meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Nezikin/Avodah Zarah/English/William Davidson Edition - English.txt"}
text: Avodah Zarah
  עבודה זרה
  William Davidson Edition - English
  
  
  Avodah Zarah
  
  
  
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  MISHNA: On the three days before the festivals of gentiles the following actions are prohibited, as they would bring joy to the gentile, who would subsequently give thanks to his object of idol worship on his festival: It is prohibited to engage in business with them; to lend items to them or to borrow items from them; to lend money to them or to borrow money from them; and to repay debts owed to them or to collect repayment of debts from them. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may collect repayment of debts from them because this causes the gentile distress. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: Even though he is distressed now, when he repays the money, he is happy afterward that he is relieved of the debt, and therefore there is concern that he will give thanks to his object of idol worship on his festival.
  GEMARA: Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the correct version of the text of the mishna. One teaches the term meaning: Their festivals, as <i>eideihen</i>, spelled with an <i>alef</i> as the first letter, and one teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>ayin</i> as the first letter. The Gemara comments: The one who teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>alef</i> is not mistaken, and the one who teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>ayin</i> is not mistaken, as there is support for each version of the term.
  The Gemara elaborates: The one who teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>alef</i> is not mistaken, as it is written: “For the day of their calamity [<i>eidam</i>] is at hand” (Deuteronomy 32:35), and the future downfall mentioned in the verse is partly due to the festivals of idol worshippers. The term there is spelled with an <i>alef</i>. And likewise, the one who teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>ayin</i> is not mistaken, as it is written: “Let them bring their witnesses [<i>eideihem</i>], that they may be justified” (Isaiah 43:9), i.e., the festivals will serve as witnesses against gentile sinners, proving that they engaged in idol worship. The term there is spelled with an <i>ayin</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>alef</i>, what is the reason that he did not teach <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>ayin</i>? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that a term that refers to a calamity is preferable. The Gemara asks: And the one who teaches <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>ayin</i>, what is the reason that he did not teach <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>alef</i>? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you: What causes this calamity to happen to them? It is the testimony that they testified against themselves. Therefore, a term that references testimony is preferable.
  The Gemara asks: But is this verse: “Let them bring their witnesses that they may be justified,” written with regard to the nations of the world? Isn’t it written with regard to the Jewish people? As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: All the mitzvot that the Jews perform in this world will come and bear witness for them in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Let them bring their witnesses that they may be justified.” These are the Jews, as their good deeds bear witness for them and demonstrate their righteousness. When the verse states: “And let them hear, and say: It is truth” (Isaiah 43:9), these are the nations of the world, who will admit to the righteousness of the Jews.
  Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: The one who says that the correct word is <i>eideihen</i> with an <i>ayin</i> derived this use of the term from here: “They that fashion a graven image are all of them vanity, and their delectable things shall not profit; and their own witnesses [<i>eideihem</i>] see not, nor know” (Isaiah 44:9). This demonstrates that the objects of idol worship will serve as witnesses against their worshippers.
  § The Gemara cites homiletic interpretations of the verse that was discussed earlier: “All the nations are gathered together, and let the peoples be assembled; who among them can declare this, and announce to us former matters? Let them bring their witnesses, that they may be justified; and let them hear, and say: It is truth” (Isaiah 43:9). Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa taught, and some say that it was Rabbi Simlai who taught: In the future, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will bring a Torah scroll and place it in His lap and say: Anyone who engaged in its study should come and take his reward.
  Immediately, the nations of the world will gather together and come intermingled with each other, as it is stated: “All the nations are gathered together and let the peoples be assembled.” The Holy One, Blessed be He, will say to them: Do not enter before Me intermingled; rather, let each and every nation enter
  
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  with their scholars, as it is stated: “And let the peoples [<i>le’umim</i>] be assembled” (Isaiah 43:9); and the term <i>le’om</i> means nothing other than kingdom, as it is stated: “And the one kingdom [<i>ule’om</i>] shall be stronger than the other kingdom [<i>mile’om</i>]” (Genesis 25:23). The Gemara asks: But is it possible for there to be intermingling before the Holy One, Blessed be He, that it should be necessary for each nation to stand and be addressed separately? Rather, the nations are instructed to stand separately so that they will not become intermingled with each other in order that they will each hear what He says to them.
  Immediately, the Roman Empire enters first before Him. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the Roman Empire enters first? It is because the Roman Empire is the most important of all of the nations. And from where do we derive that it is the most important? As it is written in the book of Daniel with regard to the fourth empire that will rule over the world: “And it shall devour the whole earth, and shall tread it down, and break it in pieces” (Daniel 7:23), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This empire that will devour the earth is the wicked Roman Empire, whose name spread throughout the world.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that whoever is more important enters first? This is in accordance with a statement of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: When a king and a community are brought before God for judgment, the king enters for judgment first, as it is stated: “That He make the judgment of His servant and the judgment of His people Israel, as every day shall require” (I Kings 8:59). And what is the reason that it is important for the king to enter first? If you wish, say that it is not proper conduct for the king to stand outside and wait for the trial of his subjects to end. And if you wish, say instead that the king is brought in first so that he may be judged before God’s anger intensifies due to the sins of the community.
  The Gemara returns to its narration of the future judgment. First, the members of the Roman Empire enter. The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them: With what did you occupy yourselves? They say before Him in response: Master of the Universe, we have established many marketplaces, we have built many bathhouses, and we have increased much silver and gold. And we did all of this only for the sake of the Jewish people, so that they would be free to engage in Torah study.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them: Fools of the world! Are you attempting to deceive Me? Everything that you did, you did for your own needs. You established marketplaces to place prostitutes in them; you built bathhouses for your own enjoyment; and as for the silver and gold that you claim to have increased, it is Mine, as it is stated: “Mine is the silver, and Mine the gold, said the Lord of hosts” (Haggai 2:8).
  Is there no one among you who can declare that they have studied this Torah? This is the meaning of the continuation of the verse from Isaiah, as it is stated: “Who among them can declare this?” (Isaiah 43:9). And “this” is referring to nothing other than the Torah, as it is stated: “And this is the Torah that Moses set before the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 4:44), and whoever did not engage in its study does not receive reward. Immediately, the members of the Roman Empire leave disappointed.
  The Roman Empire leaves, and the Persian Empire enters after it. What is the reason that the Persian Empire enters second? The reason is that after the Roman Empire it is the next most important. And from where do we derive this? As it is written in Daniel’s vision: “And behold another beast, a second, like a bear” (Daniel 7:5). And Rav Yosef teaches: These are the Persians, who are compared to a bear, as they eat and drink copious amounts as does a bear, and they are fleshy like a bear, and they grow their hair long as does a bear, and they never rest, like a bear, which is constantly on the move from one place to another.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them: With what did you occupy yourselves? They say before Him in response: Master of the Universe, we have built many bridges, we have conquered many cities, and we have fought many wars. And we did all of this only for the sake of the Jewish people, so that they would engage in Torah study.
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them: Everything that you did, you did for your own needs. You established bridges to collect taxes from all who pass over them. You conquered cities to use their residents for forced labor [<i>angareya</i>]; and with regard to fighting the wars, I wage wars, and your success is from Me, as it is stated: “The Lord is a man of war” (Exodus 15:3). Is there no one among you who can declare that they have studied this Torah? As it is stated: “Who among them can declare this” (Isaiah 43:9), and “this” is referring to nothing other than the Torah, as it is stated: “And this is the Torah that Moses set” (Deuteronomy 4:44). Immediately, the members of the Persian Empire leave from before Him disappointed.
  The Gemara asks: But once the Persian Empire sees that everything said by the Roman Empire is completely ineffective, what is the reason that they come forward? The Gemara answers: They believe that their claims will be more effective, as they say: The Romans destroyed the Second Temple, and we had built it, as the Second Temple was constructed under the auspices and with the encouragement of Cyrus, the king of Persia. The Gemara adds: And likewise, a similar exchange occurred with each and every nation.
  The Gemara asks: But once the other nations see that every-thing said by the first ones, Rome and Persia, is completely ineffective, what is the reason that they come forward? The Gemara answers that they think: Those Empires subjugated the Jewish people, but we did not subjugate the Jewish people. The Gemara further asks: What is different about these, Rome and Persia, which were singled out explicitly, and what is different about those other empires that come afterward, which were not singled out and mentioned by name? It is because with regard to these, Rome and Persia, their kingship extends until the coming of the Messiah.
  The nations will say before God: Master of the Universe, did You give us the Torah and we did not accept it? Since we never received the Torah, why are we being judged for not fulfilling its mitzvot? The Gemara asks: And can one say that they were never offered the Torah? But isn’t it written in the description of the giving of the Torah: “And he said: The Lord came from Sinai, and rose from Seir unto them” (Deuteronomy 33:2), and it is written: “God comes from Teman, and the Holy One from mount Paran” (Habakkuk 3:3). And the Sages asked: What did God require in Seir and what did He require in Paran? The Torah was not given in those locations.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, took the Torah around to every nation and those who speak every language, such as the Edomites in Seir and the Ishmaelites in Paran, but they did not accept it, until He came to the Jewish people and they accepted it. If the other nations all rejected the Torah, how can they excuse themselves by claiming that it was never offered to them?
  Rather, this is what they say: Did we accept the Torah and then not fulfill its mitzvot? The Gemara asks: But this itself serves as the refutation of their own claim, as one can respond: Why didn’t you accept it? Rather, this is what the nations of the world say before Him: Master of the Universe, did You overturn the mountain above us like a basin, and we still did not accept the Torah, as You did for the Jewish people?
  The Gemara provides the background for this claim: As it is written: “And they stood at the nether part of the mount” (Exodus 19:17), and Rav Dimi bar Ḥama says: The verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, overturned the mountain, i.e., Mount Sinai, above the Jews like a basin, and He said to them: If you accept the Torah, excellent, and if not, there, under the mountain, will be your burial. The nations of the world will claim that they too could have been coerced to accept the Torah.
  Immediately, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them: The first mitzvot will let us hear the truth, as it is stated in the continuation of the same verse under discussion: “And announce to us the first things” (Isaiah 43:9). With regard to the seven Noahide mitzvot that preceded the giving of the Torah that even you accepted, where is the proof that you fulfilled them?
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that they did not fulfill them? As Rav Yosef teaches in explanation of the verse: “He stands, and shakes the earth, He sees, and makes the nations tremble [<i>vayater</i>]” (Habakkuk 3:6): What did God see? He saw the seven mitzvot that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves, and He saw that they did not fulfill them. Since they did not fulfill them, He arose and nullified for them [<i>vehitiran</i>] the command to heed these mitzvot. The Gemara asks: Do they gain from not obeying, as they are now released from the obligation to fulfill these mitzvot? If so, we find that a sinner profits from his transgression.
  Mar, son of Ravina, said:
  
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  This serves to say that even if they fulfill the seven Noahide mitzvot they do not receive a reward for their fulfilment.
  The Gemara asks: And are they not rewarded for fulfilling those mitzvot? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: From where is it derived that even a gentile who engages in Torah study is considered like a High Priest? The verse states: “You shall therefore keep My statutes and My ordinances, which if a person do, and shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5). It is not stated: Priests, Levites, and Israelites, but rather the general term “person.” From here you learn that even a gentile who engages in the study of Torah is like a High Priest. This demonstrates that gentiles are rewarded for fulfilling mitzvot, despite the fact that they are not commanded to do so.
  Rather, the verse serves to tell you that they do not receive as great a reward for their fulfillment as one who is commanded and performs a mitzva. Rather, they receive a lesser reward, like that of one who is not commanded and still performs a mitzva. As Rabbi Ḥanina says: Greater is one who is commanded to do a mitzva and performs it than one who is not commanded and performs it.
  The Gemara returns to the discussion between God and the nations of the world, whose claims are rejected with the rebuttal that they did not receive the Torah because they did not fulfill the seven Noahide mitzvot that were incumbent upon them. Rather, this is what the gentiles say before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, as for the Jewish people who accepted the Torah, where is the evidence that they fulfilled its mitzvot?
  The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them in response: I will testify about the Jewish people that they fulfilled the Torah in its entirety. The nations say before Him: Master of the Universe, is there a father who can testify about his son? As it is written: “Israel is My son, My firstborn” (Exodus 4:22). Since God is considered the Father of the Jewish people, He is disqualified from testifying on their behalf. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Heaven and earth will testify about them that they fulfilled the Torah in its entirety.
  The nations say before Him: Master of the Universe, in this matter the testimony of heaven and earth is tainted by a conflict of interest, as it is stated: “If My covenant be not with day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25). And concerning this verse, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day” (Genesis 1:31)? This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, established a condition with the acts of Creation, and said: If the Jewish people accept My Torah at the revelation at Sinai, all is well, but if they do not accept it, I will return you to the primordial state of chaos and disorder.
  And this is similar to that which Ḥizkiyya says with regard to a different matter: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You caused sentence to be heard from heaven; the earth feared, and was silent” (Psalms 76:9)? If the earth feared, why was it silent, and if it was silent, why did it fear? One who is afraid does not stay silent, and one who remains silent thereby demonstrates that he is not afraid. Rather, this is the meaning of the verse: At first, when God came to give the Torah to the Jewish people, the earth feared that they might not accept it, and it would be destroyed. This is alluded to by the phrase “You caused sentence to be heard.” But ultimately, when the Jews accepted the Torah, the earth was silent. Consequently, heaven and earth are interested parties and cannot testify about the Jewish people’s commitment to the Torah.
  Instead, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says to the nations: Let the witnesses come from among you and testify that the Jewish people fulfilled the Torah in its entirety. Let Nimrod come and testify about Abraham that he did not engage in idol worship. Let Laban come and testify about Jacob that he is not suspect with regard to robbery (see Genesis 31:36–42). Let the wife of Potiphar come and testify about Joseph that he is not suspect with regard to the sin of adultery (see Genesis 39:7–12).
  Let Nebuchadnezzar come and testify about Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah that they did not prostrate themselves before a graven image. Let Darius come and testify about Daniel that he did not neglect his prayer (see Daniel 6). Let Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamathite, and Eliphaz the Temanite, and Elihu, son of Barachel, the Buzite, friends of Job (see Job 2:11 and 32:2) come and testify about the Jewish people that they fulfilled the Torah in its entirety. As it is stated: “All the nations are gathered together…let them bring their witnesses, that they may be justified” (Isaiah 43:9), i.e., the gathered gentiles will submit testimony on behalf of the Jewish people and demonstrate the Jews’ righteousness.
  The gentiles say before Him: Master of the Universe, give us the Torah afresh and we will perform its mitzvot. The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to them in response: Fools of the world! Do you think you can request this? One who takes pains on Shabbat eve will eat on Shabbat, but one who did not take pains on Shabbat eve, from where will he eat on Shabbat? The opportunity for performing mitzvot has already passed, and it is now too late to ask to perform them. But even so, I have an easy mitzva to fulfill, and its name is <i>sukka</i>; go and perform it.
  The Gemara asks: And how can you say so, that it is possible to perform a mitzva after the end of this world? But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: What is the meaning of that which is written: “You shall therefore keep the commandment, and the statutes, and the ordinances, which I command you this day, to do them” (Deuteronomy 7:11)? This verse teaches that today, in this world, is the time to do them, but tomorrow, in the World-to-Come, is not the time to do them. Furthermore, today is the time to do them, but today is not the time to receive one’s reward, which is granted in the World-to-Come.
  The Gemara explains: But even so, God gave the nations an opportunity to perform a mitzva, as The Holy One, Blessed be He, does not deal tyrannically [<i>beteruneya</i>] with His creations, but wants them to feel that they have been judged fairly. The Gemara asks: And why does God call the mitzva of <i>sukka</i> an easy mitzva to fulfill? Because performing the mitzva involves no monetary loss.
  Immediately, each and every gentile will take materials and go and construct a <i>sukka</i> on top of his roof. And the Holy One, Blessed be He, will set upon them the heat [<i>makdir</i>] of the sun in the season of Tammuz, i.e., the summer, and each and every one who is sitting in his <i>sukka</i> will be unable to stand the heat, and he will kick his <i>sukka</i> and leave, as it is stated: “Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us” (Psalms 2:3). The Gemara asks: Why does God heat the sun over them? But didn’t you say that the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not deal tyrannically with His creations? The Gemara answers: This is not considered dealing tyrannically with the gentiles, because for the Jewish people as well, there are times
  
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  when the season of Tammuz extends until the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, and in such years sitting in the <i>sukka</i> causes them suffering. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rava say that one who suffers in the <i>sukka</i> is exempt from performing the mitzva of <i>sukka</i>, and under these circumstances even a Jew is permitted to leave the <i>sukka</i>? If so, why are the gentiles criticized for leaving? The Gemara answers: Granted that one is exempt from performing the mitzva and is permitted to leave his <i>sukka</i>, but should one kick it?
  The Gemara resumes its narration: Immediately, the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and makes sport of those gentiles, i.e., He laughs at them, as it is stated: “He that sits in heaven makes sport, the Lord has them in derision” (Psalms 2:4). With regard to this verse, Rabbi Yitzḥak says: There is no making sport for the Holy One, Blessed be He, but on that day alone.
  There are those who teach that which Rabbi Yitzḥak subsequently said with regard to this matter, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: In the future, the nations of the world will come and convert. The Gemara asks: And do we accept them as converts at that time? But isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The court does not accept converts in the days of the Messiah; similarly, they did not accept converts either in the days of David or in the days of Solomon, due to a concern that these people wanted to convert for ulterior motives, because the Jewish people were mighty and respected?
  Rather, Rabbi Yosei means that they become converts who have attached themselves to the Jewish people, and they don phylacteries on their heads, phylacteries on their arms, place ritual fringes on their garments, and a <i>mezuza</i> in their doorways.
  When these converts see the war of Gog and Magog, every convert of this sort will say to Gog and Magog: For what purpose did you come? They will say to him: We came to fight against the Lord and against His Messiah, as it is stated: “Why are the nations in an uproar? And why do the peoples mutter in vain. The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against His Messiah” (Psalms 2:1–2).
  And then every one of these converts will tear loose his sign of performance of a mitzva and leave, as it is stated: “Let us tear their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us” (Psalms 2:3). And the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and makes sport, i.e., laughs or rejoices, as it is stated: “He that sits in heaven makes sport, the Lord has them in derision” (Psalms 2:4). Rabbi Yitzḥak says: There is no making sport for the Holy One, Blessed be He, but on that day alone.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Is there is no other making sport for the Holy One, Blessed be He? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: There are twelve hours in the day. During the first three, the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and engages in Torah study. During the second three hours, He sits and judges the entire world. Once He sees that the world has rendered itself liable to destruction, He arises from the throne of judgment and sits on the throne of mercy, and the world is not destroyed.
  During the third set of three hours, the Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and sustains the entire world, from the horns of wild oxen to the eggs of lice. During the fourth three hours, He sits and makes sport with the leviathan, as it is stated: “There is leviathan, whom You have formed to sport with” (Psalms 104:26). Evidently, God makes sport every day, not only on that one day. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says in explanation: He makes sport with His creations, just as He sports with the leviathan; He does not make sport of His creations but on that day alone.
  Rav Aḥa said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: From the day the Temple was destroyed, there is no longer any making sport for the Holy One, Blessed be He. And from where do we derive that there is no making sport? If we say that it is from that which is written: “And in that day did the Lord, the God of hosts, call to weeping, and to lamentation, and to baldness and to girding with sackcloth” (Isaiah 22:12), that is inconclusive: Perhaps that day alone was called for weeping and lamentation, and no additional days.
  Rather, you might suggest that the source is that it is written: “If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I do not remember you” (Psalms 137:5–6). This is also inconclusive, as perhaps there is no forgetting of Jerusalem for God, but in any event there is still making sport. Rather, it is derived from this verse: “I have long time held My peace, I have been still, and refrained Myself; now will I cry like a travailing woman, gasping and panting at once” (Isaiah 42:14).
  The Gemara asks: If God no longer makes sport, what does He now do during the fourth three-hour period of the day? The Gemara answers: He sits and teaches Torah to schoolchildren, as it is stated: “Whom shall one teach knowledge? And whom shall one make to understand the message? Them that are weaned from the milk, them that are drawn from the breasts” (Isaiah 28:9). The verse is interpreted in the following manner: To whom does God teach knowledge, and to whom does He make to understand the message? To those who are just weaned from the milk and to those who are drawn from the breasts, i.e., children only recently weaned from nursing.
  The Gemara asks: And initially, before the destruction of the Temple, who would teach the schoolchildren? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the angel Metatron would teach them, and if you wish, say instead that He would do both this, sport with the leviathan, and that, teach the schoolchildren; whereas after the destruction of the Temple in the fourth period of the day He only teaches the schoolchildren.
  The Gemara asks: And during the twelve hours of the night, what does God do? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the night is similar to the day, i.e., God performs the same activities as in the day. And if you wish, say instead that He rides on his light cherub and flies in eighteen thousand worlds, as it is stated: “The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even [<i>shinan</i>] thousands” (Psalms 68:18). Do not read it as even [<i>shinan</i>], rather read it as: That which are not [<i>she’einan</i>]. Since the minimum of thousands is two thousand, the phrase: That which are not thousands, indicates that two thousand are not present, i.e., the chariots of God are twenty thousand minus two thousand, which means that God rides in eighteen thousand worlds. And if you wish, say instead that God sits and listens to the songs from the mouths of the angelic creatures, as it is stated: “By day the Lord will command His loving-kindness, and in the night His song shall be with me” (Psalms 42:9).
  § Rabbi Levi says: Anyone who interrupts his study of words of Torah to occupy himself with mundane matters will be fed with the coals of the broom tree, as it is stated: “They pluck salt-wort from wormwood, and the roots of the broom are their food” (Job 30:4). Reish Lakish says: With regard to any-one who occupies himself with Torah at night, the Holy One, Blessed be He, extends a thread of kindness over him by day, as it is stated: “By day, the Lord will command His kindness, and in the night His song shall be with me” (Psalms 42:9). The verse is understood as follows: What is the reason that by day, the Lord will command His kindness to extend over him? It is due to the fact that in the night His song is with me, i.e., he occupies himself at night with Torah, which is referred to as a song.
  There are those who say that this is what Reish Lakish says: With regard to anyone who occupies himself with Torah in this world, which is comparable to night, the Holy One, Blessed be He, extends a thread of kindness over him in the World-to-Come, which is comparable to day, as it is stated: “By day, the Lord will command His kindness, and in the night His song shall be with me.”
  The Gemara continues discussing the importance of Torah study. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And makes people as the fish of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler over them” (Habakkuk 1:14)? Why are people compared to the fish of the sea? This serves to say to you: Just as with regard to the fish of the sea, once they arise onto dry land they die immediately; so too, with regard to people, once they separate themselves from studying words of Torah and performing the mitzvot, they die immediately. Alternatively, just as with regard to the fish of the sea, once the sun is heated over them they die immediately, so too with regard to people, once the sun is heated over them they die immediately.
  The Gemara clarifies: If you wish, say that this applies in this world, and if you wish, say instead that it applies to the World-to-Come. If you wish, say that it applies in this world, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina. As Rabbi Ḥanina says: All occurrences that befall man are in the hands of Heaven except for colds and obstacles [<i>paḥim</i>], from which one is able to protect himself, as it is stated: “Colds and snares are on the path of the crooked; he who guards his soul shall keep far from them” (Proverbs 22:5). This indicates that cold and, conversely, heat, are forms of harm from which one must protect himself, which teaches that being exposed to excessive heat can cause death.
  And if you wish, say instead that this is referring to the World-to-Come, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: There is no Gehenna in the World-to-Come. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, will remove the sun from its sheath [<i>minnarteikah</i>], where it is situated during these times, and heats [<i>umakdir</i>] that world with it. The wicked will be punished by it and consumed by the heat, but the righteous will be healed by it. The wicked will be punished
  
  Daf 4a
  
  by it, as it is written: “For, behold, the day comes, it burns as a furnace; and all the proud, and all that work wickedness, shall be stubble; and the day that comes shall set them ablaze, said the Lord of hosts, that it shall leave them neither root nor branch” (Malachi 3:19). This verse is interpreted as follows: Neither a root shall remain for them in this world, nor will a branch grow for them in the World-to-Come. This teaches that the sun itself will burn and consume the wicked in the future.
  And the righteous will be healed by it, as it is written in the next verse: “But to you that fear My Name shall the sun of righteousness arise with healing in its wings” (Malachi 3:20). And moreover, not only will they be healed by it, but they will even be rejuvenated by it, as it is stated in the continuation of that verse: “And you shall go forth and leap as calves of the stall.”
  Alternatively, just as in the case of fish of the sea, any fish that is bigger than another swallows the other, so too in the case of people, were it not for the fear of the ruling government, anyone who is bigger than another would swallow the other. And this is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Avot</i> 3:2) that Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: One should pray for the continued welfare of the government, as were it not for the fear of the government, every man would swallow his neighbor alive.
  § Rav Ḥinnana bar Pappa raises a contradiction between the following verses. It is written: “The Almighty, Whom we have not found out His excellent power” (Job 37:23), which indicates that His power has not been seen. And it is written elsewhere: “Great is our Lord, and mighty in power” (Psalms 147:5), and it is also written: “Your right hand, O Lord, glorious in power” (Exodus 15:6), from which it may be inferred that His power is discernable. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; here, in the first verse, God’s strength is not seen at a time of judgment, where He acts mercifully, whereas there, in the other verses, they are referring to a time of war, when He wages war against His enemies and His power is seen.
  Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a contradiction between the following verses. It is written: “Fury is not in Me” (Isaiah 27:4), and it is written: “The Lord is a jealous and furious God” (Nahum 1:2). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; here, where it states that God has no fury, it is speaking with regard to the Jewish people, whereas there, where it says that God has fury, it is speaking with regard to the nations of the world. Rav Ḥinnana bar Pappa says in explanation of the verse: “Fury is not in Me; would that I were as the briers and thorns in flame! I would with one step burn it altogether” (Isaiah 27:4). “Fury is not in Me,” as I have already taken an oath that I will not destroy the Jewish people; “would that I” had not taken this oath, since then I would be active “as the briers and thorns in flame! I would with one step burn it altogether.”
  And this is the same as that which Rabbi Alexandri says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And it shall come to pass in that day, that I will seek to destroy all the nations” (Zechariah 12:9)? “I will seek” from whom? Does God need to seek permission? Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: I will seek and search in their records [<i>benigeni</i>]; if they have merit, I will redeem them, and if not, I will destroy them.
  And this is the same as that which Rava says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Surely none shall put forth his hand to a ruinous heap, neither because of these things shall help come in one’s calamity [<i>befido</i>]” (Job 30:24)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, says to the Jewish people: When I judge the Jewish people, I do not judge them as I judge the nations of the world. When judging the nations of the world, I punish them for all of their transgressions together, as it is written: “A ruin, a ruin, a ruin, will I make it, this also shall be no more” (Ezekiel 21:32). Rather, I punish the Jewish people like the pecking [<i>kefid</i>] of a hen, which picks up only a tiny amount each time it pecks.
  Alternatively, even if the Jewish people perform but a few mitzvot before Me, like the pecking of hens that peck in a dunghill, I will combine them to a large reckoning, as it is stated: “Though they peck [<i>befido</i>],” i.e., perform mitzvot a little at a time, “they will be saved [<i>lahen shua</i>]” (Job 30:24). Alternatively, in reward for the manner in which they cry out [<i>shua</i>] and pray before Me, I will save [<i>moshia</i>] them. In other words, God punishes the Jewish people for each individual infraction, but He does not destroy them entirely in a moment of fury.
  And this is the same as that which Rabbi Abba says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And though I will redeem them, they have spoken lies against Me” (Hosea 7:13)? I said that I would redeem them through taking away their money in this world so that they should merit the World-to-Come, but they have spoken lies against Me, by saying that I am angry and uninterested in them.
  And this is the same as that which Rav Pappi says in the name of Rava: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Though I have trained [<i>yissarti</i>] and strengthened their arms, yet they consider evil against Me” (Hosea 7:15)? The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: I said that I would visit them [<i>ayasserem</i>] with afflictions in this world for their benefit, so that their arms would be strengthened in the World-to-Come, but they consider that which I have done as evil.
  With regard to the afflictions of the Jewish people, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Abbahu would praise Rav Safra to the heretics by saying that he is a great man. Therefore, they remitted Rav Safra’s obligation to pay taxes for thirteen years, as they relied upon Rabbi Abbahu’s word and wanted to reward a great man. One day they found Rav Safra and said to him: It is written: “You only have I known of all the families of the earth; therefore, I will visit upon you all your iniquities” (Amos 3:2). The meaning of this verse is unclear, as why would God punish specifically the Jewish people because He loves them? One who has wrath [<i>siseya</i>], does he raise it against his beloved? Rav Safra was silent and did not say anything in response to them. They threw a scarf around his neck and tormented him, by pulling and denigrating him.
  Rabbi Abbahu came and found them doing this to Rav Safra. Rabbi Abbahu said to them: Why are you tormenting him? They said to him: And didn’t you say to us that he is a great man? But he did not even know how to tell us the explanation of this verse. Rabbi Abbahu said to them: You can say that I said this praise of Rav Safra to you only with regard to the Oral Law and the statements of <i>tanna’im</i>, but did I say to you that he is knowledgeable with regard to the Bible?
  They said to Rabbi Abbahu: What is different about you Sages of Eretz Yisrael, that you know the Bible as well? Rabbi Abbahu said to them: We, who are situated among you heretics and are forced to debate the meaning of verses, we impose upon ourselves this obligation and analyze verses in depth. By contrast, those Sages of Babylonia, who are not forced to debate you, do not analyze the Bible in such depth.
  The heretics said to Rabbi Abbahu: In that case, you should tell us the meaning of this verse. Rabbi Abbahu said to them: I will relate a parable to you. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a person who lends money to two people, one of whom is his beloved, and the other one is his enemy. In the case of his beloved, he collects the debt from him little by little, whereas in the case of his enemy he collects the debt from him all at once. So too, with regard to the Jewish people, God punishes them for each transgression as it occurs, so that they should not receive one severe punishment on a single occasion.
  § The Gemara continues discussing the manner in which God metes out punishment. Rabbi Abba Bar Kahana says: What is the meaning of that which is written as part of Abraham’s prayer to God, when God informed him that He was going to destroy Sodom: “That be far [<i>ḥalila</i>] from You to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked” (Genesis 18:25)? This is what Abraham said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, it is a sacrilege [<i>ḥullin</i>] for You to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked.
  The Gemara asks: And does God not act in this manner? But isn’t it written: “And I will cut off from You the righteous and the wicked” (Ezekiel 21:8)? The Gemara answers: There the verse is referring to a righteous person who is not completely righteous, and he will therefore be destroyed along with the wicked.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But is it true that one who is completely righteous cannot be destroyed along with the wicked? But isn’t it written in a prophecy about the destruction of the Temple that God says to the destroyers: “And begin at My Sanctuary [<i>mimmikdashi</i>]” (Ezekiel 9:6); and Rav Yosef teaches: Do not read the word as “<i>mimmikdashi</i>,” but rather read it as <i>mimmekudashai</i>, those sanctified to Me. He explains: These are people who observed the Torah in its entirety, from the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet <i>alef</i> through its final letter <i>tav</i>. These people observed every mitzva in the Torah, and yet they were destroyed along with the wicked. The Gemara answers the difficulty: There too, since they had the power to protest against the wicked and prevent them from sinning and they did not protest, they are considered as righteous people who are not completely righteous.
  Rav Pappa raises a contradiction between the following verses. It is written: “A God that has indignation every day” (Psalms 7:12), and yet the world still exists, and it is written: “Who can stand before His indignation?” (Nahum 1:6). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; here, where the verse states that no one can stand before His indignation, it is referring to an individual, whereas there, when it is written that God is indignant every day, it is referring to the community, which can withstand the indignation of God, due to its cumulative merits.
  The Sages taught with regard to the verse: A God that has indignation every day. And how long does His indignation last? It lasts a moment. And how long is a moment? One in 53,848 parts of an hour, a very small amount of time, that is a moment. The Gemara adds: And no entity can precisely determine that moment when God is indignant, except for Balaam the wicked, that it is written concerning him:
  
  Daf 4b
  
  “And knows the knowledge of the Most High” (Numbers 24:16). Now, this should not be understood to mean that Balaam knew the thoughts of God, as is it possible that Balaam did not know the mind of his animal, and yet he did know the mind of the Most High?
  The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by the claim that Balaam did not know the mind of his animal? When the princes of Moab saw that Balaam was riding on his donkey, they said to him: What is the reason that you do not ride upon a horse, which is more fitting for you? Balaam said to them: I am riding on a donkey because I left my horse in a meadow to graze. Immediately: “And the donkey said to Balaam: Am not I your donkey?” (Numbers 22:30), i.e., the donkey you always use. Balaam said to it: For carrying burdens only, not for riding.
  The donkey further said to Balaam: “Upon which you have ridden.” Balaam said to it: Merely at irregular occurrences. The donkey said to him: “All your life long unto this day” (Numbers 22:30). The donkey added: And moreover, I perform for you riding during the day, and marriage, i.e., intercourse, during the night. The Gemara explains: This is derived from the following comparison: It is written here that Balaam’s donkey said: “Was I ever wont [<i>hahasken hiskanti</i>] to do so to you” (Numbers 22:30), and it is written there, with regard to Abishag the Shunammite and King David: “And be a companion [<i>sokhenet</i>] unto him; and let her lie in your bosom” (I Kings 1:2). This teaches that the term <i>hiskanti</i> alludes to sexual intercourse.
  The Gemara returns to its previous question: Rather, what is the meaning of: “And knows the knowledge of the Most High” (Numbers 24:16)? It means that he was able to determine precisely the hour at which the Holy One, Blessed be He, is angry. At that moment Balaam would utter his curse and, through God’s anger, it would be fulfilled. And this is what the prophet said to the Jewish people: “O My people, remember now what Balak, king of Moab, devised, and what Balaam, son of Beor, answered him; from Shittim unto Gilgal, that you may know the righteous acts of the Lord” (Micah 6:5).
  Rabbi Elazar says, in explanation of that verse: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: My nation, see how many acts of kindness I performed for you, that I did not become angry at you during all of those days when Balaam attempted to curse the Jewish people, and he was not able to find a moment of divine anger. As, had I become angry at you, there would not have remained a remnant or a refugee among the enemies of the Jewish people, a euphemism for the Jewish people themselves. Instead, God restrained His anger and Balaam’s curse went unfulfilled. And this is what Balaam said to Balak: Since God is not becoming angry, I can do nothing, as: “How shall I curse whom God has not cursed? And how shall I execrate whom the Lord has not execrated”? (Numbers 23:8).
  The Gemara further discusses this matter: And how long does His indignation last? It lasts a moment. And how long is a moment? Ameimar, and some say Ravina, said: It lasts as long as it takes to say the word moment [<i>rega</i>]. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that God’s anger lasts for only a moment? As it is written: “His anger is but for a moment; His favor, for a lifetime” (Psalms 30:6). And if you wish, say instead that it is derived from here: “Hide yourself for a brief moment, until the anger passes” (Isaiah 26:20), meaning that God’s anger passes in a mere moment.
  The Gemara asks: When is God angry? Abaye said: During the first three hours of the day, when the crest of the rooster whitens in the sun, as though life has left the rooster and it suddenly turns white, that is when God is angry. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t its crest whiten each and every hour? How can this serve as a sign? The Gemara answers: The difference is that every other hour there remain red streaks [<i>surayekei</i>] in the rooster’s crest, whereas at that hour of His anger there are no red streaks in its crest.
  The Gemara relates: A certain heretic would distress Rabi Yehoshua ben Levi by incessantly challenging him as to the meaning of verses. One day, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi took a rooster and placed it between the legs of the bed upon which he sat, and looked at it. He thought: When that moment of God’s anger arrives, I will curse the heretic and be rid of him. When that moment of God’s anger arrived, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi fell asleep and missed the opportunity to curse the heretic.
  Upon awakening, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: I can conclude from the fact that I fell asleep that it is not proper conduct to do this, to curse people, even if they are wicked, as the verse: “And His tender mercies are over all His works” (Psalms 145:9) is written even with regard to sinners. And moreover, it is inappropriate to cause the punishment of another, as it is written: “Punishment, even for the righteous, is not good” (Proverbs 17:26). Even for a righteous person, it is improper to punish another.
  In explanation of the cause of God’s anger, it is taught in the name of Rabbi Meir: When the kings wake up and place their crowns on their heads and bow down to the sun, the Holy One, Blessed be He, immediately grows angry. This is why God’s anger occurs during the first three hours of the day. Rav Yosef says: A person should not recite the additional prayers during the first three hours of the day on the first day of Rosh HaShana if he is praying individually, as, since the judgment of the entire world is reckoned then, perhaps the Heavenly court will scrutinize his actions and reject him.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, the prayer of the community should not be recited at that time as well. The Gemara explains: The prayer of the community is not rejected even at this time, due to its many merits. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then shouldn’t the morning prayer of one who is praying individually also not be recited at this time? The Gemara answers: Since there is in all places a community that prays the morning prayer at that same time, his prayer is not rejected. By contrast, the additional prayer is recited at different times by different communities, as unlike the morning prayer it does not have a fixed time but can be recited at any point during the day.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But didn’t you say that during the first three hours of the day The Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and engages in Torah study, and He engages in judgment only during the second set of three hours? The Gemara answers: Reverse the order so that it is stated that He sits in judgment during the first three hours of the day.
  And if you wish, say instead: Actually, do not reverse the order. Rather, this is the reason that an individual should not recite the additional prayer during the first three hours of the day when God is engaged in Torah study: In the case of the Torah, with regard to which it is written: Truth, as it is written: “Buy the truth, and sell it not” (Proverbs 23:23), the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not act in a manner that is beyond the letter of the law. But with regard to judgment, with regard to which it is not written: Truth, but it is a process that involves mercy and compromise, the Holy One, Blessed be He, can act in a manner that is beyond the letter of the law.
  § The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the ensuing statements of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: Today, bear witness, shake, the golden calf. The Gemara returns to an earlier discussion (3a), first by citing the matter itself. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Which I command you this day, to do them” (Deuteronomy 7:11)? This verse teaches that today is the time to do them, i.e., to perform the mitzvot, in this world, but tomorrow, in the World-to-Come, is not the time to do them. Furthermore, today is the time to do them, but today is not the time to receive one’s reward, which is given in the World-to-Come.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: All of the mitzvot that the Jews perform in this word will come and bear witness for them in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Let them bring their witnesses that they may be justified, and let them hear, and say: It is truth” (Isaiah 43:9). He explains: “Let them bring their witnesses that they may be justified”; these are referring to the Jews. “And let them hear, and say: It is truth”; these are referring to the nations of the world.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: All of the mitzvot that the Jewish people perform in this world will come and strike the faces of the nations of the world in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Observe therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations” (Deuteronomy 4:6). It is not stated: Before the nations; rather, the verse states: “In the eyes of the nations,” which taken literally teaches that they will come and strike the faces of the nations of the world in the World-to-Come.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The Jewish people fashioned the Golden Calf (see Exodus, chapter 32) only to give a claim to penitents, as it is stated after the revelation at Sinai: “Who would give that they had such a heart as this always, to fear Me, and keep all My commandments, that it might be good for them, and with their children forever” (Deuteronomy 5:25). If the nation was truly at such a lofty spiritual state, how could they worship the Golden Calf? Rather, their sin occurred so that it would be made clear that one can repent for any sin, as even a sin as severe as the Golden Calf was forgiven.
  And this is similar to that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: David was not fit to act as he did in that incident involving Bathsheba, and the Jewish people were not fit to act as they did in that incident of the Golden Calf. David was not fit to act as he did in that incident involving Bathsheba (see II Samuel, chapter 11), as it is written: “And my heart is wounded within me” (Psalms 109:22), i.e., he had vanquished his evil inclination, and therefore it should not have been able to rule over him to that extent.
  And likewise the Jewish people were not fit to act as they did in that incident of the Golden Calf, as it is written with regard to the Jewish people of that time: “Who would give that they had such a heart as this always, to fear Me and keep all My commandments, that it might be good for them, and with their children forever” (Deuteronomy 5:25). Rather, why did they perform these sins?
  
  Daf 5a
  
  This serves to say to you that if an individual has sinned, one says to him: Go to that famous individual who sinned, King David, and learn from him that one can repent. And if the community sinned, one says to them: Go to the community that sinned, i.e., the Jewish people at the time of the Golden Calf.
  The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to learn about repentance both in the case of an individual and in the case of a community. The reason is that if we had learned this idea only with regard to an individual, one might have thought that he has the option to repent only because his sin is not publicized. But in the case of a community, whose sin is publicized, one might say that the community cannot repent. And likewise, if we had learned this idea only with regard to a community, one might have said that their repentance is accepted because their prayers are more numerous than those of an individual, and they are heard before God. But in the case of an individual, whose merit is not as strong, one might say that he is not able to repent. Therefore, it is necessary to teach both cases.
  And this is similar to that which Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The saying of David, son of Yishai, and the saying of the man raised on high [<i>al</i>]” (II Samuel 23:1)? This is the meaning of the verse: The saying of David, son of Yishai, who raised and lightened the yoke [<i>ullah</i>] of repentance, as he taught the power of repentance through his own example.
  And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani further says that Rabbi Yonatan says: With regard to anyone who performs one mitzva in this world, the mitzva will precede him and walk before him in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And your righteousness shall go before you, the glory of the Lord shall be your reward” (Isaiah 58:8). And with regard to anyone who commits one transgression, that transgression will shroud him and lead him on the Day of Judgment, as it is stated: “The paths of their way do wind, they go up into the waste, and are lost” (Job 6:18).
  Rabbi Elazar says: The transgression is tied to him like a dog and does not leave him, as it is stated with regard to Joseph and Potiphar’s wife: “And he did not listen to her, to lie by her, or to be with her” (Genesis 39:10). This teaches that Joseph refused “to lie by her” in this world, which would have meant that he would have had “to be with her” in the World-to-Come.
  § The Gemara further discusses the sin of the Golden Calf. Reish Lakish says: Come and let us be grateful to our ancestors who sinned with the Golden Calf, as had they not sinned we would not have come into the world. Reish Lakish explains: As it is stated about the Jewish people after the revelation at Sinai: “I said: You are godlike beings, and all of you sons of the Most High” (Psalms 82:6), which indicates that they had become like angels and would not have propagated offspring. Then, God states: After you ruined your deeds: “Yet you shall die like a man, and fall like one of the princes” (Psalms 82:7).
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that if they had not sinned with the Golden Calf they would not have sired children? But isn’t it written that Noah and his children were instructed: “And you, be fruitful, and multiply” (Genesis 9:7)? The Gemara answers: This instruction was issued only until the revelation at Sinai, but the Jewish people would have become like angels there, had they not sinned. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it also written about the Jewish people who were at the revelation at Sinai: “Go say to them: Return to your tents” (Deuteronomy 5:27), which means that they were instructed to resume marital relations? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring to the enjoyment of conjugal rights, not to procreation.
  The Gemara further asks: But isn’t it written: “That it might be good for them, and with their children forever” (Deuteronomy 5:26), which indicates that they would continue to bear children? The Gemara answers: This verse is referring to those children who stood with them at Mount Sinai, not to future generations.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: But doesn’t Reish Lakish say: What is the meaning of that which is written: “This is the book of the generations of Adam, in the day that God created man” (Genesis 5:1)? Did Adam the first man have a book? Rather, the verse teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed Adam, the first man, every generation and its expositors, every generation and its Sages, and every generation and its leaders. When Adam arrived at the generation of Rabbi Akiva, he rejoiced in his Torah and was saddened by his death, as Rabbi Akiva was tortured and murdered. Adam said: “How weighty also are Your thoughts to me, O God! How great is the sum of them” (Psalms 139:17). It is evident from here that the Jews were destined to bear future generations from the beginning of time.
  And similarly, Rabbi Yosei says: The Messiah, son of David, will not come until all the souls of the body have been finished, i.e., until all souls that are destined to inhabit physical bodies will do so. As it is stated: “For I will not contend for ever, neither will I be always wroth; for the spirit that enwraps itself is from Me, and the souls that I have made” (Isaiah 57:16). According to Rabbi Yosei, in order for the Messiah to come in the end of days, it is necessary for the future generations to be born.
  The Gemara answers: Do not say that if our ancestors had not sinned we would not have come into the world, as we still would have been born; rather, it would have been as though we had not come into the world. We would have been of no importance, due to the previous generations that would have still been alive. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that if the Jewish people had not sinned with the Golden Calf then they would not have died? But isn’t the chapter that addresses widows whose husbands die childless (Deuteronomy 25:5–10) written in the Torah, and the chapter that addresses the inheritance a deceased father bequeaths to his sons (Numbers 27:8–11) is also written?
  The Gemara answers: These passages were written conditionally, i.e., if the Jewish people were to sin and not become like angels, those <i>halakhot</i> would take effect. The Gemara asks: And are verses written conditionally in this manner? The Gemara answers: Yes, as this is what Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day” (Genesis 1:31)? This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, established a condition with the acts of Creation, and He said: If the Jewish people accept the Torah at the revelation at Sinai, all is well and the world will continue to exist. But if they do not accept it, I will return you to the primordial state of chaos and disorder.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> to the new formulation of Reish Lakish’s statement, according to which the Jewish people would have become immortal had they not sinned with the Golden Calf. The verse states about the Jewish people after the revelation at Sinai: “Who would give that they had such a heart as this always, to fear Me, and keep all My commandments, that it might be good for them, and with their children forever” (Deuteronomy 5:26). The <i>baraita</i> states that although they had reached such an elevated state, it was not possible to nullify the power of the Angel of Death over them, as the decree of death was already issued from the time of creation.
  Rather, the <i>baraita</i> explains that the Jewish people accepted the Torah only in order that no nation or tongue would rule over them, as it is stated in the same verse: “That it might be good for them, and with their children forever.” This indicates that had the Jewish people not sinned they would not have achieved immortality, which contradicts Reish Lakish’s statement.
  The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish said his statement in accordance with the opinion of that <i>tanna</i>. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: The Jewish people accepted the Torah only in order that the Angel of Death would not rule over them, as it is stated: “I said: You are godlike beings, and all of you sons of the Most High” (Psalms 82:6), i.e., they had become immortal like angels. Then, God states: After you ruined your deeds, “yet you shall die like a man, and fall like one of the princes” (Psalms 82:7).
  The Gemara asks: And also, according to Rabbi Yosei, isn’t it written: “That it might be good for them, and with their children forever,” from which it may be inferred that although it will be good for them if they remain in this elevated state, there will still be death? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: Since there is no death, there is no greater good than this, i.e., the promise of the verse is immortality.
  The Gemara inquires: And according to the first <i>tanna</i> as well, isn’t it written: “Yet you shall die like a man,” which indicates that their mortality was decreed only due to the sin of the Golden Calf? The Gemara answers: What is meant by death? It means poverty. As the Master said: Four are considered as though they were dead: These are a pauper, a blind person, a leper, and one who has no children.
  A pauper is considered as though dead, as it is written that God said to Moses: “Go, return to Egypt; for all the men that sought your life are dead” (Exodus 4:19). And who were these men? They were Dathan and Abiram. But did they really die? They were still alive, as they participated in the rebellion of Korah, which took place years later. Rather, the verse does not mean that they had died, but that they had lost their property and become impoverished. This demonstrates that a pauper is considered as though he were dead.
  A blind person is considered as though he were dead, as it is written: “He has made me to dwell in dark places, as those that have been long dead” (Lamentations 3:6). A leper is considered as though he were dead, as it is written that Aaron said to Moses when Miriam was struck with leprosy: “Let her not, I pray, be as one dead” (Numbers 12:12). And one who has no children is considered as though he were dead, as it is written that Rachel said to Jacob: “Give me children, or else I am dead” (Genesis 30:1).
  The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “If you walk in My statutes” (Leviticus 26:3): In this context, “if” is a term that means nothing other than supplication, i.e., God is hoping that the Jewish people will observe the Torah. And similarly, it is stated: “Oh that My people would hearken to Me, that Israel would walk in My ways, I would soon subdue their enemies” (Psalms 81:14–15). And it states: “Oh that you would hearken to My commandments! Then your peace would be as a river, and your righteousness as the waves of the sea. Your seed also would be as the sand, and the offspring of your body like its grains” (Isaiah 48:18–19).
  § The Gemara returns to a verse cited above. The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “Who would give that they had such a heart as this always, to fear Me, and keep all My commandments, that it might be good for them, and with their children forever” (Deuteronomy 5:26). At a later stage, Moses said to the Jewish people: Ingrates, children of ingrates! When the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: “Who would give that they had such a heart as this always,” they should have said: You should give us a heart to fear You.
  The Gemara explains that Moses calls the Jewish people ingrates, as it is written that the Jewish people spoke disparagingly of the manna: “And our soul loathes
  
  Daf 5b
  
  this light bread” (Numbers 21:5), despite the fact it was the highest-quality food. Moses further called them children of ingrates, as it is written that after sinning and eating from the tree of knowledge, Adam said: “The woman whom You gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat” (Genesis 3:12). Adam complained that the woman had been given to him in order to cause him to sin, whereas in fact she had been given to him to serve as a helpmate.
  Yet even Moses our teacher, who said this to the Jewish people, did not allude to the Jewish people until after forty years that they should have stated this request, as it is stated: “And I have led you forty years in the wilderness” (Deuteronomy 29:4), which shows that Moses was speaking forty years after the revelation at Sinai. And at that point it is written: “But the Lord has not given you a heart to know, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, until this day” (Deuteronomy 29:3). Rabba said: Conclude from here that a person does not understand the opinion of his teacher until after forty years, as Moses said this to the Jewish people only after forty years of learning Torah.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Bana’a: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters, that send forth freely the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20)? Happy are you Israel; when they, i.e., the Jewish people, engage in Torah study and in acts of kindness, their evil inclination is given over to them, and they are not given over to their evil inclination, as it is stated: “Happy are you that sow beside all waters.” And the term sowing is referring to nothing other than performing charitable deeds, as it is stated: “Sow to yourselves according to charitableness, reap according to mercy” (Hosea 10:12). And the term waters is referring to nothing other than the Torah, as it is stated: “Ho, every one that thirsts, come for water” (Isaiah 55:1).
  With regard to the continuation of the verse: “That send forth freely the feet of the ox and the donkey,” one of the Sages of the school of Eliyahu taught: A person should always make himself subjugated to matters of Torah like an ox to a yoke and like a donkey to a burden.
  § After concluding its long introduction, the Gemara analyzes the mishna. The mishna taught that on the three days before the festivals of gentiles it is prohibited to engage with them in business or to lend them items. The Gemara asks: And is it the practice of a gentile to buy an animal so far in advance of his festival that it is required of Jews to refrain from selling an animal to idol worshippers for all of these days before their festivals?
  But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 83a): On four occasions during the year one who sells an animal to another is required to inform him: I sold the mother of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it, or: I sold the daughter of this animal today for the buyer to slaughter it. This notification is necessary so that this buyer will not slaughter the animal on the same day that its mother or its young is slaughtered, thereby violating the prohibition: “You shall not kill it and its young both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28).
  The mishna continues: And those four occasions are: The eve of the last day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, the eve of the first day of the festival of Passover, and the eve of <i>Shavuot</i>, and the eve of Rosh HaShana. And according to the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee is included as well. This mishna indicates that one prepares for a festival for only one day prior to the event. Why does the mishna here prohibit sales three days prior to gentile festivals?
  The Gemara answers: There, in the mishna in <i>Ḥullin</i>, where the animal is purchased for consumption, it is sufficient to prepare one day before the festival. Here, in the case of this mishna, where the animal is purchased for sacrifice, the gentile requires three days to ensure that the animal has no blemish. The Gemara asks: And for the purpose of sacrifice, is it sufficient to prepare merely three days in advance? But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i>: One begins to ask about the <i>halakhot</i> of Passover thirty days before Passover; Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One begins to inquire only two weeks before Passover. According to both opinions, far more than three days are needed in order to begin preparing for the sacrifice of an offering. One can assume that the same applies to gentiles.
  The Gemara answers: We Jews, for whom blemishes that disqualify the animal are common, as even a small blemish on the cornea of the eye disqualifies it, we require thirty days to prepare for the sacrificial offerings of the festivals. By contrast, with regard to them, gentiles, they hold that the only blemish that disqualifies the animal is if it is lacking an entire limb; therefore, three days are sufficient for them to prepare for the sacrifice.
  As Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived with regard to an animal that is lacking a limb, that it is prohibited for descendants of Noah to sacrifice it as an offering? As it is written: “And of every living thing of all flesh, two of every sort you shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you” (Genesis 6:19). In this verse the Torah states: Bring an animal whose extremities are alive, as some of those animals were to be used later as offerings.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t that verse required to teach that an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>] is not fit to be sacrificed as an offering? The Gemara answers: The disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> is derived from the phrase: “To keep seed alive” (Genesis 7:3), as a <i>tereifa</i> cannot propagate. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that a <i>tereifa</i> cannot give birth. According to this opinion, the disqualification of a missing limb is derived from the phrase: “Of every living thing,” while the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> is learned from the phrase: “To keep seed alive.”
  
  Daf 6a
  
  But according to the one who says that a <i>tereifa</i> can give birth, what can be said? According to this opinion, a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be excluded by the phrase: “To keep seed alive.” The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to the animals that were brought by Noah into the ark: “You shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you” (Genesis 6:19). The term “with you” indicates that the verse is stated with regard to animals that are similar to you, but not a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara asks: But perhaps Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>. If so, one cannot exclude a <i>tereifa</i> from the comparison of animals to Noah. The Gemara answers: It is written about Noah that he was “complete” (Genesis 6:9).
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the verse means that his ways were complete, but it is not referring to Noah’s physical attributes. The Gemara explains: It is already written about him that he was “righteous” (Genesis 6:9), which means that his actions were perfect. Consequently, when the verse says that he was also complete, it must be referring to his body.
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the verse means that Noah was complete in his manner, and he was righteous in his good deeds. Accordingly, the verse would not exclude the possibility that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara explains: It cannot enter your mind that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>, as, if it enters your mind that Noah was a <i>tereifa</i>, would the Merciful One have said to him: Bring in <i>tereifot</i> like you to the ark, but do not bring in whole and perfect animals?
  The Gemara asks: And now that it has been established that one derives the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> from the term “with you,” why do I need the phrase “to keep seed alive”? The Gemara answers: If one could learn only from “with you,” I would say that Noah brought the animals to the ark only for the purpose of company, and therefore even an animal that is elderly and even one who is castrated can come into the ark, provided that it is not a <i>tereifa</i>. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “To keep seed alive,” teaching that only animals that could bear offspring may be brought into the ark.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When the mishna teaches that it is prohibited to conduct business with gentiles on the three days before their festival, do the three days include them, i.e., the days preceding the festival and their festival itself, in which case the prohibition applies only to the festival and the two preceding days? Or perhaps it is referring to them without their festival, i.e., the prohibition applies to three full days before the festival.
  The Gemara suggests a proof from a mishna (7b). Come and hear, as Rabbi Yishmael says: On the three days before the festivals of gentiles and the three days after them, these actions are prohibited. The Gemara analyzes this statement. If it enters your mind that the three days include them and their festival, this would mean that Rabbi Yishmael counts the day of their festival twice, as he counts it initially, as part of the first set of three days, and he also counts it at the end, along with the second set of three days. Clearly, the three days do not include the day of the festival itself.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: It is possible that the festival is counted as one of the initial three days, i.e., the three days include them and their festival, and is not counted as part of the three days following the festival. But since Rabbi Yishmael taught that these actions are prohibited during the three days before them, he also used the same expression and taught that these actions are prohibited during the three days after them, although what he is actually teaching is that these actions are prohibited only during the two days after it.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rav Taḥlifa bar Avdimi says that Shmuel says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, it is always prohibited to engage in business with Christians, as their festival takes place every Sunday. Since the three days preceding and following their festival are included in the prohibition, one cannot engage in business with them any day of the week. And if it enters your mind that the three days of the mishna include them and their festival, i.e., only the two days preceding and following the festival are included in the prohibition, then according to Rabbi Yishmael there are still Wednesday and Thursday, on which it is permitted to engage in business with Christians.
  The Gemara clarifies: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, I have no dilemma, as it is clear that the three days mentioned in the mishna are them without their festival. When I raise the dilemma, it is according to the opinion of the Rabbis: What days are included in the prohibition according to their opinion?
  Ravina says: Come and hear a proof from the continuation of the mishna (8a). And these are the festivals of gentiles: Kalenda, Saturnalia, and Kratesis. And Rav Ḥanin bar Rava says in explanation of that mishna: When do these festivals occur? Kalenda is held during the eight days after the winter solstice, and Saturnalia is held during the eight days before the winter solstice. And your mnemonic to remember which festival is which is that the festival that occurs after the solstice is mentioned first and the festival that takes place before it is mentioned later, as in the verse: “You have hemmed me in behind and before” (Psalms 139:5), where the word “before” appears after the term “behind.”
  Ravina explains the proof: And if it enters your mind that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna counts them and their festival, in this case there are ten days that are included in the prohibition: The eight days of the festival and the two days beforehand. Why, then, would the mishna say that the prohibition applies for only three days? If the three days do not include the festivals themselves, then this difficulty does not apply, as although in practice the prohibition lasts for eleven days, the mishna is not referring to the period of the festival. The Gemara responds: This proof is inconclusive, as the <i>tanna</i> counts all of the festival of Kalenda as one day.
  Rav Ashi says: Come and hear a proof from the mishna, which specifies that the time that the actions are prohibited is: On the three days before the festivals of gentiles. And if it enters your mind that the mishna is referring to them and their festival, let it teach: At the time of the festivals of gentiles, it is prohibited to engage in business with them for three days. The wording of the mishna indicates that all three days are before the festival.
  And if you would say: That which is taught in the mishna: Before the festivals of the gentiles, serves to exclude the days following their festivals, i.e., the <i>tanna</i> is clearly indicating that the prohibition applies before, rather than afterward, let the mishna teach: At the time of the festivals of gentiles, it is prohibited to engage in business with them for three days beforehand. Rather, conclude from the wording employed that when the mishna states: The three days before the festivals, it is referring to them without their festival. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from here that this is the case.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the reason for the prohibition against conducting business with gentiles in the days preceding their festivals because the gentile might profit, which will bring him joy, and he will subsequently give thanks to his idol on his festival? Or perhaps it is because this is a violation of the prohibition: “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), as one who sells an animal to a gentile thereby aids him in engaging in prohibited idol worship.
  The Gemara explains: What is the practical difference between the two options? The practical difference is in a situation where the gentile already has an animal of his own. If you say that the reason for the prohibition is because he might profit, here too the Jew causes him to profit. But if you say that the reason for the prohibition is due to the prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind,” since the gentile has his own animal, the Jew is not helping him sin.
  The Gemara challenges: And even if he already has his own animal, does not one who assists him transgress due to the command: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind”? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan said:
  
  Daf 6b
  
  From where is it derived that a person may not extend a cup of wine to a nazirite, who is prohibited from drinking wine, and that he may not extend a limb severed from a living animal to descendants of Noah? The verse states: “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). But here, in both cases, if one does not give it to him, he can take it himself, and yet the one who provides it to him transgresses due to the prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind.”
  The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where they are standing on the two sides of a river, and therefore the recipient could not have taken it himself. Since his help was instrumental, the one who conveyed the item has violated the prohibition of putting a stumbling block before the blind. The Gemara adds: The language of the <i>baraita</i> is also precise, as it teaches: A person may not extend, and it does not teach: One may not give. Learn from the usage of the term extend that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to one located on one side of a river, who extends the item to the one on the other side.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one ignored the injunction of the mishna and engaged in business with gentiles before their festival, what is the status of the profit that he earned? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If he engaged in business, it is prohibited to derive benefit from his profits. Reish Lakish says: If he engaged in business, it is permitted to derive benefit from his profits. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the festivals of gentiles, if one engaged in business, these profits are prohibited. What, is it not referring to one who engages in business with gentiles before their festivals? Reish Lakish responded: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to business conducted specifically during their festivals.
  There are those who say that there is a different version of the above exchange. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the festivals of gentiles, if one engaged in business these profits are prohibited. Isn’t it correct to infer from the <i>baraita</i> that if the business occurred during their festivals, yes, deriving benefit from the profits is prohibited, but if it took place before their festivals, no, it is not prohibited? Rabbi Yoḥanan responded: No; the <i>tanna</i> calls both this, the days before the festival, and that, the festival itself: Their festivals.
  The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish: When the Sages said that it is prohibited to engage with the gentiles in business, they prohibited it only in the case of an item that endures. But with regard to an item that does not endure, it is not prohibited. And even with regard to an item that endures, if one did engage in business with gentiles, deriving benefit from the profits is permitted. Rav Zevid taught a <i>baraita</i> from the school of Rabbi Oshaya: With regard to an item that does not endure, one may sell it to them, but one may not buy it from them.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain heretic who sent a Caesarean dinar to Rabbi Yehuda Nesia on the day of the heretic’s festival. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to Reish Lakish, who was sitting before him: What shall I do? If I take the dinar, he will go and thank his idol for the success of his endeavor, but if I do not take the dinar, he will harbor enmity toward me. Reish Lakish said to him: Take it and throw it into a pit in the presence of the heretic. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said: All the more so, this will cause him to harbor enmity toward me. Reish Lakish explained: I said, i.e., I meant, that you should throw it in an unusual manner, so that it looks as though the dinar inadvertently fell from your hand into the pit.
  § The mishna teaches that it is prohibited to lend them items and to borrow items from them during the three days preceding their festivals. The Gemara asks: Granted, it is prohibited to lend the items to them, as this causes them to have a profit. But why is it prohibited to borrow the items from them during this period? Doesn’t this serve to reduce for them the property they possess during the festival? Abaye said: The Sages issued a decree that it is prohibited to borrow the items from them due to the concern that he might come to lend the items to them. Rava said: All of it, lending and borrowing, is prohibited for the same reason, as in either situation the gentile might go and give thanks to his idol, as he will be pleased that the Jew was forced to borrow the items from him.
  The mishna further teaches that it is prohibited to lend money to them or to borrow money from them. The Gemara asks: Granted, it is prohibited to lend money to them, as this causes them to have a profit. But if one wants to borrow money from them, why is it prohibited? Abaye said: The Sages issued a decree that it is prohibited to borrow money from them, due to the concern that he might come to lend money to them. Rava said: All of it, lending and borrowing money, is prohibited for the same reason, as in either situation the gentile will go and give thanks to his object of idol worship.
  The mishna also teaches that it is prohibited to repay debts owed to them and to collect payment of their debts. Once again, the Gemara asks: Granted, it is prohibited to repay debts owed to them, as giving them the money at this time causes them to have a profit. But why is it prohibited to collect payment of their debts? Doesn’t this serve to reduce their fortune? Abaye said: The Sages issued a decree that it is prohibited to collect debts from them, due to the concern that he might come to repay their debts. Rava said: All of it, repaying and collecting debts, is prohibited for the same reason, as in either situation the gentile might go and give thanks to his idol for having had sufficient funds to pay his debts.
  The Gemara notes: And all of the prohibitions listed in the mishna are necessary. As, if the mishna had taught only that it is prohibited to engage with them in business, one could have said that the reason for the prohibition is because it causes the gentile to have a profit, and he will go and give thanks to his idol. But with regard to borrowing items from them, which serves to reduce for them the property they possess during the festival, one may well do so.
  And if the mishna had further taught only that it is prohibited to borrow items from them, one might have thought that this is because the matter is significant to the gentile, as he is pleased that the Jew is forced to borrow items from him, and therefore he might go and give thanks. But it might have been supposed that to borrow money from them is permitted, as there is only distress for the gentile when he lends money, as he would say: My money will not return to me again, since the borrower may never repay the loan.
  And if the mishna had taught in addition only that it is prohibited to borrow money from them, one might have thought that this is because the gentile says: I will forcibly collect payment from the Jew against his will, by means of the promissory note, and now in any event he will go and give thanks that the Jew is forced to borrow money from him. But with regard to collecting payment from them, as this money will never return to him again, one might say that he has distress about paying back the debt, and he will not go and give thanks. Since one might have reached these conclusions, it is necessary for the mishna to state each ruling explicitly.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may collect the repayment of debts from them, because this causes the gentile distress. The Gemara asks: And doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda accept the principle that even though he is distressed now, he will be happy afterward?
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: A woman may not apply lime to her skin during the intermediate days of the Festival in order to remove bodily hair and soften her skin, because this temporarily disfigures her until the lime is removed. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to lime that she can peel off during the intermediate days of the Festival that she may apply it on the intermediate days of the Festival, as even though she is distressed now, as the lime renders her unattractive, she will be happy afterward, when the lime is removed and she becomes more attractive. It is evident from this <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda does take into account the joy that will be experienced at a later time with regard to permitting an action now.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says in response: Leave aside the <i>halakhot</i> of the intermediate days of a Festival. These cannot be compared to other cases, as with regard to all the labors permitted on a Festival this is the reason for the leniency: Although he is distressed by performing them now, as they involve effort and trouble, he will be happy afterward on the Festival itself that he has performed them, when he enjoys the benefits of the labor he has performed. Due to the joy they will bring him on the Festival, these labors are permitted. Ravina said that there is a different answer: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that with regard to repaying a debt a gentile is always distressed, even after the fact. But in general, Rabbi Yehuda does take into account the joy that will be experienced at a later time.
  The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, as it states that one may not collect payment from a gentile during the three days preceding their festivals, without differentiating between various cases. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: In the case of a loan with a promissory note, one may not collect payment from gentiles before their festivals, as one can demand repayment of the debt by presenting the promissory note in his possession at a later stage. By contrast, in the case of a loan by oral agreement, one may collect payment from them, because he is considered as one who salvages money from them, since he has no promissory note and cannot be sure that the gentile will repay the loan at another time.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef sat behind Rabbi Abba in the study hall, and Rabbi Abba sat before Rav Huna, as a student before his teacher. And Rav Huna sat and said the following statements: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara explains: As for the statement that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, this is referring to that which we said with regard to collecting a loan by oral agreement from gentiles during the days preceding their festivals. As for the statement that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this is as it is taught in a mishna (<i>Bava Kamma</i> 100b): In the case of one who gives wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and instead he dyed it black, or one who gives wool to a dyer to dye it black and instead he dyed it red,
  
  Daf 7a
  
  Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Since the dyer deviated from the owner’s wishes, he is considered akin to a robber who acquires the stolen item by changing it. Therefore, like a robber he keeps the changed item and pays the owner its original value. Rabbi Yehuda says: The dyer does not acquire the wool; rather, the owner of the wool must reimburse the dyer for his expenses, without losing out himself. If the value of the enhancement, i.e., the enhanced value of the wool, exceeds the dyer’s expenses, the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement.
  Rav Yosef turned his face away to demonstrate his displeasure with Rav Huna’s comment. The Gemara explains why Rav Yosef was unhappy: Granted, his ruling that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that because this is a dispute between an individual and the many, the <i>halakha</i> should be in accordance with the opinion of the many, not in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa. Rav Huna therefore teaches us that in this case the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa despite the fact that he is an individual.
  But why do I need the statement that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is obvious that this is the case, as there is a well-known principle that whenever there is a dispute in a mishna and afterward one opinion is presented as the ruling of an unattributed mishna, i.e., without attribution to a particular Sage or that the ruling is subject to debate, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion presented in the unattributed mishna.
  The Gemara adds that here the ruling of the unattributed mishna appears after the dispute, as the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir appears in tractate <i>Bava Kamma</i>, and the unattributed mishna appears in <i>Bava Metzia</i>, which is the next tractate in the order of the Mishna. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Bava Metzia</i> 76a): Whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage. This statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a craftsman who deviates from his assignment is at a disadvantage, as he receives only the expense or the enhancement, whichever is worth less.
  The Gemara asks: And why did Rav Huna feel it necessary to state explicitly that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It was necessary because Rav Huna holds that the Mishna is not sequential, and therefore it is not clear that the mishna in <i>Bava Kamma</i> precedes the mishna in <i>Bava Metzia</i>. Consequently, it can be said that in fact this is a case of an unattributed mishna that is taught first, and only afterward appears the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir. The Gemara challenges: If that is so, that the Mishna is not sequential, then in every case of a dispute that is afterward followed by an unattributed mishna, let us say that the Mishna is not sequential.
  The Gemara explains: And Rav Huna? How would he respond to this claim? He would say: When do we not say that the Mishna is non-sequential? The Mishna is considered sequential when both <i>mishnayot</i> appear in one tractate, but when they are in two different tractates, we do say that the Mishna is not sequential, and it is unclear which one was taught last. Therefore, in this case, as each mishna is found in a different tractate, one in <i>Bava Kamma</i> and the other in <i>Bava Metzia</i>, one cannot say for certain which was taught first. And how would Rav Yosef respond? He would say: All of tractate <i>Nezikin</i>, i.e., <i>Bava Kamma</i>, <i>Bava Metzia</i>, and <i>Bava Batra</i>, is considered one tractate, and therefore its internal order of <i>mishnayot</i> is sequential.
  And if you wish, say instead that Rav Yosef maintained that it was not necessary to say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, because his ruling is taught amid other decided <i>halakhot</i>: Whoever changes the terms accepted by both parties is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage, i.e., this statement is unrelated to the subject matter of the chapter in which it appears. Consequently, it is evidently the accepted <i>halakha</i> and therefore Rav Huna’s statement was unnecessary.
  § The Gemara discusses other <i>halakhot</i> that are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa. The Sages taught: A person may not say to another on Shabbat: Does it seem that you will join me this evening? This is prohibited, as the speaker is hinting that he would like to hire him for labor after the conclusion of Shabbat. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: A person may say to another on Shabbat: Does it seem that you will join me this evening? In this case, he is not asking him explicitly. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.
  The Sages taught: In the case of one who asks a question of a Sage with regard to an issue of ritual impurity and the Sage rules that the item is impure, he may not ask the same question of another Sage and have him rule that it is pure. Similarly, in the case of one who asks a Sage a halakhic question and he deems it forbidden, he may not ask the question of another Sage and have him deem it permitted.
  In a situation where there were two Sages sitting together and one deems an item impure and the other one deems it pure, or if one deems it prohibited and the other one deems it permitted, the questioner should proceed as follows: If one of the Sages was superior to the other in wisdom and in number, one should follow his ruling, and if not, he should follow the one who rules stringently. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: If the uncertainty exists with regard to a Torah law, follow the one who rules stringently; if it exists with regard to a rabbinic law, follow the one who rules leniently. Rav Yosef said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.
  The Sages taught: And with regard to all of the people who are not deemed credible due to sins that they performed, even when they retract and repent from their evil ways, society never accepts them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If they retract their ways in private, society does not accept them, but if they repent in public [<i>befarheseya</i>], society accepts them. There are those who say that there is another version of this discussion: If they performed their sinful matters in private, then when they repent society accepts them.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  But if they performed their sins in public, society does not accept them. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa say: Both in this case, where they sinned in private, and in that case, where they sinned in public, society accepts them, as it is stated: “Return, you backsliding children, I will heal your backslidings” (Jeremiah 3:22). Rabbi Yitzḥak of the village of Akko says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of that pair, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, i.e., penitents are accepted, regardless of whether they sinned in public or in private.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yishmael says: On the three days before the festivals of gentiles and on the three days after them, it is prohibited to engage in business with those gentiles. And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited to engage in business with them before their festivals, but it is permitted to engage in business with them after their festivals.
  GEMARA: Rav Taḥlifa bar Avdimi says that Shmuel says: With regard to a Christian, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael it is always prohibited for a Jew to engage in business with him. Since his festival takes place every Sunday and the three days before and after Sunday constitute the entire week, one cannot engage in business with a Christian on any day of the week.
  The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited to engage in business with them before their festivals, but it is permitted to engage in business with them after their festivals. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The statement of the Rabbis is identical to the statement of the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna on 2a, who said that it is prohibited to engage in business with gentiles during the three days before their festival. The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to the question of whether the three days includes only them, i.e., the three days, without their festival, or if the festival is counted as one of the three days. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the three days is referring to them, the days preceding the festival, without their festivals, and the later Rabbis cited in this mishna hold that the three days include them and their festivals.
  If you wish, say that the difference between the Rabbis and the first <i>tanna</i> is with regard to one who ignored this injunction and engaged in business with gentiles before their festival. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that if one engaged in business, it is permitted to derive benefit from the profits, and the later Rabbis hold that if one engaged in business, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the profits.
  And if you wish, say that the difference between the Rabbis and the first <i>tanna</i> is with regard to the statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: In the Diaspora it is prohibited to engage in business with gentiles only on their festival day itself. The first <i>tanna</i> is of the opinion that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and the later Rabbis are not of the opinion that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.
  If you wish, say that the difference between the Rabbis and the first <i>tanna</i> is with regard to a statement of Naḥum the Mede. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Naḥum the Mede says: It is prohibited to engage in business with gentiles only on the day before their festival. The first <i>tanna</i> is not of the opinion that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Naḥum the Mede, and the later Rabbis are of the opinion that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Naḥum the Mede, as they do not mention how many days before the festival are included in the prohibition.
  Having mentioned Naḥum the Mede’s opinion, the Gemara discusses the matter itself. Naḥum the Mede says: It is prohibited only on the day before their festival. The other Sages said to him: It would be best if this matter were lost and not stated, as it is not the <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara asks: But aren’t there the later Rabbis, who hold in accordance with his opinion? The Gemara answers: Who are these Rabbis? This is referring to Naḥum the Mede himself, but the other Sages disagree.
  § The Gemara cites additional statements of Naḥum the Mede. It is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that Naḥum the Mede says: Although it is prohibited to sell large livestock to gentiles, one may sell a male and elderly horse to them during a war, as it cannot be used for battle. The Sages said to him: It would be best if this matter were lost and not stated, as it is not the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there ben Beteira, who holds in accordance with his opinion? As we learned in a mishna (14b): Ben Beteira permits selling a horse to gentiles. The Gemara answers: Since ben Beteira does not differentiate between male and female horses, and Naḥum the Mede does differentiate between male and female horses, it is clear that Naḥum the Mede holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that one is generally not permitted to sell a horse to a gentile, only he permits it in this specific circumstance. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, it would be best if this matter were lost and not stated.
  The Gemara cites a similar dispute. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Naḥum the Mede says: The dill plant is subject to tithes, whether it is used as a seed, or a vegetable, or a pod. The Sages said to him: It would be best if this matter were lost and not stated, as it is not the <i>halakha</i>. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there Rabbi Eliezer, who holds in accordance with his opinion? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 4:5) that Rabbi Eliezer says: The dill plant is subject to tithes whether it is used as a seed, or a vegetable, or a pod. The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Eliezer is referring to the garden variety of dill, which is of such a high quality that its seeds, vegetable, and pods are eaten. By contrast, in the case of wild dill, only its seeds and vegetable are eaten, not the pods.
  Apropos the discussion between Naḥum the Mede and the other Sages, Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi said to Abaye: A great man came from our place, i.e., from Media, and in response to every matter that he said, the Sages said to him that it would be best if this matter were lost and not stated. Do they wish to erase all the <i>halakhot</i> taught by the Sages of Media? Abaye said: There is one instance in which we act in accordance with his opinion, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Naḥum the Mede says: During the <i>Amida</i> prayer a person may request his personal needs that are not included in the standard formulation of the <i>Amida</i> prayer, in the blessing that ends: Who listens to prayer.
  Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi said to Abaye: Apart from this <i>halakha</i>, i.e., this does not serve as proof that a statement of Naḥum the Mede was ever accepted by the other Sages, as this <i>halakha</i> is dependent on the dispute between great trees, i.e., great authorities, who expressed their opinions with regard to the <i>halakha</i> before Naḥum the Mede.
  Rav Aḥa bar Minyumi elaborates: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: A person should request his own needs first and afterward recite the <i>Amida</i> prayer, as it is stated: “A prayer of the afflicted, when he is faint and pours out <i>siḥo</i> before the Lord. O Lord, hear my prayer” (Psalms 102:1–2). These verses indicate that one first requests help concerning his afflictions and pains, and only afterward pours forth his <i>siḥa</i>. And <i>siḥa</i> means nothing other than prayer, as it is stated: “And Isaac went out to meditate [<i>lasuaḥ</i>] in the field” (Genesis 24:63).
  Rabbi Yehoshua says: One should pray first and afterward request his own needs, as it is stated: “I pour out <i>siḥi</i> before Him, I declare before Him my trouble” (Psalms 142:3), which teaches that first one pours forth his <i>siḥa</i>, and only afterward speaks of his own troubles.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Eliezer as well, isn’t it written: “I pour out <i>siḥi</i> before Him, I declare before Him my trouble”? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, this is what the verse is saying: I pour out my <i>siḥa</i> before Him when I have already declared before Him my trouble. The Gemara asks with regard to Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion: And according to Rabbi Yehoshua as well, isn’t it written: “A prayer of the afflicted, when he is faint and pours out <i>siḥo</i> before the Lord”? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yehoshua, this is what the verse is saying: When is there a prayer of the afflicted? When he has already poured out <i>siḥo</i> before the Lord, and now requests his own needs.
  The Gemara notes: Now it is clear that the verses themselves do not fit precisely in accordance with the opinion of this Sage and do not fit precisely in accordance with the opinion of that Sage, as one verse indicates that prayer is recited before stating personal requests, while the other suggests that first one states personal requests and then prays. Evidently, the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua is not based on the verses, but depends on some other issue. Therefore, the Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree?
  They disagree with regard to that which Rabbi Simlai taught. As Rabbi Simlai taught: A person should always set forth praise of God and only then pray for his own needs. From where do we derive this? We derive it from Moses our teacher, as it is written: “O Lord God, You have begun to show Your servant Your greatness, and Your strong hand; for what god is there in heaven or on earth, that can do according to Your works, and according to Your mighty acts?” (Deuteronomy 3:24). Here Moses praises God, and it is written afterward, in the following verse, that then Moses requested from God: “Let me go over, I pray You, and see the good land” (Deuteronomy 3:25).
  
  Daf 8a
  
  Rabbi Yehoshua holds that we derive from the case of Moses that one should first praise God in prayer and only afterward issue personal requests. And Rabbi Eliezer holds that we do not derive from Moses how to act, since Moses is different, as his might is great, i.e., he knew how to pray to God in this order. And the Rabbis say: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the statement of this Sage, who says that one should issue personal requests before praying, nor is it in accordance with the statement of that Sage, who says that personal requests should follow prayer. Rather, a person requests his own needs in the blessing ending: Who listens to prayer. Therefore, when Naḥum the Mede stated that this is the <i>halakha</i>, he was merely concurring with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  With regard to the halakhic ruling, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is that a person requests his own needs during the <i>Amida</i> prayer in the blessing ending: Who listens to prayer. Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, says in the name of Rav: Although the Sages said that a person requests his own needs in the blessing ending: Who listens to prayer, that is not the only option. Rather, if he wishes to recite at the conclusion of each and every blessing personal requests that reflect the nature of each and every blessing, he may recite them.
  Similarly, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav says: Although the Sages said that a person requests his own needs in the blessing ending: Who listens to prayer, if he has a sick person in his house he recites a special prayer for him during the blessing of the sick. And if he is in need of sustenance, he recites a request during the blessing of the years.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Although the Sages said that a person requests his own needs in the blessing ending: Who listens to prayer; but if one wishes to recite prayers and supplications after finishing his <i>Amida</i> prayer, even if his personal requests are as long as the order of the confession of Yom Kippur, he may recite them.
  MISHNA: And these are the festivals of gentiles: Kalenda, Saturnalia, and Kratesis, and the day of the festival of their kings, and the birthday of the king, and the anniversary of the day of the death of the king. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Every death that includes public burning is a festival that includes idol worship, and any death that does not include public burning is not a festival that includes idol worship. But in the case of the day of shaving his, i.e., a gentile’s, beard and his locks, and the day of his ascent from the sea, and the day that he left prison, and also in the case of a gentile who prepared a wedding feast for his son and celebrates on that day, engaging in business is prohibited only on that day and with that man.
  GEMARA: Rav Ḥanan bar Rava says: When are these festivals celebrated? Kalenda is celebrated during the eight days after the winter solstice, and Saturnalia is celebrated during the eight days before the winter solstice. And your mnemonic to remember which festival is that the one that occurs after the solstice is mentioned first in the mishna, and the festival that takes place before the solstice is mentioned after, as in the verse: “You have hemmed me in behind and before, and laid Your Hand upon me” (Psalms 139:5), where the word “before” appears after the term “behind.”
  With regard to the dates of these festivals, the Sages taught: When Adam the first man saw that the day was progressively diminishing, as the days become shorter from the autumnal equinox until the winter solstice, he did not yet know that this is a normal phenomenon, and therefore he said: Woe is me; perhaps because I sinned the world is becoming dark around me and will ultimately return to the primordial state of chaos and disorder. And this is the death that was sentenced upon me from Heaven, as it is written: “And to dust shall you return” (Genesis 3:19). He arose and spent eight days in fasting and in prayer.
  Once he saw that the season of Tevet, i.e., the winter solstice, had arrived, and saw that the day was progressively lengthening after the solstice, he said: Clearly, the days become shorter and then longer, and this is the order of the world. He went and observed a festival for eight days. Upon the next year, he observed both these eight days on which he had fasted on the previous year, and these eight days of his celebration, as days of festivities. He, Adam, established these festivals for the sake of Heaven, but they, the gentiles of later generations, established them for the sake of idol worship.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to the one who says that the world was created in the month of Tishrei, one can understand why Adam believed that the days were becoming shorter as part of his punishment, as he saw the short days of the winter and had not yet seen the long days of summer. But according to the one who says that the world was created in the month of Nisan, he had already seen the difference between the short days and the long days, as the days in the month of Nisan become progressively longer with the passage of time. The Gemara answers: Although Adam had experienced short days, he had not seen days that were this short, as in the days before the winter solstice.
  The Sages taught: On the day that Adam the first man was created, when the sun set upon him he said: Woe is me, as because I sinned, the world is becoming dark around me, and the world will return to the primordial state of chaos and disorder. And this is the death that was sentenced upon me from Heaven. He spent all night fasting and crying, and Eve was crying opposite him. Once dawn broke, he said: Evidently, the sun sets and night arrives, and this is the order of the world. He arose and sacrificed a bull whose horns preceded its hoofs in the order that they were created, as it is stated: “And it shall please the Lord better than a bullock that has horns and hoofs” (Psalms 69:32). This verse is referring to the one particular bull whose horns preceded its hoofs.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The bull that Adam the first man sacrificed had one horn in its forehead, as it is stated: “And it shall please the Lord better than a bullock that has horns [<i>makrin</i>] and hooves.” The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t <i>makrin</i> plural, which indicates two horns? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: <i>Mikkeren</i> is written, i.e., the letter <i>yod</i> is missing from the word, indicating that there was only one horn.
  § Rav Mattana says: Since Rome established the festival of Kalenda on a specific date, and all of the nearby towns are ruled by Rome, i.e., they pay their tax to Rome and provide its needs but do not themselves celebrate the festival, is it prohibited or permitted to engage in business transactions with the gentile residents of those towns? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: It is prohibited to engage in business during the time of the Kalenda with everyone. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is prohibited to engage in business only with its worshippers, whereas it is permitted to engage in business transactions with gentiles who do not celebrate the festival.
  The Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Although they said that Rome has established the festival of Kalenda and all of the nearby towns are ruled by Rome, it is prohibited to engage in business only with its worshippers.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to the festivals Saturnalia and Kratesis, and the day of the festival of their kings, and the day on which the king was crowned, the <i>halakha</i> is that before the festival it is prohibited to engage in business transactions, whereas after the festival it is permitted. But in the case of a gentile who prepared a feast for his son and celebrates on that day, engaging in business is prohibited only on that day itself and with that man.
  Rav Ashi said: We learn in the mishna as well in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the prohibition applies only to gentiles who celebrate the festival, not to people who are ruled by them. As the mishna teaches: With regard to the day of shaving his beard and his locks, and the day of his ascent from the sea, and the day that he left prison, engaging in business is prohibited only on that day and with that man.
  Rav Ashi explains the proof: Granted, the mishna specifies that the prohibition is limited to that day alone, in order to exclude the days before and after it. But when it states that the prohibition applies only to that man, what does the mishna exclude? Obviously the prohibition does not extend to all gentiles, as it is a personal festival. Doesn’t the mishna’s ruling serve to exclude those who are ruled by him? Therefore, conclude from the language of the mishna that a prohibition extends only to gentiles who celebrate the festival, not to those who are ruled by them.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael says: Jews who are outside of Eretz Yisrael are considered to engage in idol worship in purity, i.e., unwittingly. How does this occur? In the case of a gentile who prepared a feast for the marriage of his son, and invited all of the Jews in his town, even though they eat of their own kosher food and drink of their own kosher beverages, and their own attendant stands before them, the verse ascribes guilt to them as though they ate of the offerings to the dead, i.e., idols, as it is stated: “And sacrifice to their gods, and they call you, and you eat of their sacrifice” (Exodus 34:15). Since Jews participate in a feast in which the gentile sacrifices offerings to his idol, it is as though they partook of the offering themselves.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say that the verse is criticizing the Jews only once they eat from the sacrifice? Rava said: If that is what is meant, let the verse say only: And you eat of their sacrifice. What is meant by the additional phrase: “And they call you”? This indicates that the prohibition occurs from the time of the call. Therefore,
  
  Daf 8b
  
  during all the thirty days that follow the wedding celebration, if the gentile invites a Jew to a feast, whether he said to the Jew that the feast is due to the wedding celebration or whether he did not say to him that the feast is due to the wedding celebration, it is prohibited to attend, as it is assumed the festivity is part of the wedding celebration. From this point forward, if he said to him that the feast is due to the wedding celebration, it is prohibited to participate, but if he did not say to him that the feast is due to the wedding celebration, it is permitted to do so.
  The Gemara asks: And in a case where he said to him that the feast is due to the wedding celebration, until when is the feast assumed to be connected to idol worship? Rav Pappa said: Until twelve months of the year have passed since the wedding. The Gemara asks: And initially, before the wedding, from when is it prohibited? Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: From the time when they cast barley into the mortars [<i>ba’asintei</i>] to prepare beer for the wedding.
  The Gemara asks: And after the twelve months of the year have passed since the wedding, is it always permitted to participate in a feast? But Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiyya, happened to come to the house of a certain gentile after twelve months of the year had passed since his son’s wedding, and he heard the gentile giving thanks to his idol for the marriage of his son, and he withdrew from the feast and did not eat there. The Gemara answers: Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiyya, is different, as he is an important person and therefore his presence caused the gentile to rejoice.
  § The mishna teaches: And Kratesis, and the day of the festival of their kings. The Gemara asks: What is the festival of Kratesis? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It commemorates the day when Rome seized control of an empire. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Two festivals are Kratesis and the day when Rome seized control of an empire? This indi-cates that Kratesis and the day when Rome seized control of an empire are two separate festivals. Rav Yosef said: On two separate occasions Rome seized control of an empire. One occurred in the days of Queen Cleopatra, when they conquered Egypt, and one happened much earlier, when Rome seized control in the days of the Greeks.
  The Gemara elaborates: As when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said: The Romans waged thirty-two battles with the Greeks but were unable to defeat them, until they formed a partnership with the Jewish people and finally vanquished the Greeks. And this is the condition that they stipulated with the Jewish people: If the kings come from among us, the governors [<i>hiparkhei</i>] will come from among you; and if the kings come from among you, the governors will come from among us.
  And the Romans sent the following message to the Greeks: Until now, we attempted to resolve our conflict through fighting battles; now, let us settle the matter by means of judgment. In the case of a pearl and a precious stone, which one of them should serve as a base for the other? The Greeks sent them in response: The pearl should serve as the base for the precious stone, which has a greater value.
  The Romans further inquired: If there was a precious stone and an onyx [<i>innakh</i>], a particularly valuable precious stone, which one of them should serve as a base for the other? The Greeks answered: The precious stone should serve as the base for the onyx. Once again, the Romans asked: In the case of an onyx and a Torah scroll, which one of them should be serve as a base for the other? The Greeks responded: The onyx should serve as the base for the Torah scroll.
  The Romans sent this response to them: If that is so, then you should submit to us, as we have the Torah scroll with us, and the Jewish people are with us. The Romans are akin to the precious stone, and they are allied with the Jewish people who are akin to the onyx, and they possess the Torah scroll. The Romans therefore forced the Greeks to surrender and took over their world dominance. For twenty-six years the Romans stood faithfully with the Jewish people; from that point forward, they subjugated them.
  The Gemara asks: Initially, when the Romans acted faithfully, what verse did they interpret, and ultimately, when they subjugated the Jews, what verse did they interpret? Initially, they interpreted the verse where Esau said to Jacob upon their meeting: “Let us take our journey, and let us go, and I will go before you” (Genesis 33:12). In this verse, Esau equates himself to Jacob, prefiguring the initial Roman treatment of the Jews. And ultimately, they interpreted the verse that recites Jacob’s response to Esau: “Let my lord, I pray you, pass over before his servant” (Genesis 33:14), demonstrating Jacob’s subjugation to Esau, and by extension that of the Jews to Rome.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the twenty-six years during which the Romans stood faithfully with the Jewish people, from where do we know that this was the case? The Gemara cites a proof. As Rav Kahana says: When Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, fell ill, the Sages sent the following message to him: Our teacher, tell us two or three statements that you once told us in the name of your father, Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta, as we do not remember the statements precisely.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to them the following statements that were passed down to him by his father: One hundred and eighty years before the Second Temple was destroyed, the evil Roman Empire stretched forth over Israel and ruled over them. Eighty years before the Temple was destroyed, the Sages decreed impurity on the land of the nations and on glass vessels. Forty years before the Temple was destroyed, the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone and sat in the store near the Temple Mount.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is it necessary to know where the Sanhedrin would convene? Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: It is necessary in order to say that they no longer judged cases of fines. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that at this point the Sanhedrin no longer judged cases of fines? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Indeed [<i>beram</i>], that man will be remembered favorably, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava is his name, as had it not been for him the laws of fines would have been forgotten from among the Jewish people. The Gemara challenges that assertion: Would the laws of fines actually have been forgotten? Let the scholars study them, so they will not be forgotten.
  Rather, his intention was to say that the laws of fines would have ceased to be implemented from among the Jewish people, as they would not have been able to adjudicate cases involving these <i>halakhot</i> due to a lack of ordained judges. This is because at one time the wicked kingdom of Rome issued decrees of religious persecution against the Jewish people with the aim of abolishing the chain of ordination and the authority of the Sages. They said that anyone who ordains judges will be killed, and anyone who is ordained will be killed, and the city in which they ordain the judges will be destroyed, and the areas around the boundary of the city in which they ordain judges will be uprooted. These measures were intended to discourage the Sages from performing or receiving ordination due to fear for the welfare of the local population.
  What did Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava do? He went and sat between two large mountains, and between two large cities, and between two Shabbat boundaries: Between Usha and Shefaram, i.e., in a desolate place that was not associated with any particular city so that he would not endanger anyone not directly involved, and there he ordained five Elders, namely: Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. And Rav Avya adds that Rabbi Neḥemya was also among those ordained.
  When their enemies discovered them, Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava said to the newly ordained rabbis: My sons, run for your lives. They said to him: Our teacher, and what will be with you? Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava was elderly and unable to run. He said to them: In any case, I am cast before them like a stone that cannot be overturned; even if you attempt to assist me I will not be able to escape due to my frailty, but if you do not escape without me you will also be killed. People said about this incident: The Roman soldiers did not move from there until they had inserted three hundred iron spears [<i>lulniot</i>] into his body, making his body appear like a sieve pierced with many holes. It can be inferred from this episode that there were ordained judges who could hear cases of fines for many years after the destruction of the Temple, in contrast to Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi’s statement.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says in explanation: Do not say that after the Sanhedrin was exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone they no longer judged cases of fines; rather, emend the statement to say that they no longer judged cases of capital law, as a court does not have the authority to hear capital cases when the Sanhedrin is not sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason that the members of the Sanhedrin ceased to meet in their proper place and thereby ended the adjudication of capital cases? Once they saw that the murderers were so numerous and they were not able to judge them and punish them with death, they said: It is better that we should be exiled from the Chamber of Hewn Stone and move from place to place, so that offenders will not be deemed liable to receive the death penalty in a time period when the court does not carry out their sentences.
  The Gemara explains why a court may not adjudicate capital cases once the Sanhedrin has left the Chamber of Hewn Stone. As it is written: “And you shall do according to the tenor of the sentence, which they shall declare to you from that place” (Deuteronomy 17:10). This verse teaches that it is the place where the Sanhedrin resides that causes the judgment to take place. In other words, if the Sanhedrin has abandoned its proper place, the Chamber of Hewn Stone, all courts must cease judging capital cases.
  The Gemara returns to the earlier comment of Rabbi Yishmael in the name of his father Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta, that the Roman Empire ruled over Israel one hundred and eighty years before the second Temple was destroyed. The Gemara asks: Did Rome rule over Israel for one hundred and eighty years before the destruction of the Temple and no more? But didn’t Rabbi Yosei the Great, i.e., Rabbi Yosei ben Ḥalafta himself, teach:
  
  Daf 9a
  
  The Persian Empire, which ruled the world before the construction of the Temple, continued to do so for 34 years in the presence of the Temple, i.e., after the Temple was built; the Greek Empire ruled for 180 years in the presence of the Temple; the Hasmonean dynasty ruled for 103 years in the presence of the Temple; and the Herodian dynasty likewise ruled for 103 years. From this point forward, you can go and calculate the date on which an event occurred by how many years it happened after the destruction of the Temple.
  According to this statement of Rabbi Yosei, evidently when the Greek rule over the Jewish people ended and the Roman rule began it was 206 years before the Second Temple was destroyed, i.e., the two sets of one hundred and three years of the Hasmonean dynasty and the Herodian dynasty. But you said that when the Roman Empire stretched forth over Israel and ruled over them it was 180 years before the Temple was destroyed. This is not a contradiction, but rather, it proves that for 26 years the Romans stood faithfully with the Jewish people, honoring their agreement, and did not subjugate them. And therefore, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, does not count these 26 years among the total years in which the evil Roman Empire stretched forth over Israel and ruled over them.
  § Apropos the above <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara relates that Rav Pappa said: If this <i>tanna</i>, i.e., one who dates years in reference to the destruction of the Temple, forgot and did not know the details of the date with regard to exactly how much time had passed since the destruction of the Temple, e.g., he remembered the century but could not recall the exact decade and year, let him ask a scribe who writes official documents how many years he writes when he dates the documents. The dating system of scribes uses as its starting point the beginning of the Greek rule, 380 years before the destruction of the Temple. And let him add 20 years to the number, and in this manner he will find his number [<i>leḥumreih</i>]. And your mnemonic to remember this is the verse: “These twenty years have I been in your house” (Genesis 31:41).
  Similarly, if a scribe forgot the exact year, let him ask the <i>tanna</i> how much time he calculates has passed since the Temple’s destruction, and he should deduct from the number twenty years, and in this manner he will find his number. And your mnemonic to remember that the <i>tanna</i> adds twenty to the date of the scribe, whereas the scribe deducts twenty from the number of the <i>tanna</i>, is as follows: A scribe deducts, while a <i>tanna</i> adds on [<i>tosfa’a</i>]. This is a play on the phrase <i>tanna tosfa’a</i>, which also means to teach the <i>Tosefta</i>, the practice of a <i>tanna</i>.
  In relation to the discussion on the calculation of years, the Gemara states that one of the Sages of the school of Eliyahu taught: The world is destined to exist for six thousand years. For two thousand years the world was waste, as the Torah had not yet been given. The next set of two thousand years are the time period of the Torah. The last set of two thousand years are the period designated for the days of the Messiah, but due to our many sins there are those years that have been taken from them, i.e., such and such years have already passed and have been taken from the two thousand years that are designated for the Messiah, and the Messiah has not yet arrived. Whenever a <i>tanna</i> taught this <i>baraita</i>, he would insert the number of years that was correct for his time.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the two thousand years of the time period of the Torah, from when are they counted? If we say that they started from the giving of the Torah until now, then there is not enough time for all of these years. As, when you examine the calculations, it is evident that from the creation of the world until the giving of the Torah there were two thousand years plus a part of this third thousand, as the Torah was given 2,448 years after the creation of the world. This would mean that the time period of the Torah encroaches upon the days of the Messiah.
  Rather, the two-thousand-year time period of the Torah is counted from the time when it is stated about Abraham and Sarah: “And the souls that they had gotten in Haran” (Genesis 12:5), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to the men and women who were brought closer to the Torah by Abraham and Sarah. Therefore, it was at this point that the Torah began to spread throughout the world. And it is learned as a tradition that at that time Abraham was fifty-two years old.
  How many years are missing from the two thousand year period of the Messiah, if the period of the Torah that is taught by the <i>tanna</i> is counted from the giving of the Torah? There are 448 missing years. When you examine the calculation from the time when it is stated about Abraham and Sarah: “The souls that they had gotten in Haran,” until the time of the giving of the Torah, there are 448 years.
  With regard to this <i>baraita</i> as well, Rav Pappa said: If a <i>tanna</i> meant to state that at his time such and such years were already lost from the two thousand years that are designated for the days of the Messiah, but he forgot and did not know the details of exactly how much time had passed, let him ask a scribe how many years he writes when he dates documents. And let him add forty-eight to the number, correcting for the century, and in this manner he will find his number. And your mnemonic for this is the verse:
  
  Daf 9b
  
  “Forty-eight cities” (Numbers 35:7). Similarly, if a scribe forgot the exact year, let him ask the <i>tanna</i> how many years does he teach have already been lost from the two thousand years that are designated for the days of the Messiah. And he should deduct forty-eight years from the number, correcting for the century, and in this manner he will find his number. And your mnemonic to remember that the <i>tanna</i> must add to the date of the scribe, while the scribe must deduct from the number of the <i>tanna</i>, is again: A scribe deducts, while a <i>tanna</i> adds on [<i>tosfa’a</i>].
  § Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: In the case of one who does not know which year of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle he stands in, he should add one year to the years that have passed since the destruction of the Temple in order to begin at the start of a Sabbatical cycle. And he should calculate the general years, i.e., the centuries, as Jubilee cycles, as every Jubilee concludes seven completed Sabbatical cycles of forty-nine years, and the details as Sabbatical cycles, i.e., he should divide the remaining years into seven-year Sabbatical cycles.
  But as the Jubilee Year itself is counted as one year of a Sabbatical cycle, he should take, from every hundred years that passed, two years, and add it to the details, i.e., the remaining decades and single years. And then he should calculate with the details by dividing them into Sabbatical cycles. And from the remainder he will know how many years in the current Sabbatical cycle have passed. And your mnemonic that two years must be deducted from every century is the following verse: “For these two years the famine has been in the land” (Genesis 45:6).
  Rabbi Ḥanina says: After the year 400 from the destruction of the Temple, if a person says to you: Purchase a field that is worth one thousand dinars for one dinar, do not purchase it. It is not a worthwhile investment, as the redemption will soon come and all fields will revert to their original owners. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: After the year 4,231 from the creation of the world, if a person says to you: Purchase a field that is worth one thousand dinars for one dinar, do not purchase it. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two dates? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them of three years, as the <i>baraita</i> adds three years. The year 400 from the destruction of the Temple corresponds to the year 4,228 from the creation of the world.
  § The Gemara relates: There was a certain promissory note in which was written
  
  Daf 10a
  
  a date that had six additional years relative to the correct scribal date, which takes for its starting point the beginning of Greek rule. The Sages who studied before Rabba thought to say: This is a postdated promissory note, which can be used only from the date it specifies. Therefore, let us hold it until its time arrives so that the creditor will not repossess property that the debtor sold prior to the date that appears in the note. Rav Naḥman disagreed and said: This promissory note was written by an exacting scribe, and those six years are referring to the years when the Greeks ruled only in Elam. We do not count them, as Greek rule had not yet spread throughout the world, but he does count them. And therefore he wrote in the promissory note the correct time, as the date does in fact match the year in which the promissory note was written.
  Rav Naḥman cites a proof for his resolution: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: The Greeks ruled for six years in Elam alone, and afterward their dominion spread throughout the entire world. It is the later event that serves as the basis for the dating system used by most scribes.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov objects to Rav Naḥman’s answer: From where is it known that we count years according to the Greek rule, and that this promissory note was dated according to a system that uses the Greek rule as a starting point and was written by an exacting scribe? Perhaps we count the years using the exodus from Egypt as the starting point, which occurred one thousand years before the start of the Greek rule, and in this case the scribe left out the first thousand years from the time of the exodus and held on only to the last thousand years, omitting the thousands digit and writing merely the hundreds, tens, and single digits. And if so, this promissory note is postdated. Rav Naḥman said in response: The practice is that in the exile we count years only according to the Greek kings.
  Upon hearing this reply, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov thought: Rav Naḥman is merely deflecting my legitimate questions with this answer. Afterward, he went out, examined the matter, and discovered that it was as Rav Naḥman said. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the exile we count years only according to the Greek kings.
  Ravina said: The mishna is also precisely formulated, as it teaches that we calculate years according to the Greek kings. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Rosh HaShana</i> 2a): On the first of Nisan is the New Year for kings and for the Festivals. And we say about this: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is it stated that the first of Nisan is the New Year for kings? Rav Ḥisda said: It is said with regard to dating documents and determining their validity.
  And we learned in the same mishna: On the first of Tishrei is the New Year for counting years and for calculating Sabbatical cycles. And we say: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is it stated that the first of Tishrei is the New Year for counting years? And Rav Ḥisda said: It is said with regard to dating documents. These two statements with regard to the dating of documents are difficult in light of each other, as according to one statement the dating system is based on Nisan as the first month, whereas according to the other the year begins in Tishrei.
  And we resolved the contradiction by explaining that here the dating is according to kings of Israel, and there the dating is according to the kings of the gentile nations of the world. That is, when we date years according to the kings of the nations of the world, we count from the month of Tishrei, whereas when we date years according to the kings of Israel, we count from the month of Nisan.
  Ravina explains his proof: And now that we count from the month of Tishrei when dating documents, one can claim as follows: If it enters your mind that we count and date years using the exodus from Egypt as the starting point, while leaving off the first thousand years, then we should count from the month of Nisan, when the exodus occurred. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that we count years according to the Greek kings? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that the scribal years are in fact calculated according to the Greek kings. Therefore, one should explain as did Rav Naḥman: A promissory note that appears to be postdated by six years may not actually be a postdated promissory note; rather, it is assumed to have been written by an exacting scribe.
  § One of the gentile festivals listed in the mishna is the day of the festival [<i>geinuseya</i>] of their kings. The Gemara asks: What is meant by: The day of <i>geinuseya</i> of their kings? Rav Yehuda says: This is referring to the day on which the gentiles appoint and crown their king. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Two gentile festivals are the day of <i>geinuseya</i> and the day on which the gentiles appoint their king? This indicates that these are two separate occasions. The Gemara answers that it is not difficult: This, the day of <i>geinuseya</i>, is referring to the coronation of the king himself, whereas that, the day on which the gentiles appoint and crown their king, is referring to the coronation of his son, when a son is crowned during his father’s lifetime.
  The Gemara asks: And do the Romans actually appoint as king the son of the king? But didn’t Rav Yosef teach: The verse relating a prophesy about Edom, associated with the Roman Empire: “Behold, I made you small among the nations” (Obadiah 1:2), is a reference to the fact that the Romans do not place on the throne as king the son of the king. The continuation of the verse: “You are greatly despised,” is a reference to the fact that the Romans have neither their own script nor their own language, but use those of other nations. The Gemara therefore rejects the explanation of the <i>baraita</i> that distinguishes between coronation of a king and coronation of the king’s son: Rather, what is the day of <i>geinuseya</i>? It is the king’s birthday.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Two gentile festivals are the day of <i>geinuseya</i> and the birthday. Once again, these two events cannot be the same. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult: This, the day of <i>geinuseya</i>, is referring to the birthday of the king himself, whereas that, the birthday mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, is referring to the birthday of his son.
  The Gemara further asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The day of <i>geinuseya</i> of the king, the day of <i>geinuseya</i> of his son, and the king’s birthday and the birthday of his son? If so, the <i>geinuseya</i> cannot be either his or his son’s birthday. Rather, what is meant by the day of <i>geinuseya</i>? In fact it is referring to the day on which the gentiles appoint and crown their king. And the fact that a <i>baraita</i> mentions both the day of <i>geinuseya</i> and the day on which the gentiles appoint and crown their king is not difficult, as this, the day of <i>geinuseya</i>, is referring to his own coronation, whereas that, the day on which the gentiles appoint and crown their king, is referring to the coronation of his son.
  And if it is difficult for you that which was stated earlier, that the Romans do not appoint as king the son of the king, in fact they do appoint a son of the king as king through the request of the king. For example, there was Asveirus, son of Antoninus, who ruled at the request of Antoninus.
  The Gemara provides the background for this assertion. It is related that Antoninus said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: I wish for Asveirus my son to rule instead of me, and that the city Tiberias be released [<i>kelaneya</i>] from paying taxes. And if I tell the Roman senate one of my wishes, they will do as I wish, but if I ask for two of them they will not do as I wish. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi conveyed his answer in the following manner: He brought a man, placed him on the shoulders of another man, and put a dove in the hands of the one on top. And he said to the one on the bottom: Tell the one on top that he should cause the dove to fly from his hands. Antoninus said to himself: Learn from it that this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying to me: You should ask the Senate: Let Asveirus my son rule instead of me, and say to Asveirus that he should release Tiberias from paying taxes.
  Antoninus also said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Important Romans are upsetting me; what can I do about them? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi brought him to his garden, and every day he uprooted a radish from the garden bed before him. Antoninus said to himself: Learn from it that this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying to me: You should kill them one by one, and do not incite all of them at once.
  
  Daf 10b
  
  The Gemara asks: But why not let him say his advice explicitly? Why did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answer in such a circumspect way, which could have been interpreted incorrectly? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to himself: If I answer openly, the important Romans might hear me and will cause me anguish. The Gemara asks: But why not let him say his advice quietly? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was still worried that they might hear what he had said, because it is written: “Curse not the king, no, not in your thought, and curse not the rich in your bedchamber, for a bird of the air shall carry the voice” (Ecclesiastes 10:20).
  The Gemara relates: Antoninus had a certain daughter whose name was Gira, who performed a prohibited action, i.e., she engaged in promiscuous intercourse. Antoninus sent a rocket plant [<i>gargira</i>] to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, to allude to the fact that Gira had acted promiscuously [<i>gar</i>]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sent him coriander [<i>kusbarta</i>], which Antoninus understood as a message to kill [<i>kos</i>] his daughter [<i>barta</i>], as she was liable to receive the death penalty for her actions. Antoninus sent him leeks [<i>karti</i>] to say: I will be cut off [<i>karet</i>] if I do so. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi then sent him lettuce [<i>ḥasa</i>], i.e., Antoninus should have mercy [<i>ḥas</i>] on her.
  The Gemara relates: Every day Antoninus would send to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi crushed gold in large sacks, with wheat in the opening of the sacks. He would say to his servants: Bring this wheat to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they did not realize that the bags actually contained gold. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Antoninus: I do not need gold, as I have plenty. Antoninus said: The gold should be for those who will come after you, who will give it to the last ones who come after you. And those who descend from them will bring forth the gold that I now give you, and will be able to pay taxes to the Romans from this money.
  The Gemara relates anther anecdote involving Antoninus. Antoninus had a certain underground cave from which there was a tunnel that went from his house to the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Every day he would bring two servants to serve him. He would kill one at the entrance of the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and would kill the other one at the entrance of his house, so that no living person would know that he had visited Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. He said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: When I come to visit, let no man be found before you.
  One day, Antoninus found that Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama was sitting there. He said: Did I not tell you that when I come to visit, let no man be found before you? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This is not a human being; he is like an angel, and you have nothing to fear from him. Antoninus said to Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama: Tell that servant who is sleeping at the entrance that he should rise and come.
  Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama went and found that the servant Antoninus referred to had been killed. He said to himself: How shall I act? If I go and tell Antoninus that he was killed, this is problematic, as one should not report distressing news. If I leave him and go, then I would be treating the king with disrespect. He prayed for God to have mercy and revived the servant, and he sent him to Antoninus. Antoninus said: I know that even the least among you can revive the dead; but when I come to visit let no man be found before you, even one as great as Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama.
  The Gemara relates: Every day Antoninus would minister to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; he would feed him and give him to drink. When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to ascend to his bed, Antoninus would bend down in front of the bed and say to him: Ascend upon me to your bed. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said in response: It is not proper conduct to treat the king with this much disrespect. Antoninus said: Oh, that I were set as a mattress under you in the World-to-Come!
  On another occasion, Antoninus said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Will I enter the World-to-Come? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Yes. Antoninus said to him: But isn’t it written: “And there shall not be any remaining of the house of Esau” (Obadiah 1:18)? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi answered: The verse is stated with regard to those who perform actions similar to those of the wicked Esau, not to people like you.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From the verse: “And there shall not be any remaining of the house of Esau,” one might have thought that this applies to everyone descended from Esau, irrespective of an individual’s actions. Therefore, the verse states: “Of the house of Esau,” to indicate that the verse is stated only with regard to those who continue in the way of Esau, and perform actions similar to those of Esau.
  Antoninus said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: But isn’t it written in the description of the netherworld: “There is Edom, her kings and all her leaders” (Ezekiel 32:29)? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: The verse states: “Her kings,” but not: All of her kings, and likewise it states: “All her leaders,” but not: All of her officers. Some of them will merit the World-to-Come.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Her kings,” but not: All of her kings, and: “All her leaders,” but not: All of her officers. The inference learned from the wording of the verse: “Her kings,” but not: All of her kings, serves to exclude Antoninus the son of Asveirus; and the inference from the wording: “All her leaders,” but not: All of her officers, serves to exclude the Roman officer Ketia, son of Shalom.
  The Gemara asks: What is it that occurred involving Ketia, son of Shalom? As there was a certain Roman emperor who hated the Jews. He said to the important members of the kingdom: If one had an ulcerous sore [<i>nima</i>] rise on his foot, should he cut it off and live, or leave it and suffer? They said to him: He should cut it off and live. The ulcerous sore was a metaphor for the Jewish people, whom the emperor sought to eliminate as the cause of harm for the Roman Empire.
  Ketia, son of Shalom, said to them: It is unwise to do so, for two reasons. One is that you cannot destroy all of them, as it is written: “For I have spread you abroad as the four winds of the heaven, says the Lord” (Zechariah 2:10). He clarified: What is it saying? Shall we say that the verse means that God has scattered them to the four winds of the world? If so, this phrase: “As the four winds,” is inaccurate, since it should have said: To the four winds. Rather, this is what the verse is saying: Just as the world cannot exist without winds, so too, the world cannot exist without the Jewish people, and they will never be destroyed. And furthermore, if you attempt to carry out the destruction of the Jews, they will call you the severed kingdom, as the Roman Empire would be devoid of Jews, but Jews would exist in other locations.
  The emperor said to Ketia: You have spoken well and your statement is correct; but they throw anyone who defeats the king in argument into a house full of ashes [<i>lekamonya ḥalila</i>], where he would die. When they were seizing Ketia and going to take him to his death, a certain matron [<i>matronita</i>] said to him: Woe to the ship that goes without paying the tax. Ketia bent down over his foreskin, severed it, and said: I gave my tax; I will pass and enter. When they threw him into the house of ashes, he said: All of my property is given to Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. How was this inheritance to be divided? The Gemara relates: Rabbi Akiva went out and taught that the verse: “And it shall be for Aaron and his sons” (Exodus 29:28), means half to Aaron and half to his sons. Here too, as Rabbi Akiva is mentioned separately, he should receive half, while his colleagues receive the other half.
  The Gemara returns to the story of Ketia. A Divine Voice emerged and said: Ketia, son of Shalom, is destined for life in the World-to-Come. When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi heard this, he wept, saying: There is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come in one moment, and there is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come only after many years of toil.
  The Gemara relates: Antoninus would attend to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and similarly the Persian king Adrakan would attend to Rav. When Antoninus died, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The bundle is separated. When Adrakan died, Rav likewise said:
  
  Daf 11a
  
  The bundle is separated.
  § The Gemara mentions other Romans who converted to Judaism. It relates: Onkelos bar Kelonimos converted to Judaism. The Roman emperor sent a troop [<i>gunda</i>] of Roman soldiers after him to seize Onkelos and bring him to the emperor. Onkelos drew them toward him with verses that he cited and learned with them, and they converted. The emperor then sent another troop of Roman soldiers after him, and said to them: Do not say anything to him, so that he cannot convince you with his arguments. The troops followed this instruction, and took Onkelos with them.
  When they were walking, Onkelos said to the troop of soldiers: I will say a mere statement to you: A minor official [<i>nifyora</i>] holds a torch before a high official [<i>apifyora</i>], the high official holds a torch for a duke [<i>dukasa</i>], a duke for the governor, and the governor for the ruler [<i>koma</i>]. Does the ruler hold a torch before the common people? The soldiers said to Onkelos: No. Onkelos said to them: Yet the Holy One, Blessed be He, holds a torch before the Jewish people, as it is written: “And the Lord went before them by day in a pillar of cloud, to lead them the way, and by night in a pillar of fire, to give them light” (Exodus 13:21). They all converted.
  The emperor then sent another troop of soldiers after him, to bring Onkelos, and said to them: Do not converse with him at all. The troops followed this instruction, and took Onkelos with them. While they grabbed him and were walking, Onkelos saw a <i>mezuza</i> that was placed on the doorway. He placed his hand upon it and said to the soldiers: What is this? They said to him: You tell us.
  Onkelos said to them: The standard practice throughout the world is that a king of flesh and blood sits inside his palace, and his servants stand guard, protecting him outside; but with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, His servants, the Jewish people, sit inside their homes and He guards over them outside. As it is stated: “The Lord shall guard your going out and your coming in, from now and forever” (Psalms 121:8). Upon hearing this, those soldiers also converted to Judaism. After that, the emperor sent no more soldiers after him.
  § The Gemara returns to its discussion of Antoninus: When the matriarch Rebecca was pregnant with Jacob and Esau, “the Lord said to her: Two nations [<i>goyim</i>] are in your womb” (Genesis 25:23). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Do not read it as <i>goyim</i>, meaning nations; rather read it as <i>geyim</i>, meaning proud ones. This verse was fulfilled in two prominent individuals who descended from Rebecca, Antoninus and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, whose tables, due to their wealth, never lacked for lettuce, nor cucumbers, nor radish, neither in the summer nor in the rainy season, despite the fact that these foods do not grow year round. The reason they ensured that these items were always present at their tables is that the Master said: A radish breaks up food, lettuce stirs up food, and cucumbers expand the intestines.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Why are they called cucumbers [<i>kishuin</i>]? It is because they are as harmful [<i>kashim</i>] to a person’s body as swords. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement, that they are harmful to the body, is referring to large cucumbers, whereas that statement, explaining why they were always present on the tables of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Antoninus, is referring to small ones.
  § The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Meir the birthday of the king and the day of the death of the king are considered gentile festivals, whereas the Rabbis hold that only a death that includes public burning is considered a festival that includes idol worship. The Gemara comments: By inference, this means that Rabbi Meir holds that there is no difference whether it is a death that includes public burning, and there is no difference whether it is a death that does not include public burning; in either case, they engage in idol worship on that occasion. Evidently, Rabbi Meir holds that the burning performed at the death of the king is not an idolatrous custom, as it is not the cause of the prohibition. The Gemara continues: From here, one can conclude by inference that the Rabbis hold that the burning upon the death of the king is an idolatrous custom.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: We burn items upon the death of kings as an expression of grief, and this is not of the ways of the Amorites, but rather a Jewish custom? And if this is an idolatrous custom, how could we perform this public burning? But isn’t it written: “And you shall not walk in their statutes” (Leviticus 18:3)?
  Rather, everyone agrees that the public burning itself is not an idolatrous custom. Rather, it is performed due to the great importance of the king who passed away. And here, in the mishna, they disagree about this: Rabbi Meir holds that there is no difference whether it is a death that includes public burning and there is no difference whether it is a death that does not include public burning; in either case, in practice they engage in idol worship on that occasion. And the Rabbis hold that a death that includes public burning is important to the gentiles, and therefore they engage in idol worship on that occasion, but a death that does not include public burning is not important to them, and they do not engage in idol worship on that occasion.
  Having mentioned this <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. The <i>baraita</i> teaches: One burns items due to the death of kings as an expression of grief, and this is not subject to the prohibition of imitating the ways of the Amorites, since it is a Jewish custom. As it is stated that Jeremiah prophesied to Zedekiah king of Judah: “You shall die in peace; and with the burnings of your fathers, the former kings that were before you, so shall they make a burning for you” (Jeremiah 34:5). And just as one burns items upon the death of the kings, so too one burns items upon the death of the heads of the Sanhedrin.
  And what items do they burn upon the death of kings? They burn the kings’ beds and their utensils, so that no one else can make use of them. And there was an incident in which Rabban Gamliel the Elder died, and upon his death Onkelos the convert burned seven thousand dinars in valuable Tyrian coinage. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you state in response to the question: What do they burn upon the death of kings, that they burn their beds and their utensils? Why, then, did Onkelos burn money? The Gemara answers: Say that Onkelos burned items that were valued at seven thousand dinars in Tyrian coinage.
  The Gemara asks: And are other items not destroyed in order to accord honor to the deceased king, apart from his utensils? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that we detach the hooves of livestock upon the death of kings, and this is not subject to the prohibition of the ways of the Amorites? Rav Pappa says: That <i>baraita</i> is referring to the horse upon which the king rode. Since that animal was designated as the king’s personal item, it is therefore rendered unusable for anyone else, like his personal utensils.
  The Gemara asks: And did they not detach the hooves of the king’s kosher animals, which are not used by the king for riding? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If removing the hooves of an animal would entail that it becomes an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], it is prohibited to do so. And when doing so would not entail rendering it a <i>tereifa</i>, it is permitted. And what is a way of removing hooves that does not entail rendering the animal a <i>tereifa</i>?
  
  Daf 11b
  
  One who cuts the hooves of the animal, severing the legs from the knee and below, does not render the animal a <i>tereifa</i>. It is evident from the <i>baraita</i>, which discusses the cases in which an animal is rendered a <i>tereifa</i> and is therefore unfit to eat, that it is discussing kosher animals. The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa interpreted the <i>baraita</i> as referring to the calf that pulls the king’s coach, a kosher animal of which the king made use.
  § The mishna teaches: The day of shaving his, i.e., the gentile’s, beard and his locks. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the mishna teaching here? Is it referring to the day of shaving his beard and head, when he cuts the hair of his head and as a result his long locks at the back of his head are left as a form of idol worship? Or perhaps the mishna is speaking of the day of shaving his beard and removing his locks, which are removed some time after they were left on the head? The Gemara responds: Come and hear an answer, as both opinions are taught in <i>baraitot</i>: One <i>baraita</i> mentions the day of shaving his beard and head when his long locks at the back of his head are left, whereas a different <i>baraita</i> specifies the day of shaving his beard and removing his locks.
  The Gemara continues to discuss Roman festivals. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: They have another festival in Rome: Once every seventy years they bring a man who is whole and free from any defect and have him ride on a lame man, to symbolize the healthy Esau ruling over Jacob, who walked with a limp after his fight with the angel. And they dress him in the garments of Adam the first man and place on his head the scalp [<i>karkifelo</i>] of Rabbi Yishmael, which the Romans flayed when they executed him.
  And they hang gold on his neck weighing two hundred dinars, and cover the markets with onyx, and announce before him: The calculation [<i>sakh</i>] of the master [<i>kiri</i>] Jacob with regard to the time of the redemption is fraudulent [<i>plaster</i>]; the brother of our master, i.e., Esau, a forger. They further announce: One who witnesses this festival witnesses it, and whoever does not witness it will not witness it ever, as it was celebrated only once every seventy years. What purpose does deceit serve for the deceiver, and forgery for the forger? And they conclude in this fashion: Woe unto this one, Esau, when that one, Jacob, will arise, as this will cause Esau’s downfall.
  Rav Ashi says: The mouths of these wicked people have caused their downfall. Had they said: A forger is the brother of our master, their claim would be interpreted as they say and wish to be understood. Now that they say: The brother of our master, a forger; they can be understood as saying: It is our master himself who is the forger.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna does not count this festival in his list of gentile festivals? The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna counts those festivals that occur each and every year, and he does not count those festivals that do not occur each and every year.
  The Gemara comments: Those festivals enumerated in the mishna are the festivals of the Romans. The Gemara asks: And what are the idolatrous festivals of the Persians? The Gemara answers: <i>Mutredei</i> and <i>Turyaskei</i>, <i>Moharnekei</i> and <i>Moharin</i>. The Gemara asks: Those are the festivals of the Persians and the Romans, and what are the festivals of the Babylonians? The Gemara answers: <i>Moharnekei</i> and <i>Akenitei</i>, <i>Beḥanunei</i> and the tenth of Adar.
  § Rav Ḥanan bar Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says, and some say that it was Rav Ḥanan bar Rava who says that Rav says: There are five established temples of idol worship, and they are: The temple of Bel in Babylonia; the temple of Nebo in the city of Khursei; the temple of <i>Tirata</i>, which is located in the city of Mapag; <i>Tzerifa</i>, which is located in Ashkelon; and <i>Nashra</i>, which is located in Arabia. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: The Sages added to these places the marketplace that is located in Ein Bekhi and <i>Nadbekha</i>, which is located in Akko. There are those who say that Rav Dimi was referring to <i>Natbera</i> that is located in Akko. Rav Dimi from Neharde’a teaches the opposite, that it is the marketplace that is located in Akko, and <i>Nadbekha</i> that is located in Ein Bekhi.
  Rav Ḥanan bar Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Ḥisda: What does it mean that these temples of idol worship are established? Rav Ḥisda said to him: This is what your mother’s father, Rav Ḥanan bar Rava, said: In contrast to festivals, which last for one or several days, they are always fixed as the site of idol worship, as constantly, all year round, worship takes place there.
  § Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is that in the Diaspora, engaging in business with gentiles is prohibited only on the day of their festival itself, not during the days preceding and following the festival. Since Jews live among the gentiles, they are unable to refrain from engaging in business with them for such an extended period. The Gemara asks: And is it prohibited even on their festival day itself? But didn’t Rav Yehuda permit Rav Beruna to sell wine to gentiles, and permitted Rav Giddel to sell wheat, on the festival of the Arab merchants? The Gemara answers: The festival of the Arab merchants is different, as it does not have a fixed time, and therefore the Sages did not include it in the prohibition.
  MISHNA: In the case of a city in which there is active idol worship, it is permitted to engage in business transactions with gentiles who live outside of the city. If the idol worship is outside the city, it is permitted to engage in business within the city. What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to traveling there, a place where a pagan festival is being celebrated? When the road is designated only for that place, it is prohibited to use the road, as onlookers will assume that the traveler intends to join the festival. But if one were able to travel on it to arrive at another place, it is permitted to use the road to reach the place that is observing the festival.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances that determine whether a place is sufficiently far from a city to be considered outside of it? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina: A place that is far enough away is, for example, the bazaar [<i>atluza</i>] of Gaza, which is located outside the city walls. And some say that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish asked Rabbi Ḥanina about this issue: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the bazaar of Gaza? May one conduct business there on the day of a festival celebrated in Gaza? Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Did you never in your lifetime travel to Tyre and see a Jew and a gentile
  
  Daf 12a
  
  place two pots on one stove, and yet the Sages were not concerned and did not issue a prohibition with regard to the meat that was in the pot belonging to the Jew, despite the fact that forbidden food was in close proximity to the permitted food? Similarly, in this case as well, the Sages were not concerned about the bazaar’s proximity to Gaza and did not prohibit engaging in business there. The Gemara asks: What did he mean in stating: The Sages were not concerned, with regard to the meat, and how does that case relate the issue here?
  Abaye said: The Sages were not concerned with regard to the possibility of eating the meat of an unslaughtered animal carcass. We do not say: Cooking in this manner is prohibited since perhaps the Jew will turn his face and at that moment the gentile will throw meat of an animal carcass into his pot. Here too, in the corresponding situation, although the permitted and prohibited places are in close proximity, the Sages were not concerned about engaging in business transactions in the bazaar of Gaza, even due to the possibility that money associated with idol worship would end up in the hands of the Jews. If the money were for the purchase of an animal used as an offering for idolatry, those coins would be prohibited by Torah law. Nevertheless, the Sages were not concerned about this possibility, just as they were not concerned that the gentile might add his meat to the Jew’s pot.
  Rava said that there is a different explanation. The Sages were not lenient in the face of a potential violation of Torah law, but were lenient in a case where it was rabbinic law that might be violated. As for Rabbi Ḥanina’s comparison to pots in Tyre, there is no concern that a gentile might throw his meat into the pot of a Jew, as he would derive no benefit from doing so and would be afraid that the Jew might see him. By contrast, here the gentile is engaged in business. Rather, what is it that the Sages were not concerned about in the case of the pots? Although the gentile is cooking food next to the Jew, there is no concern with regard to the possibility that the gentile might cook the Jew’s food, causing the latter to violate the rabbinic prohibition against eating food cooked by gentiles.
  Rava concludes: Here too, in the corresponding situation, it is referring to a case where the coins were the gentile’s own money. The Sages were not concerned about engaging in business transactions in the bazaar of Gaza, even due to the possibility that the Jew might be engaging in business with residents of Gaza on their festival day, which would be a violation of rabbinic law.
  Rabba bar Ulla says: Even if the concern in the case of the pots applied only to the gentile cooking the Jew’s food, not the consumption of non-kosher meat, with regard to the bazaar the <i>halakha</i> would not be comparably lenient. The reason is the Jew need only stir the coals once to do to ensure that the food in his pot is not considered cooked by a gentile, an option that does not apply here. Rather, in the case mentioned by Rabbi Ḥanina, the Sages were not concerned with regard to the possibility that food might splatter [<i>tzinnora</i>] from the gentile’s pot into the Jew’s pot. This is an especially lenient case, both because this is an unlikely possibility and because that small amount of food would be nullified by a majority of the Jew’s food.
  Rabba bar Ulla concludes: Here too, in the corresponding situation, the Sages were not concerned about engaging in business transactions in the bazaar of Gaza with regard to the days before the festival of Gaza. This is an analogous case to that of the splattered food, as it is outside the festival in both time and place.
  § The mishna teaches: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to traveling there, a place that is celebrating a pagan festival? If the road leads only to that place, it is prohibited, but if the road leads to another place as well, it is permitted. In this connection, the Gemara cites a related <i>baraita</i>. The Sages taught: In the case of a city in which there is active idol worship, i.e., its residents are worshipping their idol on that day, it is prohibited to enter the city, and one may not leave it for another city; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: As long as the road is designated only for that place, it is prohibited to enter the city. But if the road is not designated for only that place, it is permitted.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If a thorn became imbedded in one’s foot while he was standing before an object of idol worship, he may not bend down and remove the thorn, because he appears to be bowing down to the object of idol worship; but if he is not seen, it is permitted. If one’s coins were scattered while he is before an object of idol worship, he may not bend down and pick them up, because he appears to be bowing down to the object of idol worship; but if he is not seen, it is permitted.
  Likewise, if there is a spring that runs before an object of idol worship, one may not bend down and drink from it, because he appears to be bowing down to the object of idol worship; but if he is not seen, it is permitted. With regard to figures of human faces [<i>partzufot</i>] that spray water in the cities, i.e., fountains, one may not place his mouth on the mouths of the figures and drink, because he appears to be kissing the object of idol worship. Similarly, one may not place his mouth on a pipe [<i>sillon</i>] and drink,here due to the danger that this practice poses.
  The Gemara asks: What does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it states: If he is not seen? If we say it means that he is not seen by others, doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, it is prohibited even in the innermost chambers where no one will see it, as the Sages did not distinguish between different circumstances in such cases. Accordingly, the fact that he is not seen by anyone should make no difference with regard to whether or not the action is prohibited. Rather, say: If he is not seen as one who bows down to an object of idol worship, i.e., he turns his side or back to the idol, then it is permitted.
  The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to list all of these cases, notwithstanding their similarity. As, if it had taught only the case of the thorn, one might have thought that bending down to remove a thorn is prohibited because it is possible to walk past the figure, and only then take out the thorn. But in the case of the coins, where it is not possible to collect them elsewhere, you might say that it is not prohibited to pick them up.
  And furthermore, if the <i>baraita</i> had taught only the case of the coins, one might have thought that the reason for the stringent ruling is that the loss is purely financial. But in the case of the thorn, which causes him pain, you might say that it is not prohibited to remove it. And finally, if the <i>baraita</i> had taught only these two cases, one might have thought that they are prohibited because there is no danger if the action is not performed on the spot. But in the case of the spring, where there is an element of danger, that if he does not drink he might die, one could say that it is not prohibited. Therefore, it is necessary to state each example.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need the <i>baraita</i> to teach that it is prohibited to drink from fountains formed in the figure of human faces? If the reason is to teach the <i>halakha</i> in a life-threatening situation, the <i>baraita</i> already addressed this issue in the case of the spring. The Gemara answers: It was included because the <i>baraita</i> wanted to teach the continuation of that <i>halakha</i>: Similarly, one may not place his mouth on a pipe and drink, due to the danger that this poses.
  The Gemara inquires: What danger is the <i>baraita</i> referring to here? It is referring to the danger of swallowing a leech in the water. As the Sages taught: A person should not drink water from rivers or from ponds either by drinking from the water directly with his mouth, or by collecting the water with one hand alone. And if he drank in this manner, his blood is upon his own head, due to the danger. The Gemara explains: What is this danger? It is the danger of swallowing a leech.
  This supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: In the case of one who swallows a water leech [<i>nima</i>], it is permitted to perform labor on Shabbat and heat water for him to drink on Shabbat, as his life is in danger. And in fact there was an incident involving one who swallowed a water leech, and Rabbi Neḥemya permitted them to heat water for him on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: In the meantime, until the water is ready, what should he do? Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: He should swallow vinegar.
  Rav Idi bar Avin said: One who swallowed a hornet will not live, as the hornet will sting him to death. Nevertheless, they should give him a quarter-<i>log</i> of sharp [<i>shamgaz</i>] vinegar to drink. In this manner it is possible that he will live for a bit longer until he can instruct his household with regard to his final wishes before dying.
  The Sages taught: A person should not drink water at night. And if he drank, his blood is upon his own head, due to the danger. The Gemara asks: What is this danger? The Gemara answers: The danger of the <i>shavrirei</i>, an evil spirit that rules over water. And if he is thirsty, what is his remedy? If there is another person with him, he should wake him and say to him: I thirst for water, and then he may drink. And if there is no other person with him, he should knock with the lid on the jug and say to himself: So-and-so, son of so-and-so, your mother said to you to beware of the <i>shavrirei verirei rirei yirei rei</i>, found in white cups. This is an incantation against the evil spirit.
  MISHNA: With regard to a city in which idol worship is practiced and in which there are stores that are adorned for the sake of idol worship and there are others that are not adorned, this was in fact an incident that occurred in Beit She’an, and the Sages said: With regard to the adorned shops, it is prohibited to buy from them, but in the case of those that are not adorned it is permitted.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: They taught that buying is prohibited only in the case of stores that are adorned with roses and myrtle, as one derives benefit from their smell and they serve as offerings to objects of idol worship. But with regard to stores that are adorned with fruit, it is permitted to buy from them. What is the reason that they are permitted? As the verse states: “And there shall cleave nothing dedicated to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18), i.e., the items dedicated to idol worship. From here it is derived that it is prohibited to derive benefit from idol worship,
  
  Daf 13a
  
  but it is permitted to cause benefit. Although by buying from the store one indirectly supports idol worship, as a portion of the sales are given to support idol worship, this is not prohibited by Torah law. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the stores are adorned only with fruit one is also prohibited from buying from them. This is derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If it is prohibited to derive benefit from idol worship, is it not all the more so prohibited to cause benefit to idol worship?
  The Gemara raises an objection to Reish Lakish’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Natan says: On the day in which a reduction is made from the tax in honor of idol worship, they announce and say: Anyone who takes a wreath of roses and places it on his head and on the head of his donkey in honor of the object of idol worship, his tax will be reduced. And if one does not place a wreath on one’s head, his tax will not be reduced.
  What should a Jew who is present there do? If he places the wreath on his head and on the head of his donkey, he will be found to derive benefit from idol worship. And if he does not place the wreath on his head, he will be found to cause benefit to idol worship, through the tax that he pays.
  From here the Sages stated: One who conducts business in a market of idol worship will be forced either to benefit from or cause benefit to idol worship. Therefore, any animal he bought there should be destroyed, any produce, clothing or vessels should be left to decompose, and with regard to any money or metal vessels, which would not decompose on their own, one should take them and cast them into the Dead Sea. And what constitutes destroying the animal? One cuts off the hooves of the animal from the knee and below.
  The Gemara explains the objection to Reish Lakish’s statement. In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that it is prohibited to cause benefit to idol worship, as it states: If he places the wreath on his head then he will be found to derive benefit from idol worship, and if he does not place the wreath on his head, he will be found to cause benefit to idol worship. How, then, can Reish Lakish claim that it is permitted to cause benefit to idol worship?
  Rav Mesharshiyya, son of Rav Idi, said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds as follows: The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Natan, whose opinion is cited in the <i>baraita</i>, and I spoke in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Natan. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who rules in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Natan, holds that the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Natan; rather, everyone agrees that it is prohibited to cause benefit to idol worship.
  The Gemara asks: And is it so that they do not disagree? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may go to a fair of gentiles, whose purpose is to honor to idol worship, and buy from the gentiles animals, and slaves, and maidservants, as the purchase raises the items to a more sanctified state; and he may buy houses, fields, and vineyards from them, due to the mitzva to settle Eretz Yisrael. And one may write the necessary deeds and confirm them in their gentile courts [<i>be’arkaot</i>], although this involves an acknowledgement of their authority, because it is as though he is rescuing his property from their hands, as the court’s confirmation and stamp of approval prevents the seller from denying the sale and claiming that the property still belongs to him.
  And if he is a priest, he may become ritually impure by going outside Eretz Yisrael, even though a priest is usually prohibited from leaving Eretz Yisrael to the impure land outside, in order to litigate with them and to contest their claims. And just as a priest may become ritually impure by going outside Eretz Yisrael, so may he become ritually impure for this purpose by entering a cemetery.
  The Gemara interrupts its citation of the <i>baraita</i> to express surprise at this last ruling: Can it enter your mind to say that a priest may become impure by entering a cemetery? The <i>halakha</i> that a cemetery imparts ritual impurity to a priest is by Torah law; how could the Sages override this prohibition? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to an area where there is uncertainty with regard to the location of a grave or a corpse [<i>beit haperas</i>], owing to the fact that a grave had been unwittingly plowed over, and the bones may have become scattered throughout the field. Such a field imparts ritual impurity by rabbinic law.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And a priest may likewise become ritually impure and leave Eretz Yisrael in order to study Torah or in order to marry a woman. Rabbi Yehuda says: When does this allowance apply? It applies when he cannot find a place to study in Eretz Yisrael. But when the priest can find a place to study in Eretz Yisrael, he may not become ritually impure by leaving the country.
  Rabbi Yosei says: Even when he can find a place to study Torah in Eretz Yisrael, he may leave the country and become ritually impure, because a person does not merit to learn from everyone, and it is possible that the more suitable teacher for him lives outside of Eretz Yisrael.
  Rabbi Yosei says, in support of his opinion: There was an incident involving Yosef the priest, who followed his teacher to the city of Sidon, outside of Eretz Yisrael, to learn Torah even though the preeminent Sage of his generation, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, lived in Eretz Yisrael. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says about this: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  The Gemara returns to the issue at hand. This <i>baraita</i> apparently indicates that the Rabbis do disagree with Rabbi Natan, as they hold that it is permitted to buy items from a gentile fair and cause benefit to idol worship, whereas the ruling of Rabbi Natan is a minority opinion. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: Actually, the Rabbis do not disagree with Rabbi Natan, and even according to this <i>baraita</i> one is prohibited from causing benefit for idol worship.
  The Gemara elaborates: And the fact that the <i>baraita</i> permits buying at a gentile fair is not difficult, as here, where Rabbi Natan prohibits buying items from a gentile fair, he states his ruling with regard to one who buys from a merchant, as a tax is taken from him for the benefit of idol worship; whereas there, in the <i>baraita</i> that permits buying items at the fair, it states its ruling with regard to one who buys from a homeowner, i.e., a private individual, where a tax is not taken from him.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the <i>baraita</i> that cited the opinion of Rabbi Natan. The Master said above: Any animal that one bought there should be destroyed. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a requirement to prevent suffering to animals? Abaye said: Although there is an enjoinder against causing suffering to a living creature, it is permitted when necessary, as the Merciful One states to Joshua: “You shall destroy their horses” (Joshua 11:6).
  The Master said above: And what constitutes destroying the animal? One cuts the hooves of the animal from the knee and below. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: One may neither consecrate objects, nor dedicate items for sacred use, nor valuate an item’s worth based on its appraisal (see Leviticus, chapter 27) and dedicate its monetary worth to the Temple treasury, in the present time, when the Temple no longer exists. And if one did consecrate, or dedicate, or valuate items for sacred use, the presence of these items might lead to the violation of the prohibition against using consecrated property. Therefore, if one dedicated an animal it should be destroyed. If he dedicated produce, garments, or vessels made from materials that decompose,
  
  Daf 13b
  
  he should store them until they decompose. And if he dedicated money or metal vessels, he should take them and cast them into the Dead Sea. And what constitutes destroying? He locks the door before it, and the animal dies on its own from hunger. According to the <i>baraita</i>, the disposal of the animal is carried out by starving it, not by cutting its hooves.
  Abaye said: There, in the case of a consecrated animal, the method employed is different, because cutting the animal’s hooves would cause the degradation of sacrificial animals. The Gemara asks: But why does the <i>baraita</i> require this complicated method of killing the animal? Why not simply state that he should slaughter it? The Gemara answers: If he were to slaughter it, someone might come to experience a mishap through it, by eating the meat and thereby misusing consecrated property.
  The Gemara asks: But why not let him render the animal a shard [<i>gistera</i>], by mutilating it so that it is unfit to be eaten? Why is it necessary to kill it in such a drawn-out fashion, by starving it to death? Abaye said that it is because the verse states: “And you shall break down their altars…you shall not do so to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). It is derived from here that one may not actively destroy any sacred item.
  Rava said there is a different reason a consecrated animal may not be disposed of by cutting its hooves: It is because it appears as though he is inflicting a blemish on a sacrificial animal. The Gemara asks: Why does Rava say that it merely appears as though he is inflicting a blemish, when in actual fact he is inflicting a full-fledged blemish? The Gemara answers: This matter, that one may not inflict a blemish on a sacrificial animal, applies only when the Temple is standing, as the animal is fit for sacrifice and he renders it unfit. By contrast, now, when the animal is not fit for sacrifice, since there is no Temple, we have no problem with it by Torah law. The only problem is that it appears as though one is inflicting a blemish on a sanctified animal.
  The Gemara asks: But this should be considered equivalent to one who inflicts a blemish on an animal that is already blemished, which is prohibited even though that animal is not fit for sacrifice. The Gemara answers: In the case of a blemished animal when the Temple is standing it is prohibited to inflict a blemish upon it, as granted, it itself is not fit to serve as an offering; but it is fit to make use of its monetary value, i.e., another animal may be purchased with the proceeds of its sale and sacrificed in its place. This is to the exclusion of the case here, when there is no Temple, as the animal is not fit for its monetary value and it is not fit to serve as an offering itself.
  § Rabbi Yona found Rabbi Elai, who was standing at the entrance to the city of Tyre. Rabbi Yona said to him: The <i>baraita</i> cited above teaches that if one bought an animal at a pagan fair it should be destroyed. What should be done with a slave purchased at the fair? Rabbi Yona elaborated: I do not raise the dilemma about a Jewish slave, as it is obvious that the master cannot cause him harm. Where it is a dilemma for me is the case of a gentile slave; what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Elai said to him in response: What is the reason that this is a dilemma for you? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the gentiles and shepherds of small domesticated animals, we do not raise them from a pit but we do not actively lower them into a pit either. It may be inferred from here that one may not cause the death of a gentile slave.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: The second <i>baraita</i> cited above teaches that one may go to a pagan fair and buy from the gentiles animals, slaves, and maidservants. Does the <i>baraita</i> mean that one may buy a Jewish slave, or perhaps, is it teaching that one may buy even a gentile slave? Rabbi Zeira said to him: It stands to reason that the <i>baraita</i> means specifically a Jewish slave; as, if it is referring to a gentile slave, what is the reason that it is necessary for the Sages to permit this purchase? When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: It is permitted to purchase even a gentile slave, because he brings him under the wings of the Divine Presence by having him undergo the process of conversion when he becomes the slave of a Jew.
  Rav Ashi said: But with regard to the permission to buy an animal, what is there about this purchase that one can be said to bring the animal under the wings of the Divine Presence? Rather, the reason it is permitted is because through this purchase the Jew reduces the possessions of the gentile. And here too, as he reduces the gentile’s property by purchasing the slave, it is permitted.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ya’akov bought sandals and Rabbi Yirmeya bought bread at a pagan fair. One said to the other: Orphan, i.e., one with no guide, would your teacher act in this manner? The other likewise said to him: Orphan, would your teacher act in this manner? The Gemara explains: Actually, both purchased these items from a homeowner, i.e., a private individual, and each one thought that the other had purchased his item from a merchant. As Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: The Sages taught that it is prohibited to buy from a gentile at a pagan fair only in the case of one who buys from a merchant, as a tax is taken from him and used for the benefit of idol worship. But with regard to one who buys from a homeowner, when a tax is not taken from him, it is permitted to make the purchase.
  Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: If Rabbi Yoḥanan had been present at this time and age, in a place where the tax is taken from all sales, including those conducted with private individuals, he would have prohibited buying items even from a homeowner. The Gemara asks: But if so, how did these Sages, Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Yirmeya, purchase items at the fair? The Gemara answers: They purchased the items from a homeowner who sells solely on a temporary basis.
  MISHNA: These are the items that it is prohibited to sell to a gentile at any time of year, as they are used specifically for idol worship: <i>Itzterubalin</i>, <i>benot shuaḥ</i>, <i>petotarot</i>, frankincense, and a white rooster. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is permitted to sell a white rooster to a gentile provided that it is sold along with other types of roosters. But when it is sold by itself, one should cut off its toe and sell it to the gentile, because they do not sacrifice a defective animal to their object of idol worship.
  And with regard to all remaining items, without specification it is permitted to sell them, but with specification it is prohibited to sell them. Rabbi Meir says: Even in the case of a good palm tree, <i>ḥatzav</i>, and <i>naklav</i>, it is prohibited to sell them to gentiles.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the terms in the mishna: What is the meaning of <i>itzterubalin</i>? This is the plant known as <i>torenita</i>. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: The Sages added to the list of plants whose use is prohibited during the Sabbatical Year: <i>Alekesin</i> and <i>itzterubalin</i>, <i>mukhsasin</i>, and <i>benot shuaḥ</i>. And if it would enter your mind to say that <i>itzterubalin</i> is <i>torenita</i>, is there <i>torenita</i> that is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year?
  The Gemara explains: But didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i> that this is the principle: Anything that has a root and grows is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year, and anything that does not have a root is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year? If so, <i>torenita</i>, which has no roots, is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year, and therefore it cannot be identified as <i>itzterubalin</i>. Rather, Rav Safra says: What is <i>itzterubalin</i>? It is the fruit of the cedar tree. And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Elazar says: <i>Itzterubalin</i> is the fruit of the cedar tree.
  The mishna includes <i>benot shuaḥ</i> among the items one may not sell to a gentile. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These are white figs. The mishna states: And <i>petotarot</i>. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is not another type of fruit; rather, the mishna here taught that the sale of the various fruits listed in the mishna is prohibited only when they are sold with their stems, not if they have been pruned.
  The mishna taught that selling frankincense to gentiles is prohibited. Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The mishna is referring specifically to pure frankincense, which is used as incense for objects of idol worship. A Sage taught: And with regard to all of these items whose sale is prohibited, one may sell to gentiles a large bundle of merchandise, as it is clear that the gentile intends to sell the merchandise rather than sacrifice it to his object of idol worship. And how much does such a bundle weigh? Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira explained: For the purposes of this <i>halakha</i>, no bundle is less than the weight of three hundred dinars.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But let us be concerned lest the buyer go and sell these items to another gentile, and they sacrifice them. Abaye said in response: This scenario is certainly possible, but we are commanded only not to “place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), i.e., one may not be the direct cause of a gentile’s idol worship. We are not commanded not to place a stumbling block before one who may subsequently place it before the blind.
  § The mishna teaches: And it is prohibited to sell a white rooster to a gentile. Rabbi Yona says that Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Zevid says the following ruling; and there are those who teach merely that Rabbi Yona says that Rabbi Zeira says it. If a gentile says: Who has a rooster, without specifying any particular type, it is permitted to sell him a white rooster. But if he says: Who has a white rooster, it is prohibited to sell him a white rooster.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this opinion. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: He may sell a white rooster to a gentile, provided that it is sold along with other types of roosters. What are the circumstances? If we say that the gentile says: Who has a white rooster, who has a white rooster; in that case one may not provide him a white rooster even if it is sold along with other roosters, as the gentile specified that he wants a white rooster.
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where the gentile says: Who has a rooster, who has a rooster; without mentioning a white rooster, and even so, according to Rabbi Yehuda if he sells him a white rooster along with other roosters then yes, it is permitted, but selling only a white rooster by itself is not permitted? And one can infer that according to the first <i>tanna</i>, who prohibits the sale of a white rooster, one may not sell him a white rooster even if it is sold along with other roosters. This does not accord with the statement of Rabbi Yona, who rules that if the gentile says: Who has a rooster, without specifying any particular type, it is permitted to sell him even a white rooster.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The mishna is not discussing the case of a gentile who asks for a rooster without specifying its color, as everyone agrees that in such a situation it is permitted to sell him a white rooster. Rather, here we are dealing with a case where the Jew had several different roosters, and the gentile says, pointing to different roosters: Sell me this one and that one, and one of the roosters he chose was white.
  The Gemara notes that this explanation is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is selling a white rooster prohibited? It is prohibited when the gentile said: Sell me this white rooster. But if he said: Sell me this one and that one, it is permitted. And even if he said: Sell me this rooster, and he pointed to a white rooster, in the case of a gentile who is preparing a feast for his son or who has a sick person in his house, it is permitted to sell it to him, as it is clear that he wants it for the celebration for his son or for the sick person, not for idol worship.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a mishna (8a): In the case of a gentile who made a feast for his son, engaging in business is prohibited only on that day, and with that man alone? This indicates that in any event, conducting business on that day and with that man is prohibited. Rav Yitzḥak bar Rav Mesharshiyya said: The <i>baraita</i> is speaking about a picnic [<i>betavuzig</i>], i.e., a social gathering rather than a wedding feast. A mere social gathering does not include the sacrifice of offerings to idolatry.
  § We learned in the mishna: And with regard to all remaining items, without specification it is permitted to sell them, but with specification it is prohibited to sell them. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Without specification, and what is meant by: With specification? If we say that without specification is referring to a case when the gentile says that he wants white wheat without stating the reason he wants it, and with specification is referring to a case when he says that he will use the wheat for idol worship, why is it necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i>?
  
  Daf 14b
  
  It does not need to be said that when he asks for the item without specification one may sell white wheat to him, and it does not need to be said that when he asks for it with specification one may not sell it to him, as he expressly stated that he will use it for idol worship. Rather, when the mishna says that he asks without specification, this is referring to a case where the gentile says that he wishes to buy wheat, in which case it is permitted to sell to him. If so, the case when he asks with specification is one where he says that he wants white wheat, which is an item used in idol worship, and the mishna teaches that it is prohibited to sell this to him.
  By inference, this means that in the case of a rooster, referred to earlier in the mishna, even if the gentile requests without specification, i.e., without saying that he wants a white one, it is not permitted to sell it to him. This conclusion contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Zeira. The Gemara rejects this argument: Say in response that actually, without specification is referring to a case where the gentile says that he wants to purchase white wheat, and with specification is referring to a case where he says that he needs it for idol worship.
  And as for the objection that this ruling is superfluous, in fact it is necessary for the mishna to state the <i>halakha</i> in a case where he specified that he would use the item for idol worship. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that this man does not really need the wheat for his idol worship. Rather, he is deeply attached to idol worship, and he thought that just as that man, i.e., he himself, is so attached to it, everyone else is also attached to idol worship. Therefore, he reasoned: I will say this, that I intend to use the item for idol worship, so that they will give it to me. Consequently, it is necessary for the mishna to teach us that if he says that he intends to use the item for idol worship it is prohibited to sell it to him, as he might be telling the truth.
  § Rav Ashi raised a dilemma: If a gentile asks the merchants: Who has a damaged white rooster, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether it is permitted to sell him an unblemished white rooster? Do we say that from the fact that he says that he wants a damaged rooster, it may be inferred that he does not need it for idol worship, as gentiles do not sacrifice defective animals, and therefore it is permitted? Or perhaps he is only employing artifice. In other words, he knows that a Jew will not sell him an undamaged white rooster upon request, and as it is unlikely that someone has a damaged white rooster to sell him, he hopes that he will receive an undamaged one. If so, it is prohibited to sell him a white rooster.
  If you say that this gentile is employing artifice, and it is prohibited, in a case where he said: Who has a white rooster, who has a white rooster; and they brought him a black rooster and he took it, or in a case where they bought him a red one and he took it, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether it is permitted to sell him a white rooster? Do we say: Since they brought him a black rooster and he took it, or they bought him a red one and he took it, evidently he does not need the rooster for idol worship? Or perhaps, here too he is employing artifice? The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to sell even a good palm tree and <i>ḥatzav</i> to gentiles. Rav Ḥisda said to Avimei: It is learned as a tradition that the tractate <i>Avoda Zara</i> of our forefather Abraham contained four hundred chapters, and we have learned only five chapters in our tractate <i>Avoda Zara</i>, and we do not even know the meaning of what we are saying.
  Avimei asked him: And what in the mishna here poses a difficulty for you? He replied: I do not understand the mishna which teaches the following: Rabbi Meir says: It is prohibited to sell even a good palm tree, <i>ḥatzav</i>, and <i>naklas</i> to gentiles. It may be inferred from here that it is a good palm tree that one does not sell to gentiles, but one may sell a bad palm tree. But didn’t we learn in another mishna (19b) that one may not sell to gentiles anything that is attached to the ground? Avimei said to him: What is the meaning of: A good palm tree? It means the detached fruit of a good palm tree. And similarly, Rav Huna says: The mishna means the fruit of a good palm tree.
  The Gemara explains the meaning of other terms that appear in the mishna. <i>Ḥatzav</i> is a type of date known as <i>kashba</i>. With regard to the meaning of <i>naklas</i>, the Gemara relates: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosef said that it is referring to <i>koreyatei</i>. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: We learned in the mishna <i>naklas</i>, and we did not know what it is, and now you have said that it means <i>koreyatei</i>, and we do not know what that is either. How have you helped us? Rav Dimi said to him: I have in fact helped you, as when you go there, to Eretz Yisrael, and say to them <i>naklas</i>, and they do not know what it means, say to them <i>koreyatei</i>, and they will know what it is, and they will show it to you.
  MISHNA: In a place where the residents were accustomed to sell small domesticated animals to gentiles, one may sell them. In a place where they were not accustomed to sell them, one may not sell them. But in every place, one may not sell them large livestock, calves, or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Sages prohibited these sales lest a Jew’s animal perform labor for the gentile on Shabbat in violation of an explicit Torah prohibition, as explained in the Gemara. Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of performing labor, and ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse for riding, because riding a horse on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one may not sell small domesticated animals to gentiles if it is not the accepted practice. The Gemara infers: That is to say that there is no prohibition involved; rather, there is a custom not to sell small domesticated animals. Therefore, where the practice is to prohibit the sale, that is what is practiced, and where the practice is to permit the sale, that is what is practiced.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the mishna on 22a: One may not keep an animal in the inns of gentiles, because they are suspected of engaging in bestiality. If so, it should be prohibited in all places to sell animals to gentiles, as one is thereby placing a stumbling block before the blind. Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> of the mishna there, with regard to keeping an animal in a gentile inn, is contingent on the <i>halakha</i> of the mishna here. If it is a place where the Sages permitted one to sell animals to gentiles, it must be that the gentiles of that location are not suspected of engaging in bestiality. Therefore, the Sages permitted one to leave the animal in seclusion with the gentile at the inn. Conversely, in a place where the Sages prohibited one from leaving the animal in seclusion with the gentile at the inn, because the gentiles there are suspected of engaging in bestiality, they also prohibited one from selling animals to gentiles there.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  And Rabbi Elazar says: Even in a place where they prohibited leaving an animal in seclusion with a gentile, it is permitted to sell it to a gentile. What is the reason? Once the animal is sold to the gentile, there is no concern that he will engage in bestiality. This is because a gentile spares his own animal from bestiality, as he does not want it to become sterile through this practice. By contrast, it is prohibited to leave one’s animal in seclusion with a gentile, as he would have no such compunction with regard to an animal belonging to others. The Gemara notes: And even Rav retracted his opinion; as Rav Taḥlifa says that Rav Sheila bar Avimi says in the name of Rav: A gentile spares his animal, as he does not want it to become sterile.
  § The mishna teaches: But in every place one may not sell to gentiles large livestock, calves, or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? The Gemara explains: Granted, we are not concerned about the gentile engaging in bestiality with the animal, but we are concerned about him putting the animal to work on Shabbat.
  The Gemara expresses puzzlement: And let the gentile put it to work. Why should one be concerned about this possibility? Since he bought it, he acquires it and may put it to work on Shabbat, as it no longer belongs to the Jew. The Gemara answers: Selling it is prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the concern of lending and due to the concern of leasing the animal to the gentile, as in those cases the animal would be performing work on Shabbat when it is owned by a Jew.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: But during that time period, the act of borrowing the animal causes the gentile to temporarily acquire it, and likewise, by leasing the animal, he temporarily acquires it. Why, then, is it a problem if the gentile puts the animal to work on Shabbat?
  Rather, Rami, son of Rav Yeiva, said: Selling is prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the concern with regard to testing. As at times, one sells an animal to a gentile when it is close to sunset of Shabbat eve, and one says to him: Go and test the animal, and it hears the voice of its Jewish owner and walks because of his command. And it is beneficial to the Jewish seller that the animal should walk, as he wants to demonstrate to the gentile that it is fit for labor. And in this manner, he is considered one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat. And one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to the Gemara’s assumption that leasing confers ownership. And by leasing an item, does one actually acquire it? But didn’t we learn in the mishna (21a): Even in a place with regard to which the Sages said that it is permitted for a Jew to rent a house to a gentile, they did not say that one may rent it for use as a residence, because the gentiles will bring objects of idol worship into it? The objection is as follows: And if it enters your mind to say that through leasing one acquires an item or property, then when this gentile brings the idols into the house he brings them into his own house. Why, then, is it prohibited for a Jew to rent a residence to a gentile?
  The Gemara answers: Idol worship is different, as it is a particularly severe prohibition, and therefore even an item that does not entirely belong to a Jew is treated with great stringency. As it is written: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house” (Deuteronomy 7:26), and this house still retains the name of its Jewish owner.
  Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiyya, also objects to the Gemara’s assumption that leasing confers ownership. And by leasing an item, does one actually acquire it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 11:9): An Israelite who rented a cow from a priest may feed it vetches of <i>teruma</i>, as the animal belongs to a priest; and conversely, a priest who rented a cow from an Israelite, although the responsibility to feed it is incumbent upon him, he may not feed it vetches of <i>teruma</i>, as it does not belong to him.
  And if it enters your mind to say that through leasing one acquires the item, why can’t the priest feed it vetches of <i>teruma</i>? After all, it is currently his own cow. Rather, learn from here that one does not acquire an item through leasing. The Gemara comments: And now that you have said that one does not acquire an item through leasing, and therefore an animal that was leased to a gentile still belongs to the Jew, the original proposal can be accepted: The reason that one cannot sell large livestock to gentiles is a rabbinic decree due to the concern of leasing, and a decree due to the concern of lending the animal to the gentile, and also a decree due to the concern of testing.
  § The Gemara relates: Rav Adda permitted the owners of a donkey to sell their donkey to gentiles by means of a Jewish middleman [<i>desafseira</i>]. He reasoned as follows: If the concern is due to testing, in this case the animal does not recognize the voice of the middleman so that it would walk because of him. And if the concern is due to lending and leasing, since the donkey is not his, that middleman would neither lend nor lease it. Additionally, the middleman would not lease or lend the animal because he wants to sell it and does not want any blemish to be revealed in it.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Huna sold a certain cow to a gentile. Rav Ḥisda said to him: What is the reason that the Master acted in that manner? Rav Huna said to him: I can say that he purchased it in order to slaughter it, not to use it for labor.
  
  Daf 15b
  
  Rav Huna added: And from where do you say that in a case like this we say that the animal will be slaughtered, and one is not concerned about placing a stumbling block before the blind, despite the fact that the animal could be used to violate a prohibition? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 5:8) that Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell a cow that plows in the Sabbatical Year, as it is prohibited to plow during the Sabbatical Year and the buyer presumably wants it for this purpose. And Beit Hillel permit selling the cow, since the buyer can slaughter it rather than use it for plowing. This shows that according to Beit Hillel, whose opinion is accepted as <i>halakha</i>, one may assume that an animal will be used for a permitted purpose, rather than for a prohibited action.
  Rabba said: Are these matters comparable? There, with regard to the Sabbatical Year, a person is not commanded to let his animal rest during the Sabbatical Year, as there is no prohibition against his animal performing labor. Therefore, there is no reason to decree that the sale is prohibited lest he lend, lease, or test the animal. As for the concern that he is misleading the buyer and encouraging him to sin, he may rely on the fact that the buyer probably intends to slaughter the animal. But here, with regard to selling an animal to a gentile, a person is commanded to let his animal rest on Shabbat, and therefore the Sages decreed the sale prohibited in case he comes to lend, lease, or test the animal.
  Abaye said to Rabba: And does this mean that wherever a person is commanded to allow his possessions to rest it is prohibited to sell an item to one who might use it to perform labor, even if he might also use it for an innocent purpose? But there is the case of a field, as a person is commanded to let his field rest during the Sabbatical Year, and yet we learned in a <i>baraita</i> that Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell a plowed field during the Sabbatical Year, as it is presumed that the buyer will sow it, and Beit Hillel permit this sale, since the buyer can let it lie fallow during the Sabbatical Year. In this case, although one is commanded to let his field rest during the Sabbatical Year, he may still sell it under the assumption that the buyer will use the field in a permitted manner.
  Rav Ashi also objects to Rabba’s statement: And conversely, is it true that wherever a person is not commanded to allow his possessions to rest it is permitted to sell the item? But there is the case of vessels, as a person is not commanded to let his vessels rest during the Sabbatical Year, and yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 5:6): These are the implements that a person is not allowed to sell during the Sabbatical Year: The plow and all of its appurtenances, the yoke that is used to hitch the cow to the plow, and the winnowing fork, and the stake.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: Anywhere that it is possible to assign an innocent motive, one assigns such a motive, and this applies even though one is commanded to allow the item to rest. And anywhere that it is not possible to assign an innocent motive, one does not assign an innocent motive, even though one is not commanded to allow the item to rest.
  § The Gemara relates: Rabba sold a certain donkey to a Jew who was suspected of selling large livestock to a gentile. Abaye said to Rabba: What is the reason that the Master acted in this manner? Rabba said to him: I sold the donkey to a Jew. Abaye said to him: But he will go and sell it to a gentile. Rabba responded: Is the only possibility that he will sell to a gentile, and he will not sell it to a Jew? Since there is no reason to assume that he will sell specifically to a gentile rather than to a Jew, there is no problem in selling to him.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>: In a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to Samaritans, one may sell the animals to them; in a place where the people were not accustomed to sell them one may not sell the animals to them. What is the reason that the sale of small livestock to Samaritans is prohibited? If we say that it is because Samaritans are suspected of engaging in bestiality, are they suspected of this practice? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not keep an animal in the inns of gentiles. Male animals may not be placed with men, as they are suspected of engaging in bestiality, and female animals may not be left with women, despite the fact that there is no concern that they may engage in bestiality. And needless to say, it is prohibited to leave female animals with men, and male animals with women.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And one may not entrust an animal to a gentile shepherd, and one may not seclude oneself with gentiles, due to the danger that this entails. And one may not entrust a child to them to teach him how to read books or to teach him a craft. But one may keep an animal in the inns of Samaritans, as they are not suspected of violating a Torah prohibition and engaging in bestiality. Male animals may be placed with women and female animals may be left with men, and needless to say, it is permitted to leave male animals with men and female animals with women.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: And one may entrust an animal to a Samaritan shepherd, and one may seclude oneself with Samaritans, and one may entrust a child to them to teach him how to read books and to teach him a craft. The Gemara infers from the <i>baraita</i>: Evidently, Samaritans are not suspected of engaging in bestiality, yet livestock may not be sold to them, as they are suspected of selling it to gentiles.
  And furthermore, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not sell weapons to gentiles or the auxiliary equipment of weapons, and one may not sharpen weapons for them. And one may not sell them stocks used for fastening the feet of prisoners, or iron neck chains [<i>kolarin</i>], or foot chains, or iron chains. This prohibition applies equally to both a gentile and a Samaritan.
  Abaye analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: What is the reason for the prohibition against selling these items to Samaritans? If we say that they are suspected of bloodshed, that is difficult: But are they suspected of this? Didn’t you say that one may seclude oneself with them, which indicates that they are not suspected of bloodshed? Rather, it is prohibited to sell these items to Samaritans because they will come to sell them to a gentile. According to this reasoning, it should likewise be prohibited to sell a donkey to a Jew who is suspected of selling animals to gentiles.
  And if you would say that there is a difference between a Jew and a Samaritan, as a Samaritan will likely not repent and will sell to a gentile, whereas a Jew will likely repent and not sell these items, this reasoning is incorrect. But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say explicitly that Rabba bar Avuh says: Just as the Sages said that it is prohibited to sell to a gentile, so too it is prohibited to sell to a Jew who is suspected of selling to a gentile? When Rabba heard this and realized that Abaye was correct, he ran three parasangs after the buyer who purchased his donkey to revoke the sale, as the Jew was suspected of selling to gentiles; and some say that he ran one parasang through sand. But he did not succeed in overtaking him.
  Apropos the <i>baraita</i> that discusses the prohibition against selling weapons, the Gemara relates that Rav Dimi bar Abba says: Just as it is prohibited to sell to a gentile, it is prohibited to sell to an armed bandit who is a Jew. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this prohibition? If the thief is suspected of killing, isn’t it obvious that it is prohibited? After all, he is the same as a gentile. Providing a Jew who might kill with weapons is no different from giving a weapon to a gentile, as in both cases one violates the prohibition: Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.
  And if he is a bandit who does not kill, why not sell to him? The Gemara answers: Actually, Rav Dimi bar Abba is referring to a bandit who does not kill, and here we are dealing with a bandit who steals, as sometimes he makes use of his weapon to save himself when he is caught. Consequently, it is prohibited to sell him weapons in case he kills with them in self-defense.
  § The Sages taught: One may not sell shields [<i>terisin</i>] to gentiles, despite the fact that they are used for protection, not to attack others. And some say: One may sell shields to them. The Gemara asks: What is the reason behind the opinion that prohibits selling shields to gentiles? If we say it is because they protect them in wartime, if so, then even wheat and barley should not be sold to them. Rav said:
  
  Daf 16a
  
  If it were possible to avoid selling produce to gentiles without incurring their animosity, indeed it would be prohibited to sell them. Since limiting sales to gentiles to such an extent would cause great harm, it is only prohibited to sell them shields.
  There are those who say: With regard to shields, this is the reason that one is not allowed to sell them to gentiles: As when their use of their weapon is finished in battle, they kill with these shields. And accordingly, the reason that some say in the <i>baraita</i> that one may sell shields to them is because they maintain that this is not a concern, as when their weapon is finished they flee, rather than use their shield as a weapon. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion cited as: Some say.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava says: One may not sell blocks [<i>ashashiot</i>] of iron to gentiles. What is the reason? It is because they forge weapons from them. The Gemara asks: If so, then even hoes and axes should not be sold to them, as they too can be used to forge weapons. Rav Zevid said in response: The ruling of Rav Adda bar Ahava was stated with regard to Indian iron, which is of a superior quality and used only for crafting weapons. The Gemara clarifies: And as for the fact that nowadays we do sell all weapons, Rav Ashi said: We sell the weapons to the Persians, who protect us.
  § The mishna teaches: One may not sell to gentiles calves or foals. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of being cured and living normally. The Sages said to him: But if one mates her, does she not bear offspring? And since one can mate her and she will bear offspring, the gentile will come to leave her in his possession, and Jews who see the animal in the possession of the gentile will assume that it is permitted to sell large livestock to gentiles. Rabbi Yehuda said to them in response: When she bears offspring, I will agree to be concerned about such a possibility. The Gemara notes: Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda holds that a damaged animal does not accept a male, i.e., since its legs are broken, it cannot participate in intercourse.
  The mishna also teaches that ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse to a gentile. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse because the gentile uses it for performing an act for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as riding a horse is not prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, there is no reason to prohibit its sale due to the concern that the gentile might use it for a prohibited action. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prohibits its sale due to two reasons: One is because it has the status of a weapon, as horses are used in battle, and the other one is because it has the status of large livestock.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, there is a reason to say that a horse has the status of a weapon, as a horse is taught to kill by striking down enemy troops. But what is the relevance of the observation that it has the status of large livestock? It has already been explained that a horse is used for riding, not for performing acts that are prohibited on Shabbat. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When it becomes elderly and is no longer suitable for use in battle, one makes it grind with a millstone, and therefore it will in fact be used to perform prohibited labor on Shabbat. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of ben Beteira, and it is permitted to sell a horse to gentiles.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to an ox of a fattener, which has been fattened for slaughter, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the sale of a damaged animal, and let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute that ruling.
  The Gemara elaborates: Let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as follows: Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda permits only the sale of a damaged animal, which will never come to be included in the category of an animal that is fit for labor. But with regard to this fattened ox, which if kept for a sufficient amount of time without fattening will come to be included in the category of an animal that is fit for labor, the sale is prohibited.
  Or perhaps it may be claimed that even according to the Rabbis, they prohibit the sale only there, in the case of a damaged animal that ordinarily does not stand ready for slaughter. But in this case of a fattened ox, which ordinarily stands ready for slaughter, even the Rabbis permit the sale.
  The Gemara suggests a proof: Come and hear that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The members of the household of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi were required to bring as a present for the authorities an ox of a fattener on their festival day. They deprived themselves of forty-thousand dinars, i.e., they paid this sum as a bribe, to ensure that they would not have to bring it on the actual day of their festival, but rather on the next day. They deprived themselves again, i.e., they paid a further bribe, of another forty-thousand dinars, to ensure that they would not have to bring it alive but rather slaughtered. They deprived themselves again and paid yet another bribe of forty-thousand dinars to ensure that they would not have to bring it at all.
  What is the reason that they paid a bribe to evade the responsibility of bringing a fattened ox to the authorities? Is it not due to the concern that perhaps they will come to keep the animal until it is fit for labor? The Gemara rejects this proof: And according to your reasoning, what is the reason that they paid a bribe to ensure that they would not have to bring it on the day of the festival, but rather the next day? Rather, it must be explained that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to abolish the matter entirely, and he reasoned: It is best to abolish it gradually, little by little, and in this manner they ultimately had no obligation to bring the animal at all. Therefore, no proof can be brought from this incident with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of the sale of a fattened ox.
  It was stated that if a fattened ox is kept for a sufficient amount of time without fattening it will come to be included in the category of an animal that is fit for labor. Concerning this, the Gemara asks: But even when a fattened ox is kept until it is slim, does it become healthy and able to perform labor? Rav Ashi said that the expert in this matter, Zevida, said to me: We keep a young ox that has been fattened until it is slim, and it performs twice the work of other oxen.
  MISHNA: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. One may not build with them a basilica [<i>basileki</i>], a tribunal [<i>gardom</i>], a stadium [<i>itztadeyya</i>], or a platform. But one may build with them small platforms [<i>bimmusiot</i>] and bathhouses. Even in this case, once he reaches the arched chamber in the bath where the gentiles put up objects of idol worship, it is prohibited to build it.
  GEMARA: Rav Ḥanin bar Rav Ḥisda says, and some say Rav Ḥanan bar Rava says that Rav says: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm [<i>lefirkus</i>], i.e., the symptoms of vitality required at the time of slaughtering. If an animal in danger of dying was slaughtered but did not display any spasmodic movement when it was slaughtered, it is not kosher. If it did spasm after being slaughtered, its meat is kosher But its status is not the same as that of small livestock with regard to its sale. Rather it is considered like large livestock, and therefore its sale to gentiles is always prohibited.
  Rav Ḥanan bar Rava added: This is the statement of Rav, but I say that even with regard to its sale a large beast is akin to small livestock. Therefore, in a place where the people were accustomed to sell large beasts, one may sell them, and in a place where the people were not accustomed to sell them, one may not sell them.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav’s statement. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. The Gemara analyzes the mishna: The reason that these beasts cannot be sold to gentiles is because they can cause injury to the public. It may be inferred from here that another beast, which does not cause injury to the public, is permitted to be sold to gentiles. Rabba bar Ulla says in response: This mishna does not pose a problem for Rav, as he holds that it is referring to a damaged lion, which is not fit for labor;
  
  Daf 16b
  
  and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna on 14b, that it is permitted to sell to a gentile large livestock that are damaged. Yet, it is prohibited to sell large undamaged beasts, just as one may not sell large undamaged livestock. Rav Ashi says: It is not necessary to explain that the mishna is referring to such a specific case. Rather, an ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor, as lions are not generally used to perform labor. Therefore there is no concern that a lion will be used to perform prohibited labor on Shabbat.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Just as one may not sell large livestock to gentiles, so too one may not sell large beasts to them. And even in a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles; nevertheless, one may not sell large beasts to them. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava is a conclusive refutation.
  The Gemara presents a different version of this discussion. Ravina raises a contradiction between the mishna here and a <i>baraita</i> and resolves the contradiction. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. Ravina analyzes the mishna: The reason a beast such as a lion cannot be sold to gentiles is that it can cause injury to the public, from which it may be inferred that with regard to another beast, which does not cause injury to the public, one may sell it to gentiles.
  And Ravina raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: Just as one may not sell large livestock to gentiles, so too, one may not sell large beasts to them. And even in a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles, one may not sell large beasts to them. The <i>baraita</i> indicates that one may never sell large beasts to gentiles, even if it poses no danger to the public. And Ravina resolves the contradiction between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i>: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a damaged lion, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Ashi says there is a different explanation: An ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor.
  Rav Naḥman objects to the inference drawn from the mishna: Who will tell us that a lion is considered a large beast? Perhaps it is considered a small beast, in which case it cannot be inferred that the mishna permits the sale of large beasts.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Ashi examined the mishna here carefully, and from it he raises a refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava, who permitted the sale of large beasts. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. Rav Ashi inferred two conclusions from here. First, the reason a beast such as a lion cannot be sold to gentiles is because it can cause injury to the public, whereas with regard to a beast that does not cause injury to the public, one may sell it to gentiles. This inference was cited in contradiction of the opinion of Rav, as explained before.
  And Rav Ashi then inferred, in resolution of Rav’s opinion, that the reason the mishna specifies that one may sell a lion if it does not pose a danger to the public is that an ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor. But a different animal that performs labor may not be sold. This presents a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava is a conclusive refutation.
  The Gemara asks: But in any event, what labor can a large beast perform? Why is it necessary to prohibit the sale of large beasts if they are not trained to perform any labor? Abaye said: Mar Yehuda said to me that in the house of Mar Yoḥani, they grind the mill with wild asses, which are considered large beasts.
  § Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in the study hall of Rav Yehuda, he said to us: Learn from me this matter, which I heard from a great man, but I do not know if I heard it from Rav or from Shmuel: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm, i.e., the symptoms of vitality required at the time of slaughtering.
  Rabbi Zeira continued: When I came to the city of Korkoneya, I found Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi sitting and saying in the name of Shmuel: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to myself: One can conclude from here that this was stated in the name of Shmuel. When I came to Sura, I found Rabba bar Yirmeya sitting and saying in the name of Rav: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to myself: One can conclude from here that this was stated in the name of Rav, and it was also stated in the name of Shmuel.
  When I ascended to there, Eretz Yisrael, I found Rav Asi sitting and saying that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says in the name of Rav: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to him: And doesn’t the Master hold that the Master who is responsible for dissemination of this <i>halakha</i> is Rabba bar Yirmeya? Why don’t you attribute the statement to him? Rav Asi said to me: Black pot [<i>patya</i>], a term of endearment for a scholar who works hard studying Torah: From me and from you this <i>halakha</i> may be concluded. In other words, our two statements should be combined to form one accurate attribution of the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara notes that in fact this ruling was also stated: Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Asi says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says that Rav says: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm.
  § The mishna teaches that one may not build a basilica in conjunction with gentiles. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There are three types of basilicas: Those of kings, and those of bathhouses, and those of storehouses. Rava says: Two of these types are permitted, as they are not used for inflicting the death penalty, and one is prohibited [<i>le’isor</i>]. And a mnemonic device for this ruling, that the basilica of kings is prohibited, is the verse: “To bind [<i>le’esor</i>] their kings with chains” (Psalms 149:8).
  And there are those who say that this is what Rava says: All these types of basilica are permitted. The Gemara asks: How can it be permitted to build any type of basilica; but didn’t we learn in the mishna: One may not build with them a basilica, a tribunal, a stadium, or a platform? The Gemara answers: Say that the mishna means the following: One may not build in conjunction with gentiles a basilica of a tribunal, or of a stadium, or of a platform. But it is permitted to build a basilica that is not used for sentencing and inflicting the death penalty.
  § Apropos the above discussion, the Gemara relates incidents involving Sages who were sentenced by the ruling authorities. The Sages taught: When Rabbi Eliezer was arrested and charged with heresy by the authorities, they brought him up to a tribunal to be judged. A certain judicial officer [<i>hegemon</i>] said to him: Why should an elder like you engage in these frivolous matters of heresy?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Judge is trusted by me to rule correctly. That officer thought that Rabbi Eliezer was speaking about him; but in fact he said this only in reference to his Father in Heaven. Rabbi Eliezer meant that he accepted God’s judgment, i.e., if he was charged he must have sinned to God in some manner. The officer said to him: Since you put your trust in me, you are acquitted [<i>dimos</i>]; you are exempt.
  When Rabbi Eliezer came home, his students entered to console him for being accused of heresy, which he took as a sign of sin, and he did not accept their words of consolation. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, allow me to say one matter from all of that which you taught me. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Speak. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, perhaps some statement of heresy came before you
  
  Daf 17a
  
  and you derived pleasure from it, and because of this you were held responsible by Heaven. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, you are right, as you have reminded me that once I was walking in the upper marketplace of Tzippori, and I found a man who was one of the students of Jesus the Nazarene, and his name was Ya’akov of Kefar Sekhanya. He said to me: It is written in your Torah: “You shall not bring the payment to a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the house of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). What is the <i>halakha</i>: Is it permitted to make from the payment to a prostitute for services rendered a bathroom for a High Priest in the Temple? And I said nothing to him in response.
  He said to me: Jesus the Nazarene taught me the following: It is permitted, as derived from the verse: “For of the payment to a prostitute she has gathered them, and to the payment to a prostitute they shall return” (Micah 1:7). Since the coins came from a place of filth, let them go to a place of filth and be used to build a bathroom.
  And I derived pleasure from the statement, and due to this, I was arrested for heresy by the authorities, because I transgressed that which is written in the Torah: “Remove your way far from her, and do not come near the entrance of her house” (Proverbs 5:8). “Remove your way far from her,” this is a reference to heresy; “and do not come near the entrance of her house,” this is a reference to the ruling authority. The Gemara notes: And there are those who say a different interpretation: “Remove your way far from her,” this is a reference to heresy and the ruling authority; “and do not come near the entrance of her house,” this is a reference to a prostitute. And how much distance must one maintain from a prostitute? Rav Ḥisda said: Four cubits.
  With regard to the derivation of the verse by Jesus the Nazarene, the Gemara asks: And what do the Sages derive from this phrase: “Payment to a prostitute”? The Gemara answers: They explain it in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda says: Any prostitute who hires herself out to others for money will become so attached to this practice that ultimately, when others no longer wish to hire her, she will hire others to engage in intercourse with her. As it is stated: “And in that you gave payment, and no payment is given to you, therefore you are contrary” (Ezekiel 16:34).
  The Gemara comments: And Rav Ḥisda, who stated above that the Torah requires one to maintain a distance of four cubits from a prostitute, disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Pedat. As Rabbi Pedat says: The Torah prohibited only intimacy that involves engaging in prohibited sexual relations, as it is stated: “None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6). The prohibition against intimacy in the Torah applies exclusively to sexual intercourse, and all other kinds of intimacy that do not include actual intercourse are not included in the prohibition.
  The Gemara relates: When Ulla would come from the study hall, he would kiss his sisters on their hands. And some say: On their chests. And the Gemara points out that this action of his disagrees with another ruling that Ulla himself issued, as Ulla says: Mere intimacy with a woman with whom one is prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse is prohibited, due to the maxim: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go around, go around but do not come near to the vineyard. Just as a nazirite is warned not even to come into close proximity of a vineyard lest he consume a product of the vine, so too one is obligated to distance himself from anyone with whom intercourse is forbidden.
  § In connection to the earlier mention of heresy and the ruling authorities, the Gemara cites a verse: “The horseleech has two daughters: Give, give” (Proverbs 30:15). What is meant by “give, give”? Mar Ukva says: This is the voice of the two daughters who cry out from Gehenna due to their suffering; and they are the ones who say in this world: Give, give, demanding dues and complete allegiance. And who are they? They are heresy and the ruling authority. There are those who say that Rav Ḥisda says that Mar Ukva says: The voice of Gehenna cries out and says: Bring me two daughters who cry and say in this world: Give, give.
  The following verse in Proverbs makes reference to a foreign woman, which according to the Sages is a euphemism for heresy: “None that go to her return, neither do they attain the paths of life” (Proverbs 2:19). The Gemara asks: Since those that are drawn to heresy do not return, from where would they attain the path of life? Why is it necessary for the verse to add that they do not attain the paths of life? The Gemara explains that this is what the verse is saying: In general, those who go to her do not return, and even if they return, they do not attain the paths of life, i.e., the pain of their regret will shorten their lives.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that anyone who separates himself from heresy and returns from his mistaken ways must die? But what about that woman who came before Rav Ḥisda to confess to him, and she said to him: The lightest of the light, i.e., the least of the sins that she committed, is that she conceived her younger son from engaging in intercourse with her older son. And Rav Ḥisda said to her: Prepare funeral shrouds for her, i.e., yourself, as you will certainly die soon, but she did not die.
  The above incident refutes the claim that anyone who repents for the sin of heresy must die, as from the fact that she said that the lightest of the light of her sins was that she conceived one son from engaging in intercourse with another son, by inference one can learn that she was also involved in heresy, and yet she did not die. The Gemara answers: That is a case where the woman did not repent properly, and due to that reason she did not die.
  There are those who say there is a different version of the objection to the Gemara’s statement that those who repent for the sin of heresy must die: Is that to say that if one repents for the sin of heresy, yes, the result is death, whereas if one repents for the sin of forbidden sexual intercourse he does not die? But what about that woman who came before Rav Ḥisda to confess to him and Rav Ḥisda said to those present: Prepare funeral shrouds for her, and she died? The Gemara answers: From the fact that she said: The lightest of the light, by inference one can learn that she was also involved in heresy.
  The Gemara asks: And is it correct that one who repents of the sin of forbidden sexual intercourse does not die? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They said about Rabbi Elazar ben Durdayya that he was so promiscuous that he did not leave one prostitute in the world with whom he did not engage in sexual intercourse. Once, he heard that there was one prostitute in one of the cities overseas who would take a purse full of dinars as her payment. He took a purse full of dinars and went and crossed seven rivers to reach her. When they were engaged in the matters to which they were accustomed, a euphemism for intercourse, she passed wind and said: Just as this passed wind will not return to its place, so too Elazar ben Durdayya will not be accepted in repentance, even if he were to try to repent.
  This statement deeply shocked Elazar ben Durdayya, and he went and sat between two mountains and hills and said: Mountains and hills, pray for mercy on my behalf, so that my repentance will be accepted. They said to him: Before we pray for mercy on your behalf, we must pray for mercy on our own behalf, as it is stated: “For the mountains may depart, and the hills be removed” (Isaiah 54:10). He said: Heaven and earth, pray for mercy on my behalf. They said to him: Before we pray for mercy on your behalf, we must pray for mercy on our own behalf, as it is stated: “For the heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a garment” (Isaiah 51:6).
  He said: Sun and moon, pray for mercy on my behalf. They said to him: Before we pray for mercy on your behalf, we must pray for mercy on our own behalf, as it is stated: “Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed” (Isaiah 24:23). He said: Stars and constellations, pray for mercy on my behalf. They said to him: Before we pray for mercy on your behalf, we must pray for mercy on our own behalf, as it is stated: “And all the hosts of heaven shall molder away” (Isaiah 34:4).
  Elazar ben Durdayya said: Clearly the matter depends on nothing other than myself. He placed his head between his knees and cried loudly until his soul left his body. A Divine Voice emerged and said: Rabbi Elazar ben Durdayya is destined for life in the World-to-Come. The Gemara explains the difficulty presented by this story: And here Elazar ben Durdayya was guilty of the sin of forbidden sexual intercourse, and yet he died once he repented. The Gemara answers: There too, since he was attached so strongly to the sin, to an extent that transcended the physical temptation he felt, it is similar to heresy, as it had become like a form of idol worship for him.
  When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi heard this story of Elazar ben Durdayya, he wept and said: There is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come only after many years of toil, and there is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come in one moment. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi further says: Not only are penitents accepted, but they are even called: Rabbi, as the Divine Voice referred to Elazar ben Durdayya as Rabbi Elazar ben Durdayya.
  § In relation to the issue of distancing oneself from idol worship and prostitution, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Yonatan were once walking along the road when they came to a certain two paths, one of which branched off toward the entrance of a place of idol worship, and the other one branched off toward the entrance of a brothel. One said to the other: Let us go by the path that leads to the entrance of the place of idol worship,
  
  Daf 17b
  
  as the inclination to engage in idol worship has been slaughtered and the temptation to sin in this manner no longer exists. The other said to him: Let us go by the path that leads to the entrance of the brothel and overpower our inclination, and thereby receive a reward. When they arrived there, they saw that the prostitutes yielded before their presence, i.e., they entered the building out of respect for the Sages.
  One said to the other: From where did you know this, that the prostitutes would retreat from us in embarrassment? He said to him: It is written: “From lewdness [<i>mezimma</i>] it shall watch over you; discernment shall guard you” (Proverbs 2:11), i.e., the Torah will serve as a safeguard against lewdness.
  The Sages said to Rava: What is the meaning of <i>mezimma</i>? If we say that it is referring to the Torah that will guard you, as it is written in it: “<i>Zimma</i>” (Leviticus 18:17), and we translate this term as: The council of [<i>atzat</i>] the sinners, demonstrating that <i>zimma</i> is referring to council or wisdom, and the term <i>etza</i> is also written with regard to the Torah: “This also comes forth from the Lord of hosts: Wonderful is His counsel [<i>etza</i>], and great is His wisdom” (Isaiah 28:29), this is difficult. The Gemara explains the difficulty: If so, the verse should have said: <i>Zimma</i>, and not <i>mezimma</i>. Rather, this is what the verse is saying: From lewd matters [<i>midevar zimma</i>], it shall watch over you, the Torah shall guard you, i.e., the term discernment is a reference to the Torah.
  § The Gemara returns to its discussion of the judgments of the Sages by the Roman rulers. The Sages taught: When Rabbi Elazar ben Perata and Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon were arrested by the Romans during the time of the religious persecution of the Jewish people, Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon: Fortunate are you, as you were arrested on one charge only, of teaching Torah publicly; woe is me, as I have been arrested on five charges.
  Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to him: Fortunate are you, as you were arrested on five charges but you will be saved; woe is me, as I have been arrested on one charge, but I will not be saved. You will be saved because you engaged in Torah study and in acts of charity, and I engaged in Torah study alone.
  The Gemara comments: And this is in accordance with a statement of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says: Anyone who occupies himself with Torah study alone is considered like one who does not have a God. As it is stated: “Now for long seasons Israel was without the true God, and without a teaching priest, and without the Torah” (II Chronicles 15:3). What is meant by “without the true God”? This teaches that anyone who engages in Torah study alone is considered like one who does not have a true God.
  The Gemara asks: And is it true that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon did not engage in acts of charity? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: A person should not donate his money to the charity purse [<i>le’arnakei</i>] unless a Torah scholar like Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon is appointed as supervisor over it? The Gemara answers: He was trusted to distribute the charity with honesty and integrity, but he himself did not perform charitable acts.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma: I confused my own coins that I needed for the festivities of Purim with coins of charity, and I distributed them all to the poor at my own expense. How then can it be said that he never engaged in charitable acts? The Gemara responds: He did perform acts of charity, but he did not perform as many acts as he should have, in light of his wealth.
  The Gemara returns to the description of the trial of the Sages. The Romans brought Rabbi Elazar ben Perata for his trial and said: What is the reason that you taught Torah, and what is the reason that you stole, as these were the crimes of which he was accused. Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said to them: If one is an armed robber [<i>sayafa</i>], he is not a scholar [<i>safra</i>], and if one is a scholar he is not an armed robber, i.e., I am accused of two mutually exclusive crimes; and from the fact that this characterization is not true, one may also conclude that that characterization is also not true. They asked him: But if you do not teach Torah, then what is the reason that they call you rabbi? He answered: I am the master [<i>rabban</i>] of weavers [<i>tarsiyyim</i>].
  In order to ascertain whether Rabbi Elazar ben Perata was in fact an expert weaver, they brought him two coils of wool and said to him: Which is the warp, and which is the woof? The threads used for each differ in their thickness and strength and would be immediately recognizable to an expert. A miracle occurred, as a female hornet came and sat on the coil of warp, and a male hornet came and sat on the coil of woof. Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said to them: This is a coil of warp, and that is a coil of woof. He realized that the male hornet was a sign that the coil was the woof, as the woof is threaded through the warp, while the warp, which is fixed in the loom and receives the woof, was the one on which the female hornet sat, as the female of a species receives the male.
  The Romans said to him: And what is the reason that you did not come to the house of Abidan? This was a gathering place where debates on wisdom and faith were conducted. Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said to them: I was old and feared that perhaps I would be trampled under your feet, due to the huge crowds. The Romans said: And until now, how many elders have been trampled there, that you would be worried about such a possibility? The Gemara comments: A miracle occurred, and on that day, one old man was trampled.
  The Romans asked Rabbi Elazar ben Perata: And what is the reason that you emancipated your slave? Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said to them: This matter never happened. One of them stood to testify against him, and Elijah came disguised as one of the of the Roman noblemen, and he said to that individual: From the fact that miracles occurred for Rabbi Elazar ben Perata in every other case, in this instance as well a miracle will occur for him, and that man, i.e., you, is only demonstrating his wickedness, since you cannot succeed in your aim and are merely showing yourself to be desperate to cause harm.
  But the man paid him no heed, and he stood to say his testimony to them. At that time there was a written letter that was composed by some of the most important people of the Roman Empire in order to send it to the Emperor’s court, and they had sent it in the possession of that man, i.e., the potential witness. Elijah came and threw it a distance of four hundred parasangs. The man went and did not come back, and therefore all the charges against Rabbi Elazar ben Perata were dropped.
  The Romans brought Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon for judgment, and they said to him: Why did you occupy yourself with the Torah? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to them, citing a verse: “As the Lord my God commanded me” (Deuteronomy 4:5). They immediately sentenced him to death by means of burning, and they sentenced his wife to execution by decapitation, and his daughter was condemned to sit in a brothel [<i>kubba shel zonot</i>]. The Gemara explains the Divine decree that he should receive this punishment: He was sentenced to death by burning, as he would
  
  Daf 18a
  
  pronounce the ineffable name of God with all of its letters, i.e., as it is spelled. The Gemara asks: And how could he do that? But didn’t we learn in the mishna (<i>Sanhedrin</i> 90a): These are the people who have no share in the World-to-Come: One who says that the Torah is not from Heaven or that there is no source from the Torah for the resurrection of the dead. Abba Shaul says: Also one who pronounces the ineffable name as it is written, with all of its letters, has no share in the World-to-Come.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon did it to teach himself, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the prohibition against sorcery: “You shall not learn to do” (Deuteronomy 18:9); this indicates: But you may learn to understand and to teach. In other words, certain prohibitions do not apply when one is acting only in order to acquire knowledge of the subject.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the reason that he was punished? The Gemara answers: He was punished because he would pronounce the ineffable name of God in public, instead of privately. And his wife was condemned to execution by decapitation because she did not protest his doing so. From here the Sages stated: Anyone who has the capability to protest effectively the sinful conduct of another and does not protest is punished for that person’s sin.
  The Gemara asks: And why was his daughter condemned to sit in a brothel? As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Once, the daughter of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon was walking before the nobles of Rome, and they said to each other: How pleasant are the steps of this young woman. Upon hearing this, she immediately took care to keep walking in such a fashion that her steps would continue to be pleasing to them. And this is the same as that which Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The iniquity of my heel encircles me” (Psalms 49:6)? It means that the sins that a person tramples with one’s heel in this world, i.e., dismisses and pays no attention to them as they seem to lack importance, e.g., the way that one walks, come and encircle him on the Day of Judgment.
  The Gemara relates: When the three of them went out after being sentenced, they accepted the justice of God’s judgment. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said: “The Rock, His work is perfect; for all His ways are justice” (Deuteronomy 32:4). And his wife said the continuation of the verse: “A God of faithfulness and without iniquity.” His daughter said: “Great in counsel, and mighty in work; whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of men, to give every one according to his ways” (Jeremiah 32:19). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: How great are these righteous people, that these three verses, which speak of the acceptance of God’s judgment, occurred to them at the time of accepting the righteousness of His judgment.
  § The Sages taught: When Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma fell ill, Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon went to visit him. Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to him: Ḥanina my brother, do you not know that this nation has been given reign by a decree from Heaven? The proof is that Rome has destroyed God’s Temple, and burned His Sanctuary, and killed His pious ones, and destroyed His best ones, and it still exists. Evidently, all of this is by Divine decree. And yet I heard about you that you sit and engage in Torah study, and convene assemblies in public, and have a Torah scroll placed in your lap, thereby demonstrating complete disregard for the decrees issued by the Romans.
  Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to him: Heaven will have mercy and protect me. Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to him: I am saying reasonable matters to you, and you say to me: Heaven will have mercy? I wonder if the Romans will not burn both you and your Torah scroll by fire. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to him: My teacher, what will become of me? Am I destined for life in the World-to-Come?
  Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to him: Did any special incident occur to you which might serve as an indication? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to him: I confused my own coins that I needed for the festivities of Purim with coins of charity, and I distributed them all to the poor at my own expense. Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma said to him: If that is so, may my portion be of your portion, and may my lot be of your lot.
  The Sages said: Not even a few days passed before Rabbi Yosei ben Kisma died of his illness, and all of the Roman notables went to bury him, and they eulogized him with a great eulogy. And upon their return, they found Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon, who was sitting and engaging in Torah study and convening assemblies in public, with a Torah scroll placed in his lap.
  They brought him to be sentenced, and wrapped him in the Torah scroll, and encircled him with bundles of branches, and they set fire to it. And they brought tufts of wool and soaked them in water, and placed them on his heart, so that his soul should not leave his body quickly, but he would die slowly and painfully. His daughter said to him: Father, must I see you like this? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to her: If I alone were being burned, it would be difficult for me, but now that I am burning along with a Torah scroll, He who will seek retribution for the insult accorded to the Torah scroll will also seek retribution for the insult accorded to me.
  His students said to him: Our teacher, what do you see? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to them: I see the parchment burning, but its letters are flying to the heavens. They said to him: You too should open your mouth and the fire will enter you, and you will die quickly. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to them: It is preferable that He who gave me my soul should take it away, and one should not harm oneself to speed his death.
  The executioner [<i>kaltzatoniri</i>] said to him: My teacher, if I increase the flame and take off the tufts of wool from your heart, so that you will die sooner and suffer less, will you bring me to the life of the World-to-Come? Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon said to the executioner: Yes. The executioner said: Take an oath for me, that what you say is true. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon took the oath for him, and the executioner immediately increased the flame and took off the tufts of wool from his heart, causing his soul to leave his body quickly. The executioner too leaped and fell into the fire and died.
  A Divine Voice emerged and said: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon and the executioner are destined for the life of the World-to-Come. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wept and said: There is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come in one moment, such as the executioner, and there is one who acquires his share in the World-to-Come only after many years of toil, such as Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon.
  § The Gemara relates: Berurya, the wife of Rabbi Meir, was a daughter of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon. She said to Rabbi Meir: It is a disrespectful matter for me that my sister is sitting in a brothel; you must do something to save her. Rabbi Meir took a vessel [<i>tarkeva</i>] full of dinars and went. He said to himself: If no transgression was committed with her, a miracle will be performed for her; if she committed a transgression, no miracle will be performed for her.
  Rabbi Meir went and dressed as a Roman knight, and said to her: Accede to my wishes, i.e., engage in intercourse with me. She said to him: I am menstruating [<i>dashtana</i>] and cannot. He said to her: I will wait. She said to him: There are many women in the brothel, and there are many women here who are more beautiful than I. He said to himself: I can conclude from her responses that she did not commit a transgression, as she presumably said this to all who come.
  Rabbi Meir went over to her guard, and said to him: Give her to me. The guard said to him: I fear that if I do so, I will be punished by the government. Rabbi Meir said to him: Take this vessel full of dinars; give half  to the government as a bribe, and half will be for you. The guard said to him: But when the money is finished, what shall I do? Rabbi Meir said to him: Say: God of Meir answer me! And you will be saved. The guard said to him:
  
  Daf 18b
  
  And who can say that this is the case, that I will be saved by this utterance? Rabbi Meir said to him: You will now see. There were these carnivorous dogs that would devour people; Rabbi Meir took a clod of earth, threw it at them, and when they came to devour him, he said: God of Meir answer me! The dogs then left him alone, and after seeing this the guard gave the daughter of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon to Rabbi Meir.
  Ultimately the matter was heard in the king’s court, and the guard, who was brought and taken to be hanged, said: God of Meir answer me! They then lowered him down, as they were unable to hang him. They said to him: What is this? He said to them: This was the incident that occurred, and he proceeded to relate the entire story to them.
  They then went and engraved the image of Rabbi Meir at the entrance of Rome where it would be seen by everyone, and they said: Anyone who sees a man with this face should bring him here. One day, Romans saw Rabbi Meir and ran after him, and he ran away from them and entered a brothel to hide. Some say he then escaped capture because he saw food cooked by gentiles and dipped [<i>temash</i>] this finger in the food and tasted it with that other finger, and thereby fooled them into thinking that he was eating their food, which they knew Rabbi Meir would not do. And some say that he escaped detection because Elijah came, appeared to them as a prostitute and embraced Rabbi Meir. The Romans who were chasing him said: Heaven forbid, if this were Rabbi Meir, he would not act in that manner.
  Rabbi Meir arose, fled, and arrived in Babylonia. The Gemara notes: There are those who say that he fled because of this inci-dent, and there are those who say that he fled due to embarrassment from the incident involving his wife Berurya.
  § The Sages taught: With regard to one who goes to stadiums [<i>le’itztadinin</i>] where people are killed in contests with gladiators or beasts, or to a camp of besiegers [<i>ulkharkom</i>] where different forms of entertainment are provided for the besieging army, and he sees there the acts of the diviners and those who cast spells, or the acts of the clowns known as <i>bukiyon</i>, or <i>mukiyon</i>, or <i>muliyon</i>, or <i>luliyon</i>, or <i>belurin</i>, or <i>salgurin</i>, this is categorized as “the seat of the scornful”; and with regard to such places the verse states: “Happy is the man that has not walked in the council of the wicked, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the seat of the scornful. But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord” (Psalms 1:1–2). You learn from here that these matters bring a person to dereliction of the study of Torah, since had he not sat in “the seat of the scornful,” he would delight in the study of Torah.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: One is permitted to go to stadiums, because he can scream and save the life of a Jew who would otherwise be killed there; and it is permitted to go to a camp of besiegers, because at times one can provide for the public welfare by petitioning the besiegers and saving the residents of the town, provided that he is not counted as one of them; but if he is counted as one of them, it is prohibited. This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between the statement about attending stadiums in the first <i>baraita</i> and the statement about attending stadiums in the second <i>baraita</i>, and is similarly difficult as there is a contradiction between the statement about a camp of besiegers in the first <i>baraita</i> and the statement about a camp of besiegers in the second <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara continues: Granted, the apparent contradiction between one statement about a camp of besiegers and the other statement about a camp of besiegers is not difficult, as here, the first <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he is counted as one of them, and there, the second <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he is not counted as one of them. But with regard to the contradiction between the ruling about attending stadiums in the first <i>baraita</i> and the ruling about attending stadiums in the second <i>baraita</i>, it is difficult.
  The Gemara answers: This issue is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not go to stadiums, because they are considered “the seat of the scornful.” And Rabbi Natan permits attending stadiums due to two reasons; one is because he can scream and save the life of someone who would otherwise be killed, and the other one is because even if he cannot save the man’s life, he can provide testimony that a woman’s husband died, which will enable her to marry again.
  The Sages taught: One may not go to theaters [<i>letarteiot</i>] or circuses [<i>ulkirkaseiot</i>] because they sacrifice offerings there to objects of idol worship; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It is prohibited to go to a place where they sacrifice offerings, due to a suspicion of idol worship, and it is also prohibited to go to a place where they do not sacrifice offerings, due to it being considered “the seat of the scornful.”
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinion of the Rabbis and that of Rabbi Meir? After all, according to both opinions it is prohibited to attend theaters or circuses. Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura said: The difference between them arises in the case of one who engaged in business there. According to Rabbi Meir, the profits are forbidden as the proceeds of idol worship, as Rabbi Meir maintains that the gentiles certainly worship idols at theaters or circuses. Conversely, according to the Rabbis, the profits are forbidden only if it is established that they worshipped idols there.
  § Apropos the earlier discussion of the evils of scornfulness, the Gemara cites several statements that criticize such behavior. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Happy is the man that has not walked in the counsel of the wicked, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the seat of the scornful” (Psalms 1:1)? Since he did not walk in the counsel of the wicked, how could he stand with them? And since he did not stand, how could he sit with them? And since he did not sit with them, how could he have scorned? Since he never joined the company of the wicked, he would have no reason to be involved with them in any manner.
  Rather, the verse serves to say to you that if he walked with the wicked, he will ultimately stand with them. And if he stood with them, he will ultimately sit in their company, and if he sat, he will ultimately scorn along with them. And if he scorned, the verse says about him: “If you are wise, you are wise for yourself; and if you scorn, you alone shall bear it” (Proverbs 9:12).
  Rabbi Eliezer says: Concerning anyone who scoffs, suffering will befall him, as it is stated: “Now therefore do not be scoffers, lest your suffering be made strong” (Isaiah 28:22). Similarly, Rava said to the Sages who were sitting before him: Please, I ask of you that you not scoff, so that suffering will not befall you.
  Rav Ketina says: Concerning anyone who scoffs, his sustenance is lessened, as it is stated: “He stretches out his hand with scorners” (Hosea 7:5), meaning that God withdraws His providence from scoffers and does not provide for them. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Anyone who scoffs falls into Gehenna, as it is stated: “A proud and haughty man, scorner is his name, he acts in arrogant wrath” (Proverbs 21:24). And wrath means nothing other than Gehenna, as it is stated with regard to the Day of Judgment: “That day is a day of wrath” (Zephaniah 1:15).
  Rabbi Oshaya says, based on the same verse: Anyone who is haughty falls into Gehenna, as it is stated: “A proud and haughty man, scorner is his name, he acts in arrogant wrath” (Proverbs 21:24). And wrath means nothing other than Gehenna, as it is stated: “That day is a day of wrath” (Zephaniah 1:15). Rabbi Ḥanilai bar Ḥanilai says: Anyone who scoffs causes extermination to be wrought upon the world, as it is stated: “Now therefore do not be scoffers, lest your suffering be made strong; for an extermination wholly determined have I heard from the Lord, the God of hosts, upon the whole land” (Isaiah 28:22).
  Rabbi Eliezer says: Scoffing is a severe sin, as at first one is punished with suffering, and ultimately one is punished with extermination. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi taught: “Happy is the man that has not walked in the counsel of the wicked,” this is referring to the theaters and circuses of gentiles; “nor stood in the way of sinners,” this is referring to one who has not stood as an observer at bestial contests [<i>bekinigiyyon</i>]; “nor sat in the seat of the scornful,” this is referring to one who has not sat in the bad company of people who engage in scoffing and jeering.
  Lest a person say: Since I did not go to theaters and circuses, and did not stand in bestial contests, I will go and indulge in sleep, the verse states: “And he meditates in His law day and night” (Psalms 1:2). This demonstrates that it is not sufficient simply to avoid transgressions; rather, it is necessary to engage actively in Torah study.
  § The Gemara relates an alternative homiletic interpretation of the verse discussed above. Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: “Happy is the man that has not walked in the counsel of the wicked” (Psalms 1:1); this
  
  Daf 19a
  
  is referring to our forefather Abraham, who did not walk in the counsel of the members of the generation of the dispersion, who were wicked, as it is stated that they said to each other: “Come, let us build us a city, and a tower, with its top in heaven” (Genesis 11:4), a project with a wicked aim. “Nor stood in the way of sinners” (Psalms 1:1); this too is referring to Abraham, who did not join in the stand of the residents of Sodom, who were sinners, as it is stated: “Now the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners against the Lord exceedingly” (Genesis 13:13).
  “Nor sat in the seat of the scornful” (Psalms 1:1); this means that Abraham did not sit in the seat of the Philistines, because they were scorners who engaged in jest and buffoonery. As it is stated with regard to the Philistines in a later period: “And it came to pass, when their hearts were merry, that they said: Call for Samson, that he may make us sport” (Judges 16:25).
  The Gemara cites an interpretation of a similar verse: “Happy is the man that fears the Lord, that delights greatly in His mitzvot” (Psalms 112:1). The Gemara asks: Is that to say happy is the man, but not happy is the woman? Why is it necessary for the verse to emphasize that it is speaking of a man? Rav Amram says that Rav says: The verse applies to both men and women and is teaching: Happy is one who repents when he is still a man, i.e., before he becomes elderly and his strength dwindles. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Happy is one who triumphs over his evil inclination like a man, i.e., with strength and vigor.
  The verse continues: “He delights greatly in His mitzvot.” Rabbi Elazar says: The person delights in His mitzvot themselves and not in the reward for performing His mitzvot. And this is the same as we learned in a mishna (<i>Avot</i> 1:3): Antigonus of Sokho would say: Do not be like the servants who serve the master on the condition of receiving a reward; rather, be like the servants who serve the master not on the condition that they receive a reward.
  § The Gemara returns to its interpretation of the verse that was discussed previously: “But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord” (Psalms 1:2). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A person can learn Torah only from a place in the Torah that his heart desires, as it is stated: But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord, i.e., his delight is in the part of the Torah that he wishes to study.
  The Gemara relates: Levi and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, were sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and they were learning the Torah portion. When they finished the book that they were learning and were ready to begin a new subject, Levi said: Let them bring us the book of Proverbs; and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said: Let them bring us the book of Psalms. He compelled Levi to acquiesce, and they brought a book of Psalms. When they arrived here, at the verse: “But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord,” Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explained the verse and said: A person can learn Torah only from a place in the Torah that his heart desires. Levi said: My teacher, you have given us, i.e., me, permission to rise and leave, as I wish to study Proverbs, not Psalms.
  The Gemara cites other interpretations of this verse. Rabbi Avdimi bar Ḥama says: With regard to anyone who engages in the study of Torah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, fulfills his desires, as it is stated: “But in the Torah of the Lord is his delight,” i.e., if one engages in the study of the Torah of the Lord, he will have his desires met by the Lord. Rava says, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: A person should always learn Torah from a place in the Torah that his heart desires, as it is stated: “But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord.”
  And Rava also says, with regard to this verse: Initially the Torah is called by the name of the Holy One, Blessed be He, but ultimately it is called by the name of the one who studies it. As it is first stated: “His delight is in the Torah of the Lord,” and in the continuation of the verse it states: “And in his Torah he meditates day and night.” This teaches that through study one acquires ownership, as it were, of the Torah.
  And Rava says in reference to this verse: A person must always study Torah and gain a broad knowledge of it, and only then may he analyze and delve into it. As it is stated: “His delight is in the Torah of the Lord,” meaning that he studies the Torah on a basic level, and only afterward does the verse state: “And in his Torah he meditates,” i.e., he analyzes it.
  And Rava says with regard to Torah study: A person should always study [<i>ligeris</i>] and review even though he may afterward forget, and even though he does not understand what it is saying. As it is stated with regard to the study of Torah: “My soul breaks [<i>garesa</i>] for the longing that it has for Your ordinances at all times” (Psalms 119:20). It is written: “Breaks,” and it is not written: Grinds, demonstrating that the soul is satisfied with breaking apart material, on a basic level, even if it does not have the opportunity to grind and analyze it in greater depth.
  Rava raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written that the Torah calls to people: “Upon the highest places of the city” (Proverbs 9:3), and it is written far more specifically: “On a seat in the high places of the city” (Proverbs 9:14). He explains: Initially, one who studies Torah does not have a secure place to sit, and therefore he is located merely upon the highest places, but ultimately, as he advances in his learning, he is placed on a seat of honor.
  The Gemara mentions a similar contradiction. It is written with regard to the Torah: “In the top of high places” (Proverbs 8:2), and it is written in the continuation of the verse that the Torah is “by the path.” This contradiction is resolved as follows: Initially, a person studies Torah in a private location, in the top of high places, but ultimately he will spread his knowledge, by the path, in the public realm.
  Ulla raises a contradiction with regard to the following verse. It is written: “Drink waters out of your own cistern” (Proverbs 5:15), and it is written in the continuation of the verse: “And running waters out of your own well.” He explains: Initially one should “drink waters out of your own cistern,” i.e., like the cistern that draws water into one location, learning all existing knowledge; and ultimately one can produce “running waters out of your own well,” i.e., original thought and innovative insights in Torah.
  The Gemara cites other statements relating to Torah study. Rava says that Rav Seḥora says that Rav Huna says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Wealth gotten through vanity [<i>mehevel</i>] shall be diminished; but he that gathers little by little shall increase” (Proverbs 13:11)? If a person turns his Torah into many bundles [<i>ḥavilot</i>], by studying large amounts in a short period of time without reviewing, his Torah will diminish. But if he gathers his knowledge little by little, by studying slowly and reviewing, his knowledge shall increase.
  Rava said: The Sages know this, but nevertheless they transgress it, i.e., they fail to heed this advice. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: I did this, as I studied little by little and regularly reviewed what I had learned, and my learning has in fact endured.
  Rav Sheizvi said in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya: What is the meaning of that which is written: “The slothful man [<i>remiyya</i>] will not roast [<i>yaḥarokh</i>] his prey” (Proverbs 12:27)? The deceitful [<i>harammai</i>] hunter, i.e., one who tricks people into believing that he has acquired vast stores of knowledge by studying new material without reviewing that which he has already learned, will not live [<i>yiḥye</i>] a long [<i>ya’arikh</i>] life. According to this interpretation, <i>yaḥarokh</i> is a combination of the words <i>yiḥye</i> and <i>ya’arikh</i>.
  And Rav Sheshet says that the verse means the opposite: The cunning [<i>harammai</i>] hunter will roast his prey to prevent it from escaping, i.e., he reads the verse as a rhetorical question: Will not the hunter roast? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: This is comparable to a person who is hunting birds; if he breaks the wings of the first bird so that it will be unable to fly off, and he proceeds in this manner, all of his prey will remain in his possession; but if not, they will not remain in his possession, as each bird will fly off when the next is captured. In a similar fashion, a clever student reviews that which he learns, to ensure that he retains his knowledge.
  § The Gemara returns to its interpretation of the first verses of Psalms. “And he shall be like a tree planted [<i>shatul</i>] by streams of water” (Psalms 1:3). The students of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: The verse states that a Torah scholar is comparable to a tree that has been uprooted from its original location and replanted [<i>shatul</i>] somewhere else. It does not say that he is comparable to a tree that is planted [<i>natu’a</i>] and remains in one place. This is teaching that anyone who learns Torah from one teacher alone never sees a sign of blessing, as it is necessary to acquire knowledge from many teachers.
  Rav Ḥisda said to the Sages who were studying with him: I wish to say something to you, but I am afraid that then you will leave me and go. What did he wish to tell them? He wanted to say that any-one who learns Torah from one teacher alone never sees a sign of blessing. When the students heard this, they did in fact leave him and went to learn from Rava. Rav Ḥisda said to them: That matter applies only with regard to reasoning, i.e., in order to come up with sophisticated reasoning it is necessary to hear many different opinions. But with regard to the oral tradition itself, it is preferable to learn from one teacher so that
  
  Daf 19b
  
  he will not become confused by the different versions of the same statements he hears from each teacher, as he will have no clear authoritative version from one source. The Gemara continues discussing the verse cited above: “By streams [<i>palgei</i>] of water” (Psalms 1:3). Rabbi Tanḥum bar Ḥanilai says: Since the root <i>peh</i>, <i>lamed</i>, <i>gimmel</i> can also refer to dividing, the verse is interpreted as follows: A person should always divide his years into thirds, as follows: One third for Bible, one third for Mishna and one third for Talmud.
  The Gemara asks: How can one divide his life this way? Does a person know the length of his life, that he can calculate how much a third will be? The Gemara answers: When we said that a one should divide his time into thirds, the intention was with regard to his days, i.e., he should devote one third of each day to Bible, Mishna, and Talmud, respectively.
  The Gemara discusses the continuation of the verse cited above: “That brings forth its fruit in its season and whose leaf does not wither” (Psalms 1:3). Rava says: If one brings forth fruit in its season, i.e., if he acts in accordance with the precepts of Torah that he learns, then his leaf will not wither, as the Torah will sustain him. But if one does not learn with the intention that his studies should lead to action, then with regard to both the one who is taught and with regard to the one who teaches, the verse states about them: “Not so the wicked; but they are like the chaff that the wind drives away” (Psalms 1:4).
  Rabbi Abba says that Rav Huna says that Rav says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For she has cast down [<i>hippila</i>] many wounded and a mighty host are all her slain” (Proverbs 7:26)? This is referring to a student who has not yet reached the level where he can render legal decisions, but nevertheless he already issues decisions. He is like a fetus that emerged from the womb before its time, as the word <i>hippila</i> also means to miscarry. “And a mighty host are all her slain”; this is referring to a student who has reached the level where he can render legal decisions, referred to here as “a mighty host,” but he does not issue decisions, and by refraining from teaching what he knows prevents the masses from learning Torah properly.
  And until when is a scholar considered too immature to render legal decisions? He is considered immature until the age of forty years. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava issue legal decisions before that age? The Gemara answers: There it is permitted, as in Rava’s case they are equal, i.e., if one has achieved a level of knowledge that is equivalent to that of the foremost scholar in his city, he is permitted to render decisions even before reaching the age of forty.
  The Gemara cites another discussion with regard to the aforementioned verse: “And whose leaf does not wither” (Psalms 1:3). Rav Aḥa bar Adda says that Rav says, and some say that it was Rav Aḥa bar Abba who says that Rav Hamnuna says that Rav says: One should know that even the ordinary conversation of Torah scholars require analysis, as it is stated: “And whose leaf does not wither.” This teaches that even the ordinary conversation of a Torah scholar, which is comparable to the leaves of a tree, has great significance like the actual fruit of the tree.
  The verse continues: “And in whatsoever he does he shall prosper.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: This matter is written in the Torah, and repeated in the Prophets, and stated a third time in the Writings: Concerning anyone who engages in Torah study, his property dealings will be successful. It is written in the Torah, as it is written: “Observe therefore the words of this covenant, and do them, that you may make all that you do to prosper” (Deuteronomy 29:8).
  It is repeated in the Prophets, as it is written: “This book of the Torah shall not depart out of your mouth, but you shall meditate on it day and night, that you may observe to do according to all that is written in it; for then you shall make your ways prosperous, and then you shall have good success” (Joshua 1:8). It is stated a third time in the Writings, as it is written: “But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord; and in His Torah he meditates day and night. And he shall be like a tree planted by streams of water, that brings forth its fruit in its season, and whose leaf does not wither; and in whatsoever he does he shall prosper” (Psalms 1:2–3).
  The Gemara relates that Rabbi Alexandri would proclaim in public, in the manner of a merchant selling wares: Who desires life? Who desires life? Everyone gathered around him to buy from him, saying to him: Give us life! He stated the following verse to them: “Who is the man that desires life, and loves days, that he may see good in them? Keep your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking guile” (Psalms 34:13–14).
  The psalm continues: “Depart from evil, and do good; seek peace and pursue it” (Psalms 34:15). The Gemara explains: Lest one say: I have kept my tongue from evil and my lips from speaking guile, I will therefore go and indulge in sleep. To counter this possibility, the verse states: “Depart from evil, and do good,” i.e., it is not enough to avoid evil, but one must actively do good. And the word good means nothing other than Torah, as it is stated: “For I have given you a good portion; My Torah, do not abandon it” (Proverbs 4:2).
  § The mishna teaches: One may build with gentiles small platforms and bathhouses, but once he reaches the arched chamber in the bath where the gentiles put up objects of idol worship, it is prohibited for a Jew to continue building it. Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If he did continue to build the arched chamber, his wages are permitted. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? After all, such arched chambers are only accessories of idol worship, and with regard to accessories of idol worship, both according to Rabbi Yishmael and according to Rabbi Akiva, who disagree with regard to deriving benefit from an actual object of idol worship (51b), deriving benefit from accessories of idol worship is not prohibited until they are worshipped.
  Rabbi Yirmeya says: Rabbi Elazar’s statement is necessary only to permit the wages of a Jew who built an object of idol worship itself. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that an object of idol worship of a Jew is forbidden immediately once it is built, but it is not prohibited to derive benefit from an object of idol worship of a gentile until it is actually worshipped. In this case the idol was built for a gentile, and therefore the laborer may receive payment for his work, as the idol was never worshipped. But according to the one who says that an object of idol worship of a gentile is also forbidden immediately, what can be said?
  Rather, Rabba bar Ulla says: Rabbi Elazar’s statement that the worker’s wages are permitted is necessary only with regard to the final stroke with which the laborer completes his work. In the case of an object of idol worship, what causes it to be used for idol worship? It is the completion of labor, and when is the completion of labor achieved? It is achieved with the final stroke of the laborer. The final stroke alone does not have the value of one <i>peruta</i>, and therefore the wages he receives are due when each act of labor is performed during the entire process, not when the final stroke completes the work.
  Evidently, Rabbi Elazar holds that the obligation to pay a wage is incurred continuously from the beginning of the period he was hired to its end, not merely upon completion of the work. Since the worker has rights to his wages at every stage of labor performed during the entire period of work, the wages are not considered a benefit that he receives from idol worship, as the object is classified as an object of idol worship only at the very end.
  MISHNA: And one may not fashion jewelry for an object of idol worship, and this applies to jewelry such as necklaces [<i>katla’ot</i>], nose rings, and rings. Rabbi Eliezer says: If one fashions them in exchange for payment, it is permitted. The mishna returns to the issue of selling items to gentiles: One may not sell to a gentile any item that is attached to the ground, but one may sell such an item once it is severed from the ground. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not necessary to sever the item from the ground; rather, one may sell it on the condition that it be severed.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that it is prohibited to sell to a gentile anything that is attached to the ground, derived? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says:
  
  Daf 20a
  
  The source is that the verse states: “You should not show them mercy [<i>lo teḥonnem</i>]” (Deuteronomy 7:2), which is understood as meaning: You should not give them a chance to encamp [<i>ḥanayah</i>] in, i.e., to acquire land in, Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: This phrase: “You should not show them mercy”; isn’t it necessary to teach that this is what the Merciful one is saying: You should not give them favor [<i>ḥen</i>] by praising them?
  The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse say: <i>Lo teḥunnem</i>, with the letter <i>vav</i>, as then it would be evident that this is a form of the root <i>ḥet</i>, <i>vav</i>, <i>nun</i>, which means favor. What is the reason that the verse instead states: <i>Lo teḥonnem</i>, without the letter <i>vav</i>? Conclude two conclusions from it, that one may not praise them and also that one may not allow them to acquire land.
  The Gemara asks: But still, isn’t the phrase “You should not show them mercy” necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> that this is what the Merciful One states: You should not give them an undeserved [<i>ḥinnam</i>] gift? The Gemara answers: If that were so, let the verse say: <i>Lo teḥinnem</i>. What is the reason that it is spelled without the letter <i>yud</i>, as: <i>Lo teḥonnem</i>? Learn from it all of these three <i>halakhot</i>.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “You should not show them mercy”; this teaches that you should not give them a chance to encamp in the land of Eretz Yisrael. Another matter: “You should not show them mercy”; this indicates that you should not give them favor. Another matter: “You should not show them mercy”; this teaches that you should not give them an undeserved gift.
  The Gemara notes: And this issue of an undeserved gift to a gentile is itself a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal carcass; you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:21). I have derived only that it is permitted to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile through selling. From where do I derive that it is permitted to transfer an unslaughtered animal to a resident alien through selling? The verse states: “You may give it…or you may sell it,” meaning that one has the option to do either of these.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving and one is not required to sell it to him? The verse states: “You may give it…that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Therefore, you may say that he may transfer it to both a resident alien and a gentile, both through giving and through selling. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are to be understood as they are written; one may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through giving, and to a gentile only through selling, as it is prohibited to give an undeserved gift to a gentile.
  The Gemara comments: Rabbi Meir is saying well, as the verse indicates that either method is acceptable. The Gemara explains: And Rabbi Yehuda could have said to you: If it enters your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir says, then let the Merciful One write: You may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates that he may eat it, and also you may sell it to a foreigner. Why do I need the word “or” between these two options? Learn from it that it comes to teach that the matters are to be understood as they are written.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir explain the wording of the verse? The Gemara answers: That word, “or,” teaches that one should give precedence to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that since you are commanded to sustain a resident alien, as it is stated: “And he shall live with you” (Leviticus 25:35), and you are not commanded to sustain a gentile, there is no need for a verse to teach that one should give precedence to a resident alien.
  § It is taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier: Another matter: “You should not show them favor”; this teaches that you should not give them favor by praising them. The Gemara notes that this supports the opinion of Rav. As Rav says: It is prohibited for a person to say: How beautiful is this gentile woman!
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who was on a step on the Temple mount, and he saw a certain gentile woman who was exceptionally beautiful and said: “How great are Your works, O Lord!” (Psalms 104:24). And Rabbi Akiva too, when he saw the wife of the wicked Turnus Rufus he spat, laughed, and cried. He spat, as she was created from a putrid drop; he laughed, as he foresaw that she was destined to convert and he would marry her; he cried, as this beauty would ultimately be consumed by dirt.
  And how would Rav explain the incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who praised the beauty of a gentile? The Gemara answers: Rabban Gamliel was giving thanks to God for creating such beautiful people rather than praising the gentile herself. As the Master said: One who sees beautiful or otherwise outstanding creatures recites: Blessed be He, Who has created such in His world.
  But is it permitted to gaze upon a woman? The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>. The verse states: “And you shall keep yourself from every evil thing” (Deuteronomy 23:10); this teaches that a person should not gaze upon a beautiful woman, even if she is unmarried; and a person should not gaze upon a married woman, even if she is ugly;
  
  Daf 20b
  
  and a person should not gaze upon the colored garments of a woman; and a person should not gaze at a male donkey, at a female donkey, at a pig, at a sow, or at fowl, when they are mating; and even if one were full of eyes like the Angel of Death and saw from every direction, it is not permitted to look.
  They said about the Angel of Death that he is entirely full of eyes. When a sick person is about to die, the Angel of Death stands above his head, with his sword drawn in his hand, and a drop of poison hanging on the edge of the sword. Once the sick person sees him, he trembles and thereby opens his mouth; and the Angel of Death throws the drop of poison into his mouth. From this drop of poison the sick person dies, from it he putrefies, from it his face becomes green.
  The Gemara answers: Rabban Gamliel did not intentionally look at the woman; rather, he was walking around a corner and he saw her unexpectedly as they each turned.
  With regard to the statement in the <i>baraita</i>: Nor may one gaze at the colored garments of a woman, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This is the <i>halakha</i> even if they are spread on a wall, not only when they are being worn. Rav Pappa says: And the prohibition applies only when one knows their owner. Rava said: The language of the <i>baraita</i> is also precise, as it teaches: Nor may one gaze at the colored garments of a woman, and it does not teach: Nor may one gaze at colored garments. Learn from it that the prohibition applies only to the garments of one he knows.
  Rav Ḥisda said: That statement applies only in the case of old garments, i.e., garments that have been worn; but in the case of new garments, we have no problem with it. The reason is that if you do not say so, how can we give a woman’s garment before it is worn to a launderer, i.e., one who prepares new garments for use, knowing that the launderer must look at the garments?
  The Gemara refutes this proof: But according to your reasoning, i.e., your assumption that a launderer is no different from all other men, there is a similar difficulty with that which Rav Yehuda says: If one wishes to mate an animal of one species with an animal of its own species, it is permitted to insert the male organ into the female like a brush into a tube. One could ask here as well: But isn’t he looking at the animals as they mate? Rather, he is occupied with his work, and therefore his mind will not entertain sinful thoughts. So too with regard to a launderer, he is occupied with his work, and therefore a launderer differs from other men.
  § The Master said above in the <i>baraita</i>: From this drop of poison on the Angel of Death’s sword, the sick person dies. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this opinion disagrees with a statement of Shmuel’s father? As Shmuel’s father says: The Angel of Death said to me: Were I not concerned for human dignity, I would uncover the place of the incision of the slaughter, as one does to an animal that is slaughtered. This indicates that the Angel of Death kills by slaughtering his victims with his sword, not by poisoning them. The Gemara answers: Perhaps that drop of poison cuts the two organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., the trachea and the esophagus, and thereby slaughters people.
  The Gemara notes that the continuation of the <i>baraita</i>, which states that from this drop of poison a corpse putrefies, supports the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana. As Rabbi Ḥanina bar Kahana says that they say in the school of Rav: One who wishes that his dead relative will not putrefy should turn it on its face immediately, as the drop of poison enters through the mouth, and this causes the putrefaction of the corpse.
  § The Gemara cites another source that interprets the verse cited above. The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> explaining the verse: “And you shall keep yourself from every evil thing” (Deuteronomy 23:10), which is immediately followed by the verse: “If there be among you any man who is not ritually pure by reason of that which happened to him by night” (Deuteronomy 23:11). This teaches that a person should not think impure thoughts by day and thereby come to the impurity of an emission by night.
  From here Rabbi Pineḥas ben Ya’ir would say: Torah study leads to care in the performance of mitzvot. Care in the performance of mitzvot leads to diligence in their observance. Diligence leads to cleanliness of the soul. Cleanliness of the soul leads to abstention from all evil. Abstention from evil leads to purity and the elimination of all base desires. Purity leads to piety. Piety leads to humility. Humility leads to fear of sin. Fear of sin leads to holiness. Holiness leads to the Divine Spirit. The Divine Spirit leads to the resurrection of the dead. And piety is greater than all of them, as it is stated: “Then You did speak in a vision to Your pious ones” (Psalms 89:20).
  And this statement disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Humility is greater than all of them, as it is stated: “The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord has anointed me to bring good tidings to the humble” (Isaiah 61:1). Since the pious is not stated, but rather “the humble,” you learn that humility is greater than all of them.
  § The mishna teaches that one may not sell to a gentile any item that is attached to the ground. The Sages taught: One may sell to them a tree on the condition that he cut it down, and the buyer cuts it down; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to them only a tree that has actually been cut down. Similarly, one may sell to them fodder, i.e., produce that has grown stalks but is not yet ripe, on the condition to cut it down, and he cuts it down; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to them only fodder that has been cut down. So too, one may sell to them standing grain on the condition to harvest it, and he harvests it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to them only harvested grain.
  The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state the <i>halakha</i> in each of these different scenarios. As, had the <i>baraita</i> taught us the dispute only with regard to a tree, I might have said that it is only in that case that Rabbi Meir says it must be cut down before being sold. The reason is that since the gentile does not lose out by keeping the tree in the soil, he might keep it in the ground. But in this case of standing grain, since if he keeps it in the ground he will lose out, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that it may be sold before being harvested, on the condition that the gentile will harvest it, because the gentile would not leave the grain in the soil to spoil.
  And had the <i>baraita</i> taught us only these two <i>halakhot</i>, one might have said that Rabbi Yehuda permits selling these items on the condition that they be cut down because the improvement to the tree or grain is not recognizable when it is left in the ground. But in the case of fodder, whose improvement is recognizable, as it would continue to grow and ripen if left in the ground, one might say that Rabbi Yehuda concedes to Rabbi Meir that we are concerned that the gentile will not cut down the fodder, and therefore one may sell it only once it has been cut down.
  And furthermore, had the <i>baraita</i> taught us only the dispute in this case of fodder, one might have said that it is merely in this case that Rabbi Meir says it must be cut down before being sold, but with regard to those cases of a tree or standing grain, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Yehuda that one may sell these items before they are harvested on the condition that the gentile will harvest them, as there is no recognizable improvement to them if they are left in the ground. Consequently, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated in all three cases.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the sale of large livestock, which is forbidden due to the concern that the gentile might use them to perform labor (see 14b), if such livestock are sold on the condition that the gentile will slaughter them, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara explains the aspects of the dilemma: There, in the mishna, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a tree on the condition that the gentile will cut it down? Is the reason that the trees are not in the gentile’s domain and therefore he is not able to keep them, as the Jew will force him to cut them down? But in the case of large livestock, since the animal stands in the domain of the gentile once it is sold, there is a concern that he might keep it and not slaughter it. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases, and Rabbi Yehuda would permit one to sell even large livestock to a gentile, on the condition that he will slaughter the animals.
  The Gemara suggests a resolution: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may sell large livestock to a gentile on the condition that he slaughter it, and he slaughters it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One may sell to a gentile only a slaughtered animal.
  MISHNA: One may not rent a house to a gentile in Eretz Yisrael, and needless to say one may not rent fields to them, as explained in the Gemara. And in Syria
  
  Daf 21a
  
  one may rent houses to gentiles, but one may not rent fields. And outside of Eretz Yisrael one may sell houses and rent fields to gentiles; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: In Eretz Yisrael one may rent houses to gentiles but one may not rent fields. And in Syria one may sell houses to them and rent fields, and outside of Eretz Yisrael one may sell both these, houses, and those, fields.
  Even in a place with regard to which the Sages said that it is permitted for a Jew to rent a house to a gentile, they did not say that one may rent it for use as a residence, because the gentile will bring objects of idol worship into it, as it is stated: “You shall not bring an abomination into your house” (Deuteronomy 7:26), and this is still considered the house of a Jew. And for the same reason, in every place, one may not rent a bathhouse to a gentile, since it is called by the name of the owner, and onlookers will think that the Jew is operating it on Shabbat.
  GEMARA: What is the meaning of the mishna’s statement: Needless to say one may not allow gentiles to rent fields? Why is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to fields more obvious than the <i>halakha</i> of houses? If we say that it is because allowing a gentile to rent a field entails two problems, one of which is aiding gentiles in encamping in the land, and the other one is that doing so releases the land from the mitzva of separating tithe, this cannot be correct.
  The Gemara explains why that cannot be the reason: If that is so, the same can be said about the prohibition against renting houses, as it also involves two problems: One is aiding gentiles in encamping in the land, and the other one is that it releases the house from the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>. Rav Mesharshiyya says in response: Affixing a <i>mezuza</i> is the obligation of the resident, rather than an obligation that applies to the house. Therefore, if no Jew lives in a house, it is not subject to the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>. This means that by renting a house to a gentile one is not removing the right to perform the mitzva from the house.
  The mishna teaches: In Syria one may rent houses but not fields to gentiles. The Gemara asks: What is different about selling houses that it is not permitted to sell houses in Syria? The Gemara answers that it is prohibited due to a concern that this will ultimately result in the selling of houses in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara challenges: If that is so, let us also issue a decree prohibiting renting houses to gentiles in Syria, lest it lead to renting to gentiles in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara explains: The prohibition against renting houses to gentiles in Eretz Yisrael is itself a rabbinic decree lest one come to sell the houses, and shall we arise and issue one decree to prevent the violation of another decree?
  The Gemara challenges: But the prohibition against renting a field that is in Syria is also a decree whose purpose is to prevent the violation of another decree, as the prohibition against allowing a gentile to rent one’s field in Eretz Yisrael is a rabbinic decree, and yet we still issue the decree. The Gemara explains: According to Rabbi Meir, there, with regard to selling houses and fields in Syria to gentiles, the prohibition is not merely a decree intended to prevent the violation of the decree with regard to Eretz Yisrael. Rather, Rabbi Meir holds that the conquest of an individual is called a conquest. Once Syria was conquered by King David, who is considered an individual in this regard, the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael applied to it.
  Therefore, concerning a field, which has two problems, as one releases the land from the mitzva of separating tithes and aids gentiles in acquiring land in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages issued a decree as a preventative measure, prohibiting the renting of fields just as in Eretz Yisrael. But concerning houses, which do not have two problems, the Sages did not issue such a decree.
  The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Meir, outside of Eretz Yisrael one may sell houses and rent fields, but one may not sell fields to gentiles. The Gemara explains: Concerning a field, which has two problems when it is in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages issued a decree preventing its sale even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Concerning houses, which do not have two problems, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting their sale.
  The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: In Eretz Yisrael one may rent houses but not fields to gentiles. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that one may rent houses but not fields? Concerning fields, which have two problems, the Sages issued a decree as a preventive measure prohibiting the renting of fields in Eretz Yisrael. But concerning houses, which do not have two problems, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting renting houses to gentiles.
  The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei rules: And in Syria one may sell houses and rent fields to gentiles, but one may not sell fields. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that one may sell houses but not fields? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yosei holds that the conquest of an individual is not called a conquest, and therefore there is no prohibition by Torah law against selling houses in Syria. And concerning a field, which has two problems, the Sages issued a decree as a preventive measure prohibiting the sale of fields in Syria. Concerning houses, which do not have two problems, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting their sale.
  The mishna continues: And outside of Eretz Yisrael one may sell houses and fields. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers: Since this land is at a distance from Eretz Yisrael, the Sages do not issue a decree, unlike Syria, which is near Eretz Yisrael.
  In conclusion, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that it is permitted to sell houses outside of Eretz Yisrael to gentiles. Rav Yosef says: And this is the <i>halakha</i> provided that one does not make it into a gentile settlement. And how many people constitute a settlement? The Sage taught: There is no settlement that consists of fewer than three people.
  The Gemara challenges: But let us be concerned that perhaps this Jew will go and sell to one gentile, and the other owners of the adjacent houses will go and sell to two other gentiles, resulting in a gentile settlement. Abaye said: We are commanded about placing a stumbling block before the blind (see Leviticus 19:14), but we are not commanded about placing a stumbling block before someone who may place it before the blind. In other words, this prohibition applies only when one causes another to sin by his direct action, not in a situation such as this, where the prohibition is two stages removed from the Jew’s action.
  § The mishna teaches that even in a place with regard to which the Sages said that it is permitted for a Jew to rent a house to a gentile, they did not say that one may rent it for use as a residence. The Gemara points out: By inference, this means that there is a place where one may not rent any house to a gentile.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  And this unattributed opinion in the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. As, if you say that this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that cannot be, since he holds that in every place one may rent a house to a gentile, including Eretz Yisrael.
  § The mishna teaches: And in every place, one may not rent a bathhouse to a gentile, as it is called by the name of the owner. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A person may not rent his bathhouse to a gentile, because it is called by the name of the owner, and this gentile uses it for performing prohibited labor on <i>Shabbatot</i> and on Festivals.
  The Gemara asks: It is prohibited to rent one’s bathhouse to a gentile, but with regard to a Samaritan, what is the <i>halakha</i>? It can be inferred from the lack of mention of a Samaritan that it is permitted. The Gemara asks: Why not say that a Samaritan will perform work in the bathhouse during the intermediate days of a Festival? The Gemara answers: During the intermediate days of a Festival we too perform work and heat bathhouses.
  The Gemara further infers: It is prohibited to rent one’s bathhouse to a gentile; but with regard to renting one’s field to a gentile, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Evidently, it is permitted. What is the reason for this? People know that a gentile sharecropper works for his tenancy, not for the Jewish owner. The Gemara asks: But if so, in the case of a bathhouse as well, why not say that the gentile sharecropper works for his tenancy, and therefore a Jew should be permitted to rent them to gentiles. The Gemara answers: People do not usually make this type of arrangement whereby a second party works as a sharecropper of a bathhouse. Consequently, it will be assumed that the gentile is a hired worker who is working for the Jew.
  The Gemara cites a similar discussion. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: A person may not rent his field to a Samaritan, since it is called by the name of the owner and this Samaritan will perform work in it during the intermediate days of a Festival. The Gemara infers: It is prohibited to rent one’s field to a Samaritan, but with regard to a gentile, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Evidently, it is permitted, as we say that the gentile sharecropper works for his tenancy and not for the Jewish owner. The Gemara asks: If that is so, in the case of a Samaritan as well, why not say that the sharecropper works for his tenancy?
  
  Daf 22a
  
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar does not accept the principle that a sharecropper works for his tenancy, rather than as the Jew’s employee. The Gemara asks: But if so, with regard to a gentile, what is the reason that it is permitted to rent to him? The Gemara answers that we say to him that he may not perform labor on certain days, and he complies. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then in the case of a Samaritan as well, we can say to him that he may not perform labor on certain days, and he will comply. The Gemara answers: A Samaritan will not comply, as he says: I am more learned than you, and I know that it is permitted to work on these days.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, why does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar state specifically that the reason for the prohibition is because the field is called by the name of the owner? Let him derive this <i>halakha</i> due to the fact that the Samaritan, like a Jew, is commanded to refrain from labor during the intermediate days of the Festival, and since he will work on these days, renting him a field is included in the prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar states one reason and adds another: One reason is that of the prohibition: You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind; and, furthermore, it is prohibited because the field is called by the name of the owner.
  § The Gemara relates that there were certain saffron growers who jointly owned a field in an arrangement according to which a gentile took possession of the field and worked in it on Shabbat, and a Jew took possession of it on Sunday. They came before Rava, to find out if they could divide their profits equally, and Rava permitted them to do so.
  Ravina raised an objection to the ruling of Rava from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a Jew and a gentile who received tenancy of a field in partnership, with the understanding that they were to work the field and receive part of its produce in exchange, the Jew may not say to the gentile: Take your portion of the profit for your work on Shabbat, and I will take my portion for my work on one of the days of the rest of the week. The reason one may not do so is that it turns out that when the gentile worked on Shabbat, he was laboring partly on behalf of his Jewish partner. But if they initially stipulated when they entered into their partnership that the gentile would receive a share of the profit in exchange for his work on Shabbat, and the Jew would receive a share for the work that he performs during one of the days of the week, it is permitted.
  And if they did not make this stipulation and later came to calculate the number of weekdays for which the Jew should receive the profit, corresponding to the number of <i>Shabbatot</i> that the gentile worked, it is prohibited, as this would mean that when the gentile worked on Shabbat, he was working on behalf of the Jew. Rava was embarrassed that he had ruled incorrectly. Ultimately, the matter was revealed that the saffron growers had stipulated from the outset that this was the arrangement, and therefore even according to the <i>baraita</i> Rava had ruled correctly.
  Rav Geviha from Bei Ketil said that the incident was actually as follows: The Jew and the gentile formed a partnership with regard to those <i>orla</i> saplings, to tend to them and sell them. The gentile would work and profit from them during the <i>orla</i> years, the first three years after the tree is planted when it is prohibited for a Jew to eat its fruit, and the Jew would work and profit from them during the years where the fruit is permitted. They came before Rava, who permitted them to do so.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t Ravina object to the ruling issued by Rava? The Gemara answers: No, Ravina’s intention was to provide a support for the ruling of Rava. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rava embarrassed by Ravina’s statement? The Gemara answers: That never happened.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the partners did not specify that the gentile would work on Shabbat and the Jew during the week, but they also did not calculate their profits so that they would split the earnings equally, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara attempts to provide an answer from the <i>baraita</i>: Come and hear: If they initially stipulated that the gentile would receive a share of the profit in exchange for his work on Shabbat, while the Jew would receive a share for the work on one of the other days of the week, it is permitted. This indicates that without specification, it is prohibited.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Say the last clause: If they came to calculate their profits, it is prohibited; this indicates that without specification, doing so is permitted. The Gemara concludes: Rather, no inference is to be learned from this <i>baraita</i>, as the inferences contradict each other.
  
  MISHNA: One may not keep an animal in the inns [<i>befundekaot</i>] of gentiles because they are suspected of bestiality. Since even gentiles are prohibited from engaging in bestiality, a Jew who places his animal there is guilty of violating the prohibition: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). And a woman may not seclude herself with gentiles because they are suspected of engaging in forbidden sexual relations. And any person may not seclude himself with gentiles because they are suspected of bloodshed.
  
  Daf 22b
  
  GEMARA: With regard to the assumption that gentiles are suspected of bestiality, the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 2:1): One may purchase an animal from gentiles for use as an offering, and there is no concern that it might be unfit due to it being an animal that copulated with a person, or due to is being an animal that was the object of bestiality, or due to it having been set aside for idol worship, or due to the animal itself having been worshipped.
  The Gemara analyzes this ruling: Granted, there is no concern that the animal was set aside for idolatry or was itself worshipped. The reason is that if it is so that it was set aside, or if it is so that it was worshipped, then the gentile would not have sold it to the Jew in the first place. But with regard to the possibility that it is an animal that copulated with a person or an animal that was the object of bestiality, let one raise a concern in line with the ruling of the mishna. The Gemara explains: Rav Taḥlifa says that Rav Sheila bar Avina says in the name of Rav: A gentile protects and thereby spares his own animal so that it will not become barren. Since an act of bestiality may cause an animal to become barren, there is no concern that the gentile engaged in immoral behavior with it. Therefore, one may use an animal purchased from a gentile as an offering.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well with regard to female animals, as they can become barren, but with regard to males, what is there to say? Rav Kahana says: Gentiles also refrain from engaging in bestiality with their male livestock, since doing so deteriorates the animals’ flesh, i.e., it makes them physically weaker.
  Rather, the Gemara instead raises a contradiction from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may purchase an animal for use as an offering from their shepherd, i.e., a gentile shepherd. The Gemara explains the apparent contradiction: In light of the ruling of the mishna, let us be concerned that perhaps he engaged in bestiality with the animal, as it does not belong to him, and therefore it should be prohibited to purchase an animal from gentile shepherds. The Gemara answers: Their shepherd is fearful of engaging in bestiality with the animals under his care, due to the forfeit of his wages that would result if this were discovered.
  Rather, the Gemara instead raises a contradiction from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not deliver an animal to their shepherd, i.e., a gentile shepherd. The Gemara explains the contradiction: Why may one not do so? Let us say that their shepherd is fearful due to the forfeit of his wages, and accordingly one should be permitted to give him an animal.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to themselves, i.e., other gentiles, as they are aware of each other’s actions, they are fearful that they may be caught, and therefore will not engage in bestiality with an animal belonging to another gentile. But with regard to ourselves, Jews, as we are not aware of them and their behavior, they are not fearful of us. The Gemara notes that Rabba said: This is in accordance with the adage that people say: Just as the stylus etches script upon marble, a sinner knows his fellow sinner, i.e., a transgressor is acutely aware of others who act in the same manner.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, and the reason one may purchase an animal for use as an offering from a gentile is that engaging in bestiality has a negative impact on the animal, then let us not purchase male animals from female gentiles, as we should be concerned that perhaps she engaged in bestiality with it. This would not damage the animal or render it barren, and therefore there is no deterrent that would prevent a gentile woman from doing so. The Gemara answers: Since, if she were to engage in bestiality, the animal would follow her around in public, she is afraid of others discovering her behavior.
  The Gemara further asks: But consider that which Rav Yosef teaches: A widow may not raise a dog due to the suspicion that she may engage in bestiality, and she may not allow a student of Torah to dwell as a lodger [<i>be’ushpiza</i>] in her home. Granted, it makes sense that is prohibited for her to have a student of Torah lodging in her home, as he is regarded as discreet in her eyes, so she will not be deterred from sinning with him. But with regard to a dog, since it would follow her around after she mates with it, she is afraid to engage in bestiality with it. Therefore, it should be permitted for her to raise a dog.
  The Gemara answers: Since it will also follow her around in a case when she throws it a piece of meat, people will say: The fact that it is following her is due to the meat she threw at it, and they will not suspect her of bestiality. Consequently, she will not be deterred from transgressing.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to female animals with females, what is the reason that we do not permit them to be secluded with each other? Mar Ukva bar Ḥama says: It is because gentiles frequent the wives of others, and on occasion the gentile does not find her, and he finds the animal and engages in bestiality with it instead.
  And if you wish, say instead: Even when he finds the wife, he also engages in bestiality with the animal, as the Master said: The animal of a Jew is more appealing to gentiles than their own wives, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: At the time when the snake came upon Eve, at the time of the sin of her eating from the Tree of Knowledge, it infected her with moral contamination, and this contamination lingers in all human beings. The Gemara asks: If that is so, a Jew should also be suspected of engaging in bestiality. The Gemara answers: With regard to the Jewish people, who stood at Mount Sinai and received the Torah, their contamination ended, whereas in the case of gentiles, who did not stand at Mount Sinai and receive the Torah, their contamination has not ended.
  § The Gemara inquires with regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a bird. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to birds, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Are gentiles suspected of engaging in bestiality with birds? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that they are suspected of doing so, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina: I once saw a gentile who bought a goose in the market, engaged in bestiality with it, strangled it, roasted it, and then ate it. And similarly, Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti says: I saw a certain Arab who bought a thigh of meat from the market and carved a space in it that was the size necessary to allow for penetration. Subsequently, he penetrated it, roasted it, and ate it. These incidents demonstrate that gentiles are suspected of immoral conduct with fowl.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  § The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the mishna, which rules that gentiles are suspected of bestiality, and the <i>baraita</i>, which permits an animal purchased from gentiles to be sacrificed as an offering. Ravina said that it is not difficult; this mishna issues its ruling with regard to the <i>halakha ab initio</i>, while that <i>baraita</i> is referring to the <i>halakha</i> after the fact.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that there is a difference in this case between <i>ab initio</i> and after the fact? As we learned in the mishna: A woman may not seclude herself with them because they are suspected of engaging in forbidden sexual intercourse. And one can raise a contradiction from another mishna (<i>Ketubot</i> 26b): With regard to a woman who was imprisoned by gentiles, if she was imprisoned due to monetary matters she is permitted to her husband even if he is a priest, as there is no concern that she was raped. If she was imprisoned due to a capital offense she is forbidden to her husband if he is a priest, as the captors would not restrain themselves from raping her. The first clause of the mishna in <i>Ketubot</i> rules that a woman who was imprisoned in seclusion with gentiles is not assumed to have engaged in intercourse with them. This apparently contradicts the statement of the mishna here, which rules that a woman may not seclude herself with gentiles.
  The Gemara continues: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from here that there is a difference for us between <i>ab initio</i>, as in the mishna here, and after the fact, as in the mishna in <i>Ketubot</i>? The Gemara rejects this conclusion: From where can this be proven? Perhaps I could actually say to you: Generally, even after the fact, one may not assume that a woman who was secluded with a gentile did not engage in intercourse with him, and here, in the mishna in <i>Ketubot</i>, this is the reason that she is permitted to her husband even after having been imprisoned: Since her husband might not agree to pay if his wife was raped, the gentile is fearful of raping her due to the potential loss of his money.
  The Gemara adds: Know that this is the explanation, as the latter clause of that mishna teaches: If she was imprisoned due to a capital offense she is forbidden to her husband. Clearly, the difference is that in this case there is no incentive for the gentiles to leave her unharmed. The Gemara concludes: And nothing more needs discussion, as this is certainly the correct interpretation of that mishna.
  Rabbi Pedat said: The contradiction between the mishna, which rules that gentiles are suspected of bestiality, and the <i>baraita</i>, which permits an animal purchased from gentiles to be sacrificed as an offering, is not difficult; this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, while that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 2:1) with regard to the red heifer of purification: Rabbi Eliezer says that it may not be purchased from gentiles, and the Rabbis permit it to be purchased from gentiles. Rabbi Pedat explains: What, is it not correct to say that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this issue, that Rabbi Eliezer holds that we are concerned that a person might have engaged in bestiality with the animal, and the Rabbis hold that we are not concerned that a person engaged in bestiality with the animal?
  The Gemara rejects this conclusion: From where do you know that this is the case? Perhaps everyone agrees that we are not concerned that a person might have engaged in bestiality with the animal, and here, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer: He holds in accordance with a statement that Rabbi Yehuda says that Rav says. As Rabbi Yehuda says that Rav says: If one placed a bundle of sacks upon a red heifer, he has rendered it unfit for purification, as a red heifer is fit only if it has not borne any burden, in accordance with the verse: “Upon which never came a yoke” (Numbers 19:2); and in the case of the heifer whose neck is broken, it is not rendered unfit until you pull a load with it, as the verse states: “And which has not drawn in the yoke” (Deuteronomy 21:3).
  The Gemara elaborates: One Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds: A red heifer purchased from a gentile cannot be used for purification because we are concerned that it might have been used for labor, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds: We are not concerned that the gentile used it for labor. Accordingly, the disagreement in that mishna does not relate to a concern with regard to bestiality. The Gemara responds: No; it cannot enter your mind that Rabbi Eliezer prohibits purchasing a red heifer from a gentile due to the concern that he might have placed sacks upon it, as due to the slight convenience of placing a bundle of sacks upon the heifer, the gentile will not forfeit the potential to earn a great deal of money which he can obtain by selling the heifer.
  The Gemara counters: So too, let us say: Due to the slight pleasure of engaging in bestiality with an animal, a gentile will not forfeit a great deal of money which he can otherwise obtain by selling the heifer. The Gemara responds: There, with regard to bestiality, his inclination overcomes him, and he is apt to engage in bestiality with the heifer despite the fact that he knows it is to his disadvantage to do so.
  The Gemara suggests: And perhaps everyone agrees that we are not concerned that a person might have engaged in bestiality with the animal, and here, this is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer, in accordance with that which Sheila taught, as Sheila taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer? The verse states: “Speak unto the children of Israel that they take to you a red heifer” (Numbers 19:2). This teaches that the children of Israel take the red heifer, but gentiles do not take the red heifer.
  The Gemara answers: It should not enter your mind to say so, as the latter clause of that same <i>baraita</i> teaches: And similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would disqualify an animal purchased from a gentile in the case of all offerings. The Gemara elaborates: And if it should enter your mind that Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is in accordance with that which Sheila taught, granted, in the case of the red heifer a term of taking is written, but is a term of taking written with regard to all other offerings? Since a term of taking does not appear in the context of other offerings, this cannot be Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning. The Gemara suggests: And perhaps the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer
  
  Daf 23b
  
  only with regard to the red heifer, as its price is exorbitant, and the Rabbis maintain that the gentile would not risk forfeiting the profit for a temporary benefit. But with regard to the rest of the offerings, which are not exceptionally valuable, they concede to Rabbi Eliezer that animals purchased from gentiles may not be used for these offerings.
  The Gemara rejects this possibility: But what about that which is taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>, cited earlier: One may purchase an animal from gentiles for use as an offering; in accordance with whose opinion was this taught? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer nor that of the Rabbis.
  And furthermore, it is explicitly taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What did Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues respond to him with regard to his ruling that an animal purchased from gentiles may not be used as an offering? They quoted a verse: “All flocks of Kedar shall be gathered together unto you, the rams of Nebaioth shall minister unto you; they shall come up with acceptance upon My altar” (Isaiah 60:7). Since the Rabbis learn from this verse that animals intended for use in all types of offerings may be purchased from gentiles, there is no reason to assume that they concede to Rabbi Eliezer. Consequently, Rabbi Pedat’s opinion that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, while the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, remains uncontroverted.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the <i>halakhot</i> of the red heifer. Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to a case where there is merely a concern that a person engaged in bestiality with the animal. But in a situation where the gentile certainly engaged in bestiality with it, all agree that he has disqualified it as an offering. The Gemara comments: Learn from it that the red heifer is classified as consecrated for the altar, as if it were classified as consecrated for Temple maintenance, does the fact that a person engaged in bestiality with it serve to disqualify it? Items consecrated for the maintenance of the Temple, which are not sacrificed upon the altar, are not rendered unfit by this act.
  The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Although it is classified as consecrated for Temple maintenance, the purification offering of the red heifer is different, as the Merciful One labels it with the term for a sin-offering. Accordingly, the red heifer is subject to the same <i>halakhot</i> as a sin-offering, which means it is disqualified if it is the object of bestiality.
  The Gemara counters: If that is so, then the red heifer should be disqualified if it was born by caesarean section, as this is the <i>halakha</i> concerning all other sin-offerings. The Gemara adds: And if you would say that indeed, that is so, then why is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one consecrated a red heifer despite the fact that it was born by caesarean section, it is disqualified for use as a red heifer, and Rabbi Shimon deems the heifer fit for use in purification. If, as indicated by the verse, the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin-offering apply to the red heifer, how can Rabbi Shimon deem this animal fit?
  The Gemara adds: And if you would say that Rabbi Shimon conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says (see <i>Nidda</i> 40a): A baby born by caesarean section is considered a full-fledged offspring and is no different from a baby born in a regular manner, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that Rabbi Shimon would concede with regard to sacrificial animals that an animal born by caesarian section is not consecrated? If so, even Rabbi Shimon should agree that the heifer is disqualified.
  The Gemara explains: Rather, the red heifer is different: Since a blemish disqualifies it, a matter of licentiousness and a matter of idol worship also disqualify it, as it is written: “Neither from the hand of a foreigner shall you offer the bread of your God of any of these, because their corruption is in them, there is a blemish in them” (Leviticus 22:25). This verse indicates that corruption is considered a blemish, and the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Anywhere that the term corruption is stated, it is a reference to nothing other than a matter of licentiousness and idol worship.
  The Gemara supports this claim: Corruption is a reference to a matter of licentiousness, as it is written with regard to the generation of the flood: “And God saw the earth, and, behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth” (Genesis 6:12). And corruption also is a reference to idol worship, as it is written: “Lest you deal corruptly, and make you a graven image” (Deuteronomy 4:16). And consequently, with regard to the red heifer also, since a blemish disqualifies it, a matter of licentiousness and idol worship likewise disqualify it.
  § Earlier, Sheila provided a rationale for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling that a red heifer may not be purchased from gentiles. The Gemara examines the matter itself. Sheila teaches in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer? It is as it is written: “Speak unto the children of Israel that they take to you a red heifer” (Numbers 19:2). This indicates that the children of Israel take the red heifer, but gentiles do not take the red heifer. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then when the verse states with regard to the donations for the Tabernacle: “Speak unto the children of Israel, that they take for Me an offering” (Exodus 25:2), so too one can claim that only the children of Israel take an offering for God, but gentiles do not take an offering, and that no items for the Temple service may be purchased from gentiles.
  And if you would say that indeed, that is so, this cannot be correct. But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel says: The Sages asked Rabbi Eliezer: To what extent must one exert himself to fulfill the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Go and see what a certain gentile did for his father in Ashkelon, and his name is Dama ben Netina. Once, the Sages sought to purchase precious stones from him for the ephod of the High Priest
  
  Daf 24a
  
  for six hundred thousand gold dinars’ profit, and Rav Kahana teaches that it was eight hundred thousand dinars’ profit. But the keys to the chest holding the jewels were placed under his father’s head, and he would not disturb him. It is evident from this story that the stones of the ephod may be purchased from gentiles. If so, Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning cannot be based on Numbers 19:2, as an identical phrase appears in Exodus 25:2, and yet contributions to the Tabernacle may be accepted from gentiles.
  The Gemara answers that the phrase “onyx stones” (Exodus 25:7) concluded discussion of that matter. In other words, almost all the items listed in Exodus, chapter 25, for the contributions to the Tabernacle, are joined by the conjunction “and.” Before the verse mentions the stones for the ephod, it states “onyx stones,” without the conjunction “and.” This omission serves to disconnect these stones from the earlier phrase: “That they take” (Exodus 25:2), which means that the disqualification of items purchased from gentiles for use in the Temple derived from this phrase does not apply to the items listed after that point, including the stones of the ephod. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it subsequently written: “And stones to be set,” by which the verse goes back and combines the list, so that the earlier verse applies once more? Accordingly, it should be prohibited to purchase any of the items listed in the verse from gentiles.
  The Gemara adds: And furthermore, the latter clause teaches: In a subsequent year, a red heifer was born in Dama’s herd and the Sages of Israel approached him, seeking to purchase the heifer. Dama said to them: I know concerning you that if I were to ask from you all the money in the world, you would give it to me. Now I am requesting from you only that amount of money which I lost by refraining from waking my father. This latter clause explicitly states that the Sages intended to purchase a red heifer from a gentile, which contradicts the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara answers: There, it was through the agency of Jewish merchants that they purchased the heifer. In other words, Jewish merchants purchased the heifer from Dama ben Netina, after which the Sages acquired the animal from the merchants to be used as a red heifer of purification. In this manner, the animal was purchased for the purpose of an offering from Jews.
  According to Sheila, Rabbi Eliezer’s reason for not allowing a red heifer to be purchased from gentiles is based on a derivation from a verse rather than a concern that a person may have engaged in bestiality with it. The Gemara therefore asks: And is Rabbi Eliezer not concerned about the possibility that a person has engaged in bestiality with the animal?
  The Gemara elaborates: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the Rabbis who hold that the heifer may be purchased from a gentile said to Rabbi Eliezer: There was an incident in which Jews purchased the red heifer from a gentile, and Dama was his name. And some say Remetz was his name. In response to this claim, Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Can one bring a proof from there? Certainly not, as Jews were safeguarding it from the time that it was born, to ensure that a person did not engage in bestiality with it. Contrary to the opinion of Sheila, it is evident from here that Rabbi Eliezer was concerned about this possibility. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Eliezer has two requirements: The purchase of the red heifer must be from a Jew, and he is also concerned about the possibility that a person had engaged in bestiality with the animal.
  The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Eliezer’s statement. The Master said: Jews were safeguarding the red heifer purchased from Dama ben Netina from the time that it was born. The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps gentiles engaged in bestiality with the mother while she was pregnant, as Rava says: The offspring of an animal that gored and killed a Jew is forbidden as an offering, as it is considered as if she and her offspring together gored. And similarly, the offspring of an animal that was the object of bestiality is forbidden because it is considered as if a person engaged in bestiality with both her and her offspring. The Gemara answers: Say that Rabbi Eliezer meant that Jews were safeguarding it from the time that it was conceived.
  The Gemara asks: And let us be concerned that perhaps they engaged in bestiality with the mother from the outset, i.e., before conception, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 30b): With regard to all animals that are disqualified for the altar, such as one that was the object of bestiality, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted; and it is taught with regard to this case that Rabbi Eliezer prohibits their offspring from being sacrificed on the altar. If this is the case, Rabbi Eliezer should agree that there is a concern that a person might have engaged in bestiality with the heifer’s mother at some point before its birth.
  The Gemara clarifies the difficulty: Granted, this works out well according to the opinion of Rava, as Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer applies only when a person engaged in bestiality with the animals when they were consecrated and then they conceived, as Rabbi Eliezer holds that in that case the offspring are disqualified from being sacrificed as offerings; but if someone engaged in bestiality with the animals when they were non-sacred, everyone agrees that the offspring are permitted. Accordingly, it needs to be ascertained only that no one engaged in bestiality with the mother after she was consecrated.
  But according to the opinion of Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana, who says that Rav Naḥman says: The dispute applies only when a person engaged in bestiality with the animals when they were non-sacred, but if someone engaged in bestiality with them when they were consecrated, everyone agrees that the offspring are forbidden, what is there to say? According to this opinion, Rabbi Eliezer should be concerned that a person might have engaged in bestiality with the animal prior to conception.
  The Gemara answers: Say that Jews were safeguarding it as well, i.e., the mother of the red heifer, from the time that it was conceived. The Gemara challenges: And let us be concerned that perhaps someone engaged in bestiality with the mother of the heifer’s mother. The Gemara responds: We are not concerned to such an extent.
  The Gemara discusses the revised version of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement. The Master said above: Jews were safeguarding the red heifer from the time that it was conceived. The Gemara asks: From where do we know that the mother would give birth to a red heifer, which would warrant safeguarding her? Rav Kahana says: They would pass a red cup before her while the male mounts her, an act that would cause the offspring to be red.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, and the birth of a red heifer can be induced in such a simple manner, why is its price so expensive? The Gemara answers: Since two hairs of a different color render the red heifer unfit, this method is unreliable. The Gemara asks another question: And what is different about these cows? Why did the Jews resort to purchasing the red heifer from a gentile when they could have induced its conception themselves? Rav Kahana said: Dama ben Netina owned a herd of cattle that were known to beget red heifers, and therefore they preferred to employ the aforementioned method with one of his cows.
  § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa were sitting on Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa’s porch. One of them began and said that the <i>baraita</i> teaches: And, similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would disqualify all offerings purchased from gentiles, due to the concern that a person had engaged in bestiality with the animals.
  The other one of them began and said: What did Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues respond to him? They quoted the verse: “All flocks of Kedar shall be gathered together unto you, the rams of Nebaioth shall minister unto you; they shall come up with acceptance upon My altar” (Isaiah 60:7). This verse clearly indicates that offerings will be accepted from gentiles. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: In the future all gentiles will be calculating converts, i.e., those who converted for personal gain, and as converts, they will not be suspected of engaging in bestiality.
  Rav Yosef said: What is the verse from which it is derived that they will convert? The verse states: “For then will I turn to the peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent” (Zephaniah 3:9). This verse indicates that all nations will worship God. Abaye said to him: But perhaps it is only from idol worship that they will withdraw, while they will still engage in forbidden sexual relations, including bestiality? Rav Yosef said to him: That cannot be, as it is written at the conclusion of the verse: “To serve Him with one consent,” which indicates that the gentiles will accept all of God’s mitzvot.
  The Gemara comments: Rav Pappa teaches that discussion in this manner, but Rav Zevid teaches it in this manner: Both Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: And similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would disqualify all offerings taken from gentiles. And both said: What did Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues respond to him? They quoted the verse: “All flocks of Kedar shall be gathered together unto you, the rams of Nebaioth shall minister unto you; they shall come up with acceptance upon My altar.” Rabbi Eliezer said to them: All gentiles will be calculating converts in the future.
  Rabbi Eliezer continues: And what is the verse from which it is derived that they will convert? It is from the verse: “For then will I turn to the peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve him with one consent.” Rav Yosef objects to this proof: But perhaps it is only from idol worship that they will withdraw? Abaye said to him: That cannot be, as it is written: “To serve Him with one consent.”
  § The Gemara cites a series of verses which present difficulties with regard to the claim that animals purchased from gentiles may not be used as offerings. The Gemara raises an objection from the following verse: “And Moses said: You must also give into our hand offerings and burnt-offerings that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God” (Exodus 10:25). Moses demanded that Pharaoh provide the Jews with offerings, despite the fact that he was a gentile. The Gemara explains: The <i>halakha</i> prior to the giving of the Torah was different, as at that time it was acceptable to use animals taken from gentiles as offerings.
  The Gemara raises another objection: Come and hear a proof from the verse: “And Yitro, Moses’ father-in-law, took a burnt-offering and offerings for God” (Exodus 18:12). Yitro was not a Jew, and yet he brought offerings for God. The Gemara answers: The incident with Yitro was also prior to the giving of the Torah. The Gemara observes: Granted, this works out well according to the one who says that the incident with Yitro was prior to the giving of the Torah. But according to the one who says that
  
  Daf 24b
  
  the incident involving Yitro was after the giving of the Torah, what is there to say? How could they accept offerings from him? Rather, it must be that Yitro purchased the animals from a Jew.
  The Gemara further states: Come and hear another objection from a verse: “And Saul said: They have brought them from the Amalekites; for the people spared the best of the flock and of the herd, to sacrifice unto the Lord your God” (I Samuel 15:15). The verse states explicitly that the Israelites intended to sacrifice animals previously owned by gentiles. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the phrase: “The best”? This is referring to the monetary value of the best livestock. The intention was not to sacrifice the animals themselves, but to sell them and use the proceeds of the sale to purchase other animals to sacrifice as offerings.
  The Gemara inquires: And what is different about the best animals? If the animals were sold for their value, why sell those animals in particular, rather than several inferior-quality animals? The Gemara explains that they did so in order that buyers would jump at the opportunity to buy superior-quality livestock. In other words, it is easier to sell one superior-quality animal than several inferior-quality ones.
  Come and hear another objection from a verse: “And Araunah said unto David: Let my lord the king take and offer up what seems good unto him; behold the cattle for the burnt-offering, and the threshing instruments [<i>morigim</i>] and the accoutrements of the cattle for the wood” (II Samuel 24:22). Apparently, David was willing to accept oxen as offerings from a gentile. Rav Naḥman says: Araunah was a gentile who resided in Eretz Yisrael and observed the seven Noahide mitzvot [<i>ger toshav</i>]. The seven Noahide mitzvot include the prohibition against engaging in bestiality, and therefore Araunah was not suspected of this practice.
  Tangentially, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term “<i>morigim</i>,” mentioned in this verse? Ulla said: It is a <i>turbil</i> bed. The Gemara asks: What is a <i>turbil</i> bed? It is a serrated board [<i>kurkesa</i>] used for threshing. Rav Yosef said: What is the verse from which the meaning of <i>morigim</i> is derived? It is derived from the verse: “Behold, I have made you a new threshing board [<i>morag</i>] having sharp teeth; you shall thresh the mountains, and beat them small, and shall make the hills as chaff” (Isaiah 41:15).
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. After the Philistines returned the Ark of the Covenant to the Israelites upon a cart drawn by cattle, the verse states: “And they sacrificed the cattle as a burnt-offering unto the Lord” (I Samuel 6:14). Evidently, the Jews did not hesitate to sacrifice the Philistines’ animals. The Gemara explains: There, it was a provisional edict issued in extraordinary circumstances, and their actions are not representative of the general <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara adds: This also stands to reason, as, if you do not say so, one can raise a further difficulty with this episode: Is there a female burnt-offering? Only males may be sacrificed as burnt-offerings. Since the Jews sacrificed the cows as burnt-offerings, it is clear that they were acting unconventionally due to extenuating circumstances.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: And what is the difficulty? In other words, the additional problem with the incident, that the animals were female, which is cited as proof that there were extenuating circumstances, is not in fact difficult at all. The Gemara elaborates: Perhaps the cows were offered upon a private altar, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Adda bar Ahava, as Rav Adda bar Ahava says: From where is it derived that a female burnt-offering is fit to be sacrificed upon a private altar? As it is stated: “And Samuel took a milking lamb, and sacrificed it [<i>vaya’alehu</i>] for a burnt-offering unto the Lord” (I Samuel 7:9). The phrase “milking lamb” indicates that it was a female, and yet Samuel sacrificed it upon a private altar.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the word <i>vaya’alehu</i> is masculine, which means that the lamb was a male. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Although the word is read in the masculine, it is written in the feminine form, <i>vaya’alah</i>, which teaches that even a female lamb may be sacrificed on a private altar.
  § After concluding its discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara cites another resolution of the contradiction between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is a clear demarcation in the case of an animal with whom a man engaged in bestiality. If she is less than three years old, she becomes barren as a result of penetration, but if she is already three years old, she does not become barren. Although gentiles are generally suspected of engaging in bestiality, the <i>baraita</i> rules that an animal that is less than three years old may be used as an offering because a gentile will refrain from engaging in bestiality with an animal that may become barren as a result of his actions.
  They raised all of those refutations from the aforementioned verses which indicate that animals purchased from gentiles may be brought as offerings, and he answered them by claiming that the animals being offered were less than three years old. The Gemara reexamines one of the objections. Come and hear, as the verse states: “And they sacrificed the cattle as a burnt-offering unto the Lord” (I Samuel 6:14). Rabbi Yoḥanan explained that although in that incident the cattle had been owned by Philistines, they were less than three years old, and it was therefore presumed that the Philistines had not engaged in bestiality with them.
  The Gemara cites a refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s answer: Rav Huna, son of Rabbi Natan, objects to this: If so, then this is also true with regard to the verse: “And they took two nursing cows and tied them to the cart and shut up their calves at home” (I Samuel 6:10). According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the verse is necessarily referring to cows that are less than three years old.
  And can a cow that is less than three years old give birth? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a cow or a donkey purchased from a gentile when they were less than three years old, the first of their offspring born after the purchase is certainly reserved for the priest, who is entitled to the firstborn of a cow or donkey owned by a Jew. From this point forward, i.e., if they were older than three years at the time of the sale, it is uncertain whether or not the offspring is the firstborn. This indicates that an animal does not bear offspring within the first three years of its life. Since the cows in the verse had already given birth, they could not have been less than three years old, as Rabbi Yoḥanan claimed. The Gemara concludes: Rather, it is clear as we initially answered, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan’s suggestion is rejected, and the actions in that verse were due to a provisional edict.
  § The Gemara further analyzes the episode involving the cows sent by the Philistines. The verse states: “And the cattle took the straight [<i>vayyisharna</i>] way, on the way to Beit Shemesh; they went along the highway, lowing as they went” (I Samuel 6:12). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the word <i>vayyisharna</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Meir: It means that they recited a song [<i>shira</i>]. And Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says: It means that they straightened [<i>yishru</i>] their faces so that they were opposite the Ark and recited a song.
  The Gemara asks: And what song did they recite? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Meir: They recited the song that follows the verse: “Then sang Moses and the children of Israel this song unto the Lord” (Exodus 15:1). And Rabbi Yoḥanan himself says that it was: “And on that day shall you say: Give thanks unto the Lord, proclaim His name, declare His doings among the peoples, make mention that His name is exalted” (Isaiah 12:4).
  And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that it was an orphaned psalm, i.e., a psalm whose author and the event to which it makes reference are not specified. The psalm begins with: “A Psalm. O sing unto the Lord a new song, for He has done marvelous things; His right hand, and His holy arm, have wrought salvation for Him” (Psalms 98:1). Rabbi Elazar says that it was the psalm beginning with: “The Lord reigns; let the peoples tremble” (Psalms 99:1).
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that it was the Psalm beginning: “The Lord reigns; He is clothed in majesty” (Psalms 93:1). Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa says: They did not recite a verse found in the Bible, but rather, the following song: Sing, sing, acacia; ascend in all your glory; overlaid with golden embroidery, exalted by the book [<i>devir</i>] of the palace, and magnificent with jewels. The song alludes to the Ark of the Covenant, which was made of acacia wood and covered with gold. The expression: Book of the palace, is a reference to the Torah scroll that was placed in the Ark.
  Rav Ashi teaches this statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak in relation to this verse: “And it came to pass, when the Ark set forward, that Moses said: Rise up, O Lord, and let Your enemies be scattered” (Numbers 10:35). The Gemara asks: What did the Jewish people recite at this juncture? Rabbi Yitzḥak says that they recited: Sing, sing, acacia, ascend in all your glory; overlaid with golden embroidery, exalted by the book of the palace, and magnificent with jewels.
  § Apropos the mention of the term <i>devir</i>, the Gemara discusses its etymology. Rav said: On what basis do the Persians call a book [<i>sifra</i>] by the term <i>devir</i>? They derive it from here: “Now the name of Debir [<i>devir</i>] beforehand was Kiriath Sefer” (Judges 1:11). Since the name <i>devir</i> was changed to Kiriath Sefer, the Persians referred to a <i>sifra</i>, i.e., a book, as <i>devir</i>.
  The Gemara examines the etymology of another term coined by the Persians. Rav Ashi said: On what basis do the Persians call a menstruating woman by the term <i>dashtana</i>? It is from here, a verse in which Rachel claims to be a menstruating woman: “For the manner of women is upon me [<i>derekh nashim li</i>]” (Genesis 31:35). The word <i>dashtana</i> is a shortened form of the phrase <i>derekh nashim</i>.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  § The Gemara cites a series of expositions with regard to what is called the book of Yashar. The verse states: “And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the nation had avenged themselves of their enemies. Is this not written in the book of Yashar”? (Joshua 10:13). The Gemara asks: What is the book of Yashar? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is Genesis, which is the book of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were called righteous [<i>yesharim</i>], as it is stated: “Let me die the death of the righteous [<i>yesharim</i>]” (Numbers 23:10).
  The Gemara asks: And where is it alluded to in Genesis that the sun would stand still for Joshua? The verse states in reference to Ephraim, who was Joshua’s ancestor: “And his seed shall become a multitude of nations” (Genesis 48:19). The Gemara asks: When will he become a multitude of nations? He became a multitude of nations at the time when the sun stood in place for Joshua, as it is written: “And the sun stayed in the midst of heaven, and hastened not to go down for an entire day” (Joshua 10:13).
  The Gemara inquires: And how much time elapsed before the sun finally set? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said that it took twenty-four hours: It traveled across the sky for six hours and stood still for six hours, and again traveled six hours and stood still for six hours, so that the entire matter lasted the duration of an entire day.
  Rabbi Elazar said that it lasted thirty-six hours: The sun traveled for six hours and stood for twelve hours, and again traveled six hours and stood for twelve hours, so that the accumulated time of its suspension was that of an entire day. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: Forty-eight hours elapsed before it set. It traveled six hours and stood for twelve hours, and then traveled six hours and stood for twenty-four hours, as it is stated: “And the sun stayed in the midst of heaven,” and then: “And hastened not to go down for an entire day.” By inference, it can be understood that initially it was not suspended for an entire day. Rather, at first it stood still for twelve hours, and was later suspended for an entire day.
  There are those who say that these Sages do not disagree over how much time had elapsed before the sun set. Rather, they disagree with regard to the additional time by which the day was extended. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Twenty-four hours were added to that day, because the sun traveled six hours and stood twelve hours, and again traveled six hours and stood for another twelve hours, which meant that its standing time lasted for an entire day. Rabbi Elazar said that thirty-six hours were added: It traveled six hours and stood for twelve hours, and then traveled six hours and stood for twenty-four more hours. It is with regard to the second suspension that the verse states: “And hastened not to go down for an entire day.”
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: The time the sun stood in place was forty-eight hours in total. The sun traveled six hours and stood twenty-four hours, and then traveled another six hours and stood for another twenty-four hours. His reasoning is that the verse juxtaposes the sun’s suspension to its motion: Just as the sun is in motion for an entire day, so too, its suspension was for an entire day.
  It is taught: Just as the sun stood still for Joshua, so too the sun stood still for Moses and for Nakdimon ben Guryon. It is known that it stood still for Joshua from a verse, and it is known that it stood still for Nakdimon ben Guryon by tradition. From where do we derive that it stood still for Moses as well? The Gemara answers: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the terms “I will begin” and “I will begin.” The Gemara elaborates: It is written here, with regard to Moses: “I will begin to deliver the dread of you and the fear of you upon the peoples” (Deuteronomy 2:25), and it is written there, with regard to Joshua: “I will begin to magnify you” (Joshua 3:7).
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the words “delivered” and “delivered.” It is written here, with regard to Moses: “I will begin to deliver the dread of you,” and it is written there, with regard to Joshua: “In the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel” (Joshua 10:12).
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that there is no need for a verbal analogy, as you can learn this idea from the verse itself: “This day will I begin to deliver the dread of you and the fear of you upon the peoples that are under the whole heaven, who, when they hear the report of you, shall tremble and be in anguish because of you” (Deuteronomy 2:25). When was the fulfillment of the prophecy that all the nations “shall tremble and be in anguish because of you”? It was at the time when the sun stood still for Moses.
  The Gemara raises an objection: After the sun stood still, the verse states: “And there was no day like that before it or after it” (Joshua 10:14). If there was no day comparable to it, how can it be asserted that the sun stood still for Moses as well? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the number of hours the sun stood still for Moses were not as many as in the case of Joshua. And if you wish, say instead: When the sun stood still for Moses there were no hailstones, whereas in the case of Joshua there were hailstones, as it is written: “And it came to pass, as they fled from before the children of Israel, while they were in the descent of Beth Horon, that the Lord cast down great stones from heaven upon them into Azeka and they died” (Joshua 10:11).
  The Gemara cites another exposition with regard to the book of Yashar. It is written: “And said: To teach the sons of Judah the bow. Behold, it is written in the book of Yashar” (II Samuel 1:18). The Gemara again asks: What is the book of Yashar? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is the book of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were called righteous [<i>yesharim</i>], as it is written with regard to them: “Let me die the death of the righteous [<i>yesharim</i>] and let my end be like his” (Numbers 23:10).
  The Gemara further analyzes the verse in Samuel: And where is it alluded to in Genesis that Judah must be taught to use the bow? The verse states: “Judah, your brothers shall praise you; your hand shall be on the nape of your enemies” (Genesis 49:8). The Gemara explains: What is the form of warfare that requires one’s hand to be held opposite the nape? You must say that this is referring to the use of a bow. This is the referent of the verse in Samuel.
  The Gemara cites a different interpretation: Rabbi Elazar says that the book of Yashar is the book of Deuteronomy. And why did they call it the book of Yashar? As it is written: “And you shall do that which is right [<i>yashar</i>] and good in the sight of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 6:18). And where is it alluded to in Deuteronomy that Judah must be taught to use the bow? The verse states: “And this for Judah, and he said: Hear, Lord, the voice of Judah, and bring him in unto his people; his hands shall contend for him” (Deuteronomy 33:7). What is the form of warfare that requires the use of two hands? You must say that this is referring to the use of a bow. This is the referent of the verse in Samuel.
  The Gemara provides yet another explanation: Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that the book of Yashar is the book of Judges. And why did they call it the book of Yashar? As it is written: “In those days there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right [<i>yashar</i>] in his own eyes” (Judges 17:6). And where is it alluded to in Judges that Judah must be taught to use the bow? The verse states: “Only that the generations of the children of Israel might know, to teach them war” (Judges 3:2). What is the form of warfare that requires teaching? You must say that this is referring to the use of a bow. This is the referent of the verse in Samuel.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that Judges 3:2 is written in reference to Judah? We derive it as it is written: “The children of Israel asked the Lord, saying: Who shall go up for us first against the Canaanites, to fight against them? And Lord said: Judah shall go up” (Judges 1:1–2).
  § The Gemara cites another dispute between the same <i>amora’im</i>. The verse states: “And the cook took up the thigh, and that which was upon it [<i>vehe’aleha</i>], and set it before Saul” (I Samuel 9:24). To what does the term “and that which was upon it” refer? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It refers to the thigh and the tail. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the tail is referred to as: “And that which was upon it”? The reason is that the thigh supports the tail, as it rests upon it.
  And Rabbi Elazar says: The verse refers to the thigh and the breast. What is the reason that the breast is referred to as: “And that which was upon it”? The reason is that one places the breast upon the thigh when it requires sacrificial waving, and waves it. And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: The verse refers to the thigh and the cap [<i>shofi</i>], i.e., the very top part of the leg. What is the reason that the cap is referred to as: “And that which was upon it”? It is because it is referring to the cap that stands above the thigh.
  § The mishna teaches that a woman may not seclude herself with gentiles. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with? If we say that we are dealing with a woman who secludes herself with one gentile, is this permitted in the corresponding situation involving a Jew? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Kiddushin</i> 80b): One man may not seclude himself even with two women? It is certainly forbidden for one man to be secluded with one woman.
  
  Daf 25b
  
  Rather, the mishna is referring to a case in which a woman secludes herself with three gentiles. The Gemara asks: Is this permitted in the corresponding situation involving Jews steeped in sexual immorality? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Kiddushin</i> 80b): But one woman may be secluded with two men; and Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to men of fit morals; but with regard to those steeped in sexual immorality, she may not be secluded even with ten men. There was an incident where ten men carried a woman out of the city on a bier, as though she were dead, and they engaged in intercourse with her.
  The Gemara answers: No, the ruling of the mishna here is necessary in a case where the gentile’s wife is with him. The differences between the two rulings is that in the case of a gentile, it is assumed that his wife does not guard him against sinning with another, but with regard to a Jew, his wife does guard him against sinning with another.
  § The mishna teaches that a woman may not seclude herself with a gentile due to the concern that they might engage in illicit sexual relations. The Gemara challenges: And let us derive that a woman may not seclude herself with a gentile due to the concern about bloodshed. The Gemara cites two responses. Rabbi Yirmeya says: We are dealing with a distinguished woman, whom gentiles will not kill, as they are fearful of her status. Nevertheless, there is a concern with regard to illicit sexual relations. Rav Idi bar Avin says: A woman carries her weapons upon her. In other words, there is no need to be concerned that a woman might be killed by gentiles; rather, the very fact that she is a woman protects her, as they would most likely rape her and not kill her.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two answers? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is with regard to a woman who is distinguished among men due to her political position, but is not distinguished among the women, i.e., she is unattractive. According to Rabbi Yirmeya, there is no concern that she will be killed, as she is distinguished, nor is there a concern that they will engage in illicit sexual relations. Therefore, it would be permitted for her to seclude herself with them. By contrast, as Rav Idi bar Avin stated his explanation in general terms, he evidently holds that the concern of illicit sexual relations always applies, regardless of the woman’s appearance.
  The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Idi bar Avin: With regard to a woman, even though her protection accompanies her, i.e., she is not in danger of being killed, she may not seclude herself with gentiles because they are suspected of engaging in forbidden sexual relations.
  § The mishna further teaches that a person may not seclude himself with gentiles because they are suspected of bloodshed. The Sages taught: A Jew who encounters a gentile on the road and continues his travels with him should position the gentile to his right, so that the Jew’s dominant hand is closest to the gentile, which will enable him to defend himself against a potential attack. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: If the gentile is armed with a sword, the Jew positions him to his right, because a blade is usually carried on one’s left side. But if the gentile is armed with a stick, the Jew should steer him to his left, as a stick is usually carried in one’s right hand. By walking on the same side as the gentile’s weapon, the Jew can best prevent him from drawing it.
  The Gemara continues: If the Jew and gentile were ascending an incline or descending a decline, the Jew should not be positioned below while the gentile is above, so that the gentile will not have the advantage of height if he decides to attack. Rather, the Jew should be located above while the gentile is below. And the Jew should not bend down before him, lest the gentile break his skull.
  Furthermore, if the gentile asks him where he is going, the Jew should extend the journey when relating his destination to him, i.e., he should claim that he is traveling to a place beyond his actual destination, in the manner that Jacob our father did to the wicked Esau. As it is written that Jacob said to Esau: “Let my lord pass over before his servant and I will journey on gently, according to the pace of the cattle that are before me and according to the pace of the children, until I come unto my lord unto Seir” (Genesis 33:14).
  The Gemara continues: And it is written subsequently: “And Jacob journeyed to Succoth, and built himself a house” (Genesis 33:17). Rather than meeting Esau in Seir, Jacob traveled to the nearer location of Succoth. Telling a gentile that one is traveling to a farther destination might cause the gentile to defer his attack due to the assumption that he has a longer period of time to plan and execute it. As a result of the delay, the Jew has a better chance of reaching his true destination safely.
  The Gemara illustrates this idea through a relevant story. An incident occurred involving several students of Rabbi Akiva who were traveling to Keziv. Along the way, bandits encountered them and said to them: Where are you going? Rabbi Akiva’s students said to them: To Akko. Once they reached Keziv, Rabbi Akiva’s students separated from the bandits. At this point the bandits said to them: Whose students are you? The students said to the bandits: We are students of Rabbi Akiva. The bandits said to them: Fortunate are Rabbi Akiva and his students, as they were never harmed by an evil person. The bandits were impressed with the wisdom that the students demonstrated in evading harm.
  The Gemara relates another incident: Rav Menashe was traveling
  
  Daf 26a
  
  to Bei Torta. Along the way, thieves encountered him, and said to him: Where are you going? Rav Menashe said to them: To Pumbedita, which was farther away than Bei Torta. When he arrived at Bei Torta, he separated from the thieves, who had planned to steal from him. They said to him: You are a student of Yehuda the swindler! Rav Menashe said to them: Do you know him so well that you can accuse him of swindling others? May it be God’s will that these people be subject to Rav Yehuda’s ban of excommunication.
  The Gemara continues: This curse was effective, as the thieves subsequently went and carried out thefts for twenty-two years, but they were unsuccessful. Once they saw that their efforts were for naught, they all went and claimed their curse, i.e., they asked forgiveness and requested that the curse be lifted. But there was one weaver among them who did not come to lift his curse, and a lion ate him. The Gemara notes that this explains the adage that people say: With regard to a weaver [<i>girdana</i>] who is not shy [<i>taizan</i>] but impudent, a year is deducted from his allotted years.
  With regard to these two anecdotes, the Gemara comments: Come and see what the difference is between the thieves of Babylonia and the bandits of Eretz Yisrael. Although thieves are typically less violent than bandits, the thieves in Babylonia reacted to Rav Menashe’s action by denouncing Rav Yehuda, whereas the bandits in Eretz Yisrael praised the wisdom of Rabbi Akiva.
  MISHNA: A Jewish woman may not deliver the child of a gentile woman, because in doing so she is delivering a child who will engage in idol worship. But one may allow a gentile woman to deliver the child of a Jewish woman. Similarly, a Jewish woman may not nurse the child of a gentile woman, but one may allow a gentile woman to nurse the child of a Jewish woman while the gentile woman is on the Jewish woman’s property.
  GEMARA: The Gemara cites a dispute related to the ruling of the mishna. The Sages taught: A Jewish woman may not deliver the child of a gentile woman because in doing so she is delivering a child who will engage in idol worship. And one may not allow a gentile woman to deliver the child of a Jewish woman because gentiles are suspected of bloodshed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  And the Rabbis say: One may allow a gentile woman to deliver the child of a Jewish woman when other women are standing over her watching her actions, but not when they are alone together. And Rabbi Meir says: Even when other women are standing over her one may not allow a gentile woman to deliver the child of a Jewish woman, because there are times when the midwife places her hand on the infant’s temple and kills him by applying pressure to the area, and the act is not seen.
  The Gemara relates a story that validates this concern. This is like that incident involving a certain gentile woman who said to her fellow gentile: You are the midwife of Jewish women, the daughter of a midwife of Jewish women. This was meant as an insult. In response, the other gentile said to her: May as many evils befall that woman, i.e., you, as the number of Jewish infants that I have killed, as I extract blood from them like the foam [<i>ufeya</i>] of a river. This gentile midwife claimed to have caused the deaths of many Jewish children.
  The Gemara clarifies the opinion of the Rabbis: And the Rabbis, who are not concerned to the same extent as Rabbi Meir, would say to you: That is not so; it was merely through words that the gentile midwife was establishing herself. In other words, she was bragging in order to intimidate her antagonist, whereas in reality she did not kill any infants.
  § The mishna teaches that a Jewish woman may not nurse the child of a gentile woman. The Sages taught: A Jewish woman may not nurse the child of a gentile woman because in doing so she is effectively raising a child who will engage in idol worship. And one may not allow a gentile woman to nurse the child of a Jewish woman because she is suspected of bloodshed; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One may allow a gentile woman to nurse the child of a Jewish woman when other women are standing over her, but not when the gentile woman is alone together with the child. And Rabbi Meir says: Even when other women are standing over her one may not allow a gentile woman to nurse the child, because there are times when she smears poison intended for him upon her breast when she is outside the house, and subsequently kills him with it while nursing.
  The Gemara remarks: And it is necessary for the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis to be stated with regard to both the case of a midwife and that of a wet nurse. The reason is that if the <i>tanna</i> had taught us only the <i>halakha</i> of a midwife, one might assume that it is only in that case that the Rabbis said that it is permitted to allow the gentile to deliver a Jewish infant, because it is not possible for her to kill him, due to the fact that other women see her. But with regard to a wet nurse, as it is possible that she might smear poison upon her breast while she is still outside the house and then kill him with it, one might say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir that a gentile woman may not be allowed to nurse the son of a Jewish woman under any circumstances.
  And if the <i>tanna</i> had taught us only the <i>halakha</i> of a wet nurse, one might assume that it is only in that case that Rabbi Meir said that it is prohibited for a gentile to nurse a Jewish infant, due to the fact that she might smear poison upon her breast while outside the house and kill him with it. But with regard to a midwife, since it is not possible for her to kill him where other women are standing over her, one might say that Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis. The Gemara concludes: It is therefore necessary for this dispute to be stated with regard to both cases.
  § Based on the above discussion, all agree that a Jewish woman may not deliver the child of a gentile woman. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: A Jewish woman may deliver the child of an Aramean woman in exchange for payment, but not for free. Rav Yosef said in response: It is permitted in exchange for payment due to the enmity that would be engendered if Jews refused to deliver gentile infants despite being offered money to do so.
  Rav Yosef thought to say: Delivering the child of a gentile woman on Shabbat in exchange for payment is permitted due to enmity. Abaye said to him: The concern of enmity does not apply here, because she can say to the gentile: With regard to our own women, who keep Shabbat, we desecrate Shabbat for them; with regard to your women, who do not keep Shabbat, we do not desecrate Shabbat for them.
  Rav Yosef also thought to say: Nursing the child of a gentile woman in exchange for payment is permitted due to enmity. Abaye said to him: The concern of enmity does not apply, because she can say, if she is unmarried: I wish to get married. And if she is a married woman, she may say: I do not wish to become repulsive to my husband. Since she can provide a reasonable excuse for refusing to nurse a gentile child, the concern of enmity does not apply.
  Rav Yosef thought to say a similar idea concerning that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to gentiles and shepherds of small domesticated animals, one may not raise them out of a pit and one may not lower them into a pit. Rav Yosef suggested that even so, it is permitted to raise them from the pit in exchange for payment, due to enmity.
  Abaye said to him: It is prohibited to raise a gentile from a pit even in exchange for payment, because one can say an excuse to him, such as: My son is standing on the roof  and I must go use this ladder to help him down from the roof. Alternatively, he can say to him: A time has been appointed for me to appear in the courthouse [<i>bei davar</i>] and I must attend to this matter. Since the Jew can provide a legitimate excuse for refusing to aid the gentile, there is no need to extract him from the pit.
  Apropos the notion of raising someone from or lowering him into a pit, the Gemara notes that Rabbi Abbahu taught the following while standing before Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to gentiles and shepherds of domesticated animals, one may not raise them from a pit,
  
  Daf 26b
  
  and one may not lower them into a pit. But the heretics, and the informers, and the apostates [<i>vehameshummadim</i>] are lowered into a pit, but not raised out of it.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Abbahu: I teach that the verse: “And so you shall do with every lost item of your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:3), serves to include the apostate in one’s obligation to return a lost item to another Jew; and you say that one may lower him into a pit? Remove the term apostate from here.
  The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Abbahu answer Rabbi Yoḥanan as follows: Here, with regard to a lost item, the verse includes an apostate because it is referring to an apostate who eats non-kosher meat due to his appetite, i.e., he succumbs to the temptation. Conversely, there, with regard to raising an apostate from a pit, I am referring to an apostate who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Abbahu holds that one who eats non-kosher meat to express insolence is a heretic, rather than an apostate.
  § It was stated with regard to the definition of an apostate that Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One says that someone who transgresses a prohibition due to his appetite is an apostate, while one who transgresses a prohibition in order to express insolence is a heretic. And one says that even one who sins to express insolence is considered an apostate. Rather, who is considered a heretic? This is an idol worshipper.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> against the opinion that one who sins to express insolence is considered a heretic. The <i>baraita</i> teaches: If one ate a single flea or a single mosquito, he is considered an apostate. The Gemara clarifies the objection: But here it must be assumed that the insect was eaten to express insolence, as it is unappetizing, and yet this <i>baraita</i> teaches that one who eats a flea or a mosquito is an apostate. The Gemara answers: There, he desires to experience the taste of forbidden food, and therefore he is considered to be eating only due to temptation.
  § The Gemara returns to the subject of lowering someone into a pit. The Master said: Heretics, informers, and apostates are lowered into a pit but not raised out of it. The Gemara analyzes this statement: Now that it is known that one actively lowers them into a pit, is it necessary to teach that one does not raise them from it? Rav Yosef bar Ḥama said that Rav Sheshet said: No, it is necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> because it can be inferred from here that if there was a ledge in the pit, a Jew scrapes it off so that the one in the pit cannot ascend from it, as the Jew employs a pretext and says that he is removing the ledge so that animals do not descend upon the one in the pit while he is trapped in the pit.
  Rabba and Rav Yosef both say a different answer: No, it is necessary to teach this, as it can be inferred from here that if there was a stone at the mouth of the well that one had fallen into, a Jew covers it and says that he is covering the opening in order to pass his animals over it. Ravina said: One can learn from here that if there was a ladder in the pit, a Jew removes it and says: I require the ladder to lower my son from the roof.
  § The Gemara discusses the subject of assisting or receiving aid from a gentile in the context of circumcision. The Sages taught: A Jew may circumcise a gentile for the sake of making him a convert. This is to the exclusion of circumcising a gentile for the sake of removing a worm [<i>murna</i>], which is not permitted, as it is forbidden to heal a gentile. But one may not allow a gentile to circumcise a Jew in any situation, because gentiles are suspected of bloodshed. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  And the Rabbis say: One may allow a gentile to circumcise a Jew while others are standing over him and observing his actions, but not when they are alone together. And Rabbi Meir says: Even where others are standing over him it is also not permitted, as there are times when a gentile might tilt the knife and render the Jew one whose penis has been severed, and he will be unable to father children.
  The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Meir hold that one may not allow a gentile to circumcise a Jew? And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this claim from the following <i>baraita</i>: In a city in which there is no Jewish physician, and in which there is a Samaritan physician and an Aramean, i.e., a gentile, physician, it is preferable that the Aramean circumcise the Jewish boys of the city and the Samaritan not circumcise them. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is preferable that the Samaritan circumcise the boys and the Aramean not circumcise them. Rabbi Meir holds that it is preferable for an Aramean gentile to perform circumcision despite the fact that Samaritans are considered Jewish to a certain extent.
  The Gemara answers: Reverse their opinions, so that Rabbi Meir says: It is preferable that the Samaritan circumcise the boys and not the Aramean, and Rabbi Yehuda says: It is preferable that the Aramean circumcise them and not the Samaritan.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that it is permitted for circumcision to be performed by an Aramean? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: From where is it derived with regard to circumcision performed by a gentile that it is not valid? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And God said to Abraham: And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you, and your seed after you throughout their generations” (Genesis 17:9). “My covenant [<i>beriti</i>]” here is a reference to circumcision [<i>berit mila</i>], and therefore the verse is teaching that only Abraham and his descendants, i.e., Jews, are qualified to perform circumcision.
  Rather, the Gemara suggests, actually do not reverse it. As for the apparent contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Meir, the Gemara explains: And what are we dealing with here?
  
  Daf 27a
  
  We are dealing with an expert physician, who will not risk his reputation by harming a child. This is similar to that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If the physician was considered a recognized expert, it is permitted for one to be healed by him. When Rabbi Meir said that an Aramean may circumcise a Jewish boy, he was referring specifically to a doctor who is known for his expertise.
  The latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> states that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a Samaritan may circumcise a Jewish infant. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda actually hold that it is permitted for a Samaritan to perform circumcision? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A Jew may circumcise a Samaritan but a Samaritan may not be allowed to circumcise a Jew, because he circumcises him for the sake of Mount Gerizim; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Yosei said to him: And where do we find that the mitzva of circumcision from the Torah must be performed for the sake of fulfilling God’s will? Rather, a Samaritan may continue to circumcise Jews until his soul leaves his body, i.e., until the Samaritan dies, and there is no room for concern. But Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states above that circumcision may not be performed by a Samaritan.
  Rather, actually you should reverse the opinions in the <i>baraita</i> as we reversed them initially. And as for the difficulty raised with regard to one statement of Rabbi Yehuda against the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda, that opinion, that a gentile may not perform circumcision, is actually the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Conversely, the first <i>baraita</i>, which is reversed and therefore cites Rabbi Yehuda as maintaining that an Aramean may perform circumcision, is referring to Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai. Accordingly, the different opinions reflect a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> rather than a contradiction.
  The Gemara cites a proof that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi a gentile is not qualified to perform circumcision. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: From where is it derived with regard to circumcision performed by a gentile that it is not valid? The verse states: “And God said to Abraham: And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you, and your seed after you throughout their generations” (Genesis 17:9).
  § It was stated that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda circumcision must be performed for the sake of fulfilling a mitzva, whereas Rabbi Yosei holds that no particular intention is necessary. The Gemara analyzes these opinions. Rav Ḥisda said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is written: “And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the Passover to the Lord let all his males be circumcised” (Exodus 12:48). It can be inferred from the verse that the males must be circumcised “to the Lord,” i.e., for the sake of fulfilling God’s will. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei? It is written: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>]” (Genesis 17:13). The usage of the doubled verb teaches that circumcision may be performed by anyone.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other Sage, i.e., Rabbi Yosei, isn’t it written: “To the Lord let all his males be circumcised,” which indicates that circumcision must be performed for the sake of fulfilling God’s will? The Gemara answers: That is written with regard to Passover. According to Rabbi Yosei, the phrase “to the Lord” is referring to the previous mention of the Paschal offering, rather than to circumcision. Accordingly, the verse should be read: “Will keep Passover to the Lord.” The Gemara asks: And according to the other Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, isn’t it also written: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>],” indicating that circumcision may be performed by anyone? The Gemara answers: The Torah spoke in the language of people, i.e., the doubled verb is the usual style of the Torah, which does not serve to teach a novel <i>halakha</i>.
  § The Gemara continues discussing the issue of circumcisions performed by gentiles. It was stated: From where is it derived with regard to circumcision performed by a gentile that it is not valid? Daru bar Pappa says in the name of Rav: This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: And God said to Abraham: “And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you, and your seed after you throughout their generations.” And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is derived from the verse: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>].” According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this verse teaches that a Jew must be circumcised by one who is already circumcised.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two opinions? There is a practical difference between them with regard to a circumcised Arab or a circumcised hill person [<i>gavnuni</i>]. According to the one who says that the <i>halakha</i> that a Jewish infant may be circumcised only by one who has been circumcised himself is derived from the verse: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>],” there is reason to permit an Arab or <i>gavnuni</i> to perform the circumcision, as they are circumcised. And according to the one who says that circumcision may not be performed by a gentile is derived from the phrase: “You shall keep my covenant,” there is no reason to permit an Arab or Gibeonite to perform circumcision.
  The Gemara raises an objection: And is it so, according to the one who says it is derived from the verse: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>],” that a Jew may not be circumcised by a gentile, that there is reason to permit a circumcised gentile to perform circumcision? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Nedarim</i> 31b): With regard to one who vows: Deriving benefit from those who are uncircumcised is <i>konam</i> for me, he is permitted to derive benefit from uncircumcised Jews because they are not regarded as uncircumcised, but he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the uncircumcised of the nations of the world? Apparently, even though some gentiles are circumcised, they are nevertheless considered as those who are uncircumcised.
  Rather, there is a difference between them with regard to a Jew whose brothers died due to circumcision, and as a result, they did not circumcise him. According to the one who says that the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “And as for you, you shall keep My covenant,” there is reason to permit such a person to perform circumcision, as he is a Jew. According to the one who says that the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the phrase: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>],” there is no reason to permit this Jew to perform circumcision, as he is not circumcised himself.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well: And is it so that according to the one who says that the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>],” there is no reason to permit an uncircumcised Jew to perform circumcision? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Nedarim</i> 31b): With regard to one who vows: Deriving benefit from those who are circumcised is <i>konam</i> for me, he is prohibited from deriving benefit even from uncircumcised Jews and he is permitted to derive benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world. Apparently, even though some Jews are not circumcised, they are nevertheless considered as those who are circumcised.
  Rather, there is a difference between these two opinions with regard to a woman. According to the one who says that the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “And as for you, you shall keep My covenant,” there is no reason to permit a woman to perform circumcision, as a woman is not subject to the mitzva of circumcision, and therefore she is not included in those who must keep God’s covenant. And according to the one who says that the <i>halakha</i> is derived from the verse: “He must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>],” there is reason to permit a woman to perform circumcision, as a woman is considered as one who is naturally circumcised.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty against this explanation: And is there anyone who says that a woman may not perform circumcision? But isn’t it written: “Then Zipporah took [<i>vattikkaḥ</i>] a flint and cut off the foreskin of her son” (Exodus 4:25). This verse explicitly states that a circumcision was performed by a woman. The Gemara answers that one should read into the verse: And she caused to be taken [<i>vattakkaḥ</i>], i.e., she did not take a flint herself. But isn’t it written: And she cut off [<i>vattikhrot</i>]? Read into the verse: And she caused to be cut off [<i>vattakhret</i>], as she told another person to take a flint and cut off her son’s foreskin, and he did so. The Gemara provides an alternative explanation: And if you wish, say instead: She came and began the act, and Moses came and completed the circumcision.
  MISHNA: The mishna discusses the issue of accepting certain professional services from a gentile. One may be treated by gentiles, provided that it is monetary treatment, but not personal treatment. And one may not have his hair cut by them anywhere, due to the danger that the gentile will kill him with the razor; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: In the public thoroughfare, it is permitted to have one’s hair cut by a gentile, but not when the Jew and gentile are alone together.
  GEMARA: What is monetary treatment, and what is personal treatment? If we say that monetary treatment is medical attention provided in exchange for payment, whereas personal treatment is medical attention provided for free, then let the mishna teach: One may be treated by gentiles in exchange for payment, but not for free.
  The Gemara suggests another explanation: Rather, monetary treatment is referring to medical treatment for a matter that poses no life-threatening danger, whereas personal treatment is referring to treatment for a matter that does pose life-threatening danger. The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well. But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say: Even with regard to the wound of a bloodletting incision [<i>rivda dekhusilta</i>] we are not permitted to be treated by gentiles. The wound left after bloodletting certainly does not pose life-threatening danger, and yet a Jew is prohibited from having it treated by a gentile.
  Rather, monetary treatment is referring to medical treatment provided for one’s animal, whereas personal treatment is referring to treatment provided for his own body, and this is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda says: Even with regard to the wound of a bloodletting incision, we are not permitted to be treated by them.
  Rav Ḥisda says that Mar Ukva says: But if a gentile said to him: Such and such a potion is beneficial for this ailment, or such and such a potion is harmful for this ailment, it is permitted to adhere to the gentile’s advice.
  
  Daf 27b
  
  The Gemara explains the rationale for this leniency: The gentile thinks to himself that the Jew is asking him for his opinion, and just as he is asking him, he will also ask other people. And the gentile further reasons that if the Jew understands that the gentile provided him with bad advice, that man, i.e., the gentile, will bring harm to himself by damaging his own reputation. It is therefore assumed that the gentile will provide good advice in order to avoid sullying his reputation.
  § The Gemara analyzes a situation in which one may receive medical attention from gentiles. Rava says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say that it was Rav Ḥisda who says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If there is uncertainty as to whether a patient will live through his ailment or die from it, the patient may not be treated by gentile doctors, due to the concern that a gentile doctor may kill him. But if it is certain that he will die from his affliction if he does not receive medical attention, the patient is treated by them, as it is possible that a gentile physician will save him.
  The Gemara challenges: Even if it is certain that the patient will die if he is not treated, nevertheless, there is value in temporal life, i.e., it is preferable for the Jew to live as long as his ailment permits rather than risking a premature death at the hands of a gentile physician. The Gemara explains: We are not concerned with the value of temporal life when there is a possibility of permanent recovery, and therefore it is preferable to receive medical attention from a gentile despite the risk involved.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we are not concerned with the value of temporal life? As it is written with regard to the discussion held by four lepers left outside a besieged city: “If we say: We will enter into the city, then the famine is in the city, and we shall die there; and if we sit still here, we also die. Now therefore come, and let us fall unto the host of the Arameans; if they save us alive, we shall live; and if they kill us, we shall but die” (II Kings 7:4). The starving lepers decided to risk premature death rather than waiting to die of starvation. The Gemara asks rhetorically: But isn’t there temporal life to be lost, in which case it would be preferable for the lepers to remain in their current location? Rather, is it not apparent that we are not concerned with the value of temporal life?
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not engage in dealings with heretics, and one may not be treated by them even in a case where it is clear that without medical attention one will experience only temporal life.
  The <i>baraita</i> relates an incident illustrating this point. There was an incident involving ben Dama, son of Rabbi Yishmael’s sister, in which a snake bit him. And following the attack, Ya’akov of the village of Sekhanya, who was a heretic, a disciple of Jesus the Nazarene, came to treat him, but Rabbi Yishmael did not let him do so. And ben Dama said to him: Rabbi Yishmael, my brother, let him treat me, and I will be healed by him. And I will cite a verse from the Torah to prove that accepting medical treatment from a heretic is permitted in this situation. But ben Dama did not manage to complete the statement before his soul departed from his body and he died.
  Rabbi Yishmael recited with regard to him: Fortunate are you, ben Dama, as your body is pure and your soul departed in purity, and you did not transgress the statement of your colleagues, who would state the verse: “And who breaks through a fence, a snake shall bite him” (Ecclesiastes 10:8), i.e., one is punished for ignoring an ordinance of the Sages. This incident indicates that it is not permitted for one to accept medical treatment from a heretic even if it is clear that without it he will live only a short while.
  The Gemara explains: Heresy is different, as it is enticing. In other words, it is prohibited to accept medical treatment from a heretic, as one might come to be drawn after his heresy. By contrast, receiving medical attention from a gentile is permitted if it is certain that one will die if he is not treated.
  The Master said above: You did not transgress the statement of your colleagues, who would state the verse: “And who breaks through a fence, a snake shall bite him.” The Gemara asks: But ben Dama was also bitten by a snake, even before this declaration of Rabbi Yishmael, so how can he be considered fortunate? The Gemara explains: The snake mentioned in the curse of the Sages is different, as it has no remedy whatsoever. Although ben Dama was bitten by a snake, he could have been healed.
  The Gemara asks: And what would ben Dama have said? What verse did he intend to cite as proof that it was permitted for him to be healed by a heretic? The verse: “You shall therefore keep My statutes, and My ordinances, which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Leviticus 18:5). This teaches that one should live by God’s mitzvot, and not that he should die by them. This verse serves as a source for the <i>halakha</i> that one may violate a prohibition in order to save a life.
  And why does Rabbi Yishmael disagree with ben Dama? He maintains that this matter applies only in private, but in public one may not transgress a prohibition even to save a life. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael would say: From where is it derived that if oppressors say to a person: Worship an idol and you will not be killed, that one should worship the idol and not be killed? The verse states: “He shall live by them,” and not that he should die by them. One might have thought that this applies even in public. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:32).
  § The Gemara examines various circumstances in which one is permitted to receive treatment from a gentile. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to any injury for which Shabbat is desecrated, one may not be treated by gentiles. And there are those who say that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to any
  
  Daf 28a
  
  internal injury, one may not be treated by them. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two versions of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement? There is a difference between them with regard to the case of one who was injured on the back of the hand or the back of the foot. As Rav Adda bar Mattana says that Rav says: Injuries to the back of the hand and the back, i.e., the top, of the foot are like an internal injury, and one may desecrate Shabbat for their treatment.
  Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says: With regard to any injury that requires a medical evaluation to determine whether or not it is fatal, one may desecrate Shabbat for its treatment. Rav Shemen bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And a burning fever is similar to an internal injury, and therefore one may desecrate Shabbat for its treatment.
  The Gemara inquires: From what point on the body is a wound considered an internal injury? Rabbi Ami explained: From the lips inward. Rabbi Eliezer raises a dilemma: With regard to afflictions located in the gums [<i>kakhei</i>] or teeth, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that since they are located in firm parts of the body, they are similar to external injuries, or perhaps we say that since they are situated within the mouth, they are similar to internal injuries?
  Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (<i>Shabbat</i> 111a): One who is concerned about pain in his teeth may not sip vinegar through them on Shabbat for medicinal purposes, as it is generally prohibited by rabbinic law to perform acts of healing on Shabbat. Abaye infers: It is only when he is merely concerned about pain in his teeth that he may not treat them, which indicates that if it hurts him greatly, it is permitted to seek treatment. The Gemara rejects this inference: Perhaps the <i>tanna</i> also characterizes a situation where it hurts one greatly as one of mere concern.
  The Gemara suggests a different proof: Come and hear the following incident: Rabbi Yoḥanan suffered from the illness <i>tzafdina</i>, which affects the teeth and gums. He went to a certain gentile matron who was a well-known healer. She prepared a medicine for him on Thursday and Friday. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to her: What shall I do tomorrow, on Shabbat, when I cannot come to collect the medicine from you? She said to him: You will not need it. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked her: If I do need it, what shall I do? She said to him: Take an oath to me that you will not reveal the remedy, and I will tell you, so that you can prepare it yourself should you need it. Rabbi Yoḥanan took an oath to her: To the God of the Jews, I will not reveal it. She revealed the remedy to him. On the following day Rabbi Yoḥanan went out and taught it publicly, revealing the secret of the remedy.
  The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yoḥanan took an oath to her that he would not reveal her secret. The Gemara explains that his vow meant: I will not reveal it to the God of the Jews, which indicates: But I will reveal it to His people, the Jews. The Gemara challenges: But even so, isn’t there a desecration of God’s name, as the matron now thinks that a great man of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s stature violated his vow? The Gemara answers that he revealed it to her at the outset. As soon as she disclosed the remedy to him, he informed her that his vow would not prevent him from publicizing it.
  With regard to the issue at hand, the Gemara infers: Apparently, an affliction that affects the gums is similar to an internal injury, as it was permitted for Rabbi Yoḥanan to prepare the remedy on Shabbat. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: <i>Tzafdina</i> is different, since it begins in the mouth, and ends in the intestines, i.e., the disease spreads until it infects one’s intestines, and therefore it is considered an internal affliction even while it is only in the mouth. Consequently, the incident involving Rabbi Yoḥanan affords no proof, and Rabbi Eliezer’s dilemma remains unresolved.
  The Gemara inquires: What are the symptoms of <i>tzafdina</i>? If one places an item between his teeth, blood flows from the rows of teeth. From what does it result? It results from the consumption of very cold wheat foods, and from very hot barley foods, and from remains of fried fish [<i>kasa deharsena</i>]. With what remedy did the gentile matron treat Rabbi Yoḥanan? Rabbi Aḥa, son of Rava, said: It was water in which leaven was steeped, olive oil, and salt. And Mar bar Rav Ashi said: She smeared goose fat over his gums with a goose feather.
  Abaye said: I prepared all of these medicines and was not cured from this ailment until a certain Arab told me the remedy for it: Take olive seeds that are less than one-third ripe, and burn them in a fire on top of a new hoe, and stick them along the row of gums. I did this and was cured.
  § It was stated above that Rabbi Yoḥanan sought the medical attention of a gentile. The Gemara asks: And how could Rabbi Yoḥanan do so? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to any injury for which Shabbat is desecrated, one may not be treated by gentiles. <i>Tzafdina</i> is a disease for which Shabbat is desecrated, and yet Rabbi Yoḥanan was treated by a gentile. The Gemara answers: An important person such as Rabbi Yoḥanan is different, as gentiles would not dare to kill him.
  The Gemara questions this: But Rabbi Abbahu was an important person, and yet Ya’akov the heretic placed upon his leg a salve that was actually a poison. And if it were not for Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi, who licked his leg to remove the poison, his leg would have had to be amputated. Apparently, Ya’akov the heretic attempted to kill Rabbi Abbahu despite the fact that Rabbi Abbahu was an important person.
  The Gemara explains: The healer of Rabbi Yoḥanan was an expert physician who would not jeopardize her reputation by harming him. The Gemara rejects this explanation: But the healer of Rabbi Abbahu was also an expert physician. The Gemara answers: The case involving Rabbi Abbahu is different, as heretics establish within themselves the attitude of: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:30), i.e., heretics are willing to risk their lives in order to hurt Jews, due to their religious disputes. By contrast, gentiles will not jeopardize their own reputation for this purpose, and therefore it was permitted for Rabbi Yoḥanan to be treated by the matron.
  § The Gemara lists a series of afflictions and their remedies. Shmuel said: This gash caused by a sword is considered a danger to one’s life, and one may desecrate Shabbat for its treatment. The Gemara asks: What is the remedy for this wound? To stop the blood flow one should consume cress soaked in vinegar. To cause flesh to emerge over the gash, one applies a salve made of <i>yavla</i> scrapings and thornbush scrapings, or a salve made from the worms of the trash.
  Rav Safra said: These grapelike boils are the forerunners [<i>parvanka</i>] of the Angel of Death, i.e., they often precede one’s death. The Gemara asks: What is the remedy? The remedy is either a <i>tigna</i> plant soaked in honey or parsley soaked in wine. In the meantime, while the plants are soaking, one should bring a grape of the same size and rub it on the boil, a white grape for a white boil, and a black grape for a black boil.
  Rava said: This abscess [<i>simta</i>] is the forerunner of fever. The Gemara asks: What is the remedy? One should snap [<i>itkutlei</i>] the boil sixty times with his fingers, i.e., click one’s fingers on the boil, and then he should tear it vertically and horizontally. The Gemara comments: And this statement applies only in a case where the head of the abscess has not whitened, but if its head has whitened, we have no problem with it, i.e., it is in the process of healing, and it does not pose any danger.
  Rabbi Ya’akov suffered
  
  Daf 28b
  
  from hemorrhoids. Rabbi Ami instructed him, and some say that Rabbi Asi instructed him that he should bring seven seeds of ice plant that are red like a worm and bind them in the collar of a shirt, and then he should wrap a strip of hair around it, and dip the bundle in white naphtha and he should burn it and spread the ashes upon the sores. In the meantime, he should bring the kernel of a bramble [<i>asna</i>] fruit and place its crevice against his own crevice, i.e., the anus.
  The Gemara remarks: And this matter applies only to the upper crevice, which is located at the outer edge of the anus and can be treated with bramble fruit. What should one do if he is experiencing pain in the lower crevice, located deeper within the rectum? He should bring the fat of a goat that has not yet opened, i.e., given birth, and he should melt it and then he should apply it to the irritated area.
  And if this is not possible, he should bring three pumpkin leaves that were dried in the shade and he should burn them, and then he should spread the ashes upon the irritated area. And if this is not possible, he should bring snail shells instead. And if this is also not possible, he should bring oil mixed with wax [<i>kira</i>] and he should smear it upon worn flax clothing in summer, or worn cotton clothing in winter, and place it upon the irritated area.
  Rabbi Abbahu suffered from pain in his ear. Rabbi Yoḥanan instructed him, and some say that other Sages from the study hall instructed him, how to heal it. The Gemara asks: What did they instruct him? They told him to act in a fashion similar to that which Abaye said: My mother told me that the kidney was created only for the ear, i.e., it can be extremely beneficial to the ear. And Rava said: Minyumi the physician said to me: All liquids are harmful to the ear except for the fluid of the kidneys. Therefore, Rabbi Abbahu should bring the kidney of a bald goat [<i>barḥa</i>] and tear it vertically and horizontally and then place it upon dimming coals. And as for those fluids that issue from it, he should apply them to his ear while they are neither cold nor hot, but tepid.
  The Gemara adds: And if this is not possible, he should bring the fat of a large beetle and melt it and apply it to the ear. And if not, he should fill his ear with oil and prepare seven wicks made of alfalfa [<i>aspasta</i>] and bring dried garlic ends, and tie the ends to the wicks with a strip of hair at one end, and set the wicks aflame. And he should place the other end of each wick in his ear one at a time, and place his ear opposite the flame. Parenthetically, the Gemara notes: And he should be cautious of drafts and avoid them, as they will harm his ear. The Gemara continues: And he should take one wick and remove one wick, i.e., replace each wick as it is consumed until all seven have been used.
  The Gemara presents another version of this remedy: And if not, he should bring seven wicks of wax tapers and smear them with alfalfa oil, and place one end of each wick in the flame and one end in his ear, and take one wick and remove one wick. And again he should be cautious of drafts.
  And if this is not possible, he should bring fiber that was dried but not combed and place it in his ear, and then bring his ear opposite the flame. And he should be cautious of drafts. And if not, he should bring the tube of an aged reed that is one hundred years old, i.e., that has been detached from the ground for a century, and salt it with rock salt and then burn it and stick it in his ear. The Gemara adds: And your mnemonic to remember these remedies is this: Moist cures are prescribed for dry afflictions, and dry cures are prescribed for moist afflictions.
  § The Gemara returns to the issue of medical treatment on Shabbat. Rabba bar Zutra says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: One may raise his ears to their appropriate position, i.e., set his dislocated jaw, on Shabbat. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda teaches: This applies only if one raises it by hand, but not by means of medicine. There are those who say the opposite: One may raise his ears by means of medicine, but not by hand. What is the reason that one may not manually raise the ear? It is because doing so might injure [<i>zareif</i> ] the ear, which would constitute a violation of Torah law, whereas applying medicine is a violation of rabbinic law.
  Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says: With regard to an eye that rebelled, i.e., which is apt to pop out of its socket, it is permitted to apply blue eye shadow to it on Shabbat. The Sages initially concluded from this that this statement applies only where one had already ground the ingredients yesterday, i.e., on Shabbat eve, but if he planned to grind them on Shabbat, or to bring them through a public domain, it would not be permitted, as this would constitute a desecration of Shabbat by Torah law. To dispel this notion, one of the Sages, named Rabbi Ya’akov, said to them: This matter was explained to me by Rav Yehuda, who said that even if he plans to grind the ingredients on Shabbat and bring it through a public domain, it is permitted.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Yehuda permitted someone to apply blue eye shadow to the eye on Shabbat. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to the Sages: One who adheres to the ruling of Yehuda desecrates Shabbat. Ultimately, Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda himself suffered pain in his eye. He sent a message to Rav Yehuda, asking: Is it permitted or prohibited for me to treat my eye on Shabbat? Rav Yehuda sent back to him: For everyone else, it is permitted; for you, it is prohibited, as you treated my lenient ruling with disdain.
  Rav Yehuda continues: But was it of my own accord that I issued this ruling? It is the ruling of Mar Shmuel, as demonstrated in the following incident: There was a certain maidservant who was in the house of Mar Shmuel whose eye became infected on Shabbat. She screamed in pain, but there was no one who attended to her. Eventually, her eye popped out of its socket. The next day, Mar Shmuel went out and taught: With regard to an eye that rebelled, it is permitted to apply blue eye shadow to it on Shabbat. What is the reason for this leniency, seeing as one may desecrate Shabbat only to treat life-threatening afflictions? The reason is that the tendons [<i>shuraynei</i>] of the eye are dependent upon the valves of the heart.
  The Gemara asks: What ailment of the eye, for example, is considered life-threatening? Rav Yehuda said: For example, any of the following: Abnormal discharge; the sensation of pricking; blood flow from the eye; excessive tearing; and inflammation; and the onset of infection. This list serves to exclude the final stages of a waning infection that is mostly healed, and the opening of the eye, i.e., treatment administered to improve one’s eyesight, which are not life-threatening and therefore one is not permitted to treat them on Shabbat.
  Rav Yehuda says: With regard to one who suffers from the sting of a hornet, or the prick of a thorn [<i>silva</i>], or an abscess, or one whose eye pains him, or one overcome by a fever, bathing in a bathhouse is a life-threatening danger for all of these. Additionally, eating radish [<i>ḥamma</i>] is good for a fever [<i>ḥamma</i>], and eating beets [<i>silka</i>] is good for chills [<i>tzina</i>], but the reverse, i.e., eating radish when one has chills or beets when one has a fever, poses a danger. Similarly, eating hot foods is good for the sting of a scorpion, and cold foods are good for a hornet sting, but the reverse poses a danger. Hot water is good for a thorn embedded in one’s skin, and cold water is good
  
  Daf 29a
  
  for facial wounds, but the reverse presents a danger.
  Vinegar is good for one to consume after bloodletting, and eating small fish is good for one who has completed a fast, but the reverse is a danger. Eating cress and then undergoing bloodletting poses a danger. With regard to one who suffers from a fever and undergoes bloodletting, this poses a danger to his life. Similarly, one who suffers from pain of the eye and undergoes bloodletting endangers to his life. On the second day after eating fish one may let blood, and on the second day after letting blood one may eat fish. With regard to eating fish on the third day after letting blood, or letting blood on the third day after eating fish, both of these actions pose a danger.
  § The Gemara presents a series of health-related statements. The Sages taught: One who lets blood may not eat the following foods, corresponding to the acronym <i>ḥet</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>. That is, he may consume neither milk [<i>ḥalav</i>], nor cheese [<i>gevina</i>], nor onions [<i>betzalim</i>], nor cress [<i>sheḥalim</i>]. If he ate one of these, Abaye said: He should bring a quarter<i>-log</i> of vinegar and a quarter<i>-log</i> of wine and mix them together and drink the mixture. And when he defecates, he should defecate only toward the east of the city, because the odor of the excrement after that treatment is offensive. Since the wind does not usually blow from the east, it is less likely to spread the stench.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: One may lift the <i>unkali</i> on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>unkali</i>? Rabbi Abba said: It is the edge of the ribs [<i>istumkha</i>] near the heart which sometimes bend inward, in which case they must be lifted and straightened into their proper position. The Gemara asks: What is the cure for one whose <i>unkali</i> has been bent? He should take cumin, caraway, mint [<i>ninya</i>], wormwood, satureja, and hyssop.
  This remedy is beneficial for several ailments, and the Gemara presents each of these in turn: For curing the heart, the above combination should be taken with wine, and your mnemonic for this is the verse: “And wine that makes glad the heart of man” (Psalms 104:15). For curing an ailment that arises due to the wind [<i>ruḥa</i>], one drinks the mixture in water, and your mnemonic for this is the verse: “And the spirit [<i>ruaḥ</i>] of God hovered over the face of the waters” (Genesis 1:2). For childbirth [<i>lekhuda</i>], a woman in labor drinks the mixture with beer [<i>shikhra</i>], and your mnemonic for this is the verse: “With her pitcher [<i>vekhadah</i>] upon her shoulder [<i>shikhmah</i>]” (Genesis 24:15).
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, ground all of these together and took a handful of the mixture and drank it. Rav Ashi ground each and every one of the herbs separately and he took all that he could hold between his large finger and his small finger and drank it. Rav Pappa said: I tried all these remedies and I was not healed until a certain Arab said to me: Bring a new jug and fill it with water and place in it a ladle [<i>tarvada</i>] of honey that is suspended among the stars, i.e., add the ladle at night, and drink it on the next day. Rav Pappa concludes: I did this and I was healed.
  The Sages taught: Six items heal a sick person from his illness and their cure is a permanent cure, and these are: Cabbage, beets, water in which dried chamomile was soaked, and the stomach contents of an animal, and the womb of an animal, and the lobe of the liver. And some say: Small fish are also included in this list. And moreover, eating small fish causes a person’s entire body to flourish and to grow.
  Ten items return a sick person to his illness, and his illness becomes even more severe than it originally was, and they are: One who eats ox meat, fat, roasted meat, bird meat, and a roasted egg, and cress; and the act of shaving, and bathing, and the consumption of cheese, and liver. And some say: Nuts are also included in this list. And some say: Cucumbers are also included in this list. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Why are they called cucumbers [<i>kishu’in</i>]? Because they are as harmful [<i>kashin</i>] to a person’s entire body as swords.
  § The mishna teaches: And one may not have his hair cut by gentiles anywhere. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A Jew who has his hair cut by a gentile should observe the gentile’s actions in a mirror while he cuts his hair. And in the case of a gentile who has his hair cut by a Jew, when the Jew reaches the gentile’s forelock he removes his hand and does not cut it, because it is associated with idol worship.
  The Master said: A Jew who has his hair cut by a gentile should observe the gentile’s actions in a mirror. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a haircut performed in a public domain, why do I need a mirror? After all, the gentile will not harm a Jew in public. And if it occurs in a private domain, even if the Jews observes the gentile’s actions, what of it? How does the fact that the Jew is watching prevent the gentile barber from harming him? The Gemara explains: Actually, this is referring to a haircut in a private domain, but since there is a mirror in place, the Jew appears as an important person whom the gentile will hesitate to attack.
  The Gemara relates a relevant incident: Rav Ḥana bar Bizna was having his hair cut by a gentile in one of the side streets of Neharde’a. The barber said to him: Ḥana, Ḥana; Your throat is appealing to the razor. Rav Ḥana bar Bizna said: I have this coming to me, as I violated the ruling of Rabbi Meir, who stated that one may not have his hair cut by a gentile in any location.
  The Gemara asks: And didn’t Rav Ḥana bar Bizna violate the ruling of the Rabbis as well? Say that when the Rabbis stated that it is permitted to have one’s hair cut by a gentile, they were referring to a haircut performed in a public domain; but with regard to a haircut performed in a private domain, did they say that it is permitted? Since the side streets of Neharde’a cannot be considered a public domain, evidently Rav Ḥana bar Bizna violated the ruling of the Rabbis. The Gemara explains: And Rav Ḥana bar Bizna maintains: With regard to the side streets of Neharde’a, since many people are present there, they are similar to a public domain, and it would therefore be permitted to have one’s hair cut there according to the opinion of the Rabbis.
  The <i>baraita</i> stated: And in the case of a gentile who has his hair cut by a Jew, when the Jew reaches the gentile’s forelock, he removes his hand and does not cut it, because it is associated with idol worship. The Gemara asks: And how much space should the Jew leave around the forelock? Rav Malkiyya says that Rav Adda bar Ahava says: Three fingerbreadths in each and every direction.
  In addition to Rav Malkiyya, whose ruling was just cited, there was another <i>amora</i> known as Rav Malkiyyu. In order to avoid confusing the two, the Gemara records their respective rulings. Rav Ḥanina, son of Rav Ika, says: The statements concerning a skewer, maidservants, and follicles were issued by Rav Malkiyyu; the rulings concerning a forelock, burnt ashes, and cheese were stated by Rav Malkiyya.
  Rav Pappa said a different opinion: Statements from the Mishna and <i>baraita</i> were issued by Rav Malkiyya, whereas rulings of <i>halakha</i> that are not related to a mishna or <i>baraita</i> were taught by Rav Malkiyyu. And the mnemonic to remember this is: The Mishna is a queen [<i>malketa</i>], i.e., the statements that are referring to a mishna were made by Rav Malkiyya, whose name is similar to the Aramaic term for queen. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of Rav Ḥanina and Rav Pappa? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them with regard to the <i>halakha</i> concerning maidservants. According to Rav Ḥanina, this <i>halakha</i> was stated by Rav Malkiyyu, whereas Rav Pappa holds that it was taught by Rav Malkiyya, as it is referring to a dispute in a mishna.
  
  Daf 29b
  
  MISHNA: This mishna discusses the halakhic status of various items that belong to gentiles. These are items that belong to gentiles and are prohibited to Jews, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited: Wine, and vinegar belonging to gentiles that was originally wine, and Hadrianic earthenware, and hides with a tear opposite the heart. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A hide is prohibited only when the tear around its heart is circular, but if it is elongated it is permitted, as gentiles will sacrifice a heart only when it has been removed by a circular laceration.
  Meat that enters the house of idol worship is permitted, and meat that exits this house is prohibited, because it is considered as offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. With regard to those going to a festival of idolatry [<i>tarput</i>], it is prohibited to engage in business with them. And with regard to those who are coming from it, it is permitted to engage in business with them.
  Wineskins and jugs belonging to gentiles, which have a Jew’s wine contained in them, are prohibited to Jews, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Residual grape seeds and grape skins belonging to gentiles, which are left behind after the grapes are crushed for wine, are prohibited, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Moist grape residues are prohibited, but dry residues are permitted.
  Fish stew [<i>murayes</i>] and cheese of Beit Unyaki belonging to gentiles are prohibited, and their prohibition is that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yehoshua a series of questions while they were traveling along the road. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: For what reason did the Sages prohibit the cheeses of gentiles? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Because gentiles curdle cheese with the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass, and as the carcass of an unslaughtered animal is not kosher, cheese that is curdled with it is likewise prohibited.
  In response, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: But aren’t the stomach contents of a burnt-offering subject to a more stringent prohibition than the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass? And yet they said: A priest who is open-minded [<i>shedato yafa</i>] with regard to what he eats may swallow [<i>shorefah</i>] the stomach contents of a burnt-offering while they are raw, and the other Sages did not agree with him. But the Sages said: One may not derive benefit from the stomach contents of a burnt-offering <i>ab initio</i>, and if one did derive benefit from them, he is not liable for misusing consecrated property. According to both opinions, deriving benefit from the stomach contents of a burnt-offering is not prohibited by Torah law. Since the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a burnt-offering is more stringent than that of an animal carcass, why would deriving benefit from the carcass be prohibited, while deriving benefit from the burnt-offering is permitted?
  Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Yishmael: The cheese of gentiles is prohibited because they curdle it in the stomach contents of calves used for idol worship. Since it is prohibited to derive benefit from such calves, cheese curdled in their stomach contents is also prohibited. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: If that is so, why didn’t the Sages prohibit deriving any benefit from the cheese, instead of merely prohibiting its consumption?
  Instead of answering Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Yehoshua diverted his attention to another matter and said to him: Yishmael, how do you read the following verse in the Song of Songs (1:2)? Do you read it as: For Your love [<i>dodekha</i>] is better than wine, or as: For your love [<i>dodayikh</i>] is better than wine? The first version, which is in the masculine form, would be a reference to God, whereas the second version, in the feminine, would be a reference to the Jewish people.
  Rabbi Yishmael said to him that it should be read in the feminine: For your love [<i>dodayikh</i>] is better than wine. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The matter is not so, as another verse teaches with regard to it: “Your ointments [<i>shemanekha</i>] have a goodly fragrance” (Song of Songs 1:3). This phrase, which appears in the next verse, is written in the masculine form, and therefore it is determined that the preceding verse can also be understood in the masculine form.
  GEMARA: From where do we derive that wine belonging to gentiles is prohibited? Rabba bar Avuh says that the verse states: “Who did eat the fat of their offerings, and drank the wine of their drink-offering” (Deuteronomy 32:38). This verse juxtaposes the fat of gentile sacrifices to their wine: Just as deriving benefit from their offering is prohibited, so too, deriving benefit from their wine is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the prohibition with regard to an offering itself? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “They joined themselves also unto Baal of Peor, and ate the offerings to the dead” (Psalms 106:28). This verse teaches that just as deriving benefit from a corpse is prohibited, so too, deriving benefit from an offering of idolatry is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive the prohibition of a corpse itself? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verbal analogy between the words “there” and “there” employed with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken to absolve a city from bearing responsibility for the death of a visitor. It is written here: “And Miriam died there” (Numbers 20:1), and it is written there: “And the elders of that city shall bring down the heifer unto a rough valley, which may neither be plowed nor sown, and shall break the heifer’s neck there in the valley” (Deuteronomy 21:4). Just as there, deriving benefit from the heifer is prohibited, so too here, deriving benefit from a corpse is prohibited.
  And there, from where do we learn that deriving benefit from the heifer is prohibited? The Sages said in the school of Rabbi Yannai: A term of atonement is written with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken (Deuteronomy 21:8), just as it is written with regard to sacrificial animals. This teaches that deriving benefit from the heifer is prohibited, just as deriving benefit from sacrificial animals is prohibited.
  § The mishna teaches: And vinegar belonging to gentiles that was originally wine is prohibited. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Just because the wine has soured, should its prohibition lapse? Rav Ashi said: This comes to teach us that our vinegar that is in a gentile’s possession does not require a seal within a seal for it to remain permitted for consumption. Rather, one seal is sufficient. Rav Ashi explains the reason for this leniency: If the concern is due to idolatrous libation, gentiles do not offer libations of vinegar. And if it is due to the concern that a gentile may secretly exchange his prohibited vinegar with the vinegar of a Jew, since there is one seal, the gentile will not exert himself and forge a different seal in order to facilitate the exchange.
  Rabbi Ile’a says: We learned that cooked wine belonging to gentiles that was originally uncooked wine is prohibited. The Gemara again asks: Isn’t this obvious? Just because the wine was cooked, should its prohibition lapse? Rav Ashi said: This comes to teach us that our cooked wine that is in a gentile’s possession does not require a seal within a seal for it to remain permitted for consumption. Rather, one seal is sufficient. Rav Ashi elaborates: If the concern is due to idolatrous libation, gentiles do not offer libations of cooked wine. And if it is due to
  
  Daf 30a
  
  the concern that a gentile may secretly exchange his wine with the wine of a Jew, since there is one seal, the gentile will not exert himself and forge a different seal in order to facilitate the exchange.
  § The Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> with regard to various types of wine. The Sages taught: Cooked wine and <i>aluntit</i> of gentiles are prohibited; but already prepared <i>aluntit</i> that was made by a Jew before it entered the gentile’s possession is permitted. The Gemara asks: And what is <i>aluntit</i>? It is as we learned in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to Shabbat: One may prepare <i>anomlin</i>, but one may not prepare <i>aluntit</i>. The <i>baraita</i> clarifies: And what is <i>anomlin</i> and what is <i>aluntit</i>? <i>Anomlin</i> is a drink that is a mixture of wine, honey, and pepper. <i>Aluntit</i> is a mixture of aged wine and clear water and balsam, which they prepare for drinking after bathing in a bathhouse to cool down from the heat of the bathhouse. It is prohibited to prepare <i>aluntit</i> on Shabbat because it is a type of remedy.
  Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Diluted wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, according to which the consumption of a liquid is prohibited if it is left uncovered; and cooked wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of libation, which prohibits deriving benefit from wine that has been in a gentile’s possession. A dilemma was raised before them: With regard to cooked wine, is it subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, or is it not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure? The Gemara resolves the dilemma: Come and hear: Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi testified about cooked wine and stated that it is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure.
  The Gemara cites another proof that cooked wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. When Rabbi Yannai bar Yishmael became ill, Rabbi Yishmael ben Zeirud and other Sages went to him to inquire about his health. They were seated, and this very dilemma was raised before them: With regard to cooked wine, is it subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, or is it not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure? Rabbi Yishmael ben Zeirud said to them: This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in the name of a great man. Parenthetically, the Gemara asks: And who is this great man? He is Rabbi Ḥiyya. He said: Cooked wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. The Sages said to Rabbi Yishmael ben Zeirud: Shall we rely on this claim? Rabbi Yannai bar Yishmael motioned to them: Upon me and upon my neck, i.e., you can certainly rely on this claim.
  The Gemara relates another incident: Shmuel and Ablet, a gentile scholar, were sitting together, and others brought cooked wine before them. Ablet withdrew his hand to avoid rendering the wine prohibited to Shmuel. Seeing this, Shmuel said to Ablet that the Sages said: Cooked wine is not subject to the prohibition of wine used for a libation, and therefore you need not withdraw your hand on my account.
  The Gemara cites yet another incident: Rabbi Ḥiyya’s maidservant noticed that a certain container of cooked wine had become exposed. She came before Rabbi Ḥiyya, who said to her that the Sages said: Cooked wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. Similarly, Rav Adda bar Ahava’s attendant noticed that a certain container of diluted wine had become exposed. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him that the Sages said: Diluted wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure.
  Rav Pappa said: We said that wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure only in a case where it was well diluted, but where it was only partially diluted a snake might still drink from it, and therefore it is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this claim: And is it correct that a snake drinks partially diluted wine? But wasn’t Rabba bar Rav Huna once traveling on a ship while carrying a jug of wine with him, and he saw a certain snake that slithered and approached the wine. He said to his attendant: Remove the eyes of this serpent, i.e., do something that will cause the snake to leave. His attendant took a bit of water and threw it in the wine, and the snake turned away. This indicates that snakes do not drink partially diluted wine.
  The Gemara rejects this conclusion: For undiluted wine, a snake will risk its life by exposing itself to humans, but for diluted wine, a snake will not risk its life. But in either case, if the wine is left unguarded, a snake will drink from it.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: And is it true that for diluted wine a snake will not risk its life? But wasn’t Rabbi Yannai once in Bei Akhborei, and some say that it was bar Hadaya who was in Bei Akhborei, and others were sitting with him and drinking diluted wine. When they finished, they had some wine left in the container [<i>bekhuva</i>], and they covered it with a cloth. And then they saw a certain snake take water in its mouth and pour it through the cloth into the container until the liquid filled the container and the wine flowed over the cloth, and the snake drank the overflowing wine. This shows that a snake will risk its life to drink diluted wine.
  The Sages say in response: Wine that the snake itself diluted, it does drink. Wine that another diluted, it does not drink. In other words, a snake does not drink diluted wine unless it was diluted by the snake itself. Accordingly, even partially diluted wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure.
  Rav Ashi says, and some say that it was Rav Mesharshiyya who says: Are you providing a resolution for a situation involving danger? In other words, one may not endanger lives by subscribing to such reasoning. Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> is that diluted wine is subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure and is also subject to the prohibition of wine used as a libation for idolatry; cooked wine is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure and is not subject to the prohibition of wine used for a libation either.
  § After discussing exposed wine, the Gemara addresses the matter of exposed water. The attendant of Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi noticed that a certain jug of water had become exposed, and he had been sleeping near it. He went to Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi to determine the halakhic status of the exposed water. Rav Ḥilkiya said to him that the Sages said: Fear of a sleeping person is upon them, i.e., snakes will not attempt to drink from a container that is near a person, even if he is asleep. And this matter applies only during the day, but not at night. The Gemara comments: But that is not so. Rather, there is no difference between one who sleeps during the day and one who sleeps during the night. In both cases, we do not say that the fear of a sleeping person is upon the snakes.
  The Gemara presents the opinions of Rav and Shmuel with regard to various sources of water. Rav would not drink water from the house of an Aramean, as he said: They are not careful with regard to exposure. But he would drink water from the house of a widow, as he said: She upholds her late husband’s conventions and ensures that liquids are not left uncovered.
  By contrast, Shmuel would not drink water from the house of a widow, as he said: She no longer has the fear of a man upon her, and therefore she does not necessarily cover the water. But he would drink water from the house of an Aramean, as he said: Granted that they are not particular about the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, but in any event they are particular about cleanliness, and will cover it for hygienic reasons, if not halakhic ones. The Gemara cites a different version: Some say that Rav would not drink water from the house of an Aramean, but he would drink water from the house of a widow. Shmuel would not drink water either from the house of an Aramean or from the house of a widow.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: There are three kinds of wines that are not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, and they are: Sharp, bitter, and sweet wines. Sharp is referring to acrid wine [<i>tila</i>] that cracks the jug, due to its acidity. Bitter is referring to <i>yarneka</i>. Sweet is referring to sweetened wine. These three wines that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says are not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure are all of low quality. Rav Ḥama teaches that the three wines are of high quality: Sharp is referring to wine mixed with peppers. Bitter is referring to wine mixed with wormwood [<i>apsintin</i>]. Sweet is referring to <i>mei barg</i>, a choice beverage.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: <i>Karina</i> is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. The Gemara asks: What is <i>karina</i>? Rabbi Abbahu said: It is sweet wine that comes from Asia [<i>Asya</i>] Minor. Rava says: But in its place of origin it is subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. What is the reason? The reason is that there, it is the wine of the province and snakes do not hesitate to drink from it. Rava said: With regard to this wine that has soured [<i>de’akrim</i>], until three days have passed from when it began to sour, it is subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure and is subject to the prohibition of wine used for a libation.
  
  Daf 30b
  
  From this point forward, it is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure and is not subject to the prohibition of wine used for a libation. And the Sages of Neharde’a say: Even after three days, we are concerned with regard to exposure. What is the reason? It is because at times it occurs that a snake drinks even sour wine.
  § The Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> of exposure with regard to various foods and beverages. The Sages taught: Wine that is still fermenting is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. And how long is its fermentation process? It is three days. Cress-based dishes are not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, but the residents of the Diaspora are accustomed to treating them as prohibited if they were left exposed. And we said this only in a case where the dishes do not contain vinegar; but if they do contain vinegar, the vinegar repels the snakes, and in such a situation even the inhabitants of the Diaspora do not treat them as prohibited.
  The Gemara continues: Babylonian <i>kutaḥ</i>, a popular dip, is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure, but the residents of the Diaspora are accustomed to treating it as prohibited. Rav Menashei said: If the <i>kutaḥ</i> has indentations in it, we are concerned that they are from a snake’s fangs, and it is therefore prohibited. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Shmuel says: Dripping water is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure while it is being collected. Rav Ashi said: And that is the <i>halakha</i> only in a case where the dripping occurs one drop immediately after another drop, i.e., continuously, as the snake will not drink from it in that circumstance.
  Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Shmuel says: The mouth of a fig is not subject to the <i>halakha</i> of exposure. In accordance with whose opinion is this stated? It is stated in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said: A person may eat grapes and figs at night, and he need not have cause for concern, as it is stated: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6). This verse teaches that one need not fear that harm might befall him when he engages in commonplace activities.
  Rav Safra says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua Deroma: There are three kinds of snake venom: Venom of a young snake, which sinks to the bottom when it is deposited in liquid; venom of a snake of intermediate age, i.e., a snake that is no longer young, which is suspended in the liquid; and venom of an old snake, which floats at the top. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that as a snake ages, the strength of its venom becomes weaker? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that three creatures become stronger as they age, and they are: A fish, a snake, and a pig? The Gemara answers: It is physically that a snake strengthens, but the potency of its venom diminishes.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> was it stated that the venom of a young snake sinks? The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a barrel that was uncovered, even though nine people drank from it and did not die, the tenth should not drink from it, as the venom may have sunk to the bottom of the barrel. The Gemara relates that there was an incident in which nine people drank from an exposed barrel and did not die, and a tenth subsequently drank from it and died. Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is an example of venom that sinks.
  And similarly, with regard to a melon that was exposed, even though nine people ate from it and did not die, the tenth should not eat from it. Again, there was an incident in which nine people ate from a melon and did not die, and the tenth ate from it and died. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This is an example of venom that sinks.
  The Sages taught: With regard to water that was exposed, one may not pour it out in the public thoroughfare, nor settle dust with it by sprinkling it in the house, nor mix clay with it, nor give it to drink to his animal or the animal of another, nor wash his face, hands, or feet with it. Others say: If the part that one is washing is an area of the body that has a crevice in it, it is prohibited to wash it with exposed water, as the venom may seep through the crevice; if the body part does not have a crevice, it is permitted.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: The opinion introduced with the phrase: Others say, is identical to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>. Both hold that one may not wash his face, hands, and feet with exposed water, as these body parts have crevices in them. The Gemara explains: There is a difference between them with regard to the back of the hand and the back of the foot, and the upper part of the face, i.e., the area of the cheekbones. According to the opinion introduced with the phrase: Others say, it is permitted to wash those parts of the body, as they are free of crevices. According to the first <i>tanna</i> it is prohibited, as they are part of the face, hands, and feet.
  The Master said above concerning exposed water: Nor give it to drink to his animal or the animal of another. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: But one may give exposed water to his own animal to drink? The Gemara answers: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is referring to a cat, as cats are less susceptible to snake venom. The Gemara challenges: If that is so, let him also give the water to the cat of another. The Gemara explains: The venom weakens the cat of another. The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t the venom also weaken his own cat? The Gemara explains: It will later recover. The Gemara challenges: The cat of another will also recover later. The Gemara explains: Although both will eventually recover, there are times that the owner wishes to sell the cat and loses potential profit from the cat’s current weakness.
  Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira: There are three kinds of prohibited wines: It is prohibited to derive benefit from wine used for a libation, and the wine imparts severe ritual impurity when it has the volume of an olive-bulk.
  
  Daf 31a
  
  It is prohibited to derive benefit from nondescript wine of a gentile, and the wine imparts the ritual impurity of liquids when it has the volume of one-quarter of a <i>log</i>. With regard to the wine of one who deposits his wine with a gentile, one is prohibited from drinking it, but one is permitted to derive benefit from it.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Bekhorot</i> 11b): With regard to one who deposits his produce with a gentile, it has the status of the produce of a gentile with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year and with regard to tithe, as the gentile might have exchanged the Jew’s produce with untithed produce or produce of the Sabbatical Year. According to this logic, wine deposited with a gentile should be entirely prohibited, due to the concern that the gentile exchanged it with his own. The Gemara answers: It is permitted for one to derive benefit from the wine in a case where the gentile designated a corner for the Jew’s wine, i.e., if the wine was locked away in a specific place to which only a Jew has access.
  The Gemara questions this: If that is so, drinking from the wine should also be permitted. As Rabbi Yoḥanan once happened to come to Parod, where the deceased <i>tanna</i> bar Kappara had lived. When he arrived, he said: Is there any Mishna of bar Kappara here? In response, Rabbi Tanḥum of Parod taught him the following <i>baraita</i>, citing bar Kappara: With regard to one who deposits his wine with a gentile, drinking from the wine is permitted.
  Upon hearing this, Rabbi Yoḥanan read the following verse about him: “Where the tree falls, there it shall be” (Ecclesiastes 11:3). Does it enter your mind that this means that the tree itself will be there? It is obvious that a fallen tree lands where it falls. Rather, the verse is saying: There its fruits shall be. The verse is a metaphor for a Sage, and its fruits represent his disciples. Rabbi Yoḥanan was intimating that although bar Kappara may have died, Rabbi Tanḥum, his disciple, perpetuates his wisdom.
  In any event, it is apparent from the <i>baraita</i> quoted by Rabbi Tanḥum that there is a case in which it is permitted to drink wine deposited with a gentile. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira. Rabbi Zeira said that it is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which permits drinking wine deposited with a gentile, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, whereas that statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Rabbi Zeira elaborates: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to both one who purchases or one who rents a house located in a gentile’s courtyard, and they filled the house with containers of wine, and the key to the house or a seal is in the possession of a Jew, so that the gentile cannot access the wine, in which case it is even more secure than when a corner is designated for the Jew’s wine, Rabbi Eliezer permits the wine, and the Rabbis prohibit it.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Naḥmani, says that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says, and some say that Rav Ḥisda says that Ze’eiri says, and some say that Rav Ḥisda says: Abba bar Ḥama said to me that this is what Ze’eiri said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rabbi Elazar says: All substances are sufficiently secured by one seal, except wine, which is not sufficiently secured by one seal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even wine is secured by one seal. And they do not disagree in their reasoning. Rather, this opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that opinion of Rabbi Elazar is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  There are those who say that Rabbi Elazar says: All substances are secured by a seal within a seal, i.e., two seals, except wine, which is not secured by a seal within a seal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even wine is secured by a seal within a seal. And both hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis: One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that when the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, it is with regard to one seal, but in the case of a seal within a seal, they concede that there is no concern that the gentile might have opened it, and therefore they permit the wine. And one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that they prohibited even wine that was secured by a seal within a seal.
  The Gemara asks: What is a seal within a seal like? Rava says: A basin placed over the mouth of a barrel that is smeared with clay and stamped with a seal is considered a seal within a seal. And if not, it is not considered a seal within a seal. If a basket is placed over a barrel and is fastened to it, this is a seal within a seal; if it is not fastened to the barrel, it is not a seal within a seal. With regard to a wineskin that is placed in a sack [<i>disakaya</i>], if the wineskin’s stopper is facing downward, this is a seal within a seal; if its stopper is facing upward, this is not a seal within a seal. And if he bends the wineskin’s bottleneck inward and ties the sack and seals it, this is also considered a seal within a seal.
  § The Sages taught: At first, the Sages would say that wine from the Samaritan city of Ein Kushi is prohibited, due to the concern that it might have come into contact with the idolatrous inhabitants of Birat Serika, and similarly the wine of Barkata is prohibited due to the idolatrous inhabitants of the village of Parshai, and the wine of Zagdor is prohibited due to the village of Shaleim. Subsequently, they retracted and began saying: Open barrels are prohibited but sealed barrels are permitted.
  The Gemara asks: What did they reason initially, and what did they reason ultimately? The Gemara answers: Initially they reasoned: A Samaritan is not particular about the touch of an idolatrous gentile, and there is no difference in this regard between open barrels and sealed barrels. And ultimately they reasoned: When Samaritans are not particular about agentile’s touch, this is only with regard to open barrels, but with regard to sealed barrels, they are particular. Since Samaritans ensure that gentiles do not handle sealed barrels of wine, this wine is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: But are sealed barrels permitted? And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this notion
  
  Daf 31b
  
  from the following <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who sends a barrel of wine in the hands of a Samaritan, or a barrel of fish brine or a barrel of fish stew in the hands of a gentile, if he recognizes his seal and his manner of closing the barrel, it is permitted; if he does not recognize them, it is prohibited. Apparently, a sealed barrel is permitted only when it is recognizable.
  Rabbi Zeira said that this is not difficult. Here, the first <i>baraita</i> is referring to barrels located in a city; there, the second <i>baraita</i> is referring to barrels that the Samaritan carries on the road. Sealed barrels are permitted in a city because the Samaritan is careful to ensure that gentiles do not touch them in front of anyone, so that he does not forfeit the business of Jews. While traveling he is not concerned, as he assumes that no one will discover that the gentile came into contact with the wine.
  Rabbi Yirmeya objects to this: Didn’t these barrels located in the city come by the road as well? Rather, Rabbi Yirmeya says: We learned the <i>baraita</i> that permits sealed barrels only in reference to those that are located between the winepresses. Since everyone is found there, the Samaritan is apprehensive, as he says to himself: Now, if someone sees me allowing a gentile to handle the wine they will cause me to lose my profit, as Jews will not purchase it.
  It was stated: For what reason did the Sages prohibit the beer of gentiles? Rami bar Ḥama says that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: It is due to the concern that Jews will befriend gentiles while drinking with them, which might lead to marriage with gentiles. Rav Naḥman said: It is due to the concern of exposure.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what form of exposure is there a concern? If we say that the concern is with regard to exposure of the vat, we too expose the vat, and there is no reason to prohibit gentiles’ beer more than that of Jews. And if you say: Rather, the concern is for exposure of the barrel, we also expose barrels. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to prohibit the beer in a place where the water used to brew it is allowed to settle.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, aged beer should be permitted, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: A substance that might contain exposed water but has aged is permitted, since the poison does not allow it to age, as it goes bad before it grows old. Similarly, if it soured it is permitted, because the poison impairs the taste but does not allow it to sour. Why, then, is all beer prohibited? The Gemara answers: The Sages issued a rabbinic decree with regard to aged beer due to the concern with regard to new beer.
  § The Gemara cites the opinions of various Sages with regard to beer. Rav Pappa had them bring out the beer belonging to gentiles from the store to the entrance of the store, and he would drink it outside the store. Rav Aḥai had them bring the beer to his house, and he would drink it there. And both of them drank the beer away from the presence of gentiles due to concern about marriage with gentiles. The Gemara notes that Rav Aḥai established an extreme preventive measure for himself beyond what is required by <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Shmuel bar Bisna happened to come to Marguan, and they brought him wine but he did not drink it. Next they brought him beer but he did not drink it. The Gemara asks: Granted, he did not drink the wine due to the trace [<i>shimtza</i>] of libations, but due to what reason did he refrain from drinking beer? It was due to concern for the trace of a trace, i.e., he did not drink beer due to concern about drinking wine.
  Rav says: This Aramean beer is permitted, but my son Ḥiyya does not drink from it. The Gemara asks: Whichever way you look at this matter, Rav’s statement is difficult: If the beer is permitted, then it is permitted to everyone, and there is no reason for his son to refrain from drinking it. And if it is prohibited, it is prohibited to everyone, and why would Rav say it is permitted?
  The Gemara explains: Rather, Rav holds that the prohibition is due to exposure, but the bitterness of the hops in the beer goes and impairs the snake’s venom, so that it is safe for an average person to drink. But a person of weak constitution is weakened further by the impaired venom, and Rav was saying: In the case of my son Ḥiyya, since he is weak, he does not drink from it.
  Shmuel says: All creeping animals possess venom; that of a snake kills, whereas the venom of other creeping animals does not kill. Shmuel said to Ḥiyya bar Rav: Son of a lion! Come and I will say to you a superior matter that your father, Rav, said. This is what your father said: These Arameans are swollen [<i>zukanei</i>] because they drink exposed liquids, but they did not die from doing so since they eat repugnant creatures and creeping animals, which heat their bodies and thereby render them less susceptible to the venom.
  Rav Yosef says:
  
  Daf 32a
  
  This vinegar made of Aramean beer is prohibited, as they mix in it yeast of wine used for a libation. Rav Ashi said: But vinegar from a storeroom is permitted, since if another substance is mixed with it, it would spoil over time.
  § The mishna teaches: And Hadrianic earthenware is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is Hadrianic earthenware? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is earthenware of Emperor Hadrian. When Rav Dimi came, he said: There was an expanse of virgin soil that no man had ever tilled before, and Hadrian tilled it and planted grapevines in it, which yielded wine of the highest quality. And they placed this wine in white jugs, and the jugs absorbed the wine. And they would break the jugs into shards and carry the shards with them, and anywhere that they stopped, they soaked these shards in water and drank the water. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: And our first-rate wine is like the wine produced by the third usage of their Hadrianic earthenware.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> if one wishes to use such shards to support the legs of a bed with them? Is one who desires a prohibited item’s continued existence in order to use it for another matter, i.e., not for the prohibited purpose, permitted to use it or prohibited from doing so? In this case, no benefit whatsoever is derived from the wine absorbed within the shards, but the shards themselves are being used to support the bed.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan engaged in a dispute in this case: One prohibited using the shards in such a fashion, and one permitted this practice. The Gemara adds: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Sage who prohibited it.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> to the Sage who deems it permitted: With regard to the jugs [<i>dardurin</i>] and flagons [<i>rokva’ot</i>] of gentiles that have a Jew’s wine contained in them, one is prohibited from drinking the wine, but one is permitted to derive benefit from it. The Gemara notes that Shimon ben Guda testified before the son of Rabban Gamliel with regard to Rabban Gamliel that he drank from it in Akko, but the Sages did not concede to the ramifications of his testimony.
  Concerning wineskins that belong to gentiles, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Kefusai: It is prohibited to fashion from them items such as blankets to cover a donkey, as one derives benefit from them. The Gemara explains the objection: And here, in the case of wineskins used as donkey covers, he desires its continued existence for another matter, and yet the <i>baraita</i> teaches that it is prohibited to use it for this purpose.
  The Gemara retorts: And according to your reasoning, it should be prohibited to sell jugs belonging to gentiles, and yet Jews sell them frequently; what is different about wineskins, from which one may not derive indirect benefit, and what is different about jugs, which may be sold for indirect benefit? The Gemara answers that Rava says: There is a rabbinic decree that one may not sell wineskins of gentiles lest his own wineskin break open, and to repair it he would take the gentile’s wineskin and sew it onto his wineskin. This would cause the wine absorbed in the gentile’s wineskin to mix with the wine of the Jew and render it forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that someone who desires the continued existence of a prohibited item for another matter is prohibited from using the item in this way, what is different about jugs that purchasing them is permitted? The Gemara explains that this Sage could have said to you: There, with regard to the jugs, there is no substantive prohibited entity, whereas here, in the case of Hadrianic earthenware, there is a substantive prohibited entity, as the wine is recognizable in the earthenware.
  § It was stated that Shimon ben Guda provided testimony, but the Sages did not concede to its ramifications. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to wine that comes in the flagons of gentiles, one is prohibited from drinking the wine, but one is permitted to derive benefit from it. Shimon ben Guda testified before the son of Rabban Gamliel with regard to Rabban Gamliel that he drank from it in Akko, and they conceded to him. This directly contradicts the episode cited above.
  The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the sentence: But they did not concede to the ramifications of his testimony, which was stated there, in the first account? The meaning is that the rest of his entire company, i.e., the Sages, did not concede, but his son did concede to him. If you wish, say instead that Guda with the letter <i>alef</i>, as stated in the first episode, is discrete, and Guda with an <i>ayin</i>, in the second account, is discrete, i.e., the two incidents are not referring to the same individual.
  § The mishna further teaches: And hides with a tear opposite the heart are prohibited. The Sages taught: What is considered a hide with a tear opposite the heart? Any hide that is torn opposite the heart and incised in a shape similar to an aperture, and which has a trace of coagulated blood on it, is prohibited.
  
  Daf 32b
  
  If it does not have a trace of blood upon it, then it is permitted. Rav Huna says: They taught that a bloodless hide is permitted only in a case where the gentile did not salt it, but if he salted it, it is prohibited, as I say: Its salting removed the trace of blood.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A hide is prohibited only when the tear around its heart is circular, but if it is elongated, it is permitted. The Gemara notes: Rav Yosef says that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If one rules that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, does that mean by inference that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps there is no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Abaye said to him, invoking a folk expression with regard to one who learns without achieving understanding: Is it simply learn the lesson; let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? No; it is necessary to examine an issue to understand it even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.
  § The mishna further teaches: Meat that enters the house of idol worship, before it is sacrificed, is permitted. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as if one were to posit that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, this would be difficult: Doesn’t he say: When slaughtering an animal, a gentile’s unspecified intention is to use it for idol worship? Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar would disagree with the ruling of the mishna that meat entering a house of idol worship is permitted.
  The mishna teaches: And meat that exits the house of idol worship is prohibited because it is considered as offerings to the dead, i.e., idols. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that it is classified as such? It is because it is impossible that it is not an idolatrous offering. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion does this reflect? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: From where is it derived that an idolatrous offering imparts ritual impurity by means of a tent to an individual or item situated together with it under the same structure, even if they do not come into direct contact? As it is stated: “They joined themselves also unto Baal of Peor, and ate the offerings to the dead” (Psalms 106:28). Just as a corpse imparts ritual impurity by means of a tent, so too idolatrous offerings impart ritual impurity by means of a tent. Similarly, Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira would hold that just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a corpse, so too it is prohibited to derive benefit from idolatrous offerings.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to those going to a festival of idolatry, it is prohibited to engage with them in business. The Gemara notes that Shmuel says: In the case of a gentile who goes to a festival of idolatry, if he is on his way to the festival it is prohibited to engage in business with him, as he subsequently goes and offers thanks before the object of idol worship. Upon his return it is permitted, as what was, was, i.e., he has already finished his worship, and refraining from engaging in business with the gentile at this stage will accomplish nothing.
  Conversely, with regard to a Jew who goes to a festival of idolatry, if he is on his way to the festival it is permitted to engage in business with him, as perhaps he will retract from his plan and will not go. Upon his return, it is prohibited, since
  
  Daf 33a
  
  he will cleave to it and go to worship idolatry once again.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that with regard to a Jew who goes to a festival of idolatry, whether he is on the way there or returning from it, it is prohibited to engage in business with him? The Gemara answers that Rav Ashi said: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is in reference to an apostate Jew, who will certainly go to the festival, and will certainly not change his mind.
  The Sages taught: With regard to a gentile who goes to a fair, where goods and idols are bought and sold, whether he is on the way there or returning from it, it is permitted to engage in business with him. With regard to a Jew who goes to a fair, when he is on the way there, it is permitted to engage in business with him, but if he is returning from it, it is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about a Jew that it is prohibited to engage in business with him when he is returning? The Gemara answers that this is in accordance with that which the Sages say: He sold objects of idol worship, and therefore money gained from idol worship is in his possession. Since the money in his possession is assumed to have been gained through objects of idolatry, it is prohibited to engage in business with the Jew. The Gemara challenges: But with regard to a gentile, also, let us say: He sold objects of idol worship, and therefore money gained from idol worship is in his possession. Why is it prohibited to do business only with the Jew?
  The Gemara suggests: Rather, with regard to a gentile, we say: He sold clothing or he sold wine, but not idols. The Gemara questions this: Then with regard to a Jew, also, let us say: One should say that he sold clothing or he sold wine, but not idols. The Gemara explains: If he had only wine or clothing to sell, he would have sold them here instead of going to the fair. The fact that he exerted himself to travel to a fair of gentiles indicates that he intended to sell idols.
  § The mishna teaches: And with regard to those who are coming from a festival of idolatry, it is permitted to engage with them in business. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Sages taught this only with regard to a case where those returning are not attached to one another, i.e., they are not traveling in groups. But where they are attached to one another it is prohibited to engage in business with them, as I say: The gentile intends to return to the festival with his companions.
  § The mishna further teaches: Wineskins and jugs that belong to gentiles and that have a Jew’s wine contained in them are prohibited. The Sages taught: With regard to wineskins of gentiles, if they are stripped and free from tar, and new, they are permitted, but old and tarred containers are prohibited. Nevertheless, if a gentile pitched them [<i>ribbevan</i>] and lined them and added wine to them to negate the flavor of the tar while a Jew stands over him, one need not be concerned for a prohibition.
  The Gemara asks: But once we have established that a gentile places wine in the containers, what of the fact that a Jew stands over him? Why does this affect the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa said that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If a gentile pitched the containers and lined them, and a Jew then placed wine in them while another Jew stood over him, one need not be concerned that it is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: But since a Jew is the one who places wine in them, why do I need another Jew to stand over him? The Gemara answers: It is necessary as perhaps due to the Jew’s preoccupation with pouring the wine, the gentile will manage to libate the wine, and the Jew will be unaware of it.
  The Gemara presents an alternative interpretation. Rav Zevid said: Actually, it should be as you initially said, that the gentile himself pours the wine. And here, when he pours the wine into the container, he is considered as one who splashes water in clay and does not intend to use it as a libation. Rav Pappi said: Conclude from the statement of Rav Zevid that with regard to this incident involving a gentile who casts wine into the salt receptacle of a Jew, the salt is permitted, as the gentile has no intention of using the wine as a libation.
  Rav Ashi objects to this: Are the two cases comparable? There, with regard to the pitched container, the flavor of the wine is going to be lost, due to the tar. But here, in the case of the salt receptacle, the flavor of the wine is not going to be lost. Therefore there is no reason to rule that the salt is permitted.
  The Gemara relates a relevant incident. Bar Adi the Arab seized certain wineskins from Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef, placed wine in them for an extended period of time, and then returned them to him. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came and asked in the study hall what course of action he should take. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: This is what Rabbi Ami instructed me to do in terms of practical <i>halakha</i>: One fills the skins with water for three days, so that the water will absorb the flavor of the wine, and then pours the water out. And Rava says: In addition, one must pour out the water in them every twenty-four-hour period and then refill them. Once this has been performed, the wineskins will be permitted.
  It was understood from the above incident that this matter, i.e., that one may fill the wineskins with water for three days to render them permitted, applies only to our wineskins that were taken by gentiles. But with regard to their own wineskins, it does not apply, as they are permanently prohibited. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Both ours and theirs can be rendered permitted in this manner. Similarly, Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, thought to say before Rav Ashi: This matter applies only to wineskins, but not to jugs. Rav Ashi said to him: There is no difference between wineskins and jugs, as both can be rendered permitted in this manner.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the halakhic status of various wineskins. The Sages taught: With regard to wineskins of gentiles, if they are new and stripped free from tar, they are permitted, but old and tarred containers are prohibited. If a gentile places wine in them, the Jew should put water in them. Additionally, if a gentile places wine in them, the Jew may put brine and fish stew in them immediately, and he need not be concerned.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages:
  
  Daf 33b
  
  Is it permitted to put brine or fish stew in the wineskins <i>ab initio</i>, or is the substance permitted only after the fact? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as Rav Zevid bar Oshaya teaches: With regard to one who purchases jugs from gentiles, if they are new, he may place wine in them, and if they are old, he may place brine and fish stew in them <i>ab initio</i>.
  § The Gemara discusses the effect of fire on prohibited vessels. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: If one returned prohibited containers to the furnace and they whitened due to its heat, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the fire assumed to expunge the absorbed wine or not? Rabbi Ami said to him: If brine burns away the wine, all the more so is it not clear that fire does as well? It was also stated that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to jugs belonging to gentiles that one returned to the furnace, once their tar has disintegrated they are permitted.
  Rav Ashi said: Do not say that the jugs must stay in the furnace until the tar falls apart entirely; rather, even if it only softens, the jug is permitted, despite the fact that the tar did not fall off. The Gemara adds: With regard to a situation in which the tar was removed by dropping ignited splinters of wood [<i>kinsa</i>] into the jug, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree: One deemed the jug prohibited, and one deemed it permitted. The Gemara adds: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the one who deemed it prohibited.
  The Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> with regard to beer kept in a prohibited vessel. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to putting beer in it? Rav Naḥman and Rav Yehuda prohibited this, and Rava permitted it. The Gemara notes that Ravina permitted Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Yitzḥak, to pour beer into such a jug, but he went and poured wine into it instead. And even so, Ravina was not concerned over the matter, as he said to himself: It is merely an incidental occurrence. The fact that Rav Ḥiyya mistakenly poured wine into the jug instead of beer is not a reason to prohibit filling it with beer in general.
  § The Gemara discusses different vessels and the <i>halakhot</i> that pertain to them. Rav Yitzḥak bar Bisna had certain vessels made of cow dung [<i>defakosna</i>] that had contained wine of gentiles, which he filled with water and placed in the sun in order to rid them of the forbidden substance they had absorbed. As a result, they burst. Rabbi Abba then said to him in jest: You have rendered them prohibited to you forever, i.e., you have destroyed them completely. You may say that the Sages said that one should fill the containers with water, but did anyone say that you should place them in the sun?
  Rabbi Yusna says that Rabbi Ami says: A natron vessel has no ritual purification, i.e., it cannot be rendered suitable for use, ever. The reason is that this material is highly absorbent. The Gemara asks: What is a natron vessel? Rabbi Yosei bar Avin says: It is a vessel crafted from the excavation of alum powder.
  The Gemara relates that an individual named Parzak, from house of the vizier [<i>rofila</i>], seized certain vessels from Jews of Pumbedita, placed wine of gentiles in them, and later returned the containers to them. They went and asked Rav Yehuda for a halakhic ruling on this matter. Rav Yehuda said: This vessel is an item that is not brought into storage for preservation. Accordingly, one may simply scrub such vessels in water, and they are permitted.
  Rav Avira said: With regard to these dark brown Aramean jugs, since they do not absorb substances well, one need only scrub them in water and they are permitted. Rav Pappi likewise said: With regard to these earthenware vessels from Bei Mikhsei, since they do not absorb substances well, one need only scrub them in water, and they are permitted.
  The Gemara continues: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to cups, which hold wine only temporarily, is subject to a dispute: Rav Asi prohibited them, and Rav Ashi permitted them. The Gemara comments: If a gentile drank from a cup for the first time, i.e., it had never been used before, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as a new cup absorbs a great deal of wine in its first usage. They disagree when it is being used for a second time, i.e., the cup has already absorbed a permitted liquid, and therefore its capacity to absorb the gentile’s wine is impaired.
  And there are those who say: If the cup is used for the first or the second time by a gentile, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. They disagree when it is being used for the third time. And the <i>halakha</i> is that a cup used for the first or the second time by a gentile is rendered prohibited, but with regard to the third time, it is permitted.
  Rav Zevid said: With regard to these glazed earthenware vessels, white and black ones are permitted. Green ones are prohibited, because they contain alum, which absorbs liquids well. And if any of these vessels have cracks in them, they are all prohibited. Mareimar taught: Glazed earthenware [<i>kunya</i>] is permitted, whether it is black or white or green, because the coating impairs the capacity of the container to absorb liquids.
  The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from the case of leavened bread on Passover, which is also absorbed? The Gemara explains its question: As they once asked Mareimar: With regard to these glazed earthenware vessels, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning using them on Passover? The Gemara interjects: With regard to green earthenware, do not raise the dilemma, as it contains alum and as a result absorbs leaven well, and it is therefore prohibited. Rather, let the dilemma be raised with regard to white and black earthenware. What is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara qualifies the question further: Where they have cracks in them, do not raise the dilemma, as they certainly absorb that which was placed in them and are therefore prohibited. Rather, let the dilemma be raised where they are perfectly smooth: What is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case? Mareimar said
  
  Daf 34a
  
  to them: I observe that they sweat, i.e., they exude liquid from their exterior. And since they sweat, they certainly absorb, and are therefore prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they cannot be rendered permitted by purging with hot water? It is because the Torah attested with regard to an earthenware vessel that substances absorbed in it are never expelled from its walls.
  The Gemara reiterates its question: Mareimar ruled that glazed earthenware absorbs leavened bread permanently, but he did not rule likewise with regard to wine. But in what way is leavened bread different from wine used for an idolatrous libation? Why is it that Mareimar taught with regard to them: All glazed earthenware vessels are permitted, even if they have contained wine of gentiles?
  The Gemara adds: And if you would say that these cases are different, as leavened bread is prohibited by Torah law whereas wine used for a libation is prohibited by rabbinic law, that is difficult: But there is a principle that all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted them parallel to Torah law. Although this wine is prohibited by rabbinic law, it is subject to the same <i>halakhot</i> as leavened bread. The Gemara answers: This one’s use is with hot substances, and that one’s use is with cold substances. Wine is drunk while it is cold and is therefore absorbed to a lesser extent than leavened bread, which is often cooked in the vessel.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Akiva happened to come to the city of Ginzak, whose residents asked him three questions to which he did not know the answer: First, does one fast for hours, or does one not fast for hours? The answer to the question was not available to Rabbi Akiva. Second, are clay jars that belong to gentiles permanently prohibited, or can they be rendered permitted? The answer was not available to him. Third, in what garments did Moses serve all seven days of the Tabernacle’s inauguration, as acting priest when Aaron and his sons were initiated into the priesthood? Moses presumably did not wear the priestly vestments, as he himself was not a priest. Once again, the answer was not available to him.
  Rabbi Akiva came and asked these questions in the study hall. They said to him: The <i>halakha</i> is that one fasts for hours, and if he completed the fast he prays the prayer of a fast. And the <i>halakha</i> is that the jars that belong to gentiles are permitted after they have not been used for twelve months. Finally, in what garments did Moses serve during the seven days of inauguration? He did not serve in his own clothes, nor in the regular priestly vestments, but in a special white cloak. Rav Kahana teaches: Moses served in a white cloak without a hem.
  § The mishna teaches that residual grape seeds and grape skins that belong to gentiles are prohibited. The Sages taught: Moist grape seeds and grape skins that belong to gentiles are prohibited, but dry ones are permitted. The Gemara asks: Which are considered moist and which are considered dry? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Grape residues are considered moist for all of the first twelve months after the grapes were pressed, and dry after the first twelve months.
  It was stated that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When these grape residues are prohibited, one is prohibited even from deriving benefit from them. When they are permitted, they are permitted even with regard to consumption.
  Rav Zevid says: With regard to these yeasts produced from the wine of Arameans, after twelve months of the year they are permitted. Rav Ḥaviva, son of Rava, says: With regard to these jugs that belong to gentiles, after twelve months of the year they are permitted. Rav Ḥaviva says: With regard to these
  
  Daf 34b
  
  canteens belonging to Arabs, after twelve months of the year they are permitted. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, says: With regard to these Aramean grape pits, after twelve months of the year they are permitted. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, says: With regard to these brown and black jugs, after twelve months of the year they are permitted.
  § The mishna teaches that fish stew is prohibited. The Sages taught: Fish stew prepared by an expert is permitted, as professionals do not mix wine in it. Rabbi Yehuda ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: <i>Ḥilak</i> prepared by an expert is also permitted.
  Avimi, son of Rabbi Abbahu, would teach: Fish stew prepared by an expert is permitted. He would teach this <i>baraita</i> that he received through tradition, and then he would say its explanation: The first time and the second time that fish stew is prepared from a fish, it is permitted, but the third time it is prohibited. What is the reason? With regard to the first time and the second time, as the fish’s oil is plentiful, there is no need to place wine in it. From this point forward, one might place wine in it to compensate for the insufficient fish oil.
  The Gemara relates that there was a certain boat carrying fish stew which came to the port of Akko, and Rabbi Abba from Akko placed guards over it to ensure that no wine would be added to the fish stew. Rava said to him: Until now, who guarded it? Rabbi Abba said to him: Until now, for what should we be concerned? If the problem is due to the concern that they mix wine in it, that concern is unfounded, as in the place where this fish stew was produced, a <i>kista</i> of fish stew sells for one <i>luma</i> while a <i>kista</i> of wine sells for four <i>luma</i>. Since wine was more expensive than fish stew, there is no reason to suspect that wine was added to the stew before it reached Akko, where fish stew is sold at a higher price than wine.
  Upon hearing this, Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: But perhaps they came by means of Tyre, where wine is inexpensive and therefore likely to be added to the fish stew to increase its volume. Rabbi Zeira sad to him: There, by way of Tyre, there are impediments and melted snow, which make travel very difficult, and the boat would not have sailed through that route.
  § The mishna teaches: And cheese of Beit Unyaki is prohibited. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: For what reason did they prohibit deriving benefit from the cheese of Beit Unyaki? It is because most of the calves of that city are slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, and the milk curdled in their stomach contents is prohibited. The Gemara asks: Why does this explanation specifically mention most calves? Even if a minority of calves were slaughtered for idol worship, this would also be reason enough, as Rabbi Meir, who is the <i>tanna</i> of unattributed opinions in a mishna, is generally concerned about a minority.
  The Gemara explains: If you say that the reason for the prohibition is due to a majority of calves slaughtered for idol worship, then despite the fact that the majority of animals in general used to curdle cheese are not slaughtered for idolatrous purposes, there are nevertheless a minority of animals altogether, i.e., the majority of calves, that are, and this minority of calves are cause for concern according to Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara continues: But if you say that Rabbi Meir prohibits the cheese due to a minority of calves, since there are a majority of calves that are not slaughtered for idol worship, and there are also a wider majority of the remaining animals used to curdle milk that are not slaughtered for idol worship at all, this would constitute a minority of a minority, and Rabbi Meir is not concerned for a minority of a minority. Since only a particular minority of animals used to curdle cheese, i.e., calves, are ever slaughtered for idolatry, and even within that group, only a minority are actually slaughtered, even Rabbi Meir would not be concerned.
  Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: Even when calves are slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, what of it? But are you not the one who permits animals slaughtered with idolatrous intentions?
  As it was stated: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for the sake of idol worship, or to burn its prohibited fat for idol worship, is subject to a dispute between <i>amora’im</i>. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, as he holds that one can intend from one rite to another rite. In other words, idolatrous intent while slaughtering an animal renders it prohibited, even if the intention pertains not to the slaughter itself but to sprinkling the blood or burning the fat. And he maintains that we derive <i>halakhot</i> concerning intent outside the Temple from the <i>halakhot</i> concerning intent inside the Temple. Since such intentions at the time of slaughter render an animal prohibited within the Temple, they render it prohibited outside the Temple as well, with regard to idol worship.
  And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that slaughtering an animal for the sake of idol worship does not render it prohibited. This contradicts his previous assertion that it is prohibited to derive benefit from calves that have been slaughtered for the sake of idol worship.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to Rabbi Shimon bar Elyakim: May your fortune be auspicious; the case here is where one says that he is worshipping the idol at the conclusion of the slaughter. Since the act of slaughtering itself is an act of worship, the calf is rendered prohibited immediately.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yehoshua a series of questions. The Gemara notes that Rav Aḥadevoi says that Rav says: With regard to one who betroths a woman by giving her the excrement of an ox that is to be stoned, the woman is betrothed, provided that the excrement was worth one <i>peruta</i>. Although no benefit may be derived from the ox itself, it is permitted to derive benefit from its excrement. But if one attempts to betroth her with the excrement of calves that were used as offerings of idol worship, she is not betrothed, as even their excrement is forbidden. The Gemara remarks: If you wish, propose logical reasoning, and if you wish, cite a verse to substantiate this claim.
  The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose logical reasoning: With regard to calves used for idol worship, a calf’s additional girth derived from the excrement stored in its body is satisfactory for the worshipper, as fatter animals are more impressive offerings. Since the excrement is part of the offering, it is also forbidden. But with regard to an ox that is to be stoned, its additional girth is not satisfactory for the owner, as he gains nothing from it.
  If you wish, cite a verse: It is written here, with regard to an animal used for idol worship: “And there shall cleave naught of the dedicated thing to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18), which indicates that the entire animal is forbidden. And it is written there, with regard to an ox to be stoned: “The ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten” (Exodus 21:28). This teaches that its flesh is forbidden, but its excrement is permitted.
  Rava said: We learned both of these <i>halakhot</i> from the mishna. He elaborates: From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Yishmael that cheese of gentiles is prohibited because they curdle it in the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass, one can derive the <i>halakha</i> of the excrement of an ox that is to be stoned. The reason is that Rabbi Yishmael responded to Rabbi Yehoshua: But isn’t the stomach of a burnt-offering subject to a more stringent <i>halakha</i> than the stomach of an unslaughtered animal carcass, and yet although one may not derive benefit from the stomach of a burnt-offering <i>ab initio</i>, if one did derive benefit from it he is not liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple?
  
  Daf 35a
  
  One can learn by inference from here that with regard to animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, their excrement, which is the content of their stomach, is permitted. Although deriving benefit from both a burnt-offering and an unslaughtered animal carcass is prohibited, the excrement of each is permitted. Similarly, although deriving benefit from an ox that is to be stoned is prohibited, its excrement is permitted.
  And from the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Yishmael: Cheese of gentiles is prohibited because they curdle it with the stomach contents of calves used for idol worship, and that Rabbi Yishmael responded to him: If that is so, why didn’t the Sages prohibit deriving benefit from the cheese, one may learn by inference that with regard to animals of idol worship, their excrement is prohibited. Since the cheese formed with the stomach contents of an animal of idol worship is prohibited, it is evident that the excrement formed in the stomach of such an animal is also prohibited.
  The mishna related that rather than addressing Rabbi Yishmael’s final difficulty, Rabbi Yehoshua diverted his attention to another matter. The Gemara inquires: But let him respond to Rabbi Yishmael’s query by explaining that the Sages did not prohibit deriving benefit from cheese curdled in the stomach contents of an animal used for idolatry because there is no substantive prohibited entity in such cheese.
  The Gemara reinforces its question: After all, isn’t the <i>halakha</i> with regard to fish stew, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, an application of this rationale, as they did not prohibit deriving benefit from fish stew prepared by a gentile? What is the reason for this leniency? Is it not because there is no substantive prohibited entity in it? Although fish stew may contain the wine of a gentile, deriving benefit from it is not prohibited because the wine is not discernible. Why didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua explain that deriving benefit from cheese of a gentile is similarly permitted because it contains no substantive prohibited entity?
  The Gemara rejects this possibility: The Sages say in response that here, with regard to cheese, since the rennet curdles it, it is considered like an item that contains a substantive prohibited entity. Although the prohibited rennet is not discernible in the cheese, it is nevertheless considered a substantive prohibited entity because it is essential to the formation of the cheese.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehoshua diverted Rabbi Yishmael’s attention to another matter, and began discussing the verse: “For your love is better than wine” (Song of Songs 1:2). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the verse: “For your love [<i>dodekha</i>] is better than wine”? When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: The congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, the statements of Your beloved ones [<i>dodekha</i>], i.e., the Sages, are more pleasant to me than the wine of the written Torah itself.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about this verse that led Rabbi Yehoshua to ask Rabbi Yishmael a question specifically with regard to it? Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said, and some say Rabbi Shimon bar Ami said: He chose that verse because he sought to tell him a message that can be derived from the beginning of the verse: “Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth” (Song of Songs 1:2). In essence, Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Yishmael, my brother, press your lips one to the other, and do not be so hasty to retort, i.e., do not persist in your questioning.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Yehoshua instructed Rabbi Yishmael not to question him further? Ulla says, and some say Rav Shmuel bar Abba says: The ordinance prohibiting the cheese of gentiles was a new decree, and therefore one does not scrutinize its origins. The Gemara asks: What was, in fact, the reason for the Sages’ decree prohibiting the cheese of gentiles? Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: It was due to the concern for puncturing, i.e., the concern that a snake might have deposited its venom in the cheese, as gentiles are not assumed to be careful about this.
  The Gemara comments: But if so, let Rabbi Yehoshua simply say to Rabbi Yishmael: It is prohibited due to the concern for puncturing. Why did he choose to avoid answering? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehoshua reasoned in accordance with a statement of Ulla, as Ulla said: When the Sages decreed a decree in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they would not reveal the reason behind it until twelve months of the year had passed, lest there be a person who does not agree with it and will come to treat it with contempt.
  Rabbi Yirmeya would ridicule [<i>megaddef</i> ] Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s explanation that the prohibition was due to the concern for puncturing: If that is so, dry cheese should be permitted, and likewise aged cheese should be permitted, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: With regard to exposure, a dry substance is permitted even if it was originally in the form of an uncovered liquid, because a snake’s venom does not let it dry, i.e., congeal. And an aged liquid is permitted, as a snake’s venom does not let it age, as it causes it to spoil instead.
  The Gemara presents two alternative reasons for this decree of the Sages. Rabbi Ḥanina says: The cheese is prohibited because it is not possible for it to have been made without containing particles of non-kosher milk. And Shmuel says: The cheese is prohibited because it is curdled with the skin of the stomach of an unslaughtered animal carcass.
  The Gemara comments: Shmuel’s statement indicates that only the skin of the animal’s stomach is prohibited, whereas the contents of the stomach, i.e., the rennet itself, is permitted. The Gemara asks: And did Shmuel actually say this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 116a): With regard to the stomach contents of an animal slaughtered by a gentile and the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass, each of these is prohibited.
  And we discussed it and asked: Why does the mishna mention both an animal slaughtered by a gentile and an unslaughtered animal carcass? Is that to say that an animal slaughtered by a gentile is not classified as an animal carcass? By mentioning each of these separately, the mishna indicates that generally they are subject to different <i>halakhot</i>. This is difficult, as an animal slaughtered by a gentile has the halakhic status of an unslaughtered animal carcass.
  And in answer to this difficulty, Shmuel says: The mishna is in fact teaching a single <i>halakha</i>, which is that the stomach contents of an animal slaughtered by a gentile are considered to be like the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal carcass and are therefore prohibited. Earlier, Shmuel asserted that only the physical skin of an animal’s stomach is prohibited, which indicates that the stomach contents are permitted. In his explanation of the mishna in <i>Ḥullin</i>, Shmuel posits that the stomach contents of an unslaughtered animal are prohibited.
  The Gemara explains that this is not difficult:
  
  Daf 35b
  
  Here, with regard to the mishna in <i>Ḥullin</i>, Shmuel’s comment reflects the explanation of Rabbi Yehoshua before Rabbi Yehoshua’s retraction of the assertion that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the stomach contents of an animal carcass. There, with regard to the mishna in <i>Avoda Zara</i>, Shmuel’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua after his retraction of that claim. And although this indicates that the mishna in <i>Ḥullin</i> presents an outdated ruling that was later rescinded, a mishna does not move from its place. In other words, once it has been taught in a certain manner, the <i>tanna</i> will not change the text of a mishna in order to reflect a change of opinion, so as to avoid confusion.
  The Gemara suggests additional reasons for the decree of the Sages. Rav Malkiyya says in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava: The cheese is prohibited because gentiles smooth its surface with pig fat. Rav Ḥisda says: It is because they curdle it with vinegar produced from their wine, from which it is prohibited to derive benefit. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: It is because they curdle it with sap that is subject to the prohibition against consuming the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>].
  Parenthetically, the Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is Rav Naḥman’s claim that the cheese of gentiles is prohibited because it is curdled in the sap of <i>orla</i>? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 1:7): Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who curdles cheese with the sap of <i>orla</i>, the cheese is prohibited, because the sap is considered to be fruit of the tree.
  The Gemara comments: You may even say that the statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the sap of a branch, but with regard to the sap of a fruit Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that it is prohibited as <i>orla</i>. Rav Naḥman’s statement can be understood as referring specifically to the sap of the fruit, which would mean that it is in accordance with the opinions of both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.
  The Gemara adds: And this is in accordance with that which we learned in the continuation of that mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard explicitly that with regard to one who curdles cheese with the sap of the leaves and the sap of the roots of an <i>orla</i> tree, the cheese is permitted. But if it is curdled with the sap of unripe figs it is prohibited, because that sap is considered to be fruit.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty against the last two suggested reasons for the decree of the Sages. According to both Rav Ḥisda, who holds that the cheese is prohibited because it is curdled with vinegar made from wine of gentiles, and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who maintains that it is prohibited because it is curdled with the sap of <i>orla</i>, one should be prohibited from deriving benefit from the cheese, as one may not derive benefit from either the wine of gentiles or <i>orla</i>. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.
  § Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Ḥisda, interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Your ointments have a goodly fragrance” (Song of Songs 1:3)? This is a metaphor for a Torah scholar: To what is a Torah scholar comparable? To a flask of <i>pelaitin</i>: When it is exposed, its scent diffuses; when it is covered, its scent does not diffuse.
  The Gemara remarks: And moreover, when a Torah scholar spreads his knowledge, matters that are generally hidden from him are revealed to him, as it is stated: “Maidens [<i>alamot</i>] love You” (Song of Songs 1:3), and one may read into the verse: The hidden [<i>alumot</i>]. And moreover, the Angel of Death loves him, as it is stated: “Maidens [<i>alamot</i>] love You,” and one may read into the verse: The one appointed over death [<i>al mot</i>] loves you. And moreover, a Torah scholar inherits two worlds: One is this world, and the other one is the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Maidens [<i>alamot</i>] love You,” and one may read into the verse: Worlds [<i>olamot</i>].
  MISHNA: This mishna lists items belonging to gentiles which it is prohibited to consume, but from which it is permitted to derive benefit. And these are items that belong to gentiles and are prohibited, but their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited: Milk that was milked by a gentile and a Jew did not see him performing this action, and their bread and oil. The mishna notes that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court permitted the oil of gentiles entirely.
  The mishna resumes its list: And boiled and pickled vegetables, whose usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar to them, and minced <i>tarit</i> fish, and brine that does not have a <i>kilbit</i> fish floating in it, and <i>ḥilak</i>, and a sliver of <i>ḥiltit</i>, and <i>salkondit</i> salt (see 39b); all these are prohibited, but their prohibition is not that of item from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Concerning milk, with regard to what need we be concerned? Why is the milk prohibited? If it is due to the concern that a gentile might exchange the milk of a kosher animal with the milk of a non-kosher animal, this concern is unfounded, as kosher milk is white whereas non-kosher milk has a green tinge to it, and therefore they are easily distinguishable. And if it is prohibited due to the concern that it might be mixed with non-kosher milk, let the Jew curdle the milk obtained from the gentile, as the Master said: Milk from a kosher animal curdles, but milk from a non-kosher animal does not curdle.
  The Gemara answers: If one desires to eat it as cheese, indeed, one can simply curdle it, as the milk of non-kosher animals does not curdle. What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where one desires to use the milk in <i>kamkha</i>, also known as <i>kutaḥ</i>, a food item that contains milk.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in that case, let him take a bit of milk and curdle it, to test whether or not it has been mixed with the milk of a non-kosher animal: If it curdles completely, it is kosher; if some milk is left over, it is not. The Gemara explains: Since there is also whey in kosher milk, which does not curdle, there is no way to establish the halakhic matter with regard to it. Even kosher milk will not curdle completely, and therefore this is not a reliable method to determine the halakhic status of the milk.
  The Gemara presents an alternative suggestion: And if you wish, say instead that you may even say that the concern applies where he intends to use the milk to make cheese, as there is milk that remains between the crevices of curdled cheese, and therefore there is a concern that drops of non-kosher milk might be mixed with it.
  § The mishna teaches: And bread belonging to gentiles is prohibited for consumption. Rav Kahana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Unlike oil, bread was not permitted by a court. The Gemara asks: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan states that bread was not permitted in court, can it be inferred that there is a different opinion that claims that a court did permit it?
  The Gemara answers: Yes, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out to the field, and a gentile brought before him a <i>se’a</i> of bread baked in a large baker’s oven [<i>purnei</i>]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: How exquisite is this loaf of bread! What did the Sages see that caused them to prohibit it? The Gemara asks, incredulously: What did the Sages see that caused them to prohibit it? It was prohibited due to the concern that Jews might befriend gentiles while breaking bread with them, which could lead to marriage with gentiles.
  The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was not asking why bread was prohibited in general. Rather, he asked: What did the Sages see that caused them to prohibit bread even in the field, where this concern does not apply? The Gemara notes that upon hearing of this incident the people thought that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted the bread of gentiles. But that is not so; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not actually permit such bread. This is why Rabbi Yoḥanan emphasized that the bread of gentiles was never permitted by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s court.
  The Gemara records an alternate version of this episode. Rav Yosef, and some say Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, says: The incident did not occur in this manner. Rather, they said: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went to a certain place and saw that bread was scarce for the students in the study hall. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Is there no baker [<i>palter</i>] here who can prepare bread? Upon hearing of this incident, the people thought to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was referring to a gentile baker, which would indicate that bread baked by a professional baker is permitted, even if he is a gentile. But in reality, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his question only in reference to a Jewish baker.
  The Gemara cites two qualifications of the leniency that people inferred from the above incident. Rabbi Ḥelbo said: Even according to the one who thought to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was referring to a gentile baker, we said that the bread is permitted only where there is no Jewish baker, but in a place where there is a Jewish baker, the leniency would certainly not apply. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even according to the one who thought to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was referring to a gentile baker, that statement applies only in the field, but in the city it would not apply, and the bread would still be prohibited due to the possibility of marriage with a gentile.
  The Gemara relates: Aivu would bite and eat bread of gentiles at the boundaries of the fields. Rava said to the students in the study hall, and some say that it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said to them: Do not speak with Aivu, as he eats bread of Arameans in deliberate violation of a rabbinic decree.
  § The mishna teaches: And their oil was originally prohibited but later permitted by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court. The Gemara cites a dispute with regard to the origin of the prohibition of oil. Rav says: Daniel decreed that oil is prohibited, and Shmuel says:
  
  Daf 36a
  
  The secretion of ritually impure vessels prohibits the oil that gentiles pour into them. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that all people are consumers of only ritually pure substances? Since it is common practice to eat ritually impure foods, why should the secretion of impure vessels render the oil prohibited? The Gemara emends Shmuel’s statement: Rather, the secretion of prohibited vessels prohibits the oil, as it absorbs the prohibited substances.
  Shmuel said to Rav: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the secretion of prohibited vessels prohibits the oil, this is how one can understand that when Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta came, he said that Rabbi Simlai taught in Netzivin: With regard to oil, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court were counted, i.e., voted, on this matter and permitted it.
  Shmuel elaborates: It can be explained that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds: A prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is permitted. According to Shmuel’s explanation, the prohibition was revoked because the taste absorbed by the oil would have impaired its flavor rather than enhanced it.
  But according to you, Rav, who said that Daniel decreed a prohibition upon the oil of gentiles, how can this be understood? Can it be said that Daniel decreed it, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi came and voided the decree? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 1:5): A court cannot void the statements of another court, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number? According to Rav, how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi void a decree issued by Daniel?
  Rather than answering Shmuel’s question directly, Rav first rejects his proof: Rav said to him: Was it Rabbi Simlai of Lod of whom you spoke? Residents of Lod are different, as they disparage the Sages’ decrees, and therefore Rabbi Simlai’s testimony is unreliable. Shmuel said to him: Shall I send for him? As a result, Rav became embarrassed.
  Rav claimed that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court erred in permitting the oil of gentiles, which Daniel had prohibited. Rav said: If they, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court, did not expound the following verse, will we not expound it? We must certainly do so. Isn’t it written: “But Daniel purposed in his heart that he would not defile himself with the king’s food, nor with the wine which he drank [<i>mishtav</i>]” (Daniel 1:8)? The word <i>mishtav</i> is in the plural, indicating that the verse speaks of two types of drinking: One is the drinking of wine, and one is the drinking of oil. Accordingly, Daniel himself refrained from consuming oil of gentiles, as he instituted this prohibition. Why does Shmuel reject this inference, which indicates that Daniel issued this decree?
  The Gemara explains that Rav maintained: Daniel placed the prohibition against consuming the oil of gentiles upon his heart, i.e., for himself, and he instructed all Jews to adhere to it as well. And Shmuel held: Daniel placed the prohibition upon his heart, but he did not instruct all Jews to accept it.
  The Gemara asks: And is it correct that Daniel decreed that oil is prohibited? But doesn’t Balei say that Avimi of Nota [<i>Nota’a</i>] says in the name of Rav: The prohibitions of gentiles’ bread and their oil, their wine and their daughters, are all from the eighteen matters decreed in a single day in the days of the students of Shammai and Hillel. Apparently, Rav himself maintains that the prohibition was not instituted by Daniel.
  The Gemara adds: And if you would say that Daniel came and decreed but the people did not accept it, and later the students of Hillel and Shammai came and decreed with regard to gentiles’ oil and the people accepted it, if that is so, what is the significance of Rav’s testimony that Daniel initially instituted the prohibition? The Gemara explains: Rather, Daniel decreed upon the oil of gentiles in the city, and the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that it is prohibited even in the field.
  The Gemara asks: And how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permit an ordinance issued by the students of Shammai and Hillel? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that a court cannot void the statements of another court, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number? And furthermore, doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to all issues, a court can void the statements of another court, except the eighteen matters decreed by the students of Beit Shammai, as, even if Elijah and his court were to come and rescind them, one would not listen to him.
  Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the reason that none of the eighteen decrees can be voided? Since the prohibition spread among the majority of the Jewish people, it cannot be voided. But with regard to oil, its prohibition did not spread among the majority of the Jewish people, and therefore it can be voided. As Rabbi Shmuel bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Our Sages sat and inspected the matter of gentiles’ oil and determined that its prohibition had not spread among the majority of the Jewish people, and our Sages relied upon the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and upon the statement of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, who would say: The Sages issue a decree upon the community only if most of the community is able to abide by it. As Rav Adda bar Ahava said: What is the verse from which it is derived?
  
  Daf 36b
  
  It is the verse: “You are cursed with the curse, yet you rob Me, even this whole nation” (Malachi 3:9). This teaches that if there is the acceptance of the whole nation, yes, an ordinance may be instituted, but if not, no, the ordinance may not be instituted.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Balei says that Avimi of Nota says in the name of Rav: The prohibitions with regard to gentiles’ bread and their oil, their wine and their daughters, are all from the eighteen matters issued in a single day in the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel. The Gemara asks: With regard to their daughters, what is the decree? Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They decreed upon their daughters that they should be classified as menstruating women from the time they are in their cradle, i.e., they decreed that from when they are young, gentile women are always considered to be menstruating.
  The Gemara presents another opinion. And Geneiva says in the name of Rav: Gentiles’ bread, oil, wine, and daughters were all decreed upon due to the concern that Jews might participate in idol worship with gentiles as a result of intermingling with them. As, when Rav Aḥa bar Adda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: They decreed a prohibition upon their bread due to their oil. The Gemara asks: In what way is the prohibition with regard to oil stronger than the prohibition with regard to bread? That is, why does the primary concern relate to the oil of gentiles rather than their bread?
  The Gemara offers a different interpretation: Rather, they issued a decree prohibiting their bread and their oil due to their wine. And they issued the decree prohibiting their wine due to the fact that this leads to familiarity, and Jews will come to marry their daughters. And they issued a decree prohibiting their daughters due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else, which will be explained by the Gemara.
  It was stated that the prohibition against marrying the daughters of gentiles was decreed on account of idolatry. The Gemara raises an objection: But the prohibition against marrying their daughters is prescribed by Torah law, as it is written: “Neither shall you make marriages with them” (Deuteronomy 7:3). The Gemara explains: By Torah law intermarriage is prohibited only with the seven Canaanite nations, but intermarriage with the other nations of the world is not prohibited, and the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that intermarriage is prohibited even with the other nations.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says that the subsequent verse: “For he will turn away your son from following Me” (Deuteronomy 7:4) serves to include all who turn away one’s son from God, i.e., all gentiles, what is there to say? Rather, by Torah law only sexual relations by way of marriage are prohibited, and they came and decreed that sexual relations are prohibited even by way of licentiousness.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Licentious sexual intercourse was also prohibited earlier, as they decreed a prohibition in this regard in the court of Shem, as it is written: “It was told to Judah, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has played the harlot; and moreover, behold, she is with child by harlotry. And Judah said: Bring her forth, and let her be burned” (Genesis 38:24). This proves that the prohibition against licentious intercourse with a gentile was in force long before the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel.
  The Gemara explains: Rather, the prohibition prescribed by Torah law applies to the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, as she is drawn after him toward idolatry, but the case of a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman is not included in the prohibition by Torah law. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that the prohibition applies even to a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman.
  The Gemara rejects this: The prohibition concerning a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, not a rabbinic ordinance. As the Master said: With regard to one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, zealots may attack him, as Pinehas did to Zimri in the wilderness (see Numbers 25:6–8).
  He said to him: By Torah law intercourse with a gentile is prohibited in public, and only in situations like the incident that occurred, as described in Numbers, chapter 25. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that the prohibition applies even in private. The Gemara raises another difficulty: This was also prohibited in private, as the court of the Hasmoneans decreed that it is prohibited.
  As when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: The court of the Hasmoneans decreed that a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman bears liability for transgressing four prohibitions, represented by the mnemonic: <i>Nun</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>alef</i>. These letters stands for: Menstruating woman [<i>nidda</i>], maidservant [<i>shifḥa</i>], gentile [<i>goya</i>], and married woman [<i>eshet ish</i>]. By rabbinic law, a man who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman is considered to have violated the prohibitions involved in having intercourse with all four of these women.
  And when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: He bears liability for four prohibitions represented by the mnemonic: <i>Nun</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>zayin</i>, which stands for: Menstruating woman [<i>nidda</i>], maidservant [<i>shifḥa</i>], gentile [<i>goya</i>], and prostitute [<i>zona</i>]. In any case, it is apparent that this decree was in force before the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel.
  The Gemara answers: When the court of the Hasmoneans decreed, they prohibited only sexual intercourse, but with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman, no, they did not prohibit that. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed that even seclusion with a gentile woman is prohibited. The Gemara raises an objection: Seclusion was also prohibited earlier, as the court of King David decreed that with regard to this matter.
  As Rav Yehuda says: At that time, after the incident involving Amnon and Tamar (see II Samuel 13:1–19), they decreed with regard to seclusion. The Sages said in response to the objection: There, in David’s court, seclusion with a Jewish woman was prohibited, but seclusion with a gentile woman was not prohibited. And the students of Shammai and Hillel came and decreed a prohibition even with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman.
  The Gemara raises yet another difficulty: Seclusion with a Jewish woman is prohibited by Torah law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Where is there an allusion in the Torah to the prohibition against seclusion? As it is stated: “If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you” (Deuteronomy 13:7). And does only a half brother who is the son of a mother entice one to sin, whereas the son of a father does not entice?
  Rather, there is a greater concern that a maternal half brother might entice one to sin, as a son secludes himself with his mother, and no other may seclude himself with any of those with whom relations are forbidden by the Torah. Since an individual and his maternal half brother both seclude themselves with their shared mother, they are frequently together in private, and this facilitates enticement. In any case, it is clear that the prohibition against seclusion with a Jewish woman preceded King David.
  The Gemara explains: The prohibition against seclusion prescribed by Torah law applies specifically to a married woman, and David came and decreed a prohibition even with regard to seclusion with an unmarried woman. And later the students of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel came and decreed even with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman.
  § It was stated above that they issued a decree prohibiting the daughters of gentiles due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They decreed upon a male gentile child that he imparts ritual impurity as though he were a Jew who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>ziva</i>], so that a Jewish child will not become familiar with him, leading to homosexual intercourse. The Sages employed a euphemism when referring to this decree.
  As Rabbi Zeira says: I had great trouble with Rabbi Asi when I asked him the following question, and likewise Rabbi Asi experienced trouble with Rabbi Yoḥanan when he posed it to him. And Rabbi Yoḥanan had trouble with Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai had trouble with Rabbi Natan ben Amram, and Rabbi Natan ben Amram had trouble with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The inquiry was as follows: With regard to a male gentile child, from when, i.e., from what age, does he impart ritual impurity as one who experiences <i>ziva</i>? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to me: From when he is one day old. And when I came to Rabbi Ḥiyya, he said to me: From when he is nine years and one day old.
  And when I came back and relayed Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he said to me: Discard my statement, and grasp the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who says: From when does a gentile child impart ritual impurity as one who experiences <i>ziva</i>? From when he is nine years and one day old.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  The Gemara explains the reason for this opinion: Since a nine-year-old boy is fit to engage in intercourse, he also imparts ritual impurity as one who experienced <i>ziva</i>. Ravina said: Therefore, with regard to a female gentile child who is three years and one day old, since she is fit to engage in intercourse at that age, she also imparts impurity as one who experienced <i>ziva</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara explains: It was necessary to state this ruling, lest you say that the <i>halakha</i> that a gentile who is suited for intercourse imparts impurity does not apply to a female. The possible difference between a male and female child is based on the fact that whereas that child, a nine-year-old male gentile, knows how to accustom others to sin by employing persuasion, this child, a three-year-old female gentile, does not know how to accustom others to sin until she matures. Therefore, Ravina teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> nevertheless applies to both male and female children.
  The Gemara relates a relevant incident: Rabbi Yehuda Nesia was traveling while leaning upon the shoulder of Rabbi Simlai, his attendant. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: Simlai, you were not in the study hall last night when we permitted the oil of gentiles. Rabbi Simlai said to him: In our days, you will permit bread of gentiles as well. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: If so, people will call us a permissive court. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 8:4): Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified with regard to the <i>eil kamtza</i>, a type of locust, that it is kosher, and with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure, and with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure, as soon explained by the Gemara. And as a result, they called him: Yosef the Permissive.
  Rabbi Simlai said to him: There, Yosei ben Yo’ezer permitted three matters, but the Master has permitted only one, and even if the Master permits one other matter, these will still constitute only two permissive rulings. Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to him: I have already permitted another matter. The Gemara asks: What is the other matter that he permitted?
  The Gemara explains that this is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 76b) that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I do not arrive from now until twelve months’ time, and he died within twelve months, then it is not a valid bill of divorce because it would not take effect until after the husband’s death. And it is taught with regard to that mishna that our Rabbis nevertheless permitted her to marry. The Gemara continues: And we say: Who is the mishna referring to when it mentions our Rabbis? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is referring to the court that permitted the oil of gentiles.
  Tangentially, the Gemara examines the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court concerning a bill of divorce. They hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says: The date written in a document proves when it takes effect. In other words, the bill of divorce takes effect at the time written on it. Therefore, the divorce actually goes into effect before the husband’s death, because it is retroactively initiated on the day that the bill was issued. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, says: In an earlier period, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also ruled that the bill of divorce should be valid, but the other Sages did not concede to his opinion during his entire lifetime [<i>sha’ato</i>]. And some say that all of his colleagues [<i>si’ato</i>] did not concede to his opinion.
  Rabbi Elazar said to a certain elderly man, who was a member of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court: When you permitted this woman to remarry, did you permit her immediately after the husband died, as he certainly will not arrive within the twelve months, or perhaps you permitted her only after twelve months, because only then was the condition fulfilled?
  That elderly man said to Rabbi Elazar: And let the dilemma be raised with regard to the mishna itself, as we learned in the next line of the mishna in <i>Gittin</i>: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from now if I do not arrive from now until twelve months have elapsed, and he died within twelve months, this is a valid bill of divorce. The reason is that its condition was fulfilled, as the husband stated explicitly that the bill takes effect immediately.
  He explains: And let the dilemma be raised with regard to this case: Is the bill of divorce valid immediately upon the husband’s death because he will certainly not arrive? Or perhaps the bill of divorce is valid only after twelve months have elapsed, because only then is his condition fulfilled? Rabbi Elazar answered: Yes, it is indeed so; this question can be asked with regard to the case of the mishna itself. The Gemara adds: But Rabbi Elazar asked that elder about the decision of Rabbi Yehuda Nesia’s court because he was present at that assembly, and therefore he could report on what had actually occurred.
  Abaye says: All concede that one who says that a bill of divorce will take effect once the sun emerges from its sheath is saying to his wife that it will be valid once the sun comes out in the morning. And therefore, if the husband dies during the night, before sunrise, it is a posthumous bill of divorce, which is invalid.
  Furthermore, if he said to her: On the condition that the sun will come out of its sheath, then he is saying to his wife that the bill of divorce will take effect retroactively from now, on the condition that the sun emerges. And accordingly, if he dies during the night, this is certainly a fulfilled condition, and it is a bill of divorce which takes effect retroactively, while he is alive; in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna. As Rav Huna says: With regard to anyone who states a provision employing the language: On the condition, it is tantamount to his stating in the provision that the document takes effect retroactively from now.
  They disagreed only in the case of one who said to his wife: This will be your bill of divorce if the sun emerges from its sheath, and the husband died during the night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that the date written in a document proves when it takes effect, and it is therefore considered as though the husband said: From today if I die, or as though he said: From now if I die. And the Sages do not accept the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and consequently they maintain that it is considered as though the husband said only: This is your bill of divorce if I die, in which case the bill of divorce is not valid, as it would take effect only after the husband’s death.
  § The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified with regard to the <i>eil kamtza</i> that it is kosher, and with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure, and with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure. And as a result, they called him: Yosef the Permissive. The Gemara asks: What is the <i>eil kamtza</i>? Rav Pappa says: It is a long-headed locust called <i>shoshiva</i>, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami says in the name of Ulla: It is a locust called <i>susbil</i>.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Pappa says it is a <i>shoshiva</i>, and accordingly Yosei ben Yo’ezer and the other Rabbis disagree with regard to a long-headed locust: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds that a long-headed locust is prohibited, and one Sage, Yosei ben Yo’ezer, holds that a long-headed locust is permitted. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami says in the name of Ulla that
  
  Daf 37b
  
  it is a <i>susbil</i>, and accordingly, with regard to a long-headed locust, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. And here they disagree with regard to a locust whose wings barely cover most of its body: One Sage, Yosei ben Yo’ezer, holds that we require only a minimal majority of the locust’s body to be covered by its wings, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that we require a noticeable majority of the body to be covered.
  § It was stated above: And Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they are ritually pure. The Gemara asks: What did Yosei ben Yo’ezer mean when he said they are pure? Rav says: He meant that they are actually ritually pure. And Shmuel says: They are pure in the sense that they do not impart ritual impurity to other substances; but they themselves can contract impurity.
  The Gemara explains the reasons for these opinions. Rav says that these liquids are actually pure, as he maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids applies by rabbinic law, and when the Sages decreed impurity upon liquids, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. But the Sages did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple.
  And Shmuel says: The liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not impart impurity to other substances; but they themselves can contract impurity, as Shmuel maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids themselves is by Torah law, whereas their capacity to impart impurity to other substances is by rabbinic law. And when the Sages issued this decree, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. But they did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple.
  § It was stated: And Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified with regard to one who touches a corpse that he is impure, and as a result they called him: Yosef the Permissive. The Gemara questions this: Since he issued a stringent ruling, they should have called him: Yosef the Prohibiting. And furthermore, this <i>halakha</i> is explicitly written in the Torah, as it is written: “And whosoever in the open field touches one that is slain with a sword, or one that is dead, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:16).
  The Gemara explains: By Torah law one who touches a corpse is ritually impure, but one who touches another who has touched a corpse is pure. And the Sages came and decreed that even one who touches another who has touched a corpse is also impure. And Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and established the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the original, more lenient Torah law.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: One who touches another who has touched a corpse is also rendered impure by Torah law, as it is written: “And whatsoever the impure person touches shall be impure” (Numbers 19:22).
  The Sages stated this difficulty before Rava in the name of Mar Zutra, the son of Rav Naḥman, who said a response in the name of Rav Naḥman: By Torah law, one who touches another who touches a corpse while the second individual is in concurrent contact with the corpse is impure with seven-day impurity. If this occurs while the second individual is not in concurrent contact with the corpse, he contracts impurity until the evening. And the Sages came and decreed that even where there is no concurrent contact, one still contracts seven-day impurity when he touches someone who touched a corpse. And subsequently Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and established the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the original Torah law.
  The Gemara asks: What is the source of this <i>halakha</i>, prescribed by Torah law? As it is written: “He that touches the dead, even any man’s dead body, shall be impure seven days” (Numbers 19:11), and it is written: “And whatsoever the impure person touches shall be impure” (Numbers 19:22). These two verses indicate that one contracts ritual impurity for seven days. And yet it is also written: “And the soul that touches him shall be impure until evening” (Numbers 19:22). How can these texts be reconciled?
  The Gemara answers: Here, in the first two verses, the Torah is discussing concurrent contact, which results in impurity of seven days; there, in the last verse, it is discussing a case where there is no concurrent contact, and therefore the individual in question is impure only until the evening.
  Rava said to the Sages who suggested that explanation citing Rav Naḥman: Didn’t I tell you not to hang empty pitchers [<i>bukei</i>] upon Rav Naḥman, i.e., not to attribute incorrect statements to him? Rather, this is what Rav Naḥman said: Yosei ben Yo’ezer permitted for them a case of uncertain impurity contracted in a public domain. In other words, Yosei ben Yo’ezer ruled leniently that one who is unsure whether or not he came in contact with a corpse in the public domain is ritually pure.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t we learn this <i>halakha</i> from the case of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [<i>sota</i>]: Just as a <i>sota</i> can be made to drink the bitter waters only when she is suspected of engaging in adultery in a private domain, so too, uncertain ritual impurity is considered impure only when one suspects that he came into contact with it in a private domain? This shows that even by Torah law one who is unsure whether or not he touched a corpse in the public domain remains pure.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said in explanation: This is the <i>halakha</i>, but a public ruling is not issued to that effect. Consequently, the masses treated this matter with stringency. And Yosei ben Yo’ezer came and instructed the masses to follow the original instruction of the Torah. Therefore, his ruling was in fact a leniency.
  The Gemara provides support for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that Yosei ben Yo’ezer drove stakes into the ground for the people and said: Until here is the public domain, and until there is the private domain, so that they would know the <i>halakha</i> if they suspected that they had touched a corpse. The Gemara relates that when people came before Rabbi Yannai because they suspected that they might have come into contact with a source of impurity in the public domain, he said to them: Why involve yourselves in matters of uncertainty? There is deep water in the river; go immerse yourselves in it, and resolve the problem in this manner.
  § The mishna teaches: And boiled vegetables prepared by gentiles are prohibited. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse states that when Moses asked Sihon, King of the Amorites, for passage through his land, he said: “You shall sell me food for money, that I may eat; and give me water for money, that I may drink” (Deuteronomy 2:28). By juxtaposing food and water, the verse teaches that food is like water: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was unchanged, so too, he wished to purchase food that was unchanged, i.e., uncooked. Evidently, this is because foods cooked by gentiles are prohibited.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, then in a case where a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains by roasting it in the oven, the wheat should also be prohibited, as it was cooked. And if you would say: Indeed that is so, this cannot be the <i>halakha</i>, as isn’t it taught in <i>baraita</i>: If a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains, it is permitted? The Gemara suggests a different explanation: Rather, food is like water in the following manner: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was not altered from its original state, so too, he wished to purchase food that was not altered from its original state. Roasting wheat kernels does not alter their original state.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: If that is so, then if a gentile had wheat and ground it into flour, the flour should also be prohibited, as the wheat has been altered from its original state. And if you would say: Indeed that is so, this cannot be the case, as isn’t it taught in <i>baraita</i>: If a gentile had wheat and made it into roasted grains, it is permitted; similarly, flours and fine flours belonging to gentiles are permitted? Rather, food is like water in the following manner: Just as Moses wished to purchase water that was not altered from its original state by fire, so too, he wished to purchase food that was not altered from its original state by fire. Although wheat ground into flour is altered from its original state, this change is not accomplished by means of fire.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is fire written in the verse? There is no mention of fire in the verse at all. How can it be assumed that this is the similarity between water and food?
  
  Daf 38a
  
  Rather, the cooking of gentiles is prohibited by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support.
  The Gemara discusses the particulars of the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Any item that is eaten as it is, i.e., raw, is not subject to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. The Gemara remarks: In the study hall in Sura, they taught it this way. In Pumbedita, they taught it like this: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Any item that is not eaten together with bread on the table of kings is not subject to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. In other words, foods that are not eaten by distinguished individuals are not subject to this prohibition.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two opinions? The practical difference between them is with regard to small fish, mushrooms, and porridge. These foods are not eaten raw, but they are not eaten by distinguished individuals. Consequently, these foods are prohibited according to the version taught in Sura, but permitted according to the version taught in Pumbedita.
  Rav Asi says that Rav says: Small, salted fish are not subject to the prohibition of the cooking of gentiles, because they can be eaten raw. Rav Yosef says: If a gentile roasted these fish, a Jew may rely upon them for use in the mitzva of a joining of cooked foods, which must be prepared in order to permit cooking for Shabbat on a Festival that occurs on a Friday. And if a gentile made them into <i>kasa deharsena</i>, a dish of fish fried in oil and flour, the dish is prohibited. In this case, since the flour had not been edible, it is considered the cooked food of a gentile.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? What reason would there be to think that <i>kasa deharsena</i> prepared by a gentile is permitted? The Gemara answers: This is taught lest you say that the salted fish, which one is permitted to eat even if cooked by gentiles, is the essential component. Therefore, Rav Yosef teaches us that the flour is the essential component, and the dish is therefore considered the cooked food of a gentile.
  Rav Beruna says that Rav says: In the case of a gentile who ignited a fire in the meadow, all the locusts that were burned in the meadow are prohibited. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that the reason they are prohibited is that one no longer knows which are kosher and which are non-kosher as a result of their burning, why does Rav Beruna specifically discuss a case involving a gentile? Even if a Jew burned the meadow, they would also be prohibited for the same reason. Rather, this is referring to a case where all the locusts were kosher, and the prohibition is due to the cooking of gentiles, as the locusts were effectively cooked by a gentile.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Does anyone actually prohibit the cooking of gentiles in a case like this? But doesn’t Rav Ḥanan bar Ami say that Rabbi Pedat says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to this gentile who singed the head of an animal, it is permitted to eat part of it, even from the tip of the ear, which is fully cooked? The Gemara remarks: Evidently, this is permitted because the gentile merely intends to remove the hair and not to cook the ears. Here, too, it ought to be permitted because he merely intends to clear the meadow, not to cook the locusts.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, this is referring to a case where there is a mixture of different types of locusts, and they are prohibited because one does not know which are kosher and which are non-kosher. And the reason Rav Beruna specified that the case involved a gentile is because the incident that occurred happened to have occurred with the involvement of a gentile.
  § The Gemara addresses the matter itself: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to this gentile who singed the head of an animal, it is permitted to eat part of it, even from the tip of the ear, which is fully cooked. Ravina said: Therefore, with regard to this gentile who threw a moist peg into the oven in order to dry it out and harden it, and a Jew had already inserted a gourd in the oven from the outset, the gourd is permitted, even though it was in effect cooked by a gentile. The reason is that the gentile had no intention to cook the vegetable. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach this, lest you say that the gentile intends to cook the vessel, i.e., the peg, by softening it. Therefore Ravina teaches us that he intends only to harden the vessel.
  § The Gemara continues the discussion with regard to the cooking of gentiles by examining the <i>halakha</i> of meat cooked by both a gentile and a Jew. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If a Jew placed meat upon flaming coals and a gentile came and turned the meat over, the meat is permitted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is a case where if the gentile had not turned over the meat it would have cooked anyway, it is obvious that the meat is permitted, as the gentile’s actions did not actually alter the food. The Gemara suggests: Rather, is it not a case where, if the gentile had not turned it over, it would not have cooked? But if so, why is it permitted? In such a case, the meat is certainly considered to be the cooking of gentiles and ought to be prohibited.
  The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where if the gentile had not turned over the meat, it would have cooked in two hours, and now that he did turn it over, it will cook in only one hour. Lest you say that hastening the cooking process is a significant matter, and therefore food whose preparation is expedited by a gentile is prohibited, Ravina teaches us otherwise.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Any item that has been cooked like the food of ben Derosai, i.e., partially cooked so that it is just about edible, is not subject to the prohibition of the cooking of gentiles? Consequently, if it is not cooked like the food of ben Derosai, it is subject to the prohibition of the cooking of gentiles. Accordingly, meat whose cooking was expedited by a gentile ought to be prohibited, as this ruling includes cases where it had not been cooked like the food of ben Derosai at the time of the gentile’s intervention.
  The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Asi was referring to a case where the Jew had placed the meat that was not yet cooked like the food of ben Derosai in a basket where it would not have cooked at all, and a gentile took it and placed it in the oven. Rabbi Asi was teaching that in such a case, when the current cooking process has yet to begin, the meat is prohibited if it had not already been cooked like the food of ben Derosai. By contrast, in the case addressed by Rabbi Yehuda, the meat was already cooking and the gentile’s actions hastened the process, but did not initiate it. In other words, the issue of cooked food like the food of ben Derosai is relevant only if the gentile takes a dish that is not being cooked at present.
  The Gemara adds: This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A Jew may place meat on hot coals and let a gentile come and turn it over as necessary until the Jew comes back from the synagogue or from the study hall, and the Jew need not be concerned for the prohibition of eating cooking of gentiles. Similarly, a Jewish woman may set a pot upon the stove and let a gentile woman come
  
  Daf 38b
  
  and stir it until she comes back from the bathhouse or from the synagogue, and she need not be concerned.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a gentile placed meat on a fire and a Jew turned it over, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The <i>halakha</i> can be derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If the meat is permitted when it finished cooking by the hand of a gentile, then where it finished cooking by the hand of a Jew, all the more so is it not clear that it should be permitted?
  Along these lines, it was also stated: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say Rav Aḥa bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whether the gentile placed the meat on the fire and the Jew turned it over, or whether the Jew placed the meat on the fire and the gentile turned it over, the meat is permitted, and it is not prohibited unless its cooking from beginning to end was performed by the hand of a gentile.
  Ravina says: The <i>halakha</i> is that this bread baked in an oven that a gentile lit and a Jew subsequently baked, or, alternatively, if a Jew lit the oven and a gentile baked, or, alternatively, even if a gentile lit, and a gentile baked, and a Jew came and stoked the coals to heat the fire, it is permitted, as the act of the Jew speeds up the baking process.
  The Gemara continues: With regard to fish salted by a gentile, Ḥizkiyya deems it permitted, and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it prohibited. As for an egg roasted by a gentile, bar Kappara deems it permitted and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it prohibited. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: With regard to both salted fish and roasted eggs, Ḥizkiyya and bar Kappara deem them permitted them even if they were prepared by a gentile, and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems them prohibited.
  The Gemara relates a relevant incident. Rabbi Ḥiyya of Parva arrived at the home of the Exilarch, whose attendants said to him: With regard to an egg roasted by a gentile, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Ḥiyya said to them: Ḥizkiyya and bar Kappara deem it permitted, and Rabbi Yoḥanan deems it prohibited, and the statement of one Sage has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan because he is in the minority. Rav Zevid said to them: Do not listen to him, as this is what Abaye said: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Due to the stringency Rav Zevid sought to impose, the attendants gave Rav Zevid a cup [<i>negota</i>] of spiced vinegar to drink, and he died as a result.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the halakhic status of various foods with regard to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Caper buds [<i>kafrisin</i>], and leeks [<i>kaflotot</i>], and <i>matalya</i>, and hot water, and roasted grains that belong to gentiles and were cooked by them are permitted. An egg roasted by a gentile is prohibited. With regard to oil, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court were counted, i.e., voted on the matter, and permitted it.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Matalya</i> is the same as the black-eyed pea [<i>pashalya</i>], which is also called <i>shiata</i>. What is <i>shiata</i>? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is forty years since this item emerged from Egypt and was imported here. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana himself said: It is sixty years since this item emerged from Egypt and was imported here. The Gemara remarks: And they do not disagree, as one Sage issued his statement in his year, and the other Sage issued it in his year. Whereas sixty years had passed by the time of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, only forty had elapsed when Rabbi Yoḥanan issued his statement.
  The Gemara describes the preparation of <i>shiata</i>. They take parsley seeds and flax root and fenugreek root, and soak them together in lukewarm water, and leave them until they sprout. And then they take new earthenware pots, and fill them with water, and soak red clay [<i>gargishta</i>] in them, and then stick the seeds and roots in the clay. And after that they go to the bathhouse, and by the time they come out, the plants have blossomed, and they eat from them. And as they eat them, they cool down from the heat of the bathhouse from the hair of their head until the toenails of their feet. Rav Ashi says: Rabbi Ḥanina said to me: These are mere words, i.e., this is false, as it is impossible for the plants to blossom so quickly. And some say: This was performed by means of magic words that caused the plants to grow faster.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to date husks [<i>kuspan</i>] that belong to gentiles and that were heated in hot water depends on the size of the pot in which they were prepared: If they were cooked in a large pot they are prohibited, as prohibited foods are often cooked in large pots; if they were cooked in a small pot they are permitted, because non-kosher foods, which are usually large, are not generally cooked in these pots and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the pot has not absorbed a prohibited substance. The Gemara asks: And what is a small pot? Rabbi Yannai says: It is any pot that is so small that a swallow cannot enter into it.
  The Gemara challenges: But even if non-kosher foods are not generally cooked in pots of this size, perhaps they sliced the food into smaller pieces and inserted them into the small pot. Since large non-kosher foods can be cooked in small pots once they have been sliced, the concern should apply to these pots as well. The Gemara accepts this point and amends Rabbi Yannai’s definition: Rather, a small pot is any pot that is so small that a swallow’s head cannot enter into it. Such small pots would not be used to cook even sliced non-kosher foods.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in any case, isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that food cooked in both a large pot and a small pot is permitted? This directly contradicts the <i>baraita</i> cited here, which permits only food cooked in a small pot. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult; this first <i>baraita</i> cited above is written in accordance with the one who says: A prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is prohibited, whereas that <i>baraita</i> mentioned here is written in accordance with the one who says: A prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is permitted.
  Rav Sheshet said: This oil that was cooked by an Aramean is prohibited. Rav Safra rejected this ruling and said: With regard to what need we be concerned? If it is due to the concern that it might have been mixed with wine used for an idolatrous libation, this cannot be correct, as wine ruins oil and therefore gentiles would not mix them together. If it is due to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles, this also cannot be true because oil is eaten as it is, i.e., raw. And if it is due to the oil being cooked in vessels of gentiles that require purging on account of the prohibited taste they have absorbed, and now the forbidden flavor from the vessel is in the food, this concern is also invalid as the absorbed substance is one that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, and in this case the mixture is permitted.
  The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi: With regard to these boiled dates [<i>ahinei</i>] of an Aramean, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara interjects: Do not raise the dilemma with regard to sweet dates, as they are certainly permitted, since they can be eaten raw. Similarly, do not raise the dilemma with regard to bitter dates, as they are certainly prohibited, since they are rendered edible through cooking. Rather, let the dilemma be raised with regard to dates whose flavor is moderate, neither sweet nor bitter. What is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Asi said to them: What is your dilemma? The <i>halakha</i> is clear, as my teacher prohibited such dates. The Gemara asks: And who was the Rabbi Asi’s teacher? Levi.
  § With regard to <i>shetita’a</i>, a sweet porridge made from roasted grains and honey, Rav deemed it permitted even when it was prepared by a gentile, whereas Shmuel’s father and Levi deemed it prohibited. The Gemara elaborates: With regard to <i>shetita’a</i> made of wheat or barley, everyone agrees that it is permitted. Similarly, with regard to <i>shetita’a</i> prepared from lentils to which vinegar is added, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, on account of the vinegar of gentiles. When they disagree, it is with regard to lentils made only with water: One Sage, Levi, holds that we decree a prohibition with regard to this porridge made without vinegar due to that porridge made with vinegar. And one Sage, Rav, holds that we do not decree for this reason.
  The Gemara notes: And some say that with regard to lentils made only with water, everyone agrees that the <i>shetita’a</i> is prohibited on account of lentils made with vinegar. When they disagree, it is with regard to <i>shetita’a</i> made of wheat and barley: One Sage, Levi, holds that we decree a prohibition with regard to this porridge prepared with wheat and barley due to that porridge made with lentils. And one Sage, Rav, holds that we do not decree for this reason.
  Apropos the mention of <i>shetita’a</i>, the Gemara relates that Rav said: Barzillai the Gileadite sent two kinds of <i>shetita’a</i> to David, as it is written: “And Barzillai the Gileadite of Rogelim brought beds, and basins, and earthen vessels, and wheat, and barley, and meal, and parched grain, and beans, and lentils, and parched pulse” (II Samuel 17:28). Barzillai brought two kinds of parched foods: Grain and pulse. The Gemara concludes: And now <i>shetita’a</i> is taken out in baskets upon baskets to the markets of Neharde’a, and there is no one who is concerned about that stringent ruling of Shmuel’s father and Levi.
  § The mishna teaches: And boiled and pickled vegetables of gentiles, whose usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar to them, may not be consumed, but one may derive benefit from them. Ḥizkiyya says: They taught that this prohibition applies solely to consumption only where their usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar, though there is no information about how these particular vegetables were prepared. But where it is known for certain that these vegetables were prepared with wine or vinegar, it is prohibited even to derive benefit from them. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from fish stew, which the Sages permitted one to derive benefit from? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to fish stew, wine is added merely to remove the stench of the fish and does not actually contribute any taste to it, whereas here, with regard to pickled vegetables, it is added to sweeten the taste.
  The Gemara cites a dissenting opinion. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even where it is known that wine or vinegar was added to the vegetables, it is also permitted to derive benefit from them. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from fish stew, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who prohibited deriving benefit from the fish stew? Why does Rabbi Meir permit one to derive benefit from vegetables pickled in gentiles’ wine but prohibit deriving benefit from fish stew that contains wine or vinegar?
  
  Daf 39a
  
  The Gemara explains: There, the substance of the wine is a recognizable component of the fish stew; here, its substance is not a recognizable component of the pickled vegetables.
  § The mishna teaches: And minced <i>tarit</i> fish, and brine that does not have a <i>kilbit</i> fish floating in it, and <i>ḥilak</i> are all prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is <i>ḥilak</i>? Rav Naḥman bar Abba says that Rav says: This is <i>sultanit</i>, a type of small fish that is generally caught before its scales have developed. And for what reason is it prohibited? It is because its size causes it to be intermingled with other fish, and as a result <i>sultanit</i> rises out of the water with non-kosher fish when it is caught.
  The Sages taught: If a fish does not currently possess scales but will grow them after a period of time, such as the <i>sultanit</i> and <i>afiyatz</i> fish, it is permitted. Likewise, if it has scales now but will shed them when it is caught and rises from the sea, such as <i>akunas</i> and <i>afuna</i>, <i>ketasfatiyas</i> and <i>akhsaftiyas</i> and <i>otanas</i> fish, it is permitted.
  Rabbi Abbahu announced in Caesarea: Fish entrails and their eggs may be purchased from any person, as the presumption with regard to them is that they come only from Pelusium [<i>Pilusa</i>] and Spain [<i>Aspamya</i>], and non-kosher fish are not found in those areas. This is similar to that which Abaye says: These small fish [<i>tzaḥanta</i>] of the Bav River are permitted, as non-kosher fish are not found in that river.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Abaye unequivocally permitted eating these fish and was not concerned about the potential presence of non-kosher fish among them? If we say that it is due to the fact that the water flows rapidly, and these non-kosher fish, since they do not have a spinal cord, are not able to exist in a place where the water flows rapidly, as the current carries the non-kosher fish out of the Bav River, and consequently all the remaining fish are kosher, that is not the case, since we see that non-kosher fish exist in rivers with strong currents.
  Rather, perhaps Abaye permitted the fish because the water is salty, and these non-kosher fish are not able to exist in a place of salty water since they do not have scales. This, too, is not the case, since we see that non-kosher fish exist in salty water. Rather, Abaye permitted the small fish in the Bav River because the mud in that river is not suitable for non-kosher fish to reproduce. The conditions in the river render it an unproductive habitat for non-kosher fish. Ravina says: Nowadays, as the government built canals between the rivers, and the Goza River and the Gamda River spill into the Bav and carry non-kosher fish there, it is prohibited to eat the small fish without thorough inspection.
  The Gemara cites several other statements of <i>amora’im</i> that concern the halakhic status of fish. Abaye says: This creature known as the sea donkey [<i>ḥamara deyamma</i>] is permitted; the creature known as the sea ox [<i>tora deyamma</i>] is prohibited, and your mnemonic to remember this <i>halakha</i> is: Impure is pure, and pure is impure, i.e., the name of an animal which is non-kosher on land is kosher in the sea, and that which is kosher on land is non-kosher in the sea.
  Rav Ashi said: The type of fish known as <i>shefar nuna</i> is permitted, and the type of fish known as <i>kadesh nuna</i> is prohibited, and your mnemonic to remember this <i>halakha</i> is: That which is holy [<i>kodesh</i>] is to the Lord, and not for humans. And some say that Rav Ashi said: The type of fish known as <i>kevar nuna</i> is prohibited, and your mnemonic is: The grave [<i>kever</i>] is impure like the graves of gentiles.
  The Gemara relates several incidents involving Sages and their rulings with regard to fish. Rabbi Akiva happened to come to Ginzak and they brought before him a certain fish that was similar to a <i>ḥippusha</i>, a non-kosher aquatic creature. When he enclosed it in a basket he saw that it had scales which it shed as it struggled to escape from the basket, and he permitted it on that basis. Rav Ashi happened to come to Tamduria where they brought before him a certain fish that was similar to an eel [<i>tzelofḥa</i>]. He took it out and held it against the light of day and saw that there were thin scales on it, and he permitted it.
  Rav Ashi also happened to come to a certain land where they brought before him a fish that was similar to a <i>shefarnuna</i>. He enclosed it in a white vessel and saw that it shed dark scales, which he could see against the white background of the container, and he permitted it. Rabba bar bar Ḥana happened to come to Akra DeAgma and they brought him some <i>tzaḥanta</i>, a dish prepared from small fish. He heard a certain man calling it <i>batei</i>, the name of a non-kosher sea creature.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to himself: From the fact that he called it <i>batei</i>, I can conclude from here that there is a non-kosher substance in the <i>tzaḥanta</i>. And he did not eat from it that night. In the morning, he examined the dish and in fact found a non-kosher substance in it. He read the following verse about himself: “No sin shall befall the righteous” (Proverbs 12:21).
  § The mishna teaches: And a sliver of <i>ḥiltit</i> may not be consumed, although one may derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that it is prohibited? It is because they slice it with a knife on which there is presumably non-kosher residue. And even though the Master said that a prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture is permitted, that principle does not apply in this case because as a result of the sharpness of the <i>ḥiltit</i>, the act of slicing it with a knife sweetens, i.e., enhances, the taste of the non-kosher residue. And there-fore it is like a prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the enhancement of the mixture, and it is prohibited.
  The Gemara relates that the gentile slave of Rabbi Levi would sell <i>ḥiltit</i>, and it was permitted to purchase it from him as he was the slave of a Sage. When Rabbi Levi passed away, they came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: Now that Rabbi Levi has passed, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether or not it is permitted to purchase <i>ḥiltit</i> from his gentile slave? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: The slave of a <i>ḥaver</i>, one devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, <i>teruma</i>, and tithes, is as a <i>ḥaver</i> himself, and therefore it is permitted to buy <i>ḥiltit</i> from him.
  The Gemara relates another incident that involves the status of a <i>ḥaver</i> and his household. Rav Huna bar Minyumi purchased sky-blue dye [<i>tekhelta</i>] from the people of the household, i.e., the wife, of Rav Amram the pious. One may purchase sky-blue dye for ritual fringes only from a reliable individual, as it is easy to counterfeit it. Rav Huna then came before Rav Yosef to ask if he could rely on her assurance that it was usable for the mitzva. The answer was not available to Rav Yosef.
  Later, Ḥanan the tailor happened to meet Rav Huna, and he said to him: From where could poor Rav Yosef  have known the answer to this question? Ḥanan continued: There was an incident in which I was involved, as I purchased sky-blue dye from the people of the household, i.e., the wife, of Rabena’a, brother of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, and I came before Rav Mattana to ask him the same question, and the answer was not available to him either. I then came before Rav Yehuda of Hagronya, who said to me: You have fallen into my hand, i.e., I am the only one who can answer your question. This is what Shmuel says: The wife of a <i>ḥaver</i> is herself considered like a <i>ḥaver</i>, and you may therefore rely on her statement.
  The Gemara comments: We learn here that which the Sages taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: The wife of a <i>ḥaver</i> is like a <i>ḥaver</i>; the slave of a <i>ḥaver</i> is like a <i>ḥaver</i>. Furthermore, with regard to a <i>ḥaver</i> that died, his wife and children and members of his household remain in their presumptive status until they are suspected of engaging in inappropriate deeds. And similarly, with regard to a courtyard in which they sell sky-blue dye, it remains in its presumptive status as a place in which kosher sky-blue dye is sold until it is disqualified due to unscrupulous behavior.
  The Sages taught: The wife of one who is not careful to keep the particulars of certain <i>halakhot</i> [<i>am ha’aretz</i>], who later marries a <i>ḥaver</i>, and likewise the daughter of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> who marries a <i>ḥaver</i>, and likewise the slave of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> who is sold to a <i>ḥaver</i>, must all accept upon themselves the commitment to observe the matters associated with <i>ḥaver</i> status. But the wife of a <i>ḥaver</i> who later marries an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and likewise the daughter of a <i>ḥaver</i> who marries an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and likewise the slave of a <i>ḥaver</i> who was sold to an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, these people need not accept upon themselves the commitment to observe the matters associated with <i>ḥaver</i> status <i>ab initio</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: They too must accept upon themselves the commitment to observe the matters associated with <i>ḥaver</i> status <i>ab initio</i>. And similarly, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would illustrate this point and say: There was an incident involving a certain woman who married a <i>ḥaver</i> and would tie for him phylacteries on his hand, and she later married a tax collector and would tie for him tax-seals on his hand, which shows that her new husband had a great influence on her level of piety.
  § Rav says: The substances represented by the acronym <i>ḥet</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>tav</i> are prohibited if they were deposited with a gentile while they were sealed with only one seal. Those represented by the acronym <i>ḥet</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>gimmel</i> are permitted if they were deposited with a gentile while they were sealed with one seal. The Gemara elaborates: Milk [<i>ḥalav</i>], meat [<i>basar</i>], wine [<i>yayin</i>], and sky-blue dye [<i>tekhelet</i>]
  
  Daf 39b
  
  are all prohibited when they are found with only one seal; <i>ḥiltit</i>, fish stew [<i>morayes</i>], bread [<i>pat</i>], and cheese [<i>gevina</i>] are all permitted when they are found with one seal.
  The Gemara explains why only one seal is necessary for bread. With regard to what need we be concerned in the case of bread, that one might have thought it requires two seals? If it is due to the concern for the gentile exchanging the fresh bread of the Jew with his own bread that is less fresh, the difference between cold bread and warm bread is known, and the Jew will realize that there has been an exchange. Likewise, if there is a concern that a gentile might exchange the more valuable wheat bread of the Jew with his own less valuable barley bread, the Jew will also know about it in this case. And if it is due to the concern that a gentile might exchange similar kinds of bread with each other, it can be assumed that since there is one seal the gentile will not trouble himself and forge another seal just to exchange bread of equal value.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav, what is different about cheese that it requires only one seal whereas milk requires two? If the reason is that a gentile will not trouble himself and forge a different seal, as cheese is generally inexpensive and the small profit he might make is not worth such an effort, this reasoning should apply to milk also, as he will not trouble himself and forge a new seal in this case either. Rav Kahana said: Remove the term: Milk, from Rav’s statement, and enter instead: A piece of fish that has no sign of kashrut.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Rav could not have been teaching that a piece of fish with no signs of kashrut requires two seals, as fish is the same as meat, which is already included in the list of items that require two seals. The Gemara explains that there are two categories of meat: Animal meat and fish meat. Since one might have thought that they are subject to different <i>halakhot</i>, Rav therefore teaches that both require two seals.
  The Gemara cites a different set of lists than that presented by Rav. And Shmuel says: The substances represented by the acronym <i>beit</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>tav</i> are prohibited when sealed with one seal; those represented by the acronym <i>mem</i>, <i>ḥet</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, are permitted when sealed with one seal. The Gemara explains: Meat [<i>basar</i>], wine [<i>yayin</i>], and sky-blue dye [<i>tekhelet</i>] are prohibited when sealed with a single seal; fish stew [<i>morayes</i>], <i>ḥiltit</i>, and cheese [<i>gevina</i>], are permitted when sealed with a single seal. The Gemara comments: According to Shmuel, a piece of fish that has no sign of kashrut is the same as meat, and we do not say that there is a difference between two categories of meat. Consequently, he does not include in his list a piece of fish that has no sign of kashrut.
  The Sages taught: One may not purchase foods represented by the acronym <i>yod</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>ḥet</i>; <i>mem</i>, <i>ḥet</i>, <i>gimmel</i> in Syria, not even from Jews. The Gemara elaborates: One may not purchase wine [<i>yayin</i>], nor fish stew [<i>morayes</i>], nor milk [<i>ḥalav</i>], nor <i>salkondarit</i> salt [<i>melaḥ salkondarit</i>], nor <i>ḥiltit</i>, nor cheese [<i>gevina</i>], except when purchased from an expert with a reputation for knowing and upholding the <i>halakhot</i> of kashrut. And with regard to all of them, if one is a guest in the home of his host, they are permitted, as a Jew is assumed to keep the <i>halakhot</i> of kashrut in his own home.
  The Gemara adds: This supports the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: If a homeowner sent someone a package of food to his house, the food is permitted. What is the reason? It is because a homeowner does not leave aside permitted foods and eat prohibited foods, and when he sends food to another, he sends it from that which he eats himself, even though one may not be allowed to purchase food from that individual.
  § The mishna teaches that <i>salkondarit</i> salt is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is <i>salkondarit</i> salt? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is the salt that all Roman bakers [<i>salkondarei</i>] eat. The Sages taught: With regard to <i>salkondarit</i> salt, black salt is prohibited, whereas white salt is permitted; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: White salt is prohibited; black salt is permitted. The Gemara cites a third opinion: Rabbi Yehuda ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: This and that, i.e., both white and black <i>salkondarit</i> salt, are prohibited.
  The Gemara cites an explanation of this dispute. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to the statement of the one who says that white <i>salkondarit</i> salt is prohibited, it is suspected that the intestines of white non-kosher fish are mixed in it, and this is the reason for the prohibition. According to the statement of the one who says that black salt is prohibited, it is suspected that the intestines of black non-kosher fish are mixed in it.
  According to the statement of the one who said this and that are prohibited, he is concerned that this and that, i.e., the intestines of both white and black fish, are mixed in white and black salt, respectively. The Gemara mentions an additional problem with <i>salkondarit</i> salt: Rabbi Abbahu says in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: There was a certain elder in our neighborhood who would smooth its surface with pig fat.
  § The mishna further teaches that the list of items it mentioned are all prohibited. The Gemara asks: Since the mishna began by stating that the items it lists are prohibited for consumption, what does this apparently redundant conclusion serve to exclude? The Gemara answers: According to the opinion of Ḥizkiyya cited on 38b, it serves to exclude cases where it is known that wine of gentiles’ was added to the foods, as one may not even derive benefit from such foods. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, it serves to exclude fish stew and cheese of Beit Unyaki, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from these, and accordingly, the unattributed statement in this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, cited in the previous mishna (29b).
  MISHNA: And these are permitted for consumption: Milk that was milked by a gentile and a Jew watched him doing so; and honey; and grape clusters [<i>davdevaniyyot</i>] which, despite the fact that they are dripping juice, are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of susceptibility to ritual impurity caused by contact with that liquid; and pickled vegetables whose usual manner of preparation does not involve adding wine and vinegar to them; and <i>tarit</i> fish that is not minced; and brine that has fish in it; and the leaf of a <i>ḥiltit</i> plant; and rolled olive cakes [<i>geluskaot</i>].
  Rabbi Yosei says: Overripe olives are prohibited. Locusts that come from a salesman’s basket are prohibited, whereas those that come from the storeroom [<i>heftek</i>] are permitted; and likewise with regard to the portion of the produce designated for the priest [<i>teruma</i>], as will be explained in the Gemara.
  GEMARA: We learn from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: A Jew may sit beside a gentile’s flock and wait while the gentile milks his animals and brings the milk to the Jew, and he not need be concerned, even if he cannot see the milking process from his seated position. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is known that there is no non-kosher animal in the gentile’s flock, isn’t it obvious that the milk is permitted? Why would the <i>baraita</i> teach an obvious <i>halakha</i>? And if there is a non-kosher animal in his flock, then why is the milk permitted, considering the fact that the Jew could not see the gentile from where he sat?
  The Gemara explains: Actually, this is referring to a case where there is a non-kosher animal in the flock, and when the Jew is standing he can see the gentile, but when he is sitting he cannot see the gentile. Lest you say: Since when the Jew is sitting, he cannot see the gentile, we should be concerned that perhaps the gentile will bring non-kosher milk and mix it with the kosher milk, the <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches us that since when the Jew is standing, he can see him, the gentile is fearful of being caught and does not mix anything into the milk.
  § The mishna teaches: And the honey of gentiles is permitted. The Gemara explains: For what need we be concerned with regard to honey? If it is due to the concern that a gentile might mix wine with it, honey spoils when it is mixed with wine, and therefore a gentile would not do so. If it is due to the cooking of gentiles, this too does not apply, because it is eaten as it is, i.e., raw. If it is due to the concern that the honey might have absorbed prohibited taste from vessels of gentiles that require purging, this does not apply either, as it is a prohibited substance that imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, and such a case is permitted. Since none of these concerns are relevant, the honey is permitted.
  § The mishna further teaches: And grape clusters which, despite the fact that they are dripping juice, are not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of susceptibility to ritual impurity caused by contact with that liquid. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who harvests grapes in order to take them to the press and crush them, there is a dispute as to whether or not the liquid that seeps from the grapes renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Shammai says: It has become susceptible to ritual impurity, and Hillel says: It has not become susceptible. And eventually Hillel conceded to the opinion of Shammai. This shows that the juice that seeps out of grapes does render them susceptible to ritual impurity, which apparently contradicts the ruling of the mishna.
  The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the <i>baraita</i>, he wants the juice as a beverage, and one’s intention influences the capability of certain liquids to render substances susceptible to ritual impurity. Therefore, the liquid that seeps from the grapes renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. Here, in the case of the mishna, he does not want the juice as a beverage, and therefore the grapes are not rendered susceptible to impurity.
  § The mishna further teaches: And <i>tarit</i> fish that is not minced and brine that has fish in it are permitted. The Sages taught: What is considered <i>tarit</i> that has not been minced? Any fish whose head and spine are recognizable. And what is considered brine that has fish in it? Any brine that has one <i>kilbit</i> or two <i>kilbiyot</i>
  
  Daf 40a
  
  floating in it. The Gemara asks: Now that you have said that brine which has only one <i>kilbit</i> in it is permitted, is it necessary to teach that brine that has two <i>kilbiyot</i> in it is also permitted? The Gemara explains that it is not difficult: Here, two <i>kilbiyot</i> are required to permit the brine, as it is contained in open barrels, but there, only one is required, since it is in sealed barrels.
  § It was stated that Rav Huna says: <i>Tarit</i> is not permitted for consumption until its head and spine are recognizable. Rav Naḥman says: It is permitted if either the head or the spine is recognizable. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 59a): And with regard to fish, any that has fins and scales is permitted. Evidently, the kashrut of fish is determined only by its fins and scales, not its head or its spine. Abaye said: When that mishna is taught, it is in reference to the <i>ara’a</i> and <i>falmuda</i> fish, whose heads are similar to the heads of non-kosher fish.
  The Gemara analyzes the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Ulla: The dispute applies to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies, everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and the spine are recognizable. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Zeira said: Originally, I would dip foods in their brine, but once I heard that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Ulla: The dispute is only with regard to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and the spine are recognizable; I too no longer dip foods in their brine.
  Rav Pappa said: The <i>halakha</i> is that <i>tarit</i> is prohibited until the head and spine of each and every fish is recognizable. The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappa’s statement from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to pieces of fish that have a sign of kashrut, whether this sign is present in all of them or only in a minority of them, and even if it is present in only one fish out of one hundred of them, they are all permitted. And there was an incident involving a certain gentile who brought a large jug of pieces of fish, and a sign of kashrut was found in one of them, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permitted the entire jug of fish. This apparently contradicts Rav Pappa’s assertion that all the pieces must be recognizable for them to be permitted.
  Rav Pappa interpreted that <i>baraita</i> as referring to a case where the pieces correspond to each other, i.e., they fit together so that it is clear that they are all from the same fish. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating this explicitly? It the pieces correspond it is obvious that they are permitted, as they evidently come from the same kosher fish. The Gemara explains that this was taught lest you say that one should be concerned that perhaps the pieces merely happened to fit together; the <i>baraita</i> therefore teaches us that in such a case the pieces are permitted.
  The Gemara relates that there was a certain ship carrying <i>tzaḥanta</i> which came to the city of Sikhra. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana went out and saw that the fish had scales on them and permitted them, as any fish with scales is kosher. Rava said to him: But is there anyone who permits <i>tzaḥanta</i> in a case like this, when it is from a land where fish with scales are common and it is very possible that the scales are from kosher fish that had been in the boat previously? <i>Shofarot</i> went out from the court of Rava to herald a declaration promulgating his ruling, and he thereby prohibited all the fish on that boat. And <i>shofarot</i> went out from the court of Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana, and he thereby permitted the fish.
  The Gemara presents two interpretations of the above ruling. Rav Yirmeya of Difti said: Rav Pappi said to me that when Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana permitted the fish on the ship, he was referring only to their brine, but with regard to their bodies, no, he did not permit them. Rav Ashi said: Rav Pappa said to me that when Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana permitted the fish, he was referring even to their bodies.
  Rav Ashi continued: And I do not prohibit the fish, as Rav Pappa said to me that Rav Huna permitted it, but I also do not permit the fish, as Rav Yehuda said to me in the name of Ulla that the dispute between Rava and Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana is referring to dipping foods in their brine, but with regard to eating their actual bodies, everyone agrees that it is prohibited until both the head and spine of each and every fish are recognizable.
  Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi sat before Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he sat and said: With regard to a gentile who brought a boat that was full of barrels of fish brine, and a <i>kilbit</i> was found in one of the barrels, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If the barrels were open, they are all permitted; if they were closed, then the barrel with the <i>kilbit</i> is permitted, and all the others are prohibited. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him: From where do you know this? Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi responded: I heard this from three verses, i.e., great Sages upon whom one can rely as though their statements were recorded in verses: From Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  § The Gemara discusses the <i>halakha</i> with regard to other parts of fish. Rav Beruna says that Rav says: Fish intestines and their roe may be purchased only from an expert. Ulla raises a contradiction to Rabbi Dostai of Biri: From the fact that Rav says: Fish intestines and their roe may be purchased only from an expert, it may be inferred that a non-kosher fish has roe, as otherwise there would be no reason to permit only roe purchased from an expert. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this claim from the following <i>baraita</i>: A non-kosher fish gives birth whereas a kosher fish lays eggs.
  Rabbi Dostai accepted this opinion and said: Delete the phrase: Their roe, from here. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Do not delete it, as both kosher and non-kosher fish are fish that lay, i.e., produce, eggs, but this kosher fish propagates externally by laying eggs in the water which later hatch, and that non-kosher fish propagates internally by keeping the eggs in its own body until they develop. Nevertheless, both produce roe, and there is therefore reason to be concerned that a Jew might purchase non-kosher roe.
  The Gemara asks: But even so, why do I need an expert? Let one check the signs of kashrut on the roe himself, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish. The Gemara interjects: Does it enter your mind to say that the signs of kashrut for fish are the same as the signs of kashrut for eggs? This is not so, as the signs of kosher fish are the possession of fins and scales, as written in the Torah with regard to them. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means to say: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish roe.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And these are the signs of bird eggs: Any egg that narrows at the top and is rounded, so that one of its ends is wide and the other one of its ends is pointed is kosher. If both of its ends are sharp or both of its ends are wide, it is non-kosher. If the yolk is on the outside and the albumen is on the inside, it is non-kosher; if the albumen is on the outside and the yolk is on the inside, it is kosher. If the yolk and albumen are mixed with each other, this is the egg of a creeping animal. Considering that one can easily determine the kashrut of such eggs, why are only those purchased from an expert permitted? Rava says: Rav’s ruling refers specifically to a case where the eggs have melted together and it is impossible to determine whether or not they are kosher based on these signs.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dostai of Biri, who accepted the idea that non-kosher fish do not lay eggs and says: Delete from here the phrase: Their roe, it is difficult.
  
  Daf 40b
  
  The Gemara elaborates: But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i>, as it was interpreted above: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish roe? Apparently, the <i>baraita</i> assumes that non-kosher fish roe exists. The Gemara answers: Didn’t you yourself find it necessary to explain and reinterpret the <i>baraita</i>, as it cannot be understood according to its straightforward meaning? Rabbi Dostai can also explain the <i>baraita</i> so that it effectively reads: Like the signs of bird eggs, so are the signs of fish intestines. Accordingly, the <i>baraita</i> never actually mentions fish roe at all.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But where do you find that one of the signs of fish intestines is that they must be round and pointed? The Gemara answers: You find this with regard to the swim bladder of a fish, which is considered to be kosher if it is shaped like a kosher egg.
  The Gemara asks: If there is no expert there, and one cannot determine whether or not the fish roe is kosher, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Yehuda says that once the seller says: I salted the fish from which this roe came and they were kosher, the roe is permitted. Rav Naḥman says: The roe is prohibited until the seller shows kosher fish to the buyer and says: These are the fish, and these are their intestines. That is, the roe is permitted only if the seller can present the fish that produced it. The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda instructed Adda, his attendant: Once the seller says: I salted them, they are permitted.
  § The mishna teaches: And the leaf of a <i>ḥiltit</i> plant is permitted. The Gemara asks: Since the previous mishna (35b) prohibited a sliver of <i>ḥiltit</i> only due to the concern that it might have been sliced with a non-kosher knife, isn’t it obvious that a leaf, which has not been sliced, is permitted? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach this only with regard to the slivers of <i>ḥiltit</i> that might be found on the leaf, lest you say that one should be concerned that perhaps a gentile might bring slivers sliced with a non-kosher knife and mix it with the slivers on the leaf. The mishna therefore teaches us that it is assumed that the slivers on the leaf had stuck to it and came off with the plant when it was pulled from the ground.
  § The mishna teaches: And rolled olive cakes. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that these are permitted? For what reason might they be prohibited? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they are permitted even though they are very soft. Lest you say that there is a concern that they softened because a gentile placed wine in them, the mishna therefore teaches us that these olives have softened due to the oil they possess.
  § The mishna further teaches: And Rabbi Yosei says: Overripe olives are prohibited. The Gemara asks: What are overripe olives like? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: This is referring to any olive that if one grasps it in his hand, its pit slips out, due to the softness of the olive.
  § The mishna teaches: Locusts that come from a salesman’s basket are prohibited while those that come from the storeroom are permitted. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Locusts, and caper buds, and leeks [<i>kaflotot</i>] that come from the storehouse, and from the storeroom, and from a gentile’s ship are all permitted. Those that are sold in the market [<i>bekatluza</i>] from baskets that are in front of the storekeeper are prohibited, because it is assumed that the gentile storekeeper sprinkles wine upon them. And similarly, with regard to apple wine that belongs to gentiles: Those that come from the storehouse or from the storeroom or from a salesman’s basket are permitted. Apple wine that is sold in the market is prohibited, because they mix grape wine of gentiles in it.
  The Gemara cites a relevant incident: The Sages taught: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi felt discomfort in his stomach and knew that apple wine would alleviate it. He said: Isn’t there any person who knows whether apple wine of gentiles is prohibited or permitted? Rabbi Yishmael ben Rabbi Yosei said before him: Once my father felt discomfort in his stomach and they brought him apple wine of gentiles that was seventy years old, and he drank it and was cured. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: You had so much knowledge in your hand that could have relieved me, and yet you caused me to suffer by withholding it until now.
  They checked and found one gentile who had three hundred large jugs of apple wine that was seventy years old, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi drank from it and was cured. He said: Blessed is the Omnipresent who delivered His universe to keepers. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi thanked God for causing the gentile to keep the wine for seventy years so that it could be used to heal him.
  § The mishna further teaches: And likewise with regard to <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: And likewise with regard to <i>teruma</i>? Rav Sheshet says: This means: And likewise the same <i>halakha</i> applies to a priest who is suspected of selling <i>teruma</i>, which is less expensive, as non-sacred food. It is only when the food is in front of the priest that it is prohibited; but food that comes from the storehouse or from the storeroom or from a salesman’s basket is permitted. The reason is that the priest is fearful, because he thinks to himself: If I sell <i>teruma</i> in public, the Sages will hear of it and deprive me of all my wares.
  
  MISHNA: All statues are forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from them, because they are worshipped at least once a year; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The only type of statue that is forbidden is any statue that has in its hand a staff, or a bird, or an orb, as these are indications that this statue is designated for idolatry. If the statue is holding a different item, it may be assumed that the statue was fashioned for ornamental purposes and not for worship. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is prohibited to derive benefit even from any statue that has any item whatsoever in its hand.
  GEMARA: If it is true that the statues to which Rabbi Meir is referring are worshipped at least once a year, what is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit deriving benefit from them? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In Rabbi Meir’s locale, people would worship statues once a year. And therefore, Rabbi Meir, who maintains that one must be concerned for a minority occurrence (see <i>Yevamot</i> 61b), issued a decree that statues are forbidden even in other places, due to that locale where people would worship statues. And the Rabbis, by contrast, who do not maintain that one must be concerned for a minority occurrence, did not issue a decree that statues are forbidden even in other places due to that locale.
  Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: We learned that this dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is only with regard to the statues [<i>be’andartei</i>] of kings. Rabbi Meir decreed that they are forbidden as perhaps they were designated for worship. The Rabbis assumed that they were designed for ornamental purposes, not for worship. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And furthermore, we learned that the dispute is only with regard to statues that stand at the entrance to the region. Since these statues were erected in an important location, there is concern that they are worshipped.
  
  Daf 41a
  
  Rabba says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is only with regard to statues that are erected in villages. But with regard to those that are erected in cities, all agree that they are permitted, i.e., that it is permitted to derive benefit from them. What is the reason? It is because they were fashioned for ornamental purposes and not for worship.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to those erected in villages, is there anyone who says that they are fashioned for ornamental purposes? Those in villages were certainly fashioned for idol worship. How, then, can the Rabbis maintain that such statues are permitted?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, if such a distinction was stated, this is what was stated: Rabba says that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is only with regard to statues that are erected in cities, where they may have been fashioned simply for ornamental purposes. But with regard to those erected in villages, all agree that they are used for idol worship and are therefore forbidden.
  § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The only statues that are forbidden are: Any statue that has in its hand a staff, or a bird, or an orb, as these are indications that this statue is designated for idolatry. The Gemara explains that each of these items symbolizes the statue’s supposed divinity, indicating its dominion over the world: A staff symbolizes dominion as the idol rules itself under the entire world, i.e., it rules the entire world, like one rules over an animal with a staff. A bird symbolizes dominion as the idol grasps itself under the entire world, i.e., it grasps the entire world, as one grasps a bird in his hand. An orb symbolizes dominion as the idol grasps itself under the entire world, i.e., it grasps the entire world, as one grasps a ball in his hand.
  The Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> (6:1) that they added the following to the list of items that, when added to a statue, indicate that it is worshipped as an idol: A sword in its hand, a crown on its head, and a ring on its finger.
  The Gemara explains why these items were initially believed to be insignificant and were later understood as symbolizing idol worship. With regard to a statue holding a sword, the Sages initially thought that this merely indicates that it is a statue of a bandit. But in the end they reasoned that it symbolizes the notion that the idol has the power to kill itself under the whole world, i.e., to kill the entire world.
  With regard to a crown, the Sages initially thought that it is merely a woven wreath. But in the end they reasoned that it is like the crown of a king. With regard to a ring, the Sages initially thought that this merely symbolizes the bearer of a signet ring [<i>ishtayema</i>]. But in the end they reasoned that it is symbolic of the idol’s supposed ability to seal its fate under the whole world, i.e., to seal the fate of the entire world, for death.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is prohibited to derive benefit even from any statue that has any item whatsoever in its hand. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is prohibited to derive benefit from a statue even if it is merely holding a stone, or even a twig.
  Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If the idol is grasping excrement in its hand, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is this meant to honor the statue, indicating that it is an object of idol worship? Do we say that the statue is forbidden, as this indicates that the entire world is inferior to it like excrement, or perhaps does this indicate that the idol itself is inferior to the entire world like excrement? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who finds unidentifiable fragments of statues, these are permitted, i.e., one may derive benefit from them. If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, as objects similar to those are worshipped.
  GEMARA: Shmuel says: It is permitted to derive benefit even from fragments of objects that have been seen used in idol worship. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that fragments of nondescript statues are permitted? This indicates that it is prohibited to derive benefit from fragments of idols that were known to be worshipped.
  The Gemara answers: The mishna means that fragments of statues are permitted, and the same is true even of fragments of objects of idol worship. And that which is taught in the mishna: Fragments of statues, is not meant to exclude fragments of idols. Rather, this expression is used because the mishna sought to teach in the last clause: If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, even if they are not known to be objects of idol worship, as objects similar to those are worshipped. If the first clause in the mishna had referred to fragments of idols, it would have been inferred that the latter clause was referring specifically to the figure of a hand or foot that was known to have been worshipped, and that otherwise such figures would not be forbidden.
  We learned in the mishna: If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, as objects similar to those are worshipped. The Gemara asks: Why?
  
  Daf 41b
  
  But aren’t they fragments of idols, which are permitted according to Shmuel? The Gemara answers that Shmuel interpreted the mishna as follows: It is referring to a case where these objects that are in the figure of a hand or a foot are standing on their pedestals, which shows that they were designed this way initially and are not merely fragments.
  § It was stated: With regard to objects of idol worship that broke by themselves, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is prohibited to derive benefit from them. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: It is permitted.
  The Gemara explains the sides of the dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is prohibited, as its owner did not revoke its status as an object of idol worship. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that it is permitted, as the owner presumably revoked its status as an object of idol worship, having said to himself: If the idol could not save even itself from harm, can it save that man, i.e., myself?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the passage in the book of Samuel recounting the downfall of the Philistine god Dagon: “And when they arose early the next morning, behold, Dagon was fallen on his face to the ground before the Ark of the Lord; and the head of Dagon and both the palms of his hands lay cut off upon the threshold; only the trunk of Dagon was left to him” (I Samuel 5:4). And from the next verse it seems that Dagon’s worshippers accorded it honor despite its destruction, as it is written: “Therefore, the priests of Dagon, and anyone who comes into Dagon’s house, do not tread on the threshold of Dagon in Ashdod until this day” (I Samuel 5:5). Evidently, when an idol breaks, its worshippers do not stop worshipping it.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to him: Is there proof from there? There, the reason people did not tread on the threshold of Dagon is that they had abandoned their worship of the Dagon and would instead worship the threshold upon which Dagon was found, as they stated this reasoning: The spirit of Dagon has left the Dagon idol and instead it came and rested upon the threshold.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the mishna: In the case of one who finds fragments of statues, these are permitted. This indicates that fragments of known objects of idol worship are forbidden.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish replied: Do not say that the indication is that fragments of objects of idol worship are forbidden; rather say that the indication is that full statues themselves are forbidden, and the unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who, in the previous mishna, prohibits any statue as it is possible that it is worshipped annually.
  The Gemara asks: But how does Rabbi Yoḥanan refute the following logic: From the opinion of Rabbi Meir one can learn a detail with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis. Doesn’t Rabbi Meir say that statues are forbidden, while fragments of statues are permitted? From this, one can derive that this is true according to the Rabbis as well with regard to objects of idol worship: The object itself is forbidden, but its fragments are permitted.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of statues, the fragments are permitted because there is room to say that people worshipped them, and there is also room to say that people did not worship them; and even if you say that people worshipped them, there is room to say that their owners subsequently revoked them. This is not comparable to an object of idol worship, which people certainly worshipped, and who is to say that its owner certainly revoked it? It is a conflict between an uncertainty as to whether or not it was revoked, and a certainty that it was worshipped, and the principle is that an uncertainty does not override a certainty.
  The Gemara asks: And does an uncertainty not override a certainty? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a <i>ḥaver</i> who died and left a storehouse filled with produce, even if the produce was there only that day, it has the presumptive status of produce that was ritually prepared, i.e., properly tithed. This is due to the presumption that the <i>ḥaver</i> tithed the produce himself or instructed others to do so.
  The Gemara infers: And here, in this case, the produce was certainly untithed at the outset, and there is uncertainty whether the <i>ḥaver</i> tithed it, and there is uncertainty whether he did not tithe it, and despite this conflict, the uncertainty whether it was tithed comes and overrides the certainty that it was untithed produce.
  The Gemara rejects this claim: There, in that case, conflict is between certainty and certainty, as the <i>ḥaver</i> certainly tithed the produce. This presumption is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a; as Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a says: There is a presumption with regard to a <i>ḥaver</i> that he does not release an item from his possession that is not ritually prepared.
  And if you wish, say instead that perhaps the produce did not initially have the status of untithed produce, and therefore the conflict is between uncertainty and uncertainty.
  This is because it is possible that there was never an obligation to tithe the produce, as the <i>ḥaver</i> may have acted in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Oshaya, who says that a person can employ artifice to circumvent obligations incumbent upon him in dealing with his grain, and bring it into his courtyard in its chaff so that his animal may eat from it. And this grain is exempt from tithes. Although the obligation to tithe produce that has been fully processed applies even to animal fodder, it is permitted to feed one’s animal untithed produce that has not been fully processed. In light of this <i>halakha</i> it is possible that the produce in the storehouse of the <i>ḥaver</i> never needed to be tithed. Consequently, this case is a conflict between two uncertain factors, as it is uncertain whether or not the owner was obligated to tithe the produce in the first place, and even if he was required to do so, it is uncertain whether or not he tithed it.
  The Gemara raises another objection: And is it so that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the maidservant
  
  Daf 42a
  
  of one violent person [<i>metzik</i>] in the city of Rimon, who cast a non-viable newborn into a pit, and a priest came and looked into the pit to ascertain whether the baby was male or whether it was female, as the length of time of a woman’s ritual impurity after childbirth, even if she gave birth to a non-viable newborn, depends on whether the child was male or female (see Leviticus, chapter 12). And the incident came before the Sages to rule whether or not the priest had contracted ritual impurity while standing over the corpse, and they deemed him ritually pure. The basis for this ruling was due to the fact that as martens and polecats [<i>bardelas</i>] are common there, it is likely that the body was dragged away before the priest arrived at the pit.
  The Gemara concludes its objection: And here, in this case, where it is certain that the woman cast the non-viable newborn into the pit, and it is uncertain whether an animal dragged it away and it is uncertain whether no animal dragged it away, the Sages nevertheless ruled that an uncertainty comes and overrides a certainty.
  The Gemara rejects this interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>: Do not say that the woman certainly cast a non-viable newborn into a pit; rather, say that she cast an object similar to a non-viable newborn into a pit. Perhaps it was not the body of an infant; it might have merely been congealed blood, which does not impart impurity. Therefore, it is a conflict between uncertainty and uncertainty; it is unclear whether the item that was cast into the pit could have rendered the priest ritually impure, and even if it could have, it might have already been dragged away.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i>: To ascertain whether it was male or whether it was female, indicating that the only uncertainty was with regard to its sex, as it was certainly a non-viable newborn?
  The Gemara answers that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: The priest attempted to examine two aspects of the miscarried entity. He sought to ascertain whether the woman miscarried, bearing an amorphous mass, or whether she cast a non-viable newborn into the pit; and if you say that she cast a non-viable newborn, he sought to ascertain whether it was male or whether it was female.
  And if you wish, say that there is a different answer: This case is not a conflict between certainty and uncertainty; rather it is a conflict between certainty and certainty. Since martens and polecats are common there, they certainly dragged the body away. Consequently, the ruling in this case does not contradict the principle that an uncertainty does not override a certainty.
  § The Gemara returns to the dispute with regard to an idol that broke. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from the mishna: If one found an object in the figure of a hand or in the figure of a foot, these are forbidden, as objects similar to those are worshipped. Rabbi Yoḥanan asks: Why are they forbidden? Aren’t they fragments, which according to Reish Lakish should be permitted?
  The Gemara answers: Didn’t Shmuel interpret the mishna as referring to a case where these objects are standing on their pedestals, which shows that they were designed this way initially?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a mishna (52b): A gentile can revoke the idolatrous status of his own object of idol worship or that of another gentile, but a Jew cannot revoke the status of a gentile’s object of idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan asks: Why can’t a Jew revoke the status of a gentile’s idol according to Reish Lakish? Let it be treated like an object of idol worship that broke on its own, which Reish Lakish deems permitted.
  Abaye said: That mishna is referring to a case where the Jew bent the idol out of shape without actually breaking it. The Gemara asks: And if he merely bent the idol out of shape, what of it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (53a) that if one bent an idol, changing its shape, even if he did not remove any part of it, he thereby revoked its status as an object of idol worship?
  The Gemara answers: This statement applies only in a case where a gentile bent the idol, changing its shape; but in a case where a Jew bent it, changing its shape, its status as an object of idol worship is not revoked.
  And Rava said a different answer: Actually, the basic <i>halakha</i> is that in a case where a Jew bent it, changing its shape, its status as an object of idol worship is also revoked. But the Sages issued a decree that such an idol retains its idolatrous status, lest a Jew first lift it up and then attempt to revoke its status. In this case the idol’s status is not revoked, as when a Jew lifts an idol he acquires it, and it becomes an object of idol worship in a Jew’s possession, and any object of idol worship in a Jew’s possession can never have its idolatrous status revoked. Therefore, only when an idol breaks on its own does Reish Lakish maintain that its status is revoked.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a gentile who brought stones from stone heaps that were used in the worship of the deity Mercury [<i>HaMarkulis</i>], and who then paved roads and built theaters [<i>vetarteiot</i>] with them, it is permitted to derive benefit from them, as the gentile revoked their idolatrous status. But in the case of a Jew who brought stones that were used in the worship of Mercury and who then paved roads and built theaters with them, it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: According to Reish Lakish, why does a stone such as this retain its idolatrous status? Let it be treated like an object of idol worship that broke on its own, which Reish Lakish deems permitted.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question may be answered in accordance with the opinion of Rava that the Sages issued a decree that an object of idol worship retains its idolatrous status when a Jew attempts to revoke it, lest the Jew lift and acquire the idol, which would make it impossible to subsequently revoke its status.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a gentile who shaved down an object of idol worship for his own sake, as he needed the shavings, the idol itself and its shavings are then permitted. If he did it for the sake of the idol, to improve its appearance, the idol is forbidden, but its shavings are permitted. But in the case of a Jew who shaved down an object of idol worship, whether he did it for his own sake or for the sake of the idol, the idol itself and its shavings are forbidden. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: According to Reish Lakish, in a case where a Jew shaved the idol for his own sake, why are the shavings forbidden? Let it be treated like an object of idol worship that broke on its own.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question may be answered in accordance with the opinion of Rava that the Sages issued a decree that an object of idol worship retains its idolatrous status when a Jew attempts to cause it to be revoked.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a mishna (43a): Rabbi Yosei says: When one encounters an idol, he should grind the idol and throw the dust to the wind or cast it into the sea. The Rabbis said to him: What is the good of that? That also gives a Jew benefit from the idol, as it becomes fertilizer for his crops, and deriving any kind of benefit is prohibited, as it is written: “And nothing of the proscribed items shall cleave to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: According to Reish Lakish, why is this prohibited? Let it be treated like an object of idol worship that broke on its own.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question may be answered in accordance with the opinion of Rava cited above, that the Sages issued a decree with regard to this matter.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei ben Yasian says: If one found an object in the figure of a dragon [<i>derakon</i>] with its head severed, but it is uncertain whether a gentile severed it and it is uncertain whether a Jew severed it, the object is permitted. But if it is certain that a Jew severed it, it is forbidden. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: According to Reish Lakish, why is it forbidden? Let it be treated like an object of idol worship that broke on its own.
  The Gemara answers: Here too, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s question may be answered in accordance with the opinion of Rava that the Sages issued a decree with regard to this matter.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says that one may not even plant vegetables in the rainy season under a tree worshipped as an idol, as foliage may fall on them, serving as fertilizer. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: According to Reish Lakish, why should a leaf from such a tree retain its idolatrous status? Let it be treated like an object of idol worship that broke on its own.
  The Gemara answers: There it is different, as the main object of idol worship, the tree, still exists fully intact.
  
  Daf 42b
  
  The Gemara asks: But consider the case of shavings, where the main object of idol worship still exists, and nevertheless it is taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier that if a gentile shaved an idol down for its own sake, the idol is forbidden, but its shavings are permitted. Here too, in the case of the fallen leaves of a tree that is worshipped as an idol, it should be permitted to derive benefit from them.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: The reason the leaves are not permitted is because the status of an object of idol worship cannot be revoked by its natural manner of growth. Since the falling of leaves is a natural phenomenon, their detachment from the tree does not effect a revocation of their status as objects of idol worship.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 13b): With regard to a bird’s nest at the top of a tree that belongs to the Temple treasury, one may not derive benefit from it <i>ab initio</i>, but if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple. With regard to a nest that is at the top of a tree used as part of idolatrous rites [<i>ashera</i>], although one may not climb the tree, as that would be benefiting from an object of idol worship, he may knock the nest off with a pole and benefit from it by using it for firewood and the like.
  In analyzing this <i>baraita</i>, it enters your mind that this is referring to a case where the bird broke off branches from the worshipped tree and built a nest with them. And yet, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that one may knock the nest off with a pole and it is then permitted to benefit from it. Apparently, the forbidden branches used in the construction of the nest lost their idolatrous status without human involvement, in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish that an idol that breaks loses its status.
  The Gemara explains: Here we are dealing with a case where the bird brought branches from elsewhere and built a nest with them on top of the worshipped tree. The branches were never part of an object of idol worship.
  The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise if read with this understanding, as it teaches with regard to a nest in a consecrated tree: One may not derive benefit from it <i>ab initio</i>, but if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. Granted, if you say that the bird brought branches from elsewhere, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches with regard to a nest in a consecrated tree, namely, that one may not derive benefit from it, but if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. According to this understanding of the mishna, one may not derive benefit from the nest by rabbinic law, but if one derived benefit from it, he is not liable for misusing consecrated property by Torah law, as the branches are not consecrated, but were brought from elsewhere.
  But if you say that the bird broke off branches from the tree itself and built a nest with them, why is it taught that one who derives benefit from it is not liable for misusing consecrated property? Aren’t the branches consecrated? Evidently, the mishna is referring to a nest that was built with branches from other trees, in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding that an object of idol worship that broke on its own is still forbidden.
  The Gemara responds to this proof for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding of the mishna: Does this argument prove anything? The mishna can still be interpreted as referring to a case where the branches for the nest came from the tree itself, and here we are dealing with a case of growths that came afterward, i.e., branches that grew after the tree was consecrated, and the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds that there is no prohibition against the misuse of consecrated property with regard to such growths.
  Another explanation of the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is presented. Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What does it mean that one may knock off the nest? It means that one may knock off the chicks; but one may not derive benefit from the nest itself.
  Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain the mishna to you: With regard to the chicks, which can fly away and are not confined to the tree, both here and there, i.e., both in the case of a tree consecrated to the Temple treasury and in the case of a tree used for idol worship, deriving benefit from them is permitted. But with regard to the eggs, both here and there, i.e., both in the case of a tree consecrated to the Temple treasury and in the case of a tree used for idol worship, deriving benefit from them is prohibited, as they are not seen as independent of the tree. Rav Ashi added to this and said: And chicks that still need their mother to survive are considered like eggs; deriving benefit from them is prohibited.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who finds vessels, and upon them is a figure of the sun, a figure of the moon, or a figure of a dragon, he must take them and cast them into the Dead Sea and not derive any benefit from them, as they are assumed to be objects of idol worship. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Those figures that are upon respectable vessels are forbidden. Those that are upon disgraceful vessels are permitted.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the specific figures listed in the mishna: Is this to say that people worship only these figures, but not any other item? And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this list and that which is taught in another mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 39b): With regard to one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, seas, for the sake of rivers, for the sake of the wilderness, for the sake of the sun, for the sake of the moon, for the sake of the stars and constellations, for the sake of Michael the great ministering angel, or even for the sake of a small worm, in all of these cases, the animal is forbidden, as these animals have the status of offerings to the dead, i.e., idols.
  Abaye said in response to the contradiction: With regard to worship, people might worship any item that they find. With regard to fashioning figures and then worshipping them, only with regard to these three items listed in the mishna, which are important, do people fashion figures of them and worship them. With regard to figures of any other entity, people make them merely for ornamental purposes.
  Rav Sheshet would consolidate the principles of the <i>baraitot</i> pertaining to this matter and teach: Figures of all constellations are permitted, except for the following celestial objects: The sun and the moon. And figures of all faces are permitted, except for the human face. And all figures of other items are permitted except for the figure of a dragon.
  The Master said: Figures of all constellations are permitted, except for the following celestial objects: The sun and the moon. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with here? If we say that the reference is to one who forms these figures, i.e., if Rav Sheshet is discussing the issue of which figures it is permitted to form, is forming figures of all the other constellations permitted? But isn’t it written: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver, or gods of gold, you shall not make for you” (Exodus 20:20)? This verse is interpreted to mean: You shall not make figures of My attendants who serve before Me on high, i.e., those celestial bodies, including the constellations, that were created to serve God.
  Rather, it is obvious that this <i>halakha</i> is referring to a case where one finds vessels with these figures on them, and this is as we learned in the mishna: In the case of one who finds vessels, and upon them is a figure of the sun, a figure of the moon, or a figure of a dragon, he must take them and cast them into the Dead Sea. This indicates that it is permitted to derive benefit from any other vessels that were found and that had figures on them.
  The Gemara asks: If it is a case where one finds vessels with these figures on them, say the middle clause of Rav Sheshet’s statement: Figures of all faces are permitted, except for the human face. Now, if it is a case where one finds vessels with figures on them, is a vessel with the figure of the human face forbidden? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: In the case of one who finds vessels, and upon them is a figure of the sun, a figure of the moon, or a figure of a dragon, he must take them and cast them into the Dead Sea? This indicates that a vessel with the figure of a dragon is forbidden, but a vessel with the figure of a human face is not.
  Rather, the Gemara concludes, it is obvious that the statement that the figure of a human face is forbidden is referring to a case where one forms a figure, and this is prohibited, in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who states (43b) that the interpretation of the verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver, or gods of gold, you shall not make for you” (Exodus 20:20), is: Do not make of Me, i.e., do not form the figure of a person, who was created in the image of God.
  The Gemara asks: If it is referring to a case where one forms a figure, say the last clause of Rav Sheshet’s statement: All figures are permitted except for the figure of a dragon. And if it is referring to a case where one forms a figure, is forming the figure of a dragon prohibited? But isn’t it written: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver, or gods of gold”?
  
  Daf 43a
  
  The Sages interpret this verse as referring to the heavenly constellations, which indicates that it is prohibited to form only these figures, but it is not prohibited to form a figure of a dragon.
  Rather, the Gemara concludes, it is obvious that this <i>halakha</i> is referring to a case where one finds a vessel with the figure of a dragon, and this is as we learned in the mishna: In the case of one who finds vessels, and upon them is a figure of the sun, a figure of the moon, or a figure of a dragon, he must take them and cast them into the Dead Sea.
  The Gemara asks about the lack of consistency between the clauses of Rav Sheshet’s statement: Can it be that the first clause and the last clause are referring to a case where one finds vessels with the specified figures, and the middle clause is referring to a case where one forms these figures?
  Abaye said: Indeed, the first clause and the last clause are referring to cases where one finds vessels with figures, and the middle clause is referring to a case where one forms figures.
  Rava said: The entire statement of Rav Sheshet is referring to a case where one finds vessels with these figures, and the middle clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda adds to the list of forbidden figures even a figure of a nursing woman and <i>Sar Apis</i>. The figure of a nursing woman is worshipped as it symbolizes Eve, who nurses the entire world. The figure of <i>Sar Apis</i> is worshipped as it symbolizes Joseph, who ruled over [<i>sar</i>] and appeased [<i>mefis</i>] the entire world by distributing food during the seven years of famine (see Genesis, chapter 41). But the figure of <i>Sar Apis</i> is forbidden only when it is holding a dry measure and measuring with it; and the figure of a nursing woman is forbidden only when she is holding a child and nursing it.
  § The Sages taught: What is a figure of a dragon? Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar explained: It is any figure that has scales between its joints. Rabbi Asi motioned with his hands to depict scales between the joints of the neck. Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Once, I was following Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished on the road, and he found a ring there, and there was a figure of a dragon on it. And he then encountered a minor gentile boy, but did not say anything to him. He then encountered an adult gentile, and said to him: Revoke the ring’s idolatrous status. But the gentile did not revoke it. Rabbi Elazar HaKappar then slapped him across his face, whereupon the gentile succumbed and revoked its idolatrous status.
  The Gemara comments: Learn from this incident the following three <i>halakhot</i>: Learn from it that a gentile can revoke the idolatrous status of both his object of idol worship and that of another gentile. And learn from the fact that Rabbi Elazar HaKappar waited to find an adult gentile, that only one who is aware of the nature of idol worship and its accessories can revoke the idol’s status, but one who is not aware of the nature of idol worship and its accessories, such as a minor, cannot revoke the idol’s status. And finally, learn from it that a gentile can revoke the status of an idol even against his will.
  Rabbi Ḥanina ridiculed this ruling and asked: But why was it necessary to have a gentile actively revoke the idolatrous status of the ring? Doesn’t Rabbi Elazar HaKappar the Distinguished maintain in accordance with that which we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who saves an object from a lion, or from a bear, or from a cheetah, or from a troop of soldiers, or from a river, or from the tide of the sea, or from the flooding of a river, or similarly one who finds an object in a main thoroughfare or in a large plaza, or for that matter, anywhere frequented by the public, in all these cases, the objects belong to him, because the owners despair of recovering them? Therefore, in the case of a lost ring with an idolatrous figure on it, its idolatrous status is automatically revoked, as its owner despairs of recovering it.
  Abaye said: Granted, the owner despairs of recovering the object itself, but does he despair of its forbidden [<i>me’issura</i>] idolatrous status? The owner does not assume that the object will never be worshipped again; rather, he says to himself: If a gentile finds it, he will worship it. If a Jew finds it, since it is valuable, he will sell it to a gentile who will then worship it. Therefore, Rabbi Elazar HaKappar had to have the ring’s idolatrous status revoked.
  § We learned in a mishna there (<i>Rosh HaShana</i> 24a): Rabban Gamliel had diagrams of the different figures of moons drawn on a tablet that hung on the wall of his attic, which he would show to the ordinary people [<i>hahedyotot</i>] who came to testify about sighting the new moon but who were unable to adequately describe what they had seen. And he would say to them: Did you see an image like this, or did you see an image like that?
  The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to form these figures? But isn’t it written: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver, or gods of gold” (Exodus 20:20), which is interpreted to mean: You shall not make figures of My attendants who serve before Me, i.e., those celestial bodies that were created to serve God, including the sun and the moon.
  In answering, Abaye said: The Torah prohibited only the figures of those attendants that one can possibly reproduce something that is truly in their likeness. Since it is impossible to reproduce the sun and the moon, the prohibition does not apply to these entities.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not construct a house in the exact image of the Sanctuary, nor a portico in the exact image of the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary, nor a courtyard corresponding to the Temple courtyard, nor a table corresponding to the Table in the Temple, nor a candelabrum corresponding to the Candelabrum in the Temple. But one may fashion a candelabrum of five or of six or of eight lamps. And one may not fashion a candelabrum of seven lamps even if he constructs it from other kinds of metal rather than gold, as in extenuating circumstances the Candelabrum in the Temple may be fashioned from other metals.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: One may not fashion a candelabrum of wood either, in the manner that the kings of the Hasmonean monarchy fashioned it. When they first purified the Temple they had to fashion the Candelabrum out of wood as no other material was available. Since a wooden candelabrum is fit for the Temple, it is prohibited to fashion one of this kind for oneself.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda: Do you seek to cite a proof from there, i.e., from the Hasmonean era, that a candelabrum fashioned of wood is fit for the Temple? During that era the branches of the Candelabrum were fashioned from spits [<i>shappudin</i>] of iron, and they covered them with tin [<i>beva’atz</i>]. Later, when they grew richer and could afford a Candelabrum of higher-quality material, they fashioned the Candelabrum from silver. When they grew even richer, they fashioned the Candelabrum from gold. In any event, Abaye proves from this <i>baraita</i> that the prohibition against forming a figure applies only to items that can be reconstructed in an accurate manner. Since this is not possible in the case of the moon, Rabban Gamliel’s figures were permitted.
  The Gemara asks: And is it actually permitted to fashion figures of those attendants of God concerning which it is impossible to reproduce their likeness? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver” (Exodus 20:20), is interpreted to mean: You shall not make figures of My attendants who serve before Me on high? Apparently, this includes the sun and the moon.
  Abaye said:
  
  Daf 43b
  
  This does not include the sun and the moon, as the Torah prohibits the fashioning only of a figure of all four faces of the creatures of the Divine Chariot together (see Ezekiel 1:10). All other figures, which are not in the likeness of the ministering angels, are permitted.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, let the fashioning of a figure of a human face alone be permitted. Why then is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Figures of all faces are permitted, except for the human face?
  Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: I heard in a lecture of Rabbi Yehoshua that there is a different reason why one may not fashion a figure of a human face; the verse states: “You shall not make with Me [<i>iti</i>]” (Exodus 20:20). This can be read as: You shall not make Me [<i>oti</i>]. Since the human being was created in the image of God (see Genesis 1:27), it is prohibited to fashion an image of a human being. But fashioning figures of other attendants of God is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to fashion figures of other attendants of God? But isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver” (Exodus 20:20), is interpreted to mean that you shall not make figures of My attendants who serve before Me on high, for example, <i>ofanim</i>, and seraphim, and the sacred <i>ḥayyot</i>, and the ministering angels?
  Abaye said: The Torah prohibits fashioning figures of only those attendants that are in the upper heaven, i.e., the supreme angels in the highest firmament, but it does not prohibit fashioning the celestial bodies, e.g., the sun and the moon, despite the fact that they too are located in heaven.
  The Gemara asks: And is it permitted to fashion figures of those bodies that are in the lower heaven? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “You shall not make for yourself any graven image, nor any manner of likeness, of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:4): The phrase “that is in heaven” serves to include the sun, and the moon, the stars, and the constellations. The term “above” serves to include the ministering angels. Apparently, it is prohibited to fashion a figure even of the celestial bodies that are in the lower heaven.
  The Gemara answers: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is in reference to the prohibition against worshipping them. There is no prohibition against forming a figure in their likeness.
  The Gemara asks: If that <i>baraita</i> is referring to the prohibition against worshipping them, then why does it mention only celestial bodies? It is prohibited to worship even a tiny worm. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so; and this prohibition is derived from the latter clause of that verse, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “That is in the earth” serves to include seas, and rivers, mountains, and hills. The word “beneath” serves to include a tiny worm.
  The Gemara asks: And is the mere fashioning of figures of the celestial bodies permitted? But isn’t it taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver” (Exodus 20:20), is interpreted to mean that you shall not make figures of My attendants who serve before Me on high, for example: The sun, and the moon, the stars, and the constellations. This is proof that it is prohibited to fashion figures of the sun and the moon. Consequently, the solution proposed by Abaye is rejected, leaving the difficulty of Rabban Gamliel’s diagram unresolved.
  The Gemara proposes an alternative resolution: The case of Rabban Gamliel is different, as others, i.e., gentiles, fashioned those figures for him, and it is prohibited for a Jew only to fashion such figures; there is no prohibition against having them in one’s possession.
  The Gemara asks: But there is the case of Rav Yehuda, where others fashioned for him a seal with a figure of a person on it, and Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda, who was his student: Sharp-witted one [<i>shinnana</i>], destroy this one’s eyes, i.e., disfigure it, as it is prohibited even to have a figure of a human being in one’s possession.
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of Rav Yehuda, his was a protruding seal, i.e., the figure projected from the ring, and Shmuel prohibited it due to the potential suspicion that he had an object of idol worship in his possession. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a ring whose seal protrudes, it is prohibited to place it on one’s finger due to suspicion of idol worship, but it is permitted to seal objects with it. In this case, the act of sealing forms a figure that is sunken below the surface of the object upon which the seal was impressed, which is not prohibited. If its seal is sunken, it is permitted to place it on one’s finger, but it is prohibited to seal objects with it, as that forms a protruding figure.
  The Gemara asks: And are we concerned about arousing suspicion due to the use of a human figure? But what about that synagogue that had been destroyed in Eretz Yisrael and was reestablished in Neharde’a, and they erected a statue of the king in it? And nevertheless, Shmuel’s father and Levi would enter and pray in it, and they were not concerned about arousing suspicion. The Gemara answers: A public institution is different; the public is not suspected of having idolatrous intentions. Rather, it is assumed that the statue is there exclusively for ornamental purposes.
  The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabban Gamliel an individual? According to this reasoning, his figures of the moon should have been forbidden as they would have aroused suspicion. The Gemara answers: Since he was the <i>Nasi</i>, the head of the Sanhedrin, members of the public would often be found with him, and therefore there was no room for suspicion. And if you wish, say there is an alternative answer, namely, that these figures were not whole; rather, they were formed from pieces of figures that had to be assembled. Only complete figures are forbidden.
  And if you wish, say there is yet another answer: Fashioning figures in order to teach oneself is different, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “You shall not learn to do like the abominations of those nations” (Deuteronomy 18:9): But you may learn in order to understand the matter yourself and teach it to others. In other words, it is permitted to perform certain acts for the sake of Torah study that would otherwise be prohibited.
  § The mishna (42b) teaches that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Those figures that are upon respectable vessels are forbidden. Those that are upon disgraceful vessels are permitted. The Gemara asks: Which vessels are considered respectable and which are considered disgraceful?
  Rav says: These terms do not represent different types of vessels, but rather the location of the figure upon the vessel. A respectable location for an idolatrous figure is on the side of the vessel above the level of the water or food contents; a disgraceful location is below the water level. And Shmuel says: Both these and those locations on eating utensils are disgraceful. Rather, these are respectable locations: Upon bracelets, or upon nose rings, or upon rings.
  The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel (<i>Tosefta</i> 5:1): Respectable locations for idolatrous figures are upon bracelets, or upon nose rings, or upon rings. Disgraceful locations are upon large pots, or upon small kettles [<i>hakumkemasin</i>], or upon samovars, or upon sheets, or upon towels.
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yosei says: When one encounters an idol, he should grind the idol and throw the dust to the wind or cast it into the sea. The Rabbis said to him: What is the good of that? That also gives a Jew benefit from the idol, as it becomes fertilizer for his crops, and deriving any kind of benefit is prohibited, as it is stated: “And nothing of the proscribed items shall cleave to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18).
  GEMARA: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 3:16): Rabbi Yosei said to them: But isn’t it already stated: “And your sin,
  
  Daf 44a
  
  the calf that you had made, I took and burned it with fire, and beat it in pieces, grinding it very small, until it was as fine as dust; and I cast its dust into the brook that descended out of the mount” (Deuteronomy 9:21)? Moses, who ground up the idolatrous golden calf and dispersed its dust, was apparently unconcerned with the fact that it may fertilize the soil.
  The Rabbis said to him: You seek to bring proof from there? Doesn’t it state in the verse: “And he took the calf that they had made, and burned it with fire, and ground it to powder, and strewed it upon the water, and made the children of Israel drink of it” (Exodus 32:20)? Moses ground up the calf intending only to inspect them like <i>sota</i> women, i.e., like a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful. Such a woman is compelled to drink water containing the ground-up ink from a scroll of Torah passages relating to a <i>sota</i> woman, which causes her to die if she was unfaithful, and exonerates her and bestows blessings upon her if she was faithful. Similarly, Moses ground up the calf in order to compel the people to drink, to cause the guilty parties to die.
  Rabbi Yosei said to them: But isn’t it already stated concerning Asa: “And he also removed Maacah his mother from being queen, because she had made an abominable image [<i>miflatztah</i>] for an <i>ashera</i>; and Asa cut down her image, and burned it at the Kidron River” (see I Kings 15:13)? It seems that Asa was unconcerned that the ground-up idol may provide fertilization. They said to him: You seek to bring proof from there? The Kidron River does not grow vegetation, so even if the idol would have fertilized the soil, it would have been of no benefit.
  The Gemara asks: And does the Kidron River not grow vegetation? But isn’t it taught in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 58b): This remainder of blood from the external altar and that remainder of blood from the inner altar are mixed in the Temple courtyard drain beneath the altar, and they flow out with the water used to rinse the area, to the Kidron River, and this water is sold to gardeners for use as fertilizer? The mishna continues: The gardeners pay for this water and thereby desacralize it, and failure to do so would render them liable for misuse of consecrated property. This is explicit proof that the Kidron River does yield produce. The Gemara answers: There are different places in the Kidron River area. There is a place that grows vegetation, and there is a place that does not grow vegetation.
  The Gemara tangentially inquires about the meaning of a word in the verse quoted above. What is the meaning of “<i>miflatztah</i>”? Rav Yehuda says: It means an object that intensifies [<i>mafli</i>] licentiousness [<i>leitzanuta</i>]; as Rabbi Yosef teaches: Maacah fashioned upon the idol the likeness of a male organ, and she would engage in sexual activity with it daily.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yosei attempts to cite another proof that grinding an object of idol worship is sufficient, from Hezekiah’s destruction of Moses’ serpent, which was worshipped by the Jewish people in Hezekiah’s time. Rabbi Yosei said to them: But isn’t it already stated: “And he broke into pieces the brazen serpent that Moses had made; as until those days the children of Israel sacrificed to it” (II Kings 18:4)? This indicates that breaking an object of idol worship into pieces suffices.
  The Rabbis said to him: You seek to bring proof from there? Doesn’t it state in the verse: “And the Lord said to Moses: Make you a fiery serpent, and set it upon a pole; and it shall come to pass, that everyone that is bitten, when he sees it, shall live” (Numbers 21:8)? The term “make you” is interpreted to mean that the Lord commanded Moses: Make the serpent from your property. Consequently, the serpent belonged to Moses, and the principle in such a case is that a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his. Therefore, despite worshipping the serpent, the Jewish people could not render it a forbidden object of idol worship, and by right, it was not necessary to demolish it there.
  Rather, despite the fact that the serpent did not have the halakhic status of an object of idol worship, since Hezekiah saw that the Jewish people were straying after it, he arose and demolished it. Nevertheless, since this demolishing was not done in order to fulfill the obligation to eradicate objects of idol worship, but merely to prevent its worship, breaking it into pieces was sufficient.
  Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis, citing another proof for his opinion: But isn’t it already stated: “And they left their images there, and David and his men took them away [<i>vayyissa’em</i>]” (II Samuel 5:21)? And from where may it be inferred that the meaning of this formulation: “<i>Vayyissa’em</i> David,” is winnowing, i.e., scattering in the wind? It is as Rav Yosef translates the verse: “<i>Tizrem veruaḥ tissa’em</i>” (Isaiah 41:16), and we translate it as follows: “You shall fan them, and the wind shall carry them away.” Apparently, this way of disposing of idolatrous objects is sufficient.
  The Rabbis said to him: You seek to bring proof from there? Doesn’t it state with regard to the same incident: “And they left their gods there; and David gave an order, and they were burned with fire” (I Chronicles 14:12)? And from the fact that it is not written here: And they burned them <i>vayyissa’em</i>, learn from it that the word <i>vayyissa’em</i> is not referring to scattering in the wind, but rather it should be understood literally, i.e., David and his men took the idols away; and it does not mean that they demolished and scattered them.
  The Gemara asks: In any case, the verses contradict each other. The two accounts with regard to David’s disposal of the idols seem inconsistent. One states that his men took them away or scattered them, while the other recounts that they burned them.
  The Gemara answers in accordance with the resolution of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna raises a contradiction between the verses, as follows: It is written: “And they left their gods there; and David gave an order, and they were burned with fire” (I Chronicles 14:12), and it is also written: “And David and his men took them away” (II Samuel 5:21).
  Rav Huna answers: It is not difficult. In the interim, Ittai the Gittite, who was a gentile, arrived, and David commanded him to revoke the idolatrous status of the idols, as only gentiles are capable of doing this. Here, the verse that states that they burned the idols describes their actions before Ittai the Gittite came, whereas there, the verse that indicates that they simply carried them away is referring to after Ittai the Gittite came and revoked their status as objects of idol worship, obviating the need to burn them.
  Another difficulty is resolved by Ittai’s arrival; as it is written with regard to the Ammonite idol: “And he took the crown of Malcam from off his head, and its weight was a talent of gold, and in it were precious stones; and it was set on David’s head” (II Samuel 12:30). But is it permitted for David to wear the crown? Isn’t it an object of idol worship and therefore under the category of items from which deriving benefit is prohibited? Rav Naḥman says: Ittai the Gittite arrived and revoked its status as an object of idol worship.
  § The Gemara discusses David’s crown. The verse states: “And its weight was a talent of gold.” As a talent is a very heavy weight, the Gemara asks: How could David place it on his head? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: What is meant is not that it was actually placed on his head, but rather that it was fit to rest on David’s head, i.e., it fit the size of his head. Giving a different answer, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: There was a lodestone in it that would hold it up, i.e., from which it was suspended. David sat and placed his head in it, giving the appearance that he was wearing it. Rabbi Elazar says: What is meant is not that it weighed a full talent of gold, but rather that there was a precious stone on it that was worth a talent of gold.
  The Gemara asks with regard to the verse: “This I have had, as I have kept Your precepts” (Psalms 119:56): What is it saying? The Gemara answers that this is what the verse is saying: As reward for the fact that I kept your precepts, this crown was a testimony for me that I am fit to be king. What exactly was its testimony? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: It was that David would place the crown on his head on the spot where one dons phylacteries, and it fit him perfectly. The Gemara asks: But how could he have worn the crown? Wasn’t he required to don phylacteries? Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: There is enough space on the part of the head that is fit for donning phylacteries for one to don two phylacteries.
  Similarly, it is stated with regard to Joash: “Then they brought out the king’s son, and put upon him the crown [<i>hanezer</i>] and the testimony, and made him king” (II Chronicles 23:11). “<i>Nezer</i>” is a crown. What was the “testimony”? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is a testimony for the progeny of house of David that anyone who is fit for kingship, the crown fits him properly; and anyone who is unfit for kingship, the crown does not fit him properly.
  Similarly, the verse states: “Now Adonijah, son of Haggith, exalted himself, saying: I will be king” (I Kings 1:5). Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The term “exalted himself” teaches that he sought to have the crown fit him, but it did not fit him.
  The verse continues: “And he prepared for himself chariots and riders and fifty people to run before him” (I Kings 1:5). The Gemara asks: What is the novelty of these actions, since other wealthy people do the same, even if they are not the sons of kings with designs on the throne? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that what was unique was that the runners all had their spleens removed and had the soles of their feet hollowed, i.e., flesh from their feet was removed, and these two procedures enhanced their speed.
  
  Daf 44b
  
  MISHNA: A wise gentile, Proclus ben Plospus, once asked a question of Rabban Gamliel in the city of Akko when he was bathing in the bathhouse of the Greek god Aphrodite. Proclus said to him: It is written in your Torah: “And nothing of the proscribed items shall cleave to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). For what reason do you bathe before an idol in the bathhouse of Aphrodite?
  Rabban Gamliel said to him: One may not answer questions related to Torah in the bathhouse. And when he left the bathhouse, Rabban Gamliel gave him several answers. He said to him: I did not come into its domain; it came into my domain. The bathhouse existed before the statue dedicated to Aphrodite was erected. Furthermore, people do not say: Let us make a bathhouse as an adornment for Aphrodite; rather, they say: Let us make a statue of Aphrodite as an adornment for the bathhouse. Therefore, the main structure is not the Aphrodite statue, but the bathhouse.
  Rabban Gamliel continued: Alternatively, there is another answer: Even if people would give you a lot of money, you would not enter before your object of idol worship naked, or as one who experienced a seminal emission who comes to the bathhouse to purify himself, nor would you urinate before it. This statue stands upon the sewage pipe and all the people urinate before it. There is no prohibition in this case, as it is stated in the verse only: “Their gods” (see Deuteronomy 12:2), which indicates that a statue that people treat as a deity is forbidden, but one that people do not treat with the respect that is due to a deity is permitted.
  GEMARA: The mishna relates that Rabban Gamliel first told Proclus that he cannot answer a question related to Torah in a bathhouse. The Gemara asks: And how could he have acted in this manner? How could Rabban Gamliel have stated even this <i>halakha</i> in the bathhouse? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is permitted to contemplate matters of Torah everywhere except for the bathhouse and the bathroom?
  And if you would say that Rabban Gamliel stated this ruling to him in a secular language, and therefore it was permitted for him to do so, this would not be a satisfactory answer; but doesn’t Abaye say that it is permitted to say secular statements in a bathhouse or bathroom in the sacred tongue, Hebrew, but it is prohibited to say sacred, Torah-related, statements even in a secular language in a bathhouse or bathroom?
  The Gemara answers that the mishna actually taught as follows: When he left the bathhouse, Rabban Gamliel said to him: One may not answer questions related to Torah in the bathhouse.
  § Rav Ḥama bar Yosef the Distinguished says that Rabbi Oshaya says: Rabban Gamliel gave a deceptive response to that officer, Proclus. And I, Rav Ḥama, say that the response was not deceptive but truthful.
  The Gemara explains: What was its deception, according to Rabbi Oshaya? It was that Rabban Gamliel said to him: This statue stands upon the sewage pipe and all people urinate before it. In saying this, Rabban Gamliel meant that the statue has no idolatrous status as is evident from the demeaning conduct performed before it. And this claim is deceptive, as even if one urinates before it, what of it? Does that really negate its idolatrous status? But doesn’t Rava say that the idol of Peor proves the contrary, as its worshippers defecate before it daily, and its idolatrous status still is not revoked?
  Rav Ḥama bar Yosef himself disagrees: And I say that it is not a deceptive answer. With regard to that idol, Peor, its standard manner of worship is in that manner; therefore, its status is certainly not revoked by that behavior. But with regard to this statue, Aphrodite, its standard manner of worship is not in that manner. Therefore, the display of demeaning conduct in its presence is indicative of a lack of reverence for it and of its lack of idolatrous status.
  Abaye said: The deception in Rabban Gamliel’s response was from here, when he said to him: I did not come into its domain, but rather it came into my domain. He explains: And even if it, the bathhouse, had come into its domain, what of it? Even if the idol had preceded the bathhouse, it would still not render use of the bathhouse prohibited; but didn’t we learn in a mishna (51b): With regard to an object of idol worship that has a bathhouse or a garden in front of it, one may derive benefit from the bathhouse or garden without showing favor by giving thanks or payment to its priests, but one may not derive benefit from it while showing it favor? Rabban Gamliel’s answer was therefore deceptive because the permissibility of using the bathhouse had nothing to do with its antecedence to the statue.
  Rav Ḥama bar Yosef himself disagrees: And I say that it is not a deceptive answer, as even though Rabban Gamliel visited the bathhouse without showing favor by expressing thanks or giving payment, the very fact that such an esteemed visitor paid it a visit is the equivalent of others actively showing favor.
  Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya says: The deception in Rabban Gamliel’s response was from here, when he said to him: This statue stands upon the sewage pipe and all people urinate before it. He explains: And if people urinate before it, what of it? That does not indicate a lack of idolatrous status; but didn’t we learn in a mishna (53a): If one spit in front of it, urinated in front of it, dragged it, or threw feces at it, its status as an object of idol worship is not revoked?
  Rav Ḥama bar Yosef himself disagrees: And I say that it is not a deceptive answer. There, the case of that mishna is of one who temporarily rages against the idol, and afterward he appeases it. Here, in the case of the Aphrodite statue erected on the sewage pipe, each and every hour the statue remains in a constant state of disparagement. This setup indicates a permanent lack of reverence and an absence of true idolatrous status.
  Rabba bar Ulla said: The deception in Rabban Gamliel’s response was from here, when he said to him that people do not say: Let us make a bathhouse as an adornment for Aphrodite; rather, they say: Let us make a statue of Aphrodite as an adornment for the bathhouse. He explains: And even if people say: Let us make a bathhouse as an adornment for Aphrodite, what of it? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who says: This house is hereby dedicated to idol worship, or: This cup is hereby dedicated to idol worship, he has said nothing, i.e., his words take no effect, as there is no <i>halakha</i> of consecration with regard to objects of idol worship. While one can consecrate an item to the Temple through verbal designation, there is no such method for according idolatrous status to an object. Therefore, Rabban Gamliel’s deception lies in his indication that such a formulation would render the bathhouse forbidden as an object of idol worship.
  Rav Ḥama bar Yosef himself disagrees: And I say that it is not a deceptive answer. Although the bathhouse would not be rendered forbidden as an object of idol worship due to a verbal designation, it would at least have the status of an adornment of an object of idol worship, which is also forbidden.
  
  Daf 45a
  
  MISHNA: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the gentiles who worship the mountains and the hills, the mountains and hills are permitted, but what is upon them is forbidden. It is not prohibited to derive benefit from the mountains and hills themselves, and they can be used for planting, harvesting, and the like. But if gentiles coated them with gold or silver, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the coating, as it is stated: “The graven images of their gods shall you burn with fire; you shall not covet the silver or the gold that is on them, nor take it for yourself, lest you be snared by it; for it is an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 7:25).
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says with regard to the verse: “You shall destroy all the places where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree” (Deuteronomy 12:2): The mitzva to destroy objects of idol worship applies to “their gods, upon the high mountains,” but not to the mountains themselves that are their gods. Similarly it applies to “their gods…upon the hills,” but not to the hills themselves that are their gods.
  The mishna asks: And for what reason, then, is an <i>ashera</i> forbidden? Doesn’t the verse also state: “And under every leafy tree,” which indicates that the mitzva to destroy objects of idol worship does not apply to the trees themselves? The mishna answers: It is because it is the product of human involvement and did not grow by itself, and the <i>halakha</i> is that anything that is the product of human involvement is forbidden.
  Rabbi Akiva says: I will explain and decide the matter before you. The verse does not indicate limitations to the halakhic definition of idols; rather, it is simply giving indicators of prevalent idolatrous practice: Everywhere that you find a high mountain, or an elevated hill, or a leafy tree, know that there is idol worship there.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But isn’t the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili the same as that of the first <i>tanna</i>? Both of them indicate that what is on the mountain is forbidden, while the mountain itself is permitted. Rami bar Ḥama says that Reish Lakish says: The difference between them is the issue of whether the status of the coating of a mountain is like the status of the mountain itself. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the status of the coating of a mountain is not like the mountain itself, and is therefore forbidden, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the status of the coating of a mountain is like the mountain itself.
  Rejecting this explanation, Rav Sheshet says: Everyone agrees that the status of the coating of a mountain is not like the mountain itself and is forbidden.
  
  Daf 45b
  
  And here, they disagree with regard to the status of a tree that one planted and only subsequently worshipped. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is permitted, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Sheshet infer that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that such a tree is forbidden? It is from the fact that the mishna teaches in the last clause: For what reason is an <i>ashera</i> forbidden? It is because it is the product of human involvement and did not grow by itself, and the <i>halakha</i> is that anything that is the product of human involvement is forbidden. What is added by the generalization: And anything that is the product of human involvement is forbidden? Is it not added to include the case of a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped?
  The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, also holds that a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is forbidden. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “You shall destroy all the places where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree” (Deuteronomy 12:2): Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: From that which is stated in the verse: “You shall destroy…their gods, upon the high mountains,” from which the Sages derived: But not the mountains themselves that are their gods, and: “You shall destroy…their gods…upon the hills,” but not the hills themselves if they are their gods, I would derive from the next clause in the verse: “Their gods…under every leafy tree,” that the mitzva to destroy an object of idol worship does not apply to the leafy trees themselves that are their gods.
  Therefore, the next verse states: “And you shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire” (Deuteronomy 12:3). Even a tree that was worshipped only after it was planted is forbidden.
  Rather, if the trees themselves are forbidden, why do I need the phrase “under every leafy tree”? That phrase comes to teach a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva; as Rabbi Akiva says: I will explain and decide the matter before you. Everywhere that you find a high mountain, or an elevated hill, or a leafy tree, know that there is idol worship there. From the fact that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, does not derive from the phrase “under every leafy tree” that a tree that was planted and only subsequently worshipped is still permitted, it is apparent that he holds that such a tree is forbidden. This is consistent with the opinion that Rav Sheshet ascribes to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, who maintain that a tree that was planted and subsequently worshipped is permitted, what do they do with this verse: “And burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire”? The Gemara answers: This verse is necessary with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of a tree that was initially planted for that idolatrous practice, which must be destroyed and from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, also require this phrase to teach this? The Gemara answers. Indeed, he does. Rather, from where does he derive that a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is forbidden? He derives it from the following verse: “But so shall you deal with them: You shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and hew down their <i>asherim</i>, and burn their graven images with fire” (Deuteronomy 7:5). Now, which is the tree whose trunk is forbidden but its root is permitted, as the verse instructs one to hew it down? You must say that it is referring to a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped.
  The Gemara asks how that verse can be the source of the ruling of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, for deeming forbidden a tree that was planted and only subsequently worshipped. But doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> state that he adduces the derivation prohibiting worshipped <i>ashera</i> trees from the verse: “And you shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire”?
  The Gemara answers: By deriving this <i>halakha</i> from the verse: “And burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire,” Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is speaking utilizing the style of: If it were not stated. The Gemara explains: If the verse: “Burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire,” were not stated, I would have said that the verse: “And hew down their <i>asherim</i>,” is referring to a tree that was initially planted for idol worship. Now that it is written: “And burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire,” the verse: “And hew down their <i>asherim</i>,” is rendered superfluous and is consequently interpreted as referring to a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped. Therefore, it is ultimately this latter verse that serves as the source for the implied ruling of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, that it is prohibited to derive benefit from such a tree.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with this verse: “And hew down their <i>asherim</i>”? The Gemara answers: This verse is written in order to teach a <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi; as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The felling of trees dedicated to idol worship precedes the conquering of all of Eretz Yisrael, and conquering Eretz Yisrael precedes the eradication of all the objects of idol worship.
  As Rav Yosef teaches a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire.” Rav Yosef explains: “And you shall break down their altars,” and leave them, as the Torah does not prescribe that they be burned; “and dash in pieces their pillars” and leave them.
  The Gemara asks: But does it enter your mind that the Torah is instructing one to leave them alone? Doesn’t an object of idol worship require burning, as it says at the end of the verse: “And burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire”? Rav Huna says: Pursue the enemy and then return to burn them. Meaning, first smash their objects of idol worship, then conquer the land, and then return to burn the smashed items.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, derive this opinion about the order of priorities in the process of conquering Eretz Yisrael? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “You shall destroy all the places where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree.” From the double-verb form of the directive “you shall destroy [<i>abbed te’abedun</i>]” he derives that there are two stages to the destruction of their gods: First destroy them [<i>abbed</i>], i.e., smash them; then go and conquer the land, and only afterward you shall destroy [<i>te’abedun</i>] them completely, i.e., burn or eradicate them.
  The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from the double verb? The Gemara answers: This double verb is necessary to teach that when one deracinates an object of idol worship, he needs to root out all traces of it.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, derive the obligation to root out all traces of idol worship? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “And you shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire; and you shall hew down the graven images of their gods; and you shall destroy their name out of that place” (Deuteronomy 12:3).
  The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from this verse? The Gemara answers: That verse teaches that it is a mitzva to give a derogatory nickname to an idol. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: From where is it derived that when one deracinates an object of idol worship, he needs to root out all traces of it? The verse states: “And you shall destroy their name out of that place.”
  
  Daf 46a
  
  Rabbi Akiva said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “You shall destroy” (Deuteronomy 12:2)? This obviously includes rooting out all traces of idols. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And you shall destroy their name out of that place”? This means that it is a mitzva to give it a nickname.
  One might have thought that one may give it a positive nickname. The Gemara interjects: Would it enter your mind that one may give a positive nickname to an idol? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means that one might have thought that the reference is to a nickname that is neither positive nor negative. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be accursed like it; you shall detest it, and you shall abhor it; for it is a proscribed item” (Deuteronomy 7:26). This verse clearly indicates that the nickname should be a negative one.
  How so? To what type of nickname is this referring? If the idol worshippers would call their house of worship the house of elevation [<i>beit galya</i>], one should call it the house of digging [<i>beit karya</i>]. If they call it the all-seeing eye [<i>ein kol</i>], one should call it the eye of a thorn [<i>ein kotz</i>].
  The <i>tanna</i> who recited <i>mishnayot</i> and <i>baraitot</i> in the study hall taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Sheshet: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the gentiles who worship the mountains and the hills, the mountains and hills are permitted, but their worshippers are punished with decapitation by the sword. But with regard to gentiles who worship plants and vegetables, the plants and vegetables are forbidden and their worshippers are punished with decapitation by the sword.
  Rav Sheshet said to him: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who said this to you? It must be Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: But why not interpret the <i>baraita</i> as referring to a tree that one initially planted for idol worship, and then the ruling would be consistent with the opinion of the Rabbis as well? The Gemara answers: This should not enter your mind, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches the case of plants and vegetables as being similar to the case of a mountain. Therefore, one can extrapolate that just as with regard to a mountain, it is a case where one did not initially plant it for this purpose, as mountains are not planted by people, so too, this case of plants and vegetables is a case where one did not initially plant it for this purpose.
  § It was stated: The <i>halakha</i> in a case where a gentile worships boulders that naturally became dislodged from a mountain is subject to dispute between the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya on the one hand and Rabbi Yoḥanan on the other. One side says: They are forbidden, and one side says: They are permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the one who says that they are permitted? The Gemara answers: The status of the dislodged stones is still like the status of the mountain itself. Just as in the case of a mountain, it is not the product of human involvement, and therefore it is permitted to derive benefit from it even after it is worshipped, so too, these boulders, which are not the product of human involvement, are permitted.
  The Gemara raises an objection: What is notable about a mountain? It is notable in that it is attached to the ground. This may be the reason for the leniency concerning it, and this does not apply to boulders. The Gemara responds: The case of a worshipped animal can prove that this is not relevant, as it is permitted to derive benefit from a worshipped animal even though it is not attached to the ground.
  The Gemara defends its objection: What is notable about an animal? It is notable in that it is a living, animate being. This may be the reason for the leniency concerning it, and this does not apply to boulders. The Gemara responds: The case of a mountain can prove that this is not relevant, as it is permitted to derive benefit from a mountain that was worshipped, even though it is not a living being.
  And the inference has reverted to its starting point, and the <i>halakha</i> can be inferred from a combination of the two sources: The aspect of this case, that of a mountain, is not like the aspect of that case, that of an animal, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that they are not products of human involvement, and it is permitted to derive benefit from them. So too, in any case of worshipped objects that are not the product of human involvement, including boulders, they are permitted.
  The Gemara objects: What is notable about the common element between the case of a mountain and that of an animal that prevents utilizing it as a paradigm for other cases? These worshipped objects are notable in that they were not altered from their natural form. Perhaps that is why their status remains unchanged. By contrast, a dislodged boulder has been moved from its original position.
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> that a boulder that is dislodged from a mountain is still permitted after it is worshipped is derived from the case of a blemished animal and from the case of a mountain, both of which are permitted after having been worshipped. The notable aspect of a mountain, in that it is an unaltered object and is attached to the ground, is countered by the case of a blemished animal, and the notable aspect of a blemished animal in that it is a living being is countered by the case of a mountain. Therefore, it can be derived from the common element of the two cases that just as these two are not products of human involvement and are not rendered forbidden by worship, so too, a dislodged boulder is not rendered forbidden by worship.
  Alternatively, the <i>halakha</i> can be derived from the case of an unblemished animal and from the case of a withered tree, both of which are permitted after having been worshipped. The notable aspect of an unblemished animal, in that it is unaltered and a living being, is countered by the case of a withered tree, and the notable aspect of a withered tree, in that it is attached to the ground, is countered by the case of an unblemished animal.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the one who deems worshipped boulders forbidden? The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, it is in order to teach this <i>halakha</i>: It is written: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be accursed like it; you shall detest it, and you shall abhor it; for it is a proscribed item” (Deuteronomy 7:26). This verse teaches that although one may theoretically derive, by logical inference, to permit the boulders, do not derive that <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara introduced the case of a boulder that naturally dislodged from a mountain as the subject of a dispute between the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan, but it did not specify who subscribes to which opinion. The Gemara suggests: It may be concluded that it is the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya who deem it permitted, as Ḥizkiyya, Rabbi Ḥiyya’s son, raises a dilemma: If one erected an egg in order to bow to it as an idol, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it then prohibited to derive benefit from the egg?
  The Gemara explains the proof: It enters your mind that this dilemma is referring to a case where one erected an egg in order to bow to it, and he then bowed to it. And he raises a dilemma as to whether this erecting of the egg is considered a significant act of human involvement that renders the egg forbidden as an object of idol worship, or whether it is not considered a significant act of human involvement. But if he had not erected the egg, there would be no dilemma, as clearly it would not become forbidden. Accordingly, one can conclude from this dilemma that the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya are the ones who deem the boulder permitted, since it is not a product of human involvement.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually I will say to you that perhaps it is the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya who deem the dislodged boulder forbidden after it was worshipped, and they similarly hold that in this case of the egg, if he bowed to it, even if did not erect it, the egg is certainly forbidden. And the dilemma is as follows: Here we are dealing with a case where he erected the egg in order to bow to it, but he ultimately did not bow to it. Ḥizkiyya’s dilemma was whether designation of an object as an idol renders it forbidden even without actual worship.
  The Gemara asks: But according to whom does he raise the dilemma? If it is according to the one who says that any object of a Jew who dedicated it to idol worship is immediately rendered forbidden, there is no place for the dilemma; the egg is clearly forbidden. If it is according to the one who says that an object of idol worship is not forbidden until it is actually worshipped, there is also no place for the dilemma, as the egg was not worshipped, and is therefore permitted.
  The Gemara answers by reformulating the case: No, those are not the cases with regard to which the dilemma is raised. It is necessary to raise it with regard to a case where one erected an egg in order to bow to it, but ultimately he did not bow to it, and then a gentile came along and bowed to it. It is with regard to this case that Ḥizkiyya raises the dilemma.
  There is an established principle that one cannot render forbidden an item that is not his. In this case, the egg can be rendered forbidden only by a combination of the Jewish owner’s indicated intention and the gentile’s act of worship. This dilemma assumes that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: In the case of a Jew who erected a brick in order to bow to it, and a gentile came and bowed to it, it is forbidden. And Ḥizkiyya raises the following dilemma with regard to the case of an egg: Is it specifically a brick that is forbidden, as its being erect is clearly recognizable and is therefore a clear indication of intent on behalf of the Jewish owner, but as for an egg, erecting it is not enough of an indication, and it is therefore permitted? Or perhaps there is no difference, and the egg would similarly be forbidden. The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
  § Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows down to a mountain, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the permissibility of using its stones for building the altar in the Temple?
  
  Daf 46b
  
  The Gemara explains the dilemma: An animal that was worshipped is rendered unfit to be sacrificed as an offering in the Temple. The Gemara previously established a principle that objects attached to the ground are not rendered forbidden by idol worship. The question here is this: With regard to an item that is attached to the ground and that was worshipped, is it rendered unfit for the Most High, i.e., for the Temple, just like an animal? Or is the <i>halakha</i> that with regard to an item that is attached to the ground and that was worshipped, it is not rendered unfit for the Most High, just as it is not forbidden with regard to an individual’s deriving benefit from it?
  Furthermore, if you say that with regard to an item that is attached to the ground and that was worshipped, it is rendered unfit for the Most High, are the items that merely facilitate the sacrifice of an offering, such as the altar, viewed the same way as an offering itself, or not? Perhaps the principle that items worshipped in idolatrous practice are disqualified for use in the Temple applies only to offerings, and not to the items used to facilitate the bringing of offerings.
  Rava says: The dilemma can be resolved with an <i>a fortiori</i> inference. The Torah prohibits the sacrifice of an animal as an offering or a donation to the Temple if it was given in payment to a prostitute or exchanged in the sale of a dog. And if it is so that concerning deriving benefit from an item that served as payment to a prostitute, which is permitted to an ordinary person even in a case where the item is detached from the ground, nevertheless, such an item is forbidden to use for the Most High even in a case where it is attached to the ground, as it is written: “You shall not bring the payment to a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow” (Deuteronomy 23:19), where there is no difference whether the payment is unattached to the ground and there is no difference whether it is attached; concerning an object worshipped in idolatrous practice, which is rendered forbidden in a case where it is detached even for the use of an ordinary person, is it not logical that it should be prohibited to use it for the Most High even in the case of an object attached to the ground?
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: Or one can reverse the claim. And if an object that was worshipped, which is forbidden in a case where it is detached from the ground even for the use of an ordinary person, is yet permitted for use even for the Most High in a case where it is attached to the ground, as it is stated that the mitzva is to destroy: “Their gods, upon the high mountains” (Deuteronomy 12:2), but not the mountains themselves that are their gods, and therefore with regard to such items, there is no difference between use for an ordinary person and for the Most High; concerning payment to a prostitute, which is permitted for use for an ordinary person in the case of a detached item, is it not logical that it should be permitted to use for the Most High in a case where the payment is an item attached to the ground?
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, continues: And if one would say that it should still be prohibited to use it in the Temple due to that which the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment to a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God,” which indicates a blanket prohibition, this verse is already necessary to teach another <i>halakha</i>, namely, that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “into the House of the Lord your God” excludes its use as a red heifer, which is not brought to the Temple, rather it is sacrificed outside the city on the Mount of Olives; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is stated to include the prohibition against hanging in the Temple beaten plates of gold that were used in the payment of a prostitute. Even though they are not used in the Temple service, it is prohibited to hang them up.
  Rava said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: I am stating an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that leads to a stringency, and you are stating an opposite <i>a fortiori</i> inference that leads to a leniency. And the principle is that whenever there is the option to employ an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that leads to a leniency or one that leads to a stringency, we infer the stringency.
  Rav Pappa said to Rava: And is it so that anywhere that there is an option to employ an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to infer a leniency or a stringency, we do not infer the leniency? But isn’t there the case of sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer upon one who has contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse, in order to thereby obligate him in the sacrificing and eating of the Paschal offering? As Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to whether it is permitted to do this on Shabbat, each of them employing an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to support his opinion. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that a stringency should be inferred and he thereby deems the man obligated to purify himself and bring a Paschal offering, even if he can purify himself only on Shabbat, and Rabbi Akiva infers a leniency and exempts him from the obligation to bring the offering. And clearly, contrary to Rava’s claim, Rabbi Akiva infers a leniency.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (see <i>Pesaḥim</i> 65b) that Rabbi Eliezer reasoned: If slaughter, which is generally prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law, is permitted for the sake of sacrificing the Paschal offering, all the more so is it not clear that sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer, which is prohibited on Shabbat merely due to a rabbinic decree, should override Shabbat? Rabbi Akiva replied: Or one can reverse the claim. And if sprinkling the purifying water on Shabbat, which is prohibited merely due to rabbinic decree, does not override Shabbat, then with regard to slaughter, which is prohibited by Torah law, all the more so is it not clear that it should not override Shabbat? Contrary to Rava’s claim, Rabbi Akiva clearly infers a leniency instead of the stringency inferred by Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara answers: There, Rabbi Akiva does not employ a real <i>a fortiori</i> inference. Rabbi Eliezer himself taught him this <i>halakha</i>, which he knew as a tradition, but he had forgotten his own learning and Rabbi Akiva came to remind him of it by drawing an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that would cause Rabbi Eliezer to remember that which he himself had taught. The Gemara offers a support for this interpretation from the continuation of that discussion, which is recorded in a <i>baraita</i>: And this is what Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, do not deny my contention at the time of judgement, i.e., during deliberation of this matter, as this is the tradition I received from you: Sprinkling is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat.
  § Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a stalk of wheat, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to using it for meal-offerings? Does the wheat lose its forbidden status after it is ground into flour, or not? Does a change in the form of a worshipped object revoke its forbidden status, or does a change in the form of a worshipped object not revoke its forbidden status?
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: Come and hear a resolution from that which is taught in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 30b): The principle is that concerning all items that are forbidden with regard to sacrificing them the altar, their offspring, i.e., whatever products are derived from them, are permitted. And it is taught with regard to this mishna: Rabbi Eliezer deems the offspring forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it stated with regard to this dispute that Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The dispute is with regard to a case where it became prohibited to use the animals as offerings because a person engaged in bestiality with them and later they became pregnant.
  
  Daf 47a
  
  But if they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, all agree that the offspring are forbidden because the offspring were involved in the act of bestiality, albeit in their fetal state. And here too, the case of the wheat is similar to the case where they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, because the flour was also worshipped, albeit in the form of a stalk of wheat.
  There are those who say that Mar Zutra himself quoted Rav Naḥman’s statement: The dispute is with regard to a case where it became prohibited to use the animals as offerings because a person engaged in bestiality with them and later they became pregnant. But if they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, all agree that the offspring are forbidden. And these stalks of wheat, as well, are similar to the case where they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them.
  The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of offspring that it is prohibited to bring as an offering, it was initially an animal, in its fetal state, and now it is still an animal. A fetus is treated as a full-fledged animal, and the opening of the womb is compared to a closed door that holds it in its place. Here, in the case of the flour, it was initially wheat and now it is flour; it is in a totally new form. Therefore, no proof can be derived from the mishna.
  § Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a palm tree, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to its <i>lulav</i>? Is it permitted to use a <i>lulav</i> cut from it for the mitzva or not?
  The Gemara narrows down the dilemma: With regard to a tree that one initially planted for such an idolatrous purpose, do not raise the dilemma. In that case the <i>halakha</i> is clear, as it is prohibited to use it even for an ordinary, non-mitzva, purpose. Rather, raise the dilemma with regard to a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped.
  And do not raise the dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, who holds that even for an ordinary purpose it is forbidden (see 45b). Rather, when should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that such a tree does not become forbidden: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to using a <i>lulav</i> from such a worshipped tree for a mitzva? Is it nevertheless forbidden because it is considered repulsive to use such a <i>lulav</i> for the Most High, i.e., for a mitzva, or not?
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he presented a different understanding of Reish Lakish’s dilemma. He said: Reish Lakish raises the dilemma with regard to an <i>ashera</i> whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked. His dilemma is as follows: Is there disqualification with regard to mitzvot or is there no disqualification with regard to mitzvot? This <i>lulav</i> was once unfit for the mitzva, since it was worshipped while attached to the tree. Is it permanently disqualified, i.e., can it never be rendered fit? Or is the <i>halakha</i> that there is no permanent disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and consequently when the tree’s status as an object of idol worship was revoked, the <i>lulav</i> became fit for the mitzva?
  The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 37a): With regard to one who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird and is obligated to cover the blood, if he covered the blood and it was then uncovered he is exempt from the obligation to cover it a second time. But if the wind blew dust and covered the blood and no person was involved, he is obligated to cover it. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna taught that one is obligated to cover the blood after the wind covered it only in a case where the blood was then exposed. But if it was not then exposed, he is exempt from the obligation to cover it.
  And we discussed this issue and asked: When the blood was then exposed, what of it? Why is one obligated to cover it a second time? Once it was disqualified, it should remain disqualified. When the wind covered the blood, the person was exempted from covering the blood. If so, even if the blood is subsequently uncovered, he should remain exempt. Why, then, is he obligated to cover the blood in that case?
  And Rav Pappa says: That is to say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Once the cause of the exemption from the obligation is removed, one is once again obligated to fulfill the mitzva. If so, Reish Lakish’s dilemma is resolved.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is with regard to Rav Pappa’s resolution itself that Reish Lakish raised the dilemma. Is it obvious to Rav Pappa, based on the discussion with regard to the blood, that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot; and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to leniency, as in the case of the worshipped tree whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked, thereby permitting its <i>lulav</i> branch to be used for a mitzva, and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to stringency, as in the case of the blood, where one is obligated to cover it anew?
  Or perhaps is he uncertain, and therefore, when that ruling leads to stringency, we say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and one must perform the mitzva. But when that ruling leads to leniency, we do not say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
  § Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to an animal, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to its wool? May it be used for the sky-blue wool?
  The Gemara asks: The sky-blue wool in question is for which mitzva? If it is the sky-blue wool for the ritual garments worn by priests, then Rav Pappa’s dilemma is the same as the dilemma raised by Rami bar Ḥama earlier (46b) with regard to the use in the Temple of worshipped items that have since changed in form. And if the sky-blue wool in question is for the mitzva of ritual fringes, this is the same as the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish with regard to the use of a branch of a worshipped palm tree for performing the mitzva of <i>lulav</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that Rav Pappa did not need to raise this dilemma, as it was previously addressed. And the reason that he raises this dilemma is due to other matters that he needed to clarify, concerning the use of parts of a worshipped animal in the Levites’ ritual song. With regard to its wool, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning using it for sky-blue wool used in the performance of a mitzva? With regard to its horns, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning their use for trumpets? With regard to the bones of its thighs, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning their use for flutes? With regard to its innards, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning their use for harp strings [<i>leforot</i>]?
  According to the opinion of the one who says that the primary element of song in the Temple is the accompaniment by musical instruments, do not raise the dilemma, as it is certain that use of a worshipped animal is prohibited, because the musical instruments are items used to facilitate an offering.
  When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the one who says that the primary element of song in the Temple is singing with the mouth, and that the musical instruments are used merely to sweeten the sound, i.e., to accompany and enhance the singing. And accordingly, can one bring musical instruments made of a worshipped animal’s parts, as they are not an essential element of the Temple service? Or perhaps is it nevertheless forbidden since it is repulsive to use such instruments in the course of the Temple service? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.
  § Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a spring of water, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to using its water for libations? The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? If we say that the dilemma concerns whether he is bowing to his own reflection or perhaps he is bowing to the water, why then is this a dilemma only with regard to libations in the Temple? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to the use of a pail of water that a person bowed to, even for ordinary purposes.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, it is clear that he is bowing to the water. And this is the dilemma Rava raises: Is he bowing to the water before him, and therefore it follows that the first waters, i.e., those that were present at the time of his bowing, are gone, and the water that is currently flowing is permitted, or perhaps is he bowing to the flow of the water, which would render it prohibited to use all the water that flows in that spring for libations.
  The Gemara asks: And is the water actually rendered forbidden by his worship? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Water that belongs to the public cannot become forbidden? The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma is not with regard to a public spring. Rather, it is necessary with regard to a spring that flows from the ground in one specific location that is privately owned.
  MISHNA: In the case of one whose house was adjacent to a house of idol worship and the dividing wall fell, it is prohibited to rebuild it. What should he do? He should withdraw into his own property four cubits and build the wall there.
  In talmudic times, external walls to homes were often built in two parts, with a functional space between them. If the space between the two parts of the wall belonged to him and to the house of idol worship,
  
  Daf 47b
  
  the area is treated as half and half  with regard to withdrawing into his property before rebuilding the wall; he may build the wall four cubits from the middle of that space.
  The stones of the fallen wall, its wood, and its dust, transmit impurity like a creeping animal, i.e., one who touches them becomes impure like one who touches a creeping animal, as it is stated: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be accursed like it; you shall detest it [<i>shakketz teshakketzennu</i>], and you shall abhor it; for it is a proscribed item” (Deuteronomy 7:26). The term <i>shakketz</i> is used in a different form, <i>shekketz</i>, with regard to creeping animals.
  Rabbi Akiva says: Those items transmit impurity like a menstruating woman, as it is stated: “You will put them far away as a menstruating woman; you shall say to it: Go away” (Isaiah 30:22). Just as a menstruating woman transmits impurity by carrying, as one who moves a menstruating woman, even without touching her, becomes impure, so too, objects of idol worship transmit impurity by carrying.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one must rebuild his wall at a distance from the house of idol worship. The Gemara asks: But how may one do so? Isn’t he creating more space for the house of idol worship? Rav Ḥanina of Sura said: This is not a problem, as he converts the empty space into a bathroom.
  Since the mishna teaches that no wall may be built in that space, the bathroom is apparently not enclosed. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t a bathroom need to be in a place of modesty? The Gemara answers: This is not a problem, as he converts it into a bathroom for nighttime, when no one can see him.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t the master say in a <i>baraita</i>: Who is a modest person? One who defecates at night in the same place that he defecates during the day, i.e., in a place where no one can see him? And although we interpreted the <i>baraita</i> as referring not to location but to conduct, teaching that one must conduct himself at night in the same manner, i.e., with the same degree of modesty, as he does during the day with regard to removing his clothing when defecating (see <i>Berakhot</i> 62a), nevertheless, it can be inferred from here that even at night one is required to observe the dictates of modesty.
  The Gemara answers: This is not a problem, as he converts it into a bathroom for children, who are not required to observe the same level of modesty.
  The Gemara suggests a different answer to the problem of enlarging the space used for idolatry: Alternatively, one can answer that he fences in the four-cubit space with thorns and shrubs, thereby preventing its use.
  MISHNA: With regard to idol worship there are three types of houses, each with its own <i>halakhot</i>. A house that one built initially for the purpose of idol worship is forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited to derive benefit from such a house. If one plastered a house or cemented it for the purpose of idol worship, and he thereby added a layer to the walls of the house, one removes that which he added, and the rest of the house is permitted. If one brought an object of idol worship into a house temporarily and then removed it, the house is then permitted.
  GEMARA: Rav says: One who bows to a house has rendered it forbidden. The Gemara infers: Evidently, Rav holds that an item that was detached and that one subsequently attached is considered as if it were still detached. Consequently, a house, which is attached to the ground but was built with materials that were detached from the ground, can become forbidden through worship. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that if a house was initially built for the purpose of idol worship, it is forbidden? This indicates that the house becomes forbidden only when it is initially constructed for idolatrous purposes.
  The Gemara answers that there are two cases where the house is rendered forbidden: If one built it for purposes of idol worship, even if he did not bow to it, or if he bowed to it, even if he did not build it for purposes of idol worship; it is forbidden in either case. The Gemara asks: If so, why does the mishna list only these three types of houses, when there are really four?
  The Gemara answers: Since with regard to the revocation of their idolatrous status there is no difference between a house that one built for idolatrous purposes and a house that one bowed down to, the mishna considers them as one.
  MISHNA: With regard to idol worship there are three types of stones, each with its own <i>halakhot</i>. A stone that one initially hewed for use in a platform [<i>bimos</i>] for an idol is forbidden. If one plastered a stone or cemented it for the sake of idol worship, one removes that which he plastered or cemented and the stone is permitted. If one erected an object of idol worship upon a stone and subsequently removed it, the stone is then permitted.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one may not derive benefit from a stone plastered or cemented for the sake of idol worship. Rabbi Ami says: And that is the <i>halakha</i> provided that one plastered or cemented within the stone itself, by carving or engraving into it. If the plaster or cement was merely appended to the outside of the stone as an external ornament, the stone is not forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna the <i>halakha</i> with regard to stones immediately following the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a house utilized for idol worship? This indicates that the <i>halakha</i> of a stone is similar to the <i>halakha</i> of a house. And in the case of a house that was rendered forbidden when it was plastered or cemented for idol worship, that plastering was not done within the house itself, but on the exterior of its walls, and even so it is rendered forbidden. Accordingly, even external plastering should render the stone forbidden. The Gemara answers: In the case of a house it can also be explained that the plaster or cement was added to the house itself, as there is space in between the bricks that can be filled in.
  The Gemara asks: As the mishna does not specify, are we not dealing even with a house that one plastered with no idolatrous purpose and then plastered again on top of that layer for the sake of idol worship, rendering the house forbidden even without affecting the house itself?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ami was not explaining at what point a stone plastered for idolatry becomes forbidden; rather, when Rabbi Ami’s statement was stated, it was stated with regard to revocation of the stone’s idolatrous status, and he taught that even if one plastered or cemented within the stone itself, when one removes that which was added, it is permitted.
  The Gemara explains Rabbi Ami’s ruling: Lest you say that since one plastered or cemented within the stone itself, it is equivalent to a stone that one initially hewed for idol worship, and there-fore the entire stone is forbidden, Rabbi Ami teaches us that the stone can become permitted by the removal of the additional layer of plaster.
  
  Daf 48a
  
  MISHNA: There are three types of trees that were used as part of idolatrous rites [<i>ashera</i>]: A tree that one initially planted for the sake of idol worship is forbidden, and one may not derive benefit from any part of the tree. If one lopped off part of the trunk of a tree or trimmed its branches for the sake of idol worship, i.e., to worship that which would regrow there, and the tree’s trunk or limbs regrew, one removes that which has regrown and burn it. The remainder of the tree is then permitted. If one erected an object of idol worship beneath a tree and subsequently removed it, it is permitted to derive benefit from the tree.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one lopped off or trimmed a tree’s branches for the sake of idol worship and it regrew, the tree is permitted upon the removal of the new growth. The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai say: And this is the <i>halakha</i> only when one sank the shoot of a vine into the ground or grafted onto the trunk of the tree itself.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn that if he lopped off part of the trunk or trimmed the tree’s branches, the growth is forbidden? In order to render a tree forbidden, according to the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai, the act dedicated to idol worship must be sinking or grafting, which are tantamount to replanting the entire tree. The mishna indicates that even cutting off part of a tree renders the new growth forbidden.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, when the statement of the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai was stated, it was stated with regard to the revocation of the idolatrous status. What they meant to say was that even if one sank the shoot of a vine into the ground or grafted onto the tree itself, effecting a more significant change, nevertheless, when one removes that which has regrown, the tree is permitted. As, lest you say that since one sank the shoot of a vine into the ground or grafted onto the tree itself, it is similar to a tree that one initially planted for idol worship and the entire tree should be forbidden, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai counter this and teach us that even in this case the tree is permitted when that which has regrown is removed.
  Shmuel says: In the case of one who bows to a tree, its additional subsequent growth is forbidden. Rabbi Elazar raises an objection from the mishna: If one lopped or trimmed the tree for the sake of idol worship and the tree’s trunk or limbs regrew, one removes that which has regrown and burn it. This indicates that if one lopped or trimmed it the additional growth is forbidden, but if one did not lop or trim it, even if one bowed to the tree, the growth is not forbidden.
  The Gemara answers that Shmuel could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that a tree that was planted and only subsequently worshipped is permitted, as it was not initially planted for idol worship. And Shmuel says his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, who says that a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is forbidden. Accordingly, bowing to a tree renders its subsequent growth forbidden.
  Rav Ashi objects to this answer: From where is it derived that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to additional growth? Perhaps all agree that additional growth after the tree was worshipped is forbidden, and they disagree only with regard to its trunk.
  The Gemara explains what the nature of this dispute would be: As Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda maintains that its trunk is also forbidden, as it is written: “And you shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire” (Deuteronomy 12:3). Burning with fire destroys the whole tree, which indicates that the entire tree is forbidden, including its trunk. And the Rabbis maintain that the trunk of the tree is permitted, as it is written: “You shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and hew down their <i>asherim</i>, and burn their graven images with fire” (Deuteronomy 7:5). Which is the tree whose hewn part is forbidden, but its trunk is permitted? You must say it is a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped.
  And if you would say that we did not explain their opinions in this manner previously (45b), as the source given there for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda is the same verse given here as the source for the opinion of the Rabbis, simply reverse the explanation given there to match the one given here. The verse cited there as the source for the opinion of the Rabbis, namely, “and burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire,” should instead be considered the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, who deems even the trunk of a subsequently worshipped tree forbidden. And the verse cited there as the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, namely, “and hew down their <i>asherim</i>,” should instead be considered the source for the opinion of the Rabbis that only subsequent growth is forbidden.
  The Gemara rejects Rav Ashi’s suggestion: It cannot be that all agree that additional growth is forbidden when a tree is planted and subsequently worshipped, because if so, who teaches the mishna that says that the tree is forbidden when one lopped it or trimmed it? It is neither the Rabbis nor Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda. If one were to say that the Rabbis teach it, this cannot be, as they maintain that even in a case where one did not lop it or trim it, but simply bowed to it, the additional growth is forbidden. If one were to say that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda teaches the mishna, this cannot be, as he maintains that even the trunk of the tree is forbidden after it has been worshipped, and not just the subsequent growth.
  The Gemara responds, defending Rav Ashi’s suggestion: If you wish, say that the Rabbis teach the mishna, and if you wish, say that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda teaches it. The Gemara explains each possibility: If you wish, say that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda teaches it, as when Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says that even in a case where one did not lop it or trim it, the trunk of the tree is nevertheless forbidden, it is only in a case where one worshipped the tree without specification, i.e., not to any specific part of the tree. But if one lopped it or trimmed it for the sake of idol worship, he has revealed his intention, namely, that he believes that the additional growth is suitable for his idol worship, but that the trunk of the tree is not suitable for his idol worship. Therefore, in such a case only the additional growth is forbidden.
  The Gemara explains the other possibility. If you wish, say that the Rabbis teach it. Although they maintain that even without lopping or trimming the tree the additional growth is forbidden if it is worshipped, nevertheless it was necessary for the mishna to mention the case where one lopped it or trimmed it specifically. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since one performed an action on the tree itself, the trunk of the tree should also be forbidden. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that only the additional growth is forbidden and not the trunk.
  MISHNA: Which tree is deemed forbidden as an <i>ashera</i>? Any tree that has an object of idol worship beneath it. Rabbi Shimon says: Any tree that people worship. And there was an incident in Tzaidan involving a tree that people would worship, and Jews found beneath it a heap of stones. Rabbi Shimon said to them: Examine this heap of stones. And they examined it and found in it an idolatrous image. Rabbi Shimon said to them: Since it is the image that they worship, we can permit use of the tree to those who wish to derive benefit from it.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: Which tree is an <i>ashera</i>? The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the previous mishna that there are three types of <i>ashera</i> trees? The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: Of the three trees mentioned in the previous mishna, there are two where the trees themselves are worshipped, and everyone agrees that they are forbidden. And there is one that is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. Which is the <i>ashera</i> with regard to which Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree? It is any tree that has an object of idol worship beneath it, as Rabbi Shimon says that any tree that people worship is forbidden, but that a tree under which an idol was placed is not forbidden.
  The Gemara presents a question: Which tree is assumed to be an <i>ashera</i>, even without specific knowledge that it was worshipped? Rav says: Any tree that gentile priests sit beneath and do not taste of its fruits, as they apparently consider the fruits consecrated to the idol. And Shmuel says: Even if they so much as say: These dates are for the house of Natzrefei, a house of idol worship, the tree is forbidden. This is because the idol worshippers would throw the dates into beer and drink it on their festival day. Ameimar says: The elders of Pumbedita said to me that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel.
  
  Daf 48b
  
  MISHNA: With regard to an <i>ashera</i>, one may not sit in its shade, but if one sat in its shade he remains ritually pure. And one may not pass beneath it, and if one passed beneath it he is ritually impure. If the tree was robbing the public, i.e., if its branches extended over public property, and one passed beneath it, he remains pure.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One may not sit in its shade. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? He is directly benefiting from an object of idol worship. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is necessary only with regard to the shade of its shade. The shade that extends as far as the height of the tree is considered its shade. The less significant shade, that which extends further that the tree’s height, is referred to as the shade of its shade. The mishna is teaching that even this secondary shade is forbidden.
  The Gemara comments: By inference, with regard to the shade of its height, its primary shade, if one sat there he is impure. The Gemara rejects this inference: No, this inference is not correct, as even with regard to the shade of its height, if one sat there he remains pure. And this is what the mishna is teaching us: That even with regard to the shade of its shade, one may not sit in it.
  There are those who teach this discussion with regard to the latter clause of that part of the mishna, which states: But if one sat in its shade he remains ritually pure. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Why should he be rendered impure? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is necessary only with regard to the direct shade of its height. Even in this case, he remains pure. The Gemara comments: By inference, with regard to the shade of its shade, one may even sit there <i>ab initio</i>. The Gemara answers: No, this inference is not correct. Rather, this is what the mishna is teaching us: That even with regard to the shade of its height, if one sat there he remains pure.
  § The mishna teaches: And one may not pass beneath an <i>ashera</i>, and if one passed beneath it he is ritually impure. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara answers: Because it is impossible that there is no remnant of an idolatrous offering underneath the tree.
  The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: From where is it derived that an idolatrous offering transmits impurity in a tent, i.e., to that which is under the same roof? It is derived from that which is stated: “And they joined themselves unto Ba’al-Peor, and ate the offerings to the dead” (Psalms 106:28). It is derived from here that just as a corpse transmits impurity in a tent, so too, an idolatrous offering transmits impurity in a tent.
  § The mishna teaches: If the tree was robbing the public and one passed beneath it he remains pure. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does the mishna mean that if one passed under the tree he remains pure, but that it is prohibited to pass beneath it <i>ab initio</i>? Or does the mishna mean that one may pass beneath it <i>ab initio</i>? Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar says in the name of Ḥizkiyya: One may pass <i>ab initio</i>. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna means that if one passed he remains pure, but it is prohibited to pass <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara explains: And they do not disagree. This opinion, that one may not pass beneath an <i>ashera</i>, is referring to a case where there is another way to get to his destination. That opinion, that it is permitted to pass beneath it <i>ab initio</i>, is referring to a case where there is no other way.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Sheshet, who was blind, was being guided by his attendant toward his city, and there was an <i>ashera</i> shadowing the path. Rav Sheshet said to his attendant: When you arrive at the <i>ashera</i>, have me run past it quickly. The Gemara asks: What were the circumstances? If there was no other way to get to his destination, why did Rav Sheshet request: Have me run past it? In such circumstances, it is permitted to walk normally underneath an <i>ashera</i>. And if there was another way to get to his destination, when Rav Sheshet said: Have me run past it, was it then permitted for him to do so? He still passed under the <i>ashera</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, it was a case where there was no other way to get to his destination. And although it was permitted for Rav Sheshet to walk normally underneath the <i>ashera</i>, Rav Sheshet wanted to run past it because an important person is different. An important person should try to pass under the <i>ashera</i> as quickly as possible, lest others misunderstand the circumstances and learn from him that it is permitted for one to walk underneath an <i>ashera</i> even when there is another way for him to reach his destination.
  MISHNA: One may plant vegetables underneath an <i>ashera</i> during the rainy season, as the vegetables do not benefit from its shade; on the contrary, the tree’s foliage prevents the vegetables from being properly irrigated by the rain. But one may not plant vegetables under an <i>ashera</i> during the summer, as the shade benefits them. And lettuce may not be planted there at all, neither in the summer nor in the rainy season, because shade is always beneficial to lettuce. Rabbi Yosei says: One may not plant vegetables under an <i>ashera</i> even during the rainy season, because the tree’s foliage [<i>shehaneviyya</i>] falls upon them and serves as fertilizer for them.
  GEMARA: The mishna records a dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis with regard to planting underneath an <i>ashera</i> in the rainy season when vegetables are fertilized by the tree’s forbidden fallen foliage. As the plant is also fertilized by the permitted nutrients of the ground, the plant’s growth is caused by both prohibited and permitted sources. Therefore, the Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Yosei holds that when both this and that cause it, i.e., when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is forbidden, and he therefore holds that it is prohibited to plant underneath an <i>ashera</i> in the rainy season; and the Rabbis say that when both this and that cause a result, the result is permitted?
  Didn’t we hear that they stated the opposite rulings? As we learned in a mishna (43b): Rabbi Yosei says: When one encounters an idol, he should grind the idol and throw the dust to the wind or cast it into the sea. The Rabbis said to him: What is the good of that? That also gives a Jew benefit from the idol, as it becomes fertilizer for his crops, and deriving any kind of benefit is prohibited, as it is written: “And nothing of the proscribed items shall cleave to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18).
  The contradiction between the statement of the Rabbis in that mishna and the statement of the Rabbis in the mishna here is difficult, and the contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Yosei in that mishna and the statement of Rabbi Yosei here is difficult.
  The Gemara explains: Granted, the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yosei and the other statement of Rabbi Yosei is not difficult. It may be resolved as follows: There, in the earlier mishna, since the ground-up idol is dispersed and is going to be completely lost, Rabbi Yosei permits deriving benefit from the fertilizer. By contrast, in the mishna here, where the fallen leaves are not going to be lost so quickly, as they fall together on top of the vegetables and provide direct benefit as fertilizer, deriving benefit from them is prohibited.
  But the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is difficult. Therefore, the Gemara concludes: Reverse the attribution of the statements, so that the mishna teaches that it is the Rabbis who deem it prohibited to plant under an <i>ashera</i> in the rainy season, while Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted.
  And if you wish, say instead: Do not reverse the statements. The contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Yosei can be resolved as we answered before. The contradiction between the statements of the Rabbis can be resolved in accordance with that which Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, says about an animal offering that became disqualified for sacrifice. The <i>halakha</i> is that this animal is sold and the proceeds are dedicated to the Temple treasury. One may not skin the hide of the animal whole even though this would make the hide more valuable than if it were cut up into pieces. Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, explains that this is because the value that is enhanced with regard to the hide is offset by the damage caused to the flesh. The process of skinning the hide devalues the animal’s flesh; therefore, there is no overall monetary gain for the Temple treasury.
  Here too, the value that is enhanced with regard to the planted vegetables by the foliage of the tree is offset by the damage caused by its shade. Therefore, since there is no overall benefit gained from the <i>ashera</i>, the Rabbis deem it permitted to plant underneath it in the winter.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold that when both this and that cause it, i.e., when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is forbidden? But isn’t it taught in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 1:9) that Rabbi Yosei says: One may plant the branch of an <i>orla</i> tree, i.e., a tree during the first three years after its planting, despite the prohibition against eating or deriving benefit from its fruit; but one may not plant an <i>orla</i> nut, because it is a fruit. And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Rabbi Yosei concedes that if one planted an <i>orla</i> nut, or sank the shoot of an <i>orla</i> tree into the ground, or grafted an <i>orla</i> tree, deriving benefit from that which grows as a result is permitted. This is apparently because the growth is caused by both a forbidden cause, the <i>orla</i> nut, and a permitted cause, the ground’s nutrients.
  The Gemara adds: And that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei concedes
  
  Daf 49a
  
  that if one planted an <i>orla</i> nut, or sank the shoot of an <i>orla</i> tree into the ground, or grafted an <i>orla</i> tree, that which grows as a result is permitted.
  And if you would say that this is not difficult, as Rabbi Yosei distinguishes between items that are forbidden due to other prohibitions and items that are forbidden due to idol worship, does he indeed distinguish in this manner? But isn’t it taught that with regard to a field that was fertilized with dung that came from an animal used in idol worship, and similarly, with regard to a cow that was fattened with vetches used in idol worship, there are opposing opinions: It is taught in one <i>baraita</i> that the field may be sown in the normal manner and the cow may be slaughtered and eaten, and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the field should be left fallow, and the cow should be made lean, until the effects of the dung or vetches have passed.
  What, is it not that this <i>baraita</i> that rules leniently is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is permitted, and that <i>baraita</i> that rules stringently is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis? If so, it is clear that Rabbi Yosei does not distinguish between other prohibitions and idol worship, as in this case of idol worship he still permits the result of permitted and forbidden causes. The Gemara answers: No, these <i>baraitot</i> do not reflect the opinions of Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis. Rather, this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him.
  The Gemara asks: Which dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis is referred to here? If we say that it is the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis with regard to leaven, that dispute does not necessarily correspond to the controversy between these two <i>baraitot</i>.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 2:11): In the case of non-sacred leaven and <i>teruma</i> leaven that fell into a non-sacred batch of dough, and this one alone was not potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened, and that one alone was not potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened, and they combined and caused the dough to become leavened, there is a dispute as to whether this dough has the status of <i>teruma</i>, and is therefore forbidden to non-priests, or whether it has the status of non-sacred bread.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the final element that fell into the dough. If the <i>teruma</i> fell in last, the dough is forbidden to non-priests. And the Rabbis say: Whether the forbidden item, i.e., the <i>teruma</i>, fell in first, or whether the forbidden item fell in last, the dough is not forbidden unless there is enough of the forbidden leaven alone to cause the dough to become leavened.
  And Abaye says: Rabbi Eliezer taught that when the permitted leaven fell in last, the mixture is permitted only in a case where one first removed the forbidden leaven, before the permitted leaven fell into the dough and made it rise. But if one did not first remove the forbidden leaven, the dough is forbidden even if the permitted leaven fell in last. Apparently, Rabbi Eliezer holds that when both permitted and forbidden leaven cause dough to become leavened, the dough is forbidden.
  The Gemara rejects this interpretation: But from where is it apparent that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is in accordance with Abaye’s explanation? Perhaps the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is as he says explicitly: I follow the final element. If the dough’s leavening is completed by the forbidden item, it is forbidden; and if it is completed by the permitted item, it is permitted. And this is the <i>halakha</i> whether one removed the forbidden item or whether one did not remove the forbidden item. Accordingly, Rabbi Eliezer does not necessarily hold that when both a forbidden and a permitted item contribute to a result, the result is forbidden.
  Rather, the two conflicting <i>baraitot</i> cited with regard to a field fertilized with dung used in idol worship can be attributed in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis with regard to wood from an <i>ashera</i> tree.
  As we learned in a mishna (49b): If one took wood from an <i>ashera</i>, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. In a case where one kindled a fire in an oven with the wood, if it is a new oven and by kindling the fire he hardened the oven and made it stronger for use in the future, then the oven must be shattered. Since forbidden items were used in the process of forming the oven, one may not derive benefit from the use of the forbidden items. But if it is an old oven it may be cooled; it is prohibited to use the oven only while it is still hot. If one baked bread with wood from the <i>ashera</i> as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the bread.
  If this bread was intermingled with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all the bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. In other words, one is not required to destroy the bread. Instead, one should designate money equal in value to the wood that he used from the <i>ashera</i>, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the forbidden wood. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship. Once the bread becomes forbidden, it cannot be redeemed by having the value of the forbidden wood cast into the Dead Sea. In any event, Rabbi Eliezer apparently holds that the result of both forbidden and permitted causes is forbidden, as the bread was baked with both forbidden fuel, i.e., the wood from the <i>ashera</i>, and the permitted oven.
  The Gemara asks: If the two conflicting <i>baraitot</i> cited with regard to a field fertilized with dung used in idol worship are attributed in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, and if this is referring to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement with regard to bread baked in an oven that was heated with fuel from an <i>ashera</i>, then who are the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, to whom the other <i>baraita</i> is attributed?
  If we say that the reference is to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to bread baked with wood from an <i>ashera</i>, this cannot be, as they are even more stringent than Rabbi Eliezer with regard to this matter. Not only do they deem bread that was baked with both forbidden and permitted fuel to be forbidden, but they require that it be destroyed and not redeemed. In others words, with regard to the status of the bread there is no dispute; all agree that it is forbidden. Therefore, both opinions are in accordance with the <i>baraita</i> that prohibits the result of both forbidden and permitted causes.
  If the reference is rather to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to <i>teruma</i> leaven that mixed with non-sacred leaven, as the Rabbis permit the mixture as long as the <i>teruma</i> leaven was not potent enough to cause the dough to rise, the more lenient of the two <i>baraitot</i> cannot be attributed in accordance with this opinion either; as say that you heard that these Rabbis are lenient with regard to the case of leaven; does that mean that they are lenient with regard to cases involving items of idol worship?
  As a result of this question, the Gemara retracts its suggestion that Rabbi Yosei’s opinion in the mishna is based on the opinion that a result caused by both permitted and forbidden items is forbidden. Rather, Rabbi Yosei holds that the result is permitted, as is evident from the case of a ground-up and dispersed object of idol worship and from the case of a planted <i>orla</i> nut. Therefore, the <i>baraitot</i> can actually be attributed as follows: This <i>baraita</i> that permits the use of the field is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and that <i>baraita</i> that prohibits its use is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  And as for the mishna, which seems to indicate that Rabbi Yosei holds that when a result is caused by both permitted and forbidden items it is forbidden, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion. Rather, when he said that one may not plant vegetables under an <i>ashera</i> even during the rainy season, he said so in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis that a result caused by both permitted and forbidden items is forbidden. Rabbi Yosei said to them: According to my own opinion, when both this and that cause it, i.e., when both permitted and forbidden items contribute to a result, the result is permitted. It is therefore permitted to plant vegetables under an <i>ashera</i> during all seasons.
  But according to your opinion, as you say that when both this and that cause a result it is prohibited, as seen from your ruling that it is prohibited to plant under an <i>ashera</i> during the summer because of the positive effect of the <i>ashera</i> tree’s shade, you should concede to me, in any event, that planting the vegetables even during the rainy season, when there is no shade, is prohibited, because they are fertilized by the fallen foliage.
  The Gemara asks: And how would the Rabbis reply to Rabbi Yosei’s point? The Gemara answers: They would reply in accordance with the aforementioned statement that Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, says (48b), that when a certain activity causes both a benefit and a greater or equal loss, it is not regarded as a benefit. Here, the positive effect on the plant from the tree’s foliage is offset by the fact that its shade prevents rainwater from reaching the plant. Therefore, since there is no overall benefit gained from the <i>ashera</i>, the Rabbis permit planting underneath it in the winter.
  The Gemara concludes: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>hala-kha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara recounts an incident supporting this ruling: There was a certain garden that was fertilized with dung that came from an animal used in idol worship. Rav Amram sent a query to Rav Yosef, asking what the <i>halakha</i> is in such a case. Rav Yosef said to him that this is what Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; the produce of the garden is therefore permitted.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  MISHNA: If one took wood from an <i>ashera</i>, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. In a case where one kindled a fire in an oven with the wood, if it is a new oven and by kindling the fire he hardened the oven and made it stronger for use in the future, then the oven must be shattered. Since forbidden items were used in the process of forming the oven, one may not derive benefit from the use of the forbidden items. But if it is an old oven it may be cooled; it is prohibited to use the oven only while it is still hot. If one baked bread with wood from the <i>ashera</i> as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the bread.
  If this bread was intermingled with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all the bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. In other words, one is not required to destroy all of the loaves. Instead, one should designate money equal in value to the wood that he used from the <i>ashera</i>, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the forbidden wood. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship. Once the bread becomes forbidden, it cannot be redeemed by having the value of the forbidden wood cast into the Dead Sea.
  If one took wood from an <i>ashera</i> for use as a weaving shuttle [<i>karkor</i>], it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. If one wove a garment with it, it is prohibited to derive benefit from the garment. If the garment was intermingled with other garments, and those other garments were intermingled with others, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of them. Rabbi Eliezer says: One must take the benefit and cast it into the Dead Sea. The Rabbis said to him: There is no monetary redemption for objects that are forbidden due to idol worship.
  GEMARA: The mishna presents two cases where Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree. The Gemara explains: And both are necessary; as if the mishna had taught us only the first case, concerning the forbidden bread, one might have thought that it is only in this case that Rabbi Eliezer says that the bread is permitted after casting the value gained from the forbidden wood into the Dead Sea, because at the time that the bread has finished baking, the forbidden wood has burned up. But in the case of the shuttle, where the original forbidden piece of wood is still extant, perhaps one will say that he concedes to the Rabbis that the forbidden garment may not be redeemed.
  And if the mishna had taught us only the case of the shuttle, one might have thought that it is only in this case that the Rabbis say that the forbidden garment may not be redeemed, because the original forbidden piece of wood is still extant. But in the case of the bread, where the forbidden wood was already burned up by the time the bread finished baking, perhaps one will say that they concede to Rabbi Eliezer that the bread may be redeemed. Therefore, both cases are necessary.
  Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rabba bar Naḥmani, says that Rav Ḥisda says that Ze’eiri says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There are those who say there is a different version of this ruling: Rav Ḥisda says: Abba bar Rav Ḥisda said to me that this is what Ze’eiri says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava says: They taught that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer only in the case of forbidden bread. But with regard to the case of a barrel of wine used for an idolatrous libation, which was intermingled with permitted barrels of wine, the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rav Ḥisda says: Even in the case of a barrel of libation wine, the wine in the other barrels is permitted once the value of the forbidden barrel has been cast into the Dead Sea.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain man, and it happened that a barrel of wine used for a libation became intermingled with his wine. He came before Rav Ḥisda to ask what he should do. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Take four dinars and cast them into the river, and the rest of the wine will be permitted to you.
  MISHNA: How does one revoke the idolatrous status of an <i>ashera</i>? If a gentile trimmed dry wood or pruned green wood from the tree for his own benefit, or if he removed from it a stick, or a rod, or even a leaf, he has thereby revoked its idolatrous status, as he has proven that he no longer worships it. If a gentile shaved down the tree for its own sake, to improve its appearance, it remains prohibited to derive benefit from it. If he shaved it down not for its own sake, it is permitted.
  GEMARA: With regard to those shavings that were shaved off for the sake of the <i>ashera</i>, what should be done with them? Rav Huna and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav disagree about it; one says the shavings are forbidden and one says they are permitted.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the one who says that the shavings are permitted, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a gentile who shaved down an object of idol worship for his own sake, as he wished to use the shavings, the tree and its shavings are permitted. The idolatrous status has been revoked from both the object and its shavings. If he shaved it for its, i.e., for the idol’s, own sake, it remains forbidden, but its shavings are permitted. And in the case of a Jew who shaved down an object of idol worship, whether for its sake or for his own sake, the object and its shavings remain forbidden, as a Jew cannot revoke an object’s idolatrous status.
  It was stated: With regard to an object of idol worship that broke, Rav says: It is necessary to revoke the idolatrous status of each and every sliver. And Shmuel says: An object of idol worship can have its status nullified only if part of it breaks off in the course of its natural manner of growth.
  The Gemara inquires about Shmuel’s ruling: On the contrary, can an object possibly have its idolatrous status nullified by breaking in the course of its natural manner of growth? The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Shmuel is saying: If an object of idol worship breaks, its idolatrous status is automatically nullified, as the idol worshipper will see that it broke and will no longer attribute any power to it. It needs to have its idolatrous status actively revoked only in a case where it broke off in the course of its natural manner of growth. For example, if leaves fall from a worshipped tree, the tree and the leaves retain their idolatrous status. In this case, the idol worshipper will not attribute the fallen leaves to a lack of power of the tree.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel disagree about this: One Sage, Rav, holds that people worship even fragments of idols. Therefore, the fact that an idol broke does not result in the nullification of its idolatrous status. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that people do not worship fragments of idols.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone agrees that people worship fragments of idols. And here, it is with regard to fragments of fragments that they disagree. One Sage, Rav, holds that fragments of fragments are forbidden; and one Sage, Shmuel, holds that fragments of fragments are permitted.
  And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that fragments of fragments are permitted, and here they disagree with regard to objects of idol worship that are composed of segments that come apart and that a layman can reassemble. One Sage, Rav, holds that since a layman can reassemble it, its idolatrous status is not nullified. And one Sage, Shmuel, holds that an object of idol worship needs to have its status revoked only when it breaks in the course of its natural manner of growth, as that is its typical manner. This case, where the idol is disassembled, is not related to its natural growth and therefore it requires no further act to revoke its idolatrous status.
  
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yishmael says: Three stones that are adjacent to each other at the side of Mercury [<i>Markulis</i>] are prohibited, as that idol was worshipped by tossing stones toward it, which then became part of the idol. But if there are only two stones, then they are permitted. And the Rabbis say: Those stones that are adjacent to Mercury and appear to have fallen from it are prohibited. But those stones that are not adjacent to it are permitted.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, one can explain that the Rabbis hold that idol worshippers worship fragments of idols. Therefore, those stones that are adjacent to Mercury, where it can be said that they fell from its pile of stones, are prohibited; as they are considered fragments of an object of idol worship, namely the stone pile. And those that are not adjacent to Mercury are permitted, as they did not fall from it.
  But with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, what does he hold? If he holds that idol worshippers worship fragments of idols, even two stones should be prohibited. If he holds that idol worshippers do not worship fragments of idols, even three stones should not be prohibited.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where it is known that these stones fell from the pile of stones, everyone agrees that they are prohibited, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even according to the one who says: Idol worshippers do not worship fragments. As that statement applies only to a form of idol worship where that is not the normal manner in which it is worshipped. But here, where the stones thrown onto the pile are broken stones from the outset, this is its normal manner of worship. They disagree only when it is not specifically known where these stones came from.
  
  Daf 50a
  
  Furthermore, everyone agrees that also in the case of stones that are near the stone pile dedicated to Mercury, with regard to which it can be said that they fell from it, they are prohibited. Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis disagree only when the stones are distant.
  The Gemara challenges: But the mishna teaches that the stones are at the side of Mercury, indicating that they are nearby. The Gemara explains: What is meant by the term: At the side of Mercury? It means at the side of its four cubits.
  The Gemara clarifies the dispute: Rabbi Yishmael holds that at times, idol worshippers initially construct a small stone pile dedicated to Mercury at the side of a large stone pile dedicated to Mercury. Therefore, three stones, which resemble a complete pile dedicated to Mercury, are prohibited. Two stones, which do not resemble a stone pile dedicated to Mercury, are permitted. Conversely, the Rabbis hold that idol worshippers do not construct a small stone pile dedicated to Mercury at the side of a large stone pile dedicated to Mercury. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> is not different in a case where there are three stones, and it is not different in a case where there are two stones. In both cases those stones that can be seen together with the pile dedicated to Mercury are prohibited, as they may have fallen from it, whereas those that cannot be seen together with the stone pile are permitted.
  § The Master said: In a case where it is known that these stones fell from it, everyone agrees that they are prohibited. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement from his statement presented in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to stones that fell from a pile dedicated to Mercury, those that can be seen together with it are prohibited; those that cannot be seen together with it are permitted. And Rabbi Yishmael says: Three stones are prohibited, but two stones are permitted. The <i>baraita</i> indicates that Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis also disagree where it is known that the stones fell from the stone pile. Rava said: Do not say in the <i>baraita</i>: Stones that fell from a pile. Rather, say: Stones that were found adjacent to the pile. There is no certainty that they fell from the pile.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yishmael actually hold that two stones that are found adjacent to the pile are permitted? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yishmael says: Two stones that are found in the area of the pile dedicated to Mercury are prohibited. Three stones are prohibited, even if they are found at a distance.
  Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, in the second <i>baraita</i>, it is referring to a case where both the pile and the adjacent stones are in the same area, in which case the stones are forbidden. There, in the first <i>baraita</i>, it is referring to a case where they are in two adjacent areas, in which case they are permitted. And what is considered two adjacent areas? This is referring to a case where there is an elevated area between them, and evidently the stones did not fall from the pile.
  The Gemara asks: And are stones that are merely adjacent to each other in this way considered a pile dedicated to Mercury? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: These are the stones of a place of worship dedicated to Mercury: One stone is situated on one side and one is situated on the other side, and one is situated atop of them, but not where the stones are merely adjacent to each other? Rava said: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is with regard to the main pile of stones dedicated to Mercury, but the stones that are added to it are not necessarily arranged in this way.
  § The Gemara relates: The house of King Yannai was destroyed, and gentiles came and placed stones dedicated to Mercury in it. Later, other gentiles who did not worship Mercury came and took those stones and paved paths and streets with them. There were Rabbis who withdrew from these paths, and there were other Rabbis who did not withdraw from these paths.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The son of holy ones walks on them. Should we withdraw from them? The Gemara asks: Who is the person referred to as the son of holy ones? The Gemara answers: It is Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Simai. And why did they call him the son of holy ones? They did so because Rabbi Menaḥem would not even gaze at the form on a coin, as it was sometimes an idolatrous symbol.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the one who withdraws from those paths? He holds in accordance with that which Rav Giddel says that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef says that Rav says: From where is it derived that with regard to an offering brought in idolatrous worship, there can never be any nullification of its prohibited status? This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “They joined themselves to Baal of Peor, and ate the offerings to the dead” (Psalms 106:28). Just as the prohibited status of a corpse has no nullification, and it is forever prohibited to derive benefit from it, so too, the prohibited status of an offering brought in idolatrous worship has no nullification ever.
  And the one who does not withdraw from those paths says: In order for idol worship to prohibit an offering I require the offering to be like those offerings sacrificed inside the Temple, and there is no parallel to this offering in the Temple service, as stones are not brought as offerings.
  Rav Yosef bar Abba said: Rabba bar Yirmeya happened to come to our locale, and when he came he brought the following <i>baraita</i> with him: In the case of a gentile who brought stones from a pile dedicated to Mercury and paved paths and theaters with them,
  
  Daf 50b
  
  they are permitted, as the gentile nullified their prohibited status. In the case of a Jew who brought stones from a pile dedicated to Mercury and paved paths and streets with them, they are prohibited. And there is neither a carpenter [<i>naggar</i>] nor a son of a carpenter who can resolve this, i.e., no one can resolve the difficulty inherent in this statement, not a Torah scholar, and not even a scholar who is the son of a scholar.
  Rav Sheshet said: As for me, I am not a carpenter, nor am I the son of a carpenter, and yet I will resolve the difficulty. What is the difficulty that Rabba bar Yirmeya finds in the <i>baraita</i>? The <i>baraita</i> is difficult because of the statement of Rav Giddel, that the prohibited status of offerings brought in idol worship can never be revoked. This is not difficult, as in order for idol worship to prohibit an offering I require the offering to be like those offerings sacrificed inside the Temple, and there is no a parallel offering of stones in the Temple.
  § Rav Yosef bar Abba said: Rabba bar Yirmeya happened to come to our locale, and when he came he brought the following <i>baraita</i> with him: One may remove worms from a tree and place manure on a cut in a tree during the Sabbatical Year, but one may not remove worms or place manure on a cut during the intermediate days of the Festival.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Both here, in the case of the Sabbatical Year, and there, in the case of the intermediate days of the Festival, one may not prune the trees. But one may smear oil on the previously pruned tree on the place where one pruned it in order to prevent the tree from being damaged, both during the intermediate days of the Festival and during the Sabbatical Year. And there is neither a carpenter nor a son of a carpenter who can resolve this.
  Ravina said: As for me, I am not a carpenter, nor am I the son of a carpenter, and yet I will resolve the difficulty. What is the difficulty that Rabba bar Yirmeya finds in the <i>baraita</i>? If we say that the difference between the intermediate days of the Festival and the Sabbatical Year poses a difficulty to him, this cannot be so. One cannot explain that Rabba bar Yirmeya is asking what is different about the Sabbatical Year that one is permitted to remove worms and place manure on a cut, and what is different about the intermediate days of the Festival that it is prohibited to do so, as this is not a valid question. Are they comparable? With regard to the Sabbatical Year, the Merciful One prohibited only agricultural labor, whereas other forms of exertion are permitted. With regard to the intermediate days of the Festival, even other forms of exertion are prohibited.
  Ravina suggests: Rather, perhaps the difference between placing manure and pruning poses a difficulty to him. What is different about placing manure that it is permitted during the Sabbatical Year, and what is different about pruning that it is prohibited? Ravina rejects this suggestion: This is also not a valid question. Are they comparable? The purpose of placing manure is to preserve the tree, and therefore it is permitted, whereas the purpose of pruning is to enhance the tree, and therefore it is prohibited.
  Ravina suggests: Rather, perhaps the contradiction between the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> with regard to placing manure and another mishna with regard to placing manure poses a difficulty to him, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches: One may remove worms from a tree and place manure on a cut in a tree during the Sabbatical Year. And one may raise a contradiction from a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 2:4): One may place manure on the saplings, and one may bind their branches to the trunk so that they grow upright. And one may lop off their tops to promote their growth, and make shelters for them to shield them from the sun, and water them. All these actions are permitted until Rosh HaShana of the Sabbatical Year. One can infer that until Rosh HaShana, yes, one may place manure on the tree; but during the Sabbatical Year itself one may not do so.
  Ravina rejects this suggestion: But perhaps one can account for the apparent contradiction in a similar fashion to the explanation of Rav Ukva bar Ḥama, as Rav Ukva bar Ḥama says: There are two types of hoeing [<i>kishkushei</i>]. The purpose of one type is to enhance the tree’s health, and it is therefore prohibited. And the purpose of one type is to close up cracks in the ground, which is permitted, as it is done only to prevent the trees from dying and not to enhance their growth. So too, one may suggest that there are two types of placing manure: One type whose purpose is to preserve the trees, and is therefore permitted, and one type whose purpose is to enhance the trees, and is therefore prohibited.
  Ravina suggests: Rather, perhaps the contradiction between the <i>halakha</i> in the <i>baraita</i> with regard to smearing oil and the <i>halakha</i> in another mishna with regard to smearing oil poses a difficulty for him, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches: One may smear oil on the previously pruned tree, on the place where one pruned it, both during the intermediate days of the Festival and during the Sabbatical Year. And one may raise a contradiction from the mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 2:5): One may smear oil on the unripe figs in the sixth year of the Sabbatical cycle in order to accelerate their ripening, and similarly one may pierce them and fill the cut with oil to facilitate their ripening until Rosh HaShana. One can infer that until Rosh HaShana, yes, one may smear; but during the Sabbatical Year itself one may not do so.
  Ravina rejects this suggestion: That is also not a valid question. Are they comparable? Here, the purpose of smearing oil on the place where the tree was pruned is to preserve the tree, and therefore it is permitted. There, the purpose of smearing oil on the unripe figs is to enhance and enlarge the fruit and is therefore prohibited.
  Rav Samma, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina: The contradiction between the <i>halakha</i> with regard to smearing oil during the intermediate days of the Festival and the <i>halakha</i> with regard to placing manure during the intermediate days of the Festival poses a difficulty for Rabba bar Yirmeya. Since the purpose of this action is to preserve the tree, and the purpose of that action is to preserve the tree, what is different in this case that it is permitted, and what is different in that case that it is prohibited? This is the reason that Rabba bar Yirmeya said to him: There is neither a carpenter nor a son of a carpenter who can resolve this.
  § Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In the case of an object of idol worship that is worshipped by means of a stick, e.g., by beating a stick on another object in order to produce noise, if one broke a stick before it, he is liable. If he threw a stick before it, he is exempt. Abaye said to Rava: What is different about the case where one broke a stick? In this case one is liable because it is similar to slaughtering an offering, which is a rite performed in the Temple; so too, in the case where one threw a stick, it is similar to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. Rava said to Abaye: In order for a sacrificial rite to be similar to the sprinkling of blood, I require a form of throwing that scatters the offering, and that is not the case here.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s explanation from a <i>baraita</i>: One who fed [<i>safat</i>] an idol excrement, or who poured a chamber pot of urine before it as a libation,
  
  Daf 51a
  
  is liable, even though these substances are repugnant, and even when this is not the typical manner of worshipping that idol. Granted, when one pours a chamber pot of urine before the idol, there is an act of throwing that scatters the offering. But in the case of excrement, what act of throwing that scatters the offering is there? The Gemara answers: This is stated with regard to moist excrement, which breaks apart when thrown.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that one’s liability for breaking a stick as a form of idol worship is the subject of a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: If one slaughtered a locust for an idol, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt from punishment.
  What, is it not about this issue that they disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that we say that one is liable even in the case of a rite that merely resembles slaughtering an animal, e.g., slaughtering a locust or breaking a stick. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that we do not say that it is sufficient for the rite to merely resemble slaughtering an animal. Rather, the rite must be like the type of slaughtering performed inside the Temple. One is therefore not liable for slaughtering a locust, since locusts are not slaughtered in the Temple.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone holds that we do not say that one is liable even for a rite that merely resembles slaughtering an animal. Rather, we require the rite to be like the type of slaughtering performed inside the Temple. And the case of a locust is different, since its neck is similar to the neck of an animal. Rabbi Yehuda therefore considers slaughtering a locust similar to the type of slaughter performed in the Temple.
  § Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: In the case of an object of idol worship that is worshipped by means of a stick, if one broke a stick before it, he is liable and the stick is rendered prohibited. If he threw a stick before it, he is liable, as its typical manner of worship involves a stick, but the stick is not rendered prohibited.
  Rava said to Rav Naḥman: What is different about the case where one broke a stick? In this case the stick is rendered forbidden as it is similar to slaughtering an offering, which is a rite performed in the Temple; so too, in the case where one threw a stick, it is similar to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. Rav Naḥman said to Rava: In order for a sacrificial rite to be similar to the sprinkling of blood, we require a form of throwing that scatters the offering, and that is not the case here.
  Rava asked Rav Naḥman: If that is so, by what means are the stones of a place of worship dedicated to Mercury rendered prohibited, as they do not break apart when they are thrown? Rav Naḥman said to Rava: This question was difficult for me as well, and I asked Rabba bar Avuh about it, and Rabba bar Avuh asked Ḥiyya bar Rav, and Ḥiyya bar Rav asked Rav. And Rav said to Ḥiyya bar Rav: This action is comparable to the act of enlarging the object of idol worship. The stones are not rendered prohibited as an offering brought in idol worship; rather, they are considered part of the pile dedicated to Mercury itself.
  Rava said to Rav Naḥman: This works out well according to the one who says that the object of idol worship of a gentile is prohibited immediately. But according to the one who says it is not forbidden until it is worshipped, let it be permitted, as he did not worship it, since he sacrificed no offering to it. Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Each and every one of the stones becomes part of the object of idol worship and is also considered an offering to the other stone that preceded it.
  Rava replied: If so, at least the last stone should be permitted, as nothing has yet been sacrificed to it. Rav Naḥman said to Rava: If you know which one it is, you may go and take it, as it is indeed permitted. Rav Ashi says: Even the last stone is forbidden, as each and every one of the stones becomes an offering to itself and also an offering to the other stone that preceded it.
  We learned in a mishna (51b): If one found a garment, money, or vessels at the head of Mercury, they are permitted, as they are not an offering but were left there for some other reason. If one found vine branches [<i>parkilei</i>] laden with clusters of grapes, or wreaths made of stalks, or containers of wine, oil, or flour, or any other item the like of which is sacrificed on the altar there, that item is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to wine, oil, or flour, there is a sacrificial rite comparable to those rites performed inside the Temple, and there is a rite that is similar to the sprinkling of blood that scatters the offering. But in the case of vine branches laden with clusters of grapes, and wreaths made of stalks, there is neither a sacrificial rite comparable to those rites performed inside the Temple, as these items are not sacrificed on the altar in the Temple, nor is there a rite that is similar to the sprinkling of blood on the altar that scatters the offering.
  Rava said that Ulla said: The mishna is referring to a case where he initially picked the grapes for that purpose, in order to sacrifice them in idolatrous worship. The act of picking the fruit is comparable to slaughtering an animal, and it renders them forbidden.
  § Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From where is it derived concerning one who slaughters a blemished animal in idolatrous worship that he is exempt? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “He that sacrifices to the gods, save to the Lord only, shall be utterly destroyed” (Exodus 22:19). The verse contrasts sacrificing an offering to the Lord with sacrificing an offering to other gods, indicating that the Torah prohibits only sacrificial rites that are comparable to those rites performed inside the Temple, and blemished animals are disqualified from being sacrificed in the Temple.
  Rava discussed this matter: With regard to what type of blemish does this apply? If we say that it applies in the case of a blemish on the cornea of the eye, that is difficult: Now that such an offering is fit for descendants of Noah to offer to the Most High on their personal altar, is it necessary to state that it is considered an offering with regard to the prohibition of idol worship?
  Rather, the <i>halakha</i> that one who slaughters a blemished animal in idolatrous worship is exempt is stated with regard to an animal that is lacking a limb, and it is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived that with regard to an animal that is lacking a limb, it is prohibited for descendants of Noah to sacrifice it? This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And of every living thing of all flesh, two of every sort you shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you” (Genesis 6:19). The Torah stated: “Of every living thing,” indicating that Noah should bring into the ark an animal whose extremities are living, as some of the animals would subsequently be used as offerings.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t that phrase: “And of every living thing,” required to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], which is disqualified as an offering? The Gemara answers: The disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> is derived from the verse: “Of the fowl also of the air, seven and seven, male and female, to keep seed alive upon the face of all the earth” (Genesis 7:3), as a <i>tereifa</i> cannot procreate.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that a <i>tereifa</i> cannot bear offspring. But according to the one who says that a <i>tereifa</i> can bear offspring, what can be said? According to this opinion, a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be excluded by the phrase “to keep seed alive,” as it can procreate.
  The Gemara answers: The verse states: “You shall bring into the ark, to keep them alive with you” (Genesis 6:19). The term “with you” indicates that the verse is referring to animals that are similar to you, excluding a <i>tereifa</i>. The Gemara challenges: But perhaps Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>. In that case, one cannot exclude a <i>tereifa</i> from the comparison of animals to Noah. The Gemara explains: It is written about Noah that he was “a man righteous and without blemish” (Genesis 6:9), indicating that he was physically whole.
  The Gemara challenges: Perhaps the term “without blemish” is referring to his conduct, and not to his physical attributes. The Gemara explains: The term “righteous” is written about him, indicating that his conduct was faultless, and therefore the term “without blemish” is necessarily referring to his physical completeness.
  The Gemara challenges: Perhaps the term “without blemish” is referring to his conduct, and the term “righteous” is referring to his good deeds. The Gemara explains: You cannot say that Noah himself was a <i>tereifa</i>, as, if it enters your mind to say that Noah was a <i>tereifa</i>, you must say that the Merciful One said to Noah: Bring into the ark animals that are similar to you, i.e., <i>tereifot</i>, but do not bring whole, unblemished animals, and this is clearly not reasonable.
  The Gemara asks: Now that the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> is derived from the term “with you,” why do I need the phrase “to keep seed alive”? The Gemara answers: If one excluded a <i>tereifa</i> only from the term “with you,” I would say that Noah brought the animals into the ark merely for the purpose of companionship, and therefore even an aged animal who could not bear offspring and even one who was castrated could be brought into the ark. The phrase “to keep seed alive” therefore teaches us that only animals that could reproduce were brought into the ark.
  § Rabbi Elazar says: From where is it derived concerning one who slaughters an animal as an offering to Mercury that he is liable even though it is not typically worshipped in this manner? This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And they shall not slaughter their offerings anymore to the <i>se’irim</i> after whom they go astray; this shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7). If this verse is not needed for the matter of prohibiting the worship of an idol in its typical manner, it must apply to another matter. The verse cannot be referring to idols that are typically worshipped by slaughtering offerings, as this prohibition is written in the verse: “And lest you inquire after their gods, saying: How do these nations serve their gods? Even so will I do likewise” (Deuteronomy 12:30). One must therefore apply the verse to the matter of prohibiting the worship of an idol in an atypical manner.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to this verse, does it come to teach this prohibition? This verse is required for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>, with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing offerings outside the Tabernacle:
  
  Daf 51b
  
  The verse states: “Any man…that slaughters an ox…outside the camp, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus:17:3–4). Until this point, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when the prohibition of sacrificing offerings on private altars was in effect, after the Tabernacle was erected, and then he also sacrificed them during a period when the prohibition of sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
  This is apparent as the punishment for sacrificing them is stated in this verse, as it is stated: “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, to sacrifice an offering to the Lord, before the Tabernacle of the Lord…that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus:17:4). We have heard from that verse the punishment, but with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing on a private altar, from where is it derived? The verse states: “Take heed to yourself lest you offer up your burnt-offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13).
  The Gemara comments: And this is in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Wherever it is stated: “Beware,” “lest,” or “do not,” this is nothing other than a prohibition.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From that point onward, the verse is speaking about sacrificial animals that one consecrated during a period when there was permission to sacrifice offerings on private altars, before the Tabernacle was erected, and then one sacrificed them outside the Tabernacle during a period when the prohibition of sacrificing on private altars was in effect.
  This is apparent, as it is stated: “In order that the children of Israel shall bring their sacrifices, which they slaughter upon the open field, that they shall bring them to the Lord, to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:5). The phrase: “Their sacrifices, which they slaughter,” is interpreted as referring to offerings that I have previously permitted you to slaughter on private altars. This verse teaches that those offerings may now be sacrificed only inside the Tabernacle. The phrase “upon the open field” teaches that in the case of anyone who slaughters an offering on a private altar during a period when the prohibition of sacrificing on private altars is in effect, even if he sacrifices the offering to God, the verse ascribes him blame as if he is slaughtering it upon the open field in idolatrous worship.
  The verse continues: “That they shall bring them to the Lord.” This is a positive mitzva to sacrifice even offerings that were consecrated before the Tabernacle was erected in the wilderness. And from where is it derived that there is a prohibition against sacrificing them outside the Tabernacle? The verse states: “And they shall not slaughter their offerings anymore to the <i>se’irim</i> after whom they go astray; this shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7).
  One might have thought that sacrificing these offerings outside the Tabernacle would be punishable by <i>karet</i>, as this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to offerings consecrated after the Tabernacle was consecrated. Therefore, the verse states: “This shall be to them an eternal statute, throughout their generations” (Leviticus 17:7). One can infer from this verse that this, the punishment for transgressing a positive mitzva and a prohibition, applies to them, but no other punishment applies to them. In any event, the <i>baraita</i> interprets the verse: “And they shall not slaughter their offerings anymore to the <i>se’irim</i>,” as prohibiting sacrificing to God on private altars, not as Rabbi Elazar interpreted it, as prohibiting the worship of an idol in an atypical manner.
  Rava said: One may derive both <i>halakhot</i> from the verse, as the term “And they shall not” can be interpreted as referring to two distinct prohibitions. Read into the verse: “And they shall not slaughter,” which is interpreted as prohibiting offerings to God on private altars. And also read into the verse: “And they shall not slaughter…anymore to the <i>se’irim</i>,” which is interpreted as prohibiting the worship of an idol in an atypical manner.
  MISHNA: If one found money, a garment, or vessels at the head of Mercury, these are permitted. If one found vine branches laden with clusters of grapes, or wreaths made of stalks, or containers of wine, oil, or flour, or any other item the likes of which is sacrificed on the altar there, it is prohibited.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that money, clothing, or vessels found at the head of the idol are not forbidden. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef says that Rabbi Oshaya says: One verse states: “And you have seen their detestable things and their idols, wood and stone, silver and gold, which are with them” (Deuteronomy 29:16). And one verse states: “You shall not covet the silver or the gold that is on them, nor take it for yourself” (Deuteronomy 7:25). How can these texts be reconciled? The second verse mentions the prohibition of only silver and gold, whereas the first verse also mentions wood and stone.
  The Gemara answers: This teaches that the prohibition with regard to those items that are “with them,” i.e., those found next to the idols, is similar to the prohibition with regard to those items that are “on them.” Just as with regard to those items that are on the idols, a decorative item, e.g., gold or silver, is prohibited, but that which is not a decorative item is permitted, so too, with regard to those items that are with the idols, a decorative item is prohibited, and that which is not a decorative item is permitted.
  The Gemara challenges: But one could say to the contrary, that the prohibition with regard to those items that are “on them” is similar to the prohibition with regard to those items that are “with them.” Just as with regard to those items that are with the idols, everything that is found with them is included in the prohibition, as the verse mentions wood and stone, which are not decorative items, so too, with regard to those items that are on the idols, everything that is on them is forbidden. The Gemara explains: If so, the verse should not state the prohibition with regard to items that are on the idols, as it may be inferred <i>a fortiori</i> from the prohibition with regard to items that are found next to them.
  The Gemara challenges: The mishna teaches that money that is found at the head of the idol is permitted. This is difficult, as money is a decorative item. The school of Rabbi Yannai say: The ruling of the mishna is not stated with regard to a case where coins were placed on the idol in order to adorn it. Rather, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a case where the money is inside a purse that is tied onto the idol and suspended from its neck for safekeeping, or left there as payment for the priests.
  The Gemara challenges: The mishna teaches that a garment found at the head of the idol is permitted. This is difficult, as a garment is a decorative item. The school of Rabbi Yannai say: The ruling of the mishna is not stated with regard to a garment that was placed on the idol in order to adorn it. Rather, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a garment that is folded and placed upon the head of the idol. The Gemara challenges: The mishna teaches that vessels found at the head of the idol are permitted. This is difficult, as a vessel is a decorative item. Rav Pappa said: The mishna is referring to where a pot [<i>mashkilta</i>] is placed upside down upon the head of the idol, in which case it does not serve as decoration.
  Rav Asi bar Ḥiyya says: Any item that is found within the inner partitions [<i>hakilkalin</i>] that surround the idol, even water or salt, is prohibited, as it is assumed to be an offering brought in idolatrous worship. With regard to items that are found outside the partitions, a decorative item is prohibited, but that which is not a decorative object is permitted. Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: We have a tradition that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the partitions applies neither to Peor nor to Mercury.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this stated? If we say that this means that with regard to Peor and Mercury even items that are found inside the partitions are treated like those that are found outside the partitions and they are permitted, this is difficult. Now, Peor is worshipped by defecating before it. Even excrement is offered to Peor. Is it possible that its worshippers do not sacrifice water and salt to it? Although water and salt are not generally offered to an idol, in the case of Peor they certainly can be. Rather, Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina means that with regard to Peor and Mercury even items that are found outside the partitions are treated like those that are found inside the partitions, and they are prohibited even if they are not decorative items.
  MISHNA: In the case of an object of idol worship that had a garden or a bathhouse, one may derive benefit from them when it is not to the advantage of the idol worship, i.e., when he does not pay for his use, but one may not derive benefit from them when it is to their advantage, i.e., if one is required to pay for his use. If the garden or bathhouse belonged jointly to the place of idol worship and to others, one may derive benefit from them, both when it is to their advantage and when it is not to their advantage. A gentile’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately, i.e., as soon as it is fashioned for that purpose, but a Jew’s object of idol worship is not prohibited until it is actually worshipped.
  GEMARA: Abaye says: The case where use of the garden or bathhouse is to the financial advantage of the idol worship is referring to a case where it is to the financial advantage of the priests [<i>komarin</i>], who receive payment for the use of the garden or bathhouse. The case where it is not to their financial advantage is referring to a case where it is not to the financial advantage of the priests. This is to the exclusion of a situation where using the facility is only to the financial advantage of the idol’s worshippers, in which case one is permitted to derive benefit from them.
  The Gemara comments: There are those who teach Abaye’s statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: If the garden or bathhouse belonged to the place of idol worship and to others, one may derive benefit from them both when it is to their advantage and when it is not to their advantage. Abaye says: The term: When it is to their advantage, is referring to a case where it is to the financial advantage of the other owners, while the term: When it is not to their advantage, is referring to a case where it is not to the financial advantage of the priests. But if the use of the place is to the financial advantage of the priests, one may not derive benefit from the place.
  The Gemara notes: According to the one who teaches Abaye’s statement with regard to the case presented in the latter clause of the mishna, where the garden or bathhouse is only partially owned by the place of idol worship, all the more so does this statement apply to the case presented in the first clause of the mishna, where the garden or bathhouse is owned exclusively by the place of idol worship. But according to the one who teaches Abaye’s statement with regard to the case presented in the first clause, Abaye’s statement applies only to that case. But with regard to the case presented in the latter clause, since there are others who own the place together with the place of idol worship, even if the use of the garden or bathhouse is to the financial advantage of the priests it is permitted.
  § The mishna teaches: A gentile’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately, i.e., as soon as it is fashioned for that purpose. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “You shall destroy all the places, where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every leafy tree” (Deuteronomy 12:2). The verse is speaking of vessels that were used by the gentiles for idol worship.
  One might have thought that the vessels are prohibited even if the gentiles fashioned them but did not complete them, completed them but did not bring them to the idol, or brought them to the idol but did not use them for idolatrous worship. Might one have thought that in these cases the vessels are prohibited? The verse states: “Where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods” (Deuteronomy 12:2). This indicates that the vessels are not prohibited until they are used for worship. It is from here that the Sages stated: A gentile’s object of idol worship is not prohibited until it is worshipped, but a Jew’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rabbi Akiva says: The matters are reversed. A gentile’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately, but a Jew’s object of idol worship is not forbidden until it is worshipped. The mishna is therefore in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
  The Master said above: The verse is speaking of vessels that were used by the gentiles for idol worship. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written “You shall destroy all the places” (Deuteronomy 12:2), indicating that the verse is not referring to vessels? The Gemara answers: If the <i>halakha</i> stated in this verse is not applicable for the matter of places that were worshipped, it must apply to another matter. The verse cannot apply to the places themselves, as they are not rendered prohibited, as it is written: “You shall destroy…their gods, upon the high mountains” (Deuteronomy 12:2), indicating that one is not required to destroy the mountains that are themselves their gods. Something that is attached to the ground is not rendered forbidden, and therefore even if idol worshippers worshipped the mountain itself it does not need to be destroyed.
  
  Daf 52a
  
  Since the verse does not apply to places that were themselves worshipped, apply it to the matter of vessels that were used for idol worship. It is from here that the Sages stated: A gentile’s object of idol worship is not prohibited until it is worshipped, but a Jew’s object of idol worship is forbidden immediately.
  The Gemara questions how the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an object of idol worship is derived from this verse. But didn’t we interpret this verse as being stated with regard to vessels used in idolatrous worship, and not to an object of idol worship? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “You shall destroy all the places, where the nations that you are to dispossess served their gods” (Deuteronomy 12:2). The verse juxtaposes “their gods” to “the places,” i.e., the vessels used to serve them. Just as the vessels are not forbidden until they are used for worship, so too their gods, the idols, are also not forbidden until they are worshipped. And Rabbi Akiva, who does not consider the terms juxtaposed, he could say to you that the word “<i>et</i>,” written in the verse before the term “their gods,” separates the matter of their gods from the matter of the vessels.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a gentile’s object of idol worship is not prohibited until it is worshipped. From where does he derive that a Jew’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning. From the fact that a gentile’s idol is not forbidden until it is worshipped, it stands to reason that a Jew’s idol is prohibited immediately. The Gemara asks: Why not say that a Jew’s idol is not forbidden at all? The Gemara answers: Now, the status of a Jew’s idol cannot be revoked and the idol requires interment. Is it possible that it does not become prohibited?
  The Gemara challenges: But one could say that a Jew’s idol is forbidden only once it is worshipped, just as a gentile’s idol is forbidden only once it is worshipped. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And I took your sin, the calf that you had made, and I burned it with fire” (Deuteronomy 9:21), which indicates that from the time of its making its worshippers were liable for the sin.
  The Gemara asks: Why not say that this matter applies only with regard to rendering the man who made the idol liable for the sin, but the object of idol worship does not become prohibited until it is worshipped? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “Cursed be the man who shall make a graven or molten image, an abomination to the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and shall set it up in a hidden place” (Deuteronomy 27:15), which indicates that from the time of its making the person who made the idol is liable to be cursed.
  The Gemara asks: Why not say that this matter applies only with regard to rendering the man who made the idol liable to be cursed, but the object of idol worship does not become prohibited until it is worshipped? The Gemara answers: It is written: “An abomination to the Lord” (Deuteronomy 27:15). This indicates that the idol itself is an abomination and is therefore prohibited from the time that it is made.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who does not maintain that a Jew’s idol is forbidden from the time that it is made, how does he interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva explains that the term “an abomination” means an object that leads to abomination but itself is not considered an abomination before it is worshipped.
  The Gemara explains the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: And as for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive that a gentile’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately? Ulla said: The verse states: “The graven images of their gods you shall burn with fire; you shall not covet the silver or the gold that is on them and take it for yourself, lest you be snared thereby, for it is an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 7:25). The term “graven images” indicates that from the time that the gentile engraves and carves the stone into an idol it becomes a god and is forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yishmael, how does he interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael requires that verse for that which Rav Yosef teaches in a <i>baraita</i>, as Rav Yosef teaches: From where is it derived that a gentile may revoke [<i>sheposel</i>] the status of an object as his god? This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “The graven images of [<i>pesilei</i>] their gods you shall burn with fire” (Deuteronomy 7:25).
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva derives it from the interpretation of Shmuel, as Shmuel raises a contradiction: It is written: “The graven images of [<i>pesilei</i>] their gods you shall burn with fire; you shall not covet the silver or the gold that is on them” (Deuteronomy 7:25), and in the continuation of the verse it is written: “And take it for yourself,” indicating that one is permitted to take the silver and gold. How can these texts be reconciled? If the gentile engraved and carved the stone as a god, it is immediately rendered forbidden and the prohibition “you shall not covet” applies. If the gentile revoked [<i>pesalo</i>] the idol’s status as a god, the continuation of the verse: “And take it for yourself,” applies.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that a gentile’s object of idol worship is prohibited immediately. From where do we derive that a Jew’s object of idol worship is not forbidden until it is worshipped? Rav Yehuda said that the verse states: “Cursed be the man who shall make a graven or molten image…and shall set it up in a hidden place” (Deuteronomy 27:15). This indicates that the idol is not rendered forbidden until the idolater performs in service of the idol those matters, i.e., rites, that are performed in a hidden place.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yishmael, how does he interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael requires that verse for that which Rabbi Yitzḥak says, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a Jew’s object of idol worship requires interment? This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And shall set it up in a hidden place” (Deuteronomy 27:15), which Rabbi Yitzḥak interprets as requiring one to inter the idol in a hidden place.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva derives it from that which Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says, as Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: From where is it derived that a Jew’s object of idol worship requires interment? This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall not plant for yourself an <i>ashera</i> of any kind of tree beside the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 16:21). The verse juxtaposes an <i>ashera</i>, a tree used as part of idolatrous rites, to the altar. This indicates that just as the altar requires interment, so too an <i>ashera</i> requires interment.
  The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yishmael, how does he interpret this verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael requires that verse for that which Reish Lakish says, as Reish Lakish says: Anyone who appoints over the community a judge who is unfit for the position, due to his lack of knowledge or wickedness, is considered as though he plants an <i>ashera</i> among the Jewish people, as it is stated: “Judges and officers you shall make for yourself in all of your gates” (Deuteronomy 16:18), and juxtaposed to it is the verse: “You shall not plant for yourself an <i>ashera</i> of any kind of tree beside the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 16:21).
  Rav Ashi says: And if one appoints an unsuitable individual as a judge in a place where there are Torah scholars, it is as though he planted an <i>ashera</i> next to the altar, as it is stated: “Beside the altar of the Lord your God.”
  § Rav Hamnuna raises a dilemma: If one welded [<i>ritekh</i>] a broken vessel for idol worship, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara asks: With regard to whose idol worship does Rav Hamnuna raise the dilemma? If we say that Rav Hamnuna is referring to a gentile’s idol worship, that is difficult, as both according to Rabbi Yishmael and according to Rabbi Akiva vessels used in idolatrous worship are considered accessories of idol worship, and accessories of idol worship are not prohibited until they are used for worship. Rather, Rav Hamnuna is referring to a Jews’ idol worship.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion does Rav Hamnuna raise the dilemma? If we say that he raises the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, this is difficult. Now that the idol itself is not prohibited until it is worshipped, is it necessary to state that its accessories are not forbidden until they are used for idol worship? Rather, perhaps Rav Hamnuna raises the dilemma in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that a Jew’s idol is prohibited immediately.
  The Gemara suggest an explanation of the dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a Jew’s accessories of idol worship? Do we learn the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a Jew’s accessories from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a gentile’s accessories? Just as there, in the case of a gentile’s accessories of idol worship, they are not forbidden until they are used for idol worship, so too here, in the case of a Jew’s accessories of idol worship, they are not forbidden until they are used for idol worship. Or perhaps the <i>halakha</i> is learned from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a Jew’s object of idol worship itself. Just as the idol itself is prohibited immediately, so too its accessories are prohibited immediately.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: If that is the explanation of Rav Hamnuna’s dilemma, why does he specifically raise the dilemma with regard to one who welded a broken vessel? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to one who fashioned a vessel for idolatrous worship.
  The Gemara answers: Rav Hamnuna is referring to a vessel that was used for idol worship before it broke, and he is raising the dilemma with regard to the matter of previous ritual impurity. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 11:1): With regard to metal vessels, both their flat vessels, which have no repositories, and their receptacles, vessels that have repositories, are all impure if they came into contact with a primary source of ritual impurity. If they broke, they thereby became purified. But if one remade the broken vessels into new vessels, they reassume their previous impurity.
  And this is the dilemma that Rav Hamnuna is raising: When the mishna teaches that a vessel that is remade reassumes its impurity, does this matter apply only to impurity by Torah law, but in the case of impurity by rabbinic law, such as the impurity of an object of idol worship, it does not apply? Or perhaps there is no difference between impurity by Torah law and impurity by rabbinic law. The Gemara asks: If that is the explanation of Rav Hamnuna’s dilemma, why does he specifically discuss a vessel used for idol worship? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to any other type of impurity by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara answers: Rav Hamnuna is raising two dilemmas, one of which stems from the other. Is impurity by rabbinic law reassumed, or is it not reassumed? And if you say that it is not reassumed, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the impurity of an object of idol worship? Did the Sages render its status like that of impurity by Torah law, due to the stringency of idol worship, or not? The Gemara concludes: The dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma to Rabbi Yannai: With regard to an offering consisting of food brought in idolatrous worship, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the revocation of their status as an object of idol worship by a gentile effective to purify them from the ritual impurity of an offering brought in idolatrous worship or is it not effective?
  The Gemara suggests: And let him raise the dilemma with regard to whether revocation of vessels’ status purifies vessels used in idol worship from their impurity. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise the dilemma with regard to vessels, since they have the ability to attain purity by being immersed in a ritual bath, and therefore their impurity can certainly also be nullified. When he raises the dilemma, it is only with regard to food, which cannot be purified in a ritual bath.
  The Gemara suggests: Let him raise the dilemma with regard to whether revoking its status purifies the object of idol worship itself in a case where it consists of food. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan does not raise the dilemma with regard to the object of idol worship itself,
  
  Daf 52b
  
  as, since its prohibition is nullified, its impurity is also nullified. When he raises the dilemma, it is only with regard to an offering consisting of food brought in idolatrous worship. What is the <i>halakha</i>? Does one say that since its prohibition is not nullified, in accordance with the statement of Rav Giddel, who teaches that the prohibition that takes effect with regard to offerings brought in idolatrous worship is never nullified, therefore the impurity is also not nullified? Or perhaps only their prohibition, which is by Torah law, is not nullified, but their impurity, which is by rabbinic law, is nullified. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: With regard to vessels that were used in the temple of Onias, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to using them in the Temple?
  And he raised this dilemma according to the opinion of the one who says that the temple of Onias was not a temple of idol worship. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Menaḥot</i> 109a): Priests who served in the temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple that is in Jerusalem, and needless to say, those priests who served in a temple of something else, i.e., idol worship, may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem. This distinction indicates that the temple of Onias was not a temple of idol worship. It was used for the service of God, but it violated the prohibition against sacrificing offerings outside of the Temple in Jerusalem.
  The Gemara explains the dilemma: Does one say that it is only the priests that the Sages penalized by preventing them from serving in the Temple, as they possess awareness and are responsible for their actions, but they did not institute a similar decree with regard to vessels, as they are inanimate? Or perhaps there is no difference, and the decree also applies to the vessels.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul: The vessels that were used in the temple of Onias are prohibited, and we possessed knowledge of a verse from which this <i>halakha</i> was derived, but we forgot which verse it is.
  Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul raised an objection to this ruling from a verse referring to vessels of the Temple that Ahaz had used for idol worship: “All the vessels, which King Ahaz in his reign did cast away when he acted treacherously, we have prepared and sanctified, and, behold, they are before the altar of the Lord” (II Chronicles 29:19). What, is it not the case that the term “we have prepared” means that we immersed them in a ritual bath, and the term “sanctified” means that we sanctified them to be used again in the Temple? This would indicate that the vessels may be used in the Temple even though they were used in idolatrous worship.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Yosei ben Shaul: Blessed are you to Heaven, as you have returned my lost verse to me. That verse is the forgotten source of the <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated, and it should be interpreted as follows: “We have prepared” means that we interred them; “and sanctified” means that we sanctified other vessels in their stead, as the vessels used by Ahaz were forbidden, and the same applies to the vessels from the temple of Onias.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna supports Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion (<i>Middot</i> 1:6): The northeast chamber of the Chamber of the Hearth was the chamber in which the Hasmoneans sequestered the altar stones that the people of Greece desecrated. And Rav Sheshet says: This means that they desecrated the stones by using them for idol worship. This indicates that Temple vessels that were used in idolatrous worship can no longer be used and must be sequestered.
  Rav Pappa said: That case of the altar’s stones is different, because there a Sage found a verse and interpreted it homiletically, as it is written: “And they shall profane My secret place, and robbers shall enter into it and profane it” (Ezekiel 7:22). The verse indicates that when the gentiles entered the Temple and desecrated it, the altar was desacralized and acquired non-sacred status. Consequently, when the stones were subsequently used for idolatrous worship they were rendered forbidden even for non-sacred use.
  The Gemara explains why the altar’s stones were sequestered: The Hasmoneans said: What should we do to revoke the stone’s forbidden status? Shall we break them? That is not possible, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “You shall build the altar of the Lord your God of unhewn stones” (Deuteronomy 27:6). Shall we saw them without breaking them? That is also not a viable option, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “You shall lift up no iron tool upon them” (Deuteronomy 27:5). There was therefore no alternative to sequestering the stones.
  The Gemara asks: But why did the Hasmoneans have no alternative? Let them break the stones and take them for themselves. Didn’t Rav Oshaya say: The Sages wished to sequester all of the silver and gold in the world because of the silver and gold of Jerusalem, most of which was consecrated to the Temple treasury and became mixed with other silver and gold. And we discussed it and asked: Is Jerusalem the majority of the world that all of the silver and gold of the world should be forbidden as perhaps it came from Jerusalem?
  Rather, Abaye said: The Sages wished to sequester all of the worn-out dinars of Hadrian and Trajan because of the coins of Jerusalem, as it was known that these coins contained a large quantity of the Temple treasury’s gold and silver. They did not permit the use of these coins until they found a verse in the Torah indicating that it is permitted: “And robbers shall enter into it, and profane it” (Ezekiel 7:22).
  The Gemara answers: The two cases are not comparable. There, the coins of Jerusalem had not been used in service of the Most High; they were only consecrated. Here, since the stones of the altar had been used in service of the Most High, it is not proper conduct for an ordinary person to make use of them, and therefore the Hasmoneans sequestered the stones.
  MISHNA: A gentile can revoke the status of his object of idol worship and the status of the idol of another gentile, but a Jew cannot revoke the status of the object of idol worship of a gentile. One who revokes the status of an object of idol worship thereby revokes the status of its accessories. But if he revokes the status of its accessories, its accessories alone are rendered permitted, but the object of idol worship itself remains prohibited.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the following version of the mishna: A gentile can revoke the status of his object of idol worship and the status of the idol of another gentile. Rabbi Shimon said to him: My teacher, in your youth, i.e., when you were younger, you taught us a different version of the mishna: A gentile can revoke the status of his object of idol worship and the status of the object of idol worship of a Jew. The Gemara asks: Can the status of a Jew’s idol be revoked? But isn’t it written: “And shall set it up in a hidden place” (Deuteronomy 27:15), from which the Sages derived that a Jew’s idol requires interment? Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Volas, said: No, this <i>halakha</i> is necessary in a case where the gentile has partnership in the idol, and therefore it is possible to say that its status can be revoked.
  The Gemara asks: What did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi hold in his youth, and what did he hold in his old age? The Gemara answers: In his youth he held that the Jew worships the idol based on the intention of the gentile. Once the gentile revokes the status of his share in the idol, the status of the share of the Jew is also revoked. But in his old age Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that the Jew worships the idol based on his own intentions. Therefore, when the gentile revokes the status of the object of idol worship, he revokes the status of only his own share, but the status of the share of the Jew is not revoked.
  There are those who teach Rabbi Hillel’s statement with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: A Jew cannot revoke the status of the object of idol worship of a gentile. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Said Rabbi Hillel, son
  
  Daf 53a
  
  of Rabbi Volas: No, this <i>halakha</i> is necessary in a case where the gentile has partnership in the idol, and it teaches us that it is only a Jew who cannot revoke the status of a gentile’s object of idol worship. But a gentile can revoke the status of his own object of idol worship.
  There are those who teach Rabbi Hillel’s statement with regard to a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: The status of a Jew’s object of idol worship can never be revoked. What is the reason for the additional emphasis of the term never? Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Volas, says: The emphasis is necessary only for a case where the gentile has partnership in the idol, and it teaches us that the Jew worships the idol based on his own intentions, and therefore although the gentile revokes the status of his share, the Jew’s share remains forbidden.
  MISHNA: How does a gentile revoke the status of an object of idol worship? If he cut off the tip of its ear, or the tip of its nose, or its fingertip; or if he crushed it, even though he did not remove any part of it, in all these cases he thereby revoked its status as an object of idol worship. If he spat before the idol, urinated before it, dragged it on the ground, or threw excrement at it, the status of this idol is not revoked, as this is only a temporary display of scorn, and afterward the gentile might continue to worship the idol. If the gentile sold it or mortgaged it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He thereby revoked its status. And the Rabbis say that he did not revoke its status.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if the gentile crushed the idol without removing any part of it, the status of the idol is revoked. The Gemara asks: In a case where he did not remove any part of it, by what action did he revoke its status? Rav Zeira says: The mishna is referring to a case where he crushed its face with a hammer, destroying its form, even though none of its stone was removed.
  § The mishna teaches: If he spat before the idol or urinated before it, the status of this idol is not revoked, as this is only a temporary display of scorn. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived?
  Ḥizkiyya says: This is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And it shall come to pass that, when he shall be hungry, he shall fret, and curse his king and his god, and turn his face upward” (Isaiah 8:21). And it is written after this verse: “And he shall look to the earth, and behold distress and darkness, the gloom of anguish, and outspread thick darkness” (Isaiah 8:22). This indicates that even though he cursed his king and his idolatrous god, and he turned his face upward to God, nevertheless, he subsequently looks to the earth and beholds distress and darkness, since he returns to his idol worship.
  § The mishna teaches: If the gentile sold it or mortgaged it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He thereby revoked its status. And the Rabbis say that he did not revoke its status. The Gemara cites a dispute between that which Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and that which Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says. One says: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis applies only when the gentile sold his idol to a gentile smith. But when he sold it to a Jewish smith everyone agrees that by selling the idol the gentile revoked its status, as he knows that the Jewish smith will certainly melt it down. And one says: The dispute applies to the case where he sold the idol to a Jewish smith.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the second opinion, does the dispute apply only to the case where he sold the idol to a Jewish smith; but if he sold it to a gentile smith everyone agrees that he did not revoke its status by selling it? Or perhaps both in this case and in that case there is a dispute.
  The Gemara replies: Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: My statement that by selling the idol the gentile revokes its status appears correct in a case where he sold it for the purpose of destruction, and the statement of my colleagues that its status is not revoked appears correct in a case where he sold it for the purpose of worship.
  The Gemara explains the <i>baraita</i>: What is the meaning of selling the idol for destruction, and what is the meaning of selling it for worship? If we say that selling it for destruction means literally that he knew that it was being bought for the purpose of destruction, and that selling it for worship means literally that it was bought for the purpose of worship, this is difficult. What is the reasoning of the one who says that the gentile revoked the idol’s status even though he knew that the buyer intended to worship it, and what is the reasoning of the one who says that he did not revoke its status even though he knew that the buyer intended to destroy it?
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where the buyer’s intentions were not known with certainty? And accordingly, selling the idol for destruction means selling it to one who will presumably destroy it in the future. And who is that buyer? This is referring to a Jewish smith. Similarly, selling the idol for worship means selling it to one who will presumably worship it in the future. And who is that buyer? This is referring to a gentile smith. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states that his opinion appears correct in the case of a Jewish smith and the opinion of his colleagues appears correct in the case of a gentile smith, one may conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that there is a dispute both in this case and in that case.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: My statement that the idol’s status is revoked appears to my colleagues correct in a case where he sold it for the purpose of destruction. And who is it who buys the idol with the intent of destroying it? This is referring to a Jewish smith. This is because even my colleagues disagreed with me only in a case where he sold it for the purpose of worship; but when he sold it to a Jewish smith for the purpose of destruction, they concede to my opinion.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who buys broken vessels made from gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile he may not return it. Since the idol’s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea.
  The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, if you say that in the case of a gentile who sells an object of idol worship to a Jewish smith there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis, the <i>baraita</i> is not difficult. In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that when a gentile sells an idol to a Jewish smith he does not thereby revoke its status. But if you say that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis applies only when the idol is sold to a gentile smith, but in the case of a Jewish smith everyone agrees that the gentile revoked the idol’s status, then in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>?
  The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the gentile sold the metal with the understanding that he was selling broken vessels, and he did not sell the metal with the understanding that he was selling an object of idol worship. He therefore had no intention of revoking its status.
  § The Sages taught: If a gentile borrowed money against an object of idol worship, using it as collateral, or with regard to another case where a rockslide fell on it, or a case where robbers stole it, or a case where the owners abandoned it and went overseas, the following <i>halakha</i> applies:
  
  Daf 53b
  
  In any of these cases, if the owners will return in the future, as was the case in the war of Joshua when he conquered Eretz Yisrael, then the status of the object of idol worship is not revoked.
  The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to state all of these cases. As, had the <i>baraita</i> taught only the case where the gentile borrowed money against the object of idol worship, one would say that in that case the gentile did not revoke its status, as he did not sell it, and he did not indicate that he intended to relinquish it. But in the case where a rockslide fell on it, since he did not clear the rocks, say that he revoked the status of the object of idol worship. It is therefore necessary to teach this case as well.
  And had the <i>baraita</i> taught only the case where a rockslide fell on the idol, one would say that in that case its status is not revoked because the owner thinks to himself: The idol lies under the rocks safely; whenever I want it, I shall take it, and he feels no need to clear the rockslide immediately. But in the case where robbers stole it, since he is not searching after it, this indicates that he revoked its status. It is therefore necessary to teach this case as well.
  And had the <i>baraita</i> taught only the case where robbers stole the idol, one would say that in that case its status is not revoked because the owner thinks to himself: If a gentile took it, he will worship it. If a Jew took it, since it is of great monetary value, he will sell it to a gentile and the buyer will worship it. There is therefore no indication that the gentile intends to revoke its status. But in the case where the owners abandoned the idol and went overseas, since they did not take it with them, this indicates that they revoked its status. It is therefore necessary to teach this case as well.
  The <i>baraita</i> states: If the owners will return in the future, as was the case in the war of Joshua when he conquered Eretz Yisrael, then the status of the object of idol worship is not revoked. The Gemara asks: Is it so, that after the war of Joshua the gentiles returned home? They were defeated and killed and did not return home. The Gemara explains: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the owners will return in the future, the idol has the same status as did the idols of the gentiles killed in the war of Joshua, who intended to return and did not revoke the status of their idols, and therefore its status is not revoked.
  The Gemara asks: And why should I associate this <i>halakha</i> with the war of Joshua? The Gemara answers: It teaches us a matter in passing, that the <i>halakhot</i> of idol worship may be derived from the war of Joshua, as may be illustrated by that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In the case of a Jew who set a brick upright in order to bow to it but did not actually bow to it, and a gentile then came and bowed to it, the gentile rendered it prohibited even though it was not his brick.
  The Gemara explains: From where do we derive that he rendered it prohibited? Rabbi Elazar says: This <i>halakha</i> is like the <i>halakha</i> that applied at the outset of the Jewish people’s conquest of Eretz Yisrael, when the Torah commanded them to destroy any trees that were used as part of idolatrous rites [<i>asherim</i>], as the Merciful One states: “And you shall break down their altars…and you shall burn their <i>asherim</i> with fire” (Deuteronomy 12:3). Now, Eretz Yisrael is the inheritance of the Jewish people from their ancestors, and a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his. If so, how could the gentiles render the trees forbidden, as the land was not theirs?
  If the trees were forbidden because some of them might have been those trees that were worshipped initially, before God gave the land to Abraham, it would not have been necessary to destroy them. Rather, the Jews could have forced the gentiles to revoke their status, and since the <i>asherim</i> were objects of gentiles’ idol worship, a mere revocation would be sufficient to render them permitted.
  Rather, since the Jewish people worshipped the Golden Calf, they revealed their intentions and indicated that they were amenable to idol worship. And when the gentiles came and engaged in idol worship, they were, in effect, carrying out their agency on behalf of the Jewish people. The <i>asherim</i> were therefore considered objects of Jews’ idol worship, whose status cannot be revoked. So too, in the case of a Jew who set a brick upright in order to bow to it, he thereby revealed his intentions and indicated that he is amenable to idol worship. And when a gentile came and worshipped it, he was carrying out the agency on behalf of the Jew.
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps it is only with regard to the Golden Calf that the Jewish people were amenable to worshipping it, but not with regard to any other type of idol worship. The Gemara counters: The verse states with regard to the Golden Calf: “And they said: These are your gods, O Israel” (Exodus 32:4), in the plural. This teaches that they desired many gods, and they did not desire to worship only the Golden Calf.
  The Gemara suggests: Say that whatever <i>asherim</i> were worshipped by the gentiles simultaneously with the Jewish people’s worship of the Golden Calf should be prohibited, because at that time they acted as agents of the Jewish people. But any <i>ashera</i> that was worshipped from that point forward, after the Jewish people repented and no longer engaged in idol worship, should be permitted. The Gemara answers: Who can prove when each <i>ashera</i> was worshipped? Since it is impossible to determine which <i>asherim</i> were worshipped at the time of the Golden Calf, they are all forbidden.
  MISHNA: With regard to an object of idol worship that was abandoned by its worshippers, if it was abandoned in peacetime, it is permitted, as it was evidently abandoned by choice and this constitutes an implicit revocation of its status as an object of idol worship. If it was abandoned in wartime, it is prohibited, as it was not abandoned by choice. With regard to the stone platforms of kings upon which idols are placed in honor of the kings, these are permitted, due to the fact that the idol is placed on these platforms only at the time that the kings pass by.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: The temple of Nimrod, i.e., the remnants of the tower of Babel (see Genesis 11:1–9), is considered a place of idol worship whose worshippers abandoned it in peacetime, and it is therefore permitted. This is despite the fact that when the Merciful One scattered the builders of the tower, the situation resembled wartime, as they were compelled to leave. Nevertheless, if they had desired to return, they could have returned. Since they did not return, they evidently chose to abandon the place of idol worship and thereby revoked its status.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the stone platforms of kings, these are permitted, due to the fact that the idol is placed on these platforms only at the time that the kings pass by. The Gemara asks: But should the platforms be permitted because idols are placed on them at the time that the kings pass by?
  Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is what the mishna is saying: The platforms are permitted because the idol is placed on them at the time that the kings pass by, and sometimes the kings abandon this path where the platform has been placed and choose to walk on a different path. Since the kings do not impart any importance to the platforms, they are not considered accessories of idol worship.
  § When Ulla came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he sat on a damaged platform of idol worship. Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But don’t Rav and Shmuel both say: A platform that was damaged remains prohibited? And even according to the one who says that idol worshippers do not worship fragments of idols, that statement applies only to an object of idol worship, as it is a degrading matter to a person to worship fragments. But in this case, with regard to the platform, it does not matter to him if it is damaged, as it is still fit for use.
  Ulla said to Rav Yehuda: Who shall give us of the dust of the graves covering Rav and Shmuel? We would fill our eyes with that dust, as they were great and holy men. Nevertheless, with regard to the <i>halakha</i> in this case, don’t Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: A platform that was damaged is permitted? And even according to the one who says that idol worshippers worship fragments of idols, that statement applies only to an object of idol worship, due to the fact that since he already worshipped it, it is a degrading matter to him to revoke its status. But in the case of these platforms, idol worshippers take this platform and throw it away and bring another platform that is not defective to replace it.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish: A platform that was damaged is permitted. Conversely, an altar of idol worship that was damaged remains prohibited until most of it is destroyed. What is considered a platform, and what is considered an altar? Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A platform consists of one stone; an altar consists of many stones.
  
  Daf 54a
  
  Ḥizkiyya said: What is the verse from which this <i>halakha</i> is derived? It is derived from the verse: “By this shall the iniquity of Jacob be expiated…when he makes all the stones of the altar as limestones [<i>ke’avnei gir</i>] that are beaten into pieces, so that the <i>asherim</i> and the sun images shall rise no more” (Isaiah 27:9). This indicates that if the description “as limestones that are beaten into pieces” is fulfilled, then the statement “The sun images shall rise no more” also applies, and their status is revoked. If it is not fulfilled, then they shall rise, meaning that their status is not revoked.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to an item, e.g., an animal, that was worshipped by a certain person, if it is his item it is prohibited, but if it is another’s, it is permitted. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: What is considered an animal that was worshipped and is disqualified from being sacrificed in the Temple? It is any animal that is worshipped, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether under duress or willingly. What are the circumstances of this case of an animal worshipped under duress? Isn’t it referring to a case where one forcibly took another’s animal and bowed to it, indicating that one who worships the animal of another renders it forbidden?
  Rami bar Ḥama says: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where gentiles coerced someone and he bowed to his own animal. Rabbi Zeira objects to this: The Merciful One exempts a victim of circumstances beyond his control from punishment, as it is written with regard to a betrothed young woman who is raped: “But to the maiden you shall do nothing, the maiden has no sin worthy of death, for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so is this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26).
  Rather, Rava says: All cases of idol worship were included in the prohibition: “You shall not bow down to them, nor shall you serve them” (Exodus 20:5), including the case of worship under duress. When the verse specified to you: “You shall keep My statutes…which a man shall do and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), and not that he should die by them, the verse excluded the case of duress. One would conclude from the verse that one who acts under duress is not considered an idol worshipper, and he is not required to sacrifice his life to refrain from worshipping idols.
  The Merciful One then wrote: “And you shall not profane My holy name” (Leviticus 22:32), indicating that the prohibition against idol worship applies even in a case of duress, as this constitutes a desecration of God’s name. How can these texts be reconciled? This verse is referring to worshipping under duress in private, and that verse is referring to worshipping under duress in public. In private one is not required to sacrifice his life in order to refrain from idol worship. In public one is required to sacrifice his life rather than engage in idol worship. Therefore, if one engaged in idol worship in public, even under duress, the object of idol worship is forbidden.
  The Rabbis said to Rava: That which is taught in a <i>baraita</i> supports your opinion. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The following <i>halakha</i> applies with regard to platforms of gentiles that were used for idol worship in a time of religious persecution, when gentiles decreed that Jews must engage in idol worship. During a time of religious persecution, one is required to sacrifice his life rather than transgress the prohibition against engaging in idolatrous worship even in private. Therefore, even though the religious persecution was canceled, the status of those platforms is not revoked and they remain forbidden, despite the fact that the idol worship was performed under duress.
  Rava said to the Rabbis: If one wishes to support my opinion due to that <i>baraita</i>, you cannot support my opinion, as one can say that perhaps there was an apostate Jew there and he worshipped the idol willingly, and therefore the platforms are forbidden. Rav Ashi says: Do not say that one can say it is a possibility; rather, it is certain that there was an apostate Jew there and he worshipped it willingly.
  Ḥizkiyya says: The contradiction between the <i>baraitot</i> with regard to an animal that was worshipped can be reconciled differently. The <i>baraita</i> that indicates that one who worships the animal of another renders it forbidden is referring to a case where in idolatrous worship one poured a libation of wine on the horns of an animal belonging to another. Since a sacrificial rite was performed upon the animal itself, it is forbidden. Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this: Is this a case of an animal that was worshipped? This animal is a mere platform, i.e., it serves merely as an altar, and it is permitted.
  Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava says: That <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he poured a libation of wine in worship of the animal between its horns. In this case one renders another’s animal forbidden, as he performed a sacrificial rite upon the animal itself. And this is similar to that which Ulla stated, as Ulla came from Eretz Yisrael and said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even though the Sages said that one who bows to the animal of another person does not render it prohibited, if he performed a sacrificial rite upon it he rendered it prohibited.
  Rav Naḥman said to the Rabbis: Go out and say to Ulla: This is not a novel concept, as Rav Huna already interpreted the <i>halakha</i> that you stated in Babylonia. This is as Rav Huna says: In a case where the animal of another person was lying down before an object of idol worship, once one cut one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., either the windpipe or the gullet [<i>siman</i>], he rendered it prohibited, as he performed a sacrificial rite upon the animal.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that he rendered it prohibited? If we say that it is derived from the <i>halakha</i> that priests who engaged in idol worship are disqualified from serving in the Temple, even if they did so under duress, perhaps the case of priests is different, as they possess awareness and are responsible for their actions.
  But rather, perhaps it is derived from the stones of the altar that were rendered forbidden by the Greeks, even though the stones were not theirs. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: But perhaps the reason the stones of the altar were prohibited is different, as explained by the statement of Rav Pappa (52b), that when the Greeks entered the Temple it was defiled and became theirs. One therefore cannot derive from that case that one can render the property of another person forbidden.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  But rather, it is derived from the case of vessels of the Temple that Ahaz used for idol worship, as it is written: “And all the vessels, which King Ahaz in his reign did cast away when he acted treacherously, we have prepared and sanctified, and behold, they are before the altar of the Lord” (II Chronicles 29:19). And the Master said: “We have prepared” means that we interred them; “and sanctified” means that we sanctified other vessels in their stead, as the original vessels were prohibited. But how could Ahaz render the vessels of the Temple forbidden, as a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his?
  Rather, since Ahaz performed a sacrificial rite upon them in idolatrous worship, the vessels were prohibited. Here too, when one performed a sacrificial rite upon the animal of another person by slaughtering it in idolatrous worship, he rendered it prohibited.
  § When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even though the Sages said that one who bows to the ground does not render it prohibited, if one dug pits, ditches, and caves in it, he rendered it prohibited. When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even though the Sages said that one who bows to animals does not render them prohibited, if one rendered them an item of exchange for an object of idol worship, exchanging the animal for an object of idol worship, he rendered them prohibited.
  When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the <i>halakha</i> concerning an item exchanged for an object of idol worship. One says that the item of the exchange is prohibited, but if one then acquired another item in exchange for the item of that exchange, the exchange of the exchange is permitted. And one says that even the exchange of the exchange is also prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason of the one who says that the exchange of the exchange is prohibited? The verse states: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, that you should become accursed like it; you shall utterly detest it…for it is accursed” (Deuteronomy 7:26). Not only do you become accursed, but anything that you cause to become yours from the exchange of an object of idol worship is accursed like it, i.e., is forbidden like the object of idol worship itself. And as for the other <i>tanna</i>, from where does he derive that the exchange of the exchange is permitted? The verse states: “For it is accursed.” Infer from this that “it,” the object of idol worship, is forbidden, but not the exchange of the exchange.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the other <i>tanna</i>, how does he inter-pret the term “it”? The Gemara answers: He requires that term to exclude an item acquired in exchange for <i>orla</i> or for diverse kinds of crops that grew in a vineyard. The verse indicates that if one sold <i>orla</i> or diverse kinds that grew in a vineyard and betrothed a woman with the money from the sale, she is betrothed.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does the other <i>tanna</i> derive this <i>halakha</i>? He holds that <i>orla</i> and diverse kinds that grew in a vineyard do not require an exclusion. This is because idol worship and the Sabbatical Year are two verses that come as one, i.e., both teach the same principle, that an item acquired in exchange for a forbidden item is forbidden, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common <i>halakha</i> to other cases.
  The Gemara explains: The source of this <i>halakha</i> with regard to idol worship is that ruling which we said earlier. With regard to the Sabbatical Year, the source is as it is written: “For it is a Jubilee Year; it shall be sacred for you” (Leviticus 25:12). The verse juxtaposes the Jubilee Year, the produce of which has the same status as produce of the Sabbatical Year, and sacred items. Infer from this that just as when one buys consecrated property it transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and the money is prohibited, so too, the produce of the Sabbatical Year transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and the money is prohibited.
  The Gemara asks: If so, one could say that just as consecrated property transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and is transferred to non-sacred status, so too, the produce of the Sabbatical Year transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed and is transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be sacred for you,” indicating that the produce shall always be as it is, and it is not desacralized.
  The Gemara explains: How so? If one purchased meat with produce of the Sabbatical Year, both these and those, i.e., the meat and the produce, are eradicated in the Sabbatical Year. The sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect with regard to the meat as well. It is treated like the produce, and it must be disposed of when the obligation to eradicate the produce of the Sabbatical Year goes into effect. If he then purchases fish with this meat, the meat loses its consecrated status, and the fish assume the consecrated state. If he then purchases wine with these fish, the fish lose their consecrated status and the wine assumes the consecrated state. If he then purchases oil with the wine, the wine loses its consecrated status and the oil assumes the consecrated state. How so? The final item purchased has the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year transferred to it, and the Sabbatical-Year produce itself remains forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the other <i>tanna</i>, who maintains that the term “it” excludes an item exchanged for <i>orla</i> or for diverse kinds that grew in a vineyard, how does he respond to this? The Gemara answers: He holds that two verses that come as one, i.e., that teach the same principle, teach their common <i>halakha</i> to other cases, and one could have derived the prohibition from the cases of idol worship and the Sabbatical Year. Therefore, the term “it” was necessary in order to exclude from the prohibition an item exchanged for <i>orla</i> or for diverse kinds that grew in a vineyard.
  MISHNA: The gentiles asked the Jewish Sages who were in Rome: If it is not God’s will that people should engage in idol worship, why does He not elimi-nate it? The Sages said to them: Were people worshipping only objects for which the world has no need, He would eliminate it. But they worship the sun and the moon and the stars and the constellations. Should He destroy His world because of the fools?
  The gentiles said to the Sages: If so, let Him destroy those objects of idol worship for which the world has no need and leave those objects for which the world has a need. The Sages said to them: If that were to happen, we would thereby be supporting the worshippers of those objects for which the world has need, as they would say: You should know that these are truly gods, as they were not eliminated from the world, whereas the others were eliminated.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: Certain philosophers [<i>filosofin</i>] asked the Jewish Sages who were in Rome: If it is not your God’s will that people should engage in idol worship, for what reason does He not eliminate it? The Sages said to them: Were people worshipping only objects for which the world has no need, He would eliminate it. But they worship the sun and the moon and the stars and the constellations. Should He destroy the world because of the fools? Rather, the world follows its course, and the fools who sinned will be held to judgment in the future for their transgressions.
  The <i>baraita</i> presents another matter that illustrates the same concept: Consider the case of one who stole a <i>se’a</i> of wheat and went and planted it in the ground. By right it should not grow. But the world goes along and follows its course and the fools who sinned will be held to judgment in the future for their transgressions.
  The <i>baraita</i> presents another matter that illustrates the same concept: Consider the case of one who engaged in intercourse with the wife of another. By right she should not become pregnant. But the world goes along and follows its course and the fools who sinned will be held to judgment in the future for their transgressions.
  The Gemara comments: And this is as Reish Lakish says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Is it not enough for the wicked that they treat My die for a <i>sela</i> coin as if it were ownerless [<i>pumbi</i>], using it without My permission and against My will, as they impregnate women adulterously? But moreover, they also trouble Me and cause Me to sign the result of their actions against My will, as I form the fetus and give it life, even when its creation is the result of prohibited sexual intercourse.
  A certain philosopher asked Rabban Gamliel: It is written in your Torah with regard to the prohibition against idol worship: “For the Lord your God is a devouring fire, a jealous God” (Deuteronomy 4:24). For what reason is He jealous and does He exact vengeance from the idol’s worshippers, but He is not jealous of the idol itself and does not destroy it?
  Rabban Gamliel said to the philosopher: I will relate a parable to you. To what is this matter comparable? It may be compared to a king of flesh and blood who had one son, and that son was raising a dog. And the son gave the dog a name, naming him after his father. When the son would take an oath, he would say: I swear by the life of the dog, my father. When the king heard about this, with whom was the king angry? Is he angry with the son or is he angry with the dog? You must say that he is angry with the son. So too, God is angry with the worshippers who attribute divinity to objects of idol worship and not with the objects of idol worship themselves.
  The philosopher said to Rabban Gamliel: Do you call the idol a dog? But the idol truly exists, i.e., has power. Rabban Gamliel said to the philosopher: And what did you see that caused you to believe that the idols have power? The philosopher said to Rabban Gamliel: A fire once broke out in our city, and the entire city was burned down, but that temple of idol worship was not burned down.
  Rabban Gamliel said to the philosopher I will relate a parable to you. To what is this matter comparable? It may be compared to a king of flesh and blood whose province sinned against him. When he wages war, does he wage war against the living or does he wage war against the dead? You must say that he wages war against the living. God punishes the living worshippers and not the idol, which is not alive.
  The philosopher said to Rabban Gamliel: You call the idol a dog; you call the idol dead. If it is so, let God remove it from the world. Rabban Gamliel said to the philosopher: Were people worshipping only objects for which the world has no need, He would eliminate it. But they worship the sun and the moon, the stars and the constellations, and the streams and the valleys. Should He destroy His world because of fools? And so the verse states:
  
  Daf 55a
  
  “Shall I utterly consume all things from off the face of the earth? says the Lord. Shall I consume man and beast? Shall I consume the fowls of the heavens and the fish of the sea, and the stumbling blocks of the wicked, and shall I cut off man from off the face of the earth? says the Lord” (Zephaniah 1:2–3). Should God remove objects of idol worship from the world due to the fact that the wicked stumble because of them? If so, He would have to destroy all of humanity as well, as do not idol worshippers also worship people? This is expressed in the continuation of the verse: “And shall I cut off man from off the face of the earth? says the Lord.”
  § Agrippas the general asked Rabban Gamliel: It is written in your Torah with regard to idol worship: “For the Lord your God is a devouring fire, a jealous God” (Deuteronomy 4:24). Doesn’t jealousy arise only in the following cases: A wise man might be jealous of another wise man, and a mighty man might be jealous of another mighty man, and a rich man might be jealous of another rich man? If so, why is God jealous of objects of idol worship, which are not gods?
  Rabban Gamliel said to Agrippas: I will relate a parable to you. To what is this matter comparable? It can be compared to a person who married a second wife in addition to his first wife. If the second wife is more distinguished than the first wife, the first wife is not jealous of her, and she does not feel anger toward her husband. But if the second wife is less distinguished than the first wife, she is jealous of her.
  Zunin said to Rabbi Akiva: Both my heart and your heart know that there is no substance to idol worship. Nevertheless, don’t we see people who go with broken limbs to worship idols and come back when they are whole? What is the reason for this?
  Rabbi Akiva said to Zunin: I will relate a parable to you. To what is this matter comparable? It can be compared to a trusted person who was in a certain city, and all the residents of his city would deposit items and money with him, even not in the presence of witnesses. And there was one man who did not trust him, who came and specifically deposited money with him in the presence of witnesses. On one occasion, that person forgot and deposited money with him not in the presence of witnesses. The trusted man’s wife said to him: Come, let us deny that he deposited the money with us, as there are no witnesses. The man said to her: Should we lose our credibility and act deceitfully just because this fool acted improperly and did not require the presence of witnesses?
  So too, with regard to different forms of suffering, at the time when they are sent to afflict the person, an oath is administered to them as follows: Take an oath that you shall not go and afflict the person except on such and such a day. And you shall not leave him except on such and such a day, at such and such an hour, by means of so-and-so, a specific doctor, and by means of such and such a medicine. When the time came for the suffering to leave him, this sick man went to a temple of idol worship. The forms of suffering said: By right we should not leave him. But then they say: Should we lose the fulfillment of our oath just because this fool is acting improperly?
  And this is consistent with that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Then the Lord will make your plagues wonderful, and the plagues of your seed, even great plagues and faithful, and evil and faithful sicknesses” (Deuteronomy 28:59)? The term “evil” does not mean that the agent of sickness is in itself evil. Rather, this is referring to its mission, which is to cause harm. The term “and faithful sicknesses” indicates that the illnesses are faithful to their oath and adhere to the times designated for the affliction.
  Rava bar Rav Yitzḥak said to Rav Yehuda: Isn’t there a temple of idol worship in our locale, where, when the world is in need of rain, the idol appears to them in a dream, and it says to them: Slaughter a man as an offering to me, and I will bring rain. They then slaughter a man for it, and the rain comes.
  Rav Yehuda said to Rava bar Rav Yitzḥak: Now, were I dead I would not have been able to tell you the explanation of this matter. It is therefore good that you reminded me of this matter while I am alive. The explanation is as Rav says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And lest you lift up your eyes to the heavens, and when you see the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the host of heavens, you are drawn away and worship them, and serve them, which the Lord your God has allotted [<i>ḥalak</i>] to all the nations under the whole heaven” (Deuteronomy 4:19). The verse teaches that God allowed the nations to be misled [<i>sheheḥelikan</i>] by matters that seemingly indicate that idol worship is effective in order to expel the nations from the world due to their decision to engage in idol worship.
  And this is consistent with that which Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “If it concerns the scornful, He scorns them, but to the humble He gives grace” (Proverbs 3:34)? One who comes in order to become impure, i.e., to sin, they, in Heaven, provide him with an opening to do so, and he is not prevented from sinning. If one comes in order to become purified, not only is he allowed to do so, but they, in Heaven, assist him.
  MISHNA: One may purchase from a gentile a winepress in which the grapes have been trodden on, despite the fact that the gentile takes grapes in his hand from the winepress and places them on the pile that remains to be trodden on. And the gentile’s touch does not render the juice of the grapes wine used for a libation in idol worship, which is forbidden, until it descends into the collection vat, because until then it does not have the status of wine. Once the wine descended into the collection vat, that which is in the vat is prohibited, and the rest, which did not yet descend into the vat, is permitted.
  One may tread on grapes together with the gentile in the winepress,
  
  Daf 55b
  
  but one may not harvest grapes with him. After the harvest the grapes are brought to the winepress, which is ritually impure. This would render the grapes impure, and it is prohibited to render produce of Eretz Yisrael impure. In the case of a Jew who produces his wine in a state of ritual impurity, one may not tread on grapes nor harvest them with him, as it is prohibited to assist transgressors. But once he has produced his wine, one may take the barrels to the winepress with him, as the wine is already impure. And one may also bring the barrels from the winepress together with him.
  Similarly, in the case of a baker who makes his bread in a state of ritual impurity, one may not knead or arrange the dough in the shape of bread together with him, so as not to assist in a transgression. But one may take the bread with him to the bread merchant [<i>lapalter</i>].
  GEMARA: Rav Huna says: With regard to wine, once it begins to flow toward the exit from the winepress it can become wine used for a libation in idol worship if touched by a gentile. The Gemara asks: But we learned in the mishna: One may purchase from a gentile a winepress in which the grapes have been trodden on, despite the fact that the gentile took grapes in his hand and placed them on the pile of grapes that remained to be trodden on? Presumably the wine began to flow once the grapes were pressed, and yet the mishna states that the wine is not forbidden. Rav Huna said: The mishna is referring to a winepress that is stoppered and full, and therefore the wine does not flow.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: And the gentile’s touch does not render the grape juice wine used for a libation in idol worship until it descends into the collection vat. This indicates that even if the wine flows it does not become wine used for a libation before it descends into the vat. The Gemara answers: Here, too, the mishna is referring to a winepress that is stoppered and full, and the wine does not flow.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: Once the wine descended into the collection vat, that which is in the vat is prohibited, and the rest that did not yet descend into the vat is permitted, even though it already began to flow. Rav Huna said: This is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, the <i>halakha</i> is stated in accordance with the initial version of the mishna. There, in my ruling, the <i>halakha</i> is stated in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Initially, the Sages would say the following <i>halakhot</i> whose mnemonic is <i>bet</i>, <i>dalet</i>, <i>dalet</i>, which stands for harvesting [<i>botzrin</i>], treading [<i>dorkhin</i>], and treading [<i>dorkhin</i>]: One may not harvest grapes with a gentile in order to bring them to the winepress, as this would render the grapes ritually impure and it is prohibited to impart impurity to the non-sacred produce that is in Eretz Yisrael. And one may not tread on grapes together with a Jew who produces wine from his fruit in a state of ritual impurity, as it is prohibited to assist transgressors. But one may tread on grapes in the winepress together with the gentile. The Gemara comments: And we are not concerned about the ruling of Rav Huna that from the time that it flows the wine is rendered wine used for a libation.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: But the Sages later revised this <i>halakha</i> and said the following <i>halakhot</i> whose mnemonic is <i>dalet</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>dalet</i>, which stands for treading [<i>dorkhin</i>], harvesting [<i>botzrin</i>], and treading [<i>dorkhin</i>]: One may not tread on grapes in the winepress together with the gentile. The Gemara comments: This is due to the ruling of Rav Huna that from the time that it flows the wine can be rendered wine used for a libation. The gentile usually touches the flowing wine while treading on the grapes, rendering the wine forbidden. Therefore, if a Jew receives payment for treading on the grapes with the gentile, he is profiting from an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
  
  Daf 56a
  
  And one may not harvest grapes together with a Jew who produces wine from his fruit in a state of ritual impurity, as he is thereby causing the produce to be rendered impure. And all the more so may one not tread on the grapes with him, as he is assisting the Jew who is rendering the wine impure by treading on the grapes. But one may harvest grapes into the winepress together with the gentile, as it is permitted to impart impurity to non-sacred produce that is in Eretz Yisrael.
  § The mishna teaches: And the gentile’s touch does not render the juice of the grapes into wine used for a libation until it descends into the collection vat, because until then it does not have the status of wine. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a mishna (<i>Ma’asrot</i> 1:7) with regard to the stage when the work of producing the wine is considered complete and one is obligated to separate tithes from the wine: With regard to wine, one is obligated to separate tithes from the time that the solid residue floats [<i>misheyikpe</i>] on top of the wine.
  Rava said: It is not difficult. That mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, whereas this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. This is as we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to wine, one is obligated to separate tithes from the time that the wine descends into the collection vat. Rabbi Akiva says: One is obligated to separate tithes only from the time that the solid residue floats on top of the wine.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rabbi Akiva referring to the floating of the seeds on top of the wine in the collection vat or to the floating of the yeast on top of the wine in the barrel?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this issue, as it is taught in that mishna: With regard to wine, one is obligated to separate tithes from the time that the solid residue floats on top of the wine. Subsequently, even though the residue has floated, one may collect wine from the upper winepress and from the pipe that connects the upper winepress to the vat, and one may drink it without separating tithes. Conclude from the mishna that we are speaking about the floating of the seeds on top of the wine in the collection vat. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that it is so.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Zevid teach a different version of the aforementioned dispute in a <i>baraita</i> of the school of Rabbi Oshaya: With regard to wine, one is obligated to separate tithes from the time that the wine descends into the collection vat and the seeds float on top. Rabbi Akiva says: One is obligated to separate tithes only from the time that one siphons the wine from the vat into barrels. The Gemara replies that one can resolve the contradiction: Explain that first <i>baraita</i> in this manner as well: With regard to wine, one is obligated to separate tithes from the time that the wine descends into the collection vat and the seeds float on top. Rabbi Akiva says: One is obligated to separate tithes only from the time that one siphons the wine from the vat into barrels.
  The Gemara asks: But whose opinion is expressed in the mishna that teaches: The gentile does not render the juice of the grapes into wine used for a libation until it descends into the collection vat? Shall we say that the stage when the work of producing the wine is considered complete is subject to a dispute between three <i>tanna’im</i>? The Gemara replies: No, the prohibition of wine used for a libation is different, as the Sages were stringent concerning it and render the wine forbidden even before the seeds float. By contrast, with regard to tithes, the <i>tanna</i> of this mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of either Rabbi Akiva or the Rabbis.
  
  Daf 56b
  
  The Gemara comments: And according to Rava, who explains that the mishna with regard to wine used for libations is in accordance with one opinion whereas the mishna with regard to tithes is in accordance with another opinion, and he does not hold that the case of wine used for a libation is different, he interprets it as a dispute between three <i>tanna’im</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: Once the wine descends into the collection vat, that which is in the collection vat is prohibited, and the rest, which did not yet descend into the collection vat, is permitted. Rav Huna says: The mishna taught that the rest of the wine is permitted only in a case where he did not return the wicker basket [<i>gargutni</i>], which is used to strain the wine on the way to the vat, to the winepress. But if he returned the wicker basket to the winepress, even the wine remaining in the winepress is prohibited, as the wine in the basket renders the wine in the winepress forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the wine in the wicker basket itself, in what manner is it rendered forbidden? Apparently, it is rendered forbidden by the stream of liquid that flows from the basket into the vat below, thereby connecting the wine in the basket to the forbidden wine in the vat. If so, conclude from Rav Huna’s statement that an uninterrupted stream of liquid is considered a connection. The Gemara rejects the inference: The reason for Rav Huna’s statement could be different, as Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that if one fills a gentile’s flask through a funnel, the wine in the funnel is rendered forbidden in a case where the level of the wine in his flask rose and reached the funnel. Here too, Rav Huna is referring to a case where the level of the wine in his collection vat rose and reached the basket.
  § The Gemara relates: There was a certain outstanding child who learned the tractate of <i>Avoda Zara</i> when he was six years old. People raised a dilemma to him: What is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it permitted to tread on grapes in the winepress together with the gentile? The child said to them: One may tread on grapes in the winepress together with the gentile, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna. They asked the child: But doesn’t the gentile render the wine a libation by touching it with his hands, rendering it forbidden? If so, how may a Jew derive benefit from the wine by receiving payment for his work? The child replied: It is permitted in a case where we tie his hands so that he cannot pour the wine as a libation. The child was then asked: But doesn’t the gentile render the wine a libation by touching it with his foot? The child replied: Rendering wine a libation by touching it with one’s foot is not considered rendering it a libation.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain incident in Neharde’a in which a Jew and a gentile trod on grapes and produced a certain wine together, and Shmuel delayed ruling on the matter for three Festivals, as the Sages gathered during the Festivals and presented Shmuel with the opportunity to clarify the matter with them. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Shmuel delayed his ruling? If we say that Shmuel delayed ruling on the matter because he thought to himself:
  
  Daf 57a
  
  I should delay my ruling, as if I find a <i>tanna</i> who prohibits the wine in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, I will prohibit even deriving benefit from it; this is difficult. Rabbi Natan prohibits one from deriving benefit from wine that was touched by a gentile, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If a gentile measured a Jew’s wine, whether he measured it with his hand or with his foot, it may be sold. Rabbi Natan says: If he measured it with his hand it is prohibited, but if he measured it with his foot it is permitted.
  The Gemara explains why the suggestion that Shmuel delayed his ruling because of the opinion of Rabbi Natan is difficult: Say that Rabbi Natan said that the wine is forbidden when the gentile measured it with his hand. Did he say that the wine is forbidden if he measured it with his foot? Rather, Shmuel delayed ruling on the matter because he thought to himself: If I find another <i>tanna</i> who permits the wine in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that if a gentile touches wine without intending to render it a libation, it is permitted, I will permit the wine even for drinking.
  There was a certain incident in Biram that occurred as follows: There was a certain gentile who was climbing a palm tree and he brought down with him a palm branch. While he was descending from the tree he unintentionally touched some wine with the tip of the palm branch. Rav permitted the owners to sell the wine to gentiles.
  Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said: If a gentile baby who is one day old touches wine, he renders it wine used for a libation, even though he lacks any intent? Rav said to them: Say that I said that the baby renders the wine prohibited for drinking. Did I say that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it? It is therefore permitted to sell the wine.
  § The Gemara cites Rav’s statement in order to discuss the matter itself: Rav says: If a gentile baby who is one day old touches wine, he renders it wine used for a libation, even though he lacks any intent.
  Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya raised an objection to the statement of Rav from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who purchases from the gentiles slaves who have been circumcised but have not immersed in a ritual bath, and also with regard to the sons of the gentile maidservants who grew up in a Jew’s home and were circumcised but did not immerse in a ritual bath, their conversion is not yet valid. They have the legal status of gentiles, who transmit impurity like a <i>zav</i>, a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge. Their spittle and objects upon which they tread, even if they are found in the marketplace, are ritually impure. But some say that they are ritually pure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to their wine, the adults render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, but the minors do not render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation. And which slaves are considered adults, and which slaves are considered minors? The adults are those who know the nature of idol worship and its accessories, and the minors are those who do not know the nature of idol worship and its accessories.
  In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that with regard to adults, yes, the wine they touch is rendered prohibited, but with regard to minors, no, the wine they touch is not rendered prohibited. This contradicts the statement of Rav. The Gemara replies: Interpret the distinction between adults and minors as referring to the sons of maidservants. Since they were raised in a Jewish home, there is less reason for concern lest they render the wine an idolatrous libation, and therefore the Sages did not prohibit wine touched by minors. This distinction does not apply in the case of slaves that were purchased from gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> say that the <i>halakha</i> applies to slaves purchased from gentiles and also to the sons of gentile maidservants, indicating that there is no differentiation between them? The Gemara replies: The <i>baraita</i> equates the two cases only with regard to the impurity of their spittle and of the objects upon which they tread.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that their spittle and the objects upon which they tread are impure. But according to the one who says that they are pure, what can be said? If the spittle of the slaves and the objects upon which they tread are pure, clearly the <i>halakha</i> is the same in the case of the sons of maidservants, and it is unnecessary to state this. One may therefore conclude that the <i>baraita</i> equated the two cases with regard to the status of the wine that they touch.
  The Gemara replies: Even if the <i>baraita</i> is equating the two cases with regard to the status of the wine that they touch, it is not equating them with regard to the distinction between adults and minors. Rather, this teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to slaves is similar to the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the sons of maidservants. Just as in the case of the sons of maidservants, it is only those who were circumcised but did not immerse who render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, but those who were circumcised and immersed do not; so too in the case of slaves, once they have immersed in a ritual bath they do not render wine prohibited.
  This <i>halakha</i> is to the exclusion of that which Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says, as Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: In the case of one who purchases slaves from the gentiles, even though the slaves were circumcised and immersed in a ritual bath, they still render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, as they are accustomed to idolatrous practices, until reference to idol worship disappears from their mouths. The <i>baraita</i> teaches us that their wine is not prohibited.
  § The Gemara cites the aforementioned statement in order to discuss the matter itself: Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: In the case of one who purchases slaves from the gentiles, even though the slaves were circumcised and immersed in a ritual bath, they still render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, as they are accustomed to idolatrous practices, until reference to idol worship disappears from their mouths. And how much time does this take? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: One does not assume that the slave has forgotten his idolatrous worship until twelve months have passed.
  Rabba raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the aforementioned <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who purchases from the gentiles slaves that have been circumcised but have not immersed in a ritual bath, and also with regard to the sons of the gentile maidservants who grew up in a Jew’s home and were circumcised but did not immerse in a ritual bath, their conversion is not valid and they have the legal status of gentiles. Their spittle and objects upon which they tread,
  
  Daf 57b
  
  even if they are found in the marketplace, are ritually impure. But some say that they are ritually pure. With regard to their wine, the adults render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, but the minors do not render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation. Which slaves are considered adults, and which slaves are considered minors? The adults are those who know the nature of idol worship and its accessories, and the minors are those who do not know the nature of idol worship and its accessories.
  In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that with regard to those slaves who were circumcised but did not immerse, yes, the wine they touch is prohibited, but with regard to those who were circumcised and immersed, no, the wine they touch is not prohibited, even if they have not yet forgotten their idolatrous worship. The Gemara replies: Interpret this <i>halakha</i> as referring only to the sons of maidservants who were raised in a Jewish home and never engaged in idolatrous worship, but not to slaves who were acquired from gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> teach that the <i>halakha</i> applies to slaves purchased from gentiles and also to the sons of gentile maidservants, indicating that there is no differentiation between them? The Gemara replies: The <i>baraita</i> equates the two cases only with regard to the impurity of their spittle and of the objects upon which they tread.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that their spittle and the objects upon which they tread are impure. But according to the one who says that they are pure, what can be said? If the spittle of the slaves and the objects upon which they tread are pure, clearly the same <i>halakha</i> applies in the case of the sons of maidservants, and it is unnecessary to state this. One may therefore conclude that the <i>baraita</i> equated the two cases with regard to the status of the wine that they touch.
  The Gemara answers: Even if the <i>baraita</i> equates the slaves and the sons of maidservants with regard to the status of their wine, it does not intend to compare their status once they have immersed. Rather, this teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to slaves is similar to the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the sons of maidservants. Just as in the case of the sons of maidservants, it is only the adults who render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, but minors do not render the wine they touch wine used for a libation, so too in the case of slaves, the adults render the wine that they touch wine used for a libation, but minors do not render the wine they touch wine used for a libation.
  This <i>halakha</i> is to the exclusion of that which Rav says, as Rav says: If a gentile baby who is one day old touches wine, he renders it wine used for a libation. The <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not the case.
  § The Gemara relates: There was a certain incident in Meḥoza in which a gentile came and entered the store of a Jew. The gentile said to the owners: Do you have any wine to sell? They said to him: No. There was wine sitting in a bucket. The gentile put his hand in it and stirred the wine around. The gentile said to them: This, is it not wine? The other person, i.e., the storeowner, took the bucket and, in his anger, threw its contents into a barrel of wine.
  This incident raised a dilemma with regard to the status of the wine in the barrel. Rava permitted the owner to sell the wine to gentiles, as he held that it is permitted to derive benefit from the wine. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana and Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, disagreed with him. Blasts of <i>shofarot</i> went out from the court of Rava promulgating his ruling, and they permitted the sale. And blasts of <i>shofarot</i> went out from the court of Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana and Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, promulgating their ruling, and they prohibited the sale.
  
  Daf 58a
  
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, happened to come to Meḥoza. Rava said to his attendant, Rav Elyakim: Close, close the gates, so that people who might disturb us should not come, and we may focus on clarifying the matter.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, entered into Rava’s presence. Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, said to Rava: What is the <i>halakha</i> in a case like this where a gentile stirred the wine without intending to offer it as an idolatrous libation? Rava said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman: It is prohibited even to derive benefit from it. Rav Huna, son of Rav Naḥman, asked him: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said: If a gentile stirs the wine, he does not thereby render it wine used for a libation, as Rava permitted the sale of the wine in the barrel to gentiles? Rava answered: Say that I said that it is permitted to sell the wine that was in the barrel and benefit from all the proceeds except for the monetary value of that prohibited wine that was poured into the barrel of wine. Did I say that it is permitted to derive benefit from the monetary value of that prohibited wine?
  Rava said: When I arrived at Pumbedita, Naḥmani, i.e., Abaye, surrounded us with amoraic traditions and with tannaitic sources cited in a <i>baraita</i> that indicate that in the case of wine that was stirred by a gentile it is prohibited even to derive benefit from the wine.
  Rava explains: Abaye cited amoraic traditions, as there was a certain incident in Neharde’a in which a gentile stirred the wine, and Shmuel deemed the wine prohibited, and there was a similar incident in Tiberias and Rabbi Yoḥanan deemed the wine prohibited. Rava recounts his reply: And I said to Abaye: Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan deemed the wine prohibited only because the people in those towns were not people well-versed in Torah, and it was necessary to distance them from transgression. And Abaye said to me: Are you saying that the people of Tiberias and Neharde’a are not people well-versed in Torah whereas the people of Meḥoza are people well-versed in Torah? This is obviously not the case, and therefore you should not have permitted the sale of the wine in Meḥoza, even according to your reasoning.
  Abaye cited a <i>baraita</i> that teaches as follows: In the case of a gentile market inspector [<i>de’agardamim</i>] who was in charge of measures and prices in the marketplace, who drilled a hole in a barrel with a tube and drew wine from the barrel through the tube in order to taste it, or who tasted the wine from the cup that was poured for him and then returned the residue to the barrel, what is the <i>halakha</i>? This was an incident that occurred, and the Sages prohibited the wine. Abaye said: What does this mean? Is the <i>baraita</i> not prohibiting one from deriving benefit from the wine? Rava replied: No, it is prohibiting one only from drinking it.
  Abaye said: If so, let the <i>baraita</i> teach that the wine may be sold, as the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> teaches: In the case of a gentile confiscator who extended his hand into a barrel of wine, thinking it was a barrel of oil, and it was found to be a barrel of wine, what is the <i>halakha</i>? This was an incident that occurred, and the Sages said: It may be sold, as the gentile had no intention of touching wine. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rava is indeed a conclusive refutation.
  § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Arza and Rabbi Yosei ben Nehorai were sitting and drinking wine. A certain man came and they said to him: Come, serve us drinks. After he poured the wine into the cup, it was revealed that the person was a gentile. One of those Sages prohibited one from even deriving benefit from the wine, and one of them permitted the wine even for drinking. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The one who prohibited the wine properly deemed it prohibited, and the one who permitted it properly deemed it permitted, as both opinions are viable. The one who prohibited the wine holds that
  
  Daf 58b
  
  the gentile says to himself: Can it enter your mind that great Sages like these are drinking liquor [<i>shikhra</i>]? Rather, this is certainly wine that they are drinking, and therefore the gentile may have poured it as a libation. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi continues to explain that the one who deemed the wine permitted properly deemed it permitted, as he holds that the gentile says to himself: Can it enter your mind that great Rabbis like these are drinking wine and they say to me, a gentile: Come, serve us drinks? Rather, it is certainly liquor that they are drinking, and therefore he did not pour it as a libation.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the gentile see whether it is wine or liquor? The Gemara answers: The incident occurred at night. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the gentile smell it and recognize that it is wine? The Gemara answers: This incident occurred with new wine, whose smell does not diffuse.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t the gentile touch the wine when he drew the wine in the pail, and therefore it is a case of a gentile’s unintentional touch, which renders the wine prohibited? The Gemara replies: No, it was necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> because the gentile was pouring from one vessel to another without touching the wine, and therefore it was a case where the wine was poured by the force of the gentile’s action, without any intention of offering it as a libation. And in any case where wine is poured by force of a gentile’s action, without any intention of offering it as a libation, the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting the wine, and it is permitted to drink it.
  § Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to wine that a gentile mixed [<i>mesakho</i>] with water, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Asi: And why not say: Wine that a gentile diluted [<i>mezago</i>] with water, as that is the term that is usually used? Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: I say wine that was mixed, as it is written: “She has prepared her meat, she has mixed [<i>maskha</i>] her wine” (Proverbs 9:2). Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Asi: While it is true that this is the language of the Bible, the language of the Torah is a language in itself, and the language of the Sages is a language in itself, i.e., the terminology of the Bible is not the same as the terminology employed by the Sages.
  Rabbi Asi repeated his question: What is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Asi: Although the gentile did not touch the wine when diluting it, it is prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the maxim: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, who is prohibited from drinking wine and eating grapes; go around and go around, but do not come near to the vineyard. Although a nazirite is prohibited only from eating produce of the vine, he is warned not even to come into the proximity of a vineyard as a protective measure to ensure that he will not transgress this prohibition. So too, in many cases, the Sages decreed certain items and actions to be prohibited because they understood that if people would use them, they would eventually transgress Torah prohibitions.
  Rabbi Yirmeya happened to come to Savta. He saw wine that a gentile diluted with water and then a Jew drank from it, and Rabbi Yirmeya then deemed the wine prohibited to them, due to the maxim: Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go around and go around, but do not come near to the vineyard. It was also stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Wine that a gentile diluted is prohibited, due to the maxim Go, go, we say to a nazirite, go around and go around, but do not come near to the vineyard.
  § Reish Lakish happened to come to Bozrah, a town east of the Jordan. He saw Jews who were eating untithed produce and he deemed the produce prohibited to them. He also saw water to which gentiles bowed down and yet Jews drank the water, and he deemed the water prohibited to them.
  Reish Lakish came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and told him about the incident. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: While your coat [<i>addemiktorakh</i>] is still on you, go and retract your rulings. This is because the town of Bezer which is mentioned among the cities of refuge (Deuteronomy 4:43) is not the same as Bozrah. Bozrah is not part of Eretz Yisrael, and one is not obligated to separate tithes from its produce. The water is also permitted as it is water that belongs to the public, and water that belongs to the public is not rendered prohibited.
  The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning,
  
  Daf 59a
  
  as Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Water that belongs to the public is not rendered prohibited. The Gemara infers that since water that belongs to the public is permitted, therefore, in a case where gentiles bow to water that is owned by an individual it is rendered prohibited.
  The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yoḥanan could derive that even water owned by an individual is permitted, as the water is connected to the ground, and worshipping an object that is connected to the ground does not render it prohibited. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to derive this <i>halakha</i> from the fact that the water belongs to the public in a case where a wave raised the water and detached it from the ground. In this case worshipping water owned by an individual would render it prohibited.
  The Gemara challenges: Nevertheless, the water ultimately falls into the category of objects that were detached without human involvement, such as boulders of a mountain that dislodged on their own. The Gemara (46a) cites a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya with regard to boulders that dislodged without human involvement and were then worshipped, and does not conclude who deems the boulders permitted and who deems them prohibited. May it be concluded from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who says that the boulders are prohibited?
  The Gemara replies: No, even if Rabbi Yoḥanan deems the boulders permitted, his ruling with regard to the water is necessary in a case where one struck the water with his hand and thereby detached it. Since it was detached due to human involvement, if the water was owned by an individual it is prohibited.
  § Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba happened to come to Gavla. He saw Jewish women there who were impregnated by gentiles who were in the process of converting and were circumcised but had not yet immersed in a ritual bath. He also saw wine that gentiles diluted with water and Jews then drank the wine. He also saw lupines that gentiles were cooking and Jews were eating. And despite seeing all this, he did not say anything to them to correct their actions.
  Later, he came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and told him what he had seen. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Go and declare about their children that they have the status of children born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [<i>mamzerim</i>]. And decree with regard to their wine that it is prohibited as an extension of the prohibition of wine used for a libation. And with regard to their lupines you should declare that they are forbidden due to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles, as they are not people well-versed in Torah, and any leniency would be misunderstood and applied too extensively.
  The Gemara explains that with regard to declaring about their children that they have the status of <i>mamzerim</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning concerning two <i>halakhot</i>. The first is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is never deemed to be a convert until he has been circumcised and has immersed. And since the father has not immersed, he is still considered a gentile. And the second <i>halakha</i> is as Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of a gentile or a Canaanite slave who engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, the offspring is a <i>mamzer</i>.
  The Gemara continues to explain Rabbi Yoḥanan’s second instruction to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: And decree with regard to their wine that it is prohibited as an extension of the prohibition of wine used for a libation. Although the gentile did not touch the wine when he diluted it, it is prohibited due to the maxim: Go, go, we say to a nazirite; go around and go around, but do not come near to the vineyard.
  Lastly, Rabbi Yoḥanan instructed Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba to decree with regard to their lupines that they are forbidden due to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles, as they are not people well-versed in Torah. The Gemara asks: The reason that the lupines are deemed prohibited is because they are not people well-versed in Torah; but in the case of people who are well-versed in Torah, one can infer that the lupines are permitted. But doesn’t Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak say that Rav says: Anything that is eaten raw is not subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles, even when cooked by them? Lupines are not eaten raw due to their bitterness, and therefore they are subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with that other version of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak’s statement, as Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Anything that lacks importance and therefore does not appear on the table of kings in order to be eaten together with bread is not subject to the prohibition of food cooked by gentiles. Lupines are not sufficiently important to be served on the table of kings, and therefore they are permitted even if cooked by gentiles. Consequently, the reason for prohibiting the residents of Gavla from eating them is because they are not people well-versed in Torah. But in the case of people well-versed in Torah, the lupines are permitted.
  § The Sages asked Rav Kahana: With regard to a gentile, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning the following question: May he bring grapes to the winepress without doing anything else to them? Rav Kahana said to them: It is prohibited by rabbinic decree due to the maxim: Go, go, we say to a nazirite; go around and go around, but do not come near to the vineyard. Rav Yeimar raised an objection to Rav Kahana from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a gentile who brought grapes to the winepress in baskets
  
  Daf 59b
  
  and in small barrels, even though the grapes are squashed in the process and the wine, i.e., the juice, sprays onto the grapes, nevertheless they are permitted. Rav Kahana said to Rav Yeimar: Are you saying that this is the <i>halakha</i> where the gentile already brought the grapes? The <i>baraita</i> is discussing whether the grapes are prohibited after the fact, whereas I am saying that one should not permit a gentile to bring the grapes <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain <i>etrog</i> that fell into a barrel of wine. A gentile jumped up to take it out of the barrel, thereby unintentionally touching the wine. Rav Ashi said to the people standing there: Hold his hand still, so that he does not stir the wine and render it prohibited, and tip the barrel until the wine is drained into another vessel, and then he may take the <i>etrog</i>.
  § Rav Ashi says: In the case of this gentile who intentionally poured a Jew’s wine as a libation in order to render it prohibited, even though it is prohibited to sell it to another gentile, as one may not derive benefit from it, nevertheless, it is permitted for him to collect its monetary value from that gentile. What is the reason for this? It is considered as though the gentile burned the wine and destroyed it, and he is required to pay for the damage.
  Rav Ashi says: From where do I say that this is the <i>halakha</i>? This <i>halakha</i> is derived as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a gentile who poured a Jew’s wine as an idolatrous libation but not before an object of idol worship, the wine is prohibited, but Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira deem it permitted due to two factors: One is that idol worshippers pour wine as an idolatrous libation only before an object of idol worship. And the other one is that the Jew says to the gentile: It is not in your power to render my wine prohibited against my will. Rav Ashi rules in accordance with the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>. Nevertheless, he derives from the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira that one may collect compensation from the gentile, whose actions were against the will of the owner.
  § There was a certain barrel of wine from which the stopper had been removed and the wine was spilling out. A gentile came, jumped up, and placed his hand on the hole to prevent the wine from leaking. Rav Pappa said: Any wine that is adjacent to the stopper is prohibited, as it was touched by the gentile,
  
  Daf 60a
  
  but the other wine in the barrel is permitted. There are those who say that Rav Pappa said: The wine until the stopper, i.e., in the upper portion of the barrel, is prohibited, but the other wine in the barrel, below the stopper, is permitted.
  Rav Yeimar says: Rav Pappa’s ruling is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as the mishna teaches (<i>Tevul Yom</i> 2:7): In the case of a barrel that was pierced, whether on its top, on its bottom, or on one of its sides, if one who immersed that day touched it, it is ritually impure. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it was pierced on its top or on its bottom, it is impure. If it was pierced on one of its sides, the wine is pure, whether it was touched from here or from there, i.e., on either side. Only the wine that he touched is rendered impure. According to the first version of Rav Pappa’s statement he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.
  § Rav Pappa says: In a case where a gentile is pouring the wine from the barrel and a Jew is holding the beaker [<i>kuva</i>] into which it is poured, the wine is prohibited. What is the reason? When the wine comes out of the barrel, it comes out by force of the gentile’s action. In a case where a Jew is pouring the wine from the barrel and a gentile is holding the beaker into which it is poured, the wine is permitted. But if the gentile tilts the beaker to the side, the wine is prohibited.
  Rav Pappa says: In the case of this gentile who carries a sealed wineskin and a Jew is walking behind him and ensuring that the gentile does not touch the wine itself, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. If the wineskin is full, the wine is permitted, as the wine in the wineskin is not shaken. If the wineskin is incompletely filled, the wine is prohibited, as perhaps the wine in the wineskin might have been shaken by the gentile, which would have the same <i>halakha</i> as wine poured as a libation. In the case of a beaker, which is open on top, if it is full the wine is prohibited, as perhaps the gentile might have touched the wine. If the beaker is incompletely filled, the wine is permitted, as the gentile did not touch the wine.
  Rav Ashi says: In the case of a wineskin, whether it is full or incompletely filled it is permitted. What is the reason that the wine is permitted even if it is shaken within the wineskin? It is because this is not the typical manner of offering a libation.
  § With regard to a winepress where the grapes are pressed with beams, rather than trod by foot, Rav Pappi deemed permitted wine that is produced by a gentile, as the gentile does not touch the wine. Rav Ashi, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi, deemed the wine prohibited.
  The Gemara comments: In a case where the wine is pressed by means of the gentile’s direct force everyone agrees that the wine is prohibited. They disagree when the wine is pressed by means of a force generated by his force. Conversely, there are those who say that in a case where the wine is pressed by means of a force generated by the gentile’s force everyone agrees that the wine is permitted. They disagree when the wine is pressed by means of the gentile’s direct force. The Gemara relates: There was an incident in which wine was pressed by means of a force generated by the gentile’s force, and Rav Yaakov from Nehar Pekod deemed the wine prohibited.
  § The Gemara relates: There was a certain barrel
  
  Daf 60b
  
  that split lengthwise from top to bottom, and a certain gentile jumped up and encircled it with his arms in order to prevent the wine from spilling. Rafram bar Pappa, and some say it was Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, deemed it permitted to sell the wine to gentiles, as the wine was rendered prohibited only for drinking but not with regard to deriving benefit. The Gemara notes: This statement applies only in a case where it split lengthwise. But where the barrel split widthwise and the gentile held the top and bottom halves together, it is permitted even for drinking. What is the reason that the wine is permitted? The gentile is merely performing the action of a brick by weighing the barrel down, and he is not doing anything to the wine.
  The Gemara relates: There was a certain gentile who was found standing in a winepress. Rav Ashi said: If there is enough wine in the winepress that it is moist enough to moisten other items, the winepress requires rinsing and requires a more thorough cleansing, as the Gemara will explain (74b). But if there is not enough wine to moisten other items, merely rinsing is sufficient for it.
  MISHNA: In the case of a gentile who was found standing next to the wine collection vat, if there is a loan owed by the owner of the wine vat to the gentile, the wine is prohibited. Since the gentile maintains that he has a right to the owner’s property he has no compunctions about touching the wine. But if there is no loan owed by the owner of the wine vat to the gentile, the wine is permitted, as it is assumed that the gentile did not touch the wine that was not his.
  If a gentile fell into the wine collection vat and emerged from it, or if he measured the wine in the winepress with a pole without touching it with his hands, or if he cast a hornet out of the wine by means of a pole and the pole touched the wine, or where the gentile was removing the foam that was on the top of a fermenting barrel of wine; with regard to all these cases there was such an incident. And the Sages said that the wine may be sold to gentiles, as it is permitted to derive benefit from the wine, but not to drink it. And Rabbi Shimon deems the wine permitted even for drinking. In a case where a gentile took the barrel of wine and threw it, in his anger, into the wine collection vat, this was an incident that occurred and the Sages deemed the wine fit for drinking.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that in the case of a gentile who was found standing next to a wine collection vat, if the owner of the vat owes money to the gentile the wine is prohibited. Shmuel says: And this <i>halakha</i> applies only when the loan includes the qualification that the gentile has a lien on that wine, as only then does the gentile feel that he is entitled to touch the wine.
  Rav Ashi said: The wording of the mishna is also precise according to Shmuel’s interpretation, as we learned in the following mishna (61a): In the case of a Jew who renders the wine of a gentile permitted by treading the gentile’s grapes so that the wine can be sold to Jews, and he then places the wine in the gentile’s domain until he sells it, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. If that one, the gentile, writes for the Jew: I received money from you in payment for the wine, even though he did not yet receive the actual payment, the wine is permitted. This is because the wine is considered the Jew’s property and there is no reason to suppose that the gentile might touch it. But in a case where the Jew desires to remove the wine and the gentile does not allow him to do so until the Jew gives him the money due to him, this was an incident that occurred in Beit She’an and the Sages deemed the wine prohibited.
  Rav Ashi explains: The reason that the wine is prohibited is that the gentile does not allow the Jew to remove the wine, and therefore the gentile is considered to have some degree of ownership of the wine. Therefore, one can infer that if the gentile allows him to remove the wine, the wine is permitted, even though the Jew still owes him money. One may conclude from the mishna that in order for the wine to be prohibited we require the loan to include the qualification that the gentile has a lien on that wine. The Gemara affirms: One may conclude Shmuel’s principle from the mishna.
  § The mishna teaches that if a gentile fell into the wine collection vat and emerged, it is not prohibited to derive benefit from the wine. Rav Pappa says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where the gentile emerged from the vat dead. But if he emerged alive, the wine is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the wine is prohibited? Rav Pappa said: Since the gentile was rescued from death, he considers that day like their festival day, and he offers the wine as an idolatrous libation in thanksgiving.
  § The mishna teaches that if a gentile measured the wine in the winepress with a pole, or if he cast a hornet out of the wine by means of a pole, or if he removed the foam on top of a fermenting barrel of wine, with regard to all these cases there was such an incident, and the Sages said that the wine may be sold to gentiles but one may not drink it. And Rabbi Shimon deems the wine permitted even for drinking. Rav Adda bar Ahava says: May blessings rest upon Rabbi Shimon’s head, as his reasoning is clear. When he deems the wine permitted, he deems it permitted even with regard to drinking, and when he deems the wine prohibited, he deems it prohibited even with regard to deriving benefit from it.
  Rav Ḥiyya, son of Abba bar Naḥmani, says that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says, and some say that Rav Ḥisda says that Ze’eiri says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. There are those who say that Rav Ḥisda says: Abba bar Ḥanan said to me: This is what Ze’eiri says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Despite this, the Gemara concludes: But the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the case where a gentile took a barrel of wine and threw it, in his anger, into the wine collection vat, this was an incident that occurred and the Sages deemed the wine fit for drinking. Rav Ashi says: With regard to any form of contact through which a <i>zav</i> renders an object ritually impure, in a case where a gentile has that same type of contact with wine, he renders it wine used for a libation. In the case of any form of contact through which a <i>zav</i> does not transmit ritual impurity, leaving an object ritually pure, a gentile does not render the wine with which he has contact wine used for a libation.
  Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Ashi from the mishna: With regard to the case where a gentile took the barrel of wine and threw it, in his anger, into the wine collection vat, this was an incident that occurred in Beit She’an and the Sages deemed the wine fit for drinking. One may infer that if the gentile threw the wine in his anger, yes, it is permitted. But if it was not in his anger the wine is not permitted, even though in the case of a <i>zav</i>, if he threw an object at a vessel, it does not render the vessel impure.
  
  Daf 61a
  
  Rav Ashi replied: There, the mishna is referring to a case where the barrel is not actually thrown. Rather, it is propelled by the gentile, and again propelled by him, until it reaches the vat. Therefore, if the gentile did so not in anger, there is reason to be concerned that he might have touched the wine.
  MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who renders the wine of a gentile permitted by treading the gentile’s grapes so that the wine can be sold to Jews, and although a Jew has not yet paid for the wine he then places the wine in the gentile’s domain in a house that is open to a public thoroughfare until he sells it, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. If this occurs in a city in which there are both gentiles and Jews, the wine is permitted, as the gentile does not touch the wine lest the Jews see him doing so. If this occurs in a city in which all its inhabitants are gentiles, the wine is prohibited unless a Jew sits and safeguards the wine.
  But the watchman is not required to sit and guard the wine constantly; even if he frequently leaves the place and comes in again later, the wine is permitted. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: The domain of gentiles is all one, as the Gemara will explain.
  In the case of a Jew who renders the wine of a gentile permitted by treading the gentile’s grapes so that the wine can be sold to Jews, and he then places the wine in the gentile’s domain until he sells it, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. If that one, the gentile, writes for the Jew: I received money from you in payment for the wine, even though he did not yet receive the actual payment, the wine is permitted. This is because the wine is considered the Jew’s property and the gentile does not venture to touch it. But if the Jew desires to remove the wine and the gentile does not allow him to do so until the Jew gives him the money due to him, this was an incident that occurred in Beit She’an and the Sages deemed the wine prohibited. In this case the gentile believes that he has a lien upon the wine, and therefore he has no compunctions about touching it.
  GEMARA: The Gemara questions the mishna’s distinction between a city with Jewish inhabitants and a city without Jewish inhabitants: The wine should also be permitted in a city in which all its inhabitants are gentiles, as aren’t there Jewish peddlers who travel around the various towns? Consequently, the gentile refrains from touching the wine, lest the Jewish peddlers see him touching it. Shmuel says: The mishna is referring to a city that has double doors and a crossbar, and the residents know when outsiders enter the city.
  With regard to the mishna’s statement that the wine is permitted only if the gentile’s house is open to a public thoroughfare, Rav Yosef says: And if a Jew’s window is open to that place it is considered like a public thoroughfare. And similarly, a trash heap is considered like a public thoroughfare as many people frequent it, and a palm tree is considered like a public thoroughfare, as the gentile is concerned lest someone climbing the palm tree see him.
  With regard to a case where the top of the palm tree was cut off, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree: One of them deems the wine prohibited and one of them deems it permitted. The Gemara explains: The one who deems the wine prohibited holds that since no fruit grows on the palm tree, why would someone climb up there? The gentile therefore has no reason for concern lest someone see him, and he has no compunctions about touching the wine. And the one who deems the wine permitted holds that it happens on occasion that someone loses an animal and he climbs up the palm tree to look for it. The gentile is therefore concerned lest someone climbing the palm tree see him, and he does not touch the wine.
  § The Sages taught: In the case of a Jew who purchases a house or one who rents a house in a gentile’s courtyard, and a Jew filled the house with barrels of wine, if another Jew dwells in the same courtyard, the wine is permitted. This <i>halakha</i> applies even if that Jew does not have in his possession the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine.
  
  Daf 61b
  
  If a Jew dwells only in another courtyard, the wine is also permitted, but this is only when the Jew has the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine in his possession, as this prevents the gentile from gaining access to the wine.
  In the case of a Jew who renders the wine of a gentile permitted, and the wine is in the gentile’s domain, if another Jew dwells in the same courtyard, the wine is permitted, but this is only when the Jew has the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine in his possession. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the <i>tanna</i> reciting the <i>baraita</i>: In this case you should teach that even if that Jew does not have in his possession the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine, the wine is permitted.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the second Jew dwells only in another courtyard, the wine is prohibited, even when that Jew has the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine in his possession. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  And the Rabbis deem the wine prohibited, unless a watchman is sitting and safeguarding the wine constantly, or unless an appointed person comes to safeguard the wine. This is referring to a watchman who comes at set times.
  The Gemara asks: To which case in the <i>baraita</i> are the Rabbis referring? If we say that they are referring to the last clause, this is difficult, as in that case the first <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Meir, also deems the wine prohibited. Rather, perhaps they are referring to the first clause of the last clause, with regard to a case where a Jew renders a gentile’s wine permitted and another Jew dwells in the same courtyard. But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say to the <i>tanna</i> reciting the <i>baraita</i>: You should teach that even if the Jew does not have in his possession the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine, the wine is permitted? It may be assumed that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not disagree with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Rather, the Rabbis are referring to the last clause of the first clause, with regard to a Jew’s wine that was placed in a house in a gentile’s courtyard, as the first <i>tanna</i> says: If a Jew dwells only in another courtyard, the wine is permitted, but this is only when the Jew has in his possession the key to the house or a seal on the barrels of wine. And the Rabbis say: It is always prohibited unless a watchman is sitting and safeguarding the wine constantly, or unless an appointed person comes to safeguard the wine. This is referring to a watchman who comes at set times.
  The Gemara questions this ruling: If an appointed person comes at set times, it is detrimental, as the gentile knows when to expect the watchman, and he may do as he pleases the rest of the time. Rather, emend the <i>baraita</i> and teach that the wine is prohibited unless an appointed person comes, and this is referring to a watchman who does not come at set times. Rather, he comes whenever he chooses to do so.
  § The mishna teaches that if a Jew renders the wine of a gentile permitted and leaves the wine in the gentile’s domain, the wine is prohibited unless a Jew guards the wine. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: The domain of gentiles is all one. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar come to be lenient or to be stringent? Rav Yehuda says that Ze’eiri says: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar came to be lenient. Rav Naḥman says that Ze’eiri says: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar came to be stringent.
  The Gemara explains: Rav Yehuda says that Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar came to be lenient, and accordingly, this is what the first <i>tanna</i> is saying: Just as the wine is prohibited when it is left in the gentile owner’s domain, so too the wine is prohibited when it is left in the domain of another gentile, as the bailee might allow the owner to touch the wine. And we are concerned that they might be in collusion and the bailee will not reveal that the gentile owner touched the wine, as the owner reciprocates on other occasions.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that not all the domains of gentiles are considered as one. In what case is this statement that the wine is prohibited said? This applies only when the wine is left in the gentile owner’s domain. But when it is left in the domain of another gentile the wine is permitted, as the gentile refrains from touching the wine when it is in the domain of another gentile, as his actions might become known. And we are not concerned that the two gentiles might be in collusion.
  The Gemara explains the other opinion. Rav Naḥman says that Ze’eiri says: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar came to be stringent, and accordingly, this is what the first <i>tanna</i> is saying: In what case is this statement that the wine is prohibited said? This applies only when the wine is left in the gentile owner’s domain. But when it is left in the domain of another gentile the wine is permitted, as the gentile refrains from touching the wine when it is in the domain of another gentile, and we are not concerned that the two gentiles might be in collusion. Conversely, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: The domain of gentiles is all one, and the wine is prohibited, as it is possible that the gentile bailee is in collusion with the owner.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who says that Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar came to be stringent: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: The domain of gentiles is all one, due to the swindlers. This indicates that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is presenting a more stringent opinion.
  The Gemara relates that men from the house of Parzak the vizier placed wine that had been rendered permitted by Jews who had not yet paid for it in the domain of their gentile sharecroppers. The Rabbis who were studying before Rava thought to say: When are we concerned that two gentiles might be in collusion? This matter applies only in a case where this gentile places items in the domain of that gentile, and vice versa. But here, since the vizier’s sharecroppers are not accustomed to place items in the house of Parzak the vizier, we are not concerned that two gentiles might be in collusion.
  Rava said to the Rabbis: On the contrary, even according to the one who says that we are not concerned that two gentiles might be in collusion, that statement applies only where the other gentile is not afraid of the wine’s owner. But here, since the sharecropper is afraid of the vizier, he covers up for him and testifies on his behalf that he did not touch the wine.
  There was a certain city in which a Jew’s wine was placed. A gentile was found standing among the barrels of wine. Rava said: If the gentile can be caught as a thief  if he touches the wine, the wine is permitted. Since he is afraid of being caught he does not have the presence of mind to offer the wine as a libation. But if not, it is prohibited even to derive benefit from the wine, as it is assumed that the gentile certainly touched it and offered it as a libation.
  
  
  Daf 62a
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a gentile who hires a Jewish laborer to work with wine used for an idolatrous libation with him, his wage is forbidden, i.e., it is prohibited for the Jew to derive benefit from his wage. If the gentile hired him to do other work with him, even if he said to him while he was working with him: Transport the barrel of wine used for a libation for me from this place to that place, his wage is permitted, i.e., the Jew is permitted to derive benefit from the money. With regard to a gentile who rents a Jew’s donkey to carry wine used for a libation on it, its rental fee is forbidden. If he rented it to sit on it, even if a gentile placed his jug of wine used for a libation on it, its rental fee is permitted.
  GEMARA: In the first case of the mishna, where a gentile hires a Jew to produce wine used for a libation with him, what is the reason that his wage is forbidden? If we say that since it is prohibited to derive benefit from wine used for a libation, his wage is also prohibited, that is difficult: There are the cases of <i>orla</i> produce, i.e., produce grown during a tree’s first three years, and diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, from which it is also prohibited to derive benefit, and yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Kiddushin</i> 56b) that if a man sold this produce and betrothed a woman with the money received for it, she is betrothed. Evidently, money gained from a forbidden item is not itself forbidden, as otherwise the betrothal would not take effect.
  Rather, perhaps the reason that the wage is forbidden is since the wine used for a libation transfers to the money its status as an object of idol worship. The Gemara challenges: But there is the <i>halakha</i> of Sabbatical-Year produce, which transfers its sanctity to the money with which it is redeemed, and yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 8:4): With regard to one who says to his laborer during the Sabbatical Year: Here is this dinar I give to you; gather for me vegetables for its value today, his wage is forbidden, i.e., the sanctity of the Sabbatical-Year produce is transferred to the wage, since it is as though he has purchased Sabbatical-Year produce in exchange for the dinar. But if the employer says to him: Gather for me vegetables today, without mentioning that it is for the value of the dinar, his wage is permitted, as he merely paid him for his labor. This should apply as well to the case of the wine used for a libation.
  Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This is a penalty that the Sages imposed upon donkey drivers and with regard to wine used for a libation. The Gemara explains: With regard to wine used for a libation, the penalty is as we said, that the wage of one who is hired to work in the production of wine used for libation is forbidden. With regard to donkey drivers, what is this penalty? The penalty is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the donkey drivers who were working in the transportation of Sabbatical-Year produce, their wage is Sabbatical-Year produce.
  The Gemara asks: What does it mean when it says that their wage is Sabbatical-Year produce? If we say that we give them their wage for their work from Sabbatical-Year produce, the employer consequently is paying his debt from Sabbatical-Year produce, and this violates that which the Torah states: “And the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for food for you” (Leviticus 25:6), indicating that this produce is designated for food, but not for commerce.
  And if it means that their wage is sacred with the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce, is that wage in fact sacred? But isn’t it taught in a mishna that with regard to one who says to a laborer: Here is this dinar I give to you and gather for me vegetables today, his wage is permitted, but if he says to him: Gather for me vegetables today for its value, his wage is forbidden? The case of the donkey drivers is clearly similar to the former case, where the value of the dinar was not mentioned.
  Abaye said: Actually, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement should be interpreted as saying that we give him his wage from Sabbatical-Year produce. And as for that which appears to pose a difficulty for you, that the verse designates such produce “for food” but not for commerce, that can be resolved by explaining that one gives him his wage in a permitted manner, i.e., as a gift rather than as a wage. This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 3:1) that a person should not say to another:
  
  Daf 62b
  
  Bring this produce designated as second tithe to Jerusalem for me in exchange for a share of the produce, of which you may partake in Jerusalem. This is considered payment and is tantamount to conducting commerce with the tithe. But he may say to him: Bring it to Jerusalem to eat it and drink it in Jerusalem, as long as he does not specify that it is payment; and once in Jerusalem they may give one another unrequited gifts. This indicates that what may not be given as payment may be given as a gift, and therefore the donkey drivers may be compensated with Sabbatical-Year produce.
  And Rava says: Actually, Rabbi Yoḥanan means that the produce with which the drivers are paid is sacred with the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce, and as for that which poses a difficulty for you with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of the laborer cited in the mishna, which states that his wage is not sacred, that difficulty can be resolved as follows: There is a distinction between a laborer, whose wage is not great, and therefore the Sages did not penalize him by decreeing that his wage is sacred, and donkey drivers, whose wages are great, and therefore the Sages penalized them. And with regard to the mishna that deems forbidden even the laborer’s wage in the case of one who produces wine designated for libation, the stringency of wine used for a libation is different, and it is treated more stringently than Sabbatical-Year produce.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a gentile hired a Jew to work with him in the production of nondescript wine of gentiles, i.e., wine that was not used for libation, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that since the prohibition of deriving benefit from nondescript wine of gentiles is as stringent as the prohibition of deriving benefit from wine used for a libation, his wage is also forbidden, or perhaps should it be reasoned that since the <i>halakha</i> with regard to its capacity for imparting ritual impurity to one who comes into contact with it is more lenient than the <i>halakha</i> with regard to wine used for a libation, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to its wage is also more lenient?
  Come and hear a resolution: It is related that there was a certain man who rented out his ship for transporting nondescript wine of gentiles, and the gentiles gave him wheat in payment. He came before Rav Ḥisda to determine the status of the wheat. Rav Ḥisda said to him: Go burn it and bury it in a graveyard. Evidently, payment for working with nondescript wine of gentiles is forbidden.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the method of eradication of the wheat in Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. But let him say to the ship owner: Scatter it. The Gemara responds: If he scatters it, people might be caused a mishap by it if they find kernels of the scattered wheat and gather them for eating. The Gemara challenges: But then let him burn it and scatter it. Why should it be buried? The Gemara answers: Perhaps people will fertilize their fields with it.
  The Gemara challenges: But let him bury the wheat in its unadulterated form. Didn’t we learn in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the instruments used for imposing capital punishment: The stone with which a condemned person is stoned, and the tree on which his corpse is hung after his execution, and the sword with which he is killed, and the scarf with which he is strangled, all of them are buried together with him, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. The <i>baraita</i> does not require that they be burned before they are buried.
  The Gemara answers: There, since they are buried in the court graveyard, the matter is clear to all that these were executed by the court, so everyone knows that using the instruments of execution is prohibited. Here, the matter is not clear to all, as one might say to himself that a person stole the wheat and brought it and buried it here, and he might thereby come to use it.
  § The Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai borrowed Sabbatical-Year produce from the poor and repaid them in the eighth year. Others came and said this to Rabbi Yoḥanan, out of concern that by doing so they violated the prohibition against engaging in commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: They are acting properly, as this is not considered commerce.
  And in the corresponding case concerning payment to a prostitute for services rendered, it is permitted to sacrifice such an animal as an offering. Although the Torah prohibits the sacrifice of an animal used as a prostitute’s payment (see Deuteronomy 23:19), in a case similar to this one, it is permitted; as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the man gave the prostitute payment but did not engage in intercourse with her, or if he engaged in intercourse with her but did not give her payment, it is permitted for her payment to serve as an offering.
  The Gemara discusses difficulties with the wording of the <i>baraita</i>: If he gave her payment but did not engage in intercourse with her, isn’t it obvious that it is permitted? Since he did not engage in intercourse with her, it is merely a gift that he has given her, and there is no reason for it to be forbidden. Why does the <i>baraita</i> need to state this? And furthermore, with regard to the case in the <i>baraita</i> where he engaged in intercourse with her but did not give her payment, he did not give her anything, and since he did not give her payment, what is the meaning of the statement that her payment is permitted?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If he gave her payment and afterward, after some time elapsed, he engaged in intercourse with her, or if he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward, after some time elapsed, he gave her payment, her payment is permitted, because the payment was not given proximate to the intercourse. This is also the <i>halakha</i> in the case of borrowing Sabbatical-Year produce, i.e., paying for it after time has elapsed is not considered commerce.
  The Gemara asks: If the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he gave her payment and afterward engaged in intercourse with her, then when he engaged in intercourse with her,
  
  Daf 63a
  
  the prohibition with regard to payment to a prostitute should apply to the payment retroactively. Rabbi Eliezer says: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation when she sacrificed the payment in the Temple first, before the intercourse took place.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of such a situation? If the circumstances are that he said to her: Acquire this payment from now, it is obvious that it is permitted to sacrifice it, as it is not extant as payment at the time of the intercourse, and it is merely a gift that he gave her. It would not be necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to state this.
  And if the circumstances are that he did not say to her: Acquire this payment from now, how can she be allowed to sacrifice it? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And when a man shall sanctify his house to be holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived that just as one’s house is in his possession, so too, any item that a person wishes to consecrate must be in his possession. The prostitute cannot consecrate an animal that is not in her possession.
  Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where he said to her: Let the animal be with you until the time of intercourse, and if you need it in the meantime, acquire it from now. The <i>baraita</i> teaches that in this situation she may sacrifice her payment as an offering.
  Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If she consecrated it first, before the intercourse, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Since the Master said that declaration to the Most High is equivalent to transfer to an ordinary person, i.e., a spoken consecration of an item to the Temple is deemed, in terms of acquisition, like the legal transfer of an item to a person, therefore, since she consecrated it by speech, is it considered tantamount to having sacrificed it, and consequently it would be permitted to sacrifice it? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that now, at the time of the intercourse, in any event, the animal is extant, i.e., it was not actually sacrificed, and therefore it is prohibited to sacrifice it?
  The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from the state-ment of Rabbi Eliezer, as Rabbi Eliezer says: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where she sacrificed it first. By inference, it is referring specifically to a case where she sacrificed it; but if she merely consecrated it, then it is not permitted to sacrifice the animal, as it is considered in her possession at the time of the intercourse.
  The Gemara rejects this resolution: Rav Hoshaya raises the dilemma with regard to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer itself, asking what his intent is: Is it obvious to Rabbi Eliezer that the animal is permitted specifically in a case where she sacrificed it, but in a case where she merely consecrated it, that is not the <i>halakha</i>, and the payment is forbidden, because it is extant as payment at the time of the intercourse? Or perhaps does he mention specifically the case where she sacrificed it because that case is obvious to him, but with regard to the case where she consecrated it, he is uncertain whether it is permitted or not, and he therefore did not rule on the matter? The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The <i>baraita</i> teaches: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward, after some time elapsed, gave her payment, her payment is permitted. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: If he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward gave her payment, even from now until three years afterward, her payment is forbidden.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. This case, where it is forbidden, is where he said in advance: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for this lamb. In this case the lamb is considered to be her property immediately, even if he actually gave it to her only after some time had elapsed. That case, where the animal is permitted, is where he said to her: Engage in intercourse with me in exchange for a lamb, without specifying a particular one. Since he did not specify a particular lamb as the fee, when he later gives her a lamb, it is not deemed payment.
  The Gemara asks: But when he says to her: In exchange for this lamb, what of it? Isn’t a formal act of acquisition, such as pulling the lamb, absent from the transaction? In any case she has not acquired it. The Gemara answers: The reference is to the case of a gentile prostitute, who does not acquire by pulling; gentiles acquire an item by paying money for it. And if you wish, say instead that actually, the reference is to a Jewish prostitute, and it is a case where the lamb is already standing in her courtyard. This effected the acquisition as soon as the man stated his intent to give her the lamb, in accordance with the principle that a person acquires that which is within his property.
  The Gemara challenges: If the reference is to a case where it is standing in her courtyard, that is not a case where he engaged in intercourse with her and afterward he gave her payment, since it was acquired by her before he engaged in intercourse with her. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where he rendered the lamb as designated payment [<i>appoteiki</i>] for her, i.e., a case where he said to her: If I bring you dinars from now until such and such a day, all is well, and you will return the lamb to me, but if not, take the lamb as your payment.
  § The Gemara resumes discussion of the practice of the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai, who would borrow produce from the poor during the Sabbatical Year and repay them after the Sabbatical Year, and Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that this is permitted, as it is not considered commerce with Sabbatical-Year produce. Rav Sheshet raises an objection to this ruling from a <i>baraita</i>: A person may say to his donkey drivers or to his laborers: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, and he does not need to be concerned that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money he has given them,
  
  Daf 63b
  
  neither with regard to the prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce, nor with regard to restrictions on the consumption of tithe, nor with regard to the prohibition against consumption of wine used for a libation. This is because whatever food or drink that they acquire, they acquire it of their own volition, and the employer does not bear responsibility for their actions.
  But if he said to them: Go and eat and I will reimburse you, or: Go and drink and I will reimburse you, he must be concerned with regard to the possibility that his workers will transgress a prohibition with the money, whether with regard to prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce, or with regard to restrictions on the consumption of tithe, or with regard to the prohibition against consuming wine used for a libation. This is because if they acquire forbidden food or drink, it is tantamount to his acquiring these items and giving them to the laborers.
  Rav Sheshet infers: Apparently, when he pays his laborers after some time has elapsed, it is considered as though he is paying money for forbidden items, even though the forbidden items no longer exist. Here too, when people borrow Sabbatical-Year produce with the intent of paying for it afterward, when one pays, he is paying for a forbidden purchase.
  Rav Ḥisda interpreted this <i>baraita</i> with regard to a storekeeper who regularly gives credit to the employer, so that the employer incurs the debt to him at the moment the storekeeper gives the food or drink to the laborers. This is because, since it is his custom to give him credit, it is considered as though the storekeeper acquires the dinar from him at that moment. Therefore, if the laborers bought from him Sabbatical-Year produce, it is considered as though the employer paid his laborers with Sabbatical-Year produce, which is prohibited. Therefore, this case is not comparable to the case of the Sages who borrowed Sabbatical-Year produce.
  The Gemara asks: But in the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it permitted for the employer to send his laborers to buy food, committing to reimburse them afterward? If so, rather than the <i>tanna</i> teaching that if the employer says: Go and eat with this dinar, or: Go and drink with this dinar, he does need to be concerned that they will buy forbidden food, let him distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself where he says: Go and eat and I will reimburse you.
  The <i>tanna</i> could teach as follows: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that if the employer says: I will reimburse you, he cannot allow his laborer to buy forbidden food? It is stated with regard to the case of a storekeeper who regularly gives credit to the employer, such that the employer incurs the debt to him at the moment the storekeeper gives the food or drink to the laborers. But in the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, it is permitted for the employer to instruct his laborers in this manner.
  And furthermore, there is another difficulty with this interpretation: In the case of a storekeeper who does not give credit to the employer, does he not incur the debt to him? But doesn’t Rava say that in the case of one who says to another: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so and all of my property will be transferred to you, he acquires it by the <i>halakha</i> of a guarantor? Just as a guarantor for another person’s loan renders himself liable to pay for someone else’s debt, so too, the owner of the property renders himself liable to give the property in exchange for the one hundred dinars that the acquiring party gives that so-and-so. Here too, the employer renders himself liable to pay the storekeeper when the storekeeper gives food to his laborers at his request.
  Rather, Rava says: There is no difference whether the storekeeper gives him credit, and there is no difference whether he does not give him credit. Any commitment to pay causes a liability. But although he incurs a debt to him, since he does not designate specific coins as payment for his debt the employer’s conduct is not prohibited. Therefore, the Sages of the school of Rabbi Yannai acted in a permitted manner.
  The Gemara asks: But here, in the <i>baraita</i>, why does the employer need to be concerned with regard to the prohibitions concerning Sabbatical-Year produce? He does not designate specific money as payment for his debt here. Rav Pappa said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the employer first paid the storekeeper a dinar for the food he would provide to the laborers, before they actually purchased food. Therefore, the employer is considered to have acquired forbidden items and paid his laborers’ wages with them.
  Rav Kahana said: I stated this <i>halakha</i> before Rav Zevid of Neharde’a. He said to me: If so, if the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i> is understood as referring to a case where the employer paid the storekeeper a dinar in advance, rather than teaching a case where the employer said to his laborers: Go and eat, go and drink, and I will reimburse you, the <i>tanna</i> should have taught a case where he said: Go and eat, go and drink, and I will calculate the amount that should be deducted from the dinar I gave him. Rav Kahana said to him: That is not difficult; teach the <i>baraita</i> as stating: Go, and I will calculate the amount that should be deducted from the dinar I gave him.
  Rav Ashi said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the employer took the food and drink from the storekeeper and gave it to the laborers with his own hand. Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, rather than teaching that the employer said: Go and eat, go and drink, the <i>tanna</i> should have taught a case where he said: Take and eat, take and drink. Rav Ashi said to him: Teach the <i>baraita</i> as stating: Take and eat, take and drink.
  § Rav Naḥman and Ulla and Avimi bar Pappi were sitting, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami, who was studying with them, was sitting among them, and they were sitting and a dilemma was raised before them: If one hired a person to break barrels of wine used for a libation so the wine will spill out, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that since he has an interest in the preservation of the barrels until he breaks them, so that he can be paid for breaking them, his wage is forbidden, or perhaps should it be reasoned that any action that one performs to reduce impropriety [<i>tifela</i>] is permitted, even if he is paid for the actual breaking?
  Rav Naḥman said: He may break them, and let a blessing come upon him. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a <i>baraita</i> supports his opinion: One may not hoe together with a gentile in a field that contains a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds,
  
  Daf 64a
  
  but one may uproot diverse kinds with him, in order to reduce impropriety.
  The Sages initially assumed that in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that not only one who sows or grows diverse kinds, but even one who maintains diverse kinds, is flogged. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who removes the weeds interfering with the growth of the plants or who covers up the seeds of diverse kinds with earth is flogged. Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains them instead of actively uprooting them is flogged.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “You shall not sow your field with diverse kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). I have derived only the case of one who sows. From where is it derived that one who maintains diverse kinds also receives lashes? The verse states: “Not…diverse kinds of seed,” indicating that there should not be diverse kinds in one’s field.
  The Gemara concludes its support for the opinion of Rav Naḥman: It is prohibited to maintain diverse kinds, but nevertheless, if one wishes to maintain diverse kinds temporarily in order to be paid for uprooting them, thereby reducing impropriety, it is permitted. Similarly, it is permitted for one to receive payment for breaking barrels of wine used for a libation.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>, which deems it permitted for one to uproot diverse kinds with a gentile? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit one to maintain diverse kinds, but prohibit one from maintaining wine used for a libation, so there is no proof from this <i>baraita</i> in support of Rav Naḥman’s opinion.
  The Gemara asks: If the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, why does the <i>tanna</i> specifically permit uprooting with a gentile? Even maintaining the diverse kinds is permitted. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where he performed the uprooting unpaid, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that giving an unpaid gift to a gentile is prohibited.
  The Gemara reasons that Rav Naḥman’s ruling can in any event be proven from this <i>baraita</i>: From the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda we may understand the <i>halakha</i> according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda say that it is prohibited to give a gentile an unpaid gift, but to reduce impropriety he holds that it is permitted to work with a gentile? The same can be said according to Rabbi Akiva as well: Although Rabbi Akiva says that one who maintains diverse kinds is flogged, he presumably holds that if the purpose is to reduce impropriety, it is permitted. The Gemara concludes: And nothing more is to be said on this matter.
  § Rav Naḥman, Ulla, Avimi bar Pappi, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami were sitting again and a dilemma was raised before them: With regard to the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship that are in the possession of a gentile, who sold the object to another, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does the object of idol worship transfer its forbidden status to the money that is in the possession of a gentile, as it would to money in the possession of a Jew, or not?
  Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted. This may be proven from certain gentiles who came before Rabba bar Avuh to convert. Rabba bar Avuh said to them: Go sell everything that you have, including your objects of idol worship, and then come back to me to convert.
  What is the reason he gave this advice? Isn’t it because he maintains that the proceeds from the sale of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted, and therefore he suggested they sell the objects of idol worship so they could derive benefit from the money after they converted? The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as since their intention is to convert, they certainly revoked the idolatrous status of these objects, and when they sold them they were selling permitted items.
  Rather, proof may be brought from here, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a Jew who was a creditor to a gentile for the amount of one hundred dinars, and the gentile sold an object of idol worship and from the proceeds brought him the payment of the debt, or sold wine used for a libation and from the proceeds brought him the payment of the debt, the money is permitted. But if the gentile said to him: Wait for me until I sell an object of idol worship and from the proceeds I will bring you the payment of the debt, or: Wait until I sell wine used for a libation and from the proceeds I will bring you the payment of the debt, this money is forbidden. This proves that the proceeds of an object of idol worship in the possession of a gentile are permitted.
  The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause that it is permitted, and what is different in the latter clause that it is forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: In the latter clause the proceeds are forbidden because the Jew desires the preservation of the object of idol worship or wine used for a libation, since he knows that the gentile must sell it in order to repay the debt.
  The Gemara asks: And if he desires its preservation in a case like this, is the money forbidden? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Demai</i> 6:10): In the case of a convert and a gentile who inherited from their gentile father, the convert can say to his gentile brother: You take the objects of idol worship and I will take the money, or: You take the wine used for a libation and I will take the produce; but if they make this exchange after the property came into the possession of the convert, it is forbidden.
  Rava bar Ulla said: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to an object of idol worship whose value can be distributed among its shards, i.e., even if it were broken to pieces its value would remain, so the convert does not desire its preservation.
  The Gemara asks: This resolution works out well in the case of objects of idol worship, but with regard to wine used for a libation, what is there to say? There is no situation in which the convert does not desire the preservation of the wine until the exchange. The Gemara answers: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to Hadrianic earthenware permeated with wine used for a libation. Since the wine can be extracted by soaking the earthenware in water, the convert does not desire that the vessel remain intact.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t he desire its preservation in the sense that it should not be stolen or lost? Rather, Rav Pappa said that there is a different resolution: You say there is a difficulty from the case of the inheritance of a convert? The inheritance of a convert is different, as the Sages were lenient with regard to it, as a rabbinic decree, lest he return to his corrupted ways if it were prohibited for him to inherit property from his father. In the case of one who is not a convert and desires the preservation of an object of idol worship, it is prohibited for him to profit from it.
  
  Daf 64b
  
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement, that a convert and a gentile are permitted to divide up common property that includes objects of idol worship, said? This is said with regard to property that they inherited; but if they were partners, it is prohibited.
  § The Gemara mentions another discussion among Rav Naḥman, Ulla, Avimi bar Pappi, and Rav Ḥiyya bar Ami. They were sitting again and a dilemma was raised before them: With regard to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [<i>ger toshav</i>], including the prohibition against engaging in idol worship, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the possibility that he can revoke the status of objects of idol worship? Is it the case that one who worships idols can revoke the status of one, but one who does not worship them cannot revoke the status of one? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that anyone who is of the same kind as idol worshippers, i.e., a gentile, can revoke its status, and a <i>ger toshav</i> is of the same kind as idol worshippers?
  Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that one who worships idols can revoke the status of one, but one who does not worship them cannot revoke the status of one.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a Jew who found an object of idol worship in the marketplace, as long as it has not yet come into his possession, he can tell a gentile, and the gentile can revoke its idolatrous status. Once it has come into his possession, he cannot tell a gentile and have the gentile revoke its status. This applies to any gentile, because the Sages said: A gentile can revoke the status of his own object of idol worship or that of another gentile, whether he worships it or whether he does not worship it.
  What is meant by the phrase: Worships it, and what is meant by the phrase: Does not worship it? If we say both this and that are referring to a gentile, this is the same as the previous statement in the <i>baraita</i>, that a gentile can revoke the status of his own object of idol worship or that of another gentile, i.e., an object that he worships or one that another gentile worships. Rather, isn’t it to be understood that the phrase: Worships it, is referring to a gentile? And what is the meaning of the phrase: Does not worship it? It is referring to a <i>ger toshav</i>, who does not worship any idols. And learn from it that a <i>ger toshav</i> can also revoke the status of objects of idol worship.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation. No, actually, I will say to you that this phrase and that phrase are both referring to a gentile, and with regard to that which you say, that this is the same as the statement concerning his object of idol worship or that of another gentile, it can be explained as follows: The first clause is referring to a case where both gentiles worship the same idol, e.g., this one and that one both worship Peor, or this one and that one both worship Mercury, and the <i>baraita</i> is teaching that one can revoke the status of an idol that belongs to the other. The latter clause, which distinguishes between one who worships it and one who does not worship it, is referring to a case where this one worships Peor and that one worships Mercury, indicating that an idolater can revoke the status of an idol that he does not worship at all, but only if he is himself an idolater, as opposed to a <i>ger toshav</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Who is a <i>ger toshav</i>? It is anyone who has accepted upon himself before three <i>ḥaverim</i>, i.e., people devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, <i>teruma</i>, and tithes, not to worship idols. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  And the Rabbis say: Anyone who has accepted upon himself observance of the seven mitzvot that the descendants of Noah accepted upon themselves is a <i>ger toshav</i>.
  Others say: These have not entered the category of <i>ger toshav</i>. Rather, who is a <i>ger toshav</i>? This is a convert who eats unslaughtered animal carcasses, which are not kosher, but who has accepted upon himself to observe all of the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah except for the prohibition against eating unslaughtered carcasses.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Whatever the definition of a <i>ger toshav</i>, the following <i>halakhot</i> apply to him: One may leave him alone with wine briefly without Jewish supervision with no concern that he might use it for a libation, thereby rendering it forbidden to Jews, as he is not an idol worshipper. But one may not deposit wine with him for an extended period of time, lest he exchange it with the wine of a gentile, which is forbidden. And this applies even in a town that has a Jewish majority. But one may leave him alone with wine briefly without Jewish supervision even in a town with a majority of gentiles. His oil is treated like his wine in terms of its permissibility.
  The Gemara interjects: His oil is like his wine? Can this enter your mind? Does the oil of a gentile become, i.e., assume the status of, wine used for a libation? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> should be emended as follows: His wine is like his oil. It is permitted to derive benefit from it, but not to consume it.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And with regard to all other matters, a <i>ger toshav</i> is treated like a gentile. Rabban Shimon says: His wine is treated like wine used for a libation. And some say he says: Even drinking it is permitted.
  The Gemara comments on the <i>baraita</i>: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches: And with regard to all other matters, a <i>ger toshav</i> is treated like a gentile. With regard to what <i>halakha</i> is this stated? Is it not teaching that he can revoke the status of an object of idol worship as a gentile can? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: No, it is stated with regard to giving away rights in a domain or renouncing rights in a domain in the context of the <i>halakhot</i> of joining houses in courtyards for Shabbat.
  And this is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: An apostate Jew who nevertheless observes his Shabbat in the marketplace, i.e., in public, can renounce his rights in a shared domain so the other Jews in the domain may carry in it on Shabbat, but an apostate who does not observe his Shabbat even in the marketplace cannot renounce his rights in a domain, because the Sages said that only a Jew can give away rights in his domain or renounce his rights in his domain, and this applies in the context of joining houses in courtyards on Shabbat.
  But with regard to a gentile, this is not effective unless the Jew leases his domain in the courtyard. How so? A Jew may say to another Jew: My rights in this domain are hereby acquired by you, or: My rights in this domain are hereby renounced to you, and the other Jew thereby acquires those rights, and it is not necessary for him to take possession of it through a formal act of acquisition.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Yehuda sent a gift
  
  Daf 65a
  
  to a gentile named Avidarna on their festival day. Rav Yehuda said: I know of him that he does not worship idols, so he is not considered a gentile with regard to the prohibition against giving a gift to a gentile on their festival. Rav Yosef said to him: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Who is a <i>ger toshav</i>? It is anyone who has accepted upon himself before three <i>ḥaverim</i> to not worship idols. Avidarna had not accepted this upon himself before three Jews. Rav Yehuda replied to him: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is with regard to the mitzva to sustain him.
  Rav Yosef further objected: But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A <i>ger toshav</i> for whom twelve months passed without him circumcising himself is considered as a heretic of the gentiles, and certainly this Avidarna is not circumcised. Rav Yehuda replied: There, Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to a case where the gentile who desired to become a <i>ger toshav</i> took it upon himself to become circumcised, but he recanted and did not circumcise himself, and in such a case it is assumed that he did not circumcise himself due to apostasy. Generally, in the case of a <i>ger toshav</i> who did not take this upon himself, this is not required of him.
  The Gemara relates: Rava brought a gift to a minister named bar Sheshakh on their festival day. Rava said: I know of him that he does not worship idols. Rava went to him and found him sitting up to his neck in rose water, and naked prostitutes were standing before him. Bar Sheshakh said to him: Do you have anything as fine as this in the World-to-Come? Rava said to him: Ours is better than this. Bar Sheshakh said to him: Is there anything finer than this? Rava said to him: You have the fear of the government upon you; we will not have the fear of the government upon us in the World-to-Come. Bar Sheshakh said to him: As for me, in any event, what fear of the government is there upon me? I am a powerful man.
  While they were sitting, a certain royal officer [<i>peristaka</i>] came and said to bar Sheshakh: Rise, as the king requires you to appear before him. As he was going out, he said to Rava: May any eye that wishes to see evil upon you burst, as it is clear that you were correct. Rava said to him: Amen. And then bar Sheshakh’s eye burst.
  Rav Pappi said: Rava should have said a response to him from this verse: “Kings’ daughters are among your favorites; at your right hand stands the queen in gold of Ophir” (Psalms 45:10), indicating that in the World-to-Come, the daughters of kings will serve the Jewish people. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: He should have said a response to him from here: The reward of the Jewish people will be such that “no eye has seen it, God, aside from You, Who will do for those who await Him” (Isaiah 64:3).
  § The mishna teaches: If the gentile hired him to do other work with him, even if he said to him while he was working with him: Transport the barrel of wine used for a libation for me from this place to that place, his wage is permitted, i.e., it is permitted for the Jew to derive benefit from the money. The Gemara notes that this formulation of the mishna indicates that this wage is permitted even if the gentile did not say to him to transport the barrel of wine toward evening, i.e., toward the end of his workday.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who hires a laborer, and toward evening the employer said to him: Transport this barrel of wine used for a libation from this place to that place, his wage is permitted. By inference, the reason for this ruling is that the employer said it to him toward evening, and therefore yes, it is permitted, as it is clear that he has completed the labor for which he is being paid and the wage is not for moving the barrel. But if this happened during the entire day, not toward evening, this would not be permitted.
  Abaye said: When we learned this in the mishna as well, we learned this with regard to the case where the employer said this toward evening. Rava said: This is not difficult. This case, where the wage is forbidden if it was not toward evening, is a case where the employer said to him: Transport one hundred barrels for me for one hundred <i>perutot</i>, in which case moving all of the barrels is considered a single task, and if one of the barrels was wine used for a libation, the entire wage is forbidden. That case, in which the wage is permitted in any event, is a case where the employer said to him: Transport each barrel for me for one <i>peruta</i>, such that each barrel is its own task.
  And so it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who hires a laborer and said to him: Transport one hundred barrels for me for one hundred <i>perutot</i>, and a barrel of wine used for a libation was found among them, his wage is forbidden. But if the employer said to him: Transport each barrel for one <i>peruta</i>, and there was a barrel of wine used for a libation among them, his wage is permitted.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to a gentile who rents a Jew’s donkey to carry wine used for a libation on it, its rental fee is forbidden. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this additional clause? This is the same as the first clause, as the principle is the same; only the example is different. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach the latter clause in order to teach that if the gentile rented the donkey to sit upon it, even if the gentile placed his jug of wine used for a libation on it, its rental fee is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that it is not the legal right of the renter to place a jug upon the donkey, and therefore placing the jug on the donkey was not included in the rental?
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who rents a donkey to ride on, the renter may place on it his garment, his water jug, and his food for that journey. Beyond those items, the donkey driver, who would take the renter on the journey, may prevent him from placing anything on the animal by saying that he does not wish to further burden the donkey. The donkey driver may place on it barley and hay for the donkey and his food for that first day alone. Beyond those items, the renter may prevent him from placing anything on the animal, on the grounds that it will inhibit its progress.
  Abaye said: Granted that it is the legal right of the renter to place a jug upon the donkey, but in any event, if he does not place it on the donkey, can we say to the driver: Deduct the fee of his jug from the rental? Since the donkey driver will not deduct any amount from the rental fee if he does not place the jug on the donkey, therefore, even if he does place it, the rental fee is not forbidden.
  With regard to the main point of the <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If locations in which one is able to purchase provisions on the way are common, the donkey driver can also prevent the renter from putting provisions on the donkey for the entire journey, and if locations in which one is able to purchase provisions along the way are uncommon, the renter cannot prevent the driver from taking his provisions for the journey either.
  Rav Pappa said: No, it is necessary to teach this <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where locations in which one is able to go to the trouble of purchasing provisions are common between station and station, i.e., one can find locations to purchase provisions along the way, but only with difficulty. A donkey driver is accustomed to troubling himself to purchase provisions along the way, so it is not permitted for him to pack provisions for the entire journey on the donkey. A renter is not accustomed to troubling himself to purchase provisions along the way, so he is allowed to pack all of his provisions.
  The Gemara relates: The father of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika,
  
  Daf 65b
  
  would pour wine which he sold to gentiles into their wineskins and go and ferry them over the crossing, and they would give him the jugs in which the wine had been stored as payment. The jugs that the wine had been stored in were included in the sale, and the gentiles would pay him by returning the jugs. People came and told Abaye that Rav Ika was accepting a wage from the wine of gentiles. Abaye said to them: When he labored, he labored with permitted wine, since he was pouring kosher wine into the wineskins, and only subsequently the wine was rendered forbidden by being in the possession of the gentiles.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t he desire the preservation of the wine in the wineskins in that the wineskins should not be torn, as he would then need to return the jugs he received in payment? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he stipulated with the gentile purchasers that even if the wineskins were to tear it would be at their expense and not his, and he would keep the jugs in any event. Alternatively, it is a case where the gentile purchasers brought barrels [<i>perisdakei</i>] with them, so that they could pour the wine into them should the wineskins be torn.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t he ferry them over the crossing, which is laboring with forbidden wine? The Gemara answers: This is not a case where he was ferrying the wine over the crossing himself, as he made an arrangement with the ferrymen and said to the ferryman initially that the latter would ferry the buyers and the barrels without payment. Alternatively, it was a case where he held special signal knots in collusion with the ferryman that he would ferry these people without payment. In any event, he was not laboring for them himself.
  MISHNA: In the case of wine used for a libation that fell on grapes, one rinses them and they are permitted. But if the grapes were cracked, they are forbidden. In a case where the wine fell on figs or on dates, if there is sufficient wine in them to impart flavor, they are forbidden. And there was an incident involving Boethus ben Zunen, who transported dried figs in a ship, and a barrel of wine used for a libation broke and fell on them, and he asked the Sages as to the <i>halakha</i>, and the Sages deemed the figs permitted.
  This is the principle: Anything that benefits from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it, i.e., the forbidden item contributes a positive taste to it, is forbidden, and anything that does not benefit from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is permitted, such as forbidden vinegar that fell onto split beans, as the flavor imparted by the vinegar does not enhance the taste of the beans.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the incident related in the mishna: Was an incident cited to contradict the <i>halakha</i> stated immediately before it? The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: If the wine imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, the food is permitted. And there was also an incident involving Boethus ben Zunen, who was transporting dried figs in a ship, and a barrel of wine used for a libation broke and fell on them, and the incident came before the Sages, and the Sages deemed the figs permitted because the flavor given by the wine did not enhance their taste but was instead to their detriment.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain heap of wheat upon which a barrel of wine used for a libation fell. Rava permitted selling it to gentiles, as deriving benefit from it is not prohibited.
  Rabba bar Livai raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a garment in which diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, have been lost, i.e., it is known that linen fibers became mixed into a woolen garment but they cannot be detected and removed, one may not sell the garment to a gentile, nor fashion it into a saddlecloth for a donkey, but one may make it into shrouds for a corpse with no one to bury it [<i>met mitzva</i>], as a corpse is not obligated in the observance of mitzvot.
  Rabba bar Livai asked: What is the reason that it is not permitted to sell it to a gentile? Perhaps he will come to sell it to a Jew, who will not know that it is forbidden. Here too, with regard to the wheat, the gentile purchasers may come to sell it to a Jew, who is prohibited from consuming it.
  Rava then retracted his decision and permitted grinding the wheat and baking bread with it and selling it to gentiles not in the presence of Jews. In this manner, Jews will not be likely to buy bread from the gentiles, as the bread of gentiles is forbidden to Jews.
  We learned in the mishna: In the case of wine used for a libation that fell on grapes, one rinses them and they are permitted. But if the grapes were cracked, they are forbidden. The Gemara infers: If the grapes are cracked, they are forbidden, but grapes that are not cracked are not forbidden. If so, what is the cause for concern in the case where wine spilled on the wheat? It should be sufficient to rinse the wheat. Rav Pappa said: Wheat is different, since, because of its slits, its status is similar to that of grapes that are cracked.
  
  Daf 66a
  
  § With regard to old wine used for a libation that fell onto grapes, all agree that the grapes are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them. With regard to new wine used for a libation, i.e., wine that had just been squeezed and has not yet fermented, that fell onto grapes, Abaye says that any amount renders the grapes forbidden, and Rava says that they are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them.
  The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Abaye says that any amount renders them forbidden because he maintains that when categorizing substances in the context of the <i>halakhot</i> of mixtures we follow the flavor, and this wine and those grapes are of the same flavor, which renders it a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance. And the principle is that in a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden.
  And Rava says that the grapes are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to them because he maintains that when categorizing substances in the context of the <i>halakhot</i> of mixtures we follow the name, and this wine has a discrete name, and those grapes have their own discrete name. And accordingly, this is a case of a substance in contact with a different type of substance. And the principle is that in a case of a substance in contact with a different type of substance, the mixture is forbidden only in a case where the forbidden item imparts flavor to it.
  We learned in the mishna that in the case of wine used for a libation that fell on cracked grapes, the grapes are forbidden. It enters our mind that this is referring to new wine falling on grapes. What, is it not the intention of the mishna that they are forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the grapes? If so, then it is the name that counts, as the flavor of the wine in this case is the same as the grapes. The Gemara rejects this premise: No, the mishna means that any amount of the wine renders the grapes forbidden.
  The Gemara challenges this explanation. But from the fact that the mishna teaches in the last clause: This is the principle: Anything that benefits from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is forbidden, and anything that does not benefit from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is permitted, by inference, we are dealing with a case where the forbidden item imparts flavor to the permitted item.
  And how does Abaye explain this? In his opinion, the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to old wine that fell onto grapes, which are not of the same flavor, so it is reasonable that the grapes are rendered forbidden by an amount that imparts flavor.
  This dispute between Abaye and Rava applies to another case as well. With regard to the case of wine vinegar and malt vinegar that became mixed together, and one is permitted and the other is forbidden, and also the case of leaven of wheat flour and leaven of barley flour that became mixed together, and one is permitted and the other is forbidden, Abaye says: The forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden in a case where it imparts flavor to the mixture, because we follow the flavor, and this flavor is discrete and that flavor is discrete, and therefore it becomes a mixture of a type of food mixed with food not of its own type. And a type of food mixed with food not of its own type is forbidden in a case where the forbidden food imparts flavor to the mixture.
  And Rava says: Any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden, in accordance with his opinion that we follow the name, and this is called vinegar and that is called vinegar, and this is called leaven and that is called leaven, and therefore it becomes a mixture of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, and in any case of a type of food mixed with food of its own type, any amount of the forbidden substance renders the mixture forbidden.
  Abaye says: From where do I say that we follow the flavor? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Forbidden spices that are known by two or three different names but are of the same species, or of three different species, are forbidden, and combine together to render a dish forbidden. And Ḥizkiyya says: The reason the three species combine to render the dish forbidden is that here we are dealing with types of sweet spices. Since they are all fit to sweeten the dish, they combine, as they impart the same kind of flavor. Abaye explains: Granted, if you say we follow the flavor, they are all considered the same flavor, and therefore they combine. But if you say we follow the name, why should they combine to render the dish forbidden? This name is discrete and that name is discrete.
  And Rava could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that all forbidden foods combine, whether or not they have the same name or the same flavor, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Meir: From where is it derived that any foods forbidden by the Torah that fall into a mixture combine with one another to render a mixture forbidden? As it is stated: “You shall not eat anything abominable” (Deuteronomy 14:3), which indicates that anything that I have made abominable, i.e., forbidden, to you, is prohibited for consumption, and therefore all of these prohibitions are actually a single general prohibition.
  With regard to forbidden vinegar that fell into a barrel of wine, all agree that the mixture is forbidden in a case where the forbidden vinegar imparts flavor to the mixture. In a case of forbidden wine that spilled into vinegar, since the sharper smell of the vinegar overwhelms the smell of the wine before it mixes in, Abaye says that any amount of the wine renders the mixture forbidden, and Rava says that it is forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the vinegar.
  The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Abaye says that any amount renders the mixture forbidden,
  
  Daf 66b
  
  because a liquid whose smell is vinegar and its flavor is wine is considered vinegar, and the wine, when it spilled into the barrel of vinegar, took on the smell of vinegar from the moment it reached the airspace of the barrel, and it has therefore become a type of food mixed with food of its own type. And any type of forbidden food mixed with food of its own type renders the mixture forbidden by any amount.
  Rava says that the mixture is forbidden only in a case where the wine imparts flavor to the vinegar, because a liquid whose smell is vinegar and its flavor is wine is considered wine, and it has therefore become a type of food mixed with food not of its own type. And any type of forbidden food mixed with food not of its own type renders the mixture forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to the mixture.
  § With regard to this bunghole [<i>bat tiha</i>], the hole in a barrel through which one can smell the wine, if a gentile smells a Jew’s wine through it, the wine is permitted, but for a Jew to smell a gentile’s wine through it, Abaye says that it is prohibited, whereas Rava says that it is permitted. Abaye says that it is prohibited because he holds that a smell is a substantial matter, a significant form of pleasure, and it is not permitted to derive benefit from a gentile’s wine. Rava says it is permitted because he holds that a smell is nothing; it is insignificant.
  Rava says: From where do I say that a smell is nothing? It is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 10:4): With regard to an oven that one lit with cumin stalks of <i>teruma</i> and baked bread in it, the bread is permitted because it has not absorbed the flavor of the cumin stalks but only the smell of the cumin stalks. This indicates that smell alone does not render a food forbidden. And how does Abaye explain this? He answers that it is different there, as the forbidden substance was burned. The smell of the forbidden cumin stalks entered the bread after the cumin stalks themselves were consumed by the fire, and a smell that is not from an extant substance is not forbidden. By contrast, in a case where the smell is from an extant source, it is forbidden.
  Rav Mari said: This dispute between Abaye and Rava is paral-lel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 10:3): With regard to one who detached a hot loaf of bread from the oven and placed it on the opening of a barrel of wine of <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, Rabbi Meir deems the bread forbidden to non-priests, as in his opinion the smell of the wine renders the bread forbidden to them, and Rabbi Yehuda deems it permitted. Rabbi Yosei deems it permitted in a case of wheat bread but deems it forbidden in a case of barley bread, because the barley draws out the fumes of the wine. Rav Mari explains: What, is it not with regard to this matter that the Sages in the mishna disagree: That one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a smell is a substantial matter, and one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that a smell is nothing?
  The Gemara remarks: According to the opinion of Rava, the dispute between him and Abaye is certainly parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as he must concede that Rabbi Meir holds that a smell is a substantial matter. But according to the opinion of Abaye, shall we say that it is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>?
  The Gemara answers: Abaye could say to you that Rabbi Yehuda also holds that a smell is a substantial matter. Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel,
  
  Daf 67a
  
  everyone agrees that it is forbidden, as the bread certainly absorbed of the smell of the wine? Furthermore, in the case of a cool loaf of bread and a stoppered barrel, everyone agrees that it is permitted. They disagree only with regard to the case of a hot loaf of bread and a stoppered barrel, or in the case of a cool loaf of bread and an open barrel. And this case of mine, i.e., the case of the bunghole, is also comparable to the case of a hot loaf of bread and an open barrel, in which everyone agrees that the bread is forbidden.
  § It is stated in the mishna: This is the principle: Anything that benefits from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it, i.e., the forbidden item contributes a positive taste to it, is forbidden, and anything that does not benefit from a forbidden item imparting flavor to it is permitted, e.g., forbidden vinegar that fell onto split beans, as the flavor imparted by the vinegar does not enhance the taste of the beans. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This is the <i>halakha</i>.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The Sages taught this only with regard to a case where the vinegar fell into hot split beans, imparting flavor to their detriment. But if the vinegar fell into cold split beans, the vinegar enhances the flavor, and if one subsequently heated them, it becomes like a dish that some added ingredient first enhanced its flavor and ultimately detracted from it, and it is rendered forbidden, as the initial flavor that was imparted was beneficial.
  And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he reported that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught this only with regard to the case where the vinegar fell into hot split beans. But if the vinegar fell into cold split beans and one subsequently heated the mixture, it becomes like a dish that some added ingredient first enhanced its flavor and ultimately detracted from it, and it is rendered forbidden. And similarly, when Rav Dimi came, he also reported this in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan and added: And they would prepare this dish of split beans and vinegar on the eves of Shabbat in Tzippori, and they would call it cress dish.
  § Reish Lakish says: With regard to the principle that the Sages said, that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture it remains permitted, the criterion is not that people would say: This dish is lacking in salt or is overabundant in salt, is lacking in spices or is overabundant in spices, and that is why its flavor was detracted by the forbidden food. Rather, it is referring to any dish that is not lacking in anything, but will not be eaten only because of this forbidden substance that fell into it.
  And there are those who say that Reish Lakish states a lenient interpretation of the principle: With regard to that which Sages said that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture, it remains permitted, one does not say that a certain food is forbidden because its flavor was not actually detracted by the forbidden substance, as this dish is lacking in salt or is overabundant in salt, is lacking in spices or is overabundant in spices, and it is for that reason that the forbidden substance detracted from its flavor. Rather, since now, in any event, the forbidden substance detracted from its flavor, it is permitted.
  § Furthermore, with regard to a forbidden food that became mixed with a permitted food, Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In any case where the flavor and substance of the forbidden food are perceptible in the mixture, the mixture is forbidden, and one is flogged for consuming it. And it is a tradition that this is the measure for such a case: One who eats an olive-bulk of the forbidden element in the mixture in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is liable for eating the forbidden food.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  But if only the flavor of the forbidden food is recognizable in the mixture, but not its substance, as it was completely dissolved into the permitted food, the mixture is forbidden, but one is not flogged for consuming it. And if the forbidden food amplified the flavor of the permitted food to its detriment, it is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: But then let Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If the forbidden food imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, it is permitted. Why does he use the term: Amplified? The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us: That even if there are other substances that detracted from the flavor of the mixture along with the forbidden food, e.g., insufficient salt or excessive seasoning, this is not taken into consideration; since the forbidden food detracted from its flavor, the mixture is permitted. The Gemara comments: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the last version of the statement of Reish Lakish.
  § Rav Kahana says: From the statements of all the <i>amora’im</i> who were cited, namely, Shmuel, Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Reish Lakish, we learn that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture, it is permitted. Abaye said to him: Granted, from all the rest of them this conclusion is very well; but how can this be concluded from the statement of Reish Lakish? He says only that the Sages said that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to its detriment, the mixture is permitted. Perhaps he is only citing what others said and he himself does not hold accordingly.
  The Gemara asks with regard to Rav Kahana’s statement: By inference, is there one who says that if a forbidden food imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture, it is forbidden?
  The Gemara answer: Yes, and this opinion is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Both in a case where the forbidden food imparts flavor to the detriment of the flavor of the permitted food, and in a case where it imparts flavor that enhances the permitted food, the mixture is forbidden; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: If it enhances the flavor it is forbidden, but if it causes it detriment it is permitted.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir? He derives this <i>halakha</i> from the case of vessels of gentiles that require purging, i.e., vessels that gentiles used for cooking, which the Torah requires that one purge through fire and ritually purify before they may be used by Jews (see Numbers 31:22–23 and mishna on 75b). Is it not the case that vessels of gentiles that require purging impart flavor to food that is cooked in them to their detriment? Since time has passed since the gentiles cooked non-kosher food in the vessels, the flavor that the vessels transmit to food that a Jew cooks in them is certainly detrimental, and yet the Merciful One deems their use prohibited without purging. So too, the case here is no different, and even if the flavor imparted by the forbidden food is a detrimental one, the mixture should be forbidden.
  And the opinion of the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Shimon, who deems the mixture permitted if the flavor imparted is detrimental, can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Ḥiyya; as Rav Huna, son of Rav Ḥiyya, says: With regard to the vessels of gentiles, the Torah prohibits only a pot that was used for cooking on that very day, which does not yet impart flavor to the detriment of the food cooked in it. Rather, the flavor that it imparts is not considered detrimental. And the opinion of the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Meir, can also be explained in accordance with this statement, as in his opinion, even in the case of a pot that was used for cooking on that very day, it is not possible that it does not detract from the flavor of food that is subsequently cooked in it even slightly.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that from the verse: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal carcass; you may give it to the resident alien [<i>la’ger</i>] who is within your gates, that he may eat it” (Deuteronomy 14:21), it is derived that with regard to animal carcasses, anything that is fit for a <i>ger</i> <i>toshav</i> to consume is called an unslaughtered carcass and is forbidden,
  
  Daf 68a
  
  and any carcass that is unfit even for a <i>ger</i> <i>toshav</i> to consume, e.g., one that turned rancid and is unfit for consumption, is not called an unslaughtered carcass with regard to its prohibition.
  And what can Rabbi Meir respond to this? He could say: That verse is written to exclude meat that was rancid at the outset, i.e., that was not fit for consumption even before the animal’s death, due to a defect in the animal. By contrast, a carcass that was fit for consumption when the animal died and was consequently rendered forbidden remains forbidden even when it becomes rancid. And Rabbi Shimon could counter that meat that was rancid at the outset does not need specific exclusion by the verse, as it is considered as mere dust and does not fall under the category of an unslaughtered animal carcass.
  § Ulla says: This dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to a forbidden food that enhanced the flavor of a dish when it first fell into it and subsequently detracted from its flavor. In this case Rabbi Meir deems the dish forbidden, since the forbidden food enhanced its flavor at the outset. But in a case of forbidden food that detracted from the flavor of the dish at the outset, everyone agrees that it is permitted.
  Rav Ḥagga raised an objection to the opinion of Ulla from a <i>baraita</i>: Forbidden wine that fell into lentils, or forbidden vinegar that fell into split beans, renders the food forbidden. And Rabbi Shimon deems them permitted. But here it is a case where the forbidden food detracted from the flavor of the dish at the outset, and the <i>tanna’im</i> disagree.
  Ulla said: Ḥagga does not know what the Sages say, yet he raises an objection? Here we are dealing with a case where the vinegar fell into the cold split beans and one subsequently heated them, in which case it becomes like a forbidden food that enhanced the flavor of the mixture and subsequently detracted from it, as vinegar enhances the flavor of cold split beans, and it is consequently forbidden according to Rabbi Meir.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon is with regard to a case where the forbidden food detracts from the flavor of the permitted food from the outset.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Yoḥanan mean that the dispute is with regard to a case where the forbidden food detracts from its flavor from the outset, but if it enhanced it at first and subsequently detracted from it, everyone agrees that it is forbidden? Or, perhaps he means that the dispute is both in this case and in that case. The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rav Amram said: Is it possible that there is substance to this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, i.e., that there is disagreement with regard to a case where the forbidden food detracts from the flavor of the permitted food from the outset, but it is not taught in the Mishna?
  Rav Amram went out, examined the Mishna, and discovered that this dispute is taught in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 2:8): In the case of non-sacred leaven that fell into the dough, and there is enough of it to cause the dough to become leavened, and the dough indeed became leavened, and subsequently leaven of <i>teruma</i>, or leaven of forbidden diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, fell into this dough, and there is enough of it to cause the dough to become leavened, the dough is forbidden, because the forbidden leaven is considered to have contributed to the process of the leavening. But Rabbi Shimon deems the dough permitted, because the additional leaven has a negative impact on the dough, which was already leavened.
  Rav Amram comments: But here it is a case where the forbidden substance detracted from the flavor of the dough at the outset, and Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon disagree, as a mishna that is not attributed explicitly to a <i>tanna</i> represents the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Zeira said: Dough is different, because even if the additional leaven is detrimental to its flavor, in any event the dough is enhanced, since it is suitable for leavening several other batches of dough with it. The more it is leavened, the more it is enhanced in terms of this purpose.
  The Gemara suggests another source for the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Come and hear that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of leaven of <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred leaven that fell into the dough, if this one was sufficient to cause the dough to become leavened and that one was sufficient to cause the dough to become leavened, and they both cause the dough to become leavened, it is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted. If the leaven of <i>teruma</i> fell in first, everyone agrees that it is forbidden. If the non-sacred leaven fell in first and subsequently the leaven of <i>teruma</i> or of diverse kinds that were planted in a vineyard fell in, this is also forbidden; but Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted.
  The Gemara comments: But here it is a case where the forbidden substance detracted from the flavor of the dough from the outset, and they disagree. And if you would say: Here too,
  
  Daf 68b
  
  this can be explained in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Zeira that dough is different because it is enhanced in any event, come and hear a refutation of that explanation from the latter clause of the same <i>baraita</i>: Forbidden wine that fell into lentils or forbidden vinegar that fell into split beans renders the food forbidden. And Rabbi Shimon deems them permitted. And here also, it is a case where the forbidden substance detracted from the flavor of the dough from the outset, and they disagree.
  And if you would say: Here too, it can be explained as Ulla responded to Rabbi Ḥagga, that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case when the vinegar enhanced the flavor of the split beans and subsequently detracted from it, e.g., where it spilled into cold split beans and then they were heated, this cannot be said, as do they actually disagree in a case when the forbidden substance enhanced the flavor of the permitted food and subsequently detracted from it? But isn’t it taught in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> that if the leaven of <i>teruma</i> fell in first, before the non-sacred leaven, everyone agrees that it renders the dough forbidden, as it enhanced the flavor of the dough at the outset, even though the flavor was subsequently detracted from by the non-sacred leaven?
  Rather, must one not conclude from it that the dispute is with regard to a case where the forbidden substance detracted from the flavor of the food from the outset? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to those three clauses that the <i>baraita</i> teaches concerning different cases, why do I need all three of them? Granted, the last clause, concerning the wine spilling into the lentils, teaches us that the dispute is with regard to a case where the forbidden substance detracts from the flavor of the food from the outset. The middle clause, with regard to the case where the leaven of <i>teruma</i> fell in first, also teaches a novel <i>halakha</i>, which is that in the case of a forbidden substance that enhanced the flavor of the food and subsequently detracted from it, everyone agrees that the mixture is forbidden.
  But why do I need the first clause, concerning the case of non-sacred leaven and leaven of <i>teruma</i> falling into the dough together? It could have been inferred from the other two clauses that the dough is forbidden, in the following manner: Now that in the case of the last clause, where the forbidden substance does not enhance the permitted food at all, the Rabbis deem it forbidden, is it necessary to say that it is forbidden in the first clause, where the forbidden substance enhances the food’s flavor at first before detracting from it?
  Abaye said: The first clause is necessary to teach that Rabbi Shimon deems it permitted. And this is what the Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: This dough was fit to become leavened in two hours if the permitted leaven had fallen into it alone. What caused it to become leavened in one hour? The forbidden leaven. Therefore, the dough is forbidden.
  And Rabbi Shimon could respond that when the two types of leaven enhanced the flavor of the dough, they both enhanced it, not only the forbidden leaven; and when they subsequently detracted from it, they both detracted from it. Therefore, it is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, let the permitted leaven and the forbidden leaven combine together and render the dough forbidden, since Rabbi Shimon concedes that if the permitted food was initially enhanced by the forbidden substance it is forbidden.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Shimon conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that even a forbidden substance and another forbidden substance do not combine to render a mixture forbidden. Accordingly, a forbidden substance and a permitted substance certainly do not.
  The Gemara comments: This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 18a): If <i>orla</i> and diverse kinds planted in a vineyard fell into a permitted substance, and neither one is sufficient in its own quantity to render the mixture forbidden, they combine to render it forbidden if together they are of a sufficient quantity. Rabbi Shimon says: They do not combine, and each forbidden substance is treated individually. Here too, since when the forbidden leaven enhanced the dough, it was not sufficient to enhance it by itself, the permitted leaven does not combine with it to render the dough forbidden.
  § The Gemara recounts an incident involving a certain mouse that fell into a barrel of beer. Rav deemed that barrel of beer forbidden. The Sages said before Rav Sheshet: Shall we say that Rav maintains that even in a case where the forbidden substance imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, it is forbidden? Presumably, the mouse imparted flavor to the detriment of the beer.
  Rav Sheshet said to them: Rav generally maintains that in a case where the forbidden substance imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, it is permitted. But here, in the case of a mouse, it is a novelty that the Torah prohibits the flavor from a mouse at all, as it is repulsive and people distance themselves from consuming it, and even so the Merciful One prohibits it. Therefore, although it imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, it is still forbidden.
  The Sages said to Rav Sheshet: If that is so, that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a mouse is considered a novelty and is therefore understood to be more stringent than the norm, then a dead mouse should impart ritual impurity whether it is moist or dried out. Why did we learn in a mishna (<i>Nidda</i> 54b) that carcasses of creeping animals impart impurity when they are moist but do not impart impurity when they are dried out?
  Rav Sheshet responded: And according to your reasoning, in which you compare the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity to forbidden foods, then with regard to semen, which is also repulsive, it should impart impurity whether moist or dried out. Why did we learn in a mishna (<i>Nidda</i> 54b) that semen imparts impurity when it is moist but it does not impart impurity when it is dried out?
  Rather, what have you to say? With regard to the ritual impurity of semen, the Merciful One states: “The flow of seed” (Leviticus 15:16), meaning that the reference is to semen that is fit to fertilize. Here too, with regard to the ritual impurity of a mouse, the verse states: “When they have died” (Leviticus 11:32). The Merciful One states that the carcasses of creeping animals impart impurity only when they are similar to their state at time of their death, i.e., when they are still moist. Therefore, there is no contradiction to the claim that the prohibition against eating a mouse is a novelty and consequently applies even when it detracted from the flavor of the food into which it fell.
  Rav Shimi of Neharde’a objects to the assumption that a mouse is repulsive: And is it repulsive? But isn’t it served at the table of kings and considered a delicacy? Rav Shimi of Neharde’a said in clarification: This is not difficult. This statement, that a mouse is served as a delicacy, is stated with regard to a field mouse, and that statement, that it is repulsive, is stated with regard to a city mouse.
  Rava said: The <i>halakha</i> is that if the forbidden substance imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture, it is permitted. But with regard to a mouse that fell into a barrel of beer, I do not know what the reason was that Rav deemed it forbidden. I do not know whether it was because he maintains that if the forbidden substance imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture it is forbidden, and if so, the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with his opinion, or whether it was because although he maintains that if the forbidden substance imparts flavor to the detriment of the mixture it is permitted, a mouse that falls into beer enhances its flavor.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages:
  
  Daf 69a
  
  If a mouse fell into vinegar, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does it enhance its flavor? Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: There was such an incident in the study hall of Rav Kahana, and Rav Kahana deemed the vinegar forbidden. This indicates that it enhances the flavor. Rav Ashi said to him: This is not a proof. That mouse was dismembered, and Rav Kahana deemed the vinegar forbidden due to concern that one might consume a substantive piece of the mouse in the vinegar, which is prohibited regardless of the taste.
  The Gemara relates: Ravina thought that the quantity of vinegar necessary for nullifying the flavor of the mouse should be calculated at 101 times the volume of the mouse. He said: It should not be rendered worse, i.e., more stringent, than <i>teruma</i>, which is nullified by 101 times its volume in a mixture. This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 4:7): <i>Teruma</i> is nullified in a mixture by 101 times its volume of permitted food. Rav Taḥlifa bar Giza said to Ravina: Perhaps this case is similar to spice of <i>teruma</i> in a pot, whose flavor is not nullified even by 101 times its volume of permitted food, as the flavor imparted by spice is exceptionally strong.
  Rav Aḥai calculated the amount of vinegar necessary to nullify the flavor of the mouse at fifty times its volume. Although forbidden food in a mixture usually requires the presence of sixty times its volume of permitted food to be nullified, vinegar has a sharp enough flavor that it nullifies the mouse with less. Rav Shmuel, son of Rav Ika, calculated the amount of beer necessary for nullifying the mouse at sixty times the volume of the mouse.
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that this and that, both vinegar and beer, nullify the mouse with sixty times its volume, and so is the ruling for all prohibitions in the Torah.
  MISHNA: With regard to a gentile who was transporting barrels of wine from one place to another place together with a Jew, if the wine was under the presumption of being supervised, it is permitted. But if the Jew notified him that he was going far away, the wine is forbidden if the Jew left for a sufficient amount of time for the gentile to bore a hole [<i>sheyishtom</i>] in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The wine is forbidden only if it was sufficient time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper altogether, stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
  With regard to one who placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship with a gentile, and went on his way by a shortcut [<i>bekappendarya</i>], such that the gentile does not know when the Jew will encounter him, even if the Jew entered the city and bathed, the wine is permitted, because the gentile would not use the wine for a libation, for fear the owner might catch him at it.
  If the Jew informed the gentile that he was going away for a long period of time, the wine is forbidden if it was sufficient time for the gentile to bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is forbidden only if it was sufficient time for him to open the barrel by removing the stopper altogether, stop it again, and for the new stopper to dry.
  With regard to one who left a gentile in his shop, even if the Jew went out and came in and was not there all the time, the wine is permitted. But if the Jew informed the gentile that he was going away for a long period of time, the wine is forbidden if it was sufficient time for the gentile to bore a hole in the barrel, seal it again with plaster, and for the plaster to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The wine is forbidden only if it was sufficient time for him to open the barrel, stop it again, and for the new stopper to dry.
  If a Jew was eating with a gentile at the table, and left jugs [<i>laginin</i>] of wine on the table and a jug on the side table [<i>hadulebaki</i>], and he left it and went out, what is on the table is forbidden, as it is likely that the gentile handled it, whereas what is on the side table is permitted. But if the Jew said to the gentile: Mix water with the wine and drink, even the jug that is on the side table is forbidden. Similarly, open barrels are forbidden, but sealed barrels are permitted unless the Jew was out of the room for sufficient time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper, and stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
  GEMARA: What are the circumstances described by the phrase: Under the presumption of being supervised? The Gemara explains: It is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one’s donkey drivers and laborers were unreliable with regard to ritual impurity [<i>amei ha’aretz</i>], and they were laden with wine or produce that was ritually pure, and he had instructed them not to tamper with it but he does not know whether or not they heeded him, even if he went away from them to a distance of more than a <i>mil</i>, his pure items are still pure, as it may be presumed that they heeded his instructions. But if he said to them: Go and I will come after you, so that they knew he would not be going with them, then once they are out of his sight his pure items are impure.
  The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause, where the produce is pure, and what is different in the latter clause, where it is impure? Rav Yitzḥak said: The ruling of the first clause is stated with regard to a case where he purified his donkey drivers and laborers for this assignment by having them immerse so they would not transfer impurity to the produce.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, in the latter clause this would also apply. The Gemara answers: An <i>am ha’aretz</i> is not punctilious about contact with another person. Although they themselves were purified, they may have met another <i>am ha’aretz</i> on the way, and the produce would be rendered impure by him. The Gemara further objects: If so, then let us say so even in the first clause; the produce should be impure in that case as well.
  Rava said:
  
  Daf 69b
  
  It is a case where he came to them in a roundabout way, such that they would not know from where he might appear, and they would be afraid to tamper with the goods because he might catch them in the act. The Gemara objects: If that is so, this can apply to the latter clause also. The Gemara answers: In the case of the latter clause, since he said to them: Go and I will come after you, their minds are at ease that he will not surprise them.
  § The mishna teaches similar cases, including the case of one who left a gentile in his shop, and the case of one who placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship. The Gemara explains: And it is necessary for the mishna to cite all these cases, even though they appear similar, as, had the mishna taught only the case of the gentile transporting a Jew’s barrels, one might assume that the reason there is no concern that the gentile used the wine in that case is because he thinks that perhaps the owner will come and see him. But in a wagon or on a ship, one might say that he can take his ship far off and do what he desires in such a way that the owner cannot see him.
  And had the mishna taught only the case where the Jew placed his wine in a wagon or on a ship, one might assume that the concern there is because the gentile thinks: Perhaps he will come on a different road or stand on the bank of the river and see me. But in the case of a gentile in his shop, one might say that he can hold the door closed and do whatever he desires with no concern of being seen. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that in all of these cases the same ruling applies, and there is no concern unless the Jew informed the gentile that he is going a great distance away.
  § There is a dispute in the mishna with regard to the length of time that causes the wine to be rendered forbidden if the owner notified the gentile that he is going off some distance. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is only with regard to the case of a stopper made of lime plaster, in which a hole can be sealed without being detected; but with regard to the case of a stopper made of clay, in which a patch would be detected, everyone agrees that the wine is forbidden only if there was enough time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper entirely, stop it again with a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this explanation of the dispute from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to the Rabbis: But isn’t the sealing of the hole noticeable both from above and from below, and therefore the gentile will be wary of doing so?
  The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, if you say that the dispute is also with regard to a stopper made of clay, this explanation is consistent with that which the <i>baraita</i> teaches as to the response of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: Its sealing is noticeable both from above and from below. But if you say that the dispute is with regard to a stopper made of lime plaster, granted, the location of the sealing is noticeable from below, as it is impossible to fill the entire hole with lime plaster, and an empty space remains below it; but the resealing is not noticeable from above.
  The Gemara answers: It was Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who did not know what the Rabbis were saying, and this is what he is saying to them: If you are speaking of a stopper made of clay, its sealing is noticeable both from above and from below. And if you are speaking of a stopper made of lime plaster, granted, it is not noticeable from above, but it is noticeable, in any event, from below. And how would the Rabbis respond to this claim? They maintain that since it is not noticeable from above that there is a patch, it does not occur to the gentile that the owner will turn the stopper over and see the patch. Alternatively, the Rabbis could answer that sometimes it seals firmly and is not detectable.
  Rava says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, since we learned an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion.
  This is as we learned in the last clause of the mishna: If a Jew was eating with a gentile at the table, and left jugs of wine on the table and a jug on the side table, and he left it and went out, what is on the table is forbidden, as it is likely that the gentile handled it, whereas what is on the side table is permitted. But if the Jew said to the gentile: Mix water with the wine and drink, even the jug that is on the side table is forbidden. Similarly, open barrels are forbidden, but sealed barrels are permitted unless the Jew was out of the room for sufficient time for the gentile to open the barrel by removing the stopper, stop it again by making a new stopper, and for the new stopper to dry.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? This ruling is stated explicitly in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel teaches the entire clause, and this is the continuation of his previous statement and not an unattributed statement of the mishna, Rava teaches us that this is not so.
  The Gemara asks: And since we maintain that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is not concerned about a bored hole in the barrel, and even though there is a concern that the gentile may have opened and replaced the stopper the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who is not concerned with forgery of the seal, because excessive effort is required to forge a seal (see 31a), therefore, nowadays, what is the reason we do not place wine in sealed barrels in the possession of gentiles? The Gemara answers: It is because of the bunghole, the hole in a barrel through which one smells the wine, which the gentile might widen a bit to drink from it.
  § Rava says: In the case of a gentile prostitute, where Jews are dining at her table, the wine at the table is permitted. Granted, their passion for the sin of harlotry overwhelms their judgment,
  
  Daf 70a
  
  but the passion for wine used for a libation does not overwhelm their judgment, and they will not allow her to use it for a libation. In the case of a Jewish prostitute and gentiles dining with her, the wine is forbidden. What is the reason? It is that since she is contemptible in their eyes, she is subjugated to them, and they use the wine for a libation without consideration for her.
  § The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain house where Jews’ wine was stored. A gentile entered the house, and he locked the door before the Jew, but there was a crack in the door, and the gentile was found standing between the barrels. Rava said: All the barrels that were opposite the crack through which the gentile could be seen are permitted, because he would have been wary about being seen tampering with them. Barrels on this side and that side of the crack, where the gentile could not be seen, are forbidden, as perhaps the gentile used them for a libation.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain Jew’s wine that was stored in the lower story of a house, in which the Jew was living in the upper story and a gentile in the lower story, and the wine could be supervised from the upper story. One day the residents heard a sound of quarreling and went outside. The gentile came back in first and locked the door before the Jew. Rava said: The wine is permitted, because the gentile presumably said to himself: Just as I came back in early, perhaps my neighbor the Jew came back in early and is sitting in the upper story and watching me, and therefore he would not use the wine for a libation.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain inn [<i>ushpiza</i>] where a Jew’s wine was stored, and a gentile was found sitting among the barrels. Rava said: If he was caught as a thief, i.e., if the gentile seemed startled and did not have a good explanation for being there, the wine is permitted, as the gentile was presumably afraid about being caught and would not have used it for a libation. But if not, the wine is forbidden.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain house where wine was stored. A gentile was found standing among the barrels. Rava said: If he has a way to excuse his entrance to where the wine was stored, the wine is forbidden, but if not, the wine is permitted. The Gemara raises an objection to this ruling from a <i>baraita</i>: If an inn was locked and a gentile was inside, or if the Jew said to the gentile: Safeguard my wine, the wine is forbidden. What, is it not forbidden even if the gentile does not have a way to excuse his entrance? The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where he does have a way to excuse his entrance; otherwise the wine is permitted.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain Jew and a certain gentile who were sitting and drinking wine. The Jew heard the sound of praying at the synagogue. He got up and went to pray. Rava said: The wine is permitted, because the gentile presumably said to himself: Any moment now he will remember his wine and come back.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain Jew and a certain gentile who were sitting on a ship. The Jew heard the sound of the shofar of twilight indicating the beginning of Shabbat. He disembarked and went into town to spend Shabbat there. Rava said: The wine is permitted, because the gentile presumably said to himself: Any moment now he will remember his wine and come back.
  The Gemara comments: And if one might object that the gentile is presumably not concerned because he knows that the Jew will not return until the end of Shabbat, didn’t Rava say: Issur the Convert told me: When we were still gentiles, before converting, we used to say: Jews do not actually observe Shabbat, as, if they observe Shabbat, how many wallets would be found in the marketplace that the Jews could not take on Shabbat? And I did not know that we maintain that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: One who finds a wallet on Shabbat may carry it in increments of less than four cubits. Evidently, gentiles assume that a Jew would violate Shabbat for monetary gain.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain lion who roared in a winepress. A gentile heard the roar and was frightened, and he hid among the barrels of wine. Rava said: The wine is permitted, because the gentile presumably said to himself: Just as I am hiding, a Jew might also be hiding behind me and see me.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving certain thieves who came to Pumbedita and opened many barrels of wine. Rava said: The wine is permitted. What is the reason? Most of the thieves in Pumbedita are Jews, and the <i>halakha</i> follows the majority, and therefore the wine is not rendered forbidden. There was a similar incident in Neharde’a, and Shmuel said: The wine is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this? Perhaps it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says with regard to cases of uncertainty concerning ritual purity that if the uncertainty is with regard to a person’s entry into a certain place, he is deemed pure.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 6:5): With regard to one who enters into a valley during the rainy season, i.e., winter, when people generally do not enter this area, and there was ritual impurity in such and such a field, and he said: I know I walked to that place, i.e., I walked in the valley, but I do not know whether I entered that field where the ritual impurity was or whether I did not enter, Rabbi Eliezer says: In a case of uncertainty with regard to entry, i.e., it is uncertain whether he entered the area where the ritual impurity is located, he is ritually pure. But if he certainly entered the area where the ritual impurity is located and the uncertainty pertains to contact with the source of ritual impurity, he is ritually impure. Apparently, the ruling of Shmuel, that in a case where it is uncertain whether gentile thieves entered the house at all the wine is permitted, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, it is different there, with regard to the wine barrels. Since there are thieves who open barrels for the sake of perhaps finding money in them and are not interested in the wine, it is a case of compound uncertainty, as it is uncertain whether the thieves were gentiles or Jews, and even if they were gentiles, it is uncertain whether or not they touched the wine. In a case of compound uncertainty, everyone agrees that the wine is not forbidden.
  
  Daf 70b
  
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain gentile girl who was found among wine barrels and she was holding wine froth in her hand. Rava said: The wine is permitted, as it is reasonable to say that she took it from the outside of the barrel and not from inside the barrel. And even if there is no more of the froth on the outside of the barrel, it is reasonable to say that she happened upon the froth while it was still there, even though it is no longer there.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain army [<i>pulmusa</i>] that entered Neharde’a and opened many barrels of wine. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: There was a similar incident that was brought before Rabbi Elazar, and he deemed the wine permitted. But I do not know whether he permitted it because he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Concerning uncertainty with regard to entry, the person or item is ritually pure, or whether he permitted it because he maintains that most of those who went with that army were Jews, i.e., that although it was a gentile army, the ancillaries were mostly Jews.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, why did he permit the wine? Is this a case of uncertainty with regard to entry? It is clear that the ancillaries came and opened the barrels, so it is a case of uncertainty with regard to contact, i.e., whether they touched the wine or not, and Rabbi Eliezer agrees that such a case is treated stringently. The Gemara answers: Since they opened many barrels, it is reasonable to say that they opened the barrels only with the intention of finding money and had no interest in the wine itself. And therefore it is similar to a case of uncertainty with regard to entry.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain female owner of a wine shop who transferred the key [<i>iklida</i>] to the door of her wine shop to a gentile woman. Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Elazar said: There was a similar incident that was brought before the Sages in the study hall, and they said: She transferred to her the responsibility for safeguarding the key alone but did not authorize her to enter the tavern, so there is no concern that she entered there.
  Abaye said: We learn this <i>halakha</i> in a mishna as well (<i>Teharot</i> 7:1): In the case of one who transferred keys to one who is unreliable with regard to ritual impurity [<i>am ha’aretz</i>], even though contact with an <i>am ha’aretz</i> renders pure items impure, his pure items are pure, because he transferred to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> the responsibility for safeguarding the key alone and did not authorize him to enter. Now that the mishna has determined that his pure items are pure, is it necessary to state that this principle with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of wine used for a libation?
  The Gemara asks with regard to Abaye’s reasoning: Is this to say that the <i>halakhot</i> of ritually pure items are more stringent than those concerning wine used for a libation? The Gemara answers: Indeed, that is so. As it was stated that there was a dispute with regard to a courtyard whose owners divided it among themselves with a low partition [<i>meseifas</i>]. Rav says: If one’s neighbor on the other side of the partition is an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, one’s pure items that he leaves in the courtyard are rendered impure, but in the case of a gentile neighbor, this does not render his wine an idolatrous libation. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: His pure items remain pure as well. Evidently, Rav considers the <i>halakhot</i> of purity more stringent than those of wine used for a libation.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from a <i>baraita</i>: If the inner courtyard belongs to a <i>ḥaver</i>, i.e., one devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, <i>teruma</i>, and tithes, and the outer courtyard to an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, that <i>ḥaver</i> may lay out his produce there, in the inner courtyard, and place his vessels there, without concern that the <i>am ha’aretz</i> will touch them and render them impure. And this applies even if the hand of the <i>am ha’aretz</i> can reach there. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav, who holds that even in a situation where there is a partition there is concern about contact with an <i>am ha’aretz</i>.
  The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you: It is different there, as were the <i>am ha’aretz</i> to tamper with the produce, he could be caught and accused as a thief, as he has no business being in the inner courtyard. Therefore, there is no concern that he will tamper with it.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear support for Rav’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Teharot</i> 9:11): Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If the roof of a <i>ḥaver</i> is above the roof of his neighbor who is an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, that <i>ḥaver</i> may lay out produce there and place vessels there, provided that the hand of the <i>am ha’aretz</i> cannot reach there; but if it is within his reach, the pure items of the <i>ḥaver</i> are rendered impure. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who deems permitted pure items in a courtyard divided by a low partition.
  The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: It is different there, as were the <i>am ha’aretz</i> to be discovered reaching up to the upper roof, he has a way to excuse his behavior by saying: I merely stretched myself; I was not intending to tamper with anything.
  Come and hear that which is taught in that same <i>baraita</i>: If the roof of a <i>ḥaver</i> is beside the roof of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, that <i>ḥaver</i> may lay out produce there and place vessels there, even if hand of the <i>am ha’aretz</i> can reach there. This poses a difficulty to the statement of Rav. The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you: Isn’t there the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, which stands in accordance with my opinion with regard to roofs that are next to one another? What I say is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel.
  MISHNA: In the case of a military unit [<i>boleshet</i>] that entered a city, if it entered during peacetime, then after the soldiers leave the open barrels of wine are forbidden, but the sealed barrels are permitted. If the unit entered in wartime, both these barrels and those barrels are permitted, because in wartime there is no time to pour wine for libations, and one can be certain that the soldiers did not do so.
  
  Daf 71a
  
  GEMARA: And the Gemara raises a contradiction to the assumption that soldiers during wartime do not have time to commit transgressions from that which is taught in another mishna (<i>Ketubot</i> 27a): With regard to a city that was conquered by an army laying siege, all the women married to priests located in the city are unfit and forbidden to their husbands, due to the concern that they were raped. Rav Mari resolved the contradiction and said: They do not have time to pour wine for libations, as their passion for idolatry is not pressing at that time, but they have time to engage in intercourse, because their lust is great even during wartime.
  MISHNA: With regard to Jewish craftsmen to whom a gentile sent a barrel of wine used for a libation in lieu of their wage, it is permitted for them to say to him: Give us its monetary value instead. But once it has entered into their possession, it is prohibited for them to say so, as that would be tantamount to selling the wine to the gentile and deriving benefit from it.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is permitted for a person to say to a gentile: Go and placate the collectors of the governmental tax on wine for me, and I will reimburse you subsequently, even if he pays the tax with wine used for a libation.
  One of the Sages raised an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not say to a gentile: Go in my stead to the commissary [<i>la’otzer</i>] to pay the wine tax for me, if he pays it in wine used for a libation. Rav said to him: You say that the case I am referring to is similar to one who says to a gentile: Go in my stead to the commissary? In that case, since he says: In my stead, whatever the gentile gives the commissary is considered as though the Jew gave it himself. This case that I am referring to is comparable only to that which is taught in the <i>baraita</i>: But the Jew may say to a gentile: Save me from the commissary.
  MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted. It is not tantamount to selling wine used for a libation, as the gentile purchased the wine before it became forbidden, and the money already belonged to the Jew. But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden.
  GEMARA: Ameimar says: The legal act of acquiring an object by pulling it applies to a gentile. Know that it is so, as those Persians send gifts [<i>pardashnei</i>] to one another and do not retract them, which shows that they acquire one from another by pulling the object alone, even without paying for it. Rav Ashi says: Actually, I will say to you that pulling an object does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, and the fact that they do not retract their gifts is not due to the <i>halakhot</i> of acquisition but because they are taken over by haughtiness, and they consider it shameful to retract a gift.
  Rav Ashi said: From where do I say that acquisition by pulling does not apply to gentiles? It is from that which Rav said to certain wine shopkeepers: When you measure wine for gentiles, take the dinars from them and then measure the wine for them. And if they do not have dinars with them readily available, lend them dinars and then take those dinars back from them, so that it will be a loan provided to them that they are repaying. As if you do not do so, when it becomes wine used for a libation it becomes so in your possession, and when you take the money it will be payment for wine used for a libation that you are taking. Rav Ashi concludes his proof for his opinion: And if it enters your mind that pulling an object acquires it in a transaction involving a gentile,
  
  Daf 71b
  
  from the moment that he pulled it, the gentile acquired it, whereas it did not become wine used for a libation until he touched it. Therefore, the seller can receive payment for the wine he sold, because at the time of the acquisition the wine was permitted.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: If it is a case where the seller measures the wine and pours it into the vessel of a Jew, it is indeed permitted to do so without receiving payment first. Rav’s ruling is not necessary except in a case where he measures the wine and pours it into the vessel of the gentile, which contains wine used for a libation, and the wine is rendered forbidden upon contact with the vessel even before the gentile acquires it by pulling it.
  The Gemara raises an objection: Ultimately, even in this case, when the wine reaches the interior airspace of the gentile’s vessel, he acquires it, as this too is a mode of acquisition. And it does not become wine used for a libation until it reaches the bottom of the vessel, making contact with it, so the acquisition occurs before the wine becomes forbidden. Can one conclude from this that in the opinion of Rav a stream of liquid serves as a connection between two bodies of liquid? If so, when the Jew pours the wine into the gentile’s vessel, the flow of wine that is in contact with the forbidden wine at the bottom of the vessel would render all the wine being poured into the vessel forbidden.
  The Gemara rejects this conclusion: No, a stream of liquid does not serve as a connection, and therefore if the gentile is holding the vessel in his hand, the gentile indeed acquires the wine before it becomes forbidden, and therefore the money paid for it is permitted. Rav’s ruling is not necessary unless the gentile’s vessel is set on the ground, so that there is no act of acquisition before the wine becomes forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: But let the vessels of the gentile acquire the wine from the moment it enters the interior airspace. Can one conclude from this that if the buyer’s vessels are in the domain of the seller, the buyer does not acquire the merchandise once it is placed in his vessels? This is an issue that is subject to a dispute between the Sages, which remains unresolved.
  The Gemara rejects this: No, actually, I could say to you that the buyer acquires the merchandise in such a case. But here, where the wine is rendered forbidden before being acquired by the gentile, we are dealing with a case where there is a remnant of wine remaining on the mouth of the gentile’s jug [<i>kuzanta</i>], which renders the wine poured into the jug forbidden, as each bit of wine becomes libation wine when it comes into contact with the remnant of wine on the mouth as it is poured into the jug. This is why Rav told the wine shopkeepers to take the money before measuring the wine into the gentile’s vessel.
  The Gemara raises an objection: And in accordance with whose opinion does Rav say this? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel; as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, doesn’t he say that libation wine that became mixed with other wine may all be sold to gentiles for the monetary value of the entire mixture except for the value of the wine used for a libation that is in the mixture? Accordingly, it is permitted to accept payment for wine that was poured into a gentile’s vessel, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  The Gemara answers: The explanation of this ruling can be only according to the opinion of Rav, who issued the ruling. And doesn’t Rav say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel only in the case of a barrel of permitted wine that became intermingled with another barrel of libation wine, but not in the case of wine that became mixed with other wine in the same barrel? Therefore, explaining Rav’s statement as contradicting the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not problematic; consequently, it cannot be proven from his statement that a gentile does not acquire an item by pulling it.
  The Gemara raises another objection to the statement of Ameimar that a gentile can acquire an object by pulling it. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who buys broken vessels made of gold or silver from the gentiles and finds among them an object of idol worship, if he pulled the object of idol worship, thereby performing an act of acquisition, before he gave the money to the gentile, he may return the object of idol worship to the gentile. But if he pulled it after he gave the money to the gentile, he may not return it. Since the idol’s status was not revoked, he must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea. In that case, if it enters your mind that pulling an object acquires it in a transaction with a gentile, as Ameimar maintains, then why may he return the object once he has pulled it, since it is his? Abaye said: He may return it because it appears to be a mistaken transaction, since he clearly did not intend to purchase an object of idol worship.
  Rava said: Then why, in the second instance, where he paid the money, may he not return it? Is the purchase in the first clause a mistaken transaction but the purchase in the latter clause not a mistaken transaction? Rather, Rava said: The purchase in the first clause and the purchase in the latter clause are both a mistaken transaction, but in the case presented in the first clause, where he did not pay him the dinars, it does not appear as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and so he may return it. By contrast, in the latter clause, where he did pay him the dinars, it appears as though there is an object of idol worship in the possession of a Jew, and therefore he must cast away the object rather than return it.
  § The Gemara cites a claim against Rav Ashi’s opinion that a gentile cannot acquire an item by pulling it: Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear an objection to your opinion from the mishna: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted, as the wine was acquired by the gentile before he touched it. And if you say that pulling an item does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, why is the money paid for it permitted? Rav Ashi replied: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile paid him a dinar in advance, before the measuring, thereby acquiring the wine with money.
  One of the Sages raised an objection: If that is so, say the last clause: But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden. And if he paid him a dinar in advance, why should the money paid for it be forbidden?
  Rav Ashi said to him: And according to you, as you say that pulling acquires items in a transaction involving a gentile, why in the first clause is the money paid for it permitted, and in the latter clause the money paid for it is forbidden?
  Rather, what have you to say to explain the distinction between the two cases? You say that when the Jew fixed a price, the gentile consequently relied on him that the sale would not be canceled, and so the sale was concluded by the pulling. But in a case where he did not fix a price, the gentile did not rely on him that the sale would not be canceled, and therefore the sale was not concluded.
  According to my opinion as well, even though the gentile gave him a dinar in advance, if he fixed a price, the gentile relied on him that the sale would not be canceled, and if he did not fix a price, the gentile did not rely on him that the sale would not be canceled.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear another proof against your opinion, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A descendant of Noah, i.e., a gentile, is executed by the court for theft of even less than the value of one <i>peruta</i>; but if he stole less than the value of one <i>peruta</i> from a Jew, it is not subject to restitution, i.e., he is not obligated to return it, as the Jew presumably waived the debt. And if you say that pulling an item does not acquire it in a transaction involving a gentile, why should he be executed? He did not commit a legally significant act by stealing the item, as it remains in the possession of the owner.
  The Gemara answers: He is executed because he caused a Jew distress by stealing the item, even though by the <i>halakhot</i> of acquisition the thief did not acquire it.
  
  Daf 72a
  
  And what does it mean that the stolen object is not subject to restitution? It means that it is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of restitution, because it is not technically a theft.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause of that halakhic statement: If another descendant of Noah came and took the stolen item from him, he is also executed for it. Granted, with regard to the first clause it can be explained that although there is no obligation to return the item, the gentile is executed because he caused the Jew distress; but with regard to the latter clause, what did he do? He did not cause the Jew distress, and since the item is worth less than one <i>peruta</i>, one is not obligated to return it unless he stole it from a gentile. Consequently, the second theft should not be considered a legally significant act.
  Rather, should one not conclude from it that one pulling an item acquires it in a transaction performed by a gentile? Accordingly, the actions of both the first and second gentiles are legally significant acts of theft, for which they are liable to be executed. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.
  § The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I sell this land, I will sell it to you, and they performed a formal act of acquisition to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person. Rav Yosef said: The first one has acquired it.
  Abaye said to him: But he did not fix a price with him for it. And from where do you say that wherever the people involved in the transaction did not fix a price, the buyer has not acquired the item, even if they performed a formal act of acquisition? It is from that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted. But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden.
  The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The Gemara interjects: What is meant by the question: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The conclusion is as we have stated, that it is evident from the mishna that the acquisition goes into effect only after the price is fixed. The Gemara explains its question: Perhaps due to the stringency of the prohibition of wine used for a libation, the case of the mishna is different and is not characteristic of the <i>halakha</i> in monetary matters.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that an acquisition goes into effect only after the price is fixed, as Rav Idi bar Avin said: There was an incident that came before the school of Rav Ḥisda, and Rav Ḥisda brought it before the school of Rav Huna, and Rav Huna resolved it from that which we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: If one bought from another produce that was loaded on the seller’s donkeys or carried by his laborers, and the purchaser drew the seller’s donkey drivers or laborers laden with produce and brought them into his house, in this case, whether the seller fixed a price before he measured the produce or whether he measured the produce before he fixed a price, the purchaser has not acquired the produce, and both of them, the purchaser or the seller, can retract the transaction, as no act of acquisition took place.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: But if the purchaser unloaded the produce and brought it into his house, this constitutes an act of acquisition, and therefore if he fixed a price before he measured the produce, neither of them can retract, but if he measured the produce before he fixed a price, both of them can retract. This illustrates that even if there was an act of acquisition, they can retract the transaction until the price has been fixed, in accordance with the statement of Abaye.
  § There was a related incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I will desire to sell this land, I will sell it to you for one hundred dinars, and they performed an act of acquisition to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person for one hundred and twenty dinars. Rav Kahana said: The first one has acquired it. Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this: Those twenty additional dinars compelled him to sell it to the second purchaser. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod.
  § If the seller said to the purchaser: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, even if two out of the three agreed to a certain assessment, the seller must accept this price. If he said: I will sell you this merchandise in accordance with the price that is stated by three people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all three. If he said: As it is assessed by four people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all four; and all the more so in a case where he said to him: In accordance with the price that is stated by four people.
  If the seller said to the buyer: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, and three people came and assessed it, and the other one, the purchaser, said: Let three other people, who are more proficient in their assessment, come and assess the merchandise, Rav Pappa said: The <i>halakha</i> is that he can prevent the price from being set until more proficient people assess the merchandise. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: From where can he know that those other three are more proficient in their assessment? Perhaps these, the first three, are more proficient. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.
  MISHNA: In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug, if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, the wine measured into the Jew’s jug is forbidden, as some of the wine that was measured into the gentile’s jug is mixed in it. In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted, but the wine in the vessel into which he poured is forbidden.
  GEMARA: We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Teharot</i> 8:9): A stream of water, and water descending an incline [<i>vehakatafres</i>], and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to purity. These liquids do not constitute a connection that transmits impurity, e.g., if impure water is in one place and becomes attached to water above it, the water above is not considered attached to the impure water and is not rendered impure. They also do not constitute a connection for purification, e.g., if two collections of water are attached via the pouring of a stream, they do not join together to form the amount of water necessary to form a valid ritual bath, through which people and items can become ritually pure. A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to purity.
  Rav Huna says: A stream of water, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist constitute a connection with regard to the matter of wine used for a libation.
  Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: From where do you derive this? If we say it is derived from that which we learned in the mishna: A stream, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to purity, and it is inferred that it is with regard to impurity and with regard to purity that it does not constitute a connection, but with regard to wine used for a libation it does constitute a connection, then say the latter clause: A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to purity. It can be inferred from here that with regard to impurity and with regard to purity it is a connection, but with regard to wine used for a libation it is not a connection, contrary to the <i>halakha</i> inferred from the former clause. Rather, clearly no inference is to be learned from this mishna.
  The Gemara attempts to bring proof for Rav Huna’s opinion from that which we learned in the mishna here: In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug,
  
  Daf 72b
  
  if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, it is rendered forbidden. In what manner is this remnant of wine rendered forbidden? Is it not by the stream of wine going down from the funnel into the gentile’s vessel, thereby connecting the gentile’s vessel and the funnel and rendering the wine in the funnel forbidden? Conclude from it that a stream constitutes a connection.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches that the mishna is referring to a situation where the wine in the gentile’s jug rose and reached the funnel. The Gemara infers: But in a case where the wine in the jug did not rise and reach the funnel, what is the <i>halakha</i>? It is not forbidden. Therefore, resolve the dilemma and conclude that a stream is not a connection. The Gemara rejects this inference: No, Rabbi Ḥiyya means to say that in a case where the wine in the jug rose and reached the funnel you can resolve the dilemma and conclude that it is forbidden, but with regard to a stream the dilemma remains unresolved.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the second topic discussed in the mishna: In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted. The Gemara infers: But the stream of wine between the two vessels is forbidden. Conclude from it that a stream constitutes a connection.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this proof: If a stream constitutes a connection, even the wine inside the vessel being poured from should also be forbidden. The Gemara responds to this objection: This is not difficult. It is the case where the one pouring the wine interrupts the flow, so the reason the wine in the vessel being poured from is permitted is that the stream is interrupted; but in any case, a stream is considered a connection.
  The Gemara rejects the proof: According to your reasoning, say that there is an inference from the latter clause of the mishna: It is the wine in the vessel into which he poured that is forbidden due to the forbidden remnant of wine in the funnel, but by inference, the stream of wine between the two vessels is permitted, contrary to the conclusion from the previous clause. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof from a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who pours wine from a barrel into a wine cistern containing forbidden wine, the stream of wine coming from the rim of the barrel downward is rendered forbidden. Evidently, a stream constitutes a connection. Rav Sheshet interpreted this <i>baraita</i> as referring to a gentile pouring the wine from the barrel into the cistern, and the wine streaming out of the barrel is rendered forbidden because it came from the gentile’s force, i.e., the stream was powered by the gentile’s action. If a gentile moves wine, the wine is forbidden, even if the gentile did not touch it. The stream is not rendered forbidden by virtue of its connection to the wine in the cistern.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation: If the reference is to a gentile who pours the wine, even the wine inside the barrel is rendered forbidden, because the gentile is also powering the movement of the barrel itself. The Gemara responds to this objection: The <i>halakha</i> that a gentile’s force renders wine forbidden is by rabbinic law. With regard to the wine that is poured out of the barrel, the Sages decreed that it is forbidden; but with regard to the wine that remains inside the barrel, the Sages did not decree that it is forbidden.
  The Gemara relates accounts of how the Sages ruled concerning this matter: Rav Ḥisda said to certain wine retailers: When you measure wine for gentiles, pour with interruptions, rather than in a smooth steady stream, or toss it out in a single action that does not create a steady stream. Rava said to certain wine pourers: When you pour wine, do not let a gentile approach to help you, lest you let your guard down and rest the vessel in the gentile’s hands, and the wine will emerge due to his force and will be rendered forbidden.
  The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who siphoned wine from a barrel with a large tube and a small tube. A gentile came and rested his hand upon the large tube. Rava deemed the entire quantity of wine forbidden, including the wine that was still in the barrel.
  Rav Pappa said to Rava, and some say it was Rav Adda bar Mattana who said this to Rava, and some say it was Ravina who said this to Rava: By what mechanism was the wine rendered forbidden? Was it by the stream of wine that went through the large tube, which was rendered forbidden by the contact of the gentile, and the rest of the barrel was rendered forbidden by the connection with that stream? Should one conclude from this ruling that a stream constitutes a connection? Rava rejects this inference: It is different there, as all of the wine in the barrel is drawn toward the large tube and the small tube, and so it is as though the gentile had touched all of the wine in the barrel.
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, says: For a Jew and a gentile to drink simultaneously from a vessel with tubes for several people to drink from [<i>kenishkanin</i>] is permitted. And this statement applies only in a case where the Jew stops drinking first, before the gentile; but if the gentile stops drinking first, it does not apply and the wine is forbidden, as wine from the gentile’s mouth returns to the vessel and renders all of the wine forbidden. Rabba bar Rav Huna happened to come to the house of the Exilarch, and he permitted them to drink from a <i>kenishkanin</i> together with gentiles.
  
  Daf 73a
  
  There are those who say that Rabba bar Rav Huna himself drank from a <i>kenishkanin</i>.
  MISHNA: Wine used for a libation is forbidden, and any amount of it renders other wine forbidden if they are mixed together. Wine used for a libation that became mixed with wine, or water that was used for an idolatrous libation that became mixed with ordinary water, renders the mixture forbidden with any amount of the forbidden wine or water; but wine used for a libation that became mixed with water, or water used for a libation that became mixed with wine renders the mixture forbidden only if the forbidden liquid is sufficient to impart flavor to the mixture, i.e., for the wine to flavor the water or for the water to dilute the wine to an extent that can be tasted.
  This is the principle: A substance in contact with the same type of substance renders the mixture forbidden with any amount of the forbidden substance, but a substance in contact with a different type of substance renders the mixture forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to it.
  GEMARA: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who pours wine used for a libation from a barrel into a wine cistern, even if he does this all day long, the forbidden wine is nullified little by little upon contact with the wine in the cistern, and the wine is consequently permitted.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the <i>halakha</i> reported by Rav Dimi from that which we learned in the mishna: Wine used for a libation is forbidden, and any amount of it renders other wine forbidden. What, is it not referring to a case where the forbidden substance fell into the permitted substance, as in the case of Rav Dimi’s statement? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to a case where the permitted substance fell into the forbidden substance.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a further objection to the <i>halakha</i> reported by Rav Dimi from the continuation of the mishna: Wine that became mixed with water renders the mixture forbidden if it is sufficient to impart flavor to it. What, is it not referring to a case where forbidden wine fell into permitted water, and contrary to Rav Dimi’s statement, the wine is not nullified but instead renders the mixture forbidden the moment there is a sufficient amount of it to impart flavor? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to a case where permitted wine fell into forbidden water, and as long as the water influences the flavor of the wine, it is forbidden.
  The Gemara challenges: And from the fact that the first clause is referring to forbidden water, by inference, the latter clause also dealing with forbidden water, and the latter clause teaches: Water that became mixed with wine renders the mixture forbidden in a case where it imparts flavor to it. The Gemara answers that Rav Dimi could have said to you that the entire mishna is dealing with permitted substances falling into forbidden substances, and the first clause is dealing with a case where permitted wine fell into forbidden water, while the latter clause is dealing with a case where permitted water fell into forbidden wine.
  When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who pours wine used for a libation from a small canteen into a wine cistern, even if he did so all day long, the forbidden wine is nullified little by little in the permitted wine. And this applies specifically to a small canteen, whose stream is not significant. But if one pours wine from a barrel, whose stream is significant, this does not apply.
  § When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of wine used for a libation that fell into a wine cistern, and where a pitcher of water also fell there, one considers the permitted wine as though it is nonexistent, and it is not rendered forbidden by the wine used for a libation; and with regard to the rest, i.e., the wine used for a libation, the volume of the water is greater than the volume of the wine and nullifies it.
  When Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught this only with regard to a case where the pitcher of water fell in first, but if the pitcher of water did not fall in first, the wine used for a libation has found its own type, i.e., the wine in the cistern, and been awakened. In other words, the wine used for a libation renders the wine in the cistern forbidden, causing the volume of the wine that is forbidden to become larger, and the water that subsequently falls in is not sufficient to nullify all of the wine.
  The Gemara comments: There are those who teach this <i>halakha</i> with regard to the mishna, which states that wine used for a libation that became mixed with permitted wine renders it forbidden with any amount. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna taught this only with regard to a case where a pitcher of water did not also fall into the permitted wine; but if a pitcher of water fell there, one considers the permitted wine as though it is nonexistent, and it is not rendered forbidden by the wine used for a libation, and with regard to the rest, i.e., the wine used for a libation, the volume of the water is greater than the volume of the wine and nullifies it.
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there between the one who teaches this about the mishna and the one who teaches it about the statement of Ravin? The Gemara explains: The one who teaches it about the mishna does not need for the pitcher of water to have fallen in first; in any event the water nullifies the forbidden wine. But the one who teaches it about the statement of Ravin adds to Ravin’s statement, and so he needs the pitcher of water to have fallen in first.
  § It was stated that in a case of wine used for a libation that fell into a wine cistern, and where a pitcher of water also fell there,
  
  Daf 73b
  
  Ḥizkiyya says: If the volume of the water and the wine was increased by the forbidden wine, i.e., the forbidden wine fell in last, the mixture is forbidden, because the forbidden wine renders the permitted wine forbidden by the principle of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, and the water does not nullify the forbidden wine. But if the volume of the water and the forbidden wine was increased by the permitted wine, i.e., there was a mixture of wine used for a libation and water, and the wine used for a libation was nullified by the water and then permitted wine fell into the mixture, in such a case the permitted wine is not rendered forbidden by the forbidden wine that had already been nullified, and so the entire mixture is permitted.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if the volume of the permitted wine and the water was increased by the forbidden wine, the mixture is permitted.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Shall we say that Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis?
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Orla</i> 2:11): In the case of non-sacred leaven and <i>teruma</i> leaven that fell into a non-sacred batch of dough, and neither is this one alone potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened, nor is that one alone potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened, and they combined and caused the dough to become leavened, there is a dispute as to whether this dough has the status of <i>teruma</i>, and is therefore forbidden to non-priests, or non-sacred bread.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the final element that fell into the dough. If the <i>teruma</i> fell in last, the dough is forbidden to non-priests. And the Rabbis say: Whether the forbidden item, i.e., the <i>teruma</i>, fell in first or whether it fell in last, the dough is not forbidden unless there is enough of the forbidden leaven alone to cause the dough to become leavened. Apparently, Ḥizkiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that if the forbidden substance is mixed in last, the mixture is rendered forbidden, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that if the amount of the forbidden substance is not sufficient in and of itself to render the mixture forbidden, the mixture is permitted.
  The Gemara responds: And how can you understand that this is the same dispute? But doesn’t Abaye say: Rabbi Eliezer taught that the mixture is permitted when the permitted leaven fell in last only in a case when one first removed the forbidden leaven before the permitted leaven fell into the dough and made it rise. But if one did not first remove the forbidden leaven, the dough is forbidden even if the permitted leaven fell in last. According to Abaye’s interpretation, in accordance with whose opinion does Ḥizkiyya state his ruling with regard to a mixture of forbidden wine, permitted wine, and permitted water, that if the forbidden wine was mixed in last the mixture is forbidden? According to the Rabbis the mixture should be permitted in any event, as there is not enough forbidden wine to render the mixture forbidden, and according to Rabbi Eliezer, even if the permitted wine was mixed in last the mixture should be forbidden, as the forbidden wine was not removed.
  Rather, here Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree concerning the principle that with regard to a mixture of a forbidden substance and a permitted substance of the same type, and a permitted substance of a different type, one considers the permitted substance of the same type as though it were nonexistent so that the substance of the other type can nullify the forbidden substance. Ḥizkiyya is not of the opinion that one considers it as though it were nonexistent, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan is of the opinion that one considers it as though it were nonexistent, and so he maintains that in any event the water nullifies the forbidden wine, and the permitted wine in the mixture is disregarded.
  The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yoḥanan of the opinion that one considers the permitted substance of the same type as though it were nonexistent? But didn’t Rabbi Asi ask Rabbi Yoḥanan the following question: If one had two cups of wine, one non-sacred and one of <i>teruma</i>, and he diluted them with water and mixed them together, and there is sufficient water in each of the cups to nullify the <i>teruma</i> wine, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the non-sacred wine, which is the same type of substance as the <i>teruma</i> wine, considered to be nonexistent, and the water in the mixture nullifies the <i>teruma</i> wine, or does the <i>teruma</i> wine render the non-sacred wine forbidden, and the water in both cups is insufficient to nullify the combined wine? And Rabbi Yoḥanan did not resolve the dilemma for him, indicating that he did not have a set opinion on the matter.
  The Gemara answers: Initially he did not resolve the dilemma for him, but ultimately he resolved for him that the permitted substance of the same type is considered as though it were nonexistent. It was also stated that this was Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ultimate opinion, as Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say that it is Rabbi Asi who says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one had two cups of wine, one non-sacred and one of <i>teruma</i>, and he diluted them with water and mixed them together, and there is sufficient water in each of the cups to nullify the <i>teruma</i> wine, one considers the permitted wine as though it were nonexistent, and as for the rest, the <i>teruma</i> wine, the volume of the water is greater than the volume of the wine and nullifies it.
  § The mishna states that this is the principle: A substance in contact with the same type of substance renders the mixture forbidden with any amount of the forbidden substance, but a substance in contact with a different type of substance renders the mixture forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to it.
  The Gemara presents an amoraic dispute with regard to this principle: Rav and Shmuel both say: With regard to any food forbidden by the Torah that becomes mixed with permitted food, if the permitted food is of its own type, then even any amount of the forbidden substance renders the entire mixture forbidden. If the forbidden food is mixed with another type of substance, then the mixture becomes forbidden only in a case where there is enough of the forbidden food to impart flavor to the mixture.
  According to Rav and Shmuel, what is added by the statement in the mishna: This is the principle, etc.? This is stated to include any food forbidden by the Torah, and not only wine used for a libation.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: With regard to any food forbidden by the Torah that falls into a mixture, whether of its own type of food or another type of food, the mixture is forbidden in a case where there is enough of the forbidden item to impart flavor to the mixture. This is the <i>halakha</i> except for the cases of untithed produce and wine used for a libation, which render a mixture with their own type of food forbidden in a case where any amount of the forbidden food was mixed with the permitted food; but if they are mixed with another type of substance, the mixture is forbidden only in a case where it imparts flavor to it. And according to this opinion, the statement in the mishna: This is the principle, etc., is stated to include the case of untithed produce, which is not mentioned in the mishna explicitly.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish.
  The Gemara elaborates: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel: With regard to any food forbidden by the Torah that becomes mixed with a permitted food, in a case where the permitted food is of its own type, then even any amount of the forbidden substance renders the entire mixture forbidden. But in a case where the forbidden food was mixed with another type of substance, then the mixture becomes forbidden only in a case where there is enough of the forbidden item to impart flavor to the mixture.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish: With regard to any food forbidden by the Torah that falls into a mixture, whether of its own type of food or another type of food, the mixture is forbidden in a case where there is enough of the forbidden food to impart flavor to the mixture. This is the <i>halakha</i> except for the cases of untithed produce and wine used for a libation, which render a mixture with their own type of food forbidden in a case where any amount of the forbidden food was mixed with the permitted food; but if they are mixed with another type of substance, the mixture is forbidden only in a case where they impart flavor to it.
  The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, why are untithed produce and wine used for a libation treated more stringently than other forbidden foods? Granted, wine used for a libation is treated stringently due to the severity of idol worship, but with regard to untithed produce, what is the reason that any amount of it that is mixed with permitted food of its own type renders the mixture forbidden?
  The Gemara answers: Just as it assumes its permitted status, so it assumes its forbidden status, as Shmuel says: Even one grain of wheat given as <i>teruma</i> exempts the entire heap of grain from the obligation of <i>teruma</i>. Since any amount of <i>teruma</i> given renders the entire heap of produce permitted, any amount of untithed produce also renders the entire mixture forbidden. And this is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to what situation did the Sages say that any amount of untithed produce renders a mixture forbidden? It is with regard to untithed produce that becomes mixed with its own type, but with regard to untithed produce that becomes mixed with another type, the mixture is forbidden only in a case where the untithed produce imparts flavor to it.
  
  Daf 74a
  
  MISHNA: These following items are themselves forbidden, and any amount of them renders other items with which they become mixed forbidden: Wine used for a libation; and objects of idol worship; and hides with a tear opposite the heart, indicating the idolatrous practice of sacrificing hearts of live animals.
  And this <i>halakha</i> also applies to an ox that has been condemned to be stoned (see Exodus 21:28), from which it is prohibited to derive benefit even before its sentence is carried out; and it applies to a heifer whose neck is broken when a person is found killed in an area between two cities and the murderer is unknown (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9), which is likewise forbidden from the time it is taken down to the river to be killed. In these cases, if the animal becomes mixed in a herd of similar animals, all of the animals in the herd are forbidden.
  And this <i>halakha</i> also applies to birds designated for the purification of a leper (Leviticus 14:1–6), and the shorn hair of a nazirite (Numbers 6:18), and a firstborn donkey (Exodus 13:13), and meat that was cooked in milk (Exodus 23:19), and the scape-goat of Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:7–10), and the meat of a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. All of these are forbidden themselves, and any amount of them renders a mixture forbidden.
  GEMARA: According to what criterion does the <i>tanna</i> who teaches this mishna reckon cases? If he reckons based on any item that is counted, i.e., any item that is significant enough to be considered individually, which therefore cannot be nullified in a mixture even in a very large majority of permitted items, let him also teach the case of significant cuts of an unslaughtered animal carcass. And if he reckons based on items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, let him also teach the case of leavened bread on Passover. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, and some say it was Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa who said: This <i>tanna</i> has two criteria. He reckons based on any item that is both counted and from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
  The Gemara challenges: But let the <i>tanna</i> teach the cases of <i>perekh</i> nuts, a type of nut that has a brittle shell, and Badan pomegranates, pomegranates from Badan; as these fruits are considered significant, and when they grow during the first three years after the tree was planted [<i>orla</i>], they belong to the category of items that are counted and from which deriving benefit is prohibited.
  The Gemara responds: The Mishna taught that case there, in tractate <i>Orla</i> (3:7), where <i>perekh</i> nuts and Badan pomegranates are listed among the forbidden items that cannot be nullified in a mixture, and it is stated with regard to such items: Those items to which the prohibition of <i>orla</i> applies render the entire mixture forbidden by imparting to it the status of <i>orla</i>, while those to which the prohibition of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard applies render the mixture forbidden by imparting to it the status of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard. Therefore, it is unnecessary to mention those cases here.
  The Gemara suggests: But let the <i>tanna</i> teach the case of loaves of a homeowner, each of which is unique and significant, with regard to the prohibition against deriving benefit from leavened bread on Passover. The Gemara explains: Whom did you hear who says that such loaves are not nullified in a mixture? This is taught by Rabbi Akiva, and he taught it there in tractate <i>Orla</i> (3:7): Rabbi Akiva adds to the list the loaves of a homeowner.
  At the end of the mishna here, the <i>tanna</i> reiterates the <i>halakha</i> stated at its beginning, saying: All of these are forbidden themselves, and any amount of them renders a mixture forbidden. The Gemara asks: The purpose of this reiteration is to exclude what? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude any item that is counted but from which deriving benefit is not prohibited, or to exclude items from which deriving benefit is prohibited but that are not counted.
  MISHNA: In the case of wine used for a libation that fell into a wine cistern, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of the wine in the cistern, even if the volume of the wine used for a libation was tiny in comparison to the volume of the wine in the cistern. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All of the wine in the cistern may be sold to a gentile, and the money paid for it is permitted except for the value of the wine used for a libation that is included in it.
  GEMARA: Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in a case where a barrel of wine used for a libation became intermingled with barrels of permitted wine, but not when the wine itself became mixed with permitted wine. And Shmuel says: Even when the wine itself became mixed with permitted wine, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And likewise, Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even when wine became mixed with wine, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And likewise, Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: Even when wine became mixed with wine, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And likewise, Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Even when wine became mixed with wine, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  Rav Naḥman says: The practical <i>halakha</i> is that with regard to wine that was actually used for a libation, wine that became mixed with wine renders the entire mixture forbidden, but if a barrel became intermingled with barrels of permitted wine, it is permitted to sell the barrels in the manner described by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. With regard to nondescript wine of gentiles, which is forbidden due to the suspicion that it was used for a libation, even if wine became mixed with wine, it is permitted to sell the mixture in the manner described by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
  
  Daf 74b
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a stone winepress that a gentile lined with pitch and then poured wine onto the pitch to neutralize its flavor, one may cleanse it and it is pure, i.e., wine pressed in it is permitted. And if the winepress is fashioned of wood, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One may cleanse it, but the Rabbis say: One must peel off the pitch completely. And if the winepress is of earthenware, even if one peeled off the pitch, this press is forbidden.
  GEMARA: Rava says: The requirement to cleanse the winepress applies specifically if the gentile lined it with pitch. But if he only trod on his grapes in it without lining it with pitch, this is not required. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? We learned in the mishna that cleansing the winepress is necessary if the gentile lined it with pitch. The Gemara responds: Lest you say that the same is true that it requires cleansing even if he trod on his grapes in it, and the fact that the mishna teaches a case where he lined it with pitch is because the mishna is teaching the manner in which the matter typically occurs, therefore Rava teaches us that this is not the case.
  There are those who say that Rava says: Cleansing the winepress is effective specifically if the gentile lined it with pitch. But if he trod on his grapes in it as well, cleansing it is not sufficient to purify the winepress. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? We learned in the mishna that cleansing the winepress is sufficient if the gentile lined it with pitch. The Gemara responds: Lest you say that the same is true and that cleansing is sufficient even if he trod on his grapes in it, and the fact that the mishna teaches a case where he lined it with pitch is because the mishna is teaching the manner in which the matter typically occurs, therefore Rava teaches us that cleansing the winepress is sufficient specifically if he lined it with pitch, but if he trod on his grapes in it, cleansing it is not sufficient.
  This is similar to an incident involving a certain man who came before Rabbi Ḥiyya and said to him: Give me a man who will purify my winepress that I purchased from a gentile. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: Go with him and see to it that you conduct yourself in such a manner that will not cause people to complain against me in the study hall. Rav went with him and saw that the winepress was very smooth with pitch. Rav said: Cleansing will certainly be sufficient for this, because it does not absorb the wine. While Rav was going and coming, he saw a crack underneath his feet and saw that it was full of wine. He then said: Cleansing is not sufficient for this; rather, it requires peeling. And this is what my uncle [<i>ḥavivi</i>] meant when he said to me: See to it that you do not cause people to complain against me in the study hall.
  The Sages taught: With regard to the winepress and its utensils, the ladle and the funnel, which belong to gentiles, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits them by cleansing, and the Rabbis deem them forbidden. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes with regard to earthenware jugs belonging to gentiles that they are forbidden. And what is the difference between this case and that case? This jug contains the wine for storage purposes, and that case, involving a ladle and a funnel, involves utensils that do not contain it for storage purposes but only temporarily. And if the winepress or its utensils are fashioned of wood or stone, one must cleanse them, but if they were lined with pitch, they are forbidden, and cleansing is not sufficient to render them permitted.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the last clause of the <i>baraita</i>: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that in the case of a stone winepress that a gentile lined with pitch, one may cleanse it and it is pure? The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a case where the gentile did not tread on his grapes in it, whereas the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he trod on his grapes in it.
  The Master said above: With regard to the winepress and the ladle and the funnel that belong to gentiles, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permits them by cleansing, and the Rabbis deem them forbidden. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that if the winepress is of earthenware, even if one peeled off the pitch this press is forbidden? Rava said: In the last clause of the mishna we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Rava taught: If one has a tank of wine used by gentiles, he must scald it in order to render it permitted for use. When Rava would dispatch empty kegs to Harpanya, he would turn them over, placing them in their sacks on their openings, and seal the sacks on their brims, so that the gentile carriers would not be able to use them for wine. He maintained that with regard to anything that is used to contain wine for storage, even if the wine may be stored in it only temporarily, the Sages decreed that it is forbidden for use as though it had contained wine.
  § The Gemara asks with regard to the cleansing mentioned in the mishna: How does one cleanse a winepress, or utensils used by a gentile for wine? Rav says: One cleans it with water. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: One cleans it with ashes. The Gemara asks: When Rav says: One cleans it with water, does he mean only with water and not with ashes as well? Furthermore, when Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: One cleans it with ashes, does he mean only with ashes, and not with water as well? Rather, their statements must be understood as follows:
  
  Daf 75a
  
  Rav says: One must cleanse it with water first, and the same must be done with ashes subsequently, and Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: One must cleanse it with ashes first, and the same must be done with water subsequently. The Gemara comments: And they do not disagree. This statement, that it must be cleansed first with ashes and subsequently with water, was stated with regard to a damp winepress. That statement, that first it must be moistened with water and then cleansed with ashes, was stated with regard to a dry winepress.
  A dispute was stated with regard to this matter: The Sages of the school of Rav say in the name of Rav that the cleansing process consists of two stages for a damp winepress, namely, ashes and water, and three stages for a dry winepress, namely, water, ashes, and water. And Shmuel says that it consists of three stages for a damp winepress, namely, ashes, water, and ashes, and four stages for a dry winepress, namely, water, ashes, water, and ashes.
  In Sura they taught the dispute in this preceding manner, but in Pumbedita they taught it in the following manner: The Sages of the school of Rav said in the name of Rav that the cleansing process consists of three stages for a damp winepress, namely, ashes, water, and ashes, and four stages for a dry winepress, namely, water, ashes, water, and ashes. And Shmuel says that it consists of four stages for a damp winepress, namely, ashes, water, ashes, and water, and five stages for a dry winepress, namely, water, ashes, water, ashes, and water.
  The Gemara comments with regard to the latter version of the dispute: And they do not actually disagree. One Sage, Shmuel, counts the last rinsing with water, which is only in order to remove the ashes, and the other Sage, Rav, does not count the last rinsing with water. Therefore Rav counts three and four stages, whereas Shmuel counts four and five.
  § The students asked Rabbi Abbahu with regard to a similar issue of cleansing a utensil from wine of gentiles: With regard to those wicker nets [<i>gorgei</i>] used to hold the grapes during the treading, which belong to gentiles, what is the way to cleanse them?
  Rabbi Abbahu said to them: You learned this in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one whose winepresses or olive presses were impure, and he wished to prepare his grapes and olives in a state of purity, he must first cleanse the presses from the impure produce for which they were used. He must rinse the planks used as a frame in the winepress, and the troughs, and the twigs used as brooms in the winepress; and he must cleanse the pressing baskets with ashes and water if they were made of palm leaves or of hemp [<i>bitzbutz</i>], or leave them dormant twelve months if they were made of bulrush or of reeds, because these absorb more of the wine. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He may leave them dormant from one wine-pressing season to the next wine-pressing season, or from one olive-pressing season to the next olive-pressing season.
  The Gemara interjects: Isn’t this opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel the same as that of the first <i>tanna</i>, as twelve months pass from one wine-pressing season to the next? The Gemara responds: The difference between them is with regard to early-ripening grapes and late-ripening grapes. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel does not require a precise measure of twelve months, as the lapse between ripening seasons may be greater or less.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yosei says: One who wishes to purify the winepress or olive press immediately without waiting a year can purge them by pouring boiling water over them, or scald them in water used for cooking olives. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: He can place them under a pipe whose water flows constantly or in a spring with rapid waters. And for how long should he leave them there? He should leave them for an interval of time, as the Gemara will explain.
  The <i>baraita</i> adds: In the same way that the Sages stated these cleansing instructions with regard to a winepress used for libation wine, so they stated these instructions with regard to matters of purity.
  The Gemara asks with regard to this last clause: Isn’t it the opposite? We are dealing in this <i>baraita</i> with matters of purity, not with the matter of wine used for a libation. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> should be emended: In the same way that the Sages stated this with regard to matters of purity, so they stated this with regard to libation wine.
  The Gemara asks: How long is an interval of time? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is either an entire day or an entire night. Rabbi Ḥana Sha’ina, and some say Rabbi Ḥana bar Sha’ina, says that Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is half a day and half a night.
  Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak says: And they do not disagree. This statement, that it is either a day or a night, is referring to the season of Nisan or Tishrei, i.e., the fall or spring, when the day and the night are of equal length, and that statement, that it is half a day and half a night, is referring to the season of Tammuz or Tevet, i.e., the summer or winter, when they are not equal, and so twelve hours are measured by half the day and half the night.
  § Rav Yehuda says: In order to cleanse those gentiles’ straining bags [<i>ravukei</i>], which are used for straining yeast from wine, with regard to those made of hair, which is not absorbent, one may rinse them. With regard to those made of wool, one must cleanse them with ashes and water. With regard to those made of flax, which is more absorbent, one must leave them dormant. And if there are knots, one must undo them. In order to cleanse those gentiles’ baskets and strainers, with regard to those that are plaited from palm strips, one may rinse them.
  
  Daf 75b
  
  With regard to those that are plaited from <i>tzavta</i>, one must cleanse them with ashes and water. With regard to those that are plaited from flax, one must leave them dormant. And if they have knots, one must undo them.
  § The Gemara discusses another aspect of the purity of a winepress. It was stated: In the case of one who is unreliable with regard to ritual impurity [<i>am ha’aretz</i>] who reached his hand into the winepress and touched grape clusters that were lying in the wine, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Ḥiyya disagree. One says that the cluster he touched and all its surroundings are rendered impure, but the rest of the entire winepress is pure, and one says that the rest of the entire winepress is also rendered impure, as the entire winepress is considered connected due to the wine in it.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that the cluster and all its surroundings are impure but the rest of the entire winepress is pure, in what way is this case different from that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 9:8): The carcass of a creeping animal that was found in an oil press transmits impurity to the place it touched alone, but if there was liquid flowing in the mill, it is all rendered impure? Why is it not the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the winepress as well that the entire winepress is impure due to the liquid in it?
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of the oil press, there is nothing that interrupts the flow of the liquid, and therefore the liquid connects everything to render it impure. Here, the clusters of grapes interrupt the flow of the wine, and so there is no uninterrupted connection between all of the wine in the winepress.
  The Sages taught Rabbi Yirmeya, and some say they taught the son of Rabbi Yirmeya, in accordance with the statement of the one who says: The cluster and all its surroundings are impure, but the entire winepress is pure.
  MISHNA: One who purchases cooking utensils from the gentiles must prepare them for use by Jews in the following manner: With regard to those utensils whose manner of preparation is to immerse them in a ritual bath, as they require no further preparation, he must immerse them accordingly. With regard to those utensils whose manner of preparation is to purge them with boiling water, as those utensils are used with boiling water, e.g., pots, he must purge them accordingly. With regard to those whose manner of preparation is to heat until white-hot in the fire, as they are used for grilling, he must heat them until white-hot in the fire. Therefore, with regard to the spit [<i>hashappud</i>] and the grill [<i>veha’askela</i>], he must heat them until white-hot in the fire. With regard to the knife, he must polish it and it is rendered pure.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: And they all require immersion in forty <i>se’a</i> of water, including utensils that must first be purged in boiling water or heated until white-hot. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rava says: It is derived from that which the verse states with regard to utensils captured in the battle against the Midianites: “Anything that may tolerate the fire, you shall make to go through the fire, and it shall be pure” (Numbers 31:23). By stating: “And it shall be pure,” the verse added to the process another required act of purification in addition to heating the utensil with fire, which is understood to be immersion.
  Bar Kappara teaches an additional source for this <i>halakha</i>: From that which is stated the continuation of the verse: “Nevertheless it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling [<i>nidda</i>],” I would derive that the utensils require sprinkling of purification water on the third and the seventh day of their purification process, as is the <i>halakha</i> in the case of one who is impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. Therefore, the verse states “nevertheless,” indicating that the Torah makes a distinction in this case, and that sprinkling on the third and seventh day are not required.
  If that is so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “With the water of sprinkling [<i>nidda</i>]”? Clearly, the term <i>nidda</i> is referring not to sprinkling but to a menstruating woman, who is also called a <i>nidda</i>. Accordingly, the verse means that the utensils must be immersed in water in which a menstruating woman can immerse in order to become pure; and you must say that this is referring to a ritual bath that contains forty <i>se’a</i> of water.
  The Gemara explains that both sources for this <i>halakha</i> are necessary: It was necessary for the Torah to write “and it shall be pure,” and it was necessary for the Torah to write “with the water of sprinkling,” because if the Torah had written only “and it shall be pure,” I would say that the verse means: “And it shall be pure” by immersion in any amount of water. Therefore the Merciful One writes: “With the water of sprinkling.”
  And if the Merciful One had written only “with the water of sprinkling,” I would say that the process requires the setting of the sun, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a menstruating woman, whose immersion renders her pure only after sunset. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And it shall be pure,” indicating that the utensils can be purified immediately.
  § Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: Even new utensils that were never used that are bought from gentiles are meant to be included in the requirement of immersion, as old utensils that one heated until white-hot are similar to new utensils, as they do not contain the flavor of non-kosher food, and nevertheless they require immersion. Rav Sheshet objects to this: If so, then even scissors for cutting clothing [<i>zuza desarbela</i>] should require immersion as well. Rav Naḥman said to him: Only utensils used in the preparation of meals are mentioned in the passage in the Torah, and only those require immersion.
  Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The Sages taught this only with regard to utensils that were purchased from gentiles and are therefore comparable to the utensils mentioned in the incident that was related in the passage; but the requirement does not apply to borrowed utensils.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef bought a utensil of <i>marda</i>, a mixture of earth and dung, from a gentile. He thought he was required to immerse it. One of the Sages, and Rabbi Ya’akov was his name, said to him: It was explained to me personally by Rabbi Yoḥanan himself that this requirement applies to metal utensils alone, as those are the utensils mentioned in the passage.
  Rav Ashi says: With regard to those glass utensils, since when broken they can be fixed, i.e., remade, if one melts them down and fashions the material into new utensils, they are similar to metal utensils and also require immersion. With regard to lead-glazed earthenware utensils, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with its initial state; since it was initially an earthenware utensil, it does not require immersion. And one says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with its ultimate state; since it is coated with metal, it requires immersion. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with its ultimate state.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If a Jew is holding a gentile’s utensil as collateral, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is he required to immerse it or not? Mar bar Rav Ashi said: A gentile once gave my father a silver goblet as collateral, and he immersed it and drank from it. But I do not know whether this was because he maintained that possessing a utensil as collateral is considered like a purchase, or because he saw that the gentile’s intention was to leave it with him, and therefore he considered it as his own.
  § The Sages taught: One who purchases utensils from the gentiles must prepare them for use in the following manner: With regard to items that the gentile did not use, one immerses them, and they are pure. With regard to items that the gentile used for cold food or drink, such as cups and jugs and flasks, one rinses them and immerses them, and they are pure. With regard to items that the gentile used for hot food or drink, such as large pots, small kettles [<i>hakumkamusun</i>], and samovars, one purges them with boiling water and immerses them, and they are pure. With regard to items that the gentile used with fire, such as spits and grills, one heats them until white-hot and immerses them, and they are pure.
  And with regard to all utensils that one used before immersing and purging and heating them until white-hot, it is taught in one <i>baraita</i> that the food prepared with them is forbidden, and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the food prepared with them is permitted.
  The Gemara explains: This contradiction is not difficult. This ruling, that the food prepared with such utensils is forbidden, is according to the one who says that if a forbidden substance imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture, the permitted food is forbidden. That ruling, that the food prepared with such utensils is permitted, is according to the one who says that if a forbidden substance imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture, it remains permitted. Here too, since the flavor of non-kosher food imparted by the utensil detracts from the flavor of the food, such food is permitted.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the one who says that that if a forbidden substance imparts flavor to a permitted food to the detriment of the mixture then the mixture is permitted, with regard to utensils of gentiles that require purging, which the Merciful One renders forbidden until they are purged, how can you find these circumstances when it is actually prohibited to use the utensils until they are purged? Since utensils impart a detrimental flavor to food that is cooked in them, there seems to be no reason not to use utensils of gentiles without purging them.
  Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, says: The Torah renders forbidden only a pot
  
  Daf 76a
  
  that was used for cooking that same day by a gentile, as in such a case, it does not impart flavor to food cooked in it to the detriment of the mixture.
  The Gemara asks: If so, from that point onward the pot should be permitted, as on the following day the taste of the non-kosher food imparted by the pot is already to the detriment of the food. The Gemara answers: There is a rabbinic decree that prohibits use of a pot that was not used by a gentile that same day, due to concern that one will use a pot used by a gentile that same day.
  The Gemara comments: And according to the opinion of the other <i>tanna</i>, who holds that even if the imparted flavor is to the detriment of the permitted food nevertheless it is forbidden, even the flavor imparted by a pot that was used that same day is detrimental to the flavor of the food, and still the Torah deems it forbidden, which proves that if a forbidden substance imparts flavor to a permitted food to its detriment, the permitted food is forbidden.
  § Rav Amram raises a contradiction before Rav Sheshet: We learned in the mishna: With regard to the spits and the grill, one must heat them until white-hot in the fire. But it is taught in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 97a) with regard to sacrificial meat: The spit and the grill that were used to roast sacrificial meat may not be used again after the time for eating that particular offering has passed, as the leftover taste of the offering in these utensils is forbidden, unless one purges them in hot water. Apparently, heating them until white-hot is unnecessary.
  Rav Sheshet said to him: Amram, my son, what has the matter of sacrificial meat to do with vessels of gentiles that require purging? Here, in the case of sacrificial meat, the utensils absorbed a permitted food that subsequently became forbidden, and therefore purging in hot water is sufficient. There, in the case of utensils acquired from gentiles, the utensils absorbed a forbidden food, and so they must be heated until white-hot.
  Rava disagreed, saying: Ultimately, even in the case of sacrificial meat, when it emits flavor, it emits a forbidden flavor, so what difference does it make that it was permitted when it was absorbed? Rather, Rava said: What is meant by the purging stated with regard to sacrificial meat? It means that besides heating it until white-hot, rinsing and scouring it are also required, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to any utensil used with sacrificial meat, as the verse states: “It shall be scoured and rinsed in water” (Leviticus 6:21).
  Abaye said to him: Are rinsing and scouring comparable to purging? Scouring and rinsing are done in cold water, whereas purging is done in hot water. Therefore, this is not a valid interpretation of the term purging. Rather, Abaye said that the Mishna employs the style of: Its counterpart reveals about it (see Job 36:33), as follows: The Mishna taught here that the spit and the grill require heating until white-hot, and the same is true of purging, which is also required. The Mishna taught there that purging the spit and the grill is necessary, and the same is true of heating until white-hot.
  Rava said to him: If so, let the Mishna teach all of these requirements in one of the places, and let it teach only one of them in the other, and then let us say that the Mishna employs the style of: Its counterpart reveals about it. The principle that one mishna supplements the other can apply when all of the information is stated in one of the two places, but not when each has only part of it.
  Rather, Rava said that with regard to sacrificial meat, this is the reason that its utensils do not require heating until white-hot: It is in accordance with that which Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says, as he says: Each and every day constitutes purging for the other day, i.e., the previous day. Since the designated time for eating the meat of a peace-offering ends the day after it is sacrificed, using the utensils every day for an offering sacrificed on that day guarantees that the taste of every offering is expelled from the utensils before they becomes forbidden, by using them with fire on the following day. Therefore the utensils do not require special heating until white-hot in fire in order to become permitted for subsequent use.
  The Gemara raises an objection: This works out well with regard to peace-offerings, as, since their meat may be eaten over two days, purging is achieved before they become leftover sacrificial meat, which is forbidden. But with regard to a sin-offering, since its meat may be eaten only over the course of a day and a night, when one cooks the meat of a sin-offering with the utensil now, it becomes leftover the next morning. And when one cooks with it again the next day, whether the meat of a peace-offering or a sin-offering, the utensil expels the leftover taste of the sin-offering sacrificed now into the meat of the sin-offering or peace-offering sacrificed the next day, and it should be forbidden.
  The Sages say in response: It is not necessary to purge the utensil by heating it until white-hot even if it was used for the meat of a sin-offering; it is possible to avoid such a requirement, as when one cooks a sin-offering with the utensil now, he can then cook the meat of a peace-offering with the same utensil now, i.e., on the same day, and the taste of the sin-offering is consequently expelled from the utensil on that same day.
  Then, when the taste of the peace-offering is absorbed, it creates a situation where the designated times for eating the meat of the sin-offering of the next day and the meat of the peace-offering of the previous day are complete simultaneously. It is therefore possible to use the utensil for cooking the meat of a sin-offering the next day without having to purge it from the taste of the previous day’s offerings. And one can then cook the meat of a peace-offering with the utensil the next day, thereby expelling from it the taste of the sin-offering of that day, and repeat this practice day after day.
  The Gemara raises an objection: If so, if each day the utensil expels the taste of the sacrificial meat that has not become leftover, then purging it with boiling water is also unnecessary. Why, then, does the mishna require purging with boiling water? The Gemara comments: This poses a difficulty to Rava’s explanation.
  Rav Pappa said that there is another resolution to the contradiction between <i>mishnayot</i>: In this case of a gentile’s spit and grill, because it is a utensil that is not in continual use, it becomes crusty and must be heated until white-hot; but that utensil used for sacrificial meat is in continual use, so it does not become crusty.
  Rav Ashi said: Actually, the contradiction should be resolved as we said from the outset, as explained by Rav Sheshet: There, in the case of sacrificial meat, the utensils absorbed a permitted food that subsequently became forbidden, and therefore purging is sufficient. Here, in the case of utensils acquired from gentiles, the utensils absorbed a forbidden food, and so they must be heated until white-hot.
  And as for that which poses a difficulty for you, that at the time that the utensil expels flavor, it expels the flavor of a forbidden food, the answer is that at the time it expels flavor, the forbidden food is nonexistent in its substantive form. Since the forbidden substance expelled from the utensil is not the forbidden food itself but only its flavor, it is treated leniently, and therefore the fact that it was permitted at the time it was absorbed in the utensil is taken into account.
  § Returning to the mishna, the Gemara asks: And how much does one heat utensils to make them white-hot? Rabbi Mani says: Until they shed their outer layer. And how does one purge utensils with boiling water? Rav Huna says: One immerses a small kettle inside a large kettle of boiling water.
  The Gemara asks: What does one do with a large kettle? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from an incident involving a certain cauldron that was in the house of Rav Akavya and required purging. He surrounded it
  
  Daf 76b
  
  with a rim [<i>gedanfa</i>] of dough around its rim, and filled it with water and boiled it, so that the water boiled along its rim. Rava said: Who would be clever enough to perform such an action if not Rav Akavya, as he is a great man. He maintains that as it absorbs it so it expels it; just as the rim absorbs the forbidden substance by small drops of it that reach the rim, so too it expels the forbidden substance by small drops of boiling water that reach the rim.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the knife, one must polish it and it is rendered pure. Rav Ukva bar Ḥama says: And one must thrust it ten times into the ground. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: And this must be done in untilled earth, i.e., hard earth. Rav Kahana says: And this applies to a good knife that does not have notches, so that the entire surface of the knife is scraped against the ground. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a good knife that does not have notches, one can thrust it ten times into the ground. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: This is sufficient for the purpose of eating cold food with it.
  This is like that incident involving Mar Yehuda, an important personage of the house of the Exilarch, and Bati bar Tuvi, a wealthy man, who were sitting before King Shapur, the king of Persia. The king’s servants brought an <i>etrog</i> before them. The king cut a slice and ate it, and then he cut a slice and gave it to Bati bar Tuvi. He then stuck the knife ten times in the ground, cut a slice, and gave it to Mar Yehuda. Bati bar Tuvi said to him: And is that man, referring to himself, not Jewish? King Shapur said to him: I am certain of that master, Mar Yehuda, that he is meticulous about <i>halakha</i>; but I am not certain of that master, referring to Bati bar Tuvi, that he is meticulous in this regard.
  There are those who say that King Shapur said to him: Remember what you did last night. The Persian practice was to present a woman to each guest, with whom he would engage in intercourse. Mar Yehuda did not accept the woman who was sent to him, but Bati bar Tuvi did, and therefore he was not assumed to be meticulous with regard to eating kosher food.
  