meta: {"file": "/data/tomer/Sefaria-Export/txt_done/Talmud/Bavli/Seder Kodashim/Menachot/English/merged.txt"}
text: Menachot
  מנחות
  merged
  
  This file contains merged sections from the following text versions:
  -William Davidson Edition - English
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  Menachot
  
  
  
  Daf 1a
  
  
  
  Daf 1b
  
  
  
  Daf 2a
  
  MISHNA: When one brings a meal offering to the Temple, the priest removes a handful from it, places the handful into a service vessel, conveys it to the altar, and burns it. At that point, the remainder is permitted to the priests for consumption and the owner has fulfilled his obligation. In this context, the mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice. But these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, who must therefore bring another offering. This is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all meal offerings except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy, which is brought as part of the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [<i>sota</i>]. In those cases, if the priest removed the handful not for its own sake, the offering is disqualified.
  With regard to the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy from which the priest removed a handful not for their sake, or where he placed a handful from them in a vessel, or conveyed the handful to the altar, or burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, or for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, they are disqualified.
  The mishna elaborates: How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is in a case where one removed the handful with two intentions: For the sake of a voluntary meal offering and for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice, but these offerings did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach: But these offerings did not [<i>ella</i> <i>shelo</i>] satisfy the obligation of the owner? Let it teach simply: And they did not [<i>velo</i>] satisfy the obligation of the owner. What does the word <i>ella</i> add?
  The Gemara responds: By adding this word, the mishna teaches us that the only deficiency of these offerings is that they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner; but the meal offering itself is valid and it is still prohibited to deviate from the protocol of its sacrificial process. For example, if a handful was removed from a meal offering not for its own sake, it is prohibited to also burn it not for its own sake. This <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Rava, as Rava says: With regard to a burnt offering that one slaughtered not for its own sake, it is still prohibited to sprinkle its blood on the altar not for its own sake.
  The Gemara adds: If you wish, propose a logical argument to support this statement; and if you wish, cite a verse as proof. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Just because one deviated from protocol in its sacrifice once, by removing the handful, could it be that he should continue to deviate from protocol in all the rest of the sacrificial rites? One deviation does not justify additional deviations.
  And if you wish, cite a verse: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed as a gift offering to the Lord your God, that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). The Gemara analyzes the verse: Is it a gift offering? It is a vow offering. Why does the verse first call it a vow offering and subsequently call it a gift offering? Rather, the verse teaches that if you acted in accordance with how you vowed, i.e., if you sacrificed the offering for its own sake, your obligation to fulfill your vow will be fulfilled; but if you did not act in accordance with your vow, it does not fulfill the obligation incurred by the vow, and will be considered a gift offering.
  
  Daf 2b
  
  The Gemara concludes the proof from the verse: And with regard to a gift offering, is it permitted to deviate from its protocol <i>ab initio</i>? Clearly one may not do so. Accordingly, if one of the sacrificial rites of a meal offering was performed for the sake of a different meal offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of its other sacrificial rites improperly.
  § The mishna teaches that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice and they even satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Conversely, consecrated animals that were sacrificed not for their sake do not fulfill the obligation of the owner, as in this regard meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. The difference is that when one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, its mode of preparation proves that it is in fact for the sake of a pan meal offering, as the two offerings differ in appearance. Similarly, with regard to a dry meal offering, e.g., the meal offering of a sinner, which contains no oil, whose handful is removed for the sake of a meal offering that is mixed with oil, its mode of preparation proves that it is for the sake of a dry meal offering, and one’s improper intent is therefore disregarded.
  But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so, as there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings. Since the differentiation between slaughtered offerings is established only through intention, one who sacrifices an animal offering not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. Rabbi Shimon apparently disagrees with the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna on two counts: First, he claims that if the handful of a meal offering was removed not for its own sake it satisfies the obligation of the owner, whereas the mishna teaches that the obligation is not fulfilled. Second, Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy, and the other types of meal offerings.
  The Gemara comments: This works out well, i.e., the mishna can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, according to Rav Ashi, who says (3b), in a resolution of two apparently contradictory statements of Rabbi Shimon: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel, not the type of meal offering. Conversely, there, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.
  Accordingly, it can be explained that the mishna is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, which is why it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner. But according to the statements of Rabba and Rava, who resolved that contradiction in a different manner, what can be said?
  The Gemara elaborates: And if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rabba answers, this is problematic. Rabba resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.
  The Gemara explains that the reason this is problematic is that if one accepts Rabba’s resolution, how can the mishna be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The mishna is clearly discussing the case of a change of sanctity, as it teaches: How are these rites performed for their sake and then not for their sake, whereby the offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation? It is in a case where one initially removed the handful for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and then for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. This is a change involving a different type of meal offering.
  And alternatively, if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rava answers, this is equally problematic. Rava resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.
  The Gemara explains that if one accepts Rava’s resolution, the mishna cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: The mishna is discussing a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, as it teaches: How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is a case where one removed the handful for the sake of a voluntary meal offering and then for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner. The Gemara concludes: Rather, according to the resolutions offered by Rabba and Rava, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  § The Gemara cites the <i>baraita</i> that is the basis for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon, which was mentioned in the previous discussion: And a Sage raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse written concerning the meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), indicates that there are some meal offerings whose <i>halakha</i> is like that of a sin offering, and there are some whose <i>halakha</i> is like that of a guilt offering.
  Rabbi Shimon elaborates: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meal offering of a sinner is like that of a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is disqualified, just like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Conversely, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a voluntary meal offering is like that of a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is valid, like a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake.
  Rabbi Shimon adds: And a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering in another aspect as well: Just as a guilt offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, so too, a voluntary meal offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon here apparently contradicts his ruling that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  Rabba said in resolution of this contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon.
  Abaye said to Rabba: Now consider, the fact that the Merciful One disqualifies a meal offering due to improper intent is derived from the Torah’s comparison of meal offerings to sin offerings and guilt offerings. If so, what difference is there to me if there was a change of sanctity, and what difference is there to me if there was a change of owner? In the case of a guilt offering either of these changes prevents it from satisfying the obligation of the owner.
  Rabba said to Abaye: The claim that its mode of preparation proves one’s intent, which Rabbi Shimon states in explanation of why offerings are disqualified through improper intent, is based on logical reasoning, as Rabbi Shimon interprets the reason behind the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation.
  Rabba continues: This is significant, as Rabbi Shimon holds that the Merciful One disqualifies improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the intent is not in clear contradiction to the sacrificial rites performed. The intent to sacrifice an offering for the sake of another owner does not include a change in the sacrificial rites and it therefore disqualifies the offering. The Merciful One does not disqualify improper intent that is recognizably false and contradicts the sacrificial rites performed, e.g., if one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, as the different substance itself indicates that it is a pan meal offering.
  The Gemara lists several questions with regard to Rabba’s statement, for which it provides a mnemonic: Burnt offering, burnt offering, pinched and squeezed, bird sin offering, offerings of the most sacred order, offerings of lesser sanctity.
  The Gemara first asks: But if that is so, that only intent that is not recognizably false disqualifies an offering, then in the case of a bird burnt offering where one pinched the nape of its neck above the red line that divides the upper and lower halves of the altar for the sake of a bird sin offering, it should effect acceptance according to Rabbi Shimon. The reason is the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the pinching below the red line while standing beside the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon agrees with the ruling of the mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 64b) that this bird offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
  The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that a case of a bird sin offering that is pinched above the red line is not possible? Didn’t the Master say: The pinching of a bird sin offering that is performed in any place on the altar is valid after the fact? Accordingly, there is no discernible difference between the pinching of a bird burnt offering and the pinching of a bird sin offering, so the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: If recognizably false intent does not disqualify an offering, then a bird burnt offering where a priest squeezed its blood above the red line for the sake of a bird sin offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the required act of holding the body of the bird and sprinkling its blood below the red line, instead of squeezing out its blood above that line.
  
  Daf 3a
  
  The Gemara responds: This is not considered recognizably false intent, as people might say: Perhaps it is actually a sin offering and he has already sprinkled its blood below the red line. And as for the fact that he squeezed its blood above the red line, they will say: It is the squeezing that follows sprinkling, which may be performed above the red line in the case of a sin offering. As the Master said: If one squeezed the blood of a bird sin offering in any place on the altar, the offering is valid. Since people might erroneously think that this bird is actually a sin offering, this intent is not considered recognizably false, so the offering is disqualified.
  The Gemara asks another question: According to Rabba’s resolution, a bird sin offering whose blood a priest sprinkled below the red line for the sake of a bird burnt offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird sin offering. Because if it is in fact a bird burnt offering, he would have performed it above the red line, and he would have performed the act of squeezing instead of sprinkling.
  The Gemara responds: Indeed, according to Rabbi Shimon such a bird offering effects acceptance and fulfills the obligation of the owner. In fact, bird offerings were not discussed by Rabbi Shimon at all. Rather, he said: Because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings, which means that they are not similar to slaughtered animal offerings, but he did not say that they are not similar to bird offerings.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, then offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, which is a requirement that applies only to offerings of the most sacred order, for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of the most sacred order. Because if they are in fact offerings of lesser sanctity, he would have performed their slaughter in the southern part of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara answers: The slaughter of an offering in the northern part of the Temple courtyard is not indicative of the type of offering one intends it to be, as one can say that the Merciful One states that offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered even in the southern part of the courtyard. Did He say that these offerings must be slaughtered specifically in the southern part and not in the northern part? This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 55a), that the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity may be performed in any place within the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: If so, then offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of lesser sanctity. Because if they are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, he would have performed their slaughter in the northern part of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara responds: The fact that an offering was slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard is not a clear indication that it was intended as an offering of lesser sanctity, as people might say: They are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, but the priest transgressed the mitzva to slaughter them in the northern part of the courtyard and slaughtered them in the southern part.
  The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if people might suspect an individual of performing the rite of an offering in an improper manner, then if a priest removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering as well, one who sees that this priest removes a handful for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering might say: This owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, and as for the fact that he brings it in a pan, it is actually the meal offering of a deep pan and the owner transgressed the mitzva to bring it in a deep pan, and brought it in a pan. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon maintain that such a meal offering satisfies the obligation of its owner?
  The Gemara explains: There, where the priest removed the handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if the owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, when he brings it in a pan it is considered a valid pan meal offering, and therefore the priest’s intention is recognizably false.
  This is as we learned in a mishna (102b): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, the meal offering that he brought, he brought, i.e., it is valid and the priest performs the rites of the meal offering that he actually brought, but he did not fulfill the obligation resulting from his vow, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill that obligation.
  The Gemara asks: But even so, the priest’s improper intent remains indiscernible, as people might think: Perhaps the owner said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and in spite of this he brought it in a deep pan. Such a meal offering is disqualified and is not considered a valid pan meal offering, as we learned in that same mishna: One who took a vow, saying: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he vowed: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, it is disqualified, as he did not fulfill his vow. If so, how can Rabbi Shimon say that such a meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, when the intent is not recognizably false?
  The Gemara responds: According to the Rabbis, i.e., according to the opinion of the mishna just cited, there is indeed a difficulty. But according to Rabbi Shimon there is no difficulty, since with regard to a case where one took a vow, saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a pan meal offering, and then he brought it in a deep pan, Rabbi Shimon says: He has fulfilled even the obligation resulting from his vow. Evidently, the designation of the vessel for a meal offering is nothing according to Rabbi Shimon, and there is no difference in this regard whether he said: This is for a particular type of meal offering, and there is no difference whether he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a particular meal offering. In both instances the unique actions of each particular meal offering prove its identity, and therefore the owner fulfills his obligation regardless of the priest’s improper intent.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, that in a case where the manner of its preparation proves the identity of an offering the owner fulfills his obligation, then a burnt offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering should effect acceptance. His actions prove that it is a burnt offering, as this, a burnt offering, is always male, and that, a sin offering, is female. The Gemara answers: Since there is one sin offering, the goat of the <i>Nasi</i>, which is male, it is unknown whether this animal was a burnt offering or the sin offering of the <i>Nasi</i>, and its gender is not conclusive proof.
  The Gemara continues to ask: But in a case where one said: I am hereby slaughtering this animal for the sake of a sin offering of an individual, which is always female, what can be said? Since a male animal cannot be mistaken for such a sin offering, why doesn’t this burnt offering satisfy the obligation of the owner? And furthermore, a sin offering of an individual that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering should effect acceptance, as such a sin offering is always female, and a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara responds: It is difficult to discern whether a lamb is male or female, as its genitals are covered by its tail. Accordingly, its gender is not considered proof of the type of offering being sacrificed.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well in a case where one brought a female lamb as his sin offering, as its tail makes it difficult to discern its sex. But in a case where he brought a female goat, what can be said? Its gender is easily recognized, as goats do not have tails that cover their genitals. The Gemara answers: Rather, discerning between males and females is not on people’s minds, i.e., they do not take notice of the offering’s gender and therefore this aspect of an animal is not considered discernible.
  The Gemara continues to challenge the opinion of Rabba: A Paschal offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a guilt offering should effect acceptance, as this, the Paschal offering, is in its first year, and that, a guilt offering, is in its second year. The Gemara answers: Since there are two guilt offerings that are brought from lambs in their first year, i.e., the guilt offering of a nazirite (see Numbers 6:12) and the guilt offering of a leper (see Leviticus 14:10), it is not definitively clear to an onlooker what type of offering this lamb is.
  The Gemara asks: But if one said: I am hereby slaughtering this lamb for the sake of a guilt offering for robbery, or if he said: I am slaughtering it for the sake of a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, what can be said? These guilt offerings must each be brought from an animal in its second year, and therefore they cannot be mistaken for a Paschal offering, which is in its first year. And furthermore, a guilt offering for robbery or a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property that one slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering should effect acceptance, as a Paschal offering is always in its first year, and these are in their second year.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the difference in appearance between an animal that is in its first year and one that is in its second year is not on people’s minds, i.e., this is not a clearly recognizable difference, as there can be an animal in its first year that appears as though it is in its second year, and there can be an animal in its second year that appears as though it is in its first year.
  The Gemara challenges: A goat sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a guilt offering should effect acceptance. It is clearly not a guilt offering, as this, a guilt offering, is a ram, with white wool, and that, a goat, has black hair. The Gemara responds: People will say that this goat is actually a black ram, and they may indeed mistake it for a guilt offering.
  The Gemara challenges: A calf or a bull that one slaughtered for the sake of either a Paschal offering or a guilt offering should effect acceptance. It is clear that such animals cannot be either offering, as a calf or bull offering is not sacrificed either as a Paschal offering or as a guilt offering. The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so, as according to Rabbi Shimon such offerings effect acceptance for their owners.
  
  Daf 3b
  
  And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says that meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings? He means that they are not similar to most slaughtered offerings. There are, however, certain slaughtered offerings whose preparation, which is unique to that particular offering, is proof that it is that offering. In those instances, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the offerings fulfill the obligations of their respective owners despite the improper intent.
  § The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i> that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.
  Rava elaborates: If one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering he fulfills his obligation, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7). This indicates that there is one law for all the meal offerings, i.e., they are all considered variations of the same offering, and are different only with regard to how they should be sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>. Conversely, if one sacrificed a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering, since the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written anywhere, there is no reason to conclude that one fulfills his obligation under such circumstances.
  The Gemara questions how Rava can say that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” serves as the basis for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i>, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though sacrificing a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering is a case where it is not recognizable that the intention fits the offering, i.e., the intent does not match the rites being performed, and the offering should therefore be disqualified, the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” which teaches that there is one law for all the meal offerings.
  And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? This clause indicates that the similarity between the rites of various slaughtered offerings is a reason why they should not be valid, whereas according to the above reasoning the opposite is so.
  The Gemara explains this part of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Even though there is one manner of slaughter for all animal offerings, and therefore one might think that the owner has fulfilled his obligation despite the improper intent, the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written. In other words, it is not stated: This is the law of a slaughtered offering, in the manner that a verse states: “This is the law of the meal offering.” Therefore, the owner of a slaughtered offering does not fulfill his obligation if there is improper intent, notwithstanding the similarity between the acts of slaughter.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the phrase “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering is not disqualified despite the improper intent for a different meal offering, then analogously, a sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood, or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship, or for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite, or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper should be valid and effect acceptance. As the Merciful One states: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), from which it should be derived that there is one law for all sin offerings.
  The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, such a sin offering is indeed valid and effects acceptance for its owner. The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, Rava says: A sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship is valid. But if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper it is disqualified, as with regard to these offerings, there are burnt offerings brought together with them.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, teaches that Rava holds that the <i>halakha</i> in all of these cases is disqualification of the sin offering. The reason is that the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). The word “it” indicates that it must be sacrificed for the sake of that particular sin offering, and it may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different one.
  § The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i> that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.
  Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.
  The Gemara questions how Rav Ashi can maintain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i>, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though when he removes a handful from a pan meal offering explicitly for the sake of a deep pan, it is a case where the falseness of the intention is recognizable and the offering should therefore be disqualified, it is nevertheless valid and fulfills the owner’s obligation, as intentions with regard to the vessel are irrelevant.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? He means that even though there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling of the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings, i.e., if one performs any of these rites for the sake of a different offering it is not recognizable that his intent is false, and therefore it might have been thought that the owner does fulfill his obligation, nevertheless he has improper intent with regard to an aspect of slaughtering, such as slaughtering a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which improper intention does disqualify.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, then with regard to a case where one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, why did Rabbi Shimon say that it fulfills the owner’s obligation? Since his intent concerns the meal offering itself, it should disqualify the offering. Rav Ashi said to him: When Rabbi Shimon says that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation he is referring to a case where one removes a handful merely for the sake of mixing, not for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, then when one slaughters a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering as well, one can say that his intent is merely for the sake of peace [<i>shelamim</i>] between himself and God. Why then does Rabbi Shimon say that this burnt offering does not fulfill the obligation of the owner?
  The Gemara rejects this challenge: How can these cases be compared? There, the offering itself is called <i>shelamim</i>, as it is written: “Who sacrifices the blood of the peace offering [<i>shelamim</i>]” (Leviticus 7:33), and it is also written: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14). Here, by contrast, is a meal offering itself called mixed? It is written: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil” (Leviticus 7:10), indicating that there is a meal offering that is called: Mixed with oil, but it is not simply called: Mixed. One’s intent to sacrifice a dry meal offering for the sake of mixing is therefore not a reference to the offering itself.
  § Three resolutions have been suggested for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two <i>baraitot</i> concerning whether or not a meal offering whose handful was removed not for its own sake fulfills the obligation of its owner. Rabba’s answer was that there is a difference between intent for another meal offering, in which case the owner fulfills his obligation, as the intent is recognizably improper, and intent for someone else, which is not recognizably improper. The Gemara comments: All the other Sages, i.e., Rava and Rav Ashi, do not say as Rabba did in resolving the contradiction, as they do not accept his reasoning, claiming that on the contrary, the Merciful One disqualifies recognizably false intent.
  The Gemara continues: Rava resolved the contradiction by saying that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicating that there is one law for all meal offerings, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering does not effect acceptance. Rabba and Rav Ashi do not say as Rava did in resolving the contradiction, as the verse that states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” does not indicate to them that there should be one law for all meal offerings.
  The Gemara continues: Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction by saying that when one removes the handful from a meal offering for the sake of a vessel the meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as intent concerning the vessel itself is inconsequential, whereas when one removes the handful for the sake of another meal offering, the meal offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Rabba and Rava did not say as Rav Ashi did in resolving the contradiction because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, from a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of a mixed one. Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation even though his intent concerns the meal offering itself, not the vessel.
  The Gemara notes: The matter that is obvious to Rabba in one way, i.e., that with regard to meal offerings recognizably false intention is disregarded, but when the false intention is not recognizable the offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, and that is obvious to Rava in the other way, i.e., that in cases of recognizably false intention the offering should not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is a dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. As Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma, and some say that Rav Hoshaya raises this dilemma before Rav Asi: In the case of one who sacrifices a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering,
  
  Daf 4a
  
  what should I understand that Rabbi Shimon says with regard to such a case? Is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, who says that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering is valid and effects acceptance, that intent that is recognizably false does not disqualify an offering? And if so, this meal offering from which a handful is removed for the sake of an animal offering is also a case of intent that is recognizably false, and therefore the meal offering should not be disqualified.
  Or perhaps the reason of Rabbi Shimon is that it is written: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), which indicates that there is one law for all meal offerings. If so, then a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering should be disqualified, since it is not written: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering. Rav Asi said to Rav Hoshaya: Have we ascertained the depth of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in this matter? In other words, Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning is not known.
  The Gemara explains why Rav Asi did not resolve this dilemma. Rav Asi did not resolve the dilemma of Rav Hoshaya in accordance with the resolution stated by Rabba, that there is a distinction between one who removes the handful of a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering and one who removes it for the sake of another owner, because of the difficulty posed by Abaye (2b), that the <i>halakha</i> of both these cases is derived from the same comparison in the Torah between meal offerings and animal offerings.
  Likewise, Rav Asi did not resolve the dilemma in accordance with the resolution stated by Rava, that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering is valid, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering is disqualified. This is because of the difficulty arising from the verse: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), i.e., despite this verse, the <i>halakha</i> is that a sin offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering is not valid.
  Finally, Rav Asi did not resolve the dilemma in accordance with the resolution stated by Rav Ashi, that there is a distinction between one who removes the handful of a meal offering prepared in one vessel for the sake of a different vessel, and one who removes it for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a different vessel, because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava. This difficulty concerns a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of one mixed with oil; Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering is valid despite the fact that the person’s intent referred to the meal offering itself, not the vessel.
  § The mishna teaches that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake but for the sake of another meal offering are fit for sacrifice, except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy. The Gemara asks: Granted, the meal offering of a sinner is disqualified when a handful is removed from it not for its own sake, as the Merciful One calls it a sin offering, in the verse: “He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense upon it, for it is a sin offering. And he shall bring it to the priest, and the priest shall take his handful” (Leviticus 5:11–12). This verse indicates that just as a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its own sake, so too, the meal offering of a sinner is disqualified when a handful is removed from it not for its own sake. But with regard to the meal offering of jealousy, from where do we derive that this is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara answers that this <i>halakha</i> may be derived from a <i>baraita</i>, as a <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Naḥman: With regard to money that was designated for a meal offering of jealousy, its surplus, i.e., the money remaining after the purchase of the meal offering, is used to purchase communal gift offerings.
  Rav Naḥman said to him: You are saying well, as it is written with regard to a meal offering of jealousy: “Bringing iniquity to remembrance” (Numbers 5:15), and it is written with regard to a sin offering: “And He has given it you to bear the iniquity of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17). A verbal analogy is drawn between the two uses of the term “iniquity” in these verses. This teaches that just as in the case of a sin offering, its surplus is used to purchase communal gift offerings, so too, with regard to a meal offering of jealousy, its surplus is used to purchase communal gift offerings. And a meal offering of jealousy is also like a sin offering in another aspect: Just as a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its own sake, so too, a meal offering of jealousy is disqualified when a handful is removed from it not for its own sake.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the <i>halakha</i> of a meal offering of jealousy is derived from a verbal analogy to a sin offering based on the word “iniquity,” then a guilt offering should also be disqualified if it was sacrificed not for its own sake, as a similar verbal analogy may be derived from the verse that states: “The iniquity [<i>avon</i>] of the congregation” (Leviticus 10:17), with regard to a sin offering, and the verse that states: “And shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:17), in connection with a guilt offering.
  The Gemara responds: One derives a verbal analogy based on the word “iniquity” from a verse that likewise uses the term “iniquity,” but one does not derive a verbal analogy based on the term “his iniquity [<i>avono</i>]” from a verse that uses the term “iniquity.”
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there? Didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach the following verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: “And the priest shall return [<i>veshav</i>] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse concerning the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [<i>uva</i>] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning, and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the <i>halakha</i> that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. All the more so should a less pronounced difference of one letter between <i>avon</i> and <i>avono</i> not prevent the teaching of a verbal analogy.
  And furthermore, let one derive a verbal analogy through the term “his iniquity” stated with regard to a guilt offering, and the term “his iniquity” from the verse concerning the sin offering brought for the iniquity for hearing the voice, i.e., the sin offering of one who takes a false oath that he does not have any information relevant to a matter when another requests that he testify about it, as it is written: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1).
  Rather, it must be that when the verbal analogy was derived, it was derived only with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that the surplus from the money designated for a meal offering of jealousy is used to purchase communal gift offerings, and not with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that a meal offering of jealousy from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified.
  And if you would say that there is a principle that there is no partial verbal analogy, that principle does not apply in this instance. As the Merciful One revealed with regard to a sin offering that the <i>halakha</i> of other offerings may not be derived from this case, as the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). This verse indicates that it, i.e., a sin offering, when slaughtered for its own sake is valid, and when slaughtered not for its own sake is disqualified. But all other sacrificial animals, whether sacrificed for their sake or not for their sake, are valid.
  The Gemara asks: But if the Merciful One revealed that one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of other offerings that were sacrificed not for their sake from a sin offering, then from where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> that the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy are disqualified when a handful is removed from them not for their sake?
  The Gemara explains: With regard to a sin offering, what is the reason that it is disqualified when sacrificed not for its own sake? It is because it is written with regard to this offering: “It,” in a verse discussing the sin offering of the <i>Nasi</i>: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). This indicates that a sin offering is valid only when it is sacrificed for its own sake. So too, it is written with regard to them, i.e., the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy: “It.” In the case of the meal offering of a sinner the verse states: “It is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11), and with regard to the meal offering of jealousy it is written: “It is a meal offering of jealousy” (Numbers 5:15).
  The Gemara challenges: But if so, concerning a guilt offering as well, it is written about this offering: “It,” as the verse states: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:5). Accordingly, a guilt offering should likewise be disqualified if it is slaughtered not for its own sake. The Gemara responds: That term “it” is written with regard to the stage after the burning of the sacrificial portions [<i>eimurin</i>] of a guilt offering, which are intended for burning upon the altar.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One derives from the word “it” that if the offering was slaughtered not for its own sake it is disqualified only in the case of a sin offering. But concerning a guilt offering, it is stated about this offering: “It is a guilt offering,” only with regard to the stage after the burning of the sacrificial portions. The <i>baraita</i> adds: One cannot derive that if these portions were burned not for the sake of a guilt offering then the offering is disqualified, since the guilt offering itself is valid if its sacrificial portions were not burned upon the altar at all.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the word “it” stated with regard to a guilt offering? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to a guilt offering whose owner died or whose transgression was otherwise atoned for, and that was therefore consigned by the court to grazing until it develops a blemish so that it can be sold and the proceeds used to purchase a burnt offering, if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specification of its purpose, it is fit if it was sacrificed as a burnt offering.
  The Gemara infers: If it was consigned to grazing, yes, it is fit if it was sacrificed as a burnt offering if slaughtered. By inference, if it was not consigned to grazing, it is not fit. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “It is a guilt offering,” indicating that it shall remain as it is, i.e., as a guilt offering, unless it is consigned by the court to another purpose.
  § The mishna teaches that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they do not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Concerning this, Rav says: With regard to the <i>omer</i> meal offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan (see Leviticus 23:9–14), if the priest removed a handful from it not for its own sake it is disqualified. It is disqualified since an <i>omer</i> meal offering came for a specific purpose, namely, to permit the consumption of the new crop, and this meal offering did not permit the consumption of the new crop because its rites were performed not for its own sake. And so you say with regard to the guilt offering of a nazirite who became ritually impure, whose proper sacrifice enables the nazirite to restart his naziriteship afresh in purity,
  
  Daf 4b
  
  and so you say with regard to the guilt offering of a leper, whose proper sacrifice enables the leper to enter the Israelite camp and to partake of offerings of sanctity, that if one slaughtered these offerings not for their sake, they are disqualified. They are disqualified since their sacrifice came to render the nazirite and leper fit, and these guilt offerings did not render them fit.
  The Gemara asks: We learned in the mishna that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner, except for the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy. And if it is so that an <i>omer</i> meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified, then let the mishna also teach: Except for the <i>omer</i> meal offering.
  The Gemara responds: When the mishna teaches this <i>halakha</i>, it teaches it only with regard to meal offerings that come on behalf of an individual. The mishna does not teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those meal offerings that come on behalf of the community. Additionally, when the mishna teaches this <i>halakha</i>, it is only with regard to a meal offering that comes on account of itself, i.e., as an independent offering. The mishna does not teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering that comes on account of, i.e., together with, a slaughtered offering, e.g., the <i>omer</i> meal offering, which is brought along with two sheep.
  The Gemara adds: Furthermore, when the mishna teaches this <i>halakha</i>, it is only with regard to those meal offerings whose time is not set, i.e., they may be sacrificed on any date. The mishna does not teach the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this <i>omer</i> meal offering, whose time for offering is set on the sixteenth of Nisan.
  § The Gemara analyzes the statement of Rav. The Master said: And so you say with regard to the guilt offering of a nazirite who became ritually impure, and so you say with regard to the guilt offering of a leper, that if one slaughtered these offerings not for their sake, they are disqualified. They are disqualified since their proper sacrifice came to render the nazirite and leper fit, and they did not render them fit.
  The Gemara asks: We learned in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 2a): All slaughtered offerings that one slaughtered not for their sake are fit, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. This is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all offerings except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering, which are disqualified when slaughtered not for their sake. And if it is so that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Rav, let the mishna also teach: Except for the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, since they came to render one fit and they did not render one fit.
  The Gemara answers: Since there are other guilt offerings, i.e., the guilt offering for robbery, which one brings for taking a false oath denying an accusation of robbery, and the guilt offering brought for misuse of consecrated property, that come for atonement, which do not render one fit and are fit for sacrifice if they were slaughtered not for their sake, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna could not state the <i>halakha</i> with regard to guilt offerings in an absolute manner, and therefore he refrains from mentioning guilt offerings at all.
  The Gemara asks: What is different about the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper? Why are they disqualified when slaughtered not for their sake since they came to render fit and they did not render fit? These, i.e., the guilt offerings for robbery and for misuse of consecrated property, should likewise be disqualified when slaughtered not for their sake, since they came for atonement and they did not atone.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said in response: We find that the Torah differentiates between those guilt offerings that atone and those that render fit, and the <i>halakha</i> is more stringent with regard to those that render fit. Rabbi Yirmeya elaborates: With regard to those guilt offerings that atone, there are among them offerings that come after death, i.e., they are sacrificed after the death of their owners, whereas with regard to those that render fit, there are none among them that come after death. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Kinnim</i> 2:5): With regard to a woman after childbirth who brought her sin offering for her ritual purification and died, the heirs shall bring her burnt offering,which comes to atone. If she set aside her burnt offering and died, the heirs shall not bring her sin offering, as it comes to render her fit to partake of offerings.
  Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, objects to this: With regard to offerings that render fit as well, are there not among them offerings that come after death? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 11a): In the case of one who separates funds for the offerings of his naziriteship, i.e., his sin offering, burnt offering, and peace offering, a person may not derive benefit from them <i>ab initio</i>, but if one benefited from them after the fact, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, i.e., he is not required to bring a guilt offering and is not obligated to repay the principal and an additional fifth. This is because the coins are all fit for bringing peace offerings,and there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to funds fit for a peace offering.
  The mishna continues: If the nazirite died and he had undesignated funds that he set aside to pay for his nazirite offerings without specifying how much money should be allocated toward each offering, they will be allocated for communal gift offerings. If he left behind allocated funds, then with regard to the money for a sin offering, one must take it and cast it into the Dead Sea; one may not benefit from it <i>ab initio</i>, but if one benefited from it after the fact, he is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. With regard to the money for a burnt offering, one brings with it a burnt offering, and one is liable for misusing them.
  The mishna concludes: With the money for a peace offering, one brings a peace offering with it, and these offerings are eaten for one day, like the peace offering brought by a nazirite, and do not require the loaves that are normally bought with the peace offering of a nazirite. Rabbi Yehuda explains his question: But the burnt offering and peace offering of a nazirite are offerings that render the nazirite fit to drink wine, and yet they come after death.
  Rav Pappa said in response that this is what Rabbi Yirmeya is saying: We do not find an instance of a fixed manner of rendering fit that comes after death, i.e., there is no instance where the only offering that will render one fit to act in a manner previously prohibited to him may be sacrificed after death. And the offerings of a nazirite are examples of a means of rendering fit that is not fixed,
  
  Daf 5a
  
  as the Master said about the nazirite (<i>Nazir</i> 45a): And if he shaved after the sacrifice of any one of the three of them, i.e., after sacrificing his sin offering, burnt offering, or peace offering, he has fulfilled his obligation after the fact, i.e., he has successfully completed his term of naziriteship. Accordingly, there is no specific offering that renders him fit.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the guilt offering of a leper that was slaughtered not for its own sake, or if none of its blood was placed on the leper’s right thumb and big toe, this guilt offering is offered up upon the altar and it requires libations, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of the guilt offering of a leper. But the leper must nevertheless bring another guilt offering to render him fit to partake of offerings. This <i>baraita</i> is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav, who said that the guilt offering of a leper that was slaughtered not for its own sake is entirely disqualified because it did not render the leper fit.
  § The Gemara returns to its discussion concerning the <i>omer</i> meal offering. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, with regard to an <i>omer</i> meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake, that it is valid and the handful is burned on the altar. But its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until a priest brings another <i>omer</i> meal offering on the same day and thereby permits the first offering for consumption, as the prohibition against consuming the new crop remains in effect.
  The Gemara asks: But if its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until they bring another <i>omer</i> meal offering, how can the handful removed from this <i>omer</i> meal offering be sacrificed upon the altar? Before the <i>omer</i> meal offering is sacrificed, the new crop is forbidden for consumption, and the verse states: “From the well-watered pastures of Israel; for a meal offering, and for a burnt offering, and for peace offerings” (Ezekiel 45:15), from which it is derived that one may sacrifice only from that which is permitted to the Jewish people.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said in response: Reish Lakish holds that an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day. Accordingly, since the new crop will be permitted for consumption on the same day that this handful was removed from the <i>omer</i> meal offering, it is already considered fit to be sacrificed upon the altar.
  Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak, raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation from a <i>baraita</i>: There is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to birds that does not apply to meal offerings, and there is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to meal offerings that does not apply to birds. The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: There is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to birds that does not apply to meal offerings, as birds may be brought as a gift offering on behalf of two people, i.e., two people may take a vow to bring a single bird offering jointly. But with regard to meal offerings it is written: “And when one brings a meal offering” (Leviticus 2:1), indicating that only individuals may vow to bring a meal offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And another <i>halakha</i> that applies to birds but not meal offerings involves one who has not yet brought his atonement offering, i.e., a man who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>], or woman who experienced a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [<i>zava</i>], or a woman after childbirth, or a leper, all of whom must bring an offering to complete their atonement process. They bring a bird offering, not a meal offering.
  And furthermore, with regard to birds, their general prohibition was permitted when they are consecrated, i.e., killing a non-sacred bird by pinching the nape of its neck renders it a carcass, whose consumption is prohibited, and yet pinching the nape of a bird offering enables it to be sacrificed upon the altar and permits it for consumption, which is not so with regard to meal offerings, i.e., there is no prohibition that applies to the non-consecrated ingredients of a meal offering that does not apply to actual meal offerings as well.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And there is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to meal offerings that does not apply to birds. As meal offerings require placement in a service vessel, and they require waving and bringing, i.e., they must be brought to the corner of the altar prior to removal of the handful. And lastly, there are meal offerings of the community just as there are meal offerings of individuals, e.g., the <i>omer</i> meal offering is a communal meal offering, which is not so with regard to birds. Bird offerings do not require the use of service vessels, they do not require waving or bringing, and there are no communal bird offerings.
  Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak, explains his objection: And if it is so that a handful that was removed from an <i>omer</i> meal offering not for its own sake is fit for burning upon the altar, then with regard to meal offerings as well, you find that their general prohibition was permitted when they are consecrated. And what is this meal offering that was permitted? It is the <i>omer</i> meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake, as although the new crop remains prohibited to the Jewish people until another <i>omer</i> meal offering is brought, the handful of this meal offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.
  The Gemara answers: Since an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day, the sacrificing of that handful is not a prohibition that was permitted. Instead, it was initially fit for sacrifice upon the altar, as though another <i>omer</i> meal offering had already been brought to permit it.
  Rav Sheshet raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> that discusses the ritual purification of a leper: If the priest performed the placement of oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe before the placement of blood from the leper’s guilt offering on the leper’s right thumb and big toe, i.e., his actions were in the opposite order from those prescribed in the Torah (see Leviticus 14:14–17), he fills the vessel that holds a <i>log</i> of oil and he then puts oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe again after the placement of blood. If the priest performed the placement of oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe before the placement of seven sprinklings of oil before the Lord, he fills the vessel that holds a <i>log</i> of oil and he again puts oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe after the placement of seven sprinklings.
  Rav Sheshet explains his objection: And if you say that an offering is not considered as one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day, then why should the priest place the oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe again? What he performed, he already performed, i.e., since the oil was going to be placed on the leper’s right thumb and big toe on that day, the placement should be valid even when done out of order.
  Rav Pappa said in response: The <i>halakhot</i> of a leper are different, as it is written concerning them an expression of being, as the verse states: “This shall be the law of the leper” (Leviticus 14:2). The term “shall be” indicates that it shall be as it is, i.e., the purification process of a leper must be performed in accordance with the precise order prescribed in the Torah.
  Rav Pappa raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest performed the slaughter of a leper’s sin offering before the slaughter of his guilt offering, i.e., the priest’s actions were in the opposite order from those prescribed in the Torah (see Leviticus 14:13–19), there should not be another priest stirring the blood of the leper’s sin offering to prevent it from congealing in order that his guilt offering may be slaughtered and its blood sprinkled before the blood of his sin offering. Rather, the sin offering is left until its form decays, i.e., until the next morning, at which point it is definitively disqualified due to remaining in the Temple overnight and can be taken out to the place designated for burning. The objection is as follows: If an offering that is to be brought on that day is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived, why must this sin offering be left to decay? It should be considered as though it was slaughtered after the guilt offering.
  The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Pappa raise this objection? But isn’t it Rav Pappa himself who said: The <i>halakhot</i> of a leper are different, as it is written concerning them an expression of being, which indicates that the order of slaughter of a leper’s offerings must be preserved? Rather, this is what is difficult to Rav Pappa from the <i>baraita</i>: You can say that this statement, the <i>halakha</i> that the order is indispensable to the purification process of a leper, applies only to a sacrificial rite, whereas the act of slaughter is not considered a rite. And if an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day, then another priest should be stirring the blood of the leper’s sin offering to prevent it from congealing, and a priest should sacrifice the guilt offering and present its blood in the meantime, and afterward he should sacrifice the sin offering.
  Rather, Rav Pappa said: This is the reason of Reish Lakish, who said that the handful of an <i>omer</i> meal offering that was removed not for its own sake is valid and may be burned upon the altar: It is that he holds that the illumination of the eastern horizon on the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan permits the new crop to the Jewish people even before the <i>omer</i> meal offering is sacrificed, as Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: Even when the Temple is standing,
  
  Daf 5b
  
  the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.
  The Gemara notes: And this statement of Reish Lakish was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference, i.e., it is evident from a different statement of Reish Lakish that this is his opinion. As we learned in a mishna (68b): One may not bring a meal offering, the first fruits, or the meal offering brought with the libations accompanying an animal offering, from the new crop, prior to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i>. The Gemara interrupts its citation of the mishna to add that the reason is that we require that an offering be “from the well-watered pastures of Israel,” i.e., it must be brought from that which is permitted to the Jewish people, and the new crop has not yet been permitted to them. The mishna concludes: And if he brought these offerings from the new crop they are unfit.
  The mishna continues: After the <i>omer</i> but prior to the two loaves one may not bring those offerings from the new crop. The Gemara explains that this is because the two loaves are called first fruits, and therefore they should precede all other offerings from the new crop. The mishna adds: But if he brought those offerings from the new crop, they are fit.
  And Rav Yitzḥak says that Reish Lakish says: The Sages taught that a meal offering that was brought from the new crop before the <i>omer</i> meal offering is disqualified only if it was brought on the fourteenth or on the fifteenth of Nisan. But if it was on the sixteenth, then even if he brought it prior to the <i>omer</i> meal offering, it is valid. He continues: And this statement poses a difficulty for me: Why should meal offerings be valid when sacrificed on the sixteenth if they were sacrificed before the <i>omer</i> meal offering? Let them be considered like offerings whose time has not yet arrived. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.
  § The Gemara previously cited the opinion of Rav that an <i>omer</i> meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified. The Gemara also cited the opinion of Reish Lakish that this meal offering is valid but another <i>omer</i> meal offering is necessary to permit the new crop for consumption. And Rava says: With regard to an <i>omer</i> meal offering from which the priest removed a handful not for its own sake, it is valid and its remainder is consumed, and it does not require another <i>omer</i> meal offering to permit it for consumption. The reason is that improper intent is effective [<i>mo’elet</i>] to disqualify an offering only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.
  Rava elaborates: The condition that improper intent disqualifies only when expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the intent of a blemished priest, who is disqualified from performing the Temple service. The condition that it disqualifies only when expressed with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the <i>omer</i> meal offering, which is generally unfit for the Temple service, as it is a novelty, in that it is brought from barley whereas most meal offerings are brought from wheat. And finally, the condition that it disqualifies only when expressed in a place that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude sacrificial rites that were performed with improper intent while the altar was damaged. At such a time improper intent does not disqualify an offering, and therefore if the altar is repaired on the same day, the offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.
  § The Gemara discusses the prohibition against sacrificing an item that is prohibited to the Jewish people. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is derived from a passage in the Torah that discusses burnt offerings: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), that certain animals are prohibited for sacrifice upon the altar (see <i>Temura</i> 28a). When it states later, in the next verse: “If his offering is a burnt offering of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), this is difficult, as there is no need for the verse to state this, as it was already written earlier. Rather, this serves to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>] from being brought as an offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> questions the need for this derivation: But could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? And if a blemished animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person [<i>lehedyot</i>] for consumption, is nevertheless prohibited as an offering for the Most High (see Leviticus 22:19), then certainly with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, which is forbidden to an ordinary person for consumption (see Exodus 22:30), is it not logical that it is prohibited for the Most High? The <i>baraita</i> responds: Fat [<i>ḥelev</i>] and blood prove that this <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not valid, as they are forbidden to an ordinary person and yet they are permitted for the Most High.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this suggestion: What is notable about fat and blood? They are notable in that they come from an item that is generally permitted, i.e., the animal from which they come is itself permitted for consumption. Will you say the same with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, which is entirely forbidden for eating, and therefore should not be permitted for the Most High?
  The <i>baraita</i> responds: The pinching of bird offerings will prove that one cannot derive by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that a <i>tereifa</i> is disqualified. As a bird killed by the pinching of its nape is also entirely forbidden, and yet although it is forbidden for consumption to an ordinary person, as it is rendered a carcass, it is nevertheless permitted for the Most High, as bird offerings are killed by the pinching of their napes. The verse is therefore necessary to disqualify a <i>tereifa</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this suggestion as well: What is notable about pinching? It is notable in that its sanctity prohibits it, i.e., only at the time when it becomes sanctified for the altar does it become prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, which is at the time of its pinching. But before this time it is not yet prohibited to an ordinary person for consumption. This is not the case with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, as its sanctity does not prohibit it for consumption, since it is always prohibited to eat it. Accordingly, by logical inference alone one can arrive at the conclusion that a <i>tereifa</i> should not be permitted for the Most High.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes with a statement that will soon be explained: And if you have responded, i.e., if you succeeded in rejecting the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, then when the verse states later: “Of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), as there is no need for the verse to state this phrase, it serves to exclude a <i>tereifa</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What response is alluded to by the statement: If you have responded? The conclusion of the <i>baraita</i> had indicated that the <i>a fortiori</i> inference must be accepted. The Gemara cites several suggestions, for which it provides the following mnemonic: <i>Rekiaḥ</i>, <i>Mar</i>, <i>Adda</i>, <i>Leshisheih</i>. These terms allude to the names of some of the Sages mentioned in the following discussion: Rav; Rabbi Akiva; Rav Aḥa; Mar, son of Ravina; Rav Adda; and Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi.
  Rav said that this is the response: The <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it may be said that the <i>omer</i> meal offering proves that the <i>halakha</i> concerning a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be derived by the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as the <i>omer</i> is prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, since it comes from the new crop, and yet it is permitted as an offering for the Most High. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What is notable about the <i>omer</i> meal offering? It is notable in that the <i>omer</i> renders the new crop permitted for consumption, whereas a <i>tereifa</i> does not render anything permitted.
  The Gemara responds: Although the <i>omer</i> meal offering generally renders the new crop permitted, the <i>omer</i> brought during a Sabbatical Year does not render the crop permitted, as it is prohibited to plant during the Sabbatical Year, and consequently there is no new crop for the <i>omer</i> offering to permit. The Gemara counters this suggestion: The <i>omer</i> meal offering brought during a Sabbatical Year also renders something permitted, as it permits produce that grew without being purposely planted [<i>sefiḥin</i>] during the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that <i>sefiḥin</i> are prohibited during the Sabbatical Year, the <i>omer</i> meal offering brought during a Sabbatical Year does not render the new crop permitted for consumption, and yet it is permitted for the Most High. A verse is therefore necessary to derive that a <i>tereifa</i> may not be sacrificed.
  Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva as well, let us refute the statement of Rav, as what is notable about the <i>omer</i> meal offering? It is notable in that the <i>omer</i> permits the new crop for consumption outside of Eretz Yisrael, where the prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year do not apply.
  And even according to the one who says that the consumption of produce from the new crop grown outside of Eretz Yisrael is not prohibited by Torah law, Rav’s statement can be refuted in another manner: What is notable about the <i>omer</i> meal offering? It is notable in that the <i>omer</i> comes to permit a prohibition that applies to a substance that was previously within it, i.e., the burning upon the altar of a handful from the <i>omer</i> meal offering renders the remainder of the meal offering permitted to the priests, whereas a <i>tereifa</i> is entirely forbidden.
  Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: This is not a refutation, as, if that is so, then with regard to a <i>tereifa</i> as well, you should sacrifice it and you will thereby permit a prohibition that applies to a substance that was previously within it, and its meat will become permitted to the priests for consumption. Therefore, a verse is needed to exclude a <i>tereifa</i>. Rather, one can refute the statement of Rav like this: What is notable about the <i>omer</i> meal offering? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, i.e., the Torah requires the <i>omer</i> meal offering to be brought from the new crop in order to permit the new crop for consumption. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a <i>tereifa</i>.
  Reish Lakish said that this is the response alluded to at the end of the <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that the one who prepares the incense proves that the <i>halakha</i> concerning a <i>tereifa</i> may not be derived by the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as this is prohibited to an ordinary person, and is nevertheless permitted for the Most High. The Gemara questions the terminology of Reish Lakish: But the one who prepares the incense is a person. How can it be said that a person is prohibited to an ordinary person?
  Rather, Reish Lakish meant that the preparation of the incense proves it, as it is prohibited to prepare the incense mixture for use by an ordinary person (see Exodus 30:37), and yet it is permitted to do so for the Most High. The Gemara refutes this claim: What is notable about preparation of the incense? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a <i>tereifa</i>.
  Mar, son of Ravina, said that this is the response of the <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that Shabbat proves that the <i>halakha</i> concerning a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be derived by the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as it is prohibited for an ordinary person to perform labor on Shabbat, and yet the labor involved in the Temple service is permitted on Shabbat for the Most High. Without the verse, one might similarly conclude that a <i>tereifa</i> is permitted for the Most High despite the fact that it is prohibited for consumption.
  The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about Shabbat? It is notable in that the general prohibition against labor on Shabbat was permitted with regard to an ordinary person in the case of circumcision, as the mitzva of circumcision must be performed in its proper time, even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the act of circumcision is generally prohibited on Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: Is that to say that circumcision is considered a requirement of an ordinary person, whose performance was exempted from the general prohibition against labor on Shabbat for one’s private needs? Circumcision is a mitzva. Rather, the statement of Mar, son of Ravina, can be refuted like this: What is notable about Shabbat? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, i.e., the Torah requires that offerings be brought on Shabbat. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a <i>tereifa</i>.
  Rav Adda bar Abba said that this is the response mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>: The <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that the prohibition against diverse kinds proves that the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be derived from the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as it is prohibited for an ordinary person to wear garments sewn from a mixture of diverse kinds (Deuteronomy 22:11), and yet such garments are permitted for the Most High, as the belt of the priestly vestments was fashioned from a mixture of diverse kinds.
  The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the prohibition against diverse kinds? It is notable in that the general prohibition against wearing a garment sewn from diverse kinds was permitted in the case of an ordinary person with regard to ritual fringes, as a string of sky-blue wool must be placed on a four-cornered garment even if that garment is made from linen. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that ritual fringes are considered a requirement of an ordinary person, whose performance was exempted from the general prohibition concerning diverse kinds with regard to one’s private needs? Placing ritual fringes on a garment is a mitzva. Rather, the claim of Rav Adda bar Abba can be refuted like this:
  
  Daf 6a
  
  What is notable about diverse kinds? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, since the belt of the priestly vestments must be sewn from diverse kinds. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a <i>tereifa</i>.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from the verse, because it can be said: Let this claim be derived by analogy from the common element of two sources, as follows: With regard to the question of the <i>baraita</i>: What is notable about pinching? It is notable in that its sanctity prohibits it, one can respond: Fat and blood prove that this consideration is not enough to reject the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as these are prohibited before they are sanctified and are nevertheless permitted for the Most High.
  Similarly, with regard to the question: What is notable about fat and blood? They are notable in that they come from an item that is generally permitted, i.e., the animal from which they come is itself permitted for consumption, one can reply: Pinching proves that this consideration is insufficient for a rejection of the <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as a bird that was killed by pinching is entirely prohibited for eating, and yet a pinched bird is permitted to the altar.
  Rav Sheisha concludes: And accordingly, the inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that they are prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person and are nevertheless permitted for the Most High. Therefore, I will also bring the case of a <i>tereifa</i> and say: Even though is it prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, it should be permitted for the Most High. It is therefore necessary to derive from a verse that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice. The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that with regard to fat and blood, and pinching, in both cases its mitzva is performed in this manner.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: It is necessary to derive the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>tereifa</i> from a verse because one can say that the refutation of the <i>a fortiori</i> inference is present from the outset. Rav Ashi elaborates: From where do you wish to derive the <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice? You wish to derive it from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the case of a blemished animal, as a blemished animal is permitted for consumption and prohibited for sacrifice. This is problematic.
  Rav Ashi explains: What is notable about a blemished animal? It is notable in that with regard to blemishes the Torah rendered those who sacrifice like that which is sacrificed, i.e., a blemished priest may not sacrifice an offering just as a blemished animal is unfit for sacrifice (see Leviticus, chapter 22). This cannot be said with regard to a <i>tereifa</i>, as a priest with a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months may perform the Temple service. It is therefore necessary to derive from the verse the fact that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice.
  Rav Aḥa Sava said to Rav Ashi: But an animal born by caesarean section proves that this <i>a fortiori</i> inference cannot be rejected based on that consideration, as with regard to it the Torah did not render those who sacrifice like that which is sacrificed, since an animal born by caesarean section is unfit for sacrifice whereas a priest born in such a manner may perform the Temple service. And yet an animal born by caesarean section is permitted for consumption to an ordinary person and prohibited for the Most High. If so, one cannot reject the <i>a fortiori</i> inference because with regard to blemishes the Torah rendered those who sacrifice like that which is sacrificed. Why then is a verse necessary in order to derive that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit?
  Rav Ashi responds: What is notable about an animal born by caesarean section? It is notable in that such an animal is not sanctified with firstborn status, whereas a firstborn animal that was born as a <i>tereifa</i> is sanctified. Accordingly, without the verse one might have concluded that a <i>tereifa</i> may be sacrificed.
  Rav Aḥa Sava answers: A blemished animal proves that this is not the decisive consideration, as it does become sanctified with the sanctity of a firstborn, and it too is permitted for consumption and prohibited for the Most High. And if you say: What is notable about a blemished animal? It is notable in that with regard to it the Torah rendered those who sacrifice like that which is sacrificed, one can respond: An animal born by caesarean section proves that this consideration is not decisive, as a priest born by caesarean section may perform the Temple service.
  Rav Aḥa Sava concludes: And therefore, the inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that they are permitted for consumption to an ordinary person and prohibited for the Most High. And all the more so a <i>tereifa</i>, which is prohibited to an ordinary person, should be prohibited for the Most High. If so, the derivation from a verse is unnecessary.
  Rav Ashi refutes the proof of Rav Aḥa Sava: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that their general prohibition was not permitted, since blemished animals and those born by caesarean section are never permitted for sacrifice. Will you say that the same applies to a <i>tereifa</i>, whose general prohibition was permitted, as will be explained? Accordingly, it is necessary to derive from the verse that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This <i>tereifa</i> whose general prohibition was permitted, what is it, i.e., to what case is this referring? If we say that it is referring to the pinching of a bird burnt offering for the Most High, whereby the bird is initially rendered a <i>tereifa</i> at the start of the pinching process, and nevertheless it is sacrificed upon the altar, then the same may be said of a blemished animal as well. As with regard to birds it is permitted to sacrifice a blemished bird. This is in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> that the requirement that an offering must be unblemished and male applies to animal offerings, but there is no requirement that an offering must be unblemished and male in the case of bird offerings.
  Rather, this permitting the general prohibition found in the context of a <i>tereifa</i> is referring to the <i>halakha</i> that the pinching of a bird sin offering renders it permitted to the priests for consumption despite the fact that it was not slaughtered by cutting its neck with a knife. This claim can be refuted as well, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High, i.e., they may partake of the sin offering only because it was permitted for sacrifice upon the altar. Accordingly, there is no difference between a <i>tereifa</i> due to pinching and a blemished bird, as both were released from their general prohibition in this regard, since both are permitted for sacrifice upon the altar and both are therefore permitted for consumption by the priests. Consequently, the <i>a fortiori</i> inference remains valid, and the verse is unnecessary.
  Rather, refute the <i>a fortiori</i> inference like this: What is notable about their common element? It is notable in that with regard to both a blemished animal and one born by caesarean section their blemish is noticeable, as a blemished animal is visibly blemished and it is well known when an animal is born by caesarean section. Will you say that they can serve as the source of the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>tereifa</i>, whose blemish is not necessarily noticeable? Due to that reason, the verse: “Of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), was necessary, to teach that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice.
  § After trying to prove why a derivation from a verse is necessary, the Gemara questions the very source provided by the <i>baraita</i> on 5b for the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i>, i.e., the verse: “Of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3). But is the <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for sacrifice derived from here? It is derived from there, i.e., from the verse: “From the well-watered pastures of Israel” (Ezekiel 45:15), from which it is derived that an offering may be brought only from that which is permitted to the Jewish people.
  Alternatively, this <i>halakha</i> can be derived from a verse discussing animal tithe offerings: “Whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be holy for the Lord” (Leviticus 27:32). This teaches that all animals may be sacrificed as the animal tithe, excluding a <i>tereifa</i>, as it does not pass under the rod on account of its weakness, and the Sages derived from this the <i>halakha</i> that a <i>tereifa</i> is unfit for any type of offering.
  The Gemara responds: All of these verses are necessary, because if the disqualification of a <i>tereifa</i> was derived from the verse “the well-watered pastures of Israel,” I would say that this verse serves to exclude a <i>tereifa</i> only in a case where it did not have a period of fitness, e.g., if it was born a <i>tereifa</i> and was therefore never fit for sacrifice. This is similar to the case of the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [<i>orla</i>] and diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, whose disqualification is derived from this verse. But with regard to a <i>tereifa</i> that had a period of fitness, one might say that it should be fit. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Whatever passes under the rod,” to teach that all animals that do not pass under the rod are unfit for sacrifice, even if they were once fit.
  The Gemara continues: And if the Merciful One had written only: “Whatever passes under the rod,” I would say that this verse serves to exclude a <i>tereifa</i> only where it was rendered a <i>tereifa</i> and its owner subsequently sanctified it. This is similar to the case of animal tithes, as this verse is teaching that a <i>tereifa</i> cannot be subsequently sanctified as a tithe. But if the owner sanctified it and it was subsequently rendered a <i>tereifa</i>, which means that at the time when it was sanctified it was fit, one might say that it should be fit. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote: “Of the herd,” to teach that even an animal that became a <i>tereifa</i> after it was already sanctified is unfit for sacrifice. Accordingly, all three verses are necessary.
  MISHNA: Both the meal offering of a sinner and all other meal offerings with regard to which the one who removed their handful was a non-priest, or a priest who was an acute mourner, i.e., whose relative died and was not yet buried, or a priest who was ritually impure who immersed that day and was waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed, or a priest lacking the requisite priestly vestments, or a priest who had not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, or a priest who did not wash his hands and feet from the water in the Basin prior to performing the Temple service, or an uncircumcised priest, or a ritually impure priest, or a priest who removed the handful while sitting, or while standing not on the floor of the Temple but upon vessels, or upon an animal, or upon the feet of another person; in all these cases the meal offerings are unfit for sacrifice.
  If the priest removed the handful with his left hand the meal offering is unfit. Ben Beteira says: He must return the handful to the vessel that contains the meal offering and again remove the handful, this time with his right hand.
  If a priest removed the handful of flour, and a stone, a grain of salt, or a pinch [<i>koret</i>] of frankincense emerged in his hand, the meal offering is unfit due to the fact that the Sages said: The handful that is outsized or that is lacking is unfit. The existence of one of these foreign items in the handful means that the requisite measure of flour is lacking. And which is the outsized handful? It is one where he removed the handful overflowing [<i>mevoratz</i>] in a manner in which his fingers do not hold the flour. And which is the lacking handful? It is one where he removed the handful with the tips of his fingers.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach: Both the meal offering of a sinner and all other meal offerings? Let it teach: All the meal offerings with regard to which the one who removed their handful was a non-priest or an acute mourner. Why does the mishna single out the case of the meal offering of a sinner?
  The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> in this manner in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: By right the meal offering of a sinner should require oil and frankincense like other meal offerings, so that the sinner will not profit. And for what reason does it not require oil and frankincense? So that his offering will not be of superior quality. And likewise, by right the sin offering of forbidden fat, i.e., the offering brought by one who unwittingly ate the forbidden fat of a domesticated animal, should require libations
  
  Daf 6b
  
  so that the sinner will not profit. And for what reason does his offering not require libations? So that his offering will not be of superior quality. Accordingly, it might enter your mind to say that since Rabbi Shimon says: In order that his offering will not be of superior quality, when the handful is removed by one of those unfit for performing the Temple service, the offering should also be valid, as it too is of inferior quality. Therefore, the mishna teaches us the <i>halakha</i> in a manner that emphasizes that even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon the meal offering of a sinner is disqualified when the handful is removed by one who is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: If so, then there as well, i.e., with regard to slaughtered offerings, let the mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 15b) teach: Both the sin offering of forbidden fat and all the slaughtered offerings with regard to which the one who collected their blood was a non-priest or a priest who is an acute mourner, are disqualified. And let us say that it was necessary to teach the mishna in this manner in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, to emphasize that although the sin offering is not of superior quality, in that it does not require that libations be brought with it, nevertheless it is disqualified if its blood was collected by one unfit for Temple service. Why then does that mishna teach simply: All the slaughtered offerings with regard to which the one who collected their blood was a non-priest are disqualified?
  The Gemara concludes its question: Apparently, since the <i>tanna</i> teaches that mishna with the term: All, and he does not teach: Except, all offerings are indicated by the general disqualification, and there is no need to emphasize the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering, even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Here too, with regard to meal offerings, since the <i>tanna</i> teaches the mishna with the term: All, and he does not teach: Except, this means that all of them are indicated, even the meal offering of a sinner. Why then does the mishna specifically mention the meal offering of a sinner?
  The Gemara explains: It was necessary to teach the mishna in this manner as it might enter your mind to say: Since I have established that the first clause, i.e., the mishna on 2a, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, with regard to the last clause as well, i.e., the mishna here, it may be concluded that it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, the mishna teaches us the <i>halakha</i> in this manner, to emphasize that it is in accordance with his opinion.
  § Rav says: In the case of a non-priest who removed a handful, he should return the handful to the meal offering. The Gemara challenges: But we learned in the mishna that a non-priest disqualified the meal offering by removing a handful from it. The Gemara responds: What does the mishna mean when it says: Disqualified? It means that the non-priest has disqualified the meal offering until such time as he returns the handful to the meal offering, whereupon a priest fit for the Temple service should again remove a handful from the meal offering and sacrifice it.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, then this is identical to the opinion of ben Beteira in the mishna, who says that if a priest removed a handful with his left hand it is returned to the meal offering whereupon the priest removes a handful from the offering with his right hand. What difference is there between the two opinions in the mishna? The Gemara explains: If the handful that was removed by one unfit for Temple service is in its unadulterated form, then the Rabbis do not disagree with the opinion of ben Beteira, and the handful is returned to the meal offering. They disagree when the handful is lacking. The Rabbis hold: One does not bring flour from within his house and refill the vessel containing the handful, whereas ben Beteira holds that one brings flour from within his house and refills it.
  The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the mishna is referring to a handful that is lacking, then the statement of the mishna: Ben Beteira says he must return the handful to the vessel with the meal offering and again remove a handful with his right hand, is imprecise, as the mishna should have taught: Ben Beteira says he must return the handful to the vessel with the meal offering and bring flour from within his house and refill the missing amount, and again remove a handful with his right hand.
  The Gemara therefore suggests a different answer: When Rav said that the handful is returned to the meal offering, he said this only according to the opinion of ben Beteira. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it obvious that this is the opinion of ben Beteira? The Gemara responds: Rav’s statement is necessary lest you say that ben Beteira deems the meal offering fit only when the handful was removed with one’s left hand, but with regard to other disqualifications, he does not deem it fit. Therefore, Rav teaches us that with regard to all of the disqualifications cited in the mishna, ben Beteira holds that the handful is returned to the meal offering whereupon a new handful is removed from it and sacrificed upon the altar.
  The Gemara asks: What is different in the case of a handful removed with a priest’s left hand that one might have thought that ben Beteira’s opinion applies only in this case? Perhaps the reason is that we find that the Temple service performed with the priest’s left hand is fit on Yom Kippur, i.e., when the High Priest would enter the Holy of Holies holding the vessel containing the incense in his left hand. But with regard to a non-priest as well, we find that the Temple service is fit with regard to slaughter, as an offering may be slaughtered by a non-priest. Why then is it necessary for Rav to teach that the opinion of ben Beteira applies to the case of a non-priest as well?
  The Gemara responds: Slaughter is not considered a sacrificial rite, and it is for that reason that a non-priest may slaughter an offering. Accordingly, without the statement of Rav one would not have concluded that ben Beteira holds that a handful removed by a non-priest may be returned, as the Temple service is never fit when performed by a non-priest.
  The Gemara asks: And is slaughter really not considered a sacrificial rite? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say that Rav says: The slaughter of a red heifer by a non-priest is not valid? And Rav said with regard to this <i>halakha</i>: This is because both the term: “Elazar the priest” (Numbers 19:3), and the term: “Statute” (Numbers 19:2), are written in the Torah’s description of the slaughter of the red heifer. The term “statute” indicates that if one deviates from any of the details of the service as delineated in the verses, the service is not valid. The Gemara answers: The <i>halakhot</i> of the red heifer are different, as the heifer is considered sanctified for the purpose of Temple maintenance, not for sacrifice upon the altar. Accordingly, one cannot derive from the case of the red heifer that the slaughter of an offering is considered a sacrificial rite.
  The Gemara asks: But is it not all the more so? If items sanctified for the purpose of Temple maintenance require that the performance of rites relevant to them be performed by a member of the priesthood, then with regard to items sanctified for sacrifice upon the altar, shouldn’t they certainly require that their rites be performed by a member of the priesthood? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said in response: The requirement that the red heifer be slaughtered by a priest is not proof that its slaughter is a sacrificial rite. Rather, that requirement is just as it is in the case of examination of the shades of leprous marks, which is obviously not considered a sacrificial rite, and yet the Torah requires that these marks be examined by a member of the priesthood.
  The Gemara asks: Nevertheless, why was it necessary for Rav to teach that the removal of a handful by a non-priest does not disqualify the meal offering according to ben Beteira? Let us derive it from the fact that there was a period of fitness for rites performed by a non-priest, as before the construction of the Temple it was permitted for non-priests to sacrifice offerings upon a private altar.
  And if you would say that we do not derive <i>halakhot</i> of the rites performed in the Temple from those performed on a private altar, one can respond: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to an item, e.g., the limbs of an offering, that emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby rendered unfit for sacrifice upon the altar, that if it nevertheless ascended upon the altar it shall not descend? It is derived from the fact that an item that emerged is valid for sacrifice on a private altar. This indicates that one can learn the <i>halakhot</i> of offerings in the Temple from the <i>halakhot</i> of a private altar.
  The Gemara rejects this: The <i>tanna</i> of that <i>baraita</i> relies on the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 6:2), from which it is derived that any item that ascends upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. In other words, the verse is the source for the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely as a support for this ruling.
  The Gemara asks: Rather, the reason it is known that ben Beteira permits the return to the meal offering of a handful removed by a non-priest is that Rav taught us so. Were it not for this, I would say that with regard to other disqualifications, i.e., other than a handful removed with the left hand, ben Beteira invalidates the meal offering. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, both say: Ben Beteira would deem fit in the case of all the other disqualifications listed in the mishna?
  The Gemara continues: And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall remove from there his handful” (Leviticus 2:2), that this verse indicates that the removal of a handful from a meal offering may be performed from the place where the feet of the non-priest stand, i.e., anywhere within the Temple courtyard.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Ben Beteira says that the verse should be interpreted as follows: From where is it derived that if one removed a handful with his left hand, that he must return the handful to the vessel with the meal offering and again remove the handful with his right hand? It is derived from that which the verse states: “And he shall remove from there,” indicating that the handful is removed from the place where he already removed it, i.e., the handful is returned to the meal offering and thereupon removed from the same meal offering with the right hand. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty from the <i>baraita</i>: And since the verse is written in an unspecified manner, i.e., it does not mention which handfuls are returned, what difference is it to me if the handful was removed with the left hand, and what difference is it to me if it was removed by means of one of the other disqualifications?
  The Gemara therefore suggests an alternative explanation: Rather, this is what Rav teaches us: Ben Beteira holds that if one unfit for Temple service removed a handful it may be returned to the meal offering even if he sanctified the handful by placing it in a service vessel. And the statement of Rav serves to exclude the opinion of these <i>tanna’im</i>: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei ben Yosei ben Yasiyyan and Rabbi Yehuda the baker said: In what case is this statement of ben Beteira said, i.e., in which case does he rule that the handful may be returned to the meal offering? It is in a case where the unfit individual removed a handful and did not sanctify it by placing it inside a service vessel. But if he sanctified it then he has disqualified it, even according to ben Beteira, and it may not be returned to the meal offering.
  And there are those who say that Rav teaches the opposite, that if an unfit person merely removed a handful, yes, ben Beteira permits such a handful to be returned to the meal offering from which it was removed, but if he already sanctified the handful by placing it inside a service vessel, it may not be returned. In accordance with whose opinion is this explanation? It is in accordance with the opinion of these <i>tanna’im</i>, i.e., Rabbi Yosei ben Yosei ben Yasiyyan and Rabbi Yehuda the baker, and it is to exclude the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> in that <i>baraita</i>, who disagrees with the ruling of Rabbi Yosei ben Yosei ben Yasiyyan and Rabbi Yehuda the baker and maintains that a handful may be returned even after it was sanctified by a service vessel.
  Rav Naḥman objects to this: What do these <i>tanna’im</i> of the <i>baraita</i> hold? If they hold that the removal of a handful by one unfit for Temple service is considered the performance of a sacrificial rite to the extent that it disqualifies the offering, then the meal offering should be disqualified even though he did not perform the stage of the placement of the handful in a vessel. And if they hold that the removal of a handful by an unfit individual is not considered the performance of a rite, then when he performed the stage of its placement in a vessel, what significance was there to this action? He can still return the handful to the meal offering.
  Rav Naḥman reconsidered and then said: Actually, those <i>tanna’im</i> hold that the removal of a handful by one unfit for Temple service is considered the performance of a sacrificial rite, but the rite of the handful is not complete until he performs the stage of its placement in a vessel. Consequently, the meal offering is disqualified only after a person unfit for Temple service places the handful inside a service vessel.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, i.e., if the placement of the handful inside a service vessel completes the rite that begins with the handful’s removal, then even if the handful was removed by an unfit individual who has not yet sanctified it in the service vessel designated for the handful,
  
  Daf 7a
  
  when he returns the handful to its former place in the service vessel that contains the meal offering it should become sanctified, as it is now placed inside a service vessel, and it should therefore become disqualified. It should not matter whether the handful was placed in the vessel designated for it, or back in the same vessel it was taken from.
  Concerning this challenge, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That is to say that service vessels sanctify items placed in them only when they are placed there with specific intent that they be sanctified by that vessel. Since the priest does not return the handful to the vessel containing the meal offering with such intent, the handful is not disqualified, because the rite was not completed.
  The Gemara asks: It may be inferred from this statement that if items are placed into service vessels with intent, the service vessels sanctify them. But didn’t Reish Lakish raise a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to service vessels, i.e., do they sanctify disqualified items to the extent that they may be sacrificed upon the altar <i>ab initio</i>? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him that they do not sanctify the items. The Gemara responds: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: They do not sanctify the disqualified items that are placed inside them to the extent that they may be sacrificed, but they do sanctify them to the extent that they are disqualified.
  Rav Amram says: Even if service vessels sanctify items without specific intent, it is possible to return the handful to the meal offering without the vessel sanctifying the handful, such as in a case where he returned it to a heaped bowl [<i>levisa</i>], i.e., he placed the handful upon the heap of flour in such a manner that the handful did not enter the airspace of the vessel containing the meal offering. Consequently, the handful is not sanctified by the vessel.
  The Gemara asks: But if the meal offering was heaped, how was he initially able to remove a handful from it? The handful must initially be removed from within a vessel. Rather, it is possible to return the handful without sanctifying it in a case where he returned it to a full [<i>tefufa</i>] bowl, i.e., it was full to the brim but not heaped. When the priest initially removes a handful from such a vessel, he removes it from inside the vessel, but when it is returned, it does not enter the airspace of the vessel.
  The Gemara asks: But once he removed a handful, he formed a furrow in the surface of the meal offering, and therefore when he returns the handful to its previous place inside the vessel, he is in fact returning it to a spot within the vessel, i.e., the furrow. If so, the handful should be sanctified to the extent that the vessel disqualifies it. The Gemara responds: When he returns it to the vessel containing the meal offering, he does not place it directly in the furrow. Rather, he lays it on the wall of the vessel and moves the vessel, and the handful falls by itself into the furrow. In this manner, it is as though a monkey rather than a person returned the handful to the furrow, and the handful is therefore not sanctified.
  § The Gemara returns to its discussion of the opinion of ben Beteira. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: And let one interpret ben Beteira’s ruling as speaking of a case in which the handful is not sanctified by the vessel containing the meal offering, such as where he returned it to a vessel that is resting upon the ground. Rather, the fact that this was not suggested indicates that service vessels sanctify items placed inside them even while resting on the ground. Is it correct to conclude from here that one may remove a handful of a meal offering from a service vessel that is resting upon the ground? Rabbi Zeira said to him: You have touched upon a dilemma that was already raised before us, when Rabbi Avimi was learning tractate <i>Menaḥot</i> in the study hall of Rav Ḥisda.
  The Gemara interrupts this statement with a question: And did Rabbi Avimi really learn in the study hall of Rav Ḥisda? But didn’t Rav Ḥisda say: I absorbed many blows [<i>kulfei</i>] from Avimi as a result of that <i>halakha</i>, i.e., Avimi would mock me when I questioned his statements with regard to the sale of orphans’ property by the courts, which were contradictory to the ruling of a particular <i>baraita</i>. Avimi explained to me that if the court comes to announce such a sale on consecutive days, then it is announced for thirty days, in accordance with that <i>baraita</i>. But if it will be announced only on Monday, Thursday, and Monday, then it is announced over the course of sixty days. If so, Rav Ḥisda was in fact the pupil while Rabbi Avimi was his teacher.
  The Gemara answers: Avimi was in fact the teacher, but tractate <i>Menaḥot</i> was uprooted for him, i.e., he forgot it, and Avimi came before his student Rav Ḥisda to help him recall his learning. The Gemara asks: If Rav Ḥisda was in fact Avimi’s student, let Avimi send for him and Rav Ḥisda come to Avimi. The Gemara responds: Avimi thought that this would be more helpful in this matter, i.e., that by exerting the effort to travel to his pupil in order to learn from him, he would better retain his studies.
  The Gemara returns to the statement of Rabbi Zeira: Rav Naḥman encountered Avimi upon his return from the study hall of Rav Ḥisda. Rav Naḥman said to him: How does one properly remove a handful from a meal offering? Avimi pointed to a vessel that was resting on the ground and said to him: From this vessel one may properly remove a handful. Rav Naḥman said to him: But may one remove a handful from a vessel that is resting upon the ground? Avimi said to him: When I said that such a vessel may be used, I meant that one priest would first raise it from the ground and then another priest would remove a handful from it.
  Rav Naḥman proceeded to ask Avimi another question: How does one properly sanctify the meal offerings? Avimi pointed to a vessel that was resting on the ground and said to him: The priest places it into this vessel. Rav Naḥman again said to him: But can one sanctify a meal offering in a vessel that is resting upon the ground? Avimi said to him: When I said that such a vessel may be used, I meant that another priest would initially raise it from the ground, and only then would the meal offering be placed inside it.
  Rav Naḥman said to Avimi: If so, then you require the involvement of three priests, i.e., one to raise the vessel, one to sanctify the meal offering, and one to remove the handful from the meal offering. Avimi said to him: And let it require even thirteen priests, just as the service of the daily burnt offering required the involvement of thirteen priests. The need for several priests presents no difficulty.
  Rav Naḥman raised another objection to the statement of Avimi from a mishna (12a) that discusses the <i>halakha</i> that improper intentions during the service of a meal offering disqualify it. This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, e.g., the handful or the frankincense, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>].
  Rav Naḥman explained his objection: All the rites of a meal offering are taught in the mishna, and yet raising the vessel from the ground is not taught. This indicates that there is no requirement to raise a vessel from the ground in order to use it for the service of a meal offering. Avimi responded: The <i>tanna</i> cited the order of sacrificial rites, i.e., those rites concerning which improper intentions disqualify a meal offering, but he did not cite the order of the priests, i.e., he did not cite the total number of priests involved in the service.
  On the same topic, the Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the permissibility of removing a handful from a vessel that is resting upon the ground? Is this removal valid? Rav Sheshet said to one of the Sages who raised the dilemma: Go out and see what they do within the Sanctuary when they remove the bowls containing the frankincense that were placed upon the Table of the shewbread in order to burn the frankincense upon the altar. The mishna (99b) states: When the priests would replace the shewbread every Shabbat, four priests would enter the Sanctuary, two with the two arrangements of the new shewbread in their hands and two with the two bowls of frankincense in their hands. And four priests would precede them and enter the Sanctuary before them, two to remove the two arrangements of the old shewbread and two to remove the two bowls of frankincense.
  
  Daf 7b
  
  Rav Sheshet notes: The entire process of the replacement of the shewbread is taught in the mishna, and yet the statement: A priest raises the Table above the ground so that the bowls of frankincense can be properly removed from them, is not taught. One can therefore conclude from the mishna that just as the bowls of frankincense are removed from a vessel that is resting upon the ground, i.e., the Table, so too, one may remove a handful of a meal offering from a vessel that is resting upon the ground.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Didn’t you already say there, with regard to the mishna that discusses improper intentions expressed during the service of a meal offering (12a), that the <i>tanna</i> cited only the order of sacrificial rites? Here too, the <i>tanna</i> cited only the order of sacrificial rites. Therefore, one cannot prove from here that there is no requirement to raise the Table.
  The Gemara asks: Are these <i>mishnayot</i> comparable? There, on 12a, the <i>tanna</i> did not delve into the number of priests involved in the service of a meal offering. Here, on 99b, the <i>tanna</i> does in fact delve into the number of priests involved in the service of the shewbread. Therefore, if it is so, i.e., if the Table must be raised before the bowls of frankincense are removed, let the <i>tanna</i> teach that another priest raises the Table. Rather, conclude from the mishna that one may remove a handful of a meal offering from a vessel that is resting upon the ground. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from here that this is so.
  § Rava said: It is obvious to me that a priest may remove a handful from a vessel that is resting upon the ground, as we find such an instance in the case of the removal of the bowls of frankincense from the Table of the shewbread, since the Table is resting upon the ground of the Sanctuary when they are removed. Similarly, one can sanctify a meal offering in a vessel that is resting upon the ground, as we find such an instance in the case of the arrangement of the bowls of frankincense upon the Table of the shewbread.
  Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to the sanctification of a handful by placing it in a vessel that is resting upon the ground, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we derive this <i>halakha</i> from the sanctification of a meal offering, in which case one can sanctify a handful in this manner, just as he can do so with a meal offering? Or do we derive it from the collection of the blood of an offering, in which case one cannot do so, just as the blood of an offering may not be collected in a vessel that is resting upon the ground? Rava then resolves the dilemma: We derive it from the collection of the blood.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rava really say this, that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the sanctification of a handful is derived from the collection of the blood? But it was stated: With regard to a full measure of a handful that a priest divided and placed in two vessels, Rav Naḥman says that it is not sanctified, and Rava says that it is sanctified. And if it is so that the <i>halakha</i> of the handful is derived from the collection of the blood, then let Rava derive from blood that the handful is not sanctified in this manner, just as the blood is not sanctified when divided into two. The Gemara responds: Rava retracted that statement and ruled that a handful is not sanctified when divided and placed into two vessels.
  The Gemara further discusses the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the collection of the blood. And with regard to blood, from where do we derive that it is not sanctified in halves, i.e., when collected in two vessels? It is derived from that which Rav Taḥlifa ben Shaul teaches with regard to the water of purification: If the priest sanctified the water in two vessels in such a manner that he sanctified less than the amount of sprinkling in this vessel, i.e., there was not enough water into which he could dip a bundle of hyssop and sprinkle the water with it, and he sanctified less than the amount of sprinkling in that vessel, then he has not sanctified the water. Even if he subsequently combines the contents of both vessels into a single vessel, the water is not sanctified.
  The Gemara continues: And a dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the collection of blood of a sin offering for the purpose of sprinkling it upon the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the ruling with regard to the water of purification a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai, in which case the <i>halakha</i> with regard to blood may not be derived from it, as we do not derive other cases from a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai?
  The Gemara explains the other side of the dilemma: Or perhaps, there, in the case of the water of purification, what is the reason that it is not sanctified? It is possible that the reason is that it is written in a verse that is referring to the water initially placed in the vessel: “And dip it in the water” (Numbers 19:18). If this verse is the source of the <i>halakha</i> that the hyssop may be dipped in the water of purification only when there was initially enough water in the vessel for sprinkling, then here too, in the case of the blood of a sin offering, isn’t it written: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood” (Leviticus 4:6)?
  The Gemara continues: And it was stated with regard to this dilemma: Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Elazar says: Even in the case of the blood, one has not sanctified it if he collected less than a full measure of blood in a single vessel. Rava said that this is also taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the bull of the anointed priest. The verse states: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6). From the term “And the priest shall dip” it is derived that there must be enough blood inside the vessel in which to dip his finger, and there should not be so little blood that he must resort to wiping his finger along the walls of the vessel.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Additionally, from the term “in the blood” it is derived that there should initially be in the vessel containing the blood a measure fit for dipping his finger. Furthermore, it is derived from the term “of the blood” that he must sprinkle from the blood of the matter, as will be explained.
  And it was necessary for the Merciful One to write: “And the priest shall dip,” and it was necessary for the Merciful One to write: “In the blood,” despite the fact that both terms are referring to the amount of blood that must be in the vessel. Because if the Merciful One had written only: “And the priest shall dip,” I would say that it is enough if the vessel contains enough blood for even one sprinkling, even though the priest did not initially collect a measure fit for all of the sprinklings, that is, enough with which to sprinkle seven times. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “In the blood.”
  And if the Merciful One had written only: “In the blood,” I would say that if there was initially a full measure collected in the vessel then the sprinkling is valid even if now the priest must resort to wiping his finger. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “And the priest shall dip,” indicating that the priest must be able to dip his finger into the blood and not have to wipe it on the walls of the vessel.
  The Gemara returns to the last statement of the <i>baraita</i>, that the priest must sprinkle from the blood of the matter. This statement serves to exclude what? Rava said: It serves to exclude the remainder of blood on his finger from the previous sprinkling, i.e., the priest must dip his finger into the blood before each sprinkling; he may not sprinkle with the blood that remains on his finger from the previous sprinkling. The Gemara notes: This supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says that the remainder of blood that remained on the priest’s finger is unfit for sprinkling.
  Ravin bar Rav Adda said to Rava: Your students say that Rav Amram says that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where a priest was sprinkling from the blood of a sin offering and the blood of the sprinkling sprayed from his hand onto a garment, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If the blood sprayed onto the garment before he sprinkled, the garment requires laundering, as is the <i>halakha</i> when the blood of a sin offering that is fit for sprinkling fell on a garment. But if the blood sprayed onto the garment after he had already sprinkled, it does not require laundering.
  Ravin bar Rav Adda asks: What, is it not correct to say that this means if the blood sprayed onto the garment before he completed all of his sprinkling, then the garment requires laundering, and if the blood sprayed onto the garment after he completed his sprinkling, then the garment does not require laundering? If so, one can conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that the remainder of blood that remained on his finger between each sprinkling is fit for sprinkling, as otherwise, it would not result in a requirement to launder a garment upon which it sprayed.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, the <i>baraita</i> is saying that if the blood sprayed from his hand onto the garment before any particular sprinkling left his hand, the garment requires laundering. But if the blood was sprayed after a sprinkling left his hand, in which case the blood sprayed from that which remained on his finger following that sprinkling, then the garment does not require laundering, as the blood left on his finger was already rendered unfit for sprinkling.
  Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a mishna discussing the red heifer (<i>Para</i> 3:9): When the priest has completed sprinkling the blood of the red heifer toward the entrance to the Sanctuary, he wipes his hand from the blood on the body of the heifer. Abaye explains his objection: The mishna states that when the priest completed all the sprinklings, then yes, he wipes his hand. It may be inferred that if he did not complete the sprinklings, he does not wipe his hand, even though blood remains on his finger from each preceding sprinkling. This proves that the blood that remains on his finger is fit for sprinkling.
  Rava said to Abaye: The mishna means that when the priest completed all of the sprinklings, he wipes his hand. If he has not yet completed all of them, then he does not wipe his hand but he must wipe his finger to remove the blood after each sprinkling, as that blood is no longer fit for subsequent sprinklings.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, after he completed all the sprinklings he wipes his hand on the body of the heifer, as it is written: “And the heifer shall be burned in his sight; her skin, and her flesh, and her blood” (Numbers 19:5), which indicates that the blood of the red heifer must be burned together with its flesh. But if when the priest had not yet completed the sprinklings he wipes his finger, then with what does he wipe? Because if you say that he wipes his finger on the body of the heifer, the mishna should have taught: He wipes his hand and his finger on the body of the heifer. Rather, from the fact that the mishna does not teach this, that he wipes his finger on the body of the heifer, one can conclude from this mishna that his finger does not require wiping between sprinklings.
  Abaye said: He wipes his finger on the edge of the bowl containing the blood, as it is written: “Atoning bowls [<i>keforei</i>] of gold” (Ezra 1:10), which is referring to the bowls containing the blood. The root <i>kafar</i> can also mean to wipe.
  § The Gemara returns to the issue of the sanctification of blood collected in two vessels: And did Rabbi Elazar really say this, that blood is sanctified only when a full measure is initially collected in a single vessel? But it was stated with regard to the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is not sanctified in halves, i.e., if half of a tenth of an ephah was placed in one vessel, and a second half in another vessel, neither is sanctified. Rabbi Elazar says: Since it is sacrificed in halves, as half of the meal offering is sacrificed in the morning and half in the afternoon, it may be sanctified in halves.
  
  Daf 8a
  
  And if it is so that Rabbi Elazar holds that blood may not be sanctified in halves, let him derive the <i>halakha</i> of the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering from that of blood. And if you would say that in this case Rabbi Elazar does not derive the <i>halakha</i> of the matter of a meal offering from that of another matter, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: A meal offering from which the priest removed a handful while inside the Sanctuary is valid, despite the fact that the handful should be removed in the Temple courtyard; the reason is that we find a similar case in the Sanctuary, with regard to the removal of the bowls of frankincense from the Table of the shewbread? Just as the bowls permit the shewbread for consumption when removed in the Sanctuary, so too, the handful permits the remainder of the meal offering for consumption. This indicates that Rabbi Elazar does derive the <i>halakha</i> of a meal offering from that of another matter.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Elazar does derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering from that of another meal offering; the shewbread is considered a meal offering. But he does not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering from that of blood.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar derive the <i>halakha</i> of one meal offering from that of another meal offering? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If before the priest detached the arrangement of shewbread and the bowls of frankincense from upon the Table, the bread broke into pieces, the bread is unfit for consumption and the priest does not burn the frankincense contained in the bowls on account of it. If the bread broke after the priest detached it, the bread is unfit but the priest burns the frankincense contained in the bowls on account of it.
  The Gemara continues: And Rabbi Elazar says: When the <i>baraita</i> refers to the detachment of the shewbread, it does not mean that the priest actually detached it. Rather, it means that once the time to detach it has arrived, even though he has not yet detached it and has not removed the bowls, it is considered as though he has detached it. Accordingly, if the shewbread broke after that time, the frankincense is burned.
  The Gemara explains its question: And if Rabbi Elazar derives the <i>halakha</i> of one meal offering from another, why does he say that frankincense contained in the bowls are burned in a case where the shewbread broke when the time to detach the bread had arrived? It should be like the case of a meal offering that became lacking in its measure before the removal of the handful. Such a handful is not removed and is not sacrificed upon the altar. Likewise, the frankincense was still on the Table when the shewbread broke and should therefore be disqualified.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as there is a difference between these meal offerings. In the case of a meal offering that became lacking before the removal of a handful, its handful was not clearly designated. Consequently, if the meal offering became lacking before a handful was removed, one may no longer remove a handful from it. But in the case of the shewbread and the bowls of frankincense, its handful, i.e., the frankincense, was clearly designated at the time when the frankincense was placed in the bowls, since the frankincense is in a separate container from the bread. And therefore, once the time to detach the bread has arrived, it is considered as though he has detached it.
  The Gemara asks: But if that is so, then even if the time to detach the shewbread arrived, why is the frankincense burned? It should be like a case where the remainder of a meal offering became lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning upon the altar; the <i>halakha</i> in this case is that one does not burn the handful on account of such a meal offering. The Gemara responds: Isn’t it a dispute among the <i>amora’im</i> (9a) whether or not the handful is burned in such a case? One can say that Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that if the remainder of a meal offering became lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning, the priest burns the handful on account of such a meal offering.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: With regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is not sanctified in halves, and Rabbi Elazar says: Since it is sacrificed in halves, as half of the meal offering is sacrificed in the morning and half in the afternoon, it may likewise be sanctified in halves. Rav Aḥa said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The verse states: “A meal offering perpetually, half of it in the morning, and half of it in the evening” (Leviticus 6:13). This means: First bring a whole meal offering, and only afterward divide it into halves.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. The mishna teaches (50b): The griddle-cake offering of the High Priest did not come in halves. Rather, the High Priest brings a full tenth of an ephah and then divides it into two. And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this mishna: If it were stated: A meal offering, half in the morning, and half in the evening, I would say: He brings half of a tenth from his home in the morning and sacrifices it, and another half of a tenth from his home in the evening and sacrifices it. Therefore, the verse states: “Half of it in the morning,” indicating that he brings a half from a whole, and he does not bring a half by itself.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Elazar maintains that the verse requires that a whole meal offering be brought in the morning only for a mitzva, i.e., <i>ab initio</i>. Nevertheless, if half of a tenth was brought in the morning it is valid after the fact. Rav Geviha from Bei Katil said to Rav Ashi: But the term “statute” is written with regard to the griddle-cake offering, as the verse states: “A statute forever” (Leviticus 6:15), and there is a principle that whenever the Torah calls a mitzva a statute, the details of its performance are indispensable. Rav Ashi said to him: It was necessary for the Torah to define this mitzva as a statute only with regard to the requirement that the High Priest bring a full tenth from his home. With regard to its sanctification in a service vessel, it can be sanctified in halves.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan really say this? But it was stated: If one set aside half a tenth of an ephah for any meal offering, and his intention was to add to the half in order to reach a full tenth, Rav says that it is not sanctified, as he did not bring a full tenth, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is sanctified. And if it is so that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the griddle-cake offering cannot be sanctified in halves, let him derive from the griddle-cake offering that no meal offering may be sanctified in halves.
  And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not derive the <i>halakha</i> of one matter with regard to consecrated items from that of another matter, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: Peace offerings that were slaughtered in the Sanctuary are valid, as it is written: “And slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2), i.e., in the courtyard. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: It is logical that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the minor area, i.e., the courtyard, should not be more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the major area, the Tent of Meeting. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan derives a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Sanctuary from the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan does in fact derive the <i>halakha</i> of one matter from another, and therefore he learns the <i>halakha</i> with regard to all meal offerings from the griddle-cake offering, that in general they are not sanctified in halves. But a case where one expresses his intention to add to the half measure is different, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “Both of them full of fine flour” (Numbers 7:13). “Full” is a reference only to full measurements; that is to say, the flour is not sanctified until there is a full tenth inside the vessel. And Rabbi Yosei said: When is it the <i>halakha</i> that the flour is sanctified only if a full tenth is inside the vessel? It is at a time when his intention was not initially to add to that which he placed inside the vessel. But at a time when his intention was initially to add, each initial bit of flour is sanctified by the vessel.
  The Gemara asks: And Rav, who holds that standard meal offerings are not sanctified in halves even if one’s initial intention was to add to the half measure, with regard to a griddle-cake offering, in accordance with whose opinion does he hold? If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says that a griddle-cake offering can be sanctified in halves, then let him derive from the <i>halakha</i> of griddle-cake offerings that all meal offerings may be sanctified in halves.
  And if you would say that Rav does not derive the <i>halakha</i> of one matter from that of another matter, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rav say: A standard meal offering, which is brought with oil and frankincense, is sanctified by a service vessel even without its oil and without its frankincense. It is sanctified without its oil, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the shewbread, which is sacrificed without oil and is nevertheless sanctified by a service vessel. Similarly, it is sanctified even without its frankincense, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meal offering accompanying the libations of an offering, which is sacrificed without frankincense and is nevertheless sanctified by a service vessel.
  Finally, a standard meal offering is sanctified by a service vessel even without its oil and without its frankincense, as we find with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, which includes neither of these. This indicates that Rav does derive the <i>halakha</i> of a meal offering from other meal offerings. Rather, perforce, with regard to the griddle-cake offering, Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that this offering is not sanctified in halves, and it is derived from there that no meal offerings are sanctified in halves.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rav says that a meal offering is sanctified without its oil, and its <i>halakha</i> is not the same as when a tenth of an ephah of flour is lacking, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the shewbread, which is sacrificed without oil and is nevertheless sanctified by a service vessel. Similarly, it is sanctified even without its frankincense, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meal offering accompanying the libations of an offering, which is sacrificed without frankincense and is nevertheless sanctified. Additionally, a meal offering is sanctified even without its oil and without its frankincense, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, which lacks both oil and frankincense and is nevertheless sanctified by a service vessel.
  Rav continues: And oil and frankincense are each sanctified by service vessels, this substance without that one, and that substance without this one. Oil is sanctified on its own, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, which is sanctified on its own. Frankincense is sanctified on its own, as we find such a <i>halakha</i> with regard to the frankincense that comes in the bowls that are brought with the shewbread; there is no oil in that case and yet the frankincense is sanctified in the bowls. And Rabbi Ḥanina says:
  
  Daf 8b
  
  Neither is this substance sanctified without that, nor is that sanctified without this. Rather, any meal offering that requires oil and frankincense is sanctified by a service vessel only when the flour, oil, and frankincense are all placed in the same vessel at the same time.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, for what purpose was the vessel that measured a tenth of an ephah anointed, making it possible for it to sanctify items placed inside it? This vessel was fashioned only for measuring flour, and according to Rabbi Ḥanina the flour is not sanctified without oil. What then does this vessel sanctify? The Gemara answers: The vessel was anointed for the purpose of sanctifying the meal offering of a sinner, which contains neither oil nor frankincense.
  The Gemara further asks: And for what purpose was the vessel that measured one <i>log</i> of oil anointed? After all, according to Rabbi Ḥanina oil for a meal offering cannot be sanctified by itself. The Gemara explains: It was anointed for the purpose of sanctifying the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper, which is not brought as part of a meal offering. This oil is sanctified without flour or frankincense.
  The Gemara notes: And Shmuel also holds in accordance with this statement of Rav, that a service vessel sanctifies the flour of a meal offering even without its oil, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 88a): The vessels used for liquids sanctify only the liquids, and the vessels that serve as dry measures sanctify only the dry goods. But the vessels used for liquids do not sanctify the dry goods, and the vessels that serve as dry measures do not sanctify the liquids.
  And Shmuel says with regard to this mishna: They taught that vessels used for liquids do not sanctify dry goods only with regard to vessels used as measures. But bowls that are used for collecting and tossing the blood of offerings sanctify the dry goods as well, as it is stated with regard to the offerings of the princes brought during the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “Both of them full of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering” (Numbers 7:13), which indicates that the bowl sanctifies meal offerings, which are dry.
  The Gemara continues its proof: And Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina, with regard to this derivation of Shmuel: But the meal offering of the verse is also considered a liquid, as it is mingled with oil. How then can one derive from it the <i>halakha</i> with regard to items that are entirely dry? Ravina said to him: The verse cited by Shmuel is necessary only to teach that the dry part of a meal offering, that is, the frankincense, which invariably does not come into contact with the oil, is sanctified by the bowls as well.
  The Gemara concludes its proof with regard to Shmuel’s opinion: And if it enters your mind that Shmuel holds that a meal offering is not sanctified by a service vessel until all of its components are together in the vessel, then how can you find a case where the dry parts of a meal offering are by themselves? Is it not correct that when meal offerings are sanctified, all of them are liquids, due to the oil that is mixed with them? Rather, conclude from here that Shmuel holds that this substance may be sanctified without that one.
  And if you wish, say instead in answer to Rav Aḥa of Difti’s question: A meal offering, even when it is mixed with oil, is, relative to blood, considered as a dry item. Accordingly, one may derive from the verse that the bowls sanctify dry items, and just as a bowl sanctifies a meal offering that contains oil, as it is considered dry in comparison to blood, so too, it sanctifies a meal offering that is entirely dry, i.e., that contains no oil, as claimed by Rav.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabbi Elazar says: A meal offering from which the priest removed a handful while inside the Sanctuary is valid, despite the fact that the handful should be removed in the Temple courtyard; the reason is that we find a similar case in the Sanctuary, with regard to the removal of the bowls of frankincense from the Table of the shewbread. Just as the bowls permit the shewbread for consumption, so too, the handful permits the remainder of the meal offering for consumption.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection to this opinion from a <i>baraita</i> discussing the verse: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall remove from there his handful” (Leviticus 2:2). The verse indicates that the removal of a handful from a meal offering may be performed from the place where the feet of the non-priest may stand, i.e., anywhere within the Temple courtyard.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Ben Beteira, who holds that a handful is not disqualified when removed with the left hand, says that the verse should be interpreted as follows: From where is it derived that if one removed a handful with his left hand, that he must return the handful to the vessel that contains the meal offering and again remove the handful with his right hand? The verse states: “And he shall remove from there.” This indicates that the handful is removed from the place where he already removed it, i.e., the handful is returned to the meal offering and thereupon removed from the same meal offering, this time with his right hand. It is clear from the statement of the first <i>tanna</i> that the handful of a meal offering may be removed only in the place where the feet of a non-priest may stand, but not in the Sanctuary.
  Some say that Rabbi Yirmeya raises the objection and he resolves it as well. And some say that Rabbi Ya’akov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain to you the resolution of this objection: The verse is necessary only to permit the entire Temple courtyard for removing the handful there, not to prohibit the removal of a handful inside the Sanctuary. The reason is that you should not say: Since a burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order, and a meal offering is likewise an offering of the most sacred order, then just as a burnt offering requires that its slaughter be performed in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, so too, a meal offering requires that the removal of its handful be in the northern part.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this comparison: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that it is more sacred, as it is consumed in its entirety upon the altar. The Gemara responds: The same comparison may be drawn from a sin offering, which is also an offering of the most sacred order and is not sacrificed in its entirety upon the altar, and yet it must be slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this comparison as well: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that the <i>halakhot</i> of a sin offering are more stringent, as its sacrifice atones for those sins whose transgression causes one to be liable to receive <i>karet</i>. The Gemara responds: The comparison may be drawn from a guilt offering, as it too is an offering of the most sacred order, it is not sacrificed in its entirety upon the altar, it does not atone for such sins, and yet it must be slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion as well: What is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that a guilt offering has a loftier status, as it is one of the types of offerings whose atonement is achieved through their blood, i.e., it is an animal offering. The Gemara adds: Once this claim has been accepted, from all of them as well, i.e., from a burnt offering and sin offering, one cannot draw a comparison to a meal offering either, as they are all of the types of offerings whose atonement is achieved through their blood.
  Rather, the verse was necessary in order to permit the removal of a handful anywhere in the Temple courtyard because it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “And it shall be presented to the priest, and he shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8), and it states: “And he shall remove from there his handful” (Leviticus 2:2), one could claim: Just as the bringing of the meal offering is in the southwestern corner of the altar, so too, the removal of the handful must also be performed in the southwestern corner. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the removal of the handful may be performed anywhere in the Temple courtyard, but this does not serve to exclude the Sanctuary.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Peace offerings that were slaughtered in the Sanctuary are valid, as it is stated: “And slaughter it at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 3:2), i.e., in the courtyard. And it is logical that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the minor area, i.e., the courtyard, should not be more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the major one, the Tent of Meeting or the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: From where is it derived that if gentiles surrounded the Temple courtyard and were firing projectiles inside to the point that it became impossible to remain in the courtyard on account of the threat, that the priests enter the Sanctuary and partake of the offerings of the most sacred order and the remainders of the meal offerings while inside the Sanctuary? The verse states:
  
  Daf 9a
  
  “Every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may render unto Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons. In the Sanctuary you shall eat them” (Numbers 18:9–10). This indicates that although the mitzva is to consume offerings of the most sacred order in the courtyard, in certain instances the priests may consume these offerings inside the Sanctuary, the most holy place.
  The Gemara explains its objection: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, why do I need this verse? Let him say here as well that as the verse states: “In the court of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it” (Leviticus 6:9), i.e., in the Temple courtyard, it is logical that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the minor area should not be more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the major one, i.e., if one may consume a peace offering in the Temple courtyard then all the more so may he consume it in the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara explains: Consuming an offering is not the same as slaughtering it. The slaughter of an offering is part of the sacrificial service, and it is not considered disrespectful for a person to serve his master in the place of his master, i.e., within the Sanctuary as well as in the courtyard. Therefore, we say that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the minor area should not be more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the major one. By contrast, with regard to the consumption of an offering, since a person may not eat in the place of his master, the only reason that it is permitted to consume an offering inside the Sanctuary is that it is written in the verse: “In a most holy place you shall eat them.” Had this not been written in the verse explicitly, we would not say that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the minor area should not be more stringent than the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the major one.
  § It was stated: If one mixed the oil of a meal offering into it outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is disqualified, and Reish Lakish says that it is valid. Reish Lakish says: It is valid, as it is written: “And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense upon it” (Leviticus 2:1), and then it is written: “And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall remove” (Leviticus 2:2).
  Reish Lakish explains: The Sages derived from here that from the removal of the handful onward the rites performed with the meal offering are solely a mitzva of the priesthood. Accordingly, the verse taught about pouring and mixing that they are valid when performed by a non-priest. And from the fact that the priesthood is not required for the mixing, it may be derived that it is also not required that its performance be inside the walls of the Temple courtyard.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This meal offering is disqualified, since a meal offering’s performance is in a service vessel. Therefore, granted that the priesthood is not required, yet in any event its performance inside the Temple courtyard is required. The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If a meal offering was mixed by a non-priest it is valid. But if it was mixed outside the wall of the Temple courtyard it is disqualified.
  § It was stated: With regard to a meal offering that became lacking in its full measure before the removal of the handful, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the owner shall bring additional flour from within his home and shall fill the missing part of the measure of the meal offering. Reish Lakish says: He shall not bring flour from within his home and fill it. Instead, he must bring a new meal offering.
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he brings flour from within his home and he fills it, as the removal of the handful establishes it as a meal offering to the extent that it may become disqualified. Before the removal, one may always add flour to the meal offering. Reish Lakish says: He shall not bring flour from within his home and fill it, as the sanctity of the service vessel establishes it as a meal offering. Therefore, once the meal offering was placed in a service vessel and sanctified, it is disqualified if it becomes lacking.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, Reish Lakish, from a mishna (<i>Nega’im</i> 14:10) discussing the <i>log</i> of oil brought by a leper: In a case where the <i>log</i> lacked a full measure, if it became lacking before the priest poured from it into his palm in order to place it on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, he shall fill it. Clearly the service vessel containing the <i>log</i> does not sanctify the oil to the extent that it can become disqualified. The Gemara notes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish.
  § It was stated: With regard to the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one burns the handful on account of such a remainder, and that the remainder is then permitted for consumption. And Reish Lakish says that one does not burn the handful on account of the remainder. The Gemara notes: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, everyone agrees that the handful is burned on account of the remainder. In other words, both <i>amora’im</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, concur that this is the <i>halakha</i> according to the <i>tanna</i> Rabbi Eliezer. When they disagree, it is concerning the <i>halakha</i> according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.
  The Gemara cites the dispute in question. As we learned in a mishna (26a): If, after the handful was removed, the remainder of the meal offering became ritually impure, or if the remainder of the meal offering was burned, or if the remainder of the meal offering was lost, according to the principle of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling even if there is no meat that can be eaten, the meal offering is fit, and the priest burns the handful. But according to the principle of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling only if there is meat that can be eaten, it is unfit and the priest does not burn the handful, as the handful serves to render the remainder permitted.
  The one who disqualifies the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar, i.e., Reish Lakish, holds in accordance with the plain meaning of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. And the one who deems that remainder fit, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, maintains that when Rabbi Yehoshua says that the remainder is unfit, he says so only there, in a case where nothing remained from the meal offering other than the remainder. Since the handful is intended to render permitted for consumption the remainder of the meal offering, if there is no remainder at all then the handful is not burned. But in a case where there remained a portion of the remainder, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to Rabbi Eliezer that the handful is fit to be burned.
  The Gemara cites a proof for Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is clear that this is Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to any of the offerings that are mentioned in the Torah from which there remains either an olive-bulk of meat or an olive-bulk of fat, the <i>halakha</i> is that the priest sprinkles the blood of that offering and thereby permits either the remaining meat for consumption or the remaining fat for sacrifice upon the altar. But if there remains only half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, he does not sprinkle the blood, as the consumption or burning of anything less than an olive-bulk is not significant enough to warrant the sprinkling of the blood. The volumes of the meat and the fat do not combine to form a whole olive-bulk.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And in the case of a burnt offering, even if there remains only half an olive-bulk of flesh and half an olive-bulk of fat, he sprinkles the blood, because in the case of a burnt offering it is entirely consumed, i.e., as the flesh and fat are both burned upon the altar, there is in fact an olive-bulk of the offering that is designated for burning upon the altar. And with regard to a meal offering, even though it remains entirely intact, he shall not sprinkle.
  
  Daf 9b
  
  Parenthetically, the Gemara asks: What is the mention of a meal offering doing here, in a <i>baraita</i> that discusses slaughtered offerings? There is no sprinkling in the case of a meal offering. Rav Pappa said: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a meal offering that accompanies the libations brought with a slaughtered offering.
  Rav Pappa elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that since such a meal offering comes with a slaughtered offering, it is considered like the offering itself. Accordingly, if the only part remaining from an offering is the meal offering that is brought with it, perhaps it is considered as though part of the offering itself remains, and therefore the priest may sprinkle the offering’s blood on account of it. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not the <i>halakha</i>. In any event, Rabbi Yehoshua states in this <i>baraita</i> that the blood of an offering is sprinkled if a minimum amount remains from it. The same should apply to the remainder of a regular meal offering.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan cited this <i>baraita</i> as proof that even according to Rabbi Yehoshua, if a portion of the remainder of a meal offering remains intact then the handful may be burned on account of it. The Gemara asks: And concerning the one who disqualifies the handful when the remainder is lacking, i.e., Reish Lakish, how does he explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua? The Gemara responds: Reish Lakish would claim that it is different here, in the case of a meal offering, as the verse states: “And the priest shall remove from the meal offering its memorial part, and shall make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 2:9). Since it is clear that the verse is discussing a meal offering, the apparently superfluous mention of “the meal offering” teaches that unless the entire meal offering is intact, the priest shall not burn the handful.
  The Gemara continues: And the other <i>amora</i>, Rabbi Yoḥanan, how does he interpret that verse? Rabbi Yoḥanan claims that the phrase “from the meal offering” is referring to a meal offering that was already whole at the time of the removal of its handful, and the verse teaches that he shall burn its handful even though it is currently not whole.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: If before the priest detached the arrangement of shewbread and the bowls of frankincense from upon the Table, the bread broke into pieces, the bread is unfit for consumption and the priest does not burn the frankincense contained in the bowls on account of it. And if the bread broke after the priest detached it, the bread is unfit but the priest burns the frankincense contained in the bowls on account of it. And Rabbi Elazar says: The <i>baraita</i> does not mean that the priest actually detached the shewbread. Rather, it means that once the time to detach it has arrived the frankincense contained in the bowls may be burned, even though he has not yet detached it. Just as the frankincense contained in the bowls is burned despite the broken shewbread, likewise, the handful of a meal offering should be burned even when the remainder is lacking.
  Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who permits the burning of a handful even when the remainder has been entirely destroyed. And I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I am stating a complete <i>halakha</i> to you, i.e., a <i>baraita</i> of an unspecified opinion, and you say to me that this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer alone?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan added: And furthermore, if the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of only Rabbi Eliezer, then why does the <i>baraita</i> mention specifically an instance where the bread broke? According to Rabbi Eliezer, even if the bread was burned or lost entirely, he deems the frankincense contained in the bowls fit for burning as well. The Gemara notes: Reish Lakish was silent and did not respond to the objections of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara asks: But why was Reish Lakish silent? Let him say to Rabbi Yoḥanan that one cannot cite a proof from a <i>baraita</i> that discusses the shewbread, a communal offering, because offerings of the community are different, since ritual impurity was permitted for them, i.e., communal offerings may be sacrificed even in a state of ritual impurity. Therefore, it was also permitted to sacrifice them when they are lacking. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The fact that Reish Lakish did not respond in this manner is to say that a meal offering that is lacking in measure is considered like a blemished animal, not merely like an impure offering, and there is no instance of a blemished animal being permitted for use as an offering, even in the case of a communal offering.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Pappa was once sitting and saying this <i>halakha</i>, and he noted that Reish Lakish was silent and did not respond to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s objections by differentiating between a communal offering and that of an individual, and that Rav Adda bar Ahava derived from Reish Lakish’s silence that a lack in the measure of a meal offering is tantamount to a blemish. Rav Yosef bar Shemaya said to Rav Pappa: Are we not dealing with a disagreement that exists between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish even in the case of the <i>omer</i> meal offering, which is a communal offering? And even so, they disagree. Accordingly, Reish Lakish could not have responded to the objections of Rabbi Yoḥanan by distinguishing between a communal and an individual offering, and therefore one cannot derive from his silence that a meal offering lacking in its measure is like a blemished animal.
  The Gemara further discusses the disagreement between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. Rav Malkiyu says that one <i>baraita</i> taught: The verse states: “And he shall remove…of its fine flour” (Leviticus 2:2). This indicates that if the meal offering lacks any amount of its flour, it is disqualified and the priest may not remove a handful from it. Similarly, the term: “Of its oil” (Leviticus 2:2), teaches that if the meal offering lacks any amount of its oil, it is disqualified.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that the verse that states: “But that which is left of the meal offering shall be Aaron’s and his sons’” (Leviticus 2:3), teaches that the remainder of the meal offering is given to the priests only if there was initially a whole meal offering, to the exclusion of a meal offering that was lacking, or whose handful was lacking, or from which the priest did not burn any frankincense. In such cases, the meal offering is disqualified and its remainder may not be consumed by the priests.
  Rav Malkiyu asks: Why do I need two verses to disqualify meal offerings that are lacking? Is it not correct to say that one verse is referring to a meal offering that became lacking before the removal of the handful, i.e., that one may not refill it, and one verse is referring to the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar, and it teaches that one may not burn a handful on account of such a remainder?
  Rav Malkiyu concludes: And if so, then this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan in both instances where he disagrees with Reish Lakish, i.e., in the case of a meal offering that became lacking before the removal of the handful, as Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one may refill it, and in the case of the remainder that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning, as he holds that the handful may be burned.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; one verse is indeed referring to a meal offering that became lacking before the removal of the handful, but it is not teaching that this meal offering is disqualified. Rather, this verse indicates that if he brings flour from his home and fills it so that the meal offering is no longer lacking, then yes, it is fit, but if he does not bring more flour, it is not fit. And one verse is indeed referring to the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar; nevertheless, it does not indicate that the handful may not be burned. Rather, it teaches that even though the priest burns the handful on account of such a remainder, that remainder is prohibited for consumption.
  The Gemara continues: This is indeed the appropriate explanation of the verses, as a dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says that in a case where the remainder of a meal offering became lacking between the removal of the handful and its burning upon the altar, the priest burns the handful on account of this remainder, concerning the remainder itself, what is its status with regard to consumption, i.e., may the remainder be eaten?
  Ze’eiri said that the verse states: “But that which is left of the meal offering shall be Aaron’s and his sons’,” which teaches that the priests may consume the remainder of a meal offering, but not the remainder of the remainder, i.e., if the remainder became lacking before the handful was burned, the remaining part of the remainder may not be consumed. Alternatively, Rabbi Yannai says that “of the meal offering shall be Aaron’s and his sons’” indicates that the priests may consume only the remainder of a meal offering that was previously whole when the handful was burned, not the remainder of the remainder.
  § The mishna teaches: If the priest removed the handful with his left hand the meal offering is unfit. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Zeira said that it is derived from that which the verse states: “And the meal offering was presented; and he filled his hand from it” (Leviticus 9:17). Rabbi Zeira explains: This hand, I do not know what it is, i.e., the left hand or the right. When the verse states with regard to the atonement of a leper: “And the priest shall take of the <i>log</i> of oil, and pour it into the palm of his own left hand” (Leviticus 14:15), it mentions the left hand. One can therefore derive that here, where the verse specifies, the priest must use his left hand, whereas in any place where it is stated in a verse “hand” without specification, it is referring only to the right hand.
  The Gemara asks: But how can this conclusion be derived from the verse discussing the atonement of a leper? This verse is necessary for itself, i.e., to teach that the oil must be poured on the priest’s left hand, not his right. The Gemara answers that another mention of the left hand is written in the same passage (see Leviticus 14:16). From this additional mention of the left hand it may be derived that any unspecified reference to a hand is referring to the right hand.
  The Gemara challenges: But say that according to the hermeneutical principle that one restriction after another restriction serves only to amplify, it should be inferred from the additional specification of the left hand that the oil may be poured onto the priest’s right hand. The Gemara responds: Yet another specification of the left hand is written in that passage (see Leviticus 14:26). Accordingly, the hermeneutical principle that one restriction after another serves only to amplify does not apply. Instead, the verse indicates that here the left hand is required, and there is no other instance where the Torah requires the left hand.
  The Gemara challenges: But one can say that on the contrary, just as here the left hand is required, so too generally, the left hand is required as well. The Gemara responds: Four mentions of the left hand are written in the passage, two with regard to a poor leper (Leviticus 14:26–27), and two with regard to a wealthy one (Leviticus 14:15–16). Accordingly, three of the specifications serve to indicate that the oil may be poured only onto the left hand, while the additional mention serves to restrict the use of the left hand to the case of a leper alone.
  Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: According to your opinion, one interprets homiletically the additional specifications in the passage discussing the purification of a leper. If so, there is another apparently superfluous verse: “Upon the thumb of his right hand, and upon the big toe of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:17), which is written with regard to the placement of the oil upon the right thumb and big toe of a wealthy leper. Why do I need the verse to specify that the oil is placed on the leper’s right thumb and big toe?
  
  Daf 10a
  
  After all, a verse already indicates that the oil must be placed on the right thumb and big toe, as it is written: “Upon the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:17). Since the Torah has already specified that the blood is placed upon the right thumb and big toe (Leviticus 14:14), it is clear that the oil is placed there as well. Similarly, why must the verse specify with regard to a poor leper that the oil is placed on the right thumb and big toe? Isn’t already clear from the verse where the oil must be placed, as it states: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:28)? The Gemara responds: One specification, stated with regard to a wealthy leper, serves to permit the placement of the oil on the sides of the thumb and sides of the big toe in addition to the nail side of the thumb and big toe, and one, stated with regard to a poor leper, serves to disqualify the sides of sides, i.e., their undersides.
  The Gemara inquires with regard to the verse: “Upon the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:17), stated with regard to the purification of a wealthy leper, and the verse: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:28), stated with regard to the purification of a poor leper. For what purpose do they come, i.e., why are both verses necessary?
  The Gemara responds: These verses are necessary, because if the Merciful One had written only: “Upon the blood of the guilt offering,” I would say: If the blood is still on the right thumb and big toe of the leper, yes, the priest places the oil upon the blood. But if it was wiped from there, he does not place the oil. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,” indicating that the oil is placed upon the location of the blood, not necessarily upon the blood itself.
  And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,” I would say: The oil is placed on his right thumb and big toe specifically when the blood was wiped from there. But if the blood is still there, I will say that the blood is an interposition between the oil and the thumb or toe. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the oil is placed “upon the blood of the guilt offering,” and the blood is not considered an interposition.
  Rava said: Since it is written that the priest places the oil “upon the blood of the guilt offering,” and: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering,” and it is also written with regard to a wealthy leper (see Leviticus 14:14) and a poor one (see Leviticus 14:25) that the right hand and foot are required for the placement of the blood, as the verses state: “Upon the thumb of his right hand, and upon the big toe of his right foot,” and this is also written with regard to the oil of a wealthy leper (see Leviticus 14:17) and a poor one (see Leviticus 14:28), one can ask: Why do I need all of these verses?
  Rather, Rava said: The verses that specify that the oil must be placed on the right thumb and big toe do not teach a <i>halakha</i> with regard to a leper, as it is clear that the oil must be placed on the right thumb and big toe, as it states: “Upon the place of the blood of the guilt offering.” Rather, these verses are the source of verbal analogies for other <i>halakhot</i>. When the verse states with regard to a wealthy leper: “Of his right hand” (Leviticus 14:17), this teaches a verbal analogy between the term “hand” written here and “hand” written with regard to the removal of a handful, as the verse states about the removal of a handful: “And he filled his hand from it” (Leviticus 9:17). The verbal analogy teaches that the removal of the handful must also be performed with the right hand.
  Similarly, when the verse states: “Of his right foot” (Leviticus 14:17), with regard to a wealthy leper, this teaches a verbal analogy between the term “foot” written here and “foot” written with regard to the ritual through which the <i>yavam</i>, a man whose married brother died childless, frees his brother’s widow, the <i>yevama</i>, of her levirate bonds [<i>ḥalitza</i>], as the verse states with regard to <i>ḥalitza</i>: “And remove his shoe from upon his foot” (Deuteronomy 25:9). The verbal analogy teaches that the shoe is removed from his right foot.
  Additionally, when the verse states: “Upon the tip of the right ear of him that is to be cleansed” (Leviticus 14:17), with regard to a wealthy leper, this teaches a verbal analogy between the term “ear” written here and “ear” written with regard to the piercing of a Hebrew slave’s ear with an awl, as the verse states: “And his master shall bore his ear through with an awl” (Exodus 21:6). The verbal analogy teaches that the slave’s right ear is pierced.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the additional mention of the left hand in the verse dealing with the poor leper, for what purpose does it come? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: It comes to disqualify the right hand of a priest for the purification of a leper. This teaches that you should not say: And if in a place where the left side is not included, as sacrificial rites in general are disqualified when performed with the left hand, the right hand is included, i.e., those rites must be performed with the right hand, then in a place where the left hand is included, in the case of a leper, isn’t it logical that the right hand should also be included? Therefore, the verse repeats that the oil is poured into the priest’s left hand, in order to disqualify the right hand.
  The Gemara asks: And concerning the other verses that specify the left hand of a poor leper (Leviticus 14:26–27) as well as the right hand and foot of a poor leper (Leviticus 14:25–28), for what purpose do they come? The Gemara responds: These verses come for that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Any passage that was stated in the Torah and was then repeated, was repeated only for the sake of a matter that was introduced for the first time in the repeated passage. That is, sometimes the Torah repeats an entire passage just to teach a single new detail. In this case, the verses that discuss the purification of a poor leper were repeated only for the sake of the differences in the offerings between a wealthy leper and a poor one. No additional <i>halakha</i> should be derived from them.
  § Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Any place in the Torah in which it is stated that an action is performed with a finger or by the priesthood, i.e., that one uses his finger to perform the action or that a priest performs it, this teaches that it is performed only with the right hand.
  The Gemara comments: It might enter our mind to say that this means that we require both a finger and the priesthood to be stated together in the verse in order to mandate use of the right hand, e.g., as it is written: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger” (Leviticus 4:25). And the fact that this verse is referring to a finger from his right hand is derived from a leper, as it is written: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). This cannot be correct, as there is the verse that addresses the removal of a handful from a meal offering, in which only the priesthood is written, and yet we learned in a mishna (6a): If the priest removed the handful with his left hand the meal offering is unfit.
  Therefore, Rava said: This statement means that if the verse mentions either a finger or the priesthood, only the right hand may be used.
  Abaye said to Rava: But this is contradicted by the verse discussing the conveyance of the limbs of the daily burnt offering to the ramp of the altar, as priesthood is written with regard to it, as it is written: “And the priest shall sacrifice the whole and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13), and the Master said that this verse is referring to the conveyance of the limbs to the ramp. And yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 31b): When the priest conveys the limbs to the ramp, the foot of the right side of the offering is carried in the left hand of the priest, and the place of its skin, i.e., the side of the limb covered in skin, is held facing outward. Clearly, use of the left hand does not disqualify the conveyance of the limbs.
  The Gemara responds: When we say that if the verse states either finger or priesthood then the left hand is disqualified, this is only with regard to a matter that precludes atonement, i.e., a rite whose performance is indispensable to the atonement, similar to the sprinkling of the oil on the leper (see Leviticus 14:16). The conveyance of the limbs, by contrast, is not indispensable to atonement.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the collection of the blood in a service vessel, which is a matter indispensable to atonement, and about which priesthood is written? As it is written: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5), and this is referring to the collection of the blood. And yet we learned in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 15b): If one collected the blood with his left hand, the blood is disqualified for offering, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit, despite the fact that priesthood is mentioned in the verse.
  The Gemara responds: You are saying that there is a difficulty according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Rabbi Shimon requires that both matters appear in the verse, i.e., both finger and priesthood.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon really require both? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says: In any place in the Torah in which the word hand is stated, the verse is referring only to the right hand, and whenever a verse mentions the word finger, it is referring only to a finger of the right hand? The Gemara responds: According to Rabbi Shimon, if the verse mentions only the word finger, it does not require a mention of the priesthood as well for the limitation to apply. But if the verse mentions only the priesthood, it requires mention of the term finger for the limitation to apply.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, if the mention of the priesthood alone does not suffice to disqualify the right hand, then why do I need the superfluous reference to a priest with regard to the collection of the blood? After all, the verse already states that the collection must be performed by the sons of Aaron. The Gemara responds: The additional mention of the priesthood indicates that a priest must perform the collection of the blood in his priestly state, i.e., while wearing the priestly vestments.
  
  Daf 10b
  
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the sprinkling of the blood, concerning which only the priesthood is written in the verse, and we learned: If one sprinkled the blood with his left hand it is disqualified; and Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with this ruling, indicating that Rabbi Shimon holds that a mention of the priesthood does not require a mention of the word finger? Abaye says: He disagrees with this ruling in a <i>baraita</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one collected the blood with his left hand it is disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. Additionally, if one sprinkled the blood with his left hand it is disqualified, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit.
  The Gemara asks: But that which Rava says with regard to the superfluous terms in the passage discussing a leper: One derives a verbal analogy between the word “hand” written in that passage and the word “hand” written with regard to the removal of a handful from a meal offering, to indicate that the latter must also be performed with the right hand, why do I need this verbal analogy? One can derive that the handful must be removed with the right hand from the verse’s mention of the priesthood, as it is stated: “And the priest shall remove his handful” (Leviticus 5:12).
  The Gemara responds: Both derivations are necessary, one for the removal of the handful from a meal offering, and one for the sanctification of the handful, i.e., placing it into a second service vessel. Both must be performed with the right hand.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Shimon, who does not require sanctification of the handful, or according to the one who says that Rabbi Shimon also requires the sanctification of the handful but that he deems the sanctification fit when performed with the left hand (see 26a), why do I need the verbal analogy of Rava between “hand” and “hand”?
  If one suggests that it is necessary to indicate that the removal of the handful itself must be performed with the right hand, this cannot be, since this is derived from the verse cited by Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya. As Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reason that Rabbi Shimon does not require that the handful be sanctified in a service vessel? As the verse states with regard to the meal offering: “It is most holy, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10).
  Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, elaborates: The verse compares the meal offering to a sin offering and a guilt offering. Therefore, if the priest comes to perform the burning of the handful with his hand, he performs it with his right hand, like in the case of a sin offering, whose blood is sprinkled with the hand. And if he comes to perform it with a vessel, i.e., if he first sanctifies the handful in a service vessel, then he may perform it with his left hand, like in the case of a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled from a vessel. Since the removal of the handful is performed with the hand, the verse indicates that it must be performed with the right hand, and the verbal analogy is unnecessary.
  The Gemara responds: The verbal analogy is necessary only for the handful of the meal offering of a sinner, to teach that it must be removed with the right hand. It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon says that this offering does not require oil and frankincense so that a sinner’s offering will not be of superior quality, perhaps when the priest removed the handful with his left hand, which is a manner of inferior quality, it should be fit as well. The verbal analogy therefore teaches us that the handful must always be removed with the right hand, even in the case of the meal offering of a sinner.
  § The mishna teaches: If a priest removed the handful of flour, and a stone or a grain of salt emerged in his hand,
  
  Daf 11a
  
  or a pinch of frankincense emerged in his hand, the meal offering is unfit, as the handful lacks a full measure on account of these items. The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these examples? Any one of them would convey the fact that the handful must contain a full measure.
  The Gemara explains: All of the cases are necessary. Because if the mishna had taught only the example of a stone, it might have been thought that only a stone diminishes the measure of the handful, because it is not fit for sacrifice. But with regard to salt, which is fit for sacrifice, as the priest places salt on the handful before burning it upon the altar, one might say that the handful should be fit, as the salt should not subtract from the handful’s measure.
  And if the mishna had taught only the example of salt, it might have been thought that the salt diminishes the handful’s measure as it was not initially fixed together with the entire meal offering. The reason is that the priest salts the handful alone. But with regard to the frankincense, which was initially fixed together with the entire meal offering, i.e., it is placed upon the meal offering before the priest removes a handful from it, one might say that the handful should be fit and the frankincense should not diminish from the handful’s measure. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that in any of these instances the meal offering is unfit.
  § The mishna teaches that if a stone, or a grain of salt, or a pinch of frankincense emerged in the priest’s hand together with the handful, the meal offering is unfit due to the fact that the Sages said: The handful that is lacking or that is outsized is unfit. The Gemara asks: Why does the <i>tanna</i> explain that the offering is not valid specifically because it is lacking or outsized? But let the <i>tanna</i> derive that such a handful is not valid due to the fact that there is an interposition between the priest’s hand and the handful. Rabbi Yirmeya says: Since there are certain instances where these items do not interpose between one’s hand and the handful, e.g., when they are located on the side of the handful, the mishna teaches that they disqualify the handful due to the fact that they reduce its measure.
  § Abaye said to Rava: How do the priests properly remove the handful from a meal offering? Rava said to him: They remove it as people normally remove handfuls, by folding all of their fingers over the palm of the hand. Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i> discussing the mitzva function of each of the fingers: This small finger is for measuring a span (see Exodus 28:16), i.e., the distance between the thumb and the little finger. This fourth finger is used for removal of a handful from the meal offering, i.e., the measurement of a handful begins from this finger, as the priest removes a handful by folding the middle three fingers over his palm.
  Furthermore, this middle finger is used for measuring a cubit, the distance from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger. This forefinger, next to the thumb, is the finger used to sprinkle the blood of offerings on the altar. And finally, this thumb is the one on which the blood and oil is placed during the purification ritual of a leper (see Leviticus 14:17). Evidently, the little finger is not used in the removal of a handful.
  The Gemara responds: The little finger is used only for the purposes of leveling the handful, that is to say, the priest first removes a handful with a full hand, i.e., all of his fingers, so that it should not be lacking in measure, and then he wipes away the protruding flour with his little finger from the bottom, and with his thumb from the top.
  The Gemara asks: How is the removal of the handful performed? Rav Zutra bar Toviyya says that Rav says: When the priest places his hand in the meal offering, he bends his middle three fingers until the tips of his fingers reach over the palm of his hand, and he then removes the handful.
  The Gemara notes that this is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>. From the verse that states: “And he shall remove from there his handful” (Leviticus 2:2), one might have thought that the handful should be overflowing. Therefore, another verse states: “And he shall take up from it with his handful [<i>bekumtzo</i>]” (Leviticus 6:8). The prefix that means “with” can also mean: In, indicating that the proper measure of a handful is that which is contained within one’s fingers alone.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the measurement of a handful is determined by the term “with his handful,” one might have thought that the priest removes a handful with his fingertips, i.e., that a handful consists of that which the priest removes by folding his fingers onto themselves. Therefore, the verse states: “His handful,” indicating that the handful must be full and not merely that which is contained within his fingers. How so? He scoops by closing his three fingers over the palm of his hand, and in this way takes a handful from the flour of the meal offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: In the case of a pan meal offering and that of a deep-pan meal offering, when the flour was fried before being scooped and was therefore hard, the priest wipes away with his thumb any flour that was overflowing above his handful, and with his little finger he wipes away the flour that was pushing out below. And this precise taking of the handful of a meal offering is the most difficult sacrificial rite in the Temple, as the priest must wipe away any protruding elements without removing any flour from the handful itself.
  The Gemara asks: This one is the hardest sacrificial rite, and no other? But isn’t there pinching the nape of the neck of a bird offering, which is also considered extremely difficult to perform, and isn’t there the scooping of the handful of incense by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, another rite that is extremely difficult to perform? Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means that this taking of the handful of a meal offering is one of the most difficult sacrificial rites in the Temple.
  Rav Pappa said: It is obvious to me that the term “his handful” means that the removal of the handful from a meal offering should be performed <i>ab initio</i> in the manner that people usually remove a handful, with their fingertips angled to the side. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> if the priest removed a handful with his fingertips, i.e., if he placed his hand horizontally over the meal offering and filled his palm with flour by closing his fingers to his palm? Does this disqualify the taking of the handful or not?
  Similarly, if the priest took a handful from the sides, by passing the back of his hand back and forth over the flour in the vessel so that the flour collected in his palm by way of the side of his palm, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Furthermore, if he took the handful with the back of his hand placed downward in the vessel, and with his fingers he collected the flour upward into his palm, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Are the handfuls removed in this manner fit for sacrifice? The Gemara states: These dilemmas shall standunresolved.
  Rav Pappa said: It is obvious to me that when the Torah states: “His handful” (Leviticus 16:12), in the context of the scooping of handfuls of incense by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, it means in the manner that people usually scoop a handful, by placing the backs of their hands into the vessel and bringing their hands together. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: What is the <i>halakha</i> if the High Priest scooped a handful with his fingertips? What is the <i>halakha</i> if he took a handful from the sides? What is the <i>halakha</i> if he scooped a handful with this hand and with that hand separately and then brought them together? The Gemara states: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
  Rav Pappa raises yet another dilemma: If the priest took the handful from the vessel containing the meal offering and stuck the handful onto the side of the second vessel in order to sanctify it, i.e., the handful was not placed directly into the vessel, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we require that the handful be inside the vessel, and that is the case here? Or perhaps we require that the handful be placed properly inside the vessel, and that is not the case in this instance. No answer is found, and the Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Mar bar Rav Ashi raises a similar dilemma: If the priest overturned the vessel and stuck the handful to the underside of the vessel, in a case where there was an indentation on the underside, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we require that the handful be placed inside the vessel, and that requirement is fulfilled here, as the handful is within the indentation? Or perhaps we require that it be placed properly in the vessel, and that is not the case here. The Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: How does the priest perform the removal of a handful? He extends his fingers onto the palm of his hand. If one increased its oil, decreased its oil, or decreased its frankincense, beyond the appropriate measures, the meal offering is unfit.
  GEMARA: What are the circumstances of a case where the meal offering is disqualified due to the fact that one increased its oil? Rabbi Eliezer says: The circumstances are a case where he separated two <i>log</i> of oil for the meal offering instead of one <i>log</i>, and mixed them into a tenth of an ephah of flour. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And let Rabbi Eliezer interpret the mishna as referring to a case where he mixed non-sacred oil or the oil of another meal offering into the meal offering.
  And if you would say that non-sacred oil and the oil of another meal offering do not disqualify a meal offering, Rav Zutra bar Toviyya objects to this claim: If that is so, then with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, of which it is stated (59b) that oil disqualifies it, how can you find the circumstances where it is in fact disqualified?
  Rav Zutra bar Toviyya elaborates: If you suggest that he mixed its own oil into the flour, such a case does not exist, as the meal offering of a sinner does not have any oil. If he mixed non-sacred oil or that of another meal offering into the flour, the meal offering should not be disqualified, as you said that such oil does not disqualify a meal offering. And if you would say that he designated oil for his meal offering and mixed it into the flour despite the Torah prohibition against mixing oil into it, I say that since the meal offering of a sinner does not have oil at all, any oil that he separates and mixes into it is considered non-sacred, and you have already said that non-sacred oil does not disqualify a meal offering.
  The Gemara responds: In fact, non-sacred oil and the oil of another meal offering do disqualify a meal offering, and Rabbi Eliezer is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to say that non-sacred oil and the oil of another meal offering disqualify a meal offering. But in a case where one separated two <i>log</i> for his meal offering, since this first <i>log</i> is fit for the meal offering, and that second <i>log</i> is also fit for it, one might say that even when he mixes both <i>log</i> into the meal offering, it should not disqualify the meal offering. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer teaches us that the meal offering is disqualified in this case as well.
  The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Eliezer derive this conclusion? Rava said: The terminology of the mishna posed a difficulty for him, as one can ask: Why does the <i>tanna</i> specifically teach that the meal offering is disqualified if he increased its oil, which indicates that he increased it with oil belonging to the offering itself? Let the mishna teach simply: He increased the oil. Rather, this is what the mishna teaches us: That even though he initially separated two <i>log</i> of oil for the meal offering, its own oil disqualifies the offering when there is too much.
  § The mishna teaches that if one decreased its frankincense beyond its appropriate measure, the meal offering is unfit. Concerning this, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one decreased its frankincense to the point that the amount stood at only one pinch, it is disqualified, but if the decreased amount stood at two pinches, it is fit; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: If the decreased amount stood at one pinch, it is fit; less than that, it is disqualified.
  
  Daf 11b
  
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: A handful of flour or frankincense that was decreased by any amount from its full measure is disqualified? The Gemara answers that one should teach the <i>baraita</i> as follows: A pinch of frankincense that was decreased by any amount is disqualified. And if you wish, say instead that here, the first cited statement of Rabbi Shimon, is referring to the case of frankincense that comes with a meal offering, and this frankincense is disqualified only when there is less than a pinch, whereas there, the second statement of Rabbi Shimon, is referring to the case of frankincense that comes by itself. Such frankincense is disqualified if it comprises any less than its full measure.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There are three disputes of <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to the matter. Rabbi Meir holds that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning, and ultimately the entire handful must be burned upon the altar. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning, and ultimately at least two pinches from it must be burned upon the altar. And Rabbi Shimon holds that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning and ultimately at least one pinch from it must be burned upon the altar.
  And all three of them interpret a single verse differently. The verse states: “And he shall take up from there his handful, of the fine flour of the meal offering, and of the oil of it, and [<i>ve’et</i>] all the frankincense that is upon the meal offering, and shall make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 6:8). Rabbi Meir holds that one may not make the offering smoke upon the altar unless there remains the entire measure of frankincense that was initially fixed together with the meal offering. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that when the verse states: “All [<i>kol</i>],” it is referring to any part of the frankincense, even a single pinch, as <i>kol</i> can mean any amount (see II Kings 2:4). And when the verse states: “<i>Et</i>,” this serves to includ-e another pinch. Accordingly, at least two pinches must remain to be burned upon the altar. And Rabbi Shimon interprets the word “all” in the same manner as does Rabbi Yehuda, but he does not interpret and derive a <i>halakha</i> from the term “<i>et</i>,” and he therefore holds that only one pinch must remain to be burned.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef further says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i> is with regard to frankincense that comes with a meal offering. But with regard to frankincense that comes by itself, everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, agrees that the priest must bring a handful at the beginning, and ultimately the entire handful must be burned upon the altar. For this reason it was necessary for the verse to state: “That is upon the meal offering,” as this indicates that together with a meal offering, yes, one may burn the frankincense even if there remains only a pinch or two, but with regard to frankincense that comes by itself, one may not burn it if it is in that state.
  And Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute between these <i>tanna’im</i> is with regard to frankincense that comes with a meal offering. But with regard to frankincense that comes in bowls together with the shewbread, everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, agrees that there must be two handfuls in the beginning, one handful for each bowl, and ultimately there must also be two handfuls.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is the case, as with regard to this <i>halakha</i> the verse does not state the term: All, from which one might derive that it is referring to any part of the frankincense? The Gemara explains: This ruling is necessary, lest you say that since the frankincense in the bowls comes together with bread, i.e., the shewbread, it should be considered as: “Frankincense that is upon the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:8), and therefore Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon claim that one may sacrifice it even if less than two handfuls remain. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef teaches us that this is not the case.
  The Gemara notes: Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa disagree with regard to the case of frankincense that comes by itself. One says that the dispute between the <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to whether or not a handful of frankincense that became lacking may be sacrificed upon the altar applies only with regard to frankincense that comes with a meal offering, but with regard to frankincense that comes by itself, everyone agrees that the priest must remove a handful at the beginning and ultimately the entire handful must be burned upon the altar. And one says: Just as there is a dispute in this case, so too, there is a dispute in that case.
  § The mishna teaches that if the priest decreased its frankincense beyond its appropriate measure, the meal offering is unfit. The Gemara infers from this statement that if he increased its frankincense, it is fit. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if he increased its frankincense the meal offering is disqualified? Rami bar Ḥama said: The <i>baraita</i> rules that the meal offering is disqualified in a case where he separated two handfuls of frankincense for the meal offering and placed both of them onto the meal offering.
  And Rami bar Ḥama says: In a case where one separated two handfuls of frankincense for the meal offering and subsequently lost one of them, if it was lost before the removal of the handful of the meal offering, the additional frankincense was not fixed with the meal offering, and therefore it does not disqualify the meal offering. But if this occurred after the removal of the handful of the meal offering, since both handfuls were already fixed with the meal offering, it is disqualified, as he increased its frankincense by a large amount.
  And Rami bar Ḥama says: In a case where one separated four handfuls of frankincense for placement in the two bowls that accompany the shewbread, and two of them were subsequently lost, the <i>halakha</i> depends on when they were lost. If they were lost before the removal of the bowls from the Table of the shewbread, then the additional frankincense was not yet fixed with the shewbread, and the frankincense remains fit for sacrifice. But if they were lost after the removal of the bowls, then all four handfuls were already fixed with the shewbread, and therefore the frankincense is disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I also need this? This statement of Rami bar Ḥama is identical to that previous statement, as the burning of the frankincense permits the shewbread for consumption just as the frankincense permits the meal offering for consumption. Consequently, the removal of the bowls of frankincense is comparable to the removal of the handful from a meal offering.
  The Gemara explains: The last statement of Rami bar Ḥama is necessary, lest you say that since the handful of frankincense of the shewbread is already considered designated for burning, as it is placed in a separate bowl and burned in its entirety, then once the time arrives for removing the bowls from upon the Table of the shewbread, it is considered as though the bowls were already removed, and the shewbread should therefore be disqualified on account of the additional frankincense. Therefore, Rami bar Ḥama teaches us that the additional handfuls disqualify the shewbread only if they were inside the bowls at the time of their actual removal from the Table.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard, to burn its handful outside the Temple courtyard or to burn an olive-bulk of its handful outside the Temple courtyard, or to burn its frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, in all these cases the offering is unfit, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i> for one who partakes of it. If one had the intent to partake of its remainder on the next day or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder on the next day, to burn its handful on the next day or to burn an olive-bulk of its handful on the next day, or to burn its frankincense on the next day,
  
  Daf 12a
  
  the offering is <i>piggul</i>, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the remainder of that meal offering.
  This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, e.g., the remainder, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, e.g., the handful or the frankincense, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> on account of it, provided that the permitting factor, i.e., the handful, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva. If the permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva, although the meal offering is unfit, the prohibition of <i>piggul</i> does not apply to it.
  How is the permitting factor considered to have been sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one removed the handful in silence, i.e., with no specific intent, and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time; or if one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the or burn the handful or frankincense beyond its designated time, and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar in silence, with no specific intent; or if one removed the handful and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva, and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of it due to <i>piggul</i>.
  How is the permitting factor not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva? If one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful or frankincense outside its designated area, or placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder beyond its designated time; or if one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful or frankincense beyond its designated time, and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder outside its designated area; or if one removed the handful and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder outside its designated area, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  The meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i> that one removed their handful not for their sake and placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful beyond its designated time; or that one removed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder or burn the handful beyond its designated time or placed it in the vessel, conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake; or that one removed the handful, and placed it in the vessel, and conveyed it, and burned the handful on the altar, not for their sake, that is the case of an offering whose permitting factor was not sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  If one performed one of these rites with the intent to partake of an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>.
  Rabbi Yehuda says that this is the principle: If the intent with regard to the time preceded the intent with regard to the area, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> on account of it. If the intent with regard to the area preceded the intent with regard to the time, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say: In both this case, where the intent with regard to time was first, and that case, where the intent with regard to area came first, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says that if the remainder of a meal offering became lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning of the handful on the altar the priest nevertheless burns the handful on account of such a meal offering, and as we maintain that despite the fact that the handful is burned on account of it that remainder is prohibited for consumption, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>piggul</i>? Should the burning of the handful be effective in establishing such a remainder as <i>piggul</i> when the handful was burned with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day?
  And similarly, is the burning of the handful effective in removing such a remainder from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, just as a complete remainder is removed being subject to this prohibition after the burning of the handful, when it becomes permitted to the priests for consumption?
  Rav Huna said: Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that the sprinkling of the blood of an offering, which renders its meat permitted for consumption and removes it from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, is effective in removing the meat of an offering that left the Temple courtyard from being subject to misuse of consecrated property despite the fact that such meat is prohibited for consumption, that statement applies only when the meat was disqualified by means of leaving.
  Rav Huna explains: The reason is that the meat remains as is, and the disqualification of the meat by means of leaving is on account of something else, i.e., a factor external to the meat itself. But in the case of a lack in the measure of the remainder of a meal offering, which is a disqualification on account of itself, the burning of the handful is not effective in removing the remainder from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, nor to establish it as <i>piggul</i>.
  Rava said to Rav Huna: On the contrary; even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that sprinkling is not effective in removing the meat that left the Temple courtyard from being subject to misuse of consecrated property, that statement applies only when the meat was disqualified by means of leaving, as the meat is not inside the Temple courtyard where the sprinkling could be effective for it. But with regard to a lack in the measure of the remainder of a meal offering that is inside the Temple courtyard, the burning of the handful is effective in removing the remainder from being subject to misuse of consecrated property as well as in establishing it as <i>piggul</i>.
  Rava said: From where do I say that even remainders that lack a full measure can be rendered <i>piggul</i>? This can be inferred from that which we learned in the mishna: With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder outside the Temple courtyard, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>, and if he removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder beyond the designated time or to partake of an olive-bulk of its remainder beyond the designated time the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the remainder of that meal offering. And Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches in his version of the mishna: One who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder, and he does not teach: Or an olive-bulk of its remainder.
  Rava continues: What is the reason that Rabbi Ḥiyya diverged from the standard text of the mishna and did not teach: Or an olive-bulk? Is it not because his mishna is discussing a case where the remainder later became lacking and its measure stood at an olive-bulk? And therefore Rabbi Ḥiyya did not include the clause: Or an olive-bulk, since later in the mishna, with regard to the placement of the handful in a vessel, and with regard to the conveyance of the vessel to the altar, and with regard to the burning of the handful, he could not teach the phrase:
  
  Daf 12b
  
  Or an olive-bulk, in the case of one’s intent with regard to the consumption of the remainder, because the remainder is already the size of an olive-bulk. Therefore, in the case of the removal of the handful as well, i.e., when he teaches: One who removes a handful to partake of its remainder, Rabbi Ḥiyya did not teach: Or to consume an olive-bulk of its remainder, despite the fact that he could have done so in that clause. Rava concludes his proof: And yet the latter clause teaches that if one burned the handful with the intent to consume the remainder after its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> on account of it. Evidently, burning is effective in rendering a lacking remainder as <i>piggul</i>.
  Abaye said to Rava: No, one cannot prove from here that the mishna is discussing the case of a remainder that became lacking. The reason for this is: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna of Rabbi Ḥiyya? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 109b): With regard to the handful of flour, and the frankincense, and the incense, and the meal offering of priests (see Leviticus 6:16), and the meal offering of the anointed priest (see Leviticus 6:12–15), and the meal offering that accompanies the libations brought with animal offerings (see Numbers 15:1–16), where one sacrificed an olive-bulk from one of them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable for sacrificing outside the courtyard. And Rabbi Elazar exempts one from liability until he sacrifices them in their entirety rather than just an olive-bulk from them.
  Abaye concludes: Since with regard to the burning of the handful he could not teach: Or burn an olive-bulk of its handful outside the Temple, as according to Rabbi Elazar one is not liable for burning anything less than the full handful and therefore intent to burn only an olive-bulk does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>, with regard to the remainder as well, he did not teach: Or an olive-bulk.
  The Gemara asks: If the mishna of Rabbi Ḥiyya is really in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, then this statement: To burn its handful outside the Temple courtyard, should have been phrased: To burn its handful and its frankincense outside the Temple courtyard, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 110a): With regard to the handful and the frankincense, in a case where one sacrificed only one of them outside the Temple courtyard, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer exempts from liability one who burns only one of them until he sacrifices both of them together.
  The Gemara responds: The mishna of Rabbi Ḥiyya is necessary only for the handful of the meal offering of a sinner, which has no frankincense. Since only the burning of the handful permits the remainder of the sinner’s meal offering for consumption, one’s intent to burn it the next day renders the offering <i>piggul</i>. With regard to this meal offering, one is not liable for burning anything less than the full handful, according to Rabbi Elazar, and therefore it does not teach: Or an olive-bulk.
  The Gemara asks: And did the <i>tanna</i> go to all that trouble [<i>ve’ikhpal</i>] just to teach us a <i>halakha</i> that is applicable only in the case of the handful of the meal offering of a sinner? The Gemara responds: Yes, he did. And similarly, when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael, he said that Rabbi Elazar ben Pedat said: When the mishna discusses an instance where one has intent to sacrifice the handful of a meal offering outside, it is referring to the handful of the meal offering of a sinner, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.
  Rava then said: That which I said, that the burning of the handful with the intent to consume the remainder the next day is effective in rendering even a remainder that became lacking in measure as <i>piggul</i> and to remove it from being subject to misuse of consecrated property is nothing, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the shewbread: “It is most holy” (Leviticus 24:9). The restrictive term “it” teaches that the shewbread must remain whole, so that if one of the loaves of the shewbread broke and consequently became lacking in measure, then all of its loaves are disqualified, and the burning of the bowls of frankincense do not render them permitted for consumption.
  Rava continues: It can be inferred from the <i>baraita</i> that if the loaves remained whole but one of them left the Temple, those that are inside the Temple are still fit. And whom have you heard who says: The sprinkling of the blood is effective in rendering <i>piggul</i> an item that left the Temple? It is Rabbi Akiva. And yet he says in this <i>baraita</i> that if one of the loaves broke, the burning of the frankincense is not effective for them. Similarly, with regard to the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking in measure, even Rabbi Akiva agrees that the burning of the handful is ineffective in rendering it <i>piggul</i>.
  Abaye said to Rava: How can you cite a proof from this <i>baraita</i>? Is it taught in this <i>baraita</i>: But if a loaf of shewbread left, those loaves that remain inside are fit? Perhaps all of the loaves are disqualified if even one of them left, and one should infer a different <i>halakha</i> from the <i>baraita</i>, that if one of the loaves became ritually impure, these that remain pure are fit.
  Abaye explains: What is the reason for such a distinction? The reason is that the frontplate of the High Priest effects acceptance for ritually impure offerings. But in a case where a loaf of shewbread left, the frontplate does not effect acceptance, and therefore all of the loaves are disqualified, as in a case where one loaf breaks. And if so, the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that sprinkling is not effective with regard to an item that left the Temple courtyard.
  Abaye continues: And by right the <i>baraita</i> should have also taught that if one of the loaves of shewbread left, all the loaves are disqualified. And as for the fact that it teaches the <i>halakha</i> specifically with regard to a loaf that broke, this is what the <i>baraita</i> teaches us: That even if the loaf broke, in which case the loaf is still inside the Temple, burning is not effective with regard to it. But according to Rabbi Akiva, who says that sprinkling is effective with regard to an item that left the Temple, even in the case of a lacking measure, burning is effective with regard to it.
  MISHNA: If one’s intent was to partake of half an olive-bulk of the remainder and to burn half an olive-bulk of it not at the appropriate time or not in the appropriate area, the offering is fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
  GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna: The reason that the two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together is because his intent was to partake of half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk, which indicates that if his intent was to partake of half an olive-bulk of the remainder and to partake of half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, then the halves do join together to the amount of an olive-bulk and disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: But the first clause teaches, in the earlier mishna: If one’s intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i>. One can infer from this mishna that if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, yes, such intent disqualifies an offering. But if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, this intent does not disqualify the offering, and likewise such intent does not join together with another to this end. If so, who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught the latter clause?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that one can have improper intent from the consumption performed by a person to the consumption performed by the altar, and from the consumption performed by the altar to the consumption performed by a person. In other words, if one’s intent was to burn the remainder the next day or to consume the handful the next day, such intent disqualifies an offering even though the remainder is intended for consumption by the priests and the handful is intended for burning upon the altar.
  The Gemara cites the relevant ruling of Rabbi Eliezer. As we learned in a mishna (17a): In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume after its designated time an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn beyond its designated time an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. And Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not <i>piggul</i> and consuming it is not punishable by <i>karet</i>.
  Abaye said: You may even say that the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that one should infer from the mishna that if his intent was to partake of half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one consumes it and to partake of half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, the offering is disqualified. Rather, say that if his intent was to partake of half an olive-bulk on the next day and to partake of half an olive-bulk outside the Temple, and each of these halves is from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, then the halves are joined together and disqualify the offering.
  The Gemara asks: And what is this teaching us? The previous mishna already teaches that principle explicitly: If one performed one of these rites with the intent to partake of an olive-bulk outside its designated area and an olive-bulk the next day, or an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated area, or half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, or half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, the offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>.
  
  Daf 13a
  
  According to Abaye, why do I also need this mishna here? If you will suggest that this mishna is necessary, as one can infer from it that if one intended to partake of half an olive-bulk the next day and then intended to partake of another half an olive-bulk the next day, both from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, the mishna teaches us that they join together in order to render the offering <i>piggul</i>, this suggestion can be rejected: But you already learn the <i>halakha</i> in this case from the first clause of the latter clause of the previous mishna, as it teaches: Half an olive-bulk outside and half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering is unfit. One can infer from this that if his intent was to consume half an olive-bulk the next day and half an olive-bulk the next day, it is <i>piggul</i>.
  If you suggest that the mishna is necessary for a case where one intended to consume and to burn, i.e., that the mishna teaches us the matter itself, that intent to consume does not join together with intent to burn, this too cannot be. The reason is that from the inference of the first clause of the mishna you can already learn the <i>halakha</i> in this case, as it teaches: If one intended to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>. This indicates that if his intent was to consume an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara explains how the <i>halakha</i> that intent to consume and burn do not combine can be inferred from the mishna: Now consider, if when one intended to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it and to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, you say that his intentions do not join together, despite the fact that both of his intentions referred to consumption, is it necessary for the mishna to teach that intentions to consume and to burn do not join together?
  The Gemara responds: Yes; although the mishna teaches the <i>halakha</i> of a case where one intended to consume an item typically consumed and to consume an item typically not consumed, it was necessary for the mishna to teach the <i>halakha</i> of a case where one intended to eat and to burn. As it might enter your mind to say that there, where one’s intentions referred solely to consumption, the <i>halakha</i> is that his intentions do not join together, as he intended to act not in accordance with its typical manner, since he intended to consume that which is not meant to be consumed.
  The Gemara continues: But here, where his intent was to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk, where with regard to this half he intends in accordance with its typical manner, and with regard to this half he intends in accordance with its typical manner, one might say that they should join together, despite the fact that each intention concerns only half an olive-bulk. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that such intentions do not join together, and the mishna can be explained even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  
  MISHNA: In the case of a priest who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn its handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance that it is a case of <i>piggul</i> and he is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of it. But if the priest’s intent was to burn its frankincense the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: The meal offering is unfit but partaking of it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say: It is a case of <i>piggul</i> and he is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the meal offering.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: In what manner does this differ from an animal offering, where if one slaughtered it with the intent to sacrifice the portions consumed on the altar the next day, it is <i>piggul</i>? Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis: There is a difference, as in the case of an animal offering, its blood, and its flesh, and its portions consumed on the altar are all one entity. Consequently, intent with regard to any one of them renders the entire offering <i>piggul</i>. But the frankincense is not part of the meal offering.
  GEMARA: The Gemara questions the terminology of the mishna: Why do I need the <i>tanna</i> to teach that Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance? Let the <i>tanna</i> simply state: If one removes the handful from a meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn the handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei says that the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the remainder.
  The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to teach that Rabbi Yosei concedes, because he wants to teach the latter clause of the mishna, that if his intent was to burn its frankincense the next day, Rabbi Yosei says that the meal offering is unfit, but partaking of it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>.
  The Gemara elaborates: The reason the <i>tanna</i> links the two cases of the mishna is lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Yosei does not render the meal offering <i>piggul</i> is because he holds that one cannot render an offering <i>piggul</i> with intent that concerns only half of its permitting factors. And consequently, since the burning of the handful and the frankincense render the remainder of a meal offering permitted for consumption, then even in the first clause of the mishna, where one intends to burn the handful the next day, Rabbi Yosei should hold that the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, as the intent does not refer to the frankincense as well.
  
  Daf 13b
  
  Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that in this case Rabbi Yosei concedes that if the handful is removed with the intent to burn only the handful on the next day, the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i>. Accordingly, Rabbi Yosei holds that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> with intent that concerns only half of its permitting factors, and the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i> in the case of the latter clause for a different reason, as the Gemara will discuss later.
  § The mishna teaches that if one removed the handful from a meal offering with the intent to burn its frankincense on the next day, Rabbi Yosei says that the meal offering is unfit but partaking of it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>. Concerning this, Reish Lakish says: Rabbi Yosei would say, i.e., this is Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning: A permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>. In other words, if, while performing the rites of a permitting factor, one had intent to perform the rites of a different permitting factor outside its designated time, the offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i> on account of this intent.
  Reish Lakish adds: And you would say the same with regard to the two bowls of frankincense of the shewbread, that a permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>, and therefore if the priest burned one of the bowls with the intent to burn the other bowl the next day, the shewbread is not rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is the purpose of the apparently superfluous statement: And you would say the same with regard to the two bowls of frankincense? Is there reason to assume that Rabbi Yosei would hold that the shewbread is rendered <i>piggul</i> in such a case? The Gemara responds that it is necessary, lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Yosei holds that there is no <i>piggul</i> in the case of the frankincense is because it is not of the same type as a meal offering. But with regard to the two bowls of frankincense, which are of the same type as each other, one might say that they do render one another <i>piggul</i>. Therefore, Reish Lakish teaches us that in both instances one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And can you say that the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei in the case of the frankincense in the mishna is not due to the fact that the frankincense is not of the same type as a meal offering? But isn’t it taught in the latter clause of the mishna that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: In what manner does the frankincense differ from an animal offering, where if one slaughtered it with the intent to sacrifice the portions consumed on the altar the next day it is <i>piggul</i>; and Rabbi Yosei said to the Rabbis: There is a difference, as in the case of an animal offering, its blood, and its flesh, and its portions consumed on the altar are all one entity, but the frankincense is not part of the meal offering? The mishna indicates that according to Rabbi Yosei the reason the meal offering is not <i>piggul</i> is because the frankincense is not of the same type as the meal offering.
  The Gemara explains: What does Rabbi Yosei mean when he says that the frankincense is not part of the meal offering? He means that it is not part of the preclusion of the meal offering. The Gemara elaborates: This means that the <i>halakha</i> is not that just as the handful precludes the remainder, i.e., that as long as the handful is not burned the remainder may not be consumed, so too the handful precludes the frankincense from being burned upon the altar. Rather, if the priest wants, he burns this first, and if he wants, he burns that first, i.e., he may burn the frankincense before or after the burning of the handful. Accordingly, the frankincense is an independent permitting factor. For this reason, intent with regard to the frankincense that occurred during the removal of the handful does not render a meal offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who say that the meal offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> in such a case, what is their opinion? The Gemara responds: They hold that when we say that a permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>, this is with regard to the case taught in a mishna (16a) concerning one who slaughtered one of the lambs whose sacrifice permits the consumption of the two loaves meal offering brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, with the intent to partake of the other lamb the next day. The Gemara elaborates: When you said in the mishna that both permitting factors are fit, this statement applies only where they were not fixed in one vessel. But in a situation where they were fixed in one vessel, as is the case with regard to the handful and the frankincense, they are considered like one unit, and therefore they render one another <i>piggul</i>.
  § With regard to the frankincense, Rabbi Yannai says: The collection of the frankincense from a meal offering, when performed by a non-priest, is not valid and disqualifies the meal offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is because the rite of conveying has touched it, i.e., the collection of the frankincense is considered part of the rite of the conveying of the frankincense to the altar for the purpose of burning. Even if the non-priest simply collected the frankincense and thereafter transferred it to a priest, Rabbi Yannai holds that conveying even without moving one’s leg is called conveying, and the <i>halakha</i> is that the performance of the rite of conveying by a non-priest is not valid.
  Rav Mari said: We learn this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna on 12a, which discusses those sacrificial rites of a meal offering during which improper intent renders an offering <i>piggul</i>, as well. The mishna teaches: This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. If his intent was to perform any of these actions beyond their designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> on account of it, provided that the permitting factor, i.e., the handful, was sacrificed in accordance with its mitzva.
  Rav Mari analyzes the first part of this mishna: Granted, the removal of the handful from a meal offering is the same as, i.e., equivalent to, the slaughter of animal offerings. The conveying of the handful to the altar in order to burn it is also the same as the conveying of the blood of a slaughtered offering to the altar in order to sprinkle it. Similarly, the burning of the handful and frankincense of a meal offering is comparable to the sprinkling of the blood of a slaughtered offering upon the altar. But as for placing the handful in the service vessel, what rite is he performing that is comparable to a rite of slaughtered offerings?
  If we say that the meal offering is <i>piggul</i> because the placing of the handful into a vessel is comparable to the collection of the blood of a slaughtered offering into a service vessel, one can ask: Are these rites in fact comparable? There, in the case of animal offerings, the blood enters the vessel by itself, whereas here, the priest takes the handful from the meal offering and casts it into the vessel.
  Rather, it must be due to the following reason: Since it is not possible to sacrifice the handful without first performing the act of placing it in a vessel, the placement of the handful in a vessel is considered a significant rite, and perforce this factor causes it to be considered like the collection of the blood. Here too, with regard to the collection of the frankincense, since it is not possible to sacrifice the frankincense without first performing the act of collecting it from the vessel, the collection of the frankincense is a significant rite that perforce causes it to be considered like the rite of conveying.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, this is not the reason, and one cannot prove from the mishna that the collection of the frankincense from a meal offering performed by a non-priest is not valid. Actually, the reason why intent during the placement of the handful renders the offering <i>piggul</i> is in fact because it is comparable to the collection of the blood of a slaughtered offering. And as for the difficulty you raised, that there the blood enters the vessel by itself, whereas here he takes the handful from the meal offering and casts it into the vessel, this is not a true difficulty.
  The Gemara explains: Now consider, both of them, i.e., the collection of the blood and the placing of the handful, involve the sanctity of a vessel, in which a service vessel sanctifies a permitting factor to the altar, either the handful or the blood. What difference is it to me if the permitting factor enters the vessel by itself or whether one takes the item and casts it into the vessel?
  MISHNA: If one slaughtered the two lambs that accompany the two meal offering loaves sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> with the intent to partake of one of the two loaves the next day, or if one burned the two bowls of frankincense accompanying the shewbread with the intent to partake of one of the arrangements of the shewbread the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: That loaf and that arrangement of which he intended to partake the next day are <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for their consumption, and the second loaf and arrangement are unfit, but there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> for their consumption. And the Rabbis say: This loaf and arrangement and that loaf and arrangement are both <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for their consumption.
  GEMARA: Rav Huna says: Rabbi Yosei would say, in accordance with his opinion that intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to one loaf or one arrangement does not render the second loaf or arrangement <i>piggul</i>, that if one had intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to the right thigh, i.e., he slaughtered an offering with the intent to partake of the right thigh the next day, then the left thigh has not become <i>piggul</i> and one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption. What is the reason for this? If you wish, propose a logical argument, and if you wish, cite a verse.
  Rav Huna elaborates: If you wish, propose a logical argument: Disqualifying intent is no stronger than an incident of ritual impurity, and if one limb of an offering became impure, did the entire offering then become impure? Accordingly, one limb can be rendered <i>piggul</i> without the other. And if you wish, cite a verse that addresses <i>piggul</i>: “And the soul that eats of it shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 7:18). The verse indicates that one who eats specifically “of it,” i.e., from one part, shall bear his iniquity, and not one who eats from the other part of the offering.
  Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Rav Huna from a <i>baraita</i>: And the Rabbis say that there is never liability to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the two loaves unless one has intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to an olive-bulk of both of them, i.e., one’s intent renders both loaves <i>piggul</i> only if he slaughters the lambs with the intent to consume an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both loaves combined outside their proper time. One can infer from this that if he had intent with regard to both of them, yes, both loaves are <i>piggul</i>. But if his intent was with regard to only one of them, no, the other loaf is not <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Naḥman continues: In accordance with whose opinion is the <i>baraita</i>? If we say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis of the mishna, then even if his intent was with regard to only one of them, both loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i>. Rather, it is obvious that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Now, granted, if you say that according to Rabbi Yosei the left and right thighs of an offering are considered one body, and consequently <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to one thigh renders the other thigh <i>piggul</i> as well, then due to that reason it is understandable that if the <i>piggul</i> intent was for an amount equal to one total olive-bulk from both of the loaves, then the intent with regard to each loaf is combined with the other.
  
  Daf 14a
  
  But if you say that Rabbi Yosei holds that the right and left thighs of an offering are considered two distinct bodies, and therefore <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to one does not render the other <i>piggul</i>, then in the case of the two loaves, would the intentions concerning both loaves combine to render them both <i>piggul</i>?
  Rav Huna responds: One cannot infer anything from this <i>baraita</i> with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who slaughters one of the lambs brought as peace offerings on <i>Shavuot</i> with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from this loaf  the next day, and similarly, he slaughtered the other lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from that second loaf the next day, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that this offering is valid, as his intentions do not combine.
  Rav Huna continues: It may be inferred that the reason why the priest’s intentions do not combine is that his intent was said with regard to a half and a half, i.e., he slaughtered each lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from one loaf the next day. But if he said during the slaughter of each of the lambs that he is slaughtering it with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from both of them, then the halves combine to render the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that the two loaves are <i>piggul</i> only if he has intent with regard to an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both of them combined, in accordance with whose opinion is his statement? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis of the mishna, who hold that <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to one loaf renders both loaves <i>piggul</i>, then even if his intent was with regard to only one of them, both loaves should be <i>piggul</i>. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who holds that <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to one loaf does not render the second loaf <i>piggul</i>, then our difficulty returns to its place: If Rabbi Yosei holds that the right and left thighs are considered two distinct bodies, how can intentions with regard to two halves of an olive-bulk combine to render both loaves <i>piggul</i>?
  The Gemara responds: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that the <i>baraita</i> states: It is not <i>piggul</i> unless one has the intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to both of them [<i>bishteihen</i>], in the feminine form, whereby the <i>baraita</i> would be referring to the loaves. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> states: With regard to both of them [<i>bishneihen</i>], in the masculine form, i.e., unless he slaughters both lambs with <i>piggul</i> intent, and in such a case, even if his intent was with regard to only one of the loaves, the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara adds: And this <i>baraita</i> serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna on 16a: One renders an offering <i>piggul</i> by means of intent during the sacrifice of half a permitting factor, e.g., if one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to consume the two loaves the next day, the loaves are <i>piggul</i>. This <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, then what is the meaning of the emphasis in the <i>baraita</i>: There is never liability? Granted, this phrase is understandable if you say that the <i>baraita</i> means that the loaves are not <i>piggul</i> unless he has intent with regard to both of the loaves and both of the lambs, i.e., they are <i>piggul</i> only if he slaughters both lambs with the intention to partake of both loaves the next day. In that case the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it comes to exclude the statements of both Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, and this is the reason that the <i>baraita</i> states: There is never liability, to emphasize that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with both of these opinions.
  But if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and that it serves to exclude only the opinion of Rabbi Meir, for what reason does the <i>baraita</i> stress: There is never liability? The <i>tanna</i> would not use such a word to exclude merely one opinion. Rather, it must be that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. If so, then the difficulty raised against Rav Huna, who says that <i>piggul</i> intent concerning the right thigh does not render the left one <i>piggul</i>, remains unresolved.
  And furthermore, didn’t Rav Ashi say: Come and hear a refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says in the name of Rabbi Yosei that if, while performing the sacrificial rites for the bulls or goats which are burned as an offering, the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> with regard to a matter that is performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., in the Temple courtyard, he has rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. If his intention was with regard to a matter that is performed inside the Sanctuary or the Holy of Holies, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: How so? If he was standing outside when slaughtering the animal and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention of sprinkling its blood tomorrow inside the Sanctuary, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. The reason is that when one has an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed inside, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>. Likewise, if he was standing inside when sprinkling, and said: I hereby sprinkle the blood of the sin offering in order to burn its sacrificial portions on the external altar tomorrow and to pour out its remainder on the base of the altar tomorrow, he has not rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>, as he had an intention inside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.
  But if he was standing outside and said: I hereby slaughter the animal with the intention to pour out the remainder of its blood tomorrow, or to burn its sacrificial portions tomorrow, he has rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>, as he had an intention outside with regard to a matter that is performed outside.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the case where one slaughtered the offering with the intent to pour the remaining blood the next day, what could be rendered <i>piggul</i>? If we say the blood could be rendered <i>piggul</i>, one can ask: Does blood become <i>piggul</i>? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 42b): These are the items for which one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>: The handful; the frankincense; the incense; the meal offering of priests; the meal offering accompanying the libations brought with an animal offering; the meal offering of the anointed priest; and the blood?
  Rather, it is obvious that the <i>baraita</i> means that it is the meat of the offering that could be rendered <i>piggul</i>. Now consider: And if there, in the <i>baraita</i>, where he did not have intent with regard to the meat itself, as his intention was not to partake of the meat the next day but to pour the remaining blood the next day, and yet Rabbi Yosei said that the meat is rendered <i>piggul</i>; then here, where he has intent to partake of the right thigh the next day, which is part of the offering itself, is it not all the more so that if he had intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to the right thigh, he has rendered the left thigh <i>piggul</i> as well?
  And furthermore, doesn’t Ravina say: Come and hear a refutation of the statement of Rav Huna from the mishna (13a): In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to partake of its remainder or to burn its handful on the next day, Rabbi Yosei concedes in this instance that he has rendered the offering <i>piggul</i> and he is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of it.
  Ravina continues: When one removes the handful with the intent to burn its handful, what could be rendered <i>piggul</i>? If we say that the handful could be rendered <i>piggul</i>, does the handful become <i>piggul</i>? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 42b): These are the items for which one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>: The handful, etc. Rather, it is obvious that the remainder could be rendered <i>piggul</i>. Now consider: And if there, in the mishna, where he did not have intent with regard to the remainder itself, i.e., to partake of the remainder the next day,
  
  Daf 14b
  
  and yet Rabbi Yosei said that the remainder is rendered <i>piggul</i>; then here, where he has intent to partake of the right thigh the next day, which is part of the offering itself, is it not all the more so that both thighs should become <i>piggul</i>?
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yosei holds that intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to one thigh renders the other thigh <i>piggul</i> as well, as they are of one body. Similarly, with regard to two loaves, Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that if one intends to consume an amount equal to an olive-bulk from both loaves, both loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i>. And as for his statement that intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to one loaf does not render the other loaf <i>piggul</i>, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: The verse renders the two loaves one body, and the verse also renders them two bodies. The verse renders them one body in the sense that they preclude one another, i.e., neither loaf is valid without the other. The verse also renders them two bodies, as the Merciful One states: This loaf is prepared alone and that is prepared alone, i.e., the kneading and arrangement of each loaf must be performed separately.
  Therefore, if the priest mixed them together by intending to consume an olive-bulk from both of them, then they are mixed and they are both <i>piggul</i>, as the verse renders them one body. But if he separated them by having intent with regard to only one loaf, in that case they are separated and only that loaf is <i>piggul</i>, as the verse renders them two bodies.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: If one had intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to one type of loaf from the loaves of a thanks offering, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning the remaining types of loaves, i.e., are they rendered <i>piggul</i> as well? Similarly, if one had intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to either the loaves or the wafers of baked meal offerings, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the remaining type? Rav Taḥlifa from the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, taught him a <i>baraita</i> that states: And likewise you say with regard to the bread of a thanks offering, and likewise you say with regard to a baked meal offering, that the <i>halakha</i> is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yosei and the Rabbis.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If at the time of the slaughter of an offering one had intent to consume half an olive-bulk of its meat the next day, and at the time of the sprinkling of the blood he had intent to consume half of another olive-bulk of meat the next day, the offering is <i>piggul</i>, as intentions that occur during the slaughter and sprinkling combine to render an offering <i>piggul</i>.
  There is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of this <i>baraita</i>: Some say that in the case of intentions that occur specifically during the slaughter and sprinkling, as both of them are permitting factors of the offering, yes, the intentions combine. But intentions that occur during the collection of the blood in a service vessel and the conveying of the blood to the altar do not combine, as neither rite is a permitting factor. And some say that if intentions during those rites that are distant from one another, i.e., the slaughter and sprinkling, combine, all the more so intentions during these rites that are close to one another, i.e., collection and conveying, certainly combine.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so, i.e., that intentions during the slaughter and sprinkling combine? But Levi teaches in a <i>baraita</i>: Intentions that occur during the four sacrificial rites do not combine to render an offering <i>piggul</i>, and those rites are: Slaughter and sprinkling, collection and conveying. Rava said: It is not difficult; this statement of Levi is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, whereas that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the two loaves and two lambs sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>: With regard to one who slaughters one of the lambs brought as peace offerings on <i>Shavuot</i> with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from this loaf the next day, and similarly, he slaughtered the other lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from that second loaf the next day, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that this offering is valid. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that intentions that occur during the performance of two permitting factors do not combine to render an offering <i>piggul</i>.
  Abaye said to Rava: You can say that you have heard that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that intentions do not combine to render an offering <i>piggul</i> when each intention is concerning half a permitting factor and half a measure of consumption, i.e., one lamb and half an olive-bulk. But in a case where one had intentions during the performance of an entire permitting factor, i.e., during the slaughter and sprinkling, and concerning half a measure of consumption, did you hear him say that such intentions do not combine?
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: But if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is of the opinion that intentions during the performance of an entire permitting factor and concerning half a measure of consumption combine to render an offering <i>piggul</i>, why does he rule that when one slaughters each lamb with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from one loaf the next day the offering is entirely valid? Let him decree that intentions during half a permitting factor and concerning half a measure of consumption disqualify an offering, due to the fact that intentions during an entire permitting factor and concerning half a measure of consumption render the offering <i>piggul</i>, as one finds in similar instances that Rabbi Yosei decreed and the Rabbis decreed in this manner.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan elaborates: Rabbi Yosei decreed in such a case, as we learned in a mishna (13a): With regard to one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to burn its handful on the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is <i>piggul</i>. But if his intent was to burn its frankincense on the next day, Rabbi Yosei says: The meal offering is unfit, but partaking of it does not include liability to receive <i>karet</i>. And the Rabbis say: It is a case of <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of the meal offering. Since one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i>, Rabbi Yosei evidently disqualifies the meal offering as a rabbinic decree due to concern over a case where his intention was to burn the handful the next day.
  And the Rabbis decreed as well, as we learned in a mishna (16a): If one had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or if he had such intent during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, Rabbi Meir says: The meal offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, and the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption unless he has intent of <i>piggul</i> during the burning of the entire permitting factor, i.e., both the handful and the frankincense. Since the Rabbis state that there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i>, but they do not rule that the offering is valid, evidently they maintain that the offering is disqualified by rabbinic law, due to concern over a case of <i>piggul</i> intent during the burning of the entire permitting factor.
  Abaye said to Rava bar Rav Ḥanan: How can these cases be compared? Granted there, Rabbi Yosei decreed that the offering is disqualified in a case of intent involving the handful of frankincense due to the concern of intent involving the handful of the meal offering, as the two cases are similar.
  Similarly, the Rabbis decreed that the offering is disqualified in a case of intent involving the handful due to a similar case of intent concerning the handful of the meal offering of a sinner. There is no frankincense in the case of a meal offering of a sinner, and consequently the priest’s intent with regard to the handful alone renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, as it is the sole permitting factor. And the Rabbis also decreed in a case of intent with regard to the frankincense due to a similar case of intent concerning the frankincense that comes in the bowls that accompany the shewbread. Here there is no handful, and consequently intent with regard to the frankincense alone renders the shewbread <i>piggul</i>.
  In the case of the two lambs that accompany the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i> as well (16a), the Rabbis rule that if one slaughters one of the lambs with the intent to consume both loaves the next day the offering is disqualified, but one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for partaking of it. This is a rabbinic decree in a case of intent during the slaughter of one lamb due to the other lamb, as were one to slaughter both lambs with intent of <i>piggul</i>, the loaves would be rendered <i>piggul</i>, since his intent occurred during the slaughter of the entire permitting factor.
  Similarly, when one burns a single bowl of frankincense from those that accompany the shewbread with the intent to consume both arrangements of shewbread the next day, the Rabbis disqualify the shewbread by rabbinic decree due to the other bowl, i.e., due to the concern over <i>piggul</i> intent during the burning of both bowls, as this intent involves the burning of the entire permitting factor.
  Abaye concludes: But here, in the case of the <i>baraita</i> where one slaughtered each of the two lambs with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from a different loaf, is there another instance in general where intent during the performance of a rite concerning half a permitting factor and with regard to half a measure of consumption renders an offering <i>piggul</i>, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi will arise and decree that the lambs in this instance are disqualified?
  The Gemara notes: So too, it is reasonable that the reasoning of the Rabbis is due to that explanation, i.e., they disqualified the offerings in the aforementioned cases due to the fact that in similar instances the offering is <i>piggul</i>. This is evident from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna (16a): The Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir in the case of the meal offering of a sinner and the meal offering of jealousy that if one had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the burning of the handful, the meal offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, as the handful is the sole permitting factor.
  The Gemara explains this proof: Why do I need the mishna to teach this last statement at all? Isn’t it obvious that these meal offerings are <i>piggul</i>, as is there another permitting factor aside from the handful? Rather, is it not correct to say that this is what the mishna teaches us, that the reason that the Rabbis disqualified a standard meal offering when only the handful was removed with the intent of <i>piggul</i> is because there is the case of the handful of the meal offering of a sinner, which is similar to it and is rendered <i>piggul</i> due to intent involving the handful alone?
  MISHNA: If one of the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> or one of the two arrangements of the shewbread became ritually impure, Rabbi Yehuda says: Both must be taken to the place of burning like any other disqualified offering, as no communal offering is divided. That is, it is either fit in its entirety or unfit in its entirety. And the Rabbis say: The impure one remains in its state of impurity and the pure one shall be eaten.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis applies only to a case where one loaf became ritually impure before the sprinkling of the blood of the lambs, as this is the act that renders the loaves permitted for consumption. Accordingly, they disagree whether the sprinkling is effective in permitting the remaining pure loaf for consumption. But in a case where one loaf was rendered impure after the sprinkling, meaning that both loaves were initially permitted for consumption, everyone agrees that the impure one remains in its state of impurity and the pure one shall be eaten.
  The Gemara asks: And in the case where the loaves become impure before the sprinkling of the blood, with regard to what principle do they disagree? Rav Pappa said: They disagree with regard to the frontplate of the High Priest, i.e., whether it effects acceptance only for the impurity of items sacrificed on the altar, or even for the impurity of items that would normally be consumed by the priests.
  
  Daf 15a
  
  The Rabbis hold that the frontplate effects acceptance for items that are normally consumed by the priests but have become ritually impure. Consequently, the sprinkling of the blood in this case is an entirely valid act that is capable of rendering the remaining pure loaf permitted for consumption. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the frontplate does not effect acceptance for items that are consumed by the priests and have become impure. Accordingly, the sprinkling of the blood is ineffective in rendering the remaining pure loaf permitted for consumption.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: Can this be the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis? But what about items that normally ascend upon the altar? Even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the frontplate effects acceptance for impure items that normally ascend the altar, and Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis nevertheless disagree with regard to the remaining item in a case of this kind.
  The Gemara provides the source for this claim. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one of the bowls of frankincense accompanying the shewbread, which are meant to be burned upon the altar, became impure, Rabbi Yehuda says that the rites of both of them may be performed in impurity, i.e., the priest may even render the second bowl impure and burn both of them together, as no communal offering is divided, and the mitzva to sacrifice communal offerings overrides the prohibition against rendering them impure. And the Rabbis say: The impure one remains in its state of impurity and the pure one remains in its state of purity. Evidently, their dispute does not depend on whether the frontplate effects acceptance.
  And furthermore, Rav Ashi said: Come and hear an additional proof that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis does not concern the frontplate, as we learn in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 80a) with regard to the consumption of the Paschal offering in a state of impurity, that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if one tribe is ritually impure and all the rest of the tribes are pure, all the tribes may perform the rite of the Paschal offering in a state of impurity, as no communal offerings are divided. Rav Ashi explains: But here, what relevance is there to the question of whether the frontplate effects acceptance? The frontplate effects acceptance for offerings that have become impure; but it does not render it permitted for one who is ritually impure to sacrifice an offering.
  And furthermore, doesn’t Ravina say: Come and hear a proof that the matter of the frontplate cannot be the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, as the mishna teaches: If one of the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i> or one of the two arrangements of shewbread became ritually impure, Rabbi Yehuda says: Both must be taken to the place of burning, as no communal offering is divided. And the Rabbis say: The impure one remains in its impurity and the pure one may be eaten.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: And if it is so, i.e., that the dispute between them concerns the frontplate, then Rabbi Yehuda should have said: They are both burned, because the frontplate does not effect acceptance for impure items that are consumed by the priests. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is a settled tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Yehuda that no communal offering is divided, and if one part of an offering becomes impure, the entire offering is disqualified.
  MISHNA: The thanks offering renders the accompanying loaves <i>piggul</i> but the loaves do not render the thanks offering <i>piggul</i>. How so? If one slaughtered the thanks offering, which may be consumed only during the day it is slaughtered and the night thereafter, with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and the accompanying loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i>. If he slaughtered it with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i> and the thanks offering is not <i>piggul</i>.
  Likewise, the lambs sacrificed with the two loaves meal offering on <i>Shavuot</i> render the accompanying loaves <i>piggul</i>, but the loaves do not render the lambs <i>piggul</i>. How so? If one slaughtered the lambs, which may be consumed only during the day they are slaughtered and the night thereafter, with the intent to partake of them the next day, the lambs and the accompanying loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i>. If he did so with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i> and the lambs are not <i>piggul</i>.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that a thanks offering renders its accompanying loaves <i>piggul</i>? If we say that it is due to that which Rav Kahana says, this is problematic. As Rav Kahana says: From where is it derived that the loaves of a thanks offering are themselves called a thanks offering? It is derived from that which is stated in the verse: “Then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanks offering loaves” (Leviticus 7:12). The juxtaposition of the words “thanks offering” and “loaves” indicates that the loaves are themselves called a thanks offering.
  The Gemara explains why the <i>halakha</i> of the mishna cannot be derived from Rav Kahana’s exposition. If so, then the opposite should be the <i>halakha</i> as well, that intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to the loaves should likewise render the thanks offering <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: This is not difficult, as the loaves are called a thanks offering, but a thanks offering is not called loaves.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which the mishna teaches: The lambs sacrificed with the two loaves meal offering on <i>Shavuot</i> render the accompanying loaves <i>piggul</i> but the loaves do not render the lambs <i>piggul</i>, where do we find that the two loaves are called lambs? Rather, is it not correct that this is the reason why the thanks offering renders the loaves <i>piggul</i> but not vice versa: The bread is brought on account of [<i>gelal</i>] the thanks offering, but the thanks offering is not brought on account of the bread, i.e., the thanks offering is the primary element of the sacrifice. Similarly, the two loaves of bread are brought on account of the lambs, and the lambs are not brought on account of the bread.
  The Gemara notes: And both of these <i>halakhot</i> are necessary, as, had the mishna taught us the <i>halakha</i> only in the case of a thanks offering, then one might say: It is only there, with regard to a thanks offering, that when one renders the loaves <i>piggul</i> the thanks offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, because they were not bound to one another by waving, i.e., the mitzva of waving the thanks offering may be fulfilled without the bread. But with regard to the lambs, in which the two items were bound to one another by waving, as the two loaves are waved together with the lambs, one might say that when he renders the bread <i>piggul</i>, the lambs should be rendered <i>piggul</i> as well. Therefore, it was necessary for the mishna to teach this <i>halakha</i> also with regard to the case of the lambs.
  § Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: If one slaughters the thanks offering with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from it and from its loaves the next day, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Elazar elaborates: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to rendering the thanks offering <i>piggul</i>, for the following reason: Now that in a case where his intent was to consume the entire olive-bulk from its loaves alone, the thanks offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, in accordance with the mishna’s ruling that <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to the loaves does not render the thanks offering <i>piggul</i>, then in a case where his intent is to consume half an olive-bulk from the thanks offering and half an olive-bulk from its loaves, in which case the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> only if the two intentions of less than a full measure are combined, is it necessary to teach that the thanks offering is not <i>piggul</i>?
  Rather, when I raise the dilemma, it is with regard to rendering the loaves <i>piggul</i>, which can be rendered <i>piggul</i> via intent concerning the loaves alone. In this case, does the intention of the priest with regard to the thanks offering combine with his intention concerning the loaves to render the loaves <i>piggul</i>, or not?
  Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: Even in this case, the loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i> and the thanks offering is not rendered <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara asks: But why should the loaves be rendered <i>piggul</i>? Let us say the following <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if the thanks offering, which in this case serves to render the loaves <i>piggul</i>, is itself not rendered <i>piggul</i>, then the loaves, which come to render the thanks offering <i>piggul</i>, but do not render it <i>piggul</i>, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the loaves does not combine with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the thanks offering to render the thanks offering <i>piggul</i>, is it not logical that the loaves themselves should not be rendered <i>piggul</i>?
  The Gemara asks: And do we say an <i>a fortiori</i> inference in this way? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There was an incident involving one
  
  Daf 15b
  
  who planted seeds in the vineyard of an another when the grapes on the vines were budding, and the incident came before the Sages and they deemed the seeds prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, but they deemed the vines permitted. The Gemara continues: But why did they deem the seeds prohibited? Let the Sages say through an analogous <i>a fortiori</i> inference that the seeds should be permitted: And if that which renders an item prohibited, i.e., the vine, which causes the seeds to be prohibited, is itself not prohibited, then with regard to the seeds, which come to render the vines prohibited but did not render the vines prohibited, is it not logical that they should not be rendered prohibited?
  The Gemara rejects the comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the <i>baraita</i>, only hemp and arum are prohibited by Torah law to be sown in a vineyard, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Kilayim</i> 2:5): If one’s field was sown with hemp and arum, he should not sow above them, as they produce a yield only once every three years. Other seeds are prohibited by rabbinic law. Therefore, with regard to this person who committed a transgression by planting the seeds in the vineyard of another, the Sages penalized him and deemed his seeds prohibited, but as for that person who did not commit a transgression, i.e., the owner of the vineyard, the Sages did not penalize him. But here, in the case of <i>piggul</i>, which is a biblical prohibition, let us say such an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  And there are those who teach the dilemma of Rabbi Elazar with regard to the lambs brought with the two loaves, and not with regard to a thanks offering. Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: In a case where one slaughters the lambs with the intent to consume an olive-bulk from them and from their loaves the next day, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rabbi Elazar elaborated: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to rendering the lambs <i>piggul</i> for the following reason: Now that in a case where his intent was to consume an entire olive-bulk from the loaves alone, the lambs are not rendered <i>piggul</i>, as the mishna teaches that <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to the loaves does not render the lambs <i>piggul</i>, then in a case where his intent is to consume half an olive-bulk from them and half an olive-bulk from their loaves, is it necessary to teach that the lambs are not <i>piggul</i>? Rather, when I raised the dilemma, it was with regard to rendering the loaves <i>piggul</i>. Does his intention with regard to the lambs combine with his intention with regard to the loaves to render the loaves <i>piggul</i> or not?
  Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: Even in this case, the loaves are rendered <i>piggul</i> and the lambs are not rendered <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara asks: But why should the loaves be rendered <i>piggul</i>? Let us say the following <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if that which renders an item <i>piggul</i>, i.e., the lambs, since it is maintained that intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the lambs assists to render the loaves <i>piggul</i>, is itself not rendered <i>piggul</i>, then with regard to the loaves, which come to render the lambs <i>piggul</i>, but do not render them <i>piggul</i>, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the loaves does not combine with the intent to consume half an olive-bulk from the lambs to render them <i>piggul</i>, is it not logical that the loaves themselves should not be rendered <i>piggul</i>?
  The Gemara asks: And do we say an <i>a fortiori</i> inference of this kind? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that there was an incident involving one who planted seeds in the vineyard of his friend when the grapes on the vines were budding, and the incident came before the Sages and they deemed the seeds prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard, but they deemed the vines permitted. The Gemara continues: But why did they deem the seeds prohibited? Let the Sages say through an analogous <i>a fortiori</i> inference that the seeds should be permitted: And if that which renders an item prohibited, i.e., the vine, which causes the seeds to be prohibited, is itself not prohibited, then with regard to the seeds, which come to render the vines prohibited but did not render the vines prohibited, is it not logical that they should not be rendered prohibited?
  The Gemara rejects the comparison: How can these cases be compared? There, in the <i>baraita</i>, only hemp and arum are prohibited by Torah law to be sown in a vineyard. Other seeds are prohibited by rabbinic law. Therefore, with regard to this person who committed a transgression by planting the seeds in the vineyard of another, the Sages penalized him and deemed his seeds prohibited, but as for this person who did not commit a transgression, i.e., the owner of the vineyard, the Sages did not penalize him. But here, in the case of <i>piggul</i>, which is a biblical prohibition, let us say such an <i>a fortiori</i> inference.
  The Gemara notes: The one who teaches that the dilemma of Rabbi Elazar was raised with regard to the thanks offering and the accompanying loaves, all the more so will hold that the dilemma may be raised with regard to the case of the lambs brought with the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>. But the one who teaches that Rabbi Elazar’s dilemma was raised with regard to the lambs and the two loaves, it is possible that he holds that the dilemma was raised only with regard to the lambs and the two loaves, as they were bound to one another by waving, since the priest waves the lambs and loaves together (see Leviticus 23:20). But with regard to a thanks offering and its loaves, as they were not bound to one another by waving, the dilemma was not raised, since it is obvious in this case that his intentions do not combine.
  Rabbi Abba the small taught that Rabbi Elazar raises the dilemma in this manner: Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma before Rav: If one slaughters one of the lambs brought on <i>Shavuot</i> with the two loaves intending to consume an olive-bulk from the other the next day, what is the <i>halakha</i>? When this individual thinks of the other, does he mean the other lamb, and if so, the lamb is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>? Or perhaps when this individual thinks of the other he means the other part of the offering, i.e., the two loaves, and if so his intention renders it <i>piggul</i>, as taught in the mishna.
  Rav said to Rabbi Elazar: You learned in a mishna (16a): If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is <i>piggul</i> and the other is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>. Rav concludes: Evidently, in this context the term: The other, means the other lamb. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the mishna is discussing a case where he clarifies and says: The other lamb, but the mishna is not referring to a case where he merely thought: The other.
  MISHNA: The animal offering renders the accompanying libations and meal offerings <i>piggul</i> from the moment that they were consecrated in the vessel, but not before; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The libations do not render the animal offering <i>piggul</i>. How so? In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and its libations are rendered <i>piggul</i>. But if one slaughters the offering with the intent to sacrifice its libations the next day, the libations are rendered <i>piggul</i>, while the offering is not <i>piggul</i>.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the libations of an animal offering, one is liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the offering permits them to be offered on the altar, and any item that becomes permitted for consumption or for sacrifice through a permitting factor can be rendered <i>piggul</i>, and one who partakes of such an item after its permitting factors were sacrificed is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his offering today and the accompanying libations from now until even ten days later. Evidently, then, the blood of the offering does render the libations permitted. Rabbi Meir said to them: I, too, spoke only about libations that come to be sacrificed together with the offering and were already sanctified in a service vessel for that purpose. The Rabbis said to him: But it is possible to switch the libations for use with another offering. Clearly, then, they are not considered an indispensable part of that offering.
  Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the libations are fixed to this particular offering at the time of its slaughter, and one may not use them with another offering. Accordingly, these libations are rendered <i>piggul</i> on account of intent during the slaughter of the offering, just like the loaves of a thanks offering, which are fixed to a particular thanks offering upon its slaughter and become <i>piggul</i> on account of intent during the slaughter of that particular thanks offering.
  In a similar vein, the Sages taught: With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil of the leper (see Leviticus 14:10–20), one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of <i>piggul</i> if the guilt offering that this oil accompanied became <i>piggul</i>, as the blood of the offering permits it to be placed on the right thumb and big toe of the leper. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: But a person may bring his guilt offering today and the accompanying <i>log</i> of oil from now until even ten days later. Evidently, the <i>log</i> of oil is not considered part of the guilt offering, and therefore it should not be rendered <i>piggul</i> on account of it.
  Rabbi Meir said to them: I, too, spoke only about a <i>log</i> of oil that comes with the guilt offering. The Rabbis said to him: But even in this case, the oil should not be considered part of the offering, as it is possible to switch the oil for use with another guilt offering. Rava said: Rabbi Meir holds that the <i>log</i> of oil is fixed to this particular guilt offering at the time of its slaughter and is therefore rendered <i>piggul</i> on account of it, just like the loaves of a thanks offering, as the slaughter of the thanks offering fixes the accompanying loaves to that particular offering.
  
  Daf 16a
  
  MISHNA: With regard to the burning of the handful of a meal offering and the frankincense, both of which render the meal offering permitted for consumption: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, or during the burning of the frankincense but not during the burning of the handful, i.e., he burned one of them with the intention to eat the remainder of the offering beyond its designated time, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one who eats it is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption. And the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> in this case unless he renders the offering <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor, i.e., the burning of both the handful and the frankincense.
  And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir in the case of a meal offering of a sinner and in the case of a meal offering of jealousy of a <i>sota</i> that if one had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the burning of the handful, that the meal offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, as here the handful is the sole permitting factor.
  If one slaughtered one of the two lambs sacrificed with the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> with the intent to partake of the two loaves the next day, or if one burned one of the bowls of frankincense with the intent to partake of two arrangements of shewbread the next day, Rabbi Meir says: The meal offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, and the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> unless he has intent of <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor.
  If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is <i>piggul</i> and the other is a fit offering. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit offerings, as one permitting factor does not render another permitting factor <i>piggul</i>.
  GEMARA: Rav says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to a case where one has intent of <i>piggul</i> by either the handful or the frankincense applies only, for instance, when he placed the handful upon the altar in silence, i.e., without specific intent, and thereafter placed the frankincense with intent to partake of the remainder the next day. In such a case, it is evident that his intent relates only to the frankincense.
  But if he placed the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day and then placed the frankincense in silence, all agree that the meal offering is <i>piggul</i>, as anyone who performs the rites in such a manner performs them in accordance with his initial intent. And Shmuel says: Even in such a case, there is still a dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir.
  Rava sat and stated this <i>halakha</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement, that intent of <i>piggul</i> concerning only the handful renders the meal offering <i>piggul</i>, said? It is stated in a case where one had such intent during the removal of the handful, or during the placement of the handful in a service vessel, or during the conveying of the vessel to the altar. Since these rites are not performed with the frankincense, during these stages the handful is the only relevant permitting factor.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: But once the priest comes to perform the burning of the handful, then if he placed the handful on the fire of the altar in silence and he placed the frankincense with intent of <i>piggul</i>, or if he placed the handful with intent and the frankincense in silence, Rabbi Meir says: It is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, and the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> unless he has intent of <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor.
  Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna explains his objection: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches a case where he placed the handful with intent and the frankincense in silence, and yet the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and they do not say that one performs the rite of the frankincense with one’s initial intent.
  Rava answered: Say that this is what the <i>baraita</i> means: If he placed the handful with intent, and he had already placed the frankincense in silence from the outset, then Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree. The Gemara rejects this statement: There are two possible refutations of this statement. One is that if Rava’s answer is accepted, then this case is identical to the first case of the <i>baraita</i>, which already taught that there is a dispute if the initial permitting factor was sacrificed in silence. And furthermore, isn’t it taught explicitly in another <i>baraita</i>: After placing the handful he burned the frankincense.
  Rabbi Ḥanina interpreted this <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rav: This <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case of two intentions, i.e., there were two priests, the first one of whom burned the handful with intent of <i>piggul</i>, and the second burned the frankincense in silence. Since the intent of one priest is entirely independent of the other, it cannot be said that the second priest burns the frankincense in accordance with the intent of the first priest.
  The Gemara continues: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Shmuel from a <i>baraita</i> that addresses <i>piggul</i> during the sprinkling of the blood. In what case is this statement, that the offering is rendered <i>piggul</i> even when he intends only while performing the first placement to eat it beyond its designated time, said? It is rendered <i>piggul</i> in the case of blood that is placed on the external altar, where one placement renders the offering permitted.
  But with regard to the blood placed inside, in the Holy of Holies, on the Curtain, and on the inner altar, for example, the forty-three presentations of the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, and the eleven presentations of the blood of the bull for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, and the eleven presentations of the blood of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, if the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, whether in the first set of presentations, whether in the second set, or whether in the third set, i.e., in any of the requisite sets of presentations, e.g., in the case of the Yom Kippur bull in the Holy of Holies, on the Curtain, and on the inner altar, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption. And the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> unless he had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i> during the performance of the entire permitting factor.
  The Gemara explains the proof: In any event, this <i>baraita</i> teaches: If the priest had an intention that can render the offering <i>piggul</i>, whether in the first set of presentations, whether in the second set, or whether in the third set; and Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in this case as well. Evidently, the Rabbis are not of the opinion that anyone who performs a rite performs it in accordance with his initial intent.
  And if you would say that here too, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case of two intentions, e.g., one High Priest performed the initial presentation and was thereafter disqualified from performing the other presentations, and a second priest replaced him and performed the remaining presentations, there is still a difficulty: This works out well according to the one who says that the verse: “With this shall Aaron come into the sacred place: With a young bull” (Leviticus 16:3), indicates that a High Priest may enter the Sanctuary even with the blood of a bull, i.e., he may continue the presentations with the blood of the offerings slaughtered by another High Priest. But according to the one who says that the verse indicates that a High Priest may enter “with a young bull,” but not with the blood of a bull, i.e., a replacement High Priest must slaughter another bull and begin the presentations again, what can be said? If so, it is impossible for these presentations to be performed by two priests.
  Rava said: According to Rav, here, in the <i>baraita</i>, we are dealing with a case where the High Priest had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the first set of presentations and was silent during the second set, and again had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the third set. In such a case, we say: If it enters your mind to say that anyone who performs a rite performs it in accordance with his initial intention, then why do I need the High Priest to repeat his intent of <i>piggul</i> during the third set? The fact that he repeats his intention during the third set indicates that he did not perform the second set in accordance with his initial intent. Accordingly, the Rabbis hold that the offering is not <i>piggul</i>, as he did not have intent of <i>piggul</i> during the presentation of the entire permitting factor.
  Rav Ashi objects to this explanation: Does the <i>baraita</i> teach that the High Priest was silent? Rather, Rav Ashi said: Here we are dealing with a case where he had explicit intent of <i>piggul</i> during the first, second, and third presentations, and was silent during the subsequent presentations. In such a case, we say: If it enters your mind to say that anyone who performs a rite performs it in accordance with his initial intention, why do I need the High Priest to repeat his intent of <i>piggul</i> during the second and third presentations?
  
  Daf 16b
  
  The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav Ashi’s interpretation: But the <i>baraita</i> teaches: Whether during the first presentation or whether during the second, which indicates that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir even with regard to a case where the priest had intent of <i>piggul</i> during any one of the presentations. The Gemara notes: Indeed, this poses a difficulty.
  § The Gemara returns to the discussion of the <i>baraita</i> itself. The Master said above: If the priest had intent of <i>piggul</i>, whether in the first set of presentations, whether in the second set, or whether in the third set, Rabbi Meir says: The offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, despite the fact that he performed the rest of the rite silently. The Gemara asks: Now consider, one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> unless all the permitting factors of the offering have been sacrificed, i.e., if the whole service is completed, including the presentation of the blood.
  The Gemara provides the source for this claim. As the Master said that the verse states with regard to <i>piggul</i>: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18), which indicates that the acceptance of a disqualified offering is like the acceptance of a valid offering, of which the verse states: “It shall be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27), and just as there is no acceptance of a valid offering unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed, so too there is no lack of acceptance of a disqualified offering, i.e., it is not rendered <i>piggul</i>, unless all its permitting factors have been sacrificed. That is to say, in the absence of one of its permitting factors it does not become <i>piggul</i>.
  Accordingly, the Gemara challenges: And with regard to this case, of the blood of the bull and goat brought on Yom Kippur, since he had intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to it when he was presenting the blood inside the Holy of Holies, he has disqualified it. If so, when he sprinkles the blood again later in the Sanctuary, on the Curtain and the inner altar, it is as though he is merely sprinkling water, and not the blood of the offering. Consequently, the permitting factors of the offering have not been sacrificed, and therefore the offering should not be rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  Rabba said: You find it possible in a case where there were four bulls and four goats, i.e., in a case where after the High Priest presented the blood inside the Holy of Holies with <i>piggul</i> intent, the remaining blood spilled. Consequently, he was required to bring another bull and goat in order to present their blood on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies. During that presentation he had intent of <i>piggul</i>, after which the remaining blood spilled, requiring him to bring another bull and goat in order to present their blood on the corners of the golden altar. He again had intent of <i>piggul</i> during that presentation, and then the blood spilled, which meant he had to bring yet another bull and goat in order to present their blood upon the golden altar itself.
  Rava said: You may even say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case of only one bull and one goat, and the remaining blood was in fact disqualified. Nevertheless, with regard to rendering an offering <i>piggul</i>, the presentations performed with the disqualified blood effect acceptance, as though the entire permitting factor was performed in its proper manner. In other words, even though the High Priest sprinkled the blood inside the Holy of Holies with improper intent, and thereby disqualified the offering, nevertheless, since he completed the service he is considered as having sacrificed all the permitting factors with regard to <i>piggul</i>.
  § The <i>baraita</i> mentioned that there are forty-three presentations of the blood of the bull and the goat sacrificed on Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught otherwise in a different <i>baraita</i>, which states that there are forty-seven presentations of that blood? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement, that there are forty-three presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the High Priest mixes the blood of the bull and the goat before placing it on the corners of the inner altar, rather than placing the blood of each one separately. And that statement, that there are forty-seven presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the High Priest does not mix the two types of blood before placing them on the corners, but sprinkles four times from the blood of the bull and another four times from the blood of the goat, and only afterward mixes the blood of the two animals for placement on the top of the altar.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But isn’t it taught in yet another <i>baraita</i> that there are forty-eight presentations? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement, that there are forty-eight presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the external altar is indispensable, and therefore this act is added to the total. That statement, that there are only forty-seven presentations, is in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that the pouring of the remainder of the blood is not indispensable.
  § The mishna teaches: If one had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of only part of the permitting factors, e.g., during the burning of the handful but not during the burning of the frankincense, the Rabbis rule that the offering is not <i>piggul</i>. Concerning this, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the conveying of the handful to the altar but not during the conveying of the frankincense, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> with regard to conveying the handful is like that of the removing of the handful. Just as intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to removing only the handful renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, as it is the sole permitting factor with which the rite of removal is performed, the same applies to conveying the handful. And Reish Lakish says: The conveying of the handful is like its burning. Just as intent of <i>piggul</i> is required during the burning of both the handful and the frankincense for the offering to be rendered <i>piggul</i>, as both of them are burned on the altar, the same <i>halakha</i> applies to conveying.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, one can understand the ruling of Reish Lakish, as the conveying of the handful is only part of the permitting factors, since there is also the conveying of the frankincense. But as for the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason that intent of <i>piggul</i> during the conveying of only the handful renders the offering <i>piggul</i>? After all, he has not had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the conveying of all of the permitting factors.
  Rava said: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if one performed any sacrificial rite that does not permit the offering, e.g., conveying, even if he performed it with only one of the permitting factors, such as with the handful and not with the frankincense, it is considered a significant rite with regard to rendering the offering <i>piggul</i> on account of it, by itself. It is not comparable to a case of intent of <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of only part of the permitting factors, as this rite of conveying does not render the offering permitted.
  Abaye said to Rava: But what about the slaughter of one of the lambs brought with the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>, which is a rite that does not permit the offering, as neither the sacrifice of its portions designated for burning upon the altar nor the consumption of the meat of the offering and the two loaves is permitted by this slaughter, and yet the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir in this case?
  As we learned in the mishna: If one slaughtered one of the two lambs with the intent to partake of two loaves the next day, or if one burned one of the bowls of frankincense with the intent to partake of two arrangements of shewbread the next day, Rabbi Meir says: The meal offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for its consumption, and the Rabbis say: There is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> unless he has intent of <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor. Although the slaughter of one of the lambs is a rite that does not render an offering permitted, nevertheless the Rabbis maintain that it is not considered a significant rite with regard to rendering the offering <i>piggul</i> by itself.
  Rava said to Abaye: Do you maintain that the two loaves of bread are already sanctified from when they are in the oven, and require only the sprinkling of the blood to render them permitted for consumption? In fact, the slaughter of the lambs sanctifies the loaves, and an act that comes to sanctify is considered like that which comes to permit. Since the slaughter of the two lambs sanctifies the loaves, the slaughter of each lamb is considered half a permitting factor; the slaughter of each lamb independently cannot render the loaves <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> that discusses the slaughter of the Paschal offering. The first <i>tanna</i> rules that if one slaughtering the Paschal offering intended for it to be consumed by both disqualified individuals, e.g., uncircumcised males, and fit individuals, e.g., circumcised males, the offering is not disqualified. <i>Aḥerim</i> say: In a case where one slaughtered a Paschal offering and severed one of the two organs of ritual slaughter with a disqualifying intention, and severed the other organ with a valid intention, then if one’s intent with regard to circumcised males preceded the intent with regard to the uncircumcised males, the offering is valid. But if the intent with regard to the uncircumcised males preceded the intent with regard to the circumcised males, it is disqualified.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi continues: And we maintain that the first <i>tanna</i> and <i>Aḥerim</i> disagree with regard to whether the sacrifice of half a permitting factor with disqualifying intent disqualifies the entire offering. In this case, although this slaughter does not sanctify anything, the severing of one of the organs is considered half of a permitting factor. Rava said to Rav Shimi bar Ashi: Do you maintain that the blood is already sanctified while inside the neck of the animal? In fact, the knife sanctifies the blood, and that which comes to sanctify is considered like that which comes to permit. Consequently, the slaughter of the animal is a permitting factor, and the severing of one of its organs is half a permitting factor.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement, that intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to only the handful renders the meal offering <i>piggul</i>, said? It is said in a case where one had such intent during the removal of the handful, or during the placement of the handful in a service vessel, or during the conveying.
  The Gemara clarifies the proof: What, is it not correct to say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the conveying of the handful for burning upon the altar, in which case it is teaching that intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to the handful during its conveying renders the offering <i>piggul</i>? The Gemara responds: No; the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the conveying of the handful before its placement into the service vessel that sanctifies it. Since the frankincense is not placed into a vessel, in this case the conveying of the handful alone is considered the performance of the entire rite.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why does the <i>baraita</i> state: During the placement of the handful in a vessel or during the conveying? This indicates that it is referring to an act of conveying that occurs after the placement. It should have stated: During the conveying or during the placement of the handful in a vessel. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one should emend the <i>baraita</i> and teach it in that order, i.e., with the conveying before the placement.
  The Gemara raises another objection from the next clause of the same <i>baraita</i>: Once he comes to perform the burning of the handful, there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> unless he has intent of <i>piggul</i> during the sacrifice of the frankincense as well. The Gemara asks: According to Reish Lakish, the <i>baraita</i> should have stated: Once he comes to perform the conveying and to perform the burning. Reish Lakish maintains that the conveying mentioned previously in the <i>baraita</i> occurs earlier, before its placement into a service vessel, which means that there is another act of conveying. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult; since this conveying is for the purpose of burning, it is called burning in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara further challenges: But the <i>baraita</i> also states: If he placed the handful on the altar in silence, and he placed the frankincense with intent of <i>piggul</i>. According to Reish Lakish, it should have also stated: If he carried the handful in silence, and the frankincense with intent of <i>piggul</i>, as according to Reish Lakish it is the act of conveying that he is performing at this stage. The Gemara responds: Indeed, this is a difficulty.
  § The Gemara continues its discussion of <i>piggul</i> intent that occurred during the sacrifice of part of a permitting factor. If one burned an amount the size of a sesame seed of the handful and frankincense with the intent to consume an amount the size of a sesame seed from the remainder the next day, and he repeated the same action with the accompanying intent until he burned the entire measure of the handful and frankincense, the <i>halakha</i> in this case is a matter of dispute between Rav Ḥisda, Rav Hamnuna, and Rav Sheshet. One says that the entire meal offering is <i>piggul</i>, and one says that the offering is disqualified but is not <i>piggul</i>, and one says that the offering remains fit.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the one who says that the meal offering is <i>piggul</i> holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> on account of <i>piggul</i> intent during the sacrifice of even part of its permitting factors. And the one who says that the offering is disqualified holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that such intent disqualifies an offering but does not render it <i>piggul</i>. And finally, the one who says that the offering is fit holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says (14a) that if one slaughters each of the two lambs brought on <i>Shavuot</i> with the two loaves, each time intending to consume half an olive-bulk from a different loaf the next day, the offering is fit, as the halves do not combine to render the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: From where is this conclusion drawn? Perhaps Rabbi Meir states that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> on account of <i>piggul</i> intent during the sacrifice of part of the permitting factors only there, where he had intent with regard to its entire measure. But here, where he did not have intent with regard to its entire measure, but instead had a series of intentions with regard to a measure equivalent to a sesame seed, it is possible that Rabbi Meir does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>.
  And furthermore, perhaps the Rabbis state that one does not render an offering <i>piggul</i> unless he has <i>piggul</i> intent during the sacrifice of the entire permitting factor only there, where he did not have intent concerning it during the entire permitting factor, but only during the burning of the handful. But here, where he had intent during the entire permitting factor, i.e., during the burning of both the handful and the frankincense, he has indeed rendered the offering <i>piggul</i>, despite the fact that each intention referred only to a small portion of the entire measure.
  And perhaps Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states that the offering is valid if one had intent of <i>piggul</i> with regard to half an olive-bulk from each loaf only there, where he did not subsequently complete his intention with regard to a full measure from the same sacrificial rite, as he had <i>piggul</i> intent with regard to half an olive-bulk during the slaughter of each lamb independently. But here, where he subsequently completed his intention with regard to a full measure from the same rite, perhaps he has indeed disqualified the offering.
  Rather, the one who says that an offering is <i>piggul</i> when one repeatedly burns an amount the size of a sesame seed from the handful and frankincense with the intent to consume an amount the size of a sesame seed from the remainder the next day, would claim that all of the <i>tanna’im</i> agree that it is <i>piggul</i>. Similarly, the one who says that it is disqualified would contend that all agree that it is disqualified, and the one who says that it is fit would maintain that all agree that it is fit.
  The Gemara elaborates: The one who says that all agree it is <i>piggul</i> maintains that the manner of its consumption is in such a manner, i.e., in small portions, and likewise the manner of its burning is also in such a manner. And the one who says that all agree it is disqualified holds that the manner of its consumption is not in such a manner. Accordingly, this type of <i>piggul</i> intent does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>. And the manner of its burning is also not in such a manner, and consequently it is like a meal offering whose handful was not burned properly, and is therefore disqualified. And finally, the one who says that all agree it is fit holds that the manner of its burning is in such a manner, and therefore the burning was performed properly, but the manner of its consumption is not in such a manner, which means that the <i>piggul</i> intent is inconsequential.
  § So say
  
  Daf 17a
  
  the sharp people in the city of Pumbedita: Burning renders burning <i>piggul</i>, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day renders the meal offering <i>piggul</i>. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even according to the Rabbis, who say that one does not render an offering <i>piggul</i> with intent occurring during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful alone with intent of <i>piggul</i>. The reason is that this statement applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, and the frankincense stands intact, i.e., he had no intent with regard to it. But here, when he had intent with regard to the frankincense while burning the handful, it is considered as though he had intent with regard to the entire permitting factor.
  Rava said: We learn this <i>halakha</i> in a mishna, as well (12a): This is the principle: In the case of anyone who removes the handful, or places the handful in the vessel, or who conveys the vessel with the handful to the altar, or who burns the handful on the altar, with the intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one burns it on the altar, outside its designated area, the meal offering is unfit but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. If his intent was to do so beyond its designated time, the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> on account of it.
  Rava explains: What, is it not correct to say that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to burning is similar to these, i.e., the removal of the handful, its placement in a vessel, and the conveying? Accordingly, just as with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day or to burn the frankincense the next day, the <i>halakha</i> is that the offering is <i>piggul</i>, so too with regard to burning, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: No, with regard to these, whether one’s intent was to partake of the remainder or to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is in fact <i>piggul</i>. But with regard to burning, if one’s intent was to partake of the remainder the next day, yes, it is <i>piggul</i>, but if one’s intent was to burn the frankincense the next day, it is not <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Menashya bar Gadda sat before Abaye, and while he was sitting he said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Burning does not render burning <i>piggul</i>, e.g., burning the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day does not render the offering <i>piggul</i>. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says in the mishna that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, e.g., when sacrificing the handful but not the frankincense with intent of <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Menashya bar Gadda explains that the reason is that this statement of Rabbi Meir applies only where he had intent during the sacrifice of the handful to consume the remainder the next day, as the handful is their permitting factor. But here, as the handful is not a permitting factor of the frankincense, the offering cannot be rendered <i>piggul</i> through it.
  Abaye said to Rav Menashya: Answer me, my Master, did Rav Ḥisda state this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav? Rav Menashya said to Abaye: Yes. The Gemara notes that it was also stated explicitly that Rav Ḥisda says that Rav says: Burning does not render burning <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Ya’akov bar Idi said in the name of Abaye: We learn in the mishna as well that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: If one slaughtered one of the lambs with the intent to partake of it the next day, that lamb is <i>piggul</i> and the other lamb is fit. If he slaughtered one lamb with the intent to partake of the other the next day, both lambs are fit. What is the reason? Is it not due to the fact that since the first lamb is not a permitting factor of the second lamb, it cannot render the second lamb <i>piggul</i>? The same reasoning should apply to the case of the handful and frankincense.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; there is a difference between these cases. It is only there, in the mishna, that one lamb cannot render the other <i>piggul</i>, as it was not fixed in one vessel with the other lamb, and therefore each animal stands independent of the other. But here, as the handful and frankincense were fixed in one vessel for the purpose of offering them, they are considered like one item and one of them therefore renders the other <i>piggul</i>.
  § Rav Hamnuna said: Rabbi Ḥanina helped me internalize this following matter, and to me it is equivalent to all the rest of my learning, as it contains a significant novelty: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, and burned the frankincense with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the meal offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Ḥanina teaching us? If he is teaching us that burning renders burning <i>piggul</i>, then let him simply say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense, the offering is <i>piggul</i>. If he is teaching us that one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, then let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is <i>piggul</i>. If he is coming to teach us both of these <i>halakhot</i>, let him say: If one burned the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense or to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Actually, Rabbi Ḥanina holds that burning does not render burning <i>piggul</i>, and therefore if one burned only the handful with the intent to burn the frankincense the next day, the offering is not <i>piggul</i>. And he also holds that one does not render an offering <i>piggul</i> through intent during the sacrifice of half of a permitting factor, and consequently if one burned only the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, the offering is not <i>piggul</i> either. But it is different here, as intent of <i>piggul</i> has extended over the entire meal offering, as he had intent of <i>piggul</i> during the burning of the handful with regard to the frankincense and during the burning of the frankincense with regard to the remainder.
  The Gemara relates that a <i>tanna</i> taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: If one burned the handful with the intent to partake of the remainder the next day, everyone agrees that the meal offering is <i>piggul</i>. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But don’t Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to this very case? Rather, say that the <i>baraita</i> states: Everyone agrees that the offering is disqualified, as although the Rabbis hold that such intent does not render an offering <i>piggul</i>, they concede that it disqualifies the offering.
  The Gemara challenges: But if one must emend the <i>baraita</i>, let him say that the <i>baraita</i> states: It is <i>piggul</i>, and that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara responds: It is reasonable that the <i>tanna</i> taught that everyone agrees, and that he accidentally exchanged the word <i>piggul</i> for disqualified. But he would not confuse the phrase: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, with the phrase: Everyone agrees.
  
  MISHNA: In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not consume it, i.e., the handful, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, i.e., the remainder of the meal offering, the meal offering is fit. Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, although it is not <i>piggul</i>, and consuming it is therefore not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>].
  In the case of one who removes a handful from the meal offering with the intent to consume, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does consume it, or to burn, beyond its designated time, an item whose typical manner is such that one does burn it on the altar, but his intent was to consume or burn improperly less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit. If his intent was both to consume half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, the meal offering is nevertheless fit, because eating and burning do not join together.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer that the intention to consume, beyond its designated time, an item that is not usually consumed renders the meal offering unfit? The verse states with regard to consuming an offering after its designated time: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all consumed [<i>he’akhol ye’akhel</i>]” (Leviticus 7:18), repeating for emphasis the term for consumption. He derives from the repeated term that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is the consumption of the offering by a person, e.g., by the priests or the owner of the offering, and the other one is the consumption of the sacrificial portions by their being burned on the altar. This serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of a person renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention with regard to the consumption of the altar renders the offering unfit.
  And furthermore, this serves to tell you that just as one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by the altar renders the offering unfit, so too, one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption by a person will be consumed on the altar renders the offering unfit, and one’s improper intention that a portion of the offering designated for consumption of the altar will be consumed on the following day by a person renders the offering unfit.
  What is the reason for this derivation? It is derived from the fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption.
  And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, maintain the following: This fact that the Merciful One expresses the burning of the offering using the language of consumption
  
  Daf 17b
  
  demonstrates that there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Consumption on the altar, and there is no difference if one expresses his intention using the language of: Burning on the altar. Therefore, if the priest removed the handful from the meal offering while expressing the intention that it should be burned on the altar on the following day, whether this intention was phrased as: Consumed on the altar, or: Burned on the altar, the offering is <i>piggul</i>.
  Alternatively, the doubled expression serves to teach that just as one renders the offering <i>piggul</i> only when one’s intention involves the consumption of an olive-bulk, as this is the minimal measure for an act to be considered eating, so too, one renders the offering <i>piggul</i> only when one’s intention involves the burning of an olive-bulk. But actually, the expression for consumption found in the verse indicates consuming it in the usual manner, and therefore an offering is rendered unfit only if one’s improper intention involved consuming an item that is usually consumed, or burning an item that is usually burned.
  And what would Rabbi Eliezer respond? He would say that if that were so, that the verse intends to teach only that <i>halakha</i>, let the Merciful One write either: If <i>he’akhol he’akhol</i>, or: If <i>ye’akhel ye’akhel</i>, repeating the same form of the word twice. What is the reason that the verse states “<i>he’akhol ye’akhel</i>,” employing both repetition and variation? Learn from this formulation two <i>halakhot</i>. One, as the Rabbis explain, is that the offering is rendered unfit whether one uses an expression of consumption or an expression of burning, provided that one’s intention is with regard to at least an olive-bulk. The second is that the offering is rendered unfit if one intends to burn on the altar an item that is usually consumed by a person, or to consume an item that is usually burned on the altar.
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi: But if the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is due to that derivation, and he understands that the verse equates the improper intent to consume an item that is usually consumed with the improper intent to consume an item that is usually burned, then let one also be liable to receive <i>karet</i> for consuming an offering brought with intention to consume, after its designated time, the part of the offering that is burned, or for intention to burn, after its designated time, an item that is usually consumed. Why does Rabbi Eliezer state only that the offering is rendered unfit? And if you would say that indeed, Rabbi Eliezer does hold that one who consumes such an offering is liable to receive <i>karet</i>, that is difficult: But aren’t you the one who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Rabbi Eliezer concedes that doing so is not punishable by <i>karet</i>?
  Rav Asi said to him: It is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> as to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. There is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by Torah law and one is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. It was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan cited the proof from the verse. And there is one who says that Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering to be unfit by rabbinic law, and it was in accordance with this opinion that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that according to Rabbi Eliezer there is no punishment of <i>karet</i> for this transgression.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who slaughters the offering with the intention to drink some of its blood, which is designated to be presented on the altar, on the next day, or to burn some of its meat, which is meant to be eaten, on the next day, or to eat some of its sacrificial portions, which are designated to be burned on the altar, on the next day, the offering is fit, as his intention is either to eat an item that is usually sacrificed on the altar, or to burn on the altar an item that is usually eaten. But Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit. If one slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, but not to present it or consume it, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit. Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit.
  The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that the offering is unfit even if he intends only to leave the blood for the next day, but not present it or consume it? If we say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, now consider: And if there, where the priest expresses his intention using the language of consumption, the Rabbis nevertheless deem the offering fit, despite the fact that if he had used this expression with regard to the portion burned on the altar, the offering would be <i>piggul</i>, is it not all the more so the case that here, when he intends only to leave the blood until the next day, the offering should be fit?
  Rather, it must be that Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And yet the <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Elazar said: Even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. If Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, then the explanation of Rabbi Elazar of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is identical to that of Rabbi Yehuda, and there does not appear to be any disagreement between the two.
  Rather, is it not so that the difference between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda is with regard to liability for <i>karet</i>? The difference lies in that Rabbi Yehuda holds that if one’s intention is to leave the blood for the next day, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the offering is only rendered unfit, whereas in those cases listed in the mishna, such as where one’s intention is to eat the sacrificial portions on the next day, he would be liable to receive <i>karet</i> as well. And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that according to Rabbi Eliezer, both in this case and in that case, the offering is unfit but there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> for it.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it may be that everyone agrees that according to Rabbi Eliezer in a case where one’s intention is to eat, after its designated time, an item that is usually burned, or to burn an item that is usually eaten, there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i>. And here there are three disputes with regard to the matter. The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, with regard to whether the offering is rendered unfit due to the intention to eat an item that is usually burned or to burn an item that is usually eaten. But with regard to leaving of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is fit.
  
  Daf 18a
  
  And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer disagree only in those cases, where one’s intention is to drink the blood or burn the meat of the offering. In those cases, the Rabbis deem the offering fit, since the improper intention involves making use of the item in an unusual manner. But if one’s intention is to leave of its blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is unfit. What is the reason for this? It is a rabbinic decree disqualifying the offering when some of its blood is left over until the next day due to the concern that a priest may intend to leave over all of its blood, and if one’s intention is to leave all of its blood until the next day, the offering is rendered unfit by Torah law.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede to me that if he left the blood until the next day without presenting it, that the offering is unfit? Therefore, if he intended to leave the blood until the next day, it is also unfit.
  And Rabbi Elazar comes to say that even in this case Rabbi Eliezer deems the offering unfit and the Rabbis deem it fit, as there is no distinction between a case where one intended to drink of the blood on the next day and where one intended to merely leave the blood until the next day.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda in fact hold that if one’s intention is to leave some of the blood until the next day, everyone agrees that the offering is unfit? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: When I went to Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua to clarify my knowledge, and some say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: When I went to clarify the knowledge of, i.e., study under, Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua, I found Yosef the Babylonian sitting before Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua. And every ruling that Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua taught was especially dear to him, until they began discussing one <i>halakha</i>, when Yosef the Babylonian said to him: My teacher, with regard to one who slaughters the offering with the intention to leave some of its blood for the next day, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said to him: The offering is fit. Yosef the Babylonian repeated this question that evening, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said to him that the offering is fit. He asked again the following morning, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said to him that the offering is fit. Once again, he asked this question at noon, and Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said to him that the offering is fit. When he asked the question a further time that late afternoon, Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said to him: I hold that the offering is fit, but Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit. Yosef the Babylonian’s face lit up [<i>tzahavu panav</i>] with joy.
  Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua said to him: Yosef, it seems to me that our, i.e., my, <i>halakhot</i> were not accurate until now, when I said that the offering is fit. Yosef the Babylonian said to him: My teacher, yes, I agree that the offering is fit, as you said. But my reluctance to accept your statement was due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda taught me that the offering is unfit, and I went around to all of Rabbi Yehuda’s disciples, seeking another disciple who had also heard this from him, but I could not find one, and thought that I must have been mistaken. Now that you have taught me that Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit, you have returned to me that which I had lost.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Upon hearing this, Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua’s eyes streamed with tears, and he said: Happy are you, Torah scholars, for whom matters of Torah are exceedingly dear. Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua recited this verse about Yosef the Babylonian: “O how I love Your Torah; it is my meditation all the day” (Psalms 119:97). He continued: Because Rabbi Yehuda is the son of Rabbi Elai, and Rabbi Elai is the student of Rabbi Eliezer, therefore Rabbi Yehuda taught you the mishna of Rabbi Eliezer that the offering is unfit.
  The Gemara explains its objection: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yehuda taught Yosef the Babylonian that all agree that the offering is unfit, what did Yosef the Babylonian mean when he said to Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua: You have returned to me that which I had lost? Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua had said to him only that whether the offering is rendered unfit is subject to a dispute, and Yosef the Babylonian would have been taught that all agree that it is unfit.
  Rather, what is it that Rabbi Yehuda taught Yosef the Babylonian? Did he teach him that the Rabbis deem the offering fit and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit? If that is so, what did Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua mean when he said that it was only because Rabbi Yehuda was the son of Rabbi Elai, who was the student of Rabbi Eliezer, that Rabbi Yehuda taught this dispute? According to Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua, we too teach this dispute. The fact that Rabbi Yehuda taught both opinions in a dispute does not require justification.
  Rather, it must be that actually, Rabbi Yehuda taught Yosef the Babylonian that all agree that the offering is unfit; and what did Yosef the Babylonian mean when he said: You have returned to me that which I had lost? He meant that Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua had in any event returned to him that there is some opinion in the world concerning the unfitness of the offering if one’s intention was to leave over the blood until the next day. His answer reassured Yosef the Babylonian that there is in fact such an opinion.
  MISHNA: If one did not pour the oil onto the meal offering, or did not mix the oil into the meal offering, or did not break the loaves into pieces, or did not add salt, or did not wave the <i>omer</i> meal offering or the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>, or did not bring the meal offering to the altar, or if it happened that the priest broke the meal offerings that require breaking into greater pieces than appropriate, or did not smear oil on the wafers requiring this (see Leviticus 2:4), in all these cases the meal offering is fit.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What does the mishna mean when it states that if one did not pour the oil onto the meal offering, the meal offering is fit? If we say that it means that he did not pour oil at all, that is difficult: Doesn’t the verse write with regard to the pouring of the oil that doing so is indispensable? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where a priest did not pour the oil onto the meal offering, but a non-priest did pour it. The Gemara notes: If so, that the first clause of the mishna is understood in this manner, then the next <i>halakha</i> in the mishna: If one did not mix the oil into the meal offering, should also be understood as referring to a case where a priest did not mix the oil into the meal offering, but a non-priest did mix it, so it is fit. This would indicate that if one did not mix the oil into the meal offering at all, the meal offering is unfit.
  
  Daf 18b
  
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (103b): One who volunteers to bring a meal offering of sixty-one tenths of an ephah of flour must bring a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah in one vessel and a meal offering of a tenth of an ephah in a second vessel, because sixty tenths of an ephah of flour can be properly mixed with a <i>log</i> of oil but sixty-one tenths cannot be properly mixed with the oil. And we discussed it and asked: Even if sixty-one tenths of an ephah do not mix with one <i>log</i> of oil, what of it? But didn’t we learn in the mishna here that although there is a mitzva to mix the oil into the meal offering, if one did not mix the oil into it, the meal offering is still fit?
  And Rabbi Zeira said the following explanation: For any measure of flour that is suitable for mixing with oil in a meal offering, the lack of mixing does not invalidate the meal offering. Even though there is a mitzva to mix the oil and the flour <i>ab initio</i>, the meal offering is fit for sacrifice even if the oil and the flour are not mixed. And for any measure of flour that is not suitable for mixing with oil in a meal offering, the lack of mixing invalidates the meal offering. This discussion demonstrates that when the mishna here says that the oil was not mixed into the meal offering, it means that it was not mixed at all. Therefore, the mishna’s statement that the meal offering is fit even if the oil was not poured should be understood as referring to a case where the oil was never poured, and not, as the Gemara inferred, as referring to a case where a non-priest poured it.
  The Gemara refutes this proof: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. When the mishna states: If one did not pour the oil onto the meal offering, it is referring to a case where a priest did not pour oil onto the meal offering but a non-priest did pour it. When it states: If one did not mix the oil into the meal offering, it means he did not mix the oil at all.
  § The mishna teaches: Or if it happened that the priest broke the meal offerings that require breaking into greater pieces [<i>pittim merubbot</i>] than appropriate, the meal offering is fit. The Gemara asks: Now that it has already been stated in the mishna that if one did not break the loaves into pieces at all the meal offering is fit, is it necessary to state that if one broke the meal offering into greater pieces than appropriate the meal offering is fit? The Gemara answers: What does the expression <i>pittin merubbot</i> mean? It means that he increased [<i>ribba</i>] the amount of the meal offering’s pieces by breaking the loaves into many pieces that were each smaller than an olive-bulk.
  And if you wish, say instead that the mishna is actually referring literally to large pieces [<i>pittim merubbot</i>], and it was necessary to teach this explicitly, lest you say that the meal offering is fit there, when the loaves are not broken, since they have the status of loaves, but here, when the loaves are broken into excessively large pieces and no longer have the status of loaves, as they have been broken up, but still do not have the status of pieces, as they are not the correct size, the offering is not fit. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach us this <i>halakha</i> explicitly.
  § Based on the Gemara’s earlier inference that when the mishna states that the meal offering is valid even if the priest did not pour the oil it is referring to a case where a non-priest did perform this action, the Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: Any priest who does not admit to the validity of the sacrificial rites has no portion in the gifts of the priesthood. As it is stated: “He among the sons of Aaron, that offers the blood of the peace offerings, and the fat, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33). This teaches that one who admits to the validity of the sacrificial rites and accepts responsibility for them has a portion in the priestly gifts, but one who does not admit to the validity of the sacrificial rites does not have a portion in the priestly gifts.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And I have derived only that a priest does not have a share in the priestly gifts if he does not admit to the validity of these rites of the presenting of the blood or the burning of the fats alone, which are the sacrificial rites of a slaughtered offering, as those rites are enumerated in the verse. From where is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> also includes one who does not admit to the validity of the fifteen sacrificial rites performed by the priests?
  The <i>baraita</i> clarifies: These are the rites of a meal offering, i.e., the pouring of oil, the mixing, the breaking, the salting, the waving, the bringing of the offering to the altar, the removal of the handful, and the burning of the handful on the altar. And it includes other rites as well: The pinching of the nape of the neck of a bird offering, and the receiving of the blood in a vessel, and the sprinkling of the blood, and the giving of water to a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [<i>sota</i>], and the ritual of breaking a heifer’s neck, and the purification of a leper, and lifting of the hands for the Priestly Benediction, whether inside or outside the Temple. From where is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> also includes one who does not admit to the validity of these rites?
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states: “Among the sons of Aaron,” teaching that with regard to any sacrificial rite that is entrusted to the sons of Aaron, any priest who does not admit to its validity does not have a portion in the priestly gifts. Since the pouring of the oil is included in the list of sacrificial rites entrusted to the priests, according to Rabbi Shimon the offering should not be fit if this service was performed by a non-priest.
  Rav Naḥman said: This is not difficult. There, in the <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Shimon is referring to the meal offering of priests, whereas here, in the mishna, the context is a meal offering of an Israelite. In the case of a meal offering of an Israelite, which is one that requires the removal of a handful to be burned on the altar, a verse teaches that from the stage of the removal of the handful onward, the rites performed with the meal offering are solely the mitzva of the members of the priesthood. Therefore, this verse also teaches that the pouring of the oil and the mixing, rites performed before the removal of the handful, are valid even if they are performed by a non-priest. By contrast, the meal offering of priests, which is one that does not require the removal of a handful, as the entire meal offering is burned on the altar, requires that from the outset the rites must be performed by a member of the priesthood; otherwise it is unfit.
  Rava said to him: After all, in the case of the meal offering of priests, from where was it included that there is an obligation to pour the oil? It is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of the meal offering of an Israelite, where this <i>halakha</i> is stated explicitly. Therefore, just as there the rite is valid when performed by a non-priest, so too here, the rite is also valid when performed by a non-priest.
  There are those who say the discussion took place as follows: Rav Naḥman said: This is not difficult. Here, when the mishna teaches that a meal offering is fit if the oil was poured by a non-priest, it is referring to meal offerings from which a handful is removed, whereas there, in the <i>baraita</i> that lists the pouring of the oil as one of the rites performed by the priests, it is referring to meal offerings from which a handful is not removed.
  Rava said to him: After all, in the case of meal offerings from which a handful is not removed, from where was it included that there is also an obligation to pour the oil? It is derived from meal offerings from which a handful is removed, where this <i>halakha</i> is stated explicitly. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to meal offerings from which a handful is not removed is like the <i>halakha</i> with regard to those from which a handful is removed; just as there, the rite is valid when performed by a non-priest, so too here, the rite is also valid when performed by a non-priest. Rather, since Rava deflected Rav Naḥman’s explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the <i>baraita</i>, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who hold that the offering is fit even if the oil was poured by a non-priest? The verse states: “And he shall pour oil upon it and put frankincense upon it. And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons, the priests; and he shall remove his handful” (Leviticus 2:1–2). From here it is derived that from the removal of the handful onward, the rites of the meal offering are solely the mitzva of the members of the priesthood. Therefore, this verse also teaches that the pouring of the oil and the mixing, rites performed before the removal of the handful, are valid even if they are performed by a non-priest.
  The Gemara asks: And what would Rabbi Shimon say in response? He would say that when it states: “Aaron’s sons,
  
  Daf 19a
  
  the priests,” the verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it and to the matter that succeeds it. Before mentioning the priests, the verse states the <i>halakha</i> of pouring the oil on the meal offering, and after mentioning the priests, it states the <i>halakha</i> of the removal of the handful. Therefore, a priest is required for each of these rites.
  The Gemara questions this explanation: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that a verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it and to the matter that succeeds it? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 4:34). The term “with his finger” is interpreted as referring to the term “and the priest shall take.” This teaches that the collection of the blood shall be performed only with the right hand, since the term “finger,” when stated in the context of the sacrificial rites, always is referring to the finger of the right hand. The term “with his finger” is also interpreted as referring to the term “and put it.” This teaches that the placing of the blood on the altar shall be performed only with the right hand.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon said: But is the term hand stated with regard to the collection of the blood? Since the term hand is not stated with regard to the collection of the blood, only with regard to the placement of the blood, then even if the priest collected the blood with his left hand, the offering is fit.
  And Abaye said: Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree with regard to whether a verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it and to the matter that succeeds it. The Rabbis hold that the term “with his finger” is referring to both to the term “and the priest shall take” that precedes it, and the term “and put it” that succeeds it. And Rabbi Shimon holds that a verse is interpreted as referring to the matter that succeeds it, but is not interpreted as referring to the matter that precedes it. In that case, Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that the pouring of oil must be performed by a priest can no longer be ascribed to the opinion that the phrase “Aaron’s sons, the priests” should be interpreted as referring to the description of pouring the oil that precedes it.
  Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: The verse states: “And he shall pour oil upon it and put frankincense upon it. And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons, the priests” (Leviticus 2:1–2). He therefore employs the principle that the conjunction “and,” represented by the letter <i>vav</i>, adds to the previous matter, demonstrating that the rite of the pouring of the oil is to be performed by Aaron’s sons, the priests.
  The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon hold that the letter <i>vav</i> adds to the previous matter? If that is so, then this would pose a problem with regard to that which is written: “And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord, and Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall sacrifice the blood and sprinkle the blood” (Leviticus 1:5). The Sages infer from here that from the stage of the sacrificing of the blood, which begins with the collection of the blood, and onward, it is the mitzva exclusively of members of the priesthood. By inference, this teaches that the slaughter of the offering, which is performed earlier, is valid when performed by a non-priest. If according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon the letter <i>vav</i> adds to the previous matter, if the slaughter of the offering is performed by a non-priest, it should also be unfit.
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the slaughter of an offering, it is different, as earlier the verse states: “And he shall place his hands upon the head of the burnt offering; and it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him. And he shall slaughter the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:4–5), associating the placing of the hands on the head of an offering, which is performed by the owner of the animal, with the slaughter of the offering. Therefore, just as the placing of the hands on the offering is performed by non-priests, so too, the slaughter of the offering is performed by non-priests.
  The Gemara asks: If there is a juxtaposition of the placing of the hands and the slaughter of the animals, why not also say that just as the placing of the hands on the offering is performed only by the owner of the animal, so too, the slaughter of the offering may be performed only by the owner of the animal? The Gemara answers: You cannot say that, due to an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of the sprinkling of the blood: And just as the sprinkling of the blood, which is the essential rite that enables the one who brings the offering to achieve atonement, does not require the owner to perform it, as the priests perform this rite on his behalf, with regard to the slaughter of the offering, which is not the essential rite that enables the one who brings the offering to achieve atonement, is it not all the more so clear that it does not need to be performed by the owner?
  And if you would say that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible, and the owner may not sprinkle the blood as he is not a priest, but he may still be obligated to slaughter the animal, as this rite may be performed by a non-priest, the Merciful One revealed in the Torah in the context of the Yom Kippur service with regard to the High Priest: “And he shall slaughter the bull of the sin offering which is for himself” (Leviticus 16:11). By inference, from the fact that the verse specifies that here the High Priest, who is the owner of the offering, must perform the slaughter, it is clear that usually the slaughter does not require the participation of the owner.
  § Apropos the mishna’s list of rites that are not indispensable for the meal offering, the Gemara explains that Rav says: With regard to any sacrificial rite where the term law and statute are stated, they are stated only to teach that the absence of the performance of that rite invalidates the offering. The Gemara comments: It enters our mind to say that the two terms are both required for this principle to be in effect, as it is written with regard to a red heifer: “This is the statute of the law” (Numbers 19:2).
  Before continuing its discussion of this principle, the Gemara presents a mnemonic for the questions that follow: <i>Nun</i>, <i>tav</i>, <i>tzadi</i>; <i>yod</i>, <i>kuf</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>lamed</i>. They represent: Nazirite; thanks offering [<i>toda</i>]; leper [<i>metzora</i>]; Yom Kippur; offerings [<i>korbanot</i>]; meal offering [<i>minḥa</i>]; shewbread [<i>leḥem hapanim</i>].
  The Gemara asks: But what of the offering of a nazirite, about which it is written only “law,” as the verse states: “This is the law of the nazirite who vows, and of his offering to the Lord for his naziriteship, beside that for which his means suffice; according to his vow which he vows, so he must do after the law of his naziriteship” (Numbers 6:21), and yet Rav says that the lack of waving of the offering by a nazirite invalidates the offering? The Gemara answers: There it is different, since it is written in the continuation of the verse: “So he must do,” and therefore it is considered as if the term statute were written with regard to it.
  The Gemara asks: But what of the thanks offering, about which it is written only “law,” as the verse states: “This is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:11), and we learn in a mishna (27a) that with regard to the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The Gemara answers: The thanks offering is different, since it is juxtaposed in the Torah to the offering of a nazirite; as it is written in a verse describing the thanks offering: “With the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Leviticus 7:13), instead of simply stating: The sacrifice of his thanks offering. And the Master says: The term “his peace offerings” serves to include the loaves of the peace offering of the nazirite, to teach that the same <i>halakhot</i> apply to both.
  The Gemara asks: But what of the offering of a leper, about which it is written only “law,” as the verse states: “This shall be the law of the leper” (Numbers 14:2), and we learn in a mishna (27a) that with regard to the four species that are used in the purification process of the leper, i.e., cedar, hyssop, scarlet wool, and birds, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The Gemara answers: There it is different, since it is written: “This shall be the law of the leper.” Due to the added emphasis of the term “shall be,” it is considered as if the term statute were written with regard to it.
  The Gemara asks: But what of Yom Kippur, about which it is written only “statute,” as the verse states: “And it shall be a statute for you forever” (Leviticus 16:29), and we learn in a mishna (27a) that with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the absence of each goat prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other? Rather, it must be that Rav meant that wherever either the term law or the term statute is employed, this signifies that the rite is an indispensable requirement.
  The Gemara questions this understanding of Rav’s statement: But what of the rest of the offerings, as the term “law” is written with regard to them, and yet failure to perform all of their different rites does not invalidate those offerings? The verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). The Gemara answers: When the term law appears, it is still necessary for the term statute to appear, in order to teach that failure to perform the rites invalidates the offering. But when the term statute appears, it is not necessary for the term law to appear as well. The term statute is sufficient.
  The Gemara questions this explanation: But doesn’t Rav say: Wherever the terms law and statute appear? Apparently, both are necessary for his principle to apply. The Gemara answers: This is what Rav is saying: Even in a context where the term law is written, if the term statute is written as well, then yes, failure to perform the rites invalidates the offering; but if the term statute does not accompany the term law, then failure to perform the rites does not invalidate the offering.
  The Gemara questions this explanation: But what of the meal offering, as the term “statute” is written with regard to it, as the verse states: “Every male among the children of Aaron may eat of it, as a statute forever” (Leviticus 6:11), and yet Rav says: With regard to every sacrificial rite of the law of the meal offering that the verse repeats, as the details of the meal offering are discussed in Leviticus, chapter 2, and again in Leviticus, chapter 6, it is repeated only to teach that the failure to perform that rite invalidates the offering? Doesn’t this demonstrate that where the verse repeated the command, then yes, failure to perform the rite invalidates the offering; but if the verse did not repeat it, then failure to perform the rite does not invalidate the offering, whether or not the term statute appears?
  The Gemara answers: There it is different, as when the term statute is written, it is written with regard to the eating of the meal offering rather than with regard to the sacrificial rites.
  The Gemara asks: But what of the shewbread, where when the term statute is written, it is written with regard to the eating of the shewbread, as the verse states: “And they shall eat it in a holy place, for it is most holy to him of the offerings of the Lord made by fire, a perpetual statute” (Leviticus 24:9), and we learn in the mishna (27a): With regard to the two arrangements of the shewbread, failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread, failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the arrangements of the shewbread and the bowls of frankincense, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.
  Rather, it must be that anywhere that the term statute is written with regard to eating, it is written with regard to the entire matter, i.e., all the <i>halakhot</i> of the offering, and teaches that failure to perform the rites invalidates the offering.
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the meal offering, it is different, and it is only the rites that are repeated that are indispensable, as the verse states: “Of its groats, and of its oil” (Leviticus 2:16), rather than simply: Of the groats and oil,
  
  Daf 19b
  
  teaching that the groats and oil are indispensable, and nothing else is indispensable, despite the fact that the term statute appears.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rav says: With regard to every sacrificial rite of the meal offering that the verse in the Torah repeats, it is repeated only to teach that the failure to perform that rite invalidates the offering. And Shmuel says: Only the groats and oil are indispensable, and nothing else is indispensable. The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, is it true that even though a rite of the meal offering is repeated in another verse he does not deem it indispensable?
  Rather, Shmuel must agree that wherever the verse repeats a rite it is certainly understood to be indispensable; and here, Rav and Shmuel disagree with regard to the expressions “his handful” (Leviticus 2:2) and “with his hand” (Leviticus 6:8). As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And he shall remove his handful,” and elsewhere it states: “And he shall take up from it with his hand.” The change in terminology between the two verses teaches that the priest should not use a utensil to measure an amount for the handful of a meal offering, but should use his hand.
  Rav holds that this <i>halakha</i> of using one’s hand and not a utensil is also repeated in another verse, as it is written in the context of Aaron’s service on the eighth day of the consecration of the Tabernacle: “And he presented the meal offering; and he filled his hand from it” (Leviticus 9:17), demonstrating that the handful is removed by hand and not with a utensil. And Shmuel holds that we do not derive the <i>halakha</i> for all generations from a temporary situation. Therefore, using one’s hand is not indispensable, as the general requirements of the rites of the meal offering cannot be derived from a verse referring to the meal offering that was sacrificed during the consecration of the Tabernacle.
  The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel not derive the <i>halakha</i> for all generations from a temporary situation? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 88a): Service vessels used for the liquids sanctify only the liquids placed in them, and service vessels used to measure dry substances sanctify only the dry substances that are placed in them. But service vessels used for the liquids do not sanctify the dry substances placed in them, and service vessels used to measure dry substances do not sanctify the liquids placed in them.
  And Shmuel says concerning this mishna: They taught that <i>halakha</i> only with regard to service vessels used to measure liquids, e.g., wine or oil. But cups, which are used for collecting the blood of offerings, sanctify dry substances placed in them as well, as it is written with regard to the offerings of the princes during the inauguration of the Tabernacle: “One silver cup of seventy shekels, after the shekel of the Sanctuary; both of them full of fine flour mingled with oil for a meal offering” (Numbers 7:13), indicating that the cups were also fashioned for use with flour, a dry substance. In this case, Shmuel does derive the general <i>halakha</i> from a temporary situation, in this case the offerings of the princes.
  The Gemara answers: There, with regard to the offering of the princes, it is different, as the verse is repeated twelve times, once with regard to each and every prince. Therefore, Shmuel derives a <i>halakha</i> for all generations from it. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the <i>halakha</i> for all generations cannot be derived from a temporary situation.
  The Gemara returns to discussing Rav’s statement that a rite is deemed indispensable if it is repeated in the verses. Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav: But what of bringing the meal offering to the corner of the altar, which is repeated in the verse, as it is stated: “And he shall bring it to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8); and it is not indispensable, as stated in the mishna (18a)? The Gemara elaborates: Where is it repeated? As it is written: “And this is the law of the meal offering: The sons of Aaron shall sacrifice it before the Lord, in front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7).
  The Gemara answers: That verse is not a repetition of the mitzva for the priest to bring the meal offering to the corner of the altar; rather, it comes only to establish the place for the meal offering and describe where it should be brought. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering. The sons of Aaron shall sacrifice it before the Lord, in front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7). From the phrase: “Before the Lord,” one might have thought that the meal offering must be brought on the western side of the altar, which faces the Sanctuary and is therefore “before the Lord.” Therefore, the verse states: “In front of the altar,” which is its southern side, where the priests ascend the ramp.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If the verse had merely stated: In front of the altar, one might have thought that the meal offering is brought only on the southern side of the altar, as just mentioned. Therefore, the verse states: “Before the Lord,” which indicates the western side. How can these texts be reconciled? The <i>baraita</i> answers: The priest brings it near on the southwest corner of the altar, opposite the edge of the corner of the altar, and that will suffice for him.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Eliezer says: One might have thought that the verse presents the priest with the option that he may bring it on the western side of the corner or on the southern side of the corner. You say the following principle: Any time you find two verses, one of which fulfills itself and fulfills the other, and one of which fulfills itself and negates the other, we set aside the verse that fulfills itself and negates the other, and we seize the verse that fulfills itself and fulfills the other.
  He explains: As, when you say to bring the meal offering “before the Lord,” which indicates that it shall be brought on the western side, you have nullified the other part of the verse, which states to bring it “in front of the altar,” which is on the southern side. But when you say to bring the meal offering “in front of the altar” and offer it on the southern side, you have also fulfilled the other part of the verse, which states to bring it “before the Lord.”
  The Gemara asks: But if one brought the meal offering on the southern side, where have you fulfilled: “Before the Lord”? Rav Ashi said: This <i>tanna</i>, i.e., Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the entire altar stood in the northern part of the Temple courtyard. The southern side of the altar was aligned with the midpoint of the Temple courtyard, opposite the Holy of Holies, directly before the Lord. In any event, it can be seen in this <i>baraita</i> that the purpose of the verse: “The sons of Aaron shall offer it before the Lord, in front of the altar” is to establish the precise location where the meal offering is brought, and it does not serve as a repetition.
  The Gemara cites another objection to Rav’s statement that a rite of the meal offering is deemed indispensable if it is repeated in the verses. Rav Huna objects to this: But what of the placement of the salt on the handful of the meal offering before it is burned, which is not repeated in the verse, and yet it is still indispensable in its sacrifice? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “It is an everlasting covenant of salt” (Numbers 18:19), teaching that there will be
  
  Daf 20a
  
  a covenant stated with regard to salt, ensuring that the offerings should always be salted; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: It is stated here: “It is an everlasting covenant of salt” (Numbers 18:19), and it is stated there, with regard to the reward given to Pinehas: “The covenant of an everlasting priesthood” (Numbers 25:13). This teaches that just as it is impossible for the offerings to be sacrificed without the involvement of the priesthood, so too, it is impossible for the offerings to be sacrificed without salt. The <i>baraita</i> demonstrates that the rite of salting is an indispensable requirement, despite the fact that the rite is not repeated in the verses.
  Rav Yosef said: Rav, who holds that the only sacrificial rites that are indispensable are the ones repeated in the verses, holds in accordance with the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna, who says: If one did not add salt, the meal offering is still fit. According to this <i>tanna</i>, adding salt is not indispensable. Abaye said to him: If that is so and you understand the mishna to be referring to a case where no salt is added at all, then you should also understand the mishna’s statement: If one did not pour the oil, as referring to a case where he did not pour oil at all. This cannot be, as the rite of pouring oil is repeated in the verses and is clearly indispensable. Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where a priest did not pour oil onto the meal offering, but a non-priest did pour the oil. Here too, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna means only that a priest did not add salt, but a non-priest did add salt. If no salt is added, even this <i>tanna</i> holds that the meal offering is unfit.
  Rav Yosef said to Abaye: But could it enter your mind that a non-priest would approach the altar to salt the handful of the meal offering? A non-priest may not enter the area near the altar. Since it is not conceivable that this would take place, it must be that when ruling that the meal offering is fit, the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna is referring to a case where the salt was never added.
  And if you wish, say instead that Rav holds that since with regard to the application of salt, the term “covenant” is written about it, it is considered as though it were repeated in another verse, as the term “covenant” teaches that it is an indispensable rite.
  With regard to the question that was raised to challenge the statement of Rav, the Gemara asks: And is it correct that the application of salt is not repeated in the verse? But isn’t it written: “And every meal offering of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13)? The Gemara answers: That verse does not function as a repetition, since it is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Had the verse stated only: And every offering you shall season with salt, I would derive that this applies to even the wood and the blood, which are also termed: An offering.
  To counter this, the verse states: “And every meal offering of yours,” to teach that just as the meal offering is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it, as the wood is required for the burning of the handful of the meal offering, so too any item that is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it requires the application of salt. By contrast, the wood and the blood do not require salting, as the wood itself requires no wood, and the blood is presented on the altar and does not require wood.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If that logic is employed, one could say: Just as the handful of the meal offering that is burned is unique in that it permits the remainder of the meal offering to be eaten by the priests, and it requires salting, so too, any item that is unique in that it permits other items requires the application of salt. Accordingly, I will include blood in the obligation to be salted, as its presentation permits the offering to be sacrificed and eaten. To counter this, the continuation of the verse states: “Neither shall you suffer the salt of the covenant of your God to be lacking from your meal offering,” demonstrating that it cannot be lacking from the meal offering, but not from your blood.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that the entire meal offering requires salting, including the remainder of the offering that is eaten by the priests. To counter this, the verse states: “And every meal offering [<i>korban</i>] of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13), teaching that the handful, which is burned as an offering [<i>korban</i>] on the altar, requires salting, but the entire meal offering [<i>minḥa</i>] does not require salting.
  And I have derived only that the handful of a meal offering requires salting. From where is it derived to include the frankincense, which is also burned on the altar, in the requirement to be salted? I include the frankincense due to the fact that it comes along with the handful in one vessel and is therefore included in the expression “offering.”
  From where is it derived to include in the requirement to be salted the frankincense that comes by itself as a separate offering? One may accept the obligation to bring an offering of frankincense to be burned on the altar. From where is it derived that this frankincense requires salting? Moreover, from where is it derived to include in the requirement to be salted the frankincense that comes in bowls together with the shewbread, and the incense?
  Moreover, from where is it derived in the requirement of salting in the case of the meal offerings from which a handful is not removed, i.e., the meal offering of priests, and the meal offering of the anointed priest that is brought every day by the High Priest, and the meal offering that accompanies the libations brought with burnt offerings and peace offerings? From where is it derived in the requirement of salting with regard to the sacrificial portions of the sin offering consumed on the altar, and the sacrificial portions of the guilt offering, and the sacrificial portions of the offerings of the most sacred order, and the sacrificial portions of the offerings of lesser sanctity, and the limbs of the burnt offering, and the bird burnt offering? From where is it derived that all these require salting?
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Therefore, the verse states: “You shall sacrifice salt with all your offerings” (Leviticus 2:13), demonstrating that everything burned on the altar requires salting. From this <i>baraita</i>, it is apparent that the mitzva to apply salt is necessary in order to teach about the circumstances where salt is added, and therefore it cannot be used as an instance where the mitzva is repeated in order to teach that the rite is indispensable.
  § The Gemara discusses the <i>baraita</i> cited above: The Master said: I have derived only that the handful of a meal offering requires salting. From where is it derived to include the frankincense, which is also burned on the altar, in the requirement to be salted? I include the frankincense, due to the fact that it comes along with the handful in one vessel and therefore is included in the expression “offering.” The Gemara asks: Why is this verse needed? But didn’t you state earlier that just as a meal offering is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it, as the wood is required for the burning of the handful of the meal offering, so too, anything that is unique in that other items come as a requirement requires the application of salt? Therefore, it is already known that the frankincense and all the other items require salting, since wood is required for their burning.
  The Gemara answers: When the <i>tanna</i> says: I have derived only that the handful of the meal offering requires salting, this is what he is saying: One might understand the verse “And every meal offering of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13) differently and say the following exposition: The term “offering” that appears here is a generalization, while “meal offering” is a detail. According to the hermeneutical principles, in the case of a generalization and a detail, there is nothing in the generalization other than what is in the detail. Therefore, in the case of a meal offering, yes, it requires salting, but anything else does not require salting. From where, then, is the <i>halakha</i> of salting in all other cases derived?
  Therefore, the verse then states: “You shall sacrifice salt with all your offerings” (Leviticus 2:13), and it then generalized again, so that the verse includes a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, in which case according to the hermeneutical principles you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the specified detail, i.e., the meal offering, is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it, so too, anything that is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it requires the application of salt. That is why the latter part of the verse is needed.
  The Gemara elaborates: What are the other items that come as a requirement for the meal offering? This is referring to the wood, as the wood is required for the burning of the handful of the meal offering. So too, the expression: Anything that is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it, is referring to anything that requires wood so that it may be burned on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: Why not say that the other items that come as a requirement for the meal offering is referring to the frankincense, which accompanies the meal offering, and therefore by means of the hermeneutical principle applying to a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, include blood, which is accompanied by libations? The Gemara answers: The libations are not considered to accompany the sprinkling of the blood; rather, they accompany the sacrificial portions that are burned on the altar. What is the reason? It is because the burning of the sacrificial parts and the pouring of the libations are the eating and drinking of the altar. The Gemara counters: On the contrary, the libations are considered to accompany the blood, since the atonement that is effected by the presentation of the blood is followed by the joy that is displayed in the libation of wine.
  Rather, one must say that since the frankincense comes together with the meal offering in one vessel, while the blood is not brought together with the libations in one vessel, the blood is not comparable to the meal offering. But when it is explained that the expression: The other items that come as a requirement for the meal offering, is referring to the wood, this means that just as the meal offering is rendered fit by means of the wood, so too, all offerings are rendered fit by means of the wood.
  The Gemara asks: But why not say: Just as the item mentioned in the detail, i.e., the handful of the meal offering, is clearly defined as an item for which other items come as a requirement, and in addition it renders other items permitted, so too, anything that is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it and renders other items permitted requires the application of salt. And what is included due to this derivation? Frankincense that comes in the bowls that are placed upon the shewbread, as it renders the bread permitted to be eaten. But every other item should not be included.
  The Gemara answers: It is apparent that all other items require only the factor of having other items come as a requirement for them to be considered similar to the meal offering. This is clear from the fact that in the case of blood, which is similar to the meal offering only in that it renders the offering permitted, it was necessary to teach that salt is not placed on blood, by means of the phrase: “Neither shall you suffer the salt of the covenant of your God to be lacking from your meal offering,” from which it is derived: But not from your blood. Had it been necessary for all items to have both aspects in common with the meal offering, there would be no need for a derivation to exclude blood. By inference, these other items derived from a meal offering are similar to it in one respect.
  § The Gemara continues its discussion of the <i>baraita</i>: The Master said above: The verse states: “Neither shall you suffer the salt of the covenant of your God to be lacking from your meal offering,” demonstrating that salt cannot be lacking from the meal offering, but not from your blood. The Gemara asks: But since the verse does not allude to blood explicitly, why not say that the verse teaches that salt cannot be lacking from your meal offering, but not from your limbs of the burnt offering that are sacrificed on the altar?
  The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the limbs of a burnt offering should be included in the requirement to have salt applied, since they share many characteristics with a meal offering that blood does not. The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the characteristics that they share: <i>Alef</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>nun</i>; <i>tet</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>alef</i>. These are a reference to others [<i>aḥerim</i>], fire [<i>ishim</i>], external [<i>baḥutz</i>], <i>notar</i>; ritual impurity [<i>tuma</i>], and misuse of consecrated property [<i>me’ila</i>].
  In the case of the limbs of a burnt offering, other items come as a requirement for it, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering. The burnt offering requires wood in order to be burned on the altar, which is not the case with regard to the blood. The limbs of the burnt offering are burned in the fire of the altar, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering, whereas the blood is presented on the corners of the altar. The burnt offering is sacrificed on the external altar, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering, as opposed to the blood, which is presented inside the Sanctuary in the cases of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur. It is prohibited to partake of its leftover [<i>notar</i>] parts, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering, which is not relevant to blood.
  It is prohibited to partake of a burnt offering while in a state of ritual impurity, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering, which is not relevant to blood. It is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering, which is not so with regard to the blood.
  
  Daf 20b
  
  The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, blood should be included in the requirement to have salt applied, since it renders the offering permitted to be sacrificed and eaten, as is so with regard to the handful, which renders the remainder of the meal offering permitted to be eaten. In addition, blood becomes invalid at sunset and can no longer be sprinkled on the altar, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the handful of a meal offering, whereas the limbs of the burnt offering may be sacrificed at any point during the night. The Gemara responds: These characteristics shared by the meal offering and the limbs of the burnt offering are more than those shared by the blood and the meal offering.
  § The Gemara continues discussing the <i>baraita</i>: The Master said above: Had the verse stated only: And every offering you shall season with salt, I would derive that this applies to even the wood and the blood, which are also termed: An offering. Therefore, the verse states “and every meal offering of yours” (Leviticus 2:13), to teach that just as the meal offering is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it, so too, anything that is unique in that other items come as a requirement for it requires the application of salt. Therefore, the wood and the blood do not require salting, as in their case no other item is needed. The Gemara asks: Whom did you hear who says that the wood is termed an offering? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. But according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, doesn’t the wood in fact require salting?
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And when one brings a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]” (Leviticus 2:1). The superfluous word <i>korban</i> teaches that one can voluntarily give wood as an offering for the altar. And how much wood must one bring if he does not specify an amount? Two logs. And the support for the fact that wood can be brought as a voluntary offering is from a verse, as the verse states: “And we cast lots for the wood offering” (Nehemiah 10:35). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This voluntary donation of wood is an offering like a meal offering, and therefore it requires salt and requires bringing to the corner of the altar, like a meal offering.
  And Rava says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, wood donated in this manner requires the removal of a handful, just as in the case of a meal offering, a portion of the wood must be removed and sacrificed separately. And Rav Pappa says that according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, since it is an offering for the altar, the wood that is brought as an offering needs to be placed on other wood to burn, like any other offering that is burned on wood on the altar. Apparently, this means that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the wood is termed an offering, also holds that it requires the application of salt, in contrast to the ruling in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara responds: Remove wood from the <i>baraita</i> here, as it is not excluded by the term “and every meal offering of yours.” The Gemara asks: But then, the phrase in the verse “and every meal offering of yours” is to exclude what? If it serves to exclude blood, this is derived from the continuation of the verse, which states: “From your meal offering,” as explained in the continuation of the <i>baraita</i>.
  
  Daf 21a
  
  The Gemara responds: Wood is removed from the <i>baraita</i>, and insert in its place wine libations, teaching that they do not require the addition of salt. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: But the wine libations and the blood, and the wood and the incense, do not require salt.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? If you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> concerning wood is difficult, as the <i>baraita</i> rules that wood does not require salt, whereas Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that wood does require salt. If you say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> concerning incense is difficult, as they taught in the <i>baraita</i> on 20a that any item for which another item is necessary requires salt, and this includes the incense, which is burned with wood.
  The Gemara suggests: The <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with this following <i>tanna</i>, who explains the verse that was interpreted in the <i>baraita</i> in a different manner. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: The verse states: “And every meal offering of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13). Just as the specified detail, i.e., the meal offering, is an item that is susceptible to ritual impurity, and is brought on the fire of the altar, and is sacrificed on the external altar, so too, any item that is susceptible to ritual impurity, and is brought on the fire of the altar, and is sacrificed on the external altar requires salting.
  Therefore, wood is excluded, as it is not susceptible to ritual impurity. Wine and blood are excluded, as they are not brought on the fire of the altar but rather are sprinkled on the corner of the altar. The incense is excluded, as it is sacrificed not on the external altar but rather on the inner altar.
  The Gemara asks: But how can it be that according to all opinions, the reason that blood does not require salting is that the verse excluded blood, indicating that if not for that, I would say that blood requires salt? Once one salts the blood, it exits the category of blood, as Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: With regard to blood that one cooked, one does not transgress the prohibition against consuming blood by drinking it, since it no longer has the status of blood that is fit to be presented on the altar. And Rav Yehuda says that Ze’eiri says: With regard to blood that one salted, one does not transgress a prohibition by drinking it, since salted blood has the status of cooked blood.
  And similarly, Rav Yehuda himself says: With regard to the limbs of a burnt offering that one first roasted and afterward brought them up to the altar, they do not constitute fulfillment of the requirement of the verse that an offering be “an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Exodus 29:25).
  The Gemara answers: It is still necessary to derive that blood does not require salt, lest you say that the priest should sprinkle any amount of salt, even a minute quantity, on the blood, merely for the fulfillment of the mitzva, as such an amount would not render the blood as cooked. To counter this, the verse teaches us that blood requires no application of salt.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: With regard to blood that one cooked, one does not transgress a prohibition by drinking it. Rava was sitting and saying this <i>halakha</i>. Abaye raised an objection to him from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Karetot</i> 2:19): If one curdled blood and consumed it, or in a case where one melted forbidden fat and swallowed it, even though he changed its form, he is liable. This demonstrates that even after its form is changed, the blood’s status remains unchanged.
  Rava responded: This is not difficult, as here, Ze’eiri’s statement relates to a case where he curdled the blood by means of the fire, whereas there, in the case of the <i>baraita</i>, he curdled the blood by means of the sun. Blood curdled by means of a fire cannot return to its former state, so one is not liable, whereas blood curdled by means of the sun can return to its former state, so one is liable.
  Abaye objected: But even when blood is curdled by means of the sun, let us say that since it was disqualified from being presented on the altar, it was disqualified, i.e., excluded, from the prohibition against consuming blood; as Rabbi Mani inquired of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to blood that was congealed and one ate it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rabbi Yoḥanan responded: He is not liable; since it was disqualified from being presented on the altar, it shall be disqualified from the prohibition against consuming blood. Rava was silent and had no answer.
  Abaye said to him: Perhaps here the <i>baraita</i> is certainly referring to the blood of the external sin offerings, which is sprinkled on the external altar in the Temple courtyard, whereas there Ze’eiri is referring to the blood of the inner sin offerings, which is sprinkled inside the Sanctuary.
  Rava said to him: You have reminded me of a matter, as Rabbi Ḥisda says: With regard to blood that became congealed, if it is blood of the external sin offerings and one ate it, he is liable, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25), and congealed blood is suitable for taking and placing, as one can take the congealed blood and place it upon the altar. By contrast, if it is blood of the inner sin offerings and one ate it, he is exempt, as the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood” (Leviticus 4:6), and this congealed blood is not suitable for dipping and sprinkling.
  And Rava himself says: Even if there was blood of the inner sin offerings and one ate it, he is liable, since blood corresponding to this blood is suitable to be placed on the altar in the case of the external sin offerings. Rav Pappa says: Therefore, according to the same reasoning, in the case of the blood of a donkey that became congealed and one ate it, he is liable, despite the fact that a donkey’s blood is not fit to be brought as an offering, since blood corresponding to this blood is suitable to be placed on the altar in the case of the external sin offerings.
  In the context of the <i>halakhot</i> of blood, Rav Giddel says that Ze’eiri says: Blood, whether moist or dry, interposes during ritual immersion. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Mikvaot</i> 6:9): With regard to blood, ink, honey, or milk on a person’s skin, when they are dry, they interpose during immersion; but when they are moist, they do not interpose. The Gemara explains: This is not difficult; this statement of Rav Giddel is referring to a case where the blood adheres to the skin, as it has begun to congeal and therefore interposes. That <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where the blood did not adhere and therefore does not interpose.
  § The Gemara returns to its interpretation of the verse: “And every meal offering of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13), and asks: For what purpose does the expression “you shall season” come? The Gemara answers: It is written for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Had the verse stated only: And every meal offering of yours shall be with salt, one might have thought that the <i>halakha</i> is <i>tevonehu</i>, a term that will be explained in the Gemara. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall season.” Conversely, had the verse stated only: “You shall season,” one might have thought that this obligation can be fulfilled by means of adding salt water. Therefore, the verse states “with salt.”
  The continuation of the verse: “And you shall not omit [<i>tashbit</i>] salt from your meal offering,” teaches that one should bring salt that never rests [<i>shovetet</i>], i.e., it is found continuously. And what type of salt is this? This is referring to salt of Sodom. And from where is it derived that if one did not find salt of Sodom that he should bring salt of <i>istrokanit</i>, which is quarried from rock? The verse states immediately afterward: “With all your offerings you shall sacrifice salt” (Leviticus 2:13), in order to emphasize that you should sacrifice any type of salt; you should sacrifice salt from any place, even from a location outside of Eretz Yisrael; you should sacrifice salt even on Shabbat; and you should sacrifice salt even in a state of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the meaning of the term <i>tevonehu</i>? Rabba bar Ulla said: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: One might have thought that one should mix into it [<i>yitabonenu</i>] large quantities of salt, just as one mixes straw [<i>teven</i>] into clay. Abaye said to him: If so, the <i>baraita</i> should have said: <i>Yitabonenu</i>, and not <i>tevonehu</i>. Rather, Abaye said: The <i>baraita</i> is saying that one might have thought one should form the addition of salt just as one builds a building [<i>binyan</i>], by adding layer upon layer. Rava said to him: If so, the <i>baraita</i> should have said: He should build it [<i>yivnenu</i>] and not <i>tevonehu</i>. Rather, Rava said: The <i>baraita</i> states: One might have thought <i>tevonehu</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is meant by <i>tevonehu</i>? Rav Ashi said: One might have thought that one should infuse the entire offering with the taste of salt, just as understanding [<i>bina</i>] infuses a person with wisdom. To counter this, the verse states: “You shall season.” How does he act? He brings the limb that is to be sacrificed on the altar and applies salt, and then turns it over and again applies salt, and brings it up to the altar.
  Abaye says: And one acts similarly before placing meat into a pot. If one wishes to cook meat and needs to salt it in order to extract its blood, it is sufficient to apply salt to both sides and let it sit until the blood drains. Then, after it is washed, the meat is ready to be cooked and eaten.
  
  Daf 21b
  
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 6:4): With regard to salt that is on the limb of an offering, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property, but in the case of salt that is on the ramp or that is on top of the altar, one who derives benefit from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. And Rav Mattana said: What is the verse from which it is derived that the salt found upon a sacrificial limb is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property? The verse states: “And you shall sacrifice them before the Lord, and the priests shall cast salt upon them, and they shall offer them up for a burnt offering to the Lord” (Ezekiel 43:24). In this verse, the limbs, together with the salt, are termed a burnt offering, and therefore the salt on the limb is also subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property.
  With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that salt is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property, we learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Shekalim</i> 7:7): The court instituted an ordinance about the salt and about the wood in the Temple to the effect that the priests may derive benefit from them. Shmuel says: They taught only that the priests may derive benefit from the salt for use on their offerings, but not for eating it.
  The Gemara comments: It enters our mind to say: What did Shmuel mean by the expression: For use on their offerings? He meant that the priests were permitted to salt their personal offerings. And when Shmuel states that for the purpose of eating it is not permitted for the priests to derive benefit from the salt, he is referring to adding salt when eating the meat of sacrificial animals, e.g., the portions of the sin offering and guilt offering that are given to the priests. The Gemara challenges this explanation: Now, if we give the priests salt in order to salt the hides of sacrificial animals that are given to the priests to keep, so that they can process them, is it reasonable to rule that we do not give them salt in order to add it when they eat the meat of sacrificial animals?
  The Gemara explains its challenge: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 6:2): You are found to be saying that the salt is placed in three locations in the Temple: In the Chamber of the Salt, and on the ramp, and on top of the altar. It is placed in the Chamber of the Salt, since the priests salted there the hides of sacrificial animals that are given to them. It is placed on the ramp, since the priests salted there the sacrificial limbs. It is placed on top of the altar, since the priests salted there the handful of the meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, the meal offering that accompanies the libations, and the bird burnt offering. Evidently, it was permitted for the priests to add salt to their portions of sacrificial meat.
  The Gemara suggests a different explanation of Shmuel’s statement: Rather, what did Shmuel mean by the expression: For use on their offerings? He meant that it is permitted for the priests to add salt when they eat the meat of their offerings, e.g., the portions of the guilt offerings and sin offerings that are given to the priests, as well as when they eat the remainder of the meal offering. And what is meant when Shmuel states that for the purpose of eating it is not permitted for the priests to derive benefit from the salt? He is referring to using the salt for the purpose of eating non-sacred food.
  The Gemara objects: Isn’t it obvious that the salt is not to be eaten with non-sacred food? What would non-sacred food be doing there in the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: Even though the Master says in the <i>baraita</i> that the verse stated with regard to the meal offering: “And that which is left of it Aaron and his sons shall eat” (Leviticus 6:9), teaching that the priests shall eat non-sacred food and <i>teruma</i> along with the remainder of the meal offering so that the remainder of the meal offering will be eaten in a manner that the priest will be satiated when he finishes eating it, demonstrating that non-sacred food may be brought to the Temple courtyard, even so we do not give them consecrated salt.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: So too, it is reasonable to explain that Shmuel’s explanation of the mishna in <i>Shekalim</i> is that the ordinance of the court permitted the priests to eat the salt with sacrificial foods. As, if it enters your mind to say: What did Shmuel mean by the expression: For use on their offerings? He meant that the priests were permitted to salt their personal offerings; then one must extrapolate from the mishna that the reason this is permitted is that the court stipulated that it should be, but had the court not stipulated this, it would not be permitted. That cannot be, as now that we give salt to Israelites to salt their offerings, will we not give salt to priests for the same purpose?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that we provide salt for the offerings of Israelites: One might have thought that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, must bring salt from his home, i.e., his own salt, to salt the handful that is burned on the altar, just as he brings frankincense from his home for his meal offering. And this would seem to be a logical inference: It is stated in the Torah that one shall bring a meal offering, and it is stated that one shall bring salt, as it is written: “And every meal offering of yours you shall season with salt” (Leviticus 2:13); and it is stated that one shall bring a meal offering, and it is stated that one shall bring frankincense. Therefore, just as one brings frankincense from his home, as it is written: “And put frankincense on it. And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests” (Leviticus 2:1–2), so too, one must bring salt from his home.
  Or perhaps, go this way: It is stated in the Torah that one shall bring a meal offering and that one shall bring salt, and it is stated that one shall bring a meal offering and that one shall bring wood, as the meal offering cannot be burned on the altar without the wood. Therefore, just as the wood comes from communal supplies, so too, the salt shall come from communal supplies.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Let us see to which salt is more similar, i.e., which comparison seems more reasonable: We derive the <i>halakha</i> of salt, which is a matter that applies to all offerings, from the <i>halakha</i> of wood, which is also a matter that applies to all offerings. And do not let the <i>halakha</i> of frankincense prove otherwise, as it does not apply to all offerings, only to the meal offerings.
  Or perhaps, go this way: We derive the <i>halakha</i> of salt, which is a matter that accompanies the meal offering in one vessel, from the <i>halakha</i> of frankincense, which is also a matter that accompanies the meal offering in one vessel. And do not let the <i>halakha</i> of wood prove otherwise, as it does not accompany the meal offering in one vessel.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states: “It is an everlasting covenant of salt” (Numbers 18:19), and there, with regard to the shewbread, it states: “It is from the children of Israel, an everlasting covenant” (Leviticus 24:8); Therefore, just as the phrase written there: “From the children of Israel, an everlasting covenant,” means that it is brought from communal supplies, as the shewbread is a communal offering, so too here, the verse that speaks of the everlasting covenant of salt means that the salt is brought from communal supplies. Evidently, salt is provided for offerings of Israelites, and should likewise be provided for the offerings of priests. Accordingly, there would have been no need for the court to permit the priests to salt their offerings, and it must be that the ordinance of the court permitted the priests to use salt when eating sacrificial foods.
  Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, says: The initial understanding of Shmuel’s interpretation of the mishna is correct, i.e., that the ordinance of the court permitted the priests to salt their offerings; and the ruling of the mishna is necessary only according to the opinion of ben Bukhri, who holds that priests are not obligated to contribute a yearly half-shekel to purchase the communal supplies.
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 1:4): Rabbi Yehuda said that ben Bukhri testified in Yavne: Any priest who contributes his shekel is not considered a sinner, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so. Rabbi Yehuda added that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to ben Bukhri: That is not the case; rather, any priest who does not contribute his shekel is considered a sinner, as they are obligated in this mitzva like all other Jews. But the priests who do not contribute the shekel interpret this following verse to their own advantage in order to excuse themselves from the mitzva.
  The verse states: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be wholly made to smoke; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16). Those priests claim as follows: Since the <i>omer</i> offering and the two loaves, i.e., the public offering of two loaves from the new wheat, brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and the shewbread placed on the Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, which are all meal offerings, are ours, then if we contribute shekels we will have partial ownership of these communal offerings, as they are purchased with the shekels. How, then, can they be eaten? They would then be regarded as priests’ meal offerings, which must be wholly burned.
  The Gemara clarifies: But according to the opinion of ben Bukhri, why is a priest who contributes a half-shekel not considered a sinner? Since he is not obligated to bring it <i>ab initio</i>, when he brings the half-shekel he is also a sinner, since he is causing the bringing of a non-sacred item into the Temple courtyard. He is not contributing the half-shekel as part of the communal offering, as he is exempt from this obligation. Therefore, his donation is the donation of an individual, and a communal offering cannot be brought on behalf of an individual. His donation should disqualify all offerings brought from the communal funds. The Gemara answers: The priest brings and transfers the half-shekel to the community, so it is considered part of the communal funds.
  The Gemara states the relevance of the opinion of ben Bukhri to the statement of Shmuel: According to the opinion of ben Bukhri it might enter your mind to say that
  
  Daf 22a
  
  when the Merciful One granted the Jewish people the right to use the salt when eating their offerings, he granted this to Israelites, who have an obligation to donate their half-shekels to the chamber, as this fund supplies the salt that is applied to the offerings. With regard to the priests, who do not have an obligation to donate their half-shekels to the chamber, the Merciful One did not grant them the right to make use of the salt. To counter this, the mishna in tractate <i>Shekalim</i> teaches us that the court granted to the priests the right to use the salt when eating their offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to the wood, concerning which it is obvious to the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> that it is brought from communal supplies, from where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must bring wood from his home on which the burnt offering will be sacrificed, just as he brings libations from his home along with a burnt offering (see Numbers, chapter 15). Therefore, the verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “On the wood that is on the fire which is upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:12); the Torah juxtaposes the wood to the altar, teaching that just as the altar was built from communal funds, so too, the wood and fire are brought from communal supplies. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says: Just as the altar was not used by an ordinary person, as it was built for the purpose of serving as an altar for God, so too, the wood and fire should not have been used previously by an ordinary person, so one does not bring the wood from his home. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two opinions? The Gemara answers: The difference between the two is whether there is a requirement that the wood be new, i.e., that it had never been used. According to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon, the wood is fit provided that it comes from communal supplies, even if it is not new wood, whereas according to Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua it must be new wood.
  The Gemara asks: And is it in fact the <i>halakha</i> that old, i.e., previously used, wood is not fit to be burned on the altar? But isn’t it written: “And Araunah said to David: Let my lord the king take and offer up what seems good to him; behold the oxen for the burnt offering, and the threshing instruments [<i>morigim</i>] and the equipment of the oxen for the wood” (II Samuel 24:22)? Despite the fact that the threshing instruments and equipment of the oxen have been used previously, apparently they are fit to be used when offering a burnt offering. The Gemara answers: Here too, the verse is speaking of new instruments and equipment that had not been previously used.
  Tangentially, the Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term <i>morigim</i> mentioned in this verse? Ulla said: It is a <i>turbal</i> bed. This was not a known expression in Babylonia, so the Gemara asks: What is a <i>turbal</i> bed? Rav Yehuda said: It is referring to a serrated [<i>dekurkesa</i>] board that the threshers use for threshing, which is dragged over the grain by an animal in order to separate the kernels from the stalks. Rav Yosef said: What is the verse from which the meaning of <i>morigim</i> is derived? It is the verse that states: “Behold, I have made you a new threshing sledge [<i>morag</i>] having sharp teeth; you shall thresh the mountains” (Isaiah 41:15).
  MISHNA: If a handful of one meal offering, which is to be burned on the altar, was intermingled with a handful of another meal offering, or with the meal offering of priests, or with the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, or with the meal offering of libations accompanying burnt offerings and peace offerings, all of which are burned in their entirety on the altar, it is fit for sacrifice, and the mixture is burned on the altar.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: If the handful was intermingled with the meal offering of the anointed priest, or with the meal offering of libations, the mixture is unfit because with regard to this, the handful from the standard meal offering, its mixture is thick, one <i>log</i> of oil mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour, and with regard to that, the meal offering of the anointed priest and the meal offering of libations, its mixture is loose, three <i>log</i> of oil mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour. And the mixtures, which are not identical, absorb from each other, increasing the amount of oil in the handful and decreasing the amount of oil in the meal offering of the anointed priest or the meal offering of libations, thereby invalidating both.
  GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 77b): In the case of blood of an offering fit for sacrifice that was mixed with water, if the mixture has the appearance of blood, it is fit for presenting on the altar, even though the majority of the mixture is water. If the blood was mixed with red wine, one views the wine as though it were water. If that amount of water would leave the mixture with the appearance of blood, it is fit for presentation. Likewise, if the blood was mixed with the blood of a non-sacred domesticated animal or the blood of a non-sacred undomesticated animal, one considers the blood as though it were water. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, the priest presents the blood of the mixture on the altar regardless of the ratio of sacred to non-sacred blood.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And both the the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Yehuda derived their opinions from one verse. With regard to the sacrificial rites performed by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, the Torah teaches that after sprinkling of the blood of the bull and of the goat separately between the staves of the Ark and on the Curtain, the blood of the two animals is mixed together and presented on the golden altar inside the Sanctuary. The verse states: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat and put it on the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 16:18). It is a known matter that the blood of the bull is more than the blood of a goat. Why then is the blood of the goat not nullified? Rabbi Yoḥanan explains: The Rabbis, i.e, the first <i>tanna</i>, hold:
  
  Daf 22b
  
  From here it is learned that with regard to a mixture of items that ascend to the altar, e.g., the blood of the bull and the goat, the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: From here it is learned that any substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified.
  The Gemara examines Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation of the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda. With regard to the first part of his explanation, that the Rabbis hold: From here it is learned that with regard to a mixture of items that ascend to the altar the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another, the Gemara suggests: But perhaps the blood of the goat is not nullified when mixed with the blood of the bull due to the fact that it is a substance in contact with the same type of substance.
  The Gemara answers: Had the verse taught us this <i>halakha</i> by using an example of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, and not taught us a case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar, the verse would be interpreted as you said. But now that the verse taught us this <i>halakha</i> through a case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar, it is understood that the reason it is not nullified is due to the fact that it is part of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar, not because the substances are of the same type.
  The Gemara suggests: But perhaps it is not nullified until both criteria are met, and unless the mixture is both a substance in contact with the same type of substance and a mixture of items that ascend to the altar, one nullifies the other. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.
  With regard to the second part of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s explanation: And Rabbi Yehuda holds: From here it is learned that any substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified, the Gemara suggests: But perhaps the blood of the goat is not nullified when mixed with the blood of the bull due to the fact that it is a mixture of items that ascend to the altar.
  The Gemara answers: Had the verse taught us this <i>halakha</i> by using an example of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar where the substance is in contact with a different type of substance, the verse would be interpreted as you say. But now that the verse taught us this <i>halakha</i> in a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, it is understood that the reason it is not nullified is due to the fact that it is a substance in contact with the same type of substance.
  The Gemara suggests: But perhaps it is not nullified until both criteria are met, and unless the mixture is both a substance in contact with the same type of substance and a mixture of items that ascend to the altar, one nullifies the other. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.
  The Gemara raises another objection to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan: We learned in the mishna here that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the handful was intermingled with the meal offering of priests, with the meal offering of the anointed priest, or with the meal offering of libations, the mixture is unfit because with regard to this, the handful from the standard meal offering, its mixture is thick, and with regard to that, the meal offering of the anointed priest and the meal offering of libations, its mixture is loose. And the mixtures, which are not identical, absorb from each other, invalidating both. The Gemara asks: But when the mixtures absorb from each other, what of it? This is a case of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, and therefore neither oil nullifies the other and both should be sacrificed on the altar.
  
  Daf 23a
  
  Rava said: Rabbi Yehuda holds that in the case of any mixture that consists of a substance in contact with the same type of substance as well as another type of substance, the <i>halakha</i> is to disregard the same substance, considering it as though it were not there, and in the event that the different type of substance is more than the first substance, the different substance nullifies the first substance. In the case of the mishna here, the handful of the meal offering is mixed with other types of meal offerings that comprise greater quantities of oil. The oil of the handful is disregarded, and the flour of the handful, which is present in greater quantities than the oil of the other meal offering that is absorbed in it, nullifies this oil of the other meal offering. That oil is now considered to be one with the oil of the handful, and therefore the oil of the handful is increased, and the handful is unfit.
  § It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to the <i>halakha</i> where one added oil to the handful that is removed from the meal offering of a sinner, which does not include oil. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is unfit, and Reish Lakish says: The <i>halakha</i> of the meal offering itself is to wipe it, <i>ab initio</i>, in the remainder of the <i>log</i> of oil that remains in the vessels that were used previously for other meal offerings, and the priest then brings it up and burns it on the altar. This is done so that the meal offering will not be completely dry.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the meal offering of a sinner: “He shall put no oil upon it, neither shall he put any frankincense on it” (Leviticus 5:11)? How, then, can any oil be added? The Gemara answers: That verse teaches that one should not designate oil for it as one designates oil for the other meal offerings, but the meal offering of a sinner is not rendered unfit by the addition of a small amount of oil.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 4:4): In the case of a dry meal offering that was intermingled with a meal offering that was mixed with oil, the priest shall sacrifice it. Rabbi Yehuda says: The priest shall not sacrifice it. What, is the <i>baraita</i> not referring to a handful of the meal offering of a sinner that was intermingled with a handful of a voluntary meal offering, demonstrating that the oil invalidates the handful of a meal offering of a sinner?
  Reish Lakish responded: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the meal offering that accompanies the libations brought with the offerings of bulls or rams, for which two <i>log</i> of oil is mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour, that became intermingled with the meal offering that accompanies the libations brought with the offering of sheep, for which three <i>log</i> of oil is mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour, as the former is considered dry relative to the latter.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan objected: But another <i>baraita</i> teaches this explicitly as a separate <i>halakha</i>: With regard to the meal offering that accompanies the offerings of bulls or rams that became intermingled with the meal offering that accompanies the offering of sheep, and a dry meal offering that was intermingled with a meal offering that was mixed with oil, the meal offering shall be sacrificed. Rabbi Yehuda says: It shall not be sacrificed. Therefore, the latter case must be referring to other meal offerings. Reish Lakish responded: The latter clause is explaining the first clause of the <i>baraita</i>, teaching that the reason one may not offer a meal offering that accompanies bulls and rams that was intermingled with the meal offering that accompanies sheep is because one may not offer a dry offering that was intermingled with one that is mixed with oil.
  § Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a handful whose oil the priest squeezed onto the wood and only afterward he placed the handful on the wood to be burned, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Are substances that are contiguous to items that ascend upon the altar considered to be as part of the items that ascend upon the altar, in which case the oil that was absorbed into the wood and is contiguous to the handful of the meal offering is considered part of the handful? Or are they not considered to be as part of the items that ascend upon the altar, and the oil is not viewed as part of the handful, and therefore the handful is missing oil? Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Is this not the same disagreement as the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish?
  As it was stated: With regard to one who offers up, outside the Temple courtyard, a limb that contains less than an olive-bulk of meat, but the offering’s bone completes the measure of the offering to an olive-bulk, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable, and Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one is liable because he holds that substances that are contiguous to items that ascend upon the altar are considered to be as part of the items that ascend upon the altar. Therefore, the measure of the bone is added to the measure of the meat, resulting in a total measure of an olive-bulk, which is the measure that determines liability. And Reish Lakish says that one is exempt because he holds that substances that are contiguous to items that ascend upon the altar are not considered to be as part of the items that ascend upon the altar. Since less than an olive-bulk of meat was sacrificed, he is not liable.
  Rav Ashi responded: Rava’s dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rava’s dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish. The circumstances in their dispute are not the same as in Rava’s dilemma, so their opinions in that case may not be applicable to this one. Rav Ashi elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, even though he holds that the bone is considered to be part of the meat to complete the measure of an olive-bulk. Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan says his opinion only there, in the case of a bone, because the bone is the same type as the meat, i.e., it is from the same animal, and is therefore considered to be part of the sacrificial meat. But in this case of oil, which is not the same type as the handful, it is not considered to be a part of the handful even if it is contiguous to it.
  Or perhaps, even according to Reish Lakish, he says his ruling only in the case of the bone, teaching that it does not add to the quantity of the meat. The reason is that the bone is able to be separated from the meat, and if it separated, there is no mitzva to return it to the fire. Therefore, he views it as distinct from the meat. But in this case of oil, which is not able to be separated from the handful of the meal offering, as it must be burned together with the handful, he will not hold that the oil is viewed as separate from the handful. Or perhaps there is no difference between the case of the bone and the case of the oil, and Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish would have the same opinions, respectively, in both cases. The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: In the case of two meal offerings from which a handful was not removed and that were intermingled with each other, if the priest can remove a handful from this meal offering by itself and from that meal offering by itself, they are fit meal offerings, but if not, they are unfit, as the handful of each meal offering must be taken from its original source.
  In the case of a handful that was intermingled with a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, the priest should not burn the mixture on the altar. And if he burned it, this meal offering from which the handful was taken satisfies the obligation of the owner and that meal offering from which the handful was not taken does not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  If, after it was removed, its handful was intermingled with its remainder or with the remainder of another meal offering, the priest should not burn the mixture on the altar, but if he burned it, it satisfies the obligation of the owner.
  GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda says: The meat of an unslaughtered animal carcass is nullified in a larger quantity of meat of a slaughtered animal. Although meat from a carcass generally imparts impurity, if one touches the mixture of the two meats he does not become ritually impure, as the carcass meat is considered a different type of substance from the slaughtered animal and is therefore nullified. This is not considered a mixture that comprises a substance in contact with the same type of substance, because meat from a slaughtered animal cannot attain the status of a carcass, and it is therefore viewed as a different type of substance.
  By contrast, if meat of a slaughtered animal became intermingled with a larger quantity of meat of animal carcass, the meat of the slaughtered animal is not nullified in the larger quantity of meat of the carcass, as it is possible for a carcass to attain the status of a slaughtered animal with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity, as it can lose its ability to transmit ritual impurity. This is because when a carcass rots to the extent that it is no longer edible, it loses its impure status. The <i>halakha</i> that the carcass meat has the ability to attain the ritually pure status of meat of a slaughtered animal renders the two meats as the same type of substance, and the mixture retains its status of intermingled carcass meat and meat of a slaughtered animal.
  And Rabbi Ḥanina says the opposite: Any small quantity of an item that can possibly become like the item that is present in larger quantities is not nullified when the two are intermingled, but any small quantity of an item that cannot possibly become like the item that is present in larger quantities is nullified in the larger quantity. Accordingly, a small quantity of meat of a slaughtered animal is nullified in a larger quantity of unslaughtered animal carcass meat, since the meat of a slaughtered animal cannot become like the animal carcass meat; but a small quantity of animal carcass meat is not nullified in a larger quantity of meat of a slaughtered animal, since it can lose its impure status and become akin to the meat of a slaughtered animal.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion do Rabbi Ḥanina and Rav Ḥisda state their opinions? If their opinions are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, this is difficult: Didn’t the Rabbis say that it is in the case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar that the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another, but otherwise, a substance in contact with the same type of substance is nullified? Therefore, in any case where meat of a slaughtered animal becomes intermingled with unslaughtered animal carcass meat, the smaller quantity is nullified in the larger quantity.
  If their opinions are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the blood of an offering is not nullified in the blood of a non-sacred animal because the two are the same type of substance, this is difficult: But
  
  Daf 23b
  
  Rabbi Yehuda follows the appearance of the item in determining whether the two items are the same type of substance. And therefore, this meat of a slaughtered animal and that meat of an unslaughtered carcass are viewed as a substance in contact with the same type of substance, since their appearances are identical, and neither one nullifies the other.
  Rather, it must be explained that the opinions of Rav Ḥisda and Rabbi Ḥanina are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya. As Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: The meat of an unslaughtered animal carcass and the meat of a slaughtered animal are nullified one in the other. Rav Ḥisda understands this statement to mean that the meat of an animal carcass is nullified in a larger quantity of meat of a slaughtered animal, whereas Rabbi Ḥanina understands the statement to be referring to meat of a slaughtered animal that is nullified in a larger quantity of meat of an unslaughtered animal carcass.
  The Gemara asks: But then in accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Ḥiyya himself state his opinion? If his opinion is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that is difficult: Didn’t the Rabbis say that it is in the case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar that the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another, but in general, a substance in contact with the same type of substance is nullified? And if his statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that is difficult: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda any substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that when Rabbi Yehuda says that a substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified, this statement applies only where it is possible for one to become like the other. But where it is not possible for one to become like the other, it is nullified, since the two are not considered the same substance.
  And Rav Ḥisda and Rabbi Ḥanina disagree with regard to this, as Rav Ḥisda holds that we follow the potentially nullifying substance, i.e., the larger quantity, and if it can attain the status of the smaller quantity, the two are considered identical substances and the smaller quantity is not nullified in the larger quantity. Therefore, if meat of a slaughtered animal became mingled with a larger quantity of meat of an animal carcass, the meat of the slaughtered animal is not nullified, as it is possible for a carcass to attain the status of a slaughtered animal with regard to ritual impurity, as when a carcass rots it loses its impure status.
  And Rabbi Ḥanina holds that we follow the potentially nullified substance, i.e., the smaller quantity, and only if it can attain the status of the larger quantity, e.g., in the case of meat of an animal carcass that was intermingled with a larger quantity of meat of a slaughtered animal, the two are considered identical substances and the smaller quantity is not nullified in the larger quantity.
  The Gemara offers support for the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina: We learned in the mishna: In the case of two meal offerings from which a handful was not removed and which were intermingled with each other, if the priest can remove a handful from this meal offering by itself and from that meal offering by itself, they are fit meal offerings, but if not, they are unfit, as the handful of each meal offering must be taken from its original source. And here, once he removes a handful from one, the rest of it becomes the remainder, which is designated for the priests, and this remainder does not nullify the other meal offering from which a handful has not yet been removed.
  In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that is difficult: Didn’t the Rabbis say that it is in the case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar that the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another, but in general, a substance in contact with the same type of substance is nullified? Therefore, the remainder of the first meal offering should nullify the second meal offering, as both consist of the same substances, flour and oil. Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the meal offering is not nullified in the remainder, as any substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified.
  Now, granted, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, who is the one who says that we follow the potentially nullified substance, in the mishna’s case the potentially nullified substance can become like the potentially nullifying substance, as when the priest removes the handful from the other meal offering, the intermingled offering will become a remainder that is designated for the priests, just like that of the first meal offering. Therefore, the intermingled second meal offering is not nullified in the remainder of the first meal offering.
  But according to Rav Ḥisda, who is the one who says that we follow the potentially nullifying substance, can the remainder of the first meal offering become a meal offering from which a handful has not yet been removed? Therefore, shall we say that according to Rav Ḥisda the mishna here is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion?
  The Gemara answers: There, the <i>halakha</i> of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira says that the verse teaches that nullification does not take place when remainders are intermingled with handfuls. He explains: The term burning is stated with regard to the handful removed from the meal offering (see Leviticus 2:2), as it is a mitzva to burn the handful, and the term burning is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering (see Leviticus 2:11), as it is taught that it is prohibited to burn the remainder.
  This verbal analogy teaches that just as in the case of the burning that is stated with regard to the handful, if two handfuls are mixed together one handful does not nullify the other and all agree that the two are burned on the altar, so too, in the case of the burning that is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering, if the remainder of one offering is intermingled with another meal offering, the remainder of the meal offering does not nullify the handful or the remainder of the second meal offering.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna here: In the case of the handful that was intermingled with a meal offering from which a handful was not removed, the priest should not burn the mixture on the altar, and if he burned it, this meal offering from which the handful was taken satisfied the obligation of the owner and that meal offering from which the handful was not taken did not satisfy the obligation of the owner. This is a case of a mixture of identical substances, and the meal offering from which a handful has not yet been removed does not nullify the handful, since after the fact if the mixture is burned on the altar the meal offering from which the handful was taken satisfies the obligation of the owner.
  The Gemara explains the proof: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that is difficult: Didn’t the Rabbis say that it is in the case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar that the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another, but in general, a substance in contact with the same type of substance is nullified? Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that any substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified.
  Now, granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who is the one who says that we follow the potentially nullifying substance, in the mishna’s case the potentially nullifying substance can become like the potentially nullified substance, since every bit of the meal offering is fit to have the handful taken from it. And therefore, the mixture is considered to be one that consists of a substance in contact with the same type of substance, and a substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified.
  But according to Rabbi Ḥanina, who is the one who says that we follow the potentially nullified substance, can the handful become a meal offering from which a handful has not yet been removed, so that it would not be nullified by the other meal offering whose handful was not removed? Therefore, shall we say that according to Rabbi Ḥanina the mishna here is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya with regard to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion? The Gemara answers: This mishna as well is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, who explains that a Torah edict establishes that the remainder does not nullify the handful, and similarly, a meal offering from which a handful has not yet been removed does not nullify the handful.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna here: If, after it was removed, its handful was intermingled with the remainder of another meal offering, the priest should not burn the mixture on the altar, and if he burned it, it satisfied the obligation of the owner. The Gemara explains the proof: But here, the potentially nullifying substance cannot become like the potentially nullified substance, since the remainder of the meal offering cannot become like the handful, and the potentially nullified substance cannot become like the potentially nullifying substance, since the handful cannot become like the remainder of the meal offering; and the mishna teaches that the remainder of the meal offering does not nullify the handful.
  In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that is difficult: Didn’t the Rabbis say that it is in the case of a mixture of items that ascend to the altar that the different components of the mixture do not nullify one another, but in general, a substance in contact with the same type of substance is nullified? Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that any substance in contact with the same type of substance is not nullified. But in contrast to Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement, Rabbi Yehuda apparently holds that nullification takes place even if the nullifying substance cannot become like the nullified substance, or if the nullified substance cannot become like the nullifying substance.
  Rabbi Zeira said: This mishna is an independent <i>halakha</i>, based on a Torah edict that nullification does not take place when remainders are intermingled with handfuls. He explains: The term burning is stated with regard to the handful removed from the meal offering, and the term burning is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering. This verbal analogy teaches that just as in the case of the burning that is stated with regard to the handful, if two handfuls are mixed together one handful does not nullify the other and all agree that the two are burned on the altar, so too, in the case of the burning that is stated with regard to the remainder of the meal offering, if the remainder of one offering is intermingled with another meal offering, the remainder of the meal offering does not nullify the handful or the remainder of the second meal offering.
  The Gemara suggests another proof from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Pesaḥim</i> 2:21): Come and hear: In the case of <i>matza</i> that one seasoned with black cumin, with sesame, or with any type of spice, it is fit to be eaten during the festival of Passover, as it is considered <i>matza</i>, but it is called seasoned <i>matza</i>. The Gemara comments: It enters your mind to explain that this is a case where there were more spices than the <i>matza</i> itself.
  Now, granted, according to Rabbi Ḥanina, who is the one who says that we follow the potentially nullified substance, in the case here the potentially nullified substance can become like the potentially nullifying substance, as when the <i>matza</i> becomes moldy it becomes like the spices, as it is no longer fit to be used to fulfill the mitzva of eating <i>matza</i>. Therefore, the smaller quantity of <i>matza</i> is not nullified by the larger quantity of spices. But according to Rav Ḥisda, who is the one who says that we follow the potentially nullifying substance, can the spices become like the <i>matza</i>?
  The Gemara answers: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where there are not more spices than <i>matza</i>, but rather the majority is <i>matza</i> and therefore the <i>matza</i> is not nullified. The Gemara notes: According to this explanation, the language of the <i>baraita</i> is also precise, as it teaches: It is considered <i>matza</i>, but it is called seasoned <i>matza</i>. Learn from here that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to an entity whose majority is <i>matza</i>, and therefore it is referred to as seasoned <i>matza</i>.
  § The Gemara relates: When Rav Kahana ascended from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he found the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who were sitting and saying the following: In the case of a tenth of an ephah of a meal offering that one divided
  
  Daf 24a
  
  and placed in a receptacle such that the flour of the measure was in two places, not in contact with each other, and one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed touched one of the portions of the meal offering, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does he disqualify only the part of the meal offering that he touched, or the other part as well? When we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥagiga</i> 20b) that a vessel joins all the food that is in it with regard to sacrificial food, meaning that if some of the contents become impure all the contents become impure as well, does this matter apply only where the contents are touching each other, but where the contents are not touching each other the ritual impurity is not imparted to the other contents? Or perhaps there is no difference.
  Rav Kahana said to the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya: Did we learn in the mishna that a vessel connects the contents within it? We learned that a vessel joins the contents within it, indicating that it does so in any case, whether or not the contents are in contact with one another. The sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked Rav Kahana: If one inserted another one half-tenth of an ephah between them, and one who was ritually impure who immersed that day touched it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Are the first two half-tenths rendered impure?
  Rav Kahana said to them: Only when an item requires a vessel in order for it to be sanctified, e.g., in the case of the two half-tenths of an ephah of a meal offering, does the vessel join it together. In the case of an item that does not require a vessel, such as this half-tenth that was placed between them, the vessel does not join it.
  The sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: If one who immersed that day inserted his finger between the two half-tenths of the ephah that were placed in the receptacle, without touching either one, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Are the two half-tenths rendered impure? Rav Kahana said to them in response: The only item you have that transmits impurity through its airspace is an earthenware vessel alone.
  Rav Kahana himself then asked the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya: If two half-tenths of an ephah of a meal offering are placed in one vessel but are not in contact with each other, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Can one remove a handful from this half-tenth of an ephah on behalf of that half-tenth of an ephah? Is the joining of the contents of the vessel effective by Torah law or by rabbinic law? If it is effective by Torah law, then the removal of the handful is valid. If it is effective by rabbinic law, then the removal of the handful was not performed correctly, since it was not taken from the entire tenth of an ephah of the meal offering.
  They said to Rav Kahana: We did not hear the <i>halakha</i> with regard to this case explicitly, but we heard the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case similar to this. As we learned in the mishna: In the case of two meal offerings from which a handful was not removed and which were intermingled with each other, if the priest can remove a handful from this meal offering by itself and from that meal offering by itself, they are fit meal offerings, but if not, they are unfit, as the handful of each meal offering must be taken from its original source.
  They explain: In any event, the mishna teaches that in a case when he can remove a handful from each meal offering, the meal offerings are fit. Why is this considered a valid removal of the handful? But this part of the meal offering that is intermingled with the other meal offering does not touch the part of the meal offering from which the handful is removed. Evidently, the vessel joins the different parts of the meal offering together, and one can remove the handful from any part of its contents, even if they are not touching.
  Rava said: This cannot be inferred from the mishna, as perhaps the ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a case where the clumps of the meal offering are divided like the teeth of a comb, so that although the handful is removed from a clump of the meal offering that is separate from the clump that is intermingled with the other offering, all parts of the meal offering are still in contact with one another. It may still be that in the case presented by Rav Kahana, where the parts are truly separated from one another, it is possible that one cannot remove the handful from one part on behalf of the other.
  The Gemara asks: Since this question was not resolved, what halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rava said: Come and hear a proof, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And he shall take up from it his handful” (Leviticus 6:8), meaning that he shall take the handful from the meal offering that is connected. This teaches that one shall not bring a tenth of an ephah divided in two vessels and remove the handful from one on behalf of the other. It can therefore be inferred that in the case of one vessel that is similar to two vessels, as the entirety of the meal offering is brought in one vessel although the different parts are not touching, one may remove the handful from one part on behalf of the other part.
  Abaye said to Rava: Perhaps one could say: What are the circumstances when the <i>baraita</i> states that one may not bring a tenth of an ephah in two vessels? The circumstances are, for example, if one hollowed out the area of a smaller <i>kefiza</i> measure within the area of a larger <i>kav</i> measure, so that within the one receptacle there were two cavities divided by a partition that did not reach the top of the receptacle. In this case, even though the two are intermingled on top, above the partition, since the partition of the <i>kefiza</i> measure divides them below, they are still separated and not joined together.
  Abaye continues: What are the circumstances of one vessel that is similar to two vessels, with regard to which you inferred that one may remove the handful from one part on behalf of the other part? The circumstances are, for example, a hen trough that is filled with water or fodder, and even though a partition divides the top of the trough, the contents are touching below. But here, in the case of two half-tenths of an ephah that are placed in a receptacle that are not touching each other at all, you should raise the dilemma as to whether the handful may be removed from one part on behalf of the other.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: In a scenario where a vessel joins the two half-tenths of an ephah that are inside the vessel but not touching, and there is a connection by means of water between one of the half-tenths of the ephah inside the vessel and another half-tenth of an ephah that is outside the vessel, and one who immersed that day touched the other half-tenth of an ephah that is inside the vessel, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does he also disqualify the half-tenth of an ephah that is outside the vessel?
  When we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥagiga</i> 20b) that a vessel joins all the food that is in it with regard to sacrificial food, meaning that if some of the contents become impure all the contents become impure as well, does this matter apply only to that which is inside the vessel, but not to that which is outside of it, despite the fact that the outer item is connected to an item inside the vessel? Or perhaps, since the half-tenth of an ephah found outside the vessel is connected to an impure item, it is connected and becomes impure.
  Rabbi Yirmeya continues: And if you say that since the half-tenth of an ephah found outside the vessel is connected to an impure item, it is connected and becomes impure, one can raise another dilemma. In a case where there is a connection by means of water between a half-tenth of an ephah outside a vessel and another half-tenth of an ephah that is inside the vessel, and the vessel joins two half-tenths of an ephah that are inside the vessel, and one who immersed that day touched the half-tenth of an ephah that is outside the vessel, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  When we learned in a mishna that a vessel joins all the food that is in it with regard to sacrificial food, meaning that if some of the contents become impure all the contents become impure as well, does this matter apply only in a case where the one who immersed that day touched that which is inside the vessel, thereby transmitting impurity to all of the contents of the vessel, and due to the connection by means of water the impurity is then transmitted to that which is outside the vessel, but it does not apply in a case where the one who immersed that day touched that which is outside of the vessel, and only the half-tenth of an ephah that is connected to the outer item becomes impure? Or perhaps this case is no different, and the vessel joins all of its contents with regard to ritual impurity. The Gemara comments: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § It has been demonstrated that a vessel joins the contents that are found in it, even if they are not touching one another, with regard to ritual impurity, such that if some of the contents become impure, all of the contents are rendered impure. Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to a tenth of an ephah of a meal offering that one divided and then placed the two halves in different vessels, and one of them became impure and afterward he placed it in a receptacle along with the second half-tenth of an ephah, and then one who immersed that day touched that one that was already rendered impure, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that the item is already saturated with impurity and cannot be rendered impure a second time, and therefore the second half-tenth of the ephah is not rendered impure even though it is joined in the same receptacle, or not?
  Abaye said to him: And do we say that an item that is already saturated with impurity cannot be rendered impure a second time? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 27:9): With regard to a sheet that is impure due to ritual impurity
  
  Daf 24b
  
  imparted by treading, e.g., if a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] lay down on it and transferred to it this severe impurity, and afterward one made a curtain [<i>villon</i>] of it, it is pure with regard to ritual impurity imparted by treading, as it is no longer fit for sitting or lying down. But it is impure due to having been in contact with an item that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, as it is viewed as having been in contact with itself, and therefore it can impart impurity to food and drink.
  The mishna continues: Rabbi Yosei said: What source of impurity imparted by treading did this curtain touch? Rather, the <i>halakha</i> is that if a <i>zav</i> touched the sheet itself before it was made into a curtain, and did not only lie on it without touching it directly, then although the curtain is pure with regard to ritual impurity imparted by treading, it is nevertheless impure due to contact with a <i>zav</i>. This is because the impurity transmitted by contact with a <i>zav</i> applies in the case of a curtain, which is not the <i>halakha</i> with regard to impurity imparted by treading.
  Abaye comments: When a <i>zav</i> touched the sheet, in any event it was rendered impure, even if he touched it after he lay on the sheet, thereby rendering it impure with impurity imparted by treading. In this manner, it was rendered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by treading, and afterward it was again rendered impure due to contact with a <i>zav</i>. According to the statement of Rava, why would this be the <i>halakha</i>? Let us say that the item is already saturated with impurity and cannot be rendered impure a second time.
  Rava said to him in response: And from where do you know that this statement of Rabbi Yosei: That if a <i>zav</i> touched the sheet it is nevertheless impure due to contact with a <i>zav</i>, is referring to a case where a <i>zav</i> touched the sheet after it was rendered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by treading? Perhaps he was referring to a case where a <i>zav</i> touched the sheet, rendering it impure due to contact with a <i>zav</i>, before he lay on it and rendered it impure with the ritual impurity imparted by treading. In that case, the severe form of ritual impurity imparted by the treading of the <i>zav</i>, which is a primary source of ritual impurity that imparts impurity to all people and items, takes effect in addition to the lesser form of impurity imparted by contact with a <i>zav</i>, which imparts impurity only to food and drink.
  But here, in the case of part of a meal offering that was touched by one who immersed that day after having already become impure due to the touch of one who immersed that day, where both this and that are lesser forms of impurity, perhaps the impurity does not take effect a second time, as it is already impure.
  The Gemara suggests: Rather, the proof against the existence of a principle that an item can be saturated with impurity and not susceptible to becoming impure a second time is from the last clause of a <i>baraita</i> that corresponds to the mishna: Rabbi Yosei concedes that in a case of two sheets that are folded and placed on top of one another, and a <i>zav</i> sat upon them, the top sheet is rendered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by treading, and the bottom sheet is rendered impure with the ritual impurity imparted by treading and due to contact with the top sheet that has become ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading. The Gemara explains: But according to the opinion advanced in Rava’s dilemma, why would this be the case? Let us say that the bottom sheet is already saturated with impurity and cannot be rendered impure a second time.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: There, with regard to the bottom sheet, the two types of impurity take effect simultaneously, whereas here, with regard to the impure meal offering, the two forms of impurity take effect one after the other. It is only in the latter case that Rava suggests that the second type of impurity does not take effect. Therefore, there is no conclusive proof, and the question raised by Rava remains unresolved.
  § Rava says: In a case where one divided a tenth of an ephah of a meal offering into two halves, and one half was lost and he separated another half in its stead, and afterward the first lost half was found, and all three are placed in a receptacle together, if the one that had been lost became impure, the previously lost half-tenth of an ephah and the first half-tenth of an ephah join together and become impure, in accordance with the mishna cited earlier (<i>Ḥagiga</i> 20b) that a vessel joins the two together with regard to ritual impurity. But the half-tenth of an ephah that was separated to replace the lost half-tenth does not join together with the other half-tenths, and it remains pure.
  If the one that had been separated to replace the lost half-tenth became impure, then the separated half-tenth and the first half-tenth join together and become impure, since the former was separated in order to complete the tenth together with the first half-tenth, while the previously lost half-tenth does not join together with them. If the first half-tenth became impure, then both the previously lost half-tenth as well as the half-tenth that was separated as its replacement join together and become ritually impure, as each of them had at one point been part of the same tenth as the first half-tenth.
  Abaye says: Even if any one of the half-tenths became impure, both remaining half-tenths join together and become impure as well. What is the reason? They are all residents of one cabin, i.e., they were meant to be part of the same meal offering.
  And similarly, according to Rava, with regard to the removal of the handful, if one removed the handful from the previously lost half-tenth, its remainder and the remainder of the first half-tenth of an ephah are eaten by the priests, while the half-tenth of an ephah that was separated in its stead is not eaten. Since it was not meant to join together with this other half-tenth, the removal of the handful does not permit its consumption. If one removed the handful from the one that had been separated in place of the lost half-tenth, then its remainder and the first half-tenth of an ephah are eaten, while the previously lost half-tenth is not eaten.
  If one removed the handful from the first half-tenth, then both the previously lost half-tenth as well as the half-tenth that had been separated in its stead are not eaten. This is because the removal of the handful allows the remainder of only one tenth to be eaten, and it is not known whether the consumption of the previously lost half-tenth or the replacement half-tenth has now been permitted.
  Abaye says: Even if one removed the handful from any one of them, both remaining half-tenths are not eaten. What is the reason? They are all residents of one cabin, and it is not possible to know whether the consumption of one or of the other has been permitted.
  Rav Pappa objects to this ruling of Abaye: And is that to say that in any event the remainder of the half-tenth itself from which the handful was taken is eaten? But one-sixth [<i>danka</i>] of the handful that was removed was not sacrificed to permit this remainder. The handful was removed to permit the consumption of the remainders of all three half-tenths of an ephah in the receptacle. Since the handful included one-third that was removed to account for the half-tenth that is not needed, it turns out that each of the two actual half-tenths should have had an additional one-sixth removed to render them permitted.
  Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Mesharshiyya, also objects to this ruling of Abaye: And with regard to the handful itself, how can it be sacrificed? But one-third of it, i.e., the portion separated to permit the extraneous half-tenth of an ephah, is non-sacred.
  Rav Ashi said: These questions present no difficulty, since with regard to the removal of the handful, the matter is dependent on the intention of the priest. And when the priest removes the handful, he removes it to permit the remainder of the tenth of an ephah, and not the remainder of the extraneous half-tenth. Still, the other two halves may not be eaten because it is not possible to know whether the consumption of one or of the other has been permitted.
  
  Daf 25a
  
  MISHNA: If the handful became ritually impure and despite this the priest sacrificed it, the frontplate worn by the High Priest effects acceptance of the meal offering, and the remainder is eaten by the priests. If the handful left its designated area and despite this the priest then sacrificed it, the frontplate does not effect acceptance. The reason is that the frontplate effects acceptance for offerings sacrificed when ritually impure and does not effect acceptance for offerings that leave their designated areas.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is written with regard to the frontplate: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred items, which the children of Israel shall hallow, even all their sacred gifts; and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38). The Sages expounded: But which sin does he bear? If you say he atones for the sin of <i>piggul</i>, it is already stated: “It shall not be credited to him” (Leviticus 7:18). If you say he atones for the sin of <i>notar</i>, it is already stated in the same verse: “It shall not be accepted.”
  Evidently, the High Priest wearing the frontplate bears only the sin of impurity in the offering of an individual. The frontplate is understood to atone for the sin of sacrificing an impure offering, as its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, specifically in the case of the community, since in a situation where the entire community is impure it is permitted to sacrifice impure communal offerings <i>ab initio</i>.
  Rabbi Zeira objects to this: Why not say that the frontplate atones for the sin of sacrificing offerings that leave the courtyard and are thereby disqualified, as its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, specifically in the case of an offering sacrificed on a private altar during the period after the Jewish people had entered Eretz Yisrael and before there was an established location for the Tabernacle?
  Abaye said to him: The verse states with regard to the frontplate: “And it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), teaching that in the case of a sin whose general prohibition is permitted before the Lord, i.e., in the Temple, yes, the frontplate atones for it. But in the case of the sin of offerings that leave the courtyard, whose general prohibition is not permitted before the Lord, the frontplate does not atone for it.
  Rabbi Ile’a objects to this: Why not say that the frontplate atones for the sin of performing the service using one’s left hand instead of one’s right, as its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, specifically in the case of Yom Kippur, when the High Priest carries the spoon bearing the incense into the Holy of Holies with his left hand?
  Abaye said to him: The verse states: “And Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred items” (Exodus 28:38), to say that the frontplate atones for a sin that was committed with the offering and I deferred it. This serves to exclude the spoon bearing the incense of Yom Kippur, where there is no sin that was deferred, since its proper performance is for the High Priest to hold it with his left hand, as he must hold both the coal pan and the spoon of incense.
  Rav Ashi said: The frontplate does not atone for the sin of sacrificing an offering with the left hand for a different reason: The verse states: “And Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the sacred items [<i>hakodashim</i>],” demonstrating that the frontplate atones for a sin inherent in the offering itself, and not for a sin committed by those who bring the offering [<i>hamakdishin</i>].
  Rav Sima, son of Rav Idi, said to Rav Ashi; and some say that it was Rav Sima, son of Rav Ashi, who said to Rav Ashi: But why not say that the frontplate atones for the sin of a blemished animal that is sacrificed, as its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, specifically in the case of birds? As the Master says: The <i>halakha</i> that an offering must be unblemished and the <i>halakha</i> that a burnt offering must be male are taught with regard to animal offerings, but there is no requirement that an offering must be unblemished and male with regard to birds.
  Rav Ashi said to him: With regard to your claim, the verse states about blemished animals: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23), and: “But whatsoever has a blemish that you shall not bring; for it shall not be acceptable for you” (Leviticus 22:20), teaching that in no case are blemished animals accepted as offerings, even due to the frontplate.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of blood of an offering that became impure and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, if he did so unwittingly, the offering is accepted and effects atonement for the owner of the offering. If he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. In what case is this statement said? In the case of the offering of an individual. But in the case of a communal offering, whether he sprinkled the blood unwittingly or whether he did so intentionally, the offering is accepted. And in the case of an offering of a gentile where the blood of the offering became impure, whether the priest sprinkled the blood unwittingly or whether he did so intentionally, whether he did so due to circumstances beyond his control or whether he did so willingly,
  
  Daf 25b
  
  the offering is not accepted, as the verse states with regard to the frontplate: “That it may be accepted for them before the Lord” (Exodus 28:38), with the term “for them” teaching that this applies only for Jews, not for gentiles.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: For what does the frontplate worn by the High Priest effect acceptance? It effects acceptance for the blood, for the flesh, and for the fat of an offering that became impure in the Temple, whether they were rendered impure unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to circumstances beyond one’s control or willfully, whether in the case of the offering of an individual or in the case of a communal offering. In contrast to the statement of the previous <i>baraita</i>, this <i>baraita</i> teaches that the frontplate does effect acceptance in the case of an individual offering for blood that became impure and was sprinkled intentionally.
  Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the frontplate effects acceptance for impure blood of an individual offering that was sprinkled intentionally, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, whereas that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the frontplate does not effect acceptance, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not separate <i>teruma</i> from ritually impure produce for ritually pure produce. And if he separated <i>teruma</i> from impure produce unwittingly, his <i>teruma</i> is considered <i>teruma</i>, but if he did so intentionally, the Sages penalize him and his <i>teruma</i> is not <i>teruma</i>. Rabbi Yosei says: Whether he did so unwittingly or intentionally, his <i>teruma</i> is <i>teruma</i>. Like the ruling found in the second <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Yosei does not distinguish between a case where one acted unwittingly and where one acted intentionally.
  The Gemara objects to the comparison: You can say that you heard that Rabbi Yosei holds that the Sages do not penalize him. Did you hear him say, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches, that the frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are to be eaten? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: The frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are to be eaten, and Rabbi Yosei says: The frontplate does not effect acceptance for the impurity of portions of offerings that are to be eaten?
  The Gemara answers: Reverse the opinions, so that Rabbi Eliezer says: The frontplate does not effect acceptance for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are to be eaten, and Rabbi Yosei says: The frontplate does effect acceptance for the impurity of portions of offerings that are to be eaten.
  Rav Sheshet objects to this: And are you able to reverse the opinions and say that according to Rabbi Eliezer the frontplate does not effect acceptance for the impurity of portions that are to be eaten? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that one who partakes of impure sacrificial meat, i.e., one who partakes of the meat while in a state of ritual impurity, before the sprinkling of the blood takes place, is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.
  To counter this, the verse states: “Every one that is ritually pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19), and immediately afterward the verse states: “But the soul that eats of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings, that belong to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The juxtaposition of these verses teaches that if one who is impure partakes of that which has become permitted to those who are ritually pure, he is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure.
  But if one who is impure partakes of that which is not permitted to those who are pure, he is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Since it is not permitted to eat the sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood, one who partakes of it at that point is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for eating it while ritually impure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Or perhaps, is the verse teaching only that if one who is impure partakes of that which is eaten by those who are ritually pure, he is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure; but in a case where he partakes of that which is not eaten by those who are ritually pure, he is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure despite the fact that its blood has already been sprinkled? I would then exclude sacrificial meat that was left overnight and meat that leaves the Temple courtyard, which are not permitted to be eaten by those who are ritually pure, and I would derive that one who is impure who partakes of them is not liable for eating them.
  Therefore, the verse states: “That belong to the Lord,” which teaches that the verse included leftover meat and meat that leaves the Temple courtyard in the prohibition, and one who partakes of them while impure is liable for partaking of them.
  One might have thought that I include in the prohibition the meat that was rendered <i>piggul</i> through one’s intention of consuming it after its designated time and the meat that was rendered <i>notar</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> interjects: Isn’t <i>notar</i> identical to meat that was left overnight, and it has already been established that one is liable for partaking of leftover meat while in an impure state? Rather, what is meant is as follows: One might have thought to include in the prohibition even the meats that were rendered <i>piggul</i>, just as <i>notar</i> is included. Therefore, the verse states: “Of the meat of the sacrifice of peace offerings,” and the term “of the meat” excluded one who is impure who partakes of <i>piggul</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: And what did you see to include these, i.e., leftover meat and meat that leaves the courtyard, and to exclude those, i.e., <i>piggul</i>? It answers: After the verse included some offerings and excluded others, you should say the following: I include these, the leftover meat and the meat that leaves the Temple courtyard, as they had a period of fitness after their blood was sprinkled, before they were rendered unfit by being left over or by leaving the Temple courtyard. And I exclude those, <i>piggul</i>, as they never had a period of fitness, as they were already unfit when the blood was sprinkled.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: And if you say that if that is the case, then with regard to sacrificial meat that became impure before the sprinkling of the blood, and one who was impure ate it after the sprinkling of the blood, for what reason is he liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure if it never had a period of fitness? The answer is that he is liable because the frontplate effects acceptance and the sprinkling is valid.
  It arises from this <i>baraita</i> that if the offering became impure, then yes, the frontplate effects acceptance; but in the case of sacrificial meat that leaves the Temple courtyard, the frontplate does not effect acceptance, and therefore it was never considered to have a period of fitness.
  Rav Sheshet now states his question: Who did you hear who says that the sprinkling of the blood is not effective in the case of sacrificial meat that leaves the Temple courtyard? This is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as seen in tractate <i>Me’ila</i> (6b), and yet although this <i>baraita</i> is then clearly in accordance with his opinion, it teaches that the frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are to be eaten. Therefore, this too is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and the opinions in the <i>baraita</i> cited above should not be reversed.
  Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: It is not difficult. This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are to be eaten, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, whereas that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the frontplate does not effect acceptance, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  The Gemara asks: You can say that you heard that Rabbi Eliezer holds that the frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are to be eaten, but did you hear him say that the Sages did not penalize one who acted willfully? The Gemara answers: Yes. Just as you heard that Rabbi Yosei holds with regard to <i>teruma</i> that one who separated impure produce on behalf of pure produce is not penalized, you heard that Rabbi Eliezer holds the same. This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: Whether one acted unwittingly or intentionally, his <i>teruma</i> is <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara objects: You can say that you heard Rabbi Eliezer state this <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>teruma</i>, which is lenient, but did you hear him say this with regard to consecrated items, which are more severe? The Gemara answers: If it is so that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold the same opinion with regard to consecrated items, to whom will you attribute this <i>baraita</i> that rules that the Sages did not penalize one who acted willfully? Rather, it must be that this is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Ravina said that the contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i> should be resolved as follows: With regard to the circumstances of the contraction of its ritual impurity, regardless of whether the blood was rendered impure unwittingly or intentionally, the frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity and the offering is accepted, as the second <i>baraita</i> teaches. By contrast, with regard to the sprinkling of the blood, if it was unwittingly sprinkled after becoming ritually impure, meaning that the priest was unaware that it was impure, then the offering is accepted, but if it was intentionally sprinkled after becoming impure, it is not accepted, as the first <i>baraita</i> teaches.
  And Rabbi Sheila said the opposite resolution: With regard to the sprinkling of the blood, whether it was performed unwittingly or intentionally, the offering is accepted. By contrast, with regard to the circumstances of the contraction of its ritual impurity, if it was rendered impure unwittingly the offering is accepted, and if it was rendered impure intentionally it is not accepted.
  The Gemara explains: And according to Rav Sheila, concerning that which is taught in the second <i>baraita</i>, that the frontplate effects acceptance for blood that was rendered impure regardless of whether it happened unwittingly or intentionally, this is what it is saying: If the blood was rendered impure unwittingly and one sprinkled its blood, whether it was sprinkled unwittingly or intentionally, it is accepted.
  
  Daf 26a
  
  The Gemara suggests a refutation of Rav Sheila’s opinion based on the first <i>baraita</i>: Come and hear: In the case of blood of an offering that became impure and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, if he did so unwittingly, the offering is accepted and achieves atonement for the owner of the offering. If he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. This contradicts Rav Sheila’s statement that even if the priest sprinkled the blood intentionally, it is accepted. The Gemara rejects this proof: According to Rav Sheila, this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: In the case of blood that became impure and a priest sprinkled it, whether it was sprinkled unwittingly or intentionally, if it was rendered impure unwittingly it is accepted, but if it was rendered impure intentionally then it is not accepted.
  MISHNA: If after the handful was removed the remainder of the meal offering became ritually impure, or if the remainder of the meal offering was burned, or if the remainder of the meal offering was lost, according to the principle of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling even if there is no meat that can be eaten, the meal offering is fit, and the priest burns the handful. But according to the principle of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that with regard to an animal offering the blood is fit for sprinkling only if there is meat that can be eaten, it is unfit and the priest does not burn the handful, as the handful serves to render permitted the remainder.
  GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that according to Rabbi Yehoshua the meal offering is unfit if its remainder is rendered impure, Rav says: And this is the <i>halakha</i> only when all of its remainder became impure. But if only a part of its remainder became impure, the meal offering is not unfit.
  The Gemara comments: It enters your mind that Rav holds that only if a part of the remainder became impure, then yes, the meal offering is fit; but if part of the remainder was lost or burned, then the meal offering is not fit. The Gemara asks: What does Rav hold? If he holds that what remains is significant, so that even if a portion of the remainder cannot be eaten the handful is still sacrificed to render the rest permitted, then why would this not also be the <i>halakha</i> even if part of the remainder was lost or burned? Alternatively, if he holds that what remains is not significant, and the Gemara interjects: And accordingly, what is the reason that the handful is sacrificed if a part of the remainder became impure? It is because the frontplate effects acceptance for the impurity; if that is so, then even if all of the remainder became impure, the handful should still be sacrificed.
  The Gemara explains: Actually, he holds that what remains is significant, and just as when a part of the remainder became impure but the offering is still fit, the rest of the remainder is sacrificed, the same is true with regard to a case where a part of the remainder was lost or burned. And the reason that he stated this <i>halakha</i> specifically in a case where it became impure is that he employed the terminology of the beginning of the mishna, which discusses a case where the remainder became impure.
  Rava’s statement accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehoshua says: With regard to all the offerings in the Torah from which there remains an olive-bulk of meat that is fit to be eaten or an olive-bulk of fat that is fit to be sacrificed on the altar, the priest sprinkles the blood. Similarly, if a part of the remainder can be eaten the handful is still sacrificed, as the status of the remainder relative to the handful corresponds to the status of the meat relative to the blood.
  The Gemara cites the continuation of the <i>baraita</i>: If all that remains is half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, the priest does not sprinkle the blood. This is because the half olive-bulk of meat and the half olive-bulk of fat do not combine to form one olive-bulk, since the former is eaten and the latter is sacrificed on the altar. And with regard to a burnt offering, even if all that was left was half an olive-bulk of meat and half an olive-bulk of fat, the priest sprinkles the blood, because it is consumed on the altar in its entirety. Since both the meat and the fat are sacrificed on the altar, they combine to form one olive-bulk. And with regard to a meal offering, although all of it remains pure, the priest shall not sprinkle the blood.
  The Gemara questions the last ruling of the <i>baraita</i>: What is the mention of a meal offering doing here? The discussion is about sprinkling blood, which is not relevant in the case of a meal offering. Rav Pappa said: The meal offering mentioned is the meal offering that accompanies the libations that accompany animal offerings. It could enter your mind to say: Since this meal offering accompanies the animal offering, it is comparable to the offering itself, and therefore if the offering became impure but the meal offering remained pure, the blood of the offering is sprinkled due to the remaining meal offering. To counter this, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this is not the <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara returns to its discussion of the <i>halakha</i> that if only an olive-bulk of the fat remains, the priest sprinkles the blood of the offering. From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and there are those who determined that it was stated in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Ḥananya: The verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood against the altar of the Lord at the door of the Tent of Meeting, and he shall make the fat smoke for a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:6). This verse never mentions the meat, but only the fat, indicating that the blood is sprinkled even if there is no ritually pure meat, but only fat.
  The Gemara asks: And we found a source for the <i>halakha</i> that the priest sprinkles the blood if only fat remains. From where do we derive that the priest sprinkles the blood if all that is left is the lobe of the liver or the two kidneys, which are also sacrificed on the altar? The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> that the priest sprinkles the blood in that case is derived from that which is taught at the end of the <i>baraita</i>: And with regard to a meal offering, although all of it remains pure, the priest shall not sprinkle the blood. This teaches that it is in the case of a meal offering that the priest shall not sprinkle the blood, as the meal offering is not part of the animal; but if the lobe of the liver or the two kidneys remain, the priest sprinkles the blood.
  The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yoḥanan himself says: The verse states: “For a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:6). This teaches that the blood is sprinkled whenever anything that you offer up on the altar for a pleasing aroma remains. This includes anything burned on the altar.
  The Gemara notes: And it was necessary to write “fat” in that verse, and it was necessary to write “for a pleasing aroma.” As, if the Merciful One had written only “fat,” I would say that if fat remains, yes, the priest sprinkles the blood, but if only the lobe of the liver or the two kidneys remain, since they are not as significant as the fat, the blood is not sprinkled. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote “for a pleasing aroma.” And if the Merciful One had written only “for a pleasing aroma,” I would say that it includes even a meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings. Therefore, the Merciful One wrote “fat,” to teach that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to sacrificial parts of the animal, but not to accompanying libations and meal offerings.
  MISHNA: A handful of a meal offering that was not sanctified in a service vessel is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon deems it fit. If the priest burned the handful of a meal offering twice, i.e., in two increments, it is fit.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The verse states with regard to a meal offering: “It is most holy, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10). Rabbi Shimon derives from here that the handful of the meal offering may be placed on the altar in the manner of the blood of either a sin offering or a guilt offering. If a priest comes to perform the sacrificial rites of a meal offering with his hand, as one performs the sprinkling of the blood of a sin offering, which is performed with the priest’s right index finger, he must perform its rites with his right hand, like the sin offering. If he performs the sacrificial rites with a vessel, as one performs the sprinkling of the blood of a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled from a vessel on the altar and whose sprinkling may be performed with the priest’s left hand, he may perform its rites with his left hand, like the guilt offering.
  And Rabbi Yannai says: According to Rabbi Shimon there are no restrictions on the manner in which the handful is sacrificed, as once the priest has removed the handful from a service vessel, he may bring it up and burn it even if he placed it in his belt, or even in an earthenware vessel. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: All concede that the handful requires sanctification in a service vessel before it is sacrificed.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Zevaḥim</i> 1:11): With regard to the burning of the fats, and the limbs, and the wood that were brought up to the altar, that the priest brought them up to the altar, whether by hand or with a vessel, whether with the right hand or with the left hand, they are fit. With regard to the handful, and the incense, and the frankincense, that the priest brought them up to the altar, whether by hand or with a vessel, whether with the right hand or with the left hand, they are fit. The Gemara suggests: This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who stated that if the handful is sacrificed by hand, it must be sacrificed only with the right hand.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, could say to you that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> teaches it disjunctively, and the statement should be understood as follows: If these items are brought up by hand, with the right hand, or with a vessel, whether with the right hand or with the left, they are fit.
  The Gemara attempts to refute the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak that all concede that the handful requires sanctification in a service vessel before it is sacrificed. Come and hear that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest removed the handful, but not from a service vessel, and sanctified it, but not in a service vessel, and brought it up and burned it, but not in a service vessel, then it is unfit. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon deem it fit in a case where the handful had been placed in any type of vessel. This contradicts Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim that all concede that the handful must be sanctified in a service vessel.
  The Gemara responds: Say that according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, from the point when the handful has been placed in a service vessel and sanctified and onward, it is no longer necessary to take it in a service vessel to the altar to sacrifice it. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> does not contradict Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s statement.
  The Gemara suggests another refutation of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 4:15). Come and hear: And the Rabbis say: The handful requires sanctification in a service vessel. How is this sanctification performed? The priest removes the handful from a service vessel, and sanctifies it in a service vessel, and brings it up and burns it in a service vessel. Rabbi Shimon says: Once the handful is removed from a service vessel, the priest may bring it up and burn it even if it is not in a service vessel, and this is sufficient for it. This <i>baraita</i> demonstrates that, in contrast to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s statement, Rabbi Shimon does not hold that the handful must be sanctified in a service vessel.
  The Gemara answers: Say that according to Rabbi Shimon, once the priest removes the handful and sanctifies it in a service vessel, he may bring it up and burn it, and this is sufficient for it.
  The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear: If the priest removed the handful with his right hand and put it in his left hand, he shall return it to his right hand. If the handful was in his left hand
  
  Daf 26b
  
  and he intended to partake of the meal offering in an improper manner, whether outside its designated area or beyond its designated time, the offering is not valid, but there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> if one partakes of it.
  The Gemara presents an alternative version of this <i>baraita</i>: If, while the handful was in his right hand, he intended to partake of the meal offering outside its designated area, the offering is not valid, but there is no liability to receive <i>karet</i> if one partakes of it. If he intended to partake of it beyond its designated time, then the offering is <i>piggul</i> and one who partakes of it is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon.
  And the Rabbis say: Once he put the handful in his left hand, the placing of it in his left hand renders it unfit and it cannot be rendered fit by returning it to his right hand. What is the reason? It is because it requires sanctification in a service vessel, and once he put it in his left hand, it is considered like blood that spilled from an animal’s neck onto the floor before being collected in a service vessel and one then gathered it, which is unfit and cannot be rendered fit by then being placed in a service vessel.
  The Gemara notes: By inference, one can conclude that Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon do not require sanctification of the handful by placing it in a service vessel. Accordingly, this serves as a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, who stated that even Rabbi Shimon requires sanctification in a service vessel. The Gemara affirms: This is a conclusive refutation of his opinion.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that according to Rabbi Shimon, if the priest transferred the handful to his left hand he should return the handful to his right hand. The Gemara comments: This supports the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as he said that according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon the rites of the meal offering must be performed with the priest’s right hand. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this <i>baraita</i> is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yannai, as it teaches that the handful must be transferred back to his right hand, whereas he states that once the handful has been removed from a service vessel it may be sacrificed in any manner?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yannai could say to you: I stated my ruling in accordance with the opinion of the <i>tanna</i> who taught that the burning of the fats and the limbs and the sacrifice of the meal offering can all take place with either the right or left hand. And I hold that he does not teach it disjunctively, as it was explained in order to reconcile the <i>baraita</i> with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya. Rather, it is to be understood according to its straightforward meaning.
  § The mishna teaches: If the priest burned the handful of a meal offering twice, i.e., in two increments, it is fit. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The handful is fit if it is burned twice, where half of the handful is burned each time, but not if it is burned several times, in smaller increments. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is fit if it is burned twice, and it is fit even if it is burned several times.
  The Gemara asks: What is the basis for the dispute between the two opinions? Rabbi Zeira said: The dispute between the two is with regard to whether there is significance to a handful that is less than the size of two olives and whether there is significance to the burning of less than an olive-bulk on the altar.
  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi holds that there is no significance to a handful that is less than the size of two olives and there is no significance to the burning of less than an olive-bulk on the altar. Therefore, the mishna’s statement that the handful may be burned in two increments is meant literally, and the handful may be divided into only two equal portions, where each one contains exactly one olive-bulk. It may not be divided further, since doing so would result in the burning of less than an olive-bulk on the altar. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is significance to a handful that is less than the size of two olives and there is significance to the burning of less than an olive-bulk on the altar. Therefore, if the handful was divided into several small portions and each portion was burned separately, it is fit.
  § It was stated: From when precisely does the sacrifice of the handful render permitted the remainder of the meal offering for consumption by the priests? Rabbi Ḥanina says: From when the fire takes hold of it, i.e., when it ignites. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From when the fire consumes most of the handful.
  Rav Yehuda said to Rabba bar Rav Yitzḥak: I will explain to you the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The verse states: “And behold, the smoke of the land went up as the smoke of a furnace” (Genesis 19:28), and a furnace does not release smoke until the fire takes hold of the majority of the fuel. Rabbi Yoḥanan derived from this verse that the majority of the handful must be consumed by the fire, since the priests are instructed to make the handful smoke, as it is written: “And the priest shall make the memorial part thereof smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 2:2).
  Ravin bar Rav Adda said to Rava: Your students say that Rav Amram said that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: I have derived only with regard to items whose usual manner is to be sacrificed at night, for example, the limbs of the burnt offering and the fats [<i>pedarim</i>] of the burnt offering, that the priest may bring them up and burn them after sunset and they are consumed throughout the entire night. This is derived from the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning” (Leviticus 6:2).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to items whose usual manner is to be sacrificed during the day, for example, the handful of the meal offering, the frankincense, the incense, the meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, and the meal offering that accompanies the libations, from where is it derived that the priest may bring them up and burn them after sunset?
  The Gemara interjects: Why would they be allowed to be burned after sunset? But didn’t you say that these are items whose usual manner is to be sacrificed during the day? The Gemara clarifies: Rather, the question of the <i>baraita</i> is as follows: From where is it derived that these items may be brought up and burned concurrent with the setting of the sun, in which case they are consumed throughout the entire night and not during the day? The verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 6:2), which included everything that is sacrificed on the altar.
  Ravin bar Rav Adda challenges: But if the handful is brought up and burned concurrent with the setting of the sun, you do not find that the majority of it is consumed by the fire before sunset. How does this <i>baraita</i> accord with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the majority of the handful must be consumed by the fire in order to render permitted the consumption of the remainder by the priests? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where the <i>baraita</i> does not require the consumption by fire of the majority of the handful, it is referring only to that which is required in order for the altar to receive the handful, so that it is considered the food of the altar and may continue to burn all night long. There, Rabbi Yoḥanan states that in order to render permitted the consumption of the remainder by the priests, the majority of the handful must be consumed by the fire.
  The Gemara notes: Rabbi Elazar teaches the <i>baraita</i> the way it was initially presented, as asking how it is known that items that are usually sacrificed during the day may be burned after sunset. And he interprets the <i>baraita</i> as referring to parts of the offering that were dislodged from the fire after sunset, which may be returned to the fire throughout the night. And similarly, when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yannai said the <i>baraita</i> is referring to parts that were dislodged from the fire after sunset.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yannai in fact say this? But doesn’t Rabbi Yannai say: In the case of incense that was dislodged from on top of the altar, the priests may not return even small lumps of it to the fire? And similarly, Rav Ḥanina bar Minyumi from the school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That which the fire will consume of the burnt offering on the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). This teaches that if parts of a burnt offering that were partially consumed were dislodged from the external altar you shall return them, but you do not return incense that was partially consumed and was dislodged from the internal altar. The Gemara answers: Remove from the <i>baraita</i> here the word incense, so that it is not included in the list of items that may be burned throughout the night.
  Rabbi Asi said: When Rabbi Elazar would explain the <i>halakhot</i> of the meal offerings, he would raise this dilemma: Rabbi Elazar raises a dilemma: With regard to a handful that a priest arranged on the altar, and he arranged the arrangement of wood on the altar on top of it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is this considered a proper manner of burning, or is this not considered a proper manner of burning, since the handful is not arranged on top of the wood? The Gemara comments: No answer was found, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Ḥizkiyya raises a dilemma: With regard to the limbs of the burnt offering that a priest arranged on the altar and arranged the arrangement of wood on the altar on top of them, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we say that the Merciful One states: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall lay the pieces and the head, and the fat, in order upon the wood that is on the fire upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:8), teaching that they must be placed specifically upon the wood? Or perhaps, since it is written in another verse: “That which the fire will consume of the burnt offering on the altar” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that the burnt offering may be arranged directly on the altar, if the priest desires to arrange the limbs in this manner he may do so, and if he desires to arrange them in that manner he may also do so. The Gemara comments: No answer was found, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raises a dilemma: With regard to the limbs of an offering that a priest arranged adjacent to the arrangement of wood on the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains: Do not raise the dilemma according to the opinion of the one who says that the phrase “upon [<i>al</i>] the wood” is meant literally,
  
  Daf 27a
  
  as “upon [<i>al</i>] the wood” is written, and not: Next to the wood.
  When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the one who says in the mishna (96a) that the term “upon [<i>al</i>]” (see Numbers 2:20) means adjacent to. According to that <i>tanna</i>, what is the <i>halakha</i> in this case? Is it explained that here, too, the phrase “upon [<i>al</i>] the wood” can mean adjacent to the wood? Or perhaps, the phrase “upon [<i>al</i>] the wood that is on the fire upon the altar” teaches that “upon the wood” is to be understood as similar to “upon the altar”: Just as there “upon the altar” is meant literally, so too here, the phrase “upon the wood” is meant literally. The Gemara comments: No answer was found, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: With regard to the handful, failure to sacrifice the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was sacrificed, from rendering it permitted for the priests to consume the remainder of the meal offering. With regard to a tenth of an ephah of flour brought as a meal offering, failure to sacrifice the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was sacrificed, from qualifying as a proper meal offering. With regard to the wine poured as a libation, failure to pour the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was poured, from qualifying as a proper libation. With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil that is required for the meal offering, failure to add the minority of it prevents the majority of it, which was added, from being a sufficient measure of oil.
  With regard to the fine flour and the oil, failure to bring each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the handful and the frankincense, failure to burn each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.
  GEMARA: What is the reason that the failure to sacrifice the minority of the handful disqualifies the entire offering? This is derived from the fact that the verse states “his handful” twice, once with regard to the voluntary meal offering (Leviticus 2:2) and once with regard to the meal offering of a sinner (Leviticus 5:12), and any <i>halakha</i> repeated in the verses is deemed indispensable.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to a tenth of an ephah of flour brought as a meal offering, failure to sacrifice the minority of it prevents the majority of it from qualifying as a proper meal offering. What is the reason? The verse states: “The priest shall remove of it a handful of its fine flour” (Leviticus 2:2). The usage of the term “of its fine flour” instead of: Of the fine flour, teaches that if any amount of its flour was missing, it is not valid.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to the wine poured as a libation, failure to pour the minority of it prevents the majority of it from qualifying as a proper libation. What is the reason? The verse states concerning the libations: “So shall it be done” (Numbers 15:11). The term “so” indicates that the libations must be sacrificed exactly in the manner described, without any deviation.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to the <i>log</i> of oil that is required for the meal offering, failure to add the minority of it prevents the majority of it from being a sufficient measure of oil. In the case of the oil of the meal offering that accompanies the libations, this <i>halakha</i> is learned from the term: “So” (Numbers 15:11), stated with regard to the libations. And in the case of the <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies a voluntary meal offering, the verse states: “And of its oil” (Leviticus 2:2), demonstrating that if any amount of its oil was missing, it is not valid.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to the fine flour and the oil, failure to bring each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. The <i>halakha</i> that each is indispensable is derived from the fact that the two are juxtaposed in the verse: “The priest shall remove of it a handful of its fine flour and of its oil” (Leviticus 2:2), and the fact that this requirement is repeated in the verse: “Of its groats, and of its oil” (Leviticus 2:16), teaches that each is indispensable.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to the handful and the frankincense, failure to burn each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. The <i>halakha</i> that each is indispensable is derived from the repetition of the mention of the two together in the verse, as it is written: “The priest shall remove of it a handful of its fine flour and of its oil, as well as all of its frankincense” (Leviticus 2:2), and again with regard to the meal offering of a sinner it is stated: “And all the frankincense which is upon the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:8).
  MISHNA: With regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the absence of each goat prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two sheep brought together with the meal offering of the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>, failure to bring each of the sheep prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, failure to bring each of the loaves prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.
  With regard to the two arrangements of the shewbread, failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread, failure to place each of the bowls prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. With regard to the arrangements of the shewbread and the bowls of frankincense, failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.
  With regard to the two types of loaves that accompany the offerings of a nazirite: The bread and wafers (see Numbers 6:15); the three species that are part of the rite of the red heifer: The cedar, hyssop, and scarlet wool (see Numbers 19:6); and the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering: The loaves, wafers, loaves soaked in hot water, and leavened bread (see Leviticus 7:12); and the four species of the <i>lulav</i>: The <i>lulav</i>, <i>etrog</i>, myrtle, and willow (see Leviticus 23:40); and the four species that are used in the purification process of the leper: The cedar, hyssop, scarlet wool, and birds (see Leviticus 14:4), failure to bring each of the components prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others.
  With regard to the seven sprinklings of the blood of the red heifer that the priest sprinkles opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary (see Numbers 19:4), failure to sprinkle each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the seven sprinklings of the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur that are sprinkled on the Ark between the staves (see Leviticus 16:14–15), the seven sprinklings that are sprinkled on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, and the sprinklings that are sprinkled on the golden altar on Yom Kippur, and from all other inner sin offerings, failure to sprinkle each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: With regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, the absence of each goat prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. This is derived from the verse that states with regard to the Yom Kippur service: “And it shall be a statute forever” (Leviticus 16:29), since wherever the term “statute” appears concerning a sacrificial rite, it signifies that the rite is an indispensable requirement.
  The mishna teaches: With regard to the two sheep brought together with the meal offering of the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>, failure to bring each of the sheep prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. This is derived from the verse: “They shall be holy” (Leviticus 23:20), since the employment of a term of being indicates an indispensable requirement. Similarly, with regard to the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, the reason failure to bring each of the loaves prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other is that the verse states: “They shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 23:17), employing a term of being.
  With regard to the two arrangements of the shewbread, the reason failure to place each of the arrangements prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other is that the verse employs the term statute concerning them (see Leviticus 24:9). With regard to the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread, the reason failure to place each of the bowls prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other is that the verse employs the term statute concerning them (see Leviticus 24:9). With regard to the arrangements of the shewbread and the bowls of frankincense, the reason failure to bring each of them prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other is that the verse employs the term statute concerning them, as that verse addresses each of these two components.
  With regard to the two types of loaves that accompany the offerings of a nazirite, each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as it is written with regard to the nazirite: “So he must do after the law of his naziriteship” (Numbers 6:21), demonstrating that must bring his offerings precisely as detailed in the verse. With regard to the three species that are part of the rite of the red heifer, each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, since the term statute is written about them: “This is the statute of the law” (Numbers 19:2).
  With regard to the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering, each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, since the thanks offering is juxtaposed to the offerings of a nazirite, as it is written with regard to the thanks offering: “With the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Leviticus 7:13). And the Master said: The term “his peace offerings” serves to include the loaves of the peace offering of a nazirite, and it has already been demonstrated that with regard to the loaves that accompany the offerings of a nazirite, each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others.
  And with regard to the four species that are in the purification process of the leper, each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as it is written: “This shall be the law of the leper” (Leviticus 14:2), and the term “shall be” indicates an indispensable requirement. And with regard to the four species of the <i>lulav</i>, each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as the verse states: “And you shall take” [<i>ulkaḥtem</i>]” (Leviticus 23:40), which alludes to: A complete taking [<i>lekiḥa tamma</i>], comprising all four species.
  § Rav Ḥanan bar Rava says: The mishna taught that the four species of the <i>lulav</i> are necessary for the fulfillment of the mitzva only in a case where one did not have all four species; but if one has all four species, failure to take each of the components does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, and he fulfills the mitzva by taking each species individually.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the four species of the <i>lulav</i>, two of them, the <i>lulav</i> and <i>etrog</i>, produce fruit, and two of them, the myrtle and willow, do not produce fruit. Those that produce fruit have a bond with those that do not produce fruit, and those that do not produce fruit have a bond with those that produce fruit. And a person does not fulfill his obligation of taking the <i>lulav</i> until they are all bound together in a single bundle.
  And so too, when the Jewish people fast and pray for acceptance of their repentance, this is not accomplished until they are all bound together in a single bundle, as it is stated: “It is He that builds His upper chambers in the Heaven, and has established His bundle upon the earth” (Amos 9:6), which is interpreted as stating that only when the Jewish people are bound together are they established upon the earth. This <i>baraita</i> contradicts Rav Ḥanan bar Rava’s statement, since it teaches that the four species of the <i>lulav</i> must be taken together in order for one to fulfill his obligation of taking the <i>lulav</i>.
  The Gemara answers: Whether the different species must be taken together is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>; as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A <i>lulav</i>, whether it is bound with the myrtle and willow or whether it is not bound, is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: If it is bound, it is fit; if it is not bound, it is unfit.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: By means of a verbal analogy, he derives the term taking, written with regard to the four species, from the term taking written with regard to the bundle of hyssop. It is written there, in the context of the sacrifice of the Paschal offering in Egypt: “Take a bundle of hyssop” (Exodus 12:22), and it is written here, with regard to the four species: “And you shall take for you on the first day the fruit of a beautiful tree, branches of a date palm, boughs of dense-leaved trees, and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40).
  Just as there, with regard to the Paschal offering, the mitzva to take the hyssop is specifically in a bundle, so too here, the mitzva to take the four species is specifically in a bundle. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the Rabbis? The Gemara answers: They do not derive the meaning of the term taking from the meaning of the term taking by means of the verbal analogy.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There is a mitzva to bind the myrtle and the willow together with the <i>lulav</i>, but if one did not bind it, it is fit? In accordance with whose opinion is the <i>baraita</i>? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, if one did not bind it, why is it fit? If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, what mitzva is one fulfilling by binding it?
  The Gemara answers: Actually, it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And what mitzva is one fulfilling? The mitzva is due to the fact that it is stated: “This is my God and I will beautify Him” (Exodus 15:2), which is interpreted to mean that one should beautify himself before God in the performance of the mitzvot. The Rabbis agree that although failure to bind the three species does not render them unfit for performing the mitzva, the performance of the mitzva is more beautiful when the <i>lulav</i> is bound.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the seven sprinklings of the blood of the heifer that the priest sprinkles opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary, failure to sprinkle each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, since the term statute is written about them (see Numbers 19:2).
  The mishna further teaches: With regard to the seven sprinklings of the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur that are sprinkled on the Ark between the staves, and the sprinklings that are sprinkled on the golden altar on Yom Kippur, and the sprinklings from all other inner sin offerings that are sprinkled on the golden altar, and the seven sprinklings that are sprinkled on the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, failure to sprinkle each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the sprinklings of Yom Kippur, the reason that each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others is that the term “statute” is written about the Yom Kippur service (see Leviticus 16:29).
  With regard to the sprinklings of the bull of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, and of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and those of the goats of idol worship, which are sprinkled on the Curtain and on the golden altar, the reason that each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin: “So shall he do with the bull; as he did with the bull of the sin offering” of the anointed priest (Leviticus 4:20). Why must the verse state that the bull offering for an unwitting communal sin is sacrificed in the same manner as the bull of the anointed priest, when the Torah has already explicitly specified the manner in which the service should take place? The reason it states it is in order to repeat the command of the sprinklings,
  
  Daf 27b
  
  to teach that if one omitted one of the placements of blood, he has done nothing.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the priest performed the seven sprinklings of the blood of the red heifer improperly, either by performing them not for their own sake or performing them not precisely toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of the Tabernacle (Numbers 19:4), which corresponds to the Sanctuary in the Temple, they are not valid.
  But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood that takes place inside the Sanctuary, of inner sin offerings, the blood of the bull and goat of Yom Kippur, the blood of the bull of the anointed priest, the blood of the bull for an unwitting communal sin, and the blood of the goats of idol worship, which are to be sprinkled “before the Lord, in front of the Curtain of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 4:6), and the sprinkling of the oil that takes place during the purification of the leper, which is done “seven times before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:16), if these are performed not for their own sake, then they are not valid. But if they are performed not precisely toward the direction where they should be sprinkled, they are valid.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning the sprinklings of the blood of the red heifer that if they were performed not for their own sake, they are not valid, but if they were performed not precisely toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting or Sanctuary, they are valid? Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult; this second <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, whereas that first <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Kelim</i> 1:10): With regard to those who have not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, and therefore are not permitted to enter the Temple or partake of sacrificial meat, who entered the Temple courtyard unwittingly, they are liable to bring a sin offering. If they entered intentionally, then this is punishable by <i>karet</i>. And needless to say, the same applies to one who was ritually impure who immersed that day and is waiting for nightfall for the purification process to be completed and all the others who are ritually impure and have not yet immersed.
  And with regard to those who are pure who entered beyond their boundaries, i.e., beyond where it is permitted for them to enter, such as a priest who enters the Sanctuary for a purpose other than performing the Temple service, if one entered any part of the Sanctuary, he is liable to receive forty lashes. If he entered within the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, i.e., into the Holy of Holies, or he entered the Holy of Holies all the way until he was before the Ark Cover, he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he entered any part of the Sanctuary or within the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies, he is liable to receive forty lashes; but if he entered the Holy of Holies all the way until he was before the Ark Cover, he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven.
  With regard to what issue do the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree? They disagree with regard to the proper understanding of this verse: “And the Lord said to Moses: Speak to Aaron your brother, that he not come at all times into the holy place, within the Curtain, before the Ark Cover which is upon the Ark, that he not die” (Leviticus 16:2). The Rabbis hold that entering into the holy place, i.e., the Sanctuary, is subject to the prohibition of: He shall not come, and one who violates it is punished with lashes, whereas entering within the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies and before the Ark Cover is subject to the warning of: He shall not die, and entering there is punished by death at the hand of Heaven.
  And Rabbi Yehuda holds that entering into the holy place, i.e., the Sanctuary, and within the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and Holy of Holies is subject to the prohibition of: He shall not come, and one who violates it is punished with lashes, whereas entering before the Ark Cover is subject to the warning of: He shall not die, and entering there is punished by death at the of Heaven.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the interpretation of the Rabbis? The Gemara answers: If it should enter your mind to explain the verse as Rabbi Yehuda says, then let the Merciful One write: That he not come at all times into the holy place and before the Ark Cover that he not die, and there is no need to write “within the Curtain,” and I would say: If one becomes liable to receive lashes for even entering the Sanctuary, is it necessary to teach that one incurs this punishment for entering within the Curtain? Why do I need the phrase “within the Curtain” that the Merciful One wrote? Learn from that seemingly extraneous term that entering the Holy of Holies is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven.
  And Rabbi Yehuda understands: If the Merciful One had written only that it is prohibited to come “into the holy place” and did not write “within the Curtain,” I would say: What is the holy place? It is within the Curtain, i.e., the Holy of Holies, and one who enters it violates a prohibition, but if one enters the Sanctuary he does not even violate a prohibition. And the Rabbis respond to this claim: You cannot say that, as the entire Sanctuary is called “the holy place,” as it is stated: “And the Curtain shall divide for you between the holy place and the Holy of Holies” (Exodus 26:33).
  And what is the reason for the interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda? Why does he hold that one who enters the Holy of Holies violates a prohibition but is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda holds that if it should enter your mind to explain as the Rabbis say, that entering the Holy of Holies is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven, let the Merciful One write: That he not come at all times into the holy place and within the Curtain that he not die, and there is no need to write “before the Ark Cover.” And I would say: If entering within the Curtain, i.e., the Holy of Holies, is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, is it necessary to teach that one incurs this punishment for entering before the Ark Cover? Why do I need the phrase “before the Ark Cover” that the Merciful One wrote? Learn from that seemingly extraneous term that entering before the Ark Cover is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven, but entering within the Curtain merely violates a prohibition.
  And the Rabbis understand: Indeed, it is so that in order to teach the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven it is not necessary for the verse to also state “before the Ark Cover.” And the reason that the Merciful One wrote “before [<i>el penei</i>] the Ark Cover” was in order to exclude one who entered the Holy of Holies through a roundabout path, as one who did not enter facing the Ark Cover, i.e., from the east, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven.
  This is as the school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov taught: With regard to the verse: “And he shall sprinkle it with his finger before [<i>el penei</i>] the Ark Cover to the east” (Leviticus 16:14), this established a paradigm that any place in the Torah where it is stated: “Before [<i>penei</i>],” it is referring to nothing other than before the eastern side.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to this, as it is clear that the term “before [<i>el penei</i>] the Ark Cover” is necessary to exclude one who entered the Holy of Holies through a roundabout path? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Yehuda, if the purpose was for that reason, let the verse say: Before [<i>penei</i>] the Ark Cover. What is the purpose of the word <i>el</i>? Learn from that seemingly extraneous term that one is punished with death at the hand of Heaven specifically if he entered directly before the Ark, but not if he merely entered the Holy of Holies. And the Rabbis hold that the term “<i>el</i>” does not mean specifically one who enters directly before the Ark Cover.
  The Gemara now returns to its suggestion that the contradiction between the two <i>baraitot</i> with regard to whether the sprinklings of the red heifer are valid or not when performed not precisely toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting can be resolved by explaining that one <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and the other is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the expression “before [<i>el penei</i>] the Ark Cover” teaches that the punishment is limited to one who specifically entered directly before the Ark Cover, holds that the expression: “And sprinkle of its blood toward [<i>el</i>] the front” (Numbers 19:4), also means that the sprinklings must be performed specifically toward the front of the Sanctuary.
  And the Rabbis are of the opinion that from the fact that there the term <i>el</i> does not mean specifically that one is liable to be punished with death at the hand of Heaven only if he enters directly before the Ark Cover, here too they hold that it is not meant specifically, and therefore the sprinklings are valid even when performed not precisely toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.
  Rav Yosef objects to this explanation: According to Rabbi Yehuda, from the fact that there the term <i>el</i> is used specifically, the verse: “And he shall sprinkle of the blood before [<i>al</i> <i>penei</i>] the Ark Cover” (Leviticus 16:14) should also mean that the sprinkling must be performed specifically upon the Ark Cover. But in the time of the Second Temple, where there was no Ark or Ark Cover, would Rabbi Yehuda then say that indeed the sprinklings were not performed? This is clearly not correct, as all agree that the sprinklings were performed in the Second Temple (see <i>Yoma</i> 53b).
  Rabba bar Ulla said in response: The verse states with regard to the Yom Kippur service: “And he shall make atonement for the most holy place [<i>mikdash hakodesh</i>]” (Leviticus 16:33), which is interpreted as follows: He will sprinkle the blood to make atonement not specifically on the Ark [<i>hakodesh</i>], but even on the place that is dedicated [<i>hamkudash</i>] for the Ark [<i>lakodesh</i>].
  The Gemara offers another resolution of the contradiction between the <i>baraitot</i> concerning whether the sprinklings of the red heifer are valid or invalid when performed not precisely toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. Rava said: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis:
  
  Daf 28a
  
  This <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the sprinklings are valid only when performed precisely toward the entran ce of the Tent of Meeting, is referring to a case where the priest is standing with his back to the east and his front facing west and he sprinkles the blood. In this case, although the priest does not direct the sprinklings precisely toward the entrance of the Sanctuary, they are valid since he himself is facing the Sanctuary. That <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the sprinklings are not valid when performed not precisely toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, is referring to a case where the priest is standing facing north or south and he sprinkles the blood. In this case, since he is facing the wrong direction they are not valid.
  § The Master says in the <i>baraita</i>: But with regard to the sprinkling of the blood that takes place inside the Sanctuary and the sprinkling of the oil that takes place during the purification of the leper, if these are performed not for their own sake, then they are not valid. But if they were performed not precisely toward the Holy of Holies, they are valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that with regard to the sprinklings of oil during the purification of the leper, whether they were performed not for their own sake or whether they were performed not precisely toward the Holy of Holies, they are valid?
  Rav Yosef said: This is not difficult. This first <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and that second <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. He explains: Rabbi Eliezer is the <i>tanna</i> who juxtaposes the guilt offering to a sin offering, teaching that just as a sin offering is disqualified when sacrificed not for its sake, so too, the guilt offering, such as the leper’s guilt offering, is disqualified when sacrificed not for its sake, as it is written: “As is the sin offering, so is the guilt offering; there is one law for them” (Leviticus 7:7). He also juxtaposes the <i>log</i> of oil of the leper to the guilt offering of the leper in the same verse, teaching that if the sprinkling from the <i>log</i> of oil was performed not for its own sake, it is not valid. In contrast, the Rabbis do not juxtapose the guilt offering to the sin offering, and therefore they have no reason to invalidate the sprinkling from the leper’s <i>log</i> of oil that is performed not for its own sake.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Eliezer, is it so that a matter derived via juxtaposition then teaches a <i>halakha</i> to another case via juxtaposition? There is a principle that with regard to consecrated matters, a <i>halakha</i> derived via juxtaposition cannot subsequently teach a <i>halakha</i> via juxtaposition. Therefore, the necessity for the sprinklings of the <i>log</i> of oil to be performed for its own sake cannot be derived from juxtaposition between the guilt offering of the leper and the sprinkling of the oil.
  Rather, Rava said: Both this <i>baraita</i> and that <i>baraita</i> are in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Here, where the <i>baraita</i> teaches that the sprinklings are valid, it means that they were effective in rendering the offering valid and allowing the priests to partake of the remainder of the <i>log</i>, whereas there, where the <i>baraita</i> teaches that the sprinklings are not valid, it means that they do not effect acceptance, as they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner, and therefore the leper is still prohibited from partaking of sacrificial meat.
  MISHNA: With regard to the seven branches of the Candelabrum (see Exodus 25:32), the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to its seven lamps atop the branches, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the two passages that are in the <i>mezuza</i>, which are the first (Deuteronomy 6:1–9) and second (Deuteronomy 11:13–21) paragraphs of <i>Shema</i>, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. Furthermore, the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest of them.
  With regard to the four passages that are in the phylacteries, which are the two passages in the <i>mezuza</i> and two additional passages (Exodus 13:1–10, 11–16), the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. Furthermore, the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest of them. With regard to the four ritual fringes on a garment, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as the four of them constitute one mitzva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The four of them are four discrete mitzvot, and the absence of one does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest.
  GEMARA: What is the reason that the absence of any of the seven branches of the Candelabrum prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The Gemara answers: It is written concerning them a term of being: “Their knobs and their branches shall be of one piece with it” (Exodus 25:36), and a term of being indicates an indispensable requirement.
  The Sages taught (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Ḥullin</i> 1:18): The Candelabrum was fashioned from a complete block [<i>ha’eshet</i>] and from gold. If they fashioned it from fragments [<i>hagerutaot</i>] of gold then it is unfit, but if they fashioned it from other types of metal rather than gold, it is fit. The Gemara asks: What is different about a Candelabrum made from fragments of gold, that it is rendered unfit? As it is written with regard to it: “Their knobs and their branches shall be of one piece with it, the whole of it one beaten work of pure gold” (Exodus 25:36), employing the term “beaten [<i>miksha</i>]” and a term of being, indicating that it is an indispensable requirement. But accordingly, a Candelabrum fashioned from other types of metal should be rendered unfit as well, since the verse states that it is made from gold and uses a term of being.
  The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And you shall make a Candelabrum of pure gold; of beaten work will the Candelabrum be made” (Exodus 25:31), to include other types of metal. The Gemara asks: But why not say that the expression “will be made” serves to include a Candelabrum fashioned from fragments of gold? The Gemara answers: It cannot enter your mind to say this, as the term of being, which indicates an indispensable requirement, is written with regard to the command that the Candelabrum be a beaten work, i.e., fashioned from a single block and not from different fragments, as it is stated: “Shall be of one beaten work” (Exodus 25:36).
  The Gemara challenges: But the term “will be made” is also written with regard to the command that the Candelabrum be a beaten work, as it is written: “Of beaten work will the Candelabrum be made” (Exodus 25:31). The Gemara answers: The term “beaten work” appears in Exodus 25:31, and the term “beaten work” appears again in Exodus 25:36, to demonstrate that this requirement is indispensable.
  The Gemara challenges: But the term “gold” appears in Exodus 25:31, and the term “gold” appears again in Exodus 25:36. Why not also say that this as well is to demonstrate that this requirement is indispensable?
  The Gemara answers: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that when the Candelabrum is fashioned from fragments of gold it is unfit but when fashioned from other types of metal it is fit, then this is the reason that it was necessary for the verse to state “gold,” “gold” twice, and “a beaten work,” “a beaten work” twice, to teach an interpretation, which is explained shortly. But if you say that when the Candelabrum is fashioned from fragments of gold it is fit but when fashioned from other types of metal it is unfit, what do you interpret from the repeated terms “gold,” “gold” and “a beaten work,” “a beaten work”?
  The Gemara elaborates: What interpretation is referenced above? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “Of a talent of pure gold will it be made, with all these vessels” (Exodus 25:39); this verse teaches that if the Candelabrum is fashioned of gold, it must be fashioned with the precise weight of a talent; and if it is not fashioned of gold but of other types of metal, then it does not need to be fashioned with the precise weight of a talent. Similarly, the verse: “And you will make a Candelabrum of pure gold; of beaten work shall the Candelabrum be made, even its base, its shaft, its goblets, its knobs, and its flowers” (Exodus 25:31), teaches that if the Candelabrum is fashioned of gold it must be fashioned with goblets, knobs, and flowers, and if it is not fashioned of gold but of other types of metal, then it does not need to be fashioned with goblets, knobs, and flowers.
  The Gemara asks: But then why not also say with regard to the branches of the Candelabrum, which are described in Exodus 25:31 along with the term “gold,” that if the Candelabrum is fashioned of gold it must be fashioned with branches, but if it is not fashioned of gold but of other types of metal, then it does not need to be fashioned with branches? The Gemara answers: A vessel like that is called a candlestick [<i>pamot</i>], not a candelabrum.
  With regard to the second derivation mentioned, the Gemara elaborates: The verse states: “And this was the work of the Candelabrum, beaten work of gold, to the base thereof, and to the flowers thereof, it was beaten work” (Numbers 8:4). This teaches that if the Candelabrum is fashioned of gold it must be fashioned as a beaten work, but if it is not fashioned of gold but of other types of metal, then it does not need to be fashioned as a beaten work and may be made from fragments.
  The Gemara asks: For what purpose does the term “beaten work” that is repeated again in the latter clause of the verse come? The Gemara answers: It comes to exclude the trumpets, teaching that they are fit even if they were not fashioned from a single block. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The silver trumpets that Moses was commanded to fashion in the wilderness were to be fashioned from a complete block and from silver. If one fashioned them from fragments they are fit, but if he fashioned them from other types of metal then they are unfit.
  The Gemara asks: And what is different about trumpets made from other types of metal that they are rendered unfit? As it is written with regard to the trumpets: “Make for yourself two trumpets of silver; of beaten work you shall make them; and they shall be for you for the calling of the congregation” (Numbers 10:2). The verse employs the terms silver and being, indicating that it is an indispensable requirement. But accordingly, trumpets fashioned from fragments should be rendered unfit as well, since the verse employs the terms beaten work and being. The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excludes the trumpets when it states with regard to the Candelabrum: “It was beaten work” (Numbers 8:4), indicating that it alone, but not the trumpets, was beaten work.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All of the vessels
  
  Daf 28b
  
  that Moses fashioned were fit for his generation and were fit for future generations. Yet the trumpets that Moses fashioned were fit for his generation but were unfit for future generations.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the trumpets were unfit for future generations? If we say that it is because the verse states: “Make for you two silver trumpets” (Numbers 10:2), meaning that they are fit for you, but not for future generations, that is difficult; if that is so, then the verse: “Make for you an Ark of wood” (Deuteronomy 10:1), should also teach that the Ark is fit only for you, but not for future generations. This cannot be the <i>halakha</i>, as the <i>baraita</i> stated explicitly that all vessels, other than the trumpets, that were fashioned by Moses were fit for future generations.
  Rather, the term “for you” that is written with regard to the fashioning of the Ark should be understood either according to the one who says that “for you” means from your own property, or according to the one who says that God said to Moses: I desire, as it were, that the Ark be fashioned from your property more than I desire that it be fashioned from the property of the rest of the nation (see <i>Yoma</i> 3b). Accordingly, here too, with regard to the trumpets, the term “for you” should be understood in this manner. The Gemara responds: There, with regard to the trumpets, it is different, as the verse states “for you” twice: “Make for you two trumpets of silver, of beaten work you shall make them, and they shall be for you for the calling of the congregation” (Numbers 10:2).
  § The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa, son of Rav Ḥanin, taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Yosef: The Candelabrum could be fashioned from a complete block and from gold. If one fashioned it from silver, it is fit. If one fashioned it from tin, or from lead, or from other types of metal [<i>gisteron</i>], Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it unfit, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, deems it fit. If one fashioned it from wood, or from bone, or from glass, everyone agrees that it is unfit.
  Rav Yosef said to him: What, in your opinion, is the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? Rav Pappa, son of Rav Ḥanin, said to him: Both this Sage and that Sage interpret the verse: “And you will make a Candelabrum of pure gold; of beaten work will the Candelabrum be made” (Exodus 25:31), by means of the principle of generalizations and details. The verse begins with a generalization: “And you will make a Candelabrum,” followed by a detail: “Of pure gold,” which is then followed by a generalization: “Will the Candelabrum be made.” According to the hermeneutic principle of generalizations and details, this teaches that any item that is similar to the detail is also deemed fit.
  But one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as a type of metal, so too, all other types of metal may be used in fashioning the Candelabrum. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds that just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as an item of substantial value, so too, all items of substantial value may be used in fashioning the Candelabrum. Rav Yosef said to him: Remove your <i>baraita</i> in light of my <i>baraita</i>.
  Rav Yosef continued: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to Temple service vessels that one fashioned from wood, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems them unfit and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, deems them fit. According to this <i>baraita</i>, their dispute was with regard to a Candelabrum fashioned from wood, not from metal. Rav Yosef explains: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi interprets verses by means of the principle of generalizations and details, and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, interprets verses by means of the principle of amplifications and restrictions.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi interprets the verse: “And you will make a Candelabrum of pure gold; of beaten work will the Candelabrum be made” (Exodus 25:31), by means of the principle of generalizations and details. “And you will make a Candelabrum of” is a generalization, as the material of the Candelabrum is not specified; “pure gold” is a detail, limiting the material exclusively to gold; and by then stating: “Of beaten work will the Candelabrum be made,” the verse then makes a generalization. The result is a generalization and a detail and a generalization, from which you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail, leading to this conclusion: Just as the item mentioned in the detail is clearly defined as a type of metal, so too, all other types of metal may be used in fashioning the Candelabrum.
  By contrast, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, interprets the verse by means of the principle of amplifications and restrictions. “And you will make a Candelabrum of” is an amplification, as the material of the Candelabrum is not specified; “pure gold” is a restriction, limiting the material exclusively to gold; and by then stating: “Of beaten work will the Candelabrum be made,” the verse repeated and amplified. There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse amplified and then restricted and then amplified, it amplified the relevant category to include everything except the specific matter excluded in the restriction. And what did the verse include? It includes all materials, even wood. And what did the verse exclude with this restriction? It excluded a Candelabrum fashioned from earthenware, which is furthest in quality from gold.
  Rav Pappa, son of Rav Ḥanin, said to him: On the contrary, remove your <i>baraita</i> in light of my <i>baraita</i>. Rav Yosef responded: That cannot enter your mind, as it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: If the one who is fashioning the Candelabrum has no gold, he may bring even a Candelabrum made of silver, of copper, of iron, of tin, or of lead. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, deems it fit even if it was fashioned from wood. It is evident from this <i>baraita</i> that the dispute pertains only to a Candelabrum fashioned from wood, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees that it may be fashioned from other types of metal.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: A person may not construct a house in the exact form of the Sanctuary, nor a portico [<i>akhsadra</i>] corresponding to the Entrance Hall of the Sanctuary, nor a courtyard corresponding to the Temple courtyard, nor a table corresponding to the Table in the Temple, nor a candelabrum corresponding to the Candelabrum in the Temple. But one may fashion a candelabrum of five or of six or of eight branches. And one may not fashion a candelabrum of seven branches, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even if he constructs it from other kinds of metal rather than gold, since the Candelabrum used in the Temple may be fashioned from other metals.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One may not even fashion a candelabrum from wood, in the manner that the kings of the Hasmonean monarchy did in the Temple. The Candelabrum used in the Temple in the time of the Hasmonean kings was fashioned from wood. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda: You seek to bring a proof from there? In the time of the Hasmoneans the Candelabrum was not fashioned from wood but from spits [<i>shappudim</i>] of iron, and they covered them with tin. Later, when they grew richer and could afford to fashion a Candelabrum of higher-quality material, they fashioned the Candelabrum from silver. When they again grew richer, they fashioned the Candelabrum from gold.
  § Shmuel says in the name of a certain elder: The height of the Candelabrum was eighteen handbreadths. The base and the flower that was upon the base were a height of three handbreadths; and two handbreadths above that were bare; and there was above that one handbreadth, which had a goblet, knob, and flower on it. And two handbreadths above that were bare, and there was above that one handbreadth that had a knob.
  And two branches emerge from the knob, one toward this direction and one toward that direction, and they extend and rise up to the height of the Candelabrum. And one handbreadth above that was bare, and there was above that one handbreadth that had a knob. And two branches emerge from the knob, one toward this direction and one toward that direction, and they extend and rise up to the height of the Candelabrum. And one handbreadth above that was bare, and there was above that one handbreadth that had a knob. And two branches emerge from the knob, one toward this direction and one toward that direction, and they extend and rise up to the height of the Candelabrum. And two handbreadths above that were bare. There then remained there three handbreadths in which there were three goblets, and a knob, and a flower.
  And the goblets of the Candelabrum, to what are they similar? They were like Alexandrian goblets, which are long and narrow. The knobs, to what are they similar? They were like the shape of the apples of the Cherethites. The flowers, to what are they similar? They were like the ornaments that are etched in columns. And there are found to be a total of twenty-two goblets, eleven knobs, and nine flowers on the Candelabrum.
  With regard to the goblets, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others; with regard to the knobs, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others; with regard to the flowers, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. With regard to the goblets, knobs, and flowers, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, there were twenty-two goblets on the Candelabrum, as it is written: “And in the Candelabrum four goblets made like almond blossoms” (Exodus 25:34), and it is written: “Three goblets made like almond blossoms in one branch, a knob, and a flower; and three goblets made like almond blossoms in the other branch, a knob, and a flower; so for the six branches going out of the Candelabrum” (Exodus 25:33). Therefore, the Candelabrum contains the four goblets of its main shaft,
  
  Daf 29a
  
  and the eighteen of the six branches; this equals twenty-two goblets. Concerning the knobs as well, it is clear how the number eleven was reached. The Candelabrum contains the two knobs of its main shaft, as the verse states: “Its knobs” (Exodus 25:34), with the plural “knobs” indicating that there were two, and the six of the six branches, as it is written: “In one branch, a knob and a flower” (Exodus 25:33). In addition to these eight knobs, the verse states: “And a knob under two branches of one piece with it, and a knob under two branches of one piece with it, and a knob under two branches of one piece with it” (Exodus 25:35); this equals eleven knobs.
  But from where do we derive that the Candelabrum contained nine flowers? According to the verse there are the two flowers of its main shaft, as it is written: “And its flowers” (Exodus 25:34), and the six of the six branches, as it is written: “In one branch, a knob and a flower” (Exodus 25:33), meaning that there are eight, not nine, flowers on the Candelabrum. Rav Shalman said in response: It is written: “It was a beaten work, from the base to the flower” (Numbers 8:4), which teaches that there was a ninth flower near the base.
  Rav says: The height of the Candelabrum is nine handbreadths. Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya raised an objection to the statement of Rav: We learned in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 30b): There was a stone before the Candelabrum and it had three steps, upon which the priest would stand and prepare the lamps for kindling. If the Candelabrum was only nine handbreadths high, why would it be necessary for the priest to stand on an elevated surface to reach the lamps?
  Rav said to him: Shimi, is it you who is asking me such a question? When I said that the height of the Candelabrum is nine handbreadths, I was referring not to the total height, which is eighteen handbreadths; rather, I meant that the Candelabrum is nine handbreadths from the point at which the branches extend from the main shaft and above.
  § It is written: “And the flowers, and the lamps, and the tongs, of gold, and that perfect gold [<i>mikhlot zahav</i>]” (II Chronicles 4:21). The Gemara asks: What is meant by <i>mikhlot zahav</i>? Rav Ami says: It is a reference to the fact that the Candelabrum and its vessels exhausted [<i>kilattu</i>] all of Solomon’s pure [<i>sagur</i>] gold [<i>zahav</i>], which was used in its fashioning in such great quantities. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav said: Solomon made ten Candelabrums, and for each and every one he brought one thousand talents of gold, and they placed the gold in the furnace to refine it one thousand times, until they reduced the gold to one talent for each Candelabrum, as it is stated: “Of a talent of pure gold shall it be made” (Exodus 25:39).
  The Gemara asks: Is that so that all of Solomon’s gold was exhausted for the fashioning of the Candelabrum and its vessels? But isn’t it written: “And all King Solomon’s drinking vessels were of gold, and all the vessels of the house of the forest of Lebanon were of pure gold;silver was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon” (II Chronicles 9:20)? The Gemara answers: We are saying that Solomon’s pure gold was exhausted for the fashioning of the Candelabrum, but not all of his gold.
  The Gemara asks: And would refining the gold reduce it to this extent, that one thousand talents of gold would be reduced to one talent? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: An incident occurred where the weight of the Candelabrum of the Temple was found to be greater than the weight of the Candelabrum of Moses by one <i>Kordikini</i> gold dinar, and they placed it in the furnace eighty times until the weight of the Candelabrum stood at precisely one talent. Evidently, putting the Candelabrum into a furnace reduces its weight by very little. The Gemara answers: Once it is standing, it is standing, i.e., since the gold was refined to such a degree in the time of Solomon, later when it was refined eighty times it was reduced by the weight of only one dinar.
  § Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Upon the pure Candelabrum” (Leviticus 24:4)? It teaches that the procedure for fashioning it descended, i.e., was shown to Moses, from the place of purity, i.e., by God, who showed Moses a model of the Candelabrum. The Gemara asks: If that is so, is that to say that phrase “upon the pure Table” (Leviticus 24:6) also teaches that the procedure for fashioning it was shown to Moses from the place of purity? Rather, the expression “the pure Table” teaches, by inference, that it is susceptible to becoming ritually impure. Here too, the expression “the pure Candelabrum” teaches, by inference, that it is susceptible to becoming ritually impure.
  The Gemara rejects this: Granted, the inference drawn there with regard to the Table is in accordance with that which Reish Lakish says; as Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Upon the pure Table” (Leviticus 24:6)? The expression “pure Table” teaches, by inference, that it is susceptible to becoming ritually impure, but why? Isn’t the Table a wooden vessel designated to rest in a fixed place, and any wooden vessel that is designated to rest in a fixed place is not susceptible to becoming ritually impure? Rather, this teaches that the Table was not always left in a fixed place; the priests would lift the Table with its shewbread to display the shewbread to the pilgrims standing in the Temple courtyard, and a priest would say to them: See your affection before the Omnipresent. For this reason, the Table is susceptible to becoming ritually impure.
  Parenthetically, the Gemara asks: What is meant by: See your affection before God? It is in accordance with that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: A great miracle was performed with the shewbread: Its condition at the time of its removal from the Table, after having been left there for a week, was like its condition at the time of its arrangement on the Table, as it is stated: “To place hot bread on the day when it was taken away” (I Samuel 21:7), indicating that it was as hot on the day of its removal as it was on the day when it was placed on the Table.
  The Gemara resumes stating its objection: But here, with regard to the Candelabrum, there is no reason to explain that the expression “the pure Candelabrum” teaches, by inference, that it is susceptible to becoming ritually impure; this is obvious, as the Candelabrums are metal vessels, and metal vessels are susceptible to becoming ritually impure whether or not they remain in a fixed location. Rather, it must be that the expression “the pure Candelabrum” teaches that the procedure for fashioning it descended, i.e., was shown to Moses, from the place of purity.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: An Ark of fire and a Table of fire and a Candelabrum of fire descended from the Heavens, and Moses saw their format and fashioned the vessels for the Tabernacle in their likeness. As it is stated after the command to fashion these items: “And see that you make them after their pattern, which is being shown to you in the mount” (Exodus 25:40).
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, is that to say that the verse: “And you shall set up the Tabernacle according to its fashion which has been shown to you in the mount” (Exodus 26:30), also indicates that God showed Moses a Tabernacle of fire? The Gemara answers: Here, with regard to the Tabernacle, it is written: “According to its fashion,” meaning that it should be built according to the instructions given to Moses, whereas there, with regard to the Ark, Table, and Candelabrum, it is written: “After their pattern,” indicating that an actual model of the items was shown to Moses.
  Apropos this discussion the Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The angel Gabriel was girded with a type of wide belt [<i>pesikiyya</i>] in the manner of artisans who tie up their clothes to prevent these clothes from hindering them in their work. And he showed the precise way to fashion the Candelabrum to Moses, as it is written: “And this is the work of the Candelabrum” (Numbers 8:4), and the term “this” indicates that an exact replica was shown to him.
  The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Three matters were difficult for Moses to comprehend precisely, until the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed them to him with His finger, and these are the three matters: The form of the Candelabrum, and the exact size of the new moon, and the impure creeping animals. The Candelabrum was shown to him, as it is written: “And this is the work of the Candelabrum” (Numbers 8:4). The new moon was shown to him, as it is written: “This month shall be for you the beginning of months” (Exodus 12:2). The creeping animals were shown to him, as it is written: “And these are they which are unclean for you among the swarming things” (Leviticus 11:29). And there are those who say that God also showed Moses the <i>halakhot</i> of slaughtering, as it is stated: “Now this is that which you shall sacrifice upon the altar” (Exodus 29:38), and slaughtering is the first ritual of sacrifice.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the two passages that are in the <i>mezuza</i>, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others. And furthermore, the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest of them. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva, since it is written: “And you shall write them [<i>ukhtavtam</i>]” (Deuteronomy 6:9), which teaches that the writing [<i>ketav</i>] must be complete [<i>tam</i>]?
  Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It was necessary to state that only to teach that even the absence of the thorn, i.e., the small stroke, of a letter <i>yod</i> prevents fulfillment of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: But isn’t this also obvious, since the letter is not formed properly? Rather, it is necessary according to another statement that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Any letter that is not encircled with blank parchment on all four of its sides, i.e., where its ink connects to the letter above it, below it, preceding it, or succeeding it, is unfit. When the mishna makes reference to one letter preventing fulfillment of the mitzva, it is referring to a letter that touches an adjacent letter.
  Ashiyan bar Nadbakh says in the name of Rav Yehuda: If the inner part of the letter <i>heh</i> was perforated it is fit, but if the perforation was in the leg of the letter <i>heh</i> it is unfit. Rabbi Zeira says: This matter was explained to me by Rav Huna, and Rabbi Ya’akov says: This matter was explained to me by Rav Yehuda: If the inner part of the letter <i>heh</i> was perforated it is fit. In a case where the perforation was in the leg of the letter <i>heh</i>, then if there remained in the leg that is attached to the roof of the letter the equivalent of the measure of a small letter, i.e., the letter <i>yod</i>, then it is fit. But if not, it is unfit.
  The Gemara relates: Agra, the father-in-law of Rabbi Abba,
  
  Daf 29b
  
  had the leg of the letter <i>heh</i> in the term: “The nation [<i>ha’am</i>]” (Exodus 13:3), written in his phylacteries, severed by a perforation. He came before his son-in-law Rabbi Abba to clarify the <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Abba said to him: If there remains in the leg that is attached to the roof of the letter the equivalent of the measure of a small letter, i.e., the letter <i>yod</i>, it is fit. But if not, it is unfit.
  The Gemara relates: Rami bar Tamrei, who was the father-in-law of Rami bar Dikkulei, had the leg of the letter <i>vav</i> in the term: “And the Lord slew [<i>vayaharog</i>] all the firstborn” (Exodus 13:15), written in his phylacteries, severed by a perforation. He came before Rabbi Zeira to clarify the <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Go bring a child who is neither wise nor stupid, but of average intelligence; if he reads the term as “And the Lord slew [<i>vayaharog</i>]” then it is fit, as despite the perforation the letter is still seen as a <i>vav</i>. But if not, then it is as though the term were: Will be slain [<i>yehareg</i>], written without the letter <i>vav</i>, and it is unfit.
  § Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: When Moses ascended on High, he found the Holy One, Blessed be He, sitting and tying crowns on the letters of the Torah. Moses said before God: Master of the Universe, who is preventing You from giving the Torah without these additions? God said to him: There is a man who is destined to be born after several generations, and Akiva ben Yosef is his name; he is destined to derive from each and every thorn of these crowns mounds upon mounds of <i>halakhot</i>. It is for his sake that the crowns must be added to the letters of the Torah.
  Moses said before God: Master of the Universe, show him to me. God said to him: Return behind you. Moses went and sat at the end of the eighth row in Rabbi Akiva’s study hall and did not understand what they were saying. Moses’ strength waned, as he thought his Torah knowledge was deficient. When Rabbi Akiva arrived at the discussion of one matter, his students said to him: My teacher, from where do you derive this? Rabbi Akiva said to them: It is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. When Moses heard this, his mind was put at ease, as this too was part of the Torah that he was to receive.
  Moses returned and came before the Holy One, Blessed be He, and said before Him: Master of the Universe, You have a man as great as this and yet You still choose to give the Torah through me. Why? God said to him: Be silent; this intention arose before Me. Moses said before God: Master of the Universe, You have shown me Rabbi Akiva’s Torah, now show me his reward. God said to him: Return to where you were. Moses went back and saw that they were weighing Rabbi Akiva’s flesh in a butcher shop [<i>bemakkulin</i>], as Rabbi Akiva was tortured to death by the Romans. Moses said before Him: Master of the Universe, this is Torah and this is its reward? God said to him: Be silent; this intention arose before Me.
  § The Gemara continues its discussion of the crowns on letters of the Torah: Rava says: Seven letters require three crowns [<i>ziyyunin</i>], and they are the letters <i>shin</i>, <i>ayin</i>, <i>tet</i>, <i>nun</i>, <i>zayin</i>; <i>gimmel</i> and <i>tzadi</i>. Rav Ashi says: I have seen that the exacting scribes of the study hall of Rav would put a hump-like stroke on the roof of the letter <i>ḥet</i> and they would suspend the left leg of the letter <i>heh</i>, i.e., they would ensure that it is not joined to the roof of the letter.
  Rava explains: They would put a hump-like stroke on the roof of the letter <i>ḥet</i> as if to thereby say: The Holy One, Blessed be He, lives [<i>ḥai</i>] in the heights of the universe. And they would suspend the left leg of the letter <i>heh</i>, as Rabbi Yehuda Nesia asked Rabbi Ami: What is the meaning of that which is written: “Trust in the Lord forever, for in the Lord [<i>beYah</i>] is God, an everlasting [<i>olamim</i>] Rock” (Isaiah 26:4)? Rabbi Ami said to him: Anyone who puts their trust in the Holy One, Blessed be He, will have Him as his refuge in this world and in the World-to-Come. This is alluded to in the word “<i>olamim</i>,” which can also mean: Worlds.
  Rabbi Yehuda Nesia said to Rabbi Ami: I was not asking about the literal meaning of the verse; this is what poses a difficulty for me: What is different about that which is written: “For in the Lord [<i>beYah</i>],” and it is not written: For the Lord [<i>Yah</i>]?
  Rav Ashi responded: It is as Rabbi Yehuda bar Rabbi Elai taught: The verse “For in the Lord [<i>beYah</i>] is God, an everlasting Rock [<i>Tzur olamim</i>]” is understood as follows: The term “<i>Tzur olamim</i>” can also mean Creator of worlds. These letters <i>yod</i> and <i>heh</i> that constitute the word <i>yah</i> are referring to the two worlds that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created; one with [<i>be</i>] the letter <i>heh</i> and one with [<i>be</i>] the letter <i>yod</i>. And I do not know whether the World-to-Come was created with the letter <i>yod</i> and this world was created with the letter <i>heh</i>, or whether this world was created with the letter <i>yod</i> and the World-to-Come was created with the letter <i>heh</i>.
  When the verse states: “These are the generations of the heaven and of the earth when they were created [<i>behibare’am</i>]” (Genesis 2:4), do not read it as <i>behibare’am</i>, meaning: When they were created; rather, read it as <i>beheh bera’am</i>, meaning: He created them with the letter <i>heh</i>. This verse demonstrates that the heaven and the earth, i.e., this world, were created with the letter <i>heh</i>, and therefore the World-to-Come must have been created with the letter <i>yod</i>.
  And for what reason was this world created specifically with the letter <i>heh</i>? It is because the letter <i>heh</i>, which is open on its bottom, has a similar appearance to a portico, which is open on one side. And it alludes to this world, where anyone who wishes to leave may leave, i.e., every person has the ability to choose to do evil. And what is the reason that the left leg of the letter <i>heh</i> is suspended, i.e., is not joined to the roof of the letter? It is because if one repents, he is brought back in through the opening at the top.
  The Gemara asks: But why not let him enter through that same way that he left? The Gemara answers: That would not be effective, since one requires assistance from Heaven in order to repent, in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “If it concerns the scorners, He scorns them, but to the humble He gives grace” (Proverbs 3:34)? Concerning one who comes in order to become pure, he is assisted from Heaven, as it is written: “But to the humble He gives grace.” Concerning one who comes to become impure, he is provided with an opening to do so. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that the letter <i>heh</i> has a crown on its roof? The Gemara answers: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: If a sinner returns, repenting for his sin, I tie a crown for him from above.
  The Gemara asks: For what reason was the World-to-Come created specifically with the letter <i>yod</i>, the smallest letter in the Hebrew alphabet? The Gemara answers: It is because the righteous of the world are so few. And for what reason is the left side of the top of the letter <i>yod</i> bent downward? It is because the righteous who are in the World-to-Come hang their heads in shame, since the actions of one are not similar to those of another. In the World-to-Come some of the righteous will be shown to be of greater stature than others.
  § Rav Yosef says: Rav states these two matters with regard to scrolls, and in each case a statement is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that constitutes a refutation of his ruling. One is that which Rav says: A Torah scroll that contains two errors on each and every column may be corrected, but if there are three errors on each and every column then it shall be interred.
  And a statement is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that constitutes a refutation of his ruling: A Torah scroll that contains three errors on every column may be corrected, but if there are four errors on every column then it shall be interred. A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the Torah scroll contains one complete column with no errors, it saves the entire Torah scroll, and it is permitted to correct the scroll rather than interring it. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: And this is the <i>halakha</i> only when the majority of the scroll is written properly and is not full of errors.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If that column contained three errors, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Yosef said to him: Since the column itself may be corrected, it enables the correction of the entire scroll. The Gemara adds: And with regard to the <i>halakha</i> that a Torah scroll may not be fixed if it is full of errors, this statement applies when letters are missing and must be added in the space between the lines. But if there were extraneous letters, we have no problem with it, since they can easily be erased. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that a scroll with letters missing may not be corrected? Rav Kahana said: Because it would look speckled if one adds all of the missing letters in the spaces between the lines.
  The Gemara relates: Agra, the father-in-law of Rabbi Abba, had many extraneous letters in his scroll. He came before Rabbi Abba to clarify the <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Abba said to him: We said that one may not correct the scroll only in a case where the letters are missing.
  
  Daf 30a
  
  But if there are extraneous letters, we have no problem with it, and one may erase them. This is the first <i>halakha</i> that Rav stated, which is refuted in a <i>baraita</i>.
  The other is that which Rav says: One who writes a Torah scroll and comes to finish writing it may finish writing it anywhere in the column, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to finishing it in the middle of the column. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One who writes a Torah scroll and comes to finish writing it may not finish writing it in the middle of the column in the manner that one finishes writing one of the five books of the Torah written as an independent scroll. Rather, he should progressively shorten the width of the lines until he finishes the scroll at the end of the column. The Gemara answers: When Rav says that one may finish writing even in the middle of a column, he was referring to one of the five books of the Torah.
  The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav say his statement with regard to a Torah scroll? The Gemara answers: He was referring to one of the five books that constitute a Torah scroll. Rav meant that when writing a Torah scroll, one may finish writing any of the first four books in the middle of a column. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba say that Rav Giddel says that Rav says: The words: “In the sight of all Israel” (Deuteronomy 34:12), which conclude the Torah, may be written even in the middle of the column? The Gemara answers: That ruling that was stated is with regard to finishing the Torah scroll in the middle of the line, i.e., in the middle of the width of the column.
  The Gemara cites another opinion: The Rabbis say that one may finish writing a Torah scroll even in the middle of the line, but one may finish writing it at the end of the line as well. Rav Ashi says that one must finish writing the Torah scroll specifically in the middle of the line. And the <i>halakha</i> is that it must be ended specifically in the middle of the line.
  § Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba says that Rav Giddel says that Rav says: With regard to the last eight verses of the Torah (Deuteronomy 32:5–12), a single individual reads them in the synagogue, as that section may not be divided between two readers. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this said? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And Moses the servant of the Lord died there” (Deuteronomy 34:5). Is it possible that after Moses died, he himself wrote: “And Moses died there”? Rather, Moses wrote the entire Torah until this point, and Joshua bin Nun wrote from this point forward; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And some say that Rabbi Neḥemya stated this opinion.
  Rabbi Shimon said to him: Is it possible that the Torah scroll was missing a single letter? But it is written that God instructed Moses: “Take this Torah scroll and put it by the side of the Ark of the Covenant” (Deuteronomy 31:26), indicating that the Torah was complete as is and that nothing further would be added to it.
  Rabbi Shimon explains: Rather, until this point, i.e., the verse describing the death of Moses, the Holy One, Blessed be He, dictated and Moses wrote the text and repeated after Him. From this point forward, with regard to Moses’ death, the Holy One, Blessed be He, dictated and Moses wrote with tears without repeating the words, due to his great sorrow. As it is stated there with regard to Jeremiah’s dictation of the prophecy of the destruction of the Temple to Baruch ben Neriah: “And Baruch said to them: He dictated all these words to me, and I wrote them with ink in the scroll” (Jeremiah 36:18), but he did not repeat the words after Jeremiah.
  The Gemara now states its inference: Shall we say that the ruling of Rav that the last verses of the Torah are read by only one reader is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since according to Rabbi Shimon these verses are similar to all other verses of the Torah, as they were all written by Moses? The Gemara answers: You may even say that Rav’s ruling was stated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; since they differ from the rest of the Torah in one way, as Moses wrote them without repeating the words, they differ from the rest of the Torah in this way as well, and they may not be divided between two readers.
  And Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba says that Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who purchases a Torah scroll in the marketplace is akin to one who snatches a mitzva in the marketplace, as the proper manner in which to perform the mitzva of writing a Torah scroll is to write one for himself. And if he himself writes a Torah scroll, the verse ascribes him credit as though he received it at Mount Sinai. Rav Sheshet says: If he emended even a single letter of the Torah scroll, thereby completing it, the verse ascribes him credit as though he had written it in its entirety.
  § Before continuing its discussion of the <i>halakhot</i> of writing a Torah scroll, the Gemara presents a mnemonic for the upcoming <i>halakhot</i>: <i>Samekh</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>lamed</i>, <i>mem</i>. The Sages taught: A person may prepare for a Torah scroll a sheet of parchment of any size from three columns and until eight columns, but one may not prepare a sheet of parchment that has less than three or more than eight columns.
  And he may not increase the number of columns, e.g., by writing eight columns on a narrow sheet of parchment, since then each column has the appearance of a missive due to its narrow lines. And he may not decrease the number of columns, e.g., by writing three columns on a wide sheet of parchment, since then the lines will be so wide that the reader’s eyes will wander, as it will be difficult to find the beginning of a line. Rather, the ideal width of a line is, for example, where one can write “<i>lemishpeḥoteikhem</i>,” “<i>lemishpeḥoteikhem</i>,” “<i>lemishpeḥoteikhem</i>,” for a total of three times.
  If one happened to acquire a sheet of parchment that has space for nine columns, exceeding the eight-column limit, he should not divide it into two sheets of parchment with three columns here and six columns there; rather, he should divide it into two sheets of parchment with four columns here and five columns there, so that the two sheets will be similar in width.
  In what case is this statement that the sheet must contain a minimum of three columns said? It is said with regard to sheets at the beginning and middle of the scroll. But at the end of the scroll, a sheet may consist of even one verse, and even one column. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind to say that a sheet may contain one verse? Rather, say that it may consist of even one verse on one column.
  The measure of the margin of a Torah scroll is as follows: The size of the lower margin is one handbreadth [<i>tefaḥ</i>]. There is a requirement for a large margin there, so that a reader not inadvertently rest his arm on the writing. The size of the upper margin, which is less susceptible to that occurrence, is three fingerbreadths [<i>etzba’ot</i>], and the space between each column is equal to the full width of two fingerbreadths. And with regard to one of the five books of the Torah that is written as an independent scroll, the size of the lower margin is three fingerbreadths, the size of the upper margin is two fingerbreadths, and the space between each column is equal to the full width of a thumb-breadth [<i>gudal</i>].
  And the space between one line of a Torah scroll and the following line must be equal to the space of a full line, and the space between one word and the following word must be equal to a full small letter, and as for the space between one letter and the following letter, it is sufficient for it to be equal to a full hairbreadth.
  The <i>halakhot</i> of the margins notwithstanding, a person may not reduce the size of the writing in a manner that the size of the writing is not consistent, not in order to ensure the correct amount of space for the lower margin, nor in order to ensure the correct amount of space for the upper margin, nor in order to ensure the correct amount of space between one line and the following line, nor in order to ensure the correct amount of space between one passage and the following passage, as this is not aesthetically pleasing.
  If one happens upon a word that comprises five letters and cannot be written in its entirety within the column, he may not write two letters within the column and three outside of the column, in the margin.
  
  Daf 30b
  
  Rather, he should write three letters in the column and two outside of the column. If he happens upon a word that comprises two letters and cannot be written in its entirety within the column, he may not cast it in the margin between the two columns; rather, he should return and write the word at the beginning of the following line.
  § One who mistakenly omitted the name of God and wrote the next word before discovering his error should scrape off that which he wrote, and suspend the words that he scraped off above the line, and write the name of God upon the place that had been scraped; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: One may even suspend the name of God above the line, without scraping off the word that was written in its place. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Not only may one scrape off the dry ink of the next word, but one may even wipe away the word while the ink is still wet and write the name of God in its place.
  Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: A scribe may suspend the entire name of God above the line, but he may not suspend part of the name of God above the line. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A scribe may not write the name of God either upon the place that had been scraped or upon the place that had been wiped away, and he may not suspend it above the line, as none of these options exhibit sufficient respect for the name of God. What should the scribe do? He should remove the entire sheet of parchment and inter it.
  It was stated that the <i>amora’im</i> disagreed with regard to the final halakhic ruling: Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> is that one suspends the name of God above the line. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is that one may even wipe away the word while the ink is still wet and write the name of God in its place.
  The Gemara asks: And why is it necessary to state the actual opinions? Let this Sage, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav, say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Yosei; and let this Sage, Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel, say that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of that Sage, Rabbi Yitzḥak. The Gemara answers: Since there are those who reverse the opinions of the <i>tanna’im</i>, they needed to state the opinions explicitly.
  Ravin bar Ḥinnana says that Ulla says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri; and moreover, not only is the <i>halakha</i> in accordance with his opinion with regard to this matter, but in any place where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught a <i>halakha</i>, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion.
  The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri is this referring? If we say that it is referring to the statement here, where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: A scribe may suspend the entire name of God above the line, but he may not suspend part of the name of God above the line, that is difficult: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that <i>baraita</i> that Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> is that one suspends the name of God above the line, and Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is that one may even wipe away the word while the ink is still wet and write the name of God in its place?
  And if it is so that when Rabbi Ḥanina said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri he was referring to this matter, then let Ravin bar Ḥinnana also say along with those <i>amora’im</i> that the <i>halakha</i> is that one suspends the entire name of God above the line, but not a part of the name.
  Rather, say that Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri was referring not to the discussion here, but was stated with regard to this mishna (<i>Ḥullin</i> 74b): Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: If one ritually slaughtered a pregnant cow and the calf was then removed alive, the ritual slaughter of the mother is effective with regard to the calf as well. And even if the calf is five years old and plowing the field when one wants to eat it, the earlier slaughter of its mother renders it permitted, and it does not require ritual slaughter before it is eaten.
  The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it already stated with regard to that mishna that Ze’eiri says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? And if it is so that when Rabbi Ḥanina said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri he was referring to this matter, then let Ravin bar Ḥinnana also say along with Ze’eiri that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.
  Rather, say that Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement was with regard to this mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 65b): Initially the Sages would say: With regard to one who was taken out in a collar [<i>kolar</i>] to be executed and said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, these people should write and give her the document. Although he did not explicitly say the word give, this is understood to have been his intention, in order to release her from the obligation to perform levirate marriage or <i>ḥalitza</i>. They then said that this <i>halakha</i> applies even to one who sets sail and one who departs with a caravan to a distant place. A bill of divorce is given to his wife under these circumstances even if her husband said only: Write a bill of divorce for my wife. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even in the case of one who is dangerously ill who gives that instruction, they write the bill of divorce and give it to his wife.
  Alternatively, Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement was with regard to this <i>halakha</i>: In the case of <i>teruma</i> of the tithe of <i>demai</i>, which is separated from the produce received from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, who is suspected of not separating tithes properly, that returned to its original place, i.e., it became mixed with the produce from which it had been separated, Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: In this situation, not only did the Sages permit one to ask the <i>am ha’aretz</i> whether he had set aside his tithes in the proper manner and to rely on his response on Shabbat, a day when it is not permitted to separate tithes, but one may ask him and eat based on his statement even on a weekday.
  The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it already stated with regard to those <i>mishnayot</i> that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the case of one who is dangerously ill, and in the case of <i>teruma</i> of the tithe of <i>demai</i>? And if it is so that when Rabbi Ḥanina said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri he was referring to these <i>mishnayot</i>, then let Ravin bar Ḥinnana also say along with Rabbi Yoḥanan that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.
  Rather, say that Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement was made with regard to this <i>halakha</i>: Rabbi Yosei ben Keifar says in the name of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri: If one planted a cowpea plant for its seed, i.e., not to be eaten as a vegetable but for one to either eat or plant its seeds, and some of the plants took root before Rosh HaShana, while some of them took root only after Rosh HaShana, one may not separate <i>teruma</i> or tithes from this for that, as one may not separate <i>teruma</i> or tithes from the new crop for the old or from the old crop for the new.
  How, then, shall one act so that he not err and set aside <i>teruma</i> and tithes incorrectly? It is difficult to know when the plants took root. He shall pile the entire stock onto his threshing floor, into the middle of it, mix the stock together, and then separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes; and consequently it will turn out that he has separated <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the new crop in the mixture for the new crop in it, and from the old crop in the mixture for the old crop in it.
  The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it already stated with regard to that <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? And if it is so that when Rabbi Ḥanina said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri he was referring to this <i>baraita</i>, then let Ravin bar Ḥinnana also say along with Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.
  Rather, Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement was with regard to a chest. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that it was with regard to wine. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Pappa said
  
  Daf 31a
  
  that Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement was with regard to a chest, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 18:1): A wooden chest that is large enough to contain forty <i>se’a</i> is not susceptible to contracting ritual impurity, since it is no longer considered a vessel. In determining its capacity, Beit Shammai say that it is measured on the inside, and Beit Hillel say that it is measured on the outside so that the volume of the walls of the chest itself is included in the measurement. And both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concede that the volume of the legs and the volume of the rims [<i>halevazbazin</i>] are not measured.
  Rabbi Yosei says: They concede that the volume of the legs and the volume of the rims are measured, but the space enclosed between the rims and the legs is not measured. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: If the legs were one handbreadth high then the space between the legs is not measured, since the area has an independent significance, but if the space is not one handbreadth high, the space between the legs is measured as part of the chest. It is with regard to this statement that Rabbi Ḥanina said the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement was with regard to wine, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 3:2): Rabbi Meir says: Oil, an example of a liquid, that contracted impurity, is always considered to have first-degree ritual impurity, even if it came into contact with an item that was impure with second-degree ritual impurity, which, according to the standard <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity, should result in it having third-degree ritual impurity. And the Rabbis say that this is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to honey. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: This is the <i>halakha</i> even with regard to wine. The Gemara asks: By inference, is that to say that the first <i>tanna</i> holds that wine is not considered a liquid? Rather, say as follows: Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Wine is considered a liquid, but oil and honey are not.
  § The Gemara relates another statement of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon Shezuri said: Once, my untithed produce became mixed together with a greater quantity of non-sacred, i.e., tithed, produce, and I came and asked Rabbi Tarfon how I should separate tithes from the untithed produce that was mixed with the tithed produce. And he said to me: Go and take from the market doubtfully tithed produce, which requires the removal of tithes by rabbinic law, and separate tithes from it on behalf of the untithed produce that is mixed with the tithed produce.
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Tarfon holds that by Torah law the minority of untithed produce is nullified in the majority of tithed produce and is therefore exempt from tithes; it is by rabbinic law that it is not nullified and one is obligated to separate tithes from it. And additionally, he holds that the majority of those who are unreliable with regard to tithes [<i>amei ha’aretz</i>] do separate tithes, in which case by Torah law one is not obligated to separate tithes from produce purchased from the market. And therefore, if Rabbi Shimon Shezuri receives produce from an <i>am ha’aretz</i>, he is considered by Torah law to be separating tithes from exempt produce on behalf of exempt produce, while all of it is obligated in tithes by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara suggests: But let Rabbi Tarfon say to him: Go and take produce from a gentile. Since it is exempt from tithes by Torah law but requires tithing by rabbinic law, he could then separate tithes from this produce on behalf of the untithed produce that is nullified by the tithed produce. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Tarfon holds that a gentile has no acquisition of land in Eretz Yisrael to abrogate the sanctity of the land, thereby removing it from the obligation to tithe its produce. And therefore, if Rabbi Shimon Shezuri were to take produce from a gentile, he would be considered to be separating tithes from produce that is obligated in tithes by Torah law on behalf of exempt produce, which one may not do.
  There are those who say that Rabbi Tarfon said to him: Go and take produce from a gentile and separate tithes from it on behalf of the untithed produce that is intermingled in the majority of tithed produce. Accordingly, Rabbi Tarfon holds that a gentile has acquisition of land in Eretz Yisrael to abrogate the sanctity of the land, thereby removing it from the obligation to tithe its produce. And therefore, if Rabbi Shimon Shezuri takes produce from a gentile, he is considered, by Torah law, to be separating tithes from exempt produce on behalf of exempt produce, while all of it is obligated in tithes by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara suggests: But let Rabbi Tarfon say to him: Go and take produce from an <i>am ha’aretz</i> in the market and separate tithes from it on behalf of the mixed untithed produce. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Tarfon holds that the majority of <i>amei ha’aretz</i> do not separate tithes, in which case he is considered to be separating tithes from produce that is obligated in tithes by Torah law on behalf of exempt produce.
  Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya sent the following question to Rav Pappa: That which Ravin bar Ḥinnana said that Ulla says that Rabbi Ḥanina says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri, and moreover, any place where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught a <i>halakha</i>, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion, was that said even with regard to the case of one whose untithed produce became mixed together with non-sacred, i.e., tithed, produce, or was Rabbi Ḥanina referring only to cases where Rabbi Shimon Shezuri stated his opinion in the Mishna, but not in a <i>baraita</i>?
  Rav Pappa said to him: Yes, the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri even with regard to untithed produce that was mixed together with tithed produce. Rav Ashi said: Mar Zutra said to me: Rabbi Ḥanina of Sura raised a difficulty with this: Isn’t it obvious?
  
  Daf 31b
  
  Does Rabbi Ḥanina say that wherever Rabbi Shimon Shezuri taught a <i>halakha</i> in our Mishna the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion? Rather, he says that any place where he taught a <i>halakha</i> the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with his opinion, and this applies even to <i>baraitot</i>.
  § Rav Ze’eira says that Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: If a tear in the parchment of a Torah scroll extends into two lines, one can sew the parchment to render the scroll fit, but if it extends into three lines then one cannot sew it to render it fit. Rabba Zuti said to Rav Ashi: This is what Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti said in the name of Rava: That which we say, that if the tear extends into three lines one cannot sew it to render it fit, we say only with regard to old sheets of parchment. But in the case of new sheets of parchment, we have no problem with it.
  The Gemara adds: And old does not mean literally old, and new does not mean literally new. Rather, those sheets of parchment that are not processed with gall are labeled as old and cannot be sewn, whereas those sheets of parchment that are processed with gall are labeled as new and can be sewn. And this statement, that one can sew the parchment and render it fit, applies to sewing it with sinew; but if one sews the parchment with thread [<i>bigradin</i>], it is not rendered fit.
  Rav Yehuda bar Abba asks: If the tear occurred in the space between one column and another column but it was of the length that had it occurred inside a column it would have extended more than three lines, and similarly, if the tear occurred between one line and another line horizontally, but not tearing through any letters, what is the <i>halakha</i>? No answer was found, and therefore the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § Rabbi Ze’eiri says that Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: A <i>mezuza</i> that one wrote two by two, i.e., two words on each line, is fit. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one wrote two words on one line, and three words on the following line, and one word on the line after that, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: All the more so that it is fit, as he prepared it as one writes a poem in the Torah scroll. The song sung by the Jewish people at the sea after the Exodus is written in lines whose length is not uniform. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: If one wrote it as one writes a poem in the Torah, or if one wrote a poem in the Torah as one writes it, it is unfit. The Gemara answers: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is referring to a Torah scroll, not a <i>mezuza</i>.
  It was stated by <i>amora’im</i> as well: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say it was Rav Aḥa bar bar Ḥana who says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a <i>mezuza</i> that one prepared with two words on one line, and three words on the following line, and one word on the line after that, it is fit, provided that he does not prepare it like the shape of a tent, i.e., progressively widening the lines, starting with a line of one word, then a line of two words and a line of three, and provided that he does not prepare it like the shape of a tail, progressively shortening the lines, from three words to two to one.
  § Rav Ḥisda says: One writes the last two words of a <i>mezuza</i>, <i>al ha’aretz</i>, meaning “above the earth” (Deuteronomy 11:21), by themselves on the final line, without the preceding word. The Sages disagreed as to how this is done. Some say that one writes this phrase at the end of the final line, and some say that one writes it at the beginning of the final line.
  The Gemara explains their dispute: The one who says that one writes it at the end of the final line interprets the verse: “That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, upon the land which the Lord swore unto your fathers to give them, as the days of the heaven above the earth,” in a similar manner to the verse: “For as the heaven is high above the earth” (Psalms 103:11). Consequently, if one writes “above the earth” at the end of the final line, it will appropriately be below the term “the heaven” at the end of the previous line. And the one who says that one writes it at the beginning of the final line explains the phrase “as the days of the heaven above the earth” as meaning: Just as the heaven is far from the earth. Consequently, if one writes “above the earth” at the beginning of the final line, it is far from the term “the heaven” at the end of the previous line.
  Rabbi Ḥelbo said: I saw Rav Huna wrap a written <i>mezuza</i> from the word <i>eḥad</i> to the word <i>shema</i>, i.e., rolling it from left to right, as the first verse written in a <i>mezuza</i> is: “Listen [<i>Shema</i>], O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one [<i>eḥad</i>]” (Deuteronomy 6:4). And he prepared the two passages of the <i>mezuza</i> in the closed manner, i.e., starting the second passage (Deuteronomy 11:13–21) on the same line that he finished writing the first passage (Deuteronomy 6:4–9).
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Rabbi Meir would write a <i>mezuza</i> on <i>dokhsostos</i>, the inner layer of animal hide, not on parchment, which is from the outer layer, and he would prepare it like a column of a Torah scroll, i.e., long and narrow.
  
  Daf 32a
  
  And he would make a space above and a space below the text and would prepare the passages of the <i>mezuza</i> in the open manner, i.e., he would begin the second passage on the line following the end of the first passage. I said to him: My teacher, for what reason do you prepare the passages in the open manner, when in a Torah scroll those same passages are written in the closed manner? He said to me: Since the passages are not adjacent to one another in the Torah, as the first passage is Deuteronomy 6:4–9 and the second is Deuteronomy 11:13–21, I prepare them as open passages.
  The Gemara continues: And Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. What, is it not correct that Rav stated this with regard to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s opinion that one prepares the passages in the open manner? This would present a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Huna, Rav’s student, who wrote them in the closed manner.
  The Gemara answers: No; he meant that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar with regard to the space that one must leave above and below the text. The Gemara asks: And how much space must one leave? Rav Menashya bar Ya’akov says, and some say it is Rav Shmuel bar Ya’akov who says: The space of a full scribe’s clip [<i>atba</i>], with which the sheets of parchment are held.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And you, do you not hold that when Rav said that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar he was referring to the space, not the manner of writing the passages? But Rav is of the opinion that an established custom must be observed, and nowadays the general custom is to write the passages of the <i>mezuza</i> in the closed manner.
  The Gemara provides the source that according to Rav one must observe established customs. <i>Ḥalitza</i> is the ritual that frees the widow of a childless man from the obligation to enter into levirate marriage with her late husband’s brother. This ceremony involves the widow removing her brother-in-law’s sandal from his foot. Rabba spoke of the importance of observing customs in that context, as Rabba says that Rav Kahana says that Rav says: If Elijah comes and says that one performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with a shoe, the Sages listen to him. But if he says that one may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with a sandal, they do not listen to him, as the people are already accustomed to performing <i>ḥalitza</i> with a sandal.
  The Gemara presents another version of Rav’s statement: And Rav Yosef says that Rav Kahana says that Rav says: If Elijah comes and says that one may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with a shoe, the Sages listen to him; if he says that one may not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with a sandal, they do not listen to him, as the people are already accustomed to performing <i>ḥalitza</i> with a sandal.
  Abaye continues: And we say, when discussing these versions of his statement: What is the difference between these two versions of his statement? The difference is whether one may use a shoe <i>ab initio</i>. In any case, according to both statements Rav maintains that a custom must be observed, and the custom in this case is to write the passages in a closed manner. Rather, must one not conclude from it that when Rav says that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar he was speaking of the space, not the manner of preparing the passages? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is correct.
  § Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is a mitzva <i>ab initio</i> to prepare the passages of a <i>mezuza</i> in the closed manner,but if one prepared them in the open manner, it is permitted to use the <i>mezuza</i>. And what is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar saying when he says that Rabbi Meir would prepare the passages in the open manner? He means that one may prepare them even in the open manner.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a <i>baraita</i> supports his opinion: Similarly, just as one may not convert phylacteries of the head into phylacteries of the arm, with regard to a Torah scroll that became worn and parchment of phylacteries that became worn, one may not fashion them into a <i>mezuza</i> by excising the relevant passages, despite the fact that the Torah passages of a <i>mezuza</i> appear in them. This is prohibited because one does not reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity, that of a Torah scroll or phylacteries, to a level of lesser sanctity, that of a <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara infers from this <i>baraita</i>: If it were permitted to reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity to a level of lesser sanctity, one could fashion a <i>mezuza</i> from a Torah scroll.
  The Gemara explains the proof: But why is that the <i>halakha</i>, when here, in a Torah scroll, the passages are prepared in the closed manner, but there, in a <i>mezuza</i>, the passages are prepared in the open manner? Evidently, it is permitted to write a <i>mezuza</i> with the passages prepared in the closed manner. The Gemara refutes this proof: Perhaps one should infer from the <i>baraita</i> that were it not for the fact that it is prohibited to reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity to a level of lesser sanctity, one would be allowed to complete a line or two of a <i>mezuza</i> by sewing to it those lines from a Torah scroll or parchment of phylacteries that became worn, but one may not fashion an entire <i>mezuza</i> from a sheet of a Torah scroll or parchment of phylacteries, as the passages in a Torah scroll and phylacteries are prepared in the closed manner.
  The Gemara asks another question: The <i>baraita</i> indicates that if it were permitted to reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity to a level of lesser sanctity, one could fashion a <i>mezuza</i> from phylacteries. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that it is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the passages of phylacteries are written on parchment, the outer layer of an animal’s hide, and the passages of a <i>mezuza</i> are written on <i>dokhsostos</i>, the inner layer, and when writing on parchment, one writes on the side of the hide that faced the flesh; when writing on <i>dokhsostos</i>, one writes on the side of the hide on which there was hair? How, then, can one use the other side of the hide for a <i>mezuza</i>? The Gemara answers that this requirement is of <i>dokhsostos</i> for a <i>mezuza</i> is stated as a mitzva, but it is not indispensable.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if one changed between parchment and <i>dokhsostos</i>, the item is unfit? The Gemara responds that this <i>baraita</i> is referring to phylacteries that one wrote on <i>dokhsostos</i> in the manner of a <i>mezuza</i>, not to a <i>mezuza</i> which one wrote on parchment. The Gemara raises a further difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if one changed whether in this manner or in that manner, it is unfit? The Gemara explains that this <i>baraita</i> does not mean that one changed either in the case of phylacteries or a <i>mezuza</i>. Rather, both this manner and that manner are referring to phylacteries, and this case is where one wrote them on parchment but on the side of the hide on which there was hair, not on the side that faced the flesh, and that
  
  Daf 32b
  
  case is where one wrote them on <i>dokhsostos</i> on the side that faced the flesh. In both of these situations the phylacteries are unfit, but a <i>mezuza</i> that one wrote on parchment is fit.
  And if you wish, say instead that the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> that if one changed whether in this manner or in that manner it is unfit is in fact referring to a <i>mezuza</i> that one wrote on parchment, and this is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one changed in this manner or in that manner it is unfit. Rabbi Aḥa, in the name of Rabbi Aḥai, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, deems it fit; and some say he said this ruling in the name of Rabbi Akiva, son of Rabbi Ḥanina.
  § The <i>baraita</i> indicates that if it were permitted to reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity to a level of lesser sanctity, one could make a <i>mezuza</i> from phylacteries that became worn. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But a <i>mezuza</i> requires scoring, i.e., the parchment must have lines etched in it before writing, as Rav Minyumi bar Ḥilkiya says that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says that Rav says: Any <i>mezuza</i> that is not scored is unfit, and Rav Minyumi bar Ḥilkiya himself says concerning this: The scoring of a <i>mezuza</i> is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. With regard to phylacteries, by contrast, he does not teach that their parchment requires scoring.
  The Gemara answers that this is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yirmeya says in the name of our teacher, Rav: Phylacteries and <i>mezuzot</i> may be written when the scribe is not copying from a written text, and their parchment does not require scoring.
  The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is that the parchment of phylacteries does not require scoring, but the parchment of a <i>mezuza</i> requires scoring. And unlike a Torah scroll, both these and those, phylacteries and <i>mezuzot</i>, may be written when the scribe is not copying from a written text. What is the reason for this leniency? These short texts are well known to all scribes, and therefore it is permitted to write them by heart.
  In connection to Rav Ḥelbo relating the customs of Rav Huna, the Gemara cites that Rav Ḥelbo says: I myself saw Rav Huna as he wished to sit on his bed, which had a Torah scroll placed on it. And he overturned a jug on the ground and placed the Torah scroll on it, and only then sat on the bed. The reason he did so is that he holds that it is prohibited to sit on a bed upon which a Torah scroll is placed.
  The Gemara notes: And this <i>halakha</i> disagrees with a ruling of Rabba bar bar Ḥana, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is permitted to sit on a bed upon which a Torah scroll is placed. And if a person whispers to you, saying: There was an incident involving Rabbi Elazar, who was sitting on a bed and realized that a Torah scroll was placed on it, and he immediately slipped off the bed and sat upon the ground, and in doing so he looked like one who had been bitten by a snake, i.e., he jumped up in a panic, that incident is no proof. There, the Torah scroll was placed on the ground. It is certainly disgraceful for one to sit on a bed while a Torah scroll is on the ground.
  The Gemara returns to the discussion about the <i>halakhot</i> of writing a <i>mezuza</i>. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If one wrote a <i>mezuza</i> in the manner of a missive that one composes to a friend, i.e., without being exact about the lettering of each word, it is unfit. What is the reason? This is derived by a verbal analogy between “writing,” and “writing,” from a scroll, which must be written in precisely the correct manner.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If one hung a <i>mezuza</i> on a stick in the entranceway, without affixing it to the doorpost, it is unfit. What is the reason? We require the fulfillment of the verse: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates” (Deuteronomy 6:9). This ruling is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one hung a <i>mezuza</i> on a stick, or placed it so that it was affixed behind the door within the house, he exposes himself to danger, and it does not enable him to fulfill the mitzva.
  The Gemara relates: The members of the household of King Munbaz would do so, i.e., hang <i>mezuzot</i> on sticks, in their inns, i.e., when they would sleep in an inn. They would not do this in order to fulfill the mitzva, as one who sleeps in an inn is exempt from placing a <i>mezuza</i>, but in remembrance of the <i>mezuza</i>. Since they would travel frequently, they wanted to remember the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>, which they did not fulfill often.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is a mitzva to place the <i>mezuza</i> within the airspace of the entrance, not on the outside. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? After all, the Merciful One states: “And upon your gates,” which indicates that it must be within the area of the gate, rather than the outside. The Gemara explains that it might enter your mind to say that since Rava says: It is a mitzva to place the <i>mezuza</i>
  
  Daf 33a
  
  in the handbreadth adjacent to the public domain, perhaps the further the <i>mezuza</i> is from the inside of the house the better, and one may affix it even fully outside the airspace of the entrance. To counter this, Shmuel teaches us that the <i>mezuza</i> must be within the airspace of the entrance itself.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: If one wrote a <i>mezuza</i> on two sheets it is unfit. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> that teaches: If one wrote a <i>mezuza</i> on two sheets and placed it on the two doorposts of the entrance, it is unfit. The Gemara states the objection: By inference, if the <i>mezuza</i> was affixed on one doorpost, it is fit, despite the fact that it is written on two sheets. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> is not referring to a case where one affixed the <i>mezuza</i> on two doorposts. Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is saying that if it was written on two sheets in such a manner that it is fit to be affixed to two doorposts, i.e., there is a space between the writing of the first and second passages, so that one can separate the two sheets for different doorposts, it is unfit. This is in accordance with the statement of Rav Yehuda, citing Shmuel.
  And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is that a <i>mezuza</i> must be affixed to the doorpost on its right side, and the right side is determined by the direction from which one enters the room. With regard to a <i>mezuza</i>, when deciding which side is the right side, one should follow the indication of the hinge. The The Gemara asks: What is the indication of the hinge? Rav Adda said: The socket into which the hinge is inserted. The room with the socket is considered the inside room, and the <i>mezuza</i> is affixed to the side which is on one’s right when entering that room. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances, i.e., in what kind of case was this guideline to follow the indication of the hinge necessary? The Gemara answers: This indication is necessary in a case where there is an entrance that is between two houses, e.g., between a room for men and a room for women, as in such a situation the direction of the entrance is unclear.
  The Gemara relates: The Exilarch built a new house. He said to Rav Naḥman: Affix <i>mezuzot</i> for me in the house. Rav Naḥman said: First erect the doors, so that I can affix the <i>mezuzot</i> in the appropriate places, according to the placement of the hinges.
  Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If one fashioned a <i>mezuza</i> like a bolt, i.e., he wedged it into a hole in the doorpost of a gate, or affixed it to the doorpost horizontally, it is unfit. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that so? But when Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: All the <i>mezuzot</i> in the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi were fashioned like a bolt, and he also said: That entrance by which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi entered the study hall did not have a <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This ruling, that it is unfit, is referring to a case where it is prepared like a peg, i.e., he inserted it deep into the doorpost while it was lying horizontally. That ruling, that it is fit, is referring to a case where it is prepared like an ankle [<i>ke’istevira</i>], i.e., it is vertical.
  With regard to the second element of Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef’s statement, that the entrance by which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi entered the study hall did not have a <i>mezuza</i>, the Gemara asks: Is that so? But what of that entrance by which Rav Huna would enter the study hall, which had a <i>mezuza</i>? The Gemara answers: That entrance was the one through which all were accustomed to enter the study hall. By contrast, the entrance that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi used was a side entrance, which was designated for him alone. Consequently, it was exempt from the obligation to affix a <i>mezuza</i>, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a <i>mezuza</i>, follow the entrance that people are accustomed to using.
  § Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Mattana says that Shmuel says: It is a mitzva to place the <i>mezuza</i> at the beginning of the upper third of the doorpost. And Rav Huna says: One raises the <i>mezuza</i> a handbreadth from the ground, or one distances it from the cross beam, i.e., the lintel, a handbreadth, and the entire entrance between those two handbreadths is fit for the placement of the <i>mezuza</i>.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One raises the <i>mezuza</i> a handbreadth from the ground, or one distances it from the cross beam a handbreadth, and the entire entrance between those two handbreadths is fit for the placement of the <i>mezuza</i>; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: The verse states: “And you shall bind them for a sign upon your arm” (Deuteronomy 6:8), and then it states: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house” (Deuteronomy 6:9). Just as the binding of the phylacteries is performed on the upper part of the arm, so too, the writing, i.e., the placement, of a <i>mezuza</i> must be specifically on the upper part of the entrance.
  The Gemara explains the objection: Granted, according to Rav Huna, he states his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; but according to Shmuel, in accordance with whose opinion does he state his ruling? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said: Actually, Shmuel’s ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei,
  
  Daf 33b
  
  and what is the meaning of the phrase: The beginning of the upper third of the entrance, that Shmuel says? This is referring to the maximum distancing of the <i>mezuza</i> from the doorframe, i.e., that one should not distance it from the upper cross beam more than one-third of the height of the entrance.
  § Rava says: It is a mitzva to place the <i>mezuza</i> in the handbreadth adjacent to the public domain. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Rabbis say that it is in order that one encounter the <i>mezuza</i> immediately upon one’s entrance to the house. Rav Ḥanina from Sura says: It is in order that the <i>mezuza</i> protect the entire house, by placing it as far outside as one can.
  The Gemara adds: Rabbi Ḥanina says: Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is not like the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that a king sits inside his palace, and the people protect him from the outside, whereas with regard to the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He, it is not so. Rather, His servants, the Jewish people, sit inside their homes, and He protects them from the outside. As it is stated: “The Lord is your keeper, the Lord is your shade upon your right hand” (Psalms 121:5).
  Rav Yosef, son of Rava, taught in the name of Rava: If one dug one handbreadth deep into the doorpost and placed a <i>mezuza</i> there, it is unfit. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following <i>baraita</i> supports his ruling: In a case where one affixed a <i>mezuza</i> deep in the wooden doorpost of an entrance, or after placing it in the entrance one added [<i>tala</i>] an inner framework [<i>malben</i>] to it that covers the doorpost, if there is a depth of one handbreadth there, one requires another <i>mezuza</i>, but if not, one does not require another <i>mezuza</i>.
  The Gemara deflects the support: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is referring to an entrance that is behind the door, i.e., there is another entrance on the other side of the framework, which serves for both entrances. The <i>baraita</i> is teaching that if the framework is one handbreadth thick, then each side is considered a separate entrance, and each requires its own <i>mezuza</i>.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the same <i>baraita</i> teaches explicitly this ruling of the case of another entrance: With regard to an entrance that is behind the door, if there is a depth of one handbreadth there, one requires another <i>mezuza</i>, but if not, one does not require another <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara explains: This clause of the <i>baraita</i> is teaching which case is the subject of the previous clause, i.e., the <i>baraita</i> does not state two <i>halakhot</i> but only one, which it explains as it proceeds: In what case is it taught that if there is a depth of a handbreadth there, one requires another <i>mezuza</i>? It is taught in the case of an entrance that is behind the door.
  § It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the affixing of a <i>mezuza</i>: If one positions a <i>mezuza</i> in an entrance which was a framework of reeds, to which one cannot affix the <i>mezuza</i> with nails, he carves a kind of tube from the reed on the right side and places the <i>mezuza</i> in that tube. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, says: They taught that one may affix the <i>mezuza</i> in this manner only in a case where one positioned the framework in its place first, and ultimately carved a tube and then placed the <i>mezuza</i> in it. But if before positioning the framework one carved a tube and placed the <i>mezuza</i> in it, and ultimately positioned the framework, the <i>mezuza</i> is unfit. This in accordance with the principle stated with regard to objects used for mitzvot: Prepare it, and not from what has already been prepared. In this case he affixed the <i>mezuza</i> before the obligation took effect with regard to the framework.
  And Rava says: With regard to these broken entrances [<i>pitḥei shima’ei</i>], which lack the proper form of doorways, one is exempt from the obligation of placing a <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara asks: What are broken entrances? Rav Riḥumi and Abba Yosei disagree with regard to this. One says that they do not have a proper ceiling, and one says that they do not have lintels [<i>shakofei</i>] above the openings.
  Rabba bar Sheila says that Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to a portico, i.e., a structure at the entrance to a house that is entirely open on its front side, one is exempt from the obligation of placing a <i>mezuza</i>, because it does not have doorposts [<i>patzimin</i>] on its sides. The Gemara questions this reason: This indicates that if it has doorposts, one would be obligated to place a <i>mezuza</i>. But that is not logical, as these doorposts are not there to serve as an entrance; rather, they are made to strengthen the ceiling. In that case, why should one be obligated?
  The Gemara answers: This is what Rav Ḥisda is saying: Even if it has doorposts, one is exempt from the obligation to place a <i>mezuza</i> there, because they are made only to strengthen the ceiling, not as an entrance. Similarly, Abaye said: I saw the porticos [<i>le’ispelidei</i>] of the house of the Master, Rabba, that they had doorposts but they did not have <i>mezuzot</i>. Rabba evidently holds that its doorposts are made to strengthen the ceiling.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a gatehouse, a portico, and a balcony, one is obligated to place a <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is stated with regard to a specific type of portico, the portico of a study hall, which is closed on all sides, but its walls do not reach the ceiling. The Gemara raises a difficulty: A portico of a study hall is like a full-fledged room [<i>inderona</i>], and therefore it should not be labeled a portico with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara answers: The <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is stated with regard to a Roman portico, which is more open than the portico of a study hall, as it is built with many windows instead of proper walls. The <i>baraita</i> is teaching that one is obligated to place a <i>mezuza</i> on this type of portico.
  § Raḥava says that Rav Yehuda says: With regard to a <i>bei harziki</i>, one is obligated to place two <i>mezuzot</i>. The Gemara asks: What is a <i>bei harziki</i>? Rav Pappa the Elder says in the name of Rav: It is a gatehouse that opens to a courtyard, and houses also open directly to the gatehouse. It requires two <i>mezuzot</i>, one for the entrance from the courtyard to the gatehouse, and one for the entrance from the gatehouse to the houses.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a gatehouse that has two entrances, as it opens both to a garden, which is exempt from a <i>mezuza</i>, and to a small room [<i>ulekitonit</i>], Rabbi Yosei says: Its halakhic status is like that of a small room, and it requires a <i>mezuza</i>, and the Rabbis say: Its halakhic status is like that of a gatehouse, and it does not require a <i>mezuza</i>. There is a difference of opinion among <i>amora’im</i> with regard to this dispute. Rav and Shmuel both say: With regard to the entrance through which one enters from the garden to the house, i.e., the entrance of the gatehouse to the small room, everyone agrees that one is obligated to place a <i>mezuza</i>. What is the reason? It is the way of entering the house, and the house requires a <i>mezuza</i>.
  Rav and Shmuel continue: When they disagree it is with regard to the entrance through which one enters from the house to the garden, i.e., the entrance of the gatehouse to the garden. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that the small room into which the gatehouse opens is the main area, and therefore the gatehouse, which is used for entering the small room, is considered like a regular gatehouse to a house, and all its entrances require a <i>mezuza</i>. And one Sage, the Rabbis, hold that the garden is the main area, and therefore this entrance does not require a <i>mezuza</i>.
  Conversely, Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: With regard to the entrance through which one enters from the house to the garden, i.e., the entrance between the gatehouse and the garden, everyone agrees that one is exempt from placing a <i>mezuza</i>. What is the reason? It is the entrance to the garden, and the garden does not require a <i>mezuza</i>. When they disagree it is with regard to the entrance from the garden to the house, i.e., the entrance between the gatehouse and the small room. One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that it is the way of entering the house, and the house requires a <i>mezuza</i>, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds that the entire
  
  Daf 34a
  
  area is made for the purpose of reaching the garden, not for entering the house, and therefore even with regard to the entrance between the gatehouse and small room, one is exempt from placing a <i>mezuza</i> at the entrance of the small room.
  The Gemara relates that Abaye and Rava would act in accordance with the explanation of Rabba and Rav Yosef, i.e., they would not place a <i>mezuza</i> on the two entrances of a gatehouse, neither to the garden nor to the small room, in accordance with the ruling of the Rabbis. And Rav Ashi would act in accordance with the explanation of Rav and Shmuel, stringently, i.e., following the ruling of Rabbi Yosei that both entrances require a <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara concludes: And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the explanation of Rav and Shmuel, stringently.
  § It was stated: With regard to an aperture that opens from the ceiling of a house occupied by one person to a loft occupied by another, with a walled staircase leading from the lower floor to the loft, Rav Huna says: If the staircase has one entrance, i.e., one doorway, either from the house or from the upper story, one is obligated to affix one <i>mezuza</i>; if it has two entrances, both from below and above, one is obligated to affix two <i>mezuzot</i>. Rav Pappa says: One can learn from that statement of Rav Huna that with regard to this type of room that has four gates, one is obligated to affix four <i>mezuzot</i>. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach that even though one is accustomed to using one particular gate, nevertheless, all four require a <i>mezuza</i>.
  Ameimar said: With regard to this entrance which is located at the corner of a house, one is obligated to affix a <i>mezuza</i>. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But it does not have doorposts. Ameimar said to him: These [<i>adei</i>] are its doorposts, i.e., the end of the walls serve as its doorposts.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa happened to come to the house of Mar Shmuel, where he saw a certain entrance that had only one doorpost to the left of the entrance, and yet Mar Shmuel had affixed a <i>mezuza</i> to that doorpost. Rav Pappa said to him: In accordance with whose opinion did you do this? Did you act in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who deems one obligated to affix a <i>mezuza</i> to an entrance that has only one doorpost? But one can say that Rabbi Meir says that one must do so only in a case where the doorpost is to the right of the entrance. Does he say that it requires a <i>mezuza</i> if the entrance is to the left?
  The Gemara asks: What is the source for this requirement that the <i>mezuza</i> be affixed to the right side? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When the verse states: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house [<i>beitekha</i>]” (Deuteronomy 6:9), the word <i>beitekha</i> is interpreted as <i>biatekha</i>, your entry, i.e., the <i>mezuza</i> must be affixed to the side by which you enter, which is from the right. Do you say it is from the right, or is it only from the left? Therefore, the verse states: Your house [<i>beitekha</i>]. The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation here? Rabba says: The <i>mezuza</i> is affixed in the way that you enter the house, which is from the right, as when a person lifts his foot to begin walking, he lifts his right foot first. Therefore, the <i>mezuza</i> is affixed to the right side of the doorway.
  Rav Shmuel bar Aḥa said before Rav Pappa in the name of Rava bar Ulla that the requirement that the <i>mezuza</i> be affixed to the right of the entrance is derived from here: “And Jehoiada the priest took a chest, and bored a hole in the lid of it, and set it beside the altar, on the right side as one comes into the House of the Lord; and the priests that kept the threshold put in there all the money that was brought into the House of the Lord” (II Kings 12:10). This indicates that an object designed for those entering a house is placed to the right of the one entering.
  The Gemara further inquires: What is this statement of Rabbi Meir, referred to by Rav Pappa, that he deems one obligated to place a <i>mezuza</i> on an entrance that has only one doorpost? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a house that has only one doorpost, Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to affix a <i>mezuza</i>, and the Rabbis deem him exempt from affixing a <i>mezuza</i>. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis? It is written: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house” (Deuteronomy 6:9), in the plural, which indicates that there must be two doorposts.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Meir, that one doorpost suffices to obligate one to affix a <i>mezuza</i>? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When it states “doorposts” (Deuteronomy 6:9), I would derive the minimum number of doorposts, which is two. When it says “doorposts” in the second passage (Deuteronomy 11:20), this also serves to teach a <i>halakha</i>, as otherwise there is no need for the verse to state this. This is one amplification following another amplification, and the principle is that an amplification following an amplification is stated only in order to restrict its extent. In this manner the verse restricted the minimum number to one doorpost. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rabbi Akiva says: This proof is not necessary. Rather, when the verse states: “And strike the lintel and the two doorposts” (Exodus 12:22), one can claim that there is a superfluous word in this verse, as there is no need for the verse to state “two,” since the minimum of doorposts is two. What is the meaning when the verse states “two”? This established a paradigm that anywhere where it is stated “doorposts,” it means only one doorpost, unless the verse specifies that it is referring to two doorposts.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house, and upon your gates” (Deuteronomy 6:9). One might have thought that one writes a <i>mezuza</i> on the stones of the entrance. To counter this, an expression of writing is stated here, with regard to a <i>mezuza</i>, and an expression of writing is stated there. Just as there the mitzva of writing means on a book, i.e., parchment, so too, a <i>mezuza</i> must be written on a book.
  The <i>baraita</i> suggests: Or perhaps, go [<i>kalekh</i>] this way, i.e., one can suggest a different interpretation: An expression of writing is stated here, with regard to a <i>mezuza</i>, and writing is stated there, with regard to the mitzva of writing the words of the Torah on stones upon the entry to Eretz Yisrael (Deuteronomy 27:3). Just as there, the words are written on the stones themselves, so too here, the <i>mezuza</i> should be written on the stones.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Let us see to which it is similar, i.e., which comparison appears more apt. We derive writing that is performed in all generations, i.e., that of a <i>mezuza</i>, from another writing that is performed in all generations, but we do not derive writing that is performed in all generations from writing that is not performed in all generations. And furthermore, a <i>mezuza</i> must be written with ink, as it is stated below: “And Baruch said to them: He dictated all these words to me, and I wrote them with ink in the scroll” (Jeremiah 36:18).
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: The Merciful One states: “Upon the doorposts,” which indicates that a <i>mezuza</i> should be written on the doorposts themselves, and yet you say: Let us derive a verbal analogy between “writing” and “writing,” to teach that one writes it on parchment. Why isn’t the verse interpreted in accordance with its straightforward meaning? Rav Ashi said to him: The verse states: “And you shall write them [<i>ukhtavtam</i>],” which means that it should first be complete writing [<i>ketiva tamma</i>], i.e., the full passages written down, and only then should one place them “upon the doorposts” of the house.
  The Gemara asks: And since it is written: “And you shall write them,” from which it is derived that the <i>mezuza</i> should be written first and then placed on the doorpost, why do I need this verbal analogy between “writing” and “writing”? The Gemara explains that were it not for the verbal analogy, I would say that one should write the passages of a <i>mezuza</i> on a stone, and afterward affix the stone to the doorpost. To counter this, the verbal analogy teaches us that a <i>mezuza</i> must be written on a scroll.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the four passages that are in the phylacteries, i.e., the two passages that are written in the <i>mezuza</i> and two additional passages (Exodus 13:1–9, 11–16), the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, and the absence of even one letter prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the rest of them. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that the inclusion of every letter is necessary?
  Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is necessary to state this ruling only to teach that even the absence of the thorn, i.e., a small stroke, of a letter <i>yod</i> prevents fulfillment of the mitzva. The Gemara asks: But isn’t this also obvious, since the letter is not formed properly? Rather, it is necessary only according to another statement that Rav Yehuda says. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Any letter that is not encircled with blank parchment on all four of its sides, as its ink connects to the letter above it, below it, preceding it, or succeeding it, is unfit.
  
  Daf 34b
  
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the number of compartments in the phylacteries of the head, the verse states: “It shall be for a sign upon your hand, and for <i>totafot</i> between your eyes” (Exodus 13:16), with the word <i>totafot</i> spelled deficient, without a <i>vav</i> before the final letter, in a way that can be read as singular; and again: “They shall be for <i>totafot</i> between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), spelled as a singular word; and again: “They shall be for <i>totafot</i> between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 11:18), this time spelled plene, with a <i>vav</i> before the final letter, in a manner that must be plural. There are four mentions of <i>totafot</i> here, as the third one is written in the plural and therefore counts as two. Consequently, it is derived that the phylacteries of the head must have four compartments. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rabbi Akiva says: There is no need for this proof, as the requirement of four compartments can be derived from the word <i>totafot</i> itself: The word <i>tot</i> in the language of Katfei means two, and the word <i>pat</i> in the language of Afriki also means two, and therefore <i>totafot</i> can be understood as a compound word meaning four.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that a scribe should write the passages of the phylacteries of the head on four separate hides, i.e., parchments, and place them in four compartments of four hides, one passage in each compartment. Therefore, the verse states: “And for a memorial between your eyes” (Exodus 13:9). This teaches: I said to you that the phylacteries are one memorial, but not that they are two or three memorials, i.e., the phylacteries themselves must be one unit. How so? One writes the passages on four hides and places them in four compartments fashioned of one hide.
  And if a scribe wrote all four of them on one hide and placed them in four compartments by slitting the parchment between each of the passages, one who dons these phylacteries has fulfilled his obligation. And in such a case it is necessary for there to be a space between each of the passages, so that each can be placed in a separate compartment; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It is not necessary for there to be a space between them. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis agree that one places a string or a thicker band between each and every one of the four compartments. The <i>baraita</i> adds: And if their furrows, i.e., the lines marking the separation between the compartments, are not noticeable from the outside, the phylacteries are unfit.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How does a scribe write them? With regard to the phylacteries of the arm, he writes it on one hide. But if he wrote it on four separate hides and placed it in one compartment, one who wears it has fulfilled his obligation. And in such a case it is necessary to attach the four parchments, as it is stated: “And it shall be for a sign for you upon your arm” (Exodus 13:9). This teaches that just as the phylacteries of the arm are one sign on the outside, as the compartment is fashioned from a single hide, so too, they must be one sign on the inside, i.e., the four passages must be on a single parchment. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is not necessary to attach the passages.
  Rabbi Yosei says: And Rabbi Yehuda the Distinguished [<i>Beribbi</i>] concedes to me that if one does not have phylacteries of the arm but has two phylacteries of the head, that he covers one of them with patches of hide, to render it like one compartment, and places it on his arm. The Gemara asks: How can Rabbi Yosei say that Rabbi Yehuda concedes to him in this case? This is the very situation in which their dispute applies, as they disagree over whether or not the passages of the phylacteries of the arm may be written on separate parchments. Rava said: From Rabbi Yosei’s statement one can infer that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his opinion and accepted Rabbi Yosei’s ruling.
  Rabbi Yosei said that all agree that one can convert phylacteries of the head into phylacteries of the arm. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rav Ḥananya sent the following ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one has phylacteries of the arm, he can convert it to phylacteries of the head, but if one has phylacteries of the head, he cannot convert it to phylacteries of the arm, because one does not reduce the sanctity of an item from a level of greater sanctity of phylacteries of the head to a level of lesser sanctity of phylacteries of the arm.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this ruling is stated with regard to old phylacteries, which have already been worn on one’s head and therefore have a greater level of sanctity, whereas that ruling is stated with regard to new phylacteries, which have not yet been used. The Gemara adds: And according to the one who says that designation is significant, i.e., once one designates an item for use in fulfilling a particular mitzva, it assumes the sanctity of an item used for mitzvot, this ruling is stated with regard to a case where he stipulated with regard to them from the outset that he may convert it from phylacteries of the head to phylacteries of the arm, and only in this circumstance it is permitted to convert them.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How does one arrange the four passages inside the phylacteries? The passage of: “Sanctify unto Me” (Exodus 13:1–10), and the passage of: “And it shall be when He shall bring you” (Exodus 13:11–16), are placed on the right; the passage of: “Listen, O Israel” (Deuteronomy 6:4–9), and the passage of: “And it shall come to pass, if you shall hearken diligently” (Deuteronomy 11:13–21), are placed on the left.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that one places them in the opposite manner, with the first two passages on the left and the latter two on the right? Abaye said that it is not difficult: Here it means to the right of the reader, i.e., one who is standing opposite the one donning the phylacteries, whereas there it means to the right of the one who is donning the phylacteries. And in this manner the reader reads the passages in their order, as they appear in the Torah, starting with Exodus 13:1–10 to his right.
  Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: If one exchanged its passages, i.e., placed them in a different order within the compartment, the phylacteries are unfit. Abaye said: We did not say this
  
  Daf 35a
  
  unless it is a case where one exchanges an inner passage for an outer one, e.g., he placed the passage of Exodus 13:11–16 to the right of Exodus 13:1–10, or an outer passage for an inner one, e.g., he placed the passage of Deuteronomy 11:13–21 to the right of Deuteronomy 6:4–9. But if one exchanges an inner passage for the other inner one, i.e., he exchanges Exodus 13:11–16 with Deuteronomy 6:4–9, or an outer passage for the other outer one, i.e., he exchanges Exodus 13:1–10 with Deuteronomy 11:13–21, we have no problem with it.
  Rava said to Abaye: What is different about the cases of exchanging an inner passage for an outer one, and an outer passage for an inner one, such that the phylacteries are not fit? The reason is that this passage, which needs to see the air, i.e., to be placed on the outer side, does not see it, and that passage, which does not need to see the air, does see it. But in a case where one exchanges an outer passage for the other outer one or an inner passage for the other inner one, it should be unfit as well, as this passage, which needs to see the air of the right side, sees the air of the left side, and that passage, which requires to see the air of the left side, sees the air of the right side. Rather, there is no difference between any of these cases, and any change in the order renders the phylacteries unfit.
  § And Rav Ḥananel says that Rav says: The requirement to have the <i>titora</i> of phylacteries, i.e., the base of phylacteries upon which the compartments rest, is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Abaye said: The requirement to have the <i>ma’ebarta</i> of phylacteries, i.e., the passageway through which the straps are inserted, is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. And Abaye says: The requirement to have a letter <i>shin</i> protruding on the phylacteries of one’s head, which is achieved by pressing the hide into the shape of that letter, is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai.
  Abaye further says: And there is a requirement that the furrow between each of the compartments of phylacteries of the head reach the place of the stitches, i.e., the <i>titora</i>, to which the compartments are sewn. Rav Dimi of Neharde’a says: Once it is noticeable that there is a furrow between each of the compartments, it is not necessary for them to reach all the way to the <i>titora</i>.
  And Abaye says: With regard to this parchment upon which one writes the passages of phylacteries, the scribe must examine it before writing, as perhaps it has a flaw, i.e., a perforation, and complete writing is required, and that requirement would not be fulfilled if a letter were perforated. Rav Dimi of Neharde’a says: No prior examination is required; rather, the quill examines it as one writes, as any perforation which the ink covers is disregarded.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak says: The requirement that the straps of the phylacteries be black is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: One may tie phylacteries only with straps of their same type, i.e., the straps must be made from hide, and it does not matter whether they are green, or black, or white. Nevertheless, one should not make red straps, because this is deprecatory to him, as it looks like he has wounds on his head, and also due to something else, i.e., lest people suspect him of engaging in sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman and getting blood on the straps.
  The Gemara cites the continuation of that <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Rabbi Akiva’s student, who would tie his phylacteries with strips of sky-blue wool rather than hide, and Rabbi Akiva did not say anything to him. Is it possible that that righteous man saw his student doing something improper and he did not object to his conduct? Another Sage said to Rabbi Yehuda: Yes, it is possible that the student acted improperly, as Rabbi Akiva did not see him, and if he had seen him, he would not have allowed him to do so.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: There was an incident involving Hyrcanus, the son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, who would tie his phylacteries with strips of purple wool, and his father did not say anything to him. Is it possible that that righteous man saw his son doing something improper and he did not object to his conduct? The Sages said to him: Yes, it is possible that his son acted improperly, as Rabbi Eliezer did not see him, and if he had seen him, he would not have allowed him to do so. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains the objection from the <i>baraita</i>: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that it does not matter whether the straps are green, or black, or white, whereas Rabbi Yitzḥak maintains that it is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai that the straps of the phylacteries must be black. The Gemara answers that it is not difficult. Here, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the inside of the straps, which touch the body. These may be any color other than red. Conversely, there, when Rabbi Yitzḥak says that the straps of the phylacteries must be black, he is speaking of the outside of the straps.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the <i>baraita</i> is discussing the inside of the straps, what deprecatory matter or problem of something else is there with straps that are red on the inside? After all, this side is not seen. The Gemara answers: Sometimes his straps become reversed, and therefore these concerns are applicable.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The requirement that phylacteries be square is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Rav Pappa says about this <i>halakha</i>: Square means along their seams and their diagonals, i.e., they must be perfectly square where the compartments are sewn to the <i>titora</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a mishna supports this opinion (<i>Megilla</i> 24b): One who fashions his phylacteries in a round shape exposes himself to danger, and it does not enable him to fulfill the mitzva of phylacteries. Rav Pappa said: This is no support, as one can say that the mishna is referring to phylacteries that are fashioned like a nut, i.e., their underside is rounded, and therefore there is a danger that if he strikes his head on a wall the underside will press into his head and injure him. By contrast, if the underside is flat one might have thought that it is fit despite the fact that it is not square. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that phylacteries must be square.
  § Rav Huna says: With regard to phylacteries of the head, as long as the surface of outer hide is intact, i.e., it is not torn, they are fit, even if the hide between the compartments has torn. Rav Ḥisda says: If two of the walls between the compartments tore, such phylacteries are fit, but if three of these inner walls tore, they are unfit.
  Rava said: Concerning that which you said, that if two of the walls between the compartments tore they are fit, we said this only if the inner walls that tore are not aligned with each other, i.e., they are not adjacent to one another. But if the torn walls are aligned with each other, the phylacteries are unfit. And furthermore, even in a case where the torn walls are aligned with each other, we said that they are unfit only with regard to new phylacteries, as the hide is certainly defective. But with regard to old phylacteries, we have no problem with it, as they tore due to aging.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What are the circumstances of new phylacteries, and what are the circumstances of old phylacteries? Rav Yosef said to him: In any case where if one holds the hide and pulls it, it returns to its place [<i>ḥaleim</i>], these phylacteries are considered old; and in the other case, where hide that was pulled does not return to its place, they are considered new.
  
  Daf 35b
  
  Alternatively, in any case where if the phylacteries are hanging by the strap the compartment follows the strap, i.e., it remains attached, these phylacteries are considered new; and in the other case, where the phylacteries would fall off, they are considered old.
  § The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rav Yosef when the strap of his phylacteries tore. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether one may tie the strap? Rav Yosef said to him: It is written with regard to phylacteries: “And you shall bind them [<i>ukshartam</i>] for a sign upon your arm” (Deuteronomy 6:8), which teaches that the binding must be complete [<i>keshira tamma</i>], whole and beautiful, and that would not be the case with a makeshift knot.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: What is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether one may sew a strap that tore and insert the stitching inside, so that it is not visible from the outside? Rav Ashi said to him: Go out and see what the people are doing. If the common custom is to do this, it is permitted.
  Rav Pappa says: The remnants of straps, i.e., what remains when part of the strap has been cut off, are fit. The Gemara comments: And it is not so, as can be derived from the fact that the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya say: The remnants of the sky-blue wool of ritual fringes, when only a small thread remains, and likewise the remnants of the hyssop, used for the sprinkling of the purification water of the red heifer, are fit. They did not include the remnants of straps of phylacteries in this <i>halakha</i>. The reason for this difference is that it is there that the remnants are fit, as they are mere articles used in the performance of a mitzva; but here, phylacteries are articles of sanctity, which are of greater sanctity, and therefore their remnants are not fit.
  The Gemara states: From this line of inquiry one can conclude by inference that the straps of phylacteries have a minimum requisite measure. And how much is their measure? Rami bar Ḥama says that Reish Lakish says: It is until the index finger. In explanation of this size, Rav Kahana would demonstrate a bowed measure, i.e., from the tip of the middle finger until the tip of the index finger, with the fingers spread. Rav Ashi would demonstrate a straight measure, from the tip of the thumb until the tip of the index finger, with the fingers spread.
  The Gemara relates: Rabba would tie the straps and release them and let them fall behind him. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov would tie them and plait them together like a braid. Mar, son of Rabbana, would act like we do, i.e., he would let the straps fall and hang over the front of his body.
  Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, says in the name of Rav: The form of the knot of phylacteries, i.e., that there must be the form of a letter <i>dalet</i> in the knot of the phylacteries of the head and the letter <i>yod</i> in the knot of the phylacteries of the arm, is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Rav Naḥman says: And their decorative side, the black side of the knot where the shape of the letter is visible, must face outward. The Gemara relates: Rav Ashi was sitting before Mar Zutra when the strap of his phylacteries became reversed. Mar Zutra said to him: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with the ruling that their decorative side must face outward? Rav Ashi said to him: It did not enter my mind, i.e., I did not notice.
  With regard to the verse: “And all the nations of the land shall see that the name of the Lord is called upon you, and they shall be afraid of you” (Deuteronomy 28:10), it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer the Great says: This is a reference to the phylacteries of the head, upon which the name of God is written, as they demonstrate to all that the name of God is called upon the Jewish people. With regard to the statement of God to Moses: “And I will remove My hand, and you will see My back” (Exodus 33:23), Rav Ḥana bar Bizna says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: This teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, showed Moses the knot of the phylacteries of the head.
  Rav Yehuda says: The knot of phylacteries must be above, i.e., it must rest on the head rather than on the neck, in order that the Jewish people should be above and not below. And likewise it must be placed toward the front [<i>panim</i>], i.e., not on the sides of the head, in order that the Jewish people should be in front [<i>lefanim</i>] and not behind.
  § Rav Shmuel bar Bideri says that Rav says, and some say that Rabbi Aḥa Arikha, i.e., Rabbi Aḥa the Tall, says that Rav Huna says, and some say that Rav Menashya says that Shmuel says: With regard to phylacteries, from when does one recite a blessing over them? From the time when one dons them on the arm and onward. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Shmuel says: With regard to all the mitzvot, one recites a blessing over them prior to their performance? How, then, can one recite a blessing over phylacteries after donning them? Abaye and Rava both say: One recites the blessing from the time of donning the phylacteries until the time of binding them, as the binding constitutes the performance of the mitzva.
  
  Daf 36a
  
  § Rav Ḥisda says: If one spoke between donning the phylacteries of the arm and the phylacteries of the head, he must recite the blessing again when donning the phylacteries of the head.
  The Gemara notes: One can infer that if he spoke, yes, he must recite a blessing when donning the phylacteries of the head, but if he did not speak, he does not recite a blessing. The Gemara challenges this: But Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, sent a ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: On the phylacteries of the arm one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us to don phylacteries. On the phylacteries of the head one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the Universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us concerning the mitzva of phylacteries. This indicates that one always recites a blessing when donning the phylacteries of the head.
  Abaye and Rava both say, to resolve this apparent contradiction: Rabbi Yoḥanan meant that if one did not speak, he recites one blessing; if he spoke, he recites two blessings, when donning the phylacteries of the head as well as when donning the phylacteries of the arm.
  Concerning this, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one spoke between donning the phylacteries of the arm and the phylacteries of the head, he has a sin, and due to that sin he returns from the ranks of soldiers waging war. This is referring to the preparation for war, when the officers announce: “What man is there who is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go and return to his house” (Deuteronomy 20:8). The Sages explained that this is referring to one who is fearful due to his transgressions.
  It is further taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When one dons phylacteries, he first dons the phylacteries of the arm and afterward dons the phylacteries of the head. And when he removes his phylacteries, he first removes the phylacteries of the head and afterward removes the phylacteries of the arm. The Gemara asks: Granted, the ruling that when one dons phylacteries he first dons the phylacteries of the arm and afterward dons the phylacteries of the head is understood, as it is first written: “And you shall bind them for a sign upon your arm,” and then it is written: “And they shall be for frontlets between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8).
  But from where do we derive the <i>halakha</i> that when he removes his phylacteries, he first removes the phylacteries of the head and afterward he removes the phylacteries of the arm? Rabba said in explanation: Rav Huna explained to me the source of this <i>halakha</i>. The verse states: “And you shall bind them for a sign upon your arm and they shall be for frontlets between your eyes,” and it is derived from here: As long as the phylacteries of the head are between your eyes, the number of phylacteries you are wearing shall be two.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to phylacteries, from when does one recite a blessing over them? From when the time arrives to don them. How so? If one is rising early to leave his home to travel on the road and is afraid lest his phylacteries become lost during the journey, he dons them even at night, despite the fact that this is not the proper time for the mitzva of phylacteries. And when the time for their mitzva arrives, in the morning, he touches them and recites a blessing over them.
  And until when does one wear them? Until the sun sets. Rabbi Ya’akov says: Until traffic in the marketplace ceases. And the Rabbis say: Until the time of sleep. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Ya’akov that if one removed them to go out to the bathroom or to enter the bathhouse and the sun set, one does not don them again.
  Rav Naḥman says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov. The Gemara likewise relates that Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna would pray in the evening, i.e., the evening service, with phylacteries. Some say that Rav Naḥman ruled that the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov but in accordance with the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> that the mitzva of phylacteries ends at sunset.
  
  Daf 36b
  
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna would pray in the evening with phylacteries. The Gemara explains: That opinion represented in this incident disagrees with the ruling of Rav Naḥman.
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabba bar Rav Huna actually say this, that the mitzva of phylacteries applies at night? But doesn’t Rabba bar Rav Huna say: If it is uncertain whether it is nightfall or whether it is not nightfall, one neither removes his phylacteries, as it is not yet definitely night, nor dons them <i>ab initio</i>. This indicates that if it is definitely nightfall, one removes his phylacteries. The Gemara answers: Rabba bar Rav Huna’s ruling there was stated with regard to Shabbat eve, as one may not don phylacteries on Shabbat, when the mitzva does not apply.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer: What does Rabba bar Rav Huna hold? If he holds that night is a time when one performs the mitzva of wearing phylacteries, then Shabbat is also a time when one performs the mitzva of wearing phylacteries. If he holds that Shabbat is not a time when one performs the mitzva of wearing phylacteries, then night is also not a time when one performs the mitzva of wearing phylacteries. The reason for this statement is that from the source where Shabbat is excluded from the mitzva of phylacteries, nights are excluded from there as well.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the end of the passage of the Torah that discusses both the mitzvot of the Paschal offering and phylacteries: “And you shall observe this ordinance in its season from year [<i>miyamim</i>] to year” (Exodus 13:10). This indicates that these mitzvot apply during the days [<i>yamim</i>] but not during the nights. Furthermore, the letter <i>mem</i>, meaning from, in the term: “From year [<i>miyamim</i>],” teaches: These mitzvot apply on some days, but not on all days. This excludes <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals, on which phylacteries are not worn. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This verse, mentioning an ordinance, is stated only with regard to the Paschal offering, and it is not referring to phylacteries at all. Evidently, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that at night one is exempt from the obligation of donning phylacteries, says that on Shabbat one is exempt as well.
  The Gemara answers: Rabba bar Rav Huna derives the exemption from the obligation to don phylacteries on Shabbat from a different source, the source where Rabbi Akiva derives it from, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Akiva says: One might have thought that a person should don phylacteries on <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals. To counter this, the verse states: “And it shall be for a sign for you on your arm, and for a remembrance between your eyes, so that God’s law shall be in your mouth; for with a strong arm God brought you out of Egypt” (Exodus 13:9). This teaches that the obligation to don phylacteries applies when the Jewish people require a sign to assert their status as God’s nation, i.e., during the week. This serves to exclude <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals, as they themselves are signs of the Jewish people’s status as God’s nation and a remembrance of the exodus from Egypt. Consequently, no further sign is required on these days.
  Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who dons phylacteries after sunset violates a positive mitzva. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He violates a prohibition. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that these Sages disagree with regard to the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says. As Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Any place where it is stated in the Torah any of the terms: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, this means nothing other than a prohibition, as these are negative terms.
  The Gemara explains this suggestion: As this Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Avin, and therefore the verse: “And you shall observe this ordinance in its season from year to year,” from which the exclusion of nights is derived, is a prohibition, as it employs the term “observe.” And that Sage, Rabbi Elazar, is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Avin, and therefore the term: “And you shall observe,” is a positive mitzva.
  The Gemara counters: No, everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says, and here they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that the term “observe” written with regard to a prohibition has the status of a prohibition, whereas that same term “observe” written with regard to a positive mitzva has the status of a positive mitzva, as the Torah is issuing a warning to take special care in the observance of a mitzva. Accordingly, the command with regard to the positive mitzva of phylacteries is a positive mitzva. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the term “observe” written with regard to a positive mitzva is also a prohibition.
  And Rabbi Elazar says: And although it is prohibited to don phylacteries at night, if one does so in order to safeguard them from theft and the like, it is permitted.And Ravina said: I was sitting before Rav Ashi and it grew dark, and he donned phylacteries. And I said to him: Does the Master need to safeguard them? And he said to me: Yes. But I saw that his intention in donning them was not that he needed to safeguard them; rather, Rav Ashi holds: This is the <i>halakha</i>, that night is an appropriate time for phylacteries, but a public ruling is not issued to that effect.
  Rabba bar Rav Huna says: A person is obligated to touch his phylacteries regularly for the entire time that he is wearing them. This is derived from an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the frontplate of the High Priest, as follows: And if with regard to the frontplate, which has only one mention of God’s name, the Torah states: “And it should be always upon his forehead” (Exodus 28:38), which means that the High Priest must always be aware that the frontplate is placed on his head and that he should not be distracted from it, then with regard to phylacteries, which have numerous mentions of God’s name, all the more so one must always be aware of them.
  § The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And it shall be for a sign for you on your arm [<i>yadkha</i>]” (Exodus 13:9), that this is referring to the left arm. Do you say it means the left arm, or is it only the right arm? The verse states: “Even My hand [<i>yadi</i>] has laid the foundation of the earth, and My right hand [<i>vimini</i>] has spread out the heavens” (Isaiah 48:13). And another verse states: “Her hand [<i>yadah</i>] she put to the tent pin, and her right hand [<i>viminah</i>] to the workmen’s hammer” (Judges 5:26), and another verse states: “Why do You withdraw Your hand [<i>yadkha</i>], even Your right hand [<i>viminekha</i>]? Draw it out of Your bosom and consume them” (Psalms 74:11). All these verses employ the term <i>yad</i> with regard to the left hand, and use the term <i>yamin</i>, literally, right, without the term <i>yad</i>, to indicate the right hand.
  
  Daf 37a
  
  Rabbi Yosei HaḤorem says: This is no proof, as we have found that the right hand is also called <i>yad</i>, as it is stated: “And when Joseph saw that his father was laying his right hand [<i>yad yemino</i>]” (Genesis 48:17). The Gemara asks: And the other <i>tanna</i>, who maintains that the right hand is not called <i>yad</i>, how does he respond to this proof? He maintains that the right hand is called “his right hand [<i>yad yemino</i>],” but it is not called a <i>yad</i> without further specification.
  Rabbi Natan says: This proof is not necessary, as it says: “And you shall bind them for a sign upon your arm” (Deuteronomy 6:8), and then it states: “And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house” (Deuteronomy 6:9). This teaches that just as writing is with the right hand, as most people write with their right hands, so too, the binding of phylacteries must be performed with the right hand. And since binding is with the right hand, this means that donning is on the left arm, as one cannot bind the phylacteries with the same hand upon which he is donning them. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yosei HaḤorem, who holds that the right hand is also called <i>yad</i> in the Torah, derive that donning phylacteries is on the left arm? The Gemara answers: He derives it from where Rabbi Natan derives it.
  Rav Ashi said: The requirement that phylacteries be donned on the left arm is derived from the verse: “It shall be for a sign upon your arm [<i>yadkha</i>]” (Exodus 13:16), which is written with a letter <i>heh</i> at the end. This is expounded as though it stated: Your weak [<i>keha</i>] arm. Rabbi Abba said to Rav Ashi: But one can say that <i>yadkha</i> should be interpreted as <i>yadko’aḥ</i>, with a letter <i>ḥet</i> at the end instead of a <i>heh</i>. If so, this would mean: Your arm that is of strength [<i>shebeko’aḥ</i>], which is the right arm. Rav Ashi said to Rabbi Abba: Is this word written with a <i>ḥet</i>?
  The Gemara notes that Rav Ashi’s opinion, that the <i>halakha</i> that phylacteries are donned on the left arm is derived from the term <i>yadkha</i>, is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Yadkha</i> is written with a <i>heh</i>, indicating weakness, and this is referring to the left arm. Others say: “Your arm,” i.e., <i>yadkha</i>, serves to include one without a complete arm, i.e., one whose arm ends at the elbow, in the obligation to don phylacteries, as the remaining part is also categorized as a weak arm. It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: If one does not have a left arm, i.e., not even above the elbow, he is exempt from the mitzva of phylacteries. Others say: <i>Yadkha</i> serves to include one without a left arm even above the elbow, teaching that he must don phylacteries on his right arm.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A left-handed person dons phylacteries on his right arm, which is equivalent to his left arm, i.e., his weaker arm. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that a left-handed person dons phylacteries on his left arm, which is the left arm of every other person? Abaye said: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is referring to one who has equal control with both his hands, i.e., an ambidextrous person. Since such an individual also uses his right hand, he dons phylacteries on his left arm.
  The school of Menashe taught with regard to the verse: “And you shall bind them for a sign on your arm, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8): “On your arm”; this is the bicep. “Between your eyes”; this is the crown of the head. The Gemara asks: Where exactly on the crown of the head are the phylacteries placed? The school of Rabbi Yannai say: Phylacteries are placed on the place where the bone above the baby’s brain is soft after birth.
  § The Sage Peleimu raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: In the case of one who has two heads, on which of them does he don phylacteries? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Either get up and exile yourself from here or accept upon yourself excommunication for asking such a ridiculous question. In the meantime, a certain man arrived and said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: A firstborn child has been born to me who has two heads. How much money must I give to the priest for the redemption of the firstborn? A certain elder came and taught him: You are obligated to give him ten <i>sela</i>, the requisite five for each head.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rami bar Ḥama teaches: Since it is stated with regard to the redemption of the firstborn: “The firstborn of man you shall redeem” (Numbers 18:15), I would derive that even if he was ravaged, e.g., by an animal, within thirty days of his birth, one should redeem him. To counter this, the verse states:
  
  Daf 37b
  
  “Yet the firstborn of man you shall redeem”; the addition of the word “yet” serves to differentiate and teach that there is a firstborn who is not redeemed, namely, one that was ravaged. A child with two heads is like one that was ravaged, as he will certainly not live. The Gemara answers: Here it is different, as the Merciful One makes the redemption of the firstborn dependent on his skull, as it is stated: “You shall take five shekels apiece, by the skull” (Numbers 3:47), which indicates that there is a case in which a firstborn with more than one skull must be redeemed.
  The Gemara returns to its discussion of the <i>baraita</i>: The Master says: “On your arm”; this is the bicep. The term <i>yad</i> can mean either hand or arm. Therefore, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As the Sages taught: “On your arm [<i>yadkha</i>]”; this is the upper part of the arm. Do you say that this is the upper part of the arm, or is it only literally on your actual hand, i.e., on the palm of the hand? The Torah says: Don phylacteries on the <i>yad</i> and don phylacteries on the head; just as there, with regard to the head, it means on the upper part of the head, as will be explained, so too here, it means on the upper part of the arm.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: This proof is not necessary, as the verse states: “And it shall be for a sign for you upon your arm” (Exodus 13:9), which teaches: It shall be a sign for you, but not a sign for others, i.e., one must don the phylacteries of the arm in a place where they are not seen by others. This is the arm, which is usually covered, whereas the hand is usually visible. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: This proof is not necessary, as the verse states: “Therefore you shall place these words in your heart and in your soul, and you shall bind them” (Deuteronomy 11:18). This teaches that placing the words, i.e., donning the phylacteries, shall be opposite the heart, on the bicep.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, would direct the placement of his phylacteries of the arm and don them opposite his heart. Rav Ashi was sitting before Ameimar, and there was a cut in the sleeve covering Ameimar’s arm, and as a result his phylacteries were visible, as they were not covered by a garment. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Doesn’t the Master hold that the phylacteries shall be a sign for you but not a sign for others? Ameimar said to him: This does not mean that phylacteries must be hidden; rather, this was stated in order to teach that they must be donned in a place that is a sign for you, i.e., the bicep, which is generally not seen, but it does not matter if in practice the phylacteries are visible.
  With regard to the statement of the <i>baraita</i> that the phylacteries of the head are donned on the upper part of the head, the Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? As the Sages taught: “Between your eyes” (Exodus 13:9); this is the upper part of the head. Do you say that this is the upper part of the head, or is it only literally between your eyes? It is stated here: “Between your eyes,” and it is stated there: “You shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead” (Deuteronomy 14:1), Just as there, the phrase “between your eyes” is referring to a place on the upper part of the head, as that is a place where one can render himself bald by removing his hair, so too, the place where phylacteries are donned is on the upper part of the head, a place where one can render himself bald.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: This proof is not necessary, as the Torah says: Don phylacteries on the arm and don phylacteries on the head. Just as there, with regard to the phylacteries of the arm, it is referring to a place which is fit to become ritually impure with only one type of leprous mark, that of the skin, so too here, with regard to the phylacteries of the head, it is referring to a place which is fit to become ritually impure with only one type of leprous mark, that of a place of hair (see Leviticus 13:29–37).
  Rabbi Yehuda continues: This serves to exclude the area which is literally “between your eyes,” as there is flesh and the hair of the eyebrows present there, and therefore there is a possibility of leprosy through the growth of a white hair, which is impure according to the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy of the skin (see Leviticus 13:3), and there is also a possibility of leprosy through the growth of a yellow hair, which is impure according to the <i>halakhot</i> of leprosy of the head or the beard (see Leviticus 13:30).
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the four ritual fringes on a garment, the absence of each prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others, as the four of them constitute one mitzva. Rabbi Yishmael says: The four of them are four discrete mitzvot, and the absence of one does not prevent fulfillment of the rest. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Yishmael? Rav Yosef said: The difference between their opinions is with regard to a linen sheet with woolen ritual fringes that has fewer than four ritual fringes. The first <i>tanna</i> maintains that since one is not performing a mitzva, he may not wrap himself in the sheet, due to the prohibition of diverse kinds, i.e., the prohibition against wearing clothing made from a mixture of wool and linen threads. Conversely, Rabbi Yishmael permits one to wrap himself in it, as each ritual fringe is a separate mitzva, and the mitzva of ritual fringes overrides the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds.
  Rava bar Ahina said: The difference between their opinions is with regard to a cloak with five corners. It is derived that a cloak of this kind requires ritual fringes (see 43b), but it is unclear whether ritual fringes must be placed on each corner. If each fringe is a discrete mitzva, then the obligation applies to the fifth corner as well, but if it is one mitzva then it applies only to four of the corners of this garment.
  Ravina said: The difference between their opinions is with regard to the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says: One who goes out unwittingly to the public domain on Shabbat with a four-cornered cloak that does not have all of the requisite ritual fringes attached to its corners is liable to bring a sin offering, because the remaining fringes are not an integral part of the garment. Since they do not enable the wearer to fulfill the mitzva, they are considered a burden, which may not be carried into the public domain on Shabbat. The first <i>tanna</i> agrees with this ruling, whereas Rabbi Yishmael maintains that since each corner with ritual fringes is the fulfillment of a mitzva, one is not liable to bring a sin offering due to carrying on Shabbat for wearing it into the public domain.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: One who cuts the corner of his garmenthas not done anything of consequence with regard to exempting the garment from the obligation of ritual fringes, as he has rendered it a cloak with five corners, to which the obligation of ritual fringes applies.
  Rav Mesharshiyya similarly says: One who ties his garment has not done anything of consequence with regard to exempting the garment from the obligation of ritual fringes. What is the reason? It is considered as though the garment is untied, since the knot can be loosened at any time. And we learned likewise in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 26:4): All bound leather jugs, i.e., those whose bottoms are not sewn but tied, are ritually pure, i.e., they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. This is because they are not considered receptacles, as these knots will be untied, except for leather jugs of Arabs, who would tie them with a permanent knot.
  Rav Dimi of Neharde’a similarly says: One who sews his garment, i.e., he folded over a long garment and sewed the edges together, has not done anything of consequence with regard to the obligation of ritual fringes, and he must place ritual fringes on the original corners. The reason is that if it is so that he does not need the folded part, which is why he is sewing it, let him cut it and throw it away.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says: The four of them are four discrete mitzvot, and the absence of one does not prevent fulfillment of the rest. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. The Gemara states: But the <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with his opinion.
  The Gemara relates: Ravina was walking behind Mar bar Rav Ashi on the Shabbat of the Festival when the corner of Mar bar Rav Ashi’s garment on which his ritual fringes were hanging tore, and yet Ravina did not say anything to him. When he arrived at Mar bar Rav Ashi’s house, Ravina said to him: Back there, along the way, the corner tore. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: If you would have told me then, I would have thrown off the garment there, as once one of the ritual fringes is torn no mitzva is performed with the rest, and it is prohibited to walk in the public domain on Shabbat wearing such a garment. This is in accordance with the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, who disagrees with the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t the Master say: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah? This includes the prohibition against carrying on Shabbat in the public domain. That being the case, why would he remove his garment in public?
  The Gemara answers: Rav bar Shabba interpreted that statement before Rav Kahana:
  
  Daf 38a
  
  He stated this with regard to the prohibition of: “You shall not deviate to the left or the right of that which they tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:11). A prohibition by rabbinic law is overridden by human dignity, but not a prohibition by Torah law. Therefore, Mar bar Rav Ashi would have removed his garment had he known about the tear.
  And there are those who say there is a different version of this discussion: It was when they were there, in the place where the corner of Mar bar Rav Ashi’s garment tore, that Ravina said to him that it had torn, and Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him in response: What is your opinion? Do you think that I should throw the garment off? But doesn’t the Master say: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah? The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rav bar Shabba interpreted that statement before Rav Kahana: He stated this with regard to the prohibition of: “You shall not deviate,” not the prohibition against carrying in the public domain, which applies by Torah law. The Gemara answers that here too, it is not a prohibition by Torah law, as the place where they were walking was not a full-fledged public domain but a <i>karmelit</i>, in which carrying is prohibited by rabbinic law.
  
  MISHNA: The absence of the sky-blue [<i>tekhelet</i>] strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of ritual fringes with the white strings, and the absence of white strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the sky-blue strings. If one has only one, he wears it without the other. Absence of the phylacteries of the arm does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head, and absence of the phylacteries of the head does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the arm. If one has only one, he dons it without the other.
  GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When the verse requires one to place white and sky-blue strings upon the corners of his garments and then states: “That you may look upon it” (Numbers 15:39), it teaches that the lack of either one prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. But the Rabbis say: The lack of one does not prevent the fulfillment of the mitzva with the other.
  The Gemara inquires: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, i.e., how does he derive his ruling from this verse? The Gemara explains: As it is written: “And they shall put on the fringe of the corner a sky-blue thread” (Numbers 15:38). “The fringe of the corner” is a reference to strings that are of the same type as the corner of the garment. Since garments are usually white, this phrase is referring to white strings. And it is written in this same verse: “A sky-blue thread.” And the Merciful One states in the following verse, referring to both types of strings: “And it shall be to you for a fringe that you may look upon it” (Numbers 15:39), in the singular. This teaches that one does not fulfill his obligation until both types are present together.
  The Gemara asks: And how do the Rabbis, who hold that the one can fulfill one obligation without the other, understand this verse? The Gemara answers: They hold that the phrase “that you may look upon it” indicates that one fulfills a mitzva with each one individually.
  The Gemara concludes its initial suggestion: Shall we say that the mishna, which states that one can fulfill the mitzva with either white or sky-blue strings even in the absence of the other, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? The Gemara responds: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the ruling of the mishna is necessary only with regard to granting precedence. The white strings should precede the blue strings, but if the order is reversed, one still fulfills the mitzva.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: It is a mitzva to insert the white strings into the garment before inserting the sky-blue strings, but if one inserted the sky-blue strings before the white strings, he fulfilled his obligation but omitted the mitzva. The Gemara asks: What does the <i>baraita</i> mean by the phrase: Omitted the mitzva?
  
  Daf 38b
  
  If we say that the individual omitted the mitzva of white strings and fulfilled only the mitzva of sky-blue strings, how is this possible? According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the absence of either one prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other, and therefore in this case one would not fulfill any mitzva at all.
  The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It means that he omitted a mitzva but nevertheless performed a mitzva. And what does it mean that he omitted a mitzva? It means that he did not perform the mitzva in the optimal manner because he did not insert the white strings first, but he did fulfill the mitzva of ritual fringes.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well with regard to the mishna’s statement that absence of the white strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the sky-blue strings, which has been interpreted to mean that failing to insert the white strings before the sky-blue strings does not invalidate the ritual fringes. But what is the meaning of the mishna’s statement that the absence of sky-blue strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the white strings?
  Rami bar Ḥama said: That statement of the mishna is necessary only in the case of a garment that consists entirely of sky-blue wool. In such a case, one is supposed to insert the sky-blue strings before the white strings.
  The Gemara notes that this was also stated by <i>amora’im</i>: Levi said to Shmuel: Aryokh, do not sit on your feet until you explain to me this matter: When the mishna states that the absence of the sky-blue strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of ritual fringes with the white strings, and the absence of white strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the sky-blue strings, what does it mean? Shmuel said to Levi: That statement is necessary only in the case of a linen cloak on which one places ritual fringes, where there is a mitzva to insert the white strings first.
  What is the reason for this? The verse states: “And they shall put on the fringe of the corner a sky-blue thread” (Numbers 15:38). “The fringe of the corner” is a reference to the string that is the same type as the corner of the garment. In the case of a linen cloak, which is generally white, this is a reference to the white strings, and since the verse mentions “the fringe of the corner” before the sky-blue thread, the white strings must be inserted before the sky-blue strings. The mishna therefore teaches that if one inserted the sky-blue strings before the white strings, we have no problem with it after the fact, and the ritual fringes are valid.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well with regard to the mishna’s statement that absence of the white strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the sky-blue strings. But what is the meaning of the mishna’s statement that the absence of sky-blue strings does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the white strings?
  Rami bar Ḥama said to him: That statement of the mishna is necessary only in the case of a garment that consists entirely of sky-blue wool, where it is a mitzva to insert the sky-blue strings first, as the phrase: “The fringe of the corner” indicates that the first strings one inserts into the garment are those that are the same type as the corner of the garment. The mishna therefore teaches that if one inserted the white strings first, we have no problem with it after the fact, and the ritual fringes are fit.
  Rava said: Is it actually the color of the garment that determines the proper order in which one should insert the strings? Rather, Rava said: The ruling of the mishna is necessary only for a case of severed strings. The mishna teaches that if the sky-blue strings were severed and the white ones remain, or if the white strings were severed and the sky-blue strings remain, we have no problem with it, and the ritual fringes are fit.
  As the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya say: Severed white or sky-blue strings are fit, and similarly, severed hyssop branches are fit for sprinkling the water of purification mixed with the ashes of a red heifer. The Gemara asks: What measure do severed strings need to be in order to remain fit? Bar Hamduri says that Shmuel says: The strings must remain long enough to tie them in a slipknot.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When Shmuel says that severed strings must still be long enough to tie them in a slipknot, does that mean to tie all of the strings together in a slipknot? Or perhaps the strings may be even shorter, provided that they are long enough to tie each one individually. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rav Ashi asks: If the strings are thick and cannot be tied in a slipknot, but if they were the same length but thin they could be tied in a slipknot, what is their status? Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If the strings are long enough to be fit if they are thin, all the more so they are fit if they are thick, as the mitzva one fulfills with them is more recognizable with thicker strings.
  The Gemara cited the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that one cannot fulfill the mitzva of ritual fringes without both white and sky-blue strings, and the Gemara explained that the mishna can be interpreted in accordance with his opinion. The Gemara now asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and holds that the sky-blue strings and the white strings are not interdependent? The Gemara answers: It is this following <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yitzḥak says in the name of Rabbi Natan, who said in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: If one does not have sky-blue strings, he nevertheless affixes white strings.
  Rava said: Learn from the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya that one is required to tie a knot after each and every set of windings, and one cannot suffice with only one knot at the end of all the windings. As, if it enters your mind to say that one is not required to tie a knot after each set of windings, then that which the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya say: Severed white or sky-blue strings are fit, and similarly, severed hyssop branches are fit, is difficult: Once the uppermost knot is undone, all of the windings on the entire corner will come undone, as there are no other knots holding the windings in place, and in that case the garment will not have valid ritual fringes.
  
  Daf 39a
  
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya were referring to a case where one tied knots between the sets of windings even though there is no obligation to do so.
  And Rabba says: Learn from it that the uppermost knot in the ritual fringes is required by Torah law. As, if it enters your mind to say that it is by rabbinic law, whereas by Torah law it is sufficient to merely insert the strings into the hole without tying any knots, for what reason was it necessary for the Torah to permit placing wool ritual fringes on a linen cloak? It is obvious that it is permitted, since if one attaches a swatch of wool and a swatch of linen with a single connection, it is not considered a connection with regard to the prohibition against wearing a garment that includes both wool and linen. Rather, learn from it that the uppermost knot is required by Torah law.
  § Rabba bar Rav Adda says that Rav Adda says that Rav says: If a string was severed at its base, i.e., where it is connected to the garment, the ritual fringes are unfit. Rav Naḥman sat in the study hall and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a <i>baraita</i>: In what case is this statement said, i.e., that there is a minimum length required for the strings? That is only when the strings are initially affixed to the garment. But in the end, i.e., after the strings are affixed in an acceptable manner, its remainder and its severed strings are fit at any length.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is its remainder and what are its severed strings? What, is it not that when the <i>baraita</i> mentions its remainder it is referring to a case where parts of the strings were severed and parts of them remain, and when the <i>baraita</i> mentions its severed strings it is referring to a case where the strings were completely severed, and nevertheless the strings are fit for the mitzva?
  The Gemara responds to Rava’s objection: No, the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is teaching one <i>halakha</i>, and the <i>baraita</i> should be understood as follows: The remainder of its severed strings are fit at any length. The Gemara asks: If so, let the <i>baraita</i> simply say: Its severed strings are fit at any length; why do I need the mention of its remainder? This teaches us that we require a remainder of its severed strings long enough to wrap them around the other strings and tie them in a slipknot.
  § Rabba sat in the study hall and said in the name of Rav: The string used for winding around the other strings is counted in the quota of ritual fringes, i.e., it is one of the eight strings on each corner, and there is no need to have an additional string for winding. Rav Yosef said to Rabba: Shmuel said it, and not Rav. This was also stated by another <i>amora</i>: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: Rabbi Yoshiya of Usha told me that the string used for winding around the other strings is counted in the quota of ritual fringes.
  Rava sat in the study hall and said in the name of Shmuel: If one wound the majority of the white and the sky-blue strings instead of leaving the larger portion of the strings hanging loose beyond the windings, the ritual fringes are nevertheless fit. Rav Yosef said to Rava: Rav said it, and not Shmuel. The Gemara supports Rav Yosef’s version from that which was also stated: Rav Huna bar Yehuda says that Rav Sheshet says that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: If one wound the majority of the white and the sky-blue strings, the ritual fringes are nevertheless fit.
  Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Natan, teaches this discussion like this: Rav Huna says that Rav Sheshet says that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says that Rav says: If one wound the majority of the white and the sky-blue strings, the ritual fringes are nevertheless fit. And even if he wound only one set of windings, the ritual fringes are fit. But the finest way to affix the white and sky-blue strings is to ensure that one-third of the length of the strings is windings and two-thirds are loose hanging strings.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the measure of a set of windings? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is such that one winds once and winds a second and third time, i.e., each set must contain at least three windings. It was taught: One who minimizes the sets of windings may not have fewer than seven sets, and one who adds to this number of sets may not have more than thirteen sets of windings.
  The Gemara provides explanations for these guidelines: One who minimizes the sets of windings may not wind fewer than seven sets, corresponding to the seven firmaments. And one who adds to this number of sets may not wind more than thirteen sets of windings, corresponding to the seven firmaments and the six air spaces between them.
  It was taught: When one begins to form the windings, he begins winding with a white string. This is because the verse indicates that one first inserts “the fringe of the corner” (Numbers 15:38), i.e., the white strings, which are of the same type as the corner of the garment. And when he concludes the windings, he concludes with a white string, in accordance with the principle: One elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and does not downgrade.
  § The Gemara relates: Rav and Rabba bar bar Ḥana were sitting together. A certain man was passing by wearing a cloak that was made entirely of sky-blue wool, on which he had affixed white and sky-blue strings,
  
  Daf 39b
  
  and the ritual fringes were composed entirely of windings, without any portion of the strings hanging loose. Rav said: The cloak is beautiful, but the white and sky-blue strings are not beautiful. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: The cloak is beautiful, and the white and sky-blue strings are also beautiful.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara answers: Rabba bar bar Ḥana holds that since it is written in one verse: “You shall prepare yourself twisted cords” (Deuteronomy 22:12), and in another it is written: “And they shall put on the fringe of the corner a sky-blue thread” (Numbers 15:38), it teaches that the ritual fringes may be composed entirely of either twisted cords, i.e., the windings, or loose threads or strings.
  And Rav holds that actually, we also require loose strings in addition to the windings, and when that term “twisted cords” appears in the verse, it comes for the purpose of teaching the number of strings that are required. If the verse would have employed the singular term twisted cord, it would still indicate that two strings are required, as twisted means that two strings are wound around each other. Once the verse uses the plural term “twisted cords,” it thereby indicates that four strings are required. By using the terms “twisted cords” and “thread,” the verses indicates: Form twisted cords with the four strings that one attaches to each corner, and let the strings hang loose from them.
  § Shmuel says in the name of Levi: Wool strings exempt a garment made of linen, i.e., one fulfills the mitzva by affixing wool strings to a linen garment.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether strings made of linen exempt a garment made of wool? One can say that it is only wool strings that exempt a garment of linen, as since the sky-blue string, which must be wool, exempts a linen garment, white strings of wool also exempt the garment. But if one affixes linen strings to a wool garment, he does not fulfill his obligation.
  Or perhaps, since it is written: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together. You shall prepare yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your covering” (Deuteronomy 22:11–12), which indicates that one may wear wool and linen together in order to fulfill the mitzva of ritual fringes, there is no difference whether one affixes wool strings to a garment of linen, and there is no difference whether one affixes linen strings to a garment of wool.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma, as Raḥava says that Rav Yehuda says: Wool strings exempt a garment made of linen, strings of linen exempt a garment made of wool, and strings of wool and linen exempt a garment in any case, i.e., all garments, and even garments made from silks [<i>beshira’in</i>].
  The Gemara notes: And this last point disagrees with a ruling of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says: <i>Shira’in</i> are entirely exempt from the obligation of ritual fringes. Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from the following <i>baraita</i>: Garments made from types of silks known as <i>shira’in</i>, <i>kalakh</i>, and <i>serikin</i> all require ritual fringes. The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> means that there is an obligation by rabbinic law, whereas Rav Naḥman meant they are exempt by Torah law.
  The Gemara challenges this suggestion: If that is so, then say the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: And with regard to all of these garments, strings of wool and linen exempt them. This indicates that one may affix wool sky-blue strings and white linen strings. Granted, if you say that the obligation of ritual fringes for silk garments is by Torah law, that is why diverse kinds are permitted for them. But if you say that the obligation is by rabbinic law, how could diverse kinds be permitted for them? The Gemara answers: Say instead: Either wool or linen strings exempt silk garments, but one may not affix both wool and linen strings to the same silk garment.
  The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable to assume that this is the correct interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches in the latter clause: Strings made from these silk fabrics exempt a garment of their type but do not exempt a garment that is not of their type. Granted, if you say that the obligation to attach ritual fringes to these garments is by rabbinic law, that is why they are exempted if one affixes strings of their type. But if you say that the obligation is by Torah law, then it should be only wool or linen that exempt these garments.
  The Gemara rejects this: If it is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument, because one can maintain that other fabrics also fulfill the obligation of ritual fringes by Torah law, in accordance with the opinion of Rava. As Rava raises a contradiction: It is written in one verse: “And they shall put on the fringe of the corner a sky-blue thread” (Numbers 15:38). The term “the corner” indicates that the fringe must be from the same type of fabric as the corner. And yet it is written: “Wool and linen” (Deuteronomy 22:11), immediately before the verse states: “You shall prepare yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your covering” (Deuteronomy 22:12), indicating that ritual fringes must be from either wool or linen.
  How so? Strings made of wool or linen exempt any garment, whether the garment is made of their type of fabric, or whether it is not of their type of fabric. Strings made of all other types of fabric exempt garments made of their type of fabric, e.g., silk strings exempt a silk garment, but they do not exempt a garment made from a fabric that is not their type, i.e., a garment made from a different fabric.
  The Gemara notes: And Rav Naḥman, who holds that silk garments do not require ritual fringes by Torah law, holds in accordance with the ruling stated by a <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael.
  As a <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Since the word garments is usually stated in the Torah without specification as to the material from which the garments are made, and the verse specified in one of its references to garments that it is referring to garments made from wool or linen, as it states: “And the garment in which there will be the mark of leprosy, whether it be a woolen garment or a linen garment” (Leviticus 13:47), it may be derived that so too, all garments mentioned in the Torah are those made from wool or linen. Other fabrics are not classified as garments by Torah law. Consequently, when the Torah requires strings on the corners of garments (see Numbers 15:38), it is referring specifically to garments made of wool or linen.
  Abaye said: This statement by a <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael diverges from another statement by a <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who holds that all fabrics are considered garments. As a <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: From the fact that the verse states: “A woolen garment” (Leviticus 13:47), I have derived only that a garment of wool can become ritually impure. From where is it derived that garments made of camels’ hair, rabbits’ wool, goats’ hair, or the types of silk <i>kalakh</i>, <i>serikin</i>, and <i>shirayin</i>, are also included in this <i>halakha</i>? The same verse states: “Or a linen garment.” The word “or” serves as an amplification to include all types of fabric.
  
  Daf 40a
  
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to ritual fringes on a linen cloak, Beit Shammai deem the cloak exempt from ritual fringes due to the fact that the sky-blue strings must be made from wool, and there is a Torah prohibition against wearing a mixture of wool and linen. And Beit Hillel deem a linen cloak obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes. And the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok says: But is it not the case that anyone who affixes sky-blue strings to a linen cloak in Jerusalem is considered nothing other than one of those who causes others to be astonished at their behavior, as it appears that he is violating the prohibition against wearing a garment containing wool and linen?
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If so, that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with Beit Hillel and a linen cloak is required to have ritual fringes, why did the Sages prohibit attaching ritual fringes to linen garments in Jerusalem? It is because people are not well versed in the <i>halakha</i> and might ultimately wear garments of wool and linen even when it is not necessary for the mitzva of ritual fringes.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥana said to Rava: If that is the concern, then let ten people take linen cloaks with ritual fringes and go out to the marketplace and thereby publicize the matter, i.e., that it is permitted to affix wool strings to a linen garment due to the mitzva. Rava answered: All the more so people would be astonished at us for acting in such an unconventional manner.
  The Gemara suggests: Let the Rabbis teach during their public lecture that affixing wool strings to a linen garment is permitted for the mitzva of ritual fringes. The Gemara answers: Wearing strings on a linen garment is prohibited because of a rabbinic decree due to the concern that people might use strings that were dyed blue with indigo [<i>kala ilan</i>], instead of with <i>tekhelet</i>, the sky-blue dye produced from the <i>ḥilazon</i> (see 44b), in which case they would not fulfill the mitzva of ritual fringes and would violate the prohibition against wearing garments containing wool and linen.
  The Gemara suggests: Even if one’s blue strings are not dyed with <i>tekhelet</i> as required for the mitzva, let them be considered merely as white strings. In the absence of <i>tekhelet</i> one fulfills the mitzva with white strings, and therefore it should be permitted to affix white woolen strings to a linen garment. The Gemara explains: Since it is possible to affix white strings that are the same type of material as the garment, i.e., linen, and thereby fulfill the mitzva without overriding the prohibition against wearing a garment made from wool and linen, one may not affix white wool strings to a linen garment.
  The Gemara notes: This is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish says: Any place where you find a positive mitzva and a prohibition that clash with one another, if you are able to fulfill both of them, that is preferable; and if that is not possible, the positive mitzva shall come and override the prohibition. In this case, the clash is between the mitzva of ritual fringes and the prohibition against wearing a garment that contains wool and linen. One can fulfill both of them by using white strings that are linen instead of wool if the garment is made from linen.
  The Gemara suggests: And let them test the strings to ascertain whether they are dyed with indigo or with <i>tekhelet</i>, as explained by the Gemara (42b). The Gemara responds: Rather, the prohibition against affixing ritual fringes to a linen garment is a rabbinic decree due to the concern that perhaps the sky-blue strings were colored with <i>tekhelet</i> dye that had been used for testing the color of the dye in the vat and therefore became unfit (see 42b). In such a case, there would be no fulfillment of the mitzva of sky-blue ritual fringes to override the prohibition against wearing a garment of wool and linen.
  The Gemara suggests: Let the Sages write letters informing dye producers that <i>tekhelet</i> that was used for testing the color of the dye in the vat is unfit for ritual fringes. The Gemara explains: Shall we go and rely on letters, assuming that dye producers will follow the instructions they contain? Rava responded to this and said: Now,
  
  Daf 40b
  
  with regard to the prohibitions against eating leavened bread on Passover and eating on Yom Kippur, which are punishable by <i>karet</i>, we rely on letters sent from the rabbinical court in Eretz Yisrael publicizing whether the year was declared a leap year and when they have declared the New Moon; here, with regard to the mitzva of ritual fringes, which is merely a positive mitzva, is it not all the more so correct that letters can be relied on?
  Rather, Rava said: This is a statement that I said, and it was stated in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Zeira in accordance with my opinion: The reason for the rabbinic decree is lest one’s cloak rip within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the corner of the garment, which is where the ritual fringes are placed, and he sew it with linen string and then use the excess string for ritual fringes.
  And in such a case the ritual fringes would be unfit because the Torah states: “You shall prepare yourself twisted cords” (Deuteronomy 22:12), which teaches: Prepare it, and not from what has already been prepared. Consequently, the strings must be attached to the garment for the sake of the mitzva of ritual fringes. When the individual places the linen string there in order to stitch the garment and then decides to use it for the mitzva of ritual fringes and adds sky-blue wool strings, he does not fulfill the mitzva of ritual fringes and violates the prohibition against wearing a garment of wool and linen.
  Because of this rabbinic decree, Rabbi Zeira untied the ritual fringes and removed them from his linen cloak. Rav Zeira said: The rabbinic decree prohibiting ritual fringes on a linen garment is also due to the concern that one might affix ritual fringes to a nighttime garment. Since the mitzva of ritual fringes does not apply in that case, if one wears the garment he would not fulfill the mitzva and would violate the prohibition against wearing a garment with wool and linen.
  And Rava said: This is a statement that I said, and it was stated in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Zeira in accordance with my opinion: If a garment is made from cloth and its corners are made from leather, it is required to have ritual fringes. Conversely, if a cloak is made from leather and its corners are made from cloth, it is exempt from the mitzva of ritual fringes. What is the reason for this? We require that the main part of the garment be obligated, and a leather garment is not required to have ritual fringes.
  The Gemara notes: Rav Aḥai would follow the corner in determining whether the garment is required to have ritual fringes or not, because the Torah states: “On the corners of their garments” (Numbers 15:38).
  § Rava says that Rav Seḥora says that Rav Huna says: In a case where one affixed ritual fringes to a garment possessing only three corners, which is not required to have ritual fringes, and then completed its fourth corner by sewing on additional material or cutting away some of the material, the ritual fringes he attached to the original three corners are unfit. This is due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from what has already been prepared. Once the garment is required to have ritual fringes one may attach the ritual fringes; the strings that were attached before the garment was required to have them are not fit.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: It is told of the early generations of pious men that once they weaved three fingerbreadths of the length of the garment, they would affix the white and sky-blue strings to the first two corners, even though the garment was not yet long enough to be obligated to have ritual fringes. The Gemara answers: Say that the <i>baraita</i> should read as follows: Once they completed [<i>shepatzu</i>] the garment until there were only three fingerbreadths left to weave, they would affix the white and sky-blue strings to the first two corners.
  The Gemara asks: And do we say: Prepare it, and not from what has already been prepared? Is that so that this principle disqualifies ritual fringes that one affixed to a garment before he was required to do so? But doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say: If one affixed ritual fringes to a garment that already had ritual fringes affixed to it and then removed the original strings, it is fit, despite the fact that when he attached the second set they were superfluous? This indicates that even if one attaches ritual fringes to a garment when there is no obligation to attach them, the ritual fringes are fit.
  Rava said: This does not present a difficulty, because now that he adds a second, unnecessary set of ritual fringes and is liable for violating the prohibition of adding to a mitzva (see Deuteronomy 13:1), is it not considered an action?
  Rav Pappa objects to this: From where is it known that Rabbi Zeira is discussing a case where the person intended to add to the original set of ritual fringes? Perhaps Rabbi Zeira is discussing a case where he intended to nullify the original strings, and therefore there is no prohibition of adding to a mitzva, and there is an action.
  With regard to the issue of affixing ritual fringes to a garment that already has ritual fringes, the Gemara relates: Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Mattana says that Shmuel says: White and sky-blue strings are not subject to the prohibition of diverse kinds, and this is the <i>halakha</i> even if they are affixed to a cloak that is exempt from ritual fringes.
  The Gemara asks: What is meant by: A cloak that is exempt from ritual fringes? If we say that it is referring to a cloak that is not of the size necessary to require the affixing of ritual fringes, that is difficult: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a cloak that is large enough for a minor to cover his head and most of his body with it,
  
  Daf 41a
  
  and an adult goes out in public on occasion while wearing it, it is required to have ritual fringes. But if it is not large enough for a minor to cover his head and most of his body with it, then even if an adult goes out in public on occasion while wearing it, it is exempt from ritual fringes. And so too with regard to diverse kinds, i.e., the prohibition against wearing wool and linen together.
  And we discussed it: What is meant by: And so too with regard to diverse kinds? If we say that it means: And so too with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds, that if a minor could not cover the majority of his head and body with it, the prohibition of diverse kinds does not apply, that is difficult: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Kilayim</i> 9:2): There is no exemption with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds for clothing that an adult would not wear even occasionally in public?
  And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says in explanation: Rather, the <i>baraita</i> means: And so too with regard to whether a linen cloak is required to have ritual fringes. If the cloak is large enough for a minor to cover his head and most of his body with it, then it requires ritual fringes, and wearing the garment with the ritual fringes is not a violation of the prohibition of diverse kinds. But if the garment is smaller than that, it is prohibited to place ritual fringes on it, due to the prohibition of diverse kinds. Therefore, one cannot explain Shmuel’s statement to mean that a cloak that is exempt from ritual fringes because it is too small is not subject to the prohibition of diverse kinds.
  Rather, what is meant by the statement that a cloak that is exempt from ritual fringes is not subject to the prohibition of diverse kinds? It is referring to where one affixed ritual fringes to a garment that already had ritual fringes affixed to it. Even though the second set of ritual fringes is superfluous, nevertheless there is no violation of the prohibition of diverse kinds.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rabbi Zeira already say this one time when he stated that if one attached ritual fringes to a garment that already had ritual fringes attached to it and he then removed the first set of strings, the garment is fit? The Gemara answers: One was stated from the other by inference, and Rabbi Zeira did not state both statements.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A very long cloak that is folded in half is required to have ritual fringes at the fold. And Rabbi Shimon deems it exempt it from ritual fringes at the fold because that is not where the corners of the garment are located. And Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis agree that if he folded it and sewed it, it is required to have ritual fringes at the fold.
  The Gemara challenges: If one sewed it, it is obvious that it is required to have ritual fringes at the fold. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> because it is referring to a case where he fastened it with pins rather than sewing it in the conventional manner.
  The Gemara relates that Rabba bar Huna arrived at the house of Rava bar Rav Naḥman, and he saw that Rava bar Rav Naḥman was wearing a cloak that was folded and that he had affixed strings to it on the corners of the fold. The cloak unfolded, and the string that had been on the corner of the fold now came and settled near his head, i.e., in the middle of the cloak, as the two sides of the cloak were in the front and back of Rava bar Rav Naḥman.
  Rabba bar Huna said to Rava bar Rav Naḥman: This is not the corner of the garment that the Merciful One writes about in the Torah. Rava bar Rav Naḥman went and threw it off, and he covered himself with a different cloak.
  Rabba bar Huna said to Rava bar Rav Naḥman: Do you hold that ritual fringes are an obligation incumbent upon the man? That is not so. Rather, it is an obligation that pertains to every cloak that one owns. Therefore, go and affix ritual fringes to it properly.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a <i>baraita</i> supports the opinion of Rabba bar Huna: It is told of the early generations of pious men that once they weaved three fingerbreadths of the length of the garment, they would affix the white and sky-blue strings to the first two corners, even though the garment was not yet ready to be worn. This seems to prove that there is an obligation to affix ritual fringes to all the cloaks in one’s possession, even if he is not currently wearing them. The Gemara rejects this proof: The pious men were different, as they would act stringently with themselves. Therefore, one cannot adduce the actual requirement from their behavior.
  The Gemara notes that this disagrees with what an angel said. As an angel found Rav Ketina when he was wearing a linen cloak, which is exempt from ritual fringes. The angel said to him: Ketina, Ketina, if you wear a linen cloak in the summer and a coat [<i>sarbela</i>], which has only two corners and is therefore also exempt from ritual fringes, in the winter, what will become of the ritual fringes of sky-blue wool? As a result, you will never fulfill the mitzva.
  Rav Ketina said to him: Do you punish us even for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva? The angel said to him: At a time when there is divine anger and judgment, we punish even for the failure to fulfill a positive mitzva.
  The Gemara attempts to draw conclusions from the statement of the angel: Granted, if you say that the mitzva of ritual fringes is an obligation incumbent upon the man, that is why Rav Ketina would be deemed liable at a time of divine anger, as he did not affix ritual fringes to his cloak and thereby neglected the obligation incumbent upon him. But if you say that it is an obligation to attach them to every cloak that one owns, since Rav Ketina’s cloaks were not required to have ritual fringes, he was not obligated to attach ritual fringes to them. Why should he be punished in a time of divine anger?
  The Gemara responds: Rather, what should one assume, that it is an obligation incumbent upon the man? Even so, granted that the Merciful One rendered him obligated when he is wearing a cloak that has four corners and is therefore subject to the obligation of ritual fringes, but when he is wearing a cloak that is not subject to the obligation of ritual fringes, did the Merciful One deem him obligated?
  Rather, this is what the angel is saying to Rav Ketina: Are you seeking ploys [<i>tatzdeki</i>] to exempt yourself from performing the mitzva of ritual fringes?
  Rav Tovi bar Kisna says that Shmuel says: Garments that are not being worn but are stored in a box are required to have ritual fringes, because the mitzva pertains to the garment, not the man. But Shmuel concedes in the case of an old man, where the garment was made as a shroud in his honor, that the shroud is exempt. What is the reason for this? The Merciful One states in the Torah that one must place ritual fringes on the corners of garments “with which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12). This shroud is not made for the purpose of covering oneself.
  The Gemara comments: At that time, i.e., a person’s burial, we certainly affix ritual fringes to the shroud, because otherwise it would be a violation of: “Whoever mocks the poor blasphemes his Maker” (Proverbs 17:5). If we did not place them, it would be mocking the deceased, as if to taunt him that now he is no longer obligated in mitzvot.
  § Raḥava says that Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of a cloak that became torn at one of its corners, if it was torn beyond three fingerbreadths from the edge of the garment, one may sew it. But if it was torn within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment, then one may not sew it. There is a concern that he might use the thread with which he sewed the garment for the ritual fringes, in which case the strings would be unfit due to the principle: Prepare it, and not from what has already been prepared.
  The Gemara comments: This <i>halakha</i> is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a cloak that became torn at one of its corners, if it was torn beyond three fingerbreadths from the edge of the garment, one may sew it. But if it was torn within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment, Rabbi Meir says: One may not sew it. And the Rabbis say: One may sew it.
  And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis agree that one may not bring a piece of cloth, even if it is a square cubit in size, from elsewhere, containing white and sky-blue strings, and attach it to a cloak. This is because one must attach the ritual fringes directly to the corner of the garment, rather than attaching them to a piece of cloth and then attaching that cloth to the garment. And Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis also agree that one may bring white or sky-blue strings from elsewhere and attach them to the garment, i.e., one may remove strings from one garment in order to attach them to another garment.
  
  Daf 41b
  
  This is permitted provided that the strings are not broken. The Gemara asks: Should one conclude from this <i>baraita</i> that it is always permitted to untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment? The Gemara rejects this inference: Perhaps the ruling of this <i>baraita</i> applies only if the first garment was worn out and no longer wearable.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a cloak that is made entirely of sky-blue wool, strings of every type of color exempt it, i.e., the ritual fringes that are not <i>tekhelet</i> may be any color except for indigo, a color that is indistinguishable from <i>tekhelet</i>. This indicates that if one attached strings dyed with indigo alongside the strings dyed with <i>tekhelet</i>, the ritual fringes are unfit.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: A cloak is exempted only by strings of its own type. In the case of a cloak that is made entirely of sky-blue wool, one brings sky-blue [<i>tekhelet</i>] strings and something else, i.e., strings of a different color, and attaches them to the cloak. And he may not bring strings dyed with indigo along with the strings dyed with <i>tekhelet</i>. But if he brought strings dyed with indigo together with the strings dyed with <i>tekhelet</i>, the ritual fringes are fit.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This is not difficult, because here, in the <i>baraita</i> that holds that the ritual fringes are fit after the fact, it is referring to a cloak that has only four strings, two of <i>tekhelet</i> and two of indigo. There, in the <i>baraita</i> that holds that the ritual fringes are unfit after the fact, it is referring to a cloak that has eight strings, four of <i>tekhelet</i> and four of indigo. In this case, the Sages were concerned that one would take the four indigo strings from this garment and use them in another garment, thinking that they were <i>tekhelet</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Should you conclude from the fact that the Sages were concerned lest one take the indigo strings from this garment for use in another garment that in general one may untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment? The Gemara responds: Perhaps their concern was that if one did transfer the strings, he might mistake indigo for <i>tekhelet</i>, but it is not permitted to transfer the strings <i>ab initio</i>.
  It was stated that there is a dispute between <i>amora’im</i> with regard to this <i>halakha</i>. Rav says: One may not untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment. And Shmuel says: One may untie them from one garment and affix them to another garment.
  The Gemara cites additional disputes between Rav and Shmuel: Rav says: One may not light from one Hanukkah lamp to another Hanukkah lamp. And Shmuel says: One may light from one Hanukkah lamp to another Hanukkah lamp.
  Rabbi Shimon rules that it is permitted to drag items on Shabbat despite the possibility that one might thereby create a furrow in the ground. Creating a furrow is a labor prohibited on Shabbat, but since he does not intend to create the furrow, and it is not certain that a furrow will be created, dragging the item is permitted. Rav says: The <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to dragging items on Shabbat. And Shmuel says that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to dragging items on Shabbat.
  Abaye said: In all halakhic matters of the Master, Rabba, he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Rav, except these three where he conducted himself in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. He ruled that one may untie ritual fringes from one garment in order to affix them to another garment, and one may light from one Hanukkah lamp to another Hanukkah lamp, and the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon with regard to dragging items on Shabbat.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, chair, or bench on the ground on Shabbat, provided that he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground. Even if a furrow is formed inadvertently, one does not need to be concerned.
  The Gemara relates that Rav Yehuda would give his garments containing ritual fringes to a laundryman and was not concerned that the strings dyed with <i>tekhelet</i> might become detached and that the laundryman would replace them with strings dyed with indigo. Rav Ḥanina would form a bundle with his ritual fringes so that they would not become detached while they were being laundered. Ravina would tuck them into a pocket he formed on the garment and sew the cover of the pocket in order to protect the ritual fringes.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: How many strings does one place on a garment? Beit Shammai say: Four strings are inserted into the hole in the garment, so that there are eight strings hanging down altogether, and Beit Hillel say: Three strings are inserted into the garment.
  And how much should be hanging [<i>meshulleshet</i>] beyond the knots and windings? Beit Shammai say: Four fingerbreadths, and Beit Hillel say: Three fingerbreadths. And the three fingerbreadths that Beit Hillel say should be hanging are each one-fourth of a handbreadth [<i>tefaḥ</i>] of any average person. The Gemara notes that Rav Pappa said: The handbreadth of the Torah is four fingerbreadths if measured by the thumb; six fingerbreadths if measured by the smallest finger; and five if measured by the third, i.e., the middle, finger.
  Rav Huna says that the <i>halakha</i> is: One must attach four strings within four fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment, and they should hang down four fingerbreadths beyond the knots and windings. And Rav Yehuda says: One must attach three strings within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment, and they should hang down three fingerbreadths beyond the knots and windings.
  Rav Pappa says that the <i>halakha</i> is that one must attach four strings within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment, and they should hang down four fingerbreadths beyond the knots and windings.
  The Gemara asks: Is this to say that ritual fringes have a required measure? And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That they prepare for themselves strings” (Numbers 15:38). Strings are nothing other than what emerges from the corner of the garment, and the term strings indicates only that there must be strings of any length. And it already occurred that the elders of Beit Shammai and the elders of Beit Hillel ascended to the attic of Yoḥanan ben Beteira, and they discussed the matter and said: Ritual fringes have no measure. Similarly, a <i>lulav</i> has no measure.
  What, does this not mean that ritual fringes have no required measure at all? The Gemara answers: No,
  
  Daf 42a
  
  the <i>baraita</i> means that ritual fringes do not have a maximum measure, i.e., the strings can be as long as one wants; however, they do have a minimum measure, and if the strings are shorter than this measure they are not fit. As, if you do not say so, in a case similar to it, where it is taught that a <i>lulav</i> has no measure, is it possible that it also has no measure whatsoever?
  But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Sukka</i> 29b): A <i>lulav</i> that has three handbreadths in length, sufficient to enable one to wave with it, is fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva? This indicates that if the <i>lulav</i> is less than the measure, it is not fit. Rather, it must be that a <i>lulav</i> has no maximum measure, but it does have a minimum measure. So too, ritual fringes have no maximum measure, but they have a minimum measure.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That they prepare for themselves strings” (Numbers 15:38). The term strings [<i>tzitzit</i>] means nothing other than strings that hang down [<i>anaf</i>], and so it states in the verse: “I was taken by a lock [<i>betzitzit</i>] of my head” (Ezekiel 8:3). And Abaye says: And one is required to separate the ritual fringes like a gentile’s lock of hair, part of which is braided and the rest of which is allowed to hang loose.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one affixed the ritual fringes to the tip of the corner or to the border [<i>gadil</i>], they are fit. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov disqualifies them in both cases.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says: Ritual fringes must be inserted into a hole above the corner and hang down onto the corner of the garment, as it is stated: “On the corners of their garments” (Numbers 15:38)? In accordance with whose opinion is this? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.
  Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And one must distance the hole through which the ritual fringes are inserted into the garment the length of a full thumb joint from the edge of the garment.
  The Gemara notes: And it was necessary to state the ruling of Rav Pappa (41b) that the ritual fringes must be inserted into a hole within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment, and it was also necessary to state the ruling of Rabbi Ya’akov. This is because if the location of the hole was taught only from the statement of Rav Pappa, I would say that his ruling that the hole must be within three fingerbreadths of the edge of the garment was to teach that one may not distance the hole from the edge of the garment by more than this amount, but the closer the hole is to the edge of the garment, the better. Consequently, it was necessary to include the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov.
  And if the location of the hole was taught only from the statement of Rabbi Ya’akov, I would say that his ruling that it must be a full thumb joint away from the edge of the garment was to teach that one may not situate the hole closer than that to the edge of the garment, but the further he places it, the better. Therefore, both statements were necessary.
  The Gemara relates that Ravina and Rav Samma were sitting before Rav Ashi. Rav Samma saw that the corner of Ravina’s cloak was torn and therefore the hole through which the ritual fringes were inserted was less than the full length of a thumb joint from the edge of the garment. Rav Samma said to Ravina: Doesn’t the Master hold in accordance with that statement of Rabbi Ya’akov that the hole must be at least the length of a thumb joint from the edge of the garment? Ravina said to Rav Samma: It was stated that this distance is required at the time when the ritual fringes are made. If the corner tears later, causing the hole to be closer to the edge of the garment, the ritual fringes remain fit.
  Rav Samma became embarrassed because he had asked his question based on a mistaken assumption. Rav Ashi said to Rav Samma: Do not be upset that Ravina is a greater scholar than you are; one of them, i.e., the Sages of Eretz Yisrael, is like two of us, i.e., the Sages of Babylonia.
  § With regard to attaching ritual fringes to a garment, the Gemara relates that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov would affix four strings to the garment, and he would first fold them in half and then insert them at the point of the folds into the hole of the garment, so that on one side there were eight strings and on the other side there were four loops. He would then take the eight strings and loop them through the four loops and pull them tight, thereby attaching them to the garment. The Gemara explains that he held that we require eight strings when they are initially placed in the garment, in order that there be twisted cord and “twisted cords” (Deuteronomy 22:12), i.e., four doubled strings, at the place, i.e., the time, when he creates the loose hanging string.
  Rav Yirmeya of Difti would affix eight strings that are sixteen strings after they are placed in the hole of the garment and half of each string hangs down on each side, and he would not loop them as Rav Aha bar Ya’akov did. Mar, son of Ravina, would prepare ritual fringes like ours, placing four strings through the hole and allowing both ends of each string to hang down, thereby forming eight.
  § The Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman found Rav Adda bar Ahava affixing strings to a garment and reciting the blessing that concludes: To prepare ritual fringes [<i>tzitzit</i>]. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Adda bar Ahava: What is this <i>tzitzi</i> sound that I hear? This is what Rav says: Ritual fringes do not require a blessing when one attaches them to the garment.
  With regard to this statement of Rav, the Gemara relates that when Rav Huna died, Rav Ḥisda went into the study hall to raise a contradiction from one statement of Rav to another statement of Rav, as follows: Did Rav actually say that ritual fringes do not require a blessing when one attaches them to the garment? But doesn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav says: From where is it derived that ritual fringes attached by a gentile are unfit? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “Speak unto the children of Israel and command them that they prepare for themselves strings” (Numbers 15:38). The Sages derive from here that the children of Israel shall prepare ritual fringes, but the gentiles shall not prepare ritual fringes.
  The Gemara asks: But what is the contradiction between these two statements of Rav? Rav Yosef said: Rav Ḥisda held that in the case of any mitzva for which the necessary item is fit when produced by a gentile, if it is produced by a Jew, he does not need to recite a blessing. Conversely, any mitzva for which the necessary item is unfit when produced by a gentile, if it is produced by a Jew, he needs to recite a blessing when he produces the item.
  The Gemara asks: And is this an established principle? But what about circumcision, which is valid if performed by a gentile, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a city in which there is no Jewish physician, and in which there is an Aramean, i.e., a gentile, physician and a Samaritan physician, it is preferable that the Aramean circumcise the Jewish boys of the city and the Samaritan not circumcise them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is preferable that the Samaritan circumcise the boys and the Aramean not circumcise them. Nevertheless, all agree that a circumcision performed by a gentile is valid.
  And despite the fact that circumcision performed by a gentile is valid, when it is performed by a Jew, he must recite a blessing, as the Master said: The one who circumcises a child says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and has commanded us concerning circumcision.
  The Gemara answers: Is there reason to resolve the contradiction according to anyone but Rav? Rav himself invalidates circumcision performed by a gentile, as it was stated: From where is it derived that circumcision performed by a gentile is not valid? Daru bar Pappa says in the name of Rav: This is derived from the verse: “And God said unto Abraham: And as for you, you shall keep My covenant, you, and your seed after you throughout their generations” (Genesis 17:9). The verse indicates that only the descendants of Abraham may perform circumcision.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the doubled verb in the verse: “Must be circumcised [<i>himmol yimmol</i>]” (Genesis 17:13), which he interprets to mean: Only one who is circumcised [<i>hammal</i>] may circumcise [<i>yamul</i>] others.
  The Gemara notes that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a <i>sukka</i> supports the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that when an item used for a mitzva can be created by a gentile, a Jew who creates it does not recite a blessing. And the <i>halakha</i> with regard to phylacteries is a conclusive refutation of his opinion.
  The Gemara explains: A <i>sukka</i> is fit even if it was built by a gentile, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a booth built by gentiles, a booth built by women, a booth for domesticated animals, a booth built by Samaritans, a booth of any sort, each is fit for use as a <i>sukka</i>, provided that it is roofed in accordance with the <i>halakha</i>.
  And if a <i>sukka</i> was built by a Jew, he is not required to recite a blessing upon its construction, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who constructs a <i>sukka</i> for himself recites: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he comes to sit in the <i>sukka</i>, he recites: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us to reside in the <i>sukka</i>. The Gemara notes that the <i>baraita</i> indicates that he recites a blessing at the time of construction, whereas he does not recite a blessing including the words: To construct a <i>sukka</i>, which confirms the opinion of Rav Ḥisda.
  By contrast, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to phylacteries is a conclusive refutation of Rav Ḥisda’s opinion. Phylacteries are unfit when written by a gentile, as it is taught by Rav Ḥinnana, son of Rava,
  
  Daf 42b
  
  of Pashronya: A Torah scroll, phylacteries, or <i>mezuzot</i> that were written by a heretic, a Samaritan, a gentile, a Canaanite slave, a woman, a minor, or a Jewish apostate [<i>meshummad</i>] are unfit, as it is stated: “And you shall bind them for a sign on your arm…and you shall write them on the doorposts of your house” (Deuteronomy 6:8–9). From this juxtaposition, one can derive the following: Anyone who is included in the mitzva of binding the phylacteries, i.e., one who is both obligated and performs the mitzva, is included in the class of people who may write Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and <i>mezuzot</i>; and anyone who is not included in the mitzva of binding is not included in the class of people who may write sacred texts.
  And despite the fact that phylacteries written by a gentile are unfit, a Jew who writes them does not have to recite a blessing. As Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, sent a ruling in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: On phylacteries of the arm one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us to don phylacteries. On phylacteries of the head one says the blessing: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has sanctified us through His mitzvot and commanded us concerning the mitzva of phylacteries. The implication of this is that one recites blessings only when he dons the phylacteries, whereas when he writes the phylacteries he does not recite a blessing: To prepare phylacteries.
  Rather, isn’t this the reason for the distinction between different mitzvot: For any mitzva whose performance is the completion of the mitzva, such as circumcision, even though it is valid when performed by a gentile, when it is performed by a Jew he must recite a blessing. But for any mitzva where the performance of a particular act is not the completion of the mitzva, such as writing phylacteries, where one does not complete the mitzva until he dons them, even though it is not valid when performed by a gentile, when it is performed by a Jew he does not need to recite a blessing.
  And with regard to reciting a blessing when one attaches ritual fringes to a garment, the Sages disagree about this: One Sage, Rav Adda bar Ahava, holds that it is an obligation pertaining to the cloak. Therefore, when one attaches the ritual fringes he is completing the mitzva, and he should recite a blessing: To prepare ritual fringes. And one Sage, Rav Naḥman, citing Rav, holds that it is an obligation incumbent upon the man. Consequently, the mitzva is not complete until he wears the garment, and he should not recite a blessing when he attaches the ritual fringes to the garment.
  Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: You teach this <i>halakha</i> about gentiles attaching ritual fringes to a garment in this manner, citing Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav that the ritual fringes are invalid. Consequently, Rav Ḥisda raises a contradiction between this ruling and another ruling of Rav.
  We teach it in this way, according to which there is no contradiction: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: From where is it derived that if ritual fringes are attached to a garment by a gentile they are valid? It is derived from that which is stated: “Speak unto the children of Israel and command them that they prepare for themselves [<i>lahem</i>] strings” (Numbers 15:38). From the fact that the verse does not merely state: That they prepare [<i>ve’asu</i>], but rather states “<i>ve’asu lahem</i>,” which can be translated as: That they prepare for them, the indication is that even others, i.e., gentiles, shall prepare ritual fringes for them.
  § Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If one prepared ritual fringes from threads that protrude from the fabric like thorns [<i>kotzim</i>], or if he prepared them from threads [<i>nimin</i>] that were used to sew the garment and remain attached to it, or from the strings [<i>geradin</i>] that hang from the bottom of a garment, the ritual fringes are unfit, as one must attach ritual fringes to a garment for the sake of the mitzva. But if he prepared ritual fringes from swatches of wool that were not spun for the sake of the mitzva, they are fit.
  Rav Yehuda continues: When I stated this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rav before Shmuel, he said to me: Even ritual fringes tied from swatches of wool that were not spun for the sake of the mitzva are unfit, as we require the spinning of the string to be for the sake of the mitzva.
  The Gemara notes that this dispute is like a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one took phylacteries and coated them with gold or patched them with the skin of a non-kosher animal, then they are unfit. But if one patched them with the skin of a kosher animal, then they are fit, and this is so even though he did not prepare the skin for their sake, i.e., for the sake of its use in a mitzva. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even if he patched them with the skin of a kosher animal they are unfit, until he prepares them for their sake.
  § Abaye said to Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda: How do you dye this sky-blue wool to be used for ritual fringes? Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehuda said to Abaye: We bring blood of a <i>ḥilazon</i> and various herbs and put them in a pot and boil them. And then we take a bit of the resulting dye in an egg shell and test it by using it to dye a wad of wool to see if it has attained the desired hue. And then we throw away that egg shell and its contents and burn the wad of wool.
  The Gemara comments: Learn from this statement three <i>halakhot</i>: Learn from it that wool that was dyed for the purpose of testing the dye and not for use as ritual fringes is unfit for ritual fringes. Consequently, one burns the wad of wool so that no one will use it for ritual fringes. And learn from it that we require dyeing for the sake of the mitzva. And learn from it that using dye for testing renders all the dye in that vessel unfit. Therefore, some of the dye is removed from the pot before it is tested.
  The Gemara challenges: The <i>halakha</i> that wool dyed for the purpose of testing the dye is unfit is the same as the requirement of dyeing for the sake of the mitzva. It is only because the sky-blue strings must be dyed for the sake of the mitzva that wool dyed as a test is unfit for use as ritual fringes, so why are these stated as two <i>halakhot</i>? Rav Ashi said: The statement about learning three <i>halakhot</i> employs the style known as: What is the reason, and it means: What is the reason that wool that was dyed for the purpose of testing is unfit? It is because we require dyeing for the sake of the mitzva.
  The Gemara notes that the <i>halakha</i> that using the dye for testing renders all the dye in the pot unfit is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: <i>Tekhelet</i> dye that was used for testing is unfit, as it is stated concerning the priestly vestments: “And you shall make the robe of the ephod entirely of blue [<i>kelil tekhelet</i>]” (Exodus 28:31), which indicates that the dye must be used exclusively for this purpose, i.e., this must be the first item it is being used to dye. This is the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Dahavai says: Even a second appearance caused by the dye is fit, meaning even if it is the second time that the dye is being used, it is still fit. As it is stated in the verse: “And scarlet wool [<i>ushni tola’at</i>]” (Leviticus 14:4), which is interpreted to mean that this may be the second [<i>sheni</i>] usage of the dye.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There is no reliable method of testing sky-blue wool, and therefore it may be purchased only from an expert. There is a method of testing phylacteries to ensure they were written properly, but nevertheless they may be purchased only from an expert. There is a method of testing Torah scrolls and <i>mezuzot</i>, and they may be purchased from anyone.
  The Gemara asks: And is there no method for testing sky-blue wool? But didn’t Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, test it to ensure it was dyed with <i>tekhelet</i>? The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the test, which was carried out with items whose names contain the letters <i>gimmel</i>, <i>shin</i>, or <i>mem</i>. He would bring alum clay [<i>megavya gila</i>], and water of fenugreek [<i>shavlilta</i>], and urine [<i>meimei raglayim</i>]
  
  Daf 43a
  
  that was forty days old. He would soak the sky-blue wool in this solution from night until morning. If its color would fade [<i>ipparad ḥazutei</i>], the sky-blue wool was determined to be unfit, as it was not dyed with <i>tekhelet</i> derived from a <i>ḥilazon</i>. If its color would not fade, the sky-blue wool was determined to be fit.
  And Rav Adda said before Rava in the name of Rav Avira: One brings hard [<i>arkesa</i>] leavened barley dough and bakes the sky-blue wool in it. If the color of the sky-blue wool changes for the better, meaning that the process intensifies the color of the sky-blue wool, then it is fit. If the color of the sky-blue wool changes for the worse, i.e., it fades, then it is unfit. And your mnemonic is: Change reveals falsehood and change reveals truth. All of this indicates that it is possible to test whether sky-blue wool has been dyed with real <i>tekhelet</i>, contrary to the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains the <i>baraita</i>: What does it mean when it says: There is no reliable method of testing sky-blue wool? It means that there is no way to test whether it was dyed for the sake of the mitzva or for the purpose of testing the dye.
  The Gemara relates that Mar, a Sage from Mashkhei, brought sky-blue wool in the years when Rav Aḥai was a preeminent Sage. They tested it in the manner described by Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, and its color faded. They then tested it in the manner described by Rav Adda and the color changed for the better.
  The Sages thought that the sky-blue wool should be deemed unfit because it did not pass the first test. Rav Aḥai said to them: But how could it be that this wool is not <i>tekhelet</i>, as it failed one of the tests, and is also not indigo, as it passed the other? This is impossible, because it must be one or the other. Rather, conclude from it that these <i>halakhot</i> were stated together.
  He explains: In a case where we tested the wool in the manner described by Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, and its color did not fade, it is fit and requires no further testing. If its color faded, then we test it in the manner described by Rav Adda, with hard leavened barley dough. If the color changed for the better it is fit; if the color changed for the worse it is unfit. The Gemara adds: They sent a message from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael: These <i>halakhot</i> were in fact stated together, as explained by Rav Aḥai.
  The Gemara relates that Rabbi Mani was exacting and purchased sky-blue wool in accordance with the stringencies of the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier, i.e., that wool dyed as a test is unfit for ritual fringes, and that therefore one should purchase sky-blue wool for ritual fringes only from an expert. A certain elder said to him: This is what your early predecessors did, and their businesses were successful.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who purchases a cloak with ritual fringes from the marketplace, if he purchased it from a Jew it retains its presumptive status that it is fit for the mitzva. If he purchased it from a gentile, then if he purchased it from a merchant it is presumed to be fit, as the merchant would want to maintain his credibility and would therefore purchase the sky-blue strings only from a reliable source. But if he purchased it from a gentile who is an ordinary person rather than a professional merchant, the sky-blue strings are unfit, as the seller presumably dyed them himself.
  And even though the Sages said: A person is not permitted to sell a cloak with ritual fringes to a gentile until he unties and removes its ritual fringes, it is permitted to purchase such a cloak from a gentile merchant, as it is assumed that the merchant acquired the cloak from a Jew who ignored this <i>halakha</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the prohibition against selling a cloak with ritual fringes to a gentile? The Gemara answers: Here they interpreted that it is prohibited because of the concern that the gentile will visit a prostitute and observers will think that he is a Jew. Alternatively, Rav Yehuda said: It is prohibited lest a Jew mistake the gentile for a Jew and accompany him on a journey thinking that he is also Jewish, due to his ritual fringes, and the gentile might then kill him.
  § Rav Yehuda would affix white and sky-blue strings to the garment [<i>pirzuma</i>] of his wife. And every morning he would recite the blessing: To wrap ourselves in garments with ritual fringes.
  The Gemara asks: From the fact that he would affix ritual fringes to his wife’s garments, it is apparent that he holds that the obligation of ritual fringes is a positive mitzva that is not time-bound, and therefore women are also obligated in it. But if that is his opinion, why did he recite the blessing on ritual fringes each and every morning? In order for the mitzva to not be time-bound, it must apply at night, in which case a new blessing should not be recited in the morning.
  The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda was acting in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to phylacteries, every time one dons them he recites the blessing over them, even several times in one day; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara asks: If so, he should have also recited a blessing every time that he took the cloak off and put it back on, and not merely once a day in the morning. The Gemara answers: Rav Yehuda was a modest man and he did not remove his cloak the entire day. The Gemara asks: In what way is it different from the morning, i.e., why did he recite a blessing in the morning? The Gemara answers: He recited the blessing in the morning when he changed from a nighttime garment to a daytime garment.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, including priests, Levites, Israelites, converts, women, and Canaanite slaves. Rabbi Shimon deems women exempt, because the mitzva of ritual fringes is a positive, time-bound mitzva, and women are exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, including priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? As, if priests, Levites, and Israelites were exempt from the mitzva, who then is to be obligated?
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to mention that priests are obligated to fulfill the mitzva, as it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since it is written: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together. You shall prepare yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your covering” (Deuteronomy 22:11–12), only one who is not permitted to wear diverse kinds is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes. With regard to these priests, since diverse kinds are permitted for them when they perform the Temple service, as the belt of the priestly vestments contains diverse kinds, they should not be obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes.
  Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that although the prohibition of diverse kinds is permitted for them at the time when they perform the Temple service, when it is not the time of the Temple service it is not permitted, and therefore priests are obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes.
  The <i>baraita</i> states that Rabbi Shimon deems women exempt. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that with regard to ritual fringes it is stated: “And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that you may look upon it and remember all the commandments of the Lord” (Numbers 15:39). The term “that you may look” excludes a nighttime garment, as it is dark at night and it is therefore difficult to see.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One may ask: Do you say that the verse serves to exclude a nighttime garment? Or is it to exclude only the garment of a blind person, who is also unable to see his ritual fringes? The <i>tanna</i> explains: When the verse states: “Of your covering, with which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12), the garment of a blind person is mentioned as being included, as the verse already stated: “Of your covering,” and did not need to state: “With which you cover yourself.” If so, how do I realize the meaning of the exclusion: “That you may look upon it”? It must exclude a nighttime garment.
  The Gemara asks: What did you see that led you to include the garment of a blind person from the phrase: “With which you cover yourself,” and to exclude a nighttime garment from the phrase: “That you may look upon it,” rather than including a nighttime garment in the obligation and excluding the garment of a blind person? The Gemara answers: I include the garment of a blind person, which is visible to others, even though the blind person himself cannot see it, and I exclude a nighttime garment, which is not visible even to others.
  The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon,
  
  Daf 43b
  
  what do they do with, i.e., how do they interpret, this verse: “With which you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12)? The Gemara answers that the Rabbis require it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “on the four corners of your garment” (Deuteronomy 22:12) indicates that one is required to attach ritual fringes to a garment that has four corners, but not to one that has three corners.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Do you say that a garment with four corners is obligated but not a garment with three corners? Or is it teaching only that a garment with four corners is obligated but not a garment that has five corners? When the verse states: “With which you cover yourself,” a garment with five corners is thereby mentioned in the verse as being obligated. Then how do I realize the meaning of: “On the four corners of your garment”? It teaches that this obligation is limited to a garment that has four corners, but not to one that has three corners.
  The Gemara asks: But what did you see that led you to include a garment with five corners and to exclude a garment with three corners, rather than including a garment with three corners and excluding a garment with five corners? The Gemara answers: I include a garment with five corners, as five includes four, and I exclude a garment with three corners, as three does not include four.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Shimon derive the <i>halakha</i> that a five-cornered garment is required to have ritual fringes? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the seemingly extraneous word: “With which [<i>asher</i>] you cover yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:12). The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis derive from this word? The Gemara answers: They do not learn any new <i>halakhot</i> from the word “which [<i>asher</i>].”
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with this phrase: “That you may look upon it” (Numbers 15:39), from which Rabbi Shimon derives that a nighttime garment is exempt? The Gemara answers: They require it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse: “That you may look upon it and remember” (Numbers 15:39), teaches that one should see this mitzva of ritual fringes and remember another mitzva that is contingent on it. And which mitzva is that? It is the mitzva of the recitation of <i>Shema</i>. As we learned in a mishna (Berakhot 9b): From when may one recite <i>Shema</i> in the morning? From when one can distinguish between the sky-blue strings and the white strings of his ritual fringes.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “that you may look upon it and remember” teaches that one should see this mitzva of ritual fringes and remember another mitzva that is adjacent to it in the Torah. And which mitzva is that? It is the mitzva of diverse kinds of wool and linen, as it is written: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together. You shall prepare yourself twisted cords” (Deuteronomy 22:11–12).
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That you may look upon it and remember all the commandments of the Lord” (Numbers 15:39). This indicates that once a person is obligated in this mitzva of ritual fringes, he is obligated in all of the mitzvot. The Gemara comments: And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that ritual fringes are a positive, time-bound mitzva, and women are exempt from it. Only men are obligated in all mitzvot, including positive, time-bound mitzvot, just as they are obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That you may look upon it and remember all the commandments of the Lord”; this teaches that this mitzva of ritual fringes is equivalent to all the mitzvot of the Torah.
  And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That you may look upon it and remember all the commandments of the Lord and do them.” This teaches that looking at the ritual fringes leads to remembering the mitzvot, and remembering them leads to doing them. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai says: Anyone who is diligent in this mitzva of ritual fringes merits receiving the Divine Presence. It is written here: “That you may look upon it [<i>oto</i>]” (Numbers 15:39), and it is written there: “You shall fear the Lord your God; and Him [<i>oto</i>] shall you serve” (Deuteronomy 6:13). Just as <i>oto</i> in that verse is referring to the Divine Presence, so too in this verse it is referring to the Divine Presence.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Jewish people are beloved, as the Holy One, Blessed be He, surrounded them with mitzvot: They have phylacteries on their heads, and phylacteries on their arms, and ritual fringes on their garments, and a <i>mezuza</i> for their doorways. Concerning them David said: “Seven times a day I praise You, because of Your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:164). This alludes to the two phylacteries, the four ritual fringes, and the <i>mezuza</i>, which total seven.
  And when David entered the bathhouse and saw himself standing naked, he said: Woe to me that that I stand naked without any mitzva. But once he remembered the mitzva of circumcision that was in his flesh his mind was put at ease, as he realized he was still accompanied by this mitzva. After he left the bathhouse, he recited a song about the mitzva of circumcision, as it is stated in the verse: “For the leader, on the <i>Sheminith</i>: A Psalm of David” (Psalms 12:1). This is interpreted as a psalm about circumcision, which was given to be performed on the eighth [<i>bashemini</i>] day of the baby’s life.
  Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Anyone who has phylacteries on his head, phylacteries on his arm, ritual fringes on his garment, and a <i>mezuza</i> on his doorway is strengthened from all sides so that he will not sin, as it is stated in the verse: “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecclesiastes 4:12). This is interpreted as an allusion to the three mitzvot of phylacteries, ritual fringes, and <i>mezuza</i>. And the verse states: “The angel of the Lord encamps round about them that fear Him, and delivers them” (Psalms 34:8). This is interpreted to mean that the angel of the Lord surrounds those who fulfill the mitzvot and saves them from sin.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: What is different about <i>tekhelet</i> from all other types of colors such that it was chosen for the mitzva of ritual fringes? It is because <i>tekhelet</i> is similar in its color to the sea, and the sea is similar to the sky, and the sky is similar to the Throne of Glory, as it is stated: “And they saw the God of Israel; and there was under His feet the like of a paved work of sapphire stone, and the like of the very heaven for clearness” (Exodus 24:10), indicating that the sky is like a sapphire brickwork. And it is written: “The likeness of a throne, as the appearance of a sapphire stone” (Ezekiel 1:26).
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: The punishment for not attaching white strings is greater than the punishment for not attaching sky-blue strings, despite the fact that the sky-blue strings are more important. Rabbi Meir illustrates this with a parable: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a king of flesh and blood who said to his two subjects that they must bring him a seal. The king said to one of them: Bring me a seal of clay, and he said to the other one: Bring me a seal of gold. And both of them were negligent and did not bring the seals. Which of them will have a greater punishment? You must say that it is this one to whom he said: Bring me a seal of clay, and despite its availability and low cost, he did not bring it.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: A person is obligated to recite one hundred blessings every day, as it is stated in the verse: “And now, Israel, what [<i>ma</i>] does the Lord your God require of you” (Deuteronomy 10:12). Rabbi Meir interprets the verse as though it said one hundred [<i>me’a</i>], rather than <i>ma</i>.
  The Gemara relates that on Shabbat and Festivals, when the prayers contain fewer blessings, Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Avya, made an effort to fill this quota of blessings with blessings on spices [<i>be’isparmakei</i>] and sweet fruit, of which he would partake in order to recite extra blessings.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: A man is obligated to recite three blessings every day praising God for His kindnesses, and these blessings are: Who did not make me a gentile; Who did not make me a woman; and Who did not make me an ignoramus.
  Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov heard his son reciting the blessing: Who did not make me an ignoramus. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said to him: Is it in fact proper to go this far in reciting blessings? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s son said to him: Rather, what blessing should one recite? If you will say that one should recite: Who did not make me a slave, that is the same as a woman; why should one recite two blessings about the same matter? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov answered: Nevertheless, a slave
  
  Daf 44a
  
  is more lowly than a woman, and therefore it is appropriate to recite an additional blessing on not having been born a slave.
  § The Sages taught: This <i>ḥilazon</i>, which is the source of the sky-blue dye used in ritual fringes, has the following characteristics: Its body resembles the sea, its form resembles that of a fish, it emerges once in seventy years, and with its blood one dyes wool sky-blue for ritual fringes. It is scarce, and therefore it is expensive.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Natan says: There is no mitzva, however minor, that is written in the Torah, for which there is no reward given in this world; and in the World-to-Come I do not know how much reward is given. Go and learn from the following incident concerning the mitzva of ritual fringes.
  There was an incident involving a certain man who was diligent about the mitzva of ritual fringes. This man heard that there was a prostitute in one of the cities overseas who took four hundred gold coins as her payment. He sent her four hundred gold coins and fixed a time to meet with her. When his time came, he came and sat at the entrance to her house.
  The maidservant of that prostitute entered and said to her: That man who sent you four hundred gold coins came and sat at the entrance. She said: Let him enter. He entered. She arranged seven beds for him, six of silver and one of gold. Between each and every one of them there was a ladder made of silver, and the top bed was the one that was made of gold.
  She went up and sat naked on the top bed, and he too went up in order to sit naked facing her. In the meantime, his four ritual fringes came and slapped him on his face. He dropped down and sat himself on the ground, and she also dropped down and sat on the ground. She said to him: I take an oath by the <i>gappa</i> of Rome that I will not allow you to go until you tell me what defect you saw in me.
  He said to her: I take an oath by the Temple service that I never saw a woman as beautiful as you. But there is one mitzva that the Lord, our God, commanded us, and its name is ritual fringes, and in the passage where it is commanded, it is written twice: “I am the Lord your God” (Numbers 15:41). The doubling of this phrase indicates: I am the one who will punish those who transgress My mitzvot, and I am the one who will reward those who fulfill them. Now, said the man, the four sets of ritual fringes appeared to me as if they were four witnesses who will testify against me.
  She said to him: I will not allow you to go until you tell me: What is your name, and what is the name of your city, and what is the name of your teacher, and what is the name of the study hall in which you studied Torah? He wrote the information and placed it in her hand.
  She arose and divided all of her property, giving one-third as a bribe to the government, one-third to the poor, and she took one-third with her in her possession, in addition to those beds of gold and silver.
  She came to the study hall of Rabbi Ḥiyya and said to him: My teacher, instruct your students concerning me and have them make me a convert. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to her: My daughter, perhaps you set your sights on one of the students and that is why you want to convert? She took the note the student had given her from her hand and gave it to Rabbi Ḥiyya. He said to her: Go take possession of your purchase.
  Those beds that she had arranged for him in a prohibited fashion, she now arranged for him in a permitted fashion. The Gemara completes its point about the reward of mitzvot and points out how this story illustrates the concept: This is the reward given to him in this world, and with regard to the World-to-Come, I do not know how much reward he will be given.
  § Rav Yehuda says: In the case of a borrowed cloak, for the first thirty days it is exempt from ritual fringes; from then on it is obligated.
  The Gemara notes: That distinction is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of one who resides in a guesthouse [<i>pundaki</i>] in Eretz Yisrael, or one who rents a house outside of Eretz Yisrael, for the first thirty days he is exempt from the mitzva of <i>mezuza</i>; from then on he is obligated. But one who rents a house in Eretz Yisrael must affix a <i>mezuza</i> immediately, due to the settlement of Eretz Yisrael.
  § The mishna teaches: Absence of the phylacteries of the arm does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head, and absence of the phylacteries of the head does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the arm. Rav Ḥisda said: They taught this only in a case where one has the other phylacteries, but they are not with him or he is unable to wear them for some reason. But if he does not have the other phylacteries at all, then their absence does prevent the fulfillment of the mitzva to don the phylacteries that he has.
  Later on, the students said to him: Do you still say that? Rav Ḥisda said to them: No, rather I would say the opposite: Concerning one who does not have the ability to fulfill two mitzvot, should he also not perform the one mitzva that he does have the ability to fulfill? The Gemara asks: And what did he hold initially when he said not to don one of the phylacteries in the absence of the other? The Gemara answers: He held that it was due to a rabbinic decree, lest he be negligent and not try to acquire the phylacteries that he lacks.
  Rav Sheshet says: Anyone who does not don phylacteries violates eight positive mitzvot. This is referring to the mitzva to don phylacteries of the arm and head, each of which is mentioned in four different passages (Exodus 13:9; Exodus 13:16; Deuteronomy 6:8; Deuteronomy 11:18).
  And anyone who does not have ritual fringes on his garments violates five positive mitzvot. This is because the mitzva of ritual fringes is stated four times in the primary passage concerning ritual fringes in Numbers: “That they prepare for themselves strings…and they shall put on the fringe of the corner a sky-blue thread. And it shall be to you for a fringe that you may look upon it and remember all the commandments of the Lord” (Numbers 15:38–39). An additional command appears in the verse: “You shall prepare yourself twisted cords” (Deuteronomy 22:12).
  And any priest who does not ascend the platform to recite the Priestly Benediction violates three positive mitzvot expressed in the verses: “So you shall bless the children of Israel; you shall say to them” (Numbers 6:23), and: “And they shall put My name upon the children of Israel” (Numbers 6:27).
  Anyone who does not have a <i>mezuza</i> in his doorway violates two positive mitzvot, stated in the verses: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house” (Deuteronomy 6:9), and: “And you shall write them on the doorposts of your house” (Deuteronomy 11:20).
  And Reish Lakish says: Anyone who dons phylacteries lives a long life, as it is stated:
  
  Daf 44b
  
  “The Lord is upon them, they will live, and altogether therein is the life of my spirit; and have me recover, and make me to live” (Isaiah 38:16). This is interpreted as referring to those who don phylacteries, which contain the name of the Lord, on their heads; as a result, they will live, be healed and merit long life.
  MISHNA: The mishna returns to discussing the <i>halakhot</i> of meal offerings, which are the central theme of this tractate. The absence of the fine flour and the oil for the meal offering accompanying burnt offerings and peace offerings does not prevent libation of the wine, and the absence of the wine for libation does not prevent sacrifice of the flour and the oil. Failure to perform some of the placements of blood on the external altar does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other placements, as even if the priest performed only one placement of blood, the offering effects atonement after the fact.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse concerning the additional offerings sacrificed on <i>Sukkot</i> and the Eighth Day of Assembly states: “And their meal offering and their libations for the bulls, for the rams and for the lambs” (Numbers 29:18). This indicates that after the animal is sacrificed, one must bring the meal offering and then bring the libations. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that since the verse states: “To bring an offering made by fire to the Lord, a burnt offering, and a meal offering, an animal offering, and libations, each on its own day” (Leviticus 23:37), one must bring the animal offering and then bring the libations, and only then bring the meal offering.
  The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also, isn’t it written: “And their meal offering and their libations,” indicating that the meal offering precedes the libations? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary in order to teach that once the animals have been sacrificed during the day, their meal offering and their libations may be offered even at night, and similarly, their meal offering and their libations may be offered even the next day.
  The Gemara asks: But according to the Rabbis also, isn’t it written: “An animal offering, and libations,” indicating that the libations immediately follow the animal offering and precede the meal offering? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary to teach that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Ze’eiri, as Ze’eiri says: The libations that accompany animal offerings are consecrated only through the slaughter of the animal offering. This means that once the animal is slaughtered, the libations that were set aside to be brought with that animal offering cannot be diverted to accompany a different animal offering.
  The Gemara points out that both opinions remain difficult: But Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi should also require the phrase “an animal offering, and libations” to teach that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Ze’eiri. And the Rabbis should also require the phrase “and their meal offering and their libations” to indicate that their meal offering and their libations may be offered even at night, and their meal offering and their libations may be offered even the next day.
  The Gemara offers a different explanation of the dispute in the <i>baraita</i>: Rather, this is the reasoning of the Rabbis, as it is written in the verse: “To bring an offering made by fire to the Lord, a burnt offering, and a meal offering, an animal offering, and libations, each on its own day.” The Rabbis derive from this that the meal offering should be offered immediately following the animal burnt offering. The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also, isn’t it written: “A burnt offering, and a meal offering”?
  Rather, with regard to libations that accompany an animal offering, everyone agrees that the meal offering should be brought and afterward the libations should be brought, as it is written: “A burnt offering, and a meal offering.” When they disagree it is with regard to meal offerings and libations that are brought by themselves. The Rabbis hold that from the fact that when meal offerings and libations accompany offerings, the meal offerings are brought and then the libations are brought, it can be derived that when they are brought by themselves also, first the meal offering is brought and then the libations are brought.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is specifically there, in the case of meal offerings and libations that accompany an animal offering, that the meal offering is burned on the altar before the wine libation is poured on the altar. This is because since the altar has started to eat, i.e., consume, the animal offering, one must first complete the entire matter of the altar’s eating, including the meal offering. The pouring of the wine on the altar is likened more to drinking than to eating. But when the meal offering and the libations are brought by themselves, the libations are considered preferable, because the song of the Levites is recited over them. Consequently, the pouring of the libations precedes the burning of the meal offering on the altar.
  § The mishna teaches: Failure to perform some of the placements of blood on the external altar does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other placements, as even if the priest performed only one placement, the offering effects atonement after the fact.
  Apropos this statement, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to all offerings whose blood is to be placed on the external altar that if one placed their blood with one act of placement, as opposed to the two or four that are required depending upon the offering, that the offering has nevertheless effected atonement after the fact, i.e., one has fulfilled his obligation to bring the offering? As it is stated: “And the blood of your offerings shall be poured out against the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:27).
  MISHNA: Failure to sacrifice one of the bulls, the rams, the sheep, or the goats of the additional offerings brought on Festivals does not prevent the sacrifice of the others. Rabbi Shimon says: If the Temple treasurers had sufficient funds for the numerous bulls that are required to be sacrificed on that day but they did not also have sufficient funds for the accompanying libations, they should rather bring one bull and its libations, and they should not sacrifice all of them without libations.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to these bulls, rams, and sheep mentioned in the mishna, on which festival are they offered? If we say that these are the offerings of the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, this is difficult: It is written with regard to those days that their offerings must be brought: “According to the ordinance” (see, e.g., Numbers 29:18), and: “According to their ordinance” (Numbers 29:33). This indicates that no deviation from the Torah’s prescription is possible.
  Rather, the mishna must be referring to the two bulls, one ram, and seven sheep of the New Moon and <i>Shavuot</i>, as mentioned in the book of Numbers (28:11, 27).
  
  Daf 45a
  
  The Gemara asks: The mishna mentioned rams, in plural; on which festival are multiple rams offered? If the mishna is referring to the additional offerings sacrificed on those days of the new moon and <i>Shavuot</i> as prescribed in the book of Numbers, these offerings include only one ram and not two. And if it is referring to the two rams of <i>Shavuot</i> that accompany the two loaves, as prescribed in Leviticus, a term of being is written about them in the verse: “They shall be a burnt offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:18). This term indicates that the offerings must be sacrificed exactly as prescribed in order to be valid. Consequently, one may not sacrifice fewer than two rams.
  The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to the two rams of <i>Shavuot</i> that are prescribed in Leviticus, and this is what the mishna is saying: Failure to sacrifice the rams that accompany the two loaves, as prescribed in Leviticus, does not prevent the sacrifice of the ram of the additional offering prescribed in the book of Numbers. Similarly, failure to sacrifice the ram of the additional offering, prescribed in the book of Numbers, does not prevent the sacrifice of the rams that accompany the two loaves, as prescribed in Leviticus.
  The Gemara challenges: But if that is the explanation, then when the mishna mentions bulls and sheep it means that even the bulls or sheep of the additional offering prescribed in the book of Numbers do not prevent each other from being sacrificed, i.e., the inability to sacrifice one of the bulls or sheep does not prevent one from sacrificing the rest. But when the mishna mentions rams, it is the rams mentioned here in Leviticus that do not prevent sacrifice of the rams mentioned there, in Numbers, and vice versa; but the failure to sacrifice one of those rams in Leviticus does prevent sacrifice of the other. Consequently, although the mishna mentions bulls, rams, and sheep together, the <i>halakha</i> is not the same with regard to these different animals.
  The Gemara responds: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna teaches each statement individually, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> applies to each of the animals listed in a different manner.
  § The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the offerings sacrificed on the New Moon: The verse states: “And on the day of the new moon, a young bull without blemish; and six lambs, and a ram; they shall be without blemish” (Ezekiel 46:6) The <i>baraita</i> asks: Why does the verse state “a bull” when the verse in the Torah requires two bulls, as it is stated: “And on your New Moons you shall present a burnt offering to the Lord: Two young bulls, and one ram, seven lambs of the first year without blemish” (Numbers 28:11)?
  The <i>baraita</i> answers: Since it is stated in the Torah with regard to the offering of the New Moon: “Two young bulls,” one might think that it is not acceptable to bring fewer than two bulls under any circumstances. From where is it derived that if one did not find two bulls, he brings one? Therefore, the verse states: “A young bull,” in the singular, to teach that even if one has only one bull it should be sacrificed.
  The <i>baraita</i> discusses the continuation of the verse in Ezekiel, which mentions “six lambs.” Why does the verse state only six lambs when the verse in the Torah requires seven? The <i>baraita</i> answers: Since it is stated in the Torah with regard to the offering of the New Moon: “Seven lambs,” one might think that it is not acceptable to bring fewer than seven lambs under any circumstances. From where is it derived that if one did not find seven lambs, he should bring six? Therefore, the verse in Ezekiel states: “Six lambs,” to teach that in the absence of all seven lambs one should sacrifice six.
  And from where is it derived that if he did not find six lambs, he should bring five; and that if he did not find five lambs, he should bring four; and that if he did not find four lambs, he should bring three; and that if he did not find three lambs, he should bring two; and that if he could not find even two lambs, he should bring even one lamb? Therefore, the next verse in Ezekiel states: “And for the lambs as his means suffice” (Ezekiel 46:7), indicating that one should bring however many lambs one is able to bring.
  The Gemara asks: But once this is written, why do I need the previous verse to state “six lambs,” indicating that if one does not have seven lambs he should bring six? The Gemara answers: It teaches that although the minimal obligation is satisfied with even one lamb, nevertheless, to the degree that it is possible to seek more lambs, we seek them.
  The Gemara presents another <i>halakha</i> derived from these verses: And from where is it derived that failure to slaughter some of the required two bulls and seven sheep of the additional offering on <i>Shavuot</i> prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the others? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “They shall be” (Numbers 28:31); the term “they shall be” indicates that the offerings must be brought precisely as prescribed.
  § The Gemara discusses the meaning of another difficult verse in Ezekiel: “So says the Lord God: In the first month, on the first day of the month, you shall take a young bull without blemish; and you shall purify [<i>veḥitteita</i>] the Sanctuary” (Ezekiel 45:18). The Gemara asks: Since this verse speaks of the first of Nisan, which is a New Moon, why does it state “you shall purify [<i>ḥitteita</i>],” which indicates the sacrifice of a sin offering [<i>ḥatat</i>], when in fact each of the two the bulls sacrificed on the New Moon is a burnt offering (see Numbers 28:11)? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This passage is indeed difficult, and in the future Elijah the prophet will interpret it.
  Rav Ashi says: It is possible to explain that this verse is not referring to the additional offerings sacrificed on the New Moon but rather to the offerings of the inauguration that they sacrificed later in the days of Ezra, similar to the offerings that were sacrificed during the period of inauguration of the Tabernacle in the days of Moses. When the Temple service was restored in the Second Temple, the Jewish people observed eight days of inauguration, initiating the priests in the Temple service, from the twenty-third of Adar through the New Moon of Nisan. During these eight days, they offered a bull for a sin offering in addition to the offerings of the inauguration, just as had been done at the inauguration of the Tabernacle (see Leviticus 9:2).
  The Gemara comments that this discussion with regard to the interpretation of the verse in Ezekiel is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: This passage is indeed difficult, but in the future Elijah the prophet will interpret it. Rabbi Yosei said to Rabbi Yehuda: This verse is referring to the offerings of the inauguration that they sacrificed later in the days of Ezra, similar to the offerings that were sacrificed during the period of inauguration in the days of Moses. Rabbi Yehuda said to Rabbi Yosei: May your mind be at ease, as you have put my mind at ease with this interpretation of the verse.
  § The Gemara discusses the meaning of another difficult verse in Ezekiel: “The priests shall not eat of anything that dies of itself, or is torn, whether it be fowl or beast” (Ezekiel 44:31). The Gemara asks: Is it only the priests who may not eat an unslaughtered animal carcass or an animal that was torn and now has a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], but an ordinary Jew may eat them? In fact, these items are prohibited for consumption by all. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This passage is indeed difficult, but in the future Elijah the prophet will interpret it.
  Ravina said that it was necessary for the verse to emphasize that these prohibitions apply to priests for the following reason: It might enter your mind to say that since pinching is permitted with regard to priests, therefore an animal carcass or a <i>tereifa</i> should also be permitted for them. A bird sin offering is killed by a priest pinching the nape of its neck. This is not a valid method of slaughter and would generally render a bird or animal an unslaughtered carcass, yet the priests are permitted to partake of the bird sin offering. Consequently, one might think that the prohibitions against eating an animal carcass or a <i>tereifa</i> in general do not apply to priests. Therefore, the verse teaches us that these prohibitions apply to priests as well.
  § The Gemara discusses the meaning of another difficult verse in Ezekiel: “And so shall you do on the seventh of the month for every one that errs, and for him that is simple; so shall you make atonement for the house” (Ezekiel 45:20). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expression “on the seventh of the month”? There are no special offerings that are sacrificed on the seventh day of any month.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse must be reinterpreted as referring to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is brought when the majority of the Jewish people have sinned as a result of following a mistaken ruling of the Sanhedrin. These seven alluded to in the verse are seven tribes who sinned. In such a case, a bull for an unwitting communal sin is brought even though the number of individuals who sinned are not the majority of the congregation. Because the majority of the individuals in the majority of the tribes have sinned, it is considered a sin of the congregation and not sins of many individuals.
  Similarly, the word “month [<i>ḥodesh</i>]” is to be interpreted as meaning that a bull for an unwitting communal sin is brought if the court innovated [<i>ḥiddeshu</i>] a new <i>halakha</i> contradicting the Torah, e.g., if they said that eating forbidden fat is permitted. The continuation of the verse: “For every one that errs, and for him that is simple,” teaches that the Sanhedrin is liable to sacrifice the bull for unwitting communal sin only for a matter that was hidden from the Sanhedrin, i.e., about which the Sanhedrin issued a mistaken ruling, and accompanied by unwitting action by the majority of the community, who relied on the mistaken ruling.
  The Gemara concludes the discussion of specific difficult verses in Ezekiel with the following general statement: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: That man is remembered for good, and Ḥanina ben Ḥizkiyya is his name. As were it not for him, the book of Ezekiel would have been suppressed and not included in the biblical canon, because various details of its contents appear to contradict statements of the Torah. What did Ḥanina ben Ḥizkiyya do? He brought up to his upper story three hundred jugs [<i>garbei</i>] of oil for light so that he could study even at night, and he sat isolated in the upper story and did not move from there until he homiletically interpreted all of those verses in the book of Ezekiel that seemed to contradict verses in the Torah.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: If the Temple treasurers had sufficient funds for the numerous bulls that are required to be sacrificed on that day but they did not also have sufficient funds for the accompanying libations, they should rather bring one bull and its libations, and they should not sacrifice all of them without libations.
  Concerning this, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And he shall prepare a meal offering, an ephah for the bull, and an ephah for the ram, and for the lambs as his means suffice, and a <i>hin</i> of oil to an ephah” (Ezekiel 46:7). Rabbi Shimon says: Is the measure of the meal offering accompanying bulls and rams the same, as stated in this verse that it is an ephah for each? In fact, this is not the <i>halakha</i>, as the meal offering accompanying a bull is three-tenths of an ephah of fine flour (see Numbers 15:9), whereas the meal offering accompanying a ram is only two-tenths of an ephah (see Numbers 15:6).
  Rather, the verse teaches that if the Temple treasurers had sufficient funds for the numerous bulls that are required to be sacrificed on that day but they did not also have sufficient funds for the accompanying libations, they should bring one bull and its libations, and they should not sacrifice all of them without libations. And similarly, if the Temple treasurers had sufficient funds for
  
  Daf 45b
  
  the numerous rams t hat are required to be sacrificed on that day and they did not also have sufficient funds for the ephah, i.e., the prescribed measure, of flour for all of the rams, they should bring one ram and its ephah of flour, and they should not sacrifice all of them without their ephahs of flour.
  MISHNA: On <i>Shavuot</i> there is an obligation to sacrifice burnt offerings, a sin offering, and peace offerings together with the offering of the two loaves. The burnt offerings consists of a bull, two rams, and seven sheep. A goat is brought for the sin offering. Two sheep are brought as peace offerings and waved together with the two loaves. Failure to sacrifice the bull, the rams, and the sheep, which are all brought as burnt offerings, and the goat that is brought as a sin offering, does not prevent the bringing of the two loaves, and they are sacrificed nevertheless. Failure to bring the two loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the accompanying animal offerings.
  Failure to bring the two loaves prevents sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep, but failure to sacrifice the two sheep does not prevent the bringing of the two loaves; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas says: No, rather the opposite is true. Failure to sacrifice the peace offering of two sheep prevents the bringing of the two loaves, but failure to bring the two loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep. As we found that when the Jewish people were in the wilderness for forty years after the exodus from Egypt, they sacrificed the two sheep as a peace offering on <i>Shavuot</i> without the two loaves, as the two loaves may be brought only from wheat grown in Eretz Yisrael after the Jewish people entered the land. Here too, whenever wheat is unavailable, they should sacrifice the two sheep without the two loaves. However, the two loaves are not sacrificed without the peace offering of two sheep.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas that failure to sacrifice the two sheep prevents the bringing of the two loaves but failure to bring the two loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep, but the reason for that ruling is not in accordance with his statement.
  As all the offerings that must be sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i> that are stated in the book of Numbers (see 28:27), i.e., two bulls, one ram, and seven sheep as additional offerings and a goat as a sin offering, were sacrificed when the Jewish people were in the wilderness. But all the offerings stated in Leviticus (see 23:18–20), i.e., the offerings accompanying the two loaves, were not sacrificed when the Jewish people were in the wilderness. Not only were the two loaves not sacrificed, but the accompanying offerings, including the peace offering of the two sheep, were also not sacrificed, because it was only when they arrived in Eretz Yisrael that these additional offerings and those offerings accompanying the two loaves were sacrificed. Neither the additional offerings of <i>Shavuot</i> nor the two loaves, and the offerings that accompany them, were sacrificed in the wilderness, contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas.
  Rather, for what reason do I nevertheless say that the sheep should be sacrificed without the loaves, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas? It is due to the fact that the sheep permit themselves, as the sprinkling of their blood and the burning of the portions consumed on the altar renders it permitted to partake of their meat. And why are the loaves not sacrificed without the sheep? It is because there is no item to permit the loaves, as the loaves are permitted only after the sheep are sacrificed.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches the <i>halakhot</i> of the sacrifices that generally accompany the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> in a case when the two loaves are not available. The Gemara cites a relevant <i>baraita</i>. The Sages taught: The verse that mandates these offerings states: “And you shall sacrifice with the bread seven lambs without blemish of the first year, and one young bull, and two rams” (Leviticus 23:18). The phrase “and you shall sacrifice with the bread” indicates that it is obligatory to sacrifice these burnt offerings with the loaves of bread, and if the loaves are not available, then these offerings are not sacrificed. The continuation of the verse: “Seven lambs without blemish,” teaches that the lambs are sacrificed even if there are no loaves available.
  If so, that the animal offerings may be sacrificed even without loaves, what is the meaning when the verse states “with the bread”? It teaches that they were not obligated to sacrifice the sheep before they were obligated to sacrifice loaves, i.e., they became obligated to sacrifice all of these offerings only when they entered Eretz Yisrael. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.
  Rabbi Akiva says: One might have thought that the sheep mentioned here in Leviticus, which accompany the two loaves, are the very same ones mentioned in the book of Numbers (see 28:27), in the passage prescribing the additional offerings. You must say when you reach the bulls and rams that are enumerated in the two passages that the offerings mentioned in one are not those mentioned in the other, as the number of bulls and rams are not equal. Whereas in Leviticus the verse requires the sacrifice of one bull and two rams, in Numbers the verse requires the sacrifice of two bulls and one ram. Rather, the two passages are referring to different offerings. These mentioned in Numbers come upon the altar for their own sake, and those mentioned in Leviticus come upon the altar for the sake of the two loaves.
  It is therefore found that the offerings that are mentioned in the book of Numbers were sacrificed even when the Jewish people were in the wilderness and could not bring the offering of the two loaves, but the offerings that are mentioned in Leviticus were not sacrificed in the wilderness, due to the fact that the two loaves could not be sacrificed in the wilderness.
  The Gemara challenges: But perhaps the bulls and rams mentioned in Numbers are not those mentioned in Leviticus, but the sheep mentioned in Numbers are the same as those mentioned in Leviticus. The Gemara explains: From the fact that these bulls and rams are different, it is apparent that those sheep are also different offerings.
  The Gemara asks: But from where is it proven that the bulls and rams in Numbers are different offerings than the bulls and rams mentioned in Leviticus? Perhaps they are actually the same offerings, and this is what the Merciful One is saying: If you want, sacrifice a bull and two rams, as the verse states in Leviticus; and if you want, sacrifice two bulls and one ram, as the verse states in Numbers. The Gemara answers: From the fact that the order of the offerings is different in the two passages, as the verse in Leviticus mentions the sheep, then the bull, and then the rams, whereas the verse in Numbers mentions the bulls, then the ram, and then the sheep, one may conclude from it that they are different offerings.
  § The mishna teaches: Failure to bring the two loaves prevents sacrifice of the accompanying peace offering of two sheep, but failure to sacrifice the two sheep does not prevent the bringing of the two loaves; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva?
  The Gemara answers: He derived the <i>halakha</i> based upon a verbal analogy between two verses. One verse states: “And the priest shall wave them with the bread of the first fruits for a wave offering before the Lord, with the two lambs; they shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy to the Lord for the priest” (Leviticus 23:20). The term “they shall be” indicates that it is essential that the offering be brought precisely as commanded, but it is unclear whether this is referring to the loaves or to the sheep brought as peace offerings. This is clarified by means of a verbal analogy from the verse: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two loaves of waving of two tenth parts of an ephah; they shall be [<i>tihyena</i>] of fine flour” (Leviticus 23:17).
  The verbal analogy teaches that just as there the requirement that it be done as prescribed is referring to the loaves rather than the sheep, so too here it is referring to the loaves rather than the sheep. Consequently, failure to bring the loaves prevents sacrifice of the sheep, but failure to sacrifice the sheep does not prevent the bringing of the loaves.
  The Gemara asks: And how did Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas, who holds that failure to sacrifice the sheep prevents the bringing of the loaves but failure to bring the loaves does not prevent sacrifice of the sheep, derive his ruling? He derived the <i>halakha</i> through a verbal analogy between the verse: “They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy to the Lord for the priest,” and the verse that states, concerning the seven sheep brought as burnt offerings: “They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] a burnt offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:18). Just as there the requirement that it be done as prescribed is referring to the sheep, so too here it is referring to sheep rather than loaves.
  The Gemara challenges: And according to Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas also, we should derive the <i>halakha</i> based upon a verbal analogy from the word <i>tihyena</i> as Rabbi Akiva does, and conclude that just as there it is referring to the loaves, so too here it is referring to the loaves. The Gemara responds: It is preferable to derive the meaning of the term <i>yihyu</i> from a verbal analogy using the identical form <i>yihyu</i>, and one should not derive the meaning of the term <i>yihyu</i> from a verbal analogy using the term <i>tihyena</i>.
  The Gemara asks: What difference is there whether or not the words are identical? Didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses? The verse states: “And the priest shall return [<i>veshav</i>] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [<i>uva</i>] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning, and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the <i>halakha</i> which applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week likewise applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week. Certainly, if the <i>halakha</i> can be derived via a verbal analogy with the words <i>veshav</i> and <i>uva</i>, the even slighter difference in form between <i>yihyu</i> and <i>tihyena</i> should not prevent the application of a verbal analogy.
  The Gemara answers: This matter applies only when there are no terms that are identical to it. But where there are terms that are identical to it, we derive the verbal analogy from terms identical to it rather than from the terms that are not precisely identical. Consequently, it is preferable to derive the meaning of the term <i>yihyu</i> from the identical term rather than from <i>tihyena</i>.
  The Gemara challenges: And let Rabbi Akiva also derive the meaning of the term <i>yihyu</i> from a verbal analogy to the identical term <i>yihyu</i>, as Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas does. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Akiva holds that it is preferable to derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning an item that is given as a gift to the priest, such as the loaves or the sheep brought as peace offerings, which are the subject of Leviticus 23:20, from the <i>halakha</i> concerning an item that is also a gift to the priest, i.e., the two loaves, which are the subject of Leviticus 23:17. This is to the exclusion of these seven sheep that are mentioned in Leviticus 23:18, which are burnt offerings and wholly consumed by the altar, and are not a gift to the priest. Consequently, it is preferable to derive the meaning of the term <i>yihyu</i> in verse 20 from the term <i>tihyena</i> in verse 17, rather than from the term <i>yihyu</i> in verse 18.
  The Gemara presents an alternative explanation for the basis of their divergent opinions: And if you wish, say instead that they disagree about the interpretation of the verse itself: “They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy to the Lord for the priest” (Leviticus 23:20). Rabbi Akiva holds: Which item is entirely given to the priest? You must say that it is the loaves of bread. Therefore he concludes that the word <i>yihyu</i> is referring to the loaves of bread, and if they are not sacrificed, the two sheep cannot be sacrificed as peace offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas respond to this? He would say: Is it in fact written: They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy for the priest, in which case one should interpret it as Rabbi Akiva does? It is written in the verse: “They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy to the Lord for the priest.” Therefore, it should be understood in the following manner: Which item is partially given to the Lord and partially given to the priest? You must say that it is the sheep, which are sacrificed as a peace offering, part of which is burned on the altar and part of which is consumed by the priests. Consequently, the word <i>yihyu</i> should be understood as referring to the sheep, and if they are not sacrificed, the two loaves cannot be sacrificed either.
  The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Akiva respond to this? He would say: Is it in fact written: They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy for the Lord and for the priest? It is written in the verse: “They shall be [<i>yihyu</i>] holy to the Lord for the priest.” Therefore, it should be understood to mean that it is given to the Lord, and it is then given by Him entirely to the priests, in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says: The Lord acquired it initially and then gave it to the priest.
  § With regard to the dispute in the mishna about whether failure to sacrifice the two sheep as peace offerings prevents the bringing of the two loaves or vice versa, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone concedes
  
  Daf 46a
  
  that if they became bound to each other and then one of them became lost, that the lost item prevents fulfillment of the mitzva with the other, i.e., the remaining item is unfit and must be burned. Rabbi Yoḥanan clarifies: And what is it that establishes their bond? It is the slaughter of the sheep. If the loaves existed at the time of the slaughter, then the loaves and sheep are sanctified as one unit. Consequently, if one of them is lost, the other is unfit and must be burned.
  With regard to the establishment of the bond between the loaves and the sheep, Ulla said that the Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, raise a dilemma: Does waving of the sheep and loaves before the sheep are slaughtered establish a bond between the sheep and the loaves, such that if one is lost the other becomes unfit, or does it not establish a bond between them?
  The Gemara asks: Why is there a dilemma about this issue? Resolve it from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says that slaughter of the sheep establishes a bond between sheep and the loaves. On can conclude by inference that waving, which precedes the slaughter, does not establish a bond between them.
  The Gemara answers: It is with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan itself that Ulla raises the dilemma: Is it obvious to Rabbi Yoḥanan that slaughter establishes a bond between them but waving does not establish a bond between them? Or perhaps it is obvious to him that slaughter establishes a bond between them, but he is uncertain as to whether or not waving establishes a bond between them. According to the second possibility, the reason that he mentioned slaughter is that he was certain about it. The Gemara notes that the question shall stand unresolved.
  Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥanina said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: But when it is written: “They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest” (Leviticus 23:20), it is written immediately after the verse mentions waving, and nevertheless Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas and Rabbi Akiva disagree, based on this phrase, about whether the loaves can be brought without the sheep or the sheep can be sacrificed without the loaves. This indicates that the waving does not establish a bond between these two items.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, replied to Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥanina: And according to your reasoning that one can infer the <i>halakha</i> based upon the placement of the phrase: “They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest,” is this phrase referring to the time after waving but not after the slaughter of the sheep? After all, the verse speaks of giving them to the priest, which is done after the sheep have been slaughtered. How then did Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas and Rabbi Akiva disagree concerning this verse?
  Rather, what do you have to say concerning this verse? It must be referring to a time before the slaughter, and what is meant by: “They shall be holy to the Lord for the priest”? It means an item that is ultimately given to the priest. Here too, one can explain that the verse is referring to a time before the waving, and it means an item that is ultimately given to the priest. The issue of whether or not waving establishes a bond between the sheep and loaves therefore remains an open question.
  The Gemara asks: But is it so that slaughter establishes a bond between them? And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from a <i>baraita</i> concerning a thanks offering, which consists of an animal offering accompanied by forty loaves. The <i>baraita</i> states: If one of its accompanying loaves broke before he slaughtered the thanks offering, he should bring another loaf and slaughter the thanks offering.
  But if one of its accompanying loaves broke once he slaughtered the thanks offering, it is not possible to bring another loaf because the loaves of a thanks offering are sanctified through the slaughter of the animal, which has already taken place. Consequently, the blood should be sprinkled on the altar and the meat should be eaten, but he has not fulfilled his vow to bring a thanks offering, and the loaves are all unfit.
  If one of its accompanying loaves broke after the blood was sprinkled on the altar, the loaves are not deemed unfit and the individual has fulfilled his vow to bring a thanks offering. He separates the four loaves for the priest from the whole loaves for the broken loaf. The priest receives whole loaves and not the broken one.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If one of its accompanying loaves left the confines of the walls of Jerusalem before he slaughtered the thanks offering, it is not unfit because the loaves were not yet sanctified by the slaughter. Therefore, he brings it back into the city and slaughters the thanks offering.
  If one of its accompanying loaves left the confines of the walls of Jerusalem once he slaughtered the thanks offering, the loaves are rendered unfit. Consequently, the blood should be sprinkled on the altar and the meat should be eaten, but he has not fulfilled his vow to bring a thanks offering and the loaves are all unfit. If one of the loaves left the confines of the walls of Jerusalem after the blood was sprinkled on the altar, the remainder of the offering is fit, and he separates the four loaves for the priest from the ones that remained inside the city for the loaf that went outside the walls of the city.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If one of its accompanying loaves became impure before he slaughtered the thanks offering, he brings another loaf and slaughters the thanks offering. But if one of its accompanying loaves became impure once he slaughtered the thanks offering, then the blood should be sprinkled on the altar and the meat should be eaten, and he has fulfilled his vow to bring a thanks offering. This is due to the fact that the frontplate effects acceptance of offerings that are impure. Nevertheless, the loaf that became impure is unfit, as the frontplate effects acceptance of the offering but does not render impure items pure.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: If one of its accompanying loaves became impure after the blood was sprinkled on the altar, he separates the four loaves that are given to the priest from the loaves that remained pure for the impure loaf.
  The Gemara comes to its question: If it enters your mind to say that slaughter establishes a bond between the sheep and the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>, and similarly between the animal offering and the loaves of a thanks offering, then in the cases where a loaf became unfit after the animal was slaughtered but before the blood was sprinkled, since the animal and the loaves bonded with each other through the slaughtering, once the loaf became unfit, the thanks offering should also become unfit. Consequently, the blood of the offering should not be sprinkled on the altar and the meat should not be eaten, contrary to what is stated in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara answers: The thanks offering is different, as the Merciful One called it a peace offering, as the verse states: “The sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Leviticus 7:13). Consequently, just as a peace offering is sacrificed without loaves, so too a thanks offering can be sacrificed without loaves.
  § Rabbi Yirmeya says: If you say that waving establishes a bond between the loaves and the sheep, then in a case where the loaves were lost after the waving,
  
  Daf 46b
  
  the sheep are lost as well, i.e., they cannot be sacrificed, and one must bring different loaves and sheep. Similarly, if the sheep are lost after the waving, the loaves are thereby lost as well, since a bond was established between them by means of the waving.
  And if you say that waving does not establish a bond between the loaves and the sheep, then one can raise the following dilemma: If one brought loaves and sheep and they were waved, and then the loaves were lost and he brought other loaves to replace the original loaves, does that second set of loaves require waving with the sheep, as it has not yet been waved? Or does it not require waving, as the accompanying sheep have already been waved with the original loaves, and the sheep are the subject in the verse that serves as the source of the requirement of waving (see Leviticus 23:20)?
  Rabbi Yirmeya clarifies the dilemma: In a case where the sheep were lost after the waving, do not raise the dilemma, as in this case they certainly require waving, because the primary obligation of waving is mentioned with respect to the sheep, and these sheep have not yet been waved. When should you raise the dilemma? You should raise it in a case where the loaves were lost after the waving.
  And according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Nannas, who holds that failure to sacrifice the sheep prevents one from sacrificing the loaves, do not raise the dilemma, as he says that the sheep are primary. Consequently, since the sheep have been waved, there is no need to repeat the waving. When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that failure to bring the loaves prevents one from sacrificing the sheep, as he says that the loaves are primary. According to his opinion, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning the loaves that are brought as replacements?
  On the one hand, one might say that since the loaves are primary and this set of loaves has not yet been waved, it requires waving. Or on the other hand, perhaps one should say that since its permitting factors are the sheep, and they were already waved, the new set of loaves does not require waving. The Gemara concludes that the question shall stand unresolved.
  § Abaye said to Rava: What is different about the two sheep brought as peace offerings together with the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>, such that their slaughter sanctifies the loaves (see 47a), and according to Rabbi Yoḥanan failure to sacrifice them once they have been slaughtered prevents the bringing of the loaves; and what is different about the seven sheep, the bull, and the two rams brought on <i>Shavuot</i> as an additional offering, such that their slaughter does not sanctify the loaves, and failure to sacrifice them does not prevent the bringing of the loaves?
  Rava said to Abaye: The reason for the distinction is because the two sheep and the loaves brought as peace offerings are bound to each other through the waving. This is not so with regard to the additional offerings, which are not waved with the loaves. The Gemara challenges: But in the case of a thanks offering and its loaves, which are not waved together, they are not bound to each other through waving, and nevertheless the slaughter of the animal offering sanctifies the loaves and failure to sacrifice the animal offering prevents the bringing of the loaves. This indicates that the waving is not the critical factor.
  Rather, the reason for the distinction is that the two sheep brought as peace offerings are comparable to a thanks offering. Just as a thanks offering is a peace offering, so too the two sheep are also a peace offering. Consequently, just as the slaughter of the thanks offering sanctifies the accompanying loaves, and failure to sacrifice the animal prevents one from bringing the loaves, the same applies with regard to the sheep peace offerings and loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>.
  The Gemara responds: Are the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> and the thanks offering really comparable? There, in the case of the thanks offering, there are no other animal offerings brought with it. But here, in the case of the offerings brought on <i>Shavuot</i>, where there are other animal offerings brought with it, let these peace offerings and those additional offerings sanctify the loaves. Why is it only the sheep brought as peace offerings that sanctify the loaves?
  Rather, the reason for the distinction is that the two sheep brought as peace offerings are comparable to a nazirite’s ram, which is sacrificed as a peace offering when he completes his term of naziriteship, in addition to a lamb that he sacrifices as a burnt offering, a female lamb that he brings then as a sin offering, and the nazirite loaves (see Numbers 6:14–15). Just as in the case of a nazirite’s ram, even though there are other offerings brought with it, nevertheless it is the slaughter of the peace offering that sanctifies the nazirite loaves and not the slaughter of anything else, here too, the <i>halakha</i> is no different, and it is specifically the slaughter of the peace offerings that sanctifies the loaves.
  The Gemara asks: And there, in the case of the offerings of the nazirite, from where do we derive that it is specifically the slaughter of the peace offering that sanctifies the loaves? The Gemara answers: This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning a verse stated with regard to the offerings of the nazirite: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord, with the basket of unleavened bread” (Numbers 6:17). This verse, which connects the ram and the loaves, teaches that the basket of the nazirite loaves comes as an obligation for the ram, which is a peace offering, and the slaughter of the ram sanctifies the loaves. Therefore, if the slaughter was unfit, e.g., in a case where he slaughtered the ram not for the sake of a peace offering, the loaves were not sanctified.
  § The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Akiva failure to sacrifice the two sheep brought as peace offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the loaves. Consequently, if there are no sheep, the loaves are sacrificed by themselves. Concerning this the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where the two loaves are brought by themselves, they should be waved. They should then be left overnight so that their form decays, i.e., they become disqualified, and they are then brought out to the place of burning, like any disqualified offering.
  The Gemara challenges: Whichever way you look at it, this is difficult: If the loaves are brought and waved in order to be eaten, let the priests eat them rather than burn them. If they are brought only to be burned, let the priests burn them immediately. Why are they left overnight so that they undergo a decay of form, i.e., become disqualified?
  Rabba said: Actually, the loaves are brought and waved in order to be eaten. Nevertheless, the Sages instituted a rabbinic decree that they not be eaten out of concern lest sheep become available to the nation the following year, and they might say: Didn’t we eat the loaves without any accompanying sheep last year [<i>eshtakad</i>]? Now too, we will eat the loaves without sacrificing sheep.
  And they will not know that the reason they were permitted to eat the loaves without sacrificing sheep last year is that there were no sheep, and therefore the two loaves permitted themselves to be eaten, i.e., they could be eaten without the sacrifice of the sheep. But now that there are sheep, it is the sacrifice of the sheep that permits the loaves to be eaten. Since loaves brought without sheep are fit by Torah law and may not be eaten due to rabbinic decree, they may not be burned until they become disqualified by remaining overnight.
  Rabba said: From where do I say this, i.e., what is the source for my statement? It is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 1:4): Rabbi Yehuda said that ben Bukhri testified before the Sages in Yavne: Any priest who contributes his half-shekel is not considered a sinner, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so.
  Rabbi Yehuda added that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to ben Bukhri: That is not the case, rather, any priest who does not contribute his half-shekel is considered a sinner, as they are obligated in this mitzva like all other Jews. But the priests who do not contribute the half-shekel interpret this following verse to their own advantage in order to excuse themselves from the mitzva.
  The verse states: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be wholly made to smoke; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16). Those priests claim as follows: Since the <i>omer</i> offering and the two loaves, i.e., the public offering of two loaves from the new wheat, brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and the shewbread placed on the Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, which are all meal offerings, are ours, then if we contribute half-shekels we will have partial ownership of these communal offerings, as they are purchased with the half-shekels. How, then, can they be eaten? They would then be regarded as priests’ meal offerings, which must be wholly burned.
  Rabba discusses this mishna: What are the circumstances of these two loaves? If we say that the mishna is referring to a case where they are brought with the animal offering, i.e., the two sheep brought as peace offerings, why shouldn’t the loaves be eaten? Is that to say that priests cannot volunteer to bring a thanks offering and its loaves and eat them? Just as the loaves that accompany a thanks offering may be eaten, even if brought by a priest, the same <i>halakha</i> should apply to the two loaves when they accompany sheep brought as peace offerings.
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where the two loaves are brought by themselves, and the mishna teaches that the priests claimed: How can they be eaten? Apparently, in principle the loaves come to be eaten, but due to rabbinic decree they are not eaten and are left overnight until their form decays.
  Abaye said to Rabba in response: Actually, the mishna can be interpreted as referring to loaves brought with the animal offering, and therefore it does not prove that when the two loaves are brought by themselves they may be eaten. And as for that which is difficult for you based on the case of a thanks offering and its loaves, the resolution is that the loaves of a thanks offering are not called a meal offering, and therefore even when a priest brings a thanks offering, the loaves may be eaten. By contrast, the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> are called a meal offering, as it is stated with regard to the two loaves: “Also in the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord” (Numbers 28:26). Therefore, the priests held that if they would donate half-shekels, the two loaves would not be permitted to be eaten.
  Rav Yosef said a different response to Rabba’s proof: Actually, when the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> are brought by themselves they come to be burned, i.e., they may not be eaten. And this is the reason that we do not burn them until the following day: It is because one may not burn consecrated items on a Festival.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Is the burning of the two loaves comparable to the burning of other consecrated items, such that the loaves may not be burned right away for this reason? There, in the case of other consecrated items, this is not their mitzva, i.e., they are supposed to be eaten, but if they become disqualified they must be burned. Conversely, here, in the case of the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> that are brought by themselves, where this is their mitzva, i.e., they are supposed to be burned, let the priests burn them on the Festival, just as is the <i>halakha</i> in the case of the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur, which are burned on Yom Kippur despite the fact that it is a Festival.
  Rather, Rav Yosef said: The reason the loaves are left overnight is due to a rabbinic decree not to burn them immediately, lest sheep become available to the nation afterward, i.e., later in the day, in which case the loaves could be waved with them and then eaten. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: That works out well for the entire time period when they may be sacrificed, i.e., until the afternoon daily offering is sacrificed. But after that, let them burn the loaves immediately and not wait until the next day. Rav Yosef replied: What is the meaning of the phrase in the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that the loaves must be left until their form decays? It means that they must be left until the form of their sacrifice has passed, i.e., until after the time when the sheep could be sacrificed.
  Rava said that there is a different response to Rabba’s proof: When the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> are brought by themselves, by Torah law they come to be eaten, but due to rabbinic decree they are not eaten and are left overnight until they are disqualified. The reason for the decree is due to that which Rabba said, i.e., due to the concern that the following year sheep will be available and nevertheless the nation will bring the two loaves without sheep. But the proof that by Torah law the loaves may be eaten is not from Rabba’s line of reasoning, i.e., from the mishna in <i>Shekalim</i>; rather, it is from a verse.
  And Rava said by way of explanation: From where do I state this <i>halakha</i>? From the fact that it is written with regard to the two loaves: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two loaves of waving of two tenth parts of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour, they shall be baked with leaven, for first fruits to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17). Just as first fruits are brought by themselves, without an accompanying animal offering, so too the two loaves are brought by themselves when there are no sheep available. And learn from this comparison to first fruits that just as first fruits are brought to be eaten, so too the two loaves are also brought to be eaten, even in the absence of the sheep brought as peace offerings.
  
  Daf 47a
  
  § The Gemara cites further discussion of the two sheep and the two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> consecrate the two loaves that accompany them only by means of their slaughter.
  How so? If one slaughtered the sheep for their own sake, as the peace offerings that are supposed to be sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>, and then the priest sprinkled their blood on the altar for their own sake, then the loaves are consecrated. But if one slaughtered them not for their own sake, and the priest sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated. If one slaughtered them for their own sake and he sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are partially consecrated, but they are not fully consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The loaves are never consecrated at all until one slaughters the offerings for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the slaughtering of the sheep partially consecrates the loaves even without the sprinkling of the blood?
  The Gemara answers: It is based on the fact that it is written concerning the ram brought by the nazirite when he completes his naziriteship: “And he shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] of peace offerings to the Lord, with the basket of unleavened bread” (Numbers 6:17). Since the verse uses the word <i>zevaḥ</i>, which also means slaughter, and the verse then makes reference to the loaves, that is to say that it is specifically the slaughter that consecrates the loaves that accompany the offering. Similarly, the slaughter of the sheep brought as peace offerings on <i>Shavuot</i> consecrates the accompanying two loaves, as the <i>halakha</i> of the loaves of <i>Shavuot</i> is derived from that of the loaves of the nazirite.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the slaughtering and sprinkling of the blood together consecrate the loaves? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the term: “He shall offer,” which he understands to mean that the loaves are not consecrated until the priest performs all of the actions included in the sacrificial rites of that offering, including the sprinkling of the blood.
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also, isn’t it written: “He shall offer,” which indicates that the loaves are consecrated only once the blood has been sprinkled on the altar? The Gemara answers: If it were written: A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>] he shall offer, it would be as you are saying that he should slaughter it and then perform a further action, i.e., sprinkling the blood, in order to consecrate the loaves. Now that it is written: “He shall offer the ram for a sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],” it should be understood as: By what means should he offer the ram in order to consecrate the loaves? By means of slaughtering [<i>zeviḥa</i>].
  The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, isn’t it written: “A sacrifice [<i>zevaḥ</i>],” indicating that slaughtering alone consecrates the loaves? The Gemara answers: He requires that expression for that which Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says that everyone, including Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, concedes that the loaves must be in existence at the time of the slaughter.
  § The Gemara asks: What is meant by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement in the <i>baraita</i> that if one slaughtered the sheep for their own sake and sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, then the loaves are partially consecrated, but they are not fully consecrated? Abaye says: The loaves are consecrated by means of the slaughtering, but their consecration is not complete. Rava says: The loaves are fully consecrated by means of the slaughtering, but they are not thereby permitted to be eaten.
  The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? Everyone concedes that the loaves may not be eaten as a result of this slaughtering. The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is the ability to transfer sanctity to their redemption money. According to Abaye, who holds that the loaves are not completely consecrated, they do not transfer sanctity to their redemption money if one tries to redeem them for money. According to Rava, who holds that the loaves are completely consecrated, they transfer sanctity to their redemption money.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rava, who holds that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the loaves are completely sanctified, that is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. But according to Abaye, what difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?
  The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to whether the loaves are rendered unfit by means of leaving the Temple courtyard after the slaughtering of the offering. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the loaves are rendered unfit if they leave the courtyard. According to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the loaves are not consecrated, they are not rendered unfit if they leave the courtyard.
  § The Gemara continues the discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, concerning the consecration of the two loaves by means of the slaughter and sprinkling of the blood of the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>. Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: In the case of a communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> that one slaughtered for their sake but the priest sprinkled their blood not for their sake, concerning those accompanying loaves, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to eating them?
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion was this dilemma raised? If it was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say that it is the sprinkling of the blood that consecrates the loaves? Consequently, if the blood was not properly sprinkled, it is clear that the loves are unfit and may not be eaten. And if it was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, both according to the opinion of Abaye and according to that of Rava, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the loaves are consecrated but are not permitted to be eaten.
  The Gemara responds: Rather, one must say that the question was asked in accordance with the opinion of this following <i>tanna</i>. As the father of Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba teaches in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where the two loaves left the Temple courtyard between the slaughtering of the offering and the sprinkling of its blood, and then the priest sprinkled the blood of the sheep with the intent that their meat would be eaten beyond their designated time, the sheep are rendered <i>piggul</i>. With regard to the loaves, Rabbi Eliezer says: The loaves do not become prohibited due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>. Rabbi Akiva says: The loaves do become prohibited due to the prohibition of <i>piggul</i>.
  Rav Sheshet said: These <i>tanna’im</i>, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, both hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The slaughtering consecrates the loaves by itself. Consequently, if the loaves are taken out of the Temple courtyard after the sheep are slaughtered, the loaves become disqualified.
  But they disagree as to the following: Rabbi Eliezer conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rabbi Eliezer says that sprinkling the blood is not effective with regard to offerings that left the Temple courtyard. Since the loaves left the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, the intent of the priest while sprinkling the blood that the offering be eaten outside of its designated time does not render the loaves <i>piggul</i>. And Rabbi Akiva conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rabbi Akiva says that sprinkling the blood is effective with regard to offerings that left the Temple courtyard. Therefore, the intent of the priest while sprinkling the blood that the offering be eaten outside of its designated time renders the loaves <i>piggul</i>, even though they left the courtyard.
  
  Daf 47b
  
  As we learned in a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 6b): In the case of sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of the blood is completely ineffective with regard to these portions, and therefore one is not liable for misusing them. And if one eats them, he is not liable due to the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or of partaking of sacrificial meat while one is ritually impure.
  Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective and therefore, one is liable for misusing them. And if one eats them he is liable due to the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or of partaking of sacrificial meat while one is ritually impure.
  The Gemara now concludes the dilemma that Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak raised before Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to eating the loaves when the sheep were slaughtered for their own sake, but their blood was sprinkled not for their sake?
  The Gemara clarifies the two sides of the dilemma: Should one say that from the fact that sprinkling the blood of the sheep in a manner that renders it <i>piggul</i> renders the loaves <i>piggul</i>, like the meat of the offering, despite the fact that the loaves were disqualified by leaving the courtyard of the Temple, it can be derived that sprinkling the blood not for its own sake also permits the loaves to be eaten, just as it permits the meat of the sheep to be eaten? Or perhaps it is only to be stringent that we say that sprinkling the blood is effective with regard to loaves that have left the Temple courtyard, but we do not say this in order to be lenient, e.g., to render the loaves permitted to be eaten.
  Rav Pappa objects to this understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer. From where do we know that they disagree in a case where the loaves are outside the courtyard at the time of the sprinkling?
  Perhaps in a case where the loaves are still outside the courtyard everyone agrees that sprinkling the blood is not effective with regard to offerings that left the Temple courtyard, and they disagree in a case where the loaves left the courtyard and one then brought them back into the courtyard before the sprinkling. As Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The slaughter of the sheep consecrates the loaves, and therefore the loaves became disqualified by leaving the courtyard after the sheep were slaughtered. Consequently, even if they were brought back into the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood they cannot become <i>piggul</i> because they have already been disqualified for a different reason.
  And Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said: The slaughter of the sheep does not consecrate the loaves at all before the sprinkling of the blood. Since the loaves were not yet consecrated, they do not become disqualified by leaving the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara asks: What is this interpretation of the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer? It does not fit what they say. Granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The slaughter of the sheep consecrates the loaves, that is what Rabbi Akiva means when he says that the loaves are consecrated by the slaughter of the sheep and then the sprinkling that was done with the intent to consume the offering after its appointed time comes and renders the loaves <i>piggul</i>.
  But if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who said: The slaughter of the sheep does not consecrate the loaves without the sprinkling of the blood, does sprinkling with an intent that renders the sheep <i>piggul</i> actually consecrate the loaves?
  But doesn’t Rav Giddel say that Rav says: Sprinkling with an intent that renders an offering <i>piggul</i> does not cause items to become subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property, and it does not remove items from being subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property?
  Rav explains: The <i>halakha</i> that it does not cause items to become subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property applies with regard to sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity. The prohibition against misusing consecrated property applies to: “The sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15). Consequently, it does not apply to offerings of lesser sanctity, as the meat is the property of those who brought the offering, and the sacrificial portions are disqualified by the sprinkling performed with improper intent.
  And the <i>halakha</i> that it does not remove items from being subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property applies with regard to meat of offerings of the most sacred order, such as a sin offering, a guilt offering, or a communal peace offering. Since the sprinkling of the blood was not valid, the meat, which would have become permitted for the priests to eat, retains the status of “the sacred items of the Lord,” and the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property still applies.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation: Wasn’t that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says conclusively refuted? Consequently, one cannot ask a question based on this statement.
  § The Gemara cites another dilemma concerning the sheep and loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>. Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: In a case of the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> that one slaughtered for their own sake, thereby establishing a bond between the sheep and the loaves, and the loaves were then lost, if the blood of the sheep would be sprinkled for their sake, the meat would not be permitted to be eaten because the loaves were lost. That said, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether the priest may sprinkle their blood not for their own sake but rather for the sake of a peace offering in order to permit the meat of the sheep to be eaten?
  Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Do you have anything that is not fit if the sacrificial rites are performed for its own sake, and yet it is fit if the sacrificial rites are performed not for its own sake? This is certainly not a logical option. Rabbi Yirmeya responded: And is there no precedent for this? But there is the Paschal offering before midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is not fit if it is slaughtered for its own sake, as it is before the proper time for the Paschal offering, and yet it is fit if it is slaughtered not for its own sake but rather for the sake of a peace offering.
  Rabbi Zeira replied: This is what I was saying: Do you have anything that was fit to be sacrificed for its own sake, like these sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> that were slaughtered before the loaves were lost, and was then rejected from being sacrificed for its own sake, like these sheep when the loaves were lost, and is not fit if it is sacrificed for its own sake, and yet it is fit if it is sacrificed not for its own sake?
  Rabbi Yirmeya responded: And is there no precedent for this? But there is the Paschal offering, which was fit to be sacrificed for its own sake during its designated time, and after its designated time, during the rest of the days of the year before midday, it is not fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering but it is fit to be sacrificed as a peace offering.
  Rabbi Zeira replied: This is what I was saying: Do you have anything that was fit to be sacrificed for its own sake, like the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> that were slaughtered before the loaves were lost, and it was slaughtered for its own sake, and was then rejected from being sacrificed for its own sake, like the two sheep when the loaves were lost, and it is not fit if it is sacrificed for its own sake, and yet it is fit if it is sacrificed not for its own sake?
  Rabbi Yirmeya responded: And is there no precedent for this? But there is the thanks offering, as the Gemara (46a) states that if the thanks offering was slaughtered and then its accompanying loaves broke into pieces and thereby became disqualified, the blood should be sprinkled for the sake of a peace offering rather than a thanks offering, and then the meat may be eaten. Yet, if the blood was sprinkled for the sake of a thanks offering, the meat would not be permitted to be eaten.
  Rabbi Zeira answered: The thanks offering is different, as the Merciful One called it a peace offering (see Leviticus 7:13). Just as a peace offering is sacrificed without loaves, so too a thanks offering may sometimes be sacrificed without loaves. Therefore, the loss of the loaves does not render the thanks offering disqualified, and this case is not comparable to the case of the two sheep and two loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>.
  § The Gemara cites another discussion concerning the sheep and loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one slaughtered the two sheep as required but they were accompanied by four loaves rather than the requisite two loaves, he draws two of the loaves from the four and waves them together with the sheep,
  
  Daf 48a
  
  and the rest of the loaves are permitted to be eaten through redemption. The Sages said the following before Rav Ḥisda: This <i>baraita</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that the slaughter of the sheep grants the loaves inherent sanctity, and in this case two of the loaves have inherent sanctity but it is not known which ones.
  As, if the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, since he says that the slaughter of the sheep consecrates the loaves with inherent sanctity, when the <i>baraita</i> states that he redeems the loaves, where does he redeem them?
  The process of redemption would be to place all four loaves in front of him and state that whichever two of the loaves do not have inherent sanctity are redeemed for money. If he redeems them outside of the Temple courtyard, since it is written: “And the priest shall wave them with the bread of the first fruits for a wave offering before the Lord, with the two lambs” (Leviticus 23:20), he disqualifies the two loaves that possess inherent sanctity by causing them to leave the courtyard, at which point they are no longer “before the Lord.” Conversely, if he redeems them inside the courtyard, once the two loaves that do not possess inherent sanctity are redeemed, he violates the prohibition against bringing non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard.
  Rav Ḥisda said to them: Actually the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and one redeems the loaves inside the courtyard. Nevertheless, it is not considered to be a violation of the prohibition against bringing non-sacred items into the courtyard because the non-sacred loaves came into the courtyard by themselves, i.e., they were already there when they became non-sacred and were not actively brought into the courtyard in their non-sacred state.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to this very case: When he redeems the loaves, he may redeem them only outside of the courtyard? This contradicts Rav Ḥisda’s claim that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi one redeems the loaves inside the courtyard.
  Rav Ashi answered: This <i>baraita</i> is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, because if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, when he brings the loaves outside the courtyard he thereby disqualifies them by causing them to leave the courtyard.
  § Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Let us say that the <i>baraita</i>, which states that if the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> are slaughtered with four loaves instead of two, two of the four are invested with inherent sanctity, is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan that was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves rather than the required forty. In that case, Ḥizkiyya says: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Not even forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated.
  The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to this dispute that Rabbi Zeira says: Everyone, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, concedes that in a case where the individual bringing the offering said: Let forty of the eighty loaves be consecrated, that forty are consecrated? Here too, one can say that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where one said: Let two of the four loaves be consecrated.
  § The Gemara cites another discussion concerning the sheep and loaves of <i>Shavuot</i>. Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one slaughtered four sheep for <i>Shavuot</i>, rather than the required two, accompanied by two loaves, he draws two of the sheep out of the four and sprinkles their blood not for the sake of the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>. He then sprinkles the blood of the other sheep for the sake of the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>.
  As, if you do not say to do this, but rather require him to first sprinkle the blood of two of the sheep for their own sake, then you have caused the loss of the latter two sheep. Since they were previously fit to have their blood sprinkled on the altar for the sake of the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>, and were disqualified from this status when the blood of the other two sheep was sprinkled for that purpose, they are no longer fit to have their blood sprinkled even for the sake of a different offering.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata: And does the court say to a person: Arise and sin in order that you may gain? Is it proper for the priest to sprinkle the blood of the first pair not for their own sake so that the second pair will remain fit?
  But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Zevaḥim</i> 77a) that <i>tanna’im</i> disagree concerning this matter? The mishna teaches: In the case of the limbs of a sin offering, whose flesh is eaten by priests and may not be burned on the altar, that were intermingled with the limbs of a burnt offering, which are burned on the altar, Rabbi Eliezer says: The priest shall place all the limbs above, on the altar, and I view the flesh of the limbs of the sin offering above on the altar as though they are pieces of wood burned on the altar, not an offering. And the Rabbis say: One should wait until the form of all the intermingled limbs decays and they will all go out to the place of burning in the Temple courtyard, where all disqualified offerings of the most sacred order are burned.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan continued: According to your opinion, why do the Rabbis say that the mixture is burned? Let the court say to the priest instead: Arise and sin by burning all the limbs on the altar, including the limbs of the sin offering, in order that you may gain by performing the mitzva of sacrificing the limbs of the burnt offering.
  Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata answered Rabbi Yoḥanan: We do say: Arise and sin with a sin offering in order that you may gain with regard to a sin offering, since it is the same type of offering. Similarly, one may sin with regard to the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> in order to gain with regard to the other sheep brought for the same offering. We do not say: Arise and sin with a sin offering in order that you may gain with regard to a burnt offering. Therefore, the Rabbis prohibit burning the limbs of the sin offering on the altar in order to allow for the burning of the limbs of the burnt offering.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan asked Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata: And does the court actually say: Arise and sin in order that you may gain in a case where the sin and the gain are with regard to one matter? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning a case of the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> where one slaughtered them not for their own sake, or where he slaughtered them either before their time, i.e., before <i>Shavuot</i>, or after their time, that the blood shall be sprinkled, although it shall be sprinkled for the sake of a peace offering, and the meat shall be eaten.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan continued: And if the Festival was on Shabbat, one may not sprinkle the blood, the sacrificial portions may not be burned on the altar, and the meat may not be eaten. This is because the improper slaughter of the sheep disqualified them as communal offerings, whereas individual offerings may not be sacrificed on Shabbat. But if the priest nevertheless sprinkled the blood of these sheep on Shabbat, the offering is accepted in that it is permitted to burn its sacrificial portions on the altar in the evening, after the conclusion of Shabbat, and then the meat may be eaten.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan concluded his proof: But according to your opinion, why is it not permitted to sprinkle the blood on Shabbat? Let the court say: Arise and sin by sprinkling the blood of these offerings in order that you may gain by being able to burn their sacrificial portions in the evening and then eat their meat.
  Rabbi Ḥanina Tirata answered: We do say: Arise and sin on Shabbat in order that you may gain on Shabbat. We do not say: Arise and sin on Shabbat in order that you may gain on a weekday.
  The Gemara asks: And is it so that with regard to two separate matters the court does not say that one should sin with regard to one in order to gain with regard to other? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 8:9): In the case of a barrel of wine that is <i>teruma</i> that broke in the upper section of a winepress, and in the lower section of the winepress there is non-sacred, impure wine, and the wine that is <i>teruma</i> will flow into the lower press and become impure, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua both concede that if one is able to rescue even a quarter-<i>log</i> of the wine that is <i>teruma</i> in a pure vessel so that it retains its ritual purity, he should rescue it, even if, in the process, the rest of the wine that is <i>teruma</i> will mix with the non-sacred wine. This will cause the owner a financial loss, because the wine that is <i>teruma</i> will become impure, causing the entire mixture to become prohibited for consumption.
  But if not, i.e., one cannot save any of the wine that is <i>teruma</i>, e.g., if one does not have any pure vessels in which to collect it, Rabbi Eliezer says:
  
  Daf 48b
  
  The <i>teruma</i> wine should be allowed to descend and become impure on its own, ruining the non-sacred wine in the lower press, but one should not render it impure through his direct action by catching it in an impure vessel, even though catching it would prevent the wine that is <i>teruma</i> from mixing with his impure, non-sacred wine. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: Since the wine that is <i>teruma</i> will become impure in any event, one may even render it impure through his direct action in order to save his non-sacred wine. This indicates that according to Rabbi Yehoshua it is permitted to sin with regard to one matter, i.e., the wine that is <i>teruma</i>, in order to gain with regard to another matter, i.e., the non-sacred wine.
  The Gemara responds: It is different there, in the case of the wine, because the wine that is <i>teruma</i> is going to become impure in any event. Consequently, his action is not considered a sin, and this is not a case of sinning with regard to one matter in order to gain in another.
  § The Gemara continues its discussion of the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>. When Rav Yitzḥak came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he reported traditions that he learned in Eretz Yisrael, and he taught a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a case of the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> where one slaughtered them not in accordance with their mitzva, e.g., he slaughtered them for the sake of a different offering, they are disqualified; and they should be left overnight until their form decays and they attain the status of leftover sacrificial meat, and then they are brought out to the place designated for burning.
  Rav Naḥman said to Rav Yitzḥak: The Master, i.e., Rav Yitzḥak, who compares the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> to a sin offering because they are juxtaposed in a verse (see Leviticus 23:19), teaches: The sheep are disqualified, like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. By contrast, the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Levi, who derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an obligatory peace offering, e.g., the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>, from the <i>halakha</i> concerning a voluntary peace offering, teaches that the two sheep remain valid offerings, just as a voluntary peace offering remains valid even if it is slaughtered for the sake of a different offering.
  As Levi teaches: And with regard to the other peace offerings of a nazirite that one slaughtered not in accordance with their mitzva, they are valid offerings like voluntary peace offerings, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner to bring the required nazirite peace offerings. And these offerings are eaten for only one day and one night, in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> concerning the peace offerings of nazirite, and not for two days and one night like voluntary peace offerings. They require neither bread nor the foreleg, unlike the required peace offering of a nazirite.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Yitzḥak from that which was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where one is obligated to sacrifice as a guilt offering an animal in its first year, which the Torah calls a lamb, and instead he brought an animal in its second year, which is considered a ram; or if he is obligated to sacrifice as a guilt offering an animal in its second year and he brought an animal in its first year; the offerings are disqualified. They are to be left overnight until their form decays, and are brought out to the place designated for burning.
  But in the case of the burnt offering of a nazirite, i.e., the lamb that is sacrificed when he completes his naziriteship; or the burnt offering of a woman after childbirth, i.e., the lamb she sacrifices on the forty-first day after giving birth to a son or on the eighty-first day after giving birth to a daughter; or the burnt offering of a leper, i.e., the lamb that is sacrificed after he is purified; in all of these cases if the animals were in their second year instead, and one slaughtered them, the offerings are valid.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: The principle of the matter is: Any animal that is valid as a voluntary burnt offering is also valid as an obligatory burnt offering, and any animal that is disqualified as a sin offering is also disqualified as a guilt offering, except for an offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake, which is disqualified in the case of a sin offering but not a guilt offering. This demonstrates that the <i>halakhot</i> of obligatory burnt offerings are derived from those of voluntary burnt offerings, despite the fact that the burnt offering of a nazirite is juxtaposed to the sin offering of a nazirite (see Numbers 6:14) and the burnt offering of a leper is juxtaposed to the sin offering of a leper (see Leviticus 14:19). Similarly, the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>, which are obligatory peace offerings, should be derived from the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to voluntary peace offerings, and not from the <i>halakha</i> pertaining to a sin offering as Rav Yitzḥak holds.
  The Gemara answers: This <i>tanna</i>, who taught this <i>baraita</i>, is the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Levi cited earlier, who holds that if one slaughters a sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> not for its own sake, it is nevertheless valid.
  The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rav Naḥman, who maintains that the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Levi holds that a sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> slaughtered not for its own sake is valid because he derives its <i>halakha</i> from that of a voluntary peace offering. Come and hear what Levi teaches to the contrary, as Levi teaches: The guilt offering of a nazirite, i.e., the lamb he brings on the eighth day after becoming impure through contact with a corpse, and the guilt offering of a leper, i.e., the lamb he brings at the completion of his purification, that one slaughtered not for their sake are valid, but they did not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  If one slaughtered them when the time had not yet arrived for their owners to sacrifice these offerings, or they were in their second year instead of their first year and one slaughtered them, they are disqualified.
  The Gemara comments: But if it is so that Levi derives the <i>halakhot</i> of an obligatory offering from those of a voluntary one, let him derive the <i>halakha</i> of the guilt offering from that of the peace offering, in which case the guilt offerings should be valid even if they were in their second year. The Gemara answers: Levi derives the <i>halakha</i> concerning an obligatory peace offering from the <i>halakha</i> concerning a voluntary peace offering, but he does not derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning a guilt offering from the <i>halakha</i> concerning a peace offering.
  The Gemara further challenges the statement of Rav Naḥman: But if Levi derives the <i>halakha</i> of an obligatory peace offering from that of a voluntary peace offering, let him similarly derive the <i>halakha</i> of one guilt offering from that of another guilt offering. He should derive that the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper are valid even if the animal is in its second year from the <i>halakha</i> concerning a guilt offering for robbery and a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, which are supposed to be a ram in its second year. Or, if one brought a lamb in its first year as a guilt offering for robbery or a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, Levi should derive that it is valid from the <i>halakha</i> concerning the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, which are lambs in their first year.
  Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: One can derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that is prepared not in its valid manner, e.g., the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> that were slaughtered not for their own sake, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to another item that is prepared not in its valid manner, e.g., a voluntary peace offering slaughtered not for its own sake. But one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that is prepared not in its valid manner, e.g., the guilt offering of a nazirite or a leper that is sacrificed when it is in its second year, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an item that is prepared in its valid manner, e.g., a guilt offering for robbery or for misuse of consecrated property that is sacrificed when it is in its second year.
  The Gemara asks: And can one not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to disqualified offerings from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to fit offerings? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived with regard to an item that left the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified that if it nevertheless ascended upon the altar it shall not descend? It is derived from the fact that an item that left is valid for sacrifice on a private altar. Here, the <i>baraita</i> derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an disqualified offering from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a fit offering.
  
  Daf 49a
  
  The Gemara answers: The <i>tanna</i> of that <i>baraita</i> relies on the phrase: “This is the law of the burnt offering [<i>ha’ola</i>]: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night unto the morning” (Leviticus 6:2), a seemingly superfluous general phrase which is interpreted homiletically to include the <i>halakha</i> that any item that ascends [<i>ola</i>] upon the altar shall not descend from it, even if it was disqualified. The verse is the actual source for the <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, whereas the case of a private altar is cited merely in support of this ruling. Accordingly, the <i>baraita</i> does not contradict the opinion of Rav Shimi bar Ashi.
  § The Gemara cites another discussion concerning the sheep of <i>Shavuot</i>. Rabba bar bar Ḥana taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav: In a case of the two sheep of <i>Shavuot</i> where one slaughtered them for the sake of rams and not for their own sake, they are valid offerings, but they do not satisfy the obligation of the owner, i.e., the community, to sacrifice these offerings. Rav said to Rabba bar bar Ḥana: That is not so; rather, the sheep certainly satisfy the obligation of the community.
  Rav Ḥisda said: The statement of Rav is reasonable in a case where one thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and nevertheless slaughtered them for the sake of lambs. In such a case, it makes sense that they satisfy the community’s obligation since the lambs were slaughtered for the sake of lambs.
  But in a case where he thought that they were rams when he slaughtered them, and therefore slaughtered them for the sake of rams, they do not satisfy the community’s obligation, even though they were actually lambs. This is due to the fact that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, despite the fact that it was done in error. But Rabba said: The erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting.
  Rava said: We raise an objection to our own ruling concerning this <i>halakha</i> from that which was taught in a mishna (<i>Gittin</i> 54a): In a case of priests who disqualified an offering through improper intention in the Temple, by expressing, while sacrificing the offering, the intention to eat it after the appropriate time, if they did so intentionally, they are liable to pay the value of the offering to its owner, who must now bring another offering. It follows, therefore, that if the priests did so unintentionally they are exempt. And it is taught concerning this case in a <i>baraita</i>: Even though they slaughtered it with improper intent unintentionally, their act of improper intention renders the offering <i>piggul</i>, despite the fact that they are exempt from paying damages.
  What are the circumstances in which this is the <i>halakha</i>? If we say that it is referring to a case where the priest knew that the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time, is this considered an unintentional act by the priests? Certainly they were acting intentionally.
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where the offering was a sin offering, which is eaten for only one day and one night, and the priest thought that it was a peace offering and therefore he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, which is eaten for two days and one night, and thereby his intention was that it be eaten after its appropriate time? And with regard to this case the <i>tanna</i> taught: Their act of improper intention renders the offering <i>piggul</i>. Apparently, this proves that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary to the ruling of Rabba.
  Abaye said to Rava: There is no objection from this <i>baraita</i>, because actually it is referring to a case where the priest knew that it was a sin offering and nevertheless he intended the offering to be for the sake of a peace offering, and his uprooting was done intentionally. Nevertheless, the <i>baraita</i> refers to the priests as acting unintentionally because it is referring to circumstances where the priest says, i.e., he mistakenly thinks, that it is permitted to sacrifice the offering with this intent.
  Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rabba’s opinion that erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering does not constitute uprooting. A <i>baraita</i> teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: All meal offerings from which the handful was removed not for their sake are entirely valid, and have even satisfied the obligation of the owner, unlike animal offerings slaughtered not for their sake, which do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
  This is because meal offerings are not similar to animal offerings. As, in the case of one who removes a handful from a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow-pan meal offering and not a deep-pan meal offering. Since a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan is hard and one prepared in a deep pan is soft, his intention is plainly false. Similarly, if one removes a handful from a dry meal offering, the meal offering of a sinner, which has no oil, for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, his intention is plainly false, as its mode of preparation proves that it is a dry meal offering.
  But with regard to animal offerings this is not so. There is one mode of slaughter for all of the offerings, one mode of collection of the blood for all of them, and one mode of sprinkling for all of them. Since the only factor that distinguishes between one type of offering and another is the intention of the individuals involved in its sacrifice, their intention is significant. Consequently, if one of the sacrificial rites is performed for the sake of the wrong type of offering, the offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation.
  The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Shimon is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful from it for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, then although its mode of preparation proves that it was prepared in a shallow pan, what of it? In any case he is consciously uprooting its status as a shallow-pan meal offering, changing it to a deep-pan meal offering by means of his intention when he removes the handful.
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where the priest thought it was a meal offering prepared in a deep pan and therefore removed a handful for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, but he was mistaken, as it was actually a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan? It is specifically here, in this case, that Rabbi Shimon rules that the offering remains valid, since its mode of preparation proves that it is a shallow-pan meal offering, which indicates that in general, erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, contrary the ruling of Rabba.
  Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira, in response to his objection: This objection to Rabba’s opinion is inconclusive, because one can explain that the <i>baraita</i> is actually referring to a case where the priest knew that the meal offering was prepared in a shallow pan, and nevertheless he removed a handful for the sake of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan.
  And with regard to that which you said in your question: Although its mode of preparation proves that it is prepared in a shallow pan, what of it, i.e., since he is consciously uprooting its identity, how can it satisfy its owner’s obligation? Abaye answers that Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava says: The Merciful One disqualifies an offering due to improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the physical properties of the offering itself do not prove that the intent is mistaken. The Merciful One does not disqualify an offering due to improper intent that is recognizably false. Consequently, if one removes a handful from a shallow-pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if he did so consciously, the offering remains valid and satisfies the owner’s obligation.
  MISHNA: Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings on a day when more than one is sacrificed, e.g., if it was both Shabbat and the New Moon, does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings. If the priests did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, nevertheless, they should sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering, as failure to sacrifice one daily offering does not prevent sacrifice of the other. In all of these cases, if they failed to sacrifice one offering, they should still sacrifice the other.
  Rabbi Shimon said: When does this <i>halakha</i> apply? It applies at a time when the failure to sacrifice the daily morning offering was because they were prevented from sacrificing it due to circumstances beyond their control or they failed to sacrifice it unwittingly. But if the priests acted intentionally and did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering.
  Incense was burned twice a day, half a measure in the morning and half a measure in the afternoon. If they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon.
  Rabbi Shimon said: And in such a case, the entire measure was sacrificed in the afternoon. The reason for the difference between the daily offerings and the incense is that the daily service on a new golden altar is initiated only with the burning of the incense of the spices in the afternoon, at which time they would burn a full measure. And the daily service on a new altar of the burnt offering, on which the daily offerings were sacrificed, is initiated only with the daily morning offering. And use of a new Table was initiated only with the arrangement of the shewbread on Shabbat, and use of a new Candelabrum was initiated only with the kindling of its seven lamps in the afternoon.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the daily offerings and the additional offerings each do not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. Concerning this, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: In the case of a community that did not have the resources to sacrifice both the daily offerings and the additional offerings, which of them takes precedence over the other?
  The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances to which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin is referring? If we say that he is referring to a case where the choice is between the daily offerings of that day and the additional offerings of that same day, it is obvious that the daily offerings are given preference, as the sacrifice of the daily offerings is more frequent than the sacrifice of the additional offerings, which are sacrificed only on special occasions, and the daily offerings are also sanctified.
  Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin must be referring to a case where they have enough animals for the daily offerings of today and also for either the daily offerings for tomorrow or the additional offerings for today. In such a case, are the daily offerings given preference since their sacrifice is more frequent? Or perhaps the additional offerings are given preference because they are considered more sanctified because they are sacrificed on a holy day.
  Rav Ḥisda said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin: The resolution to this dilemma can be derived from that which you learned in the mishna: Failure to sacrifice the daily offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the additional offerings, and likewise, failure to sacrifice the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the daily offerings. And failure to sacrifice some of the additional offerings does not prevent sacrifice of the other additional offerings.
  What are the circumstances to which the mishna is referring? If we say that it is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has all of the animals necessary for both offerings, and the only question is in terms of sacrificing one before the other, isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that no sacrifice should precede the sacrifice of the daily offering of morning? The <i>baraita</i> continues: It is derived from that which the verse states: “And the fire upon the altar shall be kept burning thereby, it shall not go out; and the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; and he shall lay the burnt offering in order on it, and shall cause the fats of the peace offering to go up in smoke upon it” (Leviticus 6:5).
  And Rava says in explanation of this derivation in the <i>baraita</i> that the term “the burnt offering,” with the definite article, is referring to the first burnt offering of the day, which is the daily offering. Consequently, one may not sacrifice the additional offerings before the daily offering.
  
  Daf 49b
  
  Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is referring to a case where he does not have a sufficient number of animals for both offerings. And if it is referring to the offerings of that day, why does the mishna say that failure to sacrifice one does not prevent sacrifice of the other? Since the daily offering is more frequent and it is sanctified, and the additional offerings are sanctified but are less frequent than the daily offering, the frequent offering are given preference. Consequently, failure to sacrifice the daily offering should prevent the sacrifice of the additional offerings.
  Rather, is it not referring to a case where the Temple treasury does not have enough animals for both the additional offerings of today and the daily offering of tomorrow, and yet the mishna teaches that failure to sacrifice one does not prevent one from sacrificing the other? Evidently, they are equal and he may sacrifice whichever offering he chooses. This would resolve Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s dilemma.
  Abaye said to Rav Ḥisda: That is not a valid resolution of the dilemma, as one can claim that actually, the mishna is referring to a case where they have enough animals for all the offerings, and the mishna is referring to the issue of sacrificing one before the other. And with regard to that which poses a difficulty for you based upon the <i>baraita</i> that states that no sacrifice should precede the sacrifice of the daily offering of the morning, that <i>baraita</i> is merely stating the mitzva <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin’s dilemma based upon a mishna (<i>Arakhin</i> 13a): One maintains no fewer than six lambs that have been inspected and found to be unblemished in the Chamber of the Lambs, sufficient for Shabbat and for the two festival days of Rosh HaShana that in some years occur adjacent to it.
  The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that it is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has enough animals for all of the offerings that should be brought, six lambs are not enough, as there are many lambs sacrificed for daily offerings and additional offerings on those three days. In total, twenty-two lambs are required: Two each day for the daily offerings, two for the additional offering of Shabbat, seven for the additional offering of Rosh HaShana, and seven for the additional offering of the New Moon.
  Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the Temple treasury does not have enough animals for all of the offerings, and it is teaching that the animals that he does have are utilized for the daily offerings of all three days rather than for the additional offering of Shabbat on the first of the three days? Consequently, one may conclude from it that the daily offerings of tomorrow are given preference over the additional offerings of today.
  The Gemara replies: No, this is not a valid proof, as one can claim that actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the Temple treasury has enough animals for all of the offerings of the three days, and this is what the mishna is saying when it mentions six lambs: One maintains for use as daily offerings no fewer than six lambs that have been inspected and found to be unblemished in the Chamber of the Lambs four days prior to their slaughter. Lambs sacrificed as other offerings do not have to be inspected four days prior to being slaughtered. And in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of ben Bag Bag.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that ben Bag Bag says: From where is it derived that the daily offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter? The verse states with regard to the daily offering: “You shall observe [<i>tishmeru</i>] to sacrifice to Me in its due season” (Numbers 28:2), and elsewhere, with regard to the Paschal offering, the verse states: “On the tenth day of this month they shall take for them every man a lamb…and you shall keep it [<i>mishmeret</i>] until the fourteenth day of this month” (Exodus 12:3–6).
  Consequently, it is derived by means of a verbal analogy that just as in the verse there, the Paschal offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter, from the tenth of the month to the fourteenth, so too here, the daily offering requires inspection four days prior to its slaughter. This is not a requirement that pertains to all offerings; it is stated specifically with regard to the Paschal offering and extended by means of a verbal analogy to the daily offering.
  § The Gemara cites a discussion pertaining to the mishna cited earlier. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: With regard to these six inspected lambs that must always be kept in the Chamber of Lambs, there ought to be seven, as there is a need for another lamb for the daily offering of the morning of the third day of the week, since it cannot be inspected on Shabbat or the subsequent festival days of Rosh HaShana, and therefore should be inspected and kept beforehand.
  Rav Ashi responded to Ravina: According to your reasoning the correct number is not seven, but rather it is eight; as there is also the daily offering of the afternoon of Shabbat eve that should also be counted.
  Ravina replied: That is not difficult, because the mishna is saying that after he sacrificed the daily offering of the afternoon there must be six inspected lambs.
  
  Daf 50a
  
  The Gemara asks: In any case, the question stands: Why does the mishna say six lambs when, in fact the number required is seven? The Gemara answers: Rather, the <i>tanna</i> is speaking generally, referring to how many inspected lambs are required throughout the year. And what did he mean by his statement: Sufficient for Shabbat and for the two festival days of Rosh HaShana? It is merely intended as a mnemonic, to help one remember that there must be enough lambs for the daily offering of three days.
  According to this the language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Sufficient for Shabbat and for the two festival days of Rosh HaShana, and it does not teach that there must be six lambs for Shabbat and for the two festival days of Rosh HaShana, which would have indicated that these lambs are meant to actually be sacrificed on those days. The Gemara concludes that in fact one can learn from the language of the mishna that this is the correct interpretation.
  § The mishna teaches: If the priests did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, nevertheless, they should sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering. If they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon. Rabbi Shimon said: And in such a case, the entire measure was sacrificed in the afternoon, as the daily service on a new golden altar is initiated only with the burning of the incense of the spices in the afternoon, at which time they would burn a full measure. The Gemara asks: Who mentioned anything about the initiation of the Temple vessels, i.e., what is its relevance to the mishna?
  The Gemara answers that the mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: If they did not sacrifice a lamb for the daily offering in the morning, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon. In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where the service of a new altar had not yet been initiated, since it must first be initiated with the daily offering of the morning. But if the service of the altar had already been initiated, then they should sacrifice the lamb of the daily offering in the afternoon even though they did not sacrifice the lamb of the morning offering.
  Rabbi Shimon said: When does this <i>halakha</i> apply? It applies at a time when the failure to sacrifice the daily morning offering was because they were prevented from sacrificing it due to circumstances beyond their control or they failed to sacrifice it unwittingly. But if the priests acted intentionally and did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering. By contrast, if they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon regardless of the circumstances.
  The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, that if the lamb of the daily offering of the morning was not sacrificed and the service of a new altar had not yet been initiated, then the lamb of the afternoon is also not sacrificed? The Gemara explains that it is derived as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning; and the second lamb you shall offer in the afternoon” (Exodus 29:39). This verse teaches that the second lamb of the daily offering is sacrificed in the afternoon, but if it is the first one to be sacrificed, it may not be sacrificed in the afternoon.
  In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where the service of a new altar had not yet been initiated, since it must first be initiated with the offering of the morning. When the verse refers to the first or second offering, it means the first or second offering ever sacrificed on the altar. But if the service of the altar had already been initiated, then even if it is the first to be sacrificed that day, it should be sacrificed in the afternoon.
  Rabbi Shimon said: When does this <i>halakha</i> apply? It applies at a time when the failure to sacrifice the daily morning offering was because they were prevented from sacrificing it due to circumstances beyond their control or they failed to sacrifice it unwittingly. But if the priests acted intentionally and did not sacrifice a lamb in the morning as the daily offering, they should not sacrifice a lamb in the afternoon as the daily offering. By contrast, if they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon regardless of the circumstances.
  The Gemara asks: Does it make sense that because the priests sinned by intentionally failing to sacrifice the morning daily offering, the altar should be entirely idle? Rava said that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: They, the priests who deliberately failed to sacrifice the morning daily offering, should not sacrifice the afternoon daily offering; but other priests should sacrifice it.
  By contrast, if the priests acted intentionally and did not burn the incense in the morning, even those same priests may burn it in the afternoon. The reason for this is that since burning the incense is uncommon and causes those who do so to become wealthy, it is dear to the priests, and they will not be negligent in the performance of this rite.
  §The mishna teaches that if they did not burn the half-measure of incense in the morning, they should burn the half-measure in the afternoon. Rabbi Shimon said: And in such a case, the entire measure was sacrificed in the afternoon. The reason for the difference between the daily offerings and the incense is that the daily service on a new golden altar is initiated only with the burning of the incense of the spices of the afternoon, at which time they would burn a full measure. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The service of a new golden altar is initiated with the burning of the incense of the spices of the morning? The Gemara answers: The question of whether the incense of the morning or the afternoon initiates the service of a new golden altar is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>.
  Abaye said: It stands to reason that the <i>halakha</i> should be in accordance with the one who says that it was initiated with the incense of the spices of the afternoon, as it is written with regard to the golden altar: “And Aaron shall burn thereon incense of sweet spices; every morning, when he dresses the lamps, he shall burn it. And when Aaron lights the lamps at dusk, he shall burn it, a perpetual incense before the Lord throughout your generations” (Exodus 30:7–8).
  The fact that ashes are removed from the lamps of the Candelabrum in the morning indicates that the lamps had been lit previously, since if the priest had not performed the lighting of the lamps the previous evening, from where would the ashes be removed in the morning? This proves that the Candelabrum must have been lit for the first time in the evening. Since the verse states: “When Aaron lights the lamps at dusk, he shall burn it, a perpetual incense before the Lord,” it must be that the incense was burned for the first time in the evening.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that the service of a new golden altar is initiated with the burning of the incense of the spices of the morning, from where is this <i>halakha</i> derived? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the initiation of the altar of the burnt offering. Just as there, the service of a new altar of the burnt offering is initiated by means of the daily offering of the morning rather than the afternoon, so too here, the service of a new golden altar is initiated by means of the burning of the incense of the spices of the morning.
  §The mishna teaches: And use of a new Table was initiated only with the arrangement of the shewbread on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: But does the mishna mean to indicate that if the shewbread was placed on the Table on a weekday it is merely that the use of a new Table is not initiated, but the shewbread is sanctified? The <i>halakha</i> is that the shewbread is sanctified only when it is placed on the Table on Shabbat.
  The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches us this <i>halakha</i> itself, that the initiation of the use of a new Table and the sanctification of the shewbread when it is placed on the Table occur only on Shabbat. This is as the mishna teaches in the latter clause with regard to the initiation of the use of a new Candelabrum: And use of a new Candelabrum was initiated only with the kindling of its seven lamps in the afternoon.
  §The Gemara cites another <i>halakha</i> relating to the burning of incense. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This is incense that was offered for an individual rather than the community on the external altar, and not on the golden altar as usual; and this was a provisional edict, permitted temporarily for that time only. The Gemara clarifies: To what case is the <i>baraita</i> referring? Rav Pappa said: It is referring to the incense brought by the tribal princes at the inauguration of the Tabernacle (see Numbers, chapter 7).
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to the incense of an individual, is it only on the external altar that it is not generally permitted to be burned, but an individual may sacrifice incense on the inner altar, as indicated by the <i>baraita</i>? And furthermore, on the external altar, is it only an individual who may not sacrifice incense, but the community may sacrifice incense on the external altar?
  But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> contrary to those two inferences: One might have thought that an individual may voluntarily donate and bring incense similar to the incense brought by the tribal princes to the Temple as a gift offering, and I will read with regard to this incense, as in the case of other gift offerings: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do” (Deuteronomy 23:24). Therefore, the verse states concerning the inner altar: “You shall bring no strange incense thereon” (Exodus 30:9). This indicates that an individual may not sacrifice incense even on the inner altar.
  One might have thought that only an individual may not bring a gift of incense on the inner altar, as an individual does not bring his obligatory offering similar to this gift of incense, i.e., since an individual is never obligated to sacrifice incense, he may not voluntarily sacrifice incense either;
  
  Daf 50b
  
  but a community may bring incense as a gift offering, as the community does bring its obligatory offering similar to this, i.e., since the community is obligated to sacrifice incense it can also voluntarily sacrifice incense. Therefore, the verse states: You shall not bring [<i>lo ta’alu</i>] strange incense thereon” (Exodus 30:9). The fact that the verse formulates the prohibition with the plural word <i>ta’alu</i> indicates that even the community may not sacrifice incense as a voluntary gift offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that the community may not bring a gift offering of incense on the inner altar, but it may bring incense on the external altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And the anointing oil, and the incense of sweet spices for the sacred place; according to all that I have commanded you shall they do” (Exodus 31:11). This teaches that one has the right to do only that which is stated with regard to the matter, without deviation. Consequently, incense may sacrificed only by the community, only when there is an obligation to sacrifice it, and it must be burned only on the inner altar. This contradicts the implication of the previously cited <i>baraita</i> that it is permitted to burn the incense of an individual on the golden altar or the incense of a community on the outer altar.
  Rav Pappa said: This is not problematic. The <i>baraita</i> is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows. It is not necessary to state that the community may not sacrifice incense on the external altar, as we have not found a precedent for it. And similarly, it is not necessary to state that an individual may not sacrifice incense on the inner altar, as we have not found a precedent for it. But it is necessary to state that it is even prohibited for an individual to sacrifice incense on the external altar, despite the fact that we have ostensibly found a precedent for it in the case of the tribal princes; as that was a provisional edict and therefore cannot serve as a precedent.
  mishna The twelve loaves of <i>matza</i> prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest did not come from the house of the High Priest in halves. Rather, the High Priest brings from his house a complete tenth of an ephah of flour (see Leviticus 6:13) and divides it in half, and he sacrifices half in the morning and half in the afternoon.
  In the case of a High Priest who brings and sacrifices half in the morning and dies, and they appointed another High Priest in his stead, the replacement High Priest should neither bring half of a tenth of an ephah of flour from his house nor sacrifice the remaining half of the tenth of an ephah of his predecessor. Rather, he brings from his house an entire tenth of an ephah and divides it in half, sacrifices half, and the other half is not sacrificed and is lost. Consequently, two halves of a tenth of an ephah are sacrificed, one-half of what was brought by each priest, and the other two halves are lost.
  gemara The Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>, commenting on the verse: “This is the offering of Aaron and of his sons, which they shall offer to the Lord on the day when he is anointed: The tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a meal offering perpetually, half of it in the morning, and half of it in the evening” (Leviticus 6:13). If the verse had stated: A meal offering perpetually, half in the morning and half in the evening; I would have said that the High Priest brings half of a tenth of an ephah in the morning and sacrifices it, and then he brings half of a tenth of an ephah in the afternoon and sacrifices it.
  Since the verse states: “Half of it in the morning, and half of it in the evening” (Leviticus 6:13), it teaches that he sacrifices half of a complete tenth of an ephah. How so? The High Priest brings from his house a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour, and divides it in half, and sacrifices half in the morning and half in the afternoon.
  In a case where the half of a tenth of an ephah that was supposed to be offered in the afternoon became impure or was lost after the High Priest sacrificed the first half in the morning, one might have thought that he should bring half of a tenth of an ephah from his house and sacrifice it. Therefore, the verse states: “Half of it in the morning, and half of it in the evening,” which teaches that he brings half of a complete tenth of an ephah.
  How so? The High Priest brings a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour from his house and divides it in half, and he sacrifices half, and the other half is not sacrificed and is lost. Consequently, two halves of a tenth of an ephah are sacrificed, the half that was sacrificed in the morning from the original tenth of an ephah, and half of the replacement tenth of an ephah, and the other two halves are lost.
  In the case of a High Priest who sacrificed half in the morning and died, and they appointed another High Priest in his stead, one might have thought that the second High Priest should bring half of a tenth of an ephah from his house and sacrifice it, or that he should sacrifice the remaining half of a tenth of an ephah of the first High Priest. Therefore, the verse states: “And half of it in the evening,” which teaches that he brings and sacrifices half of a complete tenth of an ephah.
  How so? The replacement High Priest brings a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour from his house and divides it in half, and he sacrifices half, and half is not sacrificed and is lost. Consequently, two halves of a tenth of an ephah are lost, half of the tenth of an ephah brought by each priest, and the other two halves are sacrificed.
  § With regard to the two halves of a tenth of an ephah that are lost, a <i>tanna</i>, i.e., a Sage who recited <i>baraitot</i>, taught a <i>baraita</i> before Rav Naḥman: With regard to the half that was not sacrificed by the first High Priest, who died, and the half brought but not sacrificed by the second High Priest who replaced him, their form should decay, i.e., they should be left overnight so they become disqualified, and then they should be brought out to the place designated for burning.
  Rav Naḥman said to the <i>tanna</i>: Granted, the half that was not sacrificed by the first High Priest should be left overnight before it is burned, because it was initially fit for sacrifice before the first High Priest died. But with regard to the half that was not sacrificed by the second High Priest, why must it be left overnight so that its form decays? It was brought to be lost from the outset, i.e., when the full tenth of an ephah was brought it was known that only half would be sacrificed and half would be lost. Consequently, it is unnecessary to leave it overnight before burning it.
  Rav Naḥman continued: Who is the one who said this <i>baraita</i> to you? It was the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabba bar Avuh, who says: All disqualified offerings, even <i>piggul</i>, which is disqualified by Torah law, require decay of form before they are burned.
  Rav Ashi said: The <i>baraita</i> can be understood even if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabba bar Avuh and hold that <i>piggul</i> does not require decay of form. Nevertheless, since at the time when the second High Priest divides the two halves, if he wants he can sacrifice this half, and if he wants he can sacrifice that other half, both halves are considered fit to be sacrificed and may not be burned until they are left overnight.
  § The Gemara cites that which was stated further about the griddle-cake offering: How are the griddle-cake offerings of the High Priest prepared? The verse seems to prescribe a variety of methods of preparation: “On a griddle it shall be made with oil; when it is soaked, you shall bring it in; and baked pieces [<i>tufinei</i>] of the meal offering shall you sacrifice for a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 6:14). Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is prepared in the following manner: The individual preparing it bakes it in an oven and afterward he fries it in a pan. Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that it is prepared in the following manner: The individual preparing it fries it in a pan and afterward he bakes it in an oven.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: It stands to reason in accordance with my opinion because the verse states: “And baked pieces [<i>tufinei</i>] of the meal offering.” The word for baked pieces [<i>tufinei</i>] should be understood as meaning that they shall be baked when they are still beautiful [<i>te’afena na’a</i>], i.e., before being fried. Rabbi Asi said: It stands to reason in accordance with my opinion because the word <i>tufinei</i> should be understood as meaning that they shall be baked when they are already partially cooked [<i>te’afena na</i>], i.e., after being fried.
  This dispute between the <i>amora’im</i> is parallel to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> in a <i>baraita</i>: The word for baked pieces [<i>tufinei</i>] should be understood as meaning that they shall be baked when they are already partially cooked [<i>te’afena na</i>]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It should be understood as meaning that they shall be baked when they are still beautiful [<i>te’afena na’a</i>]. Rabbi Yosei says: The word <i>tufinei</i> is plural, indicating that the pieces should be baked extensively, i.e., more than once. Consequently, Rabbi Yosei accepts the opinion that the pieces should be baked when they are already partially cooked, and he also accepts the opinion that they should be baked when they are beautiful. Therefore the offering should first be baked, then fried, then baked again.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (96a): Concerning the twelve loaves of the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, of which six are sacrificed in the morning and six in the evening, their kneading, and forming of their loaves, and their baking are performed inside the Temple courtyard, and all labors involved in those actions override Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, i.e., that these actions override Shabbat, derived? Rav Huna said: The verse says <i>tufinei</i>, meaning that when it is already baked it must still be beautiful [<i>te’afena na’a</i>]. And if one would bake it yesterday, on the eve of Shabbat, it would become swollen [<i>inshefa</i>] and no longer beautiful. Rav Yosef objects to this: If the purpose of baking them on Shabbat is to ensure they remain fresh, say that the loaves should be baked before Shabbat and covered with greens to preserve them.
  The Gemara cites another explanation of why the preparation of these loaves overrides Shabbat. A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse states: “On a griddle it shall be made with oil” (Leviticus 6:14), which teaches that it shall be made under all circumstances, even on Shabbat. Similarly, this phrase “shall be made” teaches that it should be made even in a state of ritual impurity.
  Abaye said that there is a different explanation: The verse states: “Fine flour for a meal offering perpetually” (Leviticus 6:13);
  
  Daf 51a
  
  this teaches that the <i>halakha</i> of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest is like that of the meal offering that is a component of the daily offerings. The daily offerings override Shabbat, as the verse says: “This is the burnt offering of every Shabbat, beside the continual burnt offering, and the drink offering thereof” (Numbers 28:10). Therefore, preparing the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest likewise overrides Shabbat.
  Rava said that the basis for it overriding Shabbat is the fact that the verse states: “On a griddle” (Leviticus 6:14), which teaches that the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest requires a vessel. Therefore, if he had baked it the previous day rather than on Shabbat, it would be disqualified by being left overnight, since the loaves had already been consecrated in a service vessel. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rava: “On a griddle” teaches that the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest requires a vessel.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The continuation of the verse states: “It shall be made with the oil.” The fact that the verse makes reference to “the oil” rather than just oil indicates that one is supposed to add extra oil to it, but I do not know how much oil to add.
  Therefore I must deduce as follows: It is stated here, concerning the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: “Oil,” and it is stated there, with regard to the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings: “A tenth part of an ephah of fine flour mingled with the fourth part of a <i>hin</i> of beaten oil” (Exodus 29:40). Just as there, with regard to the meal offering brought with the libations, the amount of oil required is three <i>log</i> per tenth of an ephah of flour; so too here, in the case of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, one brings three <i>log</i> of oil per tenth of an ephah of flour.
  Or perhaps, go this way: It is stated here, concerning the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: “Oil,” and it is stated with regard to the voluntary meal offering: “And when anyone brings a meal offering to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour; and he shall pour oil upon it” (Leviticus 2:1). Just as there, with regard to the voluntary meal offering, one brings one <i>log</i> of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour (see 88a); so too here, one brings one <i>log</i> of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour.
  The <i>baraita</i> analyzes these two possibilities: Let us see to which case it is more similar, i.e., which is a better comparison to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest. Perhaps we should derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which has characteristics represented by the letters <i>tav</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>tet</i>, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering brought with libations, which also has the characteristics represented by the letters <i>tav</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>tet</i>. These characteristics are that they are frequent [<i>tadir</i>], as these offerings are sacrificed twice daily; they are brought [<i>ba’ah</i>] as an obligation; they override Shabbat; and they override impurity [<i>tuma</i>].
  And we should not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which has the characteristics represented by the letters <i>tav</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>tet</i>, from the voluntary meal offering, which does not have the characteristics represented by the letters <i>tav</i>, <i>beit</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>tet</i>.
  Or perhaps, go this way: We should derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which has the characteristics represented by the letters <i>yod</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>lamed</i>, from the voluntary meal offering, which also has the characteristics represented by the letters <i>yod</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>lamed</i>, which stand for the following <i>halakhot</i>: Each of these offerings may be brought by an individual [<i>yaḥid</i>]; each is brought for [<i>biglal</i>] its own sake, rather than accompanying another offering; they are not accompanied by wine [<i>yayin</i>] for a libation; and they require frankincense [<i>levona</i>].
  And we should not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which has the characteristics represented by the letters <i>yod</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>lamed</i>, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the meal offering brought with libations, which does not have the characteristics represented by the letters <i>yod</i>, <i>gimmel</i>, <i>yod</i>, <i>lamed</i>. Consequently, the comparisons in both directions are equally compelling.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues its determination of how much oil is brought with the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: “This is the offering of Aaron…the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a meal offering perpetually [<i>tamid</i>], half of it in the morning, and half of it in the evening” (Leviticus 6:13). The fact that the verse makes reference to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest as <i>tamid</i> teaches that it is in the same category as the meal offering component of the daily offerings [<i>temidin</i>]. Just as the meal offering component of the daily offerings requires three <i>log</i> of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour, so too this griddle-cake offering of the High Priest requires three <i>log</i> of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The verse adds to the amount of oil that is required here, with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, and it similarly adds to the amount of oil that is required there, in the case of the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of sheep. Just as there, in the case of the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of sheep, three <i>log</i> of oil are required for each tenth of an ephah of flour, so too here, in the case of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, three <i>log</i> of oil are required for each tenth of an ephah of flour.
  Or perhaps, go this way: The verse adds to the amount of oil that is required here, and it similarly adds to the amount of oil that is required in the case of the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of bulls and rams. Just as there, in the case of the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of bulls and rams, two <i>log</i> of oil are required for each tenth of an ephah of flour, so too here, in the case of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, two <i>log</i> of oil are required for each tenth of an ephah of flour.
  With regard to these two possibilities, let us see to which case it is more similar, i.e., which is a better comparison to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest. Perhaps we should derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which is a meal offering that comes in the amount of a tenth of an ephah of flour, from the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of sheep, which is also a meal offering that comes in the amount of a tenth of an ephah of flour. And we should not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering that comes in the amount of a tenth of an ephah of flour from the <i>halakha</i> in the case of a meal offering that comes in the amount of two or three tenths of an ephah of flour, such as the meal offerings that accompany the sacrifice of bulls and rams.
  The Gemara asks a question with regard to the beginning of the <i>baraita</i>: This <i>baraita</i> itself is difficult, as it contains an internal contradiction. First you said that the expression “with the oil” stated in the verse concerning the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest serves to add extra oil, which indicates that more than the basic amount of one <i>log</i> of oil is required. And then it teaches: It is stated here, concerning the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: “Oil,” and it is stated with regard to the voluntary meal offering that it must be brought with “oil.” The <i>baraita</i> suggests that just as one <i>log</i> of oil is brought with the voluntary meal offering, so too one <i>log</i> is brought with the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest.
  In answer to this question, Abaye said: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that the term “with the oil” with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest serves to add extra oil? It is Rabbi Shimon, who holds that three <i>log</i> of oil are required, as derived from the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of sheep. And Rabbi Shimon is speaking utilizing the style of: If it were not stated. If the verse had not indicated by the term “with the oil” that extra oil is required, it would have been possible to derive from the voluntary meal offering that only one <i>log</i> is required. And who is the <i>tanna</i> who responds to Rabbi Shimon’s derivation and suggests that in fact the amount of oil can be derived from the case of the voluntary meal offering? It is Rabbi Yishmael.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said that the <i>baraita</i> should be understood differently: The entire <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who derives that three <i>log</i> of oil are required in the griddle-cake offering based upon the amount required in the meal offering component of the daily offerings.
  And with regard to the possibility of deriving that only one <i>log</i> is required, as in the voluntary meal offering, this is what he is saying: The term “with the oil” stated with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest comes to add more oil to it than the single <i>log</i> required for the voluntary meal offering. As, if the purpose of that term were merely to establish the basic fact that the offering must include oil, a verse is not needed to teach that. Since it is written with respect to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: “On a griddle [<i>maḥavat</i>]” (Leviticus 6:14), it is comparable to a pan [<i>maḥavat</i>] meal offering, which requires oil.
  Or perhaps the purpose of the verse is to establish only that the offering must include oil, and it is necessary to teach that because if the Merciful One had not stated: “With the oil,” I would say: Let it be like the meal offering of a sinner, which does not include oil.
  Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, then said: Let it even be that the purpose of the verse is to establish only that it requires oil, and even so one can arrive at the conclusion that three <i>log</i> are required due to the derivation based upon the verbal analogy from the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings. But although Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, attempts to employ this derivation he is unsuccessful, as there is a counter-indication from another verbal analogy to the voluntary meal offering. Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, needed to derive the <i>halakha</i> from the verse: “Fine flour for a meal offering perpetually [<i>tamid</i>]” (Leviticus 6:13), as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, concluded his statement in the <i>baraita</i>.
  Rabba said that the <i>baraita</i> should be understood differently: The entire <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Shimon is speaking utilizing the style of: If it were not stated.
  And this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: The term “with the oil” serves to add extra oil to it. As, if the purpose of that term were merely to establish that the offering must include oil, a verse is not needed to teach that. Since it is written with respect to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: “On a griddle [<i>maḥavat</i>]” (Leviticus 6:14), it is comparable to a pan [<i>maḥavat</i>] meal offering, which requires oil. And even if the verse had not stated: “With the oil,” I have a manner of derivation for the fact that more than one <i>log</i> of oil is required, based upon a verbal analogy.
  But although Rabbi Shimon attempts to employ this derivation he is unsuccessful, as there is a counter-indication from another verbal analogy, and therefore the term “with the oil” is needed to teach that more than one <i>log</i> of oil is required. Nevertheless, this teaches only that more oil than usual is required, but the specific amount still must be clarified. Rabbi Shimon then said: Let the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest be like the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of bulls and rams, which require two <i>log</i> of oil per ephah of flour.
  Rabbi Shimon then said: We should derive the <i>halakha</i>
  
  Daf 51b
  
  with regard to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which is a meal offering that comes in the amount of a tenth of an ephah of flour, from the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of sheep, which is also a meal offering that comes in the amount of a tenth of an ephah of flour, and not from a meal offering that is brought in the amount of two or three tenths of an ephah of flour.
  MISHNA: If they did not appoint another High Priest in his stead, from whose property was the griddle-cake offering brought and sacrificed? Rabbi Shimon says: It is brought and sacrificed from the property of the community. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is brought and sacrificed from the property of the heirs of the High Priest. And for the duration of the period until a new High Priest was appointed, the griddle-cake offering was sacrificed as a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In a case where the High Priest died and they did not appoint another High Priest in his stead, from where is it derived that his griddle-cake meal offering should be sacrificed from the property of the heirs of the High Priest? The verse states in reference to the griddle-cake offering: “And the anointed priest that shall be in his stead from among his sons shall offer it” (Leviticus 6:15).
  One might have thought that the heirs should sacrifice it in halves as the High Priest does. Therefore the verse states “it,” teaching that they should sacrifice all of the tenth of an ephah and not half of it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The continuation of the verse: “It is a statute forever [<i>olam</i>] to the Lord,” teaches that in this case of a High Priest who has died and has not yet been replaced, the offering is brought from the property of the world [<i>olam</i>], i.e., the community. The end of the verse: “It shall be wholly made to smoke to the Lord,” teaches that although it is brought by the community and not by a priest, the entire tenth of an ephah should be sacrificed and not eaten.
  The Gemara asks: And did that verse: “And the anointed priest that shall be in his stead from among his sons shall offer it,” come to teach this <i>halakha</i> that Rabbi Yehuda derived from it?
  That verse is needed for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “This is the offering of Aaron and of his sons, which they shall offer to the Lord in the day when he is anointed” (Leviticus 6:13). One might have thought that since the verse speaks of the offering in the singular, it means that Aaron and his sons should sacrifice one offering. Therefore the verse states: “Which they shall offer to the Lord,” in plural, teaching that Aaron sacrifices an offering by himself as the High Priest, and his sons sacrifice offerings by themselves as ordinary priests. When the verse refers to “his sons,” these are the ordinary priests. Each priest must bring a griddle-cake offering as an offering of initiation when he begins his service.
  Do you say that this is referring to the offering of initiation of ordinary priests, or is it referring only to the griddle-cake offering of the High Priests? When the verse states in the continuation of that passage: “And the anointed priest that shall be in his stead from among his sons shall offer it; it is a statute forever to the Lord; it shall be wholly made to smoke to the Lord” (Leviticus 6:15), the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest is thereby mentioned. How do I realize the meaning of the term “his sons” in Leviticus 6:13? These are the ordinary priests, and the verse is referring to their offering of initiation. Consequently, verse 15 is referring to the basic obligation of the High Priest to bring the griddle-cake offering, rather than referring to a case of a High Priest who died.
  The Gemara answers: The verse teaches both the basic obligation of the High Priest to bring the griddle-cake offering daily and the fact that when he dies his heirs must bring the offering until a new High Priest is appointed. If it were so that the verse is teaching only that the heirs of a High Priest who died must bring the griddle-cake offering until a new High Priest is appointed, let the verse merely write: The anointed priest that shall be in his stead, his sons shall offer. What is the need to say: “From among his sons”? Learn from the fact that verse uses this term that two <i>halakhot</i> are derived from the verse.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon, who derives the <i>halakha</i> that it should be entirely sacrificed from the phrase: “It shall be wholly made to smoke,” do with that word “it,” from which Rabbi Yehuda derives this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: He requires it to teach that in the case of a High Priest who died after bringing the first half of his griddle-cake offering, and then they appointed another High Priest in his stead, the replacement High Priest should neither bring half of a tenth of an ephah of flour from his house nor sacrifice the remaining half of the tenth of an ephah of the first High Priest, i.e., his predecessor.
  The Gemara asks: Let him derive this <i>halakha</i> from the expression: “And half of it” (Leviticus 6:13), as discussed on 50b; the word “and,” which is added by the letter <i>vav</i> at the beginning of the word, is expounded to mean that the replacement High Priest must bring a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour. The Gemara answers: He did not derive the <i>halakha</i> from there because he does not expound the extra letter <i>vav</i> in that word, as he holds that its addition is not significant.
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if the High Priest dies and a new one has not yet been appointed the griddle-cake offering is brought by the previous High Priest’s heirs, do with that phrase: “It is a statute forever to the Lord,” from which Rabbi Shimon derives that it is brought from communal resources? The Gemara answers: It teaches that the statute requiring the High Priest to sacrifice the griddle-cake offering is to apply forever.
  The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yehuda, why do I need the phrase: “It shall be wholly made to smoke”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: I have derived only that the griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest mentioned above is included in the mandate: “It shall be wholly made to smoke” (Leviticus 6:15), and that the voluntary meal offering of the ordinary priest mentioned below is included in the prohibition: “It shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16).
  From where is it derived that one is mandated to apply what is said about that verse to this one, and what is said about this verse to that one? The verse states with regard to the griddle-cake offering: “Wholly,” and the verse uses the word “wholly” with regard to the voluntary meal offering of a priest, in order to teach a verbal analogy: It is stated here, with regard to the griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest: “Wholly” (Leviticus 6:15), and it is stated there, with regard to the voluntary meal offering of the ordinary priest: “Wholly” (Leviticus 6:16).
  Just as here, with regard to the griddle-cake meal offering, it is included in the mandate: “It shall be wholly made to smoke,” so too there, the voluntary meal offering of the ordinary priest is included in the mandate: It shall be wholly made to smoke. And just as there, with regard to the voluntary meal offering of the ordinary priest, the verse comes to place a prohibition on its consumption, so too here, with regard to the griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest, the verse comes to place a prohibition on its consumption.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon hold that in a case where the High Priest died and a new one has not been appointed, the requirement that the griddle offering be brought from the property of the community is by Torah law, as indicated by the fact that he derives this <i>halakha</i> from a verse?
  But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 7:6) that Rabbi Shimon said: The court instituted seven ordinances with regard to the financial aspects of offerings and consecrations; and this ordinance, namely, that the cost of the libations accompanying the sacrifice of a found animal is borne by the public, is one of them. These are the other ordinances: In the case of a gentile who sent his burnt offering from a country overseas, and he sent with it money for the purchase of the libations that must accompany it, the libations are sacrificed at his expense. And if the gentile did not cover the cost of the libations, it is a condition of the court that the libations are sacrificed at the public’s expense, with funds taken from the Temple treasury.
  And similarly, in the case of a convert who died without heirs and left animals that he had designated as offerings, if he has the libations, i.e., if he also had set aside libations or money for that purpose, the libations are sacrificed from his estate. And if he did not do so, the libations are sacrificed from public funds.
  And another ordinance: It is a stipulation of the court with regard to a High Priest who died, and they did not yet appoint another High Priest in his stead, that his griddle-cake meal offering would be sacrificed from public funds. Rabbi Shimon then enumerates three additional ordinances. In any case, it is clear from this mishna that Rabbi Shimon holds that this <i>halakha</i> concerning the offering of a High Priest who died is a rabbinic ordinance, rather than Torah law.
  Rabbi Abbahu said in response: In fact, Rabbi Shimon holds that this <i>halakha</i> is by Torah law. But in fact, there were two ordinances that were enacted concerning this matter.
  Initially, they acted in accordance with that which is prescribed by Torah law, and if a High Priest died and a new High Priest had not yet been appointed in his stead, his griddle-cake meal offering would be sacrificed from public funds. Once they saw that the funds in the chamber of the Temple treasury were being depleted, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the payment for the offering should be collected from the previous High Priest’s heirs. Once they saw that the heirs were negligent in the matter and did not bring the offering, they revoked the previous ordinance and established it in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> as it is by Torah law, that it is brought from public funds.
  § The Gemara cites the continuation of the mishna in <i>Shekalim</i> (7:7): And the court enacted an ordinance with regard to the red heifer that one is not liable to bring an offering for misusing consecrated property if he derives benefit from its ashes. The Gemara asks: Why does the <i>baraita</i> state that this is an ordinance of the court, when in fact it is by Torah law? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to a red heifer: “It is a sin offering” (Numbers 19:9), which teaches that a red heifer is treated like a sin offering in that one is liable for misusing it. The fact that it states: “It is a sin offering” indicates that if one derives benefit from it, the animal itself, he is liable for misusing consecrated property,
  
  Daf 52a
  
  but if one derives benefit from its ashes, one is not liable for misusing consecrated property. It is clear from the <i>baraita</i> that by Torah law one is not liable for misuse of consecrated property if he derives benefit from the ashes of a red heifer.
  Rav Ashi said in response: In fact, this <i>halakha</i> is by Torah law, but there were two ordinances that were enacted concerning this matter. By Torah law, if one derives benefit from it, the animal itself, he is liable for misusing consecrated property, but if he derives benefit from its ashes he is not liable for misusing consecrated property. Once the Sages saw that people were treating the ashes of the heifer disrespectfully, and making salves for their wounds from it, they decreed that it is subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property and one may not derive benefit from it.
  Once they saw that as a result of this decree people were refraining from sprinkling it in cases where there was uncertainty as to whether or not an individual was impure and required sprinkling, they revoked the decree and established it in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> as it is by Torah law, that one is not liable for misusing the ashes of a red heifer.
  § The Gemara cites a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda that is similar to the one cited earlier. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If there is a need to sacrifice the bull for an unwitting communal sin, brought if the Sanhedrin issues an erroneous halakhic ruling concerning a prohibition for which one is liable to receive <i>karet</i> and the majority of the community acts upon it, or the goats brought if the Sanhedrin issues an erroneous ruling permitting idol worship and the majority of the community acts on it, a new collection of funds is organized for them. The funds are not taken from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber, unlike other communal offerings. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The funds for these sacrifices come from the collection of the chamber.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> the opposite, i.e., that the first opinion cited above is that of Rabbi Shimon and the second is that of Rabbi Yehuda? Which of the two <i>baraitot</i> is the later one and therefore the more accurate and authoritative version of their opinions?
  The Sages said the following before Rav Ashi: Let us say that the first <i>baraita</i> cited above is the later one, as we have heard that Rabbi Shimon is concerned about the possibility of negligence. Just as Rabbi Shimon was concerned above that the heirs of the High Priest would not provide the funds for the griddle-cake offering, it is reasonable to assume that he would be concerned that people would not contribute to a new collection, and therefore the funds are taken from the collection of the chamber.
  Rav Ashi said to the Sages: You may even say that the latter <i>baraita</i> cited above is the later and more authoritative one. When Rabbi Shimon expressed that he is concerned about the possibility of people acting with negligence, that was only with regard to a matter that does not provide them with atonement, e.g., the griddle-cake offering of the deceased High Priest. But Rabbi Shimon is not concerned about the possibility of negligence with regard to a matter that does provide them with atonement, e.g., these sin offerings.
  The Gemara asks, in light of the fact that the discussion above was inconclusive: What conclusion was reached about it; which <i>baraita</i> is later and more authoritative?
  Rabba Zuti said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a resolution, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse concerning the daily sacrifice: “Command the children of Israel, and say to them: My food that is presented to Me for offerings made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to Me, you shall observe to sacrifice to Me in its due season” (Numbers 28:2), serves to include the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the goats of idol worship. This teaches that the funds for these offerings come from the collection of the chamber; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. This proves that it is Rabbi Shimon who holds that these sacrifices are brought from the collection of the chamber.
  § The mishna teaches: And for the duration of the period until a new High Priest is appointed, the griddle-cake offering was sacrificed as a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: Does the mishna mean that a complete tenth of an ephah is offered in the morning and another complete tenth of an ephah is offered in the afternoon, because this offering is sacrificed twice a day and is not divided in half when it is not brought by the High Priest himself? Or does it perhaps mean that a complete tenth of an ephah is sacrificed in the morning and the offering is canceled in the afternoon?
  Rava said: Come and hear the resolution to this dilemma from that which is taught in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 31b) describing the order of the nine priests who brought the limbs of the daily offering up to the ramp of the altar, both in the morning and in the afternoon: The eighth priest carries the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest. And if it were so that the offering is canceled in the afternoon, then sometimes one would not find the eighth priest carrying the griddle-cake offering. What are the circumstances when there would be no eighth priest? In a case where the High Priest died after he brought his griddle-cake offering in the morning and they did not yet appoint another High Priest in his stead. Therefore, it must be that a complete tenth of an ephah was also brought for the afternoon offering.
  The Sages stated this proof before Rabbi Yirmeya. Rabbi Yirmeya rejected it and said: Those foolish Babylonians, because they dwell in a low-lying and therefore dark land, they state <i>halakhot</i> that are dark, i.e., erroneous.
  Rather, with regard to that which the same mishna teaches: The seventh priest carries the fine flour for the meal offering component of the daily offering and the ninth priest carries the wine for the libations that accompany the daily offering, is it also the case that they are never canceled?
  That is not correct, as it is derived from the verse “Their meal offering and their libations” (Numbers 29:18) that these items may be sacrificed even at night, despite the fact that the daily offering they accompany must be sacrificed during the day. Similarly, the phrase “their meal offering and their libations” indicates that these items may be sacrificed even the next day (see 44b). Under those circumstances there would not have been fine flour and wine brought by the seventh and nine priests at the time of the daily offering.
  Rather, one must explain that the <i>tanna</i> does not teach cases of what if, and is speaking only about the typical case. So too with regard to Rava’s proof from the mishna, it is not compelling because the <i>tanna</i> does not teach cases of what if the High Priest dies and a successor has not yet been appointed.
  The Sages then brought Rabbi Yirmeya’s analysis before Rava. Rava initially said to them: You state our inferior statements, which can be refuted, before the Sages of Eretz Yisrael, but you do not state our superior statements before them?
  And Rava then said to them: This statement, that the griddle-cake offering is sacrificed twice a day even if there is no High Priest, is also one of our superior statements, as the verse states concerning the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: “Fine flour for a meal offering perpetually [<i>tamid</i>], half of it in the morning, and half of it in the evening” (Leviticus 6:13). This teaches that the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest is like the meal offering component of the daily offerings [<i>temidin</i>] and must be sacrificed in the morning and the afternoon, even if the High Priest died and was not yet replaced.
  The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Come and hear a resolution to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dilemma, as it is taught explicitly in a <i>baraita</i>: If the High Priest died and was not yet replaced, a complete tenth of an ephah is sacrificed in the morning and another complete tenth of an ephah is sacrificed in the afternoon.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Abba Yosei ben Dostai and the Rabbis disagree as to the amount of frankincense brought with the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest.
  Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: The High Priest separates two handfuls of frankincense for his griddle-cake offering each day; one handful for his morning offering and one handful for his afternoon offering. And the Rabbis say: The High Priest separates one handful of frankincense each day for his griddle-cake offering. He divides it in half and brings half a handful for his morning offering and half a handful for his afternoon offering.
  The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that since one does not find a case where the Torah explicitly states that half a handful is sacrificed, he brings a complete handful for each offering. And the Rabbis hold that since one does not find a case where a tenth of an ephah requires two handfuls of frankincense, he brings only one handful and divides it between the two offerings.
  Having discussed the quantity of frankincense that is generally brought with the griddle-cake offering, the Gemara now addresses a case where the High Priest died. Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: In the case of a High Priest who died and they did not yet appoint another in his stead,
  
  Daf 52b
  
  according to the Rabbis, who hold that generally one handful of frankincense is divided between the morning and afternoon offerings, is the amount of frankincense doubled or not? Do we say that since in this case its fine flour is doubled, as a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour is sacrificed in both the morning and evening, its frankincense is also doubled? Or perhaps that which the verse reveals, i.e., that a complete tenth of an ephah is sacrificed in the morning and afternoon, it reveals, and that which it does not reveal, it does not reveal; and therefore, since the verse does not indicate that the amount of frankincense is doubled, only one handful is brought.
  And furthermore, what is the <i>halakha</i> concerning the oil of the griddle-cake offering in a case where the High Priest died and was not yet replaced, both according to Abba Yosei ben Dostai and according to the Rabbis? Is the required amount three <i>log</i>, as it is when the High Priest brings the griddle-cake offering, or is the amount of oil doubled just as the amount of fine flour is doubled?
  Rava said: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma concerning the quantity of frankincense that is brought in this case, based upon a mishna (106b): There are five <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to a handful. The <i>halakha</i> of the frankincense sacrificed with the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest is not included in this number, because only half a handful of frankincense is sacrificed at one time. And if it is so that when there is no High Priest a complete handful is brought in the morning and in the afternoon, then sometimes you find that there are seven <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to a handful.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: The <i>tanna</i> does not teach cases of what if the High Priest died, and is speaking only about a typical case. The Gemara relates that Rav Pappa was sitting and teaching this <i>halakha</i>. Rav Yosef bar Shemaya said to Rav Pappa: But the mishna does list the case of one who intentionally offers up the handful from a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard, who is liable to receive <i>karet</i>. This is not a standard case but rather a case of what if, and nevertheless it is taught in the mishna. Accordingly, Rava’s proof is valid.
  The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about this matter? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Come and hear a resolution, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In the case of a High Priest who died and they did not yet appoint another in his stead, a complete tenth of an ephah of fine flour is brought for the griddle-cake offering in the morning and another complete tenth of an ephah is brought in the afternoon. And one separates two handfuls of frankincense for it, and sacrifices one handful with the morning offering and one handful with the afternoon offering. And one separates three <i>log</i> of oil for it, and brings a <i>log</i> and a half with the morning offering and a <i>log</i> and a half with the afternoon offering.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? If we say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, what is different about its frankincense such that it is doubled in the case where the High Priest died, and what is different about its oil such that it is not doubled?
  Rather, the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Yosei ben Dostai, who said: The griddle-cake offering of the High Priest generally requires two handfuls. And therefore when the <i>baraita</i> requires two handfuls of frankincense in the case where the High Priest died and another has not yet been appointed, the frankincense is not being doubled and the oil is also not doubled. Therefore, three <i>log</i> of oil are required, as usual.
  And from the fact that according to Abba Yosei ben Dostai the requisite oil is not doubled, one can conclude that also according to the Rabbis its frankincense and its oil are not doubled.
  This discussion in the Gemara began with Rabbi Yoḥanan presenting the dispute between Abba Yosei ben Dostai and the Rabbis, and it concludes with his ruling concerning their dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Yosei ben Dostai. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan state a principle that the <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the ruling of an unattributed mishna, and we learned in the unattributed mishna cited earlier: There are only five <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to a handful. Since the mishna does not list the fact that a handful of frankincense is offered twice daily with the griddle-cake offering, how can Rabbi Yoḥanan accept that opinion?
  The Gemara answers: They are different <i>amora’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. One said that Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with Abba Yosei ben Dostai, and one said that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the <i>halakha</i> is always in accordance with an unattributed mishna.
  
  MISHNA: All the meal offerings come to be offered as <i>matza</i>, with care taken to prevent leavening, except for ten loaves of leavened bread among the forty loaves that accompany the thanks offering, and the meal offering of the two loaves that are brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, as they come to be offered as leavened bread.
  The Sages disagree as to the manner in which those meal offerings are leavened. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to the leaven added to the dough to facilitate leavening, one separates [<i>bodeh</i>] part of the flour for the meal offerings from within the flour of the meal offerings themselves, causes it to become leaven, and leavens the meal offerings with it.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: That is also not the optimal manner in which to fulfill the mitzva, as aged leaven is a more effective leavening agent. Rather, one brings the leaven from another, aged, dough and places it into the measuring vessel, and then he adds flour until he fills the measuring vessel, to ensure the appropriate measure of a tenth of an ephah of flour. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: That too is inappropriate, as in that manner the meal offering will either be lacking the requisite measure or be greater than the required measure, as the Gemara will explain.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Perida raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: From where is it derived with regard to all the meal offerings that they come to be offered as <i>matza</i>? Rabbi Ami was puzzled by this question, and replied: What do you mean when you say: From where do we derive this? Concerning every meal offering with regard to which it is written explicitly in the Torah that it comes as <i>matza</i>, it is written with regard to it, and therefore the dilemma does not arise. And concerning any meal offering where it is not written explicitly with regard to it that it must be <i>matza</i>, nevertheless it is written with regard to it:
  
  Daf 53a
  
  “And this is the law of the meal offering: The sons of Aaron shall sacrifice it before the Lord in front of the altar…And that which is left of it Aaron and his sons shall eat; it shall be eaten as <i>matzot</i>” (Leviticus 6:7–9). These verses demonstrate that there is a general requirement that meal offerings must be brought as <i>matza</i>. Rabbi Perida said to Rabbi Ami: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to the source of the mitzva <i>ab initio</i>, as that is clearly derived from these verses. Where I raise the dilemma, it is with regard to the source that indicates this requirement is indispensable, i.e., that if one violated the mitzva and brought a meal offering not as <i>matza</i> the offering is not valid.
  Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Perida: With regard to the <i>halakha</i> that the requirement that meal offerings must come as <i>matza</i> is indispensable, it is also written: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread” (Leviticus 6:10), but rather must come as <i>matza</i>. This additional verse indicates that even after the fact, if a meal offering was not made as <i>matza</i> it is not valid.
  Rav Ḥisda objects to this: But one can say that the verse should be interpreted as follows: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread,” i.e., fully leavened, but it can be brought even if it has been leavened slightly with leavening [<i>siur</i>] dough. Although it does not have the status of leavened bread and is therefore not prohibited by the verse, it also does not have the status of <i>matza</i>.
  The Gemara analyzes Rav Ḥisda’s objection, as there is a dispute among the Sages with regard to the definition of <i>siur</i> (see <i>Pesaḥim</i> 48b). According to Rabbi Meir, <i>siur</i> is dough at the beginning of the leavening process, when its surface has become pale. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda maintains that <i>siur</i> is dough that has been leavened to the point that it has cracks that look like the antennae of locusts. In this light, the Gemara inquires: This <i>siur</i>, mentioned by Rav Ḥisda in his suggested interpretation of the verse, is in accordance with whose opinion? If he is referring to <i>siur</i> as defined by Rabbi Meir, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda Rav Ḥisda’s objection does not arise, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains this is full-fledged <i>matza</i>. And if Rav Ḥisda is referring to <i>siur</i> as defined by Rabbi Yehuda, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir Rav Ḥisda’s objection does not arise either, as Rabbi Meir holds that it is full-fledged leavened bread.
  Furthermore, if Rav Ḥisda is referring to <i>siur</i> as defined by Rabbi Meir, then even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir himself the objection does not arise. The reason is that from the fact that Rabbi Meir rules that one who eats this <i>siur</i> on Passover is flogged for it, this indicates that it is deemed full-fledged leavened bread. Rather, Rav Ḥisda’s objection arises with regard to leavening dough as defined by Rabbi Yehuda, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that this dough is not considered full-fledged leavened bread.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak also objects to Rabbi Ami’s explanation: But one can say that the verse can be interpreted as follows: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread,” but one may bring a meal offering that has been boiled, as this is not leavened bread; although it is also not <i>matza</i>. The Gemara asks: This boiled dough, what is it? It is poached [<i>revikha</i>], as described in the verse: “In a pan it shall be made of oil, when it is soaked [<i>murbekhet</i>]” (Leviticus 6:14). If so, there is no need to derive the <i>halakha</i> of boiled dough from the verse: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread.” If it is a meal offering that must be poached, it is explicitly written with regard to it that it must be poached. And if it is a meal offering that is not to be poached, it is not written with regard to it that it is poached.
  The Gemara challenges: But one can say that the verse: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread,” indicates that with regard to a meal offering about which it is written explicitly that it must be poached, it is a mitzva that it be poached, and with regard to a meal offering about which it is not written that it must be poached, the one who brings the offering can decide: If he wants, let him bring it poached, and if he wants, let him bring it as <i>matza</i>. Accordingly, Rabbi Ami’s proof from the verse is inconclusive.
  Ravina also objects to Rabbi Ami’s explanation: But one can say that the verse: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread,” serves to determine that this man who brings a meal offering as leavened bread is liable for violating a mere prohibition, but the meal offering itself is not invalid.
  All these objections indicate that the verse: “It shall not be baked as leavened bread,” can be interpreted in ways other than that suggested by Rabbi Ami. Accordingly, the Gemara asks: Rather, from where do we derive that all meal offerings not brought as <i>matza</i> are not valid? The Gemara answers: We derive it as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> discussing a verse concerning meal offerings: “It shall be of <i>matza</i>” (Leviticus 2:5): One might have thought that it is only a mitzva <i>ab initio</i> for a meal offering to be of <i>matza</i>. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be,” which indicates that the verse established it as an obligation, i.e., if the meal offering was not brought as <i>matza</i> it is not valid.
  § Rabbi Perida raised another dilemma before Rabbi Ami: From where is it derived with regard to all the meal offerings that must be brought as <i>matza</i> that they are kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will be baked well, as only a small amount of oil is added, and that one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leavened while kneading and shaping them? Shall we derive this <i>halakha</i> from the prohibition concerning leavened bread on the festival of Passover, as it is written: “And you shall watch over the <i>matzot</i>” (Exodus 12:17), which indicates that one must watch over any dough that is supposed to be made into <i>matza</i>, to ensure that it does not become leavened?
  Rabbi Ami said to Rabbi Perida: The <i>halakha</i> of meal offerings is not derived from Passover, as it is written in the context of a meal offering itself: “It shall be [<i>tehiye</i>] of <i>matza</i>” (Leviticus 2:5), which can be read as meaning: Preserve [<i>haḥaye</i>] <i>matza</i>, i.e., preserve the <i>matza</i> as it is, and do not let it become leavened.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t you already derive from the term “it shall be” that the requirement that a meal offering must be made as <i>matza</i> is indispensable? The Gemara answers: If so, that this term serves to teach only one <i>halakha</i>, let the verse write: It is <i>matza</i>. What is the reason that it writes: “It shall be of <i>matza</i>”? Learn from it two conclusions, both that the requirement that it be made as <i>matza</i> is indispensable and that one must watch over the <i>matza</i> to ensure that it does not become leavened.
  § The Gemara relates an incident that involves the aforementioned Rabbi Perida. The Sages said to Rabbi Perida: The Sage Rabbi Ezra, who is of especially fine lineage, a grandson of Rabbi Avtolus, who in turn is a tenth-generation descendant of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who is a tenth-generation descendant of Ezra the Scribe, is standing and waiting at the gate of the house and seeks entry. Rabbi Perida said to the Sages: What is the need for all this detail about Rabbi Ezra’s lineage?
  Rabbi Perida elaborated: If he is a man of Torah study, he is worthy of entry on his own account, regardless of his ancestors. And if he is both a man of Torah study and a man of lineage, he is also worthy of entry. But if he is a man of lineage and not a man of Torah, better for fire to devour him than for him to enter my house. In this case, his lineage is to his detriment, as it highlights his failure to become a Sage like his ancestors. The Sages said to Rabbi Perida: Rabbi Ezra is a man of Torah study. Rabbi Perida said to them: If so, let him enter and come.
  When Rabbi Ezra entered his house, Rabbi Perida saw that Rabbi Ezra’s mind was troubled with embarrassment at having to wait outside. Therefore, Rabbi Perida taught a homily to comfort Rabbi Ezra. He began and said an interpretation of the verse: “I have said to the Lord: You are my Lord; I have no good but in You [<i>tovati bal alekha</i>]” (Psalms 16:2). Rabbi Perida interpreted: The congregation of Israel said before the Holy One, Blessed be He: Master of the Universe, give me credit, as I made Your Name known in the world, as indicated by the phrase: “You are my Lord.”
  God said to the congregation of Israel: I give no credit to you [<i>tovati bal alekha</i>]. God explained: I give credit only to the three Patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were the first who made My Name known in the world, as it is stated: “As for the holy that are in the earth, they are the excellent [<i>ve’addirei</i>] in whom is all My delight” (Psalms 16:3). The holy in the earth are the Patriarchs, in whom God delights. In this manner Rabbi Perida alluded to the importance of the ancestors of the Jewish people, including Ezra the Scribe, from whom Rabbi Ezra was descended.
  When Rabbi Ezra heard Rabbi Perida say the word: Excellent [<i>addir</i>], he too began a homily, one that plays with different forms of this term, and said: Let the <i>Addir</i> come and exact punishment for the <i>addirim</i> from the <i>addirim</i> in the <i>addirim</i>.
  Rabbi Ezra explained this statement: With regard to <i>Addir</i> in the phrase: Let the <i>Addir</i> come, this is the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is written: “The Lord on high is mighty [<i>addir</i>]” (Psalms 93:4). In the phrase: And exact punishment for the <i>addirim</i>, these <i>addirim</i> are the Jews, as it is stated: “The excellent [<i>ve’addirei</i>] in whom is all My delight” (Psalms 16:3). In the phrase: From the <i>addirim</i>, these <i>addirim</i> are the Egyptians, as it is written with regard to the splitting of the Red Sea: “The mighty [<i>addirim</i>] sank as lead in the waters” (Exodus 15:10). In the phrase: In the <i>addirim</i>, these <i>addirim</i> are the waters, as it is stated: “Above the voices of many waters, the mighty [<i>addirim</i>] breakers of the sea” (Psalms 93:4).
  Rabbi Ezra stated another, similar, homiletic interpretation: Let <i>yadid</i>, son of <i>yadid</i>, come and build <i>yadid</i> for <i>yadid</i> in the portion of <i>yadid</i>, and let <i>yedidim</i> achieve atonement through it.
  Rabbi Ezra explained this statement: With regard to <i>yadid</i> in the phrase: Let <i>yadid</i>, this is King Solomon, as it is written after Solomon’s birth: “And He sent by the hand of Nathan the prophet, and he called his name Yedidya, for the Lord’s sake” (II Samuel 12:25).
  
  Daf 53b
  
  In the phrase: Son of <i>yadid</i>, this <i>yadid</i> is Abraham, as it is written: “What has My beloved [<i>lididi</i>] to do in My house” (Jeremiah 11:15). This verse is referring to Abraham, as will be explained. In the phrase: And build <i>yadid</i>, this <i>yadid</i> is the Temple, as it is written: “How lovely [<i>yedidot</i>] are Your tabernacles” (Psalms 84:2). And with regard to the term in the phrase: For <i>Yadid</i>, this is the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is written: “Let me sing of my Beloved [<i>lididi</i>]” (Isaiah 5:1).
  In the portion of <i>yadid</i>; this <i>yadid</i> is the tribe of Benjamin, in whose territory the Temple was built, as it is stated that Moses blessed Benjamin in the following terms: “Of Benjamin he said: The beloved [<i>yedid</i>] of the Lord shall dwell in safety by Him” (Deuteronomy 33:12). And let <i>yedidim</i> achieve atonement through it; these <i>yedidim</i> are the Jewish people, as it is written with regard to them: “I have given the dearly beloved [<i>yedidut</i>] of My soul into the hand of her enemies” (Jeremiah 12:7).
  Rabbi Ezra stated another, similar homily: Let the good one come and receive the good from the Good for the good ones. He explained: Let the good one come; this good is Moses, as it is written about him: “And when she saw him that he was a goodly child” (Exodus 2:2). And receive the good; this good is the Torah, as it is written about the Torah: “For I give you a good doctrine; do not forsake my Torah” (Proverbs 4:2). From the Good; this is referring to the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is written: “The Lord is good to all” (Psalms 145:9). For the good ones; these good ones are the Jews, as it is written with regard to them: “Do good, Lord, to the good ones” (Psalms 125:4).
  Rabbi Ezra stated yet another homily structured in a similar manner. Let this one come and receive this from this One for this people. He explained: Let this one come; this is referring to Moses, as it is written about him: “For as for this Moses, the man who brought us up out of the land of Egypt” (Exodus 32:1). And receive this; this is referring to the Torah, as it is written: “And this is the Torah which Moses set before the children of Israel” (Deuteronomy 4:44). From this One; this is referring to the Holy One, Blessed be He, as it is written: “This is my God and I will glorify Him” (Exodus 15:2). For this people; these people are the Jews, as it is stated about them: “This people that You have gotten” (Exodus 15:16).
  § It was stated above that the verse: “What has My beloved to do in My house,” is a reference to Abraham. The Gemara homiletically interprets the complete verse and the one after it: “What has My beloved to do in My house, seeing that she has performed lewdness with many, and the hallowed flesh is passed from you? When you do evil, then you rejoice. The Lord called your name a leafy olive tree, fair with goodly fruit; with the sound of a great tumult He has kindled fire upon it, and its branches are broken” (Jeremiah 11:15–16). Rabbi Yitzḥak says: At the time when the First Temple was destroyed, the Holy One, Blessed be He, found Abraham standing in the Temple. He said to Abraham: “What has My beloved to do in My house?”
  Abraham said to God: I have come over matters concerning my children, to discover why God is destroying the Temple and exiling them from Eretz Yisrael. God said to Abraham: The reason is that your children sinned, and therefore they are being exiled from the land. Abraham said to God: Perhaps they sinned unwittingly, and they do not deserve such a terrible punishment. God said to him: “Seeing that she has performed lewdness [<i>hamzimmata</i>],” i.e., her evil actions were intentional. Abraham further said to God: Perhaps only a minority of Jews sinned, and the rest of the people should be spared punishment. God said to him: “With many,” i.e., the majority of the people are culpable.
  Abraham continued to contend: Even so, You should have remembered the merit of the covenant of circumcision, which would have protected them from retribution. God said to him: “And the hallowed flesh is passed from you,” as they neglected the mitzva of circumcision. Abraham persisted and said to God: Perhaps if You would have waited for them, they would have returned in repentance. God said to him: “When you do evil then you rejoice.” That is, it is proper for them to be punished without delay, and they should not be given time to repent, since when they sin and are not punished they rejoice and live at ease, and rather than repent they are encouraged to do more evil.
  Once all his arguments had been refuted, Abraham immediately placed his hands on his head in an act of mourning, and was screaming and crying. And he said to God: Is it conceivable, Heaven forbid, that the Jewish people have no further opportunity for remedy? A Divine Voice emerged and said to him the continuation of the verse: “The Lord called your name a leafy olive tree, fair with goodly fruit.” Just as with regard to this olive tree, its final purpose is fulfilled at its end, when its fruit is picked, so too, with regard to the Jewish people, their final purpose will be fulfilled at their end, i.e., they will ultimately repent and return to Me.
  The Gemara analyzes the last part of the same verse: “With the sound of a great tumult [<i>hamulla</i>] He has kindled fire upon it, and its branches [<i>daliyyotav</i>] are broken” (Jeremiah 11:16). Rabbi Ḥinnana bar Pappa says: From the sound of the words [<i>milleihen</i>] of the spies that Moses sent to Eretz Yisrael and who brought back an evil report, the branches of the Jewish people were broken. As Rabbi Ḥinnana bar Pappa says: The spies said a serious statement at that moment: “They are stronger than us” (Numbers 13:31). Do not read the phrase as: “Stronger than us [<i>mimmenu</i>],” but rather read it as: Stronger than Him [<i>mimmennu</i>], meaning that even the Homeowner, God, is unable to remove His belongings from there, as it were. The spies were speaking heresy and claiming that the Canaanites were stronger than God Himself.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rabbi Ḥinnana, objects to this interpretation. This phrase: “With the sound of a great tumult [<i>hamulla</i>],” is problematic according to your claim that it is a reference to the words of the spies. According to your interpretation, it should have stated: With the sound of a word [<i>mila</i>]. Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya interprets this phrase in accordance with the earlier explanation that these verses are referring to Abraham’s discussion with God at the time of the destruction of the Temple. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Abraham: I heard your voice, and I took pity [<i>ḥamalti</i>] on the Jewish people and will punish them less harshly. I had previously said that the Jews will be subjugated by four kingdoms: Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome, and each and every one of these kingdoms will subjugate them for the measure of time I had originally set for their subjugation to all four kingdoms put together.
  But now that you have prayed for them, the Jewish people will be subjugated to each one of these four kingdoms only for the amount of time stipulated for each one separately. And there are those who say that God said the following to Abraham: I initially said that these kingdoms will rule over the Jews one after the other, each of them for a separate period. Now I decree that their dominion shall occur simultaneously in different geographical regions, which will shorten the overall duration of the subjugation.
  The verse in Jeremiah compares the Jewish people to an olive tree: “The Lord called your name a leafy olive tree.” Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Why were the Jewish people likened to an olive tree? It is to tell you that just as the leaves of an olive tree never fall off, neither in the summer nor in the rainy season, so too, the Jewish people will never be nullified, neither in this world nor in the World-to-Come. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Why were the Jewish people likened to an olive tree? It is to tell you that just as an olive tree brings forth its oil only by means of crushing and breaking, so too, the Jewish people, if they sin, return to good ways only by means of suffering.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: With regard to the leaven added to the dough to facilitate leavening, one separates part of the flour for the meal offerings from within the flour of the meal offerings themselves and leavens the meal offerings with it. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one brings the leaven from another, aged, dough. The Rabbis subsequently questioned Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, claiming that according to his ruling the measure of the meal offering would be lacking or would be greater than required. The Gemara inquires: What is the meaning of: Lacking or greater?
  Rav Ḥisda said: If the leavening dough that was brought from elsewhere is stiff, as its flour was mixed with a small amount of water, and it is relatively small in volume, when this stiff leaven is measured with the fine flour, the amount of fine flour for the meal offering is found to be greater than a tenth of an ephah when the measuring vessel is filled. This is because it will be necessary to add more flour to make up for the small volume of leavening dough. Conversely, if the leavening dough is soft, i.e., its flour was mixed with a larger amount of water, its volume will be larger than it should be, which will mean that the measuring vessel will be filled with less fine flour than normal, and the amount of flour is found to be lacking.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with the interpretation of Rav Ḥisda: Why does it matter if the leavening dough is stiff or soft? Ultimately, when the one preparing the meal offering measures the leaven brought from elsewhere together with the fine flour used for the meal offering, he measures and reaches the requisite amount of a tenth of an ephah, as the measure is full either way.
  Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: In order to achieve the appropriate measure it is necessary to know how much flour the substance contained before water was added and it became dough. The reason is that one measures the tenth of an ephah in accordance with the amount there was of the flour of the leavening dough before it was mixed with water, together with the fine flour of the meal offering, and not in accordance with their present volume.
  The Gemara asks: But even according to the opinion of Rabbis, who hold that Rabbi Yehuda’s method may not be used because the amount might be lacking or be greater than it should be, let him take a little fine flour from the tenth of an ephah after it has been measured and found to be the requisite amount, and leaven it thoroughly outside the rest of the dough, and afterward bring it and knead it together with the rest of the dough. In this way it is possible to bring leaven from the outside and to be certain that the meal offering contains exactly the correct measure. The Gemara answers: One cannot proceed in this manner, due to a rabbinic decree. The reason for this decree is that people who would see this practice might mistakenly think that the leavened portion was not part of the original fine flour, and perhaps they will come to bring leavening dough for their meal offerings from elsewhere, i.e., leavening dough that has not been consecrated for the meal offering.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not leaven the meal offerings that come as leavened bread
  
  Daf 54a
  
  with the juice of apples, as the dough will not leaven properly. It was said in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel that one may leaven these meal offerings with juice from apples, as this is considered proper leavening. The Gemara notes that Rav Kahana would teach this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Teradyon, not in the name of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel.
  The Gemara analyzes this dispute. In accordance with whose opinion is that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 10:2): In the case of an apple of <i>teruma</i> that one mashed and placed in non-sacred dough, and the juice of the apple leavened the dough, this dough is prohibited to be consumed by anyone who may not partake of <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara reiterates the question: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? Shall we say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel, who maintains that the juice of apples causes the dough to leaven properly, and not in accordance with the ruling of the Rabbis, the majority opinion that disputes this ruling? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Granted, the Rabbis hold that dough leavened by the juice of apples does not become full-fledged leavened bread, but in any event it becomes hardened [<i>nukshe</i>] leaven. Consequently, dough leavened by the juice of <i>teruma</i> apples is prohibited to non-priests.
  § On the previous <i>amud</i> the Gemara cited the opinion of Rabba and Rav Yosef that measuring the flour in the leavening dough must be performed before water is added. The Gemara discusses this matter further. Rabbi Ila says: Of all the meal offerings, you do not have a meal offering whose removal of the handful is more difficult than that of the meal offering of a sinner. This particular meal offering is dry, as no oil is added to it. Therefore, it is very difficult to remove precisely a handful, as when the priest takes a handful with his thumb and little finger, a large amount of flour is apt to fall out. Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: The removal of the handful in the case of the meal offering of a sinner is no more difficult than its removal in other meal offerings. The reason is that although the Torah prohibited the addition of oil to the meal offering of a sinner, nevertheless the priest may knead it in water, and it is fit to be offered.
  The Gemara analyzes this dispute. Let us say that these <i>amora’im</i> disagree about this: As one Sage, Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi, holds that one measures meal offerings as they are, in their current state, after they have been mixed into a dough. Therefore it is permitted to perform the removal of the handful after water has been added, at which point it is not a particularly difficult rite to perform. And one Sage, Rabbi Ila, holds that one measures meal offerings as they were before they were mixed with water, when they were still flour. Therefore, if one were to add water before measuring he might add too much, which would cause the dough to be too soft and the measure of the offering too large, or conversely, if he were to add too little water the dough would be stiff and too small in volume. Either way, the handful will not contain the correct amount of flour, and therefore no water may be added.
  The Gemara responds: No, as everyone agrees that one measures meal offerings as they currently are. And it is with regard to this that they disagree: As one Sage, Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi, holds: What is the meaning of “dry” written in the verse discussing a meal offering: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil, or dry” (Leviticus 7:10)? It means dry of oil, but one may add water. And one Sage, Rabbi Ila, holds that the meal offering of a sinner must be dry of all substances, i.e., it may not contain even water.
  § The question concerning whether a meal offering is to be measured in its current, mixed state or as it was before it was mixed relates to a fundamental issue that also arises in other areas of <i>halakha</i>. We learned in a mishna there (<i>Okatzin</i> 2:8): Meat of a calf that swelled due to cooking, as the volume of calf flesh increases when it is cooked in water, or meat of an old animal that shrank due to cooking, which is what happens to meat of this type, are to be measured as they are in order to determine if they are the volume of an egg-bulk, in which case they can contract ritual impurity and transfer impurity of food to other items.
  The Sages disagree as to the meaning of: Measured as they are. Rav, Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Yoḥanan all say that it means the items are to be measured as they are currently, after having been cooked. Shmuel, Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Reish Lakish all say it means they are to be measured according to their volume as they are, before having been cooked. In other words, even if the meat of a calf is the volume of an egg-bulk after it was cooked, if it was less than this before cooking it cannot contract ritual impurity. Conversely, even if the meat of an old animal was less than an egg-bulk after cooking, if it was an egg-bulk before it was cooked it can contract ritual impurity.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel, Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and Reish Lakish from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to meat of a calf that came into contact with a source of ritual impurity but that was not of a volume equivalent to the minimum measure for contracting impurity, i.e., an egg-bulk, if it was then cooked, and as a result it swelled until it stood at the requisite measure for ritual impurity, this meat is pure with regard to the past, but can become impure and render other items impure from here on. In other words, the previous contact with a source of impurity did not render the meat impure, as it was of insufficient volume at the time. This indicates that the status of an item with regard to ritual impurity depends on its volume at the current moment.
  The Gemara answers: It is possible that by Torah law this meat is in fact not susceptible to ritual impurity even from here on, as the <i>halakha</i> defines it by its volume prior to cooking. Nevertheless, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that it is impure by rabbinic law.
  The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of that <i>baraita</i>: And similarly, the same principle applies to an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>], and similarly with regard to food left over from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [<i>notar</i>]. The Gemara analyzes this statement: Granted, if you say that the <i>baraita</i> is discussing <i>halakhot</i> that apply by Torah law, this is why the cases of <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i> are included in the <i>baraita</i>, as they also apply by Torah law. But if you say that the <i>halakhot</i> in the <i>baraita</i> apply by rabbinic law, are there <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i> by rabbinic law?
  The Gemara answers: Say that the <i>baraita</i> is not referring to the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i> and <i>notar</i>. Rather, it means the following: And similarly, the same principle applies with regard to ritual impurity imparted by <i>piggul</i>, and similarly with regard to ritual impurity imparted by <i>notar</i>. There is a rabbinic decree that meat which is <i>piggul</i> or <i>notar</i> imparts impurity to one’s hands even if the meat itself was not impure. The <i>baraita</i> teaches that if the meat is at least the volume of an egg-bulk after it was cooked, it renders the hands impure in this manner.
  The Gemara explains that this statement is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the concepts of impurity imparted by <i>piggul</i> and impurity imparted by <i>notar</i> apply by rabbinic law, the Sages did not institute a stringency to such an extent, making items that were less than the requisite volume until they were cooked contract and impart forms of impurity that apply by rabbinic law. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that this <i>halakha</i> does apply to those forms of ritual impurity.
  The Gemara continues to analyze this dispute. Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to meat of an old animal that initially was of a volume equivalent to the requisite measure for contracting ritual impurity and became impure, after which it was cooked and as a result shrank until it was less than the requisite measure for contracting impurity, it is considered impure with regard to items that touched it in the past, when it was large enough, and it is pure with regard to items that it may touch from here on. This <i>baraita</i> indicates that the current state of the item is decisive.
  Rabba said, in explanation of the dispute between the <i>amora’im</i>: Anywhere, i.e., with regard to any item, that was initially of a volume equivalent to the requisite measure, but now it is not of such a volume, the <i>halakha</i> is determined according to the item’s current volume, and it is not of the requisite volume. Conversely, anywhere, i.e., with regard to any item, that initially was not of the requisite measure but now it is of sufficient volume, the item contracts impurity by rabbinic law.
  
  Daf 54b
  
  When they disagree is in a case where the food initially had the requisite measure for ritual impurity, and it shrank until it was less than this measure, and subsequently it again swelled to the requisite measure for contracting impurity. The dispute is that one Sage, i.e., Shmuel, Rabbi Shimon, and Reish Lakish, holds: There is disqualification with regard to a ritual matter, including impurity. In other words, if at a certain point the food was less than the requisite measure it becomes entirely disqualified from contracting ritual impurity, even if it subsequently swells again. And one Sage, i.e., Rav, Rav Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds: There is no disqualification with regard to a ritual matter. Even if at a certain stage the food lost its ability to contract impurity, if it later swells it can once again become impure.
  The Gemara asks: And is there one who says that there is disqualification with regard to ritual matters? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Teharot</i> 3:6): In the case of an egg-bulk of a ritually impure food that one placed in the sun and that therefore shrank to less than an egg-bulk; and similarly in the case of an olive-bulk of flesh of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal, all of which impart impurity; or an olive-bulk of <i>piggul</i>, or an olive-bulk of <i>notar</i>, or an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, if any of these were placed in the sun and shrank, they are pure, i.e., they do not impart impurity to other items, and one is not liable to receive <i>karet</i> for them due to the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or forbidden fat.
  The mishna continues: If, after they shrank in the sun, one took these foods and placed them in the rain, as a result of which they again swelled to the minimum volume for ritual impurity, they are impure, as was the case before they shrank. This applies to the impurity of a corpse, the impurity of an animal carcass, and the impurity of foods, and one is also liable to receive <i>karet</i> for them due to <i>piggul</i>, <i>notar</i>, or forbidden fat. This demonstrates that the food is not permanently disqualified. Therefore, the refutation of the opinion of the one who says that there is disqualification with regard to ritual matters is a conclusive refutation.
  § The Gemara returns to the dispute over whether food is to be measured in its current volume or according to its initial volume. Come and hear a <i>baraita</i>: (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 4:2): One may separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes from fresh figs for dried figs, which have shrunk and are now smaller than they were when they were fresh. In other words, one may designate fresh figs as <i>teruma</i> and tithe to exempt the dried figs, despite the difference between these two types of figs. This separation may be performed only by number, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried figs. One may not set aside this <i>teruma</i> by volume, i.e., by separating fresh figs with a volume of one-tenth of the measure of dried figs. The reason is that the volume of the fresh figs is greater than that of the dried figs, so he would set aside fewer fresh figs than he would if he calculated by number.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>halakha</i>. Granted, if you say that one measures food items as they were initially, then since when the obligation to separate <i>teruma</i> began, the volume of the dried figs was the same as the fresh ones, then it is well; the amount of figs to be separated as <i>teruma</i> should be calculated based on number, disregarding their current volume. But if you say that foods are to be measured as they currently are, then since the volume of the dried figs is smaller than that of the fresh figs, he will separate a larger amount than necessary, and this case is an example of one who increases his tithes.
  And we learned in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Demai</i> 8:10): In the case of one who increases his tithes, i.e., he designates more than one-tenth of the produce as tithe, the remainder of his produce is rendered fit for consumption, as it has been properly tithed. But his tithes are ruined, as the amount over one-tenth is not tithe, and it was not itself tithed, so it remains untithed produce. If so, how can the fresh figs be considered proper <i>teruma</i> and tithes in this case?
  The Gemara asks: Rather, what will you claim; that one measures foods as they were initially? If so, say the latter clause of that same <i>baraita</i>: One may separate tithes from dried figs for fresh figs only by measure of volume, i.e., dried figs that are one-tenth of the volume of the fresh figs. One may not separate by number, as this would result in fewer dried figs than separation by volume.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>halakha</i>. Granted, if you say that one measures foods as they are currently, it is well. But if you say that one measures foods as they were initially, when the dried figs were fresh, it should be enough to set aside a smaller number of dried figs corresponding to the fresh ones. Since the <i>baraita</i> instructs him to separate a larger number of dried figs than required, this too is an example of one who increases his tithes.
  Therefore, this <i>baraita</i> cannot serve as proof for either opinion. Since the two statements of the <i>baraita</i> appear contradictory, it must be that this <i>baraita</i> is actually not discussing tithes, which must be separated according to a precise measure. Rather, here we are dealing with standard <i>teruma</i>. By Torah law there is no fixed measure for standard <i>teruma</i>; a single kernel of grain exempts the entire crop. The Sages established a range of measures: One-fortieth for a generous gift, one-fiftieth for an average gift, and one-sixtieth for a miserly gift. Accordingly, one who wishes to give generously should give slightly more than the exact measure. And therefore, the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> is speaking of one who wishes to separate <i>teruma</i> generously, and in the latter clause, where he also gives more than necessary, it is also referring to one who wishes to separate his <i>teruma</i> generously.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, say the last clause: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Father, i.e., Rabbi Yosei, would set aside ten dried figs that were in a vessel for ninety fresh figs that were in a basket. And if this <i>baraita</i> is referring to standard <i>teruma</i>, then with regard to this mention of ten dried figs, what is its purpose? This proportion was greater by orders of magnitude than even the amount of a generous gift established by the Sages.
  Rather, here we are dealing with <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, which the Levite separates from his tithe and gives to a priest. This <i>teruma</i> is one-tenth of the first tithe. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Elazar ben Gomel. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Abba Elazar ben Gomel says with regard to the verse: “And your <i>teruma</i> [<i>terumatkhem</i>] shall be reckoned to you as though it were the grain of the threshing floor” (Numbers 18:27), that in using a plural term of the word “your,” the verse speaks about two <i>terumot</i>. One is standard <i>teruma</i>, i.e., the grain of the threshing floor, and the other one is <i>teruma</i> of the tithe. The verse equates these two <i>terumot</i>.
  Abba Elazar ben Gomel explains: Just as standard <i>teruma</i> is taken by estimate, as there is no requirement for the amount separated to be measured precisely; and it can be taken by thought, as one is not required to physically separate it before consuming the remaining produce, so too, <i>teruma</i> of the tithe may be taken by estimate
  
  Daf 55a
  
  and by thought. And this comparison also teaches that just as in the case of standard <i>teruma</i> one should give generously, so too, with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe one should give generously. Therefore, one who separates <i>teruma</i> of the tithe from fresh figs for dried figs should do so generously, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, as though the volume of the dried figs was as large as that of fresh ones.
  The Gemara suggests: And from this statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, one can cite a proof for the opinion that food is to be measured in accordance with its initial size. As Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: Father would set aside ten dried figs that were in a vessel for ninety fresh figs that were in a basket. Granted, if you say that we say one measures food items as they were initially, it is well, as Rabbi Yosei apparently considers the dried figs set aside as tithes as though they were still fresh figs. But if you say that one measures foods as they are in their current state, then in a case where one separates ten dried figs for ninety fresh figs they are less than the requisite amount, as the volume of ten dried figs is less than the volume of ten fresh figs. This indicates that the measure of the food is determined according to its initial state.
  The Gemara answers that one cannot extrapolate from the example of dried figs to other cases. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Elazar says the following reason for that particular <i>halakha</i>: Dried figs are different, since one can boil dried figs in water and return them to their previous state; in other words, as they were when they were fresh. Consequently, one may separate them for fresh figs as though they too were fresh. One cannot extrapolate from here a principle with regard to other items.
  § The Gemara discusses the possibility of separating fresh figs as <i>teruma</i> for dried ones. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may separate <i>teruma</i> from fresh figs for dried figs by number, e.g., ten fresh figs for ninety dried ones, in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs, and therefore the fresh figs can be preserved by processing them into dried figs. But one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs.
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: One may separate <i>teruma</i> from fresh figs for dried figs in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. This indicates that in a place where they are accustomed to make dried figs, yes, one may set aside <i>teruma</i> in this manner. But in a place where they are not accustomed to make dried figs, one may not separate from fresh figs for dried ones, as the fresh figs are liable to spoil before they can be used.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is referring to a situation where there is a priest present, and the owner of the produce can give him the <i>teruma</i> without delay, then even in a place where he is not accustomed to make dried figs, why may he not set aside fresh figs for dried ones? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 2:4): In a place where there is a priest present, the owner of the produce separates <i>teruma</i> from the best-quality produce? In this case, the fresh figs are superior in quality to the dried ones, despite the fact that dried figs last longer.
  Rather, it is obvious that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, and by the time a priest is found the fresh figs might spoil. If so, say the latter clause of that <i>baraita</i>: But one may not set aside <i>teruma</i> from dried figs for fresh figs even in a place where they are accustomed to make fresh figs into dried figs. And if this is referring to a situation where there is no priest present, why may one not set aside dried figs, which can be preserved for a lengthy period, for fresh ones? But didn’t we learn in the same mishna (<i>Terumot</i> 2:4): In a place where there is no priest present, the owner of the produce separates <i>teruma</i> from that which will endure, not from the best-quality produce? Rather, it is obvious that this clause is referring to a situation where there is a priest present.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> addresses a case where there is no priest present, whereas the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present. The Gemara explains: Yes, the first clause of the <i>baraita</i> addresses a case where there is no priest present, and the latter clause addresses a case where there is a priest present.
  Rav Pappa said: Learn from this discussion that we exert ourselves and interpret the mishna according to two reasons, i.e., two different situations in accordance with the opinion of one <i>tanna</i>, but we do not interpret it as being in accordance with the opinions of two <i>tanna’im</i>. An interpretation that maintains a single authorship of a mishna is preferable even if it requires explaining the mishna as discussing two different situations.
  MISHNA: All the meal-offerings that come as <i>matza</i> are to be kneaded with lukewarm water so that the dough will bake well, as only a small amount of oil is added. And one must watch over them to ensure that they do not become leaven while kneading and shaping them, and if a meal offering or even only its remainder becomes leaven, one violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that one who allows the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened violates a prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Reish Lakish said: The verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). This section of the verse can be read as a single sentence, to indicate: Even their portion of meal offerings, i.e., the remainder eaten by priests after the removal of the handful to be burned on the altar, shall not be baked with leaven.
  The Gemara asks: And does this verse come for this purpose? It cannot, as it is necessary as the source for a different <i>halakha</i>, for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “It shall not
  
  Daf 55b
  
  be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Isn’t this requirement already stated earlier: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; as you shall burn no leaven nor any honey as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11)? Rather, the phrase “it shall not be baked with leaven” serves to teach a different <i>halakha</i>. Since the prohibition concerning leaven is first stated in general terms: Shall not be made with leaven, without specification, one might have thought that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven will be liable to receive only one set of lashes for all of his actions, i.e., kneading, shaping, and baking the dough. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” which teaches that one who causes a meal offering to become leaven is liable separately for baking it, and for each stage of its preparation.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains this derivation: Baking leaven was included in the general prohibition incorporating all of the stages involved in preparing the meal offering. Why did it emerge from the generalization to be mentioned explicitly? It emerged in order to compare the other stages to it: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single, i.e., separately defined, action, and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself if the dough is leaven, so too, I will include the other stages of the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading it and shaping it, and conclude that one is liable separately for each of these actions if the dough is leavened.
  And the same applies to any single action involved in the preparation of a meal offering. This statement serves to include the act of smoothing the surface of the dough with water. The reason this act is included is that although it is not a significant stage in the preparation of the dough, it is a single, independent action, and therefore one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself. This <i>baraita</i> demonstrates that one cannot derive the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened from the verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” as this verse is the source of a different <i>halakha</i>. If so, from where is that prohibition derived?
  The Gemara answers: The verse: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is required for the principle stated earlier. We say that the prohibition against allowing the remainder of a meal offering to become leavened is derived from the subsequent phrase: “I have given it as their portion of My offerings made by fire” (Leviticus 6:10). The remainder is the portion of the meal offering eaten by the priests.
  The Gemara challenges: But once it has been determined that the term “their portion” teaches the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, one can say this entire section of the verse comes only for this purpose, which would mean that there is no source for the <i>halakha</i> that one is liable separately for each stage of the preparation of a meal offering with leaven.
  The Gemara answers: One cannot say that this teaches only the prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering, as if so, let the verse write: Their portion shall not be baked with leaven. What is meant by the fact that the verse stated it in a different order: “Shall not be baked with leaven. I have given it as their portion”? This indicates that one should learn from this two <i>halakhot</i>, i.e., that there is a prohibition against leavening the remainder of a meal offering and that one is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each stage of preparation performed with leavened dough.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty: But one can say that the act of baking is different, as the Merciful One specified it in the Torah, and therefore one should be liable to receive one set of lashes for baking the dough. As for the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering, i.e., kneading, shaping, and smoothing, which are not explicitly stated in the verse, let him be liable to receive one set of lashes for all of them. The Gemara answers that this cannot be the <i>halakha</i>, because baking is something that was included in a generalization but emerged from the generalization in order to teach a <i>halakha</i>. According to a hermeneutic principle, a case of this kind did not emerge to teach a <i>halakha</i> only about itself, but rather it emerged to teach a <i>halakha</i> about the entire generalization, in this case, about all the other stages in the preparation of a meal offering.
  The Gemara further challenges: But one can say that the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven, is a generalization, as it does not mention any specific acts, and the phrase: “It shall not be baked with leaven,” is a detail, as it specifies one particular stage of the preparation; and there is another standard hermeneutic principle: When there is a generalization and a detail, the generalization is referring only to that which is specified in the detail. In this case, that would mean that baking, yes, is included in this prohibition, but other matters, e.g., kneading and shaping, are not included.
  Rabbi Aptoriki said: That hermeneutic principle is not relevant here, because this is a case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, as the phrase: Shall not be made with leaven (Leviticus 2:11), is far from the expression: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). And for any instance of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a <i>halakha</i> from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection, and some say that this objection is unattributed [<i>kedi</i>]: And is it correct that in the case of a generalization and a detail that appear in the Torah distanced from one another, one cannot derive a <i>halakha</i> from them by analyzing them as a generalization and a detail? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a goat brought by a king as a sin offering: The verse states: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). Where is the burnt offering slaughtered? On the northern side of the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:11). This sin offering of a king must consequently also be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: And do you learn this <i>halakha</i> from here? But isn’t it already stated: “Speak to Aaron and to his sons, saying: This is the law of the sin offering: In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered before God; it is most holy” (Leviticus 6:18)? If so, to what purpose was this singled out? Why does the Torah state explicitly that the sin offering of the king requires slaughter in the north? The <i>baraita</i> answers: It is to fix a place for it, that this is the only place where a sin offering may be slaughtered, teaching that if he did not slaughter it in the north of the Temple courtyard, he has disqualified it even after the fact.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: Do you say that it is singled out for this purpose, to teach that even after the fact a sin offering slaughtered anywhere other than in the north is disqualified? Or perhaps it is only to teach that this goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other goat sin offering requires slaughter in the north. The <i>baraita</i> answers: The verse states elsewhere: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the sin offering, and slaughter the sin offering in the place of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:29), and this established a paradigm for all sin offerings, that they require slaughter in the north. Therefore, the additional verse stated with regard to the sin offering of a king teaches that if he did not slaughter it in the north it is disqualified.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The reason that all sin offerings must be slaughtered in the north is that the Merciful One wrote: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” from which it can be inferred that if not for this verse I would say that only this sin offering, the male goat brought by a king, requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north. What is the reason for this? After all, the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered shall the sin offering be slaughtered,” appears to be referring to all types of sin offerings.
  Isn’t it because this verse is a generalization and a detail, as the verse first generalizes about all sin offerings, and then the verse concerning the sin offering of a king: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering,” is a detail, as it is referring to a specific sin offering? And even though the verse concerning sin offerings and the verse concerning the sin offering of a king are distanced from one another, nevertheless we would derive a <i>halakha</i> from them by means of the principle of a generalization and a detail. This appears to disprove the explanation of Rabbi Aptoriki.
  Rav Ashi objects to this claim raised by Rav Adda bar Ahava: Is this a generalization and a detail? It is in fact a detail and a generalization, as the verse: “And slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:24), appears in the Torah earlier than the verse: “In the place where the burnt offering is slaughtered the sin offering shall be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). A hermeneutic principle states that in this case the generalization adds to the detail, and includes all matters.
  Rather, the reason that if not for the specific textual derivation we would have thought that only a sin offering brought by a king requires slaughter in the north is that the word “it,” which is an exclusion, is difficult for the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i>, as it is unclear what this term serves to exclude. And this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Or perhaps the verse is teaching that only this sin offering requires slaughter in the north, but no other type of sin offering requires slaughter in the north, as the Merciful One writes “it,” which is an exclusion. Therefore, the additional verse: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” teaches that this <i>halakha</i> applies to all burnt offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And now that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> derives it from the phrase: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering,” to exclude what does the term “it” serve? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude the case that emerges from the following discussion, summarized by the mnemonic: Nahshon; and slaughter; bird; on Passover.
  The Gemara explains the first suggestion: It, the goat sin offering of a king, is slaughtered in the north, but the goat offered by Nahshon, prince of the tribe of Judah, was not slaughtered in the north of the Tabernacle. He, along with all the other princes of the tribes, brought offerings to inaugurate the altar and the Tabernacle, as recorded in the Torah (see Numbers, chapter 7). The sin offerings brought at this time were unique because they were not brought to atone for any sin. The term “it” teaches that even though they had some characteristics of a sin offering, the offerings of the princes did not require slaughter in the north.
  The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that since the sin offerings of the princes are included in the requirement of placing hands, they are also included in the requirement to be slaughtered in the north. Therefore, the term “it” teaches us that there was no requirement of slaughter in the north for the goats brought as sin offerings by Nahshon and the other princes.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal itself applies to the goats offered by Nahshon and the other princes? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat, and slaughter it in the place where they slaughter the burnt offering before the Lord; it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says:
  
  Daf 56a
  
  The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as communal sin offerings for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering.
  Ravina objects to this: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the offering of Nahshon was included in the requirement of placing hands on the head of the animal. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, what is there to say? Why should the Torah write the term “it,” since there is no reason to assume that it would require slaughter in the north?
  Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda as well, why not say that for that which it was included, i.e., placing hands on the head of an animal, it was included; and for that which it was not included, i.e., slaughter in the north, it was not included. Why would one think that the obligation to slaughter in the north applies to the offering of Nahshon merely because the requirement of placing hands applies to that offering?
  And if you would say that had the verse not excluded the offerings of the princes I would say that one could derive the requirement for slaughter in the north via a paradigm from all other sin offerings, if so, one could also derive the requirement for placing hands on the head of an animal itself via the same paradigm. Rather, the reason that the requirement of placing hands cannot be derived via a paradigm is that we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirements of sin offerings applicable to all generations. So too, the requirement of slaughter in the north cannot be derived via a paradigm because we do not learn the requirements of the sin offering of Nahshon, which was for the time of the inauguration of the Tabernacle alone, from the requirement of sin offerings applicable to all generations.
  Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it must be slaughtered in the north of the Temple courtyard, but the one who slaughters it does not need to stand in the north when he slaughters. The offering would be valid even if he were to stand in the south of the courtyard and use a long knife to slaughter the animal that is positioned in the north.
  The Gemara challenges this: The <i>halakha</i> of the one who slaughters has already been derived from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Aḥiyya says: The verse states with regard to the burnt offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before God” (Leviticus 1:11). Why must the verse state the exclusionary term “it”?
  He explains: Since we have found that the priest stands in the north and collects the blood from the neck of the animal in the north, and if he stood in the south and collected the blood in the north the offering is disqualified, one might have thought that this is so also with regard to this one who slaughters the offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall slaughter it,” to teach that it, the animal, must be in the north, but the one who slaughters does not have to be standing in the north of the Temple courtyard when he slaughters the animal. The question returns: What is derived from the exclusionary term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, a goat brought as a sin offering, must be slaughtered in the north, but a bird brought as an offering does not need to be killed in the north. It might enter your mind to say: Let it be derived that a bird must be killed in the north by an <i>a fortiori</i> inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a sheep, as follows: Just as is the case for a sheep brought as a burnt offering, that the Torah did not fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, yet nevertheless it fixed that its slaughter must be in the north, with regard to a bird brought as an offering, for which the Torah did fix that its slaughter must be performed by a priest, is it not logical that the Torah should also fix its slaughter in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude a bird from the requirement of being killed in the north.
  The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a bird offering from the <i>halakha</i> of a sheep offering, as what is notable about a sheep offering? It is notable in that the Torah fixed the requirement that it be slaughtered with a utensil, i.e., a knife. By contrast, a bird is killed by the priest pinching the nape of its neck with his fingernail, without a utensil. Therefore, the term “it” cannot serve to counter this derivation. If so, there is no reason to think that a bird should also have to be killed in the north, and the term “it” is not necessary to exclude this possibility.
  The Gemara explains: Rather, the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king serves to teach that it, the goat of the king, is slaughtered in the north, but the Paschal offering is not slaughtered in the north. The Gemara raises a difficulty: The <i>halakha</i> that the Paschal offering need not be slaughtered in the north is not derived from the term: “It,” but rather it is derived as stated by Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One might have thought that a Paschal offering requires slaughter in the north. And this can be derived through a logical inference: Just as in the case of a burnt offering, for which the Torah did not fix a time for its slaughter yet fixed that it requires slaughter in the north, with regard to a Paschal offering, for which the Torah fixed a time for its slaughter, i.e., it must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the fourteenth day of Nisan, is it not logical that the Torah would fix that it must be slaughtered in the north? Therefore, the verse states “it,” to exclude the Paschal offering from the requirement of slaughter in the north.
  The Gemara questions the logical inference. One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of a Paschal offering from the <i>halakha</i> of a burnt offering, as what is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar. This is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
  The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering, which is not entirely burned upon the altar yet is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it has the power to atone for those sins liable for punishment by excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>], which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering.
  The Gemara continues: If you would suggest learning a logical inference from the <i>halakha</i> of a guilt offering, which is not entirely burned, does not atone for those sins liable for punishment by <i>karet</i>, and is slaughtered only in the north, this too can be refuted. As what is notable about a guilt offering? It is notable in that it is an offering of the most sacred order, which is not so with regard to a Paschal offering. The Gemara adds: Having noted this distinction between a guilt offering and a Paschal offering, one can say that for all of the three offerings the <i>halakha</i> of a Paschal offering cannot be derived from them either, since each of them is an offering of the most sacred order.
  The Gemara returns to the earlier inference: Rather, the term “it” teaches as we said initially: It, i.e., the animal, must be standing in the north, but the one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north. And that which is difficult for you, that we derive this <i>halakha</i> from the statement of Rabbi Aḥiyya, is in fact not difficult. The derivation of Rabbi Aḥiyya from the term “it” does not come to exclude one who slaughters from the requirement to slaughter in the north, since that is known already from the term “it” stated with regard to the sin offering of a king. Rather, this is what Rabbi Aḥiyya is saying: The one who slaughters the animal does not have to stand in the north, but by inference, the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north.
  The Gemara questions this inference: The <i>halakha</i> that the one who collects the blood from the neck of the animal must stand in the north is derived from the fact that the Torah could have written: The priest shall take, and instead writes: “And the priest shall take” (Leviticus 4:34). The Gemara explains: This <i>tanna</i> does not learn anything from this distinction between: The priest shall take, and: “And the priest shall take.” Since he does not agree with this derivation, he must therefore derive the requirement to collect the blood while standing in the north from a different verse.
  § The mishna teaches: And one is liable to be flogged for kneading the meal offering, and for shaping it, and for baking it, if the meal offering becomes leaven. Rav Pappa said: If one baked a meal offering as leaven he is flogged with two sets of lashes, one for shaping the dough and one for baking it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But you said in the <i>baraita</i>: Just as the act of baking is notable in that it is a single action and one is liable to receive lashes for it by itself; this indicates that one receives one set of lashes for baking a meal offering as leavened bread, not two.
  The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of the <i>baraita</i>, i.e., that one receives a single set of lashes for baking, is referring to a case where he shaped the dough and he, the same person, also baked it. Since he already incurred liability to receive lashes for shaping the dough before he baked it, he is not liable again for shaping when he bakes it. That statement of Rav Pappa, that one who bakes the dough is liable to receive two sets of lashes, is referring to a situation where another person shaped the dough and gave the shaped dough to him, and he baked it. Although the one who shaped it is liable to receive lashes for the act of shaping, nevertheless, the one who bakes it is liable to receive two sets of lashes, as his act of baking also completed the shaping of the dough.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Bekhorot</i> 3:6): In the case of an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, a condition that can be healed only through bloodletting, one may let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision does not cause a permanent blemish. But one may not let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, as it is prohibited to intentionally cause a blemish in a firstborn animal; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  And the Rabbis say: One may even let the animal’s blood by cutting it in a place where the incision causes a permanent blemish, provided that he does not slaughter the animal on the basis of that blemish, even though in general, a firstborn animal may be slaughtered once it develops a permanent blemish. The Rabbis maintain that in this case, since he caused the blemish himself, he may not slaughter it until it develops a different, unrelated blemish. Rabbi Shimon says:
  
  Daf 56b
  
  The animal may even be slaughtered on the basis of that blemish. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the firstborn would die if its blood is not let, one may not let its blood at all.
  The Gemara discusses similar cases, including examples involving meal offerings. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: All of the Sages who disagree as to whether one may let the blood of a firstborn animal whose blood circulation is constricted concede that one who leavens a meal offering after another had already leavened it is liable to receive lashes for the additional leavening, as it is written: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), and it is also stated: “It shall not be baked with leaven” (Leviticus 6:10). This indicates that one is liable for every act of leavening performed on a meal offering.
  Similarly, everyone agrees that one who castrates an animal after one who castrates it is liable, as it is written: “Those whose testicles are bruised, or crushed, or detached, or cut, shall not be offered to the Lord, and you shall not do this in your land” (Leviticus 22:24). If one is liable when the seminal vesicles are cut, then when the testicles are detached altogether is he not all the more so liable? Rather, this verse serves to include one who detaches the testicles after one who cuts the seminal vesicles, to indicate that he is liable. Apparently, one is liable for castrating an animal that is already sterilized.
  These Sages disagree only with regard to one who inflicts a blemish on an already blemished animal, such as one whose blood circulation is constricted. Rabbi Meir maintains that as the verse states: “It shall be perfect to be accepted; there shall be no blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21), this categorical statement includes even the infliction of a blemish on an offering that is already blemished. And the Rabbis maintain that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” indicates that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish applies only to an animal that is currently perfect, i.e., unblemished, and can therefore be accepted, meaning that it is suitable to be sacrificed upon the altar. If the animal is already blemished, there is no prohibition against inflicting an additional blemish upon it.
  The Gemara analyzes this dispute. And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who derives the <i>halakha</i> from the phrase “there shall be no blemish in it,” isn’t it written also: “It shall be perfect to be accepted”? The Gemara answers: That verse serves to exclude only an animal that was blemished from the outset, i.e., an animal that was born with a blemish. In such a case, there is no prohibition to inflict an additional blemish on it. But if the animal was initially unblemished and later developed a blemish, it is prohibited to inflict another blemish upon it.
  The Gemara rejects this suggestion: There is no need to exclude an animal that was blemished from the outset, as it is merely like a palm tree, i.e., it is an item that can never attain the status of an animal consecrated as an offering. Therefore, it is obvious that the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to this animal.
  Rather, Rabbi Meir maintains that the phrase “it shall be perfect to be accepted” serves to exclude disqualified consecrated animals, to teach that after their redemption, when they become non-sacred, the prohibition against inflicting a blemish does not apply to them any longer. This exclusion is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is prohibited to shear disqualified consecrated animals or use them for labor even after they have been redeemed and are non-sacred, perhaps let it also be prohibited to inflict a blemish upon them. Consequently, this verse teaches us that there is no prohibition against inflicting a blemish upon these animals.
  The Gemara analyzes the opinion of the Rabbis. And according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, who base their opinion on the phrase: “It shall be perfect to be accepted,” isn’t it written: “There shall not be any blemish in it,” which indicates an expansion of the prohibition against inflicting a blemish? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “There shall not be any blemish in it” (Leviticus 22:21). I have derived only that it may not have a blemish caused directly by human action. From where is it derived that one may not cause a blemish to be inflicted upon it indirectly by means of other agents, e.g., that one may not place dough or pressed figs on its ear so that a dog will come and take it, thereby biting off part of the animal’s ear and leaving it blemished? The verse states: “Any blemish.” It says: “Blemish,” and it says “Any blemish”; the word “no” serves to teach that one may not cause a blemish indirectly.
  § The Gemara returns to discuss the leavening of a meal offering. Rabbi Ami says: If one placed leaven, i.e., dough that has leavened to such an extent that it is no longer used as food but as a leavening agent for other dough, on top of the dough of a meal offering, and he went and sat himself down to wait, meaning that he performed no other action, and the dough then leavened of its own accord, he is liable to receive lashes for it. This is similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat. The Gemara questions this comparison: And is one liable for performing a prohibited action on Shabbat in a case like this? But doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say
  
  Daf 57a
  
  that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat to its other side, so that both sides were roasted, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. But if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt, as the meat is considered cooked only if both sides were roasted. If so, the same should apply to one who places leaven on the dough of a meal offering: He should be liable only if he turns the dough over. This contradicts the ruling of Rabbi Ami.
  Rava said: What does Rabbi Yoḥanan, as well, mean when he says: He is liable to receive lashes for it, similar to performing a prohibited action on Shabbat? He means that one who places leaven on the dough of a meal offering, even if he does not turn it over, is similar to one who performs a prohibited action of roasting on Shabbat, meaning that he is similar to one who turned over the roasting food on the coals.
  § The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one who placed meat on top of coals on Shabbat, if he subsequently turned over the meat he is liable for cooking on Shabbat, and if he did not turn over the meat he is exempt. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that this was a situation where if he does not turn over the meat it would not cook, then it is obvious that if he does not turn it over he is exempt. Rather, it must be referring to a case where even if he does not turn over the meat it would nevertheless cook. But if so, why isn’t he liable for merely placing the meat on the coals, despite the fact that he did not turn it over?
  The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this <i>halakha</i> in a case where if he does not turn over the meat it would cook on one side only partially, roughly one-third of the ordinary process of cooking, like the food of ben Derosai. And now that he turns it over, it cooks on both sides like the food of ben Derosai. And Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that any meat roasted on only one side like the food of ben Derosai is nothing, i.e., this is not a violation of the prohibited labor of cooking on Shabbat. If it was roasted on both sides like the food of ben Derosai this is classified as cooking, and he is liable for cooking on Shabbat.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the case of meat roasted on one side on Shabbat. Rava says: And if a quantity of that meat equivalent in volume to a fig-bulk was fully roasted on one side of the meat and the roasted area was in one spot on the piece of meat, while the rest of the meat remained raw, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: It can be inferred from Rava’s statement that if the fig-bulk of meat that was roasted was in one spot, yes, he is liable, whereas if the amount of the fig-bulk was distributed over two or three separate spots he is not liable. But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Shabbat</i> 102b): One who drills a hole of any size is liable for the labor of building or the labor of striking a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel?
  The Gemara analyzes that mishna: What are the circumstances? If we say that the mishna is referring to one who drills a hole in one spot alone, why is he liable? For what purpose is a hole of any size, which includes a very small hole, fit to be used? Rather, is it not referring to one who drills holes in two or three different spots, and the reason he is liable is that these holes are fit to be joined? Builders who require a large hole will often start by drilling a few small holes which they later enlarge and join together. By the same logic, if the meat was roasted in a few spots he should be liable, as these can join together. The Gemara answers: No; actually the mishna is referring to one who drills in only one spot, as one can say that the hole is fit as an entrance [<i>levava</i>] for the placement of the tooth of a key [<i>aklida</i>], which is very small.
  And there are those who say there is a different version of this discussion: Rava says: Even if the fig-bulk of the meat that was fully roasted on only one side was distributed over two or three separate spots, he is liable for cooking on Shabbat. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: We learn this <i>halakha</i> in the mishna as well: One who drills a hole of any size is liable. What are the circumstances? If we say that the hole is in one spot alone, why is he liable? For what purpose is a hole of any size fit to be used? Rather, is it not referring to one who drills holes in two or three different spots, and the reason he is liable is that these holes are fit to be joined? Similarly, in the case discussed by Rava, one is liable for the cooking of the meat in a few different spots which can join together. The Gemara answers: No; actually the mishna is referring to one who drills in only one spot, as one can say that it is fit as an entrance for the placement of the tooth of a key.
  § The Gemara returns to discussing the prohibition against leavening a meal offering. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the deep-pan meal offering, the verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven; for any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). The term “meal offering” is apparently superfluous, and therefore the <i>baraita</i> explains: If the verse had stated only: Nothing that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven, I would say: I have derived only that the handful removed from the meal offering for burning on the altar alone is included in the prohibition: “Shall not be made with leaven,” as only the handful is burned on the altar.
  From where is it derived that one is liable for the leavening of a meal offering whose handful has not yet been removed? The verse states: “Meal offering,” to teach that the prohibition includes a meal offering before the removal of its handful. The Gemara asks: Since this verse is stated in the context of the deep-pan meal offering, from where is it derived that one is liable for leavening the other meal offerings, which are not mentioned in this passage? Therefore, the verse states the inclusive phrase: “No meal offering,” to apply this <i>halakha</i> to other meal offerings.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues to expound the verse. The phrase: “That you shall bring to the Lord,” indicates that this prohibition applies only to a fit meal offering, but not to a disqualified meal offering, e.g., a meal offering that was taken outside the Temple or that was rendered ritually impure. From here the Sages stated that one who leavens a fit meal offering is liable to receive lashes, but one who leavens a disqualified meal offering is exempt.
  With regard to the ruling that the prohibition against leavening does not apply to a disqualified meal offering, Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one leavened a meal offering when it was fit, and subsequently someone removed the meal offering and it emerged from the Temple courtyard and was thereby disqualified, and he again leavened it, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is he liable for the second leavening as well? The Gemara explains the possibilities: Does one say that since it emerged it is disqualified in accordance with the status of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area, and therefore when he again leavens it he is not liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it?
  Or perhaps, since one already leavened the meal offering, from this point forward the disqualification of a sacred item that emerges from its permitted area is ineffective with regard to removing it from the prohibition against leavening, as the prohibition against emerging from the Temple itself applies only to a fit meal offering. And therefore, when he again leavens it he is liable for it due to the prohibition against leavening a meal offering after one who already leavened it. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rav Mari raises another dilemma concerning the leavening of a meal offering. If a priest leavened a meal offering while standing at the top of the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara clarifies the possibilities: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “No meal offering that you shall bring to the Lord shall be made with leaven” (Leviticus 2:11), which indicates that this prohibition applies only to a meal offering that has not yet been brought to the Lord, i.e., to the altar. And therefore, as this meal offering has already been brought to the top of the altar, even though it has not yet been burned, perhaps it is not included in the prohibition.
  Or perhaps any offering whose burning has not yet been performed is considered like one whose action of sacrifice has not yet been performed, despite the fact that it has already been brought to the top of the altar. If so, this meal offering is included in the prohibition against leavening. No answer was found, and the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  The Gemara asks: And now that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> derives from the phrase: “No meal offering,” that the prohibition includes even a meal offering before the removal of its handful, why do I need the phrase: “That you shall bring,” in the same verse? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “That you shall bring,” in order to include the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany certain animal offerings such as burnt offerings, peace offerings, and the sin offerings and guilt offerings of a leper in the prohibition against leavening. Unlike the standard meal offerings, from which a handful is removed, these are entirely burned upon the altar, and the additional derivation is necessary to include them in the prohibition against leavening. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This phrase serves to include the shewbread in the prohibition against leavening.
  The Gemara clarifies these opinions: With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the Gemara asks: How is it possible to leaven the meal offering brought with libations? This type of meal offering is kneaded only with olive oil, which is a type of fruit juice,
  
  Daf 57b
  
  and there is a principle that fruit juices do not leaven dough. Reish Lakish says that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili would say: Even though the oil of the meal offering brought with libations is plentiful, sometimes one might also knead a meal offering with some water, if he considers it necessary to add it, and it is fit. If so, it is possible for this meal offering to leaven due to the water, and therefore the verse: “That you shall bring,” teaches that the prohibition against leavening also applies to this type of meal offering.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the vessel into which a tenth of an ephah of flour for baking the shewbread is placed in is a measuring vessel for dry items, and we have heard that Rabbi Akiva said: The measuring vessels for dry items were not consecrated as service vessels. This means the shewbread becomes consecrated only when it is placed on the Table in the Sanctuary, after it has been baked. If so, at this stage, the prohibition against leavening is not relevant.
  In answer to this question, the Gemara states that Rabbi Reuven sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, in which he cited a statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: This is the correct version [<i>hetze’ah</i>] of this <i>baraita</i>, and one should reverse the names of the Sages in it: The phrase “that you shall bring” serves to include the shewbread in the prohibition against leavening; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This phrase serves to include the meal offering brought with libations in the prohibition against leavening. Consequently, there is no contradiction between Rabbi Akiva’s statement here and his statement with regard to measuring vessels for dry items.
  The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is the one who maintains that the measuring vessels for dry items were consecrated, follows [<i>ve’azda</i>] his line of reasoning stated elsewhere. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and one of the students of Rabbi Yishmael both said the same thing. And who is that student of Rabbi Yishmael? It is Rabbi Yoshiya.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the consecration of the Tabernacle and its vessels before their inauguration: “And it came to pass on the day that Moses had made an end of setting up the Tabernacle, and had anointed it and sanctified it, and all its vessels, and the altar and all its vessels, and had anointed them and sanctified them” (Numbers 7:1). Rabbi Yoshiya says: The measuring vessels for liquid items, e.g., oil, and wine for libations, were anointed and thereby consecrated both on the inside and on the outside. The measuring vessels for dry items, such as the flour for meal offerings, were anointed and consecrated only on the inside, but were not anointed on the outside.
  Rabbi Yonatan says: The measuring vessels for liquid items were anointed on the inside and were not anointed on the outside, whereas the measuring vessels for dry items were not anointed at all. Rabbi Yonatan cites a proof for his opinion: You can know that the measuring vessels for dry items were not consecrated at all, because it is taught that these vessels do not consecrate items placed inside them. As it is written: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two wave-loaves of two tenth-parts of a ephah. They shall be of fine flour; they shall be baked with leaven, for first produce to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17). When are they considered consecrated to the Lord? Only after they are baked with leaven. This demonstrates that when the flour is placed into the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel the meal offering is not yet consecrated.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan disagree? They disagree with regard to the interpretation of the word “them” in the phrase: “And sanctified them” (Numbers 7:1). Both <i>tanna’im</i> agree that the term “them” serves to exclude something from the anointing and consecration, but they disagree over what is excluded. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that “them” serves to exclude the consecration of the measuring vessels for dry items on the outside, i.e., only the inside of the vessels is consecrated. And Rabbi Yonatan maintains that the measuring vessels for dry items are non-sacred, i.e., not consecrated at all, and therefore it is not necessary for the verse to exclude them. Where it was necessary for the verse to exclude something, it was with regard to measuring vessels used for liquid items, to teach that they are consecrated only on the inside but not on the outside.
  The Gemara asks: Since the dispute between Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Yonatan concerns the <i>halakha</i> of measuring vessels for dry items, let Rabbi Yoḥanan say also, as he did with regard to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and Rabbi Yoshiya: Rabbi Akiva and one of the students of Rabbi Yishmael both said the same thing, and who is that student? Rabbi Yonatan. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan did not say this due to the fact that their opinions are not the same with regard to measuring vessels used for liquid items: Rabbi Akiva maintains that these vessels are consecrated both on the inside and on the outside, whereas Rabbi Yonatan rules that they are consecrated only on the inside.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can it be suggested, according to the opinion that the measuring vessels for dry items were not consecrated, that the shewbread is consecrated only when it is placed on the Table? But before that there is the stage in which the dough is placed into the receptacle [<i>bisa</i>] in which it is kneaded. Since this vessel is used for liquid items, the dough should be consecrated at that point. Abaye said to Rav Pappa: This is referring to a case where he kneaded the dough on top of a flat leather spread [<i>katavliyya</i>], which does not sanctify the dough.
  The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to that which Rabbi Yonatan said to Rabbi Yoshiya as proof of his opinion, that you can know that it is so, as it is taught that these vessels do not consecrate items placed inside them, let Rabbi Yoshiya say to him in refutation of his claim: This is referring to a case where he measured the flour for the two loaves in a vessel used for measuring a tenth of an ephah, but it was a vessel that was non-sacred, and it is for this reason that the loaves are not consecrated.
  The Gemara responds: How can these cases be compared? Granted, one can say that the shewbread was kneaded on a leather spread rather than in a receptacle, as the Merciful One does not write in the Torah that one should specifically use a receptacle to knead the shewbread. Therefore, when one kneads the dough of a meal offering on top of a leather spread, we have no problem with it. But in the case of the two loaves whose flour was measured in a vessel used for measuring a tenth of an ephah, since the Merciful One states explicitly to use a vessel of a tenth of an ephah and measure with it, can it be suggested that the one preparing the meal offering should leave aside the consecrated vessel for a tenth of an ephah and measure with a non-sacred vessel for a tenth of an ephah?
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that one who offers up outside the Temple courtyard a portion of the meat of a sin offering, or a portion of the meat of a guilt offering, or a portion of the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, or a portion of the meat of offerings of lesser sanctity, or a portion of the surplus of the <i>omer</i> offering, or a portion of the leftover of the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on <i>Shavuot</i> of two loaves from the new wheat, or the shewbread, or the remainder of meal offerings, that in all these cases he violates a prohibition, although these items are not meant to be sacrificed on the altar?
  The <i>baraita</i> answers: The verse states: “For any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). The extra term “of it” teaches that any item that has already had some part of it burned in the fire on the altar is included in the prohibition: Do not burn, stated in that verse explicitly with regard to honey and leaven.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to the two loaves and the shewbread, is there some part of them burned in the fire? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A portion of every offering is sacrificed on the altar, except for the two loaves and the shewbread, as no part of them is burned in the fire?
  Rav Sheshet said: Although no part of the two loaves or the shewbread themselves is burned in the fire, nevertheless, they are included in the prohibition against offering them up to the altar, since they are not viewed as independent entities but rather as parts of larger offerings. The two loaves accompany the sheep sacrificed as burnt offerings on Shavuot, and are permitted for consumption only once those sheep have been burned on the altar. Similarly, the shewbread is permitted for consumption only after the bowls of frankincense that were on the Table with it have been burned on the altar.
  § The Gemara discusses the prohibition against offering up on the altar parts of offerings after their sacrificial portions have already been burned. It was stated: With regard to one who brings up any part of any of the items listed in the <i>baraita</i> onto the ramp leading to the altar, but not to the altar itself, Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable and Rabbi Elazar says he is exempt.
  The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: After the verse: “As any leaven and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord,” the next verse states: “As an offering of first fruits you may bring them to the Lord, but they shall not come up to the altar for a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 2:12). I have derived only that this <i>halakha</i> applies to an item that is brought on the altar. From where is it derived that the same applies if it is brought to the ramp of the altar? The verse states: “But they shall not come up to the altar for a pleasing aroma,” to be accepted, and the ramp is the means to ascend to the altar.
  And what is the reason that Rabbi Elazar says that one who brings up parts to the ramp is exempt? As the verse states: “For any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord. As an offering of first produce you may bring them to the Lord, but they shall not come up to the altar for a pleasing aroma” (Leviticus 2:11–12).
  The Gemara explains: The term “them” indicates that this <i>halakha</i> applies only to those offerings that come from leaven or honey and which are called: “An offering of first produce.” This category consists of first fruits, which are brought from dates and other sweet fruit and which are called: “The choicest first fruits of your land” (Exodus 23:19), and the two loaves, which are leaven and are the first meal offerings brought from the new crop each year. In other words, it is with regard to this category that the verse amplifies for you the <i>halakha</i> that the ramp of the altar is considered like the altar itself. But with regard to other items, e.g., the meat of sin offerings and guilt offerings, the ramp of the altar is not treated like the altar itself.
  
  Daf 58a
  
  The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that the prohibition against bringing leftover portions up to the ramp applies to all of the items listed in the <i>baraita</i>, do with this term: “Them,” in the verse: “As an offering of first produce you may bring them” (Leviticus 2:12), from which Rabbi Elazar learns that only first fruits and the two loaves are included in the prohibition?
  The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One might have thought that an individual may donate and bring to the Temple a gift offering similar to those two loaves brought by the community, and in support I will read with regard to this offering the verse that deals with other gift offerings: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24), which would mean that the offering is consecrated and he must bring it as he declared.
  Therefore, the verse states: “As an offering of first produce you may bring.” The phrase: “You may bring,” is written in the plural, meaning that it is addressed to the community. Therefore, it is interpreted to mean: I said to you that a community may consecrate and bring the two loaves, which are an offering of first produce, but an individual may not consecrate and bring two loaves of this nature.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that only an individual may not bring two loaves as a gift offering, as an individual does not bring his obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves, i.e., perhaps specifically an individual, who never has an obligatory offering of two loaves, may not bring two loaves as a gift offering. But the community shall bring two loaves as a gift offering, as the community does bring its obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves. Therefore, the verse states: “You may bring them,” to exclude the possibility of a communal gift offering of two loaves. The <i>baraita</i> concludes: And what is there left for you to bring as offerings that come from leaven and honey? The two loaves that comes from leaven, and the first fruits that come from honey, i.e., sweet fruits.
  The Gemara asks: And may the two loaves not be sacrificed as communal gift offerings? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “As any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it” (Leviticus 2:11): If it is stated: “Any leaven,” why is it stated: “Any honey”? And if it is stated: “Any honey,” why is it stated: “Any leaven”? In other words, why is it necessary for the verse to repeat the inclusive term “any,” from which it is derived that offering an insufficient quantity of honey or leaven is included in the prohibition? The <i>baraita</i> answers: Both of these terms had to be stated, because there is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to leaven that is not applicable to honey, and there is another <i>halakha</i> that applies to honey that is not applicable to leaven.
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: In the case of leaven, although it may not be sacrificed on the altar, its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances in the Temple, as the two loaves and the bread of the thanks offering, i.e., the four loaves of the thanks offering that were eaten by the priests, are leavened bread. By contrast, with regard to honey, there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple.
  There is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to honey but not to leaven, as the prohibition concerning honey is permitted in the case of the remainder of meal offerings, meaning that the priests may eat their portion of meal offerings with honey, whereas the prohibition concerning leaven is not permitted in the case of the remainder of meal offerings, since one may not leaven this remainder. The <i>baraita</i> summarizes: Due to the fact that there is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to leaven that is not applicable to honey, and there is a <i>halakha</i> that applies to honey that is not applicable to leaven, it was necessary for the verse to state: “Any leaven,” and it was also necessary for it to state: “Any honey.”
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. When the <i>baraita</i> states concerning leaven that its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances in the Temple, what is this? Isn’t this referring to the <i>halakha</i> that the meal offering of the two loaves may be sacrificed by the community as a gift offering on the altar, as the two loaves of the communal offering themselves were not sacrificed on the altar? This would mean that two loaves may be brought as a gift offering by the community, which contradicts this claim of the previous <i>baraita</i>. Rav Amram said: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to the fact that the two loaves, which were leaven, are brought as an offering with the two lambs, which are brought up onto the altar as communal peace offerings. Since they are brought together, the two loaves and the two lambs are considered a single offering, and the lambs are sacrificed on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: If so, in the case of first fruits also, the fruits should be considered part of the offering that was brought with them. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Bikkurim</i> 3:5): As for the fledglings that were placed on top of the baskets that contained the first fruits brought to the Temple, they would sacrifice these as burnt offerings, and the baskets themselves that were in the possession of those bringing the first fruits would be given to the priests. Accordingly, with regard to honey as well, its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, as these first fruits containing honey are included with the sacrifice of burnt offerings. The Gemara answers: These fledglings came only to decorate the first fruits, despite the fact that they were later sacrificed as burnt offerings. Bringing the fledglings is not obligatory, and therefore cannot be considered part of the same offering as first fruits.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the prohibition against bringing leftover parts of offerings up to the altar after the sacrificial parts have been burned. Rami bar Ḥama asked Rav Ḥisda: With regard to one who offers up on the altar some of the meat of a bird sacrificed as a sin offering, which is meant to be eaten by the priests, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is he liable to receive lashes for this action?
  The Gemara clarifies the possibilities: The Merciful One states with regard to any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar that one who sacrifices any leftover part of it violates the prohibition. And as no part of this bird sacrificed as a sin offering is burned in the fire on the altar, is he therefore exempt? Or perhaps, any item that is called an offering is included in the prohibition, and since this bird is also called an offering, one is liable. Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: Any item that is called an offering is included in the prohibition, and this bird sacrificed as a sin offering is also called an offering.
  The Gemara notes: Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma is subject to a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: Only any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar is included in the prohibition: Do not burn. Rabbi Akiva says: Any item that is called an offering is included in this prohibition.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer? Rav Ḥisda said: The difference between them concerns the case discussed earlier, of one who brings some of the meat of a bird sin offering up to the altar. Rabbi Akiva maintains that he is liable, as it is called an offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer holds that he is exempt, as no portion of it is burned on the altar.
  Rav said: The difference between them concerns the <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, as Levi teaches: Concerning the consecrated items given to priests as gifts, the verse states: “Every offering of theirs…shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). The phrase “every offering” serves to include the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper. This oil is not burned on the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva would deem one who brings some of this <i>log</i> up to the altar liable, as it is called an offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt, since no part of it is burned in the fire.
  § The Gemara returns to the discussion about the prohibition against sacrificing leaven. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When the Torah states with regard to leaven: Do not burn it (see Leviticus 2:11), I have derived only that one who burns all of it is liable, as will be explained. From where is it derived that one who burns only part of it is also included in the prohibition? The verse states: “Any [<i>kol</i>] leaven,” which serves to include such a case. The <i>baraita</i> adds: This <i>halakha</i> has been derived only with regard to leaven in a pure state; from where is it derived that the same applies to one who sacrifices it in its mixed state, i.e., mixed with another substance? The verse states the additional expression: “As [<i>ki</i>] any leaven.”
  The Gemara analyzes this <i>baraita</i>: What is it saying? What is the meaning of the term: All of it, and the term: Part of it? Abaye said: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: When the verse states about leaven: Do not burn it, I have derived only that this prohibition applies to an olive-bulk of leaven. From where is it derived that this prohibition applies if it is only half an olive-bulk? The verse states: “Any leaven.” Furthermore, from where is it derived that one is liable not only for leaven by itself, but also for leaven in its mixed state? The verse states: “As any leaven.”
  Rava said that there is a different interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: When the verse states about leaven: Do not burn it, I have derived only that this prohibition applies to the entire handful that is removed from the meal offering. From where is it derived that this prohibition applies to half of the handful? The verse states: “Any leaven.” Furthermore, from where is it derived that one is liable not only for leaven by itself, but also for its mixed state? The verse states: “As any leaven.”
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Abaye and Rava disagree? The Gemara answers: Abaye holds: There is such an entity as a handful that is less than the volume of two olives.
  
  Daf 58b
  
  And Abaye consequently maintains that there is such a matter as a halakhically significant burning of a handful even if it is less than the volume of an olive-bulk. It follows that the phrase “any leaven” teaches that if one sacrificed less than an olive-bulk of a handful that was leaven, he is liable.
  And Rava says: There is no such entity as a handful that is less than the size of two olives, and consequently the mitzva not to burn leaven is referring initially to a full handful of two olive-bulks. And Rava holds that there is no such matter as a halakhically significant burning of a handful if it is less than the volume of an olive-bulk. Therefore, one cannot derive from the phrase “as any leaven” that one can be liable for sacrificing leaven of less than one olive-bulk. Instead, the phrase must be referring to a case where half the handful is leaven.
  § The Gemara discusses another dispute between Abaye and Rava on this topic: It was stated: With regard to one who offers up a mixture made of leaven and of honey on the altar, Rava says: He is flogged with four sets of lashes for this act, as the verse: “As any leaven and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11), includes four separate prohibitions. He is flogged one set due to the prohibition against sacrificing leaven, and he is flogged a second set due to the prohibition against sacrificing honey, and he is flogged a third set due to the prohibition against sacrificing mixtures of leaven, and he is flogged a fourth set due to the prohibition against sacrificing mixtures of honey.
  Abaye says: One is not flogged for a general prohibition, i.e., a single mitzva in the Torah that includes many different prohibited acts. Since all these actions are covered by the prohibition: “You shall not burn,” it is considered a general prohibition, for which one is not flogged.
  The Gemara cites a dispute between the Sages with regard to the opinion of Abaye. There are those who say that Abaye concedes that in any event the offender is flogged with one set of lashes for sacrificing leaven, and he is also flogged a second set of lashes for sacrificing honey, as these are not considered general prohibitions. Since the phrase: “You shall not burn,” is referring to both leaven and honey, it is as though it were written: You shall not burn leaven; you shall not burn honey.
  And there are those who say that Abaye maintains that the offender is not even flogged with one set of lashes, as the prohibition he transgressed is not specific to one matter, like the prohibition against muzzling. The principle that one is liable to be flogged for violating a prohibition is derived from the juxtaposition of the mitzva: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4), with the verses that mention lashes. It is inferred from this juxtaposition that one is not liable to be flogged for violating prohibitions whose circumstances are not similar to that of muzzling, e.g., a general prohibition that is not referring to one specific action.
  
  Daf 59a
  
  MISHNA: There are four types of meal offerings: Those that require both oil and frankincense, those that require oil but not frankincense, those that require frankincense but not oil, and those that require neither frankincense nor oil.
  The mishna elaborates: And these are the meal offerings that require both oil and frankincense: The fine-flour meal offering, as it is stated: “And he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense thereon” (Leviticus 2:1); the meal offering prepared in a pan (see Leviticus 2:5–6); the meal offering prepared in a deep pan (see Leviticus 2:7–10); and the meal offering baked in an oven, which can be brought in the form of loaves or in the form of wafers (see Leviticus 2:4).
  Additional meal offerings that require both oil and frankincense are the meal offering of priests; the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the griddle-cake offering brought by the High Priest every day, half in the morning and half in the evening; the meal offering of a gentile; a meal offering brought by women; and the <i>omer</i> meal offering (see Leviticus 23:15).
  The meal offering brought with libations that accompany burnt offerings and peace offerings requires oil but does not require frankincense. The shewbread requires frankincense but does not require oil.
  The two loaves brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> (see Leviticus 23:17), the meal offering of a sinner, and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i> require neither oil nor frankincense. The two loaves do not require oil or frankincense because these additions are not mentioned with regard to it. The meal offering of a sinner does not require them, as it is written: “He shall not put oil upon it, neither shall he give any frankincense upon it; for it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11). With regard to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>, it is similarly written: “He shall pour no oil upon it, nor give frankincense upon it, for it is a meal offering of jealousy, a meal offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance” (Numbers 5:15).
  GEMARA: Rav Pappa stated a principle with regard to all the <i>mishnayot</i> in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i>: Anywhere that we learned in a mishna that one brings a meal offering, we learned that one must bring ten items of the same type, either loaves or wafers. The Gemara explains: This statement of Rav Pappa serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: One who takes a vow to bring a meal offering baked in an oven must bring ten items. If he wishes, he may bring ten loaves or ten wafers, and if he wishes he may bring half of them as loaves and the other half as wafers. Rav Pappa teaches us that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna maintains that one may not do so; all ten must be of the same type.
  § The mishna teaches that the <i>omer</i> meal offering requires both oil and frankincense. With regard to this meal offering, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall put oil upon it and lay frankincense upon it; it is a meal offering” (Leviticus 2:15). From this it can be inferred: One must put oil specifically “upon it,” but one does not place oil upon the shewbread.
  As one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, to conclude that the shewbread should require oil? The <i>baraita</i> explains: And if the meal offering brought with libations that accompany burnt offerings and peace offerings, which does not require frankincense, nevertheless requires oil, then with regard to the shewbread, for which the <i>halakha</i> is more stringent in that it requires frankincense, is it not logical that it should also require oil? Therefore, the verse states “upon it,” which indicates that one places oil upon it, the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but one does not place oil upon the shewbread.
  Similarly, the phrase “and lay frankincense upon it” indicates that one must place frankincense “upon it,” but one does not place frankincense upon the meal offering brought with libations.
  As one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference? And if the shewbread, for which the <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than the meal offering brought with libations in that it does not require oil, nevertheless requires frankincense, then concerning the meal offering brought with libations, which does require oil, is it not logical that it should also require frankincense? Therefore, the verse states “upon it,” to indicate that one places frankincense upon it, the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but one does not place frankincense upon the meal offering brought with libations.
  In the phrase “it is a meal offering,” the term “meal offering” serves to include in the obligation of frankincense the meal offering of the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle in the wilderness. With regard to that offering the verse states: “And a meal offering mixed with oil” (Leviticus 9:4), but it does not mention frankincense. Therefore, the term “meal offering” written in the context of the <i>omer</i> meal offering serves to apply the requirement of frankincense to the meal offering of the eighth day of inauguration. And the term “it is” in the same phrase serves to exclude the two loaves sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>, to indicate that they will require neither oil nor frankincense.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>halakhot</i> stated in the <i>baraita</i>: The Master said that the phrase: “And you shall put oil upon it,” teaches that one places oil upon the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but one does not place oil on the shewbread. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Why does the <i>baraita</i> conclude that this verse excludes the shewbread? One can say instead: “Upon it” you shall place oil, but one does not place oil on the meal offering of priests.
  The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the meal offering of priests should be included in the requirement of oil, as the meal offering of priests is similar in many ways to the <i>omer</i> meal offering that is the subject of the verse. The Gemara details the points of similarity between the two types of meal offerings: Both are prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour, whereas each of the twelve loaves of the shewbread is prepared from two-tenths of an ephah. Furthermore, both are kneaded and consecrated in a service vessel, whereas the shewbread is not consecrated in a service vessel but rather is baked in an oven in the Temple courtyard.
  Thirdly, both the meal offering of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are sacrificed outside the Sanctuary on the outer altar, whereas the shewbread is placed on the Table inside the Sanctuary. And in both cases the <i>halakha</i> of a change in form applies, i.e., if they were left overnight without being sacrificed they are disqualified, whereas the shewbread is left on the Table for a week. Furthermore, in both cases there is the obligation of bringing the meal offering near to the lower part of the altar, at the southwest corner, an obligation that does not apply to the shewbread.
  And finally, some portion of both the meal offering of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering is placed in the fire, as the handful of the <i>omer</i> meal offering is sacrificed, while the entire meal offering of a priest is burned on the altar. By contrast, the shewbread is not sacrificed on the altar at all. In total, there are therefore six points of similarity between the meal offering of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, all of which are not shared by the shewbread. Consequently, the requirement of oil stated with regard to the <i>omer</i> meal offering should also apply to the meal offering of priests, not to the shewbread.
  The Gemara counters: On the contrary [<i>adderabba</i>], it stands to reason that the shewbread, not the meal offering of priests, should be included in the requirement of oil, as the shewbread has points of similarity with the <i>omer</i> meal offering in that both the shewbread and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are communal meal offerings, whereas the meal offering of priests is an individual meal offering. Furthermore, they are both obligatory offerings, whereas the meal offering of priests is voluntary. Additionally, both can sometimes be sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity, as the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of impurity is disregarded in cases involving the public. Like the offering of an individual, the meal offering of priests is not brought in a state of impurity.
  Also, there is the <i>halakha</i> that both the shewbread and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are eaten by priests, while the meal offering of priests is entirely burned on the altar. Furthermore, the <i>halakha</i> of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>] applies to both the shewbread and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but not to the meal offering of priests. And finally, both the shewbread and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are brought even on Shabbat, as they are communal offerings, whereas the meal offering of priests is not sacrificed on Shabbat. Accordingly, there are also six points of similarity between the shewbread and the <i>omer</i> meal offering. Why, then, isn’t the verse interpreted as including the shewbread in the requirement of oil, and excluding the meal offering of priests?
  The Gemara answers: Even so, it stands to reason that one should include the meal offering of priests, as in the same passage that deals with the <i>omer</i> meal offering the verse states: “And when anyone brings a meal offering to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 2:1). This verse includes all meal offerings of individuals in the <i>halakhot</i> of meal offerings stated in this chapter, including the meal offering of priests.
  The Gemara further analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said: The phrase: “And lay frankincense upon it” (Leviticus 2:15), teaches that one must place frankincense upon the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but one does not place frankincense upon the meal offering brought with libations. The Gemara asks: Why does the <i>baraita</i> state that this verse excludes the meal offering brought with libations? One can say: One places frankincense upon the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but one does not place frankincense upon the meal offering of priests.
  The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the meal offering of priests should be included in the requirement of frankincense, as the meal offering of priests is similar in many respects to the <i>omer</i> meal offering. The Gemara elaborates: Both are prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour, whereas the libations that accompany meal offerings come in various amounts, depending on the type of animal offering they accompany. Furthermore, in both cases the flour is mixed with a <i>log</i> of oil, whereas in the case of the meal offering brought with libations, the amount of oil mixed with the flour depends on the type of animal offering it accompanies.
  Additionally, both the meal offering of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are brought near to the altar, a ritual that is not performed with the meal offering brought with libations. And finally, both are sacrificed due to themselves, i.e., they do not accompany any other offering, whereas meal offerings brought with libations accompany animal offerings. There are therefore four points of similarity between the meal offering of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering that do not apply to the meal offering brought with libations.
  The Gemara counters: On the contrary, it stands to reason that the meal offering brought with libations and not the meal offering of priests should be included in the requirement of frankincense. This is because the meal offering brought with libations is similar to the <i>omer</i> meal offering in that both the meal offering brought with libations and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are communal meal offerings, whereas the meal offering of priests is that of an individual.
  Furthermore, both the meal offering brought with libations and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are obligatory offerings, while the meal offering of priests is a gift offering. And both may sometimes be sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity, as the prohibition against performing the Temple service in a state of impurity is disregarded in cases involving the public; whereas the meal offering of priests must be brought in a state of purity because it is an offering of an individual.
  Finally, both are brought even on Shabbat, whereas the meal offering of priests may not be brought on Shabbat. Accordingly, as there are also four points of similarity between the meal offering brought with libations and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, one can ask why the meal offering brought with libations is not included in the requirement of frankincense. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that one should include the meal offering of priests in the requirement of frankincense, as the verse states: “Anyone” (Leviticus 2:1), which is referring to all meal offerings of individuals.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that the term: “Meal offering” (Leviticus 2:15), serves to include the meal offering of the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle in the requirement of frankincense. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one can say that this term serves to exclude the meal offering of the eighth day from the requirement of frankincense. The Gemara is puzzled by this suggestion: What is this suggestion? Granted, if you say that the verse serves to include the meal offering of the eighth day of inauguration in the requirement of frankincense, it works out well. This is because the only reason one could know that the requirement of frankincense applies would be that the <i>halakha</i> of this meal offering, which was brought on one occasion, is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a meal offering that is brought in all generations.
  But if you say that the verse serves to exclude the meal offering of the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle from the requirement of frankincense, why do I need a verse for this purpose? There is a principle that we do not learn the requirements of transitory offerings from the requirement of offerings of later generations. In other words, even without this verse one would not have thought that the requirement of frankincense applies to the meal offering of the eighth day, so there is no need for the verse to exclude this possibility.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that the term: “It is” (Leviticus 2:15), serves to exclude the two loaves sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>, to indicate that they will require neither oil nor frankincense. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one can say that this serves to exclude the meal offering of priests from the requirements of oil and frankincense. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that the meal offering of priests should be included in these requirements, while the two loaves should be excluded, as the meal offering of priests is similar to the <i>omer</i> meal offering in several respects that do not apply to the two loaves. The Gemara elaborates: Both are prepared from a tenth of an ephah of flour, unlike the two loaves, which are prepared from two-tenths.
  Furthermore, both are consecrated in a service vessel, unlike the two loaves, which are consecrated by being baked in an oven. Both come as <i>matza</i>, whereas the two loaves are leaven. And both come due to themselves, not with any other offering, whereas the two loaves come together with the lambs on <i>Shavuot</i>. With regard to both the meal offering of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, there is an obligation to bring them near to the altar, which does not apply to the two loaves. And finally, they are both placed in the fire atop the altar, whereas the two loaves are not sacrificed on the altar.
  The Gemara counters: On the contrary,
  
  Daf 59b
  
  it stands to reason that the two loaves, not the meal offering of priests, should be included in the requirement of oil and frankincense, as the two loaves have points of similarity with the <i>omer</i> meal offering. The Gemara elaborates: The two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are communal meal offerings, whereas the meal offering of priests is a meal offering of an individual. Both are obligatory offerings, whereas the meal offering of priests is a gift offering. Both are sometimes sacrificed in a state of ritual impurity, while the meal offering of priests may not be. Also, they are similar in that priests eat the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, whereas the meal offering of priests is entirely burned upon the altar.
  Furthermore, the <i>halakha</i> of <i>piggul</i> applies to the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, but not to the meal offering of priests. And these offerings are sacrificed even on Shabbat, whereas the meal offering of priests is not. Additionally, both the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering render other items permitted, as the <i>omer</i> meal offering renders permitted the consumption of the new crop and the two loaves render permitted the sacrifice of meal offerings from the new crop; whereas the meal offering of priests does not render anything permitted. And both cases include the requirement of waving, while the meal offering of priests is not waved. In addition, the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering must come from the produce of Eretz Yisrael, whereas the meal offering of priests may consist of produce from outside Eretz Yisrael.
  Also, the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are sacrificed at a fixed time, as the <i>omer</i> meal offering is brought on the day after the first Festival day of Passover and the two loaves are sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>. By contrast, there is no fixed time for a meal offering of priests. Finally, the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering must come from the new crop, whereas the meal offering of priests may be brought from the old crop. And these eleven points of similarity between the two loaves and the <i>omer</i> meal offering are more numerous than the six points of similarity between the meal offerings of priests and the <i>omer</i> meal offering.
  The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, it stands to reason that one should include the meal offering of priests in the requirement of oil and frankincense, as in the passage discussing the <i>omer</i> meal offering the verse states: “Anyone.” This verse is referring to all meal offerings of individuals, including meal offerings of priests.
  MISHNA: And if one places oil or frankincense on the meal offering of a sinner or on the meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i>, he is liable to be flogged for violating the prohibition against placing the oil by itself, and he is liable to be flogged for violating the prohibition against placing the frankincense by itself, as these are two separate prohibitions. If one placed oil upon the meal offering he has disqualified it, but if one placed frankincense upon the meal offering he should gather the frankincense and remove it. In this manner, the meal offering can be salvaged.
  Furthermore, one violates the prohibition only by placing oil on the meal offering prior to the removal of the handful; if he placed oil on its remainder he does not violate a prohibition. If one placed a vessel with oil on top of a vessel that contains a meal offering of a sinner or a meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> he did not disqualify the meal offering, as the oil was not placed on the meal offering itself.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the meal offering of a sinner is disqualified if oil is placed upon it, but if frankincense is placed upon it he should gather and remove the frankincense. The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “He shall place no oil upon it, neither shall he give any frankincense upon it, for it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11). The phrase “he shall place no oil upon it” teaches that one may not place oil on the meal offering of a sinner, and that if he did place oil on this meal offering he has thereby disqualified it.
  One might have thought that the same applies to the clause: “Neither shall he give any frankincense upon it,” and that if one gave frankincense on this meal offering he has consequently also disqualified it. Therefore, the verse states: “For it is a sin offering,” from which it is derived that even if one placed frankincense on it, it remains a sin offering, which is not the case if he placed oil upon it. One might have thought the same would also apply with regard to oil placed on a meal offering of a sinner, that in this case as well the meal offering would not be disqualified. Therefore, the verse states: “It is a sin offering,” to indicate that although it is still deemed a sin offering when frankincense is placed on it, this is not the case when oil is placed on it.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: And what did you see to interpret the verse in this manner, to disqualify the meal offering due to the addition of oil but to render it valid with the addition of frankincense, when one could have equally drawn the opposite conclusion? The <i>baraita</i> answers: This interpretation is logical for the following reason: I disqualify it due to the addition of oil, since the oil is absorbed in the flour and it is impossible to gather it and remove it from the meal offering. But I render it valid with the addition of frankincense, as it is possible to gather the frankincense and remove it from the meal offering.
  § Rabba bar Rav Huna raised a dilemma to Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one placed frankincense that had been ground into a fine powder, which cannot be gathered up and removed, on the meal offering of a sinner, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara clarifies: Is the reason that a meal offering on which frankincense was placed is generally valid due to the fact that it is possible to gather the frankincense, and since in this case it is impossible to gather it the meal offering is disqualified? Or perhaps the reason that the meal offering is usually not disqualified is due to the fact that the dry frankincense is not absorbed by the flour of the meal offering, and therefore, as this ground frankincense is also not absorbed, the meal offering is valid.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from the mishna: And if one placed frankincense upon the meal offering he should gather and remove it, and it is then valid. This indicates that the status of the meal offering depends on whether or not the frankincense can be gathered up. Since ground frankincense cannot be gathered and removed from the flour, the meal offering should be disqualified.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps there are two reasons for this <i>halakha</i> but only one of them is explicitly stated in the mishna, as the <i>tanna</i> states one reason and adds another. One reason is that the Torah did not disqualify a meal offering upon which an improper item was placed, if that item is not absorbed in the flour. And another reason the meal offering is not disqualified by frankincense is that one can gather up the frankincense and restore the meal offering to its former state.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another proof, as the aforementioned <i>baraita</i> states: I render it valid with the addition of frankincense, as it is possible to gather the frankincense and remove it from the meal offering. This also indicates that the reason the meal offering is valid is that the frankincense can be gathered up, and since ground frankincense cannot be gathered up the meal offering should be disqualified. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as here too one can say that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> states one reason and adds another. The justification he states, that the frankincense can be gathered up, may be in addition to the reason that only a substance that is absorbed by the meal offering disqualifies it.
  The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about Rabba bar Rav Huna’s dilemma? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a meal offering of a sinner or a meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i> upon which one placed frankincense, he should gather up the frankincense and the meal offering is valid. And if, before he gathered its frankincense, the priest performing the service had intent to sacrifice its handful or eat its remainder either beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>, unlike the usual case of an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [<i>piggul</i>]. This is because at the time the priest had the improper intent the meal offering was not valid, as it had frankincense upon it at that time.
  And if after he gathered its frankincense the priest has intent to sacrifice its handful or to eat its remainder outside its designated area, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for <i>karet</i>. But if he had intent to sacrifice its handful or to eat its remainder beyond its designated time, it is <i>piggul</i>, and one who eats it is liable to receive <i>karet</i> for it. This <i>baraita</i> indicates that until the frankincense is removed from the meal offering, the meal offering is disqualified. This proves that the reason a meal offering upon which frankincense has been placed is valid is due to the ability to remove the frankincense, and not because it is not absorbed. This resolves Rabba bar Rav Huna’s dilemma: If ground frankincense is placed on the meal offering of a sinner, the meal offering is disqualified.
  § The <i>baraita</i> teaches that if the priest had improper intent while there was frankincense on the meal offering, the meal offering is disqualified. The Gemara challenges: But let this meal offering of a sinner that has frankincense on it be like a meal offering on which oil had been poured from a cruse. Such a meal offering is disqualified. Why is it stated that the improper intent disqualifies the meal offering in the case where there is frankincense on it? It is already rejected from its consecrated state by the presence of the frankincense, and therefore the improper intent should have no effect.
  Abaye says: Even though the meal offering is disqualified while there is frankincense on it, nevertheless the Merciful One calls it “a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11) even in that state, and therefore the improper intent has an effect with regard to it. Rava said there is a different explanation: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan the Egyptian, who does not subscribe to the <i>halakha</i> of rejection, but holds that a sacrifice that was rejected temporarily is not rejected entirely.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Ḥanan the Egyptian says: In the event that the scapegoat of Yom Kippur was lost, even if the blood of its counterpart that is sacrificed to God has already been slaughtered and its blood has been collected in the cup, the blood is not rejected, but rather one brings another scapegoat as its counterpart and pairs it with the goat that has already been slaughtered, and the blood is sprinkled.
  Rav Ashi said that there is a different answer: Any matter that is within one’s power to remedy is not deemed rejected. In this case, since one can gather up the frankincense from the meal offering it is not rejected as an offering, and therefore the priest’s improper intention is significant.
  Rav Adda says: It stands to reason that the correct explanation is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ashi, as whom did you hear who accepts the principle of rejected offerings? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Yoma</i> 62a): And Rabbi Yehuda also says: If the blood of the goat sacrificed to God was spilled before it was sprinkled, the scapegoat, its counterpart, is left to die. Similarly, if the scapegoat dies, the blood of the goat sacrificed to God should be spilled. In either case, two other goats must be brought and lots drawn again. This indicates that according to Rabbi Yehuda, when one of the goats dies, the remaining one is rejected.
  And yet concerning a case where it is in one’s power to remedy the situation, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says: After the Paschal offerings were slaughtered in the courtyard, before the floor was rinsed a priest would fill a cup with the blood of the many offerings brought that day that was now mixed together on the floor, and sprinkle it with a single sprinkling against the base of the altar, i.e., against its north and west sides, where there was a base, as is required for the Paschal offering. This was done in case the blood of one of the offerings had been spilled. The offering would be rendered valid, as some of its blood was now sprinkled on the altar. This indicates that even if the blood of an offering was spilled onto the floor, since a priest has the power to remedy this problem the offering is not rejected.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the placement of oil upon the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i>. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one placed any amount of oil on top of an olive-bulk of a meal offering of a sinner, he has thereby disqualified the meal offering. The Gemara inquires: What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? The verse states: “He shall place no oil upon it” (Leviticus 5:11). This indicates an act of placing that has no minimum amount, and therefore one is liable for any amount of oil. When the verse states “upon it,” this teaches that a meal offering is disqualified by the oil only if it has the requisite measure of an olive-bulk.
  And Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one placed an olive-bulk of frankincense on top of any amount of a meal offering, he has thereby disqualified the meal offering. What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? It is written: “Neither shall he give any frankincense upon it” (Leviticus 5:11), which indicates that frankincense disqualifies the meal offering only if there is at least an amount that constitutes giving, which is an olive-bulk. When the verse states “upon it,”
  
  Daf 60a
  
  this is one amplificatory expression after another, one in the context of the oil and the other in the context of the frankincense. And there is a principle that one amplificatory expression after another serves only to restrict. Consequently, the placement of frankincense on any amount of a meal offering of a sinner disqualifies the meal offering.
  And there are those who say there is a different version of the discussion: Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: If one placed oil of any amount on top of an olive-bulk of a meal offering of a sinner, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara clarifies: Since the Torah states with regard to oil: “He shall place no oil upon it,” whereas with regard to frankincense it states: “Neither shall he give any frankincense upon it,” do we require that the placing of the oil must be like the giving of the frankincense, which must be an olive-bulk, or not? No answer was found, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: If one placed oil on the remainder of a meal offering of a sinner or a meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i>, he does not violate a prohibition. Concerning this, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When the verse states: “He shall place no oil upon it, neither shall he give any frankincense upon it,” one might have thought that this separation into two distinct prohibitions applies only where two priests perform these actions, one of whom places oil on the meal offering while the other puts frankincense. Perhaps in this case each of them is separately liable to receive lashes, but if one priest put both oil and frankincense on a meal offering, one might have thought he receives only one set of lashes.
  Therefore, the verse states: “Upon it,” with regard to both the oil and the frankincense, which indicates that the verse is speaking of the meal offering itself, and it is not referring to the priest who performs the service. Since both prohibited actions can be performed on the same meal offering, an individual who does both is liable to receive two sets of lashes.
  Furthermore, one might have thought this verse means one may not even place a vessel containing oil or frankincense on top of a vessel that contains the meal offering, and that if one placed such a vessel on the meal offering he has thereby disqualified it. Therefore, the verse states “upon it,” which indicates that the verse is speaking about the meal offering itself. One may not place oil or frankincense on the meal offering itself, but it is not prohibited to place a vessel containing oil or frankincense upon a vessel that contains the meal offering.
  MISHNA: There are four categories of meal offerings: Those that require bringing near, a rite that requires the priests to carry the offering in their hands and bring it near the southwest corner of the altar, but do not require waving; those that require both bringing near and waving; those that require waving but not bringing near; and those that require neither waving nor bringing near.
  The mishna elaborates: And these are the meal offerings that require bringing near but do not require waving: The fine-flour meal offering; the meal offering prepared in a pan; the meal offering prepared in a deep pan; the meal offering baked in an oven, which can be brought in the form of loaves or in the form of wafers; the meal offering of priests; the meal offering of the anointed priest; the meal offering of gentiles; a meal offering brought by women; and the meal offering of a sinner.
  Rabbi Shimon says: The meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest do not require bringing of the meal offering near to the altar, due to the fact that there is no removal of a handful in their sacrifice, and there is a principle that with regard to any meal offering where there is no removal of a handful in their sacrifice, there is also no bringing near.
  GEMARA: Rav Pappa stated a principle with regard to all the <i>mishnayot</i> in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i>: Anywhere that we learned in a mishna that one brings a meal offering, we learned that one must bring ten items of the same type, either loaves or wafers. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Pappa teaching us?
  The Gemara explains: This statement of Rav Pappa serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: One who takes a vow to bring a meal offering baked in an oven must bring ten items. If he wishes he may bring ten loaves or ten wafers, and if he wishes he may bring half of them as loaves and the other half as wafers. Rav Pappa teaches us that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna maintains that one may not do so; all ten must be of the same type.
  § The mishna teaches that the first <i>tanna</i> and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest require the ritual of bringing near. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: A verse discussing the meal offering prepared in the pan states: “And you shall bring the meal offering that is made of these to the Lord, and it shall be drawn near to the priest, and he shall bring it near to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8). If the verse had stated only: And you shall bring that which is made of these to the Lord and it shall be drawn near to the priest and he shall bring it near to the altar, omitting the words: The meal offering, I would say: I have derived only that the handful that is sacrificed on the altar alone requires bringing near.
  From where is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the entire meal offering? The verse states the superfluous term: “The meal offering,” which indicates that one must bring the entire meal offering to the altar prior to the removal of the handful. The <i>baraita</i> further asks: From where is it derived that this <i>halakha</i> applies to the meal offering of a sinner? The verse states: “The meal offering.” The addition of the definite article serves to include the meal offering of a sinner.
  The <i>baraita</i> raises a difficulty: Why is a verse necessary to teach that the requirement of bringing near applies to the meal offering of a sinner? But this <i>halakha</i> is capable of being derived by logical inference. The <i>baraita</i> elaborates: The procedure of bringing a meal offering is stated here, in the context of the meal offering of a sinner,
  
  Daf 60b
  
  which is an obligatory meal offering; and it is stated there, with regard to the deep-pan meal offering, which is a voluntary meal offering. Just as a voluntary meal offering requires bringing near, so too an obligatory meal offering, such as the meal offering of a sinner, requires bringing near.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this inference: What is notable about a voluntary meal offering? It is notable in that it requires oil and frankincense upon it, rendering its <i>halakha</i> more stringent than that of the meal offering of a sinner, which does not include oil and frankincense. Therefore, it would be logical to suggest that a voluntary meal offering requires bringing near but the meal offering of a sinner does not. The <i>baraita</i> responds: The meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>, i.e., the meal offering of jealousy, can prove that this factor is not decisive, as it does not include oil and frankincense either, and yet it requires bringing near.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this claim: One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> of the meal offering of a sinner from the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>, as there is another requirement that applies to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> but not to the meal offering of a sinner: What is notable about the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>? It is notable in that it requires waving, whereas the meal offering of a sinner does not. The <i>baraita</i> responds: The voluntary meal offering can prove that waving is not the decisive factor, as a voluntary meal offering does not require waving and yet it requires bringing near.
  Therefore, the inference has reverted to its starting point, as the aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that the voluntary meal offering and the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> are equal with regard to the requirement of the removal of a handful, and similarly they are equal with regard to the requirement of bringing near. I will also bring the additional case of the meal offering of a sinner, which is equal to them with regard to the requirement of the removal of a handful, and conclude that it should likewise be equal to them with regard to the requirement of bringing near.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this suggestion: What is notable about the common element of the voluntary meal offering and the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>? It is notable in that they are suited to come as the meal offering of a wealthy person just as they are suited to come as the meal offering of a poor person. Shall you say the same with regard to the meal offering of a sinner, which is not suitable to come either as the meal offering of a wealthy person or as the meal offering of a poor person, since a sinner who is not poor does not bring a meal offering but a different offering (see Leviticus 5:6–11)? Therefore, the verse states: “The meal offering” (Leviticus 2:8), with the addition of the definite article, to include the meal offering of a sinner in the requirement of bringing near.
  Rabbi Shimon adds to the logical inference and says that other cases are included in the derivation from the verse, as the term “and you shall bring” serves to include the <i>omer</i> meal offering in the requirement of bringing near to the altar; and so the verse states with regard to the <i>omer</i> meal offering: “Then you shall bring the <i>omer</i>, the first of your harvest to the priest” (Leviticus 23:10). Furthermore, “and it shall be drawn near” serves to include the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> in the requirement of bringing near; and so the verse states with regard to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>: “And draw it near to the altar” (Numbers 5:25).
  The <i>baraita</i> challenges: But this <i>halakha</i> is capable of being derived <i>a fortiori</i> by logical inference: And if the meal offering of a sinner, which includes a lenient aspect, as it does not require waving, nevertheless requires bringing near, then with regard to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>, which does require waving, is it not logical to conclude that it should require bringing near? The <i>baraita</i> rejects this logical inference, as there is a stringency that applies to the meal offering of a sinner which does not apply to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>: What is notable about the meal offering of a sinner? It is notable in that it comes from wheat, whereas the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> comes from barley, an inferior product.
  The <i>baraita</i> responds: The <i>omer</i> meal offering can prove that this factor is not decisive, as it also comes from barley, and yet it requires bringing near. Therefore, the same should apply to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>. The <i>baraita</i> rejects this claim: What is notable about the <i>omer</i> meal offering? It is notable in that it requires oil and frankincense, whereas the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> does not. The <i>baraita</i> answers: The meal offering of a sinner can prove that the requirement of oil and frankincense is not a decisive factor, as the meal offering of a sinner does not require oil and frankincense and yet it requires bringing near.
  Consequently, the inference has reverted to its starting point, as the aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that both the <i>omer</i> meal offering and the meal offering of a sinner are equal with regard to the requirement of the removal of a handful, and they are equal with regard to the requirement of bringing near. I will also bring the additional case of the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>, which is equal to them with regard to the requirement of the removal of a handful, and conclude that it should likewise be equal to them with regard to the requirement of bringing near.
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this suggestion: What is notable about the common element of the <i>omer</i> meal offering and the meal offering of a sinner? It is notable in that they are both not suited to come as coarse flour, but only as fine flour. Shall you say the same with regard to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>, which is suited to come as coarse flour? Therefore, the verse states: “And draw it near,” which serves to include the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> in the requirement of bringing near.
  It was stated that Rabbi Shimon derives from the term “and you shall bring” (Leviticus 2:8), written in the context of the deep-pan meal offering, that the <i>omer</i> meal offering is included in the requirement of bringing near. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda says: The term “and you shall bring” serves to include the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> in the requirement of bringing near; and so the verse states with regard to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>: “Then the man shall bring his wife to the priest, and shall bring her offering for her, a tenth of an ephah of barley flour; he shall pour no oil upon it, nor give frankincense upon it, for it is a meal offering of jealousy, a meal offering of memorial, bringing iniquity to remembrance” (Numbers 5:15).
  But with regard to the <i>omer</i> meal offering, a verse is not needed to teach that it requires bringing near. The <i>baraita</i> asks: What is the reason that no verse is needed for the <i>omer</i> meal offering? It is because this <i>halakha</i> is derived <i>a fortiori</i> by logical inference: And if the meal offering of a sinner, which includes a lenient aspect, as it does not require waving, nevertheless requires bringing near, then with regard to the <i>omer</i> meal offering, which includes a stringent aspect, as it does require waving, is it not logical to conclude that it should require bringing near?
  The <i>baraita</i> rejects this inference: What is notable about the meal offering of a sinner? It is notable in that it comes from wheat, whereas the <i>omer</i> meal offering comes from barley. The <i>baraita</i> responds: The meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> can prove that this factor is not decisive, as it comes from barley and yet it requires bringing near. The same should apply to the <i>omer</i> meal offering. The <i>baraita</i> rejects this claim: What is notable about the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>? It is notable in that it comes to clarify whether or not the wife committed the transgression of adultery, as it is described with the phrase: “Bringing iniquity to remembrance,” whereas the omer meal offering does not come to clarify whether or not one transgressed. The <i>baraita</i> answers: The meal offering of a sinner can prove otherwise, as it does not come to clarify transgression and yet it requires bringing near.
  Therefore, the inference has reverted to its starting point, as the aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case; their common element is that both the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> and the meal offering of a sinner are equal with regard to the requirement of the removal of a handful, and they are equal with regard to the requirement of bringing near. I will also bring the additional case of the <i>omer</i> meal offering, which is equal to them with regard to the requirement of the removal of a handful, and conclude that it should likewise be equal to them with regard to the requirement of bringing near. In this manner the requirement of bringing the <i>omer</i> meal offering near to the altar is derived jointly from the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> and the meal offering of a sinner.
  The Gemara asks: And how would you refute this logical inference? In other words, there is no refutation of this claim, and it is therefore unclear why it was necessary for Rabbi Shimon to derive the requirement of bringing near concerning the <i>omer</i> meal offering from the term: “And you shall bring.” The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon refutes the claim in this manner: What is notable about the common element of the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> and the meal offering of a sinner? It is notable in that they are common offerings, i.e., they can be brought many times over the course of a year, whereas the <i>omer</i> offering is sacrificed only once a year.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda respond to this claim? He maintains that this is not a valid refutation, as on the contrary, this <i>omer</i> meal offering is more common than the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> and the meal offering of a sinner. The <i>omer</i> meal offering is definitely brought once a year, whereas in the case of these offerings, there may be times when you do not find it at all, if no poor sinners come forward and no women are accused of adultery by their husbands.
  The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i>: Or perhaps when the verse states: “And you shall bring,” this does not serve to teach about the requirement of bringing near but rather is written for a different reason: To indicate that an individual Jew may donate and bring a different kind of meal offering, one made from barley, apart from these five meal offerings, all made from wheat, which the verse mentions with regard to this matter (see Leviticus 2:1–13). The five offerings are the fine-flour meal offering, the meal offering prepared in the pan, the meal offering prepared in the deep pan, and the meal offering baked in the oven, either in the form of loaves or in the form of wafers.
  And this <i>halakha</i> is necessary because the opposite conclusion could otherwise have been derived by logical inference based on juxtaposition: The community brings an obligatory meal offering from wheat, i.e., the two loaves brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and the community also brings an obligatory meal offering from barley, the <i>omer</i> meal offering. So too an individual, who brings a meal offering from wheat as a voluntary gift offering, can likewise bring a meal offering from barley as a voluntary gift offering. Therefore, to prevent this inference, the verse states: “And you shall bring the meal offering that is made of these to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:8), which teaches: I have nothing other than these five meal offerings as individual meal offerings.
  The <i>baraita</i> raises a difficulty: Or perhaps the verse states “these” not in order to exclude other individual meal offerings but rather to teach a <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who takes a vow to bring a meal offering and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, without specifying a particular type of meal offering, and it teaches that he must bring all five of them. The <i>baraita</i> explains: The verse states: “Of these,” which indicates that if the one who took a vow wants, he brings one meal offering, and if he wants, he brings all five of them.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon says: When the verse states: “The meal offering” (Leviticus 2:8), this serves to include the other meal offerings, for example the meal offering of gentiles and a meal offering brought by women, with regard to the requirement of bringing near. One might have thought that I should include from this verse even the two loaves and the shewbread. Therefore, the verse states: “Of these,” which indicates that not all meal offerings are included in the requirement of bringing near.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: And what did you see that led you to include the other meal offerings in the requirement of bringing near, and to exclude the two loaves and the shewbread from this <i>halakha</i>? One could suggest the opposite conclusion, to include these two offerings while excluding the others. The <i>baraita</i> answers: I include the other meal offerings, as there is a portion of them burned in the fire on the altar, and I exclude the two loaves and the shewbread from the requirement of bringing near, as there is no portion of them burned in the fire on the altar. Rather, they are eaten by the priests in their entirety.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: But with regard to the meal offering brought with libations, which is entirely burned in the fire, by this logic one might have thought that it should require bringing near. The <i>baraita</i> answers: The verse states: “And you shall bring the meal offering that is made of these to the Lord, and it shall be drawn near to the priest, and he shall bring it near to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8). This indicates that the requirement of bringing near applies only to those meal offerings listed in this chapter, not to the meal offering brought with libations, which is not mentioned.
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: But didn’t you already derive from the term: “And it shall be drawn near,” that the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> is included in the requirement of bringing near? The <i>baraita</i> answers: As the verse could have stated: And shall be drawn near, and instead it states: “And it shall be drawn near,” this addition serves to exclude the meal offering brought with libations from the requirement of bringing near. The <i>baraita</i> asks: And what did you see that led you to include the other meal offerings in the requirement of bringing near and to exclude the meal offering brought with libations from this requirement?
  
  Daf 61a
  
  The <i>baraita</i> answers: I include from this verse the other meal offerings, as they come due to themselves, i.e., they do not accompany other offerings, and I exclude the meal offering brought with libations, as it does not come due to itself but rather together with an animal offering. The <i>baraita</i> challenges: But the meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest also come due to themselves, and according to this logic one might have thought that they too would require bringing near.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And he shall bring it near to the altar” (Leviticus 2:8), to exclude the meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest from the requirement of bringing near. The <i>baraita</i> raises a difficulty: But that verse is required for its own sake, i.e., to teach the basic <i>halakha</i> that a meal offering requires bringing near to the altar. The <i>baraita</i> answers: This <i>halakha</i> is derived from the fact that the verse could have stated just: “And he shall bring,” and instead it states: “And he shall bring it.”
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: And what did you see that led you to include the other meal offerings in the requirement of bringing near and to exclude the meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest? The <i>baraita</i> answers: I include the other meal offerings, as there is a part of them burned in the fire of the altar, and they come due to themselves, and there is a part of them given to the priests to eat. And I exclude the two loaves and the shewbread, as there is no part of them burned in the fire. And I exclude the meal offering brought with libations, as it does not come due to itself, and I also exclude the meal offering of priests and the meal offering of the anointed priest, as there is no part of them given to the priests.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verse states: “And the priest shall take off from the meal offering its memorial-part, and shall make it smoke upon the altar, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:9). With regard to the phrase: “And the priest shall take off,” one might have thought the priest may perform this action even with a vessel. Therefore, the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering: The sons of Aaron shall offer it before the Lord, in front of the altar. And he shall take off from it his handful” (Leviticus 6:7–8). Just as the taking off that is stated below is performed specifically with the priest’s handful and not with a vessel, so too, the taking off that is stated here must be performed with the priest’s handful, not with a vessel.
  MISHNA: These are the items that require waving and do not require bringing near to the altar: The <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper and his guilt offering itself, as it is written: “And the priest shall take one of the lambs and sacrifice it for a guilt offering, and the <i>log</i> of oil, and wave them for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:12); and the first fruits, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov; and the sacrificial portions of the peace offerings of an individual and their breast and thigh, as it is written: “The thigh of heaving and the breast of waving shall they bring with the offerings of the portions consumed by fire, to wave it for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 10:15).
  This requirement applies to peace offerings belonging both to men and to women, by male Jews and not by others. The Gemara will explain this seemingly contradictory statement on 61b. In addition, the two loaves and the accompanying peace offering of two lambs brought on <i>Shavuot</i> also do not require bringing near but do require waving, as it is written: “And the priest shall wave them with the bread of the first fruits for a wave offering before the Lord, with the two lambs” (Leviticus 23:20).
  How does one perform this waving? He places the two loaves on top of the two lambs and places his two hands below the loaves and the lambs, extends the offerings to each of the four directions and brings them back, then raises and lowers them, as it is stated with regard to the waving of the ram of the inauguration of the priests: “Which is waved, and which is heaved up” (Exodus 29:27); i.e., waved back and forth, and heaved up and down. Waving was able to be performed to the east of the altar, but the bringing near of meal offerings had to be done to the west, i.e., the southwest corner of the altar. Also, with regard to all meal offerings, the wavings precede the actions of bringing near.
  The <i>omer</i> meal offering and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i> require both bringing near and waving. The meal offering of the <i>omer</i> requires waving, as it is written: “And he shall wave the <i>omer</i> before the Lord” (Leviticus 23:11), and likewise with regard to the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i> it is written: “And the priest shall take the meal offering of jealousy out of the woman’s hand and shall wave the meal offering before the Lord” (Numbers 5:25). The requirement of bringing near is derived as explained earlier. The shewbread and the meal offering brought with libations require neither bringing near nor waving.
  Rabbi Shimon says: There are three types of offerings that require performance of three mitzvot. Two mitzvot are performed on each and every one of them, but the third mitzva is not performed in their sacrifice, meaning that each of these offerings requires two out of the same three mitzvot, but not necessarily the same two as the others. And these are the three offerings: Peace offerings brought as gift offerings by an individual, communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs brought with the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>, and the guilt offering of a leper (see Leviticus 14:12–14).
  Peace offerings brought by individuals require placing hands on the head of the animals while the animals are still alive, and waving when they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation of waving them while they are alive. Communal peace offerings require waving both while the animals are still alive and after they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation of placing hands on them. And the guilt offering of a leper requires placing hands and waving while the animal is still alive, but there is no obligation of waving it after it is slaughtered.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that both the <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper and the guilt offering itself require waving. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the priest shall take one of the lambs and sacrifice it for a guilt offering, and the <i>log</i> of oil, and wave them for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:12). The plural form “them” teaches that the <i>log</i> of oil and the offering require waving, and that this should be performed with both of them together.
  And from where is it derived that if the priest waved this one by itself and that one by itself that he has fulfilled his obligation? The same verse states, in the singular form: “And sacrifice it for a guilt offering…and wave.” The Gemara inquires: Since parts of this verse are in the singular and parts are in the plural, one might have thought that he should wave both together, and then wave each one separately. Therefore, the verse states: “A wave offering,” which indicates that he should perform one waving, but not multiple wavings.
  With regard to the phrase: “A wave offering before the Lord,” the <i>baraita</i> states that this teaches that waving can be performed to the east of the altar, as taught in the mishna. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the <i>tanna</i> of a <i>baraita</i> cited earlier in the tractate (19b) say, concerning a verse discussing the bringing near of a meal offering, which states: “Before the Lord” (Leviticus 6:7), that one might have thought one brings it to the west of the altar, as this is the side facing the Sanctuary? That <i>tanna</i> proceeds to explain that the phrase: “In front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7), is a reference to the south, where one ascends the altar, and therefore the meal offering must be brought to the southwest corner. This indicates, though, that the expression “before the Lord” is a reference to the west.
  The Gemara answers: The Sages say in response: This statement, that the expression “before the Lord” is a reference to the west and not to the east, applies only with regard to the meal offering, which is called “a sin offering,” as the verse states: “It is most sacred, like the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:10), and the sin offering requires its remaining blood to be poured out on the base of the altar. Therefore, the meal offering must also be brought to a part of the altar where there is a base, and as the southeast corner of the altar did not have a base, the meal offering must be brought to the southwest corner. In this manner one fulfills both the requirement of “in front of the altar,” i.e., to the south, and the requirement of “before the Lord.” But here, with regard to the <i>log</i> of oil and guilt offering of a leper, we call any side of the altar “before the Lord.”
  § The mishna teaches: The first fruits also require waving, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. The Gemara asks: What is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, alluded to here? The Gemara answers that it is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the first fruits: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand, and place it before the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 26:4). This taught a <i>halakha</i> concerning the first fruits, that they require waving; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, as the verse is not explicitly referring to waving? The Gemara explains: The matter is derived by means of a verbal analogy from “hand,” written with regard to first fruits, and from “hand,” written with regard to a peace offering. It is written here, with regard to first fruits: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand” (Deuteronomy 26:4), and it is written there: offering “He who offers his peace offering to God…his hands shall bring it, the fire of God…to raise it as a waving before God” (Leviticus 7:29–30).
  
  Daf 61b
  
  Just as here, in the case of first fruits, it is the priest who takes the basket in his hand and waves it, so too there, in the case of the peace offering, a priest performs the waving. Just as there, with regard to a peace offering, it is the owner who performs the waving, as it is written: “He who offers…his hands shall bring it,” so too here, the owner waves the first fruits. How so; how can the waving be performed by both the priest and the owner? The priest places his hands beneath the hands of the owner and waves the first fruits together with the owner.
  The Gemara asks: And let the mishna also say that the <i>halakha</i> that first fruits require waving is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says with regard to the verse written in the portion of first fruits: “And you shall place it before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 26:10), the reference is not to the placement of the fruits alongside the altar. Rather, this is a reference to waving the first fruits. Do you say that this is a reference to waving, or perhaps it is a reference only to actual placement of the first fruits?
  He explains: When it states earlier: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand, and place it before the altar of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 26:4), placement alongside the altar is already stated; how do I realize the meaning of: “And you shall place it”? This is a reference to waving. It is therefore clear that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov is not the only <i>tanna</i> who holds that there is a requirement of waving the first fruits, as indicated by the mishna; Rabbi Yehuda also maintains this opinion.
  Rava says: The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna could have said that this <i>halakha</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. He preferred to ascribe this opinion to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, since the verse opened first with the phrase cited by Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov as the source for the requirement of waving the first fruits, as Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov derives this <i>halakha</i> from the verse: “And the priest shall take the basket from your hand” (Deuteronomy 26:4); whereas Rabbi Yehuda derives it from the later verse: “And you shall place it before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 26:10). Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The <i>tanna</i> preferred to cite this <i>halakha</i> in the name of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov since his strength in Torah is great, as the <i>halakha</i> is invariably in accordance with his opinion.
  § The mishna teaches: And the sacrificial portions of the peace offerings of an individual, which are consumed on the altar, and their breast and thigh, which are eaten by the priests, require waving. This requirement applies to peace offerings belonging both to men and to women, by male Jews and not by others. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? This statement is apparently self-contradictory, as the mishna first states that offerings brought by women require waving, and then it indicates that the offerings of others, including women, do not require waving.
  Rav Yehuda said that this is what the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna is saying: Both with regard to men and with regard to women, their offerings require waving, but the waving itself is performed only by male Jews, i.e., if the owner is a male he waves the offering together with a priest. But in the case of offerings brought by women, the female owner does not participate in the waving, as the priest alone performs the mitzva.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to peace offerings, the verse states: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: He who offers his sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord shall bring his offering out of his sacrifice of peace offerings. His own hands shall bring the offerings of the Lord made by fire. The fat with the breast he shall bring, that the breast may be waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:29–30). From the phrase: “The children of [<i>benei</i>] Israel,” it may be derived that the Jewish people wave their offerings, but gentiles who bring their offerings do not wave them. Furthermore, as the term “<i>benei</i>” can also mean: Sons of, it may be derived that only sons of Israel, i.e., males, wave their offerings, but that women do not wave their offerings.
  Rabbi Yosei says: We have found that the Torah differentiates between the offering of a Jew and the offering of gentiles and also between the offering of men and the offering of women, with regard to the obligation of placing hands. Placing hands is performed only on offerings of male Jews, not on those brought by gentiles and women. Therefore, one might have thought that a similar distinction should apply to the <i>halakha</i> of waving. Can we therefore differentiate between these different offerings also with regard to waving, and conclude that this requirement also applies only to offerings of male Jews, not those brought by gentiles or women?
  Rabbi Yosei explains: No; this conclusion is incorrect, since what is the reason that the Torah differentiates between males Jews on the one hand and gentiles and women on the other hand, with regard to placing hands? The reason is that the case of placing hands is unique, as it is performed only by the owner of the offerings; he cannot appoint an agent to perform this ceremony on his behalf. Therefore, since gentiles and women may not perform this ceremony themselves, it is logical that their offerings are excluded from this requirement.
  By contrast, can we differentiate between males Jews on the one hand and gentiles and women on the other hand, with regard to waving as well? Since waving is also performed by priests, there is no reason to distinguish between offerings of male Jews and offerings brought by others, as the priests can wave those on behalf of their owners. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “The children of [<i>benei</i>] Israel”? It means that only the Jewish people wave their offerings, but gentiles who bring their offerings do not wave them. Only sons of [<i>benei</i>] Israel, i.e., males, wave their offerings, but women do not wave their offerings.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the phrase: “The children of Israel,” I have derived only that the requirement of waving applies to the children of Israel, i.e., those who were born Jewish. From where is it derived that the same applies to converts and to emancipated Canaanite slaves? The verse states, immediately after that phrase: “He who offers [<i>hammakriv</i>] his sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:29), which indicates that the <i>halakha</i> of waving applies to anyone who brings his offering to the Temple, including converts and emancipated slaves.
  The <i>baraita</i> challenges: Or perhaps this term does not serve to include converts and emancipated Canaanite slaves, but rather this is referring to the priest who sacrifices [<i>hammakriv</i>] the sacrificial portions on the altar? The <i>baraita</i> answers: This term cannot be referring to the priest, as when it states: “His own hands shall bring the offerings of the Lord made by fire. The fat with the breast he shall bring, that the breast may be waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30), the requirement of waving by the owner is stated. Since the obligation of the owner to wave is stated in this verse, and the obligation of the priest is derived from the verbal analogy from the term “hand” written with regard to a peace offering, evidently both the owner and the priest must wave the offering. The Gemara asks: How so? The Gemara answers: The priest places his hands beneath the hands of the owner and waves the offering together with the owner.
  
  Daf 62a
  
  The Gemara asks: How does one perform the ritual of waving? First he places the sacrificial portions on the palm of the hand, and puts the breast and the thigh on them. And in any place, i.e., with regard to any offering, where there are loaves brought with together with the animal, the loaves are placed on the top.
  The Gemara asks: Where is it stated that the loaves must be placed on the top? Rav Pappa says: This is stated explicitly with regard to the ram offered at the inauguration of the priests, as the verse states: “And he took the fat, and the tail, and all the fat that was upon the inward, and the lobe of the liver, and the two kidneys, and their fat, and the right thigh. And out of the basket of <i>matzot</i> that was before the Lord he took one <i>matza</i>, and one cake of oiled bread, and one wafer, and placed them on the fat, and upon the right thigh. And he put it all upon the hands of Aaron, and upon the hands of his sons, and waved them for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 8:25–27).
  The Gemara inquires: What is the reason, i.e., from where is it learned, that the sacrificial portions should be placed on the bottom, and the breast and thigh on top of them? If we say it is because it is written: “The thigh of heaving and the breast of waving they shall bring upon the offerings of the fat made by fire, to wave it for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 10:15), which indicates that the breast and thigh are placed on top of the fats, that is insufficient: But isn’t it written elsewhere: “The fat upon the breast he shall bring, that the breast may be waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30)? That verse leads to the opposite conclusion, as it indicates that the fats are to be placed on top of the breast.
  Abaye said: That second verse is not referring to the placement of the portions for waving. Rather, it describes their placement when the priest brings the parts of the offering from the slaughtering area in order to be waved. This priest carries the breast and thigh below the fats, and accordingly, when he overturns these parts onto the hand of the priest who will wave them, the fat will be under the breast and thigh.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “And they put the fat upon the breasts” (Leviticus 9:20), which also indicates that the fat is to be on top of, not beneath, the breast and thigh? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring to the stage when the priest who waved them gives them to another priest, who brings the sacrificial portions up to the altar. Once again the parts are turned over in this exchange, so that the sacrificial fats are on top of the breast. And this third priest then goes and burns the sacrificial portions on the altar.
  The Gemara adds: And this teaches us that we require three priests to perform this service: One to bring the parts from the slaughtering area, one to wave them, and a third to burn them upon the altar. The reason why all three acts cannot be performed by a single priest is because it is written: “In the multitude of people is the King’s glory” (Proverbs 14:28). If a larger number of priests are involved in the Temple service, this represents greater glory for God. Therefore, it is preferable for the service to be carried out by three priests rather than one.
  § The mishna teaches: And the two loaves and the accompanying peace offering of two lambs brought on <i>Shavuot</i> also require waving. With regard to this waving, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the priest shall wave them upon the bread of the first fruits for a wave offering before the Lord, upon the two lambs; they shall be holy to the Lord for the priest” (Leviticus 23:20).
  One might have thought that the priest who performs the waving must place the lambs on top of the bread for the waving. Therefore, the verse states: “A wave offering before the Lord upon the two lambs,” which indicates that the two loaves must be on top of the lambs. If the verse had stated only: “Upon the two lambs,” one might have thought the priest must place the bread on top of the lambs. Therefore, the verse states: “Upon the bread of the first fruits,” which indicates that the loaves are to be placed under the lambs for waving.
  Consequently, the verse is evenly balanced, as two contradictory conclusions can be derived from it, and I do not know whether the bread should be on top of the lambs, or whether the lambs should be on top of the bread. The <i>baraita</i> resolves the contradiction: Just as we find everywhere that waving is performed that the bread is placed above the other portions, so too, in the case of the two loaves and the two lambs, the bread is placed above the lambs. The Gemara interrupts its citation of the <i>baraita</i> to ask: Where is it stated that the loaves must be placed on top? Rav Pappa says: This is stated explicitly with regard to the ram offered at the inauguration of the priests.
  The Gemara resumes its citation of the <i>baraita</i>. Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam disagrees with the previous ruling, and says: It is the lambs that are placed above, and the two loaves underneath them. And how do I realize the meaning of the phrase: “Upon the two lambs,” which seems to indicate that the two loaves are to be placed above the lambs and not under them? Rabbi Yosei ben HaMeshullam explains: This verse teaches that the requirement to wave the lambs together with the loaves applies only to the two lambs sacrificed as communal peace offerings on <i>Shavuot</i>, to exclude the seven other lambs, brought as burnt offerings, which are not to be waved with the loaves.
  Ḥanina ben Ḥakhinai says there is a different answer: The priest places the two loaves between the thighs of the two lambs and waves them. And in this manner it is found that he realizes the meaning of both of these two verses, as the bread is on top of the lambs and the lambs are also on top of the bread. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says, in objection to this opinion: One would not do so, i.e., place bread that had been placed between the thighs of lambs, before a flesh and blood king; should one do so before the King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He? Rather, he places the two loaves and the two lambs alongside each other, and waves them together, and thereby fulfills the requirements of the verses in a respectful manner.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: But we require fulfillment of the term “upon [<i>al</i>]” in the verse, either by placing the bread upon the lambs or the lambs upon the bread. In response, Rav Ḥisda says to Rav Hamnuna, and some say that Rav Hamnuna says to Rav Ḥisda: With this opinion, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that the word <i>al</i> can mean next to.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the shewbread, the verse states: “And you shall put pure frankincense upon [<i>al</i>] each row” (Leviticus 24:7). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: <i>Al</i> in this instance means: Next to. The <i>baraita</i> asks: Do you say that <i>al</i> means: Next to? Or perhaps it means only actually upon? The <i>baraita</i> explains: When it says: “And you shall put there the Ark of the Testimony, and you shall place a cover over [al] the Ark with the Curtain” (Exodus 40:3), the word <i>al</i> cannot mean upon, as the Curtain that separated the Sanctuary from the Holy of Holies was hanging near the Ark, not placed on top of it. Therefore, you must say that <i>al</i> means next to.
  § The mishna teaches that the two loaves and the two lambs are waved in the following manner: The priest places his two hands below the lambs, extends them to each of the four directions and brings them back, then raises and lowers them. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He extends the lambs and brings them back in order to dedicate them to He to Whom the four directions belong. He raises and lowers them in order to dedicate them to He to Whom the heavens and the earth belong.
  In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the idea like this: Rabbi Ḥama bar Ukva says that Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina says: He extends the lambs and brings them back in order to request a halt to harmful winds and storms that come from all directions. Similarly, he raises and lowers them in order to halt harmful dews and rains that come from above.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Rav Avin says: That is to say, i.e., it can be derived from here, that a non-essential mitzva helps prevent calamity, as waving is a non-essential mitzva; even if one failed to wave the loaves he has fulfilled his obligation, and nevertheless waving halts harmful winds and dews. Rava says: And one should conduct himself similarly with a <i>lulav</i> on the festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, i.e., he should extend and bring back and raise and lower the <i>lulav</i>, for the same reasons.
  The Gemara relates: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov would extend and bring back the <i>lulav</i> in this manner, and would say: I am hereby shooting an arrow in the eye of Satan, as despite Satan’s best efforts, the Jewish people continue to fulfill mitzvot joyously. The Gemara comments: It is not correct to say this, because this will induce Satan to come to incite the Jewish people to sin. Gloating about his victory over the evil inclination will lead Satan to redouble its efforts to corrupt them.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss <i>halakhot</i> concerning the waving of offerings: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The communal peace offerings, which were brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> and which must be waved while the animals are still alive, also require waving after their slaughter, and their waving after they are slaughtered is to be performed as they are, meaning that the whole animal must be waved, as was done when it was alive; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: One does not wave the whole animal; rather, the waving is performed only with the breast and thigh.
  The Gemara inquires: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree? Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Hamnuna, and some say Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: They disagree with regard to a principle about the application of verbal analogies. One adopts the exegetical principle: Infer from it and derive the details from it, meaning that when one case is derived from another by means of a verbal analogy, all the details of the source case are applied to the second case. The other Sage accepts the principle: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, meaning that one derives only the specific detail referred to by the verbal analogy, and all other aspects of the source case are not applied to the other case.
  The Gemara elaborates: The waving of communal peace offerings is derived from the waving of individual peace offerings through a verbal analogy. The Rabbis maintain: Infer from it and derive the details from it, leading to the conclusion: Just as individual peace offerings require waving after slaughter, so too, communal peace offerings require waving after slaughter. And derive the details from it: Just as there, in the case of individual peace offerings, the waving is performed with the breast and thigh alone, so too here, with regard to communal peace offerings as well, the waving is with the breast and thigh alone.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, meaning that the basic <i>halakha</i> of the verbal analogy is accepted: Just as individual peace offerings require waving after slaughter, so too, communal peace offerings require waving after slaughter. But interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place: It is only there, in the case of individual peace offerings, that the waving is performed with the breast and thigh alone. But here, in the case of communal peace offerings, the waving is as they are, i.e., the animals are waved whole, as they were when they were alive.
  
  Daf 62b
  
  Rav Pappa said there is a different explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis: Everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, agrees that with regard to a verbal analogy, the guiding principle is: Infer from it and derive the details from it. And this is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling that after the slaughter of the communal peace offering one waves the entire body offering, not just the breast and thigh: It is done here like it is done there, in the case of individual peace offerings: Just as there, one waves the item that is a gift to the priest, as the breast and thigh are given to the priests to eat, so too here, with regard to the communal peace offerings, one waves the item that is a gift to the priest. Since the communal peace offerings are given to the priests in their entirety, they are also waved in their entirety.
  Ravina said an explanation which is the opposite of Rav Pappa’s: Everyone, even the Rabbis, agrees that the guiding principle is: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place. And this is the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis that one waves only the breast and thigh of communal peace offerings: The verse states with regard to individual peace offerings: “For the breast of waving and the thigh of heaving I have taken from the children of Israel out of their sacrifices of peace offerings, and have given them to Aaron the priest and to his sons as an eternal portion from among the children of Israel” (Leviticus 7:34). The term: “Their sacrifices of peace offerings,” is in the plural, despite the fact that the verse is referring to individual peace offerings. This is an amplification, which teaches that the same <i>halakha</i> applies to communal peace offerings, i.e., that only the breast and the thigh are to be waved.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon says: There are three types of offerings that require performance of three mitzvot. Two mitzvot are performed on each and every one of them, but the third mitzva is not performed in their sacrifice, meaning that each of these offerings requires two out of the same three mitzvot, but not necessarily the same two as the others. And these are the three offerings: Peace offerings brought as gift offerings by an individual, communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs brought with the two loaves on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, and the guilt offering of a leper.
  The mishna continues: Peace offerings brought by individuals require placing hands on the head of the animals while the animals are still alive, and waving after they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation of waving them while they are alive. Communal peace offerings require waving both while they are still alive and after they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation of placing hands on them. And the guilt offering of a leper requires placing hands and waving it while it is still alive, but there is no obligation of waving it after it is slaughtered.
  The Gemara challenges: And let peace offerings brought by an individual require waving while still alive, as this can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if communal peace offerings, whose <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than that of individual peace offerings in that they do not require placing hands on the head of offerings while they are alive, nevertheless require waving when alive, then with regard to peace offerings brought by an individual, which do require placing hands while alive, is it not logical to conclude that they require waving when alive?
  The Gemara answers: This <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not accepted, because the Merciful One excluded peace offerings brought by an individual, as the verse states with regard to communal peace offerings: “And the priest shall wave them with the bread of the first fruits for a wave offering before the Lord, with the two lambs” (Leviticus 23:20). The word “them” serves to exclude peace offerings brought by an individual from the requirement of waving while the animal is alive.
  The Gemara asks: And let communal peace offerings require placing hands, as this can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if peace offerings brought by an individual, whose <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than that of communal peace offerings in that they do not require waving while alive, nevertheless require placing hands, then with regard to communal peace offerings, which do require waving when alive, is it not logical to conclude that they require placing hands? Ravina said: This <i>a fortiori</i> inference is not accepted, as it is learned as a tradition from Sinai that there are only two cases of placing hands in communal offerings: The scapegoat on Yom Kippur and the bull brought for an unwitting communal sin.
  The Gemara further asks: And let the guilt offering of a leper require waving after the animal has been slaughtered, as this can be derived via an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: And if peace offerings brought by an individual, whose <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than that of the guilt offering of a leper in that they do not require waving when alive, nevertheless require waving after they are slaughtered, then with regard to the guilt offering of a leper, which requires waving while alive, is it not logical to conclude that it also requires waving after it is slaughtered?
  The Gemara answers: The Merciful One excluded the guilt offering of a leper, as the verse states with regard to peace offerings brought by an individual: “His own hands shall bring the offerings of the Lord made by fire; the fat with the breast shall he bring; the breast, to wave it before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30). The word “it” serves to exclude the guilt offering of a leper from the requirement of waving after the animal has been slaughtered.
  § The Sages taught: With regard to five people who brought one offering together, one of them waves the offering on behalf of all of them. And in the case of a woman who brings an offering, the priest waves the offering on her behalf. And similarly, with regard to one who sends his offerings from overseas, the priest waves them on his behalf.
  
  Daf 63a
  
  MISHNA: One who takes a vow to bring a meal offering to the Temple and says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a <i>maḥavat</i>, may not bring one prepared in a <i>marḥeshet</i>. Similarly, if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a <i>marḥeshet</i>, he may not bring one prepared in a <i>maḥavat</i>. The mishna clarifies: What is the difference between a <i>maḥavat</i> and a <i>marḥeshet</i>? A <i>marḥeshet</i> has a cover, whereas a <i>maḥavat</i> does not have a cover; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A <i>marḥeshet</i> is deep, and due to the large amount of oil, its product is soft because it moves about [<i>roḥashin</i>] in the oil. A <i>maḥavat</i> is flat, as the sides of the pan are level with the pan, and due to the small amount of oil, its product is hard.
  GEMARA: The Gemara inquires: As the Torah does not describe the different vessels, what is the reason for the interpretation of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, explaining that a <i>marḥeshet</i> has a cover and a <i>maḥavat</i> does not have a cover? If we say that the term <i>marḥeshet</i> indicates that the offering comes to atone for the sinful musings [<i>raḥashei</i>] of the heart, as it is written: “My heart muses [<i>raḥash</i>] on a goodly matter” (Psalms 45:2), and therefore this meal offering must be prepared in a covered vessel just as the thoughts of the heart are hidden, this interpretation is insufficient. And if we say that the term <i>maḥavat</i> indicates that the offering comes to atone for transgressions committed with the corners of [<i>ammaḥavo’ei</i>] the mouth, as people say with regard to someone who speaks loudly: He is barking [<i>minbaḥ nevuḥei</i>], and therefore this meal offering must be prepared in an open vessel, this interpretation is also insufficient.
  The reason these interpretations are insufficient is that one can also say the opposite, and suggest that the name <i>maḥavat</i> indicates that the offering must be prepared in a closed vessel, as it comes to atone for the secret musings of the heart, as it is written that Laban said to Jacob: “Why did you flee secretly [<i>naḥbeita</i>]” (Genesis 31:27). Likewise, with regard to <i>marḥeshet</i>, one can say that it must be prepared in an open vessel, as it comes to atone for whispers [<i>reḥushei</i>] of the mouth which are heard and revealed, as people say: His lips were whispering [<i>meraḥashan</i>]. Therefore, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cannot derive the meanings of the terms <i>marḥeshet</i> and <i>maḥavat</i> from the verses; rather, his interpretation is learned as a tradition.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says that a <i>marḥeshet</i> is deep, whereas a <i>maḥavat</i> is flat. The Gemara explains the reason for this opinion: A <i>marḥeshet</i> is deep, as it is written with regard to this meal offering: “And all that is made in the <i>marḥeshet</i>” (Leviticus 7:9). The use of the term “in” indicates that this meal offering is prepared inside a vessel, i.e., a deep container. Conversely, a <i>maḥavat</i> is flat, with the sides of the pan level with the pan, as it is written with regard to this meal offering: “And on the <i>maḥavat</i>” (Leviticus 7:9). The use of the term “on” indicates that it is prepared on the vessel, not inside it. Therefore, a flat vessel is required.
  § The mishna teaches that if one vows: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a <i>marḥeshet</i>, he is obligated to bring a meal offering of that type. With regard to this, the Sages taught that Beit Shammai say: With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a <i>marḥeshet</i>, without using the term: Meal offering, or the preposition: In, in such a case the money for the meal offering should be placed in a safe place until the prophet Elijah comes heralding the Messiah, and clarifies what should be done.
  The Gemara elaborates: Beit Shammai are uncertain with regard to the source of the terms <i>marḥeshet</i> and <i>maḥavat</i>, whether the offerings are called these names due to the specific vessel in which each meal offering is prepared, or whether they are called these names due to the manner of their preparation. The significance of this distinction is that if the term <i>marḥeshet</i> is referring to a specific type of vessel, then if one takes a vow: It is incumbent upon me to bring a <i>marḥeshet</i>, he must bring an actual vessel of that type, whereas if the term is referring to the manner of preparation of the meal offering then he is obligated to bring that type of meal offering. Since Beit Shammai are uncertain which is the correct interpretation, they rule that he must wait until the prophet Elijah comes.
  And Beit Hillel say that there is no uncertainty about this matter, as there was a particular vessel in the Temple, and its name was <i>marḥeshet</i>. And this vessel resembled a type of deep <i>kelabus</i>, which is a vessel with indentations, and when dough is placed inside it, it gets pressed against the indentations and takes their shape. The dough resembles a type of apple of <i>berotim</i> trees, or a type of acorn [<i>balutei</i>] of the Greek oak trees. Therefore, one who takes a vow: It is incumbent upon me to bring a <i>marḥeshet</i>, must bring this type of vessel to the Temple as a donation.
  And the verse states two different prepositions with regard to these vessels: “And all that is made in the <i>marḥeshet</i> and on the <i>maḥavat</i>” (Leviticus 7:9). It does not state simply: And all that is made in the <i>marḥeshet</i> and the <i>maḥavat</i>. Since it seems from the verse that when using the <i>marḥeshet</i> the meal offering is prepared inside the vessel and when using the <i>maḥavat</i> it is prepared on the vessel, evidently they are called these names due to the vessel in which the meal offering is prepared, not due to the manner of their preparation.
  MISHNA: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering baked in an oven, he may not bring a meal offering baked on a small oven [<i>kupaḥ</i>], nor a meal offering baked on roofing tiles, nor a meal offering baked in the baking pits of the Arabs. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he so wishes, he may bring a meal offering baked on a <i>kupaḥ</i>.
  If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a baked meal offering, without specifying loaves or wafers, he may not bring half the required offering in the form of loaves and the other half in the form of wafers; rather, they must all be of one form or the other. Rabbi Shimon deems this permitted, due to the fact that both loaves and wafers are written with regard to this meal offering, which indicates that it is one offering of two possible forms.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: When the verse states: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in an oven” (Leviticus 2:4), this emphasizes that it must be prepared in an oven, and not baked on a <i>kupaḥ</i>, nor baked on roofing tiles, nor baked in the baking pits of the Arabs, in accordance with the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: In this verse it states “oven,” and it also states “oven” in another verse: “And every meal offering that is baked in the oven” (Leviticus 7:9). Since it is written two times, and these terms are restrictions, one follows the hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify the <i>halakha</i> and include additional cases. Consequently, this derivation serves to render fit a meal offering baked on a <i>kupaḥ</i>, and it too is deemed an oven. Rabbi Shimon says: The terms “oven” and “oven,” which are written a total of two times, serve to teach two <i>halakhot</i>: One instance teaches that their baking should be in an oven, and the other one teaches that their consecration is in an oven, i.e., meal offerings are not consecrated in service vessels but rather in the oven.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Shimon hold in accordance with this line of reasoning? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (95b) that Rabbi Shimon says: One should always be accustomed to say that the two loaves and the shewbread are valid if they are kneaded, shaped, or baked in the Temple courtyard, and that they are also valid if they are prepared in the place called Beit Pagei, which is outside the walls of the Temple Mount? As these offerings are not disqualified by being taken outside the Temple, evidently they are not consecrated in the oven.
  Rava said in response: Rabbi Shimon maintains that the oven does not consecrate meal offerings, and as for his statement in the <i>baraita</i> concerning the two derivations, one should say that the other derivation from the term “oven” teaches that their consecration by the owner must be explicit, i.e., from the outset he must say that he is sanctifying his meal offering for the sake of a meal offering baked in an oven.
  § The mishna teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a baked meal offering, he may not bring half the required offering in the form of loaves and half in the form of wafers, whereas Rabbi Shimon deems this permitted, as it is one offering. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in an oven” (Leviticus 2:4). The phrase: “And when you bring,” indicates that this offering is not obligatory. Rather, when you wish you may bring, i.e., the verse teaches how to perform the meal offering baked in an oven as a voluntary matter.
  With regard to the term: “A meal offering,” Rabbi Yehuda says: From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a baked meal offering, that he must not bring half of the bread in the form of loaves and half in the form of wafers? The verse states: “A meal offering,” which indicates: I told you to bring one offering, i.e., all ten loaves from one type, and not two or three offerings of different types, as allowed by Rabbi Shimon.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda:
  
  Daf 63b
  
  And is it stated with regard to a meal offering baked in an oven: “Offering,” and again: Offering, for a total of two times, once in connection to a meal offering of loaves and once in connection to a meal offering of wafers? If that were the case, it would indicate that these are two types of offerings. But doesn’t it actually say “offering” only one time: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in an oven, it shall be unleavened loaves of fine flour mixed with oil, or unleavened wafers spread with oil” (Leviticus 2:4)? And it is stated with regard to this meal offering both loaves and wafers, which indicates that these are two varieties of the same offering.
  Rabbi Shimon continues: From now it may be inferred that if one wants to bring ten loaves he may bring ten loaves, and if he prefers to bring ten wafers, he may bring ten wafers, and if he decides that half of them should be loaves and half of them wafers, he may bring it in this manner. And if he brings part as loaves and part as wafers, how does he proceed? He mingles all of them and removes a handful from both of them. And if he removed a handful and it happened that only part of one type, either loaves or wafers, came up in his hand for both of them, he has fulfilled his obligation, as they are both part of a single offering.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a baked meal offering, that he may not bring half of the offering as loaves and half as wafers? He answers: The verse states: “And every meal offering that is baked in an oven, and every one that is made in the deep pan, and on the shallow pan, shall belong to the priest who sacrifices it. And every meal offering, mixed with oil, or dry, shall belong to all the sons of Aaron, one as well as another” (Leviticus 7:9–10).
  The verses juxtapose the meal offering baked in an oven to the meal offering prepared on the pan and the meal offering prepared in the deep pan, and similarly to the meal offering brought as a gift, alluded to by the phrase: “Mixed with oil,” and to the meal offering of a sinner, which is called: “Dry.” This teaches that just as the term: “And every” (Leviticus 7:10), stated below with regard to those meal offerings, is referring to two different types of meal offering, so too, the term: “And every” (Leviticus 7:9), stated above, with regard to the two forms of meal offering baked in an oven, is referring to two different types of meal offering, and therefore one may not bring part as loaves and part as wafers.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that loaves and wafers are two different types of meal offerings baked in an oven, respond to Rabbi Shimon’s proof? After all, Rabbi Shimon is saying well when he points out that the verse mentions “offering” only once. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda could have said to you: Since it is written: “With oil,” and: “With oil,” in the verse: “It shall be unleavened loaves of fine flour mixed with oil, or unleavened wafers spread with oil” (Leviticus 2:4), it is considered as though it is written “offering” and “offering,” and therefore these are deemed two different types of meal offering.
  The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Shimon respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon maintains that the repetition of the term “with oil” teaches a different <i>halakha</i>. If it were not written “with oil,” and again “with oil,” I would say that a meal offering baked in an oven must be specifically brought half as loaves and half as wafers, and if he wanted to bring only loaves alone or wafers alone, I would say that he may not bring a meal offering in this manner. The repetition of the term “with oil” teaches us that a meal offering baked in an oven can comprise ten loaves, or ten wafers, or a combination of both types.
  The Gemara further inquires: The <i>baraita</i> states that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds that loaves and wafers are two different types of meal offerings. The opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is the same as that of his father, Rabbi Yehuda, whose opinion is also mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>. Why is it necessary to cite Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion separately? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to cite the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda, because there is a practical difference between his ruling and that of his father; as, if someone transgressed and performed the sacrifice of a meal offering baked in an oven by bringing a mixture of loaves and wafers, according to Rabbi Yehuda the offering is valid after the fact, whereas Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda deems it not valid even after the fact.
  
  MISHNA: Rabbi Yishmael says: When the day of the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> meal offering would occur on Shabbat, the labors performed that would otherwise be prohibited were kept to a minimum, and the one-tenth of an ephah of flour that was brought as an offering was processed from three <i>se’a</i> of reaped barley. And if it occurred during the week, the flour was processed from five <i>se’a</i> of reaped barley. And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week, the <i>omer</i> offering would come from three <i>se’a</i> of reaped barley.
  Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: On Shabbat the barley was reaped by an individual and with one sickle and with one basket into which the barley was placed; and during the week, it was reaped by three people with three baskets and three sickles. And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week, it was reaped by three people with three baskets and with three sickles.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis disagree in the mishna with regard to how many <i>se’a</i> of barley were reaped for the <i>omer</i> meal offering on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Yishmael three <i>se’a</i> were reaped when the offering was brought on a Shabbat, and five <i>se’a</i> were reaped when the offering was brought on a weekday. The Rabbis maintain that both during the week and on Shabbat, three <i>se’a</i> were reaped. The Gemara asks: Granted the opinion of the Rabbis is clear, as they maintain that a select tenth of an ephah of flour comes from three <i>se’a</i> of reaped barley, and therefore there is no difference whether the barley is reaped during the week or whether it is reaped on Shabbat, as a select tenth is required.
  Rather, there is a question with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who differentiates between Shabbat and during the week. What does he hold? If he holds that a select tenth of an ephah of flour can come only from five <i>se’a</i> of reaped barley, then even on Shabbat five <i>se’a</i> should also be required. And if the select tenth of an ephah of flour can come from even three <i>se’a</i>, then even on a weekday three should suffice.
  Rava said: Rabbi Yishmael holds that a select tenth of an ephah of flour can come without exertion from five <i>se’a</i>, and with exertion from three. Therefore, on a weekday we reap and bring flour from five <i>se’a</i>, as this produces a better final product, since only the highest-quality flour of each <i>se’a</i> is selected. On Shabbat, it is preferable that one should increase the effort involved in one prohibited labor, that of sifting the flour numerous times, and one should not increase the number of prohibited acts involved in performing many prohibited labors, such as reaping and winnowing, which are required for the processing of five <i>se’a</i>.
  § Rabba said: Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, said the same thing. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If the fourteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat, when the Paschal offering is sacrificed but not roasted until Shabbat ends, one flays the Paschal offering up to the breast, to enable removal of the parts of the animal that are sacrificed upon the altar on Shabbat, and flays the rest of the animal after Shabbat. Further skinning is only to facilitate eating the animal and therefore it does not override Shabbat. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And the Rabbis say: One has not performed the obligation properly unless he flays it in its entirety.
  The Gemara explains why the statements of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, are the same. Didn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, say there that anywhere that it is possible to perform the necessary task without an additional action, we do not exert ourselves on Shabbat? Here, too, since it is possible to perform the necessary task without the extra flaying, we do not exert ourselves.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: From where is this conclusion reached? Perhaps Rabbi Yishmael states his ruling only here, in the case of reaping three <i>se’a</i> on Shabbat, where there is no degradation of consecrated items. But there, where there is degradation of consecrated items, as the animal will be left half-flayed overnight,
  
  Daf 64a
  
  I could say to you that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that the entire animal should be flayed.
  Alternatively, it is possible that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, states his ruling only there, in the case of the Paschal offering, where the requirements for the Most High, i.e., the Temple service, have been fulfilled, and therefore there is no need to desecrate the Shabbat. But here, where the community must bring a select tenth of an ephah and therefore the requirements for the Most High have not been fulfilled, and it is necessary to desecrate the Shabbat, say that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that one reaps the same amount of barley on Shabbat as during the week.
  Rather, Rabba said: Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, said the same thing. As we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: On Shabbat the barley was reaped by an individual with one sickle and with one basket into which the barley was placed; and during the week, it was reaped by three people with three baskets and with three sickles. And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week, it was reaped by three people with three baskets and with three sickles.
  The Gemara explains Rabba’s comparison: Doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, say there, with regard to the process of gathering the barley, that since it is possible to reap by means of one person, we do not exert ourselves to reap it by means of three? Here, too, Rabbi Yishmael maintains that since it is possible to bring the <i>omer</i> meal offering from three <i>se’a</i> of barley, we do not exert ourselves on Shabbat to bring it from five <i>se’a</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: From where is this conclusion reached? Perhaps Rabbi Yishmael states his ruling only here, because there is no greater publicity of the event achieved by using five <i>se’a</i> rather than three. But there, in the case of reaping the barley, where there is greater publicity of the event through the involvement of more people, one can say that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Alternatively, perhaps Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, states his ruling only there, as whether one individual or three people reap, the rite is still being performed in its proper manner for the requirement of the Most High. But here, when only three <i>se’a</i> are used, and the rite is not being performed in its proper manner for the requirement of the Most High, as five <i>se’a</i> are usually needed, say that he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that on Shabbat the mitzva is performed in the same manner as on a weekday.
  Rather, Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yosei said the same thing. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Rosh HaShana</i> 21b): Whether the new moon was seen clearly [<i>ba’alil</i>] by everyone or whether it was not seen clearly, one may desecrate the Shabbat in order to testify about its appearance. Rabbi Yosei says: If the moon was clearly seen, witnesses may not desecrate the Shabbat for it, as other witnesses located nearer to the court will certainly testify. If these distant witnesses go to court to testify, they will desecrate Shabbat unnecessarily.
  The Gemara explains Rav Ashi’s comparison: Didn’t Rabbi Yosei say there: Since it is possible to receive testimony about the new moon without further witnesses, we do not exert ourselves and travel on Shabbat? Here, too, Rabbi Yishmael holds that since it is possible to bring the <i>omer</i> meal offering from three <i>se’a</i> of barley, we do not exert ourselves on Shabbat to bring it from five <i>se’a</i>.
  The Gemara rejects this comparison: From where do you draw this conclusion? Perhaps Rabbi Yishmael states only here that three <i>se’a</i> are brought on Shabbat, as there is no concern that ultimately you will cause people to stumble in the future and refrain from bringing the <i>omer</i> offering. But there, in the case of witnesses testifying about the new moon, he concedes that all potential witnesses may travel on Shabbat because if not, you will cause them to stumble in the future. People will say: Why should we go to such trouble, as our testimony is unnecessary? Yet at some point they will be needed, and no witnesses will come to the court. Therefore, in that case one can say that Rabbi Yishmael agrees with this reasoning and holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  Alternatively, it is possible that Rabbi Yosei states his ruling only there, with regard to the new moon, as this is not a requirement for the Most High, and therefore Shabbat may not be desecrated. But here, as the <i>omer</i> meal offering is a requirement for the Most High, and therefore Shabbat may be desecrated for it, say that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that on Shabbat the mitzva is performed in the same manner as on a weekday.
  § It was stated in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Pesaḥim</i> 5:7): If one mistakenly slaughtered two communal sin offerings, e.g., the goat offerings of a Festival, on a Festival that occurred on Shabbat, and only one was required, Rabba said, and some say it was Rabbi Ami who said: He is liable for the second, superfluous communal sin offering, but is exempt for the first. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even if he achieved atonement with the second offering, e.g., if the blood of the first offering was spilled after the slaughter of the second. And this is the <i>halakha</i> even if the first offering was found to be gauntand thereby disqualified as an offering, which meant that only the second offering was fit.
  The Gemara asks: And in a case where the first animal was found to be gaunt, did Rabba really say this? But doesn’t Rabba say that if one had before him two communal sin offerings on Shabbat, one choice animal and one gaunt, and he slaughtered the choice one and then slaughtered the gaunt one, he is liable for the gaunt animal, as it should not have been slaughtered. But if he first slaughtered the gaunt one and subsequently slaughtered the choice animal, he is exempt for slaughtering the choice animal. And moreover, members of the court say to him after he slaughtered the gaunt animal: Bring the choice animal and slaughter it <i>ab initio</i>. If so, in a case where the first animal was found to be gaunt, he certainly should not be liable for slaughtering the second.
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say: Remove [<i>semei</i>] the clause with regard to the gaunt animal from the first statement of Rabba. In other words, Rabba merely said that he is exempt for the slaughter of the first animal; he did not state a ruling about the second animal. And if you wish, say instead that the ruling that he is liable for the slaughter of the second animal was stated by Rabbi Ami, not Rabba.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: If the first offering is found to be gaunt, i.e., weakened, in its intestines after it was slaughtered, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we follow his intention and hold him accountable, and this man, who was unaware at the time of its slaughter that the first animal was gaunt, intended to transgress the Shabbat prohibition by slaughtering the second offering? Or perhaps we follow his actions and exempt him from liability, as the first offering had been disqualified when he brought the second.
  Rav Ashi said to Ravina: Isn’t this the same as a case subject to a disagreement between Rabba and Rava, and in fact both agree that in this case he is liable? As it was stated: If one heard that a child was drowning at sea, and he spread a net to raise fish and the result was that he raised only fish, he is liable for transgressing the Shabbat prohibition of trapping. If he intended to raise fish, and he raised both fish and the child, Rava says: He is liable, as his intention was to transgress a prohibition, and Rabba says: He is exempt, as his act saved a life and was therefore permitted on Shabbat.
  The Gemara explains why everyone would agree that one is liable in the case involving two offerings. And Rabba deemed him exempt only there, since the one who spread the net heard that a child had fallen in, and therefore we say that his intention in spreading the net was also to save the child. But had he not heard that the child had fallen in, he would not be exempt. This is comparable to the case of two offerings, where he could not have known before its slaughter that the first animal had weak intestines.
  And there are those who say that Rav Ashi said to Ravina conclusively: This is subject to the disagreement between Rabba and Rava. As it was stated: If one heard that a child was drowning at sea, and he spread a net to raise fish and the result was that he raised only fish, he is liable for transgressing the Shabbat prohibition of trapping. If he intended to raise fish, and he raised both fish and the child, Rava says: He is liable, and Rabba says: He is exempt. Rav Ashi adds that Rabba did not exempt him because he heard that a child was drowning. Rather, Rabba says that he is exempt because one follows his actions, whereas Rava says that he is liable because one follows his intention. Consequently, the same dispute applies to the case of two offerings.
  § The Gemara continues its discussion concerning performing extra prohibited labor on Shabbat in extenuating circumstances where the desecration of Shabbat is allowed. Rabba says: With regard to a dangerously ill person on Shabbat whom the doctors evaluated as needing to eat one fig to regain his health, and ten men ran and each cut and brought ten figs simultaneously, one each, they are all exempt from liability for transgressing the prohibition of reaping on Shabbat. This applies even in a case where the ten come one after the other, and even if the ill person had already recovered his health by eating the first fig.
  Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of a dangerously ill person on Shabbat whom the doctors evaluated as needing to eat two figs to regain his health, and there are two figs attached to a tree by two stems [<i>okatzin</i>] and another three figs attached to the tree by one stem, which one of them do we bring? Do we bring two figs, as that is the amount that is fit for him, i.e., this is the number of figs the ill person needs? Or perhaps we bring the three figs, as although he requires only two, this serves to limit the labor of reaping, as the three figs are attached to the tree by a single stem.
  The Gemara answers: It is obvious that we bring the three figs,
  
  Daf 64b
  
  as Rabbi Yishmael states only there, in the mishna, that three <i>se’a</i> of barley are reaped on Shabbat, as in that case when one limits the amount available for eating, he likewise limits the amount of reaping. But here, when one limits the amount of eating by bringing the two figs, he also increases the amount of reaping. Therefore is it certain that we bring the ill person the three figs attached by a single stem.
  MISHNA: The mitzva of the <i>omer</i> is to bring the barley reaped for the meal offering from fields proximate to Jerusalem. If the barley did not ripen in the fields proximate to Jerusalem, one brings it from any place in Eretz Yisrael. There was an incident where the <i>omer</i> came from Gaggot Tzerifin and the wheat for the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> came from the valley of Ein Sokher.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the barley reaped for the <i>omer</i> meal offering should ideally be brought from fields proximate to Jerusalem? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that it is because the verse states: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear [<i>karmel</i>]” (Leviticus 2:14). This indicates that the grain should be soft and fresh. Consequently it should be brought from close by, not from a place where it might become stale and hardened during a long journey.
  And if you wish, say instead that the reason is due to the principle that one does not postpone performance of the mitzvot. When presented with the opportunity to perform a mitzva, one should perform it immediately. Therefore, the barley for the mitzva of the <i>omer</i> meal offering in the Temple should be brought from the first crop encountered outside of Jerusalem.
  § The mishna teaches: There was an incident where the <i>omer</i> came from Gaggot Tzerifin and the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> came from the valley of Ein Sokher. The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> that provides the background of this event: When the kings of the Hasmonean monarchy besieged each other in their civil war, Hyrcanus was outside of Jerusalem, besieging it, and Aristoblus was inside. On each and every day they would lower dinars in a box from inside the city, and those on the outside would send up animals for them to bring the daily offerings in the Temple.
  A certain elderly man was there, in Jerusalem, who was familiar with Greek wisdom. He communicated to those on the outside by using words understood only by those proficient in Greek wisdom. The elderly man said to them: As long as they are engaged with the Temple service, they will not be delivered into your hands. Upon hearing this, on the following day, when they lowered dinars in a box, they sent up a pig to them. Once the pig reached halfway up the wall, it inserted its hooves into the wall and Eretz Yisrael shuddered four hundred parasangs by four hundred parasangs.
  When the Sages saw this, they said at that time: Cursed is he who raises pigs, and cursed is he who teaches his son Greek wisdom. And it is with regard to that time of civil war, in which the land was destroyed, that we learned: An incident occurred in which the <i>omer</i>, the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, came from Gaggot Tzerifim, and the two loaves offered on <i>Shavuot</i> came from the valley of Ein Sokher. Since no fresh barley grain was found in the fields immediately surrounding Jerusalem, it had to be brought from these outlying areas.
  § The Gemara relates another tradition with regard to that occasion when the <i>omer</i> came from Gaggot Tzerifin and the two loaves from the valley of Ein Sokher: When it came time to bring the <i>omer</i> meal offering, they did not know from where they could bring the <i>omer</i> grain, as all the surrounding fields were looted and ruined. The court publicly proclaimed their difficulty. A certain deaf-mute [<i>ḥersha</i>] came forward and stretched out one hand toward a roof, <i>gag</i> in Hebrew, and one hand toward a hut [<i>atzerifa</i>]. Mordekhai said to the Sages: Is there a place that is called Gaggot Tzerifin or Tzerifin Gaggot? They checked and found that there was such a place, and it contained fields of barley from which they were able to bring the <i>omer</i> meal offering.
  A similar incident occurred when they needed to bring the two loaves, and they did not know from where to bring the grain. Again the court publicly proclaimed their difficulty, and a certain deaf-mute came forward and stretched out one hand toward his eye [<i>a’eineih</i>] and one hand toward a door latch [<i>assikhera</i>]. Mordekhai said to the Sages: And is there a place that is called: Ein Sokher, or Sokher Ayin? They checked and found that there was such a place, and it contained fields of wheat from which they were able to bring the two loaves.
  The Gemara relates another story that demonstrates Mordekhai’s wisdom: Once, a certain three women brought three nests for their obligatory offerings of pairs of pigeons or doves (see Leviticus 15:29). One of them said: This offering is for my <i>ziva</i>; and one said: This if for my <i>yamma</i>; and the last one said: This is for my <i>ona</i>.
  The Sages understood from the first woman’s statement: For my <i>ziva</i>, that she had experienced a discharge of uterine blood when not expecting her menstrual period, which would give her the status of an actual <i>zava</i>. From the second woman’s statement: For my <i>yamma</i>, they understood: My actual <i>yamma</i>, i.e., she was also a <i>ziva</i>, as <i>yam</i> can mean: Sea, or a flow of blood. From the third woman’s statement: For my <i>ona</i>, they came to the conclusion that she needed to bring a sacrifice for her time [<i>ona</i>] of completing her purification process from being a <i>zava</i>. Accordingly, they understood that all these women were obligated to bring one sin offering and one burnt offering.
  Mordekhai said to the other Sages: Perhaps the first woman was endangered in the course of her menstrual flow [<i>zov</i>]. Similarly, perhaps the second woman was endangered at sea [<i>yam</i>]. Finally, perhaps the third woman was endangered through her eye [<i>ayin</i>], as <i>ayin</i> is phonetically similar to <i>ona</i>. According to these explanations, each woman sought to bring a voluntary offering to give thanks to God for being saved from danger. If so, the appropriate offering in each case is not a sin offering, as they are all burnt offerings. It was checked and they found that Mordekhai’s interpretation was in fact correct.
  
  Daf 65a
  
  And this is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 13b): Petaḥya was responsible for the nests of birds, i.e., the doves or pigeons brought by a <i>zav</i>, a <i>zava</i>, a woman after childbirth, and a leper. These individuals would place the appropriate sum of money into the horn designated for this purpose, and each day Petaḥya oversaw the purchase of birds from that money and their sacrifice in the proper manner. This Sage is Mordekhai; and why was he called Petaḥya, which resembles the word for opening [<i>petaḥ</i>]? The reason is that he would open, i.e., elucidate, difficult topics and interpret them to the people, and because he knew all seventy languages known in that region at the time.
  The Gemara asks: What was unique about Petaḥya? All of the members of the Sanhedrin also know all seventy languages. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They place on the Great Sanhedrin only men of wisdom, and of pleasant appearance, and of high stature, and of suitable age so that they will be respected. And they must also be masters of sorcery, i.e., they know the nature of sorcery, so that they can judge sorcerers, and they must know all seventy languages in order that the Sanhedrin will not need to hear testimony from the mouth of a translator in a case where a witness speaks a different language.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, Petaḥya was unique as he not only knew all seventy languages, but also had the ability to combine various languages and interpret them. This is the meaning of that which is written with regard to Mordekhai: “Bilshan” (Nehemiah 7:7). Bilshan is interpreted as another name for Mordekhai, as he would combine [<i>balil</i>] languages [<i>lashon</i>].
  MISHNA: How would they perform the rite of the harvest of the <i>omer</i>? Emissaries of the court would emerge on the eve of the festival of Passover and fashion the stalks of barley into sheaves while the stalks were still attached to the ground, so that it would be convenient to reap them. The residents of all the towns adjacent to the site of the harvest would assemble there, so that it would be harvested with great fanfare.
  Once it grew dark, the court emissary says to those assembled: Did the sun set? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: Did the sun set? They again say: Yes. The court emissary next says to those assembled: Shall I reap the sheaves with this sickle? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: With this sickle? The assembly says: Yes. The court emissary then says to those assembled: Shall I place the gathered sheaves in this basket? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: In this basket? The assembly says: Yes.
  If the sixteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat, the court emissary says to the assembled: Shall I cut the sheaves on this Shabbat? The assembly says in response: Yes. The emissary repeats: On this Shabbat? The assembly says: Yes. The court emissary says to those assembled: Shall I cut the sheaves? And they say to him in response: Cut. The emissary repeats: Shall I cut the sheaves? And they say to him: Cut.
  The emissary asks three times with regard to each and every matter, and the assembly says to him: Yes, yes, yes. The mishna asks: Why do I need those involved to publicize each stage of the rite to that extent? The mishna answers: It is due to the Boethusians, as they deny the validity of the Oral Law and would say: There is no harvest of the <i>omer</i> at the conclusion of the first Festival day of Passover unless it occurs at the conclusion of Shabbat. The publicity was to underscore that the sixteenth of Nisan was the proper time for the <i>omer</i> harvest.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: These are the days on which fasting is prohibited, and on some of them eulogizing is prohibited as well: From the New Moon of Nisan until the eighth of the month, the proper sacrifice of the daily offering was established, and therefore it was decreed not to eulogize on these dates. And furthermore, from the eighth of Nisan until the end of the festival of Passover, the correct date for the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> was restored, and it was similarly decreed not to eulogize during this period.
  The Gemara discusses the <i>baraita</i>: From the New Moon of Nisan until the eighth of the month the proper sacrifice of the daily offering was established, and therefore it was decreed not to eulogize on these dates. The Gemara explains that the Sadducees would say: An individual may donate and bring the daily offering, in opposition to the accepted tradition that the daily offering must be brought from communal funds. What verse did the Sadducees expound? “The one lamb shall you offer [<i>ta’aseh</i>] in the morning, and the other lamb shall you offer in the afternoon” (Numbers 28:4). Since the verse is in the singular form, the Sadducees maintained that even an individual may donate the daily offering.
  The Gemara asks: What did the Sages reply to refute the argument of the Sadducees? They cited the verse: “Command the children of Israel, and say to them: My food that is presented to Me for offerings made by fire, of a pleasing aroma unto Me, you shall observe [<i>tishmeru</i>] to offer to Me in its due season” (Numbers 28:2). The term: “You shall observe” is in the plural form, which indicates that all of the daily offerings should come from collection of the Temple treasury chamber. Since during that period, between the New Moon of Nisan and the eighth of Nisan, the Sages overruled the Sadducees, it was established as a period of rejoicing, and it was prohibited to eulogize on those dates.
  The Gemara discusses the next period listed in the <i>baraita</i>: From the eighth of Nisan until the end of the festival of Passover, the correct date for the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> was restored, and it was similarly decreed not to eulogize during this period. As the Boethusians would say that the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> always occurs after Shabbat, on a Sunday. Their reasoning was that the verse states, with regard to the <i>omer</i> offering and the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> that follows seven weeks later: “And you shall count for you from the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>], from the day that you brought the sheaf [<i>omer</i>] of the waving; seven weeks shall there be complete” (Leviticus 23:15). Disregarding the oral tradition, the Boethusians interpreted the phrase “from the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>]” literally, as referring to Shabbat, not the Festival day.
  At the time, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai joined the discussion with the Boethusians and said to them: Fools! From where have you derived this? And there was no man who answered him, except for one elderly man who was prattling [<i>mefatpet</i>] at him, and he said: Moses, our teacher, was a lover of the Jewish people and he knew that <i>Shavuot</i> is only one day. Therefore, he arose and established it after Shabbat, in order that the Jewish people would enjoy themselves for two days. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai recited this verse in response to that old man: “It is eleven days’ journey from Horeb to Kadesh Barnea by the way of Mount Seir” (Deuteronomy 1:2).
  
  Daf 65b
  
  And if Moses, our teacher, was a lover of the Jewish people, why did he delay them in the wilderness forty years? The elderly man said to him: My teacher, you dismiss me with this retort? Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to him: Fool! And will our perfect Torah not be as worthy as your frivolous speech? Your claim can easily be refuted.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai cites a proof that <i>Shavuot</i> does not need to occur specifically on a Sunday. One verse states: “Even to the morrow after the seventh week you shall number fifty days; and you shall present a new meal offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:16), and one verse, the preceding one, apparently contradicts this when it states: “And you shall count for you from the morrow after the day of rest, from the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving; seven weeks shall there be complete.” Is the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> seven full weeks after Passover, i.e., counting from Sunday through Shabbat seven times; or is it fifty days after Passover?
  The Gemara explains: How so, i.e., how can one reconcile these two verses? Here, the verse that mentions seven complete weeks, is referring to a year when the festival of Passover occurs on Shabbat. In such a year, the fifty-day period between Passover and <i>Shavuot</i> contains seven complete weeks, from Sunday through Shabbat. There, the verse that defines the period as fifty days, is referring to a year when the festival of Passover occurs in the middle of the week.
  The Gemara presents a mnemonic for several other proofs in refutation of the claim of the Boethusians: That of Rabbi Eliezer: Number; Rabbi Yehoshua: Count; Rabbi Yishmael: From the <i>omer</i>; Rabbi Yehuda: Below.
  Rabbi Eliezer says: The previous proof is not necessary, as the verse states: “Seven weeks you shall number for you; from the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain you shall begin to number seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9). The term “for you” indicates that the counting of the weeks is dependent upon the decision of the court, as they know how to calculate the new months, upon which the date of the Festival depends. Therefore, when the verse states: “The morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>]” (Leviticus 23:16), it means: The morrow after the Festival, as the determination of Festivals is by the court. This serves to exclude the interpretation that the counting starts after the Shabbat of Creation, i.e., a regular weekly Shabbat, whose counting can be performed by every person, not exclusively by the court.
  Citing a different proof, Rabbi Yehoshua says: The Torah said to count days, as it is stated: “A month of days” (Numbers 11:20), and then sanctify the month with offerings. And the Torah also said to count days from Passover and then sanctify the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> with offerings, as it is stated: “You shall count fifty days” (Leviticus 23:16). From this comparison, one can learn that just as the start of the counting toward the new month is known even before it comes, as one begins counting toward the following new month on the first day of a month, so too the start of the counting toward the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> is known even before it comes, as one begins counting toward <i>Shavuot</i> on a fixed day of the month.
  The Gemara elaborates: And if you say that the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> always occurs the day after Shabbat, how is the counting toward Shavuot known based on what came before it? If the occurrence of <i>Shavuot</i> depends upon a Shabbat, there would be no specific date after Passover upon which the counting occurs yearly.
  Rabbi Yishmael says there is another refutation of the Boethusian interpretation. The Torah said: Bring the <i>omer</i> offering on the festival on Passover and the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>. Just as there, with regard to the offering on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, the two loaves are brought at the beginning of the Festival, as it lasts only one day, so too here, with regard to the festival of Passover, the <i>omer</i> must be brought at the beginning of the Festival. If the <i>omer</i> were to always be brought on a Sunday, this might occur at the end of the festival of Passover. For example, if Passover started on a Monday, the <i>omer</i> would be brought only on the next Sunday, at the end of the Festival.
  Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says there is yet another refutation. It is stated “<i>shabbat</i>” above (Leviticus 23:15), with regard to starting the counting of the <i>omer</i>, and it is also stated “<i>shabbat</i>” below (Leviticus 23:16), with regard to the commencement of the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>. Just as there, with regard to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, it is stated: “Even until the morrow after the seventh week [<i>hashabbat</i>] you shall number fifty days,” and the word <i>shabbat</i> is referring to the beginning of the Festival and it immediately follows the end of the seventh week; so too here, with regard to the bringing of the <i>omer</i>, the word <i>shabbat</i> means Festival, so that the <i>omer</i> offering immediately follows the beginning of the Festival, on the second day of Passover. According to the Boethusians, the commencement of the counting could start well after the beginning of Passover. For example, if Passover occurs on a Sunday, the counting of the <i>omer</i> would start only the following Sunday.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall count for you from the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>], from the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving; seven weeks there shall be complete” (Leviticus 23:15). The phrase: “And you shall count for you,” teaches that the mitzva of counting is not a communal obligation. Rather, there should be a counting by each and every person.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>], this means from the morrow after the festival of Passover. Or perhaps this is not the meaning of the verse, but rather it means after the Shabbat of Creation, i.e., Sunday. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: This cannot be correct, as the verse states: “Even until the morrow after the seventh week you shall number fifty days” (Leviticus 23:16). This teaches that all the countings that you count shall be only fifty days.
  Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda elaborates: And if you say that the clause: “From the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>],” is referring to the Shabbat of Creation, sometimes you will find a count of fifty-one days from the first day of Passover, which is the date that the count began the previous year, until <i>Shavuot</i>; and sometimes you will find fifty-two, or fifty-three, or fifty-four, or fifty-five, or fifty-six. For example, in one year, Passover occurs on Shabbat, and the counting of the <i>omer</i> would start on Sunday, the sixteenth of Nisan, and <i>Shavuot</i> would occur fifty days later. Another year, Passover occurs on a Friday, and the counting starts on Sunday, then the date that <i>Shavuot</i> will occur this year is fifty-one days from the sixteenth of Nisan. If Passover occurs on a Thursday, and the counting begins on the following Sunday, <i>Shavuot</i> will occur fifty-two days from the sixteenth of Nisan.
  Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: That proof is not necessary,
  
  Daf 66a
  
  as the verse states: “Seven weeks you shall number for you; from the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain you shall begin to number seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9). By using the term “for you,” the verse indicates that the counting of the weeks is dependent upon the decision of the court, as they know how to calculate the new months. This serves to exclude the possibility that the counting starts after the Shabbat of Creation, whose counting can be performed by every person, not only the court.
  Rabbi Yosei says that the verse: “And you shall count for you from the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>]” (Leviticus 23:15), means from the morrow after the festival of Passover. Do you say it means from the morrow after the festival of Passover, or is it only referring to from the morrow after Shabbat of Creation, i.e., Sunday? You can say in response: Is it stated: From the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>] that is during Passover? No, it is stated only: “From the morrow after the day of rest [<i>hashabbat</i>].” Considering that the entire year is full of <i>Shabbatot</i>, go and try to examine to which Shabbat the verse is referring. How does one know which Shabbat this means? Clearly, then, this “day of rest” is the Festival, not Shabbat.
  Rabbi Yosei cites another proof: And furthermore, it is stated “<i>shabbat</i>” below, with regard to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> (Leviticus 23:16), and it is also stated “<i>shabbat</i>” above (Leviticus 23:15), with regard to starting the counting of the <i>omer</i>. Just as below, with regard to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, it is stated: “Even until the morrow after the seventh week [<i>shabbat</i>] you shall number fifty days,” and the word <i>shabbat</i> is referring to a time at the beginning of the Festival; so too here, with regard to the bringing of <i>omer</i>, the word <i>shabbat</i> means Festival, and the counting starts near the beginning of the Festival, on the second day of Passover. According to the Boethusians, sometimes the commencement of the counting is well after the start of Passover.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says there is yet another proof: One verse states: “Six days you shall eat unleavened bread” (Deuteronomy 16:8), and one verse states: “Seven days you shall eat unleavened bread” (Exodus 12:15). How can these texts be reconciled? Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar explains that there is <i>matza</i> that you are unable to eat for all seven days of Passover, due to the prohibition of harvesting and eating from the new crop of grain that ripened before Passover until after the <i>omer</i> offering. But you are able to eat that same <i>matza</i> for six days, although it is from the new crop, as it is permitted after the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering on the second day of Passover. This resolution of the verses is possible only if the <i>omer</i> offering is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan, not on any other date.
  Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar clarifies another two verses that deal with the counting of the <i>omer</i>: “And you shall count for you from the morrow after the day of rest, from the day that you brought the sheaf [<i>omer</i>] of the waving; seven weeks there shall be complete; even until the morrow after the seventh week you shall number fifty days; and you shall present a new meal offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:15–16). One might have thought that although one must harvest and bring the <i>omer</i> meal offering on the second day of Passover, the sixteenth of Nisan, he may start to count the <i>omer</i> from whenever he wishes after that day.
  Therefore, the verse states: “Seven weeks you shall number for you; from the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain you shall begin to number seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9). This verse indicates that the counting should commence upon the reaping of the grain for the <i>omer</i> offering. If one would read just this verse: “From the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain you shall begin to number,” one might have thought that one can harvest and count and then bring the <i>omer</i> offering whenever he wishes. Therefore, the other verse states: “From the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving…you shall number fifty days,” indicating that the counting should start on the day the <i>omer</i> offering is brought.
  If one would derive the <i>halakha</i> from this verse: “From the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving,” one might have thought that he should harvest and count and bring the <i>omer</i> offering during the day, not on the night of the sixteenth of Nisan. Therefore, the verse states: “From the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving; seven weeks there shall be complete.” When do you find that there are seven complete weeks? You find it at the time when you begin to count from the evening. Only if the counting commences at night, at the start of the sixteenth of Nisan, will the seven weeks of counting be complete, without missing that first evening.
  If so, one might have thought that all of the rites of the <i>omer</i> should be at night, and therefore one should harvest and bring the <i>omer</i> offering and start to count at night. Therefore the verse states: From the day that you brought the sheaf of the waving. How can these texts be reconciled? Does one start at night or in the day? Harvesting and counting should be performed at night, and the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering is during the day.
  § The Gemara has presented two <i>baraitot</i> with ten proofs between them countering the Boethusian claim that the counting of the <i>omer</i> begins on the Sunday after Passover. Rava said: For all of the suggested proofs there is a possible refutation except for those of the two last <i>tanna’im</i> cited, both in the first <i>baraita</i> and in the second <i>baraita</i>, for which there is no refutation.
  Rava elaborates: If one seeks to prove from that which Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said, that there is a contradiction between two verses, as one indicates that there is an obligation to count fifty days and another that the obligation is to count seven weeks, perhaps this contradiction can be resolved in accordance with the statement of Abaye. As Abaye said: It is a mitzva to count days, and it is also a mitzva to count seven weeks. When one counts, he should track both the number of days and the number of weeks.
  Rabbi Eliezer derived that the counting is dependent upon the court, not the individual. Therefore, he claimed that when the verse mentions <i>shabbat</i> it must be referring to the Festival, not a regular Shabbat, which does not require a court for its determination. Rabbi Yehoshua derived that just as the counting and sanctifying of the New Moon is performed at a distinct time, so too the counting of the <i>omer</i> and start of <i>Shavuot</i> that follows must occur on a specific date. Rava refutes both of these claims: If the proof is from that which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua said, granted that their proofs successfully demonstrate that the counting should start after the Festival, not after Shabbat, but from where does one know that it is referring to the first day of the Festival? Perhaps it is referring to the last day of the Festival, i.e., the seventh day of Passover?
  Rava now addresses the statements of the final two the <i>tanna’im</i> cited in the first <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the proof given by Rabbi Yishmael from the two loaves that are brought at the beginning of a Festival, and the proof mentioned by Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira from the usage of the word <i>shabbat</i> in connection with <i>Shavuot</i>, Rava said: They have no refutation.
  Continuing with the proofs of the <i>tanna’im</i> from the second <i>baraita</i>, Rava said: If one seeks to disprove the Boethusian claim from that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said, that if the counting starts from Shabbat then <i>Shavuot</i> can occur anywhere from fifty to fifty-six days from the date the counting had started the previous year, I would say that perhaps the verse means fifty days excluding these six extra days.
  Rava continues: If one seeks to prove from that which Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said in the second <i>baraita</i>, that the verse indicates that the counting is dependent upon the decision of the court, not an individual, this can too be refuted: From where does one know that it is referring to the first day of the Festival? Perhaps it is referring to the last day of the Festival, the seventh day of Passover?
  Rava concludes: The first proof cited by Rabbi Yosei was that if the counting starts the day after a regular Shabbat then it would be impossible to determine which Shabbat is meant. Rabbi Yosei himself saw that it is also subject to refutation, and this is why Rabbi Yosei continued and said: Furthermore, and suggested a second proof. As Rava declared, the last two proofs cited in the second <i>baraita</i>, the second proof provided by Rabbi Yosei and the proof of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, stand without refutation.
  § The Gemara analyzes the matter itself of Abaye’s statement cited in the course of the previous discussion. Abaye said: It is a mitzva to count days, and it is also a mitzva to count weeks. The Gemara notes that in fact the Sages of the study hall of Rav Ashi counted days and they also counted weeks. Ameimar counted days but not weeks. In explanation of his practice, Ameimar said: Since there is no longer an <i>omer</i> offering, the counting is performed only in commemoration of the Temple. Therefore, one does not need to be so scrupulous to count both days and weeks.
  MISHNA: After they harvested the <i>omer</i> and placed it in the baskets, they brought it to the Temple courtyard. And they would singe in the fire the kernels of barley while they were still on the stalks, in order to fulfill the mitzva of parched grain, as it is written: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire” (Leviticus 2:14). This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Prior to parching the kernels, they would remove them from the stalks by beating them with soft, moist reeds and with cabbage stalks, not with sticks, so that the kernels would not be crushed.
  They then placed the grain into a hollow vessel [<i>le’abuv</i>], and this vessel was perforated so that the fire would take hold of the grain in its entirety. After parching the kernels, they would spread the kernels in the Temple courtyard and the wind would blow upon the kernels, cooling and drying them. They then placed the kernels in a mill used to grind grits, so that the barley would not be ground so fine that the shell would be mixed with the grain. And they produced from the ground barley a tenth of an ephah of barley flour that was sifted through thirteen sifters, and the rest is redeemed and may be eaten by any person. And dough from this barley flour is obligated in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i>, and the grain is exempt from the separation of tithe. Rabbi Akiva deems this flour obligated in having <i>ḥalla</i> and tithes separated from it.
  GEMARA: The mishna cited a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis as to whether the barley kernels were first singed while they were in their stalks or only after they were beaten and removed from their stalks, when they were placed in a hollow vessel. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14). “Grain in the ear”; this is a reference to the grain, i.e., the barley kernel. “Parched [<i>kalui</i>] with fire”; this teaches that the Jewish people would singe it in fire, in order to fulfill the mitzva of bringing parched grain. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:
  
  Daf 66b
  
  Fire is not the proper interpretation of the term <i>kali</i> in the verse. Rather, <i>kali</i> means something else, i.e., the barley was parched inside a receptacle and not directly in the fire. How so? The term <i>kali</i> means only that something else, a vessel made from burnished [<i>kalil</i>] brass was used in the process of parching the grains. How so, i.e., how was this performed? There was a hollow vessel there, in the Temple, which was used for making parched grains. And it was perforated with holes like a sieve, in order to allow the fire to take hold of it in its entirety.
  The <i>baraita</i> analyzes the verse: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14). This indicates that the grain used for the <i>omer</i> offering must be parched with fire, but is unclear if that clause modifies the earlier or later part of the verse. In other words, I do not know if grain in the ear is to be parched before it is ground, or if the ground groats are to be parched. The <i>baraita</i> explains that when the verse states: With fire, it interrupted the previous matter and is now introducing a new clause. Accordingly, the instructions to parch with fire is referring to the grain still in the stalks, not the ground groats.
  The verse states that the <i>omer</i> offering should be of the fresh ear [<i>karmel</i>]. The <i>baraita</i> defines <i>karmel</i> as soft and malleable [<i>rakh umal</i>]. And likewise there are other examples of terms that are interpreted as shortened terms, as the verse states: “And there came a man from Baal Shalishah, and brought the man of God bread of the first fruits, twenty loaves of barley, and fresh ears of grain [<i>karmel</i>] in his sack [<i>betziklono</i>]. And he said: Give to the people, that they may eat” (II Kings 4:42). This verse mentions the word <i>karmel</i> in connection with the word <i>betziklono</i>, which is interpreted as an abbreviation for: He came [<i>ba</i>] and he poured for us [<i>veyatzak lanu</i>], and we ate [<i>ve’akhalnu</i>] and it was fine [<i>venaveh haya</i>].
  The <i>baraita</i> presents further examples of words that are interpreted as shortened terms of an expanded phrase. And the verse states: “Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning; let us solace ourselves [<i>nitalesa</i>] with love” (Proverbs 7:18). The word <i>nitalesa</i> is short for: We shall converse [<i>nissa veniten</i>] and we shall go up [<i>vena’aleh</i>] to bed and we shall rejoice [<i>venismaḥ</i>] and be pampered [<i>venitḥata</i>] with loves.
  The <i>baraita</i> provides an example of a similar shortened word: “The wing of the ostrich beats joyously [<i>ne’elasa</i>]” (Job 39:13). The word <i>ne’elasa</i> is a combination of the words: Carries [<i>noseh</i>], goes up [<i>oleh</i>], and places down [<i>venitḥata</i>]. This bird carries its egg, flies upward, and places it in its nest.
  Likewise, the verse states, after Balaam struck his donkey: “And the angel of the Lord said to him: Why did you hit your donkey these three times? Behold I have come out as an adversary because your way is contrary [<i>yarat</i>] against me” (Numbers 22:32). <i>Yarat</i> is also a shortened term: The donkey feared [<i>yirata</i>], it saw [<i>ra’ata</i>], and it turned aside [<i>nateta</i>].
  The Gemara returns to discuss the word <i>karmel</i>. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that <i>karmel</i> means: A full kernel [<i>kar maleh</i>], i.e., that the shell of the kernel should be filled with the ripened kernel inside.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Akiva deems this flour obligated in having <i>ḥalla</i> and the tithes separated from it. Rav Kahana said that Rabbi Akiva would say: The smoothing of a pile of consecrated grains does not exempt it from the obligation to separate tithes if it is later redeemed for common use. This is despite the <i>halakha</i> that the smoothing of the pile is what causes the obligation of separating tithes to take effect.
  Rav Sheshet raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: What would they do with the leftover of these three <i>se’a</i> of barley, i.e., the portion not used for the tenth of an ephah of flour for the <i>omer</i> offering? It is redeemed and eaten by any person, and it is obligated in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i> and exempt from the separation of tithes. Rabbi Akiva deems this flour obligated in having <i>ḥalla</i> and the tithes separated from it. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: The <i>halakha</i> of one who redeems produce from the possession of the Temple treasurer [<i>gizbar</i>] proves otherwise, as he is obligated in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i> but exempt from the separation of tithes.
  Rav Sheshet explains his objection: And if it is so that Rabbi Akiva holds that smoothing a pile of consecrated grains does not exempt it from tithes, what is the significance of that which the Rabbis said to him? Rabbi Akiva would simply disagree with their premise, as it is the same ruling itself: Just as a pile of consecrated grains that was smoothed is not exempt from tithes, so too, Rabbi Akiva would maintain that produce redeemed from the Temple treasury is not exempt from tithes.
  And furthermore, Rav Kahana bar Taḥlifa raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> to Rav Kahana bar Matitya, who reported that Rabbi Akiva holds that consecrated grain is not exempt from the obligation to separate tithes. The <i>baraita</i> teaches: Rabbi Akiva obligates one in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i> and in the separation of tithes, as the Temple money designated for the <i>omer</i> crop was given only to cover the cost of that which they required for the offering. Only the requisite tenth of an ephah out of the entire three <i>se’a</i> was paid from the Temple treasury, and was therefore its property. This indicates that had the entire crop been purchased by the Temple, it would be exempt from the obligation to separate tithes.
  Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is a settled, accepted tradition in the mouth of Rabbi Akiva that the Temple money designated for the <i>omer</i> crop was given only to cover the cost of that which they required for the offering. In other words, Rav Kahana’s version of Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, that in all cases the smoothing of a pile of consecrated grains does not exempt it from tithes, is rejected.
  Rava likewise said: It is obvious to me that the smoothing of a pile of consecrated grain exempts one from any subsequent obligation to separate tithes. And even Rabbi Akiva, who requires the separation of tithes from the remainder of the grain not used for the <i>omer</i> offering, obligates one to separate tithes only there, where the money was given only to pay for that which they required for the offering. But he concedes that the smoothing of a pile of consecrated grain generally exempts one from the obligation to separate tithes.
  Rava continues: The status of a pile of grain after smoothing performed by a gentile owner is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One separates <i>teruma</i> from produce of a Jew to exempt other produce of a Jew, and from produce bought from gentiles to exempt other produce bought from gentiles, and from produce bought from Samaritans to exempt other produce bought from Samaritans. Furthermore, one may separate <i>teruma</i> from the produce of any of the above to exempt the produce of any of the above. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, as they maintain that produce that belonged to gentiles or Samaritans is obligated in tithes and has the same status as produce that initially belonged to a Jew.
  Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: One separates <i>teruma</i> from produce of a Jew to exempt other produce of a Jew, and from produce bought from gentiles to exempt produce bought from Samaritans, and from produce bought from Samaritans to exempt produce bought from gentiles. But one may not separate <i>teruma</i> from produce of a Jew to exempt produce bought from gentiles or from Samaritans, nor from produce bought from gentiles or from Samaritans to exempt produce of a Jew. According to Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yishmael, produce that belonged to a gentile or a Samaritan is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes. Therefore one may not separate tithes from produce of a Jew, to which the obligation of tithes applies, to exempt such produce.
  
  Daf 67a
  
  Rava adds: The kneading of consecrated dough exempts it from the obligation of <i>ḥalla</i>, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥalla</i> 3:3): If a woman consecrated her dough before she kneaded it and she subsequently redeemed it, she is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. Likewise, if she consecrated it after she kneaded it and then she redeemed it, she is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. But if she consecrated the dough before she kneaded it and the Temple treasurer kneaded it and then she subsequently redeemed it, she is exempt. The reason is that at the time that its obligation in <i>ḥalla</i> would have taken effect, i.e., at the time of its kneading, it was exempt, because it was Temple property.
  Rava raises a dilemma: If dough was kneaded while in the possession of a gentile, what is its status? Is one who acquires it after it has been kneaded obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i> from it or not? The Gemara answers that this is taught explicitly, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Ḥalla</i> 3:6): With regard to a convert who converted and had dough in his possession, if it was prepared before he converted, he is exempt from the obligation of <i>ḥalla</i>. If it was prepared after he converted, he is obligated. If he is uncertain, he is obligated.
  The Gemara asks: Of the Sages who disagreed with regard to the obligation to tithe grain that is smoothed by a gentile, who taught this mishna with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>? Perhaps it is a ruling upon which everyone agrees, and even Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who obligate there, in the case of tithes, exempt here in the case of <i>ḥalla</i>.
  The Gemara explains this possibility. There are three verses written with regard to <i>teruma</i> that contain the term “your grain.” They are: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain” (Deuteronomy 12:17); “And you shall eat before the Lord your God…the tithe of your grain” (Deuteronomy 12:17); and “The first fruits of your grain…you shall give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4). It can therefore be claimed that only there Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda hold that one is obligated to separate tithes from grain that was owned by a gentile, as in addition to the first reference to “your grain,” which excludes grain that was smoothed while in the Temple’s possession, it is written an additional “your grain,” and then another reference to “your grain.”
  The Gemara elaborates: This is an example of a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression. And there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression comes only to include additional cases. In this case, the verses teach that even grain that belonged to gentiles is obligated in the separation of tithes.
  But here, with regard to the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>, the term “your dough” is written only twice: “Of the first of your dough you shall set apart a cake for a gift; as that which is set apart of the threshing floor, so shall you set it apart. Of the first of your dough you shall give to the Lord a portion for a gift throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:20–21). One reference to “your dough” teaches that one is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i> only from an amount equal to your dough in the wilderness, where the mitzva was commanded, i.e., the volume of one <i>omer</i>. And one reference to “your dough” teaches that only the dough of an ordinary Jew is obligated but not the dough of gentiles nor the dough of consecrated property.
  The Gemara continues: Or perhaps it is Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon who taught that mishna, as they maintain that grain that was smoothed by a gentile owner is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes, and likewise dough kneaded by a gentile owner is likewise exempt from the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. But Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda derive by way of verbal analogy the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>, concerning which it is written: “Of the first of your dough,” from the same expression that appears there, with regard to tithes: “The first fruits of your grain.” Just as in the case of tithes they hold that one is obligated to separate the tithes from a pile of grain that was smoothed by a gentile owner, so too they hold that one is obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i> from dough that was kneaded by a gentile owner.
  Rava said: May it be God’s will that I see the answer to my question in a dream. Rava then said: The one who says that the smoothing of a grain pile by its gentile owner exempts a future Jewish owner from the obligation to separate tithes also maintains that the kneading of dough by its gentile owner exempts a future Jewish owner from any obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. So too the one who says that the smoothing of a grain pile by a gentile owner does not exempt a future Jewish owner from the obligation to separate tithes also maintains that the kneading of dough by a gentile owner does not exempt a future Jewish owner from the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>.
  Rav Pappa raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Terumot</i> 4:13): With regard to a gentile who separated a lamb in order to redeem a firstborn donkey, or if he separated <i>ḥalla</i> from dough that he kneaded, one informs him that he is exempt from these obligations and his <i>ḥalla</i> may be eaten by non-priests and the lamb designated to redeem his firstborn donkey may be sheared and worked.
  One can infer: But if a gentile separated <i>teruma</i>, the portion of the produce designated for the priest, from a grain pile that he smoothed, his <i>teruma</i> is prohibited to a non-priest. And this is an example of a <i>tanna</i> who says: The smoothing of a grain pile by a gentile owner does not exempt it from tithes, as the same <i>halakhot</i> apply to tithes as to <i>teruma</i>, and yet he maintains that the kneading of dough by a gentile owner exempts it from the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. This refutes Rava’s conclusion that one who holds that there is an exemption in the case of tithes likewise holds that an exemption applies to <i>ḥalla</i>.
  And Ravina further raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to <i>ḥalla</i> of a gentile that he separated after kneading his dough in Eretz Yisrael, or his <i>teruma</i> that he separated after smoothing his pile of grain outside Eretz Yisrael, in both cases one informs him that he is exempt from those obligations and his <i>ḥalla</i> may be eaten by non-priests and his <i>teruma</i> does not render a mixture prohibited if it becomes mixed with non-sacred produce. One can infer: But his <i>teruma</i> from his grain in Eretz Yisrael is prohibited to non-priests and renders a mixture prohibited if it becomes mixed with non-sacred produce.
  The Gemara explains the objection: And again this is an example of a <i>tanna</i> who says: The smoothing of a grain pile by a gentile owner does not exempt it from tithes, and nevertheless he maintains that the kneading of dough by a gentile owner exempts it from the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i>.
  The Gemara answers: This ruling that the smoothing of a grain pile by its gentile owner does not exempt it from the obligations of <i>teruma</i> and tithes applies only by rabbinic law. By Torah law, the smoothing of a grain pile by its gentile owner does exempt it from the obligation to separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes. The Sages enacted a decree due to the schemes of people of means. There was a fear that conniving merchants might temporarily transfer ownership of their produce to gentiles while the piles were smoothed, after which the gentiles would return them to their possession, thereby circumventing the obligation to separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes.
  
  Daf 67b
  
  The Gemara asks: If so, then <i>ḥalla</i> should be subject to the same rabbinic decree as well, to prevent someone from circumventing their obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> by temporarily selling their dough to a gentile who will knead it and return it to them. Why then does the <i>baraita</i> teach that dough kneaded by a gentile owner is exempt? The Gemara answers: There is no need for a decree in this case, since if one wanted to circumvent his obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> from his dough, an easier method is available: It is possible for him to bake using less than five-fourths of a <i>kav</i> of flour and a bit more, the minimum amount necessitating the separation of <i>ḥalla</i>.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why is there a need for a rabbinic decree with regard to <i>teruma</i> and tithes? The obligation to separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes can also be easily circumvented by acting in accordance with that which Rabbi Oshaya suggested, as Rabbi Oshaya says: A person can employ artifice to circumvent obligations incumbent upon him in dealing with his grain, and exempt himself by bringing it into his courtyard in its chaff so that his animal may eat from it. And this grain is exempt from <i>teruma</i> and tithes. Although the obligation to separate <i>teruma</i> from and to tithe produce that has been fully processed applies even to animal fodder, it is permitted to feed one’s animal untithed produce that has not been fully processed. Alternatively, another option of avoiding the obligation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes is to bring in the produce to his house by way of roofs or by way of enclosures [<i>karpeifot</i>]. The obligation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes applies only to produce that passes through the entrance of the house.
  The Gemara answers: There, in the case of <i>teruma</i> and tithes, the two options of bringing in the grain in its chaff or by way of roofs are performed in public [<i>befarhesya</i>], and it is degrading for one to be seen circumventing his obligation. Consequently, one who wishes to avoid the obligation would prefer the option of transferring ownership to a gentile, which the Sages prevent with their decree. Here, in the case of <i>ḥalla</i>, the option of baking with less than the minimum quantity of flour to avoid being obligated to separate <i>ḥalla</i> from the dough is performed in private, and it is not degrading for him, and he would sooner take advantage of that option than go through the process of transferring the dough to a gentile. Therefore, the Sages did not apply their decree in this case.
  MISHNA: After daybreak, the priest sacrificing the <i>omer</i> came to the sifted tenth of an ephah, placed in the vessel in his hand some of its <i>log</i> of oil, and placed its frankincense on the side of the vessel. He then poured some more oil from the <i>log</i> onto the high-quality flour and mixed them together, waved and brought the meal offering to the corner of the altar, and removed the handful and burned it on the altar. And the rest of the meal offering is eaten by the priests.
  Once the <i>omer</i> was sacrificed people would emerge and find the marketplace of Jerusalem full of the flour from the parched grain of the new crop that was permitted by the waving and the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering. That filling of the marketplace with the new crop was performed not with the approval of the Sages; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: They would do so with the approval of the Sages.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the marketplaces of Jerusalem would be filled with flour of parched grain even before the sacrificing of the <i>omer</i> offering, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that the Sages approved of this practice. The Gemara asks: And doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda agree that the Sages issued a decree against filling of the marketplaces with grain that is prohibited in consumption at the time? Wasn’t he concerned that perhaps someone might come to eat from it?
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 10b): Rabbi Yehuda says that one searches for leaven on the evening of the fourteenth of Nisan, and on the fourteenth in the morning, and at the time of the eradication of leaven. And the Rabbis say: That is not the <i>halakha</i>; rather, if one did not search on the evening of the fourteenth he should search on the fourteenth during the day, and if he did not search on the fourteenth, he should search during the festival of Passover. Since Rabbi Yehuda does not allow a search on Passover itself, he is evidently concerned that one who finds prohibited food might come to eat it. The same reasoning should apply in the case of the new crop.
  Rabba says that the prohibition of new grain is different, for the following reason:
  
  Daf 68a
  
  Since before the <i>omer</i> you permitted one to harvest the crop only by picking it by hand and not in the typical manner, he will remember the prohibition and refrain from eating it. With regard to searching for leaven, there is no reminder.
  Abaye said to him: This works out well in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to picking the grain. But with regard to grinding and sifting, what can be said? Apparently, it is permitted to perform these acts in a typical manner. Why, then, is there no concern that one may eat the grain at that stage?
  The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one also performs grinding in an atypical manner. One must grind the grain before the sacrificing of the <i>omer</i> with a hand mill, not with a mill powered by an animal or by water. Likewise, sifting is performed unusually, not in the interior of the sifter. Instead, it is performed on top of the sifter. Since all of these actions are performed in an atypical manner, there is no concern that one might eat the grain.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty from the case of a field that requires irrigation, where typical harvesting is permitted, as we learned in a mishna (71a): One may harvest grain from an irrigated field and from fields in the valleys, as their grain ripens long before the <i>omer</i> is sacrificed, but one may not pile the produce. The use of the term: One may harvest, indicates that the grain was harvested in a typical manner, not by hand. In this case, what can be said? Why doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree lest someone eat from the new grain?
  Rather, Abaye said: This difference between the cases of the <i>omer</i> and leaven is not based on the manner in which one harvests, grinds, or sifts. Instead, the reason for the different rulings is that one distances himself from new grain, as it is prohibited to eat the new grain all year until the <i>omer</i> is sacrificed. By contrast, one does not distance himself from leavened bread, as eating it is permitted during the rest of the year. Therefore, he is more likely to eat leavened bread unwittingly.
  Rava said: Does the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda pose a difficulty, while the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis does not pose a difficult? There is also an apparent contradiction between the opinion of the Rabbis, who claim that the Sages issued a decree with regard to new grain but did not issue a decree with regard to leaven.
  Rather, Rava said that the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we resolved it previously. The contradiction between one ruling of the Rabbis and the other ruling of the Rabbis is also not difficult: The Rabbis maintain that there is no need to issue a decree prohibiting searching for leaven after it becomes prohibited, as with regard to one who himself is seeking out leaven specifically in order to burn it, will he eat from it? By contrast, in the case of new grain he is processing the grain and preparing it for consumption. Consequently, there is a concern that he might eat it unwittingly.
  Rav Ashi said: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the difficulty can be resolved in another manner. As we learned in the mishna that the markets of Jerusalem were filled with flour of parched grain. It is permitted to prepare only such foods before the <i>omer</i>, as they are not eaten without further preparation. Therefore, there is no concern lest one eat it unwittingly before the <i>omer</i> offering is sacrificed.
  The Gemara rejects this interpretation: And this statement of Rav Ashi is an error [<i>baruta</i>], as this suggestion can easily be refuted: That works out well with regard to the status of the grain from the point that it was processed into flour of parched grain and forward, as there is no concern that perhaps one will come to eat it. But with regard to its status initially, until it became parched grain, what can be said? There must have been a certain point when the grain kernels were edible before they were transformed into parched grain. Why is there no concern that one might eat the kernels at this earlier stage?
  And if you would say that here too the grain is distinguished by the atypical manner in which it is harvested, through picking by hand, in accordance with the earlier statement of Rabba, nevertheless with regard to the difficulty raised to Rabba’s opinion from the case of an irrigated field, which is permitted to be harvested in the typical manner, what can be said? Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that this statement of Rav Ashi is an error.
  MISHNA: From the moment that the <i>omer</i> offering was sacrificed, the produce of the new crop was permitted immediately. For those distant from Jerusalem, the new crop is permitted from midday and beyond. From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that the day of waving the <i>omer</i>, the sixteenth of Nisan, is entirely prohibited, i.e., one may partake of the new crop only the next day.
  Rabbi Yehuda said: But isn’t it forbidden by Torah law, as it is stated: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14)? This means that the new crop is prohibited on the day of the waving unless permitted by sacrifice of the offering. And if so, for what reason is it permitted for those distant to eat the new crop from midday and beyond, when the Temple is standing? It is due to the fact that they know that the members of the court are not indolent in its sacrifice, and certainly by midday the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering has been completed.
  GEMARA: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as presented in the mishna, is that after the destruction of the Temple the new crop is prohibited throughout the entire sixteenth of Nisan by Torah law. With regard to the dissenting opinion that the new crop is permitted on the sixteenth of Nisan, Rav and Shmuel both say: When the Temple is standing, the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering permits the new crop. When the Temple is not standing, the illumination of the eastern horizon on the sixteenth of Nisan permits it.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason? Two verses are written with regard to the new crop. More precisely, there are two clauses in the same verse: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh grain, until this selfsame day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14). It is written that the new crop is prohibited “until you have brought the offering,” and it is also written that the new crop is prohibited only “until the selfsame day.” How so? How can these clauses be reconciled?
  The Gemara answers: Here, when the verse permits the new crop only after the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering, it is referring to the period when the Temple is standing. There, when the verse permits the new crop immediately upon the sixteenth of Nisan, it is speaking of the period when the Temple is not standing.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: Even when the Temple is standing, the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written: “Until you have brought the offering,” which indicates that the new crop is not permitted at daybreak, but only after the <i>omer</i> offering is sacrificed? The Gemara answers: The verse means that one should wait to partake of the new crop until after the <i>omer</i> offering is brought <i>ab initio</i>, in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but nevertheless it is permitted at daybreak.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty. The mishna states: From the moment that the <i>omer</i> offering was sacrificed, the produce of the new crop was permitted immediately. This indicates that the new crop is not permitted at the illumination of the eastern horizon. The Gemara again answers that the mishna means that one should wait to partake of the new crop until after the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but it is permitted at daybreak.
  The Gemara raises yet another difficulty from the next mishna (68b): Sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering would permit consumption of the new crop in the rest of the country [<i>bamedina</i>] outside the Temple, and the two loaves offering permitted the sacrifice of the new crop in the Temple. Here, too, the Gemara answers: One should wait to partake of the new crop until after the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion.
  
  Daf 68b
  
  The Gemara questions the claim that the purpose of waiting until the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> is only in order to fulfill the mitzva in the most optimal fashion. The mishna teaches: From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that partaking from the new crop on the day of waving the <i>omer</i>, the sixteenth of Nisan, is completely prohibited and one may partake of the new crop only the next day. The Gemara analyzes this statement. What is the reason for this? It is that soon the Temple will be rebuilt, and people will say: Last year [<i>eshtakad</i>], when there was no Temple, didn’t we eat of the new crop as soon as the eastern horizon was illuminated, as the new crop was permitted immediately upon the advent of the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan? Now, too, let us eat the new grain at that time.
  And they would not know that last year, when there was no Temple, the illuminating of the eastern horizon permitted one to eat the new grain immediately, but now that the Temple has been rebuilt and there is an <i>omer</i> offering, it is the <i>omer</i> that permits the consumption of the new grain. When the Temple is standing, the new grain is not permitted until the <i>omer</i> offering has been sacrificed. The Gemara concludes its question: And if it enters your mind to say that one waits to partake of the new crop until the <i>omer</i> offering permits the new grain only in order to perform the mitzva in the optimal fashion, would we arise and decree that the entire sixteenth of Nisan is entirely prohibited only due to the performance of a mitzva in the optimal manner?
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai stated his ordinance in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that it is prohibited by Torah law to eat of the new grain until the seventeenth of Nisan, as it is stated: “And you shall eat neither bread nor parched grain, nor fresh stalks, until this selfsame [<i>etzem</i>] day, until you have brought the offering of your God” (Leviticus 23:14).
  This does not mean that it is permitted to eat the new grain on the morning of the sixteenth, when the eastern horizon is illuminated. Rather, it is prohibited until the essence [<i>itzumo</i>] of the day. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that when the verse says “until,” it means until and including, meaning that the grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth. If so, by Torah law, eating the new grain is permitted only after the conclusion of the sixteenth, unless the <i>omer</i> offering was sacrificed, in which case it is permitted to eat the new grain immediately afterward.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? But he disagrees with him, as we learned in the mishna: From the time that the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted that partaking from the new crop on the day of waving the <i>omer</i>, the sixteenth of Nisan, is entirely prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda says: But isn’t it forbidden by Torah law, as it is written: “Until this selfsame day”? This indicates that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda.
  The Gemara rejects this. It is Rabbi Yehuda who is mistaken. He thought that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying that eating new grain on the sixteenth of Nisan is prohibited by rabbinic law. And that is not so; Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is actually saying that it is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara asks: But it is taught in the mishna that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai instituted, which indicates that it is a rabbinic ordinance. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of the term: Instituted, in this context? It means that he interpreted the verses in the Torah and instituted public notice for the multitudes to conduct themselves accordingly.
  § Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, ate from the new crop on the evening of the conclusion of the sixteenth of Nisan, leading into the seventeenth of Nisan. They held that the prohibition against eating the new crop outside Eretz Yisrael applies by rabbinic law. And therefore we are not concerned for the uncertainty that perhaps the day we think is the sixteenth of Nisan is really the fifteenth, due to the court proclaiming the previous month of Adar a full thirty days long.
  And conversely, the Sages of the study hall of Rav Ashi ate from the new crop only on the morning of the seventeenth. They held that the prohibition against eating the new crop outside Eretz Yisrael applies by Torah law. Consequently, they did entertain the concern that the day they thought was the sixteenth might actually be the fifteenth of Nisan, which would mean that the new crop is permitted only the following morning.
  This is problematic, as if there is a concern that the sixteenth is really the fifteenth of Nisan, then the seventeenth would be the sixteenth of Nisan. Accordingly, how could they eat from the new crop on that morning? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Zakkai institute that the new crop is prohibited the entire day? The Gemara explains that those Sages of the study hall of Rav Ashi held: And Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai is saying that eating new grain on the sixteenth of Nisan nowadays is prohibited by rabbinic law. And the Sages instituted this prohibition only for the actual day of waving the <i>omer</i> offering, whereas it was not instituted for a day with regard to which the real date is uncertain.
  Ravina said: My mother told me: Your father would eat from the new crop only on the evening at the conclusion of the seventeenth of Nisan, leading into the eighteenth. The reason for this was that he held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that nowadays it is prohibited to eat of the new crop on the sixteenth of Nisan by Torah law, and he was therefore concerned for the uncertainty that perhaps the sixteenth of Nisan was really the fifteenth, and consequently the seventeenth was really the sixteenth. Therefore he waited until the eve of the eighteenth, when he could be sure that there was no prohibition by Torah law against eating from the new crop.
  MISHNA: Sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering would permit consumption of the new crop in the rest of the country outside the Temple, and the two loaves offering would permit the sacrifice of the new crop in the Temple. One may not bring meal offerings, or first fruits, or the meal offering brought with libations accompanying animal offerings, from the new crop prior to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i>, and if he brought them from the new crop they are unfit. After the <i>omer</i> but prior to the two loaves one may not bring these offerings from the new crop, but if he brought them from the new crop, they are fit.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that meal offerings brought from the new crop prior to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering are unfit, whereas those brought after the <i>omer</i> but prior to the two loaves are fit. Rabbi Tarfon sat and posed the following difficulty: What is the difference between meal offerings brought before the <i>omer</i> and those brought before the two loaves?
  Rabbi Yehuda bar Neḥemya said before Rabbi Tarfon: No, one cannot compare the two situations. If you said that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to before the <i>omer</i> sacrifice, this is because at that stage there are no circumstances in which the new crop’s general prohibition was permitted, even with regard to an ordinary person; shall you also say that this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to before the sacrifice of the two loaves, when the new crop’s general prohibition was permitted with regard to an ordinary person? The new crop ingredient in the meal offering is at least permitted in consumption after the <i>omer</i> is brought. Therefore, the meal offerings that were brought after the <i>omer</i> but before the two loaves are fit.
  Rabbi Tarfon was silent, and Rabbi Yehuda ben Neḥemya’s face brightened. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yehuda, has your face brightened because you answered the elder? I will be astonished if the days of your life will be lengthy. Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ilai, said: That period in which that interaction occurred was half a month before Passover. When I ascended again to the study hall for the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, I asked about him: Where is Rabbi Yehuda ben Neḥemya? And they said to me: He passed away and left this world.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Neḥemya, libations from first fruits that one brought before the <i>omer</i> offering is sacrificed should be valid. The reason is that the prohibition of the new crop does not apply to fruits at all, and therefore they are never prohibited to ordinary people. When the mishna states that first fruits are prohibited it is referring to first fruits of grain, not the fruit of a tree. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that libations from first fruits brought before the <i>omer</i> offering are valid? Why would one think that they should not be valid?
  The Gemara answers that Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s statement is necessary, lest you say: It is only there, in the case of the meal offering of grain brought after the <i>omer</i> sacrifice, that it is valid, as the new crop’s general prohibition was permitted with regard to an ordinary person. But here, since with regard to these fruits there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted, one might say that the libation should not be valid. Therefore, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak teaches us that the opposite is the case: All the more so here it is a valid offering, where the fruit was not prohibited at all.
  § The Gemara presents a mnemonic for the ensuing discussions in the Gemara: Order, sprouting, dung of, elephant. The mishna teaches that a meal offering using the new crop may not be brought prior to the <i>omer</i> sacrifice or the two loaves. Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to the two loaves offering on <i>Shavuot</i>, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether they permit the new grain to be used in the Temple, if this sacrifice was performed out of their order? The sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> permits ordinary people to eat from the new grain, whereas the sacrifice of the two loaves permits the new grain to be used in the Temple. What is the <i>halakha</i> if a new crop sprouted after the <i>omer</i> offering was brought but before the two loaves were brought?
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? The Gemara explains: This is referring to a case where they planted the grain in between the time of the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> and the time of the two loaves offering. And therefore the sacrifice of two loaves passed by first, and then the time of the <i>omer</i> offering of the following year. What is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: Does the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> and two loaves permit the new grain to be used for meal offerings if sacrificed only in their proper order, whereas if sacrificed out of their order the sacrifice does not permit the new crop? Or perhaps they permit the new grain to be used for meal offerings even when sacrificed out of their order.
  Rabba said: Come and hear proof from a <i>baraita</i>: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14). The verse is speaking of the <i>omer</i> meal offering. From where, i.e., of which grain, is it brought? It is brought from barley. The <i>baraita</i> asks: Do you say that it is brought from barley, or perhaps it is only from wheat?
  Rabbi Eliezer says that it is stated “in the ear” with regard to the plague of hail in Egypt: “And the flax and the barley were smitten; for the barley was in the ear, and the flax was in bloom” (Exodus 9:31), and it is stated “in the ear” with regard to the mitzva of the new crop, which is for all generations. Just as the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to plague of hail in Egypt is referring to barley, as is clear from the next verse: “But the wheat and the spelt were not smitten, for they ripen late” (Exodus 9:32), so too the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to the new crop for all generations is referring to barley.
  The <i>baraita</i> cites another proof that the <i>omer</i> offering is brought from barley. And Rabbi Akiva says: We found an individual who brings his obligation of a meal offering from wheat, which is brought by a poor person for a false oath of testimony, a false oath of utterance, or for entering the Temple while ritually impure, and one who brings his obligation of a meal offering from barley, in the case of a sinner’s meal offering or the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>.
  And we also found with regard to the community that they bring their obligation of a meal offering from wheat, in the case of the two loaves offering of <i>Shavuot</i>, and therefore, to keep the <i>halakha</i> of a community parallel to that of an individual there should be a case where the community brings their obligation of a meal offering from barley. And if you say that the <i>omer</i> offering comes from wheat, then we will not have found a case of a community that brings its obligation of a meal offering from barley. Consequently, it must be that the <i>omer</i> offering comes from barley.
  Rabbi Akiva suggests another proof: Alternatively, if you say that the <i>omer</i> offering comes from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be from the first fruits. The verse states that the two loaves offering of <i>Shavuot</i> should come from the first fruits: “Also in the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord in your feast of weeks” (Numbers 28:26). If the <i>omer</i> is from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be the first offering of the first fruit, as the <i>omer</i> offering of Passover precedes it. Therefore, the <i>omer</i> offering must come from barley. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  Rabba resolves Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma from this last proof of Rabbi Akiva: And if it is so, that the two loaves sacrificed not in their proper order still permit the use of the new crop for meal offerings, you can in fact find a case where the two loaves are from the first fruits even though they are also brought from wheat, just like the <i>omer</i> offering. This is a case where the community sacrifices the current <i>omer</i> offering from these wheat grains that took root prior to the bringing of the two loaves offering but after the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering of last year.
  And the current two loaves offering is brought from these grains that took root prior to the current <i>omer</i> offering and after the two loaves offering of last year. In this scenario, the two loaves come from wheat of this year’s crop and yet they are still called the first fruits, despite the fact that the <i>omer</i> offering also came from wheat, as that wheat is considered the previous year’s crop. Since this case is not mentioned in the <i>baraita</i>, evidently if the two loaves are not in the proper order with regard to a certain crop they do not permit that crop to be used in offerings in the Temple. This resolves Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma.
  In this manner Rabba has attempted to prove that the proper order of the <i>omer</i> offering followed by the two loaves is necessary to permit the new grain for use in meal offerings. The Gemara rejects the proof: Do you hold
  
  Daf 69a
  
  that when we say the two loaves must come from the first fruits, the verse is referring to the new fruit crop grown this year? This is not so. Rather, we say that the two loaves must come from the first fruits sacrificed upon the altar this year. Therefore, even in Rabba’s case the two loaves cannot come from wheat, as the altar had already consumed from the fruit, i.e., the wheat used for the <i>omer</i> offering, of this year.
  § Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: With regard to the two loaves that permit the bringing of first fruit, are all fruit that are budding at the time of the sacrifice permitted, or are only fruit that has gone through formation permitted? The Gemara asks: What is meant here by budding and what is the meaning of formation? If we say that this is referring to the budding of the fruit and the formation of the fruit, this is difficult: Now that it is taught (70a) that even in the case of the grain taking root prior to the bringing of the two loaves, that grain is permitted by their sacrifice, is it necessary to discuss the budding or formation of fruit, which corresponds to a later stage than the taking root of grain?
  The Gemara answers: Rather, Rami bar Ḥama is referring to the budding of a fruit tree’s leaf and the formation of a fruit tree’s leaf. The question is whether the budding of the fruit tree’s leaves is like the taking root of grain, and therefore all the tree’s first fruit is permitted by the two loaves, or whether this budding is not similar to the taking root of grain, and therefore the tree’s fruit is not permitted by the two loaves. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises a dilemma: With regard to wheat kernels that one sowed in the ground, does the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering permit them to be eaten or does the <i>omer</i> not permit them in consumption? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a case where the wheat kernel has already taken root prior to the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering, we already learn this in a mishna. If it is referring to a case where the wheat stalk has not yet taken root, we already learn this in a mishna as well.
  The Gemara cites the source for this claim. As we learned in a mishna (70a): If crops took root before the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering, the <i>omer</i> permits them to be eaten. And if not, i.e., they took root only after the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering, they are prohibited until the next <i>omer</i> is sacrificed the following year.
  The Gemara explains: No, Rava bar Rav Ḥanan’s dilemma is necessary only in a case where one reaped grain and sowed it again prior to the <i>omer</i>, and the time of the <i>omer</i> arrived and passed while the grain was in the ground but before it had taken root. And this is the dilemma that he raises: What is the <i>halakha</i> in such a case? Is it permitted to take these kernels and eat from them? Is their halakhic status considered like that of kernels cast into a jug, i.e., disconnected from the ground, and consequently the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering renders their consumption permitted? Or perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, in which case their halakhic status is that of seeds that did not take root and are therefore prohibited.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises another dilemma with regard to grains that were reaped and then sowed again: Does the <i>halakha</i> of exploitation apply to them in a case of a disparity of one-sixth between their sale price and their market value, which would render the exploiter obligated to refund the difference between the purchase price and the market value, or does the <i>halakha</i> of exploitation not apply to them? Since the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation apply only to movable property, not to land, this matter depends on whether these grains are considered like detached movable property or whether they have been subordinated to the land.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that one said: I sowed six <i>kav</i> of grain in the field, and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five <i>kav</i> in it, that is difficult: But doesn’t Rava say: With regard to any item that is otherwise subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation, and it is sold by measure, or by weight, or by number, even if the disparity was less than the measure of exploitation in the transaction, the transaction is reversed. A disparity of one-sixth between the value of an item and its price constitutes exploitation only in cases where there is room for error in assessing the value of an item. In a case where the sale item is easily quantifiable, any deviation from the designated quantity results in a nullification of the transaction, even if the sale item in question is subordinate to the ground.
  Rather, it is a case where the seller said: I cast kernels in the field as required, without quantifying the measure of the kernels that he cast, and witnesses came and said that he did not cast kernels in the field as required. Are they subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation, as the halakhic status of these kernels is like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation? Or, perhaps the laborer subordinated them to the ground, in which case they have the status of land, which is not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation.
  Rava bar Rav Ḥanan raises yet another dilemma with regard to grains that were reaped and then sowed again. The <i>halakha</i> is that one does not take oaths with regard to claims on land. Consequently, if one admitted to part of a claim with regard to such grain, which generally obligates him in an oath, does he take an oath with regard to the kernels or does he not take an oath with regard to the kernels? Is their halakhic status like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are like movable property and one takes an oath with regard to them? Or, perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, and they are like land and one does not take an oath with regard to them. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § Rami bar Ḥama raises another dilemma: With regard to wheat kernels that are found in the dung of cattle, or barley kernels found in the dung of an animal, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara asks: With regard to what issue was this dilemma raised? If we say it was with regard to their capacity to become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, we already learn this in a <i>baraita</i>, as it is taught: If one found wheat kernels in the dung of cattle or barley kernels in the dung of animals, they do not become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But if he collected them for eating, they do become susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.
  The Gemara provides another suggestion: Rather, perhaps Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma is referring to the use of these kernels for meal offerings. The Gemara rejects this: It is obvious that they may not be used for meal offerings, as it is written with regard to those who offer inferior items to the Temple: “Present it now unto your governor; will he be pleased with you or show you favor? Says the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 1:8). Any item that one would not feel comfortable bringing to a governor or local ruler may certainly not be brought to the Temple.
  The Gemara explains: No; it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where one collected these kernels and sowed them in the ground, and now he wants to bring meal offerings from them. What is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the reason one may not use them initially for meal offerings because they are disgusting, and since he sowed them again their disgusting quality has left? Or perhaps they were initially disqualified because they are considered weakened after having been digested by an animal. And if so, even the grains that have now grown after they were replanted are also weakened, like the kernels that gave rise to them. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rami bar Ḥama raises yet another dilemma: In the case of an elephant that swallowed an Egyptian wicker basket and excreted it intact along with its waste, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised?
  If we say that the dilemma was raised with regard to a case where the wicker basket was ritually impure and the question is if its ritual impurity is nullified by the elephant swallowing it, we already learn in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 25:9): All vessels descend into their state of ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to finish it, it immediately assumes the halakhic status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure. Therefore, as the wicker basket remained intact without physical change, it is clear that it remains ritually impure.
  The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to raise this dilemma in a case where the elephant had swallowed ends of palm leaves [<i>hutzin</i>] whole, and after the leaves were excreted one made them into an Egyptian wicker basket. The dilemma is as follows: Is this considered digestion, and therefore the basket prepared from the leaves is
  
  Daf 69b
  
  like dung vessels and like earth vessels, and these are not susceptible to ritual impurity, as the Master said: Stone vessels and dung vessels and earth vessels are not susceptible to ritual impurity, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic law? Or perhaps this is not considered digestion, as these palm leaves remained intact, and therefore the vessel prepared from them is susceptible to ritual impurity like any other wooden vessel.
  The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which Ulla says in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yehotzadak: An incident occurred in which wolves swallowed two children and excreted them on the east bank of the Jordan, and the incident came before the Sages for a ruling. They were asked whether the remains of the children were ritually impure even after they had passed through the animal’s digestive tract, and they deemed the flesh ritually pure, as it is no longer considered human flesh but wolf excrement. Similarly, the swallowed palm leaves should be considered like elephant dung and therefore the basket made from them should not be susceptible to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara rejects this resolution: That case of flesh is different, as flesh is soft and digestible. Palm leaves, by contrast, are hard and not easily digested. The Gemara suggests: But in that case, let us resolve the dilemma from the last clause of the account of that incident: The Sages ruled that flesh was ritually pure, but they deemed the intact bones ritually impure. The bones, which are a harder substance than the flesh, are not considered digested. Likewise, the hard palm leaves should also not be considered digested, and the wicker basket fashioned from them should be susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: The case of bones is different, as they are harder. Therefore, one cannot cite a proof from here with regard to palm leaves, which are a comparatively softer substance.
  § Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: With regard to wheat that fell from the clouds, what is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara asks: With regard to what issue was this dilemma raised? If it is referring to using this wheat for meal offerings, why not? There should be no problem with using the wheat, since wheat for meal offerings does not have to come from Eretz Yisrael. Rather, the dilemma is whether this wheat can be used for the offering of the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i>. What is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara explains the two possibilities. The verse states: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two wave-loaves of two-tenths of an ephah; they shall be of fine flour, they shall be baked with leaven, for first fruits to the Lord” (Leviticus 23:17). When the Merciful One states: “Out of your dwellings,” does this serve to exclude wheat that came from outside Eretz Yisrael, teaching that it may not be used for the two loaves; but wheat that fell from the clouds is permitted? Or perhaps the verse means specifically: “Out of your dwellings,” i.e., only from Eretz Yisrael; and if so, even wheat that fell from the clouds is also not acceptable.
  With regard to this dilemma, the Gemara asks: But is there a case like this? Is it possible for wheat to fall from the clouds? The Gemara answers: Yes, as in an incident involving Adi the Arab [<i>taya’a</i>], about whom it is related that it rained down on him wheat of a height of one handbreadth spread over an area of three parasangs.
  § Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi raises a dilemma: In a case where one had an ear of grain that reached one-third of its growth prior to the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering, and then he uprooted it and planted it again after the <i>omer</i>, and then it added to its growth, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we follow the original growth, which was permitted by the <i>omer</i> offering, and therefore the additional growth is also permitted? Or perhaps we follow the additional growth, which was not permitted by the <i>omer</i>, as it grew afterward. And if so, it will remain prohibited until the next <i>omer</i> offering is brought.
  The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a young vine within three years of its planting, whose fruits are prohibited as <i>orla</i>, that one grafted onto an old, permitted vine, and there were fruits on the younger vine, even if the older vine added two hundred parts of growth to the existing fruit, it is still prohibited. The two hundred permitted parts, which are generally sufficient to nullify one part of <i>orla</i>, are ineffective in this case, because the subsequent additional growth is considered subordinate to the original prohibited growth. This proves that we follow the original growth, and therefore in Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi’s case the original growth that was permitted by the <i>omer</i> should render the entire plant, including the subsequent growth, permitted in consumption.
  The Gemara cites another proof from a similar case. And likewise Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: With regard to an onion that one planted in a vineyard, creating a forbidden mixture of food crops in a vineyard, and the vineyard was subsequently uprooted, so that most of the onion grew in a permitted manner, even if the onion added two hundred parts of growth, the onion is prohibited. The reason the entire onion is prohibited is apparently because we follow the original growth, which is forbidden.
  The Gemara states that these proofs are inconclusive, as that itself is what Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi raises as a dilemma: Is it entirely obvious to the Sages that we follow the main growth, and there is no difference whether this leads to a leniency or whether it leads to a stringency? Or perhaps they are uncertain about the matter, and therefore they rule that when it leads to a stringency, e.g., prohibiting the additional growth of <i>orla</i> fruit or the additional growth of an onion that had grown in a vineyard, we say that we follow the original growth, but when it leads to a leniency, such as allowing the consumption of grain after the <i>omer</i>, we do not say that we follow the original growth. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § In connection to the previous discussion with regard to an ear of grain that had grown one-third prior to the <i>omer</i> and was subsequently uprooted and replanted, Rabba raises a dilemma: With regard to the obligation to tithe, what is the <i>halakha</i> of such grain? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? The circumstances involve a case where
  
  Daf 70a
  
  one estimated the amount of tithe necessary, and then he separated those tithes, and then he planted the grain again and it added to its growth. The question is whether we follow the initial growth, and therefore the subsequent growth is exempt from the obligation to separate tithes, or do we follow the additional growth and deem it obligated in tithes?
  Rabba adds: If you say that we do not follow the main growth and therefore the additional growth requires the separation of tithes, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the main, initial growth? Does it require an additional separation of tithes, or does it not, as tithes were already set aside for it? Abaye said to Rabba: In what way is this case different from any general case of wheat or barley? When grain is tithed and replanted, the obligation of tithes always applies to what then grows.
  Rabba said to Abaye: I do not raise the dilemma with regard to a substance whose seed disintegrates in the ground. In such a case it is clear that the new growth requires a new tithe to be separated, as the original seed is no longer extant. Rather, when I raise the dilemma it is with regard to a substance whose original seed does not disintegrate. What is the <i>halakha</i>? Do we follow the original growth, for which tithes have already been separated, or do we follow the additional growth that is still being generated by that original seed?
  The Gemara asks: Let him resolve the dilemma from that which Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a <i>litra</i> of onions that one tithed, and then he sowed a field with the entire <i>litra</i> of onions, when the field yields a crop it is tithed according to the entire crop. Although some of the onions he sowed were already tithed, he is obligated to tithe them again because the growths exceed the original onions and therefore the entire crop has untithed status.
  The Gemara rejects that resolution: There, in the case of the field sowed with the tithed onions, the entire field must be tithed because that is the normal way in which a field is sowed. One generally replants a full onion, and therefore the focus is not on the original onion but on the yield, which must be fully tithed. Here, in the case of grain, this is not the normal way in which a field is sowed. Generally one plants individual kernels, not fully grown ears of grain. Consequently, any subsequent growth from that fully grown ear is considered part of the original growth.
  Rabbi Ḥanina bar Minyumi said to Abaye: In a case of a flowerpot [<i>atzitz</i>] that is not perforated, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to separating <i>teruma</i> and tithes? Abaye replied: What is the difficulty here? If it is not perforated, this <i>halakha</i> is the same as that of any non-perforated flowerpot, i.e., the separation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes is required by rabbinic law.
  Abaye continues: Perhaps what you meant to say is that he subsequently went and perforated it. In such a case the question is whether one may separate <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the initial growth of the plant. Is the initial growth considered a separate entity, in which case one part of the growth requires the separation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes by rabbinic law and the rest by Torah law, and therefore one may not separate from the initial growth? Alternatively, perhaps the initial growth is nullified by the subsequent growth, which would mean that the obligation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes applies to the entire plant by Torah law. Consequently, this obligation can be fulfilled by separating <i>teruma</i> and tithes from the initial growth of the plant. This would be similar to Rabba’s dilemma with regard to an ear of grain that is replanted.
  Abaye explains that the two cases are not comparable. Here, in the case of the non-perforated flowerpot which was subsequently perforated, it is one single sowing. Therefore, although the original growth occurred while the pot was not perforated, since it is now perforated, the plant is considered attached to the ground and it rises and grows from there. Consequently, the obligation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes applies to the entire plant by Torah law. There, in Rabba’s dilemma involving the replanting of an ear of grain, there are two distinct sowings. Therefore, there is room to debate whether or not the additional, second sowing is part of the original, first sowing.
  § Rabbi Abbahu raises a dilemma: With regard to an ear of grain that one smoothed into a pile and then sowed it again and subsequently designated it as <i>teruma</i> or tithes while it was attached to the ground, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does one say that since he smoothed it, which is the act that renders produce subject to the obligation of <i>teruma</i> and tithes, he has given it the status of untithed produce, and therefore when he subsequently designated it he thereby sanctified it? Or perhaps, since he had sowed it again after he had smoothed it, its status as untithed produce lapsed from it.
  The Sages said to Abaye: If so, that the grain is sanctified in this situation, we have found a case of <i>teruma</i> that is sanctified while it is still attached to the ground. But we learn in a <i>baraita</i>: We do not find a case of <i>teruma</i> attached to the ground. Therefore, one must conclude that its status as untithed produce has been removed, and his designation does not render it <i>teruma</i>.
  Abaye said to one of those Sages: When that <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught with regard to <i>teruma</i>, which renders a non-priest liable to death at the hand of Heaven or payment of a fifth. If a non-priest ate <i>teruma</i> intentionally he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven; if he ate it unintentionally, he must restore the amount he ate with the addition of one-fifth (see Leviticus 22:9, 14). The reason there is no penalty for eating <i>teruma</i> that is attached to the ground is that if one detaches it and eats it, it is considered detached. And if he stooped down and ate it while it was attached to the ground he is not liable, as his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. In other words, this is an abnormal manner of eating, for which one is not liable.
  The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from the <i>halakha</i> that is written on the tablet [<i>appinkesa</i>] of Ilfa: With regard to eggs found with the carcass of a kosher bird, some of them outside the bird and some of them inside the bird, if one ate from those inner eggs directly from inside the bird, they render the garments of one who swallows them ritually impure when they are in the throat. If he removed those same eggs and ate from them when they were outside the bird, they do not render the garments of one who swallows them ritually impure when they are in the throat. Apparently, even the abnormal method of eating eggs while they are inside the bird is still considered eating. If so, the same should apply to consuming <i>teruma</i> abnormally by stooping down and eating it while it is still attached to the ground.
  The Gemara answers: With regard to an item that is detached, i.e., the eggs inside the bird, it is relatively common for people to eat even in this manner. But with regard to an item that is attached to the ground, it is not common for people to eat such produce at all.
  § Rav Tavyumei bar Kisna says that Shmuel says: With regard to one who plants diverse kinds of plants in a non-perforated flowerpot, this is prohibited. Abaye said: What is novel about this <i>halakha</i>? Granted if Shmuel had taught us that one who plants in this manner is flogged with lashes for rebelliousness by rabbinic law, it is well and understandable. But with this basic ruling he stated, that it is prohibited, what is he teaching us?
  Is he teaching that planting in a non-perforated flowerpot is considered sowing by rabbinic law? We already learn this in a mishna (<i>Demai</i> 5:10): If one separated <i>teruma</i> from produce grown in a non-perforated pot for produce of a perforated pot, it is <i>teruma</i> by rabbinic law, and he must again separate <i>teruma</i> from the produce obligated in <i>teruma</i> by Torah law to render the produce grown in the perforated pot permitted in consumption. Since this separation has the status of <i>teruma</i> by rabbinic law, evidently sowing in a non-perforated pot is considered sowing.
  MISHNA: Wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye; these are obligated in the separation of <i>ḥalla</i>, and each one of them joins together with the othersto constitute the measure that obligates one to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. And they are prohibited due to the prohibition of partaking of the new crop prior to the Passover Festival, and likewise it is prohibited to reap them prior to the <i>omer</i> offering. If these grains took root prior the <i>omer</i> offering, the <i>omer</i> permits their consumption; and if not, they are prohibited until the next <i>omer</i> is brought and sacrificed the following year.
  GEMARA: The Gemara discusses the identity of the species mentioned in the mishna. A Sage taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Spelt is a type of wheat, while oats and rye are a type of barley. The Gemara translates the lesser-known species into the vernacular Aramaic: Spelt is called
  
  Daf 70b
  
  <i>gulva</i>, rye is <i>dishra</i>, and oats are <i>shibbolei ta’ala</i>. The Gemara infers: With regard to these species, yes, the obligation of <i>ḥalla</i> applies to them, but concerning rice and millet, no, the obligation of <i>ḥalla</i> does not apply to them.
  The Gemara asks: From where is this matter, that only these five grains are obligated in the separations of <i>ḥalla</i>, derived? Reish Lakish said: This principle is derived by means of a verbal analogy between “bread” and “bread” from the case of <i>matza</i>. It is written here, with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>: “And it shall be that when you eat of the bread of the land, you shall set apart a portion for a gift to the Lord” (Numbers 15:19), and it is written there, with regard to <i>matza</i>: “Bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3). Just as <i>matza</i> can be prepared only from one of those five grains, so too the obligation of <i>ḥalla</i> applies only to bread from one of those five grains.
  The Gemara asks: And there, with regard to <i>matza</i> itself, from where do we derive that it must be from one of those five grains? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish said, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov taught, that the verse states: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it <i>matza</i>, the bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3). This verse indicates that only with regard to substances that will come to a state of leavening does a person fulfill his obligation to eat <i>matza</i> by eating them on Passover, provided that he prevents them from becoming leavened. This serves to exclude these foods, i.e., rice, millet, and similar grains, which, even if flour is prepared from them and water is added to their flour, do not come to a state of leavening but to a state of decay [<i>sirḥon</i>].
  § The mishna teaches that each one of the five types of grain joins together with the others to constitute the measure that obligates one to separate <i>ḥalla</i>. It was taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to grain from produce and flours and pieces of dough, each one of these joins together with the others. The Gemara asks: With regard to what <i>halakha</i> was this taught?
  Rav Kahana says: It was taught with regard to the prohibition of eating of the new crop prior to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering on the sixteenth of Nisan. If one ate grain, flour, and dough of the new crop that combined to equal the size of an olive-bulk, he is liable to receive lashes for transgressing a prohibition. Rav Yosef says: It was taught with regard to the prohibition of eating leavened bread on Passover. Rav Pappa says: It was taught with regard to the prohibition of eating second tithe outside the walls of Jerusalem. As, if one ate a combined olive-bulk’s worth of grain, flour and dough of the second tithe outside the wall of Jerusalem, he is flogged.
  Rava says: The <i>baraita</i> is referring to the matter of the ritual impurity of food; and this is what it teaches us: That grains of barley produce and flours are similar to pieces of dough. Just as there, concerning pieces of dough, they combine to form the minimal measure of ritually impure food only if the combination of food is as is, without other additives, so too here also, concerning grain and flour, they combine to form the minimal measure of ritually impure food only when the mixture is food as is, without any shell or other additives.
  The Gemara cites support for this opinion, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Wheat, whether shelled or unshelled, combines to form the minimal measure of food that is susceptible to ritual impurity. But as for barley, it combines only when it is shelled. When it is not shelled, it does not combine together, as the inedible shell interposes between the different grains. This support Rava’s interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>, that it addresses barley in the form of grain, flour, and dough.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so, that the shell of barley is not considered part of the grain with regard to combining for ritual impurity? But didn’t the school of Rabbi Yishmael teach in a <i>baraita</i>: Before a food item comes in contact with liquid it is not susceptible to ritual impurity, as the verse states: “And if anything falls from their carcasses upon any sowing seed that is sown, it is pure. But if water be put upon the seed, and any of the carcass fall thereon, it is impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38). The <i>baraita</i> teaches that the term “that is sown” indicates that the entire seed is susceptible to ritual impurity when it is in a state where it is typical for people to take it out to the field for sowing. This applies to wheat in its shell, barley in its shell, and lentils in their shells. This demonstrates that shells are considered part of the grain with regard to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. The ruling of this <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the shells of kernels are considered part of it with regard to ritual impurity, is stated with regard to moist kernels, whereas the ruling of that <i>baraita</i>, which teaches that the shells are not part of the seed, is stated with regard to dry kernels, in which the shells crumble and fall away.
  § The mishna teaches with regard to the five grains: And they are forbidden due to the prohibition of partaking of the new crop prior to the Passover festival. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Reish Lakish said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between “bread” written in connection with the prohibition of the new crop (see Leviticus 23:14), and “bread” written with regard to <i>matza</i> (see Deuteronomy 16:3). Just as <i>matza</i> can be prepared only from one of the five grains, so too the prohibition against eating of the new crop applies only to the five grains.
  § The mishna further teaches with regard to the five grains: And it is prohibited to reap them prior to the <i>omer</i> offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between “the first” written in conjunction with the new crop: “You shall bring the sheaf of the first fruits of your harvest to the priest” (Leviticus 23:10), and “the first” written with regard to <i>ḥalla</i>: “Of the first of your dough you shall set apart a cake for a gift” (Numbers 15:20). Just as the obligation to separate <i>ḥalla</i> applies only to bread prepared from the five grains, so too the prohibition against reaping the new crop prior to the <i>omer</i> offering applies only to crops of the five grains.
  The Gemara asks: What does the mishna mean when it says: Prior to the <i>omer</i>? Does it mean prior to the reaping of the <i>omer</i> grain or prior to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering? Rabbi Yona says: It means prior to the reaping of the <i>omer</i> grain, i.e., the new crop is permitted at daybreak on the sixteenth of Nisan. Rabbi Yosei bar Zavda says: Prior to the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering later that day.
  The Gemara cites a proof from that which we learned in the mishna: And they are forbidden due to the prohibition of partaking of the new crop prior to the Passover Festival, and likewise it is prohibited to reap them prior to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering. Granted, according to the one who said that the prohibition applies prior to the bringing of the <i>omer</i> offering, this is the reason that the mishna did not combine the clauses together and teach them as one, since the time frame for each prohibition is different. The prohibition of harvesting the new crop is lifted at daybreak after the <i>omer</i> crop was harvested at night, whereas the prohibition against consuming the new crop ends only with the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering later that day.
  But according to the one who said that the prohibition applies prior to the reaping of the <i>omer</i> grain, then both the consuming and the harvesting of the new crop are permitted at daybreak of the sixteenth of Nisan. If so, let the mishna combine them and teach them together, as follows: And they are forbidden due to the prohibition of partaking of the new crop, and likewise it is prohibited to reap them prior to the Passover Festival.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, if a dispute was stated in this matter, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches: If these grains took root prior to the <i>omer</i> offering, the <i>omer</i> permits their consumption. What does the mishna mean when it says: Prior to the <i>omer</i>? Rabbi Yona says: Prior to the bringing of the <i>omer</i> sacrifice. Rabbi Yosei bar Zavda says: Prior to the harvesting of the <i>omer</i> grain.
  Rabbi Elazar said to
  
  Daf 71a
  
  Rabbi Yoshiya of his generation, i.e., not the <i>tanna</i> of the same name: Do not sit on your knees until you have explained to me the source for that latter clause in the mishna: From where is it derived that the <i>omer</i> offering permits the consumption of the new crop upon its taking root in the ground?
  Rabbi Yoshiya responded: From where do we derive, you ask? The source is that it is written: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14). Can one not learn from here by inference that although the <i>omer</i> offering must be from fully formed grain, there is less-developed grain at an earlier stage that is not “grain in the ear,” i.e., grain that may not be used for the <i>omer</i> offering but is nevertheless permitted by the <i>omer</i>?
  The Gemara rejects this claim. Perhaps one can infer from here only that there is less-developed grain that is not “grain in the ear” but is at a further stage than simply taking root. Rather, it actually grew one-third of its full growth. If so, merely taking root is not enough for the <i>omer</i> offering to permit the consumption of that grain.
  Rather, Shmuel said that this <i>halakha</i> is derived from a verse discussing the counting of the <i>omer</i>: “Seven weeks you shall number for you; from the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain you shall begin to number seven weeks” (Deuteronomy 16:9). Can one not learn from here by inference that there is grain at an earlier stage that cannot be cut with a sickle, which nevertheless is permitted by the <i>omer</i> offering? This description applies to grain that has taken root. The Gemara rejects this claim as well: Perhaps the inference is to grain at an earlier stage that cannot be cut with a sickle but is actually fodder, i.e., produce that has grown stalks but is not yet ripe.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak said: One can derive that grain that has taken root is permitted by the <i>omer</i> offering from the term: “The standing grain” (Deuteronomy 16:9). Can one not learn from here by inference that there is grain that is too soft and unable to stand, which may not be used for the <i>omer</i> offering and yet is permitted by the <i>omer</i>? The Gemara rejects this claim as well: Perhaps the inference is to grain that is unable to stand but is actually soft grain like that of a marsh; it has grown somewhat but is still soft enough that it bends rather than stands.
  Rather, Rava said that the source of the <i>halakha</i> is the verse: “And the feast of harvest, the first fruits of your labors, which you sow in the field” (Exodus 23:16). This verse is referring to grain from the time of sowing, i.e., from when the grain takes root. Rav Pappa said to Rava: If so, then even though the grain had not taken root it should be permitted by the <i>omer</i> offering. The verse mentions grain at the time of sowing, but it does not indicate that it is necessary for that grain to have taken root in order to be permitted by the <i>omer</i>. Rava said to Rav Pappa in reply: Wise one [<i>sudni</i>]! It is written: “In the field,” which indicates that the verse is referring to freshly sown produce that has become part of the field, i.e., it has taken root.
  MISHNA: Even before the <i>omer</i> offering is brought, one may reap a crop that grows in an irrigated field in the valleys, but one may not arrange the reaped stalks in a pile. The residents of Jericho, whose fields were categorized as irrigated fields in a valley, reaped the crops with the approval of the Sages and arranged the crops in a pile without the approval of the Sages, but the Sages did not reprimand them. One may reap crops in any field for fodder and feed it to an animal. Rabbi Yehuda said: When may one do so? At a time when he begins reaping before the crop reaches one-third of its potential growth. Rabbi Shimon says: One may reap and feed the crops to animals even after they reached one-third of their potential growth.
  And one may reap crops prior to the <i>omer</i> due to potential damage to saplings growing alongside the crops; and due to the place of mourning, i.e., to create room for those consoling mourners, who would bless them upon their return from the cemetery; and due to the need to create room for students to study, as failure to do so would lead to dereliction of Torah study in the study hall. After reaping the crops for any of these reasons, one may not fashion them into sheaves, but he leaves them unbound.
  The mitzva of the <i>omer</i> is for the barley to come from standing grain. If one did not find standing grain, he brings from sheaves. Its mitzva is for it to come from fresh, moist grain. If one did not find moist grain, he brings from dry grain. Its mitzva is for one to reap the grain at night, but if it was reaped during the day, it is fit. And reaping the grain for the <i>omer</i> overrides Shabbat.
  GEMARA: With regard to the ruling of the mishna that one may reap a crop that grows in an irrigated field in the valleys, the Gemara cites that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Binyamin says that one verse states: “When you come into the land that I give to you and shall reap its harvest, then you shall bring the <i>omer</i>” (Leviticus 23:10). This verse indicates that one may reap his grain before bringing the <i>omer</i> offering. But it is also written in the continuation of the same verse: “Of the first fruits of your harvest to the priest,” from which it may be inferred that the <i>omer</i> is brought from the first reaped grain.
  How can these texts be reconciled? With regard to a place from which you bring the <i>omer</i> grain for the sacrifice, i.e., from a field that is saturated with rainwater, you may not reap there. But with regard to a place from which you may not bring the <i>omer</i> grain, an irrigated field, you may reap there.
  The Gemara questions this resolution: Why not say instead: With regard to the type of grain from which you bring the <i>omer</i>, i.e., barley, you may not reap it; but with regard to the type of grain from which you may not bring the <i>omer</i>, e.g., wheat, you may reap it? The Gemara answers: You cannot say that resolution, due to that which Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches. On 70a it was stated that Rabbi Yoḥanan derives a verbal analogy between the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>ḥalla</i> and the <i>omer</i> offering, from which he learns that the prohibition against reaping the new crop before the <i>omer</i> sacrifice applies to all five types of grain. Therefore, the reconciliation of the verses must be as first suggested, that one may reap in a place from which the <i>omer</i> grain may not be brought.
  § The mishna teaches: The residents of Jericho, whose fields were irrigated fields in a valley, reaped their crops with the approval of the Sages and arranged the crops in a pile without the approval of the Sages, but the Sages did not reprimand them. The Gemara asks: Whom did you hear who said: The Sages reprimanded them, or: They did not reprimand them? In other words, who is the <i>tanna</i> who, in the context of the customs of the residents of Jericho, addresses whether or not the Sages reprimanded them, as opposed to whether or not their actions were in accordance with the Sages’ will? The Gemara states: It is Rabbi Yehuda.
  Upon identifying the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna, the Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda really hold that the reaping of the residents of Jericho was performed with the approval of the Sages? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Pesaḥim</i> 3:15): The people of Jericho performed six actions, three with the approval of the Sages and three without the approval of the Sages.
  And these are the actions they performed with the approval of the Sages: They would graft palm trees the entire day of the fourteenth of Nisan, and they would bundle <i>Shema</i>, and they would reap grain before the <i>omer</i> offering was brought; all of these were with the approval of the Sages. And these are the actions that they performed without the approval of the Sages: They would pile the harvest before the <i>omer</i>, and they would permit the use of consecrated branches [<i>gamziyyot</i>] of carob and of sycamore trees, and they would make breaches in the walls of their gardens and in their orchards to feed fallen fruit to the poor during drought years, so that the poor could take the fruit that had fallen even on <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.
  Rabbi Yehuda said to Rabbi Meir: This is an inaccurate formulation, since if they acted with the approval of the Sages, then every person would do so, not only the residents of Jericho. Rather, you should formulate it in this manner: Both these three acts and those three acts were performed without the approval of the Sages. With regard to three of them the Sages reprimanded them, and with regard to the other three the Sages did not reprimand them.
  And these are the actions they performed for which the Sages did not reprimand them: They would graft palm trees the entire day, and they would bundle <i>Shema</i>, and they would reap and pile grain before the <i>omer</i> offering was brought. And these are the actions they performed for which the Sages reprimanded them:
  
  Daf 71b
  
  They would permit the use of consecrated branches of carob and of sycamore trees; they would make breaches in the walls of their gardens and orchards, in order to feed fallen fruit to the poor during drought years on <i>Shabbatot</i> and Festivals; and they would designate for the poor the produce in the corner [<i>pe’a</i>] in a field of vegetables. And the Sages reprimanded them for those actions. It is clear from the <i>baraita</i> that according to Rabbi Yehuda the reaping of the grain before the <i>omer</i> offering was performed without the approval the Sages. So why does the mishna, which represents Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, teach that it was with the approval of the Sages?
  The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, why did the <i>baraita</i> say that the residents of Jericho performed six actions without the approval of the Sages? Counting the cases listed in the <i>baraita</i>, there were in fact seven actions, as reaping and piling count as two actions. Evidently, the text of the <i>baraita</i> is problematic. The Gemara concludes: Rather, omit from here the case of the reaping of the grain before the <i>omer</i> offering was brought. If so, then in the <i>baraita</i> Rabbi Yehuda never commented about the reaping of the grain before the <i>omer</i>, and therefore it does not contradict the mishna’s statement that it was performed with the approval of the Sages.
  § The mishna teaches: One may reap crops in any field for fodder and feed it to an animal even before the <i>omer</i> offering. The Gemara notes that we learned in a mishna there (<i>Pe’a</i> 2:1): And these divide a field for the purpose of <i>pe’a</i>, i.e., the presence of any of these separates a field so that each section constitutes a distinct field from which <i>pe’a</i> must be allocated independently: A stream that passes through the field, and a canal [<i>vehashelulit</i>], and a private road that is four cubits wide, and a public road that is at least sixteen cubits wide, and a permanent public trail or a private trail that is used whether in the summer or in the rainy season, i.e., winter, and an uncultivated field, and a plowed field, and a seed of a different kind of plant, e.g., a section of barley seed in a field full of wheat.
  In all of the aforementioned instances a field is considered divided into two distinct fields. Another type of separation is subject to dispute: And in the case of one who reaps crops in a field for fodder, this action also divides a field in two. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: It does not divide a field unless one also plowed the area that he reaped. Only then is the field divided, as it is a plowed field.
  With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Meir said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says in the mishna: One may reap and feed the crops to animals even after they reached one-third of their potential growth. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon holds that any reaping performed for fodder is not considered reaping. Likewise, Rabbi Meir maintains that reaping for fodder, even after the crop has reached one-third of its potential growth, is not considered the start of the reaping of the entire field, and therefore it divides the field.
  Rabba sat and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Rav Aḥa bar Huna raised an objection to Rava from a <i>baraita</i>: If a section of crops in a field was consumed by grasshoppers, or ants nibbled away at those crops [<i>kirsemuha</i>], or the wind broke it down, all concede that if that section was subsequently plowed, it divides the field, and if it was not plowed, it does not divide the field. When the <i>baraita</i> states: All concede, to whom is it referring? It must be referring to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that usually, reaping for fodder divides a field without subsequent plowing, yet in this case he admits that it divides the field only if it is subsequently plowed.
  Rav Aḥa bar Huna explains his objection to the opinion that Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon: Granted, Rabbi Meir’s opinion can be explained if you say that the mishna, where Rabbi Meir maintains that reaping fodder is not considered reaping, is referring to a case where the fodder had not yet reached one-third of its potential growth, and the <i>baraita</i>, where he maintains that only if it was plowed, yes, it divides the field, but if was not plowed, no, it does not divide the field, is referring to a case where the fodder had already reached one-third of its growth. If so, the difference between the rulings of Rabbi Meir is clear, as it all depends on the growth of the produce.
  But if you say that Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, and the mishna is also referring to a case where the fodder had reached one-third of its growth, how can his ruling in the <i>baraita</i> be explained? Now, if with regard to reaping there, in a case where it involves human intervention, Rabbi Meir said: It is not called reaping; here in the <i>baraita</i>, where the reaping is performed by grasshoppers or ants, is it not clear all the more so that Rabbi Meir would not consider it reaping? And yet the <i>baraita</i> indicates that all agree that it is considered reaping, as it does not divide the field without plowing.
  Rather, Rabbi Meir stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says, with regard to the statement of the first <i>tanna</i> in the mishna that one may reap fodder and feed it to an animal: When [<i>eimatai</i>] may one do so? At a time when he began reaping before the crop reaches one-third of its potential growth. But if he began after the crop reached one-third, it is prohibited. If so, the discrepancy between Rabbi Meir’s opinion in the mishna and in the <i>baraita</i> can be resolved, as the mishna is referring to a case where the crops had not yet reached one-third of their growth, whereas the <i>baraita</i> is speaking of crops that had already reached one-third of their growth and therefore their harvesting is considered the start of the reaping of the field, which divides it only if he subsequently plows.
  The Gemara asks: You can say that you heard Rabbi Yehuda express his opinion with regard to fodder that is reaped for the purposes of feeding an animal, but did you hear him say so with regard to a case where the reaping is performed for human consumption? That cannot be his opinion, since if it were so, then there would be three disputing opinions among the <i>tanna’im</i>: The opinion of the first <i>tanna</i>, who holds that reaping fodder for animal consumption is permitted; the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that it may be reaped even for human consumption provided that it has not grown one-third; and the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that it is permitted for human consumption even in a case where it had grown one-third. This is problematic, as the Gemara in tractate <i>Sanhedrin</i> (25a) states a principle that whenever Rabbi Yehuda says in a mishna: When [<i>eimatai</i>], he is clarifying, rather than disagreeing with, the opinion of the previous <i>tanna</i>.
  Rather, when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he said: Rabbi Meir stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his teacher. Rabbi Akiva holds that even harvesting for human consumption is not considered reaping with regard to the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>pe’a</i>, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Pe’a</i> 3:2): With regard to one who reaps alternate rows of his field, and he leaves in it moist stems that are not yet fully grown, Rabbi Akiva says: One must separate <i>pe’a</i> in each and every row, as each one is considered a separate field.
  And the Rabbis say: One separates <i>pe’a</i> from one row for the whole field, as they are all considered a single field. And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Rabbi Akiva maintained that one is obligated to separate <i>pe’a</i> from each row only when he reaps alternate rows and the grain is unripe kernels used for making roasted grains. But when one reaps alternate rows and the grain is fully grown produce for his storehouse, there is no obligation to separate <i>pe’a</i> from each row, as all the rows are considered part of one field. Rav Dimi is suggesting that Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and therefore the discrepancy between the mishna and the <i>baraita</i> can be resolved: The mishna is discussing unripe grains that have not yet grown one-third, similar to unripe kernels used for roasted grains, whereas the <i>baraita</i> is discussing fully grown, ripened grains.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Akiva deems one obligated in the separation of <i>pe’a</i> from each row even where he reaped fully grown fodder in alternative sections of his field for the purposes of storing in a storehouse. According to Ravin, Rabbi Akiva holds that reaping even fully grown fodder is not considered the start of the entire field’s reaping process, but only of the individual row. Therefore, one must separate <i>pe’a</i> from each row. This is inconsistent with Rabbi Meir’s opinion that the harvesting of fodder that has grown one-third is considered reaping.
  
  Daf 72a
  
  The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with his opinion with regard to one issue, and disagrees with him with regard to one issue. In other words, Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion that the harvesting of fodder that has not yet reached one-third of its growth is not considered the start of the reaping of the entire crop, and he disagrees with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion that the harvesting of fodder that has reached one-third of its growth is also not considered the start of the reaping process, as Rabbi Meir maintains that this is considered the start of the reaping process even when it is performed for animals, and therefore it does not divide the field with regard to <i>pe’a</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: And one may reap crops prior to the <i>omer</i> due to potential damage to saplings growing alongside the crops; and due to the place of mourning, to create room for those consoling the mourners, who would bless them upon their return from the cemetery; and due to the need to create room for students to study, as failure to do so would lead to dereliction of Torah study in the study hall. The Gemara asks: What is the reason one is permitted to reap prior to the <i>omer</i> offering in these instances? The Gemara answers that the Merciful One states: “You shall bring the sheaf of the first fruits of your harvest to the priest” (Leviticus 23:10). The use of the term “your harvest” indicates that the <i>omer</i> offering’s reaping must precede any personal harvest, but it does not need to precede reaping for the purpose of a mitzva.
  § The mishna teaches: After reaping the crops for any of these reasons, one may not fashion them into sheaves, but he leaves them unbound. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The Gemara answers: Although reaping is technically permitted, one should limit his involvement with the new grain. Therefore, as much as possible to avoid exerting effort in involvement with the grain, we do not exert effort.
  § The mishna teaches that the mitzva of the <i>omer</i> is to bring the barley from the standing grain. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is the meaning when the verse states: “And if you bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, you shall bring for the meal offering of your first fruits grain in the ear parched with fire, even groats of the fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14)? The <i>baraita</i> explains: Since the mitzva of the <i>omer</i> is to bring the barley from the standing grain, from where is it derived that if one does not find barley from the standing grain, he should bring it from the harvested and gathered sheaves? The verse states: “You shall bring,” to include this scenario.
  Alternatively, the <i>baraita</i> suggests another reason why the verse states: “You shall bring.” Since it is a mitzva to bring the <i>omer</i> from the moist grain, one can ask: From where is it derived that if one does not find barley from the moist grain, he should bring it from the dry grain? The verse states: “You shall bring,” to include this case. Alternatively, the term “you shall bring” teaches the following: Since the mitzva of the <i>omer</i> is for it to be reaped at night, from where is it derived that if it was reaped during the daytime, it is fit? The verse states: “You shall bring.”
  The <i>baraita</i> adds more <i>halakhot</i> that are derived from this same verse. From where is it derived that the <i>omer</i> offering overrides Shabbat? The verse states: “You shall bring.” Also, this term: “You shall bring,” teaches that the <i>omer</i> is brought in any manner that it is found, even from gathered sheaves. Furthermore, the term “you shall bring,” teaches that the <i>omer</i> crop may be brought from anywhere in Eretz Yisrael, if none is found near Jerusalem. Additionally, “you shall bring” teaches that it may be brought even on Shabbat. Lastly, “you shall bring” teaches that it may be brought even in a state of ritual impurity.
  § The mishna teaches: If it was reaped during the day, it is fit. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Megilla</i> 20b): All mitzvot that must be performed at night may be performed anytime during that night. Therefore, the entire night is valid for reaping the <i>omer</i> on the night following the first day of Passover, for burning the fats of offerings that had been brought during the preceding day, and for burning the limbs of burnt offerings. This is the principle: A matter that it is a mitzva to perform during the entire day is valid if performed anytime during the entire day, and likewise a matter that it is a mitzva to perform at night is valid if performed anytime during the entire night.
  The Gemara analyzes this mishna: The mishna teaches the principle of mitzvot performed at night as being similar to the principle of those performed during the day. From this one can infer that just as in the case of a mitzva whose prescribed time is by day, if it is performed at night it is not valid, so too with regard to a mitzva whose prescribed time is at night, if it is performed by day it is also not valid. If so, why does the mishna here teach that if the <i>omer</i> was reaped during the day it is fit?
  Rabba said: It is not difficult. This mishna, which teaches that the <i>omer</i> reaped during the day is valid, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and that mishna in <i>Megilla</i>, which states that any nighttime mitzva performed during the day is not valid, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i> 3:9): In a case where a priest was standing and sacrificing the <i>omer</i> meal offering and it became ritually impure in his hand, if there is another measure of barley grain that is ready to be reaped, then one says to the priest: Reap the barley and bring another meal offering in its stead. And if there is no alternative meal offering available, one says to him: Be shrewd and keep silent; i.e., do not tell anyone that it is impure. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: In either case, one says to him: Be shrewd and keep silent, as any <i>omer</i> offering that is harvested not in accordance with the procedure dictated by its mitzva is unfit. Likewise, one may not reap the barley during the daytime, as its prescribed time is at night.
  With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, that barley for the <i>omer</i> offering that is reaped by day is unfit, Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, the teacher of his father. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Shabbat</i> 130a): Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve, i.e., before Shabbat begins, does not override Shabbat.
  And furthermore, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who said that the reaping of barley for the <i>omer</i> offering is a mitzva. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Shevi’it</i> 1:4) that Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse: “In plowing time and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), is not referring to the prohibition against farming the land during the Sabbatical Year, as one might have thought. Rather, it is referring to the prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. And the reason that the verse mentions these two particular forms of labor is to teach that just as the plowing that is prohibited on Shabbat is an otherwise voluntary act, as plowing is never required by the Torah, so too, the harvesting that is prohibited on Shabbat is voluntary. Therefore, the harvesting of the <i>omer</i> is excluded from the prohibition, as it is a mitzva. Consequently, the barley for the <i>omer</i> is harvested on the sixteenth of Nisan, even if it occurs on Shabbat.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan explains why Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael: And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, reached his opinion by the following reasoning: If it enters your mind to say that barley for the <i>omer</i> offering that is reaped not in accordance with the procedure dictated by its mitzva is nevertheless fit, why would it override Shabbat? Let one reap it on Shabbat eve. Rather, from the fact that the reaping overrides Shabbat, learn from here that if it was reaped not in accordance with its mitzva, it is unfit.
  The Gemara comments: Isn’t Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also a student of Rabbi Shimon, who was a student of Rabbi Akiva? Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was a student of Rabbi Shimon, and by extension of Rabbi Akiva, he should accept Rabbi Akiva’s principle that any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat. If so, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that if the <i>omer</i> was not performed at night it should be done by day, why does its harvest override Shabbat? Let it be harvested on Shabbat eve.
  The Gemara cites a proof for its claim that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was a student of Rabbi Shimon. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: When we would study Torah with Rabbi Shimon in Tekoa, we would carry to him oil and a towel [<i>aluntit</i>] from the courtyard to the roof and from the roof into an enclosure similar to a courtyard, and from one enclosure to another enclosure, until we reached the spring in which we would bathe, without passing through a public domain.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that reaping barley for the <i>omer</i> offering overrides Shabbat, in accordance with Rabbi Akiva. But this is not because it is unfit if reaped at an improper time. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the other opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon said: Come and see how dear is a mitzva performed in its proper time. As burning the fats and limbs is valid all night, and therefore it is possible to wait until the conclusion of Shabbat and burn them at night, but nevertheless one would not wait with them until nightfall; rather, one burns them immediately, even on Shabbat. Likewise, when it comes to the reaping of the <i>omer</i>, although it is fit if reaped during the previous day, reaping at night still overrides Shabbat because a mitzva is dear when performed in its proper time.
  
  Daf 72b
  
  The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, not know of this? He must have known of his father’s statement that a mitzva performed at its proper time overrides Shabbat. If so, his ruling that reaping at an improper time is unfit cannot be proven from the fact that reaping the <i>omer</i> overrides Shabbat, as claimed earlier.
  Rather, it must be that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, was aware of that principle, and nevertheless he maintains that the requirement to perform a mitzva at its optimal time does not apply to the case of the reaping of the <i>omer</i>. This is because there, in the case of the burning of the fats and limbs, it is different, as the slaughter of the animal already overrode Shabbat. Therefore, it is dear to perform the burning of its fats and limbs at the proper time, even on Shabbat. One cannot apply this reasoning to the reaping of the <i>omer</i>, as there is no prior labor performed on Shabbat before the reaping. Consequently, the reason it may be performed on Shabbat must be that it would be unfit if reaped any other time.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he should agree that the case of the burning of the sacrifice’s fats and limbs is different from the <i>omer</i>, since also there, the slaughter of the animal already overrode Shabbat. Therefore, the Gemara gives a new explanation: Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in fact the reaping of the <i>omer</i> crop does not override Shabbat, in contrast to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. For this reason Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling that the <i>omer</i> is fit if reaped at an improper time does not conflict with the principle of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, that any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not maintain that the reaping of the <i>omer</i> overrides Shabbat? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (63b) in response to Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion that when the sixteenth of Nisan occurred during the week, five <i>se’a</i> of barley were reaped, and when it occurred on Shabbat only three <i>se’a</i> were reaped: And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week, the <i>omer</i> offering would come from three <i>se’a</i>? In any case, according to both opinions, the <i>omer</i> was reaped on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: That mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty from the latter clause of that mishna. Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, says: On Shabbat the barley was reaped by an individual, with one sickle and one basket into which the barley was placed, whereas during the week it was reaped by three people, with three baskets and three sickles. And the Rabbis say: Both on Shabbat and during the week it is reaped by three people, with three baskets and three sickles. According to both opinions the <i>omer</i> was reaped on Shabbat. The Gemara again responds: That clause of the mishna is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara raises another difficulty from a mishna (65a) that describes the series of questions posed by the court emissary who reaps the grain to those assembled to witness the process: And if the sixteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat, the court emissary says to those assembled: Shall I cut the sheaves on this Shabbat? The assembly says in response: Yes. The Gemara answers: That clause of mishna is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty from the mishna (71a): If the <i>omer</i> was reaped during the day, it is fit, and it overrides Shabbat. Now, whom did you hear who said: If the <i>omer</i> was reaped during the day, it is fit? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And yet it is taught in the mishna: And it overrides Shabbat. What, is it not referring to reaping? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to the sacrifice of the <i>omer</i> offering.
  The Gemara asks: But with regard to reaping, does it not override Shabbat, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? As, isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said the following <i>halakha</i> based upon the verse: “And Moses declared the appointed times of the Lord to the children of Israel” (Leviticus 23:44): What is the meaning when the verse states this phrase? This phrase is necessary because we had learned only that the daily offering and the Paschal offering override Shabbat and ritual impurity, as it is stated concerning them: “In its appointed time” (see Numbers 9:2, 28:2), from which it is derived that each of them must be sacrificed in its appointed time and even on Shabbat; in its appointed time and even in ritual impurity.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: With regard to the rest of the communal offerings, from where is it derived that they likewise override Shabbat and ritual impurity? The verse states with regard to additional offerings that are brought on the Festivals: “These you shall sacrifice to the Lord in your appointed times” (Numbers 29:39).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From where is it derived to include in this <i>halakha</i> the <i>omer</i> and the lambs that are sacrificed with it, the two loaves sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>, and the communal peace offerings that are sacrificed with them? The verse states: “And Moses declared the appointed times of the Lord to the children of Israel,” after it lists Shabbat and the Festivals. This indicates that the verse established one time for all of them. All of these days are considered appointed times, and their offerings are not deferred.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: With regard to what ritual does the <i>baraita</i> state that these offerings override Shabbat? If we say for actual sacrifice, this cannot be correct, as are the two loaves fit for sacrifice? The two loaves are not sacrificed on the altar at all. Rather, they are waved and later eaten by priests.
  The Gemara concludes its interpretation of the <i>baraita</i>, which leads to the question about the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Rather, it is obvious that the two loaves override Shabbat with regard to grinding and sifting. And if so, similarly, with regard to the <i>omer</i> offering, it overrides Shabbat with regard to the process of reaping the grains. And as the <i>baraita</i> is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, evidently he maintains that the reaping of the <i>omer</i> overrides Sh abbat.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, one must say that the <i>baraita</i> is not referring to comparable cases. As far as the <i>omer</i> is concerned, it overrides Shabbat only with regard to its actual sacrifice, but when it comes to the two loaves, it overrides Shabbat with regard to its baking. And the reason why the two loaves must be baked on Shabbat is because Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the oven consecrates that which is baked inside it. Therefore, if one were to bake from the previous day, on the eve of <i>Shavuot</i>, he would effectively be disqualifying it from being brought on <i>Shavuot</i> day, as it would be disqualified by being left overnight.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi really hold that the oven consecrates that which is baked inside it? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The communal peace offering of two lambs that accompanies the two loaves sacrificed on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> consecrate the loaves that accompany them only by means of their slaughter. How so? If one slaughtered the lambs for their own sake, i.e., as lambs for <i>Shavuot</i> in the appropriate manner, and the priest sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are consecrated.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: But if one slaughtered them not for their own sake, and the priest sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated, as the factors indispensable in rendering the offering fit were not properly performed. If one slaughtered them for their own sake and he sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the fact that the lambs were properly slaughtered renders the loaves partially consecrated. Therefore, the loaves are consecrated to the extent that they cannot be redeemed, but they are not consecrated to the extent that they may be eaten. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.
  Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Actually, the loaves are consecrated only when one slaughters the offerings for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake, i.e., only if both factors indispensable in rendering the offering fit were properly performed. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is the slaughter of the lambs that consecrates the loaves, not baking the loaves in the oven.
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Actually, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does hold that the oven consecrates the loaves. What the <i>baraita</i> is saying when it uses the categories of consecrated and not consecrated with regard to the slaughter of the lambs is that either the two loaves are fixed as <i>Shavuot</i> meal offerings and cannot be used for any other offering, or they are not fixed as <i>Shavuot</i> meal offerings. In other words, if the lambs were slaughtered and the blood sprinkled in the proper manner, one cannot change the designation of the loaves, whereas if they were not slaughtered and their blood was not sprinkled properly, one can change their designation. If the lambs were slaughtered properly but their blood was sprinkled improperly, the status of the loaves is subject to a dispute. This has nothing to do with when the loaves are consecrated.
  
  MISHNA: And these are the meal offerings from which a handful is removed and the remainder of the offering is eaten by the priests: The meal offering of fine flour; and the meal offering prepared in a pan; and the meal offering prepared in a deep pan; and the meal offering baked in an oven that is brought entirely of loaves; and the meal offering baked in an oven that is brought entirely of wafers; the meal offering of gentiles; and the meal offering of women; and the <i>omer</i> meal offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan; and the meal offering of a sinner; and the meal offering of jealousy, brought by a <i>sota</i>.
  Rabbi Shimon says: Although its remainder is not eaten by priests, as meal offerings of priests are burned in their entirety, as it is written: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16), nevertheless, with regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests, a handful is removed. And the handful is sacrificed on the altar by itself, and the remainder is sacrificed on the altar by itself.
  GEMARA: Rav Pappa stated a principle with regard to all the <i>mishnayot</i> in tractate <i>Menaḥot</i>: Anywhere that we learned in a mishna that one brings a meal offering, we learned that one must bring ten items of the same type, either loaves or wafers. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Pappa teaching us, as this is already stated by Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna (76a)?
  The Gemara answers: This statement of Rav Pappa serves to exclude the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One who takes a vow to bring a meal offering baked in an oven must bring ten items. If he wishes, he may bring ten loaves or ten wafers, and if he wishes he may bring half of them as loaves and the other half as wafers. Rav Pappa teaches us that the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna maintains that one may not do so; all ten must be of the same type.
  § The mishna teaches: And their remainder is eaten by the priests. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara challenges the question: That which is written explicitly, is written. In the case of several meal offerings, including the gift meal offering brought by an individual, the Torah clearly states that the priests eat the remainder. And with regard to that which is not written explicitly, it is written of it: “And this is the law of the meal offering: The sons of Aaron shall offer it before the Lord…And he shall take up from it his handful…and shall make the memorial part of it smoke upon the altar….And the remainder of it shall Aaron and his sons eat” (Leviticus 6:7–9). These verses establish the principle that the priests eat the remainders of meal offerings, even where the Torah does not state this explicitly. Therefore, it is unnecessary to ask for a source.
  The Gemara explains the original question: With regard to a meal offering that comes from wheat, we did not ask, as that is included in the cited verse. When we asked it was with regard to a meal offering that comes from barley, i.e., the <i>omer</i> meal offering and the meal offering brought by a <i>sota</i>: From where is it derived that the remainders of those offerings are given to the priests? The Gemara responds: With regard to one that comes from barley also, since a handful of it is removed, as the Torah states with regard to all meal offerings (see Leviticus 6:8), clearly its remainder is given to the priests, as why else would a handful be removed and offered?
  The Gemara clarifies: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that the priests eat the remainder of all meal offerings from which a handful is removed, we did not ask about the source. When we asked it was according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: There is a type of meal offering of which a handful is removed but its remainder is not eaten.
  As we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: From the meal offering of a sinner brought by a priest, a handful is removed. Subsequently, the handful is sacrificed on the altar by itself, and the remainder is sacrificed on the altar by itself. Therefore, the question is: According to Rabbi Shimon, who says that the priests do not always eat the remainder when a handful is removed, from where do we derive that the priests eat the remainder of barley-based meal offerings?
  The Gemara answers. Ḥizkiyya said: The source is from a verse, as the verse states: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil, or dry, shall all the sons of Aaron have” (Leviticus 7:10). The verse is analyzed: If it is not necessary for the matter of a mixed meal offering of wheat, which is derived from the verse cited earlier, apply it to the matter of a mixed meal offering of barley, i.e., the meal offering of the <i>omer</i>. And if the verse is not necessary for the matter of a dry meal offering of wheat, which is derived from the verse cited earlier, apply it to the matter of a dry meal offering of barley, i.e., the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And this verse, does it come to teach this <i>halakha</i>? Isn’t the verse necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that priests may not receive a share of meal offerings in exchange for a share of animal offerings, i.e., one may not exchange his share of a meal offering for the equivalent value of meat from an animal offering of which he did not receive a share?
  
  Daf 73a
  
  The verse states: “And every meal offering that is baked in the oven…shall all the sons of Aaron have, each man like the other” (Leviticus 7:9–10). This verse emphasizes that the sons of Aaron must divide the meal offering equally among themselves, without exchanging it for a portion of any other offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of meal offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings since they do not substitute for them in the case of poverty. One who is too poor to afford to bring an animal offering, e.g., in the case of a sin offering determined on a sliding scale, does not bring a meal offering in its stead. Since meal offerings are not brought in place of animal offerings, there is clearly no connection between them. But perhaps they may receive a share of meal offerings in exchange for portions of bird offerings, since they do substitute for them in the case of poverty. If one is so destitute that he cannot afford to bring a bird offering he brings a meal offering. Therefore, the same verse states: “And all that is prepared in the deep pan…shall all the sons of Aaron have,” again emphasizing that all must have an equal share in that meal offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of meal offerings in exchange for portions of bird offerings since these, i.e., bird offerings, are types of offerings that involve blood sprinkled on the altar, and those, i.e., meal offerings, are types of offerings made of flour. But perhaps they may receive a share of portions of bird offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings, since both categories are types of offerings that involve blood sprinkled on the altar. Therefore, the same verse states: “And on a pan…shall all the sons of Aaron have,” a seemingly superfluous phrase, which teaches that one may not receive a share even of bird offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of bird offerings in exchange for portions of animal offerings because with regard to these, i.e., the birds, their processing, i.e., killing, is executed by hand, by pinching the nape of the neck, and with regard to those, i.e., the animals, their processing, i.e., killing, is executed with a utensil, by slaughtering with a knife. But perhaps they may receive a share of meal offerings in exchange for portions of other meal offerings, since the processing of both these and those are carried out by hand. Therefore, the next verse states: “And every meal offering mixed with oil…shall all the sons of Aaron have” (Leviticus 7:10).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of a meal offering prepared on a pan in exchange for portions of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, or portions of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan in exchange for portions of a meal offering prepared on a pan, since the actions with this pan result in a hard product, and the actions with that deep pan result in a soft product. But perhaps they may receive a share of a meal offering prepared on a pan in exchange for the portions of a different meal offering prepared on a pan, or a share of a meal offering prepared in a deep pan in exchange for portions of a different meal offering prepared in a deep pan. Therefore, the same verse states: “Or dry, shall all the sons of Aaron have” (Leviticus 7:10).
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that they may not receive a share of offerings of the most sacred order, e.g., meal offerings, in exchange for a portion of another similar offering, but they may receive a share of offerings of lesser sanctity in exchange for a portion of another similar offering. Therefore, the same verse states with regard to meal offerings: “Shall all the sons of Aaron have, one as well as another” (Leviticus 7:10), and near it appears the verse: “If he offers it for a thanks offering” (Leviticus 7:12), from which is derived: Just as one may not receive a share of one offering in exchange for a portion of another similar offering in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, so too, one may not receive a share of one offering in exchange for a portion of another similar offering in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, e.g., a thanks offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> further expounds this verse: It states: “One as well as another [<i>ish</i> <i>ke’aḥiv</i>],” which teaches that with regard to priests, a man [<i>ish</i>] who is an adult receives a share even if he is blemished, but a priest who is a minor may not receive a share even if he is unblemished. This <i>baraita</i> evidently interprets the verse: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil, or dry, shall all the sons of Aaron have, one as well as another” (Leviticus 7:10), as referring to the prohibition against priests exchanging shares of offerings. If so, how does Ḥizkiyya state that this verse is referring to the priests’ eating of the remainder of the <i>omer</i> offering and the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>?
  The Gemara answers: With regard to the prohibition against exchanging priestly shares, that is derived from the term: “Every meal offering.” By contrast, Ḥizkiyya derives his principle with regard to these two meal offerings from the rest of the verse. The Gemara asks: But haven’t you already derived from the word “every” that which Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, states, that when one vows to offer a meal offering baked in an oven, all the baked items must be of a uniform type, either loaves or wafers (see 63b)? The Gemara answers: Rather, that <i>halakha</i> concerning the exchange of shares of offerings is derived from the addition of the word “and,” in the term: “And every [<i>vekhol</i>] meal offering.”
  § Ravina said: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the source for the <i>halakha</i> that the <i>omer</i> offering and the meal offering of a <i>sota</i> are eaten comes from the <i>baraita</i> that Levi teaches, as Levi teaches: The verse states with regard to the priestly gifts: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items, reserved from the fire: Every offering of theirs, and every meal offering of theirs, and every sin offering of theirs, and every guilt offering of theirs, which they may restore to Me, shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). The word “every” in each clause includes a number of additional offerings that are eaten by the priests.
  The Torah states: “Every offering of theirs,” to include the <i>log</i> of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, teaching that it is also eaten by the priests. As, it might enter your mind to say that since the Merciful One writes in this verse: “From the fire,” this would exclude this oil, which is not brought onto the altar. Therefore, the verse teaches us: “Every offering,” to include the leper’s oil.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues expounding the verse: “And every meal offering of theirs,” serving to include the <i>omer</i> meal offering, and the meal offering of jealousy brought by a <i>sota</i>, teaching that they are also eaten by the priests. As, it might enter your mind to say that since the Merciful One states: “And they shall eat those wherewith atonement was made” (Exodus 29:33), the verse thereby indicates that the priests may eat only those offerings that help the owner achieve atonement. And this <i>omer</i> comes to permit eating from the new grain (see Leviticus 23:9–14), not to achieve atonement; and concerning the other offering, i.e., the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>, as well, it comes to clarify whether or not the accused woman is guilty of adultery, but not to achieve atonement. Therefore, the verse teaches us: “Every meal offering,” to teach that these two meal offerings are included.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues to expound the verse. The verse states: “And every sin offering of theirs,” to include a bird sin offering, teaching that it is also eaten by the priests. As, it might enter your mind to say: The priests may not eat it because it is an unslaughtered animal carcass, as it is killed by pinching the nape of the neck (see Leviticus 5:8), not by conventional slaughter. Therefore, the verse teaches us: “Every sin offering,” teaching that bird sin offerings are included.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues to expound the verse. The Torah states: “And every guilt offering of theirs,” to include the guilt offering of the nazirite who has become ritually impure (see Numbers 6:12) and the guilt offering of the leper, teaching that they are also eaten by the priests. The Gemara objects: With regard to the guilt offering of the leper, it is explicitly written with regard to it: “For as the sin offering is the priest’s, so is the guilt offering” (Leviticus 14:13), which already teaches that it is eaten by the priests.
  The Gemara answers: Rather, the verse serves to include the guilt offering of the nazirite, stating that its status is like the guilt offering of the leper. As, it might enter your mind to say: The guilt offering of the nazirite is not sacrificed for atonement, but rather it comes to prepare the nazirite to begin his period of naziriteship anew, and therefore its meat would not be eaten by the priests. Therefore, the verse teaches us: “Every guilt offering,” teaching that the guilt offering of the nazirite is included.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: “This shall be yours of the most sacred items…which they may restore”; this is referring to an item stolen from a convert who has no heirs and subsequently dies. In this case, the stolen item is given to the priests together with an additional one-fifth of its worth. The phrase “for you and for your sons” means that it is yours and your sons’ personal property, and it may be used even to betroth a woman with it, and it does not belong to the Temple treasury.
  § Rav Huna said:
  
  Daf 73b
  
  Peace offerings volunteered by gentiles are sacrificed as burnt offerings, which are burned completely upon the altar. With regard to the source for this <i>halakha</i>, if you wish, cite a verse; and if you wish, propose a logical argument. If you wish, propose a logical argument: Concerning a gentile who volunteers an offering, the intent of his heart is that the offering should be entirely sacred to Heaven, and he does not intend for any of it to be eaten.
  And if you wish, cite a verse: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>] who is of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, that brings his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which they will offer to the Lord as a burnt offering” (Leviticus 22:18). The doubled term <i>ish ish</i> teaches that the offerings of a gentile are accepted, and the verse thereby teaches that any offering that gentiles volunteer to be sacrificed should be a burnt offering.
  Rav Ḥama bar Gurya raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a gentile who volunteered to bring a peace offering, if he gave it to an Israelite, the Israelite eats it; if he gave it to a priest, the priest eats it. Evidently, the gentile’s peace offering is eaten, like the peace offering of a Jew.
  To answer the challenge to Rav Huna’s statement, Rava said: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If a gentile volunteered a peace offering in order to achieve atonement on behalf of an Israelite who is already obligated to bring a peace offering, then the Israelite eats of the offering. If the gentile volunteered it in order to achieve atonement on behalf of a priest who is already obligated to bring a peace offering, then the priest eats of the offering. By contrast, Rav Huna’s statement teaches that when a gentile volunteers his own peace offering, it is treated as a burnt offering.
  Rav Sheizevi raises an objection from the mishna: These are the meal offerings from which a handful is removed and their remainder is eaten by the priests…the meal offering of gentiles. If the priests may eat the remainder of the meal offerings of gentiles, it is logical that the peace offerings of gentiles should also be given to the priests to eat, as the right of the priests to eat from meal offerings and peace offerings is identical. To resolve this objection, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult. This statement in the mishna that the priests eat the meal offerings of gentiles is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and that ruling of Rav Huna that the peace offerings of gentiles are not eaten is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse cited previously states: “Any man [<i>ish ish</i>] who is of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, that brings his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which they will offer to the Lord as a burnt offering.” The verse is now analyzed: The verse could have stated: A man [<i>ish</i>]. Why does the verse state the double expression “<i>ish ish</i>”? This serves to include the gentiles, demonstrating that they can vow to bring vow offerings and gift offerings like a Jew can.
  When the verse states: “Which they will offer to the Lord as a burnt offering,” I have derived only that a gentile can vow to bring a burnt offering. From where is it derived that a gentile can vow to bring a peace offering? The verse states: “Their vows.” From where is it derived that he can bring a thanks offering? The verse states the seemingly superfluous clause: “Their gift offerings.”
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From where is it derived that the verse means to include that a gentile can bring birds as burnt offerings, and wine libations, and the frankincense, and the wood for the arrangement upon the altar? The verse states not only: “Their vows,” but also the more comprehensive term: “Any of their vows”; and the verse states not only: “Their gift offerings,” but also the more comprehensive term: “Any of their gift offerings.”
  The <i>baraita</i> asks: If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “They will offer to the Lord as a burnt offering”? The <i>baraita</i> answers: This teaches that a gentile can bring a standard burnt offering, to the exclusion of a burnt offering of naziriteship. Since a gentile is unable to assume the status of a nazirite, he is also unable to bring the offerings of a nazirite. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: When the verse states: “Which they will offer to the Lord as a burnt offering,” it indicates that nothing other than a burnt offering alone may be brought by a gentile.
  With regard to the analysis of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the Gemara asks: And this exclusion of a burnt offering of naziriteship, is it derived from here, in the verse cited? Is it not derived from there: “Speak to the children of Israel, and say to them: When a man…shall clearly utter a vow, the vow of a nazirite” (Numbers 6:2); this is interpreted to mean that the children of Israel can vow to become nazirites, but the gentiles cannot vow to become nazirites? Therefore, the exclusion of gentiles from bringing the burnt offering of a nazirite is not learned from the term “a burnt offering.”
  The Gemara answers: If the exclusion was derived from there, i.e., the verse in Leviticus, which is referring to offerings, I would say:It is the offering of nazirites that the gentiles cannot bring, but naziriteship takes effect upon them if they vow to become a nazirite. Therefore, the exclusion of naziriteship by the verse in Numbers teaches us that a gentile cannot become a nazirite at all.
  § The Gemara discusses a related matter. In accordance with whose opinion is that which we learned in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 7:6): Rabbi Shimon said: The court instituted seven ordinances with regard to the financial aspects of offerings and consecrations. And this ordinance, namely, that the cost of the libations accompanying the sacrifice of a found sacrificial animal is borne by the public, is one of them. These are the other ordinances: If a gentile sent his burnt offering from a country overseas, and he sent with it money for the purchase of the libations that must accompany it, the libations are offered at his expense. And if the gentile did not cover the cost of the libations, it is a condition of the court that the libations are sacrificed at the public’s expense, with funds taken from the Temple treasury. Evidently, a gentile can offer libations as well as burnt offerings.
  The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this mishna rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara rejects this assumption: You may even say that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and he holds that a gentile can bring a burnt offering and all its accessories, including the libations.
  The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught that which the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to libations: “All who are home born shall do these things after this manner” (Numbers 15:13), which teaches that those who are home born, i.e., Jews, can bring libations as a separate offering, but a gentile cannot bring such libations. One might have thought that a gentile’s burnt offering should not require the standard accompanying libations. Therefore, the verse states: “So it shall be done for one bull” (Numbers 15:11), which indicates that every offering requires libations. Whose opinion is this? It is not that of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and not that of Rabbi Akiva.
  The Gemara explains the question: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, doesn’t he say that a gentile may even bring wine by itself, and not only as a libation? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, doesn’t he say that with regard to a burnt offering, yes, a gentile may bring it, but with regard to something else other than the offering itself, no, a gentile may not bring it?
  The Gemara answers: If you wish, say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; and if you wish, say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. If you wish, say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and omit from that <i>baraita</i> that the <i>tanna</i> allows gentiles to bring wine, as he holds that gentiles cannot bring wine by itself. And if you wish, say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and interpret his opinion to be that a gentile may bring a burnt offering and all its accessories.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests, a handful is removed, and the entire offering is sacrificed upon the altar. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived?
  The Gemara answers: It is derived as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>. The verse states with regard to the meal offering of a sinner: “And he shall bring it to the priest, and the priest shall take his handful of it as the memorial of it, and burn it on the altar…it is a sin offering. And the priest shall make atonement for him for his sin that he has sinned in any of these matters, and he shall be forgiven; and the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering” (Leviticus 5:12–13). Since the phrase “And the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering” is seemingly unnecessary, as these verses are discussing a meal offering, it therefore teaches that its sacrificial rite would be valid even when performed by a priest who has brought the offering for his own sin.
  The <i>baraita</i> discusses the matter: Do you say that this verse teaches that the rite of the meal offering of a sinner would be valid when performed by him? Or is it only necessary to permit the eating of the remainder of the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests. And if so, how do I realize the meaning of the verse that states: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16)? Perhaps that is referring to his voluntary meal offering, but his obligatory meal offering may be eaten.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And it shall be the priest’s as the meal offering.” In this way, the verse compares the priest’s obligatory offering to his voluntary offering: Just as his voluntary offering is not eaten, so too, his obligatory offering is not eaten. In disagreeing with the previous interpretation, Rabbi Shimon said: Is it stated: And it shall be the priest’s, as his meal offering? But it states only: “As the meal offering,” referring to the meal offering of a non-priest. Rather, this verse serves to compare and render the <i>halakha</i> of
  
  Daf 74a
  
  the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests as equivalent to the status of a meal offering of a sinner brought by an Israelite. Just as with regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by an Israelite, a handful is removed, so too, with regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests, a handful is removed.
  The <i>baraita</i> challenges this: If so, then say as follows: Just as with regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by an Israelite, a handful is removed and its remainder is eaten, so too, with regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests, a handful should be removed and its remainder eaten.
  Therefore, the verse states: “And the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering,” which is interpreted to mean that with regard to the rite performed by the priest, his meal offering is like the meal offering of the Israelite, but it is not like the meal offering of the Israelite with regard to consumption by the fires of the altar. How is this possible? In what ways does the meal offering of a priest resemble that of an Israelite in some respects and not in others? The priest’s handful is sacrificed by itself, like that of the Israelite, and the remainder is sacrificed by itself, unlike those of the Israelite, which are eaten.
  § According to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> in the <i>baraita</i> cited earlier, a priest may perform the rites of a meal offering of a sinner that he brings for himself based on the verse “And the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering.” The Gemara now asks: With regard to this <i>halakha</i> that its rite is valid when performed by him, is it derived from here?
  It is derived from there, another verse cited in a <i>baraita</i>, which states: From where is it derived with regard to a priest that he may come and sacrifice his offerings at any time and at any hour that he desires, even when it is not during the period of his priestly watch? The verse states: “And if a Levite comes from any of your gates from all of Israel, where he lives, and comes with all the desire of his soul to the place which the Lord shall choose, then he shall serve in the name of the Lord his God, as all his brothers the Levites do, who stand there before the Lord” (Deuteronomy 18:6–7).
  The Gemara answers: If the <i>halakha</i> were derived from there, the verse in Deuteronomy, I would say: This statement, that a priest may perform his rites whenever he chooses, applies only to a matter that does not come to atone for a sin, as the verse is referring to an offering that he desires to bring. But with regard to a matter that comes to atone for a sin, I would say that he may not perform the rite himself. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> of the meal offering of a sinner must be derived from the verse in Leviticus: “And the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering.”
  The Gemara asks: And is this <i>halakha</i> that a priest may perform the rite of his own sin offering also derived from here, i.e., the verse: “And the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering”? It is derived from there: “And the priest shall effect atonement for the soul that sins unwittingly, when he sins unwittingly” (Numbers 15:28). The term “for the soul that sins unwittingly” teaches that the priest may effect atonement even through himself, when he performs the rite.
  The Gemara answers: If the <i>halakha</i> were derived from that latter verse, I would say: This statement, permitting him to effect his own atonement, applies when the offering is brought for a sin committed unwittingly. But with regard to an offering brought for a sin committed intentionally, the priest may not effect his own atonement. Therefore, the verse that states: “And the remainder shall be the priest’s, as the meal offering,” teaches us that the priest may perform the rite even for an offering that he brings for an intentional sin.
  The Gemara clarifies: With regard to an offering brought for a sin committed intentionally, how can you find these circumstances? The Gemara answers: You can find them in the instance of a meal offering brought as atonement for intentionally taking a false oath of testimony that he was not aware of a certain incident involving another individual. The priest may perform the rites for a meal offering that he brings to atone for such a sin.
  § With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that a handful of the meal offering of a sinner brought by a priest is separated and offered upon the altar, it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to the meal offering of a sinner brought by one of the priests, a handful is removed; and the handful is sacrificed by itself, and the remainder is sacrificed by itself. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The handful is sacrificed by itself, and the remainder is scattered upon the place of the ashes.
  With regard to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan discusses it and asks: To which place of the ashes in the Temple is he referring? If he is referring to the one that is above, upon the altar, his opinion is identical to that of his father, Rabbi Shimon, who stated that the remainder is offered and burned upon the altar, after which the ashes are swept onto the ash heap upon the altar. If so, according to both opinions, the remainder is taken to the same place. And if Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, is referring to the ash heap that is below the altar, that is difficult: Do you have any item that is sacrificed below the altar?
  Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Perhaps Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, means that the remainder is scattered there to be wasted. When the Sages heard this, they laughed at him, saying: But do you have any item that is sacrificed as part of the Temple service in order to be wasted?
  The Gemara answers that there are consecrated items that are intentionally wasted. With regard to such items, the father of Rabbi Avin teaches: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16). Why must this verse, which follows those discussing the High Priest’s daily griddle-cake offering, state that it shall not be eaten, after it already states that it is entirely offered? The verse teaches: I have likened the meal offering of a sinner brought by a priest to the daily griddle-cake offering brought by the High Priest with regard to eating, insofar as it is not eaten, but I have not likened it with regard to another matter, i.e., that the meal offering of a sinner is not burned in the manner of the griddle-cake offering.
  The Gemara asks: What is he saying, as the verse states explicitly that it must be entirely offered? Abaye said that this is what he is saying: This is how the verse is to be read: “Every meal offering of the priest…shall not be eaten,” when the offering is sacrificed to fulfill his obligation, such as the meal offering of a sinner. It is neither eaten nor completely burned, but rather placed on the ash heap. When the verse states: “Shall be offered in its entirety,” this is referring to his gift offering, which is completely burned in the manner of a griddle-cake offering. Rava said to him: This reading is like a sharp knife cutting the verses to pieces, as it interprets the beginning and end of the verse together, ignoring the middle.
  Rather, Rava says: When the verse states: “Every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety,” this is referring to his gift offering, which is entirely offered. When the verse states that it “shall not be eaten,” this is referring to his obligatory meal offering, which is neither eaten nor entirely offered.
  The Gemara asks: But why should the verse be read that way? I can reverse the interpretation and say that the priest’s obligatory meal offering is entirely offered, and his gift offering shall be neither eaten nor entirely offered. The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that his gift offering should be included in the phrase “shall be offered in its entirety,” as it resembles the griddle-cake offering and differs from the meal offering of a sinner in several respects, namely, that it is frequent, that the priest bringing it did not sin, and that its scent is fragrant, as it is mixed with oil, and frankincense is added to it.
  The Gemara asks: On the contrary, the verse should be interpreted to include his obligatory meal offering, as the obligatory meal offering is similar to the griddle-cake offering in that, unlike the gift offering, it comprises a tenth of an ephah and bringing it is an obligation. The Gemara responds: Because these similarities between the gift offering and the griddle-cake offering are more numerous than those between the obligatory offering and the griddle-cake offering, it is logical that the verse is comparing the gift offering to the griddle-cake offering.
  § After discussing the opinions of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, the Gemara asks: And as for the opinion of the Rabbis that no handful is removed from any of the meal offerings of the priests, with regard to this verse: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten,” what do they do with it? How do they interpret the superfluous phrase: “It shall not be eaten”?
  The Gemara answers: They require it for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Concerning the griddle-cake offering, the verse states: “It shall be entirely smoked for the Lord” (Leviticus 6:15). From this verse and the verse that follows it, which states: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten,” I have derived only that the griddle-cake offering mentioned above, in the first verse, is subject to: “It shall be entirely smoked,” and that other meal offerings of priests mentioned below, in the second verse, are subject to: “It shall not be eaten.”
  From where is it derived to apply the prohibition that was said about this case to that case, and the prohibition that was said about that case to this case, to teach that the priests’ meal offerings shall be entirely smoked and the griddle-cake offering shall not be eaten? The verse states: “Entirely,” in the first verse, and: “Entirely,” in the second, to be utilized as a verbal analogy: It is stated here, with regard to the priests’ meal offerings: “Entirely,” and it is stated there, with regard to the griddle-cake offering: “Entirely.”
  Just as there, the offering is subject to the prohibition of: “It shall be entirely smoked,” so too here, the offerings are subject to the prohibition of: “It shall be entirely smoked.” And just as here, with regard to the meal offering of the priest, the verse serves to impose a prohibition upon eating it, so too there, with regard to the griddle-cake offering, the verse serves to impose a prohibition upon eating it.
  § With regard to the prohibition against eating from certain offerings derived from the verse that states: “Shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten,” Ravina asks: In the case of a priest who ate from the sacrificial portions, what is the <i>halakha</i>? As to whether this priest violates the prohibition of a non-priest eating certain types of sacrificial meat, expressed in the verse: “No non-priest shall eat of the sacrificial meat” (Leviticus 22:10),
  
  Daf 74b
  
  I do not raise the dilemma. When I raise the dilemma, it is with regard to the prohibition of: “Shall be offered in its entirety; it shall not be eaten.” What is the <i>halakha</i>? Is this prohibition applicable only to the meal offering of a priest mentioned in the verse, or does it apply to a priest who eats from the sacrificial portions as well?
  Rav Aharon said to Ravina: Come and hear an answer to this question from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to every sacrificial item, not just the meal offering of a priest, such as the sacrificial portions, which is included in the category of “shall be offered in its entirety” that requires it to be burned, the verse serves to impose a prohibition against eating it.
  MISHNA: The meal offering of priests, the meal offering of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, and the meal offering brought with libations that accompany burnt offerings and peace offerings are burned in their entirety on the altar, and there is no part of them for the priests. And in the case of those offerings, the power of the altar is greater than the power of the priests. The two loaves, i.e., the public offering on Shavuot of two loaves baked from new wheat, and the shewbread, i.e., the twelve loaves that were placed on the sacred Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, are eaten by the priests, and there is no part of them burned on the altar. And in the case of those offerings, the power of the priests is greater than the power of the altar.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And are there no additional cases of sacrificial items that are completely placed on the altar, with none of their parts given to the priests? But isn’t there the burnt offering, which is completely burned on the altar? The Gemara answers: There is the burnt offering’s hide, which is given to the priests. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the bird sacrificed as a burnt offering, whose skin is not given to the priests? The Gemara answers: There is the bird burnt offering’s crop and its feathers, which are not burned upon the altar. The Gemara asks: But aren’t there wine libations, which are completely poured onto the altar? The Gemara answers: The libations go to the drainpipes, and pouring the wine into the drainpipes is not considered placing it upon the altar.
  The Gemara asks: And what is meant when the mishna emphasizes: And in the case of those offerings, the power of the altar is greater than the power of the priests, indicating that there are other items that one might have thought are burned entirely on the altar as well? The Gemara answers: The mishna’s wording serves to exclude the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: One who donates wine brings it and pours it over the fires of the altar, such that it is offered in the manner of an animal offering and not as a libation. Therefore, the mishna’s wording teaches us that wine donated in this manner goes to the drainpipes, unlike according to the opinion of Shmuel that it is entirely burned.
  The Gemara adds: With regard to another ruling, the mishna supports a different statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel said: One who donates oil to the Temple removes a handful and sacrifices it on the altar, and its remainder is eaten by the priests. Shmuel’s ruling is in accordance with the mishna, which does not list a donation of oil as one of the offerings given completely to the altar.
  § According to the mishna, with regard to the two loaves and the shewbread, the power of the priests is greater than the power of the altar. The Gemara asks: And are there no more cases of sacrificial items that are given completely to the priests, with none of their parts placed upon the altar? But isn’t there the bird sacrificed as a sin offering, which is eaten entirely by the priests, and none of it is placed upon the altar? The Gemara answers: There is its blood, which is sprinkled upon the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the <i>log</i> of oil of a leper that he brings on the day that he becomes ritually clean, which is given completely to the priests? The Gemara answers: It is not given completely to the priests, as there are its placements, when oil is sprinkled seven times “before the Lord” (Leviticus 14:16), and applied to the leper’s right ear, thumb, and big toe (see Leviticus 14:17).
  The Gemara asks: And what is meant when the mishna emphasizes: And in the case of those offerings, the power of the priests is greater than the power of the altar? The Gemara answers: This wording serves to exclude the opinion of the one who says: The two loaves that are brought by themselves, unaccompanied by the requisite two lambs, may not be offered, and instead of being eaten they go to be burned. By emphasizing that the two loaves and the shewbread are eaten by the priests and not placed on the altar, the mishna teaches us that in this case, the power of the priests is always greater, even if the two lambs are not offered with the two loaves.
  MISHNA: All the meal offerings that are prepared in a vessel, e.g., the offerings prepared in a pan or deep pan, require three placements of oil, listed here in the reverse order of their placement: Pouring oil on the cakes after they have been cooked, and mixing oil into the flour, and placement of oil into the vessel prior to preparation of the meal offerings.
  In the meal offerings that come as loaves, it is after the flour has been baked into loaves that one breaks them into pieces and mixes them with oil; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It is with fine flour that one mixes the oil. Although the loaves of the meal offering baked in an oven require mixing of their flour with oil, wafers do not require mixing, but rather a smearing of oil on them after baking. How does one smear oil on them? He does so in a shape similar to the Greek letter chi, Χ, and the rest of the oil remaining after smearing is eaten by priests.
  GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that all the meal offerings prepared in a vessel require three placements of oil, the Gemara asks: To exclude what does the mishna specify: Meal offerings prepared in a vessel? Rav Pappa said: The mishna serves to exclude the oven-baked meal offering, whose preparation does not require the use of a service vessel, as it is merely baked in an oven. Such a meal offering does not require the pouring of the oil.
  With regard to the three placements of oil in a pan meal offering and a deep-pan meal offering, the Sages taught that the verse states: “And if your offering is a deep-pan meal offering, it shall be made of fine flour in oil” (Leviticus 2:7). This teaches that it requires the placement of oil in an empty vessel, and the flour is added afterward. In addition, the term “your offering” in this verse and the term “your offering” (Leviticus 2:5), written with regard to the meal offering prepared in a pan, are understood to teach a verbal analogy:
  
  Daf 75a
  
  Just as here, with regard to the deep-pan meal offering, the placement of oil in an empty utensil is required, to which the flour is added only afterward, so too there, with regard to the meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, the placement of oil in an empty utensil is required. And just as there, with regard to the meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, pouring and mixing are required, as the verse states: “Mixed with oil…and pour oil upon it” (Leviticus 2:5–6), so too here, with regard to the deep-pan meal offering, pouring and mixing are required.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to meal offerings that come as loaves, i.e., those prepared in a shallow pan or deep pan or those baked in an oven, it is after the flour has been baked into loaves that one breaks them into pieces and mixes them with oil; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It is with fine flour, before the baking, that one mixes the oil.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, the verse states: “It shall be of fine flour unleavened, mixed with oil.” This teaches that it is mixed while still flour. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is after the flour has been baked into loaves that he mixes them, as it is stated: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in the oven, it shall be unleavened loaves of fine flour mixed with oil” (Leviticus 2:4). The Rabbis said to him: But is it not with regard to loaves of a thanks offering that it is stated: “Unleavened loaves mixed with oil…and loaves mixed with oil, of fine flour soaked” (Leviticus 7:12), and it is not possible to mix them when they are loaves, but only when they are fine flour?
  The Gemara explains the procedure of mixing the oven-baked meal offerings according to the Rabbis. How does the priest perform the rite? He places oil in a utensil before the placement of the flour is done, and then he places the flour into the utensil. And he then places oil upon it and mixes it, and kneads it in lukewarm water, and bakes it in a shallow pan or a deep pan, in accordance with his vow. And then he breaks it into pieces, and he again places oil upon the pieces, which constitutes the required pouring, and he removes a handful for the altar.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: After the meal offerings have been baked into loaves, one breaks them into pieces and mixes them with oil, as it is stated: “Loaves of fine flour mixed with oil.” How does the priest perform the rite? He places oil in a utensil before the placement of the flour is done, and then he places the flour into the utensil. And then he kneads it in lukewarm water, and bakes it in a shallow pan or deep pan, and breaks the loaves into pieces, and places oil upon the pieces and mixes them, and again places oil upon the pieces, which constitutes the pouring of the oil, and removes a handful to be burned on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the difficulty that it is not possible to mix them when they are loaves, which the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, what is it that makes it impossible? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: Since only a quarter-<i>log</i> of oil is used, how could it be divided among a number of loaves? As this is not sufficient oil to mix with baked offerings, it must be that the oil is mixed with the unbaked flour.
  § The mishna teaches: The loaves of the meal offering baked in an oven require mixing of their flour with oil, and wafers require only smearing. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse specifies with regard to the oven-baked meal offering: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in the oven, it shall be unleavened loaves of fine flour mixed with oil” (Leviticus 2:4). This indicates that only the loaves are mixed, but the wafers are not mixed. This derivation is necessary, as one might have thought: Could the opposite conclusion not be derived through logical inference? And if loaves, which do not require smearing, do require mixing, then is it not logical that wafers, which require smearing, also require mixing? To counter this inference, the verse states: “Loaves of fine flour mixed,” but wafers are not mixed.
  With regard to wafers, the same verse teaches that wafers are smeared with oil, but loaves are not smeared. This derivation is necessary, as one might have thought: Could the opposite conclusion not be derived through logical inference, namely: And if wafers, which do not require mixing, do require smearing, then is it not logical that loaves, which require mixing, also require smearing? To counter this inference, the verse states that wafers are smeared with oil, but loaves are not smeared.
  The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation? Why are the terms “mixed” and “smeared” not interpreted to be referring to both varieties of oven-baked meal offerings? The Gemara answers: Rava said: If this were the intention, then the Torah should not omit this description completely, and let it write in some other verse: Smeared loaves and mixed wafers. The fact that the Torah never describes the loaves as smeared and wafers as mixed indicates that loaves are not smeared and wafers are not mixed.
  § The mishna teaches: How does one smear oil on them? He does so in a shape similar to chi, and the rest of the oil is eaten by priests. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Similar to chi? Rav Kahana said: It is smeared in a shape similar to the Greek letter chi, Χ.
  § Concerning the mixing of oil into the loaves and the smearing of oil upon the wafers, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: An oven-baked meal offering that comes as half loaves and half wafers, i.e., five of each, may be brought according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who does not require ten items of a uniform type. How is the oil applied to this offering? According to one opinion, he brings a <i>log</i> of oil, which is the requisite quantity to accompany a tenth of an ephah of flour, and divides it into two parts. Half of the oil is used for the loaves, and half of the oil is used for the wafers.
  As for the loaves, he mixes them with the oil, and as for the wafers, he smears them. And he smears the oil on the wafer over the entire surface, not in the shape of the letter chi, and he returns the rest of the oil to mix into the loaves. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He smears them in a shape similar to the letter chi, and the rest of the oil is eaten by the priests.
  It is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: In the case of ten wafers that come by themselves as a meal offering baked in the oven, and not as part of another offering, he brings a <i>log</i> of oil and smears them, and he again smears them repeatedly until all the oil in the <i>log</i> is finished. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He smears them in a shape similar to the letter chi, and the rest of the oil is eaten by the priests.
  MISHNA: All the meal offerings that are prepared in a vessel require breaking into pieces.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: To exclude what does the mishna state that this <i>halakha</i> applies specifically to meal offerings prepared in vessels? Rav Pappa said: The mishna serves to exclude the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on Shavuot of two loaves baked from new wheat, and the shewbread, the twelve loaves that were placed on the Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat. Since these are baked in an oven and not prepared in vessels, they do not require breaking into pieces.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the verse discussing a meal offering prepared in a pan states: “You shall break it in pieces, and pour oil upon it; it is a meal offering” (Leviticus 2:6). The fact that the verse concludes with the phrase: “It is a meal offering,” indicates that the Torah means to include all the meal offerings in the requirement of breaking into pieces. One might have thought that I should include even the two loaves and the shewbread. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall break it in pieces”; i.e., the meal offering baked in a pan, but not the two loaves and the shewbread.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues that the same verse states: “And you shall pour oil upon it; it is a meal offering.” The fact that the verse concludes with the phrase “It is a meal offering” indicates that the Torah means to include all the meal offerings in the requirement of pouring. One might have thought that I should include even the oven-baked meal offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall pour oil upon it,” i.e., upon this meal offering, but not upon the oven-baked meal offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Perhaps I should exclude only the loaves from the requirement of pouring, but I should not exclude the wafers. Therefore, the verse states: “It is a meal offering,” indicating that wafers are also excluded. The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation, by which the term “it” excludes wafers specifically? Perhaps I will say: The term serves to exclude the meal offering of priests from the requirement of pouring.
  
  Daf 75b
  
  Rabba says: This is the reason that wafers are also excluded from the mitzva of pouring, while a meal offering brought by a priest is not excluded: The verse uses two expressions of exclusion: “Upon it,” and: “It is a meal offering.” What is the matter that requires two exclusions? You must say: It is the oven-baked meal offering, of which there are two types of offerings: Wafers and loaves.
  MISHNA: In breaking the meal offering of an Israelite into pieces, the priest folds [<i>kofel</i>] one into two and two into four and separates it at the folds. In breaking into pieces the meal offering of priests, the priest folds one into two and two into four and does not separate it at the folds. Because no handful is removed, separation is unnecessary. In the case of the griddle-cake meal offering of the anointed priest, he would not fold it. Rabbi Shimon says: In neither the meal offering of priests nor the meal offering of the anointed priest is there breaking into pieces, because in those meal offerings there is no removal of a handful. And any meal offering in which there is no removal of a handful there is no breaking into pieces. And in all meal offerings that are broken into pieces, the priest breaks them into olive-bulk-sized pieces.
  GEMARA: With regard to the difference between the meal offering of an Israelite and that of a priest detailed in the mishna, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “You shall break it in pieces” (Leviticus 2:6). One might have thought that it should be broken into only two pieces. Therefore, the verse states: “Break it in pieces,” indicating that each of these two pieces is subsequently broken into more pieces. If the Torah requires pieces, one might have thought that he should repeatedly break it into pieces until he renders it into crumbs. Therefore, the verse states: “Break it,” i.e., break it in pieces, and do not break its pieces into additional pieces.
  How so? In the case of the meal offering of an Israelite, the priest folds one into two and two into four and separates the pieces. In breaking into pieces the meal offering of priests and the anointed priest, the priest folds it into two, as it is stated: “In broken pieces you shall sacrifice the offering” (Leviticus 6:14). The Gemara asks: With regard to the meal offering of the anointed priest, didn’t we learn in the mishna: He would not fold it? Rabba says: He does not fold it into four, as it does not use the doubled phrase: “You shall break it in pieces [<i>patot otah pitim</i>],” but he does fold it into two.
  The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon says: In neither the meal offering of priests nor the meal offering of the anointed priest is there breaking into pieces…and in all meal offerings that are broken into pieces, one breaks them into olive-bulk pieces. Rav Yosef said: Over this cooked dish, which contains pieces of bread that are the size of an olive-bulk, before eating it one recites upon it the blessing of: Who brings forth bread from the earth. Over that same cooked dish, if it does not contain pieces of bread that are the size of an olive-bulk, before eating it one recites upon it the blessing of: Who creates the various kinds of nourishment.
  Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this <i>halakha</i>? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The first time an Israelite would stand and instruct a priest to sacrifice meal offerings in Jerusalem on his behalf, he would recite: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, Who has given us life and sustained us and brought us to this time, as it is the first time that the Israelite fulfills the mitzva of bringing that offering. Following the removal of the handful, when the priest would take the meal offerings in order to eat them, he would first recite the blessing of: Who brings forth bread from the earth. And we learned in the mishna: And in all meal offerings that are broken into pieces, the priest breaks them into pieces the size of an olive-bulk. This proves that over pieces of bread that are the volume of an olive-bulk, one recites the blessing of: Who brings forth bread from the earth.
  Abaye said to Rav Yosef: But according to the <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who said with regard to meal offerings: He crushes them continuously until he restores them to the form they had when they were flour, would you say that so too, in that case, one who eats a meal offering so prepared does not recite the blessing of: Who brings forth bread from the earth?
  And if you would say that indeed, one does not recite that blessing over these meal offerings, that is difficult: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to one who gathered a portion the volume of an olive-bulk from all of the crumbs of the meal offerings and ate it, if it was an offering of leavened bread like that of a thanks offering, and he ate it on Passover, his act is punishable by <i>karet</i>. If it was an offering of unleavened bread, a person fulfills his obligation to eat <i>matza</i> on Passover through the consumption of those pieces. This indicates that pieces of bread, regardless of their volume, are always considered bread.
  Rav Yosef answered him that this is not the <i>halakha</i>, and one does not recite a blessing over crumbs of bread as he would over actual bread. Rather, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where one kneaded the crumbs of bread together and pressed them [<i>beshe’eirsan</i>] into a single mass.
  The Gemara challenges this: If so, that which is taught about the ruling in the <i>baraita</i>: And this is the <i>halakha</i> when he ate all of the crumbs that constitute the volume of an olive-bulk in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [<i>peras</i>] of bread, is difficult. As, if it is a case where he pressed them into a single mass, the <i>baraita</i> should have taught: When he ate it, in the singular, as it is a single item. Rather, what are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where the crumbs came from a large loaf of bread. Although the crumbs themselves are each smaller than an olive-bulk, since they were broken from a large loaf, they are considered significant.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to the blessing recited on the cooked dish with pieces less than an olive-bulk in volume, what halakhic conclusion was reached about it? Rav Sheshet says: Even when eating pieces of bread that do not have the volume of an olive-bulk, one recites the blessing of: Who brings forth bread from the earth. Rava said: And this is limited to a case where the crumbs still have the appearance [<i>torita</i>] of bread, and they did not dissolve completely.
  
  Daf 76a
  
  MISHNA: All the meal offerings require rubbing three hundred times and striking five hundred times with one’s fist or palm. Rubbing and striking are performed on the wheat kernels to remove their husks prior to grinding them into flour. And Rabbi Yosei says: They are performed on the dough to ensure a smooth product. All of the meal offerings come as ten loaves or ten wafers from each one tenth of an ephah of flour, except for the shewbread and the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which come as twelve loaves or wafers; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: They all come as twelve loaves except for the four types of loaves that accompany the thanks offering and the two types of loaves that accompany the peace offering of naziriteship, which come as ten each.
  GEMARA: A <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i> that the rubbing and striking are done in the following manner: He rubs once and strikes twice. Then he rubs twice and strikes three times. This sequence is repeated one hundred times, so that he rubs three hundred times and strikes five hundred times. Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma with regard to the rubbing: Is the rubbing of the hand back and forth over the surface of the item considered one rubbing, or is perhaps rubbing back and forth considered two distinct rubbings? What is the correct count? The Gemara states: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § The mishna teaches: Rubbing and striking are performed on the wheat kernels, while Rabbi Yosei says: They are performed on the dough. The Gemara comments: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Yosei mean that these actions are performed on the dough and not on the wheat kernels? Or perhaps he means that they are performed not only on the kernels but also on the dough. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rubbing and striking are performed on the wheat kernels. Rabbi Yosei says: Rubbing and striking are performed on the dough.
  § The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, all of the meal offerings come as ten loaves or wafers, except for the shewbread and the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which come as twelve loaves or wafers. The Gemara examines the sources for these exceptions: With regard to the shewbread, it is written explicitly of it: “And you shall take fine flour and bake twelve cakes of it” (Leviticus 24:5).
  That the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest is also offered as twelve units is derived from a verbal analogy of the word “obligation,” written in the context of the verse discussing the shewbread. With regard to the griddle-cake offering, the verse states: “And the anointed priest…shall offer it; it is an obligation forever” (Leviticus 6:15), and the verse states with regard to the twelve loaves of the shewbread: “And it shall be for Aaron and his sons…a perpetual obligation” (Leviticus 24:9).
  § The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yehuda, who states in the mishna with regard to all the meal offerings that they come as ten loaves or ten wafers, from where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers that he derives it from the loaves of the thanks offering. Just as there, there are ten loaves, so too here, with regard to all other meal offerings, there are ten loaves. The Gemara challenges: But let him derive it from the shewbread: Just as there, there are twelve loaves, so too here, with regard to all other meal offerings, there must be twelve.
  The Gemara explains: It stands to reason that Rabbi Yehuda should derive the <i>halakha</i> of the other meal offerings from the loaves of the thanks offering, as the other meal offerings resemble the loaves of the thanks offering and differ from the shewbread in several respects: They are offered by an individual and not by the public; they are brought by one who donates and not as obligatory offerings; oil is used in their preparation; they are disqualified when left overnight, whereas, by contrast, the rite of the shewbread demands that it be left on the Table for eight days; they are not brought on the Sabbath, unlike the shewbread, whose rite is performed on the Sabbath; and they are not brought in a state of ritual impurity, unlike the shewbread, which is brought even in a state of impurity.
  The Gemara responds: On the contrary, Rabbi Yehuda should derive the <i>halakha</i> of the other meal offerings from the shewbread, as they resemble the shewbread in several respects: They are consecrated property of the most sacred order, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are of lesser sanctity; and they are brought with frankincense, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are not; they are brought only as unleavened bread, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering include some leavened bread; and each is brought as an offering by itself, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are brought together with an animal sacrifice.
  The Gemara explains: These analogies between other meal offerings and the loaves of the thanks offering are more numerous than the analogies between other meal offerings and the shewbread. Therefore, the <i>halakha</i> of other meal offerings is derived from the loaves of the thanks offering.
  The Gemara posited previously that according to Rabbi Yehuda, a verbal analogy teaches that, like the shewbread, the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest is brought as twelve units. The Gemara asks: And if we hold that a matter learned through a verbal analogy may subsequently teach as a paradigm, let us derive the <i>halakha</i> of the other meal offerings from the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest: Just as there, the meal offering comprises twelve units, so too here, other meal offerings should consist of twelve units.
  The Gemara responds: It stands to reason that Rabbi Yehuda should derive their <i>halakha</i> from the <i>halakha</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, as the other meal offerings resemble the loaves of the thanks offering and differ from the griddle-cake offering in several respects: They are brought by an ordinary person and not by the High Priest; they are brought by one who donates and not as obligatory offerings; and they are only brought whole, while the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering is brought in halves, half in the morning and half in the afternoon.
  In addition, they are disqualified as <i>piggul</i>, i.e., when they are sacrificed with the intent to be consumed after their appointed time, unlike the griddle-cake offering, which is not eaten at all; they are not brought on the Sabbath, unlike the griddle-cake offering; and they are not brought in a state of ritual impurity, whereas the griddle-cake offering is brought by the High Priest even while impure.
  The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, Rabbi Yehuda should have derived the <i>halakha</i> of the other meal offerings from the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, as the other meal offerings resemble the griddle-cake offering in several respects: They both contain a tenth of an ephah of fine flour, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering contain several tenths of an ephah; they are consecrated when placed in a service vessel, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are consecrated when the thanks offering is slaughtered; they are consecrated property of the most sacred order, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are of lesser sanctity; and they are brought with frankincense, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are not.
  In addition, they are brought only of unleavened bread, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering include some leavened bread; and each is brought as an offering itself, whereas the loaves of the thanks offering are brought together with an animal sacrifice; part of their rite is bringing them near the southwest corner of the altar, unlike the loaves of the thanks offering; and parts or all of them are placed on the fires of the altar, unlike the loaves of the thanks offering. The Gemara comments: And indeed, these similarities between other meal offerings and the griddle-cake offering are more numerous than the similarities between other meal offerings and the loaves of the thanks offering. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to derive the number of loaves from the griddle-cake offering.
  The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda prefers to learn the <i>halakha</i> of the other meal offerings, which are brought by an ordinary person, from the loaves of the thanks offering, which are brought by an ordinary person.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: They all come as twelve loaves. The Gemara explains: What does he hold? If he holds that a matter learned through a verbal analogy is subsequently used to teach as a paradigm, he derives the number of loaves in other meal offerings from the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, which was itself derived from a verbal analogy, as these similarities between other meal offerings and the griddle-cake offering enumerated above are more numerous.
  And if he holds that a matter learned through a verbal analogy is not subsequently used to teach as a paradigm, then he derives the number of loaves in other meal offerings from the twelve loaves of the shewbread. This is because Rabbi Meir prefers to derive the status of the other meal offerings, which are consecrated property of the highest order, from the shewbread, which is also consecrated property of the highest order, in contrast to the loaves of the thanks offering, which are of lesser sanctity.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: They all come as twelve loaves except for the loaves of the thanks offering and the loaves that accompany the guilt offering of naziriteship, which come as ten each. The Gemara explains the exceptions: With regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, it is written explicitly of them that these loaves are brought in units of ten, based on a verbal analogy: With regard to the thanks offering, the verse states: “And of it he shall present one out of each offering for a gift [<i>teruma</i>] to the Lord” (Leviticus 7:14), and with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe it is stated: “You shall set apart of it a gift [<i>teruma</i>] for the Lord, a tithe of the tithe” (Numbers 18:26). Just as the <i>teruma</i> of the tithe consists of one portion of ten, so too, the loaves of the thanks offering are brought in units of ten (see 77b).
  That ten loaves accompany the guilt offering of naziriteship is derived from a verse, as the Master says: The verse describing the thanks offering states: “With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering with the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving” (Leviticus 7:13). The term “his peace offerings” serves to include the loaves of the peace offering of the nazirite. Just as each of the four varieties of loaves accompanying the thanks offering are brought in units of ten loaves, so too, the peace offering of the nazirite comprises ten loaves.
  § The loaves of the thanks offering consist of ten of each of the following four types: Leavened loaves, unleavened wafers, standard unleavened loaves, and unleavened loaves made from flour mixed with water and oil. With regard to these loaves, Rav Tovi bar Kisna says that Shmuel says: In the case of loaves of the thanks offering that one baked as only four loaves, one of each of the four types, where each loaf is the size of ten loaves, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: But do we not require forty loaves? The Gemara answers: Forty loaves are brought in order to fulfill the mitzva in the optimal fashion, but he has nevertheless fulfilled his obligation with four loaves, one of each type.
  The Gemara challenges this: But an individual who brings the loaves as an offering is required to separate <i>teruma</i> from them by designating one loaf of each type to be given to the priests, which cannot be done where only one loaf of each type exists. And if you would say that he may separate a tenth-sized piece from each and every loaf, that is difficult: Doesn’t the Merciful One state: “And of it he shall present one out of each offering for a gift [<i>teruma</i>] to the Lord,” which teaches that he may not take sliced bread, but rather a whole loaf? The Gemara answers: This is a case where he separated it while kneading, so that it is not considered separating a slice.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Shmuel from a <i>baraita</i>: All the meal offerings where one increased the measure of their loaves or where one decreased the measure of their loaves are nevertheless fit, except for the twelve loaves of shewbread, and the twelve loaves of the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, and the ten loaves of each variety for the thanks offering and the ten loaves that accompany the guilt offering of naziriteship. Evidently, no fewer than forty loaves are fit for the thanks offering, in contradiction to the statement of Shmuel. The Gemara answers: He
  
  Daf 76b
  
  states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of that <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All the meal offerings where one increased the measure of their loaves or where one decreased the measure of their loaves are nevertheless fit, except for the twelve loaves of the shewbread and the twelve loaves of the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering. And some say: Even the ten loaves of each variety of the thanks offering and the ten loaves that accompany the guilt offering of naziriteship are fit only when brought in their prescribed measures. Shmuel agrees with the first <i>tanna</i>, according to whom the loaves of the thanks offering and the loaves of naziriteship are fit even when not offered in the proper quantities.
  § Rav Huna says: With regard to an oven-baked meal offering that one baked as only one loaf, although he did not bring the mandated quantity, he has fulfilled his obligation. What is the reason? It is that the verse states with regard to the oven-baked meal offering: “And when you bring a meal offering baked in the oven, it shall be unleavened loaves of fine flour” (Leviticus 2:4). The term “unleavened loaves [<i>matzot</i>]” is written without the letter <i>vav</i>, which is generally used with regard to the plural form. Therefore, it may be read in the singular as unleavened loaf [<i>matzat</i>], which teaches that even one unleavened loaf is fit.
  Rav Pappa objects to this derivation: The reason Rav Huna gives is that it is written in the singular form of <i>matzat</i>. But if it were written: <i>Matzot</i>, would this not be the <i>halakha</i>? But what about the verse concerning the loaves of the thanks offering, where it is written “<i>matzot</i>” with a <i>vav</i>, indicating the plural form, in the verse: “Then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanksgiving unleavened loaves mixed with oil” (Leviticus 7:12), and yet Rav Tovi bar Kisna said that Shmuel said: In the case of loaves of the thanks offering that were baked as four loaves, such that each of the four varieties of loaves is baked as only one loaf, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara answers: That statement of Shmuel disagrees with the opinion of Rav Huna, according to whom four loaves are not fit for the thanks offering.
  MISHNA: The <i>omer</i> offering, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, would come from a tenth of an ephah of flour sifted from three <i>se’a</i> of barley. The two loaves would come from two-tenths of an ephah of flour sifted from three <i>se’a</i> of wheat. The shewbread would come from twenty-four tenths of an ephah of flour sifted from twenty-four <i>se’a</i> of wheat.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason that according to the mishna, the relatively large amount of three <i>se’a</i> of barley is necessary to yield a single tenth of an ephah of flour for the <i>omer</i> offering? The Gemara answers: Since it comes from the fresh new crop, which contains a large amount of refuse, and it comes from barley, which is coarser than wheat, a choice tenth of an ephah of flour comes only from a minimum of three <i>se’a</i> of barley.
  The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna rule that the two loaves would come from two-tenths of an ephah of flour sifted from three <i>se’a</i> of wheat, whereas only a tenth of an ephah is used from the same amount of grain for the <i>omer</i>? The Gemara answers: Since the loaves come from wheat, which is of superior quality to barley, although they come from the new crop and require sifting, the grains are clean enough that two-tenths of an ephah come from the sifting of three <i>se’a</i> of grain.
  The mishna stated that the shewbread would come from twenty-four tenths of an ephah of flour sifted from twenty-four <i>se’a</i> of wheat. What is the reason? The Gemara answers: Since they come from wheat, and they come from the old crop, which contains relatively little refuse, the grains are so clean that a choice tenth of an ephah of flour comes from one <i>se’a</i> of grain, and twenty-four tenths of an ephah come from twenty-four <i>se’a</i>.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All the meal offerings where one increased the measure of their tenth of an ephah of flour by collecting it with a vessel larger than a tenth of an ephah, or where one decreased the measure of their tenth of an ephah of flour by collecting it with a vessel smaller than a tenth of an ephah, are disqualified. If he increased the measure of their <i>se’a</i> of grain or decreased the measure of their <i>se’a</i> of grain, e.g., if he used two or four <i>se’a</i> instead of three, but sifted until he was left with the correct measure of a tenth of an ephah of flour, they are fit offerings. This is because the number of <i>se’a</i> mentioned in the mishna is necessary only for the optimal fulfillment of the mitzva, but is not indispensable.
  MISHNA: The flour of the <i>omer</i> was sifted with thirteen sifters, each finer than its predecessor, and the flour that emerged from the final sifter was sacrificed. The flour of the two loaves was sifted with twelve sifters, and the flour of the shewbread was sifted with eleven sifters. Rabbi Shimon says: They have no fixed number of sifters; rather, it was fine flour that was completely sifted that one would bring for all of these offerings, as it is stated: “And you shall take fine flour and bake it” (Leviticus 24:5), indicating that one does not fulfill his obligation until the flour will be completely sifted.
  GEMARA: When a fine sifter was used, the small, dust-like particles emerged and the fine flour was caught in the sifter, and when a coarse sifter was used, the fine flour emerged and the bran was caught in the sifter. With regard to the sifting of the flour, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The sifting would begin in a sifter of slight holes, and the flour that remained would then be sifted in a sifter of large holes. The flour that emerged would again be sifted in a sifter with slight holes that were not quite as small as the first one with small holes, and again in a sifter of large holes that were not quite as large as the first one with large holes. All the sifting would proceed in this manner. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: There were thirteen sifters in the Temple, this one above, i.e., preceding, that one, and this one above that one. The highest sifter would collect bran, parts of the kernel aside from the actual pure flour, and the lowest sifter would collect fine flour.
  § The mishna teaches that in contrast to the first <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Shimon says: They have no fixed number of sifters; but the flour would be sifted as many times as was necessary, based on the verse: “And you shall take fine flour, and bake it.” In addition, the Sages taught: When the verse states with regard to the shewbread: “And you shall take fine flour and bake it,” this teaches that fine flour is acquired after it has been sifted for the baking of the shewbread.
  And from where is it derived that even wheat kernels may be purchased before they are ground and sifted? The verse states: “And you shall take,” indicating that the grain should be taken in any case and in any state. One might have thought that it is so even for other meal offerings. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall take fine flour and bake it,” indicating that the shewbread alone may be acquired as kernels because of the sparing [<i>haḥissaḥon</i>].
  Rabbi Elazar says: What is the meaning of: Because of the sparing? Rabbi Elazar says: The Torah spared the money of the Jewish people. Due to the large quantity of grain needed for the shewbread every week, purchasing sifted fine flour would be a substantial expense. The Gemara explains: Where is the allusion to this principle? It is found in a verse, as it is written that when the Jewish people were thirsty in the wilderness in the aftermath of Miriam’s death, God instructed Moses: “And speak to the rock before their eyes, so that it will give forth its water; and you shall bring forth to them water out of the rock; so you shall give drink for the congregation and for their cattle” (Numbers 20:8). Evidently, the miracle of extracting water from the rock was performed even for the purpose of providing water for the livestock.
  
  MISHNA: The flour for the loaves accompanying the thanks offering would come from a measure of five Jerusalem <i>se’a</i> offering, which are equivalent to six wilderness <i>se’a</i>. The <i>se’a</i> referred to in the Bible when the Jewish people were in the wilderness is smaller than the <i>se’a</i> used later in Jerusalem. This is equivalent to two ephahs, each ephah being three wilderness <i>se’a</i>. These two ephahs are twenty measures of a tenth of an ephah. Ten of these tenths were used to make leavened loaves and ten of these tenths were used to make unleavened loaves, i.e., <i>matza</i>.
  
  Daf 77a
  
  The mishna elaborates: There are ten tenths for the loaves of leavened bread, a tenth of an ephah per loaf. And there are ten tenths for the loaves of <i>matza</i>. And among the loaves of <i>matza</i> there are three types: Loaves, wafers, and those poached in water, ten loaves of each type. Consequently, there are three-and-one-third tenths of an ephah for each and every type, three loaves per tenth of an ephah.
  And in the Jerusalem measure there were thirty <i>kav</i>, fifteen <i>kav</i> for the loaves of leavened bread and fifteen for the loaves of <i>matza</i>. The mishna elaborates: There are fifteen <i>kav</i> for the loaves of leavened bread, one and one-half <i>kav</i> per loaf. And there are fifteen <i>kav</i> for the loaves of <i>matza</i>. And among the loaves of <i>matza</i> there are three types: Loaves, wafers, and those poached in water. Consequently, there are five <i>kav</i> for each and every type, two loaves per <i>kav</i>.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: The flour for the loaves accompanying the thanks offering would come from a measure of five Jerusalem <i>se’a</i>, which are equivalent to six wilderness <i>se’a</i>. The <i>se’a</i> referred to in the Bible when the Jewish people were in the wilderness is smaller than the <i>se’a</i> used later in Jerusalem. This is equivalent to two ephahs, each ephah being three wilderness <i>se’a</i>. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, i.e., that there are three <i>se’a</i> in an ephah, derived? Rav Ḥisda said: They are derived from a verse, as the verse states: “The ephah and the <i>bat</i> shall be of one measure” (Ezekiel 45:11). Therefore, just as the <i>bat</i>, a measure for liquids, is three <i>se’a</i>, so too the ephah, a measure for dry goods, is three <i>se’a</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the <i>bat</i> itself, from where do we derive its measure? If we say that we derive it from that which is written in the same verse: “That the <i>bat</i> may contain the tenth-part of a <i>ḥomer</i>,” and since one <i>ḥomer</i> consists of thirty <i>se’a</i>, one <i>bat</i> is equivalent to three <i>se’a</i>, there is a difficulty: With regard to an ephah as well, isn’t it written in the same verse: “And the ephah the tenth-part of a <i>ḥomer</i>”? Why, then, must the measure of an ephah be derived from that of a <i>bat</i>? Rather, I do not know how much the measure of a <i>ḥomer</i> is; consequently, when the verse states that the ephah is one-tenth of one <i>ḥomer</i>, this does not demonstrate the measure of the ephah. Here too, I do not know how much the measure of the <i>bat</i> is.
  Rather, derive the volume of the ephah from here, from a subsequent verse, where it is written with regard to separating <i>teruma</i>: “And the set portion of oil, the <i>bat</i> of oil, shall be the tithe of the <i>bat</i> out of the <i>kor</i>, which is ten <i>bat</i>, even a <i>ḥomer</i>; for ten <i>bat</i> are a <i>ḥomer</i>” (Ezekiel 45:14). The verse states that there are ten <i>bat</i> in one <i>kor</i> and ten <i>bat</i> in one <i>ḥomer</i>. Since it is known that one <i>kor</i> is equivalent to thirty <i>se’a</i>, the verse indicates that there are also thirty <i>se’a</i> in one <i>ḥomer</i>. It can therefore be derived from the verse that there are three <i>se’a</i> in one <i>bat</i>, and consequently, three <i>se’a</i> in one ephah.
  § The mishna teaches that the Sages increased the size of the measures so that five Jerusalem measures are equal to six wilderness measures. With regard to the practice of augmenting measures, Shmuel says: If the residents of a certain place want to change the standard of their measures and augment them by a certain fraction, they may not increase the measures by more than one-sixth, and they may not increase the value of a coin by more than one-sixth of its previous value. And one who profits from his sales may not profit by more than one-sixth.
  The Gemara analyzes these statements. When Shmuel said: They may not increase the measures by more than one-sixth, what is the reason for this? If we say it is because doing so causes market prices to rise, the same concern should apply to raising the prices by one-sixth, and therefore that should also not be allowed.
  Rather, one might say that the prohibition is due to concern for exploitation; and they may increase the measures only by up to one-sixth so that there will not be nullification of the transaction, as the transaction is nullified only when the disparity is more than one-sixth of the value of the item. The Gemara raises an objection: But doesn’t Rava say: With regard to any item that is otherwise subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of exploitation, and it is sold by measure, or by weight, or by number, even if the disparity was less than the measure of exploitation in the transaction, the transaction is reversed? A disparity of one-sixth between the value of an item and its price constitutes exploitation only in cases where there is room for error in assessing the value of an item. In a case where the details of the item are easily quantifiable, any deviation from the designated quantity results in a nullification of the transaction. The statement of Shmuel concerns sales involving measures.
  Rather, the prohibition is for the benefit of the merchant, so that there will not be a loss suffered by a merchant who might not realize that a new standard was issued, and might sell in accordance with the old standard. Since a merchant usually enjoys a profit of one-sixth of the value of an item, if the standard is not increased by more than this amount he will not suffer a loss, as at worst he will forfeit his profit margin. The Gemara notes: This explanation is also difficult, since even if the aim is to ensure that there will not be a loss for the merchant, does he not need to earn a profit? There is a well-known adage in this regard: If you buy and sell without earning any profit, will you be called a merchant? A merchant must profit from his sales; therefore, if this decree was instituted for the protection of merchants, the Sages should have ensured that they earn a profit.
  Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: The prohibition is not based on logical reasoning. Instead, Shmuel found a verse and interpreted it homiletically: “And the shekel shall be twenty <i>gera</i>; twenty shekels, five and twenty shekels, ten, and five shekels, shall be your <i>maneh</i>” (Ezekiel 45:12). According to this verse, the sum of all of these numbers, sixty shekels, is equivalent to a <i>maneh</i>. This is problematic: How can a <i>maneh</i> consist of sixty shekels? Since each biblical shekel is equivalent to four dinars, if a <i>maneh</i> is equal to sixty shekels, a <i>maneh</i> is two hundred and forty dinars. But a <i>maneh</i> is actually equal to twenty-five shekels, which are one hundred dinars.
  Rather, one can learn from the verse three matters: Learn from it that the sacred <i>maneh</i> was doubled, so that it equaled two hundred, not one hundred, dinars. And furthermore, as Ezekiel stated that the <i>maneh</i> will be sixty shekels, not fifty, learn from it that a community may increase measures, but they may not increase them by more than one-sixth. And learn from it that the one-sixth is calculated from the outside, i.e., it is one-sixth of the final sum, which is one-fifth of the previous sum.
  Ravina said: The mishna is also precisely formulated so as to reflect the fact that the one-sixth increase is calculated from the outside, as it teaches: The flour for the loaves accompanying the thanks offering would come from a measure of five Jerusalem <i>se’a</i> of flour, which are equivalent to six wilderness <i>se’a</i>. One can infer that the <i>se’a</i> could be increased by only one-sixth from the outside. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the <i>halakha</i>.
  
  Daf 77b
  
  MISHNA: From all of the four types of loaves accompanying the thanks offering, one takes one loaf from each set of ten as <i>teruma</i>, to be given to a priest, as it is stated: “And he shall present from it one of each offering as a <i>teruma</i> unto the Lord; to the priest that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings against the altar it shall be given” (Leviticus 7:14). The verse is analyzed: “One” indicates that one should not take a sliced loaf; “of each offering” indicates that all the offerings should be equal, i.e., that one should not take a loaf from one type of offering for another type; “to the priest that sprinkles the blood of the peace offerings against the altar it shall be given,” and the rest of the loaves are eaten by the owner.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches some of the <i>halakhot</i> of <i>teruma</i> to be taken from the loaves of the thanks offering that are derived from the verse: “And he shall present from it one of each offering as a <i>teruma</i> unto the Lord.” The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> that interprets the same verse: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “And he shall present from it” indicates that the loaves must all be as one, i.e., <i>teruma</i> may be taken from the loaves only when they are joined together in one place. “One” indicates that one should not take a sliced loaf. “Of each offering” indicates that all the offerings should be equal, i.e., that one should not take a loaf from one type of offering for another type. When the verse states: “As a <i>teruma</i> unto the Lord,” I do not know from how many loaves the <i>teruma</i> is taken.
  I therefore derive this from a verbal analogy: It is stated here, in the passage of the loaves describing the thanks offering: “<i>Teruma</i>,” and it is stated with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe: “Then you shall set apart from it a <i>teruma</i> for the Lord, even a tithe of the tithe” (Numbers 18:26). Just as below, with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, one out of every ten is separated as <i>teruma</i>, so too here, with regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, one out of every ten loaves is separated as <i>teruma</i>.
  Or perhaps, go this way and derive the measure from a different verbal analogy: It is stated here: “<i>Teruma</i>,” and it is stated with regard to first fruits: “<i>Teruma</i>” (Deuteronomy 12:17). Just as below, with regard to first fruits, it has no measure, so too here, say that it has no measure.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Let us consider to which of the two cases, <i>teruma</i> of the tithe or the first fruits, the case of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering is more similar. It is logical that one derives the <i>halakha</i> of a <i>teruma</i> that is not followed by another <i>teruma</i>, such as <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, from a <i>teruma</i> that is not followed by another <i>teruma</i>, such as <i>teruma</i> of the tithe. And the case of the first fruits will not serve as proof, since they are followed by another <i>teruma</i>, as <i>teruma</i> and tithes are taken after the first fruits are separated.
  Or perhaps, go this way and reason that one derives the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, which is eaten in a sacred place, in Jerusalem, from <i>teruma</i> of the first fruits, which is eaten in a sacred place, in Jerusalem. And the case of <i>teruma</i> of the tithe will not serve as proof, as it may be eaten anywhere.
  Since both of these comparisons are equally plausible, the verse states with regard to the loaves of the thanks offering: “From it…a <i>teruma</i> unto the Lord,” and, similarly, it is written with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe: “From it a <i>teruma</i>,” to indicate that there is a verbal analogy between the two, from which it can be derived that one separates one out of every ten loaves of the thanks offering as <i>teruma</i>.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: We have learned with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering that its measure is one out of every ten. But I do not know from this verbal analogy from how much flour each leavened loaf is to be prepared. I therefore derive this from a verbal analogy: It is stated here, in the passage concerning the loaves of the thanks offering: “Bread” (Leviticus 7:13), and it is stated there, with regard to the two loaves, i.e., the public offering on <i>Shavuot</i> of two loaves from the new wheat: “Bread” (Leviticus 23:17). Just as there, with regard to the two loaves, one prepares the loaves with a tenth of an ephah per loaf, so too here, with regard to the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering, one prepares the loaves with a tenth of an ephah per loaf.
  Or perhaps, go this way and derive the <i>halakha</i> from a different verbal analogy: It is stated here, with regard to the loaves of the thanks offering: “Bread,” and it is stated there, with regard to the shewbread: “Bread” (Leviticus 24:7). One can conclude that just as there, with regard to the shewbread, each of the twelve loaves is baked from two-tenths of an ephah flour, so too here, each of the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering should be baked from two-tenths of an ephah of flour.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Let us consider to which of the two cases, the two loaves or the shewbread, the case of the leavened loaves of the thanks offering is more similar. It is logical that one derives the <i>halakha</i> of the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering, which is a meal offering that comes as leavened bread along with an animal offering, from another meal offering that comes as leavened bread along with an animal offering, such as the two loaves, which are also leavened, and which come with animal offerings (see Leviticus 23:17–19). And the shewbread will not serve as proof, since it does not come as leavened bread, nor does it come with an animal offering.
  Or perhaps, go this way and reason that one derives the <i>halakha</i> of the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering, which is a meal offering that can come from the grain of Eretz Yisrael or of outside of Eretz Yisrael, from new grain or from old grain; from the <i>halakha</i> of the shewbread, which is also a meal offering that can come from the grain of Eretz Yisrael or from outside of Eretz Yisrael, from new grain or from old grain. And the two loaves will not serve as proof, since they can come only from new grain and from Eretz Yisrael.
  Since both of these comparisons are equally plausible, the verse states concerning the two loaves: “You shall bring out of your dwellings two loaves of waving” (Leviticus 23:17). As there is no need for the verse to state: “You shall bring,” what, then, is the meaning when the verse states: “You shall bring”? This indicates that whatever, i.e., any meal offering, you bring from a different place, it must be like this, i.e., the two loaves. Therefore, just as there, in the case of the two loaves, the measure is a tenth of an ephah per loaf, so too here, in the case of the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering, the measure is a tenth of an ephah per loaf.
  But if so, perhaps one can derive that just as there, in the case of the two loaves, the entire measure for the two loaves is two-tenths of an ephah, so too here, in the case of the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering, the entire measure for all ten loaves of leavened bread is two-tenths. To exclude this possibility, the same verse states: “They shall be,” to indicate that each leavened loaf is prepared from a tenth of an ephah. Accordingly, the ten loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering are prepared with a total of ten tenths of an ephah.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: We have learned that there are ten tenths of an ephah of flour for the loaves of leavened bread accompanying the thanks offering. From where is it derived that there are ten tenths of an ephah for the thirty loaves of <i>matza</i>? The verse states: “If he brings it for a thanks offering, then he shall bring with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached. With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering, with the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:12–13).
  By mentioning all the loaves of unleavened bread in one verse and the loaves of leavened bread in the subsequent verse, it is indicated that one must bring the <i>matza</i> in a measure corresponding to the measure of the loaves of leavened bread. Consequently, there are twenty tenths of flour for the loaves of the thanks offering, ten for the loaves of leavened bread, and ten for the <i>matza</i>.
  One might have thought that one brings ten loaves of <i>matza</i>, and that all of them shall be of only one type. Therefore, the verse states: “If he brings it for a thanks offering, then he shall bring with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached. With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering.” The verse indicates that one must bring three types of <i>matza</i>. Consequently, there are three-and-one-third of a tenth of an ephah of flour for each and every type, and three loaves to a tenth of an ephah. And consequently, there are a total of forty loaves of the thanks offering. The owner of the offering takes four of them, one loaf of each type, and gives them to the priest, and the remaining loaves are eaten by the owner and any ritually pure Jew to whom he wishes to give the loaves. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  § The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>: The Master said: “And he shall present from it,” indicates that the <i>teruma</i> may be taken from the loaves only when they are joined together in one place. The Gemara asks: If that is so, then concerning that which is written in the verse with regard to the sacrificial portions of the sin offering consumed on the altar: “And all the fat thereof he shall take off from it and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 4:19), there, what is there to be joined together?
  The Gemara responds: The sacrificial portions of the sin offering must be sacrificed from that which is joined together, in accordance with that which Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says, as Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: The priest may not cut up the meat of the offering before taking from it the sacrificial portions that are to be burned upon the altar.
  § The Master said: It is stated here, in the passage of the loaves of the thanks offering: “<i>Teruma</i>,” and it is stated with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe: “<i>Teruma</i>.” Just as one-tenth of the tithe is separated as <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, so too one out of every ten loaves of the thanks offering is separated as <i>teruma</i>.
  The Gemara challenges: And let us derive the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering from <i>teruma</i> that was taken following the war of the Jewish people against Midian, where the word <i>teruma</i> also appears (see Numbers 31:28–30). The measure of the <i>teruma</i> there was not one of ten. The Gemara responds: One derives the <i>halakha</i> with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, which is practiced for all generations, from <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, which is also practiced for all generations. And <i>teruma</i> of Midian shall not serve as proof, as it is not practiced for all generations.
  The Gemara challenges: And let us derive the <i>halakha</i> of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering from <i>teruma</i> of <i>ḥalla</i>, i.e., the portion of dough given to the priest, as the verse refers to it as a <i>teruma</i> (see Numbers 15:19–20). That measure is one in twenty-four. The Gemara responds: The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that one derives a matter, i.e., <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, of which it is stated: “From it a <i>teruma</i> unto the Lord” (Leviticus 7:14), from a matter, i.e., <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, of which it is stated: “From it a <i>teruma</i> for the Lord” (Numbers 18:26). This serves to exclude <i>teruma</i> of <i>ḥalla</i>, of which it is not stated: From it a <i>teruma</i> for the Lord.
  § Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering, is a non-priest who intentionally partakes of it liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning a non-priest who intentionally consumes <i>teruma</i> of the tithe? And similarly, is a non-priest who unwittingly partakes of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering liable to pay the value of what he consumed as well as an additional one-fifth of that value, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning a non-priest who partakes of <i>teruma</i> of the tithe unwittingly (see Leviticus 22:9, 14)? Or is one not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven or to pay an additional one-fifth for their consumption?
  Rava elaborates: Since <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering is compared to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, perhaps it is considered like <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, and the same penalties are incurred. Or perhaps, since the verse uses restrictive terms with regard to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe, as the verse states of one who intentionally partakes of it: “They shall die due to it” (Leviticus 22:9), and the verse states with regard to one who unwittingly partakes of it: “Then he shall put its fifth-part unto it” (Leviticus 22:14), the Merciful One restricted this <i>halakha</i> specifically to the case of <i>teruma</i> of the tithe.
  Rava raises another dilemma based on the comparison of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering and <i>teruma</i> of the tithe: Does <i>teruma</i> of the loaves of the thanks offering that fell into non-sacred produce render the mixture forbidden, as is the <i>halakha</i> concerning <i>teruma</i> of the tithe? Or does the comparison of <i>teruma</i> of the loaves to <i>teruma</i> of the tithe apply only with regard to the proper measure, and it does not render the mixture forbidden? The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall stand unresolved.
  § The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “They shall be,” indicating that each leavened loaf must come from a tenth of an ephah, so that the loaves of <i>matza</i> of the thanks offering are prepared from ten tenths of an ephah. The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation for this? How is this derived from “they shall be”?
  
  Daf 78a
  
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: “They shall be” [<i>tihyena</i>] is written with two instances of the letter <i>yod</i>. The superfluous <i>yod</i>, whose numerical value is ten, is interpreted to indicate that the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering must be prepared from ten tenths of flour. The Gemara raises an objection: Say that the superfluous <i>yod</i> indicates that the loaves must be prepared with ten half-kav, a smaller measure than ten tenths of an ephah? Rava says: One cannot say this, since the verse habitually spoke of tenths of an ephah and not other measures.
  § The Gemara continues its analysis of the <i>baraita</i>: We have learned that there are ten tenths of an ephah of flour for the loaves of leavened bread accompanying the thanks offering. From where is it derived that there are ten tenths of an ephah for the thirty loaves of <i>matza</i>? The verse states: “With cakes of leavened bread,” after mentioning the three types of <i>matza</i> accompanying the thanks offering (Leviticus 7:12–13), indicating that one must bring the <i>matza</i> in a measure corresponding to the measure of the loaves of leavened bread.
  The Gemara asks: But can a matter that was derived by comparison then come back and teach the matter by comparison with regard to consecrated matters? Since the <i>halakha</i> that the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering are prepared from ten tenths of an ephah is itself derived by comparison to the two loaves, can one then derive from it that the <i>matza</i> loaves of the thanks offering consist of ten tenths of an ephah? The Gemara responds: The <i>halakha</i> that the loaves of leavened bread consist of ten loaves made from ten tenths of an ephah is not derived solely by comparison to the two loaves; rather, it is derived from itself, as the <i>halakha</i> that there are ten loaves is stated in the verse concerning the thanks offering, and from another matter, and any <i>halakha</i> derived from itself and from another matter is not considered a comparison. Consequently, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>matza</i> loaves may be derived from it.
  The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that a <i>halakha</i> derived from itself and from another matter does not constitute a comparison, but according to the one who says that a <i>halakha</i> derived from itself and from another matter does constitute a comparison, what is there to say? The Gemara responds: According to that opinion, the <i>halakha</i> that each loaf is prepared from a tenth of an ephah is derived from that which the verse states with regard to the two loaves: “You shall bring” (Leviticus 23:17), which is a term of amplification that serves to teach that the loaves of leavened bread of the thanks offering consist of ten tenths of an ephah of flour. Since this <i>halakha</i> is derived not by comparison but by amplification from the two loaves, one can derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the <i>matza</i> loaves by comparison to the loaves of leavened bread.
  mishna The loaves that accompanied the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle would come parallel to the three types of <i>matza</i> that accompany the thanks offering: Loaves, wafers, and loaves poached in water and made with oil (see Leviticus 8:26). The loaves of leavened bread that accompany the thanks offering were not brought with the ram of inauguration.
  The loaves that accompany the offering that the nazirite brings upon completion of his period of naziriteship would come with only two parts of the three types of <i>matza</i> that accompany the thanks offering, namely, loaves and wafers, but there is no <i>matza</i> poached in water (see Numbers 6:15). Consequently, the loaves of the offering of a nazirite are from ten <i>kav</i> of fine flour according to the Jerusalem measure, as taught in the previous mishna that each type of the loaves of <i>matza</i> comes from five <i>kav</i> of flour, which equal six-and-two-thirds tenths of an ephah according to the wilderness measure, as each type of the loaves of <i>matza</i> comes from three-and-one-third tenths of an ephah.
  gemara The mishna teaches that the loaves that accompanied the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle consisted of the three types of <i>matza</i> brought with a thanks offering: Loaves, wafers, and loaves poached in water and made with oil. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Ḥisda said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said: It is derived from that which the verse states: “And out of the basket of unleavened bread that was before the Lord, he took one unleavened cake, and one cake of oiled bread, and one wafer” (Leviticus 8:26). Granted, “cakes” are cakes, and “wafer” is a wafer. But what is “oiled bread” referring to? Is this not referring to <i>matza</i> poached in water and made with oil?
  Rav Avya objects to this: One can say that “oiled bread” is referring to a cake of oil. Rather, derive it as Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda taught in the name of Rabbi Tavla, that the verse states: “This is the offering of Aaron and of his sons, which they shall bring to the Lord on the day when he is anointed: The tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a meal offering perpetually, half of it in the morning and half of it in the evening. On a pan it shall be made with oil; when it is poached, you shall bring it in; in broken pieces shall you bring the meal offering for a pleasing aroma to the Lord. And the anointed priest that shall be in his stead from among his sons shall bring it” (Leviticus 6:13–15).
  One can ask: And what have we learned with regard to Aaron’s sons, i.e., the ordinary priests, from the instructions for the High Priest on the day that he is anointed? Rather, the verse juxtaposes the meal offering brought by an ordinary priest during his inauguration with the meal offering brought by the High Priest when he is anointed. This juxtaposition teaches that just as the meal offering brought by the High Priest when he is anointed is poached in water, so too the meal offering brought by an ordinary priest during his inauguration is poached in water. Similarly, the loaves brought with the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle included loaves poached in water.
  § Concerning the matter of the High Priest’s meal offering on the day of his inaugural service in the Temple, Rav Ḥisda says: A High Priest who approaches the Temple service on the day that he is anointed is required to bring two meal offerings consisting of two tenths of an ephah, one for the fact that he is anointed as the High Priest and must bring the daily meal offering of the High Priest, and one for his inauguration. Mar bar Rav Ashi says: He requires three tenths of an ephah.
  And they do not disagree. This one, Rav Ḥisda, is referring to a High Priest who already performed the Temple service as an ordinary priest. Accordingly, he has already brought a meal offering for his inauguration as an ordinary priest. He therefore brings only two tenths of flour, one for his inauguration as High Priest and one for the daily meal offering of the High Priest. And that one, Mar bar Rav Ashi, is referring to a High Priest who has not yet performed the Temple service as an ordinary priest. He must therefore bring three tenths, one for his inauguration as an ordinary priest, one for his inauguration as High Priest, and one for the daily meal offering of the High Priest.
  § The mishna teaches: The loaves that accompany the offering that the nazirite brings upon completion of his period of naziriteship would come with only two parts, parallel to the types of <i>matza</i> that come with the thanks offering, i.e., loaves and wafers, but not <i>matza</i> poached in water.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the loaves brought with a thanks offering: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached. With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering with the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:12–13). “His peace offerings” serves to include the nazirite’s peace offering in the <i>halakhot</i> that its accompanying meal offerings must consist of ten Jerusalem <i>kav</i> and one-quarter of a <i>log</i> of oil, just like the measurements required for the cakes and wafers of the thanks offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that the verse indicates that the meal offering of the nazirite’s peace offering is equivalent to the loaves of the thanks offering concerning all that is stated with regard to the matter of the thanks offering, and that one brings three types of <i>matza</i> consisting of fifteen Jerusalem <i>kav</i> and half a <i>log</i> of oil. Therefore, the verse states with regard to the nazirite’s peace offering: “And a basket of unleavened bread, loaves of fine flour mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil” (Numbers 6:15), to indicate that the nazirite’s meal offering consists only of <i>matza</i> loaves and <i>matza</i> wafers, and not <i>matza</i> poached in water.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation by which “<i>matza</i>” indicates that loaves poached in water were not brought? Rav Pappa says: The verse indicates that the nazirite brings <i>matza</i> specifically from an item of which it was stated: “<i>Matzot</i>.” This serves to exclude loaves poached in water, of which it is not stated: <i>Matzot</i>. In addition, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: “Unleavened bread” is a generalization; “loaves of fine flour mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil” is a detail. When the Torah states a generalization and a detail, the generalization includes only what is in the detail. Therefore, loaves and wafers are included in the nazirite’s meal offering, while other items are not.
  
  Daf 78b
  
  MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters the thanks offering in its proper place inside the Temple courtyard, and at that time its forty loaves were outside the wall, the loaves were not consecrated. Likewise, if he slaughtered the thanks offering before the surface of the loaves formed a crust in the oven, and even if the surface of all the loaves formed a crust except for one of them, the loaves were not consecrated.
  GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies: What is meant by outside the wall? Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it means outside the wall of Beit Pagei in Jerusalem. And Reish Lakish says that it means outside the wall of the Temple courtyard.
  The Gemara elaborates: Reish Lakish says that it means outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, because the verse states with regard to the loaves of the thanks offering: “Then he shall sacrifice with [<i>al</i>] the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil” (Leviticus 7:12). And we require that the thanks offering be slaughtered strictly “with [<i>al</i>]” the accompanying loaves, i.e., with the loaves nearby. If the loaves are outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, they are not considered nearby.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If the loaves were outside the wall of Beit Pagei, they are not consecrated, because it is prohibited to eat the loaves outside the wall of Beit Pagei. Since if they were taken outside the wall of Beit Pagei, they would be disqualified because they were removed from their permitted area, they cannot be consecrated if they are there. But if they were merely outside the Temple courtyard, where they may be eaten, they are consecrated. And we do not require that the thanks offering be slaughtered strictly “with” the accompanying loaves, i.e., nearby.
  The Gemara objects: Why is it necessary for Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish to disagree with regard to a case where the loaves were situated outside the wall when the thanks offering was slaughtered? But didn’t they already disagree with regard to this matter one other time?
  This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Pesaḥim</i> 63a) with regard to the slaughtering of the Paschal offering: One who slaughters the Paschal offering with leavened bread still in his possession transgresses a prohibition, as the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice the blood of My offering with [<i>al</i>] leavened bread; neither shall the offering of the festival of Passover be left until the morning” (Exodus 34:25). Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on Passover eve with leavened bread in his possession transgresses the prohibition. And Reish Lakish says: Actually, one is not liable unless the leavened bread is in the possession of the one who slaughters the offering, or the one who sprinkles its blood, or one of the members of the group, and the leavened bread is with that person in the Temple courtyard. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is liable even if the leavened bread is not with that person in the Temple courtyard. Evidently, they already disagree with regard to the meaning of the word “<i>al.</i>”
  The Gemara replies: It is necessary to state the dispute concerning both matters. As, if their disagreement were stated only with regard to that matter of the Paschal offering, one might think that only with regard to that matter Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one is liable even if the leavened bread is not inside the Temple courtyard, since wherever there is leavened bread, its owner stands in violation of the prohibition against owning leavened bread at that time. But with regard to the matter of the consecration of the loaves of the thanks offering, one could say that he concedes to Reish Lakish that if the loaves are inside the Temple courtyard when the thanks offering is slaughtered, they are consecrated, but if they are outside, they are not consecrated.
  And if their disagreement were stated only with regard to this matter of the loaves of the thanks offering, one might think that only with regard to this matter Reish Lakish says that the loaves are consecrated only if they were within the walls of the Temple courtyard. But with regard to that matter of the Paschal offering, one could say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that one is liable for slaughtering the Paschal offering while in possession of leavened bread even if it was not with him inside the Temple courtyard, as wherever there is leavened bread, its owner stands in violation of the prohibition against owning leavened bread at that time. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute concerning both matters.
  The Gemara notes: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of one who slaughters the thanks offering inside the Temple courtyard, and at that time its loaves were outside the walls of Beit Pagei, the loaves were not consecrated.
  § The mishna teaches: If he slaughtered the thanks offering before the surface of the loaves formed a crust in the oven, the loaves were not consecrated. The next mishna also teaches: If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake, the loaves were not consecrated.
  The Gemara seeks to clarify: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught: The verse states with regard to the loaves accompanying the thanks offering: “With cakes of leavened bread he shall present his offering with the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:13). This teaches that the loaves are not consecrated unless the surface of the loaves formed a crust in the oven, as only then can they be considered “cakes of leavened bread.” The phrase “he shall present his offering with the sacrifice” teaches that the loaves are consecrated only upon the slaughtering of the offering. The phrase “the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” teaches that if one slaughtered the offering not for its sake, the loaves were not consecrated.
  § On a similar note, the Sages taught: One fulfills the obligation to eat <i>matza</i> on Passover with half-done, i.e., not fully baked, <i>matza</i>, and with <i>matza</i> made in a stewpot [<i>ilpas</i>] rather than baked in an oven. The Gemara asks: What constitutes half-done <i>matza</i>? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is any <i>matza</i> that is sufficiently baked such that if one breaks it, threads of dough are not drawn from it.
  Rava said: And so this is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the matter of the loaves of the thanks offering, i.e., if the loaves were already half-done at the time of the slaughter of the thanks offering, they are consecrated. The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary for Rava to state this? Isn’t it obvious? Here, with regard to <i>matza</i>, the term “bread” is written (Deuteronomy 16:3), and here, with regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, the term “bread” is written.
  The Gemara responds: Lest you say that since the Merciful One states with regard to the loaves of the thanks offering: “And of it he shall present one out of each offering for a gift unto the Lord” (Leviticus 7:14), this indicates that one may not take sliced bread for the thanks offering, and this half-done bread is considered like one that is sliced, as it will break apart upon being lifted, and it should consequently be disqualified for the bread of the thanks offering, therefore Rava teaches us that once it is baked to that point, it is considered as one loaf and it is valid for the thanks offering.
  § It was stated that there is a dispute among the <i>amora’im</i> with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves rather than the required forty. Ḥizkiyya says: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Not even forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated.
  With regard to this dispute, Rabbi Zeira says: Everyone, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, concedes that in a case where the individual bringing the offering said: Let forty of the eighty loaves be consecrated, that forty are consecrated. Likewise, everyone concedes that where he said: Forty should not be consecrated unless eighty will be consecrated, that they were not consecrated. They disagree when one brings eighty loaves without specification. One Sage, Ḥizkiyya, holds: He intends to consecrate only forty of them, but he brought eighty in order to guarantee that there will be sufficient loaves. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds: He intends to bring a large offering of eighty loaves; consequently, none of the loaves are consecrated.
  Abaye offered another explanation of the dispute and said: Everyone agrees that he intends to guarantee that there will be sufficient loaves, and they disagree with regard to whether service vessels consecrate the appropriate measure without the intention of the one bringing the offering. One Sage, Ḥizkiyya, holds that service vessels consecrate items without intention. Accordingly, the knife that slaughters the thanks offering and consecrates its accompanying loaves consecrates forty of the eighty. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that service vessels do not consecrate items without intention.
  Rav Pappa offered another explanation of the dispute and said: Everyone agrees that service vessels consecrate items without intention, and here they disagree with regard to whether this is also the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the slaughtering knife. One Sage, Ḥizkiyya, holds that the knife consecrates items as a service vessel does. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that since the knife has no inside, it does not consecrate items as a service vessel does.
  And there are those who say that Rav Pappa said: Everyone agrees that service vessels consecrate items only with intention, and here they disagree with regard to the ability of the slaughtering knife to consecrate without intention. One Sage, Ḥizkiyya, holds that the power of the knife to consecrate items is stronger than that of other service vessels, as even though it has no inside it consecrates items, and therefore it also consecrates items without intention. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the power of the knife to consecrate items is not stronger than that of other service vessels, and like all service vessels, it does not consecrate items without intention.
  MISHNA: If one slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, and the offering was rendered <i>piggul</i> or was disqualified, respectively, the loaves were consecrated and either rendered <i>piggul</i> or disqualified. If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it was an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>], the loaves were not consecrated, as the cause of the animal’s disqualification preceded its slaughter.
  If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal that may not be sacrificed <i>ab initio</i> but if it ascended the altar it may be sacrificed, Rabbi Eliezer says: He has consecrated the loaves, since if the offering ascends the altar it is sacrificed. And the Rabbis say: He has not consecrated the loaves, since it may not be sacrificed <i>ab initio</i>.
  If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake but for the sake of another offering, and likewise, if one slaughtered the ram of inauguration not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> not for their sake, the loaves were not consecrated.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the loaves become consecrated. The mishna also teaches that if the thanks offering was slaughtered and it was discovered that it was a <i>tereifa</i>, the loaves were not consecrated, but if it was discovered to have a blemish, Rabbi Eliezer says that the loaves were consecrated, and the Rabbis say that they were not. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: This is the principle: Any instance in which the disqualification of the thanks offering preceded its slaughter, the loaves were not consecrated, and any instance in which its disqualification came into existence after its slaughter, the loaves were consecrated. Therefore, if one slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the loaves were consecrated, as the offering remained fit until after its slaughter. But if one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it was a <i>tereifa</i>, the loaves were not consecrated, as the cause of the animal’s disqualification preceded its slaughter.
  
  Daf 79a
  
  If one slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, Rabbi Eliezer says: The loaves were consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: The loaves were not consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, consistent with the dispute appearing in the mishna.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a <i>tereifa</i>, as all agree that it was not consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions beyond its designated time, as all agree that it was consecrated; and they did not disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering and it was discovered that it is a blemished animal, as all agree that it was not consecrated. And with regard to what case did they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the sacrificial portions outside its designated area, as Rabbi Eliezer says: It was consecrated, and Rabbi Yehoshua says: It was not consecrated.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: In explanation of his opinion, Rabbi Eliezer said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time is disqualified and an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of intent to partake of it beyond its time the loaves were consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were consecrated. Rabbi Yehoshua said: Since an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area is disqualified and an offering discovered to be a blemished animal is disqualified, it is reasonable that just as in the case of a blemished animal the loaves were not consecrated, so too in the case of intent to partake of it outside its area the loaves were not consecrated.
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I compared an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, and you compared it to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. Let us consider to which it is similar. If it is similar to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, we will deduce its <i>halakha</i> from that of an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. If it is similar to an offering discovered to be a blemished animal, we will deduce its <i>halakha</i> from that of an offering discovered to be a blemished animal.
  Rabbi Eliezer began to reason: We deduce the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to an improper intention, i.e., the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters the animal with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who slaughters it with the intent to partake of it outside its designated time. And we do not deduce the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a disqualification due to improper intention from that of a disqualification due to a blemish in the physical body of the offering.
  Rabbi Yehoshua began to reason to the contrary: We deduce the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a disqualification that does not include liability for excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>], i.e., an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, from that of a disqualification that does not include liability for <i>karet</i>, i.e., an offering discovered to be a blemished animal. And the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time should not be brought as proof, as it is a disqualification that includes liability for <i>karet</i>. And furthermore, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that we deduce the <i>halakha</i> from a disqualification due to improper intention, let us deduce the <i>halakha</i> from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, as it is a disqualification due to improper intention and it also does not include liability for <i>karet</i>, and the loaves of such an offering were not consecrated.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: And Rabbi Eliezer was silent, conceding to Rabbi Yehoshua. In any event, it is clear in the <i>baraita</i> that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that if the thanks offering was slaughtered and discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i> the loaves were not consecrated, but if it was discovered to be a blemished animal Rabbi Eliezer holds that the loaves were consecrated, what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a <i>tereifa</i> such that it is considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were not consecrated; and what is different if he slaughtered it and it was discovered to be a blemished animal such that it is not considered a case where its disqualification precedes its slaughter, and the loaves were consecrated according to Rabbi Eliezer?
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Meir is referring to a blemish on the cornea of the eye, and his ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said with regard to this type of blemish: Although animals with such a blemish are disqualified as an offering <i>ab initio</i>, if they ascended the altar they shall not descend, and they are sacrificed on the altar. The Gemara adds: And Rabbi Yehoshua, who holds that if the animal is discovered to be blemished the loaves are not consecrated, says: When Rabbi Akiva said that if they ascended the altar, they shall not descend, he was referring to the disqualification of the offering itself, i.e., that once it ascended it shall not descend. But with regard to the consecration of the loaves through the slaughter of such an animal, he did not say this.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the <i>baraita</i>: It was stated: With regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time, if it ascended the altar it shall not descend. If one slaughtered it with intent to partake of it outside its designated area, Rava says: It shall descend and shall not be burned, and Rabba says: It shall not descend.
  The Gemara suggests: Rava holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who deduces the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish. Accordingly, just as a blemished sin offering descends from the altar even if it has already ascended, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends. And Rabba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who deduces the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a thanks offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area from that of an offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time. Accordingly, just as a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it beyond its designated time does not descend from the altar, so too a sin offering that was slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area does not descend.
  And Rabba retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava and ruled that a sin offering slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area descends from the altar, since Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as the <i>baraita</i> teaches that he was silent and accepted the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua. Accordingly, the <i>halakha</i> with regard to an animal slaughtered with intent to partake of it outside its designated area should be deduced from that of an offering discovered to have a blemish.
  And there are those who say: Even though Rabbi Eliezer retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, Rabba did not retract his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rava, because there, with regard to the consecration of the loaves of the thanks offering, Rabbi Eliezer conceded to Rabbi Yehoshua because Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Let us deduce its <i>halakha</i> from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake. But here, if you deduce its <i>halakha</i> from that of an offering slaughtered not for its sake, then the <i>halakha</i> should be that if it ascended the altar it shall not descend.
  § The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the thanks offering not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the ram of inauguration not for its sake, and likewise, if one slaughtered the communal peace offering of two sheep that accompany the two loaves on <i>Shavuot</i> not for their sake, the loaves were not consecrated. Rav Pappa said in bewilderment: Why does the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna omit the case of the loaves of the nazirite’s ram, which is common and is also not consecrated if the ram was slaughtered not for its sake, and teach instead the ram of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, which was brought only by the Jewish people in the wilderness? The Gemara responds: And what is the reasoning of the <i>tanna</i> of our mishna? He taught the ram of the inauguration because it was the primary matter, i.e., it was the first offering to be brought with loaves.
  MISHNA: In a case where the libations that accompany the offerings were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.
  GEMARA: With regard to statement of the mishna concerning a case where the libations of an animal offering were consecrated and the animal was then discovered to be unfit, Ze’eiri says: Libations are sanctified only upon the slaughter of the offering. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “To bring an offering made by fire unto the Lord, a burnt offering, and a meal offering, a sacrifice, and libations, each on its own day” (Leviticus 23:37), indicating that the libations complement the offering and are consecrated only upon its slaughter.
  The Gemara poses a difficulty to the statement of Ze’eiri from that which we learned in the mishna: In a case where the libations were sanctified in a service vessel when the animal was slaughtered and the offering was discovered to be unfit, if there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering; and if not, they should be disqualified by being left overnight, and then burned.
  What, is it not so that the mishna is referring to a case where the offering became unfit through its slaughter, and consequently the libations were not sanctified by the slaughter of the offering? Why, then, must the libations be left overnight in order to disqualify them? Evidently, the libations are sanctified being placed in a service vessel and not upon the slaughter of the offering, in contradiction to the statement of Ze’eiri. The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is referring to an offering that became unfit through the sprinkling of the blood; the libations were sanctified upon the slaughter of the offering, and therefore they must be disqualified by being left overnight.
  The Gemara seeks to clarify: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: If an offering has two factors that permit it for consumption or for sacrifice, they can each elevate it to sanctified status without the other. Accordingly, although the slaughter of the animal and the sprinkling of its blood are both permitting factors for the libations, the libations were sanctified through the slaughter of the animal, despite the fact that the animal became unfit through the sprinkling of its blood.
  The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and holds that both permitting factors must be performed in order to confer sanctity upon the libations, the mishna can still be explained as follows: Here, we are dealing with a case where the priest collected its blood in the cup for the purpose of sprinkling it on the altar, but the blood spilled out of the cup and could not be sprinkled. Nevertheless, the libations were sanctified, as the blood was fit for sprinkling upon the altar.
  
  Daf 79b
  
  And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father in this matter, as Rabbi Shimon said: Any blood of an offering that stands fit to be sprinkled upon the altar is considered as if it were already sprinkled. Accordingly, although the blood was spilled after it was collected in the cup and was not actually sprinkled, it is nevertheless considered as if it were sprinkled.
  § The Master said in the mishna: If there is another offering that was slaughtered and requires libations, the libations should be sacrificed with that offering. The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav Ḥisda say that oil that one separated for the sake of this one meal offering is unfit to be brought for the sake of another meal offering? Likewise, shouldn’t libations separated for one offering be unfit for sacrifice with another offering? Rabbi Yannai says: The court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations that if they were required for the offering for which they were separated, they were required and are brought with that offering. But if not, e.g., where the offering was disqualified, they should be brought with another offering.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, then shouldn’t it be that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the oil as well? The Gemara responds: The oil is part of the meal offering itself and cannot be brought for the sake of another meal offering, whereas the libations merely accompany the offering and are not an integral part of it.
  The Gemara challenges: If it is so that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations, then let the court tacitly stipulate concerning them that if the offering they are meant to accompany is disqualified, they shall emerge to non-sacred status altogether. The Gemara responds: It is a rabbinic decree that the court does not tacitly make this stipulation, lest people who are unaware of such a stipulation see that an item that was previously sanctified has become non-sacred, and they will mistakenly say: One may remove sanctified items from service vessels to become non-sacred.
  The Gemara objects: If the Sages did not tacitly make such a stipulation because they were concerned that people might mistakenly conclude that items that were already consecrated in service vessels can become non-sacred, then now as well, where the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be sacrificed with another offering, let there be a rabbinic decree against such a stipulation, lest people say: Libations that one separated for the sake of one offering are fit for the sake of a different offering <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara responds: Mattitya ben Yehuda teaches that the mishna is referring specifically to a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. In such a case, there is no concern that people will reach this mistaken conclusion, as one who sees that the libations are sacrificed immediately with the other offering will simply assume that they were separated for the sake of that offering from the outset.
  The Gemara objects to this: According to the explanation of Mattitya ben Yehuda, it can be inferred from the mishna that if there is another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then the libations are sacrificed with that offering; but if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, then what should be done with the libations? They should be disqualified by being left overnight. If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna: And if there is not another offering that requires libations, they should be disqualified by being left overnight; let the <i>tanna</i> distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself as follows: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are not sacrificed with another offering.
  The Gemara responds: That is also what the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is said in a case where there was another offering that was slaughtered at the same time. But if there is not another offering that was slaughtered at the same time, the libations are immediately considered as if they were disqualified by being left overnight, and they are disqualified.
  The Gemara explained above that the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and that he holds in accordance with the opinion of his father that any blood that stands fit to be sprinkled is considered as if it has been sprinkled. The Gemara also explained that the mishna allows for the sacrifice of the libations with another offering because the court tacitly stipulates that the libations should be brought with another offering if the first offering becomes disqualified. In light of this, the Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, i.e., the father of Rabbi Elazar, accept the principle that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the libations?
  But didn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say that Rav Amram said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to animals that were designated as daily offerings but that in the end were not needed for use by the public, and have inherent sanctity, how shall they be redeemed? According to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Since Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis, it may be inferred that according to Rabbi Shimon, one does not say that the court tacitly stipulates concerning the offerings.
  The Gemara responds: In general, Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them. And it is different there, in the case of the daily offerings, because they have an alternative arrangement through which their total loss may be avoided, as they may be left in the field to graze until they develop a blemish, at which point they may be sold. Since there is no arrangement for the libations save for sacrificing them with another offering, even Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates concerning them.
  MISHNA: With regard to the offspring of an animal designated as a thanks offering, or an animal that is its substitute; or in a case where one separated an animal as a thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, in all three cases, the second animal, i.e., the offspring, the substitute, or the replacement, is sacrificed, but it does not require the bringing of accompanying loaves. This is as it is stated: “If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour poached” (Leviticus 7:12). The verse indicates that the initial thanks offering requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: What is it that the verse teaches when it states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering? The verse states: If he sacrifices for a thanks offering. From where is it derived that with regard to one who separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, and now they both stand fit to be sacrificed, from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it? The verse states that he shall sacrifice the thanks offering, i.e., as long as he sacrifices some thanks offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: One might have thought that the second animal also requires loaves to be brought with it. Therefore, the verse states: “He sacrifices it,” indicating that only one thanks offering requires loaves, but not two. Since the verse included the second animal as fit for sacrifice and excluded it from the requirement to bring loaves with it, from where is it derived that the verse also includes a thanks offering’s offspring, replacements, and substitutes as fit for sacrifice? From the fact that the verse states: “If for a thanks offering,” one might have thought that they would require loaves to be brought with them. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall sacrifice with the thanks offering,” indicating that the initial thanks offering itself requires loaves, but neither its offspring, nor its replacement, nor its substitute requires loaves.
  § With regard to the offspring, substitute, and replacement of a thanks offering, the Gemara relates: Rav Ḥanina sent a letter from Eretz Yisrael to the Sages in Babylonia containing the following statement in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The mishna taught that the offspring, replacement, and substitute do not require loaves only in a case where they were sacrificed after the owner achieved atonement, i.e., where the initial thanks offering was already sacrificed with its loaves; but if they were sacrificed before he achieved atonement, they require loaves.
  Rav Amram discussed this <i>halakha</i> sent in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan and asked: To which <i>halakha</i> in the mishna is this referring? If we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan is referring to the replacement for an obligatory thanks offering, then there is no novelty in his statement. If his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found before the owner achieved atonement with its replacement, the replacement requires loaves, we already learned this in the <i>baraita</i>, as it states: He may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it. And if his intention is to teach that where the thanks offering was found after the owner achieved atonement with the replacement, the thanks offering does not require loaves, this too we already learned in the <i>baraita</i>, as it teaches that only the first offering requires loaves.
  
  Daf 80a
  
  Rather, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring not to the replacement for an obligatory thanks offering, but to the replacement for a voluntary thanks offering. This too is difficult, because whether the initial thanks offering was found before the owner achieved atonement with the replacement or after he achieved atonement, both offerings require loaves, as the owner is considered one who increases thanks offerings. That is, since he was not required to bring a replacement for the offering, if he brings another offering it is considered an additional voluntary offering, and a voluntary thanks offering requires loaves.
  Rather, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring to the offspring of a voluntary thanks offering. This too is difficult, because whether the offspring was sacrificed before the owner achieved atonement with its mother or after he achieved atonement, offspring do not require loaves, as this is considered a leftover of the thanks offering, which does not require loaves. Rather, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan was referring to the offspring of an obligatory thanks offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches that if the offspring was sacrificed before the owner achieved atonement, it requires loaves, but if it was sacrificed after he achieved atonement, it does not require loaves.
  The Gemara asks: According to this explanation, what is Rav Ḥanina teaching us by sending this letter? He teaches us that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, even though it is not the initial consecrated property. If one sacrifices the offspring of an obligatory thanks-offering before the thanks-offering itself, he achieves atonement with the offspring, even though it is an enhancement of the consecrated thanks-offering. Accordingly, if he offers it before its mother, it requires loaves. The Gemara notes: Abaye also discusses the letter sent by Rav Ḥanina in this way and reaches conclusions similar to those of Rav Amram.
  With regard to the conclusions of Rav Amram and Abaye, it was also stated: Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one achieves atonement with the replacement for a voluntary thanks offering, whether the thanks offering was found before he achieved atonement or after he achieved atonement, the replacement requires loaves, as the owner is considered one who increases thanks offerings. The offspring of a voluntary thanks offering, whether it was sacrificed before he achieved atonement or after he achieved atonement, does not require loaves, as offspring is considered a leftover of the thanks offering. And with regard to the offspring of an obligatory thanks offering, if it was sacrificed before he achieved atonement, it requires loaves, but if it was sacrificed after he achieved atonement, it does not require loaves.
  § The Gemara cites additional <i>halakhot</i> with regard to the loaves of a thanks offering that was lost and another animal was taken as its replacement: Shmuel says: In any situation in which a sin offering would be placed in isolation for it to die, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it does not require loaves. And in any situation in which a sin offering would be placed in the field to graze until it develops a blemish, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it requires loaves.
  Rav Amram raises an objection from the <i>baraita</i> cited on 79b: What is it that the verse teaches when it states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering? From where is it derived that one who separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost and he separated another in its stead, and the first animal was then found, and now they both stand fit to be sacrificed, from where is it derived that he may sacrifice whichever one of them he wishes, and its loaves are brought along with it? The verse states: He sacrifices for a thanks offering. One might have thought that the second animal also requires loaves to be brought with it. The verse states: “He sacrifices it,” indicating that only one thanks offering requires loaves, but not two.
  Rav Amram continues: Whereas with regard to a sin offering in a case like this, the Rabbis hold that the animal is placed in the field to graze, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Temura</i> 22b): If one separated his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another animal in its stead, and the first sin offering was found, and both animals stand fit for sacrifice, then he achieves atonement with one of them and the second animal shall be left to die; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: A sin offering is left to die only if it was found after its owner achieved atonement. It may be inferred from the opinion of the Rabbis that if it is found before the owner achieved atonement, it is placed in the field to graze.
  The Gemara responds: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: An animal separated as a sin offering that was lost at the time of the separation of its replacement, even if it was found before the replacement was sacrificed, is left to die. The principle stated by Shmuel is therefore correct, since in every situation in which a sin offering is left to die, a thanks offering does not require loaves.
  The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that even in such a case the second sin offering is left to die, how can you find a case where the sin offering is placed in the field to graze according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? The Gemara responds: It can be found in a case like that of Rabbi Oshaya, as Rabbi Oshaya says: If one separated two sin offerings, one to achieve atonement for his sin and the other as a guarantee in case the first one is lost, he may achieve atonement with whichever of them he wishes, and the second shall be placed in the field to graze.
  The Gemara challenges: But in a case like this involving a thanks offering, the animal does not require loaves. Therefore, if Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in such a case the sin offering is placed in the field to graze, then Shmuel cannot hold in accordance with his opinion, since according to Shmuel, in circumstances where a sin offering would be left to graze, a thanks offering in the same circumstances would require loaves. Rather, Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: There are five sin offerings that are left to die; one is a sin offering that was lost and found before its replacement was sacrificed, and another is the case where a sin offering was separated as a guarantee.
  The Gemara challenges: But it cannot be that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon does not hold that there are any circumstances in which a sin offering is placed in the field to graze. Accordingly, if Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, how can he say: And in any situation in which a sin offering would be placed in the field to graze until it develops a blemish, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it requires loaves?
  The Gemara responds: In fact, Shmuel also stated only one principle: In any situation in which a sin offering is placed in isolation for it to die, if that same situation occurs with a thanks offering, it does not require loaves. He did not state the second principle. The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? The Gemara responds: Shmuel teaches us his statement to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the offspring of an obligatory thanks offering requires loaves if it is sacrificed before its mother. Shmuel teaches us that one does not achieve atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, and the offspring of a thanks offering does not require loaves, which corresponds to the fact that the offspring of a sin offering is left to die.
  § With regard to the loaves of a thanks offering, Rabbi Abba says: If one volunteered to bring a thanks offering, and said: This animal is a thanks offering and this flour is designated for its loaves, then if the loaves were lost, he brings other loaves. If the thanks offering was lost, he does not bring another thanks offering, and the loaves are not sacrificed. What is the reason for this? The loaves are brought on account of the thanks offering; therefore, if there is no thanks offering, there are no loaves. But the thanks offering is not brought on account of the loaves; consequently, if the loaves were lost, the thanks offering is still sacrificed, and one brings different loaves.
  § And with regard to the distinctions between a thanks offering and its accompanying loaves, Rava says: In the case of one who separated money for his thanks offering
  
  Daf 80b
  
  and some of the money remained after he purchased the offering, he brings, i.e., purchases, with the remaining money loaves to accompany the thanks offering. If he separated money for the loaves of the thanks offering and some of the money remained after he purchased the loaves, he may not bring a thanks offering with the remaining money.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason? If we say that it is due to the statement of Rav Kahana, that is difficult. As Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the loaves of a thanks offering are themselves called a thanks offering? It is derived from that which is stated in the verse: “Then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanks offering loaves” (Leviticus 7:12). The juxtaposition of the words “thanks offering” and “loaves” indicates that the loaves are themselves called a thanks offering. Therefore, one who separated money for a thanks offering may use that money for the loaves as well. The Gemara explains the difficulty: If that is so, the opposite should also be the <i>halakha</i>, i.e., the thanks offering is called loaves, and it should therefore be permitted to use the money remaining from the loaves for the thanks offering. The Gemara rejects this: The loaves are called a thanks offering, but the thanks offering is not called loaves.
  § And Rava says: If one separated an animal as his thanks offering and it was lost, and he again separated another in its stead, and it too was lost, and he again separated another in its stead, and the first two animals were then found, and the three of them stand fit to be sacrificed, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If he achieved atonement with the first animal, the second does not require loaves, as it is the replacement for the first, and the first was sacrificed with its loaves. But the third requires loaves, because it is the replacement for the second, which does not require loaves.
  If he achieved atonement with the third, then the second does not require loaves, because its replacement, i.e., the third, was sacrificed with loaves, but the first requires loaves, because its replacement, i.e., the second, will be sacrificed without loaves. If he achieved atonement with the middle, i.e., the second animal, both of them, i.e., the first and the third, do not require loaves, because the replacement for the first, i.e., the second, was sacrificed with loaves, and the third is the replacement for the second, which was sacrificed with loaves. Abaye says: Even if he achieved atonement with any one of them, the other two do not require loaves, as they are all replacements for one another.
  Rabbi Zeira says: And so is the <i>halakha</i> for the matter of sin offerings: If one separated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he separated another in its stead, and it too was lost, and he separated another in its stead, and the first two animals were then found, and the three of them stand fit to be sacrificed, the <i>halakha</i> is as follows: If he achieved atonement with the first, the second is left to die, as is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a sin offering whose owner has already achieved atonement, and the third is placed in the field to graze until it develops a blemish and can be redeemed, since it is the replacement for a sin offering that was not sacrificed.
  If he achieved atonement with the third, the second is left to die, because its replacement, i.e., the third, was already sacrificed, and the first is placed in the field to graze, because its replacement, i.e., the second, will not be sacrificed. If he achieved atonement with the middle, both of them, i.e., the first and the third, are left to die, because the second was sacrificed as a replacement for the first, and the third would have been the replacement of the second. Abaye says: Even if he achieved atonement with any one of them, the other two are left to die, as they are all replacements for one another.
  The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Zeira mean by: And so is the <i>halakha</i> for the matter of sin offerings? Why is it necessary for Rabbi Zeira to teach this seemingly identical <i>halakha</i> with regard to three sin offerings? The Gemara responds: It is necessary to teach that these <i>halakhot</i> apply with regard to sin offerings as well, lest you say that there, in the case of the thanks offerings, if one achieved atonement with the first animal then the third requires loaves, since it can be said that the owner is one who increases thanks offerings; but here, in the case of the sin offerings, since it cannot be said that the owner is one who increases sin offerings, as one cannot volunteer a sin offering, I would say that the same <i>halakhot</i> do not apply, and if one achieved atonement with the first sin offering, the third is left to die. Rabbi Zeira therefore teaches us that the third sin offering is considered the replacement for the second and is therefore left to graze.
  § The mishna teaches that the substitute of a thanks offering does not require loaves. Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: In the case of an animal separated as a thanks offering that was intermingled with its substitute, and it is not known which is the thanks offering and which is the substitute, and one of them died, the other has no remedy. What should we do? If we bring loaves with it, this may be improper, because perhaps it is a substitute, which does not require loaves. If we do not bring loaves with it, this may be improper, because perhaps it is the actual thanks offering, which requires loaves.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is a case where the owner said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, in which case he is required to replace the thanks offering in the event of its loss, then why is there no remedy? Is it not sufficient if he does not bring another animal and loaves, and says: If the one remaining from the intermingled group is the substitute, then let this additional animal be the thanks offering and these its loaves; and if the one remaining is the thanks offering, then let it be the thanks offering and these its loaves, and let this additional animal be its guarantee, which does not require loaves?
  The Gemara responds: No, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya is necessary in a case in which one said: This animal is a thanks offering. Since he consecrated a specific animal as a thanks offering, he is not required to provide a guarantee in the event of its loss, and the above remedy is not applicable.
  § The Gemara raises a series of challenges with the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya that if a thanks offering was intermingled with its substitute and one of them died, there is no remedy for the other. The Gemara provides a mnemonic for remembering the names of the Sages that raise these challenges: <i>Lemudim</i>, i.e., Levi, who was known as <i>Lemedin</i> before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi; <i>middat</i>, i.e., Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta; <i>ala</i>, i.e., Ulla bar Abba; <i>shish</i>, i.e., Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi; <i>sheken</i>, an acronym for Rav Ashi and Rav Kahana; <i>dedamah</i>, i.e., Rav Dimi, son of Rav Huna of Dimhorya; <i>de’i</i>, i.e., Ravina of Ikla. An additional mnemonic is provided for recalling the topics of these questions: <i>Ḥalash</i>, a contraction of <i>ḥullin</i>, i.e., non-sacred items, and <i>shelamim</i>, peace offerings; leftover; substitute; outside; Ḥizkiyya; separated a sin offering; for a guarantee.
  <i>Lemedin</i>, i.e., Levi, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: But why is there no remedy in this case? Let him bring loaves for the thanks offering and let him say: If this animal that is extant from the intermingled pair is the thanks offering, then these are its loaves, and they will be consumed as the loaves of the thanks offering. And if not, i.e., if the extant animal is the substitute, which is sacrificed without loaves, then let these loaves go out to be consumed as non-sacred loaves. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: But the loaves of a thanks offering must be waved in the Temple courtyard, and do we intentionally bring non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard?
  Levi challenges: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this additional animal be the thanks offering and these its loaves. If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves, and this additional animal should be a peace offering, which does not require loaves. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: This cannot be done, because he thereby reduces the time period permitted for consuming the peace offering, which is generally two days and one night. A thanks offering may be consumed only on the day it is sacrificed and the following night.
  Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this be the thanks offering and these its loaves. And if that animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves and this will be the leftover of the thanks offering, which does not require loaves. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: It seems to me that he has no brain in his skull.
  
  Daf 81a
  
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains why: And does one separate an animal as a leftover <i>ab initio</i>?
  The Gemara suggests another solution: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta was sitting before Rav Naḥman, and he was sitting and saying: And let him bring another animal with loaves and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this be the thanks offering and these its loaves. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves and this will be a substitute, as the substitute of a thanks offering is not sacrificed with loaves, and it may be consumed for the same duration as the thanks offering itself.
  Rav Naḥman said to him: Answer me, my Master: The <i>halakha</i> is that one who separates a substitute is liable to receive forty lashes on his shoulders, and yet you say it is fit to separate a substitute <i>ab initio</i>?
  The Gemara relates that Rav Ila took ill, and Abaye and the Sages went to visit him, and they were sitting and saying: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If the loaves of the thanks offering were within Jerusalem, i.e., the area of consumption of a thanks offering and its loaves, even if they were outside the wall of the Temple courtyard when the thanks offering was slaughtered they are consecrated, then let the owner bring loaves and set them outside the wall of the Temple courtyard and let him say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then let these be its loaves, and if it is not, let them go out and be consumed as non-sacred loaves.
  The Gemara responds: This too is not a valid remedy, because there are four loaves of the forty that one must wave. How would he perform the mitzva of waving them? Shall he wave them outside the Temple courtyard? He may not, since “waved for a wave offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30) is written in the verse, and waving performed outside the Temple courtyard is not considered “before the Lord.” Shall he wave them inside the Temple courtyard? He will have brought non-sacred food into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is not possible.
  Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, objects to this: If one accepts the ruling of Ḥizkiyya, who said with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered accompanied by eighty loaves rather than the required forty: Forty of the eighty loaves are consecrated, then let the owner bring an animal and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this additional animal should also be a thanks offering and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the substitute, then let this additional animal be a thanks offering and these shall be its loaves, and let forty of the eighty be consecrated for it.
  The Gemara rejects this: This is not a valid remedy, because it reduces the consumption of the forty additional loaves, as the priests may not be able to consume the four loaves given from the additional forty, and the owner cannot consume them because they may be the portion of the priest.
  Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: If one accepts the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: If one separated a pregnant animal as a sin offering and it gave birth, if he wants he can achieve atonement with it, and if he wants he can achieve atonement with its offspring; then let the owner bring a pregnant animal and wait until it gives birth, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then this and its offspring are thanks offerings, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this mother should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves should be for both of them, and let this offspring be the leftover of the thanks offering.
  Rav Kahana said to him: Who shall say to us that the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan is that he said that the offspring is considered the property of the one who dedicated the pregnant mother, such that if he reserved it for a specific consecration it is considered reserved for that consecration? Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that if he reserved it, it is not considered reserved, and this is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one can achieve atonement with the offspring of a pregnant animal separated as a sin offering, as he said: A person achieves atonement with the enhancement of consecrated property, such as the offspring of an animal that was consecrated when pregnant.
  Ravina happened to come to Dimhorya. Rav Dimi, son of Rav Huna from Dimhorya, said to Ravina: And let the owner bring an animal and say: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal for a thanks offering, and let him separate this animal in fulfillment of his vow, and then let him bring another animal, and let him bring eighty loaves with it and say: If this animal that is extant is the substitute, then these two additional animals are thanks offerings and these eighty loaves should be for both of them. And if this animal that is extant is the thanks offering, then this one for which I said: It is incumbent upon me, should also be a thanks offering, and these eighty loaves are for both of them, and let the other animal be for a guarantee, to be sacrificed if my thanks offering gets lost, and it does not require loaves.
  Ravina said to him: The Torah said: “Better is it that you should not vow, than that you should vow and not pay” (Ecclesiastes 5:4), and you say: Let him rise up and vow <i>ab initio</i>? Taking a vow to bring an offering is not encouraged. As all possible remedies have been rejected, the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, that there is no remedy in a case where a thanks offering and its substitute were intermingled and one of them died, stands.
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, must bring it and its loaves from non-sacred money in his possession and not second-tithe money. Since he said: It is incumbent upon me, bringing the offering is an obligation, and one may not fulfill an obligation with second-tithe money.
  
  Daf 81b
  
  If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money. If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it in that manner. Likewise, if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he may bring it in that manner. And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money.
  GEMARA: With regard to the various ways in which one can take a vow to bring a thanks offering and its loaves, Rav Huna says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves, even though he did not expressly take upon himself the obligation to bring the thanks offering itself. What is the reason? This man knows that loaves are not brought without a thanks offering, and by stating the vow in this manner, he was effectively saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves. And the reason he stated his vow in this manner, namely, by saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, was that he was citing the end of the matter, as the sacrifice of a thanks offering is completed with the bringing of the loaves.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty with the statement of Rav Huna from that which we learned in the mishna: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, he may bring it as he vowed. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Huna that one who takes a vow to bring the loaves of a thanks offering intends to bring the thanks offering as well, why does the mishna state that he may bring the thanks offering from second-tithe money? Since he said: Its loaves from non-sacred money, he should bring a thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money.
  The Gemara responds: It is different there, in the case of the mishna, as since he said initially: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money, and then said: And its loaves from non-sacred money, he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves to exempt the thanks offering of so-and-so. His vow to bring the loaves is not considered a new vow, but rather as a vow to bring loaves for the specific offering he vowed to bring.
  The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to the first clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, then he must bring the thanks offering and its loaves from non-sacred money, here too let it be said that he is considered as one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering to exempt the loaves of so-and-so, and he therefore should bring a thanks offering from second tithe. His initial vow to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money should not include the bringing of the loaves.
  The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from second-tithe money and its loaves from non-sacred money, it can be said that he intends that the loaves should be brought to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring a thanks offering, because loaves come to exempt the thanks offering. But in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering from non-sacred money and its loaves from second-tithe money, it cannot be said that the thanks offering is meant to complete the vow of one who is obligated to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, as does a thanks offering come to exempt the loaves?
  The Gemara continues to discuss the statement of Rav Huna that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring loaves of a thanks offering, must bring a thanks offering and its loaves. Come and hear a proof from a <i>baraita</i> that contradicts the opinion of Rav Huna: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or an animal offering without libations, the court coerces him, and he brings a thanks offering with its loaves, or an offering with its libations.
  The Gemara infers: The reason that he is coerced to bring a thanks offering with its loaves is that he said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering. But if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but instead said that it is incumbent upon himself to bring the loaves of a thanks offering, he would not be coerced to bring a thanks offering with the loaves, in contradiction to the opinion of Rav Huna.
  The Gemara rejects this: Actually, the same is true even if he did not say that it is incumbent upon himself to bring a thanks offering, but said only: It is incumbent upon me to bring the loaves. And this is the reason that the <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> mentions specifically the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering without loaves: Since the <i>tanna</i> wants to teach the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring an animal offering without libations, concerning which he could not teach a case where one renders himself obligated to bring libations without an offering, because, unlike the loaves of a thanks offering, libations are in fact brought on their own and one can take a vow to bring them on their own, he therefore also taught the case of one who renders himself obligated to bring a thanks offering.
  The Gemara addresses the actual statement of the <i>baraita</i> and asks: Why is he coerced to bring a thanks offering and its loaves? Isn’t this an instance of a vow with its inherent opening? That is, the vow should be dissolved entirely on the grounds that the one who took the vow may claim that he thought it was possible to bring a thanks offering without loaves, and now that he has been made aware that he cannot, he regrets taking the vow.
  Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend to only the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nazir</i> 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> is with regard to one who says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner, i.e., to bring a thanks offering without loaves or an animal offering without libations, I would not have vowed in this manner but in that manner, i.e., I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves. There is therefore no opening for a dissolution. And what does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it states that the court coerces him? Why would he require coercion if he says that he would have willingly taken the proper vow? The <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where, despite the fact that he would have taken the proper vow initially, he now wants to retract his vow altogether.
  The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> in support of the response of Ḥizkiyya: Come and hear: In a case involving one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering without loaves, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring an animal offering without libations, and the Sages said to him: Bring a thanks offering with its loaves, or: Bring an animal offering with its libations, and he says: Had I known that such is the requirement I would not have vowed at all; the <i>halakha</i> is that the court coerces him, and says to him: “Observe and hear” (Deuteronomy 12:28).
  The Gemara continues: Granted, this works out well according to Ḥizkiyya, who says that the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one attends only to the first statement, since this <i>baraita</i> can also be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that the <i>baraita</i> discusses a case where the person who took the vow says: Had I known that one does not vow in this manner I would have vowed to bring a thanks offering with its loaves, this <i>baraita</i> presents a difficulty, as although the individual claims that he would not have taken any vow, he must still bring a thanks offering and its loaves. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: This latter <i>baraita</i> is certainly in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, but the previous <i>baraita</i> may still be explained in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel.
  The Gemara turns to analyze the <i>baraita</i> itself: What is the relevance of the phrase in the verse that says: “Observe and hear,” to one who vows to bring a thanks offering without its loaves? Abaye says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering; “and hear” means: Bring its loaves. Rava says: “Observe” means: Bring a thanks offering and its loaves; “and hear” means that you should not act in this manner regularly.
  § The mishna teaches that if one states: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and its loaves from second-tithe money, he shall bring it in that manner. The Gemara asks: Why does the mishna teach: He shall bring, which suggests that he must bring the thanks offering and loaves from second-tithe money? Is it not sufficient to fulfill his vow even if he does not bring it from second-tithe money but from non-sacred money? In fact, it is preferable that he bring the offering from non-sacred money. Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda say: The mishna does not mean that he must bring it specifically from second-tithe money; rather, if he wants, he brings it from second-tithe money, and if he does not want, he does not need to bring it from second-tithe money.
  § The mishna teaches: And he may not bring the loaves from second-tithe wheat; rather, he purchases the flour with second-tithe money. With regard to this, Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda both say: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased with second-tithe money.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira, and he was sitting and saying: The mishna taught only that the loaves may not be brought from second-tithe wheat itself, but he may bring the loaves from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. Rabbi Zeira said to him: My teacher, do you say so? I say that he may not bring the loaves even from wheat purchased from second-tithe money. And I will say my reasoning and I will say your reasoning. I will say your reasoning first: From where do you derive that the loaves of a thanks offering may be brought from wheat purchased with second-tithe money? You derive it from the <i>halakha</i> of a peace offering. A thanks offering is a type of peace offering, as the verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanks” (Leviticus 7:15), and a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money.
  
  Daf 82a
  
  And the <i>halakha</i> that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from the verse discussing second tithe. The verse states with regard to a peace offering: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and you shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7), and the verse states with regard to second tithe: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place that He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there” (Deuteronomy 14:23). And from this it may be concluded: Just as peace offerings are not themselves brought from second tithe, as they are not produce, so too with regard to the loaves of a thanks offering, they are not themselves brought from second tithe. And that wheat which is purchased with second-tithe money is also not itself second tithe; it may therefore be used for the loaves of the thanks offering.
  Now I will say my reasoning for why one may not prepare the loaves of a thanks offering with wheat that was purchased with second-tithe money: From where do I derive the <i>halakha</i> that a thanks offering may be brought from second-tithe money? I derive it from the <i>halakhot</i> of a peace offering. And the <i>halakha</i> that a peace offering may be brought from second-tithe money is derived by a verbal analogy between “there” and “there” from second tithe. Therefore, just as a peace offering is not of the same species as second tithe, so too the loaves of a thanks offering may not be of the same species as second tithe. This serves to exclude wheat purchased with second-tithe money, which is of the same species as second tithe.
  § Rabbi Ami says: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the money does not assume the status of a peace offering. What is the reason? The reason is that the sanctity of the peace offering is not strong enough to take effect upon items that have the sanctity of second tithe.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a mishna (<i>Ma’aser Sheni</i> 1:4): Ideally, one should use second-tithe money to purchase peace offerings. If one purchases a peace offering with second-tithe money, only the flesh of the animal is consecrated, while its hide is non-sacred. The mishna teaches: With regard to one who uses second-tithe money in an improper manner and purchases an undomesticated animal for a peace offering, a purpose for which an undomesticated animal cannot be used, or purchases a domesticated animal for meat of desire, i.e., ordinary meat, the Sages penalized him and decreed that the hide does not become non-sacred. The Gemara asks: Is that not to say that the hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money assumes the status of a peace offering, and it must be sold and the money used to purchase a peace offering, in contradiction to the statement of Rabbi Ami?
  The Gemara rejects this: Wasn’t it stated concerning that mishna that Rav said: The hide of the animal purchased with the second-tithe money does not assume the status of a peace offering; and what is the meaning of the mishna that the hide does not become non-sacred? This is what the mishna is saying: The hide, as part of an undomesticated animal, is not in the category of a peace offering at all so that its hide would become non-sacred. What is the reason? Rabba says: Since he used the second-tithe money in an improper manner, it is considered as if he purchased an ox for plowing, to which no sanctity of second tithe applies.
  § It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The money assumes the status of a peace offering, and Rabbi Elazar says: The money does not assume the status of a peace offering.
  The Gemara elaborates: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Second tithe is non-sacred property, everyone agrees that the money assumes the status of a peace offering. When they disagree, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Second tithe is property belonging to the Most High. The one who says that the money does not assume the status of a peace offering holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and one may not designate property of the Most High for another purpose. And the one who says that the money assumes the status of a peace offering holds that since second tithe is called a peace offering, as an animal purchased with second-tithe money without specification is brought as a peace offering, when he designates the money for a peace offering, it as well is designated with the sanctity of a peace offering.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Elazar from a <i>baraita</i>: In a case involving one who designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the sanctity of a peace offering is applied to this money in addition to the sanctity of second tithe. Therefore, when he redeems this money, he adds to it two-fifths: One-fifth for the redemption of the sacrificial sanctity of a peace offering and one-fifth for the redemption of second tithe. Evidently, the sanctity of a peace offering does take effect on second-tithe money.
  The Gemara responds: Do you maintain that this <i>baraita</i> is agreed upon by everyone? In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that second-tithe money is non-sacred property. Accordingly, the sanctity of a peace offering takes effect on the money. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
  MISHNA: From where is it derived with regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, that he may bring it only from non-sacred money? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2). The verse is difficult: Doesn’t the Paschal offering come only from lambs and goats? If so, why does the verse state: “The flock and the herd”? It is to juxtapose all offerings that come from the flock and from the herd to the Paschal offering, teaching that just as the Paschal offering is a matter of obligation and comes only from non-sacred money, so too any matter of obligation comes only from non-sacred money.
  Therefore, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a peace offering, since these offerings come as an obligation due to his vow, they may be brought only from non-sacred money. And libations, in any case, may be brought only from non-sacred money, and not from second-tithe money, because second-tithe money must be used to purchase items eaten by people, while libations are poured out next to the altar.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the <i>halakha</i> that any matter of obligation must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the <i>halakha</i> of the Paschal offering. The Gemara asks: And concerning the Paschal offering itself, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred property? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Eliezer says: “Paschal offering” is stated in the Torah with regard to the offering sacrificed in Egypt (see Exodus 12:3), and “Paschal offering” is stated with regard to the yearly obligation throughout the generations (see Exodus 12:25). Therefore, just as the Paschal offering stated with regard to Egypt was brought only from non-sacred property, as there was no second tithe in Egypt, so too the Paschal offering stated with regard to the obligation throughout the generations may be brought only from non-sacred property.
  Rabbi Akiva said to him: But does one derive the possible from the impossible? Does one derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, when there exists the possibility of using second-tithe money, from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt, when there was no second tithe? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Even though it was impossible to bring the Paschal offering in Egypt from consecrated money, it is a great proof, and we shall derive this <i>halakha</i> from it.
  Rabbi Akiva then presented a different logical derivation to reject the proof of Rabbi Eliezer: One cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from that of the Paschal offering in Egypt, as what is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar.
  
  Daf 82b
  
  Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?
  Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Paschal offerings should be compared, as the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “And it shall be when the Lord shall bring you into the land of the Canaanite, and the Hittite, and the Amorite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite, which He swore to your fathers to give you, a land flowing with milk and honey, that you shall perform this service in this month” (Exodus 13:5). This indicates that all the services of this month for the generations shall be like this, the Paschal offering of Egypt.
  The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: Initially, Rabbi Akiva rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer based on the claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. He then rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer on a technicality, namely that the two Paschal offerings have different sacrificial requirements. The Gemara therefore challenges: And as for Rabbi Akiva, if he holds that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, then let him stand by his statement.
  And if he retracted and conceded that one derives the possible from the impossible, and the fact that he did not derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the <i>halakha</i> of the Paschal offering in Egypt is due to that refutation that he proposed, i.e., that the Paschal offerings are different, then the Paschal offering that was sacrificed in the second year in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect. That offering did require placement of the blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money, as there were no tithes in the wilderness.
  The Gemara explains: Rabbi Akiva stated this objection in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. He meant as follows: According to my opinion, one does not derive the possible from the impossible, and this is a sufficient reason why one cannot derive the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the <i>halakha</i> of the Paschal offering in Egypt. And even according to your opinion, in which you said that one derives the possible from the impossible, this comparison can be refuted: What is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar. Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?
  And in response to this, Rabbi Eliezer said to him that the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations should be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of the Paschal offering in Egypt, since the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “That you shall keep this service in this month.”
  The Gemara asks: But why must Rabbi Eliezer cite this verse? Let him say to Rabbi Akiva: The Paschal offering brought in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect, since it did require placement of the blood and consumption of sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money.
  The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Akiva. He meant as follows: In my opinion, one derives the possible from the impossible. And as for that refutation that you raised, that the Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations have different sacrificial requirements, the Paschal offering of the wilderness will prove that this is not a valid refutation. According to your opinion, in which you said that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, the verse states: “That you shall keep this service in this month,” indicating that the Paschal offering of the generations is compared to the Paschal offering in Egypt.
  The Gemara challenges: But even now, let Rabbi Akiva refute this comparison by the same claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. Rav Sheshet says: That is to say that one cannot refute a juxtaposition, i.e., one cannot refute such a derivation based on reasoning.
  And in the study hall [<i>uvetarbitza</i>] they discussed the statement of the mishna that the <i>halakha</i> that all obligatory offerings must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the Paschal offering of the generations, and they said: But can a matter derived via juxtaposition, i.e., the Paschal offering of the generations, whose <i>halakha</i> is derived by juxtaposition from the Paschal offering in Egypt, again teach a matter via another juxtaposition? The Gemara responds: This is not considered an instance of a matter derived by juxtaposition teaching a matter derived by another juxtaposition. Rather, the statement of the mishna that all offerings are juxtaposed to the Paschal offering was stated in a general manner, since the entire Paschal offering is one matter. The Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations are both referred to as a Paschal offering.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who rejects the proofs of Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he derive that the Paschal offering comes only from non-sacred money? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Akiva derives it from that which Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It is stated: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). This verse connects all of the specified offerings, such that individual aspects of each offering are applicable to all of the offerings.
  The Gemara details these aspects. The verse states: “Of the burnt offering,” to teach that all of the offerings are like a burnt offering in that just as a burnt offering requires a utensil in its preparation, so too do all animal offerings require a utensil. What is the utensil? If we say it is a bowl, a utensil used for collecting the blood, as is learned from the burnt offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai, that cannot be correct, as a utensil for collecting blood does not need to be learned from a burnt offering. With regard to communal peace offerings it is also written: “And they offered burnt offerings, and they sacrificed peace offerings…And Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins” (Exodus 24:5–6).
  Rather, the term utensil must be referring to a knife, as the slaughter may be performed only with a knife and not with a sharp stone or reed. The Gemara asks: And with regard to a burnt offering itself, from where do we derive that it must be slaughtered with a knife? This is learned from that which is written: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10); and there, Abraham was sacrificing a burnt offering, as it is written: “And offered it up for a burnt offering instead of his son” (Genesis 22:13).
  The Gemara continues to expound the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 7:37). When the verse mentions a meal offering, it teaches that just as a meal offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood (see Leviticus 6:9–11), so too are all of the offerings mentioned in this verse eaten only by males of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: With regard to what offering is it that this <i>halakha</i> must be derived? If one suggests that it is with regard to the sin offering and the guilt offering,
  
  Daf 83a
  
  this <i>halakha</i> is explicitly written of them. With regard to the sin offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat it” (Leviticus 6:22), and with regard to the guilt offering, it is stated: “Every male among the priests may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:6).
  If one suggests that the <i>halakha</i> must be derived with regard to communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs that were sacrificed as communal offerings on <i>Shavuot</i> together with the offering of the two loaves (see Leviticus 23:19), this <i>halakha</i> is derived from the amplification of the verse stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings. The verse states: “In a most sacred place shall you eat of it; every male may eat it” (Numbers 18:10), and it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse teaches with regard to communal peace offerings that they are eaten only by males of priestly families.
  The Gemara explains: It is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i>. There is one <i>tanna</i> who cites it, the <i>halakha</i> that only males of priestly families may eat of the communal peace offering, from here, i.e., the precedent mentioned explicitly with regard to the meal offering; and there is one <i>tanna</i> who cites it from there, i.e., the amplification of the verse stated with regard to meal offerings, sin offerings, and guilt offerings.
  The Gemara continues expounding the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings.” “Sin offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a sin offering, whatever it touches is sanctified through the substance that becomes absorbed, so too for all offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch is sanctified through the absorbed portions.
  “Guilt offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a guilt offering, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred within it, because a guilt offering is always male and as such never holds a fetal sac or a placenta, so too for any of the offerings mentioned in the verse, a fetal sac and a placenta are not sacred if found within it. The Gemara notes: Evidently, this <i>tanna</i> holds that with regard to offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the moment of their births, but not in utero. And he also holds that one derives the possible from the impossible, so that the <i>halakha</i> of a fetal sac and a placenta in the case of female animals may be derived from the <i>halakha</i> of a male animal.
  “Inauguration offering” teaches: Just as with regard to the inauguration offering, the rams and the bread of which were brought during the seven days of inauguration of the Tabernacle and which the priests ate, their leftovers were disposed of by incineration, as is stated: “And if any of the flesh of the inauguration offering, or of the bread, remain until the morning, then you shall burn the remainder with fire” (Exodus 29:34), and there were no living animals counted among their leftovers disposed of by incineration, so too for all offerings mentioned, their leftovers are disposed of by incineration, and there are no living animals counted among their leftovers disposed of by incineration. Accordingly, if one sanctifies two animals so that either one may be brought if the other is lost, when one animal is sacrificed, the surviving animal is not killed and incinerated.
  “Peace offering” teaches: Just as with regard to the peace offering, its components may render components of the offering <i>piggul</i> and are rendered <i>piggul</i>, so too with regard to all offerings mentioned in this verse, their components render components of the offering <i>piggul</i> and are rendered <i>piggul</i>.
  § It was taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the name of Rabbi Akiva that the verse states: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). From the term “meal offering” it is derived: Just as with regard to a meal offering, whatever it touches is sanctified through the substance that becomes absorbed, as it is stated: “Whatever shall touch them shall be sacred” (Leviticus 6:11), so too for all offerings mentioned in this verse, whatever they touch is sanctified through the absorbed portions.
  The Gemara notes: And it was necessary to write the <i>halakha</i> of absorption with regard to a sin offering, and it was necessary to write the <i>halakha</i> of absorption with regard to a meal offering. As, had the Merciful One written this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a meal offering, I would say that since it is soft, it is absorbed and therefore sanctifies what it touches; but with regard to the meat of a sin offering, I would say that it does not sanctify what it touches. And had the Merciful One written this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a sin offering, I would say that it is because, on account of its fattiness, the meat penetrates [<i>kadeir</i>] into whatever it touches and sanctifies it; but with regard to a meal offering, I would say that it does not sanctify what it touches. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to write both.
  The cited <i>baraita</i> continues: “Sin offering” teaches: Just as a sin offering is brought only from non-sacred animals, and it is sacrificed specifically in the daytime, and its service must be performed with the priest’s right hand, so too all offerings mentioned are brought only from non-sacred animals, and are sacrificed specifically in the daytime, and each one’s service must be performed with the priest’s right hand.
  And with regard to a sin offering itself, from where do we derive that it is brought only from non-sacred animals? Rav Ḥisda said: It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And Aaron shall present the bull of the sin offering, which is his” (Leviticus 16:11). This teaches that the animal must come from his cattle, and not from money with which the second tithe has been redeemed.
  The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to derive from the <i>halakha</i> of a sin offering that an offering is sacrificed in the daytime? Isn’t this principle derived from the expression: “On the day of His commanding” (Leviticus 7:38), which is understood to be referring to all offerings? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the <i>baraita</i> cited the principle from the model of a sin offering for no reason [<i>kedi</i>], and it was mentioned here on account of the other principles.
  The Gemara asks: Why must the <i>baraita</i> teach that the <i>halakha</i> of the sin offering teaches that the rites of offerings must be performed with the priest’s right hand? Isn’t this derived from the statement of Rabba bar bar Ḥana? As Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Reish Lakish says: In any place in the Torah that it is stated that an action is performed with a finger, or that it is performed by priesthood, the <i>halakha</i> is that the rite is performed only with the right hand. This is derived from the Torah’s statement with regard to the leper: “And the priest shall dip his right finger” (Leviticus 14:16). The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> cited the principle from the model of a sin offering for no reason, since it is actually derived from Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement.
  The cited <i>baraita</i> continues: “Guilt offering” teaches: Just as with regard to a guilt offering, its bones have no sanctity and are permitted for any use, so too with regard to any mentioned offering, its bones are permitted.
  The mishna teaches that the verse that states: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:2), indicates by juxtaposition that every obligatory offering, like the Paschal offering, may be brought only from non-sacred money. The Gemara therefore asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who derives this from the verse: “This is the law of…the sin offering,” that verse: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering,”
  
  Daf 83b
  
  what does he make of it, i.e., what does he derive from it? He requires it for that which was stated by Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering, an animal consecrated but not ultimately sacrificed on Passover eve, is sacrificed as a peace offering afterward? It is derived from that which is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Passover offering unto the Lord, your God, of the flock and the herd.” The verse is difficult: But isn’t a Paschal offering brought only from the sheep and from the goats? Rather, it is derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering should be sacrificed as an offering brought both from the flock and from the herd, i.e., a peace offering.
  The Gemara asks: But is it derived from here that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering? It is derived from the verse that Shmuel’s father cites: As it is written: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord is of the flock” (Leviticus 3:6); and Shmuel’s father said: This teaches that an offering that is brought only from the flock, i.e., the Paschal offering, will be a sacrifice of peace offerings.
  But still it must be asked: Is it derived from here? It is derived from there, from the verse cited in the following <i>baraita</i>. And isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Even though the verse already states that peace offerings come from the flock, as it is written: “And if his offering for a sacrifice of peace offerings to the Lord be of the flock, male or female, he shall sacrifice it without blemish” (Leviticus 3:6), the verse goes on to specify: “If he bring a lamb for his offering…and if his offering be a goat” (Leviticus 3:7–12). The word “lamb” is written to include the Paschal offering in the requirement that the fat tail be sacrificed on the altar, which is written subsequently with regard to a peace offering (Leviticus 3:9), since this <i>halakha</i> is not mentioned in the verses concerning the Paschal offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: When the verse states: “If he brings a lamb,” it is to include in all the mitzvot of peace offerings a Paschal offering whose first year has passed and is therefore too old to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering, and peace offerings brought due to a Paschal offering. Specifically, this indicates that they require placing hands on the head of the offering, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh.
  And when the verse states: “And if his offering is a goat,” it interrupted the previous matter and taught that the sacrifice of a goat does not require that the fat tail be burned on the altar. In any event, the verse indicates that a Paschal offering that was disqualified as such because it has reached its second year, i.e., the leftover of a Paschal offering, is sacrificed as a peace offering. It may therefore be asked: Why are there three verses to indicate this one <i>halakha</i>?
  Rather, none of these derivations are superfluous, as three verses are written that teach the <i>halakha</i> that a Paschal offering that is sacrificed not on Passover eve is sacrificed as a peace offering. One verse teaches this <i>halakha</i> in a case where its time of sacrifice, Passover eve, has passed, and its first year has also passed, disqualifying it for sacrifice as a Paschal offering. And one verse teaches the <i>halakha</i> in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed, but not its first year. And the third one teaches a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year has passed, but it was sacrificed before Passover eve.
  And all these verses are necessary. As had the Merciful One written only the case where both its first year and its time of sacrifice have passed, one could say that only such a Paschal offering should be sacrificed as a peace offering, as it was completely rejected from its status as a Paschal offering; but in a case where its time of sacrifice has passed but its first year has not passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on the second <i>Pesaḥ</i>, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering.
  And if the Torah had taught us only that a leftover Paschal offering whose time has passed but whose year has not passed is sacrificed as a peace offering, one might think that this is because the Paschal offering was rejected from the first <i>Pesaḥ</i>; but in a case where neither its time of sacrifice nor its first year have passed, in which case it is still fit to be sacrificed as a Paschal offering on Passover eve, I would say that it is not sacrificed as a peace offering. Therefore, all three verses are necessary.
  
  MISHNA: All communal and individual meal offerings may come from produce grown in Eretz Yisrael and from outside Eretz Yisrael, from the new crop, i.e., the current year’s crop, and from the old crop from previous years. This is the <i>halakha</i> of all meal offerings except for the <i>omer</i>, i.e., the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and the two loaves, i.e., the communal offering brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, as they come only from the new crop and from Eretz Yisrael.
  And all meal offerings come only from the optimal-quality grain. And which places have the optimal grain for them? Fields in Makhnis and Zateḥa are the primary [<i>alfa</i>] source for fine flour. Secondary to them is Aforayim in the valley.
  All the regions were valid as the source of the grain, but it is from here, the primary and secondary places, that they would bring grain, because it was of optimal quality.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that the <i>omer</i> meal offering and the two loaves are prepared only from the new crop. The wording of the mishna indicates that this is an essential requirement. The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this following <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: An <i>omer</i> meal offering that comes from the old crop is valid. Similarly, the two loaves that come from the old crop are valid, but by bringing them from the old crop one lacks the proper fulfillment of its mitzva.
  The Gemara provides the biblical sources for the rulings of the <i>baraita</i>: The source for the ruling concerning the <i>omer</i> meal offering is as it is written: “And when you shall bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord, it is ripened grain, toasted over fire, even groats of the fresh ear, you shall bring the meal offering of your first fruits” (Leviticus 2:14). The superfluous repetition of the term “you shall bring” teaches that the <i>omer</i> is valid even if brought from an old crop that was stored away in the attic.
  The source for the ruling concerning the two loaves is as it is written: “And you shall offer a new meal offering to the Lord. From your dwellings you shall bring two wave-loaves” (Leviticus 23:16–17). The term “your dwellings” is a reference to Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, the verse indicates that the two loaves must be brought from grain grown there, and not from outside of Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, the term “from your dwellings” teaches that the offering may come from any grain grown in Eretz Yisrael and even from an old crop that was stored away in the attic.
  The Gemara asks how two <i>halakhot</i> can be derived from the same term: Didn’t you already expound that term to teach that one can use grain only if it is grown in Eretz Yisrael? How can you also derive from it that the grain can be brought from an old crop? The Gemara explains: That is derived from the next term, as the verse states: “From your dwellings you shall bring” (Leviticus 23:17), which teaches that one may bring them from any grain grown in Eretz Yisrael and even from an old crop that was stored away in the attic.
  The Gemara questions this answer: But that term is necessary to teach that any leavened bread offering that you bring in another instance, i.e., the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, is to be like this offering of the two loaves, i.e., the same requirements apply to it (see 77b). How, then, can you expound the term to also teach that grain from an old crop can be used for the two loaves? The Gemara explains: If so, that the term is written only to teach about the requirements for other leavened bread offerings, then let the verse write: You shall bring [<i>tavi</i>], using the singular form. For what reason then, does it write: “You shall bring [<i>tavi’u</i>],” using the plural form? It is written so that one can learn from it two different <i>halakhot</i>.
  The Gemara questions the ruling of the <i>baraita</i> that the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves are valid even if brought from an old crop: But isn’t the term “first” written with regard to both the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves? This indicates they must come from the new crop. The <i>omer</i> is referred to as “the first of your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), and the two loaves are referred to as “an offering of the first” (Leviticus 2:12). The Gemara answers: The term indicates that only the new crop should be used, but that is only for the proper fulfillment of the mitzva. If an old crop was used, the offerings are still valid.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the two loaves: “A new meal offering” (Leviticus 23:16), which indicates that only the new crop can be used? The fact that with regard to the two loaves the Torah repeats this requirement twice suggests that it is indispensable. The Gemara answers: The word “new” cannot teach that the use of the new crop is essential, as it is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Akiva said that even if the two loaves are brought from the old crop, they are valid. How do I realize the meaning of: “A new meal offering”? This teaches that the two loaves are to be the first of all the other meal offerings. No other meal offerings may be brought from the new crop until the meal offering of the two loaves has been brought.
  § The Gemara defines the limits of the dispute between the mishna and <i>baraita</i>: They disagree only with regard to whether it is essential for the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves to be brought from the new crop.
  
  Daf 84a
  
  But with regard to the requirement to use grain grown in Eretz Yisrael, they do not disagree that if the <i>omer</i> and the two loaves come from Eretz Yisrael, indeed, they are valid, but if they come from outside of Eretz Yisrael, they are not valid.
  In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is not in accordance with the opinion of this following <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that the <i>omer</i> may come from outside of Eretz Yisrael. How do I realize the meaning of the verse that introduces the obligation to bring the <i>omer</i>: “When you come into the land which I give to you” (Leviticus 23:10)? This verse appears to indicate that the bringing of the <i>omer</i> is restricted to Eretz Yisrael. That verse teaches that the Jewish people were not obligated in the mitzva of bringing the <i>omer</i> before they entered Eretz Yisrael.
  The Gemara explains the basis of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: And he holds that even outside of Eretz Yisrael, consuming the new crop is prohibited by Torah law, as it is written: “From all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:17), which indicates that the prohibition applies anywhere that you dwell, even outside of Eretz Yisrael. Accordingly, the earlier verse, which introduces the prohibition with: “When you come into the land which I give to you” (Leviticus 23:10), is a reference to the time of the Jewish people entering Eretz Yisrael, and it indicates that the prohibition takes effect only from that time. And since Rabbi Yosei holds that the new crop outside of Eretz Yisrael is prohibited for consumption by Torah law, he consequently holds that one may also offer the <i>omer</i> from crops grown there.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Shekalim</i> 4:1): The guards who are appointed by the court to protect some of the produce that grew without being purposely planted [<i>sefiḥin</i>] during the Sabbatical Year, in order that it can be used for the <i>omer</i> and the offering of the two loaves, collect their wages from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber.
  Rami bar Ḥama raises a contradiction to Rav Ḥisda: We learned in that mishna that the guards of <i>sefiḥin</i> during the Sabbatical Year collect their wages from the collection of the Temple treasury chamber. This indicates that even in the Sabbatical Year, the <i>omer</i> is brought from that year’s crop. And one can raise a contradiction to this from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the Sabbatical Year of the land shall be for you for eating” (Leviticus 25:6), which indicates it is to be used for eating, but not for burning. Accordingly, since the <i>omer</i> is burned on the altar, it should not be brought from produce of the Sabbatical Year.
  Rav Ḥisda said to him: The Merciful One said to you about the <i>omer</i>: “It is a statute forever throughout your generations” (Leviticus 23:14), indicating that the mitzva can be fulfilled in all times, and you say the <i>omer</i> should be canceled in a Sabbatical Year?
  Rami bar Ḥama said to him: But am I saying that the <i>omer</i> should be canceled? Certainly not. Let one bring the <i>omer</i> from grain that sprouted during the previous year, concerning which there is no prohibition against burning it. Rav Ḥisda rejects this suggestion: But to fulfill the mitzva I require that the grain be of the “fresh ear” (Leviticus 2:14), i.e., young grain, and this requirement is not fulfilled with grain that sprouted during the previous year, as it has already been growing a long time.
  Rami bar Ḥama persists: But let one bring the <i>omer</i> from the young grain that was cut during the harvest of the previous year, when it was still fresh. Rav Ḥisda rejects this suggestion: The verse states: “Fresh ear, you shall bring” (Leviticus 2:14). The juxtaposition of the mitzva to bring the grain with the requirement that it be young indicates that I need it to still be young grain at the time of offering it, and this condition is not fulfilled if one uses grain from the previous year’s harvest. Young grain is soft (see 66b), whereas grain that was reaped during the previous year would have become brittle.
  § An amoraic dispute was stated concerning the source of the <i>halakha</i> that the <i>omer</i> may not be brought from the previous year’s crop: Rabbi Yoḥanan says it is derived from: “Fresh ear, you shall bring,” as Rav Ḥisda explains. Rabbi Elazar says it is derived from the fact that the <i>omer</i> is referred to as: “The first of your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), which indicates that the <i>omer</i> is brought only from the first of your harvest, i.e., from the first produce of the current year’s crop, and not from the last of your harvest, i.e., from produce taken from the remainder of the previous year’s crop.
  Rabba raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, from a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And when you shall bring a meal offering of first fruits to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:14). The verse is speaking of the <i>omer</i> meal offering. From which type of grain does it come? It comes from barley. Do you say that it comes from barley, or does it come only from wheat?
  Rabbi Eliezer says that it is stated “in the ear,” with regard to the plague of hail in Egypt: “And the flax and the barley were smitten; for the barley was in the ear, and the flax was in bloom” (Exodus 9:31), and it is stated “in the ear” with regard to the mitzva of the new crop, which is for all generations. Just as the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to the plague of hail in Egypt is referring to barley, as is clear from the next verse: “But the wheat and the spelt were not smitten; for they ripen late” (Exodus 9:32), so too the term “in the ear” that is stated with regard to the new crop for all generations is referring to barley.
  The <i>baraita</i> cites another proof that the <i>omer</i> offering is brought from barley. And Rabbi Akiva says: We found an individual who brings his obligation of a meal offering from wheat, which is brought by a poor person for a false oath of testimony, a false oath of utterance, or for entering the Temple while ritually impure, and one who brings his obligation of a meal offering from barley, in the case of a sinner’s meal offering or the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>. And we also found with regard to the community that they bring their obligation of a meal offering from wheat, in the case of the two loaves offering of <i>Shavuot</i>, and therefore, to keep the <i>halakha</i> of the offering of a community parallel to that of an individual there should be a case where the community brings their obligation of a meal offering from barley. And if you say that the <i>omer</i> offering comes from wheat, then we will not have found a case of a community that brings their obligation of a meal offering from barley. Consequently, it must be that the <i>omer</i> offering comes from barley.
  Rabbi Akiva suggests another proof: Alternatively, if you say that the <i>omer</i> offering comes from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be brought from the first fruits. The verse states that the two loaves offering of <i>Shavuot</i> should come from the first fruits: “Also in the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord in your feast of weeks” (Numbers 28:26). If the <i>omer</i> is from wheat, then the two loaves offering would not be the first offering of the first fruit, as the <i>omer</i> offering of Passover precedes it. Therefore, the <i>omer</i> offering must come from barley. Rabba explains the objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Evidently, the <i>omer</i> offering is brought from the new crop because the grain used is referred to as first fruits, i.e., “the first of your harvest.” The Gemara concludes: This <i>baraita</i> is a conclusive refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Bikkurim</i> 1:3): One may bring first fruits only from the seven species with which Eretz Yisrael is praised in the verse: “A land of wheat and barley, vines, figs and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey” (Deuteronomy 8:8). But one may not
  
  Daf 84b
  
  bring them from dates that grow in the mountains, and one may not bring them from produce that grows in the valleys. Such produce is of inferior quality and may not be used. Ulla says: Even if one did bring such produce, he does not thereby consecrate it, i.e., it does not attain the consecrated status of first fruits.
  Rabba sat in the study hall and stated this <i>halakha</i>. Rabbi Aḥa bar Abba raised an objection to Rabba from a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah refers to the two loaves offering as: “A first offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11), which indicates that it is to be the first of all the meal offerings that come from the new crop. And similarly the verse states with regard to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>: “On the day of the first fruits, when you bring a new meal offering to the Lord” (Numbers 28:26). By designating the two loaves as “new,” the verse indicates that they should be brought from the first of the new crop.
  I have derived only that it must be new, i.e., the first, of all wheat meal offerings. From where do I derive that it must also be new, i.e., the first, of all barley meal offerings, e.g., the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>? With regard to the two loaves, the verse states the word “new,” and again states the word “new,” once in Numbers 28:26 and again in Leviticus 23:16. If the second mention is not needed to teach the matter of being the new meal offering of wheat, apply it to the matter of being the new meal offering of barley.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And from where is it derived that the two loaves precede the bringing of the first fruits as well? The verse states: “And you shall make for yourself a festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, the first fruits of the wheat harvest” (Exodus 34:22). The order of the verse teaches that the offering of the Festival, which is the two loaves offering, precedes the bringing of the first fruits of the wheat harvest. I have derived only that the two loaves precede the first fruits of the wheat harvest. From where do I derive that they also precede the bringing of the first fruits of the barley harvest? The verse states with regard to the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>: “And the festival of the harvest, the first fruits of your labors, which you will sow in the field” (Exodus 23:16). The order of the verse teaches that the offering of the Festival, which is the two loaves offering, precedes all forms of first fruits that are sown in the field, which includes barley.
  From this verse, I have derived only that the two loaves precede the bringing of the first fruits that sprouted from seeds you sowed, as the verse states: “Which you will sow.” From where do I derive that they precede even the bringing of first fruits that sprouted by themselves? The continuation of that verse states: “In the field” (Exodus 23:16). The term is superfluous and serves to include even produce that sprouted by itself.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From this verse, I have derived only that the two loaves precede the bringing of produce that grew in a field. From where do I derive to include even produce that grew on a roof, or that grew in a ruin, or that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship? The verse states with regard to the priestly gifts: “The first fruit of all that grows in their land, which they shall bring to the Lord, shall be yours” (Numbers 18:13). The term “first fruits” in this verse is referring to all types of first fruits. This teaches that when the two loaves are referred to as the first fruits (see Exodus 34:22), the intention is that they should be brought first before all other types of produce.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: From where is it derived that the offering of the two loaves is to precede both the bringing of libations from grapes of the new crop and the bringing of the first fruits of the tree? It is stated here, with regard to the two loaves: “The first fruits of your labors” (Exodus 23:16), and it is stated there at the end of that verse: “When you gather in the products of your labors from the field.” Just as there, the term “your labors” is referring both to fruits used for the libations and the fruit of the tree, so too, here, the term is referring to both fruits used for the libations and the fruit of the tree.
  Rabbi Aḥa bar Abba explains how the <i>baraita</i> poses a challenge to Ulla’s ruling: In any event, it was taught in this <i>baraita</i> that bringing the two loaves must precede even the bringing of produce that grew on a roof, that grew in a ruin, that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship. This indicates that all these types of produce are valid to be brought as first fruits, despite the fact that they are of inferior quality. This would appear to contradict Ulla’s ruling that dates that grow in the mountains and produce grown in the valleys are not fit to be brought as first fruits. Rabba explains: Whereas in the first clause, the <i>baraita</i> discusses which types of produce can be used for the first fruits, in the latter clause we come to discuss which grains can be used for meal offerings. Produce that grew in these atypical locations is valid to be brought as meal offerings, but not as first fruits.
  The later clause of the <i>baraita</i> explained that the verse: “The first fruit of all that grows in their land” (Numbers 18:13), is referring to produce that grows in atypical locations. Rabba defended Ulla’s opinion by explaining that the verse concerns meal offerings only. Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this: If so, that which is written in the latter part of the verse: “Any pure member of your household may eat of it,” is difficult, as the phrase “your household” includes a priest’s wife and daughters and teaches that they may also partake of the priestly gifts referred to in the verse; but if the verse is referring to meal offerings, that is problematic as they are permitted to be eaten only by male priests.
  In resolution of this difficulty, Rav Mesharshiyya said: Perforce this verse should be read as if two verses are written, as otherwise it contains an inherent contradiction: The first clause states: “The first fruit…shall be yours” (Numbers 18:13), indicating that only a priest himself may partake of the priestly gifts. And it is written in the continuation of the verse: “Any pure member of your household may eat of it,” indicating that even female family members may partake of it. How can these texts be reconciled? Here, the latter part of the verse, concerns the first fruits, which even female family members may eat, and there, the first part of the verse, concerns meal offerings, which may be eaten only by male priests.
  Rav Ashi said that there is an alternative resolution: The verse in its entirety concerns meal offerings, but with the latter clause of the verse we come to the specific case of the loaves of a thanks offering, which even female family members of the priest may eat.
  § The Gemara notes: Ulla and Rav Aḥa bar Abba disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of earlier <i>amora’im</i>: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even if one did bring mountain dates or valley produce as first fruits, he does not thereby consecrate them, i.e., they do not attain the sanctified status of first fruits. Reish Lakish says: If one did bring them, he has consecrated them; they are regarded just like a gaunt animal with regard to sacrificial animals. Although it is improper to consecrate such animals or such produce as an offering, if one does, the consecration certainly takes effect.
  The Gemara discusses the dispute: Granted, the opinion of Reish Lakish is well founded, as he stated the reason for his ruling. But as for Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason for his ruling? Rabbi Elazar said: I have an explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling and since I was privileged to see Rabbi Yoḥanan in a dream, I know that I am saying a proper matter. The verse states with regard to first fruits: “And you shall take from the first of all the fruit” (Deuteronomy 26:2). The addition of the word “from” indicates that one should take from some of the first fruits, but not from all the first fruits. This teaches that one should use only the seven species for the mitzva. The verse continues: “That you shall bring from your land.” The addition of the word “from” indicates that one should take first fruits from some areas of the land, but not from all areas in your land. This teaches that one should not take dates from the mountains or produce from the valleys.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Reish Lakish, for what <i>halakha</i> does he use this term “your land”? He holds that the term is necessary for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabban Gamliel, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, says: “From your land” is stated here (Deuteronomy 26:2), with regard to the first fruits, and “land” is stated there with regard to the praise of Eretz Yisrael: “A land of wheat and barley, vines, figs, and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey” (Deuteronomy 8:8), which are the seven species. This serves as the basis for a verbal analogy and teaches that just as there, the verse is referring only to the produce that is the praise of Eretz Yisrael, so too, here, with regard to the mitzva to bring the first fruits, the verse is referring only to the produce that is the praise of Eretz Yisrael, i.e., the seven species.
  The Gemara asks: And the other one, Rabbi Yoḥanan, since he has already expounded the term “from your land” to teach that one may not use mountain dates or valley produce, from where does he derive that only the seven species may be used? Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that since the Torah could have just written “your land” but instead writes “from your land,” the word “land” can be used to form the verbal analogy while the word “from” can teach that one may not use mountain dates or valley produce.
  And the other one, Reish Lakish, what does he derive from the fact that the Torah adds the word “from”? He does not learn anything from the fact the Torah could have just written “your land” but instead writes “from your land.” In Hebrew, the term: From your land, is expressed by a single word: <i>Me’artzekha</i>. Reish Lakish holds that the verbal analogy uses the entire word.
  § It is taught in one <i>baraita</i>: With regard to produce that grew on a roof, or that grew in a ruin, or that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship, the owner brings it to the Temple and recites the accompanying passage of thanks to God (see Deuteronomy 26:1–11). And it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> with regard to such fruits: The owner brings them but does not recite the accompanying passage.
  The Gemara attempts to reconcile the <i>baraitot</i>: Granted according to Reish Lakish, both <i>baraitot</i> accord with his opinion that even inferior produce can be brought as first fruits, and they contradict each other only with regard to whether or not one should recite the accompanying passage. And even with regard to that, the fact that the ruling of one <i>baraita</i> about produce that grew on a roof is contradicted by the ruling of the other <i>baraita</i> about produce that grew on a roof is not difficult. One can explain that this <i>baraita</i>, which states that the passage is recited, is referring to a roof of a cave, which is considered part of the ground, whereas that <i>baraita</i>, which states that the passage is not recited, is referring to a roof of a house.
  Similarly, the fact that the ruling of one <i>baraita</i> about produce that grew in a ruin is contradicted by the ruling of the other <i>baraita</i> about produce that grew in a ruin is not difficult. One can explain that here, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the passage is recited, is referring to a cultivated ruin, whereas there, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the passage is not recited, is referring to an uncultivated ruin.
  And the fact that the ruling of one <i>baraita</i> about produce that grew in a flowerpot is contradicted by the ruling of the other <i>baraita</i> about produce that grew in a flowerpot is not difficult. One can explain that here, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the passage is recited, is referring to a perforated flowerpot, where the produce is able to draw nourishment from the soil beneath it, whereas there, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the passage is not recited, is referring to an unperforated flowerpot.
  And the fact that the ruling of one <i>baraita</i> about fruit that grew on a ship is contradicted by the ruling of the other <i>baraita</i> about fruit that grew on a ship is not difficult. One can explain that here, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the passage is recited is referring to a ship made of wood, where the fruit were able to draw nourishment through the wood from the ground, whereas, there, the <i>baraita</i> that states that the passage is not recited is referring to a ship made of earthenware.
  
  Daf 85a
  
  Having reconciled all the apparent contradictions between the two <i>baraitot</i> according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, the Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds inferior produce cannot be consecrated as first fruits, the first <i>baraita</i> is difficult, as it states that inferior produce can be consecrated.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>baraitot</i> cited above contradict Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion. But there is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> with regard to this issue, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to produce that grew on a roof, or that grew in a ruin, the owner brings it and recites the accompanying passage. With regard to produce that grew in a flowerpot, or that grew on a ship, the owner does not bring it at all. Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with that <i>baraita</i>.
  § The mishna states: And all meal offerings come only from the optimal produce. One of the places the mishna mentions as having good-quality produce is Aforayim. The superior quality of its produce was so well known that Aforayim was used as an example in colloquial aphorisms. In Moses and Aaron’s first meeting with Pharaoh, Aaron cast his staff to the ground, whereupon it turned into a serpent. Pharaoh’s necromancers then duplicated the feat using their incantations, only to then be confounded when Aaron’s staff swallowed up all of theirs (see Exodus 7:10–12). The Gemara relates the conversation that took place: Pharaoh’s two leading necromancers, Yoḥana and Mamre, said to Moses: Are you are bringing straw to Afarayim? Performing necromancy in Egypt, the world leader in sorcery, is like bringing straw to Afarayim, which is rich in the finest grains. Moses said to them: It is as people say: To a city rich in herbs, take herbs. If you want to guarantee that people will appreciate your merchandise, bring it to a place where they are familiar with it.
  MISHNA: Even when selecting grain for meal offerings from the locations mentioned in the previous mishna, one may not bring as a meal offering grain from a fertilized field, nor from an irrigated field, nor from a field of trees, as such fields do not produce grain of optimal quality. But if one did bring a meal offering of grain from such fields, it is fit.
  How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, but he does not sow it, and in the second year, he sows it seventy days before Passover, and in that manner it produces grain that will provide an abundance of fine, high-quality, flour.
  How does the Temple treasurer inspect the flour to determine whether it is of sufficiently high quality? The treasurer inserts his hand into the flour. If, when he removes his hand, flour powder covers it, the flour is unfit, until one sifts it with a fine sifter, so that no powder will remain.
  And if the flour became wormy, it is unfit for use in a meal offering.
  GEMARA: The mishna states: How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, and in the second year he sows it. The Gemara clarifies what should be done in the second year: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the <i>tanna</i> saying? Is he saying that he plows the field during the first year, and in the second year he plows it and sows it? Or perhaps he is saying that he plows the field during the first year, and in the second year he sows it without plowing it.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: Also concerning grain grown in Kerazayim and Kefar Aḥim, if only those places had been close to Jerusalem, they would have brought barley from them for the <i>omer</i>. As the <i>halakha</i> is that one brings the <i>omer</i> only from the southern fields and those that were plowed for that purpose, as upon such fields, the sun rises and shines, and from those fields, the sun also sets. In other words, those fields are exposed to a lot of sunlight, so they produce a superior-quality crop. Kerazayim and Kefar Aḥim were such fields, but they were too far from Jerusalem for their barley to be used for the <i>omer</i> offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: How does one produce optimal-quality grain? He plows the field during the first year, and in the second year, he plows it once and then repeats the plowing a second time, and he sows it seventy days before Passover. It is done this way in order that the sowing will be done close to the time when the strength of the sun reaches its climax, and will thereby produce a high-quality crop in which the length of a stalk is a handspan and the ear itself is two handspans.
  And then one reaps the grain and gathers it together into a pile, and then he threshes the grain and winnows it, and then he sorts the inedible admixture from the edible grain, and then he grinds the grain and sifts it and brings the flour produced to the Temple treasurer. And the treasurer inserts his hand into it in order to check its quality. If upon removing his hand powder covers it, the treasurer says to the owner: Go back and sift it a second time. The Sages say in the name of Rabbi Natan that the treasurer would perform a more thorough examination of the flour’s quality. He douses his hand with oil and then inserts it into the flour until all of its powder will be brought up.
  The Gemara explains that the <i>baraita</i> provides a resolution to the dilemma: In any event, the <i>baraita</i> teaches that during the second year, the owner of the field plows it once and then repeats the plowing. It is explicit, then, that during the second year the field should be plowed.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: But even according to your reasoning, ultimately the mishna does not teach that he plows the field and then repeats the plowing;
  
  Daf 85b
  
  it is only the <i>baraita</i> that teaches that he plows and then repeats the plowing. It would appear, then, that the mishna and <i>baraita</i> express different opinions, and it may be that according to the mishna one does not need to plow in the second year at all.
  The Gemara dismisses this suggestion: This is not difficult; it is possible that the mishna and the <i>baraita</i> do not disagree, and here, the mishna, which does not require plowing a second time, is referring to a cultivated field, whereas there, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to an uncultivated field, and therefore it requires that the field be plowed a second time.
  The Gemara concludes: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? Come and hear the resolution from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For the first year, one plows the entire field during the first half of the year, and then he sows half of the field, leaving the other half fallow. For the second year, one again plows the entire field during the first half of the year, and then he sows the half of the field that was left fallow in the previous year. It is evident from this <i>baraita</i> that during the second year as well, the field is plowed before it is sown.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One brings the <i>omer</i> only from the southern fields of Eretz Yisrael, as upon those fields, the sun rises and shines, and from those fields, the sun also sets. Those fields are exposed to abundant sunlight, and so they produce a superior-quality crop.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Abba Shaul says that the <i>omer</i> would come from grain grown in the valley of Beit Mikle. The field there was about three <i>se’a</i>, and it was a southern field, and the sun would rise and shine upon it, and the sun would set from it. During the first year, the farmer plowed the entire field during the first half of the year, and he then sowed half of the field, leaving the other half fallow. During the second year, he again plowed the entire field during the first half of the year, and he then sowed the half of the field that was left fallow in the previous year.
  The Gemara demonstrates the efficacy of this method: Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi had a tract of land. He plowed the field during the first half of the year and then sowed half of it. The next year, he plowed the field during the first half of the year and then sowed the other half of it. And this method was so effective that his field produced twice as much wheat as other fields its size, and it was of such a superior quality that he sold the wheat to be used as fine flour [<i>lismida</i>] for the meal offerings in the Temple.
  § The mishna teaches: And if the flour became wormy, it is unfit for use in a meal offering. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Fine flour the majority of which became wormy is unfit. And similarly, wheat kernels the majority of which became wormy are unfit, and they may not be used to produce fine flour for meal offerings. Rabbi Yirmeya asks: What is the meaning of this latter ruling? Is it saying only that if the majority of an individual wheat kernel becomes wormy the flour produced from it is unfit, or is it saying that when the majority of a <i>se’a</i> of kernels becomes wormy the entire <i>se’a</i> is unfit? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  Rava asks: If one consecrated grains of wormy wheat for use in a meal offering, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether he should be flogged for consecrating them due to the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item as an offering? One is flogged for consecrating a blemished animal as an offering (see <i>Temura</i> 6b); does the same apply to consecrating wormy wheat? Does one say that since the wheat is unfit, it is comparable to a blemished animal? Or perhaps, the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item applies only to an animal. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § We learned in a mishna elsewhere (<i>Middot</i> 2:5) with regard to the wood logs that are burned on the altar: Priests inspect them before they are used and any log in which a worm is found is unfit for use on the altar. In reference to this mishna, Shmuel says: They taught this <i>halakha</i> only with regard to a wet log, as a wormy section cannot be removed. But if a wormy section is found in a dry log, the priest scrapes the wormy spot away, and the log is fit for use.
  Rava asks: If one consecrated a wormy log to be used on the altar, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether he should be flogged for consecrating it due to the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item as an offering? Does one say that since the log is unfit, it is comparable to a blemished animal? Or perhaps, the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item applies only to an animal. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: Olive trees in Tekoa are the primary source of oil to be used in meal offerings. Abba Shaul says: Secondary to Tekoa is Regev on the east bank of the Jordan River. All the regions were valid for oil to be brought from them, but it was from here that they would bring it.
  One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from olives taken from a fertilized olive grove, nor from olives taken from an irrigated olive grove, nor from olives taken from an olive grove where grain was sown between the trees. But if one did bring a meal offering containing oil from such groves, it is valid. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from unripe olives [<i>anpiktan</i>], but if one did bring it, it is valid. One may not bring a meal offering containing oil from olives that were soaked in water, nor from pickled olives, nor from boiled olives, and even if one did bring it, it is not valid.
  GEMARA: The Gemara notes the effect of Tekoa’s oil on those living there: The verse states: “And Joab sent to Tekoa, and fetched from there a wise woman” (II Samuel 14:2). What is different about Tekoa that Joab chose to bring a woman from there? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Since the residents of Tekoa are accustomed to use olive oil, wisdom is prevalent there.
  § The Gemara digresses to discuss the tribal portion of Asher, in which the city of Tekoa is located: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In his blessing to the tribe of Asher, Moses said: “He will be pleasing to his brothers, and immerse his foot in oil” (Deuteronomy 33:24). This is referring to the portion of Asher, as the oil flows there like a spring. The Gemara relates: They said that once, the people of Laodicea were in need of oil. They appointed a gentile messenger [<i>polmostos</i>] and said to him: Go and bring us one million <i>maneh</i> worth of oil.
  He first went to Jerusalem to procure the oil, but residents there did not have that quantity of oil. They said to him: Go to Tyre, which was a commercial city. He went to Tyre, but they also did not have enough oil. They said to him: Go to Gush Ḥalav, which is located in the portion of Asher. He went to Gush Ḥalav, and they said to him: Go to so-and-so, to that field. He went there and found someone hoeing [<i>ozek</i>] under his olive trees. The messenger said to that man: Do you have the one million <i>maneh</i> worth of oil that I need? The man said to him: Wait for me until I complete my labor, i.e., hoeing. The messenger waited until the man completed his labor.
  After he completed his labor, the man slung his tools over his shoulders behind him, a manner typical of poor laborers, and started walking, and he was removing stones from his orchard as he went along the path. Upon seeing this behavior, which suggested the man was merely a laborer, the messenger questioned whether the man was truly able to provide him with the oil. He said to the man: Can it be that you really have the one million <i>maneh</i> worth of oil that I need? It seems to me that the Jews of Gush Ḥalav are making a laughingstock of me by sending me here. When he reached his city, the man’s maidservant brought out to him a kettle [<i>kumkemos</i>] of hot water, and he washed his hands and his feet. Afterward, she brought out to him a golden basin filled with oil, in which he immersed his hands and feet, in fulfillment of that which is stated with regard to the Tribe of Asher: “And immerse his foot in oil” (Deuteronomy 33:24).
  After they ate and drank, the man measured out for the messenger one million <i>maneh</i> worth of oil. The man said to him: Are you sure that you do not need any more oil? The messenger said to him: Yes, I do need more, but I do not have the money for it. The man said to him: If you wish to take more oil, take it and I will go back to Laodicea with you and collect the money for the extra oil there. The messenger agreed and the man measured out an additional 180,000 <i>maneh</i> worth of oil. Concerning this incident, people said: The messenger had such an enormous burden of oil that he left neither a horse, nor a mule, nor a camel, nor a donkey in all of Eretz Yisrael that he did not rent in order to help transport the oil back to Laodicea.
  When the messenger finally reached his city, the people of his city came out to praise him [<i>lekaleso</i>] for achieving this tremendous feat. The messenger said to them: Do not praise me. Rather, praise this man who has come with me, as it is he who measured for me one million <i>maneh</i> worth of oil, and he extended a debt to me for 180,000 <i>maneh</i> worth of oil. This incident was in fulfillment of that which is stated: “There is one who seems to be rich, yet has nothing; there is one who seems to be poor, yet has great wealth” (Proverbs 13:7).
  § The mishna teaches: One may not bring a meal offering containing oil made from olives from a fertilized olive grove. The mishna continues to state that one may not bring a meal offering containing oil from unripe olives, and, according to one version of the mishna’s text, it adds that even if one did bring a meal offering containing such oil, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One may not bring a meal offering containing oil made from unripe olives,
  
  Daf 86a
  
  but if one did bring a meal offering made of such oil, it is not valid. But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that if one did bring it, it is valid, because it is regarded merely as sap and not as oil? This contradicts this mishna, which assumes that it is regarded as oil.
  Rav Yosef said: It is not difficult to resolve this contradiction. This <i>baraita</i> expresses the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and that mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As Rabbi Ḥiyya would toss such oil away, as he did not consider it to be oil, and Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, would dip his food into it, as he considered it to be oil. The Gemara concludes: And your mnemonic by which to remember their respective opinions is: The wealthy are parsimonious, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, was wealthy, and he did not toss the oil away.
  § The Gemara digresses to discuss oil of myrrh: In describing the treatments provided to the women in preparation for their meeting with King Ahasuerus, the verse states: “For so were the days of their anointing accomplished: Six months with oil of myrrh, and six months with sweet odors and with other ointments of the women” (Esther 2:12). The Gemara asks: What is “oil of myrrh”? Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya says: It is the aromatic oil called <i>setakhta</i>. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba says: It is an oil derived from olives that have not yet reached one-third of their growth; the acidic oil is effective as a depilatory.
  The Gemara notes: This explanation of Rav Yirmeya bar Abba is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says: The term <i>anpikanon</i> is referring to olive oil produced from olives that have not yet reached one-third of their growth. And why do women spread it on their bodies? They do so because it removes the hair and pampers the skin.
  § The mishna teaches: One may not bring meal offerings containing oil from olives that were soaked in water, nor from pickled olives, nor from boiled olives, and even if one did bring it, it is not valid. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Olive oil produced from pickled olives, boiled olives, or olives soaked in water, and oil made from olive sediment, and oil with a foul odor may not be brought as part of a meal offering, and even if one did bring it, it is not valid.
  Rava asks: If one consecrated one of these unfit oils for use in meal offerings, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether he should be flogged for consecrating it due to the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item as an offering? Does one say that since it is unfit, it is comparable to a blemished animal? Or perhaps the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item applies only to an animal. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: There are three harvests of olives each year, and in each of them, three different grades of oils are produced.
  How is the first olive harvest processed? One picks the ripe olives at the top of the olive tree, as those are the first to ripen, and crushes them in a mortar and places them inside the bottom of a wicker basket that has many small holes in it. The oil will then drip from the olives through those holes into a vessel placed underneath the basket. Rabbi Yehuda says: One positions the olives on the walls, surrounding the basket. This produces more refined oil, as the dregs stick to the walls of the basket. This is the first grade of oil produced from the first harvest.
  After the oil ceases to seep from the crushed olives, one then presses down with a wooden beam upon them, causing additional oil to flow from the basket into the vessel. Rabbi Yehuda says: The excessive pressure produced by pressing down with a beam would cause some of the flesh of the olives to get mixed in with the oil, compromising its quality. Rather, one applies pressure by placing stones upon the olives. This is the second grade of oil.
  One then ground the olives with a millstone and pressed down with a beam on those olives to extract any remaining oil; this is the third grade of oil.
  The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, which requires: “Refined olive oil” (Leviticus 24:2), and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings.
  How is the second olive harvest processed? One picks the crop of olives that is accessible while one is standing on the rooftop. This was the second lot of olives to ripen. And one crushes it in a mortar and places those olives into a wicker basket, allowing the oil to drip through the holes into a vessel underneath. Rabbi Yehuda says: One positions the olives on the walls, surrounding the basket. This is the first grade of oil from the second harvest.
  One then presses down upon those olives with a wooden beam, thereby producing more oil. And Rabbi Yehuda says: One applies pressure only by placing stones upon them. This is the second grade of oil.
  One then ground the olives with a millstone and pressed down upon them with a beam, thereby extracting any remaining oil; this is the third grade of oil.
  The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings.
  How is the third olive harvest processed? This harvest consists of all the olives that still remain on trees. One packs it into a vat [<i>oteno</i>] in the building that houses the olive press [<i>beit habbad</i>] where it remains until it softens, and then one raises it up to the roof and dries it on the rooftop to remove the foul-smelling liquid secreted from the olives while in the vat. Then, one crushes the olives in a mortar and places them into a wicker basket, allowing the oil to drip through the holes into a vessel underneath. Rabbi Yehuda says: One positions them on the walls, surrounding the basket. This is the first grade of oil.
  One then presses down on those olives with a wooden beam, thereby producing more oil. And Rabbi Yehuda says: One applies pressure only by placing stones upon them. This is the second grade of oil.
  One would then grind the olives with a millstone and press down upon them with a beam, thereby extracting any remaining oil; this is the third grade of oil.
  The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the correct text of the mishna? Do we learn that one picks the olives at the top [<i>megargero</i>], i.e., one selects those that are ripe, or do we learn that one allows all the olives to ripen [<i>megalgelo</i>], and then picks them all?
  The Gemara answers: Come and hear the resolution to this dilemma from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>. The verse states that the olive oil used for the kindling of the Candelabrum is to be: “Refined oil of an olive” (Exodus 27:20), which is interpreted to mean that the olives should be so ripe that the oil drips from them while they are still hanging on their olive tree, without them needing to be pressed. From here the Sages said that for the first olive harvest, one allows all the olives to ripen [<i>megalgelo</i>], picks the entire crop and brings it into the olive press, and he grinds it with a millstone and places it in wicker baskets, and this oil that would flow from it would be the first grade of oil.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Then one presses down upon the olives with a wooden beam. As for the oil that flows from it, this would be the second grade of oil. And then one would remove the crushed olives from the baskets and grind them, and press down upon them with a beam or stones, thereby extracting any remaining oil; this would be the third grade of oil. The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings. And the same process was similarly used for the second olive harvest.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And for the third olive harvest, the entire crop is packed into a vat in the building that houses the olive press, where it remains until it softens, and then one raises it up to the roof and makes it into a sort of heap, wide at the bottom and narrow at the top, and leaves it there until the fluid it produced while in the vat flows away. And then one brings it to the olive press and grinds it with a millstone and places it into wicker baskets. As for the oil that would then flow from it, this would be the first grade of oil.
  Then one presses down upon it with a wooden beam. As for the oil that would then flow from it, this would be the second grade of oil. And then one would remove the crushed olives from the baskets and grind them, and press down upon them with a beam or stones, thereby extracting any remaining oil; this would be the third grade of oil. The first grade is fit for kindling the Candelabrum, and the rest are fit for use in meal offerings.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Rabbis and says: One does not grind the crop of olives with a millstone; rather, one crushes it in a mortar. And one does not press down upon the olives with a wooden beam; rather, one presses on them with stones. And one does not place the olives into the bottom of the wicker baskets; rather, one positions them on the inner walls of the basket, all around the basket. In this <i>baraita</i>, the term: One allows all the olives to ripen [<i>megalgelo</i>], is used.
  Having resolved the dilemma based on the <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara now clarifies the ruling of the mishna in light of it. The Gemara asks: This mishna itself is difficult, as the first <i>tanna</i> teaches that the olives should be crushed. From the <i>baraita</i> it is evident that whose opinion is it that the olives are crushed? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Yet, when the first <i>tanna</i> states that the olives are placed inside the bottom of the basket, and not on its walls, we arrive at the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda in the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara explains: This <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one issue, i.e., the need to crush the olives, but disagrees with him with regard to another issue, i.e., he holds that the olives should be placed inside the basket, not on its walls.
  MISHNA: Having enumerated the nine grades of oils in the previous mishna, this mishna proceeds to rank them by their quality: As for the first grade of oil that is produced from the first harvest, there is none superior to it. The second grade of oil that is produced from the first harvest and the first grade of oil that is produced from the second harvest are of equal quality; there is no reason to choose one over the other. The third grade of oil that is produced from the first harvest and the second grade of oil that is produced from the second harvest and the first grade of oil that is produced from the third harvest are of equal quality. The third grade of oil that is produced from the second harvest and the second grade of oil that is produced from the third harvest are of equal quality. As for the third grade of oil that is produced from the third harvest, there is none inferior to it.
  Also, with regard to all the meal offerings, it was logical that they should require the highest quality of refined olive oil, just like the Candelabrum. Because if the Candelabrum, whose oil is not to be consumed on the altar, requires refined olive oil, then meal offerings, which are to be consumed on the altar, is it not logical that they should require refined olive oil? To dispel this notion, the verse states: “Refined pounded olive oil for illumination” (Leviticus 24:2), which indicates that the high-quality, refined, pounded oil is required for the Candelabrum, but there is no need for refined pounded olive oil for meal offerings.
  
  Daf 86b
  
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: How can the mishna state that the second grade of the first harvest and the first grade of the second harvest are of equal quality? But didn’t you say that the first grade of each harvest is fit for kindling the Candelabrum and the rest are fit only for use in meal offerings? It would appear then that the first grade in any harvest is actually superior to the second grade of other harvests. To resolve this, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What does the mishna mean when it states that they are of equal quality? It means that they are equal with regard to meal offerings, and there is no reason to choose one over the other.
  § The mishna teaches: Also with regard to all the meal offerings, it was logical that they should require refined olive oil. To dispel this notion, the verse states: “Refined pounded olive oil for illumination” (Leviticus 24:2). The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse cited in the mishna: The word “refined” means nothing other than clean oil, which flows by itself from the olives without applying any pressure. Rabbi Yehuda says that the word “pounded” means nothing other than olives crushed with a mortar, but not with a millstone.
  One might have thought that refined, pounded oil is unfit for meal offerings, since the verse specifies that this oil is to be used for illumination. To dispel this notion, the verse states with regard to the meal offering brought with the daily offering: “And a tenth of fine flour, thoroughly mixed with a quarter of a <i>hin</i> of pounded oil” (Exodus 29:40). This indicates that pounded oil is fit to be used in meal offerings. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states that the refined pounded oil is “for illumination”? Rather, the Torah requires the use of refined pounded oil only for the Candelabrum, due to the sparing [<i>haḥisakhon</i>] of money, as the highest-quality oil is very expensive.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason for being sparing? Rabbi Elazar says: The intention is that the Torah spared the money of the Jewish people and did not require that the highest-quality oil be used for the meal offerings.
  § The Gemara discusses the Candelabrum and other aspects of the Temple. The verse states: “Command the children of Israel, and they shall take for yourself refined pounded olive oil for illumination, to kindle the lamps continually” (Leviticus 24:2). Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: God tells the Jewish people that the oil should be taken “for yourself,” to indicate that it is for their benefit and not for My benefit, as I do not need its light.
  Similarly, with regard to the Table of the shewbread, located in the north of the Sanctuary, and the Candelabrum, located in the south of the Sanctuary, Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Elazar says: God said to the Jewish people: I do not require the Table for eating, nor do I require the Candelabrum for its illumination. In evidence of this, the Candelabrum was not positioned close to the Table, as is done by one who sets a table with food in order to eat there.
  With regard the Temple built by King Solomon, the verse states: “And he made for the House, windows narrow and broad” (I Kings 6:4). The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Typically, windows are constructed to widen toward the inside in order that the light from the outside would be dispersed throughout the room. For the Temple, God said: Make the windows narrow within and broad without, as I do not require its illumination. On the contrary, the light of the Temple is to be radiated outward.
  God instructed Aaron to kindle the Candelabrum: “Outside the Curtain of the testimony in the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 24:3). The dividing curtain is referred to here as: The Curtain of the testimony, to indicate that the illumination of the Candelabrum is testimony to all of humanity that the Divine Presence rests among the Jewish people.
  And if you question this and say: How is this testimony; perhaps the Candelabrum is lit for illumination? To this God would respond: Do I need its light? But isn’t it so that for all forty years that the Jewish people walked in the wilderness of Sinai until they entered Eretz Yisrael, they walked exclusively by His light, i.e., from the pillar of fire that guided them at night. If God provides light for others, he certainly does not need it Himself. Rather, evidently, the illumination of the Candelabrum is testimony to all of humanity that the Divine Presence rests among the Jewish people.
  What provides its testimony? Rava says: The testimony is provided by the westernmost lamp of the Candelabrum, in which they place a quantity of oil equivalent to that placed in the other lamps, and nevertheless it continues to burn longer than any of the other lamps. It burns so long that every evening, from it the priest would kindle the Candelabrum, i.e., he lit that westernmost lamp first, and the following morning, with it he would conclude the preparation of the lamps for the following evening’s lighting, because it remained alight longer than any of the other lamps. This perpetual miracle was testimony to God’s continuous presence among His people.
  MISHNA: From where would they bring the wine for libations? Keduḥim and Attulin are the primary sources for wine. Secondary to them is Beit Rima and Beit Lavan, located in the mountain, and the village of Signa, located in the valley. All the regions were valid sources for wine; but it was from here, i.e., the aforementioned locations, that they would bring the wine.
  One may not bring libations of wine that come from a fertilized vineyard, or from an irrigated vineyard, or from a vineyard in which grain was sown between the vines. But if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is valid. One may not bring libations from sweet wine made from sun-dried grapes [<i>hilyasteyon</i>], but if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is valid. One may not bring wine aged for one year; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but the Rabbis deem it valid. One may not bring libations from sweet wine, nor from wine produced from smoked grapes, nor libations from boiled wine, and if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is not valid. And one may not bring wine produced from grapes suspended on stakes or trees; rather, one brings it from grapes at foot height, i.e., that rest on the ground, which are superior-quality grapes, and from vineyards that are cultivated, i.e., where one hoes beneath the vines twice a year.
  And when producing wine for libations, one should not collect the wine into large barrels, as it causes the wine to spoil; rather, it should be placed in small casks. And one does not fill up the cask until its mouth; rather, one leaves some empty space so that its fragrance will collect there and diffuse when the lid is opened.
  One should not bring libations from wine that rests at the mouth of the cask due to
  
  Daf 87a
  
  the flour-like white scum that floats on the surface, nor from the wine at bottom of the cask due to the sediment that collects there. Rather, one brings from the wine in its middle third.
  How does the Temple treasurer inspect the wine to determine that it is from the middle of the cask? The treasurer sits alongside the cask and has the measuring reed in his hand. The spigot is opened and the wine begins to flow. When he sees that the wine emerging draws with it chalk-like scum [<i>hagir</i>], he immediately knocks with the reed to indicate that the spigot should be closed.
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Wine in which there is flour-like white scum is unfit for libations, as it is stated with regard to animal offerings: “Unblemished they shall be for you…and their meal offering shall be fine flour mixed with oil…unblemished they shall be for you, and their libations” (Numbers 28:19–20, 31). This indicates that animal offerings, meal offerings, and libations must all be brought from flawless products. Therefore, the presence of flour-like white scum in wine renders it unfit.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One may not bring libations from sweet wine, nor from boiled wine, nor from wine produced from smoked grapes, and if one did bring a libation from such wine, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the first clause teach: One may not bring libations from sweet wine made from sun-dried grapes, but if one did bring a libation from such wine it is valid? How can one clause teach that a libation of one type of sweet wine is valid, and the other clause teach that a libation of another type of sweet wine is not valid?
  Ravina said: The text of the mishna is corrupt. To correct it, combine the two clauses into one and teach with regard to all the wines mentioned that they are unfit to be used for libations. Rav Ashi said: The text of the mishna is correct. The reason for the difference between the two wines is that the sweetness of grapes sweetended by the sun is not objectionable, so libations of wine made from such grapes are valid, while sweetness that results from the sugars of the fruit itself is objectionable, so libations of wine made from such grapes are not valid.
  § The mishna teaches: One may not bring wine aged for one year; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but the Rabbis deem it valid. The Gemara provides the source for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling. Rabbi Ḥizkiyya said: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? The verse states with regard to the libations that accompany the New Moon offering: “And their libations: Half a <i>hin</i> for a bull, a third of a <i>hin</i> for a ram, and a quarter of a <i>hin</i> for a lamb, of wine” (Numbers 28:14). The juxtaposition of the terms lamb and wine teaches that just as a lamb is fit to be used as an offering only if brought in its first year, so too wine is fit to be used as a libation only if it is in its first year.
  The Gemara ask: If so, take the analogy further and conclude that just as if one offers a lamb in its second year, it is not valid, so too a libation of wine in its second year is not valid. And if you would say that this is indeed the <i>halakha</i>, that is difficult: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that wine in its second year may not be brought <i>ab initio</i>, but if one did bring it as a libation, it is valid? That <i>baraita</i> certainly expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as whom did you hear who said that aged wine may not be brought? Only Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who explicitly states this opinion in the mishna. And yet he says in the <i>baraita</i>: If one did bring a libation of aged wine, it is valid. According to Rabbi Ḥizkiyya’s explanation of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion, such an opinion is illogical.
  Rather, Rava said: This is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: As it is written in the verse exhorting a person not to be enticed by fine wines: “Look not upon the wine when it is red” (Proverbs 23:31). Evidently, the redness of wine is indicative of its quality. After a year, wine begins to lose its redness and so it should not be used, <i>ab initio</i>. Nevertheless, it is still of a sufficient quality to be acceptable, after the fact.
  § The mishna teaches: One may not bring wine produced from grapes suspended on stakes or trees; rather, one brings wine produced from grapes at foot height and from vineyards that are cultivated. The definition of vineyards that are cultivated is clarified in a <i>baraita</i> that taught: Vineyards that are cultivated twice a year. This is done by hoeing the earth underneath the vines.
  The Gemara relates the efficacy of cultivating the land twice a year: Rav Yosef had a tract of land that was used an orchard [<i>depardeisa</i>] to which he used to give an extra hoeing, and consequently it produced wine of such superior quality that when preparing the wine for drinking it required a dilution using twice the amount of water than that which is usually used to dilute wine.
  § The mishna teaches: When people produced wine for libations they would not collect the wine into large barrels, as it causes the wine to spoil; rather, it would be placed in small casks. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The casks referred to by the mishna are flasks that are made in Lod and that are medium-sized.
  The Gemara adds another <i>halakha</i>: When storing casks containing wine for libations, they should not be placed in twos, i.e., one atop the other, but rather singly, i.e., each one should be placed separately.
  § The mishna teaches: How does the Temple treasurer inspect wine to determine that it is from the middle of the cask? The treasurer sits alongside the cask and has the measuring reed in his hand. The spigot is opened and the wine begins to flow. If he sees that the wine emerging draws with it chalk-like scum, he immediately knocks with the reed to indicate that the spigot should be closed. The precise point at which he knocks is clarified in a <i>baraita</i> that taught: If the wine draws with it chalk-like scum, which comes from the sediment, he knocks with the reed.
  The Gemara challenges: Why does the treasurer knock with the reed; let him simply speak. The Gemara explains: This supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Just as speech is beneficial to the incense spices, so is speech detrimental to wine, and so the treasurer avoids speaking.
  § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Wine in which there is flour-like white scum is unfit for libations. Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma concerning such wine: If one consecrated it to be used as a libation, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to whether he should be flogged for consecrating it due to the prohibition against consecrating a flawed item as an offering? Does one say that since it is unfit, it is comparable to a blemished animal? Or perhaps, the prohibition to consecrate a flawed item applies only to an animal. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  § Having discussed which flours, oils, and wine are fit to be offered in the Temple, the Gemara considers which animals are of sufficient quality to be used as offerings. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The choicest rams are those from Moab; the choicest lambs are those from Hebron; the choicest calves are those from Sharon; and the choicest fledglings, i.e., doves and pigeons, are those from the King’s Mountain.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: One should bring lambs whose height is like their width, i.e., they are so robust that they are as wide as they are tall. Rava bar Rav Sheila said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is written: “And He will give the rain for your seed, with which you sow the ground, and bread of the produce of the ground, and it shall be fat and bountiful; your cattle shall graze in wide pastures [<i>kar nirḥav</i>] on that day” (Isaiah 30:23). The word “<i>kar</i>” can also mean a lamb, and “<i>nirḥav</i>” means wide. Accordingly, Rabbi Yehuda interprets this verse, on a homiletical level, to be alluding to robust sheep.
  The chapter concludes by quoting an additional prophecy of Isaiah concerning the rebuilding of Eretz Yisrael: It is written: “I have set watchmen upon your walls, Jerusalem; they shall never be silent day nor night; those who remind the Lord, take no rest” (Isaiah 62:6). This is referring to the angels appointed by God to bring the redemption. The Gemara asks: What do these watchmen say to remind the Lord? This is what Rava bar Rav Sheila said: They recite the verse: “You will arise and have compassion upon Zion; for it is time to be gracious to her, for the appointed time has come” (Psalms 102:14).
  Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They recite the verse: “The Lord builds up Jerusalem, He gathers together the dispersed of Israel” (Psalms 147:2). The Gemara asks: And initially, when the Temple still stood and the Jewish people were gathered together in Eretz Yisrael, what would the watchmen say? Rava bar Rav Sheila says: They would say: “For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it for His habitation. This is My resting place forever; here will I dwell for I have desired it” (Psalms 132:13–14).
  
  MISHNA: Two sizes of measuring vessels for dry substances were used in the Temple for measuring flour for the meal offerings. One held a tenth of an ephah and the other held one-half of a tenth of an ephah. Rabbi Meir says: There were three measuring vessels; one that held a tenth of an ephah, another one that also held a tenth of an ephah, and a third one that held one-half of a tenth of an ephah.
  What purpose did the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel serve? It was the vessel with which one would measure flour for all the meal offerings. One would not measure the flour by using a measuring vessel of a size that held the entire volume of flour required at once, i.e., neither with a vessel of three-tenths of an ephah for the meal offering accompanying the sacrifice of a bull, nor with a vessel of two-tenths of an ephah for the meal offering accompanying the sacrifice of a ram. Rather, one measures the flour for them by repeatedly using the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel to measure the required number of tenths.
  What purpose did the one-half of a tenth of an ephah measuring vessel serve? It was the vessel with which one would measure the flour for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering. A tenth of an ephah was required each day; he sacrificed half of it in the morning and the other half of it in the afternoon.
  GEMARA: The Gemara cites a <i>baraita</i> that clarifies Rabbi Meir’s opinion. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Meir would say: What is the meaning when the verse states: “A tenth, a tenth, for every lamb” (Numbers 28:29)? The fact the word “tenth” appears twice teaches that there were two measuring vessels that each held a tenth of an ephah in the Temple. One of them held that volume when it was heaped, and the other one was slightly larger and held that same volume when the flour was leveled with the rim.
  The one that held a tenth of an ephah when heaped was the vessel with which one would measure the flour for all the meal offerings.
  
  Daf 87b
  
  The one that held a tenth of an ephah when leveled was the vessel with which one would measure the flour for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, and then that flour would be divided into two equal parts.
  And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Meir and say: There was only one measuring vessel that held a tenth of an ephah there in the Temple, as it is stated: “And one tenth-part for every lamb” (Numbers 29:4). But if so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “A tenth, a tenth, for every lamb” (Numbers 28:29)? Rabbi Meir derived from the repetition of “a tenth” that there were two measuring vessels that held a tenth of an ephah. How do the Rabbis expound that? They hold it serves to include another measuring vessel for dry substances, one that holds one-half of a tenth of an ephah.
  Having cited the <i>baraita</i>, the Gemara discusses each opinion: And as for Rabbi Meir, from where does he derive that there was a measuring vessel that held one-half of a tenth of an ephah? He derives it from the superfluous “and” in the phrase “and one tenth-part for every lamb.” The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, why don’t they expound this from the term “and”? They do not derive anything from “and.” They hold that the addition of the word is not significant enough to be expounded.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Meir, this verse: “And one tenth-part for every lamb,” from which the Rabbis derive that there was only one measuring vessel of a tenth of an ephah, what does he do with it? The Gemara answers: That verse teaches that one should not measure the flour by using a measuring vessel of a size that holds the entire volume of flour required, i.e., neither with a vessel that holds three-tenths of an ephah for the meal offering accompanying the sacrifice of a bull, nor with a vessel that holds two-tenths of an ephah for the meal offering accompanying the sacrifice of a ram. Rather, one measures the flour for them by using the tenth-ephah measuring vessel multiple times.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive that <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara explains: They derive it from its dot. In the Torah text, a dot appears above the term “a tenth.” This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: Why is the letter <i>vav</i> in the middle of the term “a tenth [<i>issaron</i>]” dotted the first time that the term “a tenth” appears in the verse concerning the first festival day of the Festival of <i>Sukkot</i>? The verse there states: “And a tenth, a tenth, for every lamb of the fourteen lambs” (Numbers 29:15). This serves to teach that one should not measure flour using a vessel of a size that holds the entire volume required, i.e., neither with a vessel that holds three-tenths of an ephah for the meal offering of a bull, nor with a vessel that holds two-tenths of an ephah for the meal offering of a ram. And as for Rabbi Meir, what does he derive from the dot? He does not derive anything from its dot. He holds that the dot is not significant enough to be expounded.
  § The mishna teaches: What purpose did the one-half of a tenth of an ephah measuring vessel serve? It was the vessel with which one would measure the flour for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering. A tenth of an ephah was required each day; he sacrificed half in the morning and the other half in the afternoon. From the mishna it appears that each half-tenth is measured separately.
  The mishna indicates that the half-tenth vessel was used for measuring. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from a mishna (50b): The twelve loaves of <i>matza</i>, baked from a tenth of an ephah of flour, of the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest did not come from the house of the High Priest in halves. Rather, the High Priest brings from his house a complete tenth of an ephah of flour (see Leviticus 6:13) and divides it in half, and he sacrifices half in the morning and half in the afternoon. It is apparent from this mishna that the tenth of an ephah is first measured in its entirety and only then divided.
  To resolve the contradiction Rav Sheshet said: What is the meaning of: Used for measuring, that the mishna here teaches? It means only that the High Priest would divide the tenth of an ephah into two equal portions using the half-tenth measure, but the quantity would initially be measured in its entirety, as the mishna on 50b states.
  § In light of Rabbi Meir’s opinion that there were two vessels for measuring a tenth of an ephah, one that held its measure when leveled and one when it was heaped, Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: With regard to the one-half of a tenth of an ephah measuring vessel, according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, was it one that held its measure when heaped or was it one that held its measure when leveled?
  Before citing Rav Ḥisda’s response, the Gemara provides a mnemonic that alludes to the three dilemmas it will immediately present: Half; griddle-cake offering; Table. This alludes to one-half of a tenth of an ephah; the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering; and the shewbread Table.
  Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: But why do you ask specifically with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir? The dilemma can be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis. Rami bar Ḥama answered: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, it would be with regard to the measuring vessel of a tenth of an ephah itself that one raises the dilemma, asking whether it was one that held its measure when heaped or was one that held its measure when leveled. The dilemma I raised concerned the half-tenth vessel, which is pertinent specifically according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as he holds that there were both heaped and leveled measuring vessels of a tenth of an ephah.
  In answer to Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma, Rav Ḥisda said to him: From the opinion of Rabbi Meir concerning the vessel of a tenth of an ephah we can extrapolate what Rabbi Meir holds concerning the vessel of one-half of a tenth of an ephah; and from that opinion of Rabbi Meir we can extrapolate what the Rabbis hold concerning both vessels.
  Rav Ḥisda elaborates: From the fact that Rabbi Meir said that the vessel of a tenth of an ephah used for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering held its measure when leveled, we can extrapolate that the vessel of one-half of a tenth, as well, was such that it held its measure when leveled. It is reasonable that since both vessels were used for the same offering, they should be of the same type. And from the fact that Rabbi Meir holds that vessels used for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering held their measures when leveled, we can extrapolate that also according to the Rabbis, who hold that both vessels were used for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, both of them held their measures when leveled.
  Rami bar Ḥama raised another dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: With regard to the dough used for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, with what would one divide it into the loaves of the offering, six in the morning and six in the afternoon? Was the division done with one’s hand or with a measuring vessel? Rav Ḥisda said to him: It is obvious that it was divided with one’s hand, as if one suggests that it was done with a measuring vessel, would one bring scales [<i>turtanei</i>] into the Temple courtyard for this purpose?
  Rami bar Ḥama responds: And let him bring scales into the courtyard. Rav Ḥisda explains: Since in God’s admonition of the Jewish people the act of weighing bread is written as part of a curse: “When I break your staff of bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, and they shall deliver your bread again by weight; and you shall eat and not be satisfied” (Leviticus 26:26), as weighing bread is generally performed only at a time of famine, therefore it is not proper conduct to weigh the dough in the Temple.
  Rami bar Ḥama raised another dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: With regard to the shewbread Table, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether it consecrates handfuls removed from meal offerings or from frankincense that were not consecrated by being placed in a service vessel, as they should have been, but were instead placed on the upper part of the Table, between the rows of shewbread? The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: Does one say that from the fact that the Table consecrates the loaves of shewbread placed upon it, it follows that it also consecrates handfuls placed upon it? Or perhaps the Table consecrates only that which is fit for it, i.e., the loaves, but it does not consecrate that which is not fit for it, such as the handfuls.
  Rav Ḥisda said to him: The Table does not consecrate these handfuls. Rami bar Ḥama retorted: Is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The shewbread loaves were longer than the length of the Table. Accordingly, it was necessary to fold the edges of the loaves in order that they would rest entirely upon the Table itself and not protrude past its edges. How much of each side needed to be folded up is subject to a tannaitic dispute concerning the length of the Table (see 96a). According to the statement of the one who says that one folds two and a half handbreadths from each side of the loaves, it emerges that the Table consecrates fifteen handbreadths above it, as there were six loaves on each side of the Table, which were each two and a half handbreadths high. And according to the statement of the one who says that one folds two handbreadths from each side of the loaves, it emerges that the Table consecrates twelve handbreadths above it. Rabbi Yoḥanan stated that the Table consecrates that which is placed above it, regardless of whether it is fit for the Table or not.
  Rav Ḥisda said to him: When I said that the Table does not consecrate the handfuls, I meant that it does not consecrate them to the extent that they can be sacrificed on the altar. But it certainly consecrates them to the extent that they will be disqualified by the same disqualifications that apply to handfuls that were consecrated by being placed in a service vessel, e.g., by being left overnight or by coming in contact with a ritually impure person who had immersed that day.
  MISHNA: There were seven measuring vessels for liquids in the Temple. There was a vessel of one <i>hin</i>, i.e., twelve <i>log</i>. Three vessels were used to measure the oil and wine for the meal offerings and libations that accompanied the sacrifice of an animal. For a bull there was a vessel of one-half of a <i>hin</i>, i.e., six <i>log</i>; and for a ram there was one of one-third of a <i>hin</i>, i.e., four <i>log</i>; and for a lamb there was one of one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>, i.e., three <i>log</i>.
  In addition, there was a vessel that held one <i>log</i> to measure the oil for all standard meal offerings; and another one that held one-half of a <i>log</i> for measuring the water used in the rite of a woman suspected by her husband of having been unfaithful [<i>sota</i>] and also for the oil used in the loaves accompanying the thanks offering (see 88a); and another one that held one-quarter of a <i>log</i> for measuring the water used in the purification of a leper and also for the oil used in the wafers and loaves that the nazirite brings on the day that his term of naziriteship ends.
  Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: It was not necessary to have several vessels of different sizes; rather, there were graduations [<i>shenatot</i>] on the vessel that held one <i>hin</i> indicating that until here is the quantity needed for the bull, and until here is the quantity needed for the ram, and until here is the quantity needed for the lamb.
  Rabbi Shimon says: There was no vessel there in the Temple that held one <i>hin</i>, as what purpose could a one-hin vessel serve? That volume of liquid was never used in an offering. Rather, there was an additional measuring vessel of one and a half <i>log</i> there, in the Temple, which completed the tally of seven vessels, with which one would measure the oil used for the griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest; one and a half <i>log</i> were used in the morning and one and a half <i>log</i> in the afternoon.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There were seven measuring vessels for liquids in the Temple. Listed in ascending order of size, they held: One-quarter of a <i>log</i>; one-half of a <i>log</i>; one <i>log</i>; one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>; one-third of a <i>hin</i>; one-half of a <i>hin</i>; and one <i>hin</i>. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says that there were these seven vessels but he lists them in descending order: One <i>hin</i>; one-half of a <i>hin</i>; one-third of a <i>hin</i>; one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>; one <i>log</i>; one-half of a <i>log</i>; and one-quarter of a <i>log</i>. Rabbi Shimon says: There was no vessel there in the Temple that held one <i>hin</i>, as what purpose could a one-hin vessel serve? That volume of liquid was never used in an offering.
  
  Daf 88a
  
  If so, which size vessel shall I bring in its stead to complete the tally of seven vessels? Rather, there was an additional measuring vessel of one and a half <i>log</i> there in the Temple, with which one would measure the oil used for the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest; one and a half <i>log</i> were used in the morning and one and a half <i>log</i> in the afternoon.
  The Rabbis said to Rabbi Shimon: There is no need for a dedicated vessel for the one and a half <i>log</i> for the High Priest’s offering, as there was a vessel of one-half of a <i>log</i> there, in the Temple, and it is possible to calculate the required one and a half <i>log</i> by using the vessel of one-half of a <i>log</i> three times.
  Rabbi Shimon said to them: But according to your statement as well, one should not fashion a vessel of one-half of a <i>log</i> or of one <i>log</i>, as there was a vessel of one-quarter of a <i>log</i> there, and it is possible to calculate whatever quantity is required by repeatedly using the vessel of one-quarter of a <i>log</i>. Rather, this was the principle with regard to measuring vessels in the Temple: A measuring vessel that was used for measuring this quantity was not used to measure a different quantity.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes with an opinion that is also stated in the mishna: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: There were graduations on the vessel that held one <i>hin</i>, indicating the respective quantities needed for the bull, the ram, and the lamb.
  The Gemara analyzes the <i>baraita</i>. What difference is there between the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda? They both list the same seven vessels, but in a different order. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The practical difference between them concerns whether the vessels consecrate the overflow [<i>beirutzei</i>] of the measuring vessels, i.e., the liquid that flows down over the outer walls of the vessel when it is filled beyond capacity.
  According to the one who said that the vessels should be listed in ascending order of size, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, he holds that the overflow of measuring vessels is consecrated. His reasoning is as follows: When Moses was commanded to fashion these vessels, the Merciful One initially gave Moses a measuring vessel of one-quarter of a <i>hin</i> and said to him: With this vessel calculate the various quantities needed and fashion vessels accordingly. So, for example, to calculate one-half of a <i>hin</i>, Moses would twice fill up the vessel of one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>, each time pouring it into a larger vessel. When pouring from a small vessel into a larger one, the overflow also enters the larger one and so it is included in the calculation. Evidently, the overflow is also consecrated.
  According to the one who said that the vessels should be listed in descending order of size, i.e., Rabbi Meir, he holds that the overflow of measuring vessels is not consecrated. His reasoning is as follows: When Moses was commanded to fashion these vessels for the Temple, the Merciful One initially gave Moses a measuring vessel of one <i>hin</i> and said to him: With this vessel calculate the various quantities needed and fashion vessels accordingly. So, for example, to calculate one-half of a <i>hin</i>, Moses filled the vessel of one <i>hin</i> and divided it equally into two vessels. Then, to calculate one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>, he would equally divide the liquid in one of those vessels into another two vessels. When pouring from a large vessel into a smaller one, the overflow on the outer walls of the larger vessel does not enter the smaller vessel but instead falls to the ground. Therefore, the overflow is excluded from the calculation. Accordingly, there is no basis to say that the overflow is consecrated.
  Abaye said: Everyone, both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir, agrees that with regard to the overflow of measuring vessels, one could say that they are consecrated and one could say that they are not consecrated, i.e., their dispute is unrelated to this issue. But here they disagree with regard to the meaning of the term “full” in the verse: “And his offering was one silver dish, its weight was one hundred and thirty shekels, one silver basin of seventy shekels, after the shekel of the Sanctuary; both of them full of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering” (Numbers 7:13).
  The one who said that the vessels should be listed in descending order of size, i.e., Rabbi Meir, holds that the term “full” indicates that the size of each vessel should be exact, i.e., that it should hold neither less nor more than the prescribed amount. If one calculates the various sizes by first filling a vessel of the largest size, one <i>hin</i>, and then dividing its contents carefully between two smaller vessels and so on, one will arrive at accurate measurements. By contrast, if one starts with the smallest size and uses it multiple times to calculate larger quantities, then each time one pours he includes the overflow of the smaller vessel, and so the quantities calculated are slightly larger than prescribed.
  And the one who said that the vessels should be listed in ascending order of size, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda, holds that the intention of the term “full” is that the size of each vessel should not hold less than the prescribed amount, but if it holds more, that is still called full. Accordingly, the various quantities can be calculated by starting with the smallest vessel.
  In the mishna and the <i>baraita</i> cited above the Master said that in contrast to the opinion of the Rabbis, Rabbi Shimon says: There was no vessel there in the Temple that held one <i>hin</i>, as what purpose could a one-<i>hin</i> vessel serve? That volume of liquid was never used in an offering. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Shimon is saying well to the Rabbis, i.e., this is a reasonable objection. And what would the Rabbis say? Why is there a measuring vessel of one <i>hin</i>? The Gemara answers: It was the vessel of one <i>hin</i> that Moses fashioned in the wilderness for measuring the anointing oil with which the Tabernacle, its vessels, and the priests were anointed, as it is written: “And of olive oil a <i>hin</i>. And you shall make it a holy anointing oil” (Exodus 30:24–25).
  The Gemara explains the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. One Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that since there was no further need for the vessel of one <i>hin</i> in future generations, Moses fashioned it only for the sake of that time, and then afterward it was sequestered. And the other Sage, the Rabbis, holds that since it was fashioned and used in the time of Moses, it was kept in the Temple despite the fact there was no longer a need for it.
  The Master said in the <i>baraita</i> that after claiming that there was no vessel of one <i>hin</i>, Rabbi Shimon asked: If so, which size vessel shall I bring in its stead to complete the tally of seven vessels? The Gemara asks: Is it not possible to simply not include a seventh vessel? What compels him to list a seventh? The Gemara explains: It is just as Ravina said with regard to a different matter: It is learned as a tradition that there are two instances in which placing hands on the head of the offering is required for communal offerings. Here too, one must say that it is learned as a tradition that there were seven measuring vessels for liquids in the Temple.
  The mishna teaches: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: It was not necessary to have separate vessels for the meal offerings and libations of each type of animal. Rather, there were graduations on the vessel that held one <i>hin</i> indicating the measures for the various offerings. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok, have the tradition that there were seven measuring vessels? The Gemara concedes: He does not have that tradition. And if you wish, say instead that he has that tradition, but he understands that what is meant by seven measuring vessels? It means that seven fixed ways of measuring should exist, but not that there must be seven different vessels.
  MISHNA: What purpose did the quarter-<i>log</i> measuring vessel serve? It was used to measure a quarter-<i>log</i> of water for the purification of the leper, and a quarter-<i>log</i> of oil for the wafers and loaves that the nazirite brings on the day that his term of naziriteship ends.
  What purpose did the half-<i>log</i> measuring vessel serve? It was used to measure a half-<i>log</i> of water for the rite of the <i>sota</i> and a half-<i>log</i> of oil for the three types of loaves of <i>matza</i> accompanying the thanks offering.
  And with the vessel of one <i>log</i>, one would measure the oil for all the standard meal offerings.
  Each tenth of an ephah of flour requires one <i>log</i> of oil. Accordingly, even if one brings a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of flour, one adds to it sixty <i>log</i> of oil. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Each meal offering, irrespective of its volume, even a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of flour, requires only its single <i>log</i> of oil, as it is stated with regard to the offering brought by a poor leper on the day of his purification: “And a tenth of an ephah of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering, and a <i>log</i> of oil” (Leviticus 14:21). The juxtaposition of “a meal offering” with “a <i>log</i> of oil” teaches a principle for all meal offerings: Each offering requires only one <i>log</i> of oil.
  The mishna lists the quantities of oil and wine that were required for the meal offerings and libations that accompanied the sacrifice of an animal. Six <i>log</i>, i.e., one-half of a <i>hin</i>, for those of a bull; and four <i>log</i>, i.e., one-third of a <i>hin</i>, for those of a ram; and three <i>log</i>, i.e., one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>, for those of a lamb.
  In addition, three and a half <i>log</i> of oil were required for the Candelabrum, as there were seven lamps and a half-<i>log</i> was required for each lamp.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was sitting in study and posed a difficulty: For what purpose was the quarter-<i>log</i> measuring vessel anointed with the anointing oil, thereby consecrating it a service vessel? If you suggest it was necessary in order to measure the water used in the purification of a leper,
  
  Daf 88b
  
  one can counter that the rite is performed outside the Temple, and so it does not require a service vessel. And if you suggest it was for measuring the oil for the loaves of a nazirite, one can counter that the loaves of a nazirite are consecrated through the slaughter of the ram he brings, and there is no need for the oil to have been consecrated through a service vessel.
  Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: The consecration of the quarter-<i>log</i> measuring vessel was necessary, as with it one would measure oil for the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, as a quarter-<i>log</i> of oil is used for each and every loaf. In praise for resolving his difficulty, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi read the verse about Rabbi Ḥiyya, who had traveled from Babylonia to join Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Eretz Yisrael: “The man of my counsel from a far country” (Isaiah 46:11).
  § The mishna teaches: What purpose did the half-<i>log</i> measuring vessel serve? It was used to measure a half-<i>log</i> of water for the <i>sota</i> and a half-<i>log</i> of oil for the thanks offering. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was sitting in study and posed a difficulty: For what purpose was the half-<i>log</i> measuring vessel anointed with the anointing oil, thereby consecrating it a service vessel? If you suggest it was necessary in order to measure the water used in the rite of the <i>sota</i>, one can counter: Is the water that was used non-sacred such that it is necessary to consecrate it? Isn’t it written: “And the priest shall take holy water in an earthen vessel” (Numbers 5:17)? And if you suggest that it was for measuring the oil for the loaves of a thanks offering, one can counter that the loaves of a thanks offering are consecrated through the slaughter of the thanks offering, and so there is no need for the oil to have been consecrated through a service vessel.
  Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said to his father: The consecration of the half-<i>log</i> measuring vessel was necessary, as with it one would distribute a half-<i>log</i> of oil to each and every lamp of the Candelabrum. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to his son in praise: Lamp of Israel! Indeed, that was its use.
  § Apropos the lamps of the Candelabrum, the Gemara relates that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If there is a lamp whose flame went out during the night, the oil in the lamp is halakhically rendered as ashes and the wick is rendered as ashes, and they may no longer be used. How should the priest act? He removes the ashes, i.e., the oil and wick, from the lamp, and puts new oil and a new wick into it and kindles it.
  Rav Zerika was sitting and studying this <i>halakha</i> and raised a dilemma: When the priest puts oil in the lamp, does he fill it with the same quantity of oil that was initially used, i.e., a half-<i>log</i>, or does he just fill it with an amount equal to what it now lacks, in order to replace the oil that was removed?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is obvious that he fills it with the same quantity of oil that was initially used, as, if he were to fill with an amount equal to what it now lacks, there would be a difficulty: How do we know how much oil it lacks? And if you would say that the priest calculates it using a measuring vessel, one could counter that if so, there would not be only seven measuring vessels for liquids; rather, there would have to be many more measuring vessels of a whole range of volumes.
  In praise for resolving his difficulty, Rabbi Zerika read the verse about Rabbi Yirmeya: “And in your majesty prosper, ride on, on behalf of truth and meekness and righteousness” (Psalms 45:5).
  An amoraic ruling was also stated in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yirmeya: Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say that Rabbi Abba says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: If there is a lamp whose flame went out during the night, the oil in the lamp is rendered as ashes and the wick is rendered as ashes, and they may no longer be used. How should the priest act? He removes the ashes, i.e., the oil and wick, from the lamp, and puts into it oil of the same quantity that was initially used, with a new wick, and kindles it.
  § Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda, says that Rav Sheshet says: Each lamp of the Candelabrum in the Temple was movable, as the branches holding it were thin and flexible. They could therefore be bent over in order to tip out any ashes, remaining oil, or wicks from the lamps. The basis for his opinion is the verse: “And you shall make a Candelabrum of pure gold, of beaten work the Candelabrum shall be made, its base, and its shaft; its cups, its knobs, and its flowers, will be from it…of a talent of pure gold it shall be made” (Exodus 25:31, 39).
  The Gemara explains that Rav Sheshet holds that when it is written that the Candelabrum is to be fashioned from a single talent of gold, and that it be beaten into its form, it is written with regard to both the frame of Candelabrum and each of its lamps, i.e., they must all be fashioned together from a single piece of gold beaten into its form. Perforce, the lamps must have been movable, because since it is necessary to remove the ashes from the lamps, were each lamp not movable, it would not be possible to remove the ashes.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Sheshet’s opinion from a <i>baraita</i>: How would the priest act when removing the ashes from the lamps? He would remove the lamps from the Candelabrum and place them in the Tent of Meeting, i.e., the Sanctuary, and scrub them with a sponge [<i>bisfog</i>] to remove any remaining oil. And then he would put fresh oil into them and kindle them. Evidently, the lamps and the frame of the Candelabrum were separate parts.
  The Gemara explains that there is a dispute between <i>tanna’im</i> concerning this issue and Rav Sheshet states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of that <i>tanna</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The Rabbis say that when removing the ashes, the priest would not move the lamp from its place; rather, he would remove the ashes while the lamp was still attached to the frame.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the <i>baraita</i> states that the priest would not move the lamp from its place, it would appear that if one wanted to move it, he was able to move it from its place. Apparently, then, the lamps were independent parts. The Gemara explains: Rather, emend the <i>baraita</i> to say: The lamp would not move from its place, as the lamps were not independent removable parts but were formed together with the frame from a single piece of gold.
  The Gemara asks: And whose opinion is expressed by the Rabbis in the <i>baraita</i>? It is the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as it is taught in another <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: There was a kind of gold plate [<i>tas</i>] for each lamp, which was placed on top of it and which served as a cover for the lamp. The plate was attached to one side of the lamp, to the lamp’s head, and the wick emerged from the other side, from the lamp’s mouth. When the priest would come to remove the ashes from the lamp, he would first push up on the part of the plate at the mouth of the lamp, thereby exposing its contents. The lamp would then be bent over and its contents tipped out. And when he would come to place fresh oil and a wick in the lamp, he would place the new wick at its mouth and then push down on the plate at the head of the lamp, thereby closing it, then he would straighten it up and pour in the oil through a hole in the middle of the plate.
  The Gemara comments: And whether or not the lamps were independent removable parts is the subject of a dispute between these following <i>tanna’im</i>, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Both the frame of the Candelabrum and its lamps are produced together from the same talent of gold. But its tongs and its pans, which were the implements used for removing the ashes, were not fashioned from that same gold talent. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Only the frame of the Candelabrum is produced from the talent of gold, but its lamps and its tongs and its pans are not produced from that same gold talent; rather, they are formed independently. The lamps are then positioned on the frame, but can still be removed from it.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what do these <i>tanna’im</i> disagree? The Gemara explains: They disagree with regard to the exposition of this verse, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: From the verse: “Of a talent of pure gold it shall be fashioned with all these vessels” (Exodus 25:39), we learned about the frame of the Candelabrum that it is produced from the gold talent. From where is it derived to include its lamps, that they should also be fashioned together with the frame from the same talent? The verse states: “It shall be fashioned with all these vessels.” This indicates that not only the frame, but also additional parts should be fashioned from the same talent. If so, one might have thought that I should include even its tongs and its pans. To counter this, the verse states: “It shall be fashioned.” The additional word “it” teaches that only the frame and the lamps are to be fashioned from the gold talent. This is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya.
  The Gemara interrupts the citation of the <i>baraita</i> and notes that the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya in this <i>baraita</i>, in which he claims the lamps were fashioned from the talent with the frame, is difficult, as it is contradicted by the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya in the other <i>baraita</i>, in which he claims the lamps were independent parts. The Gemara explains: There are two <i>tanna’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya.
  The Gemara resumes its citation of the <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Only the frame of the Candelabrum was produced from the talent of gold, but its tongs and its pans and its lamps were not produced from the talent. Rather, how do I realize the meaning of the verse: “Of a talent of pure gold it shall be fashioned with all these vessels”? It teaches only that all the vessels associated with the Candelabrum were made of gold, even though they were not fashioned from the same gold talent from which the Candelabrum and its lamps were.
  The Gemara questions the need for the derivation of the <i>baraita</i>: But the requirement that the vessels be made of gold is explicitly written in the verse: “And you shall fashion its lamps seven, and they shall kindle its lamps, and it will enlighten toward its face. And its tongs and its pans shall be of pure gold” (Exodus 25:37–38); why then is it necessary for the <i>baraita</i> to derive this from the phrase “with all these vessels”? The Gemara explains: This derivation of the <i>baraita</i> is necessary only to teach that the same applies to the mouth of the lamps, where the wicks rest. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since the mouth of the lamps blackens and is damaged by the burning wick, therefore the principle that the Torah spared the money of the Jewish people should be applied,
  
  Daf 89a
  
  and consequently, let the mouth of the lamps be fashioned from gold of any quality, not necessarily from pure gold. Therefore, the <i>baraita</i> teaches us that even the mouth of the lamps must be fashioned from pure gold.
  § The mishna teaches: A half-<i>log</i> of oil was used to measure oil for the thanks offering. The thanks offering was accompanied by four different types of loaves; three types were unleavened and one was leavened, as the verse states: “If he offers it for a thanks offering, than he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanks offering: Unleavened loaves mixed with oil; and unleavened wafers spread with oil; and poached fine flour, loaves mixed with oil. With loaves of leavened bread he shall present his offering, with the sacrifice of his peace offerings for a thanks offering” (Leviticus 7:12–13).
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Akiva says: Why must the verse state: “With oil,” “with oil,” writing it twice; why was the first time not sufficient? Because were the term “with oil” stated only once, I would have said that, with regard to the amount of oil required, the meal offerings that accompany the thanks offerings are like all other meal offerings to the extent that they require one <i>log</i> of oil. Now that the verse wrote “with oil,” “with oil,” it constitutes one amplification following another amplification, and the principle is that one amplification following another amplification serves only to restrict the extent of the <i>halakha</i>. Accordingly, in this case the verse restricted the amount of oil used in the three types of unleavened meal offerings to a half-<i>log</i> for all of them together.
  The Gemara interjects the citation of the <i>baraita</i> to ask: Is this a case of one amplification following another amplification? It would appear that there is only one amplification, as according to the <i>baraita</i> the first mention of the term “with oil” is necessary to teach the basic requirement that the meal offerings of the thanks offering require oil, like other meal offerings. How then can it be considered an amplification?
  Rather, Rabbi Akiva’s statement should be emended, as follows: Were the term “with oil,” not written at all, I would still have said that the thanks offering meal offerings are like all other meal offerings to the extent that they requires one <i>log</i> of oil. Now that the verse wrote “with oil,” “with oil,” it constitutes one amplification following another amplification, and the principle is that one amplification following another amplification serves only to restrict the extent of the <i>halakha</i>. Accordingly, in this case the verse restricted the amount of oil used in the three types of unleavened meal offerings to a half-<i>log</i> for all three together.
  The Gemara resumes its citation of the <i>baraita</i>: Once it has been established that the meal offerings require only a half-<i>log</i> of oil, one might have thought that this half-<i>log</i> should be equally divided between the three types of unleavened meal offerings, i.e., one-sixth of a <i>log</i> for the loaves, one-sixth for the wafers, and one-sixth for the poached loaves. When the verse states: “With oil,” with regard to the poached loaves, that is seemingly superfluous, as there is no need for the verse to state the requirement to use part of the half-<i>log</i> of oil, being that this requirement has already been established. It must therefore serve to amplify the amount of oil used for a poached loaf as opposed to the other two types. How so? One brings a half-<i>log</i> of oil and divides it equally into two. Half of it is further divided and used both for the ten regular loaves and for the ten wafers, and the other half of it is used entirely for the ten poached loaves.
  Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to Rabbi Akiva: Akiva, even if you were to amplify <i>halakhot</i> the entire day from the terms “with oil,” “with oil,” I would not listen to you and accept your claims. Rather, the <i>halakha</i> that a half-<i>log</i> of oil is required for the thanks offering, and similarly, the <i>halakha</i> that a quarter-<i>log</i> of oil is required for the loaves of a nazirite, and the <i>halakha</i> that a woman who experiences an emission of blood during the eleven days that are between one seven-day period of menstruation and the next period of menstruation is a <i>zava</i>, each of these is a <i>halakha</i> transmitted to Moses from Sinai; they are not derived from verses.
  § The mishna states that with the vessel of one <i>log</i> one would measure the oil for all the standard meal offerings. It then cites a dispute between the Rabbis, who hold that one <i>log</i> of oil is required for each tenth of an ephah of flour used, and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who holds that each meal offering, irrespective of its size, requires only one <i>log</i> of oil.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a poor leper, who cannot afford the standard offerings that are required as part of the purification process and is instead required to bring one lamb as a guilt offering and a tenth of an ephah of flour as a meal offering, it is written: “And a tenth-part of an ephah of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering, and a <i>log</i> of oil” (Leviticus 14:21). The verse juxtaposes the need for a <i>log</i> of oil with the fact the offering is made of a tenth of an ephah of flour. Accordingly, it teaches about each tenth of an ephah of flour that it requires one <i>log</i> of oil; this is the statement of the Rabbis.
  Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer say: Each meal offering, irrespective of its size, and even a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of flour, requires only its single <i>log</i> of oil, as it is stated with regard to offering of a leper: “And a tenth of an ephah of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering, and a <i>log</i> of oil.” The juxtaposition of “a meal offering” with “a <i>log</i> of oil” teaches a principle for all meal offerings: Each offering requires only one <i>log</i> of oil.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, what do they do with this verse: “And a tenth-part of an ephah of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering and a <i>log</i> of oil,” which links the need for a <i>log</i> of oil with the fact the offering is made of a tenth of an ephah of flour? The Gemara explains: That verse is required to teach the matter itself, as the Merciful One states: Let a poor leper bring an offering of just a tenth of an ephah of flour. Accordingly, it cannot be used to teach a principle about meal offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the other, i.e., the Rabbis, how do they respond to this claim? They maintain that it is not necessary to teach the matter itself, as from the fact that the Merciful One revealed with regard to a leper who is not poor that he must bring three animal offerings and a meal offering of three-tenths of an ephah as part of his purification process, it may be inferred that here, with regard to a poor leper, who brings only one offering, that he similarly brings a meal offering of only a tenth of an ephah. Accordingly, the fact that the verse mentions that his offering is only a tenth of an ephah is superfluous and can teach a principle for all meal offerings.
  The Gemara continues to ask: And as for the other, Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer, how would they respond to this claim? They maintain that it was necessary for the verse to state the size of his meal offering, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that since the Merciful One spared the money of the poor leper by allowing him to bring an offering affordable in poverty, one might say that the Merciful One does not require from him to bring any meal offering at all. The Gemara asks: And as for the other, the Rabbis, how would they respond to this? They claim that we do not find that the Torah entirely exempts a poor person from the offerings of the purification process, only that it provides a less expensive way to complete that process.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with the juxtaposition in the end of this verse: “For a meal offering and a <i>log</i> of oil,” from which Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer derive the principle that each meal offering requires only one <i>log</i> of oil? The Gemara explains: The Rabbis maintain that that the juxtaposition teaches about one who donates a meal offering, without specifying its size, that he should not bring less than an amount of flour that requires one <i>log</i>. And what is this amount? A tenth of an ephah. The Gemara asks: And as for the other, Rabbi Neḥemya and Rabbi Eliezer, from where do they derive that <i>halakha</i>, as they maintain the verse teaches the principle for all meal offerings? The Gemara explains: They maintain that two <i>halakhot</i> can be derived from this verse.
  § The mishna lists the quantities of oil and wine that were required for the meal offerings and libations that accompanied the sacrifice of an animal. Six <i>log</i>, i.e., one-half of a <i>hin</i>, for those of a bull; and four <i>log</i>, i.e., one-third of a <i>hin</i>, for those of a ram; and three <i>log</i>, i.e., one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>, for those of a lamb. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive these quantities? We derive them from a verse, as it is written: “And their libations shall be one-half of a <i>hin</i> of wine for a bull, and one-third of a <i>hin</i> for the ram, and one-quarter of a <i>hin</i> for a lamb” (Numbers 28:14).
  The Gemara elaborates: Now, one <i>hin</i> is twelve <i>log</i>, as it is written: “And of olive oil a <i>hin</i>” (Exodus 30:24), and it is written afterward in the same verse: “Sacred anointing oil, this [<i>zeh</i>] shall be for Me, throughout your generations.” The numerical value [<i>gimatriyya</i>] of <i>zeh</i> is twelve. Once it is established that one <i>hin</i> is twelve <i>log</i>, it is possible to calculate how may <i>log</i> are in one-half, one-third, and one-quarter of a <i>hin</i>.
  § The mishna teaches: Three and a half <i>log</i> of oil were required for the Candelabrum, as there were seven lamps and a half-<i>log</i> was required for each lamp. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the Candelabrum: “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it from evening to morning, before the Lord” (Exodus 27:21). This indicates that you shall put into each lamp its required quantity of oil so that it will continue burning from evening until morning. Alternatively, the phrase “from evening to morning” indicates that the mitzva is fulfilled throughout the night, and you have no other rite that is valid from evening until morning except for this one alone. And the Sages calculated that a half-<i>log</i> of oil for each lamp is necessary to ensure that they continue burning from evening until morning.
  How did the Sages reach the conclusion that a half-<i>log</i> of oil is needed? There are those who say that the Sages calculated it by initially using a large quantity of oil, more than necessary to burn throughout the night, and then decreasing the quantity by a small amount each night until they saw that at the end of the night there was no oil remaining. And there are those who say that they calculated it by initially using a small quantity of oil and then increasing the quantity each night until they saw that the quantity was sufficient to allow the lamps to burn throughout the night.
  The Gemara elaborates: The one who said that they calculated it by increasing the quantity each night holds that they did so in accordance with the principle that the Torah spared the money of the Jewish people, so the Sages wished to minimize the financial cost of their experimentation. And the one who said that they calculated it by decreasing the quantity each night holds that in the Temple one’s actions should not be motivated by a concern for the financial cost, as in a place of wealth there is no poverty.
  MISHNA: Many animal offerings are brought together with a meal offering and a wine libation. These additions are collectively referred to as libations. One may mix together the libations of bulls with the libations of rams; the meal offerings may be mixed as they both share the same ratio of flour to oil, i.e., two <i>log</i> of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour. Likewise, one may mix together the libations of lambs with the libations of other lambs, as the meal offerings both share the same ratio of three <i>log</i> of oil for each tenth of an ephah of flour. And one may mix together the libations of the offering of an individual with those of a communal offering.
  
  Daf 89b
  
  And one may mix together the libations of an offering brought on one day with those of the day before, if the meal offerings have the same ratio of oil to flour.
  But one may not mix together the libations of lambs with the libations of bulls or the libations of rams, as the meal offerings have different ratios of oil to flour. And nevertheless, if one intermingled the flour and oil of these lamb offerings by themselves and the flour and oil of these bull or ram offerings by themselves, and only then were they mixed together, then they remain fit to be sacrificed. If they were mixed together before the oil and flour of each offering were independently intermingled to form the meal offering, then they are disqualified.
  With regard to the lamb offering that comes with the <i>omer</i> meal offering, which is accompanied by another meal offering and a wine libation, even though the quantity of flour used in its meal offering is doubled, i.e., one uses twice the amount that is generally used for meal offerings that accompany the sacrifice of a lamb, its oil and wine libations were not doubled; rather, three <i>log</i> of oil and three <i>log</i> of wine were used, per the standard quantities used for a lamb.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that different types of libations may be mixed together provided that the meal offerings have the same flour to oil ratio. And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this from a <i>baraita</i> discussing the verse: “And he shall sacrifice, from the peace offerings, a fire to the Lord: The fat covering the innards, and all the fat that is on the innards, and the two kidneys with the fat that is on them, which is over the loins; and the diaphragm with the liver, with the kidneys, he shall take away. And Aaron’s sons shall burn it on the altar, apart from the burnt offering, which is on the wood that is on the fire; it is a fire of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 3:3–5).
  The direct object of the term: “And they shall burn,” i.e., the pronoun “it,” is singular, despite referring to the many types of fats listed in the verse. This indicates that one may not mix fats of one offering with the fats of a different offering, but should burn the parts from each offering separately. Similarly, it follows that the libations accompanying different animal offerings should not be mixed together.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna stated only that if libations of different offerings were mixed together one may still sacrifice them, but not that this is permitted <i>ab initio</i>. Accordingly, there is no contradiction between the mishna and <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara infers: If that is so, then when the mishna states in its first clause: And one may not mix together the libations of lambs with the libations of bulls or the libations of rams, the intention is that even after the fact, if they were mixed together, they are also not valid. The Gemara challenges: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: If one intermingled the flour and oil of these lamb offerings by themselves and the flour and oil of these bull or ram offerings by themselves and only then were they mixed together then they remain fit to be sacrificed, which is explicitly referring to the <i>halakha</i> after the fact, it may be inferred that the first clause stated the <i>halakha ab initio</i>.
  Abaye said that this is what the mishna is saying: When different animal offerings are sacrificed, their wine libations may be mixed together <i>ab initio</i>, but only if their fine flour and their oil from their respective meal offerings were already mixed together, albeit improperly.
  The Gemara asks: And is it correct that one may not mix together the wine libations of different offerings <i>ab initio</i> unless their flour and oil were already mixed? But isn’t it taught in the continuation of the <i>baraita</i> just cited: In what case is this statement, that one may not mix together parts from different offerings, said? It is said only with regard to flour and oil. But one may mix together the wine libations of different offerings. The implication is that this is the <i>halakha</i> even if their meal offerings had not been mixed together.
  Rather, Abaye said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to offerings of similar types of animals, where their fine flour and their oil from their respective meal offerings have been burned on the altar, one may mix together the wine libations <i>ab initio</i>. And even where their fine flour and their oil have not been burned, if their fine flour and their oil have at least been mixed together, one may mix together their wine libations <i>ab initio</i>. But if the fine flour and oil have not been mixed together, then one may not mix the libations together. The reason is that if one does mix the libations, perhaps one will come to mix together their flour and oil <i>ab initio</i>, which is prohibited.
  § The mishna teaches: With regard to the lamb offering that comes with the <i>omer</i> meal offering, the quantity of flour used in its meal offering is doubled, i.e., one uses twice the amount that is generally used for meal offerings that accompany the sacrifice of a lamb, but the quantities of oil and wine are not doubled. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the <i>omer</i> meal offering: “And its meal offering shall be two tenths” (Leviticus 23:13). This verse teaches about the lamb that comes with the <i>omer</i> that the size of its meal offering is doubled.
  One might have thought that just as its meal offering is doubled, so too its wine libation should be doubled, i.e., instead of using a quarter-<i>hin</i>, as is generally done for lambs, one should use a half-<i>hin</i>. To counter this, the verse states, in its continuation: “And its libation shall be of wine, a quarter-<i>hin</i>” (Leviticus 23:13). One might have thought that it is only its wine libation that should not be doubled, as it is not intermingled with the flour of its meal offering, but its oil should be doubled, as it is intermingled with the flour of its meal offering. To counter this, the verse states: “And its libation shall be of wine, a quarter-<i>hin</i>,” which teaches that all of its libations shall be only a quarter-<i>hin</i>, but no more.
  The Gemara elaborates on the final proof in the <i>baraita</i>: What is the biblical derivation here? Rabbi Elazar says: There is an ambiguity as to whether the possessive pronoun in the term “and its libation” is referring to the lamb offering or the meal offering, both of which are mentioned previously in the verse. This is due to a disparity between the way the Hebrew word for the term is written and the way it is vocalized. It is written as <i>veniskah</i>, with the possessive pronoun in the feminine form. This would be referring to the meal offering [<i>minḥa</i>], which is a feminine noun. Accordingly, this means: The libation of the meal offering, and it is referring to the oil that is intermingled in the meal offering. And we read it as <i>venisko</i>, with the possessive pronoun in the masculine form. This would be referring to the lamb offering itself [<i>keves</i>], which is a masculine noun. Accordingly, this means: The libation of the lamb offering, which is a reference to the wine libation that accompanies the lamb offering.
  How can this be explained? It teaches that the libation of the meal offering, i.e., its oil, is like the libation of the lamb of wine: Just as the quantity of wine used is a quarter-<i>hin</i>, so too, the quantity of oil used is a quarter-<i>hin</i> and no more.
  § The Gemara cites a related discussion: A guilt offering brought by a leper as part of his purification process is distinct from other guilt offerings in that there is an additional requirement that it must be brought together with a meal offering and a wine libation. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of a guilt offering of a leper that one slaughtered not for its own sake, although the leper can therefore no longer fulfill his obligation with it, the offering continues to be regarded as a guilt offering of a leper and still requires libations, i.e., a meal offering and a wine libation; as if you do not say this, you have disqualified it. To bring it without libations one would have to regard it as a standard guilt offering, but the <i>halakha</i> is that an offering may not be sacrificed for a different purpose than the one for which it was originally consecrated.
  Rav Menashya bar Gadda objects to this: If that is so, that whenever an offering is consecrated for a specific purpose that requires various additional conditions to be fulfilled beyond those normally required for that type of offering, then even if it is then slaughtered not for its own sake those conditions must still be fulfilled in order for the offering to be valid; then with regard to the lamb offering that comes with the <i>omer</i> meal offering the <i>halakha</i> should likewise be that if one slaughtered it not for its own sake, the flour in its meal offering should still be doubled in quantity, as normally required for the <i>omer</i> meal offering, because it continues to be regarded as an <i>omer</i> meal offering, as if you do not say this, you have disqualified it.
  And similarly, with regard to the daily morning offering, if one slaughtered it not for its own sake, it should still require the arrangement of two logs of wood on the fire on the altar by one priest, because it continues to be regarded as a daily morning offering; as if you do not say this, you have disqualified it. And similarly, with regard to the daily afternoon offering, if one slaughtered it not for its own sake, it should still require the arrangement of two logs of wood on the fire on the altar by two priests, because it continues to be regarded as a daily afternoon offering; as if you do not say this, you have disqualified it. The fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan did not mention these <i>halakhot</i> suggests that he holds they are not correct, but then his opinion is logically inconsistent.
  The Gemara deflects the objection: Yes, it is indeed so that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling should be extended to other cases, as Rav Menashya bar Gadda claimed. Rather, Abaye said: Rabbi Yoḥanan mentioned just one of them as an example, even though they are all correct.
  Rabbi Abba said that there is a different resolution: Actually, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling is limited to a guilt offering of a leper. The other offerings that Rav Menashya bar Gadda mentioned would be valid even if the additional conditions that originally applied to them were not fulfilled. The reason for this is as follows: Granted, these other offerings that Rav Menashya bar Gadda mentioned would be valid, as they are burnt offerings;
  
  Daf 90a
  
  therefore, even if they are no longer fit to be sacrificed as obligatory burnt offerings, for which they were originally consecrated, having now been slaughtered not for their own sake they can still be sacrificed as voluntary burnt offerings, without the need to fulfill the additional conditions that originally applied to them. But here, with regard to the guilt offering of a leper, if you do not maintain it in accordance with its original status and require it to be brought together with its libations, it can no longer be considered a guilt offering at all, as is there a voluntary guilt offering?
  The Gemara notes that it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of a guilt offering of a leper that one slaughtered not for its own sake, or in a case where one did not place some of its blood upon the leper’s right thumb and big toe, this guilt offering is still brought up upon the altar and requires libations, i.e., a meal offering and wine-libation; but since it was sacrificed incorrectly, the leper needs to bring another guilt offering to permit him to partake of offerings.
  MISHNA: All measuring vessels that were in the Temple were such that they held the volume that they measured when their contents were heaped above the rim, except for the measuring vessel used to measure the flour for the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, as its heaped measure, i.e., the quantity of flour held by a tenth of an ephah measuring vessel when heaped, was contained within its walls when the flour was leveled with the rim. This was due to the fact that the measuring vessel for the griddle-cake offering was slightly larger than the tenth of an ephah measuring vessel.
  With regard to measuring vessels for liquids, their overflows, i.e., that which flows onto the outside of vessel’s walls, are sacred, but with regard to measuring vessels for dry substances, their overflows are non-sacred.
  Rabbi Akiva says that the reason for this difference is that since the measuring vessels for liquids are themselves sacred, therefore their overflows are sacred, and since the measuring vessels for dry substances are non-sacred, therefore their overflows are non-sacred. Rabbi Yosei says: The difference is not due to that factor. Rather, it is because the overflow of liquid was originally inside the vessel, where it became consecrated, and was then displaced, whereas the overflow of a dry substance was not displaced from inside the vessel, so it had not become consecrated.
  GEMARA: The mishna and Gemara on 87a cite a dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir concerning the number and nature of the measuring vessels used for dry substances. In light of that dispute, the Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna here? If you suggest it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that is difficult: He holds that there were two measuring vessels that held a tenth of an ephah, but only one of them was such that it held its measure when heaped; the other one held its measure when leveled. And if you suggest it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that is difficult: They hold there was only one measuring vessel that held a tenth of an ephah, and it held its measure when leveled. How can the mishna state that all measuring vessels in the Temple were heaped?
  Rav Ḥisda said: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that only one of two measuring vessels that held a tenth of an ephah was such that it held its measure when heaped. And what does the mishna means when it states: All measuring vessels [<i>kol middot</i>] in the Temple were heaped? It means that that all measurements [<i>kol medidot</i>] performed with that measuring vessel were done when its contents were heaped above its rim.
  § The mishna discusses the status of overflows: The first <i>tanna</i> states simply that with regard to measuring vessels for liquids, their overflows are sacred, but with regard to measuring vessels for dry substances, their overflows are non-sacred. Rabbi Akiva explains that this distinction is a function of whether the measuring vessel is itself sacred. Rabbi Yosei explains it is function of whether the overflow had initially been inside the vessel. The Gemara asks: With regard to what matter do these three <i>tanna’im</i> disagree?
  The Gemara explains: The first <i>tanna</i> holds that the measuring vessels for liquid items, e.g., wine for libations and oil, were anointed and thereby consecrated both on the inside and on the outside. Therefore, the overflow is consecrated as it comes in contact with the outside of the vessel’s walls. The measuring vessels for dry items, such as the flour for meal offerings, were anointed and consecrated only on the inside, but were not anointed on the outside. Therefore, the overflow is not consecrated when it comes into contact with the outside of the vessel’s walls.
  And Rabbi Akiva, who states the difference is due to whether the vessel is sacred or non-sacred, holds that the measuring vessels for liquid items were anointed on the inside and were not anointed on the outside, whereas the measuring vessels for dry items were not anointed at all, and they remained non-sacred and so could not consecrate the overflow.
  And Rabbi Yosei holds that this and that, i.e., both types of measuring vessels, were anointed only on the inside but were not anointed on the outside, and so here, this is the reason behind whether the overflow was sacred: As the overflow of liquid was originally inside the vessel and was then displaced, and it comes from the inside of the vessel, it is therefore consecrated. But the overflow of a dry substance was not originally inside the vessel and then displaced, and so it is never consecrated.
  The Gemara questions this explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: But even if the overflow was previously inside the vessel and then displaced, what of it? A person intends to consecrate only that which he requires, and so even if the overflow had been inside the vessel it would not have been consecrated.
  Rav Dimi bar Shishna said in the name of Rav: That is to say that service vessels consecrate their contents even without the intent of the person using them. Ravina said: Actually, I will say to you that service vessels consecrate their contents only with the intent of the person using them, and by Torah law the overflows are not sacred. But the Sages issued a decree to regard them as sacred, lest people say that one may transfer a substance that has been consecrated in a service vessel to non-sacred status.
  Rabbi Zeira raised an objection to this explanation from a mishna (100a): Each Shabbat, new shewbread and bowls of frankincense were arranged on the Table in the Sanctuary. They remained there until the following Shabbat, at which point the frankincense was burned, thereby permitting the shewbread to be eaten. If the priest arranged the bread and the bowls of frankincense on the Table after Shabbat, during the week, and then he burned the frankincense in the bowls on the Shabbat at the end of that week, the bread is disqualified, as it had not been on the Table for a full seven days from one Shabbat to the next. How then should one proceed to prevent the disqualification? He should leave the bread on the Table until the following Shabbat, as even if it remained on the Table for many days, there is nothing wrong with that, provided that it is there for at least seven days. The frankincense may then be burned and it will permit the bread to be eaten.
  Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: But why is it permitted to leave the bread on the Table for more than seven days? There too, let us say that the Sages issued a decree disqualifying the bread lest people say that one can store sacred items in a service vessel overnight and that will prevent them becoming disqualified. Evidently, the Sages did not issue such decrees, and it follows that also with regard to using the measuring vessels they did not issue a decree.
  The Gemara rejects this claim: Are you raising a contradiction between a rite performed inside the Sanctuary, i.e., the arrangement of the shewbread, and a rite performed outside the Sanctuary, i.e., using the measuring vessels? Since in the case of a rite performed inside the Sanctuary not everyone is aware of what is happening, there is no concern that people will misinterpret what is going on and so there is no need to issue a decree concerning it. In the case of a rite performed outside the Sanctuary everyone is aware of what is happening, and there is a need to issue a decree to prevent people from drawing mistaken conclusions.
  § The Gemara continues to discuss the overflow of measures. We learned in a mishna there (<i>Shekalim</i> 10b): The surplus libations were sold and the proceeds used to purchase supplementary offerings of the altar [<i>keitz hamizbe’aḥ</i>].
  The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: Surplus libations?
  Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef says: It means the overflows of measuring vessels. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Surplus libations are like that which we learned in another mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 13a): In the case of one who accepts upon himself to supply fine flour at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, and its market price stood at three <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, he is required to fulfill his commitment and supply fine flour at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>.
  
  Daf 90b
  
  If one committed to supply fine flour at three <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, and its market price decreased until it stood at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, he must supply fine flour at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>. The reason for this <i>halakha</i> is that the Temple treasury is at an advantage. In the latter case, the merchant ends up providing the Temple with a greater quantity of flour than had initially been intended. Consequently, the Temple has more flour than it requires. The extra amount is referred to as surplus libations, and it is sold in order to purchase supplementary offerings.
  The Gemara comments: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef, and it is taught in another <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara elaborates: It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef: These overflows of measuring vessels, what would be done with them? They are gathered, and if there is another offering to be sacrificed that day, the priests sacrifice this liquid with it as part of its libations. And if there is no other offering that day, and instead the overflows were left overnight without being sacrificed, they are disqualified by being left overnight. And if the overflows were not sacrificed with another offering and were not disqualified by being left overnight, they are sold, and the proceeds from their sale are used to purchase animals to supplement the offerings of the altar. And these supplementary offerings, what form do they take? They are burnt offerings; their flesh is entirely burned on the altar to God, and the hides are given to the priests.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: In the case of one who accepts upon himself to supply fine flour at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, and its market price stood at three <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, he is required to fulfill his commitment and supply fine flour at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>. If one committed to supply fine flour at three <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, and its market price decreased until it stood at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>, he must supply fine flour at four <i>se’a</i> for a <i>sela</i>. The reason for this <i>halakha</i> is that the Temple treasury is at an advantage. And it is to this later case that we referred when we learned in the mishna: The surplus libations were sold and the proceeds used to purchase supplementary offerings of the altar.
  MISHNA: All offerings, whether communal or individual, require libations, i.e., a meal offering and a wine libation, except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, the Paschal offering, the sin offering, and the guilt offering, with which libations are not brought. But the exception to this exception is that the sin offering of a leper and his guilt offering do require libations.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> that derives each of the rulings of the mishna from the verses that state the requirement to accompany animal offerings with the sacrifice of libations. The Torah states: “And you will make a fire offering to the Lord, a burnt offering, or a sacrifice, in fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered, or as a gift, or on your Festivals, to make a pleasing aroma to the Lord, of the herd or of the flock. And he who brings his offering to the Lord shall sacrifice a meal offering of a tenth of an ephah of fine flour mixed with a quarter-<i>hin</i> of oil; and wine for a libation, a quarter-<i>hin</i>, you shall make it with the burnt offering or for the sacrifice, for the one lamb” (Numbers 15:2–5). The Torah then proceeds to detail the quantities of flour, oil, and wine for a ram and a bull.
  The verse states: “And you will make a fire offering to the Lord.” Accordingly, one might have thought that any offering that is raised up on the altar as a fire offering shall require that libations be brought with it, even a meal offering. The verse then states: “A burnt offering,” which teaches that the requirement of libations applies only to animal burnt offerings, but not to meal offerings. If so, from where is it derived that a peace offering requires libations? The verse states: “A sacrifice.” From where is it derived that a thanks offering requires libations? The verse states: “Or a sacrifice.” The superfluous word “or” serves to include thanks offerings.
  One might have thought that I should include even the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, the Paschal offering, the sin offering, and the guilt offering. To counter this, the verse states: “In fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered, or as a gift.” This teaches that an offering that comes in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering requires libations, whereas each of these offerings, which do not come in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering but only as obligatory offerings, do not require libations.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: It has been derived, then, that one should exclude these offerings from the requirement of libations, as they are obligatory. Perhaps then I will likewise exclude the obligatory offerings that come on account of the pilgrimage Festival, which are sacrificed on the pilgrimage Festival, and what are these? Burnt offerings of appearance in the Temple and Festival peace offerings, both of which are brought on the three pilgrimage Festivals. To counter this, the verse states: “Or on your Festivals,” which indicates that any offering that comes on your Festivals, even if it is obligatory, requires libations.
  It has been derived, then, that one should include even these Festival offerings, despite the fact that they are obligatory. Perhaps then I will likewise include the goat sin offerings brought as part of the additional offerings on the Festivals, since they come as obligatory offerings on the pilgrimage Festival. To counter this, the verse states in the continuation of that passage: “And when you make a young bull as a burnt offering” (Numbers 15:8), and proceeds to state the requirement to bring libations with it.
  Now, the requirement to bring libations with a young bull was already included in the general requirement to bring libations with any fire offering, as stated in the beginning of that passage; and why, then, was it singled out and mentioned explicitly? This is in order to equate all other offerings to it, teaching that the requirement of libations applies only to offerings similar to a young bull: Just as a young bull is distinct in that it can come in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering, so too, any offering that comes in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering requires libations.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: The verses at the beginning of the passage state: “To make a pleasing aroma to the Lord, of the herd or of the flock.” What is the meaning when the verse states this? Since in the previous verse it is stated: “A burnt offering,” I would derive that all types of burnt offerings require libations, and even a bird sacrificed as a burnt offering is indicated. Therefore, the verse states: “Of the herd or of the flock,” which limits the requirement to offerings of animals such as sheep or cattle, but not to bird offerings; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.
  Rabbi Yonatan says: This verse is unnecessary, as the verse states: “A sacrifice,” and a bird offering is not referred to as a sacrifice. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Of the herd or of the flock”? Since it is stated with regard to a burnt offering: “A person, when he sacrifices from you an offering to the Lord, of the animals: Of the herd and of the flock, you shall sacrifice your offering” (Leviticus 1:2), one might have thought that one who takes a vow by saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, without specifying which type of animal he will bring, that he must bring animals of both of these two types, i.e., from the herd and the flock. To counter this, the verse states: “Of the herd or of the flock,” separating the two types with the word “or,” thereby indicating that if he wanted to bring one of them, he may bring just one, and if he wanted to bring two, he may bring two. This concludes the <i>baraita</i>.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, why do I need an independent verse to teach that one who takes a vow to bring a burnt offering does not have to bring both types? Didn’t Rabbi Yonatan himself say an exegetical principle that whenever the Torah mentions two details together with regard to a <i>halakha</i>, it is presumed that the <i>halakha</i> is fulfilled even when only one of the details is realized, unless the verse specifies that both details are required by writing the word: Together, in the verse? Accordingly, when the verse states: “Of the herd or of the flock,” the intention is that either one is sufficient, and there should be no need for an independent verse to teach this.
  The Gemara answers: Despite his principle, an independent verse was necessary to teach this, as it might enter your mind to say:
  
  Daf 91a
  
  Since in Leviticus 1:2 it is written: “And of the flock,” and not merely: Of the flock, it is as though the word: Together, was written in the verse. Therefore, the verse in Numbers 15, which does state: “Or of the flock,” is necessary to teach that this is not the case.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, who said that even though it is not explicitly written in the verse: Together, it is as though it is written: Together, i.e., it is presumed that the <i>halakha</i> is fulfilled only when both details are realized, a verse should be required. Yet, in the <i>baraita</i>, Rabbi Yoshiya expounds the phrase “of the herd or of the flock” to teach a different <i>halakha</i>. From where, then, does he derive that one who takes a vow to bring a burnt offering does not need to bring both types of animals?
  The Gemara explains: Isn’t it written: “If his offering is a burnt offering of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), and then in a separate verse it states: “And if his offering is of the flock” (Leviticus 1:9)? The fact that these possibilities are presented in two disjointed verses is an explicit indication that the burnt offering can be brought from even just one of these animals. Therefore, even Rabbi Yoshiya concedes that there is no reason to presume a burnt offering must be brought from both types there.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the other <i>tanna</i>, Rabbi Yonatan, why does he require a verse at all? The Gemara explains: It was necessary to have a verse to teach this, because otherwise it might enter your mind to say: These statements, i.e., the verses that indicate it is sufficient to bring just one type of animal, concern a case where one specifies in his vow that he intends to bring just one animal, and the verses indicate that it is valid to bring just one. But if one vowed without specification, one might say: Let him bring burnt offerings from both of them. Therefore the phrase “of the herd or of the flock” teaches us that even in that case, it is sufficient to bring just one type of animal.
  § The Gemara continues to analyze the <i>baraita</i>. The Master said in the <i>baraita</i>: From where is it derived that a peace offering requires libations? The verse states: “A sacrifice.” From where is it derived that a thanks offering requires libations? The verse states: “Or a sacrifice.” The superfluous word “or” includes thanks offerings. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that a thanks offering is not referred to as a sacrifice? It certainly is. Why, then, is it only included through the word “or”? The Gemara answers: An independent inclusion was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since in any event there is bread brought together with the thanks offering, it should not require libations.
  The Gemara raises a question concerning this explanation: But in what way is a thanks offering different from a nazirite’s ram, as there is bread brought together with it also, and yet it requires libations? The verse states with regard to the ram of a nazirite: “And one unblemished ram for a peace offering, and a basket of unleavened bread, cakes of fine flour mixed with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and their meal offering, and their libations” (Numbers 6:13–15).
  The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that one should differentiate between the thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram as there, together with the nazirite’s ram, he brings only two types of bread, i.e., loaves and wafers, whereas, here, together with the thanks offering, one brings four types of bread. Therefore, one might have concluded that since there are many types of loaves it does not require libations. For that reason it is necessary to have an independent derivation that teaches us that it does require libations.
  The Gemara analyzes another one of the derivations of the <i>baraita</i>. The verse states: And you will make a fire offering to the Lord, a burnt offering, or a sacrifice, in fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered, or as a gift.” This teaches that an offering that comes in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering requires libations. The Gemara challenges: But if that is the <i>halakha</i>, then let the Merciful One write only: “In fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered, or as a gift,” and it would be unnecessary to write: “A burnt offering,” as a burnt offering is a type of offering that can be brought as a vow or gift offering.
  The Gemara explains: Had the Merciful One not written “a burnt offering,” I would say that the verse should be expounded as follows: “And you will make a fire offering to the Lord” is a generalization, indicating that all offerings require libations. But then it states: “In fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered, or as a gift,” which is a detail, indicating that the requirement applies only to offerings brought in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift. But with “to make a pleasing aroma to the Lord” it then generalized. If so, this is a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and according to the principles of exegesis you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail: Just as the detail is explicit in referring to an offering that does not come to atone for a sin, but comes to fulfill a vow or as a gift, so too any offering that does not come to atone for a sin requires libations.
  Accordingly, I would exclude a sin offering and a guilt offering from the requirement to have libations, as they come to atone for a sin, and I would include the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering, as they do not come to atone for a sin. In order to preclude the possibility of expounding the verses in this way, the verse states: “Burnt offering,” as an additional detail, which serves to further exclude offerings that are brought only in fulfillment of an obligation.
  The Gemara asks: Now that it is written: “Burnt offering,” what do you include through the generalization and detail and generalization in this verse? The Gemara explains: Just as the detail of a burnt offering is explicit in referring to an offering that one had not always been obligated to bring, as it is referring to a burnt offering brought in fulfillment of a vow, which one became obligated to bring only once the vow was taken, so too, any offering that one had not always been obligated to bring requires libations.
  This serves to include in the requirement for libations the offspring of consecrated animals, e.g., of a female peace offering; and substitutes of consecrated animals, i.e., a non-sacred animal with regard to which one stated that it should be a substitute for a consecrated animal, in which case the result is that both animals are consecrated and must be sacrificed; and a burnt offering that comes from the proceeds of having sold surpluses of items donated to the Temple that were not needed.
  And this also serves to include a guilt offering whose owner either died or achieved atonement through sacrificing another animal and which was therefore consigned to grazing until it developed a blemish, at which point it should be sold and the proceeds used to purchase supplementary offerings for the altar. If instead, the guilt offering itself was sacrificed as a burnt offering, it is valid. In such a case, the offering requires libations. And this also serves to include all offerings that were slaughtered not for their own sake. Such offerings were brought to fulfill the owner’s obligation. Since they were not sacrificed for the sake of that purpose, the owner does not fulfill his obligation, but nevertheless the offerings are valid. In such a case, these offerings also require libations.
  The Gemara asks: And now that you have said that the word “or” in the phrase “or a sacrifice” is necessary for the derivation that teaches that the thanks offering requires libations, I can similarly ask why do I need the word “or” in the phrase “in fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered or as a gift,” to separate between them? The Gemara explains: It was necessary to write “or” in that phrase, as it might enter your mind to say that until one brings both a vow offering and a gift offering together they do not require libations. The word “or” teaches us otherwise, that even if one brings a vow offering by itself it requires libations, and if one brings a gift offering by itself he must bring libations.
  The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as he holds that whenever the Torah does not explicitly separate between two details stated with regard to a <i>halakha</i>, it is presumed that the <i>halakha</i> is fulfilled only when both details are realized. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, who holds that in general it is presumed that either detail is sufficient, why do I need the word “or”? The Gemara explains: Were it not for this word, it might enter your mind to say that although the <i>halakha</i> is that if one brings a vow offering by itself it requires libations, and if one brings a gift offering by itself it requires libations, nevertheless, if one brings both a vow offering and a gift offering together, it would be sufficient to bring libations for just one of them. Therefore, the word “or” teaches us that libations are required for each offering.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need the word “or” in the phrase “or on your Festivals”? The Gemara answers: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this matter, that even when two offerings are brought together libations are required for each of them, applies only when they are distinct both in the type of offering and in the nature of the obligation to bring them, such as where one brings a burnt offering in fulfillment of a vow and a peace offering as a gift offering, or vice versa.
  But where one brings a burnt offering and a peace offering both in fulfillment of a vow, or alternatively, a burnt offering and a peace offering both as gift offerings, one might have said that since in the former case both offerings are of a single type of commitment, i.e., a vow, and in the latter case both are of a single type of commitment, i.e., a gift offering, therefore it would be sufficient to bring libations for just one of them. Consequently, the word “or” in the phrase “or on your Festivals” teaches us that even if they are distinct only in the type of offering, libations are required for each offering.
  The Gemara continues its analysis: Why do I need the word “or” in the verse: “And when you prepare a young bull for a burnt offering or for a sacrifice” (Numbers 15:9)? The Gemara explains: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this matter, that when two offerings are brought together libations are required for each of them, applies only when the two offerings are distinct in the type of offering, such as where one brings a burnt offering and a peace offering both in fulfillment of a vow, or alternatively, a burnt offering and a peace offering both as a gift offering.
  But where one brings two burnt offerings, one in fulfillment of a vow and one as a gift offering, or alternatively, two peace offerings, one in fulfillment of a vow and one as a gift offering, I would say that since in the former case both offerings are of a single type of offering, i.e., a peace offering, and in the latter case both offerings are of a single type of offering, i.e., a burnt offering, therefore it would be sufficient to bring libations for just one of them. Consequently, the word “or” teaches us that even if they are distinct only in the nature of the commitment to bring them, libations are required for each offering.
  The Gemara continues: Why do I need the word “or” in the verse: “In fulfillment of a vow clearly uttered or for peace offerings” (Numbers 15:8)? The Gemara answers: It was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this matter, that when two offerings are brought together libations are required for each of them, applies only where two offerings are distinct from each other either in the nature of the commitment to bring them or in the type of offering, such as where one brings two burnt offerings, one in fulfillment of a vow and one as a gift offering, or alternatively, two peace offerings, one in fulfillment of a vow and one as a gift offering.
  But where one brings two burnt offerings, both in fulfillment of a vow, or two burnt offerings, both as a gift offering, or alternatively, two peace offerings, both in fulfillment of a vow, or two peace offerings, both as a gift offering, I might have said with regard to the first of these cases that since both offerings are of a single type of offering, i.e., a burnt offering, and of a single type of commitment, i.e., a vow, and likewise with regard to the other cases, therefore, it would be sufficient to bring libations for just one of them. Consequently, the word “or” teaches us that even if the offerings are not distinct from each other at all, libations are nevertheless required for each one.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that according to Rabbi Yonatan, the word “or” in the phrase “of the herd or of the flock” teaches that one who takes a vow to bring a burnt offering fulfills his obligation even if he brings only one animal, either from the herd or from the flock. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yoshiya, why do I need the word “or” in this phrase “of the herd or of the flock”? Although the <i>baraita</i> explains that he expounds the phrase to teach that one does not bring libations with a bird offering, it does not explain what he derives from the word “or.”
  The Gemara explains: The word “or” is necessary, as otherwise it might enter your mind to say that this matter, that when two offerings are brought together libations are required for each of them, applies only where one brings two kinds of animals, i.e., one from the flock and one from the herd; but where both animals are of a single kind, it would be sufficient for him to bring libations for just one of them. Therefore, the word “or” teaches us that even if the offerings are of the same kind of animal, libations are nevertheless required for each one.
  Later in the passage concerning libations it states: “So shall be done for each young bull, or for each ram, or for each of the lambs, or of the goats. According to the number that you may prepare, so you shall do for each one according to their number” (Numbers 15:11–12). The Gemara asks: Why do I need this verse? The Gemara explains: It is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this matter, that when two offerings are brought together libations are required for each of them, applies only where the offerings were consecrated one after the other. But if they were consecrated at the same time, it would be sufficient for him to bring libations for just one of them. Therefore, the verse teaches us that in all cases, one must bring separate libations for each animal.
  § The mishna teaches that in general sin offerings and guilt offerings do not require libations. But the exception is that the sin offering of a leper and his guilt offering require libations. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> concerning the following verse, which details the offerings a leper is required to bring as part of his purification process: “And on the eighth day he shall take two unblemished male lambs, and one unblemished female lamb in its year, and three-tenths of fine flour for a meal offering, mixed with oil, and one <i>log</i> of oil” (Leviticus 14:10). The <i>baraita</i> explains: It is with regard to a meal offering that comes with an animal offering that the verse speaks, and so it is stating that each of the three offerings mentioned requires libations.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Do you say that it is with regard to a meal offering that comes with an animal offering that the verse speaks? Or perhaps it is only with regard to a meal offering that comes by itself. When the verse states, in the continuation of that passage: “And the priest shall sacrifice the burnt offering and the meal offering” (Leviticus 14:20), which demonstrates that the meal offering accompanies the burnt offering, you must say that in the earlier verse as well it is with regard to a meal offering that comes with an animal offering that the verse speaks.
  But still, I do not know whether this meal offering requires wine libations or whether it does not. Therefore, the verse states: “And wine for pouring a libation, a quarter-<i>hin</i>, you shall prepare with the burnt offering or for the sacrifice, for the one lamb” (Numbers 15:5). The verse is expounded as referring to each of the leper’s offerings: “The burnt offering”; this is referring to the burnt offering of a leper. “The sacrifice”; this is referring to the sin offering of a leper. And as for the word “or” in the phrase “or for the sacrifice,” this is referring to the guilt offering of a leper.
  The Gemara suggests: And let the <i>tanna</i> derive both the sin offering and the guilt offering from the word “sacrifice” alone, without relating to the word “or.”
  
  Daf 91b
  
  This would be just as the Master said in a <i>baraita</i> concerning a nazirite: A nazirite who completes his term of naziriteship is required to shave his hair and bring various offerings. With regard to the shaved hair, the verse states: “And he shall take the hair of his nazirite head, and put it on the fire which is under the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Numbers 6:18). The <i>baraita</i> asks: From where is it derived that if, instead of putting his hair on the fire under the peace offering, he puts it on the fire under his sin offering or under his guilt offering, he still fulfills the obligation? The verse states: “The sacrifice,” which serves to include these two offerings. Evidently, the term “sacrifice” refers both to a sin offering and to a guilt offering. Why does the <i>baraita</i> concerning a leper derive a guilt offering only from the word “or”?
  The Gemara explains: This matter, that both a sin offering and a guilt offering can be derived from the same term, applies only where they are both brought together, for the same purpose, as in the case of a nazirite. Both offerings serve to render him fit, in the case of a pure nazirite to partake of wine and cut his hair, and in the case of an impure nazirite to begin counting his term of naziriteship again. But in the case of a leper, where his guilt offering serves to render him fit to return to the camp and his sin offering serves to atone for the sin that was the cause of his leprosy, since they come for different purposes, we need two verses, i.e., sources, to teach about the two of them.
  The Gemara once again questions the derivations in the <i>baraita</i>: “The sacrifice”; this is referring to the sin offering of a leper. The Gemara asks: And how does the <i>baraita</i> know this? I could say instead that this is referring the sin offering and guilt offering of a nazirite. The sin offering is brought by a nazirite who completes his term of naziriteship, and the guilt offering is brought by a nazirite who became ritually impure. Accordingly, only those offerings of a nazirite would require libations, but not the burnt offering of a leper.
  The Gemara rejects this possibility. This should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: In describing the offerings a nazirite brings upon the completion of his term of naziriteship, the verse states: “And he shall sacrifice his offering to the Lord, one unblemished male lamb in its year as a burnt offering, and one unblemished female lamb in its year as a sin offering, and one unblemished ram as peace offerings…and their meal offering, and their libations” (Numbers 6:14–15). The <i>baraita</i> explains that it is with regard to his burnt offering and his peace offering, mentioned earlier in that passage, that the verse speaks, and so it is only those nazirite offerings that require libations.
  Do you say that the verse speaks with regard to his burnt offering and his peace offering? Or perhaps the verse speaks even with regard to the sin offering that a nazirite brings if he becomes ritually impure? To preclude the possibility of explaining the verse in that way, the verse states in the subsequent verses: “And he shall make the ram a sacrifice of a peace offering to the Lord, with the basket of unleavened bread; and the priest shall offer its meal offering and its libations” (Numbers 6:16–17).
  Now, this ram offering was already included with all other peace offerings, which all require libations. Why, then, was it singled out in this verse with an independent statement teaching that it requires libations? It was in order to equate all other offerings to it, teaching that the requirement of libations applies only to offerings similar to it. Just as a ram is distinct in that it can come in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering, so too, any offering that can come in fulfillment of a vow or as a gift offering requires libations. This excludes the sin offering and guilt offering of a nazirite, as they cannot be brought as vow offerings or gift offerings.
  The Gemara questions another of the derivations in the <i>baraita</i>: “The burnt offering”; this is referring to the burnt offering of a leper. The Gemara asks: And how does the <i>baraita</i> know this? I could say instead that this is referring the burnt offering of a woman who gave birth (see Leviticus 12:6), and if so, there would be no source to require libations for the burnt offering of a leper.
  Abaye said: The requirement to bring libations with the burnt offering of a woman who gave birth is derived from the end of that verse, so the term “the burnt offering,” mentioned just before it, remains available to include the burnt offering of a leper in the requirement for libations.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And wine for pouring libations, a quarter-<i>hin</i>, you shall prepare with the burnt offering or for the sacrifice, for the one lamb” (Numbers 15:5). Rabbi Natan says: “For the one lamb”; this is referring to the burnt offering of a woman who gave birth and includes that offering in the requirement for libations. “The one”; this is referring to the eleventh animal of the animal tithe, which is sacrificed as a peace offering. In order to tithe his animals, the owner counts them one by one, and every tenth animal is consecrated as an animal tithe offering. If, when counting, he accidently counts the tenth animal as the ninth and the eleventh as the tenth, both are consecrated, the former as the animal tithe and the latter as a peace offering.
  The <i>baraita</i> comments: It is necessary to have an independent derivation to teach that the eleventh animal requires libations, because we do not find another <i>halakha</i> like this in the entire Torah, in which the ancillary case is more stringent than the principal case. In this case, the animal tithe offering itself does not require libations.
  The Gemara presents another answer. Rava says: The verse is expounded to be referring to three different offerings and includes them in the requirement to bring libations. It is reasonable that these three offerings all share an association with each other. What is the only matter in which three offerings are brought that would necessitate three inclusions to teach that each of them require libations? You must say that this is the offerings of a leper, who brings three different offerings.
  § It is further stated in the passage concerning libations: “Or for a ram, you shall prepare a meal offering of two-tenths of an ephah of fine flour, mixed with one-third of a <i>hin</i> of oil” (Numbers 15:6–7). The details of the meal offering brought with a ram are also mentioned elsewhere: “And two-tenths of fine flour for a meal offering, mixed with oil, for the one ram” (Numbers 28:12); therefore, the Gemara asks: Why do I need the verse here to state this? Rav Sheshet says: This verse serves to include in the requirement for libations the ram of Aaron, i.e., the ram of the High Priest that he sacrifices as a burnt offering on Yom Kippur.
  The Gemara challenges: But the requirement to bring libations with the ram of Aaron should be derived from the term: “On your Festivals” (Numbers 15:3), as the <i>baraita</i> derived from that term that all obligatory offerings of Festivals require libations. The Gemara resolves this challenge: It is necessary to have an independent derivation for the ram of Aaron, as it might enter your mind to say that this matter, that obligatory offerings of Festivals require libations, applies only to communal offerings, but not to offerings of an individual, such as the ram of Aaron.
  The Gemara questions this: But why would one think that because the ram of Aaron is an offering of an individual it would not require libations? In what way is it different from the burnt offering of a woman who gave birth, which is also brought by an individual and yet it requires libations?
  The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say that this matter, i.e., the conclusion drawn from the <i>halakha</i> of the burnt offering of a woman who gave birth that even offerings of an individual require libations, applies only to an offering that does not have a fixed time when it must be sacrificed; but with regard to an offering that has a fixed time when it must be sacrificed, I might say that it does not require libations. Accordingly, it is necessary to have an independent derivation that teaches us that the ram of Aaron requires libations.
  The Gemara continues to expound the verse cited: Why do I need the word “or” in the phrase “or for a ram”? The Gemara explains: It serves to include the sacrifice of a <i>palges</i> in the requirement to bring libations. When referring to sheep, the Torah speaks only of lambs and rams. A sheep during its first twelve months is called a lamb, and one older than thirteen months is called a ram. A <i>palges</i> is a sheep in its thirteenth month and is never explicitly mentioned by the Torah. It is therefore necessary to have an independent derivation to teach that if one is sacrificed, libations must be brought with it.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that a <i>palges</i> is considered an independent entity, i.e., it is not regarded as a lamb or a ram, as we learned in a mishna (<i>Para</i> 1:3): One who is obligated to sacrifice a lamb or a ram and sacrificed a <i>palges</i> should bring with it the libations that are required when bringing a ram, but nevertheless its sacrifice is not considered a fulfillment of his obligation to bring an offering of a ram or a lamb. And, commenting on this mishna, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the requirement to bring libations in this case is derived from the phrase “or for a ram,” which serves to include the sacrifice of a <i>palges</i>.
  But the need for an independent derivation is difficult according to the opinion of bar Padda; as he said that in the mishna’s case, the individual brings the libations of a ram but stipulates concerning them that if a <i>palges</i> is a ram, then all of the libations should be regarded as its libations, and if a <i>palges</i> is a lamb, then the quantity of those libations required for a lamb should be regarded as its libations and the rest should be regarded as a gift offering, because he holds that a <i>palges</i> is either a lamb or a ram but that it is uncertain to us which it is. According to bar Padda, one can ask: Is it necessary to have a verse to include an uncertain case? Although it is not known how to categorize a <i>palges</i>, it is included either in the category of a sheep or a ram, and its libations are therefore detailed in the verse.
  The Gemara concludes: Certainly, according to the opinion of bar Padda, this matter is difficult.
  § The Gemara discusses another verse in the passage about libations: “So it shall be done for the one bull, or for the one ram, or for the kid of the lambs or of the goats” (Numbers 15:11). Ostensibly, this verse states nothing beyond that which has already been explained in the beginning of that passage, which delineates the requirement of libations for each type of animal offering. The Gemara asks: Why must the verse state: “For the one bull”? The Gemara answers: Since we have found the verse differentiates between the libations of a ram and the libations of a lamb, even though they are both sheep, one might have thought that we should likewise differentiate between the libations of a bull, which is in its second year, and the libations of a calf, which is still in its first year. Therefore, the verse states: “For the one bull,” teaching that there is one <i>halakha</i> for all bulls, including calves, i.e., the same requirement applies to them.
  The Gemara asks: Why must the verse state: “For the one ram”? The Gemara answers: Since we have found the verse differentiates with regard to sheep between the libations of a lamb in its first year and the libations of a ram in its second year, one might have thought that we should further differentiate with regard to rams themselves between the libations of a ram in its second year and the libations of a ram in its third year. Therefore, the verse states: “For the one ram,” teaching that there is one <i>halakha</i> for all rams.
  The Gemara asks: Why must the verse state: “For the kid of the lambs”? The Gemara answers: Since we have found that the verse differentiates with regard to male sheep between the libations of a male lamb and the libations of a ram, one might have thought that we should further differentiate between the libations of a female lamb and the libations of a ewe. Therefore, the verse states: “For the kid of the lambs.”
  The Gemara asks: Why must the verse state: “Or of the goats”? The Gemara answers: Since we have found that the verse differentiates with regard to sheep between the libations of a male lamb and the libations of a ram, one might have thought that we should further differentiate between the libations of a kid and the libations of an older goat. Therefore, the verse states: “Or of the goats.”
  § Having mentioned the libations of a ewe, the Gemara relates that Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us by asking the following question:
  
  Daf 92a
  
  How much wine is used for the libations of a ewe? And I resolved this question from that which is stated in a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 14b): Generally, the wine for libations would be procured from the supplies of the Temple. One bringing an offering would pay the Temple treasurer for the quantity of wine required, and then the treasurer would give him a token as a receipt indicating what had been paid for. The individual would then proceed to the official appointed over the Temple’s supplies to collect the wine he had paid for. If the token had the word: Kid, it could be used to collect wine for libations for sheep, whether large or small, male or female, except for those of rams. Evidently, the same quantity is required for the libations of ewes as for lambs.
  MISHNA: For all communal offerings there is no mitzva of placing hands on the head of the offering, except for the bull that comes to atone for a community-wide violation of any one of the mitzvot that was perpetrated due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, where the judges of the Sanhedrin are required to place their hands upon its head (see Leviticus 4:13–21); and the scapegoat brought on Yom Kippur, upon which the High Priest places his hands (see Leviticus, chapter 16). Rabbi Shimon says: Also in the case of the goat that comes to atone for a community-wide perpetration of idol worship that occurred due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, the judges of the Sanhedrin are required to place their hands upon its head (see Numbers 15:22–26).
  All offerings of an individual require placing hands, except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering.
  The mitzva of placing hands is performed by the owner of the offering. The mishna adds: And if the owner died, then the heir is regarded as the offering’s owner and so he places his hands on the offering and brings the accompanying libations. And furthermore, he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it. Although it is prohibited to perform an act of substitution, if the owner of an offering does this, his attempt is successful to the extent that the non-sacred animal is thereby consecrated, even though the original offering also remains sacred.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: For all communal offerings there is no mitzva of placing hands, except for the bull that comes to atone for a community-wide violation of any one of the mitzvot, and the goats that come to atone for a community-wide violation of the prohibition of idol worship; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says: There is no mitzva of placing hands with regard to the goats that come to atone for idol worship. But if this is the <i>halakha</i>, which offering shall I bring in their place? The scapegoat.
  The Gemara interrupts the citation of the <i>baraita</i> with a question: Why does Rabbi Yehuda search for an additional case? Is it not possible not to insert an additional case? Ravina said: It is learned as a tradition that there are two instances in which placing hands is required for communal offerings.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda: How can you include the scapegoat as one of the two cases requiring the placing of hands? Isn’t it the <i>halakha</i> that placing hands can be performed only by the offering’s owner, i.e., the one who will achieve atonement through the sacrifice of the offering? And with regard to this offering, the scapegoat, it is Aaron the High Priest or whichever of his sons serves as High Priest who places his hands on it, and yet it is not he who achieves atonement through it. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: With regard to this offering as well, that <i>halakha</i> is fulfilled because Aaron and his sons are considered owners, as they also achieve atonement through it together with the rest of the community.
  The Gemara elaborates on the dispute. Rabbi Yirmeya said: And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, who disagree as to whether the High Priest achieves atonement through the scapegoat, each follow their standard line of reasoning.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: At the end of the passage delineating the Yom Kippur Temple service, the verse states: “He shall bring atonement upon the sanctum of the sacred, and upon the Tent of Meeting and the altar he shall effect atonement; and upon the priests and upon all the people, shall he bring atonement” (Leviticus 16:33). “He shall bring atonement upon the sanctum of the sacred”; this is referring to the innermost sanctum, i.e., the Holy of Holies. “And upon the Tent of Meeting”; this is referring to the Sanctuary. “And the altar”; this is understood in accordance with its plain meaning. “He shall effect atonement”; this is referring to the Temple courtyards. “And upon the priests”; this is understood in accordance with its plain meaning. “And upon all the people”; these are the Israelites. “Shall he bring atonement”; this is referring to the Levites.
  All of them are equated with regard to the fact that they are all atoned for through one atonement, i.e., that they are atoned for by the scapegoat for all transgressions other than the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: Rabbi Shimon says: Just as the blood of the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary atones for Israelites for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, so too, the blood of the bull of the High Priest, whose blood presentation is also performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for the priests for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods. And just as the confession made over the scapegoat atones for Israelites for other transgressions, so too, the confession made over the bull atones for the priests for other transgressions. It is apparent from the <i>baraita</i> that it is only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that the scapegoat atones for both Israelites and priests, and consequently the High Priest may be considered an owner with regard to the mitzva of placing hands.
  The Gemara analyzes Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: And according to Rabbi Shimon, one can ask: Weren’t both Israelites and priests certainly equated in the verse in Leviticus? In what way are they equated in the verse? The Gemara explains: Yes, according to his opinion they are equated in that they are all subject to atonement on Yom Kippur, but each one of the groups achieves atonement in its own way. The priests achieve atonement through the bull brought by the High Priest and his confession, while the Israelites and Levites achieve atonement through the confession over the scapegoat.
  The Gemara summarizes: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, for the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, Israelites achieve atonemment through the presentation of the blood of the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, and the priests achieve atonemment through the presentation of the blood of the bull of Aaron, i.e., of the High Priest. And for other transgressions, both these Israelites and those priests achieve atonement through the confession made over the scapegoat. But according to Rabbi Shimon, for other transgressions as well, the priests achieve atonement through the confession made over the bull of the High Priest.
  This understanding of their dispute is just like that which is taught in a mishna (<i>Shevuot</i> 2b): Israelites and priests and the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, achieve atonement from the scapegoat equally. What is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed priest? It is only that the bull of the High Priest that he offers on Yom Kippur atones for the priests for their defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, whereas the Israelites achieve atonement for defiling caused by them through the goats that are sacrificed on Yom Kippur; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  And Rabbi Shimon says: With regard to the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, just as the blood of the goat, whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for Israelites, so too, the blood of the bull of the High Priest, whose blood presentation is also performed inside the Sanctuary, atones for the priests. And for all other transgressions, just as the confession made over the scapegoat atones for Israelites, so too, the confession made over the bull atones for the priests.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree as to whether or not the goats that come for a community-wide violation of the prohibition against idol worship require the rite of placing hands. With regard to this, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to the bull that comes to atone for a community-wide violation of one of the mitzvot: “And the elders of the congregation shall place their hands upon the head of the bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 4:15). The verse specifies that this requirement applies to the bull to indicate that, with regard to offerings brought for community-wide transgressions, only the bull requires placing hands, but the goats brought for idol worship do not require placing hands; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Shimon says: Both offerings require placing hands. The verse specifies the requirement with regard to the bull because only it requires that placing hands be performed by Elders of the Sanhedrin, but the goats brought for idol worship do not require that placing hands be performed by the Elders, but rather by Aaron, i.e., the High Priest.
  And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: With regard to the Yom Kippur scapegoat, the verse states: “And Aaron shall place both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions, even all their sins” (Leviticus 16:21). The emphasis of “the live goat” indicates that with regard to communal offerings of goats, only the live goat, i.e., the scapegoat, requires placing hands, but the goats brought for idol worship do not require placing hands; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: Both offerings require placing hands. The verse specifies the requirement with regard to the live goat to teach that it requires that placing hands be performed by Aaron, i.e., the High Priest,
  
  Daf 92b
  
  but the goats brought for idol worship do not require that placing hands be performed by Aaron. Rather, they require that it be performed by the Elders of the Sanhedrin. This contradicts the <i>baraita</i> that states that Rabbi Shimon holds that placing hands on the goats brought for idol worship is performed by the High Priest.
  Rav Sheshet said: And how can you understand that this first <i>baraita</i> is accurate, in order to use it as the basis for a contradiction? But didn’t Rabbi Shimon say that we require that placing hands be performed by the owners, i.e., those who will achieve atonement through the offering? The goat brought for idol worship is brought to atone for the Sanhedrin and the people, not for the High Priest.
  Rather, answer that the earlier <i>baraita</i> teaches as follows: The verse specifies the requirement of placing hands with regard to the bull brought for a community-wide transgression to indicate that only that bull requires placing hands, but the goats brought for idol worship do not require placing hands; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The verse specifies the requirement of placing hands with regard to the live goat, i.e., the scapegoat, to indicate that only that live goat requires that placing hands be performed by Aaron, i.e., the High Priest, but the goats brought for a community-wide perpetration of idol worship do not require that placing hands be performed by Aaron. Rather, they require that it be performed by the Elders of the Sanhedrin.
  The Gemara adds: And this is what Rabbi Shimon was saying to Rabbi Yehuda: Goats brought for idol worship require placing hands. And if you heard a tradition that they do not require placing hands, it is only with regard to the fact that it is not to be performed by Aaron, i.e., the High Priest, that you heard that tradition, and the exclusion of the High Priest from having to place hands is derived from the term “the live goat.”
  The Gemara questions Rabbi Yehuda’s statement: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, why do I need to exclude the goats brought for idol worship from the requirement of placing hands by deriving this exclusion from a verse? Didn’t Ravina say that it is learned as a tradition that there are two instances in which placing hands is required for communal offerings? Accordingly, once it has been established that placing hands is required for the bull brought for a community-wide transgression and for the scapegoat, it follows that it is not required in any other case. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda holds that the tradition Ravina cited is merely a well-known statement. It is not a tradition that was transmitted to Moses; rather, the Sages formulated it to remember the <i>halakha</i> that they derived from the verses.
  The Gemara questions Rabbi Shimon’s statement: And according to Rabbi Shimon, from where do we derive that the goats brought for idol worship require placing hands?
  The Gemara answers that we derive it from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When a king sins…he shall bring for his offering an unblemished male goat. And he shall place his hand upon the head of the goat” (Leviticus 4:22–24). The verse could have stated: Upon its head. The reason it adds “of the goat” is to include the goat brought as a sin offering by Nahshon (see Numbers 7:12–17) in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: The term “of the goat” serves to include the goats brought as sin offerings for communal idol worship in the requirement of placing hands on the head of an offering, as Rabbi Shimon would say: Any sin offering whose blood enters inside the Sanctuary requires placing hands.
  The Gemara questions the concluding statement of the <i>baraita</i>: Why do I need the <i>baraita</i> to state: As Rabbi Shimon would say? The statement would appear to explain that Rabbi Shimon’s ruling is merely an expression of a principle that he held, while the <i>baraita</i> itself explains that Rabbi Shimon derived the matter from the repetition of the word “goat.” The Gemara explains: The statement is not presenting the basis of his ruling but is merely a mnemonic to aid in remembering it.
  The Gemara questions why Rabbi Shimon expounds the word “goat” as referring to goats brought for idol worship: But why not say that the word “goat” includes the goat whose blood presentation is performed inside the Sanctuary on Yom Kippur? The Gemara answers: It is more reasonable to include a goat offering that is similar to the offering mentioned in that verse, i.e., the goat of a king, which atones for known transgressions of a mitzva. A goat brought for idol worship is similar in this regard, whereas the goat brought on Yom Kippur atones specifically for transgressions of which the transgressor is unaware.
  The Gemara questions why Rabbi Shimon needs a verse at all: And according to the opinion of Ravina, who said: It is learned as a tradition that there are two instances in which placing hands is required for communal offerings, why do I need any verses, i.e., why do I need the word “goat,” to include goats brought for idol worship in the requirement of placing hands? Since he holds that the priests do not achieve atonement through the scapegoat, perforce the goat brought to atone for idol worship must require placing hands, as otherwise there would not be two instances.
  The Gemara explains: The <i>halakha</i> learned by tradition was necessary, and the exposition of the verses was necessary as well.
  The Gemara elaborates: As, if the <i>halakha</i> were to be derived only from the verse, I would say through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that even communal peace offerings, i.e., the two lambs brought with the two loaves on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i>, require placing of the hands.
  The Gemara explains: This is like the difficulty raised against the mishna of that chapter, i.e., Chapter Five, which begins: All the meal offerings come to be offered as matza. The mishna there states (61a): Rabbi Shimon says: There are three types of offerings that require performance of three mitzvot; in each case, two of the mitzvot apply, but not the third. The mishna continues: Peace offerings brought by individuals require placing hands on the head of the animal while the animal is still alive, and waving after it is slaughtered, but there is no obligation to wave it while it is alive. Communal peace offerings require waving both while they are alive and after they are slaughtered, but there is no obligation to place hands on them. And the guilt offering of the leper requires placing hands and waving while alive, but there is no obligation to wave it after it is slaughtered.
  The Gemara there (62b) raises the following difficulty: Let us bring an <i>a fortiori</i> inference to the contrary, i.e., conclude that communal peace offerings should require placing hands through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If peace offerings brought by an individual, whose <i>halakha</i> is more lenient than that of communal peace offerings in that they do not require waving while alive, nevertheless require placing hands, then with regard to communal peace offerings, which do require waving when alive, is it not logical to conclude that they require placing hands? To counter this inference it was necessary to have the <i>halakha</i> learned by tradition to limit the requirement of placing hands to only two instances.
  And conversely, if it were derived only from the <i>halakha</i> learned by tradition, without the exposition of the verse, I would say that we do not know exactly which offering other than the bull brought for a community-wide transgression requires placing hands. Therefore, the word “goat” teaches us that the second instance is a goat offering similar to the offering mentioned in that verse, specifically the goat of a king, which atones for known transgressions of a mitzva, i.e., a goat brought for idol worship.
  § The mishna teaches: All offerings of an individual require placing hands except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, and the Paschal offering.
  Leviticus, chapter 3, discusses peace offerings and details the obligation of placing hands. The term “his offering” is mentioned a number of times. Each time serves to emphasize that peace offerings require placing hands and to exclude another type of offering from that requirement. The Sages taught a <i>baraita</i> detailing which offerings are excluded and why one might have thought otherwise. “His offering” (Leviticus 3:1) requires placing hands, but not the firstborn offering. As one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as follows: If a peace offering, whose consecration does not originate from being in its mother’s womb, nevertheless requires placing hands, then with regard to a firstborn offering, whose consecration originates from the womb, is it not logical that it requires placing hands? To counter this inference, the verse states: “His offering,” teaching that a peace offering requires placing hands but the firstborn offering does not.
  “His offering” (Leviticus 3:2) requires placing hands, but not the animal tithe offering. As one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as follows: If peace offerings, which are unlike the animal tithe in that their designation does not consecrate the animals before and after them, i.e., this unique stringency of animal tithe does not apply to them, nevertheless require placing hands, then with regard to an animal tithe offering, which can consecrate the animals before and after it, as in the case where the ninth or eleventh animal to be counted was mistakenly designated as the tenth animal, is it not logical that it requires placing hands? To counter this inference, the verse states: “His offering,” teaching that a peace offering requires placing hands, but the animal tithe offering does not.
  The <i>baraita</i> concludes: “His offering” (Leviticus 3:6) requires placing hands, but not the Paschal offering. As one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference, as follows: If peace offerings, which are not subject to a positive mitzva to arise and bring them, nevertheless require placing hands, then with regard to a Paschal offering, which is subject to a positive mitzva to arise and bring it, is it not logical that it requires placing hands? To counter this inference, the verse states: “His offering,” teaching that a peace offering requires placing hands, but the Paschal offering does not.
  The Gemara rejects the inferences of the <i>baraita</i>: Each of these <i>a fortiori</i> inferences can be refuted. What is notable about peace offerings? They are notable in that they require libations and the waving of the breast and thigh. Therefore, a <i>halakha</i> that applies to peace offerings cannot necessarily be applied to the firstborn offering, animal tithe offering, or Paschal offering, which do not share those requirements. Accordingly, the verses that the <i>baraita</i> cites must be understood as a mere support, but are not actually necessary to counter the <i>a fortiori</i> inferences.
  The Gemara asks: But
  
  Daf 93a
  
  if the repeated term “his offering” is not needed to counter the <i>a fortiori</i> inferences, why do I need these three verses? The Gemara explains: One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of another person. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of a gentile. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.
  § The mishna states: If the owner of an offering died, then the heir is regarded as the offering’s owner. Therefore, he places his hands on the offering and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it. Although it is prohibited to perform an act of substitution, if the owner of an offering does this, his attempt is successful to the extent that the non-sacred animal is thereby consecrated, even though the original offering also remains sacred.
  Rav Ḥananya taught a <i>baraita</i> in the presence of Rava: An heir does not place hands on an offering he inherited, and an heir cannot substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering he inherited. Rava asked: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: The heir places his hands on the offering, and brings the accompanying libations, and he can substitute a non-sacred animal for it and thereby consecrate the non-sacred animal?
  Rav Ḥananya said to Rava: Should I reverse the current version of the <i>baraita</i> to have it be in accordance with the mishna? Rava said to him: No, as whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: An heir places hands, and an heir can effect substitution. Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not place hands, and an heir cannot effect substitution.
  The Gemara clarifies: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? He expounds the term “his offering” as teaching that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on one’s father’s offering that one inherited. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda derives the <i>halakha</i> concerning who can substitute a non-sacred animal for an offering, which is the initial stage of consecration, from the <i>halakha</i> concerning who performs the rite of placing hands on the offering, which is the final stage of consecration: Just as with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir does not place his hands, so too, with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir cannot effect substitution.
  And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive their opinion? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [<i>hamer yamir</i>] animal for animal” (Leviticus 27:10), with the doubled form of <i>hamer yamir</i> serving to include the heir as one capable of effecting substitution. And furthermore, they derive the <i>halakha</i> concerning who performs the rite of placing hands, which is the final stage of consecration, from the <i>halakha</i> concerning who can effect substitution, which is an initial stage of consecration: Just as with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir can effect substitution, so too, with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir places his hands.
  The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what do they do with this term: “His offering”? The Gemara explains how the Rabbis expound each mention of the term. One instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of a gentile. Another instance of “his offering” teaches that one places hands only on one’s own offering, but not on an offering of another person. The third instance of “his offering” serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., they are all required to place their hands on the offering.
  The Gemara clarifies: And Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one of the mentions serves to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands, so he is able to expound it to exclude an heir from the requirement. Alternatively, if he holds that one of the mentions serves to include owners of a jointly owned offering, then he must derive that one does not place hands on the offering of a gentile or of another person from the same one mention in the verse, which leaves him two more mentions in the verses. One he expounds to teach that on “his offering” he places hands, but not on his father’s offering that he inherited, and the other mention remains to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with the use of the doubled form in this verse: “If he shall substitute [<i>hamer yamir</i>]”? The Gemara answers: He requires it to include a woman among those who can effect substitution. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Since the entire matter of substitution is stated in the Torah only in the masculine form, what is the reason that we ultimately come to include a woman? The verse states: “If he shall substitute [<i>hamer yamir</i>],” using a doubled form.
  And as for the Rabbis, they derive that a woman can effect substitution from the term: “And if” (Leviticus 27:10), in the phrase “and if he shall substitute.” And Rabbi Yehuda does not expound the term “and if” at all.
  MISHNA: Everyone who brings an animal offering places hands upon its head, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind person, a gentile, a Canaanite slave, the agent of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on the owner’s behalf, and a woman.
  And the requirement of placing hands is a non-essential mitzva; therefore, failure to place hands does not prevent the owner from achieving atonement.
  The rite of placing hands is performed by leaning on the head of the offering with two hands. And in the same location in the Temple that one places hands, one slaughters the animal. And immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed.
  GEMARA: The Gemara explains why certain types of people do not place hands on an offering: Granted, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor do not place their hands on the offering, as they are not mentally competent. The exclusion of a gentile is also understandable, as the verses concerning placing hands are introduced with: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them” (Leviticus 1:2), which indicates that the children of Israel place hands upon their offerings, but gentiles do not place their hands upon their offerings. But with regard to a blind person, what is the reason that he does not place his hands on his offering?
  Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi disagree as to the source of the exclusion of a blind person. One said that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the mention of placing hands in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of placing hands stated with regard to the bull offering brought for a community-wide violation perpetrated due to an erroneous ruling of the Sanhedrin, which is performed by the Elders of the congregation, i.e., the judges of the Sanhedrin: Just as the judges may not be blind (see <i>Sanhedrin</i> 34b), so too the rite of placing hands is not performed by a blind person.
  And the other one said that it is derived from a verbal analogy between the mention of placing hands in the passage detailing the general requirement to do so, and the mention of placing hands stated with regard to the burnt offering of appearance brought by an individual on the pilgrimage Festivals: Just as a blind person is exempt from making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and bringing the offering (see <i>Ḥagiga</i> 2a), so too he is excluding from the requirement of placing hands.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said that the exclusion of a blind person is derived from the burnt offering of appearance, what is the reason that he does not derive this from the placing of hands performed by the Elders of the congregation?
  
  Daf 93b
  
  The Gemara answers: He holds that one derives the <i>halakhot</i> of the offering of an individual from the <i>halakhot</i> of another offering of an individual, such as the burnt offering of appearance, and one does not derive the <i>halakhot</i> of the offering of an individual from the <i>halakhot</i> of a communal offering, e.g., the bull brought for a community-wide violation.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the one who said that the exclusion of a blind person is derived from the placing of hands performed by the Elders of the congregation, what is the reason that he does not derive this from the burnt offering of appearance? The Gemara answers: He holds that one derives the <i>halakhot</i> of a matter concerning which the requirement of placing hands is explicitly written with regard to that case itself, as is the case in the passage detailing the general requirement of placing hands, from another matter concerning which placing hands is also explicitly written with regard to that case itself, as is the case in the passage describing the bull brought for a community-wide violation of a sin. This serves to exclude the possibility of deriving the <i>halakhot</i> from those of the burnt offering of appearance, as the requirement to place hands upon it is not explicitly written in the Torah with regard to it, but rather it itself is derived from the requirement stated with regard to a voluntary burnt offering.
  This is as a <i>tanna</i> taught in a <i>baraita</i> in the presence of Rav Yitzḥak bar Abba: With regard to the obligatory offering brought by Aaron the High Priest on the eighth day of the inauguration of the Tabernacle, it is written: “And the burnt offering was presented, and he sacrificed in accordance with the ordinance” (Leviticus 9:16). This last phrase means: In accordance with the ordinance of a voluntary burnt offering. Accordingly, this verse teaches about every obligatory burnt offering, including the burnt offering of appearance, that it requires placing hands, just as a voluntary burnt offering does.
  § The mishna states: A Canaanite slave, the agent of the owner of the offering who brings the offering on his behalf, and a woman do not place hands on their offerings. Concerning these <i>halakhot</i>, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The term “his hand” is mentioned three times in Leviticus, chapter 3, which details the requirement of placing hands. Each mention is expounded to exclude a different case. “His hand” (Leviticus 3:2), but not the hand of his Canaanite slave; “his hand” (Leviticus 3:8), but not the hand of his agent; “his hand” (Leviticus 3:13), but not the hand of his wife.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these three exclusions? The Gemara explains that all three mentions are necessary, as had the Merciful One written only one exclusion, I would say that it serves to exclude only a Canaanite slave, as since he is not commanded in mitzvot it is reasonable that he cannot perform the rite of placing hands. But with regard to an agent, since he is commanded in mitzvot, and there is a principle that the halakhic status of a person’s agent is like that of himself, one might say that he could place his hands on the offering of the owner on the owner’s behalf, and thereby fulfill the requirement. Therefore, it is necessary to have an independent source to exclude an agent.
  And had the Merciful One taught us only these two <i>halakhot</i>, one would have excluded only a Canaanite slave and an agent, as they are not considered like his own flesh. But with regard to his wife, who is considered like his own flesh, one might say that she places her hands on her husband’s offering. Therefore, the third mention is necessary to teach that even a wife cannot fulfill the requirement on behalf of her husband.
  § The mishna states: The requirement of placing hands is a non-essential mitzva. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering, and it shall be accepted for him to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4). The <i>baraita</i> asks: But does the rite of placing hands effect atonement? Isn’t atonement effected only through the presentation of the blood? As it is stated with regard to blood: “For the soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to effect atonement for your souls, for it is the blood of the soul that effects atonement” (Leviticus 17:11). Rather, the verse serves to say to you that if one treated placing hands as though it were a non-essential mitzva and therefore neglected to perform it, then the verse ascribes him blame as though he did not effect atonement; but nevertheless, in actuality, the offering atones for his sin and he does not need to bring another offering.
  And it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to waving in this way: “He shall take one male lamb as a guilt offering to be waved to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 14:21). The <i>baraita</i> asks: Does waving the offering effect atonement? Isn’t atonement effected only through the presentation of the blood? As it is stated: “For it is the blood of the soul that effects atonement” (Leviticus 17:11). Rather, the verse serves to say to you that if one treated waving as though it were a non-essential mitzva and therefore neglected to perform it, then the verse ascribes him blame as though he did not effect atonement; but nevertheless, in actuality, the offering effects atonement for his sin and he does not need to bring another offering.
  § The mishna further states that that placing hands is performed by leaning on the head of the offering. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The phrase “his hand upon the head” is mentioned three times in Leviticus, chapter 3. Each mention is expounded to exclude the possibility of performing the rite on a different part of the animal’s body. Placing hands is performed with “his hand upon the head” (Leviticus 3:2), but not with his hand on the neck of the animal; with “his hand upon the head” (Leviticus 3:8), but not with his hand on the back of the animal; with “his hand upon the head” (Leviticus 3:13), but not with his hand on the breast of the animal.
  The Gemara asks: Why do I need all these three exclusions? The Gemara explains that all three mentions are necessary, as had the Merciful One written only one exclusion, I would say that it serves to exclude only the animal’s neck, as it is not level with the head of the animal. But with regard to its back, which is level with its head, one might say that it is not precluded and that one can fulfill the requirement by placing one’s hands there. Therefore, it is necessary to have an independent source to exclude the animal’s back.
  And had the Torah taught us only these two <i>halakhot</i>, one would have excluded only the neck and the back, as those parts are not included in the waving of the offering, i.e., they are not waved. But with regard to the animal’s breast, which is included in the waving of the offering, one might say that it is not precluded and that one can fulfill the requirement by placing one’s hands there. Therefore, the third mention is necessary to teach that placing hands cannot be performed even on the animal’s breast.
  A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one placed his hand on the sides of the animal’s head, what is the <i>halakha</i>; does one fulfill the requirement of placing hands by doing so? The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Abba Bira’a, son of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, says that the verse: “And he shall place his hand upon the head of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 1:4), indicates that it must be done with his hand on the top of its head and not with his hand on the sides of its head.
  Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If one’s hands were wrapped in a cloth, what is the <i>halakha</i> as to whether the cloth is regarded as an interposition between his hands and the animal such that it invalidates the rite? The Gemara answers: Come and hear a resolution from a <i>baraita</i>, which states: The rite is valid provided that there is no item that interposes between him and the offering.
  § The mishna adds that the placing of hands is performed with two hands. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Reish Lakish said: As the verse states with regard to the Yom Kippur service: “And Aaron shall place both his hands [<i>yadav</i>] upon the head of the live goat” (Leviticus 16:21). The word <i>yadav</i>, meaning: His hands, is written without a second <i>yod</i>, and so if read without vowels it reads as: His hand. But it is also written “both,” which makes clear that the intention is that he must use both of his hands. This established a paradigm that in any place where it is stated in the Torah: His hand, there are here two hands, unless the verse explicitly specifies that there is only one.
  The Gemara relates: Rabbi Elazar went and stated this <i>halakha</i> in the study hall, but he did not say it in the name of Reish Lakish. Reish Lakish heard about this and became angry. He said to Rabbi Elazar: If it enters your mind that wherever it is written: His hand, the meaning is that there are actually two hands, then why do I ever need the Torah to write: His hands, his hands, i.e., <i>yadav</i> in the plural, which it does on numerous occasions?
  Reish Lakish raised objections against him from twenty-four occasions where the Torah writes: His hands, for example: “His own hands [<i>yadav</i>] shall bring the offerings of the Lord” (Leviticus 7:30); “his hands [<i>yadav</i>] shall contend for him, and You shall be a help against his adversaries” (Deuteronomy 33:7); “Guiding his hands [<i>yadav</i>] wittingly, for Manasseh was the firstborn” (Genesis 48:14). Rabbi Elazar was silent, as he had no response.
  After Reish Lakish had calmed down, he said to Rabbi Elazar: What is the reason that you did not say to me the following: When I established that paradigm, I was speaking only about the term: His hands [<i>yadav</i>], with regard to placing hands. But with regard to other <i>halakhot</i>, when the Torah says “his hand” the reference is to just one hand, and so when referring to two hands it must say “his hands.”
  The Gemara asks: But also with regard to placing hands it is written, concerning Moses’ ordination of Joshua: “And he placed his hands [<i>yadav</i>] upon him and gave him a charge” (Numbers 27:23), using the plural “his hands” [<i>yadav</i>] instead of: His hand [<i>yado</i>]. The Gemara clarifies that Reish Lakish meant that one could say: When I established that paradigm, I was speaking only about the term: His hands [<i>yadav</i>], with regard to placing hands on an animal offering. But in all other cases, if the intention is that there were two hands, the plural must be used.
  § The mishna teaches: And in the same location in the Temple that one places hands, one slaughters the animal. And immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed. The Gemara asks: What is the mishna saying? The mishna appears to state two distinct rulings. But if so, the first statement is superfluous, because if the slaughter immediately follows the placing of hands, then it is obvious that the animal is slaughtered without changing its location. The Gemara explains that this is what the mishna is saying: In the same location in the Temple that one places hands one slaughters the animal, because immediately following the rite of placing hands, the slaughter is performed. There are not two distinct rulings; rather, the second statement is the explanation of the first.
  MISHNA: There is an aspect of greater stringency with regard to placing hands than there is with regard to waving, and there is an aspect of greater stringency with regard to waving than there is with regard to placing hands. The stringency with regard to placing hands is that if several people are partners in bringing an offering, one of them waves the offering on behalf of all the other partners, but one cannot fulfill the requirement of placing hands if he alone places hands on behalf of all the other partners; rather, each member must place hands himself. The stringency with regard to waving is that waving is practiced in the cases of both offerings of an individual, e.g., peace offerings, where the breast and thigh and sacrificial portions are waved, and in the cases of communal offerings, e.g., the two lambs sacrificed on <i>Shavuot</i>, which are waved together with the two loaves;
  
  Daf 94a
  
  and it is practiced both in the cases of offerings when they are alive, e.g., the guilt offering of a leper and the lambs of <i>Shavuot</i>, and in the cases of offerings after they are slaughtered, e.g., the breast and thigh. By contrast, placing hands is practiced with a live animal. A further stringency is that waving is practiced both in the case of an item in which there is a living spirit, i.e., an animal offering, and in the case of an item in which there is not a living spirit, e.g., the <i>omer</i> offering, the <i>sota</i> meal offering, and the loaves accompanying a thanks offering and the ram of the nazirite, whereas placing hands is only ever performed upon living beings.
  GEMARA: The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to placing hands: “And he shall place his hand on the head of his offering” (Leviticus 3:2). The term “his offering” serves to include all of the owners of an offering in the requirement of placing hands, i.e., each one must perform it.
  It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought: Could it not be derived through an <i>a fortiori</i> inference that only one partner needs to place his hands on the offering? The inference is as follows: If the requirement of waving, which was amplified to apply also to slaughtered animals, nevertheless was limited with regard to an offering jointly owned by a number of partners, as only one of them waves on behalf of all of them, then with regard to the requirement of placing hands, which was not amplified to apply also to slaughtered animals, is it not logical that it was also limited with regard to an offering jointly owned by partners, and it is sufficient for one partner to place his hands on behalf of the others? To counter this inference, the verse states: “His offering,” to include each of the owners of an offering in the requirement of placing hands.
  The Gemara asks: But one could suggest the opposite inference and conclude that the requirement of waving should be amplified with regard to partners, through the following <i>a fortiori</i> inference: If the requirement of placing hands, which was not amplified to apply also to slaughtered animals, was amplified with regard to an offering jointly owned by partners, requiring each partner to perform it himself, then with regard to the requirement of waving, which was amplified to apply also to slaughtered animals, is it not logical that it was also amplified with regard to an offering jointly owned by partners, requiring each partner to perform it himself?
  The Gemara rejects this: This inference cannot be correct, because it is obvious that only one of the partners needs to perform the waving. It is not possible to have all of them perform it, as how would it be done? If one says: Let all of the partners wave together, with each one placing his hands under those of another, that is difficult: There would be an invalidating interposition between the offering and hands of the partners who are not directly holding onto the offering. And if one says: Let one partner wave, and then the next one will wave, and so on, that would also be invalid, as the Merciful One states in the Torah that one must perform a waving, using a singular noun, which indicates that one waving, but not multiple wavings, should be performed.
  § The mishna states that placing hands is not performed upon a slaughtered offering. The Gemara questions this: And is there no instance of placing hands performed on slaughtered animals? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Tamid</i> 33b): When the High Priest would want to sacrifice the daily offering, as it is his right to be the one to sacrifice it whenever he wishes to, he would ascend the ramp to the top of the altar, and the deputy [<i>segan</i>] High Priest would also ascend to the right of the High Priest. If it occurred that the High Priest reached halfway up the ramp and grew tired, the deputy would hold him by his right hand to assist him and would bring him up to the top of the altar. And the first of the group of priests who had been selected to bring the limbs of the daily offering to the altar would hold out the head and the right hind leg of the offering to the High Priest, who would place his hands upon them, and then he would throw the limbs onto the fire of the altar.
  Then the second priest would hold out the two forelegs to the first priest, and the first priest would give them to the High Priest, who would place his hands upon them and then throw them onto the fire. At this stage the second priest would slip away and leave, as he was no longer needed. The first priest remained where he was, as he was still needed to present the other limbs of the offering to the High Priest. And in this manner the other priests who had been selected would hold out the rest of all the limbs to the first priest, who would present them to the High Priest, who would then place his hands upon them and throw them onto the fire.
  The mishna concludes: And when the High Priest wants, he may merely place his hands upon the limbs, and then the other priests throw the limbs onto the fire of the altar.
  This mishna apparently demonstrates an instance of placing hands performed upon a slaughtered animal. In resolution of this difficulty, Abaye said: In the mishna there, the placing of hands is not in fulfillment of the requirement to do so to an offering; rather, it is done merely due to the eminence of the High Priest, so that his sacrifice of the limbs of an offering is more distinguished than when performed by ordinary priests.
  
  MISHNA: The two loaves that are brought on the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> from the new wheat are each made from a tenth of an ephah of fine flour. They are kneaded one by one and they are baked one by one, i.e., each loaf is placed separately in the oven. The loaves of the shewbread are kneaded one by one and baked two by two, i.e., two loaves are placed in the oven at the same time. And the baker would prepare the shewbread in a mold [<i>defus</i>] when he made the dough. When he removes the shewbread from the oven he again places the loaves in a mold so that their shape will not be ruined.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the two loaves are kneaded one by one and baked one by one. The loaves of the shewbread are also kneaded one by one but are baked two at a time. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? They are derived from a verse, as the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall take fine flour, and bake twelve cakes from it; two-tenths of an ephah shall be in one cake. And you shall set them in two arrangements, six in an arrangement, upon the pure Table before the Lord” (Leviticus 24:5–6). The phrase “Two-tenths of an ephah shall be in one cake” teaches that the loaves of the shewbread are kneaded one by one.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: From where is it derived that this is also the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the two loaves, i.e., that they are kneaded one at a time? The verse states: “Shall be,” to include the two loaves. And from where is it derived that the baking of the loaves of the shewbread is performed two by two? The verse states: “And you shall set them [<i>vesamta otam</i>],” the plural form indicating that two loaves should be baked together. One might have thought that the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i> should also be baked in this manner. The verse states: “Them [otam],” which is a term of exclusion, indicating that only the loaves of the shewbread are baked two at a time, but not the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i>.
  The Gemara asks: Didn’t you already derive from this term: “Them,” that the shewbread must be baked two loaves at a time? The Gemara answers: If so, i.e., if the term “them” teaches only that the shewbread is baked two loaves at a time, let the verse say: And you shall set them [<i>vesamtam</i>], using the shortened form. What is the verse teaching by using the longer form “<i>vesamta otam</i>”? You may learn from the verse two matters, both that the loaves of the shewbread should be baked two at a time and that this requirement does not apply to the two loaves brought on <i>Shavuot</i>.
  § The mishna teaches that the shewbread was placed in a mold, and with regard to this the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And you shall set them” (Leviticus 24:6), which means to set them in a mold. There are three molds that are used in the Temple in the preparation of the loaves. First, the baker places the shewbread in a mold while it is still dough. And second, there was a type of mold for the shewbread in the oven, in which the loaves were baked. And when he removes [<i>rodah</i>] the shewbread from the oven, he places it in a third mold so that its shape will not be ruined. The Gemara asks: But why is a third mold necessary? Let him return the shewbread to the first mold, in which the dough was kneaded. The Gemara answers: Once the dough is baked, it rises, and no longer fits into the first mold.
  § It was stated: How is the shewbread prepared, i.e., in what shape?
  
  Daf 94b
  
  Rabbi Ḥanina says: It was rectangular, with a wide base and two parallel walls with an open space between them, like a box that is open on two sides. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the shewbread was like a rocking boat, i.e., a triangular-shaped boat with a narrow base from which two walls rise at angles. Since the boat does not have a wide base it rocks from side to side.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who said the shewbread was like a box that is open on two sides, this is the reason that the bowls of frankincense could rest upon it. The Gemara asks: But according to the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, how would the bowls rest upon it? The Gemara answers: The baker prepared a flat place for the bowls to rest, on the side of the shewbread.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who said the shewbread was like a box that is open on two sides, this is the reason that the rods could rest upon the it. The shewbread was placed on the Table in two arrangements. In each arrangement the lowest loaf was placed on the Table and the remaining loaves were set one above the other, with rods separating the loaves. There were fourteen rods for each arrangement, each loaf being placed upon three rods, except for the uppermost loaf, which was placed on only two rods. The Gemara asks: But according to the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, how were the rods resting upon the shewbread? Since the loaves had a narrow base, they would rest on only one rod. The Gemara answers: The baker would make a protrusion in the base of the loaves, which would slightly widen their pointed base, enabling them to rest with stability upon the rods.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who said the shewbread was like a box that is open on two sides, this is the reason that the panels would support the loaves. There were four gold panels that stood at the two sides of the Table and rose up above the height of the Table, and the rods rested on these panels. The loaves were placed lengthwise along the entire width of the Table, and the panels supported the two sides of the loaves, preventing them from falling to the ground. The Gemara asks: But according to the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, how would the panels support the loaves? Since the sides of the shewbread rose at an angle, the panels would touch only the upper edges of the shewbread. The Gemara answers that the panels would be made to curve inward at an angle corresponding to the angle of the shewbread, so that the panels supported the loaves along their entire length.
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, this is the reason that we require panels. Since the loaves do not have a wide base they cannot stand on their own without the support of the rods and panels. The Gemara asks: But according to the one who said the shewbread was like a box that is open on two sides, why do I need panels? The loaves could stand without the assistance of rods and panels. The Gemara answers: If there were no panels supporting the loaves from the sides and the loaves were placed on top of each other, due to the weight of the upper loaves the lower loaves would break [<i>telaḥ</i>].
  The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, it is evident that the panels are placed on the Table, in order to prevent the slanted loaves from falling to the ground. The Gemara asks: But according to the one who said the shewbread was like a box that is open on two sides, where would the priest place the panels? Since the wide base of the loaves reached the edge of the Table, there was no room for the panels there. Would the priest place them on the ground? The Gemara answers: Yes, the panels were placed on the ground, as Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: According to the statement of the one who says the shewbread was like a rocking boat, the panels are placed on the Table, whereas according to the statement of the one who says the shewbread was like a box that is open on two sides, the panels are placed on the ground.
  The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Yehuda said: The loaves support the panels and the panels support the loaves, i.e., they lean against one another? It is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan. According to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥanina, the panels stood on the ground and did not require the support of the loaves.
  
  Daf 95a
  
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from another <i>baraita</i>: There was a mold in the oven for the shewbread that was similar to a barrel made of reeds, as it was perforated to enable the bread to bake well, and in its shape it resembled a type of rectangular tablet [<i>tavla</i>]. This indicates that the shewbread was rectangular. The Gemara answers: Say that the opening, i.e., the upper section of the mold, resembled a type of rectangular tablet, and that the mold tapered down to a point.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> in accordance with the one who said the shewbread was like a rocking boat, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: There were four gold panels there, on the Table, which split up at their upper ends so that they were like forked reed branches. The panels were forked because the bread, which resembled a type of rocking boat, was supported by them.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: During the era of the Tabernacle, was the shewbread disqualified during the journeys of the Jewish people in the wilderness, or was it not disqualified during the journeys? When the Jewish people would travel from one place to another in the wilderness, the Tabernacle would be dismantled and the Table would be carried with the loaves upon it. The dilemma is about whether or not the loaves were disqualified, since they left the boundaries of the Sanctuary. This matter is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. One says the loaves were thereby disqualified, and one says they were not disqualified.
  The Gemara explains their respective reasons: The one who says the shewbread was disqualified derives his opinion from a verse, as it is written with regard to the journeys: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall journey with the camp of the Levites in the midst of the camps; as they encamp, so shall they journey, every man in his place, by their banners” (Numbers 2:17). The verse juxtaposes the encampments with the journeys, indicating that just as when the Tabernacle is encamped the shewbread is disqualified when it leaves the Tabernacle courtyard, so too, when the Tabernacle journeys the shewbread is disqualified when it leaves the courtyard.
  The one who says the shewbread was not disqualified during the journeys derives his opinion from a verse, as it is written with regard to the journeys: “And upon the Table of shewbread they shall spread a cloth of blue…and the continual bread shall remain upon it” (Numbers 4:7). The verse refers to the shewbread as “the continual bread” even during the journeys, indicating that as long as the loaves are on the Table they retain their sacred status.
  The Gemara asks: But also according to the other <i>amora</i>, who maintains the shewbread was not disqualified during the journeys, isn’t it written: “As they encamp, so shall they journey,” indicating that the shewbread is disqualified when it leaves the Tabernacle during the journeys? The Gemara replies that according to this opinion, the juxtaposition of the encampments with the journeys is interpreted in the other direction: Just as when the Tabernacle is encamped, if the shewbread does not leave its place and remains on the Table it is not disqualified, so too, when the Tabernacle journeys, if it does not leave its place on the Table it is not disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: But also according to the other <i>amora</i>, who maintains the shewbread was disqualified during the journeys, isn’t it written: “And the continual bread shall remain upon it,” indicating that the shewbread retains its sanctity as long as it is on the Table? Rather, when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is different. With regard to a case where the shewbread is arranged on the Table, everyone agrees the shewbread is not disqualified during the journey. Rather, when they disagree it is in a case where the shewbread is removed from the Table before the journey.
  The Gemara explains their respective reasons: The one who says the shewbread is disqualified derives his opinion from a verse, as it is written: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall journey with the camp of the Levites in the midst of the camps; as they encamp, so shall they journey, every man in his place, by their banners” (Numbers 2:17). The verse juxtaposes the encampments with the journeys, indicating that just as when the Tabernacle is encamped the shewbread is disqualified when it leaves the Tabernacle courtyard, so too, when the Tabernacle journeys the shewbread is disqualified when it leaves the courtyard.
  According to the one who says the shewbread is not disqualified during the journeys, this is derived from a verse, as it is written: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall journey,” indicating that even though it has journeyed it is still considered the Tent of Meeting, and therefore the shewbread is not disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: But also according to the other <i>amora</i>, who maintains the shewbread was not disqualified during the journeys, isn’t it written: “As they encamp, so shall they journey,” indicating that the shewbread is disqualified when it leaves the Tabernacle during the journeys? The Gemara replies that according to this opinion, the juxtaposition of the encampments with the journeys is interpreted in the other direction: Just as when the Tabernacle is encamped, if one does not take the shewbread out of the courtyard it is not disqualified, so too, when the Tabernacle journeys, if one does not take the shewbread out of the courtyard it is not disqualified.
  The Gemara asks: But also according to the other <i>amora</i>, who maintains the shewbread was disqualified during the journeys, isn’t it written: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall journey,” indicating that the Tent of Meeting retains its sanctity during the journeys and therefore the shewbread should not be disqualified? The Gemara answers: That verse is not referring to the sanctity of the Tent of Meeting during the journeys. Rather, it comes to teach the position of the Tent of Meeting between the banners of the different tribes during the journeys.
  The Gemara asks: And according to the other <i>amora</i>, from where does he derive the position of the Tent of Meeting during the journeys? The Gemara replies: He derives this from the continuation of the verse: “With the camp of the Levites in the midst of the camps” (Numbers 2:17).
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i> to the opinion that the shewbread was not disqualified during the journeys: At the time of the dismantling of the Tabernacle in order to commence the journeys, when the curtains surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard are removed, the sacrificial food is disqualified from being consumed, as it is considered to have left the Tabernacle courtyard. And <i>zavim</i> and lepers are sent out of the partitions of their camps; the <i>zavim</i> are sent out of the Levite camp, while lepers are sent out of the Israelite camp. What, is it not referring even to the shewbread, indicating that it is disqualified during the journeys? The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> means that most sacrificial food is disqualified, except for the shewbread.
  The Gemara challenges: Whichever way you look at it, this explanation is difficult. If the phrase: “Then the Tent of Meeting shall journey,” is meant exactly, i.e., literally, and it still has the status of the Tent of Meeting even during the journeys, then even other sacrificial food should not be disqualified during the journeys. If “then the Tent of Meeting shall journey,” is not meant exactly, and it does not have the status of the Tent of Meeting during the journeys, then even the shewbread should be disqualified.
  Rather, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that there is actually no dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. This Master, who stated that the shewbread is not disqualified during the journeys, stated his ruling with regard to loaves that are arranged on the Table; and that Master, who stated that the shewbread is disqualified during the journeys, stated his ruling with regard to loaves that were removed from the Table. And the two <i>amora’im</i> do not disagree, as each was referring to a different case.
  § The aforementioned <i>baraita</i> states that when the Tabernacle was dismantled the sacrificial food was disqualified, as it was considered to have left the Tabernacle courtyard. Abaye said: One may conclude from the <i>baraita</i> that there could be a case where the dismantling of the Tabernacle in order to commence the journeys would take place at night. This is a necessary conclusion, as if it should enter your mind to say that there could not be a case where the dismantling of the Tabernacle in order to commence the journeys would take place at night, when would the curtains surrounding the Tabernacle be removed? If they were removed right away in the morning, why was the sacrificial food disqualified specifically due to the fact that it left the Tabernacle courtyard? I may derive that it was disqualified because of the fact that it was left overnight.
  The Gemara challenges: It is obvious that the Tabernacle could be dismantled at night, as it is written: “And the Lord went before them by day in a pillar of cloud, to lead them the way; and by night in a pillar of fire, to give them light; that they might go by day and by night” (Exodus 13:21). The Gemara answers that Abaye’s observation is necessary lest you say that this statement, that they would travel at night, applies only in a case where the Jewish people dismantled their camp and began to journey by day, in which case they would continue to travel at night. But in a case where they did not dismantle their camp by day they could not dismantle the camp and leave at night. Abaye therefore teaches us that they could set out even at night.
  § The aforementioned <i>baraita</i> teaches that even when the Tabernacle was dismantled, <i>zavim</i> and lepers were sent outside the camp, as the sanctity of both the Levite camp and the Israelite camp remained intact even while the Tabernacle was dismantled. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another <i>baraita</i>: Once the curtain surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard was rolled up, the <i>zavim</i> and the lepers were permitted to enter into that area where the Tabernacle had stood. This indicates that the camps did not retain their sacred status once the Tabernacle was dismantled. Rav Ashi said: This is not difficult; this <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer and that <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>:
  
  Daf 95b
  
  Rabbi Eliezer says: One might have thought that if <i>zavim</i> and lepers pushed their way in and entered the Temple courtyard during the sacrifice of a Paschal offering that is brought in a state of impurity, i.e., when the majority of the nation are ritually impure due to contact with a corpse, that perhaps the <i>zavim</i> and lepers are liable. In other words, one might have thought that since it is prohibited for <i>zavim</i> and lepers to enter even under such circumstances, they would be liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>]. Therefore, the verse states: “That they send out from the camp any leper and any <i>zav</i> and anyone impure by reason of a corpse” (Numbers 5:2). The verse indicates that at a time when those who are impure with impurity imparted by a corpse are sent out of the Temple, <i>zavim</i> and lepers are also sent out of the Temple and are liable to receive <i>karet</i> if they enter it.
  But when those who are impure with impurity imparted by a corpse are not sent out of the Temple, <i>zavim</i> and lepers are also not sent out, i.e., they are not liable to receive <i>karet</i> if they enter the Temple. The <i>baraita</i> that teaches that once the curtain surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard was rolled up it was permitted for <i>zavim</i> and lepers to enter the place where it had stood, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. The reason is that once the curtain was rolled up it was permitted for those who were impure with impurity imparted by a corpse to enter; it was prohibited for them to enter only the Temple courtyard, and this had been dismantled. According to Rabbi Eliezer, it was permitted even for <i>zavim</i> and lepers to then enter the camp. The <i>baraita</i> that rules that even when the Tabernacle was dismantled <i>zavim</i> and lepers were sent outside the camp, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.
  MISHNA: In the case of both the two loaves and the shewbread, the kneading of their dough and the forming of their loaves take place outside the Temple courtyard, but their baking takes place inside the Temple courtyard. And their preparation does not override Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda says: All of the procedures involved in their preparation take place inside the courtyard. Rabbi Shimon says: One should always be accustomed to say that the two loaves and the shewbread are fit if they were prepared in the Temple courtyard and they are also fit if they were prepared in Beit Pagei, outside the Temple Mount, as he maintains that they may be baked outside the Temple courtyard.
  GEMARA: The mishna states that according to the opinion of the first <i>tanna</i> the two loaves and the shewbread are kneaded and shaped outside the Temple courtyard, but they are baked inside the courtyard. The Gemara comments: This itself is difficult.
  The Gemara elaborates: You said initially that the kneading of their dough and the forming of their loaves take place outside the Temple courtyard. One can infer from this that apparently, the dry measure, i.e., the vessel used in the Temple for measuring dry substances, e.g., flour, was not consecrated. If the dry measure sanctified the items placed in them, the flour brought for the two loaves and the shewbread would already be sanctified, and these loaves could not be kneaded and shaped outside the courtyard. And the mishna subsequently states that their baking takes place inside the Temple courtyard. One can infer from this that apparently, the dry measure was consecrated. If the flour had not been sanctified by being placed in the measuring vessel, why must the loaves be baked inside the Temple courtyard? Rabba says: A formidable man, who is as tough as iron, raised this difficulty. And who is that Sage? This is referring to Rav Sheshet.
  The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty? Perhaps the measure of a tenth of an ephah, which is used to measure the flour for the two loaves and the shewbread, does not sanctify that which is placed inside it, but the oven sanctifies the loaves that are baked in it, and therefore they must be baked inside the Temple courtyard.
  Rather, if the mishna is difficult, this is difficult: The mishna states that the baking of the two loaves and the shewbread takes place inside the courtyard. Evidently, the oven sanctifies that which is baked inside it. And the mishna subsequently states that kneading, shaping, and baking the loaves does not override Shabbat. If these procedures were performed before Shabbat in a vessel that sanctifies them, the loaves would be disqualified by virtue of the fact that they were left overnight without having been placed on the Table. Rather, Rava says: A formidable man, who is as tough as iron, raised this difficulty. And who is that Sage? This is referring to Rav Sheshet.
  Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty? Perhaps the oven does not sanctify the loaves that are baked in it, and therefore the two loaves and the shewbread are not disqualified by being left overnight. And accordingly, what is the meaning of the statement: Their baking takes place inside? This is not referring to inside the Temple courtyard. Rather, it means they are baked in a place where there are priests who are vigilant in their efforts, who will supervise the loaves as they are baked and ensure they do not become leavened.
  The Gemara notes: And this statement attributed to Rav Ashi is an error [<i>baruta</i>], as whichever way you look at it, it is difficult: If we require vigilant priests for the baking of the two loaves and the shewbread, we should also require vigilant priests for the kneading and forming of the loaves. And if we do not require vigilant priests for the kneading and forming of the loaves, we should also not require vigilant priests for the baking. Rav Ashi’s explanation does not explain why the mishna differentiates between the kneading and forming of the loaves on the one hand, and their baking on the other hand. Rather, the statement attributed to Rav Ashi is an error.
  § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: All the procedures involved in the preparation of the two loaves and the shewbread take place inside the Temple courtyard, whereas Rabbi Shimon maintains that even their baking may take place outside the courtyard. Rabbi Abbahu bar Kahana says: Both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon derived their opinions from the same verse, which they interpreted homiletically. When David fled from King Saul he came to Nov, where he requested bread from Ahimelech the priest. Ahimelech replied: “There is no non-sacred bread under my hand, but there is sacred bread” (I Samuel 21:5), i.e., the shewbread. David then said to Ahimelech: “But it is a non-sacred manner, and yet it shall be consecrated today in the vessel” (I Samuel 21:6).
  Both Sages understand David’s response to be a halakhic critique: Rabbi Yehuda holds that David found the priests baking the shewbread on a weekday. David said to them: Why are you baking the shewbread in a non-sacred manner, i.e., on a weekday, rather than on Shabbat? “Yet it shall be consecrated today in the vessel,” i.e., it will be consecrated today when it is baked in the oven, and it will be disqualified tomorrow because it will have been left overnight. Rabbi Yehuda infers from David’s criticism that the shewbread must be baked on Shabbat in the Temple courtyard, as it is consecrated in the oven.
  Rabbi Shimon holds that David found the priests baking the shewbread on Shabbat. David said to them: Aren’t you required to prepare it in a non-sacred manner, i.e., on a weekday? Does the oven consecrate the shewbread? No, it is the Table that consecrates it when the shewbread is placed there. The loaves are therefore not disqualified by being left overnight.
  The Gemara asks: And how can you say that David found the priests at the time of baking? But isn’t it subsequently written: “And the priest gave him sacred bread, for there was no bread there but the shewbread that was taken from before the Lord” (I Samuel 21:7)? This indicates that David received shewbread that had already been on the Table, not loaves that had just been baked.
  Rather, what is the meaning of the statement: “But it is a non-sacred manner, and yet it shall be consecrated today in the vessel,” which David said to the priests? The Gemara replies: This is what the priests said to him: There is no bread here except “the shewbread that was taken from before the Lord,” and the shewbread is prohibited for consumption by non-priests.
  David said to the priests: It is not necessary to say that it is permitted for me to eat this shewbread, which has already been removed from the Table. This is because the frankincense placed in the bowls that were on the Table has been burned. Since the shewbread has been removed from having the status of items to which the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property apply, it is considered a non-sacred matter, i.e., permitted to priests for consumption. But even the other shewbread, which “shall be consecrated today in the vessel,” i.e., the shewbread placed on the Table today, you should give him, i.e., you should give me, to eat.
  
  Daf 96a
  
  This is because he is, i.e., I am, dangerously ill, being utterly famished, and a non-priest may eat sacrificial food in a life-threatening situation. And with regard to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, their dispute does not stem from the interpretation of the verses. Rather, they disagree with regard to a tradition, as they had divergent traditions as to whether or not the oven consecrates the shewbread.
  The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: One should always be accustomed to say that the two loaves and the shewbread are fit if they were prepared in the Temple courtyard and they are also fit if they were prepared in Beit Pagei. The term: One should always be accustomed to say, indicates that Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is based on an oral tradition and not on the interpretation of a verse. The Gemara concludes: One may conclude from the mishna that this is the case.
  MISHNA: With regard to the twelve loaves of the High Priest’s griddle-cake offering, of which six are offered in the morning and six in the evening, their kneading, the forming of their loaves, and their baking take place inside the Temple courtyard, and all types of labor involved in those actions override Shabbat. These labors cannot be performed prior to Shabbat, as once the loaves are consecrated in a service vessel they are disqualified if they are left overnight. Grinding their flour and sifting their flour do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat, but one that cannot be performed on Shabbat eve overrides Shabbat.
  All preparatory procedures of the meal offerings that take place inside the Temple courtyard, e.g., kneading and forming the High Priest’s griddle cakes, involve the use of a service vessel that consecrates the offerings. But any preparatory procedures that take place outside the Temple courtyard, e.g., kneading and forming the two loaves and the shewbread, do not involve the use of a service vessel.
  With regard to the two loaves, their length is seven handbreadths, their width is four handbreadths, and they have hornlike protrusions made of dough that is attached to each of their corners, which are four fingerbreadths high. With regard to the loaves of shewbread, their length is ten handbreadths, their width is five handbreadths, and each loaf’s hornlike protrusions is seven fingerbreadths high.
  Rabbi Yehuda says: The following letters are a mnemonic so that you will not err and forget the dimensions of the two loaves: <i>Zayin</i>, <i>dalet</i>, <i>dalet</i>. The numerical value of the letter <i>zayin</i> is seven and the numerical value of the letter <i>dalet</i> is four. The mnemonic therefore represents the length of seven handbreadths, the width of four handbreadths, and the height of four fingerbreadths, respectively. The following letters are a mnemonic for the dimensions of the shewbread: <i>Yod</i>, <i>heh</i>, <i>zayin</i>, which stand for the length of ten handbreadths, the width of five handbreadths, and the height of seven fingerbreadths, respectively. Ben Zoma says that it is written: “And you shall set upon the Table shewbread [<i>leḥem panim</i>] before Me always” (Exodus 25:30). The term <i>leḥem panim</i> indicates that it should have vertical sides [<i>panim</i>] rather than a rounded shape.
  As for the Table, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths, as the Torah states that the Table is two cubits long and one cubit wide (see Exodus 25:23), and Rabbi Yehuda holds that the cubit used as the unit of measurement for the construction of the Temple vessels was equal to five handbreadths. With regard to the shewbread, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths.
  The priest places the length of the two shewbread arrangements across the width of the Table, which leaves five handbreadths of each loaf protruding from the Table. And he folds the protruding two and a half handbreadths upward on this side of the Table, and the protruding two and a half handbreadths upward on that side of the Table. One finds, therefore, that the length of the shewbread covers the width of the Table. Similarly, since the width of each loaf is five handbreadths, the width of the two loaves filled the entire length of the Table. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.
  Rabbi Meir says: With regard to the Table, its length is twelve handbreadths and its width is six handbreadths, as the measure of a cubit used in the construction of the Temple vessels was equal to six handbreadths. Concerning the shewbread, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths.
  Rabbi Meir continues: The priest places the length of the shewbread across the width of the Table, which leaves four handbreadths of each loaf protruding from the Table. He folds the protruding two handbreadths upward on this side of the Table, and the protruding two handbreadths upward on that side of the Table. The width of the two arrangements of shewbread occupies only ten of the twelve handbreadths of the length of the Table, and this leaves a space of two handbreadths in the middle, between the two arrangements, so that the wind will blow between them and prevent the loaves from becoming moldy.
  Abba Shaul says: There, in the space between the two arrangements, the priests would place the two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread. The Sages said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “And you shall place pure frankincense upon [<i>al</i>] each arrangement, that it may be for the bread as a memorial part, an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 24:7)? The verse indicates that the frankincense is placed upon the shewbread and not next to it. Abba Shaul said to the Sages in response: Isn’t it already stated: “And next to him [<i>alav</i>] shall be the tribe of Manasseh” (Numbers 2:20)? Just as the preposition “<i>alav</i>” in this verse means that the tribe of Manasseh pitched camp next to the tribe of Ephraim and not upon it, so too, the preposition “<i>al</i>” means that the frankincense was placed next to the arrangements of the shewbread.
  The mishna continues to describe the shewbread Table: And there were four panels of gold there, which stood on the ground and rose above the height of the Table, and they split up at their upper ends, above the Table, so that the rods upon which the shewbread was placed could rest upon the panels. In this manner the panels would support the shewbread. There were two panels for this arrangement and two panels for that arrangement, and there were twenty-eight rods, each of which was shaped like half of a hollow reed. There were fourteen rods for this arrangement and fourteen rods for that arrangement.
  Neither the arranging of the rods for the new shewbread, nor their removal from the arrangement of the old shewbread, overrides Shabbat. Rather, a priest enters the Sanctuary on Shabbat eve, i.e., Friday before sundown, and removes each of the rods from between the loaves. And according to Rabbi Meir he then places each rod in the space between the two arrangements, along the length of the Table. Then, on Shabbat, he places the new shewbread on the Table without the rods, and he inserts the rods between the loaves at the conclusion of Shabbat.
  The mishna concludes: All the vessels that were in the Temple, including the Table, were placed so that their length was from east to west, along the length of the Temple.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that all preparatory procedures of the meal offerings that take place inside the Temple courtyard involve the use of a service vessel that consecrates the offerings. The Sages asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From where is this <i>halakha</i> derived? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: Doesn’t the verse state: “And he said to me: This is the place where the priests shall cook the guilt offering and the sin offering, where they shall bake the meal offering; that they do not bring them out to the outer courtyard, to sanctify the people” (Ezekiel 46:20)? Cooking the meat of the guilt offering and the sin offering requires the use of a vessel, and the verse indicates that this must be performed inside the Temple courtyard, as the meat may not be brought to the outer courtyard.
  Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi explains: The verse compares the meal offering to the guilt offering and the sin offering, indicating that the <i>halakha</i> of the meal offering is similar to the <i>halakha</i> of the guilt offering and the sin offering. Just as the guilt offering and the sin offering require the use of a service vessel in order to cook the sacrificial meat, and this is performed inside the Temple courtyard, so too, the meal offering also requires a service vessel for its preparation, which is performed inside the Temple courtyard.
  § The mishna cites the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: As for the Table, its length is ten handbreadths and its width is five handbreadths. Five handbreadths of each loaf of the shewbread, each of which is bent upward, protrude from the Table; two and a half handbreadths on each side. Rabbi Meir holds that the width of the Table is six handbreadths. Therefore, only four handbreadths of each loaf protrude from the Table and two handbreadths are bent upward on each side.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to the statement of the one who says that one folds up two and a half handbreadths from each side of the loaves, it emerges that the Table consecrates fifteen handbreadths above it, as there were six loaves on each side of the Table, which were each two and a half handbreadths high. And according to the statement of the one who says that one folds up two handbreadths from each side of the loaves, it emerges that the Table consecrates twelve handbreadths above it.
  The Gemara asks: But aren’t there rods between the loaves? The total height of the arrangements should therefore be more than fifteen handbreadths according to Rabbi Yehuda, and more than twelve handbreadths according to Rabbi Meir. The Gemara answers that the rods did not add to the height of the arrangement, as the loaves were shaped with indentations so that the rods were embedded in them.
  The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the rods are required? They are required because the bread is apt to become moldy. The rods prevent this by enabling the air to circulate between the loaves. But if the rods are sunk into the loaves, ultimately the bread will become moldy. The Gemara answers that the priest would raise the rods slightly above the loaves. The rods were not completely embedded in the loaves, and there was a small gap between the loaves that enabled the air to circulate.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, isn’t there that slight gap between each of the six loaves, causing the total height of each arrangement to be more than fifteen or twelve handbreadths? The Gemara answers: Since the gaps did not amount to a single handbreadth, Rabbi Yoḥanan did not count them.
  The Gemara asks: But aren’t there also the bowls of frankincense that are placed above the arrangements, adding to the total height of the items consecrated by the Table? The Gemara answers: The bowls of frankincense would rest inside the middle of the bread and consequently their height corresponded with that of the bread. The Gemara asks: But aren’t there the hornlike protrusions of the shewbread, which are seven fingerbreadths in height? These protrusions should be added to the total height of the arrangements. The Gemara answers: With regard to the protrusions, the priest would fold them into the bread, and the loaf of bread above rested upon them. The protrusions therefore did not increase the height of the arrangements.
  
  Daf 96b
  
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the Table’s decorated frame, which ran around its perimeter and was one handbreadth wide, as the verse states: “And you shall make for it a frame of a handbreadth” (Exodus 25:25)? Since the arrangements are placed on the Table’s frame, they rise one additional handbreadth above the Table.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said the Table’s frame was not above the Table’s surface but below it, and therefore it did not add any height to the arrangements on the Table. And furthermore, even according to the one who said the Table’s frame was above the Table’s surface, it did not add to the height of the arrangements. This is because the frame was tilted outward, but the bread was set within the area of the Table’s surface.
  The Gemara cites the dispute with regard to the location of the frame: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: There were no panels there at all, as they were not required in order to support the loaves. Rather, the Table’s frame supported the bread, as the frame was above the Table’s surface. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yosei: The Table’s frame was below the Table’s surface, and therefore the panels were required to support the loaves.
  § Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to the statement of the one who says that the Table’s frame was below the Table’s surface, the surface was merely a flat board. It is a halakhic principle with regard to wooden utensils that only rounded utensils are susceptible to ritual impurity, but not flat utensils. It is known that the shewbread Table was susceptible to impurity. One may therefore infer from this that a flat board is susceptible to impurity, provided that it can be turned over and used on both sides. This is because the wide surface of the board renders it functionally similar to a concave receptacle.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan continues: According to the statement of the one who says that the Table’s frame was above the Table’s surface, the Table served as a receptacle. One therefore cannot infer the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a flat board that can be turned over from the case of the Table, and you must still raise the dilemma as to whether it is susceptible to ritual impurity.
  The Gemara asks: One can conclude by inference from Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that the Table is susceptible to ritual impurity. But it is a wooden vessel designated to rest in a fixed place, and any wooden vessel that is designated to rest in a fixed place is not susceptible to impurity.
  The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this <i>halakha</i>? The verse states with regard to items that are rendered impure by the carcasses of creeping animals: “And anything upon which any of them fall when they are dead shall be impure, whether it is any vessel of wood, or cloth, or leather, or sack” (Leviticus 11:32). The verse juxtaposes wooden vessels with sacks, indicating that we require a wooden vessel to be similar to a sack in order to be susceptible to ritual impurity. Just as a sack is carried both when it is full and when it is empty, so too, any wooden vessel that is carried both full and empty is susceptible to impurity. Since the Table is designated to rest in a fixed place and not to be carried, it should not be susceptible to impurity.
  The Gemara answers: The Table is also carried both full and empty, i.e., even when the shewbread is upon it, in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. This is as Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And you shall set them in two arrangements, six in an arrangement, upon the pure Table before the Lord” (Leviticus 24:6)? The term “the pure Table” teaches by inference that there is a case where the Table becomes impure, and therefore the Torah states that the Table must be pure when the shewbread is set upon it. This conclusion is difficult, as the principle that a wooden vessel designated to rest in a fixed place is not susceptible to impurity indicates that the Table should not be susceptible to impurity.
  Rather, the verse teaches that the priests would lift the Table with its shewbread to display the shewbread to the pilgrims standing in the Temple courtyard, and a priest would say to them: See how beloved you are before, i.e., in the eyes of, the Omnipresent, Who constantly performs a miracle with regard to the shewbread. For this reason, the Table is susceptible to ritual impurity.
  This is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: A great miracle was performed with the shewbread: Its condition at the time of its removal from the Table, after having been left there for a week, was like its condition at the time of its arrangement on the Table; as it is stated: “To place hot bread on the day when it was taken away” (I Samuel 21:7), indicating that it was as hot on the day of its removal as it was on the day when it was placed on the Table.
  The Gemara asks: But why is it necessary to derive that the Table is susceptible to impurity due to the fact that it is not designated to rest in a fixed place? I may derive that it is susceptible to impurity due to its gold covering. Didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 22:1): Consider the case of the table and the <i>dulbeki</i>, a small table upon which the food and drink are placed before being served at the dining table, that were partially broken, or that one covered with marble stone, which is not susceptible to impurity. If an area of their surface large enough for placing cups there was left unbroken or uncovered with marble they remain susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Yehuda says: The remaining surface area must be large enough for placing pieces of meat and bread as well.
  One can infer from the mishna that if one left part of the surface area of the table without covering it with marble, yes, it remains susceptible to impurity. But if he did not leave part of the table without covering it with marble it is not susceptible to impurity. Evidently, the status of a vessel is determined according to the material of its external covering and not according to its main material. Consequently, since the shewbread Table was covered with gold it should have the status of a metal vessel, which is susceptible to ritual impurity even if it is designated to rest in a fixed place.
  And if you would say the case of the shewbread Table is different, as here, with regard to the marble-covered table, the mishna is referring to a permanent covering that is fixed to the table with nails, whereas there, in the case of the shewbread Table, the discussion is referring to a covering that is not permanent, as the gold was not attached to the shewbread Table with nails, this explanation is difficult. But didn’t Reish Lakish raise a dilemma to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is the mishna that discusses the marble-covered table referring only to a permanent covering, or even to a covering that is not permanent? Is it referring only to a case where one covered
  
  Daf 97a
  
  the Table’s rim [<i>levazbazin</i>] as well as the Table itself, or even to a case where one did not cover its rim? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: The case of a permanent covering is not different, and the case of a covering that is not permanent is not different. Likewise, the case where one covered the rim is not different, and the case where one did not cover the rim is not different. In any case a vessel’s status is determined according to the material of the external covering, and the shewbread Table should be susceptible to impurity because its external covering was of gold. It is therefore not necessary to derive that the Table is susceptible to impurity due to the fact that it is not designated to rest in a fixed place.
  The Gemara suggests another explanation: And if you would say that the acacia wood from which the shewbread Table is fashioned is different, as it is an important, valuable type of wood and therefore the Table’s status as a wooden vessel is not negated by the fact that it was covered with gold, there would still be a difficulty. This explanation works out well according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, who said: The mishna taught that the status of a wooden vessel is determined according to the material of its covering only with regard to vessels made of medium-grade <i>akhsalgos</i> wood, which come from overseas, but vessels made of expensive <i>masmas</i> wood are important, and therefore their status as wooden vessels is not negated by the covering. According to this opinion the ruling works out well, as the acacia wood of the shewbread Table is also valuable. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said the importance of <i>masmas</i> vessels is also negated by the covering, what is there to say?
  The Gemara answers: The Table is different, because the Merciful One called it wood, as it is stated: “The altar was of wood, three cubits high, and its length two cubits, and so its corners; and its length, and its walls were also of wood, and he said to me: This is the Table that is before the Lord” (Ezekiel 41:22). This verse is referring to the shewbread Table, and it describes it as being made of wood, even though the wood was not visible. This indicates that its status is like that of all wooden vessels, which are not susceptible to impurity unless they are carried both when empty and when full.
  The Gemara challenges: Why does the verse begin with the word “altar” and conclude with the word “Table,” even though both terms are referring to the same item? Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar both say the following interpretation: When the Temple is standing, the altar effects atonement for the transgressions of a person, but now that the Temple is not standing, a person’s table effects atonement for his transgressions, if he provides for the poor and needy from the food on his table.
  § The mishna describes the shewbread Table (96a): There were four panels of gold there, which split up at their upper ends, above the Table, and there were twenty-eight rods that rested upon the panels. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Ketina said: The verse states with regard to the Table: “And you shall make its dishes and its pans, <i>uksotav umnakkiyyotav</i>, with which it shall be covered; of pure gold you shall make them” (Exodus 25:29).
  Rav Ketina interprets the verse: “Its dishes,” these are the molds in which the loaves are kneaded, baked, and placed after baking (see 94a). “Its pans,” these are the bowls for the frankincense that is placed on the Table with the shewbread. “<i>Kesotav</i>,” these are the four panels of gold. “<i>Umnakkiyyotav</i>,” these are the rods, which rest on the notches in the panels and bear the loaves, one on top of the other. “With which it shall be covered,” this indicates that the bread is covered by the rods.
  Rava raises an objection to this interpretation, which indicates that the rods are required by Torah law: The mishna states: Neither the arranging of the rods for the new shewbread, nor their removal from the arrangement of the old shewbread, overrides Shabbat. And if it enters your mind to say the rods are required by Torah law, why does their arrangement not override Shabbat?
  Rava then said: That which I said, that one can infer from the mishna that the rods are not required by Torah law, is not correct, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat. And these actions, arranging and removing the rods, can also be performed in a manner that does not require overriding Shabbat for them, as the rods can be removed before Shabbat, and the rods can be arranged for the new loaves once Shabbat has ended.
  Rava explains why the rods can be arranged after Shabbat: What is the reason that the rods are required? They are necessary in order to create a gap between the loaves, so that the bread does not become moldy. In such a short time period as this, from when the new loaves are placed on the Table on Shabbat until the arrangement of the rods after Shabbat, the loaves will not become moldy.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the removal and arrangement of the rods: How does the priest proceed? He enters the Sanctuary on Shabbat eve and removes the rods from between the loaves. And he places them in the space of two handbreadths between the two arrangements, along the length of the Table. And at the conclusion of Shabbat he enters the Sanctuary again. He raises the ends of a loaf of the shewbread and inserts a rod underneath it, and again raises the ends of a loaf and inserts a rod underneath it.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues to describe the placement of the rods: Each arrangement contains six loaves. The four loaves in the middle of the six require three for the first of the four middle loaves, and likewise three rods for each of the other middle loaves, totaling twelve rods. The upper loaf requires only two rods, as the weight of another loaf does not bear upon it. Each arrangement therefore requires a total of fourteen rods, and the two arrangements require twenty-eight rods. As for the lowest loaf of each arrangement, it does not require rods at all, as it rests on the Table itself.
  § We learned in a mishna there (<i>Kelim</i> 17:10) that Rabbi Meir says: All the cubits that were mentioned with regard to the Temple were medium cubits, consisting of six handbreadths, except in the case of the following items: The golden altar, which was one cubit long and one cubit wide; each protruding corner of the external altar, which were one cubit long, one cubit wide, and one cubit high; the surrounding ledge of the external altar, which was five cubits high and one cubit wide; and the base of the altar, which was one cubit high and one cubit wide. In all these cases, the cubit was of five handbreadths. Rabbi Yehuda says: The measure of a cubit that was used with regard to the building of the Temple was a cubit of six handbreadths, but the cubit mentioned with regard to the Temple vessels, e.g., the Table, the Candelabrum and the golden altar, was a smaller cubit of five handbreadths.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda derived their opinions from the same verse: “And these are the measures of the altar by cubits: The cubit is a cubit and a handbreadth,
  
  Daf 97b
  
  and the bottom shall be a cubit, and the breadth a cubit, and its border by its edge round about shall be the one span. And this shall be the higher part of the altar” (Ezekiel 43:13). The first section of this verse is referring to the outer altar: “The bottom shall be a cubit,” this is the base of the altar. “And the breadth a cubit,” this is the surrounding ledge of the altar. “And its border by its edge round about shall be the one span,” these are the protruding corners of the altar, which were one cubit wide and one cubit high. “And this shall be the higher part of the altar,” this is referring to the golden altar, which stood inside the Sanctuary and was also measured with small cubits.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan explains that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree with regard to the inference from the phrase “And this shall be the higher part of the altar.” Rabbi Meir maintains that one can infer that it is this, the golden altar, which is measured with a cubit of five handbreadths, but all the cubits of the other vessels in the Temple are measured with a cubit of six handbreadths. And Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one can infer that like this small cubit shall be all the cubits of the other vessels in the Temple.
  The Gemara discusses the interpretation of the verse: It might enter your mind to say that the verse is referring to the height of the sections of the altar, i.e., from the base of the altar until the surrounding ledge the height is measured with a cubit of five handbreadths. And what is the meaning of the phrase “The bottom shall be a cubit, and the breadth a cubit”? This is what the verse is saying: From the cubit at the bottom, i.e., the base of the altar, until the cubit of the breadth of the surrounding ledge shall be measured with a cubit of five handbreadths.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty with this interpretation: According to this interpretation, how many cubits is the height of the altar? It is ten cubits. Six of these cubits, from the ground up to the surrounding ledge, are measured with a cubit of five handbreadths each, totaling thirty handbreadths. And the remaining four cubits, from the ledge up to the top of the corners of the altar, are measured with a cubit of six handbreadths each, totaling twenty-four handbreadths.
  Accordingly, how many handbreadths is the height of the altar? It is fifty-four handbreadths. How many handbreadths is the height of half of the altar? It is twenty-seven handbreadths. How many handbreadths is the height from the top of the corners of the altar until the surrounding ledge? It is twenty-four handbreadths, four cubits of six handbreadths each. Therefore, how many handbreadths is the surrounding ledge short of half the height of the altar? It is three handbreadths above the halfway mark. And we learned in a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 3:1): A red line encircled the altar in the middle, in order to separate between the blood that must be presented on the upper part of the altar and the blood that must be presented on the lower part of the altar.
  But this interpretation is contradicted by that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the bird burnt offering, the blood of which must be presented on the upper part of the altar: The priest would ascend the ramp and turn to the surrounding ledge and arrive at the southeast corner. He would pinch off the bird’s head across its nape, and separate it from its body. He would then squeeze out its blood on the wall of the altar beside him. And if the priest performed the squeezing below his feet, i.e., below the surrounding ledge, even one cubit beneath the ledge, it is valid.
  The Gemara explains the difficulty: According to the previous calculation, the surrounding ledge was only three handbreadths above the halfway mark. Therefore, if one squeezes out the blood one cubit, of five handbreadths, below the ledge, isn’t he putting the blood of an offering that must be presented on the upper part of the altar, two handbreadths below the middle of the altar?
  Rather, the verse must be interpreted differently. It is not referring to the height of the altar but to the width of each of its levels, as follows: “The bottom shall be a cubit”: From the top of the external side of the base of the altar, the wall of the altar is inset by one cubit of five handbreadths. “And the breadth a cubit,” this is referring to the width of the surrounding ledge of the altar, as at this point the wall is again inset by one cubit of five handbreadths. “Its border by its edge round about shall be the one span,” this is referring to the width of the corners of the altar, which is also a cubit of five handbreadths, causing the area of the top of the altar to be inset by an additional cubit.
  The Gemara explains the <i>halakha</i> with regard to the bird burnt offering according to this interpretation: How many handbreadths is the height of the altar? It is sixty handbreadths, ten cubits of six handbreadths each. How many handbreadths is the height of half of the altar? It is thirty handbreadths. How many handbreadths is the height from the top of the corners of the altar until the surrounding ledge? It is twenty-four handbreadths, four cubits of six handbreadths each. Therefore, how many handbreadths is the surrounding ledge short of half the height of the altar? It is six handbreadths above the halfway mark. And we learned in the <i>baraita</i>: And if the priest performed the squeezing below his feet, even one cubit beneath the ledge, it is valid. According to this calculation, one cubit below the surrounding ledge is still part of the upper section of the altar.
  The Gemara asks: To what part of the altar did you interpret the verse to be referring? It is referring to the width by which each section of the altar is inset. And can you interpret the verse as referring to the width by which each section is inset? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 3:1): The measurements of the base of the altar were thirty-two cubits by thirty-two cubits. Once the altar rose to the height of one cubit it was inset by one cubit on each side. This lower section was the base of the altar. One therefore finds that the second section of the altar measured thirty cubits by thirty cubits.
  If the width of the base is measured with a cubit of five handbreadths, then the second section of the altar does not measure thirty cubits by thirty cubits. Since the rest of the altar is measured with a cubit of six handbreadths, the second section measures thirty cubits and two handbreadths.
  And furthermore, the aforementioned mishna continues: Once the altar rose to the height of six cubits, i.e., five cubits above the base, it was inset by one cubit on each side, forming a ledge. This is the surrounding ledge. One therefore finds that the third section of the altar measured twenty-eight cubits by twenty-eight cubits. If the width of the base and the surrounding ledge are measured with a cubit of five handbreadths, the third section measures twenty-eight cubits and four handbreadths.
  And if you would say that since the additional area is not a full cubit the mishna did not count it, this explanation is difficult, as the mishna continues: The area taken up by each of the four corners of the altar was one cubit on this side, along the length of the altar, and one cubit on that side, along the width of the altar. One therefore finds that the area of the top of the altar, within the corners, is twenty-six cubits by twenty-six cubits.
  If the corners of the altar were also measured with a cubit of five handbreadths, then the top of the altar was a full cubit of six handbreadths wider, as the wall of the altar was inset three times on each side by a cubit of five handbreadths rather than six handbreadths. The area of the top of the altar was therefore twenty-seven cubits by twenty-seven cubits, which the mishna should not have referred to as twenty-six cubits. The Gemara answers that the <i>tanna</i> was not precise, as he should indeed have stated that the altar measured twenty-seven cubits by twenty-seven cubits.
  The Gemara rejects this explanation, as the mishna continues: Within the corners of the altar there was an area where the priests set their feet as they circuited the altar. This area was one cubit on this side, along the length of the altar, and one cubit on that side, along the width of the altar. One therefore finds that an area of twenty-four cubits by twenty-four cubits remained as the area for the arrangement of wood on the altar. If the total area of the top of the altar was twenty-seven cubits by twenty-seven cubits, the remaining area would be twenty-five cubits by twenty-five cubits, not twenty-four by twenty-four.
  And if you would say that here too, the <i>tanna</i> was not precise, that is difficult: But isn’t it written: “And the hearth shall be twelve cubits long by twelve wide, square on its four sides” (Ezekiel 43:16)? The hearth is the area for the arrangement of wood on the altar. One might have thought that the area for the arrangement of wood was only twelve cubits by twelve cubits. When the verse states: “On its four sides,” this teaches that one measures from the middle of the altar twelve cubits in each and every direction, i.e., the area for the arrangement of wood was twenty-four cubits by twenty-four cubits, not twenty-five by twenty-five.
  The Gemara rejects an alternative explanation: And if you would say that when the mishna states that the base of the altar was thirty-two cubits by thirty-two cubits, with regard to six of those cubits the mishna initially counted them as cubits of five handbreadths, this explanation is difficult. If so, the base of the altar measures six handbreadths less, totaling only thirty-one cubits of six handbreadths, in which case the vacant area in the Temple courtyard would be one cubit wider than it actually was.
  The Gemara elaborates: This is as we learned in a mishna (<i>Middot</i> 5:1): The dimensions of the entire Temple courtyard were a length of 187 cubits by a width of 135 cubits. The length of the courtyard from east to west was 187 cubits, divided as follows: The area of the Israelite courtyard, where it was permitted for Israelites to set their feet, was eleven cubits long, and the area where it was permitted only for the priests to set their feet was eleven cubits long. The altar was thirty-two cubits long. The area designated as: Between the Entrance Hall and the altar, was twenty-two cubits, and the Sanctuary was one hundred cubits long. There was an additional eleven cubits of space behind the Hall of the Ark Cover, i.e., behind the Holy of Holies, which was at the western end of the Sanctuary. If the altar was actually only thirty-one cubits long, the mishna accounts for the length of only 186 cubits.
  Rather, the verse must be interpreted differently: “The bottom shall be a cubit,” this is referring to the height of the base. “The breadth a cubit,” this is referring to the width of the surrounding ledge, where the wall of the altar is inset by one cubit. “Its border by its edge round about shall be the one span,”
  
  Daf 98a
  
  this is referring to the measurements of the corners of the altar, concerning which there is no difference with regard to this, their height, and there is no difference with regard to that, their width, as both are measured with a cubit of five handbreadths.
  Accordingly, how many handbreadths is the height of the altar? It is fifty-eight handbreadths high, as only eight of its cubits are of six handbreadths, while two cubits, those of the base and of the corners, are of five handbreadths. How many handbreadths is the height of half of the altar? It is twenty-nine handbreadths. How many handbreadths is the height from the top of the corners of the altar until the surrounding ledge? It is twenty-three handbreadths, as the corners of the altar are five handbreadths high, and the upper section of the altar is three cubits of six handbreadths.
  Therefore, how many handbreadths is the surrounding ledge short of half the height of the altar? It is six handbreadths above the halfway mark. And this correlates with that which we learned in the <i>baraita</i>: And if the priest performed the squeezing below his feet, even one cubit beneath the ledge, it is valid. According to this calculation, one cubit below the surrounding ledge is still part of the upper section of the altar.
  The Gemara adds that the language of the verse is also precise. The verse indicates that although it is referring to the height of the base, it is referring to the width of the surrounding ledge, as it is written with regard to the base: “The bottom shall be a cubit,” whereas with regard to the ledge it is written: “And the breadth a cubit.” Since the verse mentions the breadth only with regard to the surrounding ledge one can infer that the previous term is referring not to the width but to the height. The Gemara concludes: One may conclude from the language of the verse that this is the correct interpretation.
  § The Gemara (97a) cited a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. According to Rabbi Meir all the cubits mentioned with regard to the Temple were medium cubits, except for the measurements of the golden altar, the corners of the external altar, its surrounding ledge, and its base. The Gemara asks: And how many handbreadths is a medium cubit? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is six handbreadths. Rabbi Yosei bar Avin says: We learn in a mishna (96a), as well: Rabbi Meir says: The Table, its length is twelve handbreadths and its width is six handbreadths. Since the Torah states that the length of the Table was two cubits and its width one cubit (see Exodus 25:23), this indicates that the cubit is six handbreadths.
  The Gemara asks: May one derive from the fact that the cubit of six handbreadths is referred to as a medium cubit that there is a cubit that is larger than the medium cubit? The Gemara answers: Yes, there is a larger cubit, and so we learned in a mishna (<i>Kelim</i> 17:9): There were two rods for measuring cubits in the chamber of Shushan the capital, which was located above the eastern gate of the Temple Mount, one in the northeast corner and one in the southeast corner. The one that was in the northeast corner was longer than the cubit used by Moses in the building of the Tabernacle, which was of six handbreadths, by half a fingerbreadth, and the one that was in the southeast corner was longer than the other one by another half a fingerbreadth. One therefore finds it longer than Moses’ cubit by a full fingerbreadth.
  The mishna continues: And why did the Sages say that there should be two measures of a cubit, one large and one small? It was so that the artisans who were working in the Temple would take payment according the amount of work they did, as measured by the small cubit, and return it to the Temple through their work, as measured by the large cubit, so they would not come to misuse consecrated property. If they would accept any payment that they did not deserve, they would be misusing consecrated property.
  The Gemara asks: And why do I need two large cubits? The Gemara answers: One, the shorter of the two, was used to measure silver and gold. Since silver and gold were valuable, the difference between the two measurements was set at only half a fingerbreadth, so that the artisans would not suffer too great a loss. And the other one, which was longer than Moses’ cubit by a full fingerbreadth, was used in the construction of wood and stone structures.
  § The Gemara discusses the depiction of Shushan the capital: We learned in a mishna there (<i>Middot</i> 1:3): One of the five gates of the Temple Mount was the eastern gate upon which Shushan the capital was depicted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Shushan the capital was depicted on a gate of the Temple Mount?
  There is a dispute with regard to this matter between Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi. One said that Shushan was depicted so that those who passed through the gate would know from where it was that they had come back to Jerusalem. The Jews returned once Persia had conquered Babylonia, and therefore they should give thanks to the Persian Empire for releasing them from exile. And one said that it was depicted so that the fear of the Persian Empire would be upon them, to prevent them from rebelling.
  The Gemara continues to discuss giving a king his due: Rabbi Yannai says: The fear of kingship should always be upon you, even when the king does not deserve it, as it is stated that Moses said to Pharaoh, when he warned him about the forthcoming plague of the firstborn: “And all these, your servants, shall come down to me, and bow down to me, saying: Get out, you and all the people who follow you, and after that I will go out” (Exodus 11:8). Although ultimately Pharaoh would himself come to Moses, Moses mentioned only that Pharaoh’s servants would come to him, whereas he did not say this to Pharaoh about Pharaoh himself, because of giving a king his due.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said this principle may be derived from here, as it is stated: “And the hand of the Lord was on Elijah, and he girded up his loins, and ran before Ahab to the entrance of Jezreel” (I Kings 18:46). Despite Ahab’s wickedness, Elijah acted in this manner out of respect for the king.
  § The Gemara cites another dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi: With regard to the fruit trees that in the future will grow on either side of a river that will emerge from the Temple, the verse states: “And by the river upon its bank, on this side and on that side, shall grow every tree for food, whose leaf shall not wither, neither shall its fruit fail. It shall bring forth new fruit every month, because its waters issue out of the Sanctuary, and its fruit shall be for food, and its leaf for healing [<i>litrufa</i>]” (Ezekiel 47:12). The Gemara interprets the term “<i>litrufa</i>” as a contraction of <i>lehatir peh</i>, meaning: To unlock the mouth, and there is a dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi with regard to the meaning of this term.
  One said the leaf shall serve to unlock the mouth that is above, i.e., in the person’s head. The leaves will unlock the mouths of the mute and they will be capable of speech. And one said the leaf shall serve to unlock the mouth that is below, i.e., the womb, enabling barren women to give birth. It was likewise stated that Ḥizkiyya says: The leaf shall serve to unlock the mouth of the mute, whereas bar Kappara says: It shall serve to unlock the mouth, i.e., the womb, of the barren women.
  § The Torah states with regard to the shewbread: “And you shall take fine flour, and bake twelve cakes from it; two-tenths of an ephah shall be in one cake. And you shall set them in two arrangements, six in an arrangement, upon the pure Table before the Lord” (Leviticus 24:5–6). The Sages taught: Had the Torah stated: “And you shall take fine flour, and bake twelve cakes from it…And you shall set them in two arrangements,” but had it not stated the continuation “six in an arrangement,” I would have said there may be one arrangement of four loaves and one of eight loaves, i.e., the arrangements do not have to be of equal size. Therefore, it is stated: “Six in an arrangement.”
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And had the Torah stated: “Two arrangements, six in an arrangement,” but had it not stated: “Twelve cakes,” I would have said that the total number of loaves may be more than twelve, and the phrase “six in an arrangement” teaches that one may bring another arrangement of six loaves in addition to the two mentioned in the verse, so that there are three arrangements of six loaves each. Therefore, it is stated: “Twelve cakes.”
  And had the Torah stated: Twelve cakes…And you shall set them in arrangements, but had it not stated: “Two” and “Six,” I would have said that the twelve loaves should be divided into three arrangements of four loaves each. Therefore, it is stated: “Two arrangements,” and: “Six in an arrangement.” Therefore, until these three phrases in the verses were stated we could not learn how to set the shewbread on the Table.
  How are these arrangements actually set on the Table? The priest places on the Table two arrangements of six loaves each. And if he placed one arrangement of four loaves and one arrangement of eight loaves he has not fulfilled the obligation. If he added two loaves, so that there were two arrangements of seven loaves each, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One views the upper loaf of each arrangement as though it is not there, and he has fulfilled the obligation. The Gemara asks: But don’t we require that the frankincense be placed upon the shewbread, as it is stated: “And you shall place pure frankincense upon [<i>al</i>] each arrangement, that it may be for the bread as a memorial part” (Leviticus 24:7)? If the priest places an additional, non-sacred loaf upon the arrangement, it interposes between the frankincense and the shewbread.
  Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Hamnuna, and some say that Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he said that the word “<i>al</i>” means that the frankincense is adjacent to the shewbread. This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states: “And you shall place pure frankincense by [<i>al</i>] each arrangement” (Leviticus 24:7). The preposition “<i>al</i>” in this verse means that the frankincense is adjacent to the shewbread. Do you say that <i>al</i> means adjacent to the shewbread, or perhaps it means nothing other than that the frankincense was literally upon the shewbread? When it says: “And you shall place the Curtain as a screen next to [<i>al</i>] the Ark” (Exodus 40:3), it is evident that “<i>al</i>” does not mean upon the Ark, as the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies was hung in front of the Ark and not placed on top of it. Therefore, you must say that the word <i>al</i> can also mean adjacent to.
  § The mishna states: All the vessels that were in the Temple were placed so that their length was from east to west, along the length of the Temple. The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to all the vessels that were in the Temple, their length was placed along the length of the Temple, except for the Ark, whose length was placed along the width of the Temple, from north to south. And in this manner the Ark was placed, and in that manner its staves were placed.
  The Gemara asks: What is the <i>tanna</i> saying in the last clause of the <i>baraita</i>? The Gemara explains that this is what he is saying: One can infer that in this manner the Ark was placed, i.e., along the width of the Temple, from the fact that its staves were placed in that manner, along the length of the Temple. Since the staves were fixed along the width of the Ark, the Ark itself was necessarily placed along the width of the Temple
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to its staves, from where do we derive that they were placed along the length of the Temple, from east to west? This is derived as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And the staves were so long that the ends of the staves were seen from the holy place before the Sanctuary, but they could not be seen outside” (I Kings 8:8). One might have thought that the staves did not touch the Curtain separating the Sanctuary and the Holy of Holies, and did not protrude at all. Therefore, the verse states: “The ends of the staves were seen.” If the verse had stated only: “The ends of the staves were seen,” one might have thought that the staves tear through the Curtain and emerge into the Sanctuary. Therefore, the verse states: “They could not be seen outside.” How can these texts be reconciled?
  
  Daf 98b
  
  The <i>baraita</i> explains: The staves of the Ark pressed against the Curtain and bulged outward. And they appeared like two breasts of a woman that are discernible through her clothes, as it is stated: “My beloved is to me like a bundle of myrrh that lies between my breasts” (Song of Songs 1:13). Since the staves pressed against the Curtain, they were evidently placed from east to west.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the Ark’s staves were set along the width of the Ark? Perhaps they were set along the Ark’s length, in which case the Ark was placed along the length of the Temple, not along its width. Rav Yehuda said that this cannot be the case, as the Ark was carried by two men on each side, who stood between the two staves. If the staves were placed along its length, the two men carrying it on each side would be positioned along the width of the Ark, which was one and a half cubits. This is impossible, as two men standing next to each other in the space of only one and a half cubits cannot walk. If the staves were placed along the width of the Ark, the two bearers on each side would be positioned between the staves along the length of the Ark, which was a larger space of two and a half cubits.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that the Ark was carried by four men? This is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to the carrying of the Ark by the descendants of Kohath: “And the Kohathites would travel, the bearers of the Holy Ark, that the Tabernacle might be set up before their coming” (Numbers 10:21). The verse uses the plural form twice. The first phrase: “And the Kohathites would travel,” indicates that two people bear the Ark, and the second phrase: “The bearers of the Holy Ark,” also indicates that two people bear the Ark; the total is therefore four bearers.
  § The Sages taught: King Solomon built ten additional tables, modeled after the one that Moses crafted, as it is stated in the description of the Temple constructed by Solomon: “He made also ten tables, and placed them in the Sanctuary, five on the right side, and five on the left” (II Chronicles 4:8).
  And if you say that the terms “right” and “left” are referring to the two sides of the entrance to the Sanctuary, which was in the center of the eastern wall, this is difficult. According to this interpretation, Solomon placed five tables to the right of the entrance, on the north side, and five tables to the left of the entrance, on the south of the Sanctuary. If so, we find that in the case of the five tables to the left of the entrance, the table was placed in the south of the Sanctuary. But the Torah said: “And you shall put the Table on the north side” (Exodus 26:35).
  Rather, the verse means that the Table of Moses was placed in the middle of the north section of the Sanctuary, while five of Solomon’s tables were placed to the right of Moses’ Table and the other five were placed to the left of Moses’ Table. All of the tables were in the north of the Sanctuary.
  Similarly, the Sages taught: King Solomon built ten additional candelabra, modeled after the one that Moses crafted, as it is stated: “And he made the ten candelabra of gold according to the ordinance concerning them; and he set them in the Sanctuary, five on the right, and five on the left” (II Chronicles 4:7).
  And if you say that the terms “right” and “left” are referring to the two sides of the entrance to the Sanctuary, this is difficult. According to this interpretation, Solomon placed five candelabra to the right of the entrance, on the north side, and five candelabra to the left of the entrance, on the south side. If so, we find that in the case of the five candelabra to the right of the entrance, the candelabrum was placed in the north of the Sanctuary. But the Torah said: “And you shall set the Table outside the Curtain, and the Candelabrum opposite the Table on the side of the Tabernacle toward the south, and you shall put the Table on the north side” (Exodus 26:35).
  Rather, the verse means that the Candelabrum of Moses was placed in the middle of the south section of the Sanctuary, while five of the candelabra that Solomon crafted were placed to the right of the Candelabrum of Moses, and five to its left, all in the south of the Sanctuary.
  § It is taught in one <i>baraita</i> that these tables and candelabra were set inward of the first half of the length of the structure of the Temple, as measured from east to west. And it is taught in one <i>baraita</i> that they were set inward of the first third of the length of the structure of the Temple.
  The Gemara explains that this is not difficult, as the two <i>baraitot</i> do not disagree with regard to the location of the tables and candelabra. In the second <i>baraita</i> the Sage is reckoning the length of the Hall of the Holy of Holies, which was twenty cubits, together with the length of the Sanctuary, which was forty cubits. Accordingly, the total length of the structure of the Temple was sixty cubits, and the tables and candelabra were set inward of the first third of its length, i.e., twenty cubits from the entrance. Conversely, in the first <i>baraita</i> the Sage is not reckoning the length of the Hall of the Holy of Holies together with the length of the Sanctuary. Since he is referring to the forty cubits of the Sanctuary itself, inward of the first half of the structure of the Temple’s length means twenty cubits from the entrance.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: All the tables built by Solomon were placed from east to west, i.e., their length was along the length of the Sanctuary, as was the Table in the Tabernacle; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: They were placed from north to south, along the width of the Sanctuary. The Gemara explains: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? He derives this <i>halakha</i> from a comparison of the tables to the Candelabrum: Just as the Candelabrum was placed from east to west, so too, these tables were positioned from east to west.
  The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Candelabrum itself, from where do we derive that it was positioned from east to west? This is derived from the fact that it is written with regard to the western lamp of the Candelabrum: “Outside the Curtain of the testimony, in the Tent of Meeting, Aaron shall set it in order, to burn from evening to morning before the Lord continually” (Leviticus 24:3). The phrase “shall set it in order” is written in the singular, referring only to the western lamp.
  The Gemara explains: One can infer from the fact that the verse states that the western lamp is set “before the Lord,” i.e., before the Holy of Holies, that the location of all the other lamps of the Candelabrum is not considered “before the Lord,” as they are not situated in the same proximity to the Holy of Holies. This would be the case only if the Candelabrum was positioned from east to west. But if it enters your mind to say that the Candelabrum was positioned from north to south, then all the other lamps should also be considered “before the Lord,” as all the lamps are an equal distance from the Holy of Holies.
  The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason for his opinion? The Gemara replies: He derives this <i>halakha</i> from a comparison of the tables to the Ark: Just as the Ark was placed from north to south, so too, these tables were positioned from north to south. The Gemara challenges: But as for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, let him also derive from the Ark that the tables were positioned from north to south. The Gemara explains that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, one derives the position of the tables, which are located in the outer area of the Sanctuary, from the Candelabrum, which is also located in the outer area of the Sanctuary. And one does not derive the position of the tables, which are located in the outer area of the Sanctuary, from the Ark, which is located in the inner area of the Sanctuary, the Holy of Holies.
  The Gemara challenges: And as for Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, let him derive from the Candelabrum that the tables were positioned from east to west. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, could have said to you: The Candelabrum itself was also placed from north to south.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t it written with regard to the western lamp of the Candelabrum: “Aaron and his sons shall set it in order, to burn from evening to morning before the Lord” (Exodus 27:21), indicating that this lamp must be in greater proximity to the Holy of Holies, which is possible only if the Candelabrum is positioned from east to west? The Gemara replies that according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, the term “before the Lord” means that the wick of the middle lamp is turned toward the Holy of Holies, as the priest who kindles the lamps turns the wicks of the other lamps slightly to the side, whereas the wick of the middle lamp is turned directly toward the Holy of Holies.
  This is as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “When you light the lamps, the seven lamps shall give light toward the front of the Candelabrum” (Numbers 8:2). This teaches that the priests would turn the front of each lamp toward the middle lamp, but the middle lamp was turned toward the Holy of Holies. Rabbi Natan says: One can infer from here that the middle position is preeminent.
  § The Gemara discusses the different opinions with regard to the position of the tables: The length of each table was two cubits. When the ten tables were placed one alongside the other their overall length would amount to slightly more than twenty cubits. Granted, according to the one who said the tables were positioned along the length of the Sanctuary from east to west, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this is the way that ten tables resided in an area twenty cubits long; they could extend slightly beyond the twenty cubits, since the entire area was forty cubits long. But according to the one who said the tables were positioned along the width of the Sanctuary from north to south, i.e., Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, how could ten tables reside in an area that was precisely twenty cubits wide?
  And moreover, if the ten tables occupied the entire width of the Sanctuary, how would the High Priests pass them in order to enter the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur? And moreover, if the tables were positioned in this manner we find that five of the ten tables were located in the south of the Sanctuary, whereas the Torah states that the Table must be in the north of the Sanctuary. And moreover, if the ten tables built by Solomon occupied the entire width of the Sanctuary, where would one place the Table built by Moses?
  The Gemara replies: But according to your reasoning, the last question applies according to the one who said the tables were positioned from east to west as well: Where would one place the Table built by Moses? If the ten tables of Solomon occupied the entire twenty cubits of the inner half of the Sanctuary, how could Moses’ Table be placed in the middle of the ten tables?
  Rather, do you maintain that there was only one row of tables? It was not so; they were set in two rows, with the Table of Moses between the rows. Therefore, there was room for all the tables and it was also possible for the High Priest to pass by them.
  
  Daf 99a
  
  The Gemara continues: Granted, according to the one who said the tables were positioned along the width of the Sanctuary, from north to south, it works out well. According to this opinion there was enough room on the east and the west of the Table for the two priests arranging the new loaves to stand on one side of the Table and for the two priests removing the old loaves to stand on the other side.
  But according to the one who said the tables were positioned along the length of the Sanctuary, from east to west, in which case the priests arranging and removing the shewbread would stand at the north and south of the Table, this is difficult. Now, consider how much space was taken up by the tables: How far was the Table removed from the northern wall of the Sanctuary? It was two and a half cubits away from the wall, as this is the space necessary for the two priests to pass. And to this one must add one cubit for the width of the northern row of tables itself, and another two and a half cubits that were between the northern row of five tables and Moses’ Table, as space for two priests to pass is required here as well.
  The Gemara continues to calculate the area occupied by the tables: And then one must add one cubit for the width of the Table of Moses, and two and a half cubits that were between Moses’ Table and the southern row of tables, and another cubit for the width of the southern row itself. This totals ten and a half cubits, according to which it is found that the Table occupies half a cubit in the south of the Sanctuary, although the Table is supposed to be entirely in the north of the Sanctuary.
  The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that the Table of Moses resided together with the other ten tables, i.e., parallel to them? It was not so. The Table of Moses was situated to the west of the other tables, in the space corresponding to the space between the two rows of tables, and its width should not be added to the width of the two rows of Solomon’s tables. All the tables were therefore situated in the north of the Sanctuary. Since the Temple was built on terrain that sloped downward from west to east, this means that the Table of Moses was raised above the tables of Solomon. The Table of Moses was placed to the west and the tables of Solomon were lowered slightly toward the east. Solomon’s tables therefore appeared in relation to Moses’ Table as a student who sits on a lower level before his teacher.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Solomon built ten tables that were situated in the Sanctuary, in addition to Moses’ Table, but the priests would arrange the shewbread only upon the Table of Moses. This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And Solomon made all the vessels that were in the House of the Lord, the golden altar, and the Table upon which the shewbread was, of gold” (I Kings 7:48), indicating that the shewbread was placed on only one Table.
  Likewise, Solomon built ten candelabra, but the priests would kindle the lamps only on the Candelabrum of Moses. This is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And they burn unto the Lord every morning and every evening burnt offerings and sweet incense; the shewbread also they arrange in order upon the pure Table, and the Candelabrum of gold with its lamps, to burn every evening” (II Chronicles 13:11). The singular form indicates that the lamps were kindled on only one Candelabrum.
  Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua says: They would arrange the shewbread upon all the tables, as it is stated: “And Solomon made all the vessels that were in the House of God, the golden altar as well, and the tables upon which was the shewbread” (II Chronicles 4:19). The plural form indicates that the shewbread was arranged on all the tables. And they would kindle the lamps on all the candelabra, as it is stated in the subsequent verse: “And the candelabra with their lamps, which they should burn according to the ordinance before the Sanctuary, of pure gold” (II Chronicles 4:20).
  Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: They would arrange the shewbread only upon the Table of Moses. Rather, how do I realize the meaning of the verse: “And the tables upon which was the shewbread…of pure gold” (II Chronicles 4:19–20)? These are the three tables that were in the Temple, of which there were two that were situated in the Entrance Hall to the Sanctuary, on the inside near to the entrance to the Temple, i.e., near the entrance to the Sanctuary. One of these tables was made of silver, and the other one was made of gold.
  On the table of silver the priest places the new shewbread that has been baked, before its entrance into the Sanctuary, so that the loaves may cool a little from the heat of the oven. And when the old shewbread is removed from the shewbread Table it is placed on the table of gold upon its exit from the Sanctuary, until the frankincense is burned on the altar. The reason the shewbread is placed on a silver table before it is brought into the Sanctuary and on a gold one when it is removed is that one elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. Since it is set on the gold shewbread Table all week, it cannot be downgraded to a silver table upon its removal. The Gemara concludes: The third of the three tables is the one Table of gold inside the Sanctuary upon which the shewbread is always found.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that one does not downgrade in matters of sanctity? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: This is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And Moses erected the Tabernacle, and he laid its sockets, and set up its boards, and put in its bars, and erected its pillars” (Exodus 40:18). This teaches that once Moses, who was at a greater level of sanctity than the rest of the people, began the work of erecting the Tabernacle, he alone completed it.
  The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that one elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: This is derived from a verse, as the verse states with regard to the coal pans of the men of Korah’s assembly, in which they burned incense before they were consumed by a fire: “The coal pans of these men who have sinned at the cost of their lives, and let them be made beaten plates for a covering of the altar, for they have become sacred because they were brought before the Lord, that they may be a sign to the children of Israel” (Numbers 17:3). Initially the coal pans had the status of articles used in the service of the altar, as they contained the incense, and now that they have been made into a covering for the altar their status has been elevated to that of the altar itself.
  § Having mentioned the principle that one does not downgrade in matters of sanctity, the Gemara cites a related issue. The verse states: “At that time the Lord said to me: Hew for yourself two tablets of stone like the first…And I will write on the tablets the words that were on the first tablets, which you broke, and you shall put them in the Ark” (Deuteronomy 10:1–2). Rav Yosef teaches a <i>baraita</i>: This verse teaches that both the tablets of the Covenant and the pieces of the broken tablets are placed in the Ark. One should learn from here that with regard to a Torah scholar who has forgotten his Torah knowledge due to circumstances beyond his control, e.g., illness, one may not behave toward him in a degrading manner. Although the first tablets were broken it is prohibited to treat them with disrespect, due to their sanctity. A Torah scholar who forgot the Torah knowledge he once possessed is likened to these broken tablets.
  The Gemara notes a mnemonic for the following three statements of Reish Lakish, which are all related to the concept stated by Rav Yosef: One who caused dereliction of the study of Torah for the sake of a mitzva, a Torah scholar who sinned, and a Torah scholar who forgot his studies.
  Reish Lakish says: Sometimes
  
  Daf 99b
  
  the apparent dereliction of the study of Torah is its foundation, e.g., if one breaks off his studies in order to participate in a funeral or a wedding procession. This is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And the Lord said to Moses: Hew for yourself two tablets of stone like the first, and I will write upon the tablets the words that were on the first tablets, which [<i>asher</i>] you broke” (Exodus 34:1). The word “<i>asher</i>” is an allusion to the fact that that the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Your strength is true [<i>yishar koḥakha</i>] in that you broke the tablets, as the breaking of the first tablets led to the foundation of the Torah through the giving of the second tablets.
  And Reish Lakish says: With regard to a Torah scholar who sinned, he is not disgraced in public, as it is stated: “Therefore, you shall stumble in the day, and the prophet also shall stumble with you in the night” (Hosea 4:5). One can derive from the verse that if a prophet or any other Torah scholar stumbles and sins, one should conceal his offense like the night and not punish him in public.
  And Reish Lakish says: Anyone who causes himself to forget even one matter from his studies violates a prohibition, as it is stated with regard to the receiving of the Torah on Mount Sinai: “Only observe for yourself, and guard your soul diligently, lest you forget the matters that your eyes saw, and lest they depart from your heart all the days of your life, but you should make them known to your children and to your children’s children” (Deuteronomy 4:9). And this is in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Wherever it is stated: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition.
  Ravina says: One who forgets his studies violates two prohibitions, as the verse uses both the term “observe” and the term “lest,” and these are two prohibitions. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: He violates three prohibitions, as it is stated: “Only observe for yourself, and guard your soul diligently, lest you forget the matters that your eyes saw.” The term “Guard your soul” is derived from the same root as “observe” and is considered an additional prohibition.
  The Gemara qualifies this statement: One might have thought this applies even to one who forgot his Torah knowledge due to circumstances beyond his control. Therefore, the verse states: “And lest they depart from your heart.” This indicates that the verse is speaking of one who willingly causes them to depart from his heart. Rabbi Dostai, son of Rabbi Yannai, says: One might have thought that this applies even if his studies were too hard for him to remember. Therefore, the verse states: “Only,” which excludes one who is unable to recall his studies.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar both say: The Torah was given in forty days, when Moses ascended to Mount Sinai to receive it, and similarly the soul of man is formed in forty days, as the formation of the fetus in the womb takes forty days from the time of conception. This teaches that anyone who preserves his Torah studies, his soul is likewise preserved, and anyone who does not preserve his Torah studies, his soul is not preserved either.
  The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: This can be illustrated by a parable, as it is comparable to a person who delivered a sparrow to his slave for safekeeping, and said to him: Are you under the impression that if you lose it I will take from you an <i>issar</i>, a small coin, which is the value of the bird? It is not so; I will take your soul from you as punishment, meaning I will kill you. Similarly, one who fails to preserve the Torah entrusted to him will be severely punished.
  MISHNA: There were two tables in the Entrance Hall, on the inside of the Entrance Hall, next to the entrance to the Temple, i.e., next to the entrance to the Sanctuary. One was of marble and one was of gold. On the table of marble, the priests place the new shewbread that has been baked, before its entrance into the Sanctuary, so that the loaves may cool a little from the heat of the oven and not spoil. And when the old shewbread is removed from the shewbread Table it is placed on the table of gold upon its exit from the Sanctuary, where it remains until the frankincense is burned on the altar.
  The reason the shewbread is placed on a gold table when it is removed, rather than on a marble or silver table, is that one elevates to a higher level in matters of sanctity and one does not downgrade. Since it is set on the gold shewbread Table all week, it cannot be downgraded to a marble or silver table upon its removal. And there was one Table of gold within the Sanctuary, upon which the shewbread is always found.
  The mishna describes the manner in which it is ensured that the shewbread is constantly on the Table: And four priests enter, two with the two arrangements of the new shewbread in their hands and two with the two bowls of frankincense in their hands. And four priests precede them, entering the Sanctuary before them, two to take the two arrangements of the old shewbread from the Table, and two to take the two bowls of frankincense.
  Those bringing the new shewbread into the Sanctuary stand in the north and their faces are to the south, and those removing the old shewbread stand in the south and their faces are to the north. These priests draw the old shewbread from the Table and those priests place the new shewbread on the Table, and for each handbreadth of this old shewbread that is removed from the Table a handbreadth of that new shewbread is placed upon the Table, so that the Table is never without loaves upon it, as it is stated: “And you shall set upon the Table shewbread before Me always” (Exodus 25:30).
  Rabbi Yosei says: Even if these priests were to remove the shewbread from the Table entirely, and only afterward those priests were to place the new shewbread upon the Table, this too would fulfill the requirement that the shewbread always be on the Table. It is unnecessary to ensure the uninterrupted presence of the shewbread upon the Table, as long as it does not remain a single night without shewbread upon it.
  The mishna describes the manner in which the shewbread is distributed: The priests who carried the old shewbread loaves came out of the Sanctuary and placed them on the table of gold that was in the Entrance Hall. The priests then burned on the altar the frankincense that was in the bowls. And the loaves were subsequently distributed to the priests. This occurred on Shabbat, the day that the priestly watch that served in the Temple during the preceding week was replaced by the priestly watch that would serve during the following week. The shewbread was distributed to the priests of both watches.
  If Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat, the loaves are distributed at night, at the conclusion of the fast, since they may not be eaten during the day. If Yom Kippur occurs on Friday, i.e., when the holy day begins on Thursday evening, the goat sin offering of Yom Kippur is eaten by the priests at night, i.e., on Friday night, as it may be eaten only on the day that it is sacrificed or during the following night, until midnight. And since there is no possibility of cooking the meat, as one may not cook on Yom Kippur or Shabbat, the Babylonians, i.e., priests who had emigrated from Babylonia, eat it when it is raw, due to the fact that they are broad-minded with regard to their food, i.e., they are not particular and will eat meat even when it is not cooked.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that according to Rabbi Yosei, even if the priest first removes the old shewbread entirely, and only then places the new shewbread upon the Table, this fulfills the requirement that the shewbread always be on the Table. Moreover, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the priest removed the old shewbread on the morning of Shabbat, and arranged the new shewbread toward evening, there is nothing wrong with that. Rather, how do I realize the meaning of the verse: “And you shall set upon the Table shewbread before Me always” (Exodus 25:30)? This means that the Table should not be left overnight without bread upon it.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that according to Rabbi Yosei, even if the old shewbread remained on the Table for a short while in the morning, and the new shewbread was placed on the Table toward evening, and even though it did not reside constantly on the Table, this fulfills the requirement that the shewbread should always be on the Table. Rabbi Ami says: From Rabbi Yosei’s statement we may learn that even if a person learned only one chapter of the Mishna in the morning and one chapter of the Mishna in the evening, he has thereby fulfilled the mitzva of: “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall contemplate in it day and night, that you may take heed to do according to all that is written in it, for then you shall make your ways prosperous, and then you shall have good success” (Joshua 1:8).
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: Even if a person recited only the recitation of <i>Shema</i> in the morning and in the evening, he has fulfilled the mitzva of: “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth.” And it is prohibited to state this matter in the presence of ignoramuses [<i>amei ha’aretz</i>], as they are likely to get the impression that there is no need to study Torah beyond this. And Rava says: On the contrary, it is a mitzva to state this matter in the presence of ignoramuses, as they will realize that if merely reciting the <i>Shema</i> leads to such a great reward, all the more so how great is the reward of those who study Torah all day and night.
  Ben Dama, son of Rabbi Yishmael’s sister, asked Rabbi Yishmael: In the case of one such as I, who has learned the entire Torah, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to studying Greek wisdom? Rabbi Yishmael recited this verse about him: “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall contemplate in it day and night.” Go and search for an hour that is neither part of the day nor part of the night, and learn Greek wisdom in it.
  The Gemara notes: And this statement of Rabbi Yishmael’s disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: This verse is neither an obligation nor a mitzva, but a blessing. Rabbi Yonatan explains: The Holy One, Blessed be He, saw Joshua and observed that the words of Torah were very precious to him, as it is stated: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face-to-face…and his servant Joshua, son of Nun, a young man, did not depart from the Tent” (Exodus 33:11). The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Joshua: Joshua, are the words of Torah so precious to you? I bless you that “this Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth.”
  The <i>tanna</i> of the school of Rabbi Yishmael teaches: The words of Torah should not be considered as an obligation upon you, i.e., one should not treat Torah study as a burden, but at the same time you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.
  Ḥizkiyya said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “He delivers the afflicted due to His affliction, and opens their ear by tribulation; and also He has allured you out of a narrow opening to a broad place without confines below it, and that which is set on your table is full of fatness” (Job 36:15–16)? Come and see that the attribute of flesh and blood is unlike the attribute of the Holy One, Blessed be He. The attribute of flesh and blood is that a person allures another from the paths of life to the paths of death, but the Holy One, Blessed be He, allures the person from the paths of death to the paths of life, as it is stated: “And also He has allured you out of a narrow opening,” i.e., from Gehenna, the opening of which is narrow so that its smoke is collected
  
  Daf 100a
  
  within it. And lest you say: Just as the opening of Gehenna is narrow, so too, all of Gehenna is narrow, the verse states: “For Gehenna has been arranged of old, it has been prepared even for the king, deep and large, its pile is fire and much wood, the breath of the Lord kindles it like a stream of brimstone” (Isaiah 30:33).
  And lest you say that Gehenna is prepared only for ordinary people, but it is not prepared for important individuals such as a king, the verse states: “It has been prepared even for the king.” And lest you say there is no wood in Gehenna, the verse states: “Its pile is fire and much wood.” And lest you say that this, i.e., escaping Gehenna, is the only reward for Torah study, the verse states: “And that which is set on your table is full of fatness” (Job 36:16). This indicates that one who obeys God and turns from the paths of death to the paths of life is not only saved from Gehenna, he also attains tranquility and prosperity.
  § The mishna states: If Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat, the loaves are distributed on Saturday night. If Yom Kippur occurs on Friday, the goat sin offering of Yom Kippur is eaten Friday night, on Shabbat. Since there was no possibility of cooking the meat, the Babylonian priests would eat it raw. The Gemara notes: Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These priests are not actually Babylonians. Rather, they are Alexandrians, i.e., priests who came from Egypt. But since the Jews of Eretz Yisrael hate the Jewish Babylonians, they would call the gluttonous Alexandrians by the name Babylonians.
  This interpretation of the mishna is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yosei says: These priests are not actually Babylonians. Rather, they are Alexandrians. But since the Jews of Eretz Yisrael hate the Babylonians, they would call the gluttonous Alexandrians by the name Babylonians. Rabbi Yehuda, whose family originated from Babylonia, said to Rabbi Yosei, after hearing this explanation: May your mind be at ease, because you have put my mind at ease.
  MISHNA: If one arranged the bread on the Table on Shabbat but arranged the bowls of frankincense only after Shabbat, then if he subsequently burned the frankincense placed in the bowls on the following Shabbat, the loaves are unfit for consumption, since the frankincense had not been on the Table for the entire week. Since the burning of the frankincense did not render the loaves permitted for consumption, one is not ever liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i> or <i>notar</i>, or for partaking of the shewbread when one is ritually impure. One violates these prohibitions only if the frankincense is burned in a manner that permits consumption of the shewbread.
  If one arranged the bread and the bowls of frankincense on Shabbat but then burned the frankincense that was in the bowls after the following Shabbat, that burning of the frankincense is not valid and the shewbread is unfit for consumption. And since the frankincense was not burned in a manner that permits consumption of the shewbread, one is not ever liable for eating them due to violation of the prohibitions of <i>piggul</i> or <i>notar</i>, or for partaking of the shewbread when one is ritually impure.
  If one arranged the bread and the bowls of frankincense after Shabbat and burned the frankincense that was in the bowls on the subsequent Shabbat, the burning of the frankincense is not valid and the shewbread is unfit for consumption. How should one act to prevent the shewbread from being rendered unfit? One should not remove the shewbread and frankincense from the Table on the subsequent Shabbat. Rather, he should leave it on the Table until the following Shabbat, so that it remains on the Table for a full week from Shabbat to Shabbat. It is permitted to leave the bread and frankincense on the Table beyond seven days, as even if it is on the Table for many days there is nothing wrong with that, i.e., it is not rendered unfit.
  GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there (<i>Yoma</i> 28a) with regard to the Yom Kippur service in the Temple: The appointed priest said to the other priests: Go out and stand on a high point in the Temple and see if it is day and the time for slaughtering the daily offering has arrived, as one may not slaughter offerings at night. If the time has arrived, the observer says: There is light [<i>barkai</i>]. Mattitya ben Shmuel maintained that one should wait until greater light is observed. Therefore, when he was the appointed priest, he would say: Is the entire eastern sky illuminated, even to Hebron? And the observer would say: Yes.
  The mishna asks: And why did they need to institute this, to send someone to observe the first light from a high place? The mishna explains that this was deemed necessary because once, the light of the moon rose and the priests imagined that the eastern sky was illuminated with sunlight. They then slaughtered the daily offering, and when they realized that it had been slaughtered too early they had to take it out to the place designated for burning and burn it. In order to prevent similar errors in the future, the Sages instituted that they should carefully assess the situation and ensure that day has begun before slaughtering the daily offering.
  The mishna continues: Once the daylight was observed on Yom Kippur, the priests led the High Priest down to the Hall of Immersion. The mishna comments: This was the principle in the Temple: Anyone who covers his legs, a euphemism for defecating, requires immersion afterward; and anyone who urinates requires sanctification of hands and feet with water from the Basin afterward.
  The father of Rabbi Avin teaches a <i>baraita</i>: Not only in this case, with regard to slaughtering the daily offering, did the Sages say that if it is performed at night it is disqualified, but even in the case of a bird burnt offering whose nape was pinched at night, and in the case of a meal offering from which a handful was removed at night, the offering is disqualified and must be taken out to the place designated for burning.
  The Gemara asks: Granted, a bird burnt offering is disqualified if pinched at night, as it cannot be restored to its former state. But in the case of a meal offering whose handful was removed at night, why is it burned? It is possible to remedy the situation, as the priest can restore the handful to its original place and then remove a handful from the meal offering once again during the day.
  The Gemara replies that the father of Rabbi Avin teaches the <i>baraita</i> and he says its explanation: Service vessels sanctify their contents even when those contents are not placed in the vessel at the appointed time for that service. Once the handful is placed in the service vessel it acquires the sanctity inherent to the handful and the situation can no longer be remedied.
  The Gemara raises an objection from a <i>baraita</i>. Any offering that is sacrificed during the day is consecrated by a service vessel only during the day, and any offering that is sacrificed at night is consecrated by a service vessel only at night, and any offering that is sacrificed both during the day and at night is consecrated both during the day and at night.
  The <i>baraita</i> teaches that any offering that is sacrificed during the day is consecrated during the day, from which one can infer that during the day, yes, it is consecrated, but it is not consecrated at night. This indicates that the handful of the meal offering is not consecrated at night, contrary to the explanation of Rabbi Avin’s father. The Gemara answers: When an offering is placed in a service vessel not at the appointed time, the contents are not sufficiently consecrated to be sacrificed on the altar, but they are sufficiently consecrated to be disqualified.
  Rabbi Zeira raises an objection from the mishna: If one arranged the bread and the bowls of frankincense after Shabbat and burned the frankincense that was in the bowls on the subsequent Shabbat, the burning of the frankincense is not valid and the shewbread is unfit for consumption. How should one act to prevent the shewbread from being rendered unfit? One should not remove the shewbread on the subsequent Shabbat. Rather, he should leave it on the Table until the following Shabbat, so that it remains on the Table for a full week from Shabbat to Shabbat. It is permitted to leave the bread and frankincense on the Table beyond seven days, as even if it is on the Table for many days there is nothing wrong with that, i.e., it is not rendered unfit.
  Rabbi Zeira explains: And if it enters your mind to say that service vessels sanctify their contents to the extent that those contents are disqualified even when they are not placed in the vessel at the appointed time, then even if the shewbread is arranged after Shabbat it should be sanctified by the Table and subsequently disqualified by being left overnight.
  Rabba said: The one who raises the objection, Rabbi Zeira, raises the objection well. Nevertheless, the father of Rabbi Avin is also stating a <i>baraita</i>, and the difficulty must therefore be resolved. Rabba explains: The <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> cited by Rabbi Avin’s father maintains that in the case of a rite that should be performed during the day, if it is performed during the preceding night it is not considered a rite whose time has not yet arrived, as the night and day are considered a single unit. Therefore, if one places the handful in a service vessel at night the service vessel sanctifies the handful, and since the rite is not valid the offering is disqualified. But if a rite is performed several days earlier it is considered a rite whose time has not yet arrived. Therefore, the Table does not sanctify shewbread that is placed on it on any day except Shabbat.
  The Gemara asks: Ultimately,
  
  Daf 100b
  
  if a rite performed during the night preceding its appointed time is not considered a rite whose time has not yet arrived, then when the night arrives, i.e., the twilight of Shabbat eve, the arrangement of loaves remaining on the Table should be consecrated and subsequently disqualified by being left overnight. Rava says: The mishna is referring to a case where the priest removed the shewbread from the Table before nightfall on Shabbat eve in order to prevent its consecration, and arranged it again the following day.
  Mar Zutra, and some say Rav Ashi, said: Even if you say the mishna is referring to a case where one did not remove the shewbread before nightfall, the loaves are not consecrated by the Table. Since the priest arranged the shewbread at a time that was not in accordance with the procedure dictated by its mitzva, it is considered as though a monkey had arranged the shewbread, and it is not consecrated by the Table.
  MISHNA: The two loaves that are brought on <i>Shavuot</i> are eaten by the priests no less than two days and no more than three days after they were baked. How so? They are generally baked on the eve of the festival of <i>Shavuot</i> and they are eaten on the day of the Festival, which is on the second day. If the Festival occurs after Shabbat, on Sunday, the loaves are baked on Friday, in which case they are eaten on the third day.
  The shewbread is eaten no less than nine days and no more than eleven days after it is baked. How so? It is generally baked on Shabbat eve and eaten on the following Shabbat, which is on the ninth day. If a Festival occurs on Shabbat eve the shewbread is baked on the eve of the Festival, on Thursday, in which case it is eaten on the tenth day.
  If the two festival days of Rosh HaShana occur on Thursday and Friday, the shewbread is baked on Wednesday, in which case it is eaten on the eleventh day. And this is because the preparation of the two loaves and the shewbread overrides neither Shabbat nor a Festival. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest: Their preparation overrides a Festival but does not override the fast day of Yom Kippur.
  GEMARA: Ravina said: According to the statement of the one who says vow offerings and voluntary offerings may not be sacrificed on a Festival, do not say they are fit to be sacrificed on a Festival by Torah law and it is the Sages who decreed they may not be sacrificed. The Sages might have issued such a decree so that one would not delay sacrificing his offerings until he ascends to Jerusalem for the Festival. Rather, vow offerings and voluntary offerings are unfit to be sacrificed on a Festival also by Torah law.
  Ravina explains this may be inferred from the mishna, as the offering of the two loaves is an obligation of the day of <i>Shavuot</i>. It is therefore not possible to say that the Sages decreed they may not be prepared on the Festival lest one delay bringing them. And yet the mishna teaches that baking and preparing the two loaves overrides neither Shabbat nor a Festival. All the more so that vow offerings and voluntary offerings, which do not need to be sacrificed specifically on a Festival, may not be sacrificed on a Festival by Torah law.
  
  MISHNA: With regard to the fine flour for meal offerings or the wine for libations that became ritually impure, as long as they have not yet been consecrated in a service vessel and assumed inherent sanctity, their redemption is possible. If they are redeemed, their sanctity will be transferred to the redemption money. Once they have been consecrated in a service vessel and have assumed inherent sanctity, their redemption is no longer possible, and they are burned like any other offerings that became ritually impure.
  With regard to consecrated birds, wood for the altar, frankincense, and service vessels, once they became ritually impure they have no possibility of redemption, as redemption of items consecrated for the altar was stated only with regard to a consecrated animal that developed a blemish, not with regard to other consecrated items.
  GEMARA: According to the mishna, impure meal offerings and libations may be redeemed as long as they have not yet been placed in a service vessel. Shmuel says: Even if they are ritually pure, they also may be redeemed. What is the reason for this? As long as they have not been consecrated in a service vessel, they possess sanctity that inheres only in their value, and items whose sanctity inheres only in their value may be redeemed.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: The meal offerings and libations that became ritually impure are redeemed? The Gemara answers: The same is true even if they had not become ritually impure. And the <i>tanna</i> mentions a case where they became ritually impure since he wants to teach the latter clause, which states: Once they were consecrated in a service vessel and have assumed inherent sanctity, they have no possibility of redemption, meaning that even when they became ritually impure and are disqualified from use as an offering, they still have no possibility of redemption. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> also taught the first clause: That became ritually impure before they were consecrated in a service vessel.
  With regard to flour or oil that has been consecrated in a service vessel, the Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that they are not redeemed, as they are consecrated with inherent sanctity?
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state that items consecrated in a service vessel cannot be redeemed, as it may enter your mind to say: Since a blemished animal is called impure, as the Gemara will explain shortly, this analogy could be reversed and an impure animal could also have a status similar to that of a blemished animal. And just as in the case of a blemished animal, even though it is consecrated with inherent sanctity, when it develops a blemish it is redeemed, so too these impure items discussed in the mishna may also be redeemed despite their possessing inherent sanctity. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> teaches us that it is not in this context that the Merciful One called a blemished animal “impure.”
  
  Daf 101a
  
  One cannot draw the conclusion that these substances can be redeemed, since we do not find a case where an item that has been consecrated in a service vessel is redeemed.
  The Gemara asks: And where is a blemished animal called “impure” in the Torah? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to redeeming an offering, that the Torah states: “And if it be any impure animal, of which they may not bring an offering to the Lord, then he shall set the animal before the priest. And the priest shall value it, whether it is good or bad; as you the priest values it, so shall it be. But if he will indeed redeem it, then he shall add the fifth part thereof to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:11–13). The verse is speaking of blemished animals that are redeemed, and they are referred to as impure because they are not fit to serve as offerings.
  The Gemara clarifies: Do you say that the verse is referring to blemished animals that were redeemed, or is it referring only to an actual non-kosher [<i>tamei</i>] animal, as the plain sense of the verse indicates? The Gemara responds: When the verse states later in that section: “And if it be of an impure [<i>tamei</i>] animal, then he shall redeem it according to your valuation, and shall add to it the fifth part thereof” (Leviticus 27:27), an actual non-kosher animal is mentioned as being subject to redemption. How do I realize the meaning of the verse: “And if it be any impure [<i>tamei</i>] animal” (Leviticus 27:11)? The verse is speaking of blemished animals that were redeemed, i.e., that have the possibility of being redeemed.
  The Gemara continues to discuss this <i>halakha</i>: One might have thought that offerings are redeemed even due to the presence of a temporary blemish. Therefore, the continuation of the verse states: “Of which they may not bring an offering to the Lord,” which is referring to an animal that is not sacrificed to God at all. The verse serves to exclude this animal with a temporary blemish, which is not sacrificed today, while it remains blemished, but is sacrificed tomorrow, after the blemish disappears.
  Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ raises an objection to Shmuel’s opinion that even meal offerings and libations that are pure may be redeemed if they have not yet been consecrated in a service vessel. The mishna states: With regard to consecrated birds, wood for the altar, frankincense, and service vessels, once they became ritually impure, they have no possibility of redemption, as redemption of consecrated items is stated only with regard to an animal consecrated for the altar that became blemished. Granted, birds are not redeemed, since they are imbued with inherent sanctity, and the Torah stated that only with regard to blemished animals, not birds, is redemption possible for items of inherent sanctity.
  But with regard to wood, and frankincense that is not consecrated with inherent sanctity until it is placed in a service vessel, and service vessels themselves that became impure, since none of these possess inherent sanctity, let them be redeemed. Rather, is it not that these items are not redeemed because pure sacrificial items in general are not redeemed, even when they do not possess inherent sanctity?
  And these items too, i.e., the wood, frankincense, and service vessels, even though they became impure, they are treated like they are pure. Their impurity is incomplete because wood and frankincense are not capable of becoming food, and consequently they should not be susceptible to impurity at all. Rather, the regard for the sanctity of sacred property transforms their status into that of food, which renders them susceptible to ritual impurity.
  With regard to wood, as long as one does not trim it into logs, it does not become susceptible to impurity. With regard to frankincense as well, as long as it is not consecrated in a service vessel, it does not become susceptible to impurity. With regard to service vessels also, since they have the capacity to attain purity in a ritual bath, their impurity is revocable. Apparently, the reason the mishna teaches that these items are not redeemed is because they are in some sense still regarded as pure, and consecrated items that are considered ritually pure are not redeemed, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel.
  The Gemara responds: No, actually, I will say to you that in general, pure items are redeemed; and these items are not redeemed, despite the fact that they are not imbued with inherent sanctity, because they are not readily available. If these items can be redeemed when they are pure, then they may not be available for the Temple service.
  The Gemara challenges: Granted, frankincense and service vessels are not readily available, but wood is readily available. Why, then, may it not be redeemed? The Gemara answers: Wood usable for the Temple service is also difficult to procure. This is apparent since the Master said that any wood in which a worm is found is disqualified for use on the altar. Consequently, wood suitable for the altar is not readily available.
  The Gemara continues to discuss the opinion of Shmuel that libations and the flour for meal offerings are redeemed even when pure, as long as they have not been consecrated in a service vessel. Rav Pappa said that if Shmuel had heard that which is taught in the following <i>baraita</i>, he would have retracted his opinion. The <i>baraita</i> teaches: In the case of one who consecrates unblemished animals for Temple maintenance rather than for the altar, they are redeemed only for use on the altar. They may not be redeemed for any other use, in accordance with to the principle that any consecrated item that is fit to be sacrificed on the altar may never leave the altar. And even though these animals possess only sanctity that inheres in their value, they are not redeemed, since they are ritually pure and fit for the altar. Had Shmuel known this <i>baraita</i>, he would have retracted his opinion.
  The Gemara responds: But that is not so; this <i>baraita</i> was heard by him, and he still did not retract his opinion. Rather, he explained it as follows: Didn’t you say there, i.e., earlier in the discussion of the mishna, that the reason one may not redeem wood, frankincense, and service vessels that were consecrated for Temple maintenance is that since they are not readily available, the Sages decreed that they are not redeemed?
  Here, too, with regard to an unblemished animal that was consecrated for Temple maintenance, since blemishes that disqualify an animal as an offering are common, as even a blemish as insignificant as one on the cornea of the eye also disqualifies the animal, therefore, unblemished animals that are fit to be sacrificed on the altar are not readily available. That is why the Sages decreed that unblemished animals, even when consecrated for Temple maintenance, may be redeemed only for use as an offering on the altar. By contrast, meal offerings and libations, which were the subject of Shmuel’s statement, are readily available, and may be redeemed even when they are still pure.
  § After analyzing Shmuel’s opinion permitting the redemption of meal offerings and libations that are pure and have not yet been consecrated in a service vessel, the Gemara now cites a dissenting opinion: Rav Kahana said that only meal offerings and libations that are impure are redeemed, but those that are pure are not redeemed. And Rabbi Oshaya similarly said that those meal offerings and libations that are impure are redeemed, but those that are pure are not redeemed. There are those who say that Rabbi Oshaya says: Even pure ones are redeemed.
  Rabbi Elazar says: With regard to all meal offerings, if they are impure they are redeemed, and if they are pure, they are not redeemed, except for the tenth of an ephah of fine flour of a meal offering of a sinner, which is redeemed even if it is pure.
  The reason for this is that the Torah stated with regard to an extremely destitute individual who brings a tenth of an ephah of fine flour: “And the priest shall effect atonement for him for his sin [<i>meḥattato</i>] that he has sinned of one of these, and it shall be forgiven for him” (Leviticus 5:13). By contrast, with regard to a wealthy person who brings a lamb as a sliding-scale offering, the verse states: “And the priest shall effect atonement for him from his sin [<i>al ḥattato</i>] that he has sinned” (Leviticus 5:6). The word “<i>al</i>,” which can also mean on, indicates that if an extremely destitute individual designates a tenth of an ephah for his meal offering and then becomes wealthy, he redeems his meal offering and adds money on to the original sum in order to purchase an offering that is appropriate for his current financial status. In that case, the meal offering is redeemed even if it is pure.
  § The Gemara cites another statement that Rabbi Oshaya says: I heard that according to Rabbi Shimon, when one rendered a meal offering <i>piggul</i> by sacrificing it with the intent to consume it beyond its designated time, it is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. As we learned in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Okatzin</i> 3:12): <i>Orla</i>, diverse kinds in a vineyard,
  
  Daf 101b
  
  the flesh of an ox that is stoned, a heifer whose neck is broken,the birds sacrificed by a leper (see Leviticus 14:4–7), a firstborn donkey whose neck was broken, and meat cooked together with milk are all susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, despite the fact that they are forbidden for consumption.
  Rabbi Shimon says: None of them are susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since they are all items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit, and they are therefore not considered food. And Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to meat cooked together with milk that it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food since it, i.e., both the meat and the milk, had a time that it was fit for consumption before it was rendered forbidden.
  And Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that an item from which it is prohibited to derive benefit is not susceptible to impurity of food? It is because it is stated: “All food which may be eaten [<i>ha’okhel asher ye’akhel</i>], that on which water comes, shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The redundancy in the phrase “food which may be eaten” indicates that specifically food that you are able to feed to others, in this case, gentiles, is termed food for the purposes of susceptibility to the impurity of food, but food that you are not able to feed to others is not termed food. Therefore, items from which it is prohibited to derive benefit and which it is therefore prohibited to feed to others are not considered food in this context.
  Rabbi Oshaya explains how this can be applied to <i>piggul</i>: A meal offering that one rendered <i>piggul</i> is also food that you are not able to feed to others, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Consequently, it is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food according to Rabbi Shimon.
  The Gemara asks: If so, why doesn’t he also derive that meat cooked in milk is susceptible to impurity because it is food that you may feed to others, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that it is permitted to derive benefit from meat and milk cooked together?
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: With regard to meat cooked in milk, eating it is prohibited and deriving benefit from it is permitted, as it is stated: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God; you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And elsewhere the verse states: “And you shall be holy men to Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn by animals [<i>tereifa</i>] in the field” (Exodus 22:30). Just as there, with regard to an animal torn by animals, which is forbidden as a <i>tereifa</i>, i.e., an animal possessing a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months, eating it is prohibited but deriving benefit from it is permitted, so too here, with regard to meat cooked in milk, where being a holy people is also mentioned, eating it is forbidden but deriving benefit from it is permitted.
  The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> that cites Rabbi Shimon’s opinion states one reason why meat cooked in milk is susceptible to impurity and adds another. One reason is that it is food that you can feed to others. Therefore, it is called food for the purpose of being susceptible to impurity. And another reason is that even for him, i.e., a Jew, although it is currently prohibited to eat the milk and meat, it had a time when each was fit to be eaten, i.e., before they were cooked together; therefore, they remain susceptible to impurity.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya from a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Shimon says that there is a case of the leftover of an offering that is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, but there is also a case of the leftover of an offering that is not susceptible to the impurity of food.
  How so? If it was left overnight before the sprinkling of the blood on the altar, it is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, as it never became fit for consumption. But if it was left overnight after the sprinkling of the blood, it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since from after the sprinkling of the blood until it was left overnight, it was fit for consumption.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: And with regard to <i>piggul</i>, both in cases of offerings of the most sacred order as well as in cases of offerings of lesser sanctity, the meat of the offering is not susceptible to the impurity of food. This is because it was rendered forbidden for consumption at the beginning of the sacrificial rite, and was never fit for consumption. If the priest rendered a meal offering <i>piggul</i>, it is susceptible to the impurity of food, since it did have a period of time when it was acceptable, i.e., when it was still flour before it was consecrated as a meal offering. This ruling contradicts Rabbi Oshaya’s understanding that according to Rabbi Shimon, a meal offering that became <i>piggul</i> is not susceptible to the impurity of food.
  The Gemara answers: That is not difficult, as here, in the <i>baraita</i> where Rabbi Shimon ruled that the meal offering that became <i>piggul</i> is susceptible to the impurity of food, it is referring to a case where it had a time in which it was fit for consumption. There, where it is not susceptible to the impurity of food, it is referring to a case where it did not have a time in which it was fit for consumption.
  The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where it did not have a time in which it was fit for consumption? Before the flour was consecrated as a meal offering, it was certainly permitted for consumption. The Gemara answers: This would occur where he consecrated the wheat while it was still attached to the ground and was therefore not yet susceptible to impurity. Once harvested, it was already prohibited for consumption.
  The Gemara raises a difficulty: The flour may still have a time in which it was fit. Let him redeem it before it is placed in a service vessel. Why is it regarded as not having a time in which it was fit for consumption? The Gemara qualifies the question: This distinction, between flour that came from wheat that was consecrated before it was harvested and wheat or flour that was consecrated at a later point, works out well according to this version of that which Rabbi Oshaya said: Impure meal offerings and libations that have not been consecrated in a service vessel are redeemed; if they are pure, they are not redeemed. Accordingly, it works out well that the flour does not have a time in which it was fit for consumption when it came from wheat that was consecrated before being harvested. It could not be redeemed and made fit for consumption.
  But according to this version of what Rabbi Oshaya said: Even pure meal offerings and libations are redeemed, there remains the possibility of letting him redeem the meal offering while it is pure and before is consecrated in a service vessel. Therefore, it should be considered as having a time in which it is fit for consumption.
  The Gemara answers: In any event, now he has not redeemed it. Therefore, it is not considered to have had a time in which it is fit for consumption.
  The Gemara asks: How can the flour be considered as not having a time in which it is fit for consumption merely because he has not redeemed it, even though he could have redeemed it? Since in a case where if he wants, he may redeem it, don’t we attribute to Rabbi Shimon that he said that for any item that stands to be redeemed, it is as if it already is redeemed?
  The Gemara cites a source for this assertion: As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon says: A red heifer, even if it has been slaughtered and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a time in which it was fit. And Reish Lakish said, explaining how it is possible to derive from this <i>halakha</i> that any item that could be redeemed is considered as though it has been redeemed: Rabbi Shimon would say that a red heifer is redeemed with money even when it has already been slaughtered and placed upon its pyre in preparation for being burned. If so, a meal offering that could be redeemed should also be considered fit for consumption, as it is considered as though it has been redeemed.
  The Gemara answers: How can these cases be compared? Granted, with regard to the red heifer, it is considered to be an item that stands to be redeemed, since if he found another animal choicer than it, there is a mitzva to redeem the first one and purchase the choicer one with the money. But is there a mitzva to redeem these meal offerings?
  The Gemara challenges: But there is a case where sacrificial meat remained overnight before the sprinkling of the blood occurred, where there was a mitzva to sprinkle the blood the day before, and if he had wanted he could have sprinkled it, and the offering would not have been disqualified. And yet, Rabbi Shimon teaches in the <i>baraita</i> that sacrificial meat that remained overnight is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, even though it should have been considered fit for consumption on the day the offering was slaughtered, as the blood stood to be sprinkled and there was a mitzva to sprinkle it.
  The Gemara answers: Here, we are dealing with a case where there was not sufficient time remaining in the day to sprinkle the blood, as the offering was slaughtered close to sunset. Therefore, the blood did not stand to be sprinkled and the meat was therefore never fit for consumption.
  The Gemara asks: But in a case where the offering was slaughtered when there was sufficient time remaining in the day to sprinkle the blood, what would then be the <i>halakha</i> according to Rabbi Shimon? Would meat left overnight be susceptible to the ritual impurity of food?
  If so, rather than Rabbi Shimon teaching the following: Sacrificial meat that was left overnight before the blood was sprinkled is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, but if left overnight after the sprinkling of the blood it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, instead let him distinguish within the case itself: In what case is this statement said? When is sacrificial meat left overnight without the blood of the offering having been sprinkled not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food? It is in a case where there was not sufficient time remaining in the day to sprinkle the blood; but if there was sufficient time remaining in the day to sprinkle the blood, it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.
  The Gemara answers: That is indeed what he is saying in the <i>baraita</i>, that if the offering was left overnight before it was available for sprinkling, i.e., if it was slaughtered so late in the day that there was no time left to sprinkle the blood, it is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. By contrast, if it was left overnight after it was available for sprinkling, i.e., there was still time to sprinkle the blood, then it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food.
  The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Shimon in fact hold that an item that stands to be redeemed is treated as though it has already been redeemed, and is therefore considered to have had a time in which it is fit, even if it was never actually redeemed? But isn’t it so that when one renders either offerings of the most sacred order or offerings of lesser sanctity <i>piggul</i>, there was a mitzva to sprinkle the blood once the offering was slaughtered,
  
  Daf 102a
  
  and if he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood of these offerings properly? Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon teaches in the <i>baraita</i> that the meat of an offering that was rendered <i>piggul</i> is not susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. What, is it not referring to a case where he rendered it <i>piggul</i> during the rite of sprinkling? If so, since the offering stood to have its blood sprinkled, it is considered as though it has been sprinkled, and the offering was considered fit for consumption before he rendered it <i>piggul</i>; therefore, it should be susceptible to the impurity of food. The Gemara answers: No, the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case where he rendered it <i>piggul</i> during the rite of slaughtering, and the blood never stood to be sprinkled.
  The Gemara asks: But if he rendered it <i>piggul</i> during the rite of the sprinkling, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Is the <i>halakha</i> that the meat of the offering indeed becomes susceptible to the ritual impurity of food?
  The Gemara challenges: If so, rather than continuing and teaching that if he rendered the meal offering <i>piggul</i> it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, i.e., instead of contrasting the animal offering case with a case involving an meal offering, let the <i>tanna</i> distinguish within the case of the animal offering itself in the following way: In what case is this statement, that if one renders an offering <i>piggul</i> the meat is not susceptible to the impurity of food, said? It is said in a case where he rendered it <i>piggul</i> during the rite of slaughtering, but if he rendered it <i>piggul</i> during the rite of sprinkling, it is susceptible to the impurity of food.
  The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to contrast it with a case of one who rendered a meal offering <i>piggul</i> in order to teach that even though he already rendered it <i>piggul</i> at the time of the removal of the handful, and the principle is that the removal of the handful of a meal offering is equivalent to the slaughtering of an animal offering, and an offering that was rendered <i>piggul</i> at the time of slaughtering is not susceptible to the impurity of food, even so, the meal offering is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it initially had a time that was fit for consumption, when the flour was not yet consecrated as a meal offering.
  Rav Ashi said: I related this discussion in the presence of Rav Naḥman and explained Rabbi Shimon’s opinion differently: Even if you say that the case in the <i>baraita</i> is one in which the meat was actually left overnight and there was time to sprinkle the blood during the day, and even if you say that he rendered the offering <i>piggul</i> at the time of the sprinkling of the blood rather than during the slaughtering, Rabbi Shimon does not consider those to be cases in which the offering had a time when it was fit for consumption.
  Rabbi Shimon said only that if he had wanted, he would have redeemed it, and therefore an item that stands to be redeemed is treated as if it were already redeemed. Redemption is simple and requires only a verbal statement. According to Rabbi Shimon we do not say that if he had wanted, he would have sprinkled it, i.e., that the sprinkling of the blood and similar actions that stand to take place are treated as having taken place already.
  The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion from a mishna (<i>Me’ila</i> 2a): Rabbi Yehoshua states a principle about the misuse of offerings that became disqualified: With regard to any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it, and with regard to any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests before it became disqualified, one is liable for misusing it. Misuse of consecrated property applies only to offerings that are considered fully reserved for God. Once the priests are permitted to partake of the offering it is no longer categorized as consecrated property.
  Rabbi Yehoshua clarifies: And what is a disqualified offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, after the blood was sprinkled, the meat of the offering was left overnight; or when the meat of an offering became ritually impure; or when an offering left the Temple courtyard. One is not liable for misuse in these cases, since the meat of these offerings became permitted to the priests once the blood was sprinkled and only subsequently was it disqualified.
  And what is a disqualified offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests? Examples of such a situation are as follows: When, at the time that it was slaughtered, he intended to eat it, sprinkle the blood, or burn the sacrificial potions on the altar beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or when priests who were disqualified for Temple service collected or sprinkled its blood. In these cases, since there was never a time that it was permitted for the priests to consume the meat of the offering, one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property.
  The Gemara addresses the objection to Rav Ashi’s opinion: In any event, the first clause teaches that meat of an offering that was left overnight, and meat that became impure, and meat that left the courtyard all had a time when they were permitted to the priests. What, is it not referring to a case where it was actually left overnight, i.e., both the blood and the meat of the offering, and here the case is an instance of: If he had wanted, he could have sprinkled the blood, and for that reason the mishna teaches that one is not liable for misusing it? It is considered as having had a time that it was permitted to the priests since he could have sprinkled the blood during the day, and therefore the offering is treated as if the sprinkling already happened, counter to Rav Ashi’s claim that such reasoning does not apply with regard to the sprinkling of the blood.
  The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to cases where the meat left the courtyard at a time when it was fit to leave, and the meat became impure when it was fit to become impure, and was left over when it was fit to be left over, i.e., the mishna is discussing cases where these occurred after the blood was sprinkled, rendering the meat fit to be consumed by the priests. For that reason it was not subject to the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property.
  The Gemara again challenges Rav Ashi’s opinion: But according to this, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a case where the whole offering, including the blood, was actually left overnight? Is that indeed a case where one is liable for misusing consecrated property, as the priests never had a time when it was permitted to consume the meat? If so, those statements in the mishna: Any offering that had a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, and any offering that did not have a time that it was permitted for consumption by the priests, are imprecise. They indicate that the critical factor is whether the meat had a time that it was potentially permitted, even if it was ultimately disqualified.
  Instead, the mishna should have stated: With regard to any offering that has, in actuality, a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is not liable for misusing it. And, similarly, with regard to any offering that does not have a time that it is permitted for consumption by the priests, one is liable for misusing it.
  It must be that Rav Ashi concedes that the mishna in <i>Me’ila</i> should be understood to include the case where both the blood and the meat were leftover, and that under such circumstances one is not liable for misuse of the offering due to the fact that once the blood could have been sprinkled, the offering is already considered permitted to the priests. Rav Ashi nevertheless claims that this mishna does not pose a difficulty to his understanding of Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to an offering’s status as susceptible to the impurity of food. Rather, Rav Ashi says: Are you raising a contradiction between the <i>halakhot</i> of misuse of consecrated property and the <i>halakhot</i> of ritual impurity?
  These cannot be compared, as liability for misuse of consecrated property is due to the sanctity or lack of sanctity of an item, i.e., on whether it is classified as fully reserved for God. Therefore, after the sanctity of the offering has lapsed, which occurs when the blood is ready to be sprinkled, as at that point it is already regarded as permitted to the priests, how can it return and be inured in it?
  But with regard to impurity, the offering’s susceptibility to the impurity of food is due to whether it is considered food or not considered food. Therefore, in any case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he could sprinkle it, it is only in sprinkling the blood that he grants the meat the status of food, and then it is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food. But in a case where if he wants to sprinkle the blood he cannot sprinkle it for some reason, and the offering is subsequently disqualified, he does not grant it the status of food, since it never became permitted to eat and it therefore is not susceptible to the impurity of food.
  The Gemara raises another objection from a mishna (<i>Karetot</i> 23b) to Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to susceptibility to the impurity of food, blood that is ready to be sprinkled is not considered as if it were sprinkled: With regard to one who brings a provisional guilt offering to be sacrificed, because he is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering (see Leviticus 5:17–19), and later it becomes known to him that he has not sinned, the status of the offering is as follows: If it became known to him that he had not sinned before the offering was slaughtered, the consecrated ram should go out and graze in the flock as a non-sacred animal, as the consecration was performed in error. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say
  
  Daf 102b
  
  it is treated as a guilt offering that was disqualified and it should graze until it becomes blemished, and then it is sold, and its money that is received from the sale is allocated for communal gift offerings. Rabbi Eliezer says: It should be sacrificed in its current state, since if it does not come to atone for this sin, it will come for a different sin, as he certainly committed some sin of which he is unaware.
  If, after the provisional guilt offering was slaughtered, it became known to him that he had not sinned, the blood collected in a cup to sprinkle on the altar should be spilled into the Temple courtyard drain and the meat should be burned in the place of burning, in accordance with the <i>halakhot</i> of a disqualified offering.
  If the blood was already sprinkled on the altar when it became known to him that he had not sinned, the meat of the offering is eaten by the priests in the normal manner. And Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he discovered that he had not sinned while the blood was still in the cup, it is sprinkled on the altar and the meat is eaten.
  And Rava says in explanation of Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: Rabbi Yosei stated this ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar, it is as if it has already been sprinkled. Therefore, once the blood is in the cup and is ready to be sprinkled, the meat is permitted as though the blood already had been sprinkled. This statement contradicts Rav Ashi’s opinion that with regard to the status of the meat as food, an offering whose blood stands to be sprinkled is not necessarily considered as though it has already been sprinkled.
  The Gemara responds: Is that the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s opinion? They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei: His reasoning is that he holds that a service vessel sanctifies disqualified offerings to be sacrificed on the altar <i>ab initio</i>, and in this case the blood was already in the service vessel.
  Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Since Rabbi Shimon said that for any blood that stands to be sprinkled on the altar it is as if it has already been sprinkled, and for any item that stands to be burned it is as if it is already burned, why does he hold, as the Gemara mentioned previously (101b), that meat from an offering that is leftover, and the meat of a red heifer that is not yet burned on its pyre, are both susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since there was a time that they were fit for consumption by the priests? They are merely dust, as they stand to be burned, and therefore should no longer retain the status of food. Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi in response: Nevertheless, regard for the sanctity of sacred property renders them susceptible to the impurity of food.
  Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Granted that the regard for the sanctity of sacred property is effective in order to disqualify the meat itself if it becomes impure, but is it also considered impure to the extent that one counts first- and second-degree with regard to it, as indicated by the language: Susceptible to the ritual impurity of food? Accordingly, if the meat came into contact with a primary source of impurity, it would have first-degree impurity and it would subsequently transfer second-degree impurity to an item that comes into contact with it.
  If that were the case, one could resolve the dilemma that Reish Lakish raises: With regard to a dry portion of flour taken from one of the meal offerings that has not come into contact with a liquid and is therefore susceptible to impurity due only to regard for its sanctity, does one count first- and second-degree impurity with it, or does one not count first- and second-degree impurity with it? Since Reish Lakish’s inquiry is unresolved, presumably the same uncertainty applies here.
  The Gemara responds: When Reish Lakish raises the dilemma, it is with regard to the status of the dry mass of the meal offering by Torah law, as consecrated items are burned only when rendered impure by Torah law. When we said that leftover meat and the meat of the red heifer are susceptible to the impurity of food, we were inquiring about the status of the leftover meat and of the red heifer by rabbinic law, and therefore nothing can be derived from the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish.
  MISHNA: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan instead, the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation that he undertook with his vow and he must therefore bring another meal offering.
  If he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought it prepared in a deep pan instead; or if he said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a deep pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan, this offering is not valid, because he did not fulfill what he had stated concerning that tenth of an ephah of flour.
  In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided it and brought it in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two tenths of an ephah for two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought one meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and removed one handful from it, then the meal offering that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  If he says: These two tenths of an ephah before me are a meal offering in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, removing a handful from each; or if he says: These tenths of an ephah are two meal offerings in two vessels, and he brought them in one vessel, both of these offerings are not valid, because in both cases he deviated from the number of handfuls that he vowed to remove.
  In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of two tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and he divided them and brought them in two vessels, and others said to him: You vowed to bring a meal offering in one vessel, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels they are not valid even as voluntary meal offerings, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill his obligation. His failure to respond and explain that it was not his intention to fulfill his vow with this offering indicates that he does intend to fulfill his vow with it. Since he deviated from his vow, the offering is not valid. If he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in one vessel after he was reminded, it is valid, as he fulfilled his vow.
  Likewise, in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring two meal offerings totaling two tenths of an ephah in two vessels, and he brought it all in one vessel, and others said to him: You vowed to bring meal offerings in two vessels, then if he sacrificed the two tenths of an ephah in two vessels as he had originally vowed, they are valid. If he placed it all in one vessel, its halakhic status is like that of two meal offerings that were intermingled prior to removal of the handfuls. Therefore, if one can remove a handful from each meal offering in and of itself, they are valid. If not, they are not valid, as the Gemara explained on 23a.
  GEMARA: The mishna cites cases where one vowed to bring a meal offering prepared in a shallow pan and instead brought one prepared in a deep pan and vice versa, as well as cases where one vowed to bring two tenths of an ephah in one vessel and instead brought them in two vessels and vice versa. In all these cases, the offering is accepted but he has not fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the mishna to mention both types of changes from the initial vow.
  It is necessary because had the <i>tanna</i> taught us only this first case, one might think that perhaps this individual does not fulfill his obligation because he said: In a shallow pan, and he brought it instead in a deep pan. But here, where he changes the number of offerings but both this, the offering specified in his vow, and that, the offering that he actually brought, are in a shallow pan, or both this and that are in a deep pan, I would say that he has indeed fulfilled his vow, as the difference in number of offerings brought is not significant. Therefore, the <i>tanna</i> taught the second case as well, to teach that the change in the number is in fact significant.
  And conversely, had the <i>tanna</i> taught us only this case, where there was a discrepancy between the number of offerings he vowed to bring and the number he actually brought, one might think that he does not fulfill his obligation only because he divided the two tenths of an ephah that were supposed to be brought together. But there, where he changed the type of pan but did not divide the flour to be used, I would say that it is not a case where he failed to fulfill his obligation. Therefore, it was necessary for the <i>tanna</i> to teach that where he changes the type of pan, he does not, in fact, fulfill his obligation.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> a case similar to that of the mishna: If one brings a meal offering somewhat different from that which he vowed to bring, then the one that he brought, he brought as a voluntary meal offering, but he has not fulfilled his vow. Rabbi Shimon says: He has even fulfilled his vow, as Rabbi Shimon maintains that the type of pan or the number of offerings is not significant.
  § The mishna teaches that if he says: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering to bring in a shallow pan, and he brought a meal offering prepared in a deep pan instead, it is not valid. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> that in this case the service vessel does not consecrate the flour, since he brought it in a different service vessel than he had vowed? Therefore, the meal offering is still non-sacred and can be used. The Gemara answers that the <i>baraita</i> should be understood according to that which Abaye says: Under such circumstances, the service vessel does not sanctify them with regard to being sacrificed on the altar, but it does sanctify them in order to become disqualified.
  And Abaye says an additional comment about the previous case: The Sages taught in the mishna that in the case of a change in the type of meal offering, the meal offering not valid
  
  Daf 103a
  
  only when he assigned it at the time of the vow. But if at the time of the vow he simply said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, and at the time of the designation of the fine flour as a meal offering he specified a particular type of meal offering, he is not obligated to bring that type, and if he brought a different type, he has still fulfilled his obligation.
  The reason for this is that the Torah states: “That which has emerged from your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24). Since it states: “According to what you have vowed,” and not: According to what you have designated to fulfill your vow, only matters specified as part of the vow are essential to its content.
  It was also stated that Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina says that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The <i>tanna’im</i> taught in the mishna that meal offerings are not valid only when he established their type at the time of the vow and subsequently brought a different type of meal offering. But if he mentioned one type of meal offering at the time of the designation of the flour, and then brought it differently, it is not invalid, as the Torah states: “According to what you have vowed,” and not: According to what you have designated for your vow.
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from barley, should bring the meal offering from wheat, as voluntary meal offerings are brought exclusively from wheat. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from flour, should bring the meal offering from fine flour, as it is written: “His offering shall be of fine flour” (Leviticus 2:1). If one vows to bring a meal offering without oil and without frankincense, he should bring it with oil and frankincense, as voluntary meal offerings require oil and frankincense.
  If one vows to bring as a meal offering half a tenth of an ephah, he should bring a complete tenth of an ephah, the minimum measure of a voluntary meal offering. If one vows to bring a meal offering of a tenth and a half an ephah, he should bring two tenths, as there are no partial tenths of an ephah brought in meal offerings. Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt from bringing a meal offering in all these cases. This is because the vow does not take effect, as he did not pledge in the manner of those who pledge.
  GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why is the vow to bring a meal offering from barley valid? It is seemingly a case of a vow and its extenuation together. The statement: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, is a valid vow, while the next term: From barley, constitutes a retraction, as the speaker knows that a meal offering may not be brought from barley.
  Ḥizkiyya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say: In the case of one who stated a declaration comprising two contradictory statements, attend only to the first statement. As we learned in a mishna (<i>Nazir</i> 9a): If one says: I am hereby a nazirite from dried figs and from pressed figs, which is a contradictory statement, as figs are not prohibited to a nazirite, Beit Shammai say: He is a full-fledged nazirite, as one attends only to the first statement, i.e., I am hereby a nazirite, and the second part is discounted. And Beit Hillel say: The second part of his statement is not discounted, and therefore he is not a nazirite, as he did not accept naziriteship upon himself.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. It is referring to one who, upon being informed that such a vow is not effective, says: Had I known that one cannot vow in this manner to bring barley for a meal offering, I would not have vowed in this manner but rather in that manner, by vowing to bring wheat instead.
  § The Gemara cites another disagreement between Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan about the mishna: Ḥizkiyya says that the Sages taught in the mishna only that where he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from barley, he can bring a meal offering from wheat instead, but if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering from lentils, the vow is not valid.
  The Gemara asks: Now, Ḥizkiyya said that his tradition of interpreting the mishna is that it is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with Beit Shammai’s opinion, and Beit Shammai’s ruling is due to the principle that one should attend only to the first statement. If so, what is the difference to me whether he vowed to bring a meal offering from barley or from lentils? In either case, that principle should require him to bring a meal offering from wheat. The Gemara answers: Ḥizkiyya retracted his initial explanation that the mishna is in accordance with Beit Shammai, and subscribes to the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that he retracted his explanation? Rava said: The mishna posed a difficulty for him: Why does the <i>tanna</i> specifically teach this <i>halakha</i> using the example of a meal offering from barley? Let it teach the <i>halakha</i> using the example of a meal offering from lentils, which is a greater novelty.
  Rather, learn from it that the reason the vow takes effect is because one may err. With regard to barley, it is reasonable that one may err, since one of the individual meal offerings, the meal offering of a <i>sota</i>, comes from barley. But with regard to lentils, one would not err in thinking that one may bring a meal offering from them. Therefore, one can presume that by saying: Lentils, he intended to negate his initial statement.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to the mishna, even if he vowed to being a meal offering from lentils, the vow takes effect. The Gemara asks: Now, Rabbi Yoḥanan states that his tradition in interpreting the mishna is that it is in accordance with whose opinion? It is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, and Beit Hillel understand that the reason the meal offering takes effect is because one may reasonably err. One may err with regard to barley being fit for a meal offering, but with regard to lentils, he will not err that they are fit. Why then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan hold that the meal offering takes effect even if he said: Lentils?
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan does in fact hold that when he vows to bring a meal offering from lentils it is not valid. What he said was in response to the statement of Ḥizkiyya. Rabbi Yoḥanan is saying to him: What is the reason that you retracted your explanation of the mishna as being in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai? It is because the mishna does not teach using the example of one who vowed to bring a meal offering from lentils, which would have been a greater novelty.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan questions this reasoning: Perhaps the mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary. It is not necessary to say that when one vows to bring a meal offering from lentils, the vow takes effect and he brings a meal offering from wheat. He brings it because one has reason to say that he in fact intended to vow and then retracted his initial statement, and yet the vow takes effect in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai that one should attend only to the initial statement and his retraction is disregarded. But even if he vowed to bring a meal offering from barley, where one has reason to say he made an error, and had he known that a meal offering is not brought from barley, he would not have vowed at all, nevertheless, the vow takes effect and he must bring a meal offering, due to the principle: Attend only to the first statement.
  
  Daf 103b
  
  The Gemara cites another comment concerning the ruling in the mishna that a vow to bring a meal offering from barley takes effect: Ze’eiri said: The Sages taught that the first portion of one’s statement is accepted only where he said in his vow: Meal offering [<i>minḥa</i>], but not in the Hebrew construct where it is attached to the term: From barley [<i>minḥat se’orim</i>]. But if he did not say the word meal offering independently, but either said <i>minḥat se’orim</i> or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring barley, the vow does not take effect, and he does not bring a meal offering.
  Rav Naḥman was sitting and reciting this <i>halakha</i> of Ze’eiri. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from the mishna: One who vows to bring a meal offering from regular flour, which is not used for a meal offering, should bring the meal offering from fine flour. Is it not referring to a case where he did not say: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, but rather said: It is incumbent upon me to bring regular flour? Apparently, the vow takes effect even if one did not state the term meal offering in an independent form. Rav Naḥman responded: No, it is referring to where he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of regular flour.
  Rava raised another, similar objection from the continuation of the mishna: With regard to one who vows to bring a meal offering without oil and frankincense, his vow takes effect, and he shall bring it with oil and frankincense. What, is it not referring to a case where he did not say the word meal offering in his vow, and yet it still takes effect? Rav Naḥman responds: No, it is referring to a case where he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering without oil or frankincense.
  Rava asks again based on the mishna: If one vows to bring a meal offering of half a tenth of an ephah, he should bring a complete tenth of an ephah. What, is it not referring to a case where he did not say the term meal offering in his vow, and yet it still takes effect? Rav Naḥman responds: No, it is referring to a case where he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of half a tenth of an ephah.
  Rava asks: If it is so that in all the cases in the mishna his vow included the term meal offering, say the last clause: If one vows to bring a meal offering of a tenth and a half of an ephah, he should bring two tenths. Once he said the term meal offering, he is obligated in bringing a tenth of an ephah of flour. Therefore, when he states the words: Half a tenth, he is not saying anything, as he did not say the term meal offering with it, and would not have to bring two tenths. In what case is the ruling in the latter clause relevant?
  Rav Naḥman answers: No, it is necessary to teach the <i>halakha</i> in the case where he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of half a tenth and a tenth. Since he said the term meal offering, he is obligated in bringing a tenth of an ephah for it. When he said: Half a tenth, he is saying nothing, since a meal offering is not brought with that amount of flour. When he then said the word tenth, he therefore brings another tenth, totaling two tenths.
  Rava asks: If so, then when the mishna continues: Rabbi Shimon deems one exempt from bringing a meal offering in all these cases, as he did not pledge in the manner of those who pledge, why is this his opinion? Once he said the term meal offering, the vow should be valid. Rava said in response: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that the conclusion of a person’s statement is also accepted. Therefore, even when he said the term meal offering at the beginning of the vow, since at the end he also made declarations that do not apply to a voluntary meal offering, the vow does not take effect.
  MISHNA: A person may pledge a meal offering of sixty tenths of an ephah of fine flour, and bring all sixty tenths in one vessel. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring sixty tenths of an ephah, he brings it in one vessel. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring sixty-one tenths of an ephah, he brings sixty tenths in one vessel and one tenth in another vessel, as the greatest number of tenths of an ephah that the community brings as meal offerings in one day is on the first festival day of <i>Sukkot</i> when it occurs on Shabbat, when sixty-one tenths of an ephah of fine flour are brought.
  It is sufficient for an individual that the maximum amount he can bring at once is one tenth of an ephah less than that of the community. When the first day of <i>Sukkot</i> occurs on Shabbat, thirteen bulls, two goats, and fourteen lambs are sacrificed as the additional offerings of <i>Sukkot</i>, two lambs are sacrificed as the daily offerings, and two lambs are sacrificed as the additional offering of Shabbat. Three tenths of an ephah are brought for each bull, two tenths for each goat, and a tenth for each lamb. Altogether, that is sixty-one tenths of an ephah.
  Rabbi Shimon says: What is the relevance of the tenths of an ephah sacrificed on <i>Sukkot</i> that occurs on Shabbat? Aren’t these meal offerings for bulls and those for lambs, and they are not mixed with each other (see 89a)? Rather, the reason that one may not bring more than sixty tenths of an ephah in one vessel is because up to sixty tenths of fine flour can be mixed with one <i>log</i> of oil.
  The Rabbis said to him: Is it so that sixty tenths of flour can be mixed with a <i>log</i> of oil, but sixty-one tenths cannot be mixed? Rabbi Shimon said to them: All the measures of the Sages are so: For example, in a ritual bath containing forty <i>se’a</i> of water, one immerses for purification, and in a ritual bath with forty <i>se’a</i> less the small measure of a <i>kortov</i>, one cannot immerse in it for purification.
  GEMARA: The Sages asked a question above, i.e., in front of, Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai: From where is it derived that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering of sixty-one tenths, brings sixty tenths in one vessel and one tenth in another vessel?
  Rabbi Yehuda bar Elai, the first speaker on every occasion, began his speech and said: Since we find that the greatest number of tenths of an ephah that the community brings in one day is on the first festival day of <i>Sukkot</i> when it occurs on Shabbat, when sixty-one tenths of fine flour are brought, it is therefore sufficient for an individual that the maximum amount he can bring at once is one tenth of an ephah less than that of the community.
  Rabbi Shimon said to him: Aren’t these meal offerings brought with bulls and those brought with lambs? Don’t these, the meal offerings brought with the bulls, have a thick mixture, as six <i>log</i> of oil are mixed with three tenths of an ephah of flour, and those, the meal offerings brought with the lambs, have a thin mixture, as three <i>log</i> of oil are mixed with a tenth of an ephah of flour? Isn’t the mixture of these meal offerings, the daily offering and the additional offerings, performed in the morning, and the mixture of those meal offerings, brought with the afternoon daily offering, performed in the afternoon, and isn’t it the case that they are not mixed with one another? The communal offerings cannot serve as precedent because they never bring sixty-one tenths in one vessel.
  The Sages said to him: You should state a reason why a meal offering of more than sixty tenths of an ephah must be brought in more than one vessel. Rabbi Shimon said to them: It says in the Torah: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil, or dry, shall all the sons of Aaron have, one as well as another” (Leviticus 7:10). The Torah has already stated here: Bring a meal offering that is capable of being mixed.
  Rabbi Yehuda said to him: Is it so that if the mixture consists of sixty tenths of flour, it can be mixed with a <i>log</i> of oil, and if it consists of sixty-one tenths, it cannot be mixed? Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehuda: All the measures of the Sages are so: In a ritual bath containing forty <i>se’a</i> of water, one immerses for purification, and in a ritual bath with forty <i>se’a</i> less the small measure of a <i>kortov</i>, one cannot immerse and be purified.
  Similarly, food in the volume of an egg-bulk transmits the ritual impurity of food, while food in the volume of an egg-bulk less a small amount equal to the volume of a sesame seed does not transmit impurity of food. Similarly, a garment that is three by three handbreadths is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading if a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [<i>zav</i>] sits or lies on it, while if it is three by three handbreadths less one thread, a tiny measurement, it is not susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading.
  The Gemara asks: Even if sixty tenths do not mix with one <i>log</i> of oil, what of it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that although there is a mitzva to mix the oil with the flour in a meal offering, if he did not mix them, it is still valid? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Zeira says: For any measure of flour that is suitable for mixing with oil in a meal offering, the lack of mixing does not invalidate the meal offering. Although there is a mitzva to mix the oil and the flour <i>ab initio</i>, the meal offering is fit for sacrifice even if the oil and the flour are not mixed. And for any measure of flour that is not suitable for mixing with oil in a meal offering, the lack of mixing invalidates the meal offering.
  The Gemara relates an incident involving halakhic measurements: Rabbi Beivai says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: There was an incident involving a mule belonging to the house of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that died, and the Sages estimated the amount of its blood that emerged as a quarter-<i>log</i>, which is the minimum measurement for it to impart ritual impurity.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Bisna raises an objection: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira testified that they had a tradition concerning the blood of unslaughtered animal carcasses that it is ritually pure. Similarly, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Beteira said: An incident occurred where people were killing wild donkeys in order to feed the meat to the lions that were in the king’s stadium [<i>be’istarya</i>], and those ascending to Jerusalem on the pilgrimage festival were wading up to their knees [<i>rekhuboteihen</i>] in the donkeys’ blood, and the Sages did not say anything to them about them becoming impure. Apparently, the blood of an animal carcass does not transmit ritual impurity, even though the carcass itself does.
  Rabbi Beivai was silent and did not answer. Rabbi Zerika said to him: What is the reason that the Master does not respond to the question? Rabbi Beivai said to him: How can I respond to him? My circumstances can be described as Rabbi Ḥanin said in interpreting the verse: “And your life shall hang in doubt before you; and you shall fear night and day, and you shall have no assurance of your life” (Deuteronomy 28:66). “And your life shall hang in doubt before you”; this is referring to one who purchases grain from one year for the next, because he is not certain that he will find grain to eat in the next year.
  “And you shall fear night and day”; this is referring to one who purchases grain from one Shabbat eve to another because he does not have the resources to provide for himself further. “And you shall have no assurance of your life”; this is referring to one who relies on the baker [<i>hapalter</i>] to give him bread because he has no grain of his own.
  
  Daf 104a
  
  Rabbi Beivai concludes: And that man, i.e., I, relies on a baker. Therefore, my mind is not sufficiently settled to answer the question properly.
  The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about this question? Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yehuda was the halakhic decisor of the house of the <i>Nasi</i>, and he instructed them according to his tradition that the blood of an animal carcass is impure.
  As we learned in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that six matters are among the leniencies of Beit Shammai and among the stringencies of Beit Hillel. They include the blood of a carcass, which Beit Shammai deem ritually pure, as in their opinion only the flesh of a carcass imparts impurity; and Beit Hillel deem it ritually impure. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Even when Beit Hillel deemed it impure, they deemed it impure only when it is in the quantity of at least a quarter-<i>log</i>, since that amount, were it to congeal, could constitute an olive-bulk, which is the minimum amount of the flesh of a carcass that is deemed impure.
  MISHNA: One does not pledge a libation of one <i>log</i>, two <i>log</i>, or five <i>log</i> of wine, because there are no existing libations with those measures of wine. But one pledges a libation of three <i>log</i>, which is the measure of wine brought with a lamb, or four <i>log</i>, which is the measure of wine brought with a ram, or six <i>log</i>, which is the measure of wine brought with a bull. And one may pledge a libation of six <i>log</i> and beyond, as any greater amount can be composed of combinations of these three.
  GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is there a fixed amount for libations, in that when one vows to bring a certain number of <i>log</i> of wine they are not offered separately, or is there no fixed amount for libations, and it is permitted to divide them and offer them in smaller amounts?
  The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? It is a case where he brought five <i>log</i> of wine. If you say that there is no fixed amount for libations, then he removes and offers four of them, as those are suitable for the libations of a ram, and the other <i>log</i>, which is not of sufficient volume, is allocated for communal gift offerings. Either it itself is offered, or it is redeemed and the money is used to buy offerings for the repletion of the altar, i.e., for times when the altar is idle. But if you say that there is a fixed amount for libations and the wine may not be divided and offered separately, then it is not offered itself or redeemed with money and offered until he adds to the existing measurement such that the total number of <i>log</i> may be offered as an independent libation.
  What is the <i>halakha</i>? Abaye said: Come and hear the answer from a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 6:5): There were six collection horns for communal gift offerings, and we say: For what were they designated? They were designated for funds left over from the purchase of sin offerings, for funds left over from the purchase of guilt offerings, for funds left over from the purchase of a guilt offering of a nazirite, for funds left over from the purchase of the guilt offering of a leper, for funds left over from the purchase of pairs of birds, and for funds left over from the purchase of the meal offering of a sinner.
  And if it is so that there is no fixed amount for libations, and if one vowed to bring five <i>log</i> then four are offered as a ram’s libation and the fifth can be redeemed and its money used for a communal gift offering, then let them institute an additional collection horn in the Temple for funds left over from the purchase of libations.
  The Gemara responds: These six horns are dedicated to funds that go to communal gift offerings, and these <i>log</i> of wine left over from libations are common, so there is no need to store them, since it is possible that the libation of this person will be combined with the libation of another person together in order to reach the desired amount, and then it is offered immediately. Therefore, no additional horn was necessary for the money from the redemption of libations.
  Rava said: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from a <i>baraita</i>: The Torah states with regard to libations: “All that are home born shall do these things in this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 15:13). As this verse is superfluous, the various terms in it are used to derive <i>halakhot</i>. The term “home born” teaches that one may pledge libations even when they are not sacrificed together with an offering. And how much is the minimum volume that is offered? Three <i>log</i>, which is the smallest measurement of a libation in the Torah, i.e., the libation that is offered with a lamb.
  And from where is it derived that if one desires to add to this amount he may add? The verse states with regard to libations associated with the additional offerings for the New Moon: “And their libations: Half a <i>hin</i> of wine shall be for the bull, and one-third of a <i>hin</i> for the ram, and one-quarter of a <i>hin</i> for the lamb” (Numbers 28:14). From the superfluous “shall be” one may understand that there are others, and derive that independent libations may also be brought. Can one decrease the amount of wine in a libation to less than three <i>log</i>? The verse states: “All that are home born shall do these things, in this manner” (Numbers 15:13), i.e., one may not bring less than three <i>log</i> of wine.
  The Gemara clarifies: What does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it says that one may add to the minimum of three <i>log</i> for an independent libation? If we say it means that it is permitted to offer four or six <i>log</i>, then what is different about three <i>log</i> that it was specified? It is because it is suitable for the libations of a lamb. If so, then four or six <i>log</i> are also suitable, as four <i>log</i> is offered as the libation for a ram and six <i>log</i> is offered as the libation for a bull. Rather, in saying that one may add, isn’t the <i>baraita</i> referring to five <i>log</i> of wine, despite the fact that it is not a measurement used with any of the offerings? And learn from this <i>baraita</i> that there is no fixed amount for libations. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from the <i>baraita</i> that this is so.
  Rav Ashi said: But didn’t we learn this in the mishna: One does not pledge a libation of one <i>log</i>, two <i>log</i>, or five <i>log</i> of wine? Rav Ashi continues: In phrasing the mishna in this manner, the <i>tanna</i> teaches that the status of five <i>log</i> is similar to the status of two <i>log</i>: Just as two <i>log</i> are not suitable at all to be offered independently, so too, five <i>log</i> are also not suitable at all to offer, as there are no libations of this size. This demonstrates that there is a fixed amount to libations, and one may not divide them into two.
  The Gemara responds: Are the cases comparable? This, two <i>log</i>, is as it is, and that, five <i>log</i>, is as it is, and there is no reason to compare them. Four of the five <i>log</i> are offered, with the fifth allocated for a communal gift offering.
  Abaye said: If you say that there is no fixed amount for libations, then there is no fixed amount for libations, and no further discussion is necessary. If you say that there is a fixed amount for libations, then the <i>halakha</i> of up to ten <i>log</i> of wine is obvious to me. One <i>log</i>, two <i>log</i>, or five <i>log</i> may not be brought, since these amounts are not offered as standard libations, but three, four, or six <i>log</i> are brought, as their amount is equivalent to those of standard libations. Between six and ten <i>log</i> may also be brought, since these amounts can be composed of a combination of the various wine libations. With regard to eleven <i>log</i>,
  
  Daf 104b
  
  I ask, what is the <i>halakha</i>? Does the man who vowed to bring eleven <i>log</i> intend to bring an amount of wine corresponding to that which is brought in association with an offering of two bulls, i.e., twelve <i>log</i>, and until he accumulates that amount, the libation is not brought? Or perhaps he intends to bring an amount equal to that associated with two rams and one lamb, i.e., four for each ram and three for the lamb, totaling eleven. Do we say that he intended to bring two libations associated with one type, i.e., a ram, and one libation associated with another type, i.e., a lamb, or not? What is the <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.
  MISHNA: One may pledge to bring independent libations of wine, but one may not pledge oil alone; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may pledge oil as well.
  Rabbi Tarfon said: Just as we found that wine comes as an obligation and comes as a gift offering independent of any offering, so too, we find that oil comes as an obligation and comes as a gift offering. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that this is true with regard to wine, as it is sacrificed with its obligatory offering by itself, shall you also say that this is also the case with regard to oil, which is never sacrificed with its obligatory offering by itself but only mixed with the flour?
  The mishna concludes with a ruling concerning a voluntary meal offering: Two people do not pledge a meal offering of a tenth of an ephah as partners, but they may pledge a burnt offering and a peace offering. And they may pledge to bring even an individual bird, not only a pair.
  GEMARA: With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva about whether one can pledge oil, Rava said: From the statements of both of them, we learn that a person may pledge a meal offering like those brought with the libations that accompany animal offerings every day.
  The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara explains: It needed to be said, lest you say that the Merciful One revealed the nature of a voluntary meal offering (see Leviticus, chapter 2). Perhaps only those five meal offerings detailed there are indeed brought as voluntary offerings, but any additional types, such as a meal offering brought with libations, are not. Rava therefore teaches us that these matters in the Torah apply only where his pledge of a meal offering was unspecified, but where he specified that the oil and flour about which he vows should be brought in the manner of a meal offering with libations, then he has specified, and the vow takes effect.
  § The mishna stated that two people do not pledge a tenth of an ephah together. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? If we say that it is because it is written: “And when an individual brings a meal offering” (Leviticus 2:1), in the singular, that is not a proof, as with regard to a burnt offering as well, it is written in the singular: “When any man of you brings an offering” (Leviticus 1:2). Nevertheless, two people may bring a burnt offering together, as stated in the mishna.
  Rather, what is the reason that a burnt offering is brought by two people? The reason is that it is written in second person plural: “These you shall offer…beside your burnt offerings [<i>le’oloteikhem</i>], or your meal offerings, or your drink offerings, or your peace offerings” (Numbers 29:39). The Gemara points out: With regard to a meal offering, it is also written in the plural: “Your meal offerings [<i>leminḥoteikhem</i>].” Rather, the reason that one may not bring a meal offering as a partnership is because it is written: “And when an individual brings a meal offering” (Leviticus 2:1), indicating that only one individual may offer it, but not two together.
  This is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states an explanation of the following verse: “Anyone that brings his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their free-will offerings that they sacrifice to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:18). It is evident from the use of the plural in the second part of the verse that any offering can be brought in a partnership, and the verse excludes only a meal offering from this principle, as it is stated: “And when an individual brings a meal offering.”
  The Gemara cites another comment about the fact that the Torah introduces the voluntary meal offering by emphasizing that it is brought by an individual. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: For what reason is the meal offering different from other offerings in that the term “an individual [<i>nefesh</i>]” is stated with regard to it? The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Whose practice is it to bring a meal offering? It is that of a poor individual; and I will ascribe him credit as if he offered up his soul [<i>nafsho</i>] in front of Me.
  § The Gemara cites another comment made by Rabbi Yitzḥak about meal offerings. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the reason that the meal offering is differentiated from other offerings in that the Torah stated these five types of preparations with oil with regard to it? The five types of voluntary meal offerings are: A meal offering of fine flour, a meal offering in a shallow pan, a meal offering in a deep pan, a meal offering of loaves baked in an oven, and a meal offering of wafers baked in an oven. All are brought with oil. This can be explained by a parable of a flesh-and-blood king whose friend made a festive meal for him, but the king knows that the friend is poor. The king said to him: Make for me foods from five types of fried dishes, so that I may benefit from you.
  
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a tenth of an ephah for a meal offering, must bring a meal offering of one-tenth. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring tenths of an ephah, he must bring two-tenths, as that is the minimum plural amount. If he says: I specified several tenths of an ephah but I do not know which number I specified, he must bring sixty-tenths, as that is the maximum amount of a meal offering. The flour beyond the amount that he actually specified is rendered a voluntary meal offering.
  If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, he may bring whichever meal offering that he wishes, i.e., the fine-flour meal offering, the shallow-pan or deep-pan meal offering, or the meal offering baked in an oven in the form of loaves or wafers. Rabbi Yehuda says: He must bring the fine-flour meal offering, as it is the most notable of the meal offerings.
  If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a type of meal offering, he must bring one meal offering. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two. If he says: I specified a meal offering but I do not know which meal offering I specified, he must bring all five types of meal offerings.
  If one says: I specified a meal offering of tenths of an ephah but I do not know how many tenths I specified, he must bring a meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: His obligation is satisfied only when he brings meal offerings of all sizes, in increments of tenths of an ephah, ranging from one-tenth of an ephah to sixty-tenths, for a total of sixty meal offerings with a total volume of 1,830 tenths of an ephah, or 183 ephahs. He fulfills his vow with one of the meal offerings, and the rest are rendered voluntary meal offerings.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a tenth of an ephah for a meal offering, must bring a meal offering of a tenth. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Why is it necessary to teach this in the mishna? The Gemara answers that it was necessary for the mishna to mention this case as a preamble to the following <i>halakha</i>, that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring tenths of an ephah he must bring two-tenths. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this also obvious? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach that the minimum amount that the word tenths is used in reference to is two-tenths.
  § The mishna teaches that if one says: I specified several tenths of an ephah but I do not know what number I specified, he must bring sixty-tenths. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this?
  Ḥizkiyya said: This statement is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi mentioned at the end of the mishna. As if it was the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, didn’t he say that such a person must bring meal offerings of all sizes, in increments of tenths of an ephah, ranging from one-tenth of an ephah to sixty-tenths?
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed and said: You may even say that this statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, because the case at the end of the mishna is a case where one specified that he would bring the tenths of an ephah in a single vessel. In such a case Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that one must bring sixty different amounts in sixty different vessels. By contrast, the former case in the mishna is one where the person says: I specified several tenths of an ephah but I did not establish that they must be brought in one vessel. In such a case all agree that he must bring sixty-tenths of an ephah in sixty vessels, a tenth in each vessel.
  § The mishna teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, the first <i>tanna</i> holds he may bring whichever meal offering he wishes, whereas Rabbi Yehuda maintains that he must bring the fine-flour meal offering, as it is the most notable of the meal offerings. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: Rabbi Yehuda says that he must bring the fine-flour meal offering, since in the passage of the Torah that discusses the meal offering (Leviticus, chapter 2) the verse opens with the fine-flour meal offering first, mentioning it before the other meal offerings.
  The Gemara challenges: If that is so, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, without specifying which type of animal, must bring a young bull as his burnt offering, since the verse opens with it
  
  Daf 105a
  
  first, in the passage discussing burnt offerings (see Leviticus 1:3).
  Similarly, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering from the flock, must bring a lamb as his burnt offering, since the verse opens with it first in the passage discussing burnt offerings of the flock, as it is stated: “And if his offering is of the flock, whether of the lambs, or of the goats, for a burnt offering, he shall offer it a male without blemish” (Leviticus 1:10).
  Similarly, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering from a type of bird, must bring doves as his burnt offering, since the verse opens with it first in the passage discussing burnt offerings of birds, as it is stated: “And if his offering to the Lord is a burnt offering of birds, then he shall bring his offering of doves or of pigeons” (Leviticus 1:14).
  If so, why did we learn in a mishna (107a): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must bring a lamb, which is the least expensive land animal sacrificed as an offering. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may bring either a dove or pigeon as a bird burnt offering. And Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree.
  The Gemara provides a new interpretation: Rather, what does Rabbi Yehuda mean when he says that the fine-flour meal offering is the most notable of the meal offerings? He means that it has no modifier. Only a fine-flour offering is referred to simply as a meal offering, with no other qualification.
  The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in the <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehuda says that one must bring a fine-flour meal offering since the verse opens with it first? The Gemara answers: This is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: Which meal offering is the most notable of the meal offerings, as it has no modifier? It is this, i.e., the fine-flour meal offering, with which the verse opens first. The reason that Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must bring a fine-flour meal offering is not because the verse opens with it, but because it has no modifier.
  The Gemara challenges: If so, the explanation of the <i>baraita</i> is unnecessary; isn’t it obvious that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to the fine-flour meal offering, as he says so explicitly? The Gemara answers: The <i>baraita</i> explains that the reference to the meal offering with which the passage opens merely serves as a mnemonic, so one should not forget which type of meal offering Rabbi Yehuda is referring to.
  § The mishna teaches that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a type of meal offering, he must bring one meal offering. This is because he stated his intent in the singular. But if he says in the plural: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings, or: Meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two meal offerings. Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of a meal offering, using a combination of singular and plural forms, what is the <i>halakha</i>?
  The Gemara explains the dilemma: Perhaps it should be reasoned that since he said: Types, in the plural, apparently he was saying that he intends to bring two meal offerings. And if so, what is the reason he used the singular word: Meal offering? He used it because the entire category of meal offerings is also referred to as: Meal offering, in the singular, as it is written in the verse: “And this is the law of the meal offering: The sons of Aaron shall offer it before the Lord, in front of the altar” (Leviticus 6:7).
  Or perhaps it should be reasoned that since he said: Meal offering, in the singular, apparently he was saying that he intends to bring only one meal offering. And if so, what did he mean by using the plural phrase: Types of a meal offering? This is what he was saying: Of the various types of a meal offering, it is incumbent upon me to bring one.
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that his intent is to bring two meal offerings, from that which is stated in the mishna: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring a type of meal offering, he must bring one. This indicates that if he said: Types of a meal offering, he must bring two.
  The Gemara rejects this proof. Say the latter clause: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings, or: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two. This indicates that if he says: Types of a meal offering, he must bring only one. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as the potential inferences are contradictory.
  The Gemara suggests another resolution to Rav Pappa’s dilemma: Come and hear that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two meal offerings of one type. This indicates that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring of the various types of a meal offering, he is required to bring only one.
  The Gemara rejects this inference: Perhaps the correct inference from the <i>baraita</i> is that this indicates that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of a meal offering, he must bring two meal offerings, of two different types.
  The Gemara challenges the rejection. But this is not taught in the <i>baraita</i>, as the full <i>baraita</i> reads as follows: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring meal offerings of a certain type, he must bring two meal offerings of one type. If he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of meal offerings, he must bring two meal offerings, of two different types. This indicates that if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring types of a meal offering, he brings only one.
  The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the <i>baraita</i> is not in accordance with all opinions; rather, in accordance with whose opinion is this <i>baraita</i>? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said with regard to one who vows to bring a meal offering baked in an oven that if he wants to bring half of the meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers, he may bring it in that manner. And accordingly, what is the meaning of the phrase: Types of a meal offering? It means a meal offering that has two types of baked dough. Therefore, bringing one such meal offering is sufficient.
  But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that if one wishes to bring half of the meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers, he may not bring it in this manner, as they hold that all of the baked items in a meal offering must be of the same type, he consequently must bring two meal offerings of two different types.
  § The mishna teaches that if one says: I specified a meal offering but I do not know what meal offering I specified, he must bring all five types of meal offerings. The Gemara asks: Who is the <i>tanna</i> who taught this <i>halakha</i>?
  Rabbi Yirmeya said: This <i>halakha</i> is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, since he said that if one wants to bring half of his baked meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers he may bring it in that manner, why does one have to bring only five meal offerings to cover all possible vows that he may have made? He should be required to bring several meal offerings baked in an oven to cover all the possible combinations of loaves and wafers.
  Therefore, even if the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that all meal offerings are brought as ten items, as opposed to the opinion of Rabbi Meir that all meal offerings are brought as twelve items, there is cause for uncertainty, which renders fourteen different meal offerings necessary. In addition to the shallow-pan meal offering, the deep-pan meal offering, and the fine-flour meal offering, there are another eleven combinations of baked meal offering that he may have intended. He may have intended to bring ten loaves, or ten wafers, or one loaf and nine wafers, two loaves and eight wafers, three loaves and seven wafers, and so forth.
  Abaye rejected Rabbi Yirmeya’s explanation and said: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. We have heard that Rabbi Shimon said: One who is uncertain whether he is obligated to bring a certain offering may bring the offering and stipulate that if he is obligated to bring an offering, this is his offering, and if he is not obligated, it is a voluntary offering. Therefore, in the case of the mishna, one can bring the five types of meal offerings, with his baked meal offering including ten loaves and ten wafers, and stipulate that whichever items were included in his vow serve as fulfillment of his obligation, and all the others are voluntary offerings.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> (<i>Tosefta</i>, <i>Nazir</i> 6:1): How should one whose status as a leper is uncertain bring his guilt offering and <i>log</i> of oil on the eighth day of his purification? Rabbi Shimon says: On the following day, after his seven days of purification, he brings his guilt offering and his <i>log</i> of oil
  
  Daf 105b
  
  with it and says the following stipulation: If this offering is one of a leper, i.e., if I am a leper, this is his guilt offering and that is his <i>log</i> of oil. And if I am not a leper, this animal that I brought for a guilt offering shall be a gift peace offering, because their sacrificial rites are equivalent.
  And that uncertain guilt offering requires slaughter in the north of the Temple courtyard, as does a guilt offering; and placement of the blood on the right thumb, and right big toe, and right ear of the leper, as described in Leviticus 14:14; and it requires placing hands on the head of the animal, and the accompanying wine libations, and waving of the breast and thigh, as does a peace offering. And it is eaten by males of the priesthood for one day and the following night like a guilt offering, and not for two days and the intervening night like a peace offering.
  The Gemara relates to the problem that arises from this stipulation, as treating an offering as two different types of offerings due to a stipulation can cause a situation where an offering is unduly disqualified. In the case of an offering that is sacrificed as both a peace offering and a guilt offering, if its meat is not eaten by dawn of the following day, it is disqualified, even though it might be a peace offering, which can be eaten for another day. The Gemara comments: And even though a Sage resolves this issue in the tractate of: The slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate <i>Zevaḥim</i>, in a manner that would not enable a stipulation to be made in this case (see 76b), there is a distinction between the case discussed there and the case discussed here.
  The resolution given there was: Say that Rabbi Shimon said that in a case of uncertainty one may bring an offering and stipulate with regard to its type <i>ab initio</i> only for the remedy of a man, e.g., in order to purify a person from his uncertain status as a leper, as there is no other way for him to purify himself. But in general, after the fact, after uncertainty arose with regard to the status of a certain offering it is indeed permitted to sacrifice the offering in a manner that may reduce the amount of time allotted for eating it, but one may not consecrate such an offering <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara explains why here it would nevertheless be permitted to make the stipulation <i>ab initio</i>: Nevertheless, this statement that one may stipulate with regard to an offering only after the fact applies only to a peace offering, as sacrificing it as a guilt offering reduces its allotted time for eating, which may bring sacrificial meat to the status of disqualification. But stipulation with regard to meal offerings when one does not remember which type he vowed to bring is permitted even <i>ab initio</i>, as this does not reduce its allotted time for eating. Therefore, the mishna could be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.
  Rav Pappa said to Abaye: How can you explain that the mishna could be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that if one wants to bring half of his baked meal offering as loaves and half of it as wafers he may bring it in that manner, as one can bring a meal offering of ten loaves and ten wafers and stipulate that some of them are brought in order to fulfill his obligation and the rest are a voluntary offering? This cannot be, as the twenty loaves and wafers constitute a total of two-tenths of an ephah in volume, and must therefore be sanctified in two separate service vessels. This causes a situation where one brings one-tenth of an ephah, which constitutes one meal offering as fulfillment of the individual’s obligation, from two separate tenths of an ephah. And similarly, the two meal offerings require two <i>log</i> of oil, each of which is sanctified in a separate vessel, and it turns out that each meal offering includes one <i>log</i> of oil from two separate <i>log</i>.
  Abaye answered: This is not difficult, as we have heard that Rabbi Shimon said that if one brought one-tenth of an ephah as a meal offering from two separate tenths, and similarly, if one brought one <i>log</i> of oil from two separate <i>log</i>, he has fulfilled his obligation.
  The Gemara asks: But how does one remove a handful from this meal offering, which consists of both loaves and wafers? The Gemara answers that he stipulates and says: If I specified in my vow that I would bring loaves only, or similarly if I said that I would bring wafers only, let the handful that I remove from the loaves be for the loaves, and let the handful that I remove from the wafers be for the wafers. If I said in my vow that I would bring a meal offering that is half wafers and half loaves, let the handful that I remove from the loaves be for half the loaves and half the wafers, and let the handful that I remove from the wafers be for half the wafers and half the loaves.
  The Gemara challenges this suggestion: But if the vow was to bring a meal offering that is half loaves and half wafers, it requires removing one handful from the loaves
  
  Daf 106a
  
  and wafers together; and according to this suggestion, he removes a handful from the loaves for the wafers and a handful from the wafers for the loaves.
  The Gemara answers: We have heard that Rabbi Shimon said: If one brought a meal offering that is part loaves and part wafers, and the priest removed a handful, and that which came up in his hand was only from one of the two types, either only loaves or only wafers, he has fulfilled his obligation of removing a handful.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a problem with the surplus oil? The Gemara (75a) states that if a meal offering is brought half as loaves and half as wafers, the oil is divided equally between them; half is mixed with the loaves and half is applied to the wafers. The surplus oil from the wafers may also be mixed in with the loaves. But if the meal offering is baked entirely as wafers, the oil that remains is given to the priests. Therefore, Abaye’s explanation of the mishna is problematic, because if the person said in his vow that he would bring half loaves and half wafers, one brings back the surplus oil and mixes it in with the loaves. But if he said that the entire offering shall be wafers, the surplus oil should be eaten by the priests.
  The Gemara resolves this problem in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon that the oil of a meal offering baked half as loaves and half as wafers is applied as follows: One anoints the wafers in the shape of the Greek letter chi, Χ, and the surplus oil is eaten by the priests. Consequently, the surplus oil of a meal offering baked half as loaves and half as wafers is used the same way as that of a meal offering baked entirely as wafers.
  § Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi: If one specifies in his vow which meal offering he will bring, and subsequently forgets, why does he bring only five types of meal offerings? Isn’t there room to be uncertain with regard to another type of meal offering, namely, the meal offering brought with the libations that accompany various burnt offerings? This meal offering can also be brought independently as a gift, as Rava said: A person may volunteer a meal offering brought with the libations every day, if he so wishes.
  The Gemara answers that there is no uncertainty with regard to the possibility that he said that he would bring a meal offering brought with the libations, because it is completely different than the other types of meal offerings. When one is uncertain as to which meal offering he vowed to bring, the uncertainty is only with regard to certain meal offerings. The Gemara presents a mnemonic for these differences: Individual, due to, frankincense, with a <i>log</i>, removes a handful of it.
  The Gemara elaborates: The uncertainty with regard to which meal offering one vowed to bring is with regard to a meal offering that is brought exclusively due to the obligation of an individual. But one is not uncertain with regard to a meal offering that is brought due to the obligation of the public, e.g., a meal offering brought with libations, which accompany communal offerings as well as individual ones; he certainly did not vow to bring this type of meal offering.
  Furthermore, when one is uncertain it is with regard to a meal offering that is brought due to its own obligation. But one is not uncertain with regard to a meal offering brought with libations due to the requirements of an offering.
  When one is uncertain it is with regard to a meal offering that requires that frankincense be brought with it. But one is not uncertain with regard to a meal offering brought with libations, which does not require frankincense.
  When one is uncertain, it is with regard to a type of meal offering that is brought with one <i>log</i> of oil. But one is not uncertain if it is brought with three <i>log</i> of oil or more, which is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to meal offerings brought with libations (see Numbers 15:5–6, 9).
  When one is uncertain it is only with regard to a meal offering that requires removal of a handful. But one is not uncertain with regard to a meal offering that does not require removal of a handful, which is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to a meal offering brought with libations.
  § The mishna teaches: If one says: I specified a meal offering of tenths of an ephah but I do not remember how many I specified, according to the Rabbis he must bring a meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi he must bring sixty meal offerings, each with a different number of tenths, from one to sixty.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one says: I specified that I would bring a meal offering, and I established that they must be brought in one vessel of tenths of an ephah, but I do not know what number of tenths I specified, he must bring one meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He must bring sixty meal offerings of tenths in sixty vessels, each containing an amount from one-tenth until sixty-tenths, which are in total 1,830 tenths of an ephah.
  The <i>baraita</i> continues: If one said: I specified a certain type of meal offering with a certain number of tenths of an ephah to be brought in one vessel, but I do not know what I specified, or which type of meal offering I specified, and I do not know how many tenths of an ephah I specified, he must bring the five different types of meal offerings, and each one must contain sixty-tenths of an ephah, which are in total three-hundred-tenths of an ephah. This is the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He must bring five different types of meal offerings, and for each type he must bring sixty meal offerings, each with a different number of tenths, from one until sixty, which are in total 9,150 tenths of an ephah.
  The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree? Rav Ḥisda said: They disagree with regard to whether it is permitted to bring non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is prohibited to bring non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is necessary to bring sixty meal offerings of each type, as if one merely brings one meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah in a single vessel, he may be in violation of this prohibition, as it is possible that he vowed to bring less than that amount, and the surplus amount is non-sacred. And the Rabbis hold that it is permitted to bring non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, even if the meal offering is of a greater volume than necessary, it is inconsequential.
  Rava said that the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is with regard to a different issue: Everyone agrees that it is prohibited to bring non-sacred items into the Temple courtyard, and here they disagree with regard to whether it is permitted to mix an offering that fulfills an obligation together with a gift offering.
  The Rabbis hold that it is permitted to mix an offering that fulfills an obligation together with a gift offering, and therefore one may bring sixty-tenths in one vessel and stipulate that the amount beyond his obligation will be a gift offering. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that it is prohibited to mix an offering that fulfills an obligation together with a gift offering, and therefore one cannot make such a stipulation; every possible meal offering requires its own vessel. Concerning each vessel, he stipulates that if this one can fulfill his vow, it should count as fulfillment of his vow, and otherwise it should serve as a gift offering.
  Abaye said to Rava: According to the Rabbis, who say that it is permitted to mix an offering that fulfills an obligation together with a gift offering, and one vessel with sixty-tenths of an ephah can serve in part to fulfill the obligation and in part as a gift offering, there is a difficulty: Don’t we require the removal of two handfuls, one for the obligatory meal offering and one for the gift offering? Rava answered: According to the Rabbis, it is required that the priest removes a handful and again removes a handful.
  Abaye said to Rava: But if so, since the tenths that fulfill an obligation and the tenths that are a gift are mixed together in a single vessel, when the priest removes a handful, isn’t he removing a handful from tenths that fulfill an obligation to account for tenths that are a gift offering, and removing a handful from tenths that are a gift offering to account for tenths that fulfill an obligation?
  Rava answered Abaye: This is not difficult, as the one who brings the meal offering renders it dependent on the intent of the priest, as he says: Wherever the priest’s hand reaches now, when he removes the first handful, shall be the location of the tenths that fulfill my obligation, and wherever his hand reaches at the end, when removing the second handful, shall be a gift offering.
  Abaye asked Rava: But how does the priest burn the handful upon the altar? If the priest will burn the handful from the gift offering first, how can he then burn the handful of the tenths that fulfill the obligation? Perhaps the entire meal offering is for the obligation, as the vow was to bring sixty-tenths of an ephah, and everything apart from the first handful, including the second handful, is the remainder, and by burning part of it the priest causes the remainder to be lacking.
  And the Master said: With regard to the remainder of a meal offering that became lacking between the removal of the handful and the burning of the handful upon the altar, the <i>halakha</i> is that one does not burn the handful on its account, as it is not considered a valid meal offering.
  Alternatively, if the priest will burn the handful that fulfills the obligation first, how can he burn the handful of the gift offering?
  
  Daf 106b
  
  But perhaps the vow was to bring sixty-tenths of an ephah, in which case the entire meal offering is necessary to fulfill the obligation. Consequently, only one handful may be removed, and all the rest is considered the remainder. And there is a principle: Whatever is partly burned in the fire on the altar is subject to the prohibition of: You may not make as an offering (see Leviticus 2:11). This principle states that if part of an item, such as the blood of an animal offering or the handful of a meal offering, has been sacrificed, one who sacrifices any other part of it that is not designated for sacrifice has violated a prohibition. In this case, the second handful is considered part of the remainder of the meal offering, and burning it is prohibited.
  Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, said: The priest does not burn the oil as an offering but burns it for the sake of wood, i.e., not as a sacrificial rite, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer says: The verse states: “No meal offering that you shall bring unto the Lord shall be made with leaven; for you shall make no leaven, nor any honey, smoke from it as an offering made by fire unto the Lord. As an offering of first fruits you may bring them unto the Lord; but they shall not come up for a pleasing aroma on the altar” (Leviticus 2:11–12). This verse indicates that you may not offer up leaven and honey as a pleasing aroma, i.e., as an offering. But you may offer up leaven and honey and other substances for the sake of wood, not as an offering.
  Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: But perhaps everyone agrees that it is permitted to mix an offering that fulfills an obligation together with a gift offering, and here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer that it is permitted to burn on the altar as fuel even items that are prohibited from being burned as offerings. As the Rabbis accept the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and therefore they allow one to bring one meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah, since the handful removed from it may be burned, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.
  Rav Ashi said to him: This cannot be the dispute, as if it enters your mind that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi it is permitted to mix an offering brought as an obligation together with a gift offering, and he does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not require sixty separate vessels. Instead, one could bring sixty-tenths of an ephah in one vessel, and one additional tenth in one other vessel, from which the handful of the gift offering would be removed. And he could touch them, i.e., place them so they touch each other, so that they are considered as one, and the priest could then remove a handful from that tenth for the gift, and remove another handful from the vessel with sixty-tenths to fulfill the obligation.
  Rava said that there is an alternative explanation of the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Everyone agrees that it is permitted to mix an offering brought as an obligation together with a gift offering, and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And here they disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and the Rabbis.
  As we learned in a mishna (88a): Each tenth of an ephah of flour requires one <i>log</i> of oil. Accordingly, even if one brings a meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah of flour, one adds to it sixty <i>log</i> of oil. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Each meal offering, irrespective of its volume, even a meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah of flour, requires only its single <i>log</i> of oil, as it is stated with regard to the offering brought by a poor leper on the day of his purification: “And a tenth of an ephah of fine flour mixed with oil for a meal offering, and a <i>log</i> of oil” (Leviticus 14:21). The juxtaposition of “a meal offering” with “a <i>log</i> of oil” teaches a principle that pertains to all meal offerings, that each offering requires only one <i>log</i> of oil.
  Rava explains: The Rabbis in the mishna hold in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov and who said: A meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah requires sixty <i>log</i> of oil. Therefore, in a case of uncertainty, it is possible to bring sixty-tenths of an ephah, and each and every measurement of one-tenth takes one <i>log</i>.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who said that a meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah has only its one <i>log</i> of oil. And therefore, when one is uncertain about his vow and brings sixty-tenths, he cannot bring them with one <i>log</i> of oil, as we do not know whether the entire sixty-tenths is one meal offering, so that one <i>log</i> suffices for it, or whether they are two meal offerings, one that is obligatory and one that is a gift, which require two <i>log</i> of oil. For this reason, there is no way of resolving the uncertainty except by bringing sixty separate meal offerings, with one <i>log</i> of oil for each.
  Rav Ashi said that there is alternative explanation of the disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: They disagree with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of one who is obligated to bring a small offering and instead brings a large offering. The Rabbis hold that if one is obligated to bring a small offering and brings a large one instead he has fulfilled his obligation, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that in such a case he has not fulfilled his obligation. Therefore, in the case of the uncertainty in the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that by bringing one meal offering of sixty-tenths of an ephah one does not fulfill his obligation if he vowed to bring a smaller offering.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t they already disagree about this topic once? As we learned in a mishna (107b) that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a small bull, and he brought a large bull instead, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the value of a small bull is included in the value of a large bull. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He has not fulfilled his obligation, as the offering that he brought did not correspond to his vow.
  The Gemara answers: It is necessary for the dispute to be mentioned with regard to both cases, as had their dispute been stated only with regard to this case of one who vows to bring a small meal offering and brings a large one instead, there would be room to reason that it is only in this case that the Rabbis say that he has fulfilled his obligation, because both this small meal offering and that large meal offering are identical with regard to the portion of the offering that is sacrificed on the altar; in both cases it is a handful. But there, in the case of one who vows to bring a small bull but brings a large one, since the sacrificial portions are greater, i.e., larger, there is room to say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  And had their dispute been stated only in that case of one who vows to bring a small bull and brings a big one, there would be room to reason that only in that case Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that the person has not fulfilled his obligation, because the sacrificial portions are larger. But in this case of bringing a large meal offering instead of a small one, there is room to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes to the opinion of the Rabbis. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach both cases.
  § The Gemara gives a mnemonic for the <i>halakhot</i> discussed in the upcoming <i>mishnayot</i>: Wood, gold, wine, burnt offering, thanks offering, bull.
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate pieces of wood as fuel for the altar, must donate no fewer than two logs. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring frankincense, must bring no less than a handful.
  The mishna states tangentially: There are five <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to handfuls. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering of frankincense, may not bring less than a handful. One who pledges to bring a meal offering must bring with it a handful of frankincense. One who intentionally offers up a handful of a meal offering outside the Temple courtyard is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>]. The two bowls of frankincense that accompany the shewbread are required to have two handfuls of frankincense.
  One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate gold to the Temple treasury, must give no less than a gold dinar. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate silver to the Temple treasury, must give no less than the value of a silver dinar. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate copper to the Temple maintenance, must give no less than the value of a silver <i>ma’a</i>. One who says: I specified the amount of gold, silver, or copper, but I do not know what I specified, must bring the maximum amount of gold, silver, or copper, until it reaches an amount where he says: I am certain that I did not intend to donate that much.
  GEMARA: With regard to one who pledges to donate wood, the Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states: “And when one brings a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]” (Leviticus 2:1). The superfluous word “<i>korban</i>” teaches that one can voluntarily give wood as an offering for the altar. And how much wood must one bring if he does not specify an amount? Two logs. And the support for the fact that wood can be brought as a voluntary offering is as the verse states: “And we cast lots for the wood offering” (Nehemiah 10:35). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This voluntary donation of wood is an offering like a meal offering, and therefore it requires salt and requires bringing to the corner of the altar, like a meal offering.
  Rava says: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, wood donated in this manner requires the removal of a handful; just as in the case of a meal offering, a portion of the wood must be removed and sacrificed separately. And Rav Pappa says that according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, since it is an offering for the altar, the wood that is brought as an offering needs to be placed on other wood to burn, like any other offering that is burned on wood on the altar.
  The mishna teaches: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring frankincense, may not bring less than a handful. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this <i>halakha</i>? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And he shall take up from it his handful, of the fine flour of the meal offering, and of its oil, and all the frankincense which is upon the meal offering, and shall make the memorial part of it smoke upon the altar for an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 6:8). The Torah juxtaposes the frankincense with the taking up of a handful of the meal offering. This indicates that just as the taking up from a meal offering is referring to a handful, so too, the minimum size of a frankincense offering is also a handful.
  § The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i> which discusses vows to bring frankincense that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring to the altar, and does not specify what he will bring, must bring frankincense, as you have nothing that is entirely sacrificed on the altar other than frankincense. One who says: I specified what I intended to bring to the altar, but I do not know what I specified, must bring one of everything that is sacrificed on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: And is there nothing else that is entirely sacrificed on the altar other than frankincense? But isn’t there a burnt offering, which is entirely burned on the altar? The Gemara answers that there is its hide, which is given to the priests and not burned on the altar.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a bird burnt offering, which is entirely burned on the altar, including its skin? The Gemara answers: There are
  
  Daf 107a
  
  the crop and feathers, which are thrown on the ground next to the altar and are not burned.
  The Gemara asks: But aren’t there wine libations, which are poured entirely onto the altar? The Gemara answers that the wine is not actually poured onto the altar; it is poured into ducts on the side of the altar and goes down to the drainpipes.
  The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a meal offering brought with libations, which is entirely burned on the altar? The Gemara answers that when one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring to the altar, his intent is clearly to bring a type of offering that is only sacrificed on the altar. A meal offering brought with libations is a type of meal offering. Therefore, since there are other types of a meal offering from which the priests eat, after a handful has been removed from it and burned, a meal offering brought with libations is not a clear example of an offering that is sacrificed on the altar in its entirety, and certainly was not his intent. Therefore, his intent must have been to bring frankincense.
  § The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate gold to the Temple treasury, must donate no less than a gold dinar. The Gemara challenges: But perhaps his intention in using the word gold is not to a coin at all, but to a small piece [<i>naskha</i>] of gold. Rabbi Elazar said: The case of the <i>baraita</i> is where he said the word coin. The Gemara challenges further: But perhaps his intention is not to a dinar, but to smaller coins, such as <i>perutot</i>. Rav Pappa said: People do not make <i>perutot</i> of gold. Therefore, it is unlikely that this was his intent.
  § The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate silver to the Temple maintenance, must donate no less than the value of a silver dinar. The Gemara challenges: But perhaps his intention in using the word silver is not to a coin at all, but to a small piece of silver. Rabbi Elazar said: The case of the <i>baraita</i> is where he said the word coin. The Gemara challenges further: But perhaps his intention is not to a dinar, but to smaller coins, such as <i>perutot</i>. Rav Pappa said: The <i>halakha</i> of the <i>baraita</i> is stated with regard to a place where silver <i>perutot</i> do not circulate.
  § The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate copper to the Temple maintenance, must donate no less than the value of a silver <i>ma’a</i>. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: He must donate no less than the amount needed to forge a small copper hook. The Gemara asks: For what use is that suitable in the Temple? Abaye said: They scrape the wicks from the Candelabrum with it and clean the lamps of the Candelabrum with it.
  The mishna discusses pledges of gold, silver, and copper. What is the <i>halakha</i> if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate iron? It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that others say: He must donate no less than the amount that can be made into a base and spike designed to eliminate the ravens [<i>mikkalya orev</i>]. The Gemara asks: And how much is that? Rav Yosef said: One cubit in width by one cubit in length.
  There are those who say another version of this <i>baraita</i> and the subsequent explanation: One who pledges to donate iron must donate no less than one cubit in width by one cubit in length. The Gemara asks: For what is this amount of iron suitable? Rav Yosef said: It is suitable for a base and spike designed to eliminate the ravens.
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a libation of wine, must bring no less than three <i>log</i>, as that is the minimum amount of wine brought as a libation accompanying an animal offering. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring oil, must bring no less than a <i>log</i>, as the smallest meal offering includes one <i>log</i> of oil. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He must bring no less than three <i>log</i>, as that is the amount of oil in the meal offering that accompanies the sacrifice of a lamb, which is the smallest amount in any of the meal offerings that accompany the sacrifice of an animal.
  One who says: I specified how many <i>log</i> I vowed to bring but I do not know what amount I specified, must bring an amount of oil equivalent to the amount brought on the day that the largest amount of oil is sacrificed in the Temple.
  GEMARA: The Torah states with regard to libations: “All that are native born shall do these things in this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 15:13). As this verse is superfluous, the various terms in it are used to derive <i>halakhot</i>. The term “native born” teaches that one may pledge libations independently, even when they are not sacrificed together with an offering. And how much is the minimum size that is offered? Three <i>log</i>, which is the smallest measurement of a libation in the Torah and is offered with a lamb.
  And from where is it derived that if one desires to add to this amount, he may add to it? The verse states with regard to libations associated with the additional offerings for the New Moon: “And their libations: Half a <i>hin</i> of wine shall be for the bull, and the third part of a <i>hin</i> for the ram, and the fourth part of a <i>hin</i> for the lamb (Numbers 28:14). From the superfluous “shall be” one may understand that there are other amounts of wine that may be brought as independent libations. One might have thought that he can decrease the amount of wine in a libation to less than three <i>log</i>. Therefore, the verse states: “All that are native born shall do these things, in this manner” (Numbers 15:13), i.e., one may not bring less than three <i>log</i> of wine.
  The mishna teaches that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring oil, he must bring no less than a <i>log</i>, as the smallest meal offering includes a <i>log</i> of oil. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He must bring no less than three <i>log</i>. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree?
  The Sages said before Rav Pappa: The Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree with regard to the proper method of logical derivation when deriving the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one matter from the <i>halakha</i> with regard to another matter. One opinion holds that the proper method is to infer from it, and again from it, i.e., equate the two cases in all aspects, while the other holds that the comparison extends only to one specific issue derived from the primary case, in accordance with the principle: Infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, i.e., in all other aspects the cases are not equated.
  The Sages explained: The Rabbis hold by the principle: Infer from it, and again from it. The Gemara explains the application of this principle: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too oil is contributed, as inferred from the verse addressing the meal offering. And again one infers from this source: Just as a meal offering requires a <i>log</i> of oil, so too here, an offering of oil alone must be a <i>log</i> of oil.
  And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that the proper method is to infer from it but interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too oil is contributed. But with regard to all other aspects of this <i>halakha</i>, interpret the <i>halakha</i> according to its own place, and its status is like that of libations, which are similar to oil in that they are also poured onto the altar: Just as one contributes libations of three <i>log</i>, so too when one contributes oil, one contributes three <i>log</i>.
  Rav Pappa said to the Sages who suggested this interpretation: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derived the source of the gift offering of oil from the verse addressing the meal offering, he would not disagree with the Rabbis, as everyone employs the principle of: Infer from it, and again from it. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the gift offering of oil from a verse concerning libations: “All that are native born shall do these things in this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire” (Numbers 15:13). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from here that just as one may contribute wine libations, so too one may contribute oil. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi compares oil to wine libations: Just as one contributes libations of three <i>log</i>, so too one contributes three <i>log</i> of oil.
  Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: And how can you say that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the source of the gift offering of oil is not from the meal offering? But isn’t it taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the verse: “And when one brings a meal offering [<i>korban minḥa</i>]” (Leviticus 2:1), that the superfluous word <i>korban</i> teaches that one may contribute oil. And how much must one contribute? Three <i>log</i>. The Gemara explains the question: Who did you hear that says the gift offering of oil is three <i>log</i>? This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and yet he cites the source of the gift offering of oil from the word <i>korban</i>, which is referring to a meal offering. Rav Pappa said to him: If this <i>baraita</i> is taught, it is taught, and I cannot take issue with it.
  The mishna teaches that one who says: I specified how many <i>log</i> I vowed to bring but I do not know what number I specified, must bring an amount of oil equivalent to the amount brought on the day that the largest amount of oil is sacrificed in the Temple. The Sages taught: He must bring an amount of oil equivalent to the amount that is brought on the first day of the Festival, i.e., <i>Sukkot</i>, when it occurs on Shabbat. The offerings brought on that day include the additional offerings for <i>Sukkot</i> and also the additional offerings for Shabbat, and the total amount of oil brought on that day is 140 <i>log</i>.
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must bring a lamb, which is the least expensive land animal sacrificed as an offering. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: He may bring either a dove or a pigeon, as a bird burnt offering.
  One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering, and I specified that it would be from the herd, but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a male calf, as a burnt offering is brought only from male animals. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering and I specified that it would be from the animals but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a male calf, a ram, a large male goat, a small male goat, and a male lamb. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering, and I specified what type of burnt offering it would be, but I do not know what I specified,
  
  Daf 107b
  
  adds a dove and a pigeon to the previous list.
  One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a thanks offering and a peace offering, must bring a lamb, which is the least expensive land animal sacrificed as an offering. One who says: I vowed to bring a peace offering and I specified that it would be from the herd but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a cow, and a male calf and a female calf. One who says: I vowed to bring a burnt offering and specified that it would be from the animals, but I do not know what animal I specified, must bring a bull and a cow, a male calf and a female calf, a ram and a ewe, a large, i.e., adult, male goat and a large female goat, a small, i.e., young, male goat and a small female goat, and a male lamb and a female lamb.
  One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the bull, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the total value of one hundred dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a calf, must bring the calf, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the total value of five <i>sela</i>, which equal twenty dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a ram, must bring the ram, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the value of two <i>sela</i>, which equal eight dinars. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a lamb, must bring the lamb, its accompanying meal offering, and its libations, with the value of one <i>sela</i>, which equals four dinars.
  One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull with the value of one hundred dinars as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the bull with the value of one hundred dinars excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a calf with the value of five <i>sela</i> as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the calf with the value of five <i>sela</i> excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a ram with the value of two <i>sela</i> as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the ram with the value of two <i>sela</i> excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a lamb with the value of one <i>sela</i> as a burnt offering or peace offering, must bring the lamb with the value of one <i>sela</i> excluding its accompanying meal offering and libations.
  If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull with the value of one hundred dinars as a burnt offering or peace offering, and he brought two bulls with a combined value of one hundred dinars, he has not fulfilled his obligation. And that is the <i>halakha</i> even if this bull has the value of one hundred dinars less one dinar and that bull has the value of one hundred dinars less one dinar.
  If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a black bull, and he brought a white bull; or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a white bull, and he brought a black bull; or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a large bull, and he brought a small bull, in all these cases he has not fulfilled his obligation. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a small bull, and he brought a large bull, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the value of a small bull is included in the value of a large bull. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He has not fulfilled his obligation, as the offering that he brought did not correspond to his vow.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one vows to bring a burnt offering and does not specify which animal he will bring, according to the first <i>tanna</i> he must bring a lamb, and according to Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya he may bring a dove or a pigeon. The Gemara explains: And they do not disagree in principle. This Sage rules in accordance with the custom of his locale, and that Sage rules in accordance with the custom of his locale. In the locale of the first <i>tanna</i>, when people would say: Burnt offering, they would be referring to a land animal, whereas in the locale of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, when people would say: Burnt offering, they would also be referring to a bird.
  The Sages taught in a <i>baraita</i>: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering with the value of one <i>sela</i> for the altar, must bring a lamb; as you have no animal that is sacrificed on the altar and has the value of one <i>sela</i> but a lamb. One who says: When I made my vow I specified that I will bring an item that is sacrificed on the altar and has the value of one <i>sela</i>, but I do not know what I specified, must bring one of every animal that is sacrificed on the altar and has the value of one <i>sela</i>. Although this condition generally indicates a lamb, since the person specified a particular animal but does not remember which, one cannot be certain that he specified a lamb.
  § The mishna teaches that if one says: I vowed to bring a peace offering, and I specified that it would be from the herd, but I do not know what animal I specified, he must bring a bull and a calf. The Gemara asks: Why? Let him bring a bull, as whichever way you look at it he has fulfilled his vow. If he vowed to bring a bull, he has done so. If he vowed to bring a calf, he has fulfilled his vow, because the value of a calf is included in the value of a bull.
  The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a small bull, and he brought a large bull, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  The Gemara asks: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, say the latter clause of the mishna: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull with the value of one hundred dinars, and he brought two bulls with the combined value of one hundred dinars, he has not fulfilled his obligation, and that is the <i>halakha</i> even if this bull has the value of one hundred dinars less one dinar and that bull has the value of one hundred dinars less one dinar.
  If one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a black bull, and he brought a white bull; or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a white bull, and he brought a black bull; or said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a large bull, and he brought a small bull, in all these cases he has not fulfilled his obligation. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a small bull, and he brought a large bull, he has fulfilled his obligation, as the value of a small bull is included in the value of a large bull. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He has not fulfilled his obligation, as the offering that he brought did not correspond to his vow.
  If the first clause, which teaches that one who vowed to bring an offering from the herd must bring both a bull and a calf, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, then it turns out that the first clause and the last clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the middle clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Can that be so?
  The Gemara answers: Yes, the first clause and the last clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and the middle clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And this is what the mishna is saying: This matter, i.e., the ruling that one who vows to bring an offering from the herd must bring a bull and a calf, is not universally accepted. Rather, it is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis.
  § We learned in a mishna there (<i>Shekalim</i> 18b): There were six collection horns in the Temple for the collection of donations for communal gift offerings, i.e., burnt offerings that were sacrificed when the altar was idle. The Gemara asks: To what did these six horns correspond? The Gemara gives a mnemonic for the names of the five Sages who give answers to this question: <i>Kuf</i>, <i>mem</i>, <i>peh</i>, <i>shin</i>, <i>ayin</i>.
  Ḥizkiyya says: These six collection horns corresponded to the six extended patrilineal families of priests who served each week in the Temple. There was one collection horn for each family, which the Sages installed for them so that there would be peace between one another and they would not quarrel. The hides of the burnt offerings are given to the priests, and by keeping the money for the offerings sacrificed by each family separate, they would not come to quarrel over those hides.
  Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Since the money for the communal gift offerings was plentiful, as much money was donated for this purpose, there was a concern that if too many coins were placed in one collection horn, only the uppermost coins would be taken and the bottom ones would deteriorate. Therefore, the Sages installed many collection horns for them, so that each horn would contain fewer coins and the coins would not decay.
  And Ze’eiri says: The six collection horns correspond to the six types of animals from which burnt offerings can be brought: A bull, a calf, a ram, a lamb, a small goat, and a large goat. And each type of animal required its own collection horn, because the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a small bull and he brought a large bull, he has not fulfilled his obligation, as the offering that he brought did not correspond to his vow.
  And bar Padda says: The six collection horns correspond to the six types of animals from which sin offerings and guilt offerings can be brought. If an animal designated for a guilt offering or a communal sin offering was lost, another animal was consecrated in its stead, and then the first animal was found, the value of that animal is placed into one of these collection horns, and a communal gift offering is brought with it. One was for the value of the bulls brought as communal sin offerings. And one was for the value of the rams brought as guilt offerings for robbery or for misuse of consecrated property,
  
  Daf 108a
  
  And one was for the value of the lambs brought as a nazirite’s or a leper’s guilt offering. And one was for the value of the goats brought as communal sin offerings on Festivals. And one was for the surplus coins of one who designated money to purchase one of those offerings and had money left over after purchasing the animal. And one was for the additional silver <i>ma’a</i> paid as a premium in a case when two people brought their half-shekel jointly as one shekel.
  After citing these four opinions, the Gemara explains: All of the other Sages do not say in accordance with the explanation of Ḥizkiyya that the six collection horns are to prevent quarrels between the families of priests, as they hold that we are not concerned about quarreling between the priests. There is no reason for them to fight, as each and every family serves on its own day and receives the hides of the animals sacrificed on that day.
  The other Sages do not say in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan that the six horns are to prevent the coins from decaying, as we are not concerned that the coins will decay.
  The other Sages do not say in accordance with the explanation of Ze’eiri that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, because we do not interpret a mishna in accordance with an individual opinion against the majority opinion.
  The other Sages also do not say in accordance with the explanation of bar Padda that the six collection horns were for the value of bulls, rams, lambs, and goats that had been lost, for the surplus coins left over after purchasing an offering, and for the <i>ma’a</i> paid as a premium in addition to the half-shekel of two people. This is because they hold that there is no reason to differentiate between the surplus and the value of specific animals, as all of the animals that were lost and another offered in their place are also surplus, and their value is surplus after the replacement offering was purchased.
  The other Sages also do not agree with bar Padda’s explanation that the sixth collection horn was for the <i>ma’a</i>, because they hold that the <i>ma’a</i> goes toward the same purpose as the regular shekels, as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to the <i>ma’a</i>: Where would this premium [<i>kalbon</i>] go, i.e., what was done with it? It would be added to the shekels themselves, which would be used to buy the daily and additional offerings; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Eliezer says: It would be used for communal gift offerings.
  The Gemara cites two additional explanations for the purpose of the six collection horns. And Shmuel says: These six horns correspond to the surplus coins left over after purchasing six offerings, namely: The surplus coins left over after purchasing a sin offering; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a guilt offering; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a nazirite’s guilt offering, brought if he comes into contact with a corpse during his term of naziriteship; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a leper’s guilt offering, brought as part of his purification process; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a meal offering of a sinner; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering sacrificed by the High Priest each day, half in the morning and half in the evening.
  And Rabbi Oshaya says that there is a different explanation for the six collection horns: They correspond to the surplus coins left over after purchasing a sin offering; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a guilt offering; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a nazirite’s guilt offering; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a leper’s guilt offering; and the surplus coins left over after the purchase of pairs of doves or pigeons by women after childbirth, by <i>zavim</i> as part of their purification process, and others; and the surplus coins left over after purchasing a meal offering of a sinner.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Shmuel does not say in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Oshaya that one of the collection horns was for the surplus coins left over after purchasing pairs of birds? The Gemara answers: A collection horn for coins for pairs of birds is already taught in the first clause of the mishna in tractate <i>Shekalim</i> (18a), among the list of seven collection horns that served purposes other than the communal gift offerings.
  The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Oshaya teach the mishna without teaching that one of the collection horns was for pairs of birds? Does he have a different version of the mishna? But doesn’t Rabbi Oshaya teach the mishna explicitly, teaching in his version of the mishna that there was a collection horn for pairs of birds? The Gemara answers that one of the collection horns was for coins designated for purchasing pairs of birds, and one collection horn was for the surplus coins remaining after purchasing pairs of birds.
  The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rabbi Oshaya does not say in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel? The Gemara answers that he holds like the one who says that the surplus coins left over after purchasing the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest are not used to purchase other offerings but are left to rot; as it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The surplus coins left over after purchasing the meal offering of are used for the purchase of a communal gift offering. The surplus coins left over after purchasing a meal offering are left to rot.
  The Gemara clarifies the opaque wording: What is the <i>baraita</i> saying? Rav Ḥisda said that this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: The surplus coins left over from the purchase of a meal offering of a sinner are used for the purchase of a communal gift offering. The surplus coins left over from purchasing the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest are left to rot.
  Rabba offered an alternative interpretation of the <i>baraita</i> and said: Even the surplus coins left over from purchasing the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest are also used for the purchase of a communal gift offering. Rather, the surplus coins left over from purchasing the loaves accompanying a thanks offering are left to rot.
  The Gemara points out that the opinions of Rav Ḥisda and Rabba correspond to opinions raised in the dispute among earlier <i>amora’im</i>, as with regard to the surplus coins left over from purchasing the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that they are used to buy a communal gift offering, while Rabbi Elazar says that they must be left to rot.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar from a mishna (<i>Shekalim</i> 6b): The surplus coins that had been designated for shekels are non-sacred property; but with regard to the surplus coins left over after purchasing the tenth of an ephah meal offering, and the surplus money that had been designated to purchase offerings that are brought due to ritual impurity or a sin, such as the pairs of birds of <i>zavim</i>, the pairs of birds of <i>zavot</i>, the pairs of birds of women after childbirth, and sin offerings, and guilt offerings, in these cases, the surplus coins must be used for a communal gift offering.
  The Gemara explains the objection: What is the meaning of the phrase: The tenth of an ephah meal offering? Is it not referring to the surplus coins left over after purchasing the High Priest’s tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering?
  The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to the surplus coins left over after purchasing the meal offering of a sinner, which is also brought from a tenth of an ephah of fine flour (Leviticus 5:11).
  Rav Naḥman bar Rav Yitzḥak said: It is reasonable to accept the opinion of the one who said: The surplus coins left over from purchasing the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest are left to rot.
  As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> with regard to a sinner’s meal offering: The verse states: “But if his means are not sufficient for two doves or two pigeons, then he shall bring his offering for that which he has sinned, the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour for a sin offering; he shall put no oil upon it, nor shall he put any frankincense upon it, for it is a sin offering” (Leviticus 5:11). Rabbi Yehuda said that the phrase “it is a sin offering” is interpreted as a restriction: It is called a sin offering, and no other meal offering is called a sin offering. This taught that with regard to the tenth of an ephah griddle-cake meal offering of the High Priest, it is not called a sin offering, and consequently it requires frankincense.
  Rav Naḥman inferred: And since it is not called a sin offering, its surplus coins should not be used to buy communal gift offerings like the surplus coins of sin offerings; rather, they should be left to rot.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who said: This bull is hereby a burnt offering, and subsequently it became blemished [<i>venista’ev</i>] and was disqualified from sacrifice, he should redeem the bull and with that money purchase another bull as an offering in its stead. If he wishes, he may bring two bulls with its redemption money instead of one. If one says: These two bulls are hereby a burnt offering, and subsequently they became blemished, if he wishes he may bring one bull with their redemption money. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems this prohibited, and holds that he must bring two bulls.
  In a case where one said: This ram is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a lamb with its redemption money. In a case where one said: This lamb is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a ram with its redemption money. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it prohibited for one to bring one type of animal with redemption money from another type of animal.
  
  Daf 108b
  
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one vows to bring a certain bull as a burnt offering and it became blemished, he may bring two bulls with its redemption money. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say in the first clause, i.e., in the previous mishna (107b), that if one said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a bull with the value of one hundred dinars as a burnt offering or peace offering, and he brought two bulls with a combined value of one hundred dinars, he has not fulfilled his obligation? If so, why does the mishna here teach that one may bring two bulls with the redemption money of one bull?
  The Gemara answers that these two cases are not comparable. The previous mishna was referring to a case where one vowed to bring a bull worth one hundred dinars, without referring to a specific bull. Therefore, he is obligated to fulfill the specific conditions of his vow. By contrast, this mishna is referring to a case where one said: This bull is hereby a burnt offering, and therefore, if the bull becomes blemished and disqualified as an offering the <i>halakha</i> is different. Since he was only ever obligated to sacrifice this bull, and is no longer able to sacrifice it, he is no longer obligated by his vow, and may bring any number of offerings with its value.
  The mishna teaches that if one says: These two bulls are hereby a burnt offering, and they became blemished, if he wishes he may bring with the money of their redemption one bull. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems this prohibited, and holds that he must bring two bulls. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it prohibited to bring only one bull?
  The Gemara answers: Because it is similar to a case where one vowed to bring a large bull and he brought a small bull, in which case he has not fulfilled his vow. Similarly, in this case, he vowed to bring two bulls and brought only one. And although he is not actually obligated to bring two bulls, as the bulls that he consecrated became blemished and he needs only to bring an offering with their redemption money, nevertheless Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not permit bringing two bulls instead of one <i>ab initio</i>.
  The Gemara asks: But if so, let Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree in the first clause of the mishna as well, which states that if one consecrated a specific bull as a burnt offering and it subsequently became blemished, he may purchase two bulls with its redemption money. There, too, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi should prohibit bringing two bulls <i>ab initio</i>, as it is similar to a case where one vowed to bring a small bull and brought a large one, in which case Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi also holds that he has not fulfilled his obligation.
  The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees with this entire matter, both in the first and latter clauses of the mishna; but he waited until the Rabbis had completed their statement, and then disagreed with them with regard to both cases.
  Know that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees with the statement of the Rabbis in the first clause of the mishna as well, as the mishna teaches that if one said: This ram is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a lamb with its redemption money. In a case where one said: This lamb is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a ram with its redemption money. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it prohibited for one to bring one type of animal with the redemption money of another type of animal, even if he wishes to bring a ram with the redemption money of a lamb. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees with the Rabbis even in a case where one consecrated a small animal and wishes to bring a large animal with its redemption money. Conclude from it that he also disagrees in a case where one vowed to bring a certain animal which subsequently became blemished; the person may not bring two animals with the redemption money.
  § A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the Rabbis, what is the <i>halakha</i> with regard to one who wishes to use the redemption money from an animal of one species which became blemished to purchase a different species of animal? For example, if one vowed to bring a bull which subsequently became blemished, may he bring rams with its value instead?
  The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one said: This bull is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, he may not bring a ram with its redemption money, as a ram is not worth as much as a bull. But he may bring two rams with its redemption money, if together they are equal in value to the bull. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems this prohibited, the reason being that one must bring two meal offerings to accompany his two rams. These meal offerings must be brought in two vessels, because there is no mixing permitted. Accordingly, bringing two offerings runs counter to the person’s vow, which involved bringing only one meal offering. Conclude from this <i>baraita</i> that according to the Rabbis it is permitted to use the redemption money from one species of animal to purchase a different species.
  The Gemara asks: If so, if the Rabbis deem it permitted to bring a different species of animal, why does the <i>baraita</i> specifically state that one may bring two rams in place of a bull? The same <i>halakha</i> would apply even for one ram, as although one ram is smaller than one bull, in a case where the animal became blemished, according to the Rabbis, there is no difference whether one brings a large animal or a small animal. If one vowed to bring a ram he may bring a lamb instead, so why not a ram in place of a bull?
  The Gemara answers: There are two <i>tanna’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis. The <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds that the Rabbis deem it permitted to bring a small animal in place of a large animal that became blemished. The <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds that the Rabbis do not deem it permitted to bring a small animal in place of a large animal.
  The <i>baraita</i> states: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it prohibited to bring two rams with the redemption money of a bull, because there is no mixing. The Gemara infers: The reason that he deems it prohibited is because there is no mixing. But had there been mixing, then according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi it would be permitted.
  The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that if one said: This ram is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes he may bring a lamb with its redemption money. If one said: This lamb is hereby a burnt offering, and it became blemished, he may bring a ram with its redemption money. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems it prohibited for one to bring one type of animal with the redemption money of another type of animal. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prohibits any kind of divergence from the animal that was consecrated, regardless of whether mixing is permitted.
  The Gemara answers: There are two <i>tanna’im</i>, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The <i>tanna</i> of the <i>baraita</i> holds that Rabbi Yehuda deems it prohibited to switch to a different type of animal only if it affects the accompanying meal offering, whereas the <i>tanna</i> of the mishna holds that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems any kind of change prohibited.
  The Gemara cites the latter clause of the <i>baraita</i>: All of the cases in the mishna and <i>baraita</i> are referring to a case where the animal became blemished; and with regard to pure animals, i.e., those that are not blemished, if one vowed to bring a calf and brought a bull instead, or he vowed to bring a lamb and brought a ram instead, he has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara explains that the unattributed last clause of the <i>baraita</i> is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would disagree in this case as well.
  § The mishna teaches that if one vows to bring a certain bull as a burnt offering, and it became blemished, if he wishes, he may bring two bulls with its redemption money. Rabbi Menashya bar Zevid says that Rav says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where one said: This bull is hereby a burnt offering. But if he said: This bull is incumbent upon me to bring as a burnt offering, his responsibility for it in a case where it became blemished is fixed, and he must bring one bull with its redemption money, not two.
  The Gemara challenges Rav’s opinion: But perhaps when he said: This bull is incumbent upon me, he meant: It is incumbent upon me to bring it as an offering, but he did not intend to accept responsibility in case it becomes blemished.
  Rather, if it was stated that there is a case where one is responsible if the animal becomes blemished, it was stated as follows: Rabbi Menashya bar Zevid says that Rav says: The Sages taught this <i>halakha</i> only in a case where one said: This bull is hereby a burnt offering, or he said: This bull is incumbent upon me to bring as a burnt offering. But if he said: This bull and its value are incumbent upon me to bring as a burnt offering, his responsibility for it in a case where it becomes blemished is fixed, and he must bring one bull with its redemption money, and not two.
  MISHNA: With regard to one who says: One of my lambs is consecrated, or: One of my bulls is consecrated, and he has two lambs or bulls, the larger of them is consecrated. If he has three lambs or bulls, the middle-sized animal among them is consecrated. If one says: I specified the lamb or bull that is to be consecrated but I do not know what animal I specified in my vow, or he says that: My father said to me before his death that he consecrated one of the lambs or the bulls, but I do not know what animal he consecrated, the largest of them is consecrated.
  GEMARA: The first clause of the mishna teaches that if one says: One of my lambs is consecrated, and he has two lambs, the larger one is consecrated. The Gemara infers: Apparently, one who consecrates, consecrates generously. But say the latter clause of the mishna: If he has three lambs, the middle-sized animal among them is consecrated. Apparently, one who consecrates, consecrates sparingly. How can this contradiction be resolved?
  Shmuel said: The presumption is that one who consecrates, consecrates generously. When the latter clause of the mishna states that the middle-sized animal is consecrated, it does not mean that only the middle-sized animal is consecrated. Rather, the larger animal is consecrated, and additionally we are concerned, i.e., we must take in consideration the possibility, that the middle-sized animal is consecrated, as compared to consecrating the small animal, consecrating the middle-sized animal is generous. Therefore, the vow could have been referring to either the large animal or the middle-sized animal.
  The Gemara asks: How should he act? He consecrated only one of them, and it is uncertain which animal should be sacrificed. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav said: He should wait until the middle-sized animal becomes blemished and then desacralize it by transferring its sanctity onto the large animal, which is then sacrificed on the altar.
  § The mishna teaches that if one had three lambs or bulls, the middle-sized animal is consecrated. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The Sages taught that the middle-sized animal is consecrated only when he said: One of my bulls is hereby consecrated. But if he said: A bull from among my bulls is hereby consecrated, only the largest of them is consecrated. It is as if he said: The most valuable bull from among my bulls [<i>tora betorai</i>] is consecrated.
  The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Huna say that Rabbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Ulla: One who says to another: I am selling you a house from among my houses, can show him an loft [<i>aliyya</i>], since he did not specify which house he is selling? Is this not because the loft is the worst of his houses? If so, when one says: A bull from among my bulls is hereby consecrated, he is presumably referring to the least valuable of his bulls. The Gemara answers: No, Ulla did not say that the seller gives the purchaser a loft, but rather the best [<i>me’ula</i>] of his houses.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabba bar Avuh from a <i>baraita</i>: If one said: A bull from among my bulls is consecrated, or similarly if a consecrated bull became mixed with other non-consecrated bulls, the largest of them is consecrated, and all of the other bulls must be sold to people who vowed to bring burnt offerings, for the purpose of bringing them as burnt offerings, since it is uncertain which one of them was consecrated, and the payment for them is non-sacred. Evidently, if one says: I hereby consecrate a bull from among my bulls, all of his bulls have uncertain consecrated status.
  The Gemara answers: Interpret this as referring only to a consecrated bull that became mixed with others. The Gemara challenges: But doesn’t the <i>baraita</i> say: And similarly, indicating that this <i>halakha</i> applies to both cases? The Gemara answers: Interpret it as referring to the <i>halakha</i> that the largest of the bulls is consecrated. That <i>halakha</i> does apply to both cases, but the <i>halakha</i> that the rest of the bulls have uncertain consecrated status applies only to the latter case.
  The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabba bar Avuh from a <i>baraita</i>: If one says to another: I am selling you a house from among my houses, and one of the houses subsequently fell, he can show him the fallen house, and say to him: This is the one I sold you. Similarly, if one says to another: I sell you a slave from among my slaves, and one of the slaves dies, he can show him the dead slave and say: This is the slave I sold you.
  
  Daf 109a
  
  But according to the opinion of Rabba bar Avuh, why can the seller automatically give the purchaser the fallen house or the dead slave? Let him see which house fell, or which slave died, as according to Rabba bar Avuh, the sale should apply to the house or slave that was the most valuable at the time of the sale.
  The Gemara answers: Are you saying that the statement of Rabba bar Avuh applies in the case of a purchaser? A purchaser is different, as there is a principle in the <i>halakhot</i> of commerce that in a case involving a dispute between the seller and the purchaser, the owner of the document of sale, i.e., the purchaser, is at a disadvantage, as a document is always interpreted as narrowly as possible. Therefore, the seller can claim that he has sold the buyer the fallen house or the dead slave.
  The Gemara adds: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the objection posed earlier to the statement of Rabba bar Avuh from the statement of Ulla can be rejected easily. Ulla said that if one says to another: I am selling you a house from among my houses, since he did not specify which house he is selling, he can show him an attic [<i>aliyya</i>]. Although this was explained above as referring not to a loft but to the best [<i>me’ula</i>] of his houses, now you may even say that it is referring to a loft, which is the worst of his houses, due to the principle that the owner of the document is at a disadvantage.
  MISHNA: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering, must sacrifice it in the Temple in Jerusalem. And if he sacrificed it in the temple of Onias in Egypt, he has not fulfilled his obligation. One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, must sacrifice it in the Temple in Jerusalem, but if he sacrificed it in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, it is not consecrated as a burnt offering; such a statement does not consecrate the animal at all.
  If one says: I am hereby a nazirite, then when his term of naziriteship is completed he must shave the hair of his head and bring the requisite offerings in the Temple in Jerusalem; and if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has not fulfilled his obligation. If one says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, he must shave in the Temple in Jerusalem; but if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says that one who says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, is not a nazirite at all, as his vow does not take effect.
  GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering that I will sacrifice in the temple of Onias, and sacrifices it in the temple of Onias, has fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara asks: How has he fulfilled his obligation? By sacrificing it in the temple of Onias, hasn’t he merely killed it without sacrificing it properly?
  Rav Hamnuna says: The mishna does not mean that he has fulfilled his vow to bring an offering. Rather, he is rendered like one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will not be responsible for it if I kill it beforehand. When the mishna says that he has fulfilled his obligation it simply means that if the animal he consecrated is no longer alive, he does not have to bring another animal in its place.
  Rava said to Rav Hamnuna: If that is so, what about the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that if one says: I am hereby a nazirite provided that I will shave in the temple of Onias, he must shave in the Temple in Jerusalem, but if he shaved in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation? In this case do you also maintain that he is rendered like one who says: I am hereby a nazirite on the condition that I will not be responsible for bringing its offerings if I kill them beforehand? Such a condition cannot exempt a nazirite from bringing his offerings, because as long as he does not bring his offerings, he is not fit to conclude his term of naziriteship and is still bound by all of the restrictions of a nazirite.
  Rather, Rava said there is a different explanation: The animal was never consecrated at all, as this person intended merely to bring the animal as a gift [<i>doron</i>], but not to consecrate it as an offering. He presumably lives closer to the temple of Onias than to the Temple in Jerusalem, and must have said to himself: If it is sufficient to sacrifice this animal in the temple of Onias, I am prepared to exert myself and bring it. But if it is necessary to do more than that, i.e., to bring it to Jerusalem, I am not able to afflict myself. The mishna teaches that although the person never intended to bring the offering to Jerusalem, ideally, he should sacrifice the animal properly, in the Temple in Jerusalem. If he did not bring it there, but sacrificed it in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his obligation, and is not required to bring any other offering in its place.
  This is the explanation of the latter clause of the mishna as well: If one said that he would be a nazirite provided that he will shave in the temple of Onias, this man did not intend to accept upon himself the halakhic status of naziriteship. Rather, he merely intends to practice abstinence by not drinking wine, along with observing the other restrictions of a nazirite. Therefore, he said to himself: If it is sufficient to shave in the temple of Onias, I am prepared to exert myself and do so. But if it is necessary to do more than that, i.e., to go to Jerusalem to shave and bring the required offerings, I am not able to afflict myself. The mishna teaches that ideally, he should go to the Temple in Jerusalem to shave and bring all his offerings. If he shaved and brought his offerings in the temple of Onias, he has fulfilled his vow and has no further obligation.
  And Rav Hamnuna could have said to you in response to Rava’s challenge: With regard to the case of one who vowed to become a nazirite on the condition that he would shave and bring his offerings in the temple of Onias, the interpretation of the mishna is as you said. But with regard to one who vows to bring a burnt offering in the temple of Onias, his intent is as I explained, and it is as if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will not be responsible for it if I kill it beforehand.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan also holds in accordance with that which Rav Hamnuna said, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will sacrifice it in the temple of Onias, and he sacrificed it in Eretz Yisrael but not in the Temple, he has fulfilled his obligation, but his actions are also punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [<i>karet</i>] because he sacrificed an offering outside of the Temple. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Hamnuna that the animal is consecrated.
  This explanation of Rav Hamnuna and Rabbi Yoḥanan is also taught in a <i>baraita</i>: If one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering on the condition that I will sacrifice it in the wilderness of Sinai, thinking that the wilderness of Sinai still has sanctity since the Tabernacle had been located there, and he sacrificed it on the east bank of the Jordan, he has fulfilled his obligation, but his actions are also punishable by <i>karet</i> because he sacrificed an offering outside of the Temple.
  MISHNA: The priests who served in the temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem; and needless to say, if they served for something else, a euphemism for idolatry, they are disqualified from service in the Temple. As it is stated: “Nevertheless the priests of the private altars did not come up to the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem, but they did eat <i>matza</i> among their brethren” (II Kings 23:9). The halakhic status of these priests is like that of blemished priests in that they receive a share in the distribution of the meat of the offerings and partake of that meat, but they do not sacrifice offerings or perform any of the sacrificial rites.
  GEMARA: Rav Yehuda says: With regard to a priest who slaughtered an offering for idol worship and who subsequently repented and came to the Temple in Jerusalem to serve, his offering is acceptable and considered to be an aroma pleasing to the Lord.
  Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi says: What is the verse from which it is derived? The verse states: “Because they served them before their idols and became a stumbling block of iniquity unto the house of Israel, therefore I have lifted up My hand against them, says the Lord God, and they shall bear their iniquity” (Ezekiel 44:12). And it is written afterward: “And they shall not come near to Me, to serve Me in the priestly role” (Ezekiel 44:13). This indicates that if a priest performed a service for an idol that is considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple, he is disqualified from serving in the Temple, but the slaughter of an offering is not considered service, as it is not considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple and can be performed in the Temple even by a non-priest.
  It was stated: If a priest unwittingly performed the sprinkling of the blood of an idolatrous offering and then repented and came to serve in the Temple, Rav Naḥman says that his offering is accepted and is an aroma pleasing to the Lord. Rav Sheshet says: His offering is not a pleasing aroma to the Lord, as he is not fit to serve in the Temple.
  Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say that if a priest sprinkled blood unwittingly for idol worship he cannot serve in the Temple? As it is written: “And they became a stumbling block of iniquity unto the house of Israel.” What, is it not referring to one who served in idol worship either as a stumbling block or as an iniquity? Accordingly, neither may perform the service in the Temple. And the term “stumbling block” is a reference to one who sins unwittingly, and the term “iniquity” is a reference to an intentional sinner. Therefore, even one who unwittingly served in idol worship may not subsequently serve in the Temple.
  And Rav Naḥman interprets the verse to mean a stumbling block of iniquity, i.e., only one who serves in idol worship intentionally is disqualified from serving in the Temple, but not one who serves in idol worship unwittingly.
  Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that if a priest sprinkled the blood of an idolatrous offering unwittingly his subsequent offering in the Temple is accepted? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: The verse states with regard to one who unwittingly committed idolatry: “And if one person sin through error, then he shall offer a she-goat in its first year for a sin offering. And the priest shall effect atonement for the soul that errs unwittingly, when he sins unwittingly, before the Lord, to effect atonement for him; and he shall be forgiven” (Numbers 15:27–28). The phrase: “For the soul that errs unwittingly” teaches that a priest who sins unwittingly may receive atonement by sacrificing his sin offering on his own.
  Rav Naḥman clarifies: In what manner did this priest commit idolatry? If we say he sinned through slaughtering an idolatrous offering, why does the verse indicate specifically that a priest who slaughtered an idolatrous offering unwittingly can bring his own sin offering? This is obvious, as even one who did so intentionally may serve in the Temple after repentance. Rather, is it not referring to a priest who committed idolatry by sprinkling the blood of an idolatrous offering? Accordingly, if he did so unwittingly his subsequent service in the Temple is valid, but if he did so intentionally, he is disqualified from serving in the Temple.
  And how does Rav Sheshet interpret that <i>baraita</i>? He could have said to you: Actually, the verse is referring to a case where the priest sinned through slaughtering an idolatrous offering. And although Rav Yehuda said that a priest who slaughtered an idolatrous offering may serve in the Temple after repentance, that statement applies only to one who slaughtered an idolatrous offering unwittingly. But if he did so intentionally, the priest is disqualified from serving in the Temple. Rav Yehuda’s reasoning is that slaughter is not a sacrificial rite in the Temple; but does one who slaughters an idolatrous offering intentionally not become a servant of idol worship?
  And Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet follow their respective lines of reasoning, as it was stated that if a priest acted intentionally in the slaughter of an idolatrous offering and subsequently repented, Rav Naḥman says that his offering in the Temple is an aroma pleasing to the Lord, i.e., it is not disqualified, and Rav Sheshet says that his offering in the Temple is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord, i.e., it is disqualified.
  Rav Naḥman says that his offering is an aroma pleasing to the Lord, because he did not perform service for an idol that is considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple. And Rav Sheshet says that his offering is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord,
  
  Daf 109b
  
  as by slaughtering the idolatrous offering intentionally he became a servant of idol worship.
  Rav Naḥman said: From where do I say that even a priest who intentionally slaughters an idolatrous offering is nevertheless fit to serve in the Temple if he repents? As it is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: With regard to a priest who served in idol worship and repented, his offering in the Temple is an aroma pleasing to the Lord and is acceptable.
  Rav Naḥman clarifies: In what manner did he serve in idol worship? If we say that he served in idol worship unwittingly, what does the <i>baraita</i> mean when it says: And repented? He is already repentant, as he never intended to sin in the first place. Rather, it is obvious that the <i>baraita</i> is referring to a case of intentional idol worship. And if the <i>baraita</i> is referring to sprinkling the blood of an idolatrous offering, when he repents, what of it? Hasn’t he performed idolatrous service, thereby disqualifying himself from serving in the Temple in any event? Rather, is it not referring to the slaughter of an idolatrous offering? Evidently, even if the priest slaughtered it intentionally, once he repents he is fit to serve in the Temple.
  And as for Rav Sheshet, he could have said to you that actually the <i>baraita</i> is referring to unwitting slaughter. And this is what the <i>baraita</i> is saying: If the priest is repentant from the outset, as when he served in idol worship he served unwittingly, then his offering is an aroma pleasing to the Lord and is acceptable. But if not, i.e., he slaughtered an idolatrous offering intentionally, his subsequent offering in the Temple is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord.
  § The Gemara lists other similar disagreements between Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet. In a case where a priest bowed to an object of idol worship, Rav Naḥman says: If he subsequently repents and serves in the Temple, his offering is an aroma pleasing to the Lord. And Rav Sheshet says: His offering is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord. In a case where a priest acknowledges an object of idol worship as a divinity, Rav Naḥman says: If he subsequently repents and serves in the Temple, his offering is an aroma pleasing to the Lord. And Rav Sheshet says: His offering is not an aroma pleasing to the Lord.
  Having listed four similar disputes between Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet, namely, with regard to a priest who unwittingly sprinkled the blood of an idolatrous offering, a priest who intentionally slaughtered an idolatrous offering, a priest who bowed to an idol, and a priest who acknowledged an idol as a divinity, the Gemara explains: And it was necessary to teach the dispute with regard to all four cases. As, had the Sages taught us only this first case, where a priest sprinkles the blood of an idolatrous offering unwittingly, one might have thought that only in that case Rav Sheshet says that the priest’s subsequent service in the Temple is disqualified, because he performed a service for idolatry that is considered a sacrificial rite in the Temple. But in a case where the priest merely performed slaughter, since he did not perform a service for idolatry that is a sacrificial rite in the Temple, there is room to say that Rav Sheshet concedes to the opinion of Rav Naḥman.
  And had the Sages taught us only the dispute with regard to a priest intentionally performing slaughter for an idolatrous offering, one might have thought that Rav Sheshet says that the priest’s subsequent service in the Temple is disqualified because he performed a sacrificial rite for idolatry. But if he merely bowed to the idol, since he did not perform a sacrificial rite for idolatry, there is room to say that Rav Sheshet does not disqualify the priest’s subsequent service in the Temple. Therefore, it was necessary to teach this case as well.
  And had the Sages taught us only the case of a priest bowing to an idol, one might have thought that in this case Rav Sheshet says that the priest’s subsequent service in the Temple is disqualified because he performed an action for idolatry. But if he only acknowledged the idol as a divinity, which is mere speech, there is room to say that Rav Sheshet does not disqualify the priest’s subsequent service in the Temple. The Gemara concludes: Therefore, it was necessary to teach this case as well.
  § The mishna teaches: And needless to say, if priests served for something else, a euphemism for idolatry, they are disqualified from service in the Temple. The Gemara comments: From the fact that it says: Needless to say, if they served for something else, by inference, the temple of Onias is not a temple of idol worship, but rather a temple devoted to the worship of God.
  It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> like the one who says that the temple of Onias is not a temple of idol worship. As it is taught: During the year in which Shimon HaTzaddik died, he said to his associates: This year, he will die, euphemistically referring to himself. They said to him: From where do you know?
  Shimon HaTzaddik said to them: In previous years, every Yom Kippur, upon entering the Holy of Holies, I had a prophetic vision in which I would be met by an old man who was dressed in white, and his head was wrapped in white, and he would enter the Holy of Holies with me, and he would leave with me. But this year, I was met by an old man who was dressed in black, and his head was wrapped in black, and he entered the Holy of Holies with me, but he did not leave with me. Shimon HaTzaddik understood this to be a sign that his death was impending.
  Indeed, after the pilgrimage festival of <i>Sukkot</i>, he was ill for seven days and died. And his fellow priests refrained from reciting the Priestly Benediction with the ineffable name of God.
  At the time of his death, he said to the Sages: Onias, my son, will serve as High Priest in my stead. Shimi, Onias’ brother, became jealous of him, as Shimi was two and a half years older than Onias. Shimi said to Onias treacherously: Come and I will teach you the order of the service of the High Priest. Shimi dressed Onias in a tunic [<i>be’unkeli</i>] and girded him with a ribbon [<i>betziltzul</i>] as a belt, i.e., not in the vestments of the High Priest, and stood him next to the altar. Shimi said to his fellow priests: Look what this man vowed and fulfilled for his beloved, that he had said to her: On the day that I serve in the High Priesthood I will wear your tunic and gird your ribbon.
  The fellow priests of Onias wanted to kill him because he had disgraced the Temple service with his garments. Onias ran away from them and they ran after him. He went to Alexandria in Egypt and built an altar there, and sacrificed offerings upon it for the sake of idol worship. When the Sages heard of the matter they said: If this person, Shimi, who did not enter the position of High Priest, acted with such jealousy, all the more so will one who enters a prestigious position rebel if that position is taken away from him. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, the temple of Onias was built for idol worship.
  Rabbi Yehuda said to him: The incident was not like this. Rather, Onias did not accept the position of High Priest because his brother Shimi was two and a half years older than him, so Shimi was appointed as High Priest. And even so, even though Onias himself offered the position to Shimi, Onias was jealous of his brother Shimi. Onias said to Shimi: Come and I will teach you the order of the service of the High Priest. And Onias dressed Shimi in a tunic and girded him in a ribbon and stood him next to the altar. Onias said to his fellow priests: Look what this man, Shimi, vowed and fulfilled for his beloved, that he had said to her: On the day that I serve in the High Priesthood I will wear your tunic and gird your ribbon.
  His fellow priests wanted to kill Shimi. Shimi then told them the entire incident, that he had been tricked by his brother Onias, so the priests wanted to kill Onias. Onias ran away from them, and they ran after him. Onias ran to the palace of the king, and they ran after him. Anyone who saw him would say: This is him, this is him, and he was not able to escape unnoticed. Onias went to Alexandria in Egypt and built an altar there, and sacrificed offerings upon it for the sake of Heaven. As it is stated: “In that day shall there be an altar to the Lord in the midst of the land of Egypt, and a pillar at its border, to the Lord” (Isaiah 19:19). According to Rabbi Yehuda, the temple of Onias was dedicated to the worship of God.
  And when the Sages heard of the matter they said: If this one, Onias, who fled from the position of High Priest and offered it to his brother, still was overcome with such jealousy to the point where he tried to have Shimi killed, all the more so will one who wants to enter a prestigious position be jealous of the one who already has that position.
  § As a corollary to the statement of the Sages with regard to one who is jealous and wants the position of another, it is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Peraḥya said: Initially, in response to anyone who would say to me: Ascend to the position of <i>Nasi</i>, I would tie him up and place him in front of a lion out of anger for his suggestion. Now that I have become the <i>Nasi</i>, in response to anyone who tells me to leave the position, I would throw a kettle [<i>kumkum</i>] of boiling water at him out of anger at his suggestion.
  It is human nature that after one ascends to a prestigious position he does not wish to lose it. As evidence of this principle, Saul initially fled from the kingship, as he did not wish to be king, as stated in the verse: “When they sought him he could not be found…Behold he has hidden himself among the baggage” (I Samuel 10:21–22). But when he ascended to the kingship he tried to kill David, who he thought was trying to usurp his authority (see I Samuel, chapters 18–27).
  § Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Abaye: What does Rabbi Meir do with this verse of Rabbi Yehuda? Since Rabbi Meir holds that the temple of Onias was dedicated to idol worship, how does he explain the verse in Isaiah?
  Abaye answered Mar Kashisha and said that Rabbi Meir uses this verse for that which is taught in a <i>baraita</i>: After the downfall of Sennacherib, the king of Assyria who besieged Jerusalem (see II Kings, chapters 18–19), King Hezekiah emerged from Jerusalem and found the gentile princes Sennacherib had brought with him from his other conquests, sitting in carriages [<i>bikronot</i>] of gold. He made them vow that they would not worship idols, and they fulfilled their vow, as it is stated in Isaiah’s prophecy about Egypt: “In that day there shall be five cities in the land of Egypt that speak the language of Canaan
  
  Daf 110a
  
  and swear to the Lord of hosts; one shall be called the city of destruction” (Isaiah 19:18). They went to Alexandria in Egypt and built an altar and sacrificed offerings upon it for the sake of Heaven, as it is stated in the following verse: “In that day shall there be an altar to the Lord in the midst of the land of Egypt, and a pillar at its border, to the Lord” (Isaiah 19:19).
  The verse states: “One shall be called the city of destruction” (Isaiah 19:18). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the verse: “One shall be called the city of destruction”? The Gemara answers: As Rav Yosef translates into Aramaic: Concerning the City of the Sun, which will be destroyed in the future, it will be said that it is one of them. And from where is it derived that in the phrase: “The city of destruction [<i>heres</i>],” the term <i>heres</i> is referring to the sun? As it is written: “Who commands the sun [<i>ḥeres</i>], and it does not rise; and seals up the stars” (Job 9:7).
  § After mentioning the Jewish community in Egypt, the Gemara discusses Jewish communities in other locations. The verse states: “Fear not, for I am with you; I will bring your seed from the east and gather you from the west; I will say to the north: Give up, and to the south: Keep not back, bring My sons from far, and My daughters from the end of the earth” (Isaiah 43:5–6). What is the meaning of “bring My sons from far”? Rav Huna says: These are the exiles of Babylonia, whose minds are calm, like sons, and who can therefore focus properly on Torah study and mitzvot. What is the meaning of “and My daughters from the end of the earth”? These are the exiles of other countries, whose minds are unsettled, like daughters.
  § Rabbi Abba bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav Ḥisda says, and some say that Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: The gentiles living from Tyre to Carthage recognize the Jewish people, their religion, and their Father in Heaven. But those living to the west of Tyre and to the east of Carthage recognize neither the Jewish people nor their Father in Heaven.
  Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya raised an objection to the statement of Rav from the verse: “From the rising of the sun until it sets, My name is great among the nations; and in every place offerings are presented to My name, and a pure meal offering; for My name is great among the nations, says the Lord of hosts” (Malachi 1:11). This indicates that God’s name is known across the entire world, even to the west of Tyre and the east of Carthage. Rav said to him: Shimi, is it you who is raising such an objection? The verse does not mean that they recognize God and worship him. Rather, it means that although they worship idols, they call Him the God of gods.
  § The verse states: “And in every place offerings are presented to My name, and a pure meal offering; for My name is great among the nations, says the Lord of hosts.” Does it enter your mind to say that it is permitted to sacrifice offerings in every place? Rather, Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says that Rabbi Yonatan says: These are Torah scholars, who engage in Torah study in every place. God says: I ascribe them credit as though they burn and present offerings to My name.
  Furthermore, when the verse states: “And a pure meal offering,” this is referring to one who studies Torah in purity, i.e., one who first marries a woman and afterward studies Torah. Since he is married, he is not disturbed by sinful thoughts.
  The Gemara cites another verse that praises Torah scholars. “A Song of Ascents, Behold, bless the Lord, all you servants of the Lord, who stand in the House of the Lord at night” (Psalms 134:1). What is the meaning of “at night,” given that the Temple service is not performed at night and all the offerings must be sacrificed during the daytime? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: These are Torah scholars, who engage in Torah study at night. The verse ascribes them credit as though they engage in the Temple service.
  § The Gemara cites another verse that is interpreted in a similar vein. King Solomon said to Hiram of Tyre: “Behold, I am about to build a house for the name of the Lord my God, to dedicate it to Him, and to burn before Him incense of sweet spices, and for the continual shewbread, and for the burnt offerings morning and evening, on the <i>Shabbatot</i>, and on the New Moons, and on the Festivals of the Lord our God. This is an ordinance forever for Israel” (II Chronicles 2:3). Since the Temple was eventually destroyed, what did Solomon mean when he said that it is “an ordinance forever”? Rav Giddel says that Rav says: This is referring to the altar that remains built in Heaven even after the earthly Temple was destroyed, and the angel Michael, the great minister, stands and sacrifices an offering upon it.
  And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is an alternative explanation of the verse: These are Torah scholars, who engage in studying the <i>halakhot</i> of the Temple service. The verse ascribes them credit as though the Temple was built in their days and they are serving in it.
  § The Gemara cites similar interpretations of verses: Reish Lakish said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “This is the law [<i>torah</i>] of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the consecration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37)? This teaches that anyone who engages in Torah study is considered as though he sacrificed a burnt offering, a meal offering, a sin offering, and a guilt offering.
  Rava said an objection to this interpretation: This verse states: “Of the burnt offering, of the meal offering.” If the interpretation of Reish Lakish is correct, the verse should have written: “Burnt offering and meal offering.” Rather, Rava says that the correct interpretation of this verse is: Anyone who engages in Torah study need not bring a burnt offering, nor a sin offering, nor a meal offering, nor a guilt offering.
  Rabbi Yitzḥak said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), and: “This is the law of the guilt offering” (Leviticus 7:1)? These verses teach that anyone who engages in studying the law of the sin offering is ascribed credit as though he sacrificed a sin offering, and anyone who engages in studying the law of a guilt offering is ascribed credit as though he sacrificed a guilt offering.
  MISHNA: It is stated with regard to an animal burnt offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), and with regard to a bird burnt offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:17), and with regard to a meal offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:2). The repetitive language employed concerning all of these different offerings is to say to you that one who brings a substantial offering and one who brings a meager offering have equal merit, provided that he directs his heart toward Heaven.
  GEMARA: Rabbi Zeira said: What is the verse from which this principle is derived? “Sweet is the sleep of a laboring man, whether he consumes little or much”(Ecclesiastes 5:11).The verse is interpreted as referring to one who brings an offering, and teaches that one who brings a substantial offering and one who brings a meager offering can be equally assured that their offering will be accepted.
  Rav Adda bar Ahava said that the source is from here: “When goods increase, those who consume them increase; and what advantage is there to the owner, except seeing them with his eyes?” (Ecclesiastes 5:10). One who brings a substantial offering, who thereby increases the number of priests who partake of it, does not have more merit than one who brings a meager offering. Rather, the offering that God desires is one where He recognizes, i.e., “seeing them with His eyes,” that its owner has the proper intent.
  The Gemara addresses the expression “an aroma pleasing to the Lord” stated in the verses mentioned in the mishna. It is taught in a <i>baraita</i> that Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai says: Come and see what is written in the portion of offerings: As in these verses, the divine names <i>El</i> and <i>Elohim</i> are not stated, but only “the Lord.” This is so as not to give a claim to a litigant to argue. Only one name of God is used in conjunction with all the various offerings, to prevent heretics from claiming that different offerings are brought to different gods.
  And it is stated with regard to a large bull offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9), and with regard to a small bird offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:17), and with regard to a meal offering: “A fire offering, an aroma pleasing to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9). The repetitive language employed concerning all of these different offerings is to say to you that one who brings a substantial offering and one who brings a meager offering have equal merit, provided that he directs his heart toward Heaven.
  And lest you say that God needs these offerings for consumption, in which case a larger offering would be preferable to a smaller one, the verse states: “If I were hungry, I would not tell you; for the world is Mine, and everything within it” (Psalms 50:12). And it is stated: “For every beast of the forest is Mine, and the cattle upon a thousand hills. I know all the fowls of the mountains; and the wild beasts of the field are Mine” (Psalms 50:10–11). Similarly, it is stated in the following verse: “Do I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?” (Psalms 50:13).
  I did not say to you: Sacrifice offerings to me, so that you will say: I will do His will, i.e., fulfill His needs, and He will do my will. You are not sacrificing to fulfill My will, i.e., My needs, but you are sacrificing to fulfill your will, i.e., your needs, in order to achieve atonement for your sins by observing My mitzvot, as it is stated: “And when you sacrifice an offering of peace offerings to the Lord, you shall sacrifice it so that you may be accepted” (Leviticus 19:5).
  Alternatively, the verse: “And when you sacrifice an offering of peace offerings to the Lord, you shall sacrifice it so that you may be accepted [<i>lirtzonkhem</i>]” (Leviticus 19:5), can be interpreted differently: Sacrifice willingly [<i>lirtzonkhem</i>]; sacrifice intentionally.
  This is as Shmuel asked Rav Huna: From where is it derived with regard to one who acts unawares in the case of consecrated items, i.e., if one slaughtered an offering without intending to perform the act of slaughter at all, but rather appeared like one occupied with other matters, that the offering is disqualified? Rav Huna said to Shmuel: It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:5), teaching that the mitzva is not performed properly unless the slaughter is for the sake of a young bull, i.e., with the knowledge that he is performing an act of slaughter.
  Shmuel said to Rav Huna: We have this as an established <i>halakha</i> already, that it is a mitzva to slaughter the offering for the sake of a bull, but from where is it derived that this requirement is indispensable? Rav Huna said to him that the verse states: “With your will you shall slaughter it” (Leviticus 19:5), i.e., sacrifice intentionally, in the form of a purposeful action.
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