meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Commentary/Reshimot Shiurim/Seder Zeraim/Reshimot Shiurim on Berakhot/English/merged.txt"}
text: Reshimot Shiurim on Berakhot
  רשימות שיעורים על ברכות
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
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  Reshimot Shiurim on Berakhot
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  The Mitzvah of Kriyat Shema during the Evening and Morning
  A. Mitzvah of Kriyat Shema - Is it One or Two Mitzvahs
  See Rambam's brief counting of the mitzvot at the beginning of the halachot of Kriyat Shema: "It [Kriyat Shema] is a singular positive, and it involves reading the Shema twice during the day." And in Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment #10) he writes: " It is commanded to say Shema at night and in the morning, as it says "...and you will speak of them." Let it be clarified that the Rambam reasons that there is one positive commandment to read the Shema twice during the day, and the Kriyat Shema of the evening and the Kriyat Shema of the morning combine to fulfill the single mitzvah of Kriyat Shema for the entire day, and that it [Kriyat Shema] is not two separate mitzvot to say Shema in the evening and in the morning.
  This is clarified from the language of the Rambam (Mishna Torah, Chapter 1, Halachot Kriyat Shema, Halacha 1): "Twice every day one reads Kriyat Shema in the evening and in the morning, as it says: "...in your resting and in your getting up..." And it is clear that the obligation to say Kriyat Shema is twice during the day, and Kriyat Shema of the evening and Kriyat Shema of the morning combine to fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, and that it is not two separate mitzvot.
  According to this, it appears that according to the Rambam, that even though the two readings [of Shema] do not prevent one another from being said, [meaning that] if one does not read the Kriyat Shema of the evening, he is certainly obligated to read the Kriyat Shema of the morning, in any case, the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is not fulfilled in its entirety rather it is only completed if he reads Kriyat Shema twice during the day. [As it can be seen] that the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment #12 &amp; #13) counts tefillin of the arm and the tefillin of the head as two separate mitzvot because they do not prevent either one's completion; [meaning that] one who has his head tefillin, and does not have his arm tefillin places his head tefillin: "And the proof that tefillin of the head and of the arm are two mitzvot is discussed in the Gemara (Menachot 44a) [from the fact that the Gemara is] on the side of surprise [regarding] the one who considers that neither the head tefillin nor the arm tefillin be placed on someone without the other, rather only if they are together, etc...the one who does not [consider them] two [separate] mitzvot [rather] one mitzvah has not done it, that is to say that one who is not able to do the two mitzvahs has not completed even one mitzvah. This is not so, [rather] one does a mitzvah that is available, and therefore one places which of the [tefillin] is available to him. Behold it is clarified to you that arm tefillin and head tefillin are called two mitzvot." And the Ramban (in Sefer HaMitzvot end of Shoresh 11) brings a difficulty that according to that which the Rambam wrote, [it appears] that only if two mitzvot prevent one another, does [the Rambam] consider it to be a single mitzvah. This requires elucidation, why does the Rambam not count two mitzvot by tzitzit, since it was established that [not having] techeilet [strings] does not prevent [the fulfillment of] white [strings], and [not having] the white [strings] does not prevent [the fulfillment of] techeilet [strings]. And thus it requires explanation: why does the Rambam not count Kriyat Shema as two separate mitzvot, one mitzvah in the morning and one mitzvah in the evening, that the two recitations do not prevent one another, [from the fact] that it is obvious that one does not say Kriyat Shema of the evening is still obligated to say the Kriyat Shema of the morning.
  It appears that [in order] to explain the Rambam, it can be reasoned that there is a distinction between the mitzvah of tzitzit and the mitzvah of tefillin, that regarding tzitzit it we establish that techeilet [strings] does not prevent the white [strings], and that the white [strings] do not prevent the techeilet [strings], [meaning] that it turns out that one fulfills the mitzvah of tzitzit by [wearing] purely the white or techeilet strings only. Indeed, it appears that there is only a fulfillment of the mitzvah of tzitzit in its entirety if one wears techeilet and white strings together. (It is possible that this was the intention of the Ramban there in what he writes: "That we see the master of halachot who counted the mitzvot of tzitzit as a singular mitzvah because it is considered one concept that [having both] the techeilet and white [strings] completes for us the intention in this mitzvah "to remember all the mitzvot of Hashem and to do them"). This is not so regarding tefillin - that head tefillin does not prevent at all the [full] completion of the arm tefillin. And when one places arm [tefillin] by itself, one fulfills the mitzvah of arm tefillin in its entirety, even if does not put on the head tefillin at all. So too in the opposite, that when one only puts on the head tefillin, one fulfills the mitzvah of putting on head tefillin in its entirety.
  According to this, it appears that [it is necessary to] clarify the opinion of the Rambam who counts the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema twice every day as one [single] mitzvah. Granted, that the Kriyat Shema of the morning does not prevent the completion of the Kriyat Shema of the evening, in any case, [however] if one only says Kriyat Shema of the evening or of the morning, one does not fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in its entirety, [because] the two readings [of the Shema] complete one  another, and because of this, the two readings of Kriyat Shema are counted as one mitzvah. On the other hand, the Ramban reasons that Kriyat Shema of the morning and Kriyat Shema of the evening are two separate mitzvahs, like arm tefillin and head tefillin.
  B. The Mitzvah of Three Tefillot During the Day
  Additionally, see further in the Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment #10) he writes: "It is commanded to say Shema at night and in the morning...and it is written in the Tosefta that just as the Torah established times for Kriyat Shema, so too did the Sages give a time for tefillah, which means to say that the times of tefillah are not from the Torah. Indeed the obligation of the tefillah itself is from the Torah, like that which we clarified, and the sages established for them set times. And this is the concept that was stated "the prayers were established according to the Tamid offerings", which means to say that they established times [for prayer] according to the times for the sacrifices." This needs further elucidation of why does the Rambam count here the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, and bring the Tosefta that deals with subject of zmanim (times) of tefillah withe the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema. 
  It appears that the opinion of the Rambam is that there is one singular mitzvah to pray every day. And the obligation is generated by that specific day that the tefillah is said, like that which is written (Ch. 1, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 1): "It is a positive mitzvah to pray every day as it says "And you shall serve Hashem, your Lord." According to this, it appears that the obligation to pray three times a day, is the set measurement of fulfilling the mitzvah of tefillah every day, that on a rabbinic level, they [the rabbis] instituted that in order to fulfill the mitzvah of tefillah that arises [as a result of] the specific day occurring would require one to pray the three tefillot in their [proper] time  corresponding to the time the sacrificial offering [was offered up]. The three tefillot are not three fulfillments in of themselves rather they are each a part of the fulfillment [of the obligation] of tefillah that arises as a result of the day [occurring]. And according to this, it appears that this clarifies the words of the Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvot, who brings the words of the Tosefta: "...that just as the Torah established times for Kriyat Shema, so too did the Sages give a time for tefillah," that is to say that just like by tefillah, the three tefillot are the measurement for the primary fulfillment of the mitzvah of tefillah on a Torah level as a result of the day occurring, so too regarding Kriyat Shema that generates an obligation of Kriyat Shema as a result of a day occurring, which has a Kriyat Shema of the evening and a Kriyat Shema of the morning which would be considered the [amount necessary] for the fulfillment of the daily obligation of Kriyat Shema. It is clarified according to this, that just as we explained by Kriyat Shema of the evening and Kriyat Shema of the morning are not considered two separate mitzvot rather are considered each part of one single mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, [that is say] that the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema generates reading Kriyat Shema twice per day.
  The Rambam organizes the laws of Kriyat Shema here, in the Sefer Ahavah, and at the beginning of Sefer Ahavah, the Rambam writes the verse: "How I love Your Torah! It is my conversation all day long" (and in each book of the fourteen books of the Mishna Torah, the Rambam brings a verse at the beginning of the book, and that verse expresses the idea of the book). It appears that the foundation of the fence of love is consistency, and when the verse (Psalms 119:97) says "How I love Your Torah! It is my conversation all day long" - That one converses all of the day in matters of Torah, this is the expression of loving Torah. Based off this explanation, it appears that [according to] the opinion of the Rambam, there is a single mitzvah of saying Kriyat Shema twice during the day, and by saying Kriyat Shema twice a day, it is considered as if one said Kriyat Shema for the entire day, and this is the fulfillment of "How I love Your Torah! It is my conversation all day long," and because of this, the Rambam organized the halachot of Kriyat Shema in Sefer Ahavah.
  C. A Half Measure of the Mitzvah of Kriyat Shema
  Rather, according to [that which was discussed in the previous section], it requires further study. [Two questions arise:] why is it established that if one does not say Kriyat Shema of the evening, that one is [still] obligated to say Kriyat Shema of the morning, and [why] do we not say  that one is able to fulfill a half measure of Kriyat Shema on a Torah level, [for example], if one says it only once during the day. In any case, it appears that concerning mitzvot there is no [concept of any form of] completion at all with a half measurement. 
  This, the main [aspect] of the halacha of a half measure [is in discussions of forbidden items and acts, where we rule that] it is forbidden [to do even a half measure] on Torah level. There is what to distinguish from the idea that [a half measure is either] a facet of the manifestation of the full measurement [of the forbidden], or perhaps that a half measure is forbidden as part of its own category [of that which is forbidden by the Torah], that the status of 'forbidden' is established [also] by [the concept of] half measure. It seems that the practical [application] difference in this would be in the subject of fulfilling a [positive] mitzvah on a half measure amount, [the question then arises:] is it that one [is able] to fulfill a [positive] mitzvah at a half measure level, or is it that [the Torah] only created the the novelty of 'half measure' by forbidden mitzvot. If perhaps, we say that [mechanism of] half measure is forbidden on a Torah level, [and this is so] because [a half measure] is appropriate to combine [with subsequent measurements], [it is] thus included in the category of 'negative commandments [which contain a specific] measurement', there is to say that the mechanism of half measure occurs even by fulfilling [positive] mitzvot, that even though a mitzvah is only [considered] complete by [completing] a full measure. In any case, the mechanism of half measure occurs [by positive commandments] and generates a fulfillment of a mitzvah. This is not so if we say that a half measure is considered a category of negative commandment in of itself, and it is not considered under the category of 'negative commandments [which contain a specific] measurement.' Then, it is logical to say that the [concept of] negative commandment creates the novelty of half measure, which is only [applicable] to negative commandments, but it is not relevant by fulfillment of [positive] commandments.
  HaGRaM tz''l here brings a proof that the [concept] of half measure is [new and] novel prohibition in of itself, and is not included as [an aspect] of prohibition[s which contain a set measurement to be obligated for transgressing] itself, from the words of the Rambam (Ch. 5, Laws of Shevuot, Halacha 7) in which he writes: "[if one took] an oath not to eat any amount of neveilah (animals that died without kosher slaughter) and treifah (animals which had a blemish or disease) and one ate less than a kezayis (a volume of an olive) [of a neveilah or treifah] he is liable for [violating his] oath, because one is not bound by an oath of Mount Sinai [in regards to] a half measure [of a negative commandment]." See the Kesef Mishnah there, who raises a difficulty of how can the Rambam rule that one [is able to] make an oath that one should not eat any amount [of forbidden food because the Torah already forbade it], [additionally it] is established that a half measure [of eating forbidden food] is [also] forbidden on a Torah level (and this is clarified in the Rambam, Ch. 2, Laws of Rest on the Tenth [of Tishrei], Halacha 3). The Kesef Mishnah explains (NEEDS SOURCE): "...and there are those who say that, granted, a half measure is forbidden on a Torah level because [the half measure of forbidden substance] is fitting to combine [with other forbidden food to fulfill the full amount], but it is not explicitly forbidden in the Torah, and an oath is only made on things that are explicit in the Torah. You should know that it is written in the Torah: "Do not stray from the thing which He tells you," even if the oath is promulgated on forbidden things on a Rabbinic level." His explanation requires clarity that if you say that a half measurement is forbidden on a Torah level because a half measurement is included in the full measurement [of a specific transgression], and [thus] that [specific] transgression is triggered via the half measurement. If so, [half measurements] are included in the body of the transgression which is written in the Torah, and [therefore] Mount Sinai bound and established him [to not transgress negative commandments containing half measures], since this transgression is explicit in the Torah. The GRaM tz''l clarifies that one is forced to say that is proved from the Rambam (according to the words of the Kesef Mishnah), that half measurements are not prohibited as part of a specific prohibition itself, rather [half measures] constitute a triggering of a new prohibition which is prohibited because it is fitting to combine [to complete the full measure], therefore, the Rambam rules that the oath [is binding] since the prohibition of a half measurement is not included in the explicit prohibitions mentioned in the Torah, and they are not part of category of prohibitions [like] chelev (forbidden fats) and blood rather it constitutes a general prohibition of "half measures" which is not explicit in the Torah.
  Apparently, there is an additional practical difference which is relevant to one who eats less than a kezayis on a fast day, whether or not one is able to receive an aliyah to the Torah, as it is accepted that only those who are fasting can read the Torah (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, Siman 566, Seif 6). It was a fact that in Beit Midrash of HaGRaM tz''l, he would permit giving an aliyah to the Torah on Yom Kippur to a sick person at risk who ate less than the [requisite] amount [to violate the prohibition of eating]. The GRaM tz''l clarified that eating less than the [requisite] amount does not nullify the mitzvah of the fast, since the prohibition of a half measure is a prohibition in of itself, and it is not included in the specific prohibition of the measurement for [eating on the fast]. The general prohibition of "half measurements" do not nullify the fulfillment of the mitzvah of fasting, and one who ate less than the [requisite] amount does not transgress the prohibtion of "and a soul which does not afflict [itself]," and one is considered on a Torah level as having completely fasted, and it is fine [for him to receive] an aliyah to the Torah.
  According to this , it is reasonable [to say] there is no category of "half measurements" that is generated by mitzvot, and there is no fulfillment of a mitzvah by [completing] a half measure. Only by [the category of] prohibitions is [the idea] of new prohibition of half measurements innovated from a gezeirat hakatuv, which is not the case by [positive] mitzvot which are only fulfilled if the mitzvah is completed in its entirety with its full measurement. If so, the opinion of the Rambam by the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema , which [he rules] is a single mitzvah to recite Kriyat Shema twice a day, needs to be investigated: why is Kriyat Shema different from all of the other mitzvot, and why is one obligated to recite the [Kriyat Shema] of the day when one did not read the [Kriyat Shema] of the night?
  It seems that [we need to] explain that a single recitation of Kriyat Shema once [during] the day is different from half measurements of other mitzvot, because a single [recitation of] Kriyat Shema is full action of a mitzvah - that it is the main characteristic of Kriyat Shema. This is not the case by all of the other mitzvot, where [completing a] half measurement is not [considered] the main characteristic of the mitzvah and is not considered like an action of [doing] the mitzvah at all. [For example,] one who eats a half kezayit of matzah has not done the requisite action of the mitzvah at all, [because] the mitzvah is eating matzah, and the amount of a kezayit is the primary measurement and aspect of the requisite action of the mitzvah because there is no [action of] eating less than a kezayit, therefore there is no fulfillment of the mitzvah of eating a half measurement. This is not the case by reciting Kriyat Shema in the morning and not in the evening, [since] there is no lacking primary characteristic of Kriyat Shema [by a single recitation], rather there is only a lack of fulfillment of the obligation on the person [himself] to recite Kriyat Shema twice a day. Since in a single recitation within a day is not a deficiency in the primary essence of the requisite action of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, it is fine to say that there was a fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema to a [minimal] extent, and it is not similar to half measurements by [other] mitzvot. Because of this, the Rambam reasons that even though [regarding] the matter of obligation on the person [himself], one is required to say Kriyat Shema twice a day, in any event, one who does not recite Kriyat Shema in the evening, is [still] obligated to recite Kriyat Shema in the morning, [since] one who recites Kriyat Shema one time [during] the day fulfills the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema to a [minimal] extent.
  D. Two Fulfillments in the Mitzvah of Kriyat Shema
  Additionally, it appears that [it needs to be clarified], that here the Rishonim argue what is [considered] the primary aspect of Kriyat Shema on a Torah level, which the Rambam writes (Ch. 1, Laws of Kriyat Shema, Halacha 1-2): "Twice every day, we read Kriyat Shema, in the evening and in the morning as it says: "...In your laying down and in your arising..." and what is [Kriyat Shema?] Onee who reads the three sections, and these are they: "Shema," "v'Hayah Im Shamoa," "Vayomer." It is clarified that the opinion of the Rambam [holds that] these three sections of Kriyat Shema are a Torah Level. According to the opinion of Rashi (2a DH "Ad Sof") only reading the first section is a Torah obligation, and the opinion of Rabbeinu Yonah (1a in the pages of the Rif, end of DH "v'Ifsika") the first two sections are a Torah obligation, and the remainder is a Rabbinic obligation. There is a potential difficulty later [in the gemara] (13b) which [states]: "It was taught by the Rabbis: "Listen, Israel, Hashem is our Lord, Hashem is One" this is the Kriyat Shema of  Rebbi Yehudah HaNasi...Rabbi Ila son of Rav Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav: one who said, "Listen, Israel, Hashem is our Lord, Hashem is One" and was overcome with sleep [soon after] has fulfilled [his obligation of Kriyat Shema], RAV NACHMAN said to his slave Daru: [if I have fallen asleep] bother me [in order to wake me so I can recite]  the first verse [of Shema], any other verses [further than the first] do not bother [to wake me in order to recite them]." It is clarified in the Gemara that in only reading the first verse of the Shema, one fulfills the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, as this is the Kriyat Shema of Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi. Therefore, [regarding] one who is sleeping, we only wake him in order to say the first verse only. This needs further investigation, as [according to] all of the opinions of the Rishonim, as it appears to me, how did Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema on a Torah level with only the first verse only?
  It appears that there are two facets and [types] of fulfillment in the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema: a facet of [doing the] action of reading the paragraphs [of Shema], [and a facet of] of fulfilling "accepting the yoke of heaven." It seems that the Rambam reasons that in order to fulfill the facet of [doing the] action of reading the Kriyat Shema, one needs to read all three paragraphs, this is not so [however, in order to] fulfill [the facet] of accepting the yoke of heaven, [where] one can fulfill this facet by reading just the first verse [of the Shema] (SIDE NOTE 1: And according to this, there is what to investigate by the law of berachot of Kriyat Shema, whether it is [dependent on the aspect of] the fulfillment of reading all of the paragraphs is or whether [it is dependent on the aspect of] the fulfillment of accepting the yoke of heaven is relevant. The practical difference is in regards to the Kriyat Shema of Rebbi Yehuda HaNasi, that when one reads only the first verse,  one should say the berachot of Kriyat Shema if it applicable to the aspect of fulfillment of "accepting the yoke of heaven" [or perhaps] one should not say the berachot if one is lacking the aspect and fulfillment of saying all paragraphs of Shema. See further (Letter E) which requires further investigation) . It appears additionally that in each verse of Kriyat Shema there are two fulfillments, an aspect of reading (doing the action of Kriyat Shema) and an aspect of accepting the yoke of heaven, and that each verse has a primary innate aspect of "accepting the yoke of heaven" and an aspect of [doing] the complete action of the mitzvah of "accepting the yoke of heaven." According to this, it appears that it is not [proper] to equate a single recitation of Kriyat Shema as [part of the category of] half measure of  mitzvot, [since] a single reading of the Shema is complete action of the mitzvah of "accepting the yoke of heaven, which is not so by half measurements of [other] mitzvot, which do not have the primary innate aspect of the action of the mitzvah at all.
  E. The Laws of Berachot of Kriyat Shema
  Here, [let it be] clarified according to the opinion of the Rambam who counts the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema twice every day as a singular mitzvah. Granted, that Kriyat Shema of the morning does not withhold [the ability to] fulfill the Kriyat Shema of the evening, in any event, if one said Kriyat Shema only at night (or in the morning only) [one] does not fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in its completion, [being] that the two recitations complete one another, and because of this, the Rambam counted the double [recitation] of Kriyat Shema of the day as a singular mitzvah. This matter of "the two recitations completing one another" requires further clarification. 
  The Rashba brings a difficulty (Shu''T HaRashba Siman 320) that seemingly there is contradiction in the words of the Rambam in which he rules (in Ch. 3, Halacha 6, Laws of Circumcision) that we do not say the blessing on the circumcision of an androgyne, that even though [there is a principal of] a doubt concerning Torah law, [we err on] the side of stringency, in any case since the obligation of blessings of a mitzvah is only a rabbinic law, we do not say a blessing based off of this doubt - that is, even though the primary mitzvah is a Torah obligation. This requires further investigation that the Rambam (Ch. 2, Laws of Kriyat Shema, Halacha 13) himself rules that if there is a doubt if one said Kriyat Shema or not, one returns and says [Kriyat Shema, and not only that but also] says the blessings before and after [the Shema]. This indicates that it is better to say a blessing of a mitzvah [even in] doubt, where the primary mitzvah is a Torah level [obligation], and [therefore] one completes a mitzvah from the principal of "a doubt concerning a Torah law [we err on the side of] stringency.
  The Rashba explains (see in the Kesef Mishnah Ch. 2, Laws of Kriyat Shema, Halacha 13): "And I say perhaps the reasoning of the [Rambam] is that he reasons that from the onset it was established that any one who reads [the Shema] is obligated to read ideally with its blessings."
  It appears that the Rashba's explanation clarifies that the Rambam reasons that [there is a] distinction in the foundation of berachot of mitzv0t in general and the berachot of Kriyat Shema, in that the beracha of a mitzvah is a category and [type of] fulfillment in of itself [requiring one] to say a beracha before doing a mitzvah. The opinion of the Rambam that the beracha of the mitzvah generates a concept of permissibility to [allow the action of] doing the mitzvah, like that which is clarified from the words of the Rambam (Ch.1, Laws of Blessings, Halachot 2-3): "And from the words of Rabbis [it is commanded that one] recite a blessing on all food first and then afterwards [one may] benefit from them...and anyone who benefits [from eating food] without saying a blessing is considered to have committed me'ilah (misappropriation of sacred or consecrated items for the Beit HaMikdash)... and just as one bless on the benefit, so too does one say a blessing on each and every mitzvah, and then afterwards one does it." The Rambam's comparison [when he states] "and just as one bless on the benefit, so too does one say a blessing on each and every mitzvah, and then afterwards one does it" requires clarification, as what is his intention with this comparison. The Rambam rules (Ch. 11, Laws of Blessings, Halachot 2-3) that one should recite blessings for mitzvot before doing the mitzvot, and what is the novelty of the Rambam [saying that] just as we recite a blessing on benefitting before we [actually] benefit, so too do we recite a blessing before [actually] doing it. It thus appears that it can be proven from this that [according to the] opinion of the Rambam a prohibition is generated from doing a mitzvah without reciting a beracha before completing it just like a prohibition is generated from benefitting from this world without saying a blessing [over food], and [therefore] the beracha of a mitzvah generates a form of permissibility [to do the mitzvah]. Just as [according to] his opinion that the beracha of a mitzvah is a fulfillment in of itself, [meaning that] the beracha of the mitzvah grants a permissibility [to do the mitzvah] but does not combine to be part of the main fulfilliment of the mitzvah. This is not so by the blessings of Kriyat Shema which is a Rabbinic part and fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in of itself, [meaning that] if one said Kriyat Shema without saying the berachot of Kriyat Shema, [then on a] rabbinic level one has not fulfilled the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in its entirety. Because of this, the Rambam reasons that even by the rest of the other berachot of mitzvot, if there is a doubt if one is obligated [to redo a certain] Torah mitzvah, one [should] return and do that this mitzvah, but he should not say the blessing [on that mitzvah, since] the beracha is a commandment in of itself, and [therefore] it is a doubt in of itself [and not connected to the Torah mitzvah], and any case of Rabbinic doubt, [we err on the side of] leniency (SIDE NOTE 2: And even though without the beracha, the prohibition of not to do the mitzvah [without the recitation of beracha] is generated, in any event, it is a [case of] doubt of a Rabbinic level prohibition we are lenient. See the Gilyon HaShas for Rabbi Akiva Eiger tz''l (later on Daf 12a, Tosafos D''H "Lo") who differs on this and reasons that there is not a prohibition by berachot of mitzvah [of doing the mitzvah without the beracha], and because of this we say since there is a doubt on a Rabbinic level [we err on the side of] leniency. These berachot [that we] benefit from that there would be a prohibition, like when one eats food without saying a beracha, we say that one is obligated to say a beracha in a case of doubt even though it is only a doubt on a Rabbinic level. Perhaps the reasoning is that we do not [apply the concept of] "doubt on a Rabbinic level [we err on the side of] leniency" in cases where there is already a previous prohibition in place, and since the food is prohibitted without a beracha, [we apply the concept of] "a previous prohibition already in place," and one is obligated to recite a beracha on it. This is not so by mitzvot that do not have a previous prohibition already in place, where we would say [in a case] of Rabbinic level doubt [we err on the side of] leniency) in any case, concerning Kriyat Shema, where one does not recite the berachot of Kriyat Shema, [one is] lacking on a Rabbinic level the essence of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, [meaning that] one does not fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in its complete essence, and not just lacking the fulfillment of the berachot. Because of this, the Rambam rules that [in a case of] doubt if one said Kriyat Shema, [one should] go back and recite the Shema, and [one should] also go back and say the berachot [of the Shema] since the recitation of the berachot are an essential part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah Kriyat Shema.
  In this clarification of the distinction between berachot of Kriyat Shema and rest of the berachot of mitzvot it appears that even though that the action of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is a recitation of the paragraphs of the Shema, in any event, the primary fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is the fulfillment in the heart, which is accepting the yoke of Kingdom of Heaven into his heart.  This proof from the intention in the first verse prevents the fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema (like the ruling of the Rambam, Ch. 2, Laws of Kriyat Shema, Halacha 1) which is not so by the rest of the mitzvot, which is established that the mitzvot do not require [proper] intention (see the Rambam, Ch. 6, Laws of Chametz and Matzah, Halacha 3), and this proves that the primary fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema occurs with the fulfillment of accepting the yoke of Heaven, which occurs [with the recitation of] the first verse, and because of this it is established that within the first verse, the intention prevents [the completion of the mitzvah]. It appears that on a Rabbinic level it was enacted that the berachot of Kriyat Shema is like a portion of the fulfillment of accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven of Kriyat Shema, that the three berachot of the berachot of Kriyat Shema that were established by the Rabbis, parallel the three paragraphs of the Kriyat Shema. That the first beracha of the Kriyat Shema - the blessing of "Yotzer Ohr," discusses that Hashem created everything, corresponding to the first paragraph [of the Shema which discusses] the Oneness of Hashem and accepting the yoke of Heaven. The second blessing of "Ahavah Rabbah" discusses learning Torah, and one exempts himself from Birkat HaTorah [by reciting this blessing, if he did not say Birkat HaTorah], and this corresponds to the second paragraph [of the Shema] which discusses learning Torah as it says in it "...and you shall teach it your sons to speak of them." The third blessing - "G'aal Yisroel," which corresponds to the third paragraph of the Shema [which mentions] the [commandment] of remembering the exodus of Egypt and the redemption of Israel. It appears that the Rabbis established the berachot of Kriyat Shema like a single fulfillment of "Kriyat Shema with its berachot," [meaning] that Kriyat Shema and its blessings generates a single fulfillment of "accepting the yoke of Heaven." Because of fact that the subjects of the berachot parallel the paragraphs of the Shema, and that which we have in the Rambam (Ch.1, Laws of Kriyat Shema, Halacha 2-3) that [the acceptance of] Hashem's Oneness and loving Him, learning Torah, and remembering the exodus of Egypt constitutes the fulfillment of accepting the yoke of Heaven. Thus the three berachot of Kriyat Shema correspond to these three subjects and constitutes a singular fulfillment of accepting the yoke of Heaven.
  FFFF. The Limit of the Fulfillment of Kriyat Shema of the Morning and the Kriyat Shema of the Evening
  It is clarified from this that the fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in its primary [sense involves] the fulfillment of accepting the yoke of Heaven, and the berachot of Kriyat Shema correspond to the paragraphs of the Shema, and that they were established to elaborate the intentions within the paragraphs [of the Shema] and that the fulfillment of accepting the yoke of heaven is withen them. It appears [that it is necessary] to add two topics and aspects of "acceptance of the yoke of heaven" of Kriyat Shema and its blessings: A) Accepting the yoke of heaven by mentioning the Uniqueness of Hashem and His Oneness, B) Accepting the yoke of heaven through songs and praises to Hashem. It seems that [when one] says Kriyat Shema of the morning and the evening, one completes the other, that there is a distinction between the fulfillment of "accepting the yoke of heaven" in the Kriyat Shema and its blessing in the morning and the fulfillment of Kriyat Shema and its blessings in the evening. The distinction between them is elaborated from text of the berachot of Kriyat Shema, that [by] the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the morning, we mention the singing of the angels ("and all [of them] opened their mouths...with song and melody...), however, we do not mention this singing in the [blessings] in the evening, [since] there is no singing at night, and this is established [from the fact that] we do not say Hallel except during the day, as it is written "From the rising to the setting of the sun, Hashem's name is to be praised (see Megillah 20b)." And thus we find that the angel said to Yaakov Avinu (Genesis 32:27), "Let me go, for dawn is coming," and Rashi's explanation [there]: " ...and I need to sing during the day," this indicates that precisely during the day the angels sing.
  It appears that because of this, we do not say the Kedushah in the beracha of Kriyat Shema in the evening, that [it seems] after all, that the Kedushah is the songs of the angels, and the angels do not say the song at night. It is [thus] clarified that the distinction between the fulfillment of "accepting the yoke of heaven" of Kriyat Shema and its blessings of the morning from the fulfillment of "accepting the yoke of heaven" of the Kriyat Shema and its blessings of the evening, [is that by] the morning the acceptance of the yoke of heaven can also be generated [and fulfilled by] the singing and praising to Hashem (like that which we say: "and they all accepted upon themselves the yoke of heaven, this [one] from this [one]...Holy! Holy! Holy!...). This is not the case by the evening that since there is no song during the night, it seems that fulfillment of the acceptance of the yoke of heaven can only be generated [and fulfilled] by proclaiming [Hashem's] Uniqueness and Oneness without mention of the song [of Kedushah], and because of this we say in the text of the beracha of the evening: "Hashem, always living and existing, ruling over us forever and ever," that this proclamation is considered the only aspect of "accepting the yoke of heaven."
  According to this, it is explained why on Shabbat we precisely mention the matter of the day of Shabbat in the berachot of Kriyat Shema in the morning ("This praise of the seventh day...") and not in the berachot of Kriyat Shema during the evening of Shabbat, [since] only mentioning the song of the day is relevant to mention, also the matter of praise of Shabbat [is added to the day], in order to mention and emphasize that the song and praise of Shabbat is different from the song of a weekday, as it says, "A psalm song for the day of Shabbat." Therefore, in the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the evening, [where we] do not mention anything regarding song, there is no place [that we] mention the matter of praise of the Shabbat.
  Additionally, [we need to] distinguish between the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the morning and the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the evening. By the morning, we mention prayers and requests in the middle of the berachot, which by the evning we only mention the faith in Hashem and acceptance of the yoke of His kingdom on ourselves. It appears that this is the foundation of the verse, "to tell in the morning Your kindness and Your faith in the evening," that is to say, that in the morning we request kindnesses from HaKadosh Baruchu and in the night we only mention our faith in Him (see later in the Gemara 12b). It is [thus] clarified that the night is not the time for requests. According to this, [let it be] elaborated why precisely by the berachot of the Kriyat Shema of the day we say "Stone of Israel, rise..." in a language of request, which is not the case in the evening [where] we only say, "and it is said, because [Hashem] redeemed..." Similar to this in the evening we skip the requests of the morning for example, "enlighten our eyes in Your Torah..."
  It appears [necessary] to add that the two sides of acceptance of the yoke of heaven as it appears to me, that the morning and the evening are based on these two explanations of that are in the verse of Shema Yisroel, that according to the explanation of Rashi (Deuteronomy 6:4) [that the] intention of the verse of "Hashem is One" is that in the future, even the nations of the world will accept the kingdom of Heaven upon themselves, like the matter [which is discussed] in the verse "...on that day, Hashem will be One and His Name will be One." It is found that in saying Kriyat Shema, we are praying for the future, that HaKadosh Baruchu will bring this era in which the idea of Hashem's Uniqueness will be publicized. According to the understanding of the Rambam (Ch.1, Laws of the Foundations of Torah, Halacha 7), one who understands that "Hashem is One" does not refer to the distant future [in which He will be recognized among the nations], rather the intention is that the existence of HaKadosh Baruchu is One, and He is Unique and Distinctive in this world, and in saying the verses of Kriyat Shema we are designating [Hashem as Unique] and declaring this belief.
  Accordingly, it appears that because of this the two readings of Kriyat Shema - [once] in the evening and [once] in the morning - the two of them complete one another. The main aspect of the intention [one should have when saying] the Kriyat Shema of the evening needs to be [that which was] clarified by the Rambam, [which is] that at first, man takes upon himself to accept with complete faith the Oneness of Hashem, and only afterwards during the time of the morning Kriyat Shema, is the main intention that which was clarified by Rashi, that one [should] request that in the future His Name will be One, and that He will reign over all of the world. The order of obligation of the two recitations of the paragraph of Shema is [as follows] - first in one's laying down - in the Kriyat Shema of the evening, and only afterwards - in one's arising, in the Kriyat Shema of the morning.
  Now, [we] return to the difficulty [raised] by the Ramban on the Rambam, [which was:] what is the reason [the Rambam] counts the Kriyat Shema of the morning and of the night as a single mitzvah? [It would be answered as followed: since] its concepts are similar to tzitzit, [in that] having both the techelet [strings] and the white [strings] together, one fulfills one [full] mitzvah of tzitzit, that [in order to] fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzit in its entirety, [the tzitzit] requires both techelet and white, and so too [here,] - [by one completing] the two recitations of the paragraphs of Shema - [once] in the evening and [once] in the morning - one completes the other of accepting the yoke of Heaven in its entirety.
  End of discussion of mitzvah of Kriyat Shema in the evening and in the morning
  Mishnah. "From when do we recite the Shema..."
  The Concept of Hearing is Considered as Answering in Kriyat Shema and Prayer  
  A. The [following] needs clarification: why is the Tanna of our Mishnah precise [in language] concerning Kriyat Shema and uses the language of "reciting" in a plural form, which later (Daf 11a) concerning the berachot of Kriyat Shema, the Mishnah uses singular language: "in the morning one blesses..." The Gra writes (Shenot Eliyahu, Ch.1 Mishnah 1, Ch.3 Mishnah 3, and in his innovations to Berachot, in his work Imrei Noam, Daf 2a D''H "Korin") that there is a distinction in halacha between Kriyat Shema and the berachot of Kriyat Shema. By Kriyat Shema, one is not able to exempt someone [else from having to recite Kriyat Shema via] the principle of Shomeah K'oneh (literally "listening is like answering," meaning that one person is able to exempt someone else from a recitation, e.g. berachot, if the other person is listening to one who is attempting to exempt him). This is not the case by the berachot of Kriyat Shema, where one is able to exempt someone [else via] the principle of Shomeah K'oneh. Thus the Tanna is precise [in his usage of language] that is in our Mishnah, [where he] writes in the language of "reciting" [in plural form], in order to teach that it is impossible to exempt someone via the principle of Shomeah K'oneh, and [therefore] each person needs to recite Kriyat Shema himself, which is not so by the Tanna later who is dealing with the berachot of Kriyat Shema, and thus writes in a singular form of language [in the Mishnah, and from this we learn out] that by the berachot [of Kriyat Shema] it is possible for one to recite the blessing and exempt everyone [present] via the principle of Shomeah K'oneh.
  This principle has already been discussed by the Rishonim, as the Ramban writes (Berachot 11b D''H "v'Achshav"): "[During] the first generations, the congregation would not recite all of the berachot by themselves, rather the Shaliach Tzibbur (literally "messenger of the congregation," known as the prayer leader, or "chazan") would preemptively go down before the tevah (the platform where the prayer leader recites the prayers) and say before the [congregation] all of the berachot, and they would all answer...and they would recite Kriyat Shema with their mouths, [since] that is the mitzvah that was imposed on each individual that is should be sharp [and familiar] in their mouths." Thus it is clarified in the [Talmud] Yerushalmi (Berachot Ch.3 Halacha 3): "It was taught to me that all mitzvot that a person who is exempt [themself from a specific obligation] can exempt others from their obligation, except for Birkat Hamazon (the set of blessings said after a meal). But it has been taught: anyone who is not [innately] obligated in a [specific] matter, cannot exempt others from their obligation, [but if one is generally] obligated, even if he is [currently] exempt [as a result of fulfilling the obligation] he is [able] to exempt [others]. Rebbi Laya said it is different [by Birkat HaMazon, since] by Birkat HaMazon it is written: "and you shall eat and you shall be satiated, and you will bless Hashem, your God" [which can be inferred that] one who eats [also] recites a blessing. Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Yuda ben Pazi were sitting and they said: "is it not logical that by Kriyat Shema that for each person and every person it should sharp [and familiar] in their mouths, [and is not also] logical that by tefillah that for each and every person it should request mercy for their own behalf?" [It is thus] clarified that by Kriyat Shema there is no principal of Shomeah K'oneh. This concept requires clarification as it is well established throughout the Torah that [there is an applicable concept of] Shomeah K'oneh. Why is Kriyat Shema different from all of the mitzvot which are dependent on speaking, and [thus they have] the principle of Shomeah K'oneh.
  It seems that [in order to] explain this there are two principles by the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema: A) The act of the recitation, B) Accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven. Thus it is indicated from the Mishnah (Daf 13a): "Why does the paragraph of Shema precede...so that one accepts upon himself the yoke of Heaven first." Thus it is indicated from this that it is established that [improper] intention in the first verse of Kriyat Shema prevents [fulfilling the obligation] (see Rambam, Ch.2, Laws of Kriyat Shema, Halacha 1), and even though by all the other mitzvot it is established that the mitzvot do not require [proper] intention (see Rambam, Ch.6, Laws of Chametz and Matzah, Halacha 3). It is clarified from all of this that even though the [primary] action of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is the recitation itself, in any event, the fulfillment of the the [complete] mitzvah is not [fulfilled] just by doing the [primary] action of recitation only, rather the primary fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is accepting the yoke of Heaven in heart of the one who recites it. It seems that since accepting the yoke of Heaven is part of the body and fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, the principle of Shomeah K'oneh is not relevant [in this scenario, since] Shomeah K'oneh [only] takes effect where the mitzvah['s main fulfillment is through the primary] action of reciting only, like the mitzvah of reciting Bikkurim, reciting the Megilla, and saying berachot in general, which is not so by Kriyat Shema , [since] the primary fulfillment of the mitzvah is accepting the yoke of Heaven, and with this [point,] Shomeah K'oneh is not relevant [by Kriyat Shema] (SIDE NOTE 3: And see the general introduction of the Pri Megadim Section 3, Letter 28...).
  Indeed, there is what to ask a difficulty on as perhaps this clarification contradicts the opinion of the Ramban in his Milchamot Hashem on Rosh HaShanah (page 7, from the pages of the Rif, D''H "Amar") where he writes: "...and accordingly, it seems that there is a proof that mitzvot need [proper] intention from that which was established regarding Kriyat Shema, that in the first verse requires [proper] intention...and since according to the one who says that mitzvot do not require [proper] intention, then even the first verse [of the Shema] should also not require [proper] intention, [and this cannot be so] from that which would be a difficulty on our Mishnah, [when it says,] "One who is reading [portions of the Torah and he gets to the paragraph of Shema and the specific time arrived to recite Kriyat Shema, if he focused his heart when coming to that verse to fulfill the obligation of Kriyat Shema, he has fulfilled his obligation]" and what does it mean if "one focused his heart" to fulfill [meaning why is it necessary for the Mishnah to state that, because if you say that reciting Kriyat Shema does not require proper intention, the Mishnah would simply say he has fulfilled his obligation without stating"if he focused his heart"]? Learn from this that mitzvot require [proper] intention. But why is this a difficulty? Let us say that one only needs to have [proper] intention of the heart for the first verse or paragraph [of the Shema], rather learn from this that according to the one who says that mitzvot do not require [proper] intention like Megillah or Shofar and all of the mitzvot are like Kriyat Shema." It is thus clarified from the words of the Ramban that whether Kriyat Shema [requires proper] intention [or not] depends on this argument in Oral Torah of whether mitzvot require [proper] intention or not, and according to the one who says that mitzvot do not require [proper] intention, [then by] Kriyat Shema, no [proper] intention is needed, not even by the first verse. The Ramban seemingly requires further elucidation, as he equates the law of whether all [other] mitzvot need [proper] intention [or not] dependent on whether [or not] Kriyat Shema requires [proper] intention. It seems, that there is a difference in the aspect of [proper] intention by all [other] mitzvot and in the aspect of [proper] intention by Kriyat Shema, [since] by all [other] mitzvot, the intention is a [mere] condition to the fulfillment of the mitzvah, but [the intention] is not an innate part of the action of the mitzvah, whereas by Kriyat Shema the intention is an innate part of the action of the mitzvah, [and therefore] it is impossible to equate [all other mitzvot to Kriyat Shema.] According to the words of the Ramban, it seems to me that it would be effective if on was exempted from [the obligation of] Kriyat Shema from the principle of Shomeah K'oneh, as he would reason that the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is purely in the recitation, and that the intention is [merely] an additional condition to the fulfillment of the mitzvah. According to this, his words in the Milchemet Hashem are contradictory to that which he writes in his Chiddushim on Berachot: that one needs to [have proper intention] for each and every [word] when he sharply [pronounces] Shema with his mouth. There are further [examples] which clarify this point, [for example,] in the Gemara later (Daf 30a) where [it states] that one who is praying needs to direct (using the language of "intention") his heart, and this is how the Shulchan Aruch ruled (Orach Chaim, Siman 98, Seif 1). Even so, in the Gemara Rosh Hashanah (Daf 33a) states that the Shaliach Tzibbur can exempt the obligation of one who does not know how to pray, and that is also how the Shulchan Aruch ruled (Orach Chaim, Siman 124, Seif 1). Thus the words of the Ramban in our tractacte and words the Gra requires further elucidation: why do we not say regarding Kriyat Shema that one should recite it, and another should hear and have [proper] intention like we do by Tefillah? (SIDE NOTE 4: This is clarified later in the Shiurim (Letter B) that the Rav tz''l explains at length that the principle that the Shaliach Tzibbur can exempt the congregation's [obligation of] tefillah is not fulfilled via the principle of Shomeah K'oneh in general, rather it is a unique principle that arises from communal tefillah, see there [for further elucidation]) And why can't a person exempt [himself from] his obligation of Kriyat Shema when he hears from someone else and intends to be exempted via the principle of Shomeah K'oneh?
  Therefore, it seems [necessary] to clarify his opinion from another perspective, as we have in the Yerushalmi in Berachot (Ch. 1, Halacha 2): "Rebbi Yochanan in the name of Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai [said] for example we who are busy with learning Torah, even for reciting the Shema, we do not interrupt [our learning,] and doesn't Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai admit that we interrupt [learning Torah] in order to do [the mitzvah of] Sukkah or [the mitzvah of] lulav...the reasoning of Rebbi Shimon Bar Yochai is they [reciting Shema and learning Torah] are both forms of learning, and [therefore the principle of] one does not desist from this learning for another [form of] learning [is applied]." It is clear from the Yerushalmi, that Kriyat Shema is a fulfillment of learning Torah. There is to say that since Kriyat Shema is a fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning Torah, it is not relevant [to apply the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh. This seems to be the intention of the Yerushalmi (Ch.3, Halacha 3) concerning Kriyat Shema: "each person should [recite Kriyat Shema] directly from his own mouth," which is to say that since Kriyat Shema is a fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning Torah, it is not relevant to [apply the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh.
  It seems based off of these words, that there are two aspects in the mitzvah of learning Torah: an aspect of learning the Written Torah and an aspect of learning the Oral Torah, and they are different fundamentally. By the Oral Torah, the fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning Torah is by understanding [one's learning] (SIDE NOTE 5: This is clarified in the Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim, Siman 7, Siman Katan 2, regarding uttering mishnayot in their place [in tefillah] every day: "but if one utters the mishnah and does not understand [what he is saying], this is not considered studying [Torah], therefore one needs to study the explanation.") and by the Written Torah, the fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning Torah is through verbally reciting and committing [to memory.] It is obvious that [the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh is not applicable by fulfilling the mitzvah of learning the Oral Torah, whichever way one considers it: if one person is learning and a second person hears, but does not understand, then the [second person] has not fulfilled the mitzvah of learning Oral Torah, as he did not understand what was being studied, and if the second [person] did understand [what he heard the first person learning], then the [second person] himself has fulfilled the mitzvah [and not via Shomeah K'oneh. There is what to say then that this is also the law even by learning the Written Torah, that [the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh is not applicable to exempt one's obligation. [This can be seen from the fact that] memorizing and learning the Written Torah obligates each person to memorize and recite the verses orally [in order to fulfill the mitzvah of learning the Written Torah.]
  According to this, there is what to say that only by Kriyat Shema, within the fulfillment of an action of recitation, there is also a fulfillment of learning the Written Torah, therefore it is impossible to exempt one's obligation of Kriyat Shema from the principle of Shomeah K'oneh. [Since] in order to fulfill learning the Written Torah each person needs to learn the verses [out] verbally (SIDE NOTE 6: See the Chidushei of the Ritva (Berachot, Daf 45b, D''H "Ha B'Shaar Berachot"): "Since the manner of berachot of Kriyat Shema is not recited by each and every person individually, rather the Shaliach Tzibbur says the blessing and everybody is exempt, since it is appropriate [to do] this, except for Kriyat Shema [itself] which obligates every person [to recite themselves] so that it should be [constantly] reviewed." The Shittah Mekubetzet also writes (Daf 21a, D''H "v'Harei Tefillah") that one is not exempted of his obligation of Kriyat Shema by someone else so that it be reviewed [by the person himself.] It is clear from his words that is like the words of the Rav - that Kriyat Shema [one cannot apply the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh, and each person needs to say Kriyat Shema by himself, since by Kriyat Shema there is a fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning Torah, and by learning Torah, the principle of Shomeah K'oneh is not applicable. It is also clear from the words of the Abudraham (Shaar 2, Subject: Weekday Shachrit): "...because from the berachot of Kriyat Shema, the Shaliach Tzibbur is able to exempt anyone who doesn't know [the berachot] because the matter is dependent on hearing it is like reciting, but from Kriyat Shema [the Shaliach Tzibbur] is not able to exempt [anyone] because it says "and recite them [the words of Kriyat Shema]," this is not the case by the public reading of the Torah...because the matter depends on hearing [it is like reciting]...but by learning Torah, the Shaliach Tzibbur is not able to exempt any person." See in the Pri Megadim (Orach Chaim, Siman 62, Siman Katan 2) which he writes in the name of the Maharam Elshaker: "Kriyat Shema cannot be exempted [for someone] by listening to his friend as it says, "and recite them," it seems that one is not exempted because of the aspect of learning Torah that is within Kriyat Shema, and because the fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning Written Torah is through speaking with one's mouth as it says "and recite them") according to this, it seems by the retelling of the Exodus of Egypt, reading of the Megillah, and reciting Hallel, that one can be exempt from his obligaiton [via the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh, and each person does not have the [obligation] to read [or recite] for himself from the principle of learning Written Torah, it is because the foundation of these obligations is that the [relevant] section [of the Torah should be] read, [and only an] action of a general recitation [is necessary], and the [potential] aspect of learning Written Torah is not generated [by these mitzvot], and because of this, [the public] can be exempt through Shomeah K'oneh.
  No difficulty can be drawn on this [idea] from Kriyat HaTorah, that the who one reads [the Torah] and exempts the public from their obligation, and even though that it is obvious that the mitzvah of Kriyat HaTorah is a fulfillment of a mitzvah of learning the Written Torah. There is to say that the obligation of Kriyat HaTorah is not an obligation that is generated on each individual to read the Torah, rather the congregation generates an obligation that the Torah is read publicly. A proof to this is from (Megillah, 23a) [the fact that] a minor can count [as one of the] seven [who are called up] to read from the Torah. At first glance, a minor [falls under the category of] one who is not obligated [in any mitzvot], and is not able to exempt the congregation from their obligation, and this requires greater elucidation, as if this is so, how is [the minor able] to be counted as [one of] the seven [who are called up] to read for the public. One is forced to say that Kriyat HaTorah is not an obligation of reading [Torah] that is generated on each and every individual, rather the mitzvah is that the Torah should be read publicly, and because of this, a minor - who is a part of the congregation - is [able to] by his reading, generate a proper [fulfillment of the primary aspect of] reading the Torah, and the congregation is exempt from their obligation, because the Torah was read publicly, and therefore, even a minor who [falls under the category of] one who is not obligated [in any mitzvot] can also [read the Torah on behalf of the congregation.]
  There was an incident that occurred in the synagogue of the G''RaM tz''l, where the Baal Koreh was angered by the congregation, and after the reading of the Torah, he informed [the congregation] that they were not exempted from Kriyat HaTorah, and the G''RaM tz''l ruled that [the congregation] is not obligated to return and listen to Kriyat HaTorah because they were exempted without the [proper] intention of the one who is reading the Torah to exempt them. The proof to this is that a minor can be counted as part of the seven [who read from the Torah], and the congregation is exempted from their obligation by this even though the minor [falls under the category of] one who is not obligated [in any mitzvot.] It is proven [from this] that the foundation of the law of Kriyat HaTorah is only that the Torah should be read publicly.
  It seems [appropriate] to bring a proof regarding that which was written that learning the Written Torah has an [required] aspect of reciting, and that learning the Oral Torah is fulfilled by understanding it, from that which Rashi writes later on Daf 5a (D''H "Zeh Mikrah, and D''H "Zo Mishnah"), "This is Mikra - [refers to] the Chumash, [as it is] a mitzvah to read the Torah,"[and] "This is Mishnah - [refers to] being involved in [learning] the Mishnah." From what Rashi has written concerning Chumash, [he uses] the language of "to read," and by the Mishnah [he uses the language of] "to being involved in," it seems that by the Written Torah, one has fulfilled the mitzvah of learning Torah by [simply] reading it, and by the Oral Torah [the mitzvah of learning Torah is fulfilled] by being involved in understanding the Mishnah. Additionally, [we can] bring [another] proof that the fulfillment of the mitzvah of learning the Written Torah is only completed by its recitation [in one's] mouth, as we have later (Daf 15b): "Rav Ovadya taught before RAVA: 'And you shall teach them' that your learning should be complete, [meaning] that one [should] give space between the nearby [words so that the words can be enunciated clealy,] Rava answered after him: for example, 'Al levavecha' and 'Al levavchem' [as the first word ends in the same letter as the second word in both of these groups, and therefore one may mispronounce the words] ..." The Maran Rav Chaim tz''l remarked that according to the Rishonim who reason that only the first paragraph of the Kriyat Shema is a Torah level [obligation, the difficulty arises:] the verse of 'And you shall teach them" [from which we previously expounded,] is from the second paragraph of the Shema which [according to their view would] only be a rabbinic level [obligation,] and this requires further elucidation: how do we expound from this a Torah level halacha that one's learning should be complete concerning the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema. Rav Chaim tz''l clarifies that it is proven from the Gemara, that in truth, the halacha of "one's learning should be complete" is part of the mitzvah of learning the Written Torah on a Torah level [obligation,] which has a requirement of reciting, and because of this, the halacha of separating [nearby words] was generated. According to this, there is what to say that from [that which we learned about] the requirement[s] of reading the Written Torah, there is also the halacha that is generated by Kriyat Shema  that [the Shema] be recited [clearly] in the mouth of each and every person, and because of this, Kriyat Shema does not contain the principle of Shomeah K'oneh.
  B. The Halacha of Kriyat Shema in the Congregation
  The Ran writes in Rosh Hashanah (11b in the pages of the Rif, D''H "Yachid shelo Berach"): "It is explained that even though it is established that [by] all of the berachot, even if one is already exempt [or] has been exempted, he can [go ahead] and exempt [others by an additional recitaiton and] this is inferred by the Yerushalmi Berachos [that it applies to] Birkat HaMazon, Kriyat Shema, and [general] tefillah, that it is conditional there that by all of the berachot that a person can be exempt from, [he can also] exempt the public from their obligation, except for Birkat HaMazon, as it is written: "and you shall eat and you be satisfied and you shall bless" [this infers that] one who eats, [should do] the blessing. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yehuda ben Pazi were sitting and said: "Is it not logical by Kriyat Shema that it should be cognizant in each persons mouth [and therefore each person should say Kriyat Shema themselves and not be exempted]...however, these words [apply when] one knows how to do the beracha, but one who does not know [how to do Kriyat Shema], his friend can exempt him...Whether a scribe or a boor, the scribe blesses and the boor is exempt." From what was written by the Ran [when he says]: "...even though it is established that [by] all of the berachot, even if one is already exempt [or] has been exempted, he can [go ahead] and exempt [others by an additional recitaiton and] this is inferred by the Yerushalmi Berachos [that it applies to] Birkat HaMazon, Kriyat Shema..." this partially indicates that concerning Kriyat Shema, only if one is already exempt, one cannot exempt one who is proficient, but if he is still not exempt, one is able to exempt even those who are proficient, and this is not like the opinions of the Ramban and the Gra, and Ran's logic requires clarification.
  It appears that [we should] preempt [this discussion] by seeing the opinion of the Rambam in the law of Shomeah K'oneh throughout the Torah, [which he] holds (Ch.1, Laws of Blessings, Halacha 11): "Any person who hears a beracha from the beginning to the end, and has proper intention to exempt [himself] from his obligation, [he is considered] exempt, even though he did not answer "Amen," and any person who answers "Amen" after one who recites a blessing is considered like the one who said the blessing, [assuming that] the one who said the blessing [was originally] obligated in that beracha." It is clear from his words that there are two facets to being exempt from one's obligation when one listens to a beracha from another [person]: 1) the facet of Shomeah K'oneh and 2) the facet of answering "Amen." Furthermore, it is indicated that both facets are distinct from each other, as by the principle of Shomeah K'oneah is only triggered where one intends to exempt [someone else] and [only] when one listens to the entire beracha from beginning to end, which is not the case by answering "Amen," where one is exempt in any situation. It seems that the source of the principle of answering "Amen" is from the Gemara in tractate Shevuot (Daf 36a): "[regarding] "Amen," there is [an aspect] of acceptance, and there is [an aspect] of belief." From the principle of "Amen [containing an aspect of] acceptance," one who answers "Amen" is considered as if recited the blessing himself, and therefore is exempt when he says "Amen" even though he did not intend to be exempted from the beginning of the beracha to the end. The Rambam rules (Ch. 8, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 9): "The Shaliach Tzibbur exempts the congregation from their obligation. How [is this accomplished?] At the time when he prays and they listen and answer "Amen" after each beracha, it is as if they were [actively] prayering." From the language of the Rambam, it seems that the congregation is exempt from their obligation precisely when they answer "Amen." This is inferred from the language of the Rambam (Ch. 9, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 3): "and the Shaliach Tzibbur begins and prays in a loud voice from the  beginning of  Birkot [HaShachar] to exempt those who have not prayed yet, and everyone listens and answers "Amen" after each beracha." So too, does the Rambam rule by Birkat HaMazon (Ch. 5, Laws of Blessings, Halacha 15): "Two who eat together, each one should say [Birkat HaMazon] by themselves, and if one of them knows how to [say Birkat HaMazon] and one of them does not, the one who knows how to, [should] recite the blessing in a loud voice and the second person should answer "Amen" after each beracha in order to be exempt of his obligation." It is clear that one is not exempt except through answering "Amen," however, one who intends to exempt [himself] and listens to all of the berachot from beginning to end is not exempt from his obligation. This requires further elucidation, why by tefillah and Birkat HaMazon is one exempt only through answering "Amen" and not through [the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh.
  It appears that it can be said that the Rambam reasons like the opinion in the Yerushalmi, as it appears to me, that in three places does [the principle] of Shomeah K'oneh not take effect: 1) by Kriyat Shema, 2) by tefillah, and 3) Birkat HaMazon. By Kriyat Shema, the [principle] of Shomeah K'oneh does not apply because Kriyat Shema is a fulfillment of [both] learning Torah and accepting the yoke of Heaven, and [regarding these two aspects] one is not able to exempt his friend. [Regarding] tefillah, it is [considered] a request for mercy, and [therefore it is fitting that Shomeah K'oneh does not apply here because] each person needs to request mercy for himself. [Finally, whether one is obligated in saying] Birkat HaMazon [or not] is dependent on the benefit of one's stomach [being satiated] and only by one's own benefit can one bless over [and not other's experienced satiety.] However, it is [clearly] established that the Shaliach Tzibbur can exempt the congregation from their obligation in tefillah, [therefore] we are forced to say that there is a distinction in the fulfillment of tefillah for the congregation [and that of tefillah of an individual] within the foundation of the principle of Shomeah K'oneh, that tefillah in the congregation generates a [specific] designation of congregational tefillah, and an individual can be exempt from his obligation via congregational tefillah. Similarly to this, we need to say regarding Kriyat Shema and Birkat HaMazon, that the Rambam's reasoning is even though an individual cannot be exempt in [either of these two obligations,] via [the principle of] Shomeah K'oneh, [an individual can however,] be exempt through the congregational fulfillment [of these two obligations.]
  Here the Rambam writes (Ch. 9, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 1): "The order of the tefillot of the congregation is thus...and [the Shaliach Tzibbur] begins reciting Kriyat Shema [and its berachot] in a loud voice, and they [the congregation] answer "Amen" after each and every beracha." In Halacha 3 (there), [the Rambam] writes [regarding Shemonah Esrei]: "...and [the Shaliach Tzibbur] stands and begins to pray in a loud voice from the beginning of the berachot to exempt one who as not prayed, and all those who are standing and listening answer "Amen" after each and every beracha." [It is important to note] the precision in the language of the Rambam that in order to exempt their obligation, the congregation actually needs to answer "Amen," as the Rambam does not mention that it is possible to also become exempted via Shomeah K'oneh, and similarly, [the Rambam] brings in Laws of Blessings (Ch.1, Halacha 11): "Anyone who listens to a beracha...is as if he listened from the beginning until the end, and had the intention to be exempted from their obligation, [is considered to be] exempt, even though he did not answer "Amen." The clarification in this is that congregational tefillah is not merely the tefillah of ten individuals rather there is a designation and an innate aspect exclusive to congregational tefillah, that [it is considered as if] the congregation prays as a single [unit. Therefore,] through their statement of "Amen" where there is an action [of saying a] beracha, it is as if the individual himself says the beracha, and he combines [fundamentally] at the most innate level with the congregational tefillah. Nevertheless, if one does not answer "Amen" and only has the intention from beginning to end [in listening to the beracha,] he does not combine at the most innate level with the congregational tefillah, and is not exempted from his obligation. The principle of Shomeah K'oneh is not [applied] in tefillah, as the principle of Shomeah K'oneh is [generally] only relevant by an individual exempting an individual, but by tefillah an individual cannot exempt the other person because of mercy [requested in tefillah is only applicable to oneself.] Perhaps by congregational tefillah the Shaliach Tzibbur does not necessarily exempt each individual within the category of "individual" from the principle of Shomeah K'oneh, rather the Shaliach Tzibbur prays the fundamental aspect of congregational tefillah which is tefillah in of itself of the entire congregation, and in this way the congregation can exempt the individual from his obligation via the congregational tefillah, as the fulfillment of congregational tefillah combines each [individual] in the congregation. [Thus,] in order to be considered as a part of the congregation and be exempt via their tefillah, the individual needs to answer "Amen" where there is an action of a beracha, and in this [way] he combines with the congregational tefillah (SIDE NOTE 7: It indicates that we want to say that by the principle of Shomeah K'oneh, the one who listens is not considered like one who did the actual action of the beracha itself, and perhaps one who answers "Amen" is like one who blesses on the action of the beracha itself. Seemingly, the practical difference would be whether Shomeah K'oneh would be considered like a pause for one who is standing in the middle of tefillah, and the practical difference to this matter is whether one is able to pause in the middle of his tefillah to listen to Kaddish or Kedushah. If it is that Shomeah K'oneh is considered like an action of a beracha, there is what to say that it would be break [in the tefillah] and if it is not like an action of a beracha, it would not be a [considered] like a pause and would permitted. See Tosafos later on Daf 21b (D''H "Ad") and the discussions there.)
  [It is possible] to bring an additional proof as it seems to me - that the concept of congregational tefillah functions by itself and that the Shaliach HaTzibbur does not exempt the congregation from their obligation via Shomeah K'oneh, from what we have in the gemara (Rosh Hashanah 35a) that the Shaliach HaTzibbur exempts the masses that are in the field and [involved with their] work, who cannot come to the synagogue as a result of uncontrollable circumstances, and this requires further investigation, that if they do not come to the synagogue, then [practically, the principle of ] Shomeah K'oneh cannot be applied and if so, how can they be exempt from their obligation via the tefillah of the Shaliach Tzibbur. This proves that the tefillah of the Shaliach Tzibbur is a [innate and] primary aspect of congregational tefillah - that [the tefillah of the Shaliach Tzibbur] is considered as the tefillah for the entire congregation. The fulfillment of congregational tefillah is attributed to anyone who is in the congregation, and this is so even without the mechanism of Shomeah K'oneh. The people that are in the fields and [involved with their] work, [and are unable to attend the synagogue as a result of] unforeseen circumstances are considered as a portion of the congregation, and because of this, they are absolved of their through the Shaliach Tzibbur. (See in the Rambam, Ch. 8, from Laws of Prayer, Halacha 9-10, and the Kesef Mishnah there)
  It seems that this is the law by Kriyat Shema, in relation to the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the congregation, the Rambam rules (Ch. 9, from Laws of Prayer, Halacha 1): "[The Shaliach Tzibbur] begins reciting Shema and its berachot in a loud voice, and they (the congregation) answer "Amen" after each and every beracha." The Rambam also rules (there, Halacha 9): "In the evening, all of the congregation sit, and he says..."Barchu et Hashem HaMevorach..." and begins reciting Shema and its berachot, and [then] he says Kaddish, and afterwards, everyone stands and prays silently." It seems from the Rambam  that the congregation does not say Kriyat Shema and the berachot of Kriyat Shema themselves, rather they are exempt from their obligation via the Chazan. This proves that the Rambam reasons that it is possible to exempt one's obligation of Kriyat Shema via the congregation. This [further] indicates that one who is well versed [in reciting the tefillot, nonetheless] is exempt via the Kriyat Shema of the congregation, and even though an individual  cannot exempt his friend in Kriyat Shema, by the congregation it is [innately] different. It seems that this is so because the fulfillment of the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema is a fulfillment of accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, and from the opinion of the Rambam, he has a [unique] concept of accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven by the congregation. By the acceptance of the yoke of heaven publicly in the congregation, the fulfillment [of the mitzvah of] sanctification of Hashem's name occurs, and what is the reason that Kriyat Shema is considered a matter of holiness which requires [a quorum of] ten [men.] Indeed, Kriyat Shema is distinct from all other matters of holiness, [by all other matters of holiness] only are recited with ten [men], whereas by Kriyat Shema can be recited by an individual and by the congregation. However, when the congregation recites Kriyat Shema, the aspect of "matter of holiness" is established, and there is a specific fulfillment in it of accepting the yoke of Heaven in public in the congregation. Since there is a specific fulfillment of Kriyat Shema in the congregation, the Rambam reasons that each person that is in the congregation is exempt from their obligation of Kriyat Shema via answering "Amen" and even for one who is well versed [is exempt, nonetheless.]
  From the words of the Rambam it seems also that there is a specific fulfillment of the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the congregation, as he writes (Ch. 8, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 5): "So too, one should not recite the beracha of Shema, and all who hear answer after him "Amen," rather only with a [quorum of] ten men, and this is called the "poreiss al Shema." The Raavid argues on this [as he writes]: "This is only said regarding "Yotzer" [blessing] because of the kedusha within it and this is the poreiss...and this is one of the two [berachot] before [Shema.]" It is clear from the understanding of the Raavid that only the blessing of "Yotzer" requires [a quorum of] ten men, because of the kedusha that is within it, but by the rest of the berachot of Kriyat Shema, an individual is able to recite the beracha and another person may answer "Amen" (and see the Kesef Mishnah, and the Lechem Mishnah there). When we return to the opinion of the Rambam, who reasons concerning the berachot of Kriyat Shema that even though an individual cannot exempt another person via [the concept of] Shomeah K'oneh, as is explained in the Yerushalmi (SIDE NOTE 8: that is to say that according to that which is explained that there is no [application] of the concept of Shomeah K'oneh by Kriyat Shema because Kriyat Shema is [considered] a fulfillment within one's own heart of accepting the yoke of Heaven; there is what to say that also by the berachot of Kriyat Shema there is no [application of] the concept of Shomeah K'oneh, since it is also a fulfillment of accepting the yoke of Heaven, like Kriyat Shema. Alternatively, [we could say] that there is no [application of] the concept of Shomeah K'oneh by Kriyat Shema because Kriyat Shema is a fulfillment of [the mitzvah of] learning Torah, and there is what to say that all of this is only concerning Kriyat Shema, however, by the berachot of Kriyat Shema, which are not innately part of the written Torah, and [therefore] there is no fulfillment of learning Torah, in which case it would be fitting to apply the concept of Shomeah K'oneh by the berachot of Kriyat Shema. It seems that it is proved from the words of the Rambam, that it is necessary to answer "Amen" to the berachot of Kriyat Shema, as he reasons that there is no application of the concept of  Shomeah K'oneh by Kriyat Shema because there is a fulfillment of accepting the yoke of Heaven involved.), in any case, it is possible for an individual to be exempt from his obligation of the berachot of Shema by answering "Amen" [as being a part of] the congregation. By answering "Amen," which contains a physical action of beracha, one combines with the primary innate aspect of the berachot of the congregation and is exempt from his obligation via the fulfillment of the berachot of Kriyat Shema of the congregation. According to this, it seems that the logic of the Rambam that the law requires [a quorum of] ten men to recite the blessing of the Shema is not because of [the idea that the beracha of] "Yotzer" is considered a matter of holiness, rather [the source and reasoning is from] the concept of the beracha of Kriyat Shema of the congregation. This fulfillment applies by all berachot of Kriyat Shema. Thus we need to be precise [in analyzing] what the Rambam writes (Ch. 9, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 1): "The order of the Tefillot of the congregation is thus...and one begins and recites the beracha of Kriyat Shema in a loud voice, and they answer "Amen" after each and every beracha." From the language of the Rambam, it is clear that in order to be exempt [of one's obligation] via the berachot of the Kriyat Shema of the congregation, one needs to answer "Amen," and it is simply not enough to just [apply the concept of] Shomeah K'oneh, and because of one's answering "Amen" [he is included in the broader] category of Kriyat Shema of the congregation.
  It seems that this is the law also by Birkat HaMazon, where one is well versed [with the blessings of Birkat HaMazon] and one is not so familiar, and it is indicated from the words of the Rambam (Ch. 5, Laws of Blessings, Halacha 15) that one who is not so well versed [in Birkat HaMazon] can be exempt from his obligation only by answering "Amen," [as he writes]: "And if one of them knows [how to properly recite Birkat HaMazon] and the second one does not know, the one who does know [should] recite the blessing in a loud voice and the second person [should] answer "Amen" after each beracha, [and thus] be exempt from his obligation." Similar to this, the Rambam also rules that when making a Zimmun for Birkat HaMazon with three men, that it is possible to exempt others precisely through answering "Amen," as he writes (Ch. 5, Laws of Blessings, Halacha 2-3): "Three who eat bread together are obligated to recite the Zimmun blessing before Birkat HaMazon...and they answer "Amen" after each and every beracha." Through this, the category of "Birkat HaMazon of the group" is applied [to all in the group] via the Zimmun combining [the group]. By Birkat HaMazon, the concept of Shomeah K'oneh is not applied to exempt an individual because Birkat HaMazon depends on the pleasure of the digestion, and an individual cannot exempt his friend of his obligation via Shomeah K'oneh, (as explained in the Yerushalmi, as it appears to me). [Therefore] when a Zimmun of three is gathered and the group answers "Amen," the individual who is the expert (he is familiar with Birkat HaMazon) does not exempt the individual non-expert via the concept of Shomeah K'oneh, rather through [the non-expert] answering "Amen," the non-expert combines with the expert into one unit in order to fulfill Birkat HaMazon in a Zimmun. In the beracha of the Zimmun, there is a combining of all of the people in the group, and they are exempt as a result of the beracha being applied to the entire group, and there is application of the concept of "Birkat HaMazon in a Zimmun," which is similar to the law by congregational tefillah, where the Shaliach Tzibbur prays with a loud voice, and the congregation is exempt via the application of the concept of "congregational tefillah." This is law by Birkat HaMazon with three people which acts to apply Birkat HaMazon on the group as a single unit.
  According to this, perhaps this is also the explanation of the opinion of the Ran, whose reasons that one who still has not been exempt, can exempt [someone else] even an expert in Kriyat Shema. Perhaps the intention of his words is that we are dealing precisely when there is ten men praying as a congregation, that are exempt via the fulfillment of Kriyat Shema of the congregation. This requires further investigation, as this is the end of the words of the Ran.
  In explaining all of this, as it appears to me, that the opinion of the Ramban and the Gra that it is impossible for one to exempt another in the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema, however, one is able to exempt [another] in the berachot [of Kriyat Shema]. [Within] the opinion of the Rambam, even if it is impossible for an individual to be exempt from the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema via the concept of Shomeah K'oneh, in any case, one is able to be exempt via Kriyat Shema that is recited in public, from applying the concept of Kriyat Shema of the congregation (SIDE NOTE 9: See the Rambam (Ch.9, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 1): "and one begins and recites the beracha of Kriyat Shema in a loud voice...", and we go according to his opinion that the specific fulfillment of Kriyat Shema of the congregation is applied and because of this, one needs to recite the blessings of Kriyat Shema, and he says the Kriyat Shema in a loud voice. According to this, there is what to remark that the opinion of the Rambam who requires the Chazan to say the words "Gaal Yisroel" in a loud voice, that the one who recites the beracha needs to say all the berachot in a loud voice, and according to the Rambam, the congregation needs to answer "Amen" after the beracha of "Gaal Yisroel," in order to fulfill the [obligation of the] berachot of Kriyat Shema of the congregation. The opinion of the Ramban and the Gra is that we do not answer "Amen," in order that there should not be an interruption between Redemption and Tefillah. The Rav tz''l said in anywise, that in order to fulfill the opinion of the Rambam, it appears that the Chazan will say "Gaal Yisroel" in a loud voice and the congregation will say word for word [what the Chazan says] and they do not need to answer "Amen" between Redemption and Tefillah)
  End of discussion of Shomeah K'oneh in Kriyat shema and Tefillah
  Mishnah. "From the time that the Kohanim enter to eat their Terumah." We have in the mishnah in Sukkah (Day 38a): "One who comes from traveling on the road and does not have a lulav in his hand to take, when he enters his house, he should take [the lulav] at his table," and Rashi explains (D''H "Yitol al Shulchano): "If he forgot and did not take before eating, one needs to stop his meal and take the lulav." (SIDE NOTE 10: And the Shulchan Aruch rules accordingly, in Siman 652, Seif 2: "It is forbidden to eat before one takes [the lulav]." See the Biur Halacha there, as this is the law regarding all things mentioned above in Siman 232, that it is forbidden before the tefillah of Minchah and see further there...) It seems from the language of the mishnah before us, it is indicated that the Kohanim would eat terumah before [reciting] Kriyat Shema even though the time for Kriyat Shema already arrived, and Tzlach brings up (ב א D''H "M'Sha'ah") that since the eating of the terumah is the service of the gift (as we have in Pesaching 73a) it is permitted for the Kohanim to eat terumah before they recite Kriyat Shema. This requires clarification, what is the difference between eating terumah before Kriyat Shema from eating a [regular] meal before taking the lulav.
  It seems that there is what to settle, as what is the fundamental understanding of the prohibition to eat before doing a mitzvah, is it because we are concerned perhaps the meal will continue on and one will forget to do the mitzvah, or perhaps the reason for the prohibition is because where there is before a person an opportunity to do a mitzvah and a permissible [non obligatory] opportunity, [and in general doing the] action of the mitzvah precedes a permissible [non obligatory] action. There seems to be a practical difference in this [distinction, as follows:] does appointing a custodian to remind him to do the mitzvah work [as a permit to eat first,] that if we say that the prohibition to eat before doing a mitzvah is on account of perhaps one will forget to do the mitzvah, then appointing a custodian to remind him should work to permit him to eat [first and then do the mitzvah]. If, perhaps, we say that the basis of the prohibition to eat [before doing a mitzvah] is because it is prohibited to do a non obligatory action before a mitzvah, then we can say that the appointment of a custodian should not be effective [to permit eating before doing a mitzvah]. An additional practical difference would be eating terumah before reciting Kriyat Shema, that if we use the reason the prohibition to eat before doing a mitzvah is because one might forget, we can say that it is prohibited for a Kohen to eat terumah before he recites Kriyat Shema, because also by eating terumah, there is possibility for concern that perhaps the meal will continue on, and he will forget to recite Kriyat Shema. Indeed, if the prohibition to eat before doing a mitzvah is a result of the reason that when one has before him [the opportunity to] do a mitzvah and [to do] a non obligatory action, it is forbidden to do the non obligatory action before doing the mitzvah, then we can say that since eating terumah is also a mitzvah, then there is no prohibition to eat terumah before Kriyat Shema, as why is this mitzvah [of reciting Kriyat Shema] stronger than this mitzvah [of a Kohen eating terumah]?
  It is clear from the gemara later (Daf 4b) which indicates that there is a unique gezeirah by Kriyat Shema that one should not eat before one recites Kriyat Shema because we are concerned perhaps one will eat and will be overcome with sleep and will sleep the entire night, and it is not prohibited [to eat terumah before Kriyat Shema] because [of the reason that it is prohibited] to do a non obligatory action before doing a mitzvah, and according to this, it is clear that it is also prohibited for a Kohen to eat terumah before reciting Kriyat Shema, and this is not like the [explanation of the] Tzlach.
  See Rashi there, D''H K'dei L'harchik: "
  
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  F. Gemara: "From when do we begin to say the Shema in the evening? From the time that the day is sanctified on Erev Shabbat, these are the word of Rebbi Eliezer." See Rashi (DH M'sha'ah): We have by Bein Hashmashot (the time between sunset and the emergence of three medium sized stars, often translated as twilight, and literally means "between the watches") a doubt [whether it is] the day or [whether it is] the night, and since it is a doubt, the sanctification of the day is from a doubt." And this needs clarification, that Rashi reasons that the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema depends on Tzeiz HaKochavim (emergence of three medium starts which determines it is halachically night), and his opinion requires further exploration. How does Rebbi Eliezer reason that one has completed the Kriyat Shema of the evening, from [the time period of] sanctifying the day which is [in the period of] Bein Hashmashot which is in doubt [whether it is] night [or not]. And it appears that concerning many various laws, that after the sun sets, the status of 'night' is generated, and this can be found by blood that becomes invalid during the sunset, [so too] regarding Kriyat Shema is considered like night, that if there was a doubt of [whether or not it was] night, one would not be able to fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema [since] it is a doubt on a Torah level. In previous discussions, it was explained that by the setting of the sun, the timeframe of night begins [regarding] on a certain level like the opinion of the Gra, and it appears that Rebbi Eliezer reasons that the obligation of Kriyat Shema depends on the time[frame] of the night and not on the innate aspect of night [itself].
  
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  Tosafos D''H "L'man D'gani." "and if you say, doesn't Rebbi Eliezer hold (later on Daf 9b) "until one recognizes between [the color] of techeilet and karti (a dark green)" [is what is required in order to recite] the Kriyat Shema of the morning? In any case, since one knows when Amud HaShachar occurs, [by the time] one arises and prepares himself [for the morning prayers,] the time will have already arrived." It is clarified from Tosafos that he reasons that Kriyat Shema of the morning is dependent of the time of "m'sh'yakir," and "m'sh'yakir"prevents, even after the fact, that if one recites it before "m'sh'yakir"
  
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  Gemara: "In actuality, [the Rabbis go according to] Rabban Gamliel who [only] said "until midnight" in order to distance man from sin, like that which it was taught: the Rabbis made a "fence" for their words in order that a man should not come from the field in the evening and say: "I will go to my house and eat a little, drink a little, and sleep a little, and afterwards, I will say Kriyat Shema and pray, [in actuality,] he is overcome with sleep and is found to be sleeping all of the night (and therefore misses saying Kriyat Shema), but a man who comes from the field in the evening, and enters the synagogue, if he is accustomed to read Torah [verses], he reads [them], and if he is accustomed to learning [mishnayot], he learns [them], and then [later he] says Kriyat Shema and prays, and [then he] eats his bread and recites the blessings [over it]. And anyone who violates the words of the Rabbis is liable to [court imposed] death. What is the difference that in every [other] place which does not teach that one is liable to [court imposed] death penalty and here [by Kriyat Shema the Rabbis stated] one is liable for the death penalty? If you want you can say because [one will be anxious to return home and when he comes home he will be overcome] by sleep [the Rabbis therefore made an injunction that one be extra vigilant to pray before one goes home], and if you want you can say that [this] excludes the one who says that the evening prayer is optional, thus it is concluded that [indeed it is] an obligation." See later in the Gemara (10b): "and Rebbi Yose says in the name of Rebbi Chanina in the name of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov: "What does [the verse mean] when it says: "Do not eat with the blood," [it means] do not eat before you pray over your blood. Rebbi Yitzchak said in the name of Rebbi Yochanan who said in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Chanina in the name of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yaakov: anyone who eats or drinks and afterwards prays, upon him the verse says: "and Me you have thrown behind your back." Do not read [the word] "gavecha (your back)" rather [read it as] "ge'echa (your pride)." HaKadosh Barchu said: "After [this one] has become haughty [and has satisfied his own needs first, only then does he] accept upon himself the Kingdom of Heaven." The Gemara elaborates that there is a negative commandment [derived from the verse:] "Do not eat with the blood," [which comes to teach that] one should [not] eat before Shacharit prayer service. This is not the case by the negative commandment to eat before reciting Kriyat Shema in the evening which does not generate the category of a negative commandment of eating, rather there is a negative commandment that one [should not] do anything, as perhaps [something] might cause a person to be negligent, and not fulfill the mitzvah of Kriyat Shema that is imposed upon him. In truth, this law is not exactly a law concerning tefillah and Kriyat Shema, rather it is a principle by all mitzvot, as clarified in the Mishnah in Tractate Sukkah Daf 38a): "One who comes on the road and did not have in his hand a lulav to take, when he enters his house, he should take [the lulav] to his table," and Rashi there explains: "If one forgot and did not take [the lulav to fulfill the mitzvah of waving the four species] before he ate, he needs to pause his meal and take the lulav [to wave.]" We see [from this] that even in the mitzvah of taking the lulav, it is forbidden to eat before one takes [it and fulfills the mitzvah.] It seems that the foundation of the prohibition of eating before doing a mitzvah is not a triggering of a certain prohibition on the action of eating before doing a mitzvah, rather it is forbidden to do anything where there is a concern that it will cause one to be preoccupied and neglect the completion of the mitzvah, and we have this also in Tractate Shabbos (Daf 9b) [where it discusses] that a person should not sit to get a haircut, enter [to wash oneself in a bathouse, enter a tannery to work leather,], start eating,  or [commence] court cases before praying Mincha.
  According to this, we can explain the words of Rabbeinu Yonah (Daf 5, in the pages of the Rif, D''H "Kol HaOchel") in which he writes: Rav Hai Gaon tz''l said, that which we said is precisely to begin is forbidden, but if before the time for tefillah, one began to eat [or do some other activity] 
  
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  Gemara: "What does [the verse mean] when it writes: "Hashem loves the gates of Tzion more than all the dwellings of Yaakov?" [It means that] Hashem loves the gates that are distinguished (language of "metzuyanim" is similar to the word of Tzion in the verse quoted) in halacha more than the synagogues and the houses of study. And this [idea that the study of halacha is optimal is what was meant when] Rebbi Chiya bar Ami in the name of Ulla said: "From the day that the Beit HaMikdash was destroyed, HaKadosh Barchu is only [revealed] in this world exclusively in the four amot of halacha."
  The Concept of Holiness in the Synagogue and Beit HaMidrash
  A. The Explanation  
  
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  Gemara: "What does [the verse mean] when it says: "Do not eat with the blood," [it means] do not eat before you pray over your blood."
  A. The Rambam [writes] (Ch.6, Halacha 4,  Laws of Prayer): "It is forbidden for a person to taste anything or do any work after Amud HaShachar until one prays the Shacharit prayer." (and see in the Kesef Mishnah and in Rabeinu Manoach who noted the source of the Rambam from our section). On the other end, regarding Maariv, the Rambam ruled (there, Halacha 7): "Even though the tefillah of Maariv is not mandatory, a person should not come from his work and say: "I will eat a little and take a nap, and afterwards I will pray," as perhaps he will mistakenly sleep a little longer, and end up sleeping all night, rather one [should] pray Maariv [first] and [only] afterwards one can eat, drink, or sleep." It seems [that the Rambam] makes a distinction by the prohibition of eating before Maariv, [and views it] as a general decree perhaps one will mistakenly [miss] and will not say Kriyat Shema, whereas by the prohibition of eating before praying Shacharit, [as it seems] a specific prohibition of eating is generated in of itself. According to this, [let us ] carefully examine the language of the Rambam when he writes: "It is forbidden for a person to taste anything," this seems to indicate that even if one has a [simple snack] is forbidden, and if this is because perhaps one will mistakenly [miss Kriyat Shema], there is to say that a snack (a non-established meal) is permitted and there is no prohibition generated except through a [fully] established meal. Additionally, perhaps there is a practical difference in this matter, [in a case where] one began to eat, whether or not he would need to pause [his meal,] as concerning eating before praying Mincha, the Rambam rules (Ch. 6, Laws of Prayer, Halacha 5) that if one begins [his meal,] he does not [need to] stop [to pray in the middle of the meal.] Indeed, it seems that all of this concerns the prohibiton of eating before [praying] Mincha and Maariv, [and that] the rationale is because of the concern that perhaps one will continue his meal and mistakenly miss [the proper time] to pray. This is not the case concerning the prohibition of eating before praying Shacharit which generates a prohibition of eating, [and perhaps] one can argue [in this case] if one began his meal, he would need to cease [from eating in order to pray Shacharit.]
  B. There is what to investigate as what is the law for one who prayed in the morning a tefillat n'davah and afterwards ate, but still has not prayed the Shacharit tefillah, do we say that one has transgressed the prohibition of not eating with the blood - [which is understood to mean that] one should not eat before praying for his blood, or not. It seems that when one prays a n'davah [tefillah] it is only considered a fulfillment of tefillah from the perspective of [seeking] mercy, and one does not fulfill his obligation of established tefillah, and perhaps one does not transgress the prohibition of "not to eat with the blood" - as this prohibition is dependent on the fulfillment of tefillah as a result only of [seeking] mercy and not from one exempting themself from their obligation of established tefillah, or perhaps one has transgressed [the prohibition], as the prohibition is in place until one fulfills one's obligation of the Shacharit Tefillah, and this requires further study (SIDE NOTE 75: See in Rabbeinu Manoach (Ch. 6 from Laws of Prayer, Halacha 4) who writes in the name of Rashi who explains that "on your blood" [means] "on your souls," and according to this, we can say that even when one prays any free will prayers, one only fulfills a request for mercy, and one does not then transgress the prohibition to not eat on the blood. Perhaps this doubt is dependent on the two reasons in the gemara, which states: "Rebbi Yitzchak said Rebbi Yochanan in the name of Rebbi Chanina in the name of R'Aabi: Anyone who eats and drinks and then afterwards prays, the verse speaks about him: "
  y
  
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  One Who is Involved with One Mitzvah is Exempt from Other Mitzvahs
  Gemara: "Like that which is taught "in your sitting, in your house" comes to exclude one who is involved with a mitzvah, "and in your walking on the road" comes to exclude a groom. From here they say [that one] who has relations with a virgin is exempt [from other mitzvot], and [one who has relations with a widow] is obligated [in other mitzvot]...if so, one who has relations with a widow is also occupied [with this mitzvah], [and yet we say he] is not occupied."
  A. See there in Rashi (D''H "u'Velechtecha B'Derech Prat L'Chatan"): "...and even though a Chatan is also involved in a mitzvah
  
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  (Chiddushim on Aggadah)
  Gemara. "Rebbi Yehudah opened [his speech]...in the honor of the Torah and expounded: "And Moshe would take the tent and pitched it outside of the camp..." isn't this a Kal Vachomer