the latter ones’ garments are not rendered impure is that I require the fulfillment of the verse: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterward he may come into the camp” (Leviticus 16:28). And since they have not yet left the camp, they cannot come into it, and therefore they do not contract the impurity described in the verse.
  The Gemara asks: But if they can become impure only after they leave, how did Rabbi Elazar raise this dilemma? The Gemara answers: He raised the dilemma with regard to a case where they take the offering with staffs [<i>bevakulsei</i>], i.e., after the offering is returned to the Temple courtyard, other people stand outside the courtyard and bring it out again using staffs. Does the offering render these people impure, even though they are standing outside the courtyard? The dilemma of Rabbi Elazar remains unresolved.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to bulls that are burned, and a red heifer, and the scapegoat of the Yom Kippur service, the one who sends them, the one who burns them, and the one who takes them out of the Temple courtyard render their garments impure. And the animals themselves, after they emerge from the Temple courtyard, do not render garments that they touch impure, but they render food and drink that they touch impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: A red heifer and bulls that are burned render food and drink impure, but the scapegoat does not transmit impurity at all, as it is still alive when it leaves the Temple, and a living being does not render food and drink impure.
  The Gemara comments. Granted, according to Rabbi Meir there is no difficulty, as his opinion is in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states that seeds can contract impurity from the carcass of a creeping animal only if they first come in contact with water: “And if any part of their carcass fall upon any sowing seed which is to be sown, it is pure. But if water be put upon the seed, and any part of their carcass fall thereon, it is impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38).
  Just as is the case for seeds, which, like any food, can never contract impurity severe enough to transmit it to human beings, and they need exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to their less severe level of impurity, so too, all items that can never contract impurity severe enough to transmit it to human beings need exposure to liquid to be rendered susceptible to their less severe level of impurity and to transmit it. This serves to exclude the carcass of a kosher bird, which can contract impurity severe enough to be transmitted to a human being who swallows it, and therefore does not need to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity in order to transmit ritual impurity. According to this <i>baraita</i>, bulls that are burned, a red heifer, and a scapegoat, which are all sources of impurity for human beings, are able to transmit impurity to food and drink on their own, even if they have not been exposed to liquid and have not come in contact with any source of impurity. Rabbi Meir’s opinion accords with this principle.
  But for the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir and say that a scapegoat does not transmit impurity to food and drink, this is difficult. If they accept that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, then even the scapegoat should transmit impurity to food and drink. And if they do not accept that statement, then from where do we derive that even a red heifer and bulls that are burned transmit impurity to food and drink?
  When Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say: The opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Meir is that bulls that are burned and a red heifer need to contract impurity from somewhere else to be able to transmit impurity to foods. Since the scapegoat cannot contract impurity, as it is alive, it cannot transmit impurity.
  § Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma: With regard to bulls and goats that are burned, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether they can transmit impurity to food and drink inside the Temple courtyard, before they leave, as they do outside afterward? Is an offering that has not yet left the Temple considered as if it were an item for which a necessary action has not yet been performed, i.e., because it has not yet become a source of impurity to those who carry it, it also does not transmit impurity to food without being rendered susceptible by coming into contact with a liquid and then coming into contact with a source of impurity? Or perhaps no, because the offering will become a source of impurity to those who carry it once it leaves the Temple courtyard, it already transmits impurity to food without being rendered susceptible.
  After Rabbi Elazar raised the dilemma, he then resolved it: An offering that has not yet left is considered as if it were an item for which a necessary action has not yet been performed, and it does not transmit impurity to food without being rendered susceptible.
  § Rabbi Abba bar Shmuel posed another dilemma to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Food transmits impurity to other food or drink only if it is the volume of at least one egg-bulk and it is first rendered susceptible to impurity. The carcass of a kosher bird transmits impurity to a person who swallows it even if it is of the volume of at least one olive-bulk, and even if it has not been rendered susceptible to impurity. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that the carcass of a kosher bird transmits impurity to other food without first being rendered susceptible to impurity, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to the requisite measure? Does the carcass of a kosher bird transmit impurity to food even if it is of the volume of an olive-bulk, as it would to a person?
  The Gemara clarifies: Do not raise the dilemma in a case where the carcass lies on the ground, as in that case it certainly must be of the volume of an egg-bulk, like any other impure food. And do not raise the dilemma in a case where a person holds the bird’s flesh in his mouth, as it may be swallowed and transmit impurity to him even if it is of the volume of only an olive-bulk; in this case it certainly transmits impurity to food in the same measure. When you raise the dilemma, raise it in a case where he holds the bird’s flesh in his hand. When the flesh has not yet been brought close to being swallowed, is it considered to be like an item for which a necessary action has not yet been performed, in which case it is considered a normal food and must be of the volume of an egg-bulk, or perhaps not?
  After Abba bar Shmuel raised the dilemma, he then resolved it:
  
  Daf 105b
  
  Even if the carcass of a kosher bird has not yet been brought close to being swallowed, it is still not considered as if a necessary action has not yet been performed, and an olive-bulk is sufficient to transmit impurity to food and drink.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abba bar Shmuel, based on a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 1:1): Thirteen matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird, and this is one of them: In order to be susceptible to impurity as a food, it requires a person’s intention that it be eaten; and it does not need to be rendered susceptible to such impurity by contact with liquid; and it transmits ritual impurity of food in the amount of an egg-bulk. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? What, is it not the opinion of Rabbi Meir? If so, he holds that an egg-bulk of a carcass of a kosher bird is necessary to transmit impurity.
  The Gemara responds: No, the mishna is the opinion of the Rabbis.
  The Gemara challenges: But the first clause of that mishna teaches: In order to be susceptible to impurity as a food, it requires a person’s intention that it be eaten and it does not need to be rendered susceptible by contact with liquid. And from whom do you learn this reasoning? From Rabbi Meir, as was taught in the <i>baraita</i> (105a). And since the first clause is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, it follows that the latter clause is also the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara responds: Are the cases comparable? Must both clauses be the opinion of the same <i>tanna</i>? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is.
  The Gemara challenges: But one can still infer this from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches: The slaughter or the pinching of the nape of a bird offering purifies it from its impurity, i.e., prevents it from assuming the impure status of a carcass, even if it is found to have a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>]. And from whom did you learn this reasoning? From Rabbi Meir (see 67a). Could it be that the first clause and the last clause represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the middle clause represents the opinion of the Rabbis?
  The Gemara responds: Yes, the first clause and the last clause represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and the middle clause represents the opinion of the Rabbis.
  § Rav Hamnuna said to Rabbi Zeira: Do not sit down until you tell me the resolution of this matter: In general, when a food touches a primary source of ritual impurity after having been rendered susceptible to impurity by contact with a liquid, it contracts first-degree impurity. If it then touches another food, it imparts to it second-degree impurity. The carcass of a kosher bird, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, transmits impurity to food without being rendered susceptible. Does one count its first and second degrees of impurity when it touches food or drink, treating it like a primary source of impurity? Or perhaps one does not count first and second degrees of impurity, but rather treats it as a food with first-degree impurity, which imparts second-degree impurity?
  Rabbi Zeira said to him: Wherever an item can render a person impure through contact, it is considered a primary source of impurity, and one counts its first and second degrees of impurity. And wherever it cannot render a person impure through contact, one does not count its first and second degrees of impu-rity. Since the carcass of a kosher bird does not render a person impure through contact, but only by being swallowed, it is treated as a food with first-degree impurity.
  Rabbi Zeira posed a dilemma to Rabbi Ami bar Ḥiyya, and some say to Rabbi Avin bar Kahana concerning that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 8:8): Connections between foods by liquid, i.e., liquids in contact with two foods, a situation that causes the impurity of one food to be transmitted to the other and their sizes to be combined toward the minimum measure for transmitting impurity, are considered a connection for the lenient impurity of foods, but are not considered a connection for impurity severe enough to be transmitted to a human being. If two pieces of animal carcass are connected by a liquid, they do not combine to form the minimum measure for transmitting their impurity to a person, but they can transmit impurity to food.
  Rabbi Zeira asks: If these two pieces of animal carcass come in contact with food, does one count its first and second degrees of impurity and treat the pieces as a primary source of impurity, such that the food will impart second-degree impurity to other food? Or does one not count its first and second degrees of impurity, and treat the animal carcass as food with first-degree impurity?
  Rabbi Zeira said to him: Wherever an item can render a person impure, one counts its first and second degrees of impurity. And wherever it cannot render a person impure, one does not count its first and second degrees of impurity. Since the pieces of carcass cannot transmit their impurity to a person, they are treated as food with first-degree impurity.
  § The mishna teaches: When both these priests and those priests emerged, all of their garments were rendered ritually impure. The Gemara explains: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat that are burned on Yom Kippur: “They shall be carried forth outside the camp” (Leviticus 16:27). There, elsewhere, the verse states that such bulls and goats are burned outside three camps, those of the Tabernacle, the Levites, and the Israelites, whereas here, the verse states only that they are taken outside one camp, i.e., the Tabernacle. This serves to tell you: Once the offering emerges beyond one camp, one who carries it renders his garments impure, as the next verse states: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28).
  The Gemara explains further: And from where do we derive that <i>halakha</i> itself, that the bulls and goats are burned outside the three camps? As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is stated about the bull brought as a sin offering of the High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp unto a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it” (Leviticus 4:12), meaning that he should take it outside the three camps. Do you say that he takes it outside the three camps, or is he required to take it outside only one camp?
  When the verse states with regard to the bull brought as a communal sin offering: “He shall carry the bull outside the camp, and burn it as he burned the first bull” (Leviticus 4:21), it requires explanation, as there is no need for the verse to state “outside the camp,” since it is already stated at the end of that same verse: “And burn it as he burned the first bull,” which indicates that all the <i>halakhot</i> of the bull brought as a sin offering of a High Priest apply to the bull brought as a communal sin offering. What then does the verse mean when it states “outside the camp”? To give it a second camp, i.e., it indicates that it must be removed not only from the camp of the Divine Presence, corresponding to the Temple, but also from the Levite camp, corresponding to the Temple Mount.
  And when another verse states with regard to the removal of the ash: “And he shall put off his garments, and put on other garments, and carry forth the ashes outside the camp to a pure place” (Leviticus 6:4), that verse also requires an explanation, as there is no need for the verse to state this, since it is already stated with regard to the bull brought as a sin offering of a High Priest: “Even the whole bull shall he carry outside the camp to a pure place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn it on wood with fire; where the ashes are poured out shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). The repetition of “outside the camp” indicates that he is required to give it a third camp, i.e., teaching that it is burned when outside the Israelite camp, corresponding to the land outside the walls of Jerusalem.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon do with this phrase, stated with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “Outside the camp” (Leviticus 16:27), given that he holds that the garments do not become impure until the offering is burning? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: It is stated here: “Outside the camp,” and it is stated there, with regard to the red heifer: “He shall bring it outside the camp” (Numbers 19:3). Just as here, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned outside three camps, so too there, the red heifer is burned outside three camps. And just as there, the red heifer is burned east of Jerusalem, since it must be burned “toward the front of the Tent of Meeting” (Numbers 19:4), opposite the entrance of the Temple, which is to its east,
  
  Daf 106a
  
  so too here, the bull and goat of Yom Kippur are burned east of Jerusalem.
  But according to the Rabbis, then, where outside Jerusalem do they burn them? The Gemara responds: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Where are the bulls and goats burned? They are burned north of Jerusalem, outside of the three camps. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: They are burned on the place of the ashes, where the ashes from the altar were poured.
  Rava said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to bulls that are burned: “Where the ashes are poured out [<i>shefekh hadeshen</i>] shall it be burned” (Leviticus 4:12). This teaches that ashes must be there already when the bulls are burned. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: This verse teaches that its place should slope [<i>meshupakh</i>] downward so that ashes from the burning will slide downhill.
  Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps they disagree only about whether the place must slope, but Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov agrees that it must be the place where the ashes from the altar were deposited.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bull and goat of Yom Kippur: “And he who burns them shall wash his garments” (Leviticus 16:28). This teaches that only the one who burns them renders his garments impure, but the one who kindles the fire does not render his garments impure, and the one who sets up the arrangement of wood does not render his garments impure. And who is considered the one who burns? One who assists at the actual time of burning.
  One might have thought that this priest renders his garments impure even after the bull and goat become ash. Therefore, the verse states: “And he who burns them” (Leviticus 16:28), teaching that they, the whole bull and goat, render garments impure, but they do not render garments impure once they become ash. Rabbi Shimon says: The word “them” teaches that they render garments impure, but once the flesh is incinerated they do not render garments impure.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rava said: The difference between them is when he turned it into a charred mass, and the form of the animal has become distorted, but has not actually become ash. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that at this stage the offering still transmits impurity, whereas Rabbi Shimon holds that it does not.
  
  MISHNA: One who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard and one who offers it up outside the Temple courtyard is liable for the slaughter and liable for the offering up, as each act involves an independent prohibition. If done intentionally, he is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>] for each act, and if done unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since the moment that he took it outside the courtyard, he thereby rendered it unfit. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.
  One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive <i>karet</i> if he did so intentionally and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, this <i>halakha</i> would apply even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, because once he touched it, he thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.
  And a pure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as one is liable for eating sacrificial food in impurity only due to the impurity of one’s body, but not due to the impurity of the food.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one both slaughters and offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable for each act, as they are independent prohibitions. The Gemara asks: Granted that one is liable for the offering up, as the punishment for this act is written in the Torah and the prohibition concerning this act is also written in the Torah. The punishment is as it is written: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The prohibition is as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13). And this is in accordance with that which Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Elazar says: Wherever it is stated in the Torah: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. Accordingly, the verse in Deuteronomy is understood as issuing a prohibition.
  But for the slaughtering, why is one liable? Granted that the punishment is stated in the Torah, as it is written: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:3–4). But from where do we derive its prohibition? One is liable only in a case where the Torah specifies both the prohibition and the punishment. The Gemara answers: The verse states in the continuation of that passage: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i> after whom they go astray” (Leviticus 17:7).
  The Gemara questions the use of this verse as a source: But this verse is necessary for the purpose of expounding in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar, as he says: From where is it derived with regard to one who slaughters an animal as an offering to Mercury, a pagan deity, that he is liable even though this is not the established manner in which that deity is worshipped? As it is written: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i>.” If the verse is not needed to teach the matter of worshipping a deity in accordance with its established manner, as it is already taught that one is liable for this, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself…lest you inquire after their gods, saying: How do these nations serve their gods, so too will I do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30), then apply it to the matter of worshipping a deity in a way that is not in accordance with its established manner.
  Rabba said: Both <i>halakhot</i> can be derived from the same verse. Read into the verse as though it stops after the phrase: “And they shall not slaughter” (Leviticus 17:7), and relates to the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, which was mentioned in the previous verses. And also read into the verse as relating to the verse’s continuation: And not anymore their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i>, which serves as the source for the prohibition against sacrificing offerings to false deities.
  The Gemara challenges: But the verse is still necessary for the purpose of expounding that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Any man…that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). Until this point, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect, i.e., after the Tabernacle was erected, and then he also sacrificed them during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
  
  Daf 106b
  
  This is apparent, as the punishment for sacrificing them is stated in this verse: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people.” The prohibition is also explicit, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13).
  From that point onward, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when there was permission to sacrifice offerings on private altars, i.e., before the Tabernacle was erected, and then he sacrificed them outside the Tabernacle during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
  This is apparent, as it is stated: “In order that the children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices, which they slaughter upon the open field, that they shall bring them to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:5). The phrase “their sacrifices, which they slaughter” is interpreted as referring to offerings that I have previously permitted for you to slaughter on private altars. This verse teaches that those offerings may now be sacrificed only inside the Tabernacle. The phrase “upon the open field” tells you that in the case of one who slaughters an offering on a private altar during a period when the prohibition against sacrificing on private altars is in effect, even if he sacrifices the offering to God, the verse ascribes him blame as if he sacrificed it upon the open field in idolatrous worship.
  The verse continues: “That they shall bring them to the Lord.” This is a positive mitzva to sacrifice in the Tabernacle even offerings that were consecrated before the Tabernacle was erected. From where is it derived that there is a prohibition against sacrificing them outside the Tabernacle? The verse states: “And they shall not slaughter anymore their offerings to the <i>se’irim</i> after whom they go astray; this shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7).
  One might have thought that sacrificing these offerings outside the Tabernacle would be punishable by <i>karet</i>, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings consecrated after the Tabernacle was erected. Therefore, the verse states: “This shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7). One can infer from this verse that this, the punishment for transgressing a positive mitzva and a prohibition, applies to them, but no other punishment applies to them. It is clear from this <i>baraita</i> that the verse “And they shall not slaughter anymore” is used to teach about the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Tabernacle those offerings that were consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, and not those offerings that were consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars.
  Rather, Rabbi Avin says: The prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple is derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: Just as in a case in which the Torah did not prescribe punishment for a certain action, it nevertheless prohibited it, as is the case with regard to sacrificing outside the Temple an offering consecrated while there was permission to sacrifice on private altars, so too, in a case in which the Torah did prescribe punishment for a certain action, as is the case with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple an offering consecrated while it was prohibited to sacrifice on private altars, is it not logical that the Torah prohibited the action?
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If so, that whenever the Torah states a punishment for a certain action, there is no need for it to state the prohibition, then let the Torah not state a prohibition with regard to eating forbidden fat of a kosher animal, and then derive the fact that it is prohibited through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered animal carcass: Just as with regard to a carcass, even though the Torah did not prescribe punishment for consuming it, it nevertheless prohibited consuming it, so too, with regard to animal fat, for which the Torah did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that the Torah prohibited its consumption?
  Rav Ashi came before Rava and said to him: The prohibition against eating animal fat can also not be derived from the prohibition of a carcass, as the <i>a fortiori</i> inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a carcass? It is notable in that it renders other items ritually impure through contact with it. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency. The existence of a unique stringency undermines the possibility of using an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  Rav Ashi raises the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from various other prohibitions that, like forbidden fat, do not carry the stringency of being punishable by <i>karet</i>, and Rava rejects each one. Can one derive the prohibition against eating forbidden fat from the prohibition against eating carcasses of ritually impure creeping animals (see Leviticus 11:41)? One cannot, as what is notable about ritually impure creeping animals? They are notable in that they render other items ritually impure though contact with any amount of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
  Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating the carcasses of ritually pure creeping animals (see Leviticus 11:41), which do not have the capacity to render other items ritually impure? One cannot, as what is notable about ritually pure creeping animals? They are notable in that with regard to their prohibition there is liability for consuming any amount of them. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency, as one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of it.
  Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>] or from the prohibition against eating diverse kinds in a vineyard, for which one is liable only if he eats an olive-bulk of them, just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as what is notable about <i>orla</i> and diverse kinds in a vineyard? They are notable in that they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
  Can one derive it from the prohibition against eating Sabbatical Year produce, from which benefit is permitted just like with regard to animal fat? One cannot, as what is notable about Sabbatical Year produce? It is notable in that it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is purchased. Forbidden fat does not share this stringency.
  Can one derive it from the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of the portion of the produce that is designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>]? One cannot, as in the case of <i>teruma</i> there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted. The prohibition concerning <i>teruma</i> applies broadly, unlike in the case of forbidden fat, where the prohibition applies only to the fat of domesticated animals but not to the fat of undomesticated animals. Rava notes that the possibility of deriving the prohibition against eating forbidden fat from all of those prohibitions can also be refuted based on this claim, as in those cases, too, there are no circumstances in which their general prohibition was permitted.
  Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me in accepting Rabbi Avin’s claim that the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, this is difficult for me: That which we learned in a mishna (<i>Karetot</i> 2a), which enumerates the thirty-six cases for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The end of that mishna lists: One who neglects sacrificing the Paschal offering and one who does not undergo circumcision, which are positive mitzvot, unlike the other cases enumerated in the mishna, which are all prohibitions.
  Rava explains his difficulty: If Rabbi Avin is correct, derive that there is a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat beyond the allotted period for its consumption (see Leviticus 22:30): Just as in the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat, where the Torah did not prescribe punishment but nevertheless prohibited this act, so too, with regard to neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering and not undergoing circumcision, for which the Torah did prescribe punishment, is it not logical that the Torah actually prohibited neglecting them as well?
  Rav Ashi said: I stated this very discussion before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: One cannot derive a prohibition against neglecting the sacrifice of the Paschal offering from the case of one who leaves over sacrificial meat via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as it can be refuted: What is notable about one who leaves over sacrificial meat? He is notable in that there is no remedy once the prohibition has been violated. Shall you say the same about the neglect of the Paschal offering, for which there is a remedy? One who fails to bring it on the first <i>Pesaḥ</i> must bring it on the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>.
  The Gemara challenges the very premise of Rabbi Avin’s claim: But can one derive that the Torah prohibits an action via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? Even the one who says that the court administers punishment based on an <i>a fortiori</i> inference concedes that one does not derive a prohibition from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. Therefore, Rabbi Avin’s claim is refuted.
  Rather, the prohibition against slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says: It is derived from the prohibition against offering up outside the Temple through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple, and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up outside the Temple.
  With regard to slaughtering, it is stated: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and with regard to offering up, it is stated: “That offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment for an action unless it also explicitly prohibited the action, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.
  
  Daf 107a
  
  Rava said: The prohibition can be derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yona, as Rabbi Yona says: It is derived from the verse: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14), through the juxtaposition of the word “there” in the first part of the verse to the word “there” in the second part of the verse. This serves to juxtapose the offering up, mentioned in the first part, to the sacrifice of an offering, mentioned in the second part, which includes slaughtering it. Accordingly, it teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it also prohibited it. Therefore, even though the Torah does not explicitly state the prohibition, it is evident that it is prohibited.
  § The Gemara (106a) states that the source for the liability for offering up outside the Temple is the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, and that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The Gemara asks: We have found that one is liable only for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard, having been appropriately slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, which one then offered up outside the courtyard. The verse states: “He will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” which indicates that they were fit to be brought to the Temple. From where is it derived that one is also liable with regard to offerings that are unfit and are to be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that one then offered up outside?
  Rav Kahana said: The beginning of that verse states: “And to them [<i>va’alehem</i>] you shall say” (Leviticus 17:8). The term “<i>alehem</i>,” to them, written with the letter <i>alef</i>, is phonetically similar to the term <i>alehem</i>, about them, written with the letter <i>ayin</i>. Therefore, the verse can be understood as saying: About that which is written in the adjacent passage you shall say. The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so the liability for offering up outside the Temple mentioned in this verse is also referring to those offerings.
  Rava objects to this: Is it written: And about them? “And to them” is written, and it means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage. Rather, liability in this case is derived as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The opening phrase: “And to them you shall say,” starts with the conjunction “and” to mix the passages of slaughtering outside the Temple and offering up outside the Temple, in order to teach that one is liable for the latter even after having done the former.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Liability in this case is derived through a verbal analogy between the reference to bringing stated with regard to slaughtering (see Leviticus 17:4), and the reference to bringing stated with regard to offering up (see Leviticus 17:9). The verbal analogy teaches that just as there, with regard to slaughtering, one is liable for offerings that are going to be burned outside the Temple, since one slaughtered them there, so too here, with regard to offering up, one is liable even for offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple, having been slaughtered there.
  Rav Beivai objects to these suggestions: But what about that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Karetot</i> 2a): There are thirty-six cases in the Torah for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The mishna enumerates all thirty-six, and offering up outside the Temple is counted as only one of them. According to these suggestions, there are thirty-seven, as there is one case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered inside the Temple, and the other case of one who offers up an offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple, which are considered two independent prohibitions. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.
  § The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (110a): One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., if he sprinkles one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard, is liable; from where do we derive this? The <i>tanna</i> derives it from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the Temple courtyard: “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). This serves to include liability for one who sprinkles sacrificial blood outside the Temple courtyard; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is derived from the verse: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). The term “or” serves to include liability for one who sprinkles blood outside the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this term “or” in “a burnt offering or sacrifice”? It serves to divide them into two independent cases, such that liability is incurred even if one offered up only one of them.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the <i>halakha</i> to divide them into two cases? He derives it from the next verse: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:9). The term “it” is written in the singular to indicate that one is liable even if he offered up only one of them.
  And as for Rabbi Yishmael, why does he not derive that <i>halakha</i> from the term “it”? The Gemara answers: According to him, that term is necessary as the source for the <i>halakha</i> that one is liable for offering up a complete animal, but one is not liable for offering up an incomplete animal. The term “it” indicates an animal in its entirety. And as for Rabbi Akiva, he derives this from the repetition of “it” in the continuation of the verse: “He will not bring it…to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9).
  And as for Rabbi Yishmael, how does he explain the repetition of “it”? He holds that each mention teaches about a different case: One is referring to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were then offered up outside. And the other one is referring to offerings that are unfit and so will be burned outside the Temple as they were unlawfully slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. In both cases one is exempt. And so it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that with regard to offerings that were fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard and that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside, one would be liable. To dispel this notion, the verse states: “To sacrifice it,” which indicates that for offering up a complete animal one is liable, but one is not liable for an incomplete animal.
  And Rabbi Akiva, who has already expounded both mentions of “it,” disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael and holds that one is liable for offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside.
  Rabbi Yishmael derives the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard from the verse “Blood shall be imputed to that man.” The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this verse: “Blood shall be imputed to that man”? He expounds it to include liability for the slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard. One is liable despite the fact that inside the Temple, a bird is sacrificed by pinching the nape of its neck, not by slaughtering it. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, he derives this <i>halakha</i> from: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3).
  And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary to teach that only one who slaughters a bird offering outside is liable, but one is not liable for pinching its nape outside. And as for Rabbi Yishmael, from where does he derive that one is exempt if he pinches? He derives it from the phrase at the beginning of the passage about slaughtering outside: “This is the matter” (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates that one is liable only for slaughtering and not for any other method of killing.
  Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). From this verse I have derived liability only for one who slaughters an animal offering outside; from where do we derive that one is liable if he slaughtered a bird offering outside? The verse states: “Or that slaughters,” to include liability for slaughtering a bird.
  One might have thought that even one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside would be liable. And there is a logical inference to support this: If with regard to the slaughter of a bird offering, which is not the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, one is nevertheless liable if he did it outside, then with regard to pinching the nape of a bird offering, which is the valid method of preparation inside the Temple, is it not logical that one is liable if he did it outside? To counter this, the verse states: “This is the matter” (Leviticus 17:2), which indicates one is liable only for slaughtering, not for any other method of killing.
  And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that he does not derive it from that verse, as he holds that it is necessary for expounding as part of a verbal analogy with the passage with regard to vows, where it is written: “This is the matter that the Lord has commanded” (Numbers 30:2).
  § The Gemara considers the source for other prohibitions. And concerning that which we learned in a mishna (112b): One who takes a handful from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard but does not burn it, and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel outside the Temple courtyard but does not sprinkle it on an altar, he is exempt; from where do we derive this, that one is not liable unless he also completes the subsequent sacrificial rites? The Gemara is surprised by the question: But from where would it be derived that one is liable for these acts, necessitating a source for the fact that he is exempt?
  The Gemara demonstrates that there is no reason to have assumed that one would be liable: If you suggest deriving it through a comparison to slaughtering outside the Temple, where one is liable even if he does not perform the subsequent sacrificial rites, this can be refuted: What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is thereby disqualified. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.
  And if you suggest deriving it through a comparison to sprinkling blood outside the Temple, as one is liable for sprinkling the blood even though it is only one of the sacrificial rites of the offering that should have been performed inside the Temple, this can be refuted: What is notable about sprinkling? It is notable in that a non-priest who sprinkles blood in the Temple is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven for this act. The cases in the mishna do not share this stringency.
  
  Daf 107b
  
  Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Gemara suggests: Derive it through a comparison to the common element shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.
  The Gemara rejects this: If that were so, and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then let the Torah not state that one is liable for sprinkling blood outside the Temple, and instead derive it from the common element shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.
  The derivation would be as follows: And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for slaughtering, that could be refuted. What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that, with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat, it is thereby disqualified. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for offering up, that could also be refuted. What is notable about offering up? It is notable in that liability for offering up also exists with regard to a meal offering. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. But it should still be possible to derive liability for sprinkling from the common element shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.
  The Gemara explains: It is for this very reason that a verse is written to teach the liability for sprinkling outside the Temple, to say to you that liability for performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple cannot be derived from the common element shared by two other cases; rather, it must be directly derived from a verse. Accordingly, the Gemara has demonstrated that there is no basis to have assumed that one who takes a handful from a meal offering, or collects blood, outside the Temple is liable.
  § The Gemara cited a dispute concerning the source for the liability for sprinkling part of the blood of an offering outside the Temple courtyard. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it is derived from the verse in the passage about slaughtering outside the Temple: “Blood shall be imputed to that man” (Leviticus 17:4). According to Rabbi Akiva, it is derived from the verse in the passage about offering up outside the Temple: “Any man…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). Rabbi Abbahu says: One who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood outside the Temple in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, is liable to bring one sin offering, as liability for each transgression is derived from the same passage and they are subcategories of the same prohibition. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, one is liable to bring two sin offerings, as the liability for each transgression is derived from a different passage and they are considered independent prohibitions.
  Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as the verse states with regard to performing sacrificial rites outside the Temple courtyard: “But in the place that the Lord will choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). Since the first part of the verse makes reference to offering up, by inference, the term “you shall do” in the second part must be referring to all the other sacrificial rites. Therefore, the verse has regarded all of the sacrificial rites apart from offering up as one rite with regard to the prohibition against performing them outside the Temple courtyard.
  Rabbi Abbahu also said: One who sprinkled the blood of an offering and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael is liable to bring two sin offerings. According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering.
  Abaye said: Even according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva he is liable to bring two sin offerings, as it is for this reason that the verse differentiated between the offering up and the slaughtering, as it states: “There you shall offer up your burnt offerings, and there you shall do,” in order to teach that one who performs both is liable for each one.
  Finally, Rabbi Abbahu adds the logical conclusion that with regard to one who slaughtered an offering and sprinkled its blood and offered it up outside, in a single lapse of awareness, all agree that he is liable to bring two sin offerings.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Any man of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). Based on the first part of the verse: “That slaughters…in the camp,” one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, instead of in the north, where it should be slaughtered, will be liable, as he has slaughtered it outside the area in which it should be slaughtered. To counter this, the next part of the verse states: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” indicating that liability is incurred only for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Three concentric areas, so-called camps, arranged according to decreasing level of sanctity, encompassed the Tabernacle and Temple: The camp of the Divine Presence comprised the courtyard of the Tabernacle, and later on, of the Temple. Surrounding that was the Levite camp and then the Israelite camp. If the verse had stated only: “That slaughters it outside the camp,” one might have thought that a person would be liable only for slaughtering an offering outside all three of the camps. To dispel this notion, the first part of the verse states: “That slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp,” which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside these camps. From where is it derived that one is liable even if he slaughters inside the Levite camp? The verse states: “That slaughters…in the camp,” which indicates that liability is incurred even for slaughtering inside the three camps.
  If the verse stated only the term “in the camp,” which indicates that one is liable even for slaughtering inside the three camps, one might have thought that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard, which is regarded as being outside of the holier northern section of the courtyard, where such an offering should be slaughtered, will also be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp.”
  This indicates that just as the phrase “outside the camp” is distinctive in that it is referring to an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order or for slaughtering any other type of offering, so too, the term “in the camp” is referring to an area unfit for the slaughter of any offering. This excludes the south of the courtyard, as even though it is an area that is not fit for slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order, it is fit for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity. Therefore, no liability is incurred for slaughtering an offering in the south of the courtyard, even if it should have been slaughtered in the north.
  Based on this <i>baraita</i>, Ulla says: One who slaughters an offering on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, since the roof is an area that is not fit for the slaughter of any offering. Rava objects to this: If so, let the verse write only: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp,” and it would not be necessary to write: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4). Why do I need the verse to also write: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”? Is it not to exclude the roof of the Sanctuary, as in the Temple the Sanctuary corresponded to the Tent of Meeting? Although the roof is an area that is not fit for slaughtering any offering, one should not be liable for slaughtering there since the offering was nevertheless brought to the Tent of Meeting.
  The Gemara questions Rava’s claim: But according to Rava, if that is so and one is exempt if he slaughtered on the roof of the Sanctuary as ultimately the offering was brought to the Tent of Meeting, then let the verse write only: “And he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.” Why do I need the verse to also write “in the camp” and “outside the camp”? Is it not that the term “in the camp” indicates that there is a case where one is liable even when slaughtering inside the courtyard, which serves to include liability for slaughtering on the roof of the Sanctuary? According to this, the term “outside the camp” would then be necessary to exclude liability for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south of the courtyard.
  Rav Mari said in defense of Rava: No, the term “in the camp” is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering in a case where its body is entirely inside the courtyard but its neck is outside the courtyard.
  The Gemara modifies Rav Mari’s statement: If its neck is outside the courtyard, it is obvious that one is liable, as about what is the Merciful One particular? The Merciful One is particular about the slaughter. And in this case, the slaughter is done out-side the courtyard. Rather, say instead that the term “in the camp” is written to include liability for slaughtering an offering where its body is entirely outside the courtyard but its neck is inside the courtyard.
  § An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard today, when there is no Temple: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, and the location of the Temple remains sacred even after the Temple was destroyed. Accordingly, it is still possible now to build an altar there and bring offerings upon it; therefore, one is liable if he instead offers up an offering outside the Temple courtyard area. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that the initial consecration of the Temple sanctified it for its time but did not sanctify it forever. Accordingly, one can no longer bring offerings there; therefore, one is not liable for offering up outside that area.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 8:6): Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary in the Second Temple, they would fashion temporary curtains for the Sanctuary and temporary curtains for the courtyards to serve as partitions until the construction of the stone walls was completed. The difference was only that in the Sanctuary, the workers built the walls outside the curtains, without entering, and in the courtyards, the workers built the walls within the curtains.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that one sacrifices offerings on the altar even if there is no Temple, and one partakes of offerings of the most sacred order in the Temple courtyard even if there are no curtains, and one partakes of offerings of lesser sanctity and second-tithe produce in Jerusalem even if there is no wall surrounding the city. This is due to the fact that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever.
  The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua based his opinion on the principle that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem forever, can one not learn by inference that Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it did not sanctify them for-ever? The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish would then directly parallel the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where do you draw this inference? Perhaps everyone maintains that the initial consecration sanctified the Temple and Jerusalem for their time and also sanctified them forever. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, stated that tradition, which he heard from his teachers, and there is no dispute between them. And if you would say: Why do I need curtains at all according to Rabbi Eliezer? The original sanctity remained when Jerusalem was not surrounded by walls, and similarly, the presence or absence of curtains is irrelevant to the sanctity of the Temple area as well. The Gemara answers: The curtains were established merely for seclusion, as it would have been unbecoming for the activity in this most sacred venue to have been visible to all.
  § An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who offers up outside the Temple a limb of an offering and it does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the bone completes the measure to make an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable. Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.
  The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar, e.g., a bone attached to sacrificial flesh, is also regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar. Even though if it were to become detached, there would be no requirement to offer it up, nevertheless, as long as it is attached it is considered part of the flesh and it contributes to the required measure of an olive-bulk. Reish Lakish says that he is exempt, as he holds that an item attached to flesh that must be offered up on the altar is not regarded as an item that must be offered up on the altar.
  Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard
  
  Daf 108a
  
  the head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is one liable for offering it up outside?
  Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.
  The Gemara elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk as it is of the same kind that flesh is, i.e., they are both animal parts. But in the case of salt, which is not of the same kind as a pigeon, perhaps it would not contribute to the measure. And the dilemma can also be raised according to Reish Lakish: Perhaps Reish Lakish states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, as if the bone separates from the flesh, there is no mitzva to offer the bone up on the altar. But here, with regard to salt, concerning which if it separates from the pigeon there is a mitzva to offer it up, he would not rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases.
  The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.
  While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that the offering had a period of fitness. Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the offering never had a period of fitness? It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.
  Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the sanctity of the altar renders the offering acceptable and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the sanctity of the altar does not render the offering acceptable? Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two responses? Ze’eiri said: The practical difference between them is a case of slaughtering an offering at night inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.
  Rabba said: The practical difference between them is a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the collection of the blood was done there in a non-sacred vessel and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.
  § The mishna teaches: One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive <i>karet</i> if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.
  The Gemara notes: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?
  Rava said in elaboration of the dispute: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable if he eats the meat. This is because the prohibition due to the impurity of one’s body, which carries the punishment of <i>karet</i>, took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.
  When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person’s body is rendered impure. In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.
  Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, as the Rabbis hold that we say that since the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one’s body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.
  The Gemara asks: But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person’s body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of <i>karet</i>, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.
  Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person’s body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person’s impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.
  MISHNA: There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside.
  The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.
  If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.
  Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.
  GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the first <i>halakha</i> of the mishna: What is different about one who offers up outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose, that he is exempt? As it is written: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But with regard to slaughtering, isn’t it also written: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4)?
  The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>] of the house of Israel…that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>” teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But also with regard to offering up it is written: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>] of the house of Israel…that offers up a burnt offering” (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: That amplification is necessary to teach that two people who offered up a limb of an offering together outside the courtyard are liable.
  The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering, the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>” should be used to teach that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are liable, contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “And that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). The term “that man,” which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together.
  The Gemara challenges: But if so, also with regard to offering up, isn’t it written: “That man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn’t that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: That term is necessary
  
  Daf 108b
  
  to exclude from the liability for <i>karet</i> one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The Gemara challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?
  The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term “that man” are written: “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.
  The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>.” Accordingly, the Gemara asks: But why do I need the term “to the Lord”? The Gemara explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.
  § The mishna teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What <i>halakha</i> is alluded to when the verse states: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>]…that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that two people who grasped a limb of an offering and offered it up together outside the courtyard are liable. It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable, and nevertheless, two who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering are exempt, then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where one who offers up for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped a limb and offered it up will also be exempt? To counter this, the verse states “<i>ish ish</i>” to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.
  Rabbi Yosei says that the <i>halakha</i> concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term “that [<i>hahu</i>] man” (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together. The <i>baraita</i> asks: If so, what <i>halakha</i> is alluded to when the verse states “<i>ish ish</i>”? The <i>baraita</i> explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term “<i>ish ish</i>” is that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and no <i>halakhot</i> are to be derived from it.
  The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he derive from the term “that man”? The Gemara explains: This term: “That man,” is necessary to exclude from liability one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei derives that <i>halakha</i> from the fact that the verse could have stated <i>hu</i> and instead stated “<i>hahu</i>.” The Hebrew word for: That, <i>hahu</i>, is formed of the definite article <i>ha</i> and the pronoun <i>hu</i>. And Rabbi Shimon does not expound any <i>halakhot</i> from the fact that the verse could have stated <i>hu</i> and instead stated “<i>hahu</i>.” He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei, from the fact that he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase “<i>ish ish</i>” written with regard to offering up, as he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, then also with regard to that phrase: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>]” (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, he should not derive any <i>halakhot</i> from it. But if so, from where does he derive that one who slaughters outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “Blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary man is liable.
  § The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.
  The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. Reish Lakish says: The dispute in the mishna concerns four or five limbs that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: When it is written: “To sacrifice it” (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the <i>halakha</i> that for offering up a complete item one is liable but that one is not liable for offering up an incomplete item, it is written with regard to a whole animal. Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that that verse is written with regard to each and every limb of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. But with regard to the offering up of one limb in parts, everyone agrees that a person is liable to bring only one sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The dispute in the mishna concerns one limb from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple, that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the Temple, one is liable. Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. But with regard to offering up four or five limbs, everyone agrees that one is liable for each and every limb, as they understand that the phrase “to sacrifice it” is written with regard to each and every limb.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the courtyard, that one is liable. They disagree only with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.
  There are those who say there is a different version of Ulla’s statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yoḥanan. Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.
  And the statement of Shmuel’s father disagrees with the first version of Ulla’s statement, as Shmuel’s father says: In accordance with whose opinion do we restore limbs that were dislodged from upon the altar to the altar? In accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei recorded in the mishna. Shmuel’s father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla’s opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord” (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.
  The Gemara explains how each <i>tanna</i> interprets the verse that supports the other. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Shimon’s, isn’t it written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring merely to an elevated place and not specifically to an altar. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yosei’s, isn’t it written: “And Manoah took…and offered it up upon the rock”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in that case was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative <i>halakha</i> from it.
  And if you wish, say instead that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, but a specifically erected altar is not required in order to offer up on a private altar during periods when it is permitted to do so. Therefore, one who offered up outside the courtyard on a rock or on a stone is liable.
  The Gemara questions the formulation of the <i>baraita</i>: If the <i>baraita</i> was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it should have concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has fulfilled his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, therefore, during a period when the use of private altars is prohibited, one who offers up outside on a rock or on a stone is liable.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a dilemma: Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the corner, the ramp leading to the altar, the base of the altar, and the square shape. What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether they are also indispensable for the validity of a private altar during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The corner, the ramp, the base, and the square shape are all indispensable for the validity of a great public altar, but they are not indispensable for the validity of a small private altar.
  
  Daf 109a
  
  MISHNA: With regard to both fit sacrificial animals, and unfit sacrificial animals whose disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., in the course of the Temple service, and one sacrificed them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable.
  One who offers up outside the courtyard an olive-bulk made up of the flesh of a burnt offering and of its sacrificial portions is liable.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to offering up outside the courtyard: “That offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice, and he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:8–9). From the term “burnt offering” I have derived only that one is liable for offering up a burnt offering, which is burned entirely on the altar. From where do I derive to include that one is liable for offering up outside the courtyard the sacrificial portions of a guilt offering, the sacrificial portions of a sin offering, the sacrificial portions of offerings of the most sacred order, or the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” which includes the sacrificial portions of all other offerings that are to be burned on the altar.
  From where is it derived to include that one is liable for offering up outside the courtyard the handful taken from a meal offering; the frankincense that was to be offered with it; the incense, which was offered each day in the Sanctuary; the meal offering of priests; the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, which he offered daily; and to include as liable one who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of wine, which is the volume of the smallest wine libation used in the Temple; or one who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of water that was consecrated to be used as a libation during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? The verse states: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that with regard to any offering that is fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to be offered there upon the altar, one is liable for offering it up outside the courtyard.
  I have derived only that one is liable for offering up fit offerings; from where do I derive to also include liability for unfit offerings whose disqualification occurred in sanctity?
  For example: Sacrificial meat that was left overnight, or an offering that went outside the courtyard, or an offering that is impure, or an offering that was slaughtered with intent to consume it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, or an offering that an unfit person collected and sprinkled its blood, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed above the red line encircling the altar below it, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed below the red line above it, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside on the external altar, or if one placed the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside it, or a Paschal offering or sin offering whose blood was placed not for their sake?
  Since the disqualification of these offerings occurred in sanctity, if they were to be, albeit unlawfully, placed upon the altar, the altar would render them acceptable such that they should not be removed from upon it. From where is it derived to also include liability for these unfit offerings? The verse states: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord,” which indicates that with regard to any item that is rendered acceptable upon the altar at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, even if it should not have been brought there <i>ab initio</i>, one is liable for offering it up outside the courtyard.
  § The mishna teaches: One who offers up outside the courtyard an olive-bulk made up of the flesh of a burnt offering and of its sacrificial portions is liable. The Gemara infers: The mishna states that for an olive-bulk combined of the flesh of a burnt offering and of its sacrificial portions, yes, one is liable. By inference, for an olive-bulk combined of the meat of a peace offering and of its sacrificial portions, one is not liable, because its meat is eaten, not burned on the altar.
  We learn in the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Me’ila</i> 1:28): The flesh of a burnt offering and its sacrificial portions combine to form the minimum measure, of an olive-bulk, to render one liable for offering them up outside the courtyard, and to render one liable for eating them due to <i>piggul</i>, i.e., if the sacrificial rites were performed with the intent of sacrificing the offering after its designated time; <i>notar</i>, i.e., if its flesh remained after the period in which it was permitted to sacrifice it; or for eating them while he was ritually impure. This <i>baraita</i>, too, states that only the flesh and sacrificial portions of a burnt offering combine. This indicates that the meat and sacrificial portions of a peace offering do not combine.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, it is logical that for a burnt offering, which is entirely consumed upon the altar, that yes, everything will combine, and that for peace offerings, whose meat is not burned on the altar, the meat and sacrificial portions will not combine. But with regard to liability for <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, and eating while ritually impure, what is the reason that the <i>baraita</i> differentiates between a burnt offering and a peace offering?
  The Gemara compounds its questions: And didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 15a): Anything that is <i>piggul</i> combines together, and anything that is <i>notar</i> combines together, to form the measure of an olive-bulk to render one liable? The mishna indicates that this <i>halakha</i> applies to all types of offerings. Accordingly, the Gemara notes: The ruling about <i>piggul</i> in the <i>baraita</i> is difficult, as it is contradicted by the ruling about <i>piggul</i> in the mishna, and the ruling about <i>notar</i> in the <i>baraita</i> is difficult, as it is contradicted by the ruling about <i>notar</i> in the mishna.
  The Gemara resolves the difficulties: That the ruling about <i>piggul</i> in the <i>baraita</i> is contradicted by the ruling about <i>piggul</i> in the mishna is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, the ruling that they combine concerns liability for eating <i>piggul</i>, whereas there, in the <i>baraita</i>, the ruling that only the parts of a burnt offering combine concerns <i>piggul</i> intention. An offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> only if one intends to eat an olive-bulk of it after the designated time for eating it or to sacrifice an olive-bulk of it after the designated time for sacrificing it. The <i>baraita</i> rules that for a burnt offering, if one has such intention for both half an olive-bulk of its meat and half an olive-bulk of its sacrificial portions, that is sufficient for the entire offering to be rendered <i>piggul</i>. For a peace offering, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> only if one has such intention about an olive-bulk comprised only of meat or only of sacrificial portions.
  The Gemara resolves the second difficulty: That the ruling about <i>notar</i> in the <i>baraita</i> is contradicted by the ruling about <i>notar</i> in the mishna is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, the ruling that they combine concerns liability for eating <i>notar</i>, whereas there, in the <i>baraita</i>, the ruling that only the parts of a burnt offering combine concerns a case in which only an olive-bulk combined of both the flesh and the sacrificial portions remained from the offering, the rest having been destroyed, before its blood was sprinkled. Blood may not be sprinkled unless an olive-bulk of the offering remains. And if the blood is not sprinkled, the offering will never be rendered <i>notar</i>. The <i>baraita</i> rules that in the case of a burnt offering, the different parts of it combine to form an olive-bulk to permit the sprinkling of the blood. This does not apply to a peace offering, for which an olive-bulk of only meat or of only sacrificial portions must remain in order to permit the sprinkling of the blood.
  The Gemara asks: And whose opinion is expressed by the <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to all the offerings that are mentioned in the Torah from which there remains only an olive-bulk of meat, the rest having been destroyed or rendered impure,
  
  Daf 109b
  
  or from which there remains only an olive-bulk of sacrificial portions, e.g., fat to be burned on the altar, one still sprinkles the blood of the offering on the altar and one thereby fulfills his obligation.
  But if all that remains is half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, one may not sprinkle the blood, as since the meat and the sacrificial portions are used differently, the former being eaten and the latter being burned on the altar, they cannot combine to form the minimum requirement of an olive-bulk. This applies only to offerings whose meat is eaten. But for a burnt offering, even if all that remains is half an olive-bulk of flesh and half an olive-bulk of fat, one sprinkles the blood, because since the offering is consumed upon the altar in its entirety, all of its parts combine together. And with regard to a meal offering, even if all of it still exists, one does not sprinkle the blood. It is apparent that Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion in this <i>baraita</i> is the one expressed in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara clarifies the final clause of the <i>baraita</i>: What is the relevance of a meal offering to the sprinkling of blood? In a meal offering there is no blood at all. Rav Pappa said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a meal offering brought with the libations that accompany an animal offering. If the entire body of the offering was destroyed but the meal offering that accompanied it remains, one might have thought that it would be sufficient to allow for the sprinkling of the blood. The <i>baraita</i> teaches that this is incorrect.
  mishna With regard to the handful of a meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, and the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings, in a case where one sacrificed even an olive-bulk from any one of these, which should be sacrificed on the altar, outside the Temple, he is liable, as the burning of an olive-bulk is considered a proper burning. Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. But Rabbi Eliezer concedes that with regard to any of them that one sacrificed inside the courtyard but left over an olive-bulk from them and then sacrificed that olive-bulk outside the courtyard, he is liable.
  And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt.
  One who sacrifices sacrificial meat, which is eaten, and sacrificial portions, i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, outside the courtyard, is liable for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions. But he is not liable for sacrificing the meat.
  gemara The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Each morning and afternoon, a <i>peras</i>, i.e., half a <i>maneh</i>, of incense must be burned in the Sanctuary. Nevertheless, one who burns only an olive-bulk of incense outside the courtyard is liable. If one burns half a <i>peras</i> inside the Temple, he is exempt.
  The Gemara addresses the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: It enters our mind to explain: What is meant by: He is exempt? It means that a non-priest, for whom it is prohibited to perform the sacrificial rites in the Temple, is exempt if he burns incense inside the Temple. The Gemara rejects this: Why should he be exempt; this is an act of sacrificial burning? Even though he burned less than a <i>peras</i>, it is apparent from the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> that burning even an olive-bulk is considered an act of sacrificial burning.
  Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Ḥisda said that Rav Yirmeya, son of Abba, said that Rav said: What is meant by: He is exempt? It means that if a priest burns half a <i>peras</i> inside the Temple, the community is thereby exempt from its obligation to burn incense despite the fact that less than the required amount was burned.
  Rabbi Zeira said: If there is something difficult for me with regard to this <i>baraita</i>, this is difficult for me: That which Rav said concerning this <i>baraita</i>: With regard to this <i>halakha</i>, that if a priest burns less than a <i>peras</i> of incense the community fulfills its obligation, even Rabbi Eliezer concedes. Rabbi Zeira explains: This is difficult for me as Rabbi Eliezer rules in the mishna that one who burns an olive-bulk of incense outside is exempt. Effectively, he is saying that burning less than the required amount is not an act of sacrificial burning. How then can he hold that the community fulfills its obligation by the burning of less than a <i>peras</i>?
  Rabba said: With regard to the burning of incense designated to be burned in the Sanctuary upon the golden altar, everyone, i.e., the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer, agrees that the Torah does not specify the amount to be burned; the requirement to burn a <i>peras</i> is rabbinic. Accordingly, the obligation is fulfilled even if only an olive-bulk of incense is burned there, as the <i>baraita</i> states, and one who burns an olive-bulk of that incense outside the Temple is liable.
  When they disagree in the mishna, it is with regard to the burning of incense in the inner sanctum, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur. Concerning that obligation, the verse states: “And he shall take…his handful of sweet incense, beaten small, and bring it within the Curtain” (Leviticus 16:12). As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that “his handful” indicates that specifically that measure must be burned in order to fulfill the obligation. Accordingly, he also holds that one who burns only an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is exempt. And the other Sage, the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, holds that “his handful” does not indicate that specifically that measure must be burned, and the obligation can be fulfilled even with a lesser amount. Accordingly, they also hold that one who burns even an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is liable.
  Abaye said to Rabba: But when the term “statute” is written with regard to the Yom Kippur Temple service (see Leviticus 16:29), it is also written with regard to the burning of incense in the inner sanctum. The term “statute” stated with regard to a rite indicates that it is valid only if performed precisely in accordance with all the details mentioned in the Torah concerning it. Accordingly, the term “his handful” must be specific.
  Rather, Abaye said: With regard to the burning of incense in the inner sanctum, i.e., in the Holy of Holies, on Yom Kippur, everyone agrees that the obligation is only fulfilled if a handful of incense is burned. Also, everyone agrees with regard to burning incense in the Sanctuary that the obligation is fulfilled even with an olive-bulk, as the <i>baraita</i> states, and one who burns an olive-bulk of incense outside the Temple is liable.
  When they disagree in the mishna, it is with regard to the burning of incense of the Holy of Holies outside the Temple courtyard. One Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we derive the measure for liability for incense of the inner sanctum from incense of the outer sanctum, i.e., the Sanctuary. Just as for the latter one is liable for an olive-bulk, so too, for the former one is liable for an olive-bulk. And the other Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that we do not derive one from the other. Rather, since the obligation inside the Holy of Holies is fulfilled only with a handful of incense, one is liable for burning that incense outside the Temple only if he burns that amount.
  Rava said in rejection of Abaye’s understanding: Now, if the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for offering up outside the Temple courtyard, with regard to other rites performed in the outer sanctum, from incense of the outer sanctum, is it necessary to question whether they would derive the measure for liability for incense of the inner sanctum from incense of the outer sanctum? Certainly, they would not.
  The Gemara asks: What is the rite that Rava is referring to in his response to Abaye? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that one who offers up outside the courtyard less than an olive-bulk of the handful taken from a meal offering or less than an olive-bulk of the sacrificial portions, or who pours as a libation outside the courtyard less than three <i>log</i> of wine or who pours as a libation on <i>Sukkot</i> less than three <i>log</i> of water, that he would be liable. To counter this, the verse states: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it” (Leviticus 17:9). The term “to sacrifice it” indicates that one is liable for the sacrifice of a complete offering outside the courtyard but one is not liable for the sacrifice of an incomplete offering outside.
  The Gemara explains Rava’s inference: But the <i>baraita</i> states that for a libation of less than three <i>log</i> outside the courtyard one is exempt despite the fact that the libation still contains a few olive-bulks. And it is apparent then, that the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for the rite of libation that should be performed in the outer sanctum from incense that should be burned in the outer sanctum. Certainly then, they would not derive the measure for liability for incense of the inner sanctum from incense of the outer sanctum.
  Rather, Rava said to resolve Rabbi Zeira’s difficulty: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis agree with regard to the incense of the Sanctuary, that the Torah does not specify an amount to be burned, and the community fulfills its obligation even if only an olive-bulk is burned, as is taught in the <i>baraita</i>. When they disagree in the mishna, it is in a case where, for example, one designated two half-<i>peras</i> portions of incense, in accordance with the rabbinic requirement to burn one <i>peras</i>,
  
  Daf 110a
  
  by placing them in a vessel. One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the designation of a measure of incense larger than an olive-bulk by placing it in a vessel is a significant matter that renders one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed there. Therefore, one who then burned only an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is exempt. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that it is nothing and does not render one obligated to burn all the incense that was placed in the vessel. Therefore, one who then burned an olive-bulk of that incense outside the courtyard is liable.
  Rava said: Now, according to the one who says that designation by placing in a vessel is nothing, if one designated in a vessel six <i>log</i> of wine as a libation to accompany the sacrificing of a bull, which is the required amount, and then removed four <i>log</i> from it and brought those four <i>log</i> as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be liable, as a libation of four <i>log</i> of wine is fit for the sacrificing of a ram (see Numbers 28:14).
  Similarly, if one designated by placing in a vessel four <i>log</i> of wine for a libation to accompany the sacrificing of a ram and then removed three <i>log</i> of wine from it and brought those three <i>log</i> as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be liable, as three <i>log</i> of wine is a fit libation for the sacrificing of a lamb (see Numbers 28:14).
  But if those three <i>log</i> were lacking any amount, and one brought them as a libation outside the courtyard, he would be exempt because less than three <i>log</i> of wine is never a fit libation.
  Rava inferred from the <i>baraita</i> that the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the pouring of a libation, from one performed in the outer sanctum, i.e., the burning of incense. From that he concluded that the Rabbis would certainly not derive the measure for liability for a rite performed in the inner sanctum from a rite performed in the outer sanctum. This refuted Abaye’s claim that the Rabbis derive the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the inner sanctum from the measure for liability for burning outside the incense of the outer sanctum. Rav Ashi said in defense of Abaye’s opinion: Indeed, as is indicated by the <i>baraita</i>, the Rabbis do not derive the measure for liability for pouring a libation outside the courtyard from the measure for liability for burning incense, which are two different rites performed in the outer sanctum.
  Rav Ashi continues: Even though the Rabbis do not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of a rite performed in the outer sanctum from a different rite performed in the outer sanctum, they do derive the measure for liability for burning the incense of the outer sanctum from the identical rite of burning of the incense of the inner sanctum, even though it involves deriving the <i>halakhot</i> of a rite performed in the outer sanctum from one performed in the inner sanctum.
  § After enumerating various items that are burned entirely on the altar, the mishna states: And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices it outside the courtyard, he is exempt. Concerning this ruling, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is a lack that occurs to an offering outside the courtyard considered a lack in order to exempt one who sacrifices the remainder outside the courtyard? Or is it not considered a lack?
  Do we say that once an offering emerges from the courtyard it is in any event disqualified, and yet the Torah deems one liable for offering it there, so what difference is there to me if there is an additional disqualification of being lacking and what difference is there to me if it is still complete? Or perhaps it is only with regard to emerging from the courtyard, where it is still in its original state, that yes, one is liable despite the fact that it was disqualified by emerging from the courtyard, but where it is not in its original state, one would not be liable.
  Abaye said: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer deems him exempt unless he sacrifices the whole of any one of these items outside the Temple. It is apparent then that the offering must remain complete.
  Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: Can the Master resolve the dilemma from the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, and hold that one is liable for sacrificing even an olive-bulk, and the dilemma was raised according to their opinion.
  Abaye said to him: I heard explicitly from Rav that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only where the offering is still in its original form, i.e., complete. But where it is lacking, they concede to him that one is not liable. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Was Rav not referring to a case where it became lacking outside the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even according to the Rabbis a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: No, he was referring to a case where it became lacking inside the courtyard. Accordingly, this mishna cannot serve as a proof.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the continuation of the mishna: And with regard to any of these offerings that were lacking any amount, if one sacrifices them outside the courtyard, he is exempt. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof from here: Is the mishna not referring to a case where it became lacking outside the courtyard? If so, it is evident that even a lack that occurs outside is considered a lack. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a case where it became lacking inside the courtyard. Accordingly, this cannot serve as a proof.
  § The mishna teaches: One who sacrifices sacrificial meat, which is eaten, and sacrificial portions, i.e., those that are to be burned on the altar, outside the courtyard, is liable for the sacrifice of the sacrificial portions, but not for the meat. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? If the meat is placed directly on the altar’s fire and then the sacrificial portions are placed upon the meat, isn’t there an interposition between the altar and the sacrificial portions? Since if they were offered in the Temple in that manner, one would not have fulfilled the obligation, one should not be liable if he offers them up in this manner outside the Temple.
  Shmuel said: The mishna is referring to a case where he turned them over and the sacrificial portions lay directly on the altar’s fire.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said there is another explanation: You may even say that the mishna is referring to a case where they did not turn them over. And in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says (108a) that even if one offered it up on a rock he is liable. According to him, it is clear that in order for one to be liable, the mode of offering up performed outside the Temple does not need to entirely parallel the mode of offering up in the Temple.
  Rav said there is another explanation: Even in the Temple, burning the sacrificial meat and sacrificial portions in this manner would be valid as both items are from the same animal, and a substance in contact with the same type of substance does not interpose.
  MISHNA: If there is a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, and one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt from liability, because until the handful is actually removed it is not fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple. But if a priest took a handful from it and then returned its handful into the remainder of the meal offering, and one sacrificed the entire mixture outside the courtyard, he is liable, as once the handful has been removed it is fit to be burned on the altar inside the Temple, and one is liable for offering it up outside even though it is mixed into the remainder.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the final clause: But why is he liable? Let the remainder of the meal offering, which is certainly the majority of the mixture, nullify the handful.
  Rabbi Zeira said: A term of burning is stated with regard to the handful removed from the meal offering, and a term of burning is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering. With regard to the handful, referred to by the Torah as “the memorial part,” it is written: “And the priest shall burn the memorial part upon the altar” (Leviticus 2:2), and with regard to the remainder of the meal offering it is written: “Do not burn it as a fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). This provides a verbal analogy that teaches that just as with regard to the burning of the handful, if two handfuls are mixed together one handful does not nullify another, so too, with regard to the burning of the remainder, if the remainder and the handful are mixed together, the remainder does not nullify the handful.
  MISHNA: The burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the consumption of the remainder of the meal offering by the priests. With regard to the handful and the frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second. Since the remainder of the meal offering becomes permitted only once both have been burned, he considers each one alone to be an incomplete offering, and he holds one is not liable for sacrificing only one of them. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable.
  The burning of two bowls of frankincense permits the consumption of the shewbread. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he also sacrifices the second, since the shewbread becomes permitted only once both bowls of frankincense are burned. Rabbi Eliezer concedes that if one sacrificed one inside the courtyard and one outside the courtyard, he is liable.
  GEMARA: The mishna is based on the fact that it is permitted for the priests to consume the remainder of the meal offering only once both the handful and the frankincense have been burned. With regard to this, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raises a dilemma: If one burned the handful but not the frankincense, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether this will permit the consumption of the corresponding half of the remainder? Since the burning of both the handful and the frankincense permits the entire remainder, it seems that each one of them affects half of the remainder. Accordingly, it is unclear whether burning one of them will entirely permit half of the remainder, or whether it will merely weaken the prohibition concerning the remainder, and it will still be prohibited to eat any of it.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raise this dilemma? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: One can render an offering <i>piggul</i> by having <i>piggul</i> intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption, i.e., during either one of them, then it should be obvious that the offering of the handful alone should entirely permit half of the remainder. The fact that Rabbi Meir holds that intention during just one of the acts can render the offering <i>piggul</i> demonstrates that he holds that each act alone has the power to permit part of the offering. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to Rabbi Meir’s opinion.
  If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> by having <i>piggul</i> intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption; rather, one must have <i>piggul</i> intention during both acts, then it is evident that neither act alone has the power to affect the offering, and so the burning of the handful alone should neither permit any of the remainder nor weaken the prohibition that applies to it. It is apparent, then, the dilemma was not raised according to the Rabbis’ opinion.
  Rather, the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer as taught in the mishna. Rabbi Eliezer rules that one who sacrifices outside only the handful or the frankincense is not liable. Evidently, he holds that neither of these alone can permit the consumption of the meal offering. The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well: Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> by having <i>piggul</i> intention during half of two acts that together permit the offering for consumption. Accordingly, he would hold that the offering of only the handful neither permits any of the remainder, nor weakens the prohibition concerning it, and it would not make sense to raise the dilemma according to him.
  Rather, it must be that the dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that is taught here in the mishna. They hold that one is liable even for sacrificing outside only the handful or only the frankincense. Evidently, they hold that each one alone has the power to affect the status of the remainder. Accordingly, Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa asked concerning a case where one of them is burned on the altar in the Temple, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does it entirely permit half of the remainder, or does it weaken the prohibition concerning the entire remainder?
  The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: One who sprinkles part of the blood of an offering, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four, outside the Temple courtyard
  
  Daf 110b
  
  is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water consecrated for the libation of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, during the Festival, outside the courtyard, is liable. Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.
  GEMARA: Rava says: Rabbi Elazar generally holds that one is liable for sacrificing outside only when he sacrifices a complete offering, but Rabbi Elazar concedes with regard to the sprinkling of the blood of an offering, that one is liable for sprinkling outside even part of the blood, e.g., one sprinkling instead of four. This is clearly the <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings whose blood is sprinkled on the external altar, as a single sprinkling renders such an offering valid (see 36b), and it can be regarded as a complete offering. Rabbi Elazar concedes that this is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to offerings whose blood is sprinkled on the inner altar, despite the fact that such offerings are valid only once all the sprinklings have been completed.
  The fact that Rabbi Elazar concedes this point is apparent from that which is taught in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 60a) with regard to the numerous sprinklings of blood performed in the Holy of Holies, upon the Curtain, and on the inner altar, as part of the Yom Kippur Temple service: If during the sprinklings the blood spills and it is necessary to bring the blood of a second animal in order to complete them, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon say: From the place that the High Priest stopped sprinkling the blood of the first animal, there he begins to sprinkle the blood of the second animal; it is unnecessary to repeat any of the sprinklings that have already been performed. From this ruling it is apparent that each sprinkling is considered an independent and complete act of service, and one will be liable for even a single act of sprinkling done outside the Temple.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Elazar says: So too, one who pours as a libation water consecrated for the libation of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, during the Festival, outside the courtyard, is liable. Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Menaḥem Yodfa’a: Rabbi Elazar said that <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his teacher, who says: The water libation on <i>Sukkot</i> is a mitzva by Torah law. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Akiva says concerning the verse: “Beside the daily burnt offering, its meal offering, and its libations” (Numbers 29:31), the fact that the Torah makes reference to “libations” in the plural indicates that the verse is speaking of two types of libations. One is the water libation, which is unique to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>; and the other one is the wine libation, which always accompanies the daily offering. If the water libation was not a mitzva by Torah law, one would not be liable for pouring it as a libation outside the Temple courtyard.
  Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: If Rabbi Elazar derives the mitzva of the water libation through the derivation taught by Rabbi Akiva, according to which both the wine libation and water libation are derived from the same word, then he should hold that just as there, with regard to wine, one is liable only if he pours three <i>log</i>, so too here, with regard to water, one should be liable only if he pours three <i>log</i>. But in the mishna, Rabbi Elazar says simply: Water of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, which seems to include any amount. Furthermore, he should hold that just as with regard to pouring a libation of wine outside the Temple, one is liable for pouring a libation during the rest of the days of the year and not only on <i>Sukkot</i>, so too, with regard to pouring a libation of water, one should be liable for pouring a libation during the rest of the days of the year. But in the mishna Rabbi Elazar says that one is liable only if he pours the water libation during the Festival. It is apparent that Rabbi Elazar derived the mitzva of the water libation from a different source.
  That which Rabbi Asi says escaped him, as Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Neḥunya, a man of the valley of Beit Ḥortan: The <i>halakha</i> of ten saplings, the practice of taking a willow in the Temple during <i>Sukkot</i>, and the obligation to perform the water libation during <i>Sukkot</i>, each of these is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. According to Rabbi Asi, the mitzva of the water libation is not derived from the same source as the wine libation, and it is possible that there will be differences in the <i>halakhot</i> that apply to them.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of water during the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: If he filled a service vessel with the three <i>log</i> in order to consecrate them for the sake of the Festival, he is liable.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two opinions? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They disagree with regard to whether there is a precise measure of water that can be consecrated as a libation. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that even if one fills a service vessel with more than three <i>log</i>, the water is thereby consecrated. Therefore, if one then pours at least three <i>log</i> of that water outside the courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar holds that if one attempts to consecrate more than three <i>log</i>, the consecration of the water is ineffective. Therefore, if one then pours three <i>log</i> of that water as a libation outside the courtyard, he is not liable.
  Rav Pappa said:
  
  Daf 111a
  
  They disagree with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement with regard to whether wine libations were offered in the Tabernacle in the wilderness before the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara will soon explain the logical connection between the two issues.
  Ravina said: Everyone agrees that wine libations are valid even if they are not first consecrated in a sacred service vessel. Therefore, one who pours a wine libation outside the courtyard is liable even if it was not first consecrated in a service vessel. They disagree with regard to whether the liability for pouring a water libation can be derived from that of a wine libation. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that it can; Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that it cannot.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who pours as a libation three <i>log</i> of wine outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: And that is in a case where he first consecrated the wine in a sacred service vessel.
  What is the difference between them? Rav Adda bar Rav Yitzḥak said: The difference between them is with regard to whether the overfill of measuring vessels is also consecrated. Both agree that one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard only if it was first consecrated in a service vessel. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the liquid that rises above the rim of a vessel is also consecrated, and if one collects three <i>log</i> of that liquid and pours it as a liba-tion outside the courtyard he is liable. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that only the wine within the walls of the vessel itself is consecrated.
  Rava, son of Rabba, said: The difference between them is with regard to whether one is liable for pouring a libation outside the courtyard that was not first consecrated in a service vessel. This dispute is based on a disagreement as to whether wine libations were offered on private altars.
  He explains: And they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: An offering sacrificed on a private altar does not need to be accompanied by wine libations; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It does require wine libations. Service vessels are not used in the context of private altars. Therefore, if libations are brought on private altars then it is apparent that libations can be valid even if they were not first consecrated in a service vessel. Accordingly, one would be liable for pouring a libation outside the Temple even if it had not first been consecrated in a service vessel. If libations are not brought on private altars, then there is there is no precedent of a libation that was not first consecrated in a service vessel, and one would not be liable for pouring a non-consecrated libation outside the Temple.
  And the opinion of these <i>tanna’im</i> is like the opinion of those <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In introducing the mitzva to bring wine libations together with animal offerings, the verse states: “When you come into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you” (Numbers 15:2), which indicates that the mitzva to bring libations began only once the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. The verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a great public altar. This assumes libations were not brought on a public altar in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required.
  Do you say that the verse is referring to offerings brought on a great public altar, or is it even referring to offerings brought on a small private altar? Perhaps libations were brought on the public altar in the wilderness, and it is therefore unnecessary to state that after entering Eretz Yisrael libations should continue to be brought on a public altar. Accordingly, the verse must be teaching that after the Jewish people have entered Eretz Yisrael, libations are required even on private altars. This suggestion is rejected: When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings, which I give to you [<i>lakhem</i>],” using the plural form of the word “you,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of a public altar that is used by everyone; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rabbi Akiva says: Through its introductory clause: “When you come,” the verse speaks in order to require that libations be brought with animal offerings that are brought upon a small private altar. This assumes libations were already brought in the wilderness, and the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.
  Do you say that the verse is speaking of a small private altar outside the Temple? Or is it only referring to a great public altar? Perhaps libations were not brought on the public altar in the wilderness and the verse is necessary in order to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. When the verse states: “Into the land of your dwellings,” it is apparent that the verse is speaking of an altar that is used in all your dwellings, which certainly must be referring to private altars, as there was only one central public altar.
  The Gemara explains: When you analyze the matter you will find that you can say that according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, libations were not offered in the wilderness. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that upon entering Eretz Yisrael they are required. And according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva libations were offered in the wilderness. Therefore, the verse must be teaching that libations are required even on private altars.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Neḥemya says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Neḥemya taught this <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the statement of the one who says that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Neḥemya says that for the remainder of the blood of an offering that one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Isn’t pouring the remainder of the blood considered a non-essential mitzva, which is not indispensable to the validity of the offering? Accordingly, one should not be liable for sacrificing the blood outside the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Neḥemya said to him: Sacrificial limbs and fats of a burnt offering will prove the matter, as they are considered a non-essential mitzva, and yet one who sacrifices them outside the courtyard is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable with regard to the burning of the limbs and fats, which is the start of a sacrificial rite, i.e., burning them is an sacrificial rite in and of itself, shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the pouring of the remainder of the blood, which is not the start of a sacrificial rite, but is just the conclusion of the sprinkling of the blood?
  The Gemara explains the challenge from the <i>baraita</i>: And if it is so that Rabbi Neḥemya holds that that failure to pour the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar disqualifies the offering, let Rabbi Neḥemya say in response to Rabbi Akiva: These too, i.e., the pouring of the remainder of the blood, are considered to be a sacrificial rite in and of themselves because failure to pour out the remainder disqualifies the offering. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.
  The Gemara qualifies its rejection: And now that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: The dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to whether failure to pour the remainder of the blood disqualifies the offering is only with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar, but with regard to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar everyone agrees that failure to pour it does not disqualify the offering; the apparent contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement and the <i>baraita</i> can therefore be resolved. When Rabbi Neḥemya says in the mishna that one is liable for sacrificing the remainder of the blood outside the courtyard, he is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the inner altar. The pouring of that blood is considered a rite in and of itself, and one is liable for sacrificing it outside the Temple. When that statement of Rabbi Neḥemya is taught in the <i>baraita</i>, it is referring to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Concerning such blood, Rabbi Neḥemya concedes that the pouring is not considered a rite in and of itself.
  In light of this, the Gemara explains the discussion between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Neḥemya: And Rabbi Akiva did not know what Rabbi Neḥemya was saying. Rabbi Akiva thought that Rabbi Neḥemya was stating a ruling about the pouring of the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva responded to him with a claim relating to the remainder of blood that was presented on the external altar and said that it is a non-essential mitzva. And then Rabbi Neḥemya answered him by saying a defense of his opinion in accordance with the misconception underlying the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  MISHNA: One who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside the Temple courtyard and then offers it up outside the courtyard is liable. But if one pinched its nape outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard he is exempt, as pinching the nape of a bird outside the courtyard is not considered valid pinching. One who slaughters, with a knife, a bird offering inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard is exempt, as slaughtering a bird offering in the Temple courtyard disqualifies it as an offering.
  
  Daf 111b
  
  But if one slaughtered a bird offering outside the courtyard and then offered it up outside, he is liable.
  Evidently, the manner of its preparation inside the courtyard, i.e., pinching, effects its exemption outside the courtyard, and the manner of its preparation outside the courtyard, i.e., slaughter, effects its exemption inside the courtyard.
  Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
  GEMARA: In summarizing its rulings the mishna states: The manner of its preparation outside the courtyard effects its exemption inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: This term: The manner of its preparation, is inappropriate when referring to the slaughter of a bird offering, as a bird offering is not prepared by slaughtering; on the contrary, it is disqualified if slaughtered. The slaughter of a bird offering outside the courtyard is the reason for its liability. The Gemara concedes: Emend the mishna and teach: Its liability.
  § The mishna cites the ruling of Rabbi Shimon: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt. The Gemara asks: To what does he refer?
  If we say that he is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which states: One who pinches the nape of the bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, but if one pinched its nape outside and then offered it up outside, he is exempt; and it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first <i>tanna</i>: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who pinches its nape outside and then offers it up outside is liable, this is difficult. If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then instead of saying in the mishna: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for a similar act of killing done outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first <i>tanna</i> on this issue.
  Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the first clause and says to the first <i>tanna</i>: Just as one who pinches the nape of a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who pinches its nape inside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first <i>tanna</i> on this issue either.
  Rather, he is referring to the latter clause of the mishna: One who slaughters a bird offering inside and offers it up outside is exempt, but if one slaughtered a bird offering outside and then offered it up outside, he is liable. And it is with the second part of this clause that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says to the first <i>tanna</i>: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering inside and then offers it up outside is not liable, so too one who slaughters it outside and then offers it up outside is not liable. The Gemara rejects this: If that is what Rabbi Shimon intended, then he should have said: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is not liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also not liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard. Evidently, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with the first <i>tanna</i> on this issue.
  Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first part of the latter clause and says to the first <i>tanna</i>: Just as one who slaughters a bird offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable, so too one who slaughters it inside and then offers it up outside is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Shimon clearly does not hold this, as the mishna teaches that he concludes: This is the <i>halakha</i> except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
  If Rabbi Shimon is not referring to any of the rulings mentioned in the mishna, he must be disagreeing with the first <i>tanna</i> with regard to another issue. Ze’eiri said: The difference between the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the slaughter of an animal offering at night inside the courtyard, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first <i>tanna</i> said: And so too, one who slaughters an animal offering inside the courtyard at night and then offers it up outside is exempt, as by slaughtering the animal at night he caused it to become disqualified. But one who slaughtered an animal outside the courtyard at night and then offered it up outside is liable.
  It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing inside the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
  The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rava said that the difference between the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to the collection of the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel, and this is what the mishna is saying: The first <i>tanna</i> said: And so too, one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel inside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is exempt, as receiving blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering. But one who collects the blood of an offering in a non-sacred vessel outside the courtyard and then offers up that offering outside is liable.
  It is with this ruling that Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: With regard to any act done with an animal, i.e., the collecting of its blood, concerning which, when it was performed outside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act inside the courtyard. This is the <i>halakha</i> except with regard to one who slaughters a bird inside the courtyard and offers it up outside the courtyard; he is exempt.
  The Gemara comments: Now that Shmuel’s father, son of Rav Yitzḥak, has taught a <i>baraita</i>, another explanation can be provided. The <i>baraita</i> teaches: One who pinches the nape of a bird inside the courtyard and then offers it up outside is liable, but one who pinched the nape of a bird outside and then offered it up outside is exempt. And Rabbi Shimon says that he is liable. It is apparent then that Rabbi Shimon in the mishna is referring to there, i.e., to the first clause of the mishna, and disagreeing with it. Therefore, one should emend the mishna and teach: With regard to any act of killing an animal concerning which, when it was performed inside the courtyard, one is liable for subsequently offering it up outside the courtyard, one is also liable for having offered the animal up outside the courtyard after performing a similar act of killing outside the courtyard.
  MISHNA: With regard to a sin offering where one collected its blood in one cup, if he first placed its blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard, or if he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, in both cases he is liable for placing the blood outside the courtyard, as the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed on the altar inside the courtyard.
  If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard he is exempt as he acted appropriately. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable, as both are fit to be placed inside. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup unfit to be placed on the altar; therefore, there is no liability for placing it on an altar outside. If he first placed the blood from one cup outside and then placed the blood from the other one inside, he is liable for the external placement as that blood was fit to be placed inside, and the internal placement atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.
  To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found. In that case, both of them stand before him and he must sacrifice one as his sin offering. If he slaughtered both of them inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he slaughtered both of them outside the courtyard, he is liable, as each was fit to be slaughtered in the courtyard. If he first slaughtered one inside and then slaughtered the other one outside he is exempt from liability for slaughtering the second, as he has already fulfilled his obligation with the first, thereby rendering the second one unfit for sacrifice. If he first slaughtered one outside and then slaughtered the other one inside he is liable for slaughtering the external animal outside the courtyard, as it was fit to be slaughtered inside, and the internal animal atones for the transgression for which the sin offering was brought.
  The mishna adds: In a case where one slaughtered both inside the courtyard, just as placing the blood of the first animal exempts one who consumes its meat from liability for misuse of consecrated property, so too, it exempts one who consumes the meat of its counterpart, the second animal, from liability.
  
  Daf 112a
  
  GEMARA: The Gemara discusses the first clause of the mishna: Granted that one is liable in a case where he first placed the blood on an altar outside the courtyard and then placed the remaining blood on the altar inside the courtyard; that is because, as the mishna explains: As the blood in its entirety is fit to be placed inside the courtyard. But in a case where he first placed its blood on the altar inside the courtyard and then offered up the remaining blood on an altar outside the courtyard, why he is liable? That blood is merely a remainder, and one should not be liable for offering it up outside.
  The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, who says: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that was supposed to be poured at the base of the altar and that instead one sacrificed outside the courtyard, one is liable.
  The Gemara asks: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, then say the latter clause: If one collected its blood in two cups and placed the blood from both of them on the altar inside the courtyard, he is exempt. If he placed the blood from both of them on an altar outside the courtyard, he is liable. If he first placed the blood from one cup inside and then placed the blood from the other one outside, he is exempt. By using the blood of the first cup to perform the mitzva of placing the blood on the altar, he thereby rendered the blood in the second cup a mere remainder. The Gemara asks: How can this clause be attributed to Rabbi Neḥemya? But doesn’t Rabbi Neḥemya say: For the remainder of the blood of an offering that one offered outside the courtyard, he is liable?
  The Gemara answers: In the latter clause we arrive at the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, who disagrees with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. As that <i>tanna</i> says: The placement of the blood from one cup renders the blood of the other cup as disqualified. Since it is actually disqualified and not merely a remainder, one is not liable for offering it up outside.
  § The mishna presents an analogy for its ruling: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a case where one separated an animal for his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its place, and thereafter, the first animal was found.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need to ask: To what is this matter comparable, and provide an analogy to the mishna’s rulings? What does the analogy add? The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says (see <i>Temura</i> 22b): A sin offering that was lost during the time of the separation of a substitute, if it is later found and one of them is slaughtered as the person’s sin offering, the other one is put to death. Accordingly, it is actually disqualified from being used as an offering, and one is therefore not liable for offering it up outside.
  And this is what the mishna is saying by presenting its analogy: The reason that one is exempt from liability for offering up the unused sin offering outside is that it was lost at the time its substitute was separated and therefore it is considered disqualified. But if one separated two sin offerings from the outset as a guarantee, so that even if one is lost he can use the other, then if neither is lost and he sacrifices one of them, the other one is not put to death. Rather, it is left to graze until it becomes blemished, at which point it is sold and the proceeds used to purchase a voluntary burnt offering. It emerges that from the outset, one of these two animals, i.e., the one that was not ultimately sacrificed as his sin offering, is a burnt offering, and therefore if one offers it up outside the courtyard he is liable. The analogy teaches that with regard to blood collected in two cups, if one offers up blood from the unused cup outside, he is exempt only because the blood in that cup is considered disqualified, but he would not be exempt if it was considered a remainder.
  And this is in accordance with the statement that Rav Huna says that Rav says, as Rav Huna says that Rav says: A guilt offering that was consigned to grazing per the <i>halakha</i> to leave it to graze if its owner dies or achieves atonement through another guilt offering, and then instead of being left to develop a blemish, at which point it could be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a voluntary burnt offering, one slaughtered it, even with unspecified intent, the animal itself is fit to be sacrificed as a burnt offering. Similarly, the mishna assumes that in any case where an animal is consigned to grazing it is considered fit, and one would be liable for slaughtering it outside the courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: Are these cases comparable? There, in Rav’s ruling, it is logical that the animal is considered fit, as a guilt offering is a male animal and a burnt offering is a male animal, so it is possible to bring an animal as the latter even if it had been designated as the former. Therefore, a guilt offering left to graze is still considered fit. But in the mishna’s case, just because the animal is left to graze does not necessarily indicate that it itself is fit to be brought, as a sin offering is a female animal, which can never be brought as a burnt offering. Therefore, it should be considered unfit. Rav Ḥiyya from Yostiniyya said: The ruling of the mishna is with regard to the goat of the <i>Nasi</i>, which is a male sin offering. Therefore, in a case where it is left to graze it is still considered fit, as it can be brought as a burnt offering.This chapter discussed two distinct prohibitions: That of slaughtering an offering outside the Temple courtyard and that of offering up an offering by placing it upon an altar outside the Temple courtyard. Since they are considered two distinct prohibitions, one is liable even if he performs only one of them, and he is liable twice if he performs both.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to the red heifer of purification that one burned outside its pit, the pit being an excavation on the Mount of Olives opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary designated for its slaughter and its burning, and likewise the scapegoat that one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard rather than casting it off a cliff as prescribed, he is exempt from punishment for violating the transgression of slaughtering and sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard.
  The source for this is as it is stated with regard to slaughter of sacrificial animals outside the courtyard: “Whatever man…that slaughters outside the camp, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4). From that verse it is derived: For any offering that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for sacrifice on the altar, e.g., the red heifer and the scapegoat, one is not liable for its slaughter and sacrifice outside its place.
  With regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or an animal that was set aside for idol worship, or an animal that was worshipped as a deity, or an animal given as the price of a dog that was purchased, or an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], or an animal born by caesarean section, any of which one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt.
  The source for this is as it is stated: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord.” From this verse, it is derived: For any animal that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for sacrifice on the altar, one is not liable for its slaughter and sacrifice outside the courtyard.
  For blemished animals, whether they are permanently blemished or whether they are
  
  Daf 112b
  
  temporarily blemished, which one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, one is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: For permanently blemished animals one is exempt; for temporarily blemished animals one is liable for violation of a prohibition, but it is not the type of prohibition for which he will receive <i>karet</i>, because ultimately the animal will be fit for sacrifice.
  With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are fit for sacrifice only when they are older, after their wings assume a golden hue; and pigeons whose time of fitness has passed, as they are fit only when they are young and their wings did not yet assume a yellowish tint, that one sacrificed outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: For pigeons whose time of fitness has passed one is exempt, and for doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived he is in violation of a prohibition.
  With regard to an animal itself and its offspring that were slaughtered on the same day, where one violates a prohibition for slaughtering the second, and an animal whose time has not yet arrived, if one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: For an animal whose time has not yet arrived, that person is in violation of a mere prohibition, as Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to any sacrificial animal that is fit to come and be sacrificed after the passage of time, if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, that person is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say: In any case in which there is no liability for <i>karet</i> there is no violation of a prohibition.
  The mishna adds: An animal is defined as one whose time has not yet arrived, whether it is intrinsically premature, e.g., doves whose wings have not yet assumed a golden hue or an animal less than seven days old (see Leviticus 22:27), or whether it is premature for its owner.
  Which is the animal whose time has not yet arrived because it is premature for its owner? It is the animal of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>], and a woman who experiences a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], and a woman after childbirth, and a leper whose period of impurity is not yet complete, where these owners, who are ritually impure, sacrificed their sin offerings or guilt offerings outside the Temple courtyard. In this case they are exempt, as they are neither obligated nor permitted to bring those offerings. But if they sacrificed their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside the courtyard they are liable, as those offerings may be brought as gift offerings even if their owner is ritually impure.
  One who offers up outside the Temple courtyard a portion of the meat of a sin offering that is eaten; of the meat of a guilt offering; of the meat of other offerings of the most sacred order that are eaten, e.g., the sheep sacrificed on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, or of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, is exempt, as all these are eaten by the priests and not sacrificed on the altar. And for the same reason, one who sacrificed a portion of the surplus of the <i>omer</i> offering, a measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of the Hebrew month of Nisan, after the handful was removed; or the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on <i>Shavuot</i> of two loaves from the new wheat; or the shewbread arranged on the Table each Shabbat in the Sanctuary; or the remainder of meal offerings, is also exempt.
  And likewise with regard to one who pours oil onto a meal offering; and one who breaks the loaves of a meal offering into pieces; and one who mixes oil into the flour of a meal offering; and one who salts a meal offering or other offerings; and one who waves a meal offering; and one who brings a meal offering to the corner of an altar, if he performs these actions outside the courtyard; and one who arranges shewbread on the table outside the Sanctuary; and one who removes the ashes from the lamps of the Candelabrum; and one who removes a handful from a meal offering; and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel, if he did so outside the Temple courtyard: In all of these cases he is exempt. This is because one is liable only if he performs an action similar to sacrifice that completes the sacrificial service, while all of these actions are ones that are normally followed by additional sacrificial rites.
  And one is likewise not liable for any of these actions, neither due to the prohibition against a non-priest performing the Temple service, nor due to the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of ritual impurity, nor due to the prohibition against a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments while performing the Temple service, nor due to the prohibition against performing the Temple service without washing one’s hands and feet.
  Until the Tabernacle was established, private altars were permitted and the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn. And from the time that the Tabernacle was established, private altars were prohibited and the sacrificial service was performed by the priests. Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle in the wilderness and offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten throughout the camp of Israel. When the Jewish people arrived at Gilgal private altars were permitted, offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains, and offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten anywhere.
  When they arrived at Shiloh, private altars were prohibited. And there was no roof of wood or stone there, i.e., in the Tabernacle in Shiloh; rather there was only a building of stone below and the curtains of the roof of the Tabernacle were spread above it. And the period that the Tabernacle was in Shiloh was characterized in the Torah as “rest” in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you” (Deuteronomy 12:9). Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe were eaten in any place that overlooks Shiloh.
  When Shiloh was destroyed (see I Samuel 4:18), the Jewish people arrived with the Tabernacle at Nov, and later at Gibeon, and private altars were permitted. Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains in the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting, and offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten in all the cities of Eretz Yisrael.
  When the Jewish people arrived at Jerusalem and built the Temple during the reign of Solomon, private altars were prohibited, and private altars did not have a subsequent period when they were permitted. And the Temple in Jerusalem was characterized as “inheritance” in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you.” Offerings of the most sacred order were then eaten within the curtains, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe were eaten within the walls of the city, whose legal status was that of the Israelite camp in the wilderness.
  With regard to all offerings that one consecrated during a period of prohibition of private altars and sacrificed during a period of prohibition of private altars, if he sacrificed them outside their designated area, for these animals he is in violation of both the positive mitzva to sacrifice the offering in the place chosen by God and the prohibition against sacrificing them on a private altar, and he is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for doing it.
  If one consecrated the animals during a period of permitting of private altars and sacrificed them during a period of prohibition of private altars, outside their designated area, for these animals he is in violation of a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but he is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for sacrificing them. If he consecrated the animals during a period of prohibition of private altars and sacrificed them during a period of permitting of private altars, outside their designated area, for these animals he is in violation of a positive mitzva for failure to bring it to the Tabernacle, but these animals are not subject to a prohibition, as it is permitted to sacrifice on a private altar.
  And these are the sacrificial items that are sacrificed only in the Tabernacle even when private altars are permitted: Sacrificial animals that were presumed to be consecrated for sacrifice in the Tabernacle. Therefore, communal offerings are sacrificed in the Tabernacle, but offerings of an individual may be sacrificed on a private altar. In addition, with regard to offerings of an individual that were consecrated expressly for sacrifice in the Tabernacle, one must sacrifice them in the Tabernacle. But if he sacrificed them on a private altar, he is exempt.
  And what is the difference between the private altar of an individual and the public altar at the site of the Tabernacle when it was located in Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon? It is that on a private altar there is no placing of hands on the head of an offering, no slaughter in the north,
  
  Daf 113a
  
  no placement of blood around all sides of the altar in offerings for which this is required, no waving of meal offerings, and no bringing of meal offerings to the corner of the altar prior to removal of the handful. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no meal offering sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple. And requiring a member of the priesthood to perform the sacrificial rites, the priestly service vestments, the service vessels, the pleasing aroma to God, the partition for the blood, i.e., the red line dividing the upper and lower halves of the altar, and the priest’s washing of hands and feet before his service all do not apply to sacrifice on private altars, as the service there need not be performed by priests nor follow all the protocols of the Temple service.
  But the intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time, which renders the offering <i>piggul</i>; the <i>halakha</i> of portions of the offering left over [<i>notar</i>] beyond the time it may be eaten; and the prohibition against eating consecrated meat while ritually impure are equal in this, a private altar, and that, a public altar.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who burns the red heifer outside its pit is not liable for sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of: Outside its pit? Reish Lakish said: It means outside the place that was inspected to ensure that it is not a gravesite, which would render it impure. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: But is not all of Eretz Yisrael inspected for impurity? Therefore, there is no need for the site of the burning of the red heifer to be specially inspected.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The term: Outside its pit, is referring to a case where the priest slaughtered the red heifer within the walls of Jerusalem and not in the place outside the walls, as the Torah prescribes: “And it shall be brought outside the camp, and it shall be slaughtered before him” (Numbers 19:3).
  The Gemara challenges: But let Rabbi Yoḥanan interpret it to be a case where the priest slaughtered it outside the wall but not opposite, i.e., not in the direction of, the entrance to the Temple, as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If he slaughtered it in a location not opposite the entrance, it is disqualified, as it is stated with regard to the red heifer: “And you shall give it to Elazar the priest, and it shall be brought outside the camp, and it shall be slaughtered before him. And Elazar the priest shall take of its blood with his finger, and sprinkle of its blood toward the front of the Tent of Meeting seven times” (Numbers 19:3–4).
  The slaughter of the red heifer and the sprinkling of its blood are juxtaposed so that one will draw the following conclusion: Just as its sprinkling must be performed opposite the entrance, so too, its slaughter must be performed opposite the entrance. And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not juxtapose the two verses for the purpose of this comparison, that is difficult: But it was stated with regard to a red heifer slaughtered in a location not opposite the entrance that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is disqualified, as “and it shall be slaughtered” is juxtaposed with “and sprinkle.” Reish Lakish says: It is fit, since it is stated: “And it shall be brought outside the camp, and it shall be slaughtered,” indicating that it may be slaughtered in any location outside the camp.
  And it was also stated that <i>amora’im</i> disagree with regard to a red heifer that the priest burned not opposite the entrance to the Temple. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is disqualified, and Rabbi Oshaya says: It is fit. The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is disqualified because of an additional juxtaposition. It is stated: “And the heifer shall be burned in his sight; its skin, and its flesh, and its blood, with its dung, shall be burned” (Numbers 19:5), while in the previous verse it is stated: “And sprinkle of its blood toward the front of the Tent of Meeting.” This teaches that just as the sprinkling of the blood must be done opposite the entrance, so too must the burning be done opposite the entrance.
  And Rabbi Oshaya says that a red heifer that was burned in a location not opposite the entrance is fit, as the verse states: “With its dung [<i>pirshah</i>], shall be burned,” which is interpreted homiletically to mean: In the place that its soul departs [<i>poreshet</i>] for death, there shall be its burning. Just as no specific location is given for the soul’s departing, so too, the burning need not be performed in a specific location. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the red heifer must be slaughtered opposite the entrance to the Temple, why does he not understand the term: Outside of its pit, to be referring to its slaughter in any location not opposite the Temple entrance?
  The Gemara answers: Say that Rabbi Yoḥanan is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary for the mishna to teach that in slaughtering a red heifer outside the wall in a location not opposite the entrance, one does not transgress the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard. In that case it is clearly disqualified, as he has distanced it from where it is meant to be slaughtered. But even if one slaughtered it inside the wall of Jerusalem, so that he brings it closer to the Temple, and one might say that it is a valid way of slaughtering the red heifer, Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that nevertheless it is disqualified.
  § The Gemara returns to the disagreement cited earlier: The Master says that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: But is not all of Eretz Yisrael inspected for impurity? Since Reish Lakish’s response to this question is not mentioned, the Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the flood in the time of Noah descended upon Eretz Yisrael, and its residents perished. It is therefore necessary to inspect the place where the red heifer is burned to ascertain whether it is a gravesite. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael, and there is no reason to suspect there are lost graves there.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: And both of them, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, interpreted the same verse, stated by Ezekiel with regard to Eretz Yisrael, to derive their opinions. The verse states: “Son of man, say to her: You are a land that is not cleansed, nor rained upon in the day of indignation” (Ezekiel 22:24).
  Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the verse is asking a rhetorical question: Eretz Yisrael, are you not cleansed from the impurity imparted by corpses? Did the rains of the flood fall upon you on the day of indignation? And Reish Lakish holds that this verse should be read in accordance with its straightforward meaning, i.e., as a statement, not a question: You are a land that is not cleansed. Didn’t rains fall upon you on the day of indignation? Therefore, the bodies of all of those who perished in the flood are somewhere in the ground.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mish-na (<i>Para</i> 3:2): Courtyards were built in Jerusalem on stone, and beneath these courtyards there was a hollow space due to the concern that there was a lost grave in the depths. The space served as a barrier preventing the impurity from reaching the courtyards above. And they would bring pregnant women, and those women would give birth in those courtyards. And those women would raise their children there, thereby ensuring that the children never became impure. This would enable the children to assist in the rite of the red heifer.
  And once the children reached the appropriate age, the priests would bring oxen there. And on the backs of these oxen, they would place doors, and the children would sit upon the doors, so that the doors would serve as a barrier between them and any impurity in the depths, and they would hold cups of stone, which are not susceptible to ritual impurity, in their hands, and they would ride upon the oxen to the Siloam pool. And they filled the cups with water and would sit back in their places upon the oxen and be taken to the Temple Mount. The water in the cups would be used for the rite of the red heifer. Apparently, there is concern that hidden sources of impurity exist in Eretz Yisrael.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan would reply: The Sages established a higher standard for purity in the case of the red heifer, but generally speaking there is no concern for hidden sources of impurity in Eretz Yisrael caused by those who perished in the flood.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Eduyyot</i> 3:3): Once, human bones were found in the Chamber of the Woodshed, and the Sages sought to decree impurity upon Jerusalem, i.e., to proclaim all who go there to be impure, as if a corpse can be found in a chamber of the Temple there is reason to be concerned that there are lost graves in other places as well. Rabbi Yehoshua stood upon his feet and said: Is it not a shame and disgrace for us to decree impurity upon the city of our fathers because of this concern? Show me: Where are the dead of the flood, and where are all of the dead killed by Nebuchadnezzar?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan infers: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua said this, is this not to say that there were no lost graves in Jerusalem from the flood, because the flood did not take place there? Reish Lakish responds: And according to your reasoning, so too were there not those killed by Nebuchadnezzar, in and around Jerusalem, who were mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua? Certainly there were, as Nebuchadnezzar killed many people in Jerusalem. Rather, there were, and others removed the bodies. Here too, with regard to the dead of the flood, there were, and others removed the bodies. And it is possible to ask: If they were removed, why is it necessary to be concerned that there may be impurity in the place of the red heifer,
  
  Daf 113b
  
  as they were already removed. One can respond: This <i>baraita</i> deals exclusively with Jerusalem. Granted that the bones of those who perished in the flood and at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar were removed from Jerusalem, but they were not removed from all of Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, outside Jerusalem, the red heifer may be slaughtered only in a place that has been inspected.
  There are those who say the discussion should be inverted, and Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that the flood did not affect Eretz Yisrael, from that <i>baraita</i>, as Rabbi Yehoshua said: Where are the dead of the flood, and where are all of the dead killed by Nebuchadnezzar? Reish Lakish said: What, is it not possible to infer from this question that since those slaughtered by Nebuchadnezzar were in Eretz Yisrael, those who perished in the flood were also there? Rabbi Yoḥanan responds: Are the cases comparable? This is as it is and that is as it is, i.e., the dead of Nebuchadnezzar were indeed in Eretz Yisrael, but the dead of the flood were not, as there was no flood there.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to the flood, it is stated: “All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life, whatsoever was on the dry land, died” (Genesis 7:22). Granted, according to my opinion, that I say the flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael, due to that reason all living creatures on Earth died, even those in Eretz Yisrael. But according to your opinion that the flood did not descend on Eretz Yisrael, why did they die there? Rabbi Yoḥanan responds: They died due to the heat that accompanied the floodwaters, and that spread to Eretz Yisrael as well. Those corpses were then buried in known locations.
  The Gemara notes that this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: The generation of the flood sinned with boiling heat, i.e., forbidden sexual intercourse, and they were punished with the boiling heat of the flood waters. As it is written here, with regard to the flood: “And God remembered Noah and every living creature and all the cattle that were with him in the ark; and God made a wind to pass over the earth and the waters calmed [<i>vayashoku hamayim</i>]” (Genesis 8:1); and it is written there, with regard to the execution of Haman: “So they hanged Haman on the gallows that he had prepared for Mordecai. Then the king’s boiling anger was assuaged [<i>shakhakha</i>]” (Esther 7:10). This latter verse indicates that a matter is assuaged from heat; similarly, the flood waters were hot.
  There are those who say that this discussion should be inverted, and in fact Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from that verse: It is stated that “whatsoever was on the dry land, died” (Genesis 7:22). Granted, according to my opinion, that I say that the flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael, due to that reason, there was an area of dry land even during the flood, and all living creatures there died from the heat. But according to your opinion that the flood did descend upon Eretz Yisrael, what is the meaning of “dry land”? There was no dry land anywhere. Reish Lakish responds: The verse is referring to land that had been dry initially, before the flood.
  And why does the Torah call it “dry land” during the flood? There was no dry land during the flood. It is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: During the generation of the flood no decree was decreed upon the fish in the sea, as it is stated: “Whatsoever was on the dry land, died” (Genesis 7:22), i.e., only those creatures that had been on dry land, but not the fish in the sea.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says the flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is the explanation of the fact that the <i>reima</i> remained there, in Eretz Yisrael, and survived the flood. But according to the one who says the flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael, i.e., Reish Lakish, how did the <i>reima</i> remain? Given its large size, it clearly could not have fit into Noah’s ark. Rabbi Yannai says: They brought <i>reima</i> cubs into the ark, and they survived the flood.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say: I have seen a day-old offspring of the <i>reima</i>, and it was as large as Mount Tabor. And how large is Mount Tabor? It is forty parasangs. And the length of the cub’s neck was three parasangs, and the place where its head rests, i.e., its neck, was a parasang and a half. It cast feces, and thereby dammed up the Jordan river. Even the cub would have been too large for the ark.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They brought only the head of the cub into the ark, while its body remained outside. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Master, i.e., Rabba bar bar Ḥana, say that the size of the place where its head rests was a parasang and a half? Consequently, even its head alone would not fit into the ark. Rather, they brought the head, i.e., edge, of its nose into the ark, so that it might breathe.
  The Gemara wonders why Rabbi Yoḥanan was compelled to give this answer: But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that the flood did not descend upon Eretz Yisrael? According to his opinion, perhaps the <i>reima</i> survived by remaining there during the flood. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan said his answer in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish.
  The Gemara challenges: But the ark was moving upon the water. How it was possible to keep the nose of the <i>reima</i> in the ark? Reish Lakish says: They tied its horns to the ark, so that the <i>reima</i> would move with it. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Ḥisda say that the people of the generation of the flood sinned with boiling heat and were punished with boiling heat? How could the <i>reima</i> have survived the boiling water?
  The Gemara replies: And according to your reasoning, that it was impossible to survive the boiling water, how did the ark itself move? It was covered with pitch, which melts in boiling water. Moreover, how did Og, king of the Bashan (see Numbers 21:33–35), who according to tradition was of the generation of the flood, stand, i.e., survive the boiling water? Rather, it must be that a miracle was performed for them, namely that the water on the sides of the ark cooled, allowing the ark, the <i>reima</i>, and Og to survive.
  The Gemara challenges: But even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, that the flood descended upon Eretz Yisrael and the corpses of those who perished in the flood might impart impurity there, though the flood did indeed descend upon Eretz Yisrael, no trace of the dead remains there. As Reish Lakish says: Why is Babylonia called Metzula (see Isaiah 44:27)? It is because all the dead of the flood, throughout the world, sank [<i>nitztalelu</i>] there. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why is Babylonia called Shinar? It is because all the dead of the flood were deposited [<i>ninaru</i>] there. Evidently, even Reish Lakish says that all who died in the flood, including those from Eretz Yisrael, sank in Babylonia. The Gemara responds: It is impossible that the corpses of some of those in Eretz Yisrael who perished in the flood were not stuck in the mud and remained there.
  Having mentioned some explanations for the names of Babylonia, the Gemara adds: Rabbi Abbahu says: Why is it called Shinar? Because it shakes [<i>shemena’eret</i>] its wealthy people, i.e., they do not remain wealthy. The Gemara asks: But we see that there are wealthy people in Babylonia who remain wealthy. The Gemara responds: Their wealth does not extend for three generations.
  With regard to the statement that the corpses of those who perished in the flood came to Babylonia, Rabbi Ami says: Concerning anyone who eats the dust of Babylonia, it is as if he eats the flesh of his ancestors, since there is a great deal of dust from the dead there. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning anyone who eats the dust of Babylonia, it is as if he eats the flesh of his ancestors. And some say: It is as if he eats repugnant creatures and crawling things, which also died in the flood and were absorbed by the ground of Babylonia.
  § The mishna teaches that if one sacrificed the scapegoat of Yom Kippur outside the Temple he is exempt from the prohibition against sacrificing outside, since the Torah states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and the scapegoat is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “To present it as an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4), and it is derived from the word “offering” that one who slaughters non-sacred animals inside the Temple is not liable. The <i>baraita</i> asks: Or perhaps from the word “offering” I would derive that the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple applies even to items consecrated for Temple maintenance, as they too are called offerings, as it is stated with regard to the spoils of the war against Midian: “And we have brought the Lord’s offering, what every man has gotten, of jewels of gold, armlets, and bracelets, signet rings, earrings, and girdles, to make atonement for our souls before the Lord” (Numbers 31:50). These were certainly not items consecrated for the altar.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to that which is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, i.e., is fit to be sacrificed. Excluded are items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not fit for sacrifice.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Perhaps I shall exclude these, i.e., items consecrated for Temple maintenance, which are not fit to be sacrificed upon the altar, from the prohibition against slaughtering outside the Temple, but I shall not exclude the scapegoat, which is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. Therefore, the verse states: “To present it as an offering to the Lord,” which serves to exclude from this prohibition the scapegoat, which is not designated as a sacrifice to the Lord, but is rather sent to Azazel. According to the <i>baraita</i>, the scapegoat is fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the scapegoat is fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to before the lottery, wherein the two goats of the Day of Atonement are brought into the Temple courtyard, and the High Priest draws lots to determine which is to be sacrificed to the Lord, and which is for Azazel. There, the mishna that states that the scapegoat is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to after the lottery, at which point it is no longer fit for the Temple. The Gemara challenges: After the lottery it is also fit to be brought inside, as there is still an obligation for the High Priest to recite confession upon it in the Temple courtyard.
  Rather, Rav Mani said: This is not difficult, as here, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the scapegoat may be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to before the confession, when it is still fit to enter the Temple. There, the mishna that states that it is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is referring to after the confession, at which point it is no longer fit to be brought inside.
  § The mishna teaches that with regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person, or an animal that was the object of bestiality, or another disqualified offering such as an animal that was designated for idol worship, or one that was worshipped: If one sacrificed it outside the Temple courtyard, he is exempt. This is because with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering outside, the Torah states: “He did not bring it, to present it as an offering to the Lord before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that there is no liability for slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard an animal that is not fit to be sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to this too, derive from the first part of that verse: “To the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” that, as in the case of the red heifer and the scapegoat, if an animal is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for slaughtering it outside.
  
  Daf 114a
  
  Granted, with regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person or an animal that was the object of bestiality, you find circumstances in which the exemption for one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard cannot be based on the fact that it is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, e.g., a case where one initially consecrated it, at which point it was fit to be brought to the Temple courtyard, and then engaged in bestiality with it. Since it was initially fit to be brought to the Temple courtyard, another verse is needed to exclude it.
  But with regard to an animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped, this explanation is not tenable, since an animal that was already consecrated would not become disqualified because a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara responds that it is possible to disqualify a consecrated item in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, such as a peace offering, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: An offering of lesser sanctity is the property of the owner.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse states with regard to the obligation to bring a guilt offering for robbery for taking a false oath concerning unlawful possession of the property of another: “If anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). The term “against the Lord” serves to include one who takes an oath with regard to another’s offerings of lesser sanctity, since they are the property of their owner. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
  The Gemara summarizes: Therefore, all of the cases listed in the mishna are cases in which the animal was initially fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting but was subsequently disqualified as an offering. An animal that actively copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality are disqualified after having been consecrated, due to a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse. An animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped as an object of idol worship becomes forbidden after it was consecrated in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity, which according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is the property of its owner.
  In the case of an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal born by caesarean section, none of which could have occured at a time that the animal was fit to be sacrificed, the mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals that were given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog while in utero. These animals were fit to be brought as a sacrifice while they were still part of a consecrated animal, and only following birth are they considered to be unfit for sacrifice.
  Although these offspring are still part of a consecrated animal while in utero, and as such one might say that the status of payment to a prostitute or the price of a dog should not take effect with rgeard to them, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds that with regard to the offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the time of birth, but not in utero. Therefore, they can be disqualified by serving as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog.
  § The mishna cites a disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon with regard to temporarily blemished animals: Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard violates a prohibition, as they will be fit for sacrifice after the passage of time, whereas the Rabbis hold that one is exempt. The mishna cites two similar disagreements: With regard to doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived that are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, and with regard to one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring on one day, where the latter, which is not fit for being sacrificed until the next day, is slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara comments: And all of these cases are necessary. As, if the mishna had taught the disagreement only in the case of temporarily blemished animals, one would think that the Rabbis deem exempt one who sacrifices outside the Temple courtyard only in that case, because they are repulsive; but with regard to doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, which are not repulsive and which will be fit when their time arrives, I will say that this is not the <i>halakha</i>, and that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon that one does violate a prohibition.
  And if the mishna had taught the disagreement only in the case of doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, one could say that it is only in this case that Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside violates a prohibition, because they are not defined as: Fit for sacrifice and rejected; their time of fitness simply has not arrived. But with regard to temporarily blemished animals, which were fit for sacrifice and then disqualified, I will say that this is not the <i>halakha</i>, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to the Rabbis that one who sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard does not violate a prohibition, since they are not fit to be sacrificed as offerings.
  And if the mishna had taught only these two cases, i.e., temporarily blemished animals and doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, I would say that the Rabbis hold that one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable because their disqualification is inherent. But in the case of the animal itself and its offspring, where the disqualification comes to the offspring from an external factor, i.e., that its parent was slaughtered that day, I will say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon that one who slaughters an animal and its offspring outside the Temple courtyard does violate the prohibition. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach the disagreement in each case.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of any sacrificial animal that is fit to be sacrificed after the passage of time, if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, he is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. Rabbi Shimon did not specify what prohibition is violated. The Gemara therefore asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon?
  Rabbi Ile’a says that Reish Lakish says that the verse states: “You shall not do all that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes. For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God gives you” (Deuteronomy 12:8–9). Moses said the following to the Jewish people: When you enter Eretz Yisrael, upright offerings, i.e., offerings that one believes are proper to bring due to one’s own generosity, such as vow offerings and gift offerings, you may sacrifice, but obligatory offerings you may not sacrifice, even in the Tabernacle in Gilgal, until you arrive at “the rest,” i.e., Shiloh, at which point you may sacrifice them.
  And since obligatory offerings during the period of Gilgal, in relation to the period of Shiloh, are considered offerings whose time has not yet arrived, and Moses said to the Jewish people concerning them: “You shall not do,” during that period, it follows that one who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not do.”
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Therefore, it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings whose time has not yet arrived, even if they are sacrificed in the Tabernacle as was the case in Gilgal. If so, anyone who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived, even if he sacrifices it inside the Temple courtyard,
  
  Daf 114b
  
  should also receive lashes for sacrificing it, just as one would for violating other Torah prohibitions. Why did Rabbi Zeira say elsewhere that one who slaughters, inside the Temple courtyard, an offering whose time has not yet arrived does not receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23), which is the general prohibition against sacrificing animals that are not fit to be sacrificed. Rabbi Zeira explains that he does not receive lashes because the verse has transmuted the negative precept into a prohibition that is stated as a positive mitzva, in the verse: “But from the eighth day forward it may be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27). There is no punishment of lashes for violating such a prohibition. Rabbi Yirmeya is asking that one should still receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “You shall not do.”
  The Gemara responds: That statement of Rabbi Zeira applies only according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the mishna and hold that the verse that states: “You shall not do,” does not indicate that one who slaughters an animal whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of a prohibition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one would indeed receive lashes for slaughtering an animal whose time has not yet arrived inside the Temple.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rabbi Zeira’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who also holds that one would not receive lashes for slaughtering inside the Temple courtyard an offering whose time has not yet arrived. A prohibition cannot be derived from the prohibition stated with regard to the Tabernacle in Gilgal, since inside the Tabernacle in Gilgal, in relation to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, is considered like outside, and the prohibition: “You shall not do,” pertains only to sacrificing an offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the Temple courtyard.
  Rabba said: The reason of Rabbi Shimon is not based upon: “You shall not do,” as Reish Lakish claims, but upon another verse. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: From where is it derived that one who slaughters his Paschal offering on a private altar at a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars violates a prohibition? The verse states: “You may not sacrifice the Paschal offering within any of your gates; but at the place that the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell in, there you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:5–6).
  One might have thought that even at a time when it is permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars this is so. Therefore, the verse states: “Within any [<i>be’aḥad</i>] of your gates,” which indicates that I said this prohibition to you only when all of the Jewish people enter the Temple through one [<i>eḥad</i>] gate in order to sacrifice their offerings. When there is no permanent communal altar, it is permitted to slaughter the Paschal offering on a private altar.
  Rabba analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: When was this Paschal offering, for which one violates a prohibition for slaughtering it during a time when it is forbidden to sacrifice on private altars, slaughtered? If we say that it was after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the proper time for sacrificing the Paschal offering in the Temple, then one who sacrifices it then violates not only a prohibition, he should also be deemed liable to receive <i>karet</i> as well, as would anyone who slaughters a fit offering outside the Temple courtyard. Rather, is it not discussing one who slaughtered the Paschal offering on a private altar on the fourteenth of Nisan before midday, when its time had not yet arrived?
  The Gemara rejects Rabba’s explanation: Actually, the Paschal offering may have been sacrificed on a private altar after midday of the fourteenth of Nisan, and it is referring to a time when it is permitted to sacrifice on private altars, i.e., the periods of Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon. The verse teaches that although it was permitted to sacrifice voluntary vow offerings and gift offerings on a private altar, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed only on a great public altar.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> state: At a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars? The Gemara responds: The <i>baraita</i> means that it is prohibited for one to sacrifice the Paschal offering on a private altar, but it is permitted to use a private altar for another offering, i.e., a voluntary vow offering or gift offering.
  § The mishna teaches that with regard to an offering whose time has not yet arrived because it is premature for its owner, one who sacrifices it outside the Temple courtyard is exempt. This category includes a <i>zav</i>, a <i>zava</i>, and a woman after childbirth, any of whom sacrificed a sin offering or guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard during the days that they are counting toward purification. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring guilt offerings? Ze’eiri said: The text of the mishna should teach: Leper, together with the <i>zav</i>, <i>zava</i>, and woman after childbirth. A leper brings a guilt offering as part of his purification process.
  The mishna also teaches that if those whose time has not yet arrived sacrifice their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside the Temple courtyard, they are liable. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring peace offerings? Rav Sheshet said: Teach the case of a Nazirite as part of the list in the mishna. A nazirite brings a peace offering at the conclusion of his term of naziriteship. The Gemara notes that the addition of Ze’eiri to the text of the mishna, i.e., the case of a leper, was fixed by the <i>tanna’im</i> in the version of the mishna that they would teach, while the addition of Rav Sheshet, i.e., the case of a nazirite, was not fixed by the <i>tanna’im</i> in the mishna that they would teach.
  § The mishna teaches that if one whose days of purification are not complete, e.g., a leper, slaughters his guilt offering outside the courtyard, he is exempt, since the offering is not fit for sacrifice at that time. With regard to this, Rabbi Ḥilkiya, a Sage from the school of Rav Tovi, says: They taught this only with regard to one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard for its own sake. But if he slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard not for its own sake but for the sake of a different offering, he is liable for having sacrificed outside the courtyard. This is because it was fit to be sacrificed not for its own sake inside the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake is fit for sacrifice (see 2a).
  The Gemara asks: If so, one who slaughtered the guilt offering for its own sake should also be liable for having slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, since it was fit to be slaughtered not for its sake inside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara answers: In order for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard to be considered fit to be sacrificed inside it, it first requires uprooting of its status, i.e., the one who slaughters it should intend explicitly that it be a different sacrifice. If its status as a guilt offering has not been uprooted, it is not considered fit to be sacrificed inside.
  Rav Huna objects to Rabbi Ḥilkiya’s statement that a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived is fit to be sacrificed inside if it is slaughtered not for its own sake: And is there anything that is not fit if its action is performed for its own sake, but is fit if its action is performed not for its sake? The Gemara replies: And is there not? But there is
  
  Daf 115a
  
  the Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year, i.e., not on the fourteenth of Nisan after midday, when it is fit to be sacrificed, which is not fit if it was sacrificed for its sake, but is fit if it was sacrificed not for its sake. The Gemara responds: The Paschal offering during the rest of the days of the year is considered to be a peace offering, not a Paschal offering that was slaughtered not for its sake.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard, not for its own sake, is liable: One might have thought that I exclude from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering outside the courtyard even one who slaughters a burnt offering whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner, e.g., a woman after childbirth whose term of impurity is not yet finished, and one who slaughters the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper before they are fit to sacrifice their offerings.
  To counter this, the verse states with regard to slaughter outside the courtyard: “Whatever person there be of the house of Israel that slaughters an ox, or lamb, or goat, in the camp, or that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). “Ox” indicates in any case of an ox, “lamb” indicates in any case of a lamb, and “goat” indicates in any case of a goat, that one is liable for slaughtering them outside the courtyard; while a sin offering was omitted from the cases in the <i>baraita</i> where one who slaughters the offering outside the courtyard is liable.
  The Gemara clarifies: What are we dealing with in this <i>baraita</i> when it discusses the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper? If we say that it is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the courtyard at its proper time, why state that one is liable specifically for a guilt offering? One would be liable for slaughtering a sin offering outside the courtyard at its time as well. Rather, it is discussing a guilt offering that was slaughtered not at its time, i.e., when the nazirite or leper’s time had not yet arrived.
  The Gemara explains: And what is the <i>baraita</i> dealing with? If we say that it is dealing with one who slaughtered it for its sake, why would he be liable for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the courtyard if it is not fit for sacrifice? Rather, is the <i>baraita</i> not dealing with one who slaughtered it not for its sake, and the <i>baraita</i> states that one would be liable, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya? The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with one who slaughtered a guilt offering outside the courtyard at its proper time and not for its sake.
  And although there is ostensibly no need for an additional verse from which to derive the <i>halakha</i> in this case, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake inside the courtyard is fit for sacrifice, the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: We juxtapose a guilt offering with a sin offering in the verse: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; there is one law for them” (Leviticus 7:7), from which it may be derived that they have equivalent halakhic status. Therefore, a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified, and consequently one might say that one who slaughters a guilt offering not for its sake outside the Temple courtyard is exempt, as it is not fit for sacrifice. Therefore, the derivation from the verse is necessary.
  And the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> taught: Guilt offering, which, in this context, is secondary to the sin offering, as it is derived from the latter. But the same is true of the primary, i.e., the sin offering: One who slaughters it outside the courtyard not for its sake is liable.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i> in support of Rabbi Ḥilkiya: One might have thought that I include in liability even one who slaughters a burnt offering whose time has not yet arrived because it is intrinsically lacking, i.e., eight days have not yet passed; and one who slaughters a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, whether because it is intrinsically lacking or because it is premature for the owner.
  To counter this, the verse states with regard to one who slaughters outside the courtyard: “And has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that for any sacrifice that is unfit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable for slaughtering it outside the courtyard. But a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived was omitted by the <i>tanna</i>, from which it can be inferred that one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the courtyard is liable.
  The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say that the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a case where one slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard for its sake, then one who slaughters a guilt offering should also be exempt, as it is an offering whose time has not yet arrived. Rather, is it not dealing with a case of one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard not for its sake? In this case, one would be exempt for slaughtering it outside the courtyard, as if it is slaughtered inside the courtyard not for its sake it is disqualified. But in the case of a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived one would be liable, since it is fit for sacrifice, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.
  The Gemara responds: Actually, the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with one who slaughtered a sin offering whose time has not yet arrived, outside the courtyard not for its sake. And nevertheless, it may not be inferred that in the case of a guilt offering one would be liable, as this <i>baraita</i> may be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who juxtaposes a guilt offering with a sin offering; and one who slaughters a guilt offering is also exempt. The <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> omitted mention of a guilt offering because he taught: Sin offering, which is the primary case of the disqualification of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, and all the more so it applies to the secondary case, i.e., the guilt offering.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof for the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, as when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said that the school of Rabbi Livai taught a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that I exclude from the category of those who are liable for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard even one who slaughters a burnt offering whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner, or who slaughters a guilt offering of a nazirite or the guilt offering of a leper whose time has not yet arrived due to its being premature for its owner. From where is it derived that one is liable for doing so? Rav Dimi added: And the Sages brought a derivation from a verse to prove that one is liable, but I do not know what the derivation is.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation? Ravina said that it is derived from the verse cited above with regard to offerings that are slaughtered outside the courtyard, where “ox” indicates in any case of an ox, “lamb” indicates in any case of a lamb, and “goat” indicates in any case of a goat. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya, as the <i>baraita</i> is discussing a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived that is slaughtered not for its sake, and contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna. The Gemara asks: What contradiction is this? It can be resolved as you stated earlier: That the <i>baraita</i> is dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake at the proper time, and is accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rav Naḥman said that according to the opinion of Rav Dimi, the <i>baraita</i> cannot be interpreted as dealing with a guilt offering that was slaughtered at its proper time, because he raises a contradiction between the <i>baraita</i> that the school of Rabbi Livai taught and a <i>baraita</i> that Levi taught: The guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper that one slaughtered not for their sakes are fit, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  If one slaughtered them in a case where the offering was premature due to its owner, or if the lambs were in their second year when one slaughtered them, and not in their first year as required, they are disqualified, and one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable. This contradicts the <i>baraita</i> taught by the school of Rabbi Livai.
  And Rav Dimi answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the <i>baraita</i> that states that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is exempt, it is referring to a case where the animal whose time has not yet arrived was slaughtered for its sake; there, in the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that one who slaughters outside the courtyard is liable, it is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered not for its sake.
  Likewise, Rav Ashi raises a contradiction between the mishna, which teaches that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the courtyard is exempt, and the <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that one who does so is liable. And Rav Ashi answers: Here, the mishna that teaches that one is exempt is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered for its sake. And there, the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that one is liable is referring to a case where the offering was slaughtered not for its sake, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥilkiya.
  The Gemara says: If so, shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who holds that one who slaughters a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived not for its sake outside the courtyard is exempt?
  The Gemara replies that Rav Huna could have said to you: What are we dealing with here, in the <i>baraita</i> that deems one liable for a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake? We are dealing with a case where one separated two guilt offerings as a guarantee, so that atonement would be achieved through the sacrifice of the second if the first was lost, but before the proper time arrived he slaughtered one of them as a burnt offering rather than as a guilt offering. In this case there would be liability for slaughtering outside the courtyard, as is the case with one who slaughters a burnt offering outside the courtyard, since one of them, i.e., the one that will not effect atonement, is a burnt offering from the outset.
  
  Daf 115b
  
  This is in accordance with the statement that Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or achieved atonement through a different guilt offering and which was consigned to grazing in the field until it develops a blemish, and prior to its being consigned one slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit as a burnt offering.
  § The mishna teaches: One who offers up outside the Temple courtyard a portion of the meat of a sin offering that is eaten, or who offers up a portion of several other items, is exempt. With regard to the reasoning behind this <i>halakha</i>, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard a portion of the meat of a sin offering, or a portion of the meat of a guilt offering, or a portion of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, or a portion of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, or a portion of the surplus of the <i>omer</i> offering, or the two loaves, or the shewbread, or the remainder of meal offerings is exempt, as all these are eaten by the priests and not sacrificed on the altar?
  The verse states with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard: “Whatever man…that sacrifices a burnt offering or sacrifice, and brings it not to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord, that man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:8–9). The term “burnt offering” teaches: Just as a burnt offering is fit for offering up upon the altar, so too, anything that is fit for offering up is included in the prohibition. All of the offerings listed in the <i>baraita</i> are not sacrificed upon the altar but given to the priests.
  From where is it derived that even with regard to one who pours oil onto the meal offering, and one who mixes the oil into the flour of the meal offering, and one who breaks the loaves of the meal offering into pieces, and one who salts the meal offering or other offerings, and one who waves the meal offering, and one who brings the meal offering to the corner of an altar that he constructs outside the courtyard, and one who arranges the shewbread on the table outside the Sanctuary, and one who removes the ashes from the lamps of the Candelabrum, and one who removes a handful from a meal offering, and one who collects the blood of an offering in a vessel, if he did so outside the Temple courtyard he is exempt.
  The verse states: “That sacrifices a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8). Just as sacrificing is the conclusion of the sacri-ficial service, so too, any rite that is the conclusion of a sacrificial service is included. All of these are excluded from the prohibition, as there are rites that follow them.
  § The mishna teaches: Until the Tabernacle was established, private altars were permitted and the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn. The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Rav Ketina was sitting before Rav Ḥisda and was reading this verse with regard to the revelation at Sinai: “And he sent the young men of the children of Israel, who offered burnt offerings and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord” (Exodus 24:5). The young men referred to in the verse were the firstborn of the Jewish people. Rav Ḥisda said to him: This is what Rabbi Asi said: They sacrificed the offerings and then ceased to serve; after that day, the firstborn no longer performed the sacrificial service.
  Rav Huna thought to raise a contradiction from the mishna, which states that the firstborn performed not only the sacrificial service on that day, but also did so until the Tabernacle was established the following year. In the meanwhile, he heard Rav Ḥisda say in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava that the burnt offering that the children of Israel sacrificed in the wilderness before the establishment of the Tabernacle did not require flaying of the skin and cutting into pieces; it was sacrificed as it was. He therefore raised the contradiction from a <i>baraita</i> that is equal with regard to both of them, i.e., from which Rav Huna could raise a contradiction to both of Rav Ḥisda’s statements.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Until the Tabernacle was established, private altars were permitted, the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn, and all animals were fit to be sacrificed: A domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird; males and females; unblemished and blemished animals. All animal sacrifices were brought from animals and birds that were kosher, but not from non-kosher species.
  And all offerings brought before the construction of the Tabernacle were sacrificed as burnt offerings. And the burnt offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the wilderness before the Tabernacle was established required flaying of the skin and cutting into pieces. And today, gentiles are permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars. The <i>baraita</i> states explicitly that until the Tabernacle was constructed, the sacrificial service was performed by the firstborn, and the burnt offering required flaying and cutting.
  Rav Ḥisda replied that with regard to the firstborn, it is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: God said to Moses on Mount Sinai: “And let the priests also that come near to the Lord sanctify themselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them” (Exodus 19:22). In other words, they should separate themselves and not approach the mountain. This command was given one day after the burnt offerings and peace offerings were sacrificed in anticipation of the revelation at Sinai. With regard to this command, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: This command is a reference to the separation of the firstborn, as they functioned as priests. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This command is a reference to the separation of Nadav and Avihu, who were priests.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that the command for the priests to sanctify themselves is referring to the separation of Nadav and Avihu, this is the meaning of that which is written after their death on the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “Then Moses said to Aaron: This is it that the Lord spoke, saying: Through them that are near to Me I will be sanctified…and Aaron held his peace” (Leviticus 10:3). Nadav and Avihu had already been warned not to draw too close: “Lest the Lord break forth upon them.”
  But according to the one who says that the command for the priests to sanctify themselves is referring to the separation of the firstborn, where is the allusion to the fact that God would be sanctified through Nadav and Avihu? The Gemara replies: As it is written: “And there I will meet with the children of Israel; and it shall be sanctified by My glory” (Exodus 29:43). Do not read it as “by My glory [<i>bikhvodi</i>]”; rather, read it as: By My honored ones [<i>bimekhubadai</i>]. God will be sanctified by those considered honored by God when He reveals Himself in the Tabernacle.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, said this statement to Moses, but Moses did not know its meaning until the sons of Aaron died. Once the sons of Aaron died, Moses said to him: Aaron, my brother, your sons died only to sanctify the name of the Holy One, Blessed be He. When Aaron knew that his sons were beloved by the Omnipresent, he was silent and received a reward, as it is stated: “And Aaron held his peace [<i>vayidom</i>].”
  And likewise in a verse written by David it states: “Resign yourself [<i>dom</i>] to the Lord, and wait patiently [<i>vehitḥolel</i>] for Him” (Psalms 37:7). Although He strikes down many corpses [<i>ḥalalim</i>] around you, you be silent and do not complain. And likewise in a verse written by Solomon it states: “A time to keep silence, and a time to speak” (Ecclesiastes 3:7). There are times that one is silent and receives reward for the silence, and at times one speaks and receives reward for the speech.
  And this is what Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Awesome is God out of your holy places” (Psalms 68:36)? Do not read it as: “From your holy places [<i>mimikdashekha</i>]”; rather, read it as: From your holy ones [<i>mimekudashekha</i>]. When the Holy One, Blessed be He, carries out judgment upon His holy ones, He is feared, and exalted, and praised by all. In any event, there is no contradiction from the <i>baraita</i> which teaches that the first-born performed the sacrificial service before the Tabernacle was established, as this matter is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>.
  But there is still a difficulty with regard to the burnt offering, as it was stated in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava that the burnt offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the wilderness did not require flaying of the skin or cutting into pieces, while the <i>baraita</i> states that it did. The Gemara replies: This is a dispute between the opinions of two <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael says: The general statements, i.e., the principles of the Torah, were said at Sinai, and the details of the mitzvot that are explicated in Leviticus were said to Moses in the Tent of Meeting. This includes the <i>halakha</i> that the burnt offering must be flayed and cut into pieces. Consequently, it could not have been in effect before the construction of the Tabernacle.
  Rabbi Akiva says: Both general statements and the details of mitzvot were said at Sinai and later taught again in the Tent of Meeting, and taught a third time by Moses to the Jewish people in the plains of Moab, when he taught the Torah to the people (see Deuteronomy 1:1). According to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the <i>halakha</i> of flaying and cutting into pieces was in effect when the Torah was given, even before the construction of the Tabernacle.
  § The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: Before the Tabernacle was established, all animals were fit to be sacrificed: A domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, or a bird. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Huna said: As the verse states with regard to the offering that was sacrificed after the flood: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure fowl, and offered burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). The Gemara explains: “Animal [<i>behema</i>],” is understood in accordance with its plain meaning, a domesticated animal, and the same is true of fowl; an undomesticated animal [<i>ḥayya</i>] is included in the term “<i>behema</i>” that is stated in the verse.
  
  Daf 116a
  
  That which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: All animals were fit to be sacrificed: Males and females, unblemished and blemished animals, pertains to that which the Master said as a principle concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of sacrifices: The requirements that an offering must have unblemished status and that a burnt offering must have male status apply to animal offerings, but the requirements of unblemished status and male status do not apply to birds.
  And in the verses that recount Noah’s sacrifices upon exiting the ark, a domesticated animal is juxtaposed with a bird, in the verse: “Of every pure animal, and of every pure fowl” (Genesis 8:20), which teaches that kosher animals had a status identical to that of birds, and could be sacrificed whether male or female, unblemished or blemished.
  The Gemara adds: That which was taught in the <i>baraita</i>: Unblemished and blemished animals, serves to exclude animals that are lacking a limb, which were not fit for sacrifice. As Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived that an animal that is lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah, i.e., gentiles, to be used as a sacrifice? The verse states with regard to Noah: “And of every living being of all flesh, two of every sort shall you bring into the ark” (Genesis 6:19). With regard to the phrase: “And of every living being,” which is superfluous, the Torah stated: Bring an animal whose limbs are all living, not one lacking a limb, as that animal is disqualified from sacrifice.
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps this phrase: “And of every living being,” serves to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>] from being fit as a sacrifice. The Gemara explains: The disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> is derived from the phrase: “To keep seed alive” (Genesis 7:3), as a <i>tereifa</i> cannot propagate.
  The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the one who says that a <i>tereifa</i> cannot give birth. In this case the disqualification of the <i>tereifa</i> is derived from the verse: “To keep seed alive,” while the disqualification of the animal lacking a limb is derived from the verse: “And of every living being.” But according to the one who says that a <i>tereifa</i> can give birth, what can be said? According to this opinion, a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be excluded by the phrase: “To keep seed alive.” The Gemara explains: Doesn’t the verse state with regard to the animals that were brought by Noah into the ark: “You shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you” (Genesis 6:19)? The term “with you” indicates that the verse is stated with regard to animals that are similar to you, not a <i>tereifa</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But perhaps Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>. If so, one cannot exclude a <i>tereifa</i> from the comparison of animals to Noah. The Gemara answers: It is written about Noah that he was “complete” (Genesis 6:9), which indicates that he was physically whole and unblemished. The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the verse means that his ways were complete, and it is not referring to Noah’s physical attributes. The Gemara explains: It is already written about him that he was “righteous” (Genesis 6:9), which means that his actions were perfect. Consequently, when the verse says that he was also complete, it must be referring to his body.
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the verse means that Noah was complete in his manner, and he was righteous in his good deeds. Accordingly, the verse would not exclude the possibility that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara responds: If it enters your mind to say that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>, would the Merciful One have said to him: Bring in <i>tereifot</i> like you to the ark, but do not bring in whole and perfect animals? It is not reasonable to say that there would be a preference for him to bring <i>tereifot</i>. Rather, Noah was certainly not a <i>tereifa</i>, and the fact that a <i>tereifa</i> is disqualified for sacrifice is derived from “with you.”
  The Gemara asks: And once we derive the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> from the term “with you,” why do I need the phrase “to keep seed alive”? The Gemara answers: If one could derive only from “with you,” you would say that Noah brought the animals to the ark only for the purpose of companionship, and therefore even an animal that is old or even one who is castrated can come into the ark, provided that it is not a <i>tereifa</i>. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “To keep seed alive,” which teaches us that only animals that can bear offspring were allowed to be brought into the ark.
  § The <i>baraita</i> also teaches that before the Tabernacle was constructed, sacrifices were brought from animals and birds that were kosher, but not from non-kosher species. This is based on the verse that describes what Noah sacrificed when he exited the ark: “And he took of every pure animal and of every pure fowl and offered burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). The Gemara asks: And were there pure and impure species at that time, during the period of Noah? The distinction between pure, i.e., kosher species, and impure, i.e., non-kosher species, was introduced only after the Torah was given (see Leviticus, chapter 11). Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: The pure animals that Noah took were from those that had not been used in the performance of sin.
  The Gemara asks: From where did Noah and his sons know which animals had been used in the performance of a sin, in order to prevent them from entering the ark? The Gemara answers that it is in accordance with the statement of Rav Ḥisda. As Rav Ḥisda says: Noah caused all of the animals to pass before the ark. All animals that the ark accepted, i.e., drew in, was known to be pure; if the ark did not accept them, it was known that they were impure.
  Rabbi Abbahu says there is a different explanation as to how Noah knew which animals were pure or impure. The verse states: “And they that went in, went in male and female of all flesh” (Genesis 7:16), which means: Those that went in on their own. Consequently, Noah did not need to distinguish between pure and impure animals, as only the pure ones approached.
  § In describing the sacrificial service before the Tabernacle was constructed, the Master said: And all offerings brought before the construction of the Tabernacle were sacrificed as burnt offerings. The Gemara infers: Burnt offerings, yes, were sacrificed, but peace offerings were not sacrificed. The Gemara challenges: But with regard to the offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai at the time of the giving of the Torah, it is written: “And they offered burnt offerings, and sacrificed peace offerings of oxen to the Lord” (Exodus 24:5). This event occurred prior to the construction of the Tabernacle. Rather, say that the <i>baraita</i> means: All offerings sacrificed were either burnt offerings or peace offerings.
  The Gemara challenges: And isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i>: But peace offerings were not sacrificed before the construction of the Tabernacle; rather, only burnt offerings were sacrificed? Clearly, burnt offerings, yes, were sacrificed, but peace offerings were not sacrificed. The Gemara answers that this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that peace offerings were not sacrificed by the descendants of Noah. As it was stated that there is a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina with regard to this: One says that the descendants of Noah sacrificed peace offerings, and one says that they did not sacrifice peace offerings.
  The Gemara explains the two opinions: What is the reasoning of the one who says that the descendants of Noah sacrificed peace offerings? As it is written: “And Abel, he also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of the fat thereof” (Genesis 4:4). Abel, like all gentiles, is categorized as a descendant of Noah. The verse emphasizes that the fat was sacrificed. The Gemara analyzes: What is an item, i.e., an offering, the fat of which is sacrificed upon the altar, but that is not sacrificed in its entirety upon the altar? You must say: This is the peace offering, the meat of which is consumed.
  What is the reasoning of the one who says that they did not sacrifice peace offerings? As it is written: “Awake [<i>uri</i>], O north; and come, south…Let my beloved come into his garden, and eat his precious fruits” (Song of Songs 4:16). The Gemara interprets this homiletically: The nation, i.e., the nations of the world, who are the descendants of Noah, whose acts, i.e., sacrifices, are only in the north, i.e., they sacrifice only burnt offerings, which are slaughtered and their blood collected in the north of the Temple courtyard, shall be removed [<i>titna’er</i>], and in its place shall come the Jewish nation, whose acts, i.e., sacrifices, are in the north and in the south, as they sacrifice burnt offerings, whose rites are performed in the north, and peace offerings, whose rites may also be performed in the south, as the entire courtyard is fit for their rites.
  The Gemara asks: And also according to the Master who holds that the descendants of Noah did not sacrifice peace offerings, isn’t it written: “And of the fat thereof,” from which it may be derived that Abel sacrificed a peace offering? The Gemara answers: “The fat thereof,” does not mean that Abel sacrificed only the fats of his offerings; rather, it means that he sacrificed the fattest of them, i.e., the fattest and choicest of his animals.
  The Gemara asks: And also according to the Master who holds that the descendants of Noah did sacrifice peace offerings, isn’t it written: “Awake, O north,” from which it may be derived that the nations of the world do not sacrifice peace offerings? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, that verse is written with regard to the ingathering of the exiles, i.e., the Jewish exiles will come from the north and the south.
  With regard to the opinion that the descendants of Noah did not sacrifice peace offerings, the Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And Moses said: You must also give into our hand sacrifices [<i>zevaḥim</i>] and burnt offerings, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God” (Exodus 10:25)? This indicates that sacrifices [<i>zevaḥim</i>], i.e., peace offerings, were sacrificed before the Torah was given. The Gemara answers: In this context, “<i>zevaḥim</i>” is referring to animals to be used for consumption, as the word <i>zevaḥ</i> can also be translated as an animal for slaughter, and “burnt offerings” is referring to animals to be used for sacrifice.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written before the giving of the Torah: “And Yitro, Moses’ father-in-law, took a burnt offering and sacrifices [<i>zevaḥim</i>] for God” (Exodus 18:12)? Since the word <i>zevaḥim</i> there is referring to sacrifices, as the verse clearly states that Yitro took them for God, evidently peace offerings were sacrificed before the giving of the Torah. The Gemara answers: That verse was written with regard to the period after the giving of the Torah, when the Jewish people were permitted to sacrifice peace offerings.
  The Gemara notes: This works out well according to the one who says that the episode with Yitro was after the giving of the Torah. But according to the one who says that the episode with Yitro was before the giving of the Torah, what can be said? As it was stated: The sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi engage in a dispute concerning this issue. One says that the episode with Yitro was before the giving of the Torah, and one says that the episode with Yitro was after the giving of the Torah. The Gemara answers: The one who says that the episode with Yitro was before the giving of the Torah maintains that the descendants of Noah did sacrifice peace offerings.
  § The Gemara notes that the disagreement between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to when Yitro came to Mount Sinai is like a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: The Torah states with regard to Yitro, before he came to Mount Sinai: “Now Yitro, the priest of Midian, Moses’ father-in-law, heard of all that God had done for Moses, and for Israel His people, how the Lord had brought Israel out of Egypt” (Exodus 18:1). What tiding did he hear that he came and converted? Rabbi Yehoshua says: He heard about the war with Amalek, as it is written adjacent to the verses that state that Yitro came: “And Joshua weakened Amalek and his people with the edge of the sword” (Exodus 17:13).
  Rabbi Elazar HaModa’i says: He heard about the giving of the Torah and came. As when the Torah was given to the Jewish people, the voice of the Holy One, Blessed be He, went from one end of the world to the other end, and all of the kings of the nations of the world were overcome with trembling in their palaces and recited a song of praise, as it is stated: “The voice of the Lord makes the hinds to calve…and in his palace all say: Glory” (Psalms 29:9), i.e., each king in his own palace recited songs of praise to God.
  At that time, all of the kings gathered around Balaam the wicked, who was the greatest gentile prophet, and said to him: What is the tumultuous sound, i.e., the loud noise, that we have heard? Perhaps a flood is coming to destroy the world, as it is stated: “The Lord sat enthroned at the flood” (Psalms 29:10)? Balaam said to them: “The Lord sits as King forever” (Psalms 29:10), which means that the Holy One, Blessed be He, already took an oath after the flood never to bring a flood to the world, as it is stated: “And the waters shall no more become a flood” (Genesis 9:15).
  The kings said to him: He will not bring a flood of water, as he vowed, but perhaps He will bring a flood of fire, as in the future the Lord will punish the nations with fire, as it is stated: “For by fire will the Lord contend, and by His sword with all flesh; and the slain of the Lord shall be many” (Isaiah 66:16). Balaam said to them: He already took an oath that He will not destroy all flesh in any manner, as it is stated: “To destroy all flesh” (Genesis 9:15). Therefore, there will not be a flood of fire.
  They asked: And if so, what is this tumultuous sound that we have heard? Balaam said to them: He has a good and precious item in His treasury, that was hidden away with Him for 974 generations before the world was created, and He seeks to give it to his children, as it is stated: “The Lord will give strength to His people” (Psalms 29:11). “Strength” is a reference to the Torah, which is the strength of the Jewish people. Immediately, they all began to say: “The Lord will bless His people with peace” (Psalms 29:11).
  The Gemara offers another explanation of what Yitro heard: Rabbi Eliezer says: He heard about the splitting of the Red Sea and came, as it is stated in a similar context with regard to the splitting of the Jordan in the days of Joshua: “And it came to pass, when all the kings of the Amorites, that were beyond the Jordan westward, and all the kings of the Canaanites, that were by the sea, heard how that the Lord had dried up the waters of the Jordan from before the children of Israel, until they were passed over, that their heart melted, neither was there spirit in them anymore, because of the children of Israel” (Joshua 5:1). And even Rahab the prostitute said to Joshua’s messengers: “For we have heard how the Lord dried up the water of the Red Sea before you” (Joshua 2:10).
  The Gemara asks: What is different there, i.e., with regard to the splitting of the Jordan, where the verse states: “Neither was there spirit in them anymore,” and what is different here, i.e., in the statement of Rahab, where the verse states: “Neither did there remain [<i>kama</i>] any more spirit in any man” (Joshua 2:11)?
  
  Daf 116b
  
  The Gemara replies that Rahab used this phrase euphemistically, to say that their fear was so great that their male organs were not even able to become erect, as “<i>kama</i>” also means rise. The Gemara asks: And how did Rahab know this? The Gemara replies: As the Master said: You do not have any prince or ruler at that time who did not engage in intercourse with Rahab the prostitute.
  The Gemara adds that the Sages said with regard to Rahab: She was ten years old when the Jewish people left Egypt, and she engaged in prostitution all forty years that the Jewish people were in the wilderness. After that, when she was fifty years old, she converted when the two spies visited her. She said: May all of my sins of prostitution be forgiven me as a reward for having endangered myself with the rope, window, and flax, by means of which I saved Joshua’s two spies. Rahab first concealed the spies in stalks of flax, and later assisted them in exiting her home by lowering them from the window with a rope (see Joshua 2:6 and 2:15).
  § The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> that discussed the sacrifice of offerings before the construction of the Tabernacle: And today gentiles are permitted to do so, i.e., to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple courtyard, despite the fact that this is forbidden for the Jews. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught with regard to the verses that prohibit the slaughter of offerings outside the Temple: “Speak to Aaron, and to his sons, and to all the children of Israel” (Leviticus 17:2). This indicates that only Jews are commanded with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple, but gentiles are not commanded with regard to offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.
  Therefore, each and every gentile may, if he desires, construct a private altar for himself, and sacrifice upon it whatever he desires. Rabbi Ya’akov bar Aḥa says that Rav Asi says: Although it is permitted for gentiles to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple courtyard, it is prohibited for a Jew to assist them or to fulfill their agency in this matter, as sacrificing in this manner is forbidden for a Jew. Rabba said: But to instruct them how to sacrifice outside the Temple is permitted.
  This is similar to that incident in which Ifera Hurmiz, the mother of King Shapur of Persia, sent an offering to Rava, with which she sent this message to him: Sacrifice this for me, for the sake of Heaven. Rava said to Rav Safra and to Rav Aḥa bar Huna: Go, take two gentile youths of the same age, i.e., similar to one another, so that the sacrifice will be performed with maximal beauty, and see where the sea currently raises silt [<i>sirton</i>], which is a place that no one has used before. And take new wood and bring out fire from new vessels, and the two youths will sacrifice the offering for her, for the sake of Heaven.
  Abaye said to Rava: In accordance with whose opinion was the instruction to sacrifice exclusively with new wood? Was it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says: Just as the altar is a place that is not used by an ordinary person, so too, the wood that will be used must not be used by an ordinary person. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua concede that in the case of a private altar the wood need not be new?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to David’s purchase of the site of the Temple, when he wished to build an altar there at God’s instruction, one verse states: “So David gave to Ornan for the place six hundred shekels of gold by weight. And David built there an altar to the Lord, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings” (I Chronicles 21:25–26). And it is written elsewhere: “So David bought the threshing floor and the oxen for fifty shekels of silver. And David built there an altar to the Lord, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings” (II Samuel 24:24–25). How can these texts be reconciled?
  David would collect from each tribe of the twelve tribes fifty shekels, which are a sum of six hundred shekels. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says in the name of Abba Yosei ben Dostai that there is another explanation: David purchased the cattle and the wood and the site of the altar for fifty shekels, and he purchased the site of the entire Temple for six hundred shekels.
  Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says likewise: David purchased the cattle and the wood and the site of the altar for fifty shekels, and the site of the entire Temple for six hundred shekels, as it is written: “And Araunah said to David: Let my lord the king take and offer that which is good in his eyes; see the cattle for the burnt offering, and the threshing tools, and the implements of the cattle for the wood” (II Samuel 24:22), to which David replied: “No, but I will buy it from you at a price” (II Samuel 24:24). Consequently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua, David purchased the threshing instruments and the furniture of the oxen for use as wood. And Rava could have said to you in response: There too, in the case of David, the verse is dealing with new vessels that had not yet been used.
  The Gemara asks: What are “the threshing instruments [<i>morigim</i>]” mentioned in the verse? Ulla said: It is a <i>turbal</i> bed. The Gemara asks: What is a <i>turbal</i> bed? Abaye said: It is a heavy, serrated board [<i>dekurkesa</i>], used for threshing. Abaye said: What is the verse from which the meaning of <i>morigim</i> is derived? “Behold, I have made you a new threshing board [<i>morag</i>] having sharp teeth; you shall thresh the mountains, and beat them small, and shall make the hills as chaff” (Isaiah 41:15). This verse indicates that a <i>morag</i> has grooves and teeth, and is used for threshing.
  With regard to the contradiction between the verses that relate the sum of shekels paid by David, the Gemara says that Rava was teaching these verses to his son, and raised a contradiction between verses: It is written: “So David gave to Ornan…six hundred shekels of gold by weight” (I Chronicles 21:25), and it is written: “So David bought…fifty shekels of silver” (II Samuel 24:24). How can these texts be reconciled? David would collect from each tribe of the twelve tribes fifty shekels, which are a sum of six hundred shekels.
  The Gemara asks: But these verses are still difficult, as they contradict one another, since there in the book of Samuel it is stated that David paid silver shekels, while here in Chronicles it is stated that he paid gold shekels. The Gemara replies: Rather, this is what the verses are saying: David would collect from each tribe silver shekels that had the value of fifty gold shekels in weight, so that the value of the final sum was equal to six hundred gold shekels.
  § The mishna teaches that once the Tabernacle was established in the wilderness, offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten throughout the camp of Israel. Rav Huna says: This means that offerings of lesser sanctity were eaten in any of the places that an Israelite would be found. But there was no actual camp, outside of which it was prohibited to eat the offerings.
  Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Rav Huna: And were there not camps when the Jews were in the wilderness? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> (see <i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Kelim Bava Kamma</i> 1:12): Just as there was a camp in the wilderness that was divided into different sections, with each section having particular <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to the consumption of offerings and to the ritually impure individuals who were prohibited from entering there, so too, there is a corresponding camp in Jerusalem: The area from the walls of Jerusalem to the Temple Mount has the status of the Israelite camp. The area from the Temple Mount to Nicanor’s Gate at the entrance to the Temple courtyard has the status of the Levite camp.
  From that point onward, i.e., from the entrance to the Temple courtyard, the area has the status of the camp of the Divine Presence; and the Temple courtyard has the same status as the area within the curtains surrounding the courtyard of the Tabernacle in the wilderness.
  The Gemara replies: Rather, say that Rav Huna meant that when the Tabernacle was in the wilderness, offerings of lesser sanctity could be consumed wherever the Israelite camp was located. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Wherever the Jews were located in the wilderness was where the Israelite camp was. The Gemara responds: Lest you say that during the periods of travel between encampments the offerings were taken outside the Israelite camp, and were thereby disqualified due to the meat’s leaving the area within the partitions, Rav Huna teaches us that the meat is not disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say that this is indeed so, i.e., that the meat is disqualified because it left the camp? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “Then the Tent of Meeting, with the camp of the Levites, shall travel in the midst of the camps; as they encamp, so shall they travel” (Numbers 2:17), which indicates that although it traveled from its place it is still the Tent of Meeting. Similarly, the Israelite camp retains its status even while traveling.
  § With regard to the division of Jerusalem into three camps, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: There was an additional camp in Jerusalem, within the area of the Temple Mount, and it was the rampart of the women’s courtyard. The Sages rendered it prohibited for certain ritually impure individuals to enter that area, but they would not punish them for entering it, as by Torah law it does not constitute a distinct section of the Temple Mount but has the status of the Levite camp. The <i>baraita</i> adds: And when the Tabernacle was in Shiloh there were only two camps.
  The Gemara asks: Which of the three camps that were present in the wilderness was not present in Shiloh? Rabba said: It stands to reason that the Levite camp was present, but the Israelite camp was not. As, if it enters your mind to say that the Levite camp was not present in Shiloh,
  
  Daf 117a
  
  it would consequently be found that both <i>zavim</i> and those who are ritually impure from impurity imparted by a corpse are sent out of one camp, i.e., the camp of the Divine Presence, and both are permitted in the Israelite camp. But the Torah said with regard to sending the ritually impure out of the camp: “Outside the camp you shall put them; that they will not defile their camps” (Numbers 5:3).
  The use of the plural “camps” indicates: Give a specific camp to this group, i.e., those who are ritually impure from impurity imparted by a corpse, who may enter the Levite camp but are forbidden to enter the camp of the Divine Presence, and give a specific camp to this group, i.e., those who are <i>zavim</i>, who may enter the Israelite camp but are forbidden to enter the camp of the Divine presence or the Levite camp. If there were no Levite camp in Shiloh, it would follow that both a <i>zav</i> and one who is ritually impure from the impurity imparted by a corpse are sent out of only one camp, and there is no distinction between them.
  Rava said to him: Rather, what would you say instead? Would you say that the Israelite camp was not present in Shiloh? If so, it would be found that <i>zavim</i> and lepers are both sent to one place, i.e., outside the Levite camp. But the Torah said with regard to the leper: “He shall dwell alone; outside the camp shall his dwelling be” (Leviticus 13:46). The word “alone” teaches that another ritually impure person should not dwell with him.
  Rather, it must be that actually, all three camps were present in Shiloh, and what is the meaning of that which was taught with regard to Shiloh: There were only two camps? It is with regard to the fact that the Levite camp did not provide refuge to one who unintentionally killed another. The Gemara asks: By inference, does this mean that in the wilderness the Levite camp did provide refuge to those who unintentionally killed others?
  The Gemara replies: Yes, and so it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse concerning the cities of refuge. The verse states: “And one who did not lie in wait…and I will appoint for you a place where he may flee” (Exodus 21:13). The phrase “I will appoint for you” teaches that God said to Moses: There will be a place that provides refuge for unintentional murderers even during your lifetime. The term “a place” means that it will be from your place, meaning the Levite camp served as the place that provided refuge in the wilderness. “Where he may flee” teaches that the Jews would exile unintentional murderers in the wilderness as well, before they entered the land. To where did they exile unintentional murderers when they were in the wilderness? They exiled them to the Levite camp, which provided refuge.
  From here the Sages said: A Levite who killed unintentionally is exiled from one Levite city to another Levite city. And if he was exiled to another area within his city, he is admitted to his city, i.e., it provides him with refuge.
  The Gemara asks: What is the verse from which the principle is derived that one who was already exiled to a city of refuge and who then killed another person is exiled to another area in that same city? Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says that the verse: “For in his city of refuge he shall dwell” (Numbers 35:28), indicates that he can be exiled to a city in which he was already admitted, as the verse is referring to it as his city, and he shall continue to reside there.
  § The mishna teaches that when the Jewish people arrived at Gilgal private altars were permitted. The Gemara elaborates: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Any offering that was brought due to a vow, or contributed voluntarily, was sacrificed on a private altar; and any offering that is neither brought due to a vow nor contributed voluntarily, but rather is compulsory, was not sacrificed on a private altar. Therefore, a meal offering, which is generally brought voluntarily, and offerings of a nazirite, which have the status of vow offerings as no one is compelled to become a nazirite, were sacrificed upon a private altar. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Only burnt offerings and peace offerings were sacrificed upon a private altar, not meal offerings or offerings of a nazirite.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: Any offering that the public or an individual could sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness could also be sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal. What, then, is the difference between the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness and the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal? During the period of the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness private altars were not permitted and offerings could be sacrificed only in the Tabernacle, while during the period of the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal private altars were permitted. But even if one desired to sacrifice an offering upon his private altar on his roof, he could still sacrifice upon it only burnt offerings and peace offerings.
  And the Rabbis say: Any offering that the public could sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness could also be sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal, and here, in the Tabernacle in Gilgal, and there, upon private altars, only burnt offerings and peace offerings were sacrificed for an individual. Rabbi Shimon says: Even the public did not sacrifice every type of offering in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal; they sacrificed only Paschal offerings
  
  Daf 117b
  
  and compulsory public offerings that have a set time to be sacrificed, e.g., daily offerings and additional offerings. Public offerings that do not have a set time were not sacrificed upon the great public altar in Gilgal.
  § The Gemara explains the various opinions cited in the <i>baraita</i>: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir that only vow offerings and gift offerings, such as nazirite offerings and meal offerings, were sacrificed upon a private altar during the period of Gilgal? It is as the verse states: “You shall not do all that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is fitting in his own eyes. For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance” (Deuteronomy 12:8–9).
  Moses said the following to the Jewish people: When you enter Eretz Yisrael but have not yet arrived at Shiloh or Jerusalem and are therefore permitted to sacrifice upon private altars, you may not sacrifice whatever has been sacrificed in the wilderness, i.e., both obligatory offerings and gift offerings. Rather, the phrase “every man whatsoever is fitting [<i>hayashar</i>] in his own eyes,” means that fitting offerings [<i>yesharot</i>], i.e., offerings that are fitting in one’s eyes and are brought due to one’s own benevolence, you may sacrifice, but you may not sacrifice obligatory offerings. Meal offerings and offerings of a nazirite are included in the category of fitting offerings: Meal offerings are sacrificed as vow offerings or gift offerings while offerings of a nazirite are considered a vow offering, as becoming a nazirite is not compulsory.
  And what is the reason that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and state that meal offerings and offerings of a nazirite were not sacrificed on a private altar? They hold that a meal offering is not ever sacrificed upon a private altar and that offerings of a nazirite are considered compulsory. While one assumes the status of a nazirite voluntarily, once he has become a nazirite he is required to bring the offering.
  With regard to this, Shmuel says that the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis pertains only to the sin offering and the guilt offering brought by the nazirite. But with regard to the burnt offering and the peace offering that the nazirite brings, all agree that they are considered offerings that one deems fitting to sacrifice and are therefore sacrificed on a private altar.
  Rabba raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> of the breast and thigh portions of peace offerings, which are given to the priests (see Leviticus 7:34), and the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, i.e., the bread that was given to the priests from each of the four types of loaves that were brought with the thanks offering (see Leviticus 7:14), apply only with regard to a great public altar, and do not apply with regard to a small private altar. Rabba comments: By contrast, another of the priestly gifts, the cooked foreleg of the nazirite’s ram (see Numbers 6:19–20) was omitted by the <i>tanna</i>.
  Rabba notes: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree even with regard to whether a burnt offering and peace offering of a nazirite may be sacrificed upon a private altar, then in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i> that omits the nazirite’s ram? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the peace offering of the nazirite was not sacrificed upon a private altar. But if you say that they disagree only with regard to a sin offering and guilt offering, while the Rabbis agree that the peace offering and burnt offering of a nazirite were sacrificed on a private altar, then in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>?
  Rather, if this was stated, it was stated like this: Shmuel said that the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis pertains only to the burnt offering and peace offering that were brought by the nazirite. But with regard to the sin offering and guilt offering, all agree that they are compulsory, and even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir they are not sacrificed upon a private altar.
  § The Gemara continues to clarify the opinions in the <i>baraita</i>: The Master, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, said that any offering that the public or an individual could sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness, including vow offerings, gift offerings, and compulsory offerings, could also be sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal. It was only on a private altar that the individual was limited to sacrificing burnt offerings and peace offerings. And the Rabbis say: Any offering that the public could sacrifice in the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness could also be sacrificed in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal. An individual could sacrifice only burnt offerings and peace offerings, whether on a great public altar or on a private altar.
  The Gemara clarifies the two opinions: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis that only the public could sacrifice compulsory offerings on a great public altar? The verse states with regard to the period in which private altars were permitted: “You shall not do all that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is fitting in his own eyes” (Deuteronomy 12:8). This indicates that it is “a man,” i.e., an individual, who may sacrifice only offerings that he deems “fitting,” i.e., voluntary offerings, but may not sacrifice compulsory offerings. But the public may sacrifice even compulsory offerings.
  
  Daf 118a
  
  And Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an individual may also sacrifice compulsory offerings on a great public altar, could have said to you that when the phrase “whatsoever is fitting” is written, indicating that individuals may sacrifice only vow offerings and gift offerings, it is with regard to “in his own eyes” that it is written. In other words, it is referring to a location that is fitting in his eyes for sacrifice, i.e., a private altar. But on a great public altar, even compulsory offerings may be sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: But even if that derivation is correct, isn’t “man” written in that verse? Isn’t that to say that with regard to “a man,” i.e., an individual, only offerings that one deems fitting to sacrifice may be sacrificed, but compulsory offerings may not be sacrificed? The Gemara replies: When “man” is written in this verse, it is to qualify a non-priest to perform the sacrificial service on a private altar.
  The Gemara challenges: But the fact that a non-priest is qualified to perform the sacrificial service on a private altar is derived from the verse: “And the priest shall dash the blood against the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). The verse indicates that service at a great public altar may be performed only by a priest, from which it is inferred that the service on a private altar may be performed by a non-priest as well.
  The Gemara replies: Lest you say that whereas that verse indicates it is not required that the service on a private altar be performed by a priest, nevertheless consecration of the firstborn is required for this purpose, as was the case initially, i.e., before the Tabernacle was constructed. Perhaps the only non-priests who may perform the service on private altars are the firstborn sons. Therefore, the verse states: “Every man whatsoever is fitting in his own eyes,” which teaches us that with regard to private altars, each person may sacrifice his own offerings.
  § The Gemara clarifies the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, by questioning: But the statement of the Rabbis is identical to the statement of the first <i>tanna</i>, i.e., the Rabbis cited at the beginning of the <i>baraita</i>, who say that on a private altar an individual sacrificed only burnt offerings and peace offerings. What is the difference between the first <i>tanna</i> and the Rabbis?
  Rav Pappa said: The difference between them is whether libations were offered in the wilderness along with burnt offerings and peace offerings. According to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, libations were not offered in the wilderness, nor were they offered in Eretz Yisrael during the period of Gilgal. According to the Rabbis in the latter section of the <i>baraita</i>, libations were offered in the wilderness and in Gilgal.
  § The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says that even the public did not sacrifice all offerings in the Tent of Meeting in Gilgal; they sacrificed only Paschal offerings and compulsory public offerings that have a set time. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And the children of Israel encamped in Gilgal; and they kept the Passover on the fourteenth day of the month at evening in the plains of Jericho” (Joshua 5:10).
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that they brought the Paschal offering? The Paschal offering is compulsory. Rather, this verse teaches us that in Gilgal, only compulsory offerings similar to the Paschal offering, i.e., that have a set time, were sacrificed, but offerings that are not similar to the Paschal offering were not sacrificed. The Gemara asks: And how does the other <i>tanna</i>, i.e., the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that during the period of Gilgal other offerings were sacrificed by the public, interpret the verse?
  The Gemara responds: It is necessary for the <i>halakha</i> that was taught by Rabbi Yoḥanan. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bena’a: If an uncircumcised Jew contracted ritual impurity from a corpse, he may receive sprinkling of the water containing the ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh days of his purification, despite the fact that he is uncircumcised. In the time of Joshua, the Jewish people became circumcised after they were purified from impurity imparted by a corpse.
  § With regard to the Paschal offering and compulsory public offerings that have a set time mentioned by Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara relates that a <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> in the presence of Rav Adda bar Ahava: The difference between a great public altar, e.g., the altar in Gilgal, and a small private altar is only that the Paschal offering and compulsory offerings that have a set time may be sacrificed upon a great public altar, but not upon a private altar. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him: From where would an individual sacrifice compulsory offerings that have a set time? There is no such offering brought by an individual. It was therefore unnecessary for the <i>tanna</i> to state that this type of offering is not sacrificed on a private altar.
  The <i>tanna</i> said to him: If so, shall I remove it from the text of the mishna, and teach only: Paschal offerings? Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him: That is not necessary; interpret your mishna as referring to a compulsory burnt offering, i.e., the burnt offering of appearance brought on the pilgrimage Festivals by every individual, which is not sacrificed on a private altar, as there is, conversely, a voluntary burnt offering that may be sacrificed on a private altar. This <i>baraita</i> must be discussing a burnt offering brought by an individual, as if it is referring to a sin offering brought by an individual, are there compulsory sin offerings that have a set time?
  The Gemara asks: And let him establish the <i>baraita</i> as referring to the compulsory meal offering of an individual, which has a set time, as there is the griddle-cake offering that the High Priest was obligated to sacrifice every day and that may be sacrificed only upon a great public altar, not upon a private altar. The Gemara replies: Rav Adda bar Ahava holds that there is no meal offering sacrificed upon an altar outside the Temple, even a great public altar.
  § The mishna teaches that when they arrived at Shiloh, private altars were prohibited. There was no roof of wood or stone in the Tabernacle in Shiloh; there was only a building of stone below, and the curtains of the roof of the Tabernacle were spread above it. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One verse states, with regard to Hannah bringing Samuel to the Tabernacle: “And she brought him to the house of the Lord in Shiloh” (I Samuel 1:24), and one verse states: “And He forsook the Tabernacle of Shiloh, the tent that He had made to dwell among men” (Psalms 78:60). And in addition, it is written: “Moreover he abhorred the tent of Joseph and chose not the tribe of Ephraim” (Psalms 78:67).
  One verse describes the Tabernacle in Shiloh as a house, while the other describes it as a tent. How can these texts be reconciled? As the mishna states: There was no roof  of wood or stone there; rather, there was stone below, and it was therefore described as a house, and the curtains of the Tabernacle were spread above it, and it was therefore described as a tent. And the period that the Tabernacle was in Shiloh was characterized in the Torah as “rest” in the verse: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God has given you” (Deuteronomy 12:9).
  § The mishna teaches that during the period of Shiloh, offerings of the most sacred order were eaten within the curtains, and offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe were eaten in any place that overlooks Shiloh. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Oshaya said: As in the context of the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Tabernacle, the verse states: “Take heed to yourself that you do not offer your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13), from which it may be inferred: You may not offer up in every place that you see, but you may eat the offerings in every place that you see.
  The Gemara challenges: Say instead the following inference: You may not offer up offerings upon an altar in every place that you see, but you may slaughter offerings in every place that you see. It would therefore be permitted to slaughter offerings in any place that overlooks Shiloh.
  Rabbi Yannai said that the subsequent verse states: “But in the place that the Lord shall choose in one of your tribes, there you shall offer your burnt offerings, and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). This verse teaches that all of the sacrificial service is performed in the place that the offering is burned, and only the consumption of offerings of lesser sanctity is permitted in any place that overlooks Shiloh.
  Rabbi Avdimi bar Ḥasa said that when describing the boundaries of the portions of Eretz Yisrael of the children of Joseph, wherein Shiloh was located, the verse states:
  
  Daf 118b
  
  “And the border turned about eastward to Taanath Shiloh” (Joshua 16:6), a place adjacent to Shiloh. Why did it bear the name of Taanath Shiloh? It is because it was the place from which whoever saw the Tabernacle in Shiloh after its destruction would moan [<i>mitane’aḥ</i>] for it with regard to the consumption of sacrificial animals from offerings of lesser sanctity that had been previously permitted there, but was now no longer permitted.
  Rabbi Abbahu says that a different biblical allusion may be found in what the verse states in the context of Jacob’s blessing to Joseph: “Joseph is a fruitful vine, a fruitful vine by a fountain [<i>ayin</i>]” (Genesis 49:22). The Gemara interprets the word fountain homiletically: An eye [<i>ayin</i>] that did not wish to partake or derive benefit from something that was not his, i.e., the wife of Potiphar, shall merit to have offerings of lesser sanctity consumed in Shiloh, in Joseph’s portion of Eretz Yisrael, to the fullest extent of its eyes, i.e., from wherever Shiloh can be seen.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says that another allusion may be found in the context of Moses’ blessing to Joseph: “And the good will of Him Who dwelt in the bush [<i>seneh</i>]” (Deuteronomy 33:16). The Gemara interprets the word “<i>seneh</i>” homiletically: An eye that did not wish to derive benefit from something that was not his shall merit to have offerings of lesser sanctity consumed among the haters [<i>senu’in</i>]. In other words, offerings of lesser sanctity may be consumed in any place that overlooks Shiloh, even in the portions of the other tribes, who are described by the Torah as hating Joseph (see Genesis, chapter 37).
  § With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that during the period of Shiloh offerings of lesser sanctity could be eaten in any place that overlooks Shiloh, it was taught: The term: Overlooks, that was stated in the mishna, means that one sees it in its entirety, and there is nothing that obstructs between the seer and the surrounding area. Rabbi Shimon ben Elyakum said to Rabbi Elazar: I shall explain this type of seeing to you: For example, the synagogue of Maon, which was adjacent to the city of Tiberias, and from where Tiberias could be seen. Rav Pappa said that the term: Overlooks, that was stated does not mean that one must see the Tabernacle in Shiloh in its entirety, but rather even if one sees it partially, offerings of lesser sanctity may be consumed there.
  With regard to the definition of overlooking, Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one is in a place where he stands and sees Shiloh, but if he sits he does not see Shiloh, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is this considered overlooking? Likewise, Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one is in a place where he can stand upon the bank of the stream and see Shiloh, but if he is in the stream he does not see Shiloh, what is the <i>halakha</i>? No resolution is found for either of these questions, and the Gemara concludes: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
  § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The Divine Presence rested upon the Jewish people in three places: In Shiloh, and Nov and Gibeon, and the Eternal House, and in all of those the Divine Presence rested only in the portion of the tribe of Benjamin, as it is stated in Moses’ blessing to Benjamin: “The beloved of the Lord shall dwell in safety by Him; He covers him all the day and He dwells between his shoulders” (Deuteronomy 33:12), meaning: All coverings, i.e., times of resting of the Divine Presence upon the Jewish people, shall be only in the portion of Benjamin.
  The Gemara relates that when Abaye went to study Torah with Rav Yosef, he said the statement of Rav Dimi before Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef said in response: Kaylil, Abaye’s father, had one son, and he is not proper. But isn’t it written with regard to the Tabernacle in Shiloh: “And He forsook the Tabernacle of Shiloh” (Psalms 78:60); and it is written: “Moreover He abhorred the tent of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephraim” (Psalms 78:67)? These verses indicate that the Tabernacle in Shiloh was in the portion of Joseph, not of Benjamin.
  Rav Adda said: What is Rav Yosef’s difficulty from that verse? Perhaps the Tabernacle was in both the portion of Benjamin and that of Joseph. The Divine Presence was in the portion of Benjamin, and the Great Sanhedrin, which sits adjacent to the location of the Divine Presence, was in the portion of Joseph. This is similar to what we found in the case of the Eternal House, where the Divine Presence was in the portion of Benjamin and the Sanhedrin was in the portion of Judah.
  Rav Yosef said to him in response: How can these cases be compared? There, in the Temple in Jerusalem, the portions of Benjamin and Judah were close to each other, and a division in which the Temple was located in the portion of one tribe while the Sanhedrin was located in the portion of another was possible. Here, with regard to Shiloh, are Shiloh and the portion of Benjamin close to each other? The Gemara replies: Here too they are close, as Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: A strip of land protruded from the portion of Judah and entered into the portion of Benjamin, and the altar in the Temple was built on that strip. And the tribe of Benjamin the righteous would agonize over it every day, desiring to take it into its portion, due to its unique sanctity.
  Here too, with regard to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, a strip of land protruded from the portion of Joseph and entered into the portion of Benjamin, which connected Shiloh to the portion of Benjamin, and it was upon that strip, which had the status of Benjamin’s portion, that the Tabernacle stood. And that is what it means concerning that which is written with regard to the boundary of Joseph: “And the border turned about eastward to Taanath Shiloh” (Joshua 16:6), which in this context, is interpreted as meaning that the tribe of Benjamin would bemoan the fact that the Tabernacle in Shiloh was not located entirely in its portion.
  The Gemara notes that the dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the tribe in which the Tabernacle in Shiloh was located is like a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught with regard to Moses’ blessing to Benjamin: “He covers him”; this is a reference to the First Temple. “All the day”; this is a reference to the Second Temple. “And He dwells between his shoulders”; this is a reference to the messianic era.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: “He covers him”; this is a reference to this world. “All the day”; this is a reference to the messianic era. “And He dwells between his shoulders”; this is a reference to the World-to-Come. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, the Divine Presence dwelled in the portion of Benjamin from the first Temple period and onward, but not during the period of the Tabernacle in Shiloh, when it was in the portion of Joseph. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the entire period that the Divine Presence dwelled in this world, including the period of Shiloh, it did so in the portion of Benjamin.
  § With regard to the duration of the different periods mentioned in the mishna, the Sages taught: The days of the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness were forty years, less one year. The days of the Tent of Meeting that were in Gilgal were fourteen years: Seven years during which the Jews conquered the land and seven years during which they divided the land among the tribes. The days of the Tent of Meeting that were in Nov and Gibeon were fifty-seven years, until the Temple in Jerusalem was constructed. Since the Temple was constructed 480 years after the Exodus from Egypt (see I Kings 6:1), it follows that there remain for the period of the Tabernacle in Shiloh 370 years less one.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the days of the Tent of Meeting that were in the wilderness were forty years less one? As the Master said in a <i>baraita</i>: In the first year after the Exodus from Egypt, Moses constructed the Tabernacle; in the second year the Tabernacle was erected, and Moses sent spies. Because of the sin of the spies, the Jewish people remained in the wilderness for forty years. It follows that the Tabernacle in the wilderness stood for thirty-nine years.
  From where do we derive that the Tabernacle remained in Gilgal for fourteen years, seven years during which the Jews conquered the land and seven years during which they divided it? As Caleb, son of Jephunneh, said to Joshua at the conclusion of the period of conquest before the land was divided: “Forty years old was I when Moses, the servant of the Lord, sent me from Kadesh Barnea to spy out the land; and I brought him back word as it was in my heart” (Joshua 14:7), and it is written: “And now, I am this day eighty and five years old” (Joshua 14:10).
  When the Jewish people crossed the Jordan, how old was Caleb? He was seventy-eight years old: The spies were sent by Moses in the second year after the Exodus from Egypt, and in the fortieth year they crossed the Jordan. And at the time of the division of the Land, he said that he was eighty-five years old. This indicates that it was seven years during which the Jews conquered the land.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that there were seven years during which they divided the land? If you wish, say: Since it was a period of seven years in which they conquered the land, it was presumably also a period of seven years in which they divided the land.
  And if you wish, say instead: Because otherwise, you do not find any plausible explanation for the date mentioned by the prophet Ezekiel in the verse: “In the beginning of the year, on the tenth day of the month, in the fourteenth year after that the city was smitten” (Ezekiel 40:1). This indicates that it was a Jubilee Year, unless capturing and dividing the land took a total of fourteen years, after which point they began to calculate Sabbatical and Jubilee Years.
  § The <i>baraita</i> stated that the period of the Tent of Meeting that was in Nov and Gibeon was fifty-seven years. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As it is written in the description of the death of Eli the High Priest, upon being informed that the Ark was captured by the Philistines: “And it came to pass, when he made mention of the Ark of God, that he fell from off his seat backward by the side of the gate, and his neck broke, and he died” (I Samuel 4:18).
  And a <i>tanna</i> taught: When Eli the priest died, Shiloh was destroyed and the Jews arrived at Nov, where they erected the Tabernacle. At that time, Samuel began to lead the people. When Samuel from Rama died, Nov was destroyed by Saul (see I Samuel 22:19) and they arrived at Gibeon, where the Tabernacle remained (see I Chronicles 16:39).
  The Gemara determines the number of years from when the Ark was captured by the Philistines and Shiloh was destroyed: And it is written: “And it came to pass, from the day that the Ark abode in Kiriath Jearim that the time was long; for it was twenty years; and all the house of Israel yearned after the Lord” (I Samuel 7:2). The Ark was returned by the Philistines to Kiriath Jearim seven months after it was captured, and it remained there for twenty years, until David brought it to Jerusalem.
  The Gemara explains that these twenty years are calculated as follows: Ten years that Samuel reigned alone, from the death of Eli until the coronation of Saul, and one year that Samuel and Saul reigned, i.e., Saul reigned for one year during the lifetime of Samuel, and two years that Saul reigned alone after the death of Samuel. And in addition to these thirteen years, there were the seven years of David’s reign in Hebron, before the years of his reign in Jerusalem.
  
  Daf 119a
  
  As it is written: “And the days that David reigned over Israel were forty years: Seven years he reigned in Hebron, and thirty-three years he reigned in Jerusalem” (I Kings 2:11). In the first year that David reigned in Jerusalem he brought the Ark there from Kiriath Jearim. The Ark was therefore in Kiriath Jearim for twenty years. When the thirty-three years of David’s reign in Jerusalem are added to these, there are a total of fifty-three years from the destruction of Shiloh. During all of these years, and at the beginning of Solomon’s reign, the Tabernacle was in Nov and Gibeon (see I Kings 3:4).
  And with regard to the construction of the Temple in the time of Solomon, it is written: “And he began to build it in the second day of the second month, in the fourth year of his reign” (II Chronicles 3:2), which was the 480th year following the Exodus (see I Kings 6:1). When the forty years in the wilderness, the fourteen years that the Tabernacle stood in Gilgal, and the fifty-seven years that the Tabernacle stood in Nov and Gibeon, which totals 111 years, are subtracted from the 480, there remain for Shiloh 370 less one years in which the Tabernacle stood there.
  § The mishna teaches that when Shiloh was destroyed and they arrived at Nov and Gibeon, private altars were permitted and offerings of lesser sanctity could be eaten in any city in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? they are derived as the Sages taught: The Jewish people were told that when they enter Eretz Yisrael they would be permitted to sacrifice on private altars, “for you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance” (Deuteronomy 12:9), during which time those altars would be prohibited.
  The Gemara interprets the verse: “To the rest”; this is a reference to Shiloh. “The inheritance”; this is a reference to Jerusalem. One may ask: Why does the verse divide them into two terms, i.e., “rest” and “inheritance”? It is in order to give permission to sacrifice on private altars during the period between this one and that one. Therefore, it was permitted to sacrifice on private altars during the period of Nov and Gibeon.
  Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Let the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to second tithe as well. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Second tithe is derived from what was written with regard to the Ark, by means of the verbal analogy between “there” and “there.” With regard to second tithe, the verse states: “And there you shall eat before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:7), while with regard to the Ark, the verse states: “There you shall place the Ark of the Testimony” (Exodus 40:3). Due to the analogy between second tithe and the Ark, one can infer that since there was no Ark in Nov and Gibeon, as at that time it was in Kiriath Jearim, there was also no second tithe eaten there.
  Reish Lakish asked: If it is so that this is the source, then with regard to the Paschal offering and other sacrificial animals, which everyone agrees were consumed in Nov and Gibeon, it can also be said that they are derived from the Ark by means of the verbal analogy between “there” and “there,” and since the Ark was not in Nov and Gibeon they too were not there.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: With regard to the one who said this to you, i.e., the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, from which you inferred that second tithe was not eaten in Nov and Gibeon, in accordance with whose opinion is this statement of his? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: Even the public sacrificed upon a great public altar, e.g., in Nov and Gibeon, only Paschal offerings and compulsory public offerings that have a set time. But compulsory offerings that do not have a set time were not sacrificed here or there, i.e., on a great public altar or on a small private altar. This includes an animal tithe offering, which is a compulsory offering that has no set time, and grain tithe is juxtaposed to animal tithe. Since animal tithe offerings were not brought at that time, second tithe was not eaten there either.
  The Gemara asks: Based on this, may it be concluded by inference that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that compulsory offerings for which there is no set time were sacrificed upon a great public altar, second tithe was eaten there and animal tithe offerings were sacrificed? The Gemara responds: Yes, as Rav Adda bar Mattana says: Second tithe and animal tithe offerings were consumed in Nov and Gibeon according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara challenges: But these require the Temple, not a tent, to which people will come to eat tithes. The Gemara responds: But didn’t Rav Yosef teach a <i>baraita</i> that states: There were three temples: Shiloh, Nov and Gibeon, and the Eternal House. He teaches it and he says it: This is referring to consuming second tithe, and is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  § The mishna teaches that when they arrived at Jerusalem, private altars were prohibited and there was no subsequent period in which they were permitted. And the Temple in Jerusalem was characterized as “inheritance.” With regard to this, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse that discusses the permissibility of private altars states: “For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance” (Deuteronomy 12:9). The Gemara interprets: With regard to “rest,” this is a reference to Shiloh, and with regard to “inheritance,” this is a reference to Jerusalem.
  And similarly, the verse that relates a prophecy with regard to Jerusalem states: “I have forsaken My house, I have cast off My inheritance…My inheritance has become to Me as a lion in the forest” (Jeremiah 12:7–8). And additionally, in that same prophecy the verse states: “Is My inheritance to Me as a speckled bird of prey? Are the birds of prey against her round about?” (Jeremiah 12:9). This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  By contrast, Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to “rest,” this is a reference to Jerusalem, and with regard to “inheritance,” this is a reference to Shiloh. And this is evident from the verse that says: “This is My resting place forever; here will I dwell, for I have desired it” (Psalms 132:14). And it states in the previous verse: “For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His habitation” (Psalms 132:13), which indicates that the verses are referring to Jerusalem.
  The Gemara challenges: Granted, according to the one who says that with regard to “rest,” this is a reference to Shiloh; that is, as it is written: “To the rest and to the inheritance,” in chronological order, as the period of Shiloh preceded that of Jerusalem. But according to the one who says that with regard to “rest,” this is a reference to Jerusalem, and with regard to “inheritance,” this is a reference to Shiloh, the verse should have stated: To the inheritance and to the rest. The Gemara explains: This is what the verse is saying: When you enter Eretz Yisrael private altars will be permitted, and it is not necessary to say that you have not arrived at the “rest,” i.e., the Temple in Jerusalem, but you have not even arrived at the “inheritance,” i.e., the Tabernacle in Shiloh.
  § With regard to the words “rest” and “inheritance” in the aforementioned verse, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that this and that, i.e., both terms, are a reference to Shiloh. Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: This and that are a reference to Jerusalem. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that with regard to “rest,” this is
  
  Daf 119b
  
  a reference to Shiloh, and with regard to “inheritance,” this is a reference to Jerusalem, or the reverse, i.e., that “rest” is a reference to Jerusalem and “inheritance” is a reference to Shiloh, this is as it is written: “To the rest and to the inheritance [<i>el hamenuḥa ve’el hanaḥala</i>],” utilizing two different phrases. But according to the one, i.e., the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that this and that are both references to Shiloh, or according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai that both this and that are references to Jerusalem, the verse should have stated: For you have not as yet come to the rest and inheritance [<i>menuḥa naḥala</i>]. The Gemara concedes that this is difficult.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one, i.e., Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says this and that are references to Shiloh, each of the designations may be explained: It is called “rest” because during the period of Shiloh they rested from the conquest in the time of Joshua, and it is called “inheritance” because they divided the portions of land among the tribes there, as it is written: “And Joshua divided the land for them, and he cast a lot for them in Shiloh according to the Lord” (Joshua 18:10).
  But according to the one, i.e., the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says this and that are references to Jerusalem, granted that “inheritance” is a reference to Jerusalem, since it is an eternal inheritance. But with regard to “rest,” what rest was there in the Temple in Jerusalem? The Gemara answers: The rest of the Ark, as it is written: And when the ark rested. In other words, verses occasionally refer to the Temple in Jerusalem as the resting place of the Ark.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one, i.e., Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says that this and that are references to Jerusalem, and consequently private altars were forbidden only following the establishment of the Temple in Jerusalem, but during the period of the Tabernacle in Shiloh private altars were permitted, this is as it is written: “So Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered them upon the rock to the Lord” (Judges 13:19), i.e., he sacrificed them upon a private altar and not in Shiloh.
  But according to the one, i.e., the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that this and that are references to Shiloh, and private altars were forbidden during this period, what is the meaning of: “So Manoah took,” as it was forbidden to sacrifice offerings outside the Temple? The Gemara answers: Permitting this sacrifice was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances.
  The Gemara notes that with regard to the disagreement between the <i>tanna’im</i> over the interpretation of the words “rest” and “inheritance,” there is another version of that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says that this and that are references to Jerusalem. And your mnemonic to remember this is: The man pulled the men, meaning: Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who is an individual, pulled, i.e., convinced, the members of the school of Rabbi Yishmael to adopt his opinion.
  § The mishna teaches that with regard to all offerings that one consecrated during a period of the permitting of private altars and sacrificed outside their designated area during a period of prohibition of private altars, one is in violation of a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but he is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for sacrificing them. With regard to this, Rav Kahana says: They taught that only with regard to slaughter of these animals outside the designated area is one not liable to receive <i>karet</i>. But with regard to offering up, one would also be liable to receive <i>karet</i>.
  What is the reason for this? It is that immediately following the Torah’s description of an offering that was consecrated during a period of the permitting of private altars the verse states the penalty for sacrificing outside the designated area: “And to them [<i>va’alehem</i>] you shall say” (Leviticus 17:8). The term “<i>alehem</i>,” to them, the first letter of which is the letter <i>aleph</i>, is phonetically similar to the term: <i>Alehem</i>, about them, the first letter of which is the letter <i>ayin</i>. Therefore, the verse can be understood to mean: About that which is written in the adjacent passage you shall say. The preceding passage discusses offerings that were slaughtered outside the Temple, so although there is no penalty of <i>karet</i> for their slaughter, one is liable for <i>karet</i> for sacrificing them upon a private altar.
  Rabba objects to this: Is it written: And about them you shall say? “To them” is written, and we read it as “to them.” The verse means that the command should be relayed to Aaron, his sons, and the Jewish people, who are mentioned in the beginning of the passage.
  And additionally, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon would say four principles with regard to sacrificial animals: With regard to offerings that one consecrated during a period of prohibition of private altars, and slaughtered and offered up outside their designated area during a period of prohibition of private altars, for these one is in violation of a positive mitzva and a prohibition, and they carry the punishment of <i>karet</i>. With regard to one who consecrated them during a period of the permitting of private altars, and slaughtered and offered them up during a period of prohibition of private altars, for these one is in violation of a positive mitzva and a prohibition, but they do not carry the punishment of <i>karet</i>.
  With regard to one who consecrated them during a period of prohibition of private altars, and slaughtered and offered them up outside their designated area during a period of the permitting of private altars, for these one is in violation of a positive mitzva, but one has not violated a prohibition with regard to them.
  With regard to one who consecrated them during a period of the permitting of private altars, and slaughtered and offered them up during a period of the permitting of private altars, he is exempt from all violations. The <i>baraita</i> states explicitly that there is no distinction between slaughtering and offering up on a private altar: In both cases, one who consecrated the offering during a period of the permitting of private altars and slaughtered or offered it up during a period of prohibition of private altars is exempt from the punishment of <i>karet</i>. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Kahana, who distinguished between slaughter and offering up, is a conclusive refutation.
  § The mishna teaches: And these are the consecrated items, and lists components of the sacrificial service that were performed only on a great public altar, i.e., in the Tabernacle, and not on a private altar. The Gemara clarifies the source of each ritual on the list: The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning placing hands on the head of an offering is as it is written: “If his offering be a burnt offering…he shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, that he may be accepted before the Lord. And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:3–4).
  The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning slaughtering offerings of the most sacred order in the north is as it is written: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning placement of the blood of a burnt offering around, i.e., on all four sides of, the altar, is as it is written: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall…sprinkle the blood roundabout against the altar that is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 1:5).
  The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning waving of those offerings that require waving is as it is written: “And the priest shall take one of the lambs, and offer it for a guilt offering, and the <i>log</i> of oil, and wave them for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:12). The source for the <i>halakha</i> concerning bringing meal offerings to the corner of the altar before the removal of the handful is as it is written: “And he shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8). The definite article before the word “altar” indicates that this applies only to the altar in the Tabernacle, and not on a private altar.
  § With regard to the question of whether a meal offering was sacrificed upon an altar outside the Temple, the mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no meal offering sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple, even a great public altar, e.g., the Tabernacle in Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon. Rav Sheshet says: According to the statement of the one who says there is a meal offering sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple, there are also bird offerings sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple. According to the statement of the one who says there is no meal offering sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple, there are also no bird offerings sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple.
  The reason for this is that the Torah is referring to offerings that were sacrificed during the period of the permitting of private altars as: Slaughtered offerings [<i>zevaḥim</i>], in the verse: “And sacrifice them for sacrifices of [<i>vezaveḥu zivḥei</i>] peace offerings” (Leviticus 17:5), from which it may be inferred: Slaughtered offerings but not meal offerings; slaughtered offerings but not bird offerings, i.e., neither meal offerings nor bird offerings were sacrificed on an altar outside the Temple, including a great public altar.
  The Gemara continues detailing the distinctions between great public altars and small private altars: And a priest is required only at a public altar, as it is written: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood against the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). Priestly service vestments are required only at a public altar, as it is written: “And they shall be upon Aaron, and upon his sons when they go into the Tent of Meeting or when they come near to the altar to minister in the sacred place” (Exodus 28:43).
  And with regard to service vessels, it is written: “And they shall take all the service vessels wherewith they serve in the sacred place” (Numbers 4:12). With regard to a pleasing aroma, i.e., that limbs that had previously been roasted off the altar should not be placed upon the altar, it is required only on a public altar, as it is written: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood against the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and the priest shall make the fat smoke for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:6).
  A partition for the blood, i.e., the red line that divides the altar, as the blood of some offerings, e.g., a sin offering, was sprinkled above the line, and the blood of other offerings, e.g., a burnt offering, was sprinkled below the line, was required only on a public altar, as it is written: “And the net may reach halfway up the altar” (Exodus 27:5). The definite article before the word “altar” indicates that this applied only to the altar in the Tabernacle. With regard to the requirement for washing of hands and feet before the service, it is required only on a public altar, as it is written: “When they went into the Tent of Meeting and when they came near to the altar, they shall wash” (Exodus 40:32).
  § Concerning the <i>halakha</i> requiring a partition for the blood, and other <i>halakhot</i> that did not apply to a private altar but did apply to a great public altar, Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages taught that there is no requirement for a partition only with regard to consecrated sacrificial items to be used on a small private altar, and which one sacrificed upon a small private altar. But in the case of consecrated sacrificial items to be used on a small private altar that were sacrificed upon a great public altar, there is a partition.
  Rabba raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> of waving the breast and the thigh of a peace offering and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering applies with regard to sacrificial items of a great public altar and does not apply with regard to sacrificial items of a small private altar, even if they were sacrificed upon a great public altar. The Gemara responds: Say that the text of the <i>baraita</i> should be the following: The <i>halakha</i> of waving the breast and thigh and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering applies to a great public altar, even with regard to a sacrificial item of a small private altar, but does not apply to a small private altar.
  Some say that Rami bar Ḥama said: The Sages taught that there is a requirement for a partition only with regard to sacrificial items of a great public altar that were sacrificed upon a great public altar. But in the case of sacrificial items of a small private altar, even though they were sacrificed upon a great public altar, there is no partition.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama: Waving of the breast and thigh of a peace offering and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering applies to sacrificial items of a great public altar, and does not apply to sacrificial items of a small private altar.
  The Gemara responds: No proof may be brought from here, as I will say that it means the <i>halakha</i> of waving the breast and thigh and the <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of a thanks offering applies to a great public altar, even with regard to the sacrificial items of a private altar, and does not apply to a small private altar. The Gemara notes: And this latter version of Rami bar Ḥama’s statement disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: A burnt offering of a private altar that one brought inside, i.e., into the area of a great public altar, is absorbed, i.e., sanctified, by the partitions for all matters.
  With regard to the previous matter, Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: With regard to a burnt offering of a private altar
  
  Daf 120a
  
  that one brought inside and subsequently took outside, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does it have the status of a sacrificial item of a public altar? The Gemara clarifies the question: Do we say that once it was brought in the partition has already absorbed it, and all <i>halakhot</i> of sacrificial items of a public altar apply; or perhaps once it returns, i.e., was taken outside again, it returns to its prior status as an offering of a private altar?
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t this issue a disagreement between Rabba and Rav Yosef? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 2a): With regard to offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., a sin offering or a guilt offering, that were slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard, and not in the north as dictated by <i>halakha</i>, and are therefore disqualified, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property, and despite the fact that they should not ascend the altar, if they ascended they shall not descend.
  And a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If they did descend the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to ascending again? Rabba says: They shall not ascend, and Rav Yosef says: They shall ascend. Consequently, they disagree with regard to the issue of whether an item that is not fit to be sacrificed in a consecrated area acquires the sanctity of that area even if it is removed from there.
  The Gemara responds: The disagreements are not identical, as the dilemma can be raised according to the opinion of Rabba, and the dilemma can be raised according to the opinion of Rav Yosef. The Gemara elaborates: It is possible to raise the dilemma according to the opinion of Rabba, as Rabba says his statement: Offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south shall not descend if they ascended, only with regard to the altar, as the altar consecrates that which is fit for it, while it does not consecrate that which is not fit for it. But with regard to the partition of the public altar, even though an offering that was consecrated for a private altar is not fit for that altar, the partition nevertheless absorbs the offering and it is sacrificed there. Consequently, all the <i>halakhot</i> of the public altar apply to that offering, even if it is taken outside.
  Or perhaps the dilemma of the burnt offering of a private altar can be raised even according to the opinion of Rav Yosef. Rav Yosef states his opinion there, that offerings of the most sacred order that were slaughtered in the south of the Temple courtyard and descended the altar shall ascend again, only because the altar and the offering are both located in one place, i.e., the Temple courtyard. But here in Rabbi Zeira’s case, where the private altar and public altar are two separate places, the <i>halakhot</i> of the public altar do not apply if the offering was taken outside the designated location. Or perhaps there is no difference, and the opinions of Rabba and Rav Yosef in one case are identical to their opinions in the other. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  The Gemara notes that a matter that is obvious to Rabba on one side, i.e., that these offerings shall not ascend the altar again, and to Rav Yosef on the other side, i.e., that they shall ascend again, was raised as a dilemma by Rabbi Yannai. As Rabbi Yannai raises a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the limbs of a burnt offering of a private altar that ascended the altar and descended? The Gemara notes: In a case where the fire has not yet taken hold of them, do not raise the dilemma, as they certainly shall not ascend again. When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it in a case where the fire has taken hold of them: What is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § Additionally, with regard to a private altar it was stated: With regard to the slaughter of offerings at night on a private altar, Rav and Shmuel disagree: One says that it is valid, and one says that it is not valid. The Gemara explains: And they disagree with regard to the resolution to a contradiction that was raised by Rabbi Elazar.
  As Rabbi Elazar raised a contradiction between two verses: It is written in the context of Saul’s war with the Philistines: “And the people flew upon the spoil and took sheep and cattle and calves and slew them on the ground; and the people ate them with the blood. Then they told Saul, saying: ‘Behold, the people sin against the Lord in that they eat with the blood. And he said: You have dealt treacherously; roll a great stone to me this day” (I Samuel 14:32–33). That stone was made into a private altar upon which offerings could be slaughtered and sacrificed. Evidently, Saul was particular about slaughtering offerings during the day and not at night, despite the fact that it was a private altar and not a public altar.
  And immediately thereafter it is written: “And Saul said: Disperse yourselves among the people and say to them: Bring me here every man his ox and every man his sheep, and slay them here and eat and sin not against the Lord in eating with the blood. And all the people brought every man his ox with him that night, and slew them there” (I Samuel 14:34). This verse states explicitly that the slaughter took place at night and not during the day.
  Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the resolution of this contradiction: One Sage answers that here, i.e., when the slaughter took place at night, it was of non-sacred animals, while there, i.e., when Saul was particular about slaughtering during the day, it was the slaughter of sacrificial animals. According to this opinion, the sacrificial service was performed only during the day, even on a private altar. And the other Sage answers that both verses are referring to the slaughter of offerings: Here, in the verse that states that Saul was particular about slaughtering during the day, it is referring to the sacrificial animals of a great public altar, while there, in the verse that states that the slaughter took place at night, it is referring to sacrificial animals of a small private altar.
  § It was stated that with regard to the burnt offering of a private altar, Rav says: It does not require flaying and cutting into pieces, which the Torah requires of a burnt offering (see Leviticus 1:6), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It does require flaying and cutting into pieces. The Gemara explains: And they disagree with regard to the meaning of a statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The burnt offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the wilderness, i.e., at Mount Sinai before the establishment of the Tabernacle, did not require flaying and cutting into pieces, because the requirement of flaying and cutting into pieces applied only from the Tent of Meeting and onward, as this <i>halakha</i> was first taught in the Tent of Meeting.
  One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that from the Tent of Meeting and onward there is a requirement of flaying and cutting into pieces, and there is no difference whether the offering is brought upon a great public altar, and there is no difference whether it is brought upon a small private altar. And one Sage, Rav, holds that with regard to a great public altar, yes, flaying and cutting are required, but with regard to a small private altar they are not.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: What are the matters that are different between a great public altar and a small private altar? The corner of the altar, the ramp, the base of the altar, and the square shape are required in a great public altar, but the corner, the base, the ramp, and the square shape are not required in a small private altar. The Basin and its base are required in a great public altar, but the Basin and its base are not required in a small private altar. The breast and thigh of a peace offering, which are given to a priest, are waved at a great public altar, but the breast and thigh are not waved at a small private altar.
  And there are other matters in which a great public altar is identical to a small private altar: Slaughter is required at both a great public altar and a small private altar. Flaying a burnt offering and cutting it into pieces is required at both a great public altar and a small private altar. Sprinkling the blood permits the meat to be eaten, and if at that time the priest thought of eating or sacrificing this offering outside its appropriate time, this renders the offering <i>piggul</i> both at a great public altar and at a small private altar. Likewise, the <i>halakha</i> that blemishes disqualify an offering and the <i>halakha</i> that there is a limited time for eating offerings are in effect at both a great public altar and a small private altar.
  § Following the detailing of the differences between a communal altar and a private altar, the mishna teaches: But the <i>halakha</i> that portions of the offering left over [<i>notar</i>] beyond the time it is permitted must be burned and that one who eats them incurs <i>karet</i>, and the <i>halakha</i> that intent to sacrifice or partake of the offering beyond its designated time renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, and the prohibition against performing the sacrificial service or eating consecrated meat while ritually impure are equal in this, i.e., a private altar, and that, i.e., a public altar.
  With regard to this the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that time, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> that an offering left over beyond its designated time is disqualified, in the case of a small private altar should be made equivalent to the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a great public altar? The Torah stated: An offering that was left overnight must be burned, and likewise the Torah stated that an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>] must be burned. Therefore, another parallel may be drawn between them: Just as <i>piggul</i> is disqualified in the case of a private altar, so too, an offering that was left overnight is disqualified in the case of a private altar.
  Or go this way, and say that because the Torah stated: An offering that was left overnight must be burned, and likewise, the Torah stated that an offering that leaves the Temple courtyard must be burned, the following conclusion may be drawn: Just as an offering that leaves the Temple courtyard is valid in the case of a private altar because it has no set perimeter, so too, an offering that was left overnight is valid in the case of a private altar, and it may therefore be concluded that the <i>halakha</i> of time does not apply to offerings on a private altar. The Gemara asks: And is it not an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of bird offerings that in the case of a private altar, time should render an offering disqualified?
  
  Daf 120b
  
  If bird offerings, whose <i>halakhot</i> are more lenient in that a blemish does not disqualify them, are nevertheless disqualified by time, then with regard to sacrificial animals of a small private altar, which are disqualified by a blemish, is it not logical that they should be disqualified by time?
  The Gemara questions the inference: What is notable about bird offerings? They are notable in that a non-priest is not fit to sacrifice them. Shall you say the same with regard to offerings sacrificed on a small private altar, where a non-priest is fit? No, and consequently they should not be disqualified by time. Therefore, the verse states: “And this is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:11), which equates all peace offerings, to render the <i>halakha</i> of time with regard to a small private altar identical to the <i>halakha</i> of time with regard to a great public altar.
  