meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Moed/Chagigah/English/merged.txt"}
text: Chagigah
  חגיגה
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -William Davidson Edition - English
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  -Sefaria Community Translation
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  Chagigah
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNA: All are obligated on the three pilgrim Festivals in the mitzva of appearance, i.e., to appear in the Temple as well as to sacrifice an offering, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor; and a <i>tumtum</i>, and a hermaphrodite, and women, and slaves who are not emancipated; and the lame, and the blind, and the sick, and the old, and one who is unable to ascend to Jerusalem on his own legs.
  Who has the status of a minor with regard to this <i>halakha</i>? Any child who is unable to ride on his father’s shoulders and ascend from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel say: Any child who is unable to hold his father’s hand and ascend on foot from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, as it is stated: “Three times [<i>regalim</i>]” (Exodus 23:14). Since the term for feet is <i>raglayim</i>, Beit Hillel infer from here that the obligation to ascend involves the use of one’s legs.
  Beit Shammai say: The burnt-offering of appearance brought on a pilgrim Festival must be worth at least two silver coins, and the Festival peace-offering must be worth at least one silver <i>ma’a</i> coin. And Beit Hillel say: The burnt-offering of appearance must be worth at least one silver <i>ma’a</i> and the Festival peace-offering at least two silver coins.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: When the mishna states that all are obligated in the mitzva of appearance in the Temple, the term: All, comes to add what in the mishna’s ruling? The Gemara answers: It serves to add one who is half-slave half-freeman. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Ravina, who said: One who is half-slave half-freeman is exempt from the appearance in the Temple, the term: All, comes to add what? The Gemara answers: It comes to add one who was lame on the first day of the Festival and was unable to travel, and was healed on the second day of the Festival. This man is obligated to appear before the end of the Festival.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that all seven days of the Festival redress one another, i.e., the obligation to appear applies equally on all days of the Festival. Consequently, one who was unable to travel on the first day may do so on the second day. However, according to the one who said that the main obligation is on the first day and all the remaining days merely redress the first day, and therefore one who was exempt from appearing on the first day of the Festival remains exempt throughout the rest of the Festival, the term: All, comes to add what? The Gemara answers: It comes to add one who is blind in one of his eyes.
  The Gemara notes: And this is not in accordance with the opinion of this <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Yoḥanan ben Dehavai says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: One who is blind in one of his eyes is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as it is stated: “Three occasions in the year all your males will appear [<i>yera’e</i>] before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). Since there are no vowels in the text, this can be read as: All your males will see [<i>yireh</i>] the Lord God. This teaches that in the same manner that one comes to see, so he comes to be seen: Just as the usual way to see is with both one’s eyes, so too the obligation to be seen applies only to one who comes with the sight of both his eyes. Therefore, one who is blind in one eye is not obligated in the mitzva of appearance in the Temple.
  And if you wish, say instead: Actually, it is as we said initially, that it comes to include one who is half-slave and half-freeman. And as for that which poses a difficulty to the opinion of Ravina, it is not difficult: Here it is in accordance with the initial version of the mishna, whereas there, Ravina’s statement, is in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 88a): One who is half-slave half-freeman serves his master one day and works for himself one day. This is the statement of Beit Hillel.
  Beit Shammai said to them:
  
  Daf 2b
  
  You have remedied the situation of his master, who benefits fully from all his rights to the slave, but his own situation you have not remedied. How so? He is unable to marry a maidservant, as half of him is already free, and a free Jew may not marry a Canaanite maidservant. He is likewise unable to marry a free woman, as half of him is still a slave.
  And if you say he should be idle and not marry, but isn’t it true that the world was created only for procreation, as it is stated: “He did not create it to be a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18)? Rather, for the betterment of the world we force his master to make him a freeman, and the slave writes a bill to his master accepting his responsibility to pay half his value to him. And Beit Hillel ultimately retracted their opinion, to rule in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai that a half-slave must be set free.
  § The mishna taught: Except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor. The Gemara notes: By listing these three cases together the mishna is teaching that a deaf-mute is similar to an imbecile and a minor: Just as an imbecile and a minor are among those who are not of sound mind, so too the deaf-mute [<i>ḥeresh</i>] mentioned here is one who is not of sound mind. And this teaches us as we learned in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 1:2): The <i>ḥeresh</i>, whom the Sages discussed everywhere, is one who does not hear and does not speak, and therefore his mind is not lucid. It can be inferred from this that one who speaks but does not hear and one who hears but does not speak are obligated in mitzvot like any other person.
  The Gemara notes: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> (<i>Terumot</i> 1:2): One who speaks but does not hear, this is a deaf person. One who hears but does not speak, this is a mute. Both this one and that one are in the same legal category as those who can see and hear with regard to all matters. This shows that the <i>ḥeresh</i> exempted by the Sages is one who neither hears nor speaks.
  The Gemara asks: And from where is it derived that one who speaks but does not hear is a deaf person, and one who hears but does not speak is a mute? As it is written: “But I am as a deaf man, I hear not; and I am as a dumb man [<i>illem</i>] who does not open his mouth” (Psalms 38:14). If you wish, say instead that this is as people say: His speech has been taken [<i>Ishtakeil Milulei</i>]; the term <i>illem</i> is an acronym for this phrase.
  The <i>Tosefta</i> taught that one who speaks but does not hear and one who hears but does not speak are obligated in mitzvot. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one who speaks but does not hear and one who hears but does not speak are exempt?
  Ravina said, and some say it was Rava who said: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: All are obligated in the mitzvot of appearance in the Temple and rejoicing during the pilgrim Festival by eating the sacrificial meat, except for a deaf person who speaks but does not hear and mute person who hears but does not speak, each of whom is exempt from the mitzva of appearance. And even though he is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, he is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing. But one who does not hear and does not speak, and an imbecile and a minor, each of these is exempt even from rejoicing, since they are exempt from all the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah, as they are not of sound mind.
  That opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All are obligated in the mitzva of appearance and in rejoicing, except for a deaf person who speaks but does not hear and one who hears but does not speak, as they are exempt from the mitzva of appearance. And even though they are exempt from the mitzva of appearance,
  
  Daf 3a
  
  they are obligated in rejoicing. And one who does not hear and does not speak, an imbecile, and a minor are all exempt even from rejoicing, since they are exempt from all the mitzvot mentioned in the Torah. The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to the mitzva of appearance, that a deaf person and a mute are exempt from this mitzva? And what is different with regard to the mitzva of rejoicing, that they are obligated?
  The Gemara explains: With regard to their exemption from the obligation of appearance, the <i>tanna</i> derives this <i>halakha</i> by means of a verbal analogy between the term appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of appearance at the Temple on the pilgrim Festival and the term appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly, i.e., the obligation to assemble in the Temple on <i>Sukkot</i> in the year following the Sabbatical Year. As it is written, with regard to the mitzva of assembly: “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones” (Deuteronomy 31:12), and it is written in that context: “When all of Israel come to appear” (Deuteronomy 31:11). Just as a deaf person and a mute are not obligated to attend the assembly, they are likewise exempt from appearing in the Temple on the Festivals.
  The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to the mitzva of assembly, from where do we derive that a deaf person and a mute are exempt? As it is written there: “That they may hear, and that they may learn” (Deuteronomy 31:12), and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the phrase “that they may hear” excludes one who speaks but does not hear; and the phrase “and that they may learn” excludes one who hears but does not speak, as he is unable to learn.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that one who is not able to speak is not able to learn? But consider the following incident. There were two mute people who were in the neighborhood of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. They were the sons of the daughter of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda, and some say that they were the sons of the sister of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda. Whenever Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would enter the study hall they would also enter and sit before the Sages, and they would nod their heads as if they understood and move their lips.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prayed for God to have mercy upon them, and they were healed. And it was discovered that they had learned and were proficient in <i>halakha</i>, i.e., Mishna; <i>Sifra</i>, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus; <i>Sifrei</i>, the halakhic midrash on Numbers and Deuteronomy; and the entire Talmud. This shows that those who cannot speak are able to learn.
  Mar Zutra said that one should read into the verse: That they may teach [<i>yelamdu</i>], instead of: “That they may learn [<i>yilmedu</i>]” (Deuteronomy 31:12). Even if a mute person is able to learn he cannot teach others. Rav Ashi said that the verse is certainly to be read: That they may teach. As, if it enters your mind that one should read: “That they may learn,” as it is written, and you will explain that since he is not able to speak he is not able to learn, and similarly the reason for the exemption of a deaf person is that since he is not able to hear he is not able to learn, you will have erred. According to this interpretation, it is clear from the context that a deaf person is exempted by the phrase: “That they may hear,” not merely due to his lack of hearing but because his inability to hear prevents him from learning.
  However, this is incorrect, for if so, this exemption of a mute could also be derived from: “That they may hear,” as the verse has already taught the basic principle that anyone who cannot learn is not obligated in the mitzva of assembly. Rather, the verse is certainly to be read as: “That they may teach,” which indicates that although a mute is able to learn himself, and therefore he is not exempted by the previous verse, he is nevertheless exempt because he is unable to teach others.
  Rabbi Tanḥum said: One who is deaf in one ear is exempt from the mitzva of appearance in the Temple, as it is stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly: “When all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place that He shall choose, you shall read this law before all Israel in their ears” (Deuteronomy 31:11). This verse indicates that the obligation of assembly applies only to those who can hear with both ears. Since the two mitzvot are connected by verbal analogy, as explained above, this <i>halakha</i> applies to the mitzva of appearance as well.
  The Gemara asks: But this phrase: “In their ears,” is necessary to teach that the reading of the Torah at the assembly must enter the ears of the entire Jewish people. Consequently, it cannot serve as the source of the <i>halakha</i> concerning one who is deaf in one ear. The Gemara answers: That <i>halakha</i>, that the reading of the Torah must be heard by the entire Jewish people, is derived from the phrase: “Before all Israel” (Deuteronomy 31:11). The Gemara asks: If that <i>halakha</i> were derived from: “Before all Israel,” I would say that the mitzva applies even though they cannot hear; therefore, the Merciful One writes: “In their ears,” and that indicates that they must be able to hear. If so, this phrase is not available for deriving the <i>halakha</i> of someone who is deaf in one ear.
  The Gemara answers: That <i>halakha</i>, that the people must hear, is derived from: “That they may hear” (Deuteronomy 31:12). Therefore, the phrase: “In their ears,” is not required for that purpose. Rather, it teaches that only those who can hear with both ears are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, and by extension, in the mitzva of appearance as well.
  Rabbi Tanḥum said: One who is lame in one leg is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as it is stated: “Three times [<i>regalim</i>] shall you keep a feast for Me in the year” (Exodus 23:14).Since the term for feet is <i>raglayim</i>, it can be inferred from here that the obligation to ascend involves the use of both of one’s legs.
  The Gemara asks: But the term “<i>regalim</i>” is necessary to exclude people with artificial legs. Although these people are capable of walking, as they do not have two natural legs they are exempt from ascending to the Temple. The Gemara responds: That <i>halakha</i> is derived from: “Three occasions [<i>pe’amim</i>] in the year all your males will appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). The term <i>pe’amim</i> can also mean legs, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>, with regard to the term “<i>pe’amim</i>”: <i>Pe’amim</i> means nothing other than legs. And so it says: “The foot shall tread it down, even the feet of the poor and the steps [<i>pa’amei</i>] of the needy” (Isaiah 26:6), and it says: “How beautiful are your feet [<i>fe’amayikh</i>] in sandals, daughter of the prince” (Song of Songs 7:2).
  With regard to the aforementioned verse, Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “How beautiful are your feet in sandals, daughter of the prince [<i>nadiv</i>]”? How pleasant are the feet [<i>raglehen</i>] of the Jewish people when they ascend to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage Festival [<i>regel</i>]. “Daughter of the prince”: this is referring to the daughter of Abraham our father who is called a prince, as it is stated: “The princes of the peoples are gathered together, the people of the God of Abraham” (Psalms 47:10). The Gemara asks: Is God only “the God of Abraham,” and not the God of Isaac and Jacob? Rather, the verse mentions “the God of Abraham,” as he was the first of the converts. Abraham was the first prince, as all converts who follow in his path are called “the princes of the peoples.”
  The Gemara cites another statement of Rabbi Tanḥum. Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Natan bar Manyumi taught in the name of Rabbi Tanḥum: What is the meaning of that which is written with regard to Joseph: “And they took him, and cast him into the pit; and the pit was empty, there was no water in it” (Genesis 37:24). By inference from that which is stated: “And the pit was empty,” don’t I know that there was no water in it? Rather, this teaches that there was no water in it, but there were snakes and scorpions in it.
  § The Sages taught: There was an incident involving Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥisma, when they went to greet Rabbi Yehoshua in Peki’in. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: What novel idea was taught today in the study hall? They said to him: We are your students and we drink from your water, i.e., all of our Torah knowledge comes from you, and therefore how can we tell you something you have not already learned? He said to them: Even so, there cannot be a study hall without a novelty.
  He asked them: Whose week was it, i.e. who was the lecturer this week? They said to him: It was Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya’s week. He inquired: And on what subject was the lecture today? They said to him: He spoke about the portion of the mitzva of assembly. Rabbi Yehoshua persisted: And what verse did he interpret homiletically with regard to this mitzva?
  They said to him that Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya interpreted the following verse: “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the little ones” (Deuteronomy 31:12). This verse is puzzling: If men come to learn, and women, who might not understand, come at least to hear, why do the little ones come? They come in order for God to give a reward to those who bring them, i.e., God credits those who bring their children to the assembly. Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: This good pearl of wisdom was in your hands, and you tried to conceal it from me?
  Upon seeing that Rabbi Yehoshua was pleased to hear this idea, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥisma said to him: Additionally, Rabbi Elazar interpreted the following verses homiletically: “You have affirmed, this day, that the Lord is your God, and that you will walk in His ways and keep His statutes, His mitzvot, and His ordinances, and listen to His voice. And the Lord has affirmed you, this day, to be His treasure, asHe promised you, and that you should keep all His mitzvot” (Deuteronomy 26:17–18).
  Rabbi Elazar explained: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to the Jewish people: You have made Me a single entity in the world, as you singled Me out as separate and unique. And therefore I will make you a single entity in the world, as you will be a treasured nation, chosen by God. You have made Me a single entity in the world, as it is written: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One” (Deuteronomy 6:4). And therefore I will make you a single entity in the world, as it is stated:
  
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  “And who is like Your people, Israel, one nation in the land?” (I Chronicles 17:21).
  The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya also commenced his lecture and taught: It is written: “The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails well fastened are those that are composed in collections; they are given from one shepherd” (Ecclesiastes 12:11). Why are matters of Torah compared to a goad? To tell you that just as this goad directs the cow to her furrow to bring forth sustenance for life to the world, so too the words of Torah direct those who study them from the paths of death to the paths of life. The Gemara asks: If so, derive the following from that same analogy: Just as this goad is movable and not rigid, so too matters of Torah are movable in accordance with circumstance and are not permanent. Therefore, the verse states: “Nails,” which are permanent.
  The Gemara further asks: If so, one can explain as follows: Just as this nail is diminished in size and does not expand, as it wastes away over time, so too matters of Torah are gradually diminished and do not expand. Therefore, the verse states: “Well fastened [<i>netuim</i>].” Just as this plant [<i>neti’a</i>] flourishes and multiplies, so too matters of Torah flourish and multiply. “Those that are composed in collections [<i>ba’alei asufot</i>]”: These are Torah scholars who sit in many groups [<i>asupot</i>] and engage in Torah study. There are often debates among these groups, as some of these Sages render an object or person ritually impure and these render it pure; these prohibit an action and these permit it; these deem an item invalid and these deem it valid.
  Lest a person say: Now, how can I study Torah when it contains so many different opinions? The verse states that they are all “given from one shepherd.” One God gave them; one leader, i.e., Moses, said them from the mouth of the Master of all creation, Blessed be He, as it is written: “And God spoke all these words” (Exodus 20:1). The plural form “words” indicates that God transmitted all the interpretations of the Ten Commandments. Since the Sages invariably utilize the Torah itself or the statements of the prophets as the sources for their opinions, there is a certain unity to the study of Torah, despite the numerous explanations and applications.
  So too you, the student, make your ears like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear both the statements of those who render objects ritually impure and the statements of those who render them pure; the statements of those who prohibit actions and the statements of those who permit them; the statements of those who deem items invalid and the statements of those who deem them valid. When Rabbi Yehoshua heard these interpretations, he said to them in these words: No generation is considered orphaned, i.e. without a leader, if Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya dwells among it.
  The Gemara asks: But Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka and Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥisma should have told Rabbi Yehoshua these statements of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya directly, without delay. Why did they hesitate at first? The Gemara answers: They were hesitant due to an incident that occurred. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving Rabbi Yosei ben Durmaskit, who went to greet Rabbi Eliezer in Lod. Rabbi Elazar said to him: What novel idea was taught today in the study hall?
  Rabbi Yosei ben Durmaskit said to him: The Sages assembled, counted the votes, and concluded that although the lands of Ammon and Moab on the eastern side of the Jordan River are not part of Eretz Yisrael, and therefore the <i>halakhot</i> of the Sabbatical Year and tithes should not apply to them, as these lands are adjacent to Eretz Yisrael, one separates the poor man’s tithe there in the Sabbatical Year. Since the Sages debated which tithes should be separated, they had to take a vote to determine the <i>halakha</i> in this regard.
  Rabbi Elazar said to him in anger: Yosei, extend your hands and catch your eyes, which are about to come out of their sockets. He extended his hands and caught his eyes. Rabbi Elazar wept and said the verse: “The counsel of the Lord is with them who fear Him; and His covenant, to make them know it” (Psalms 25:14), i.e., the Sages arrived at the correct conclusion, although they were unaware of the proper rationale behind it.
  Rabbi Elazar said to Rabbi Yosei to go and say to the Sages in the study hall: Do not be concerned with regard to your counting, that you might not have ruled properly, as you have not in fact instituted a new ordinance at all. This is the tradition that I received from Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who heard from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher: It is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that in Ammon and Moab one separates the poor man’s tithe in the Sabbatical Year. What is the reason? Those who ascended from Egypt conquered many cities, and those who ascended from Babylonia did not conquer them after the destruction of the First Temple.
  This difference is important, because the first consecration of Eretz Yisrael, by those who ascended from Egypt, caused it to be sanctified only for its time and it was not sanctified forever, as that depended on the renewed conquest of the land by the Jewish people. And those who ascended from Babylonia left those cities aside and did not consider them part of Eretz Yisrael even after Jewish settlement was renewed there. They would plow and harvest in these places in the Sabbatical Year and tithe the poor man’s tithe, so that the poor of Eretz Yisrael, who did not have sufficient income from the previous years, could rely upon that produce in the Sabbatical Year, receiving help from this tithe.
  It was taught that after Rabbi Elazar’s mind was put at ease, he said: May it be God’s will that Rabbi Yosei’s eyes should return to their place. And indeed his eyes returned. Due to this event, in which Rabbi Elazar responded harshly when his disciple related what he considered a novel idea, the students of Rabbi Yehoshua hesitated to recount what they had heard until their teacher encouraged them to do so.
  § The Sages taught: Who is considered an imbecile? One who goes out alone at night, and one who sleeps in a cemetery, and one who rends his garment. It was stated that Rav Huna said: One does not have the halakhic status of an imbecile until there are all of these signs present in him at the same time. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is considered an imbecile even due to the appearance of one of these signs.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case under discussion? If he performs them in a deranged manner, then even the appearance of one sign should be enough to classify him as an imbecile. If he does not perform these actions in a deranged manner, but has a reason to act this way, then even if he performs all of them he should not be deemed an imbecile.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to one who performs these actions in a deranged manner, but each action on its own could be explained rationally. With regard to one who sleeps in the cemetery, one could say that he is doing so in order that an impure spirit should settle upon him. Although it is inappropriate to do this, as there is a reason for this behavior it is not a sign of madness. And with regard to one who goes out alone at night, one could say that perhaps a fever took hold of him and he is trying to cool himself down. And as for one who tears his garments, one could say that he is a man engaged in thought, and out of anxiety he tears his clothing unintentionally. Despite these possible explanations, since one performed all of these together they are considered
  
  Daf 4a
  
  like the actions of a forewarned ox that gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel. Since this ox gored three different animals on three separate occasions, it is considered predisposed to gore and becomes forewarned for every type of animal. Likewise, if someone performs three different deranged actions, it is assumed that there is no logical reason for his behavior and he is classified as an imbecile. Rav Pappa said: If Rav Huna had heard that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Who is an imbecile? This is one who destroys whatever is given to him, he would have retracted his statement that one is an imbecile only if he performs three deranged actions.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to Rav Pappa’s statement: When Rav Pappa claims that Rav Huna would have retracted his statement, would he have retracted only from the case of one who tears his garments, as this person is similar to one who destroys whatever is given to him? Or perhaps he would have retracted his opinion with regard to all of the signs of an imbecile? The Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved, as no answer was found.
  § The mishna taught: And a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite are exempt from the mitzva of appearance in the Temple. The Sages taught, with regard to the verse: “Three occasions in the year all your males will appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17), had the verse simply said “males,” this would serve to exclude women from this mitzva. By specifying “your males,” it comes to exclude a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite as well. Furthermore, when the verse adds “all your males,” this serves to include male minors.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: “Males” comes to exclude women. The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse for this <i>halakha</i>? After all, the obligation of appearance on a Festival is a positive, time-bound mitzva, and women are exempt from any positive, time-bound mitzva.
  The Gemara answers: This statement was necessary, as otherwise it could enter your mind to say: Let us derive by means of a verbal analogy between the term: Appearance, which appears here, and the term: Appearance, stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly (Deuteronomy 31:11), which is also a positive, time-bound mitzva. Just as there, women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, so too here, women are obligated in the mitzva of appearance on the Festival. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that women are exempt.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: “Your males” comes to exclude a <i>tumtum</i> and a hermaphrodite. The Gemara asks: Granted, the exclusion of a hermaphrodite was necessary, as it could enter your mind to say that since he possesses an aspect of masculinity, i.e., he has a male sexual organ, he should be obligated like a male. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that a hermaphrodite is a being unto itself, which is neither male nor female.
  However, as the status of a <i>tumtum</i>, who lacks external sexual organs, is a halakhic uncertainty, is a verse necessary to exclude an uncertainty? Abaye said: It is referring to a case when the testicles of a <i>tumtum</i> are on the outside, although his penis is not visible. The verse teaches that this <i>tumtum</i> is not obligated in the mitzva of appearance, despite the fact that he is certainly male.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: “All your males” comes to include minors. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: All are obligated to appear, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor? Abaye said: This is not difficult. Here, the <i>baraita</i> that obligates minors is referring to a minor who has reached the age of training in mitzvot. There, the mishna is referring to a minor who has not yet reached the age of training in mitzvot, and therefore he is exempt from the mitzva of appearance. The Gemara asks: The obligation of a minor who has reached the age of training is one that applies by rabbinic law. How then can the <i>baraita</i> derive this <i>halakha</i> from a verse? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, and the verse is a mere support for this rabbinic obligation.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, for what purpose does the verse: “All your males,” come? It comes to teach that which <i>Aḥerim</i> taught. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say that a scrimper, one who gathers dog feces to give them to tanners for the purpose of tanning hides; and a melder of copper, who purifies copper from dross; and a tanner of hides, are all exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as their occupation inflicts upon them a particularly unpleasant odor. This is because it is stated: “All your males,” which indicates that only one who is able to ascend with all your males is obligated, excluding those who are not suited to ascend with all your males, as people avoid their company.
  § The mishna taught that women and slaves who are not emancipated are exempt from the mitzva of appearance. The Gemara asks: Granted, women are exempt, as we said earlier that this is derived from the phrase: “Your males.” However, with regard to slaves, from where do we derive that they are exempt? Rav Huna said that the verse states: “Before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). This indicates that one who has only one Master is obligated, which excludes this slave, who has another master.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to teach this <i>halakha</i>? After all, with regard to every mitzva in which a woman is obligated, a slave is also obligated in that mitzva; and with regard to every mitzva in which a woman is not obligated, a slave is not obligated in it either. The reason for this principle is that it is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the phrase: “To her” (Leviticus 19:20), written with regard to a designated maidservant, and the phrase: “To her” (Deuteronomy 24:3), written with regard to a divorced woman.
  Ravina said: This verse is necessary only to teach the exemption of one who is half-slave half-freeman. The Gemara notes that the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Women and slaves who are not emancipated. What is the purpose of specifying: Who are not emancipated? If we say that this means that they are not emancipated at all, let it simply teach: Slaves, without any further description. Rather, is it not the case that the mishna is referring to slaves who are not entirely emancipated? And who are these slaves? One who is half-slave half-freeman. The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that this is correct.
  The mishna further taught: And the lame, and the blind, and the sick, and the old are all exempt from the mitzva of appearance. The Sages taught: “Times [<i>regalim</i>]” (Exodus 23:14) alludes to the use of one’s feet [<i>raglayim</i>], and therefore it excludes people with artificial legs. Although they are able to walk, they are exempt from traveling, as they do not have feet. Alternatively, the term “<i>regalim</i>” comes to exclude the lame, the sick, the blind, the old, and one who is unable to ascend on his own feet. The Gemara asks: The last category of one who is unable to ascend on his feet, comes to add what? The <i>baraita</i> already taught that the lame and the sick are exempt. Rava said: It comes to add
  
  Daf 4b
  
  a delicate man, who cannot walk without shoes. As it is written: “When you come to appear before Me, who has required this at your hand, to trample My courts?” (Isaiah 1:12). Entering the Temple with shoes is described by the prophet as trampling, and therefore one who cannot enter barefoot is exempt from the mitzva of appearance.
  It is taught: The uncircumcised and the ritually impure are exempt from the mitzva of appearance. The Gemara comments: Granted, a ritually impure person is exempt, as it is written: “And there you shall come” (Deuteronomy 12:5), followed by: “And there you shall bring” (Deuteronomy 12:6). The juxtaposition of these verses teaches: Anyone included in the mitzva of coming, i.e., anyone who may enter the Temple, is also included in the obligation of bringing offerings; and anyone not included in the mitzva of coming is not included in the obligation of bringing either. Since it is prohibited for a person who is ritually impure to enter the Temple, he is also exempt from the obligation to bring a burnt-offering of appearance.
  However, with regard to the uncircumcised, from where do we derive that he is exempt? The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who amplifies the <i>halakha</i> so that the uncircumcised is included in the same category as the ritually impure. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Akiva says, with regard to the verse: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>] of the seed of Aaron that is a leper or has an issue; he shall not eat of the sacred things” (Leviticus 22:4), the double use of the term: “Ish,” comes to include the uncircumcised. Like the ritually impure, the uncircumcised may neither eat sacrificial meat nor bring offerings to the Temple.
  The Sages taught: A ritually impure person is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as it is written: “And there shall you come,” “and there you shall bring.” Anyone included in coming is also included in the obligation of bringing offerings; and anyone not included in coming is not included in the obligation of bringing either.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Dehavai says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: One who is blind in one of his eyes is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as it is stated: “Three times a year all your males shall appear [<i>yera’e</i>] before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). Since there are no vowels in the text, this can be read as: All your males will see [<i>yireh</i>] the Lord God. This teaches that in the same manner that one comes to see, so he comes to be seen: Just as one comes to see with both his eyes, so too the obligation to be seen applies only to one who comes with both his eyes. Therefore, one who is blind in one eye is exempt from the mitzva of appearance in the Temple.
  The Gemara relates that when Rav Huna reached this verse, which can be read as: “Will see” [<i>yireh</i>] and “shall appear” [<i>yera’e</i>], he cried. He said: Can it happen to a slave whose master expects to see him, that the master will eventually distance himself from him and not want him anymore? As it is written: “When you come to appear before Me, who has required this at your hand, to trample My courts?” (Isaiah 1:12).
  Similarly, when Rav Huna reached this verse, he cried: “And you shall sacrifice peace-offerings, and you shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7). Can it happen to a slave whose master expects him to eat at his table, that his master will eventually distance himself from him? As it is written: “To what purpose is the multitude of your offerings to Me? says the Lord” (Isaiah 1:11).
  The Gemara similarly relates: When Rabbi Elazar reached this verse, he cried: “And his brethren could not answer him, for they were affrighted at his presence” (Genesis 45:3). He said, in explanation of his emotional reaction: If the rebuke of a man of flesh and blood was such that the brothers were unable to respond, when it comes to the rebuke of the Holy One, Blessed be He, all the more so. When Rabbi Elazar reached this verse, he cried: “And Samuel said to Saul: Why have you disquieted me, to bring me up” (I Samuel 28:15). He said: If Samuel the righteous was afraid of judgment when he was raised by necromancy, as he thought he was being summoned for a Divine judgment, all the more so that we should be afraid.
  The Gemara asks: In the case of Samuel, what is it that he feared? As it is written: “And the woman said to Saul, I see a godlike being coming up [<i>olim</i>] out of the earth” (I Samuel 28:13). “<i>Olim</i>,” in the plural form, indicates that there were two of them. One of them was Samuel, but the other, who was he? The Gemara explains that Samuel went and brought Moses with him. He said to Moses: Perhaps, Heaven forbid, I was summoned for judgment by God; stand with me and testify on my behalf that there is nothing that you wrote in the Torah that I did not fulfill.
  When Rabbi Ami reached this verse, he cried: “Let him put his mouth in the dust, perhaps there may be hope” (Lamentations 3:29). He said: A sinner suffers through all this punishment and only perhaps there may be hope? When Rabbi Ami reached this verse, he cried: “Seek righteousness, seek humility; perhaps you shall be hidden on the day of the Lord’s anger”(Zephaniah 2:3). He said: All of this is expected of each individual, and only perhaps God’s anger may be hidden? Likewise, when Rabbi Asi reached this verse, he cried: “Hate the evil, and love the good, and establish justice in the gate; perhaps the Lord, the God of hosts, will be gracious” (Amos 5:15). He said: All of this, and only perhaps?
  When Rav Yosef reached this verse, he cried: “But there are those swept away without justice” (Proverbs 13:23). He said: Is there one who goes before his time and dies for no reason? The Gemara answers: Yes, like this incident of Rav Beivai bar Abaye, who would be frequented by the company of the Angel of Death and would see how people died at the hands of this angel. The Angel of Death said to his agent: Go and bring me, i.e., kill, Miriam the raiser, i.e., braider, of women’s hair. He went, but instead brought him Miriam, the raiser of babies.
  The Angel of Death said to him: I told you to bring Miriam, the raiser of women’s hair. His agent said to him: If so, return her to life. He said to him: Since you have already brought her, let her be counted toward the number of deceased people. Apparently, this woman died unintentionally. Rav Beivai asked the agent: But as her time to die had not yet arrived, how were you able to kill her? The agent responded that he had the opportunity, as she was holding a shovel in her hand and with it she was lighting
  
  Daf 5a
  
  and sweeping the oven. She took the fire and set it on her foot; she was scalded and her luck suffered, which gave me the opportunity, and I brought her.
  Rav Beivai bar Abaye said to the Angel of Death: Do you have the right to act in this manner, to take someone before his time? The Angel of Death said to him: And is it not written: “But there are those swept away without justice” (Proverbs 13:23)? Rav Beivai said to him: And isn’t it written: “One generation passes away, and another generation comes” (Ecclesiastes 1:4), which indicates that there is a predetermined amount of time for the life of every generation.
  He said to him: I shepherd them, not releasing them until the years of the generation are completed, and then I pass them on to the angel Duma who oversees the souls of the dead. Rav Beivai said to him: Ultimately, what do you do with his extra years, those taken away from this individual? The Angel of Death said to him: If there is a Torah scholar who disregards his personal matters, i.e., who overlooks the insults of those who wrong him, I add those years to him and he becomes the deceased’s replacement for that time.
  § The Gemara returns to the previous topic. When Rabbi Yoḥanan reached this verse, he cried, as God said to the Satan about Job: “Although you did incite Me against him, to destroy him without cause” (Job 2:3). Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a slave whose master is one whom others incite to act harshly against the slave and the master is incited to do so, is there a remedy for the slave? Additionally, when Rabbi Yoḥanan reached this verse, he cried: “Behold He puts no trust in His sacred ones” (Job 15:15), saying: If He does not place trust in His sacred ones, in whom does He place trust?
  The Gemara relates: One day Rabbi Yoḥanan was walking along the road, and he saw a certain man who was picking figs in an unusual manner: He left the ones that had reached the stage of ripeness and took those that had not yet reached that state. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Aren’t these ripe ones much better? He said to him: I need these dates for the road; these that are not yet ripe will be preserved, and these that are already ripe will not be preserved. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the same as is written: “Behold He puts no trust in His sacred ones”; there are righteous people whom God takes from this world before their time, as He knows that in the future they will stumble.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But there was a certain student in the neighborhood of Rabbi Alexandri, and he died while he was still young. And Rabbi Alexandri said: If this young Sage had wanted, he would have lived, i.e., his actions caused him to die young. And if it is so, as Rabbi Yoḥanan suggested, perhaps this student was from those concerning whom it is written: “Behold he puts no trust in his sacred ones,” and it was not his sins that caused his death. The Gemara answers: That student was one who acted irreverently toward his teachers, and Rabbi Alexandri knew of his improper behavior.
  When Rabbi Yoḥanan reached this verse, he cried: “And I will come near to you to judgment; and I will be a swift witness against the sorcerers, and against the adulterers, and against false witnesses, and against those who oppress the hireling in his wages, the widow, and the fatherless, and who turn aside the convert from his right, and do not fear Me, says the Lord” (Malachi 3:5). He said: With regard to a slave whose master comes near to him to judge him and is swift to testify against him, is there a remedy for him?
  With regard to that same verse, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: Woe to us, as the verse weighs lenient mitzvot for us like more stringent mitzvot, as it lists both those who violate sins punishable by death, e.g., sorcerers and adulterers, with those who violate apparently less severe sins, e.g., those who withhold payment from a hired worker.
  Reish Lakish said: Anyone who distorts the judgment of a convert, it is considered as if he distorted the judgment of the One above, as it is stated: “And who turn aside [<i>umattei</i>] the convert” (Malachi 3:5). This term is written as: <i>Umatti</i>, turn Me aside, i.e., one who distorts the judgment of a convert it considered as though he distorts the judgment of God, as it were. Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa said: Anyone who does something sinful and regrets it, he is forgiven immediately, as it is stated: “And do not fear Me” (Malachi 3:5), which indicates that if they do fear Me and are embarrassed to sin before God, they are forgiven immediately.
  Additionally, when Rabbi Yoḥanan reached this verse, he cried: “For God shall bring every work into the judgment concerning every hidden thing” (Ecclesiastes 12:14). He said: With regard to a slave whose master weighs his unwitting sins like intentional ones, i.e., God punishes him even for an action that was hidden from him, is there a remedy for him?
  The Gemara asks: What sin is the verse referring to when it states: “Concerning every hidden thing”? Rav said: This is referring to one who kills a louse in the presence of another and his friend is disgusted by it. God judges him for the unintentional discomfort he caused. And similarly, Shmuel said: This is referring to one who spits in the presence of another and his friend is disgusted by his action.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the end of that verse: “Whether it be good, or whether it be evil” (Ecclesiastes 12:14)? This verse indicates that God judges man harshly even for the good deeds he performs. The Sages from the school of Rabbi Yannai say: This verse is referring to one who gives charity to a poor person in public. Although he performed a good deed, he embarrassed the pauper, as in this case of Rabbi Yannai, who saw a certain man who was giving a dinar to a poor person in public. He said to him: It would have been better had you not given it to him than what you did, as now you gave it to him and embarrassed him.
  The Sages from the school of Rabbi Sheila say: This verse is referring to one who gives charity to a woman in private, as he subjects her to suspicion, for people might think that he is engaging her services as a prostitute. Rava said: This is referring to one who sends his wife meat that is not sliced, i.e., that has not yet had the prohibited sciatic nerve removed, on Shabbat eve. Since she is in a hurry she might not notice and will perhaps cook the prohibited meat.
  The Gemara asks: But yet Rava himself would send this type of meat to his wife on Shabbat eve. The Gemara answers: The daughter of Rav Ḥisda, Rava’s wife, is different, as he was certain about her that she was an expert in this matter. Rava trusted that his wife would realize the sciatic nerve had not been removed even when she was in a hurry on Shabbat eve.
  Additionally, when Rabbi Yoḥanan reached this verse, he cried: “Then it shall come to pass, when many evils and troubles are come upon them” (Deuteronomy 31:21). He said: With regard to a slave whose master brings upon him evils and troubles, is there a remedy for him?
  The Gemara asks: What is the verse referring to when it states: “Evils and troubles”? Rav said: Evils that become troubles for one another, i.e., the remedy for one problem has a deleterious effect on the other. For example, one who is stung by a hornet and a scorpion. The sting of a hornet must be treated only with a cold ointment, while that of a scorpion must be treated with a hot ointment. As these medicaments are mutually exclusive, one cannot treat both stings at the same time.
  And Shmuel said: This verse is referring to one who provides money to a poor person as a loan during his exigent financial circumstances, but immediately after the borrower is released from the initial pressure by receiving the loan, the lender begins to demand repayment, subjecting the recipient to further pressure. Rava said that this explains the folk saying that people say: A dinar for produce is not found; for hanging it can be found. A poor person cannot find money to buy basic necessities; however, when the lenders hang on and pressure him he must come up with the money somehow.
  On the same topic the Gemara states: “Then My anger shall be kindled against them in that day, and I will forsake them, and I will hide My face from them, and they shall be devoured” (Deuteronomy 31:17). Rav Bardela bar Tavyumei said that Rav said: Anyone who is not subject to His hiding of the face, i.e., whose prayers are invariably answered, is not from the Jewish people, as the verse states about the Jewish people that God will hide His face from them as a result of their sins. Similarly, anyone who is not subject to: “And they shall be devoured,” i.e., gentiles do not steal his money,
  
  Daf 5b
  
  is not from among them. The Sages said to Rava: Master, you are not subject to His hiding of the face, as your prayers are heard, and you are not subject to: “And they shall be devoured,” as the authorities take nothing from you. He said to them: Do you know how many gifts I send in private to the house of King Shapur? Although it might seem that the monarchy does not take anything from me, in actuality I am forced to give many bribes. Even so, the Sages looked upon Rava with suspicion. In the meantime, messengers from the house of King Shapur sent for him and imprisoned him to extort more money from him. Rava said: This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Wherever the Sages looked upon someone, it resulted in either death or poverty.
  With regard to the verse: “And I will hide my face in that day” (Deuteronomy 31:18), Rava said that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Even though I hid my face from them and My Divine Presence is not revealed, nevertheless: “I speak with him in a dream” (Numbers 12:6). Rav Yosef said: His hand is outstretched, guarding over us, as it is stated: “And I have covered you in the shadow of my hand” (Isaiah 51:16).
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya was standing in the house of the Caesar. A certain heretic, who was also present, gestured to him, indicating that his was the nation whose Master, God, turned His face away from it. Rabbi Yehoshua gestured to him that His hand is outstretched over us in protection. The Caesar said to Rabbi Yehoshua: What did he gesture to you, and how did you respond? He replied: He indicated that mine is the nation whose Master turned His face from it, and I gestured to him that His hand is outstretched over us.
  The members of the Caesar’s household said to that heretic: What did you gesture to him? He said to them: I gestured that his is the nation whose Master has turned His face from it. They asked: And what did he gesture to you? He said to them: I don’t know; I did not understand. They said: How can a man who does not know what others gesture to him dare to gesture in the presence of the king? They took him out and killed him.
  The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya was dying, the Sages said to him: What will become of us, from the threat of the heretics, when there is no scholar like you who can refute them? He said to them that the verse states: “Is wisdom no more in Teiman? Has counsel perished from the prudent? Has their wisdom vanished?” (Jeremiah 49:7). He explained: Since counsel has perished from the prudent, from the Jewish people, the wisdom of the nations of the world has vanished as well, and there will be no superior scholars among them.
  And if you wish, say instead that the same idea can be derived from here: “And he said: Let us take our journey, and let us go, and I will go corresponding to you” (Genesis 33:12). Just as the Jewish people rise and fall, so too, the nations of the world simultaneously rise and fall, and they will never have an advantage.
  The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ila was ascending the stairs in the house of Rabba bar Sheila, a children’s teacher. He heard a child who was reading a verse out loud: “For, lo, He Who forms the mountains, and creates the wind, and declares to man what is his speech” (Amos 4:13). Rabbi Ila said: With regard to a servant whose master declares to him what is his proper speech, is there a remedy for him? The Gemara asks. What is the meaning of the phrase: “What is his speech”? Rav said: Even frivolous speech that is between a man and his wife before engaging in relations is declared to a person at the time of death, and he will have to account for it.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? Is it prohibited for a man to speak in this manner with his wife? Wasn’t Rav Kahana lying beneath Rav’s bed, and he heard Rav chatting and laughing with his wife, and performing his needs, i.e., having relations with her. Rav Kahana said out loud: The mouth of Rav is like one who has never eaten a cooked dish, i.e., his behavior is lustful. Rav said to him: Kahana, leave, as this is not proper conduct. This shows that Rav himself engaged in frivolous talk before relations.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where this type of speech is permitted, it is referring to a situation where he must appease his wife before relations, and therefore this speech is appropriate. However, this statement, that it is prohibited, is referring to a situation where he doesn’t need to appease her. In these circumstances, it is prohibited to engage in excessively lighthearted chatter with one’s wife.
  The verse states: “But if you will not hear it, my soul shall weep in secret [<i>bemistarim</i>] for your pride” (Jeremiah 13:17). Rav Shmuel bar Inya said in the name of Rav: The Holy One, Blessed be He, has a place where He cries, and its name is Mistarim. What is the meaning of “for your pride”? Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: God cries due to the pride of the Jewish people, which was taken from them and given to the gentile nations. Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: He cries due to the pride of the kingdom of Heaven, which was removed from the world.
  The Gemara asks: But is there crying before the Holy One, Blessed be He? Didn’t Rav Pappa say: There is no sadness before the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “Honor and majesty are before Him; strength and gladness are in His place” (I Chronicles 16:27)? The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. This statement, that God cries, is referring to the innermost chambers, where He can cry in secret, whereas this statement, that He does not cry, is referring to the outer chambers.
  The Gemara asks: And doesn’t God cry in the outer chambers? Isn’t it written: “And on that day the Lord, the God of hosts, called to weeping, and to mourning, and to baldness, and to girding with sackcloth” (Isaiah 22:12)? The Gemara responds: The destruction of the Temple is different, as even the angels of peace cried, as it is stated: “Behold, their valiant ones cry without; the angels of peace weep bitterly” (Isaiah 33:7).
  The verse continues: “And my eye shall weep sore, and run down with tears, because the Lord’s flock is carried away captive” (Jeremiah 13:17). Rabbi Elazar said: Why these three references to tears in the verse? One is for the First Temple; one is for the Second Temple; and one is for the Jewish people who were exiled from their place. And there are those who say: The last one is for the unavoidable dereliction of the study of Torah in the wake of the exile.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that the last tear is for the Jewish people who were exiled, this is as it is written: “Because the Lord’s flock is carried away captive.” However, according to the one who said that this tear is for the dereliction of the study of Torah, what is the meaning of: “Because the Lord’s flock is carried away captive”? The Gemara answers: Since the Jewish people were exiled from their place, there is no greater involuntary dereliction of the study of Torah than that which was caused by this.
  The Sages taught that there are three types of people for whom the Holy One, Blessed be He, cries every day: For one who is able to engage in Torah study and does not engage in it; and for one who is unable to engage in Torah study and nevertheless he endeavors and engages in it; and for a leader who lords over the community.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was holding the book of Lamentations and was reading from it. When he reached the verse: “He has cast down from heaven to earth the beauty of Israel” (Lamentations 2:1), in his distress the book fell from his hand. He said: From a high roof to a deep pit, i.e., it is terrible to tumble from the sky to the ground.
  § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Ḥiyya were walking along the road. When they arrived at a certain city, they said: Is there a Torah scholar here whom we can go and greet? The people of the city said: There is a Torah scholar here but he is blind. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: You sit here; do not demean your dignified status as <i>Nasi</i> to visit someone beneath your stature. I will go and greet him.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi grabbed him and went with him anyway, and together they greeted the blind scholar. When they were leaving him, he said to them: You greeted one who is seen and does not see; may you be worthy to greet the One Who sees and is not seen. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Now, if I had listened to you and not gone to greet him, you would have prevented me from receiving this blessing.
  They said to the blind scholar: From whom did you hear that we are worthy of this blessing? He said to them: I heard it from the instruction of Rabbi Ya’akov, as Rabbi Ya’akov of the village of Ḥitiyya would greet his teacher every day. When Rabbi Ya’akov grew elderly, his teacher said to him: Do not despair, my Master, that my Master is unable to make the effort to greet me. It is better that you should not visit me.
  Rabbi Ya’akov said to him: Is it a minor matter, that which is written about the Sages: “That he should still live always, that he should not see the pit. For he sees that wise men die” (Psalms 49:10–11)? In this regard an <i>a fortiori</i> reference applies: Just as one who sees Sages in their death will live, all the more so one who sees them in their lifetime. From here the blind scholar learned the importance of greeting Torah scholars, which is why he blessed the Sages who came to greet him.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Idi, father of Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi, would regularly travel three months on the road to reach the study hall and as he would immediately travel back again to arrive home for the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, he spent only one day in the school of Rav. And the Sages would disparagingly call him: A student of Torah for one day. He was offended and read the following verse about himself: “I am as one that is a laughingstock to his neighbor, a man who calls upon God, and He answers him” (Job 12:4). Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Please do not punish the Sages, i.e., do not take offense and be harsh with them, as this will cause them to be punished by God.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan left Rav Idi and went to the study hall and taught: “Yet they seek Me daily, and delight to know My ways” (Isaiah 58:2). But is it possible that only during the day they seek Him and at night they do not seek Him? What is the meaning of daily? Rather, this verse comes to say to you that with regard to anyone who engages in Torah study even one day a year, the verse ascribes him credit as though he engaged in Torah study the entire year.
  And the same applies to the attribute of punishment, as it is written: “After the number of the days in which you spied out the land, even forty days, for every day a year, shall you bear your iniquities” (Numbers 14:34). But did they sin for forty years? Didn’t they sin for only forty days? Rather, this comes to say to you that anyone who transgresses a sin even one day a year, the verse ascribes him liability as though he transgressed the entire year.
  § The mishna taught: Who is a minor who is exempt from the mitzva of appearance in the Temple? Any child who is unable to ride on his father’s shoulders and ascend from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount. Rabbi Zeira strongly objects to this:
  
  Daf 6a
  
  Who brought him to here, all the way to Jerusalem? If the father could bring his child to Jerusalem, why can’t he bring him to the Temple Mount?
  Abaye said to him: With regard to the way to here, as his mother is also obligated in rejoicing on the Festival, his mother brought him when she herself ascended to the capital. From this point forward, if he is able to ascend and hold his father’s hand from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount, he is obligated, and if not, he is exempt.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded in place of Beit Hillel, that according to the statement of Beit Shammai that a child who is unable to ride on his father’s shoulders is not obligated in the mitzva of appearance, they must explain a verse that deals with Hanna, Samuel’s mother: “But Hanna did not ascend, for she said to her husband: Until the child is weaned, when I will bring him” (I Samuel 1:22). But Samuel was able to ride on his father’s shoulders. The age of weaning is twenty-four months, before which Samuel was already old enough to ride on his father’s shoulders, and yet he was not ready to ascend to the Tabernacle. This shows that only a child who is able to walk on his own is obligated in the mitzva of appearance.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s father said to him: According to your reasoning, ask about Hanna herself: Wasn’t she obligated in rejoicing? Why didn’t she travel to the Tabernacle to fulfill a mitzva in which she herself was obligated? Rather, Hanna saw in Samuel the need for extra pampering, and she was concerned about Samuel lest he experience weakness from the journey. Since she was unable to bring him, she herself did not come.
  Rabbi Shimon raises a dilemma: With regard to a minor who is lame and yet he is able to ascend on his father’s shoulders, according to the statement of Beit Shammai, and likewise a minor who is blind but is able to hold his father’s hand and ascend, according to the statements of both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Are these children obligated in the mitzva of appearance?
  The Gemara inquires: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is referring to a lame minor who cannot be healed, and a blind child who cannot develop sight, what is the dilemma? Now, if an adult in this state is exempt, is it necessary to ask about a minor? Since this minor will never be obligated in the mitzva, even when he is an adult, there is no need to train him in its performance. The Gemara explains: No; it is necessary to ask with regard to a lame minor who can be healed and a blind minor who can develop sight. What is the <i>halakha</i>? Since the minor might eventually be obligated, is it necessary to train him at this point?
  Abaye said: Anywhere that an adult is obligated by Torah law, one must also train a minor in that state of health by rabbinic law. Anywhere that an adult is exempt by Torah law, a minor in that same state is also exempt by rabbinic law. Since in this current condition an adult would be exempt, there is no obligation to train this minor either, despite the fact that he might become obligated in the future.
  § The mishna taught that Beit Shammai say: The burnt-offering of appearance, brought by a pilgrim when he appears at the Temple on a Festival, must be worth at least two silver coins, and the Festival peace-offering must be worth at least one silver <i>ma’a</i> coin. And Beit Hillel say: The burnt-offering of appearance must be worth at least one silver <i>ma’a</i> and the Festival peace-offering at least two silver coins.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Beit Shammai say: The burnt-offering of appearance must be worth two silver coins, and the Festival peace-offering need be worth only one silver <i>ma’a</i>. The reason the burnt-offering must be worth more is that the burnt-offering of appearance goes up entirely to God, which is not so with regard to the Festival peace-offering, as parts of a peace-offering are eaten by its owner while other portions are consumed by the priests. And furthermore, another reason for this difference is that we find with regard to the festival of Assembly, i.e., <i>Shavuot</i>, that the verse includes more burnt-offerings than peace-offerings. The sacrificial requirement consists of one bull, two rams, and seven sheep as burnt-offerings, but only two sheep for peace-offerings.
  And Beit Hillel say: The burnt-offering of appearance must be worth one silver <i>ma’a</i> and the Festival peace-offering must be worth two silver coins. The reason for this difference is that the Festival peace-offering existed before the speech of God, i.e., before the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai, which is not so with regard to the mitzva of appearance. And furthermore, another reason is that we find with regard to the offerings of the princes during the dedication of the Tabernacle that the verse includes more peace-offerings than burnt-offerings. Each prince brought one cow, a ram, and a sheep as burnt-offerings, but two cows, two rams, five goats, and five sheep as peace-offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And Beit Hillel, what is the reason that they do not say in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? Beit Hillel would respond to both claims of Beit Shammai. With regard to that which you said, that the burnt-offering of appearance is superior because it goes up entirely to God, on the contrary, the Festival peace-offering is superior, as it has two consumptions, by God on the altar and by people. And with regard to that which you said that we derive this <i>halakha</i> from the festival of Assembly, i.e., <i>Shavuot</i>, one could argue instead that one should derive the <i>halakhot</i> of the offering of an individual from another offering of an individual, i.e., the princes; and one does not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of the offering of an individual from the communal offering of <i>Shavuot</i>.
  The Gemara asks the reverse question: And what is the reason that Beit Shammai do not say in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel? Beit Shammai would respond to the arguments of Beit Hillel: With regard to that which you said, that the Festival peace-offering is superior, as it existed before the speech of God, the burnt-offering of appearance also existed before the speech. According to the opinion of Beit Shammai, the Jewish people sacrificed burnt-offerings at Mount Sinai before the giving of the Torah.
  And with regard to that which you said, that one derives the <i>halakhot</i> of these offerings from the offerings of the princes, one could argue that one derives the <i>halakhot</i> of a matter that is performed in all generations, i.e., the value of the different Festival offerings, from another matter that is performed in all generations, i.e., the offerings brought on <i>Shavuot</i>. However, one does not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of a matter that is performed in all generations from a matter that is not performed in all generations, as the offerings of the princes was a specific mitzva for the Tabernacle in the wilderness.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, what is different about the Festival peace-offering, that it existed before the speech of God, as it is written: “And they sacrificed peace-offerings of bulls to the Lord” (Exodus 24:5)? The burnt-offering of appearance is also mentioned, as isn’t it written in the same verse: “And they sacrificed burnt-offerings”?
  The Gemara responds: Beit Hillel hold that the burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai was the daily burnt-offering, which is a communal offering, as there were no individual burnt-offerings before the giving of the Torah. And Beit Shammai hold that the burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai was a burnt-offering of appearance, which is an individual offering.
  Abaye said: Beit Shammai, Rabbi Elazar, and Rabbi Yishmael all hold that the burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai was a burnt-offering of appearance. And Beit Hillel, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili all hold that the burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai was a daily burnt-offering, not an individual offering.
  The Gemara explains the source for each opinion. Beit Shammai is that which we said. Rabbi Yishmael, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yishmael says: General statements were said at Sinai, i.e., Moses received general mitzvot at Sinai, including the Ten Commandments.
  
  Daf 6b
  
  And the details of the mitzvot, e.g., the particulars of the sacrificial process, were said to Moses at a later time in the Tent of Meeting. And Rabbi Akiva says: Both general statements and the details of mitzvot were said at Sinai and later repeated in the Tent of Meeting, and reiterated a third time by Moses to the Jewish people in the plains of Moab, as recorded in the book of Deuteronomy. And if it enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yishmael holds that the burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai was the daily burnt-offering, rather than the burnt-offering of an individual, the following question arises:
  Is there any offering that initially did not require skinning and cutting into pieces, as these details of the daily burnt-offering were transmitted later in the Tent of Meeting, and ultimately, when these details were added, the offering required skinning and cutting? It is not plausible that the details of a mitzva would change over time. Therefore, it is clear that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael the Jews did not sacrifice the daily burnt-offering before the giving of the Torah, which means that the burnt-offering sacrificed at Mount Sinai must have been a burnt-offering of appearance.
  The Gemara cites the source for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “It is a daily burnt-offering, which was performed on Mount Sinai” (Numbers 28:6). Rabbi Elazar says: The details of its performance were said at Sinai, but it itself was not sacrificed until the Tabernacle was erected. This indicates that the offering brought on Mount Sinai was a burnt-offering of appearance.
  Rabbi Akiva says: It was sacrificed when they stood at Mount Sinai and its sacrifice never ceased. The Gemara asks: But if so, how do I uphold, i.e., how does Rabbi Akiva explain the following verse: “Did you bring to Me sacrifices and offerings for forty years in the wilderness, house of Israel?” (Amos 5:25). This verse indicates that they did not sacrifice these offerings.
  The Gemara answers: The tribe of Levi, which did not commit the sin of idol worship, sacrificed it from their own funds. Since the rest of the Jewish people did not contribute the funds for the daily burnt-offering, it is as though they did not sacrifice this offering. This concludes the list of sources of the opinions of those Sages who hold that the daily burnt-offering was not sacrificed at Mount Sinai, and the offering that was sacrificed there was a burnt-offering of appearance.
  The Gemara cites the sources for the opinions that the daily burnt-offering was sacrificed at Mount Sinai. Beit Hillel: That which we said. Rabbi Akiva: Also that which we said, in the aforementioned dispute with Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The Jewish people were commanded to perform three mitzvot when they ascended to the Temple for the pilgrimage Festivals: The burnt-offering of appearance, and the Festival peace-offering, and the peace-offering of rejoicing.
  Rabbi Yosei HaGelili continues. There is an element of the burnt-offering of appearance that is not present in the other two; there is an element of the Festival peace-offering that is not present in the other two; and there is an element of the peace-offering of rejoicing that is not present in the other two. He elaborates: There is an element of the burnt-offering of appearance that is not present in the other two, as the burnt-offering of appearance goes up entirely to God, which is not so with regard to the other two, as the majority portion of the other two offerings is eaten.
  There is an element of the Festival peace-offering that is not present in the other two, as the Festival peace-offering existed before the speech of God at Mount Sinai, which is not so with regard to the other two. Finally, there is an element of the peace-offering of rejoicing that is not present in the other two, as the peace-offering of rejoicing is performed by both men and by women, which is not so with regard to the other two. This shows that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that the burnt-offering of appearance was not sacrificed at Mount Sinai, which means that the burnt-offering mentioned in that context must have been the daily burnt-offering.
  The Gemara asks a question with regard to Abaye’s explanation. And with regard to Rabbi Yishmael, what is the reason that you established his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that the burnt-offering sacrificed at Mount Sinai was a burnt-offering of appearance? The explanation for his opinion was: If it enters your mind that the burnt-offering the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert was a daily burnt-offering, is there any offering that initially did not require skinning and cutting into pieces and ultimately required skinning and cutting into pieces?
  But wasn’t it Rabbi Yosei HaGelili who said: The burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai was the daily burnt-offering? Nevertheless, he holds that initially it did not require skinning and cutting into pieces, and ultimately it required skinning and cutting into pieces.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert did not require skinning and cutting into pieces, because the requirement of skinning and cutting offerings applied only from the time God commanded this mitzva in the Tent of Meeting and onward. The Gemara concludes: There is no clear evidence as to what Rabbi Yishmael actually maintains in this regard, and therefore one should delete Rabbi Yishmael from this list here, i.e., the list of those who hold that the burnt-offering sacrificed in the desert was a burnt-offering of appearance.
  Rav Ḥisda raises a dilemma: This verse, how is it written, i.e., how should it be understood? Should the following verse be read as two separate halves, with the first part consisting of: “And he sent the young men of the children of Israel, and they sacrificed burnt-offerings” (Exodus 24:5), which were sheep; and the second part consisting of the rest of the verse: “And they sacrificed peace-offerings of bulls to the Lord,” i.e., these peace-offerings alone were bulls? Or perhaps both of these were bulls, as the term: “Bulls,” refers both to the burnt-offerings and the peace-offerings.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two readings? Mar Zutra said: The practical difference is with regard to the punctuation of the cantillation notes, whether there should be a break in the verse after: “And they sacrificed burnt-offerings,” indicating that these offerings consisted of sheep; or whether it should read: “And they sacrificed burnt-offerings and sacrificed peace-offerings of bulls,” as one clause.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said that the difference between these two readings of the verse is for one who says in the form of a vow: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt-offering like the burnt-offering that the Jewish people sacrificed in the desert at Mount Sinai. What is he required to bring? Were they bulls or were they sheep? The Gemara does not provide an answer and states that the question shall stand unresolved.
  We learned in a mishna there (<i>Pe’a</i> 1:1): These are the mitzvot that have no measure:
  
  Daf 7a
  
  Produce in the corner of the field that must be left unharvested, which is given to the poor [<i>pe’a</i>]; and the first fruits, which are brought to the Temple; and the appearance in the Temple on the pilgrim Festivals; and acts of loving-kindness; and Torah study.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We thought to say that the mitzva of appearance in the Temple does not have a maximum measure, but it does have a minimum measure; until Rabbi Oshaya the Distinguished came and taught: The mitzva of appearance has neither a maximum nor a minimum measure. However, the Rabbis say: The burnt-offering of appearance must be worth one silver <i>ma’a</i> and the Festival peace-offering two silver coins.
  § What is the mitzva of appearance to which this mishna is referring? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is the mitzva of the appearance of one’s face in the Temple courtyard. One may appear in the Temple as often as he likes over the course of a Festival. And Reish Lakish said: It is the appearance of one’s face in the Temple with an offering. There is no measure in this regard, as every time one appears in the Temple during a Festival he must bring an offering.
  The Gemara explains: On the main i.e., on the first, day of the pilgrimage Festival, everyone agrees that the appearance of one’s face must be accompanied by an offering. When they disagree, it is with regard to the rest of the days of the pilgrimage Festival, i.e., whether or not one who appears must sacrifice an offering. Furthermore, anywhere, i.e., in any case that one comes and brings an offering, everyone agrees that we accept it from him. When they disagree, it is when he comes and does not bring an offering. Is this man obligated to bring an offering or not?
  The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the mitzva is merely the appearance of one’s face in the Temple courtyard. Therefore, one doesn’t need to bring an offering whenever he comes to the Temple. Reish Lakish said that the mitzva is the appearance of one’s face with an offering, which means that whenever one comes he must bring an offering with him.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The verse states: “Three times you shall keep a feast for Me in the year…and none shall appear before Me empty-handed” (Exodus 23:14–15). This verse indicates that one must bring an offering whenever he appears in the Temple. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: That obligation applies only on the main day of the pilgrimage Festival, but not on the rest of the Festival days.
  Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a <i>baraita</i>: “And none shall appear before Me empty-handed.” This teaches that Festival pilgrims must appear with animal offerings. Do you say that they must appear with animal offerings, or perhaps it is only with bird-offerings or meal-offerings? And it is possible to determine the answer by logical derivation: It is stated that one must bring a Festival peace-offering for a commoner to eat, and it is stated that one must bring a burnt-offering of appearance, which is for God. Just as the Festival peace-offering that is stated for a commoner is referring to animal offerings, so too, the burnt-offering of appearance that is stated to be sacrificed wholly for God is referring to animal offerings.
  And what are these animal offerings that the Festival pilgrims sacrifice to God? Burnt-offerings. Do you say that they are burnt-offerings, or perhaps it is only that they are peace-offerings? And it is possible to determine the answer by logical derivation: It is stated that one must bring a Festival peace-offering for a commoner, and it is stated that one must bring a burnt-offering of appearance, which is solely for God. Just as the Festival peace-offering that is stated for a commoner is referring to an offering that is fitting for him to eat, i.e., a peace-offering, so too, the burnt-offering of appearance that is stated to be for God is referring to an offering that is fitting for Him, i.e., a burnt-offering, which is entirely consumed on the altar.
  And similarly, one can learn by logical derivation that your table should not be full of meat while your Master’s table, i.e., the altar, is empty. This indicates that one must sacrifice a burnt-offering whenever one appears in the Temple, which contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yoḥanan again said to him: This obligation applies only on the main day of the pilgrimage Festival.
  Reish Lakish raised another objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Three times a year the Jewish people were commanded to ascend on the pilgrimage Festival: On Passover, on <i>Shavuot</i>, and on <i>Sukkot</i>. They may not appear partially, i.e., only some of the people, because it is stated: “All your males” (Exodus 23:17). And they may not appear empty-handed, because it is stated: “And none shall appear before Me empty-handed” (Exodus 23:15). Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: That too is referring to the main day of the pilgrimage Festival.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “All your males shall appear.” Although the verse as written can be read: “Will see [<i>yireh</i>],” it is actually read: “Shall be seen [<i>yera’e</i>].” The <i>baraita</i> derives that just as I, God, come to see you for free, as He has no obligation to bring an offering when He comes to see us in the Temple, so too, you may come to see Me in the Temple for free, i.e., there is no requirement to bring an offering. The Gemara accepts this objection and therefore proceeds to explain the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in a different manner.
  Rather, with regard to anywhere that one comes to the Temple courtyard after the initial time on the first day of the Festival and he does not bring an offering, everyone agrees that one enters, appears, and exits without having to bring an offering. When they disagree it is in a case where one comes and brings an offering.
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the appearance mentioned in the mishna is referring to the appearance of one’s face in the Temple courtyard, maintains that it is this appearance itself that has no maximum measure, i.e., one may appear as often as he wishes without an offering. However, there is a maximum measure, i.e., a limited number of offerings, that one may bring; only one burnt-offering of appearance per Festival. And Reish Lakish said: The appearance of one’s face means with an offering, as even offerings have no maximum measure. One may bring as many offerings during the Festival as he wishes.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish: “Let your foot be seldom in your neighbor’s house, lest he be sated with you, and hate you” (Proverbs 25:17). It can be inferred from this verse that one should not bring extra gifts, i.e., offerings, to God. The Gemara responds: There, the verse is referring to sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, i.e., it is better not to sin in the first place.
  This explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Levi, as Rabbi Levi raised a contradiction between two verses. It is written: “Let your foot be seldom in your neighbor’s house,” and it is written: “I will come into Your house with burnt-offerings, I will perform for You my vows” (Psalms 66:13). Rabbi Levi explained: This is not difficult; here, the verse is referring to sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, and there, it is referring to burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, concerning which one may bring as many as he likes.
  That opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “Let your foot be seldom in your neighbor’s house.” The verse is speaking of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings. Do you say it is referring to sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, or perhaps it is only referring to burnt-offerings and peace-offerings? When it says: “I will come into Your house with burnt-offerings, I will perform for You my vows,” burnt-offerings and peace-offerings are mentioned, as these are more pleasant to sacrifice to God. How then do I uphold the meaning of the verse: “Let your foot be seldom in your neighbor’s house”? The verse is speaking of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings.
  § Earlier the <i>baraita</i> taught: The people may not appear partially, as the verse states: “All your males” (Exodus 23:17). Rav Yosef thought to say: One who has ten sons should not let five ascend now and the other five tomorrow. Rather, they must all ascend to the Temple together.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  Abaye said to him: This is obvious; which of his sons would he render sinners, who are too lazy to ascend, and which of them would he render vigilant, eager to perform the mitzva at the first opportunity?
  Rather, for what purpose does the verse: “All your males,” come? It comes to teach that which <i>Aḥerim</i> taught. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Aḥerim</i> say that a scrimper, one who gathers dog feces to give them to tanners for the purpose of tanning hides; a melder of copper, who purifies copper from dross; and a tanner of hides are all exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as their occupation inflicts upon them an unpleasant odor. As it is stated: “All your males,” which indicates that only one who is able to ascend with all your males is obligated, excluding these. As people avoid their company, they cannot ascend with all your males.
  MISHNA: Burnt-offerings that one sacrifices on the intermediate days of the Festival must come from non-sacred property, not from sacred property such as second-tithe money. But the peace-offerings may be brought from the second tithe, i.e., from money with which one redeemed second tithe, which is subsequently used to purchase food in Jerusalem. With regard to the Festival peace-offering sacrificed on the first day of the festival of Passover, Beit Shammai say: It must come from non-sacred property, and Beit Hillel say: It may be brought even from the second tithe.
  In general, Israelites fulfill their obligation to eat peace-offerings of rejoicing with their voluntary vows and gift offerings donated during the year and sacrificed on the Festival; and likewise with animal tithes. And the priests fulfill their obligation of rejoicing with the meat of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings and with firstborn offerings, as the priests receive a portion of these, and with the breast and thigh of peace-offerings, to which they are also entitled. However, they do not fulfill their obligation with birds, e.g., a bird sacrificed as a sin-offering, nor with meal-offerings, as only the eating of meat constitutes rejoicing.
  GEMARA: When the mishna states that burnt-offerings sacrificed during the intermediate days of the Festival may come from non-sacred property, this leads to the surprising conclusion that on the Festival they may even come from the second tithe. The Gemara asks: Why should this be the case? The burnt-offering is an obligatory matter, and there is a principle that any obligatory matter with regard to offerings may come only from non-sacred property that was consecrated expressly for this purpose alone, not from property that was previously consecrated for another purpose.
  And if you would say that this teaches us that burnt-offerings may come, i.e., be sacrificed, on the intermediate days of the Festival, whereas on the Festival they may not come at all, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Beitza</i> 19a) that Beit Shammai say: One brings peace-offerings on a Festival, but one does not place his hands on them, as placing one’s hands on an animal on a Festival is prohibited by rabbinic law. However, one may not sacrifice burnt-offerings at all, as they are not eaten, and slaughtering is permitted on a Festival only for human needs. And Beit Hillel say: One brings both peace-offerings and burnt-offerings, and one does place his hands on them. It is unlikely that an anonymous mishna would follow the opinion of Beit Shammai, whose rulings are not accepted as <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara answers: This mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Burnt-offerings brought as a fulfillment of one’s vow or as gift offerings may come on the intermediate days of the Festival. However, on the Festival itself they may not come. And the burnt-offering of appearance comes even on the Festival, but when it comes, it may come only from non-sacred property, as it is obligatory. And peace-offerings of rejoicing may come even from the second tithe. And with regard to the Festival peace-offering brought on the first day of Passover, Beit Shammai say: It may come only from non-sacred property, and Beit Hillel say: It may come even from the second tithe.
  That opinion is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Burnt-offerings brought as a fulfillment of one’s vow or as gift offerings may come on the intermediate days of the Festival. However, on the Festival itself they may not come. And the burnt-offering of appearance comes even on the Festival, but when it comes it may come only from non-sacred property. And peace-offerings of rejoicing may come even from the second tithe. And with regard to the Festival peace-offering brought on the first day of the festival of Passover, Beit Shammai say: It may come only from non-sacred property, and Beit Hillel say: It may come even from the second tithe.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about the Festival peace-offering brought on the first day of the festival of Passover? Rav Ashi said: This emphasis on the specific date teaches us that for the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, i.e., the pilgrimage Festival offerings brought on the first day of Passover, yes, this restriction applies; however, for the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, no, this limitation is not in force. If the Paschal lamb was too small for a group, they would bring an additional peace-offering so that the Paschal lamb could be eaten when one was full. This offering was called the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth of Nisan. Since this offering is not obligatory, everyone agrees that it may be purchased with second-tithe money.
  
  Daf 8a
  
  Apparently, he holds that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth does not apply by Torah law, and therefore one may bring it even from second-tithe funds.
  § The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> that Beit Hillel say: Festival peace-offerings may be brought even from the second tithe. The Gemara asks: Why? It is an obligatory matter, and any obligatory matter may come only from non-sacred property. Ulla said: This is referring to a case where one combines, i.e., the offering is purchased with a combination of second-tithe funds and non-sacred money. The Gemara adds that <i>amora’im</i> dispute the details of this <i>halakha</i>.
  Ḥizkiya said: One may combine one animal with another animal. If one has a large household for which one animal will not suffice, he brings one animal for the Festival offering from non-sacred money and he may combine funds of second tithe to purchase a second animal. Since he has fulfilled his obligation of the Festival offering by bringing one animal from non-sacred money, he may bring the others from second tithe or animal tithes. But one may not combine money with other money, i.e., one may not combine second-tithe funds with non-sacred money toward the purchase of one animal for the Festival offering. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may combine money with other money, but one may not combine one animal with another animal.
  The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara elaborates: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: “After the measure of the gift offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 16:10). This teaches that a person brings his obligatory offering from non-sacred property. And from where is it derived that if one wishes to mix he may mix? The verse states: “As the Lord your God blesses you” (Deuteronomy 16:10), i.e., one may use any money with which God has blessed him, even second tithe. The term: Mix, means combining money from different sources.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Ḥizkiya: “After the measure” (Deuteronomy 16:10). This teaches that a person brings his obligatory offering from non-sacred property. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to this issue, as Beit Shammai say: On the first day one may bring only from non-sacred property. From this point forward one may buy the animal from the second-tithe money. And Beit Hillel say: The first eating must be from non-sacred property. From this point forward one may bring from the second-tithe money. The phrase: The first eating, means the first animal that one eats, which is in accordance with Ḥizkiya’s opinion.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: All this applies on the first day of the Festival. But with regard to all the other days of Passover, on which one is obligated to bring peace-offerings of rejoicing, a person fulfills his obligation even with animal tithes, and certainly with funds of second tithe. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that one does not fulfill his obligation with animal tithes on the Festival?
  Rav Ashi said: There is a concern that if one requires additional animals, perhaps he may come to separate tithes on the Festival itself, and one may not separate tithes on the Festival due to the red dye [<i>sikrata</i>]. Every tenth animal is marked with red dye, and as it is prohibited to dye on a Festival due to the labor of writing, one may not separate tithes on a Festival.
  The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that this: “After the measure [<i>missat</i>],” mentioned in the verse, is a term for non-sacred property? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And the king Ahasuerus laid a tribute [<i>mas</i>] upon the land” (Esther 10:1), which is clearly referring to a tribute of non-sacred property.
  § The mishna stated that Israelites fulfill their obligation to eat peace-offerings of rejoicing with their vow offerings and gift offerings. The Sages taught that the verse: “And you shall rejoice in your feast” (Deuteronomy 16:14) comes to include all types of rejoicing as constituting a fulfillment of the mitzva of rejoicing. From here the Sages stated: Israelites fulfill their obligation to eat peace-offerings of rejoicing with their vow offerings and gift offerings and likewise with animal tithes.
  And the priests fulfill their obligation of rejoicing with the meat of sin-offerings and guilt-offerings, and with firstborn offerings, and with the breast and thigh of peace-offerings. One might have thought that they can fulfill their obligation even by eating bird-offerings and meal-offerings. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall rejoice in your feast.”
  
  Daf 8b
  
  This teaches that eating those animals from which the Festival peace-offering may come, i.e., sheep and cattle, is a fulfillment of the mitzva of rejoicing. This excludes these, i.e., bird-offerings and meal-offerings, from which the Festival peace-offering may not come.
  Rav Ashi said: There is no need to derive this <i>halakha</i> from “And you shall rejoice in your feast” by explaining that the word feast is referring to the Festival peace-offering. Rather, this <i>halakha</i> is derived simply from the phrase “And you shall rejoice.” This excludes those bird-offerings and meal-offerings that do not have an element of rejoicing, as the joy of eating is provided only by animal meat.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rav Ashi do with the phrase: “In your feast”? The Gemara answers: That phrase comes to teach in accordance with the statement of Rav Daniel bar Ketina. As Rav Daniel bar Ketina said that Rav said: From where is it derived that one may not marry a woman on the intermediate days of the Festival? As it is stated: “And you shall rejoice in your feast,” indicating that one should rejoice only in your feast and not with your wife.
  MISHNA: One who has many eaters, i.e., members of his household, and a small amount of property, may bring many peace-offerings and few burnt-offerings, so he can feed the members of his household with the peace-offerings. If one has much property and few eaters, he should bring many burnt-offerings and few peace-offerings.
  If both these and those, his property and the members of his household, are few, with regard to this individual it is stated in the mishna (2a) that the Sages established the smallest amount of one silver <i>ma’a</i> for the burnt-offering of appearance in the Temple and two silver coins for the Festival peace-offerings. If both his eaters and his property are many, with regard to this individual it is stated: “Every man shall give as he is able, according to the blessing of the Lord your God, which He has given you” (Deuteronomy 16:17).
  GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that one who has many eaters and a small amount of property may bring many peace-offerings, the Gemara asks: From where can he bring many peace-offerings? He does not have much property. Rav Ḥisda said: He combines his property with the second-tithe money and brings a large bull. In this way he will have a lot of meat from the peace-offering. Rav Sheshet said to him: The Sages said that one may combine an animal with another animal.
  Since Rav Sheshet’s objection is unclear, the Gemara asks: What is he saying to Rav Ḥisda? If we say that he was saying to him as follows: They said that one may only combine an animal with another animal, but one may not combine money with other money to purchase one large bull, then let him simply say: One may not combine money with other money. Rather, this is what he said to him: The Sages said that one may even combine an animal with another animal. Why did you, Rav Ḥisda, limit him to the purchase of one large animal? Why not also suggest that this individual may bring other animals from second-tithe money?
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rav Sheshet say this? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Ḥizkiya, who said that one may combine only one animal with another animal, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that one may combine only money with other money.
  And if you would say: It is the <i>amora’im</i> who disagree, whereas the <i>baraitot</i> that were cited in support of their opinions do not disagree and therefore Rav Sheshet may present his own opinion on the matter, this cannot be the case, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches: The first eating must come from non-sacred property. In other words, the first animal one eats must come entirely from non-sacred property, and combining is permitted only for the second animal. This indicates that although one may combine an additional animal with that first one, one may not combine money with other money to purchase even one animal.
  The Gemara explains. What is the meaning of: The first eating? This means that when one combines non-sacred money with second-tithe money, the monetary value of the required measure of the first eating from the offering must come from non-sacred funds. However, the remaining value of that animal may come from second-tithe funds. Therefore, according to the opinion of Rav Sheshet, one may combine an animal with another animal, i.e., by purchasing two separate animals, one from non-sacred funds and one from second-tithe money. Another option is to purchase one animal with combined funds, provided that the first eating is from non-sacred funds.
  § Ulla said that Reish Lakish said: If one separated ten animals for the purpose of his Festival peace-offering, and he sacrificed five of them on the first day of the Festival, he may return and sacrifice the remaining five on the second day of the Festival, or on any of the other days. There is no concern for the prohibition of: “You shall not add” (Deuteronomy 13:1), as though he were celebrating the first day twice, because the remaining offerings merely complete the first day’s offerings. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Since he stopped after the first five offerings on the day on which he first brought the Festival peace-offerings, he may no longer sacrifice the remaining animals on the other days, as that would be considered celebrating an extra day.
  Rabbi Abba said: And these <i>amora’im</i> do not disagree, as they are referring to different circumstances. Here, Rabbi Yoḥanan is speaking of a case where one did not specify when he intended to sacrifice these offerings, and therefore it is assumed that he meant to sacrifice them all on the first day. There, Reish Lakish is referring to a case where one explicitly said at the outset that he intended to bring them on all the days of the Festival (Rabbeinu Ḥananel).
  The Gemara asks: With regard to this case where he did not specify, what are the circumstances? If we say that there was no time left in the day to sacrifice, i.e., he brought all his animals on the first day and realized that there was not enough time to sacrifice all of them, one can assume that the reason that he did not bring them is that there was no time left in the day. If so, his offering on another day is certainly considered merely the completion of the obligations of the first day. In this case his bringing of the additional offerings is not prohibited.
  But rather, you must say that this is referring to a case where he does not have enough eaters in his household, and as one may not have leftovers, he did not sacrifice the remaining offerings. Here too, the fact that he did not sacrifice them is because he does not have enough eaters. Again, this cannot be the case in which it is prohibited to sacrifice the extra offerings.
  The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this ruling only in a case where there is time left in the day and he has eaters in his household. From the fact that he did not sacrifice them on the first day of the Festival, one can conclude from it that he left them intentionally. Therefore, he is no longer permitted to sacrifice them on the other days of the Festival.
  The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable that Rabbi Yoḥanan agrees that if one specifies his intentions he may sacrifice the offerings on the remaining days, as when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one separated ten animals for his Festival peace-offering, and he sacrificed five on the first day of the Festival, he may return and sacrifice the other five on the second day of the Festival. These two statements of Rabbi Yoḥanan, cited by Ulla and Ravin respectively, apparently contradict each other.
  Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this contradiction that this statement here is dealing with a case where one did not specify, whereas there it is referring to a situation where one stated his intentions explicitly? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from here that it is so.
  It was also stated that Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:
  
  Daf 9a
  
  They taught that one may sacrifice the Festival peace-offering on the first Festival day but not on all seven days, as recorded in the <i>baraita</i> on this <i>amud</i> below, only in a case where he did not finish. However, if he finished, he may go back and sacrifice.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term: Finish, in this context? If we say it means that he finished sacrificing all of his offerings, what is he going back to sacrifice? Rather, it means that if the day did not end and he still has offerings left over, he may not return to sacrifice those on other Festival days. However, if the day ended and he had not finished sacrificing his offerings, he may go back and sacrifice them. This shows that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes that in these circumstances it is permitted to sacrifice Festival peace-offerings during the remaining days of the Festival.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who did not celebrate by bringing the Festival peace-offering on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, he may celebrate and bring it during the entire remaining days of the pilgrimage Festival, and even on the final day of the Festival, i.e., on the Eighth Day of Assembly.
  If the pilgrimage Festival passed and one did not celebrate by bringing the Festival peace-offering, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it. Even if he consecrated an animal for this purpose and it was lost, once the Festival is over he has no obligation to replace it, as he has missed the opportunity for performing this mitzva. And about this it is stated: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” (Ecclesiastes 1:15).
  Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is the crooked that cannot be made straight? This verse is referring to one who engaged in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him and fathered a <i>mamzer</i> with her. This individual is unable to rectify his sin, because the status of the illegitimate child is permanent. And if you say that it is referring to one who steals or robs, although he is crooked he can return what he stole and in this manner his sin will be rectified.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: One calls crooked only someone who was initially straight and subsequently became crooked. And who is this? This is a Torah scholar who leaves his Torah study. Here is an example of something straight that became crooked.
  GEMARA: The mishna taught that if one did not bring his Festival peace-offering on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, he may bring it even on the Eighth Day of Assembly, despite the fact that it is a separate Festival. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael that this <i>halakha</i> is derived by means of a verbal analogy. It is stated: “Assembly” (Deuteronomy 16:8), with regard to the seventh day of Passover, and it is stated: “Assembly” (Leviticus 23:36), with regard to the eighth day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. Just as there, with regard to Passover, the day of assembly, i.e., the seventh day of Passover, is available for redress, as it is certainly part of the Festival, so too here, in the case of <i>Sukkot</i>, the Eighth Day of Assembly is available for redress.
  The Gemara adds that the term assembly in each of these contexts is free for this verbal analogy, i.e., it is superfluous in both contexts. As, if it is not free the verbal analogy can be refuted, because each context in which the term appears contains features that do not apply to the other one. What can one say about the seventh day of Passover? That it is not distinct from the days preceding it with regard to the Festival offerings and the prohibition against eating leavened bread. Can you say the same with regard to the eighth day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, which is distinct from the days preceding it, i.e., that the Eighth Day of Assembly does not involve the same mitzvot as the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>?
  However, this is not so [<i>la’ei</i>], as the term assembly is certainly free. Now, what is the meaning of: “assembly [<i>atzeret</i>]”? It means that one is stopped [<i>atzur</i>], i.e., prohibited, from performing labor. But isn’t it already written: “You shall not perform labor” (Deuteronomy 16:8)? Why then do I need this term <i>atzeret</i> that the Merciful One writes? Rather, learn from here that it is free for the verbal analogy.
  The Gemara comments: And a <i>tanna</i> cites proof from here, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a verse that deals with the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>: “And you shall keep it a feast to the Lord seven days” (Leviticus 23:41). One might have thought that one may continue to celebrate by bringing the Festival peace-offering all seven days of the Festival. Therefore, the verse states: “It,” which teaches: It, i.e., the first day of the Festival, you shall celebrate with these offerings, and you may not celebrate all seven days. If so, why is “seven” stated? For redress, i.e., if one failed to bring an offering on the first day he may do so all seven days.
  And from where is it derived that if one did not celebrate by bringing the Festival peace-offering on the first day of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> that he may continue to celebrate throughout the pilgrimage Festival and even on the last festival day of <i>Sukkot</i>, which is the Eighth Day of Assembly? The verse states: “You shall keep it in the seventh month” (Leviticus 23:41), which indicates that one may bring the Festival offerings even after the seven days of the Festival. If the verse said only: “In the seventh month,” one might have thought that one may continue to celebrate by bringing the offering at any time during the rest of the entire month. Therefore, the verse states: “It,” indicating that you celebrate it, i.e., any of the Festival days, and you may not celebrate outside of these days.
  § The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the concept of redress mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The other days are redress for the first day. If one did not bring the Festival offering on the first day, he may still do so on the remaining days of the Festival. And Rabbi Oshaya said: The days are redress for one another. Each day can be considered the main day of obligation, i.e., if one did not bring the offering on the first available day he may do so on the remaining days.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two explanations? Rabbi Zeira said: The practical difference between them is in a case of one who was lame on the first day of the Festival and was healed on the second day. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the other days are redress for the first day; since he was not fit, i.e., was not qualified to sacrifice his offerings on the first day, he is not fit to do so even on the second, as the second day is redress for the first. The second day is not for those who were completely exempt on the first, but for those who were obligated to sacrifice but neglected to do so. And Rabbi Oshaya said that the days are redress for one another. Consequently, even though he was not fit to bring the offering on the first day, he is fit to do so on the second. Since a separate obligation applies on each day, even if one was unfit to bring the offering on the first day he must do so when he becomes fit.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Rabbi Yoḥanan was involved in a dispute with regard to a nazirite. A nazirite who becomes ritually impure as a result of contact with a corpse must undergo a seven-day process of ritual purification, after which he must bring a set of offerings and restart counting the days of his nazirite period. Usually, a nazirite may bring one set of offerings even for many occurrences of ritual impurity. However, if he came into contact with a corpse for a second time on the eighth day after he first became ritually impure he must bring two sets of offerings, as the second impurity occurred at a time when he could have begun counting the days of his nazirite vow again. The <i>amora’im</i> dispute the details of this <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara continues. Didn’t Ḥizkiya say that if a nazirite became ritually impure on the eighth day itself, he brings a second set of offerings? However, if he became ritually impure on the previous night he does not bring an additional set of offerings, because he could not have brought the offering at night. Although seven complete days have passed, as he did not yet have the opportunity to bring the offering, it is as though his seven days were not yet complete. Consequently, he may still bring one set of offerings for the two instances of ritual impurity.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the nazirite became ritually impure on the night on which the eighth day begins, he also brings a second set of offerings. Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that this nazirite is effectively ready to begin counting the days of his vow again, as only the technicality that one may not bring offerings at night prevents him from doing so. This shows that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, even when one is incapable of sacrificing his offerings, his obligation remains intact. So too, in the case of a lame person, his obligation to bring the Festival offering applies in theory even on the first day, which means that he should be able to bring the offerings at a later date during the Festival.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: The case of one who cannot bring an offering due to ritual impurity is different. He is not completely disqualified, as there is redress for ritual purity. This can be demonstrated from the <i>halakha</i> of the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>. Just as one who is ritually impure and may not sacrifice the Paschal offering has the opportunity to redress the situation by means of the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, so too, anyone who cannot bring an offering due to impurity may redress this at a later date.
  Rav Pappa strongly objects to this reasoning: This works out well according to the one who said that the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>
  
  Daf 9b
  
  is redress for the first Paschal offering. According to this opinion, it is clear that ritual impurity does not nullify one’s obligation. However, according to the one who said that the second <i>Pesaḥ</i> is a separate pilgrimage Festival, established for those who were unable to sacrifice the Paschal offering at the proper time, what is there to say? In that case, Rav Yirmeya’s answer does not apply, and therefore it remains unclear that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one who is not obligated in the Festival offerings on the first day is exempt during the remaining days.
  Rather, Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that night is not considered part of a date whose time has not yet arrived. Although one may not sacrifice offerings at night, the date itself has arrived and his period of impurity is complete, which is why any further impurity requires a second set of offerings. Consequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion with regard to a lame person does not contradict his ruling concerning a nazirite. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this, that night is not considered part of a date whose time has not yet arrived?
  But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: A <i>zav</i> at the end of his seven-day purification process who saw that he experienced one emission at night and then two in the day brings additional offerings for the second impurity? Had he experienced the emissions before he became ritually pure, he would have been required to bring only one set of offerings. However, once his purification is complete he must bring a separate set. In this case, the first emission occurred before he was able to sacrifice the offerings for his initial period of impurity. Nevertheless, as the two subsequent sightings occurred during the day, and they alone would suffice to confer upon him the status of a <i>zav</i>, they combine with the one from the previous night and he is required to bring new offerings.
  However, if he saw two emissions at night and one in the day, he does not bring additional offerings, because at night he could not yet sacrifice the offerings owed due to his current status, and without those two new sightings he would not become a <i>zav</i> again. And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that night is not considered a date whose time has not yet arrived, then even in the case where he saw two emissions at night and one in the day he should have to bring another set of offerings. He already reached the date of sacrificing the previous offerings before these new emissions occurred. This indicates that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that night is considered part of a date whose time has not yet arrived.
  The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yoḥanan said this statement, he spoke according to the one who says that night is considered part of a date whose time has not yet arrived. However, he himself maintains that even if a <i>zav</i> saw all three emissions at night he must bring another offering. The Gemara asks: If he spoke only according to the one who says that opinion, it is obvious that no new offerings are required; what novel idea did Rabbi Yoḥanan intend to express? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, it was necessary for him to teach the case of a <i>zav</i> who saw two in the day and one at night.
  The Gemara elaborates: It was necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan to say this, lest it enter your mind to say in the manner of the strong objection of Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi (see <i>Keritot</i> 8a), who holds that there is no reason to distinguish between a <i>zav</i> seeing one or two emissions at night. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, that the first sighting confers merely the status of ritual impurity of one who has a seminal emission, and he is not yet classified as a <i>zav</i>. Consequently, there is a difference between one who experienced one emission at night and one who experienced two.
  § The mishna taught that if the pilgrimage Festival passed and one did not celebrate it by sacrificing a Festival peace-offering, he is not obligated to pay restitution for it. And about this it is stated: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” (Ecclesiastes 1:15).
  The Sage bar Hei Hei said to Hillel that if this is the correct interpretation of the verse, this term: “Be numbered [<i>lehimanot</i>]” is apparently inappropriate. It should have said: Be filled. Rather, this verse is referring to one whose friends reached a consensus [<i>manuhu</i>] with regard to a matter of a mitzva and he was not part of their consensus, and therefore he missed his opportunity to join them in the performance of the mitzva.
  This explanation is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. The meaning of the verse “That which is crooked cannot be made straight; and that which is wanting cannot be numbered” is as follows: “That which is crooked cannot be made straight” is referring to one who omitted the recitation of the morning <i>Shema</i> or the recitation of the evening <i>Shema</i>, or who omitted the morning prayer or the evening prayer. “And that which is wanting cannot be numbered” is referring to one whose friends reached a consensus with regard to a matter of a mitzva and he was not part of their consensus.
  The Gemara records another discussion between bar Hei Hei and Hillel. Bar Hei Hei said to Hillel: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Then you shall again discern between the righteous and the wicked, between he who serves God and he who does not serve Him” (Malachi 3:18). There are two redundancies here: “The righteous” is the same as “he who serves God,” and “the wicked” is the same as “he who does not serve Him.” Hillel said to him: The one “who serves Him” and the one “who does not serve Him” are both referring to completely righteous people. But the verse is hinting at a distinction between them, as one who reviews his studies one hundred times is not comparable to one who reviews his studies one hundred and one times.
  Bar Hei Hei said to him: And due to one extra time that he did not review, the verse calls him a person “who does not serve Him”? He said to him: Yes. Go and learn from the market of donkey drivers. One can hire a driver to travel up to ten parasangs for one dinar. However, he will travel eleven parasangs only for two dinars. This shows that any departure beyond the norm is considered a significant difference.
  The Gemara relates that Elijah the Prophet said to bar Hei Hei, and some say that he said this to Rabbi Elazar: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Behold, I have refined you, but not as silver; I have tried you in the furnace of affliction [oni]” (Isaiah 48:10)? This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, sought after all good character traits to impart them to the Jewish people, and He found only poverty [<i>aniyut</i>] capable of preventing them from sin. Shmuel said, and some say it was Rav Yosef: This explains the folk saying that people say: Poverty is good for the Jewish people like a red bridle [<i>barza</i>] for a white horse. Just as a red bridle accentuates the white color of the horse, so the challenge of poverty draws out the purity of the Jewish people.
  § The mishna taught that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: Who is the crooked that cannot be made straight? This verse is referring to one who engaged in intercourse with a woman forbidden to him and fathered a <i>mamzer</i> with her. The Gemara infers from the mishna: If he fathers a child, yes, this verse applies, as he cannot remedy the situation; if he does not father a child, no, the verse does not apply, as he can make amends.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: If a person steals it is possible that he might return his stolen property and be made straight; if a person robs from another it is possible that he might return his robbed property and be made straight. However, one who has sexual relations with a married woman with her consent and thereby renders her forbidden to her husband is banished from the world and passes away. There is no way for him to rectify the situation and achieve atonement, because a married woman who willingly has sexual relations with another man is permanently forbidden to her husband.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai says: Someone who wants to examine an animal for blemishes to bring it as an offering does not say: Inspect the camel, or: Inspect the pig, as these are inherently disqualified for the altar. Rather, he says: Inspect the lamb. Similarly, the term: “Crooked,” applies only to one who was previously straight. And who is this? This is a Torah scholar who leaves his Torah study.
  Rabbi Yehuda ben Lakish said: Any Torah scholar who leaves the Torah, about him the verse says: “As a bird that wanders from her nest, so is a man who wanders from his place” (Proverbs 27:8). And it says: “What unrighteousness have your fathers found in Me, that they are gone far from Me?” (Jeremiah 2:5). This indicates that the punishment is greater for one who was close to God and became distant from Him. In any case, there is a contradiction here, as in the mishna Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says that the act of one who fathers an illegitimate child is crooked and cannot be straightened, whereas in the <i>baraita</i> he says the same applies to anyone who has forbidden sexual relations, regardless of whether or not he fathers a child.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, the mishna is dealing with a case where he had forbidden sexual relations with his unmarried sister. Although the intercourse itself is a severe sin, if he does not sire a child it can be rectified through repentance. There, in the <i>baraita</i>, it is referring to a case where he sinned with a married woman, causing irreparable damage to her marriage. And if you wish, say instead: This and that are both referring to a married woman. And it is not difficult. Here, the mishna is dealing
  
  Daf 10a
  
  with a rape, in which case it is not prohibited for the woman to return to her husband. There, it is referring to a woman who had relations willfully, and therefore she is forbidden to her husband. And if you wish, say that this and that are both dealing with a rape, and it is still not difficult. Here, where the transgression cannot be rectified, it is referring to one who raped the wife of a priest, as it is forbidden for a priest to have relations with his wife once she has intercourse with any other man, even unwillingly. There, it is referring to one who raped the wife of an Israelite, in which case there is no prohibition against her returning to her husband.
  Since the Gemara mentioned a Torah scholar who abandons the study of Torah, it cites a relevant verse: “Neither was there any peace to him that went out or came in due to the adversary” (Zechariah 8:10). Rav said: Once a person leaves the study of <i>halakha</i>, i.e., Mishna and Gemara, even for the study of the Torah itself, he will no longer have peace. The verses of the Torah are often obscure and it is difficult to learn <i>halakha</i> directly from them without the aid of the interpretations of the Talmud.
  And Shmuel said: This is referring to one who leaves the study of Talmud to learn Mishna. Whereas the reasoning of the Talmud is relatively clear, the Mishna cites legal rulings without explaining their reasoning. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse applies even to one who leaves the study of one Talmud for the other Talmud, i.e., who leaves off his study of the Jerusalem Talmud to begin the Babylonian Talmud, as he will encounter difficulties with the new style of learning.
  MISHNA: Incidental to the Festival peace-offering, the mishna describes the nature of various areas of Torah study. The <i>halakhot</i> of the dissolution of vows, when one requests from a Sage to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to support them, as these <i>halakhot</i> are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah. There is only a slight allusion to the dissolution of vows in the Torah, which is taught by the Sages as part of the oral tradition.
  The <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat, Festival peace-offerings, and misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair, as they have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their <i>halakhot</i> are numerous. The details of monetary law, sacrificial rites, ritual purity and impurity, and the <i>halakhot</i> of those with whom relations are forbidden all have something to support them, i.e., there is ample basis in the Torah for these <i>halakhot</i>, and these are the essential parts of Torah.
  GEMARA: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer said: The <i>halakhot</i> of the dissolution of vows have something to support them, as it is stated: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Leviticus 27:2), and: “When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), i.e., the words “clearly utter” appear twice. One clear utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one states his intention to accept the vow, and one clear utterance is for dissolution, when he provides the Sage with a reason why the vow should no longer apply. This is an allusion in the Torah to the annulment of vows.
  Rabbi Yehoshua likewise says: These <i>halakhot</i> have something to support them, as it is stated: “Wherefore I swore in My wrath” (Psalms 95:11), meaning: In my wrath I swore, and I retracted. This is the basis for the dissolution of vows, in which the one who uttered the vow tells the Sage that he regrets it, as he did so in a moment of anger.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These <i>halakhot</i> have something to support them, as it is stated: “Whoever is of a willing heart, let him bring it” (Exodus 35:5). This verse indicates that as long as one retains the same desire to fulfill the vow, he must continue to fulfill it, but if he regrets taking the vow he may arrange for it to be dissolved. Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, also says: They have something to support them, as it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106). This verse indicates that certain oaths need not be fulfilled, i.e., those that have been dissolved.
  Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I had been there, sitting with those Sages, I would have said to them: My source is better than yours, as it is stated: “He shall not nullify his word” (Numbers 30:3), from which it may be inferred: He himself cannot nullify his word; however, others, i.e., a Sage, may nullify it for him by dissolving his vow. Rava said: For all of the suggested sources for the dissolution of vows there is a possible refutation, except for that of Shmuel, for which there is no refutation.
  Rava elaborates. As, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps the phrase: “Clearly utter” should be understood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said an alternative interpretation in the name of Rabbi Tarfon. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to two people who are arguing whether or not someone who passed before them is a nazirite, each of them declaring that if he is correct he himself will become a nazirite, Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: Actually, neither of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is effected only by means of a clear utterance and neither party is certain they will be a nazirite at the time of their utterance. He derives this <i>halakha</i> from this phrase: “Clearly utter.”
  Similarly, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, perhaps this is what the verse is saying: In my wrath I swore and I do not take it back, despite the fact that it was stated in a moment of anger. If it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, perhaps the phrase “a willing heart” comes to exclude the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: If one decided in his heart but did not verbalize a vow, it is insufficient, as he must verbally express it. And therefore this phrase teaches us that even though he did not verbally express the vow he is still obligated to fulfill it.
  Finally, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, perhaps the phrase “and fulfilled it” should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel, who said that Rav said a different interpretation of this verse. As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: From where is it derived that although one is already obligated to fulfill all mitzvot one may take an oath to fulfill a mitzva, and this is not considered an oath taken in vain? As it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe Your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106).
  Rav concludes. However, for Shmuel’s source there is no refutation. Rava said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said: This explains the folk saying that people say: One spicy pepper is better than a basketful of squash, as the single pepper has more flavor than all the squash combined.
  § The mishna stated that the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat are written, i.e., the prohibition against performing labor is explicit in the Torah. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to say this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abba. As Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat only because he needs its dirt and not for the hole itself is exempt from liability for that act, as this is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Abba issue this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One who performs on Shabbat a labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is exempt from liability for it.
  The Gemara offers an alternative possibility. This ruling can be explained even if you say that Rabbi Abba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that one is liable for a labor that is not necessary for its own sake. There, in other cases, Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable because his purpose is creative. Here, where one is digging the hole for the dirt, the purpose is destructive, as the action damages the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in this case he is exempt.
  The Gemara returns to the mishna. What then does the mishna mean by the phrase: Like mountains suspended by a hair?
  
  Daf 10b
  
  The Gemara answers: The Torah prohibited only planned, creative labor on Shabbat. An act of labor that is not intended, or whose result is unintended, or whose consequence is destructive, is not included in this category. Therefore, one who performs labor in this manner is exempt. And limitation of the prohibition against creative labor is not written anywhere in the Torah with regard to the laws of Shabbat. Admittedly, this principle is written in connection with the Tabernacle, and there is an established exegetical link between the building of the Tabernacle and Shabbat. Nevertheless, as this fundamental principle concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of Shabbat does not appear explicitly, it is compared to mountains suspended by a hair.
  § The mishna taught that the <i>halakhot</i> of Festival peace-offerings are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But they are written in the Torah. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to say this in accordance with that which Rav Pappa said to Abaye: From where is it derived that this verse: “And you shall celebrate it as a Festival [<i>veḥagotem</i>] to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:41), is referring to an animal offering? Perhaps the Merciful One is simply saying: Celebrate a Festival.
  Abaye responded: However, if that is so, consider that it is written: “Let My people go, that they may hold a feast [<i>veyaḥogu</i>] to Me in the wilderness” (Exodus 5:1). So too, the meaning of this verse is that they will merely celebrate a Festival, and not bring an offering. And if you would say that is indeed so, that this means that they should celebrate a Festival, but isn’t it written: “And Moses said: You must also give into our hand sacrifices and burnt-offerings, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God” (Exodus 10:25)? This shows that the command is referring to offerings.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty. But perhaps this is what the Merciful One said: Slaughter animals so that you can eat, drink, and celebrate a Festival before Me, but no offerings are necessary. The Gemara answers: This cannot enter your mind, as it is written: “The fat of My Festival feast [<i>ḥagi</i>] shall not remain all night until the morning” (Exodus 23:18). And if it enters your mind to say that it is referring to a regular Festival feast and not an offering, does a Festival feast have forbidden fats?
  The Gemara asks: But perhaps this is what the Merciful One states in the Torah: The fats of gift offerings that are brought during a Festival may not remain all night. If so, the phrase “My Festival feast” is not referring to a type of offering at all, but to a particular time.
  The Gemara answers: However, if that is so, this verse indicates that it is only those fats that are brought during a Festival that may not remain overnight. It may be inferred from here that fats which are brought throughout the year may remain all night. But it is written about burnt-offerings: “On its firewood upon the altar all night into the morning” (Leviticus 6:2). This shows that burnt-offerings must burn upon the altar all night.
  The Gemara further asks: Perhaps if this <i>halakha</i> was derived from that verse, I would say that verse serves as the source of a positive mitzva. Therefore, the Merciful One writes this verse: “Shall not remain all night,” as a prohibition as well.
  The Gemara responds. With regard to the prohibition against leaving over an offering on a Festival, another verse was written: “Neither shall any of the flesh, which you sacrifice the first day at evening, remain all night until the morning” (Deuteronomy 16:4). The Gemara asks: But perhaps the verse: “Shall not remain all night” comes to teach that one who does so violates two prohibitions and a positive mitzva.
  Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation in favor of the claim that the source for a Festival peace-offering comes from a verbal analogy between the term “wilderness” stated here and the term: “wilderness” stated elsewhere. It is written here: “They shall make an offering to Me in the wilderness” (Exodus 5:1), and it is written there: “Did you bring to Me sacrifices and offerings forty years in the wilderness, house of Israel?” (Amos 5:25). Just as there it is referring to actual animal offerings, so too here, it is referring to animal offerings, not merely the celebration of a Festival.
  The Gemara asks: And in light of this verbal analogy, in what way is this <i>halakha</i> like mountains suspended by a hair? The Gemara answers: The textual evidence is not that strong, as generally one does not derive Torah matters from texts of the tradition, i.e., Prophets and Writings. Since the prophets were not permitted to introduce new <i>halakhot</i>, as the Torah is the only authoritative source in that regard, this verbal analogy does not carry the same weight as a <i>halakha</i> derived from the Torah itself.
  § The mishna taught that the details of the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But they are written in the Torah (Leviticus 5:14–16). Rami bar Ḥama said: This statement is necessary only for that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 20a): With regard to an agent who performs his agency, e.g., when a homeowner sends someone to buy an object with consecrated money and the agent does as he was instructed, the homeowner has misused consecrated property and must bring an offering for the actions of the agent performed on his behalf. However, if the agent did not perform his agency, but in some way acted on his own account, the agent has misused consecrated property, and he is the one obligated to bring the offering.
  The Gemara explains: And when he performed his agency, why is the owner considered to have misused consecrated property? And is it possible that this one sins and that one is rendered liable? Since this <i>halakha</i> is counterintuitive, it is not apparent from the verses. This is what the mishna was referring to when it said that these <i>halakhot</i> are like mountains suspended by a hair.
  Rava said: And what is the logical difficulty with this <i>halakha</i>? Perhaps the transgression of misuse of consecrated property is different, as it is derived through a verbal analogy from the parallel term “sin” (Leviticus 5:6) and “sin” (Numbers 18:9), from the case of <i>teruma</i>: Just as there, with regard to <i>teruma</i>, the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself, and therefore the agent may separate <i>teruma</i> on behalf of the owner of the produce, so too here, with regard to misuse of consecrated property, the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself, which means that when the agent properly performs his agency the owner is liable.
  Rather, Rava said: The mishna’s statement with regard to mountains is necessary only for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If, after he sent an agent to use a consecrated object, the homeowner remembered that it was a consecrated item and the agent did not remember, the agent has misused consecrated property despite the fact that he was merely performing his agency. This is because one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property only if he acted unwittingly. In this instance, what did the poor agent do? He simply performed his agency on behalf of the owner, and yet because the owner remembered about the consecrated object, the agent is liable. This is what the mishna is referring to when it says that these <i>halakhot</i> are like mountains suspended by a hair.
  Rav Ashi said: And what is the logical difficulty with this <i>halakha</i>? Perhaps this is just as it is with regard to one who spends consecrated money for non-sacred purposes. Although this individual did not know that the money was consecrated, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering. Here too, once the owner canceled the agency upon realizing the money was consecrated, the agent unwittingly misused consecrated property, and therefore he is liable.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: The mishna is necessary only for that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 19b): If one picked up a consecrated stone or beam, he has not misused consecrated property merely by this action. However, if he gave it to another, he has misused consecrated property and the other person has not misused consecrated property. The Gemara analyzes this case: Since he picked it up, what difference is there to me if he keeps it, and what difference is there to me if he gives it to another? What is the basis for the distinction between the two cases? Rather, this is the case the mishna is referring to when it says that these <i>halakhot</i> are like mountains suspended by a hair.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty. What is the logical difficulty with this <i>halakha</i>? Perhaps it should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Here, this mishna is not referring to an ordinary person who picked up a consecrated stone for himself.
  
  Daf 11a
  
  Rather, we are dealing with the treasurer of the Temple, to whom the consecrated building stones were transferred for safekeeping. The reason for the exemption is that anywhere that the stone is resting, it is considered to be resting within his domain. Consequently, he is not liable for picking up the stone or beam, as he is permitted to carry it. However, he does not have permission to give it to someone else, and therefore when he hands it over to someone else he has misused consecrated property. If so, this <i>halakha</i> is also perfectly logical and should not be considered like mountains suspended by a hair.
  Rather, the comparison of these <i>halakhot</i> to mountains suspended by a hair is based on the latter clause of that same mishna: If he built the stone into his house, he has not misused consecrated property until he dwells under it an amount of time that is worth a <i>peruta</i>. Since he has changed the stone by incorporating it into his house, what difference is there to me if he dwelt there, and what difference is there to me if he did not dwell there? Apparently, this is the <i>halakha</i> considered like mountains suspended by a hair.
  The Gemara rejects this claim. And what is the logical difficulty with this <i>halakha</i>? Perhaps it is stated in accordance with the opinion of Rav. As Rav said: This mishna is referring to a case where he placed the stone over a window, but he did not make any adjustment to the stone itself. If he dwelt in the house, yes, he has misused consecrated property, as he derived benefit from it. If he did not dwell in it, no, he has not misused consecrated property, as he gained no benefit from the stone.
  Rather, the reason is actually in accordance with the aforementioned opinion of Rava, who holds that the innovative element of this <i>halakha</i> involves a case where the homeowner remembered, which caused the agent to misuse consecrated property. And with regard to that which posed a difficulty for you, i.e., that the <i>halakha</i> here should be just as it is with regard to one who spends consecrated money for non-sacred purposes, the two cases are not identical. There, in the case that Rava mentioned, the agent knew that he also had consecrated coins and therefore he should have examined carefully whether this money was consecrated. Here, did the agent know that there was a possibility that the money was consecrated? This is why this <i>halakha</i> is like mountains suspended by a hair.
  § The mishna explained that those matters that are like mountains suspended by a hair have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their <i>halakhot</i> are numerous. A Sage taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: The <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy and the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity imparted by tents in which a corpse lies have little in the Torah and their <i>halakhot</i> are numerous. The Gemara asks: With regard to leprosy, is there little about their <i>halakhot</i> in the Torah? Leprosy is something about which there are numerous details stated in the Torah (see Leviticus, chapters 13–14). Rav Pappa said that this is what the mishna is saying: Leprosy has numerous details in the Torah but relatively few <i>halakhot</i>. In contrast, the case of ritual impurity imparted by tents has little in the Torah but numerous <i>halakhot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the practical difference whether there are numerous or few references to a particular <i>halakha</i> in the Torah? The Gemara answers: If you are uncertain about a matter with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy, delve into the verses, as it is treated extensively there. And if you are uncertain about a matter with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of the ritual impurity imparted by tents, delve into the Mishna, as these <i>halakhot</i> are not sufficiently explicated in the Torah.
  § The mishna taught that monetary law is one of those matters that have something to support them in the Torah. The Gemara asks: Monetary laws are written in the Torah; why does the mishna merely say it has something to support it? The Gemara answers: This is necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: “But if any harm follow, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23). This verse is referring to a payment of money. Do you say money, or perhaps it is solely an actual life that is demanded? The term giving is stated below: “You shall give life for life,” and giving is stated above, in the previous verse: “And he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, the giving is in the form of money, so too here, it is referring to a payment of money. Although this <i>halakha</i> is not explicit in the Torah, the verses lend support to it.
  § The mishna stated that the <i>halakhot</i> of sacrificial rites have something to support them. The Gemara asks: Sacrificial rites are written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state that sacrificial rites have merely something to support them only with regard to the rite of carrying the blood to the altar. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall offer the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); this is referring to collecting the blood, which is the stage before carrying the blood to the altar.
  And the Merciful One expressed collecting the blood in the language of carrying, i.e., by means of the term offer. As it is written: “And the priest shall offer the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13). And the Master said that this term, “offer,” is not referring to sacrificing on the altar, as that is expressed by the phrase: “Make it smoke upon the altar.” Rather, this is referring to carrying the limbs to the ramp next to the altar, from where it is placed on the altar itself.
  Evidently, the Torah is referring to collecting the blood with the same terminology it used when referring to carrying. That is to say that carrying should not be excluded from the category of collecting. In other words, all the <i>halakhot</i> that pertain to collecting the blood of offerings, e.g., that it must be performed by a priest with his right hand, apply equally to carrying the blood.
  § The mishna further taught that the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity have something to support them. The Gemara again asks: But ritual purity is written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: The observation that the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity merely have something to support them is necessary only for the minimum measure of a ritual bath, which is not written explicitly in the Torah. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And he shall bathe his flesh in water” (Leviticus 14:9). This means in the water of a ritual bath. And it is stated: “And he shall wash all his flesh in water” (Leviticus 15:16), which indicates that it must contain water in which his whole body can enter. And how much water is this? One cubit by one cubit with a height of three cubits. And the Sages estimated that the measure for ritual bath water is forty <i>se’a</i>.
  § The mishna stated that the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity also have something to support them. Once again the Gemara asks: Ritual impurity is written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: This is necessary only with regard to the size of a lentil-bulk from a creeping animal, which is not written. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a verse that deals with creeping animals: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31).
  One might have thought that only someone who touches an entire, whole creeping animal becomes ritually impure. The verse states: “And upon whatever any of them falls, when they are dead, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). “Of them” indicates that this <i>halakha</i> applies even if one comes into contact with a part of them. One might have thought that even some of them suffices to impart impurity. The verse states: “Them,” i.e., all of them. This conclusion apparently contradicts the first ruling.
  How can this apparent contradiction be resolved? One does not become impure until he touches some of it that is like the whole, i.e., a significant amount. And the Sages estimated this measure as the size of a lentil-bulk. The reason is that in its early stages, the <i>ḥomet</i>, the smallest of these creeping animals, is the size of a lentil-bulk. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The size of a lentil-bulk is that of a lizard’s tail, which is considered a part that is like the whole. The tail of a lizard can be cut off easily, and as it continues to twitch even after it has been cut off, it has the appearance of life. Consequently, it is fitting to label it as a part that is like the whole.
  § The mishna further taught that the <i>halakhot</i> of those with whom relations are forbidden have something to support them. The Gemara asks: The <i>halakhot</i> of those with whom relations are forbidden are written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: This is necessary only
  
  Daf 11b
  
  with regard to his daughter born from the woman he raped, which is not written explicitly in the Torah. It is forbidden for this man to have sexual relations with this daughter, despite the fact that she is not the daughter of his wife, as he did not marry her mother.
  As Rava said: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to me that this <i>halakha</i> is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term they [<i>hena</i>], an unusual form of this word, written in one context, and the same term, they, written elsewhere. As it is written: “The nakedness of a woman and her daughter…you shall not take…they [<i>hena</i>] are near kinswomen; it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). And it is written: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness you shall not uncover; for they [<i>hena</i>] are your own nakedness” (Leviticus 18:10). This indicates that every daughter, even from the rape of a woman who is not one’s wife, is forbidden, just like one’s daughter from his wife.
  Furthermore, the punishment for this transgression is derived from a verbal analogy between: “It is lewdness [<i>zima</i>]” (Leviticus 18:17), which is written with regard to a woman and her daughter, and the same term “lewdness” that appears elsewhere, as it is stated: “And if a man take with his wife also her mother, it is lewdness [<i>zima</i>]: They shall be burnt with fire, both he and they” (Leviticus 20:14).
  § The mishna taught: These [<i>hen hen</i>] are the essential parts of the Torah. The Gemara asks: These, the topics mentioned in the mishna, which are not written explicitly but for which there is ample basis in the Torah, yes, they are the essential parts of Torah, whereas those other categories listed in the mishna that are written explicitly, no, they are not essential? Rather, one must say that both these and those [<i>hen vehen</i>] are the essential parts of the Torah. Every part of the Torah is essential, whether or not it is written explicitly.
  We shall return to you, [chapter of] "All of obligated..."
  MISHNA: One may not expound the topic of forbidden sexual relations before three or more individuals; nor may one expound the act of Creation and the secrets of the beginning of the world before two or more individuals; nor may one expound by oneself the Design of the Divine Chariot, a mystical teaching with regard to the ways God conducts the world, unless he is wise and understands most matters on his own.
  The mishna continues in the same vein: Whoever looks at four matters, it would have been better for him had he never entered the world: Anyone who reflects upon what is above the firmament and what is below the earth, what was before Creation, and what will be after the end of the world. And anyone who has no concern for the honor of his Maker, who inquires into and deals with matters not permitted to him, deserves to have never come to the world.
  GEMARA: The Gemara poses a question: You said in the first clause of the mishna: Nor may one expound the Design of the Divine Chariot by oneself, which indicates that the topic may not be learned at all, and yet you subsequently said: Unless he is wise and understands most things on his own, which indicates that an individual is permitted to study the Design of the Divine Chariot.
  The Gemara explains: This is what the mishna is saying: One may not expound the topic of forbidden sexual relations before three students, nor the act of Creation before two, nor may one teach the Divine Chariot to one, unless that student was wise and understands on his own.
  § The Gemara continues to clarify the mishna, which reads: One may not expound the topic of forbidden sexual relations before three individuals. What is the reason for this? If we say it is because it is written: “None of you [<i>ish</i>, <i>ish</i>] shall approach any near of kin to uncover their nakedness” (Leviticus 18:6). <i>Ish</i>, <i>ish</i>, literally means: Man, man. It is understood as an allusion to the number of students permitted to study the topic. This is as it is explained immediately: “Man, man” equals two; “any near of kin to him” is one; and the Merciful One states: “You shall not approach to uncover their nakedness,” which indicates that one may not expound the <i>halakhot</i> of forbidden sexual relations in the presence of three individuals.
  They ask: If that is so, then what of this verse: “Any man [<i>ish</i>, <i>ish</i>] who curses his God” (Leviticus 24:15), or “Any man [<i>ish</i>, <i>ish</i>] who gives of his seed to the <i>Molekh</i>” (Leviticus 20:2), which is a form of idol worship? In both cases the double expression implies the number two. So too there, will you say that it is prohibited to teach these <i>halakhot</i> before two individuals?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, those instances of the double expression: Man, man, are required for him, the <i>tanna</i>, in order to include gentiles, who are commanded with regard to blessing, a euphemism for cursing, God, and with regard to idol worship just as Jews are commanded.
  But if so, this mention of “man, man” in the case of forbidden relations is also required for him to include gentiles, who are commanded with regard to forbidden sexual relations, as Jews are.
  Rather, the Gemara rejects the previous explanation, and suggests that the prohibition against teaching three is derived from the following verse stated with regard to forbidden sexual relations: “And you shall observe My charge” (Leviticus 18:30), which is explained as follows: “And you shall observe [<i>ushmartem</i>],” in the plural, indicates at least two; “My charge” is one; and the Merciful One states at the conclusion of this verse: “That you do not perform any of these abominable customs” (Leviticus 18:30), indicating that this topic may not be taught to three.
  The Gemara asks: However, if that is so, then what of that which is written: “And you shall observe the Shabbat” (Exodus 31:14), and “And you shall observe the festival of <i>matzot</i>” (Exodus 12:17), and “And you shall observe the charge of the sacred things” (Numbers 18:5); so too, will you say that none of these subjects may be taught to three?
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: These scriptural allusions are all unacceptable. What is the meaning of: One may not expound the topic of forbidden sexual relations before three? It means: One may not expound the concealed laws of forbidden sexual relations before three. The prohibition against teaching before three applies to <i>halakhot</i> of forbidden sexual relations that are not explicitly stated in the Torah but are derived by expounding the verses or through analogy.
  What is the reason? It is due not to a biblical allusion, but rather it is based on logical reasoning: When two students sit before their teacher, one of them is typically involved in a discussion of <i>halakha</i> with his teacher, while the other lends his ear to listen to the teaching. However, if there are three students, one of them is involved in a discussion with his teacher while the other two are engaged in a discussion with one another, and they do not know what their teacher is saying, and may come to render permitted a forbidden relation by following their own reasoning rather than the explanation provided by their teacher.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, the entire Torah should likewise be taught only to two individuals, to prevent similar errors.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> of forbidden sexual relations is different, for the Master said: Robbery and forbidden sexual relations are sins that one’s soul covets and lusts after. Therefore, we are concerned that one who has not properly studied these matters with his teacher will rule leniently for himself.
  The Gemara asks: If so, robbery should also not be taught to more than two, for this very reason. The Gemara responds: There is a difference between the lust for forbidden sexual relations and the lust for robbery. In the case of those with whom relations are forbidden, his evil inclination is strong whether or not the objects of desire are before him. With regard to robbery, however, if the object presents a direct temptation before him his inclination is strong, but when it is not before him his inclination is not strong, and we are therefore less concerned.
  § It is taught in the mishna: “Nor the act of Creation before two.” The Gemara poses a question: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara explains: As the Sages taught that the verse states: “For ask now of the days past, which were before you” (Deuteronomy 4:32); since this verse is stated in the singular, it teaches that an individual may ask questions with regard to Creation, i.e., “the days past,” but two may not ask, which indicates that one may teach such matters to only one student.
  One might have thought that a person may ask questions with regard to matters preceding the creation of the world. Therefore, the continuation of the verse states: “Since the day that God created man upon the earth,” but not earlier.
  One might have thought that a person may not ask questions with regard to matters that occurred during the six days of Creation before the creation of man. Therefore, the verse states: “For ask now of the days past, which were before you,” indicating that one may inquire about the days preceding the creation of man.
  One might have thought that a person may ask questions with regard to what is above, what is below, what was before, and what is after the world. Therefore, the same verse states: “From one end of the heavens to the other” (Deuteronomy 4:32), which is explained as follows: With regard to that which is from one end of the heavens to the other, within the boundaries of the world, you may ask, but you may not ask what is above, what is below, what was before, or what is after.
  
  Daf 12a
  
  The Gemara poses a question: Now that it is derived from the phrase “from one end of the heavens to the other,” why do I need the phrase “since the day that God created man upon the earth”?
  The Gemara answers that this phrase teaches us something else, according to Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar said: The height of Adam the first man reached from the ground to the skies, as it is stated: “Since the day that God created man upon the earth, and from one end of the heavens” (Deuteronomy 4:32). When he sinned, the Holy One, Blessed be He, placed His hand upon him and diminished him, as it is stated: “You fashioned me behind and before, and laid Your hand upon me” (Psalms 139:5).
  Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The size of Adam the first man was from one end of the world to the other, as it is stated: “Since the day that God created man upon the earth, and from one end of the heavens to the other,” which indicates that he spanned the entire length of the world. Once he sinned, the Holy One, Blessed be He, placed His hand upon him and diminished him, as it states: “And laid Your hand upon me.”
  The Gemara asks: If so, the two parts of the verse contradict each other, since one indicates that his height reached the heavens while the other says it reached the end of the earth. The Gemara answers: Both this and that are one, the same, measure.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss Creation: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Ten things were created on the first day of Creation, and they are as follows: Heaven and earth; <i>tohu</i> and <i>vohu</i>, i.e., unformed and void; light and darkness; wind and water; the length of day and the length of night.
  All of these are derived from the Torah: Heaven and earth, as it is written: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth” (Genesis 1:1). <i>Tohu</i> and <i>vohu</i>, as it is written: “And the earth was unformed and void [<i>tohu vavohu</i>]” (Genesis 1:2). Light and darkness; darkness, as it is written: “And darkness was upon the face of the deep” (Genesis 1:2); light, as it is written: “And God said: Let there be light” (Genesis 1:3). Wind and water, as it is written: “And the wind of God hovered over the face of the waters” (Genesis 1:2). The length of day and the length of night, as it is written: “And there was evening, and there was morning, one day” (Genesis 1:5).
  It was taught in the <i>Tosefta</i>: <i>Tohu</i> is a green line that encompasses the entire world, and from which darkness emerges, as it is stated: “He made darkness His hiding place round about Him” (Psalms 18:12), indicating that a line of darkness surrounds the world. <i>Vohu</i>; these are damp stones submerged in the depths, from which water emerges, as it is stated: “And He shall stretch over it the line of <i>tohu</i> and stones of <i>vohu</i>” (Isaiah 34:11), which demonstrates that <i>tohu</i> is a line and that <i>vohu</i> is referring to stones.
  The Gemara poses a question: And was light created on the first day? But isn’t it written: “And God set them in the firmament of the heaven” (Genesis 1:17), and it is also written: “And there was evening, and there was morning, a fourth day” (Genesis 1:19), indicating that light was created on the fourth day.
  The Gemara answers: This should be understood in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: The light that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created on the first day was not that of the sun but a different kind of light, through which man could observe from one end of the world to the other. But when the Holy One, Blessed be He, looked upon the generation of the Flood and the generation of the Dispersion and saw that their ways were corrupt and that they might misuse this light for evil, He arose and concealed it from them, as it is stated: “And from the wicked their light is withheld” (Job 38:15).
  And for whom did He conceal it? For the righteous people in the future, as it is stated: “And God saw the light, that it was good” (Genesis 1:4), and “good” is referring to none other than the righteous, as it is stated: “Say of the righteous that it shall be good for them, for they shall eat the fruit of their actions” (Isaiah 3:10).
  When the light saw that it had been concealed for the righteous, it rejoiced, as it is stated: “The light for the righteous shall rejoice” (Proverbs 13:9).
  The Gemara comments: This is like a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>: The light that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created on the first day was so profound that man could observe through it from one end of the world to the other; this is the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov. And the Rabbis say: This light is the very same as the lights created on the first day, but they were not suspended in their designated places in the firmament until the fourth day.
  § Rav Zutra bar Tuvya said that Rav said: The world was created through ten attributes: Through wisdom, through understanding, through knowledge, through strength, through rebuke, through might, through righteousness, through justice, through kindness, and through mercy.
  Scriptural proof is provided for this statement as follows: It was created through wisdom and through understanding, as it is written: “The Lord founded earth with wisdom, and established the heavens with understanding” (Proverbs 3:19); through knowledge, as it is written: “With His knowledge the depths were broken up” (Proverbs 3:20); through strength and through might, as it is written: “Who by Your strength sets fast the mountains, who is girded about with might” (Psalms 65:7); through rebuke, as it is written: “The pillars of heaven tremble and are astonished at His rebuke” (Job 26:11); through righteousness and justice, as it is written: “Righteousness and justice are the foundation of Your throne” (Psalms 89:15); through kindness and mercy, as it is written: “Remember Your mercies, O Lord, and Your kindnesses, for they are from times of old” (Psalms 25:6).
  And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, with regard to the same matter: When the Holy One, Blessed be He, created the world, it continued to expand like two balls of a warp, whose cord lengthens as they unravel, until the Holy One, Blessed be He, rebuked it and made it stand still, as it is stated: “The pillars of heaven tremble and are astonished at His rebuke” (Job 26:11). And this is the same as that which Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I am the Almighty God [<i>El Shaddai</i>]” (Genesis 17:1)? It means: I am He Who said to the world “enough [dai],” instructing it to stop expanding. Similarly, Reish Lakish said: When the Holy One, Blessed be He, created the sea, it continued to expand until the Holy One, Blessed be He, rebuked it and made it dry, as it is stated: “He rebukes the sea and makes it dry, and desiccates all the rivers” (Nahum 1:4).
  § Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute the order of Creation, as the Sages taught: Beit Shammai say: The heavens were created first and afterward the earth was created, as it is stated: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth” (Genesis 1:1), which indicates that heaven came first. And Beit Hillel say: The earth was created first, and heaven after it, as it is stated: “On the day that the Lord God made earth and heaven” (Genesis 2:4).
  Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: According to your words, does a person build a second floor and build the first floor of the house afterward? As it is stated: “It is He Who builds His upper chambers in the heaven, and has founded His vault upon the earth” (Amos 9:6), indicating that the upper floor, heaven, was built above the earth. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: According to your words, does a person make a stool for his feet, and make a seat afterward? As it is stated: “So said the Lord: The heavens are My seat, and the earth My footstool” (Isaiah 66:1). But the Rabbis say: Both this and that were created as one, for it is stated: “Indeed, My hand has laid the foundation of the earth, and My right hand has spread out the heavens; when I call to them, they stand up together” (Isaiah 48:13), implying that they were created as one.
  The Gemara asks: And the others, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, what, in their opinion, is the meaning of “together”? The Gemara responds: It means that they do not separate from each other. In other words, the term “together” is referring not to the moment of their creation but to the manner of their positioning. The Gemara comments: In any case, the verses contradict each other, as heaven is sometimes mentioned first, while on other occasions earth is listed beforehand. Reish Lakish said: When they were created, He first created the heavens and afterward created the earth, but when He spread them out and fixed them in their places, He spread out the earth and afterward He spread out the heavens.
  Incidental to the above, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning and source of the word “heaven” [<i>shamayim</i>]? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: It is an acronym, <i>shesham mayim</i>, meaning: That water is there. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Shamayim</i> means <i>esh umayim</i>, fire and water, which teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, brought them both and combined them together, and made the firmament from them.
  § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Akiva a question when they were walking along the way. He said to him: You who served Naḥum of Gam Zu for twenty-two years, who would expound and learn that every appearance of the word <i>et</i> in the Torah is meant to teach something, what would he expound from the phrase: “The heaven and the earth” [<i>et hashamayim ve’et ha’aretz</i>] (Genesis 1:1)? He said to him: These words should be expounded as follows: Had it stated: In the beginning God created <i>hashamayim veha’aretz</i>, i.e., the heaven and the earth, without the word <i>et</i>, I would have said: <i>Shamayim</i> is the name of the Holy One, Blessed be He, and the same goes for <i>aretz</i>, and the verse would sound as if it meant that God, whose name is <i>Shamayim</i> and <i>Aretz</i>, created the world. Since it states “<i>et hashamayim ve’et ha’aretz</i>,” it is clear that these are created objects and that <i>shamayim</i> means the actual heaven and <i>aretz</i> is the actual earth. It is for this reason that the word <i>et</i> is necessary.
  
  Daf 12b
  
  Why do I need “and the earth” [<i>et ha’aretz</i>]? To teach that heaven preceded earth in the order of Creation. The next verse states: “And the earth was unformed and void” (Genesis 1:2). The Gemara asks: After all, the Bible began with heaven first; what is different about the second verse? Why does the Bible recount the creation of earth first in the second verse? The Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: This can be explained by a parable of a flesh-and-blood king who said to his servants: Rise early and come to my entrance. He arose and found women and men waiting for him. Whom does he praise? Those who are unaccustomed to rising early but yet rose early, the women. The same applies to the earth: Since it is a lowly, physical sphere, we would not have expected it to be created together with heaven. Therefore, it is fitting to discuss it at greater length.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: Woe to them, the creations, who see and know not what they see; who stand and know not upon what they stand. He clarifies: Upon what does the earth stand? Upon pillars, as it is stated: “Who shakes the earth out of its place, and its pillars tremble” (Job 9:6). These pillars are positioned upon water, as it is stated: “To Him Who spread forth the earth over the waters” (Psalms 136:6). These waters stand upon mountains, as it is stated: “The waters stood above the mountains” (Psalms 104:6). The mountains are upon the wind, as it is stated: “For behold He forms the mountains and creates the wind” (Amos 4:13). The wind is upon a storm, as it is stated: “Stormy wind, fulfilling His word” (Psalms 148:8). The storm hangs upon the arm of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “And underneath are the everlasting arms” (Deuteronomy 33:27), which demonstrates that the entire world rests upon the arms of the Holy One, Blessed be He.
  And the Rabbis say: The earth stands on twelve pillars, as it is stated: “He set the borders of the nations according to the number of the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 32:8). Just as the children of Israel, i.e., the sons of Jacob, are twelve in number, so does the world rest on twelve pillars. And some say: There are seven pillars, as it is stated: “She has hewn out her seven pillars” (Proverbs 9:1). Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says: The earth rests on one pillar and a righteous person is its name, as it is stated: “But a righteous person is the foundation of the world” (Proverbs 10:25).
  § Rabbi Yehuda said: There are two firmaments, as it is stated: “Behold, to the Lord your God belongs the heaven and the heaven of heavens” (Deuteronomy 10:14), indicating that there is a heaven above our heaven.
  Reish Lakish said: There are seven firmaments, and they are as follows: <i>Vilon</i>, <i>Rakia</i>, <i>Sheḥakim</i>, <i>Zevul</i>, <i>Ma’on</i>, <i>Makhon</i>, and <i>Aravot</i>. The Gemara proceeds to explain the role of each firmament: <i>Vilon</i>, curtain, is the firmament that does not contain anything, but enters at morning and departs in the evening, and renews the act of Creation daily, as it is stated: “Who stretches out the heavens as a curtain [<i>Vilon</i>], and spreads them out as a tent to dwell in” (Isaiah 40:22). <i>Rakia</i>, firmament, is the one in which the sun, moon, stars, and zodiac signs are fixed, as it is stated: “And God set them in the firmament [<i>Rakia</i>] of the heaven” (Genesis 1:17). <i>Sheḥakim</i>, heights, is the one in which mills stand and grind manna for the righteous, as it is stated: “And He commanded the heights [<i>Shehakim</i>] above, and opened the doors of heaven; and He caused manna to rain upon them for food, and gave them of the corn of heaven” (Psalms 78:23–24).
  <i>Zevul</i>, abode, is the location of the heavenly Jerusalem and the heavenly Temple, and there the heavenly altar is built, and the angel Michael, the great minister, stands and sacrifices an offering upon it, as it is stated: “I have surely built a house of <i>Zevul</i> for You, a place for You to dwell forever” (I Kings 8:13). And from where do we derive that <i>Zevul</i> is called heaven? As it is written: “Look down from heaven and see, from Your holy and glorious abode [<i>Zevul</i>]” (Isaiah 63:15).
  <i>Ma’on</i>, habitation, is where there are groups of ministering angels who recite song at night and are silent during the day out of respect for Israel, in order not to compete with their songs, as it is stated: “By day the Lord will command His kindness, and in the night His song is with me” (Psalms 42:9), indicating that the song of the angels is with God only at night.
  With regard to the aforementioned verse, Reish Lakish said: Whoever occupies himself with Torah at night, the Holy One, Blessed be He, extends a thread of kindness over him by day, as it is stated: “By day, the Lord will command His kindness,” and what is the reason that “by day, the Lord will command His kindness”? Because “and in the night His song,” i.e., the song of Torah, “is with me.” And some say that Reish Lakish said: Whoever occupies himself with Torah in this world, which is comparable to night, the Holy One, Blessed be He, extends a thread of kindness over him in the World-to-Come, which is comparable to day, as it is stated: “By day, the Lord will command His kindness, and in the night His song is with me.”
  With regard to the same matter, Rabbi Levi said: Anyone who pauses from words of Torah to occupy himself with mundane conversation will be fed with the coals of the broom tree, as it is stated: “They pluck saltwort [<i>maluaḥ</i>] with wormwood [<i>alei siaḥ</i>], and the roots of the broom tree [<i>retamim</i>] are their food” (Job 30:4). The exposition is as follows: Those who pluck, i.e., pause, from learning Torah, which was given upon two tablets, <i>luḥot</i>, which sounds similar to <i>maluaḥ</i>, for the purpose of <i>siaḥ</i>, idle chatter, are punished by having to eat coals made from “the roots of the broom tree.” And from where do we derive that <i>Ma’on</i> is called heaven? As it is stated: “Look forth from Your holy <i>Ma’on</i>, from heaven” (Deuteronomy 26:15).
  <i>Makhon</i>, dwelling place, is where there are storehouses of snow and storehouses of hail, and the upper chamber of harmful dews, and the upper chamber of drops, and the room of tempests and storms, and the cave of mist. And the doors of all these are made of fire. How do we know that there are storehouses for evil things? For it is stated: “The Lord will open for you His good storehouse, the heavens” (Deuteronomy 28:12), which indicates the existence of a storehouse that contains the opposite of good.
  The Gemara asks a question: With regard to these things listed above, are they located in heaven? It is obvious that they are located on the earth. As it is written: “Praise the Lord from the earth, sea monsters and all depths, fire and hail, snow and mist, stormy wind, fulfilling His word” (Psalms 148:7–8). The verse seems to indicate that all these things are found on the earth. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: David requested mercy with regard to them, that they should not remain in heaven, and He brought them down to earth. He said before Him: Master of the Universe, “You are not a God that has pleasure in wickedness, evil shall not sojourn with You” (Psalms 5:5). In other words, You are righteous, O Lord. Nothing evil should sojourn in Your vicinity. Rather, it is better that they remain close to us. And from where do we derive that this place is called “heaven”? As it is written: “And You shall hear in heaven, the <i>Makhon</i> of Your dwelling” (I Kings 8:39).
  <i>Aravot</i>, skies, is the firmament that contains righteousness; justice; righteousness, i.e., charity; the treasuries of life; the treasuries of peace; the treasuries of blessing; the souls of the righteous; the spirits and souls that are to be created; and the dew that the Holy One, Blessed be He, will use to revive the dead. The Gemara proves this statement: Righteousness and justice are found in heaven, as it is written: “Righteousness and justice are the foundation of Your throne” (Psalms 89:15); righteousness, as it is written: “And He donned righteousness as armor” (Isaiah 59:17); the treasuries of life, as it is written: “For with You is the source of life” (Psalms 36:10). And the treasuries of peace are found in heaven, as it is written: “And he called Him the Lord of peace” (Judges 6:24), implying that peace is God’s name and is therefore found close to Him. And the treasuries of blessing, as it is written: “He shall receive a blessing from the Lord” (Psalms 24:5).
  The souls of the righteous are found in heaven, as it is written: “And the soul of my master shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord, your God” (I Samuel 25:29). Spirits and souls that are to be created are found there, as it is written: “For the spirit that enwraps itself is from Me, and the souls that I have made” (Isaiah 57:16), which indicates that the spirit to be released into the world, wrapped around a body, is located close to God. The dew that the Holy One, Blessed be He, will use to revive the dead is found in heaven, as it is written: “A bountiful rain You will pour down, God; when Your inheritance was weary, You confirmed it” (Psalms 68:10).
  There, in the firmaments, are the <i>ofanim</i>, the seraphim, the holy divine creatures, and the ministering angels, and the Throne of Glory. The King, God, the living, lofty, exalted One dwells above them in <i>Aravot</i>, as it is stated: “Extol Him Who rides upon the skies [<i>Aravot</i>], Whose name is God” (Psalms 68:5). And from where do we derive that <i>Aravot</i> is called “heaven”? This is learned by using a verbal analogy between two instances of “rides” and “rides”: Here, it is written: “Extol Him Who rides upon the skies [<i>Aravot</i>],” and there, it is written: “Who rides upon the heaven as your help” (Deuteronomy 33:26).
  And darkness and clouds and fog surround Him, as it is stated: “He made darkness His hiding place, His pavilion round about Him; darkness of waters, thick clouds of the skies” (Psalms 18:12). The Gemara asks: And is there darkness before Heaven, i.e., before God? But isn’t it written: “He reveals deep and secret things, He knows what is in the darkness, and the light dwells with Him” (Daniel 2:22), demonstrating that only light, not darkness, is found with God? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This verse, which states that only light dwells with Him, is referring
  
  Daf 13a
  
  to the inner houses, where there is only light; that source, according to which He is surrounded by darkness, is referring to the outer houses. And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: There is one more firmament above these, which is above the heads of the divine creatures, as it is written: “And over the heads of the divine creatures there was the likeness of a firmament, like the color of the terrible ice” (Ezekiel 1:22).
  The Gemara comments: Until here, you have permission to speak; from this point forward you do not have permission to speak, as it is written in the book of Ben Sira: Seek not things concealed from you, nor search those hidden from you. Reflect on that which is permitted to you; you have no business with secret matters. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said: What response did the Divine Voice provide to that wicked man, Nebuchadnezzar, when he said: “I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High” (Isaiah 14:14), thereby intending to rise to heaven? A Divine Voice came and said to him: Wicked man, son of a wicked man, descendant, i.e., follower of the ways, of Nimrod the wicked, who caused the entire world to rebel against Him during the time of his reign.
  How many are the years of man? Seventy years, as it is stated: “The span of our life is seventy years, or if we are strong, eighty years” (Psalms 90:10). Now is there not from the earth to the firmament a walking distance of five hundred years, and the thickness of the firmament itself is a walking distance of five hundred years, and a similar distance exists between each and every one of the firmaments?
  And above them, above all the firmaments, are the divine creatures. The feet of the divine creatures correspond in distance to all the firmaments; the ankles of the animals correspond to all of them, the shins of the animals correspond to all of them, the knees of the animals correspond to all of them, the thighs of the animals correspond to all of them, the bodies of the animals correspond to all of them, the necks of the animals correspond to all of them, the heads of the animals correspond to all of them, and the horns of the animals correspond to all of them. Above them is the Throne of Glory: The feet of the Throne of Glory correspond to all of them, the Throne of Glory corresponds to all of them, and the living, almighty, lofty, exalted King dwells above them. And you, Nebuchadnezzar, say: “I will ascend above the heights of the clouds; I will be like the Most High” (Isaiah 14:15), but the next verse states: “Yet you shall be brought down to the netherworld, to the uttermost parts of the pit” (Isaiah 14:15).
  § It is taught in the mishna, according to the Gemara’s explanation: Nor may one expound the Design of the Divine Chariot to an individual. Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: But one may transmit to him, an individual, the outlines of this topic, leaving him to comprehend the rest on his own. Rabbi Zeira said: One may transmit the outlines of the Design of the Divine Chariot only to the president of the court, who needs to know them due to his wisdom and meritorious deeds, and to anyone whose heart inside him is concerned, i.e., one who is concerned about his sins and desires to achieve full repentance. There are those who say that this does not refer to two separate individuals, but to the president of the court, whose heart inside him is concerned.
  Rabbi Ami said: The secrets of the Torah may be transmitted only to one who possesses the following five characteristics: “The captain of fifty, and the man of favor, and the counselor, and the cunning charmer, and the skillful enchanter” (Isaiah 3:3). And Rabbi Ami said further: The words of Torah may not be transmitted to a gentile, as it is stated: “He has not dealt so with any nation, and as for His ordinances, they have not known them” (Psalms 147:20).
  § The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Elazar: Come and I will teach you the Design of the Divine Chariot. Rabbi Elazar said to him: I have not yet aged sufficiently, as one must be very settled in one’s mind for these studies. When he grew old, Rabbi Yoḥanan had already passed away. Rabbi Asi said to him: Come and I will teach you the Design of the Divine Chariot. He said to him: Had I merited, I would have learned it from Rabbi Yoḥanan, your teacher. It therefore appears that I am unworthy of studying it.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef would study the Design of the Divine Chariot and was familiar with the subject, whereas the Elders of Pumbedita would study the act of Creation. They said to Rav Yosef: Let the Master teach us the Design of the Divine Chariot. He said to them: You teach me the act of Creation. After they taught him that subject, they said to him: Let the Master teach us the Design of the Divine Chariot. He said to them: We learned with regard to them the secrets of the Torah: “Honey and milk are under your tongue” (Song of Songs 4:11), meaning that matters that are sweeter than honey and milk should remain under your tongue. In other words, one should not speak of such matters, and anyone who is familiar with them may not reveal them to others.
  Rabbi Abbahu said: It is derived from here, from the following verse: “The lambs [<i>kevasim</i>] will be for your clothing” (Proverbs 27:26), which he expounds as though it were written with the letter <i>shin</i>, <i>kevashim</i>, meaning concealed matters: Things that constitute the concealed matters of the world should be under your clothing; you should not reveal them. When the Elders of Pumbedita saw that Rav Yosef was not going to teach them, they said to him: We have learned them, the verses concerning the Design of the Divine Chariot written in the book of Ezekiel, up to the verse “And He said to me, son of man” (Ezekiel 2:1). He said to them: If so, these verses are the very essence of the Design of the Divine Chariot, as they provide the main details of the topic.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this from a <i>baraita</i>: Until where is the Design of the Divine Chariot related? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Until the latter “And I saw” (Ezekiel 1:27), not including the last verse. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Until the word “the electrum” (Ezekiel 1:27). Neither of these opinions accord with Rav Yosef’s opinion that the Design of the Divine Chariot continues until the end of the chapter. The Gemara answers: Until “And I saw,” we teach those worthy of it; from this point forward, we transmit only the outlines. There are those who say: Until “And I saw,” we transmit the outlines; from this point forward, if he is wise and can understand of his own accord, yes, we teach him. If not, we do not teach him even the outlines.
  The Gemara poses a question: And may one teach about the electrum of the Design of the Divine Chariot at all? But wasn’t there a certain youth who expounded the electrum, and fire came out and consumed him, showing that such study is highly dangerous? The Gemara answers: That youth was different, for his time to study such matters had not yet arrived. Therefore, he was punished.
  Rav Yehuda said: Indeed, that man is remembered for good, and Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya was his name, because were it not for him, the book of Ezekiel would have been suppressed. Why did they wish to suppress it? Because they found that its words contradicted the words of Torah, as its later chapters contain many <i>halakhot</i> that appear not to accord with those of the Torah. What did he do? They brought up to him three hundred barrels of oil, for light and sustenance, and he sat in an upper chamber and expounded it, to reconcile its teachings with those of the Torah.
  The Sages taught: An incident occurred involving a youth who was reading the book of Ezekiel in the house of his teacher, and he was able to comprehend the electrum, and fire came out of the electrum and burned him. And they sought to suppress the book of Ezekiel due to the danger it posed. Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya said to them: If this youth happened to be wise, are all people wise enough to understand this book?
  The Gemara asks: What is the electrum? Rav Yehuda said:
  
  Daf 13b
  
  It refers to speaking animals of fire. Electrum [<i>ḥashmal</i>] is an acrostic of this phrase [<i>ḥayyot esh memallelot</i>]. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At times they are silent; at times they speak. When the divine speech emerges from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, they are silent; and when the divine speech does not emerge from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, they speak.
  § The verse states: “And the divine creatures ran and returned like the appearance of a flash of lightning [<i>bazak</i>]” (Ezekiel 1:14). What is the meaning of “ran and returned”? Rav Yehuda said: Like fire that is emitted from a furnace, whose flame is continuously bursting out and withdrawing. What is the meaning of “like the appearance of a flash of lightning”? Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: Like the fire that is emitted from between pieces of earthenware used for refining gold, as an additional meaning ascribed to the word <i>bazak</i> is shards of earthenware.
  The verse states: “And I looked and, behold, a stormy wind came out of the north, a great cloud, with a fire flashing up, so that a brightness was round about it; and out of its midst was like the color of electrum, out of the midst of the fire” (Ezekiel 1:4). The Gemara poses a question: Where did that wind go? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It went to conquer the entire world under the wicked Nebuchadnezzar. And why was all of this necessary? Why was it necessary that the entire world be subjected to his dominion? So that the nations of the world would not say: The Holy One, Blessed be He, delivered His children into the hands of a lowly nation. Since it was already decreed that the kingdom of Israel would fall into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, God made him into a great conqueror, so that Israel would not be ashamed of being defeated by him. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said with regard to this: Who caused Me to be an attendant to worshippers of molten images, forcing Me to wage their wars? It was the sins of Israel that led Me to do so.
  Another verse in the same chapter states: “Now as I beheld the divine creatures, behold, one wheel [<i>ofan</i>] was upon the earth near the divine creatures” (Ezekiel 1:15). Rabbi Elazar said: This wheel is a certain angel who stands on the earth and its head reaches the divine creatures. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This angel is named Sandalfon, who is taller than his colleague by a distance of five hundred years, and he stands behind the Divine Chariot and weaves crowns for his Maker. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Can crowns be woven for God? But isn’t it written: “Blessed be the Lord’s glory from His place” (Ezekiel 3:12), which proves by inference that no one knows His place? Therefore, how can crowns be woven for Him? Rather, it can be done by saying a name for the crown, and then the crown goes and sits on God’s head of its own accord.
  § Rava said: All that Ezekiel saw, the prophet Isaiah saw as well, but the latter did not find it necessary to describe his vision in such detail. To what may Ezekiel be compared? To a villager who saw the king and is excited by all the extravagances of the king’s palace and everything it contains, as he is unaccustomed to them. And to what may Isaiah be compared? To a city dweller who saw the king. Such an individual focuses on the encounter with the king, and is oblivious to all the distractions. Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I will sing to the Lord, for He is highly exalted” (Exodus 15:1)? It is fitting to sing to He Who is exalted above the exalted. As the Master said: The king of the beasts is the lion, the king of the domestic animals is the ox, the king of the birds is the eagle, and man is exalted and lords over them, but the Holy One, Blessed be He, is exalted above all of them and above the entire world, as the creatures that appear in the Divine Chariot are the ox, the lion, the eagle, and man.
  The Gemara poses a question with regard to the animals of the Divine Chariot: One verse states: “As for the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man; and the four had the face of a lion on the right side; and the four had the face of an ox on the left side” (Ezekiel 1:10). And it is also written: “And each one had four faces: The first face was the face of the cherub, and the second face was the face of a man, and the third the face of a lion, and the fourth the face of an eagle” (Ezekiel 10:14), but it does not include the face of an ox in this second list. Reish Lakish said: Ezekiel requested mercy with regard to it, i.e., the face of the ox, and had it turned into a cherub. He said before Him as follows: Master of the Universe. Shall an accuser [<i>kateigor</i>] become a defender [<i>saneigor</i>]? As the face of an ox recalls Israel’s sin of the Golden Calf, it would be preferable for there to be a different face on the Divine Chariot.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of “cherub”? Rabbi Abbahu said: Like a baby [<i>keravya</i>], for in Babylonia they call a baby <i>ravya</i>. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: However, if that is so, what is the meaning of that which is written: “The first face was the face of the cherub, and the second face was the face of a man, and the third the face of a lion, and the fourth the face of an eagle”? The face of a cherub is the same as the face of a man; what is the difference between them? He replied: The difference is that the face of a man is referring to a large face, whereas the face of a cherub means the small face of a baby.
  The Gemara asks another question: One verse states: “Each one had six wings; with two it covered its face and with two it covered its feet, and with two it flew” (Isaiah 6:2), and another verse states: “And every one had four faces, and every one of them had four wings” (Ezekiel 1:6). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as here, when the verse states they each had six wings, it is referring to the time when the Temple is standing, while there, where four wings are described, it is referring to the time when the Temple is not standing, for it is as if the number of the wings of the animals were diminished so that they now have only four.
  The Gemara asks: Which of the wings were diminished? Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said: Those with which they recite song. The proof is that it is written here: “And with two it flew [<i>yeofef</i> ]. And one called to the other and said” (Isaiah 6:2–3), and it is written: “Will you set [<i>hata’if</i> ] your eyes upon it? It is gone” (Proverbs 23:5), implying that the flight of these wings had ceased.
  And the Rabbis say that the wings they lost are those with which they cover their feet, for it is stated: “And their feet were straight feet” (Ezekiel 1:7). Now if these wings had not been diminished, how would he know what their feet looked like? Clearly their feet were no longer covered. The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof, for perhaps they were momentarily revealed, allowing him to see them. Because if you do not say so, that he saw them for a moment, then with regard to the verse: “And the likeness of their faces, they had the face of a man” (Ezekiel 1:10), so too will you say that these the wings covering their faces were diminished as well? Rather, it must be that they were revealed and he saw them. Here too, they were revealed and he saw them.
  The Gemara refutes this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, it is logical that his face was revealed, as it is proper conduct for an angel to reveal his face before his Master, and therefore it is possible that they would have revealed their faces at certain times; but with regard to his feet, it is not proper conduct to reveal them before his Master. Therefore, they must have lacked wings to cover their feet.
  § The Gemara continues to address apparent contradictions between verses concerning similar matters: One verse states: “A thousand thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him” (Daniel 7:10), and another verse states: “Is there a number to His troops?” (Job 25:3), implying that they are even more numerous than “ten thousand times ten thousand.” The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, for here, when they are without number, the verse is referring to the time when the Temple is standing; there, the other verse is referring to the time when the Temple is not standing, for it is as though the heavenly entourage [<i>pamalya</i>] were diminished.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says in the name of Abba Yosei ben Dosai: “A thousand thousands ministered to Him” is referring to the number of angels in a single troop, but with regard to the number of his troops, it can be said: “And to his troops, there is no number”. And Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: There is no contradiction, since with regard to the phrase “a thousand thousands ministered to Him,” the pronoun “Him” can be literally translated as: It, referring not to those who serve God Himself, but to those who administer to the River Dinur, as it is stated: “A fiery [<i>dinur</i>] river issued and came forth from before him; a thousand thousands ministered to it, and a myriad myriads stand before it” (Daniel 7:10). The ministers of God, however, are indeed too numerous to count.
  The Gemara asks: From where does this river flow? The Gemara answers: From the perspiration of the divine creatures. And where does it flow to? Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: Upon the heads of the wicked in Gehenna, as it is stated: “Behold, a storm of the Lord has gone forth in fury, a whirling storm; it shall whirl upon the head of the wicked” (Jeremiah 23:19). And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: The river flows over those who were snatched away, i.e., the generations that were never created, as it is stated: “Who were snatched away before their time, whose foundation was poured out as a stream” (Job 22:16), implying that the River Dinur flows over them. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon HeḤasid said in explanation of this verse: These people “who were snatched away” are those nine hundred and seventy-four generations that were snatched away; they were to have been created
  
  Daf 14a
  
  before the creation of the world, but they were not created. The Torah was supposed to have been given a thousand generations after the world was created, as it is written: “He commanded His word for a thousand generations” (Psalms 105:8), but God gave it earlier, after only twenty-six generations, so that nine-hundred and seventy-four generations should have been created but were not. The Holy One, Blessed be He, acted by planting a few of them in each and every generation, and they are the insolent ones of the generation, as they belonged to generations that should not have been created at all.
  And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the verse: “Who were snatched [<i>kumtu</i>]” (Job 22:16), is written for a blessing, as the verse is not referring to lowly, cursed people, but to the blessed. These are Torah scholars, who shrivel [<i>mekamtin</i>], i.e., humble, themselves over the words of Torah in this world. The Holy One, Blessed be He, reveals a secret to them in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Whose foundation [<i>yesodam</i>] was poured out as a stream” (Job 22:16), implying that He will provide them with an abundant knowledge of secret matters [<i>sod</i>].
  Shmuel said to Ḥiyya bar Rav: Son of great ones, come and I will tell you something of the great things that your father would say: Each and every day, ministering angels are created from the River Dinur, and they recite song to God and then immediately cease to exist, as it is stated: “They are new every morning; great is Your faithfulness” (Lamentations 3:23), indicating that new angels praise God each morning. The Gemara comments: And this opinion disagrees with that of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: With each and every word that emerges from the mouth of the Holy One, Blessed be He, an angel is created, as it is stated: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and by the breath of His mouth all their hosts” (Psalms 33:6). The hosts of heaven are the angels, who, he claims, are created from the mouth of God, rather than from the River Dinur.
  § The Gemara continues to reconcile verses that seem to contradict each other: One verse states: “His raiment was as white snow, and the hair of his head like pure white wool” (Daniel 7:9), and it is written: “His locks are curled, black as a raven” (Song of Songs 5:11). The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here the verse in Daniel is referring to when He is in the heavenly academy, while there the verse in Song of Songs speaks of when He is at war, for the Master said: There is no finer individual to study Torah in an academy than an old man, and there is no finer individual to wage war than a youth. A different metaphor is therefore used to describe God on each occasion.
  The Gemara poses another question: One verse states: “His throne was fiery flames” (Daniel 7:9), and another phrase in the same verse states: “Till thrones were placed, and one who was ancient of days sat,” implying the existence of two thrones. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. One throne is for Him and one is for David, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this issue: One throne for Him and one for David; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said to him: Akiva, how long shall you make the Divine Presence profane, by presenting it as though one could sit next to Him? Rather, the two thrones are designated for different purposes: One for judgment and one for righteousness.
  The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Akiva accept this rebuff from him, or did he not accept it from him? The Gemara offers a proof: Come and hear the following teaching of a different <i>baraita</i>: One throne is for judgment and one is for righteousness; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him: Akiva, what are you doing occupying yourself with the study of <i>aggada</i>? This is not your field of expertise. Take [<i>kelakh</i>] your words to the topics of plagues and tents. Meaning, it is preferable that you teach the <i>halakhot</i> of the impurity of leprosy and the impurity of the dead, which are within your field of expertise. Rather, with regard to the two thrones: One throne is for a seat and one is for a small seat. The seat is to sit on, and the small seat is for His footstool, as it is stated: “The heavens are My seat, and the earth My footstool” (Isaiah 66:1).
  § The Gemara stated earlier that one who studies the secrets of Torah must be “a captain of fifty and a man of favor” (Isaiah 3:3), but it did not explain the meaning of these requirements. It now returns to analyze that verse in detail. When Rav Dimi came from Israel to Babylonia, he said: Isaiah cursed Israel with eighteen curses, and his mind was not calmed, i.e., he was not satisfied, until he said to them the great curse of the following verse: “The child shall behave insolently against the aged, and the base against the honorable” (Isaiah 3:5).
  The Gemara asks: What are these eighteen curses? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “For behold, the Master, the Lord of hosts, shall take away from Jerusalem and from Judah support and staff, every support of bread, and every support of water; the mighty man, and the man of war; the judge, and the prophet, and the diviner, and the elder; the captain of fifty, and the man of favor, and the counselor, and the cunning charmer, and the skillful enchanter. And I will make children their princes, and babes shall rule over them” (Isaiah 3:1–4). The eighteen items listed in these verses shall be removed from Israel.
  The Gemara proceeds to clarify the homiletical meaning of these terms: “Support”; these are masters of the Bible. “Staff”; these are masters of Mishna, such as Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima and his colleagues. The Gemara interjects: Rav Pappa and the Rabbis disagreed with regard to this. One of them said: They were proficient in six hundred orders of Mishna, and the other one said: In seven hundred orders of Mishna, only six of which remain today.
  “Every support of bread”; these are masters of Talmud, as it is stated: “Come, eat of my bread, and drink of the wine that I have mingled” (Proverbs 9:5). “And every support of water”; these are the masters of <i>aggada</i>, who draw people’s hearts like water by means of <i>aggada</i>. “The mighty man”; this is the master of halakhic tradition, one who masters the <i>halakhot</i> transmitted to him from his rabbis. “And the man of war”; this is one who knows how to engage in the discourse of Torah, generating novel teachings in the war of Torah. “A judge”; this is a judge who judges a true judgment truthfully. “A prophet”; as it literally indicates. “A diviner”; this is a king. Why is he called a diviner? For it is stated: “A divine sentence is on the lips of the king” (Proverbs 16:10). “An elder”; this is one fit for the position of head of an academy.
  “A captain of fifty,” do not read it as “<i>sar ḥamishim</i>,” rather read it as “<i>sar ḥumashin</i>”; this is one who knows how to engage in discourse with regard to the five books of [<i>ḥamisha ḥumshei</i>] the Torah. Alternatively, “a captain of fifty” should be understood in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu, for Rabbi Abbahu said: From here we learn that one may not appoint a disseminator over the public to transmit words of Torah or teachings of the Sages if he is less than fifty years of age. “And the man of favor”; this is one for whose sake favor is shown to his generation. The Gemara provides different examples of this: Some garner favor above, such as Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa, whose prayers for his generation would invariably be answered. Others gain favor below, for example: Rabbi Abbahu, who would plead Israel’s case in the house of the emperor.
  “The counselor”; this is referring to one who knows how to intercalate years and determine months, due to his expertise in the phases of the moon and the calculation of the yearly cycle. “The cunning”; this is a student who makes his rabbis wise through his questions. “Charmer [<i>ḥarashim</i>]”; this is referring to one so wise that when he begins speaking matters of Torah, all those listening are as though deaf [<i>ḥershin</i>], as they are unable to comprehend the profundity of his comments. “The skillful”; this is one who understands something new from something else he has learned. “Enchanter [<i>laḥash</i>]”; this is referring to one who is worthy of having words of the Torah that were given in whispers [<i>laḥash</i>], i.e., the secrets of the Torah, transmitted to him.
  The Gemara continues to interpret this verse: “And I will make children their princes” (Isaiah 3:4). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of “And I will make children [<i>ne’arim</i>] their princes”? Rabbi Elazar said: These are people who are devoid [<i>menu’arin</i>] of mitzvot; such people will become the leaders of the nation.
  “And babes [<i>ta’alulim</i>] shall rule over them”; Rav Pappa bar Ya’akov said: <i>Ta’alulim</i> means foxes [<i>ta’alei</i>], sons of foxes. In other words, inferior people both in terms of deeds and in terms of lineage. And the prophet Isaiah’s mind was not calmed until he said to them: “The child shall behave insolently against the aged, and the base against the honorable” (Isaiah 3:5). “The child” [<i>na’ar</i>]; these are people who are devoid of mitzvot, who will behave insolently toward one who is as filled with mitzvot as a pomegranate. “And the base [<i>nikleh</i>] against the honorable [<i>nikhbad</i>]”; this means that one for whom major [<i>kaved</i>] transgressions are like minor ones [<i>kalot</i>] in his mind will come and behave insolently with one for whom even minor transgressions are like major ones in his mind.
  § The Gemara continues its explanation of the chapter in Isaiah. Rav Ketina said: Even at the time of Jerusalem’s downfall, trustworthy men did not cease to exist among its people, as it is stated: “For a man shall take hold of his brother of the house of his father, and say: You have a cloak, be our ruler” (Isaiah 3:6). The Gemara explains that they would approach someone and say to him: Things that people are careful to keep covered as with a cloak, i.e., words of Torah that are covered and concealed, are under your hand, as you are an expert with regard to them.
  What is the meaning of the end of that verse: “And this stumbling block” (Isaiah 3:6)? Things that people cannot grasp unless they have stumbled over them, as they can be understood only with much effort, are under your hand. Although they will approach an individual with these statements, he “shall swear that day, saying: I will not be a healer, for in my house there is neither bread nor a cloak; you shall not make me ruler of a people” (Isaiah 3:7). When the verse states: “Shall swear [<i>yissa</i>],” <i>yissa</i> is none other than an expression of an oath, as it is stated: “You shall not take [<i>tissa</i>] the name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exodus 20:6). Therefore, the inhabitant of Jerusalem swears: “I will not be a healer [<i>ḥovesh</i>]” (Isaiah 3:7), which means: I was never one of those who sit [<i>meḥovshei</i>] in the study hall; “for in my house there is neither bread nor a cloak,” as I possess knowledge of neither the Bible, nor Mishna, nor Gemara. This shows that even at Jerusalem’s lowest spiritual ebb, its inhabitants would admit the truth and own up to their complete ignorance.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But perhaps it is different there, for if he had said: I have learned, they would have said to him: Tell us, and people do not lie about things that can be easily verified. The Gemara rejects this claim: If he were a liar, he would have said that he learned and forgot, thereby avoiding shame. What is the meaning of “I will not be a healer,” which seems to imply that he had learned in the past? It means: I will not be a healer at all, as I have never learned. Consequently, there were trustworthy men in Jerusalem after all.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: Is that so? But didn’t Rava say: Jerusalem was not destroyed until trustworthy men ceased to exist in it, as it is stated: “Run to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem, and see now and know, and seek in its broad places, if you can find a man, if there is any that acts justly, that seeks truth, and I will pardon her” (Jeremiah 5:1), implying there were no trustworthy people at that time? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult:
  
  Daf 14b
  
  This case is referring to words of Torah, while that case is referring to commerce. With regard to words of Torah, they were trustworthy; with regard to commerce, they were not.
  § The Gemara returns to the topic of the Design of the Divine Chariot. The Sages taught: An incident occurred involving Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who was riding on a donkey and was traveling along the way, and his student, Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh, was riding a donkey behind him. Rabbi Elazar said to him: My teacher, teach me one chapter in the Design of the Divine Chariot. He said to him: Have I not taught you: And one may not expound the Design of the Divine Chariot to an individual, unless he is a Sage who understands on his own accord? Rabbi Elazar said to him: My teacher, allow me to say before you one thing that you taught me. In other words, he humbly requested to recite before him his own understanding of this issue. He said to him: Speak.
  Immediately, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai alighted from the donkey, and wrapped his head in his cloak in a manner of reverence, and sat on a stone under an olive tree. Rabbi Elazar said to him: My teacher, for what reason did you alight from the donkey? He said: Is it possible that while you are expounding the Design of the Divine Chariot, and the Divine Presence is with us, and the ministering angels are accompanying us, that I should ride on a donkey? Immediately, Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh began to discuss the Design of the Divine Chariot and expounded, and fire descended from heaven and encircled all the trees in the field, and all the trees began reciting song.
  What song did they recite? “Praise the Lord from the earth, sea monsters and all depths…fruit trees and all cedars…praise the Lord” (Psalms 148:7–14). An angel responded from the fire, saying: This is the very Design of the Divine Chariot, just as you expounded. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai stood and kissed Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh on his head, and said: Blessed be God, Lord of Israel, who gave our father Abraham a son like you, who knows how to understand, investigate, and expound the Design of the Divine Chariot. There are some who expound the Torah’s verses well but do not fulfill its imperatives well, and there are some who fulfill its imperatives well but do not expound its verses well, whereas you expound its verses well and fulfill its imperatives well. Happy are you, our father Abraham, that Elazar ben Arakh came from your loins.
  The Gemara relates: And when these matters, this story involving his colleague Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh, were recounted before Rabbi Yehoshua, he was walking along the way with Rabbi Yosei the Priest. They said: We too shall expound the Design of the Divine Chariot. Rabbi Yehoshua began expounding. And that was the day of the summer solstice, when there are no clouds in the sky. Yet the heavens became filled with clouds, and there was the appearance of a kind of rainbow in a cloud. And ministering angels gathered and came to listen, like people gathering and coming to see the rejoicing of a bridegroom and bride.
  Rabbi Yosei the Priest went and recited these matters before Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who said to him: Happy are all of you, and happy are the mothers who gave birth to you; happy are my eyes that saw this, students such as these. As for you and I, I saw in my dream that we were seated at Mount Sinai, and a Divine Voice came to us from heaven: Ascend here, ascend here, for large halls [<i>teraklin</i>] and pleasant couches are made up for you. You, your students, and the students of your students are invited to the third group, those who will merit to welcome the Divine Presence.
  The Gemara poses a question: Is that so? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: There are three lectures. In other words, there are three Sages with regard to whom it states that they delivered lectures on the mystical tradition: Rabbi Yehoshua lectured on these matters before Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai; Rabbi Akiva lectured before Rabbi Yehoshua; and Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai lectured before Rabbi Akiva. However, Rabbi Elazar ben Arakh was not included in the list, despite the testimony that he lectured before Rabban Yoḥanan. The Gemara explains: Those who lectured and were also lectured to were included; but those who lectured and were not lectured to were not included. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t there Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai, who was not lectured to, and yet he is included? The Gemara answers: Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai actually lectured before one who lectured in front of his own rabbi, so he was also included in this list.
  § The Sages taught: Four entered the orchard [<i>pardes</i>], i.e., dealt with the loftiest secrets of Torah, and they are as follows: Ben Azzai; and ben Zoma; <i>Aḥer</i>, the other, a name for Elisha ben Avuya; and Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva, the senior among them, said to them: When, upon your arrival in the upper worlds, you reach pure marble stones, do not say: Water, water, although they appear to be water, because it is stated: “He who speaks falsehood shall not be established before My eyes” (Psalms 101:7).
  The Gemara proceeds to relate what happened to each of them: Ben Azzai glimpsed at the Divine Presence and died. And with regard to him the verse states: “Precious in the eyes of the Lord is the death of His pious ones” (Psalms 116:15). Ben Zoma glimpsed at the Divine Presence and was harmed, i.e., he lost his mind. And with regard to him the verse states: “Have you found honey? Eat as much as is sufficient for you, lest you become full from it and vomit it” (Proverbs 25:16). <i>Aḥer</i> chopped down the shoots of saplings. In other words, he became a heretic. Rabbi Akiva came out safely.
  The Gemara recounts the greatness of ben Zoma, who was an expert interpreter of the Torah and could find obscure proofs: They asked ben Zoma: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to castrating a dog? The prohibition against castration appears alongside the sacrificial blemishes, which may imply that it is permitted to castrate an animal that cannot be sacrificed as an offering. He said to them: The verse states “That which has its testicles bruised, or crushed, or torn, or cut, you shall not offer to God, nor shall you do so in your land” (Leviticus 22:24), from which we learn: With regard to any animal that is in your land, you shall not do such a thing. They also asked ben Zoma: A woman considered to be a virgin who became pregnant, what is the <i>halakha</i>? A High Priest may marry only a virgin; is he permitted to marry her? The answer depends on the following: Are we concerned for the opinion of Shmuel? Shmuel says:
  
  Daf 15a
  
  I can engage in intercourse several times without blood. In other words, I can have relations with a woman while leaving her hymen intact. If this is so, it is possible that the assumed virgin had intercourse in this manner and is forbidden to the High Priest. Or, perhaps a person who can act like Shmuel is not common and the <i>halakha</i> is not concerned with this case. He said to them: One like Shmuel is not common, and we are concerned that she may have conceived in a bath. Perhaps she washed in a bath that contained a man’s semen, from which she became impregnated while remaining a virgin.
  The Gemara asks: How could she possibly become pregnant in such a manner? Didn’t Shmuel say: Any semen that is not shot like an arrow cannot fertilize? The Gemara answers: This does not mean that it must be shot like an arrow at the moment of fertilization. Even if initially, when released from the male, it was shot as an arrow, it can also fertilize a woman at a later moment.
  With regard to the fate of ben Zoma, the Sages taught: There was once an incident with regard to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya, who was standing on a step on the Temple Mount, and ben Zoma saw him and did not stand before him to honor him, as he was deep in thought. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: From where do you come and where are you going, ben Zoma, i.e., what is on your mind? He said to him: In my thoughts I was looking upon the act of Creation, at the gap between the upper waters and the lower waters, as there is only the breadth of a mere three fingers between them, as it is stated: “And the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters” (Genesis 1:2), like a dove hovering over its young without touching them. Rabbi Yehoshua said to his students who had overheard this exchange: Ben Zoma is still outside; he has not yet achieved full understanding of these matters.
  The Gemara explains: Now, this verse: “And the spirit of God hovered over the face of the waters,” when was it stated? On the first day, whereas the division of the waters occurred on the second day, as it is written: “And let it divide the waters from the waters” (Genesis 1:6). How, then, could ben Zoma derive a proof from the former verse? The Gemara asks: And how much, in fact, is the gap between them? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Like the thickness of a thread; and the Rabbis said: Like the gap between the boards of a bridge. Mar Zutra, and some say it was Rav Asi, said: Like two robes spread one over the other, with a slight gap in between. And some said: Like two cups placed one upon the other.
  § The Gemara stated earlier that <i>Aḥer</i> chopped down the saplings, becoming a heretic. With regard to him, the verse states: “Do not let your mouth bring your flesh into guilt” (Ecclesiastes 5:5). The Gemara poses a question: What was it that led him to heresy? He saw the angel Mitatron, who was granted permission to sit and write the merits of Israel. He said: There is a tradition that in the world above there is no sitting; no competition; no turning one’s back before Him, i.e., all face the Divine Presence; and no lethargy. Seeing that someone other than God was seated above, he said: Perhaps, the Gemara here interjects, Heaven forbid, there are two authorities, and there is another source of power in control of the world in addition to God. Such thoughts led <i>Aḥer</i> to heresy.
  The Gemara relates: They removed Mitatron from his place in heaven and smote him with sixty rods [<i>pulsei</i>] of fire, so that others would not make mistake that <i>Aḥer</i> made. They said to the angel: What is the reason that when you saw Elisha ben Avuya you did not stand before him? Despite this conduct, since Mitatron was personally involved, he was granted permission to erase the merits of <i>Aḥer</i> and cause him to stumble in any manner. A Divine Voice went forth saying: “Return, rebellious children” (Jeremiah 3:22), apart from <i>Aḥer</i>.
  Upon hearing this, Elisha ben Avuya said: Since that man, meaning himself, has been banished from that world, let him go out and enjoy this world. <i>Aḥer</i> went astray. He went and found a prostitute and solicited her for intercourse. She said to him: And are you not Elisha ben Avuya? Shall a person of your stature perform such an act? He uprooted a radish from a patch of radishes on Shabbat and gave it to her, to demonstrate that he no longer observed the Torah. The prostitute said: He is other than he was. He is not the same Elisha ben Avuya, he is <i>Aḥer</i>, other.
  The Gemara relates: <i>Aḥer</i> asked Rabbi Meir a question, after he had gone astray. He said to him: What is the meaning of that which is written: “God has made even the one as well as the other” (Ecclesiastes 7:14)? Rabbi Meir said to him: Everything that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created, He created a similar creation corresponding to it. He created mountains, He created hills; He created seas, He created rivers.
  <i>Aḥer</i> said to him: Rabbi Akiva, your teacher, did not say so, but explained the verse as follows: Everything has its opposite: He created the righteous, He created the wicked; He created the Garden of Eden, He created Gehenna. Each and every person has two portions, one in the Garden of Eden and one in Gehenna. If he merits it, by becoming righteous, he takes his portion and the portion of his wicked colleague in the Garden of Eden; if he is found culpable by becoming wicked, he takes his portion and the portion of his colleague in Gehenna.
  Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the verse from which it is derived? With regard to the righteous, it is stated: “Therefore in their land they shall possess double” (Isaiah 61:7); whereas with regard to the wicked, it is stated: “And destroy them with double destruction” (Jeremiah 17:18); therefore, each receives a double portion.
  <i>Aḥer</i> asked Rabbi Meir another question, again after he had gone astray. What is the meaning of that which is written: “Gold and glass cannot equal it; neither shall its exchange be vessels of fine gold” (Job 28:17)? If it is referring to the praise and honor of the Torah, it should have compared it only to gold, not to glass. He said to him: This is referring to words of Torah, which are as difficult to acquire as gilded vessels and vessels of fine gold but are as easy to lose as glass vessels. <i>Aḥer</i> said to him: Rabbi Akiva, your teacher, did not say so, but taught as follows: Just as golden vessels and glass vessels have a remedy even when they have broken, as they can be melted down and made into new vessels, so too a Torah scholar, although he has transgressed, has a remedy. Rabbi Meir said to him: If so, you too, return from your ways. He said to him: I have already heard the following declaration behind the dividing curtain, which conceals God from the world: “Return, rebellious children,” (Jeremiah 3:22) apart from <i>Aḥer</i>.
  The Gemara cites a related story: The Sages taught: There was once an incident involving <i>Aḥer</i>, who was riding on a horse on Shabbat, and Rabbi Meir was walking behind him to learn Torah from him. After a while, <i>Aḥer</i> said to him: Meir, turn back, for I have already estimated and measured according to the steps of my horse that the Shabbat boundary ends here, and you may therefore venture no further. Rabbi Meir said to him: You, too, return to the correct path. He said to him: But have I not already told you that I have already heard behind the dividing curtain: “Return, rebellious children,” apart from <i>Aḥer</i>?
  Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir took hold of him and brought him to the study hall. <i>Aḥer</i> said to a child, by way of divination: Recite your verse that you studied today to me. He recited the following verse to him: “There is no peace, said the Lord, concerning the wicked” (Isaiah 48:22). He brought him to another study hall. <i>Aḥer</i> said to a child: Recite your verse to me. He recited to him: “For though you wash with niter, and take for you much soap, yet your iniquity is marked before Me” (Jeremiah 2:22). He brought him to another study hall. <i>Aḥer</i> said to
  
  Daf 15b
  
  a child: Recite your verse to me. He recited to him: “And you, spoiled one, what are you doing, that you clothe yourself with scarlet, that you deck yourself with ornaments of gold, that you enlarge your eyes with paint? In vain you make yourself fair” (Jeremiah 4:30).
  He brought him to another synagogue, until he had brought him into thirteen synagogues, where all the children recited to him similar verses that speak of the hopeless situation of the wicked. At the last one, he said to him: Recite your verse to me. He recited to him: “And to the wicked [<i>velerasha</i>] God says, what is it for you to declare My statutes” (Psalms 50:16). The Gemara relates: That child had a stutter, so it sounded as though he were saying to him: <i>Vele’elisha</i>, i.e., and to Elisha, God says. This made Elisha think the child was deliberately insulting him. Some say <i>Aḥer</i> had a knife, and he tore the child apart and sent him to the thirteen synagogues. And others say that <i>Aḥer</i> merely said: Had I a knife, I would have torn him apart.
  The Gemara relates: When <i>Aḥer</i> passed away, the Heavenly Court declared that he should not be judged, nor brought into the World-to-Come. He should not be judged in a manner befitting his deeds, because he occupied himself with Torah, whose merit protects him. And he should not be brought into the World-to-Come because he sinned. Rabbi Meir said: It is better that he be judged properly and be brought into the World-to-Come. When I die I will request this of Heaven, and I will cause smoke to rise up from his grave, as a sign that he is being sentenced in Gehenna. The Gemara relates: When Rabbi Meir passed away, smoke rose up from the grave of <i>Aḥer</i>, implying that Rabbi Meir’s wish was granted.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Was this a mighty deed on Rabbi Meir’s part, to burn his teacher? Was this the only remedy available? Can it be that there was one Sage among us who left the path and we cannot save him? If we hold him by the hand, who will remove him from our protection; who? Rabbi Yoḥanan continued and said: When I die I will have the smoke extinguished from his grave, as a sign that he has been released from the sentence of Gehenna and brought to the World-to-Come. Indeed, when Rabbi Yoḥanan passed away, the smoke ceased to rise up from the grave of <i>Aḥer</i>. A certain eulogizer began his eulogy of Rabbi Yoḥanan with the following: Even the guard at the entrance could not stand before you, our rabbi. The guard at the entrance to Gehenna could not prevent Rabbi Yoḥanan from arranging the release of <i>Aḥer</i>.
  The Gemara relates: The daughter of <i>Aḥer</i> came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and said to him: Rabbi, provide me with sustenance, as she was in need of food. He said to her: Whose daughter are you? She said to him: I am the daughter of <i>Aḥer</i>. He said to her, angrily: Is there still of his seed remaining in the world? But isn’t it stated: “He shall have neither son nor grandson among his people or any remaining in his dwellings” (Job 18:19)? She said to him: Remember his Torah, and do not remember his deeds. Immediately, fire descended and licked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s bench. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wept and said: If God protects the honor of those who treat the Torah with contempt in such a manner, as <i>Aḥer</i> despised the Torah and relinquished its teachings, how much more so would He do for those who treat it with honor.
  The Gemara poses a question: And Rabbi Meir, how could he learn Torah from the mouth of <i>Aḥer</i>? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “For the priest’s lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek Torah from his mouth; for he is an angel of the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 2:7)? The verse teaches: If the rabbi is similar to an angel of the Lord of hosts, perfect in his ways, they should seek Torah from his mouth; but if not, they should not seek Torah from his mouth.
  Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Meir found a verse and interpreted it homiletically: “Incline your ear, and hear the words of the wise, and apply your heart to My knowledge” (Proverbs 22:17). It does not state “to their knowledge,” but “to My knowledge.” In other words, one must listen to the words of the Sages, despite their flaws, provided that their opinion concurs with that of God.
  Rav Ḥanina said that one can find support for this idea from here: “Listen, daughter and consider, and incline your ear; forget also your own people and your father’s house” (Psalms 45:11), which likewise indicates that one must listen to the words of a Sage while forgetting, i.e., ignoring, the faulty aspects of his teachings.
  The Gemara asks: If so, the verses contradict each other, for one source states that one may learn only from a scholar who is perfect in his ways, while the other indicates that it is permitted even to learn from one whose character is flawed. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, in which it is permitted to a flawed scholar, is referring to an adult; whereas that case, which prohibits doing so, is referring to a minor, who should learn only from a righteous person, so that his ways are not corrupted by a teacher with flawed character.
  When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say: Rabbi Meir ate a half-ripe date and threw the peel away. In other words, he was able to extract the important content from the inedible shell. Rava taught: What is the meaning of that which is written: “I went down into the garden of nuts, to look at the green plants of the valley” (Song of Songs 6:11)? Why are Torah scholars compared to nuts? To tell you: Just as this nut, despite being soiled with mud and excrement, its content is not made repulsive, as only its shell is soiled; so too a Torah scholar, although he has sinned, his Torah is not made repulsive.
  The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Sheila found Elijah the prophet, who had appeared to him. He said to Elijah: What is the Holy One, Blessed be He, doing? Elijah said to him: He is stating <i>halakhot</i> transmitted by all of the Sages, but in the name of Rabbi Meir He will not speak. He said to him: Why? He replied: Because he learned <i>halakhot</i> from the mouth of <i>Aḥer</i>. He said to him: Why should he be judged unfavorably for that? Rabbi Meir found a pomegranate and ate its contents while throwing away its peel. He said to him: Indeed, your defense has been heard above. Now God is saying: My son, Meir, says: When a person suffers, e.g., by receiving lashes or the death penalty at the hands of the court, how does the Divine Presence express itself? Woe is Me from My head, woe is Me from My arm, as God empathizes with the sufferer. If the Holy One, Blessed be He, suffers to such an extent over the blood of the wicked, how much more so does He suffer over the blood of the righteous that is spilled.
  The Gemara relates: Shmuel found Rav Yehuda leaning on the bar of the door, crying. He said to him: Long-toothed one [<i>shinnana</i>], what are you crying for? He said to him: Is it a small matter, that which is written with regard to Sages who have sinned: “Where is he who counted, where is he who weighed? Where is he who counted the towers?” (Isaiah 33:18). He proceeded to explain: “Where is he who counted”; for they would count all the letters of the Torah. “Where is he who weighed”; for they would weigh and compare the minor and major transgressions of the Torah. “Where is he who counted the towers”; for they would teach three hundred <i>halakhot</i> concerning the details of tent impurity involving a wooden closet floating in the air. If they studied a subject so removed from reality in such depths, how much more so did they analyze other issues.
  And Rabbi Ami said: Doeg asked Ahithophel three hundred questions with regard to a closet floating in the air, as they were both great Torah scholars. And we learned in a mishna (<i>Sanhedrin</i> 90a): Three kings and four commoners have no portion in the World-to-Come, a list that includes Doeg and Ahithophel. If such great Sages could sin and forfeit their share in the World-to-Come, we, who are less knowledgeable than they, what will be of us? He said to him: Long-toothed one, there was mud [<i>tina</i>] in their hearts, i.e., they had certain flaws that prevented their Torah learning from protecting them.
  The Gemara explains: <i>Aḥer</i>, what was his failing? Greek tunes never ceased from his mouth. He would constantly hum Greek songs, even when he was among the Sages. This shows that from the outset he was drawn to gentile culture and beliefs. Similarly, they said about <i>Aḥer</i>: When he would stand after learning in the study hall, many heretical books, which he had been reading, would fall from his lap. Therefore, he was somewhat unsound even when among the Sages.
  The gentile philosopher, Nimos HaGardi, asked Rabbi Meir: Does all wool that enters the cauldron to be dyed emerge colored? In other words, do all those who learn Torah emerge as decent and worthy? He said to him: Whoever was clean when he was with his mother, from the outset, will emerge decent and worthy, but all those who were not clean when they were with their mother will not emerge worthy. One who approaches Torah study having been flawed from the outset will not be properly influenced by it.
  § The Gemara returns to the four who entered the orchard. It is stated above that Rabbi Akiva ascended in safety and descended safely. With regard to him, the verse states: “Draw me, we will run after you; the king has brought me into his chambers” (Song of Songs 1:4). The Gemara relates: And even Rabbi Akiva, the ministering angels sought to push him out of the orchard. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to them: Leave this Elder, for he is fit to serve My glory.
  
  Daf 16a
  
  The Gemara asks: What verse did Rabbi Akiva expound that prevented him from making the same mistake as <i>Aḥer</i>? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It was the following: “And He came [<i>ve’ata</i>] from the holy myriads” (Deuteronomy 33:2), which he explained in this manner: He, God, is unique [<i>ot</i>] among His myriads of angels. Therefore, he knew that he had merely seen an angel.
  And Rabbi Abbahu said: Rabbi Akiva expounded the verse: “Preeminent above a myriad” (Song of Songs 5:10) to indicate that He is exemplary among His myriad.
  And Reish Lakish said: He expounded the verse: “The Lord of hosts is His name” (Isaiah 48:2); He is the Master in His host.
  And Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He expounded the verses: “But the Lord was not in the wind. And after the wind, an earthquake; the Lord was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake, fire; but the Lord was not in the fire. And after the fire, a still, small voice,” and it states in that verse: “And behold, the Lord passed by” (I Kings 19:11–12). Rabbi Akiva used this verse in order to recognize the place of His presence and refrain from trespassing there.
  § The Gemara returns to discussing the heavenly beings. The Sages taught: Six statements were said with regard to demons: In three ways they are like ministering angels, and in three ways they are like humans. The <i>baraita</i> specifies: In three ways they are like ministering angels: They have wings like ministering angels; and they fly from one end of the world to the other like ministering angels; and they know what will be in the future like ministering angels.
  The Gemara is puzzled by this last statement: Should it enter your mind that they know this? Not even the angels are privy to the future. Rather, they hear from behind the curtain when God reveals something of the future, like ministering angels.
  And in three ways they are similar to humans: They eat and drink like humans; they multiply like humans; and they die like humans.
  Six statements were said with regard to humans: In three ways, they are like ministering angels, and in three ways they are like animals. The <i>baraita</i> explains: In three ways they are like ministering angels: They have intelligence like ministering angels; and they walk upright like ministering angels; and they speak in the holy tongue like ministering angels. In three ways humans are like animals: They eat and drink like animals; and they multiply like animals; and they emit excrement like animals.
  § The mishna taught: Whoever looks at four things, it would have been better for him had he never entered the world: Anyone who reflects upon that which is above the firmament; that which is below the earth; what was before the creation of the world; and what will be after the end of the world. The Gemara asks: Granted, it is prohibited to reflect on what is above, what is below, and what is after. This is fine, since one is examining things that are not part of the world but lie beyond it. But before the creation of the world, what has happened has happened. Why is it prohibited to reflect upon this?
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar both say: This can be demonstrated through a parable with regard to a flesh-and-blood king who said to his servants: Build for me large palaces on a garbage dump. They went and built them for him. Clearly, in that case, the king does not desire that they mention the garbage dump. Here too, God does not want people to concern themselves with the chaos that preceded the world.
  It is taught in the mishna: Whoever has no concern for the honor of his Maker deserves to have never come to the world. The Gemara asks: What is lack of concern for the honor of one’s Maker? Rabbi Abba said: This is one who looks at a rainbow. Rav Yosef said: This is one who commits a transgression in private. They proceed to clarify their opinions: Looking at a rainbow constitutes an act of disrespect toward the Divine Presence, as it is written: “As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain so was the appearance of the brightness round about. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord” (Ezekiel 1:28), and it is a dishonor to God to stare at His likeness.
  Rav Yosef said: This is one who commits a transgression in private, in accordance with Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Whoever commits a transgression in private, it is as though he pushed away the feet of the Divine Presence, as it is stated: “Thus said the Lord: The heavens are My seat, and the earth My footstool” (Isaiah 66:1). If one believes that no one can see what he is doing in private, it is as though he said that God is absent from that place. He is therefore compared to one who attempts to remove God from His footstool.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: And is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Ela the Elder say: If a person sees that his inclination is overcoming him, he should go to a place where he is unknown, and wear black, and wrap himself in black, in the manner of mourners, because he should be ashamed of his weakness, and do there what his heart desires, but let him not desecrate the Name of Heaven in public. This shows that sinning in private is sometimes preferable to the public performance of a transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This case, where one who commits a transgression in public has no concern for the honor of his Maker, occurs when one is capable of overcoming his inclination and fails to do so. That case, where it is preferable to sin in private, occurs when one is incapable of overcoming his inclination. He is therefore advised to, at the very least, refrain from desecrating God’s name in public.
  Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Naḥmani, the disseminator of Reish Lakish, interpreted a verse homiletically: Whoever looks at the following three things, his eyes will grow dim: One who looks at a rainbow, at a <i>Nasi</i>, and at the priests. He explains: At a rainbow, as it is written: “As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud on the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about, this was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord” (Ezekiel 1:28). At a <i>Nasi</i>, as it is written: “And you shall put of your splendor upon him” (Numbers 27:20), which indicates that the splendor of the Divine Presence rested upon Moses, who was the <i>Nasi</i> of Israel. The third item, looking at priests, is referring to one who looks at the priests when the Temple is standing, as they would stand on their platform and bless Israel with the ineffable name, at which point the Divine Presence would rest above the joints of their fingers.
  Apropos this Sage, the Gemara cites another statement of his: Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Naḥmani, the disseminator of Reish Lakish, interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Trust not in a companion, do not put your confidence in an intimate friend” (Micah 7:5)? If the evil inclination says to you: Sin, and the Holy One, Blessed be He, will forgive, do not trust it, since it is stated: “Trust not in a companion [<i>rei’a</i>].” And <i>rei’a</i> is referring to none other than the evil [<i>ra</i>] inclination, as it is stated: “For the inclination of the heart of man is evil [<i>ra</i>]” (Genesis 8:21).
  And “intimate friend” is referring to none other than the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is stated: “You are the intimate friend of my youth” (Jeremiah 3:4). Lest you say: Since I am acting in private, who will testify against me? The stones of the house and the beams of the house of each person testify against him, as it is stated: “For the stone shall cry out of the wall, and the beam out of the timber shall answer it” (Habakkuk 2:11).
  And the Sages say: A person’s soul shall itself testify against him, as it is stated: “Guard the doors of your mouth from she who lies in your bosom” (Micah 7:5). What thing lies in a person’s bosom? You must say it is his soul. Rabbi Zerika said: The two ministering angels who accompany him, i.e., each individual, they testify against him, as it is stated: “For He will command his angels over you, to guard you in all your ways” (Psalms 91:11). And the Sages say: A person’s limbs testify against him, as it is stated: “Therefore you are My witnesses, says the Lord, and I am God” (Isaiah 43:12), which indicates that each individual becomes his own witness and testifies against himself on the Day of Judgment.
  MISHNA: Yosei ben Yo’ezer says not to place one’s hands on offerings before slaughtering them on a Festival because this is considered performing labor with an animal on a Festival. His colleague, Yosef ben Yoḥanan, says to place them; Yehoshua ben Peraḥya says not to place them; Nitai HaArbeli says to place them; Yehuda ben Tabbai says not to place them; Shimon ben Shataḥ says to place them; Shemaya says to place them; Avtalyon says not to place them. Hillel and Menaḥem did not disagree with regard to this issue. Menaḥem departed from his post, and Shammai entered in his stead. Shammai says not to place them; Hillel says to place them.
  
  Daf 16b
  
  The first members of each pair served as <i>Nasi</i>, and their counterparts served as deputy <i>Nasi</i>.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught: Three of the first pairs who say not to place hands and two of the last pairs who say to place hands served as <i>Nasi</i>, and their counterparts served as deputy <i>Nasi</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say the opposite: Yehuda ben Tabbai was deputy <i>Nasi</i> and Shimon ben Shataḥ was the <i>Nasi</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai said: I swear that I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not kill a conspiring witness. This means that Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai sentenced a conspiring witness to death, in order to counter the views of the Sadducees, who would say: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless the sentenced one has been executed. Their views opposed the traditional view, which maintains that conspiring witnesses are executed only if the one sentenced by their testimony has not yet been executed.
  Shimon ben Shataḥ said to him: I swear that I will not see the consolation of Israel if you did not shed innocent blood, as the Sages said: Conspiring witnesses are not executed unless they are both found to be conspirators; if only one is found to be a conspirator, he is not executed. And they are not flogged if they are liable to such a penalty, unless they are both found to be conspirators. And if they testified falsely that someone owed money, they do not pay money unless they are both found to be conspirators.
  Hearing this, Yehuda ben Tabbai immediately accepted upon himself not to rule on any matter of law unless he was in the presence of Shimon ben Shataḥ, as he realized he could not rely on his own judgment.
  The <i>baraita</i> further relates: All of Yehuda ben Tabbai’s days, he would prostrate himself on the grave of that executed individual, to request forgiveness, and his voice was heard weeping. The people thought that it was the voice of that executed person, rising from his grave. Yehuda ben Tabbai said to them: It is my voice, and you shall know that it is so, for tomorrow, i.e., sometime in the future, he will die, and his voice will no longer be heard. Yehuda ben Tabbai was referring to himself, but he did not want to mention something negative about himself in direct terms.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This provides no conclusive proof that the voice was not that of the executed man, as perhaps ben Tabbai appeased the executed individual in the World-to-Come. Or, alternatively, the latter may have prosecuted him by the law of Heaven, and that is why his voice can no longer be heard.
  The Gemara returns to its original question: Whose opinion does this <i>baraita</i> follow? Granted, if you say it is in accordance with that of Rabbi Meir, who said that Shimon ben Shataḥ was deputy <i>Nasi</i> while Rabbi Yehuda ben Tabbai was <i>Nasi</i>, that explains why he had previously issued a halakhic ruling in the presence of Shimon ben Shataḥ to execute the conspiring witness, and only after that unfortunate incident did he undertake to issue rulings only in the presence of his colleague. But if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the Sages, who said: Yehuda ben Tabbai was deputy <i>Nasi</i> and Shimon ben Shataḥ the <i>Nasi</i>, why did he need to make such a commitment? May the deputy <i>Nasi</i> issue a halakhic ruling in the presence of the <i>Nasi</i>?
  The Gemara refutes this: No; what did he mean by accepting upon himself not to rule on his own? He spoke with regard to joining the ruling of others: Even with regard to joining the ruling of others, I will also not join until I have first heard the view of Shimon ben Shataḥ.
  § It is taught in the mishna: Menaḥem departed and Shammai entered. The Gemara asks: To where did Menaḥem depart? Abaye said: He departed and went astray. Therefore, the mishna did not wish to delve into the details of his case. Rava said: He departed for the king’s service. He received a post from the king and had to leave the court. This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Menaḥem departed for the king’s service, and eighty pairs of students dressed in silk robes left with him to work for the king, and that they no longer studied Torah.
  § Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A rabbinic decree [<i>shevut</i>] should never be taken lightly in your eyes, since placing hands on the head of an offering on a Festival is prohibited only as a rabbinic decree because it is considered making use of an animal, which is not considered a prohibited labor but merely resembles one, and yet the greatest scholars of each generation disputed it.
  The Gemara is puzzled by this statement: This is obvious. Since it is an accepted rabbinic decree, why should people take it lightly? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to state it because it is a rabbinic decree related to a mitzva. In other words, although this rabbinic decree of placing the hands on an animal is not performed for one’s own sake but for the purpose of a mitzva, it was nevertheless a serious matter in the eyes of the Sages.
  The Gemara remains puzzled: This too is obvious. In that case as well, the act is prohibited by the Sages. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement comes to exclude the opinion of the one who said that they disagree with regard to the actual obligation of placing hands, i.e., whether or not obligatory peace-offerings require placing the hands. He therefore teaches us that it is a rabbinic decree that is the subject of their dispute, not the requirement itself.
  Rami bar Ḥama said: You can learn from here, from this dispute, that the mitzva of placing hands requires not only placing one’s hands on the animal’s head, but we also require that one places his hands with all his strength. For if it enters your mind that we do not require all his strength, what prohibition does one violate by placing his hands? Let him place them on a Festival as well, as this does not resemble a prohibited action at all.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this from a <i>baraita</i>: “Speak to the children of [<i>benei</i>] Israel” (Leviticus 1:2). The word <i>benei</i> literally means: Sons of. And it states nearby: “And he shall place his hand on the head of the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 1:4), from which we learn that the sons of Israel place their hands, but the daughters of Israel do not place them. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yishmael say: It is optional for the daughters of Israel to place their hands. They may place their hands if they so choose, although they are not obligated to do so.
  Rabbi Yosei said: The Sage Abba Elazar related to me the following incident: On one occasion, we had a calf for a peace-offering, and we brought it to the Women’s Courtyard, and women placed their hands on it. We did this not because there is an obligation of placing hands in the case of women, but in order to please the women, by allowing them to sacrifice an offering, in all of its particulars, as men do. Now, if it enters your mind that we require placing hands with all one’s strength, would we perform work with consecrated offerings in order to please the women? Placing one’s hands forcefully on an animal is considered performing work with it, and if one does it without being obligated to do so, he has thereby performed work with an offering. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this that we do not require placing hands with all one’s strength?
  The Gemara rejects this: Actually, I could say to you that we do require placing hands with all one’s strength, but here they allowed women to place their hands by saying to them: Ease your hands and do not press forcefully, so that their hand placing should not constitute work. The Gemara retorts: If so, then the reason formulated as: Not because there is an obligation to place hands in the case of women, is irrelevant to this law. Let him derive the permission for women to do so from the reason that it is not considered placing hands at all. If placing hands must be performed with all one’s strength, this action the women are performing does not constitute placing hands.
  Rabbi Ami said: He stated one reason and another. One reason is that it is not considered placing hands at all, as it is not performed with all of one’s strength; and another reason is that they allowed it in order to please the women.
  Rav Pappa said: Learn from this that anything upon which one may not place objects or upon which one may not sit on Shabbat, its sides are likewise prohibited, for if it enters your mind to say that the sides are permitted, they could have told the women to place their hands on the sides, i.e., on the head of the animal rather than on its back, as the head of the animal is considered as if it were one of its sides. Rather, must one not conclude from this that the sides are prohibited?
  
  Daf 17a
  
  Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that sides are permitted in general, there is no proof from here, since anything that is near the animal’s back is considered as its back. Therefore, placing the hands on the head of the animal is the same as placing them on the animal itself, as opposed to its sides.
  MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: One may bring peace-offerings on a Festival because both the owners and the priests partake of them, but one may not place his hands on them, on the peace-offerings before sacrificing them. However, one may not bring burnt-offerings at all because they are not eaten, and labor is permitted on Festivals only for the sake of preparing food for humans. And Beit Hillel say: One may bring peace-offerings and also burnt-offerings, and one places his hands on both of them.
  If the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> occurs on the eve of Shabbat, Beit Shammai say: The day of slaughter is after Shabbat, on Sunday. This is the day on which the animals brought in honor of the pilgrim Festival are slaughtered, since they maintain that the Festival burnt-offering is not sacrificed on the Festival day itself but on the following day, and all burnt-offerings vowed by individuals are postponed to the following day. And Beit Hillel say: The day of slaughter is not after Shabbat. Since the slaughter may be performed on the Festival day itself, it is unnecessary to postpone it. But they concede that if <i>Shavuot</i> occurs on Shabbat, the day of slaughter is after Shabbat.
  The mishna relates that when the day of slaughter was on a Sunday, the High Priest would not dress in his festive garments but would wear his regular clothing. And all were permitted to eulogize and fast on this day. This was done in order not to uphold and reinforce the opinion of the Sadducees, who would say: <i>Shavuot</i> must always occur after Shabbat. As the day of slaughter was on Sunday, it was necessary to demonstrate that we do not accept the view of the Sadducees, and that the day is not a Festival.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: From where is it derived that the <i>Shavuot</i> offerings can be redressed, i.e., that the obligatory Festival offerings can be sacrificed all seven days following the Festival? As it is stated: “Three times a year all your males shall appear…on the festival of Passover, and on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>” (Deuteronomy 16:16). The verse compares the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> to the festival of Passover by analogy: Just as one can redress the failure to bring the offering on the festival of Passover on all seven days of the Festival, so too, on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, one can redress the failure to bring the offering for all seven, i.e., <i>Shavuot</i> and the six days following it.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But perhaps you should say instead that the verse compares <i>Shavuot</i> to the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> by analogy: Just as the Festival day of <i>Sukkot</i> can be redressed for all eight days, as the Eighth Day of Assembly is part of the Festival, so too can the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> be redressed for all eight days. The Gemara answers: The Eighth Day of Assembly is an independent pilgrimage Festival and is not considered part of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  The Gemara continues to ask: You can say that when they said that The Eighth Day of Assembly is an independent pilgrimage Festival, this applies only to the issue of <i>peh</i>, <i>zayin</i>, <i>reish</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>beit</i>, an acronym for the six <i>halakhot</i> that differentiate The Eighth Day of Assembly from the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. But with regard to the redress of the Festival offerings, it is considered a day of redress for the first Festival day, as we learned in a mishna (9a): One who did not celebrate by sacrificing the Festival offerings on the first day of the <i>Sukkot</i> Festival can celebrate by sacrificing them throughout the pilgrimage Festival of <i>Sukkot</i> and on the last day of that Festival. If so, the question remains: Why do we not compare <i>Shavuot</i> to <i>Sukkot</i> and allow its offerings to be completed on all eight days?
  The Gemara answers by implementing the following principle: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something. In other words, when one must choose between a smaller number and a larger one, there is more certainty in choosing the smaller one. Even if that choice turns out to be erroneous, it is preferable to the larger one, as it is included in it. In this case, seven is included in eight. Therefore, it is preferable to compare <i>Shavuot</i> to the seven days of Passover than to the eight days of <i>Sukkot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But if we do not compare <i>Shavuot</i> to <i>Sukkot</i>, for the sake of what <i>halakha</i> did the Merciful One write the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> in this context? The laws of all the Festivals were already listed, so the Torah must have mentioned their names again in order to compare them for a particular reason. The Gemara answers: The festival of <i>Sukkot</i> was mentioned in order to compare it by analogy to the festival of Passover, in the following manner: Just as the festival of Passover requires lodging overnight in Jerusalem after the conclusion of the Festival, as one may not depart that night, so too the festival of <i>Sukkot</i> requires lodging in Jerusalem after <i>Sukkot</i> has ended.
  The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to Passover itself, from where do we derive that it requires lodging?
  
  Daf 17b
  
  The Gemara answers: One may leave Jerusalem only in the morning, after staying there for the night following the Festival, as it is written following the laws of the Paschal offering: “And you shall turn in the morning and go to your tents” (Deuteronomy 16:7).
  § We learned in the mishna: If the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> occurs on the eve of Shabbat, Beit Shammai say: The day of slaughter is after Shabbat; and Beit Hillel say: It does not have a day of slaughter. What, is it not that it does not have a day of slaughter at all; i.e., there are no days of redress for an offering that was meant to be sacrificed on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> itself? The Gemara rejects this: No, Beit Hillel means that it does not require a day of slaughter.
  The Gemara asks: And what does this teach us; that all offerings are sacrificed on their day? But they have already disputed this once, as we learned in a mishna: Beit Shammai say: One may bring peace-offerings on a Festival but one may not place his hands on them. However, one may not bring burnt-offerings at all; and Beit Hillel say: One may bring peace-offerings and also burnt-offerings, and one places his hands on both of them. Why is it necessary to restate this argument in different terms?
  The Gemara answers: It is necessary, for had the mishna taught us only this case, that Beit Shammai prohibits bringing burnt-offerings on a Festival, we might have said: It is with regard to this case, a regular Festival followed by a weekday, that Beit Shammai state their opinion, because it is possible to sacrifice these burnt-offerings on the following day, on the day of slaughter after the Festival; but there, with regard to a <i>Shavuot</i> that occurs on a Friday, when one cannot sacrifice offerings on the following day, you might perhaps say that they agree with Beit Hillel that the burnt-offerings should be sacrificed on the Festival itself. It was therefore necessary to state that Beit Shammai’s view is the same in both cases.
  The reverse also applies: And had it taught us only that case, that there is no day of slaughter after Shabbat, we might have said: It is with regard to that case that Beit Hillel state their view, that the offerings should be sacrificed on the Festival itself, because it is not possible to sacrifice them on the following day, which is Shabbat; but here, on a regular Festival followed by a weekday, you might say that perhaps they agree with Beit Shammai. It is therefore necessary for the mishna to specify both cases. The question of whether there days of redress for <i>Shavuot</i> according to Beit Hillel therefore remains unresolved.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a different source: One who did not celebrate by sacrificing the peace-offerings of the Festival on the seven days of Passover, or on the eight days of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, or on the first day of <i>Shavuot</i> may no longer celebrate and sacrifice those offerings. The Gemara infers: Does this not mean that if one did not sacrifice on the Festival day of <i>Shavuot</i> itself, this lapse cannot be remedied, thereby demonstrating that there are no days of redress for <i>Shavuot</i>? The Gemara refutes this: No, the term Festival day is referring to the day of slaughter, rather than the Festival itself. The Gemara immediately counters: If so, let us at least resolve from here, i.e., the mishna that there is only one day of slaughter and not seven days. The Gemara rejects this: Say that the wording of the mishna should be corrected, so that instead of: A day of slaughter, it reads: Days of slaughter.
  The Gemara suggests further: Come and hear a proof from another source, as Rabba bar Shmuel taught the following <i>baraita</i>: The Torah said to count thirty days, as it is stated: “A month of days” (Numbers 11:20), and then sanctify the month with offerings. And the Torah also said to count days from Passover and then sanctify the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> with offerings, as it is stated: “You shall count fifty days” (Leviticus 23:16). From this comparison, we learn the following <i>halakha</i>: Just as the new month is sanctified for the unit of time by which it is counted, i.e., for one day, so too, <i>Shavuot</i> is sanctified for the unit of time by which it is counted, i.e., for one full week, as it is stated: “Seven complete weeks shall there be” (Leviticus 23:15). The Gemara infers from this: Does this not mean that we learn from the month? If so, we can also learn that just as the festival of a month, the New Moon, is one day, so too <i>Shavuot</i> is only one day, without days of redress.
  Rava said: And how can you understand it that way? Is that to say that for <i>Shavuot</i> we count days but we do not count weeks? Didn’t Abaye say: It is a mitzva to count days, in the counting of the <i>omer</i>, as it is written: “Until the morrow of the seventh week, you shall count fifty days” (Leviticus 23:16); and it is also a mitzva to count weeks, as it is written: “Seven weeks you shall count for yourself, from when the sickle is first put to the standing corn” (Deuteronomy 16:9);and further, it is written: “The festival of weeks [<i>shavuot</i>]” (Deuteronomy 16:10), which indicates that it is a Festival that is established through a count of weeks? Consequently, the days of redress for <i>Shavuot</i> should last a week, in accordance with its components.
  § In the school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, a Sage taught the following: The verse states with regard to <i>Shavuot</i>: “And you shall make a proclamation on this very day, it shall be a holy convocation, you shall do no kind of laborious work” (Leviticus 23:21), and it states in the same chapter: “And when you reap the harvest of your land” (Leviticus 23:22). Which is the Festival on which you make a proclamation and also reap, i.e., which Festival occurs in the harvest season? You must say it is the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>.
  The Gemara proceeds to analyze the teaching: When exactly does this refer to? If we say it is referring to the Festival day itself, is it permitted to reap on a Festival? Obviously, ordinary work is prohibited on Festivals. Rather, is it not referring to the issue of redress? In other words, it speaks of those days on which redress can be made for the offerings of the Festival, i.e., the days of slaughter, on which one may indeed reap because they are regular weekdays, and they nevertheless have a festive quality.
  The Gemara comments: And even though the teaching that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said, that the <i>halakha</i> of the redress for <i>Shavuot</i> is derived from the comparison to Passover, was stated, it was nevertheless necessary to state the teaching of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov as well, for if we had learned only the proof that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said, I would say the following: Just as on the days of redress for the festival of Passover it is prohibited to perform any work that will not cause irretrievable loss, as they are part of the Festival, so too on the days of redress for <i>Shavuot</i> it is also prohibited to perform work. We are therefore taught the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov as well, that on these festive days one may reap, as they are weekdays. Conversely, if we had learned the <i>halakha</i> only from the words of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov,
  
  Daf 18a
  
  I would not know how many days of redress there are. The Gemara therefore teaches us, from the statement that Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said, that there are seven days of redress.
  And Reish Lakish said, providing a different proof: From the very name of the day: “And the Festival of harvest” (Exodus 23:16), we can learn the following: On which Festival do you celebrate and harvest? You must say it is <i>Shavuot</i>. When exactly does this apply? If we say that it is on the Festival day itself, is harvesting permitted on a Festival? Rather, is it not referring to the day of redress?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: However, if that is so, you should likewise say with regard to “the Festival of gathering” (Exodus 23:16): On which Festival is there gathering? You must say it is the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>. When exactly? If we say it is on the Festival day itself, is labor permitted on a Festival? Rather, it is referring to the intermediate Festival days. But on the intermediate Festival days, too, is it permitted? One may perform only work that, if neglected, would result in irretrievable loss. Rather, you must explain that “the Festival of gathering” is referring to the season of the year, i.e., the Festival that occurs during the time of gathering. Here too: “The Festival of harvest” means a Festival that occurs during the time of harvest.
  § The Gemara comments: Since Reish Lakish does not dispute the accuracy of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, it may be inferred from their statements that both of them hold that the performance of labor during the intermediate Festival days is prohibited by the Torah.
  The Gemara proceeds to ask: From where are these matters derived; what is the biblical source for this prohibition? As the Sages taught: “You shall observe the festival of Passover seven days” (Exodus 23:15). This teaches that the performance of labor is prohibited during the intermediate Festival days, as “observe” denotes a negative commandment; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiyya. Rabbi Yonatan says: This proof is not necessary, as it does not accord with the straightforward meaning of the verse. Rather, it is learned from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as follows: If the performance of labor on the first and seventh days of Passover, which are not preceded and followed by sanctity as the days before the first day and after the seventh day are weekdays, is nevertheless prohibited, is it not right that on the days of the intermediate Festival days, which are preceded and followed by sanctity, i.e., the first and last days of the Festival, the performance of labor should be prohibited?
  The Gemara questions this conclusion: The six days of Creation, i.e., the days of the week, shall prove this, since they are preceded and followed by the sanctity of Shabbat, and yet the performance of labor on them is permitted. The Gemara rejects this difficulty: What of the fact that the six days of Creation are regular weekdays on which there is no additional offering; can you say the same with regard to the intermediate Festival days, on which there is an additional offering, bestowing these days with a measure of sanctity? The Gemara counters this: The New Moon shall prove this, since it has an additional offering, and the performance of labor is nevertheless permitted on it. The Gemara refutes this argument: What of the fact that the New Moon is not called “a holy convocation”; can you say the same with regard to the intermediate Festival days, which are called “a holy convocation”? Since they are called “a holy convocation” it is logical that the performance of labor should be prohibited on them.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i> concerning the same topic: With regard to the first day of Passover and <i>Sukkot</i>, the verse states: “You shall do no kind of laborious work” (Leviticus 23:35), followed by “seven days, you shall bring an offering made by fire to the Lord,” which teaches that the performance of labor is prohibited during the intermediate Festival days; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not necessary, since it is stated earlier in that chapter: “These are the appointed Festivals of the Lord, holy convocations, which you shall proclaim in their appointed season” (Leviticus 23:4). With regard to what is the verse speaking? If it is referring to the first day of the Festival, it has already explicitly stated “a solemn rest” (Leviticus 23:39) with regard to that day; if it is referring to the seventh, it has already stated “a solemn rest” (Leviticus 23:39) with regard to that day as well. Therefore, the verse can be speaking only of the intermediate Festival days, teaching you that the performance of labor is prohibited on them.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Six days you shall eat unleavened bread, and on the seventh day there shall be a solemn assembly for the Lord your God; on it, you shall do no work” (Deuteronomy 16:8). If so, just as the seventh day of the Festival is precluded from the performance of labor, so are the six intermediate Festival days precluded, since the word “and” in the phrase “and on the seventh day” connects it to the previous days.If so, perhaps: Just as the seventh day is precluded from the performance of all labor, so too the six intermediate days are precluded from the performance of all labor, even those whose performance prevents irretrievable loss.
  The verse therefore states: “And on the seventh day there shall be a solemn assembly,” literally, pause. This indicates that the seventh day alone is precluded from the performance of all labor, but the other six days are not precluded from the performance of all labor but only from certain forms of work. Since the Bible does not specify which types of work are prohibited, the verse has therefore entrusted the matter to the Sages exclusively, to tell you on which day work is prohibited and on which day it is permitted, and similarly which labor is prohibited and which labor is permitted.
  § The mishna taught: All were permitted to eulogize and fast on the days of slaughter, in order not to uphold the opinion of the Sadducees, who would say: <i>Shavuot</i> must always occur after Shabbat. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t it stated: An incident occurred when Alexa died in Lod, and all of Israel gathered to eulogize him, but Rabbi Tarfon would not allow them do so because it was the Festival day of <i>Shavuot</i>?
  The Gemara analyzes this passage: Can it enter your mind to say that it was a Festival day? If it had been a Festival day, would they have come? Certainly they would not have assembled to eulogize someone on the Festival itself. Rather, say that they were prohibited to eulogize because it was the Festival day of slaughter. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, since here, the incident in Lod, is referring to a Festival that occurs after Shabbat, whose day of slaughter does not fall on a Sunday. The day of slaughter retains a measure of the sanctity of <i>Shavuot</i> through the offering of Festival offerings and should therefore be treated as a Festival. There, however, the mishna is referring to a Festival that occurs on Shabbat. Since in that case the day of slaughter occurs on a Sunday, it cannot be observed as a Festival, in order to counter the view of the Sadducees. After discussing many issues unrelated to the main topic of the tractate, the Gemara now begins to discuss the topic of ritual purity and will do so for the remainder of the tractate. These <i>halakhot</i> are relevant to the pilgrim Festivals, as all are obligated to purify themselves in order to enter the Temple and sacrifice offerings.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  MISHNA: One must wash his hands by pouring a quarter-<i>log</i> of water over them before eating non-sacred food, and for tithes and for <i>teruma</i>; but for eating sacrificial food one must immerse one’s hands in purification waters, such as those of a ritual bath. And with regard to one who wishes to touch the purification waters of the red heifer used for sprinkling, concerning which the Sages ordained further measures of sanctity, if one’s hands were rendered impure even by rabbinical ritual impurity, which usually only renders the hands impure, his entire body is rendered impure, and he must immerse himself in a ritual bath.
  The mishna continues to list additional differences between various levels of ritual purity: If one immersed for the purpose of eating non-sacred food, he assumes a presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, and it is prohibited for him to eat tithes, as he did not purify himself with the intention of eating tithes. If one immersed to eat tithes, he assumes a presumptive status for tithes, but he is prohibited from eating <i>teruma</i>. If one immersed for <i>teruma</i>, he assumes a presumptive status for <i>teruma</i>, but he is prohibited from eating sacrificial food. If he immersed for sacrificial food, he assumes a presumptive status for sacrificial food, but he is prohibited from coming in contact with the purification waters. The principle is as follows: One who immersed to eat a food in a stringent category is permitted to eat a food in a lenient one. Another principle: One who immersed without the intention to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity, i.e., one who immersed but did not intend to purify himself, it is as though he has not immersed at all.
  The mishna continues: The garments of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, one who is not careful with regard to the laws of ritual purity, are considered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>. That is considered a primary level of impurity for individuals who are scrupulous with regard to impurity [<i>perushin</i>]. The garments of <i>perushin</i> are considered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for priests who eat <i>teruma</i>; the garments of those who eat <i>teruma</i> are considered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for those who eat sacrificial food; and likewise the garments of those who eat sacrificial food are considered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for those dealing with the preparation of the purification waters.
  The mishna relates: Yosef ben Yo’ezer was the most pious member of the priesthood and was extremely careful to eat <i>teruma</i> in a state of ritual purity, and yet his cloth was considered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for those who ate sacrificial food. Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda would eat non-sacred food while following the laws of ritual purity for sacrificial food all his days, and nevertheless his cloth was considered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for those preparing the purification waters.
  GEMARA: Before discussing the details of the <i>halakhot</i> listed in the mishna, the Gemara poses a basic question: Do non-sacred foods and tithes indeed require washing the hands?
  The Gemara raises a contradiction to the mishna, from the following mishna in tractate <i>Bikkurim</i> (2:1): With regard to <i>teruma</i> and first fruits, one is liable to the death penalty for them, e.g., if a non-priest ate them intentionally; if he did so unintentionally, he must restore the amount he ate with the addition of a fifth; and they are prohibited to non-priests; and they are the property of the priest. Consequently, a priest can purchase anything he wishes with them, or betroth a woman with them. And if they fell into non-sacred produce and became mixed with it, they are nullified only in a mixture that contains one hundred and one times their amount; and they require washing of the hands and the setting of the sun before they can be eaten, i.e., an impure priest who has immersed at the proper time must still wait for the sun to set before he is fit to eat them. These laws apply to <i>teruma</i> and first fruits, but not to tithes. The mishna adds: And all the more so do they not apply to non-sacred food.
  This is difficult: The <i>halakha</i> of tithes stated in <i>Bikkurim</i> seems to contradict the <i>halakha</i> of tithes taught in the mishna here, which states that the hands must be washed before tithes are eaten. Additionally, it is difficult with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of non-sacred food, as it contradicts the <i>halakha</i> applicable to non-sacred food stated in the mishna here.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, one of the laws with regard to tithes, as opposed to the other law with regard to tithes, is not difficult, since the contradiction can be resolved as follows: This case, the mishna in <i>Bikkurim</i>, is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, while that case, the mishna here, follows the Rabbis.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 11:5): Anything that requires immersion in water by rabbinic law renders sacrificial food impure. If it touches a consecrated item, the latter is itself rendered impure with a second-degree ritual impurity. It also renders impure any other consecrated object that comes into contact with it with a third-degree ritual impurity and invalidates <i>teruma</i>, meaning that it renders the <i>teruma</i> itself impure, but not to the extent that the <i>teruma</i> can render other <i>teruma</i> impure. And anything that requires immersion in water by rabbinic law is permitted for non-sacred produce and for tithes, meaning that it does not render these items impure, as something impure to such a low degree does not invalidate even non-sacred food. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. But the Rabbis prohibit this in the case of tithes, meaning that they are invalidated. This source demonstrates that according to the Rabbis, the <i>halakha</i> that applies to tithes differs from that of non-sacred produce, which explains why one must wash his hands for tithes. However, the law with regard to non-sacred food as opposed to the other law of non-sacred food is still difficult.
  The Gemara responds: It is not difficult. Here the mishna is referring to eating, before which one must wash his hands. There the mishna in <i>Bikkurim</i> deals with touching alone, for which prior washing of the hands is not necessary.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi strongly objects to this: The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir only with regard to eating tithes, but with regard to touching tithes and eating non-sacred food they do not disagree with him. Therefore, the Gemara’s resolution of the difficulty with regard to non-sacred food is not acceptable. Rather, the previous explanation is to be rejected in favor of the following: Both this mishna and that mishna are referring to eating, and it is not difficult: Here the mishna is dealing with eating bread, which requires washing one’s hands, whereas there, in <i>Bikkurim</i>, the mishna is referring to eating non-sacred fruit, for which one need not wash his hands, for Rav Naḥman said: Anyone who washes his hands for fruit is of the haughty of spirit because he shows himself to be more particular than required by the Sages.
  § The Sages taught: One who washes his hands, if he intended to purify them, his hands are pure; if he did not intend to do so, his hands are impure. Similarly, in the case of one who immerses his hands in forty <i>se’a</i> of water, if he intended to purify them, his hands are pure; if he did not so intend, his hands are impure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that his hands are pure whether he did or did not intend to purify them? Rav Naḥman said: This is not difficult, as there, the second <i>baraita</i> is referring to non-sacred food, for which one need not have the intention to purify his hands;
  
  Daf 19a
  
  whereas here, the first <i>baraita</i> is referring to tithes, for which intention to purify oneself is required. And from where do you say this, that non-sacred food does not require the intention that one is purifying himself for the sake of eating it? As we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 5:6): If a wave containing forty <i>se’a</i> of water became detached from the sea and fell on a person or on vessels, they are ritually pure. The mishna teaches that a person is similar to vessels: Just as vessels do not intend to be purified, as they obviously harbor no intentions, so too, the case of a person is referring to a situation in which he does not intend to purify himself, thereby implying that people can be ritually purified even without intention.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: And from where is it clear that this is the meaning of the mishna? Perhaps we are dealing with one who is sitting and awaiting for when a wave will detach and fall on the vessels, and the implication is the opposite: Vessels are similar to a person: Just as a person is capable of intention to ritually purify himself, so too the case of the vessels mentioned in the mishna is referring to a situation where one intends on their behalf that they be purified.
  And if you would say that the mishna is indeed is referring to one who is sitting and awaiting, what is the purpose of stating this? Such a <i>halakha</i> would not appear to offer a novelty; why would it be necessary to state it?
  The Gemara responds: It nevertheless provides a novel teaching, as it might enter your mind to say that it should be decreed that a detached wave does not affect purification, lest one come to immerse in a flow of rainwater whose volume is forty <i>se’a</i>. In other words, one might think that immersion in a flood of rainwater effects purification, whereas the <i>halakha</i> is that rainwater purifies only if it is gathered in one location. Alternatively, you might think that it should be decreed that purification by means of the edges of the waves that comes in contact with the ground should be ineffective due to the upper arcs of the waves. The mishna therefore teaches us that we do not so decree.
  And from where do you say that one may not immerse in the arcs? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may immerse in the edges of waves, but one may not immerse in their arcs, because one may not immerse in air. The area under the arc of a wave is considered mere air, despite the fact that the individual is surrounded by water on all sides.
  Rather, the proof that the purification with regard to non-sacred produce does not require intention is from that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Makhshirin</i> 4:7): In the verse that is referring to the preconditions required for fruit and seeds to be susceptible to ritual impurity, it is stated: “If water be put on seeds, and any of their carcasses fall there, it shall be impure to you” (Leviticus 11:38). If fruit fell into a water channel, and one whose hands were ritually impure extended his hands and lifted them up with the goal of removing them from the water channel, his hands are ritually pure, as he has purified them by inserting them into the water channel, and these fruits are not included in the category of “if water be put on seeds.” The verse is referring only to fruit that has intentionally been brought into contact with water. Since the fruit in this case was not intentionally made wet, it cannot as yet contract impurity.
  And if he put his hands into the water channel in order to wash his hands, his hands are ritually pure, and the fruit is included in the category of “if water be put on seeds.” Since he intended to wet his hands, the contact of the fruit with this water renders them susceptible to ritual impurity. In any case, the mishna teaches that his hands are ritually pure in either situation, indicating that no special intention is required for purification.
  Rabba raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the mishna here: One who immersed for the purpose of eating non-sacred food and assumes a presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food is still prohibited from eating tithes. The Gemara infers: If one immersed with the intention of assuming a presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, yes, he assumes that status; if he did not immerse with the intention of assuming that presumptive status, no, he does not assume that status. This proves that even for the sake of non-sacred produce, one must intend to assume the appropriate status of ritual purity.
  Rav Naḥman refutes this proof: This is what the mishna is saying: Even though he assumes a presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred produce, he is prohibited from eating tithes. In other words, the mishna does not teach that intention is required for eating non-sacred food in a state of ritual purity. Rather, it teaches that even if one intended to purify himself for non-sacred food, he is not purified with regard to tithes.
  He, Rabba, raised an objection to him from another teaching of our mishna: With regard to one who immersed without intending to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity, it is as if he has not immersed. What, is it not teaching that it is as if he had not immersed at all?
  Rav Naḥman rejected this proof as well: No, it means that it is as if he has not immersed for tithes, but he is considered to have immersed for non-sacred produce, for which no intention is necessary. The Gemara comments: He, i.e., Rabba, thought that Rav Naḥman was merely refuting his proof by saying that the wording of the mishna does not conclusively prove his case, but he did not actually think that the mishna should be understood differently. However, he subsequently went and examined the sources and found that a <i>baraita</i> was explicitly taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: One who immersed and did not intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity is prohibited from eating tithes, but is permitted to eat non-sacred produce, even if he eats non-sacred produce only when ritually pure.
  § With regard to assuming a presumptive status of ritual purity, Rabbi Elazar said: If one immersed without any particular intention and ascended from his immersion, he may assume a presumptive status of ritual purity after his immersion for whatever he wishes. In his opinion, there is no need to have a definite intention in mind at the actual moment of immersion.
  The Gemara raises an objection to this from the following <i>baraita</i>: In a case where one has immersed and is ascending, and one of his feet is still in the water, if he had originally intended to assume presumptive status of ritual purity for a minor matter, he may still intend to assume presumptive status for a major matter. But if he has fully ascended, he may no longer intend to assume a presumptive status for any other matter.
  The Gemara infers from this <i>baraita</i>: What, is it not teaching that if one has ascended he may not intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity at all, which proves that one may do so only if he is still at least partially in the water?
  The Gemara rejects this inference: No, it should be understood as follows: If he is still in the water, then although he previously intended to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity for a minor matter, he may now intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity for whatever purpose he wishes, since one can adjust his intention during his immersion. Once he has already ascended, if he did not intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity at all, but immersed without any intention, he may intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity for whatever he wishes even after ascending from the ritual bath; but if he did intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity for a minor matter, he may not intend to assume a presumptive status of ritual purity for a major matter, as his intention was fixed when he ascended from the ritual bath.
  In relation to the above, the Gemara explains: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that one whose foot is still in the water is considered to be still immersing himself? Rabbi Pedat said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 7:6): In the case of a ritual bath that was measured and found to contain exactly forty <i>se’a</i> of water, and then two individuals descended and immersed one after the other, the first one is ritually pure, since he immersed in a valid ritual bath, but the second is ritually impure. Because a small amount of water clings to the first individual, the ritual bath subsequently holds less than the requisite amount. Therefore, it does not purify the second individual. Rabbi Yehuda said: If the feet of the first one were still touching the water, so that he had not yet exited the ritual bath entirely while the second one immersed, the second is also ritually pure. This teaches that Rabbi Yehuda is of the opinion that one who still has a foot in the water is considered to be inside the ritual bath.
  Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda pertains to higher standards of ritual purity established by the Sages, where the obligation to immerse is due to a rabbinical ordinance. However, when the purpose of the immersion is to transition from full-fledged ritual impurity to purity, everyone agrees that the second individual is impure. And this is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Pedat on this topic, who asserts that only Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one may assume a presumptive ritually pure status if one of his feet is still in the ritual bath.
  There are those who say a different version of this statement: Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: This dispute is referring only to one who is obligated to immerse in order to transition from ritual impurity to purity, but with regard to higher standards of ritual purity established by the Sages, everyone agrees that even the second individual is ritually pure if the foot of the first is still in contact with the water. And consequently, this opinion disagrees with the statement of Rabbi Pedat, since, according to this version, all agree that with regard to higher standards of ritual purity, the immersion continues as long as a single foot remains in the water.
  With regard to the discussion above, Ulla said: I asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: According to Rabbi Yehuda, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to immersing small vessels, such as needles and knitting needles, on the head of the first individual immersing himself? Since Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one whose foot is still in the water is considered as immersed in the ritual bath, does this mean that his body and even his wet hair can serve as part of the ritual bath?
  The Gemara clarifies the dilemma raised by this question: Does Rabbi Yehuda accept only the principle of lowering the partition, meaning that an item positioned above another item is considered as if it continued downward, and therefore the water on the body of the one immersing is viewed as descending into the ritual bath, so that the bath retains its requisite size; but he does not accept the concept of raising the partition, so that the water in the ritual bath is not considered to rise up to one’s head, making him part of the ritual bath as well? Or, perhaps he also accepts the principle of raising the partition, which means that one is indeed considered part of the ritual bath?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: You already learned it in the <i>Tosefta</i> (<i>Mikvaot</i> 3:3): If there are three depressions in the bed of a stream that are not completely dry, an upper one, a lower one, and a middle one; and the upper and lower ones hold twenty <i>se’a</i> each, while the middle one contains forty <i>se’a</i>, and a flow of rain runs between them, thereby linking the depressions one to another, Rabbi Yehuda says: My colleague, Rabbi Meir, would say: One may immerse in the upper one. This indicates that Rabbi Meir holds that the waters of the middle depression, which contains the requisite amount of water for a ritual bath, are considered to have ascended by means of the rainwater into the higher depression. Since Rabbi Yehuda cites his colleague’s statement without comment, he evidently accepts the principle of raising the partition.
  Ulla raised a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says:
  
  Daf 19b
  
  Rabbi Meir would say: One may immerse in the upper one, and I say: In the lower one but not in the upper one. This demonstrates that Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of raising the partition. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: If this <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it. Therefore, it is clear that the matter is held in dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> and that Rabbi Yehuda does not accept the principle of raising the partition.
  § It is taught in the mishna: One who immersed for the purpose of eating non-sacred food with the intention of assuming a presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food it is prohibited for him to eat tithes. The Gemara comments: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is that of the Rabbis, who differentiate between non-sacred produce and tithes, since they maintain the following: If one who is required by rabbinic law to immerse touches non-sacred food, it remains pure, but if he comes into contact with tithes they are rendered ritually impure.
  However, in that case, say the latter clause of the mishna, which states that the garments of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, who is not careful with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, are considered to be rendered ritually impure by the impurity imparted by the treading of a <i>zav</i>, which is considered a primary source of ritual impurity, for <i>perushin</i>, individuals who are careful to eat even non-sacred food in a state of purity. The garments of <i>perushin</i>, although they are careful to remain ritually pure, are nevertheless considered to be rendered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for priests who partake of <i>teruma</i>. Consequently, the latter clause differs from the opinion of the Rabbis in the earlier clause.
  Therefore, we have arrived at the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Non-sacred produce and tithes are similar to one another, as this clause of the mishna does not distinguish between those eating non-sacred food and those eating tithes. Is the earlier clause the opinion of the Rabbis and the latter clause the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The Gemara answers: Yes; although it is unusual, in this instance we must explain that the earlier clause was said by the Rabbis and the latter clause by Rabbi Meir.
  However, Rav Aḥa bar Adda would teach that five levels of ritual purity are listed in the latter clause of the mishna, by counting the clause that states that the clothes of those who eat non-sacred produce in a state of purity are ritually impure for tithes, and in this way he establishes the entire mishna in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  § Rav Mari said: They learn from the mishna that non-sacred produce that was prepared according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food, i.e., with the same stringencies as required for sacrificial food, is like sacrificial food. From where is this deduced?
  
  Daf 20a
  
  It is deduced from the fact that it is not taught in their regard that those who eat non-sacred produce according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food must treat the produce with a higher standard with regard to their degree of purity, like those who actually partake of sacrificial food.
  The Gemara asks: But perhaps the reason for this fact, that a higher standard is not taught with regard to those who actually partake of sacrificial food, is that these foods are not on a distinct level of ritual purity, as, if they are similar to the level of <i>teruma</i>, <i>teruma</i> has already been taught; and if they are similar to non-sacred produce, non-sacred produce has also already been taught. As we learned in a <i>baraita</i> that they are not considered to be on a level of their own: Non-sacred foods prepared according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food are like non-sacred food; Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: They are like <i>teruma</i>, but not like sacrificial food. Therefore, the fact that this level is not explicitly mentioned affords no proof.
  Rather, the proof is derived from the last clause in the mishna: Yosei ben Yo’ezer was the most pious member of the priesthood, and yet his cloth was considered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for those who ate sacrificial food. Yoḥanan ben Gudgeda would eat non-sacred foods prepared according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food all his days, and nevertheless his cloth was considered rendered impure by the treading of a <i>zav</i> for those preparing the purification waters.
  The Gemara infers from this: For the purifying waters, yes, his cloth was considered to have ritual impurity imparted by treading, but for sacrificial food, no, it was not considered to have ritual impurity imparted by treading. Apparently, he maintains that non-sacred produce prepared according to the level of ritual purity required for sacrificial food is like sacrificial food, as one who is particular to preserve the ritual purity required for sacrificial food even with regard to non-sacred produce is considered pure even with regard to sacrificial food themselves.
  § With regard to the particular care that must be taken to prevent any suspicion that one’s clothes have contracted impurity, Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar said: If the shawl of one who was stringent with regard to ritual purity fell off of him, and he said to another person: Give it to me, and he gave it to him, the shawl is impure. Even if the other individual is himself pure, since his attention was diverted at that moment from being cautious with regard to impurity, it is as though the shawl were rendered impure. Similarly, Rabbi Yonatan ben Amram says: If one’s Shabbat clothes were switched for his weekday clothes and he wore them, they are impure. His assumption that they were different clothes than the clothes he had intended to wear is enough of a distraction to spoil his caution against impurity.
  Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: There was an incident involving two women who were wives of <i>ḥaverim</i>, who are meticulous in observance of <i>halakha</i> especially with regard to matters of impurity, whose clothes were switched in the bathhouse; and the incident came before Rabbi Akiva and he declared the clothes impure. This demonstrates that an unintentional act is considered a lapse of attention, which renders the items impure, even if there was no other reason to consider them impure.
  Rabbi Oshaya strongly objects to this: However, if that is so, one who inserted his hand into a basket to take a loaf of wheat bread, and a loaf of barley bread came up in his hand instead; in that case, too, will you say that the loaf is rendered impure?
  And if you would say, indeed, this is correct, but isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who is minding a barrel to ensure its ritual purity on the assumption that it is a barrel of wine and it is found to be of oil, it is ritually pure in the sense that it does not transmit impurity? This indicates that one’s lack of knowledge with regard to the identity of the item he is minding does not itself cause impurity. The Gemara rejects this: But according to your line of reasoning, say the latter clause of that same <i>baraita</i>: And it is prohibited to be eaten, which indicates that the supervision is insufficient in this case. The Gemara asks: Why is it that the barrel’s status is pure and yet there is a prohibition against eating its contents? If the supervisor’s error does not harm the food’s ritually pure status, one should likewise be permitted to eat it.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to one who says: I guarded it from things that render it impure but not from things that invalidate it. In other words, he was careful to guard it only from being rendered impure with a severe degree of impurity, which causes anything it renders impure to render others impure in turn, but not from a lesser degree of impurity that merely invalidates it for use but does not enable it to render other items ritually impure. Since he guarded it from impurity, it is considered pure with regard to rendering other items impure, but it still may not be eaten, in case it was invalidated by an impure object.
  The Gemara asks: And is there guarding by half measures; can it be said that one was careful with regard to only a particular type of impurity? The Gemara responds: Yes, as it is indeed taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one inserted his hand into a basket filled with figs, and the basket was placed on his shoulder, and a shovel was in the basket, and his mind was on the basket to guard it from impurity, but his mind was not on the shovel, the basket is pure and the shovel is impure.
  The Gemara asks: Why is the basket pure? Let the shovel render the basket ritually impure, if the former is in fact impure. The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> is that a vessel cannot render a different vessel impure. Therefore, the basket remains pure. The Gemara asks another question: And let it render impure any food that is inside the basket, as food is not a vessel and can therefore be rendered impure by a vessel. Ravina said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to one who says: I guarded the shovel from things that render it ritually impure, which is why it cannot render other objects impure, but I did not guard it from things that invalidate it, so it is impure. Consequently, there is no proof from here that the contents of the barrel in the earlier case may not be eaten.
  Returning to the prior discussion, the Gemara states that in any case it is difficult. Why should an object be impure just because the one guarding it was mistaken with regard to the identity of its contents; how would this accord with the <i>baraita</i> that explicitly taught that if one minds a barrel under the assumption that it is wine and it turns out to contain oil, the oil is pure and cannot render others impure?
  And Rabba bar Avuh raised a further objection: There was an incident involving a certain woman who came before Rabbi Yishmael and said to him: Rabbi, I wove this garment in a ritually pure state, but my mind was not on it to guard its state of purity. In other words, although I did not intend to guard it in this manner, I am certain that no impurity came into contact with it. And during the interrogations that Rabbi Yishmael conducted with her, to see if it had remained in a state of purity, she happened to say to him: Rabbi, a menstruating woman pulled the rope with me as I was weaving, and the garment was therefore rendered fully impure by a menstruating woman moving it. Rabbi Yishmael said: How great are the words of the Sages when they said: If one’s mind is focused on guarding it, it is pure; if one’s mind is not focused on guarding it, it is impure. Since she was not focused on preserving the garment’s pure state, it contracted impurity without her noticing.
  There was another incident involving a certain woman who came before Rabbi Yishmael and said to him: Rabbi, I wove this cloth in a state of ritual purity, but my mind was not on it to guard it from impurity. And during the interrogations that Rabbi Yishmael conducted with her, she said to him: Rabbi, a thread of mine that was woven into the cloth snapped and I tied it with my mouth. It can be assumed that the thread became moist from her spittle, which means that if that thread was touched by a source of impurity, the cloth would be rendered ritually impure by contact with impure liquids. This is because the Sages decreed that any impurity that touches liquid renders the liquid ritually impure to the first degree, so any vessel that comes into contact with the liquid would be impure to the second degree.
  Rabbi Yishmael said: How great are the words of the Sages when they said: If one’s mind is focused on guarding it, it is pure; if one’s mind is not focused on guarding it, it is impure. In any case, if one intends to keep something in a state of ritual purity, a mistake on his part with regard to its identity is not considered enough of a distraction to render the item impure, unlike the <i>baraita</i> that explicitly taught that if one minds a barrel under the assumption that it is wine and it turns out to contain oil, the oil is pure and cannot render others impure.
  The Gemara clarifies: Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok there is no difficulty, as in the case of the two wives of <i>ḥaverim</i> whose garments were switched it can be said that each of them says to herself: My colleague is the wife of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and not a <i>ḥaver</i>. And she diverts her mind from her garments, as she is certain that they have already been rendered impure, and a distraction of this kind makes it likely that the garment contracted impurity. It is therefore considered impure.
  Likewise, according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Amram there is no difficulty either, as with regard to the case of one who switched his Shabbat clothes with his weekday clothes, it can also be said that since he is more protective of Shabbat clothes, he will divert his mind from that higher level of protection if he thinks that they are weekday garments. A distraction of this kind makes it likely that the garment contracted impurity, so it is considered impure. But according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Elazar, who deals with the case where one’s shawl fell and another person lifts it up, why should this be considered a distraction? Let him guard his garments from ritual impurity while they are in the other person’s hands; why should they be considered impure?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is a presumption that a person does not guard that which is in another’s hand. Since the object is in the hands of another, he will inevitably be distracted from guarding it. The Gemara asks: And can one indeed not guard an item in the hand of another?
  
  Daf 20b
  
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one whose donkey drivers and workers, who were <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, were bearing pure food, without touching the pure food itself but only the earthenware vessels containing them, even if he distanced himself from them as they walked by more than a <i>mil</i>, his pure foods are pure. Since the workers are unaware of his departure, he is still considered to be guarding the food in their possession and need not be concerned that they may have touched the pure foods. But if he said to them: Go, and I will follow behind you, then once they are no longer within his eyesight, his pure foods are impure.
  The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>, where the food remains pure, and what is different in the latter clause, where the food is impure? Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: The first clause is referring to one who purifies his donkey drivers and workers for this purpose, meaning that he ensured that they immersed and purified themselves beforehand, so that concern for impurity was removed.
  The Gemara questions this: If so, in the latter clause they should also be pure. The Gemara responds: An <i>am ha’aretz</i> is not particular about the contact of his colleague, and therefore there is concern that they might have encountered another <i>am ha’aretz</i> on the way, who touched the produce and thereby rendered it impure.
  The Gemara counters: If so, in the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> there should also be concern that they might have met an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and despite the employer’s warning to his workers to stay ritually pure, they are not careful with regard to the impurity of another <i>am ha’aretz</i>. The Gemara answers: The first clause is referring to a situation when he comes across them via a circuitous path. Since he is not walking directly behind them but can appear from the sides, they cannot always see him. Consequently, they are concerned that he may return at any moment. Therefore, they are careful not to render themselves ritually impure, and they are also wary of the contact of other <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, although they are not usually particular about the contact of their colleagues.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, in the latter clause, too, since he can arrive from around a corner at any given moment, they should certainly be cautious. The Gemara responds: Since he said to them: Go and I will follow behind you, they rely on this, and they do not consider themselves to be under observation. Consequently, they are not particular about the contact of another <i>am ha’aretz</i>.
  
  MISHNA: Concerning several matters there is greater stringency with regard to sacrificial food than with regard to <i>teruma</i>, a portion of the produce designated for the priest. This expresses itself in many ways, the first being that one may immerse vessels inside other vessels to purify them for <i>teruma</i>; but not for sacrificial food, for which one must immerse each vessel separately. Another difference is that the <i>halakhot</i> of the back of a vessel and its inside and its place for gripping apply to vessels used for <i>teruma</i>, meaning that each part of the vessel has its own use and is considered a separate vessel in that it does not convey impurity to the other parts of the vessel when it contracts impurity; but not to sacrificial food, for which an impure section of the vessel does convey impurity to all the other sections.
  Likewise, one who carries an object trodden on by a <i>zav</i>, a man suffering from gonorrhea, may carry <i>teruma</i> at the same time, if he is careful that neither he nor the impure object should come into contact with the <i>teruma</i>, but this may not be done with sacrificial food. The garments of those who eat <i>teruma</i> are like an object trodden on by a <i>zav</i> with regard to sacrificial food.
  The mishna lists other stringencies that apply to sacrificial foods but not to <i>teruma</i>: The characteristics of <i>teruma</i> are not like the characteristics of sacrificial food, as in the case of vessels that are used with sacrificial food, if one has a garment or vessel that is tied up he must untie it and dry it if there was any moisture on it, as both a knot and absorbed moisture are considered interpositions that prevent the water of the ritual bath from reaching the entire garment. And he may then immerse them, and afterward he may tie them up again if he wishes. But with regard to <i>teruma</i> he may, if he so desires, tie up the garment and then immerse it without any concern that the knot might be considered an interposition.
  Vessels that were fashioned and completed in purity nevertheless require immersion to be considered pure for sacrificial foods, but not for <i>teruma</i>. A vessel combines all the food that is in it with regard to sacrificial food, meaning that if one piece of food becomes impure all the other pieces become impure as well; but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>, concerning which each piece is treated independently.
  The mishna continues the list of differences between sacrificial food and <i>teruma</i>. Sacrificial food that is impure with fourth-degree impurity is disqualified, meaning that the sacrificial food is rendered impure but it does not impart impurity to other items. <i>Teruma</i> is disqualified when it is impure with third-degree impurity; it is not susceptible to fourth-degree impurity at all. And with regard to <i>teruma</i>, if one of one’s hands became impure by rabbinic law that renders only the hands impure, its counterpart, i.e., the other hand, remains pure. But with regard to sacrificial food, if one hand becomes impure he must immerse them both, as one hand renders its counterpart impure with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>. One may eat dry foods, i.e., foods that have never come into contact with liquid and are therefore not susceptible to impurity, with impure hands when it is <i>teruma</i>, but not when it is sacrificial food.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  An acute mourner [<i>onen</i>], i.e., someone who has experienced the loss of a close relative on that day, who had not come into contact with the deceased; and one who is lacking atonement, i.e., someone who still needs to bring an offering to complete his purification procedure, such as a <i>zav</i> or a woman after childbirth, both require immersion in order to eat sacrificial food. The <i>onen</i> would immerse after the day has passed and the one lacking atonement would immerse after the requisite offering is brought. However, immersion in these cases is not necessary for eating <i>teruma</i>.
  GEMARA: It is taught in the mishna that one may not immerse one vessel inside another if they will be used for sacrificial food, though this may be done for <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: With regard to sacrificial food, what is the reason that one may not immerse vessels in this manner? Rabbi Ila said: Because the weight of the inner vessel causes an interposition between the water and the vessels. That is, the innermost vessel weighs down on the bottom one, not allowing the water to reach the two vessels’ point of contact.
  The Gemara poses a question on this explanation: But is it not so that since the latter clause of the mishna mentions that sacrificial foods and <i>teruma</i> differ with regard to matters of interposition, the first clause of the mishna must not be with regard to matters of interposition, but is referring to a different consideration? As it teaches in the latter part of the mishna: The characteristics of <i>teruma</i> are not like the characteristics of sacrificial food, as in the case of sacrificial food, if one has a garment or vessel that is tied up he must untie it and dry it, and he may then immerse them, and afterward he may tie them up again if he wishes; but with regard to <i>teruma</i> he may tie up the garment and then immerse it. This latter clause shows that there the Sages were concerned for any possibility of interposition with regard to sacrificial food, so most likely the earlier clause of the mishna is due to a different reason.
  The Gemara answers: No, this is not necessarily so. In both the first clause and the latter clause of the mishna the concern is due to interposition, and it is nevertheless necessary to teach us both cases. For had the mishna taught us only the first clause, i.e., that one may not immerse one vessel within another, I would have said that this is the reason one may not do so for sacrificial food: Because there is the weight of the interior vessel that must be taken into account. But in the latter clause, where there is no weight of a vessel to be considered, I will say that it is not considered an interposition for sacrificial food either. And had it taught us only the latter clause dealing with the knotted garments, I would have said that this is the reason one may not do so for sacrificial food: Because it is possible
  
  Daf 21b
  
  that it is the nature of knots to tighten even more in water, creating an interposition that bars the water from entering all the way, but in the case of the first clause of the mishna, which deals with one vessel inside another and where water by nature causes the top vessel to lighten and float away from the lower vessel rather than weigh down on it, I would have said that it is not considered an interposition. It is therefore necessary for the <i>halakha</i> to be stated in both cases.
  The Gemara comments: Rabbi Ila here conforms to his standard line of reasoning in considering these two issues as one, as Rabbi Ila said that Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappa said: They taught ten stringencies of sacrificial food here in this mishna, rather than the apparent eleven. The first five stringencies apply both to the sacrificial foods themselves and to non-sacred food that was prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, whereas the last five apply only to actual sacrificial food but not to non-sacred food that was prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food. The fact that Rabbi Ila counts only ten cases in the mishna shows that he considered the two cases discussed above to be of the same category, and therefore they are counted together as one stringency.
  The Gemara explains Rabbi Ila’s statement. What is the reason for this distinction? With regard to the first five stringencies, which have a connection to impurity as defined by Torah law because ignoring them can lead to a case of impurity by Torah law as opposed to merely rabbinic law, the Sages decreed these stringencies both for actual sacrificial food and for non-sacred food prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food. However, with regard to the last five, which do not have a connection to impurity by Torah law, as their entire impurity is based on a rabbinic decree, the Sages decreed these stringencies only for actual sacrificial food. But with regard to non-sacred food made according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, the Sages did not decree these stringencies for such foods.
  Rava disagreed with Rabbi Ila. He said that since the reason for the stringency in the latter clause is due to concern for interposition, this implies that the reason for the stringency in the first clause is not due to interposition, but to a different reason. And with regard to the stringency in the first clause that one may not immerse one vessel within another, this is the reasoning: It is a rabbinic decree to ensure that one not immerse small vessels, such as needles and hooks, inside a vessel whose mouth is less than the width of the tube of a wineskin. In such a case the water in the bottle would not be considered attached to the rest of the ritual bath, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 6:7): The joining of different bodies of water in cases of ritual baths takes place if the opening between the two bodies is at least as wide as the width of the tube of a wineskin, counting both the thickness of the wall of the tube
  
  Daf 22a
  
  and its space, which is equivalent to the width of two fingers going around in their place, i.e., a space large enough to insert two fingers and twist them around inside. If one body of water contains the requisite forty <i>se’a</i>, while another, adjacent body is lacking this amount, then if the opening between the two bodies of water is wider than this measurement, the two bodies are considered as one, and the smaller body is also considered an acceptable ritual bath. Since any opening smaller than this is not considered to connect two bodies of water, the water inside a bottle with a narrow mouth would be considered disconnected from the water of the ritual bath, and smaller vessels inside such a narrow-necked vessel would not be considered as having come into contact with the water of the ritual bath. The Sages therefore enacted a decree rendering prohibited the immersion of any vessel inside another vessel.
  The Gemara notes: Rava holds in accordance with this statement that Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: They taught eleven stringencies of sacrificial food here in this mishna, rather than Rabbi Ila’s ten. The first six stringencies apply both to sacrificial food itself and to non-sacred food that was prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, whereas the last five apply only to actual sacrificial food but not to non-sacred food that was prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food.
  The Gemara asks: What practical difference is there between the opinion of Rava, i.e., that the Sages rendered it prohibited to immerse one vessel inside of another because they were concerned lest one immerse needles in a vessel whose mouth is narrower than the tube of a wineskin, and the opinion of Rabbi Ila, who holds that their concern was about interposition?
  The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case of a basket or a wicker bin [<i>gargutni</i>] that one has filled with smaller vessels and has immersed them all together. According to Rabbi Ila, the one who said it is prohibited to immerse one vessel inside another due to the concern of interposition, in this case as well there is such a concern, as the inner vessels might weigh down against the basket and prevent the water from touching the contact points. But according to Rava, the one who said it is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree lest one immerse needles and hooks inside a vessel whose mouth does not have the width of the tube of a wineskin, there are no such things as baskets and wicker bins whose mouth does not have the width of the tube of a wineskin, and therefore the decree would not apply to them.
  The Gemara notes: And Rava follows his line of reasoning, as Rava said: A basket or wicker bin that one has filled with smaller vessels and has immersed them all together, they are pure in all regards, even for sacrificial food.
  Rava stated a second teaching with regard to baskets and bins as well: And in the case of a ritual bath that one divided into two sections by inserting a basket or wicker bin, so that each section is left with less than the required forty <i>se’a</i>, if one immerses there, his immersion is ineffective for him. Despite the certainty that water seeps through the basket or bin, this is not enough to join the two incomplete sections of the ritual bath to be counted as one. We know that this is so, for the earth is entirely porous, and nevertheless we do not rely on this to allow several adjacent, small ditches full of water to add up to forty <i>se’a</i>, but rather require that there be forty <i>se’a</i> together in one place.
  The Gemara comments: And this <i>halakha</i>, that small vessels such as needles cannot be immersed inside a vessel with a narrow opening, applies only if he immersed them in a pure vessel, which does not require purification on its own. But if he did so in an impure vessel, which requires purification in its own right, since the immersion is effective for the whole of the outer vessel, including its inside, it is also effective for the vessels that are inside of it. Since the water that enters the outer vessel is considered attached to the rest of the ritual bath for purposes of purification of the outer vessel, so is it considered attached with regard to the purification of the inner vessels.
  We know this, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Mikvaot</i> 6:2): With regard to vessels that one filled with other vessels and immersed them all together, they are pure, regardless of the width of the opening of the outer vessel. And if he did not immerse, the joining of waters is not effective until they are joined like the width of the tube of a wineskin. This second sentence of the mishna is unclear, and the Gemara seeks to clarify it. What is the mishna saying here when it says: And if he did not immerse? The Gemara explains. This is what the mishna is saying: And if he has no need to immerse the outer vessel, as it was already pure, and similarly in a case of two bodies of water that are joined together by means of a hole, it is not valid until the water is joined through a space as wide as the tube of a wineskin.
  § The Gemara notes: And this dispute between Rava and Rabbi Ila is also a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a basket or a wicker bin that one filled with vessels and then immersed them, whether for purposes of sacrificial food or for purposes of <i>teruma</i>, they are pure. This is identical to Rava’s opinion. Abba Shaul says: They are pure for purposes of <i>teruma</i> but not for purposes of sacrificial food. This is identical to Rabbi Ila’s opinion.
  The Gemara asks: If so, in light of these two reasons we have given for concern with regard to immersing vessels inside other vessels, this should not be permitted for <i>teruma</i> either. The Gemara responds: For whom do we say the principle that one vessel may not be immersed inside another? For <i>ḥaverim</i>, individuals devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot, especially <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity. Others do not carefully follow these <i>halakhot</i> in any event. And <i>ḥaverim</i> know such things well, that water is considered detached from the ritual bath if it is separated by a narrow opening, and that if one vessel is weighing down on another, preventing the water from reaching that spot, the top vessel must be lifted to allow the water to touch all parts of the vessel. Therefore, there is no need to apply these concerns and stringencies to the case of <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara counters with another question. If so, we should say the same thing in the case of sacrificial food too, i.e., that all these <i>halakhot</i> are for <i>ḥaverim</i>, who meticulously follow ritual purity for sacrificial food and inquire about such <i>halakhot</i>. Why, then, did the Sages apply these concerns and stringencies to the case of sacrificial food? The Gemara responds: With regard to sacrificial food they were concerned that a common person [<i>am ha’aretz</i>], who is not meticulous about ritual purity, may see the <i>ḥaver</i> immersing small vessels inside of large vessels, and will then go and immerse vessels of his own in this manner. But he will not take the same precautions as the <i>ḥaver</i> would, ensuring that the outer vessel has a wide opening and that the vessels on top do not weigh down on the lower ones.
  The Gemara objects: But the same concern could be raised with regard to <i>teruma</i> as well. It is possible that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> may see the <i>ḥaver</i> immerse vessels for <i>teruma</i> in this manner, and he will then go and immerse his vessels this way, without taking the precautions that the <i>ḥaver</i> would take. The Gemara answers: We do not accept <i>teruma</i> from <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, as they are not trustworthy with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, and therefore it does not matter if the vessels he uses for <i>teruma</i> are not immersed properly. Therefore, the Sages were not concerned that the <i>am ha’aretz</i> may come to a misunderstanding when observing a <i>ḥaver</i> immersing vessels within vessels.
  The Gemara continues its line of questioning. If so, we should likewise not accept sacrificial food from <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, since they are not sufficiently meticulous with ritual purity, and we should therefore not care if they immerse their vessels improperly. The Gemara responds: The <i>am ha’aretz</i> will have feelings of antagonism if sacrificial food is not accepted from him, and this would lead to internal discord and conflict within Israel.
  The Gemara asks: If so, in the case of <i>teruma</i> he will also have feelings of antagonism if <i>teruma</i> is not accepted from him. Why were the Sages concerned about this factor only with regard to sacrificial food and not <i>teruma</i>? The Gemara replies: An <i>am ha’aretz</i> does not care if his <i>teruma</i> is not accepted by <i>ḥaverim</i>, as he can always go and give his <i>teruma</i> to an <i>am ha’aretz</i> priest who is his friend and who will accept it from him. In the case of sacrificial food, however, there is only one Temple, and care must be taken not to make the <i>amei ha’aretz</i> feel they are being rejected.
  The Gemara notes that this sensitivity of not causing offense to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> is expressed elsewhere as well: And who is the <i>tanna</i> that is concerned for such antagonism of <i>amei ha’aretz</i>? It is Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei said: For what reason are all people, i.e., even <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, trusted with regard to the purity of their wine and oil that they bring to the Temple for sacrificial purposes throughout the year? Why is the status of these items not investigated to determine that they were prepared with the necessary regard for ritual purity? In order to avoid schisms among the people, so that each and every individual should not go off and build a private altar for himself and burn a red heifer for himself. Were the Sages to reject sacrificial wine and oil from <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, they would become alienated and go off and create schisms, going so far as to build their own separate temples and bring their own private offerings.
  Rav Pappa said: In accordance with whose opinion do we accept testimony nowadays from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, despite the concern of some Sages that their carelessness with regard to observance of <i>halakha</i> might also lead to personal untrustworthiness? In accordance with whom is this done? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  § We have established that the reason for leniency with regard to immersing one vessel inside another for <i>teruma</i> is based on the fact that we do not care if the vessels <i>amei ha’aretz</i> use for <i>teruma</i> are improperly purified, since we do not accept <i>teruma</i> from them in any event. The Gemara asks: But let us be concerned about borrowing vessels from them. Although <i>ḥaverim</i> do not accept <i>teruma</i> from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, they do sometimes borrow their vessels and use them for <i>teruma</i>. It should therefore be a matter of concern for us if those vessels are not properly purified.
  The Gemara proves that it is acceptable to borrow vessels from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>: As we learned in a mishna (<i>Eduyyot</i> 1:14): An earthenware vessel of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> shields all kinds of items from the ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. There are two applications of this fact: If there are objects or foods inside a tightly sealed earthenware vessel located inside a room containing a corpse, the vessel prevents the impurity from reaching the items inside it. Also, if there is a corpse in the first floor of a house and food or vessels are located in a second story of the same building, with an opening such as a skylight in the floor between the two stories, an earthenware vessel plugging up the opening will prevent the ritual impurity from spreading to the second story. This is the statement of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: It shields only food, drink, and earthenware vessels, but not utensils of metal, wood, cloth, etc.
  The mishna continues: Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: For what reason do you make this distinction? It is clear that a closed, pure earthenware vessel serves as a barrier, blocking the spread of impurity in a room with a corpse (see Numbers 19:15). Beit Shammai said to them: Because the earthenware vessel itself is impure on account of its contact with an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. The Sages decreed that anything touched by an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is impure, since such people are not meticulous or sufficiently knowledgeable about the <i>halakhot</i> of purity; therefore his vessels are considered impure. And the principle is that an impure vessel does not serve as a barrier from impurity. Beit Hillel said to them: But didn’t you declare the food and drink inside the earthenware vessel to be pure? If the vessel of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> cannot serve as a barrier, why do you say that some items inside it are pure? Beit Shammai said to them: When we declared the food and drink inside it to be pure,
  
  Daf 22b
  
  we declared them pure for the <i>am ha’aretz</i> himself, not for <i>ḥaverim</i>, since <i>ḥaverim</i> in any event do not consider anything touched by an <i>am ha’aretz</i> to be pure. A <i>ḥaver</i> would therefore never relate to the food of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> as pure, and he would not use the earthenware vessels of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> for preparation of pure food, since an earthenware vessel cannot be purified through immersion. However, he might borrow a metal vessel, for instance, and purify it through immersion before using it for pure food.
  But how can we purify a vessel of metal and other materials, whose purity would be relevant both for you and for him? A <i>ḥaver</i> may one day borrow a metal vessel from the <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and not realize that it was once inside an earthenware vessel in the same room as a corpse and as a result requires extensive purification from corpse contamination through the ashes of the red heifer, rather than mere immersion. Therefore, the <i>am ha’aretz</i> is informed that his vessels of metal and other materials have contracted impurity from the corpse, and must undergo the extensive purification process, and after this is done these vessels will now be fit for use of the <i>ḥaver</i> after mere immersion.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this debate between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel: Rabbi Yehoshua said: I am ashamed of your words, Beit Shammai, for they are illogical. Is it possible that there should be a corpse on the first floor, with an earthenware vessel blocking the opening to the second story, and a woman is standing upstairs kneading dough in a metal bowl, and the woman and the bowl are impure for seven days owing to the impurity of the corpse, while the dough inside the trough is pure? For that would be the result according to Beit Shammai, who distinguishes between food and earthenware vessels on the one hand and metal vessels on the other. Similarly: Is it possible that there is a metal pitcher [<i>login</i>] full of liquid in the second story, and the pitcher should be impure with impurity of seven days, while the liquids remain pure?
  After Rabbi Yehoshua posed this question, one student from among the students of Beit Shammai approached him and said to him: I will tell you Beit Shammai’s reasoning. He said to him: Speak. He said to him: Does an impure vessel serve as a barrier to corpse contamination or does it not serve as a barrier? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: It does not serve as a barrier. The student asked further: And is a vessel of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> pure or impure? He said to him: Impure. The student responded: And if you tell him that his vessel is impure, will he pay attention to you at all? Clearly he will not. What is more, if you say to him that it is impure, he will say to you: On the contrary, my vessel is pure and yours is impure.
  And that is Beit Shammai’s reasoning: Food, drink, and earthenware vessels inside a sealed earthenware vessel remain pure, as, since they belong to an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, a <i>ḥaver</i> will not eat the food or borrow the earthenware vessel. Vessels of metal or similar materials may one day be borrowed by a <i>ḥaver</i>, however, and therefore Beit Shammai declared these to be impure.
  Once he heard the logic behind Beit Shammai’s opinion, Rabbi Yehoshua immediately went and prostrated himself on the graves of Beit Shammai, i.e., the students and proponents of Shammai, and said: I humble myself before you, bones of Beit Shammai. If such clarity and wisdom is found in your rulings that you stated and left unexplained, all the more so must this be the case in your rulings when they were stated and explained. People said of Rabbi Yehoshua: Throughout his days his teeth darkened because of all his fasts that he undertook to atone for having spoken inappropriately of Beit Shammai.
  The Gemara returns to its main point. In any event, this mishna teaches that the status of the vessels of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is relevant both for you and for him. Apparently, then, we <i>ḥaverim</i> may borrow vessels from <i>amei ha’aretz</i>. The question therefore arises: Why are the Sages not concerned that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> may immerse vessels inside of other vessels in an inappropriate way, so that they will remain unpurified when borrowed by a <i>ḥaver</i>? The Gemara answers: For when we <i>ḥaverim</i> borrow vessels from them we immerse them before using them. It is therefore inconsequential to us if their vessels were not immersed properly beforehand.
  The Gemara asks: If so, let Beit Hillel respond to Beit Shammai. They can respond as follows: When we borrow vessels from them we immerse them, and that is why we rule that vessels of metal or similar materials are pure. The Gemara explains: That dispute is referring to the impurity of a corpse. And that which becomes impure by proximity to a corpse requires sprinkling of the red heifer’s ashes on the third and seventh days of its purification, and people do not generally lend vessels for seven days. The solution the <i>ḥaver</i> implements of immersing vessels that he borrows from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is effective only for other impurities, but not for the impurity imparted by a corpse.
  The Gemara poses a question with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that a <i>ḥaver</i> must immerse vessels that he borrows from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>: But is it so that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are not trusted with regard to immersion? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted with regard to the purification process of immersion of that which has become impure by contact with a corpse? In addition to being sprinkled with purification water on the third and seventh days, a person or article that has been in contact with a corpse must also undergo immersion on the seventh day. An <i>am ha’aretz</i> is believed when he says that he has performed this immersion.
  The Gemara presents two answers for this question. Abaye said one answer: This is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is trusted, is referring to the immersion of his body, whereas this teaching of the Gemara that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are not trusted concerning immersion deals with his vessels. Rava said a different answer: Both this and that, both the <i>baraita</i> and the Gemara’s teaching, refer to the vessels of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and it is nevertheless not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is trusted, is referring to an <i>am ha’aretz</i> who said: I never immersed one vessel inside another, which is a statement that we accept. And this teaching of the Gemara that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are not trusted deals with one who said: I have immersed vessels inside of other vessels, but I did not immerse with a vessel whose mouth does not have the width of the tube of a wineskin. It is with regard to such details that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> cannot be trusted.
  And so it was taught in a <i>baraita</i> to this effect: An <i>am ha’aretz</i> is trusted to say that produce has not been made susceptible to impurity, i.e., that it has never come into contact with water, but he is not trusted to say that the produce has been made susceptible to impurity but has not actually become impure. This <i>baraita</i> shows that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted concerning basic facts, but not concerning matters that require detailed knowledge and scrupulous care.
  The Gemara poses a question with regard to Abaye’s opinion: And is an <i>am ha’aretz</i> really trusted concerning his body, when he claims to have immersed? Isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning a <i>ḥaver</i> who comes before those in charge of sprinkling water of purification to be sprinkled with that water, and claims that the requisite three days have passed since his contamination by a corpse, they may sprinkle upon him immediately. But concerning an <i>am ha’aretz</i> who comes before them and claims that three days have passed, they may not sprinkle upon him until he performs and counts in our presence the third day and the seventh day? This shows that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is not trusted concerning the purity of his own body.
  Rather, Abaye said, modifying his previous explanation: Because of the stringency that you applied to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> in his beginning, i.e., at the beginning of the purification process, by not allowing him to purify himself without first ensuring that he has not been in contact with a corpse for three days, you may be lenient with him in his end, in that he is trusted regarding having immersed at the end of the seven days, removing the impurity contracted through contact with a corpse.
  § The mishna teaches: The <i>halakhot</i> of the back of a vessel and its inside apply to vessels used for <i>teruma</i>, but not for sacrificial food. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: The back and its inside?
  The Gemara explains. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Keilim</i> 25:6): A vessel whose back part, as opposed to its inside, was defiled by contact with impure liquid. Its back is impure, while its other parts, such as its inside, its rim, its ear-shaped handles, and its straight handles are pure. By Torah law, foods and liquids cannot impart ritual impurity to a vessel at all, but by rabbinic law liquids can. In order to clarify that it is only a rabbinic decree, they instituted that the impurity thereby imparted, if the liquid touched the outside of the vessel, should affect only the part touched by the liquid, but not its inside or the other parts of its outside. However, if its inside was defiled, even by impurity only according to rabbinic law, it is all impure. This <i>halakha</i> applies only to <i>teruma</i>, but regarding offerings, the defilement of any part of the vessel renders it all impure.
  § The mishna teaches: And its place for gripping. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Place for gripping [<i>beit hatzevita</i>]? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is the place where he grips the vessel in order to pass [<i>tzovet</i>] it, a kind of indentation used for grasping the vessel. And similarly it states: “And he pinched [<i>vayitzbat</i>] some parched corn for her” (Ruth 2:14), which means that he gave her a little of the corn. Therefore, the term is referring to a place on the vessel used to grasp it. Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is the place that fastidious people use for dipping. A small receptacle for spices and the like would be attached to the sides of vessels for dipping one’s food.
  Rav Beivai taught the following <i>baraita</i> before Rav Naḥman: No vessels have this difference between the back and inside, whether they are vessels used for consecrated foods of the Temple or those used for consecrated foods of outlying areas, i.e., outside the Temple. In these cases, if one of the parts of the vessel was defiled with impure liquids the entire vessel becomes impure. Rav Naḥman said to him: What are these consecrated foods of outlying areas mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>? This term is usually applied to <i>teruma</i>, but if so the <i>baraita</i> contradicts the mishna. For didn’t we learn in the mishna: The <i>halakhot</i> of the back of a vessel and its inside and its place for gripping apply to vessels used for <i>teruma</i>?
  Rav Naḥman continued: Perhaps when you said the consecrated foods of outlying areas you were not referring to <i>teruma</i>, but rather you are speaking of non-sacred food prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, and you called them consecrated foods of outlying areas because this level of purity can be observed outside the Temple as well.
  In the course of this discussion Rav Naḥman said to Rav Beivai: You have now reminded me of something that Rabba bar Avuh said concerning this issue: They taught eleven stringencies of sacrificial food here in the mishna. The first six apply both to sacrificial food and to non-sacred food prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food, whereas the last five apply only to sacrificial foods but not to non-sacred food prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial food. Rabba bar Avuh’s statement therefore corroborates the interpretation of the <i>baraita</i> as dealing with non-sacred food prepared according to the standards of purity of sacrificial foods.
  § The mishna teaches: One who carries an object trodden by a <i>zav</i> may carry <i>teruma</i> at the same time, if he is careful that neither he nor the impure object come into contact with the <i>teruma</i>, but this may not be done with sacrificial food. The Gemara asks: Concerning sacrificial food, what is the reason that he may not carry it? As long as contact with the food is prevented, why should he not carry sacrificial food as well? The Gemara answers: This enactment was made due to an incident that occurred. As Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: There was once an incident involving someone who was transferring a barrel of sacrificial wine from one place to another,
  
  Daf 23a
  
  and the strap of his sandal, which had been rendered ritually impure by being trodden by a <i>zav</i>, broke off, and he picked up the strap and placed it on top of the mouth of the barrel, and it fell into the airspace of the barrel, thereby rendering the entire barrel impure. At that time the Sages said and issued a permanent decree that one who carries an object that is impure by having been trodden by a <i>zav</i> may carry <i>teruma</i> at the same time, but not sacrificial food.
  The Gemara asks: If so, if they prohibited doing so due to that incident, they should have made the same decree with regard to <i>teruma</i> also, because if the same incident would occur with <i>teruma</i> it would defile the <i>teruma</i> as well. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this stated? It is that of Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya, who said concerning a similar issue: They prohibited it only in the Jordan River, and only in a boat, in a situation similar to the incident that occurred, which triggered the enactment. In his opinion, whenever the Sages enacted a decree prohibiting something due to a particular incident, they did not extend the prohibition to related cases, but only to the same set of circumstances that pertained to that specific incident.
  The Gemara presents the background to Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya’s statement: What is that enactment that Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya was referring to? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A person may not carry the water of purification and the ashes of purification and transport them across the Jordan River, and this is if he is on a boat. Nor may he stand on one side of the river and throw them to the other side. Nor may he float them across the river. Nor may he ford the river riding on an animal or on his friend and carrying the water or ashes of purification, unless his feet are touching the ground as he fords the river. But he may transfer them across the river over a bridge without concern about transferring them improperly. This decree applies both to the Jordan and to other rivers. Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya says: The Sages prohibited these acts only in the Jordan River, and only if he transports them in a boat, and in circumstances exactly like those of the incident that occurred.
  The Gemara inquires: What was the incident that occurred? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: There was once an incident involving a person who was transferring water of purification and ashes of purification in the Jordan, and he was on a boat, and an olive-bulk from a corpse was discovered stuck in the floor of the boat, over which the water of purification had passed, thereby rendering them impure and invalid. At that time the Sages said: A person may not carry water of purification and ashes of purification and transport them across the Jordan, and this is if he is on a boat. Just as in that case, Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya stated that the decree was limited to the specific circumstances of the original incident, here too, he would say that since the original incident involved sacrificial food and not <i>teruma</i> the Sages did not apply the decree to <i>teruma</i>.
  Several dilemmas were raised before the scholars: It is clear that this <i>halakha</i>, like the incident itself, applies to an object that has actually contracted impurity by being trodden by a <i>zav</i>, such as an impure sandal. But if it is a pure sandal, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the decree so far-reaching as to include a prohibition against carrying even a pure sandal together with sacrificial food? Similarly, the <i>halakha</i> certainly applies to an open barrel, where there is a danger that the sandal may enter the airspace of the barrel, as in the original incident, but if it was a closed barrel, where there is no such danger, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does the decree apply in this case as well? Another question: If someone transgressed this decree and carried an impure sandal together with sacrificial food, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Did the Sages decree that the sacrificial food would become defiled because their decree was transgressed or not?
  The Gemara presents a conclusion for the last dilemma. Rabbi Ila said: If one transgressed and carried sacrificial food together with an impure sandal, it is indeed rendered impure. Rabbi Zeira said: If he transgressed and carried sacrificial food in this manner, it is still pure.
  § The mishna states: Vessels that were fashioned and completed in purity require immersion for sacrificial food but not for <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: Who completed the work of these vessels? If we say that it was a <i>ḥaver</i>, an individual who is meticulous about the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity, who completed them, why should they require immersion, given that he is meticulous about the <i>halakhot</i> of purity?
  Rather, it must mean that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> completed them. But can one call these vessels completed in purity? The very touch of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> renders them impure. Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Mattana said that Shmuel said: Actually, the mishna is dealing with vessels that a <i>ḥaver</i> completed, and the Sages declared them impure for sacrificial food due to a concern that the spittle of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> might have fallen on them, which would render them impure if he were a <i>zav</i>.
  The Gemara asks: When did this hypothetical spittle fall on the vessel? If we say it was before he completed the vessel, in that case it is not yet a vessel, and therefore cannot contract impurity at that stage at all. Rather, it must have sprayed onto the vessel after he completed it. But at that point, since he is a <i>ḥaver</i>, he is careful about it. He would ensure that no spittle would fall on it, so there is no danger that it might have become defiled. The Gemara responds: Actually, we must explain that the spittle fell before he completed it, when the <i>ḥaver</i> was not yet guarding it against impurity, and the Sages were concerned that perhaps at the moment when he completed the vessel the spittle was still moist, and thus still capable of defiling the finished vessel, for the continued presence of the spittle on the vessel might have escaped the attention of the <i>ḥaver</i> craftsman.
  The Gemara comments: The mishna states that the vessel requires immersion, implying: Immersion, yes, but the setting of the sun after immersion, not, i.e., it is considered pure immediately after immersion, even though generally the purification engendered by immersion does not take effect until sunset.
  The Gemara asks: If so, the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 5:4): Regarding a tube of reed, which one cut for storing ashes of purification, Rabbi Eliezer says: He should immerse it immediately; Rabbi Yehoshua says: He should first render it impure by touching it to an actual source of impurity and only after that immerse it. And we discussed the mishna’s case, asking: Who cut this tube? If we say a <i>ḥaver</i> cut it, why do I need immersion? The <i>ḥaver</i> prepared it with the strictest adherence to the <i>halakhot</i> of purity. Rather, it must be that an <i>am ha’aretz</i> cut it. But in that case, would Rabbi Yehoshua say that he should first render it impure and only then immerse it? Isn’t it already impure, due to the handling of the <i>am ha’aretz</i>?
  And in response to this question, Rabba bar Sheila said that Rav Mattana said that Shmuel said: Actually, the case is that a <i>ḥaver</i> cut it, and the reason it requires immersion is because the Sages were concerned that the spittle of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> might have touched it. The Gemara asks: When did this hypothetical spittle fall on the tube? If we say it was before he cut the tube, in that case it is not yet a vessel and therefore cannot contract impurity at that stage. Rather, it must have sprayed onto the vessel after he completed it. But at that point, since he is a <i>ḥaver</i>, he is careful about it and would ensure that no spittle would fall on it, so there is no danger that it might have become impure. The Gemara responds: Actually we must explain that the spittle fell before he cut it, and the Sages were concerned that perhaps at the moment when he cut the tube the spittle was still moist, and thus still capable of rendering the finished tube impure.
  The Gemara continues: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehoshua it is found that there is an act of recognition performed in opposition to the Sadducees, in order to demonstrate that the Sages do not take their opinions into account.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 3:7): They would render impure the priest who burns the red heifer, in order to counter the opinion of the Sadducees, who used to say: The ritual of the red heifer was to be performed by those who had experienced sunset after their immersion. The Sadducee opinion was that all those involved in the preparation of the red heifer must be completely pure, having undergone immersion as well as having waited until after sunset, when the purification takes full effect. The Sages, however, maintain that the red heifer may be prepared by people immediately after immersion, without waiting for sunset. In order to clearly demonstrate their rejection of the Sadducee opinion they would deliberately defile the people involved with preparing the red heifer and then immerse them. It is for this reason as well that Rabbi Yehoshua ruled that the tube must be rendered impure before it is immersed.
  But according to Rabbi Eliezer, granted, if you say that generally, the setting of the sun is required after a vessel is completed, it is found that there is some act of recognition in opposition to the Sadducees, as according to him, the tube used for the red heifer ashes, which should normally have required the setting of the sun, is used without waiting for sunset. But if you say that generally the setting of the sun is not required to remove the impurity caused by the touch of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, and immersion alone is sufficient, what act of recognition in opposition to the Sadducees is there here? It must be, therefore, that Rabbi Eliezer requires the setting of the sun for purification from the impurity imparted by an <i>am ha’aretz</i>. Therefore, the mishna, which implies that immersion alone is sufficient, does not accord with Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion.
  Rav said: Indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does not require the setting of the sun for vessels that have been completed in purity, but there is nevertheless a demonstrative sign that the opinion of the Sadducees is rejected,
  
  Daf 23b
  
  as they treated the tube with severity as though it had been rendered impure by contact with a dead creeping animal. Therefore, in not requiring the setting of the sun they made it noticeable that they were opposed to the Sadducees.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty. However, if that is so, that the tube is treated as if defiled by a creeping animal, it should not render a person impure, as something defiled by a creeping animal is impure to the first degree of ritual impurity, which cannot impart ritual impurity to people. Why, then, is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The one who cuts and immerses the tube for the red heifer ashes requires immersion himself, which shows that the tube does defile people? But rather, say that they treated it as something made impure by contact with a corpse, for such objects do defile people as well. The Gemara asks: If that is so, the tube should also require the sprinkling of the water of purification on the third and seventh days of its purification, like all things defiled by a corpse.
  Why, then, is it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The one who cuts and immerses it requires immersion, which indicates that immersion for the tube, yes, this is required, but sprinkling of the third and the seventh day, no. Rather, you must say that they treated it as something made impure by contact with a corpse that is already in its seventh day, after its sprinklings, when it is still impure and imparts impurity to those who touch it, but requires only immersion and no further sprinkling.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Sages never made any innovations in the <i>halakhot</i> of impurity with regard to the red heifer procedure. In other words, although the Sages added stringencies to the red heifer procedure, they never created new <i>halakhot</i> for it that do not exist elsewhere in other areas of <i>halakha</i>. We have said that the tube is treated as if it had had contact with a corpse even though it did not; this is an innovation that is not found anywhere else.
  The Gemara answers: Abaye said: When they said that the Sages did not make innovations, they were not referring to something of this nature, but meant that they did not say that a spade upon which a <i>zav</i> sits can become impure as a seat. They thereby preserved the basic <i>halakhot</i> of impurity, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It states with regard to a <i>zav</i>: “And he who sits on any object whereon the <i>zav</i> sits shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water, and be unclean until the evening” (Leviticus 15:6). One might have thought that if a <i>zav</i> turned over a vessel used to measure a <i>se’a</i> and sat on it, or if he turned over a vessel used to measure a <i>tarkav</i>, i.e., a half-<i>se’a</i>, and sat on it, that the vessel should be rendered impure as a seat upon which a <i>zav</i> sat.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Therefore, the verse states: “And he who sits on any object whereon the <i>zav</i> sits…and be unclean until the evening” (Leviticus 15:6). The wording of the verse indicates that it is speaking of an object that is designated for sitting, i.e., upon which people generally sit, excluding such a vessel for which we would say to someone sitting on it: Stand up, so we can do our work. A spade and a measuring bowl, then, are not subject to the impurity of the seat of a <i>zav</i>, even if a <i>zav</i> sat on them. Rather, they are considered to be on the lower level of impurity transmitted through simple contact with a <i>zav</i>. The same <i>halakha</i> was applied to the vessels used in preparation of the red heifer; the Sages did not add stringency and decree that a vessel not generally used for sitting should be considered as the seat of a <i>zav</i>.
  § The mishna states: A vessel combines all the food that is in it with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? What is the source for this stringency? Rabbi Ḥanin said: The verse states with regard to the sacrificial donations of the tribal princes: “One golden pan of ten shekels, full of incense” (Numbers 7:14), which teaches us that the verse treats everything inside the pan as one unit, even if the items are not attached to each other.
  Rav Kahana raised an objection against this based on the mishna that teaches (<i>Eduyyot</i> 8:1): Rabbi Akiva added to the list of it items that are considered combined when in the same vessel fine flour, incense, frankincense, and coals, saying that if one who immersed himself that day but has not waited until sunset touched a part of the contents of a vessel containing these substances, all of the vessel’s contents are disqualified, as the vessel combines them.
  Isn’t this <i>halakha</i> that these substances are considered combined by rabbinic law? From where do we know that this is so? From the fact that it teaches in the first clause of that mishna: Rabbi Shimon ben Beteira testified with regard to ashes of purification in a vessel that if an impure person or object touched part of it, it renders all of it impure. The purification ashes of the red heifer are neither food nor a sacrificial item, so Rabbi Ḥanin’s verse does not apply to the ashes, and the vessel certainly does not combine the ashes together by Torah law, but by rabbinic law. And it is taught immediately following this: Rabbi Akiva added, which shows that Rabbi Akiva’s <i>halakha</i>, like the previous <i>halakha</i>, deals with an additional level of impurity instituted by the Sages rather than a Torah law.
  Reish Lakish said in the name of Bar Kappara:
  
  Daf 24a
  
  Rabbi Akiva’s testimony is not needed to teach the basic <i>halakha</i> that a vessel combines its ingredients, which is Torah law; it is necessary only for the remainders of the meal-offering, the part of a meal-offering left over after a fistful of it and its frankincense have been sacrificed on the altar, which is eaten by a priest. In such a case the <i>halakha</i> of combining applies only by rabbinic law, for by Torah law only when an item requires a vessel in order for it to be sanctified does the vessel combine it with regard to impurity, even if its parts are not touching each other. But in the case of something that does not require a vessel, the vessel does not combine it. The remainder of a meal-offering no longer requires a vessel, since it is given to a priest after the fistful is sacrificed, so the flour in a vessel would not be considered combined according to Torah law.
  And the Sages came and decreed that even if something does not require a vessel, such as the leftover flour of the meal-offering, the vessel nevertheless combines it.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: It works out well in the case of flour, which can be said to refer to the flour left over from meal-offerings, but with regard to incense and frankincense, what is there to say? In these cases a vessel is certainly required, but if the <i>halakha</i> of combining applies to them from the Torah, why did Rabbi Akiva include them in his list? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: For example, if he piled them up on a leather board [<i>kartavla</i>], rather than in a containing vessel. By Torah law a vessel that has an inside combines its ingredients, but one that is flat and does not have an inside does not combine. And the Sages came and decreed that even if it does not have an inside it nevertheless combines what is placed on it.
  The Gemara comments: And this opinion of Rabbi Ḥanin’s, that impurity by combining is derived from the Torah, disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. For Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in reference to our mishna: This mishna was taught based on Rabbi Akiva’s testimony. In other words, the mishna’s teaching that a vessel combines its contents follows the statement of Rabbi Akiva, indicating that it is by rabbinic law, unlike Rabbi Ḥanin, who said that it is based on a source from the Torah.
  § It was taught in the mishna: The fourth degree of impurity, with regard to sacrificial food, is disqualified. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei said: From where is it derived with regard to the fourth degree of ritual impurity, that with regard to sacrificial food it is disqualified? It is a logical derivation, by <i>a fortiori</i>: If one who is lacking atonement, an impure person who is obligated to bring an offering to complete his purification process, who is permitted to eat <i>teruma</i>, is nevertheless disqualified with regard to the consumption of sacrificial food, as specified in the Torah, then concerning something that is impure to the third degree of ritual impurity, which is disqualified if it is <i>teruma</i>, is it not right that it should engender a fourth degree of ritual impurity when it touches sacrificial food? Therefore, we have learned that there is a third degree of impurity with regard to sacrificial food from the Torah, and that there is a fourth degree of impurity from <i>a fortiori</i> reasoning.
  The above <i>baraita</i> taught that there is a third degree of impurity for sacrificial food from the Torah. The Gemara asks: From where is this derived? As it is written: “And the meat that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19). Is it not so that we are not dealing in that verse with meat that touches any “impure thing” at all, even if it touched something that is of the second degree of ritual impurity, which is also called an “impure thing”? And yet the Merciful One states with regard to that meat, which having touched a second-degree impurity is now impure to the third degree: “It shall not be eaten,” meaning that it has been rendered unfit due to impurity. And as for the <i>baraita’s</i> statement that the fourth level of impurity is derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference – it is as we said just above, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference put forth by Rabbi Yosei.
  § It was taught in the mishna: And with regard to <i>teruma</i>, if one of one’s hands became impure with impurity by rabbinic law that renders only the hands impure, its counterpart, the other hand, remains pure. But with regard to sacrificial food, if one hand becomes impure he must immerse them both. Rav Sheizevi said: When they said that with regard to sacrificial food a hand that is rendered impure renders the other hand impure as well, they taught this only for a situation when the pure hand is in contact with the sacrificial food when the impure hand touches it. But if the pure hand is not in contact with the sacrificial food, no, the pure hand is not rendered impure by touching the impure hand. According to Rav Sheizevi, the Sages enacted the decree that one hand renders the other impure because they were concerned that the impure hand may have touched the sacrificial food directly without being noticed. Therefore, the decree applies only when the pure hand is touching the sacrificial food.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rav Sheizevi from the following teaching: Even a dry hand that is impure renders its counterpart, i.e., the other hand, impure, to the extent that the second hand will now render impure any food that it touches. This is true with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The second hand is not rendered impure to such a severe extent. It can merely disqualify sacrificial food that it touches, by rendering it impure to the fourth degree, but not render it impure with third-degree impurity.
  Granted, if you say that the second hand becomes impure even when it is not in contact with the sacrificial food, this would explain the noteworthiness of a dry hand rendering its counterpart impure. It teaches that even though normally a dry hand would not render another hand impure, the Sages nevertheless declared it impure with regard to sacrificial food. But if you say that when the second hand is in contact with sacrificial food, yes, the decree that the second hand becomes impure applies, lest the impure hand touch the sacrificial food directly, but when it is not in contact, no, the decree does not apply, then what is the noteworthiness of stating that it applies in the case of a dry hand?
  It was also stated that <i>amora’im</i> disputed a similar issue: Reish Lakish said: They taught that one hand renders the other impure only if the second hand is his own hand,
  
  Daf 24b
  
  but an impure hand does not render impure the hand of another. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: An impure hand renders another hand impure whether it is his own hand or the hand of another, provided the second hand is touched by the same hand that came into contact with the impurity. Moreover, the impure hand affects the food it touches only to disqualify it, but not to render it impure.
  The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion. From where did he learn this? From the fact that it teaches in a latter clause in the mishna: For one renders its counterpart, i.e., the other hand, impure with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>. Why do I need this phrase as well? It was already taught in the first clause that one hand renders the other hand impure with regard to sacrificial food. Rather, must one not conclude from this added phrase that it comes to include the rendering impure of the hand of another as well as his own other hand?
  The Gemara observes: And Reish Lakish, too, retracted his own opinion in favor of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion. For Rabbi Yona said that Rabbi Ami said that Reish Lakish said: The decree that one hand renders another impure applies whether it is his own hand or the hand of another, provided the second hand is touched by the same hand that came into contact with the impurity. Moreover, the impure hand affects the food it touches only to disqualify render it, but not to render it impure.
  The Gemara comments: And this opinion, that an impure hand affects the sacrificial food only to disqualify it but not to render it impure, is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Yadayim</i> 3:2): Anything that disqualifies <i>teruma</i> by contact with it, i.e., anything that is impure at least to the second degree, renders the hands impure to the second degree. And furthermore, a hand that is impure to the second degree renders its counterpart, the other hand, impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. But the Rabbis say: Hands themselves are impure to the second degree, and that which is impure to the second degree cannot impart second-degree impurity to something else with regard to non-sacred food.
  From the Rabbis’ response to Rabbi Yehoshua it is clear that the latter’s opinion is that the second hand is indeed rendered impure to the second degree, imparting third-degree impurity to sacrificial food that it touches. Moreover: What, is it not correct to infer from the Rabbis’ words that it is impurity to the second degree that the first hand does not impart to for the second hand by touching it, but impurity to the third degree it does impart to the second hand? The second hand would thus only disqualify the sacrificial food that it touches by imparting to it a fourth-degree impurity. Therefore, the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehoshua are arguing about this very point: Does the second hand only disqualify sacrificial food by imparting to it fourth-degree impurity, or does it render the food impure with third-degree impurity?
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the Rabbis meant that the first hand does not impart impurity to the second hand to either the second or the third degree, for in their opinion one impure hand does not defile the other hand at all, in contradiction to the mishna, whereas the opinion expressed in the mishna would be following Rabbi Yehoshua.
  Rather, the issue of which degree of impurity is imparted to the second hand is like the following dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier: Even a dry hand that is impure renders its counterpart, i.e., the other hand, impure to the extent that the second hand will now render impure food that it touches. This is true with regard to sacrificial food but not with regard to <i>teruma</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The second hand is not rendered impure to such a severe extent. It can merely disqualify sacrificial food that it touches, by making it impure to the fourth degree, but not render it impure to the third degree.
  § It was taught in the mishna: One may eat dry foods, i.e., foods that have never been wetted and are thus not susceptible to impurity, with impure hands in the case of <i>teruma</i>, but not in the case of sacrificial food. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that there is a difficulty with this statement of the mishna: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus said: Now, is there such a possibility as dry food, i.e., food that is not susceptible to impurity, with regard to sacrificial food? Is it not so that the reverence accorded to sacrificial food itself renders it fit to contract impurity even if it has never been in contact with liquid at all? All sacrificial food is thus automatically susceptible to impurity, and whether it is dry, i.e., it has never been wetted, or not is irrelevant.
  The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to state this. And the case is not one of dry sacrificial food, as was first assumed. Rather, the mishna is dealing with a case in which, for example, his friend inserted sacrificial food or <i>teruma</i> into his mouth, or, alternatively, a case in which he inserted it into his own mouth by means of a spindle or whorl, which are wooden vessels without receptacles that cannot contract impurity. In either event the food arrives in his mouth without being rendered impure by his impure hands. And then, while the sacrificial food or <i>teruma</i> is still in his mouth, he wishes to put into his mouth and eat a non-sacred radish or onion along with them.
  Non-sacred food is not rendered impure by being touched with impure hands, so it should not be problematic to put a radish or onion into one’s mouth with his hands. However, regarding sacrificial food the Sages enacted a decree against doing so, lest the person inadvertently touch the sacrificial food in his mouth with his impure hand. This decree, the mishna teaches, applies only to sacrificial food, but in a case in which he had <i>teruma</i> in his mouth the Sages did not enact a decree against it.
  § It was taught in the mishna: An acute mourner and one who is lacking atonement require immersion in order to eat sacrificial food, but this is not necessary for <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this decree? Since until now it was prohibited for them to partake of sacrificial food and they therefore might not have guarded themselves properly from impurity, the Sages required them to undergo immersion before eating sacrificial food.
  MISHNA: The previous mishna listed stringencies that apply to sacrificial food but not to <i>teruma</i>. However, there are also stringencies that apply to <i>teruma</i> over sacrificial food: In Judea all people, even people who are not generally meticulous in their observance of the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity [<i>amei ha’aretz</i>], are trusted with regard to the purity of consecrated wine and oil throughout all the days of the year. And during the period of the winepress and olive press, when grapes and olives are pressed and made into wine and oil, respectively, they are trusted even with regard to the purity of <i>teruma</i>, as all people, including <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, purify their vessels for this season.
  But once the periods of the winepress and olive press have passed, if <i>amei ha’aretz</i> brought to him, i.e., to a priest who is meticulous concerning the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual purity [<i>ḥaver</i>], a barrel of <i>teruma</i> wine, he may not accept it from them, as <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are not trusted with regard to matters of ritual purity during the rest of the year. But the giver may leave it over for the following winepress season, in the following year, at which point the <i>ḥaver</i> priest may accept it from him, although it was prohibited for him to accept the same barrel beforehand. And if the giver said to the priest: I separated and placed into this barrel of <i>teruma</i> a quarter-<i>log</i> of sacrificial wine or oil, he is trusted with regard to the entire contents of the barrel. Since an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is trusted with regard to the purity of sacrificial food, he is also believed with regard to <i>teruma</i> that is mingled with the sacrificial food.
  With regard to jugs of wine and jugs of oil
  
  Daf 25a
  
  that are mingled, <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted with regard to them during the period of the winepress and the olive press, and also up to seventy days before the winepress, for that is when people begin to purify their vessels in preparation for the wine-pressing season.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted with regard to the purity of sacrificial wine and oil in Judea. The Gemara infers: In Judea, yes, but in the Galilee, no. What is the reason for this distinction between the two places?
  Reish Lakish said: It is because a strip of land inhabited by Samaritans [<i>Kutim</i>] separates between Judea and the Galilee, and it is impossible to travel from one land to the other without traversing this strip. The Sages decreed that lands inhabited by non-Jewish nations are considered ritually impure, so that it would be impossible to transport food from the Galilee to Judea, where the Temple is located, without the food becoming impure. Therefore, even oil and wine prepared by <i>ḥaverim</i> who lived in the Galilee were not accepted for sacrificial use.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: And let the residents of the Galilee place the wine and oil and transport it to Judea in a closed box, a chest, or a closet, whose contents cannot contract impurity, as they have the status of separate tents. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: A thrown tent, i.e., a moving tent, is not called a proper tent, and therefore its contents are subject to impurity. In our case, then, the contents would contract the impurity decreed upon the lands of non-Jewish nations. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning one who enters a land of non-Jewish nations sitting in a box, a chest, or a closet, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi declares him to be impure, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, declares him to be pure.
  The Gemara raises a further difficulty: And let them bring oil and wine to the Temple in an earthenware vessel sealed with a tightly bound cover, which cannot contract impurity even if it is in the same tent as a corpse, as it states: “And every open vessel, which has no covering tightly bound upon it, is unclean” (Numbers 19:15). Rabbi Eliezer said: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Sacrificial food, unlike other items, is not spared from impurity by being in a container with a tightly bound cover.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Water of purification containing ashes from the red heifer is not spared from impurity by being in a vessel with a tightly bound cover? What, is it not implied in the <i>baraita</i> this inference: That sacrificial food is spared from impurity in such a situation? The <i>baraita</i> seems to imply that this is a special stringency for water of purification, which does not apply to anything else, including sacrificial food. The Gemara rejects this: No, the <i>baraita’s</i> inference should be understood differently, as this: Water that has not yet been consecrated by being mixed with ashes of the red heifer is spared from impurity by being in a vessel with a tightly bound cover, even if they are designated for such a use at a later stage.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But didn’t Ulla say: <i>Ḥaverim</i> purify their wine and oil, i.e., they produce their wine and oil by the standards of purity used for sacrificial food in the Galilee, to be used for sacrificial purposes? This indicates that there must have been some way of transporting them from the Galilee to the Temple, for otherwise why would they have prepared such items? The Gemara answers: Indeed, they could not transfer these items to the Temple. Rather, they would leave them in their place, and their thought was that when Elijah comes in messianic times and purifies the road from Galilee to Judea, these items will become eligible for use.
  § It was taught in the mishna: And during the period of the winepress and olive press, <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted even with regard to the purity of <i>teruma</i>. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following teaching: An <i>am ha’aretz</i> who finishes pressing his olives should leave over one sack of unpressed olives, and give it to a poor priest as <i>teruma</i>, so that the priest himself can make ritually pure oil from it. This shows that even during the period of the olive press the <i>am ha’aretz</i> is not trusted to make pure olive oil himself.
  Rav Naḥman said: This is not difficult. This case of the mishna, where <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted to produce pure olive oil themselves, is referring to people who press their olives early, during the regular season of the olive press, while that case is referring to those who press their olives later, after the period when most people press their olives has passed. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to him: Such as what case, for example? Such as those olives of your father’s house. Rav Naḥman’s father had many olives, and he often pressed them after the regular pressing season.
  Rav Yosef said a different resolution of the above contradiction. The source that states that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are not trusted was taught with regard to the Galilee, and as the mishna taught earlier concerning sacrificial wine and oil, <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are trusted only in Judea and not in the Galilee. Abaye raised an objection to him from a <i>baraita</i>: Transjordan and the Galilee are like Judea, in that they are trusted with regard to wine of <i>teruma</i> during the period of wine production, and with regard to oil of <i>teruma</i> during the period of oil production. However, they are not trusted with regard to wine during the period of oil production, nor are they trusted with regard to oil during the period of wine production. This <i>baraita</i> shows that with regard to <i>teruma</i> there is no difference between the trustworthiness of <i>amei ha’aretz</i> who live in the Galilee and that of those who live in Judea.
  Rather, Rav Yosef’s answer must be rejected, and it is clear that the correct answer is as we answered initially, that it is speaking of the period following the conclusion of the winepress.
  § It was taught in the mishna: Once the periods of the winepress and olive press have passed, if <i>amei ha’aretz</i> brought to a <i>ḥaver</i> priest a barrel of <i>teruma</i> wine, he may not accept it from them. But the giver may leave it over for the following winepress season, in the following year. They raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If the priest violated the <i>halakha</i> and did accept the wine from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is it permissible that he should leave it over for himself for the following winepress season? Since it is permissible to accept the wine and oil of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> intentionally left until that time, perhaps it is also permissible if the priest himself intentionally leaves it over until that time. He said to him: You learned it in a mishna (<i>Demai</i> 6:9):
  
  Daf 25b
  
  In the case of a <i>ḥaver</i> and an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, who are brothers and inherited property from their father, who was also an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, the <i>ḥaver</i> can say to his <i>am ha’aretz</i> brother: You take the wheat that is in such and such a place and I will take the wheat that is in such and such a place. The <i>ḥaver</i> knows that the former batch of wheat had been made susceptible to impurity, and he would therefore have no use for it, while the latter batch had not been made susceptible to impurity.
  The mishna continues: Similarly, the <i>ḥaver</i> brother may say to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> brother: You take the wine that is in such and such a place and I will take the wine that is in such and such a place. The <i>ḥaver</i> knows that the latter batch of wine has not been rendered impure, and he wants to take that batch as his share. When brothers inherit a quantity of a certain item they will each end up receiving an equal share of that item. Therefore, the principle of retroactive designation applies, meaning that it is considered that whatever portion any particular brother receives in the end is the one that had been designated for him as his inheritance from the beginning. It is not considered to be a trade or a business transaction with the other brothers in exchange for their portions.
  The mishna continues: But the <i>ḥaver</i> brother may not say to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> brother: You take the wet produce and I will take the dry produce. Nor may he say: You take the wheat, and I will take the barley. The principle of retroactive designation does not apply to objects of different types. If one brother would take wheat and the other barley it would be considered a trade. And it is prohibited for a <i>ḥaver</i> to sell or transfer impure produce or produce that is susceptible to impurity to an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, who does not strictly follow the principles of purity, as this would involve the prohibition of “You shall not place a stumbling-block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14).
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this mishna: If the <i>ḥaver</i> receives a share that consists of some items that are wet and some that are dry, that <i>ḥaver</i> must burn the wet produce if it was <i>teruma</i>, as it has certainly been defiled and impure <i>teruma</i> is burned, but he may leave the dry produce and use it, as it can be assumed that it has not been defiled.
  The Gemara draws a conclusion based on this <i>baraita</i>: Why must he burn the wet <i>teruma</i>? Let him leave it over until the following winepress season, during which time <i>teruma</i> from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is considered pure. The fact that this option is not taken into account indicates that one may not intentionally leave over <i>teruma</i> received from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> until the next winepress season, which would resolve the dilemma presented to Rav Sheshet. The Gemara rejects this proof: Here it is referring to something that does not have a winepress, i.e., to liquids that are never used in the Temple service, as <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are careful only with regard to liquids that may be used in the Temple service. The Gemara asks: Even so, there is another option: And let him leave it for the next pilgrimage Festival, for the mishna later teaches (26a) that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are assumed to observe all laws of ritual purity on Festivals. The Gemara answers: It is referring to something that would not last until the next pilgrimage Festival, but which would spoil beforehand. The dilemma presented to Rav Sheshet therefore remains unresolved.
  § It was taught in the mishna: And if the giver says to the priest: I separated and placed into this barrel of <i>teruma</i> a quarter-<i>log</i> of sacrificial wine or oil, he is deemed credible. The Gemara proceeds to cite a mishna in tractate <i>Oholot</i>, the discussion of which ultimately relates to this mishna here: We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Oholot</i> 18:4): Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that one may examine the ground for those performing the paschal offering, but one may not examine the ground for those who eat <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: One may examine? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A person may blow at the ground of a <i>beit haperas</i> and walk through it as he does so. A <i>beit haperas</i> is a patch of ground with a grave in it that was subsequently plowed over. The Sages were concerned that there might be small pieces of human bone scattered in the field, which would impart impurity to anyone moving them with his foot. Therefore, they decreed that whoever traverses such a field becomes impure. However, the Sages allowed one to pass through the field while maintaining his purity if he blows on the ground as he goes, the assumption being that any small pieces of bone would thereby be blown out of his path. This is the examination to which this mishna refers. The mishna teaches that this examination is sufficient to allow one to retain his purity as he goes to perform the paschal offering, but not to allow one to retain his purity with regard to the eating of <i>teruma</i>.
  And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said in the name of Ulla: A <i>beit haperas</i> that has been trodden by passersby who have beaten a path through it is considered pure for those who are on their way to perform the paschal offering, as the assumption is that no more bone fragments remain on the surface of the ground. The examination referred to in the mishna, then, is referring to ascertaining whether a particular <i>beit haperas</i> has been trodden or not. The reason for this leniency is that the impure status of a <i>beit haperas</i> is only a rabbinical decree, and the Sages did not uphold their words decreeing the field to be impure in a place where this affects one’s ability to perform a mitzva involving <i>karet</i>; and failure to bring a paschal offering is punishable by <i>karet</i>.
  However, with regard to those who wish to eat <i>teruma</i> after traversing a <i>beit haperas</i>, the Sages did uphold their words decreeing the field to be impure in a place of a sin involving the punishment of death by God’s hand. The sin of eating <i>teruma</i> in a state of impurity is punishable by death by God’s hand, and the Sages were therefore strict in insisting that one not eat it after traversing a <i>beit haperas</i>.
  A dilemma was raised before the scholars: If one examined a <i>beit haperas</i> for the purpose of bringing his paschal offering, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>teruma</i> after he has traversed the field? Is it permissible that he can rely on this examination to eat his <i>teruma</i> as well, since his passage through the field has been established as not having defiled him? Ulla said: If he examined the ground for purposes of bringing his paschal offering, he is permitted afterward to eat his <i>teruma</i>, for once he is declared pure with regard to the offerings it would be inconsistent to declare him at the same time impure with regard to <i>teruma</i>. But Rabba bar Ulla said: If one examined the ground for purposes of bringing his paschal offering, it is prohibited for him to eat his <i>teruma</i>.
  A certain older man said to Rabba bar Ulla: Do not argue with Ulla, as we learned in the mishna in accordance with his opinion, for the mishna states: And if the <i>am ha’aretz</i> says to the priest: I separated and placed into this barrel of <i>teruma</i> a quarter-<i>log</i> of sacrificial wine or oil, he is deemed credible. Apparently, then, once the <i>am ha’aretz</i> is deemed credible with regard to the sacrificial items in the barrel he is also deemed credible with regard to the <i>teruma</i> in it. Here too, the same principle should be applied, so once he is deemed credible and is considered pure with regard to the paschal offering, he is also deemed credible with regard to <i>teruma</i>.
  § It was taught in the mishna: Concerning jugs of wine and jugs of oil that are mingled, <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are deemed credible during the period of the winepress and the olive press. A Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Amei ha’aretz</i> are not deemed credible, neither with regard to flasks nor with regard to <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara asks: Flasks of what? If it is referring to flasks of sacrificial food, since an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is deemed credible concerning the sacrificial items it contains, he must necessarily be deemed credible concerning the flasks as well. Rather, it is referring to flasks of <i>teruma</i>. But this is obvious: Now, if he is not deemed credible concerning the <i>teruma</i> itself, is it possible that he would be deemed credible concerning the flasks containing it?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, it is referring to empty flasks that had contained sacrificial food during the rest of the days of the year, i.e., during all the days of the year, for an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is deemed credible with regard to sacrificial food throughout the year, yet he is not deemed credible with regard to its flask once the food has been removed, and it is referring as well to flasks full of <i>teruma</i> wine during the period of the winepress, when they are deemed credible with regard to the <i>teruma</i> itself, but not the vessels.
  The Gemara asks a question: We learned in the mishna: With regard to jugs of wine and jugs of oil that are mingled [<i>meduma</i>], <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are deemed credible during the period of the winepress and the olive press, and seventy days before the winepress. The Gemara asks: What, is it not so that mingled means that there is a mixture of <i>teruma</i> oil or wine in the jug, and yet the mishna states that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are deemed credible with regard to the jugs? This would appear to contradict the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> that they are not deemed credible with regard to flasks containing <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara answers: In the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya they say that the mishna in fact is referring to ordinary oil or wine mingled with sacrificial wine or oil, so that it contains a certain amount of sacrificial liquid.
  The Gemara asks: And does the concept of <i>meduma</i> apply to sacrificial foods at all? This term <i>meduma</i> applies only to <i>teruma</i>, not to sacrificial items. In the school of Rabbi Elai they say that the <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is stated with regard to one who is keeping his wine <i>tevel</i>, i.e., produce from which the requisite <i>teruma</i> and tithes have not yet been separated, in purity, because he intends to take wine for libations from it. It is therefore in a sense a mixture of sacrificial food, <i>teruma</i> and non-sacred food all in one, and accordingly the term <i>meduma</i> is applicable. The mishna is teaching that since the <i>am ha’aretz</i> is deemed credible with regard to the sacrificial food in this mixture, he is also deemed credible with regard to the <i>teruma</i> and the jugs.
  § It is taught in the mishna that apart from the period of the winepress itself, <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are also deemed credible seventy days before the period of the winepress. Abaye said: You can learn from here, incidental to the laws of purity, that the law is that a tenant farmer in a vineyard must make the effort of acquiring flasks for the wine seventy days before the time of the winepress, for the mishna considers this amount of time the period of preparation for the pressing of grapes.
  MISHNA: From Modi’im and inward toward Jerusalem, i.e., in the area surrounding Jerusalem, up to the distance of the town of Modi’im, which is fifteen <i>mil</i> from Jerusalem, all potters, including <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, are deemed credible with regard to the purity of earthenware vessels that they have produced. Because these places supplied earthenware vessels for the people in Jerusalem, the Sages did not decree impurity for them. From Modi’im and outward, however, they are not deemed credible. The details of this ruling are specified: How so? A potter who sells pots, if he entered within Modi’im from outside it, although the potter, and the pots, and the customers were all previously located outside Modi’im, where he is not deemed credible with regard to purity, he is now deemed credible. And the opposite is true of the opposite case: If the same person who was deemed credible inside left the boundaries of Modi’im, he is no longer deemed credible.
  GEMARA: A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to Modi’im itself, there are times that it is considered like inside the perimeter surrounding Jerusalem, and there are times that it is considered like outside that perimeter. How so? If a potter is leaving the perimeter and a <i>ḥaver</i> is entering it, and they meet in Modi’im, it is considered like inside, and the <i>ḥaver</i> may purchase the jugs. However, if both are entering the perimeter
  
  Daf 26a
  
  or both are leaving it, it is considered like outside the perimeter and the <i>ḥaver</i> may not acquire vessels from him. The reason is that if they are both entering the perimeter they can easily wait until they are inside and then conduct the transaction, and if they are both leaving they should have completed the deal beforehand, and the <i>ḥaver</i> may not make up for this lapse by doing so now.
  Abaye said: We, too, learn this in the mishna. For it is taught there: A potter who was selling pots and entered within the Modi’im area is deemed credible, which indicates that the only reason he is deemed credible is that he is inside the Modi’im area, thus implying that in Modi’im itself he is not deemed credible. But now say the latter clause of the mishna: If he left he is not deemed credible, thus implying that in Modi’im itself he is deemed credible, which contradicts the previous inference. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna the following distinction: Here, in the latter clause, it is referring to a potter who is leaving and a <i>ḥaver</i> who is entering, in which case he is deemed credible; and there, in the first clause, it is referring to a situation where they are both leaving or both entering, in which case he is not deemed credible. Consequently, both inferences from the mishna are upheld. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is the case.
  § A <i>tanna</i> taught in the <i>Tosefta</i> (3:33): All people, including <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, are deemed credible with regard to purity from Modi’im and inward only with regard to small earthenware vessels, and they may be used for sacrificial food. Since these small vessels were needed by all, the Sages deemed the <i>amei ha’aretz</i> credible concerning them. The <i>amora’im</i> discussed the meaning of the term small vessels. Reish Lakish said: It is speaking of those vessels that can be picked up in one hand, but no larger. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if they cannot be picked up in one hand, they can still be called small vessels.
  Reish Lakish said further: They taught in the <i>baraita</i> only that <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are deemed credible with regard to empty vessels, but if they are full of liquid they are not deemed credible. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if the jugs are full, and even if his garment [<i>apikarsuto</i>] is inside the vessel, the Sages were not concerned about impurity, as they did not apply their decree to such vessels at all. And Rava said: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the liquids themselves in the vessel that they are impure, for although the Sages declared the vessels to be pure they did not waive the decree that liquids touched by <i>amei ha’aretz</i> are impure. And do not be perplexed by this apparent contradiction, for there is a similar <i>halakha</i> in a case of an earthenware pitcher full of liquid in a room with a corpse and the pitcher is tightly sealed with another earthenware vessel of an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, where the <i>halakha</i> is that the pitcher is impure with a seven-day impurity, while the liquids remain pure.
  MISHNA: In the case of <i>amei ha’aretz</i> tax collectors who entered a house to collect items for a tax, and similarly thieves who returned the vessels they had stolen, they are deemed credible when they say: We did not touch the rest of the objects in the house, and those items remain pure. And in Jerusalem all people, even <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, are deemed credible with regard to sacrificial food throughout the year, and during a pilgrimage Festival they are deemed credible even with regard to <i>teruma</i>.
  GEMARA: And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a different mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 7:6): If <i>amei ha’aretz</i> tax collectors entered a house, the entire house is impure. The Gemara answers: It is not difficult, as that mishna is referring to a situation where there is a gentile with them, in which case they conduct a thorough search in the whole house, and certainly will have touched everything; whereas this mishna deals with a case when there is no gentile with them, and their claim not to have touched anything is therefore accepted. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 7:6): If there is a gentile with the tax collectors, they are deemed credible if they were to say: We did not enter the house at all; but they are not deemed credible if they were to say: We entered the house but did not touch its vessels.
  The Gemara raises a question: And when there is a gentile with them, what of it? Why does this affect the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar disputed this issue. One said: The fear of the gentile, who is their senior, is upon them, for they are afraid he might punish them. And one said: The fear of the kingdom, i.e., the government, is upon them, as the gentile might report them to the authorities if they do not carry out a thorough search. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara responds: The practical difference between them is the case of a gentile who is not important, i.e., he does not have senior authority. In that case they are not afraid of him personally, but there is still concern that he might report them to the government authorities.
  § It is taught in the mishna: And similarly thieves who returned vessels are deemed credible. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 7:6): Concerning the thieves who entered a house, only the place where the feet of the thieves had trodden is impure. The implication is that all the vessels of the section of the house where they had entered are impure, and they are not deemed credible if they say that they did not touch a particular item. Rav Pinḥas said in the name of Rav: The mishna here is referring to a case where the thieves repented, which is why they are deemed credible, whereas the mishna in <i>Teharot</i> is referring to a case in which the thieves did not repent. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Thieves who returned vessels, which indicates that they repented and made restoration willingly. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is the case.
  § The mishna teaches: And in Jerusalem all people are deemed credible with regard to sacrificial food. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: They are deemed credible even with regard to large earthenware vessels for sacrificial food, and not only small ones. And why did the Sages exhibit so much leniency, waiving their regular decrees of impurity within Jerusalem for large vessels and all the way to Modi’im for small vessels? Because there is a principle that potters’ kilns may not be made in Jerusalem, in order to preserve the quality of the air in the city. It is therefore necessary to bring in earthenware vessels from outside the city, and consequently the Sages were lenient concerning such utensils.
  § It was taught in the mishna: And during a pilgrimage Festival they are deemed credible even with regard to <i>teruma</i>. The Gemara poses a question: From where are these matters derived, i.e., that there is a difference between Festival days and other periods? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The verse states concerning the incident of the concubine in Gibeah: “And all the men of Israel gathered to the city, like one man, united [<i>ḥaverim</i>]” (Judges 20:11). This verse is interpreted to teach that whenever the entire people of Israel gathers together in a single place, the Torah makes, i.e., considers, all of them <i>ḥaverim</i>. The final word of the phrase, <i>ḥaverim</i>, is a reference to the members of a group dedicated to scrupulous observance of mitzvot, as the term is used by the Sages.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who opens his barrel of wine for public sale, and similarly one who starts selling his dough during the time of the pilgrimage Festival, and these items perforce come into contact with <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, Rabbi Yehuda says: Since the food was pure, despite its contact with <i>amei ha’aretz</i>, when he began selling it, he may finish selling it in a state of purity even after the Festival, and there is no concern about the contact that has been made by <i>amei ha’aretz</i> during the Festival. But the Rabbis say: He may not finish selling it.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa were once sitting in the courtyard of Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa. One of them opened the discussion and said: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the possibility of him leaving his wine for another, subsequent pilgrimage Festival and continuing to sell it at that point? Although according to the Rabbis one may not continue selling it once the Festival has concluded, may he leave the barrel aside until the next Festival, at which point it would once again be able to be sold in purity?
  The other Sage said to him: Everyone’s hand has touched it, and yet you are saying that perhaps he may leave it for another pilgrimage Festival and then sell it in purity? How could such a possibility even be considered? He said back to him: Is that to say that until now, throughout the Festival, everyone’s hand was not touching it? It was permitted during the Festival despite the fact that everyone was touching it; apparently, their touching did not render it impure at all. He said to him: How can these cases be compared? Granted, until now, the Merciful One declares pure the impurity of the <i>am ha’aretz</i> during the Festival, and consequently his impurity is disregarded, but now that the Festival has passed, the touch of an <i>am ha’aretz</i> is once again considered impure.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say this dispute between <i>amora’im</i> is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. For it is taught in one <i>baraita</i>: He may leave it for another pilgrimage Festival and then continue to sell it. And it was taught in a different <i>baraita</i>: He may not leave it for another Festival. What, is it not so that this very issue is a dispute between these two <i>tanna’im</i>, the authors of these two <i>baraitot</i>?
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that this <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that he may leave it, follows the opinion, cited in the mishna, of Rabbi Yehuda, who allows the wine seller to finish selling his wine after the Festival, whereas that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that he may not leave it, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who prohibit him to finish it. The Gemara questions this conclusion: And how can you understand it that way? Didn’t Rabbi Yehuda say he may finish it after the Festival? Consequently, there would be no need for him to leave it for another Festival. Rather, say as follows: This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that he may not leave it, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, whereas that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that he may leave it, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what is the meaning of the statement: He may not leave it for another Festival? It means that he has no need to leave it for another Festival, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains he can finish selling it in purity immediately.
  MISHNA: Once the pilgrimage Festival has passed by, the priests pass all the vessels of the Temple courtyard through a process of purification, since they were touched by <i>am ha’aretz</i> priests during the Festival. If the Festival passed by into a Friday, i.e., if the Festival ended on Thursday night, they would not pass the vessels through the purification process on that day, due to the honor of Shabbat, in order to give the priests time to prepare the requirements of Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: They do not even purify them on Thursday, in the event that the Festival ended on Wednesday night, because the priests are not free to do so.
  GEMARA: A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>, in explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s words: The priests do not purify the vessels of the Temple courtyard on Thursday, as the priests are not free from removing the ashes. During the Festival days a large quantity of ash would accumulate on the altar, due to the large number of offerings brought at that time. Because they would not remove the ashes on the Festival itself, they would have to remove a very large amount afterward. Consequently, all the priests were kept busy with this task upon the conclusion of the Festival, which did not leave them with enough time to deal with other matters.
  MISHNA: How do they pass all the vessels of the Temple courtyard through a process of purification? They immerse the vessels that were in the Temple. And they say to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> priests who served in the Temple during the Festival: Be careful
  
  Daf 26b
  
  that you not touch the table of the shewbread. If you defile it by touching it, it would need to be removed for immersion, and this would lead to the temporary suspension of the mitzva of the shewbread, which had to be on the table at all times.
  The mishna continues: All the vessels that were in the Temple had second and third substitute vessels, so that if the first ones became impure they could bring the second ones in their place. All the vessels that were in the Temple required immersion after the Festival, apart from the golden altar and the bronze altar, because they are considered like the ground and therefore, like land itself, not susceptible to impurity. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is because they are coated.
  GEMARA: A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i> that they would say to the <i>am ha’aretz</i> priests: Be careful lest you touch the table, as explained above, or the candelabrum, as the Gemara will explain. The Gemara asks: And regarding the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna, what is the reason he did not teach that they were instructed not to touch the candelabrum as well? The Gemara answers: With regard to the table it is written: “Shewbread before Me always” (Exodus 25:30), indicating that the table holding the shewbread must always be in its place, whereas with regard to the candelabrum it is not written “always,” and therefore it can be removed for immersing.
  The Gemara asks: And regarding the other <i>tanna</i>, in the <i>baraita</i>, why does he include the candelabrum? The Gemara answers: Since it is written: “And you shall set the table without the veil and the candelabrum opposite the table” (Exodus 26:35), indicating that the candelabrum must always be placed opposite the table; it is as though it is written “always” with regard to the candelabrum as well. And the other <i>tanna</i>, in the mishna, who does not object to removing the candelabrum for immersion, would reply: That verse comes only to establish a place for the candelabrum, to describe where it must be positioned, but it does not mean to say that it must be opposite the table at all times.
  The Gemara poses a question concerning the requirement to keep <i>amei ha’aretz</i> away from the table: And let us derive it, i.e., let it be established, that it is not necessary to take care against contact with the table, as it is incapable of contracting ritual impurity. This is because it is a wooden vessel designated to rest in a fixed place, and the <i>halakha</i> is that any large, wooden vessel designated to rest in a fixed place cannot become impure. What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? Since wooden vessels and sacks are juxtaposed in the verse describing their impurity (Leviticus 11:32), we require a wooden vessel to be similar to a sack in order to be capable of contracting impurity, in the following manner: Just as a sack is carried when it is both full and empty, so too any wooden vessel that is carried full and empty can contract impurity, as opposed to vessels, such as the table, that are designated to rest in a fixed place. The table should therefore not be susceptible to impurity at all.
  The Gemara answers: The table too is in fact carried full and empty, in accordance with the words of Reish Lakish. For Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And you shall set them in two rows, six in a row, upon the pure table” (Leviticus 24:6)? The words “pure table” teach by inference that it is capable of becoming impure, and therefore the Torah warns us to make sure it is pure when the twelve loaves of bread are placed there.
  And why indeed is the table susceptible to ritual impurity, being that it is a wooden vessel designated to rest in a fixed place and should therefore not be susceptible to impurity? Rather, this verse teaches that they would lift the table with the shewbread on it to display the shewbread to the pilgrims standing in the Temple courtyard, as it was prohibited for Israelites to enter the Sanctuary, where the table stood, and they would say to them: Behold your affection before God, Who performs a perpetual miracle with the bread, for when it is removed from the table on Shabbat it is just as fresh as when it was arranged on the previous Shabbat. As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: A great miracle was performed with the shewbread: As its condition during its arrangement, so was its condition during its removal, as it is stated: “To place hot bread on the day when it was taken away” (I Samuel 21:7), indicating that it was as hot on the day of its removal as it was on the day when it was placed.
  The Gemara asks another question: Let us derive this fact, i.e., that the table can contract ritual impurity, not because it is portable but due to its golden coating. For didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 22:1): Concerning a table and a <i>dulpaki</i> that some of its surface became broken off, or that one coated with marble, i.e., stone not being susceptible to impurity: If he left on them a place on the surface that remained unbroken or uncoated, big enough for placing cups, it remains susceptible to impurity as a wooden vessel. Rabbi Yehuda says: It must have an unbroken and uncoated place big enough for placing pieces of meat and bread as well in order to maintain susceptibility to impurity as a wooden vessel. It is clear from this mishna that if a table is completely coated with stone it is not susceptible to impurity, showing that the status of a vessel follows its external coating, not its main material. The Temple table, which was coated with gold, should have the status of a metal vessel.
  The Gemara proposes a possible answer: And if you would say that acacia wood, from which the Temple table was made, is different, as it is an important, valuable kind of wood and is therefore not nullified by a coating, this works out well according to Reish Lakish, who said: They taught that a wooden vessel is nullified by its coating only with regard to vessels made of cheap <i>akhselag</i> wood which comes from overseas, but vessels made of expensive <i>masmi</i> wood are not nullified by a coating. According to this opinion it is fine, for we can say that the acacia wood of the table is also not nullified by its golden coating. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Even expensive <i>masmi</i> vessels are also nullified by a coating, what is there to say?
  The Gemara proposes another possible answer: And if you would say that the mishna is not applicable because here in the mishna the wood is nullified by its coating because it is speaking of a fixed coating, whereas there in the case of the Temple table the golden coating is not fixed onto the wood, this is impossible. For didn’t Reish Lakish inquire of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Does this law that vessels follow their coating deal only with a fixed coating or even with a coating that is not fixed? And he asked him further: Does it deal only with a coating that covers the table’s rim as well as the table itself, or even with one that does not cover its rim?
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him in response: It is not different if it is a fixed coating and it is not different if it is a coating that is not fixed; and it is not different if the coating covers the table’s rim and it is not different if it does not cover its rim. Therefore, since the coating always determines the status of the vessel, the Temple table, with its gold coating, should be susceptible to impurity. Rather, we must say a different explanation as to why the coating does not make the table susceptible to impurity: The table is different
  
  Daf 27a
  
  because the Merciful One called it: “Wood,” as it is written with regard to the table of the shewbread: “The altar, three cubits high, and its length two cubits, was of wood, and so its corners, its length, and its walls were also of wood, and he said to me: This is the table that is before the Lord” (Ezekiel 41:22). This verse indicates that even though the table was coated, its identity as a wooden vessel was preserved, which means that, like all wooden vessels, it would not be susceptible to impurity were it not for the fact that they took it out to show to the pilgrims.
  As the Gemara has cited the above verse, it clarifies a puzzling aspect of it: The verse began with the word “altar” and ended with the word “table,” both words describing the same item. Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say the following exposition: When the Temple is standing the altar atones for a person; now that the Temple has been destroyed, it is a person’s table that atones for him, for his feeding of needy guests atones for his sins.
  § The mishna taught: All the vessels that were in the Temple had second and third substitute vessels, etc. All the vessels that were in the Temple required immersion, apart from the golden altar and the bronze altar, because they are considered like the ground. The Gemara cites the relevant sources: The bronze altar is considered like the ground, as it written concerning this altar: “An altar of earth you shall make for Me” (Exodus 20:21). The golden altar is considered like the ground, as it is written: “The candelabrum and the altars” (Numbers 3:31). The plural word “altars” indicates that the two altars of the Temple, the bronze one and the golden one, are compared to each other, teaching that just as the bronze altar is like the ground in that it cannot contract impurity, the same applies to the golden altar.
  § According to the mishna, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that the altars are pure because they are like the ground, and the Rabbis say: It is because they are coated. The mishna seems to be saying that the Rabbis are offering a different reason for the altars not being susceptible to impurity, namely, that they are coated. The Gemara is puzzled by this: On the contrary, since they are coated with gold or bronze that is a reason that they should contract impurity, as the metal coating makes the entire altar considered as a metal vessel, as stated above, and metal is susceptible to impurity. The Gemara answers: Say and emend the mishna text as follows: And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer altogether, and declare the altars to be susceptible to impurity, because they are coated.
  And if you wish, say that that our text of the mishna is correct, and we should understand that the Rabbis were saying their statement in response to Rabbi Eliezer: What is your reasoning for stating that the altars are not susceptible to impurity because they are like the ground? Why didn’t you say simply that they are wooden vessels fixed in one place? For that is sufficient reason for them not to be susceptible to impurity. Is it because they are coated with metal, and therefore they would be considered metal vessels rather than wooden ones, and susceptible to impurity, were it not for the fact that they are considered like the ground?
  This is a mistake, for the coating is not important, and their coating is nullified and considered subordinate to them, so that they are indeed considered wooden vessels in a fixed place and therefore not susceptible to impurity. Although generally the status of a vessel does follow its coating, the Temple table and its altars are exceptions, as derived from the verse in Ezekiel cited above (41:22). There is therefore no need to mention that they are compared to the ground. Since these altars are made of wood they do not contract impurity, irrespective of whether or not they are attached to the ground.
  § Apropos the coating of the altar, the Gemara cites an Aggadic teaching: Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said: The fire of Gehenna has no power over Torah scholars. This can be derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the salamander [<i>salamandra</i>], a creature created out of fire and immune to its effects, and whose blood is fireproof: If a salamander, which is merely a product of fire, and nevertheless when one anoints his body with its blood, fire has no power over him, all the more so should fire not have any power over Torah scholars, whose entire bodies are fire, as it is written: “Surely My words are as fire, says the Lord” (Jeremiah 23:29), and the words of Torah become part of the Torah scholars’ very bodies.
  Reish Lakish said: The fire of Gehenna has no power over the sinners of Israel either. This can be derived by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the golden altar: If the golden altar, which has on it a coating that is no more than the thickness of a gold dinar, and which has incense burning on it for many years and yet fire has no power over it, as the gold miraculously remained undamaged, all the more so should immunity from fire be granted to the sinners of Israel, who are filled with good deeds as a pomegranate is full of seeds, as it is written: “Your temples [<i>rakatekh</i>] are like a pomegranate split open” (Song of Songs 4:3), which is to be expounded as follows: Do not read this word as <i>rakatekh</i>, rather read it as <i>reikanin shebakh</i>, meaning the empty, worthless people among you; even these people are as full of good deeds as a pomegranate is full of seeds.